2021 UT 66

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In re Estate of JOHN CLIFFORD HEATER

GINA MALLOUGH KIRKLAND

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN CARLON,

Respondent.

No. 20200441

Heard May 10, 2021

Filed November 12, 2021

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Second District, Farmington

The Honorable David M. Connors

No. 083700165

Attorneys:

Brent D. Wride, Salt Lake City, for petitioner

Ben W. Lieberman, Salt Lake City, for respondent

JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE,

JUSTICE HIMONAS, and JUSTICE PEARCE joined.

JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 Petitioner Gina Mallough Kirkland and her brother

Garret Heater are co-personal representatives of the intestate 

estate of their deceased father John Clifford Heater (Heater). 
In re Estate of JOHN CLIFFORD HEATER

Opinion of the Court

2

Kirkland and Garret1 have litigated the administration of the 

estate for a number of years. During this litigation, Respondent 

John Carlon intervened, claiming Heater was his biological father 

and that he is therefore an additional heir to Heater’s estate.

Genetic testing proved him right. And the district court entered 

an order determining that Kirkland, Garret, and Carlon are the 

heirs to Heater’s estate. Kirkland appealed, and the court of 

appeals affirmed.

¶2 The case is now before us on certiorari. Kirkland argues 

that the establishment of a parent-child relationship in a probate 

case is governed by the Utah Uniform Parentage Act. And she 

contends that under the Parentage Act, Carlon’s presumed father 

is not Heater but the man who was married to his mother at the 

time of his birth. She further argues that the Probate Code 

prohibits Carlon from inheriting from two fathers. We reject 

Kirkland’s statutory arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶3 John Clifford Heater died intestate in 2008. His daughter

and son, Kirkland and Garret, were Heater’s only known heirs at 

the time of his death and are the co-personal representatives of his 

estate.

¶4 In 2016, with the litigation over the estate still ongoing, 

Garret connected with John Carlon through social media. Garret 

told Carlon that he thought Carlon might be Heater’s biological 

son.

¶5 When Carlon was born, his mother Myrol Carlon was 

married to Thomas Carlon. The two remained married until 

Thomas died in 2007. But Myrol used to work for Heater and had 

a sexual relationship with him during the time Carlon was 

conceived. According to Carlon, Heater treated him and Myrol 

“in a manner that was not consistent with merely an employer 

and employee,” showing “great interest” in the two of them. For 

instance, Heater took Myrol to some of her prenatal appointments 

when she was pregnant with Carlon, bought her maternity 

__________________________________________________________

1 Because several of the people involved in this case share the 

same last name, we refer to some individuals by their first name 

with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality.
Cite as: 2021 UT 66

Opinion of the Court

3

clothes, and drove her to the hospital when she was in labor. 

Heater also paid for Carlon to have a live-in nanny as a child and 

sent Carlon birthday cards with $100 every year through Carlon’s 

college years and marriage. This led Carlon to “suspect[] for years 

that John Clifford Heater could be [his] father.”

¶6 After Garret and Carlon’s social media discussion, Carlon

moved to intervene in the probate case. He stated that he believed 

Heater was his biological father and, if true, that he was an heir to

Heater’s estate. Garret supported the motion but Kirkland 

opposed it.

¶7 The district court permitted Carlon to intervene for the

limited purpose of obtaining DNA testing. The DNA test results 

confirmed that Garret and Carlon were biological half-siblings.2

Carlon had previously submitted to the court DNA test results 

that established he and his purported biological brother (Thomas 

and Myrol’s son) did not share the same biological father. Carlon 

then renewed his motion to intervene in the probate case, which 

Kirkland opposed and the district court granted.

¶8 Carlon moved for summary judgment, seeking (1) a 

determination that he was Heater’s biological son and (2) an order 

determining the heirs to Heater’s estate. The district court granted 

summary judgment in Carlon’s favor, finding first that Heater 

was Carlon’s biological father and ultimately entering an order 

naming Kirkland, Garret, and Carlon as the heirs to Heater’s 

estate. Because the court had determined Carlon was Heater’s 

biological son, the court’s order said “no further proceedings 

[were] necessary” to determine heirship.

¶9 Kirkland appealed, arguing that the district court had 

erred in its interpretation of the Probate Code in two ways. She

first argued that under the Probate Code, the parent-child 

relationship must be determined in accordance with the Parentage 

Act. Kirkland v. Carlon (In re Est. of Heater), 2020 UT App 70, ¶ 8, 

466 P.3d 728. And she asserted that under the Parentage Act, 

Carlon’s father is presumed to be the man who was married to his 

mother at the time of his birth—Thomas Carlon—and it was too 

late for Carlon to rebut this presumption because Thomas is 

deceased. Id. ¶¶ 10, 17. Second, she argued that the Probate Code 

__________________________________________________________

2 Kirkland refused to submit to a DNA test.
In re Estate of JOHN CLIFFORD HEATER

Opinion of the Court

4

prohibits a child from inheriting from more than one set of 

parents, so Carlon could not inherit from two fathers. Id. ¶¶ 8, 16–

17. The court of appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed

the district court. Id. ¶¶ 21–22.

