No. 245, August 2009 Strategic Forum 1

noted the continuing destructive effect of 

political influence on the forces. Major 

challenges remain, including corruption, 

weak rule of law, overlap in responsibilities, 

sectarianism, logistical deficiencies, and the 

lack of professionalism. Despite the overall 

improvement in the Iraqi forces, as recently 

as March 2009 the Department of Defense 

(DOD) reported that they are incapable of 

operating independently.1

This report highlights a number of challenges similar to those cited 2 years ago by 

General James Jones, the current National 

Security Advisor, when he oversaw an independent commission examining the ISF. Its findings suggested the main challenge to the ISF 

was political party meddling in its responsibilities, especially in the Ministry of Interior. This 

challenge of political interference was also 

mentioned by General Raymond Odierno in his 

latest comments on the U.S. withdrawal from 

Iraqi cities. He stated that his biggest fear:

has to do with the potential political drivers of instability that remain. We still have 

much work to do in terms of Arab-Kurd 

relations. We still have reconciliation to 

go through. We’ve made some good steps 

towards reconciliation, but they have to 

continue to address the area of reconciliation in Iraq. So I think it’s these political issues that will be the most important 

as we move towards the national elections. 

And I think these could cause some instaAs U.S. Armed Forces draw down in 

Iraq, there is increasing concern about the 

possibility of resurgent ethnic and sectarian 

tensions. Many Iraqis believe that the United 

States may be making a grave mistake by not 

fully using its remaining leverage to insulate 

the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) from the political influence of the incumbent Iraqi sectarian 

political parties. U.S. efforts to rebuild the ISF 

have focused on much needed training and 

equipment, but have neglected the greatest 

challenge facing the forces’ ability to maintain 

security upon U.S. withdrawal: an ISF politicized by ethno-sectarian parties. These ties 

pose the largest obstacle to the ISF in its quest 

to become genuinely professional and truly 

national in character. 

U.S. leaders may not realize that by not 

doing more to ensure that incumbent parties stay away from influencing ISF behavior, 

the United States risks training and arming 

security forces that will be the instrument for 

provoking, rather than preventing, future ethnosectarian conflict. In the end, supporting and 

strengthening the national character of the ISF 

is the best hope for a stable and integrated Iraq.

U.S. Assessments

Recent U.S. assessments of the Iraqi 

Security Forces (ISF) have shown a slow 

but constant improvement in overall performance and combat capability, but have 

 Strategic Forum No. 245

August 2009

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

Iraqi Security Forces after U.S. Troop 

Withdrawal: An Iraqi Perspective

by Najim Abed Al-Jabouri

bility, and that’s what I worry about. What 

I hope is these will be solved through politics and diplomatic measures and not 

through violence.2

The DOD report makes a similar 

comment, concluding that in the last 2 

years there has been much improvement in 

combat capability and training in the ISF, 

but that “national reconciliation and political accommodation continue to be hindered 

by the pursuit of ethno-sectarian agendas and disagreements over the distribution 

of power and resources at all levels.”3 The 

Jones report suggests that this political problem is an issue that only Iraqis can ultimately resolve.4

 The success of the provincial 

elections in January 2009 gave U.S. policymakers hope that Iraqis would now choose 

political means to settle their differences, 

rather than resorting to violence. The United 

States also assessed that since security for 

the elections was maintained by the ISF 

independently, they are now nationalistic 

enough to operate independently across the 

country. However, there is danger in assuming that these recent successes characterize a fundamental change in the trajectory 

of Iraqi political and security force behavior. The United States fails to notice that 

it is mainly the incumbent ethno-sectarian political parties who share U.S. optimism in the ISF ability to maintain security 

and in an Iraqi resolve to use the political 
No. 245, August 2009 Strategic Forum 2

process to resolve differences rather than 

violence. The incumbent ethno-sectarian 

parties share this optimism because they are 

now in the position to gain the most from a 

decrease of U.S. involvement in Iraq.

Iraqi Assessments

Independent Iraqi assessments of the 

future of the ISF mirror the three U.S. assessments. At the same time, however, Iraqis tend 

to see the ramifications of the assessments 

differently from U.S. conventional wisdom. 

Both agree there are generally three main 

challenges to ISF development: first, political 

party meddling in ISF responsibilities; second, 

the lack of professionalism and training; and 

third, logistics and organization. The United 

States appears to be adequately addressing the 

second and third challenges, but some Iraqis 

do not think it is doing enough to address the 

first and arguably most important challenge: 

halting political party meddling in ISF duties. 

