The Honor able B rian M. Cog an, United States District Judge f or the Ea stern District of * New Y ork, sitting by

desig nation. 07 -05 07 -cv Ja ra m ill o v . W ey er

hae use r C o. 1 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS 2 F OR THE SE CO ND CI RC UI T 3 4 August Term 2007 5 6 7 (Argued: Marc h 5, 2008 Certified Que stion: August 1, 2008) 8 9 Docke t No. 07-0507-c v 10 11

_____________________________________ 12 13 MARI O MI GUEL J ARAMI L L O, 14 Plaintif f-Appellant , 15 16 -v.- 17 18 WEYERHAEUSER COMP ANY a nd TECHNOL OGY L I CENSI NG ASSOCI ATES, I

NC., 19 Defendants-Cross-Claimants-Cross-Defendants-Appe llees , 20 21 22 CORRUGATED GEAR AN D SERVI CES, I NC., 23 Defendant- Cross-Clai mant , 24 25 26 KRAFT F OODS GL OB AL , I NC. and PRI ME TECHNOL OGY, I NC., 27 De fe nd an ts- Cro ss-

De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lle es. 28 29 30

_____________________________________ 31 32 Be fore : WES L EY, L I VI NGSTON, Circuit Judges , 33 and COGAN , District Judge . * 34 35 A worke r injured by a used industrial mac hi n e o wned by his employ er soug ht to hold the 36 machine’ s former owner strictly liable in tort under Ne w York la w. The United States District Court2

1 for the Souther

n District of Ne w Y o rk (B uchwa ld, J. ) g rante d summary judgme nt dismi ssing the 2 c omp la int

and de ni ed pla int if

f’ s c ro ss- mot ion

se e kin g a

de c lara tio n th a t de fe nd ant c ou ld b e he ld 3 strictly

liable. Plaintiff appea led. 4 Question ce rtified. 5 J AMES AL EXAND ER BURKE, L arkin, Axelrod, 6 I ng rassia, & Tetenba um, L L P, Newburgh, New Y ork, for 7 Plaintif f-Appellant . 8 9 KE VI N B UR NS, Go ldb e rgSe g a lla , L L P, Wh ite Pla ins , 10 New Y ork, for De fe nd an t- Cro ss- Cla im an t- Cro ss11 Defendant- AppelleeW

eye rhaeuser Company . 12 13 L I VI

NGSTON, Circuit Judge : 14 15 Plaintiff-appe llant Mario Mig uel J ara millo appeals from a j u d gm ent of the United States 16 District Court for the Souther n Di s trict of Ne w York ( Buc hwald, J. ), g rantingdefe ndant-a ppellee 17 Wey erha euser

Company ’s (“ Wey erha euser ”) motion for s ummary judgme nt, denying Jaramillo’s 18 cross-motion, and dismissing the c omplaint. Jaramillo v. W ey er haeuser Co. , No. 03 Civ. 1592 19 (N RB ), 20 07 WL19 40 11 (S .D .N .Y . Jan . 2 4, 20 07 ). Jar amil lo s e e ks in thi s d ive rs ity a c tio n to ho ld 20 Weye rh a e us e r s tr ic tly lia ble un de r N e w Y or

k la w fo r a pe rs on a l in

jur y he su sta ine d in

20 02 wh ile 21 operating an industrial machine called a Flexo Folder Gluer ( “F FG” ) that Wey erha euser purcha sed 22 second- hand in 1971 and use d for f ifteen year s befor e selli n g t o J ar am illo’s employ er, G lenwood 23 Un ive rs a l Pa c ka g ing(“ Gl e nw oo d”) in 19 86 . We y e rh a e us e r a

rg ue s th a t it

c ann ot b e he ld s tr ic tly 24 liable bec ause it wa s a “casual” or “occa sional” seller of FFGs, not an “or dinary” or “ regular” seller. 25 We conclude that this case re quires us t o resolve a signific ant question conc erningwhen a seller of 26 us e d ma c hin e ry

may be de e me d a

re g ula r s e lle r f or purp os e s o f N e w Y or

k’ s str ic t pr od

uc ts l ia bil ity3

1 law. F or the re ason s that follow, we be lieve this question should be answer ed by the New York 2 c ourt s and , a c c or din g ly , w e c e rt if y it t o th e Ne w Y or

k Co ur t of Ap pe a ls. 3 4 BACK GR OUND 5 Unless ot h er wi se noted, the f ollowing f

acts we re undisputed f

or purpose s of the summary 6 jud g me nt m oti on s. 7 8 A. W

eye rhaeuser’s Busine

ss Operations 9 Wey erha euser is an int ernational paper company with its principal place of business in the 10 state of Was hin g ton . I t is inv olv e d in n ume ro us ve ntu

