United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

October 1996 B-2 BOMBER

Status of Efforts to

Acquire 21 Operational

Aircraft

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-97-11

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-272634 

October 22, 1996

Congressional Committees

The conference report on the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal

year 1994 requires us to report to the congressional defense committees at

regular intervals on the total acquisition costs of the B-2 bomber program

through the completion of the production program, scheduled to end in

June 2000. This, our third report, is a continuation of prior reports

discussing the Air Force’s progress in acquiring B-2 aircraft. This report

(1) highlights recent program changes; (2) discusses program funding and

current cost estimates; and (3) shows the progress achieved in the flight

test program, production, and modification efforts.

B-2 Program

Background

B-2 operational requirements specify that the weapon system have

low-observable characteristics and sufficient range and payload to deliver

precision-guided conventional weapons or nuclear weapons anywhere in

the world with enhanced survivability. The B-2 combines conventional and

state-of-the-art aircraft technology, such as special shaping and radar

absorbing materials, to achieve low-observability (stealth) characteristics,

high aerodynamic efficiency, and large payload capacity. The blending of

these technologies makes it a complex and costly aircraft to develop and

produce and, in some respects, to maintain.

The B-2 development program was initiated in 1981, and the Air Force was

granted approval in 1987 to begin procurement of 132 operational B-2

aircraft, principally for strategic bombing missions. With the demise of the

Soviet Union, the emphasis of B-2 development was changed to

conventional operations and the number was reduced to 20 operational

aircraft, plus 1 test aircraft that was not planned to be upgraded to an

operational configuration. Production of these aircraft has been

concurrent with development and testing.

The concurrency of development, testing, and production required the Air

Force to devise a mechanism for accepting incomplete aircraft until the

final configuration could be defined and demonstrated in the test program.

Thus, the Air Force is accepting delivery of production B-2s in three

configuration blocks—blocks 10, 20, and 30. The block 30 configuration is

to be fully capable and meet the essential employment capabilities1

1

Essential employment capabilities are the characteristics and capabilities required by the Air Force to

satisfy the full operational spectrum of the B-2.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
B-272634 

defined by the Air Force. Initial delivery will be 6 test aircraft, 10 aircraft in

the block 10 configuration, 3 in the block 20 configuration, and 2 in the

block 30 configuration. All block 10, 20, and test aircraft are to eventually

be modified to the block 30 configuration. This modification process

began in July 1995 and is scheduled to be completed in June 2000.

Block 10 configured aircraft provide limited combat capability with no

capability to launch conventional guided weapons. B-2s in this

configuration are located at Whiteman Air Force Base and are used

primarily for training. Block 20 configured aircraft have an interim

capability to launch nuclear and conventional munitions, including a

guided munition.

The 1994 Defense Authorization Act limited B-2 program acquisition cost

to $28,968 million (1981 dollars) for 20 operational and 1 test aircraft that

was not planned to be upgraded to an operational configuration. The 1996

Defense Authorization Act repealed this and other limitations placed on

the B-2 program and authorized continuation of certain B-2 acquisition

activities. In March 1996, the President directed the 1 remaining test

aircraft to be upgraded, bringing the total operational B-2s to 21.

Results in Brief The Air Force is confident that the program, as currently defined, can be

completed within the estimated cost of $29,160 million (1981 dollars), the

equivalent of $44,785 million in then year, or actual dollars to be budgeted

and spent. However, there remain certain cost and schedule risks in the

B-2 program. These risks are primarily associated with (1) completion of

flight testing by July 1, 1997, as scheduled; (2) completion of modification

programs designed to upgrade B-2s to the block 30 configuration within

cost and schedule predictions; and (3) the potential for additional

modifications as a result of tests that are being accomplished concurrently

with modifications of aircraft to the block 30 configuration.

The Air Force’s current estimated cost includes costs for the 20 aircraft

program formerly limited by the Congress, as well as costs for activities

added by the Congress in fiscal years 1995 and 1996. About 96 percent of

the estimated cost of $44,785 million has been appropriated through fiscal

year 1996. Appendix II shows more detailed funding information for the

current Air Force estimate.

Completion of Flight

Testing

Because most costs of flight test efforts are incurred under a cost-type

contract and the Air Force is responsible for the cost of extensions, the Air

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
B-272634 

Force is attempting to complete the remaining 25 percent of the B-2 flight

tests by July 1, 1997. To ensure the flight test program is not extended

beyond July 1, 1997, the Air Force has reduced the flight test content

compared to the test program that was planned in May 1995 and has made

certain other changes. However, because less than 1 year remains in the

scheduled flight test program, any delays in delivering required software

or hardware, increase in deficiencies, or grounding of test aircraft will

impact the Air Force’s ability to complete the revised test program by

July 1, 1997. The Air Force estimates that further reductions may be

required to ensure close out of the flight test program by July 1, 1997.

The revised flight test program deferred certain operational testing,

eliminated testing not necessary to demonstrate essential employment

capabilities, and combined other tests. The revisions resulted in 387 fewer

test point hours,2

 about a 14-percent reduction. Additionally, to meet the

test schedule, the Air Force extended the time aircraft were scheduled to

be in the test program, added an aircraft to do block 20 operational testing,

scheduled more flight tests per month, and made other changes.

As part of the flight test reductions, the Air Force deferred 60 flight test

point hours of operational survivability testing to the Follow-on Test and

Evaluation Program at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. These test

point hours were deferred because test ranges would not be available to

complete them by July 1, 1997. Air Force officials said additional

survivability test point hours are at risk of being deferred because of the

limited remaining time in the test program. B-2 program and Air Combat

Command officials stated the deferred testing would still be accomplished

at a later time by the operational test command in a less costly test

environment. All of the officials agreed that deferring these test point

hours would not affect the Air Force’s ability to demonstrate the B-2’s

essential employment capabilities.

