Under Rule 25(d)(1) of the F eder al Rules of Civil P roce dure, A dminist rator K are n 1 G. Mills has been substituted for for mer Administrator Steven Pre ston. F ED . R. C IV . P. 25(d). UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT F O R T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O LU M B IA

___________________________________________ ) RI CHARD AMERI CA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Ci vi l A cti onNo. 03 -18 07 (P L F) ) KAREN G. MI L L S, ) Administrator, Small

Business Administrati on , ) ) De fe nd ant. )

1 ___________________________________________)
OPI NI ON Plaintiff Richard Amer ica br oug ht this action ag ainst his former e mploy er, the Small Business Administration (“SBA” ), for violations of Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 19 64 , a s ame nd e d, 42 U. S.C. §§ 20 00 e e t se q. De fe nd a nt S B A a rgue d th at pl a int if

f f a ile d to
s t at e a c l a i mb e c a

u s e h i s a l l e g at i o n s o f

d i s c r i m i n at i o na g a i n s tth e S B Aw e r e r e l e a s e d b y a settlement ag ree ment signe d in September 1998. Plaintiff ac knowledg es the settlement ag ree ment but claims that it was brea ched by the def endant a nd thus does not bar this lawsuit. Th e Court

pr e vio us ly

de nie d a mot ion by the SB A t o d ism iss , tr e atin git a s a motion for summary

judgme nt. Discovery

now has c oncluded a

nd the matter is bef

ore the Court on defe ndant’s post-discove ry motion to di smiss or for summary judgme nt. Both par

ties rely on materia ls outside the pleading s, so the Court will treat this moti on as one f or summary

judgme nt. Def endant moves f

or judg ment on the g rounds that (1) pla intiff failed to e x haust theTh e pa pe rs su bmi tte d in

c onne c tio n w iththi s mo tio n in c lud e : D e fe nd ant’ s Po st- 2 Discover y Motion to Dism iss or, in the Alternative, f or Summary

J udg ment (“Mot.”) ; Plainti ff’ s Opposition to Defenda

nt’s Motion to Dism iss or for Summary J udg ment (“O pp.”); a

nd Def endant’ s Reply

in Support of SBA’s Post Discovery Motion to Dism iss or, in the Alternative, fo r S umm ary

Judg me nt. 2 administrative re medies ca lled for by the settlement agree ment, and (2) plaintiff ca nnot show that defe ndant in fac t brea ched the ag ree ment. After car eful c onsideration of the parties’ paper s, the rele vant ca se law a

nd the entire history

of the c ase, the Court rejec ts defenda nt’s arguments and finds that g enuine disputes as to mate rial fa cts rema in that can only be re solved by

trial. The 2 Court theref

ore w ill deny

defe ndant’s motion.

I . BA CKGROUND Th e Court ’s Op ini on

of De c e mbe r 2 7, 20 06 de sc ri be s th e fa c tua l ba c kgro un d to this disput e, which ne ed not be r epea ted her e. See A merica

v. Preston, 468 F. Supp. 2d 118 (D.D.C. 2006). What is important is that the parties ente red into a se ttlement ag ree ment on September 11, 1998 which re solved all of plaintiff’ s discrimination complaints (the “Settlement Ag ree ment”). See Mot., Ex . 1, Settlement Ag ree ment. Paragraph 6 of the Settlement Ag ree ment stated that “a ll inquiries [ about plaintiff] from prospec tive employ ers r ece ived by OFAshall be ref err ed to and ha

ndled by the Ag ency ’s Off

ice of Human Resourc es.” I d. ¶ 6. The Settlement Agre e me nt a lso pr ov ide d th at if pla int if f b e lie ve d th at th e SB A h a d f a ile d to c omp ly

fu lly wi th the te rm s o f t

he Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt, pla int if f s ha ll notify the Ag ency ’s Assistant Administrator for Equa l Employ ment Opportunity

and Civil Ri g hts Compl iance , in writing and in ac corda

nce w ith the provisions of Title 29, Code of Fe dera l Regulations, Section 1614.504, of the alleg ed non-c ompliance within thirty

(30) c alenda

r day s of when he knew or should have known of the a lleg ed noncomplianc e, and ma y reque st that the3 terms of this Settlement Ag ree ment be spec ifically implemented or, alter natively , that the forma l EEO administrative proc ess be reinstated f

rom the point proce ssing c ease d. I d. ¶ 10. This Court previously held that def

endant ha d brea ched the Settlement Ag ree ment when its employ ees did not immediately forwa rd telephone calls by

