Affirmed and Opinion Filed July 23, 2024 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-22-01237-CR 

ALAN FREDERICK BEARDEN, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 86th Judicial District Court 

Kaufman County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 19-40112-86-F 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Pedersen, III, and Carlyle 

Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness 

A jury found Appellant Alan Fredrick Bearden guilty of continuous sexual 

abuse of a child and assessed punishment at life imprisonment. The trial court 

entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict. Bearden brings two issues 

on appeal: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict; and (2) the trial 

court committed reversible error by submitting an erroneous definition of “sexual 

contact” in the jury charge. We affirm. 
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BACKGROUND1

The complaining witness Charlotte lived across the street from Bearden in the 

Heartland area of Kaufman County. When Charlotte was in fourth grade, she 

befriended Bearden’s granddaughter, Emily, who often visited Bearden at his home. 

Because of this friendship with Emily, Charlotte began spending significant time at 

Bearden’s home, sometimes sleeping over when Emily was there. 

When Charlotte was in fourth or fifth grade and about ten years old, Bearden 

began sexually abusing her. Bearden would often touch Charlotte’s inner thigh, then 

move up and touch her vagina. This occurred in various locales. On one instance, 

Charlotte was sitting on a couch in the garage with Bearden next to her. While 

Charlotte was using a computer tablet, Bearden put his hand under her pants and 

underwear and touched her vagina. This happened again on numerous occasions. 

Charlotte also described how Bearden would allow Charlotte to drive a golf cart in 

the neighborhood. While Charlotte drove, Bearden sat next to her, put his hand under 

her pants, and began touching her vagina. 

Bearden, Emily, and Charlotte would often sleep in the same bed. Emily’s 

grandmother (Nana) would sleep in the master bedroom, while Bearden and the girls 

usually slept in a back bedroom separate from Nana. While in this separate bedroom, 

Bearden touched Charlotte’s vagina on repeated occasions. After Nana died in June 

1

 We use the pseudonyms given at trial to protect the identity of the complaining witness and another 

child victim. 
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2016, Bearden moved into the master bedroom, where the sexual abuse continued. 

According to Charlotte, Bearden touched her vagina countless times from the time 

Charlotte was ten to fourteen years old. On several instances, Bearden penetrated 

Charlotte’s vagina with his fingers. Occasionally, Bearden put Charlotte’s hand on 

his penis and encouraged her to touch him more. Bearden also touched Emily’s 

breast, buttocks, and vagina on many occasions. 

In October 2017—when Charlotte was twelve years old—she, Emily, and 

Bearden went to Town East Mall. A mall patron alerted security after observing 

Bearden’s behavior with the girls. A security officer then observed Bearden and 

noticed him invading their personal space, stroking Charlotte’s hair, and appearing 

to touch Charlotte’s leg while the girls were seated in massage chairs. The officer 

approached Bearden to investigate. Bearden became defensive and denied any 

wrongdoing. The officers called Charlotte’s and Emily’s parents. Charlotte’s mother 

picked Charlotte up from the mall. After the incident, Charlotte’s parents forbade 

her from going into Bearden’s house. However, Charlotte continued to visit the 

Bearden residence, and the sexual abuse continued after the Town East Mall 

incident. 

In May 2019—when Charlotte was fourteen years old—her parents 

discovered her in possession of an Apple watch. Upon investigation, they discovered 

Bearden had purchased the watch for Charlotte at her insistence. Upon further 

questioning by her mother, Charlotte stated Bearden had touched her. Charlotte’s 
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parents called police, and Charlotte was interviewed by a forensic examiner with the 

Kaufman County Children’s Advocacy Center. During the interview, Charlotte 

described the sexual abuse she had experienced from ages ten to fourteen at the 

hands of Bearden. Emily was also forensically interviewed, but she denied any 

abuse. However, after later therapy sessions, Emily disclosed sexual abuse by 

Bearden. 

Bearden was arrested and charged with continuous sexual abuse of a child. 

