alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
. .. 

In The Matter Of: 

NORTHEASTERN 

AVIATION, CORP. 

Respondent 

SERVED: May 14,2013 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Docket No. FAA-2012-1264 

Case No. 2012EA110030 

ORDER RESETTING RULE 16 LITIGATION SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 

';. cc '. ,_i ·.) 

On March 7, 2013, an Order Resetting Rule 16 Litigation Scheduling Conference and 

Directing Rule 26(±) Planning and Submission was filed. This Order reset the Rule 16 Litigation 

Scheduling Conference to Monday, May 20, 2013, at 11:00 a.m. and the deadline for the parties 

to file their Rule 26(±), proposed scheduling/discovery plan to May 13, 2013. 

On Aprill9, 2013, the parties filed a Jointly Proposed Scheduling/Discovery Plan. 

On May 13, 2013, Complainant's Counsel contacted Office of Hearings attorney staff to 

request postponement of the Rule 16 Litigation Scheduling Conference because of an 

unavoidable scheduling conflict with a separate matter. Complainant's Counsel stated that 

Respondent's Counsel did not object to rescheduling the Conference and provided mutually 

agreed alternate dates for consideration. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

The Rule 16 Litigation Scheduling Conference previously set for May 20, 2013, at 

11:00 a.m. is reset to Tuesday, June 4, 2013, at 11:00 a.m. Eastern time. 

Attaclunent: Service List 
SERVICE LIST- BY U.S. MAIL 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

Attention: HearingDocket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W10001 

Mr. Zachary M. Berman, Esq. 

Complainant's Counsel 

Office of the Regional Counsel 

Eastern Region 

Federal Aviation Administration 

1 Aviation Plaza 

Jamaica, NY 11434 

TEL: 718-553-3258 

FPCX: 718-995-5699 

Mr. James Ehrig, Esq. 

Respondent's Counsel 

ONE COPY 

Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellot, LLC 

1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, 12th Floor 

Washington, DC 20006-4604 

TEL: 202-659-6672 

FAX: 202-659-6699 

jehrig@eckertseamans.com 

Judge J.E. Sullivan, 

US. Administrative Law Judge 

Office ofHearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (E11-310) 

Washington, DC 20590 

TEL: 202-366-2132 

FAX: 202-366-7536 

FDMS No. FAA-2012-1264 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

1 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2Wl000, Washington, 

DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430.
**Exhibit 23. Consents of Experts andCounsel**
Consent of Independent Registered PublicAccounting Firm
We consent to the incorporation by reference inRegistration Statement Nos. 333-52148 and 333-139017 ofHudson Valley Holding Corp. on Forms S-8 of our reportdated March 15, 2007, (which expresses an unqualifiedopinion and includes an explanatory paragraph relating to theadoption of Statement of Financial Accounting StandardNo. 158, “Employer’s Accounting for DefinedBenefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans” as ofDecember 31, 2006), relating to the consolidated financialstatements of Hudson Valley Holding Corp., and our report datedMarch 15, 2007 relating to management’s report on theeffectiveness of internal control over financial reportingappearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of HudsonValley Holding Corp. for the year ended December 31, 2006.
/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP
New York, New YorkMarch 15, 2007
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed May 26, 2021.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D20-1580

Lower Tribunal No. F14-19599A

________________

Francky Louis,

Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida,

Appellee.

An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from 

the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ellen Sue Venzer, Judge.

Francky Louis, in proper person.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LINDSEY, LOBREE and BOKOR, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Louis v. State, 240 So. 3d 705 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-6122

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus JEROME WALDEN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief District Judge. (CR-95-63) Submitted: May 20, 2005 Decided: September 7, 2005 Before LUTTIG, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Jerome Walden, Appellant Pro Se. David John Novak, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Jerome Walden seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his motion under Fed. R. Civ P. 60(b) following denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a § 2255 proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000); see Reid v. Angelone , 369 F.3d 363, 370 (4th Cir. 2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)(2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Walden has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. In accordance with United States v. Winestock , 340 F.2d 200, 206-08 (4th Cir.), cert. denied , 124 S. Ct. 496 (2003), we have also construed Walden’s notice of appeal and informal brief as an application for authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2000). We deny such authorization because- 3 - Walden does not allege newly discovered evidence or a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. Id. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Case No. 9,365.