re s, inc lud ingg ro wi ngand mana g ingfo re sts , 11 pr od

uc ingpa pe r a nd wo od , a nd pr ov idi ngc erta in f

ina nc ia l se rv ic e s. Am on g its many bu sin e ss 12 activities, Wey erha euser operates plants that produce car dboard box es from cor rug ated c ardboa

rd 13 sheets. F FGs a

re use d in the manufa cture of such boxes. I n the 1980s, most of Wey erha euser ’s 65 14 box plants in the United States and Europe used two or thre e F FGs. A s o f 2 0 0 5 , the company 15 e mpl oy e d a

bo ut 1 97 su c h ma c hin e s at it s 7 9 U .S. pla nts . 16 The FFG at issue in this case wa s sold used in 1986 by Wey erha euser ’s Investment Recove ry 17 Business ( “I RB”) , t h e division through which the compa ny g ener ally disposes of its obsolete or 18 otherwise unne eded e quipm ent. Accordingto the I RB’s 1983 Policy and Proce dure Ma

nual, the 19 purpose of the I RB “is to manag e the or derly dispositi on of idle fa cilities, equipment, material a nd 20 supplies, which ar e no long er e conomically useful to W ey erha euser Company

in their prese nt form 21 or location.” The manua l provides th a t t h e I RB ’ s o b

je ctives include, a

mong othe r thing s, maintaining4

1 cash f

lows by providing for the timely

disposal of surplus assets, re cover ing the m ax i m um value 2 froms u r

p lu s a s s e ts , an d

in c r e a s in g th e ma

r g in s o nth ir d - p arty

s a le s b y o f f e r in g r e f urbished 3 equipment and e ng ag ing in f ull-time sales efforts. The surplus assets sold by the I RB have included 4 F le xo ma c hin e s su c h a s th e F F G, a s w e ll a s o the r e qu ip men t from We y e rh a e us e r’ s b ox pla nts , 5 including c onveyors, drives, she eter s, and trucks and automobiles. The 1983 I RB manua l indicates 6 that the I RB mar

kets Wey erha euser ’s used e quipment by distributing quarte rly cata logs, a dvertising 7 in trade journa ls, telemarke ting, a nd conductingmarke t resea rch on pote ntial buy ers a

nd deale rs of 8 us e d e qu ipm e nt. 9 Al tho ug h th e pa rt ie s d isa g re e on

the pr e c ise amou

nt, it i s c omm on

g ro und th at the I RB 10 g rossed somewhe re be tween $7.5 a nd $8.5 milli on in 1986, the y ear Wey erha euser sold the FF G that 11 eventua lly

injured Jaramillo. This accounted f or appr ox imately

0.15 perc ent of W ey erha euser ’s net 12 sales of about $5.65 billion that y ear . The I RB had around 15 employ ees at that time and maintained 13 three fac iliti es whe re sur plus equipment was aw aiting sa le. 14 15 B. Fl e

x o F old e r G lue rs 16 1. W

e y e rh ae us e r a nd

FFGs Ge ne ra lly 17 There is no evidence in the rec ord conc erningWey erha euser ’s sales of used F FGs be fore 18 1986. There is some dispute conce rning the fre quency wit h wh i ch Wey erha euser sold used FF Gs 19 the re a ft e r. Th e pa rt ie s su bmi tte d d oc ume nts fr om We y e rh a e us e r’ s “WEY PAC ” a c c ounti ngsy ste m, 20 which inventorie d the i tems sold throug h the I RB from 1986 to 2006. Accor ding to Jaramillo, the 21 WEYPAC documents show that during that time, W ey erha euser sold around 60 F FGs in the U nited5

1 States—an ave rag e of a bout 3 per y ear

—and that th es e sales g ener ated r evenue s of about $6.4 2 milli on—an ave rag e of a bout $107,000 per mac hine. J ara millo m aintains that these number s do not 3 acc ount for all of the FF Gs sold by Wey erha euser

during this ti me. 4 Weye rh a e us e r a sse rt s th a t Jar amil lo m isi nte rp re ts t he WEY PAC do c ume nts and inc lud e s in 5 his cou nt machines that a re not F FGs. Wey erha euser contends that the pr oper numbe r is about 19 6 machines sold in the United St ates in the l ast 25 y ear s, an ave rag e of le ss than one mac hine per y ear . 7 I n a dd iti on , th e re is e vid e nc e that We y e rh a e us e r o wn s pate nts re late d to te c hn olo g y us e d in 8 F F Gs , a

nd that th e c omp any

ma int a ins re latio ns hip s w ithFFG man ufa c tur e rs . It ha s o c c a sio na lly 9 made rec ommendations to ma nufac turers about how to improve FF G desig n, including w ith reg ard 10 to sa fety features. When it has detec ted safe ty issues with an FF G, the compa ny has also sometimes 11 su g g e s te d

