United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on International Operations and Human

Rights, Committee on International

Relations, House of Representatives

October 1996 VIETNAMESE

ASYLUM SEEKERS

Refugee Screening

Procedures Under the

Comprehensive Plan of

Action

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-97-12

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-274161 

October 21, 1996

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith

Chairman, Subcommittee on International Operations

 and Human Rights

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The United States has a continuing special interest in the protection and

welfare of many Vietnamese and other ethnic groups in Southeast Asia

(including former employees of the U.S. government and others closely

associated with the U.S. presence in Vietnam before 1975),1

 and family

members of persons in the United States. Accordingly, since 1975 the

United States has resettled hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers from

the region, including about 12,900 Indo-Chinese refugees under the

Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA).2

 The CPA was an arrangement, or

nonbinding agreement, for achieving a durable solution to the continuing

flow of asylum seekers in the Southeast Asia region, adopted by the

governments represented in the International Conference on Indo-Chinese

Refugees in Geneva on June 13-14, 1989.

In response to your request, we reviewed the implementation of the CPA.

Specifically, we (1) determined whether the first-asylum countries of Hong

Kong and Indonesia implemented CPA refugee status determination

procedures in accordance with international standards and criteria,3

(2) developed information about alleged corruption in the program, and

(3) ascertained whether asylum seekers returning to Vietnam had

encountered persecution. We also identified U.S. and United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) costs associated with implementing

the CPA.

1

The United States withdrew its remaining military forces and civilian presence from Vietnam when

the South Vietnamese government fell in April 1975.

2

The United States has also resettled over 445,000 Vietnamese of special interest from inside Vietnam

under the continuing Orderly Departure Program (ODP), established in 1979 to provide a safe, legal

alternative means of leaving the country, other than clandestinely by boat. (The ODP program also

serves to relieve the flow of asylum seekers into first-asylum countries.)

3

Hong Kong is a British Dependent Territory. Refugee status determination procedures are often

referred to as refugee screening procedures. Those given refugee status are referred to as screened in,

and those denied refugee status are screened out.

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Regarding the refugee screening process and corruption issues, the scope

of our review was limited to Hong Kong and Indonesia,4

 where we were

provided access to documents contained in UNHCR case files. However, we

were not permitted to review Hong Kong or Indonesian government files,

nor did we interview individual asylum seekers in these countries.

Moreover, as with most human endeavors such as this, actual refugee

status decisions involved considerable judgment on the part of

interviewing and reviewing officials in determining the merits and

credibility of the applicants’ claims, particularly when many asylum

seekers lacked evidence and documentation to substantiate their claims.

We do not believe the information in UNHCR’s files was sufficient for us to

make conclusive determinations on asylum seekers’ refugee status;

however, we believe it was sufficient to assess whether status

determination decisions made by country and UNHCR officials appeared

reasonable based on international refugee adjudication standards. We

examined the Hong Kong and Indonesian screening processes within this

context.

At the request of Congressmen Robert K. Dornan, Benjamin A. Gilman,

and Thomas M. Davis, III, and Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren, we are

currently examining other aspects of the CPA’s implementation in Hong

Kong and Indonesia, as well as in Malaysia and the Philippines. This work

involves about 235 individual asylum seeker cases and focuses primarily

on an analysis of whether the cases may be of special interest to the

United States. Our emphasis is on cases involving family unity and victims

of violence, which are not addressed directly in this report, and on some

cases involving refugee status determination. However, the respective

governments restricted our access to asylum seekers and documents

belonging to the first-asylum countries. We will be reporting separately on

this work.

Background Between 1975 and 1989, over 2 million Indo-Chinese, many of them

Vietnamese, left their countries of origin seeking asylum elsewhere in the

region. Most were ultimately resettled in Western countries, including the

United States and Canada. However, by the late 1980s an unabating

outflow, large numbers of asylum seekers already in asylum camps, and

continuing resettlement placed increasing burdens on neighboring

countries and territories and Western countries, and the need for a durable

solution to the problem became critical.

4

Other primary countries of first-asylum not included in this review were Thailand, Malaysia, and the

Philippines.

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In June 1989, 75 countries, including the United States, Great Britain,

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries,5

 and Vietnam

adopted by declaration the CPA agreement to deal with the problem. The

agreement’s primary objectives were to deter clandestine departures,

provide temporary refuge to all asylum seekers, establish procedures for

determining their refugee status, resettle in third countries those found to

be refugees, and repatriate those determined not to be refugees.

The agreement stipulated that refugee status determination screening was

the responsibility of the national authorities of individual first-asylum

countries, in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention relating to the

Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol,6

 bearing in mind the 1948

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and taking into account the

special situation of asylum seekers and the need to respect the family unit.

Refugee status determination procedures were to be structured in

accordance with international norms and were to employ internationally

accepted refugee status determination criteria. International screening

procedures include prescreening counseling for applicants, first-instance

screening, and an appeal process for denied applicants.

Notwithstanding the responsibilities vested with the first-asylum countries

under the CPA, the agreement placed a number of important

responsibilities on UNHCR. The CPA’s drafters envisioned the agreement’s

implementation as a dynamic process that would require continued

coordination and possible adaptation to respond to changing situations.

To ensure its effective implementation, the plan, among other things,

established that

• UNHCR, with the financial support of the donor community, would be in

charge of continuing liaison and coordination with concerned

governments and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations

to implement the agreement;

• UNHCR was to participate in the refugee status determination process in an

observer and advisory capacity; and

• UNHCR would be responsible for (1) providing training to first-asylum

country officials to help ensure fairness and consistency in the screening

process; (2) coordinating the timely resettlement of those found to be

5

Participating ASEAN countries included Brunei Darussalom, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,

Singapore, and Thailand.

6

Of the five first-asylum countries that adopted the CPA, only the Philippines was a signatory to the

1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol, but it had not enacted comprehensive legislation to implement

the Convention and Protocol.

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refugees; and (3) administering a safe, dignified repatriation program for

those found to be nonrefugees.7

Appendix I discusses UNHCR’s responsibilities under the CPA relative to its

U.N. chartered authorities and responsibilities.

The Charter of the Office of High Commissioner authorizes UNHCR to make

its own determinations about individuals’ refugee status. This authority is

commonly referred to as mandate authority. In what is essentially an

additional procedure in the refugee status determination process, UNHCR

has examined under mandate authority many asylum seekers that were

denied refugee status by national authorities. Some first-asylum countries,

such as Hong Kong, have recognized UNHCR’s mandate authority; others

have not.

Although not a requirement of the CPA, UNHCR has also carried out a

returnee monitoring program designed to ensure that asylum seekers

returning to Vietnam did so under conditions of safety and dignity and in

conformance with Vietnamese and international law.

According to State Department statistics, over 120,000 Vietnamese were

screened under the CPA. As of March 1996, about 33,200 had been screened

and resettled in third countries. About 75,500 had returned to Vietnam. A

total of 36,623 remained in asylum camps in the region as of March 1996.

(See fig. 1.)

7

As discussed later, UNHCR took a more active role than enumerated in the CPA agreement in

Indonesia’s screening process.

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Figure 1: Vietnamese Asylum Seekers in Southeast Asia Camps

Peoples Republic

of China

Hong Kong

19,679

Philippines

2,774

Vietnam

Indonesia

4,291

Malaysia

3,260

Thailand

4,857

Total : 35,618

Other: 757

As of March 1996

Source: Department of State.

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In March 1996, the Steering Committee of CPA member countries

announced the CPA’s formal closure as of June 30, 1996. The Committee

reaffirmed that the only viable option for Vietnamese determined to be

nonrefugees was for them to return to Vietnam, either voluntarily or under

a mandatory repatriation program. The Steering Committee directed UNHCR

to, therefore, phase down its care and maintenance activities and staffing

in the first-asylum countries as of that date. In the case of Hong Kong,

mindful of the special circumstances prevailing in the territory and the

large number of asylum seekers still in the camps, UNHCR was to make

other appropriate arrangements to resolve the asylum seeker problem as

soon as possible.8

The application of international and U.S. refugee screening criteria can

differ somewhat and could result in different screening decisions. For

example, under U.S. criteria an asylum seeker could be properly

considered a refugee solely on the basis of past persecution,9

 but under

international criteria, this is only one of several elements to be considered.

Other elements include whether (1) the past persecution was distant in

time, (2) the individual was subsequently able to lead a normal life, and

(3) it is reasonably likely that the individual will be persecuted on return to

his or her country. Therefore, individuals considered refugees under U.S.

criteria may not be refugees under international criteria. (See app. I for a

more complete discussion of these differences.)

Results in Brief The CPA agreement stipulated that the first-asylum countries’ refugee

screening procedures be carried out in accordance with established

international screening criteria and procedures, including prescreening

counseling for applicants, first-instance screening, and an appeals process

for denied applicants. Our examination in Hong Kong and Indonesia

indicated that both programs met the CPA’s basic structural requirements

for refugee adjudication criteria and screening procedures. Both countries

agreed to follow international criteria recognized in the 1951 U.N.

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and

8

As of June 30, 1996, first-asylum camps in Malaysia were closed and all remaining asylum seekers in

the camp were repatriated to Vietnam; the CPA and UNHCR’s involvement in the camps in the

Philippines were terminated; and Indonesia and Thailand extended their involvement with the CPA for

90 days.

9

While under U.S. law a person who was actually persecuted in the past on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion may qualify as a refugee, an

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officer may, at his or her discretion, deny refugee status

if conditions in the person’s country have changed to such an extent that the alien’s fear of persecution

is no longer well-founded. (INS Basic Law Manual; Matter of Chen, Int. Dec. No. 3104 BIA 1989.)

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both countries’ procedures met minimal procedural requirements

endorsed by the Executive Committee of UNHCR.

On the basis of our review of Hong Kong’s screening process,

notwithstanding acknowledged errors during its implementation, we

believe the process contained sufficient checks and balances to provide

reasonable assurances that asylum seekers’ cases could be heard and

errors could be identified and corrected. We received no allegations of

corruption in the program in Hong Kong.

The Hong Kong Immigration Department was responsible for first-instance

screening, and an independent Refugee Status Review Board was

established to hear denied applicants’ appeals. Depending upon the

circumstances of their cases, those denied refugee status at appeal had

further opportunity to have their cases reviewed in the Hong Kong courts.