¶10 Kirkland petitioned for certiorari, which we granted. We 

exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 “On certiorari, this court reviews the decision of the court 

of appeals for correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions 

of law.” State v. Marquina, 2020 UT 66, ¶ 24, 478 P.3d 37 (citation 

omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶12 On certiorari, Kirkland contends the court of appeals 

erred in affirming the district court’s order determining Carlon is 

Heater’s child and an heir to Heater’s estate.3 But before we 

proceed to the merits of this matter, we must first address 

whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to do so.

I. JURISDICTION

¶13 Although the district court granted summary judgment 

to Carlon and entered an order determining heirs, there are still 

ongoing proceedings in the district court. And for an appellate 

court to have jurisdiction, there must be “no claims pending 

below.” WDIS, LLC v. Hi-Country Ests. Homeowners Ass’n, 2019 UT 

45, ¶ 23, 449 P.3d 171. This is known as the final judgment rule. Id.

¶ 21 (“Under what we refer to as the final judgment rule, an 

‘appeal is improper if it is taken from an order or judgment that is 

not final.’” (citation omitted)).

__________________________________________________________

3 Our order on certiorari identified the question for review as:

“Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the district 

court’s construction and application of the Utah Probate Code and 

Uniform Parentage Act to allow Respondent John Carlon to 

intervene in the probate action and to determine he is an heir of 

John Clifford Heater.” (Emphasis added.) However, Kirkland has 

not made an argument regarding Carlon’s intervention in the 

probate matter, so no issue relating to intervention is before us.
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Opinion of the Court

5

¶14 There are three general exceptions to the final judgment 

rule: (1) “when the legislature provides a statutory avenue for 

appealing nonfinal orders,” Copper Hills Custom Homes, LLC v. 

Countrywide Bank, FSB, 2018 UT 56, ¶ 13, 428 P.3d 1133 (citation 

omitted), (2) interlocutory appeals under rule 5 of the Utah Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, id. ¶ 14, and (3) a district court’s 

certification under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 

id. ¶ 15.

¶15 Kirkland’s notice of appeal was not brought under any of 

these exceptions. But in the notice of appeal, she explained that 

because the order determining heirs said “no further proceedings 

are necessary to determine the heirs of the Estate of John Clifford 

Heater,” it was “final for purposes of appeal” “[u]nder Utah’s 

pragmatic case-by-case approach to finality in probate matters.”

¶16 Both parties cite to precedent from the court of appeals 

supporting this pragmatic approach to determining finality in 

probate matters. See, e.g., Kelly v. West One Trust Co. (In re Est. of 

Morrison), 933 P.2d 1015, 1016–17 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (permitting 

an appeal of an order compelling an estate’s heirs to return 

distributions despite ongoing claims in the district court because 

“Utah has effectively adopted [a] pragmatic, case-by-case 

approach to finality in probate matters”). And both Kirkland and 

Carlon argue that we have effectively endorsed such an approach, 

because Kelly v. West One Trust Co. (In re Estate of Morrison), relied 

on case law from this court concluding an order was final and 

appealable when it “‘resolve[d] an issue of vital importance’ and 

‘conclude[d] a major phase in the process of formal testacy 

proceedings.’” Id. at 1017 (alterations in original) (quoting In re 

Est. of Christensen v. Christensen, 655 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1982)); see 

also id. at 1016–17 (citing First of Denver Mortg. Invs. v. C.N. Zundel 

& Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 528 (Utah 1979); Hayward v. Voorhees (In re 

Est. of Voorhees), 366 P.2d 977, 980 (Utah 1961)).

¶17 But the cases upon which In re Estate of Morrison relied

are in conflict with rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 

Procedure and rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 

And these rules are controlling. See UTAH R. APP. P. 1(a) (“These 

rules govern the procedure before the Supreme Court and the 

Court of Appeals of Utah in all cases.” (emphasis added)); UTAH 

R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in the courts of the 

state of Utah in all actions of a civil nature . . . . These rules govern 

all actions brought after they take effect and all further 
In re Estate of JOHN CLIFFORD HEATER

Opinion of the Court

6

proceedings in actions then pending.”); see also Gillett v. Price, 2006 

UT 24, ¶¶ 7–9, 135 P.3d 861 (explaining that, where “the rules 

provide the source of available relief,” our precedent that held 

otherwise was abrogated); Strand v. Nupetco Assocs. LLC, 2017 UT 

App 55, ¶ 4, 397 P.3d 724 (“Courts are, in short, bound by the text 

of the rule.”).

¶18 The parties argue that the “pragmatic approach” is 

necessary in probate matters because such cases may effectively 

resolve after an important ruling, although the ruling does not 

trigger an entry of final judgment. However, we note that in such

a scenario, an order resolving “an issue of vital importance” that 

did not result in an entry of final judgment could be a candidate 

for rule 54(b) certification or a petition for interlocutory appeal 

under appellate rule 5.

¶19 We take the opportunity to disavow the pragmatic test 

and clarify that a nonfinal order in a probate case may be 

appealed only through the mechanisms delineated in our civil and 

appellate rules or statutory exemptions.4 Under the applicable 

procedural rules, Kirkland should have pursued an interlocutory 

appeal or sought a 54(b) certification from the district court judge. 

