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THE ACTION. 
RENDERED: APRIL 18, 2024 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2022-SC-0520-MR

JEFFREY SCOTT TAYLOR APPELLANT 

V. 

ON APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE MICHAEL O. CAPERTON, JUDGE 

NO. 17-CR-00190-001

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT 

AFFIRMING 

 Jeffrey Scott Taylor appeals from his conviction by the Laurel Circuit 

Court after a jury trial in which he was convicted of the murder of his 

girlfriend, Shannon Saylor1, and tampering with physical evidence. On appeal, 

Taylor argues the trial court committed reversible error by not allowing him to 

fully cross examine a witness, Susie Scalf, on her involvement in local drug 

trafficking. Finding no error, we affirm. 

I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 

Saylor and Taylor were friends with married couple Boyd Simpson and 

Susie Scalf. In March 2017, Saylor and Simpson borrowed Taylor’s truck and 

1 The Indictment in this case names the victim as Shannon Vaughn Saylor. The 

Commonwealth refers to the victim by the name Shannon Vaughn in its brief but for 

purposes of this opinion, we will use the name Shannon Saylor, or “Saylor.” 
2

drove around hoping to find someone to sell them methamphetamine. Taylor 

contacted Scalf to find out where Saylor and Simpson were and Scalf informed 

him that the two were looking for drugs and she, too, wanted to find them.

After Scalf reached Simpson by phone, Scalf picked up Taylor and his friend 

Wendell Farmer and drove to meet up with Saylor and Simpson at a gas 

station. At the gas station, there was an altercation between Scalf and Saylor.

After the altercation, Simpson and Scalf returned home.

Farmer and Saylor rode with Taylor to Taylor’s father’s home. Farmer 

went inside to use the bathroom and when he came out, he saw Saylor on the 

ground and witnessed Taylor throw a large rock at Saylor’s head. Farmer 

observed blood coming out of Saylor’s face and mouth. Farmer left the scene 

but did not report the matter to authorities. 

 Approximately an hour later, Taylor called Simpson and Scalf. Kristen 

Scalf Miller, Scalf’s sister-in-law, was able to listen to this conversation and 

would later report what she heard to the police. During the call, Scalf was 

concerned Saylor was going to contact police about the assault at the gas 

station but Taylor informed Scalf that Saylor was “not going to be calling the 

law on anybody” and that he “had killed her” and would be coming over in 

twenty minutes. After Taylor arrived, Miller was able to again listen to their

conversation and heard Taylor tell Scalf and Simpson that he had “hit her with 

a rock and flattened her head.” 

At the time, Taylor was not yet sure if Saylor was dead and asked

Simpson and Scalf to return with him to her body which he had taken into the 
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woods. There, Scalf stayed in the vehicle while Simpson and Taylor went to 

view Saylor’s body. Upon his return, Simpson informed Scalf that there was “no 

chance” that Saylor was still alive. Taylor stayed that night with Simpson and 

Scalf and then next morning Scalf witnessed Taylor cleaning out his truck in 

their driveway. For several weeks Scalf remained silent about what had 

occurred but finally told her brother who called police. 

In the interim, Taylor told Chris Duff that he “didn’t know he could make 

a head a pancake.” At the time Duff did not know that Saylor was missing, but 

after learning from Saylor’s sister she was, he too contacted police. Taylor also 

took Matthew Caldwell, whom he had met through a mutual friend Chad 

Bowling, to Saylor’s body, told him he had killed her, and asked him to help 

him cover the body with rocks and tree branches. Caldwell did not immediately 

contact police alleging that he was afraid of being charged, but later did so and 

took police to the location of Saylor’s body. 

When Taylor was questioned by police, he informed them that he had 

broken up a fight between Scalf and Saylor and that he had later tried to drive 

Saylor to Scalf’s home for an apology. However, on the way to Scalf’s, Saylor 

became upset when Taylor refused to pick up some methamphetamine, got out 

of the vehicle, and walked off. Taylor said he never saw her again. 