The Air Force has essentially completed the block 20 flight testing and is

working to complete testing of the remaining block 30 capabilities,

including survivability, offensive and defensive avionics, radar

terrain-following and avoidance, the Joint Direct Attack Munition, contrail

management system, Military Strategic Tactical Relay Program, and other

corrections of previously identified deficiencies. Progress was made in

resolving past problems with radar signature, terrain-following and

avoidance radar, and others. However, some radar signature issues must

2

Test point hours reflect the actual flight times needed to complete test points, excluding

nonproductive flight hours like refueling and flight time to and from test ranges.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
B-272634 

yet be resolved and further testing is required to fully demonstrate

terrain-following radar capabilities, especially in the rain.

Completion of

Modifications

Completion of the block 30 modification effort within the planned

schedule and cost is important if the B-2 program is to be completed

within the current estimated cost. The block 30 modification effort is still

in its early stages. It is about a 5-year effort, scheduled to take from July

1995 to June 2000. The first aircraft entered the block 30 modification

process on schedule and the effort is being accomplished on schedule, but,

currently, is only about 50-percent complete.

Potential for Additional

Modifications

Remaining flight testing is scheduled to be done concurrently with the

assembly of the 2 block 30 production aircraft and with 7 of the 19 aircraft

that must go through block 30 modifications. Testing could identify

deficiencies that require further modifications after the block 30

modifications are complete, adding unplanned costs to the B-2 program.

While no post-block 30 modifications have been specifically identified, the

historical data Northrop Grumman uses to predict the potential for future

changes indicate that there are likely to be additional modifications to B-2s

even after block 30 modifications are completed. The B-2 development and

production contracts are cost and incentive fee-type contracts,

respectively. Under these contracts, the government would pay all

development and most production costs related to additional

modifications.

Agency Comments The Department of Defense (DOD) generally agreed with this report. It did,

however, provide some technical corrections that have been incorporated

into this report. The DOD response is included in appendix IV.

Scope and

Methodology

We reviewed available documents and records and interviewed officials at

the B-2 program office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the

Combined B-2 Test Force, Edwards Air Force Base, California; the Air

Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; the Air Force Cost

Analysis Agency, Arlington, Virginia; DOD and the Air Force, Washington,

D.C.; the Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Contract Management

Command, Pico Rivera and Palmdale, California; and the Northrop

Grumman Military Aerospace Division, Pico Rivera and Palmdale,

California. Documents included cost and budgetary estimates, financial

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
B-272634 

and program management reports, test schedules and plans, delivery

acceptance reports, and many others that allowed us to assess the current

status of the B-2 program. Interviews with Air Force and contractor

financial and technical managers provided information on issues not

included in formal reports.

We performed our review from October 1995 through July 1996 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and the

Air Force, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other

interested parties. We will make copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any

questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are

listed in appendix V.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
B-272634 

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs,

Testing, and

Modifications

10

Air Force Believes It Can Complete the Program Within

Estimated Costs

10

Risks Remain to Complete Revised Test Plan on Schedule 15

Status of B-2 Modification Efforts 24

Air Force Is Planning Future B-2 Conventional Enhancements 26

Appendix II 

B-2 Program Fiscal

Year 1997 President’s

Budget

28

Appendix III 

Concurrency in Air

Force Accelerated

Schedule for B-2

Production, Test, and

Modifications

29

Appendix IV 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

30

Appendix V 

Major Contributors to

This Report

31

Tables Table I.1: Estimated Costs at Completion for B-2 Development

and Production Contracts

11

Table I.2: B-2 Delivery Performance 14

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Contents

Table I.3: Changes in Flight Test Point Hours From May 31, 1995,

to April 29, 1996

17

Table I.4: Status of Completion of B-2 Flight Test Program 21

Abbreviations

DCMC Defense Contract Management Command

DOD Department of Defense

FOT&E Follow-On Test and Evaluation

GAM GPS-Aided Munition

GPS Global Positioning System

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

TF/TA terrain-following/terrain-avoidance

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

The Air Force estimates it can complete the development and

procurement of 21 B-2s within the funding provided for the baseline

program, formerly capped by the Congress, and the funding for additional

activities added by the Congress in fiscal years 1995 and 1996. The cost

performance indicators the Air Force uses to monitor contract efforts

suggest that significant growth in costs and/or schedule is not expected

even though the estimated costs to complete the Northrop Grumman

contracts have increased slightly.

Several factors create uncertainty about the final cost of the program.

These center around the concurrent test and production efforts and the

uncertain completion of the test and modification programs. The

development and test program is incomplete and remaining production

and block 30 modification efforts are to be ongoing concurrently with

remaining development and test effort. Accordingly, there is potential for

cost growth that could result from identifying deficiencies that require

additional rework or modifications. Because the flight test program is

within 1 year of its scheduled completion date, any problems or delays in

testing could require extending flight testing, thereby increasing

development costs.

On-time delivery of production aircraft has improved compared with

earlier experience, with four of the last five aircraft delivered ahead of the

contract schedule. Although delivery performance has improved, these

aircraft were delivered, for the most part, with greater numbers of

deviations and waivers than previous deliveries. The deviations and

waivers are the result of the concurrent development and production

activities and are intended to be corrected in the block 30 configuration.

Air Force Believes It

Can Complete the

Program Within

Estimated Costs

The current estimated costs to acquire 21 B-2s are $29,160 million (1981

dollars) or $44,785.1 million (then-year dollars). This estimate includes

amounts for the baseline program, formerly capped by the Congress, as

well as the congressional add-ons that occurred in fiscal years 1995 and

1996. These add-ons include:

• Procurement funds appropriated in fiscal year 1995 to protect the

industrial base and maintain the option to produce additional B-2s for 

1 year. Because no new B-2 aircraft were authorized, this contract was

essentially completed in July 1996.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

• Missile procurement funds added by the Congress in fiscal year 1995 to

buy limited quantities of the Global Positioning System Aided Munition

(GAM).