However, because she and Carlon relied on case law that allowed

the appeal to go forward, our holding today is prospective only 

and we resolve this case on the merits. See Merrill v. Lab. Comm’n, 

2009 UT 74, ¶ 5, 223 P.3d 1099 (“[T]he court may, in its equitable 

discretion, prohibit or limit retroactive operation of its ruling 

‘where the overruled law has been justifiably relied upon or 

where retroactive operation creates a burden.’” (citation omitted)).

__________________________________________________________

4 We do not dismiss the parties’ arguments about the unique 

nature of probate matters and the more frequent need to appeal 

interlocutory orders. While we view civil rule 54(b) and appellate 

rule 5 as broad enough to address these circumstances, we 

recognize that probate practitioners have an important 

perspective and may see a need to refine these rules in the specific 

context of probate cases. If so, we encourage them to provide us 

or our appropriate standing committees with their concerns.
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Opinion of the Court

7

II. DETERMINING THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP

FOR PURPOSES OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION

¶20 Because Heater died without a surviving spouse, his 

intestate estate is to be divided equally among his descendants 

per capita at each generation. See UTAH CODE § 75-2-103(1)(a). 

“Descendants” at each generation are first determined by “the 

relationship of parent and child at each generation.” Id. § 75-1-

201(9).

¶21 The dispute in this case centers on whether and how 

Carlon may establish a parent-child relationship with Heater 

under the Probate Code. The relevant provision of the Probate 

Code states that “for purposes of intestate succession . . ., an 

individual is the child of the individual’s natural parents, 

regardless of their marital status. The parent and child 

relationship may be established as provided in Title 78B, Chapter 

15, Utah Uniform Parentage Act.” Id. § 75-2-114(1).

¶22 Kirkland argues that the final sentence of subsection 

114(1) means that the parent-child relationship must be 

established in the manner provided in the Parentage Act. And she 

asserts that this disposes of Carlon’s inheritance claim in two 

ways. First, she argues that under the Parentage Act, Thomas is 

presumed to be Carlon’s father because he was married to 

Carlon’s mother at the time of Carlon’s birth. And she contends 

that the only way Carlon can rebut this presumption is through 

the applicable provisions of the Parentage Act. But she argues it is 

now too late for him to do so because Thomas is deceased. 

Second, she contends that even if DNA tests show that Heater is 

Carlon’s biological father, the Probate Code does not allow Carlon 

to inherit from two fathers. And although Kirkland does not 

contend that Carlon actually inherited anything from Thomas, she 

argues that, as a legal matter, Carlon was Thomas’s heir when 

Thomas died and this precludes him from also being Heater’s 

heir.

¶23 We first conclude that the court of appeals correctly held

that subsection 114(1) of the Probate Code does not require 

parentage to be determined only through the Parentage Act. Then 

we determine that, in any event, Carlon satisfied both the Probate 

Code and the Parentage Act in establishing a parent-child 

relationship with Heater. Finally, we explain that the statutory 

one-set-of-parents rule is inapplicable to this case.
In re Estate of JOHN CLIFFORD HEATER

Opinion of the Court

8

A. Subsection 114(1) of the Probate Code

¶24 The Probate Code defines the parent-child relationship 

“for purposes of intestate succession.” UTAH CODE § 75-2-114(1). 

Specifically, it states that “an individual is the child of the 

individual’s natural parents, regardless of their marital status.” Id.

It then provides that “[t]he parent and child relationship may be 

established as provided” by the Parentage Act. Id.

¶25 Kirkland reads this reference to the Parentage Act in the 

second sentence of subsection 114(1) to mean that the Parentage 

Act governs the establishment of the parent-child relationship in a 

probate case, making the description of the parent-child 

relationship in the first sentence of subsection 114(1) irrelevant. 

We reject this argument. We agree with the court of appeals that 

the description of the parent-child relationship in subsection 

114(1) stands on its own and is not overtaken by the subsequent 

reference to the Parentage Act. See Kirkland v. Carlon (In re Est. of 

Heater), 2020 UT App 70, ¶¶ 11–13, 466 P.3d 728. As we will 

explain, the Probate Code allows a person to establish a parentchild relationship either by meeting the terms of subsection 114(1) 

itself or by satisfying one of the definitions or methods in the 

Parentage Act.

¶26 The Probate Code does not mandate that parentage be 

determined only under the provisions of the Parentage Act. 

Kirkland bases her argument on a portion of the text of subsection 

114(1): “[t]he parent and child relationship may be established as 

provided in [the Parentage Act].” UTAH CODE § 75-2-114(1). But as 

the court of appeals explained, this language is permissive 

because it uses the word “may.” See id. § 68-3-12(1)(g) (“‘May’ 

means that an action is authorized or permissive.”); In re Est. of 

Heater, 2020 UT App 70, ¶¶ 14–15. Accordingly, the Probate Code 

allows an individual to establish the parent-child relationship 

through the Parentage Act, but it does not require it.