All asylum seekers denied refugee status had their cases examined by

UNHCR for mandate refugee review. All asylum seekers had legal counsel

available to them—through UNHCR, privately retained attorneys, and

possibly the Hong Kong Legal Aid Department. (Hong Kong’s screening

process is discussed in more detail in app. II.)

Hong Kong government and UNHCR officials acknowledged errors, such as

misinterpretations of language, questionable interviewing practices and

techniques, and inadequate assessments of applicants’ claims, during the

screening process—particularly early in the process.10 However, the

officials told us they had worked to correct the errors and that the process

had improved over time.

In a limited test of Hong Kong’s screening procedures and the quality of

the screening decisions, we relied on UNHCR case files to examine the

decisions reached in 10 selected cases.11 (Hong Kong authorities denied us

access to their case files.) On the basis of documentation contained in

UNHCR’s case files, we believe the Hong Kong government and UNHCR

officials’ decisions appeared to be reasonable in 9 of the 10 cases we

examined. In the 10th case, we identified information that we believe

should have been factored into the decision. UNHCR agreed and

subsequently granted the individual mandate refugee status. A UNHCR

10Refugee screening in Hong Kong actually began in June 1988, a year before the inception of screening

under the CPA. Hong Kong modified its process somewhat to conform to CPA requirements.

11Five of the cases were referred to us by Boat People S.O.S., a Vietnamese asylum seekers advocacy

group. We selected the remaining five randomly from a list of cases referred to UNHCR by another

nongovernmental organization.

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official in Hong Kong attributed the initial (negative) screening decision to

human judgment by the reviewing officials.

In Indonesia, we believe the large majority of asylum seekers with strong

claims for refugee status were screened in—due in part to UNHCR’s heavy

involvement in the screening process.12 In fact, there is evidence that an

undetermined number of nonmeritorious cases were also screened in by

the Indonesian authorities. UNHCR recommended that these cases be

screened out but did not challenge the authorities’ decisions. Corruption in

the Indonesia process likely contributed to undeserving cases’ gaining

refugee status; however, it is unlikely that strong cases were denied

refugee status due to unmet corruption demands.

The process in Indonesia provided for both first-instance screening and an

appeals procedure involving Indonesian authorities and UNHCR legal

consultants; however, few asylum seekers received individual legal

assistance in preparing for screening or drafting appeals. According to

UNHCR, its staff provided group prescreening counseling, and its legal

consultants provided screened-out applicants counseling, mostly in group

sessions, on their right of appeal and appeal procedures. However, no

legal assistance was provided in drafting appeals. According to UNHCR, the

Indonesian government did not allow nongovernmental organizations to

participate in asylum seeker counseling, and asylum seekers did not have

access to private attorneys or judicial review.

According to UNHCR, it concentrated its efforts in Indonesia on trying to

ensure that those with well-founded refugee claims were screened in. It

did this by performing an initial interview of all asylum seekers and

making recommendations on their refugee status to Indonesian

authorities. According to UNHCR, the Indonesian government accepted all

but 22 of the more than 3,000 cases it recommended for refugee status.

Rumors of corruption in Indonesia’s screening process began at the

inception of the screening process. Nongovernmental organizations,

asylum seeker advocacy groups, some Members of Congress, and others

have severely criticized the process, alleging widespread corruption and

denial of refugee status to asylum seekers with well-founded claims due to

their unwillingness or inability to accede to bribery demands or demands

for sexual favors. For example, Boat People S.O.S. provided us a list of

12Seven cases were not screened in during screening but were later given mandate refugee status by

UNHCR.

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seven cases in Indonesia that it said were strong cases improperly

screened out due to unmet corruption demands.

Reports, files, and documents provided to us by nongovernmental

organizations, advocacy groups, former asylum seekers, UNHCR, and other

knowledgeable sources indicated widespread corruption in the process.

UNHCR officials in Jakarta and at the asylum camp in Galang, an asylum

seeker spokesman in Galang, and other reliable sources at Galang also

readily acknowledged corruption in the process.

We did not conduct an independent investigation of allegations of

corruption provided us. UNHCR officials had no hard evidence with which

to demonstrate corruption, how and with whom it took place, and how it

affected the screening process. Indonesian authorities we spoke with

denied the existence of corruption in the process. Therefore, we cannot

definitively state that corruption occurred or that weak or well-founded

cases were screened in or out due to corruption or failure to comply with

corruption demands.

However, on the basis of documentation available to us, discussions with

UNHCR officials in Geneva and Indonesia, and the results of a series of

reviews of the process by UNHCR in 1995, it appeared that corruption in the

process was likely and asylum seekers with weak cases participated in the

corruption in order to gain otherwise unattainable refugee status.

Moreover, we cannot rule out the possibility that bonafide (ultimately

screened in) refugees were victimized by unscrupulous Indonesian

officials and possibly by locally hired UNHCR legal consultants during the

screening process. But, we did not identify well-founded cases that were

screened out on the basis that they were unable to meet corruption

demands. (In our examination of the seven cases referred to us by Boat

People S.O.S., five appeared to be reasonable decisions. The decisions in

the remaining two cases appeared questionable; however, UNHCR had

reviewed the cases and accorded the claimants mandated refugee status as

part of its 1995 review of the Indonesia process.)

UNHCR monitors in Vietnam have reported that they found no evidence of

persecution of returned asylum seekers by Vietnamese authorities. Our

review of 12 returnee cases referred to us by Boat People S.O.S. and Asia

Watch as cases of persecution or special concern also revealed no

evidence of persecution. We found that UNHCR had implemented a

comprehensive monitoring program that provides reasonable assurance

that returnees were not persecuted. Our discussions in Vietnam with

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various knowledgeable officials from the United States, European Union,

the British Embassy, and nongovernmental organizations with activities in

Vietnam, and interviews with 22 returnees in the North and South

reinforced the monitors’ reports. Nevertheless, Vietnam remains an

authoritarian communist government that does not tolerate political

dissent, and returnees risk persecution should they become involved with

political activities not approved by the government.

UNHCR spent an estimated $444 million on the CPA from 1989 through 1995,13

excluding unpaid obligations of $139 million in Hong Kong. U.S.

contributions to UNHCR for the CPA during the period were an estimated

$151 million. The United States also contributed about $9 million to

voluntary agencies in support of CPA activities.

Hong Kong’s

Procedures and

Criteria Consistent

With CPA Guidance

A total of 60,275 persons were screened under the CPA in Hong Kong.

Table 1 shows the results of first-instance and appeals screening and the

UNHCR mandate review.

Table 1: Hong Kong Refugee Status

Determination Results

(March 1989-December 1995) 

Allowed refugee

status

Refugee status

not approved

Percent

approved

First-instance

screening 6,974 53,301 11.6

Appeala 2,821 46,078 5.8

UNHCR mandate 1,553 47,374 3.1

Total 11,348 48,927 18.8

aSome screened out at first instance did not appeal their decisions.

Hong Kong government reports stated that refugee screening procedures

were carried out under UNHCR guidelines in accordance with

internationally accepted refugee status determination practices. According

to Hong Kong Immigration Department officials, CPA screening was

conducted in accordance with the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and

13This figure excludes general program expenditures in Thailand. General program funds provide for

UNHCR’s in-country operations and include administrative expenses and care and maintenance costs

for in-country refugee populations.

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Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, and no additional criteria were

developed.

Hong Kong Immigration Department officials stated that selection of

interviewing officers was based on rank, experience, education, and

language and writing skills. The selected interviewing officers were

experienced naturalization officers, visa officers, and Hong Kong entry

point supervisors in the Immigration Department.

UNHCR reports and interviews with UNHCR and government officials in Hong

Kong indicate that UNHCR took an active role in training government

officials involved in the screening process. The officers’ training program

included a 9-day seminar of lectures and workshops and an extensive list

of readings, including articles and books on Vietnam and human rights

topics.14 Immigration Department officials told us most of the interviewing

officers were also sent to Vietnam for 7-day familiarization visits. We were

told that an extensive library of materials on conditions in Vietnam was

established for the officers’ use. At the height of CPA screening there were

approximately 220 interviewing officers.

According to UNHCR officers in Hong Kong, informal monthly staff

meetings were held during the initial phases of the screening program at

which Hong Kong’s procedures were discussed and critiqued. We were

told that if issues or points were raised that needed to be brought to the

government’s attention they were passed on to Immigration Department

officials.

The UNHCR officials also said that in accordance with a 1988 agreement

with the Hong Kong government, UNHCR monitored and advised the

government on its refugee screening procedures and provided the

government periodic formal assessments of its procedures. According to

UNHCR officials, these assessments identified various problems and

suggested improvements. Early problems with Hong Kong first-instance

screening procedures that UNHCR brought to the government’s attention

included inadequate interpretation of applicants’ statements during

screening interviews, questionable interviewing practices and techniques

by interviewing officers, and inadequate assessments of applicants’ claims

by interviewing officers. Hong Kong government officials with whom we

met also acknowledged such problems with screening procedures. UNHCR

officials told us the Hong Kong government was very responsive to the

problems raised and endeavored to correct them. The Chairman of the

14Later extended to 2 weeks.

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Refugee Status Review Board told us that the quality of interviewing

officers’ first-instance screening decisions varied widely initially but that

the officers had good training and learned quickly.

To gain greater insights into Hong Kong’s screening procedures, and as a

limited test of them, we examined 10 selected cases in which asylum

seekers had been screened out by the Hong Kong authorities and denied

mandate by UNHCR. Five of the cases were provided to us by Boat People

S.O.S.; we selected the other five at random from a list of cases another

advocacy group had requested that UNHCR reexamine.

Among the first five cases, one had been accepted by the United States on

family reunification grounds and was awaiting resettlement.15 Another had

been offered resettlement in the United States but refused the offer unless

his son, who was screened separately as an adult and denied refugee

status, could join him. In two other cases, we concluded, based on the

documentation in UNHCR’s files, that the applicants had failed to establish a

well-founded fear of persecution. In the fifth case, the applicant was

screened out due to a lack of plausibility about portions of his claims.

However, when we raised questions about portions of his claims and

pointed out to UNHCR the strength of those aspects of the claim where

plausibility had not been questioned, UNHCR reexamined his case and

mandated refugee status for him. A UNHCR official acknowledged

judgmental errors in this case. According to the official, any system

dependent upon human judgments will sometimes produce errors.

In the other five cases, documentation in UNHCR’s case files indicates that

the applicants could not establish a well-founded fear of persecution for

any of the reasons specified in the 1951 Convention. On the basis of

available documentation, it appears these cases were reasonably

adjudicated.