th a t t h e ma nu f a c tu r e r in s ta ll a n e ws a f e ty me c h an is m i nth e ma c h in e in question. 12 Specifica lly

rele vant to this case, older FF Gs have “open arc hitecture ,” which me ans that they have 13 open spac es betwe en oper ating sections that a pe rson ca n enter while the mac hine is in operation. 14 “Closed ar chitectur e” ma chines, in contra st, do not permit such en try . To make ope n arc hitecture 15 machines sa fer , a saf ety mat or an inter locking device may be installed to s t o p the machine 16 automatically

if a saf ety g ate lea ding to one of the open spac es is acc essed. Wey erha euser has adde d 17 interlockingdevice s to some of its open arc hitecture FF Gs or had the manufa cture r do so. 18 19 2. TheFFG i n th is C as e 20 The F FG that injured J ara millo was an open a

rchitec ture mac hine manufa cture d around 1964 21 by S&S Manufa cturing (“S& S”), a Br ookly n-base d company that went bankr upt around 1986. The6

1 F F G w a s so ld n e w t o th e Ge ne ra l F oo ds Com pa ny , wh ic h us e d the ma c hin e in a c e re a l pla nt i n B a ttl e 2 Creek, Mic higa

n from about 1964 until 1971. W ey erha euser purcha sed the mac hine from Ge nera l 3 Foods in 1971 for about $36,500, and ins talled i t in its L y nchburg , Virg inia box plant. Wey erha euser 4 added a

vacuum tra

nsfer sy stem and installed a solid state drive and motor. In 1984, Wey erha euser 5 a lso c on du c te d a

“ re bu ild ” of

the ma c hin e , r e pla c inga ll w or n p art s. I t ma de no c ha

ng e s to the sa fe ty 6 mecha

nisms installed by S&S in the orig inal manufa cture . Wey erha euser ’s total investment in the 7 machine w as ar ound $282,000. 8 The machine was still functional in 1986—fifte en y ear s after its purchase by

Wey erha euser 9 and

mor e tha n tw e nty y e ars fo llo wi ngits manu fa c tur e —a nd Weye rh a e us e r h a d it

ru nn ingtw o s hif

ts 10 per d ay . W ey erha euser never theless dec ided to sell the machine throug h the I RB to Glenwood, a 11 Y o n k e r s - b a s e d

c o mp an y, f

o r a b o u t $ 7 0 , 0 0 0 . T h e m a c h i n e w a s d i s a s s e mb l e d i nV i r g i n i a

b y a 12 Gl e nw oo d e mpl oy e e , tr ans po rt e d to Yo nk e rs , a nd re a sse mbl e d at th e Gl e nw oo d p lant. 13 Th e pa

rt ie s we re un a

ble to l oc a te the inv oic e fr om t he 19 86 sa le . T he he a din g of a sampl e 14 I RB sale s invoice fr om 1986, however , states that equipment is “SOL D AS I S, W HERE I S, W I TH 15 AL LFAU L TS.” Acc ording to the deposit ion testimony of former Wey erha euser employ ee Walter 16 Paulson, this m eant that potential buy ers we re invited to i nspect I RB produc ts to decide if they 17 wa

nte d to buy

the m in the c on dit ion in wh ic h the y we re dis pla

y e d. Pa uls on te sti fi e d a lso that “ mos t 18 o f t h e t i m e” I R B s al es we re “d o n e a s -i s , wh er e- i s , ” a n d th at th e co mp an y “n ev er wa rr an t edan y

th i n g, 19 g uara

nteed a ny thing.” Acc ording ly , while t here is lit tle direc t evidence of the c onditions of the sale, 20 the e xistin g e vid e nc e ind ic a te s th a t the ma c hin e wa s sold “ a s is , w he re is” and

wi tho ut a ny e xpre ssJ ara millo claims t hat this evidence is insufficient to show that Wey erha euser sold the 1 ma c hin e that in

jur e d h im “ a s is , w he re is, ” a s Pa uls on ’s te sti mony

a bo ut what th e c omp any

did most of the time does not establish what it did in thi s case . The plaintiff- appellant, howe ver, who bore the burden of

establishing that Wey erha euser was a regular seller

of used F FGs, see Sukljian v. Charles Ross & Son Co., Inc. , 69 N.Y.2d 89, 96, 511 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824 (1986) (af firming g rant of summar

y judgme nt dismi ssing strict pr oducts liability claim wher e ther e wa s “no showing ” that the de fenda nt was a r egular seller), adduc ed no evide nce te nding to show that the machine w as sold on some basis other than “ as is, wher e is.” We agree with the district court that in the absenc e of suc h evidenc e, “the re is no g enuine dispute of f act a s to whether the machine was sold in ‘as- is, where is’ condition.” J aram illo , 2007 WL 194011 at *1 n.7. 7 1 wa rr anti e s. 1 2 3 C. The Acc ident and Subsequent Litigati on 4 G le n w o o d u s e d th e F F G it h a d p ur c h a s e d f r o m We y e r

