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43–001 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 108–927 

KEEPING AMERICA’S MASS TRANSPORTATION 

SYSTEM SAFE: ARE THE LAWS ADEQUATE? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 8, 2004 

Serial No. J–108–66 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah, Chairman 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina 

BRUCE ARTIM, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Biden, Joseph R., Jr., a U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware ...................... 9 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 55 

Hatch, Hon. Orrin G., a U.S. Senator from the State of Utah, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 65 

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 76 

Sessions, Hon. Jeff, a U.S. Senator from the State of Alabama .......................... 1 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 95 

WITNESSES 

Frazier, Ernest R., Sr., Chief of Police and Security Department, National 

Railroad Passenger Corporation, Washington, D.C. ......................................... 16 

Jenkins, Brian Michael, Director, National Transportation Security Center, 

Mineta Transportation Institute, San Jose, California ..................................... 18 

Lindsey, S. Mark, Chief Counsel, Federal Rail Administration, Department 

of Transportation, Washington, D.C. .................................................................. 6 

Mattice, Harry S., Jr., U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of Tennessee, Chattanooga, Tennessee .............................................................................................. 4 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Ernest R. Frazier, Sr. to questions submitted by Senators Leahy 

and Biden .............................................................................................................. 30 

Responses of S. Mark Lindsey to questions submitted by Senators Biden 

and Leahy ............................................................................................................. 35 

Responses of Harry S. Mattice to questions submitted by Senators Biden 

and Leahy ............................................................................................................. 46 

Question submitted to Brian M. Jenkins from Senator Leahy (Note: At the 

time of printing, after several attempts to obtain a response to the written 

question, the Committee had not received a response from the witness.) ...... 54 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Frazier, Ernest R., Sr., Chief of Police and Security Department, National 

Railroad Passenger Corporation, Washington, D.C., statement ...................... 59 

Jenkins, Brian Michael, Director, National Transportation Security Center, 

Mineta Transportation Institute, San Jose, California, statement .................. 66 

Lindsey, S. Mark, Chief Counsel, Federal Rail Administration, Department 

of Transportation, Washington, D.C., statement ............................................... 79 

Mattice, Harry S., Jr., U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of Tennessee, Chattanooga, Tennessee, statement ........................................................................... 87 

(1) 

KEEPING AMERICA’S MASS TRANSPORTATION 

SYSTEM SAFE: ARE THE LAWS ADEQUATE? 

THURSDAY, APRIL 8, 2004 

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m., in Room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeff Sessions, presiding. 

Present: Senators Sessions and Biden. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF SESSIONS, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA 

Senator SESSIONS. The Committee on Judiciary will come to 

order. I am pleased to convene this hearing on ‘‘Keeping America’s 

Mass Transportation System Safe: Are the Laws Adequate?’’ Senator Biden will be the Ranking Member today and will be in shortly. He asked that I go ahead and get started, so we will do that. 

In this time of terror, there are issues that Congress is obligated 

to consider and discuss. Let me say from the beginning that I do 

appreciate Senator Biden, who has been a leader in the area of 

criminal law and he understands it very well. 

My opening statement will refer back to March 11 of this year, 

when democracy was once again threatened when 911 after the attacks on the World Trade Center, terrorists again struck in Madrid 

against the Spanish Railway System. While that attack might not 

have resulted in as many deaths as happened in the United States 

on September 11, it is a troubling and deadly act telling us that 

the war against terrorism continues, that terrorists are out there 

still, and they are looking to attack our country whenever they 

have the opportunity, and that railways could be one of the prime 

areas that they would attack. 

While there are many questions that remain unanswered about 

the infrastructure that we have today and its vulnerabilities, this 

hearing will focus on the criminal laws and whether or not they are 

adequate to respond to a terrorist attack on our mass transit system. I believe this hearing will reveal that the disturbing answer 

is no. 

Every day, millions of Americans turn to mass transit for pleasure and business. To be exact, 32 million times a day, people board 

public transportation systems. When people board the subway to 

commute to work or take an Amtrak train to visit their family in 

another State, they should do so knowing that our laws are fully 

adequate to deter and punish anyone who would attack them. 

2 

On Tuesday of this week, I introduced S. 2289, the Railroad Carriers and Mass Transportation Act of 2004. This bill is very similar 

to S. 1608, the Anti-Terrorism Protection of Mass Transportation 

and Railroad Carriers At of 2003, which I introduced last year. 

While I believe that S. 1608 addresses a number of important 

issues, some have expressed concern about the surveillance portion 

of that bill. Because the need to pass rail transportation provisions 

and protections is now, I was willing to modify that bill and eliminate those concerns that some of my colleagues may have had. 

S. 2289 will provide many of the necessary tools to prosecute terrorist activities, many of which are not currently prosecutable as 

a terrorist act, by eliminating inconsistencies that exist between 

the ‘‘wrecking trains’’ statute and the Terrorist Acts Against Mass 

Transportation statute. Let me take a moment to highlight some 

of those troublesome inconsistencies. 

The two laws address similar attacks on similar means of transportation, but they often provide inequitable results. For example, 

the current wrecking trains statute does not prohibit many types 

of attacks that are currently covered by the mass transportation 

statute. There is no reason that legislation should prohibit certain 

terrorist attacks on an airplane but not on a railroad carrier. To 

that end, the new bill will protect both mass transportation systems as well as railroad and freight carriers by consolidating the 

predicate crimes, including but not limited to interfering with a 

dispatcher or a driver, and the undermining of our transportation 

infrastructure. 

Moreover, there presently exists a discrepancy in the severity of 

punishment for terrorists who attack trains versus those who attack other mass transportation systems. Under the current law, 

when someone violates the wrecking trains statute and that violation results in the death of a citizen, the criminal will be eligible 

for the death penalty. However, when someone commits a similarly 

substantial criminal act on a plane in violation of the mass transportation statute, he or she is not eligible for the death penalty. 

There is no justifiable reason for this distinction and we should 

eliminate it so that those who commit similar acts of evil against 

this country are faced with similar punishments for their crimes. 

To that end, this bill will increase penalties for the most heinous 

attacks against mass transportation systems by classifying certain 

offenses, such as those involving mass transportation vehicles carrying passengers, as aggravated offenses. The penalty for these attacks range from a fine to imprisonment up to life, or under certain 

circumstances, death. These standards will cover railroad freight 

carriers as well as traditional mass transportation systems. Current law does not apply justice equally in these circumstances as 

it should, and S. 2289 remedies those concerns. 

In addition, the new bill will make it a Federal crime to release 

biological agents or other hazardous materials on the property of 

mass transportation providers or railroad carriers, covering circumstances like Japan’s subway gas attack. 

It will eliminate the inconsistency between the requisite mens 

rea in the mass transportation statute and the wrecking trains 

statute so that a person must be shown to have knowingly comVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Nov 06, 2008 Jkt 043001 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43001.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
3 

mitted the criminal offense. This change will help ease our law enforcement efforts to prosecute those who try to harm our citizens. 

Those who wish to attack this country should know that we will 

no longer distinguish their attacks based on what means of mass 

transportation they choose to attack. We will move swiftly and severely against anyone who dares to challenge the comfort and safety of millions of Americans that travel by mass transportation 

every day. 

On more than one occasion, the FBI has warned that intelligence 

has led to the belief that al Qaeda and other operatives are targeting the U.S. rail sector. These terrorists look to do anything, 

from destroying key rail bridges and sections of track to cause derailment or targeting hazardous material containers. 

America has demanded more attention to rail security and the 

administration has responded. No less than two weeks ago, DHS 

announced plans to, among other things, develop a rapid response 

team centered on bomb-sniffing dogs and to implement a pilot program that would test the feasibility of screening luggage. However, 

we should not stop there. America demands more than additional 

security mechanisms. We have already responded to criminal 

threats by passing appropriate and adequate laws for the purpose 

of deterring criminal activities. So we must act proactively here to 

meet this requirement. 

It is time to put the terrorists on notice that their activities 

against American citizens will be detected and will result in swift 

and strong punishment. We have to give law enforcement the ability to prosecute and the judicial system the ability to impose substantial sentences. 

I believe that S. 2289 would accomplish some of these objectives. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony today and to working on 

securing America’s mass transit systems through adequate criminal laws so that the next time someone asks, are the laws adequate, the answer will be yes. 

We will be having a vote right now, at 2:45, I am told. Senator 

Biden should be here soon. The vote has started already. It will 

take me about ten minutes to go and vote. I will go and cast my 

vote and return and then we will have our first panel. 

Thank you, and we are adjourned for the interim. 

[Recess from 2:46 p.m. until 3:05 p.m.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Senator Biden, I expect, will come by shortly. 

The vote is ongoing right now. 

But we have an excellent panel of witnesses who can help us 

with some rather technical matters involving this legislation. As a 

prosecutor myself for quite a number of years, I on more than one 

occasion had the opportunity to be looking to charge a defendant 

with a crime and be shocked that they weren’t covered, that it just 

wasn’t there, or you had to charge with some other lesser crime because that was the only thing that was chargeable. 

On the matters of terrorism, we ought to be able to ensure that 

no crime of terrorism has to be charged in some secondary way. We 

ought to have a clear statute that covers that. 