¶27 And the Parentage Act does not claim to be the only way 

to establish parentage where another statute has its own specific 

provisions on the matter. See UTAH CODE § 78B-15-203 (“[A] 

parent-child relationship established under this chapter applies 

for all purposes, except as otherwise specifically provided by 

other law of this state.”). As the court of appeals noted, where 

another statute provides its “own definition of [the] parent-child 

relationship for specific purposes,” the Parentage Act “is 

subordinate” to that statute. In re Est. of Heater, 2020 UT App 70, 
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Opinion of the Court

9

¶ 11. As subsection 114(1) of the Probate Code provides its own 

definition of the parent-child relationship, it stands on its own. 

But it also permits an individual to establish parentage through 

the Parentage Act.

¶28 We recognize that, with respect to the father-child 

relationship, subsection 114(1) differs from the Parentage Act’s 

presumption of paternity. In contrast to the Parentage Act, the 

Probate Code permits the father-child relationship to be 

established based on biological fatherhood alone, without 

reference to the marital status of the natural parents. Compare

UTAH CODE § 75-2-114(1) (“[A]n individual is the child of the 

individual’s natural parents, regardless of their marital status.” 

(emphasis added)), with id. § 78B-15-204(1) (explaining that a 

“man is presumed to be the father of a child if” certain 

requirements are met, all hinging upon the marital status of the 

man and the child’s mother), and id. §§ 78B-6-110(3)(a), -

120(1)(f), -121, -122(2) (providing that an unmarried biological 

father has no right to be notified of an adoption or to consent, or 

refuse to consent, to an adoption unless he strictly complies with 

certain requirements).

¶29 But although the father-child relationship is defined 

differently in the Probate Code and the Parentage Act, we do not 

find the two statutes to be in conflict in the context of a probate 

case. Rather, they co-exist. For purposes of intestate succession, a 

person can establish the father-child relationship through section 

114(1) of the Probate Code, which recognizes natural parent-child 

relationships that the Parentage Act generally would not 

recognize unless specific procedural requirements had been met.

Alternatively, a person could choose to establish the father-child 

relationship by reference to the provisions of the Parentage Act.

¶30 The latter method is an optional way to prove paternity

in a probate case. Accordingly, we reject Kirkland’s argument that 

the statute makes it the sole, mandatory method of doing so.

¶31 Kirkland argues in the alternative that even if we accept 

the definition of the parent-child relationship contained in 

subsection 114(1), Carlon does not meet it because he has not 

established that Heater is his “natural” father. Kirkland contends 

that the term “natural parent” in subsection 114(1) does not mean 

biological or genetic parent, but rather non-adoptive parent. And 

she asserts that Carlon’s non-adoptive father is his presumed 

father, Thomas. She argues that the court of appeals erred when it 
In re Estate of JOHN CLIFFORD HEATER

Opinion of the Court

10

found otherwise. In re Est. of Heater, 2020 UT App 70, ¶¶ 13 n.7, 

20.

¶32 But Kirkland is wrong that “natural parent” does not 

mean biological parent. While “natural parent” may in some 

contexts be used in contrast to “adoptive parent,” that is because

the ordinary meaning of “natural parent” is biological or genetic 

parent. The dictionary definition of “natural” includes “begotten 

as distinguished from adopted,” and “being a relation by actual 

consanguinity as distinguished from adoption.”5 Natural, 

MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/natural (last visited Sept. 23, 2021). We also note that 

in Black’s Law Dictionary under “natural father,” one is directed 

to the definition of “biological father.” See Natural father, BLACK’S 

LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Black’s then defines biological 

father as “[t]he man whose sperm impregnated the child’s 

biological mother.—Also termed natural father; birth father; genetic 

father.” Biological father, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).

¶33 In the law, “natural parent” is also used synonymously 

with biological or genetic parent. For instance, in Santosky v. 

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), the Supreme Court discussed what 

__________________________________________________________

5 See also Beget, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/beget (last visited Sept. 23, 2021) (“[T]o 

procreate as the father[.]”); Consanguineous, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consanguineous 

(last visited Sept. 23, 2021) (“[O]f the same blood or origin . . . 

descended from the same ancestor[.]”).

Kirkland cites the Merriam Webster Dictionary of Law, stating 

that it “establishes that the word ‘natural’ means not ‘adopted.’” 

But when read in context, that dictionary also defines “natural” as 

“begotten, as distinguished from adopted” and “relat[ed] by 

consanguinity as opposed to adopted.” Natural, MERRIAMWEBSTER LAW DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary /natural#legalDictionary (last visited 

Sept. 23, 2021). Accordingly, while we agree with Kirkland that 

“natural parent” may be used in contrast to “adoptive parent,” it 

does not follow that “natural parent” does not mean biological 

parent. Rather, in that context “natural parent” is being used as a 

synonym for biological parent.
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Opinion of the Court

11

due process is required when terminating parental rights. The 

Court referred to the petitioners, who were the biological parents

of the children at issue in the case, as “the natural parents.” Id. at 

751; see also id. at 753 (“The fundamental liberty interest of natural 

parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does 

not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents 

or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even 

when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest 

in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.” 

(emphasis added)).

¶34 We too have used the term “natural parent” 

interchangeably with “biological parent.” See, e.g., Hill v. Nakai (In 

re Est. of Hannifin), 2013 UT 46, ¶ 22, 311 P.3d 1016 (explaining that 

the Probate Code “prohibit[s] adopted children from taking by 

intestacy from both their natural parents and their adoptive 

parents” and then contrasting that with the doctrine of equitable 

adoption, which “in no way alters the legal relationship between 

. . . the claimant and the biological parents”); Manzanares v. 

