Report of the 

Defense Science Board 

2007 Summer Study 

Challenges to Military 

Operations in Support of 

U.S. Interests 

Volume II 

Main Report 

 

 

December 2008 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
Report Documentation Page Form Approved

OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and

maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,

including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington

VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it

does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE

DEC 2008 2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED

 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008 

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. Interests (Volume II

Main Report)

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Office of the Under Secretary of Defence,for Acquisition, Technology,

and Logistics,Washington,DC,20301-3140

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 

NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 

ABSTRACT

Same as

Report (SAR)

18. NUMBER

OF PAGES

505

19a. NAME OF

RESPONSIBLE PERSON

a. REPORT

unclassified

b. ABSTRACT

unclassified

c. THIS PAGE

unclassified

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). 

The DSB is a federal advisory committee established to provide 

independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, 

conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not necessarily 

represent the official position of the Department of Defense. 

The DSB Task Force on Challenges to Military Operations in Support 

of U.S. Interests completed its information gathering in August 2007. 

 

This report is unclassified and has been cleared for public release.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301–3140

9 Dec 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 

ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study on 

Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. Interests

I am pleased to forward the final report of the Defense Science Board 2007 

Summer Study on Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. Interests. 

The report offers important considerations for the Department of Defense in 

response to future threats to our nation’s security. 

This study, robust in scope, concerns itself with challenges the U.S. military 

might face in the future, emphasizing areas where the nation is less well prepared. 

Future adversaries are more likely to attack the nation with asymmetric tools of 

war, employed using non-traditional concepts of operation. Thus, challenges from 

nuclear weapons, from cyber warfare, in and from space, to force deployment and 

resupply, and on U.S. soil, may well dominate in the decades ahead. Addressing 

U.S. vulnerabilities in these and other areas is the focus of the study’s effort, 

leading to actions for the Department that can improve the nation’s posture against 

future threats.

I endorse all of the study’s recommendations and encourage you to forward 

the report to the Secretary of Defense.

William Schneider, Jr. 

DSB Chairman

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301–3140

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Defense Science Board

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study on 

Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. Interests

U.S. conventional military capability remains unmatched by any state. As a result, 

nations and powerful non-state actors, weaker in conventional weaponry, will face the 

United States with unconventional weapons. Further, these asymmetric tools of war may 

well be employed using non-traditional concepts of operation. And the battlefield may 

no longer be limited to regions afar, but may include the U.S. homeland. The United 

States could well confront the possibility of going to war abroad in the face of significant 

devastation in the homeland—dividing forces between homeland catastrophe relief 

operations and combat abroad—even facing the possibility that deploy and supply of 

U.S. military forces could be delayed and disrupted.

How to contemplate this future, over the next two decades, was the focus of the 

Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study. The question asked by the study is this: 

Is the United States maintaining its capability to deter and defeat a nation or 

non-state actor who might employ unconventional as well as conventional means, 

in non-traditional as well as traditional ways, to thwart U.S. interests?

To focus on challenges for which the United States might be less well prepared, the 

study investigated seven topic areas, making recommendations for actions in each of them:

• Future of war. The character of war is changing—it is irregular, 

catastrophic, disruptive and no longer confined to the traditional battlefield. 

This changing character of warfare calls for considerations about how the 

nation’s military capabilities should evolve—the type of forces, reliance on 

information infrastructures, protection to forces and critical infrastructure, 

new capabilities. At the same time, other instruments of national power 

must be brought to bear, which will involve strengthening relationships 

between the Department of Defense and other federal partners.

• Unconventional weapons and technology proliferation. The technology 

equation, between the United States and potential adversaries, is key to the 

nature of future warfare and the ability of our nation to prevail. The range 

of possible destructive weapons is vast, but three stand out as the most 

critical: nuclear weapons, biological agents, and cyber warfare. There are 

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD
steps that can be taken—in prevention, attribution, mitigation, and 

recovery—that can improve the U.S. posture against such attacks.

• Nuclear proliferation—a special case. The nuclear threat stands in a class 

by itself in terms of its potential for damage, disruption, and devastation. 

Thus, managing the challenge of nuclear proliferation deserves special 

attention. History has shown that it is possible to influence the decision to 

acquire nuclear weapons. Thus emphasis should be placed on developing 

tailored approaches to proliferation prevention to shape the nuclear 

environment. At the same time, the United States needs to prepare to cope 

with the military operational challenges of a more proliferated world—

closing the sizeable gap between current capabilities and future needs. 

• Unconventional operational concepts and the homeland. The capable 

adversary of the future will execute “one game”—attacking U.S. interests 

wherever the nation is most vulnerable, and that could mean the homeland. 

Overseas deployment, simultaneous with responding to a significant scale of 

attacks in the homeland, will stress DOD capabilities. Roles and 

responsibilities are not clearly defined, and adequate resources have not 

been invested in the homeland defense missions. Furthermore, the problem 

extends beyond DOD to the interagency and response communities, where 

the handoffs and roles are not well understood—in part because they are 

not effectively exercised.

• What we know and don’t know about adversary capabilities: 

intelligence. It is not possible to plan and prepare for all possible futures; 

nor is it possible for an adversary to exercise all of the opportunities to 

which they might take advantage. Thus, with good intelligence, the United 

States can focus its investments on the most likely cases. Strategic issues 

should command top level focus in the Intelligence Community, and the 

attention of some of its best resources. Improvements are also needed in 

foreign and domestic intelligence collection, analysis, and support; 

countering foreign intelligence; net assessments and gaming; and methods 

for improving intelligence related to the threat of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD).

• Fighting through asymmetric counterforce. While the range of potential 

asymmetric attacks is wide, this study identified three as particularly 

challenging: conducting military operations in WMD environments,

countering attacks on U.S. and allied space capabilities, and cyber warfare 

against information networks. DOD needs to take steps to enhance the 

capabilities of general-purpose forces to operate in an environment where 

WMD have been used. Further, the ability to operate in and from the global 

commons—space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace—is 

critical to DOD’s ability to conduct operations and project power anywhere 
in the world. Thus, the Department must act to mitigate vulnerabilities in 

these areas.

• Strategic communication—another instrument of U.S. power. 

Defending U.S. interests against future adversaries will require more than 

just military might—involving other instruments of U.S. power such as 

diplomacy, economic and financial sanctions, and strategic communication. 

Strategic communication is vital to America’s future and must be 

transformed at strategic and operational levels. The range of future threats 

varies greatly and requires a strategic communication instrument with 

sustained impact and far greater capacity to understand, engage, and 

influence global populations on issues of consequence—an instrument that 

emphasizes actions that are consistent with what national leaders say.

Taken together, the issues addressed in this study point to the fact that the cost to 

deter or defeat future adversaries is rising—costs defined not only in financial terms but 

also along other dimensions to include military lives, civilian lives, money, civil liberties, 

daily comfort, economic health, and global reputation. Thus, instruments of national 

power, other than military, will assume greater importance.

The nation is unprepared and is making little progress in reducing these costs. But 

circumstances can be materially improved. The United States can achieve its national 

objectives by taking a combination of actions that will have an impact on costs—actions 

that are detailed in the recommendations of this report. DOD must begin to act, even as 

it fights the current war, to make sure it is ready for the next war, one that could well be 

even more stressing than the war the nation fights today.

Dr. Craig Fields Mr. Richard Haver

Co-Chair Co-Chair

TABLE OF CONTENTS I ix

Table of Contents 

Volume I. Executive Summary 

Volume II. Main Report 

 Major Themes..................................................................................................................xi 

 Preface ............................................................................................................................xiii 

 Part I. The Future of War as We Know It...............................................................1

 Chapter 1. Why Do We Have a Military?.....................................................................3 

 Chapter 2. The Past: Fads and Phases in Warfare ....................................................16 

 Chapter 3. The Role of Technology: Weapons that Change War ..........................26 

 Chapter 4. Present Concerns: What Now? ................................................................28 

 Chapter 5. The Future: What is New? ........................................................................34 

 Chapter 6. Homeland Defense: What is Needed? ....................................................54 

 Part II. Unconventional Weapons and Technology Proliferation ..................61

 Chapter 7. Technology of Unconventional Weapons..............................................63 

 Chapter 8. Red Objectives and Attack Options........................................................68 

 Chapter 9. How Blue Can Respond............................................................................94 

 Appendix II-A. Supporting Data...............................................................................105 

 Part III. Nuclear Proliferation: A Special Case ................................................115

 Chapter 10. A Core Emerging Challenge.................................................................117 

 Chapter 11. Needed Military Capabilities in a More Proliferated World.............136 

 Chapter 12. Toward More Effective Proliferation Prevention .............................161 

 Appendix III-A. Proliferation Contingencies 2027.................................................171 

Part IV. Unconventional Operational Concepts and the Homeland............201

 Chapter 13. One Game: Defending the Homeland................................................203 

 Chapter 14: DOD Roles and Responsibilities .........................................................210 

 Chapter 15. Assuring Deployment and Supply .......................................................220 

 Chapter 16. Building the National Team..................................................................239 

 Appendix IV-A. Relevant Legislation and Directives for DOD in 

 Homeland Security and Defense..........................................................................263 

 Appendix IV-B. Selected Excerpts from the “Strategy for Homeland 

 Defense and Civil Support,” June 2005..............................................................268 

 
x I TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Part V. What We Know and Don’t Know about Adversary 

 Capabilities: Intelligence ...................................................................................273

 Chapter 17. What We Know and Don’t Know ......................................................275 

 Part VI. Fighting Through Asymmetric Counterforce ....................................287

 Chapter 18. The Asymmetric Challenge...................................................................289 

 Chapter 19. Combat Operations in a WMD Environment...................................292 

 Chapter 20. Countering Attacks on U.S. and Allied Space Assets.......................308 

 Chapter 21. Cyber Warfare Against Information and Networks..........................319 

 Chapter 22. Crosscutting Observations....................................................................341 

 Part VII. Strategic Communication: Another Instrument of 

 U.S. Power.............................................................................................................343

 Chapter 23. The Importance of Strategic Communication...................................345 

 Chapter 24. What is Strategic Communication and Why Does it Matter?..........353 

 Chapter 25. The World is Changing .........................................................................363 

 Chapter 26. Technology is Changing........................................................................380 

 Chapter 27. Engaging National Capability...............................................................401 

 Chapter 28. Conclusions and Recommendations...................................................422 

 Appendix VII-A. Executive Summary and Recommendations from the 

 2004 DSB Report on Strategic Communication ...............................................438 

 Appendix VII-B. Recommendations from the 2001 DSB Report on 

 Managed Information Dissemination.................................................................446 

 Appendix VII-C. Government and Independent Organization Studies 

 of Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy, 

 September 2001–October 2007 ...........................................................................450 

 Terms of Reference.....................................................................................................455 

 Study Participants ........................................................................................................461 

 Presentations to the Study..........................................................................................469 

 Glossary .......................................................................................................................481
MAJOR THEMES I xi

Major Themes 

Nations and powerful non-state actors, weaker in conventional weaponry, 

will face the United States with unconventional weaponry. The most 

challenging are: 

 nuclear weapons, worsened by proliferation 

 self-replicating biological weapons 

 cyber weapons to disrupt net-centricity, including in space 

They will also exploit vulnerabilities in our homeland security by: 

 attacking our homeland to disrupt military deployment and supply 

 dividing our joint forces between domestic civilian relief and foreign 

military operations 

We are unprepared: 

 At best, our policies and actions will be severely constrained. 

 Worse, we will enter the fray and then quit when we come to appreciate 

the full cost of success. 

 These costs are defined not only as financial costs, but also along broader 

dimensions, such as military lives, civilian lives, money, civil liberties, 

daily comfort, economic health, and global reputation. 

Instruments of national power other than the military, such as strategic 

communication, will assume greater importance. 

PREFACE I xiii

Preface 

U.S. conventional military capability remains unmatched by any state. U.S. 

military operations since Operation Desert Storm have demonstrated an 

overwhelming ability to continually grow conventional capability and outmatch 

opponents. As a result, no adversary—peer, near peer, or powerful non-state 

actor—with objectives in conflict with U.S. interests will oppose our nation with 

conventional military means. The United States is too strong and capable. Yet, 

this strength in the conventional arena does not mean that the nation is 

unmatched across the spectrum of conflict. 

At one point in time, for example, the Soviet Union challenged U.S. 

interests with a strong nuclear capability and significant conventional strength as 

well. While that threat no longer exists today in the form it once did, the 

proliferation of nuclear weapons opens the possibility that U.S. interests and 

conventional capability could again be threatened by such weapons in some 

region of the world. The proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction—

biological, chemical, and radiological, among others—should be expected as 

well, adding to potential future threats. 

Moreover, the proliferation of technology, technical information, and 

technical skills facilitates access to a range of weaponry that can be used to attack 

the United States both at home and abroad by means other than conventional. 

These asymmetric tools of war may well be employed using non-traditional 

concepts of operation. And the battlefield may no longer be limited to regions 

afar, but may include the U.S. homeland. Furthermore, the proliferation of 

technology has, to a certain degree, “lowered the bar” such that future 

adversaries will not be limited to nation states, but will extend to non-state actors 

such as terrorists, insurgents, and groups not bound by geography and the 

traditional trappings of statehood. This outlook suggests that U.S. interests could 

be threatened by adversaries in the future that, in the past, would never have 

been labeled a “peer” or “near peer”—that, in fact, might never have been 

anticipated as adversaries at all. 

How to contemplate this future, over the next two decades, was the focus of 

the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study. The question asked by the study 

was this: 
xiv I PREFACE 

Is the United States maintaining its capability to deter and defeat a 

nation or non-state actor who might employ unconventional and 

conventional means, in non-traditional as well as traditional ways, to 

thwart U.S. interests? 

The study concerns itself with challenges the U.S. military might face in the 

future for which the nation is less well-prepared. One such challenge is the 

possibility of going to war abroad in the face of significant devastation in the 

homeland. Such a circumstance would put competing demands on the military—

dividing forces between homeland operations and combat abroad—and possibly 

constrain our nation’s ability to project military force in support of national 

interests. 

Homeland devastation, caused by malicious or natural acts, is but one scenario. 

Precision attacks on domestic infrastructure critical to military operations—such as 

bases, depots, ports, airfields—as well as components in the private sector on 

which the military relies, such as commercial communications or contractor 

factories, can disrupt military deployment and supply. Other scenarios could 

involve blackmail through an arsenal of nuclear weapons or skillful use of the 

media to circumscribe U.S. military options. In any regard, devastation of the 

homeland could well demoralize the American public, potentially changing the 

behavior of the U.S. government in response to public pressure. 

The question addressed in this study is broad and touches on the full 

spectrum of warfare, using the full spectrum of weaponry, against the full 

spectrum of potential adversaries. But to conduct such a study without limits was 

not possible. Thus, in an effort to limit the scope to some degree, the focus of 

the study included the following: 

 U.S. national interests that may demand use of military force 

 nations and powerful non-state actors 

 homeland defense as needed to ensure military prowess in war 

 nuclear proliferation and coercion, attribution, consequence 

management, fighting through a limited nuclear attack on our forces 

 asymmetric, unconventional weapons 

 weapons smuggled into the U.S. homeland, weapons of mass destruction 

produced in the United States 

 transformation in the face of adversary unconventional weapons and/or 

operational concepts 

 capabilities rather than scenarios 
PREFACE I xv

What is left out? Outside the scope of this study are U.S. national interests 

that do not demand use of military force or instruments of U.S. power other 

than military force. The study does not focus on ad hoc terrorist groups or 

criminals. It does not specifically consider stabilization, reconstruction, nationbuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, or continuing counterterrorism 

operations—though some if its recommendations could improve U.S. capabilities 

to conduct such operations as well. It also leaves aside the scenario of all-out 

nuclear war. As the study focuses on asymmetric, unconventional weapons, 

traditional order of battle is not addressed, nor is ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, 

or air and maritime defense of the homeland. Current readiness, recruitment, and 

retention challenges are also left for others to examine. 

Methodology 

Despite efforts to narrow its focus, the scope of the study remained robust, 

presenting the challenge of how to approach the investigation into U.S. 

capabilities, capability gaps, and necessary actions to improve the nation’s ability 

to prevail against the future described herein. Thus, the subject matter was 

divided into six topic areas, with no attempt to ensure that they were mutually 

exclusive: 

1. unconventional weapons and technology proliferation 

2. nuclear proliferation: a special case 

3. unconventional operational concepts and the homeland 

4. what we know and don’t know about adversary capabilities: intelligence 

5. fighting through asymmetric counterforce 

6. strategic communication: another instrument of U.S. power 

Each of these topics is addressed in Parts 2 through 7 of this report. 

Accommodating such a future will not be easy. Nor will predicting it. And the 

consequence of being wrong could be severe. Notwithstanding this point, history 

can offer perspective, and it is useful to ask how the past might be able to inform 

the future. The critical question may well be whether the future is likely to look 

so different that it invalidates current defense programs or concepts of operation 

that have been central to the American way of war. Thus, this report begins, in 

Part 1, with an assessment of the future of war with the aim of identifying what 

might be new in the future—“game changers” to which the nation must 

respond, and ideally anticipate. 
xvi I PREFACE 
Part I 

The Future of War as We Know It 

WHY DO WE HAVE A MILITARY? I 3

Chapter 1. Why Do We Have a Military? 

The first step in reviewing whether the U.S. military is properly postured for 

the future is to consider and/or validate the reasons why the nation has a military 

force. In the largest sense, the answer is obvious: to help achieve national 

objectives, when other instruments of national power have proved unsuccessful. 

Yet, what are those national objectives, and how do they translate into military 

missions for which the armed forces must prepare? 

Military Objectives 

Protecting Ourselves: The Homeland Defense Mission 

The first and most important duty of the government is spelled out clearly in 

the Constitution: “To provide for the common defense.” The highest priority 

national objective—of which there is little disagreement as to purpose—is 

preservation of the Republic and protection of its citizens. Thus, “Job #1” for 

the U.S. military is defense of the homeland. 

Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the United States faced little 

direct threat to the homeland other than the specter of a full arsenal exchange 

with the (former) Soviet Union—a threat dealt with by symmetrically assuring 

the destruction of their homeland. Mutually assured destruction, and deterrence 

more generally, seemed sufficient to protect the homeland from attack. This 

complacency was shattered along with the World Trade Center in 2001. 

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the nation has begun to reconsider 

both the threats to its homeland and the appropriate military countermeasures to 

those threats. If the threats were conventional bombardment and/or invasion of 

the continent, there would be little difficulty defining the role of the Department 

of Defense (DOD) and the military force it manages. The difficulty arises when 

valid threats appear to come from non-state actors, loosely networked, and 

potentiated by weapons of mass destruction, or at least weapons of mass 

disruption. At issue is the ambiguous, officially unresolved, expectations of the 

military in the event when remediation and, perhaps, internal peacekeeping are 

the order of the day. 

For the case of serious devastation to the homeland, DOD is neither 

especially well-postured nor especially resourced as the “first responder of last 
4 I PART I. CHAPTER 1 

resort.” While much of DOD’s materiel and soldiery are sufficiently versatile to 

be able to mount a credible response, nonetheless, an attack on the homeland 

poses a serious complication. That complication—a tenet of this study—is that a

U.S. military response to a domestic calamity, inflicted purposely by an adversary, 

contends directly with the nation’s ability to project force and deal directly with that 

adversary or associated adversaries. Whether an adversary attack on the 

homeland is targeted at the U.S. population and its critical infrastructure, or its 

military garrisons and lines of supply, such attacks could constrain and perhaps 

fatally compromise the nation’s ability to project force as required. As will be 

discussed in this report, the ability to strike seriously at the U.S. homeland, once 

reserved for the high-end adversary, may now be within reach of lesser states and 

stateless, networked adversaries as a result of globally available technology, 

transport, and connectivity. 

Influencing the Behavior of Others: A Force Protection 

Mission 

The United States is anxious to live at peace within the international 

community, prosper, and encourage others similarly. It respects and guarantees 

the rights of its citizens and encourages other countries to do likewise. It seeks to 

accomplish these things through moral leadership and the use of “soft power.” 

On occasion, soft power falls short and the U.S. military is called upon to: 

 Deter, dissuade, and/or compel its adversaries. The specter of the 

U.S. military can be required to convince others to refrain from doing 

something they might otherwise be tempted to do, and sometimes to 

help urge them to do something they are otherwise disinclined to do. 

Attacking the United States or its allies is the most obvious case for 

deterrence or dissuasion. Encouraging others to act responsibly within 

the family of nations generally results in compliance. 

 Defend allies. Direct engagement by U.S. military force may be required 

to defend its allies and their worthy interests. In this context, defense 

may necessarily involve the projection of U.S. force. An adjunct, possibly 

an alternative, is providing defensive weaponry, a theme revisited in this 

report. 

 Secure markets. Although the United States does not consider itself 

“mercantilist,” free market competition and access to foreign markets for 

competitive U.S. industries, goods, and services is essential to economic 

well-being and to the economic benefit of all nations. 
WHY DO WE HAVE A MILITARY? I 5

 Secure supplies. The obverse of access to international markets is 

access to international raw materials and component goods and services, 

which is equally important for economic health and, as above, for 

international prosperity. 

 Free the oppressed. As the United States has matured as a nation, its 

concern over the rights of its own citizens has elevated to a larger 

concern over the rights of all peoples—all equally entitled to life, liberty, 

and the pursuit of happiness. This concern with human rights is, at once, 

both altruistic and pragmatic. 

This catechism of national objectives, as stated, largely reflects the 

Westphalian tradition of thinking of international actors as nation-states—

although, admittedly, the last concern with human rights does not respect that 

tradition. At the dawn of the 21st century, the United States recognizes that there 

are other actors on the international stage with whom it must contend. Islam, as 

its name advertises, is a nation but not a state in the sense of Westphalia. 

Whether, and to what extent, this type of adversary may lead our nation to 

modify its characterization of national objectives will be answered in time. 

Helping Allies Defend Themselves: A Military Assistance 

Mission 

While direct military engagement may, in some cases, be required of the 

United States to defend its allies, this course of action need not, and should not, 

be the first option. Military assistance, training, and joint exercise are also part 

and parcel of defending allies. Providing military materiel, whether through grant, 

purchase, or “lend lease,” can be an important ingredient in the recipe for 

defending allies. 

The nation’s processes of relentless research and development; intelligenceinformed threat and capabilities analyses; and quality production, deployment, 

training, and maintenance make U.S. weaponry nonpareil. The larger portion of 

this effort is geared to equipping the nation’s war-fighters with offensive 

weaponry—the capability to project force when and where needed. Yet, providing 

“defensive” weaponry to allies seems a more attractive option. Done well, it may 

obviate the need for direct engagement of U.S. military forces. It can provide a 

distributed deterrent, with less concern that a headstrong ally might needlessly 

embroil the United States were it to provide weapons better suited to offense. 

Defensive weaponry is attractive for the homeland defense mission as well. 
6 I PART I. CHAPTER 1 

Comforting the Needy: A Humanitarian Mission 

Humanitarian missions, while not the premier reason for maintaining military 

force, nonetheless serve both to reinforce the nation’s position of moral 

leadership and pragmatically to calm turbulent waters in addition to fulfilling a 

commitment to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness to all people. 

Such missions are also known as “operations other than war” or “security, 

stability, transition, and reconstruction operations.”1 They generally involve 

a crisis that has overtaken a large population whose local government is unable 

to meet basic needs due either to disruption or displacement. The root cause 

might be specific events like war, famine, or natural disaster, and certain 

populations are historically more vulnerable to such events as a result of 

overpopulation and under-developed infrastructure. Technological disasters such 

as Chernobyl or Bhopal may foreshadow future after-effects related to weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD) bear relationship to an aspect of the homeland 

defense mission. 

A “Peer” by Any Other Name 

Who might cause the United States to back away from a legitimate national 

objective? By definition, the answer is a “peer competitor” or a “near peer.” A 

peer competitor, in the national security sense, is any nation whose capabilities 

are such that in a supreme test of wills with the United States, the outcome is 

uncertain. The peer relationship—military and/or economic—might be symmetric, 

where their capabilities mirror those of the United States, or asymmetric, where their 

strengths play to U.S. weaknesses.

A peer’s instruments of national power need not be at parity with the United 

States, even in the symmetric case. It is not a question of whether, in a supreme 

test of wills, the United States could prevail. Rather it is a question of whether 

the U.S. can prevail at an acceptable cost. History shows that in a contest between 

nations the winner is not necessarily the most endowed nation, but the one whose 

government can extract the necessary treasure and commitment from its people.

What appears to be different today, and likely to be so in the future, is that 

adversaries who might not have been labeled a “peer” or “near peer” in the past, 

 

1. Former “stability and support operations.” 
WHY DO WE HAVE A MILITARY? I 7

by dint of available technology and homeland insecurity, could raise costs to a 

level where they prevail and the United States does not. 

China, the “Elephant in the Room” 

China, the world’s most populous nation, is poised to become the world’s 

largest economy. Yet China is not the only “elephant in the room.” Even in 

conventional terms, a resurgent Russia or a surging India might qualify. 

By 2025 the number of English–speaking Chinese is likely to exceed the 

number of native English speakers in the rest of the world. More honor students 

(top quartile) are currently in school in China than the total number of students 

in the United States. If you are “one in a million” in China, then there are 1,300 

other people just like you (in India, 1,100). According to The World Factbook, the 

current population of China is 1,321,851,888 (Central Intelligence Agency, July 

2007 est.) This August the one-millionth auto rolled off the Chevy assembly 

plant in China. It took 6 years to produce the first half-million, and just a yearand-a-half to produce the second half million. 

For centuries China stood as a leading civilization, outpacing the rest of the 

world in the arts and sciences, but in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the 

country was beset by civil unrest, major famines, military defeats, and foreign 

occupation. After World War II, the Communists under Mao Zedong established 

an autocratic socialist system that, while ensuring China’s sovereignty, imposed 

strict controls over everyday life and cost the lives of tens of millions of people. 

After 1978, his successor, Deng Xiaoping, and other leaders focused on marketoriented economic development and, by 2000, output had quadrupled. For much 

of the population, living standards have improved dramatically and the room for 

personal choice has expanded, yet political controls remain tight.2

 

In what may prove a mastery of understatement, the DOD, in its annual 

report to Congress, remarked that “China’s rapid rise as a regional political and 

economic power with global aspirations is an important element of today’s 

strategic environment—one that has significant implications for the region and 

the world.” The report goes on to state that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

is transforming from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its 

territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity 

 

2. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html 
8 I PART I. CHAPTER 1 

conflicts against high-tech adversaries dependent on “informatization.” China’s 

ability to project power is presently limited but it seems only a matter of time. 

Significantly, China is perhaps the most assiduous student of U.S. military 

doctrine and operations, adopting and adapting, copying and countering, looking 

to play the game and to change the game. Fortunate for the United States, and 

like our nation, China is a prolific publisher of its military thinking. 

The “Cost Equation” and Asymmetries 

The cost of a military adventure is reflected along several dimensions, not all 

easily denominated in dollars and cents. One of those dimensions is human 

lives—U.S. combatants, theirs, and innocent civilians.3 Others include 

international standing, the cost of materiel expended, the opportunity cost of 

manpower employed, and the loss of civil liberties and economic well-being for 

the civilian population. Table 1-1 illustrates the ways in which an asymmetric 

adversary would impose untenable costs on the United States, and the 

technology “drivers” that facilitate the imposition of such costs. 

The current situation is that U.S. costs are increasing while the adversary 

enjoys a declining cost. The adversary enjoys a world awash in conventional 

weapons—a buyer’s market, bargain prices. Commercial technologies obviate his 

development costs, and he requires a less diverse arsenal of weapons and tactics 

because the battlefield is known and local. The adversary devalues life; bears 

lower costs for training, rations, and quarters; brings mass to the force-on-force 

equation; and uses “human guidance” rather than more expensive technical 

guidance. Moreover, the adversary accepts more readily the use of weaponry that 

may endanger its user—e.g., chemical, biological, and/or radiological weapons. 

This is not the case for the United States. 

 

3. Cf., CRS Report for Congress—American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics, Order 

Code RL32492 
WHY DO WE HAVE A MILITARY? I 9

Table 1-1. Imposing Untenable Costs on the United States through 

“Irregular Warfare” and Associated Technologies 

“All’s Fair in ...War” Technology Drivers 

 Unconventional warfare—no holds 

barred—a time-proven technique against 

an otherwise superior conventional force 

 Recent Lebanon example—Israel v. 

Hezbollah 

 Threaten a long, protracted war of attrition 

 Raise the level of violence and brutality 

 Exploit the “home-field” advantage 

 Expand and escalate by targeting U.S. 

homeland and key allies 

 Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) information and 

communication technologies adaptable to coordinate 

military operations 

 Satellite and cellular phones, and internet 

 Commercial encryption 

 Personal Global Positioning System 

 Personal digital assistants (PDAs) w/ maps and images 

 COTS sensor technologies 

 Arrays of unattended sensors for tactical warning 

 Night vision devices 

 Adaptable weaponry 

 Shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile (SAM) and anti-armor 

 Integration of COTS sensors into seekers–“fire and forget” 

 Innovative explosives–thermobaric and fuel-air mixtures; 

new energies 

 Next-generation improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 

 Explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), sensors and 

networks–smart and mobile 

 Lethal “non-lethals” 

 Long-range acoustics, millimeter wave and laser dazzlers 

 WMD, esp. biotechnologies 

In material terms, “war U.S.-style” is becoming increasingly costly. The 

United States employs higher and higher cost weaponry. Consumables are often 

too expensive for live-fire training. Often, more specialized elements require a 

more diverse arsenal, which complicates logistics and affords a smaller and 

smaller inventory, which means that stockpiles can be exhausted and stockpile 

replenishment may have a long lead-time. The United States also takes it upon 

itself to bear the high cost of cleanup—it almost seems as if to the vanquished go 

the spoils. 

With respect to the human toll on innocent civilians, the U.S. strategy is to 

reduce “collateral damage.” Through better command, control, communications, 

computing, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); targeting; 

and precision weapons the United States has been able to reduce civilian 

casualties (Figure 1-1). The asymmetric adversary, however, is frequently 

disposed to try and force the United States to increase, rather than decrease, the 

grisly toll. In this endeavor, the adversary is often assisted by a media attuned to 
10 I PART I. CHAPTER 1 

the horrors of war. In applying such a cost-incurring strategy, the adversary has 

learned that one “on-camera” casualty is worth a multitude of dead and injured 

unseen in the living room. 

Figure 1-1. The Impact of War on Civilians and the Larger Geo-political Impact 

Not infrequently, international clashes have been decided fatefully by one 

opponent imposing untenable costs on the other. The application of costincurring strategies is no stranger to the United States. On occasion, the nation 

has practiced it successfully, beginning with the Revolutionary War.4

The United States has also imposed costs on a strategic adversary on a 

grander scale. A grand example was the continuing development of penetrating 

aircraft, which caused the Soviets to spend hundreds of billions on air defense. 

Another example was the (first) intervention in Afghanistan when the 

administration abandoned a policy of playing the game of Cold War geopolitics 

according to the rules of the Brezhnev Doctrine and challenged it both directly 

and indirectly. Having identified the Soviet economy as the "strategic center of 

gravity," the United States “adopted an asymmetric and cost-incurring strategy to 

exploit the mismatch between the large and growing U.S. economy and the much 

smaller Soviet economy.”5

 The Strategic Defense Initiative (known also as “Star 

 

4. A subsequent section of this report comments at length on the frequency with which smaller, less wellendowed nations prevail over stronger opponents. 

5. Mackubbin T. Owens, The "Correlation of Forces," Then and Now, http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/oped/ 

owens/04/cof.html Feb2004 
WHY DO WE HAVE A MILITARY? I 11

Wars”) would raise the arms race to a new plateau the Soviets could not afford to 

reach. These measures, inter alia, spun the Soviet Union into tactical retreat, 

which “soon constituted a strategic retreat of a kind that Lenin or Stalin could 

never have imagined, culminating in the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.” 

But, the United States is not the only successful practitioner of cost-incurring 

strategies. Witness the Vietnam War. Now, too, the nation finds itself on the 

receiving end with radical Jihadists, on the one hand, seeking to diminish U.S. 

influence in the Middle East, and China seeking to diminish U.S. influence in 

Asia by adopting an “anti-access” strategy. 

In a sense, the meaning of victory remains constant: the achievement of 

one’s target political objectives. What changes is the expansiveness of those 

objectives. The United States must constantly re-evaluate those political 

objectives to determine which are unobtainable without resorting to military 

power, but perhaps too costly for military solution. Learning how to wield better 

all other instruments of national power would seem like an excellent idea. 

Winning without fighting is surely preferable to the other alternatives, fighting 

without winning, even fighting and winning. 

Potential Military Applications 

No matter how desirable a set of “scenarios” may be for planning, the 

scenarios themselves have modest positive value and may even have negative 

value. Scenarios, intended only as notional examples, tend to take on an 

undeserved reality. As a compromise, Table 1-2 offers a smorgasbord of 

characteristics that help map the terrain of conflict. In this table, the “class” of 

crisis maps to a major military mission or objective. The characterization and 

examples of adversaries is self-explanatory. The attention of the reader is directed 

at the right-most column, which illustrates the kinds of things that might change 

the cost equation in conflict with the United States. 
12 I PART I. CHAPTER 1 

Table 1-2. The Spectrum of Crises: Types, Adversaries, Examples, and Complications 

Class 

Nature of 

Adversary Example 

Changing the Cost 

Equation 

Classic defense of 

ally 

Large rogue Korean War WMD coercion 

 Regional hegemon  China invades Taiwan 

 Russia invades 

Ukraine 

 Turkey invades or 

coerces Kurdistan 

 Access denial 

 Strikes and blockade 

 WMD coercion 

Seize and protect 

critical resources 

Islamist 

revolutionaries 

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait With and without WMD 

threats by third party 

Invasion and 

regime change 

Potentially large or 

populous state well 

prepared for 

irregular warfare 

Iran  C4ISR vulnerabilities 

 Potential for long-term 

stabilization 

Invasion and 

stabilize 

Islamists, 

revolutionaries, etc. 

Egypt and/or Saudi 

Arabia 

Global Islamist Jihad 

Deal with and 

recover from attack 

on homeland 

State or non-state 

actor 

Islamists with WMD  Multi-modal 

 Multiple, near 

simultaneous 

Toward a (New?) Theory of (New?) War 

War has been classically defined as the violent conflict between states where 

each tries to impose its political objective upon the other. While violence is 

timeless, states, which have been the critical actors for half a millennium, are 

themselves a relatively recent invention in the history of human conflict. 

Contemporary developments, however, have brought into question both the 

state-based nature of war and the need for physical violence. Non-state actors 

and cyber-based economic disruptions may change the character of warfare in 

this century. 

Still, war as an extension of politics always has a purpose. Appreciating this 

purpose helps predict an opponent’s strategy, tactics, and operations. 

Understanding the “why” helps anticipate the “who” and the “how.” Absent this 

understanding, analyses of future threats tend to focus on worst case scenarios 

regardless of how likely they might be. 
WHY DO WE HAVE A MILITARY? I 13

The United States is a nation-state with a superb conventional military atop a 

deep economic base. The concern, in this study, is only with adversaries capable 

of inflicting strategic damage—having the means, ways, and will—thereby, 

putting the outcome of any conflict in question. When a strategic adversary is a 

classical peer or near-peer it will have a national footprint and be more likely to 

directly engage U.S. military force. Other adversaries, classically “non-peer,” may 

never present coherent forces against which the United States could strike and 

are more likely to attack soft targets rather than risk major losses by attacking 

hard targets. 

Actors in war consist of a government, its people, and its military. In a peer, 

or nation-state, these three elements are distinct and clearly defined. Indeed, the 

law of war stipulates that the combatant forces—i.e., the military—be schooled 

in the law of war, be uniformed—i.e., identifiable—and be under positive 

command and control. Non-peers, like terrorist networks, observe none of these 

niceties. They may try to blend into the civilian, non-combatant population. 

Indeed, the only difference may be recruitment, which can wax and wane, giving 

comfort to the enemy or joining in directly. Instead of centralized leadership, 

such adversaries may act on general guidance from the center or merely presume 

their leaders’ intent. Their hierarchy may be flat and all command and control 

may be local. In the extreme, non-state actors operating independently in tune 

with a common ideology, pose a conundrum: nothing to hold at risk in the 

service of deterrence, and no head to decapitate. 

Losing a war is the failure to achieve one’s own political objective and/or 

being on the receiving end of an adversary’s agenda—failing to impose your will 

or finding yourself subject to his will. All losses are political, whether the result 

of physical or economic damage or, more rarely, simply the triumph of an 

opponent’s message. Conversely, winning a war is the achievement of the 

political goal at an acceptable cost. As described elsewhere, victory does not 

always go to the better endowed, but more often to the more resolute. Of 

course, not all wars end with the clarity of a winner and a loser. Neither may win, 

both may lose, each can become exhausted—a mutual loss of will. 

Despite the popular distinction between symmetry and asymmetry, no 

adversary knowingly plays his weakness into an opponent’s strength. Symmetric 

conflict is merely a miscalculation. 
14 I PART I. CHAPTER 1 

Target: United States 

Seen through hostile eyes from without, the United States has three primary 

“weaknesses” or handicaps: 

 plentiful soft civil and economic targets both here and abroad as a result 

of global presence 

 a feedback loop from its citizens to their government 

 a culture that places a high value on life—ours and theirs 

Current and potential adversaries need not—indeed do not—have such 

handicaps and the consequences for misunderstanding this can be dire. 

 In this spirit, consider the relative appeal of various weapons to the nonpeer adversary. Figure 1-2 illustrates the cost-benefit calculation for a non-state 

actor using a biological weapon. Biological warfare agents, never extensively used 

previously, pose the threat of an autonomous self-replicating agent—a new 

category of low-cost stealthy threats that can be released remotely, spread 

indefinitely, and overwhelm the present health care system (this phenomenon 

will be discussed in more detail in Part II of this report). 

Note: PHS: Public Health System; FRP: Federal Response Plan; NDMS: National Disaster Medical System 

Figure 1-2. The Cost-benefit Calculation for a Non-state Actor Using a Biological 

Weapon 
WHY DO WE HAVE A MILITARY? I 15

The psychological impact of such an attack could be enormous as citizens, 

themselves, become unwitting, unwilling weapons. Quarantine can be a force 

multiplier for the adversary: its potentially enormous economic impact can be 

greater than the immediate threat itself. Whether or not the United States 

chooses to quarantine itself, other countries will not hesitate. The progression of 

biotechnology continually lowers the threshold for developing such a weapon, 

and many deadly agents exist readily in nature. (Similar analyses could be made 

for nuclear or other weapons systems or attacks.) 

Thus, the United States must do a better job of seeing itself as the target 

sought out by its adversaries and appreciating the calculus they employ in 

planning their attacks and adapting their tactics. 
16 I PART I. CHAPTER 2 

Chapter 2. The Past: Fads and Phases in Warfare 

The style and sequence of armed conflict can be described in many ways. 

Indeed, published students of military history often provide distinctive sequences 

of phases that characterize the evolution of warfare and not all of them agree. 

These differences largely reflect the discontinuities in the style and substance of 

armed conflict—the essence of this chapter. Sometimes the discontinuities are 

easily recognized; more often, they are apparent only in retrospect and from a 

distance. This point is important in that it reflects the difficulty that nations face 

in noticing ongoing, significant change and reacting to it in a timely way—in 

essence, the difficulty embodied in anticipating the next discontinuity and 

appreciating its timing. 

National Security Policy Phases 

Writing in 1954, Samuel P. Huntington argued that the history of the United 

States could be divided into three broad national security policy phases, each 

identified by broad, enduring national security policy objectives. To remain 

relevant each of the military services had to modify their “strategic concepts” to 

conform to the requirements of each unique era. Huntington described these 

eras as following: 

1. Continental Era (1783–1889) where the objective was to secure the 

continent and preserve the Union. The United States abstained from 

entangling alliances, engaged the rest of the world with naval forces only, 

and the dominant service was the Army. 

2. Oceanic Era (1890–1946) where the objective was to secure the 

maritime approaches to the hemisphere to allow more active participation 

in world affairs. During this period, the United States began to send large 

expeditionary forces overseas. The dominant service was the Navy. 

3. Transoceanic Era (1947–1990) where the objective was to deter and 

contain a hostile ideological continental peer located across the oceans. 

It was an era replete with entangling alliances as the United States began 

to base combat forces overseas. The dominant service, initially, was the 

Air Force. 

 In 1961, the “dominant service resource allocation model” is replaced 

by a standing joint forces resource allocation model. The planning, 
THE PAST: FADS AND PHASES IN WARFARE I 17

programming, and budgeting system “locks in” the 1/3-1/3-1/3 

resource allocation model. 

 By 1973, the U.S. armed forces shift from a conscription force to a 

standing all-volunteer, professional total force (active and reserve 

components). 

 By 1986, the search for the best means to achieve unified action of the 

armed forces ends with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 

 In 1989, the era ends unexpectedly with the demolition of the Berlin 

Wall and, a year later, VII corps is on the way to fight in the first 

Persian Gulf War. 

While not part of the Huntington framework, the Global Era describes well 

the aftermath of the Transoceanic Era. During this era, the United States has 

assumed a new “joint expeditionary posture” with fewer forward-based forces 

and most of its combat power based on sovereign soil. The nation’s exterior 

basing network resembles the British “coaling station” network with Europe as 

a “strategic trampoline” and over 90 status-of-forces agreements and numerous 

“gas-and-go” agreements. Global strike forces now focus on conventional 

attack and the United States maintains a global command, control, 

communications, and intelligence (C3I) network providing support to the 

operational/tactical warfighter. 

Through all of these phases, the United States maintained an expeditionary 

posture. But the use of the military became more frequent, with less “slack time” 

through each succeeding era, as shown in Figure 1-3. The U.S. national security 

aperture has progressively widened from a continental, to oceanic, to 

transoceanic, to global focus. Economic and technological globalization has led 

to global problems such as proliferation, terrorism with global reach, and radical 

extremists loosely but globally networked. Moreover, the lack of a peer military 

threat has allowed an unprecedented operations tempo and ever more frequent 

major combat operations. 

Since the creation of the nation, the U.S. military has been called upon many 

times. They have fought with distinction in many places and under many 

conditions. Overall, neither the frequency of deployment nor the locale appears 

to be predictable, as borne out in Figure 1-4. Contemporaneous events, equally 

unpredictable, overall, are the forcing factor. 
18 I PART I. CHAPTER 2 

Figure 1-3. The Increasingly Frequent Deployment of U.S. Forces and the Consequent 

Reduction in "Slack Time" 

Figure 1-4. U.S. Involvement in Military Action, 1800–2006
THE PAST: FADS AND PHASES IN WARFARE I 19

The Revolution in Military Affairs 

“Generations” of Warfare 

The four generations of modern war, according to its author,6 began with the 

Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years’ War and established 

a “state monopoly” on war. Previously, many different entities had fought 

wars—families, tribes, religions, cities, business enterprises—using not just 

armies and navies but also, for example, bribery and assassination. For much of 

the intervening years, state militaries have found it difficult to imagine war in any 

way other than fighting state armed forces similar to themselves. In his book, 

Lind describes the four generations of war as follows: 

1. The First Generation of modern war, roughly 1648 to 1860, was war of 

line and column tactics, formal battles, and an orderly battlefield—one 

that created a military culture of order. Much that distinguishes “military” 

from ”civilian”—uniforms, saluting, gradations, and rank—developed 

during this era to reinforce the culture of order. Alas, in mid-19th 

century, rifled muskets, then breech loaders and machine guns, made the 

old line and column tactics first obsolete, then suicidal. Ever since then, 

the contradiction has grown between the orderly military culture and the 

increasing disorderliness of the battlefield. 

2. Second Generation warfare answered this contradiction by the end of 

World War I with mass firepower, mostly indirect artillery fire. The goal 

was attrition, and the doctrine was summed up by the French as, “The 

artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.” Centrally-controlled firepower, 

infantry, tanks, and artillery, were choreographed in a “conducted battle” 

where the commander was the “conductor” of the orchestra. 

Second Generation warfare came as a great relief to soldiers (or at least 

their officers) because it preserved the culture of order. Focusing on 

rules, processes, and procedures, obedience trumped initiative and 

discipline was imposed top-down. Having learned Second Generation 

warfare from the French during World War I, it remains the American 

way of war—"putting steel on target," though aviation has supplanted 

artillery as the source of most firepower—despite the Marine's formal 

doctrine, which is Third Generation maneuver warfare. 

 

6. William S. Lind, Understanding Fourth Generation War, 15 Jan 2004, www.antiwar.com. 
20 I PART I. CHAPTER 2 

3. Third Generation warfare, also a product of World War I, was developed 

by the German Army, and is commonly known as Blitzkrieg or maneuver 

warfare. Here, the emphasis is not on firepower and attrition but speed, 

surprise, and mental as well as physical dislocation. Tactically, in the attack 

a Third Generation military seeks to get into the enemy's rear and collapse 

him from the rear forward. Instead of “close with and destroy,” the motto 

is “bypass and collapse.” In the defense, it attempts to draw the enemy in, 

and then cut him off. War ceases to be a shoving contest, where forces 

attempt to hold or advance a “line;” third generation warfare is non-linear. 

Not only do tactics change in the Third Generation, so does the military 

culture. A Third Generation military focuses outward, on the situation, 

the enemy, and the result the situation requires, not inward on process 

and method. Orders themselves specify the result to be achieved, but 

not, generally, the method (“Auftragstaktik”). Initiative is more important 

than obedience (mistakes are tolerated, so long as they come from too 

much initiative rather than too little), and it all depends on self-discipline, 

not imposed discipline. 

4. Fourth Generation war undoes the state monopoly on war and is 

marked by a return to a world of cultures, not merely states, in conflict. 

Here, invasion by immigration can be at least as dangerous as invasion by 

a state army. Nor is Fourth Generation warfare merely something that is 

imported, as was the case of 9/11. At its core lies a universal crisis of 

legitimacy of the state, and that crisis means many countries will evolve 

Fourth Generation war on their soil. 

One key to success in Fourth Generation war may be “losing to win.” Where 

the initial invasion destroys the state, it provides fertile ground for Fourth 

Generation forces. In a world where the state is in decline, if you destroy a state, it 

is very difficult to recreate it. While war against another state may be necessary, 

one should seek to preserve that state even as one defeats it. Grant the opposing 

armies the “honors of war,” tell them what a fine job they did, make their defeat 

“civilized” so they can survive the war institutionally intact, and then work for 

your side. This approach would be similar to 18th century notions of civilized war 

and contribute greatly to propping up a fragile state. Humiliating the defeated 

enemy troops, especially in front of their own population, is a serious mistake. 
THE PAST: FADS AND PHASES IN WARFARE I 21

Victory to the Mighty, or to the Resolute? 

It is relatively easy to rank the military prowess, size, and resources of 

contenders, but it is a good deal harder to predict the outcome of any match. 

Victory does not always favor the largest, best-endowed side. Frequently, it 

comes down to “will,” which may be uncorrelated with raw capability. Weaker 

opponents win a surprising number of times, as Figure 1-5 shows. 

 Since World War II, weaker opponents have outdone stronger 

opponents in 39 percent of wars (Sullivan).7

 Over the past 200 years, weaker opponents have outdone stronger foes 

41 percent of the time (DeMesquita).8

Source: Jason Lyall, Princeton University and Lt. Col. Isaiah Wilson III, U.S. Military Academy at West 

Point. The Washington Post

Figure 1-5. How Likely is it that Powerful Countries can Defeat Insurgencies? 

 

7. Patricia L. Sullivan, “War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars.” Journal of 

Conflict Resolution, June 2007, Vol 51, No. 3: 496–524. 

8. Bueno de Mesquita (2000). 
22 I PART I. CHAPTER 2 

The United States has 

 won 81 percent of interventions where cooperation was not required 

 won 44 percent of interventions with political aims; withdrew without 

achieving political objectives 56 percent of the time9 

Based on these statistics, one may conclude that powerful nations tend to 

“win” when aims can be achieved by brute force, but more often “lose” when 

victory requires an opponent’s “cooperation”—i.e., “winning their hearts and 

minds.” As Richard Nixon declared in an earlier time, the war is not a test of 

power; it is a test of will and character. 

Even earlier, C.E. Callwell,10 a colonel in the British army, wrote in 1896 that 

a powerful force can easily lose if it does not fully understand the enemy, fails to 

describe clear objectives, or, in the worst case of all, pursues military objectives 

that do not contribute to the conflict’s political goal. A larger obstacle to 

“winning” wars against insurgents—“small wars,” as he called them—is that 

mere victory is not enough: the enemy must be thoroughly destroyed to the last, 

which means enormous civilian casualties. For most democracies, he explained, 

this is unacceptable. The level of violence and barbarism it would take to beat an 

insurgent force is an action most democracies would refuse to take. This keeps 

victory out of reach.11 

How do Strong Nations Miscalculate? 

At the risk of being repetitive, the outcome of a “war” depends not only on 

the relative military capabilities of the combatants, but also on their respective 

commitments to the war aims—their “resolve.” It is relatively easy to measure 

and compare military capabilities, but much harder to estimate the respective 

resolve of the combatants. Resolve is increasingly important if the intent is not to 

annihilate the adversary or exact spoils of war but to change his mindset—i.e., to 

impose a new political agenda. 

Historically, strong states appear to have focused on their might and neglected 

to account accurately for their will and, especially, the adversary’s. The cost of 

victory is increasingly harder to estimate accurately as relative resolve becomes a 

 

9. Patricia L. Sullivan, June 2007. 

10. C.E. Callwell, Small Wars, 1896 

11. Cf. Larry Kahaner, http://www.hnn.us/articles/31296.html 
THE PAST: FADS AND PHASES IN WARFARE I 23

more influential factor in the outcome of a conflict. Generally, resolve needs to 

increase when an opponent’s “cooperation” is needed, say, to achieve political 

objectives. If resolve is misestimated, powerful nations can be pushed beyond 

their cost tolerance and forced to withdraw. Thus, the probability that a strong 

state will prevail over a weak adversary declines as the need for cooperation to 

achieve aims increases. 

Psychological research shows that cognitive biases in how people process 

information and evaluate risk predispose political leaders to favor military action 

over diplomatic solutions. 

Such impulses may incline national leaders to 

 exaggerate the evil intentions of adversaries 

 misjudge how adversaries perceive them 

 attribute aggressive behavior of the other side to deep hostilities, 

excusing their own provocations as being “pushed into a corner” 

 be overly sanguine when hostilities start 

 be overly reluctant to make necessary concessions in negotiations 

These biases have the effect of making wars more likely to begin and more 

difficult to end. As has been noted: for the weaker, not losing is winning; for the 

stronger, not winning is losing. Of course, the preferred paradigm should be 

winning without fighting. 

1990s: Happy Times for Military Planners 

As a result of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the U.S. victory in the first Gulf 

War, the 1990s gave rise to an era of strategic optimism. Analysts concluded that 

because of its edge in emerging technologies, especially information technologies, 

the U.S. position in the world was unassailable for the foreseeable future. As well, 

there was no “peer competitor” on the horizon capable of replacing the Soviet 

Union as an existential threat to the United States. 

This apparent national security situation led U.S. planners in many cases to 

adopt simplified—if not simplistic—defense planning assumptions: 

1. Challenges to U.S. security would arise primarily from regional powers and 

involve regional/theater contingencies featuring conventional major 

combat operations. 
24 I PART I. CHAPTER 2 

2. These likely adversaries would be smaller, less capable versions of the 

U.S.S.R. 

3. The U.S. monopoly in strike, information technology, and stealth would 

constitute a barrier to entry for adversaries and would continue into the 

foreseeable future. 

These assumptions led to major changes in U.S. force structure, including the 

“conventionalization” of the U.S. strategic bomber force and a shift in the focus of 

space and C3I programs from the strategic level to the operational/technological 

level. Planers assumed that since future wars would be short, “strategic speed” had 

become critical. Thus joint planners stressed such concepts as “rapid halt,” “rapid 

decisive operations,” “shock and awe,” and “10-30-30.” One consequence of 

perspective was a lack of focus on stabilization operations, also referred to as 

Phase IV. 

Speed, Stealth, Precision, and Information 

At the close of the last century, the peerless performance of the U.S. military 

was conditioned largely by speed, stealth, and precision. All three were enabled, 

in one way or another, by the information revolution—a revolution the DOD 

helped bring about. The troika of speed, stealth, and precision all embodied 

important physical aspects: 

 Speed was the result of materials engineering and fabrication 

improvements but even these derived, in part, from advances in 

computational power and complexity. As important, speed of response 

resulted not only from V and V but also from better, quicker, more 

universally available targeting information from our C4ISR capabilities. 

 Stealth, too, rested on powerful design computational capabilities as well 

as materials. 

 Precision most clearly resulted from navigational (GPS) capabilities as 

well as benefiting enormously from C4ISR. 

DOD investments in command and control, communications, computing 

and remote sensing paid huge dividends in improved military capability. The 

investment horizon stretches back at least to 1943 when ENIAC—the first large 

scale, electronic, digital computer—was built for trajectory computations. There 

were many milestones along the way. Many, if not most, were funded by the 

Department, including the ARPANET and a succession of ever faster 
THE PAST: FADS AND PHASES IN WARFARE I 25

supercomputers to feed the cryptologic maw. Among the innumerable 

competitive advantages to U.S. forces which leverage these investments include 

the following: 

 information sharing across services and echelons 

 pervasive communications, which enable coordination of activities across 

services and units 

 common situational awareness, which promotes understanding across 

battle elements 

 assistance in accurate and rapid decision-making 

 precision geo-location and persistent sensors, which enable accurate 

tracking and targeting 

 sensor-to-shooter links—and, in some cases, sensor-to-seeker links—that 

enable real-time tracking and targeting 

These, in turn, support tactics based upon speed of maneuver and synchrony 

of action across service elements. 

On the commercial front, as well, DOD utilization of Internet and commercial 

satellites and networks enabled rapid and effective access not only to information 

but also to the commercial transportation industry for movement of equipment 

and troops and access to other commercial services, such as SCADA [supervisory 

control and data acquisition] systems, that support warfighter. The U.S. reliance on 

commercial-off-the-shelf components also underscores U.S. reliance on 

technology. Further the indefatigable use of information technology—some would 

say overly dependent—has surely not escaped notice by potential adversaries. 
26 I PART I. CHAPTER 3 

Chapter 3. The Role of Technology: 

Weapons that Change War 

While politics, religion, and the like may set the course of war, unequivocally 

technology can change the course of the war, as illustrated by these examples12: 

 Catapults, invented by the Greeks in 400 B.C., were used in ancient and 

medieval times to hurl stones, spears, and other objects at fortifications. 

Te first war of the engineers? 

 The Trojan Horse, in legend, epitomized the steady evolution of denial and 

deception. The stealth bomber of its day, or merely a glorified siege tower? 

 Crossbows, invented in China and perfected in medieval Europe, 

propelled arrows with tremendous force as far as 350–400 yards and 

allowed soldiers to fire from great distances and avoid close contact with 

the enemy. Alternatively, the English long-bow—perhaps the AK-47 of 

its day—could deliver twice as many aimed shots per minute and 

permitted greater maneuverability. 

 Gunpowder and cannons developed in the 1300s could demolish castle 

walls and blast through wooden ships. 

 Rifled barrels and spin stabilization enabled longer range accuracy and 

the construct still competes well with “fin stabilization,” first proven in 

the bow and arrow. 

 Machine guns and “repeating rifles” like the Gatling gun and the Spencer 

Carbine first used in the American Civil War allowed for rapid, 

continuous fire, eliminating frequent reloading. Subsequently, the Maxim 

gun helped reverse the fortunes of the fixed defender. 

 Minié Ball, a conical bullet with a hollow base that expanded when fired, 

used in the 19th century, which markedly improved precision over the 

round “musket ball.” 

 Tanks—armored combat vehicles equipped with cannon and machine 

guns—ended trench warfare with their caterpillar traction that could 

 

12. Martin Van Crevald. Technology and War from 2000 B.C. to the Present. New York: The Free Press, 

1989. Other examples selected from various Google searches. 
WEAPONS THAT CHANGE WAR I 27

bulldoze over trenches. First used at the end of World War I, they 

symbolized modern warfare. 

 Combat aircraft, both bombers and fighter planes, changed the nature of 

war during World War II. Air superiority became critical to victory. 

“Strategic” bombardment of civilians reached new heights. In the Pacific, 

aircraft changed the nature of naval warfare. 

 Submarines, too, changed the nature of naval warfare, which dramatically 

became three-dimensional. Submarines performed tactical missions such 

as enforcing blockades and denying access, and played a strategic role as 

a stealthy (and survivable) leg of the triad. 

 Radar and navigation aids of the Second World War elevated aerial 

bombardment and air defense to a new plateau. 

 Radio frequency command, control, and communications enabled 

battlefield coherence and paved the way for massed effects without 

necessarily massing men and machines into an inviting target. 

 Nuclear weapons, developed in 1945, allow for massive destruction 

and, as with chemical and biological weaponry, became subject to 

treaty limitations. 

 Smart bombs (or precision-guided munitions) hit their targets much 

more frequently and cause both fewer casualties and less damage to 

civilian areas. 

Indeed, as described at the end of the previous chapter, at the turn of the 

century the pre-eminence of the U.S. military was based on a troika of speed, 

stealth, and precision. For the future, it seems clear that the information revolution 

has not played itself out, biology is resurgent, and nanotechnology is poised. 

Directed energy has been, and remains, an area of anticipated development.13 How 

these will translate into changes in military fortune is legitimate speculation. 

 

13. Cf. Douglas Beason, Los Alamos National Laboratory. 
28 I PART I. CHAPTER 4 

Chapter 4. Present Concerns: What Now? 

The sovereignty of a nation-state, supreme within its borders, depends on the 

ability to defend those borders. Increasingly, sovereignty is challenged by new 

developments: 

 “recognition of human rights as norms transcending internal laws; 

 weapons of mass destruction that render the defense of state borders 

ineffectual for the protection of the society within; 

 global and transnational threats such as environmental insults, migration, 

population expansion, disease, or famine; 

 world economic regime that effectively curtails states in the management 

of their economic affairs; and 

 global communications network that penetrates borders electronically 

and threatens national languages, customs and cultures.” 

The counter to some of the most pressing challenges to sovereignty may not 

be traditional military might, as the examples below delineate. 

Trends 

One commentator on the evolution of modern warfare and U.S. defense 

planning focuses on trends he believes have sufficient momentum that they will 

persist into the future.14 Among the trends he identifies are: 

 Demographics. Demographic decline and collapse of public health in 

Russia as unlikely to be reversed in one generation, which argues against 

a resurgence of Russian national power in the near term. Similarly, the 

aging and contraction of Japan’s population suggests declining power. 

Consider, too, that the countries across the Mediterranean from Europe 

are growing in population, and there are already large Islamic populations 

in Europe with higher birth rates than the non-Islamic populations. 

 

14. Stephen Peter Rosen, “The Future of War and the American Military—Demography, technology and 

the politics of modern empire”, The Harvard Magazine, May-June 2002, http://www.harvardmagazine.com/ 

on-line/050218.html 
PRESENT CONCERNS: WHAT NOW? I 29

 Technology. Advances in information technology will continue, along 

with a diffusion of the ability to construct nuclear, biological, and 

chemical weapons. 

 Politics. The dominance of democracies and international institutions in 

Europe seems likely to insure relative international peace, while the 

comparative rarity of stable democracies in Asia—from Turkey to 

Korea—together with the social dislocations associated with the process 

of industrialization and economic growth, suggest a more turbulent 

future for that populous continent. 

Information Technology 

The U.S. military, as never before, is dependent on information technology. 

Much of this is embedded in C4ISR systems without which our present methods 

of war prosecution might falter. As we learn daily, both military and commercial 

cyber space is vulnerable and defending it is daunting. Technological advance 

consistently seems to favor offense over defense. To make matter worse, despite 

hand wringing, the United States continues to allocate its scarcest resource—the 

most highly skilled—to computer exploitation and attack, rather than to defense. 

Successful attacks on information systems are categorized according to 

whether the confidentiality of the data was breached, the integrity of the data 

compromised, or the availability of the data lost. Yet much of what plagues 

NIPRNET (the unclassified, but sensitive internal DOD network) today, is 

unauthorized access to data and occasional attempts at “denial of service”—that 

is, attacks on confidentiality and sometimes availability. In some ways, however, 

attacks on data integrity, particularly unrecognized attacks by the “high end” 

adversary, could represent the graver threat to military operations. Graver, still, 

than remote hacks via NIPRNET are supply-chain attacks and threats from 

recruited insiders. The consensus is that we have not really experienced, or 

perhaps not recognized, these yet. In the event, the result might be disruption of 

C4ISR services to the warfighter, leading to: 

 degraded communications 

 imprecise geo-location 

 inaccurate and/or tardy targeting 

 misinformation 

 delayed and/or incorrect decision making at all levels 
30 I PART I. CHAPTER 4 

The net effect would likely be to jeopardize speed of maneuver and 

synchrony of action. The effects are undeniable and the attraction to the 

adversaries irresistible. It is essential that the United States establish the capability 

to “fight through” such calamities. More realistic exercises that force alternate 

courses of action would be a first step, as the Defense Science Board has 

recommended repeatedly. 

Is Combat Force Sized to the Mission(s)? 

When a challenge to U.S. interests arises that requires military force, the 

nation must be ready to act when needed, not worry about raising the required 

number of combat troops once such a crisis presents itself. When U.S. combat 

forces are deployed, they need to be sent in sufficient quantity to indicate that 

the United States means business. 

The current U.S. military deployment in Iraq focuses attention on whether 

U.S. forces, overall, are sized properly for the missions they are likely to be called 

upon to execute. It also focuses attention on whether force policy and force 

composition are adequate. Even if the size of the current force is adequate, at 

more than a million members, whether enough of the force is trained for the 

right missions is in question. Today, there is more “tail” than “tooth”; few forces 

are trained for stabilization and reconstruction; and members of the reserve 

components are being used at unprecedented levels, while many likely assumed 

they would not be deployed for years on end. Different missions call for 

different force inventory (such as a greater number of soldiers, properly trained 

and prepared for years of occupation). 

The immediate concern, illustrated in Figure 1-6, is that keeping well in 

excess of 100,000 troops in Iraq through 2008 will severely strain the military. 

Indeed, coupled with the desire to ensure that all active-duty Army units get at 

least 12 months15 at home between deployments, the Army already has found it 

necessary to extend tour length in Iraq from 12 to 15 months. The Army 

National Guard and the Army Reserve are still slated to serve 12-month tours. 

All reserve component personnel, including the Army National Guard, will now 

 

15. Secretary Gates is quoted as hoping to achieve a “rotation goal for army active duty forces of 12 

months deployed and 24 months at home.” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/ 

6546925.stm 
PRESENT CONCERNS: WHAT NOW? I 31

be mobilized for a maximum of 12 months at a time, with the goal of five years 

at home before their next mobilization. 

Note: All numbers are end-of-month estimates or latest available for current month. 

Source: The Brookings Institute 

Figure 1-6. Troop Strength in Iraq

There are proposals to increase the size of the land component, the Army and 

Marines, by as much as 100,000 troops to supplement the existing 500,000 plus 

troops. In February 2007, the Secretary announced that DOD will be increasing 

the permanent end strength of the Army and Marine Corps by some 92,000 over 

the next five years. According to some, that is the minimum required to maintain 

presence in the world’s hot spots—Iraq and Afghanistan today—and be prepared 

to defend U.S. interests around the world wherever challenged. That challenge 

might come elsewhere in the Middle East or in Korea, Taiwan, or the Horn of 

Africa, or in some location not yet on the radar screen. As previously stated, 

available forces would need to meet such challenges; and it is unlikely that strategic 

warning or foresight would allow time to recruit, train, and equip new forces. 

Underscoring the contention that the U.S. Army is undersized, last year, the 

Pentagon reportedly was forced to deploy the 82nd Airborne Division’s “ready 

brigade” to Iraq. This is the unit that is supposed to be on call to respond to a 

crisis anywhere on a moment’s notice. Indeed, Secretary Gates, himself, admitted 

that he had “...two concerns about the state of the U.S. military. One was that the 

Army and the Marine Corps were not big enough to accommodate the multiple 
32 I PART I. CHAPTER 4 

missions that they had been given over the past dozen years or so. The second was 

the use and condition of the National Guard.”16

A substantial fraction of today’s military burden is borne by guard and 

reserve forces, themselves hard-pressed to fulfill their assignments. Indeed, there 

has been a dramatic shift over the last decade in the role and capabilities of the 

National Guard. As Secretary Gates confirmed, “For much of the last century, 

the Guard was largely considered a strategic reserve, standing by in case of a 

mass mobilization. It was not a priority for funding and equipment, even though 

its members had served in every conflict from the Revolutionary War onwards. 

Since September 11, we’ve seen a remarkable transformation of the Guard—

from a strategic reserve to a fully operational reserve that is an integral, indeed an 

indispensable, part of America’s pool of forces used in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

elsewhere in the broader Global War on Terror.” 

These positive changes notwithstanding, a larger problem looms. As the 

Defense Science Board has observed previously, although the U.S. military may 

manage to reduce the duration of the initial combat phase, so-called “Phase IV” 

operations have proved more resistant and historically such operations average 

around a decade in length. Were the U.S. military to engage more frequently than 

once a decade—as it has, recently—then the cumulative requirement for U.S. 

military forces would rise monotonically (and endlessly). Of course, a helping hand 

from allied and coalition forces can ease this burden, but it still appears crushing. 

Recently, Army Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, President Bush’s new war adviser,17

said in an interview that frequent tours for U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan 

have stressed the all-volunteer force and made it worth considering a return to a 

military draft.18

 

16. Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, speaking before the Senior Leadership Meeting of the National 

Guard, 27 February 2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1128 

17. Deputy national security adviser with responsibility for ensuring efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are 

coordinated with policymakers in Washington. 

18. National Public Radio's “All Things Considered,” 10 August 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/ 

story/0,2933,292949,00.html 
PRESENT CONCERNS: WHAT NOW? I 33

American Victory versus American Liberties 

There has always been a tension between steps the government takes to secure 

the homeland and the individual liberties of its citizens—the challenge of 

mobilizing a free society. 

 During the Civil War period what has been called a constitutional 

dictatorship suspended civil liberties, including habeas corpus. 

 During World War II, a crisis government subjected its citizens to 

rationing, price controls, and blackouts, and interned many of them. 

Under massive assault, a democracy will turn to extreme measures it would 

not ordinarily use in peace times, infringing on civil rights and suspending due 

process. When the crisis is declared over, the liberties are returned. This begs the 

question, of course, of who decides when or whether the crisis is over? 
34 I PART I. CHAPTER 5 

Chapter 5. The Future: What is New? 

As skeptics predicted, and events such as 9/11 and the war in Iraq have 

demonstrated, adversaries have adapted to American power by adopting 

“asymmetric” responses to U.S. advantages. The result has been the emergence 

of trends, as described in this chapter, which undermine older U.S. planning 

assumptions and require rethinking the character of future war. 

Technical Innovation—Military Revolution 

As discussed previously, the technology vectors that loosely characterized the 

ascendancy of the U.S. military at the end of the 20th century are “speed,” 

“stealth,” and “precision,” along with the general application of information 

technology to command and control and to situational awareness. It is likely that 

none of these vectors has played itself out, as yet. Inevitably, however, the 

United States will begin to face diminishing returns and, worse, potential 

adversaries will threaten to catch up. Worrisome, too, would be counter-stealth 

advances and, of course, threats to U.S. information dominance by attacking the 

nation’s information technology infrastructure. Perhaps worst of all would be 

technological advances in the development, manufacture, and dissemination of 

WMD agents, although all the steps are probably within reach of a determined 

adversary currently. 

Nation-State versus Stateless Nation 

As Bobbitt has so clearly stated, for five centuries it has taken the resources 

of a state to destroy another state.19 Only states could muster the huge revenues, 

conscript the vast armies, and equip the divisions required to threaten the 

survival of other states. Indeed, as Bobbitt points out, posing such threats, and 

meeting them, created the modern state. In such a world, every state knew that 

its enemy would be drawn from a small class of nearby potential adversaries with 

local interests. But this is no longer true, owing to global interests, global reach, 

advances in international telecommunications, rapid computation, and methods 

of mass destruction. 

 

19. Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles—War, Peace and the Course of History, 2002. 
THE FUTURE: WHAT IS NEW? I 35

Others have remarked similarly, noting that in the 20th century—through the 

world-war period and super-power confrontation—wars between nation-states 

vastly overshadow other armed conflicts within the territories of existing states 

or empires.20 Indeed, at the turn of the 20th century Hague conventions codified 

the rules of war on the presumption that conflicts were to take place primarily 

between sovereign states. There was to be a bright line between war and peace—

conflicts starting with a declaration of war and ending with a treaty of peace. A 

similar immutable distinction could be made between combatants—“uniformed” 

and thus recognizable as belonging to an organized armed force—and noncombatants, civilians who deserved protection in time of war, insofar as possible. 

Changing Character (not Nature) of War 

In the 1990s, it was not unusual for planners to claim that emerging 

technologies had changed “the very nature of war.” But the nature of war—as 

best described by the Prussian “philosopher of war,” Carl von Clausewitz—

remains constant. The essence of war is the use of force by one actor to impose 

his will on an adversary—not an inanimate object, but an active will—who is 

trying to do the same to the former. Thus, adversaries respond to our actions by 

acting in unpredictable ways. 

On the other hand, the “character” of war can continuously evolve. Thus, a 

weaker adversary can adopt various modalities of war to engage and defeat a 

stronger power. Success in war has traditionally gone to the most adaptive side 

that can bear the costs of the conflict. 

Multi-Dimensional Warfare 

Nevertheless, war, properly understood, is always multidimensional. In the 

era of state-on-state warfare, the traditional or conventional category was central, 

but combatants also pursued strategies to exploit irregular capabilities—guerrilla 

warfare, insurgency, or disruptive attempts, such as acts of terrorism, to 

undermine an enemy’s public support for the war. But a particular form of 

multidimensional warfare may constitute the most demanding challenge to 

American planners in the future: “complex irregular warfare.” 

 

20. Eric Hobsbawn, The Future of War and Peace, see also The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-

1991. New York, N.Y.: Random House, Inc. 1996. 
36 I PART I. CHAPTER 5 

Complex Irregular Warfare 

Characteristics of complex irregular warfare include the likelihood that future 

adversaries will be “hybrids.” These hybrid threats will seek to raise the potential 

cost of U.S. military action by adopting aspects of all of the warfare categories. 

An example of a prototype hybrid is Hezbollah. During the 2006 war with 

Israel, Hezbollah exhibited both state-like capabilities—long-range missiles, antiship cruise missiles, sophisticated anti-armor systems, armed unmanned aerial 

vehicles, and signals intelligence—while still skillfully executing guerrilla warfare. 

Combining the two approaches complicates U.S. planning and execution. 

But hybrid warfare is not only a phenomenon associated with the “low end” 

of the spectrum of conflict. There is no reason that a future peer competitor 

would restrict military competition with the United States to only the 

“traditional” category. It would logically also try to confront the United States 

asymmetrically in those areas where the United States is perceived to be less 

capable than in the traditional category. The publication in China several years 

ago of Unrestricted Warfare indicates the potential of hybrid complex irregular 

warfare at the “upper end” of the spectrum of conflict. 

“Lawfare” 

In general, complex irregular warfare exploits the political effects of a conflict, 

seeking to undermine the legitimacy of U.S. military actions. Thus it exploits 

“lawfare,” the use of the rules of warfare against the United States (while ignoring 

these rules themselves), by, for example, taking refuge among the civilian 

population in an attempt to maximize civilian casualties. Such casualties are 

magnified by the proliferation of media assets on the battlefield, to the advantage 

of our adversaries. Complex irregular warfare is, above all, a battle of perceptions. 

History of the Law of War 

Rules regulating the practice of warfare date back to ancient societies.21

However, these regulations were more a matter of custom and philosophy than 

 

21. International Law Reports, vol. 110, Elihu Lauterpact, C.J. Greenwood, A.G. Oppenheimer (eds), 

Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 429 (recounting a passage in the Hindu epic Mahabharatha, in which 

the hero Arjuna refuses to use a weapon of mass destruction because to so would be contrary to religion 

and the laws of war). 
THE FUTURE: WHAT IS NEW? I 37

of law, and the brutality of the battlefield often did not reflect humanitarian 

constraints.22 As Christianity took root in Europe, canon lawyers and 

philosophers began to systematically explore theories of just war. In 1625, in the 

midst of the devastating Thirty Years War, Hugo Grotius published his 

watershed work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace), which set the 

theoretical tone for modern international law, setting its foundations upon 

natural law while providing a structure that housed the pragmatic application of 

political affairs.23 

Legal codification of the laws of war is thought to have begun in 1863, 

during the American Civil War with the Lieber Code, adopted as General Orders 

no. 100 of the Union Army.24 In Europe, the massive suffering of nearly 40,000 

soldiers wounded at the battle of Solferino inspired the Swiss businessman, Henri 

Duant, to found the Society of the Red Cross (later, the International Committee 

of the Red Cross).25 The Red Cross drew up the first Geneva Convention in 1864, 

which set out rules for the care and treatment of wounded soldiers; ten nations 

became signatories by the end of that year.26 The Geneva Conventions evolved 

and expanded, and, along with other treaties like the Hague Conventions of 1898 

and 1907, became the authoritative source of the laws of war. 

Contemporary Problems 

Two major problems confront the United States in its campaign against 

international terrorism, commonly referred to as the Global War on Terror 

(GWOT). The first is how to apply the traditional laws of war to an 

unconventional conflict. The second, and related problem, is the complications 

caused by the attempts by various actors (including U.S. lawmakers, international 

governments, and non-governmental organizations and associations) to bring the 

laws of war under the rubric of the criminal justice system. 

 

22. Ibid. at 430. The Second Lateran Council of the Catholic Church condemned the use of the crossbow 

and siege machine as “deadly and odious to God,” but the Church’s finding had little effect on the 

battlefield. 

23. Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, New York: Macmillan, 1947, pp.2-3. 

24. Howard S. Levie, “History of the law of war on land,” International Review of the Red Cross ̧ no. 838, p. 

339, (2000), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQHG. 

25. “From the Battle of Solferino to the First World War,” website of the International Committee of the 

Red Cross, available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JNVP. “From the Battle of 

Solferino to the First World War,” website of the International Committee of the Red Cross, available at 

http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JNVP. 

26. Ibid
38 I PART I. CHAPTER 5 

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush issued a military order that 

provided for the apprehension and trial by military commission of terrorists and 

co-conspirators responsible for the attacks.27 The administration claimed that al 

Qaeda terrorists and Taliban fighters were not protected by the Geneva 

Conventions because, as a terrorist organization, they were not members of the 

“High Contracting Parties,” that are signatories to the Conventions.28 In the U.S. 

Supreme Court case, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,

29 the Court disagreed with this position, 

and held that all persons detained by the United States in the GWOT are protected 

by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The Court also held the 

military commissions’ process to be invalid, and invited Congress to participate in 

setting up a framework for such commissions that would be legitimate. 

The Hamdan decision is widely criticized because many believe it misapplies 

Common Article 3, which was designed for conflicts “not of an international 

nature.” The Bush administration, and many experts, claimed that the GWOT 

was an international conflict, but the Court disagreed, writing that international 

conflicts can only be waged between nation-states. 

As an answer to Hamdan, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 

2006, establishing a process for military commissions for the detainees at 

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.30 The most controversial provision of the act is the 

limitations on U.S. courts to hear habeas corpus petitions by the detainees. The 

act provides the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia with 

exclusive jurisdiction to review final decisions by the military commissions, and 

challenges by detainees as to whether the Combatant Status Review Tribunal 

properly found them to be enemy combatants.31 The challenges to the 

constitutionality of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 will probably rest on 

whether or not detainees have a right to habeas review in U.S. courts. 

 

27. Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 

66 Fed. Reg. 57, 831-834 (Nov. 16, 2001). 

28. High Contracting Parties are the signatory nations of the Convention. The Taliban fighters were 

determined not to be prisoners of war because they did not follow the requirements to distinguish (i.e., 

identify) themselves in battle. See Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 

War, Art. 4(A) 1-2, belligerents (those taking part in hostilities) are required to be either a member of the 

regular forces, or to (1) be apart of a chain of command, (2) wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable from 

a distance, (3) carry arms openly, and (4) comply with the laws of war. 

29. 126 S. Ct 2749 (2006). 

30. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006. 

31. The CSRTs were set up to comply with article 5 of the Third Geneva Conventions that requires a 

hearing to determine the status (e.g., lawful combatant, unlawful combatant, non-combatant) of those 

captured 
THE FUTURE: WHAT IS NEW? I 39

The second problem with applying the laws of war in the GWOT is an 

attempt to undermine the use of the traditional laws of war, and replace them 

with criminal trials. Since the beginning of the GWOT, there have been those 

who insist that terrorist detainees should be treated as criminals rather than 

belligerents, and such voices have gained volume in recent times.32 The argument 

is that trying terrorists as criminals rather than belligerents would de-legitimize 

both their actions and their cause, while at the same time providing a transparent 

and politically advantageous legal process; whereas treating them as warfighters 

provides them with undeserved prestige, and trying them by commissions 

undermines the United States’ reputation as a nation of justice. 