h a e u s e r f o r s ixt e e n y ear s without 5 incident. B y

Marc h 9, 2002, the date of hi s injury , J ara millo had been employ ed by Glenwood f

or 6 about five year s and had ope rate d the machine on numerous occasions. J ara millo set up the mac hine 7 on the morning of Mar ch 9 and r an an initial test print of a c ardboa rd box . Du ri n g t he test, he 8 “ente red” the machine—that is, stepped into one of the open space s between t h e o p er ati ng 9 sections—while it was running . His rig ht hand was ina dverte ntly caught betwee n two rollers a nd 10 seriously

injured. 11 J ara

millo fil ed a complaint in New York S upreme Court naming Wey erha euser , Corrug ated 12 Gea

r and Service s, I nc., the succe ssor-in-intere st to S&S, Tec hnology L icensing Associates, Inc. and 13 Prime Technolog y , I nc., purcha sers of some of S&S’s bankr upt estate, a

nd Kra ft Foods Globa l, I nc., 14 the su c c e sso r- in- int e re st t o G e ne ra l F oo ds , th e or ig ina l pur c ha se r of the ma c hin e . T he c la im a g a ins t 15 Wey erha euser sounded principally in stric t pr oducts liability . J ara millo’s theor

y in e ssence was that 16 by

1986, when Wey erha euser sold the used FF G to Glenwood, o p en ar ch i tecture machines w ereWey erha euser argued also that the ma chine wa s not defec tive, and that eve n if it were , 2 the def ect ne verthe less was not the proximate cause of Jaramillo’s injury . The c ompany withdrew these a spects of its summary judgme nt motion, although it did not concede the issues, and proce eded to se ek summary judgme nt only

on the ca sual seller que stion. I n a dd iti on

to t he str ic t pr od

uc ts l ia bil ity c la im, Jar amil lo a sse rt e d c la ims a g a ins t 3 Wey erha euser

sounding in ne g lige nce a nd brea ch of w arr anty . The district cour t concluded that the re wa s in su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e that th e c omp any a c te d n e g lig e ntl y

or ma de any

wa rr anty to Glenwood, a

nd it therefor e dismissed these cla ims. Se e J aram illo , 2007 WL 194011 at *6. J ara millo’s brief to this Court focuses solely on the ca sual/regular seller issue. We do not consider the dismiss al of his re maining c laims. See Norton v. Sam’ s Club , 145 F.3d 114, 117 ( 2d Cir . 1 99 8) (“ I ssu e s n ot s uf fi c ie ntl y argue d in the br ie fs are c on sid e re d w a ive d a nd no rm a lly wi ll not be addr essed on a

ppeal.” ). 8 1 defe ctive in cha

rac ter if not equippe d wi t h d evice s to shut off operation in the event open spa ces 2 we re a c c e sse d. Th e g ist of Jar amil lo’ s c la im w a s that Wey e rh a e us e r fa ile d to add sa fe ty fe a tur e s to 3 the machine —either a safe ty mat or an i n terlockingsafe ty g ate—that would have pre vented 4 J ar am i l l o ’ s i n

j u r y. 5 The c ase w as re moved to the Sout h ern District of New Y ork on Mar ch 7, 2003. 6 Wey erha euser

moved for summar

y judgme nt, argu i ng principally that the company

was a “ca sual 7 seller” of FFGs and there fore could not be held strictly liable for a

ny defe cts under N ew Yor

k law. 2 8 Jar am i l l o c r o s s - m o v e d , s e e k i n g a d e c l ar a t i o nt h a tW e y e r

h a e u s e r w a s s u b j e c tt o s tr i c tp r o du c ts 9 lia bil ity a s an “ or din ary

se lle r” of F F Gs . Jar amil lo d isc on tin ue d h is c la ims a s to the oth e r d e fe nd ants , 10 leavingonly

his alleg ations ag ainst Wey er h aeuser. The district court g rante d Wey erha euser ’s 11 su mmar

y jud g me nt m oti on , d e nie d Jar amil lo’ s c ro ss- mot ion , a nd dis mis se d th e c omp la int . Th is 3 12 appea l followed. 139

1 DI SCU SSIO N 2 Summary

judgme nt is warra

nted o n ly upon a showingby

the movant “that ther e is no 3 g enuine issue a s to a ny materia l fac t and that the moving party is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter 4 of law.” See, e .g. , Sc ho las tic , I nc . v . H arris , 2 59 F .3 d 7 3, 81 (2 d Cir . 20 01 ) (q uo tin g F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 56(c) ). When the burde n of proof at trial would fa ll on the nonmoving party , it or dinarily is sufficient 6 for the mova

nt to point t o a lack of evidence to g o to the t rier of fac t on an esse ntial element of the 7 nonmovant’s claim. Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 4 77 U. S. 3 17 , 3 22 -2 3 ( 19 86 ); see Virgin Atl. Airways 8 Ltd