#### In re MEAD.

[19 N. B. R. 81:12 N. J. Law J. 26.]

District Court, D. New Jersey,

Oct. Term, 1878.

Bankruptcy — Fraudulent Conveyance — Purchaser with Knowledge of Fraud — Improvements — Incumbrances Paid.

One who, with notice of the fraud, purchases property fraudulently conveyed by a bankrupt, has no right, after being compelled to surrender it to the assignee, to reimbursement either for improvements upon the premises or for moneys advanced to reduce incumbrances.

On petition to expunge claim of Edmund Mead.

1

 [Reprinted from 19 N. B. R. 81, by permission.]

NIXON, District Judge.

The assignee of Peter Mead, bankrupt, filed a bill in this court, some years ago, to set aside, as fraudulent and void against creditors, a conveyance of real estate made by said Mead and wife to one Temperance Berry. The claimant in this case was one of the defendants in that suit, filing a separate answer and contesting the as-signee's right to recover. The decree of the court was that the sale was fraudulent and void, and that the claimant, who was a purchaser of the premises of the bankrupt’s grantee, had sufficient notice of the fraud to put him upon inquiry, and that, although he may have paid full value, he took the property subject to the right of the creditors of Peter Mead to be paid their debts.

The testimony in these proceedings disclose the fact that when Peter Mead transferred the premises to Berry they were incumbered with two mortgages; one to a Mr. Bonnell, to secure the payment of five hundred dollars, and the other to a Mr. Wliitty, for two thousand dollars, and that Berry paid off the latter in the month of October, 186S. while the property was held by his wife. He did not cancel the mortgage, however, but caused it to be assigned to one Alfred Berry, who says that he was ignorant of the transaction at the time and paid nothing on the mortgage. There seems to be some confusion in the testimony whether the Bonnell mortgage was paid by Berry before the execution of the agreement to sell the property to the claimant on the 19th of May, 1809, or with the five hundred dollars that Edmund Mead advanced on the delivery of the said agreement. But it is a matter of small consequence whether the mortgages were in fact paid by Edmund Mead or by Berry. In either case the person paying has no claim upon the estate of Peter Mead, as against his creditors, to have the amount refunded. The court has already decided that the transfer to Berry was a fraud and that Edmund Mead had cause to know that the fraud was being perpetrated upon the creditors of Peter Mead.

Under these circumstances he purchased the property at his peril, and when, after a long litigation, he was compelled to surrender it to the assignee, there does not remain in him any claim either for improvements upon the premises for reduction of incumbrances. The case falls within the rulings of the supreme court in Railroad Co. v. Soutter, 13 Wall. [80 U. S.] 517, and there must be an order entered expunging the claim.
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 127

To amend chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, to authorize the use 

of clinical social workers to conduct evaluations to determine workrelated emotional and mental illnesses. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 24, 2005

Mr. INOUYE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

A BILL

To amend chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, to 

authorize the use of clinical social workers to conduct 

evaluations to determine work-related emotional and 

mental illnesses.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Clinical Social Work5 ers’ Recognition Act of 2005’’. 
2

•S 127 IS 

1 SEC. 2. EXAMINATIONS BY CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKERS 

2 FOR FEDERAL WORKER COMPENSATION 

3 CLAIMS. 

4 Section 8101 of title 5, United States Code, is 

5 amended—

6 (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘and osteo7 pathic practitioners’’ and inserting ‘‘osteopathic 

8 practitioners, and clinical social workers’’; and 

9 (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘osteopathic 

10 practitioners’’ and inserting ‘‘osteopathic practi11 tioners, clinical social workers,’’.

Æ
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-41273

 

DARON FONTENOT,

Movant-Appellant,

versus

GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,

Respondent-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:97-CV-302

- - - - - - - - - -

December 11, 1998

Before DAVIS, DUHE’, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Daron Fontenot, Texas prisoner # 589653, seeks a certificate

of appealability (“COA”) in order to appeal the district court’s

dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as barred by

limitations. 