Iraqi assessments suggest that without separating the ISF from the incumbent ethnosectarian parties, the ISF will be a tool for 

creating instability in the country.

Iraqis realize that the reasons and justifications for a civil war are still at play in Iraq. 

When the country lacks security, it is easy 

for political parties to manipulate sectarian 

and ethnic differences in a way that divides 

Iraqis. If high-profile mass murder attacks 

and assassinations continue, the ISF will be 

confronted with a dilemma: if they are not 

able to provide security for the people, then 

the people will seek alternative means of 

protection. During these times of uncertainty, 

there are two ways in which the ethno-sectarian parties seize the initiative: first, by allowing partisan militias to operate in their areas 

of influence; and second, by allowing security to overshadow their deficiencies in governance and public services. The first method is 

discriminatory protection and deepens feelings of distrust in the mixed areas of Iraq. As 

communities fall in on themselves to improve 

security, they become more susceptible to 

terrorist groups’ offers of protection and retribution attacks, and ultimately a return of 

large scale communal violence. Chaos associated with a return of communal violence 

increases the likelihood of corruption and 

reverses improvements in the delivery of public 

services. The violence encourages incumbent 

ethno-sectarian parties to husband resources 

and gain power relative to other parties, which 

in turn would accelerate the downward spiral 

of ethnic and sectarian violence.

Another U.S. misperception gaining 

acceptance on Capitol Hill—and even with 

the Defense Department—is that current 

ethno-sectarian divisions with the ISF have 

helped with stability in Iraq, and are therefore a positive short-term development in 

light of a pending U.S. withdrawal. However, 

it is important for the United States to understand that Iraq does not have three or four 

homogeneous regions, but rather is a country saturated with socially mixed and integrated urban areas. Because of the memories 

of Iraqis, sectarian and ethnic differences 

are easily exploited to start conflict where 

strong national security forces are not present. For example, the issue of Kirkuk and the 

areas mixed with Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen 

could lead to an ethnic war; a high-profile 

attack on a Shia or Sunni religious site could 

restart a sectarian war at any moment. Iraq’s 

main provinces are “crazy quilts” of ethnosectarian cohabitation (that is, in Baghdad, 

Diyala, Basra, Ninevah, Ta’mim [Kirkuk], 

Salahadeen, and Hilla). The ethno-sectarian 

parties with political interests in these respective areas seek greater influence over the ISF 

than their competitors, forcing the ISF, in 

both the Iraqi police and Iraqi army, to align 

their loyalty to the party that sponsors them. 

Consequently, during times of ethnic and 

sectarian tension, the ISF do not behave as 

national forces, but rather as militias loyal to 

their paymasters. This is a recipe for disaster. 

The first priority for the ISF must be professionalism based on loyalty to the state, not to 

the party.

The ISF track record since 2003 has not 

been good in this respect. The forces have 

been partially responsible for Iraqi suffering 

because a portion of them were the means for 

ethnic and sectarian killing. These factions of 

the ISF, especially the infamous death squads 

that worked within the Ministry of Interior—

responsible for the Iraqi police—were one of 

the main causes for the migration of millions 

of Iraqis inside and outside of the country. 

The ISF behaved in this way because of its 

ties to political parties, and as long as these 

political parties retain influence, the risk 

of similar behavior still exists. The ISF are 

so deeply connected to political parties that 

even Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who is 

the commander in chief of the armed forces, 

has had to form his own personal security 

forces that are not connected to the Ministries 

of Interior or Defense because of the fear of 

political party influence over those ministries. As a response to what the prime minister has done to create his own security forces, 

the political parties accuse him of building a 

new dictatorship in Iraq.