L inda Opar

nica of Documente d Refer ence Check (“ DRC”) to defe ndant’s Human Re source s Depa rtment as require d by

para g raph 6 of

the Settlement Ag ree ment. See Amer ica v. Pre ston, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 123-24. It also held that the question of whe ther the br eac h was mate rial, and the ref ore wh e the r r e sc iss ion

of the Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt a nd re ins tate me nt o f p la int if

f’ s T itl e VI Ic la ims
was a ppropriate , was a

question for a

jury . See id. at 124-25. B ased upon infor mation produce d in discovery , defe ndant now moves for summary judgme nt on differ ent g rounds — (1) that by not contactingthe EEO Administrator upon le arningof an a lleg ed bre ach of the Settlement Ag ree ment in 2000, plaintiff failed to e x haust his administrative reme dies under the Ag ree ment and ther eby

waived his right to assert fur ther a lleg ed bre ache s later; and ( 2) that plaintiff c annot prove, w ith admissibl e evide nce, that the alleg ed 2002 conve rsations ac tually occur red.
I I . STANDARD OF REVI EW Summary

judgme nt may

be g rante d if “the ple ading s, the discover y and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits [ or dec larations] show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c) ; see a lso Anderson v. L iberty L obby , Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) ; Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D .C. Cir. 2006). “A fa ct is ‘mater ial’ if a dispute ove r it might af fec t4

the outcome of

a suit under the g overninglaw; fa ctual disputes that ar e ‘irr eleva nt or
unnece ssary ’ do not aff

ect the summar

y judgme nt determination.” H olcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d at 895 (quotingAnder son v. L iberty L obby , Inc., 477 U.S. at 248). An issue is “g enuine” if the evide nce is such that a re asonable jury could re turn a verdic t for the nonmovingparty . See Scott v. Har ris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Ander son v. L iberty L obby , Inc., 477 U.S. at 248; Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d at 895. When a motion for summary judgme nt is under consider ation, “the e vidence of the non-mova nt is to be believed, and all justifiable infe renc es ar e to be dr awn in his favor .” Ande rson v. L iberty L obby , Inc., 477 U.S. at 255; see a lso Mastro v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 849- 50 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Aka v. Washing ton Hospital Center, 156 F .3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ( en banc ); Was hin g ton

Pos t Co . v . U .S. De p’ t of He a lthand

Human Se rv ic e s, 86 5 F .2 d 3 20 , 3 25 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 9) . O n a

mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, the Court

mus t “ e sc he w m akin gc re dib ili ty de te rm inatio ns or

we ig hin gthe e vid e nc e .” Cze ka lsk i v. Pe te rs , 4 75 F .3 d 3 60 , 3 63 (D .C. Cir. 2007). The nonmovingparty ’s opposition, however, must consist of more than mere unsupported alleg ations or denials a nd must be supported by

aff idavits, declar ations or other competent e vidence , setting f orth specif

ic fa cts showingthat there is a g enuine issue f or trial. F ED . R. C IV . P. 56 (e ); Ce lot e x Cor p. v. Catr e tt, 47 7 U .S. 31 7, 32 4 ( 19 86 ). He is r e qu ir e d to provide e vidence that would permit a re asonable jury to find in his favor. L aning ham v. United State s N avy , 8 13 F .2 d 1 23 6, 12 42 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 7) . I f t he no nmo va

nt’ s e vid e nc e is “ me re ly colora ble” or “not sig nificantly

probative,” summary

judgme nt may

be g rante d. Ander son v. L iberty L obby , Inc., 477 U.S. at 249-50; see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. at 380 (“ [W ]here the r ecor dThe pa rties’ pa pers sometimes conf

late two sepa

rate arguments: first, that 3 plaintiff fa iled to exhaust hi s administrative reme dies as re quired by the EEO r egulations; and second, that plaintiff brea ched the Settlement Ag ree ment by failingto comply

with its parag raph 10. The fir st argument border s on the frivolous. Were pla intiff arguing that his original 5 take n a s a wh ole c ou ld n ot l e a d a