• Procurement funds appropriated for certain B-2 activities that are planned

to be used to upgrade the first test aircraft to a block 30 configuration.

A detailed estimate supporting the fiscal year 1997 President’s budget,

which includes all of the funds discussed above is included in appendix II.

Cost Performance

Indicators Do Not Suggest

Major Cost Growth

Cost and schedule performance data on the Northrop Grumman

development and production contracts, which account for over 75 percent

of the total program costs, do not suggest there will be major cost growth

through completion of the planned contract effort. The Air Force monitors

cost and schedule performance data on these contracts and uses it to

develop cost estimates at completion for these contracts. Its estimates of

costs at completion, excluding fees and profits, are shown in table 1.1 for

the last 5 quarters beginning in April 1995, as reported in the Defense

Acquisition Executive Summary.

Table I.1: Estimated Costs at

Completion for B-2 Development and

Production Contracts (excludes fees

and profit) (millions of then-year

dollars)

Development contract Production contract

April 1995 $20,576 $12,698

July 1995 $20,576 $12,704

October 1995 $20,495 $12,740

January 1996 $20,605 $13,094

May 1996 $20,610 $13,170

The increases in the estimates to complete the production contract were

primarily the result of incorporating efforts that were planned but not

previously on contract, including support and training requirements and

block 30 capabilities.

The B-2 development and production contracts include provisions that

result in the government paying for development and most production

costs related to efforts necessary to correct deficiencies. Northrop

Grumman estimates that about $432 million in development and

$439 million in production costs will have been incurred to correct

deficiencies through completion of the contracts. These costs are included

in the estimated cost to complete the contract efforts.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) officials located at the

Northrop Grumman B-2 facilities conduct in depth reviews of the cost

accounts at Northrop Grumman on a routine basis. These reviews and

other monitoring efforts have not identified any major cost or schedule

concerns at this time.

Program Concurrency and

Remaining Schedules

Create the Potential for

Cost Increases

The remaining development and flight test program is scheduled to be

done concurrently with final assembly of block 30 production aircraft and

the modification efforts on several aircraft. Program costs could increase

if remaining testing identifies deficiencies requiring additional

modification efforts to aircraft that have completed block 30 work.

Further, if Northrop Grumman cannot complete the currently identified

block 30 modification efforts on schedule or if the remaining flight test

program cannot be completed on schedule, total program costs could

increase. Costs for these development, production, and modification

efforts are included in the original development and production contracts.

Additional effort or delays in the schedule provided for in the contracts

would result in additional costs to the Air Force.

The flight test program, scheduled for completion on July 1, 1997, overlaps

the final assembly and production of initial production and modified block

30 configured aircraft. The last two production aircraft are block 30

configured aircraft and are scheduled to complete final assembly before

July 1997. In addition, seven aircraft will be in the block 30 modification

line before flight testing is scheduled to be completed. Appendix III shows

the overlap of initial deliveries, modifications, and the flight test program.

If, as a result of flight testing, further modifications are required, that will

add costs to the program. Northrop Grumman officials said that as of

May 1996, there were no deficiencies identified that would require

modifications after block 30 is complete. Based on the historical

experience in the B-2 program, Northrop Grumman estimates, however,

that additional modification activities could be required after completing

block 30 modifications.

The block 30 modifications began in July 1995 and are scheduled to

continue through June 2000. The modifications are on schedule, but, as of

May 1996, none of the 19 aircraft to be modified has completed the

modification process that is estimated to take from 13 to 36 months

depending upon the configuration and condition of the aircraft when it

enters the process. Therefore, Northrop Grumman or the Air Force do not

know if they will encounter problems in the actual modification. If the

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

work currently scheduled for the modification program does take longer

than planned or if additional work is added to the already lengthy

program, the modification’s costs will increase.

Problems in Completing

Tests Could Delay

Schedule and Increase

Costs

The flight test program is scheduled to be completed by July 1, 1997, and

any delays will increase development costs. Completion of the flight test

program has been delayed numerous times before. B-2 program officials

believe the test program can be completed on schedule and that the

schedule can accommodate some delays. However, an Air Force test

planning document indicates that tests assigned to one of the test aircraft

may not be completed on time. The potential delay, initially estimated at 

4 months, was recently reduced to 1 month. Furthermore, because less

than 1 year remains in the scheduled test program, any delays in delivering

software or hardware, major deficiencies, or grounding of test aircraft add

to the risk of not completing flight testing on schedule. For example, the

test aircraft were recently grounded for a few days because failures in the

B-2 engine tailpipe needed to be inspected and repaired to prevent damage

to the aircraft. The Air Force estimates that each month of flight testing

with the current three aircraft force costs about $10.3 million.

Aircraft Delivery

Performance Improved

Recent aircraft deliveries have been ahead of the contractually required

schedule. Since August 1995, when we reported that B-2 aircraft were

being delivered on average 57 days late, Northrop Grumman has delivered

5 production aircraft on average 71 days early, although with some

increase in the number of major deviations and waivers from the contract

specifications and requirements. Table I.2 shows the delivery performance

on all aircraft delivered through June 30, 1996.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

Table I.2: B-2 Delivery Performance

Aircraft

Actual delivery

date

Contract

delivery date

Days early

late(-)

Major

deviations

and waivers

8 12/11/93 12/17/93 6 57

9 08/16/94 03/30/94 –139 61

7 08/29/94 08/29/94 0 58

11 10/27/94 10/18/94 –9 61

10 12/29/94 07/25/94 –157 75

12 02/16/95 01/20/95 –27 66

13 06/26/95 04/14/95 –73 79

14 09/25/95 10/10/95 15 79

16 12/21/95 04/05/96 106 91

15 01/12/96 01/12/96 0 89

17 03/29/96a 06/30/96 93 67

18 05/13/96 09/30/96 140 68

aThis is delivery to the B-2 Combined Test Force for block 20 operational tests.

