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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43726

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

PHILLIP MILTON RUGGIERO,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2017 Unpublished Opinion No. 421

Filed: March 29, 2017

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction, affirmed.

Bublitz Law, P.C.; Jessica B. Bublitz, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge

Phillip Milton Ruggiero appeals from his judgment of conviction for preparing false 

evidence. Ruggiero raises two issues on appeal. First, Ruggiero argues the district court abused 

its discretion in admitting into evidence letters purportedly written by the victim, but actually

written by Ruggiero, because the State did not establish an adequate foundation. Second, 

Ruggiero argues the district court erred in admitting witness testimony regarding his past 

stalking charge. The State argues there was adequate foundation for the admission of the letters 

and Ruggiero did not preserve the argument on appeal that the district court erroneously admitted 

testimony. Even if Ruggiero’s arguments were preserved, the State asserts the testimony 

regarding Ruggiero’s past stalking charge was relevant and the district court properly balanced 

the probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice as required by Idaho Rule of 

Evidence 403. Finally, the State argues that even if the district court erred in admitting 

testimony of Ruggiero’s past stalking charge, such error was harmless. We affirm. 
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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Ruggiero was charged in a separate case with misdemeanor stalking. The magistrate 

assigned to that case received three typewritten letters, one purported to be from the alleged 

stalking victim, and the other two letters purported to be from two other people. Each letter

supported the proposition that Ruggiero was not guilty of the stalking charge. As a result, 

Ruggiero was charged in this case with three counts of preparing false evidence in violation of 

Idaho Code § 18-2602.

Ruggiero filed a motion to dismiss, arguing there was not substantial evidence presented 

at the preliminary hearing that he committed the alleged crimes. After a hearing, the district 

court granted the motion to dismiss. The State appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the 

district court’s order dismissing the charges. State v. Ruggiero, 156 Idaho 662, 330 P.3d 408 

(2014).

Upon remand, the case was set for trial. Prior to trial, the State filed a notice pursuant to 

I.R.E. 404(b) which stated: “The State intends to admit evidence of the underlying criminal 

charge to provide context of [Ruggiero’s] intent and motive to the jury. The State does not 

oppose a limiting instruction that the jury may only consider the evidence for proof of motive 

and intent.” At the hearing on the State’s notice, the State specified it intended to establish the 

elements of the underlying case “to the extent necessary.” The district court recognized the only 

way to prove falsifying evidence was to establish there was an underlying charge. The district 

court stated: “I’m not even sure it’s necessary to treat this as a 404(b),” and further noted 

“there’s utterly no way to avoid this. It’s part of the charge itself. It is essential.” Ruggiero 

made no objection at the I.R.E. 404(b) hearing, and he did not file a written response to the 

State’s I.R.E. 404(b) notice. 

At trial, Ruggiero made an oral motion in limine to exclude testimony from the 

prosecutor of the misdemeanor case, arguing the prosecutor’s testimony was not relevant to 

prove an element of the crime--that Ruggiero intended to produce the letters as evidence or allow 

them to be produced in the misdemeanor case. Ruggiero also argued that the prosecutor’s 

testimony would be prejudicial and confuse the jury. The district court denied the motion in 

limine finding the prosecutor’s testimony was relevant to establish there was a proceeding or 

inquiry authorized by law, which is an element of the offense. The district court also found 
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evidence regarding intent to publish for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose would be relevant, and 

the prosecutor could supply context as to what the proceeding was and how the letters could have 

affected that proceeding. 

Five witnesses testified at Ruggiero’s trial for falsifying evidence. The prosecutor from 

the misdemeanor stalking case testified she had prosecuted Ruggiero for second degree stalking. 

The magistrate assigned to that misdemeanor case testified the charge was a second degree 

stalking case, memorable for being “Jerry Springer-ish.” Ruggiero’s ex-wife testified Ruggiero 

owned a typewriter and she witnessed Ruggiero typing documents during the relevant time 

period. Ruggiero’s ex-wife also testified she specifically saw the letter admitted by the State 

which was purported to be from the victim, and she had observed Ruggiero spray perfume on the 

letter to make it “smell like a female.” The detective who interrogated Ruggiero about the letters 

testified Ruggiero acknowledged he wrote the letters to get out of trouble. The victim of the 

stalking case also testified, describing Ruggiero’s conduct that resulted in her filing a police 

report and the subsequent second degree stalking charge. 