So our first panel, if you will step forward. Mr. Sandy Mattice 

is currently serving as United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Tennessee. We have got a history of some good United 

4 

States Attorneys there. I have known several over the years. Prior 

to his service as United States Attorney, he served for more than 

10 years as Senior Counsel to the United States Senate Committee 

on Governmental Affairs. We didn’t get them all straight. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SESSIONS. He has private practice experience, having 

been an associate and partner of the firm of Miller and Martin in 

Chattanooga and associated with the firm of Baker, Donaldson, 

Behrman, and Caldwell in Chattanooga, Tennessee. 

Mark Lindsey has served as Chief Counsel of the Federal Railroad Administration since 1987. Prior to serving in this capacity, 

he was Assistant Chief Counsel from 1978 to 1984. Mr. Lindsey received his law degree from Yale Law School in 1971. 

Mr. Mattice, we will be delighted to take your testimony, then 

turn to Mr. Lindsey. I would ask that you limit your comments to 

ten minutes, if you could. Mr. Mattice? 

STATEMENT OF HARRY S. MATTICE, JR., U.S. ATTORNEY, EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 

Mr. MATTICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon. 

Good afternoon to the distinguished members of the Committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to join you today to discuss the adequacy of the laws protecting America’s mass transportation and 

railroad systems. 

In the wake of Madrid rail bombings and the subsequent discovery of unexploded bombs underneath the railway lines in France 

and Spain, this hearing addresses a timely and important issue. 

Mass transportation and railroad systems play a vital role in the 

life of our Nation. Americans regularly use trains, buses, airplanes, 

and other mass transportation vehicles to commute to work, visit 

loved ones, and go on vacation. Railroads are also used to transport 

vital goods and materials across the country. 

The availability of safe and reliable mass transportation and railroad systems is critical to the health of our Nation’s economy as 

well as Americans’ quality of life, so we must remain vigilant and 

prepare for the possibility that terrorists may attempt to launch attacks on those systems. 

The protection of mass transportation and railroad systems obviously requires a multi-faceted approach. In my testimony today, 

however, I would like to focus on one critical element of any strategy for safeguarding our Nation’s railways, buses, subways, ferries, 

and passenger aircraft, the existence of strong, consistent, and effective criminal sanctions under Federal law for those perpetrating 

attacks on mass transportation and railroad systems. 

In 2001, Congress took an important step towards protecting 

mass transportation systems when it passed the USA PATRIOT 

Act. Section 801 of the Act created a new Federal statute, 18 

U.S.C. Section 1993, which criminalizes terrorist attacks and other 

acts of violence against mass transportation systems. 

As the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Tennessee, I 

have witnessed firsthand the value of this new statutory provision. 

Recently, a passenger on a Greyhound bus traveling from Nashville, Tennessee, to Knoxville allegedly caused disturbances on the 

bus and then attempted to assault the bus driver with a knife. 

5 

Thankfully, other passengers were able to subdue this individual 

before he was able to reach the driver. But the driver, other passengers, and members of the general public were put at significant 

risk by this passenger’s alleged conduct. 

After reviewing the available options, my office determined that 

the best avenue for prosecuting this violent passenger effectively 

was to charge him under the new Federal statute prohibiting terrorist violence against mass transportation systems contained in 

Section 801 of the USA PATRIOT Act. The passenger was subsequently indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. Section 1993 and a jury 

trial has been scheduled for June 8 of this year. 

As this case demonstrates, Congress and the administration have 

taken significant steps towards ensuring that those who attack 

mass transportation and railroad systems are effectively prosecuted 

and appropriately punished. But there is still more to be done to 

close gaps in these statutes and make them clear and less vulnerable to legal challenge. 

This is why the Department of Justice strongly supports S. 2289, 

the Railroad Carriers and Mass Transportation Protection Act of 

2004, recently introduced by you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to 

take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to thank you for your leadership role in this area. The same legislation has also been introduced in the House of Representatives by Congresswoman Capito. 

S. 2289 would make a number of significant improvements to the 

Federal criminal laws protecting mass transportation systems and 

railroad systems. I will highlight a few of the most significant and 

important changes. 

To begin with, S. 2289 would consolidate the new Mass Transportation statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 1993, and the statute imposing 

criminal sanctions on wrecking trains, 18 U.S.C. Section 1992, into 

a new criminal prohibition against attacks on mass transportation 

systems on land, on the water, or through the air, and against railroad carriers. This consolidation would harmonize the laws protecting mass transportation systems, including passenger trains, 

and the laws protecting railroads, including freight trains. 

Under existing law, for example, the wrecking trains statute does 

not prohibit many types of attacks that are currently covered by 

the mass transportation statute, such as interfering with, disabling, or incapacitating a dispatcher or driver. S. 2289 would 

eliminate these inconsistencies. 

It would also strengthen the protecting of mass transportation 

and railroad systems by updating the law to match current developments and by making the statutory language more precise in 

several respects. It would also broaden the statute’s coverage by 

updating the definition of ‘‘dangerous weapons’’ to cover box cutters 

and other previously unrecognized weapons. 

S. 2289 would also ensure that terrorists who attack mass transportation systems are punished with the appropriate severity. Currently, for instance, while those violating the wrecking trains statutes are eligible for the death penalty if their offense results in 

death, those violating the mass transportation statute are not eligible for the death penalty. 

S. 2289 would end this senseless discrepancy and would increase 

penalties for the most serious attacks against mass transportation 

6 

systems by making it an aggravated offense to commit the prohibited terrorist acts in situations involving vehicles carrying passengers, high-level radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, or a designated hazardous material. For an offense resulting in the death 

of any person, the defendant will receive either capital punishment 

or life in prison. 

In conclusion, the Department of Justice believes that S. 2289, 

the Railroad Carriers and Mass Transportation Protection Act of 

2004, would greatly assist in prosecuting those who perpetrate terrorist attacks upon this Nation’s mass transportation and railroad 

systems. 

Thank you once again for allowing me to appear before you, and 

I look forward to your questions on this important issue. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Mattice. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mattice appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Lindsey, we are glad to hear from you. 

STATEMENT OF S. MARK LINDSEY, CHIEF COUNSEL, FEDERAL 

RAIL ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. LINDSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. I am 

very pleased to be here to testify on behalf of the Secretary of 

Transportation concerning improving the criminal laws addressing 

sabotage and terrorism on the rails and in mass transit. We think 

this is extremely important. I ask that you put my full statement 

in the record and I will summarize it very briefly. 

Senator SESSIONS. We will be glad to make that a part of the 

record and hear your comments. 

Mr. LINDSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The hearing is especially timely in the wake of the March 11 attacks in Madrid. Certainly, those were extremely serious attacks. We from the FRA, 

though, have over a number of years observed a fairly steady 

drumbeat of acts against railroads of much lesser magnitude. 

We see it as extremely important, not just to address these large 

headline-capturing events but also the many smaller ones that 

have occurred, that there be strong, effective, consistent criminal 

statutes that enable prosecutors to go after the people who perpetrate these acts effectively and to deter those who are susceptible 

of deterrence. Now, granted, they aren’t all. Our first line of defense needs to be to try to detect those who might do it and prevent 

them in the first place. But it is certainly extremely important that 

when we have potential perpetrators who are deterrable, that we 

have strong, effective criminal statutes which will do that. 

The existing wrecking train statute dates from 1940 and shows 

its age a bit. Mr. Mattice certainly laid out a number of the ways, 

and you did, sir, in your opening statement, in which S. 2289 

would improve the existing statutes. The Department very strongly 

supports S. 2289. We have been looking for legislation of this sort 

for a good 7 years and we are eager to work with you to enact such 

a statute, which we think is very badly needed. 

Secretary Mineta has been very strong in his leadership in transportation security, setting a strong example for everyone in the Department of Transportation to follow in pursuing it. I know under 

7 

his leadership that we are eager to work with you to enact this legislation. 

Instead of repeating in detail all of the ways that S. 2289 would 

improve the statutes, I think I will simply stop there, sir, and respond to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lindsey appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator SESSIONS. I think Senator Biden will be here shortly. 

Mr. Mattice, if you are trying to prevent a terrorist attack, and 

I understand that is the key philosophy now of the Department of 

Justice, the FBI, and the Attorney General is to not wait to prosecute a criminal afterwards, but to try to intervene in advance. You 

can’t make an arrest unless there is a crime afoot, can you? In 

other words, if you know somebody is going to do something and 

it is not a Federal crime, it can undermine your ability to make a 

preventive arrest, is that not right? 

Mr. MATTICE. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. In the absence of 

a clearly definable criminal statute on point, we are without authority to act with our investigative and arresting agencies to issue 

a request for an arrest warrant. 

Senator SESSIONS. Senator Biden, this is the first question I 

asked and— 

Senator BIDEN. No, no, no, go. I will catch up. 

Senator SESSIONS. Okay. We will go right ahead, then. I will ask 

you this. Under the current law, the statute prohibiting the wrecking of trains, 18 U.S.C. 1992, provides for the option of a death 

penalty if an attack on a train results in a death of a person. However, the statute prohibiting a terrorist attack or other acts of violence against mass transportation systems, Section 1993, does not 

if an attack is on a mass transportation system and causes death. 

Do you see any reason for that disparity? Should we fix it, and does 

this bill do so adequately? Mr. Mattice? 

Mr. MATTICE. Your Honor, first of all—or Mr. Chairman, I am 

sorry. 

Senator SESSIONS. That is all right. I am glad to hear a real lawyer in here. 

Mr. MATTICE. I am used to being a lawyer in court, Mr. Chairman. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MATTICE. Certainly, I see no reason for— 

Senator SESSIONS. I still say that to Senator Biden when he was 

chairing the Committee. 