DCMC officials said the number of deviations and waivers is not a major

concern to them at this time. They said that because of the concurrency in

the program, the only feasible way they can accept aircraft is through the

use of authorized deviations and waivers. They said the B-2 is comparable

to previous concurrent acquisition programs like the B-1B—for example,

they said the 100th B-1B was delivered with 56 waivers.

Extended Use of Some B-2

Funds Approved by the

Congress

Air Force officials said that about $107 million in fiscal year 1991, 1992,

and 1993 funds could have become unavailable for use if not expended

within the allowed time frame. These funds were available for obligation

for a period of 3 years. Public Law 101-510, enacted November 5, 1990,

limited the period in which appropriated funds are available for

expenditure to 5 years after expiration of the period in which these funds

are available for obligation. Therefore, the total period of availability for

expenditure of these funds is 8 years.

The Congress has provided the Air Force with almost 96 percent of the

$44,785 million total estimated cost to complete the 21 B-2 aircraft

program through fiscal year 1996. As of December 31, 1995, 94 percent of

the appropriated funds were obligated and 87 percent expended. For most

aircraft programs, the law provides adequate time to expend funds

appropriated. However, the long time to produce, deliver, and modify B-2s

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

could preclude all expenditures for certain B-2 aircraft being made within

the time limit. Production aircraft, placed on contract with fiscal year

1991-93 funds, must be returned to the contractor’s facility after initial

delivery to be modified into the final contract configuration (block 30).

For some aircraft, this manufacture, deliver, fly, return, modify, and

redeliver process will take longer than the 8 years allowed to expend

funds.

The Air Force identified this as a funding issue in its report to the B-2

Defense Acquisition Executive. The Department of Defense (DOD)

requested the Congress to grant an extension to the period of availability

for these appropriations. The Congress granted an extension in the

defense appropriations act for fiscal year 1997 that extends the time for

expenditure of up to $107 million in fiscal years 1991 funds and up to

$15 million in fiscal year 1992 funds.

Risks Remain to

Complete Revised

Test Plan on Schedule

The Air Force made significant reductions in the content of the flight tests

that are to be completed by July 1, 1997, the planned completion date of

the flight test program. Through April 29, 1996, the Air Force had

completed about 75 percent of the revised B-2 flight test program, but

some significant tests remain to be completed. And, with less than 1 year

remaining in the test program, any delays in delivering software or

hardware, any major deficiencies, or any grounding of test aircraft add to

the risk that the content will be further reduced or that the test plan will

have to be extended.

The tests that remain to be concluded are crucial to demonstrate the full

effectiveness of the B-2. The B-2 is to demonstrate it meets the “essential

employment capabilities” defined by the Air Force. Most remaining flight

tests are to demonstrate block 30 essential employment capabilities

including:

• survivability in the threat environment;

• band 4 and other features of defensive avionics;

• additional radar modes;

• guided weapons integration;

• contrail management system; and

• others, including the demonstration of corrections of deficiencies.

Radar signature flight tests were completed in March 1996. The Air Force

characterized the results as generally good, but, in some cases, the

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

signature did not meet the planned design predictions for the block 30

configuration. Air Force officials said that the preliminary analysis of

deficient signature areas shows no significant operational impact will

result. However, the Air Force has contracted for a more detailed analysis

to determine the operational impact of particular signature points that did

not meet the requirements, and plans to determine whether further design

and testing is necessary. Radar problems previously reported have either

been resolved or are still being tested.

Flight Test Program

Reduced to Meet Schedule

Since May 1995, the Air Force has made changes to the flight test program

by eliminating unnecessary tests in order to meet cost and schedule

pressures to complete testing by July 1, 1997. However, there is still some

risk that all planned testing will not be completed on time. Test point

hours have been eliminated, deferred, or combined reducing total test

point hours by 387 (14 percent) since May 1995. The revised flight test plan

focuses remaining testing efforts on demonstrating the minimum essential

employment capabilities needed to field a fully combat capable aircraft.

Following are the primary changes in the flight test program.

• Reduced flight test point hours by 387 from 2,720 test point hours in 

May 31, 1995, to 2,333 test point hours in April 29, 1996. This included

deferring about 60 flight test point hours of operational survivability

testing until they can be completed during the Follow-On Test and

Evaluation (FOT&E) Program that is to be conducted from Whiteman Air

Force Base, the operational base for the B-2.

• Extended the scheduled time in the flight test program of two flight test

aircraft, thereby changing the schedule for modifying those aircraft to the

block 30 configuration.

• Used AV-17, a block 20 production aircraft, to do developmental and

dedicated operational testing for block 20, freeing the test aircraft for

other test requirements.

• Reduced the planned times that test aircraft are to have available to

upgrade their hardware and software.

• Planned for more test flights per month by scheduling more flights on

weekends and at night, and by adding an additional maintenance crew to

reduce downtime for maintenance.

Table I.3 shows the change in flight test point hours since May 1995, which

was the test plan discussed in our August 1995 report.3

3

B-2 Bomber: Status of Cost, Development, and Production (GAO/NSIAD-95-164, Aug. 4, 1995).

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

Table I.3: Changes in Flight Test Point

Hours From May 31, 1995, to April 29,

1996 Test category

Planned hours as

of May 31, 1995

Increase/decrease

(-) in hours

Planned hours as

of April 29, 1996

Structures 93.2 8.1 101.3

Systems 308.2 –15.0 293.3

Armament 247.0 –71.7 175.3

Offensive avionics 488.3 –80.9 407.4

Defensive avionics 95.4 –21.5 73.9

Flight controls 367.0 –23.6 343.5

Terrain

following/avoidance

417.8 –92.8 325.0

Radar signature 247.6 3.0 250.6

Contrails 10.8 –8.3 2.5

Survivability 278.0 –57.4 220.6

Operational 135.0 0.0 135.0

Pilot vehicle interface 31.5 –26.6 4.9

Total 2,719.8 –386.5 2,333.3

The Air Force provided the following reasons for reductions of more than

50 test point hours shown in the table.