The problem with this conflated approach is multileveled. First, criminal 

trials involve complex rules of evidence that would undermine many attempts to 

convict a person captured on the battlefield or captured using classified evidence 

and protected sources. Putting the warfighter into the position of forensic expert 

in the middle of mortal combat would be an undo burden. To expect soldiers in 

battle to have to simultaneously concern themselves with rules of evidence 

would force another level of risk into an already life-threatening situation and 

would be unacceptable. In addition, given that Americans are outraged when 

common criminals walk free on legal “technicalities,” is it hard to imagine that 

they would be willing to let a terrorist walk free because the circumstances of his 

capture did not meet the intricate standards of evidence, such as reading them 

Miranda rights on the battlefield?33

Secondly, the laws of war are designed to reward those who follow them and 

punish those who do not. If suspected terrorist detainees were provided criminal 

trials, they would be receiving far more protections than captured belligerents 

who follow the rules of war and are held as prisoners of war. Therefore, the laws 

of war do not require charges to be filed in order to hold captured enemy 

belligerents because the purpose of detaining belligerents is to keep them off the 

battlefield, not to try them. Lawful belligerents have a legal right to kill, and 

 

32. For instance, a recent New York Times op-ed piece by former NATO commander General Wesley Clark 

and law professor Kal Raustiala called for terrorists to be treated as criminals, see “Why Terrorists Aren’t 

Soldiers,” Wesley Clark and Kal Raustiala, New York Times , Aug. 8, 2007. See also “Bush Advisors Weigh 

Closing Guantanamo Bay Prison Sooner,” David Stout, New York Times, June 22, 2007. 

33. Mary Jo White, former United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, speaking from 

her experience prosecuting the terrorists of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, stated in a conference 

that military commissions are preferable to criminal trials because of the criminal justice system is not 

equipped to handle the classified evidence needed to convict terrorists. George Washington Law Review 

Symposium, Oct. 19, 2006. 
40 I PART I. CHAPTER 5 

therefore cannot be tried for killing the enemy, if done in the course of adhering 

to the laws of war. In addition to the tit-for-tat protection of the warfighter, one 

of the main goals of the laws of war is to establish constraints on warfighting to 

protect civilians. Combatants who hide among the civilian population ultimately 

draw fire upon innocents. Were terrorist detainees granted all the protections of 

a criminal trial, it would ultimately undermine the incentive to follow the laws of 

war and their humanitarian purpose.34

Future of “Lawfare” 

Although the enemy has changed drastically, this study is not recommending 

a change in the laws of war, but rather a change in the nation’s approach to 

understanding, promulgating, and applying them. DOD could adopt important 

policy changes to enable these goals. 

Asymmetric, Cost-Incurring Strategies 

Access Denial 

Other characteristics of future war include the adoption by adversaries of 

asymmetric “access denial” strategies to undermine the cornerstone of U.S. global 

military power: the ability to project and sustain substantial military forces at great 

distances from the continental United States. In general, there are a number of 

points at which an adversary may attempt to derail U.S. power projection. 

As the United States is deciding to project power, an adversary may attempt 

to deter, by threatening actions that would make the cost of power projection 

too high. As the United States is deploying its forces to ports and airfields, an 

adversary may attempt to disrupt the deployment by means of terrorist attacks, 

sabotage of transportation means, and the like. As the United States is 

transporting its forces to the theater of action and attempting to debark, an 

 

34. See William H. Taft, IV, “The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features” 28 The Yale 

Journal of International Law. 319, 320-1 (2003) ([I]t is important to recall why the Convention lays down such 

specific criteria for determining which combatants are entitled to the status of POW [prisoner of war] . . . 

Jean Pictet . . . called Article 4 of the GPW [Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 

War] “in a sense the key to the Convention.” . . . [W]hile Article 4 expressly entitles the legitimate soldier 

to the GPW’s protections, it real beneficiaries are the civilians who make up the mass of our societies. It 

requires soldiers to adhere to certain basic principles, such as distinction and compliance with the law, 

which serve first and foremost to protect civilian populations). 
THE FUTURE: WHAT IS NEW? I 41

adversary will try to deny entry to the U.S. force by military and political means, 

e.g., attacks and threats against U.S. allies in the region. And as U.S. forces 

establish a lodgment and begin offensive operations, an adversary will seek to 

defeat U.S. forces. 

Additionally, there are two “indirect” ways, already referred to, in which an 

adversary may attempt to derail U.S. power projection. One, a major focus of the 

overall study, is to cause a domestic calamity, which would force the President to 

divide forces between combat abroad and support at home. Another, also a 

major topic of this study, is to disrupt supply so that sustained effective presence 

abroad is impossible. 

“360 Degree Warfare” 

In the past, adversaries have focused their efforts on the last two points, 

denial, and defeat. But in the future, an adversary’s most cost-efficient actions 

may be to deter and disrupt the projection of U.S. forces. This possibility is the 

result of another emerging characteristic of future conflict: “360 degree warfare.” 

In the past, war has usually been characterized by the existence of “fronts” 

and secure “rear areas,” whether at the strategic, operational, or tactical level. Of 

course, airpower provided the means to attack the enemy’s rear and long-range 

airpower and missiles threatened to extend the ability to attack the rear to the 

homeland, as illustrated in Figure 1-7. Nonetheless, actual attacks against the 

strategic rear of both sides were deterred by the likelihood of mutual destruction. 

Figure 1-7. Challenges from All Directions 
42 I PART I. CHAPTER 5 

While guerrillas, insurgents, terrorists, and other armed groups have sought 

to wage a “war without fronts,” the strategic emergence of true 360 degree 

warfare is a recent development. 9/11 indicated that the ability of the United 

States to deter attacks against its homeland is no longer assured. Iraq and 

Afghanistan illustrate that our adversaries have adopted this approach at the 

operational and tactical levels of war as well. 

Here warfare is characterized by distributed, weakly connected battlefields; 

unavoidable urban battles; and unavoidable collateral damage exploited by 

adversary’s strategic communication and highly vulnerable rear areas. On such 

battlefields, friends and enemies are commingled and there is a constant battle 

for the loyalty of the population. 

Future Weapons, Future Battlefields 

Self-Replicating Agents 

Biological weapons have never before been used extensively and they pose a 

new kind of threat: the autonomous self-replicating agent. Along with cyber 

threats, biological weapons represent a new category of low-cost, stealthy threats 

that can be released remotely and spread indefinitely. Such biological weapons 

directly impact the U.S. health care system, which is already strained. The 

psychological impact is enormous as citizens become weapons. In addition, 

quarantine is a force multiplier for the adversary with potentially grave economic 

impact that can be greater than the threat itself. Whether or not the United States 

chooses to quarantine itself, other countries will not hesitate to quarantine us. 

The progression of biotechnology continually lowers the threshold for 

developing such weapons, and many deadly agents exist readily in nature. 

Ultimately, weapons used in strategic ways could force the United States to 

change its foreign policy, so it is necessary to understand “what war we are in.” No 

matter the outcome, as the Iraq deployment winds down, the enemy will have to 

shift to other U.S. targets and strive for an effect that dwarfs 9/11. Self-replicating 

agents, whether they are biological or cyber, could have considerable appeal. 

Cyber Space 

Adversaries are aware of America’s dependence on the application of 

information technology to warfare. U.S. forces depend on ever-improving C4ISR, 

precision navigation, and targeting and communications, as depicted in Figure 1-8. 
THE FUTURE: WHAT IS NEW? I 43

They are essential to the speed and accuracy of maneuver tactics. They are equally 

an important part of strategic decision-making, for which “situational awareness” 

is the mantra. Adversaries see U.S. success in using information technology as an 

Achilles’ heel, and attacking these assets is especially attractive because it can be 

done “on the cheap.” 

Figure 1-8. Information Space becomes a Battleground—Enabler Today, Target Tomorrow 

The barriers to entry even for high-end cyber warfare capabilities are low—no 

fissile material needed, no expensive enrichment plants required. And, it is safer, 

too. No radiation hazards with which to contend, no strategic weapons that can be 

held at risk, and relatively little chance of attribution beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The catalogue of concerns includes kinetic and/or directed energy antisatellite (ASAT) attacks; ground system disruption; hackers, insiders and supplychain operations; jammers and “dazzlers.” 

In a real sense, the United States is a victim of its own success, employing 

information technology, perhaps to the point of over-dependence, and cashing in 

untold savings through the use of COTS technology increasingly made by or 

within reach of potential adversaries. It would appear that we are so wary of 

having to give back some fraction of the savings, some portion of the 

efficiencies, that we may delude ourselves into thinking “it couldn’t really 

happen.” But, some argue, it is already happening, citing recent attacks on 

Estonian information infrastructure, the seemingly irresistible daily attacks on 
44 I PART I. CHAPTER 5 

DOD’s information systems attached to the Internet, and Islamist radicals’ 

attempts to target U.S. soldiers at Ft. Dix, inter alia.

35

Space 

Space is an interesting place. It is relatively hard to reach, and the further you 

go, the bigger it gets. It is hard to hide in space and it is hard to hide from space. 

Most of all, space is an as-yet untested battlefield. 

Whether or not space is the final frontier, the recent Chinese direct-ascent 

anti-satellite demonstration should make it clear that it is the next battlespace. 

The successful test should have come as no surprise. The Defense Department’s 

2003 annual report to Congress on “The Military Power of the People’s Republic 

of China” stated that Beijing “is believed to be conducting research and 

development on a direct-ascent ASAT system that could be fielded in the 2005-

2010 timeframe.” 

Curiously—some would say, preposterously—the Chinese Foreign Ministry 

asserted that the test was not targeted against any country and does not pose a 

threat to any country. Still, the United States is highly dependent on fragile space 

architecture, with vulnerabilities known only too well to military planners, and 

this has not escaped the notice of others. Dependence on satellites for 

communications, intelligence, and ballistic missile defense may be seen as an 

inviting vulnerability of the United States. 

Despite the obvious asymmetric threat invited by our overwhelming reliance 

upon space-based assets, China’s ASAT test fundamentally contradicts its 

adamant opposition to American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the 

subsequent deployment of a ballistic missile defense shield. Both China and 

Russia have sought to limit American space capabilities by proposing an 

international ban on weapons in space in order to deter a new “space race” and 

prevent American hegemony in space. Surely disingenuous, China’s Foreign 

Ministry replied to U.S. and Japanese concerns about its ASAT test by stating: 

“Since other countries care about this question and are opposed to 

weaponization of space and an arms race in space, then let us join hands to 

realize this goal.” 

 

35. The concerned reader is referred to the Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on Information Management 

for Net-Centric Operations. 
THE FUTURE: WHAT IS NEW? I 45

However, an “arms control regime” prohibiting the “militarization” of space 

would present a nearly insurmountable verification challenge and would only 

serve to handicap the United States and others who would adhere to their treaty 

obligations. At least two potential adversaries, Russia and China, are known to 

have demonstrated ASAT capability. General Maples, Director of the Defense 

Intelligence Agency, testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee in 

January 2007 that “while Russia and China continue to be the primary states of 

concern regarding military space and counter-space programs ... several 

countries continue to develop capabilities that have the potential to threaten U.S. 

space assets and some have already deployed systems with inherent anti-satellite 

capabilities ... [including] kinetic or directed energy weapons capabilities.” 

There should be no doubt about the U.S. position in space. Just a year ago 

America’s space policy was revised. An unclassified version, released, marks a 

significant paradigm shift in the traditional rhetorical ambiguity surrounding the 

weaponization of space. Among the new principles set forth by the amended 

space policy was the declaration that the “Freedom of action in space is as 

important to the United States as air power and sea power ... and [America] 

rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of the United States to operate in 

and acquire data from space ... or the development of new legal regimes or other 

restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space.” 

Moreover, the United States “will dissuade or deter others from either impeding 

those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions 

necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if 

necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national 

interests.” The revised policy charges the Secretary of Defense with ensuring 

“force enhancement, space control, and force application missions.” 

Exploiting Media Proliferation 

As previously pointed out, when “winning” involves capturing hearts and 

minds, victory will prove elusive if military force is the only advantage held by 

the United States. In a succession of studies, the Defense Science Board has 

argued for a more robust—well-resourced, well-led and well-executed—program 

of “strategic communication,” i.e., strategic influence. In this study, as well, 

strategic communication is an important facet. 
46 I PART I. CHAPTER 5 

Information technology today is revolutionizing world media every bit as 

consequentially as did Johannes Gutenberg’s introduction of moveable, re-usable 

type to Europe in the mid-fifteenth century.36 Printing soon became the principal 

means of mass communication. It put more knowledge in the hands of more 

people faster and more cheaply than ever before. As a result, reading and writing 

spread widely and rapidly. This is another example of technology lowering the 

barriers to entry, just as the Internet has done most recently for publishing. Even 

in the more traditional “broadcast” media, trail-blazers like CNN and Al Jazeera 

have changed the playing field. 

These new media are no respecters of national boundaries and the pervasive 

technology, coupled with a Constitutional “right” to information, enable 

adversaries to reach the mind of the U.S. public as never before. At the same 

time, America faces more competition in reaching its target audiences abroad. 

Efforts at psychological operations and strategic influence are often deemed 

embarrassing and charges that the entertainment media are deliberate tools of 

“cultural imperialism” cause discomfort. The media, like cyberspace and outerspace, are tomorrow’s battlefields, for which the nation must prepare. 

Whom Does the Next Generation Technology Favor? 

The United States perceives itself as the master of high technology and 

generally presumes that as technology has worked to its advantage in the past, so 

must it work in the future. Table 1-3, however, suggests that this may not always 

be the case. One reason technology has favored the United States has been its 

expense and the nation’s willingness to invest. As technology becomes ever more 

affordable, barriers to entry for an opponent fall away. In some cases, what was 

exclusively a military technology moves into the commercial mainstream and is 

available to an adversary, “off the shelf.” Moreover, there are certain 

technologies—WMD-related, principally—from which the United States refrains 

as a matter of policy, which in some cases is formalized in treaty obligations. 

Finally, many, if not most, of the military technological advances favor the 

offense rather than the defense. And, because America does not envision itself as 

the aggressor, it suffers by comparison except insofar as an offensive capability 

serves as a deterrent. 

 

36. Although printing with moveable type reportedly existed in East Asia since at least the 700s. 
THE FUTURE: WHAT IS NEW? I 47

Table 1-3. Who Does the Next Generation of Technology Favor? 

Net Advantage 

Modality Us Them Comments 

Biological 

 They value life less 

 US has no offense by policy 

 US defenses are minimal 

Cyber 

 Low barriers to entry 

 Defensive technology not keeping up with 

offensive 

 US depends more 

 Media for propaganda, command and 

control, and recruiting 

Nuclear 

 US posture frozen in time 

 Adversaries modernizing with a vengeance 

 Adversary willingness to cross nuclear 

threshold 

 Technology proliferation 

Chemical 

 They value life less 

 US has no offense by policy 

 MOPP [military oriented protective posture] 

constrains operations 

Radiological 

 They value life less 

 US has no offense by policy 

 MOPP constrains operations 

Robotics   We value humans more 

EMP   US more dependent on vulnerable 

infrastructure 

Directed 

Energy and 

Lasers 

 

 Declining barriers to entry 

 Commercial off-the-shelf availability 

 of high-powered lasers 

 US restrained by policy against blinding 

Innovation 

Explosives 

 They value life less 

 They benefit from increased energy density 

 New category of casualty with increased 

strategic consequences 
48 I PART I. CHAPTER 5 

Paradoxically, there is a brighter side to this situation: another of Murphy’s 

laws states that each new, technologically enabled capability brings with it new 

vulnerabilities. Of course, this plagues the United States mightily, but as our 

nation anticipates when an adversary begins to rely on high technology, we 

should be quick to exploit the attendant vulnerabilities. 

Potential “Game Changers”—Countering Critical U.S. 

Military Capabilities 

Paying tribute to the U.S. superiority in conventional, high-tech warfare, 

potential adversaries seek to negate any advantages we might have and to use 

disruptive strategies to frustrate our ambitions. They seek either to counter our 

critical military capabilities or to circumvent them. Some military powers, with 

substantial technological capacity in their own right, may seek to acquire 

disruptive capabilities that directly counter critical U.S. military capabilities. 

Others—armed groups and less advanced militaries—would more likely focus on 

irregular warfare and information operations to disrupt our operations and 

remove support for our campaigns. And, of course, rising military powers may 

straddle both camps. In the series of accompanying figures (Tables 1-4 to 1-6), 

organized according to a particular U.S. military capability, we array the strategies 

and the technologies which enable them. 

The ability to project force is our premier military capability and any 

adversary would be highly motivated to diminish that capability by raising the 

price of access. The associated technologies present a familiar shopping list, as 

Table 1-4 illustrates. 

No adversary could fail to appreciate the degree to which the U.S. military 

depends on C4ISR, nor could they overlook the crucial enabler, U.S. space 

operations. This very dependence suggests vulnerability to a determined 

adversary. Some of the technologies to counter the U.S. advantage, like directascent ASAT operations, present a high barrier to entry. Others, like denial and 

deception and attacks on information infrastructure, represent lower cost 

endeavors. Evidence suggests that aspiring peer nations will attempt to employ a 

gamut of counters (Table 1-5). 
THE FUTURE: WHAT IS NEW? I 49

Table 1-4. Countering Critical U.S. Military Capabilities—Force Projection 

Raise the Price of Access Technology Drivers 

 Increase risk to U.S. naval and air 

operations entering contested area 

 Dissuade allies and partners who can 

provide basing and support to U.S. 

operations 

 Speed up their operations, slow down 

ours, and present fait accompli

 Interrupt timely U.S. deployment 

 Compel U.S. force to operate further from it’s 

intended target 

 Seek to destroy high-value (iconic) 

asset–e.g., aircraft carrier–for both 

tactical and strategic benefit 

 Over-the-horizon (OTH) reconnaissance and 

targeting 

 Range and lethality of anti-ship and land-attack 

weapons 

 Emergent undersea threats 

 Autonomous mobile and deep-water mines 

 Long-endurance, quiet submarines 

 Range and seeker capabilities of air defense 

weapons 

 Energetic propellants 

 Lightweight materials 

 Autonomous seekers 

 Guidance, control and radar 

 Swarm tactics with associated technologies 

 Low observables–“stealth” 

Table 1-5. Countering Critical U.S. Military Capabilities—Information and Space 

Operations 

Bring Down the “Network” Technology Drivers 

 Degrade our information systems 

 Disrupt our Command and Control 

 Deny U.S. surveillance and 

reconnaissance 

 Deceive U.S. intelligence 

 Counter-space advances 

 ASAT 

 Ground systems disruption 

 Threats to information networks 

 Distributed Denial of Service (DDS) and remote 

corruption 

 Insider and supply chain attacks 

 “Backhoes” 

 Electromagnetic pulse and directed radio-frequency 

energy 

 Laser “blinding” and/or damaging ISR sensors 

 Threats to related infrastructure 

 SCADA systems (cf. Idaho National Labs) 
50 I PART I. CHAPTER 5 

Disrupting U.S. precision strike capabilities does double duty for the 

opponent. It helps protect his military assets and it precipitates larger numbers of 

innocent casualties and collateral damage that work to his advantage in 

undermining our nation’s willingness to persevere. The technologies and 

countermeasures are varied; again, some are high cost, others more affordable 

(Table 1-6). An aspiring peer could be expected to pursue the entire spectrum. 

This inevitably leads to the easy availability of more affordable counters on the 

international arms markets. 

Table 1-6. Countering Critical U.S. Military Capabilities—Precision Surveillance and Strike 

Increase the “CEP” Technology Drivers 

 Reduce U.S. standoff range, force “closein” engagement 

 Remove the risk to strategic retaliatory 

systems 

 Disperse, intersperse, camouflage and 

conceal targets 

 Confound U.S. guidance systems 

 Range and lethality of air defense systems 

 Multi-sensor and data fusion capabilities to detect 

and locate 

 Mobility of weapon systems 

 Deep-dig 

 Multi-spectral camouflage 

 Veridical decoys 

 Emerging electromagnetic challenges 

 GPS jamming 

 AESA [active electronically scanned array] radars for 

aircraft and sensor jamming 

 Directed energy weapons 

 Laser blinders 

But, of Course, We Will Still Have Nukes ...or Will We? 

Some take comfort in thinking that the United States can always fall back on 

its nuclear weapons if required. The nation may be tempted to take ultimate refuge 

in the idea that, should U.S. conventional capabilities be seriously disrupted, or 

attacks on the homeland threatened, it can rely on its nuclear weaponry. 

From World War II on, the United States (and the Soviets) turned out 

thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons, from small atomic demolitions to 

megaton warheads. None, however, have been used since 1945. What follows is 

a brief tour, since that time, with respect to nuclear weapons: 
THE FUTURE: WHAT IS NEW? I 51

Yesterday, though nuclear weapons threatened Armageddon, leaders found 

ways to manage those risks, to stabilize the security environment and, indeed, to 

turn back a broader interest in nuclear weapons. 

 American Monopoly. Massive retaliation, New Look emphasizes 

strategic bombers, land and undersea-based ballistic missiles; assumed 

aggressive tactical and operational use of nuclear weapons results in new 

organizations such as the Pentomic Division. 

Over time, possessors came to see such weapons as useful only for purposes 

of deterrence and defense, and worthy of extreme caretaking. They rebuffed 

interest from non-state actors and from states seeking shortcuts and they 

undertook cooperative action to reduce common risks. 

 Strategic Parity. Flexible Response and Mutual Assured Destruction 

(assured second strike); Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. Because of the 

escalatory ladder, interest in operational/tactical nuclear warfare declines. 

Today, things are more fluid. Some covet nuclear weapons as a tool for 

inducing U.S. restraint—and, indeed, for attacking it outright, if reports from 

al Qaeda are to be believed. They may also see nuclear weapons as useful for 

attacking U.S. allies, friends, and interests in regions of their vital interest, and as 

essential for creating new security orders fitting their own images. 

 Unconsummated Revolution. A search for nuclear substitutes at the 

operational/tactical level of war; precision-guided munitions with 

conventional warheads obviate the need for tactical nukes. 

Tomorrow, if nuclear weapons are broadly accepted as quintessential tools of 

asymmetric conflict, their use could become conventionalized, threatening U.S. 

security and international stability. The future likely will have more nuclear 

capable actors than today and the question, of course, is: Will the future bring 

terrible nuclear calamities or new stability? 

What should the United States do about the future? What can we do about the 

future? As the “world’s only superpower” the United States has a preeminent 

interest in managing the moment in ways that focus on the new opportunities for 

stability. The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review in 2001 prescribed a rapid evolution 

in the U.S. strategic posture to remain relevant in a changing international 

environment. It called for a transformation of the U.S. nuclear deterrent that has 

not yet begun some seven years later. 
52 I PART I. CHAPTER 5 

Heretofore, the nation has dwelt almost exclusively on “red force” changes—

that is, on changes that affect how the adversary might contest U.S. objectives—

and changes largely driven by technical rather than political trends. This following 

brief section, however, about the evolving nuclear posture in the United States, is 

less about the technology than the policies that constrain that technology. 

Some may think that the United States possesses, and shall continue to 

possess, so vast and capable a nuclear arsenal that it provides a hedge against 

nearly any defense planning assumptions gone wrong and will ensure America’s 

unchallenged position as world leader. The astute reader may recognize the 

parallels between this supposition and the Russian view that they, too, hold the 

same preeminence despite their recent diminution. Which of these two views is 

more naïve than the other? Any comparison would have to take into account 

dimensions other than nuclear, of course, but it should also review what is being 

done to the respective nuclear arsenals. The Russians are rumored to be 

modernizing their inventory with a vengeance. The United States, by contrast, is 

frozen in time. 

In the not too distant future, the United States may be one of several dozen 

nuclear weapons-capable states (as will be discussed further in Part 3 of this 

volume). According to the International Atomic Energy Agency there are 

presently 66 countries that have nuclear activities safeguarded by that agency. 

Many of these 66 have a “high latency” for weapons—that is, they could have 

nuclear weapons sooner rather than later, should they so choose. Meanwhile, the 

will of the Congress ordains that the United States may find itself with: 

 The oldest nuclear arsenal. As the only one of the original five nuclear 

weapons states that has not set its post-Cold War agenda and begun the 

process of modernization, the United States will have nuclear weapons 

optimized for yesterday’s environment, and with declining performance 

margins. The point to be made about the old arsenal is not that it is less 

optimized, but rather that it was exquisitely optimized for a world that has 

not existed for almost two decades. The current environment demands 

different characteristics for effective assurance, dissuasion, and/or 

deterrence (e.g., applications in limited strike scenarios where lower yields 

with higher accuracies and end-to-end control). The Service Life Extension 

Program is not “transformation,” and the Reliable Replacement Warhead 

merely perpetuates the 1991 force. 
THE FUTURE: WHAT IS NEW? I 53

 An arsenal of uncertain reliability (presently high, but inevitably 

declining). The “stewardship” concept may be sound but it is hard to 

calibrate without testing, from which the nation is proscribed by law 

and treaty. 

 A smaller nuclear arsenal. Presently still one of the largest, with 1,700–

2,200 strategic weapons “on station.” 

 An inadequate infrastructure. The United States is not able to enlarge 

its arsenal in a timely fashion in response to a changed environment, nor 

is it able to change out the arsenal in any timescale of less than 25 years—

even under the most optimistic scenarios. (This is true in large part 

because of a lack of a true production capability for pit production—a 

situation that has existed for 15 years.) 

The question that must be asked—but one whose considered answer is 

beyond the present scope—is whether the state of the U.S. nuclear arsenal will do 

the job(s), to include: deterrence, extended deterrence and assurance, dissuasion, 

employment, and defeat of hard and deeply buried targets. That is, does the 

nation’s nuclear posture lack the credibility needed for U.S. dissuasion objectives 

or will it encourage others to aspire to nuclear parity? 
54 I PART I. CHAPTER 6 

Chapter 6. Homeland Defense: 

What is Needed? 

The United States can depend on its great military prowess to protect its 

primary interests in the international arena. It does not, nor can it ever, have the 

military power to protect or pursue all of its interests. Indeed, the increasing cost 

of military inventions—in terms of blood and treasure, international reputation, 

and internal schisms within the nation—all point to an era in which the other 

instruments of influence and power will be even more important than in the past. 

This is a consequence of the changed nature of war. 

Another consequence of the changed nature of war is the notion, described 

in the previous chapters, of the homeland as battlefield, requiring a capability to 

respond to a homeland crisis while at the same time deploying forces to deal with 

an adversary abroad. While clear in its importance, the challenge is managing the 

varied players and responsibilities involved when the homeland is the theater and 

ensuring strong capabilities government-wide to address the challenge after next. 

The Interagency and Homeland Defense 

Defending forward—i.e., projecting force—is the focus of the Department of 

Defense and its military departments. Roles and mission, responsibilities, and 

authorities are unambiguous once war is the chosen instrument. Command and 

control—unity of command—is the watchword. Because the mission is 

contingency, the “day job” involves organizing and equipping, with adequate time 

and resources allocated to planning, training, and exercising. With the National 

Guard and reserve structure, the bench is designed to be deep and the ability to 

surge is designed in. Obligation to duty is paramount. 

Not so with defense of the homeland in all its manifestations (Figure 1-9). 

Multiple jurisdictions, departments, and agencies, government and nongovernment, are involved. Roles and missions overlap and responsibilities and 

authorities are sometimes maddeningly indistinct. A complex coordination schema 
HOMELAND DEFENSE: WHAT IS NEEDED? I 55

substitutes for unity of command.37 There is little reserve for contingencies, and 

planning, training, and exercising for exigencies is modest. As a consequence, two 

troubling complications arise for DOD: 

1. DOD’s force projection mission depends on a secure, fully functional 

“rear.” 

2. DOD—vacillating between timidity and temerity—anticipates, then 

largely ignores, the fact that it might have to step in, in extremis. 

Figure 1-9. Comparison of Organizational Strengths Across the Continuum from Civil 

to Military Preparedness 

“Civilian Defense Corps” 

Consideration should be given to conceptualizing an integrated corps of civil 

agencies and “civilians,” organized, trained, and equipped using best practices of 

the uniformed military, as an alternative or adjunct to U.S. military operations at 

 

37. Cf. The National Incident Management System, FEMA 501/Draft August 2007, “When an incident occurs 

within a single jurisdiction and there is no jurisdictional or functional agency overlap, a single IC [incident 

commander] should be designated with overall incident management responsibility by the appropriate 

jurisdictional authority. (In some cases where incident management crosses jurisdictional and/or 

functional agency boundaries, a single IC may be designated if agreed upon.) Jurisdictions should consider 

pre-designating ICs for pre-established IMTs [incident management teams] in their preparedness plans.” 

[emphasis added]. 
56 I PART I. CHAPTER 6 

home. Properly led and resourced, this “U.S. Civilian Defense Corps” would be 

prepared to take on all languishing homeland defense missions, freeing the 

military to concentrate on its force projection role and “securing the rear” to 

ensure that deployment, sustainment, and reach-back could operate without 

serious interruption. 

Note that this is several steps beyond the National Incident Management 

System (NIMS).38 In its most ambitious instantiation, the Civilian Defense Corps 

would include, inter alia, all first responders and would have adequate reserve 

forces on which to draw when surge was required. An obligation to duty would 

be required. Special care would be taken in the management of these reserves to 

ensure that reservists were not “double-counted” as part of military reserves. It is 

clear that major legislation would be required and thorny issues—such as states’ 

rights—would have to be addressed. This is not a proposal to be taken lightly. 

This Corps is nothing short of a capability for national mobilization, but 

desperate times could call for desperate measures. 

Bring “Jointness” to Civilian Agencies 

Again, a step beyond NIMS as currently envisioned, the U.S. Civilian Defense 

Corps construct would emphasize more integration vice coordination across the 

operational elements of relevant federal departments and agencies. By example, it 

would encourage “jointness” in sub-federal organizations, as well as establish the 

utility of vertical integration of federal and sub-federal operational elements. Table 

1-7 illustrates how disjoint things are now. 

The impact of events like Katrina are multiplied several fold, not for lack of 

resources, but for lack of authority, initiative, and training to use them in a timely and 

coordinated manner. Certain assumptions also hinder domestic rescue operations: 

 Current doctrine only requires Disaster Medical Assistance Teams to be 

self-sustaining for 72 hours. 

 The National Disaster Medical System is designed for evacuation but not 

quarantine. 

 Most participants in the NIMS are part-time employees with episodic 

training and other obligations. 

 

38. Cf. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), Management of Domestic Incidents, 28 

February 2003. 
HOMELAND DEFENSE: WHAT IS NEEDED? I 57
58 I PART I. CHAPTER 6 

 The creation of DHS was an important effort to bring together disconnected federal 

organizations under one roof. Events like Katrina have demonstrated, however, that 

tying them all together under an overarching bureaucratic envelope is not enough to 

ensure their timely, coordinated deployment. Instead, it has become clear that the 

nation needs a new, single, responsible organization with both political authority and 

boots on the ground to lead the charge during a mega-disaster. The key is to combine 

the best of the civilian and military world. The civilian side has expertise, authority, 

and responsibility; the military, however, has discipline, organization, and resources. 

A blend of the two combined with novel approaches to training creative intelligence 

and moral courage will create a new force that can not only prevent natural events 

from becoming economic disasters but also unnatural events from becoming strategic 

blows. 

Crisis Deployment by Other Government Agencies 

Within the seeds of this idea is the solution to another problem that vexes 

the DOD and confounds military deployments—the transition in “Phase IV” 

operations. Depending upon the engagement, at the end of the decisive combat 

phase there is often the need to move into stabilization and reconstruction 

activities. Increasingly, the U.S. military is consciously planning and training for 

this aspect of the mission but this phase requires integration with, and hand off 

to, other federal agencies. Even with the best of intentions, this has proved 

difficult because those other federal partners are not well organized, trained, and 

equipped to project and sustain their capabilities during the immediate postcombat phase. The nature of the U.S. Civilian Defense Corps that is envisioned 

here would be better suited to equal partnership with the DOD in this context. 

Quite apart from Phase-IV operations, this Corps might also be available to 

“project” its capabilities abroad to shoulder its fair share of the humanitarian 

assistance mission now borne almost exclusively by the U.S. military. Curiously, 

this brings us full circle: 

The irony is that when a humanitarian crisis occurs abroad we send the military: 

a single, coherent organization with a clear command structure and highly 

trained full-time professionals that are able to sustain themselves in-country 

indefinitely. When a disaster occurs within the U.S., authority is divided between 

local, state, and federal entities, and resources and responsibilities are divided 

between a myriad of organizations. 
HOMELAND DEFENSE: WHAT IS NEEDED? I 59

An Alternative to Simply Defending Critical 

Infrastructure 

In a simple sense there are two strategies for ensuring a functional 

infrastructure against the potential of an attack by a competent, motivated, 

adversary: 

1. Spend scarce resources on the defense of the present infrastructure. 

2. Invest resources in replicating, diversifying, and enlarging the 

infrastructure—making it highly redundant and with excess capacity— 

so that it has the resiliency to withstand attack. 

Economically, the latter course makes more sense because it strengthens the 

nation substantially absent an attack, yet may provide the same measure of 

assured functionality in the event of an attack. 

The threats and remedies surrounding Y2K provide a good example. Indeed, 

money was spent on remedial efforts, but considerable sums were spent on 

replacing vulnerable legacy systems with new systems, hardware, and software, 

which were flawless. It was the latter expenditure that provided substantial 

benefit to the nation at large. 

How does this apply to the Department of Defense investment? 

 Where the DOD depends on civilian infrastructure, it should consider 

investments in redundant capacity that is “uncorrelated” as an alternative 

or adjunct to investments in defense to assure survivable capacity. 

 The DOD should rank high those developments that seek survivability 

by opening up new parts of the spectrum, geography, etc. 

While this is a “big” idea, it is not an especially “new” idea. Today’s interstate 

highway system, as some remember, had as its genesis the “National Defense 

Highway System.” Since it was signed into law in 1956 by President Eisenhower,39

DOD has continued to identify and update defense-important highway routes. 

 

39. President Dwight D. Eisenhower understood the value of roads. In 1919, as a Lt. Colonel, he was aboard 

the U.S. Army's first transcontinental convoy, a 2-month journey from Washington, DC, to San Francisco, 

CA, to assess the readiness of military vehicles to make such a long trip. During World War II, Gen. 

Eisenhower saw the advantages Germany enjoyed because of the autobahn and noted the enhanced mobility 

of the Allies when they fought their way into Germany. http://www.tfhrc.gov/pubrds/06mar/07.htm 
60 I PART I. CHAPTER 6 

The National Defense Highway system was designed to move military equipment 

and personnel efficiently. Similarly, when the Department decided that its radiofrequency communications were too easy to intercept and/or jam, it moved to 

higher frequencies. This opened up a new spectrum that enabled wireless and 

handheld commercial devices, which most of us rely upon as much for business 

and personal communications as we do the interstate system for personal and 

business transportation needs. 
Part II 

Unconventional Weapons 

and Technology Proliferation 

T H E T EC H N O LO G Y O F U N C O N VEN T IO N A L WE A PO N S I 63

Chapter 7. The Technology of Unconventional 

Weapons 

The technology equation, between the United States and potential 

adversaries, is, as the previous section described, a key element in evaluating U.S. 

capabilities to effectively and successfully wage war in the future. Access to 

technology will have a critical impact on the future battlefield. Few nations will 

attempt to fight the United States’ vast conventional arsenal and will instead turn 

to unconventional weapons. As later sections of this report will discuss, 

adversaries will likely make use of these unconventional weapons using 

unconventional tactics, techniques, and procedures in hopes of gaining an 

asymmetric advantage against the United States. 

Because of the importance of technology proliferation, this study placed 

significant effort on understanding adversary use of various technologies in 

developing weapons, the technical issues underlying such development, and how 

the United States might combat their use.40 Eight destructive modalities were 

evaluated: nuclear, radiation dispersal devices (RDD), biological, cyber warfare, 

chemical, high explosives (HE), electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and directed 

energy (DE). 

As shown in Figure 2-1, each modality was examined in a systematic way. The 

assessment initiated with a “Red” perspective—with experts for each technology 

considering how Red objectives could be best achieved using this technology and 

what advantages and disadvantages that would offer relative to other forms of 

attack. In essence, modality experts attempted to “sell” their capabilities to, or seek 

investment from, an adversary board of directors. In addition, they evaluated what 

would be required to provide the intended capabilities. 

 

40. This analysis was conducted by the summer study’s technology assessment panel. It members were 

selected for their collective depth of understanding of technology in the eight destructive modalities 

evaluated in this chapter and its accompanying appendices. The panel organized itself into teams according 

to the eight modalities, but functioned as an integrated group to address cross-modality attacks and to 

avoid the perils of stovepipe thinking. 
64 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 7 

Figure 2-1. Technology Assessment Methodology 

With these individual modality assessments as a foundation, the logic path 

outlined in Figure 2-1 was pursued—a path consistent with the “battlefield 

areas” within the scope of the study: asymmetric warfare, overseas asymmetric 

conflict with unconventional opponents, disruption of U.S. deployment and 

supply, and attacks on the U.S. civil infrastructure and population. The steps of 

the evaluation are as follows. 

! Step 1. Define a representative set of Red strategic objectives. For each 

objective, derive a number of supporting tactical objectives. In each case, 

the goal was to responsibly cover the possible spectrum; no attempt was 

made to be all inclusive. 

! Step 2. Determine options for accomplishing each tactical and strategic 

objective with the technology of a particular modality, as applicable. The 

selection of these options was based on expert judgment rather than 

quantitative analysis. With these single attack options defined, it was clear 

that multiple attacks (sequential, concurrent, or complementary) would 

multiply the effectiveness of a single attack. 

! Step 3. Identify the “best” options for meeting Red’s strategic objectives. 

All of the defined options served as the realm of “the possible,” from 

which a Red “board of directors” (a group of modality experts) identified 

the best, taking into account cost, risk, ease of execution, availability of 

critical resources, effectiveness, and so on. 
T H E T EC H N O LO G Y O F U N C O N VEN T IO N A L WE A PO N S I 65

! Step 4. Identify topics of major concern for “Blue” in terms of damage 

to the military or the economy, as well as psychological impacts to the 

national fabric. In this step, the study team shifted to a Blue perspective 

to determine how the nation could best prepare for, prevent, mitigate, 

and recover from the attacks considered most disruptive. 

The results of this analysis are described in the following two chapters, with 

chapter 8 addressing the Red objectives and options for attack, and chapter 9 

recommendations for Blue. Greater detail is available in appendices 

corresponding to each of the modalities.41 An objective of this assessment was not 

only to understand the realm of the possible in terms of adversary use of available 

technology, but also to provide a sense of priorities among the modalities—that 

could be used as a basis for decision-making and investment priorities. 

Modalities 

A variety of methods are available to terrorists to attack the United States or 

its interests. For example, Figure 2-2 illustrates the vast amounts of stored energy 

that might be accessible to an adversary, ranging from a nuclear device to the 

potential destruction of major dams, unleashing the enormous energy of their 

waters. Innovative uses of high explosives can sometimes rival chemical, 

biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons in destructive power. 

Figure 2-2. Stored Energy in Two Different Modalities 

 

41. An overview and background for each modality is provided in appendices in the classified volume of 

this report. Appendices address the following: basic science, delivery and damage/disruption mechanisms, 

difficulty/ease of developing and executing, range of the possible based on technology, range of the 

probable based solely on technology, red payoff (pros) and challenges (cons), other factors of importance, 

and recommendations for Blue actions to counter Red. 
66 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 7 

Figure 2-3 provides a top level view of the modalities evaluated in this study. 

The relative positioning of these eight forms of attack is based on judgment and 

depends a great deal on the objective of the attack, the nature of a Red scenario, 

and many other factors. The arrangement (from left to right) of the likelihood 

that an adversary would choose a particular modality is subjective because this 

depends on the adversary class that can range from small insurgent groups to 

nation states. The modalities, arrayed from bottom to top, are according to the 

effective disruption; this ranking depends on a variety of possible Red objectives. 

Nonetheless, this albeit oversimplified figure provides a useful perspective on the 

attractiveness to Red and the potential disruptiveness to the nation of each of the 

modalities—which in turn can be useful in prioritizing the Department’s 

attention and investment decisions. 

Figure 2-3. Subjective Assessment of Single Attack Modalities 

As illustrated in Figure 2-2, an innovative use of high explosives (e.g., the 9/11 

attack) can provide much more disruption and damage than might initially be 

obvious—for that reason it is shown in Figure 2-3 as a large range in potential 

damage in the space plotted. Likewise, cyber warfare, because of the globalization 

of information technology, is not only likely but observed frequently today and, by 

its very nature, has tremendous potential for disruption and damage. In some 

scenarios and for some objectives, cyber attack may be the most effective of all. 
T H E T EC H N O LO G Y O F U N C O N VEN T IO N A L WE A PO N S I 67

The assessment presented here indicates that: 

! Nuclear is in a class by itself (denoted by the broken scale) among single 

attacks. 

! Cyber attacks should be particularly worrisome, both because of their 

potential damage and their growing accessibility. 

! Biological attacks could be extremely effective. 

! High explosives are today's weapon of choice for many adversaries 

and, used innovatively, can result in serious consequences, both 

tactical and strategic. 
68 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 8 

Chapter 8. Red Objectives and Attack Options 

Given a basic understanding of each modality, the question of most concern 

is, “what would Red do if X were available?” There is no single answer to that 

question, but it is clear that Red’s potential use of any of the modalities ties 

intimately with its objectives in carrying out an attack. Red's choice might be 

dramatically different if the goal is to wage a campaign of continual harassment 

tied to a long-term objective of politically exhausting the United States versus the 

creation of a single catastrophic “spectacle” event aimed at extracting maximum 

loss of life. Examining the linkages between objectives, modalities, and attacks is 

one way to shed light on this area. 

Single Modality Attack Options 

The study team performed an analysis for each modality to determine its 

potential in serving some representative strategic and tactical Red objectives. The 

methods for employing these modalities were also considered. These objectives 

were arrayed on three “battlefields,” as follows: (1) overseas asymmetric conflict, 

(2) disruption of the deployment or supply chain supporting force projection, 

and (3) attacks on the civil population and infrastructure of the continental 

United States. 

The overseas asymmetric conflict was further subdivided into those of a peer 

or near-peer, and those of an unconventional opponent—that is, one that is not 

territorial- or state-based. This same distinction was not made in the attacks on 

the U.S. homeland because in most cases, a serious physical attack on the U.S. 

homeland attributed to a peer or near-peer state would almost certainly lead to 

immediate conventional warfare. Non-attributable or less serious attacks were 

assumed to be perpetrated by an unconventional opponent. Situations in which 

state-backed attacks were accomplished by proxy through an unconventional 

player were treated as if the unconventional opponent perpetrated that attack 

unilaterally. An inherent challenge for Blue in this case would be to understand 

the motivator, supplier, or financier of such attacks. 

For each of the battlefield or conflict areas, a number of high-level, 

representative strategic objectives were considered; they are summarized in 

Table 2-1. In turn, for each of the strategic objectives, tactical objectives were 

derived. The panel considered each tactical objective to determine where a 
RED O BJ ECT IV ES A ND AT T A CK O PT IO N S I 69

particular modality could contribute substantially to achieving that objective. 

Those cases in which a modality team found an effective use for their modality 

to achieve a given tactical objective were noted in the intersections of Tables 2-2 

through 2-11, each representing one of the strategic objectives described in 

Table 2-1. Each of Tables 2-2 through 2-11 list the eight modalities across the 

top and the tactical objectives down the left side. The intersections describe how 

each particular modality would be employed to satisfy the tactical objective that 

was being served, along with the form of the attack that would best apply. 

Many of the table entries are necessarily shortened and may appear cryptic in 

this format. The intent of this exercise is not to provide details, but rather to 

indicate the process that was followed. As such, the results are displayed in a very 

summary fashion prior to filtering to a set of particularly interesting cases. It is 

important to note that no such exploration as this can ever be complete, 

comprehensive, or definitive. Rather, the goal in the selection of strategic and 

tactical objectives and threat use was to identify reasonably representative sets 

that would enable further analysis. 

Overseas Asymmetric Conflict with a Peer or Near Peer 

In this situation, Blue finds itself drawn into an unconventional confrontation 

with a major state player, either because of ongoing activities by Red, or because of 

ongoing activities by Blue to which Red feels the need to respond. Identified in 

Table 2-1 are three potential strategic objectives underlying Red’s hostile 

interaction with Blue: 

1. A desire to increase Red’s hegemony in some new region of the world, in 

which there is an existing Blue relationship that Red would seek to diminish 

2. A perceived need by Red to preserve its strategic lines of communications 

in a region close to home or to prevent (or counter) what it views as Blue 

interference in a region it considers its own 

3. A desire to erode Blue or Blue's allied political support for continuation 

of an ongoing war effort with a client state or another friendly player in 

some region of the world 
70 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 8 
RED O BJ ECT IV ES A ND AT T A CK O PT IO N S I 71

These objectives are discussed in the three subsections that follow. A number 

of tactical objectives that were seen as representative in supporting these higher 

level strategic objectives are identified, and examples of how various threat 

modalities could be employed to service the tactical objectives are listed within 

the tables. 

Increase Red Hegemony in New Region 

Two attack objectives support the goal of increasing Red hegemony in a new 

region. The first, aimed at increasing anti-American sentiment in the region, uses 

any of three destructive modalities to create havoc without leaving any Red 

“fingerprints,” and then lays blame on the Blue with false “evidence.” In the 

second, Red creates harmful or disruptive situations in an area in which conflict 

is ongoing between two parties, after which Red comes to the aid of the party 

they see as dominant and which will eventually emerge victorious and in control 

of the area. In both situations, Red would employ strategic communication 

through the Internet and other media to support its objectives of enhancing its 

own image while diminishing Blue’s. Table 2-2 outlines the interaction of the 

modalities with the two tactical objectives. 

Near-Peer Maintaining Strategic Lines of Communication or 

Preventing Blue Interference Close to Red Home 

Three Red attack objectives are identified in support of this strategic 

objective. All are aimed at reducing Blue’s ability to fight in the region. The first, 

destroying or reducing Blue’s ability to see and communicate, attempts to take 

away one of the fundamental strengths of Blue and one upon which many of 

Blue’s most modern weaponry and war fighting tactics depend most. Both the 

second and the third attack objectives play upon the fact that Blue is attempting 

to maintain a fighting military presence far from home, both on the sea and in 

support bases on land. Reducing either capability will seriously impede Blue’s 

ability to conduct sustained military operations in the region. The matrix of how 

modalities might serve these three attack objectives is provided in Table 2-3. 
72 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 8 

Near-Peer Eroding Political Support for Overseas War Effort in which 

Blue is Engaged 

Four attack objectives are considered. The first two are both aimed at making 

it difficult for Blue to bring resources into the area and play to Blue’s political 

desire to get in and out of overseas actions quickly. The two differ only in Red’s 

willingness to escalate the level of action and hostility, the second one based on a 

willingness to take more provocative action. The third is more political in nature, 

focusing on creating civilian turmoil and resistance while the fourth relies on a 

form of brinksmanship, demonstrating Red’s willingness to “play on the edge” of 

all-out war. Table 2-4 displays the interplay of modalities and the four listed 

tactical objectives. 

Overseas Asymmetric Conflict with an Unconventional 

Opponent 

The situation for Blue is similar to that described in the previous section, 

except here the opponent is an organization without a fixed geographic or state 

base. This type of opponent could take the form of a terrorist organization, such 

as al Qaeda, or an insurgency, such as the conflict in Iraq today. The assumption 

is that Blue is engaged with a group of this type overseas and that Red, with no 

realistic chance of militarily defeating Blue, is focusing on Blue’s political staying 

power. Three strategic objectives are described: 

1. Eroding the political support for Blue’s continuation of the war effort 

2. Preventing Blue from achieving a clear victory and bogging Blue down in 

a stalemate situation 

3. An escalation of item 2 by going further with more provocative acts 

aimed at diminishing Blue’s fighting ability 

Erode Political Support for Continuation of Blue War Effort 

The strategic objective is the same as it was for the near-peer, except that in 

this situation, Blue is directly involved militarily with Red. All six of Red’s tactical 

objectives are aimed primarily at political objectives, although the first three are 

based on direct physical attack of the troops or their families. The tactical 

objective/threat modality matrix for the unconventional opponent is provided in 

Table 2-5. 
RED O BJ ECT IV ES A ND AT T A CK O PT IO N S I 73
74 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 8 
RED O BJ ECT IV ES A ND AT T A CK O PT IO N S I 75

Create a Stalemate Situation and Prevent Blue Victory while Limiting 

Escalation 

Here, Red is attempting to bog Blue down in an unwinnable conflict in the 

hope that a continued effort with seemingly little gain will strain Blue’s political 

staying power to the breaking point. Red understands that if the conflict escalates 

sufficiently, Blue can bring in sufficient resources to militarily defeat Red. Thus, 

believing that time is on his side, Red wants to avoid acts that provide Blue 

political cover for major escalation. 

The first six attack objectives are focused on Blue directly, while the seventh 

threatens Blue’s coalition support with the use of WMD or actually carries out 

lesser attacks on allied infrastructure. Table 2-6 provides the interaction of all 

seven tactical objectives and the potential use of the eight threat modalities. 

Create a Stalemate Situation and Prevent Blue Victory—Willing to 

Risk Escalation 

 The situation and objective is identical to the previous one except for a 

difference in Red’s calculus about the impact of potential escalation. Here, Red 

believes that victory for Blue is impossible, even with a significant degree of 

escalation. Thus, Red feels less constrained in terms of the level of attack he is 

willing to mount. Table 2-7 contains by reference all of the objectives and attack 

elements of Table 2-8 and adds three new objectives. 

Attacks on the Homeland to Disrupt Blue Deployment and 

Supply 

In this battlefield situation, Red is attempting to hamper Blue’s ability in the 

homeland to provide logistics, materiel, and troop support for an ongoing conflict 

overseas. Because, in the view of this study, physical attacks on U.S. soil by a major 

state adversary would almost certainly escalate to full-scale warfare, this battlefield 

is primarily concerned with unconventional opponents. Exceptions, for example, 

where the stated use of a modality by a near-peer is not necessarily likely to lead to 

full-scale war, are noted in the tables. 

Two strategic objectives are identified for Red: to diminish Blue’s ability to 

deploy troops and equipment from the continental United States, and to diminish 

the ability of Blue’s supply and support infrastructure to service the war effort 
76 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 8 
RED O BJ ECT IV ES A ND AT T A CK O PT IO N S I 77
78 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 8 

Diminish Blue’s ability to deploy troops and equipment 

 Three attack objectives are attributed to Red. Two of them are focused on 

the physical ability of Blue to move people and equipment around the United 

States and to air or sea lift them out of the country. 

The third is aimed at creating chaos within the military support bases either 

directly or by attacks on military dependents and other civilians living in nearby 

host cities. The attack objective and modality matrix for this strategic objective is 

provided as Table 2-8. Only the counter network operations are considered 

appropriate to a near-peer, state-based opponent. 

Reduce Ability of Blue Homeland Supply and Support Infrastructure 

to Service War Effort 

 Here, Red is attempting to defeat Blue’s military support infrastructure. Two 

of the supporting attack tactics are identical to the case above, in which the 

movement of people and material is the target, since the attacks here focus on 

the transportation infrastructure. Two other attack objectives, however, are 

different and focus on the defense industry, both conventional and nuclear, and 

the civilian work force upon which much of the military support infrastructure is 

dependent. The matrix is provided in Table 2-9. The near-peer would be the only 

adversary with the capacity to attack GPS satellites with directed energy (in this 

case high power microwave) and might also engage in counter network 

operations against Blue. With the exception of the directed energy attack, the 

unconventional adversary might engage in all of the attack objectives. 

Strategic Attacks on U.S. Civilians and Infrastructure 

In this last battlefield situation, Red is directly attacking Blue’s homeland in 

an attempt to accomplish either (or both) of two strategic objectives: 

! Inflict severe damage on the U.S. economy, political function, and/or 

civilian lifestyle 

! Further unite true believers in Red’s ideology and recruit new members 

from the international community by demonstrating Red’s ability to 

“destroy” the infidel 
RED O BJ ECT IV ES A ND AT T A CK O PT IO N S I 79

Both of these objectives strike at the heart of Blue society. If the attacks that 

service these objectives are perpetrated by a near-peer, state-based entity, it is 

highly likely that all-out war would quickly result. 

Thus, with the sole exception of influence operations, short of an ongoing 

full-scale war, these attacks lay in the province of an unconventional adversary. 

Severely Damage the U.S. Economy, Political Function, and Lifestyle 

In Table 2-10, the matrix for this strategic objective, four of the five attack 

objectives are ends in themselves, all designed to create havoc across the full 

spectrum of Blue society—very large loss of life, serious economic loss, mass 

panic, iconic destruction. The fifth attack objective is an enhancer for one or 

more of the others—to create a situation someplace in the city that drains off 

public safety and medical first responders to an area far from where the main 

attack will subsequently occur. 

Unite True Believers, Recruit New Members from International 

Community 

This is the last of the ten strategic objectives considered in this assessment. 

Like many of the others, it represents a means to an end—creating economic, 

social, or political havoc in Blue’s homeland to demonstrate the strength and 

commitment of Red, invoke the will and support of a supreme being to Red’s 

cause, and, in so doing, further unite the faithful and attract new like-minded 

members from elsewhere in the world. The matrix for this element of Red 

strategy is presented in Table 2-11. All of the entries are focused largely on an 

unconventional opponent. 

One of the issues associated with this Red strategy, as well as some others, 

was whether or not there is a damage threshold that Red does not want to 

exceed. The posited argument behind this self-deterrence question is that an 

attack that exceeds some very high level of loss of “innocent” life loses the 

sympathies of even the most devoted followers and becomes counterproductive. There is, of course, no clear or even single answer to this question, 

but it is often raised as one of the possible answers to “why hasn’t this happened 

yet?” If there is even a shred of merit in this argument, it should be explored and 

understood better so that perhaps it could form an element of Blue strategy in 

countering some of these threats, particularly the more devastating ones. 
80 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 8 
RED O BJ ECT IV ES A ND AT T A CK O PT IO N S I 81
82 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 8 
RED O BJ ECT IV ES A ND AT T A CK O PT IO N S I 83

Multiple Modalities and Attack Options 

The previous section dealt primarily with attacks built on the use of single 

strikes employing single modalities. This is of course an oversimplification of 

Red’s options. If beneficial to Red’s objectives, an adversary could combine 

modalities in either single or repeated attacks. State adversaries, or very powerful 

non-state adversaries that have not yet emerged, have the capability to conduct 

orchestrated campaigns. As a result, it may be useful for the United States to 

consider potential attacks from such adversaries as orchestrated campaigns and 

not as singular events—horrendous though a singular event may be. 

One way of looking at such options is exemplified in the 2x2 matrix in Table 

2-12. In this section, the attributes and downsides of each of the four quadrants 

of the table are briefly examined. 

Table 2-12. Multiple Modality and Attack Taxonomy 

Same Modality Different Modality 

Concurrent ! Heighten impact by creating 

spectacle 

! Ex: simultaneous chemical attacks 

on three sports arenas and two 

train terminals 

! Create synergies to increase overall effect 

! Ex: hazmat attack, IEDs to kill first 

responders, and cyber attack to destroy 

communications and coordination 

Multiplicity 

Sequential ! Grow panic over time 

! Destroy faith in government’s 

ability to provide basic services 

! Ex: High-explosive attacks every 

week at random times for two 

sequential months 

! Increased impact and dread over 

“Sequential/Same” 

! Ex: bio contamination of milk supply week 1, 

high-explosive attack on school week 2, chem 

in hospital HVAC week 3, and so on 

Multiple Concurrent Attacks using the Same Modality 

The events of 9/11 were an attack of this type. Four separate targets were 

attacked, three of which were carried out successfully. The purpose of such an 

attack structure is to raise the “spectacle” value of the event, as well as to 

increase the damage inflicted. The obvious downside is that such a 

contemporaneous multiplicity of attacks requires much greater planning, 

coordination, and preparation than a single attack of the same type. Because 

more perpetrators will be involved and because the required number of personal 

and electronic communications between the participants is higher, the chances of 
84 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 8 

a “leak” or simply getting caught by accident are much higher and therefore 

present an increased opportunity for Blue intelligence assets and capabilities. 

Nevertheless, al Qaeda, in particular, seems to be enamored with this kind of 

attack structure. Some of the vulnerabilities can be mitigated by Red if these are 

independent attacks intended to be executed at a pre-determined time or signal. 

Repeated Sequential Attacks using the Same Modality 

There is significant evidence that repetition of even relatively unsophisticated 

attacks can be quite effective in achieving Red objectives. There are recent 

examples that make this point convincingly: 

! IED campaign in Iraq 

! Washington D.C. sniper in October 2003 

! anthrax letters in fall 2001 

The current experience in Iraq indicates that roadside IEDs, vehicle-borne 

IEDs and/or suicide bombers will likely be the overseas asymmetric weapons of 

choice for insurgents, terrorists, and possibly third world states when 

confronting the overwhelming superiority of the U.S. military. Despite billions of 

dollars and several years of focused effort, Blue has made only very modest 

headway in eliminating this low-technology threat, owing in part to the high 

degree of flexibility and adaptability this weapon affords. Successes in preventing 

attacks have been continually offset by an increase in the number of attacks 

attempted and a shift to devices that extract greater casualties per successful 

detonation. The result is that the loss of life, both American and Iraqi, has 

remained relatively constant over an extended period. 

Ultimately, IEDs will not stop the U.S. military from achieving significant 

combat objectives. Despite the tragedy they represent to the troops who fall 

victim to them, they inflict relatively little damage on the scale of major force-onforce engagements. However, the steady loss of life IEDs inflict has proven to 

be maddeningly effective for achieving the Red objectives of creating a stalemate 

situation and eroding political support for continuation of the U.S. presence in 

stability and support operations. The key impact of the IED threat accrues from 

frequent repetition, rather than the severity of any single event, and the ease with 

which enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures can adapt to stay ahead of the 

U.S. response. It is certainly reasonable to assume that these kinds of attacks will 

continue to be the method of choice for future situations that involve willing 
RED O BJ ECT IV ES A ND AT T A CK O PT IO N S I 85

emplacement personnel, a large supply of adaptable munitions, and political 

rather than purely military aims. 

Beyond this current-day situation, Blue must consider how more advanced 

versions of improvised conventional munitions might be employed in the next 

10 to 20 years as more advanced technology becomes available in the global 

marketplace. These future versions could consist of helicopter “mines,” 

combinations of high explosive and chemical or biological agents, and so on. 

Given the demonstrated ability of unconventional adversaries to adapt very 

rapidly to counters to their weaponry, Blue needs to do a better job of getting 

ahead of the power curve, figuring out Red's “move after next,” and countering 

it before it happens. 

In the United States, both the Washington D.C. sniper attacks and the 

anthrax letter incidents indicate the impact that simple attacks with relatively low 

damage can have when repeated regularly. These attacks were effective because 

they targeted ordinary citizens in a random pattern. As a result, nearly every 

individual in the target area felt some degree of risk. The impact of a more 

widespread attack could be devastating, for example, if a terrorist organization 

announced a plan to kill a number of Americans every week as they carried out 

their normal daily activities. Two or three sequential weeks of adversary success 

would undoubtedly result in a change in current urban life and a resulting 

catastrophic political and economic impact. 

Repeated attacks using high explosives, biological agents, or chemical agents 

could have a significant immediate impact on the Blue psyche and lifestyle. 

Extensive press coverage would be expected, and would amplify the effect. If 

Red claimed responsibility and were able to continue the attacks, the competence 

of Blue’s government to protect its population, one of the most fundamental 

roles of government, would come into question with severe political fallout. 

Sequential attacks could also be effective in satisfying the objectives of raising the 

stature of the Red organization at home and helping it to recruit new members. 

Overall, the long-term effects of such attacks are less obvious. Blue resolve 

may very well increase and the populace may unite around a cause to defeat the 

aggressive enemy, provided that he can be identified and targeted. Certainly the 

Battle of Britain in World War II was such an example, and in the end proved 

counter-productive to the enemy. This type of attack also shares the downside of 

requiring more planning, preparation, and coordination, and therefore increased 

exposure. 
86 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 8 

Concurrent Employment using Different Modalities 

In cases of concurrent employment using different modalities, the Red 

objective is not necessarily for spectacle or mass hysteria purposes, although they 

may result, but rather to increase effectiveness of a single attack. Innovative uses of 

multiple modalities could have a synergistic effect, the most obvious ones being 

the combined employment of a physically destructive modality (e.g., high explosive 

or chemical) with cyber warfare attacks on any one of the supporting networks, 

including public safety communications, power grids, water supplies, hospitals, and 

the like. The advantage to Red is not only the added effectiveness such combinations 

can provide, but also the fact that skillfully perpetrated cyber operations may be 

difficult to detect and even more difficult to attribute. Thus, in this case, the added 

modality does not provide much of an added degree of exposure. 

Another complementary modality is the use of public networks, most notably 

the Internet and the press, for Red influence operations. “Spreading the word” of 

further Red intentions, particularly after the successful perpetration of a damaging 

act, could provide effective leverage on the damage that was actually accomplished 

and the impact it provided. This too is a simple and cheap accompaniment to a 

physical act; can be carried out from any place in the world; and is unlikely, if 

properly implemented, to lead to increased exposure. 

A third and more difficult type of concurrent combined modality attack 

involves the use of multiple destructive modalities. A good example is contained 

in some of the Department of Homeland Security planning scenarios and one 

that was used by the Defense Science Board in the 2005 summer study on 

Reducing Vulnerability to Weapons of Mass Destruction. In these types of scenarios, 

one physically destructive modality is employed as the primary mechanism, while 

a secondary modality, with far less destructive capability but much more easily 

employed, is used to hamper public safety and medical response. An example of 

such a multi-modality structure in the 2005 study was an attack on a large, highpressure chlorine storage facility. The main attack was accompanied by the 

employment of a number of IEDs, which were remotely detonated as public 

safety personnel arrived to seal the immediate area and coordinate evacuation. 

The public safety personnel were unable to properly coordinate activities for a 

critical period of time and the resulting casualties were significantly heightened. 

Perhaps the most serious example of concurrent employment with different 

modalities, is a peer or near-peer attack against C4ISR while Blue forces are 

engaged in an overseas conflict. A combination attack with the following 
RED O BJ ECT IV ES A ND AT T A CK O PT IO N S I 87

components, for example, could seriously degrade or destroy many or most 

C4ISR: (1) a concentrated cyber attack (denial of service, corruption of Blue data, 

destruction of hardware via control systems, computer network exploitation, 

malicious code and tampered hardware); (2) possibly nuclear EMP, jamming, and 

blinding Blue communications and sensor assets; (3) anti-satellite systems; and 

(4) selected high explosive attacks on communication nodes or command and 

exploitation facilities. If timed to the advantage of the opposing forces, this type 

of combined attack could lead to serious losses in that conflict. 

Sequential Employment using Different Modalities 

In this most complex attack structure, sequential employment using different 

modalities, the perpetrator is not building upon the natural synergies between 

different modalities, but is demonstrating his ability to do anything he chooses 

whenever he chooses. This kind of attack also builds upon the natural inclination 

of public safety and military organizations to try to do a better job in combating 

the last issue with which they dealt. This trend is evident in the Transportation 

Security Agency today, six years after 9/11. Thus, a series of attacks of different 

modalities, all aimed at children in natural settings, would likely have an even 

greater impact than sequential high explosive attacks. The resultant change in 

societal behavior, including, in particular, the impact on civil liberties and 

freedom of activity and life style, would be significantly greater as well. 

The downside to Red is, once more, the greater degree of planning required 

and the increased number of personnel involved. Not only would the number of 

perpetrators be greater, but the fact that more than one technical specialty would 

be involved could lead to a greater potential for discovery. Unfortunately, human 

activity pattern recognition is not a well-developed competence. Further, if Red 

is concerned about the potential for discovery, this weakness can be ameliorated 

by inserting a number of “sleeper” cells, each with a capability in one modality 

and completely independent of other cells. The attack could be initiated using a 

very loosely coordinated schedule, triggered by some global signal or event. 

Combining Modality Technology and Delivery Means 

This last subject deals with the combination of effect and delivery, particularly, 

but not necessarily limited to, a less than near-peer state actor engaged in conflict 

with the United States. An opposing entity would most likely want to directly 

attack U.S. forces in theater with a combination of technologies which have a 
88 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 8 

minimal cost but maximum effectiveness. Some potential possibilities of combined 

delivery technologies against Air Force, Army, and Navy forces are described here: 

! Attacks on naval forces at sea are possible by theater ballistic missiles 

using unique guidance methods. There is evidence that at least one 

country has deployed very large numbers of theater ballistic missiles 

including a subset with guidance that can terminally hone on ships. 

! Torpedo attacks are also possible by various conventional and 

unconventional platforms using advanced acoustic guidance. In World 

War II, intensive submarine attacks of surface ships occurred in both the 

Atlantic (by German submarines) and in the Pacific (by U.S. submarines). 

Since then, much more capable torpedoes have been developed, as well as 

both nuclear submarines and submarines with air-independent propulsion. 

! Jamming naval, commercial, and military satellite communication links 

may be combined with the disruption of Navy networks by software 

attacks. Much of the long-range communications for Navy ships and U.S. 

ground forces is carried through military and commercial satellites that 

are not protected from jamming. In addition, the recent attacks on the 

Estonian Internet system indicate the similar U.S. Internet system used 

by U.S. military forces is extremely vulnerable to such attacks. 

! The Army depends on shipping to transport its heavy equipment to 

overseas theaters. World War II experience indicates the vulnerability of 

such transport unless a massive counter-submarine effort is employed to 

protect shipping vessels. 

! Conventional warfare using ballistic missiles has been a factor since the 

V2 rocket was used in World War II. The recent massive use of unguided 

short-range missiles against Israel by Hezbollah from bases in Lebanon 

was a new threat in conventional warfare. When such missiles are 

equipped with GPS-based guidance and combined with easily-available 

imagery on the Internet and spotters on the ground, such attacks could 

cripple conventional land forces engaged in conventional warfare. 

! Experience in Iraq over the past four years indicates that the use of IEDs 

to mine transport and resupply routes is extremely effective. Increasingly 

clever detonation triggering systems are being employed and can be 

expected in the future. 

! Fixed Army or Air Force installations, such as logistics, maintenance, 

housing, and meal facilities, are characteristic of lengthy counterinsurgency operations. These locations are very vulnerable to a variety 
RED O BJ ECT IV ES A ND AT T A CK O PT IO N S I 89

of WMD area attacks, facilitated by the availability of civilian satellite 

optical surveillance imagery for targeting. One example is radioactive dust 

deployed from stand-off locations. 

! Anti-satellite attacks on U.S. surveillance, communication, and navigation 

satellites are a real possibility after the 2007 test of an anti-satellite 

weapon by the People’s Republic of China. Both low-earth-orbit satellites 

and higher-orbit satellites are vulnerable. 

! The resupply of fuel and heavy munitions to U.S. forward air bases could 

be severely hampered by the use of cruise missiles launched from 

submarines or even from small civilian boats. 

Most Effective Attack Options 

Selection of “Best” Attack Options 

Tables 2-2 through 2-11 examined a series of representative tactical 

objectives across the eight modalities examined in this study and attempted to 

determine how, from Red’s perspective, each modality could be employed to 

achieve a particular objective. The intent of that analysis was to find “the most 

promising single modality attack options” to satisfy each tactical objective. 

Armed with this identification of attack options for achieving a 

representative set of strategic and tactical objectives, it is possible to look across 

modalities and determine the attack options that make the most sense to Red. 

“Made the most sense” implies a filtering or screening process and, while a more 

detailed quantitative analysis supported by reasonable metrics was preferred, that 

was not practical within the constraints of this study. Therefore judgment, albeit 

in a structured framework, was used. The subjective filters considered in 

determining the best attack options included the following: 

! The number of times similar applications of a given modality satisfied 

one of the 10 representative strategic objectives 

! Operational criteria: 

- availability of resources 

- ease of implementation 

- minimum required personnel 

- effectiveness in meeting objectives 
90 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 8 

- surety of result 

- risk of interdiction 

- ease of mitigation by Blue 

! More abstract but nevertheless important factors 

- Low cost: human intensive rather than technology intensive 

- Flexible: attack approaches that offer the most operational flexibility 

so they can be used against more of the objectives rather than 

optimizing them for a one or a few 

- Scalable: attack approaches that offer the most flexibility in scale of 

attack; one would prefer a weapon that can be scaled from a few 

casualties to hundreds or more, depending upon the specific objective 

- Known: few uncertainties in terms of operations, construction, 

acquisition, expertise, and effects. The very nature of the known is 

that the risk is lower 

- Difficulty in Blue’s ability to employ countermeasures: some attacks 

are fundamentally more difficult to countermeasure than others, as are 

more diverse attacks 

Table 2-13 lists the 18 selected single-modality attack options, arrayed by 

modality, that resulted from this analysis and that appeared to be very favorable 

from a Red perspective. The “best way” for Red to achieve an objective will 

vary widely with the situation and the Blue environment so, rather than select 

some smaller number of the highest priority attacks, all 18 were addressed in 

the belief that Red, given the necessary resources and motivation, would try to 

develop the capability for as many of these as feasible, within the constraints of 

available resources. 

The Role of Information Operations 

Not shown in Table 2-13 are the attack options related to cyber warfare. As 

single-modality attacks, these are powerful weapons in themselves with the 

potential, for example, to disrupt both civilian and military targets. For military 

targets, cyber warfare attacks can feed false information to command and control 

structures; can neutralize Blue intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

advantages; and can degrade Blue precision. In a more general sense, these attacks 

can demoralize Blue troops and sow mistrust throughout the chain of command. 
RED O BJ ECT IV ES A ND AT T A CK O PT IO N S I 91

Table 2-13. Eighteen Attack Options Favored by Red 

Modality Attack Options 

Nuclear ! Blackmail—threaten attack on major U.S. or allied city 

! Iconic attack on military, e.g., Guam, Carrier Battle Group 

! Actual attack on major U.S. or allied city 

Biological ! Attack military through water or food supply 

! Attack civilians in high density urban setting 

! Attack economy, e.g., agriculture, cattle industry 

Chemical ! Attack people in high density enclosed spaces 

! Military area denial using persistent agent, e.g. APOD, SPOD 

! Release of In Situ toxic industrial chemicals, e.g. chlorine storage 

Radiological ! Denial of critical military area, e.g., APOD, SPOD 

! Denial of important economic area, e.g., Wall Street 

EMP ! High altitude nuclear effect—Van Allen Belt and/or EMP 

Directed Energy ! Jamming critical military resource, e.g., GPS, ISR, communications 

! Blinding ISR assets 

! Ground-based ASAT 

High Explosive ! Conventional use, e.g., mines, direct assent ASAT 

! Campaign, e.g., IED 

! Single attacks with long economic tail, e.g., 9/11, Hoover Dam 

When used against civilian targets, cyber warfare can disrupt Blue civil 

command and control structures equally well. In addition, success in this area can 

corrupt financial networks and disrupt the economy. Attacks could also disable 

air traffic control and municipal utilities and supervisory control and data 

acquisition (SCADA) systems, ultimately negating public safety systems. Wellplanned attacks can spread a variety of false information, may cause panic, and 

could lead to a number of other effects. Cyber attacks alone could, in some 

circumstances and with some opponents, accomplish many of the strategic 

objectives described earlier in this chapter. 

In addition, while generating Tables 2-2 to 2-11, it quickly became apparent 

that virtually every attack would benefit from a coordinated attack in the influence 

operations area in one form or another, perhaps several. In fact, it seems almost 

incomprehensible that any significant opponent would fail to capitalize on the 

gains from such a coordinated supporting attack. A consideration of the attributes 

from a Red perspective reveals the following benefits: 
92 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 8 

! coordination can be relatively loose 

! Blue systems have a variety of vulnerabilities 

! magnification factor for sowing confusion is high 

! cost is low 

! risk of attribution or apprehension can be low 

! the perpetrator/executor of the influence operations element can be a 

world away 

The goals of such a supporting attack with influence operations can range 

from simply creating confusion and panic among the first responders and the 

population of the affected area, to a sophisticated attack on its own intended to 

seriously degrade or damage SCADA systems or even to kill numbers of people. 

Blue has defenses against this kind of influence operations attack but there are 

known vulnerabilities in the design and architecture and almost certainly some 

introduced by potential opponents of the United States. 

The United States is probed every day via cyber warfare. Because no great 

disaster has occurred, some believe that Blue defenses are adequate or simply 

that the Red opponents haven’t found the right time yet. To some extent, both 

are likely to be true. As with all of the modalities described here, defense is much 

more difficult than attack. 

What the United States must worry about is the level of sophistication and 

the size of development efforts in cyber warfare conducted by various potential 

opponents. In the intelligence assessment of these factors for countries, nonstate actors, and others, the study found that the United States is not alone at the 

top in cyber capabilities. Although the Red opponents may be relatively close in 

terms of sophistication, the edge may well go to the side with the hidden 

malicious code or unrecognized hardware tampering. 

Representative Attacks 

The 18 generic attacks in Table 2-13 were augmented to include two cyber 

attacks that could be carried out either by themselves or in combination with one 

or more of the 18. The two added attacks were both against computer networks. 

One focused on military networks, such as those that supported C4ISR or 

battlefield communications, and the other against important civilian networks 

such as SCADA or financial systems. 
RED O BJ ECT IV ES A ND AT T A CK O PT IO N S I 93

Each of the resulting 20 single-modality attacks was then further evaluated 

from a Red and Blue perspective. This assessment involved establishing the likely 

placement of each of the 20 attacks in a two dimensional plot—one dimension 

being the favorability to Red and the other being the potential damage or 

disruption to Blue. The former was determined by roughly quantifying the Red 

favorability elements discussed previously (e.g., flexibility, scalability, resources 

required, ability to meet objectives, extent of unknowns, and so on) and the latter 

by establishing three Blue criteria: (1) the potential damage created by a 

successful and unmitigated attack, (2) the probability that the attack would be 

discovered and interdicted, and (3) the degree to which Blue could mitigate the 

effects of the attack. The results for the 20 representative attacks are plotted in 

Figure 2-4 for two cases: a state actor perpetrating attacks overseas and a nonstate actor attacking assets in the United States. 

The plots are derived in a formal yet admittedly subjective manner, and are 

believed to be qualitatively correct.42 Note that the upper right hand area of the 

plan should be the most worrisome to Blue, as it is the area that is most 

favorable to Red and potentially damaging to Blue. As demonstrated in previous 

studies, nuclear, cyber, and biological continue to emerge as the three most 

worrisome modalities and deserve the most attention. 

Figure 2-4. Subjective Prioritization of the 20 Generic Attacks

 

42. The data for these plots is included in Appendix II-A. 
94 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 9 

Chapter 9. How Blue Can Respond: 

Recommendations 

The previous chapter identified what are believed to represent some of the 

most devastating potential attacks that could be undertaken using each of the 

modalities assessed in this study. The results of this effort point to the need for 

the United States to take serious and meaningful action now to prepare for, 

prevent, mitigate, and recover from the type of attacks described. 

One of the easiest but still meaningful courses of action is to focus initially 

on steps that can readily be taken to prevent an easy path for an adversary to do 

serious damage. Perhaps the most obvious example of this type of action was 

discussed extensively in the Defense Science Board 2005 Summer Study on 

Reducing Vulnerabilities to Weapons of Mass Destruction—controlling all cesium 

in the United States, the material of choice for radiological (“dirty bomb”) 

attacks. Figure 2-5 indicates the location of the 1,117 137Cs irradiators of 1,000 

curies or more. Replacements using X-ray or 60Co irradiation for these are 

available, and replacement of all is estimated to cost approximately $200 million. 

This investment is a very small fraction of what it would cost to clean up or 

replace the contaminated areas from even one successful attack. It is also much 

less than the cost of long-term security to prevent access to these sources. 

Furthermore, that security typically would rely on detection followed by response 

from local authorities and cannot be effective against a concerted adversary. 

Depending on the targeted area, the impact on the United States' economy would 

likely be huge. For example, one of these samples, dissolved in water and sprayed 

uniformly could render a large section of Manhattan unusable for decades. 

Taking the adversary’s view for an extended period provided new insights 

into the likely exchanges that will come in this long war. There seem to be little 

difficulty and few obstacles for modestly educated adversaries in the not too 

distant future using available material and easily accessed or obtained facilities to 

execute very damaging blows to the United States—blows that could have 

significant impact economically, militarily, societal, and/or politically, perhaps 

even to the extent of ripping the national fabric. 
H O W BLU E C AN R E S PO N D : R EC O MM EN D AT IO N S I 95

Figure 2-5. Location of Cesium-based Irradiators in the United States 

Informed by the Red considerations discussed above, the final piece of this 

assessment returned to focus on Blue. The following conclusions and 

recommendations are made, therefore, from a U.S. perspective. 

Each of the 20 representative attacks charted in Figure 2-4 was examined 

from the Blue perspective, with an eye toward ways to enhance prevention, 

interdiction, mitigation, and recovery, while at the same time, reducing the value 

(and therefore favorability) to Red. The combination of both of these effects is 

the essence of deterrence. 

By way of example, the following response to a Red biological attack on Blue 

details a number of actions Blue might take to prevent, interdict, mitigate, or 

deter an attack on civilians in the homeland using a release of B. anthracis aerosol 

in large enclosed space. The attack could be any one of attacks listed in the 

Biological column in Table 2-1043, as well as a biological weapon attack on 

civilians in high density urban setting. 

 

43. "Release in crowds in multiple cities," "Senate Office Building attack," or "Infect crowds in theaters or 

airplanes, announce afterwards." 
96 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 9 

! Prevention. None for release in buildings or sports stadiums except portal 

screening for biological agent for all people, bags, and other sources. 

! Interdiction. Networks of real-time sensors, including bioagent specific, 

class-specific, such as spores, generic for respirable aerosols, generic for 

pressurized canisters, surveillance for suspicious activities. 

! Mitigation. Building response, purge HVAC, replace fresh air, exhaust 

contaminated air, rain-out bio-aerosol. Medical response, stockpile 

therapeutics, pre-distribute treatment, implement rapid exposure 

mitigation (i.e., showers), assess rapid exposure, enable rapid diagnostics. 