U.S. Assessment

Falls Short

What the United States fails to realize 

is that the ISF itself is the battleground in 

the larger communal struggle for power and 

survival. Middle Eastern concepts of civilmilitary relations are fundamentally different than Western ones. Western militaries 

have developed a culture of political control 

over armed forces. While this may have been 

a tool for the development of Western democracies, this is not the established culture in 

Iraqi assessments 

suggest that without 

separating the ISF from 

the incumbent ethnosectarian parties, the ISF 

will be a tool for creating 

instability in the country

Major General (Ret.) Najim Abed Al-Jabouri was an officer in the former Iraqi Air Defense. He was also 

Police Chief and later Mayor of Tel Afar, Ninevah, from 2005–2008. General Najim is now a Senior Fellow 

in the Near East South Asia Center at the National Defense University and is working with the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies.
No. 245, August 2009 Strategic Forum 3

either Iraq or the greater Middle East. In 

Iraq, there is a culture of “he who owns the 

security forces, owns the politics.” When the 

incumbent ethno-sectarian parties took over 

responsibility of the government after 2003, 

their first priority was to fill positions of ISF 

leadership with people who would be loyal to 

their party. Since these political parties were 

sectarian in nature, the ISF, and in particular the Iraqi police—political parties have 

not been able to influence the Iraqi army as 

much as the police because U.S. forces have 

been more involved in training the army—

were heavily infiltrated by sectarian and 

ethnic militias loyal to the political parties 

that hired them.

In 2006–2007, as Iraq suffered through 

a grueling sectarian conflict, the different political parties each controlled factions 

of the Ministry of Interior, and used them 

to create competing sectarian militias that 

were all approved as official ISF. Recruits to 

both the police and army were hired or fired 

depending on loyalty to a political party, or 

whether they were seen as a threat to the 

party’s interests. For example, the volunteers of the Anbar Awakening, a Sunni tribal 

uprising against al Qaeda, were accepted 

by the ministry from the beginning as official recruits and received salaries from it, yet 

they were heavily influenced by the rising 

Sunni Awakening political movement. The 

U.S. forces, in an effort to expand the influence of the Awakening, started the Sons of 

Iraq program, in which it usually paid Sunni 

tribesmen in al Qaeda–infested areas to 

work as paramilitaries, hoping that someday 

they would be integrated into the Ministry of 

Interior.5 The ethno-sectarian parties in the 

government were more favorable to integrating the Anbar Awakening fighters into the 

ministry because they were from a homogeneous Sunni province that was a former 

al Qaeda sanctuary. Integrating these fighters was not a political threat to these parties, 

and these Anbari fighters were seen as reducing the threat of al Qaeda in Iraq. However, 

the Sons of Iraq were later employed by 

the United States in mixed areas such as 

Salahedeen, south Baghdad, Diyala, and 

west Baghdad neighborhoods where the Iraqi 

police and army units were mainly Shia. The 

Sunni paramilitary fighters being paid by the 

United States in these areas were not as interested in reconciling with the Iraqi government as the Anbar Awakening leaders were, 

and they posed a political threat to the Shia 

parties in their areas. As a result, the Ministry 

of Interior has been reluctant to integrate 

them into the ISF.

Thus, the incumbent ethno-sectarian parties, which the United States will 

strengthen by not doing more to decrease 

their influence over the ISF, are the main 

challenge to ISF development. The state 

security institutions have been built upon 

a foundation of shifting loyalties that will 

likely collapse when struck by the earthquake of ethnic and sectarian attacks. Iraq’s 

best hope for creating a long-term stable 

democracy will come from an independent 

national security force that is controlled by 

the state, and not by political parties competing to control the state.

Next Steps

Iraqi leaders can take a variety of 

steps to further insulate tomorrow’s ISF 

from potential cleavages across ethnic 

and sectarian lines. Here are six possible 

suggestions for action.

1. Redouble efforts at national reconciliation. It is almost impossible for the incumbent ethno-sectarian political parties to reach 

an agreement on how to achieve true national 

reconciliation. But this is to be expected; it 

would be similar to asking U.S. political parties 

to reconcile on the issues of abortion or gay 

marriage. However, there is a growing consensus in Iraq that true national reconciliation is fundamental to stability and that the 

ethno-sectarian political parties are the main 

obstacle to achieving that end. For an idealist, the best means to start national reconciliation may be free and fair elections this 

coming year, when the Iraqi people will be 

able to choose platforms that make national 

reconciliation a genuine priority. But realists 

recognize that reconciliation would weaken 

the positions of some of the incumbent ethnosectarian parties, which will do what they 

can to remain in power in spite of opposition against them. For example, one tenet of 

national reconciliation is the reintegration of 

former Ba’athists. While the de-Ba’athification 

laws were rescinded in early 2008, they have 

been applied discriminatorily. There are many 

former high-ranking Ba’athists currently working in the government and in the ISF, but they 

were given their positions because a leading 

political party was confident that these individuals would work in the interest of the party. 