ratio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t to fi nd

fo r t he no n- mov ingpa

rt y , th e re is ‘no g enuine issue f

or trial.’” ) (quotingMatsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Ze nith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). To de feat a motion for summary judgme nt, a plaintiff must have more than “ a scintilla of evide nce to support his cla ims.” Fre edman v. MCI Telec ommunications Corp., 255 F.3d 840, 845 ( D.C. Cir. 2001).
I I I . DI SCUS SI ON A. Fa ilu reto A c t up on 20 00DR C Re po rt De fe nd ant a

rgue s th at pl a int if

f’ s c la ims sh ou ld b e dis mis se d b e c a us e pla int if

f d id
no t c onta c t th e EE O D ir e c tor wi thi n th ir

ty da y s o f h avin gre c e ive d a

re po rt fr om D RC in Dec ember

2000 (the “ 2000 DRC Report”) that SBAhad violated pa ragraph 6 of

the Settlement A g r e e m e n to nS e p t e mb e r 1 4 , 2 0 0 0 , a s r e qu i r e d

b y p ar a g r a p h1 0 o f th e S e t t l e m e n tA g r e e m e n t . It is undisputed that plaintiff did not contact the EEO D irec tor or other wise inform de fenda

nt of the
a lle g e d b re a c h in

20 00 . In f

a c t, h e did

no thi nguntil he re c e ive d a se c on d r e po rt

fr om D RC
conce rningadditional violations of para g raph 6 of the Settlement Ag ree ment in 2002 (the “2002 DRC Report”). See Americ a v. Preston, 468 F . Supp. 2d at 120-22.

De fe nd ant a

rgue s th at w he n p la int if

f f a ile d to a c t on

the 20 00 DR C Re po rt , plaintiff bre ache d para g raph 10 of the Settlement Ag ree ment, which re quires exhaustion of administrative re medies and inc orporates the exhaustion requireme nts of 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504. See Settlement Ag ree ment ¶ 10. Had plaintiff notifie d the EEO Dir ector upon lear ning of a 3discrimination claims were revive d based on de fenda nt’s alleg ed bre ach in 2000, his cla im might well be ba

rre d for f ailure to e x haust his administrative reme dies under the EEO re gulations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a) . But this case involves a cha lleng e to an a lleg ed bre ach of the Settlement Ag ree ment in 2002, not the 2000 brea ch or the underly ing disc rimination claims. Def endant c ites no authority

for the pr oposition t hat a f ailure to e x haust with respe ct to an initial br e a c h o f a

se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt b ars all challeng es to subsequent alleg ed bre ache s of the settlement ag ree ment. Nor doe s the Court find any support for this proposition in the lang uag e of the re gulation on which def endant r elies, in the Settlement Ag ree ment, or in the ca se law. Indeed, pa

rticularly since the Supre me Court’s dec ision in National Railroad Passeng er Corp. v. Mo rg an, 53 6 U .S. 10 1 ( 20 02 ), c ourt s sc ru pu lou sly dis tin guis h b e tw e e n v ari ou s a lle g e d d isc re te incidents of discrimination to deter mine which we re e x hausted a nd there fore are actionable and wh ic h w e re no t e xha

us te d. Pla int if

f’ s f a ilure to a c t up on

the 20 00 DR C Re po rt

do e s n ot b ar h is c ur re nt c la ims
. 6 brea ch in 2000, def

endant a rgues, it would have put the SB A on notice a nd allowed it to cure any futur e br e a c he s, be the y

te c hn ic a l or

mate ri a l. D e fe nd ant a

rgue s th at by

fa ili ngto i nf

or m SB A i n 2000, the plaintiff ther eby waived his right to challeng e any subsequent alleg ed bre ache s by defe ndant. Plaintiff responds that the a lleg ed bre ach in 2000 wa s not material; that the Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt d id n ot r e qu ir e him to a c t on the 20 00 br e a c h; a

nd that e ve n th ou g h h e did
no t a c t on it, he did no t w a ive his c la ims ba se d o n s ub se qu e nt a lle g e d b re a c he s b y de fe nd ant. There is nothing in the languag e of the Settlement Ag ree ment that require s plaintiff to raise e very

brea ch of the Ag ree ment, no matter how minor or immaterial, and the Settlement Ag ree ment does not by its terms provide any

conseque nce f

or plaintiff’s f

ailure to a ct as desc ribed in par ag raph 10. A s plaintiff points out, to reach the conclusion sug g ested by defe ndant would be nonse nsical — in order to maintain the rig ht to enforc e any provision of a settlement ag ree ment in the future, a n employ ee w ould have to re port eve ry perc eived br eac h, even the most technical. To infe r such a require ment would put an enor mous burden on the employ ee — to e ng ag e in administrative litigation at the mere st whiff of a brea ch or r isk losing the rig ht to challeng e substantive violations of a se ttlement ag ree ment down the roa d, even whenSe e L ind e ll v . L a nd is C or p. 40 1( k) Pla