! Recovery. Map surface contamination to aid decontamination, use 

decontamination foams and sprays, purge building with antimicrobial 

vapor. 

! Deterrence. Anti-microbial paints and fabrics, personal gas masks, air 

purifiers, and air replacement. 

Priority Recommendations 

A similar approach to the above for the biological attack was made for all 20 

attacks in terms of examining ways to lessen the impact on Blue and the value to 

Red.44 The following subsections outline some of the resulting recommendations 

in each of the eight threat modalities. The first three, referred to as the “big 3”—

nuclear, cyber, and biological—received the most emphasis. In addition, the DSB 

2005 Summer Study on Reducing Vulnerabilities to Weapons of Mass Destruction

addressed this subject more comprehensively and should be considered 

complementary.45 

 

44. The Blue responses to the 20 representative attacks are discussed in detail in their respective modality 

appendices. 

45. Defense Science Board 2005 Summer Study on Reducing Vulnerabilities to Weapons of Mass Destruction. 2005. 

Washington D.C., Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. 
H O W BLU E C AN R E S PO N D : R EC O MM EN D AT IO N S I 97

RECOMMENDATIONS: NUCLEAR

Do everything possible to prevent nuclear weapons from getting into 

the hands of adversaries who are not likely to be deterred by cold war 

approaches—including both terrorists whose values are not well 

understood and, therefore, not likely to be held at risk, and nation states 

with leadership that borders on the irrational. 

The essence of prevention in this case is cutting off the supply, either by 

making movement of material more difficult or by enhancing Blue's ability to 

determine the origin of nuclear material and holding those suppliers, who may be 

more easily deterred, responsible. Thus, attribution of suppliers is a critical 

contributor to their potential deterrence. 

Such activities include: 

! supporting non-proliferation initiatives 

! improving forensics, including tasking intelligence to collect samples 

! continuing declaratory policy regarding passive loss of control and active 

support 

! taking away the easy paths for moving nuclear weapons and materials 

around (and, in the case of fully assembled weapons, assuming the 

adversary will have guaranteed “salvage fuzing”) 

Regardless of efforts to prevent a nuclear attack on the United States, it must 

at least be assumed that such an attack will eventually occur. Public education, 

along with prudent preparations, can limit damage and loss of life, 

potentially saving tens or even hundreds of thousands of lives if and when 

that attack happens. The public needs to understand the actions and role of the 

individual. There needs to be plans and exercises in advance. If everyone 

understands their role, the potential for widespread panic is diminished. 

This course of action has to be well thought through in order to gain public 

understanding and cooperation without causing unnecessary panic. Public 

education on the potential for nuclear attack and responding measures in terms 

of preparation and action, if and when an attack takes place, should be organized 
98 I P ART I I. CHA PT ER 9 

along the lines of civil defense during World War II.46 Detailed plans need to be 

developed for every significant population center, and resource-appropriate 

fallout shelters should also be designated. 

If an attack occurs, the nation needs the capability to identify the 

parties responsible. Post-detonation attribution capabilities should enable 

initial assessment within 48 hours. To achieve such a capability, the following 

actions should be taken: 

! DTRA assume responsibility for robustness of post-detonation technical 

forensics: 

- Identify collection and analysis limitations that compromise timeline 

and accuracy goals. Identify and begin implementation of programs to 

reduce these limitations. 

- Define and execute red team assessment of countermeasures to 

technical forensics. 

- Triple current DTRA funding (from ~$10 million in fiscal year 2007 

to ~$30 million) for this mission. 

! Task intelligence community with population of nuclear materials 

databases per NSPD-17, Annex IV. 

! U.S. Strategic Command/DTRA plan and execute realistic response 

exercise with senior leadership. 

! Reflect in all of the above, constraints and uncertainties of realistic 

attribution environments. 

In the area of post-detonation consequence management, the goal is 

local capability for major U.S. cities for initial 1–3 days of response. 

! National Guard work with local authorities to ensure detailed response 

plans (radiation hazards, shelter/evacuation decisions, medical surge, 

pragmatic decontamination for many 1,000s of people). 

! Exercise with National Guard Civil Support Teams and U.S. Northern 

Command assets upon completion of plans. 

 

46. For example, Civil Defense Wardens or Community Emergency Response Teams. See 

https://www.citizencorps.gov/cert/ for status. 
H O W BLU E C AN R E S PO N D : R EC O MM EN D AT IO N S I 99

RECOMMENDATIONS: CYBER WARFARE

Cyber warfare is potentially the most devastating modality after nuclear and is 

very attractive to adversaries of all sizes and capabilities. Cyber warfare could be 

used in single modality attacks against command and control and most of the 

nation's infrastructure and financial systems; the attacks in Estonia in May 2007 

were examples of what could happen. In addition, its use can enormously magnify 

the effects of an attack with another modality or modalities. For example, cyber 

warfare could be used to deny first responders the ability to communicate, corrupt 

situational awareness, insert false reports in the media, and cause loss of faith in 

the U.S. government’s ability to protect its population. Its use is equally applicable 

to causing disruption in military operations and those that enable distributed force 

coordination on the battlefield and in urban environments. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics (USD [AT&L]) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Networks and Information Integration (ASD [NII] ) identify DOD’s 

mission critical systems and make their protection a priority: 

! Selection process—Y2K process model for identifying/ranking critical 

systems. 

! Design and build them differently: 

- use technically diverse systems 

- create protected supply chain for essential capabilities 

- implement protected capability citadels/fail soft/wartime 

reserve modes 

- use red teams early and often through life cycle 

- harden with anti-tamper technology where appropriate 

- provide intelligence on adversary cyber capabilities (and industry) 

! Test them differently: 

- independent red teams design and participate in tests 

- include cyber offense and defense capabilities in test and exercise 

plans 
100 I PAR T II. C H APT ER 9 

- perform aggressive operational test and evaluation iteratively through 

life cycle, on occasion to the point of breakage 

- evaluate timeliness of recovery and remediation 

! Exercise/operate them differently: 

- based upon strong, current intelligence on adversary cyber capabilities 

- in degraded modes multiple times per year 

- based upon lessons learned returned to the design, build, and 

test processes 

Deputy Secretary of Defense educate industry CEOs on industry’s 

cyber vulnerabilities and adversary capabilities; solicit their participation 

in protection and remediation activities 

USD (AT&L) and ASD (NII) increase efforts on computer network 

defense. Carefully assess where additional resources could significantly 

improve Blue's defensive posture, including separate and hardened 

control systems, and apply appropriately. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: BIOLOGICAL

Biological attacks can take a variety of forms, ranging from outdoor aerosol 

delivery, to widespread contact with an infected individual, to corruption of the 

food or water supply chain, to direct contact such as anthrax in the mail. Each 

of these forms may be detected when delivered, but may not be recognized 

until the incubation period has passed and symptoms are manifested. The wide 

range of possibilities makes prevention heavily dependent on intelligence, 

places a premium on early detection and characterization of the attack, and 

puts heavy emphasis on mitigation after the attack. In the longer term, it may 

be possible (and is the subject of a significant level of current investment) to 

develop vaccines and therapeutics that deal with classes of biological agents 

rather than each one at a time—these are called broad-spectrum drugs and 

have the long term potential to negate the adversary value of biological attacks. 
H O W BLU E C AN R E S PO N D : R EC O MM EN D AT IO N S I 101

Interdiction 

! DTRA/Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) for Chemical and 

Biological Defense develop sensor networks in critical enclosed 

spaces of DOD (e.g., critical C3 nodes) for real-time triggers/ 

identifiers integrated with HVAC to control/contain 

contamination. 

Mitigation

! Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs advance DOD 

medical surveillance/response program for biological attack and 

coordinate with civilian programs (Center for Disease Control/ 

Federal Bureau of Investigation/Department of Health and Human 

Services): 

- rapid diagnostics and networked reporting to contain/control 

- rapid distribution of treatments/prophylaxis (1–2 days) 

! Find mechanisms and institute programs to address medical surge 

requirements (applicable to nuclear and chemical weapons as 

well). Some specific trial programs under this recommendation were 

provided in the DSB 2005 Summer Study on Reducing Vulnerabilities to 

Weapons of Mass Destruction. Review, assess, and implement if deemed 

appropriate. (Department of Homeland Security) 

Attribution 

! USD (AT&L) expand earlier bio-forensics/global reference 

database to identify specific bio-agents and attributes (virulence, 

drug resistance). 

Recovery 

! Continue development of diagnostics and broad-spectrum 

antimicrobials/vaccines and effective decontamination systems. 

(DTRA/DARPA/JPEO)

! Educate the public so they understand actions taken and know 

what themselves to do to minimize their risks. (Department of 

Homeland Security) 
102 I PAR T II. C H APT ER 9 

Additional Recommendations 

Recommendations in other modalities are highlighted below. 

RECOMMENDATION: HIGH EXPLOSIVES

High explosives have been a staple of both open conflict and terrorism 

for centuries and are likely to continue in that role for some time to come. 

They are almost certainly the most likely form of attack other than the continual 

use of cyber warfare. Prior to 9/11, the destructive capacity of single highexplosive events tended to be in terms of tens to hundreds of lives; with 9/11 it 

is now in the thousands and there is real potential for greater numbers with 

innovative and well-planned attacks. 

! Department of Homeland Security charter a team to identify U.S. targets 

and approaches that, if attacked with a truck load or a regional jet aircraft 

loaded with high explosives, could kill thousands of people either from 

primary or secondary effects or significantly disable a key part of the 

economy. Develop protection plans for these cases. The key challenge to 

this tasking is to assure innovative thinking. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: CHEMICAL 

Chemical attacks to kill or injure people are most effective in enclosed 

spaces such as arenas, large office buildings, or malls. For attacks outside, 

generally very large quantities are required since dilution occurs rapidly. Therefore, 

either military delivery or access to toxic industrial chemicals is most effective. The 

use of persistent chemicals can be effective as an area denial attack.

! Department of Homeland Security develop and deploy detectors for 

chemical and biological agents that can be installed in HVAC and air 

handling equipment, along with flow controls, so that on detection of an 

agent, the air flow is managed to protect people in the spaces. Such 

detectors can be set to a high-false alarm rate because they will only affect 

the air flow until the threat is confirmed. Secure and protect all sources of 

very large quantities of toxic industrial chemicals in close proximity to 

densely populated areas, such as pressurized chlorine storage facilities or 

rail sidings. 
H O W BLU E C AN R E S PO N D : R EC O MM EN D AT IO N S I 103

RECOMMENDATIONS: RADIOLOGICAL 

Radiological dispersion device weapons rely on access to radiological 

materials. These are generally used as an area denial weapon rather than for 

killing people. Limiting access and rapid cleanup for military attacks is key. For 

attacks on civilian urban areas, elimination of source material is currently the only 

practical method.

! Department of Homeland Security require protection of the major 

radiation sources in the United States and change from attacker-attractive 

materials to those that are not. For example, substitute 

e-beam or cobalt technologies for cesium-based sources in blood 

irradiation systems. Develop effective means of cleanup so that an area 

denied remains so for only a limited time. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE 

AND DIRECTED ENERGY 

Attacks employing EMP weapons are unlikely by any adversary other than 

holders of fairly large numbers of nuclear weapons. If the weapons available are 

few in number, it is probable that the attacker would find more lucrative uses. In 

addition, in many cases, cyber warfare can accomplish many of the same 

objectives (albeit for a more limited amount of time) and with much less 

uncertainty in the eyes of the attacker. EMP is, of course, a significant threat 

for a peer or near-peer who is willing to risk crossing the nuclear 

threshold, even in this somewhat limited manner. 

Directed energy in the forms of jamming, blinding, or high-powered 

microwaves will almost certainly be used in limited conflicts with a peer or nearpeer. It should be recognized that many U.S. systems typically include but do not 

implement anti-jam techniques to any great extent and thus are often vulnerable. 

Directed energy is more likely to be used as a secondary, complementary 

modality to the main thrust of an attack. 
104 I PAR T II. C H APT ER 9 

Summary 

The Red-Blue perspective presented in the previous chapter included an 

evaluation of 20 representative attacks (Figure 2-4). Figure 2-6 shows the 

potential impact of the study’s recommendations, assuming that the full scope of 

recommendations from this study are implemented (those from this chapter as 

well as the classified modality appendices).47 Although these recommendations 

are not a panacea and do not totally eliminate the threats, by implementing the 

recommendations of this study, the potential consequences of these attacks can 

be lowered significantly and can be made far less attractive to Red. Both are 

important in reducing the risk to the country, either directly or through the 

increased degree of deterrence that may be established. 

Figure 2-6. Red-Blue Perspective after Recommendations 

 

47. The supporting data for Figure 2-7 is provided in Appendix II-A. 
SU P PO R T I N G D AT A F O R A S SE SS M EN T S I 105

Appendix II-A. Supporting Data for 

Technology Impact Assessments 

Chapters 8 and 9 each contain two “bubble charts,” which attempt to portray 

the appeal to Red and the potential impact on Blue of 20 different attack 

strategies using the eight threat modalities—nuclear, biological, chemical, EMP, 

directed energy, radiological, high explosive, and cyber warfare—discussed 

throughout this report. This assessment was accomplished by establishing a 

representative, but admittedly inexact, placement of each of the 20 attacks in a 

two-dimensional plane—one dimension being the favorability to Red and the 

other being the potential damage or disruption to Blue. The former was 

determined by roughly quantifying the Red favorability elements, e.g., flexibility, 

scalability, resources required, ability to meet objectives, and extent of unknowns. 

The disruption or consequence to Blue was determined by establishing three 

Blue criteria—the potential damage created by a successful and unmitigated 

attack, the probability that the attack would be discovered and interdicted, and 

the degree to which Blue could mitigate the effects of the attack. The data and 

methods used to establish the two dimensional coordinates of each of the 20 

attacks are presented here. Tables 2A-1 through 2A-4 correspond directly to the 

four bubble charts represented as Figures 2-4 and 2-6. 

Each of the tables is divided into two main sections, as indicated by the two 

titles—Red Attractiveness and Blue Consequences. Each relevant intersection of 

an attack tactic is scored according to a two-part assessment—red, yellow, green 

and blue—representing “Poor,” “Fair,” “Good,” and “Excellent,” respectively. 

In order to roll up the results into an overall assessment, the assigned colors are 

each given a numerical value of 1, 2, 4, and 8, respectively. This geometric, rather 

than arithmetic, progression is used to ensure that the relative impact of moving 

from one category to another stays constant regardless of which category is 

under consideration. In selected cases, an intermediate number was assigned; for 

example, a 6 may be assigned for a situation that was not really “excellent” but 

better than others that were listed as “good.” 
106 I PAR T II. A P PEN D I X II- A 

Red Attractiveness 

The Red perspective in all of the charts considers the four principal attributes 

listed under Red, and within each of these attributes, a number of subconsiderations, as described below. 

Flexibility 

Flexibility is made up of two considerations, one numerical and one 

judgmental. The numbers in the Multi-Use column represent how many times 

each Attack Tactic appeared as a viable option in the 10 tactical objectives tables 

in Chapter 8 for the appropriate adversary types—i.e., state actor or non-state 

actor. The color scheme employed is yellow for 1, green for 2 or 3, and blue for 

4 and above. The colors in the Scalability column are subjective assessments as to 

how scalable the use of a given modality is to the attack objective listed. At one 

end of the spectrum are nuclear attacks, which regardless of yield are of very high 

consequence, and at the other end of the scale are high explosive and counter 

network operations—both of which can be scaled from very significant down to 

relatively minor, if desired. The Overall column is simply the average color of the 

two preceding columns. 

Operational Effectiveness 

The assessment of Red operational effectiveness is made up of three 

considerations, all of which were determined subjectively. It is also the only set 

of Red considerations that are determined numerically before establishing colors. 

The numbers in each of the three columns represent judgment as to the 

probability, from 0 to 1, of each attack satisfying the criteria listed in the column 

heading. The Effectiveness, Meets Objectives entry represents the judgment of the 

panel that the attack strategy—supposing Blue can neither interdict the attack 

nor mitigate its effects—will achieve the tactical objectives. Because these 

assessments are from a Red perspective, the color scheme reflects that a high 

probability is good and a low probability is bad. Risk of Interdiction and Probability 

of Blue Mitigation represent the likelihood that the attack will be stopped by Blue 

or, if not stopped by Blue, that the intended effects will be mitigated. 

In both of these assessments, low numbers are good from a Red perspective, 

and therefore, a probability of zero is blue, 0.25 is green, 0.50 is yellow, and 0.75 

is red. The final Overall column is calculated as a sequence of probabilities 

representing the three considerations in tandem leading to a successful attack—

i.e, the probability that the attack will meet objectives given no interdiction or 
SU P PO R T I N G D AT A F O R A S SE SS M EN T S I 107

mitigation, multiplied by one, minus the probability of interdiction, multiplied by 

one, minus the probability of mitigation. The Overall assessment represents Red’s 

expectation that the use of that modality in the way described will satisfy the 

objectives given whatever Blue can do to stop or mitigate it. Therefore, high 

numbers are good and low numbers are poor. Because they are calculated, the 

values may fall anywhere between 0 and 1. The color scheme represents that 

perspective, with red for values less than 0.25, yellow for values from 0.025 to 

less than 0.050, green for values from 0.050 to less than 0.75, and blue for values 

above 0.75. 

Other Operational Issues 

This assessment addresses Red’s confidence in achieving the intended results. 

Surety of Result deals with the uncertainty in the linkage between the physical or 

direct outcome of the attack and the tactical effect that is desired, under the 

assumption that the attack is neither interdicted nor mitigated by Blue. Unintended 

Consequences considers effects that were not planned and may not be desirable 

from a Red perspective. An example might be a targeted Blue nuclear response 

on population centers to the use of a high altitude nuclear event by Red that was 

narrowly aimed at destroying some satellites. Red’s calculus might assume that 

Blue would not respond with a nuclear ground attack to a Red event that created 

no physical damage on the ground, but Red would likely look hard at the 

downside of a Blue reaction beyond that assumption. Knowns and Unknowns

considers the physical surety of the direct effect actually happening. A good 

example of “poor” in this category is the use of a nuclear event to create EMP 

damage to Blue. 

Many orders of magnitude of uncertainty exist in both the creation of the 

pulse and the coupling into specific electronic equipment, and Red’s enthusiasm 

for employing EMP as an attack tactic would certainly be tempered by this 

uncertainty. Contrasting with this is the use of high explosives, for which nearly 

all of the effects are well known as a function of size and type of explosive. 

Uncertainties are very small and Red can be confident that what he assumes will 

happen, will indeed happen, at least from a physical effect point of view. The 

Overall column presents the arithmetic average of values in the three 

subcategories. The color scheme is as follows: red for values below 1.5, yellow 

for values equal to or greater than 1.5 but below 3, green for values equal to or 

greater than 3 but below 6, and blue for values 6 or above. 
108 I PAR T II. A P PEN D I X II- A 

Availability and Readiness 

This assessment deals with Red’s ability to acquire the necessary resources and 

have them available to implement an attack. Three subcategories are considered: 

Resource Availability weighs the relative availability of getting the critical modality 

material and any required specialized fabrication equipment or critical skills to 

weaponize the device; Implementation Ease examines the complexity involved, given 

the existence of the weapon, in creating an effective attack, including the steps 

involved, the complexity of the planning process, the need for rehearsals, and so 

on; Personnel Required assesses how many people would be involved in both 

perpetrating the attack and in whatever training and coordination is required, both 

of which have an impact on Red’s assessment of potential discovery by Blue. The 

Overall column is once again the arithmetic average of the three subcategories and 

employs the same color scheme as in Other Organizational Issues. 

Overall Red 

Overall Red combines all of the elements under the preceding four categories. 

Values are calculated by multiplying the Overall Operational Effectiveness by the 

average of the Overall assessments in Flexibility, Other Operational Issues, and 

Availability and Readiness. This way of combining the four scores—i.e., using the 

Overall Operational Effectiveness as a multiplier—seemed reasonable because if a 

particular attack tactic has very little or no expected operational effectiveness, 

other factors matter little. In averaging the other three categories, no factor 

dominated the others, and the values were combined in this way. The end results 

were normalized in all four scenarios by a factor of 1.5 to give the best attack 

tactic a score of 8, and these were colored using the scheme described for Other 

Operational Issues. The Overall Red scores as shown in the four tables are used to 

position the balls horizontally in Figures 2-4 and 2-6. 

Blue Consequences 

In assessing the potential consequences to Blue, there were three 

considerations. The first, labeled Consequence, was a judgment, qualitatively 

determined, as to how devastating the results of a successful and unmitigated 

attack would be on Blue from a variety of standpoints—economic, political, 

military readiness, etc.—depending upon the nature of the attack. The standard 

scale of 0 to 8 was used, with high numbers representing very serious 

consequences and low numbers less serious. Standard color-coding was applied. 

The values for Probability of Interdiction and the Probability of Blue Mitigation ranged 

from 0 to 1 and were treated as though they were probabilistic. 
SU P PO R T I N G D AT A F O R A S SE SS M EN T S I 109

Here, since high probabilities are good for Blue (the inverse of the situation 

for Red), a zero chance of interdiction or no ability to mitigate are colored red, 

whereas higher numbers are yellow or green. In the same manner as in the Red 

assessment, the values for Overall Blue were arrived at by multiplying the assessed 

raw Consequence by one minus the probability of interdiction and one minus the 

degree or probability of Blue mitigation. Here, low numbers are good and 

therefore the color scheme is inverted: blue for values below 1.5, green for values 

equal to or above 1.5 but below 3, yellow for values equal to or above 3 but 

below 6, and red for values equal to 6 or higher. The Overall Blue score is used to 

position the balls vertically in Figures 2-4 and 2-6. 

Data Tables 

All of the assessments are determined using the techniques and scoring 

strategies described above. Table 2A-1 represents the 20 attacks, as they might be 

assessed today, for all of the attacks serving the strategic objectives of a state actor 

operating against the United States overseas. It corresponds to the left chart in 

Figure 2-4. Table 2A-3 represents the same situation, but under the assumption 

that all of the recommendations relating to the eight modalities have been fully 

implemented. It corresponds to the left side of Figure 2-6. Table 2A-2 represents 

the 20 attacks, as they might be assessed today, for all of the attacks serving the 

strategic objectives of a non-state actor operating within the U.S. homeland. It 

corresponds to the right side of Figure 2-4. Table 2A-4 represents the same 

situation, but under the assumption that all of the relevant recommendations have 

been fully implemented. It corresponds to the right side of Figure 2-6. 

Final Note 

The reader will notice that the scores under Red for Interdiction and Mitigation

are the same as those listed under Blue. In hindsight, it is more likely that 

Red would adopt an “offense conservative” view of these probabilities (i.e., Red 

would tend to assess them at the high end of a possible range) because Red’s 

concern would be “what if” things went wrong for Red and right for Blue. Blue, in 

contrast, would adopt the opposite, or a “defense conservative” view, based upon 

Blue’s desire to understand what might happen if Red pulled things off 

just right and Blue’s actions didn’t actually happen quite as planned. The effect of 

these conservative perspectives would be to move the balls in the figures slightly 

higher (worse for Blue) and slightly to the left (not as favorable to Red). 

These movements would be small and unlikely to affect the overall trends shown 

in the charts. 
110 I PAR T II. A P PEN D I X II- A 
SU P PO R T I N G D AT A F O R A S SE SS M EN T S I 111
112 I PAR T II. A P PEN D I X II- A 
SU P PO R T I N G D AT A F O R A S SE SS M EN T S I 113

Part III 

Nuclear Proliferation: A Special Case 

A CORE EMERGING CHALLENGE I 117

Chapter 10. A Core Emerging Challenge 

The previous three chapters examined eight technology areas available to 

potential adversaries and assessed the implications of attacks using weapons 

derived from these technologies. As in previous assessments by the DSB, one 

particular weapon stands in a class by itself in terms of its potential for damage, 

disruption, and devastation—the nuclear weapon. The importance of nuclear 

weapons, both in terms of the consequences of their use as well as attractiveness 

to some potential adversaries, motivated an in-depth look, as part of this study, 

at the matter of nuclear proliferation in the emerging military landscape. 

The U.S. nuclear security environment is multifaceted and encompasses the 

problems posed by (1) nuclear relations among the major nuclear powers (Russia, 

China, Britain, France, and the United States), (2) new nuclear weapon states, and 

(3) non-state actors seeking nuclear weapons. This study focused on only one of 

these three factors, new nuclear weapon states, and not on the larger problem 

set. But as appropriate and necessary, it has explored the overlaps among these 

three problems. 

Methodology 

Two primary questions guided the assessment of the nuclear proliferation 

landscape. First, will nuclear weapons be embraced by enemies as their premier 

asymmetric capability? Second, will nuclear weapons endow a new tier of states 

with peer-like capabilities to limit U.S. freedom of action? To derive those 

answers, the following methodology was employed: 

1. Looking ahead two decades, how might nuclear proliferation proceed? 

2. What would be the consequences for the United States and what will 

U.S. leaders want to do? 

3. What military capabilities and capacities should the Department of 

Defense create to underwrite these ambitions? 

4. Are the needed capabilities coming together? What more needs to be 

done? 

5. Is there anything more that can be done now that might make a 

substantial difference in preventing proliferation? 
118 I PART III. CHAPTER 10 

It is important to explain the relationship of this fifth item to the remainder 

of this study. This study, as a whole, looks ahead two decades to the year 2027 

and explores how capable our future adversaries might be and what strategies 

they might pursue. The proliferation problem is explored within that time 

horizon—how proliferation might unfold between now and then, and its 

implications for needed military capabilities and capacities in 2027. The primary 

focus of this assessment is not on how to manage the proliferation problem 

today in a way that helps to prevent future proliferation. But it does reveal some 

useful insights into this topic, which will be addressed in response to question 

number five. 

Forecasting the Future of Proliferation 

What kind of nuclear proliferation problem will the United States face in 

2027? Many people in the defense community already have a clearly defined 

answer to this question: a rapid breakdown of nuclear order with a doubling or 

trebling of the number of nuclear-armed states in the next decade or two. In the 

judgment of this study, this answer is wrong. It is also misleading, as it points to 

the wrong set of implications for military planning and capability development. 

In our judgment, the nuclear future cannot be predicted reliably. Some 

“outcomes” in 2027 are more plausible than others, but none can be predicted 

with high certainty. Military planning and capability development must account 

for this uncertainty. 

The widespread conviction that the nation is headed toward a more anarchic 

global nuclear environment derives from the following two hypotheses. First, 

proliferation is inevitable—and “history proves it.” This way of thinking results 

from the steady addition of new nuclear-armed states over the last few decades, 

as represented in Figure 3-1. 

The second hypothesis is that global nuclear order now stands at a tipping 

point, to be followed shortly by a cascade of new nuclear proliferation. The 

argument runs as follows. 

 The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998 signaled the renewal of 

nuclear competition among states of long-standing proliferation concern. 
A CORE EMERGING CHALLENGE I 119

Figure 3-1. New Nuclear Weapon States, by Year 

 North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 has reignited debates in Japan and 

South Korea, which will lead inevitably to their acquisition of nuclear 

weapons, with Taiwan certain to follow suit at some later time. 

 Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons is triggering renewed interest 

among its neighbors in nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. Egypt, 

Turkey, and Saudi Arabia will have to follow suit; the latter may seek an 

extended nuclear guarantee from Pakistan rather than develop its own 

weapons (as suggested by the dotted line connectors in Figure 3-2). 

These choices will generate second-order effects among other states in 

the region, including possibly the rekindling of nuclear weapons 

ambitions in Iraq and Libya. 

 There will be spillover effects from Northeast and Southwest Asia into 

neighboring regions and more generally. Brazil will follow Japan’s 

nuclearization to signal its role as a major power, and others in Latin 

America will be compelled to follow. Nuclear competition in the Middle 

East will reignite the nuclear ambitions of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, 

among others. Ultimately, the threat to Europe will become so severe as 

to re-open debates there about independent nuclear deterrents. 

 Further, the growth in the number of nuclear-armed states will be 

accompanied by a growth in the potential for non-state actors to acquire 

nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials. 
120 I PART III. CHAPTER 10 

By this logic, as many as 20 or 30 new nuclear-armed states would exist in a 

decade or two, as represented in Figure 3-2. 

Figure 3-2. A Potential Nuclear Proliferation Cascade 

What implications follow from these hypotheses? One is simply to throw in 

the towel on proliferation prevention. If it is inevitable, goes the argument, 

accept it as inevitable, don’t misuse scarce political and fiscal capital for 

nonproliferation, and get on with needed military and other preparations. The 

other implication is to prepare militarily for the worst of all possible worlds. 

“Hunker down,” by aggressively building a military posture that insulates 

America from an anarchic world while also creating new capabilities to dole out 

occasional punishment to nuclear-arming enemies. 

These two hypotheses fit well with the tendency in the military planning 

community towards focusing on the worst-case. But that does not make them 

valid. From our perspective, there are obvious reasons to quarrel with each. It is 

difficult to square the prediction of inevitability with the fact that the number of 

nuclear-armed states is lower than it was when the Cold War ended roughly two 
A CORE EMERGING CHALLENGE I 121

decades ago (Pakistan and North Korea have been added to the list of nucleararmed states whereas Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and South Africa have all 

abandoned nuclear weapons). It is difficult to square the prediction of an 

imminent cascade with the fact that acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities is 

time-consuming and difficult—sufficiently so that many states that have sought 

nuclear weapons have opted not to go the distance. 

Accordingly, this study sought an alternative way of thinking about the future 

of nuclear proliferation. We, too, began with an assumption: that historical 

experience can inform an understanding of future possibilities. Indeed, we have 

projected some alternative futures as an extension of trend lines from historical 

experience, seeking combinations of trends that seem to span the plausible 

problem space. To understand historical experience for this purpose, the 

experience of proliferators, actual and potential, in creating technical capabilities 

associated with nuclear weapons production was mapped. This effort does not 

encompass every step in the evolution of their nuclear ambitions, plans, 

programs, capabilities, or strategies. Rather, it focuses on only those key steps 

that had a substantial impact on the development of the potential for weapons 

production, whether by increasing that potential or holding it steady or even 

decreasing it. The main gradients in capability are defined as follows: 

 Nil weapons potential. Countries within this category do only limited 

nuclear research. They have no other access to fissile materials. Their 

domestic base for science and engineering is constrained by 

developmental factors, and they have accepted safeguards obligations. 

 Modest weapons potential. Countries within this category have a 

substantial nuclear power industry. They also have a latent capability for 

weapons design and engineering in their national science and technology 

base. They have also accepted safeguards obligations. 

 High weapons potential. Countries within this category have brought 

together some but not all of what they need for serial weapons production. 

Either they have a uranium enrichment capability or a robust scientific 

and engineering capability for weapons design and production. In addition, 

they have not fully implemented the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty, which provides for a high level of safeguards 

protection against illicit diversion of weapons materials and technologies. 

 Potential for serial production. Countries within this category possess 

all three of the attributes: a fuel cycle allowing them direct access to fissile 

materials, the scientific research and engineering capacity to competitively 
122 I PART III. CHAPTER 10 

design and develop nuclear weapons, and rejection of the restrictions of 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards system. 

Figure 3-3 re-tells the story of the four nonproliferation failures of recent 

decades. It depicts the steady growth in weapons production capability. To 

illustrate the methodology, take the case of North Korea (yellow line): 

 1965. First research reactor went critical. In subsequent years North 

Korea gained a working knowledge with key technologies and processes. 

 1987. Weapons potential significantly increased as the Yongbyon reactor 

went on-line. In subsequent years, North Korea accumulated spent fuel 

rods, which it then removed for reprocessing as it also constructed the 

reprocessing plant. 

 1995. Potential again significantly increased when (as alleged) North 

Korea began its secret uranium enrichment program and in subsequent 

years enriched uranium while further developing the plutonium pathway. 

 2006. Nuclear test signaled production of a functioning device. 

Figure 3-3. Four Nonproliferation Failures 
A CORE EMERGING CHALLENGE I 123

There were many other developments in North Korea’s nuclear program, 

strategy, and ambitions. But these few steps highlight the pathway from an 

original ambition to the potential for serial production.1

In contrast, Figure 3-4 tells the story of four rollback successes. One country, 

South Africa, moved steadily up and then down the capabilities ladder. Three 

others acquired nuclear weapons as the Soviet Union dissolved and they too 

chose to abandon those weapons as well as some of the associated capabilities. 

Figure 3-5 illustrates the proliferation dynamics that unfold within regions, in 

this case Asia. One or two states might well lead a region that otherwise had not 

suffered proliferation to proliferate far more widely. On the other hand, one or 

two states might well lead a region that had suffered no proliferation to remain 

that way despite new pressures. Note that this figure does not include China, as 

the major nuclear powers are a not a focus of this work. 

On a global scale, Figure 3-6 displays the complex, messy story of nuclear 

proliferation history. It drives home a simple point: that history is much more 

complex and rich than the simple linear progression that informs the proposition 

that proliferation is inevitable. 

Two other figures (Figures 3-7 and 3-8) illuminate the fact that twice before 

in nuclear history the world has faced the possibility of a significant cascade of 

nuclear proliferation, first in the 1960s and then again in the 1970s/1980s. 

The first potential wave attenuated with the conclusion and entry into force of 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as many states with nuclear ambitions set 

them aside in favor of security guarantees extended by the United States, latent 

capabilities, and reliance on the nonproliferation norm. The second potential 

wave attenuated more slowly but culminated in nuclear rollback by the four 

states in the early 1990s, as noted above. 

 

1. Detailed support for each of the steps up or down the timelines in this work is available in Alexis Blanc, 

Nuclear Proliferation: An Historical Overview (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2007). 
124 I PART III. CHAPTER 10 

Figure 3-4. Four Rollback Successes 

Figure 3-5. The History of Nuclear Proliferation in Asia 
A CORE EMERGING CHALLENGE I 125

Figure 3-6. Nuclear Proliferation History in All its Complexity 

Figure 3-7. The First Potential Proliferation Cascade: 1960s 
126 I PART III. CHAPTER 10 

Figure 3-8. The Second Potential Cascade: 1970/80s 

What insights follow from this survey of historical proliferation experience? 

First, this survey reinforces the assessment that proliferation is not inevitable. 

The states that have acquired nuclear weapons are a small fraction of those who 

set out to do so. It has been possible to roll back some proliferators. Others have 

opted to hold steady with a level of capability short of weapons production. The 

historical peak of nuclear seekers was 20. In the period since the 1960s, the ratio 

of prevention wins to losses is 18 to 5. 

Second, there have been at least two potential cascades in nuclear history. 

These erupted as waves, driven by a mix of primary drivers and secondary 

reactions. The world appears to be at a third potential tipping point. But success 

in diminishing the proliferation pressures of prior potential cascades suggests 

that the collapse of international nuclear order may not be inevitable or 

imminent. 

Third, the decision points along any single country’s nuclear “pathway” are 

numerous. Our research identified more than 300 major decisions by over 50 

states in this time period. These are opportunities for influence. How best to use 

the current opportunities is the subject of a later chapter. 
A CORE EMERGING CHALLENGE I 127

Fourth, proliferation typically takes a long time. Although some states have 

sought shortcuts to nuclear weapons, all have had to develop some degree of 

indigenous capability, usually substantial. This proved time-consuming and 

technically difficult. The challenges of indigenous development of fissile material 

are well illustrated in Table 3-1. It is also important to note that the most likely 

countries to seek nuclear weapons in the next 20 years are developing countries, 

many of which have not developed the kind of scientific, research, and engineering 

infrastructures that will allow them to rapidly accumulate capabilities indigenously. 

Similarly extended timelines are also typical on the development and 

engineering side. Weapons design, with or without foreign help, typically takes 

less time than production of fissile material. But production of the designs and 

their subsequent weaponization has typically required approximately 15 years. 

This way of thinking about the nuclear past suggests that hyper-proliferation 

anarchy in the 20-year future is less likely than some in the defense community 

believe. Indeed, in this study it led to a different set of conjectures. Almost 

anything is possible in a 20-year timeframe, but not everything is equally likely. 

North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is unlikely to readily lead to a 

broader proliferation of nuclear weapons in East Asia. Those proliferation risks 

are long-standing, and states there have made a series of choices to manage those 

risks with some reliance on U.S. security guarantees and some reliance on latent 

weapons potential. Iran’s nuclear acquisition may have more immediate and farreaching consequences for the Middle East. Its neighbors may renew their quests 

for nuclear deterrents of their own, but unless shortcuts are available to them, 

the development of a viable nuclear weapons production infrastructure is 

decades away for them. Moreover, allies and friends of the United States in that 

region may see U.S. guarantees as a preferable option for meeting the challenges 

of a proliferating Middle East than trying to develop nuclear weapons of their 

own, competitively and in increasing isolation. 

Other regions of the world seem unlikely to fall into renewed nuclear 

competition unless there is a substantial breakdown of the nonproliferation regime 

and other institutions of international security. In the 20-year timeframe, a 

doubling of the number of nuclear-armed states from today’s total of nine would 

require that some countries with advanced infrastructures in Europe and East Asia 

opt for nuclear weapons, which seems highly unlikely in this timeframe. 
128 I PART III. CHAPTER 10 

Table 3-1. Timelines to Fissile Material Production

Technology 

# of Countries 

Interested in 

Technology 

# of Countries 

with Successful 

Production 

Programs* 

Average Time 

to 

Pilot Plant** 

(in years) 

Average 

Time to 

Production*** 

(in years) 

Gaseous 

Diffusion 

enrichment 

6 5 - 6 

Centrifuge 

enrichment 18 7 8 14 

Electromagnet

ic isotope 

separation 

11 1 2 3 

Chemical 

isotope 

separation 

3 - 6 11 

Aerodynamic 

isotope 

separation 

3 1 7 18 

Laser 

enrichment 14 - - - 

Graphite–

moderated 

production 

reactor 

6 6 1 2-11 

Heavy-water 

moderated 

reactors 

12 5 1 2-6 

Research 

Reactor 14 3 - 4-5 

Reprocessing 19 13 6 10 

Source: Pacific Northwest National Laboratories, Nuclear Proliferation Technology Trend Analysis, September 

2005. 

Qualifiers: * more than gram quantities of material produced 

 ** technological capability demonstrated 

 *** significant quantities of material produced 
A CORE EMERGING CHALLENGE I 129

To be sure, there is the ever-present possibility of shortcuts. In an era 

marked by rising concern about networks like that of A.Q. Khan and evidence of 

North Korean “off-shore” nuclear activities, it would seem that those 

possibilities are multiplying. But historically, few of the states seeking shortcuts 

have found them (or found them trustworthy). Moreover, states seeking to 

develop indigenous capabilities with selective use of shortcuts have had to make 

numerous decisions along the way about what level of capability to create, and 

these decision points have been targets of opportunity for influence. 

How might the trends from the past combine and re-combine to create new 

patterns in the future? 

Looking ahead to 2027, this study has defined two theoretically possible but 

not realistically plausible “outcomes.” One would be a world in which all of the 

states with serial weapons production capabilities abandon their nuclear weapons 

and drop below the cross-over point from weapons potential to weapons 

production, as depicted on the time-line charts. This world would be one of 

nuclear disarmament and, in the view of this study, it is not possible between 

now and 2027. But this view does not rule out the possibility that one or more 

nuclear weapon states might roll back their capabilities. 

The other notionally possible but not plausible future is hyper-proliferation. 

In this world all of the states with weapons potential, even if presently nil or, 

indeed, non-existent, accelerate their climb up the capabilities curve and cross the 

red line from weapons potential to weapons production. 

Four alternative “outcomes” are more plausible in this two-decade 

timeframe, as described in Figure 3-9: 

Alternative Future 1. Under this alternative, no new states have crossed the 

line to weapons production, but more states have latent weapons potential, and 

those states with weapons potential are developing increasingly robust breakout 

capabilities. Any rollback successes would likely fall into this category as well. 

There would be growing risks associated with the acceleration of technology 

diffusion and the larger and more diverse market in materials, technologies, and 

expertise. Non-state and sub-state actors could find more opportunities to 

advance their interests in such a world. States seeking shortcuts on the 

developmental pathway might also find increasing opportunities here. This 

alternative is referred to as “more latency.” 
130 I PART III. CHAPTER 10 

Figure 3-9. Alternative Nuclear Futures 

Alternative Future 2. Alternative two would include all the challenges noted 

in alternative 1. In addition, a small number of states would have crossed the line 

into weapons production. But the defining feature of this world would be that 

those states are motivated primarily by a desire to possess a minimum deterrent 

that they safeguard for defensive purposes. This alternative is referred to as 

“more minimum deterrents.” 

Alternative Future 3. In addition, to the challenges of the first two 

alternatives, this future would include some number of states that are competing 

for nuclear advantage. That competition might occur between neighbors and 

within specific regions. It might spill over across regions, particularly as longrange delivery systems are deployed. It might also include competition directly 

with the United States. It is possible to imagine various forms of competition: for 

supremacy, for parity, to seize opportunities before a nuclear counter-balancer 

emerges, to extend deterrence to counter U.S. regional influence, or to ensure 

effective retaliatory capabilities in light of improvements in an adversary’s ability 

to strike first (and absorb a counter-strike with missile defenses). It is possible to 

conceive of new nuclear competitors as seeking to develop capabilities up to (and 

beyond) certain specific thresholds. These thresholds are defined as follows: 
A CORE EMERGING CHALLENGE I 131

 First operational weapon: signals a state’s emergence as a nuclear power. 

 Minimum defensive capability: the level sufficient to expect one weapon 

to survive to a high-value target (this threshold would be much higher 

against countries with preemptive and defensive capabilities). 

 Minimum offensive capability: above plus enough in reserve to induce 

retaliation restraint by the attacked party (proliferator may believe that it 

could win a limited war for limited stakes with such a force). 

 Existential threat: above plus enough to pose an existential threat to its 

enemy (threshold a function of size and capabilities of enemy). If 

numbers sufficient, may be willing to hand some off to others. 

 Parity in numbers: above plus numbers comparable to enemy (threshold 

again a function of enemy—very high if United States or Russia). 

 Numerical and/or technical superiority: of limited additional operational 

value to proliferator so long as enemy poses existential threat. 

This alternative future is called “new nuclear competitions.” 

Alternative Future 4. This alternative “outcome” could erupt out of any of 

the three futures described above. In this future, a new revolutionary power 

emerges that is willing to employ and share nuclear weapons in service of its 

cause. The quintessential expression of this problem would be the emergence of 

a nuclear-armed Caliphate guided by the philosophy of Osama bin Laden and 

fellow revolutionaries. In this scenario, the Caliphate is suddenly restored over 

the holy sites in Arabia, a nuclear umbrella is unfurled, and the new entity 

expands its attacks against its near and far enemies, but this time with nuclear 

weapons, whether held in reserve or actually employed. It is also possible that 

some radical regimes might seek to affiliate themselves with a radical nucleararmed Caliphate and pursue a form of coalition warfare against their near and far 

enemies under a larger nuclear umbrella. This vision is cogently conveyed in 

Figure 3-10, from a radical Islamist website. 

One of the text boxes in Figure 3-10 describes the military attributes of a 

“United States of Islam” in 2030, including the “strongest army in the world, 

strongest currency in the world, largest country in the world, and atomic and 

superpower country.” Note that the lower right-hand box in this figure depicts a 

vision of the world 100 years from now, in which the total world population has 

been subsumed into a single Islamic “state.” 
132 I PART III. CHAPTER 10 

Source: http://strangemaps.wordpress.com/2007/11/01/194-the-united-states-of-islam/

Figure 3-10. An Illustration of the Potential for a Revolutionary Nuclear-Armed “Peer” 

This fourth alternative future is referred to as “nuclear anarchy.” The 

members of this study believe that this alternative future has not so far captured 

the attention of U.S. defense planners but that it should be a central focus of 

policy development. The possible sudden emergence of a nuclear-armed state 

committed to revolutionary purposes and drawing on the sympathies of large 

numbers of anti-American and anti-Western peoples could well bring the return 

of the kind of peer adversarial competition that has not had to concern the 

United States for the last two decades. 

The purpose of elaborating these alternative futures is not to predict a 

specific proliferation outcome in 2027. Rather, it is to define a spectrum of 

plausible outcomes so that it is possible to explore what military capabilities will 

be needed. Before turning to that specific question, we offer observations on 

how the proliferation problem will intersect with the non-state and major power 

nuclear problems. 
A CORE EMERGING CHALLENGE I 133

It is difficult to conceive of a plausible proliferation outcome in 2027 that 

does not involve an intensification of the challenges associated with non-state 

actors seeking access to nuclear weapons, materials, technologies, and expertise. 

Those actors will encounter a larger and more diverse network of suppliers, 

which will probably afford them new opportunities to divert, steal, or bribe their 

way to desired capabilities. They may also find common cause with radical 

regimes that are willing to use them as conduits for unconventional employment 

of nuclear weapons. 

With regard to the connection between proliferation and major power 

nuclear relations, it seems likely that the United States will want to focus strategic 

resources on proliferation and not on Russia or China if it is not absolutely 

necessary to do so. But proliferation will drive changes in the strategic military 

postures of all three, and that will make this difficult. Managing the potential 

instabilities in the strategic offense/defense relationships of the three will be a 

central challenge of sustaining global nuclear order in an era of heightened 

proliferation risk. Just because something can be unstable does not mean that it 

necessarily will be. Maybe the nation will get lucky or, better yet, find the 

necessary wisdom and will. 

Proliferation’s Implications 

What implications will proliferation have for the United States? What will U.S. 

leaders want to do in response, and to shape the security environment? Without 

answers to these questions, it is impossible to know what military operational 

challenges might confront the United States in these alternative futures. 

The possible implications of proliferation over the next two decades can be 

expressed as follows. Further nuclear proliferation could: 

 Raise the costs to the United States and its allies and friends of U.S. 

intervention on their behalf, reducing its freedom of maneuver and 

intensifying political debate about what burdens it should bear. 

 Expose the United States and its allies and friends to attempted coercion 

by new nuclear states and/or coalitions of states. 

 Expose all states to the risks associated with access by non-state actors to 

weapons, materials, technologies, and expertise—not least through direct 

transfer from states. 
134 I PART III. CHAPTER 10 

 Expose all states to the possibility for more rapid breakout through 

sharing arrangements among states. 

 Generate new demands for U.S. security guarantees. 

 Generate new concerns about the nuclear vulnerability of the homeland. 

 Bring to a head the growing debate about the competence of the United 

States to understand and safeguard the interests of its allies and friends 

around the world. 

 Bring a loss of U.S. credibility whenever a U.S. ally or friend goes nuclear. 

A collapse of the nuclear nonproliferation regime would deal a particular 

blow to U.S. credibility, as this was a particularly American project. 

 Expose all states to the risks of economic, environmental, social, and 

political impacts of regional nuclear wars. 

 Create new demands on international security institutions to sustain the 

peace, redress noncompliance with international treaty commitments, 

punish nuclear aggressors, and intervene to try to stop regional nuclear 

wars. 

In fact, most of these costs and risks seem to be a function not just of the 

proliferation threat, but also what is done about it. It is possible to reduce those 

costs and risks in various ways—and in a cumulative way—that can make a 

substantial difference—a point that will be discussed in the following chapter. 

Another way to explore the possible implications of proliferation is to 

explore how U.S. leaders will want to act to confront proliferation challenges and 

shape the security environment. It is useful to distinguish between what U.S. 

leaders will want to do, won’t want to do, and may have to do. 

U.S. leaders will want to contain and deter nuclear aggressors, counter their 

attempts at nuclear-backed coercion, and punish those who act aggressively with 

nuclear weapons. They will want to assure friends and allies that they need not 

meet the new proliferation challenges with their own nuclear weapons and to 

also dissuade potential adversaries from seeking to compete with the United 

States by nuclear means. They will want to secure loose nuclear weapons in weak 

states and to suppress illicit nuclear networks of all kinds. They will want to buy 

more time vis-à-vis the next proliferators and to use it to good effect. They will 

also want to manage major power relations in a way that keeps Russia, China, 
A CORE EMERGING CHALLENGE I 135

and others aligned with the United States in meeting the challenges of a more 

proliferated world. 

U.S. leaders will not want to appease proliferators or acquiesce to the actions 

of a revolutionary Caliphate to attempt to unseat “apostate regimes.” They will 

not want to stand by idly while allies distance themselves from the United States 

because of the perception that it might be unreliable in a nuclear crisis. They will 

not want to be constrained in their exercise of U.S. power and influence. And 

they will not want to pay a high economic or political price to inhibit further 

proliferation. 

Despite these preferences, U.S. leaders may have to do some of the following. 

They may have to act rapidly as a nuclear-armed state collapses to secure its arsenal 

and stockpiles of fissile material. They may have to conduct a preventive war if 

revolutionary forces appear poised to gain control of a nuclear-armed state. They 

may have to defeat nuclear-armed enemies on battlefields where it is believed that 

nuclear weapons can be used locally without risking strategic retaliation (something 

U.S. leaders would likely prefer to do by non-nuclear means, if possible). They may 

have to try to boost the willingness and ability of new nuclear states to maintain 

their nuclear capabilities according to high safety and security standards. They may 

have to provide technical assistance to them toward that end—or facilitate/ 

condone such action by others. They may have to acquiesce to extended 

deterrence roles in the Middle East and perhaps elsewhere by other states. They 

may even have to accommodate some of the demands of proliferators. 

What military capabilities are needed to underwrite these intentions? This 

topic will be addressed in the following chapter. 
136 I PART III. CHAPTER 11 

Chapter 11. Needed Military Capabilities in a 

More Proliferated World 

The four alternative futures described in the previous chapter were used in 

this study to define what military capabilities will be needed in a more 

proliferated world. For each alternative, two contingencies were elaborated in 

detail—with a characterization of U.S. interests and objectives, top-level 

concepts of operations, and needed capabilities and capacities (a distinction 

elaborated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR]). One contingency 

focused on crisis response and the other on shaping the security environment. 

The complete list follows: 

 Alternative Future #1, marked by more latency: 

- Crisis contingency: suppress a newly discovered illicit proliferation 

pathway. 

- Shaping contingency: inhibit nuclear defections by non-nuclear states, 

principally from among U.S. allies and friends but also more 

generally. 

 Alternative Future #2, marked by the emergence of more minimum 

deterrents: 

- Crisis contingency: secure an arsenal of weapons and materials in a 

failing state. 

- Shaping contingency: dissuade development of more potent 

capabilities by those who have crossed the minimum deterrent 

threshold. 

 Alternative Future #3, marked by the eruption of new forms of nuclear 

competition within and among the regions and also with the United 

States: 

- Crisis contingency: conduct stabilization and reconstruction as a part 

of terminating a regional nuclear war to which the United States was 

not a direct party. 

- Shaping contingency: extend nuclear deterrence to new security 

partners in regions of rising proliferation concern. 
NEEDED MILITARY CAPABILITIES I 137

 Alternative Future #4, marked by the emergence of a revolutionary 

nuclear power or powers and near anarchy: 

- Crisis contingency: neutralize an expansive revolutionary state armed 

with nuclear weapons. 

- Contingency: contain a coalition of states hostile to the United States 

and protected by the nuclear umbrella of a revolutionary state. 

The selection of contingencies is meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. 

Other crises are imaginable and it is conceivable that some of the crises 

associated with a particular future might also occur in a different future. 

“Shaping” will remain an imperative in each future, whatever specific form it 

might take. The objective of this modest effort in capabilities-based planning was 

to span the problem space so as to characterize broadly and comprehensively the 

capabilities that will be needed. 

For each contingency, the specified Blue concept of operation was used as a 

basis for deriving a list of needed capabilities and capacities.2

 Some were unique 

to a specific contingency but most cut across many contingencies. These are 

catalogued and summarized as follows. 

Needed Military Capabilities 

The United States needs three basic types of capabilities. 

 First, it needs a joint force able to execute the missions associated with 

combating nuclear proliferation (as specified in the National Military 

Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction).3

 Second, it needs a strategic posture able to meet the demands of 

assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and defeat (including explicitly 

extended deterrence, all as elaborated in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review).4

 

2 Details of the eight contingencies are contained in Appendix III-A. 

3. National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Washington, D.C., February 13, 2006. 

4. Nuclear Posture Review Report, U.S. Department of Defense, January 9, 2002, (submitted t Congress 

December 31, 2001) classified report. 
138 I PART III. CHAPTER 11 

 Third, it needs a capacity to integrate all of the tools of national 

power in support of peacetime and war-time objectives. Each of these is 

described briefly below, followed by a more detailed discussion. 

Joint Force Capability: Interdiction 

In most of the contingencies, high value was attached to the ability to 

effectively locate and either seize or destroy nuclear materials and weapons in 

transit. Generally, this was important to dissuade and deter further nuclear 

proliferation involving both states and non-states, especially in the shaping 

contingencies. In particular, the contingencies demonstrated specific needs for 

interdiction to disrupt smuggling routes globally, halt the flight of nuclear 

weapons from a failed or defeated state, and stop nuclear weapons in the 

approaches to the U.S. homeland. 

Joint Force Capability: Elimination 

The contingencies also demonstrated the need for nuclear elimination 

capabilities to find, secure, and render safe nuclear weapons and/or materials 

and/or the programs that produced them. These capabilities include site control, 

exploitation, disablement, dismantlement, and material disposition against both 

state and non-states. In the first alternative future of “more latency,” this 

capability is primarily aimed at dissuading nuclear defections or other 

proliferation by demonstrating U.S. capability to eliminate nuclear weapons and 

materials when necessary. In addition to this shaping function, the capability also 

serves specific purposes in other alternative futures. Each of the crisis 

contingencies for the other alternative futures (capturing “loose nukes” from a 

failing state, intervening in a regional nuclear war, and reacting to nuclear 

aggression by a revolutionary power) require responsive and robust nuclear 

elimination capabilities. 

Joint Force Capability: Passive Defense 

In two of the contingencies crafted for this study, U.S. military forces were 

compelled to operate in regional environments contaminated with radioactive 

material. One contingency was associated with efforts to terminate a regional 

nuclear war and to participate in the stabilization and reconstruction efforts to 

follow. This effort could well involve operations in areas contaminated by 

nuclear attack prior to the arrival of U.S. forces. The other contingency involved 

the potential for direct attack on U.S. forces by a revolutionary state willing to 
NEEDED MILITARY CAPABILITIES I 139

employ nuclear weapons and calculating that it could use nuclear weapons in 

ways that would fall beneath the U.S. retaliatory threshold. Such a case could 

involve military operations against an enemy trying to use nuclear weapons to 

cripple single points of failure in a U.S. war plan or to cripple U.S. morale—or 

the political will of its regional allies. Passive defenses are also relevant to the 

shaping contingencies in the sense that they convey a capability and willingness 

to operate effectively in nuclear environments and to surge protection of allies. 

Accordingly, the joint force must be capable of sustaining stabilization 

operations in a nuclear contaminated theater and sustaining battlefield operations 

under very limited attack. To do so requires passive defense effective against 

nuclear effects. 

Joint Force Capabilities for Consequence Management 

The circumstances that could lead U.S. forces to need to operate in a 

contaminated environment also create a need for those forces to be able to help 

allies, friends, and others subjected to nuclear attack prepare for and cope with 

those attacks. The associated humanitarian problem could be of daunting 

proportions. This study focused on foreign consequence management and did 

not address the separate, but related, and important issues associated with 

domestic consequence management. 

Joint Force Capability: Attribution 

The ability to quickly, accurately, and credibly identify and attribute 

responsibility for an unclaimed nuclear explosion is critical for the types of 

nuclear futures envisioned in this study. Such an explosion might take place on 

the high seas, on the territory of a friend or ally, or on U.S. territory. It might 

take place with no warning on a slow day, in the heat of an escalating crisis with 

U.S. government agencies already on high alert, or during an on-going war. In all 

circumstances, it is imperative that the president quickly have the facts at hand in 

order to select courses of action, to reassure the American public, and to engage 

diplomatically with allies and partners. 

“Quickly,” in this study is defined as 24 to 48 hours—a difficult stretch goal. It 

is highly likely that the president would also want to take a technical case to the 

United Nations Security Council within a few days. The linchpin is to be able to 

attribute responsibility. Presumably, the intelligence community would have ready 

for the president all relevant evidence from U.S. and partner sources. The point of 

origin may be easy to trace quickly, e.g., a nuclear weapon delivered by a ballistic 
140 I PART III. CHAPTER 11 

missile on a known trajectory. But the focus here is on the unclaimed nuclear 

explosion for which there is scant intelligence other than that to be acquired from 

nuclear forensics. The focus thus is twofold: the ability of the U.S. forensics 

community to provide the president with the needed information, and the ability 

of corroborating international evidence to lend credibility to U.S. claims. 

Joint Force Capability: Intelligence 

In all of the alternative futures examined in this study, the demands for highquality nuclear intelligence would be high. Both the National Strategy to Combat 

WMD and the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD rightly describe intelligence 

as a critical enabler of effective implementation. Indeed, comprehensive, technically 

accurate, in-depth intelligence on foreign nuclear weapons programs and activities 

is essential to mission success across the entire combating WMD mission space. 

Strategic Posture Capability: Non-Nuclear Strike 

The crisis contingencies illustrate the need to be able to destroy nuclear 

weapons being readied for use in a regional nuclear conflict, being transferred to 

a proxy actor, or being deployed as a breakout capability by a new revolutionary 

regime. The shaping contingencies also illustrated the value of being able to do 

these things in terms of influencing the decisions of others to accept U.S. 

protection as opposed to creating their own strategic strike capabilities. 

Strategic Posture Capability: Active Defenses 

Both the crisis and shaping contingencies illuminate the value of being able 

to protect the United States, its military forces, and its allies and friends from 

attack with nuclear-tipped ballistic and cruise missiles. Being seen as able to 

negate the value of threats from nuclear missile-armed states should be very 

helpful in inducing their restraint in confrontation with the United States and/or 

a U.S. ally. 

Strategic Posture Capability: C4ISR 

The contingencies all illustrate the value of a reasonably complete and up-todate intelligence picture of foreign nuclear weapons activities; command, control, 

communication, and computer capabilities to coordinate complex high-speed 

operations; and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to find and track 

nuclear weapons and materials originating from known or likely related sites. 

They also suggest the value of effective information assurance. 
NEEDED MILITARY CAPABILITIES I 141

Strategic Posture Capability: Nuclear Deterrence 

The proliferation contingencies elaborate various values for the U.S. nuclear 

force in both crisis response and shaping. In the crisis contingencies, the U.S. 

nuclear force is important when persuading new nuclear competitors not to 

threaten or conduct attacks on the United States, its allies and friends, and its 

military forces. Think of this as central deterrence and extended deterrence. In the 

shaping contingencies, the U.S. nuclear force is important to persuade challengers 

that they cannot gain strategic equivalency (dissuasion), to assure allies that they 

need not abandon the security relationship with the United States and seek 

nuclear deterrents of their own (assurance), and to contain a hostile coalition 

through the threat of punishment. The shaping contingencies also illustrate ways 

in which responsible U.S. stewardship of the nuclear enterprise sets a standard 

for surety (security and safety) to which others should be held. In short, the 

contingencies illustrate various ways the United States can strategically apply its 

nuclear weapons enterprise (nuclear forces and supporting infrastructure) to 

influence the nuclear proliferation environment worldwide for the greatest net 

benefit to U.S. and global security. Four priorities stand out: 

First, the United States needs a nuclear force that its allies, friends, enemies, 

and potential adversaries see as viable for purposes of deterrence, both central 

and extended. A credible deterrent is essential for persuading U.S. allies and 

friends that they need not translate their weapons potential into an independent 

nuclear force. It is essential also for persuading enemies and potential adversaries 

that there would be no net gain in their security or prestige through the 

acquisition of nuclear weapons because they could not hope to prevail in a crisis 

or war in which they threaten or employ nuclear weapons. 

Second, the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise must perform nuclear surety 

(safety and security) at the highest possible level. After all, in a more proliferated 

world the United States will want to hold all states, including especially the new 

ones, to these highest possible standards. To do that, it must set that best 

practices standard. Its own best practices are a function of assumptions about the 

threat and human performance factors and of cost. 

Third, the nuclear weapons enterprise must be able to responsively field 

nuclear forces under changing conditions. The absence of such a capability 

works against the objectives of dissuading potential competitors and assuring 

allies and friends seeking viable extended deterrence. A responsive infrastructure 

also enables the United States to reduce reliance on a large stockpile of warheads 

as a reserve force and to reduce the need for testing weapons as part of the long-
142 I PART III. CHAPTER 11 

term stewardship effort, which help to reinforce the responsible stewardship 

objective noted above. 

Fourth, the enterprise must be (and be seen to be) well aligned with U.S. 

international treaty commitments, especially to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty. The contingencies illuminate the various ways in which the United States 

can employ the treaty commitments of others, international norms, and 

international processes to isolate and pressure problem states, and to assure and 

encourage those states that prefer non-nuclear futures. Accordingly, the United 

States must not be seen as disdainful of its own treaty commitments, including 

those to Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

Strategic Posture Capacity: Flexible Infrastructure 

The contingencies associated with dissuasion and containment point to the 

value of being able to rapidly produce new strategic capabilities in response to 

geopolitical change, technology surprise, and new mission requirements. The 

nuclear element has already been discussed above. 

National Capacity: Integration 

The DIME (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) construct is 

intended to bring home a larger point to the defense community: diplomatic, 

informational, military, and economic tools of national power must be integrated 

to support national objectives in the security environment. This concept is as 

true in dealing with the proliferation challenges of the future as with other 

problems in that environment. The contingencies vividly illustrate the need for 

such integration. All of the shaping contingencies illuminate the ways in which 

U.S. objectives cannot be achieved by relying on military means alone and, 

similarly, the numerous contributions of the U.S. military to efforts for which 

other governmental entities have the lead. Even in the crisis contingencies, the 

successful implementation of Blue concepts of operation typically requires the 

effective integration of a broad range of interagency partners. Without such 

integration, the military will be called upon to do things that it is ill-equipped to 

do alone, such as stabilization and reconstruction after a regional nuclear war. 

Such integration is also essential for all of the Phase Zero activities associated 

with proliferation prevention, assurance, and extended deterrence. 

These needed capabilities and capacities are summarized as follows: 
NEEDED MILITARY CAPABILITIES I 143

The joint force must be able to perform the following missions effectively: 

 interdiction to locate and seize nuclear materials and weapons in transit 

 elimination to eliminate weapons captured from terrorists or collapsing 

or defeated states and the programs that produced them 

 passive defense to allow sustained operations in a nuclear contaminated. 

environment, scaled on high-end to very limited enemy use 

 consequence management to prepare and protect civilian populations 

in affected areas 

 attribution to quickly provide a national assessment to the president 

following an unclaimed nuclear explosion, and an international technical 

assessment to UN Security Council shortly thereafter 

 intelligence as an enabler to provide timely access by the president, 

Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders to comprehensive, 

technically informed, and actionable nuclear intelligence to support crisis 

action, network suppression, and longer-term planning 

The strategic posture must be able to meet the demands of assurance, 

dissuasion, deterrence, and defeat with capabilities to: 

 hold at risk enemy nuclear assets and other high-value targets by nonnuclear means 

 defeat enemy preemptive or retaliatory strikes with active df 

 and track mobile systems, coordinate complex high-speed operations, 

and provide prompt situational awareness 

 deter nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland and extend deterrence to allies 

and friends that they deem credible by nuclear and other means 

 demonstrate high standards of responsible nuclear ownership and 

advocate for international standards 

 respond to geopolitical change, technological surprise, and new mission 

requirements with new capabilities from the existing infrastructure 

A capacity to integrate the tools of national power in service of U.S. 

nonproliferation and counterproliferation objectives is an essential adjunct to the 

other military capabilities and capacities. 
144 I PART III. CHAPTER 11 

It is useful to think of these needed capabilities and capacities as tools in the 

military toolkit. Any individual contingency may call for the use of only a few of 

those tools. Only the most demanding would call for the use of most or all of 

them. If the future could be known with certainty, the United States could 

emphasize the development of only a subset of tools identified here. But the future 

is not sufficiently predictable, as previously argued. Thus, the nation must develop 

the broad military toolkit envisioned here if it is going to be able to do what leaders 

are likely to want to do or have to do in the proliferation futures envisioned. 

This list of needed capabilities and capacities derives from the study’s 

assessment of the requirements of success in military-operational contingencies 

in a more proliferated world. Many of these contingencies could materialize well 

before the outer time limit of this study: 2027. Of course, the opposite is also 

true: they may not materialize between now and then, or ever. National strategy 

and guidance already put a high value on the ability to employ military 

instruments proactively to confront nuclear proliferators and nuclear challengers. 

Most, if not all, of the needed capabilities identified above are in fact currently 

needed, with the stipulation that over time the needed capability is likely to 

become more robust. 

This approach to defining needed capabilities and capacities does not address 

two issues: (1) the sweeping changes to the U.S. foreign base posture that might 

be driven by the need to contain a revolutionary, nuclear-armed Caliphate, or (2) 

the kinds of force structure adaptations that would be necessary to support the 

defense of allies and friends and the projection of power in the face of nuclear 

threats from a revolutionary power. These could be sweeping. 

Assessing Current Capabilities 

During the course of this study, the time and expertise were not available to 

conduct a detailed review of the status of current capabilities across this portfolio 

of 13 needed capabilities. But charged with the task of identifying current 

capability gaps, a top-level comparison was conducted of current capabilities and 

future needs in select areas. Overall, three propositions emerged: 

First, the current capabilities of the joint force to perform the nuclear-related 

missions of the combating WMD strategy are not robust. Indeed, they are 

grossly mismatched to the needs and policy priority of proliferation prevention 

and management. The stand-up of a few new capabilities has been accompanied 

by the atrophy of some older but still needed ones. 
NEEDED MILITARY CAPABILITIES I 145

Second, the strategic posture is in transformation but remains poorly tuned 

to the requirements of assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence. Overall, this force 

must become much more capable of providing a broader range of strategic 

military options than is currently available with nuclear weapons. 

Third, the needed integration remains a vision but not a reality. The U.S. 

government has not organized and mobilized for this problem in the way that it 

has for the counterterrorism problem. 

Current Interdiction Capabilities 

Despite good progress in creating the planning and execution processes for 

strategic interdiction, actual capabilities remain quite modest in comparison to 

the anticipated threat. There are several reasons for this situation. There are 

currently too few trained and assigned units with specialized personnel (especially 

special operations forces) to effectively operate against a dispersed proliferation 

network or multiple networks operating simultaneously. Current training and 

exercises are not addressing this requirement. 

In addition, current detection capabilities for locating and tracking nuclear 

weapons and materials do not perform at the desired level against competent 

adversaries. The lack of detectors that can be used from a distance and are robust 

against countermeasures (such as masking or shielding) represents a substantial 

gap in needed capabilities for nuclear interdiction. 

Finally, there is no global system architecture that would allow for an 

accountable prioritization of activities and investments. The result is an uneven 

and inefficient (sometimes ad hoc) distribution and application of interdiction 

capabilities. This is particularly problematic because interdiction depends on 

intelligence, interagency, and international capabilities in addition to those within 

DOD. As a result, successful interdiction is extremely difficult, especially against 

an adaptive adversary who will seek to exploit weaknesses. Successful 

interdiction also requires actionable intelligence and there are significant gaps 

there as well, as discussed in further detail below. 

Current Elimination Capabilities 

There are only limited efforts in DOD to plan, train, equip, and exercise for 

nuclear elimination. Although the mission exists, its requirements (for scope, 

simultaneity, etc.) have not been fully defined and it is not fully resourced. 
146 I PART III. CHAPTER 11 

Current capabilities are scaled and tailored to past problems (e.g., a replay of the 

war to find Iraqi weapons of mass destruction). In future conflicts, U.S. forces 

may have to be ready to contend with a large arsenal, operating infrastructure, 

and substantial nuclear risks. There seems to be only limited ability to surge for 

larger-scale elimination missions or simultaneous missions. These capabilities are 

further limited by gaps in intelligence, particularly with regard to the location and 

disposition of adversary nuclear facilities, weapons, and/or materials. 

Current Passive Defense Capabilities 

The Services once had up-to-date and well-practiced concepts of operations 

and tactics, techniques, and procedures for operations on a nuclear contaminated 

battlefield. But with the end of the Cold War, the emphasis in chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) training and research and 

development procurement has shifted in favor of chemical and biological at the 

expense of radiological and nuclear. This shift is reflected in the ratio of training 

hours, currently running at nine hours for passive defense for chemical and 

biological attack for every one hour of training for passive defense for nuclear or 

radiological attack. Although it is intended to provide comprehensive training on 

all weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. Army Chemical School, which is 

responsible for CBRN training, has deemphasized radiological and nuclear 

throughout its curriculum. 

One result in this training gap is that very few forces are adequately trained 

on radiation detection. It is important to be specific about the nature of the 

training deficiency: it is not that officers and noncommissioned officers do not 

know how to operate or keep the equipment functional; rather, they do not 

understand the implications of different meter readings in terms of their impact 

on the health of the military personnel around them. Without proper 

understanding, all meter readings are interpreted as dangerous, which leads to 

poor risk assessments, a loss of combat efficiency, wasted time and effort as 

individuals deal with background-level radiation issues, and units maneuvering to 

avoid all measurable radiation “hazards,” even those that are not hazardous. The 

notion that “all radiation is bad” also increases the risk of individual panic. 

Another important gap is in available understanding of nuclear weapons 

effects. The number of systems vulnerable to nuclear weapons effects is growing 

and the understanding of vulnerabilities is declining. With DOD’s increasing 

dependence on technology, U.S. military forces are increasingly at risk of 

equipment failure due to nuclear weapons effects, especially electromagnetic 
NEEDED MILITARY CAPABILITIES I 147

pulse. DOD can only identify such vulnerabilities on the systems it tests and it 

does not test many systems. The Army tests mission-critical systems but the 

other military services test only a small subset of equipment with the majority 

focused on surviving space environments. Concerns about this problem were 

well articulated by the EMP Commission of 2004, but interim progress in 

creating the needed understanding has been disappointing. 

There are other gaps as well. Operational guidelines for plausible 

contingencies have not been written. The architecture for stand-off detection of 

radiation remains underdeveloped. 

Current Consequence Management Capabilities 

DOD appears to be singularly focused on protecting its own forces and 

facilities and has not yet tackled the difficult subject of how to extend its 

capabilities and capacities to help its allies and friends cope with attacks on them. 

The official roles and missions associated with foreign consequence management 

do not seem to be developed, nor have plans been created or exercised. 

Current Attribution Capabilities 

Current forensics capabilities are firmly rooted in Cold War nuclear history. 

In the mid-1940s, the U.S. Air Force developed an ability to conduct airborne 

surveillance for evidence of a foreign nuclear test. Consequent to the dual needs 

of U.S. nuclear war planning and the monitoring requirements for a series of 

arms control arrangements, the United States, through the end of the Cold War, 

developed an elaborate global system of sensors and an operational concept for 

alerting and characterizing nuclear explosions. Although much of this system 

remains in place today, it is not aligned to the newly relevant problems of an 

unclaimed nuclear explosion, possibly in an urban area, possibly out of the blue. 

Despite a decade of rising concern about the need to align forensics capabilities 

with a changing security environment, and an on-going effort directed from the 

White House level, significant problems remain. Current capabilities cannot meet 

desirable time lines, and bench depth is not strong, meaning that the system 

would fare poorly if stressed by the need to deal with more than a single incident. 

Further discussion of gaps and efforts to fill them can only be conducted at the 

classified level. 
148 I PART III. CHAPTER 11 

Current Combating WMD Intelligence Capabilities 

In 2005, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction offered an indictment of current U.S. 

capabilities: 

“The Intelligence Community was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war 

judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. This was a major 

intelligence failure...We simply cannot afford failures of this magnitude....We 

still know disturbingly little about the weapons programs and even less about 

the intentions of many of our most dangerous adversaries.” 

Current capabilities are inadequate to enable interdiction that quickly collapses 

smuggling routes, planning for elimination in a way that scales capabilities to likely 

demands, preparation of passive defense and consequence management practices 

suitable to enemy tactics, and rapid attribution of unclaimed nuclear detonations. 

The Commission flagged as a specific problem “poor analytical tradecraft—

namely, the failure to do proper technical analysis informed by thorough 

knowledge of the relevant weapons technologies and practices.” 

Current Non-Nuclear Strike Capabilities 

In this area, the study relied on the 2004 Report of the Defense Science Board Task 

Force on the Future of Strategic Strike Capabilities to underpin an assessment that 

much more progress can and should be made in fielding needed capabilities. 

Looking ahead by one or two decades, two key gaps stand out. One is in the 

ability to destroy several to a few tens of nuclear-related targets in transit. The 

other is in the ability to destroy or functionally disable large arrays of nuclearrelated targets quickly enough to prevent them from launching ready nuclear 

forces, or to allow the escape of such systems to unknown locations, possibly in 

allied and U.S. territory. 

Current Active Defense Capabilities 

This study did not review current missile defense capabilities. 

Current C4ISR Capabilities 

The study did not review current C4ISR capabilities. These, too, were 

elaborated in the 2004 DSB study on strategic strike, which concluded the 

following: There is little real time characterization and monitoring of activities at 
NEEDED MILITARY CAPABILITIES I 149

suspect facilities. The ability to find and track mobile nuclear-related systems is 

limited. C4 may not be survivable or able to support fast and complex 

preemptive or damage-limiting operations. Sophisticated adversaries are currently 

able to deny state-of-the art information assurance. 

Current Nuclear Capabilities 

Current capabilities seem robust for deterrence of large-scale nuclear attack 

on the U.S. homeland by proliferators. Indeed, this capability is likely to remain 

very robust so long as the United States fields a nuclear force primarily for 

purposes of dealing with uncertainties in relations with major nuclear powers. 

We assume that the United States will maintain a nuclear deterrent and that 

planning the main operational capabilities of that force will be informed primarily 

by decisions about what is necessary vis-à-vis Russia and perhaps also China. 

Recall that the focus of this study is on nuclear proliferation and not the nuclear 

problem more generally in U.S. national security strategy. Accordingly, the U.S. 

nuclear posture as a whole and the debate about Reliable Replacement Warhead 

and U.S. nuclear modernization policies and practices more generally have not 

been reviewed or assessed. 

However, on the general topic of the future of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, 

two basic observations are offered. First, within the timeline of this study 

(between now and 2027), a plan for modernizing warheads and delivery systems 

must be put in place and, in fact, be well underway. Obviously the debate about 

how to modernize the warheads has already begun. The debate about how to 

modernize delivery systems has not begun, but is likely to involve discussion 

about whether to replace the old triad of nuclear bombers and sea- and landbased nuclear missiles with successor systems (at huge expense) or to move to 

some other posture (with uncertain consequences). It is possible that 

proliferation will motivate a future debate about the necessity of re-creating a 

nuclear delivery force that can operate within a theater but from a medium-range 

distance. Second, no strategy seems to exist for accomplishing the anticipated 

modernization, other than a piecemeal approach that is uncertain of promising 

success. This casts some doubt on the assumption stated above. 

The preceding analysis of needed future nuclear capabilities highlighted some 

specific requirements, three of which are, in the view of this study, areas of 

concern: the credibility of extended deterrence, best-in-class nuclear security, and 

responsiveness to changing conditions. 
150 I PART III. CHAPTER 11 

The first requirement is that the United States be able to extend deterrence 

that its allies and friends, as well as enemies and potential adversaries, see as 

credible. Unfortunately, there seems to be no evidence of detailed understanding 

of the thinking of allies, friends, enemies, or potential adversaries on this point. 

Most of the available thinking in the U.S. defense community about extended 

deterrence is deeply rooted in the requirements of strategic relationships 

constructed during the Cold War. Only sporadic efforts exist to engage in 

strategic dialogues with allies and friends that explore what they see as necessary 

and sufficient in the U.S. military posture for purposes of their security and 

assurance in the new era. When it comes to enemies and potential adversaries, 

what is evident is a set of propositions about their theories of victory and their 

confidence that the United States will be self-deterred so as to render moot its 

extended nuclear guarantees—propositions that have not been tested against 

available evidence. Moreover, there is concern about the possibility that U.S. 

policymakers may unwittingly erode the credibility of extended nuclear 

deterrence when they express doubts about the viability of deterrence or the 

need for new and different nuclear forces. 

The second requirement is for best-in-class nuclear security. While a detailed 

review of this subject was not undertaken as a part of this study, its members 

share the impression of many expert advisory groups that more can be done to 

achieve a uniformly high level of risk management performance across the 

enterprise. A key challenge is how to promote the adoption of best practices by 

others. Enhancing norms for responsible nuclear ownership is possible to the 

extent that more robust nuclear surety measures can be implemented 

domestically and internationally with sufficient transparency to provide 

confidence internationally in their efficacy. But there are serious security 

concerns about, and appropriate limitations on, the export of U.S. nuclear surety 

approaches and methods. However, these decrease with greater generality and 

with applications to material in non-weapon configurations (whereas they 

increase with greater technical specificity regarding fielded nuclear weapons). 

The third requirement is for responsiveness to changing conditions. The U.S. 

nuclear weapons enterprise is today widely perceived to be fundamentally 

deficient for this purpose. This study did not undertake a systematic review of 

the weapons complex or its capacities for responsiveness and thus is not in a 

position to validate or refute the perceived deficiencies. It can attest to the lack 

of national consensus on future directions for the enterprise and expects that 
NEEDED MILITARY CAPABILITIES I 151

some needed capabilities will not be available over the next two decades without 

some fundamental choices about future directions.5

 

Current Infrastructure Capacities 

Current infrastructure capacities are far from robust. This problem is broader 

than the nuclear enterprise alone. Expertise is aging out in various sectors of the 

defense research and development community. Some of the relevant defense 

industrial base is fading, as, for example, for the production of ballistic missiles. 