Mr. MATTICE. I see no reason for the disparity in that respect. 

This statute does fix that disparity, and certainly, as we have come 

to recognize the unfortunate ingenuity of certain people intent on 

doing harm with various devices, it would be a valuable law enforcement and prosecutorial tool. 

Senator SESSIONS. Now, under 1993, current law, it prohibits the 

placing of a biological agent or toxin on or near a mass transportation vehicle with the intent to endanger the safety of any passenger or employee of the mass transportation provider. Eighteen 

U.S.C. 1992, however, does not similarly prohibit placing a biological agent or toxin on or near a freight train. 

8 

Mr. Lindsey, I guess that is a concern to your agency. Do you see 

any reason for the disparity? Is there, and am I correct that there 

is one, and should we fix it, and do we do so adequately in this legislation? 

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, you are correct. There is a disparity, and no, there is no sound rationale for the disparity, and 

yes, sir, I think S. 2289 does fix it correctly and adequately. I think 

it is very important that it do so. Freight trains carry a tremendous 

variety of commodities, among which are hazardous materials of all 

types. Should the placement of a biological agent on a train, for example, disable the operating crew, making available to somebody 

some of the hazardous materials on the train, that would be an extremely adverse event. We ought to deter that event if we can and 

punish it harshly wherever we cannot. 

Senator SESSIONS. A train, even though it is a freight train, not 

a passenger train, has the potential to do tremendous amounts of 

damage, either caused by the chemicals it may be carrying or surreptitiously may have been placed on it, very dangerous chemicals 

and toxins. There seems to be a gap there, particularly for freight 

trains, under our current law. Is that correct? 

Mr. LINDSEY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. A tremendous 

amount of the freight flowing in international commerce and 

through the United States occurs in enclosed freight containers 

that might contain all sorts of things, and it would certainly be an 

extremely adverse event were a toxin or biological agent placed in 

one of those. We certainly need an adequate criminal statute to be 

able to address any such event. 

Senator SESSIONS. The way we have written this, we use the 

standard of ‘‘knowingly.’’ I don’t know if you are aware of it, Mr. 

Mattice, because that is a significant prosecutorial standard of 

proof. It is not the highest. But as I read the statute and it is our 

intent, if the offense were to rise to the level of a potential death 

penalty, the death penalty statute that requires willful and knowingly, I believe the language is in that penalty section. Intentionally is a standard which is a higher standard than knowingly. 

That would cover any death penalty case, or have you had a chance 

to look at that? I should have given you advance notice. 

Mr. MATTICE. Mr. Chairman, yes. We have looked at that and we 

believe that the knowingly standard, as incorporated in S. 2289, 

would be sufficient to permit this to be a death-eligible statute. 

Senator SESSIONS. It would make it a death-eligible statute. But 

before the imposition of the death penalty—and I think this is important. I think ‘‘knowingly’’ is, frankly, not a sufficient standard 

for the death penalty. I think somebody should intentionally do 

something before you execute them. The death penalty statute, 

3591, says a defendant who has been found guilty of these certain 

offenses that carries a death penalty, intentionally killed a victim 

and so forth. So the intent requirement that is the highest standard is in the—before you could do a death penalty, you would have 

to meet that standard. 

Mr. MATTICE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is correct. Under the 

scheme in Federal law, as you now, you can have a variety—well, 

not a variety, a limited number of offenses that are so-called deatheligible, and then the way the Federal statutory scheme works, 

9 

then in order to make a recommendation of death in a particular 

case, you go to another statutory scheme that does have very stringent guidelines before the prosecutor can actually make a recommendation to the Attorney General to seek death in a particular 

case. 

Senator SESSIONS. Very good. 

Senator Biden, I thank you for coming. I know you have a tremendous amount of activities, and especially as the Ranking Member on the Foreign Relations Committee. I know there has been a 

lot going on there. Over the years, Mr. Mattice, Senator Biden has 

been a key player in things such as the sentencing guidelines and 

other things that prosecutors like us have used. So I am glad you 

could be here, Senator Biden, and you take any time you need to 

make any opening statement you would like, and also you have 

your questions. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, my schedule is no busier than yours. We just have different calls on us at 

the moment. 

This is an issue which the Chairman knows I have been intensely interested in for a long time. As usual, the Chairman not 

only knows the law and the statute, but knows the constitutional 

requirement under the death penalty statutes. They are written 

the way they did to comport with the Supreme Court rulings on the 

requirement of intent. 

There are two phases, I think, to the Chairman holding this 

hearing, two pieces. One is the enforcement side of this. We are 

talking about it now, and that is whether or not we should have 

a death penalty. We should rationalize the statutes that exist, and 

I think he is right. 

I think his legislation is—I must tell you, I haven’t fly-specked 

it myself, but based on what I know, I agree with what the Senator 

is attempting to do, and I guess we are going to have a second 

panel a little bit later that is going to talk about the prevention 

side, not in terms of dissuading because of penalty, but physically 

preventing this from happening. 

But I would like to ask about resources on the law enforcement 

side of this a moment. I will be relatively brief here. 

We rely heavily, as you know as a prosecutor, and Mr. Lindsey, 

as you well know, on the expertise and the talent of the FBI in a 

lot of these cases, although a lot of these cases, I mean, when we 

find a terrorist trying to take down a tunnel or a track or a bridge 

over which a train is going, it is as likely to have it be some local 

county sheriff finding that person as it is someone with night-vision goggles wearing fatigues working for the Special Forces Unit. 

I realize this cuts across, but the FBI is an integral part of all 

of this. What we have learned from al Qaeda is that they are persistent and they tend to want targets that are celebrated in the 

sense that they can either have significant symbolic imagery if they 

are hit and/or do significant damage. 

One of the things the Chairman and I—he may remember this— 

a year ago talked about was we are concerned about someone putVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Nov 06, 2008 Jkt 043001 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43001.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
10 

ting plastic on their body and walking into a city bus and blowing 

themselves up, or a restaurant. We see that happening in other 

parts of the world. It happened in Paris as many as 15 years ago 

and it is happening in Israel every day. 

But what we are trying to figure out is how we prevent the catastrophic event. We can’t stop everything. I know there are over 

100,000 miles of track in the United States of America because, as 

my friend—and he has been supportive of this—my friend will tell 

you, I have been a broken record on rail security for God knows 

how long. People say to me, well, you can’t protect every mile of 

track. Well, that is true, but I sure can protect 350,000 people in 

the tunnels underneath New York City today. That is how many 

people will be in the seat of a train underneath the ground in a 

tunnel, the most recent one of which was built in 1911, with no security, no lighting, et cetera. 

Now to my question. The FBI is critical. The major cities in 

America where we have counterterrorism forces are the ones that 

we are assuming is the most likely place an al Qaeda will go, 

though they can go anywhere, but they are more likely to go to 

New York City, Los Angeles, Atlanta, than they are to Selbyville, 

Delaware, or the Eastern Shore of Maryland, et cetera. We have 

relatively large offices there of the FBI. The FBI agents talk about 

the harsh realities of the ultimate impact investigations, is the 

phrase they use, in these major cities where the major damage 

could be done. 

Now, I have spent a lot of my time here, the Chairman, as a 

prosecutor prior to coming here, to understand there is some correlation between resources and protection. These young women and 

men joining the FBI, many of whom have law degrees, most have 

advanced degrees, are, for example, in New York City, there is an 

article in USA Today titled, ‘‘Low Pay Squeezes FBI Agents, Perhaps U.S. Security.’’ 

There is a quote from a young man who is—it talks about this 

low pay and describes how one young agent in the New York City 

office, a law school graduate, a former Marine captain, whose starting salary is $39,000 a year—$39,000 a year. He lives in a sparse 

rented apartment 42 miles away from the City of New York because it is the only place he can find one to live because he can’t 

afford to live where he works. The agent said, quote, ‘‘I took an 

oath when I joined the FBI. I never thought it would also include 

the vow of poverty,’’ end of quote. 

So my question is this. Do you fellows think, and I realize it is 

above your pay grade, as we say, to be able to—but just from your 

experiences, do you believe that we should be going back and taking a look at the starting salaries we are paying the brightest 

young women and men we are looking for to be the front line in 

a very sophisticated line of work—forget the danger, just a sophisticated line of work requiring some real ingenuity and capability. 

Do you think we should be paying these folks more to start? 

I mean, patriotism is a motivating factor, but when you have a 

law school degree, you can start in that same city and get a job on 

Wall Street. I think the starting salary now in law firms, you 

know, they have a standard start, I think it is $158,000, $160,000, 

and yet we are asking these same bright people to maybe be 

11 

agents, work as a counterterrorism specialist in the FBI office in 

New York City and start at $39,000. 

What do you think? Talk to me about that. Or is it enough that 

we are just still going to attract just really good, bright people and 

that is all we can afford or should afford? I know as prosecutor, you 

are not making a lot of money, either, but you will get no empathy 

up here. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LINDSEY. Do you want to take the first shot? 

Mr. MATTICE. I guess I will take the first crack, Senator. Thank 

you for the question. As you point out, they make these decisions 

above my pay grade, and certainly as a Federal employee and as 

a citizen, I certainly understand the competing demands on the 

Federal budget. In one sense, having the privilege to serve as U.S. 

Attorney and observing our law enforcement officers working on a 

day-to-day basis, and I have to say, I have to emphasize, it has 

been my privilege to serve in this capacity. There are days when 

I think there is not enough money in the world to compensate the 

folks for the service that they render to this country. On the other 

hand, it has also been my experience that most of them do it not 

for the money, for the privilege of serving themselves. 