. v . B rit ish Ai rwa

y s P LC , 2 57 F .3 d 2 56 , 2 73 (2 d Ci r. 20 01 ). In th a t e ve nt, the no nmo vin g pa rt y 9 mus t c ome fo rw ard wi th a dmi ssi ble evi den ce suf fi c ie nt t o r a ise a

g e nu ine iss ue of

fa c t f or tr ia l in 10 order to a

void summary

judgme nt. Celotex , 4 77 U. S. at 32 2- 23 ; see Rask in v. W yatt Co. , 125 F.3d 11 55, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1997). 12 Th e Court re vie ws de novo both the g rant of Wey erha euser ’s motion for summary judgme nt 13 and

the de nia l of

Jar amil lo’ s cros s- mot ion , in e a c h c a se c on str

uin g the e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t 14 favor able to the nonmovingparty . Sc ho las tic , 259 F.3d at 81. 15 16 A. Or

din ar yan d O c c as ion al S

e lle rs 17 Under New York law, the seller of a product ordinarily is stric tly liable for injuries c aused 18 by

any manufa cturing , desig n, or wa rningdefe ct. Sukljian v. Charles Ross & Son Co. , 69 N.Y.2d 89, 19 94, 511 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (1986). The strict liability doctrine is not so broad as to c over e very seller 20 of eve ry

g ood, howeve r. New York courts distinguish betwee n “ordina ry” or “r egular” sellers of a 21 product—those who se ll the product on a r egular ba sis, thro u gh the ordinary

course of business—andThis rule is ref lected in the Re statement (Sec ond) of Tor ts § 402A, which the Ne w York 3 C o u rto f Ap p e a l s h a s ye tt o a d o p te x p l i c i t l y, Stiles v. Batavia Atomic Horse shoes, Inc

. , 174 A. D. 2 d 2 8 7 , 2 9 1 & n . 1 , 5 7 9 N. Y. S . 2 d 7 9 0 , 7 9 3 & n . 1 (4 thDe p ’t 1 9 9 2 ) ( ci t i n g Mi c alle f v . M ie hle Co. , 39 N.Y.2d 376, 387-88, 384 N .Y.S.2d 115, 122 (1976)), rev’d on other grounds 81 N.Y.2d 950, 597 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1993), but which it has c ited with approva l in discussing the scope of strict products liability , see, e .g. , Sukljian , 69 N.Y.2d at 95, 511 N.Y .S.2d at 823

. 10 1 “ca sual” or “ occa s i o n al ” s el lers—those who se ll the product in sporadic transac tions that are 2 incidental to their businesses. The liability of a casua l seller ex tends only insofar as it fails “to warn 3 the pe rs on

to who m th e pr od

uc t is su pp lie d o f k

no wn de fe c ts that ar e no t ob vio us or re a dil y 4 discernible.” Id. at 94-97, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 823-25. Moreove r, the Ne w York Court of A ppeals ha s 3 5 expressly

noted that the question whether the doctrine of strict products liability applies to regular 6 sellers of used g oods is an o p en q u es tion in New York. Se e Sti le s v . B ata v ia A tom ic Ho rse sh oe s, 7 Inc. , 81 N.Y.2d 950, 951, 597 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (1993) . 8 There are two principal re asons for imposingstrict products liability on ordinary sellers. The 9 first is that those who sell products in the norma l course of business, “by

rea son of their c ontinuing 10 relationships wit h manufa cture rs, ar e most oft en i n a p o s ition to ex ert pre ssure for the improved 11 s af

et y o f p ro d u ct s an d ca nre co v er

i n cr ea s edco s t s wi th i nth ei r c o m m e r c i a l d ea l i n gs , o r t h ro u gh 12 contribution or indemnification in li tigation.” Sukljian , 69 N.Y.2d at 95, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 823. The 13 second is that those who ma rket produc ts as a re g ular pa rt of their businesses “may be said to have 14 a ssume d a sp e c ia l re sp on sib ili ty to the pu bli c , wh ic h ha s c ome to e xpe c t th e m to sta nd be hin d th e ir 15 g oods.” Id. 16 I n contra st, the occa sional seller ex ception is based upon the opposite presumptions. “[T] he 17 occa sional seller ha s neither the oppor tunity , nor the ince ntive, nor the prote ction of the m a n u f a c tu r er 18 or seller

who puts that product into the stream of commerc e as a normal part of its business, and the11