Byington (In re Adoption of Baby B.), 2012 UT 35, ¶ 58 n.21, 308 P.3d 

382 (collecting cases, many of which equate a child’s “natural” 

father with the biological father); J.S. v. P.K. (In re Adoption of I.K.), 

2009 UT 70, ¶¶ 8, 10, 16, 19, 21, 23, 220 P.3d 464 (using the term 

“Natural Father” interchangeably with “biological father”); 

Bonwich v. Bonwich, 699 P.2d 760, 761–62 (Utah 1985) (equating a 

“natural parent” with a “biological parent”); id. at 762 (“[D]espite 

the blood relationship, a strong mutual bond does not always 

develop between natural parent and child.”); Hutchison v. 

Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 39–40 (Utah 1982) (explaining that, 

although a blood test excluded the respondent as the child’s 

“natural father, she considers him her father both psychologically 

and biologically”); Walton v. Coffman, 169 P.2d 97, 103 (Utah 1946) 

(“The common experience of mankind teaches ‘that blood is 

thicker than water,’ that usually there is a much stronger 

attachment between a natural parent and child than is developed 

between the child and a foster parent . . . .”).

¶35 The ordinary meaning of “natural parent” in the law may 

be viewed as “an empirical question—about the sense of a word 

or phrase that is most likely implicated in a given linguistic 

context.” Richards v. Cox, 2019 UT 57, ¶ 18, 450 P.3d 1074 (citation 

omitted) (making this point in presenting a corpus linguistic 

analysis of the meaning of “employment” in article X, section 8 of 

the Utah Constitution). To answer such a question, it may not be 
In re Estate of JOHN CLIFFORD HEATER

Opinion of the Court

12

enough to cite a number of relevant dictionary examples. See id.

(explaining that “dictionary definitions” may not be “dispositive” 

in all cases). It may be helpful to assess the meaning of “natural 

parent” across all of our cases—a form of “corpus” of the 

language of our law. See Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen,

Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 868 (2018) 

(emphasizing that corpus linguistic analysis “facilitates 

transparency and scrutiny” and provides “an empirical check on 

our . . . linguistic intuition” (citation omitted)).

¶36 In a comprehensive review of all the Utah appellate 

opinions using the term “natural parent” up to the effective date 

of the statutory language in question,6 a Westlaw search 

uncovered 131 relevant cases. Of those cases, many used “natural 

parent” in a manner or context in which its meaning was unclear. 

But in every case in which the context was sufficient to determine 

the meaning of this term (twenty-four), the term “natural parent” 

was used to refer to “biological parent.”7 We found no case in 

__________________________________________________________

6 The effective date is July 1, 1998. S.B. 75, Uniform Probate 

Code Amendments, § 22, Utah Laws 166, 175 (codified at UTAH 

CODE § 75-2-114). We used this date range in the event that the 

meaning of the search term underwent a change after the statute’s 

effective date and to limit the search results to a reasonable 

number for review. The date range of the 131 results spanned 

from August 16, 1913, see Hummel v. Parrish, 134 P. 898 (Utah 

1913), to August 21, 1997, see Brinkerhoff v. Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d 113 

(Utah Ct. App. 1997). Notably, in the cases we analyzed that came 

after the statute’s enactment, see supra ¶ 34, the meaning of 

“natural parent” had not changed.

7 State ex rel. J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 712–14, 716 (Utah 1990) 

(determining that a man who was not a child’s biological father 

was not the child’s natural father), superseded by statute as 

recognized in Mackley v. Openshaw, 2019 UT 74, 456 P.3d 742; Wiese 

v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700, 701–03 (Utah 1985) (equating biological 

parents with natural parents); Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 

40–41 (Utah 1982) (referring to a biological parent as a child’s 

natural parent); State ex rel. Baby Girl M., 476 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Utah 

1970) (equating a child’s biological mother with her natural 

mother); D_ P_ v. Soc. Serv. & Child Welfare Dep’t of Relief Soc’y

Gen. Bd. Ass’n of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 431 P.2d 

(continued . . .)
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Opinion of the Court

13

which “natural parent” was clearly used to mean “non-adoptive 

parent” to the exclusion of biological parent. This is an aid to our 

 

547, 547, 550 (Utah 1967) (referring to a biological mother as a 

natural mother); Chidester v. Ellett (In re Adoption of Trimble), 398 

P.2d 25, 26 (Utah 1965) (referring to a biological father as the 

natural father); State ex rel. London v. Bell, 390 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 

1964) (using the term natural mother to refer to the biological 

mother); State ex rel. F_ v. Dade, 376 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1962) 

(referring to biological parents as natural parents); State ex rel L.J.J.

v. Mr. & Mrs. B_, 360 P.2d 486, 488 (Utah 1961) (equating 

biological parents with natural parents); Midgley v. Denhalter (In re 

Lewis’ Est.), 242 P.2d 565, 568 (Utah 1952) (referring to a person’s 

biological parents as his natural parents); Walton v. Coffman, 169 

P.2d 97, 101 (Utah 1946) (using natural parents to refer to 

children’s biological parents); Benner v. Garrick (In re Benner’s Est.), 

166 P.2d 257, 258 (Utah 1946) (referring to biological parents as 

natural parents), superseded by statute as recognized in Hill v. Nakai

(In re Est. of Hannifin), 2013 UT 46, 311 P.3d 1016; Kurtz v. 