I hate to come down that way. As I say, they do make those decisions above my pay grade and I guess we can only hope until we 

find a way or until policy makers such as yourself and the administration who sets the budget finds a way to allocate the scarce resources out there for all our needs, I guess we just have to hope 

that we do have the sort of dedicated folks out there who are willing to make—who they and their families are willing to make the 

sacrifices necessary to protect us. 

Senator BIDEN. What I am going to urge my colleagues to think 

about, and professionals like you guys, is I agree it is never going 

to be competitive. I am not suggesting that. Otherwise, my son 

wouldn’t be making $50,000 as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in 

Philadelphia, although he has now, after 7 years, gone. You would 

have made a lot more as U.S. Attorney, the same as you, sir, and 

that also goes for your job, Mr. Lindsey. But I do think $39,000 to start is shamefully low in terms of 

what we ask these folks to live on, and it is not like they are living 

in suburban Wilmington, Delaware, or in suburban Birmingham, 

which are still high standards of living, but living in San Francisco, 

New York, Atlanta, Miami, places where there is a very high cost 

of living. 

Let me switch and I will end my questioning of this panel, Mr. 

Chairman. 

One of the things that frustrates me is, and this is mainly directed to you, Mr. Lindsey, is to state my—I was going to try to 

figure out how to ask this question without revealing my prejudice, 

but it is so obvious what my prejudice is, I might as well not try 

to even pretend to be objective. 

We have a set of very stringent laws, which I fully support, relative to airline passenger travel. We literally have, not figuratively, 

literally have scissors women use to trim their eyebrows taken as 

they go through a metal detector. I have had literally a nail clipper 

you buy for $1.79 taken, and I am not complaining. There is a 

12 

whole bevy of laws relating to airlines that talk about and make 

it a crime to possess a weapon, possess an explosive, et cetera. 

But that same legislation does not apply to public transportation 

other than airlines. Why, when you have 560 people on a loaded 

Amtrak train, about 24 of which will leave and arrive in the station 

today down the street, which contain more people, or as many people as a loaded 747, is there any reason why we shouldn’t rationalize the law, that if you bring a weapon, if you—I am not figuring 

out how you detect it, but if there is a weapon that you bring onto 

that train, it is ipso facto a violation of Federal law, like it is if you 

go onto an airline? Can you think of any rationale why we should 

treat them differently? 

Mr. LINDSEY. Certainly, there is a great deal of value in consistency here, Senator Biden. I would certainly agree with that. There 

are some differences in the kinds of vehicles. I think S. 2289 ends 

up addressing very well what a potential bad actor can do on a 

train. 

Some of the differences that make a difference between trains 

and airplanes, for example, is that compared to the difficulty of getting into an airline cockpit, it is very, very hard to get into the engine compartment of a train. You can’t readily get there from a 

passenger car, and should you get there, then you don’t really have 

the ability to direct the vehicle someplace else. So there are some 

differences in the modes of transportation that do make a difference. 

That said, I think it is extremely important that we reach all 

those kinds of weapons about which you spoke and things that can 

be turned into weapons, such as box cutters, which S. 2289 would 

certainly include among dangerous weapons, that a few years ago 

no one would have thought was worth covering and that the wrecking train statute sure didn’t. It is extremely important that we be 

able to include those and that when anybody comes on and uses 

them, certainly, that— 

Senator BIDEN. But how about the mere possession? If you get 

on an airplane with the mere possession of an explosive and incendiary device or other dangerous weapon, it is a violation of Federal 

law. Why, when I commute every day back and forth to Wilmington, Delaware, and I get on a packed train, knowing that if, 

in fact, someone has an incendiary device in a duffel bag that is 

in the middle car going under the Baltimore tunnel, which was 

built in 1869, and explodes it, it is guaranteed to do as much damage as would occur if that device went off in a 747 flying at 35,000 

feet. Why should it not be automatically, ipso facto, just like getting on an aircraft with an incendiary device, a violation of the 

law? 

Mr. LINDSEY. I can’t think of any reason why it shouldn’t be, sir. 

Senator BIDEN. Okay. I thank you both very, very much, and I 

thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I 

may have two questions each in writing—I will not make a lot of 

work for you—that at your leisure you could answer in writing for 

the Committee. I would appreciate that if that is all right, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Senator SESSIONS. Fine. 

13 

Senator BIDEN. I would ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, 

that my opening statement, because I apologize again for being 

late, be entered in the record at the beginning of the hearing as 

if I had delivered it. 

Senator SESSIONS. Without objection, we will put that in at the 

appropriate place. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator SESSIONS. This statute, the bill that I proposed, does include expanded definitions of weapons for railways, does it not, Mr. 

Lindsey? 

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, sir, it certainly does. 

Senator SESSIONS. And it includes box cutters and knives and 

other things, is that right? 

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, sir. The definition of dangerous weapon is now 

very broad and comprehensive. 

Senator SESSIONS. Could it help you under certain circumstances? I know it won’t cover everything, but under certain 

circumstances, it could be a valuable tool for law enforcement. 

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes, sir. In a variety of circumstances that we have 

seen over the years, the expanded definition of dangerous weapon 

will be very important. 

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask a point here, because I want to support your legislation, I want to ask for a point 

of clarification. What you are referring to is on page four of the bill, 

Subsection 6— 

Senator SESSIONS. Page seven. 

Senator BIDEN. Oh, okay. I am sorry. I was really looking at page 

four. It says, ‘‘engaging in conduct, including the use of a dangerous weapon with intent to cause death or serious bodily injury.’’ 

I apologize because maybe it is just— 

Senator SESSIONS. I was having a hard time finding it myself. 

Staff had to help me. The bottom of page seven, under definitions, 

defines dangerous weapon. 

Senator BIDEN. Now, here is my point. As I understand, again, 

now I pretend no expertise in your bill because I have not thoroughly read it. Subsection E—page seven, definition, biological 

agent, dangerous weapon, refers back to the use of it. The crime 

is the use of it, not the possession of it. 

Mr. LINDSEY. That is correct. 

Senator SESSIONS. Yes. 

Senator BIDEN. My point is, if you get on an aircraft, whether 

you use it or not, if you get on an aircraft with a loaded weapon, 

you get on an aircraft and you get through security with a biological agent in your valise, you get on an aircraft with possession of 

an incendiary device, the mere possession of it is a violation of Federal law. 

I would urge you to think about the possibility of amending this 

to not make box cutters a violation of Federal law, because there 

is a correlation. It is difficult to get into—by the way, the new 

trains, just so you know, the new train sets, as you well know, they 

have a door. They have a door that you can enter from the last car 

into the engine. The other trains do not have a door. You have to 

14 

get outside, pull a ‘‘Silver Streak,’’ jump on top of the engine, and 

get down. 

Now, granted, it is reinforced. What I don’t know is whether it 

is as reinforced under the specifications that exist for airlines. I 

don’t think it is. I could be wrong. And you do know every conductor has a key. 

Mr. LINDSEY. Yes. 

Senator BIDEN. Every conductor has a key, unlike what happens 

on the airline. None of the stewardesses have a key to get into that 

door. So the fact is, we are still making false distinctions here. 

I promise you, because of the lack of security on switching, I can 

take a new Metroliner, and we call them—they are no longer called 

Metroliners—a new Metroliner with 500 people at 150 miles an 

hour and run it through that damn station, never having been able 

to brake once, and kill thousands of people, the people in and the 

people in the station. And all I have to do is take a gun to a head 

of a conductor up front, walk him through that door with his key, 

make it right to the engineer, shoot him in the head, full throttle, 

and have someone working just like they did on the ground, making sure that the switching is locked, because there is no security 

on the switching. And I promise you, seven cars at 150 miles an 

hour will make a wreck on an aircraft look like a game. 

Nobody listens to me. Nobody pays attention, and that is my 

frustration. You sit there, and I have great respect for you, sir. You 

are talking about how you can’t get in the engines. You can get in 

the engines. You don’t even have the security requirements that 

exist now for stewardesses on an aircraft because we have this ridiculous mindset that only bad things can happen in the air. 

The last point I will make, Mr. Chairman, and I didn’t use to say 

this, but the terrorists know this already. All you have got to do 

is get in the freight yard here right four blocks down the road here, 

take an ammonium oxide tanker, put an incendiary device underneath it that is time—that is how they have been blowing up these 

trains, you know—wait until it gets under the Supreme Court of 

the United States, and I promise you, Mr. Chairman, you will see 

the Supreme Court sink into a 50-foot hole. 

It goes by. You want to make real news? Wait until you take out 

the Cannon Building. It is not a joke. It is real, real. We have no 

guards. We have no security. And guess what? You can walk on 

that train with as many pounds of plastic as you can, acting like 

you are a jeweler, wheeling the big carts that have their big jewelry in it. No one checks it. And you want to blow up—I think it 

is the Cannon Building. Which one, Jim? It is the Cannon Building. Take out 150 Congressmen and their staff. You think a plane 

full of fuel is a problem, hang on. Hang on. 

So I hope you would consider just changing one thing, and that 

is making the mere possession on a mode of public transportation 

of an incendiary device, an explosive device, a weapon, a gun. I am 

not worried about box cutters as much as I am—that is a problem, 

maybe. But I would just settle for being able to take on a 50-pound 

bomb. Again, we don’t know the facts. 