Indonesia’s

Procedures and

Criteria Consistent

With CPA Guidelines

Both Indonesian government and UNHCR officials stated that refugee

screening procedures were generally carried out under UNHCR guidelines,

in accordance with internationally accepted refugee status determination

criteria. Our review of the process indicated that it met the basic structural

requirements of the international guidelines, such as provision for appeal

of negative first instance decisions and the application of international

15UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Handbook) indicates

that at a minimum the spouse and minor children benefit from the principle of family unity. In practice,

other dependents, such as aged parents of refugees, are normally considered if living in the same

household.

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refugee status determination criteria. UNHCR trained both P3V and appeals

level officials in the application of the procedures, according to UNHCR

officials.16

A total of 18,131 persons were screened under the CPA in Indonesia.

Appendix III describes Indonesia’s screening process. Table 2 shows the

results of first-instance and appeals screening.

Table 2: Indonesia Refugee Status

Determination Results

(March 1989-September 1993) 

Allowed refugee

status

Refugee status

not approved

Percent

approved

First-instance

screening 5,083 13,048 28

Appeal 2,759 9,463 22.5

UNHCR mandate • • •

Totala 7,842 10,289 43.3

aSome screened out at first-instance did not appeal their decisions.

Of 13,048 persons screened out at first-instance, 12,222 filed appeals. The

appeals process in Indonesia consisted of a Review Committee, which

reviewed all appeals, and an Appeals Board, which reviewed those cases

on which the Review Committee could not reach a decision. The Review

Committee decided the large majority of the appeals, confirming 9,392

negative decisions and reversing 2,592 (about 21.6 percent). The

Committee could not reach a decision on 238 cases, and these were

referred to the Appeals Board. The Board reversed 167, or about

70 percent of the cases referred to it, to positive decisions.

UNHCR officials in both Jakarta and Galang (the island asylum camp in

northern Indonesia) told us they were most concerned with ensuring that

deserving asylum seekers were screened in and concentrated their efforts

to that end. They said that in their view Indonesian officials were too

generous in screening in weaker cases, but UNHCR (in keeping with its

policy) did not challenge the Indonesians’ decisions on asylum seekers

they believed to be undeserving. A UNHCR official told us it was in the

Indonesian government’s interest to screen in and have resettled in third

countries as many applicants as possible, because those remaining in the

camp represented a problem for the government.

16“P3V” is the Indonesian inter-ministerial task force created to deal with Vietnamese boat people.

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Corruption Apparent

in Indonesia’s

Screening Process

Rumors of corruption began appearing in Indonesia at the inception of the

status determination process. The first documented reporting of

corruption appeared in June 1991, when a UNHCR official at Galang in a

memorandum to his office in Jakarta reported rumors of P3V officials

soliciting sexual favors from female asylum seekers and offerings of such

services by the asylum seekers in exchange for favorable screening

decisions. Boat People S.O.S. provided us numerous statements, affidavits,

and referrals of individuals who had been asked for or had paid bribes or

other demands for themselves or family members in exchange for

favorable screening decisions. The alleged corruption involved not only

Indonesian government officials in Galang and Jakarta, but two

Indonesian legal consultants employed by UNHCR, as well. The allegations

included assertions that asylum seekers with genuine refugee claims were

screened out due to their inability to met corruption demands.

Affidavits and interviews with individuals referred to us by Boat People

S.O.S. and discussions with UNHCR officials in Jakarta and Galang and

inhabitants of the Galang camp indicated potentially widespread

corruption in the screening process. UNHCR officials told us that there was

undoubtedly corruption in the camps during the screening process. And,

residents in the camp indicated that corruption existed. A Vietnamese

camp leader told us, for example, that P3V officials actively solicited

bribes and asylees willingly offered payment in exchange for help in the

screening process.

UNHCR officials told us that despite widespread rumors of corruption they

had no hard evidence of it. A senior UNHCR official told us that UNHCR had

no authority to investigate Indonesian government officials’ activities and

that UNHCR could only urge Indonesian authorities to pursue the matter.

The official told us that Indonesian authorities regularly conducted

investigations at Galang and that a number of cases were overturned as a

result. He said, because P3V officials were removed and cases were

overturned, he concluded that corruption was involved. He said he never

saw a documented corruption case, however, and Indonesian authorities

did not acknowledge corruption. Indonesian officials also denied to us that

any corruption existed in the refugee determination process.

UNHCR officials in Indonesia told us they took various steps to combat

corruption by pressuring the Indonesian government to minimize it. These

included mentioning allegations to Indonesian authorities, discussing

rumors with high-level foreign government officials during consultations

and visits to the Galang camp, and publishing allegations in quarterly

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operations reports, all in the attempt to embarrass the government into

acting.

UNHCR officials acknowledged there were no posters or leaflets distributed

in the camps urging residents not to participate in corruption and to report

any bribery solicitations. There were no UNHCR notices or warnings to

camp officials. There were also no provisions, such as hot lines,

established for residents to report anonymously.

A UNHCR official at Galang told us that on his own initiative he conducted a

15-month investigation into corruption in the camp. The official, who for a

time lived in the camp and had his own network of informants, was unable

to obtain proof of corruption. During his investigation, the official

compiled a list of about 40 corruption cases, all instances of individuals

paying bribes but being screened out nonetheless. The official said he

heard of these cases only because the individuals were complaining in an

attempt to recoup their bribe money. According to the official, none of the

cases in his investigation involved individuals with strong refugee claims

being screened out because they could not pay bribes. The official

concluded that asylum seekers were active participants in corruption and

were unwilling to provide direct evidence because it benefited those with

weak claims.

In response to intense criticism by nongovernmental organizations and

some members of the U.S. Congress in late 1994 and early 1995, UNHCR

launched a series of four reviews of screening procedures and the impacts

of corruption on the screening caseload in Indonesia. The reviews,

conducted by UNHCR attorneys and senior program personnel from outside

Indonesia, examined a total of 486 nonrandomly selected cases,

representing about 10 percent of the remaining camp population.17 The

selected cases included high-visibility cases, such as the 22 cases screened

positive by UNHCR but negative by Indonesian officials, all the cases

examined by UNHCR’s two Indonesian legal consultants who had corruption

allegations lodged against them, and 21 cases previously referred from the

U.S. Department of State and nongovernmental organizations. The reviews

also included both positive and negative cases on which UNHCR consultants

and Indonesian officials had reached the same decisions.

The reviews upheld the screening decisions in 481 of the 486 cases

reviewed. The remaining five cases were given refugee status under

UNHCR’s mandate authority, although this status had not yet been

17Cases do not equate to numbers of individuals: A case can involve several individuals.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
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recognized by the Indonesian government or communicated to the asylum

seekers at the time of our field work in January 1996. The reviews

concluded that, overall, Indonesia’s screening procedures properly

identified and screened in cases with serious protection concerns, but that

a small number of borderline cases could possibly have benefited from

more sympathetic application of the screening criteria. The reviews found

that corruption was a factor that impinged on screening procedures, but

was rarely, if ever, substantiated in the case files, and that the chief effect

was to inflate the number of positive decisions by also screening in weak

cases. The reviews did not support the assertion that strong cases failed

because they could not pay corruption demands.

The reviews also concluded that UNHCR did not take adequate steps to

detect or prevent corruption in the screening process, allowing corruption

to undermine the integrity of the process. They also indicated that UNHCR

took no actions with regard to the two Indonesian legal consultants

alleged to have been involved in corruption.18

In a limited test of Indonesia’s processing procedures and screening

decisions, we examined a sample of 10 cases. All were cases alleged by

Boat People S.O.S. to have been improperly screened out and included

seven cases where the individuals were allegedly screened out because

they could not pay bribes demanded of them. Our review of UNHCR case

files in the branch office near Galang (the files did not contain P3V or

appeals data) indicated that in five of the seven cases allegedly screened

out due to the applicants’ inability to pay bribes, the decisions reached

appeared to be reasonable and consistent with screening criteria. In two of

the cases, however, the applicants appeared to have reasonable claims and

the screening decisions appeared to be incorrect. Both cases had been

examined by UNHCR as part of its 1995 review, however, and both were

among the five cases mandated during the review.

Of the three remaining cases, one appeared to have a reasonable claim for

refugee status but was screened out at first instance. However, he fled

Galang for Australia before his case was appealed.19 UNHCR officials told us

that had he been screened out on appeal, he probably would have received

UNHCR mandated refugee status. The second case appeared to be

reasonably adjudicated. In the third case, we raised questions that resulted

in UNHCR’s mandating the individual. In this case, Indonesian authorities

screened the individual out at both first instance screening and upon

18UNHCR dismissed the officials in 1994.

19The individual was granted refugee status in Australia.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
B-274161 

appeal. UNHCR representatives had recommended that the individual be

screened in at first instance, but UNHCR concurred in the appeal decision.

UNHCR also rejected the individual at mandate review, on the bases that

elements of the individual’s claims did not constitute persecution and

additional important representations presented at appeal lacked

credibility. UNHCR reconsidered and mandated the case after we raised

questions about whether elements of the individual’s and his family’s

treatment after 1975, taken together, could afford the individual the benefit

of a doubt—even without considering the information provided at appeal.

Department of State Failed

to Monitor Screening

Processes

As a participating country and a major contributor to the CPA, the United

States has a strong interest in the CPA’s effective implementation. The

Department of State has responsibility for ensuring that U.S. interests in

international programs that receive U.S. funding are protected.

Despite widespread concerns that corruption affected the refugee

screening process, State Department officials told us they had only a

general awareness of the problem in Indonesia and elsewhere in the

region. Our review indicated that while State Department’s Washington

and embassy officials were familiar with the CPA program and had in-depth

knowledge of asylum seekers’ care and maintenance and resettlement

issues, they possessed only cursory knowledge of the first-asylum

countries’ screening processes and weaknesses in them. It was not until

advocacy groups began petitioning State and UNHCR in mid-1994 (after the

screening process had essentially concluded) to look into charges of

corruption that the scope of the alleged corruption became known. It

appears that until that time, State relied on UNHCR reporting to determine

how the screening process was being implemented and confined its

oversight and management to care and maintenance and resettlement

issues. State officials acknowledged to us that the Department failed to

become aware of the problems in the camps early enough and that the

Department did not adequately monitor the screening processes of the

countries of first-asylum to ensure their integrity.