Christensen, 209 P. 340, 342–44 (Utah 1922) (referring to biological 

parents as natural parents); Harrison v. Harker, 142 P. 716, 720–21, 

728, 730, 737, 744, 749 (Utah 1914) (referring to biological parents 

as natural parents); Hummel, 134 P. at 901–02 (equating a child’s 

birth mother to her natural parent); Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d at 115

(equating children’s biological father with natural parent); R.S. v. 

State (State ex rel. J.M.), 940 P.2d 527, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 

(using natural parent to refer to a child’s biological father); 

Duncan v. Howard, 918 P.2d 888, 891 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 

(equating a child’s biological parents with its natural parents); 

Giffen v. R.W.L. (In re Adoption of R.N.L.), 913 P.2d 761, 762 (Utah 

Ct. App. 1996) (referring to a child’s biological parents as the 

natural mother and natural father); In re Adoption of W., 904 P.2d 

1113, 1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (referring to biological fathers as 

natural fathers); State ex rel. W.D. v. Drake, 770 P.2d 1011, 1012

(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (equating biological parents with natural 

parents); Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 

(referring to children’s biological parents as their natural parents); 

T.R.F. v. Felan (In re Adoption of T.R.F.), 760 P.2d 906, 914 (Utah Ct. 

App. 1988) (referring to a child’s natural father as its biological 

father); In re K.B.E., 740 P.2d 292, 293 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 

(referring to a child’s biological mother as her natural mother).
In re Estate of JOHN CLIFFORD HEATER

Opinion of the Court

14

inquiry into contextual meaning beyond the assistance provided 

by dictionaries, our linguistic intuition, or selected sample 

sentences. See Richards, 2019 UT 57, ¶ 19. It confirms that in the 

law, “natural parent” means biological parent.

¶37 And the case Kirkland cites to establish that “natural 

parent” means only non-adoptive parent does not help her. See In 

re Est. of Olenick, 562 N.E.2d 293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). That case says 

“‘[n]atural parents’ means biological, or blood, as contrasted with 

adoptive.” Id. at 300. Olenick in turn relies on another case, 

McKeone v. Pesikey (In re Estate of Cregar), 333 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. 

Ct. 1975), which does discuss “natural” versus “adoptive 

parents”—but throughout the opinion, the court uses “natural” as 

a synonym for “blood relation.” See, e.g., id. at 542–43 (explaining 

that the appellants were adopted by their “natural aunts,” with 

whom they had a “blood relationship”). So even the case Kirkland 

relies on establishes that “natural parent” means biological parent.

¶38 The court of appeals correctly determined that, under the 

plain language of subsection 114(1), Carlon has established that 

Heater was his “natural parent.” Carlon did this through genetic 

testing showing that he and Garret are half-siblings, thereby 

proving that Heater was his biological father.

¶39 In sum, we conclude that a person can establish the 

parent-child relationship under the Probate Code either by 

satisfying the plain terms of subsection 114(1)—i.e., showing that 

the deceased individual was their “natural parent”—or by 

utilizing one of the methods or definitions found in the Parentage 

Act. And here, Carlon has established that Heater was his 

“natural parent” by proving that Heater was his biological father

through genetic testing.

B. The Utah Uniform Parentage Act

¶40 Even assuming that the Parentage Act did control the 

establishment of the parent-child relationship in a probate case, 

Carlon has also satisfied the provisions of that statute. As 

discussed above, subsection 114(1) of the Probate Code provides 

that “the parent and child relationship may be established as 

provided in [the Parentage Act].” UTAH CODE § 75-2-114(1). And 

the Parentage Act states that “[a] man is presumed to be the father 

of a child if . . . he and the mother of the child are married to each 

other and the child is born during the marriage.” Id. § 78B-15-

204(1)(a). That presumption “may only be rebutted in accordance 
Cite as: 2021 UT 66

Opinion of the Court

15

with Section 78B-15-607.” Id. § 78B-15-204(2). Section 607 of the 

Parentage Act, in turn, explains that to rebut the statutory 

presumption of fatherhood, a party may, among other things, 

provide “genetic test results that exclude the presumed father” or 

“genetic test results that rebuttably identify another man as the 

father.” Id. § 78B-15-607(3)(a)–(b).

¶41 Carlon has done both. Carlon’s mother Myrol was 

married to Thomas when she gave birth to Carlon. So we agree 

with Kirkland that under subsection 204(1)(a) of the Parentage 

Act, Thomas was Carlon’s presumed father. But Carlon has 

successfully rebutted that presumption in the manner established 

by the Parentage Act. He produced genetic test results showing 

the man he believed to be his full biological brother did not share 

the same biological father. This was genetic evidence “exclud[ing] 

[his] presumed father”—Thomas—as his genetic father. See id.