I used to hesitate to say this, Mr. Chairman, because I don’t 

want to publish it, but I finally figured out from our agency that 

al Qaeda, all these guys know this. It is not like—the only people 

15 

I am hiding it from are the American people. Al Qaeda knows. 

They know the tunnels. We have been warned, by the way, as long 

as two-and-a-half years ago. We, the United States of America, 

warned by our own intelligence service that rail is a likely target, 

rail, both passenger and freight. 

You saw what happened when a tanker blew up in North Dakota, for God’s sake, in the middle of nowhere, in an area that is 

twice as big as my whole State, and what it did to two whole 

towns. 

So I hope we get serious about this, because I want to tell you 

something. It is a little like Pontius Pilate as we approach Easter. 

He said, ‘‘I wash my hands of this.’’ I tell you what. I am washing 

my hands of this. Warning, warning, warning, warning, warning. 

This is self-evident and obvious and we are doing thus far nothing. 

Homeland Security so far has done nothing. 

I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. This is more than a hobby horse. I 

think this is the place where you are going to see significant casualties of Americans if we don’t get smart. 

Senator SESSIONS. We appreciate your insight and knowledge of 

the rail industry and the problems and threats it faces and maybe 

we can make some progress on some of those suggestions that you 

make, that is for sure. 

I appreciate also your expression of interest in the FBI. They are 

working very, very hard. That starting salary does appear to be 

low. I think there is some additional compensation in the major 

urban areas, but it does trouble me, that starting salary for a person with a law degree or accounting degree, CPA. They would not 

be starting at that. 

One thing I would ask you just on that subject, Mr. Mattice. I 

know that since September 11, I suppose, the Attorney General 

and the FBI Director have made terrorism a top priority, the top 

priority of the FBI and the Department of Justice. In your experience with what is happening in Tennessee, do you think that that 

has sunk in? Are the FBI agents out in the country of America, 

throughout this country, do they react first and foremost, no matter 

what else is on their plate, to anything dealing with terrorism now? 

Mr. MATTICE. Mr. Chairman, there is no question about it. It has 

been my experience since I came into office, and I was sworn into 

office on October 16 of 2001, just a month after 9/11, and by the 

time I got there, there was no question that it was the number one 

priority of the FBI, including in the Eastern District of Tennessee, 

a relatively rural district like much of the country out there, as 

well as my office. 

By the time I got there, only a month after 9/11, there was already set up what was called the Anti-Terrorism Task Force run 

out of my office. Shortly thereafter, the FBI followed on our heels 

of setting up the Joint Terrorism Task Force for East Tennessee. 

I have monthly, if not more frequent, meetings with the Special 

Agent in Charge of the Knoxville Division of the FBI. The sole topic 

is terrorist issues in our district. We coordinate, as I say, at least 

that frequently face to face, not to say the countless phone calls we 

have. It have been my experience that in places like East Tennessee, there is no doubt that— 

16 

Senator SESSIONS. I think that is important, because we have 

seen some things. A lot of these cases have bubbled up from areas 

not just in the big cities. They may be carrying out their attacks 

here, but a lot of the people knew about it. I knew that this was 

supposedly occurring. I am glad to see it is. 

I believe we have one more panel. Thank you so much for your 

testimony. 

We have Chief Ernest R. Frazier, who is Amtrak’s top law enforcement officer, having been appointed Chief of Police in May of 

1994. In December of 2001, he testified before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee regarding the security of our passenger 

and rail infrastructure. He served in the Army as an intelligence 

analyst and also holds a law degree from Rutgers University School 

of Law. 

Brian Michael Jenkins, a captain in the Green Berets, is one of 

the world’s foremost authorities on terrorism and sophisticated 

crime. He was a White House appointee during the Clinton administration, working in several capacities in the field of transportation counterterrorism. He is currently the Director of the National Transportation Security Center for the Mineta Transportation Institute and senior advisor to the President of the RAND 

Corporation. 

First we will hear from Mr. Frazier, and then turn to Mr. Jenkins. Again, we will enter your full statements in the record. If you 

would keep your remarks to the ten-minute limit, we would appreciate that. 

Mr. Frazier? 

STATEMENT OF ERNEST R. FRAZIER, SR., CHIEF OF POLICE 

AND SECURITY DEPARTMENT, NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Chief FRAZIER. Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, members of 

the Senate Judiciary Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify before this important hearing concerning the laws on mass 

transportation security. 

Amtrak is the nation’s only inter-city passenger rail transportation company and operates over 300 trains per day over some 

22,000 miles of rail with approximately 540 stations in 46 States. 

Like rail transportation systems worldwide and mass transit systems in the United States, Amtrak functions in a very open transportation environment. Because of advantages such as easy access, 

convenient locations, and intermodal connections, rail and mass 

transit systems are completely different from the structure and organization of the airline transportation and airport industry. As a 

result, the security framework that works ideally in the airport setting is not transferrable to rail station systems. 

The Amtrak Police Department has 342 sworn officers, with most 

of its security force located in the Northeast Corridor, where Amtrak runs and operates the tracks and infrastructure. In 1992, the 

Amtrak Police Department received its distinction of being the first 

national law enforcement agency in the nation accredited by the 

Commission of Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies. It has 

been re-accredited in 1997 and 2002. 

17 

Though the Amtrak Police Department is a traditional police department, since September 11, 2001, our department has worked to 

develop terrorism-based vulnerability and threat assessments, 

emergency response and evacuation plans, as well as security 

measures that address not only vandalism and other forms of 

street crime that were occurring on our system, but the potential 

for explosions and blast effects at critical infrastructure locations. 

Amtrak has also developed a security threat level response plan 

that mirrors the Homeland Security Advisory System and requires 

Amtrak to engage in specific security countermeasures according to 

the existing threat level. 

Amtrak has also increased its police canine patrols by adding 12 

explosive detection canine teams to conduct random sweeps of baggage rooms, train platforms, and stations. The Police Department 

has also purchased full-face respirators for all sworn personnel and 

deployed these devices for Amtrak’s first responders to protect 

against CBR attack. In major stations, gamma/neutron radiological 

detectors have been also deployed to address radiological threats. 

The Amtrak Police Department does budget for elevations in 

HSAS. Frankly, manpower costs when we go to ‘‘orange’’ are roughly $11,000 in additional funds a day. However, there have been so 

many days already this fiscal year that we are coming close to surpassing this reserve budget. 

We also recognize that we must stand ready to manage an incident if and when there is some form of attack. Through our Office 

of Emergency Preparedness, we conduct training for first responder 

agencies, over 21,000 of them situated along the Amtrak service 

route. We have purchased a public safety database that lists each 

police, fire, and emergency rescue agency in order to facilitate State 

and local emergency response and to establish a clear record of 

agency training. 

Specifically with respect to criminal law sanctions, Amtrak 

agrees with the language of S. 2289 that reconciles criminal acts 

of terrorism against mass transit systems and amends the railroad 

section of the United States Crimes Code by including passenger 

rail. Any act of terrorism committed against a passenger and/or 

mass transit rail system should be treated in the same fashion. 

While criminal sanctions, such as S. 2289, are important tools to 

have in this new security environment, I would also ask the Committee and your colleagues in the Senate and House to address 

some basic legal matters that confront railroad police across the 

nation and at Amtrak. 

Specifically, rail police are not on the same equitable level as 

State, local, and mass transit police in key areas, such as the ability to participate in safety programs, such as the bulletproof vest 

partnership program, entitlement to public safety officer benefits, 

and in some States like California, the ability to directly access law 

enforcement records while performing stops. 

Further, while Amtrak has submitted security plans to the government for review and currently has been included in recent rail 

security funding legislation, which is S. 2273, which was reported 

out of the Senate Commerce Committee today, the lack of a consistent and ongoing source of security-related funding will be an 

18 

issue into the future. It is an immediate need and should be addressed through legislation. 

I thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony to the Committee. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Frazier appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Jenkins, we are glad to have you with us. 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SECURITY CENTER, MINETA 

TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE, SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Biden. I have provided the Committee with written testimony. Let 

me just highlight six points of that testimony very, very quickly so 

that we can proceed to the questions and answers; we may even 

have some argument on some of these issues, but perhaps not on 

others. 

First of all, with regard to the threat, there is no question that 

the threat is real. Trains and buses have become highly attractive 

targets to terrorists, particularly terrorists bent upon high body 

counts. If we look at it from the terrorist perspective—for terrorists 

are determined to kill in quantity, willing to kill indiscriminately— 

trains, subways, and buses are ideal targets. They offer the terrorists ease of access, ease of escape, crowds. And contained environments in train coaches and buses and tunnels are especially vulnerable to both conventional explosives and unconventional weapons. 

We also know that terrorist attacks on public transportation systems cause great disruption and alarm. These are the traditional 

objectives of terrorists. And in the last two-and-a-half years, since 

9/11, we have not only seen the attack in Madrid, but we know now 

about a number of plots that were thwarted or discovered in other 

places, in Singapore, in Italy, in the Philippines. So this certainly 

is part of al Qaeda and like-minded Jihadists’ play book. It is in 

there. They have done it. They have tried to do it elsewhere. The 

threat is real. 

The second point is that, having said that, we know that we can’t 

protect surface transportation the same way that we protect commercial aviation. It now takes 60,000 screeners, approximately, to 

check two million passengers who fly from U.S. airports daily. An 

equivalent nationwide screening system for the approximately—I 

believe, Senator Sessions, you mentioned—32 million passengers a 

day who board trains, light rail, commuter trains, subways, and 

buses in this country would require hundreds of thousands of 

screeners and would cost tens of billions of dollars. The delays 

would be enormous, the cost prohibitive. Public transportation 

would effectively be shut down. 