n, Civ il A c tio n N o. 08 -1 46 2, 20 09 U. S. 4 Dist. L EXI S 65228 at *5 (D.D.C. J uly 28, 2009); Dodg e v. Truste es of Nat’l Gallery of Art, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D .C. 2004). 7 su c c e ss m ig ht e nti tle him to n o r e me dy

at a ll o r, at mo st, to n omi na l da ma g e s r athe r t

ha n to
resc ission or any

thing substantial. See G ree nwich Ins. Co. v. I ce Contrs., Inc., 541 F . Supp. 2d 32 7, 33 3 ( D. D. C. 2 00 8) (t o p re va il o n b re a c h o f c ontr a c t c la im, pla int if f m us t de mon str ate damag es re sulting fr om alleg ed bre ach) ; Ba himan v. 3407-9-11 29th St., N.W., I nc., Civil Action No. 89-0576 at *4-5 (D.D.C. July 19, 1990) (“ if a pa

rty ’s bre ach of

a contr act is immaterial, the ag g rieve d party

may not canc el the contr act a

nd may only sue to collec t damag es re sulting fr om th e p art i al b re ac h
. ”) (c i t i n g R E S TA TE ME NT (S EC OND ) O F C ON TR AC TS §§ 236, 241 (1981))
.

F ur the rm or e , th e Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt d oe s n ot e xpre ssl y state that th e fa ilure to exhaust under the Agree ment constitutes a waive r of the r ight to cla im a separ ate br eac h of the te rm s o f t he Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt l ate r. In th e a bs e nc e of a c le ar r ig ht o r o bli g atio n s e t f or th i n the languag e of a

contra ct — and a

settlement agree ment is a contra ct — a cour t should not 4 lightl y fi nd an im pli e d r ig ht o r o bli g atio n. F or a wa ive r t o b e imp lie d f

ro m c on du c t, “ the a c ts,
c on du c t or

c ir c ums tanc e s r e lie d u

po n to sh owwa ive r m

us t make out a

c le ar c a se .” F ir st Anna po lis B anc or

p, Inc . v . Unit e d St ate s, 75 F e d. Cl. 28 0, 29 0 ( F e d. Cl. 20 07 ). De fe nd ant d id not even knowof plaintiff’s suppose d waiver of his contra ctual rights until discovery in the
curr ent litigation, and de fenda nt theref ore c annot claim to have rea sonably believed that plaintiff relinquished his rig hts to neutral re fer ence calls under the Settlement Ag ree ment when de fenda nt alleg edly brea ched the Ag ree ment ag ain in 2002. See L ongI sland Sav. Ba nk, FSB v. United States, 503 F.3d 1234, 1252 (F ed Cir. 2007) (“ [i ]m plied waiver may be infe rre d by

conduct or actions that mislead the br eac hing pa rty into reasonably believ ing that th e ri g hts to a

c la im8

arisingfrom the br eac h was wa ived”) (empha sis added).
B. The20 02 DR C Re

po rt Def endant ne x t argues that summary judgme nt should be g rante d in its favor beca use there is no competent, admissible evidenc e to show that it brea ched the Settlement Ag ree ment. Specifica lly , it argues that plaintiff c annot prove that the phone c onversations identified in the 2002 DRC Report eve r occ urre d. First, def endant a rgues that the only

evidenc e of the phone calls (the 2002 D RC R eport itself) is una uthenticated a

nd otherwise ina dmissibl e, and that the phone calls desc ribed in the Repor t theref ore c annot be r elied upon to def eat
summa ry jud g me nt. Se c on d, de fe nd ant a rgue s th at de fe nd ant h a s p ro ff e re d s uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to show that the conve rsations identified in the 2002 DRC Report in fac t never took place.
1. Ad mis sib ili ty

of the 20 02 DR C Re po rt Ms. Oparnic a testified at her de position t hat she c annot re member Mr . Americ a or the 2002 DRC Report specific ally , but that the 2002 DRC Report looked like a tra nscription repor t that she did for DRC. See Mot., Ex. 4, Videotaped De position of L inda Opar nica Gonc har (“O parnic a De p.”) at 29-30. She explained that when c onductingref ere nce c hecks f