UNHCR’s Returnee

Monitoring

Procedures Appeared

Effective

UNHCR’s monitoring efforts in Vietnam began with the voluntary

repatriation of 75 persons from Hong Kong in March 1989, thereby

pre-dating the June 1989 CPA. The legal basis for UNHCR’s program is a

Memorandum of Understanding between UNHCR and Vietnam, signed in

December 1988, which committed the Vietnamese government to

“. . . ensure that the voluntary return from the countries of first-asylum will

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
B-274161 

take place in conditions of safety and dignity in conformity with national

and international law.” This translated, in practice, to ensuring that no

voluntary returnees would be subjected to punitive or discriminatory

measures related to their illegal departures, stays abroad, or returnee

status, and that they would not be subjected to intimidation or

harassment. The Memorandum of Understanding also stipulated that

UNHCR would have full access to voluntary returnees. Involuntary returnees

were not covered by the Memorandum of Understanding, but subsequent

Memoranda between the Vietnamese and first-asylum governments

relating to repatriation of nonrefugees provided the same assurances for

involuntary returnees that the UNHCR/Vietnam agreement afforded

voluntary returnees.20

We found UNHCR’s monitoring program to be well structured and

implemented, achieving broad national coverage and contact with large

numbers of returnees. Together with a network of contacts made up of

western governments, nongovernmental organizations, journalists, and

other interested individuals, UNHCR was able to maintain visibility over a

significant portion of the returnee population, thus helping to monitor the

Vietnam government’s adherence to internationally agreed terms of

returnee admission, reception, and reintegration. As of January 1996,

UNHCR monitors had visited all 53 provinces in Vietnam, 360 of the 363

districts with resident returnees, and about 20,000 (about 26 percent) of

the approximately 77,000 returnee population. UNHCR and other officials

we spoke with in Vietnam told us that they had no knowledge of any

political persecution among returnees. Appendix IV describes UNHCR’s

returnee monitoring process.

Monitoring Efforts

Identified No Evidence of

Persecution Among

Returnees

Both UNHCR and British monitoring officials told us they had found no

evidence of persecution among the returnee population. We also met with

officials of the U.S. Embassies in Hanoi and Bangkok and Immigration and

Naturalization Service officials who administer the Orderly Departure

Program; the European Union and several nongovernmental organizations

who were conducting returnee assistance programs; Asia Watch; and

numerous individuals with personal knowledge of returnee cases who had

traveled independently in Vietnam. They told us they were not aware of

any instance of persecution among the returnees.

20UNHCR was a party to the Memoranda of Understanding involving Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,

and the Philippines: UNHCR was not a party to Vietnam’s Memorandum of Understanding with Hong

Kong and United Kingdom.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
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In a limited test of the status of returnees, we examined 12 cases referred

to us by Boat People S.O.S. and Asia Watch as examples of persecution or

cases for special concern. Our discussions on these cases with UNHCR

monitoring officers and examination of UNHCR’s case files indicated that

none of the individuals had been subjected to persecution by the

government related to their departure. According to UNHCR monitoring

officers, three of the individuals were in prison for predeparture criminal

offenses, such as murder and armed robbery. Three others were briefly

arrested for criminal activities but were released from prison and had

re-integrated well, as had the other individuals.

In addition, we interviewed 22 returnees from northern and southern

Vietnam and discussed their experiences since returning. All of the

returnees told us that they had not experienced problems with

government officials since their return. Our discussions indicated that all

had assimilated well and had been welcomed back into their communities.

The returnees’ most common complaints were economic difficulties and

establishing family registration when attempting to relocate to new

provinces.

The absence of protection-related problems for returnees does not mean

that there are not concerns over the Vietnamese government’s human

rights conduct. Political opposition is not tolerated by government

authorities, even in the present mood of reforms. According to Asia Watch,

those who publicly question the authority of the Communist Party have

been detained and imprisoned, be they proponents of multiparty

democracy, advocates of civil and political rights, or religious leaders

seeking greater autonomy from official control. UNHCR officials told us that

returnees who were forcibly returned or were politically active and

outspoken in the camps of first-asylum often faced extended questioning

by government security officials upon return. Though a matter of concern,

an Asia Watch official told us that in their opinion these interrogations do

not rise to the level of persecution. We were told by UNHCR officials that

the government questioning ends soon after the individuals’ return to their

homes.

Monitoring Costs UNHCR’s monitoring effort in Vietnam is unprecedented: There has been no

other refugee situation where UNHCR has conducted individual case

monitoring. UNHCR has expended $8.8 million, including an estimated

$1.6 million for 1996, to maintain its monitoring operation in Vietnam.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
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In addition, between 1993 and 1995, UNHCR allocated $34.4 million to

support the economic and social reintegration of returnees. This

assistance included cash grants of $240 to $360 to each returnee, the

operation of two reception centers, in-country travel costs of returnees,

and additional assistance to unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable

returnees.

The assistance also included approximately $9 million in micro-projects

(such as the construction of schools, health clinics, water delivery

systems, and bridges). The micro-projects were designed to benefit local

populations that absorb the returnees as well as returnees themselves.

UNHCR views the projects as an important mechanism for cultivating

goodwill among local officials who assist in the monitoring effort and

prevents resentment among the local populations who are often jealous of

returnees’ reintegration allowances.

UNHCR and U.S. CPA

Expenditures

In annual funding appeals for the CPA program, UNHCR requested voluntary

contributions of about $640 million between 1990 and 1995. It received

substantially less in contributions, expending an estimated $444 million in

Special Program (CPA) and General Program (regional) funds between

1989 and 1995. (See table 3.)

Table 3: Schedule of UNHCR CPA Budgets and Expenditures (1989-95) 

Dollars in millions

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total

Budgets:

Special programs • $69.56 $90.49 $102.41 $85.97 $78.41 $67.03 $493.87

General programs • 38.94 28.15 28.47 24.82 14.97 10.51 145.86

Total • 108.50 118.64 130.88 110.79 93.38 77.54 639.73

Expenditures:a

Special programs $12.25 44.64 58.88 58.75 55.24 50.78 34.91 315.45

General programsb 33.54 20.79 19.86 19.06 14.81 10.12 10.51c 128.69

Total $45.79 $65.43 $78.74 $77.81 $70.05 $60.90 $45.42 $444.14d

aAccording to UNHCR officials, CPA expenditures were limited to available voluntary

contributions.

bWe excluded general program expenditures in Thailand because UNHCR’s program in Thailand

includes various refugee-related activities in addition to CPA activities, and UNHCR did not have

a breakout of General Program expenditures for CPA versus other activities.

cBudget estimate. Complete expenditure data were not available at the time of our review.

dThese figures exclude the costs of UNHCR monitoring activities in Vietnam.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
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Table 4 shows U.S. contributions of $150.83 million to UNHCR’s General and

Special Programs in support of the CPA during fiscal years 1990-96.

Table 4: Schedule of U.S. Contributions to UNHCR CPA Programs for Fiscal Years 1990-96, as of February 1996

Dollars in millions

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total

Special

programs $11.54 $18.10 $22.35 $16.98 $12.00 $8.50 $10.00 $99.47

General

programsa b 5.13 13.62 9.00 12.61 11.00 b 51.36

Total $11.54 $23.23 $35.97 $25.98 $24.61 $19.50 $10.00c $150.83

aAccording to State officials, contributions to UNHCR’s General Program were for Asia, and a

portion could have been used for elements of other UNHCR programs in the region.

bThe State Department made no general program contributions in support of the CPA during

these periods.

cThe State Department stipulated that none of the 10 million fiscal year 1996 contribution could be

used for any movements of asylum seekers under involuntary repartriation programs.

The United States also contributed $9.05 million to various

nongovernmental organizations for CPA-related activities between fiscal

years 1992 and 1996. Recipient organizations included

• Save the Children Federation ($3.40 million),

• World Vision ($1.46 million),

• International Catholic Migration Commission ($2.23 million),

• Southeast Asia Resource Action Center ($1.77 million),

• Hmong National Development ($0.13 million), and

• InterAction ($0.06 million).

Agency Comments The Department of State and UNHCR generally agreed with this report.

(UNHCR comments are reprinted in app. V; State did not provide written

comments.) The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) provided

technical clarifications (which we incorporated as appropriate), but did

not provide written comments.

Scope and

Methodology

We conducted our review at the Department of State and INS in

Washington, D.C., and at UNHCR Headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland; in

Hong Kong and Indonesia; and in Vietnam.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
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At all these locations, we examined available program records and files

and interviewed knowledgeable officials involved with the program. We

did not examine in depth all of the CPA first-asylum countries’ programs

but limited our review to Hong Kong and Indonesia. We selected Hong

Kong because of the large asylum seeker population, which included

Vietnamese from both the North and South, and Indonesia because its

distinctly southern Vietnamese asylum seeker population was

representative of the other first-asylum country populations, and because

it was one of the countries with alleged corruption in the screening

process.

Our review of the refugee status determination process was limited in that

we were not permitted to review Hong Kong or Indonesian government

files, nor did we interview asylum seekers in these countries. However, we

did review documents contained in UNHCR files, and took notes on them.

UNHCR also provided us with written summaries of the cases. We do not

believe the information contained in UNHCR’s files was sufficient for us to

make conclusive, independent determinations on the asylum seekers’

refugee status. However, we determined whether the decisions made by

Hong Kong, Indonesia, and UNHCR officials on the cases appeared

reasonable based upon international refugee adjudication standards and

information available to us in the files. We assessed the cases on these

bases.

Our scope was limited to examining how the CPA was implemented in

these countries and did not include an examination of subsequent

resettlement activities involving UNHCR and the resettlement countries.

This included resettlement activities in which the U.S. Department of State

and the INS may have been involved.

Status Determination

Process

We took several steps to assess whether CPA refugee status determination

procedures were implemented in accordance with international standards

and criteria. We interviewed and reviewed documents and testimonies by

critics of the asylum screening process—Lawyers Committee for Human

Rights, Refugees International, United States Catholic Conference,

Refugee Concern Hong Kong, among others, to obtain an understanding of

the problems they alleged were prevalent. To obtain an understanding of

the program and its alleged weaknesses, we interviewed UNHCR officials

currently involved in the CPA program and numerous officials who had

first-hand knowledge of the status determination process from their tours

of duty in Geneva and the countries of first-asylum during the early stages

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
B-274161 

of the CPA. In these meetings we obtained detailed information on each

step of the screening process, including training of first-asylum country

screening officials, prescreening counseling provided asylum seekers,

appeals counseling, case monitoring by UNHCR, and other procedures to

ensure the fairness of the process.