Yet other qualified former Ba’athists and highranking officers who have proven their loyalty 

to the new Iraq, usually Arab Sunni officers, 

have not been given equal treatment because 

they are seen as a threat to the ethno-sectarian 

agenda. Theoretically, if these ethno-sectarian 

parties are voted out of office in the next elections, these officers will have a better chance 

to participate in government positions. But one 

can expect the incumbent parties will do all 

in their means to prevent this from happening. One of the key ways the parties can do this 

is through their influence over the ISF and the 

positioning of ISF commanders.

Another important aspect of true 

national reconciliation that has been ignored 

because of the current ethno-sectarian agenda 

is retirement payments to officers and soldiers 

in the former Iraqi army. There were nearly 

1 million officers and soldiers in the former 

army, and hundreds of thousands of them rely 

on retirement pay. Except for those few who 

were deemed assets to the ethno-sectarian 

parties and given positions in the new ISF and 

Iraqi government, for the last 6 years these 

hundreds of thousands of former officers and 

soldiers who served in the ISF for over 15 years 

and earned pension payments have been left 

without means to support their families. They 

feel discriminated against. They are convinced 

that the Iranian-backed sectarian parties at 

the helm of the parliament block retirement 

what the United States 

fails to realize is that 

the ISF itself is the 

battleground in the larger 

communal struggle for 

power and survival
No. 245, August 2009 Strategic Forum 4

party meddling in the ISF, especially during 

election season.

4. The Ministry of Defense needs to interchange battalions across Iraqi army (IA) divisions. The majority of these divisions are under 

the patronage of a political party. For example, the 8th IA division in Kut and Diwanya is 

heavily influenced by the Dawa party; the 4th

IA division in Salahadeen is influenced by 

President Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of 

Kurdistan; the 7th IA division in Anbar is influenced by the Iraqi Awakening Party, and the 

5th IA division in Diyala is heavily influenced 

by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. The 

political parties are able to maintain influence over the divisions because the commanders and many of the soldiers were hired by the 

party. Moving battalions from one division to 

another would weaken sectarian and ethnic 

susceptibilities and strengthen the loyalty of 

the army to the state. Some divisions, especially those in the areas disputed by the Kurds, 

have begun to be mixed because the government recognized that mixing the IA divisions as much as possible in the Kurdish areas 

would weaken the Kurdish parties’ bargaining power with the government over highly 

sensitive issues such as Kirkuk. Prime Minister 

al-Maliki—the instigator for mixing the IA 

divisions in areas under Kurdish influence—

has gained rare Arab Sunni and Shia support 

for mixing these divisions and decreasing 

the Kurdish parties’ influence over the ISF in 

these areas. The government needs to apply 

the same principle to other areas where the 

political parties have influence over the ISF, 

although doing so would weaken those same 

parties’ ties to the ISF in their areas of interest. Many middle-ranking officers confess that 

they must be loyal to the incumbent political parties’ agenda because not showing that 

loyalty will cost them not only their jobs, but 

also their personal security guards. This is a 

significant disincentive for the military officers to expose the political party meddling in 

ISF affairs.

Similarly, the Ministry of Interior should 

make regulations that prohibit the Iraqi 

police from working near their places of residence. It is generally accepted that the closer 

a member of the ISF works to his home, the 

more likely he will violate ISF regulations 

against corruption, unduly influence local 

pay because Iran would consider paying these 

officers and soldiers who fought in the IranIraq war as a direct insult to Iran. On the 

other hand, giving them retirement payments 

would be a significant step toward reconciliation not only because the payments would give 

much needed financial support to the officers 

and soldiers who are the main providers of 

families, but also because it would show that 

the government chooses national interests over 

regional pressures.

2. The government of Iraq needs to 

have a plan to remove corrupt leaders in the 

ISF and enforce term limits. This is especially difficult with the high-ranking political 

appointees in the Ministries of Interior and 

Defense because they are the gatekeepers for 

the political parties to influence the ISF.

The government must also set and 

enforce the professional requirements needed 

for leadership positions. It is well known 

that many Iraqis have been given ranks 

and positions that they clearly are not qualified for. There are reports of people who 

have purchased officer ranks, or have been 

promoted from the rank of lieutenant to 

general in a matter of weeks. The Iraqi 

government needs to fire officers who do not 

meet the legal requirements and qualifications for their positions.