§ 78B-15-607(3)(a). And he submitted genetic test results that 

established he and Garret were biological half-siblings. These 

genetic test results constituted evidence “identify[ing] another 

man”—Heater—as Carlon’s father. See id. § 78B-15-607(3)(b). 

Thus, within the probate case, Carlon rebutted the Parentage Act’s 

presumption that Thomas was his father and identified Heater as 

his genetic father in the manner prescribed by the Parentage Act.

¶42 Kirkland makes one argument as to why these test results 

are insufficient to rebut the presumption that Thomas was 

Carlon’s father. She points to section 603 of the Parentage Act, 

which states that when commencing an action, “a man whose 

paternity of the child is to be adjudicated” “shall be joined as [a]

part[y] in [the] proceeding.” Id. § 78B-15-603(2). She notes that 

because Thomas is deceased, he cannot be joined as a party. And 

she reasons that this makes it too late for Carlon to rebut 

Thomas’s paternity.

¶43 But this is a significant logical leap for which Kirkland 

provides no legal or analytical support. Kirkland’s argument is 

based on an assumed premise that an inability to comply with the 

joinder provision of the Parentage Act constitutes an absolute bar 

to adjudicating parentage. This would mean that a child could 

never adjudicate the paternity of a man after the man’s death. But 

she offers no legal authority or textual argument for this 

proposition. There is no provision in the Parentage Act that says a 

petition cannot be brought if the “man whose paternity of the 

child is to be adjudicated” is deceased. Further, Kirkland’s 
In re Estate of JOHN CLIFFORD HEATER

Opinion of the Court

16

argument runs contrary to other provisions of the Act. Both the 

Parentage Act’s standing and venue provisions suggest that it can 

apply to deceased individuals and their estates. See id. § 78B-15-

602(6) (explaining that “a representative authorized by law to act 

for an individual who would otherwise be entitled to maintain a 

proceeding but who is deceased” has standing to bring an action 

under the Parentage Act); id. § 78B-15-605(3) (“Venue for a judicial 

proceeding to adjudicate parentage is in the county of this state in 

which . . . a proceeding for probate or administration of the 

presumed or alleged father’s estate has been commenced.”).8

¶44 We conclude that Carlon has rebutted the presumption 

that Thomas is his father and identified Heater as his biological 

father in a manner prescribed by section 607 of the Parentage Act. 

And we find Kirkland’s joinder argument to be unpersuasive. 

Accordingly, even if Kirkland had prevailed on her argument that 

in a probate proceeding the parent-child relationship can be 

rebutted or established only in accordance with the Parentage Act, 

__________________________________________________________

8 We note that Kirkland’s argument also seems to assume that 

to establish a parent-child relationship within the probate case 

using the Parentage Act, a probate litigant would need to bring a 

separate proceeding under the Parentage Act that complies with 

all of the Parentage Act’s procedural requirements—although 

Kirkland has not explicitly made this connection. However, it is 

not clear from the Probate Code whether the reference to the 

Parentage Act in subsection 114(1) requires this, or whether a 

person can simply use the methods articulated in the Parentage 

Act to establish a parent-child relationship within the probate 

case. Nor is it clear whether, if done within a probate case, the 

party must comply with the Parentage Act’s procedural 

requirements, such as joinder and notice. See UTAH CODE § 75-2-

114(1) (stating only that “[t]he parent and child relationship may 

be established as provided in Title 78B, Chapter 15, Utah Uniform 

Parentage Act”). We do not resolve this question because 

Kirkland has not raised it. And we do not opine on whether other 

arguments could be made as to why Carlon has not satisfied the 

Parentage Act. We simply reject Kirkland’s argument that the 

joinder provision of the Parentage Act prohibits Carlon from 

rebutting Thomas’s presumed paternity.
Cite as: 2021 UT 66

Opinion of the Court

17

it would not present a barrier for Carlon because he has satisfied 

the terms of both the Parentage Act and the Probate Code.

C. Subsection 114(2) of the Probate Code: The

“One-Set-of-Parents Rule”

¶45 Kirkland next argues that even though the genetic test 

results show Heater was Carlon’s biological father, Carlon cannot 

be an heir to Heater’s estate because the Probate Code does not 

allow him to inherit from two fathers—in other words, she claims 

that the Probate Code establishes a “one-set-of-parents rule.” 

Kirkland does not assert that Carlon actually did inherit from 

Thomas. But she argues that because Thomas was Carlon’s 

presumptive father when Thomas died, Carlon was Thomas’s 

legal heir and could have inherited from his estate if there had 

been one.

¶46 We agree with the court of appeals that the Probate Code 

does not create a “one-set-of-parents rule” that is a “universal 

principle governing intestate succession.” In re Est. of Heater, 2020 

UT App 70, ¶ 19. The “one-set-of-parents rule” to which Kirkland 

refers is found in a separate subsection of the Probate Code, 

subsection 114(2). See In re Est. of Hannifin, 2013 UT 46, ¶ 26 n.9

(holding that subsection 114(2) “establishes a one-set-of-parents 

inheritance rule” in the context of adoptions). And subsection 

114(2) creates such a rule only where a child has been adopted, 

providing that “[a]n adopted individual is the child of the 

adopting parent or parents and not of the natural parents.” UTAH 

CODE § 75-2-114(2). So, an adopted child can inherit through 

intestate succession only from the child’s adopting parents, not 

from both the adopting and biological parents.