To obtain U.S. and international refugee determination standards and

criteria, we interviewed U.S. and UNHCR officials and examined pertinent

U.S. legislation and U.N. documents, which establish refugee

determination criteria and describe adjudication procedures. The latter

included INS Refugee Processing Guidelines and the UNHCR Handbook on

Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status.

In Hong Kong, we met with government officials responsible for each

phase of the status determination process and obtained pertinent

documents descriptive of the process. In these meetings, we inquired into

how the screening process was designed and implemented and evaluated

those processes against criticisms levied by nongovernmental

organizations that represent asylee interests. We met with a prominent

local attorney and an official from the refugee legal advocacy organization,

LAVAS, who provided legal counsel to asylum seekers to obtain their

insights, evaluations, and criticisms of the screening process.

As a limited test of both screening procedures and screening decisions, we

examined 10 cases represented by the Lawyers Committee for Human

Rights (five cases) and Boat People S.O.S. (five cases) as having been

wrongly screened out. We reviewed these cases from both the merits of

the claim and the soundness of the process perspective. However, our

access to case files was limited. The government of Hong Kong denied us

access to its screening files. UNHCR officials reviewed their case files with

us and allowed us to take notes. They also provided us with written

summaries of the cases. They did not permit us to make copies of material

contained in the case files.

UNHCR files did not contain transcripts or detailed interview write-ups of

the first-instance screening interviews by Hong Kong screening officials or

transcripts from the Refugee Status Review Board. Also, we did not

interview asylees. However, UNHCR’s case files contained the Hong Kong

authorities’ decisions and the stated reasons for them; the asylum seekers’

biographical profiles;21 written appeals of first-instance screening

21The profiles contain such information as the asylee’s family history; school, work and military

experience; periods of time in re-education camps or New Economic Zones; and details supporting

claims of persecution.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
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decisions by the asylum seekers and/or their UNHCR-provided or private

legal counsellors; and statements by UNHCR officials reviewing the cases

for mandate status. The latter included the asylum seekers’ claims,

summaries of the applicants’ claims made to the Hong Kong authorities

and their decisions, and UNHCR’s independent assessments and

recommendations regarding mandate status. The files also sometimes

contained other documentation, such as reports from UNHCR monitors in

Vietnam verifying some aspect of asylum seekers’ claims.

In Indonesia, we met with government, UNHCR, and U.S. Embassy officials,

the chairman of the refugee camp committee, and other individuals with

first-hand experience with the screening process in order to determine

how the process was designed and implemented. To test the screening

process, we examined 10 cases represented by Boat People S.O.S. as

examples of cases wrongly screened out due to corruption or

inappropriate application of refugee criteria. In conducting our case

reviews, we reviewed documentation made available to us by UNHCR and

discussed the merits of the cases and the adjudication process with UNHCR

officials. Similar to Hong Kong, our access to case files was limited. As in

Hong Kong, UNHCR officials in Indonesia reviewed their case files with us

and allowed us to take notes. They also provided us with written

summaries of the cases. The Indonesian government denied us access to

their screening files and UNHCR’s files did not contain P3V documents or

documents related to the appeals process. Therefore, we could not make

definitive determinations on the accuracy of the Indonesian authorities’

screening decisions. We reviewed the decisions to determine whether they

appeared reasonable based on information in the UNHCR case files and

UNHCR reviewers’ assessments of the claims.

Allegations of Corruption To develop information about alleged corruption in the CPA program, we

interviewed State Department, UNHCR, and nongovernmental organization

officials, and other persons knowledgeable of the screening process and

camp life. From Boat People S.O.S., we obtained documents, affidavits,

and reports that Boat People S.O.S. represented to us as proof of

corruption in the screening process. We did not verify the authenticity of

the information provided to us by Boat People S.O.S. We reviewed

documents and files at the Department of State and at UNHCR offices in

Geneva and Indonesia for reporting on corruption in an attempt to

determine what actions were taken to respond to corruption charges. We

also interviewed seven former residents of first-asylum camps in the

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
B-274161 

region who said they had first-hand experience with corruption in their

status determination proceedings.

In Indonesia, we examined seven cases represented to us by Boat People

S.O.S. to have been wrongly screened out due to corruption in order to

determine whether (1) the individuals presented strong refugee claims and

(2) there were any indications of corruption. We also reviewed three other

cases represented to us by Boat People S.O.S. to have been improperly

screened out. As in Hong Kong, we did not interview the asylum seekers

whose cases we examined.

To obtain additional insight into corruption allegations, we interviewed a

UNHCR official who conducted a 15-month investigation on corruption in

Galang camp. We also examined the results of a series of UNHCR case

reviews conducted in 1995, which included cases handled by UNHCR’s

Indonesian legal consultants alleged to have engaged in corruption. While

UNHCR officials did not provide us the full reports or case files on their 1995

reviews, they discussed the results with us and provided us a brief

summary of the review. We were denied access to Indonesian government

files, and high level Indonesian government officials we met with denied

the existence of corruption in the screening process.

Treatment of Returnees to

Vietnam

To determine whether those who returned to Vietnam were subject to

persecution by the government, we examined UNHCR’s program for

monitoring returnees and the skills, access, and independence of their

monitors. We met with U.S. Embassy officials in Bangkok and Hanoi and

officials from the INS who administer the Orderly Departure Program and

were familiar with conditions in Vietnam. We inquired into their freedom

of movement and access to returnees in Vietnam and whether the

government of Vietnam was abiding by its commitments not to persecute

returnees. We met with the human rights group, Asia Watch, to obtain

names of returnees of concern to them and reviewed that organization’s

reporting on Vietnam. We met with officials from the British Embassy in

Hanoi who monitor persons forcibly returned to Vietnam from Hong Kong

and obtained their assessment of the Vietnamese government’s treatment

of this caseload. We also met with officials from several nongovernmental

organizations who work with the returnee population, and with numerous

individuals who had traveled independently within Vietnam and had

personal knowledge of some returnee cases to determine how the

returnees were faring as a whole and whether they were aware of any

instances of persecution.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
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While in Vietnam, we interviewed 22 returnees from both the north and

south of Vietnam to determine what challenges they have faced since

returning home and whether they have experienced any problems from

the government. We also observed UNHCR officials as they (1) met an

Orderly Return Program flight from Hong Kong and (2) conducted a

monitoring mission to observe their freedom of movement, access to

returnees, and whether the presence of Vietnamese authorities inhibited

the candidness of returnees’ statements. We also examined UNHCR’s

returnee monitoring database and obtained information on 12 returnee

cases presented to us from Boat People S.O.S. and Asia Watch as

examples of persons being persecuted or of special concern.

Cost Data To determine costs of the CPA, we obtained financial data from the UNHCR

and the Department of State. We did not verify the accuracy of the data

provided.

We conducted our review from November 1995 to August 1996 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking

Minority Members of the House and Senate Committees on

Appropriations, the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee,

the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, and other interested

committees; the Secretary of State and the Attorney General; the United

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and others upon request.

If you or your staff have any further questions concerning this report,

please contact me at (202) 512-4128. Major contributors to this report were

David R. Martin, Assistant Director, and Patrick A. Dickriede, Senior

Evaluator.

Sincerely yours,

Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director

International Relations and Trade Issues

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

The Comprehensive

Plan of Action

Stipulated National

Programs Using

International

Screening Standards

30

Appendix II 

Asylum Seeker

Screening Process in

Hong Kong

36

Hong Kong’s Procedures and Criteria Were Consistent With CPA

Guidance

36

Appendix III 

Asylum Seeker

Screening Process in

Indonesia

41

Indonesia’s Procedures and Criteria Were Consistent With CPA

Guidance

41

Appendix IV 

UNHCR Monitoring of

Returnees to Vietnam

46

Appendix V 

Comments From the

United Nations High

Commissioner for

Refugees

49

Tables Table 1: Hong Kong Refugee Status Determination Results 10

Table 2: Indonesia Refugee Status Determination Results 13

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Contents

Table 3: Schedule of UNHCR CPA Budgets and Expenditures 20

Table 4: Schedule of U.S. Contributions to UNHCR CPA

Programs for Fiscal Years 1990-96, as of February 1996

21

Figures Figure 1: Vietnamese Asylum Seekers in Southeast Asia Camps 5

Figure II.1: Screening Procedures in Hong Kong 37

Figure III.1: Screening Procedures in Indonesia 42

Abbreviations

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CPA Comprehensive Plan of Action

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service

ODP Orderly Departure Program

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix I 

The Comprehensive Plan of Action

Stipulated National Programs Using

International Screening Standards

The Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) agreement called for a consistent,

regionwide refugee status-determination process to be conducted by

first-asylum countries’ national authorities in accordance with established

international refugee criteria and procedures. The United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was to participate in the process in an

observer and advisory capacity and was to institute a comprehensive

regional training program for the national officials involved in the process.

The refugee screening criteria to be followed were those recognized in the

1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol,

bearing in mind the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the

special circumstances and needs of the asylum seekers. The UNHCR

Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status was

to serve as an authoritative and interpretative guide in developing and

applying CPA screening criteria.1

The UNHCR Handbook quotes the 1951 Convention definition of a refugee

as any person who

. . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,

membership of a particular social group, or political opinion is outside the country of his

nationality and is . . . unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who,

not having a nationality and being outside . . . of his former habitual residence . . . is unable

or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

The Handbook includes detailed discussions of the international

instruments defining a refugee; the criteria for determining refugee status

(including exclusion clauses, special cases, and the principle of family

unity); and the procedures for determining refugee status (including

principles and methods for establishing the facts in a case, and the

application of benefit of the doubt).

CPA screening procedures to be followed by the governments of the

countries of first-asylum were to be in accordance with those endorsed by

the Executive Committee of UNHCR, as follows:

1

Basic procedures for determining refugee status were endorsed by the Executive Committee of

UNHCR, 28th Session, 1977. At the same session, the Executive Committee requested that UNHCR

consider issuing a handbook for the guidance of governments, relating to procedures and criteria for

determining refugee status. The UNHCR Handbook was initially published in 1979.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix I 

The Comprehensive Plan of Action

Stipulated National Programs Using

International Screening Standards

• The competent interviewing official shall have clear instruction for dealing

with the case and should act in accordance with the principle of

non-refoulement.2

• The applicant should receive the necessary guidance as to the screening

procedures to be followed.