Defense industrial base sustainment has been the focus of various DOD studies, 

including some by the Defense Science Board, but there appears to be no 

systematic effort to implement a viable long-term strategy for preserving core 

needed capabilities and capacities. 

Current Integration Capacity 

There are many examples of the lack of needed integration. In the joint 

requirements process, concepts for Phase Zero remain underdeveloped for the 

purposes of proliferation prevention, assurance, and dissuasion. Tailored country 

campaigns have not so far developed despite repeated recommendations. Little 

effort has been made to understand and articulate how the three pillars of the 

national strategy to combat WMD (counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and 

consequence management) can and should be integrated to produce effects that 

are complementary and synergistic. Even less effort has been made to build a 

viable political consensus on the objectives of national nuclear strategy or the 

means to achieve those objectives. The latest reorganization of the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense has eliminated capacity to lead analytical effort and sharply 

curtailed ability to engage effectively outside DOD on these issues. These are all 

examples of long-standing roadblocks to integration that have not been 

considered. 

A striking condition is the contrast between the capacity for integration 

created for countering terrorism and the capacity for integration so far in place 

for countering proliferation. The United States government seems seized with 

the counter-terror challenge, and has created an aggressive integration effort, led 

from the highest levels, that writes strategy and implementation plans, 

 

5 See Report of the Joint Defense Science Board/Threat Reduction Advisory Committee Task Force on the Nuclear 

Weapons Effect National Enterprise, forthcoming. 
152 I PART III. CHAPTER 11 

coordinates execution, assesses performance, and redirects resources. This 

process has also helped guide the flow of dramatic new levels of resources for 

operations and for capability and capacity development. It is difficult to find any 

such parallel activity on the “counter proliferation” side of “the nexus.” The 

interagency process is weak. The highest level is not consistently involved. 

Implementation plans are created on a more or less ad hoc basis. Very few new 

resources have flowed. Indeed, some core defense capabilities and capacities for 

dealing with nuclear issues and proliferation have been thinned out as emphasis 

has shifted to “the long war.” 

Current Capabilities in Summary 

The following summarizes, at the unclassified level, key gaps identified 

during the course of this study in the needed military capabilities and capacities 

to execute combating nuclear proliferation missions: 

 Interdiction: no global system architecture, too few specialized and 

trained personnel, detection systems do not enable desired actions 

 Elimination: not able to surge for larger-scale challenges 

 Passive defense: too little training, no operational-level training, no 

stand-off detection architecture, growing systems vulnerabilities to 

nuclear weapons effects 

 Consequence management: DOD’s current sole focus is installation 

protection 

 Attribution: national assessment takes weeks, databases inadequate, 

forensics capabilities not robust 

 Intelligence: collection, analysis, integration with technical expertise all 

remain inadequate, as reflected in incomplete implementation of WMD 

Commission recommendations 

In the ability of the strategic posture to meet the demands of assurance, 

dissuasion, deterrence, and defeat, key gaps: 

 Non-nuclear kinetic strike: unable to conduct prompt strike from long 

range or achieve desired effects 

 Active defense: theater protection of allies and friends, homeland 

protection from larger forces 
NEEDED MILITARY CAPABILITIES I 153

 C4ISR: across the board weaknesses in finding and tracking mobile 

systems, coordinating complex high-speed operations, providing prompt 

situational awareness—plus C4 survivability 

 Nuclear strike: an understanding of what the requirements of extended 

deterrence are and might become 

 Infrastructure: aging out of expertise, erosion of nuclear weapons 

complex capacity, fading of relevant defense industrial base 

In the capacity to integrate tools of national power, the key gap is that the 

U.S. government is not organized and mobilized for this problem the way it has 

for the counterterrorism problem, despite abundant high-level guidance. 

The Challenges of Closing Capability Gaps 

It is useful to distinguish between bottom-up and top-down processes for 

creating desired capabilities (and capacities). The bottom-up process is driven by 

the separate activities of the military services, combat support agencies, 

technology providers, and others to work the issues “in their lane.” This process 

can be highly effective in generating new capabilities when the motivation to do 

so is widely shared and the resources are available. Absent shared motivation and 

resources, the results are typically piecemeal, incremental, and ultimately 

inadequate against an adversary that has been more purposeful. The top-down 

process is driven by the leadership. This process can be highly effective if 

leadership stays on message, provides strategic management of implementation 

activities, and directs the needed resources to the problem. The focus of this 

section is on the top-down process. There is a lot of activity to report from the 

bottom-up perspective on each of the 13 capability areas, but, so far at least, the 

results appear piecemeal, incremental, and inadequate for closing gaps against a 

skillful adversary willing and able to create, share, or use nuclear weapons. 

The top-down effort to create the needed capabilities identified above and to 

address shortfalls in current capabilities is reflected in the following top-level 

guidance: 

 2002 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which emphasized the 

framework of assure, dissuade, deter, defeat. 

 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, which elaborated the New Triad concept 

and the value of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons by increasing 

reliance on other means. 
154 I PART III. CHAPTER 11 

 2005 National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, which specified the eight mission areas. 

 The 2006 QDR, which sought to transform enterprise management 

through the adoption of the joint capability portfolios. The 2006 QDR 

specified two such portfolios relevant to proliferation: combating WMD 

and New Triad/global deterrence. It also promised to “greatly expand” 

these specific capabilities. That QDR also highlighted the urgent need to 

enhance the capacity of DOD partners, including those in the 

interagency process and those abroad. 

This top-down effort has not had much of an impact on the bottom-up 

process. Many new top-down processes have been created, but so far very little 

new capability has reached the force. Why is this so? Two main answers stand out. 

First, the overall level of effort to create needed capabilities remains far too 

low to generate major capability increases. The current level of effort to develop 

needed capabilities and capacities for a more proliferated nuclear world 

underscores the point that DOD’s priorities are elsewhere. Figure 3-11 utilizes 

the eight-mission construct of the national strategy to combat WMD to depict an 

approximate and unofficial basis for the allocation of funding across the missions 

and within them for the nuclear problem. The overall impression gained is an 

investment effort that is too small and ill-balanced to generate major capability 

increases, even as those are sought in the domains of missile defense and 

chemical and biological defense. (Note that the column for offensive operations 

does not include the funding for the nuclear weapons complex.) 

Figure 3-12 illustrates funding for strategic forces over the last decade. The 

nearly flat line on investments incorporates the major increase for missile 

defense, which suggests how much funding has shrunk on other strategic 

systems over the last decade. (The $70 billion scale accords with the high point 

of spending during the Cold War.) This figure also reveals the fact that DOD 

spends far more on sustaining the current force than on investing for the future 

force. This level of effort seems unpromising in terms of developing the needed 

new non-nuclear capabilities in addition to whatever replaces the triad of nuclear 

forces inherited from the Cold War. 
NEEDED MILITARY CAPABILITIES I 155

Note: Nuclear (yellow) versus chemical and biological (blue) (distinction not relevant for active defense 

and for some other generic capabilities). Dollar totals encompass research and development, procurement, 

and operations and maintenance. Dollar figures are approximate and have not been officially validated; 

there is some overlap among categories. 

Figure 3-11. Approximate Investment Patterns in the Eight Missions of the National 

Strategy to Combat WMD, Fiscal Year 2008

Figure 3-12. Funding for Strategic Systems 
156 I PART III. CHAPTER 11 

Neither time nor expertise was available during the course of this study to 

attach even approximate dollar figures to many of the needed new capabilities, so 

there is no attempt here to specify what level of investment would be “right” or 

where the biggest and quickest pay-offs in capability development might be. 

Moreover, some of the most important capability improvements can come in the 

operational realm and not in technology or procurement of new systems. But no 

evidence was uncovered to suggest that others have answers to these questions. 

Of note, most of the new program starts in this business over the last decade 

have come as a result of moving funds around within a small pool of money 

being spent on chemical, biological, and nuclear problems. 

In sum, one plausible explanation for the continued existence of numerous 

capability gaps is that there has been no ramp up of investment consistent with 

the ramp up of very high-level political commitment to “greatly expand 

capabilities.” The other essential factor is that the department lacks the 

institutional capacity it needs to sustain innovation and capability development 

for a more proliferated future. 

Indeed, at a time when the leadership wants to “greatly expand capabilities,” 

the department has been shedding capacities. The military services have steadily 

downgraded nuclear expertise. The Joint Staff has pared back and spread over a 

larger portfolio the relevant staff expertise. In acquisitions, the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense has not aligned itself with the objectives of national 

guidance for combating WMD. In terms of policy, recent reorganizations have 

eliminated focus and analytical support and seriously eroded the capacity to 

participate in needed interagency activities. 

A simple illustration of this disinvestment in needed capability follows. In the 

1980s, there were a number of nuclear-weapon-related analysis organizations 

within OSD and the military services that collectively provided a robust analytical 

capability. With the end of the Cold War, that capability was steadily reduced. By 

2000, it was limited essentially to a small cell of analysts within the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (ASD/ISP) 

called the Studies and Analysis Group (SAG). This group provided computer 

programming, operational study support, maintained sensitive databases, and 

provided other related technical support. Its work advanced the development of 

a capabilities-based New Triad and evaluated emerging challenges, ranging from 

terrorists to nuclear-armed peer competitors. 
NEEDED MILITARY CAPABILITIES I 157

The group’s products were used directly by the ASD/ISP to brief the 

Secretary of Defense, enabled the ASD’s staff to interact with the Joint Staff, and 

helped enable civilian oversight of planning activities at U.S. Strategic Command. 

In 2007, the group was disbanded. Today there is no analytic capability in OSD 

to support nuclear policy development, evaluate the progress in achieving nuclear 

policy goals, determine stockpile compositions, support arms reduction 

negotiations, issue guidance on DOD plans and programs, and recommend 

integration strategies to address future threats to the United States and its allies 

and friends. 

At the same time, some institutional capacities have atrophied, and 

departmental leadership has promised to create some new capacities—but has not 

so far done so. The 2006 QDR included the promise to move to a joint capability 

portfolio management approach allowing more horizontal management across 

capability “stovepipes” within each portfolio; only four of the dozen or so 

portfolios identified by the QDR were given new horizontal management 

structures, and neither combating WMD nor New Triad/global deterrence is 

among them. Capabilities-based planning was created in order to deal with just this 

kind of problem; so far at least, capabilities-based planning has not proven to be 

effective for dealing with challenges outside the “defeat” problem space (that is, 

with assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence). Improved nuclear intelligence outputs 

continue to require much improved collaborations between the intelligence and 

military communities. The 2006 QDR praised the virtues of partnership capacities, 

both interagency and international, and committed DOD to rapid capacity 

development; so far at least, these efforts seem to have generated new activities on 

only a very small sub-set of the 13 capability areas. 

In each of these areas, the problem seems to be that there is just enough 

effort underway to create the impression that enough effort is underway. To 

drive home this point, consider the case of WMD intelligence. Capability gaps 

are unmistakable. There is a lot of bottom-up activity to improve intelligence 

performance. There is also a lot of top-down activity. Processes are being 

improved. More information is being collected. But this critical enabler still fails 

to enable much of the needed activity. Why is this so? 

To create better WMD intelligence, top-down efforts have led to two 

significant experiments: the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) under 

the auspices of the Director of National Intelligence and the U.S. Strategic 

Command Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD). The latter is the 

equivalent of a joint forces functional component command and is co-located 
158 I PART III. CHAPTER 11 

with DTRA. One of the primary functions of the SCC-WMD is to develop and 

maintain global situational awareness of foreign nuclear weapons programs and 

activities as a way to support the planning and operational requirements of the 

regional combatant commands. Obviously, this demands a fusion of all available 

information, ranging from open-source to the most classified intelligence 

available to the United States. For nuclear weapons programs and activities, it is 

critical that the situational awareness be technically informed, drawing upon the 

technical information available at DTRA and through DTRA’s network of 

partnerships with the wider technical communities. To support the work of the 

SCC-WMD, DTRA has created a Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Enterprise (one of the four associate directorships in the agency) and draws upon 

the resources of the entire agency. One of the major DTRA campaigns—

situational awareness—is focused specifically on this mission requirement, and a 

number of the studies done by DTRA’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office 

are in support of the SCC-WMD’s situational awareness needs. These efforts 

promise to enhance the understanding of combatant commanders of the known 

WMD challenges in their areas of responsibility—understanding that should help 

motivate and focus further capability improvements. 

But there is also the problem of the unknown. Much of what military 

operators and planners need to know is not currently known—as the WMD 

Commission attests. How much of what is unknown might be unknowable is an 

open question. This brings us to the second experiment—the NCPC. From 

DOD’s perspective, this experiment is at least as important as the SCC-WMD 

experiment. The NCPC is intended to make two primary contributions to the 

military’s need for improved understanding of foreign nuclear activities. First, it 

identifies gaps in current knowledge and helps put in place strategies for filling 

those gaps. Second, it seeks to understand and help characterize the over-thehorizon nuclear proliferation threat, i.e., the potential next proliferators and 

proliferators after next. Who are they? Why would they make this choice? How 

would they go about it? This work draws heavily on cross-disciplinary subject matter 

experts who work largely in the open-source and gray-literature communities. 

Gaining “deep knowledge” on these questions promises to be extremely 

difficult. The problem set is growing more complex, with a growing number of 

countries of proliferation interest. The problem is growing more difficult, as more 

countries learn from the denial and deception practices of current and past 

proliferators. Deep knowledge also requires an interdisciplinary approach, 

combining regional and cultural with operational and technical expertise. Efforts to 

create and accumulate such deep knowledge have been undermined by the steady 
NEEDED MILITARY CAPABILITIES I 159

erosion of investment in studies and analytical ability over the last two decades—

this despite the valuable efforts of OSD Net Assessment and DTRA’s Advanced 

Systems and Concepts Office to fill some of the gaps. 

A strong and effective partnership is needed between these two experiments. 

Its virtues are often praised by the leaders of these two institutions and a positive 

workshop relationship is in the making. But what is the current result of this topdown effort? The following observations are offered: 

First, the military has not been as effective as it might be in getting the 

intelligence community focused on its needs. The reasons are numerous. It 

doesn’t know what to ask for, in part because it doesn’t know what it can get. It 

often establishes special cells to work specific issues that do not effectively enlist 

intelligence community expertise. It has not learned intelligence community 

processes well enough to know what inputs can help ensure desired outputs. It 

focuses very heavily on tactical operations with too little interest in strategic 

topics, where there are unrealized opportunities to help drive intelligence 

collection and analysis. On proliferation specifically, military experts 

collaborating with the intelligence community seem to believe that proliferation 

ought to be easy to understand, explain, and predict. 

Second, the intelligence community has not focused adequately on national 

military needs. To be sure, there is a lot of on-going activity associated with 

providing timely intelligence information to the Secretary of Defense and 

combatant commanders. The community participates in joint cells focused on 

specific issues and hard targets, provides technically informed sources-andmethods intelligence as needed, and advises on capability needs for collection, 

data fusion, and exploitation as they relate to the tactical intelligence picture. But 

the community does not well understand military needs beyond the immediately 

military tactical ones. It does not understand the military’s need to create 

operational plans across all of the defined operational phases. It has little 

appreciation of the strategic picture that many highly experienced military 

planners bring to the proliferation subject. As a result, intelligence collection and 

analysis that might be focused on more strategic questions is not. 

These are of course gross generalizations and there are exceptions to each of 

them. But the general pattern is clear: the experiments have not yet created the 

partnership that will create the needed intelligence. Although success it not yet in 

hand, the two experiments can succeed and their success will be mutually 

reinforcing. In the view of this study, it is possible for DOD to respond effectively 
160 I PART III. CHAPTER 11 

to intelligence community desires for more effective partnership, by strengthening 

the expertise it brings to the partnership. The two would benefit from a joint 

commitment to work long-term issues and address capability shortfalls associated 

with the need for situational awareness and information dominance. A strategic 

picture of the global proliferation problem is not out of the question and would be 

highly valuable for the amplification of military situational awareness. More 

effective partnership on WMD interdiction issues is also possible; currently there is 

too much fragmentation and not enough high-level DOD engagement. 

This case study well illustrates the gap between process and result—between 

top-down initiatives to make new things happen and their effective implementation 

that creates the needed result. The important progress in standing up these 

experiments ought to be much praised. The need for continued progress to 

accomplish stated goals ought not to be forgotten. 
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION I 161

Chapter 12. Toward More Effective 

Proliferation Prevention 

 Separate and apart from exploring the military operational requirements of 

life in a more nuclear-crowded future, this study addressed the question of 

whether more can be done to enhance proliferation prevention now. Much is 

already being done, with a particular focus on the problems posed by North 

Korea and Iran. The historical work conducted during the course of this study as 

a way to identify trends into the future proved rich in insight about the 

opportunities for rolling back the intentions and capabilities of potential 

proliferators. As argued earlier, along each state’s proliferation “pathway” are 

numerous key decisions about developing capabilities and/or adhering to 

international treaty commitments, and each of these decision points is a target of 

opportunity that can be worked to persuade potential proliferators not to further 

develop capabilities or buy time. 

Historical experience illustrates the prominent U.S. role in inducing restraint 

by potential proliferators. Working in partnership with others, and sometimes 

alone, it can impose economic, political, and security costs on those states, via 

sanctions, coalitions, and alliances. It can extend deterrence to allies to help 

reduce the perceived need for indigenous nuclear forces. It can lend its power to 

the effort to build regional security systems that help to ameliorate the perceived 

need for nuclear deterrents. It can offer leadership in strengthening international 

norms against proliferation, and advocating for (and demonstrating) the highest 

standards of responsible nuclear ownership. Experience also illustrates that this 

role is most promising when U.S. engagement is sustained and proactive. 

Episodic engagement has worked poorly. Equally important has been the ability 

to innovate policy approaches to tailor existing policy tools and create new ones 

to meet new challenges. 

Perhaps the greatest success in attenuating proliferation pressures was in the 

1960s, a time when many states in the developed and developing worlds were 

beginning to explore nuclear weapons options and to put programs in place. The 

escalating arms race between East and West provided the main context for nuclear 

thinking for most countries, especially in the developed “First World.” China’s 

nuclear test in 1964 was a key potential tipping point, as it might have driven other 

countries in Asia and elsewhere in the “Third World” to pursue nuclear weapons. 

The potential cascade of proliferation that might have followed was met with a 
162 I PART III. CHAPTER 12 

mix of guarantees from the United States, both formal and informal; sanctions 

against recalcitrant states; and a codification of restraint in the form of the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty. The result was that only a handful of the 20–30 states 

that started down that path ended up with nuclear weapons. 

The next potential tipping point came a decade after China’s test in the mid1970s, with India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974 and U.S. withdrawal 

from Vietnam in 1975, which raised fundamental questions for many U.S. friends 

and allies in East Asia about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees. In 

response to this new wave of proliferation risk, the United States effectively 

exploited international proliferation concerns to enforce a much higher level of 

discipline in the trade of sensitive materials and technologies. It also took steps 

to reinforce the credibility of its guarantees in the eyes of a few particularly 

worried allies. The result again was that a wave of potential proliferation in the 

developing world crested and receded without the addition of anything more 

than 1-2 new devoted seekers of nuclear weapons. Indeed, it culminated with the 

decision by four states to abandon nuclear weapons: South Africa, Ukraine, 

Belarus, and Kazakhstan. 

This short survey does not exhaust the relevant nuclear history. It does 

illustrate the potential for proliferation prevention even when facing a potential 

tipping point, as well as the value of sustained engagement and policy innovation 

by the United States. Over time, prevention (and rollback) has been enabled by 

two main policy tools: the nonproliferation regime and deterrence. In the 1960s, 

the treaty regime was created to formalize the restraint that most countries in the 

First, Second, and Third Worlds chose as consistent with their interests in this 

period; extended deterrence played a critical role in meeting the security needs of 

many. In the 1970s and 1980s, the treaty regime was used to induce further 

restraint in tailored strategies targeted on problem countries. A shadow was cast 

over extended deterrence by U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the United 

States took many steps in this period to reassure its allies of its continuing 

commitments to them. In the 1990s, the nonproliferation regime was the 

foundation for Cooperative Threat Reduction and for tailored strategies vis-à-vis a 

handful of noncompliant states; doubts arose about the credibility of extended 

deterrence in the face of rogue states armed with nuclear-tipped missiles and 

again steps were taken to erase those doubts. In the current decade, the treaty 

regime has shown itself useful for all of the previous purposes, though still not 

efficacious in dealing with the problems of willful noncompliance (though to be 

clear, this is not a task for which it was created). Efforts to adapt deterrence to 

the challenges of dissuasion have preceded an emerging array of doubts about 

the credibility of U.S. guarantees and about U.S. competence to safeguard the 
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION I 163

interests of its allies and friends. Despite well-founded frustrations with the 

nonproliferation regime, it remains an essential foundation for cooperative action 

to enforce norms. Despite repeated concerns about the viability of U.S. extended 

deterrence, it remains essential for preventing proliferation by the many U.S. 

allies and friends among the next tier of potential proliferators. 

This leads to an important recommendation: 

RECOMMENDATION: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

With the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the 

lead, the Department of Defense should develop tailored approaches to 

proliferation prevention that span the full problem space and work to 

energize an interagency process on these issues. 

 Working with the geographic combatant commands, country campaign 

plans should be composed that address the full range of potential 

problems in each area of responsibility: 

- allies and friends 

- enemies and potential adversaries 

- linchpin countries whose choices will affect many 

- potential secondary reactions 

 Ensure participation in composing and executing those plans of needed 

interagency partners: 

- Partners include the Departments of State, Energy, Commerce, and 

Treasury, as well as the intelligence community. 

- This interagency partnership would work best if it is coordinated 

at the top, implying that the optimal solution would be a plan 

crafted and led at the National Security Council that DOD supports. 

Less preferable would be a DOD plan that has coordinated 

interagency inputs. 

 Integrate these country campaign plans into planning for Theater 

Security Cooperation and Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) 

8099 Phase Zero. 

 Execute, assess, and adapt as required by the planning cycles for the 

Theater Security Cooperation and CONPLAN processes. 
164 I PART III. CHAPTER 12 

To underwrite the execution of these plans over the medium- and long-term, 

it will be necessary also for the Department to develop the capabilities and 

capacities noted above. Deterrence cannot be extended without forces in being. 

Assurance derives in part from an ally’s understanding that the United States has 

available to it viable means to deal with the challenges of aggressive neighbors. 

Dissuasion requires that potential adversaries understand that the military 

advantages they seek through the creation of new, and in this case nuclear, 

capabilities will not be won because the United States will not stand idly and 

allow the military tables to be turned. 

Additional Recommendations 

The following recommendations, organized by key actor, grew out of the 

analysis conducted and described in this and the preceding chapter. They direct 

specific actions that key leaders need to take to affect the type of change 

described and lay the foundation for developing the needed military capabilities 

and capacities identified. 

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, 

TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

1. Follow through on 2006 QDR commitment to implement more 

horizontal management approach to joint capability portfolios. Formally 

designate portfolio managers for the New Triad and Combating WMD 

portfolios. Endow them with the institutional resources (principally 

analytical support and political top cover) to create roadmaps and assess 

progress in implementation. 

2. In the Combating WMD portfolio, initial investments in interdiction, 

detection, and forensic capabilities need to be followed with stepfunction increase; ramp-up passive nuclear defense and consequence 

management. Supplement funding to DTRA for specified purposes. 

3. In the New Triad portfolio, reprioritize so that investments match the 

accelerating threat. Also, establish the analytical capability to study 

options for nuclear force modernization/transformation in a plausible 

range of future planning assumptions. 

4. Stand up a nuclear analytical group to support senior OSD leadership 

on nuclear posture and broader related issues. 
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION I 165

5. Advocate with DOD leadership to integrate technical improvements into 

a larger process of capability and capacity development encompassing 

both material and non-material solutions. 

6. Formulate a strategic plan for DTRA, including roles, missions, and 

capacities. 

DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

1. Lead DOD efforts to understand the problem and solution spaces. 

DTRA needs to be more than a gap filler job-shop. 

2. Advocate with OSD for designation of the capability portfolio managers. 

3. Ramp up to assist OSD with the analytical questions associated with 

development and implementation of portfolio roadmaps. 

4. Define metrics to measure progress and balance effort across modalities 

and combating WMD pillars (nonproliferation, counterproliferation, 

consequence management). 

5. Secure funding for more robust and faster-paced development of 

capabilities for nuclear counterproliferation: 

- For interdiction, seek funding for advanced stand-off detector work 

at $100 million. 

- For attribution, seek funding for ownership of technical robustness 

of forensics capabilities at $25 million. Key tasks: (1) identify current 

capability limitations of collection and analysis systems; (2) execute 

red-team assessment of countermeasures to technical forensics. 

- Redress severe atrophy in nuclear weapons effects enterprise. (Scale 

of effort appropriate to expectation of need to sustain operations 

under very limited attack—eliminate enemy cheap shots.) 

6. Expand collaborative activities with the NCPC. Accelerate over-thehorizon work. Assist NCPC to develop more strategic approaches to 

WMD intelligence. Commit to completing one for each combatant 

command area of responsibility in two years. 
166 I PART III. CHAPTER 12 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND CENTER FOR COMBATING WMD 

1. Assess the center’s roles and missions beyond elimination and interdiction 

in light of the full combating WMD mission space. Better map the gaps 

and seams with the New Triad/tailored deterrence missions as they bear 

on the capacity to prepare for future proliferation challenges. 

2. Lead U.S. Strategic Command efforts to support the regional combatant 

commands in developing effective execution plans for the Combating 

WMD CONPLAN 8099. Where regional commands face existing nuclear 

threats, will require effective coordination with other Strategic Command 

mission areas. Include consequence management as a next priority. 

3. To reap targets of rollback opportunity, develop Phase Zero 8099 

implementation plans that integrate proliferation prevention and 

response requirements into Theater Security Cooperation Plans. 

4. Advocate with the military services to budget to fill capability and 

capacity gaps identified by combatant commanders. 

5. Support Joint Forces Command experimentation so that it adequately 

maps the problem/solution space. Integrate technical and operational 

solutions. 

6. Support Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) efforts to meet intelligence 

requirements of 8099. 

7. Experiment with a single combatant command operational plan to 

explore the implications of intelligence gaps that cannot be filled. 

Assess how operations at all phases will be influenced. Identify ways 

to work around unavailable information that might be needed in 

concepts of operations and tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

1. Through regional bureaus and in partnership with combatant commanders 

and the State Department, develop tailored regional strategies that support 

national combating WMD guidance. These regional strategies should 

include plans focused on specific countries of interest and tailored for the 

unique challenges of assurance, dissuasion, or deterrence associated with 

each. Such plans should: 
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION I 167

- Identify the conditions of success for U.S. policy within each country. 

- Identify the sources of influence within each country and the best 

means to target each. In most countries, there are multiple constituent 

groups whose views must be understood and responded to in a 

tailored fashion. 

- Direct the integrated employment of all instruments of U.S. national 

power—economic, political, and military—so that “carrots and 

sticks” can be orchestrated to achieve U.S. objectives. 

- Direct the integrated employment of partner capacities, whether 

those of other major powers influential in regions of proliferation 

concern or of international institutions of various kinds, including 

both U.S. alliances such as NATO and other entities as appropriate. 

- Define metrics of success and monitor performance of the plan with 

the support of intelligence inputs. 

2. Advocate with the State Department and the White House for creation 

of a comprehensive national plan that integrates DOD efforts into 

broader U.S. strategy. 

3. Utilize the new Force Employment Guidance to complete the development 

of guidance for combating WMD and global deterrence. Fully elaborate 

the Phase Zero shaping requirements. 

4. In parallel with work on tailoring deterrence, undertake work on tailoring 

assurance. This will require new dialogues with allies and partners. Focus 

on linchpin countries in specific areas of responsibility and on strategic 

communications with them. 

5. Fix the problems generated by the recent reorganization: 

- re-create a focal point at a senior level 

- re-assign personnel to enable effective OSD participation in relevant 

departmental, interagency, and international activities, including 

especially analytical ones 

6. Advocate with the OSD leadership for more effective efforts to create 

and deepen bipartisan support of the deterrent: 

- Secretary of Defense should enhance the effort to develop a core of 

interested, informed, engaged members of Congress on a bipartisan 

basis. 
168 I PART III. CHAPTER 12 

- Deputy Secretary of Defense should prepare for the next Nuclear 

Posture Review so that its release can become a major step in 

consensus building. 

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and U.S. Strategic 

Command should develop a strategy for applying deterrence 

capabilities to produce desired nonproliferation outcomes. 

JOINT STAFF

1. Address the underperformance of capabilities-based planning for the 

proliferation problem: 

- ensure that analytical front end adequately maps problem space: 

 Defense planning scenarios need to reflect plausible spectrum 

 Joint Integrating Concept for Combating WMD needs to reflect 

full nuclear counterproliferation challenges 

 Joint Operating Concept for Shaping needs to address dissuasion 

and assurance 

- create a Functional Capability Board with the range of interest to 

address proliferation concerns (The present system, which relegates 

all counterproliferation decisions to the Force Protection Board, is 

inadequate.) 

2. Sustain an adequate base of joint staff expertise: 

- The number and seniority of J-5 staff with combating WMD 

responsibility has declined steadily in recent years. 

- J-8 needs to be staffed at a level enabling it to deal with its expanding 

portfolio (from chem.-bio defense to combating WMD). 

3. Complete draft Joint Pub 3-12.1 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning) and oversee implementation 

by the military services. 
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION I 169

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

1. Continue to build the partnership between DOD elements (e.g., DIA, 

SCC-WMD) and the NCPC by helping to: 

- Augment the pace of future risk assessments in the NCPC “over-thehorizon” portfolio, identify cross-cutting lessons and needs, and 

formulate strategic questions of the kind to which DOD needs 

answers. 

- Develop models of the nuclear status of each country of proliferation 

concern that map out internal decision-making milestones and 

external indicators, and exploit these models to shape motivation, 

intent, and capability. 

- Develop country-specific proliferation “watch” capabilities that: 

 drive intelligence collection to extend to information on politicalmilitary leadership intentions; use doctrine, regional security 

perceptions, and support the development of collection sources 

and methods where needed 

 develop a methodology for using such information to trigger U.S. 

actions that help shape the decisions of potential proliferators 

 guide the intelligence analysis process to close key gaps in the 

understanding of a proliferator’s strategic behavior (For example, 

what would it take to understand a proliferator’s “theory of 

victory” in nuclear conflict with the United States?) 

 understand and disseminate information on sensitivity of 

outcomes given insufficiencies in the available information 

2. Invest to meet the requirements of the Intelligence Campaign Plan 

supporting CONPLAN 8099 (Combating WMD). 

3. With Strategic Command and combatant command planners, identify the 

consequences of information/intelligence that will probably never be 

known. Pick a single plan, exercise with intelligence denied, and share the 

lessons with all commands. Ideally, such work would be linked 

conceptually with an NCPC gap analysis that has clarified what can be 

known, might be known, and won’t be known. 
170 I PART III. CHAPTER 12 

Final Observations 

This discussion of nuclear proliferation closes with the two questions posed 

at the beginning of Chapter 10: Will nuclear weapons be embraced by enemies as 

their premier asymmetric capability? Will nuclear weapons endow a new tier of 

states with peer-like capabilities to limit U.S. freedom of maneuver? To a 

significant degree, the answers to these questions are up to the United States. 

Consider the possibility that the United States fails to create the capabilities 

for life in a more proliferated world. What would be the implications? The 

answer can be framed in terms of what U.S. leaders will want to do, won’t want 

to do, and might have to do: 

 If gaps are not filled, U.S. leaders may not be able to do what they will 

want in a more proliferated world. They may not be able to contain or 

deter nuclear aggressors, counter their attempts at coercion, or teach the 

right lessons. They may not be able to suppress networks or capture 

“loose nukes.” Or the nation may pay a higher than needed price for 

doing these things because leaders failed to create the needed options. 

 If the gaps are not filled, U.S. leaders may have to do things they don’t 

want to do. They might have to appease proliferators, acquiesce to their 

acts of aggression, tolerate the nuclear defections of friends and allies, 

and suffer the costs to credibility and standing. 

 And they may have to go to war against nuclear-armed enemies but then 

back down—or escalate in ways that would not otherwise be necessary, 

and that would have large consequences for the nature of the peace to 

follow. 

Alternatively, what might be if needed capabilities are created in timely 

fashion? Nuclear weapons are unlikely to be embraced by enemies as their 

premier asymmetric capability. The United States is unlikely to find itself 

hemmed in by a new tier of states endowed with peer-like capabilities to limit 

U.S. freedom of maneuver. 

The contrast between these two very different outcomes is stark. The 

consequences of a laissez faire approach to gap-filling are significant. More 

deliberate action is necessary. 
PROLIFERATION CONTINGENCIES 2027 I 171

Appendix III-A. Proliferation 

Contingencies 2027 

This appendix provides detail on the eight contingencies analyzed in the 

nuclear proliferation chapters of this report: 

1. Suppress a newly discovered illicit proliferation pathway 

2. Inhibit allied nuclear defections 

3. Capture loose nukes from a failing state 

4. Dissuade proliferator development of more potent capabilities 

5. Intervene to terminate a regional nuclear war 

6. Extend nuclear deterrence to new security partners 

7. React to nuclear-backed aggression by a revolutionary, expansive power 

8. Contain a hostile coalition 

The odd-numbered contingencies are crisis-driven; the even-numbered ones are 

contingencies associated with efforts to shape the security environment. These 

are linked sequentially to the four alternative futures, as described in the body of 

the report. 

Contingency 1. Crisis: Suppress a newly discovered illicit 

proliferation pathway 

Essential Features 

 The number of states with small arsenals for defensive purposes has 

grown by a modest number. 

 The number of states with latent capabilities continues to grow. 

 Uneven capacities among new states to control nuclear components and 

potential suppliers of unauthorized material or components exist. 

 There is an increased number of radical or autocratic regimes in regions 

with new or latent nuclear powers. 
172 I PART III. APPENDIX III-A 

 Radical terrorist organizations increase their dominance in regional 

ungoverned territories and accelerate their drive to the stated goal of 

obtaining nuclear capability. 

 Pervasive insecurity among regional non-nuclear states spurs desire for 

rapid nuclear development. 

 Transnational criminal and black market activity of all types has increased. 

Flashpoints leading to crisis contingency: 

 Intelligence indicators of rapid buildup of nuclear infrastructure in one or 

more non-nuclear states or terrorist operations area in ungoverned space. 

 Intercept of partial shipment of dual-use components with utility in 

nuclear material processing or weapons development. 

AND/OR 

 Unknown quantities of fissile material unaccounted for by one or multiple 

nuclear custodians. 

 Electronic intercepts of internet plans for design of sophisticated nuclear 

weapon and identification of specific components required (i.e., “a 

shopping list”). 

U.S. Objectives 

U.S. leaders would want to: 

 Identify the source and destination of illicit materials: 

- establish proper control of nuclear or dual-use materials at the source 

- dismantle or destroy nascent infrastructure at unsanctioned locations 

- locate and secure loose fissile material 

 Identify potential pathways and intermediaries: 

- eliminate transportation and shipment routes between the source and 

potential destinations 

- disrupt and destroy illicit financial, transportation, and supplier 

network activity 

- uncover and eliminate unwitting cooperation by legitimate enterprises 

 Gain international cooperation to close down networks, and establish 

increased controls. 
PROLIFERATION CONTINGENCIES 2027 I 173

What they would not want to do: 

 Allow unauthorized transfer of nuclear materials or components to nonnuclear actors. 

 Allow unsanctioned movement of fissile material outside of originator’s 

borders. 

 Go it alone. 

 Unilaterally use force without international cooperation, especially against 

a sovereign territory, unless there was the imminent threat of nuclear or 

radiological weapon use. 

 Allow continued progress toward nuclear weapon capacity while 

establishing “proof” to the international community. 

 Take action that would suppress uncovering key nodes of the network 

(i.e. allow it to go more underground). 

 Spark creation of alternate pathways or new markets. 

 Waste limited resources on black markets with no connection to 

nuclear trade. 

 Pay a high economic or political cost to inhibit further proliferation. 

Losing would mean: 

 Failure of the nonproliferation regime. 

 Pervasive insecurity in international environment: 

- tightening security and closing borders by major economic 

nations, resulting in decline of worldwide trade 

- increased nuclear competition 

- increased risk of miscalculation among nuclear actors 

 Increased opportunities for nuclear terrorism: 

- higher potential for nuclear or radiological weapons use with 

no/little warning 
174 I PART III. APPENDIX III-A 

Blue Concept of Operation 

Political strategies: 

 Short term: 

- Build an international consensus against suppliers and recipients. 

- Build an international task force to track and destroy this network by: 

 emphasizing information sharing and development of a common 

operating picture 

 coming to an agreement for rapid engagement by member parties 

best suited for specific action or activity with limited consultation 

of other member parties 

- Encourage immediate and complete accounting of nuclear materials 

by nuclear states. 

 Long term: 

- Create an international environment hostile to trade in nuclear by: 

 gaining renewed (and universal) international cooperation and 

commitment to eliminate illicit networks 

 invigorating the Proliferation Security Initiative 

 increasing information sharing among law enforcement, 

intelligence, and financial agencies 

 developing international strategic communication aimed at black 

marketers (message: “you can’t get away with it”) 

 cooperating to track and disrupt financial flows 

- Renew the international commitment to a revamped nonproliferation 

regime by: 

 reorienting its focus toward security of nuclear systems and 

material, border controls, and cooperation to stop illicit 

movement and transfer 

 creating incentives for complete and accurate accounting by 

nuclear states 
PROLIFERATION CONTINGENCIES 2027 I 175

 revamping the oversight role of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency and provide increased capabilities for oversight through 

international consortia 

- Promote dialogue among regional actors aimed at building 

confidence by creating mutual understandings of the sources of 

instability in their unfolding nuclear relationships and by adopting 

mechanisms to manage those instabilities. 

Military strategies: 

 Short term: 

- Stop the flow of nuclear material and components by: 

 increasing intelligence monitoring in key regions or transit areas 

 working with international intelligence and law enforcement 

agencies to develop a common operational picture of illicit 

activities 

 deploying military forces (especially special operations forces) to 

key locations and prepare for interdiction operations 

 considering a blockade at source or destination ports 

- Develop an information operations campaign to intercept and disrupt 

electronic transmissions, spoof communications, and electronically 

isolate network nodes. 

 Long term: 

- Focus security cooperation on building partner capacities and 

interoperability to detect and disrupt illicit nuclear flows. 

- Develop niche capabilities in key areas for intelligence monitorint, 

interdiction, nuclear detection, and disablement. 

Needed Capabilities and Capacities 

Capabilities 

 A strategic toolkit that is regionally deployed and includes intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance; nuclear detection; special operations 

forces; interdiction; and information operations. 
176 I PART III. APPENDIX III-A 

Capacities 

 Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaisance to continually track and 

monitor material movement. 

 Information sharing with allies, partners, and international agencies. 

 Nuclear “rapid deployment force”: 

- rapid deployment of interdiction and SOF capabilities to disrupt 

known movement of materials (within 24 hours) 

- force able to dismantle nuclear infrastructure and secure loose 

materials with little notice 

Contingency 2. Shaping: Inhibit allied nuclear defections 

Essential Features 

 Few, if any, additional states possess nuclear weapons. 

 States that possess nuclear weapons have generally refrained from 

wielding them to directly threaten during periods of increased tensions: 

- more defensive/self-protective nuclear postures during crises 

- elevated alerts with short employment times are rare 

- significant international efforts to de-escalate and defuse crises 

 Many more states have significant indigenous latent capabilities and 

capacities to quickly develop, field, and mature nuclear weapons arsenals: 

- nuclear power production enterprise with closed fuel cycle 

- diverse, mature nuclear R&D programs with military participation 

- access to significant stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material 

 indigenous 

 shared pool among regional energy partners 

- sustained investment in conventional military modernization 
PROLIFERATION CONTINGENCIES 2027 I 177

 Some states and non-state entities in persistent competition with strong 

(nuclear or non-nuclear) powers have established security partnerships 

with states that are very near or over the nuclear weapons threshold. 

 Nuclear surety (safety, security, use control, reliability) approaches, 

practices, and levels of assurance for weapons and weapons-usable 

material vary significantly among states. 

 Sophisticated dual-use technologies, military delivery vehicles, nuclear 

weapons knowledge, and smuggling pathways have diffused worldwide. 

Nuclear weapons-usable material is the last significant hurdle remaining 

to nuclear weapons capabilities for criminal and terrorist enterprises. 

U.S. Objectives 

U.S. leaders would want to: 

 Diminish the relevance globally of nuclear weapons as instruments of 

national power. 

 Resolve persistent strategic tensions in regions that could drive state 

decisions to cross nuclear weapons thresholds. 

 Strengthen international normative behavior for control, transparency of 

control, and surety of nuclear weapons, components, and usable material. 

 Assure allies and friends with latent capabilities of U.S. commitment to 

conduct in the region that: 

- reinforces reliability of U.S. security guarantees 

- is supportive of and responsive to their security interests 

 Assure competitors with latent nuclear weapons capabilities that 

transparent non-possession best serves their security interests. 

 Dissuade everyone with latent capabilities from: 

- increasing opacity of weapons-sensitive nuclear activities 

- taking steps toward more incipient weapons capabilities 

 Dissuade potential adversaries from perceiving that nuclear weapons 

possession could mitigate their security risks. 

 Deny the ability of non-state entities to acquire or sustain pursuit of 

nuclear weapons-usable capabilities. 
178 I PART III. APPENDIX III-A 

 Deter states with nuclear weapons or weapons-capable material from 

contributing, either knowingly or through sloppy nuclear surety, to 

illegitimate transfers of nuclear weapons, components, or usable material. 

 Foster responsible use of nuclear power production to increase energy 

security and combat global climate change. 

U.S. leaders would NOT want to: 

 Be dissuaded from knowledge or uncertainty of competitors’ nuclear 

weapons capabilities from following through on security commitments. 

 Be perceived as impotent in slowing/stabilizing movement toward 

incipient nuclear weapons capabilities. 

 Drive latent nuclear capability toward/across acquisition threshold as an 

unintended consequence of U.S. foreign relations policies and conduct. 

 Be unable to garner international consensus/support for dissuasive 

pressures against incipient nuclear weapon acquisition. 

 Be unable to detect or correctly interpret indicators of: 

- latent state capabilities moving toward/across weapon threshold 

- preparations for criminal or terrorist theft or control of nuclear 

weapons, components, or material 

- loss of legitimate control of nuclear weapons, components, or 

material 

 Be perceived as having less-than-exquisite intelligence on matters of 

nuclear proliferation and control. 

U.S. leaders might HAVE to: 

 Cede U.S. self-interests in a region (e.g., spread of democracy, 

containment of competitors’ influence, military presence, etc.) for the 

sake of reducing nuclear tensions or gaining concessions from 

competitors. 

 Expose intelligence sources/methods/capabilities to establish incipient 

capabilities/activities forensically to garner international opposition. 

 Forcibly remove/destroy keystone threshold crossing capabilities of 

states operating outside international norms of acceptable behavior. 
PROLIFERATION CONTINGENCIES 2027 I 179

 Accept greater transparency of the state of the U.S. nuclear weapons 

enterprise in exchange of reciprocal measures. 

Losing would mean: 

 More states with nuclear weapons. 

 Greater challenges in reducing/containing the number of nuclear states. 

 Increased complexity and uncertainties in managing nuclear national 

security risks. 

 Weakening of international nonproliferation frameworks. 

Blue Concept of Operations 

Political strategies: 

 Promote dialogue and formal agreements among regional actors aimed at 

resolving sources of strategic tensions through cooperative solutions for 

mutual benefit. 

 Strengthen international norms and sanctions against pursuit of nuclear 

weapons capabilities. 

 Foster adoption of robust nuclear material surety “best business 

practices” with high degree of transparency. 

 Foster adoption of/conversion to more intrinsically resistant nuclear 

power generation enterprises. 

 Champion engagement in international agreements/ frameworks for: 

- nuclear material control and transparency 

- nuclear arms diminishment 

 Be prepared to offer substantive concessions in U.S. military posture 

(nuclear and conventional power projection into the region) in exchange 

for commensurate measures. 

 Strengthen U.S. commitment to extend non-nuclear deterrence and 

defenses to non-nuclear allies. 

- enable extended deterrence ratchet to nuclear strike capabilities, while 

suppressing nuclear facets in policies and strategic communications 
180 I PART III. APPENDIX III-A 

 Exercise restraint in exercising military power against non-nuclear 

competitors to achieve strategic objectives (to de-motivate nuclear 

acquisition urges). 

Military strategies: 

 Establish regional cooperative security exchanges, with metrics, for 

gauging progress and adaptive feedback mechanisms for: 

- proliferation prevention 

- tension resolution 

 Advocate a reduction in numbers and alert levels of nuclear forces. 

 Establish the capacity to strengthen extended non-nuclear deterrence to 

partners through shared defensive and strike resources. 

 Demonstrate the willingness and capabilities to increase transparency of 

nuclear posture and enterprise activities. 

 Increase intelligence monitoring/surveillance for illicit nuclear networks. 

 Establish the perception of exquisite capabilities to hold at risk any 

nuclear enterprise activities outside the bounds of international 

normative behaviors. 

Needed Military Capabilities and Capacities 

Capabilities: 

 Insert special operation forces for forensic intelligence collection, 

keystone capability elimination. 

 Robust extended non-nuclear deterrence infrastructure, planning, 

operations, and training toolkits. 

Capacities: 

 Resources to surge extended deterrence capabilities at the request of 

extended deterrence partners. 
PROLIFERATION CONTINGENCIES 2027 I 181

Contingency 3. Crisis: Capture loose nukes from 

a failing state

Essential Features 

 The number of states with small arsenals for defensive purposes has 

grown by a modest number. 

 The nuclear relationships between and among new regional nuclear 

actors have not become intensely competitive. 

 None of those actors has developed the ambition to compete with the 

U.S. to create a relationship of assured mutual vulnerability. 

 The number of states with latent capabilities continues to grow, 

increasing the risk of rapid breakout and rapid deterioration of the 

regional security environment. 

 Non-state actors see more targets of opportunity to purchase or steal a 

nuclear weapon or some key components. 

Flashpoint leading to crisis contingency: 

 Internal instability in a nuclear state 

 Potential or actual loss of positive control of warheads 

U.S. Objectives 

U.S. leaders would want to: 

 Set conditions so that positive control over weapons is maintained, 

despite instability. 

 If positive control by responsible party is no longer certain, then locate, 

secure and render safe or destroy the weapons or set conditions so that a 

responsible party quickly establishes or re-establishes positive control 

over the weapons. 

 Prevent weapons in employable form from falling into hands of terrorists 

or other hostile party that might detonate the weapons or transfer them 

outside the country in question. 
182 I PART III. APPENDIX III-A 

 Eliminate residual nuclear capability of state or ensure safeguards under 

responsible and accountable central authority. 

 Set conditions for status quo or new central authority to maintain order. 

What they would not want to do: 

 Allow a deteriorating situation to lead to the central authority’s loss of 

positive control or a responsible nuclear regime to be toppled. 

 Allow weapons to “leak” out of the country in question. 

 Allow horizontal escalation, i.e., attacks on external parties that widen the 

crisis. 

 Allow weapons to be used against U.S. interests. 

 Return weapons to an unstable regime (or even to a stable one). 

 Respond slowly to events. 

Theory of victory: 

 Nuclear weapons are eliminated or placed under positive control of 

responsible party. 

 Terrorist or other groups hostile to U.S. interests do not have a nuclear 

capability. 

 The long-term threat of loss of positive control of nuclear weapons is 

reduced. 

 Conditions are set for stabilization within the country. 

Losing would mean that: 

 Some nuclear weapons end up outside the positive control of a 

responsible/accountable/deterrable authority, and could be used or 

brandished against U.S. interests or to disrupt international peace and 

security. 
PROLIFERATION CONTINGENCIES 2027 I 183

Blue Concepts of Operation 

Political: 

 Oppose violent extremist parties. 

 Aid the responsible party within a state with reasonable prospects of 

maintaining or establishing positive control over weapons. 

 Limit horizontal escalation or intervention by any third party. 

 Reassure neighboring countries through deployment of missile defense. 

Military: 

 Clandestinely preposition ISR, explosive ordnance disposal, and render 

safe equipment to speed operations in extremis. 

 Clandestinely locate and tag nuclear weapons prior to crisis. 

 Assist responsible party to maintain/restore stability and positive control 

over weapons. 

 Interdict weapons and prevent transit out of country. 

 Conduct wide area surveillance. 

 Detect fissile material. 

 Locate, characterize, and track weapons and/or delivery systems. 

 Locate, detain, and interrogate key personnel. 

 Find and render safe weapons. 

 Secure key installations, weapons, and areas. 

 Provide overwatch for key government and military installations and 

assets. 

 Conduct elimination of nuclear capabilities or remove weapons from 

country. 

 Conduct foreign internal defense/counter-insurgency under limited 

nuclear threat. 
184 I PART III. APPENDIX III-A 

Needed Capabilities and Capacities 

Capabilities: 

 Missile defenses for reassurance of regional states and defense of U.S. 

military presence in theater. 

 Penetrating/survivable, high-volume, long-range precision strike. 

 Prompt global strike. 

 Non-lethal weapons for securing large sites with minimum footprint. 

 Network entry and attack. 

 Wide area ISR, including fissile material detection, persistent synthetic 

aperture radar ground surveillance with change detection. 

 Rapid forcible entry to secure key airfields and installations. 

 Explosive ordnance disposal team(s) and equipment. 

 Render safe special operations forces and equipment. 

 Special operations forces for foreign internal defense. 

 In-theater render-safe pre-positioned fly-away packages. 

 Special airlift for insertion and extraction at range. 

 Site exploitation and security. 

 Shielding against electromagnetic pulse. 

Capacities: 

 Penetrating/survivable, high-volume, long-range strike. 

 Tier I render safe/national mission force. 

 In-theater pre-positioned stocks (U.S.-based and clandestine). 

 Airborne ISR assets for wide area surveillance. 

 Network monitoring and attack. 

 Sufficient deployable missile defenses. 

 Forces and materiel for WMD elimination and site security 24/7. 
PROLIFERATION CONTINGENCIES 2027 I 185

Contingency 4. Shaping: Dissuade proliferator 

development of more potent capabilities 

Essential Features 

 The number of states with small arsenals for defensive purposes has 

grown by a modest number. 

 The nuclear relationships between and among new regional nuclear 

actors have not become intensely competitive. 

 None of those actors has developed the ambition to compete with the 

United States to create a relationship of assured mutual vulnerability. 

 The number of states with latent capabilities continues to grow, 

increasing the risk of rapid breakout and rapid deterioration of the 

regional security environment. 

 Non-state actors see more targets of opportunity to purchase or steal a 

nuclear weapon or some key components. 

Flashpoint leading to crisis contingency: 

 Not relevant for shaping contingencies—in this contingency, none of 

the new possessors is on the brink of political collapse. 

U.S. Objectives 

U.S. leaders would want to: 

 Dampen incipient pressures that might lead to an intensification of 

competition among new regional nuclear actors. 

 Assure friends and allies that they need not meet new proliferation 

challenges with nuclear weapons of their own. 

 Suppress illicit networks of all kinds. 

 Buy more time vis-à-vis the next proliferators—and use it well. 

What they would not want to do: 

 Stand by idly while allies distance themselves from the United States 

because of the perception that others are losing faith in the credibility of 

the U.S. deterrent. 

 Pay a high economic or political cost to inhibit further proliferation. 
186 I PART III. APPENDIX III-A 

Losing would mean that: 

 Regional security environments become much more competitive, as 

sketched out in the alternative future “new nuclear competitions.” 

 A loss of U.S. credibility and a loss of confidence in the United States 

as a security guarantor, with the result that friends and allies seek 

nuclear capabilities of their own as part of a distancing strategy from 

the United States. 

Blue Concept of Operations 

Political strategies: 

 To induce regional actors to formalize self-accepted restraint in the 

further development of their nuclear weapons capabilities, as for example 

with agreements that constrain or prevent weapons testing, fissile 

material protection, weaponization, deployment, etc. 

 To promote dialogue among regional actors aimed at building confidence 

by creating mutual understandings of the sources of instability in their 

unfolding nuclear relationships and by adopting mechanisms to manage 

those instabilities. 

 To offer (or reiterate) positive and negative security guarantees where 

applicable. 

 To safeguard against the possibility that other major international actors 

might exploit this contingency to counter-balance U.S. influence by 

maintaining a regular dialogue with Moscow, Beijing, and others on the 

issues at stake in regions of potential nuclear competition. 

Military strategies: 

 To compose U.S. strategic capabilities, such that no proliferator might 

come to believe that a relationship of assured mutual vulnerability can be 

created with the United States. 

 Where a U.S. friend or ally (“partner”) is a potential victim of a neighbor’s 

potential development of more potent nuclear capabilities, to extend 

improved protection to that partner. Protection could encompass: 

- missile and other defenses, and/or 

- locally or regionally deployed strike capabilities, and/or 

- new basing arrangements for U.S. conventional forces 
PROLIFERATION CONTINGENCIES 2027 I 187

Needed Capabilities and Capacities 

Capabilities: 

 A strategic toolkit that is regionally deployed—missile defenses, strike 

systems (including possibly nuclear, depending on circumstance), and 

ISR deployed with allies. 

Capacities: 

 To surge additional strategic power into the region and to an ally in the 

event of a sudden disruption to the regional military balance. 

 A nuclear force structure large enough such that no proliferator could 

conceive of achieving peer status. 

 A missile defense structure capable of rapidly expanding, such that no 

proliferator could conceive of creating a balance of mutual vulnerability. 

Contingency 5. Crisis: Intervene to terminate a 

regional nuclear war 

Essential Features 

 A handful of nuclear-armed states have moved beyond possession of 

minimum deterrents in an effort to gain nuclear war-fighting advantage 

over a neighbor and/or an outside intervening state. 

 In at least one global sub-region, this has brought an intensification of 

competition for advantage and a series of political-military crises 

generated by leaders seeking to exploit the benefits of shifts in the 

military balance. 

 The United States and some other major international actors continue to 

desire to play a role in managing significant international instabilities and 

threats to the peace. 

Flashpoint leading to contingency: 

 A crisis gets out of hand and escalates into nuclear employment by at least 

one state with the potential of more to come from one or both (or more). 
188 I PART III. APPENDIX III-A 

U.S. Objectives 

U.S. leaders would want to: 

 Terminate the conflict at the earliest possible time. 

 Prevent the further use of nuclear weapons. 

 Where such use cannot physically be prevented, disincentivize such use by 

establishing that further attacks would generate international retaliation. 

 Ensure that effective control is maintained at all times by the warring states 

of their nuclear arsenals and that there is no successful exploitation of 

crisis deployments by non-state actors seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. 

 Punish a state (or, where possible in a discriminate manner, just its 

leaders) that has made use of nuclear weapons for purposes of aggression 

in order to teach a right lesson for the larger international community. 

What they would not want to do: 

 Stand by idly while the slaughter continues. 

 Stand by idly as a nuclear aggressor consolidates a victory. 

 Punish a state or its leaders who have used nuclear weapons for purposes 

of defense. 

 Legitimize the use of nuclear weapons in any way. 

Losing would mean that: 

 The guarantors of international stability would be seen as impotent in the 

face of nuclear aggression. 

 By-stander states would conclude that they need to significantly increase 

their reliance on nuclear weapons of their own because they have become 

legitimized as “conventional” tools of military power. 
PROLIFERATION CONTINGENCIES 2027 I 189

Blue Concept of Operations 

Political strategies: 

 Build consensus within the international community and especially with 

Moscow (and perhaps also Beijing and others) around the key elements 

of a strategy for rapidly terminating crisis. 

 Build a similar consensus around the key elements of a strategy for 

achieving an effective settlement of the factors that precipitated crisis. 

Military strategies: 

 Visibly prepare to project strategic military power that lends credibility to 

conduct counterforce attack operations if necessary. 

 Extend the protection of conventional forces to the party against which 

aggression has been committed. 

 Ready a strong international response to the humanitarian and other 

problems associated with a localized nuclear war. 

Needed Capabilities and Capacities 

Capabilities: 

 A strategic toolkit with: 

- exquisite local ISR 

- prompt non-nuclear strike 

- render safe 

 A conventional force: 

- capable of limited operations in a contaminate environment 

- capable of render safe operations in a state with a moderately sized force 

Capacities: 

 To surge additional strategic power into the region—missile defense, 

close-in strike. 

 To surge a conventional power projection force that stabilizes one or two 

countries in partnership with other stabilizers. 
190 I PART III. APPENDIX III-A 

Contingency 6. Shaping: Extend nuclear deterrence to new 

security partners 

Essential Features 

 More states possess indigenous nuclear weapon development/ 

production capabilities, and most of these are working to diversify and 

enlarge their nuclear arsenals in order to wield them more effectively. 

 Some competitors (state and non-state) that are not known to possess 

nuclear weapons are improving their abilities to quickly acquire and 

utilize them by: 

- advancing indigenous capabilities to develop, produce, and field 

(states only), or 

- strengthening relationships with supportive factions within states that 

possess indigenous capabilities, and 

- increasing the ambiguity of their nuclear postures and confounding 

intelligence collection and assessment 

 States in other regions have enhanced their latent indigenous capabilities, 

increasing concerns for spillover proliferation cascades. 

 Nuclear weapons frequently play more prominent roles in geopolitical 

competitions for more actors (sub-state, trans-state, state, coalitions, and 

alliances) in a few regions, to: 

- exert influence over regional competitors 

- influence policies of major powers (United States, India, China, 

Russia, European Union, etc..) that impinge upon core regional 

strategic interests 

- deter or limit U.S. military power projection within the region 

 Security partnerships/coalitions among nuclear weapons possessors and 

non-possessors seek to contain U.S. influence in the region. 

 Extended nuclear deterrence is more prominent and varied: 

- offered by nuclear states to regional partners in direct competition 

with U.S. offerings 

- extended by allies independent of the United States to their partners 

in volatile regions 
PROLIFERATION CONTINGENCIES 2027 I 191

- concerns with extension by anonymous proxy in support of coalition 

interests 

 The potential for nuclear proliferation shortcuts is much higher, due to: 

- more potential source terms, both complicit and unwilling 

- diversity, unevenness of nuclear security practices and policies 

- complexity of potential pathways 

- more potential receptors with technical and operational 

sophistication 

 International concerns for nuclear instabilities, cascading proliferation, 

and employment are at historic highs, having overtaken global warming 

and food production in priority. 

 The wielding of nuclear weapons as a source of power and influence has 

not yet crossed the threshold of employment to produce nuclear 

detonations. 

U.S. Objectives 

U.S. leaders would want to: 

 Prevent/defuse crises that could escalate nuclear employment potential. 

 Establish international norms of responsible nuclear weapon ownership 

for: crisis management, surety (security, safety, use control) of nuclear 

weapons and material, transparency. 

 Prevent further (horizontal) nuclear proliferation. 

 Limit/reduce diversity and size of existing arsenals (dissuade further 

vertical proliferation, motivate rollback). 

U.S. leaders would NOT want to: 

 Go to nuclear war as an unintended consequence of U.S. or a partner’s 

actions. 

 Be compelled to cede major geopolitical position by a nuclear-armed 

competitor. 

 Engage in nuclear signaling/brinksmanship without well-understood 

vocabularies for strategic communications. 
192 I PART III. APPENDIX III-A 

 Be perceived as impotent to effectively dissuade/prevent: 

- vertical development of hostile competitors’ nuclear weapons 

capabilities 

- further nuclear threshold crossing of friends and non-competitors 

 Lose a security partner to a competitor’s extended nuclear deterrence. 

U.S. leaders might HAVE to: 

 Be prepared to fight with non-nuclear means against a nuclear-armed 

adversary. 

 Threaten U.S. nuclear engagement in a regional conflict to dissuade it 

from escalating to nuclear. 

 Sacrifice U.S. nuclear capabilities/features or OCONUS military power 

projection posture in order to gain commensurate concessions in others’ 

nuclear postures. 

 Accept higher risks in some facets of nuclear national security to reduce 

risks in higher priority facets. (balanced risk management). 

 Cede extended nuclear deterrence in a region to non-competitor states. 

Losing would mean: 

 Greatly increased risks and expectations of: 

- nuclear weapons employed in volatile regions 

- non-state nuclear weapon possession and use 

 Broader recognition and acceptance of the legitimacy and effectiveness 

of nuclear weapons as tools of power and influence. 

 Significant erosion of international norms and decorum in wielding nuclear 

weapons (actual, inferred, and threatened possession) for power and 

influence. 

 Formation and strengthening of coalition(s) involving nuclear weapon 

possessors in strategic opposition to U.S. and allied interests (regional 

and global). 

 Weakening of relative U.S. ability to exert power and influence affairs 

globally. 
PROLIFERATION CONTINGENCIES 2027 I 193

Blue Concept of Operations 

Political strategies: 

 To promote dialogue among regional competitors and their strategic 

partners to: 

- resolve sources of tensions that could potentially escalate to 

confrontation 

- establish crisis management and strategic communications protocols 

 To induce regional nuclear competitors to participate in internationally 

binding treaties/conventions to: 

- resolve sources of tensions that could escalate to nuclear crises 

- verifiably limit/reduce nuclear arsenal growth and development 

- increase transparency of nuclear weapon readiness/alert postures 

- prohibit provocative behaviors that could escalate nuclear crises 

 To foster the adoption of and contribute nuclear weapons and material 

surety “best business practices” and toolkits for possessors of nuclear 

weapons capabilities. 

 To be prepared to offer substantive rollback of U.S. nuclear weapons 

capabilities/posture in exchange for commensurate measures among 

regional nuclear states. 

 De-emphasize nuclear strike as the primary method of extended 

deterrence. 

 Rely more explicitly on intertwining strategic interests and deploying 

non-nuclear strike and defensive resources as the primary instruments of 

extended deterrence. 

Military strategies: 

 To beef up non-nuclear strike and defensive resource sharing with 

partners (nuclear and non-nuclear) at risk from nuclear competitors. 

 To “surge” extended deterrence to partners during escalating tensions as 

crisis management tool. 

 To demonstrate U.S. capabilities and willingness to: 

- support nuclear posture transparency and crisis management regimes 
194 I PART III. APPENDIX III-A 

- fight and win with non-nuclear means against nuclear-armed 

opponents 

- engage in and decisively win asymmetric nuclear warfare, making the 

most effective use of the available arsenal, no matter what its specific 

features are 

Needed Military Capabilities and Capacities 

 OCONUS deployed/sharable non-nuclear strike and defense toolkits, 

and associated training, exercise, and support for extending deterrence by 

non-nuclear means. 

 Rapidly deployable toolkits for “surging” nuclear components to 

extended deterrence partners that “plug-and-play” into general extended 

deterrent frameworks, e.g.:

- transparent nuclear C3 overlay onto regional combat support network 

- “self-certifying” nuclear weapons for general purpose delivery vehicles 

 Toolkit and operational proficiency to greatly increase U.S. capacity to 

absorb and recover from nuclear detonations, and strategic 

communications to convey this capacity. 

 Forensic intelligence tools to rapidly establish culpability and roles in any 

ambiguously sourced nuclear detonation, and strategic communications 

to convey these capabilities. 

 Technical capabilities and capacities to “tune” size and readiness posture 

of U.S. nuclear forces and stockpiles as geopolitical strategic conditions 

change. 

 Nuclear force deployment and targeting planning contingencies to 

establish confidence, limits, and methods of U.S. nuclear deterrence for 

alternative force sizes/compositions. (Provide widest envelope of 

options for nuclear arms control negotiators.) 
PROLIFERATION CONTINGENCIES 2027 I 195

Contingency 7. Crisis: React to nuclear-backed aggression 

by a revolutionary, expansive power 

Essential Features 

 Saudi Arabia is taken over by al Qaeda, proclaiming the beginning of a 

new caliphate. 

 Saudi missile and air forces are quickly armed with a modest number of 

nuclear weapons obtained from a prearranged unknown source. 

 With this nuclear deterrent as protection, the expansive nuclear caliphate 

(ENC) threatens virulent terrorist campaigns to topple and incorporate 

the states of the Islamic world. 

 This aggressive, nuclear-armed, ideologically radical state—initially 

controlling 25 percent of global oil production and reserves—poses a 

fundamental challenge to world order. 

 Near-nuclear anarchy threatens from multiple sources: the unknown 

source of the ENC nuclear weapons may supply others, the ENC will 

embark on its own nuclear weapons program, and it will likely deploy 

these weapons to any additional states it comes to control. 

 Other regional states may see these developments as requiring them to 

have nuclear forces. 

U.S. Objectives 

U.S. leaders would want to: 

 Quickly intervene to overthrow the revolutionary government of Arabia 

before it can consolidate its political control. 

 Destroy or disable ENC-ready nuclear forces before they could possibly 

be used. 

 Prevent ENC nuclear weapons and materials from being smuggled or 

otherwise moved out of the country. 

 Find, render safe, destroy or dismantle, and remove all components of 

any other ENC nuclear programs and activities that may exist. 

 Prepare for and implement whatever consequence management actions 

would be suitable in the event of nuclear detonations or contamination. 
196 I PART III. APPENDIX III-A 

U.S. leaders would not want to: 

 Leave its allies and friends to fend for themselves against such a 

dangerous and aggressive enemy—especially as allies and friends seem 

likely to start crash efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. 

 See nuclear weapons apparently confirmed as an effective shield for 

aggression against interests the U.S. had previously protected. 

 Compromise the U.S. role and influence that has come with having been 

willing to pay high prices to protect allies and friends. 

 Take preemptive/preventative actions that result in highly destructive 

nuclear strikes against U.S. or other forces or states. 

Failing to successfully snuff out the ENC in its earliest days could 

mean: 

 A difficult campaign to contain the ENC that could last for decades and 

would require creating and maintaining a cohesive defensive alliance until 

the ENC has been defeated or had lost its zeal for expansion. 

 A race between the U.S. and allied efforts to create the New Triad and 

the other necessary capabilities to effectively neutralize ENC nuclear 

strike capabilities versus ENC efforts to establish nuclear forces that can 

ensure at least a few nuclear detonations on every allied state. 

 Crash programs by threatened regional states to buy or create their own 

independent nuclear forces 

Blue Concept of Operations 

Political strategies: 

 Project for allies, friends, and others the implications if the ENC is able 

to establish itself, and seek the broad support for immediate intervention. 

 Assure U.S. regional allies and friends that they have the protection of 

U.S. nuclear deterrent forces, as well that of U.S. defenses and other 

conventional forces and capabilities. 

 Jointly plan and prepare for the intervention: 

- managing the consequences for areas that suffer nuclear attacks and 

contamination 

- political stabilization of the liberated areas and the immediate support 

and restoration of their societies 
PROLIFERATION CONTINGENCIES 2027 I 197

Military strategies: 

 Ensure that assembly, support, and operations of forces within the 

theater do not provide rich targets for ENC nuclear attacks. 

 Employ information operations to conceal warning of when and if the 

attack on the ENC is actually coming. 

 Prepare forces to seal the borders of the ENC and allow only thoroughly 

inspected and necessary cargoes to pass. Intercept and, if necessary, 

destroy vehicles attempting to avoid inspection. 

 Attack and destroy the air and missile delivery systems and the key 

infrastructure that are known or suspected to be made part of ENCready nuclear force capabilities. 

 Intervene with ground forces and overthrow the regime. 

 Find and eliminate all nuclear weapons related facilities, weapons, and 

materials. 

 Support stabilization and humanitarian aid. 

Needed Capabilities and Capacities 

 New Triad capabilities to protect U.S. forces and allied forces and 

populations from nuclear attacks and their worst consequences in order 

to keep the risks of the intervention tolerable. 

 Supporting capabilities to seal within the ENC all nuclear weapons and 

materials until they can be captured and destroyed. 

 Broad-area survivable surveillance systems allowing effective tracking for 

quick destruction of identified or likely ENC nuclear weapons and 

materials in transit. 

 An intelligence picture of ENC nuclear capabilities that is sufficiently 

well developed and up-to-date to support attack and destruction of all its 

ready to launch nuclear weapons. 

 Up-to-date training for U.S. and coalition forces on how to operate with 

maximum safety in the presence of nuclear contamination and other 

nuclear effects. 

 Capabilities to find, recognize, and sanitize an entire state’s nuclear 

weapons related activities within at most a few months. 

 Safe, secure, and responsive nuclear forces that provide the deterrent 

efficacy that is available in this and other plausible contingencies. 
198 I PART III. APPENDIX III-A 

Some Key Features of the Contingency Scenario 

 If the U.S. and its allies do not have access to substantial amounts of high 

quality New Triad and supporting capabilities required by this kind of 

contingency, they could be forced to engage in an expensive and 

dangerous containment campaign that could last for decades. 

 Limiting reactive nuclear proliferation by the many states who would feel 

threatened by the appearance of such a nuclear-armed challenger would 

be a major challenge for the U.S. and could lead to strong pressures on 

the U.S. to provide extended nuclear deterrence to a large number of 

states. Other nuclear states may have to be involved in providing nuclear 

security guarantees. 

 The United States would need the acquiescence, if not the active support, 

of Russia, China, and NATO to carry out either early intervention against 

the ENC or the long containment campaign to follow. 

 The highly aggressive nature of the ENC and its threat to the majority of 

global oil production and reserves seems likely to guarantee exceptionally 

broad international support for intervening and, if necessary, containing 

the ENC. 

Contingency 8. Shaping: Contain a hostile coalition 

Essential Features 

 Proliferation in the Middle East has coincided with some partial al Qaeda 

success in casting out “apostate regimes,” but not full progress in 

restoring a unified caliphate. 

 Many of the successor regimes are hostile to the United States and its 

role in the region and enjoy broad popular support to aggressively 

confront the U.S. presence while they also attack the residual moderate 

governments the United States seeks to protect. 

 Those regimes sometimes find it useful to cooperate to project power 

and other times are divided by non-identical interests. 

U.S. Objectives 

U.S. leaders would want to: 

 Frustrate their efforts to continue revolutionary activities against 

moderate governments that they oppose. 
PROLIFERATION CONTINGENCIES 2027 I 199

 Continue economic activity with those in the region remaining engaged 

in the globalized economy. This would include energy access wherever 

possible. 

 Protect against and punish attacks on U.S. forces in the region and other 

forms of U.S. presence—political, economic, and cultural. 

 Exploit differences of interest among the coalition to frustrate their 

efforts to find consensus. 

 Challenge their efforts to extend deterrence to additional potential 

partners. 

 Reassure the leaders of moderate states that feel threatened by this 

coalition that they need not resort to nuclear forces of their own to 

safeguard their societies. 

What they would not want to do: 

 Acquiesce to efforts by the leaders of the coalition to extend their 

revolutionary purposes. 

 Stand by idly as they make war against Israel and other free societies in 

the region. 

Losing would mean that: 

 Al Qaeda would enjoy continued successes in its long war for Islamic 

renewal (as it sees it). 

 A significant restructuring of global power, with significantly reduced 

freedom of maneuver for the United States and a significant loss of 

stature as its power and/or will are seen increasingly as unable to 

withstand the jidhadi WMD threat. 

 Emboldened jihadi leaders more willing to run the risks associated with 

opening their WMD arsenals to like-minded non-state actors. 

Blue Concept of Operations 

Political strategies: 

 Create and lead a counter-coalition of states in the region seeking 

protection and others outside the region willing to extend protection. 

 Foster and exploit a convergence of worldview among the major powers 

to ensure that none “defects” to become a supporter of the coalition in a 

bid to counter-balance U.S. hegemonism. 
200 I PART III. APPENDIX III-A 

Military strategies: 

 Build up and supplement the military power of states in the Middle East 

and nearby regions seeking protection from the coalition. 

 Secure the U.S. homeland from missile and unconventional attack. 

 Draw a strong cordon around the coalition so that its nuclear weapons, 

materials, and technologies do not leak (or get sent surreptitiously) to 

others beyond the region. 

Needed Capabilities and Capacities 

Capabilities: 

 Non-strategic toolkit, i.e., stout conventional defense for U.S. allies in the 

region, including from terrorist attack (including nuclear). 

 Strategic toolkit, i.e., strike capabilities that integrate local and global in a 

continuum of escalation options. 

 Protection capabilities that: 

- protect key allied capitals and capabilities. 

- fully protect the United States from coalition missile attack or 

significant terrorist operations so that it is free to intervene locally 

without fear of escalation to attack on CONUS. 

Capacity 

 To project power conventionally in an unfolding crisis. 
Part IV 

Unconventional Operational 

Concepts and the Homeland 

DEFENDING THE HOMELAND I 203

Chapter 13. One Game: Defending the Homeland 

The capable adversary of the future will execute “one game”: attacking U.S. 

interests wherever and however the nation is most vulnerable, and that could 

mean the homeland. DOD has, in fact, acknowledged such a future: 

The Department of Defense must change its conceptual approach to 

homeland defense. The Department can no longer think in terms of the 

“home” game and the “away” game. There is only one game. ... Defending the 

U.S. homeland—our people, property, and freedom—is our most fundamental 

duty. Failure is not an option.1 

Part IV of this volume focuses on the implications to DOD of adversary 

attacks on the homeland, as an instrument of war, with an eye toward the 

particular challenges that can arise if an “away” game is in progress as well. 

War on the Domestic Front 

The United States has long postured itself for wars to be won by assertion of 

its national strength—large force size and/or technological advantage. But current 

conflicts and the rise of asymmetric strategies and tactics are making clear the 

weakness of this assumption. Future adversaries, either by choice or necessity, will 

not follow the path leading to a conflict of strength against strength. 

A series of interviews on the Chinese book No Limit Warfare quotes one of 

its authors, Senior Colonel Qiao Liang, as saying “If we were to try to use high 

technology to counter U.S. high technology, that would in fact land us in the 

U.S. trap. We could never catch up to them on that track. So for a poor and 

weak country to try to use high technology to counter the United States would in 

fact be like throwing eggs against a rock.”2

The refusal to adopt a symmetric approach to war also goes beyond the basic 

issues of military strength and operational doctrine. The nations and non-state 

 

1. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Department of Defense, June 2005. See also Appendix 

IV-B for relevant excerpts of this strategy. 

2. Sha Lin, “Two Senior Colonels and No-Limit War,” Beijing Zhongguo Qingnian Bao in Chinese, Foreign 

Broadcast Information Service translation, June 28, 1999. 
204 I PART IV, CHAPTER 13 

actors of the world are observing, through the current era of terrorism, that the 

most lucrative potential approach to war with the United States could well be 

through operations outside the nation’s moral framework and anticipated 

behavioral norms. They have been able to observe the effectiveness of this 

approach when the conditions involve a disparity of interest. Therefore, when an 

adversary has a vital interest that conflicts with the non-vital interest of a strong 

state, the former has the greatest incentive to use asymmetric approaches. 

Many scenarios come to mind where U.S. adversaries view an issue as 

threatening life and/or state, while the United States has relatively little at stake. 

Under those circumstances, adversaries will often attempt to influence U.S. 

foreign-based activities.3 Simply put, they could execute innovative asymmetric 

approaches to shape U.S. national will in order to: 

 Deter U.S. entry into any foreign affair of no perceived immediate 

national security impact or no perceived threat to national sovereignty by 

threatening disproportionate asymmetric damage to the United States. 

 Halt U.S. entry or accelerate a withdrawal if the nation decides to employ 

forces in a foreign action. 

 Delay any U.S. decision to act by executing a range of asymmetric 

approaches. Many unconventional homeland approaches, particularly 

information operations, will also be very difficult to trace. Since the U.S. 

political process requires a high degree of certainty for legislated action, 

the nation’s response could be delayed and diffused until it is simply too 

late to act effectively. 

Moreover, U.S. military leadership has had difficulty embracing the concept of 

a two-front war, with one of the fronts being the homeland battlefield. Since the 

end of the Indian Wars in 1891, the United States has treated warfare as an “away 

game.” Attacks on the U.S. homeland (except by symmetric capabilities of ballistic 

missiles and long-range bombers) have been unthinkable due to the geographical 

isolation of the Americas and the strength of U.S. naval and air forces. The rise of 

global travel, commerce, and information flows has radically changed traditional 

American isolation. America’s sea and air power still make conventional mass 

invasion unlikely, but as military modes shift from concentrated industrial 

 

3. Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., “Where Are Our Asymmetric Vulnerabilities,” The Revenge of the Melians: 

Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR, McNair Paper 62, 2000, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 

National Defense University, page 3. 
DEFENDING THE HOMELAND I 205

warfare to distributed wars among populations, domestic disruption is 

likely. Effects-based targeting, used with great success by U.S. forces to inflict 

maximum impact with minimum force, is similarly useful to aggressors seeking to 

distract the U.S. population; disrupt infrastructure, commerce, and government; 

and delay support to U.S. military forces operating abroad. 

The homeland could be subjected to a wide range of attacks. In addition to 

the possibility of a serial or parallel accumulation of clearly feasible attack modes 

(IEDs and vehicle-borne IEDs, suicide bombers, and sniper attacks, for 

example), the attacks could employ nuclear explosives (including those designed 

to cause electromagnetic pulse effects), toxic chemicals, biological agents, 

radiological materials, and cyber means, as described in previous chapters. The 

attacks could be from terrorists or disguised as such. They could move from 

isolated events to “war” campaigns. There is a distinct possibility of large loss of 

life and significant economic hardship. Destruction and degradation of national 

or local infrastructure is also possible. Military consequences of such actions on 

the U.S. logistics base can be severe. Civilian consequences of such actions can 

only be imagined but would be of major importance. While such attacks will 

be (initially) a Department of Homeland Security concern, they drastically 

affect DOD’s ability to defend the homeland and carry out military 

missions abroad.