And we also have to keep in mind that any new security measures should provide a net security benefit, that is, not merely displace the risk toward other equally vulnerable targets. We know 

that keeping terrorists off airliners provides a net security benefit. 

As terrorists demonstrated on 9/11, a hijacked airliner can be 

turned into a missile that kills thousands. 

19 

Senator Biden, you have outlined some scenarios that can get up 

to significant casualty levels, and I think what we have to do is address those individually and see what measures we can take realistically—apart from, say, screening, every single passenger—that 

will enable us to thwart some of those frightening scenarios. 

Senator BIDEN. I am not suggesting screening everyone. 

Mr. JENKINS. No, I understand that, and I think there may be 

some procedures as well as some technology around some of the 

tunnels and other vulnerable infrastructure that we can deploy to 

at least bring the threat down to, let us say, the level that we face 

in other public places, whether they are supermarkets, shopping 

malls, or even long lines of people waiting to go through security 

measures. 

We also have to keep in mind that, given the nature of the threat 

we face today, whatever steps we take now are likely to become 

permanent, and therefore we have to make sure that any new security measures are not only effective but also sustainable and efficient. Now, that doesn’t mean that nothing can be done to protect 

surface transportation. In fact, we can do a number of things, and 

indeed, analysis of previous terrorist attacks and campaigns 

against mass transit systems have provided a growing catalog of 

lessons learned and some best practices. 

Chief Frazier has already mentioned some of them which are 

practical measures that make sense. Visible security patrols and 

visible staff have a deterrent effect. Closed-circuit television coverage has been used extensively in Europe, and with good results. 

Enlisting employees and the public in surveillance can also be very 

effective, although the public cannot be expected to assist unless 

their communications with the authorities are facilitated and calls 

bring a rapid, visible response. Otherwise, we simply have exhortation, and it doesn’t work. 

New technology is giving us the ability to detect and diagnose incidents more effectively, to detect explosives, chemicals, biological 

substances. A lot more can be done through the design of vehicles 

and facilities to eliminate hiding places, facilitate surveillance, and 

reduce casualties. 

Another option is red-teaming, that is, planning actual terrorist 

attacks—and Senator Biden, you were giving a pretty good example of red-teaming in some of your introductory comments—that 

look at how one would actually plan some of these scenarios, do 

that in great detail, assess the vulnerability, and then use the assessment as a basis for deploying security measures that can 

thwart those kinds of attacks. 

Exercises and drills involving transportation staff, police, and 

other emergency responders are crucial. This was demonstrated 

dramatically on September 11, when not only the 200,000-andsome people who are underground in New York on the subway at 

any given moment on a busy day, but also 60,000 passengers and 

300 employees in the stations immediately below the World Trade 

Center, were safely evacuated, every one of them, and that was because of having good practices in place. 

Now, these are good ideas, but this brings me to my fourth point. 

There is no single best way to implement them. Surface transportation is not a single national system. We are obliged to treat secuVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Nov 06, 2008 Jkt 043001 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43001.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
20 

rity in airports in the same way at all 430 airports in the country. 

But surface transportation is a complex quilt of networks. They 

vary in size, in mode, in means of providing security; and geography does make a difference. The threat in Duluth is not the same 

as the threat in the District of Columbia, so we have to allow some 

flexibility in how we apply these measures. 

I think that a best practices approach is the most effective model. 

In a best practices approach, the Federal Government supports the 

research, subsidizes the deployment of the technology, provides intelligence, which is critical, augments security when the threat 

warrants, and assists with emergency response and investigation 

in the case of a terrorist attack. 

The new legislation that you have offered, Senator Sessions, and 

the proposals of Senators Biden, Specter, and Hatch, by expanding 

and filling in some of the gaps in the criminal law—whatever it 

does for the prosecution side, and I am not an attorney, I am not 

a prosecutor—is useful in that it expands and clarifies the criminal 

law, it facilitates the investigations and intelligence collection. 

I am not always sure that the kind of adversaries we face today 

are deterred by the death penalty, because we are dealing with 

some people in some cases who are willing to give up their lives. 

But I think that facilitating the intelligence collection by opening 

up some space here in the criminal law is a very useful contribution. 

My fifth point is that I think we have to look at this strategically. Since the beginning of the republic, security considerations 

have been major factors in the development of the nation’s transportation system, from the building of the first national road to the 

creation of the Interstate Highway System. So I think we have to 

think about a broad national transportation security strategy. 

Now, this involves more than simply mandating increased security. It makes security a criterion in the design of new transportation facilities, and Senator Biden, you are quite right in pointing 

out that we are dealing with infrastructure that was built in the 

last century and, in some cases, the century before that. A transportation security strategy may encourage the construction of some 

new transportation infrastructure that is inherently more robust, 

or that reduces some of the obvious current vulnerabilities, or that 

has built-in redundancies to reduce disruption. 

One thing we have to be careful of is that the transfer of the 

Transportation Security Agency from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland Security, while that makes 

sense in terms of consolidating security responsibilities, should not 

lead to an exclusive reliance on regulation and enforcement as the 

only ways to mitigate risk. We have to think about this really as 

a national strategy. 

That brings me to my final observation. Certainly, we must do 

all we can to enhance the ability of our intelligence efforts and law 

enforcement officials to uncover and thwart terrorist plots, increase 

security around vulnerable targets, and improve our ability to respond to attacks when they occur. At the same time, however, we 

must be realistic about the acceptance of risk. We cannot allow fear 

to become the framework of American governance, and we should 

be wary of slouching toward a security state in which protected peVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Nov 06, 2008 Jkt 043001 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43001.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
21 

rimeters, gates, and guards dominate the landscape and irrevocably alter our lives. 

Even this august body cannot legislate an end to terrorism. It 

cannot eliminate all the vulnerabilities from an open society, and 

it cannot transfer all risks from its citizens to its government, nor 

should it try. Ultimately, in my view, the strength of this Nation 

is going to depend not on the thickness of the concrete walls or the 

severity of the criminal code, but on the courage, self-reliance, and 

inherent creativity of its free citizens. Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. That was very insightful. We appreciate those comments. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Chief, as I was thinking about your situation, 

I remembered, I believe Wednesday, I walked down to Union Station to get a bite to eat and they were evacuating the station. Was 

that something you did and is that something that happens 

around—I think Paris is having an evacuation today. How do you 

go about making those decisions and how often does that occur? 

Chief FRAZIER. Mr. Chairman, Wednesday’s incident was an actual security matter. What happened was, and I was there, what 

happened was a backpack, a blue knapsack was left by one of the 

restaurants in the main area of Union Station and it was found by 

a security officer, who reported it to us. We went and checked, and 

basically, it had an odor. The odor smelled like fuel. 

Based on our procedures that are in place for emergency evacuation, we made notice, formed up the Incident Command Center, 

and began investigating this matter. We roped off 300 yards to 

start, or 300 feet to start based on the size of the package, and ultimately received help upon the arrival of the fire department and 

police authorities to assist us. 

Back last June, we had a multi-agency drill at Union Station 

here in Washington and we had over 120 participants from all 

branches of government, State, local, and Federal, and put together 

a solid framework—this is a TSA-sponsored drill—put together a 

solid framework to improve on what we already had. 

So ultimately, we did get the package inspected. It turned out 

that lighter fluid had been in there, that it had spilled, and that 

that was what created the foul incendiary type of smell. 

How often does it happen? Suspicious packages are found on Amtrak, things that are called to our attention by employees, things 

that are called to our attention by passengers quite frequently. 

Three or four, maybe five times a day somewhere on the system, 

we receive a notification that something is being checked out somewhere, either at a station or on board a train or on our tracks. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think Mr. Jenkins mentioned technology. I 

think I will ask you first about things like surveillance cameras. 

Are you satisfied you have enough of that? Would you like to expand your capability there? That is just a pretty decent preventive 

tool, certainly a good investigative tool. 

Chief FRAZIER. The level of sophistication of what we have right 

now goes, for example, perhaps back to 1974. We may have some 

camera system in some place that is that old. It may be some stuff 

22 

we were able to put in in Philadelphia back in the mid–1990s that 

we are looking to upgrade at this point in terms of CCTV. 

We believe that it is a good deterrent, and in fact, we are working with TSA on a pilot in Philadelphia that will deal with the latest technology associated with CCTV and perhaps having an ability 

to have that technology work to identify things that are unusual 

so that it can help our operators to review the information and 

process it. 

Is what we have adequate at this point? It is not. We need to, 

as Mr. Jenkins has indicated, probably have some improvements in 

terms of CCTV and, of course, in terms of other technologies that 

are available today. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Jenkins, what would you say about technology? What are some of the things that come to mind? I know 

you haven’t issued an official report on these things, but you have 

had some—I am sure you have thought about it, some things that 

we maybe could do to go beyond. This is a law enforcement Judiciary hearing, but what could we do to go beyond that to the Transportation Department or some others might consider, and private 

businesses might consider to make their places of business more 

safe? 

Mr. JENKINS. In 2002, Chief Frazier and I served together on a 

transportation panel that looked specifically at the issue of applications of technology to countering terrorism. I think one of the interesting findings of that panel was that while there are obviously 

some areas that we would wish to develop that we are still just 

pushing right now—in other words, chemical detection—we are 

making great progress. The detection of chemical substances is still 

technology on the move. We have some experimental systems that 

have been deployed. 