1 public consumer does not have the same e x pectation when it buy s from such a seller.” Id. at 95-96, 2 511 N.Y.S.2d at 824. 3 Whil e the r easons be hind the ordinary seller r ule and oc casiona l seller exception ar e cle ar, 4 wher e to dra

w the line betwe en ordina ry and occ asional seller s is not. 5 6 1. Galindo 7 The principal case on which J ara millo re lies to argue that Wey erha euser is an ordinar

y seller 8 of us e d F F Gs is Galindo v. Pre ci s i o n A merican Corp. , 754 F.2d 1212 ( 5th Cir. 1985). Applying 9 Texas law, the F ifth Circuit rejec ted the view of the district court in that ca se that “‘ g etting r id of the 10 depre ciated e quipment used for pr oduction of the goods and service s that constitute the business of 11 the seller’ can never constitute a business in which the seller is eng ag ed.” Id. at 1219 (quoti ng district 12 court). I

n dictum , the cour

t opined that a business that sells its obsolete assets “[c]learly” would not 13 be exempt from s trict products liability if: (1) the c ompany

“ha[d] a policy

of purc hasingnew 14 equipment . . . [fo r ex am p l e, ] ev ery five y ear s”; (2) the company “ha[d] a divisi on or depa rtment 15 devoted to selling the us ed equipment”; (3) “the de partment a dvertise[d] t he ava ilability of 16 e qu ipm e nt o n a

wi de sp re a d b a sis ” ; and

(4 ) t he c omp any

“ re a lize [d] su

bs tanti a l re ve nu e s fr om t

his 17 activity .” Id. The c ourt conc luded that “ther e may well exist circ umstances in which, be cause of the 18 numbe r of sa le s or the e xtent of sa le s a c tiv iti e s, a se lle r of de pr e c iate d e qu ipm e nt w ou ld f it s qu are ly 19 within the rationale f or imposition of strict li ability .” Id. at 1220-21. 2012

1 2. Suklji an 2 Th e le a d in g N e w Y o r k c a s e o n th e o r d in ar

y /o c c a s io n a l s e ll e r d is ti n c ti o n , an d th e o ne on 3 wh ic h We y e rh a e us e r r e lie s h e avil y , is Sukljian v. Charles Ross & S on Co. , 69 N.Y.2d 89, 511 4 N.Y.S.2d 821. I n that case , Gene ral Electric Corporation (“GE” ) purc hased a g rinding mill for about 5 $4,000, had the manuf actur er install a safety

switch and re movable fe ed hopper , used the mac hine 6 for a

bout eleven year s, and then sold it in a surplus sale. The mill was the only piece of equipment 7 of its kind sold at thi s sale, the ter ms of which wer e “as is, whe re is.” B idders we re invited to inspect 8 the ma c hin e , a

nd we re tol d th a t th e re were no warra nti e s o n th e e qu ipm e nt. Th e re wa s so me 9 evidenc e that the sa le was adver tised in ne wspape rs and mag azines. The mill was sold for $35, and 10 there afte r

p a ssed throug h various hands—inc luding a used equipment de aler

that rebuilt the mac hine 11 to its original spec ifications, re moving the safe ty switch and fe ed hopper

—befor e eve ntually

being 12 sold to the plaintiff’s employ er. Id. at 92-94, 511 N.Y .S.2d at 822-23. 13 The plaintiff injure d his hand while using the mill and sued the manufa cture r as we ll as the 14 intermediate seller who had rebuilt it. GE was impleaded on a strict liability theory and moved f or 15 summary

judgme nt, inte r a lia , dismiss ing the strict liability claim on t he ground that the company 16 was a

n occa sional seller of grinding mills . The Supreme Court grante d this bra nch of the motion and 17 the Appellate Division affirmed. Id. 18 The Ne w York Court of Appeals affirmed as well, hol ding that “there was no showingthat 19 Gene ral Electric was regularly eng ag ed in the bus iness of selli ng the equipment in issue.” Id. at 96, 20 511 N.Y.S.2d at 824. The Court re lied on the fac ts that: (1) the mac hine was sold by GE af ter more 21 than 11 y ear s in use; (2 ) t h e surplus sale w as on an “ as is, wher e is” ba sis; (3) purcha sers we re13