In light of these potential consequences, the United States should expect 

future asymmetric attacks to focus on manipulating its populace—by attacking 

either critical infrastructure targets or the populace directly. The attacks would 

generally be tactical, but with strategic effect. If the population internalizes the 

terror associated with future attacks and begins to believe they are at risk in the 

normal course of their daily lives, then the will of the nation could be shaped. 

Additionally, if the threat involves weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the 

resulting image of massive casualties would elevate the effect to even higher 

levels of fear. If terror is reinforced by successive events, the American people 

could come to believe that they have no control. Then the real intent of these 

attacks would surface. A perception could emerge that personal security would 

only be regained by a decision to withdraw from a distant conflict (with no clear 

connectivity to the United States). The result would be achieved. Figure 4-1 

captures these factors. 
206 I PART IV, CHAPTER 13 

Figure 4-1. The “One Game” Approach of Future Capable Adversaries 

As a foundation for its assessment of homeland defense, the DSB established 

the following assumptions. A future adversary will engage in coordinated attacks 

both in the U.S. homeland and in foreign theaters. With a high degree of 

resources and sponsorship, the attacks at home will most likely be at a scale 

beyond those envisioned in most current homeland defense planning, which is 

focused primarily on terrorist attacks. Moreover, adversaries will likely act at 

multiple points nearly simultaneously, or a carefully orchestrated sequence of 

attacks—a campaign. The openness of the U.S. society, its size, the geographical 

extent of its infrastructure, and its diversity will make it practically impossible to 

avoid all assaults. In addition, DOD will be divided between protecting the 

homeland from further attacks and prosecuting forward offensive operations 

against the adversary. 

Consequences of Catastrophe 

Disasters brought about by enemy action in the homeland cannot be 

precisely predicted, although conditions leading up to them may be generally 

evident. In any event, surprise should be an expected element of an attack(s). 

Dealing with the consequences of the attack(s) will have as much or more to do 

with addressing common issues as with the specific nature or cause of an attack. 

Planners should anticipate the breakdown of orderly society, manifested by: 
DEFENDING THE HOMELAND I 207

 failure of critical infrastructure—lack of essential goods and services 

(Table 4-1) 

 insufficient professional resources to deal with multiple 

catastrophes—response forces (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

National Guard, DOD, DHS, police, fire, American Red Cross, and 

others) sized to handle only one or two crises at a time 

 national will hard to focus—public anger manifested through 

misguided, vigilante-style attacks 

 impaired ability of national, state, and local governments to 

govern—lack of, or confusing, communications; fractured local 

authority; insufficient, disorganized emergency response 

Without adequate preparedness at all levels of government, across the private 

sector, and among the populace, the post-attack results could indeed become 

catastrophic. Some outcomes might include: 

 Flight. Remaining in place would prove untenable for many people for 

actual or perceived reasons. 

 Breakdown of mutual aid agreements. Resource-intensive incidents 

are typically handled through mutual aid agreements within the National 

Guard, first responder, and medical communities. When under attack, 

however, leaders in unaffected regions might opt not to support 

interregional common aid agreements and to conserve their resources 

in case they are needed locally. 

 Breakdown of civil order. Looting, vigilante actions, gang violence, 

riots, and civil disobedience would further stress first responders. 

 Failure of quarantine. Many will be reluctant to stay confined. 

 Hoarding. People will rush to amass excess goods to stock up after 

the attack. 

 “Shoot your neighbor.” As people perceive the social and civil situation 

deteriorating, they will escalate the force they use as a first resort to protect 

home and family from interlopers (“shoot first, ask questions later”). 

 Rampant rumors. Media will promulgate messages from many sources 

without confirmation. 
208 I PART IV, CHAPTER 13 

 Population center “meltdowns.” Many U.S. population centers are 

located where life without infrastructure services will be difficult to sustain, 

such as in the desert southwest in summer and northern cities in winter. 

Table 4-1. Examples of Consequences of Attacks on the Infrastructure

Infrastructure targets Examples of consequences if attacked

Transportation  Disruption of air traffic flow 

 Mass transit contamination 

 Hazmat releases from freight carrier 

 Breakdown of supply chain essential to provide life sustaining 

goods and services (e.g. food, medical) 

Oil and gas production and 

storage 

 System (storage, refining, and pipeline) intrusion and degradation 

Water storage and delivery  Water supply contamination 

 Interruption of availability (dams, deep public wells, etc.) 

Banking and finance  Data corruption 

 Effective freezing of assets 

 Massive stolen identity 

Electrical power generation 

and distribution 

 Damage to generating stations and operating systems 

 Disruption of transmission, distribution systems, and associated 

fuel supply 

Information and 

communications 

 Lost and damaged data and information 

 Degraded computing and telecommunications 

 Breakdown of processing, storage, and transmission of data 

Government services  Loss of essential government services 

 Overload on critical emergency services 

Defense  Lack of ability to execute missions from CONUS installations 

Population  Casualties and injuries at schools, malls, and other places of 

population/community massing 

 Mass casualties in the event of WMD use 

Responses will be further exacerbated because of the evolution of U.S. society. 

Dependence on “just-in-time” centrally managed, networked supplies of water, 

power, food, communications, and transportation leaves the United States 

extremely vulnerable to an effects-based attack. Additionally, over time, mobility of 

the American population has resulted in a breakdown of extended family and 

community-based societal structures that once provided informal local leadership 

and community organization and support. In twenty-first century society, many do 

not know their neighbors, let alone have the capability or capacity to form effective 
DEFENDING THE HOMELAND I 209

support networks for long periods of time. Skepticism of authority makes 

governance in a disaster difficult, while the public nevertheless expects 

governmental assistance to mitigate the aftermath. 

Implications for DOD 

When a determined adversary succeeds in attacking the homeland at the scale 

imagined in this study, the nation will call on DOD to “provide for the common 

defense” through both defense at home and offense abroad. That fact is 

recognized in the Department’s 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense, as noted at the 

outset of this chapter. The question, then, is how well the department has 

progressed in turning that strategy into reality. The study broke this larger 

question into three more specific questions, each of which is discussed in 

subsequent chapters: 

1. How well does DOD (and others) understand what is expected of it? 

How well prepared is DOD to execute across a range of homeland 

defense missions? 

2. Given the “one game” nature of the capable adversary, can DOD have 

high confidence that it will be able to ensure deployment and supply in 

whatever set of missions it undertakes within and from the homeland? 

3. Success in both the current scope of homeland security and defense, and 

the more stressing environment of the future, depends on teaming and 

integration unprecedented in recent history: across and among all levels 

of government; with and across the private sector; down to individual 

actions for preparedness. Where does the nation, and especially DOD, 

stand in building the “one team” needed for success? 
210 I PART IV, CHAPTER 14 

Chapter 14. DOD Roles and Responsibilities 

This chapter addresses whether or not DOD roles in homeland security and 

defense are well understood, and how good DOD might be at executing them. 

Definitions taken from DOD’s 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support 

set the stage for this discussion: 

 Homeland security. “Concerted national effort to prevent terrorist 

attacks within the U.S., reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 

minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.” DHS is 

the lead agency to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States. The 

Attorney General leads law enforcement to detect, prevent, and 

investigate terrorist activity with the United States. 

 Homeland defense. “Protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic 

population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and 

aggression.” DOD is responsible for homeland defense. 

 Defense support to civil authorities (civil support). “DOD support for 

domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other 

activities.” This occurs by direction of the President or Secretary of 

Defense. 

The establishment of U.S. Northern Command and the Assistant Secretary 

for Homeland Defense in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy has provided focal points within and outside the DOD to address the 

Department’s responsibilities within the homeland. These two organizations 

have done a lot to sort through the many issues for DOD in the homeland. But 

they have largely been on their own, given the consuming demands in the 

Department, on both leadership and resources, for prosecuting the “away game” 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both organizations also have to engage in an 

interagency effort led by DHS, which is still experiencing its own growing pains 

and has seen its priorities shift from prevention to preparedness in the wake of 

federal shortcomings in responding to Hurricane Katrina. 
DOD ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES I 211

DOD: Support versus Lead 

Engaging in an overseas deployment, while at the same time responding to a 

significant scale of attacks in the homeland, will stress DOD capabilities. The 

public will expect DOD to defend the homeland and DOD will be ordered to 

participate, regardless of the intentions of the military leadership prior to the 

incident—engaging in incident prevention, mitigation, and remediation through 

the U.S. domestic political process. Legislation and directives support this 

approach. Further, the 2005 National Defense Strategy clearly directs the military 

leadership to properly shape, size, and globally posture to: 1) defend the U.S. 

homeland and 2) operate in and from the forward regions. 

Homeland defense currently includes a range of activities in CONUS. Often, 

DOD will be called on to provide support to the civil government, but its activities 

can also progress to a leadership role in response, and consequence management 

efforts if and when the scope of attack is sufficiently severe. The concept described 

is notionally depicted in Figure 4-2, in which the transition from a supporting role 

by principally DOD reserve component forces shifts to one of leadership at 

significant attack levels involving reserve and active duty forces. 

Under coordinated global aggressive action from a capable adversary, the 

military response will involve actions that could be described as “at war within 

the homeland.” In other words, an active layered defense must stretch across the 

integrated global battle space—extending from the forward regions, to the 

approaches to the United States, and the homeland itself. 

Figure 4-2. Notional Transition of DOD Forces from Support to Lead 
212 I PART IV, CHAPTER 14 

When defense of the homeland transfers to the military, it implies a 

hardening of the target—which, in and of itself, can act as a deterrent to an 

adversary. At that time, an adversary has to recalculate the overall benefit of his 

actions. The U.S. Northern Command Homeland Defense Plan recognizes this 

potential deterrent effect and outlines a robust range of actions in CONUS—

ranging from sustained deterrence and enhanced deterrence, both targeted to 

deter threats and support civilian law enforcement agencies; to contingencies for 

the escalation of asymmetric activities at the severe end of the scale, described as 

decisive operations. 

Unfortunately, DOD has applied inadequate resources to these homeland 

defense missions. The first step to resolving this situation is to acknowledge and 

communicate the roles and missions throughout the chain of command. 

Additionally, the portion of the Homeland Defense Plan addressing “decisive 

operations” has not been integrated and coordinated with the appropriate range 

of agencies and government entities. Therefore, the resources and capabilities 

that DOD has to offer are not yet effectively applied. DOD does not really know 

what is expected of it and the homeland security community does not know what 

to expect from DOD. The transition of responsibility from supporting to leading 

roles among the various agencies involved—and the handoff of these roles from 

one agency to another—are not well understood among the interagency and 

response communities. Although improving, this confusion extends to deterrent 

operations due to the immaturity of the DOD/DHS interface, but certainly is 

not yet addressed under “decisive operations” scenarios. 

This interdependent and interactive problem is a difficult one to resolve and 

will need a great deal of attention. The relationships between all homeland 

partners, including state and local governments, will vary and depend on the type 

of asymmetric attack. The roles will be very different for ballistic, kinetic, WMD, 

and cyber approaches. Therefore, “jointness” beyond DOD must be pursued, 

with all the commensurate requirements in leadership, planning, training, and 

exercises fully resourced. 

Legislation and Directives 

The study found nothing in legislation, directives, or other documents to 

prevent a more aggressive posture and engagement by DOD. On the contrary, 

the documents set expectations for DOD preparedness, whether as supporting 

agency (expected in most situations) or supported agency (shift to homeland 

defense). Starting with the Constitution, the federal government is to “provide 
DOD ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES I 213

for the common defense.” The Stafford Act allows for use of the military for 

disaster relief operations at the request of the state governor, and further defines 

three scales of involvement: essential assistance (up to 10 days), emergency, and 

major disaster. 

The Posse Comitatus Act is typically viewed as a restriction on DOD 

engagement since it punishes those who “...except in cases and under 

circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, 

willfully use any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or 

otherwise to execute the laws....” A statutory exception to posse comitatus 

allows the President or other key government officials special authorizations 

for engaging the military in domestic situations. That authority has been 

exercised sparingly; examples include granting the U.S. Coast Guard law 

enforcement authorities and allowing the military to share information and 

equipment with civilian law enforcement, while prohibiting its ability to make 

arrests or conduct searches and seizures. 

The Homeland Security Act gave DHS the lead for homeland security. DOD 

continues to maintain the lead for defense of the homeland. The Homeland 

Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs), issued by the White House since the 

establishment of DHS, provide further guidance for DOD’s roles in civil support 

(HSPD 5), its lead responsibilities as the infrastructure sector “owner” for the 

defense industrial base (HSPD 7), and responsibilities for emergency preparedness 

(HSPD 8). 

DOD has also recognized its responsibilities, through formal directives, in 

which it should be prepared to take the lead and/or act pragmatically: 

 in support of natural disasters (its immediate assignment of resources in 

the aftermath of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake; its immediate 

deployment (unrequested) of a hospital ship to New Orleans after Katrina) 

 to preserve public order where other options are unavailable or 

overwhelmed in order to carry out governmental operations 

 in sudden and unexpected civil disturbances, disasters, or catastrophes 

when civil authorities can no longer maintain control 

 to provide catastrophe relief without or before imposition of the Stafford 

Act, on a temporary basis 

 to undertake some specific law enforcement activities 
214 I PART IV, CHAPTER 14 

The Board’s assessment is that there is sufficient breadth and flexibility in the 

relevant legislation to allow DOD to take on a wide range of roles. Those roles 

should be clearly understood at all levels so that all stakeholders can plan 

accordingly. 

DOD Capabilities for Homeland Security and Defense 

After the incidents on September 11, 2001, the nation was forced into a new 

level of national preparedness against attack on the homeland. The Department 

of Homeland Security was created to take the lead role in homeland security. As 

described previously in this chapter, DHS and DOD have either lead or support 

roles in protecting the homeland, depending on the type and scale of attack. The 

creation of DHS, while clearly adding to the preparation and focus of the 

country on improving homeland security, has also added some confusion 

regarding roles and missions for DOD in homeland defense. The Board believes 

this confusion comes from general statements about roles and responsibilities, in 

contrast to specific statements about DOD’s roles and missions that tend to 

alleviate disputes or uncertainties. 

Nonetheless, DOD leadership, both civilian and military, has been slow to 

accept this apparently expanded scope of responsibilities because with it comes 

significant resource demands and financial costs that are not likely to be 

adequately supported. The study determined that a focus on specifics was needed 

in order to motivate the Department’s leadership to focus on priorities. Table 4-2 

offers an illustrative list of those specific roles and missions that are generally 

accepted as DOD responsibility and those that are not. 

As the table notes, typical roles expected of DOD are sharing intelligence, 

sharing infrastructure assurance standards (to support their mission), sharing 

operational doctrine and training, and providing consequence management 

support in case of an isolated terrorist attack or a natural disaster such as 

Hurricane Katrina. Clearly, DOD has lead responsibility for defense against air, 

missile, and maritime (with the Coast Guard) attack and for protection of its 

bases. DOD is in a lead role to assure the protection and resiliency of the 

defense industrial base, but also must take a strong supporting role to assure 

protection and resiliency of other infrastructure that supports its missions (at 

least until a first significant attack(s) where it may be called upon to assume the 

lead). Roles that are not appropriate for DOD include protection of the country 

from internal threats like isolated terrorist attacks, production of WMD, or 

border monitoring for smuggling or illegal immigration. 
DOD ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES I 215

Table 4-2. DOD Responsibilities for Homeland Defense

Reasonable Unreasonable

 Share intelligence 

 Protect against air, missile, and maritime threats 

 Protect designated civil infrastructure after first 

attack 

 Provide consequence management after 

attacks 

 Meet infrastructure assurance standards for 

DOD facilities and contractors 

 Prepare to protect U.S. homeland from large 

scale attack 

 Develop doctrine and plans to assure supply 

during attack of U.S. homeland 

 Train with federal agencies and state and local 

authorities 

 Protect against or detect in U.S. homeland 

 Production of WMD 

 Terrorists 

 Protect civil infrastructure against initial attack 

 Constant surveillance of land and maritime 

borders 

 Smuggling weapons, for example 

Table 4-3 provides a rough assessment of the key capabilities DOD should 

have in order to execute the responsibilities listed in Table 4-2. The assessment 

includes not only a “grade” and trend (in the far right column labeled “How 

Good”), but also a breakdown to better highlight progress (or lack thereof). 

The bottom line of this assessment is not a positive one. In the more 

traditional roles of air defense, missile defense, and maritime defense, DOD 

has or is developing a capability for these roles, but is far from having a wellexercised set of national capabilities. For example, while DOD maintains the 

best air superiority force in the world, its capabilities are not well suited to 

protecting the nation from general aviation or unmanned aerial vehicle threats. 

Protecting DOD installations has been a focus of force protection programs 

for some time, but addressing cyber threats and WMD remain major shortfalls. 

In too many other cases, DOD preparedness falls woefully short. Combatant 

commanders, especially U.S. Northern Command, have made many of these 

capability requirements known, but priorities within the Department have 

placed resources elsewhere. 
216 I PART IV, CHAPTER 14 

Table 4-3. Capability of DOD to Perform Expected Roles 

DOD Capacities for Homeland Security and Defense 

The study next turned to the issue of how chaos in the homeland would 

affect the military’s ability to deploy and effectively prosecute offensive actions 

abroad. One important concern is whether DOD has sufficient capacity to 

support the “one game” envisioned in this study—whether DOD’s role in the 

homeland and abroad implies a change in total force requirements. Lacking 

scenarios or plans for the “one game,” the study considered the level of DOD 

support to Hurricane Katrina as a surrogate for force sizing for a single major 

event. Katrina drew a total of nearly 80,000 troops plus equipment, principally 

through the National Guard, but also from specialized active components, as 

shown in Table 4-4. 

In a generic model of response to a catastrophic event, the initial response will 

come from traditional first responders—fire, police, and medical support. Based 

on the magnitude of the event, additional state resources could respond, including 

National Guard forces. Support from the National Guards in other states could be 

requested under Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) 

arrangements. For catastrophic events, federal resources, including DOD forces, 

could be deployed to support the response. In addition, depending on the number 
DOD ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES I 217

of incidents and the expectation of further attacks, DOD forces (active and reserve 

component) could support other homeland protection missions (for example, 

guarding critical infrastructure nodes to prevent follow-on attacks). 

Table 4-4. DOD Support to Hurricane Katrina

Support Logistics

Search, Rescue, and Evacuation 

Approximately 15,000 residents of the 

Gulf coast were rescued and 80,000 

others evacuated. 

Medical Assistance 

Ten thousand medical evacuations by 

ground and air; medical treatment of 

more than 5,000 patients; more than 

3,000 beds in field hospitals, 

installations, and aboard U.S. Navy 

ships. 

Mosquito Abatement 

C-130s treated over 2 million acres. 

Mortuary Affairs 

Thirteen mortuary teams supported local 

authorities in the systematic search, 

recovery, and disposition of the 

deceased 

Personnel 

Over 72,000 title 10 and National Guard forces. 

Aviation 

293 helicopters and 68 fixed-wing aircraft. 

Maritime 

23 naval ships. 

Commodities 

DOD delivered more than 30 million meals (24.5 million 

meals ready to eat) and 10,000 truckloads of ice and 

water. 

Medical 

Over 2,000 health care professionals deployed to the 

area. 

Installations 

Nine DOD installations in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 

Louisiana, and Mississippi served as FEMA mobilization 

centers or staging areas. 

The intended outcome is a layering or cascading of support to the homeland, 

which has the potential to involve significant numbers of military forces. This 

layering should ensure that the appropriate level of support is provided at each 

level. The situation will be further exacerbated in the case of multiple events in 

the homeland. At the same time, military forces (including active duty, National 

Guard, and reserve forces) will be deployed to conduct military operations 

outside the homeland. At each layer of support, in the homeland or abroad, 

individuals will be filling critical positions and functions—their availability will be 

essential to the successful conduct of these missions and functions. The same 

individual cannot support multiple critical functions at the same time. 

Despite the logic of this statement, the study came across several anecdotal 

indications (but not much hard data) that many individuals are filling multiple 

roles in the cascade. This is most apparent for the National Guard and reserves: 

 Estimates suggest that 10–15 percent of the National Guard are also first 

responders. 
218 I PART IV, CHAPTER 14 

 Fifty percent of forces in Iraq in 2006 were guardsmen. 

 Thirty-three percent of the National Guard deployed in Iraq or for 

Katrina in September 2005. 

More accurate data were not available because the data are not collected on a 

systematic basis. Absent specific data, the full extent of the impact cannot be 

quantified. However, it is likely that local communities, state leaders and planners, 

and DOD planners could be counting on the same individuals to fill two or even 

three roles at the same time within a global asymmetric warfare situation. 

The “worst case” model would be the local first responder to a specific 

incident, who is then activated by the state governor as a member of a National 

Guard unit (to respond to the same incident, another incident in the state, or 

under EMAC to another state), and whose unit is subsequently called to federal 

status to provide homeland support or to engage in military operations overseas. 

Figure 4-3 illustrates the dilemma. As a result, it is critical to planning at every 

level that the extent of “double counting” be quantified at a higher level of 

resolution, and its effects on planning assumptions understood. 

Figure 4-3. Double and Triple Counting of the Reserve Components 
DOD ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES I 219

RECOMMENDATIONS: DOD ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Addressing the shortfalls identified in this chapter will require significant 

resources, sustained commitment, and greater involvement on the part of DOD 

with other agencies, especially with DHS. To begin the process, the Board 

recommends the following: 

1. The Secretary of Defense task the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD 

[HD&ASA]) to revise and implement DOD policies and 

procedures covering homeland defense requirements. This tasking 

should include the clarification of relationships, roles, and missions of all 

the elements (federal agencies, civilian and private sectors, state and local 

responders, and law enforcement) of homeland defense at a level of 

specificity highlighted in this chapter. Clarification of this sort would go 

far to eliminate the uncertainty and/or confusion about what is expected 

of DOD and what others can indeed expect of DOD. The scope should 

include contingencies where DOD assumes the lead response role in the 

homeland. Only those policies and procedures that lower the barriers to 

planning, exercising, information sharing, cooperation, and coordination 

across the entire homeland defense community should be approved. 

2. Service Chiefs and the National Guard Bureau assess force 

requirements and adjust, adapt, and/or expand force structure to 

meet the “one game” demands of the future. Force structure should 

be built not just on the regional command war plans for overseas 

operations, but also on those being developed by U.S. Northern 

Command for homeland operations. The effort will involve the 

development of accurate databases to understand the civilian skills and 

job commitments of the reserve components in order to assess and 

address the “double counting” issue. It will also require close planning 

and coordination with the Service Secretaries across the spectrum of 

doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 

personnel, and facilities in order to ensure that shortfalls are addressed. 
220 I PART IV, CHAPTER 15 

Chapter 15. Assuring Deployment and Supply 

One of the critical issues facing the military in time of war is deploying forces 

to the battle site and providing supplies of all sorts (from meals to fuel to 

weapons). If the homeland is under attack, then the primary base of support and 

the supply chain may be significantly impacted. One concept for addressing this 

concern is “resilience.” 

Merriam-Webster's on-line dictionary defines resilience as: 1) the capability of 

a strained body to recover its size and shape after deformation caused especially 

by compressive stress; 2) an ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune 

or change. The concept of resiliency with respect to the nation’s critical 

infrastructure and DOD logistics supply chain goes beyond protection and 

hardening of potential targets to include redundancy as well as rapid response 

and recovery. 

This chapter examines how well the nation is prepared to meet the 

simultaneous demands of fighting a war both in the homeland and abroad. The 

assessment is based on the resiliency of the nation’s critical infrastructure and 

functions, DOD processes and status for ensuring resiliency, DHS processes and 

status for protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure, DOD preparedness 

(supply, logistics, installations), as well as family and individual preparedness.4

 

Critical Functions and Infrastructure 

The nation must be prepared for a future adversary who conducts clandestine 

and well-executed attacks on the U.S. homeland, while simultaneously executing 

overt military actions at great distance from the United States. Can DOD defend 

the homeland if required to deploy? Can DOD deploy if the homeland is under 

attack? Answering these questions must start with addressing more basic ones: 

 What military missions and functions must be assured from the homeland? 

 What assets and operations are critical to that assurance? 

 How do we figure that out? 

 

4. Relevant excerpts from DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support can be found in 

Appendix IV-B. 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 221

 Who is responsible for doing what (DOD, DHS, others with key 

infrastructure responsibilities), and do we understand how the system 

expects to function under stress? 

 What will be the availability of critical national assets and capabilities? 

 What competing demands will be made on the military and National 

Guard? 

 How do DOD and the nation measure its preparedness—or readiness? 

The United States has transitioned to a global economic power with an agile, 

but fragile, set of interconnected and interdependent infrastructures. In the 

1800s, the nation consisted primarily of a distributed collection of communities 

in rural areas, cities, and states with somewhat independent supply, social, and 

governing structures. In the 20th century, national networks emerged to unify 

these local systems, which became dependent upon each other. The consequence 

is a system that is economically focused on high performance at the lowest 

possible cost, which leads to a highly efficient system, but one with few 

redundancies. Lack of redundancy opens the structure to multiple vulnerabilities, 

especially single node failures, with large-scale (national and international) 

economic impact. 

For purposes of this discussion, the study assumed a multi-point attack on the 

United States that is severe enough for the President to declare the nation “under 

attack,” with federal authorities in overall control. Under such conditions, national 

resources will be stretched to the point where demands for national and international 

requests will go unmet. Local resources will also be overwhelmed and could face 

societal panic, if people feel localities are unable to provide law and order, medical 

care, municipal services (water, refuse), food, energy, trade, transportation, 

information system availability, and protection from the elements. 

Under such a scenario, two critical warfighting requirements occur 

simultaneously: defending against domestic catastrophe and ensuring 

deployment and supply. Domestic catastrophes occur in an environment of a 

large, undisciplined population, and these violent attacks can have a 

destabilizing effect on society. On the other hand, military deployment and 

supply take place in a disciplined organization, trained to accomplish the 

mission. Yet the two are linked—military deployment and supply is critically 

dependent on infrastructure elements that may be destroyed or severely 

compromised in a domestic catastrophe. Furthermore, both missions will draw 

on many of the same people and equipment, as discussed in the previous 
222 I PART IV, CHAPTER 15 

chapter. The protection challenge for the U.S infrastructure is significant, as 

illustrated in Table 4-5. 

Table 4-5. Size Indicators of Some Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets 

Agriculture and food 1,912,000 farms; 87,000 food-processing plants 

Water 1,800 federal reservoirs; 1,600 municipal waste water facilities 

Public health 5,800 registered hospitals 

Emergency services 87,000 U.S. localities with 30,000 fire departments (80% volunteer); 

18,000 law enforcement agencies 

Defense industrial base 250,000 firms in 215 distinct industries 

Telecommunications 2 billion miles of cable 

Energy  Electricity: 2,800 power plants 

 Oil and natural gas: 300,000 producing sites 

Transportation  Aviation: 5,000 public airports 

 Passenger rail: 22,000 miles 

 Freight rail: 120,000 miles of major railroads 

 Highways, trucking, and busing: 590,000 highway bridges 

 Pipelines: 2 million miles of pipelines 

 Maritime: 300 inland/costal ports 

 Mass transit: 500 major urban public transit operators 

Banking and finance 26,600 FDIC insured institutions 

Chemical industry and 

hazardous materials 

66,000 chemical plants 

Postal and shipping 137 million delivery sites 

Key assets  National monuments and icons: 5,800 historic buildings 

 Nuclear power plants: 104 commercial nuclear power plants 

 Dams: 80,000 dams 

 Government facilities: 3,000 government owned/operated facilities 

 Commercial assets: 460 skyscrapers 

Source: National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, February 2003 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 223

DHS has the interagency lead for critical infrastructure protection, and has 

assigned each infrastructure sector to its most logical federal “owner” or sectorspecific agency (SSA). An important consideration for each SSA is the fact that 

improvements in infrastructure resiliency will come about largely by the efforts 

of its private owners. The development of the public-private partnership is no 

more important than in this area. (The next chapter addresses the public-private 

partnership in more detail.) The SSA works with the private sector via its Sector 

Coordinating Council (SCC) to develop a sector-specific risk mitigation and 

resiliency improvement plan. That plan helps prioritize federal investments, as 

well as focus private efforts for business continuity. The SSA joins with other 

interested federal agencies to form a Government Coordinating Council (GCC) 

where cross-sector issues can be addressed. 

DOD has responsibility for not only the protection and assurance of its own 

military installations and facilities, but it is also the SSA for the defense industrial 

base infrastructure sector. In addition to leading the GCC for the defense 

industrial base sector, DOD has a presence on 14 Critical Infrastructure/Key 

Resource National Sector GCCs: transportation; information technology; 

telecommunications; energy; chemical; commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and 

waste; government facilities; emergency services; public health and healthcare; 

drinking water and water treatment systems; dams; postal and shipping; food and 

agriculture; and national monuments and icons. 

DOD Approach and Progress for Assuring Defense Critical 

Functions 

DOD is beginning to make progress in identifying what is critical through 

the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) within ASD (HD&ASA), 

supported by the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Virginia. Together 

with the combatant commanders, a “mission assurance” process is being 

developed and implemented—a process that incorporates many of the 

recommendations of a prior DSB study regarding risk management and 

mitigation.5

 The process focuses first on identifying critical functions and 

capabilities, followed by identifying and assessing those few assets or facilities 

necessary to ensure the functions or capabilities. The process also provides 

guidance to assess a number of critical infrastructures “outside the fence” on 

 

5. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Critical Homeland Infrastructure Protection, January 2007. 
224 I PART IV, CHAPTER 15 

which the combatant commanders might depend and/or need to defend. 

Figure 4-4 illustrates the mission assurance process, which proceeds as follows: 

 Combatant commanders identify critical capabilities, missions, and 

functional networks (41 have been identified as in the most critical tier 1 

category; several hundred are in the tier 2 category). 

 The critical capabilities, missions, and functional networks are 

decomposed into defense critical assets that are assessed against threats, 

hazards, and vulnerabilities (risk assessment). Risk of loss is assessed and 

mitigation actions are proposed (protect/harden, duplicate/backup, relocate, and others). 

 The Services then analyze the results and the proposed mitigation actions 

(N.B.: The Department is at this stage now). 

 Finally a senior group (the Deputies Advisory Working Group or its 

equivalent) adjudicates differences and prioritizes for resource allocation. 

Figure 4-4. DOD Mission-Assurance Process for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 225

Specifics are classified, but examples of DOD mission critical functions and 

related assets include: 

 command and control 

 ballistic missile defense 

 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

 power projection 

The study judged that the list appeared logical, but neither complete nor 

consistent in the application of the tier criteria.6

 Recognizing that it is a process 

in its early stages, the DSB nonetheless believes that more effort must be applied 

to get it right and complete. 

With respect to the defense industrial base, efforts led by ASD 

(HD&ASA)/DCIP are underway to work in a similar fashion with defense 

industrial base owners through National Guard assessment teams, but this too is 

a work in progress. Some initial positive outcomes (classified) are notable, but the 

process has not yet enjoyed widespread visibility. There is also the question of how 

far the private sector will go to meet what it may view as DOD special assurance 

needs over and above business continuity to support other customers. In that 

respect, DOD will have to address what incentives it might be able to offer. 

One factor contributing to the relatively slow progress at DOD is the recent 

reorganization in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, which 

decimated the staff devoted to this area. This will make it extremely difficult to 

implement the inspired proposal to create a Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for “mission assurance,” which would consolidate policies, programs, 

and procedures for CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and highexplosive), anti-terrorism, consequence management, critical infrastructure 

protection, and continuity of operations in one office. The biggest gap, however, 

is that no one is charged with the responsibility or authority to ensure that 

corrective actions are taken, either within DOD or nationally through DHS. 

 

6. Tier 1 Task Critical Asset (TCA), loss or disruption will cause failure of multiple assigned strategic 

missions (determined by combatant commander); Tier 2 (TCA), loss or disruption will cause failure of a 

single assigned strategic mission or cause severe disruption to mission accomplishment of several assigned 

missions (determined by combatant commander); Tier 3 (TCA), loss or disruption will cause severe 

disruption to mission accomplishment of a single assigned strategic mission (determined by combatant 

commander). These TCAs are then analyzed by the Joint Staff, and TCAs that support multiple combatant 

commanders are considered to be Defense Critical Assets (DCAs). 
226 I PART IV, CHAPTER 15 

The result is that despite nearly seven years since 9/11, many U.S. critical 

infrastructures remain vulnerable, and for DOD, many critical supply chains—to 

include meals ready to eat, missiles, munitions, and fuel—are not as resilient as 

they should be. 

DHS Process and Status for Critical Infrastructure Protection 

DHS has a related but different approach to identifying critical national 

functions. It focuses on 17 sectors called Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides the basis for DHS roles and 

responsibilities. HSPD-7 outlines the national approach. Other key documents 

and plans include the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Strategy for 

Securing Cyberspace, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 

Infrastructure/Key Resources, and several other HSPDs. 

With these strategies and directives as a basis, DHS has led the development 

of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). The NIPP’s overarching 

goal is to “Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing 

protection of the Nation’s CI/KR (critical infrastructure/key resources) to 

prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists 

to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit them; and to strengthen national 

preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery in the event of an attack, 

natural disaster, or other emergency.” The DHS approach for managing risk is 

that “Sectors that are primarily dependent on fixed assets and physical facilities 

may use a bottom-up, asset-by-asset approach, while sectors (such as 

Telecommunications and Information Technology) with diverse and logical 

assets may use a top-down business or mission continuity approach.” 

Sector-specific plans (SSP) support the NIPP by establishing a coordinated 

approach to national priorities, goals, and requirements for critical infrastructure 

and key resource protection. The SSPs provide the means by which the NIPP is 

implemented across all critical infrastructure and key resource sectors, as well as 

a national framework within which each sector can address its unique 

characteristics and risk landscape. This coordinated approach allows federal 

funding and resources to be applied in the most effective manner to manage risk. 

DHS has focused, so far, on assets and facilities versus operations and functions. 

DHS coordinates and provides guidelines, but cannot edict standards for security 

across sectors (although it should be promulgating best practices). At this point, 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 227

the DHS has identified 36 “Tier 1” assets and over 2,500 “Tier 2” assets.7 These 

include several identified by DOD. How the tier criteria are developed and 

applied were not clear (to this study team, at least) nor were the processes by 

which the SSAs or SCCs influenced choices. 

The DSB discovered inconsistent involvement by private sector owners and 

operators in the DHS process. The DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection is 

redirecting the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center to provide 

analytical support to sectors and agencies, and to characterize interdependencies 

among sectors, so that a more consistent and carefully analyzed set of priorities 

can be established. Significant private sector engagement will be required to 

achieve a rigorous and robust analytic capability. In the view of the DSB, 

information assurance, highlighted in the accompanying side bar, is probably the 

most pervasive issue in infrastructure protection. 

Information Assurance 

Pervasive to critical infrastructure/key resource assurance is information assurance (corroborated by both the 

technology and counterforce panels of this study, and explicitly highlighted in the following section on logistics). Two 

of the most significant recommendations of the Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on Information 

Management were to: 1) identify the DOD information management system as a weapon system and treat it with all 

the same processes as that implies for readiness assessments and for use in exercises and in training; and 2) 

develop and fund robust information assurance efforts to lessen the vulnerability of the system to attack, improve its 

resilience and assure ability to operate with a degraded system. In part II of this current study, concepts of testing and 

operations to improve information assurance are recommended. Yet, the DSB believes that more should be done to 

not only protect the military system but commercial cyberspace as well. All facets of the U.S. economy are critically 

linked to efficient transmission of information. Therefore, a whole new look is required. 

Finding. The number and complexity of cyber transactions on today’s Internet are well beyond those conceived at the 

initial design stages of ARPANET. A new look at network design, operation, and traffic flow protocols is needed with a 

fresh insight in light of the enormous information exchange impact of the Internet today. 

Recommendation. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency should assemble a small group of the 

brightest commercial and academic minds in the area of Internet operation to review current status and develop a 

plan for next generation Internet operation and protocols, building on, but not limited to, the National Science 

Foundation Genie Program. This group should recommend both short- and long-term enhancements to the Internet in 

all areas of operational effectiveness and security including recommendations for adequate development funding and 

realistic time scales for implementation. 

 

7. Criteria for Tier 2 are sector-specific. Criteria for Tier 1 are more severe: (1) make the Tier 2 list and (2) 

satisfy at least two of the following: prompt fatalities greater than 3000; economic impact of $50B or more; 

psychological impact requiring mass evacuations with prolonged absence; or loss of governance or mission 

execution that disrupts multiple regions for more than one week, resulting in loss of necessary public services. 
228 I PART IV, CHAPTER 15 

Logistics 

The DOD logistics system has shown significant improvement in its ability 

to produce a rapid and precise response (Figure 4-5). Examples include: 

 improved materiel availability 

 implemented state-of-the-art commercial logistics information 

technology systems 

 improved asset visibility 

 designation of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) as the 

distribution process owner 

The TRANSCOM designation has, in turn, facilitated planning and 

coordination of DOD’s supply chain. However, much more needs to be 

accomplished. 

The U.S. industrial base produces the vast majority of the material required 

to support the Department of Defense. There are many critical commodities and 

items that are essential for DOD to accomplish its mission, both abroad and at 

home. Examples include: meals ready to eat, subsistence, medical, fuel, and spare 

parts for critical weapon systems. Many of these items (especially critical spare 

parts) are produced by sole-source companies or by companies with limited 

competition. Strategies have yet to be developed to assure the availability of these 

materials in the event of attacks on the homeland. Such a strategy should include: 

 a comprehensive list of critical commodities and items, updated and 

(re)prioritized on a routine basis 

 assessment and assurance of transportation routes required for their 

delivery from industry to DOD facilities 

 assessment and assurance of the sources of the critical commodities and 

items (for example, through developing alternative sources of supply for 

these items by contracting for the capability, but not necessarily the 

actual production) 

This strategy has been used successfully for a limited number of medical 

items, and should be expanded significantly. 

Each military service and the Defense Logistics Agency have either 

implemented or are in the process of implementing state-of-the-art commercial 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 229

logistics information technology systems. However, no organization has been 

given the leadership role to ensure that these systems are interoperable and 

secure. These new logistics IT systems remain vulnerable to attacks because, by 

design, they must remain accessible to the commercial industrial base. DOD 

needs to develop a team of experts from both within DOD and the commercial 

sector to address this vulnerability. 

At a higher level, as the DOD supply chain becomes more and more joint, 

the roles and responsibilities of the military services, combatant commanders, 

Defense Logistics Agency, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense need to be reviewed and clarified. Additionally, the Office of the 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness 

(ODUSD [LM&R]) needs to develop common performance metrics for the 

entire supply chain. 

The weakest segment of the DOD supply chain is often described as the 

“last tactical mile.” In the logistics context, this represents the tactical movement 

and distribution of material once in-theater to its actual use by the warfighter. 

There has not been a coordinated effort to implement a single asset visibility 

system for the “last tactical mile” that would track and report consumption to 

the DOD national provider or to the end user. ODUSD (LM&R) should 

coordinate this effort. Visibility of material in the “last tactical mile” must be an 

element of a joint logistics enterprise-wide visibility system, which uses a 

common data architecture, has authoritative sources of data, and is available 24 

hours a day, 7 days a week. 
230 I PART IV, CHAPTER 15 

Figure 4-5. Assessment of Robustness of DOD’s Supply Chain 

Military Installation Protection 

In addition to ensuring supplies from a robust private supply and internal 

distribution system, DOD must also assure the security of the forces it expects to 

deploy. The first step is assuring the inherent security of the installation itself. 

The military services each approach base security and force protection 

differently, but almost all of them plan on the support of local community 

emergency response resources in a serious incident (this being a consequence of 

outsourcing in this domain).8

 These civilian capabilities will not be available if the 

incident is an attack of a serious-enough scale. In particular, the study worries 

about the consequences of a WMD attack in terms of both the technical and 

operational shortfalls in both military and civilian communities. 

 

8. For example, the Army has consolidated installation management under a single command, as did the 

Navy earlier. Mission commanders establish what is critical and each garrison commander takes measures 

within his/her resources to protect and/or assure the critical function; special needs are funded by the 

mission command. Garrison and mission commanders coordinate plans for deployment under 

catastrophic scenarios. All garrison commanders have memoranda of understanding with the local 

response community for mutual aid. Plans are tested through training and annual exercises. 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 231

A previous DSB task force assessed best practices for protecting U.S. military 

installations and recommended various approaches to enhancing security and 

protection of these facilities.9

 Principal findings included: 

 DOD has many facilities that are vulnerable to the threats considered 

in the study, but a rational focus should be on protecting its critical 

military mission capabilities and functions (as opposed to installations 

and facilities). 

 Interdependencies of DOD facilities upon non-DOD infrastructure are 

not entirely known. 

 DOD, until recently, lacked policies and standards to guide installation 

commanders in securing, or creating contingencies around, infrastructure 

on which they depend. 

 DOD Directive 3020.40, “Defense Critical Infrastructure Program,” 

signed August 2005, assigns DCIP responsibilities at all levels across 

the department. 

As a consequence of those findings, the task force recommended that: 

 ASD(HD&ASA)/DCIP lead efforts to characterize defense sector 

infrastructure dependencies, develop risk mitigation guidance, and 

establish uniform DCIP standards (which is now underway, as 

outlined previously in this chapter). 

 Services develop and implement plans to mitigate risk across owned 

installations; provide annual update to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

 Installation commanders develop local assessment of dependencies and 

implement risk mitigation plans consistent with guidance and standards. 

 Commander, U.S. Northern Command develop understanding of 

dependencies and risk mitigation by Services in the continental United 

States; other combatant commanders do the same in their respective 

areas of responsibility. 

 DOD through ASD(HD&ASA)/DCIP monitor, collect, and share 

examples for installation preparedness as a basis for judging risk 

mitigation decisions within the previously recommended risk 

management program. 

 

9. Report of the DSB Task Force on Critical Homeland Infrastructure Protection, January 2007. 
232 I PART IV, CHAPTER 15 

The study team was updated on some programs for installation risk 

assessments and management and came to believe that these prior findings and 

recommendations remain largely valid. With the exception of the start of the 

mission assurance process developed by ASD(HD&ASA)/DCIP, little has been 

done beyond earlier force protection programs. 

Family and Individual Preparedness 

Every mission begins at home.

10

No amount of planning, training, and exercising can totally protect against 

homeland attacks. The second line of defense, as discussed in the previous 

sections of this chapter, must be to harden government and civil organizations 

and critical functions against the effects of an attack and/or to assure an orderly 

recovery. The third line must be preparation of individuals and their families to 

withstand the impacts of a national catastrophe. 

The study team was reminded of the many examples where individual 

preparedness proved pivotal in mitigating the consequences of a natural disaster, 

and the strong role it played in the early days of the Cold War. The effectiveness 

with which Florida is able to contend with hurricanes, having learned valuable 

lessons from Hurricane Andrew, especially when compared to Louisiana’s 

inability to deal with Katrina, shows how state and local preparation can blunt a 

disaster’s impact. The preparedness of the Swiss population to hunker in place 

during military emergencies is another good example of preparedness. More 

often, however, unless catastrophe is a near-term reality, most major domestic 

preparedness programs are likely to fail because of competing, short-term 

resource needs. Katrina was widely and credibly forecast for many years, yet 

Louisiana remained poorly prepared (Table 4-6). 

 

10. Quantico Marine Corp Base, sign at entrance to military housing. 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 233

Table 4-6. Progress Toward Preparedness 

In the aftermath of Katrina, President Bush demanded that “we find 

out the lessons, that we learn them, and that we fix the problems, 

that we take every action to make sure America is safer, stronger, 

and better prepared.” The lessons referenced were those 

enumerated in The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Lessons Learned, 2006. These included planning, resource 

management, evacuation, situational awareness, communications, 

and coordination. These lessons are not new; in fact they have 

been repeatedly observed and stated: 

Hurricane Katrina, 2005 

Command centers in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

and elsewhere in the Federal government had unclear, and often 

overlapping, roles and responsibilities that were exposed as flawed 

during this disaster ... This lack of coordination at the Federal 

headquarters-level reflected confusing organizational structures in 

the field. ... Furthermore, the Joint Field Office (JFO) staff and 

other deployed Federal personnel often lacked a working 

knowledge of National Incident Management System (NIMS) or 

even a basic understanding of ICS. 

The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, 

2006:52 

September 11, 2001 

It is a fair inference, given the differing situations in New York City 

and Northern Virginia, that the problems in command, control, and 

communications that occurred at both sites will likely recur in any 

emergency of similar scale. The task looking forward is to enable 

first responders to respond in a coordinated manner with the 

greatest possible awareness of the situation. .... Emergency 

response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command 

System. When multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are 

involved, they should adopt a Unified Command. Both are proven 

frameworks for emergency response. 

The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004:315,397 

Oklahoma City Bombing, 1995 

The Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) and 

Incident Command System (ICS) were weakened early in the 

event due to the immediate response of numerous local, state and 

Federal agencies, three separate locations of the Incident 

Command Post (ICP), within the first few hours, and the 

deployment of many Mobile Command Posts (MCPs), representing 

support agencies. 

After Action Report: Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing, 

2003:3

Hurricane Andrew, 1992 

The Committee heard substantial testimony that 

the post-disaster response and recovery to 

Hurricane Andrew suffered from several problems, 

including: 

Inadequate communication between levels of 

government concerning specific needs; 

 Lack of full awareness of supply inventories 

and agency capabilities; 

 Failure to have a single person in charge with 

a clear chain of command; and 

 Inability to cut through bureaucratic red tape. 

Governor’s Disaster Planning and Response 

Review Committee Final Report, 1993:60 

These shortfalls in communications are repeatedly 

identified in a multitude of after-action reports. 

Recent catastrophic events have resulted in many 

legislative actions and directives to address these 

problems: 

 Homeland Security Act of 2002 

 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 – 

Management Domestic Incidents 

 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 – 

Critical Infrastructure Identification, 

Prioritization & Protection 

 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 – 

National Preparedness 

 Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform 

Act of 2006 

 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 

Act of 2004 

 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Act of 2007 

As evidenced by the enormous scope of the 

recent 9/11 legislation, it is widely perceived that 

little progress has been made in addressing these 

problems. Why don’t we learn? Why are these 

problems a challenge to military operations? 
234 I PART IV, CHAPTER 15 

Whatever measures are taken to deal with domestic catastrophes, they all 

must have intrinsic value—improved efficiency, greater safety, better level of 

service, less cost. Government should not be the principal source of resources, 

but should lead in encouraging improvements, providing guidelines, and offering 

the venues for educating and practicing how well prepared communities are—or 

should be. DOD’s success in assuring the deployment and supply of 

expeditionary forces, or defense against domestic catastrophe, is utterly 

dependent upon the military community’s ability to function adequately in a 

post-attack or pandemic environment. Homeland security and the ability to 

continue military operations in a hostile environment at home is a capability 

supported by three pillars: government, private sector, and individuals and 

families. If any of these are weak, the system, like a three-legged stool, is 

unstable, and seriously degraded, at best. The sentiment was best summed up by 

Jim Schwartz, Arlington County Fire Chief, Incident Commander, Pentagon 

9/11: “A prepared society lessens the burden on DOD to do its warfighting job.”

Resiliency 

According to FEMA, there have been over 1,700 federal disaster declarations 

issued since 1953, with an annual average of 31 events per year. The number of 

events during the last decade has exceeded this average (Figure 4-6). A capable 

enemy could take advantage of any one of these annual events as an opportunity 

to launch an attack while U.S. resources are strained and leadership distracted. 

Americans have been conditioned over many decades to assume disaster 

relief assistance will come from communities adjacent to military installations and 

that other federal and state assets will be available. Firefighters and emergency 

medical technicians (EMT), for example, call for mutual aid when local systems 

are stretched beyond their limits, and major disasters routinely draw from 

resources across the nation including the National Guard. 

In the event of coordinated asymmetric attacks in many parts of the country 

and/or simultaneously with a natural disaster or avian flu pandemic, emergency 

responders and relief organizations may not be able to move across local or state 

borders. Resources will be severely strained and responders will be busy dealing 

with or preparing to deal with disaster on their home turf. 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 235

Source: FEMA, August 2007; http://www.fema.gov/news/disaster_totals_annual.fema 

Figure 4-6. Number of U.S. Disaster Declarations 

This reality has a sobering consequence. Even in the best of worlds, with all 

public and private emergency response and recovery systems operating as 

designed, help may not be there when military members and their families 

desperately need it. Evidence of this has been dramatically illustrated during 

countless disaster relief operations. To cite one example, in January 1998, the 

worst ice storm in New York State’s recorded history paralyzed an area in a 

northern region of the state the size of Vermont, affecting over 18 million 

acres.11 Twenty thousand utility poles had collapsed, the power grid was out of 

service for weeks, fallen trees made most roads impassable, and citizens were left 

to survive in the sub-freezing temperatures with only the food, water, and other 

supplies they had on hand. 

For most of them, especially those with children, the experience was a 

terrible ordeal. Tragically, some did not survive. But for a few, the experience 

was no more than an inconvenience. These were usually older people who had 

grown up in a time when self-reliance was an accepted way of life. They had 

stockpiles of water, food, fuel for woodstoves, and medicines. One elderly 

 

11. Federal Emergency Management Agency. New York Ice Storm Final Report, January 1998. Retrieved on 

August 13, 2007 from http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=10489 
236 I PART IV, CHAPTER 15 

couple replied to a rescue team that came to their home to offer assistance, “Go 

help somebody else, we’re good here until Spring.” 

For military families, it comes down to one simple truth: the ability to 

function during or after a terrorist attack, pandemic, or natural disaster will 

reflect the quality of individual planning and preparations. Relying totally on 

traditional government responsive means of support in times of crisis is a 

strategic blunder with potentially dire outcomes. 

A Culture of Preparedness 

Instilling and promoting a culture of preparedness can provide both physical 

and psychological benefits to members and their families. There is much that can 

be done without great expense or effort to better prepare for both natural and 

man-made disasters.12 Greater hazard awareness, training, home storage, and 

family communication and evacuation plans can provide greater peace of mind, 

strengthen emotional resiliency and empower DOD families to carry on through 

a disaster. Preparedness also reduces the impact of a crisis and likelihood that 

these families will have to depend only upon the emergency relief infrastructure. 

Self-sufficiency also empowers members and families to help others and set an 

example the community can follow. 

Most emergency preparedness guidelines encourage a minimum of 72 hours 

worth of supplies per individual for use until authorities are able to restore order 

and marshal emergency services.13 However, experience has shown, and future 

disaster estimates (such as for a pandemic flu) indicate, that individuals should be 

prepared for much longer periods (two weeks to several months). Over time, 

individuals and families can build up their own home storage supply of food, 

water, medicines, and other necessary items including financial reserves and 

prudent debt avoidance. 

Fortunately, preparedness at the individual and family level is the cheapest 

and perhaps most achievable of strategies to enable the nation’s military 

 

12. Events include such things as floods, mudslides, hurricanes, tornados, fires, severe snow or ice storms, 

earthquakes, volcanoes, infectious disease outbreaks, severe power and fuel outages, hazardous chemical 

releases, nuclear or radiological incidents, acts of terrorism and/or civil disturbance. 

13. Helpful Resources: DHS Be Ready, http://www.ready.gov/; FEMA, 

http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/, http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/tab3.html; Citizens Corps, 

http://www.citizencorps.gov/; CDC, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/; Florida Division of Emergency 

Management, http://www.floridadisaster.org/bpr/family%20preparedness/ index.htm 
DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY I 237

community to continue operations during times of adversity. The idea of 

individual and family preparedness was reinforced by a group of 

noncommissioned officers (NCOs) with whom a part of the study team met: 

“We can’t protect our country if we can’t protect ourselves.” 

DOD must recognize that soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines will not 

likely be effective warfighters if they are simultaneously worried about the 

security of their families. While obvious steps, such as increased base 

protection, can be implemented, too many families live outside the installation. 

Having them educated and prepared for self sufficiency for up to two weeks 

would have immense morale, as well as actual, impact. The idea is not new in 

the homeland security context, but DHS’s programs have been poorly funded 

and not well publicized. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: ASSURING DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY

The recommendations offered here are restricted to those that affect DOD, 

although there are many related items that DHS should address, as well. The 

first set of recommendations is associated with ensuring deployment and 

supply. Toward that end, the Secretary of Defense, should direct:

 OSD ASD (HD&ASA)/DCIP to extend the mission assurance process 

to the defense industrial base and recommend approaches for addressing 

shortfalls. 

 USD (AT&L) to work with defense industrial base owners to develop 

and implement corrective action plans. 

 OSD ASD (HD&ASA)/DCIP to develop a prioritized action plan for 

addressing identified risks to DOD owned assets. 

 U.S. Northern Command to lead the integration and analysis of defense 

agency critical functions, within the framework identified by ASD 

(HD&ASA)/DCIP, to enhance mission assurance, and to be the 

principal advocate for prioritized resource needs and shortfalls. 

 Service secretaries to fund actions for mission assurance in owned functions. 

 USD (AT&L)/LM&R to ensure resourcing of logistics shortfalls: 

- to assure sources of supply and movement to DOD depots 

- to eliminate the last tactical mile issues 

- to make the information management system interoperable, robust, 

and resilient to attack, from both within and outside 
238 I PART IV, CHAPTER 15 

An important additional aspect, not highlighted in the recommendations 

above, is that DOD should also continue to carefully assess those parts of 

the infrastructure outside the defense industrial base on which it depends 

(telecomm, transportation, and others) to understand its robustness and 

availability in the environments characterized in this report.

In the area of family preparedness, the Service chiefs of staff should 

actively promote the ability of military families to shelter at home for two 

weeks, or evacuate on short notice. They should: 

 Reinforce message via NCO leadership academies, on-base medical 

community, Armed Forces Network, unit town-hall meetings, movie/TV 

celebrities, veterans’ organizations, and other similar venues. 

 Assure base commanders export this capability to adjacent civilian 

communities. 

These recommendations were crafted on the strong advice of the NCOs 

consulted. They stated that the most effective way to achieve this capacity is 

through leadership, rather than by an administrative order. Families should not be 

“ordered” to prepare since orders could be politely ignored or even 

counterproductive, and impossible to enforce. Instead, leadership should help 

them understand why it is important and how to do it. Leadership should help 

them want to do it by implementing an education and outreach campaign. This 

should cascade from the chiefs down through example and encouragement to the 

individual unit level. 

This message could be reinforced through NCO leadership academies, onbase medical community (pan-flu education), Armed Forces Network, unit townhall meetings, celebrity endorsements, motivational speakers, promotional sales 

(at cost) via commissaries, as well as veteran and community organization 

involvement. DOD could also partner with other organizations such as the 

DHS-sponsored Citizens Corps on how best to prepare and educate members 

and their families.14 According to FEMA, there are over 2,200 Citizens Corp 

Councils serving areas containing 75 percent of the total U.S. population.15

Commissary stocks of long shelf-life items should also be increased. A significant 

collateral benefit (according to the NCOs) would be enhanced morale for 

members serving in assignments that separate them from their families. 

 

14. American Red Cross, Center for Disease Control, Community Emergency Response Team, 

Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Medical Reserve Corps 

Program, Neighborhood Watch/USAonWatch, and Volunteers in Police Service. 

15. Citizens Corps, (2007). Retrieved on August 13, 2007 from http://www.citizencorps.gov/ 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 239

Chapter 16. Building the National Team 

“One Team” 

The third dimension of the study’s assessment of homeland defense 

addressed the status of the “national team” and DOD’s involvement. As stated 

in Chapter 13, success in both homeland security and defense, whether against 

terrorism or more stressing peer-generated environments, demands a level of 

partnership and integration between and among all levels of government as well 

as with the private sector. In its investigation, the study team found an almost 

exclusive focus in national strategy and plans on terrorist attacks, most 

often a single event, even if distributed in nature (as a bio or cyber attack might 

be), rather than on the more capable adversary envisioned in this study. 

In spite of the wake-up call provided by Katrina, progress toward an 

integrated national system is painfully slow, and the leaders who will have to act 

in those situations are choosing not to take full advantage of the training 

opportunities presented to them. Transitions in command from local to federal 

authorities, or from DHS to DOD, are not practiced. Most important, in the 

view of the DSB, is the lack of the homeland security/defense professional—

either civilian or military. Academic programs are starting in several universities, 

but the government professional development track in homeland security and 

homeland defense, akin to those of other accepted prime missions of federal 

departments, has not yet been created. 

The Homeland Security Team 

Homeland security organizations responsible for dealing with national 

calamities are a diverse group: federal agencies, state and local authorities, and 

private firms. Some are new, some long-standing, and many, with principal 

and/or historic missions elsewhere, are included because of their special 

expertise or location. This community, in its present form, was hastily assembled 

following the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. Its “pick-up” nature 

has meant that homeland security and defense leaders often lack sufficiently 

broad perspectives across the numerous capabilities and equities participating in 

the homeland security mission. Some of the organizations do not fully appreciate 

what other team members (such as private firms that operate critical 

infrastructures) can offer. Many homeland security leaders—police and fire, 
240 I PART IV, CHAPTER 16 

Coast Guard, FEMA, FBI, National Guard, and others—have extensive 

experience in organizations with long histories of disaster response, recovery, 

and relief, but little experience working in a unified command environment. In 

today’s threat environment, the planning and coordination needed for effective, 

timely response to national emergencies is greater than ever before in the 

nation’s history. However, DHS, as the lead agency for creating that level of 

response, is still in its infancy. 

At the state and local level, the DSB heard little that was positive about their 

federal “partners.” DHS continues to reorganize, changes points of contact 

frequently, and brings to the table too much of a “we’re in charge” attitude. This 

judgment is shared by the private sector, although the relationship between 

DOD and the defense industrial base seems to be better than with other sectors 

and their federal agency lead. With respect to U.S. Northern Command, DOD’s 

principal operating “face” to the homeland security community, the command 

has been restrained by the view among the Department’s leadership that the 

priority is—and should be—the “away game.” Its low profile start has produced 

some serious perception problems that must be overcome with the many 

partners it will need to work with in a national emergency. 

Possibly the most neglected member of the team is the private sector. The 

previous chapter discussed the importance to DOD (and of course, the nation) 

of critical infrastructure protection. The private sector owns most of the 

infrastructure and will be the most effective in restoring its function after an 

attack. As such, it must be as integral to the national team as government actors. 

The real challenge to the nation’s leaders is to ensure that the right agency, 

with the appropriate authorities and capabilities, is postured to lead a response at 

the appropriate time and with the necessary capabilities, from its own resources 

and/or from other supporting agencies and qualified contributors. 

Interagency 

The major departments of the federal government responsible for 

coordinating the elements of national power in the defense of the nation—the 

Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State, as well as the 

intelligence community—have varying degrees of authority and responsibility 

under different circumstances. Coordinating these efforts in remote theaters where 

roles and responsibilities are well understood is very difficult. The challenges are 

even more acute in the homeland. As the agency charged with protecting the 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 241

United States from terrorist attacks, DHS is responsible for leading the federal 

effort to prevent attacks and to respond to domestic events, whether man-made or 

natural. The Department of Justice, however, is the law enforcement agency with 

the lead for domestic terrorist incidents. The DOD has significant responsibilities 

in support of civil authorities and assurance of critical infrastructure, especially as it 

relates to the defense infrastructure base. 

Under the National Response Framework, DOD is a primary agency for urban 

search and rescue and a support agency for nearly every other identified emergency 

support function: transportation, communications, firefighting, emergency 

management, mass care, emergency assistance, housing and human services, public 

health and medical services, oil and hazardous materials response, agriculture and 

natural resources, energy, public safety, long-term community recovery, and 

external affairs. The Army Corps of Engineers is the coordinator and primary 

agency for public works and engineering. Furthermore, DOD is identified as the 

coordinating agency for cyber incidents and as a cooperating agency for every 

other identified incident, including biological, nuclear, radiological, and terrorism 

law enforcement investigation. As discussed in previous chapters, DOD may also 

find itself in the lead should events become serious enough. 

The 2005 DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support recognizes the 

importance of the interagency: “Given that we face an emerging global, multidimensional threat, how should we prepare ourselves to operate ‘jointly’ across 

the interagency in a way that increases our effectiveness and decreases our 

vulnerabilities along the seams?” 

An example of the effectiveness of a cooperative interagency construct is the 

Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)–South. This organization offers a unique 

model for day-to-day interagency operations. JIATF-South conducts counterillicit trafficking interdiction operations, intelligence fusion, and multi-sensor 

correlation to detect, monitor, and handoff suspected illicit trafficking targets. It 

also promotes security cooperation, as well as country team and partner nation 

initiatives in order to defeat the flow of illicit traffic. 

As a true interagency organization, membership in JIATF-South includes 

Customs and Border Patrol, Central Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement 

Agency, Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau 

of Investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, National Security 

Agency, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. This pairing of military 

and civilian government agencies under a unified command structure provides 
242 I PART IV, CHAPTER 16 

for routine interaction between the entities that will need to work together 

effectively during a crisis. 

Taking a lesson from the success of JIATF–South, the panel believes that the 

complex network of interdependent roles, responsibilities, and relationships 

demands a full-time integrated approach to homeland security and homeland 

defense activities through a number of such standing operational task forces. Some 

specialized examples, such as the National Maritime Intelligence Center, operated 

jointly by the Coast Guard and Navy, or the FEMA-DLA memorandum of 

understanding for DLA logistics support in national emergencies, are a good, but 

incomplete, start. For DOD, this means that U.S. Northern Command must step 

up—and in some cases, be allowed to step up—to a more proactive role in the 

interagency forum. 

Federal-State-Local 

In the case of a point attack, the first manifestation—and response—will 

occur locally. If or when those resources are overwhelmed, requests to the state 

will be made. At that point, the governor can call out the National Guard, as well 

as exercise mutual aid agreements with other states for additional response 

resources. When those avenues of response are tapped out, appeals for federal 

help can and will be made. However, the study heard from several state and 

regional response leaders that federal support can be slow in coming and what 

they can count on is largely unknown. In fact, the leader of one of the largest 

state emergency response offices stated that he plans for no federal help at least 

for three days after a major event. Interesting, as well, were comments from local 

and state responders that, by and large, they didn’t need more “stuff” as provided 

by the DHS grant programs, but rather support for regional planning, training, 

and exercising. 

With respect to prevention, state and local response leaders noted how much 

they can contribute, provided they have adequate threat information to recognize a 

threat when observed. In other words, a strong partnership with their federal 

counterparts can contribute significantly to threat mitigation and/or apprehension. 

Several examples, positive and negative, highlight the power of effective 

federal-state-local partnerships. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 243

Y2K Information Reporting and Communications 

During Y2K, an Information Coordination Center was established by 

Executive Order 13073 and implemented through a system for reporting 

information from the local level to federal, as well as the provision of information 

of interest to state and local entities. The Information Coordination Center was the 

federally operated central point for gathering, analyzing, and summarizing 

information on systems operations during the Year 2000 date rollover. The guiding 

principles for its development and operation were: 

 common, consistent operational picture to the President and decisionmakers 

 owners to fix their own problems at the lowest level 

 use of existing agencies and capabilities; supplement where needed 

 federal assessment, assistance where national interest, life, and safety merit 

 Federal Response Plan used as the model 

 individual agencies required to validate data they supplied 

 information content planned, templated, routinely transmitted; 

significant events transmitted on an exception basis 

 one voice to the nation 

The model for the operation of the Information Coordinating Center is 

captured in Figure 4-7. The interagency and intergovernmental coordination and 

teamwork leading up to the rollover and immediately thereafter was commendable, 

and could provide a valuable model for information-sharing in high alert and/or 

crises for today’s homeland security and homeland environment. 
244 I PART IV, CHAPTER 16 

Figure 4-7. Y2K Information Flow 

Response to Katrina 

The failings of government at every level in the response to Hurricane 

Katrina have been the subject of many studies and treatises, both within and 

outside the government. This study turned to the experience of its members as 

well as outside sources to better understand specifics of the response. Clearly, 

state and local agencies and officials had inadequate planning and preparation to 

deal with the scope and scale of the event, but problems occurred at every level. 

The federal-state-local shortcomings, as developed independently for the 

Homeland Security Council, are summarized as follows:16

 Key decision-makers were unfamiliar with response plans. 

 Federal agencies were slow to respond to the unprecedented 

requirements for federal support and coordination. 

 Federal multi-agency coordination centers were not established in the 

field until after the height of the crisis. 

 Critical public affairs structures were not operating at full capacity until 

weeks after landfall. 

 

16. GEN Dennis Reimer, USA (ret.), DFI International Government Services, Analysis for the Homeland 

Security Council. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 245

 The delayed establishment of key federal coordination mechanisms (such 

as a joint field office) exacerbated management problems and confusion 

in the field. 

 The joint field office should have been fully resourced and prepositioned prior to the event. 

 Key federal, state, and local personnel, especially state National Guard 

leaders, should have been co-located to facilitate joint planning and 

decision-making. 

 The military played a critical role in the response to Hurricane Katrina, 

but overall coordination was lacking. 

 DOD’s mission assignment process proved cumbersome and delayed the 

delivery of some resources. 

 Greater operational planning is needed for specific defense support to 

civil authorities missions. 

 Greater integration between U.S. Northern Command and the National 

Guard would have enhanced coordination and response. 

 Equipment, personnel, and training shortfalls affected the National 

Guard response. 

 DOD needs a greater understanding of the types of support that will be 

expected during a domestic disaster. 

 DHS officials need greater awareness of the capabilities and authorities 

of DOD; conversely, key DOD personnel should be trained on the 

National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, and 

the Incident Command System. 

State and Local Intelligence Fusion Centers 

Since 9/11 many state and local jurisdictions have established “fusion” 

centers for the purpose of collecting information on terrorist threats from a wide 

range of sources—including criminal investigations, the media, and tips from the 

public. Major metropolitan areas like Los Angeles and New York City pioneered 

these efforts. In 1996, Los Angeles County established the Terrorism Early 

Warning Group as an interdisciplinary group in which local, state, and federal 

agencies work together to share information and combine resources to enhance 

the ability to identify and respond to acts and threats of terrorism. Today at least 
246 I PART IV, CHAPTER 16 

46 states and the District of Columbia have operating fusion centers to create a 

fuller picture of potential threats in their area. 

In December 2005, President Bush directed federal agencies to “develop a 

common framework” for sharing security information with other levels of 

government and the private sector. The Departments of Homeland Security and 

Justice grants have helped fund many of the centers. DHS contributions have 

amounted to $380 million so far. There are several examples of how these 

centers have proven effective in apprehending suspects wanted by the federal 

government. But there is growing concern that without a plan to identify and 

allocate state funding to keep these centers operating, they could be in jeopardy. 

Many of these centers are voluntary endeavors and funding profiles vary greatly 

from state to state. 

Public-Private 

As discussed previously, DHS has been tasked with significant leadership 

responsibilities for identifying and protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure 

and key resources. In addition to the Government and Sector Coordinating 

Councils (GCCs/SCCs) it has organized to facilitate the process, DHS has 

established the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) to 

support the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). Through CIPAC, 

DHS coordinates federal infrastructure protection programs with infrastructure 

protection activities of the private sector and state, local, territorial, and tribal 

governments, and facilitates interaction among the stakeholders in each sector.17

Because CIPAC meetings are customarily closed to the public, participants can 

more comfortably share security-sensitive information about threats, 

vulnerabilities, and protective measures. 

During the course of this study, the DSB heard from representatives of the 

healthcare, defense industrial base, energy (electricity), information technology, 

communications, and emergency services sectors, and from three transportation 

sub-sectors (mass transit, oil and natural gas, and railroads). The consensus among 

these sectors suggested that the GCC/SCC “partnership” concept is good 

because it provides an opportunity to build trust among all stakeholders. 

However, the concept is not uniformly applied across all sectors. 

 

17. CIPAC is exempt from the Federal Advisory Committee Act [P.L. 92-463]. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 247

For example, DHS and other sector-specific federal government agencies 

(SSA) worked with SCCs to produce sector-specific plans (SSP) required by the 

NIPP.18 But the experience of the sectors was dependent upon the relationship 

with the SSA. The information technology sector, whose SSA is the cyber 

security component of DHS, was very satisfied with the experience, as was the 

oil and natural gas sector, whose SSA is the Department of Energy. Success was 

attributed to strong relationships and information sharing between the private 

and public principals. 

On the other hand, where the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

is the SSA, some transportation sub-sectors have reported unsatisfactory 

experiences. Some sector representatives said DHS has the classic “left 

hand/right hand” problem and the “partnership” concept is contradicted at 

times by the regulatory responsibility and mind-set of some of its agencies, 

especially TSA. DHS must institute a consistent approach across all its 

components, and persist with other SSAs in reinforcing the importance of sector 

“partnership.” To build trust, DHS must treat all sectors as full partners, not as 

subordinates. Rather than try to control the sector, DHS must facilitate security 

efforts of the sectors. 

In spite of these problems, critical infrastructure owners and operators 

independently have taken steps to protect their assets and enhance the resiliency 

of their systems based upon their own risk assessments.19 In many instances, 

however, they say they are not doing all they could be doing to protect their 

facilities and employees because of competing interests or issues.20 For example, 

companies are chartered to fulfill a fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders 

for continuity of operations, but in some cases the activities needed for them to 

best protect their employees are counter to the activities to provide the best 

continuity of operations. Also, if they actually envisioned the kinds of scenarios 

contemplated in this study, it could put them on uncertain legal ground regarding 

risk disclosure and could result in a misperception on Wall Street that could 

negatively impact shareholders. 

Another problem voiced by the private sector is that it does not have a full 

understanding of the threat since it does not have access to the same level of 

 

18. Sector-specific plans appear to be programmatic plans to guide the DHS grant process vice operational 

plans for sectors. 

19. DHS grants legislatively are restricted to public entities. 

20. Comments by representatives of the defense industrial base sector. 
248 I PART IV, CHAPTER 16 

information DHS has. Intelligence flow, at an appropriate level, to the private 

sector is limited due to the more commonly held principle of “need to know” vice 

“need to share.” Therefore, business continuity plans are more often based upon 

a company’s own evaluation of risk, which may or may not be consistent with 

DHS’s assessment. A robust information flow from DHS and the responsible 

SSA would support effective deployment of limited private resources for business 

continuity and resiliency, and additional critical infrastructure protection that the 

government or military might require. Absent that, businesses are likely to limit 

security investment to the level judged prudent for business continuity. 

A related intelligence issue is the private sector’s view that even when DHS 

intentions are good, it does not always recognize when a sector has a “need to 

know” due to complex interdependencies with other sectors, unfamiliarity with 

sector operations, and co-location of infrastructures. As an example of this 

problem, DHS did not notify the railroad sector of the 2006 Iraq chlorine 

vehicle-borne IED incidents even though the industry has cleared personnel and 

a DOD-cleared facility.21 Although the attacks in Iraq involved chlorine trucks 

and not rail tank cars, detailed information about the Iraq attacks is very relevant 

because of the volume of chlorine transported by rail and because the railroad 

industry is in the process of designing the next-generation chlorine tank car. 

Perhaps the best example of this complex problem occurred in August 2004, 

when DHS raised the alert level to Orange for the financial services sector in 

New York City, Northern New Jersey, and Washington, D.C., and issued direct 

warnings to specific entities in those regions, including the Citigroup buildings in 

the New York City area; the New York Stock Exchange Building in New York 

City; the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Buildings in 

Washington D.C.; and the Prudential Insurance Company of America in Newark, 

New Jersey. DHS did not, however, issue warnings to the owner and manager of 

the Citicorp Center, Boston Properties. At that time, Citicorp did not own, 

manage, or even occupy a majority of the Citicorp Center. Nor did DHS issue 

warnings to owners and operators of other critical infrastructure located adjacent 

to or under these buildings. This left mass transit operators, water, gas pipeline, 

 

21. After a similar incident in 2007 was reported in the press, the industry sought more information by 

submitting a list of Industry Information Requirements to DHS. As of this writing, DHS has not fully 

answered the industry’s information requirements. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 249

telecommunications, and electric companies unaware of the potential danger to 

their operations.22

The assignment of sector subject matter experts to the DHS intelligence unit 

(Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center [HITRAC]) would go 

a long way toward closing the intelligence sharing and analysis gap. However, the 

clearance process and the DHS requirement for full-time vice part-time 

personnel are impediments to progress. 

In the late 1990s, many sectors established Information Sharing and Analysis 

Centers (ISAC) at the urging of the federal government.23 ISACs were tailored to 

the needs of the individual sectors. Some sectors received federal funding for 

their ISACs; other ISACs were self-funded. But DHS ended federal support for 

sector-established ISACs and established the Homeland Security Information 

Network (HSIN), a “one-size-fits-all” approach. The level of satisfaction with 

HSIN depends upon the constituencies of the SCCs. For example, where the 

previous ISAC was not well supported, HSIN is a step forward. However, where 

SCCs are safety and security standard-setting organizations for their industries, 

and where sectors are network industries, more robust information sharing 

within the sector is traditional and indeed required for safety (such as the 

emergency management and railroad sectors). HSIN does not measure up to 

their standards for timely and useful information. The panel questions whether a 

single system could ever meet the diverse needs of the many sectors it is 

attempting to support. 

Leadership for the National Team 

Response to national catastrophes requires close cooperation among leaders 

and their organizations, which, in turn, depends on leaders with a sound vision 

of the team operation and relationships with other team members. This concept 

is the homeland defense equivalent of “jointness” as practiced within the DOD. 

The federal government is in the unique position to unite the homeland team. 

Forming a truly joint homeland security and defense team starts with 

developing leaders with a joint perspective—both through education and 

career experiences—building an interagency cadre of leaders, whose 

 

22. “Public-Private Sector Intelligence Coordination,” National Infrastructure Advisory Council, July 11, 

2006. 

23. Pursuant to Presidential Decision Directive 63, Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructures. 
250 I PART IV, CHAPTER 16 

understanding of homeland defense transcends their immediate position. 

Carrying out homeland defense requires “joint operations” teamwork; leading such 

operations requires a truly joint leadership team. Homeland security and defense—

regardless of agency, level of government, or public or private sector—must be 

seen as a professional opportunity for those seeking to lead in this critical field. 

The DSB saw no such recognition of the need to develop homeland security 

leadership in the same manner as the nation has invested in developing national 

security leadership. The military and civil service education, training, and 

advancement processes for the latter could and should serve as a model for a 

parallel track for homeland security. 

Plans and Exercises 

There appear to be numerous doctrinal and operational plans, with 

embedded processes for review and revision of the plans. But processes to 

ensure that the plans are practiced and capabilities measured against 

readiness metrics are lacking. While there are many exercises (possibly too 

many), the exercises are highly scripted, unconnected to each other, and typically 

focus on a top-down approach (where the supporting organizations are “training 

aids” to the senior-level players) instead of bottom-up approach (focusing on an 

integrated and layered response beginning with the initial event). Even the 

national-level exercises have not been effective—more often broad than deep, 

where the real lessons get learned. They are often stopped before the more 

difficult issues of transfer of command, or employment of specialized assets, or 

unknowns (like public panic), come into play. Figure 4-8 is a compilation of the 

top two levels of national exercises planned for the next five years. Surprisingly, 

this chart represents the first time that all such exercises were captured in one 

place. The DSB, and the DHS program manager responsible, note the lack of 

connection and integration among them. 

More worrisome than the disjointed nature of the exercises is the lack of any 

process for effectively “learning from” the lessons of these exercises. While there 

are mechanisms for capturing observations and documenting problem areas 

identified during the exercises, there are no mechanisms to promulgate the 

lessons to the wider homeland security and homeland defense community, or to 

implement, track, and record corrective actions taken as a result of the lessons. 

DHS has recognized the problem and is standing up the “National Exercise 

Program” to put more discipline into their processes. But the discipline inherent 

in DOD is lacking in the homeland security community, so that promulgating 

lessons learned will be a much more difficult task. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 251

Figure 4-8. The Five Year National Exercise Schedule 

The gap extends to DOD, where relevant exercise programs do not appear 

to be effectively linked to national objectives. For example, the Joint Forces 

Command (JFCOM) Noble Resolve exercises, initiated in the current year, are an 

experimentation series designed to address homeland scenarios. These are not 

yet linked to DHS’ National Exercise Plan, nor do the JFCOM personnel 

involved seem aware of the official DHS scenarios or of existing tools and 

models already developed. The DSB was quite dismayed to learn that the 

maritime intercept scenario of Noble Resolve-1 was artificially limited to avoid 

interagency handoff or coordination issues. 

Northern Command’s Ardent Sentry exercise series is a move in the right 

direction to involve local and regional responders, but its objectives appear to be 

overly broad and shallow, in that there are too many players with disparate goals 
252 I PART IV, CHAPTER 16 

and exercise objectives. One reason appears to be that many of the players may 

be using the exercises as their primary means of training, rather than using the 

exercise as a “capstone” event to validate plans and training and to assess 

interactions with other participants. 

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency and DHS experience from exercises 

such as BioNet (military-civilian response to a bio attack in the San Diego region) 

and with U.S. Pacific Command (military-civilian response to a nuclear event on 

Oahu) provide numerous pointers for military-civilian combined operations 

associated with WMD events. A key lesson learned from these experiences is the 

importance of exercising mutual aid responsibilities anticipated in plans, 

including coordinated approaches to public information and interoperable 

communications for response elements. The exercises also highlight operational 

and technical shortfalls in planning for WMD consequence management and 

multiple, major events. However, it is not clear what impact these exercises have 

had beyond the participants themselves—in other words, these lessons have not 

informed the homeland security and homeland defense community at large. 