or DRC, she made the c alls from home ba sed on a sc ript provided by DRC. See Opar

nica De p. at 17, 19. She
cre ated a log of attempted phone c alls and transc ribed a ny actua l conver sations. See id. at 19, 23. She would send an e lectronic version of a draf t report to her

supervisor, Mike Rankin. See id. at 90. He would “ g o throug h and make sure that e very thing wa s in order” and send it on to the client. I d. Although Ms. Opa rnica ’s sig nature appea

rs at the bottom of the 2002 DRC Report
c e rt if yingthat th e c onte nts are tr ue and c or re c t, s he te sti fi e d th at sh e did no t ha ve the op po rt

un ityMr. Rankin’s sig nature appea rs at the bottom of the 2002 DRC Report statingthat 5 he re viewed it, see 2002 DRC Report at 6, but neither pa rty has bee n able to locate Mr. Rankin. 9 to reviewthe final ve rsion of the re port. I d. at 95. Ther efor e, whe n asked at her de position whether it is “possibl e” that Mr. Rankin made substantive c hang es to the 2002 DRC Report, she responde d: “Any

thing is possible.” I d. at 95. 5 On the basis of this testimony , defe ndant ar gues that the 2002 DRC Report ca nnot be authe nticated a

nd, that even if

it could, it is inadmissible hearsa y and ther efor e ca

nnot be relied upon to de feat summary judgme nt. In the abse nce of proof that the 2002 D RC R eport
a c c ur ate ly

re fl e c ts the a lle g e d c onve rs atio ns be tw e e n M s. Op arn ic a and the SB A e mpl oye e s, defe ndant maintains, plaintiff has no c ase. D efe ndant makes muc h of the fa ct that Ms. Opar nica cannot now r emember

makingthe spec ific phone c alls in question and that she did not have control over

the final re port prior to its beingsent to the client (in this case , the plaintiff). Def endant a rgues that Mr. Rankin could have made any chang e he w ished to her r eport a nd may have ha d in c e nti ve to d o s o to pr od uc e a “ fa vo ra ble ” re po rt

fo r t he c lie nt. The F eder al Rules of Evidenc e provide that “[t] he re quirement of a uthentication
or ide nti fi c atio n a s a

c on dit ion

pr e c e de nt t o a dmi ssi bil ity is s atis fi e d b y

e vid e nc e su ff

ic ie nt t o support a findingthat the matter in que stion is what its proponent c laims.” F ED . R. E V ID . 901(a)
. The thre shold for the Court’s de termination of authe nticity is not high. See United States v. Safavia n, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D .C. 2006) (citingUnited States v. Reilly , 33 F.3d 1396, 1404 (3d Cir. 1994) (“ the burde n of proof for a uthentication is slight”) ); see a lso United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 168 (1st Cir. 1994) (“the standard f or authe ntication, and henc e for admissibili ty , is one of re asonable likelihood”); United States v. Coohey , 11 F.3d 97, 99 ( 8th Cir.10

19 93 ) ( “ the pr op on e nt n e e d o nly de mon str ate a

ra tio na l ba sis fo r i ts c la im that th e e vid e nc e is what the pr oponent asser

ts it t o be”) ). The que stion for the Court under Rule 901 is whe ther the proponent of the evidenc e has “ offe red a foundation fr om which the jury could re asonably

find that the evidenc e is what the pr oponent say s it is.” United States v. Safavian, 435 F . Supp. 2d at 38 . T he Court

ne e d n ot f

ind that th e e vid e nc e is n e c e ssa ri ly wh at th e pr op on e nt c la ims , b ut o nly that there is sufficient evide nce so that the jury ultimately

might do so. See id. De fe nd ant’ s c ha lle ng e to t he 20 02 DR C Re po rt

a dd re sse s whe the r i ts c on te nts are tr ue and a c c ur ate , b ut d oe s n ot r a ise a c ha lle ng e to whe the r t

he 20 02 DR C Re po rt

is what it purports to be — namely

a Refe renc e Chec k Report produc ed by DRC. Sufficient evidenc e exis ts for a jury

to find that the document is what plaintiff sa y s it is. S ee United States v. Safavia n, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 39. Ms. Opar nica testified that this document is a “Refe renc e che ck fo r s ub je c t Ric ha