The case proceeded to trial. The State’s case-in-chief included testimony from 

Charlotte, Emily, the forensic examiner, investigators, Charlotte’s mother, one of 

Bearden’s neighbors, and Emily’s therapist. Bearden testified in his defense and 

denied the accusations. The defense also offered testimony from the forensic 

examiner and several of Bearden’s other granddaughters. 

The jury found Bearden guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child as 

charged in the indictment and assessed punishment at life in prison. The trial court 

entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict. This appeal followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, we 

must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and 

determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a 

rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 
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This “familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly 

to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable 

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). When facts support 

conflicting inferences, the reviewing court must presume the trier of fact resolved 

any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution and must defer to that resolution. Id.

(citations omitted). We defer to the fact finder’s credibility and weight 

determinations because the fact finder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility 

and the weight to be given to their testimony. See Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 

768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). 

ANALYSIS 

In two issues, Bearden asserts (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his 

conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child; and (2) the trial court committed 

reversible error by submitting an erroneous definition of “sexual contact” in the jury 

charge. We address each issue in turn. 

I. The Evidence Is Sufficient To Support Bearden’s Conviction 

In his first issue, Bearden asserts the evidence is insufficient to support his 

conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child. We disagree. 

A. Legal standards—continuous sexual abuse of a child 

A person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child if, during 

a period that is thirty or more days in duration, he commits two or more acts of sexual 
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abuse and, at the time of the commission of each act, he is seventeen years of age or 

older and the victim is a child younger than fourteen. TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b). 

Relevant here, an “act of sexual abuse” means an act of indecency with a child 

by contact, or sexual assault. Id. § 21.02(c)(2)–(3). A person commits indecency 

with a child by contact if, with a child younger than seventeen years of age, that 

person engages in sexual contact with the child. Id. § 21.11(a)(1). Generally, “sexual 

contact” means, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, 

any touching by a person, including touching through clothing, of the anus, breast, 

or any part of the genitals of a child. Id. § 21.11(c)(1). However, continuous sexual 

abuse of a child pursuant to indecency with a child excludes “touching through 

clothing, the breast of a child.” Id. § 21.02(c)(2). 

A person commits the offense of sexual assault of a child if, regardless of 

whether the person knows the age of the child at the time of the offense, he 

intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the sexual organ of a child by 

any means. Id. § 22.011(a)(2)(A). 

The exact dates of the abuse need not be proven; the offense of continuous 

sexual abuse of a child only requires proof that two or more acts of sexual abuse 

occurred during a period of thirty days or more. Garner v. State, 523 S.W.3d 266, 

271 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet); TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(d) (jury not 

required to unanimously agree on which specific acts of sexual abuse were 

committed by defendant or exact dates when those acts occurred, but jury must agree 
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unanimously that defendant, during period of thirty or more days, committed two or 

more acts of sexual abuse). Additionally, child victims are not required to be specific 

about the dates the abuse occurred. Turner v. State, No. 05-21-00922-CR, 2023 WL 

3991662, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 14, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication). The testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to 

support a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child. Garner, 523 S.W.3d at 

271 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07(a)). 

B. Application 

Here, the indictment alleged that during a period thirty or more days in 

duration, from approximately August 1, 2014 to December 26, 2018, Bearden 

committed two or more acts of sexual abuse, specifically: (1) touching Charlotte’s 

genitals; (2) causing Charlotte to touch Bearden’s genitals; and/or (3) penetrating 

Charlotte’s sexual organ with his finger. The State’s evidence in support of the 

charges came primarily from the testimony of Charlotte, Emily, and forensic 

examiner Ramirez. 

Charlotte testified Bearden touched her vagina on numerous occasions when 

she was between ten and fourteen years old. She described a time where she and 

Bearden were sitting on a couch in the garage, looking at a computer tablet. Bearden 

put his hand under her pants and underwear and touched her vagina. Charlotte stated 

this happened on numerous occasions, whenever they were on that couch. Charlotte 

further described an occasion where Bearden touched Charlotte’s vagina while she 
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was driving a golf cart and Bearden was next to her. Charlotte testified Bearden also 

touched her vagina while in one or more bedrooms of Bearden’s house, and 

sometimes Bearden would penetrate Charlotte’s vagina with his finger. Charlotte 

also described how Bearden had her touch his penis on a few occasions. The abuse 

occurred both before and after Nana’s death in 2016. Charlotte also stated abuse 

occurred both before and after the Town East Mall incident in 2017. 