Stepping back, the DSB concluded that most of the exercise examples lacked 

realistic design and planning, interagency integration, and application of lessons 

learned. Exercises appeared in many instances to be a collection of activities 

artificially aggregated into an exercise construct. It is difficult to conduct a good 

exercise, whereby “good” means: (1) provides answers to questions established 

prior to the exercise and (2) effectively meets objectives for all participants. If the 

homeland defense community is ever to run meaningful and useful tests that give 

answers as to the value and shortcomings of U.S. homeland defense operations, 

six rules, derived from work on design of experiments, should be followed: 

 The exercise must have an objective. It must be designed to stress 

specific elements of the operations plan (in many homeland security and 

homeland defense cases, a unified operational plan) in ways that result in 

lessons that will improve the plan and participants’ actions. Exercises are 

learning (not training) opportunities. 

 There must be a model for the exercise. If the objective of the exercise 

is to test operations in response to a specific event, there must be a model 

for that response beforehand against which to evaluate the results of the 

exercise. This model may or may not be a computer model, but it should 

be easy enough to understand that anyone involved in, or reviewing, the 

exercise can clearly understand the exercise. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 253

 The exercise design should allow observation based on the model. If 

the exercise is designed to produce a given result, the result should be well 

understood, observable, and comparable to that from the model. 

 The data obtained by early observations should be such that they 

can be analyzed quickly so that the model, which is bound to be wrong 

in some respects, and the modeling methods can be changed prior to the 

next phase of the exercise. 

 Exercise design and execution must provide a comprehensive, objective, 

and accurate after-action reporting mechanism, coupled with a 

corrective action plan and a commitment to resource implementation 

by all parties. 

 Regardless of the importance of the exercise in providing answers related 

to new operations, the exercise should also provide teaming 

opportunities for the participants to work together with other members 

of the homeland security/defense team. 

Why Can’t We Learn? 

With the current preparedness system and exercise program, the involved 

agencies at all levels of government unfortunately end up training on real world 

events. The history of major disasters shows the same lessons observed, over and 

over again. The list invariably includes: 

 communications 

 leadership 

 logistics 

 planning 

 situational awareness 

 operations 

 resource management 

Learning from these lessons is much less evident. During each new event 

solutions found earlier are often re-invented. When asked about specific threats 

and exercises, a representative of the International Association of Fire Chiefs 

indicated little training to address enemy attacks on the homeland, but “I’m sure 

if it happens, we’ll find a way to get it done.” 
254 I PART IV, CHAPTER 16 

The Department of Homeland Security sponsored a workshop soon after 

Katrina to examine why the emergency response community finds it difficult to 

learn certain lessons. This workshop uncovered several barriers to learning and 

achieving change. These findings were echoed by many responders, homeland 

security professionals, and private sector representatives with whom the study 

met. In summary, they are:24 

 lack of motivation for change 

 ineffective review and reporting processes 

 unproductive learning and teaching 

 poorly planned and executed exercises 

 resource constraints 

Motivation for Change 

Several barriers to effective resolution of these issues exist. First and 

foremost is motivating the sustained energy required to achieve lasting change. 

Organizational change is extremely difficult, especially in the emergency response 

area. Memory is short-lived and the ability to garner the political will to make 

well-thought out and rational changes in the national response system is often 

short-changed due to other pressing matters such as failing schools, high fuel 

prices, and other economic calamities. Even when important lessons do result in 

calls for change, the disparate emergency response community at all levels of 

government lacks a shared vision of what to do about those lessons. 

Another barrier to sustaining motivation for change is the irregular nature of 

significant events. In general, the longer lasting effects of even very large events 

are confined to a relatively small geographic region. To improve response on a 

national level, agencies and organizations must be willing to learn from events 

even if they were not directly affected. This calls for organizations to think 

collectively and be willing to learn from each other. The attitude that “it won’t 

happen here or it won’t happen again” is pervasive. When asked after her 

Katrina experience in Louisiana “What can the federal government do to help 

you the next time such an event occurs?,” a local emergency response director 

replied, “Hold me accountable.” The need for effective leadership and 

 

24. A more detailed report can be found in Homeland Security Affairs, The Journal of the Naval Postgraduate 

School Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Volume II, Issue 2, July 2006. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 255

accountability at all levels of government is critical to motivate change and 

implement the necessary elements to sustain it. 

Review and Reporting Process 

The process of learning begins with identifying lessons. In the areas of 

emergency response, homeland security, and homeland defense, this is often 

achieved through after-action reports. Such reports could be of immense value 

to many emergency response agencies at all levels of government, but there is 

no universally accepted approach to the development or content of such 

reports. It is not uncommon for multiple reports to emerge from any given 

incident. These reports differ and often conflict because perspectives and 

experiences vary dramatically. 

Worse than conflicts and possible inaccuracies, concern about attribution 

and retribution often constrains an open and frank dialogue concerning lessons 

learned. Meaning is also confused by the lack of common terminology. Afteraction reports tend to focus on what went wrong with little to no attention on 

what went right. As a result, there is precious little documentation on good 

solutions and best practices or “near misses.” To achieve this kind of reporting 

requires an additional analytical step; those preparing the reports need to 

understand not only what happened, but also why it happened and what 

corrective action would have improved the circumstances. 

Given that such reports could be prepared, the next step is to assure effective 

distribution. Most dissemination is either tightly controlled or achieved through 

informal mechanisms. This is particularly true for state and local agencies that 

may not have access to controlled distributions and often do not have the 

necessary resources to establish their own repositories, such as the Center for 

Army Lessons Learned. 

Learning and Teaching 

There are many theories on organizational learning behaviors, and most 

agree on four essential phases, such as those described by Kolb in Figure 4-9. 
256 I PART IV, CHAPTER 16 

Figure 4-9. The Learning Cycle 

The scope of Kolb’s model applies to individuals and organizations who aim 

to learn from experience, which includes both working and training situations. 

There are four stages to the cycle: (1) active experience of some specific task and 

context; (2) reflective review to assess the significant events and relationships of 

that experience; (3) generalization of the lessons learned from the experience; 

and (4) prescription of how future activities will be modified given the lessons 

learned. These stages correspond with two dimensions: abstraction (from the 

concrete to the conceptual) and engagement (from active participation to 

reflection). The same dimensions underlie the “learning styles” inventory used to 

assess the individual approaches to problem solvers. Kolb’s model is particularly 

evident in techniques used to train collaborative decision-making—a key element 

of an effective unified incident command. 

In many cases, particularly in civilian emergency response, failure to learn is 

due, in part, to the lack of common and accessible systems to identify and 

disseminate lessons. Learning begins with analysis to identify the causal process 

that underlies the lesson. One workshop participant put it this way: “We don’t 

study lessons carefully enough and apply them in a serious way. We don’t drill down 

into the details of what changes are really required to address lessons.” This dilemma 

is intensified by the fact that civilian emergency response disciplines lack a common 

operating doctrine. Agencies often lack a systems view and will tend to consider 

individual incidents and/or particular lessons in isolation in much the same way as 

current exercise plans and objectives are developed in various stovepipes. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 257

After action reports often identify lessons and occasionally appropriate 

remedies, which can easily lead to a false sense of security that we have actually 

learned the lessons before they are properly included in a training program. 

Practice is often short-changed. In absence of an effective training program and 

opportunities to practice, change is not embedded in the system and often the 

same mistakes occur on the next exercise or incident. 

Planning and Executing Exercises 

One of the most important elements of the learning cycle is the inclusion of 

effective exercises to ensure that new behaviors are instilled in the organization. 

Unfortunately, the current process for design and execution of disaster exercises 

is woefully inadequate. Creating an exercise scenario that is believable, even for 

events that have a low probability of occurring but high consequence should an 

event transpire, is critical to engaging a level of play and experiential learning that 

will be long lasting. Lack of realism both with respect to scenarios and what can 

be expected of the response community exist at all levels of government. Often 

exercises are designed such that true complexities in actual response operations 

and incident management are never uncovered. Everything works nicely, no one 

makes mistakes, or if they do, it doesn’t really affect the outcome. Lastly, the fear 

of failure in our current exercise programs is a very real impediment to getting 

the right people to the table and the design of a realistic exercise environment. 

Often participants who have not been engaged in the planning, do not 

understand either the performance expectations or exercise objectives. As stated 

above, even in large “national-level” exercises many groups come together with 

their own exercise objectives, and while these groups play “in parallel,” they often 

do not integrate their exercise objectives into a single unified exercise scenario. 

The scenarios become unwieldy and result in exercises consisting of, for example, 

5000 players and 2000 exercise objectives (Ardent Sentry 2007). As a result, these 

exercises are grossly expensive and highly scripted and participants get “one shot” 

at their part and never get a chance to learn from their mistakes and try again. 

Resource Constraints 

Providing the necessary funding for sustaining corrective action and 

continued engagement, in a world of many distractions and competing priorities, 

is a challenge that must be overcome, especially in the large civilian response 

community critical to both homeland security and homeland defense missions. 

DOD has many resources that could support preparedness in the homeland 
258 I PART IV, CHAPTER 16 

security environment and enhance its effectiveness when the operational 

environment transitions from supporting civil authorities to homeland defense. 

Overcoming the fundamental challenges of long-term resource commitment and 

achieving the organizational discipline required to engage interagency, 

intergovernmental, and private sector communities will be necessary. The civilian 

emergency response community is very diverse, often fractured, and consists of a 

large volunteer force (especially in firefighting). Even when federal grant dollars 

are being spent, procurement decisions are often made at the local level, which 

makes adoption of a common operational doctrine, not to mention interoperable 

or incompatible equipment, a difficult task to achieve. 

Crisis Communications 

Communications is almost always at the top of the list of recurring issues. It 

can make or break a successful response. It starts with the basics of compatible 

equipment and language among response communities. There has been 

significant improvement across the United States in recent years, especially 

through the Urban Area Security Initiative and other DHS grant programs and 

through the efforts of DHS’s Office for Interoperability and Compatibility and 

its SAFECOM program. 

However, progress is inconsistent and slow, and seems to be hampered as 

much by the will to change as by resources. It extends to the public-private 

linkage, where both the pre-emptive and response actions by private sector 

owners of critical infrastructure can mitigate significant problems, yet they are 

more often than not kept in the dark or not allowed access. (This was an acute 

problem in recovery and restoration post-Katrina.) It also covers crisis 

communication to the public. Too often it is developed “real time” without 

benefit of factual vetting and without coordination, such that what is 

communicated to the public can be misleading or just outright wrong (e.g.,

anthrax attacks in 2001). The DSB came to believe that if there were only 

one thing that DHS and DOD ought to improve among the national 

team, it should be to develop a common doctrine and an enabling 

unified command with an interoperable, survivable communication 

infrastructure. 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 259

RECOMMENDATIONS: BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM 

As with other recommendations in this study, the recommendations related to 

building the national team focus on what DOD should do. Secretary of Defense 

leadership is needed in the interagency to address current deficiencies in national 

plans and strategies and support for domestic threat assessment. DOD must step 

up to its preparedness responsibilities in the broad set of communications issues. 

To address deficiencies in plans and communications, the Secretary of 

Defense should: 

 Promote the combination of the National Security Council/Homeland 

Security Council (NSC/HSC) to coordinate and integrate a national 

strategy and response for global asymmetric engagement. 

 Request a National Intelligence Estimate on the scope of the projected 

threat. 

- Direct the Office of Net Assessment to conduct a capabilities-based 

net assessment. 

 Request that DHS work with DOD to codify the transition from DOD 

support to DOD lead for a war at home. 

 Direct the Deputy Secretary to develop a comprehensive DOD 

communication system and public affairs strategy for homeland defense 

preparedness and crisis/consequence management. 

 Develop an equipment and concept of operations architecture compliant 

with the NIMS. 

 Ensure availability of DOD communication assets compatible with 

civilian responder community. 

 Work with DHS to develop messages, and coordinate and educate those 

who deliver them, appropriate to the full range of contingencies. 

The one game nature expected from future adversaries will demand seamless 

decision-making, starting with the White House, hence, the recommendation for 

a joint HSC/NSC strategy. The request for a national intelligence estimate will 

illuminate the shortfalls in intelligence and therefore allow a better focus of 

effort. Recognizing that intelligence will always be limited, the estimate should be 

complemented with a capabilities-based net assessment to enable the DOD 
260 I PART IV, CHAPTER 16 

community to plan and hedge in a reasonable and balanced manner. National 

policy is necessary to better understand when and how a transition from DHS to 

DOD response leadership would occur. And the critical nature of timely, 

accurate communications during a crisis requires considerable preparation—

something that DOD understands and knows how to do better than any other 

agency. Thus, DOD may be called upon to lead, given the diversity of 

capabilities, resources, and generally fractured nature of the civilian emergency 

response community. 

The Secretary of Defense should direct U.S. Northern Command to 

work with the National Exercise Program at DHS to design and 

execute more effective exercise programs that address: 

 unified management of national capabilities 

 communication and information sharing across public and private 

boundaries 

 regional planning and coordination 

 interoperable and response capability shortfalls 

 transition from DOD support to DOD lead scenarios 

In the layered approach to DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 

Support, one of the layers—“Enable”—directly focused on improving domestic 

capabilities through sharing DOD expertise and technology. The military is 

recognized for its unsurpassed training, exercise, and doctrinal programs. An 

integrated National Exercise Program should: 

 train and exercise to a common set of goals and objectives 

 build from the bottom up—including all relevant players 

- maximize value of involvement: make it worthwhile 

- exercise what is important at the strategic and policy level 

- exercise what is important in sufficient depth 

- provide unified management of national capabilities 

 follow through with effective corrective actions both in policy and practice 

 structure to identify interoperable and response capability shortfalls 
BUILDING THE NATIONAL TEAM I 261

 address transition from homeland security to homeland defense 

operations (transition from DOD support to DOD lead scenarios) 

 aggressive red teaming to identify interoperable and response capability 

shortfalls 

As a part of this recommendation, DOD could enable a National Emergency 

Response Lessons Learned Institute. DOD has capabilities and expertise that can 

enable analysis and dissemination of lessons learned. The national civilian 

emergency response infrastructure lacks sufficient discipline and consistency in 

critical capabilities necessary to manage large-scale or simultaneous incidents. 

One of the challenges in achieving such a capability is the promulgation of an 

unbiased, standardized, and readily accessible reporting system. Leveraging 

capabilities such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned, U.S. Training and 

Doctrine Command, and the Lessons Learned Information Sharing web site, this 

institute could be at the foundation of a new national doctrinal institute. 

Engaging such an activity will also enable DOD to better understand what 

resources it may be required to provide in defense of asymmetric attacks on the 

homeland. Furthermore, these lessons learned should drive continuous 

improvement of the national training and exercise programs. 

To support regional planning and coordination, FEMA and DLA, as an 

aspect of their memorandum of understanding and in collaboration with state 

homeland SCCs, should jointly plan for and deploy pre-positioned materials in 

support of emergency response operations. These cached materials should be 

tailored to regional needs and could be coordinated with local private sector 

suppliers. These caches should include emergency communications equipment, 

specialized protective equipment, and medical supplies that may be needed for 

WMD events; they should also take into consideration the current capabilities 

and threat environment (including natural disasters) of the region they are 

intended to support. For example, regions subject to flooding events, will likely 

expect federal government support for water rescue. 

Other potential ideas could include FEMA working with other federal 

agencies, including DOD, to provide for more flexible and streamlined 

procurement and legal guidelines to obtain needed resources in real time, and 

standardizing credentialing capability for access of critical personnel to disaster 

areas. Delegation of authority in acquisition matters should be at the lowest level 

possible. DOD might also advocate for a one-stop shopping mechanism like 

GSA to enable and encourage state and local governments to work together for 

the purpose of making “bulk” purchases. This kind of arrangement will likely 
262 I PART IV, CHAPTER 16 

provide a powerful incentive for state and local regions to maintain interoperable 

and compatible equipment and concepts of operations. 

ASD (HD&ASA) should take the initiative to help establish a 

strategically-managed, interagency homeland defense/homeland security 

leader development program with the following attributes: 

 graduate-level, senior service DHS-sponsored “war” college developed in 

conjunction with the National Defense University 

 an Executive Exchange Program modeled on the President’s Executive 

Exchange Program 

 recognition as credit equivalent to senior service schools and for 

promotion to flag officer rank and the senior executive service in DOD 

 training expanded to state and local levels, and the private sector 

One of the most significant conclusions of this study is the realization 

that DOD’s success in prosecuting future wars against capable adversaries 

will likely depend on the success of other agencies of the government—at 

all levels—and on the private sector to succeed at their missions in the 

face of attacks on the homeland. As such, DOD must take much more 

seriously its own strategy statements that “failure (in the homeland) is not 

an option.” 

Success will require the department to step up to a much more active role in 

the interagency arena, to engage the local and regional communities on which 

they depend at home more consistently and deeply, and to carefully examine its 

own mission critical needs and ensure their availability in times of attack. Lots of 

homework and relationship-building outside the historic mainstream of DOD 

activities will be required. As with all new things, the ability to attract good 

people to this critical work must come with the incentives for career progression 

and recognition. 

While many of these activities are difficult to contemplate in the current and 

near future environment of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring 

Freedom, and the major recapitalization bills these campaigns will demand, a 

number of these activities require relatively inexpensive efforts in planning, 

training, and exercising. The key ingredient will be leadership commitment 

to chart and sustain the path.
RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND DIRECTIVES I 263

Appendix IV-A. Relevant Legislation and 

Directives for DOD in Homeland Security 

and Defense 

There are numerous legislative and executive directives defining DOD’s roles 

and responsibilities with regard to homeland defense and support to civil 

authorities. 

Article II of Constitution 

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution specifies that “the President shall be 

commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the 

militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United 

States.” In this role as Commander in Chief, he is authorized to utilize both the 

active duty military as well as the National Guard (militia) in support of the 

national defense. 

Stafford Act 

This act provides statutory authority for employing the U.S. armed forces for 

domestic disaster relief. Permitted operations include debris removal and road 

clearances; search and rescue; emergency medical care and shelter; provision of 

food, water, and other essential needs; dissemination of public information and 

assistance regarding health and safety measures; and the provision of technical 

advice to state and local governments on disaster management and control. The 

Stafford Act does not authorize the use of Federal military forces to maintain law 

and order. 

DOD doctrine (DOD 3025) allows commanders to provide resources and 

assistance to civil authorities without, or prior to, declaration under the Stafford 

Act when a disaster overwhelms the capabilities of local authorities and 

necessitates immediate action “to prevent human suffering, save lives, or mitigate 

great property damage.” 
264 I PART IV, APPENDIX IV-A 

Posse Comitatus Act 

The Constitution does not expressly bar the use of military forces in civilian 

situations or in matters of law enforcement, but the United States has traditionally 

refrained from employing troops to enforce the law except in cases of necessity. 

Congress has provided for a number of statutory exceptions to the Posse 

Comitatus Act explicitly by vesting law enforcement authority directly in a military 

branch, or indirectly by authorizing the President or another government official 

to call for assistance in enforcing certain laws. 

Homeland Security Directive #5. Management of 

Domestic Incidents 

The heads of federal departments and agencies shall adopt the National 

Incident Management System (NIMS) within their departments and agencies, 

and shall provide support and assistance to the Secretary of Homeland Security 

in the development and maintenance of the NIMS. All Federal departments and 

agencies will use the NIMS in their domestic incident management and 

emergency prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation 

activities, as well as those actions taken in support of state or local entities. The 

heads of Federal departments and agencies shall participate in the National 

Response Plan (NRP), shall assist and support the Secretary of Homeland 

Security in the development and maintenance of the NRP, and shall participate 

in and use domestic incident reporting systems and protocols established by the 

Secretary. 

The Secretary of Defense shall provide military support to civil authorities for 

domestic incidents as directed by the President or when consistent with military 

readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the law. The Secretary of 

Defense shall retain command of military forces providing civil support. The 

Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish 

appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination 

between their two departments. 

Homeland Security Directive #8. National 

Preparedness 

The Department of Defense will provide to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security information describing the organizations and functions within the 
RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND DIRECTIVES I 265

Department of Defense that may be utilized to provide support to civil authorities 

during a domestic crisis. 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive #7. Critical 

Infrastructure, Identification, Prioritization & 

Protection; Department of Defense Directive 

3020.40, August 2005 

DOD is the sector-specific agency for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). The 

term “sector-specific agency” means a Federal department or agency responsible 

for infrastructure protection activities in a designated critical infrastructure sector 

or key resource category. 

Federal departments and agencies will identify, prioritize, and coordinate the 

protection of critical infrastructure and key resources in order to prevent, deter, 

and mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit 

them. Federal departments and agencies will work with state and local 

governments and the private sector to accomplish this objective. 

Federal departments and agencies will ensure that homeland security 

programs do not diminish the overall economic security of the United States. 

 Federal departments and agencies will appropriately protect information 

associated with carrying out this directive, including handling voluntarily provided 

information and information that would facilitate terrorist targeting of critical 

infrastructure and key resources consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 

2002 and other applicable legal authorities. 

Federal departments and agencies shall implement this directive in a manner 

consistent with applicable provisions of law, including those protecting the rights 

of United States persons. 

NSPD 51, HSPD 20, National Continuity Policy 

The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, shall provide secure, integrated, continuity of government 

communications to the President, the Vice President, and, at a minimum, 

Category I executive departments and agencies. 
266 I PART IV, APPENDIX IV-A 

Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order (aka 

“The Insurrection Act”) 

Congress has delegated authority to the President to call for the military 

during an insurrection or civil disturbance (10 U.S.C. 331-335). The Insurrection 

Act has been used to send the armed forces to quell civil disturbances a number 

of times during U.S. history, most recently during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. 

The 109th Congress included in the Defense authorization bill for FY2007 a 

provision that is intended to explicitly cover instances of “domestic violence” 

where public order is disrupted due to a national disaster, epidemic or other 

serious public health emergency, terrorist attack, or incident. This revision of 10 

U.S.C. 333 authorizes the President to employ Federal troops to “restore public 

order and enforce the laws of the United States without a request from the 

governor or legislature of the state involved, when he/she determines that local 

authorities are unable to maintain public order.” 

Military Support for Law Enforcement Agencies 

Congress has also authorized the armed forces to share information and 

equipment with civilian law enforcement agencies, although it has prohibited the 

use of armed forces personnel to make arrests or conduct search and seizures. 

DODD 5525.5 Cooperation with Civilian Law 

Enforcement Officials 

This directive defines DOD’s responsibilities to cooperate with civilian law 

enforcement officials consistent with the needs of national security and military 

preparedness. This directive applies to OSD, the military departments, the 

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), the unified and specified 

commands, and the defense agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as DOD 

components). The term “military service,” as used herein, refers to the Army, 

Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. 

Responsibilities enumerated in this directive include, but are not limited to: 

 Coordinate with civilian law enforcement agencies on long-range policies 

to further DOD cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials. 
RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND DIRECTIVES I 267

 Provide information to civilian agencies and the National Narcotics Border 

Interdiction System (NNBIS) to facilitate access to DOD resources. 

 Coordinate with the Department of Justice, the Department of 

Transportation (U.S. Coast Guard), and the Department of the Treasury 

(U.S. Customs Service) and represent DOD on interagency organizations 

regarding matters involving the interdiction of the flow of illegal drugs 

into the United States. 

 Review training and operational programs to determine how and where 

assistance can best be provided to civilian law enforcement officials. 

 Implement procedures for prompt transfer of relevant information to 

law enforcement agencies. 

 Implement procedures for establishing local contact points in 

subordinate commands for purposes of coordination with Federal, state, 

and local civilian law enforcement officials. 

DODD 3025 Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances 

This directive provides for DOD officials to take emergency action without 

prior authorization in cases where: “sudden and unexpected civil disturbances 

(including civil disturbances incident to earthquake, fire, flood, or other such 

calamity endangering lives) occur, if duly constituted local authorities are unable 

to control the situation and circumstances preclude obtaining prior authorization 

by the President.” 
268 I PART IV, APPENDIX IV-B 

Appendix IV-B. Selected Excerpts from the 

“Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 

Support,” June 2005 

The Department of Defense must change its conceptual approach to 

homeland defense. The Department can no longer think in terms of the “home” 

game and the “away” game. There is only one game. The Strategy for Homeland 

Defense and Civil Support is a significant step toward this strategic transformation. 

Defending the U.S. homeland—our people, property, and freedom—is our most 

fundamental duty. Failure is not an option. 

Key Definitions 

Homeland security, as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland 

Security, is “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the 

United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the 

damage and recover from attacks that do occur.” The Department of Homeland 

Security is the lead Federal agency for homeland security. In addition, its 

responsibilities extend beyond terrorism to preventing, preparing for, responding 

to, and recovering from a wide range of major domestic disasters and other 

emergencies. It is the primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security to 

prevent terrorist attacks within the United States. The Attorney General leads our 

nation’s law enforcement effort to detect, prevent, and investigate terrorist activity 

within the United States. Accordingly, the Department of Defense does not have 

the assigned responsibility to stop terrorists from coming across our borders, to 

stop terrorists from coming through U.S. ports, or to stop terrorists from hijacking 

aircraft inside or outside the United States (these responsibilities belong to the 

Department of Homeland Security). Nor does DOD have the authority to seek 

out and arrest terrorists in the United States (these responsibilities belong to the 

Department of Justice). 

Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic 

population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and 
SELECTED EXCERPTS I 269

aggression, or other threats as directed by the President.25 The Department of 

Defense is responsible for homeland defense. 

DOD Activities, Objectives, and Core Capabilities 

Lead Achieve Maximum Awareness of Threats 

 Maintain agile and capable defense intelligence architecture 

 Analyze and understand potential threats 

 Detect, identify, and track emerging threats in all operational domains 

 Ensure shared situational awareness within DOD and with domestic and foreign partners 

Deter, Intercept, and Defeat Threats at a Safe Distance 

 Deter adversaries from attacking the U.S. homeland 

 Intercept and defeat national security threats in the maritime and air approaches and 

within U.S. territory 

Achieve Mission Assurance 

 Ensure force protection, to include DOD installations, especially against the threat of 

CBRNE attacks 

 Prepare and protect defense critical infrastructure 

 Ensure preparedness of the Defense Industrial Base 

 Prepare to protect designated national critical infrastructure 

 Ensure DOD crisis management and continuity preparedness

Support Support Consequence Management for CBRNE Mass Casualty Attacks 

 Manage consequences of CBRNE mass casualty attacks 

Enable Improve National and International Capabilities for Homeland Defense and Homeland 

Security 

 Effective interagency planning and interoperability 

 Improved Federal, state, and local partnership capacity and effective domestic 

relationships 

 Improved international partnership capacity and effective defense-to-defense relationships 

Defense support of civil authorities, often referred to as civil support, is 

DOD support, including Federal military forces, the Department’s career civilian 

and contractor personnel, and DOD agency and component assets, for domestic 

emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities. The 

 

25. Homeland defense includes missions such as domestic air defense. The Department recognizes that 

threats planned or inspired by “external” actors may materialize internally. The reference to “external 

threats” does not limit where or how attacks could be planned and executed. The Department is prepared 

to conduct homeland defense missions whenever the President, exercising his constitutional authority as 

Commander in Chief, authorizes military actions. 
270 I PART IV, APPENDIX IV-B 

Department of Defense provides defense support of civil authorities when 

directed to do so by the President or Secretary of Defense. 

Defense Critical Infrastructure 

Related to its force protection responsibilities for DOD facilities, the 

Department of Defense has the responsibility to assure it has access to defensecritical infrastructure. This is defined as DOD and non-DOD cyber and physical 

assets and associated infrastructure essential to project and support military 

forces worldwide. When these infrastructures are located on Department of 

Defense installations, their protection is the responsibility of the installation 

commander or facility manager. In some instances, however, critical defense 

assets are located at public or private sites beyond the direct control of DOD. In 

either case, the protection of designated defense critical infrastructure must be 

assured on a priority basis. 

In some scenarios, assurance of non-DOD infrastructures might involve 

protection activities, in close coordination with other Federal, state, local, tribal, 

or private sector partners. This could include elements of the Defense Industrial 

Base, which is a worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to perform 

research and development and design, produce, and maintain military weapons 

systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet military requirements. These 

defense-related products and services are essential to mobilize, deploy, and 

sustain military operations. Moreover, defense critical infrastructure could also 

include selected civil and commercial infrastructures that provide the power, 

communications, transportation, and other utilities that military forces and DOD 

support organizations rely on to meet their operational needs. 

In addition, the President or the Secretary of Defense might direct U.S. 

military forces to protect non-DOD assets of national significance that are so 

vital to the nation that their incapacitation could have a debilitating effect on the 

security of the United States. 

Core Capability: Preparedness and protection of defense 

critical infrastructure 

Because resources are constrained, it is not possible to provide uniform 

protection of all defense-critical infrastructure. The Department must prioritize 

the protection of assets based on their criticality to executing the National 

Defense Strategy and seek to minimize the vulnerability of critical assets in 
SELECTED EXCERPTS I 271

accordance with an integrated risk management approach. To this end, the 

Department will devise a strategy to: 

 identify infrastructure critical to the accomplishment of DOD missions, 

based on a mission area analysis 

 assess the potential effect of a loss or degradation of critical 

infrastructure on DOD operations to determine specific vulnerabilities, 

especially from terrorist attack 

 manage the risk of loss, degradation, or disruption of critical assets 

through remediation or mitigation efforts, such as changes in tactics, 

techniques, and procedures; minimizing single points of service; and 

creating appropriate redundancies, where feasible 

 protect infrastructure at the direction of the President or the Secretary of 

Defense where the nature of the threat exceeds the capabilities of an 

asset owner and civilian law enforcement is insufficient 

 enable real-time incident management operations by integrating current 

threat data and relevant critical infrastructure requirements 

The military departments, defense agencies, and other DOD components are 

now implementing the Protective Risk Management Strategy through 

modifications to their programs and budgets. 

Core Capability: Preparedness of the Defense Industrial Base 

The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key 

Assets (2003) notes that, without the important contributions of the private 

sector, DOD cannot effectively execute core defense missions. Private industry 

manufactures and provides the majority of the equipment, materials, services, 

and weapons for the U.S. armed forces. The President recently designated DOD 

as the sector-specific agency for the DIB. In this role, DOD is responsible for 

national infrastructure protection activities for critical defense industries, as set 

forth in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7. 

To assure that mission-critical supplies and services are available, DOD 

contracts are being modified to ensure that protective measures are in place at 

key facilities and that DOD can assess the security of the DIB. In addition, the 

DLA and other DOD contracting activities are revising the contract process to 

ensure that civilian defense contractors are able to operate for the duration of a 

national emergency. Defense contractors must be able to maintain adequate 
272 I PART IV, APPENDIX IV-B 

response times, ensure supply and labor availability, and provide direct logistic 

support in times of crisis. DOD program managers will be held accountable for 

ensuring the protection of supporting infrastructure, including key suppliers. 

DOD base and installation commanders, and those who contract for non-DOD 

infrastructure services and assets, will monitor assurance activities through 

compliance with contract language that clearly identifies reliable service 

availability, priority of restoration, and asset protection. 

Core Capability: Preparedness to protect designated national 

critical infrastructure 

The Department has historically focused on preventing unauthorized 

personnel from gaining access to DOD installations and protecting those 

installations from traditional military attacks. In the post-September 11, 2001 era, 

DOD is expanding the traditional concept of critical asset protection to include 

protection from acts of trans-national terrorism. Countering terrorist 

reconnaissance activity is central to the successful defense of critical infrastructure. 

As outlined in the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 

Infrastructures and Key Assets (2003), DOD bears responsibility for protecting its 

own assets, infrastructure, and personnel. At the Department’s request, domestic 

law enforcement may protect DOD facilities. For non-DOD infrastructure, 

including private and public assets that are critical to the execution of the 

National Defense Strategy, DOD’s protection role is more limited. The initial 

responsibility for protection of non-DOD infrastructure rests with asset owners. 

Civilian law enforcement authorities augment and reinforce the efforts of asset 

owners, creating a second tier of protection. 

Should protection requirements exceed the capabilities of asset owners and 

civilian law enforcement, state authorities provide an additional layer of defense. 

In addition to a governor’s authority to employ National Guard forces in a state 

active duty status, recent changes to Title 32 of the U.S. Code may provide an 

additional, expeditious means to use National Guard forces under the control of 

the governor, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, using Federal 

funding to perform homeland defense activities. To achieve critical infrastructure 

protection in the most serious situations, the Department of Defense maintains 

trained and ready combat forces for homeland defense missions. 
Part V 

What We Know and Don’t Know about 

Adversary Capabilities: Intelligence 

WHAT WE KNOW AND DON’T KNOW I 275

Chapter 17. What We Know and Don’t Know 

This chapter offers an assessment of the Intelligence Community’s posture 

regarding strategic topics associated with future stressing wars—threats such as 

those posed by weapons of mass destruction, cyber warfare, and other 

asymmetric threats or innovative concepts of operations that could be employed 

by an adversary.78 Rather than focus solely on what the community knows, this 

study delved into the question of what the nation “doesn’t know” in the context 

of future conflict. This latter question departs from typical assessments of this 

type and led us to consider how the community can better position itself to gain 

knowledge in important areas that go unaddressed today. 

We conducted our assessment in three ways: 

1. First, we conducted extensive discussions with many intelligence 

collection, analysis, and user organizations regarding their subjective 

evaluation of detailed aspects of Intelligence Community’s knowledge of 

adversary threats in the following areas: strategic nuclear, chemical, 

radiological, directed energy, electro-magnetic pulse, biological, cyber, 

and high-leverage kinetic. These threats are referred to in this discussion 

as asymmetric threats. 

2. Second, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessed the 

community’s knowledge of a specific set of countries and strategic threats 

tailored to the study’s areas of emphasis. 

3. Third, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) in the Department of 

Defense approved the use of an intelligence tool known as Intellipedia to 

conduct a community-wide “deep dive” into the state of knowledge of 

specific nuclear-essential elements of information associated with an 

Indo-Pakistan war scenario. This deep dive was formally assessed by the 

National Intelligence Council, which provided classified results related to 

the Intelligence Community posture in this area. 

 

78. The Intelligence Community, established by executive order in 1981, comprises 16 organizations 

throughout the federal government’s executive branch that play a role in the business of national 

intelligence: Central Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; National Reconnaissance Office; 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; Bureau of Intelligence and 

Research (Department of State); Federal Bureau of Investigation; the intelligence organizations of the four 

military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps); Department of Homeland Security; U.S. 

Coast Guard; Energy Department; Department of the Treasury; and Drug Enforcement Administration. 
276 I PART V CHAPTER 17 

Collectively, these three forms of assessment produced consistent 

conclusions about the current posture in the community. 

Given an understanding of the Intelligence Community’s “know/don’t 

know” posture related to future stressing wars, this study then developed ideas of 

how the community can close the identified intelligence gaps. The forthcoming 

recommendations focus on improving foreign intelligence collection, analysis, 

and customer support activities; assessing counter-intelligence issues associated 

with future stressing wars; and developing better domestic intelligence associated 

with the foreign-inspired threats to the U.S homeland. The conclusions of this 

assessment also point to options for retiring intelligence gaps at the edges of war, 

lead to recommendations related to issues associated with applying net 

assessment and gaming to deal with intelligence uncertainties, and address 

methods for improving intelligence support and interaction with the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) on threats related to weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD). 

Know/Don’t Know Posture 

While much of the assessment of the community’s know/don’t know 

posture is classified, this study does concur with the sentiments of the 2005 

WMD Commission, which asserted that “strategic issues” such as these should 

command top level focus in the Intelligence Community and, further, that the 

community should devote some of its best collection, analysis, and customer 

interactions to these topics.79 Yet, two years later, it is still not clear that the 

community has internalized these observations, nor taken deliberate steps in the 

areas of collection, analysis, and customer support efforts to devote the 

necessary resources to strategic threats. 

 

79. Final Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, March 2005. 
WHAT WE KNOW AND DON’T KNOW I 277

RECOMMENDATION: KNOW/DON’T KNOW POSTURE

To better position itself to close strategic information gaps, the 

intelligence community should create a set of X-treme intelligence teams. 

The key issue here is to “organize for a high probability of success.” Small, 

agile, multi-disciplinary teams should be formed from the best talent available in 

collection operations and would be supported by analysis, technology, security, 

and high levels of customer involvement. The teams would focus on strategic 

essential elements of information related to important strategic threats. These 

integrated Intelligence Community teams would be applied against a narrow 

range of the nation’s most strategic and pressing intelligence and customer needs, 

operate beyond “mission managers” that currently exist within the Intelligence 

Community, and work closely with community assets to focus on the assigned 

threat. While the teams would start as prototypes to prove the concept, their 

approach is intended to change the nature of the intelligence game by pushing to 

higher and more successful levels of performance.80

As with X-treme sports, the team members will be hand-selected for their 

proven abilities, potential for extraordinary performance against difficult odds, 

and for thinking and actions outside the box. The team leadership, dynamics 

between and among the team players, their ability to know and extract support 

from the existing Intelligence Community, and their technical and operational 

skills would be unsurpassed. Team size and structure is to be determined, but it 

could be comprised of both full-time and part-time consulting personnel. 

Countering Foreign Intelligence Threats to U.S. 

Military Operations 

Foreign intelligence operations against the United States are now more diffuse, 

more aggressive, more technologically sophisticated, and potentially more 

successful than ever before. In particular, the use of human intelligence operations 

by weaker powers to achieve advantage is a classic “asymmetric strategy,” which 

increasingly will challenge future U.S. military operations as adversaries learn from 

 

80. The classified version of this report includes detailed description of the differentiated attributes of 

X-treme teams. 
278 I PART V CHAPTER 17 

past successes. As the counterintelligence community learned in the lead up to 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, strategic operational planning to degrade foreign 

intelligence capabilities has long lead times to identify collection gaps and strategies 

to fill them, assess vulnerabilities, develop targets, exploit opportunities, and 

execute operations to degrade or neutralize enemy capabilities. 

Given DOD’s global responsibilities, activities to identify, assess, and defeat 

foreign intelligence activities are an ongoing defense mission, spanning peacetime 

to wartime. Despite this compelling requirement, the Secretary of Defense does 

not have central command over the forces assigned to countering foreign 

intelligence threats. Nor is there a full-time commander focused on defeating the 

foreign intelligence threats to DOD’s personnel, operations, installations, and 

information. While service counterintelligence components provide support to 

the individual combatant commands to counter foreign intelligence operations 

within their respective areas of responsibility, the command structure is ill-suited 

to undertake global operations against an adversary intelligence service, which in 

the context of future stressing wars will have operational presence beyond the 

immediate theater (including within the United States). 

To fix this serious problem, the Secretary of Defense should establish a new 

joint operational component within DOD, drawn from the service 

counterintelligence components and CIFA, with the standing mission of 

degrading foreign intelligence capabilities. This new command would enable a 

robust planning function focused on defeating foreign intelligence threats, and 

serve as the beginning of a “purple” defense counterintelligence service. It would 

also be responsible for developing doctrine to guide who does what globally 

against foreign intelligence targets (a key missing ingredient in the defense 

counterintelligence posture), for assigning resources, and for directing and 

executing operations to achieve strategic objectives. 

Finally, establishing a new joint operational counterintelligence component 

would galvanize intelligence community support for the defense 

counterintelligence effort, and provide the nucleus for a serious national level 

strategic capability. The new command would provide a single focal point 

interface with the counterintelligence support element within the National 

Clandestine Service, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 

other community resources. If DOD can deliver an integrated force capable of 

degrading foreign intelligence targets as part of a strategic campaign, the other 

departments and agencies with counterintelligence resources can—and likely 

will—fall in line. 
WHAT WE KNOW AND DON’T KNOW I 279

Today, defense counterintelligence is a collection of disaggregated and servicedriven operational programs, each with distinct doctrinal and organizational bases 

that are grounded in history and differences in service missions. This circumstance 

was true back in the late 1960s when DIA was first constituted (and was assigned 

the foreign intelligence part of the counterintelligence mission) and despite 

significant changes remains true today. The Army aligns its counterintelligence 

function with those of human and signals intelligence under the Assistant Chief of 

Staff for Intelligence; its counterintelligence officers have no criminal jurisdiction. 

The Air Force and the Navy, on the other hand, keep counterintelligence separate 

from their intelligence functions and combine its duties with criminal investigation. 

The Air Force component (the Office of Special Investigations) reports to the Air 

Force Inspector General, while the Navy Criminal Investigative Service is a 

separate command within the Department of the Navy. The 650th Military Group, 

NATO, is yet another separate operational unit. 

 CIFA was created in part to compensate for this disunity of command, to 

supply strategic direction, and to integrate defense counterintelligence programs. 

But simply imposing an organizational cover on a disjointed architecture doesn’t 

make it joint. Defense counterintelligence needs a genuine Goldwater-Nichols 

transformation to bring strategic direction and command coherence to countering 

foreign intelligence threats to future military operations. 

Summary of Findings 

 DOD’s personnel, operations, installations, and information are principal 

targets of foreign hostile intelligence. 

 The job of defeating adversary intelligence capabilities directed against 

U.S. military operations is a key DOD mission. 

 Despite this compelling requirement, the Secretary of Defense does not 

have unity of command with respect to the counterintelligence forces 

that are assigned to identify, assess, and defeat these threats. 

 Operational intelligence on foreign intelligence activities is poor. 

 Military service counterintelligence components provide support to 

individual combatant commanders, but the command structure is ill-suited 

to undertake global operations against an adversary intelligence service. 
280 I PART V CHAPTER 17 

RECOMMENDATION: FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREATS

The Secretary of Defense should establish a joint operational 

component within DOD with the standing mission of detecting and 

degrading foreign intelligence capabilities that threaten U.S. military 

operations while retaining the focus of the service counterintelligence 

organizations. 

Intelligence on Foreign-Inspired Domestic Threats 

Foreign-inspired domestic threats to DOD forces, operations, resources, and 

critical assets within the United States remain largely unknown to U.S. 

intelligence and, therefore, present high order challenges to U.S. military 

operations in future engagements. 

Dating from the Cold War, DOD has broad experience in mission-critical 

asset identification and protection, and has developed and employed dynamic 

tools for assessing installation infrastructure dependencies and vulnerabilities 

both inside and outside the fence. While implementation has been uneven, 

current defense guidance clearly assigns responsibility for anti-terrorism/force 

protection and for defense critical infrastructure protection, including policy lead, 

support duties, and command execution responsibilities for mission-critical 

infrastructure protection. It is a difficult (but manageable) analytic problem to 

identify mission-critical dependencies and vulnerabilities; it is quite another (and 

more difficult) problem to identify adversary plans, intentions, and capabilities to 

disrupt or deny these critical assets in order to enable measures to protect them. 

As the National Intelligence Estimate on Terrorist Threats to the U.S. 

Homeland, released July 17, 2007, warned, “The ability to detect broader and 

more diverse terrorist plotting ... will challenge current U.S defensive efforts and 

the tools we use to detect and disrupt plots. It will also require greater 

understanding of how suspect activities at the local level relate to strategic threat 

information and how best to identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst 

of legitimate interactions.” 

 When one extrapolates from this warning (which concerns the highest 

priority intelligence target receiving the most intense national intelligence effort) 

to the even less well-understood threats to the U.S. homeland presented by peer 

and near-peer actors, the implications are profound and urgent. The nation 
WHAT WE KNOW AND DON’T KNOW I 281

simply does not have the intelligence it needs to protect mission-critical DOD 

activities at home. Moreover, DOD’s requirements for intelligence support at 

home have not been well-defined. This deficiency may be due in part to low 

expectations for having those intelligence support requirements met, but is likely 

also due to competing DOD priorities for intelligence support. 

 The panel discussed, without coming to resolution, the debilitating 

shortcomings inherent in current national processes and capabilities dedicated to 

identifying and assessing foreign-inspired domestic threats. Insights into foreign 

presence and operations within the United States—spanning aggressive foreign 

intelligence collection operations, activities that might constitute “battlefield 

preparation” for hostile action within the continental United States, and foreign 

terrorist activities—are outside the traditional lanes of U.S. intelligence, which 

historically have been directed (and in important ways confined) to a foreign 

focus, outside the continental United States. 

 Legislative history behind the new DNI structure, including the work of the 

9/11 Commission and the WMD Commission, suggests that the Office of the 

DNI was created in large measure to better connect foreign and domestic 

intelligence. Yet the weaknesses in capability persist. Intelligence on foreigninspired domestic threats must be derived in part from contributions of 

independent law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local levels, which 

lack the training or established processes needed to function as intelligence 

producers, or the structural discipline or experience to function as a community. 

There is also some measure of trial and error in bringing intelligence tools and 

techniques into the domestic arena, as ongoing public debate weighs civil liberties 

concerns against public safety and national security needs. These concerns extend 

to DOD force protection activities at home, as recent experience with the 

Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA)/Talon database attests. 

 One promising note is the work of the New York Police Department 

(NYPD), which (consistent with the rule of law) has adopted seasoned 

intelligence collection and analysis practices and exported them to the streets of 

New York. As a recent example, Transit Police on the Number 7 train in New 

York observed two men videotaping infrastructure. Most of the video was of 

tourist interest, but two minutes of the tape included imagery of train track. The 

cameramen were later found to be working for Iranian intelligence. The NYPD 

turned the individuals over to the FBI and they were deported 10 days later. 

NYPD’s success in such work derives in large measure from having hired a 

deputy police commissioner who is a retired senior CIA intelligence officer. New 
282 I PART V CHAPTER 17 

Yorkers also have the painful history of September 11, 2001 as compelling 

motivation to work locally to ensure the security of the city and to contribute to 

overall national-level understanding of the threat. 

The current and projected lack of intelligence on foreign-inspired domestic 

threats has three immediate implications for DOD. First, understand that 

intelligence on foreign-inspired domestic threats is poor and plan accordingly. 

Planners will need to take threat uncertainty into account, underscoring the 

renewed importance of national security emergency preparedness plans and 

programs to ensure enduring essential capabilities through prioritized planning 

for redundancy, reconstitution, and recovery. 

Second, clearly articulate and prioritize intelligence support requirements at 

home, and reinvigorate DOD’s intelligence, counterintelligence, and security 

programs to help meet them. The defense guidance (DODD 3929.40 August 19 

2005) charges the USD(I) with responsibility for establishing policy to provide 

intelligence, counterintelligence, and security support to the Defense Critical 

Infrastructure Program (DCIP), including establishing intelligence collection 

policy for DCIP efforts, establishing policy for sharing and maintaining DCIPrelated threat assessments, and validating DCIP intelligence collection priorities. 

The USD(I) should take the lead in validating and prioritizing intelligence 

requirements for DOD’s three complementary responsibilities of force 

projection, defense of the homeland, and support to homeland security across 

the spectrum of civil support needs, and for the range of national security and 

emergency preparedness activities (including warning intelligence and situational 

awareness) necessary for their success. 

These activities are broader than force protection, or base protection alone, 

and include people and functions on and off base, as well as privately owned 

elements that are often more vulnerable than a base itself. The analytic 

methodology employed for national security and emergency preparedness should 

yield a taxonomy of prioritized intelligence requirements that DOD should present 

to the DNI. This analytic work should also inform U.S. Northern Command’s 

intelligence campaign plan and metrics for homeland defense contingencies. 

DOD’s role and focus to address improved collection and analysis of foreigninspired domestic threats needs to be expanded, which falls to the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security to execute. While the 

new joint operational counterintelligence component discussed elsewhere in this 

report has global responsibilities, its establishment and work product should also 
WHAT WE KNOW AND DON’T KNOW I 283

prove an invaluable resource to DOD and nationally for the positive intelligence 

and operational options it may supply for identifying, assessing, and defeating 

foreign intelligence operations within the United States. 

Finally, help develop local “intelligence” capabilities in prioritized areas. Unlike 

politics, it is manifestly untrue that “all intelligence is local.” Instead, some 

intelligence is local. Indeed, the whole thrust of the intelligence critique presented 

herein is the need for strategic intelligence assessments. National-level intelligence 

is critical to DOD’s ability to execute its mission in future stressing wars; but 

national security emergency preparedness, antiterrorism, and force protection 

programs are also dependent on local insights. As an additional layer of protection, 

DOD should prioritize its need for the kind of local threat data best collected and 

analyzed locally, and identify localities where adopting the NYPD model described 

above would likely be of particular value to DOD’s mission. 

Summary of Findings 

 Among the most stressing challenges to U.S. military operations are 

threats to homeland-based forces, operations, resources, and assets. 

 DOD is responsible for force protection (and dependent on critical 

defense infrastructure including industrial base) but does not have and 

cannot presently acquire sufficient understanding of the threat within the 

United States. 

 U.S. intelligence lacks situational awareness and sophisticated 

understanding of foreign-inspired threats or operations within the United 

States. 

 Without change, the current DHS, FBI, and other law enforcement 

organizations, along with the existing Intelligence Community entities, 

will not be able to provide adequate domestic intelligence to meet DOD 

mission needs. 

 DOD has not adequately defined its intelligence requirements at home 

related to future stressing war scenarios. 

 NYPD has adopted an approach for utilizing strong intelligence 

collection and analysis methodologies that may be an ideal “franchise 

model” across localities critical to DOD missions. 
284 I PART V CHAPTER 17 

RECOMMENDATIONS: FOREIGN-INSPIRED DOMESTIC THREATS

 The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, working with USD (I), 

should ensure that DOD identifies military capabilities in localities 

where the NYPD model can be more aggressively applied; develop 

and expand that NYPD intelligence methodology—in effect, 

franchise the NYPD template locally via DHS and law enforcement 

training and grant activities. 

 USD (I) should strengthen his role as the DOD focal point for 

intelligence in support of defending U.S. military homeland-based 

capabilities, assets, facilities, and functions. Principle attention 

should be given to the following: 

- Revalidate requirements and needs. 

- Develop and update domestic intelligence campaign plans and metrics: 

 Expand the role and focus of Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Counterintelligence and Security to address 

improved collection and analysis of foreign-inspired domestic 

threats to the DOD rear. 

 Work with the Intelligence Community, DHS, and law 

enforcement organizations to improve collection and analysis of 

threats to DOD-dependent critical infrastructure. 

- Define what additional capabilities are required. 

Need for Strategic Analysis

The study reviewed the relationship between intelligence and net assessment 

processes, and had several interactions with the Director of Net Assessment in 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with regard to studies and analysis. The 

study concluded that net assessment processes of red on blue interaction, 

expanded to full gaming and simulations of future strategic threat issues, could 

be very useful in better understanding the significance of intelligence gaps, in 

gaming notional threats to explore the sensitivities of the intelligence 

uncertainties, and for making and exploring a range of informed intelligence 

speculations in the face of unknown threats. 
WHAT WE KNOW AND DON’T KNOW I 285

Interestingly, as a bi-product of closer intelligence and net assessment 

cooperation and coordination, in-depth intelligence collection and analysis could 

also be improved, and the DOD and the intelligence community together could 

rediscover the full potential of net assessment disciplines to contribute to 

departmental preparedness and intellectual ferment for anticipating and dealing 

with strategic threats of the kind posed by potential peers or near-peers. 

Summary of Findings 

 Net assessment (blue on red interaction) has proven itself in identifying 

important gaps in complex and multi-dimensional military problems. 

 Given the poor state of knowledge of future stressing war, net 

assessment and gaming and simulation techniques should be employed to 

identify and understand intelligence gaps, the implications of these gaps, 

and commensurate intelligence opportunities. Employing such tools 

would also sensitize the blue side to “fact-of” such intelligence gaps. 

RECOMMENDATION: STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

The Office of Net Assessment, USD (I), and DNI should establish a 

capability to assess big complex peer problems (e.g. space anti-access) for 

net assessment and modeling of future stressing war. 

Intelligence Community 

With regard to the high-end threats addressed by this study, DTRA is an 

important customer and partner for the intelligence community. There are certain 

aspects of the community’s relationship with DTRA that are models of great 

support (the Underground Facility Analysis Center [UFAC], for example), but 

there are also areas where the intelligence connections with DTRA leave 

something to be desired. The WMD Threat Research and Analysis Center 

(WTRAC) and U.S. Strategic Command’s Combating WMD Center are two such 

examples. 

While the recommendations in this area focus on actions for the director of 

DIA, there could also be implications here for the DNI to ensure that DTRA is 

better serviced by the Intelligence Community, and that the community is able to 

access and utilize the technical expertise that DTRA can bring to collection and 
286 I PART V CHAPTER 17 

analysis. In particular, cooperation and collaboration on third- and fourthgeneration nuclear weapons might serve as a specific starting point for building 

dramatically improved relationships on these strategically important topics. 

Summary of Findings 

 To date, collaborative efforts between DTRA and the intelligence 

community are insufficient to support the WTRAC and STRATCOM 

Center for Combating WMD. 

 The UFAC is an effective model for collaboration between DTRA and 

the community. 

 Improved collaboration between the two organizations could particularly 

help with challenges associated with advanced design (including third and 

fourth generation) nuclear weapons. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The Director, DIA should take the lead in expanding support for 

activities related to WTRAC interactions around the UFAC model. 

Develop a special analysis effort between DTRA and the Intelligence 

Community on third and fourth generation weapons. 

The recommendations described herein are targeted to improve U.S. 

intelligence capabilities in support of future stressing wars. The challenges ahead 

will require broad emphasis on counterintelligence, on foreign inspired domestic 

threats, and on the other challenges described in this section. Many of these 

recommendations involve new ways of doing business, improved collaboration 

among community organizations, and attention from community leadership to 

ensure adequate resources are directed to these efforts. 
Part VI 

Fighting Through 

Asymmetric Counterforce 

THE ASYMMETRIC CHALLENGE I 289

Chapter 18. The Asymmetric Challenge 

The United States has significant plans for improving its conventional military 

capability, which should enable it to retain its advantage in force-on-force 

capability through the next several decades. Faced with this conventional U.S. 

advantage, potential adversaries will likely seek asymmetric methods to undermine 

and ultimately deter or influence U.S. military operations. Such asymmetric 

methods might include attacks on U.S. vulnerabilities, the use of deception to 

avoid a direct U.S. response, use of non-attribution, and intimidation of allies. 

Methods that are difficult or impossible to detect and attribute create an advantage 

for an adversary, who can therefore achieve an effect before retaliatory combat 

operations can be initiated by the United States. 

Adversaries will seek to destroy a variety of capabilities to reduce U.S. 

combat capabilities. A combination of the following elements offers effective 

options to achieve this effect: 

 direct attack of deployed military forces focusing on command and 

control; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; and 

logistics support centers 

 interruption of logistics lines of communication to interfere with support 

for deployed forces 

 attacks against the U.S. homeland 

 use of asymmetric capability to intimidate U.S. allies or neutrals into 

withdrawing support to the United States, thereby undermining U.S. 

credibility to protect its allies 

Until recently, it was assumed that the U.S. homeland was a sanctuary where 

military forces could prepare for combat operations, and from which they could 

be supported. This assumption is now broadly viewed as flawed, as was 

discussed previously in this report. Disrupting the logistics support chain and/or 

attacks against the American populace or infrastructure could undermine public 

support for any U.S. military operation abroad and impede efforts to secure 

more military capability to support homeland defense. It can also undermine 

trust in U.S. systems. 
290 I PART VI. CHAPTER 18 

Adversaries may seek to employ multiple asymmetric attacks that 

simultaneously impede or deter U.S. military operations abroad and at home. 

Moreover, there is a troubling risk that the United States could face an adversary 

with sufficient understanding of asymmetric counterforce to optimize a sequence 

of actions in key areas that would cripple U.S. military operations, while 

maintaining a non-attribution posture. Examples of combined and sequenced 

actions include: cyber attack against ISR system control elements to deny the 

United States knowledge that its satellite systems are under direct attack, substitute 

older imagery for current images to mislead decision makers, send false control 

signals to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to deny ISR coverage, and send false 

warnings of WMD attacks. 

 In addition to the examples above, there are numerous other potential 

combinations that planners must imagine and consider in order to prevent or 

counteract an adversary’s attempt to undermine U.S. military capabilities at home 

and abroad. While the range of potential asymmetric attacks is wide, this study 

chose to focus its work on a small set of the most compelling challenges, which 

were selected based on the following criteria: 

 potential for catastrophic consequences 

 lack of U.S. preparedness to handle the threat (and even greater lack of 

preparedness among U.S. allies and friends) 

 modest investment by adversary may bring dramatic consequences 

 adversary attacks against deployed U.S. forces would have consequences 

for civilian populations, and economic and political targets at home and 

abroad 

 non-attribution capability may make retaliation difficult 

 potential to undermine international perception of U.S. power 

Among the many options considered, the three most compelling challenges 

identified for examination in this study are: 

 Combat operations in a WMD environment. This challenge includes 

the threat of, or actual use of, WMD against U.S. forces and/or an ally. 

Countering this threat involves protecting critical bases of operations, 

and projecting and sustaining forces in distant anti-access environments. 

 Countering attacks on space assets. Critical to this challenge is gaining 

and maintaining space-situational awareness, conducting defensive and 
THE ASYMMETRIC CHALLENGE I 291

offensive counter-space operations, and conducting combat operations 

when space capabilities are degraded. 

 Cyber warfare against information and networks. The challenge of 

keeping pace with this ever-advancing threat is real. Counters include 

learning to operate with degraded networks and corrupted information, 

and developing integration applications of cyber defense, attack, and 

exploitation. 

Many challenges were considered, but not selected, as the “most compelling.” 

Examples include attacks on naval task forces, directed energy attacks against 

fighter and bomber aircraft, simultaneous attacks against multiple U.S. military 

installations (without alerting force protection responses), and directed energy 

attacks against airborne systems. Each of these attacks would indeed have a 

significant effect on military operations. However, it is the opinion of the members 

of this study that they would not have catastrophic effects of the type and scale 

that could be achieved through the use of WMD, attacks on U.S. space assets, or 

cyber attacks against U.S. information and networks. 

After examining these asymmetric counterforce issues, the study concluded 

that the United States must invest more heavily in the development of 

intellectual capital, technology, and operational concepts that will, in time, enable 

the U.S. military to significantly counter these challenges. Serious and focused 

preparation in these areas can significantly reduce an adversary’s ability to impact 

U.S. conventional military forces and, in effect, impede or deter his actions. The 

next three chapters detail the findings and recommendations for each of the 

three challenges that derive from these broad conclusions. As Part 4 of this 

report addressed the impact of asymmetric operational concepts on the 

homeland, this part of the report will focus on the impact of the United States to 

wage war abroad. 
292 I PART VI. CHAPTER 19 

Chapter 19. Combat Operations in a WMD 

Environment 

During the Cold War, the world was dominated by two superpowers. The 

widespread use of WMD was constrained by the balance of power between the 

two superpowers (mutually assured destruction) and later by various treaties. 

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world 

has been dominated by one superpower that has no apparent peer. In the 21st

century, it is widely accepted that competitors—-peer, near-peer and major nonstate actors—will exploit asymmetric means to win an advantage over a still 

strong United States. These competitors, especially non-state actors, will be far 

more difficult to deter using means that have worked in the past. Though 

deterrence is not rejected as a strategy, it is important to plan for a future in 

which deterrence is not effective. 

This chapter explores the impact of the use of weapons of mass destruction 

(nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological) on the ability of the United States 

to fight and win in a foreign theater of operations. Key issues addressed include 

the following: 

 How do the WMD modalities available to adversaries challenge U.S. 

forces? 

 What would a determined peer, near-peer, or non-state actor target—

U.S. forces (deploying or deployed), allied or partner forces, local 

populations, or local food and water supplies, for example? 

 What are the major implications for the U.S. ability to station, deploy, 

employ, and sustain military forces overseas in the combat theater of the 

future? 

 What actions should the United States take to improve preparedness? 

In the future, competitors will likely seek the greatest possible advantage in 

any action against the United States. For example, the attacks of September 11, 

2001, would not have been as dramatic had the target cities been other than New 

York or Washington, DC. A competitor that would use WMD is not likely to be 

constrained by societal or moral norms, or by laws of war from using such 

weapons, even against heavily populated civilian areas. Indeed, they may actually 

achieve more of the effects they desire by creating mass civilian casualties. This 
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN A WMD ENVIRONMENT I 293

chapter omits the impact of such attacks on the homeland (as they were 

addressed in previous chapters) except to note that the ability to sustain the flow 

of forces or supplies to an overseas theater could be seriously impaired if the 

supporting logistics structure in the United States were attacked. 

The impact of WMD attacks on civilian populations should be of particular 

concern to U.S. forces. The military services depend on large numbers of 

contractors, both U. S. and foreign, to sustain operations in a foreign theater. A 

civilian work force that is killed or injured by WMD is no more useful than one 

that has walked off the job in the face of threats to use such weapons. The 

resident civilian population in most anticipated theaters will not be wellprotected against these threats, and may require a large commitment of U.S. 

forces in the wake of an attack. The nature of the help that will be needed to 

manage the consequences of a WMD attack will be different from that required 

to support displaced persons on a more conventional battlefield. These concerns, 

and the extraordinary impact WMD will have on the way the U.S. will fight, must 

be accounted for in planning for war over the next 20 years. 

The same capabilities the Department of Homeland Security is trying to put 

in place in the wake of Hurricane Katrina will be needed by U.S. forces and 

partner nations overseas. That said, requirements are markedly different when 

preparing to fight through a WMD event. Preparedness measures to survive and 

recover from a WMD attack on the U.S. homeland are far below the level 

achieved in the early years of the Cold War when, in response to a clear and 

compelling threat, there was a strong and visible civil defense structure, frequent 

civilian training and drills, and robust training and exercises for military forces. 

Although it is true that the services have maintained a higher state of readiness 

than their civilian counterparts, U.S. forces are not ready for the WMD threats 

they may encounter. Nor can it be said that the U. S. government civilians and 

contractor work force that support deployed forces are ready to sustain 

operations in a theater threatened by WMD. 

The National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction establishes 

the military strategic goal of ensuring that the United States and its armed forces, 

allies, partners, and interests are neither coerced nor attacked by enemies using 

WMD. If an adversary succeeds in using WMD against the United States, the 

strategy calls for military forces capable of minimizing the effects to continue 

operations in a WMD environment and assist the civil authorities of the United 

States and its allies and partners. 
294 I PART VI. CHAPTER 19 

Actions can be taken before, during, and after a successful WMD attack to 

minimize its effects: 

 Actions that can be taken before an attack to prevent debilitating 

consequences include hardening likely targets, positioning sensors to 

detect chemical or biological agents, inoculating prospective victims 

against likely biological agents, and providing protective equipment and 

training people to use it. 

 Actions that can be taken during an attack and in its immediate 

aftermath to ameliorate consequences include detecting the attack, 

sounding the alarm, increasing protective posture, identifying victims, 

and applying first aid. 

 Actions taken to clean up after an attack are those defined in Joint 

Publication 1-02 as consequence management—“actions taken to 

maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems 

resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or 

terrorist incidents.” 

Various agencies are responsible for taking such actions, as Table 6-1 depicts. 

For attacks against the U.S. homeland, DHS has lead responsibility for 

preparations before, response during, and consequence management after an 

attack. DOD, under U.S. Northern Command, is charged with providing support 

to civil authorities in domestic emergencies, such as in the case of large-scale 

disasters. DOD’s involvement in the Hurricane Katrina response serves as 

example. The displacement of the U.S. population by a WMD event may be 

greater in scope and scale than the Katrina experience and may be of much 

longer duration if a nuclear weapon is involved. Such events will overwhelm the 

ability of the civil emergency response structure and will require DOD support 

over a much longer period. 

U.S. forces—active, guard, and reserve—that are called to respond to 

homeland emergencies will not be available to support an overseas operation. In 

fact, support for a WMD event in the United States may take precedence over 

operations abroad. Should a sizeable number of forces be required at home, it 

could impact the conduct of operations abroad. The number of military 

personnel involved in support of Hurricane Katrina was about 80,000 at the 

peak. One can infer a similar, or even greater, commitment of forces to a WMD 

event with the attendant impact on the progress of operations in an overseas 

contingency. It will therefore be even more important that partner nations have 

the capacity to support U.S. forces abroad. 
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN A WMD ENVIRONMENT I 295

Table 6-1. Responsibility for Mitigating Actions in Response to a WMD Attack

Before During After

U.S. homeland DHS DHS DHS/DOD (DSCA)

U.S. forces (in CONUS, 

overseas, or en route) 

DOD DOD DOD 

Allied or partnered 

forces 

Partner nation Partner nation Partnered/host nation state is 

primary federal agency for 

foreign consequence 

management; DOD may 

support state

Local population Host nation Host nation Host nation state is primary 

federal agency for foreign 

consequence management; 

DOD may support state

For U.S. military forces, DOD has the lead responsibility for mitigating 

actions before, during, and after an attack, whether the forces are in the United 

States or overseas. For countries participating as part of a U.S.-led coalition, the 

parent nation has responsibility for allied and partner forces. The host nation has 

responsibility for the local population and infrastructure, and the food and water 

supply before, during, and after a WMD attack. 

Should the host nation government or partner forces find themselves 

overwhelmed by the consequences of a WMD attack and request assistance from 

the United States, the Department of State is the designated lead federal agency, 

and DOD may be directed by the President to support the foreign consequence 

management effort. Thus, it is possible that the same U.S. military capabilities, 

particularly the specialized capabilities organized, trained, and equipped to deal 

with WMD attacks, may be in demand to support civil authorities in the U.S. 

homeland, foreign consequence management efforts abroad, and U.S. combat 

forces in overseas contingency operations—all at the same time. 

Critical Challenges in Fighting Through WMD 

In analyzing the impacts of fighting in a WMD environment, three challenges 

stood out as particularly critical to the success of U.S. military operations (Table 

6-2). Failure to adequately address these challenges could have debilitating effects 

on U.S. military operations against a WMD-armed enemy. 
296 I PART VI. CHAPTER 19 

Table 6-2. Fighting Through WMD Poses Critical Challenges

Challenges Potential Effects

U.S. military operations depend on others 

who lack protection from chemical, biological, 

and radiological attacks 

 Allied and partner military forces 

 Critical civilian personnel 

 Host nation population 

Partners who lack capacity to withstand attacks 

will suffer disproportionate losses, rendering 

them unable or unwilling to support U.S. military 

operations. 

Loss of partner support could have catastrophic 

effects on outcome of the conflict. 

Concepts and doctrine have changed little 

since the Cold War 

 “Combating WMD” is focused on weapons 

 Emphasis on “fighting through” has diminished 

Forces that are not well trained and equipped to 

deal with chemical, biological, and radiological 

attacks will suffer massive losses and may be 

rendered combat-ineffective. 

Plans not validated through realistic exercises 

may be ineffective in the face of WMD attacks. 

U.S. forces vulnerable to small-scale nuclear 

attack 

 Critical nodes 

 EMP 

Even one or two nuclear weapons could bring 

U.S. force deployments to a halt and cripple 

C4ISR. 

First, U.S. forces abroad depend on host nations for bases and logistical 

support, and on host-nation and other civilians to deploy and sustain the force. 

These elements are subject to the effects of any WMD attacks directed against 

U.S. forces. Yet most host nations do not have the same degree of protection 

against such attacks, nor do they have the same capability to manage their 

consequences. As a result, host nations and supporting forces may be less willing 

to support U.S. military operations in the face of WMD threats if they could 

reasonably expect to suffer disproportionately, compared to U.S. military forces. 

Further, the civilian population in an area of operations could require support 

from U.S. forces in the aftermath of a WMD event. The United States can take 

actions to mitigate such consequences. Providing training assistance to partner 

countries and foreign consequence management support are key elements of 

strategic communication, particularly in overseas areas, because they convey U.S. 

concern for, and resolve to assist, friends and allies. 

Second, in recent years, concepts and doctrine have not kept pace with the 

changing WMD environment. The “combating WMD” doctrine that has been 

developed to deal with the new environment appears overly focused on defeat 
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN A WMD ENVIRONMENT I 297

of the weapons themselves, giving less attention to the capabilities needed to 

fight a campaign against an adversary armed with and willing to use them. The 

demands of current operations have further reduced the time most forces have 

available to train for operations in a WMD environment. In short, U.S. forces 

may not be properly organized, trained, and equipped for fighting through the 

effects of WMD. 

Third, although U.S. forces are better protected against chemical and 

biological attacks than the civilians and foreign nationals on whom they depend, 

nuclear attacks pose a much greater challenge to both U.S. forces and their 

partners. Even a single nuclear weapon could render key nodes unusable for 

extended periods, and EMP effects from a limited nuclear attack could blind 

sensors and shut down key command and control systems. U.S. forces routinely 

trained for operations in a WMD environment into the early 1990s—fighting 

through chemical, biological, and even nuclear effects. 

Building Partnership Capacity 

In its published guidance, the Department both emphasizes and qualifies its 

support of building partnership capacity to fight through WMD attacks. In 

recent years, DOD has strongly pledged to help partners prepare for such 

attacks. For example, the July 2000 Joint Publication 3-11, Joint Doctrine for 

Operations in a NBC Environment, states: 

All commands are responsible for cooperative actions in peacetime with 

governments, armed forces of allies, and potential multinational partners to 

facilitate sustainment of operations in NBC environments [emphasis added]. 

The JFC [Joint Force Commander] has responsibility for ensuring that coalition 

and HN [host nation] weaknesses do not compromise U.S. forces or missions. 

It may be necessary in this regard to apply U.S. resources to support 

multinational partners and HNs before, during, and after NBC attacks. 

The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review further emphasizes the 

importance of marshalling all the elements of national and international power 

and makes building partnership capacity central to DOD strategy. As stated in 

the report: 

The Department must help partners improve their ability to perform their 

intended roles and missions. This includes foreign governments trying to 

police themselves and govern their populations more justly and effectively....” 

[p. 17, emphasis added] 
298 I PART VI. CHAPTER 19 

Finally, the March 2006 National Military Strategy for Combating WMD states that: 

[DOD] must assist international partners to build capacities to combat WMD 

effectively. ... The military must strive to expand and exercise combating WMD 

partnerships with a goal of creating partners that can provide for themselves 

and assist during coalition operations. 

Two other directives issued in March 2006 seem to indicate, however, that 

DOD has qualified its support for building partnership capacity during aspects of 

combating WMD. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3214.01B, 

Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management, emphasizes the host nation’s 

responsibility and generally constrains U.S. support to specific requests made 

through the Department of State. Further, DOD Instruction 2000.21, Foreign 

Consequence Management, states that, when requested, DOD “will support U.S. 

Government Foreign Consequence Management operations to the extent allowed 

by law and subject to the availability of appropriated funds for such purposes.” 

This guidance raises questions regarding whether and to what extent DOD 

will honor its pledge to help develop the capabilities of its allies and partners, as 

well as critical civilian personnel and host nation populations, to “fight through” 

a WMD environment. 

The bottom line is that the lack of clear guidance creates a gap that 

has an impact on activities in support of building partnership capacity are 

resourced. 

DOD has taken some steps toward building partnership capacity, but much 

more is required to fully develop this needed capability. The Security Cooperation 

Guidance describes the Secretary of Defense’s priorities to build partnership 

capacity for the future. The contributions of partner nations through enhancement 

of their capacity to defeat current and emerging threats are a cornerstone of the 

security cooperation effort. Although priorities have been established, resources 

are limited for activities such as exercises, global train and equip, and the National 

Guard State Partnership Program. In addition to the Security Cooperation Guidance, 

the 2006 post-QDR roadmap for building partnership capacity established DOD 

strategic and budgetary priorities for these activities across the Department. The 

2006 reorganization of the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

underscored the emphasis on allies and partners by creating deputy assistant 

secretaries of defense for partnership strategy and coalition support. 
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN A WMD ENVIRONMENT I 299

Using authority granted under Section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense 

Authorization Act, DOD funded some global train and equip projects around 

the world during fiscal year 2006, obligating almost $100 million for programs in 

key target countries. Such programs include the following: 

 Pakistan. Improving counterterrorism strike capabilities (~$27m) 

 Indonesia. Securing strategic sea lanes against terrorists and oil 

disruptions (~$18m) 

 Lebanon. Reducing Hezbollah's operational space (~$10m) 

 Sri Lanka. Reducing ungoverned maritime spaces (~$11m) 

 Gulf of Guinea (Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe). Expand governed 

maritime areas (~$6.8m) 

 Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Nigeria, Chad, and Senegal. Securing the 

trans-Sahara region against terrorists (~$6m) 

 Yemen. Countering cross-border terrorist activity (~$5m) 

 Panama and the Dominican Republic. Forward defense of the U.S. 

homeland (~$15m) 

 Thailand: Securing strategic sea lanes (~$5m obligated before coup)1

 

These initial DOD projects have been well thought out, but modest in scale 

and primarily focused on counterterrorism. Combatant commanders, for example, 

requested resources for 67 projects for fiscal year 2007 totaling almost $800 

million, $500 million more than was authorized. Moreover, the projects that were 

funded (such as those fiscal year 2006 projects listed above) focused on counterterrorism rather than combating WMD. While these efforts are important, they do 

not address the unique challenges of combat in a WMD environment. 

In addition to the challenge of inadequate funding, efforts also suffer from 

the fact that current authorities limit DOD’s ability to build partners’ capacity 

most effectively. Despite repeated DOD and Department of State requests, 

Congress has not made global train and equip—another name for building 

partnership capacity—authority permanent. Furthermore, current law (title 10, 

section 12310, Duties Relating to Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction) 

 

1. OUSD (Policy) briefing, undated, “Building Partnership Capacity with Section 1206.” 
300 I PART VI. CHAPTER 19 

prohibits use of National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams outside the United 

States. These teams are at the core of U.S. domestic WMD capabilities and their 

members are the subject matter experts who can most effectively train and assist 

U.S. partners in developing their own capabilities. In a related example, the 

funding for the National Guard State Partnership Program remains based on 

yearly supplemental appropriations. Begun in 1993, this program has established 

56 partnerships between National Guard Joint Forces Headquarters and foreign 

countries on every continent and in every region of the world. 

Overall, the factors described here create a gap in how DOD conducts 

building partnership capacity. Despite its strong rhetorical support, these 

programs are woefully under-resourced. Moreover, building partnership capacity 

does not address in any substantial way helping allies and partners prepare to fight 

through WMD. 

To truly build partnership capacity, DOD must increase its emphasis on and 

expand its vision of this important set of activities. While the current effort is well 

meaning, it needs to grow significantly beyond its current ad hoc and meager 

funding levels. DOD must also expand its vision in this area to include preparing 

allies and partners to “fight through” WMD. A new vision for building 

partnership capacity will create opportunities to expand proven programs and 

establish other initiatives for key target regions and countries in the coming years. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY

DOD should establish a discrete program of not less than $500 million 

per year to enhance partners’ capacity to “fight through” WMD. 

In support of this program, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD 

[P}) should issue appropriate guidance (including measures of effectiveness) to 

develop strategy, assign responsibilities, allocate resources, and provide oversight. 

In addition, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, should direct that combatant 

commanders are given more priority to building the capacity of partner forces 

and nations to fight through WMD. 

USD (P) should direct recurring and stable programmed funding of 

$18 million per year for the National Guard State Partnership program. 

DOD needs to continue to work to reduce obstacles that limit its ability to 

conduct activities that enhance partner capacity. This restriction prevents these 

subject matter experts from helping train U.S. partners to fight through WMD. 
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN A WMD ENVIRONMENT I 301

Preparedness to Fight in WMD 

While U.S. forces are better organized and equipped today, they are not as 

well trained to fight in a WMD environment as they were during the Cold War. 

Emphasis on operating in a WMD environment has waxed and waned over 

several decades. The Army’s interest in the offensive application of nuclear 

weapons peaked during the 1950s with the “Pentomic Division” experiment, and 

then diminished rapidly as the Vietnam War became the Army’s principal 

mission. When focus shifted after Vietnam back to defense of Europe, the 

prospect of having to fight on a dirty battlefield again caught the Army’s interest, 

probably reaching its peak just before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ground 

units and land-based air units routinely practiced operating in full protective gear 

for extended periods and trained to perform their wartime missions in a nuclear, 

biological, and chemical (NBC) environment. Soldiers and airmen who faced the 

Warsaw Pact expected to be attacked with chemicals, and thus gave serious 

attention to learning how to survive in such an environment. 

Emphasis on chemical defense continued after the fall of the Soviet Union, 

particularly in the run-up to Operation Desert Storm and later Iraqi Freedom. 

Thinking about and training for operations in a nuclear environment dropped off 

sharply, however, and even chemical defense preparedness began to diminish once 

the WMD that was expected to be encountered in Iraq could not be located. 

Today, as units cycle through training in preparation for rotations to Iraq and 

Afghanistan, little time is devoted to training for operations in an NBC 

environment. Despite the acknowledged need for plans to be visibly and 

successfully exercised in order to provide maximum deterrent effect on potential 

adversaries, most WMD war games and exercises end when the adversary uses 

nuclear or chemical weapons; few address the issues associated with fighting on 

despite their effects. Korea is an important exception: there, the proximity of a 

major chemical threat motivates a much higher degree of readiness. 

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, emphasis within DOD shifted to 

counter-proliferation. This term was later subsumed as part of “combating 

WMD,” derived from the goal stated in the National Security Strategy of preventing 

enemies from threatening the United States, its allies, and friends with weapons 

of mass destruction. Consistent with the intent declared in the National Security 

Strategy to act preemptively, if necessary, to forestall or prevent such hostile acts, 

the “combating WMD” policy and doctrine, as implemented to date, appear to 

be focused more on defeat of the weapons themselves than on fighting a 

campaign against an adversary possessing and prepared to use them. The National 
302 I PART VI. CHAPTER 19 

Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, published in February 2006, 

more clearly articulates the need to continue operations in a WMD environment 

after first use by the adversary, but supporting policies and doctrine lag. 

The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), 

illustrated in Figure 6-1, uses joint concepts to identify and describe shortcomings 

and redundancies in warfighting capabilities, identify the timeframe in which the 

shortfall or redundancy exists, describe effective solutions, and identify potential 

approaches to resolve those shortcomings. The JCIDS process is initiated through 

the execution of a capabilities-based assessment, which identifies the capabilities 

required to successfully execute missions, the shortfalls in existing weapon systems 

to deliver those capabilities and the associated operational risks, and the possible 

solution space for the capability shortfalls. A capability-based assessment may be 

based on a Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) approved by the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council; a concept of operations endorsed by a combatant command, 

Service, or defense agency; or an identified operational need. 