A COA may be issued only if the prisoner has made a

"substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In cases in which the underlying

constitutional issues were never reached, the movant must make a 
No. 97-41273

-2-

credible showing of error by the district court in its dismissal.

See Murphy v. Johnson, 110 F.3d 10, 11 (5th Cir. 1997). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”),

Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217 (1996), created the one-year

limitations period contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The

district court’s conclusion that Fontenot’s § 2254 petition,

filed on May 5, 1997, was untimely was based on the assumptions

that the one-year limitations period began to run when Fontenot’s

conviction and sentence became final and that the tolling of the

limitations period during the pendency of Fontenot’s state habeas

corpus application was therefore inconsequential. The district

court erred in dismissing the instant petition. See Fields v.

Johnson, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir. Oct. 28, 1998, No. 98-10012), 1998

WL 754901 at *3 (§ 2244(d)(2) tolling provision applies to the

one-year limitations period commencing on AEDPA’s effective

date). We lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of the

unaddressed underlying habeas corpus claims because the district

court did not consider whether a COA should be granted on those

issues. Whitehead v. Johnson, 157 F.3d 384, 387-88 (5th Cir.

1998).

COA is GRANTED, the district court’s judgment is VACATED,

and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.
#### Sheila E. BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 76-734.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Sept. 20, 1977.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Richard S. Power, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

ANSTEAD, Judge.

In a previous opinion1 we remanded this cause to the trial court with directions to make written findings as to whether or not there was probable cause to arrest appellant, Sheila E. Brown, and conduct a search of her person. Following these directions, the trial court entered an order finding that probable cause existed. By way of supplemental brief appellant has persuaded us that the foregoing procedure we ordered was incorrect and that appellant was entitled to a new trial rather than a further proceeding to determine probable cause. The reasons set forth in *Land v. State,*293 So.2d 704 (Fla.1974) that led the court to conclude that a new trial was necessary if a trial court failed to specifically find a confession voluntary before submitting it to a jury also lead to a conclusion that a new trial is necessary if a trial court delegates to the jury the court’s duty to determine whether a search and seizure was lawful. Therefore, though a remand for a posttrial hearing to determine probable cause appears to be an expeditious way of remedying the error, the Supreme Court has indicated that such a procedure is inadequate to protect the rights of an accused.

Accordingly, we reluctantly reverse the judgment and sentence appealed and remand the cause for a de novo hearing on *62appellant’s motion to suppress, if the appellant seeks such a hearing, and a new trial.

DOWNEY and DAUKSCH, JJ., concur.

1

. *Brown v. State,*352 So.2d 60 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
Need to return call by / at/between and . Signature:

Project No.: 0172.09.005.412 Page 1 of 1

Project Name: 304m 2012 Annual Review CBI?

Yes

No

TELEPHONE CALL RECORD

Incoming

Outgoing

Date: 01/25/12 Time: 9:00 am

pm

Company Name: Nebraska DEQ ERG Staff Name: Kimberly Landick

Contact Name: Reuel Anderson and Cay Ewoldt Contact Phone Number: (402) 471-1367 and (402) 

471-2023

General Subject: Meat and Poultry Facility Discharges

TOPICS DISCUSSED AND ACTION TAKEN

On January 25, 2012 at 9am I called the Nebraska NPDES Permits and Compliance Unit and was given the 

names of 2 permit writers for the 3 facilities I requested information about: 

1. Reuel Anderson (402-471-1367) – Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., Lexington, NE permit writer

2. Cay Ewoldt (402-471-2023) – Cargill Meat Solutions Corp, Schuyler, NE and Farmland Foods, Inc, 

Crete, NE permit writer

I called Reuel Anderson and Cay Ewoldt around 9am on January 25, 2012 and left messages for both of them. 

At 11:57am on January 25, Reuel Anderson returned my call. He stated that the Tyson Fresh Meats facility in 

Lexington, NE falls under Subcategory B because they are a complex slaughterhouse. The size of the facility is 

6,000 heads per day. He stated that I can request an updated permit from Nebraska’s Public Records Request 

(402-471-3557) and to request fact sheets as well. The facility’s permit limits were based on both water quality 

criteria and effluent limitation guidelines; they were compared when determining the permit limits. He stated 

that this facility has two outfalls, one that is used and one that is not used (but both have the same permit limits). 