Emily testified she witnessed Bearden touch Charlotte’s (and Emily’s) vagina 

on multiple occasions, both before and after Nana’s death. Forensic examiner 

Ramirez testified Charlotte told her Bearden had sexually abused Charlotte over a 

period of time when she was under fourteen years old. Charlotte told Ramirez 

Bearden had touched her “girl part” ten or fifteen times. 

In sum, the jury heard testimony that between the time Charlotte was ten and 

fourteen years old (1) Bearden touched her genitals on multiple occasions; (2) 

Bearden caused Charlotte to touch his genitals; and (3) Bearden penetrated 

Charlotte’s sexual organ with his finger. Charlotte’s testimony alone is sufficient to 

support Bearden’s conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child, and other 

witnesses corroborated Charlotte’s allegations. Garner, 523 S.W.3d at 271; TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07(a); TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 21.02(b), (c)(2)–(3), 

21.11(a)(1), (c)(1), 22.011(a)(2)(A).2

2

 Trial testimony established Bearden was well above seventeen years of age at the time of the 

incidents, and Bearden does not challenge this element of the crime. 
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Bearden asserts the State did not prove two or more acts of sexual abuse 

occurred over a period of thirty days. Bearden complains Charlotte made only 

“vague references” to “touching.” However, Bearden acknowledges Charlotte 

testified he touched her vagina on several instances, as discussed above. These acts 

support a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE

§§ 21.02(b), (c)(2), 21.11(a)(1), (c)(1). 

Bearden also complains Charlotte did not provide specificity regarding the 

timing of the acts. While Charlotte did not give specific dates for the acts, this was 

not required. Turner, 2023 WL 3991662, at *3. It is not often that children will know, 

even within a few days, the dates they were sexually assaulted. Sledge v. State, 953 

S.W.2d 253, 256 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Montero v. State, No. 05-18-01281-

CR, 2019 WL 3229170, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 18, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication). Furthermore, when an indictment alleges an offense 

occurred “on or about” a certain date, the State is not required to prove the offense 

occurred on the specific date alleged, but only that the offense occurred prior to the 

presentment of the indictment and within the limitations period. Sledge, 953 S.W.2d 

at 255–56; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.02(6). 

Here, the indictment alleged that during a period thirty or more days in 

duration, from approximately August 1, 2014 to December 26, 2018, Bearden 

committed two or more acts of sexual abuse. As discussed above, witness testimony 

supports Bearden sexually abused Charlotte on multiple occasions during this 
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timeframe, when Charlotte was between the ages of ten and fourteen. Charlotte 

testified the sexual abuse occurred prior to Nana’s death (June 2016) and after the 

Town East Mall incident (October 2017). This necessarily entails two acts of sexual 

abuse during a period of thirty days or more. See Turner, 2023 WL 3991662, at *3. 

(children’s testimony that defendant committed multiple acts of sexual abuse when 

they were between twelve and fourteen years old sufficient to support conviction for 

continuous sexual abuse of a child); Montero, 2019 WL 3229170, at *2–4 (evidence 

sufficient where victim testified sexual abuse occurred when she was eight years old 

and occurred two to three times a week until she was twelve); Michell v. State, 381 

S.W.3d 554, 561 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.) (evidence sufficient to support 

the conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child; while child victim could not 

give specific dates, she described instances of sexual abuse occurring over several 

years and gave details of where the abuse took place, the school grade, or season of 

the year). 