During the falsifying evidence trial, the judge admitted the letters into evidence subject to 

being stricken. After the State rested its case, Ruggiero moved to strike the letters, arguing there 

was insufficient foundation laid to admit the letters. The district court held, “I think the 

foundation for a letter, for a unique document, can be provided by circumstantial evidence. And 

I think the fact that it’s aimed at side-railing a particular case is sufficient. So I am removing the 

restrictions. The exhibits are admitted without limitation.” Ruggiero was convicted of three 

felony counts of preparing false evidence in violation of I.C. § 18-2602. Ruggiero timely 

appeals.

II.

ANALYSIS

Ruggiero raises two issues on appeal. First, Ruggiero argues the district court abused its 

discretion in admitting the letters into evidence because there was insufficient foundation for the 

letters. Second, Ruggiero argues the trial court erred in allowing witnesses to testify regarding 

Ruggiero’s past stalking charge without performing the balancing test required under I.R.E. 403. 
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A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting the Letters Into 

Evidence

Ruggiero argues the district court improperly admitted the letters without adequate 

foundation because there was insufficient evidence to show a connection between Ruggiero and 

the letters. The State argues that because proving the letters were submitted to the judge in 

Ruggiero’s misdemeanor case was an element of the offense, the testimony of the magistrate and 

the prosecutor who participated in the misdemeanor case was sufficient to lay foundation for 

admission of the three letters. Alternatively, the State contends that even if it was required to 

establish that Ruggiero was the author of the letters, the testimony from Ruggiero’s ex-wife, the 

victim of the stalking case, and the detective provided sufficient foundation. 

Ruggiero correctly recognized in his briefing that whether there is a proper foundation 

upon which to admit evidence is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. The applicable 

appellate standard of review, however, requires the appellate court to conduct a multi-tiered 

inquiry to determine whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, 

acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 

applicable to the specific choices before it, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 

State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). Failure to address this multitiered inquiry is “fatally deficient” to the party’s case. State v. Kralovec, ___ Idaho ___ n.2, ___ 

P.3d ___ n.2 (Jan. 23, 2017); see also Cummings v. Stephens, 160 Idaho 847, 855, 380 P.3d 168, 

174 (2016). Here, Ruggiero failed to address the multi-tiered inquiry required for appellate 

review of a claim of abuse of discretion. Ruggiero did not provide the relevant standard of 

appellate review and similarly failed to identify which prong he alleges the district court 

violated. Nonetheless, it appears Ruggiero is arguing the trial court violated the second prong of 

the Hedger analysis, when he argues the trial court erroneously admitted letters which had not 

been authenticated and lacked sufficient foundation. As such, we will address the claim.

Idaho Rules of Evidence require “authentication or identification as a condition precedent 

to admissibility,” which “is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in 

question is what its proponent claims.” I.R.E. 901(a). Idaho Rule of Evidence 901(b) contains 

an illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of suggested methods of identification, such as 

“[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be” or 

examination of the evidence’s “distinctive characteristics and the like,” including “[a]ppearance, 

contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction 
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with circumstances.” I.R.E. 901(b)(1), (4). Whether there is a proper foundation upon which to 

admit evidence is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. Harris, 151 Idaho at 770, 264 P.3d 

at 409. 

Here, the magistrate testified the three letters being offered into evidence were the same 

letters he received in Ruggiero’s stalking case. The prosecutor also testified the letter marked as 

State’s Exhibit 1 was one of the letters she received in Ruggiero’s stalking case. Thus, an 

adequate foundation was laid for the admission of the letters because the testimony was 

sufficient to show the letters were connected to the alleged criminal behavior that formed the 

basis of the falsifying evidence charge. However, even if, as Ruggiero argues here, evidence 

tying Ruggiero to the letters was necessary before the exhibits could be admitted, that foundation 

was provided. Ruggiero’s ex-wife testified Ruggiero owned a typewriter, and she witnessed 

Ruggiero typing documents during the relevant time period. The ex-wife also testified she 

specifically saw the letter admitted as State’s Exhibit 1, which purported to be from the victim, 

and she had observed Ruggiero spray perfume on the letter to make it “smell like a female.” The 

detective who interrogated Ruggiero about the letters testified that Ruggiero acknowledged he 

wrote the letters to get out of trouble. Taken together, this evidence provides a sufficient 

foundation that Ruggiero wrote the letters and for the letters to be admitted in the trial. 