• There should be a clearly identified authority—whenever possible a single

control authority—with responsibility for examining requests for refugee

status and making a decision in the first instance.

• The applicant should be given the necessary facilities, including the

services of a competent interpreter, for submitting his or her case to the

proper authorities. The applicant should also be given the opportunity to

contact a UNHCR representative.

• If recognized as a refugee, the applicant should be informed accordingly

and provided written documentation certifying his or her refugee status.

• If not recognized as a refugee, the applicant should be given a reasonable

time to appeal for a formal reconsideration of the decision.

• The applicant should be permitted to remain in the first-asylum country

pending a decision on his or her initial request, and any appeal to higher

authority.

UNHCR’s Responsibilities

Under the CPA

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was

established by statute adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on

December 14, 1950, as an annex to U.N. Resolution 428 (v). The statute

stipulated that the work of the High Commissioner is humanitarian and

social in nature and of an entirely nonpolitical character and that the High

Commissioner is to provide international protection, under the auspices of

the United Nations, to refugees falling within the competence of his or her

office. In establishing the Office, the General Assembly called upon

governments to cooperate with the High Commissioner in the

performance of the Office’s functions concerning refugees falling under its

competence. While recognizing that the Office’s effectiveness depended

upon the cooperation of U.N. member and nonmember states, the statute

gave UNHCR no directional or enforcement authority over them. The statute

states that the High Commissioner should follow policy directives of the

General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council. The Executive

Committee of the High Commissioner’s Program, a 49 member-state

advisory committee on refugees, approves and supervises the material

assistance program of the High Commissioner’s Office and advises the

2

Participating states shall not expel or return a refugee to the frontiers or territories where his or her

life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix I 

The Comprehensive Plan of Action

Stipulated National Programs Using

International Screening Standards

High Commissioner on the implementation of the Commissioner’s

functions under the statute.

UNHCR’s responsibilities under the CPA were consistent with those

envisioned by the Office’s enabling statute. The agreement charged UNHCR

with coordinating the CPA’s implementation with involved countries and

devising procedures for monitoring its progress. The CPA stipulated that

first-asylum countries were to be responsible for screening asylum seekers

for refugee status, and that UNHCR was to participate in the process in an

observer and advisory capacity. UNHCR’s responsibilities in the screening

process were to include:

• assisting the first-asylum countries in designing and implementing their

screening processes,

• providing comprehensive training for national officials involved in asylum

seeker screening, and

• advising asylum seekers about the screening processes and procedures.

UNHCR was also charged under the agreement with coordinating with

first-asylum and third countries the timely resettlement of those found to

be refugees and with administering a safe, dignified repatriation program

for those found to be nonrefugees.

A UNHCR senior legal officer in Geneva told us that, with regard to refugee

status determinations, the CPA’s authors recognized that the first-asylum

countries were sovereign decisionmakers, and the CPA authors did not

expect UNHCR to ensure a proper decision in every case. The CPA’s authors,

he said, did not view UNHCR as the final arbiter in refugee determinations,

and UNHCR was not the decision-making body. As previously noted, the

Statute of the Office of High Commissioner authorizes UNHCR to make its

own determinations about individuals’ refugee status. This authority is

commonly referred to as mandate authority. In what was essentially an

additional procedure in the refugee status determination process, UNHCR

could examine screened out asylum seeker cases for mandate (refugee)

status. The CPA agreement did not make specific reference to UNHCR’s

mandate authority, but Hong Kong nonetheless recognized this authority.

The other countries of first-asylum had not formally recognized this UNHCR

authority as of June 1996, but some, such as the Philippines and Indonesia,

indicated to us that UNHCR’s mandates would be honored.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix I 

The Comprehensive Plan of Action

Stipulated National Programs Using

International Screening Standards

Application of

International and U.S.

Refugee Screening

Standards Can Differ

The U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act3 as a amended, defines a refugee

(in part) as

. . . any person who . . . is unable or unwilling to return to . . . [his or her country of

nationality or habitual residence] because of persecution or [underscoring added] a

well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion . . . .

The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) 1983 refugee

processing guidelines state that the burden of proof of refugee status rests

with the applicant. According to INS’ guidelines, the applicable burden to

be met by the applicant is a well-founded fear of persecution, based on

one of the reasons for persecution in the refugee definition.

In determining an applicant’s refugee status, INS officers must evaluate

whether the applicant’s statements and feelings lead to a finding of

well-founded fear of persecution based on their consistency and credibility

in light of known conditions and practices in the country from which

refuge is sought.

In addition, Public Law 101-1674

 states that certain categories of aliens

(including Vietnamese who are members of categories of individuals

determined by the Attorney General to be targets of persecution) may for

purposes of refugee status determination establish that they have a

well-founded fear of persecution based on one of the five reasons for

persecution by asserting such a fear and asserting a credible basis for

concern about the possibility of such persecution.

Categories of Vietnamese found by the Attorney General to be of interest

to the United States include former South Vietnamese government officials

and members of the military; persons formerly closely affiliated with the

U.S. or Western institutions; those sent to re-education camps, or to New

Economic Zones because they were considered politically or socially

undesirable; members of certain ethnic or religious groups; and family

members of the above.

According to INS guidelines, these categories of aliens shared common

characteristics that identified them as targets of persecution in their

countries. The facts surrounding the establishment of the categories were

sufficiently known and established to permit what was, in essence,

3

Section 101(a) (42), codified as 8 U.S.C.§1101 (a) (42).

4

Public Law 101-167, Section 599D, 103 Statute 1261.

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix I 

The Comprehensive Plan of Action

Stipulated National Programs Using

International Screening Standards

“judicial notice” to be taken without further proof. Thus, according to INS

guidelines, if applicants clearly proved themselves to come within one of

the established categories they would have also established themselves

likely targets of persecution.

INS guidelines state that if in interviewing an applicant the INS officer is

satisfied that he or she falls within a designated category, a strong

likelihood will have been established that the applicant is qualified for

refugee status. The interviewing officer should then obtain information

regarding the applicant’s actual persecution or well-founded fear of

persecution. Statements indicating that category applicants fled their

country for fear of persecution or due to actual acts of persecution, if

credible, are generally sufficient for findings of refugee status, according

to INS guidelines.

Notwithstanding the view by some that the U.S. refugee definition fully

replicates the international definition, both U.S. and UNHCR officials

acknowledged that the definitions—and their applications—can differ.

According to senior INS officials, the international definition is

forward-looking “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted,” while

the U.S. definition can look to the past “persecution or a well-founded fear

of persecution.”

Thus, under the U.S. definition an applicant can be adjudicated a refugee

on the basis of past persecution.5

 Indeed, INS guidelines state that refugee

status may be based upon persecution suffered in the past or upon the

likelihood of future persecution. The presence of either is sufficient: Both

conditions are not required.

According to UNHCR officials, refugee screening under international

standards assesses and takes into account past persecution, but also when

the persecution took place and ended, and the reasonable likelihood of

future persecution upon the individual’s return to his or her country of

5

According to the INS’ Basic Law Manual, which provides guidance on refugee and asylum

adjudications, an applicant for refugee status may establish his claim by demonstrating past

persecution in lieu of evidence of a well-founded fear of persecution. If it is determined that an

applicant has established past persecution, he shall be presumed to have a well-founded fear of

persecution. If, however, a preponderance of the evidence shows that conditions in the applicant’s

country have changed to such an extent that the alien’s fear of being persecuted is no longer

well-founded, an INS officer may deny refugee status in the exercise of discretion if the officer is

satisfied that an alien who has suffered persecution in the past is no longer in danger of persecution.

Nevertheless, if it is determined that the applicant has demonstrated compelling reasons for being

unwilling to return arising out of the severity of the past persecution, he may be granted refugee

status—Matter of Chen, Int. Dec. No. 3104 (BIA 1989).

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix I 

The Comprehensive Plan of Action

Stipulated National Programs Using

International Screening Standards

origin. The officials stressed that while past persecution is an element in

establishing whether an individual has a well-founded fear of persecution

upon return, it is not sufficient to establish refugee status. They added,

however, that past persecution can be the basis for refugee status on

humanitarian grounds when the persecution was so egregious that the

individual could not reasonably be expected to resume a normal life upon

return.

UNHCR officials stated that changing conditions in asylum seekers’

countries-of-origin must also be taken into account in assessing

individuals’ well-founded fear of persecution. UNHCR’s assessment of

conditions in Vietnam, based on reports from nongovernmental

organizations, governments, and UNHCR’s monitors in Vietnam indicated

significantly improved conditions in the country. UNHCR reports on the CPA

stated, for example, that what may have been a borderline case in the past

could well fail to establish a well-founded fear of persecution now in light

of improved conditions in Vietnam.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix II 

Asylum Seeker Screening Process in Hong

Kong

All Vietnamese migrants arriving in Hong Kong before June 16, 1988, were

automatically given refugee status, making them eligible for resettlement.

However, according to Hong Kong government documents, it became

increasingly clear during the mid-1980s that the large majority of arriving

Vietnamese migrants did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in

Vietnam and thus were not entitled to refugee status. According to the

documents, departures from Vietnam appeared to be motivated principally

by the desire for resettlement, rather than asylum, and resettlement

countries were becoming increasingly reluctant to take people from Hong

Kong.1

 The Hong Kong government therefore decided that it could no

longer grant automatic refugee status, and on June 16, 1988, initiated

refugee screening procedures. These procedures were amended in

September 1988 following an agreement with UNHCR, and again in June

1989, following implementation of the CPA agreement. Between March 1989

and December 1995, 60,275 asylum seekers in Hong Kong were screened

for refugee status under the CPA. About 11,300 (18.8 percent) were

screened in and resettled. The remaining 48,900 were determined not to be

refugees and were either voluntarily or involuntarily repatriated to

Vietnam or remained in Hong Kong asylum camps.

Hong Kong government and UNHCR officials acknowledged mistakes in the

implementation of Hong Kong’s CPA processing procedures, particularly

early in the process, but said the process improved as it matured. We also

noted errors. However, we believe the process was generally implemented

in accordance with CPA guidelines.

Hong Kong’s

Procedures and

Criteria Were

Consistent With CPA

Guidance

We interviewed UNHCR and Hong Kong government officials and reviewed

various documents they provided us in developing a description of Hong

Kong’s refugee screening procedures. Refugee screening in Hong Kong

was a multitiered process involving both government bodies and UNHCR.