• Armament, reduced 71.7 test point hours. Test point hours involving

targeting and release of the Mk-62 (500-pound destructor mine) were

reduced because its characteristics were similar to the Mk-82 (500-pound

general purpose bomb). The Air Force successfully completed testing of

the Mk-82 in fewer test point hours than had been planned. Planned testing

of the M-117 (750-pound general purpose bomb) was moved to a lower test

priority to be tested only if time permits. According to Air Force officials,

it is a World War II gravity bomb. Finally, the Joint Direct Attack Munition

(JDAM) test point hours were reduced because of its similarity to the GAM,

which has successfully completed flight testing as the block 20 interim

guided munition.

• Offensive Avionics, reduced 80.9 test point hours. Most of the reductions

were the result of not testing the full specification for some radar modes

and only demonstrating a basic capability with these modes. According to

the Air Force, these include ground moving target search and track and

two classified modes that have limited operational utility. Also, Air Force

officials said the initial results from Global Positioning System (GPS)

testing were excellent, allowing consumption of fewer test point hours

than planned to successfully complete the evaluations of the GPS interface

with the offensive avionics.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

• Terrain-following/terrain-avoidance (TF/TA), reduced 92.8 test point hours.

Most of the reductions were to eliminate test point hours included as

contingencies by the Air Force in the May 1995 test plan because of the

many problems being experienced by the terrain-following system at that

time. In addition, testing of the system’s capability to identify various

kinds of high towers was consolidated to allow for more efficient testing.

• Detection/survivability, reduced 57.4 test point hours. These operational

test point hours were deferred to FOT&E because the test range was not

available and the testing could not be accomplished by July 1, 1997.

Detection and survivability testing is flight testing against real or simulated

ground and air threats. This testing is to evaluate whether an adversary’s

defenses can detect the B-2 and to determine the degree of survivability of

the B-2 against these threat systems. To complete the test program on

time, 60 of 180 test point hours in an integrated air defense environment

were deferred to FOT&E.

Air Force operational test officials stated deferred test point hours would

slightly reduce the confidence in demonstrating Critical Operational Issue

3 in the Test and Evaluation Master Plan—Can the B-2 carry out its

assigned mission with a high degree of survivability when employed within

its concept of operations? However, the operational test command would

complete about 120 test point hours of testing to answer this question.

Accordingly, they said the deferred testing would not reduce the

operational utility of the B-2. B-2 Program and Air Combat Command

officials stated that deferred testing will still be accomplished by the

operational test command, but it will be accomplished more cost

effectively at the B-2 operational base as opposed to the more costly

development test base. The deferred testing would begin some time after

delivery of the first block 30 B-2 to Whiteman Air Force Base, which is

scheduled for August 1997.

Further Reductions May

Be Necessary to Meet

Schedule

The above flight test program reductions and changes may not be

adequate to complete planned testing by July 1, 1997. While the above

changes have created enough flight test capacity overall, configuration

differences between test aircraft create another limitation on the ability to

complete testing on time. AV-3 is the only test aircraft modified to include

the block 30 radar signature configuration upgrades, which are needed to

fly the remaining detection and survivability test point hours. Although the

Air Force is committed to completing the flight testing by July 1, 1997,

AV-3 capacity problems need to be resolved. The Air Force had estimated

this testing would take until November 1, 1997, 4 months past the July 1,

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

1997, scheduled completion date. Air Force officials said they are working

to resolve this problem and have recently reduced the estimated extension

to 1 month. In addition, because less than 1 year remains in the scheduled

flight test program, any problems can cause further delays or require more

reductions in the test plan. If testing is not completed on July 1, 1997, it

will result in added development costs and delay the delivery of a full

block 30 capability to the Air Force by deferring critical tests until later.

Officials said shifting any incomplete detection and survivability testing to

FOT&E would be cheaper than continuing to operate the entire B-2 test

force at Edwards Air Force Base. They estimated that the test program, as

currently configured with three aircraft, would cost an additional

$10.3 million a month to extend. However, if the incomplete testing is

critical to demonstrating the essential employment capabilities, deferring

further testing to FOT&E could restrict the operational capability of a block

30 B-2.

The Air Force is still looking for ways to complete survivability testing

without deferring additional test point hours. The major time factor in the

detection and survivability testing is analyzing the large amounts of data

between flights. This data analysis, which may take up to 2 weeks, must be

accomplished before a similar mission profile can be flight tested.

Therefore, the Air Force is hiring additional analysts to try and reduce the

time between flights. In addition, AV-4 has extra capacity for

accomplishing flight test point hours for which it is configured. The Air

Force will try to identify test point hours that can be shifted from AV-3 to

the other test aircraft.

With less than 1 year remaining in the scheduled flight test program,

delays or problems with software, hardware, or test aircraft can cause

further extensions in the test program. The Air Force test director noted

that completing remaining test effort is dependent on delivering the final

block 30 software on schedule, delivering the JDAM on schedule, and

having the test aircraft available for flight testing. In 1995, the scheduled

delivery date for the block 30 software to the B-2 combined test force was

delayed 2 months to August 1996. The Air Force test director said they

could not afford further delays in this software as it is the key to

completing the remaining block 30 testing. Since our discussion with the

test director, the software that precedes the delivery of block 30 software

to the test force was delivered about 1 month late.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

In June 1996, DCMC reported that a significant number of software

deficiencies (696) remained to be resolved and closed and that some of

these deficiencies may not be corrected before the completion of the

development flight test program. Flight testing continues through July 1,

1997; thus, additional deficiencies will likely be discovered. DCMC reported

that deficiencies not corrected in time to be incorporated in the block 30

modification program will require further development and testing in a

post block 30 effort. Until fixes are identified and incorporated, Northrop

Grumman may have to develop procedural work arounds for the Air Force

to use the block 30 aircraft. According to DCMC, these work arounds have

the potential to impact operational capabilities, reliability, and

maintainability.