Detection of biological pathogens is a bit further behind. It is a 

more complicated technological task, but it is also on the move. We 

have made great progress in explosives detection, but there, we 

still deal with the issue that you have to get fairly close to a suspicions object to be able to pick it up. You have to be able to actually run it through a machine or swab it with a piece of gauze to 

make detection work. 

Closed-circuit TV is now on the shelf. To say that we have camera systems in place that were put there in 1974, I mean, that is 

an archaeological dig in terms of the movement of technology on 

this stuff. 

Senator BIDEN. It is like telling my daughter just got out of college and is working in Philadelphia in the city, that I am going to 

buy her a black-and-white TV. 

Mr. JENKINS. It is. I mean, the cameras, fortunately, have not 

only improved in quality in terms of their abilities to do things— 

pan, zoom, tilt—but there is color now, and the resolution is sufficient to qualify for evidence in trial as opposed to showing blurry 

little black-and-white images. And fortunately, also, the costs have 

come down. 

Another interesting area is bringing together a closed-circuit TV 

system, which they have done very effectively, for example, in the 

United Kingdom. To give you an idea of the comparison of our system to theirs, for British Rail in England and the London UnderVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Nov 06, 2008 Jkt 043001 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43001.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
23 

ground, according to the last figures I saw, they were installing 

5,000 cameras. Now, that is intensive coverage. 

To be able to take those cameras the next step and make them 

smart cameras, we have learned that with software, in fact, the 

mechanical surveillance system can be taught to recognize normal 

patterns and to pick out anomalies. That is an area where, in fact, 

we can take technology further. 

In terms of tunnels, which came up several times in our discussion, we are looking at ventilation systems. To be able to rapidly 

diagnose when something is going wrong is one thing. But, what 

are you going to do about it? We need to have systems that enable 

us to vent tunnels, to remove smoke from tunnels. We know from 

experience in Korea with the recent accidental incident, or from 

tunnels in Europe, that smoke is the killer. So can we get smoke 

out of tunnels? Can we get chemical substances out of tunnels? 

In some cases, we don’t want to vent into the street. I mean, if 

we have a poison gas, just popping it through ventilators onto pedestrians isn’t necessarily going to be an improvement. So that is 

another area where we can make great strides. 

And then, finally, there is the design of the stations and vehicles 

themselves. Eliminating things that turn to shrapnel in explosions 

or that produce toxic fumes when burning, designing vehicles that 

explode in such a fashion that they allow the explosives to vent and 

reduce the internal pressures, those are some other things we can 

do. 

The interesting finding—and correct me if I am wrong in this— 

is that we had the technology. We knew what the technology was. 

The problem was institutional barriers. Cost was part of it, but also 

a lot of institutional barriers prevented us from an effective deployment of this technology; and beyond that, we still have a tendency, 

even in airport security, to deploy a machine and attach a human 

being to it without much thought about the human performance 

and the human factors. So it is not just a question of deploying 

technology. We should really be thinking about these things in a 

much more systematic way than we have done before. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. Very good. 

Senator Biden? 

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. And again, Mr. Chairman, 

I can’t tell you how much I appreciate your holding this hearing. 

Brian, you may remember, you were here on October 16, back in 

the bad old days when I was Chairman of this Committee, October 

16, 2001, just a little over six weeks, fie, six weeks after 9/11. I 

reread the testimony. We haven’t done anything since this testimony. 

And Chief, you are a good soldier, but you are not even close to 

being able to protect. I have made over 6,800 round trips on Amtrak from Wilmington, Delaware, to Washington, D.C. in 32 years. 

I am no more safe today than I was before, not because of your not 

doing your job, but because, in fact, you have probably gotten a lot 

worse. 

Quite frankly, I am going to say something outrageous. I know 

as much about your institution and you guys as you do. I know 

more of your guys by name than you do, I bet. Literally, not figuratively. 

24 

Chief FRAZIER. I believe that is true. 

Senator BIDEN. If you think I am joking, I am not joking. 

Chief FRAZIER. I believe that is true. 

Senator BIDEN. They have been my guys and women. But let me 

tell you something. You said here, for example, and I think it is 

important people know, you have 12 canine teams. How long have 

you had 12 canine teams? 

Chief FRAZIER. The explosive teams were put on in 19—excuse 

me, in 2001. 

Senator BIDEN. In 2001. And all 12? 

Chief FRAZIER. Yes. 

Senator BIDEN. How many total number of dogs do you have? 

Chief FRAZIER. Seventeen. 

Senator BIDEN. Seventeen dogs. Now, the idea that—here is my 

problem, Mr. Jenkins. We have a tendency here to make perfect 

the enemy of the good. You are a bona fide terrorism expert. Everyone I have spoken to in this country, in Germany, in France, in 

England, makes several things clear. If we are dealing with, for 

lack of a better phrase, institutionalized terror, the al Qaedas of 

the world, they seek, particularly al Qaeda, seek maximum effect. 

They want to make the news broadcast as horrific as they can possibly make it. Terror is called terror as opposed to war because it 

is designed to terrorize civilian populations. 

Now, what I don’t understand is you know and I know and Chief, 

you know, that there are high-value targets that are very high 

value. As I said, one Metroliner and one Amfleet full passing each 

other in a tunnel is more than five full 747s. 

Now, here is my problem. Particularly at time of high alert, 

Brian, why does it not make sense for us to install into a central 

com remote control television cameras at the entrance and midway 

and partially through every major tunnel in the Northeast corridor? What is so hard about that? I could get some kid who does 

the computers in my office to wire that, not figuratively, literally. 

Why is it when we go on orange alert, why is it we don’t have 

enough cops for you guys to station, actually 24 hours a day, one 

guard in front of every tunnel, either end, just to guard? You are 

not going to stop a train, but you are going to stop someone moving 

in, dropping a bomb in the middle of it, a guard. You don’t need 

rocket science to deal with some of this stuff. 

Remember you used to go through the old Baltimore tunnel and 

in the middle of the tunnel, you had a guy sitting there in a booth? 

Do you remember that? There was a reason for that. That was for 

security. An accident happens in the middle of the tunnel. This is 

1940s technology. I am not even asking us to get up to the 21st 

century. 

There are some things I just can’t fathom. How many—if we took 

and hired another 500 police officers, the total cost of that would 

be infinitesimal compared to the cost of security nationwide, and 

just made sure that every single major tunnel had guards in front 

of it. It wouldn’t stop something in a train. 

But we have another problem. These guys are pretty inventive. 

It doesn’t take much to slide down the bank right next to the Baltimore tunnel and walk in, walk in. You can carry a 100-pound bomb 

25 

down there. You just walk it in the middle of the tunnel, a remote 

control detonator. 

So what I am trying to get at, Brian, what is this institutional 

thing? It is almost like if we cannot do it all, we do nothing. There 

are more canine patrols in the City of Wilmington, Delaware, than 

you have on all of Amtrak. We are not going to get to make sure 

we have every single passenger screened. That is ridiculous, okay. 

You have a total of how many Metroliners today in the Northeast 

corridor, and I picked the Northeast not because it is more important, it is just the most passengers. You can blow up the most people. If we had a canine cop on every train, nothing else, we are 

talking about putting—which I support and you support U.S. Marshals on as many aircraft as we can get—one canine patrol on 

every Metroliner, or every crowded train—you wouldn’t have to do 

them all. 

Now, will that guarantee that dog will sniff out every single solitary explosive on there? No. Is it a deterrent? Yes. Does it increase 

more than marginally the possibility we get someone? Remember, 

these guys didn’t use chemical weapons, Brian. They took a computer, they took the Internet, they took an aircraft, and they took 

fuel in the belly of an aircraft. What do we have to do to learn? 

How dumb are we? What is the problem? 

Mr. JENKINS. When I say institutional barriers, I don’t mean that 

the institution can’t figure it out or that somebody is demanding 

the perfect solution as a barrier against doing some sensible things. 

The institutional barriers tend to revolve around jurisdictional 

issues—who is going to be in charge, who is going to do this. 

Technologically, you are absolutely right. I mean, look, we strung 

fiber optics through these tunnels. We have rigged these tunnels so 

that your cell phones work in the tunnels. We managed to do that. 

Senator BIDEN. Yes. 

Mr. JENKINS. It is no more difficult to string TV cameras through 

the tunnels, and we should be doing that. That is not an insurmountable task. 

As for explosives detection using canine crews, I might differ 

with you there, because I would say that if I had an increased 

number of canines for explosives detection, I would probably be 

wanting to deploy them more effectively in the stations rather than 

on the trains. 

Senator BIDEN. You are the expert. The only point I am trying 

to make is that some of the things we could do—for example, I say 

to you, Chief, you indicated that this is really—you acknowledge it 

is fundamentally different than airports. In some ways, yes. In 

other places, wrong. 

We are now having proposals coming from the Federal Aviation 

outfit saying that maybe we should not only have detection when 

you walk in and put your bag on the plane or when you walk in 

and you go through the detector to get on the plane. There are proposals now, and you know better than I do, Brian, to have detection before you can walk into the airport. I promise you, Chief, you 

know it, more people in Grand Central today than in any airport 

in the United States of America. There are more people in Philadelphia in that city right now in one place in that station at rush hour 

26 

than there are—I don’t mean in the trains, I mean in the station— 

than there are at the Philadelphia airport. 