3. The government must enforce laws 

that prohibit political parties from intervening in ISF responsibilities and hold accountable those parties that violate this law. To 

do this, the government can do two main 

things. First, it needs to protect Iraqi judges, 

and second, it must allow more media access. 

Currently, political parties use their positions in government as a means to intimidate judges by indirect threats not to accept 

or pass judgment on cases that weaken the 

party’s power. Judges who attempt to accept 

or pass these types of judgments are usually 

fired or hunted by killers. The government can also do more to allow the media 

to expose the political parties that violate 

these laws and that intimidate the judges. 

The government of Iraq is sensitive to media 

reports. The media play more of a role of 

checks and balances on the government 

than does the government party structure of 

power-sharing. The media can be an effective 

means of transparency to discourage political 

political interests, and commit sectarian 

violence.6 It is difficult to find police officials 

able to implement such transfers because of 

political sensitivities and entrenched interests 

from those who would lose from such transfers. While I was mayor of Tel Afar in northern Iraq, a unique municipality of Kurds, 

Turks, Yazidis, Sunni, and Shia Arabs, the 

majority of the police were Shia Turks. There 

were mainly Shia Turks in the police because 

al Qaeda intimidated the Sunni from joining. 

During one high-profile attack in the Shia 

area of the town, the majority of the casualties were either relatives of the police or Shia 

Turks. At this time of high emotions, local 

troublemakers influenced a portion of the 

police to seek revenge using their vehicles for 

sectarian violence. The police succumbed and 

used their vehicles to attack a Sunni area of 

the town, killing over 60 people. This tit-fortat violence deepened the distrust among the 

different ethnic and sectarian groups in the 

municipality. Obviously, it would have been 

far more difficult for the police to commit 

this criminal act of revenge if they had been 

more mixed with other sects and ethnicities, 

and if the Iraqi police were not deployed near 

their homes.

5. Conscription would be an important 

step toward mixing the IA and making them 

more professional and nationalist. While it 

may be difficult to fairly implement conscription when the ISF, in particular the Iraqi 

police from the Ministry of Interior, should 

be decreasing its numbers, efforts to reform 

the ISF in this direction would be helpful. There should be a limited time period, 

not more than a year, wherein conscripted 

soldiers should be given the same salary as 

a first-year enlisted soldier and be assigned 

to areas not near their places of residence. 

Many military officers currently in the IA 

suggest this as a means of nationalizing 

the government of Iraq 

needs to have a plan to 

remove corrupt leaders 

in the ISF and enforce 

term limits
No. 245, August 2009 Strategic Forum 5

the security forces, but the ethno-sectarian 

parties are strongly against such plans.

6. The government should reduce the 

size of the Ministry of Interior, whose forces 

have become oversized, cumbersome, and 

unmanageable. Many of these forces are 

actually beyond the ministry’s authority, 

answering to political parties but operating 

as official forces. An unmanageable ministry facilitates corruption and political party 

meddling in the local dynamics of the ISF.

Three Ways to 

Support Reform

There are three principal ways in which 

the U.S. Government might support a capable and cohesive Iraqi security force in the 

future: strong and persuasive pressure, transparency, and support.

First, the United States might use its 

leverage to directly pressure the Iraqi government to implement the reforms mentioned 

above. This will require a change in tone. 

Nuanced approaches may not be understood in Iraq. When talking with Iraqi leaders 

about important reforms, the United States 

uses a soft rhetoric of “we advise you to” or 

“we hope you would.” Although there is a 

place for approaches that are sensitive to the 

concerns of Iraqis, avoiding a direct approach 

about the importance of reforms may not be 

one of them. A soft approach simply will be 

lost on many Iraqi politicians. An example of 

strong language occurred in late 2006 when 

Congress announced that it would withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq because the Iraqi 

government was not making political progress. Because this decision threatened the 

survival of the Iraqi government, it moved 

closer to the U.S. position. The United States 

needs to use its leverage while it still has 

it. Iraqis believe that Washington still calls 

the shots in Iraq. If they see the government 

of Iraq and the ISF working for the ethnosectarian agenda, then Iraqis understand 

that this agenda is working for U.S. interests. 

Improvements in U.S. strategic communication would help the United States both pressure the Iraqi government and communicate 

effectively to Iraqis.