The test director also said they need to limit the amount of down time for

test aircraft. Each of the three test aircraft have one more scheduled

lay-up period where new software and hardware are installed for testing.

The Air Force is trying to minimize the length of this lay-up, which, in the

past, has been a contributor to the extension of the total flight test

program. In addition, any further general standdowns of aircraft as has

happened in the past for engine tailpipe problems cannot be

accommodated within the remaining time available for testing.

Progress and Issues With

Remaining Testing

The Air Force has essentially completed the block 20 flight testing and will

continue to test and demonstrate remaining block 30 capabilities,

including survivability, defensive avionics, and integration of the JDAM and

other block 30 capabilities. As of April 29, 1996, the Air Force had

completed 75 percent of the test point hours required by the revised test

plan. Based on the previous May 1995 test point hour plan, the Air Force

would be only about 64 percent complete. Table I.4 shows the percent

complete for flight testing categories as of April 29, 1996.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

Table I.4: Status of Completion of B-2

Flight Test Program

Test Category

Planned hours as

of April 29, 1996

Hours flown as of

April 29, 1996

Percent complete

as of April 29, 1996

Structures 101.3 101.3 100

Systems 293.3 257.0 88

Armament 175.3 134.9 77

Offensive avionics 407.4 334.3 82

Defensive avionics 73.9 32.7 44

Flight controls 343.5 328.6 96

TF/TA 325.0 222.5 68

Radar signature 250.6 203.6 81

Contrails 2.5 .8 32

Survivability 220.6 70.3 32

Operational 135.0 51.0 38

Pilot vehicle interface 4.9 4.9 100

Total 2,333.3 1,741.9 75

Remaining testing and other test issues are discussed below.

Radar Signature Radar signature is the most critical stealth feature needed for B-2

operational effectiveness. The block 30 signature testing was completed in

March 1996. According to Air Force officials, test results showed the radar

signature generally meets the predictions used to establish the block 30

radar signature design. This design was the result of prior corrections to

deficiencies in the B-2 radar signature identified early in flight testing

(early 1990s). They said, in most cases, the test results exceeded or met

block 30 design predictions, but, in some cases, it did not meet those

requirements. Air Force officials said that preliminary analysis of deficient

signature areas shows no significant impact will result in B-2 operational

survivability. The Air Force has contracted for a more detailed analysis of

particular signature points that did not meet the requirements, and plans

to determine whether further design and testing is necessary. They

indicated there could be some minor degradations in survivability, and

they have identified relatively inexpensive fixes to solve the problems. The

Air Force has not reached a final decision on the cost benefit of

incorporating fixes. They plan to resolve the degradation issues and have a

new radar signature specification that reflects the final test results by

November 1996.

Other key issues regarding the radar signature of the B-2 are still being

studied by the Air Force, including reliability and maintainability problems

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

on stealthy materials used on the B-2. This includes improvements in the

engine tailpipes, radar signature tape and caulking materials and

application processes, paint, blade seals, and others. They are also

working on ways to improve maintenance and repair of these important

B-2 components, especially in reducing long curing times for selected

repairs to stealth and to more easily accomplish these activities when the

aircraft is deployed to forward locations. The operational test director said

radar signature maintenance needs to be studied and improved.

Defensive Avionics Defensive avionics are important for providing the crew accurate and

timely information on the locations of adversary weapon systems that may

be a threat to the B-2 during an operational mission. Block 20 aircraft, now

being delivered to Whiteman Air Force Base, will be the first aircraft with

a defensive avionics capability. The Air Force has completed most of the

block 20 flight testing and has identified one anomaly that must be

resolved. The systems performance must still be tested in a highly dense

threat signal environment and the results analyzed. These tests are

scheduled in late August 1996.

The block 20 defensive system provides coverage in the first three of the

four frequency bands covered by the defensive system. The delivered

block 20 capability will include one deficiency that requires an alternate

operating procedure until the block 30 system is delivered. According to

the Air Force, this deficiency will not restrict the use of the B-2.

The next phase of testing will be to complete the block 30 testing, which

adds the fourth frequency band of coverage to the existing block 20 bands

1 through 3. The complete defensive system software, including

corrections of known deficiencies, are not scheduled to be delivered to the

test force until August 1996. This increases the pressures and risks of

completing testing on schedule especially if any additional deficiencies are

discovered. In addition, the capability to be delivered in the block 30

configuration is to provide a computer tool that will allow the Air Force to

create specific mission threat databases for installation into the aircraft.

Until this is developed, the Air Force will have to rely on the contractor to

provide this database for operational situations. In some cases, the Air

Force estimated it could take up to 3 months to create specific mission

threat data files, which would delay the availability of B-2s for contingency

missions.

TF/TA Subsystem As noted in our August 1995 report, the TF/TA subsystem has encountered

numerous problems in testing. These included radar immaturity,

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

operations in the rain, and problems with the antenna. The Air Force has

resolved or is working to resolve these problems and was able to deliver a

block 20 capability greater than planned in the essential employment

capability plan. Instead of providing capability to fly at 1,000 feet, as

originally planned for block 20, the system will be cleared for flights at 

600 feet and include other features not planned for block 20. The Air Force

is continuing efforts to improve the capability of the TF/TA system to

distinguish rain from other obstacles. New software has been tested in the

avionics flying test bed and in the B-2 with some success. A final software

fix, which was successfully tested in the laboratory, will be installed in the

B-2 in June 1996. This will be tested through the spring of 1997. Radar

antenna problems discussed in our August 1995 report have been resolved.

Remaining TF/TA testing includes testing in the rain, against high towers,

over snow and tree tops, and operational testing. The testing is scheduled

to be completed in January 1997.