A JIC is part of the family of future Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) 

developed from top-level strategic guidance to provide a top-down baseline for 

identifying future capabilities. New capability requirements must relate directly to 

capabilities identified through the family of future joint concepts. Therefore, the 

future concepts are not intended to provide immediate solutions, but rather 

proposed solutions that can afford careful examination over a more extended 

period of time. A concept of operations may indicate short-term capability needs. 

Concepts allow the joint community to adjust or divest current capabilities by 

providing the operational context needed to justify or modify current programs. 

The process flows from national level and strategic guidance through either a 

concept of operation for short-term needs or the JOpsC family of concepts, as 

shown in Figure 6-1.2 

 

2. CJCSI 3170.01F, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, 1 May 07, and CJCSM 

3170.01C, Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, 1 May 07. Both 

accessed 14 Aug 07 at the Joint Electronic Library website, 

http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/index.htm 
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN A WMD ENVIRONMENT I 303

Source: CJCSI3170.01F. Joint capabilities integration and development system, 1 May 2007, Figure A-1, 

page A-3 

Figure 6-1. JCIDS Top-Down Capability Needs Identification Process 

Assessments to determine the capabilities needed for combating WMD, or for 

combat in WMD, have been at best interim steps because the front-end conceptual 

basis has not been available. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, part of 

the JOpsC, highlights the WMD challenge, but offers no ideas on what do to 

about it. The Joint Forcible Entry Operations JIC mentions nuclear and chemical 

weapons only twice, as something from which to protect the force. The Major 

Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept addresses the challenge in much 

greater depth, and includes the following proposed assessment plan: 

Operations against an adversary with weapons of mass destruction.

Future adversaries will pursue nuclear WMD to offset their inability to respond 

to the overmatching conventional military capability of the United States and its 

partners. Those future adversaries that are successful in developing a nuclear 

WMD capability will have a significant deterrent to US military engagement 

when our National interests are threatened. Furthermore, the US must consider 

preemptive and other actions (e.g., ISR) that may serve as triggers to use or 

disperse nuclear weapons and other WMD. Finally, the US must consider 

response courses of action in the event the adversary uses WMD and must 
304 I PART VI. CHAPTER 19 

consider second- and third-order effects of WMD use. National policy and 

guidance are undefined on how to deal with an irrational or rogue actor with 

limited WMD capability. This has operational implications in regard to 

preemption, shaping, and response. Operationally, the US and its potential 

coalition partners lack sufficient capability to locate, identify, track, and contain 

nuclear weapons and other WMD. Operational approaches to destroy, 

neutralize, observe or capture WMD hinge upon US ability to find and track 

them in hardened, deeply buried locations. Failing this, the United States and 

multinational forces must be prepared to project force and protect forces in a 

CBRN environment. A US and perhaps allied policy of preemption in light of 

potential triggering must be considered. 

Potential Experimentation Methodology: Craft a focused, controlled 

experimentation environment that promotes scenarios that challenges [sic] our 

ability to locate, identify, track and contain WMD and that can simulate 

potential capability solutions. 

The scenario(s) must describe an environment that will allow for analysis of the 

adversary’s WMD capabilities, adversary’s will to use WMD, possible target areas 

in US homeland and multinational partner nations, and US/allied responses and 

deterrent policies needed to respond to actions taken by the adversary. 

Because of its critical nature and high priority, a series of events dealing with 

combating WMD and solving WMD-related issues should culminate in a 

focused event and a senior leader review.3 

This proposed experimentation methodology has not been implemented. 

A Combating WMD JIC, authored by U.S. Strategic Command, is nearing 

completion. Once approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, this 

concept will provide the basis for a formal assessment of the capabilities needed 

for operations in a WMD environment. Such a capabilities-based assessment 

should address a number of larger campaign scenarios to provide the necessary 

context, ranging from major combat operations as noted above to irregular warfare 

and military support to stabilization, stability, transition, and reconstruction 

operations to combating WMD in the context of homeland security operations. 

The current joint doctrine for operations in NBC environments points out 

correctly that the basic principles of operations in NBC environments apply to 

military operations other than war. The joint force commander and joint force 

 

3. Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0, December 2006, pp D-4 and D-5. 

Accessed 14 Aug 07 at the Future Joint Warfare website, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/joc.htm 
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN A WMD ENVIRONMENT I 305

elements must be prepared for NBC use and contamination with toxic materials at 

any point, including the transition from non-combat to combat environments.4

 

As noted above, future concepts like the Combating WMD JIC are intended to 

provide proposed solutions that can afford careful examination over a more 

extended period of time. Under JCIDS, short-term capability needs can be 

assessed based on a concept of operations to allow the joint community to adjust 

or divest current capabilities by providing the operational context needed to justify 

or modify current programs. 

The recent approval of CONPLAN 8099 provides the basis for identifying 

near-term capability needs as geographic combatant commands develop 

supporting plans. The concept of operations they develop can provide the context 

needed to assess current capabilities. 

In summary, without a set of capabilities-based assessments developed from 

sound strategy, sound concepts, and a range of campaign scenarios, the 

Department has no way of knowing whether current capabilities are adequate for 

operations in an NBC environment, or what new capabilities might need to be 

developed. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: PREPAREDNESS TO FIGHT IN WMD 

To improve capabilities to conduct military operations in an environment 

contaminated by WMD, the study makes the following recommendations: 

The JROC should direct a series of capabilities-based assessments to 

identify capability needs and gaps for operating in a WMD environment. 

These assessments should be based in the near-term on concept of 

operations developed by geographic combatant commanders in response to the 

Combating WMD CONPLAN and, in the longer term, on the Combating WMD 

Joint Integrating Concept, applied to a wide range of scenarios. 

Joint Forces Command should conduct a series of experiments, with 

the support of U.S. Strategic Command’s Center for Combating WMD, to 

 

4. Joint Publication 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) 

Environments, 11 July 2000, pg. VI-2. Accessed 14 Aug 07 at the Joint Electronic Library website, 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine.htm 
306 I PART VI. CHAPTER 19 

explore WMD-related issues associated with operations in a WMD 

environment. 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff should direct the combatant 

commands to place particular emphasis on joint and multinational 

exercises where “fighting through WMD” is a main objective. 

Such exercises will serve to enhance deterrence and help geographic 

combatant commanders gain awareness of the capabilities and limitations of their 

own forces and of host nations and partner forces, when operating in such an 

environment. 

Small-Scale Nuclear Attacks 

The greatest threat from WMD, in terms of consequences, will come from 

the use of nuclear weapons. As declared in the National Military Strategy to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction, the nation’s military strategic goal is to ensure that the 

United States, its armed forces, allies, partners, and interests are neither coerced 

nor attacked by enemies using WMD. Deterring or disarming a determined 

nuclear-armed adversary is, of course, the preferred course of action. But it is 

necessary also to be prepared to minimize the effects of an attack and continue 

to operate should such an attack occur. 

Given current U.S. methods of operation, forces overseas can be vulnerable 

to even a small-scale nuclear attack involving as few as one or two weapons. 

Current operations in Iraq illustrate this vulnerability. Leading up to Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, the United States was limited to moving personnel and 

equipment through the air and sea ports of debarkation in Kuwait. A second 

route into the theater through Turkey was anticipated but was foreclosed by the 

Turkish Parliament. Preparations for operations continued in Kuwait, with all 

forces required to move through a single port complex. Had that port complex 

been attacked by even an improvised nuclear device, deployment operations and 

the ensuing reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration would have 

been severely disrupted—perhaps even brought to a complete halt. 

Another example of current vulnerability to the use of nuclear weapons 

comes from the increased use of maritime forces closer to shore. Tactics, 

techniques, and procedures have not evolved to address the increase in maritime 

operations in the littorals, where the WMD threat, particularly from nuclear 

weapons, is greater than that in deep water. 
COMBAT OPERATIONS IN A WMD ENVIRONMENT I 307

Hardening equipment against the nuclear threat includes protection from 

blast, thermal, and EMP effects. Hardening is expensive and, given pressures to 

cut costs, seldom receives more than cursory consideration during equipment 

development. Once a program has moved past the design phase, it is costprohibitive to redesign the equipment to meet hardening criteria. Information 

availability is critical for net-centric operations. The physical layout of command 

and control systems varies from theater to theater based on geography and 

availability of systems. Since a network failure could be catastrophic, vulnerability 

analyses of C4ISR networks is essential to identify potential points of failure. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: SMALL-SCALE NUCLEAR ATTACKS

To reduce vulnerabilities to small-scale nuclear attacks, the study makes the 

following recommendations: 

U.S. Strategic Command’s Center for combating WMD should work with 

combatant commanders to visualize potential nuclear effects and construct plans 

for fighting through them. Modeling and simulation tools are available that can 

help with visualizing, understanding, and mitigating these effects. 

DISA should develop tools for network analysis that will allow joint force 

commanders to assess the vulnerability of C4ISR systems to nuclear effects 

based on their physical locations. Analysis should identify ways to reduce critical 

node vulnerability, establish redundancy requirements, and identify options for 

degraded operations and reconstitution. 

Secretary of Defense direct the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the 

Defense Information Systems Agency to assess the utility of applying nuclear 

hardening techniques to discrete network elements using combinations of 

shielding, redundancy, and radiation-hardened components. 

A renewed emphasis should be placed on nuclear hardening for equipment 

vulnerable to EMP. It will be cost-prohibitive to harden all systems, but some 

systems critical to network operations may warrant the extra cost. Emphasis 

should be placed on ensuring acquisition programs consider hardening during 

equipment design, and test against the effects during development. This is a 

department-wide issue. All services need to buy into hardening against EMP. If 

not, portions of C4ISR networks that are vulnerable to EMP effects will impact 

other systems. Redundancy must also be considered. 
308 I PART VI. CHAPTER 20 

Chapter 20. Countering Attacks on U.S. and 

Allied Space Assets 

The United States and its allies depend heavily on space assets to enable 

many critical services, including ISR, precision navigation and attack capabilities, 

beyond line-of-site communications, and weather and environmental data. U.S. 

adversaries recognize this dependence on space and will most certainly attack 

U.S. and allied space assets. The United States must assume that it will be 

challenged in space and should expect to respond to attacks in space. If the 

armed forces are not well trained and equipped to respond to such attacks and 

capable of maintaining space superiority, an adversary may very well attempt to 

use attacks in space to drive a wedge between the United States and its 

warfighting partners. The less prepared the nation is to defend its space 

capabilities, the greater the likelihood that these assets will be attacked. 

Three key elements of any effort to counter attacks on U.S. and allied space 

assets are: 

1. gaining and maintaining space situational awareness 

2. conducting defensive and offensive counter-space operations 

3. conducting combat operations when space capabilities are degraded 

Impact of Attacks on Space Assets 

Recently, space has ceased to be the above-the-battle “sanctuary” it was in 

the past. Forty-four countries now have assets in space. No nation, including the 

United States, is well prepared to defend against attacks in space. A serious attack 

against U.S. space assets would have grave consequences not only for the United 

States and its allies, but also for the world economy. Due to their technological 

sophistication, the United States and its allies are particularly vulnerable to a 

catastrophic attack in space. 

Such an attack would not only severely degrade U.S. and allied military 

capabilities but also would create troubling economic and political issues 

worldwide. Economically, an attack on space assets can impact international 

exchange and stock markets and banking systems, and degrade commercial 

navigation. Political leaders will have to face allies who will look to the United 
COUNTERING ATTACKS ON SPACE ASSETS I 309

States for leadership and assistance in response to such an attack. Alliances, 

coalitions, and partnerships could be undermined based on the U.S. response. 

The types of attacks on U.S. space assets that could deny the United States 

critical space situational awareness, and seriously degrade its command, control, 

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C2ISR) capabilities include: 

 attacks against the U.S. GPS capability, leaving navigation and precision 

attack capabilities seriously degraded or denied 

 jamming sophisticated military weapons systems that rely heavily on a 

precise GPS timing signal 

 degrading satellite communications systems that carry essential military 

voice and data transmissions 

Conducting joint warfighting operations in such an environment will be, at 

best, extremely challenging for U.S. forces. At worst, it could mean defeat for the 

United States and its allies. Action must be taken now to reduce military reliance 

on space capabilities. Furthermore, the United States must develop the capability 

to carry out defensive and offensive counter-space operations in defense of its 

space assets. 

Space Situational Awareness 

Space situational awareness is important to protecting space capabilities. If 

DOD forces cannot assess, characterize, or attribute an attack to its source, then 

executing an effective response will be all but impossible. Yet maintaining 

situational awareness in space is becoming increasingly difficult. From 1957–

1961, only four objects existed in low earth orbit to track and catalog. In the 

decades since, forty-four nations and several commercial enterprises have placed 

objects in space. Low-earth orbit and geosynchronous earth orbit positions are 

becoming increasingly crowded. With both government and commercial entities 

launching tactical mini- and nano-satellites, space objects are becoming smaller 

and more numerous. All of this makes the job of maintaining space situational 

awareness much more complicated. 

Moreover, space debris is becoming a bigger problem. Recently, government 

and commercial satellites have been maneuvered to avoid collisions with other 

space objects. Services from those satellites are normally suspended during the 

maneuver and precious onboard fuel is consumed. 
310 I PART VI. CHAPTER 20 

The number of objects in space will continue to grow and their average size 

will become smaller, making the maintenance of situational awareness in space 

ever more difficult. The United States and allies will have to develop and 

implement the capability to detect and track micro- and nano-satellites, as well as 

debris from objects that break up in space. Physical attacks on satellites or other 

objects in space will produce debris that must be tracked and catalogued in order 

to maintain an accurate situational awareness. 

Figure 6-2 illustrates the tremendous growth in the number of objects orbiting 

the earth since the launch of Sputnik in 1957. The blue line (top) depicts the total 

number of objects cataloged over time; the red line (middle) the number of objects 

that have decayed; and the yellow line (bottom) the number of objects currently 

catalogued on orbit. The sharp upward spike in cataloged orbital objects in 2007 

was caused by debris from the Chinese anti-satellite test—which demonstrated 

China’s capability (and perhaps intent) to attack satellites in low-earth orbit. 

Figure 6-2. Growth Challenges to Space Situational Awareness 

In light of this demonstrated capability, this study recommends that DOD 

immediately initiate a program to upgrade the U.S. Space Surveillance Network 

(SSN) to enable it to track the growing class of smaller objects in space. It would 

be extremely difficult to maintain accurate space situational awareness if an 

adversary simultaneously attacked multiple satellites due to the amount of debris 

that would be created. The SSN would become oversaturated with the sheer 
COUNTERING ATTACKS ON SPACE ASSETS I 311

number of objects it would have to process and catalog. Further, with current 

sensor technologies, very small debris may be impossible to track. 

Additionally, DOD should consider initiating a program to develop the 

capability to de-orbit objects (debris) from space. In the future, this mission may 

be carried out by small solid-state lasers. 

Another major shortfall in the current SSN is the inability to cover space 

objects in the southern hemisphere (Figure 6-3). The current network was 

developed during the Cold War when there was little need for southern 

hemisphere coverage (Soviet launches were all to the north). However, with a 

shift away from Cold War coverage requirements and significant change in the 

global political and military landscape, the need for the United States to have 

solid southern hemisphere space coverage has become more critical. 

Figure 6-3. Current Space Surveillance Network 

The Chinese are well aware of the gap in coverage of the southern 

hemisphere and frequently launch into those coverage gaps. The significance of a 

launch into these gaps is that it takes much longer to find, identify, and catalogue 

an object that would otherwise be tracked and tagged in a few hours. The gap in 

coverage makes it far more difficult to discern the true purpose or activities of a 

launched object with respect to U.S. space assets during the period of time that it 
312 I PART VI. CHAPTER 20 

is undetected and unidentified. Therefore, the study recommends that DOD 

improve SSN coverage, especially in the southern hemisphere. 

With the steady increase in the number of objects orbiting the earth, the SSN 

is becoming saturated. The SSN’s processing capabilities have remained 

unchanged since 1994. Consequently, the task of tracking and cataloging space 

objects is becoming increasingly difficult. Often, small debris cannot be tracked 

at all. Some universities are now teaching the process of developing and 

launching micro- and nano-satellites—so the information is becoming more 

widely available. These very small satellites can now be rather easily launched into 

orbits where the SSN cannot see them. 

Therefore, new ground-based sensor capabilities—like solid-state laser radars 

or light detection and ranging (LIDAR) lasers—need to be developed and 

integrated into a modernized SSN. Space-based components of the network may 

be needed as well. Furthermore, legacy radio frequency radar sensors in the SSN 

will most certainly need to be upgraded, and more processing power added to 

ensure the United States has the capability to detect, identify, catalog, and track 

what is projected to be even more numerous and ever smaller objects in space. 

Another major issue with regard to maintaining space situational awareness is 

the lack of an automated space common operating picture or a “single integrated 

space picture.” Current displays in command centers are created manually and 

information about who is doing what in space is spread among several disparate 

databases that reside in a variety of locations. It will be virtually impossible for 

personnel working in command centers to manually track what is occurring in 

space if an adversary begins to attack multiple assets over a short period of time. 

Attack assessment and target characterization will be next to impossible if the 

space common operating picture remains a manual system. 

More intelligence resources need to be focused in the space area, as well. 

Space has been a sanctuary in the past; thus, few national resources have been 

dedicated to gathering intelligence in this area. Since there are several indications 

(including the Chinese ASAT test) that the threat to U.S. space capabilities is 

increasing, more intelligence is needed on what nations are developing 

capabilities in this area. Special emphasis should be placed on gathering foreign 

intelligence about offensive space capabilities that are in development. 

Furthermore, the process for determining space post-attack response options 

is not well defined. For example, if an attack in space occurs, there is not an 

agreed process for how attack notification occurs and who is responsible for 

making those notifications. Furthermore, there is no national process for how 
COUNTERING ATTACKS ON SPACE ASSETS I 313

potential response options will be developed, debated, and/or executed. Finally, 

there is currently no process for how allies will be notified and/or how 

commercial entities will be involved if one of their assets is attacked or involved 

in post-attack maneuvers. Needless to say, much work is needed in this area if 

post-attack responses are to be well-conceived, properly debated, and effectively 

executed in a timely manner. 

Tools and systems for countering attacks in space are insufficient given the 

documented threat. While there have been some initial defensive and offensive 

capabilities considered, these capabilities have not been proliferated in any 

number, nor have sufficient military units with such capabilities been fielded. As 

threats to U.S. and allied space capabilities increase, much more work will be 

needed to develop this capability. 

DOD needs to undertake a major effort to provide a sound intellectual 

foundation for protecting assets in space and for conducting space control 

negation and prevention. The Department also needs to improve policy 

guidance, joint space warfighting doctrine, delineation of responsibilities, and 

rules of engagement. 

 Additionally, today the United States and its allies have a very limited 

capability to know when an attack in space occurs. Attack characterization and 

assessment capabilities need significant improvement, and better ways to 

determine the identity of the attacker are needed. Furthermore, there currently is 

not an effective process for coordinating an international response to an attack in 

space. This is an area where further discussions among nations will be needed as 

threats to international space capabilities increase. 

These are some of the reasons why the study has concluded that improving 

space situational awareness is really “job one.” As previously noted, if DOD 

forces cannot assess, characterize, or attribute an attack to its source, executing 

an effective response will be all but impossible. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

DOD needs to field an improved Space Surveillance Network that 

produces an automated single integrated space picture; incorporates 

southern hemisphere coverage and new sensor capabilities; and supports 

distributed, collaborative space command and control operations.
314 I PART VI. CHAPTER 20 

Improvements are needed to the Department’s space situational awareness 

capabilities. The first is to field launch, flight trajectory following, and tracking 

sensors/fences to expand the SSN coverage from its current northern hemisphere 

focus into the southern hemisphere. Sensor improvements, including capabilities 

to track small objects and laser-derived tracking and surveillance, are needed as 

well. Moreover, application of air-, space-, and ground-based sensors to space 

surveillance should be considered. The development and the fielding of a program 

for a common operational picture for space awareness and a collaborative 

information environment for space control, both of which must be operable at 

multiple security levels and include inputs from coalition, commercial, other DOD, 

and intelligence community assets, are also recommended. 

The services need to begin incorporating attack assessment/attack 

reporting sensors on key space assets. 

Development of sensors capable of attack indications and warning, and their 

incorporation on key designated space assets prior to launch, will provide 

significant leverage to space situational awareness. 

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence request the Director of 

National Intelligence to focus additional national intelligence resources 

on collecting and analyzing space intelligence. 

 Critical, too, is an emphasis by the intelligence community on allocating 

more resources focused on collecting, analyzing, and reporting space-related 

intelligence. 

Space Control 

DOD must improve its training, education, and exercise efforts to 

incorporate much more realism with respect to adversary attack and exploitation 

of space capabilities, and the use of effective counter-attack and counter-space 

measures in the wake of such attacks. The work the Department has already 

undertaken to develop an effective information operations training “range” 

should be expanded to include similarly effective space capabilities. Perhaps even 

more important, DOD needs to develop and field a responsive, viable 

reconstitution program (i.e., in a matter of hours to days, vice months or years). 
COUNTERING ATTACKS ON SPACE ASSETS I 315

The Department can and should pursue a number of options to mitigate 

against catastrophic loss of critical space-based capabilities, as described in Figure 

6-4. These options focus either on time-sensitive (within hours-to-days vice 

months or years) reconstitution of lost space-borne capabilities, or on establishing 

alternatives that can even be fielded today that would reduce reliance on space. 

 

Figure 6-4. Space Reconstitution Program Options Needed 

Some of these options entail non-space alternatives. ISR sensors, 

communications, and other payloads could be flown on “near-space” (i.e., 65,000 

to 325,000 feet altitude) lighter-than-air, unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Some 

research and development work in this area has been accomplished (DARPA’s 

“ISIS” project, for instance), but the study recommends a more concerted 

approach leading to fielded operational platforms and systems. 

Likewise, DOD is fielding next-generation weapon systems such as the F-22 

Raptor and F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter) that, along with certain older platforms 

like the F/A-18 and F-15E, carry a plethora of highly capable radar and other 

sensors. These potential sources of “non-traditional ISR” could be networked via 

common data-linked airborne and surface communications gateways—offering 

significant potential for complementing conventional but low density/high 

demand architecture of space-based and air-breathing ISR capabilities. 
316 I PART VI. CHAPTER 20 

DOD should also continue efforts looking at flight testing and eventually 

fielding a number of launch-on-demand “operationally responsive” space 

capabilities. These small, low earth orbit satellites could provide a capability to 

rapidly reconstitute at least some functionality in the wake of catastrophic attack 

against space-based ISR, navigation, and/or communication systems. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: SPACE CONTROL

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy articulate policy on protecting U.S. and 

allied space capabilities. Include guidance on sharing space situational 

awareness information and coordinating response options. 

U.S. Strategic Command develop joint space control doctrine; concepts of 

operations; and tactics, techniques, and procedures 

Services improve both defensive and offensive space control capabilities. 

Harden satellites, add attack detection sensors, improve ground station physical 

security, and add redundant and secure communication means. 

Develop a rapid global strike capability. 

U.S. Joint Forces Command incorporate realistic space threats and space 

control play into education, training, and exercise programs. Also upgrade 

information operations range to incorporate space range capabilities. 

U.S. Strategic Command develop a responsive space reconstitution program. 

Operations in a Degraded Space Environment 

Equally vital is the need to improve capabilities to operate despite a degraded 

space environment. An important element of such capabilities is to field the 

Global Information Grid (GIG) with a robust network that has redundant 

communications means, alternative waveforms, redundant data sources, and 

automatic communications rerouting capabilities. It should be engineered in such 

a way that a loss of satellite communications will not impact the operational user. 

The Air Force’s Objective Gateway program is just initiating the 

development of an airborne communications gateway that interfaces with ground 

communications nodes (RAIDRS) that will allow interoperability with the 

commercially available global fiber network. When this capability is fully 

developed, military communications (voice and data) can be routed either 
COUNTERING ATTACKS ON SPACE ASSETS I 317

through space or, if satellite communications are degraded or denied for any 

reason, via airborne communications relay capabilities and then through ground 

nodes connected into the global fiber network. When auto communications relay 

capabilities can be integrated into such an architecture, the GIG will be much 

more robust and reliable than what is available today to support global military 

operations. 

Potential adversaries will recognize the critical importance of GPS to U.S. 

and allied military capabilities. It is therefore likely that they will attack the GPS 

constellation or attempt to jam the signal with GPS jammers. GPS jamming was 

already attempted in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In order to reduce U.S. reliance 

on the presence of an uninterrupted and accurate GPS signal, accurate inertial 

measurement units (IMUs) and “atomic clocks on a chip” should be integrated 

into DOD systems whenever practicable. IMUs have already been integrated into 

many GPS-based navigation and attack systems to compensate for positioning 

errors, but technical capabilities in this area are constantly improving. Better 

IMUs should be incorporated into new systems and added to older systems as 

they are being modified, whenever possible. 

DARPA is about to field an “atomic clock on a chip,” which would allow 

very accurate system timing to be maintained during times when GPS signals are 

interrupted. These chips should be incorporated into future systems along with 

more accurate IMUs. An accurate timing signal is as important to some systems 

as an accurate positioning signal is to other systems. A disruption of GPS in the 

United States could result in difficulty supporting a deployed force. 

Another way to limit U.S. reliance on space capabilities is to ensure that a 

mix of weapons and terminal guidance systems is maintained in U.S. arsenals. 

Currently this is the situation because legacy weapon systems did not rely on 

GPS. However, as weapons and weapon systems are modernized, a mix of 

capabilities should be retained. Developers should resist the temptation to go to 

all GPS-based systems, for example. Electro-optical and laser-guided systems, as 

well as TERCOM-type guidance systems should remain in the overall U.S. and 

allied weapons inventories. 

Finally, U.S. Joint Forces Command and geographic combatant commands 

should incorporate realistic degraded space scenarios into future joint and 

combined war games and exercises. Also, improved modeling and simulation 

capabilities may be required to create a realistic “degraded space environment.” 

In addition to better modeling and simulation capabilities, the study recommends 
318 I PART VI. CHAPTER 20 

that JFC seek to incorporate both information operations and space range 

training capabilities onto live-fly and maneuver ranges so that realistic training 

can be conducted to prepare the joint force for future conflict. 

RECOMMENDATIONS: DEGRADED SPACE ENVIRONMENT

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 

Integration, the Defense Information Systems Agency, and the Services 

field a Global Information Grid that has redundant communication means 

and waveforms with auto-communication rerouting capabilities. 

Services field systems with highly accurate and reliable inertial 

measurement units and incorporate “atomic clocks on a chip” for 

timing signal. 

Services ensure a mix of terminal guidance systems and weapons in 

the nation’s arsenal—not only GPS-guided weapons. 

Joint Forces Command incorporate realistic exercise scenarios into 

joint and combined exercise that emphasize degraded space capabilities. 

Services incorporate training in degraded space environment on livefire training ranges. 
CYBER WARFARE I 319

Chapter 21. Cyber Warfare Against 

Information and Networks 

Cyber attacks can be launched against the networks through which 

information is transferred, or against the information itself with the objective of 

destroying or corrupting it. Two themes pervade this chapter: 

1. Defense against cyber attacks is not just about ensuring networks remain 

operable and the information uncorrupted. It is also about preparing 

traditional kinetic forces to operate in an environment where the 

networks and information they use are under attack. 

2. Cyber defense is not just defense per se, but also the integrated application 

of cyber attack and exploitation in support of defense. 

In keeping with these two themes, cyber warfare is defined as actions 

conducted in cyberspace—computer network defense, attack, and exploitation—

plus the actions taken by kinetic forces to conduct operations in the face of 

cyberspace attacks. While some parties consider electronic warfare and directed 

energy to be part of cyber warfare, they are not included here. In addition, for 

the scope of this work, cyber attack is included insofar as it supports cyber 

defense, but not as an offensive means for other purposes (e.g., to disable an air 

defense system). 

The Cyber Warfare Threat 

Adversaries conduct cyberspace operations against the military forces of 

the United States and its allies and partners for two reasons: 1) attack to 

degrade the effective use of information and 2) exploitation to steal classified 

and unclassified information about our cyber and kinetic capabilities. More 

specifically, the objectives of cyber attack are: denial of information access 

and/or transfer, corruption of information and services, and destruction of 

information and services. Corruption is perhaps of most concern. If military 

forces lose network capacity, they understand what has happened and possibly 

can deal with it; but if data are found to have been altered, then trust may be 

lost in the validity of all data. 
320 I PART VI. CHAPTER 21 

Attack and exploitation are executed in three ways: 1) remote access in which 

operators on a network illegitimately gain access to their adversary’s networks 

and nodes, 2) close access in which the adversary’s networks and nodes are 

physically penetrated, and 3) life cycle insertion in which illegitimate hardware 

and software are surreptitiously implanted during the life cycle of network and 

nodal components (e.g., in development or maintenance), with the intent of later 

using these implants for attack or exploitation. Close access is typically used 

against closed networks (i.e., those not accessible from the Internet), which 

would typically be classified and, in some cases, highly sensitive. Remote access 

would be used against the numerous DOD and civilian networks accessible from 

the Internet, but could also extend to classified networks connected to 

unclassified ones if the guards providing the connection could be subverted. 

While particulars are classified, the following key observations can be made 

about the implications of existing and anticipated threats: 

 Real-world incidents and red team activities show U.S. military networks 

have major, widespread vulnerabilities. Peer or near-peer adversary 

capability to penetrate U.S. military networks must be accepted as a 

fundamental planning assumption. 

 Attacks against U.S. and allied/partner civilian infrastructure are a 

high-leverage option for coercive purposes. For example, in the face 

of a pending military operation, or even a serious political or economic 

dispute, an adversary could attack U.S. utility or financial systems as a 

warning to the general population that the United States should back off, 

or even greater pain could be inflicted. 

 Major adversaries may exceed the United States in cyber 

capabilities. The relevant technology is global, so it is not likely the 

United States would have a significant advantage in technology. Highly 

skilled technical people are a critical component of the capability, too, 

and some potential adversaries have a much larger base of such people 

than does the United States. 

 While high visibility Internet attacks can focus attention on remote access 

attacks, close-access penetration and life cycle insertion may be the 

most serious threats in the long term. These two threats, which are 

getting the least attention now, could be the hardest to defend against 

and could affect the most sensitive U.S. systems. Peer or near-peer 

intelligence agencies are expected to be well practiced in close-access and 

life cycle insertion, as well as in remote access attacks. 
CYBER WARFARE I 321

Cyber Attack and Exploitation 

Cyber attacks can disrupt operational forces in a number of ways. Not only 

could their access to information be denied, but possibly more important, the 

information could be corrupted, thereby leading to a loss of confidence in all 

information. 

However, the cyber threat is not a case of “one size fits all.” A few 

spectacular penetration examples do not imply the complete vulnerability of the 

force. Rather, there are significant differences in the ease and means of 

penetration depending on command involvement and level of preparedness, the 

type of network (NIPRNET and SIPRNET [DOD’s unclassified and classified 

networks], other wide-area classified networks, and tactical networks), and effects 

sought from the attack or exploitation. Examples of the type of effects that 

might be sought include disruption of command and control of forces, deny or 

corrupt situational awareness, deny or corrupt mission support information 

(targeting, navigation, intelligence, logistics), disrupt battle management and 

weapon system execution, compromise force status and location information, 

compromise plans and intelligence, and disrupt force deployment and 

sustainment. Thus, to counter the threat, planners of military operations must 

proceed in a systematic way by considering the specifics of the threat, the 

vulnerabilities of the different networks employed, the protection provided by inplace defensive measures, and the objectives of the forces affected. 

Cyber attacks against the civilian infrastructure could include several types. 

Two particularly stressing kinds would be attacks against financial and banking 

systems, and attacks against the supervisory control and data acquisition systems 

that control, for example, electricity generation and water distribution. Cyber 

attacks against U.S. infrastructure have long been a concern. Because of their 

coercive potential, attacking the infrastructure of allies and partners can also have 

serious and direct ramifications for the United States. That is, an adversary could 

inflict cyber “pain” on civilian populations of allies and partners as a means to 

get them to withdraw their support (troops, basing rights, etc.) for the United 

States in a crisis or conflict. To remain a credible partner, the United States 

would have to provide defensive support to the attacked country. This type of 

contingency does not seem to have received much consideration in DOD 

(although the recent Estonia attacks may have spurred some planning efforts). 

There are two critical aspects to the development and execution of successful 

counters to cyber attack and exploitation. The first is recognizing that 
322 I PART VI. CHAPTER 21 

responsibilities fall to both operational commanders and technical specialists—

commanders of the “old fashioned” kinetic forces must prepare those forces to 

operate in an environment of degraded networks and information. Contingency 

plans and reconstitution processes must be thought through and practiced in 

advance. The second critical aspect is that U.S. cyber exploitation and attack 

need to be fully applied to its cyber defense. U.S. forces use computer network 

exploitation to understand the battle space, and computer network attack to 

respond to and defeat attackers. 

To expand on the second point above, the following gives a systematic set of 

steps for conducting cyber defense with integrated support of cyber offense: 

 apply computer network exploitation and “traditional” intelligence to 

understand the nature of the threat 

 maintain situational awareness of networks 

 provide indications and warning of impending attacks/exploitation 

 maintain computer network defense in depth 

 detect network penetrations rapidly 

 respond rapidly to control damage and counterattack, possibly employing 

preemptive attack 

 restore degraded networks and corrupted data 

In short, defense against cyber attacks and exploitation should apply the 

broadest set of means possible, as is the case in any warfighting operation. 

Improvement Efforts 

The task force examined a number of ongoing efforts aimed at enhancing the 

U.S. posture for countering the cyber warfare threat, including national activities 

that cannot be further discussed here. While each of the efforts differs in its 

maturity and level of effort, significant shortcomings remain in DOD’s readiness 

and capability to respond to cyber attacks: 

 U.S. Strategic Command operational centers overseeing computer 

network defense and integrated support from National Security 

Agency (NSA) assets 
CYBER WARFARE I 323

 operational activities under service commands, such as the Army’s 1st 

Information Operations Command, Navy’s Network Warfare Command, 

and the Air Force’s Cyber Command 

 combatant command and service exercises assessing information 

assurance preparedness 

 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff development of National Military Strategy 

for Cyberspace Operation and follow-on products 

 Deputy Secretary of Defense directed GIG mission assurance effort to 

ensure execution of essential functions in the face of cyber attacks 

 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 

Integration (ASD [NII])/DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) 

development of information assurance compliance policy 

 programmatic developments, including several parties, such as ASD 

(NII)/DOD CIO, USD (I), NSA, and the Defense Security Agency 

 classified national activities 

Assessment and Recommendations 

Given the nature of the threat and the actions being taken to counter the 

threat, including knowledge of the activities listed in the previous section, the 

study members chose eight assessment areas on which to focus. The eight areas 

are characterized as follows: 

1. How well-prepared are operational forces to conduct their missions in 

the face of cyberspace attacks? 

2. Are inter-organizational relations adequate for preparing for and 

responding to cyberspace attacks? 

3. Have proper command and control concepts and procedures been 

developed for conducting cyberspace operations? 

4. Is the workforce adequate for conducting cyberspace operations? 

5. Are existing acquisition plans and programs adequate for defending 

against cyberspace attacks, and what improvements are required? 

6. Are changes in policy and legislation necessary to enhance the ability to 

conduct cyberspace defense? 

7. What is the role and responsibility of DOD in defense against cyber 

attacks on the U.S. homeland? 

8. What concepts can be developed to deter cyberspace attacks? 
324 I PART VI. CHAPTER 21 

Each area was carefully reviewed during the course of the study and a set of 

significant findings and recommendations determined. The recommendations fall 

into two categories: principal recommendations and additional recommendations. 

The difference is not intended to imply that the additional recommendations are 

less important. Rather, it was possible to build more substantial recommendations 

in the areas identified as principal. 

Before moving to the individual assessments and recommendations, it is 

useful to identify the higher-order objectives that guided their development. The 

cyber warfare recommendations put forth in the following sections will enable 

DOD to: 

 Gain a much deeper understanding of the effects of cyber attacks on 

operations, both current and future. It is difficult to develop strategies, 

plans, and programs without “ground truth.” 

 Strengthen defense against cyber attacks through the integrated 

application of attack and exploitation in support of defense, while paying 

particular attention to intelligence and situational awareness. 

 Greatly expand preparation to operate in conditions of degraded 

information assurance. Even exquisite defense against cyber attacks 

cannot guarantee success. 

 Be prepared to assume a role in homeland cyber defense, if that role 

should be assigned. Critical attacks on the homeland could lead the 

President to direct DOD support. 

Preparedness of Operational Forces 

To gain an understanding of the preparedness of the nation’s operational 

forces, a set of questions about operational preparedness was posed to each of 

the military services. However, the clearest, most specific set of data on the 

subject came from the synopsized Information Assurance and Interoperability 

(IA&I) assessments of combatant commands and (to a lesser extent) individual 

service exercises. These assessments were prepared by the office of the Director, 

Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). The detailed OT&E assessments 

for the individual exercises are carried out by each of the service’s Operational 

Test Agency (OTA) in support of the combatant commands and the services. 

Congress mandated that the DOT&E conduct information assurance 

assessments of Combatant Command and Service exercises. Since 2003, over 60 
CYBER WARFARE I 325

exercises have been assessed. The set of exercises for which DOT&E has 

conducted assessments is shown at the top of Figure 6-5. (Bold type indicates the 

exercises with the most significant information assurance assessments.) 

Note: Congressionally mandated information assurance assessments begun in 2003 – 60+ conducted to 

date. 

Source: Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 

Figure 6-5. DOT&E Exercise Assessments 

The results of these assessments are presented to combatant commands 

(typically to command J6s organizations) for their use in addressing vulnerabilities. 

The extent to which fixes have been implemented varies significantly from 

command to command. 

There are two general questions to be assessed in the exercise results: 

1. How good are the exercises from a cyber warfare perspective? 

2. What do these exercises reveal about the operational preparedness of the 

U.S. forces? 

The findings derived from the exercise results are: 

 Cyber attacks are played regularly in combatant command exercises— 

but not all combatant commands are strongly engaged. Furthermore, red 

team activities are often restrained (a pending CJCS directive may 

strengthen cyber play in exercises). 
326 I PART VI. CHAPTER 21 

 Red teams are allowed to test penetrations, but usually not allowed to 

exercise the consequences of those penetrations (data corruption, etc.). 

 Extensive exercise data assessing policy compliance now exists, but 

assessments are just starting to address operational effectiveness. 

 While exercises show some improvement in force preparedness, 

significant deficiencies remain. 

 Exercise red team results indicate the ability to penetrate networks 

(details classified). 

In sum, exercises continue to grow in terms of analytical sophistication (the 

data presented in the table in Figure 6-5 has become available only recently), but 

the means to truly assess operational impacts are just beginning to be developed. 

Additionally, significant shortcomings in the operational preparedness of the 

forces were routinely found. 

The table at the bottom of Figure 6-5 is a summary, provided by DOT&E, 

of 52 assessments of policy compliance conducted from fiscal years 2005–2007, 

showing both current status and changes over the past three years. (This is a 

stoplight chart without any green; an orange assessment is intermediate between 

yellow and red.) Policy compliance is, in turn, one measure of the operational 

preparedness of the forces for dealing with cyber attack. 

Two points follow from this table: 

1. Improvements over the three-year span are limited and significant 

deficiencies remain. 

2. The most significant deficiency is in the recovery and restoration 

category, which measures the ability of a force to resume an operationally 

effective state after being attacked. 

After evaluating these assessments, the task force concludes that while 

regular series of exercise are conducted, these exercises provide little 

operational understanding of consequences of cyber attack. As a result, 

there are significant, continuing deficiencies in the information assurance 

posture of U.S. forces. 

The information assurance assessments of combatant command exercises and 

discussions with joint and Service representatives indicate that a significant portion 

of the operations community is not seriously committed to preparing for and 
CYBER WARFARE I 327

operating against cyberspace threats. All too often, commanders and operators 

view cyber preparedness as a technical responsibility, not an operational one. Key 

to addressing this deficiency is the application of exercises and experiments, as well 

as “readiness reporting,” to assess and report how well the deficiencies found in 

the exercises are being addressed. 

While the combatant command exercises have been quite valuable in 

identifying cyber vulnerabilities and increasing awareness that they exist, exercises 

have generally stopped well short of putting stress on the forces in the way a 

capable adversary could. The forces need to be so stressed to bring home to 

them the operational consequences of such vulnerabilities and to test the plans 

the forces have developed for dealing with those vulnerabilities. Steps to provide 

for more stressing and operationally focused exercises are: 

 progress from currently measuring information assurance compliance to 

measuring operational effectiveness in the face of cyberspace threats 

 allow consequences of red team attacks to be played through fully (may 

require “resetting the clock” to allow the exercise to continue) 

 institute process led by the combatant commands for capturing and 

disseminating tactics, techniques, and procedures, and lessons learned 

from exercises and real world operations for countering cyber attacks 

One argument against playing stressing cyber threats through is they could 

lead to premature termination of an exercise if the force were wholly defeated, 

and thus preclude achieving other exercise objectives. This objection can be 

overcome by “resetting the clock” and resuming the exercise without playing the 

threat to its full extent the second time through. 

Experiments allow greater free play and exploration than do exercises (while 

not providing as much of a venue for training). Extensive series of experiments are 

required for two reasons. First, to allow “traditional” forces to develop concepts of 

operations for dealing with cyberspace threats and operating with the degradations 

those threats will impose. The second reason is to develop the concepts for 

operating within cyberspace, which will require a high degree of interplay in highly 

time-sensitive situations between cyber defense, attack, and exploitation. 

Given role of Joint Forces Command in joint concept development and 

experimentation and U.S. Strategic Command’s role in computer network 

operations, both commands can collaboratively play a lead role in seeing that 

such experiments are undertaken. Outputs of the experiments in both cases 
328 I PART VI. CHAPTER 21 

should include understanding how given cyberspace threats would affect 

operational effectiveness. Experiments in the second case (operating within 

cyberspace) will allow development of concepts for “cyber command and 

control,” and should address such factors as rules of engagement, delegation of 

authority, and enabling “100 ms” responses. These experiments can build on and 

extend current activities using information operation ranges. 

Ultimately, experiments and development of concepts for operating 

traditional forces in a cyber threat environment and operations within cyberspace 

should be carried out together, since they both contribute to overall operational 

effectiveness. But in the beginning, the two types of activities are probably best 

kept separate (but ongoing in parallel) because of the difficulties involved in 

executing each. 

PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATION: OPERATIONAL FORCES

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and 

service chiefs provide greater buy-in and participation by operations 

community in countering cyberspace threats. 

 Need two-way interaction between operations (“J3”) and network (“J6”) 

communities. 

 Combatant commands and services commit to more rigorously 

addressing cyberspace threats in exercises. Play consequences of red team 

attacks through fully. Understand operational effectiveness in the face of 

threats. 

 Combatant commands and services should be formally required to 

address deficiencies identified in exercises. Report to the Secretary of 

Defense; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and service chiefs on progress. 

 Combatant commands and services develop robust series of experiments 

to develop operational concepts for dealing with cyber threats. 

Organizational Relationships 

Many effective inter-organizational relationships are required to meet cyber 

attacks. Examples include the relationships between operational and technical 

communities, between cyber defense and cyber offense components, and between 
CYBER WARFARE I 329

military and intelligence communities. The findings in this area, based on extensive 

briefings and discussions, are: 

 Technical organizations are diligent in tracking the health of networks, 

but they tend to neglect performance measures immediately relevant to 

end-users (e.g., to see if e-mail and chat are working properly). 

 Cooperation among operational computer network defense, attack, and 

exploitation elements (in particular Joint Task Force-Global Network 

Operations [JTF-GNO] and NSA components) has developed 

substantially over the last few years. 

 There is an argument that the Cyber JIATF, which coordinates cyberefforts across relevant government departments and agencies, needs 

more formal authorities. It is now a “coalition of the willing,” albeit a 

seemingly responsive and effective one. 

 There are separations of cyber defense and offense responsibilities in the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (ASD [NII] and USD [I]) and the 

Joint Staff (J6 and J3) that impede decision making and defense-offense 

coordination. 

 U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component Command for 

Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) (the attack component) has no forces 

assigned, which could impede the timeliness of its response. This is 

primarily an issue for service components, since NSA assets are readily 

transferable. 

 “Traditional” intelligence support for cyberspace defense is lacking; a 

discipline and community to analyze and assess the cyber threat has not 

yet been developed. This involves much more than computer network 

exploitation. 

The assessment in this area is mixed. On the one hand, cooperation 

promoting coordination of defense and offense has strengthened 

significantly. At the same time, the lack of “traditional” intelligence 

support for cyberspace defense remains a significant deficiency, given 

the importance of timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence to 

planning and operations. 

Dealing with cyberspace threats requires dedicated and specialized intelligence 

support, as does any major threat. The most extensive example of such support is 

how the intelligence community organized to understand the Soviet threat during 

the Cold War. No organized process or established community has yet been 
330 I PART VI. CHAPTER 21 

formed to help understand the cyber threat, especially as it exists in states that are 

peers or near-peers in cyberspace. Overall, a dedicated and comprehensive effort is 

needed to provide the proper intelligence support for understanding and 

countering the cyberspace threat. The following recommendation outlines steps to 

achieve such a capability. 

PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATION: INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

USD (I), with support of DIA, establish a process for enhancing 

“traditional” intelligence about the cyberspace threat. 

 Develop statement of intelligence requirements from the operations and 

network communities. 

 Review current collection priorities and assess if they need to be adjusted. 

 Develop an analytical cadre at DIA and CIA, open to new thinking, to 

assess the threat. 

 Keep intelligence analysts closely coupled with the end-users. 

Cyber Command and Control 

The fundamental differences between cyber warfare and kinetic warfare 

require that new command and control concepts (and associated procedures and 

technical capabilities) be developed for cyber warfare. At the very least, 

“traditional” command and control concepts must be assessed and modified for 

application to cyber warfare. Some initial work has been done in this area. This 

work includes crafting the Chairman’s National Military Strategy for Cyberspace 

Operations and drafting an operational concept for cyberspace operations. 

Additionally, there have been related activities within the services, such as the Air 

Force’s Cybervision war games. Nevertheless, much more work needs to be 

done. For example: 

 Fundamental concepts for cyber command and control are not articulated. 

 Among the questions to be addressed: How is a commander’s intent 

expressed? What is “maneuver” in cyberspace? How are offense and 

defense integrated? 

 Additionally, delegation of authority issues for timely response by theater 

commanders has not (in general) been addressed. 
CYBER WARFARE I 331

 “Cyber situational awareness” is lacking. The status of network 

connectivity is routinely displayed, but operational implications are not 

addressed. 

 Cyber command and control requires very timely action (sometimes 

within 100s of milliseconds), which currently is not possible, in general. 

Closely associated with command and control is the need for situational 

awareness. As noted above, lack of cyber situational awareness is a significant 

shortcoming. While displays exist showing the status of networks, there are as yet 

neither means nor procedures to show the operational state of red and blue 

assets in the “cyber battle space.” 

Finally, effective operations in cyberspace require very rapid action and 

reaction since attacks can propagate across global networks in hundreds of 

milliseconds. Anticipation and timely reaction require the development of rules 

of engagement and delegation of authority. Additionally, necessary technical 

capabilities must also be developed (e.g., rule-based machine-to-machine 

interactions to avoid slow human-in-the-loop decision cycles, and increased 

automation for critical activities like reviewing audit logs). These actions have 

been taken to an extent, but much further development is needed. 

Thus, fundamental concepts for command and control of cyberspace 

operations are at the rudimentary stage; operational situational 

awareness is limited at best. The recommendations described above in the 

section on preparation of operational forces offer a solution to remedy these 

deficiencies as well. 

Workforce Development 

An adequate workforce, with specialized and unique technical and operational 

skills, is a critical component of overall capability to operate in cyberspace. With 

regard to the workforce, the study found that: 

 Responses from the services and agencies indicate the size of the 

workforce is significantly smaller than what is needed for effective 

cyberspace operations. 

 The DOT&E IA&I assessments indicate deficiencies in the training of 

the network operators (“yellow” in Figure 6-5, discussed in the previous 

section on operational preparedness). 
332 I PART VI. CHAPTER 21 

 Three levels of capabilities are needed 

- network and systems administrators 

- personnel with advanced technical capabilities to lead network defense 

activities 

- individuals with “exquisite” technical skills for cyber attack and 

exploitation 

 Skilled workforce members are lost to non-related assignments due to 

the absence of career paths, and to better paying career opportunities 

outside government. 

 Necessary training programs generally exist, but are not fully available to 

the workforce at large. 

In short, the workforce needed to operate in cyberspace is a critical 

component of the overall cyber warfare capability. Workforce development 

is an area warranting much further attention, especially given that major 

adversaries almost certainly have a significant workforce advantage over 

the United States. 

As mentioned previously, the DOT&E assessments indicate deficiencies in 

the training of network operators. But other skill sets are also needed. In 

particular, more highly skilled individuals are needed to lead network defense 

activities and to conduct computer network attack and exploitation. Creating this 

workforce will be a difficult challenge, given all the other personnel demands on 

the services and agencies as well as the opportunities for these individuals outside 

DOD. But the critical need for this workforce requires that DOD make its 

development a high priority. Military personnel with the requisite technical skills 

are already serving in the National Guard and Reserves. The challenge and 

opportunity is to include these reserve components in cyber missions to leverage 

their civilian exposure to leading edge technical developments. 

PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATION: WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in 

conjunction with ASD (NII)/DOD CIO and the Service chiefs, implement 

efforts to establish an adequate workforce for cyberspace defense. 

 Estimate number and type of personnel required and compare to current 

staffing at three levels: network and systems administration, advanced 
CYBER WARFARE I 333

technical skills for network defense, and “exquisite” skills for attack and 

exploitation. 

 Identify sources for personnel in greater numbers and with expanded 

technical expertise—possibly drawing from sources such as the guard 

and reserve components. 

 Establish and refine career fields within the services for developing and 

retaining the necessary personnel. 

 Review training and identify where enhanced training and leader 

development are required. 

Acquisition Plans and Programs 

Two subjects fall within this general assessment area: overall programmatic 

development, and the test and evaluation of acquisition programs (as distinct 

from the test and evaluation of fielded systems, discussed above for the exercise 

programs). The findings in the first area are as follows: 

 Defensive capabilities have been increasing but significant deficiencies 

remain. 

 Capabilities are still required to defend against mid-level threats; 

fortunately, those needs are largely understood. 

 Capabilities against advanced threats are also required, but these are not 

well understood. 

 The Deputy Secretary of Defense has initiated the GIG missionassurance effort to develop a major assessment and plan to ensure the 

execution of essential functions in the face of cyber attack. This effort is 

engaged in policy development now with programmatic 

recommendations to be addressed later. 

 NSA’s GIG Information Assurance Portfolio lays out a broad plan for 

improving cyber defenses, but it does not address the use of attack and 

exploitation to aid defense. 

Accordingly, DOD has been making a major effort to enhance its cyber 

defense capabilities through, for example, the concerted efforts of the 

ASD(NII)/DOD CIO working in concert with the Services and combat support 

agencies. However, this matter is still very challenging. There is at present no 
334 I PART VI. CHAPTER 21 

plan that provides a comprehensive capability for cyber operations (including 

associated attack and exploitation capabilities in support of defense), identifies 

associated investments, and ties operational benefits to those investments. 

The second area—test and evaluation of acquisition programs— refers to 

cyber defense systems per se, and to any system (e.g., weapons systems, sensors) 

that connects to the GIG. The study finds that: 

 Information assurance requirements in capability acquisition programs 

are inadequate and do not realistically reflect current and future operating 

environments. 

 Information assurance developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) is not 

being extensively pursued in existing programs. 

 Information assurance considerations in DT&E are largely confined to 

contractor activities, particularly given the de-emphasis of DT&E in 

OUSD (AT&L). 

 New incremental information technology development methods offer 

the opportunity (and need) for enhanced information assurance test and 

evaluation. 

 OT&E information assurance policy for all acquisition programs has 

recently been strengthened, but efforts by programs to initiate compliance 

activities have been limited thus far. 

With regard to the information assurance OT&E of acquisition programs, new 

and strengthened guidance was issued by the DOT&E in the fall of 2006. 

However, as of June 2007, the preparation by acquisition programs for such 

OT&E has been limited—only 6 of 25 Tier 1 programs under DOT&E oversight 

for information assurance assessment were deemed by DOT&E to have adequate 

OT&E interaction. The fact is that fielded systems have shown significant 

information assurance shortcomings. At the same time, no acquisition program to 

date has failed information assurance OT&E, which could indicate that 

information assurance OT&E was not sufficiently stressing or that it did not fully 

reflect the operational environment into which the program was fielded. These 

environments can vary significantly over the lifetime of the systems involved. 

In summary, significant acquisition planning efforts are underway. But 

an operationally driven plan, with an expeditious sense of implementation, 

is lacking. Further, test and evaluation of acquisition programs does not 

reflect the changing life cycle environment. 
CYBER WARFARE I 335

OT&E, conducted just prior to system fielding, is receiving significant 

attention. But test and evaluation is required throughout the life cycle of systems, 

from development through their use in the field. This need is particularly 

heightened with the incremental development of systems and services, and the 

rapid evolution of the threat. 

One important requirement is for a network test bed, such as might be 

obtained by the broad application of the Federated Development and 

Certification Environment (FDCE) concept being developed by the Defense 

Information Systems Agency (DISA). By federating disparate development and 

test infrastructure; employing net-centric principles; and instituting standardized 

testing, evaluating, and certifying processes with the right governance, DOD can 

speed transition, capturing both risk and opportunity costs and achieving higher 

levels of mission assurance. 

The intent is that the GIG FDCE will provide for a persistent, operationally 

realistic environment in which materiel provider, test and evaluation, service 

provider/consumer, and user communities can execute their responsibilities to 

develop, evaluate, and certify new capabilities prior to their being fully deployed 

onto the GIG. Existing and new development and test infrastructure, along with 

existing GIG transport services, will be connected to provide the foundation for 

rapid development and delivery of new capabilities. Under policy established by 

the DOD CIO, procedures will be implemented to rapidly enable the 

employment of these assets in support of GIG capability development and 

testing by any materiel provider. DISA will establish a GIG FDCE operations 

and maintenance entity in support of materiel provider, test and evaluation, 

service provider/consumer, and user activities and responsibilities. 

PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATION: ACQUISITION 

USD (AT&L), working with the DOT&E and ASD (NII)/DOD CIO, 

establish an information assurance test and evaluation process that spans 

the life cycle of systems. 

 Needed because of rapid evolution of threat and continual software and 

hardware upgrades. 

 For all systems (information technology, weapon, and sensor), establish 

guidelines for the extent of information assurance testing required in 

DT&E; include red teams. 
336 I PART VI. CHAPTER 21 

 Characterize target run-time environments for candidate capability areas 

(e.g., command and control and intelligence) for capability acquisitions. 

 Mature the DISA FDCE process and apply to all information technology 

systems development. Ensure representative operator involvement in 

FDCE execution. 

 Feed the lessons learned from combatant command information assurance 

assessments involving federal systems back into acquisition programs. 

DOD devotes much effort to planning for cyberspace defense investments, 

but the work can often be slow in coming to fruition and not directly associated 

with operational benefits. The following recommendation details steps to redress 

those deficiencies. Key is the exercise of leadership in the face of complex DOD 

processes. 

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATION

ASD (NII)/DOD CIO ensure that investment and compliance 

activities for addressing cyberspace threats are conducted in an 

expeditious and operationally focused manner. 

 Lead effort to identify the operational benefits associated with proposed 

investments. 

 In the face of continuous process and study, provide leadership to 

identify particular investments with high operational benefit to make 

now. Design and test for resilience (continuity of operations is a subset). 

 Continue promoting information assurance compliance measures, but do 

so in context of their operational benefits, not simply “compliance for 

compliance’s sake.” 

Policy and Legislation 

Policy and legislation strongly influence the actions that can be carried out in 

cyber defense as well as in attack and exploitation in support of defense. The key 

issue is that adversaries can attack and exploit the United States from any location 

within the global reach of cyberspace, but U.S. authorities to counter such attacks 

change organizational jurisdiction based on the origin of the incursion. 
CYBER WARFARE I 337

 Most legislation and some policy applying to cyberspace operations 

predate the modern era of globally distributed networks and information 

access. 

 Cyberspace is borderless, but organizational jurisdiction changes across 

U.S. borders (e.g., between DOD and FBI). This slows the ability to 

respond to and track attacks, and gather intelligence. Adversaries take 

advantage of these limitations. 

 A comprehensive assessment of policy and legislation is needed. The 

politically sensitive nature of factors involved requires a public dialogue 

to gain necessary understanding and support; this especially applies to 

issues of access versus privacy. 

Policy matters involved include delegation of authority and resolution of 

interagency coordination issues. Examples of relevant legislation are the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, the Computer Security Act of 1987, and 

the Federal Information Management Security Act of 2002. The issue is both 

whether adequate authorities exist and how existing authorities can be 

streamlined and de-conflicted across departments and agencies. An important 

issue to consider is whether authorities and procedures could be less restrictive in 

time of crisis or war than their peacetime counterparts. The sensitivity of the 

issues involved requires that the review of policy and legislation, and any 

subsequent efforts to alter them, should be carried out in a manner to gain public 

support and endure through the transition of Presidential administrations. Some 

activity to address these matters is ongoing (specifics classified). 

The inside-outside U.S. distinction of organization authorities is at 

odds with the borderless nature of cyberspace. 

Policy and legislation define the actions allowed in cyber defense and offense. 

An assessment of policy and legislation is needed to ensure that the proper 

actions are allowed, consistent with the overall principles of the U.S. government 

and society. These actions occur both across interagency lines and within the 

military chain of command. 

The administration has activities ongoing to address the interagency 

dimension, but actions within the military operational chain must also be 

considered. The military must have the flexibility necessary to enable timely 

response to cyber attacks, to include from the perspective of the field commander, 

who may not have the time to go “up the chain” for approval to act. 
338 I PART VI. CHAPTER 21 

RECOMMENDATION: POLICY AND LEGISLATION

USD (P), with ASD (NII)/DOD CIO and the Commander of U.S. 

Strategic Command, identify changes in policy and legislation needed to 

enhance effectiveness of countering cyberspace threats. 

 Work with interagency partners to develop processes needed for 

coordinated cyber operations between DOD, intelligence, law 

enforcement, and homeland security communities. Political sensitivities 

involved (such as privacy issues) require that the U.S. government have a 

“strategic communication” plan before rolling out this issue publicly. 

 Implement military operational processes to enable nearly instantaneous 

defensive and offensive responses to cyber attacks. Meet needs of field 

commanders as well as strategic needs. Establish delegation of authority 

and rules of engagement for both peacetime and wartime situations. 

Homeland Cyber Defense 

Cyber attacks against the U.S. homeland could affect U.S. military forces in 

two ways. Either directly by destruction or degradation of assets required by the 

forces (e.g., logistics and transportation capabilities), or indirectly through “pain” 

on the civil society influencing the population and the political leadership. 

 DHS has the lead for securing the United States against cyber attacks, but 

in event of a major attack the President could turn to DOD, and the 

department must be prepared. 

 DOD-developed technical capabilities have applicability to wider 

government and civil cyber defense. 

 Interagency coordination is essential for effective defense (e.g., coupling 

of legal, intelligence, and defense). 

 Cyber attacks on the homeland (as well as WMD attacks) could require a 

“national command and control” capability to effect necessary 

interagency response. The DHS-led National Command and 

Coordination Capability (NCCC) effort, as currently construed, is not 

likely to provide the necessary capability. 

DOD’s responsibility (in particular, U.S. Strategic Command) to be prepared 

for cyber attacks on the civilian infrastructure may be made explicit in the Unified 
CYBER WARFARE I 339

Command Plan for 2007, now under preparation. In addition, some activity 

(specifics classified) to address the matters raised above is ongoing. 

A related issue, noted under the last bullet above, is the need to establish a 

“command and control” capability at the national level to deal with any major 

catastrophic event affecting the United States. An effort in that direction is the 

NCCC, being led by DHS. However, that effort is now concerned primarily with 

matters of communications connectivity. A far broader approach focused on 

senior-level decision-making and means to reassure the nation would be required 

to deal with truly catastrophic events. 

Cyber attacks against the U.S. government or the U.S. economy and 

populace in general represent a critical threat that a peer or near-peer 

could employ against the United States for coercive or deterrent purposes. 

DOD must contribute to planning for such contingencies and be prepared to 

accept an operational role if such occurs. In fact, Unified Command Plan 2007 is 

expected to assign Strategic Command the responsibility to be so prepared, which 

would allow DOD to aggressively pursue the recommendation outlined below. 

PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATION: HOMELAND CYBERDEFENSE

The Secretary of Defense, with the Secretary of Homeland Security, 

determine how DOD can best contribute to national cyber defense 

planning and be prepared to assume greater responsibilities during major 

cyber attacks affecting U.S. government and civilian infrastructure. 

 Establish a well-defined set of procedures for integration of DOD and 

DHS cyber defense activities. 

 Participate in interagency coordination required for effective defense. 

 Participate in developing a national command and controls and 

situational awareness capability, considering how such might grow from 

existing and planned DOD capabilities. 

 Apply, as feasible, DOD developed technologies for broader national 

cyber defense. 

 Determine the role DOD can play in strengthening cyber defense 

capabilities in and through industry (such as establishing policies for 

technical cooperation). 
340 I PART VI. CHAPTER 21 

Deterrence 

Deterrence is critical to the overall cyber warfare posture, just as it is to 

“traditional” warfighting. The findings in this area are: 

 A brief review of the literature and related discussions reveals no 

substantive deterrence concepts based on currently realistic capabilities. 

 A strong defense and effective counter-attack capability contribute to 

deterrence. This is not the case today, but possible in the future. 

 Deterrence in cyberspace may hold at risk assets outside cyberspace. 

 Deterrence considerations must address the meaning and consequence of 

escalation in cyberspace attack and counter-attack. 

 Attribution is critical to any concept of deterrence. This is very difficult 

to accomplish today; it is an open question as to how much improvement 

can be made. 

Thus, while there are fragments of ideas relating to deterrence, no 

substantive concepts based on currently realistic capabilities have been 

developed. All that can really be said at this time as a conclusion is that efforts to 

develop such concepts and capabilities should continue. 

The subject of attribution (identification of the attacking party) is worth 

some further discussion, however. Attribution is obviously critical in order to 

retaliate against an attacker, but it is very difficult to obtain because the 

perpetrator of an attack can mask his or her identity by operating through an 

intermediate site located far from the attacker’s actual location. Currently, 

attribution can require detailed forensic analysis and take from days to months 

(or longer). There are, however, some technical developments (specifics 

classified) that could make attribution simpler in the future. 
CROSSCUTTING OBSERVATIONS I 341

Chapter 22. Crosscutting Observations 

Four observations apply across the three asymmetric environments examined 

in the preceding chapters: 

1. U.S. forces are ill-prepared to operate in or “fight through” the 

environments such attacks would create because: 

- They are insufficiently trained and equipped to do so. 

- They have highly vulnerable systems that can be improved. 

- They do not exercise rigorously to measure readiness or progress. 

2. Determining precisely who initiated a WMD, space, or cyber attack can 

be difficult or impossible without the right sensors and continuous 

situational awareness. 

3. U.S. forces generally do not have standing tactics, techniques, 

procedures, or equipment to rapidly reconstitute key elements of space or 

networking capabilities if they are rendered inoperable by an attack. 

4. The nation has chosen not to develop and publicly deploy offensive 

capabilities in the space and cyber realms. 

The study concludes that in every case, military forces must be able to 

operate effectively for extended periods of time and to WIN in degraded 

environments. This is a tall order but critically important. Potential asymmetric 

capabilities could have catastrophic consequences in future combat operations 

unless action is taken now to offset these vulnerabilities. The assessment offered 

here should sharpen the understanding within DOD about the need for 

investments in countering WMD, and for preparing to conduct operations in 

space and cyberspace. 

War against adversaries who use asymmetric capabilities against the United 

States will be a new experience for the armed forces. An intellectual foundation 

is needed as a basis for developing concepts of operations. Such a foundation 

should serve as the basis for training and leadership development programs in 

operational warfighting that are not presently available. Experimentation, 

exercises, and assessments are necessary to gain experience and refine 

operational concepts. Although not discussed in much detail in this report 

because of security concerns, offense in each of these areas is equally if not more 

important than defense and certainly both are required. 

Part VII 

Strategic Communication: 

Another Instrument of U.S. Power 

IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION I 345

Chapter 23. The Importance of Strategic 

Communication 

The cost of employing military force to advance national interests is on the 

rise—not only financial cost but also loss of life and global standing. And these 

costs will be on the rise even if all recommendations proposed in the preceding 

chapters are fully implemented. Technology will continue to proliferate, our 

homeland will continue to be insecure. Thus, our national security strategy 

should seek to apply both “hard” and “soft” instruments of power to achieve the 

nation’s objectives—employing coordinated defense, diplomacy, and 

development. Greater attention needs to be paid to instruments of national 

power other than military force. Diplomacy (e.g., treaties, negotiation) and 

development (e.g., foreign aid, fiscal and monetary policy, trade policy) are 

additional instruments. Strategic communication can amplify or diminish the 

effect of defense, diplomacy, and development. Accordingly, strategic 

communication was chosen as a unique focus of this study. 

Strategic communication is an integrated process that includes the 

development, implementation, assessment, and evolution of public actions and 

messages in support of policies, interests, and long-term goals. This challenging, 

senior-level management responsibility spans complex organizational capabilities, 

broad geographies, diverse audiences, collaborative partnerships, and timeframes. 

In successful strategic communication, “actions” are often the most authentic 

“messages.” 

Strategic communication differs from public relations and public affairs. 

It includes but goes beyond media affairs and short-term news streams to focus 

on mid-range and long-term objectives that require multi-disciplinary capabilities, 

engagement in a dialogue of ideas, and durable partnerships with civil society 

organizations. As such, strategic communication is more “long-term strategic.” 

Public affairs is more “short-term tactical.” Coordination between them is vital 

and facilitated in the Department of Defense (DOD) through development of an 

Integrated Strategic Communication Plan. 

In recent years, private sector and civil sector organizations around the globe 

have embraced the capabilities associated with integrated strategic 

communication. Many have reorganized and resourced their organizations to 
346 I PART VII. CHAPTER 23 

enhance the capacity of strategic communication to support mission 

accomplishment as well as to mitigate potential competitive threats. 

The release of the first U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic 

Communication has recently elevated the role of strategic communication in 

achieving long-term U.S. national security goals However, the U.S. government 

has yet to identify the comprehensive leadership structure, interagency 

coordination process, and resource levels through which sustained long-range 

planning and implementation of “whole of government” integrated strategic 

communication can be achieved. 

This study sought to assess U.S. government capability gaps in strategic 

communication in the face of innovative technologies, systems, operational 

concepts, and management processes that have developed since the 2004 report 

of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication. The chapters that 

follow summarize key findings and recommend opportunities to strengthen the 

strategic communication management process to enhance its ability to serve U.S. 

national interests in an increasingly complex and multi-dimensional policy 

environment. 

Effective Strategic Communication is Vital to Achieve 

U.S. Strategic Objectives 

The U.S. National Security Strategy85 and the U.S. National Strategy for Public 

Diplomacy and Strategic Communication86 list the following strategic objectives: 

 champion aspirations for human dignity 

 strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent 

attacks against us and our friends 

 work with others to defuse regional conflicts 

 prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

 ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and 

free trade 

 

85. See www.whitehouse.gov/nss/2006/ 

86. See U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, 

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87427.pdf 
IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION I 347

 expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the 

infrastructure of democracy 

 develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global 

power 

 transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges 

and opportunities of the 21st century 

 engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization 

Strategic communication is critical to achieving all U.S. strategic objectives. It 

is an increasingly powerful instrument, essential to the success of persuasive, 

cooperative, and coercive instruments of national power. It involves significant 

and sustained investments across all departments and agencies; and it requires 

coordinated policies, programs, messages, and actions. 

Positive Changes Implemented: Department of State 

Since the publication of the 2004 Defense Science Board Report on Strategic 

Communication, progress has been made in improving the nation’s strategic 

communication capability.87 Perhaps the most important advance has been in 

establishing strategic communication as a priority at the highest levels of the U.S. 

government. In April 2006 a Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) chaired by 

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen P. 

Hughes, was established.88 In June 2007, the PCC released a U.S. National 

Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication.89 This document 

presents a clear and well-articulated strategy intended to serve as a framework for 

strategic communication implementation plans across the interagency. Agencies 

are in the process of preparing and submitting to the PCC their specific strategic 

communications plans. 

In order to achieve greater agility in communicating U.S. policy, the 

Department of State has established three public diplomacy “hubs” in Dubai, 

London and Brussels.90 These operations are in response to the increasingly 

regional nature of today’s media, which transcend national borders and require that 

 

87. See http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf 

88. A discussion of roles and responsibilities of the PCC is included in U.S. National Strategy on Public 

Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, June 2007. 

89. See http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87427.pdf 

90. See http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/84970.pdf 
348 I PART VII. CHAPTER 23 

U.S. government spokespersons get into regional news cycles, not those in 

Washington D.C. In Dubai, for example, more than one thousand media 

operations are represented.91 The public diplomacy hubs have increased the U.S. 

presence in pan-Arab media by more than thirty percent since they were 

established in 2006.92 In addition, Under Secretary Hughes has issued a set of 

“rules” to empower the nation’s diplomats to seize media opportunities in making 

the case for U.S. policies without the slow headquarters clearance process that 

previously characterized media operations in the Department of State.93

When the 2004 DSB report was written, the U.S. government had no effective, 

agile way to respond to what international media were communicating to mass 

audiences (in Arabic, Farsi, or other regional languages) about America, its policies, 

and its military operations. The State Department’s new Rapid Response Unit—

consisting of a state-of-the-art broadcast center—now constantly monitors 

international media, with the help of the Intelligence Community’s Open Source 

Center, and produces a daily report that informs policy makers of what is driving 

world news from Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America. The Rapid 

Response Unit provides the U.S. position on many of those issues in an email to 

several thousand senior officials, from cabinet secretaries to combatant 

commanders. Some combatant commands have similar rapid response units. 

With significant assistance from the DODand the Open Source Center, the 

Department of State has set up an interagency Counter Terrorism Communication 

Center to develop culturally sensitive messages to undermine ideological support 

for terror. 

The Department of State also has begun a Digital Outreach initiative, in 

which American Arabic language bloggers counteract the misinformation and 

disinformation rampant in the Arab blogosphere about the United States, its 

policies, and actions.94 These individuals, who clearly identify themselves as 

employees of the Department of State, face off daily against an army of 

anonymous bloggers unbound by any standard of “truth,” providing verifiable, 

factual information to anyone reading Arab language blogs. 

 

91. See http://www.state.gov/r/us/2007/88630.htm 

92. See http://www.state.gov/r/us/2007/88630.htm 

93. See http://www.state.gov/r/us/64106.htm 

94. "At State Department Blog Team Joins Muslim Debate," http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ 

09/22/Washington/22bloggers.html 
IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION I 349

The national strategy recognizes that perhaps the most effective tool of 

strategic communication over the last fifty years has been educational exchange 

programs in critical areas. Since the 2004 DSB report, there has been a substantial 

increase in the number of exchange participants, from approximately 27,000 to 

almost 39,000 in 2006. Following a decline in the number of student visas issued in 

the aftermath of September 11, 2001, which reached a low of 473,719 in 2003, the 

downward trend has been reversed. More than 591,000 student visas were issued 

in 2006 and the Department of State has partnered with America’s higher 

education community to send a clear message that the United States wants the 

future leaders of the world to come to the United States to study and get to know 

its culture, social values, and political system. 

Similar gains have been made in other programs. The 

flagship Fulbright Exchange program has seen substantial 

increases both in the number of American students and 

researchers studying abroad and in the numbers of 

foreign scholars and researchers coming to the United 

States to teach and conduct research. 

English as a Second Language (ESL) instruction 

programs and infrastructure are expanding, and currently the State Department is 

funding ESL programs reaching more than 10,000 young people—often from 

marginalized populations—in more than 40 Muslim-majority countries. ESL 

instruction provides young people with an employable skill and opens the door to 

dialogue with America and its values. 

Promising steps have been taken to institute a culture of measurement in the 

field of public diplomacy. Under Secretary Hughes established a unified Public 

Diplomacy Evaluation Office to undertake a range of evaluation and performancemeasurement initiatives. This office has developed an evaluation strategy 

encompassing the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of 

International Information Programs, and overseas missions; a core set of public 

diplomacy performance indicators; a global public diplomacy tracking system; and 

the first pilot study to attempt to quantify the aggregate impact of public 

diplomacy programs and products. 

Positive Changes Implemented: Department of Defense 

The study reviewed the DOD activities involving strategic communication 

since the DSB 2004 report and is encouraged that several recommendations from 
350 I PART VII. CHAPTER 23 

that report are being pursued. Significant capability shortfalls in several combatant 

commands remain, however, and should be resourced without further delay. 

Notably, the 2005 Quadrennial Review process included for the first time a 

Strategic Communication Working Group. That group produced a Strategic 

Communication Roadmap signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 

September 25, 2006. 

As members of the Strategic Communication Integration Group (SCIG), the 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Public Affairs, the Director of the Joint Staff, and representatives 

from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Legislative Affairs formed an executive committee that meets on 

a weekly basis, with bi-weekly meetings with the deputy secretary. 

A high-level mechanism for re-allocating resources within DOD, the deputy 

secretary’s Advisory Working Group now includes SCIG-recommended resource 

requirements in its issues for decision. 

A new Deputy Assistant Secretary for Joint Communications was established 

in the public affairs office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to support 

SCIG activities, oversee initial compliance with the Strategic Communication 

Roadmap tasks, and better define the role of public affairs personnel in 

supporting combatant commanders and joint task force commanders overseas. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy established a separate office, 

Support to Public Diplomacy, in January 2007, with a deputy assistant secretary 

reporting directly to the principal deputy—paralleling a specific recommendation 

by the DSB in 2004. That office is now coordinating across functional and 

regional offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff to 

institutionalize the development of strategic communication plans to counter 

ideological support to terrorism. 

At the combatant commands, U.S. Central Command plans and operates in 

the information environment through a Strategic Effects cell in Baghdad and an 

analogous function with NATO forces in Kabul. An Arab media engagement 

cell was established in Dubai in 200595, and Central Command representatives 

are working with Open Source Center and Defense Intelligence Agency 

 

95. This cell was disestablished in the wake of the new State Department hub in Dubai. 
IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION I 351

representatives to fashion a regionally focused media analysis and response 

center in Qatar. 

DOD Regional Centers for Security Studies, and the 

war colleges, provide counter ideological support for 

terrorism strategies to future foreign civilian and military 

leaders involved in security functions in their countries. 

 The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in 

cooperation with the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy and the Open Source Center, provides 

unclassified daily reports on Arab media and terrorist use of the Internet relevant 

to the geographic combatant commanders, as well as situational awareness 

briefings concerning terrorist propaganda to US forces deploying to Iraq. 

U.S. European Command has re-organized its information activities around a 

concept called Operation Assured Voice, which has a combined information 

operation and public affairs cell reporting to the Chief of Staff. Websites aimed at 

the Balkans and North Africa carry content in the appropriate languages to 

support the commander’s mission to shape the environment in his area of 

responsibility. The European Command approach is a model for other combatant 

commands to consider. 

U.S. Southern Command has established a separate office for strategic 

communication for “launching ideas, not Tomahawks.” 

U.S. Strategic Command, designated to support the geographic combatant 

commands with respect to information operations, currently provides a daily 

report and weekly summaries to regional commanders highlighting foreign print 

media in their regions. Strategic Command’s Joint Information Operations 

Warfare Command is partnering with U.S. Special Operations Command to 

examine better ways to use psychological operations messaging and products to 

influence key target audiences in the war on terror. 

Special Operations Command, as both a supported and supporting 

command, has developed a trans-regional website initiative and has expanded its 

trans-regional psychological operations (PSYOP) program under the auspices of 

its Joint PSYOP Support Element. More than a dozen Special Operation 

Command Military Information Support Teams are deployed worldwide in 

support of Embassy Country Teams. 
352 I PART VII. CHAPTER 23 

As a government legacy 

support, the Open Source Center 

(formally the Foreign Broadcast 

Information Service) has expanded 

monitoring and reporting of 

foreign broadcasting and the internet, and carries foreign media products 

generated by DOD components on its global website. The Open Source Center 

has recently created a new Emerging Media Center designed to draw outside 

experts to support its work in this area. 

While many positive steps have been taken within the Departments of State 

and Defense, many of these actions have been organizational and tactically 

reactive. Fundamental transformation in the goals, methods, and structures of 

strategic communication is vital to the national interest. Collaboration between 

government and civil society on an unprecedented scale is imperative. Significant 

reforms are essential in the way strategic communication is directed and funded. 

Strategic communication can no longer be hostage to three-year cycles of shortterm commitment followed by short-term inattention. Changes must be 

substantial and durable. These kinds of changes can only occur when led by a 

President with bipartisan Congressional support. 
WHY DOES STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION MATTER I 353

Chapter 24. What is Strategic Communication and 

Why Does it Matter? 

Strategic communication is vital to U.S. national security. It is an increasingly 

powerful, multi-dimensional instrument that is critical to America’s interests and 

to achieving the nation’s strategic goals. 