Another great U.S. asset for leverage is 

regional allies. For example, the United States 

can exert leverage through its strong relations with Arab Gulf countries, Turkey, Egypt, 

and Jordan, all of whom finance and support 

Arab Sunni parties in Iraq. These allies are 

reluctant to support an Iraqi government 

that has a strong ethno-sectarian agenda 

because they fear that they might indirectly 

support Iranian and Kurdish ambitions. At 

the same time, the United States has leverage 

with individual Iraqi politicians who represent these ethno-sectarian groups, such as 

its relationships with the key Kurdish leader 

Masoud Barazani, Iranian-backed Shia 

leader Abdul Azziz Al-Hakim, and many 

important leaders of Iraqi tribes. The United 

States needs a strategy that plays to the interests of its regional allies and key Iraqi leaders to put pressure on the Iraqi government to 

ensure that there is no ethno-sectarian party 

meddling in the ISF.

Second, the United States should make 

better use of the media, particularly the 

U.S.-sponsored al-Hurra, to enhance transparency. Television can be an especially effective way to influence Iraq’s political parties. 

There is ample evidence to suggest that the 

United States can use the media to help shape 

Iraqi public opinion and political behavior. For example, a recent report on al-Hurra 

about how Iraqi politicians failed to turn in 

their financial reports to the government 

convinced one high-ranking government official to summon his staff and tell them to 

turn in the financial statement the following day.7

 Unfortunately, al-Hurra devotes 

the majority of its airtime to programs not 

related to issues important to Iraqis and 

that have little value in shaping public opinion or political party behavior. Instead of 

giving more airtime to effective programs on 

corruption or government mismanagement, 

al-Hurra often airs programs about Arab and 

Iraqi artists or soccer teams. These programs 

might be interesting during a time of stability, but are not as important as the pressing 

issues concerning Iraq’s future.

Finally, the new Iraqi state needs to look 

beyond the current focus on internal threats 

and security to include foreign threats and 

external security. Of course, there is a matter 

of sequencing and priorities, and the immediate priorities of the ISF are properly centered 

on internal security. But to maintain internal 

security and protect it from external threats, 

the ISF will need support in logistics, arms, 

and training for at least the next 5 years. For 

the ISF to defend itself from foreign threats, 

it will have to develop a modern and professional air force. The Iraqi air force is currently 

limited to only a few aircraft for domestic uses. 

Iraq will need continued U.S. air support and 

coordination with its air force.

Current budget constraints and domestic security needs keep the government of 

Iraq from giving external threats more attention. It might take years of training and 

purchases to develop this vital aspect of 

national defense. The ISF still lacks a clear 

military doctrine defining the national 

enemy or potential enemy. Military doctrine 

is fundamental to building a national military because it coordinates training and 

acquisitions. The United States could support 

Iraq with conferences that discuss and shape 

the future military culture of the ISF. While 

this will mainly be an Iraqi affair and will 

not need a large U.S. footprint, America can 

help as a coordinator, since it still plays a role 

of arbiter and maintains effective modes of 

transportation in Iraq.

The Next 2 Years

Upon withdrawal of U.S. troops from 

Iraqi cities, the ISF will be at a crossroads. In 

the next 2 years, the ISF can continue either 

in the direction of divisive ethno-sectarianism or more in the direction of unifying nationalism. There are tradeoffs for both 

directions, and the Iraqi army and police 

will develop at different paces because of 

the different nature of their missions and 

proximity to political parties.8 The direction of ethno-sectarianism provides a temporary balance of power among the disparate 

incumbent political parties, who will attempt 

to strengthen their ties to the ISF to continue 

pursuing their interests. Iran will retain 

influence over the Shia parties, which will 

Iraqis believe that 

Washington still calls the 

shots in Iraq
No. 245, August 2009 Strategic Forum 6

Awakening, facilitated official Iraqi army and police 

recruitment of men who were encouraged by the 

Awakening leaders to fight al Qaeda through the 

ISF. From its beginning, the Anbar Awakening was 

a political movement that used recruitment into the 

ISF as a vehicle to counter the destructive insurgent 

and terrorist elements of the Sunni communities, 

and then to gain favor with the U.S. forces and Iraqi 

government as a viable political entity. Success of 

the Anbar Awakening inspired U.S. forces to attempt 

expanding its influence in other Sunni areas of Iraq 

in which al Qaeda was a threat. This U.S. initiative to 

recruit and pay Sunni fighters became known as the 

Sons of Iraq program, but was not affiliated with the 

Anbar Awakening. Many American policymakers and 

analysts wrongly assume that the Anbar Awakening 

was an American initiative in which it paid Sunni 

tribesmen to fight al Qaeda, and then continued as 

the Sons of Iraq program.