Armament Fixed target effectiveness involves the integration of munitions and guided

weapons with the B-2. The Air Force successfully completed testing of the

interim block 20 guided weapon, the GAM, meeting the contract

specifications for accuracy. JDAM is the remaining guided weapon to be

tested during the remaining block 30 flight testing. Other weapons deemed

important to the B-2 mission, such as a stand-off missile and a deep

penetrating bomb, are planned to be integrated as part of a multi-staged

improvement program that is to occur after the completion of the block 30

flight test program. The Air Force is already assessing candidates for these

new B-2 munitions. Planned upgrades to the block 30 configuration are

discussed later in the report.

Other Test Issues The Air Force and Northrop Grumman are also working to resolve a

number of other miscellaneous issues that include:

• an unacceptable oscillation or shaking of the wings and fuselage that,

according to the Air Force, occurs at certain nonmission critical speeds at

lower altitudes;

• demonstration of corrections for problems identified with the

environmental control system;

• high failures in a rotary launcher assembly part that reduces availability of

the launcher to the combat forces;

• fixes for the low observable coating in the engine tailpipe; and

• deficiencies in the engine thrust control unit.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

Status of B-2

Modification Efforts

The Air Force has scheduled modification programs to upgrade B-2

aircraft to block 20 and 30 configurations. The scheduled modifications

are intended to bring B-2s into a configuration that meets the essential

employment capabilities defined by the Air Force. The Air Force data

show that the B-2 modification programs are meeting the planned

schedule, but the modifications are being done concurrently with the flight

test program. Because the modification plan has already been developed

but flight testing is incomplete, there is a risk that tests will identify

additional problems that require further modifications in order for the B-2

to meet the essential employment capabilities.

All but two of the 21 B-2 aircraft must undergo major modifications after

their initial delivery in order to achieve the essential employment

capabilities for the B-2. The block 20 modifications for five aircraft are

expected to require about 2.5 months for each aircraft and be complete in

May 1997. A significantly more extensive block 30 modification is

scheduled for 19 aircraft and is expected to require from 13 to 36 months

depending on the changes needed to each individual aircraft. Appendix III

displays the Air Force’s schedule for the remaining aircraft deliveries and

the block 20 and 30 modifications. The current schedule shows that actual

delivery dates for aircraft are expected sooner than the contract delivery

dates.

Block 20 Modifications The block 20 modification program began in May 1996 and is scheduled to

end in May 1997. It is to provide the Air Force with a minimum of 8 aircraft

having a guided munition for strike capabilities, until aircraft modified to

the block 30 configuration can be delivered. The eight aircraft include

three block 20 production aircraft and five block 10 aircraft to be modified

to that configuration. Approximately 1 year after each of the five aircraft

completes the block 20 modification, it is scheduled to be returned to

Northrop Grumman to begin receiving block 30 modifications.

Block 10 aircraft, because they are not equipped with guided strike

weapons and many required B-2 system capabilities, are considered to

provide a training capability. The block 20 configuration provides combat

capabilities not available on the block 10 aircraft. The primary capabilities

added with the block 20 modification program are

• GPS navigational system;

• GPS-Aided Targeting System;

• GAM, which is a guided 2,000 pound bomb;

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

• defensive avionics to provide situational awareness to the crew in three of

the four frequency bands planned to be covered by the B-2; and

• limited terrain-following capability.

During the modification program, changes are also to be made to correct

certain deficiencies found during testing or deployment.

Block 30 Modifications Block 30 modifications began in July 1995 and are scheduled to end in

June 2000. These modifications are intended to provide all B-2 aircraft

with the equipment needed to meet the essential employment capability.

The Air Force must modify five block 10, eight block 20, and six test

aircraft to bring them up to the required block 30 configuration by

June 2000, the Air Force accelerated schedule. The contract completion

date is July 2000.

The dilemma regarding block 30 modifications is that some aircraft will

have made significant progress in the block 30 modification process

before the tests are completed that are necessary to determine if the

configuration meets the essential employment capabilities of the B-2. As of

July 1996, four aircraft are currently in the block 30 modification program

and three more will enter it before flight testing is completed. The last two

production aircraft will be block 30 configured and will complete

assembly before flight testing is complete. This concurrency poses a risk

that problems requiring correction may be discovered too late to be

incorporated during the modification efforts on some or all aircraft. As a

result, Air Force officials believe additional modifications may be

necessary to ensure that all B-2s already delivered and modified are fully

capable of meeting the essential employment capability.

The block 30 modifications include:

• incorporation of configuration changes needed to make B-2s conform to

the approved radar signature;

• replacement of the aft decks;

• installation of remaining defensive avionics functions;

• installation of remaining planned radar features, including TF/TA;

• installation of interfaces needed for carriage and delivery of JDAM;

• Military Strategic Tactical Relay Program; and

• installation of a contrail management system.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

During the modification program, deficiencies found during testing and

deployment are also planned to be corrected.

Scheduled modification time varies depending on the specific

configuration of each aircraft. For example, the test aircraft will require

more time to modify because they must have test wiring and

instrumentation removed, and they need more changes because they were

delivered early in the program. Block 20 aircraft will require the least time

to modify because they will have already received many changes and

corrections. The number of changes authorized for each aircraft as of

May 1996 ranged from about 729 changes on AV-2 to about 37 on AVs 17,

18, and 19.

Air Force Is Planning

Future B-2

Conventional

Enhancements

The Air Force has identified enhancements needed to make the B-2 a more

effective conventional bomber in the year 2000 and beyond. It has

awarded contracts to Northrop Grumman to study future needs and

identify alternative ways to meet the needs as part of a B-2 Multi-Stage

Improvement Program. Northrop Grumman began its study in August 1994

and is expected to complete it in August 1996.