If the Philadelphia airport were considering whether or not, before you can walk into the door—we haven’t done it, but that is a 

consideration—before you walk into the door, we are going to check 

it out, I think it is an institutional bias against rail. If you think 

I am joking, I am not. 

We think of rail like it is somehow another century. Therefore, 

it is not much of—all you have got to do is watch one of these 

science fiction movies. They are ridiculous sounding. Just take one 

of those new trains at 120 miles an hour and hit it from Carrollton. 

What have you got? Man, you have got yourself a science fiction 

movie that is not very hard to do. 

Now, I really have two questions and then I will stop. To the best 

of my knowledge, and I don’t want to go through all of what we 

don’t have, I don’t want to advertise too much here, but to the best 

of my knowledge, unlike airlines, we do not have extensive security 

around switching. We don’t have extensive security around access 

to the command and control terminals, where you have got guys 

sitting there making sure more than one train is not on one track. 

We don’t have any serious security like we do for the air traffic 

controllers’ tower. We don’t have that for the similar towers that 

exist—they are not towers now—for our rail system, East Coast, 

West Coast, South, North. 

And, to the best of my knowledge, basic things like you have 350 

police officers and you have them working overtime. By the way, 

I might add parenthetically, more drugs are transported on our 

trains heading up the Northeast corridor than all of I–95. Forget 

the rest. But that is another question. 

So here is what I want to know. If you had to, if I said to you, 

Brian, this may be unfair, but you guys, and you, Chief, you indicated you were on a task force already. What are the most, and you 

can submit it in writing if you don’t want to do it now, what are 

the most immediate technologically doable security measures that 

you would take if I said to you, you have a carte blanche, regardless of the cost, but you have to employ these security measures. 

They have to be able to be employed within the next 6 months. 

That is all you have got, 6 months. What are the things that you 

prioritize and do? 

The good news is, the bill that I introduced with Senator Hollings and Carper and others passed out of the Commerce Committee today, Chief, and I have never done this before, and I want 

to thank John McCain for keeping his commitment. It passed out 

with 14 votes, unanimously. It is $1,093,000,000 for rail security. 

It is $5 million to do a vulnerability assessment of passenger and 

freight rail. 

The second section where we are talking about spending money, 

it provides right away $570 million for the New York tunnels, $57 

millon in the same period for the Baltimore and Potomac tunnels, 

$40 million for the D.C. tunnels, and $3 million included for primary design for a new tunnel under the Baltimore Harbor. 

It also provides $500,000 to assist families who are victims of rail 

accidents. It provides $62 million for improvements in train secuVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Nov 06, 2008 Jkt 043001 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43001.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
27 

rity, station security, employment of additional police and security 

officers, so maybe help is on the way, Chief. 

I have written a letter to the Majority Leader a while ago, and 

I wrote it again, saying I would ask that in light of what we all 

now know and can’t deny, that immediately upon us coming back 

from the recess, we have a freestanding vote. For 2 years, Brian, 

I have been unable to get a vote. Two years I have been unable to 

get a vote on rail security. 

So I am going to make it clear. We have a chance to put in motion significant improvements in rail security. I don’t want to be 

the guy a year from now standing on the floor when we have our 

own Madrid and say, hey, man, we didn’t do anything. So I want 

everybody on notice. There is zero excuse not to bring this bill up 

and pass it in a day, and I am prepared to debate anybody on the 

merits of it at all. I will lay you eight-to-five when it comes up for 

a vote, it will pass 98–2. I don’t even know who the two no votes 

are. 

So you may have the ability to do exactly what I am asking you. 

What do you do? What are your highest priorities immediately relative to security that isn’t rocket science? 

Chief FRAZIER. Perhaps, Senator, I might start by saying that 

that bill, we had quite a bit of opportunity to participate in the 

drafting of that bill and I certainly appreciate your sponsorship of 

it. I am a little bit reluctant in terms of addressing financial issues 

here. Frankly— 

Senator BIDEN. I am not asking for numbers. I am just saying— 

I don’t mean dollars. If you had a wish list, what do you want? Do 

you want 300 more cops? Do you want cameras? What are the immediate things, if tomorrow you had the money, not the dollar 

number, if you had the money, what would you do? 

Chief FRAZIER. Well— 

Senator BIDEN. You have been thinking about this for a while. 

You have had panels. You have studied it. You have had recommendations. God love the former Governor of Pennsylvania who 

is now the Homeland Security Advisor. He keeps telling me he is 

concerned about it. I keep saying, tell me something. Say something. Step up to the ball. What do you want? 

Chief FRAZIER. Senator, I have to just comment a little bit here 

about the truth of the situation, and that is as it relates for Amtrak itself. Amtrak itself is struggling for financial stability. 

Senator BIDEN. Tell me about it. I am the guy that gets your 

money every year. Forget that. I don’t want to know about that. I 

am asking you a different question. What do you do if you had the 

money? What is your highest priority now security-wise? What do 

you need most? 

Chief FRAZIER. All right. What we want to do, as is indicated in 

that security investment plan that we put forward, is to take care 

of these stations, is our number one priority. You have mentioned 

Grand Central. Well, we have Penn Station in New York where 

there are over— 

Senator BIDEN. I meant to say Penn Station. That is bigger. 

Chief FRAZIER. There are over 500,000, 600,000 people a day in 

that multi-modal facility. We also have Washington, D.C. We also 

have Chicago and Philadelphia that we have identified as our priVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:18 Nov 06, 2008 Jkt 043001 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\43001.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
28 

ority majority stations where we need to place security measures 

in. 

We want to add police to those stations. We want to add explosives detection capability. We want to put more dogs into those stations. We want to increase the numbers of radiological pagers that 

we have that are available to us. We want to continue to work with 

the first responders in the communities where those stations are located to try and improve how we are doing our business and to 

mitigate, if we cannot stop the problem from happening in the first 

place, to mitigate the losses that will result. 

Our next area is tunnels. Our next area is to improve the security of tunnels through surveillance equipment, through the deployment of additional fence. Right now, based on Amtrak’s own capital 

dollars, it is extending fence in the Baltimore area to deal with the 

very issue you were talking about, high-security fence that I observed when I went over to the United Kingdom and some help 

from our friends over there in terms of what we should do from 

that standpoint. 

We want to improve the security of our trains, just as you have 

mentioned. I mean, at this point, it would be a sheer luxury to 

think in terms of any equivalent of a sky marshal on the Amtrak 

system. We just don’t have adequate ability to do that. 

So at this point, technology, yes. We want to understand the 

blast vulnerability of our stations and what we can do to improve 

their physical ability to withstand a problem and to protect the 

passengers that use them— 

Senator BIDEN. Chief, our time is running out. I want to tell you, 

I thank you very much, and I know you know more—the only point 

I was trying to make in asking you that question is I don’t think 

there is a single person sitting in this audience or watching this 

on television who would say that any use suggested wasn’t—that 

makes sense. That makes sense. And you didn’t sit here and say, 

what I need is new 800,000-pound gates in front of tunnels that 

open automatically. I don’t need new—you are talking about real 

basic, honest-to-God things, that there is not a serious business in 

this country doesn’t have. 

That is the only point in my making you go through that a little 

bit. It is, I think, close to criminal that two-and-a-half years later, 

almost 3 years later, after the warnings we have received from our 

own intelligence community, after what we have recently seen in 

Madrid, that we are still even debating these basic things. We are 

talking about a lot of money, but in a $2-plus trillion budget, $1 

billion over 5 years, wow. We gave the airlines $15 billion in three 

weeks. 

Can I ask you the same question in two minutes to answer what 

the highest priority is? 

Mr. JENKINS. I will agree with the Chief and with you that the 

list of things that can be done is a very pragmatic, sensible list. 

There are no secrets in that. There is a checklist of items contained 

in the overview that was prepared at the request of Secretary Mineta right after 9/11 that is as valid today as it was two-and-a-half 

years ago. 

I will be happy to also come back to provide you with a more 

thoughtful answer than I can give in two minutes here, but I would 

29 

endorse all of those things. I mean, look, we want to look at major 

stations, major congregations of people. We want to look at tunnels. 

That is a critical vulnerability. We want to look at rail conveyance 

of hazardous materials. There are some obvious areas that we can 

look at. 

At the same time we are looking at those measures, I would say 

that you could start a red-team to take some of those scenarios that 

you touched upon in the beginning and make sure that as we 

spend this money, we are going to cover some of the kinds of things 

that adversaries may think of. 

The final comment I will make, however, is the following. It is 

really a question for us as a society. To get to where we are in aviation security took us 32 years. What we have now began with the 

first rule, created 32 years ago, which was that we would have universal passenger screening. Everything that we have done since, in 

terms of explosives detection, other forms of detection, other procedures that we go through, each one of those relates back to an individual tragedy. We have had hijackings. We have had planes sabotaged. We have had all sorts of catastrophes. 

Now, the question for us is, do we have to go through 32 years 

of catastrophes on rail? Do we need a whole string of Madrids and 

Paris and London bombings in order to begin to take the security 

measures, or can we be thoughtful and realize that this is a threat 

now—and it is—and compress the amount of time so that we can 

get those measures out there in months or a couple of years as opposed to waiting decades? 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much, and congratulations on 

that move in the Commerce Committee. That is a big piece of legislation. I know it is something you care about. 

Senator Hatch, Chairman of this Committee, and Ranking Member Patrick Leahy have submitted statements for the record. They 

will be made a part of the record, and we will keep the record open 

for a week for further questions. 

Thank you for an excellent discussion, gentlemen. We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:42 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.] 

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