6

 Letter from Iraqi army brigade commander to 

author. There are many other officers working on the 

ground who share this opinion.

7

 Conversation with a political advisor to Tariq 

al-Hashimi.

8

 For example, the Iraqi army has progressed 

more than the Iraqi police because U.S. forces have 

focused more on army capacity-building, and more 

importantly, because U.S. proximity to the army has 

made it difficult for the political parties to influence the army as much as the police. However, as the 

United States decreases its proximity to the army, it is 

expected that the ethno-sectarian parties will try to 

influence it more than the police because the army 

constitutes a greater tool for achieving political ends.

9

 See Gina Chon, “Iran’s Hard Line Fuels Iraq 

Attacks,” The Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2009.

in turn try to gain more influence over the 

ISF in their areas;9 Kurdish aspirations will 

retain influence over the Kurdish parties, 

but the Kurdish parties’ influence over the 

ISF will decrease as the government of Iraq 

integrates the IA in their areas; and Arab 

states and Turkey will retain their influence over the Sunni parties. On the other 

hand, the direction of nationalism provides 

a long-term balance of power between the 

competing countries in the Middle East, but 

will include short-term political risks, as it 

will be difficult to separate the incumbent 

ethno-sectarian political parties from their 

entrenched ties to the ISF.

Over the next few months, Iraq will 

witness an increasing number of attacks. 

Terrorist organizations, militias, and even 

military factions of ethno-sectarian political parties will be behind these attacks. The 

attacks will be conducted in different ways, but 

each will be gauging ISF fault lines, strengths, 

and vulnerabilities. The incumbent ethnosectarian political parties, which do not gain 

political power from the growing nationalist movement, will benefit the most from these 

attacks. They will use the attacks to prove to 

their constituencies that the nationalist movement will not bring security and that the 

al-Maliki administration has failed. As security again becomes the main priority for Iraqi 

voters, the incumbent ethno-sectarian parties 

will delay the politically difficult and sensitive short-term reforms needed to achieve 

national reconciliation and fight corruption 

and government mismanagement.

In its oversight capacity, the United 

States must pay close attention to political 

party meddling in the ISF and use the leverage discussed above to pressure the government of Iraq to decrease such interference. 

Acting passively to counter—or even justifying—ethno-sectarian party meddling in 

the ISF as a temporary means for a graceful U.S. exit from Iraq risks decreasing the 

likely success of political nationalism in 

the upcoming elections. After all the sacrifices made in Iraq, the United States cannot 

afford to allow the ISF to go in the direction 

of ethno-sectarianism. The best chance for 

long-term success in Iraq is steering the ISF 

toward the direction of loyalty to the state. To 

do this, the United States will need to prepare 

a strategy using its political, military, and 

economic ties with regional allies and Iraqi 

politicians to keep the incumbent ethnosectarian parties away from the ISF.

Notes

1

 See Department of Defense (DOD), 

“Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 

2009, available at <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/

pdfs/Measuring_Stability_and_Security_in_Iraq_

March_2009.pdf>. The report states, “While making 

significant gains, the ISF continue to rely on the 

Coalition for logistics, fire support, close air support, 

communications, planning assistance, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, 

particularly in northern Iraq” (v).

2

 Interview with General Raymond T. Odierno, 

Fox News, June 28, 2009, as well as his interview the 

same day on CNN.

3

 DOD, iv.

4

 Independent Commission on the Security 

Forces of Iraq, “Report to Congress,” September 2007, 

130, available at <www.c-span.org/pdf/jonesreport090607.pdf>.

5

 It is important to clarify an important distinction that is highly misunderstood by Americans about 

the Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq program. 

The Anbar Awakening was not an American counterinsurgency initiative, but the Sons of Iraq program 

was. The Anbar Awakening was a reaction to the 

atrocities committed by al Qaeda. Starting in July 

2006, U.S. forces in Ramadi, the center of the Anbar 

after all the sacrifices 

made in Iraq, the United 

States cannot afford 

to allow the ISF to go 

in the direction 

of ethno-sectarianism

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I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Patrick M. Cronin

Eugene B. Rumer Director David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press