B. The District Court Did Not Err in Admitting Evidence of Ruggiero’s Prior Conduct

In his brief, Ruggiero’s issue on appeal is: “Did the trial court err in allowing witnesses 

for the prosecution to testify regarding past charges without performing the required balancing 

test to determine relevance and prejudicial effect?” In essence, Ruggiero claims the district court 

did not comply with the requirements of I.R.E. 403 before admitting the evidence. Ruggiero’s 

argument section, however, asserts the district court violated I.R.E. 404(b) by admitting detailed 

testimony about Ruggiero’s past stalking charge. Ruggiero further argues the witness testimony 

was irrelevant, and even if relevant, its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 

It is within Ruggiero’s I.R.E. 404(b) argument that he contends the district court abused its 

discretion by failing to conduct an I.R.E. 403 balancing test before admitting the testimony. The 

State asserts it is unclear on appeal what evidence Ruggiero claims was improperly admitted 

because Ruggiero did not cite to specific testimony or any particular objection. Further, the State 

contends Ruggiero’s I.R.E. 404(b) claim on appeal is not preserved because Ruggiero did not 

make an I.R.E. 404(b) objection at trial. 
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Three different witnesses provided testimony about Ruggiero’s prior stalking charge. In

his opening brief, Ruggiero did not identify which portions of the testimony he found to be 

erroneously admitted; instead, he made only generalized assertions about the erroneous 

admission of the testimony. A general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district 

court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue. 

Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442, 445, 263 P.2d 990, 991 (1953). This Court will not search the 

record on appeal for error and we address only the three specific objections and testimony

Ruggiero addressed in his reply brief.

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 See Suits v. Idaho Bd. of Prof’l Discipline, 138 Idaho 

397, 400, 64 P.3d 323, 326 (2003). 

1. The district court correctly determined the testimony of the prosecutor in 

Ruggiero’s previous stalking case was admissible

a. Ruggiero’s claim that the district court did not engage in an 

I.R.E. 403 balancing test before admitting the prosecutor’s testimony

is not supported by the record

At trial, Ruggiero moved in limine to prevent the State from offering the prosecutor’s 

testimony that Ruggiero was previously charged with second degree stalking, arguing the 

testimony would be irrelevant and prejudicial. The district court ruled on Ruggiero’s motion in 

the following matter: 

I’m not going to grant the motion in limine. And that’s because the Idaho code 

section that is relevant in this case states that every person guilty of preparing any 

false or antedated book, paper, record, or instrument in writing, or other matter or 

thing, with intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced, for any fraudulent or 

 1 Although in his reply brief, Ruggiero listed the three pieces of testimony he argues were 

erroneously admitted, as the Idaho Supreme Court held in Shepherd v. Shepherd, 161 Idaho 14, 

20, 383 P.3d 693, 699 (2016):

A reviewing court looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the issues presented 

because those are the arguments and authority to which the respondent has an 

opportunity to respond in the respondent’s brief. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 

708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). Consequently, this Court will not consider 

arguments raised for the first time in the appellant’s reply brief. Myers v. 

Workmen’s Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508, 95 P.3d 977, 990 (2004). 

Ruggiero’s claim of error in his opening brief is a generalized assertion that the district court 

erred in admitting witness testimony regarding the prior stalking charge. In his reply brief, 

Ruggiero listed three instances where he claims testimony was erroneously admitted. Generally, 

raising these additional arguments in a reply brief would preclude the consideration of those 

arguments by this Court. See Shepherd, 161 Idaho at 20, 383 P.3d at 699. However, because the 

State addressed the claims, this Court will also address them.
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deceitful purpose as genuine or true upon any trial, proceeding, or inquiry, 

whatever, authorized by law, is guilty of a felony. 

In order to prove that, the State does have to establish that there was a 

trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law. And so that is an element of the 

case. And a prosecutor in a criminal proceeding is a person who is aware that 

there is a proceeding or inquiry authorized by law or trial. And so it is relevant 

for that purpose.

. . . I think you’re correct that the fraudulent or deceitful purpose, there 

has to be an intent to publish a fraudulent or deceitful purpose. But I think part of 

it is to include what the proceeding is, how this evidence could have affected that 

proceeding, inquiry, or whatever. 

And so there needs to be context supplied by the witnesses. And I think 

it’s fair for that purpose. 

During the prosecutor’s testimony, Ruggiero made no objections to any of the prosecutor’s 

specific statements. 

Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 

the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. I.R.E. 403; State 

v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009). The Idaho Supreme Court has 

previously explained the weighing process that a district court must use in determining whether 

to admit or exclude evidence under I.R.E. 403: 

The rule creates a balancing test. On one hand, the trial judge must 

measure the probative worth of the proffered evidence. The trial judge, in 

determining probative worth, focuses upon the degree of relevance and 

materiality of the evidence and the need for it on the issue on which it is to be 

introduced. At the other end of the equation, the trial judge must consider 

whether the evidence amounts to unfair prejudice. . . . Only after using this 

balancing test, may a trial judge use his discretion to properly admit or exclude 

the proffered evidence.

Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 110, 753 P.2d 1253, 1256 (1987) (citations omitted). 

Evidence should be excluded as unfairly prejudicial if it invites inordinate appeal to lines of 

reasoning outside of the evidence or emotions which are irrelevant to the decision-making 

process. State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 604, 809 P.2d 455, 465 (1991). A lower court’s 

determination under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to be an abuse 

of discretion. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 (1991); State v. Clark, 115 

Idaho 1056, 1059, 772 P.2d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 1989). When a trial court’s discretionary 

decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: 

(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the 

lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
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standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its 

decision by an exercise of reason. Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600, 768 P.2d at 1333. 

The Supreme Court held that it is an abuse of discretion to admit or exclude evidence 

without conducting the I.R.E. 403 balancing test. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 

720, 722 (2010). In Ruiz, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that a witness testified 

against him to avoid a mandatory minimum sentence. Id. The district court excluded the 

evidence. Id. at 470, 248 P.3d at 721. On review, the Court explained that although the district 

court acknowledged the evidence was relevant, it abused its discretion because “[t]o exclude 

evidence under Rule 403, the trial court must address whether the probative value is substantially 

outweighed by one of the considerations listed in the Rule. The district court here did not 

conduct that analysis. It merely said, ‘You can’t talk about minimum mandatories.’” Ruiz, 150 

Idaho at 471, 248 P.3d at 722 (citation omitted). 

In this case, the record demonstrates that before trial the district court properly complied 

with the requirements of I.R.E. 403 when determining whether testimony regarding Ruggiero’s 

prior stalking charge was admissible. At the I.R.E. 404(b) notice hearing, the district court

explicitly recognized testimony regarding Ruggiero’s prior stalking charge was relevant to 

establish an element of the offense--that there was a prior proceeding. The court then implicitly 

engaged in the I.R.E. 403 balancing test when it concluded, “there’s utterly no way to avoid this. 

It’s part of the charge itself. It is essential.” The district court’s statements indicate the district 

court weighed the relevance of the evidence against its prejudicial effects. See State v. Floyd, 

159 Idaho 370, 372, 360 P.3d 379, 381 (Ct. App. 2015) (appellate courts are required to examine 

the record to determine implicit findings which would support the trial court’s order and such 

implicit findings should be overturned only if not supported by substantial evidence). Thus, 

before trial, the district court conducted an I.R.E. 403 balancing test and determined testimony 

concerning Ruggiero’s past stalking charge was admissible. 

Then, at trial, when Ruggiero made a motion in limine to exclude the prosecutor’s 

testimony about Ruggiero’s past stalking charge, the district court found the testimony of the 

prosecutor concerning Ruggiero’s past stalking charge was relevant and “fair for that purpose.” 

In determining the evidence was fairly admitted to establish the fact of the prior proceeding, the 

district court implicitly balanced the relevance of the testimony against its unduly prejudicial 

affect. Moreover, the testimony Ruggiero moved in limine to exclude contained the same 
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subject matter the district court had ruled was admissible in the pretrial I.R.E. 404(b) hearing. 

Thus, because the district court had already weighed the relevance of the prosecutor’s testimony 

against its prejudicial effects and determined that the testimony regarding Ruggiero’s stalking 

charge was admissible, the district court properly conducted an I.R.E. 403 balancing test before 

admitting the prosecutor’s testimony. 

b. Ruggiero’s claim that the district court erred in admitting the 

testimony of the prosecutor pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) is not preserved 

for appeal

Ruggiero also argues the prosecutor’s testimony regarding Ruggiero’s past stalking 

charge should have been excluded pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b). The State argues because Ruggiero 

did not object to the prosecutor’s testimony based on I.R.E. 404(b), Ruggiero is precluded from 

challenging the admission of the prosecutor’s testimony pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b). 