rd Am e ri c a ” that sh e a

pp e ars to h ave pr e pa

re d f or DR C. O pa

rn ic a De p. at 29-30. It bear s the DRC logo at the top, is identical in format to the 2000 DRC Report, and ha s her sig nature on it. I d. at 30. Compare 2002 D RC R eport with Mot., Ex . 3, 2000 DRC Report. Se e Un ite d St ate s v . Sa fa via n, 43 5 F . Su

pp . 2 d at 40 (a

uth e nti c atin ge ma ils ba se d o n th e ir

“ dis tin c tiv e c ha

ra c te ri sti c s” ). Th e re is s uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to c on c lud e that th e do c ume nt i s in fac t a Refe renc e Chec k Report cr eate d by DRC for plaintiff, and it ther efor e passe s the authentication threshold of Rule 901(a)
.

De fe nd ant n e xt ar gue s th at e ve n if the Re po rt

is a uth e nti c ate d, it i s in a dmi ssi ble hear say — “a statement, other tha n one made by

the dec lara

nt while testifying a

t the trial or hear ing, of

fer ed in evidenc e to prove the truth of the matter .” See F ED . R. E V ID . 801(c) . There can be no doubt that the 2002 DRC Report is hearsa y — indeed, the tr

uth of the matter a sserted11

there in is the basis for plaintiff’s c ase. Plaintiff see ks to admit the 2002 DRC R eport unde r either of two exceptions to the hearsa y rule — e ither as a

past rec ollection rec orded, se e F ED . R. E V ID . 803(5), or

as a r ecor d of re gularly

conducte d business activity . See F ED . R. E V ID . 803(6). De fe nd ant a

rgue s th at th e 20 02 DR C Re po rt sh ou ld n ot b e c on sid e re d o n th is m oti on and sh ou ld be excluded at tria l under e ither exception to the hea rsay rule be cause Ms. Oparnic a does not
now re collect the c ontents of the orig inal repor t and there fore cannot testify as to whethe r the
ve rs ion to b e int ro du c e d in

e vid e nc e is a c c ur ate . D e fe nd ant c onte nd s it may no t be a c c ur ate be c a us e Mr . Ra

nk in h a d th e op po rt

un ity and po ssi bly the mot ivatio n to a lte r i ts c onte nts . Def endant is cor

rec t that if the 2002 DRC Report would not be admissible at trial under a ny circ umstances, plaintiff c ould not rely on it to defeat summary

judgme nt. But at the summary judgme nt stag e “a

nonmovant is not required . . . to produc e evide nce in a for m that
wo uld be a dmi ssi ble at tr ia l, [b ut] the e vid e nc e sti ll mus t be c a pa ble of be ingc onve rt e d into admissible evidence .” Wilburn v. Robins on, 480 F.3d 1140, 1143 n.2 ( D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Gleklen v. De mocratic Cong. Campa ign Comm., Inc., 199 F .3d 1365, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2000)) (empha sis in original). T he Court conc ludes that the doubts defe ndant ra ises are of a kind that may be cur ed bef

ore tria l, such that plaintiff may be able to produce admissible evidence
. First, af ter fur ther re viewingthe 2002 DRC Report, Ms. Oparnic a’s r ecollec tion may be re fre shed and she may have a better r ecollec tion of the fac ts and circ umstances than she had at he r deposition. Second, the Court may conclude that her de position t estimony , or other evidenc e submitted with briefingon subsequent motions in li mine, supports the admission of the Report as a

past rec ollection rec orded be cause it was “made or adopte d by the witness when the matter wa s fre sh in [ her] memory and to re flec t that knowledg e cor rec tly .” F ED R. E V ID . 803(5);12

see a lso Oparnica

Dep. at 31-33. As Professor Saltz burghas explained, “[i] f a w itness cannot
re m em b er

fa ct s ab o u tth e c as e i nwh i ch [ s ] h e i s ca l l edt o t es t i fy , b u tato n e t i m e h adkn o wl ed ge of the fa c ts that is re fl e c te d in a me mor and

um o r o the r r e c or d ma de or a do pte d b y

the wi tne ss wh e n th e matte r w a s f

re shin m e mor

y , th e me mor and

um o r r e c or d ma

y be int ro du c e d into evidenc e.” 4 S A LTZBURG , E T AL ., F ED ER A L R U LES O F E VI DENCE M A N U A L § 8 03 .0 2[6][a ] at 803-3 (9th ed. 2006) (“S A LTZBURG ”). Mor eover , “[i] t is sufficient if the witness testifies that [s] he knows that a

rec ord of this ty

pe is corr ect be cause it was [her] habit or practice to rec ord
s u ch m at t er s ac cu ra t el y . ” P ark er v . R ed a, 3 2 7 F. 3 d

2 1 1 , 2 1 4 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g J A CK B. W EINS TEI N & M AR GA R E T A. B ER GER , W E IN ST E IN ’ S F ED ER A L E VI DENCE § 803(5)[01], at 803-181 (1996) ).

