II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1171 

To halt Saudi support for institutions that fund, train, incite, encourage, 

or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, and to secure full Saudi 

cooperation in the investigation of terrorist incidents, and for other 

purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 6, 2005 

Mr. SPECTER (for himself, Mr. BAYH, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. JOHNSON, Mrs. 

MURRAY, Mr. FEINGOLD, and Mr. WYDEN) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To halt Saudi support for institutions that fund, train, incite, 

encourage, or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, 

and to secure full Saudi cooperation in the investigation 

of terrorist incidents, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Saudi Arabia Account5 ability Act of 2005’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 
2 

•S 1171 IS

1 (1) United Nations Security Council Resolution 

2 1373 (2001) mandates that all states ‘‘refrain from 

3 providing any form of support, active or passive, to 

4 entities or persons involved in terrorist acts’’, take 

5 ‘‘the necessary steps to prevent the commission of 

6 terrorist acts’’, and ‘‘deny safe haven to those who 

7 finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts’’. 

8 (2) The Council on Foreign Relations concluded 

9 in an October 2002 report on terrorist financing 

10 that ‘‘[f]or years, individuals and charities based in 

11 Saudi Arabia have been the most important source 

12 of funds for al-Qaeda, and for years, Saudi officials 

13 have turned a blind eye to this problem’’. 

14 (3) In a June 2004 report entitled ‘‘Update on 

15 the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing’’, 

16 the Council on Foreign Relations reported that 

17 ‘‘[w]e find it regrettable and unacceptable that since 

18 September 11, 2001, we know of not a single Saudi 

19 donor of funds to terrorist groups who has been 

20 publicly punished’’. 

21 (4) According to the final report of the Na22 tional Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

23 United States, when asked where terrorist leaders 

24 would likely locate their bases, military officers and 
3 

•S 1171 IS

1 government officials repeatedly listed Saudi Arabia 

2 as a prime location. 

3 (5) A report released on January 28, 2005 by 

4 Freedom House’s Center for Religious Freedom 

5 found that Saudi Arabia is the state most respon6 sible for the propagation of material promoting ha7 tred, intolerance, and violence within United States 

8 mosques and Islamic centers, and that these publica9 tions are often official publications of a Saudi min10 istry or distributed by the Embassy of Saudi Arabia 

11 in Washington, D.C. 

12 (6) During a July 2003 hearing on terrorism 

13 before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology 

14 and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Ju15 diciary of the Senate, David Aufhauser, General 

16 Counsel of the Treasury Department, stated that 

17 Saudi Arabia is, in many cases, the ‘‘epicenter’’ of 

18 financing for terrorism. 

19 (7) The New York Times, citing United States 

20 and Israeli sources, reported on September 17, 

21 2003, that at least 50 percent of the current oper22 ating budget of Hamas comes from ‘‘people in Saudi 

23 Arabia’’. 

24 (8) The Middle East Media Research Institute 

25 concluded in a July 3, 2003, report on Saudi sup-
4 

•S 1171 IS

1 port for Palestinian terrorists that ‘‘for decades, the 

2 royal family of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has 

3 been the main financial supporter of Palestinian 

4 groups fighting Israel’’. The report notes specifically 

5 that Saudi-sponsored organizations have funneled 

6 over $4,000,000,000 to finance the Palestinian 

7 intifada that began in September 2000. 

8 (9) A joint committee of the Select Committee 

9 on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Se10 lect Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep11 resentatives issued a report on July 24, 2003, that 

12 quotes various United States Government personnel 

13 who complained that the Saudis refused to cooperate 

14 in the investigation of Osama bin Laden and his net15 work both before and after the September 11, 2001, 

16 terrorist attacks. 

17 (10) After the 1996 bombing of the Khobar 

18 Towers housing complex at Dahran, Saudi Arabia, 

19 which killed 19 United States Air Force personnel 

20 and wounded approximately 400 people, the Govern21 ment of Saudi Arabia refused to allow United States 

22 officials to question individuals held in detention by 

23 the Saudis in connection with the attack. 

24 (11) As recounted by counterterrorism officials 

25 in a September 2003 issue of Time Magazine, Saudi 
5 

•S 1171 IS

1 Arabia denied United States officials access to sev2 eral suspects in the custody of the Government of 

3 Saudi Arabia, including a Saudi Arabian citizen in 

4 detention for months who had knowledge of exten5 sive plans to inject poison gas in the New York City 

6 subway system. 

7 (12) The United States Commission on Inter8 national Religious Freedom has reported that Saudi 

9 Arabian Government-funded textbooks used both in 

10 Saudi Arabia and also in North American Islamic 

11 schools and mosques have been found to encourage 

12 incitement to violence against non-Muslims. 

13 (13) Many religious institutions that receive 

14 funding from Saudi Arabia, and the literature dis15 tributed by such institutions, teach a message of 

16 hate and intolerance that provides an ideological 

17 basis for anti-Western terrorism. The effects of such 

18 teachings are evidenced by the fact that Osama bin 

19 Laden and 15 of the 19 individuals who participated 

20 in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were 

21 citizens of Saudi Arabia. 