¶47 Kirkland acknowledges that subsection 114(2) is 

inapplicable here because Carlon does not have an adoptive 

parent. But she argues that the same principles that support the 

one-set-of-parents rule in the context of subsection 114(2) are 

equally applicable here, where subsection 114(1) is at issue. But 

that is a policy choice for the legislature to make. We must follow 

the language of the statute. And the plain language of subsection 

114(2) makes clear that it applies only when a child has been 

adopted. Further, Kirkland cites no language in the Probate Code 

suggesting that the one-set-of-parents rule within subsection

114(2) has any application to subsection 114(1). Accordingly, we 

agree with the court of appeals that “absent statutory language 

extending the rule beyond certain adoption scenarios, we cannot 
In re Estate of JOHN CLIFFORD HEATER

Opinion of the Court

18

conclude that the rule applies to this case, which does not feature 

an adoption of any sort.” In re Est. of Heater, 2020 UT App 70, ¶ 19.

¶48 Kirkland also argues that another case in which we 

interpreted the Probate Code, Hill v. Nakai (In re Estate of Hannifin),

2013 UT 46, 311 P.3d 1016, supports her position. Kirkland asserts 

that in that case, we held that the Probate Code establishes a oneset-of-parents rule. But in In re Estate of Hannifin, we concluded 

only that subsection 114(2) created such a rule in the context of 

adoptions. 2013 UT 46, ¶ 26 n.9. Specifically, we held that 

subsection 114(2) conflicted with the common law doctrine of 

equitable adoption.9 Id. ¶¶ 2, 19–27. We explained that, in 

intestate cases, this common law doctrine permitted “dual 

succession” from both an individual’s natural parents and their 

adoptive parents. Id. ¶¶ 23–24. But our cases espousing the 

doctrine of equitable adoption were before the legislature enacted 

subsection 114(2). Therefore, we held that subsection 114(2) 

“expressly foreclosed” the common law equitable adoption rule

because that rule permitted dual succession. Id. ¶ 24; see also UTAH 

CODE § 75-1-103 (“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of 

this code, the principles of law and equity supplement its 

provisions.”). But our interpretation of subsection 114(2) in In re 

__________________________________________________________

9 We recognized the common law doctrine of equitable 

adoption in In re Williams’ Estates, stating:

It is generally recognized that where a child’s 

parents agree with the adoptive parents to 

relinquish all their rights to the child in 

consideration of the adopted parents’ agreement to 

adopt such child, . . . and such agreement is fully 

performed by all parties connected with such 

contract except there is no actual adoption, the 

courts will decree specific performance of such 

contract and thereby award to the child the same 

distributive share of the adoptive parents’ estate as it 

would have been entitled to had the child actually 

been adopted as agreed.

348 P.2d 683, 684 (Utah 1960), superseded by statute as recognized in

In re Est. of Hannifin, 2013 UT 46, ¶ 2.
Cite as: 2021 UT 66

Opinion of the Court

19

Estate of Hannifin does not provide a basis for extending that 

provision outside of that subsection or to the circumstances here.

¶49 Accordingly, we reject Kirkland’s assertion that the oneset-of-parents rule from subsection 114(2) should be extended 

here or that it impacts Carlon’s ability to establish Heater’s 

biological paternity in any way.

CONCLUSION

¶50 Carlon has established a parent-child relationship with 

Heater both by showing that Heater was his “natural parent” 

under subsection 114(1) and by satisfying the provisions of the 

Parentage Act, as permitted by subsection 114(1). The court of 

appeals correctly affirmed the district court’s ruling that Heater is 

Carlon’s natural father and its order naming Carlon as one of 

Heater’s heirs.10 We affirm.

__________________________________________________________

10 In affirming, the court of appeals opined that this outcome 

was “bizarre, or at least at odds with societal expectations.” 

Kirkland v. Carlon (In re Est. of Heater), 2020 UT App 70, ¶ 20, 466 

P.3d 728. The court then suggested that Kirkland would “clearly 

prevail” if Utah had adopted the 2010 amendments to the 

Uniform Probate Code (UPC) “because the UPC, unlike the 

Probate Code, provides that where a child has a presumed father 

under the [Parentage Act] who is not the child’s biological father, 

the presumptive father is the child’s only father for purposes of 

intestate succession.” Id. But the UPC sections in question were 

updated again in 2019. This update was generated to respond to 

changes in the Uniform Parentage Act of 2017. See UNIF. PROB.

CODE § 2-117, hist. n. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019). And our legislature 

has not adopted the 2010 or the 2019 amendments to the UPC, nor 

the 2017 amendments to the Uniform Parentage Act upon which 

the updated UPC now relies. As such, we do not opine on what 

the result would be if the legislature chooses to adopt one or more 

of these uniform laws in the future, though we note that the term 

“genetic parent” from section 2-115 of the 2010 version of the UPC 

upon which the court of appeals relied has been removed, leaving 

the outcome far less certain. Id. § 2-117, cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N

2019).