Taylor was indicted for murder and tampering with physical evidence and, 

following a jury trial, was found guilty of both charges. The trial court sentenced 

Taylor in accordance with the jury’s recommendation to twenty-five years for 
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murder and five years for tampering with physical evidence to be served 

consecutively for a total of thirty years in prison. 

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Taylor’s only argument on appeal is that the trial court committed 

reversible error by not allowing him to cross-examine Scalf regarding 

allegations of her trafficking methamphetamine. 

A. Was the Trial Court’s Refusal to Allow Taylor to Question Scalf

Regarding Allegations of Drug Trafficking an Abuse of Discretion and 

did it Deny Taylor’s Rights of Due Process? – Preserved

Taylor argues that the trial court abused its discretion and deprived him 

of his due process rights by excluding testimony Taylor wished to elicit from 

Scalf relative to allegations of her involvement in drug trafficking. 

On review, we recognize the admission of evidence to be vested within the 

trial court’s discretion. Doneghy v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 95, 109 (Ky. 

2013). A trial court’s decision to admit evidence will not be disturbed absent a 

showing of an abuse of discretion. Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 

19 (Ky. 2005). We define abuse of discretion as a court acting arbitrarily, 

unreasonably, unfairly, or in a manner “unsupported by sound legal 

principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)

During Scalf’s questioning by the Commonwealth, she testified that she 

was participating in drug court and was trying to remain sober. The 

Commonwealth also asked Scalf if she was a convicted felon to which she 

responded affirmatively. 
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On cross examination, Taylor’s counsel asked Scalf if she battled with 

drug addiction which she admitted. Taylor’s counsel then asked Scalf if she 

had relapsed to which the Commonwealth objected. At a bench conference, 

Taylor’s counsel first argued that he should be allowed to impeach Scalf on her 

drug use since it could potentially affect her ability to recall events. The trial 

court refused that request. Taylor’s counsel also argued that he could crossexamine Scalf about her and Simpson being involved in drug trafficking under 

the theory that Scalf and Simpson sold drugs to, and used drugs with, Caldwell 

and Bowling. Bowling had passed away by the time of the trial, but Taylor’s 

counsel wanted to explore the parties’ connections, if any, with the death of 

Saylor. Taylor’s counsel also argued that such questioning would go to

impeachment as it might reveal a motive for Scalf being untruthful. Taylor 

argued that his theory of the case was that Caldwell and Bowling were taken to 

Scalf and Simpson’s residence to buy meth and that Caldwell had a motive to 

help his meth dealers (Scalf and Simpson) by testifying against Taylor. 

According to Taylor, Scalf might also have had a motive to testify to help 

Caldwell, and Taylor’s further theory was that during their fight, Scalf may 

have been the one to have struck the fatal blow to Saylor.

The trial court decided that Taylor’s counsel could ask Scalf if she knew 

either Caldwell or Bowling but if Scalf denied knowing either, then questioning 

on the subject would end. However, if Scalf knew either of the men, counsel 

could ask her how she knew them and if it was from trafficking drugs. 

However, Taylor’s counsel could not begin his inquiry by asking her if she 
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trafficked drugs. The trial court also asked Taylor’s counsel if he had a witness 

who was going to testify that Scalf trafficked in drugs, and Taylor’s counsel

responded “[p]robably not” other than evidence from prior convictions for Scalf 

and Bowling related to drug trafficking.

When Taylor’s counsel asked whether she knew Bowling or Caldwell she 

said, “[n]o.” Scalf was also asked if she was on probation or parole to which she 

also responded, “[n]o.” The trial court allowed Taylor’s counsel to take avowal 

testimony of Scalf during the lunch break. In that testimony, Scalf admitted 

that she and Simpson had sold drugs from their home, that they had sold 

methamphetamine to people she didn’t know, and that she could not confirm 

or deny if they had sold drugs to Caldwell and people were coming in and out 

of their house all the time.

The trial court agreed that Scalf could remain subject to recall if Taylor’s 

counsel could provide caselaw persuading him to allow additional testimony 

into evidence. However, Taylor’s counsel did not recall Scalf to testify in 

Taylor’s defense and provided no caselaw or additional arguments to support 

either recalling Scalf or furnishing her avowal testimony to the jury. 