Before trial, Ruggiero did not generally or specifically object to the prosecutor’s 

testimony on I.R.E. 404(b) grounds or make any specific I.R.E. 404(b) objections during the 

prosecutor’s testimony. Instead, prior to trial, he generally objected to the testimony of the 

prosecutor on relevance and prejudice grounds. Idaho Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) provides that 

error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits evidence unless a “timely objection or 

motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground 

was not apparent from the context.” See also State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 72, 44 P.3d 1122, 

1127 (2002). Although Ruggiero argues in his reply brief that arguing relevance and prejudice is 

essentially making an I.R.E. 404(b) objection, that argument pre-supposes there was a specific 

objection from which we could determine the context. Because there was no specific objection

to the prosecutor’s testimony, there is no context for us to consider. As such, Ruggiero has not 

preserved a claim that the prosecutor’s testimony was erroneously admitted pursuant to 

I.R.E. 404(b). 

2. The district court correctly determined the testimony of the victim was 

admissible

a. Ruggiero’s claim that the district court did not engage in an 

I.R.E. 403 balancing test before admitting the victim’s testimony is 

not supported by the record

Ruggiero asserts the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the victim to 

respond to the question: “Did the relationship ever change, or did conduct ever escalate?” 

Ruggiero contends the district court abused its discretion by not balancing the prejudicial effect 
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of the victim’s prospective answer against its probative value as required by I.R.E. 403. 

Ruggiero relies on Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 248 P.3d 720 to support his argument. The State argues 

Ruggiero’s argument is contradicted by the record. 

The record demonstrates the district court properly complied with the requirements of 

I.R.E. 403 by explicitly recognizing the testimony from the victim regarding Ruggiero’s past 

stalking charge was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. At trial, the State asked the victim 

whether her relationship with Ruggiero changed or escalated. Ruggiero’s trial counsel objected 

and stated: “Objection, Your Honor, prejudicial. It has no relevance to anything to do with this 

case.” The district court overruled the objection and reasoned, “because the nature of the charge 

is that there was preparation of false evidence for a proceeding, then it is relevant and admissible 

to discuss that there was a proceeding.” The district court allowed the State to proceed with 

questioning and concluded: “It is relevant. And I don’t think it’s unduly prejudicial. It’s 

something we addressed pretrial.” By finding the testimony relevant and then determining the 

evidence was not unduly prejudicial, the district court determined the probative value of the 

testimony was not outweighed against the danger of unfair prejudice. Furthermore, the district 

court also referenced its pretrial ruling wherein it determined that evidence regarding Ruggiero’s 

past stalking charge was admissible and not outweighed by undue prejudice. Thus, because the 

district court conducted an I.R.E. 403 balancing test, it did not abuse its discretion. 

b. Ruggiero’s claim that the district court erred in admitting the 

testimony of the victim pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) is not preserved for 

appeal

Ruggiero argues the district court violated I.R.E. 404(b) when it allowed testimony of 

Ruggiero’s prior stalking charge. The State argues Ruggiero did not preserve his I.R.E. 404(b) 

argument on appeal because he did not make an I.R.E. 404(b) objection at trial. In his reply 

brief, Ruggiero asserts that although his objection did not specifically mention I.R.E. 404(b), the 

basis for the objection was apparent from the context, and therefore, the issue is preserved for 

appeal. During the trial, Ruggiero challenged two specific pieces of testimony. The first 

objection was as follows:

State: Okay. Did the relationship ever change, or did conduct ever escalate?

Counsel: Objection. Objection, Your Honor, prejudicial. It has no relevance to

anything to do with this case. 

Preliminarily, we note that although Ruggiero challenged the testimony generally, he did

not challenge this particular ruling on the grounds the district court incorrectly determined the 
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evidence was relevant. A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is 

lacking. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). By failing to challenge 

the basis on which the evidence was admitted, Ruggiero waived any claim that the district court 

erred in admitting this specific piece of testimony on the grounds of relevance. 

Instead of challenging the specific answer on relevance grounds, Ruggiero argues on 

appeal the admission of this specific piece of testimony on the grounds that it violated 

I.R.E. 404(b). However, as to this specific piece of testimony, Ruggiero provided no argument 

or authority that this specific answer violated I.R.E. 404(b), and as a result, Ruggiero waived 

review of this issue. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970. 

Ruggiero’s second objection was as follows:

State: At some point, did you feel the need to call law enforcement or file a 

report?

Victim: I did. 

State: When did you do that?

Victim: I did that on the day that [Ruggiero] told me he had my license plate 

memorized, which he recited to me, described the clothes that I was 

wearing. 

Counsel: Objection, Your Honor. We will stipulate there was a proceeding. We 

can’t retry what happened. And this is already trying to turn this into a 

stalking case. And, at this point, we’ll stipulate there was a court 

proceeding or a court filed.