The jury had sufficient evidence to conclude Bearden sexually abused 

Charlotte on at least two occasions thirty or more days apart, when Charlotte was 

between ten and fourteen years of age. The jury acts as the sole judge of the 

witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. See Winfrey, 393 

S.W.3d at 768. We defer to their finding and determine the evidence was sufficient 

to prove Bearden committed continuous sexual abuse of a child as charged in the 

indictment. We overrule Bearden’s first issue. 
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II. Jury Charge 

In his second issue, Bearden contends the trial court reversibly erred by 

submitting an incorrect definition of “sexual contact” in the jury charge. We 

disagree. 

Our first duty in analyzing a jury-charge issue is to decide whether error exists. 

Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Then, if we find error, 

we analyze that error for harm. Id. The degree of harm necessary for reversal 

depends on whether the appellant preserved the error by objection. Id. Jury charge 

error requires reversal when the defendant has properly objected to the charge and 

we find “some harm” to his rights. Id. When the defendant fails to object or states 

he has no objection to the charge, we will not reverse for jury charge error unless the 

record shows “egregious harm” to the defendant. Id. at 743-44. 

Egregious harm exists if the error affects the very basis of the defendant’s 

case, deprives him of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory. Lozano 

v. State, 636 S.W.3d 25, 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 750). 

To determine if the jury charge egregiously harmed the defendant, we examine the 

record as a whole, including the entire jury charge, the evidence, the contested issues, 

and the arguments of counsel, and anything else in the record that informs our 

analysis. Id. The record must show the defendant suffered actual harm, not 

theoretical harm, and neither party has burden to show harm. Id. Egregious harm is 
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a “high and difficult standard” to meet. Villarreal v. State, 453 S.W.3d 429, 433 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2015). 

Here, Bearden asserts the abstract portion of the jury charge included the full 

statutory definition of indecency with a child, including touching the child’s breast. 

See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11(c)(1). Because the offense of continuous sexual abuse 

of a child excludes touching of the breast of a child, Bearden asserts the inclusion of 

this definition constituted reversible error. See id. § 21.02(c)(2). We assume the 

inclusion of the full statutory definition was error. However, Bearden did not object 

to the jury charge. Therefore, we will not reverse for jury-charge error unless the 

record shows “egregious harm.” Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743-44.

Our Court of Criminal Appeals has stated: “Where the application paragraph 

of the charge correctly instructs the jury, an error in the abstract instruction is not 

egregious.” Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also 

Crenshaw v. State, 378 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“It is the 

application paragraph of the charge, not the abstract portion, that authorizes a 

conviction.”). 

Here, while the abstract portion of the jury charge contained the full statutory 

definition of indecency with a child, including touching the child’s breast, the 

application portion of the charge did not allow the jury to convict Bearden for 

touching Charlotte’s breast. Instead, the application portion required the jury to find 

Bearden committed two or more of the following acts of sexual abuse: (1) touching 
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Charlotte’s genitals; (2) causing Charlotte to touch Bearden’s genitals; or (3) 

penetrating Charlotte’s sexual organ. The application portion of the charge thus 

correctly instructed the jury on the acts of sexual abuse necessary to find Bearden 

guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 21.02(b)(1), 

(c)(2)–(3), 21.11(a)(1), (c)(1)–(2), 22.011(a)(2)(A). Furthermore, the application 

paragraphs mirrored the indictment, and sufficient trial evidence supported Bearden 

committed each of these types of acts, as discussed above. Any error in the abstract 

portion of the charge does not constitute egregious harm. Medina, 7 S.W.3d at 640. 

We overrule Bearden’s second issue. 

CONCLUSION 

The evidence is sufficient to support Bearden’s conviction for continuous 

sexual abuse of a child. Furthermore, even if jury charge’s abstract instruction on 

“sexual contact” was erroneous, there is no egregious harm where the application 

paragraph correctly instructed the jury on the elements necessary to convict Bearden 

of continuous sexual abuse of a child. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 

221237F.U05 

 

/Robbie Partida-Kipness/

ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

ALAN FREDERICK BEARDEN, 

Appellant 

No. 05-22-01237-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 86th Judicial 

District Court, Kaufman County, 

Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 19-40112-86-

F. 

Opinion delivered by Justice PartidaKipness. Justices Pedersen, III and 

Carlyle participating. 

 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered this 23rd day of July, 2024.