The Court may

also conc lude base d upon her de position t estimony , or other evidenc e, that Ms. Opar

nica should be pe rmitted to testify at trial as a

“custodian or

other qu a lif ie d w itn e ss” that th e Re po rt wa s “ ke pt i n th e c ours e of a re gula rl y c on du c te d b us ine ss activity” and that it was “the re gular pra ctice of the business ac tivity ” to make suc h repor t. F ED R. E V ID . 80 3( 6) . Se e Op arn ic a De p. at 30 -3 2. Ye t, e ve n if the Court

c on c lud e s th at Ms
. Opar nica is unable provide foundation testim ony to admit the rec ord under Rule 803(6), plaintiff may provide a nother witness with knowledg e of D RC’s recor d-kee ping pr actice s. See S A LTZBURG § 803.02[7] [d] at 803-47-48 ( “The foundation witness must know something a bout the re cord ke epingproce ss, but the witness need not have persona l knowledg e of a ny particula r
rec ordingor how it was made .”). F inally , plaintiff may locate Mr . Rankin or another employ ee of DRC who ca

n provide testimonial support for the c onclusion that the contents of the repor t are substantively

the same a s Ms. Oparnica ’s transc ription of the phone c alls.13 To repe at, if it is possibl e to conve rt potential evidenc e into a for m that would be admissible at trial — as it appea rs to be in this case — the Court may consider it at the summar y judgme nt stag e. See Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d at 1143 n.2; see a lso Richards v. Option On e Mo rt g a g e Co. , Ci vil Ac tio n N o. 08 -0 00 7, 20 09 U. S.D ist . L EX I S 77 95 8 at*4 -5 n. 3 ( D. D. C. Au gus t 28 , 2 00 9) . T he Court wi ll n ot e xclu de the 20 02 DR C Re po rt fr om c on sid e ratio n at th is point. I ts admissibi lity , with or without the support of additional testimony , will be considere d at trial.
2. Genuine I ssues of Mate rial F act Rema in

The de fenda

nt’s rema ining a

rgument in favor of

summary judgme nt is that the
re fe re nc e c a lls re fl e c te d in the 20 02 DR C Re po rt

sim ply did no t ha pp e n. I t su

pp or ts t his argument with testimony

from the a lleg ed re cipients of the c alls that they did not rece ive them and that they

likely wer e not in the offic e on the r espec tive dates listed in the Report. De fenda nt further notes that the ver acity

of re ports from DRC have be en ca lled into question in another
case . See Mot. at 2. Plaintiff responds by rely ing on the contents of the 2002 D RC R eport a nd sug g ests explanations for how the c alls could have occur red, e ven if the r ecipients we re not in the of fi c e (e .g ., by

fo rw ard ingthe c a lls to a

no the r l oc atio n) . Pl a int if f f ur the r n ote s th at de fe nd ant d id not orig inally

challeng e the ve rac ity

of the 2002 DRC Report. Th e Court

wo uld be ha rd pr e sse d to fi nd

a mor e g e nu ine ly

dis pute d mate ri a l f

a c t: Did the ca lls occur or

did they not? Resolution of the parties’ disa g ree ment require s making finding s as to the cr edibility of witnesses a

nd the re asonable ness of their e x planations for e vents. The Court ca

nnot make such a

deter mination at the summary

judgme nt stag e. See Czekalski v.14

Pe te rs , 4 75 F .3 d at 36 3. Whe the r o r n ot t he se c a lls oc c ur

re d a nd wh at w a s sa id o n th e se c a lls — and, ac cording ly , whether or not there is a basis for f inding that de fenda

nt brea ched the Settlement Ag ree ment — are questions for the jury . The Court will deny defe ndant’s motion for summary judgme nt. An Orde r consistent with this Opinion will issue this same day
. /s/________________________ PAULL . FRI EDMAN Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge DATE: September

17, 2009