The process included initial screening and an appeals process by the

government, mandate review by UNHCR, and possible judicial review

through the Hong Kong courts. The process is depicted in figure II.1.

1

During the 1980s, the balance between north and south Vietnamese arriving in Hong Kong began to

change, with the proportion of northerners steadily increasing. In 1984, 28 percent came from the

northern part of Vietnam, whereas by 1989 the proportion from the north had increased to 86 percent.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix II 

Asylum Seeker Screening Process in Hong

Kong

Figure II.1: Screening Procedures in Hong Kong

UNHCR audited cases

for mandate review

Accepted for

mandate review

Rejected for

mandate review

Mandate (refugee 

status) granted Mandate denied

Orientation and

process familiarization

Hong Kong government

Initial screening

Screened in as

refugees Screened out

Transferred to 

refugee camps to 

await resettlement

Advised of right to appeal

to Refugee Status Review

Board: files given to UNHCR 

legal consultants

If credible case 

UNHCR legal 

consultants

prepared appeals

If not credible

applicants advised

about submitting

own appeals

Applicant could seek

Judicial Review by 

Hong Kong Courts

Review by

Hong Kong Courts

Screening decision 

confirmed

Screening decision

set aside

Applicant 

rescreened by 

Review Board

Optional appeal process

Refugees 

transferred to 

refugee camps to 

await resettlement

Non-refugees

remain in Hong Kong

pending repatriation

Review Board

Screens appeals;

applicants notified

Hong Kong 

Legal Aid rejects

applicant's petition

Hong Kong 

Legal Aid accepts

applicant's petition

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix II 

Asylum Seeker Screening Process in Hong

Kong

According to Hong Kong government reports, asylum seekers were

informed upon interception in Hong Kong waters that they were entering

the territory illegally and if they stayed would be subject to screening to

determine their refugee status. They were told that those accorded refugee

status would be resettled and those found not to be refugees would be

detained pending repatriation.

Prior to initial, or first-instance, screening, both the Hong Kong

Immigration Department and UNHCR were to provide asylum seekers

orientation and process familiarization interviews and materials. UNHCR

legal consultants and Australian lawyers (who were working under a

Jesuit Refugee Service project) were to provide asylum seekers legal

advice and assistance prior to first-instance screening. Private Hong Kong

attorneys entitled to practice in Hong Kong, when hired by asylum

seekers, could also provide legal advice at this stage.

At first-instance screening Immigration Department assistants, using

UNHCR-approved questionnaires, interviewed asylum seekers to collect

biographical information. This included the individuals’ personal and

family histories; military service data; involvement in political parties or

resistance organizations; religious activities; any denial of economic and

social rights; prosecution; and motives for leaving and not wishing to

return to Vietnam. There was also provision for any additional points or

comments the individual wished to make. Immigration officers, assisted by

government-provided interpreters, interviewed the asylum seekers, using

the completed questionnaires as baseline data, and recorded their claims

to refugee status. The officers made preliminary refugee status

determinations from this data. These decisions were reviewed by senior

immigration officers before the applicants were notified of the screening

results. Notices of determination explaining the decisions were to be given

all applicants. If screened in as refugees, the applicants were moved to a

refugee camp to await resettlement. If screened out, applicants were

advised of their right to appeal.

Screened out applicants could appeal to the Refugee Status Review Board,

a body composed of government and nongovernment officials. The review

process was to be initiated by submitting the cases to the Review Board

within 28 days of receipt of the initial status determination.

On the day applicants were notified of negative determinations, copies of

their files were to be given to UNHCR legal consultants—Agency for

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix II 

Asylum Seeker Screening Process in Hong

Kong

Volunteer Service counselors,2 who met and advised them on the merits of

their cases. If the counselors believed particular claims warranted

reconsideration, the counselors prepared the submissions to the Review

Board. If not, they provided applicants counseling and guidelines for

submitting their own written submissions. According to UNHCR and Review

Board officials, Agency for Volunteer Service consultants filed about

25 percent of the approximately 49,000 appeals filed.

Private Hong Kong attorneys could also file appeals on behalf of their

clients. Review Board officials estimated that about 8 percent of those

whose cases were not appealed by UNHCR counselors retained private

attorneys who submitted their appeals for them.

The Review Board was organized into two-person panels, each of which

heard cases. No legal representation or oral evidence could be given at the

Review Board, although according to the Board chairman about 25 percent

of the asylum seekers making appeals were re-interviewed by Board

members.3

 A positive decision by either panel member could overturn

negative Immigration Department decisions.

The Review Board provided the asylum seekers written notification of its

decisions, with reasons for decisions. If screened in at this review, the

asylum seekers were transferred to refugee camps to await resettlement. If

screened out, they were informed that they would be permitted to remain

in Hong Kong pending their repatriation.

According to a representative of the Hong Kong Attorney General’s Office,

under Hong Kong administrative law asylum seekers could seek judicial

review of the Review Board’s negative decisions in the Hong Kong courts

if they believed the decisions were unreasonable or illegal, or involved

procedural improprieties. Judicial review was not a review of the cases’

merits but, rather, the procedures employed in deciding them.

Asylum seekers apply for judicial review of their cases through the Hong

Kong Legal Aid Department, which determines the merits of the

applicants’ claims. The Department can reject the applications, request the

Refugee Status Review Board to reconsider (rescreen) the cases, or refer

them to the courts for judicial review. According to a Legal Aid

Department official, 3,651 asylum seekers had applied for assistance as of

2

The Agency for Volunteer Service was a local nongovernmental organization created and financed by

UNHCR to provide legal counsel to denied applicants.

3

UNHCR could monitor the re-interviews.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix II 

Asylum Seeker Screening Process in Hong

Kong

July 1996. Of that number, 450 had been granted Legal Aid Department

assistance, and another 1,354 applications were under active

consideration.

The Legal Aid Department official could not provide us the number of

cases rescreened by the Review Board or heard by the courts. According

to the official, those statistics were not kept. However, the official said

that few cases actually go to court as the Department usually processes

deserving cases through the Review Board. According to the Attorney

General’s Office representative we spoke with, there was only one

instance where the court ordered a decision by the Review Board set

aside. In that case, the court ruled that both the first-instance and Review

Board decisions were flawed by procedural irregularities.4

In what became essentially another level of review, the Hong Kong

government recognized UNHCR’s right to grant refugee status under its own

authority.5

 This meant that in cases the Hong Kong government rejected

but UNHCR considered meritorious, UNHCR was able to recognize persons as

refugees under its own mandate. UNHCR viewed recognition of its mandate

as an important safety net for ensuring that no persons with valid claims

were improperly screened out and returned to Vietnam.

According to UNHCR officials in Hong Kong, all screened-out applicants’

cases, about 46,000, were examined for the possibility of mandate and

about 11,000 were selected for mandate review. UNHCR granted mandates

(refugee status) to about 1,550.6

4

The individual was later rescreened, and was screened in, by Hong Kong authorities.

5

The Statute of the Office of the UNHCR authorizes UNHCR to make its own determinations about

refugee status. This authority is commonly referred to as mandate authority.

6

As of January 1996.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix III 

Asylum Seeker Screening Process in

Indonesia

Refugee screening in Indonesia was a two-phased process that met basic

international structural screening standards but did not contain some of

the checks and balances we found in the Hong Kong process. UNHCR played

a major role in the process, although the Indonesian authorities retained

decision-making responsibilities.

Indonesia’s

Procedures and

Criteria Were

Consistent With CPA

Guidance

Refugee screening in Indonesia began in September 1989 and ended in

September 1993. All asylum seekers arriving after March 17, 1989, were

screened for refugee status. (Those arriving before that time were

automatically accorded refugee status and the opportunity to resettle in

third countries.) The process in Indonesia was essentially a two-stage

(first-instance and appeals) system, involving both Indonesian government

authorities and UNHCR. This process is depicted in figure III.1.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix III 

Asylum Seeker Screening Process in

Indonesia

Figure III.1: Screening Procedures in

Indonesia

Interviewed by P3V

officials

Orientation and process

Familiarization

UNHCR

First- instance screening

and screening recommendation 

Written decisions delivered

Screened in Screened out

Processed for settlement

to 3rd country

Counseled by UNHCR

legal consultants

Appeal considered 

by

Review Committee

Committee could 

refer unclear cases

to Appeals Board

Filed appeal Did not file appeal

Final decision

delivered

Refugees

processed for 

resettlement to 

3rd countries

Non-refugees

remained in 

Indonesia pending

repatriation

Optional appeal process

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix III 

Asylum Seeker Screening Process in

Indonesia

First-instance screening was conducted at Galang, the island asylum camp

located several hundred miles north of Jakarta, the capital. Upon arrival at

the camp, asylum seekers registered and provided basic biographical

information to P3V, the Indonesian inter-ministerial task force created to

deal with Vietnamese boat people. Later, UNHCR staff provided group

prescreening counseling and materials and explained screening

procedures and criteria. UNHCR staff, assisted by Vietnamese camp

volunteers, then administered a more comprehensive questionnaire,

designed to elicit more detailed information about the individuals’ claims

for refugee status. We did not evaluate the adequacy of the information

provided to asylum seekers during prescreening counseling. However, an

independent observer with long experience at Galang told us UNHCR

provided the asylum seekers ample information on the screening process

and that asylum seekers were well prepared for the screening process.

At first-instance screening, preliminary interviews were conducted by

UNHCR legal consultants, attorneys trained in international refugee

determination procedures and criteria. The consultants were assisted by

UNHCR interpreters. The consultants prepared written case evaluations and

screening recommendations, on the basis of the applicants’ biographical

data and the interviews. The consultants worked under the supervision of

a senior UNHCR legal officer, who was responsible for reviewing the

consultants’ case evaluations.

The asylum seekers’ files, containing their biographical data, the UNHCR

questionnaires, and the consultants’ evaluations and screening

recommendations were then passed to P3V. Teams of P3V officials,

consisting of an interviewing officer and an interpreter, interviewed the

asylum seekers to assess their credibility and verify the accuracy of the

information in the UNHCR consultants’ preliminary interviews. (UNHCR

representatives were free to monitor the interviews, but only spot checked

them, according to UNHCR officials.) The interviewing officers then

prepared the first-instance screening decisions.