22 (14) There are indications that, since the May 

23 12, 2003, suicide bombings in Riyadh, the Govern24 ment of Saudi Arabia is making a more serious ef25 fort to combat terrorism. 
6 

•S 1171 IS

1 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

2 It is the sense of Congress that— 

3 (1) it is imperative that the Government of 

4 Saudi Arabia immediately and unconditionally— 

5 (A) provide complete, unrestricted, and un6 obstructed cooperation to the United States, in7 cluding the unsolicited sharing of relevant intel8 ligence in a consistent and timely fashion, in 

9 the investigation of groups and individuals that 

10 are suspected of financing, supporting, plotting, 

11 or committing an act of terror against United 

12 States citizens anywhere in the world, including 

13 within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; 

14 (B) permanently close all charities, schools, 

15 or other organizations or institutions in the 

16 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that fund, train, in17 cite, encourage, or in any other way aid and 

18 abet terrorism anywhere in the world (hereafter 

19 in this Act referred to as ‘‘Saudi-based terror 

20 organizations’’), including by means of pro21 viding support for the families of individuals 

22 who have committed acts of terrorism; 

23 (C) end funding or other support by the 

24 Government of Saudi Arabia for charities, 

25 schools, and any other organizations or institu26 tions outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that 
7 

•S 1171 IS

1 train, incite, encourage, or in any other way aid 

2 and abet terrorism anywhere in the world (here3 after in this Act referred to as ‘‘offshore terror 

4 organizations’’), including by means of pro5 viding support for the families of individuals 

6 who have committed acts of terrorism; and 

7 (D) block all funding from private Saudi 

8 citizens and entities to any Saudi-based terror 

9 organization or offshore terrorism organization; 

10 and 

11 (2) the President, in deciding whether to make 

12 the certification under section 4, should judge 

13 whether the Government of Saudi Arabia has contin14 ued and sufficiently expanded the efforts to combat 

15 terrorism that it redoubled after the May 12, 2003, 

16 bombing in Riyadh. 

17 SEC. 4. SANCTIONS. 

18 (a) RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORTS AND DIPLOMATIC

19 TRAVEL.—Unless the President makes the certification 

20 described in subsection (c), the President shall take the 

21 following actions: 

22 (1) Prohibit the export to the Kingdom of 

23 Saudi Arabia, and prohibit the issuance of a license 

24 for the export to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, of— 
8 

•S 1171 IS

1 (A) any defense articles or defense services 

2 on the United States Munitions List under sec3 tion 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 

4 U.S.C. 2778) for which special export controls 

5 are warranted under such Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 

6 et seq.); and 

7 (B) any item identified on the Commerce 

8 Control List maintained under part 774 of title 

9 15, Code of Federal Regulations. 

10 (2) Restrict travel of Saudi diplomats assigned 

11 to Washington, District of Columbia, New York, 

12 New York, the Saudi Consulate General in Houston, 

13 or the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles to a 25-mile 

14 radius of Washington, District of Columbia, New 

15 York, New York, the Saudi Consulate General in 

16 Houston, or the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, re17 spectively. 

18 (b) WAIVER.—The President may waive the applica19 tion of subsection (a) if the President— 

20 (1) determines that it is in the national security 

21 interest of the United States to do so; and 

22 (2) submits to the appropriate congressional 

23 committees a report that contains the reasons for 

24 such determination. 
9 

•S 1171 IS

1 (c) CERTIFICATION.—The President shall transmit to 

2 the appropriate congressional committees a certification of 

3 any determination made by the President after the date 

4 of the enactment of this Act that the Government of Saudi 

5 Arabia— 

6 (1) is fully cooperating with the United States 

7 in investigating and preventing terrorist attacks; 

8 (2) has permanently closed all Saudi-based ter9 ror organizations; 

10 (3) has ended any funding or other support by 

11 the Government of Saudi Arabia for any offshore 

12 terror organization; and 

13 (4) has exercised maximum efforts to block all 

14 funding from private Saudi citizens and entities to 

15 offshore terrorist organizations. 

16 SEC. 5. REPORT. 

17 (a) REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT.—Not later than 6 

18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 

19 every 12 months thereafter until the President makes the 

20 certification described in section 4(c), the Secretary of 

21 State shall submit to the appropriate congressional com22 mittees a report on the progress made by the Government 

23 of Saudi Arabia toward meeting the conditions described 

24 in paragraphs (1) through (4) of section 4(c). 
10 

•S 1171 IS

1 (b) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection 

2 (a) shall be in unclassified form but may include a classi3 fied annex. 

4 SEC. 6. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE5 FINED. 

6 In this Act, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional com7 mittees’’ means the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

8 the Senate and the Committee on International Relations 

9 of the House of Representatives. 

Æ