On appeal, Taylor argues that “[Scalf] and [Simpson’s] drug dealing might 

not seem to be related but each witness in the case had something in common,

they all used meth” and “[Scalf] and [Simpson] were directly involved with

[Saylor’s] disappearance” further noting that Scalf had some of Saylor’s clothes 

in the trunk of her car that she burned after Saylor was dead and kept quiet 

about Saylor’s death “for weeks.” According to Taylor, Scalf “being a drug 
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dealer in the local area [and] having possible connections to the other 

witnesses had direct bearing on whether her testimony was truthful and 

whether she had a motivation to testify against Taylor to protect Caldwell or

someone else.” 

According to Taylor, the trial court was not permitted to deny him the 

right to fully cross-examine Scalf on matters bearing on her credibility “when it 

significantly undermine[s] fundamental elements of the defendant’s defense” 

and cannot apply evidentiary rules in such a way as to deprive defendants of 

due process, citing to McPherson v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.3d 207, 214 (Ky. 

2012). 

“[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective 

cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and 

to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Davenport v. Commonwealth, 177 

S.W.3d 763, 768 (Ky. 2005) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,

679 (1986)). As we stated in Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 63, 85 

(Ky. 2013), “[t]he right to cross-examine witnesses is . . . ‘[a]n essential aspect 

of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause[,]’ ” “[b]ut that right

‘is not absolute’[,] . . . and [our] trial courts have broad discretion ‘to impose 

reasonable limits on such cross-examinations[.]’ ” (quoting Davenport, 177 

S.W.3d at 767; Van Arsdall, 475. U.S. at 679).

Under KRE 608(b), a witness may be cross-examined on a prior bad act 

that has not resulted in a criminal conviction, but only if that act is “probative 

of truthfulness or untruthfulness,” and only if “the cross-examiner has a 
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factual basis for the subject matter of his inquiry.” Rogers v. Commonwealth, 

366 S.W.3d at 446, 454-55 (Ky. 2012). Further, “[t]he rule vests the trial court 

with broad discretion in its application, and in exercising that discretion the 

court should assess both the sufficiency of the examiner’s factual predicate as 

well as the prior bad act’s relevance to the witness’s ‘truthfulness or 

untruthfulness.’” Id. 

In this instance, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision to limit 

Taylor’s questioning of Scalf was an abuse of discretion or violated Taylor’s 

rights to confrontation. The presence of, and use of, methamphetamine by 

many of the participants in this matter was made quite clear to the jurors 

through the direct testimony of witnesses called by the Commonwealth. Taylor 

was unable to provide any witnesses of his own or develop any testimony 

during cross-examinations of the Commonwealth’s witnesses to support the 

notion that Scalf was dealing close in time to when Saylor was murdered. In 

fact, Taylor called no witnesses in his defense. 

Even if Scalf had testified she was trafficking in drugs around the time of 

Saylor’s murder, we are not persuaded this would have changed the jury’s 

ultimate decision. Taylor had opportunities to develop any alternative theories 

he wished to explore or present through cross-examination of the 

Commonwealth’s witnesses, each of which carried their own baggage with them 

to Taylor’s trial. Despite such opportunity, the overwhelming weight of the 

evidence, in fact all of the evidence, presented at Taylor’s trial served to prove 
9 

that Taylor alone murdered Saylor and that he attempted to cover up her 

murder by relocating and concealing her body. 

 We find nothing in the record of Taylor’s trial or within his appeal that 

would make us question the trial court’s actions in this matter. The trial court 

acted appropriately and well within its discretion to limit Taylor’s examination 

of Scalf to avoid unnecessary questioning on matters both irrelevant and 

collateral to the real issues before the jury. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We affirm Taylor’s convictions and sentences by the Laurel Circuit Court. 

All sitting. All concur. 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: 

Adam Meyer 

Assistant Public Advocate 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: 

Russell M. Coleman 

Attorney General of Kentucky 

Thomas A. Van De Rostyne 

Assistant Attorney General