1 invited to inspect the proper ty befor e buying a

nd wer e denie d any

war ranties; and ( 4) the pric e wa s 2 $35, less than one perc ent of GE’s own purcha se price for the e quipment. Id. The Court re fer ence d 3 the dictum in Galindo , b ut ult imate ly c on c lud e d that, “[e ]ve n if w e we re to r e c og nize tha t li a bil ity 4 might be imposed in a case such as hy pothesized in Galindo —i.e., regular, periodic dispositions of 5 sawmill equipment, a division devoted to selling that equi p m en t, widesprea d adver tising, and 6 substantial reve nues fr om that activity —this recor d cont ai n s no such fa cts.” Id. at 96-97; 511 7 N.Y.S.2d at 824 (c itations omi tted). 8 9 B. Thi

s Ca se 10 J ar am i l l o c o n t e n d s t h a tt h i s c a s e i s j u s tl i k e th e o n e e n v i s i o n e d b y Galindo , p ri mari ly

be c a us e 11 Wey erha euser

had a division for se lling used g oods that g rossed be tween $7.5 a nd $8.5 milli on a 12 y ear , adver

tised it s u sed equipment e x tensively , and sold up to three use d FF Gs per year in the 13 twenty

y ear s fr o m 1 9 8 6 to 2006. I n addition, J ara millo poi nts to the facts that Wey erha euser 14 maintained re lationships with FFG manufa cture rs and made safe ty rec ommendations to them, and 15 that the company made a lterations to the machine that allowed it to sell the m achine to Glenwood 16 for twice the amount Wey erha euser had paid f

or the F FG when W ey erha euser acquir ed it from 17 Gene ral F oods. J ara millo claims that imposing strict liability in this case ther efor e would adva nce 18 the policy

g oals of the r egular seller rule. 19 Wey erha euser responds that the I RB’s g ross reve nue of around $7 to $8 milli on a y ear is too 20 small a p o rt i o n of the c ompany ’s total reve nue to be de emed “ substantial” within the meaningof 21 Galindo , an d

t h a te v e nt h r e e s a l e s o f

u s e d F F G s p e r ye ar i s t o o i n f r e qu e n tt o tr i g g e r

s tr i c tl i a b i l i ty.14

1 The company likens this case to Sukljian , pointing to t he fa cts that the I RB sold equipment on an “ as 2 is, where is” basis and without e x press war ranties, that the machine was sold to Gle nwood fiftee n 3 y ear s after

Wey erha euser ’s purc hase a nd twenty -two y ear s after it wa s manufa cture d, and that the 4 company

sold the machine f

or $70,000, af

ter having inve sted over $280,000. 5 I n short, the re solution of the summary judgme nt motions turns principally on the questions 6 w h e th e r

th e N e w Y o r

k c o u rts w o u ld

r e c o g n iz e the Galindo hy pothetical as a

case wher e strict 7 liability

should be imposed, and whe ther the f ac t s o f t h i s case are sufficie ntly simil ar to that 8 h y p o th e ti c a l s u c hth a t W e y e r h a e u s e r s h o u ld b e d e e me d

ano r d in ar

y s e ll e r of used FF G s . We 9 c on c lud e that th e se qu e sti on s are be st a ns we re d b y

the Ne w Y or

k Co ur t of Ap pe a ls. 10 Pursuant to Sec ond Circuit L ocal Rule § 0.27 a nd New Y ork law, “ we may cer tify a question 11 to the Court of Appea ls when a que stion of New Yor k law is ‘dete rmin ative’ of a cla im before us 12 and ‘no c ontrolling pre cede nt of the Court of Appea ls’ resolves the question.” O’Mara v . Town of 13 W appinger , 485 F.3d 693, 698 ( 2d Cir. 2007) (quoting N.Y. C o m p. Codes R. & Reg s. tit. 22, § 14 500.27). In decidingwhether to cer tify , we c onsider thre e main issues: (1 ) the abse nce of 15 authoritative state c ourt dec isions relating to the issue; ( 2) the importance of the issue to the state a nd 16 wh e the r t

he qu e sti on imp lic a te s iss ue s of state pu bli c po lic y ; and

(3 ) t he c a pa c ity of c e rt if ic a tio n to 17 resolve the litigation. Id. 18 T h e is s u e r a is e d b y th is c a s e is a p p r o p r iate f

o r c e rti f ic a ti o n . F ir st, since Sukljian , the New 19 York Court of Appe als has not had a n opportunity

to addre ss a ca se like the hy pothetical posed by 20 Galindo . Ind e e d, it a pp e ars to re ma in a

n o pe n q ue sti on in N e w Y or

k w he the r s tr ic t pr od

uc ts l ia bil ity 21 can attach to a reg ular seller of used g oods at all, let alone companies l ike the one e nvisioned by the15