He didn’t think that the facility was required to sample for nitrates and that it was included in the Total Nitrogen 

limits but to double check with the permit. He also didn’t know of any discharge that is currently not being 

regulated at the facility. 

I called Nebraska’s Public Records Request and asked how to go about requesting copies of permits. I was told 

to email my request to ndeq.records@nebraska.gov. I sent this email after talking to the public records request 

department. I sent a follow up email requesting the facility fact sheets as well on January 27th, 2012. 

On January 27, 2012 at 9am Cay Ewoldt returned my call. He stated that the inspectors for the specific facilities 

would know more about the facilities that he would. He did say that for the Cargill Meat Solutions Corp. 

facility, the permit limits were based on weight and that the ammonia limits were more stringent than the water 

quality criteria. He said that they had compared waste load allocations and ELGs and used the most stringent for 

the permit limits. The Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation inspector is Brett Anderson (402-595-1766) and the 

Farmland Foods, Inc inspector is Reuel Anderson (402-471-1367). 

I received the facility permits and fact sheets on January 27th, 2012.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1207 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1207

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 30777 Rancho California Road in Temecula, California, as the ``Dalip 
                  Singh Saund Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              June 9, 2005

 Mrs. Feinstein (for herself and Mrs. Boxer) introduced the following 
 bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland 
                   Security and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 30777 Rancho California Road in Temecula, California, as the ``Dalip 
                  Singh Saund Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DALIP SINGH SAUND POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 30777 Rancho California Road in Temecula, California, shall 
be known and designated as the ``Dalip Singh Saund Post Office 
Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the Dalip Singh 
Saund Post Office Building.
                                 <all>
```
**EXHIBIT
        32.1**
 
 
 
 **CERTIFICATION
        PURSUANT TO**
 **18
        U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**
 **AS
        ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**
 **SECTION
        906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
 
 
 In
        connection with the Annual Report of Electronic Clearing House, Inc. (the
        “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 2007, as filed with the
        Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Charles
        J. Harris, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
        U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
        Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:
 
 (1)
              The
                  Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
                  15(d) of
                  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                  and
 
 (2)
              The
                  information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                  respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
                  the
                  Company.
 
 
 /s/
        Charles J. Harris
 
 
 
 Charles
        J. Harris
 Chief
        Executive Officer
 December
        14, 2007
<PAGE>


Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Franklin Wireless Corp. (the "Company")
on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, OC Kim,
chief executive officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my
knowledge:

(1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
         the Company.


/s/ OC Kim
OC Kim
President
May 19, 2006
Exhibit 23(a)
                           RICHARD A. EISNER & COMPANY, LLP

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the  incorporation by reference in the registration  statements of
NCT Group, Inc. (the "Company")(formerly Noise Cancellation Technologies,  Inc.)
on Forms S-1 (File Nos. 33-19926,  33-38584 and 33-44790) and on Forms S-8 (File
Nos.  33-64792,  333-11209  and  333-11213)  of our  report,  which  includes an
explanatory  paragraph  about  the  Company's  ability  to  continue  as a going
concern,  dated March 11, 1999 (with respect to Note 8, March 24, 1999),  on our
audits of the consolidated  financial  statements and schedule of the Company as
of December 31, 1998 and 1997 and for the years ended  December  31, 1998,  1997
and 1996 which report is included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A.

/s/ RICHARD A. EISNER & COMPANY, LLP
New York, New York
April 29, 1999
EXHIBIT 10.16
                                                                   -------------



                                                     November 13, 2007

RedRoller Holdings, Inc.
2498 West 41st Avenue, Suite 123
Vancouver, British Columbia
V6M 2A7
Canada


         Attn:  Board of Directors


     This  letter is to inform you that I hereby  resign my position as Director
of RedRoller  Holdings,  Inc. (f/k/a Aslahan  Enterprises Ltd.) (the "Company"),
effective  immediately  upon the closing of that certain  Agreement  and Plan of
Merger and  Reorganization  among the Company,  RedRoller  Acquisition Corp. and
RedRoller, Inc.

                                       Sincerely,


                                       /s/ Tina Sangha
                                       --------------------------------------
                                       Tina Sangha




cc:      Corporate Secretary