The Air Force believes enhancements are needed in weapons,

communications, and cost of ownership activities like the maintenance of

low-observable capabilities. Preliminary estimates to develop and

incorporate enhancements ranged from about $1 billion to over $3 billion

(1995 dollars) depending on which enhancement options are selected.

Weapons Enhancements The Air Force believes B-2 conventional capabilities need to be expanded

beyond the block 30 capability to provide the B-2 the ability to engage a

wider variety of targets. The primary munition for the block 30 aircraft is

JDAM, a 2,000-pound GPS guided gravity bomb. Two munition candidates for

providing a more advanced strike capability are (1) a GPS version of the

BLU-113—a guided bomb to penetrate and destroy hard and deeply buried

targets—and (2) the Joint Stand-Off Weapon to provide an accurate launch

and leave stand-off glide bomb to suppress enemy air defenses. A stand-off

capability was originally planned for the B-2 with the Tri-Service Standoff

Attack Missile, but it was canceled because of development problems.

Communication

Enhancements

Enhancements are needed to expand the B-2’s ability to communicate and

operate in an integrated conventional warfare environment that has

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix I 

Status of B-2 Costs, Testing, and

Modifications

changed since the B-2 was designed in the 1980s. This requires an

improved capability to communicate with other friendly forces and greater

use of near real time combat intelligence information and

data—capabilities not in the B-2 block 30 configuration. Three candidates

being evaluated for providing enhanced communications are:

• the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System to provide the B-2

crews real time retargeting and situational awareness from satellite and

aircraft command and control systems;

• new satellite communication and anti-jam radios for secure real time

command and control with all force elements involved in a combat

situation; and

• upgraded B-2 avionics subsystems to integrate the enhanced tactical and

targeting information and weapons control information into the B-2

aircraft platform.

The extent of the communications, situational awareness, and targeting

enhancements can impact the amount of funding needed for future

enhancements. Any enhancement that impacts heavily on the limited

capacity and through-put of the 1980s’ computer architecture in the B-2

could cause a complete or partial replacement of this outdated technology,

a costly endeavor.

Reductions in Ownership

Cost

The Air Force also identified a need to reduce the high cost of maintaining

the B-2’s low-observability characteristics. Items being evaluated are:

• a low weight, long life, conductive paint that would provide material cost

and weight savings;

• high durability, radar absorbing material that would provide greater

erosion resistance, long life, and be installed in 1 day rather than the

current 7 days; and

• a thin conductive radar signature tape for B-2 maintenance access panels

on the aircraft that would be cheaper and require less labor to replace,

have greater durability, and provide an improved radar signature.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix II 

B-2 Program Fiscal Year 1997 President’s

Budget

Then-year dollars in millions

1996/prior 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001/04 Total

Development program

Northrop $20,242.6 $390.9 $262.4 $197.2 $119.7 $4.2 $21,217.0

G.E. Engines 564.3 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 569.2

Armament 121.2 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 125.2

Aircrew trainer 561.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 561.2

Mission planning 252.6 31.8 45.3 8.2 0.0 0.0 337.9

Government test 732.1 45.3 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 793.4

Other government costs 578.7 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 579.9

Engineering change orders 17.4 23.2 16.4 10.5 6.2 2.6 76.3

Direct release 317.1 27.8 5.9 6.1 7.6 4.9 369.4

Development total $23,387.2 $528.5 $346.6 $222.0 $133.5 $11.7 $24,629.5

Procurement program

Aircraft procurement

Air vehicle recurring $13,955.0 $9.8 $0.0 $0.0 $4.0 $0.0 $13,968.8

Air vehicle non-recurring 1,333.1 28.5 21.2 20.4 102.2 212.9 1,718.3

Total air vehicle $15,288.1 $38.3 $21.2 $20.4 $106.2 $212.9 $15,687.1

Equipment/data/training 1,516.5 30.1 65.9 35.4 4.8 0.4 1,653.1

Interim contractor support 179.8 17.1 74.5 85.9 81.0 10.0 448.3

Spares 931.3 45.0 80.6 92.4 110.4 228.8 1,488.5

Retrofit 104.6 6.1 5.8 6.6 7.9 31.5 162.5

Other government costs 89.0 7.6 8.3 7.9 6.0 0.6 119.4

Software support 274.5 0.0 62.0 16.3 0.0 0.0 352.8

Mission support 12.0 12.0 11.0 11.0 9.4 9.4 64.8

Facilities 140.3 3.6 3.7 3.3 3.4 0.0 154.3

Aircraft procurement total $18,536.1 $159.8 $333.0 $279.2 $329.1 $493.6 $20,130.8

Missile procurement total $24.8 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $24.8

Procurement total $18,560.9 $159.8 $333.0 $279.2 $329.1 $493.6 $20,155.6

B-2 program total $41,948.1 $688.3 $679.6 $501.2 $462.6 $505.3 $44,785.1

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix III 

Concurrency in Air Force Accelerated

Schedule for B-2 Production, Test, and

Modifications

 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

AV-19 

AV-04 

AV-18

AV-17

AV-03 

AV-16

AV-05 

AV-15 

AV-14 

AV-13 

AV-11

AV-12

AV-07 

AV-09 

AV-10 

AV-06 

AV-08 

AV-02 

AV-13

AV-20 

AV-19

AV-18

AV-17

AV-16

AV-15

AV-12

AV-11

AV-07

AV-10

AV-14

12/12/93

AV-21 

BLOCK 10 BLOCK 20 BLOCK 30 EMD 

REWORK

CONTRACT

DELIVERY DATE

AV-01 

DEPOT

MAINTENANCE

7/1/97

AV-10

Period of

Concurrency

Initial production of aircraft

AV-12

AV-13

AV-14

AV-15

AV-16

Flight Test

AV-8

AV-09

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
Appendix V 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

David E. Cooper

Robert D. Murphy

Chicago Regional

Office

Michael J. Hazard

James R. Wilson

(707125) Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-97-11 B-2 Bomber
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