1 Galindo court. See Stiles , 81 N.Y.2d at 951, 597 N.Y .S.2d at 667 (leavingopen quest i o n whether 2 us e d g oo ds de a le rs may be he ld s tr ic tly

lia ble ); but see Gonzalez v. Ruthe rford Corp. , 881 F. Supp. 3 829, 836-41 (E.D .N.Y. 19 9 5) (Rag g i, J. ) (discussingcase s ext endingstrict liability to used g oods 4 deale rs, including two Appellate D ivision cases). 5 Second, the r egular seller doctrine is intended to advanc e certain publi c poli cy g oals, such 6 as spre adingthe costs of a ccide nts, e ncoura g ing improvements in pr oducts safe ty and quality , and 7 prese rving consumer expectations. Howeve r, as the di strict court sugg ested in this case , extending 8 str ic t pr od

uc ts l ia bil ity to c omp anie s li ke Weye rh a e us e r rais e s c on c e rn s a bo ut t he po te nti a lly 9 deleter ious effe cts on the marke t for used e quipment, which not only hel p s companies dispose of 10 obsolete asse ts in an eff icient way , but al so makes low-c ost equipment available for smaller 11 c o mp an ie s th a t o th e r w is e mi g h t n o t b e a

b le to a f f o r d it. See Jar amillo , 2007 WL 194011 at *5. 12 Acc ording ly , whether and to what e x tent courts should impose strict liabi l i t y on sellers of use d 13 e qu ipm e nt l ike Weye rh a e us e r de pe nd s on the we ighin g of va ri ou s p oli c y

c on sid e ra

tio ns , w hic h is 14 best ac complished by the New York Court of Appe als. See Sealed v . Sealed, 332 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 15 2003) (c ertifica

tion favore d wher e question of state law “implicate s the weigh ing of policy 16 conce rns”) . 17 Finally , most of the materia l fac ts i n t h i s ca s e ar e not in dispute. The princ ipal rema ining 18 issue that could conc eivably matter is pre cisely how many used F FGs Wey erha euser sold eac h y ear 19 a ft e r 1 98 6. Weye rh a e us e r m a int a ins that e ve n cr e dit ing Jar amil lo’ s ass e rt ion that th e c omp any

so ld 20 an ave rag e of thre e used F FGs pe r y ear from 1986 to 2006, this is inadequate to bringit within t he 21 scope of

the re g ular seller doctrine, a ssuming the doc trine applies to seller s of used industrial16

1 machines at all. J ara millo di sputes this, ar gu i n g t h at t he sale of larg e industrial machine s at an 2 aver ag e pric e in excess of $100,000 ove r a pe riod of many y ear s is a dequate to invoke the re g ular 3 seller d octrine, e ven assuminga small number of aver ag e y ear ly

sales. The evidenc e adduc ed by 4 J ara

millo, however, re lates only to sales occur

ring in 1986—the y ear that the sale to Gle nwood took 5 place —an d af

t er wa rd s , and does not pe rtain to the y ear s leadingup to the sale of the FF G that 6 injured him. At any ra t e, gi v en that the potentially materia l issues here a

re la rg ely undisputed, a 7 response from the Ne w York Court of A ppeals to the que stion whether a sell er o f u sed industrial 8 equipment s uch as Wey erha euser may be deemed a regular seller and therefor e held strictly liable, 9 and in what c ircumstance s, will, we believe , b e sufficient to dispose of the par ties’ summary 10 jud g me nt m oti on s. 11 We t

he re fo re c e rt if

y the qu e sti on

be low to t he Ne w Yo rk Court

of Ap pe a ls, wh ic h o f c ours e 12 may

ref ormulate or expand upon the question as it sees fit. See Pachter v . Bernard Hode s Group, 13 Inc. , 505 F.3d 1 2 9 , 1 3 5 (2 d C ir. 2007). We express our appr eciation for the Court of Appe als’s 14 consideration of this matter. 15 16 CO NC LU SION 17 I t here by

is ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court tra nsmit t o the Clerk of the New Y ork 18 Court of Ap p ea l s a Certific ate in the f orm attac hed, tog ether

with a copy

of this opinion and a 19 c omp le te se t of the br ie fs , ap pe nd ic e s, and re c or d fil e d by the pa rt ie s in this Court . Thi s pan e l w ill 20 reta in jurisdiction to decide the ca se onc e we h av e had the benef it of the views of the New Y ork 21 Court of Appea ls, or once that court dec lines cer tificati o n . Fi n al l y , we or der the parties to bea r17

1 e qu a lly

any fe e s and c os t th a t ma

y be re qu e ste d f

ro m th e Ne w Y or

k Co ur t of Ap pe a ls. 2 3 CE RT IF IC AT E 4 Th e fo llo wi ngqu e sti on he re by is cert ifie d to the Ne w Y or k Co ur t of Ap pe a ls p ur su ant t o 5 Se c on d Ci rc uit

L oc a l Ru le § 0.2 7 an d 22 N.Y .C. R.R . § 50 0. 27 , a s o rd e re d b y the Cou rt of Ap pe a ls 6 fo r t

he Se c on d Ci rc uit : 7 Con str uin g the e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t fav or a

ble to Jara

mil lo, is 8 Wey erhaeu s er Company a “r egular seller ” of use d Flexo Folder 9 Gluers suc h that it can be he ld strictly liable under

New Y ork law?