The district court overruled the objection. Notably, Ruggiero’s objection to the 

admission of the victim’s testimony did not articulate a specific ground for the objection. In his 

reply brief, Ruggiero argues that although he did not specifically mention I.R.E. 404(b), it is 

clear from the context, especially given his reference to “retry what happened,” that the objection 

was pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b). 

We disagree that it is apparent from the context that Ruggiero was objecting pursuant to 

I.R.E. 404(b) because regarding other testimony about his prior stalking charge, Ruggiero 

objected on relevance or prejudice grounds, or stood silent. Ruggiero’s statements in support of 

his objection are insufficient for this Court to conclude the objection was pursuant to 

I.R.E. 404(b). This Court will not speculate upon which basis Ruggiero objected or meant to 

object, nor will we analyze all potential objections to determine whether Ruggiero may have had 

some viable basis for the objection. See State v. Martinez, 128 Idaho 104, 110, 910 P.2d 776, 

782 (Ct. App. 1995) (unable to review whether the district court erred in admitting testimony 
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because defendant’s trial counsel did not state the specific ground for the objection and the basis 

for the objection could not be determined from the record). Thus, because Ruggiero did not state 

a specific ground for his objection and the basis for his objection is not clear from the context, 

we cannot conclude the district court erred in admitting the evidence. 

C. Any Error Was Harmless 

Finally, Ruggiero argues admitting the victim’s testimony was not harmless; he does not 

make such a claim in regard to the prosecutor’s or magistrate’s testimony. The State argues even 

if the district court erred in admitting the victim’s testimony, the error was harmless. Error is not 

reversible unless it is prejudicial. State v. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 169, 171, 667 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. 

App. 1983). With limited exceptions, even constitutional error is not necessarily prejudicial 

error. Id. Thus, we examine whether the alleged error complained of in the present case was 

harmless. See State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 578, 114 P.3d 133, 136 (Ct. App. 2005). 

Here, over defense counsel’s objection, the district court allowed the victim to testify that 

Ruggiero thought he had a relationship with the victim and thought he was going to marry the 

victim. The jury was instructed that in order to find Ruggiero guilty of falsifying evidence in 

violation of I.C. § 18-2602, the jury must find Ruggiero: (1) “prepared a false paper or 

instrument in writing;” (2) “with the intent to produce it or allow it to be produced for any 

fraudulent or deceitful purpose as genuine or true, to wit, a false letter;” and (3) “upon any trial, 

proceeding or inquiry, authorized by law.” The purpose of the victim’s testimony was to show 

there was a trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law. However, the jury had already heard 

from multiple witnesses about Ruggiero’s prior stalking charge. The prosecutor from the 

stalking case testified she was familiar with Ruggiero because she previously prosecuted 

Ruggiero’s misdemeanor second degree stalking charge. The prosecutor also testified that upon 

receiving the false letters, she had concerns because she knew the victim’s fears and position. 

The magistrate assigned to Ruggiero’s prior case testified the charge was a second degree 

stalking case, memorable for being “Jerry Springer-ish.” Ruggiero’s ex-wife testified Ruggiero 

owned a typewriter and she witnessed Ruggiero typing documents during the relevant time 

period. Ruggiero’s ex-wife also testified she specifically saw the letter admitted as State’s 

Exhibit 1, which purported to be from the victim, and she had observed Ruggiero spray perfume 

on the letter to make it “smell like a female.” The jury also heard from the detective who 

interrogated Ruggiero about the letters and he testified Ruggiero acknowledged he wrote the 
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letters to get out of trouble. Because the jury was presented with testimony about the type and 

nature of Ruggiero’s charge, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the 

victim’s testimony did not contribute to the verdict. Thus, to the extent the admission of the 

victim’s testimony was error, it was harmless error. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the letters allegedly written by 

Ruggiero because sufficient foundation was laid. Ruggiero waived review of his claim on appeal 

that the district court erred in admitting the prosecutor’s testimony because he failed to provide 

argument or authority. Because Ruggiero did not state a specific ground for his objection and 

the basis for his objection cannot be determined from the record, we are unable to review 

whether the district court erred in admitting the victim’s testimony. Further, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in admitting the victim’s testimony because it conducted an I.R.E. 403 

balancing test. Finally, even if the district court did err in admitting the victim’s testimony, any 

error was harmless. Therefore, we affirm Ruggiero’s judgment of conviction.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge GUTIERREZ CONCUR.