The UNHCR consultants’ interviews were, in effect, the substantive

first-instance screening interviews. According to UNHCR officials, P3V

officials placed strong credence in the consultants’ evaluations, and rarely

disagreed with their recommendations. A UNHCR official told us that of the

more than 3,000 cases screened positive by UNHCR at first-instance, P3V

disagreed with the consultants’ recommendations in only 22 cases. A

UNHCR official informed us that some P3V interviewing officers asked only

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Appendix III 

Asylum Seeker Screening Process in

Indonesia

a few questions of applicants, relying on the consultants’ evaluations in

reaching their decisions.

Written screening decisions were served to each applicant. Screened-in

cases were processed for resettlement in third countries; those screened

out were informed of their right to submit a written appeal.

Screened out applicants had 15 days from the date of notification to

appeal their decisions. UNHCR legal consultants counseled applicants,

mostly in group sessions, on how to submit their appeals. UNHCR-trained

camp-resident volunteers assisted applicants in drafting their appeals.1

Applicants’ appeals were considered by the inter-ministerial Review

Committee in Jakarta. The Committee based its deliberations on the

applicants’ appeals submissions and case files, which had been forwarded

from Galang. It did not reinterview asylum seekers, according to UNHCR

officials. The Committee could uphold or reverse negative first-instance

decisions depending upon whether it believed the appeals submissions

provided additional credible information and whether the cases had been

screened in conformance with international refugee status determination

criteria. Most appeals were decided at the Review Committee level. These

decisions were considered final; however, according to UNHCR, many of the

positive decisions were delivered to the applicants as late as 1 year or

more after the decision was made. This was contrary to the CPA’s guidance

concerning prompt notification, and, according to a UNHCR program

officer, provided an opportunity for corruption to occur.

The Committee had the option of referring questionable or unclear cases

to a 10-member Appeals Board for final determination. The Committee

referred only those cases on which it could not make a clear

determination.

A UNHCR representative attended Review Committee and Appeals Board

meetings as an observer and advisor. The representative was also

responsible for presenting UNHCR’s views on cases at appeal. UNHCR

officials involved in the screening process told us applicants’ case files and

appeals were forwarded to the UNHCR office in Jakarta at the same time

they were sent to the Review Committee. They said UNHCR in Jakarta

reviewed all asylum seekers’ appeals before they were discussed by the

Review Committee to determine those with merit. They said that while

1

Indonesia did not permit nongovernmental organizations to participate in applicant counseling, as the

Hong Kong government did with Agency for Volunteer Service counselors.

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Appendix III 

Asylum Seeker Screening Process in

Indonesia

P3V at Galang had almost always accepted UNHCR positive screening

recommendations at first instance, there were occasionally cases that P3V

denied despite the recommendations. The Galang consultants noted those

cases for Jakarta’s review. The officials told us they instructed their

representative to present UNHCR’s views on the cases it felt strongly about

to the Review Committee and/or Appeals Board.

According to UNHCR officials, UNHCR and the Review Committee or Appeals

Board reached consensus on every case UNHCR believed merited refugee

status. The Indonesian authorities accepted UNHCR’s positive first-instance

recommendations on all but 22 cases, screening out those cases during the

appeals process. During the appeals process UNHCR concurred with the

Review Committee’s and/or Board’s negative decisions. Thus, according to

UNHCR officials, because no meritorious claims remained in question,

UNHCR had no need to exercise its mandate authority. (Later, however,

UNHCR mandated seven cases as a result of its reviews of screening

decisions.)

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix IV 

UNHCR Monitoring of Returnees to Vietnam

The CPA charged UNHCR with administering the repatriation of asylum

seekers determined not to be refugees but did not specifically charge the

agency with the monitoring mission. However, U.N. Secretary General

Javier Perez de Cueller did so in a September 1990 letter to the High

Commissioner for Refugees, when he requested that the High

Commissioner, independent of the mandate as High Commissioner for

Refugees and on an exceptional basis, serve as the Secretary General’s

Special Representative to coordinate and monitor the returnees program

to Vietnam. In his letter, the Secretary General noted that the CPA’s success

depended upon a balanced implementation of all its aspects, including that

of the return and reintegration of persons determined not to be refugees,

and that humanitarian consideration argued strongly for the United

Nation’s continued involvement in the matter.

As of February 1996, UNHCR employed seven international staff as

monitoring officers (four based in Hanoi and three in Ho Chi Minh City)

and a contingent of national administrative and support staff to implement

its monitoring program. All of the monitoring officers were fluent in

Vietnamese—several were also fluent in regional dialects. Five of the

monitoring officers had worked in first-asylum country programs prior to

taking positions as monitors in Vietnam. None of the monitoring officers

needed or used interpreters in their work.

The UNHCR monitoring system is built around and keyed to priority cases,

returnees of special significance or concern or those who specifically

request monitoring upon their return.1 UNHCR offices in the first-asylum

countries are to notify the Hanoi office of pending returnees, both priority

and routine cases. This information is to be placed in returnee databases

in UNHCR’s Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City offices.

Returnees, who usually arrived by air in Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City, were

to be met by UNHCR officers and first-asylum country embassy

representatives,2

 in addition to Vietnamese authorities. If the flights

comprised involuntary returnees from Hong Kong, they were also to be

met by British Embassy officials, as Hong Kong’s involuntary return

program, called the Orderly Return Program, was being carried out under

a bilateral agreement between the British and Hong Kong governments

1

Examples of priority monitoring include individuals who may have been politically active in

first-asylum camps or who may have been facing prosecution or imprisonment for criminal acts

committed before their departure from Vietnam.

2

According to UNHCR officials, embassy representatives usually met only Orderly Return Program, or

involuntary returnee, flights.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix IV 

UNHCR Monitoring of Returnees to Vietnam

and Vietnam. British Embassy monitoring officers were to independently

monitor Hong Kong’s involuntary returnees, including priority cases.

British and UNHCR officers viewed their dual monitoring of these cases as

positive reinforcement of each other’s efforts. The British viewed their

monitoring effort as necessary to be consistent with their orderly return

Memorandum of Understanding with the Vietnam government,

notwithstanding UNHCR’s monitoring program.

Returnees were to be transferred from the airports to reception centers,

where they were to undergo registration and reintegration processing by

government agencies and foreign nongovernmental organizations, such as

Nordic Assistance to Returning Vietnamese. They were also to be visited

by UNHCR monitors, who were to answer any questions, pass out business

cards with addresses and telephone numbers where they could be

reached,3

 and take names and addresses of individuals who requested

priority monitoring.

From the returnee databases, UNHCR planned monitoring missions—field

trips designed to visit specific priority cases. These cases were

supplemented with names of routine returnees in the area. The monitors

notified the government authorities of their monitoring mission

destinations (by province, district, and village) and in the south provided

lists of all returnees in the provinces to be visited.4

According to UNHCR monitoring officials this approach had several

advantages. It

• ensured government authorities of UNHCR’s openness, while securing the

assistance of local officials as guides in finding individual returnees;5

• ensured systematic planning so that all priority cases would be visited;

• was more efficient than random visits; and

• did not specify individual priority cases to be visited.

This approach also enabled UNHCR to visit with local government officials

and help ensure that local officials were adhering to government

commitments not to persecute returnees.

3

Unrestricted communication in Vietnam has led to increased direct contact by returnees with UNHCR

monitoring officers. In 1995, for example, UNHCR’s Ho Chi Minh City office had 1,168 walk-in visits.

4

In commenting on a draft of this report, UNHCR said that it does not provide government authorities

lists of returnees to be monitored in the north.

5

According to UNHCR monitors, there are no street signs in many Vietnamese villages, and individuals

must be located by local officials.

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix IV 

UNHCR Monitoring of Returnees to Vietnam

Monitoring missions, which normally consisted of two monitoring officers

in the south and one in the north, were designed to contact 100 to 150

returnees per mission. Monitoring officers had conducted 363 monitoring

missions as of our visit in February 1996. As they traveled, the monitors

stopped at villages to ask village leaders and local citizens how local

returnees were faring as a whole. They also visited outlying areas to ask

similar questions. The monitors then visited individual returnees. UNHCR

monitors told us that through these practices they gained a good

knowledge about a much larger proportion of returnees than the numbers

visited would indicate.

If the officers sensed a returnee was reluctant to speak candidly they

employed the technique of either occupying government officials with one

officer while the other took the individual aside, or simply taking the

returnee aside, to discuss the situation. According to UNHCR officials, as

well as our observations while interviewing returnees in Dong Nai

province, government officials normally did not attend the interviews but

rather waited in places such as coffee shops until the monitoring visits

were completed. Monitors, as well as others with extensive experience in

Vietnamese culture told us, however, that Vietnamese speak their minds

freely and would not be reticent to voice their concerns of treatment in

front of government officials.

The government’s attitude and attention toward monitoring has evolved

over time; returnee monitoring initially drew considerable government

attention, according to UNHCR monitoring officers. They said their

monitoring missions drew entourages of 10 to 12 persons, including

officials from the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Labor, War

Invalids, and Social Affairs; but, over time the government’s attitude grew

more relaxed. Over the last several years UNHCR monitoring officers were

usually accompanied only by an official from the Labor and Social Welfare

Department under the provincial Peoples’ Committee and the Labor

Ministry. These departments are UNHCR’s counterparts and hosts in the

provinces. They organize and administer the distribution of UNHCR’s

individual cash grants and support the planning and implementation of

UNHCR’s micro-projects.

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix V 

Comments From the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Now on p. 2.

Now on p. 4.

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix V 

Comments From the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees

Now on p. 6.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 10.

See comment 2.

Now on p. 15.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix V 

Comments From the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees

Now on p. 45.

See comment 3.

Now on p. 46.

See comment 4.

Now on p. 47.

See comment 4.

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
Appendix V 

Comments From the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees

The following are GAO’s comments on the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees letter dated September 9, 1996.

GAO Comments 1. We agree that the CPA Steering Committee’s March 1996 announcement

reaffirmed language in the CPA that asylum seekers found not to be

refugees should be repatriated, and we revised our report accordingly.

2. Hong Kong Immigration Department officials we spoke with stated that

refugee screening was conducted in accordance with UNHCR guidelines and

that no additional screening criteria beyond that stipulated in the CPA were

applied.

3. While our draft report referred to mandates resulting from UNHCR’s 1995

reviews, we modified the report to reflect the number of mandates

resulting from all UNHCR reviews in Indonesia.

4. We modified the report to incorporate this suggestion.

(711155) Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-97-12 Vietnamese Asylum Seekers
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