 Although attention to strategic communication is widespread, its power and 

potential are generally misunderstood. Too often it is an afterthought in 

determining strategic priorities. For many it is simply a matter of crafting and 

disseminating messages. Today’s threats and opportunities call for a radically 

different approach. Asymmetric threats abroad and vulnerabilities at home are 

decreasing the effectiveness of military force and increasing the need to invest in 

other instruments of power.96 At the same time, significant new opportunities 

exist to leverage national capacity within government and to mobilize talent, 

expertise, and creativity outside government. The nation needs to build capacity 

in both with much greater emphasis on institutions that connect government and 

civil society.97

The United States can no longer depend on an instrument that is low 

priority, reactive, and episodic—something “discovered” after an attack and 

addressed only in occasional bursts of national commitment. National needs 

require a proactive and durable means to engage and influence the attitudes and 

behavior of global publics on a broad range of consequential issues. 

Strategic communication is essential to the successful use of all persuasive, 

cooperative, and coercive instruments of national power. It can amplify or 

diminish their effects. It is necessary long before, during, and after armed 

conflict. It can help prevent or limit conflict. It is central to the formulation and 

implementation of strategies, and it must be treated accordingly. 

 

96. For an expanded analysis of this point, see the forthcoming report of the DSB 2007 Summer Study on 

Challenges to Military Operations in Support of National Interests. See also John Robb, Brave New War: The Next 

Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2007). 

97. By “civil society” we mean the totality of voluntary civic, social, and commercial organizations and 

institutions that form the basis of a functioning society as opposed to the structures of a state. 
354 I PART VII. CHAPTER 24 

Strategic Communication is an Interactive Process 

Strategic communication is a sustained and coherent set of activities that 

include:98

 understanding identities, attitudes, behaviors, and cultures; media trends 

and information flows; social and influence networks; political, social, 

economic, and religious motivations. 

 advising policymakers, diplomats, and military commanders on the 

public opinion and communication implications of their strategic and 

policy choices—and on the best ways to communicate their strategies 

and policies. 

 engaging in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions that 

support national interests and, wherever possible, common interests and 

shared values. 

 influencing attitudes and behavior through communication strategies 

supported by a broad range of government and civil society activities. 

 measuring the impact of activities comprehensively and over time. 

These activities are elements in a continuous, dynamic, and iterative process 

that begins with choices among strategic priorities and deep comprehension of 

attitudes and cultures. This means more than just an appreciation of the opinions 

and motivations of others. It means seeing ourselves as others see us, rather than 

through the “looking glass” of our own perceptions. It means full use of the rich 

variety of interpretive tools available for penetrating analysis of cultures and 

influence networks. Planning, advising leaders, building relationships, advocacy 

campaigns, assessment of impact, and adaptation to changing circumstances 

follow, as illustrated in Figure 7-1. 

Strategic communication takes place in three timeframes: 

1. short-term news streams 

2. medium-range campaigns on high-value policies 

3. long-term engagement 

 

98. See also Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Strategic Communication, 

September 2004, pp. 11-13. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ 

2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf 
WHY DOES STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION MATTER I 355

Figure 7-1. Strategic Communication Process

Strategic communication is conducted not just by the Departments of State 

and Defense, but by at least 64 U.S. government agencies, 50 states, many U.S. 

cities, coalition partners, and a wide variety of civil society organizations. Public 

diplomacy, military civil affairs, military international education and training 

programs, cultural diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and 

support for democracy are among the means by which it is carried out. 

Strategic communication differs from education, journalism, advertising, 

branding, and public relations. To succeed, however, it depends on strong 

relationships with civil society and uses many of civil society’s methods, skills, 

and norms.99 Strategic communication is an instrument of statecraft that depends 

 

99. On differences between strategic communication by governments and civil society, and the value of 

importing civil society’s methods, see Todd C. Helmus, Christopher Paul, and Russell W. Glenn, Enlisting 

Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation (Washington, DC: 

2007) http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG607.pdf; U.S. General Accountability 

Office, Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research, GAO-07-904, Washington, DC, July 

2007; http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07904.pdf; and Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy as Strategic 

Communication,” Chapter 17, pp. 336-357, in James J. F. Forest (editor), Countering Terrorism and Insurgency 

in the 21st Century, volume 1, (Westport, CT: Praeger); earlier version in “Public Diplomacy and Strategic 
356 I PART VII. CHAPTER 24 

on shared knowledge and adaptive networks—both within government and 

between government and society. It must be understood, directed, coordinated, 

funded, and conducted in ways that leverage relationships with civil society in 

support of the nation’s interests at home and abroad. 

Strategic Communication Depends on Cultural Context 

While “all politics is local,” all communication is now global. Gaps between 

what the nation says and does—and gaps between what it says and what others 

hear—have strategic consequences. These “say-do” and “say-hear” gaps affect 

U.S. interests in ways that can be measured in lives, dollars, and lost opportunities. 

We, as a nation, continue to underestimate them to our disadvantage. 

Successful strategic communication requires an interactive relationship 

between senders and receivers.100 People understand and relate to ideas and 

information when they identify with what is conveyed. Successful communicators 

enlist interest and evoke common ground.101 They enlist interest through credible 

symbols (actions, images, and words) that resonate with others. They evoke 

common ground by focusing on culturally independent concepts that are globally 

valued—human dignity, health, personal safety, education, the environment, and 

economic well-being—and do so in ways that build support and mobilize allies. 

The opinions of others should not determine U.S. strategies, but taking them into 

account is critically important to any successful strategy. 

Deep appreciation that what the nation says often is not what others hear is 

also critical. Words such as “democracy,” “rule of law,” and “freedom” have 

different meanings in different cultures at different stages of their development. 

When the United States says democracy, our message may be self-rule; but others 

may hear chaos. To U.S. citizens, rule of law means order; for others it may mean 

oppression. To some, jihad means terrorism; to others it means holy war or 

 

Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms,” Paper presented at the American Political 

Science Association Conference on International Communication and Conflict, Washington, DC, August 

31, 2005, http://www8.georgetown.edu/cct/apsa/papers/ 

gregory.pdf#search=%22gregory%20firewalls%22. 

100. Steven R. Corman, Angela Trethewey, and Bud Goodall, A 21st Century Model for Communication in a 

Gobal War of Ideas: From Simplistic Influence to Pragmatic Complexity, Report #0701, Consortium for Strategic 

Communication, Arizona State University, April 3, 2007. 

101. See the section on “Historic Strategic Communication Successes” later in this chapter. 
WHY DOES STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION MATTER I 357

purification. Understanding the “pictures in the heads” of others is a crucial first 

step in strategic communication. 

Actions are more important than carefully crafted messages. Additionally, it 

is important to avoid message vulnerabilities. Messages intended to galvanize 

support at home often have negative impact internationally—such as “global war 

on terror,” “fighting them there so we don’t have to fight them here.” Images, 

body language, and media context in real and virtual worlds are messages as 

well—messages that often conflict with actions and words.102

Most people don’t choose between true and false messages. In a complex 

globalizing world they choose between trustworthy and untrustworthy 

messengers. For presidents, policymakers, diplomats, and military commanders, 

credibility and “message authority” matter more than the message. 

Strategic Communication Must Be Agile 

Strategic communication is engaged in a generational and global struggle 

about ideas. This is not a war between the West and Islam. It is not a war against 

terrorism, although it is about challenging ideas that give rise to terrorism. 

Strategic communication is an instrument that can be used to engage and 

influence global publics on a broad range of strategic issues (such as nuclear 

proliferation, trade, energy, global pandemics, climate change, and a variety of 

challenges from state and non-state actors). 

To succeed, strategic communicators must be agile and adaptive. Events and 

actions provide opportunities for interpreting positive values in fresh and 

effective ways. Some events and actions—by the United States, its allies, and its 

adversaries—can be anticipated. Engagement and influence strategies can be 

planned in advance. Other events and actions are surprises. Skilled 

communicators need a basic understanding of issues and themes. But in a world 

of rapid change, they also need the support of rapid response capabilities that 

monitor the forces and media frames driving events. They need both the 

mindsets and the tools that will enable them to seize opportunities and adapt. 

Agility is critical. 

 

102. Images of Saddam Hussein talking with visibly frightened children during Operation Desert Storm in 

1991 and the “Mission Accomplished” sign behind President Bush on the USS Abraham Lincoln after 

major combat in Iraq in 2003 make the point. 
358 I PART VII. CHAPTER 24 

Adversaries present opportunities to offer a contrasting positive vision based 

on shared values where they exist, as well as to de-legitimize their actions and 

messages. This means emphasizing actions, relationships, images, and messages 

that build on shared values. It means empowering surrogates and credible third 

parties (exchange participants, religious leaders, foreign media, and academics) 

without undermining their legitimacy. 

The United States also must identify its opponent’s weaknesses and exploit 

them vigorously. The nation should emphasize actions and statements that are 

inconsistent with prior statements or with the core values and cultures of the 

communities it seeks to influence. Attention to failures, inconsistencies, and 

falsehoods—time after time—can create a compelling story that isolates 

extremists, undermines their efforts, and possibly changes opinions and actions. 

The identities and beliefs of the audience are key. For example, the image of 

a child suicide bomber shows a violation of sacred values. To many Muslims and 

non-Muslims alike, the image of a mosque destroyed by Muslims may be an 

unexplained inconsistency and a desecration. Sometimes a single statement or 

image persists in the mind of the listeners or viewers. For example, John 

Kennedy’s statement “Ich bin ein Berliner” had lasting impact. The single image 

of an Iraqi woman holding up her finger coated with purple ink to indicate that 

she had voted had immediate impact and staying power. 

 Rapid response is challenging because of the many media organizations that 

are operating 24/7 and responding to the same situations.103 Citizen reporters 

who can transmit via a multiplicity of channels— websites, blogs, listserves, and 

virtual platforms such as YouTube—add to the challenge. All have access to 

rapid communication. Media frames of events travel across the world with light 

 

103. See Chapter 26 for an expansion on this issue. 

Reuters AP/Wide World Photo Independent Media 
WHY DOES STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION MATTER I 359

speed. They shape the perceptions of 

competing elites and global publics. Media 

frames reflect different cultural contexts and 

the mindsets of reporters and editors. In 

breaking news environments, media frames 

are not likely to change what people think, 

but they are powerful agents in telling 

people what to think about. 

Rapid responses and generational struggle are not inconsistent. Strategic 

communication requires sprinters and long-distance runners. 

Historic Strategic Communication Successes 

 Americans have had many strategic communication successes. In some cases 

it was a single document or speech (the Declaration of Independence, the 

Gettysburg address) or an image (the moon landing). In other cases, success was a 

product of actions, complemented by images and 

words, in the context of strategic objectives (the 

Marshall Plan, Dayton Accords, HIV/AIDs 

initiatives). In still other cases, long-term relationships 

between people and institutions led to success (the 

Fulbright program, large-scale educational and 

scientific exchanges). 

What were the elements of success? 

 Strategic objectives were defined at the nexus of national interests and 

shared values. 

 Sustained Presidential leadership, bipartisan support, and generous 

funding were linked to comprehensive strategies. 

 Civilian and military departments and agencies collaborated. 

 Programs and activities were culturally, politically, and/or economically 

relevant. 

 Activities were understood, timely, focused, credible, meaningful, and 

accessible to the intended populations. 

 Significant government and non-government resources were involved. 

 Successes were often scientifically and/or technologically enabled. 

Department of Defense

NASA
360 I PART VII. CHAPTER 24 

Not every element was relevant to every success, but lessons were taught and 

can be learned (Table 7-1). Effective communication strategies in the past were 

grounded in actions, relationships, images, and words. They were sustained, 

comprehensive, relevant, and adequately resourced. Presidential leadership and 

bipartisan support were critical. 

Table 7-1. Lessons Taught from Successful Strategic Communication Activities 

Actions trump words Relationships are critical 

Partners count Coordination is critical 

Messenger authority Trusted voices 

Language matters Images matter 

Speed counts Endurance counts 

Strategic Communication Challenges 

Effective strategic communication is inherently difficult. As the examples of 

historic communication successes illustrate, shared values and a genuine, positive 

correlation of interests are necessary. Ironically, the explosion of new 

communications media and the attendant social change it is spawning will make it 

more difficult to frame positive outcomes in the foreseeable future. As traditional 

barriers to information flow fall, the speed with which information circulates and 

its ubiquity will overwhelm the ability to distinguish important from trivial. More 

and more, image will overwhelm context. 

The “say-do gap,” always a challenge for powerful nations that must balance 

competing and often conflicting interests, will be more obvious. The ability of 

the U.S. government to operate in secrecy or to control messages, perceptions, 

and attitudes will be greatly diminished. 

The growing youth bulge adds to complexity. In many developing societies 

the percentage of youth in the population is rising rapidly, as that percentage 

decreases in most developed countries. Young people have access to new 

information sources that will often amplify distrust of traditional sources. 

The viral nature of electronic media, coupled with the growing proliferation 

of electronic communication devices, means that almost every action or 

operation that can be witnessed can also be recorded, distributed, manipulated, 
WHY DOES STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION MATTER I 361

and distorted. Individual actions will be amplified. In military situations, small, 

tactical actions will be viewed globally and take on strategic significance. 

A thoughtful, sustained, and comprehensive response is essential. The United 

States will have to think and operate differently and must learn to think and 

communicate in ways that unite rather than divide. Polarizing rhetoric may have 

short-term benefits in motivating support at home, but abroad it can have 

adverse long-term consequences that reduce the willingness of potential allies to 

collaborate and give unwarranted legitimacy and unity of effort to dispersed 

adversaries. 

 The more difficult interpersonal communication is, the more important it 

becomes. The more difficult it is to engage potential adversaries in a common 

search for solutions, the more important it is to try. The easier it is to employ 

military power to respond to challenges to national interests, the more important 

it becomes to consider alternative responses. 

Transforming Strategic Communication 

The world is changing with profound consequences for how the United States 

considers and uses strategic communication. During the hot and cold wars of the 

20th century, states were dominant actors. Relatively few non-state actors occupied 

the world stage. Contests about ideas were secular struggles between authoritarian 

and democratic worldviews. Bright lines separated war and peace. Information 

systems used analog technologies. Governments organized on hierarchical 

principles. National armies fought on battlefields with industrial age weapons. 

That world no longer exists. Globalism, networks, non-state actors, ideas, 

advanced technologies, and new forms of warfare are transforming strategic 

communication and all other instruments of 21st century statecraft. The United 

States will struggle to engage in effective strategic communication in a world 

where states are becoming more limited in their legitimacy and in their capacity 

to satisfy human needs. Highly centralized, prescriptive, top-down 

communication strategies will matter far less. Resilient strategies grounded in 

deep comprehension of the attitudes, cultures, and goals of others will matter 

much more. Strong networks, rather than hierarchies, will be critical to these 

strategies—networks characterized by openness, trust, access, and collaborative 

effort by multiple public and private actors with diverse motives. 
362 I PART VII. CHAPTER 24 

A fundamental transformation in the goals, methods, and structures of 

strategic communication is vital to the national interest. Collaboration between 

government and civil society on an unprecedented scale is imperative. Significant 

reforms are essential in the way strategic communication is directed and funded. 

Strategic communication can no longer be hostage to cycles of short-term 

commitment followed by inattention. Change must be substantial and durable. 

This kind of change can only occur when led by a President with bipartisan 

Congressional support. 
THE WORLD IS CHANGING I 363

Chapter 25. The World is Changing 

The world has changed in fundamental ways that profoundly affect the 

significance and role of strategic communication. It has become increasingly 

interdependent (global economies, environment, and media), urbanized (over half 

the world’s population live in cities104), and influenced by youth (44 percent of the 

world’s population is under 25, and 27 percent is under 15105). Failed states have 

provided enabling conditions and safe havens for non-state actors to develop and 

engage in global terrorism. The spread of the Internet, information technology, 

and communications has accelerated globalization and further enabled terrorism. 

According to independent polling, the United States faces continuing decay in 

support for U.S. policy and rising anti-Americanism which challenges national 

interests.106 Actions and words with global impact are increasingly important in this 

interdependent world as evidenced by activities such as the Peace Corps and U.S. 

support to the Indonesian Tsunami relief. Unfortunately, the U.S. government has 

a poor understanding of foreign languages and cultures which exacerbates the 

challenge. This chapter details global changes, identifies opportunities and threats, 

and articulates their implications for strategic communication. 

Multiple Dimensions of Change 

Accelerating Globalization 

Faster, deeper, cheaper interdependencies at transcontinental distances are 

transforming social consciousness and concrete connections between states and 

between states and non-state actors.107 While globalism is not new, the speed and 

density of globalism are new. 

 

104. UN General Assembly, GA/EF/3160, 26 October 2006. See http://www.un.org/News/ 

Press/docs/2006/gaef3160.doc.htm 

105. U.S. Census Bureau, see http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbagg 

106. Pew Global Attitudes Project 

107. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Governance in a Globalizing World,” in Robert O. 

Keohane, ed., Power and Governance in a Partially Globalizing World, (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 193-218. 
364 I PART VII. CHAPTER 25 

Demographics, Migration, Urbanization 

More people, more people on the move, and more young people are creating 

formidable challenges. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that 44 percent of the 

world’s population is under the age of 25108 and projects a population increase 

worldwide from 6 billion in 1999 to 9 billion in 2042109, with highest growth rates 

in an arc extending from Brazil, through Africa, the Middle East and the 

Caucuses to South and Southeast Asia. Academic and government studies show 

that a youth bulge in this arc increases the likelihood of instability, extremism, 

and outbreaks of civil conflict.110 People on the move include highly skilled 

professionals, economic migrants with few skills, and large numbers of refugees 

and displaced persons.111 For the first time in history, according to United Nation 

and World Bank reports, more than half of the world’s people live in cities.112 

Layered Governance 

More governance occurs in global, regional, sub-national, and non-territorial 

public spheres. State actors still dominate on many global issues. Increasingly, 

however, rules governing behavior and means to satisfy human needs and wants 

exist in: 

 global and regional associations of states (United Nations, World Trade 

Organization, and the European Union) 

 sub-state connections between provinces, cities, “countries within 

countries” (Quebec and Kurdistan) 

 networks of government professionals focused on single issues 

 the activities of a multitude of civil society actors at all levels 

 

108. U.S. Census Bureau, see http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbagg 

109. U.S. Census Bureau, see http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpopinfo.html 

110. See for example http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf 

111. Robert P. Cincotta, Robert Engleman, Daniele Anastasion, The Security Demographic: Population and Civil 

Conflict After the Cold War, Population Action International, Washington, DC, 

2003http://www.populationaction.org/Publications/Reports/The_Security_Demographic/ 

The_Security_Demographic_Population_and_Civil_Conflict_After_the_Cold_War.pdf; UNHCR, 2006 

Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons, June 2007 

http://www.rms.org.nz/document/UNHCR%20global%20trends%202006.pdf 

112. UN General Assembly, GA/EF/3160, 26 October 2006. See http://www.un.org/News/ 

Press/docs/2006/gaef3160.doc.htm 
THE WORLD IS CHANGING I 365

Many “Big Ideas” 

A contested mix of secular and religious ideas—globalization, fundamentalism, 

terrorism, multiculturalism, post-colonialism, and anti-Americanism—has replaced 

the secular ideological struggles of the last century.113 Leaders, practitioners, 

scholars, and publics now debate “clashes of civilizations,” “plural identities,” 

“religious and secular authority in governance,” “terrorism,” “zones of democratic 

peace,” “support for democracy,” “climate change,” “the promise and perils of 

globalism,” and varieties of “anti-Americanism.” Within Islam, the contrasting 

views of Sunni and Shia, and adherents of violent and non-violent means in each, 

are shaping geopolitics and the future of one of the world’s great religions. 

Networks and Non-State Actors 

Driven by globalization and a digitized information environment, networks are 

becoming the dominant architecture of society and politics.114 Rapid change and 

reversible processes flatten hierarchies. Vertically, command and control models 

matter less, but they still matter. Horizontally, “social capital” models matter more. 

Global problems outrun the capacities of stovepiped institutions. Small events 

have systemic effects. Extraordinary growth is occurring in networks of regional 

and global groups with activist, corporate, religious, ethnic, terrorist, criminal, and 

knowledge-based agendas. 

New Paradigm of War 

Armed conflict within civilian populations by state and non-state contestants 

in frequent long-term conflicts is now the norm. Wars between states are rare.115

Today, adversaries with global reach and no fixed location successfully challenge 

sovereign states with fixed borders and known vulnerabilities. The media are a 

 

113. See, for example, Amartya Sen, Identtity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, (New York: W.W. 

Norton & Company, 2006). 

114. Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, Vol 1 of The Information Age: Economy, Society, 

and Culture, (Malden, MA, Blackwell Publihsers, 2006). 

115. As Philip Bobbitt states: “National security will cease to be defined in terms of borders alone because 

both the links among societies as well as attacks on them exist in psychological and infrastructural 

dimensions, not on an invaded plain marked by the seizure and holding of territory.” The Shield of Achilles: 

War, Peace, and the Course of History, (New York: Vintage Books, 2002), p. 813. Rupert Smith argues 

similarly, that “war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a 

dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exits.” The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern 

World, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), p. 3. 
366 I PART VII. CHAPTER 25 

decisive theater of operations. Virtual conflict and “perceptual damage” are as 

important as real conflict and real damage. 

Digital Technologies116 

The Internet is transforming diplomacy, markets, media, civil society, and 

war. North America, Oceana/Australia, and Europe lead the world in Internet 

penetration as a percentage of population. Asia, Europe, and North America 

have the greatest numbers of users. The highest rates of usage growth, however, 

are in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Mobile devices, expanded 

bandwidth, software innovation, and an explosion in use by non-Westerners are 

generating new forms of horizontal collaboration and competition. The Internet 

is enabling discovery, innovation, and value creation on an unprecedented global 

scale. Likewise unprecedented is its use by terrorists and insurgents for planning, 

publicity, recruitment, fundraising, and training. Society’s dependence on the 

Internet increases vulnerabilities to cyber attacks. More than other form of 

media, the Internet detaches content from sender identity and social frames that 

give credibility and meaning. Source and context are not necessarily self-evident 

(Al Qaeda’s terrorists, Second Life’s avatars), and tactical events become instant 

strategic problems (Abu Ghraib, Danish cartoons). 

Climate Change, Scarce Water, and Energy 

A growing scientific consensus argues that global warming is accelerating, sea 

levels are rising, and weather severity is increasing. According to the 2007 UN 

Human Development Report, “Climate change is the greatest challenge facing 

humanity at the start of the 21st Century” raising the “specter of unprecedented 

reversals in human development.”117 The same report finds that a “water crisis is 

deepening around the world,” that “more than one billion people lack clean 

water for drinking,” and that 2.6 billion “lack sanitation.” Dwindling supplies of 

cheap petroleum and other energy sources is coupled with increasing demand. 

Government-controlled national oil companies dominate oil supplies and prices. 

The search for more oil and alternative energy sources is creating an energy 

transition and changing geopolitics. 

 

116. See Chapter 26 for an expansion on this topic. 

117. Human Development Report 2007/2008. Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world. United 

Nations Development Programme. 2007. 
THE WORLD IS CHANGING I 367

Global Media 

Advanced technologies are transforming global media and creating new 

media forms—24/7 news streams, satellite and cable television, video for high 

broadband, video for cell phones, blogs, video games, and more. Western media 

no longer dominate. Challenges come not only from Al Jazeera (Arabic, English), 

pan-Arab media, and robust Asian and Latin American satellite networks, but 

also from rapid growth in low budget, good quality local media around the 

world. The United States and many other countries are experiencing a decline in 

appointment news and print media consumption, and a rise in multi-channel 

Internet, cable, and talk radio news. Pervasive many-to-many communication 

raises central investment and production issues for one-to-many broadcasting by 

government and commercial services. The viral spread of unmediated 

information creates formidable problems for all stakeholders, political leaders, 

media organizations, and news consumers. 

State Challenges 

States are changing too. China, India, Russia, and Iran are projecting more 

regional and global influence with new hard and soft power assets. Petroleumbased autocracies (such as Venezuela) with surplus resources play on the world 

stage. Demographic pressures, group grievances, poverty, and a host of other 

drivers of instability are creating failed states, including prominently Sudan, Iraq, 

Somalia, Zimbabwe, and Afghanistan. 

Positive Trends: Opportunities 

Not all change is bad. There are positive global trends and opportunities as 

well. These positive trends include the fact that freedom and democracy has had 

a 30-year gain—from 42 “free” countries in 1976 to 90 “free” countries in 2006, 

although it has been flat since its 1998 peak.118 There has been an increase in 

international assistance by non-governmental organizations (Doctors without 

Borders, Gates Foundation, and Oxfam). Increased innovation and a rapid rise in 

the use of the Internet, mobile devices, bandwidth, and collaboration software 

are enabling communities of interest and new forms of value creation in a global 

community. The life expectancy gap is closing between developing and high-

 

118. Arch Puddington, Freedom in the World 2007: Freedom Stagnation Amid Pushback Against Democracy. See 

http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=130&year=2007. 
368 I PART VII. CHAPTER 25 

income countries. Survival rates of children are increasing with 2.1 million fewer 

deaths in 2004 than in 1990. Adult literacy has increased from 75 to 90 percent 

since 1990 and primary school enrollment is up. Since 1990, the percent of 

people around the globe living under $1 per day is down from 28 to 21 percent. 

Taken together, these improvements in wealth, health, education, freedom, civil 

society engagement and technology provide hope and new opportunities. 

Negative Trends: Threats 

Unfortunately, these positive trends are countered by a number of negative 

trends. Between 1959 and 1999 the world population grew from 3 billion to 6 

billion, and is projected to grow to 9 billion by 2042, with a notable youth bulge 

in vulnerable countries. In addition, the United Nations (UN) warns that climate 

change (e.g., rising sea levels) will be the “greatest challenge facing humanity.” 

The UN also notes the “water crisis is deepening” with more than 1 billion 

people lacking clean water and 2.6 billion lacking proper sanitation. While many 

search for alternative fuels, global fossil fuel demand is up and supply is down 

driving higher prices as government oil companies dominate (Saudi Arabia, 

Venezuela, Russia). Based on an index of instability indicators, a number of 

states are considered “failed” including Sudan, Congo, Ivory Coast, Iraq, 

Zimbabwe, Chad, Somalia, Haiti, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. 

The Internet is been used as an asymmetric weapon by terrorists (for secure 

communication, planning, publicity, recruitment) and represents a vulnerable 

critical infrastructure subject to cyber attack. Also, global communications can 

make instant strategic problems out of tactical events (such as Abu Ghraib). 

Illicit networks, such as AQ Kahn, have increased the risk of proliferation of 

nuclear weapons, materials, and knowledge to state and non-state actors. 

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the number of 

worldwide refugees has surged (driven by Iraq) to 9.9 million, including 4.3 

million Palestinians. Worldwide there are 24.5 million displaced persons. By 

2010, more than half the world’s population will live in cities. Infectious disease 

remains a threat, especially HIV/AIDs in Africa as well as global risks of 

tuberculosis, severe diarrhea, repertory infections, and malaria. 

According to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Worldwide 

Incident Tracking System, in 2006 terrorist attacks increased over 25 percent (to 
THE WORLD IS CHANGING I 369

14,000) resulting in a 40 percent increase in deaths (20,000), the majority of 

which have occurred in Iraq.119 As illustrated in Figure 7-2, nearly all of the 

attacks with more than 10 deaths have occurred in the Near East and South Asia, 

while attacks elsewhere have declined. A worrisome trend is that sub-Saharan 

Africa incidents are up 64 percent from last year, from 256 to 422 incidents. 

Global changes that occur faster than people can accept them breed frustration 

and humiliation. In the words of author Thomas Friedman, terrorism is spawned 

by a poverty of dignity, not a poverty of money.120 Finally, UN statistics show a 

rise in crime in all countries. 

Source: Terrorism Knowledge Base, see www.tkb.org 

Figure 7-2. Terrorism Intensity across the Middle East 

In conclusion, leveraging opportunities is as important in strategic 

communication as defending against threats. Positive trends that provide new 

strategic communication opportunities include: 

 an increase in the world’s democracies (Freedom House finds 90 

countries were “free” in 2006, compared with 42 in 1976.) 

 

119. See www.nctc.gov 

120. Thomas L. Friedman, “A Poverty of Dignity and a Wealth of Rage”, The New York Times, July 15, 

2005. See http://thomasfriedman.blogspot.com/2005/07/poverty-of-dignity-and-wealth-of-rage.html 
370 I PART VII. CHAPTER 25 

 an explosion of humanitarian and nongovernment organizations (Oxfam, 

Medecins Sans Frontieres, the Gates Foundation) 

 newly empowered individuals at all levels of society collaborating and 

sharing knowledge with mobile and virtual technologies 

 an increase in average life expectancy 

 a decrease in child mortality 

 a rise in adult literacy and primary school enrollment rates coupled with a 

shrinking gender gap 

 an overall decline in income poverty generated by high economic growth 

rates in China and India 

Negative trends with particular relevance to strategic communication include: 

 social unrest driven by the size and location of youth populations 

 economic migrants, refugees, and displaced persons 

 the spread of infectious disease 

 extremism and religious militancy born of frustration, humiliation, and 

change that is faster and deeper than people and cultures can accept 

Anti-Americanism on the Rise 

One particularly negative trend worthy of highlighting is that America suffers 

an image problem around the globe. This problem includes attacks on America’s 

policies as well as suspicions of America’s intentions. For example, via a series of 

multinational surveys focusing on worldwide issues, the Pew Global Attitudes 

Project has found America’s motives are questioned. The Pew Foundation (Kohut 

2007) found widespread opposition to the war in Iraq with strong anti-American 

sentiments among Muslim publics. A 2005 Pew poll found that many in Muslim 

countries believed suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq 

were justifiable. Pew’s 2006 poll showed that majorities in Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, 

Indonesia, and Pakistan believe the war in Iraq has made the world more 

dangerous. More startling, their 2005 poll found about half of Moroccans (56%) 

and Jordanians (49%) and about one-in-four in Turkey believe suicide attacks 

against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable. Many foreign 

publics in the Mideast, Europe, and beyond question America’s motives. As shown 

in Figure 7-3, majorities in Pakistan, Turkey, Morocco, and Jordan believe U.S. 

motives are to control Mideast oil, to dominate the world, to target unfriendly 

Muslim governments, and to protect Israel. 
THE WORLD IS CHANGING I 371

Questions asked of those who believe the war on terrorism is not a sincere effort, or have mixed views. 

Percentages show the percent of the TOTAL POPULATION who believe each is an important reason 

the U.S. is conducting the war on terrorism. 

Source: Pew Report, A Year After Iraq War 

Figure 7-3. Suspicions of American Power 

As illustrated in Figure 7-4, all five majority Muslim countries now see the 

United States as a threat to their country.121 Even the majority (nearly 70%) of 

the public polled in NATO member Turkey were “very” or “somewhat” worried 

that the United States could be a military threat against their country. Further, a 

BBC World Service poll of more than 18,000 adults in 18 different countries 

shows an increasingly negative view of the United States influence (Figure 7-5).122

The Pew study found the United States was viewed around the world to be as 

dangerous as Iran and North Korea to world peace. Even 60 percent of Britons 

found the war in Iraq has made the world more dangerous. 

 

121. Pew 2006. 

122. BBC January 2007. See http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/ 

international_security_bt/306.php?nid=&id=&pnt=306&lb=btis 
372 I PART VII. CHAPTER 25 

Source: Pew Report, A Year After Iraq War 

Figure 7-4. United States Seen as Threat to Muslim Countries 

Source: BBC, January 2007 

Figure 7-5. U.S. Influence Viewed Negatively 
THE WORLD IS CHANGING I 373

Figure 7-6 shows a multiyear trend of Pew surveys, which, except in Pakistan, 

illustrates a downward trend in favorable opinion of the United States in many 

countries.123 Not only is the United States viewed with increasing disfavor, but 

also favorable views toward individual Americans (as distinct from the United 

States as a nation) have decreased, as shown in Figure 7-7. 

In spite of these negative perceptions abroad, however, there is some hope. 

For example, America’s humanitarian response to the horrific December 2004 

tsunami helped improve its image in the world’s largest Muslim country, 

Indonesia. Following a significant drop of public support for American in 

response to the Iraq war, American aid resulted in more than doubling of 

support (from 15 to 38%) for Americans (see Figure 7-8).124 Although less 

pronounced, Pew noted a similar pattern in Pakistan following U.S. aid for the 

October 2005 earthquake, from 23 percent in 2005 to 27 percent in 2006. 

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 

Figure 7-6. Downward Trend in Favorable Opinions of the United States 

 

123. Pew, 2006. Pew Global Attitudes Project. Conflicting Views in a Divided World: How Global Publics View: 

Muslim-Western Relations, Global Issues, U.S. Role in the World, Asian Rivalries. See 

http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/DividedWorld2006.pdf. 

124. Kohut, Andrew. 2007. America’s Image in the World: Findings from the Pew Global Attitudes 

Project. Testimony to Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight 

Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives, March 14, 2007. 
374 I PART VII. CHAPTER 25 

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 

Note: Percent favorable indicates those responding with a very or somewhat favorable opinion of 

Americans. 

Figure 7-7. Downward Trend in Favorable Opinions of Americans

Source: America’s Image in the World: Findings from the Pew Global Attitudes Project 

Figure 7-8. Tsunami Relief Boosts U.S. Image 
THE WORLD IS CHANGING I 375

While it is difficult to ascribe favorable opinions of the United States as the 

result of particular incidents, favorability can be compared when polling similar 

populations on differing topics at the same time. With the caveat that correlation 

does not equate to causation, Figure 7-9 juxtaposes 2005 opinions of the United 

States in general and opinions of the U.S. Tsunami relief effort. In all but three 

countries surveyed (India, Britain, and Poland), the U.S. Tsunami relief efforts 

were viewed more positively than the United States in general. 

Source: Data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project. 

Figure 7-9. Comparison of Favorability of the U.S. and Tsunami Relief

The United States need not be perfect, but simply better than the alternative 

peer or non-peer competitors. There are some indicators of hope. For example, 

the majority of publics in Africa prefer democracy to any other kind of 

government (Figure 7-10).125 A 2005 sample of 2,089 Afghan adults found that 

81 percent held a negative view of Al-Queda’s influence on the world, 88 percent 

held a negative view of the Taliban, and 90 percent held an unfavorable (75% 

very unfavorable) view of Osama bin Laden.126 That same poll found an 83 

 

125. Afrobarometer, 2005. See http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brafricara/ 

209.php?nid=&id=&pnt=209&lb=braf 

126. Afghan, 2005. See http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brasiapacificra/ 

155.php?nid=&id=&pnt=155&lb=bras 
376 I PART VII. CHAPTER 25 

percent favorable (39% very favorable) rating of “the US military forces in our 

country.” A 2007 poll found that 74 percent of Iranians have an unfavorable 

view of bin Laden.127

Source: Afrobarometer, 2005 

Note: Percent saying “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.” 

Figure 7-10. Democracy Preferred in Africa 

There is also some optimism suggested by other trends in Arab opinion 

polls. A worrisome 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project poll indicated that many 

in Muslim countries believed suicide attacks against Americans and other 

westerners in Iraq were justifiable. In that poll, just over half of Moroccans 

(56%) and nearly half of Jordanians (49%) thought such attacks justifiable. Even 

in Turkey, where bin Laden is unpopular and support for terrorism is generally 

low, about one-in-four said suicide bombings against Americans and Westerners 

in Iraq can be justified. Fortunately, as Figure 7-11 illustrates, many Muslim 

publics have shown reductions in support for suicide bombings against civilians, 

in some cases as much as 40 percentage point change in attitudes in the past five 

years. Unfortunately, a persistent worry is that 70 percent of respondents from 

Palestinian territories (roughly equally proportional across gender, ages, and 

 

127. See http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/ 

313.php?nid=&id=&pnt=313&lb=btis 
THE WORLD IS CHANGING I 377

religiosity) believe suicide bombing against civilians can be often or sometimes 

justified. Also a concern, Muslim majorities in Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, and the 

Palestinian territories believe that tensions between the Sunnis and Shia are a 

problem beyond Iraq, although these views are not shared in Asian countries 

with large Muslim populations.128 Muslim populations both in the Middle East 

and Asian continue to see the U.S. as a military threat.129

Except within the Palestinian territories where confidence remains high 

(57%), Muslims overall show very low confidence that bin Laden is a leader who 

will do the right thing in world affairs. For example, while four years ago 56 

percent of Jordanians supported bin Laden, that support has dropped to only 20 

percent in 2007.130

Source: About the Pew Global Attitudes Project, July 2007 

Note: Percent who believe suicide bombing justified 

Figure 7-11. Suicide Bombing Never Justified (Muslim Respondents) 

 

128. Pew Global Opinion Trends 2002-2007: A Rising Tide Lifts Mood in the Developing World. Sharp Decline in 

Support for Suicide Bombing in Muslim Countries. July 24, 2007. http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/257.pdf, p. 

58. 

129. Ibid.. p. 58. 

130. Ibid.. p. 148. 
378 I PART VII. CHAPTER 25 

Implications for Strategic Communication 

The future will not be just a projection of current trends. Surprise and 

punctuating events are inevitable. Nevertheless, understanding how the world is 

changing points to discernable implications for planning and investment 

priorities in strategic communication. 

Durable, Expanded, Resourceful, Forward Leaning 

The United States no longer has the luxury of a strategic communication 

instrument that is limited, reactive, and employed only episodically. Strategic 

communication is required before, during, and after violent conflicts, at home 

and abroad. 

“No One Size Fits All” 

Preoccupation with terrorism and current conflicts (Iraq and Afghanistan) 

marginalizes the use of strategic communication on other pressing issues: 

governance, economic growth, the distribution of public goods, and cross-border 

challenges. 

Net-Centric Tools and Structures 

Stovepipes, gatekeepers, and tribal cultures still dominate. Hierarchies have a 

role. However, today’s information technologies and social structures favor 

networks and much stronger and more imaginative links between governments 

and civil society. Achieving this requires unusual leaders, hybrid institutions, and 

flexible practitioners. In strategic communication, as in other instruments of 

statecraft, the strategies employed, the skills developed, and the tools used need 

to be based on networking mindsets. 

New Communications Paradigm 

Strategic communication will require a much larger investment in “listening” 

understood as deep comprehension of cultures, attitudes, and influence network. 

It will require practitioners willing to take risks and policymakers comfortable 

with “edgy” attention-getting content. Strategic communication calls for varsity 

play in the next generation Internet, and rethinking the government’s one-tomany mass audience broadcasting model from top to bottom. Diplomats and 
THE WORLD IS CHANGING I 379

soldiers must learn to operate successfully in the space between state and nonstate actors on multiple issues in constantly changing patterns of interaction. 

Trust and Attention Counts More than Information 

Fifty years ago, governments took advantage of widespread demand for news 

and information. Today, information saturation creates an attention deficit. The 

signal-to-noise ratio makes communication more difficult. Disseminating 

information and “getting the message right” are not top priorities. Trust, 

credibility, actions, legitimacy, and reputations are critical to success. 

Bridging the Challenge/Reform Disconnect 

That the world is changing more rapidly than leaders, practitioners, and their 

institutions is not news. Reports with recommendations calling for change 

abound but few offer implementing roadmaps, and too many focus on change 

from within. Fixing strategic communication only from within means change 

that is marginal and slow. Fixing strategic communication requires focused 

attention and political courage from presidents and lawmakers. Radical 

transformation will take years. 

Prepare for Uncertainty 

Strategic communication requires leaders and practitioners recruited and 

trained to adapt quickly in a world in which unexpected personalities, low 

probability, high-impact events, and technology breakthroughs will play 

unforeseen roles. 
380 I PART VII. CHAPTER 26 

Chapter 26. Technology is Changing 

The previous chapter examined the positive and negative trends in the world 

and implications for strategic communication. This chapter considers the 

revolutionary changes in the ways people access and share information—

principally as a consequence of the global spread of satellite television and the 

rise of the Internet. 

Media Transformation 

In the last two decades, revolutionary changes have occurred in the ways 

people access and share information, driven principally by the global spread of 

satellite television and the rise of the Internet (Figure 7-12). Today people 

everywhere have many alternative sources for news and entertainment; state 

control of content is becoming technically impossible; and the physical means of 

transport is no longer the primary concern as it has been in the past, when 

shortwave radio was the primary means of reaching citizens in foreign countries. 

Figure 7-12. Media Access Then and Now
TECHNOLOGY IS CHANGING I 381

Traditional Media are Losing their Influence 

Satellite and cable television have changed the nature of broadcast media by 

opening up an abundance of alternative channels to international audiences. 

Instead of being limited to a handful of broadcast channels, viewers are now 

offered an almost unlimited choice of channels. People are free to choose 

content that closely matches their own interests and biases. With the audience 

splintering and the variety in available viewpoints, the great trusted and unifying 

voices, such as Walter Cronkite, have been irrevocably lost. The media now 

serves to amplify any latent polarization, and the very presence of so many 

differing viewpoints has caused people to lose their trust in media itself. 

A Pew Research poll released in August 2007 highlights some of these trends 

in the U.S. audience:131

On the trust in media: 

In 1985, most Americans (55%) said news organizations get the facts straight. 

Since the late 1990s, consistent majorities – including 53% in the current survey—

have expressed the belief that news stories are often inaccurate. As a 

consequence, the believability ratings for individual news organizations are lower 

today than they were in the 1980s and 1990s. 

On the growing partisan divide: 

In the current survey, however, fewer than half of Republicans (41%) express a 

favorable opinion of major national newspapers, a 38-point decline when 

compared with 1985.

Thirty years ago Americans typically had a choice of seven channels; now 

according to the Nielsen reports, the average U.S. home receives 104 channels.132

In the competition for eyeballs this plentiful choice exacerbates the polarization 

of media. As Fox News turns right, CNN is forced to the left to retain its share. 

The same systemic behavior might be expected elsewhere in the world. 

 

131. Internet News Audience Highly Critical of News Organizations: Views of Press Values and Performance: 1985-

2007. The Pew Research Center, August 2007, see http://peoplepress.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=348 

132. See http://www.nielsenmedia.com/nc/portal/site/Public/ 

menuitem.55dc65b4a7d5adff3f65936147a062a0/?vgnextoid=48839bc66a961110VgnVCM100000ac0a260

aRCRD 
382 I PART VII. CHAPTER 26 

Worldwide Satellite Access 

Satellite television is now the primary means of media access in most of the 

world. In the Middle East and North Africa only Afghanistan relies more on 

radio than television for news and entertainment. In other countries the use of 

television exceeds that of radio by more than 2 to 1. Even in Iran, perhaps the 

most tightly controlled regime for media, citizens are able to access uncontrolled 

content on satellite television. The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting 

approves and monitors all television and radio programming put on the air. 

However, in their quest for alternative perspectives and lighter fare, Iranians tune 

to expatriate-run satellite stations, flouting the official ban on dish ownership. 

Los Angeles-based stations garner more than 10 percent weekly viewership in 

spite of the Islamic Republic’s crackdowns on dish ownership.133 In addition, 

Voice of America Persian TV has significant weekly audience reach. 

Direct-to-home television now serves about 24 percent of households in the 

Mideast, and Arab consumers typically have access to some 55-60 free-to-air 

Arabic language services (Figure 7-13). Al Jazeera was launched in 1996 out of 

Qatar, and now rivals the BBC in the number of worldwide viewers in the range 

of 40–50 million. Al Jazeera’s viewing tops 70 percent in the Gulf Kingdoms and 

almost 60 percent of adults in Morocco and Tunisia. This popularity has largely 

been achieved by taking on subjects that were once considered politically or 

culturally taboo, and in spite of provoking the ire of regional governments and 

socially conservation elements. The prevalence of satellite dishes in the Middle 

East is best illustrated by this picture of an Arab village (Figure 7-14). 

Popular programming in the Middle East may not be that different than in 

the United States—entertainment, news, reality shows, call-in shows, and even 

“Who Wants to be a Millionaire” or “Star Search,” modeled after “American 

Idol.” A representative from Intermedia, experienced in researching Middle East 

audiences, explained to study partipcipants that “allowing self-criticism” was the 

best way to acquire credibility for U.S. content in this region. 

In their quest for increased viewership, broadcast news coverage everywhere 

invariably emphasizes sensational events, giving terrorists and insurgents an easy 

and automatic way to publicize their actions. The nightly news leads with videos 

of bombings, and the building of a new school doesn’t even make the cut. News 

 

133. Intermedia. 
TECHNOLOGY IS CHANGING I 383

is, almost by definition, bad news. Consumers are usually looking for 

entertainment, and crime, mayhem, tragedies, and the like are considered 

entertaining. The strategic communication problem is to make good news as 

entertaining as bad news. Needless to say, this is a considerable challenge. 

Source: Intermedia 

Note: Percent of adults who report owning a satellite dish 

Figure 7-13. Dish Ownership in the Middle East 

Source: Intermedia 

Figure 7-14. Satellite Dishes in an Arab Village 
384 I PART VII. CHAPTER 26 

Terrorists also have other advantages in their use of media. They have fast 

response and great flexibility, enabled by a decentralized leadership with local 

autonomy. Moreover, they are unconstrained by considerations of truth. Their 

concern with communication is exemplified by actions that seemed to have been 

planned with media attention as the primary objective. 

The Global Rise of the Internet 

About a quarter of Americans currently use the Internet as their primary 

news source. These Internet users tend to be younger and better educated than 

the public as a whole, and a recent Pew survey finds that they hold relatively 

unfavorable opinions of the mainstream media. The United States is, of course, 

relatively advanced in its use and reliance on the Internet. Much of the rest of the 

world is still evolving in its Internet access, and may follow the general rule of 

exponential growth with an annual doubling in the number of users (Figure 

7-15). Although the penetration of the Internet in the Middle East is only 

estimated at only 10 percent, a larger number of people may occasionally access 

the Internet in public kiosks, such as at Internet cafes. A poll from Intermedia 

breaks down access based on weekly usage as shown in Figure 7-16. 

Source: www.internetworldstats.com 

Figure 7-15. Internet Penetration by World Region
TECHNOLOGY IS CHANGING I 385

Source: Intermedia 

Figure 7-16. Percentage Using the Internet Weekly in Mideast Countries

This survey data may obscure the possibility that the relatively small number of 

Internet users may be among the most influential people in the country. Moreover, 

the information these users gain on the Internet may be spread by word-of-mouth, 

or reported by the more conventional media. Thus, it is hard to determine the 

overall importance of the Internet in influencing opinions abroad. However, it is 

certain that is that the number of Internet users is inevitably growing. 

Information Flows on the Internet 

The Internet has broken the traditional broadcast paradigm. Instead of one-tomany, as in the broadcast media, the primary flows are one-to-one. The paradigm 

here is pull, rather than push. Consequently, it is observed that on the Internet 

broadcast is hard, but conspiracy is easy. While satellite television has both 

dramatically increased the reach of broadcast media and splintered its audience, the 

rise of the Internet has personalized news, empowered the individual to become a 

news source, and facilitated the gatherings of like-minded people. 

The Internet offers a number of different models for information flow. The 

closest to the traditional broadcast model is the handful of mega-sites devoted to 

news, such as CNN, MSN, the New York Times, and other print and television 

organizations looking to expand the reach of their content into the new medium. 
386 I PART VII. CHAPTER 26 

According to figures tracked by Nielsen/NetRatings, nytimes.com attracted 

about 12.5 million readers worldwide in June 2007. That is a huge global 

audience for news, and approximately ten times the Times' print circulation. 

There is a phenomenon on the Internet known as the “long tail.” Access is 

dominated by a few popular sites, followed by a multitude of sites (the long tail), 

each with very few viewers. The Internet greatly exacerbates the splintering 

evident in satellite television; instead of a thousand channels, there is an 

unlimited number, and the cost of broadcast is almost zero. Anyone can be a 

broadcaster, and everyone can easily find a source of content that exactly 

matches his or her own biases. 

Many of these “broadcast channels” take advantage of the Internet paradigm 

by enabling individual visitors to post comments. For example, the Al Jazeera 

English web site posts comments from individuals, many of which are critical of 

the Al Jazeera coverage. Such critical comments appear to contribute positively 

to the overall credibility of the site. 

The most popular web sites on the Internet do not vary greatly from country 

to country. Table 7-2 compares the list of site popularity in the United States 

with that in Iran. The list is dominated by the search engines, connectivity 

suppliers, and repositories of basic information. 

The popular search engines Yahoo, Google, and MSN, have enormous 

power in information space; so much so that there have been instances where 

states have censored their search results. In a sense, these engines are politically 

and culturally neutral, depending on computer algorithms to determine best fits 

for queries. Google uses a page-rank algorithm, which uses a link analysis of the 

web to determine which sites are most linked by other sites on a given topic. 

(There are other factors considered in addition, and the algorithm is kept secret.) 

In whatever manner the rankings are determined, they shape the world opinion 

on important subjects. Furthermore, these search engines are used to derive a 

great deal of contextual information relevant to strategic communication. 

In addition to search engines and commercial information providers, there 

are a number of enormously popular sites that enable or facilitate individuals to 

post and exchange views, information, images, and opinions. In the United 

States, those sites on the list include Myspace (social interactions), YouTube 

(videos), Facebook (social interactions), eBay (auction), Craigslist (lodging), 

Wikipedia (encyclopedia entries), Blogger.com (tools for blogs), Photobucket 

(images), and Flickr (photos). 
TECHNOLOGY IS CHANGING I 387

Table 7-2. Most Popular Web Sites, August 2007 

United States Iran 

1 Yahoo Yahoo 

2 Google Google 

3 Myspace Rapidshare 

4 YouTube MSN 

5 MSN Megaupload 

6 Wikipedia Persianblog.com* 

7 Amazon.com Tinypic 

8 AOL Wikipedia 

9 Blogger.com 4Shared 

10 Go Window Live 

11 Megaupload Farsnews* 

12 CNN Lana.ir* 

13 Internet movie database Mobile9.com 

14 Photobucket GSM.ir 

15 Comcast Internet movie database 

16 Microsoft Parseek.com* 

17 Flickr Islamic Republic News Agency 

*In Persian 

Source: Alexa International 

A second model for information flow on the Internet is exemplified by 

Wikipedia, which has become the international authority on encyclopedia-style 

information by implementing an open source model where entries are iteratively 

corrected by users. (There is moderation by a steering committee.) Supposedly, 

the information is self-correcting, and entries eventually settle to a communal 

“truth” that in some cases may exhibit a bias representing the main view of the 

interested community. Wikipedia might be taken as an instance of the 

phenomenon known as “the wisdom of crowds.” 

Viral Information 

Perhaps the most important model of information flow on the Internet is 

that of viral connectivity. Sites like Myspace, YouTube, Facebook, Blogger, 

Photobucket, and Flickr enable the exchange of information from one individual 
388 I PART VII. CHAPTER 26 

to another. A piece of information flows from one individual to another, with a 

multiplicative effect as it spreads like an epidemic. Studies have verified the 

popular notion of “six-degrees of separation,” showing how little reach is 

required to achieve widespread communication. 

Perhaps the power of viral communication is exemplified in how quickly 

good jokes can traverse the world practically overnight. In the Internet world a 

blogger might create a story that gets popularized by being quoted and linked by 

other sites. These links are noted by Google, which moves the blog site up on its 

ranking. Technorati.com adds the site to its current list of the most popular blogs 

(Figure 7-17). Both of these reports provide positive feedback to amplify the 

popularity of the original story—regardless of whether it is right or wrong, good 

or bad. 

In order for this “information infection” to occur, the information must have 

the property of inducing replication—something that cries out for being passed 

along. A research question is how to create “good viruses” and how to contain 

the contagion of “bad viruses.” 

Figure 7-17. Guide to Blogs on Technorati.com 
TECHNOLOGY IS CHANGING I 389

Some critics worry that blogs exacerbate social tensions by handing a powerful 

free electronic platform to extremists. Bad people find one another in cyberspace 

and so gain confidence in their ideas. The conventional media filter out extreme 

views to avoid offending readers, viewers and advertisers, while most bloggers 

have no such inhibition. On the other hand, blogs have a self-correcting 

mechanism of real-time criticism that is lacking in the conventional media. 

There are an estimated 80 millions blogs currently on the Internet. While the 

great majority of all these blogs are voices in the dark, there are others that can be 

quite influential. Once again there is an instance of the long tail. Which few are the 

most popular, and/or the most influential? Taken in its totality, the “blogosphere” 

constitutes a treasure trove that can be mined for sociological and cultural 

information and opinion. For example, blogs can give insight into questions such 

as: What are the Islamic bloggers saying about a recent Al Qaeda action? 

The United States has limited resources to counter this multitude of individual 

blogs. Those resources should be reserved for only the most influential blogs as 

determined by quantitative measurements. Even in these cases it is not clear what 

the rules of engagement should be. When should responses be identified as from 

the U.S. government, as opposed to from responsible individuals? What forms of 

response are most effective? In this evolving medium the United States has little 

experience or wisdom in means of influence. 

Viral information is also exemplified in the meteoric rise of YouTube since it 

was founded in February 2005 (Figure 7-18). Users contribute videos, which are 

accessible by other users. YouTube now serves in excess of 100 million videos 

each day. Some of these videos become enormously popular, while most 

languish unseen—another “long tail.” YouTube lists prominently the most 

popular videos, which then become famous for being famous. A popular video 

on YouTube can be viewed by millions of people and have considerable 

influence in the Internet world. The phenomenon needs study to understand the 

characteristics that underlie such popularity. 

The world’s youth is congregating in chat rooms, on MySpace and 

FaceBook, and in massively multiplayer online role-playing games (Figure 7-19). 

In 2006, the number of registered users on MySpace exceeded 100 million. In 

these Internet “places” young people are making friends, exchanging information 

and opinions, and forming coalitions in chat rooms. In many cases there is nary 

an adult present. 
390 I PART VII. CHAPTER 26 

Figure 7-18. User-supplied Videos on YouTube 

Figure 7-19. Where the Youth of the World Gathers
TECHNOLOGY IS CHANGING I 391

The chat rooms and multi-player online games serve as worldwide 

laboratories for the study of the cultures and evolving opinions of the youth. 

Aside such studies, it is not clear how these media can be used for influence. 

As in the case of blogs, the questions of if, when, and how to enter these media 

have no obvious answers. 

Technology Transformation 

Foreign Language Information Access 

Human language technology provides a window into foreign cultures and 

concerns as well as a vehicle for engagement. In terms of understanding content, 

as Figure 7-20 illustrates for English language text the current best systems 

enable the automated extraction of entities (e.g., people, places, and things) at 95 

percent accuracy, relations among entities (e.g., person A was the leader of 

organization Y at time T) at 70–80 percent accuracy, and events (e.g., 

organization Z purchased WMD pre-cursor material W from person Q, for 

example) at about 60 percent accuracy. 134 

Entity, relation, and event extraction systems are, respectively, approximately 

5, 10, and 20 percent less accurate than human performance. Accuracy here is 

measured as a balance of precision (Did the system get only the correct items?) 

and recall (Did the system get all the correct items?). Performance in new 

domains such as biological entity extraction (e.g., genes and proteins), important 

for biological weapons intelligence, has already shown promising 80 percent 

accuracy for entity extraction after only two years of development in the 

National Science Foundation-supported BioCreative initiative.135 Notably, entity 

and relation extraction rivals human performance in English and is advancing 

rapidly in some foreign languages (Chinese, Arabic). 

 

134. Message Understanding Conference, Automated Content Extraction Program, Event99, and BioCreative 

135. Hirschman, L., Yeh, A., Blaschke, C., and Valencia, A. 2005. Overview of BioCreAtivE: critical assessment of 

information extraction for biology. BMC Bioinformatics 2005, 6(Suppl 1):S1. 
392 I PART VII. CHAPTER 26 

Source: Message Understanding Conference 

Figure 7-20. Information Extraction Performance across Languages

Communication and Media Analysis using Machine 

Translation 

Advances in statistical machine translation have increased accessibility to 

foreign documents, web sites, blogs, and even broadcast news. Governmentfunded community evaluations (such as trec.nist.gov) have accelerated 

development. Integration of emerging components has enabled new capabilities, 

such as content-based retrieval of foreign video and multilingual chat. For 

example, Figure 7-21 illustrates the integration of a broadcast news video 

indexing system (Virage Video Logger) together with a statistically trained 

commercial machine translation system (Language Weaver) to enable an end user 

to perform cross-language retrieval. 
TECHNOLOGY IS CHANGING I 393

Figure 7-21. Retrieval and Translation of Arabic News Broadcast in Commercial 

The example shows a user query of “Bin Laden,” retrieval of a relevant Arabic 

news program, its speech transcription, and its translation into English. Related 

machine-translation technology is integrated with search engines to enable foreign 

web site browsing with instant messaging to enable multilingual chat (Figure 7-22). 

These capabilities can dramatically enhance both understanding of activities and 

interests in foreign media as well as enable direct one-on-one engagement with 

foreign audiences. While current methods can be employed if augmented by 

human linguists, further development in machine translation is required to enhance 

quality and expand applicability to lower density languages. 
394 I PART VII. CHAPTER 26 

Figure 7-22. Translingual Instant Messaging (TrIM) between English and Arabic Speakers

Social Network/Influence Analysis 

Tools such as Google’s PageRank algorithm have successfully used analysis 

of links among web pages to automatically determine the popularity of a site. 

Simply put, PageRank considers a web page with more links to it (“inward links”) 

as more significant than one with fewer links but also weighs links from more 

“important” pages more heavily. For individual web servers, tools such as 

Google Analytics (Figure 7-23) can enable web site managers to automatically 

compute usage statistics such as the volume of visits per page, the origin of 

searchers (by URL and geographically), if they were new or returning visitors, the 

number of pages viewed per visit, and the bounce rate. More generally, for larger 

sites, site ratings (Neilson’s internet rating, Technorati, for example) can be 

employed to understand popular sites; however, more granular demographic data 

is needed (by age, economic status, religion). 
TECHNOLOGY IS CHANGING I 395

Source: mycvs.org 

Figure 7- 23. Google Analytics 

As illustrated in the left side of Figure 7-24, information flows from ISI/AlQaeda to a forum to a news website to Al Jazerra TV. On the right hand side, 

data collected from alexa.com illustrates the geographical spread of visitors to the 

primary distribution sites for insurgent media (in this example, the largest 

number of visitors to most sites coming from Saudi Arabia and also Egypt and 

the Palestinian territories). 

Just as it is possible to understand the importance of web pages (for both 

searching and assessing them) by exploiting their relationships, so too should it 

be possible to understand the importance of users by assessing their social 

influence. Researchers have already conducted significant research on social 

network analysis, such as information and communication flows and structures 

(email propagation is one example).136 One technical opportunity that overcomes 

privacy concerns associated with social network analysis is to analyze public 

 

136. Wasserman, S. and Faust, K. 1994. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cambridge 

University Press. 
396 I PART VII. CHAPTER 26 

communication fora (public blogs, listservs, text chat) in order to assess 

contributor frequency and communication networks—that is, who talks to 

whom. Further, with limited text analysis it is possible to assess which ideas or 

views are “picked up” by which users. Assessing how rapidly ideas spread from 

one user or site to another, and how broadly content is communicated can give a 

sense of their degree of “infectivity.” 

Source: Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War if Images and Ideas 

Figure 7-24. Information Flow and Measurement137

Moreover, to the extent there is a shift in attitudes or behaviors, it is possible 

this could be reflected in the communication (someone expressing a change in 

their beliefs or promising or threatening to take some action) that might indicate 

the “affectivity” of the idea. It might be possible to measure the “virulence” of 

an idea, i.e., track “infections ideas” as a precursor to interdicting or influencing 

it. Developments in de-identification—i.e., removing proper names or individual 

identifying information from free text—promise to enable data mining while 

ensuring privacy.138 Important open research questions include how individuals 

establish trust, form identity, and create groups in the digital domain. 

Another important development on the web is the rapid expansion of social 

technologies. These include social networking (sites like mySpace, Facebook, 

LinkedIn) that enables individuals to create pages that link into friends and 

 

137. Kimmage, D. and Ridolfo, K. 2007. Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Ideas, Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty regional analysts. Video briefing at 

http://www.newamerica.net/events/2007/iraqi_insurgent_media. 

138. Gupta, D. Saul, M. and Gilbertson, J. 2004. Evaluation of a Deidentification (De-Id) Software Engine to Share 

Pathology Reports and Clinical Documents for Research. American Journal of Clinical Pathology. 2004 (121):176–186. 
TECHNOLOGY IS CHANGING I 397

colleagues and share information. In addition, social bookmarking sites (such like 

del.icio.us, Flickr) enable users to bookmark and label their favorite sites and 

content which can then be shared with a larger community. 

As might be expected, users exhibit social behavior in social media. For 

example, according to Gladwell, some participants take on special roles.139 These 

include: 

 connectors who are hubs in social networks 

 mavens who are experts (such as bloggers who detect media 

misinformation) 

 salespeople who persuasively influence others, often subconsciously 

These individuals can wield disproportionate influence and cause “social 

epidemics,” or sudden and often chaotic phase changes from one state to 

another (when a particular idea becomes viral). Finally, their contributions reflect 

the power law, i.e., contribution is an inverse log scale—few contribute most 

content; many contribute little. Figure 7-25 illustrates this long tail, power law in 

an example search on “Green Zone” at the photo-sharing site, Flickr. As 

illustrated by the graph to the right in the figure, of 482 images from 22 

photographers of the Green Zone in Baghdad, 40 percent are provided by one 

individual, 18 percent of the contributors provide 80 percent of the content (the 

so called 80-20 rule), and 80 percent of the photographers provide less than 22 

photos, the average per photographer. This Flickr example illustrates how a few 

productive or influential contributors dominate the information space. 

 

139. Gladwell, M. 2000. The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference. Little Brown. 
398 I PART VII. CHAPTER 26 

Figure 7-25. Power Law in Flickr Photo-Sharing Site 

Automated Sentiment Analysis 

Given the volume and importance of electronic information, distinguishing 

between opinions and facts140—or at least detecting the degree of an author’s 

pro/con feelings toward a topic—is becoming increasingly important. Innovative 

approaches using language processing for sentiment detection and analysis 

promise scaleable and accurate measurement of positive (favorable) or negative 

(unfavorable) opinions in documents, websites, blogs, and chat.141 Depending 

upon the source and purpose, effective sentiment analysis could require content 

segmentation, topic identification, information extraction, author identification, 

machine translation, and sentiment classification. 

 

140. Cardie, C., Wiebe, J., Wilson, T., and Litman, D. 2003. “Combining Low-Level and Summary 

Representations of Opinions for Multiperspective Question Answering.” In AAAI Spring Symposium on 

New Directions in Question Answering, pages 20–27. 

141. Wilson, T., Hoffmann, P., Somasundaran, S., Kessler, J., Wiebe, J., Choi, Y., Cardie, C., Riloff, E., and 

Patwardhan, S. 2005. OpinionFinder: A system for subjectivity analysis. Proceedings of HLT/EMNLP 2005 

Demonstration Abstracts, pages 34–35, Vancouver, October 2005. 
TECHNOLOGY IS CHANGING I 399

Sentiment analysis is used for stock market analysis,142 product reviews,143 and 

analysis of multilingual political discourse.144 In a test of opinions about an 

organization and pharmaceutical products, Nasukawa and Yi145 demonstrated high 

precision (75–95%) in detecting sentiments in a half million web pages and a 

quarter million news articles, and believe these could be extended to billions of 

pages. These methods could provide the foundation for identifying issues of 

importance to an author or group, measuring their level of confidence, their 

agreeability/argumentativeness, and “extremeness” of their views. Important 

future areas of research include relating sentiment measures to identity, trust, and 

reverence. 

Gaming 

Computer games have become a multibillion-dollar industry. The Army has 

successfully used games for recruiting but has also found them to have 

unforeseen benefits in virtual basic training. Already insurgents have used games 

to engage and motivate youth to support Jihad. Given the availability of gaming 

engines as a foundation, these could have valuable strategic communication 

applications, including teaching English, skills for employment, and education of 

universal values. 

Scientific Progress 

While many of the above technologies can be beneficially applied today, 

additional research is required to advance the underlying theories and algorithms. 

For machine learning, data and annotated foreign language corpora for algorithm 

training are expensive but essential to accuracy improvements. Task-oriented 

evaluations, such as TREC (trec.nist.gov), have fostered community-wide 

progress. Simple, usable, and open solutions that focus on analytic/operational 

impact are essential. Finally, the nature of the strategic communication challenge 

will require multidisciplinary scientific teams, iterative and staged processes, and 

 

142. Das, S. and Chen, M. 2001. Yahoo! for Amazon: Sentiment Parsing from Small Talk on the Web. August 5, 

2001. EFA 2001 Barcelona Meetings. 

143. Kushal, Dave, Lawrence, Steve, and Pennock, David M.. 2003. Mining the Peanut Gallery: Opinion 

Extraction and Semantic Classification of Product Reviews. In WWW, pages 519–528. 

144. Mullen, T. and Malouf, R. 2006. A Preliminary Investigation into Sentiment Analysis of Informal Political 

Discourse. Proceedings of the AAAI Workshop on Analysis of Weblogs, 2006. 

145. Nasukawa, T. and Yi, J. 2003. Sentiment Analysis: Capturing Favorability Using Natural Language Processing. 

International Conference On Knowledge Capture Proceedings of the 2nd International ACM Conference on 

Knowledge Capture. Sanibel Island, FL, 70–77. 
400 I PART VII. CHAPTER 26 

rigorous application of the scientific method to ensure resultant capabilities that 

can effectively support mission requirements. 

Conclusions 

Advances in technology in the last two decades have led to a revolution in 

media, opening access to a seemingly infinite number of channels and 

introducing new models for the origins and flow of information. 

Although technology has served as the enabler, much of the information 

ecology today is a social invention. The World Wide Web itself, as well as some of 

its most important constituents, like Wikipedia, eBay, Facebook, and YouTube, are 

social inventions. This invention continues at an incredible rate. YouTube, for 

example, went from nothing to 100 million daily videos in only a little over a year. 

Understanding and influencing this fast-evolving landscape is obviously a difficult 

matter. The pace of change may be greater than that of understanding. 

With the rise of the Internet and satellite television, state censorship of 

content is becoming much less effective, and will ultimately become impossible. 

Technically it is quite difficult to control information access on the Internet. 

Even though some countries limit Internet connectivity through proxy servers 

that filter content, many users know how to circumvent these filters, and the 

information they access gets passed along in other ways. 

With so many pathways that information can reach people, the emphasis 

today should be much less on the physical mechanism for delivery than it has 

been in the past. The problem now is crafting messages that inherently want to 

travel through this complex and variegated landscape. 
ENGAGING NATIONAL CAPABILITY I 401

Chapter 27. Engaging National Capability 

In the fast-paced environment of real-time public and private 

communication, issue experts and casual observers alike are flooded with 

information and viewpoints. Gone are the days of limited access to the means of 

mass transmission of ideas as was common when governments and large private 

institutions were the only entities with sufficient finances to utilize mass media. 

Message reach and clarity are now constrained primarily by imagination and 

tenacity, rather than access to communications technology or financial assets. As 

a result, the ability to astutely break through the cacophony of vantage points 

with a compelling rationale that motivates individual behavior becomes a 

supreme challenge for all who seek to influence future outcomes. In this 

complex environment, “actions” can become the most authentic “messages.” 

The United States has among its citizens some of the world’s most 

accomplished experts in the skills requisite to develop and respond to strategic 

communication. Within the U.S. government there is also a long legacy of 

significant programming and communication outreach to foreign publics, with 

some of the most successful efforts originating in the early period of the Cold War. 

Recent U.S. government strategic enhancements are attempting to address 

the changing communications environment. Following the release of the first 

U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication in June 2007, 

each federal agency is now preparing its own strategic communication plan. 

When complete, these strategic plans will provide the groundwork for increased 

coordination and collaboration. 

However, when compared to private and civil sector enterprises that have 

rapidly embraced the capabilities associated with integrated strategic 

communication, the U.S. government continues to have an underdeveloped 

strategic communication management process. This deficiency limits its ability to 

leverage the world-class capabilities of its citizens outside the federal government 

to contribute to its effort. It also makes a daunting task even more challenging 

since the U.S. government continues to depend on many strategic and 

organizational methodologies that originated in the pre-Internet, broadcastingoriented world, further limiting its ability to collaborate to accomplish shared 

interagency and public/private goals. 
402 I PART VII. CHAPTER 27 

Strategic Communication Originating in the United 

States has Many Sources 

Many federal, state and local nongovernmental, corporate, and individual 

enterprises originating in the U.S. are involved in strategic communication with 

foreign audiences. While there is often a single enterprise performing the role of 

program leader, each program relies on many essential contributions from 

beyond the domain of its central team to accomplish its goals. 

A snapshot of several of the programs sponsored by these enterprises shows 

the diversity of subject expertise and resource management necessary to conduct 

foreign outreach on behalf of U.S. interests. Also highlighted below are some of 

the existing and complex collaborations between public, private, and nongovernmental organizations in the accomplishment of shared goals. 

Federal: International Educational Exchange Programs 

U.S. government-sponsored international exchange and training activities are 

defined in Congressional and Presidential mandates as the “movement of people 

between countries to promote the sharing of ideas, to develop skills, and to 

foster mutual understanding and cooperation, financed wholly or in part, directly 

or indirectly, with United States Government funds.”146

During fiscal year 2005, 15 cabinet-level departments and 49 independent 

agencies and commissions reported management of 239 international exchange 

and training programs (Figure 7-26). Nearly 900,000 foreigners and U.S. citizens 

participated in these exchanges, ranging from academic exchanges for students, 

research exchanges for scholars, and professional skill development for midcareer professionals.147 While over $1.2 billion in federal funds (63% of total) was 

expended to conduct these programs in fiscal year 2005, federal investment 

leveraged an additional $708 million (37% of total) from non-U.S. government 

sources (Figure 7-27)—including contributions from foreign governments, U.S. 

private sector, foreign private sector and international organizations.148

 

146. IAWG 2005 Report, see www.iawg.gov. 

147. IAWG 2005 Report, “FY 2005 Participants by Federal Sponsor: Total U.S. & Foreign” p. 14, see 

http://www.iawg.gov/rawmedia_repository/039262c1_618a_400f_bade_4716fe743ae4 

148. Interagency Working Group on U.S. Government-Sponsored International Exchanges and Training 

(IAWG) FY 2005 Inventory of Programs. 
ENGAGING NATIONAL CAPABILITY I 403

Source: IAWG 

Figure 7-26. Fiscal Year 2005 Participants by Federal Sponsor 
404 I PART VII. CHAPTER 27 

Source: IAWG 

Figure 7-27. Fiscal Year 2005 Sources of Funding

This funding split is the result of a long-term successful international 

public/private partnership as well as federal interagency collaboration. While visas 

are coordinated through the Department of State, Bureau of Educational and 

Cultural Affairs, U.S. government personnel in each agency are responsible for 

developing, implementing and evaluating the programs, and often work through 

public/private partnerships with the private sector and non-governmental 

organizations to administer the programs.149

Federal: Broadcasting Board of Governors 

Over 155 million people are reached each week through the international 

broadcasting services of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). Tracing 

its roots back to the creation of the U.S. Information Agency in the early 1950s, 

today the BBG is the sole independent federal agency that oversees all U.S. 

government and government–sponsored, non-military, international 

broadcasting. The BBG seeks to provide a strong, independent media where one 

does not exist. The following six broadcast units comprise the BBG: 

 

149. IAWG 2005 Report, “FY 2005 Participants by Federal Sponsor: Total U.S. & Foreign” p. 15. 
ENGAGING NATIONAL CAPABILITY I 405

Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts on radio, television, 

the Internet, VOAMobile for Internet-enabled devices, Real 

Simple Syndication feeds, and podcasts in over 45 languages 

and provides news updates over VOA Internet. 

Alhurra provides Arabic-language news and information to 22 

countries in the Middle East. 

Radio Sawa combines a mix of Western and Arabic pop 

music with news and information with a 24/7 Arabic-language 

network to reach youth in various regions of the Middle East. 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 

offering more than 1,000 hours of programming from the 

Arctic Sea to the Persian Gulf in 28 languages, is streamed 

live and on-demand over the Internet. 

Radio Free Asia (RFA) broadcasts news, 

information and commentary in nine languages to 

China, Tibet, Burma, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and 

North Korea. 

Radio and TV Marti provide news, information, and 

other programming to the people of Cuba. Radio Marti 

broadcasts 162 hours weekly of news and information 

(mostly live). TV Marti broadcasts 168 hours weekly of 

news, information, and entertainment programming via satellite and 30 hours 

weekly via the airborne platform. Approximately 15 hours weekly of TV Marti 

broadcasts are original programming. Broadcasting units are assisted by the 

engineering, technical, and administrative capabilities of the International 

Broadcasting Bureau.

Connectivity is an essential element of the growing social media phenomenon. 

While the “one-to-many” model of communication has been primarily operative in 

large-scale information transfer in the past, the “many-to-many” model is 

spreading rapidly to challenge old communication hierarchies based on corporate 

and state leadership of the assets needed to transmit information. As individuals, 

especially in younger populations, increasingly choose to acquire and forward 

information online, BBG has developed VOA Internet to reach this tech-enabled 

audience. Looking ahead, the U.S. government will need to assess whether the 

historic funding allocation of BBG toward broadcasting as its primary means of 
406 I PART VII. CHAPTER 27 

message transfer should be maintained or reallocated in recognition of emerging 

media vehicles and audience dynamics. 

State and Local: Sister Cities International 

Municipal partnerships between U.S. cities, counties, and states, and similar 

jurisdictions in other nations provide opportunities for civic leaders and citizens 

to experience and explore other cultures, and to build economic ties. 

Launched in 1956 following a White House summit in which President 

Eisenhower called for new people-to-people exchanges to enhance citizen 

diplomacy and cross-cultural friendship, Sister Cities International150 was created 

to promote peace through mutual respect, understanding, and cooperation. It is a 

global citizen diplomacy network, originating from the town square. 

Sister City International programs involve community-based efforts that 

draw on the skills of local government, business, and the private voluntary 

sector, including civil society nonprofit organizations and citizen volunteers. 

Areas of focus include sustainable development, youth and education, arts and 

culture, humanitarian assistance, and economic growth programs. 

There are currently 694 Sister Cities International communities in the United 

States, with at least one in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. 

territories. These cities are partnered with 1,749 international communities in 134 

countries. While Europe has 35 percent of all sister city relationships with the 

United States (an artifact of the program’s origination during a period of 

heightened reconstruction of post World War II Europe), communities in Africa, 

Latin America, Asia/Oceania, the Caribbean, Eurasia, the Middle East, and 

Canada, are also partnered with U.S. communities. 

 

150. See www.sister-cities.org. 
ENGAGING NATIONAL CAPABILITY I 407

Private Sector: Global Corporate Citizenship and Corporate 

Social Responsibility 

Expressions and images associated with the United States reach across the 

globe. Many U.S. brands and cultural icons are widely appreciated around the 

world. It is not unusual for crowds of individuals who are protesting U.S. 

government policies overseas to be wearing apparel emblazoned with U.S. 

commercial logos, evidence of the frequent dichotomy that exists between the 

viewpoints on the U.S. government as distinguished from American culture. 

In recent years, there has been phenomenal growth in the number and scope 

of community engagement efforts by the private sector, both in the United States 

and abroad. Public/private partnerships increasingly offer a means for partners 

to achieve common goals that are beyond the scope of their individual abilities 

but achievable through shared effort. Employee volunteer programs have 

become an important aspect of community outreach as well. 

More U.S. corporations are acknowledging global responsibility to their 

customers, partners, employees, and shareholders as well as to the communities 

in which they do business. Global Corporate Citizenship and Corporate Social 

Responsibility are receiving increased attention as being important future 

indicators of corporate performance. 

The United Nations Global Compact,151 the world’s leading 

voluntary corporate citizenship initiative, both builds on and 

encourages this trend as do investment analysts who are 

increasingly taking notice. 

Campus programs such as Net Impact152, provide training and 

capacity building to the next generation of business leaders 

interested in corporate social responsibility, sustainable enterprise, 

and social entrepreneurship. 

 

151. See www.unglobalcompact.org. 

152. See www.netimpact.org. 
408 I PART VII. CHAPTER 27 

Nongovernmental and Civil Society Organizations 

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are generally any non-profit 

organizations that are independent from government. NGOs generally seek to 

mobilize support and voluntary contributions to impact social, economic, and 

political activities in communities. Voluntarism and altruism are important 

characteristics. 

While NGOs often work in areas underserved by government aid, many 

receive a significant percentage of their operating income from government 

sources when they work together in partnership to achieve shared goals. Other 

NGOs seek to achieve change by exerting outside influence on the political 

system. 

The nature and capabilities of NGOs varies widely. They range from global 

organizations with a large headquarters staff supported by thousands of 

volunteers, to mega philanthropies underwritten by wealthy individuals, to small, 

community-based self-help groups launched and boot-strapped through the 

inspiration of one social entrepreneur. 

Reflecting the diversity of their programming and outreach activities, 

definitions across the NGO sector vary. For example, the World Bank classifies 

NGOs into three main groups: international organizations that implement 

operations in more than one country, national organizations that work in one 

country, and community-based membership organizations that work exclusively 

at the grass-roots. Alternatively, the Organization of American States refers to 

NGOs as civil society organizations. 

Individuals: Both Nodes and Hubs in the Net-centric World 

In the increasingly net-centric environment of daily life, individuals around 

the globe are empowered to build “communities of interest” based on new forms 

of idea championship that both challenge and support nation state interests. 

Among those individuals with direct personal access to new communication 

vehicles, there will continue to evolve new methods of combining the physical 

world with the digital world. 

Net-centricity allows individuals empowered by technology to simultaneously 

become consumers, replicators, and disseminators of information on a massive 

scale. Around these “hub individuals” grow “communities of interest.” 
ENGAGING NATIONAL CAPABILITY I 409

Since the most powerful information in both the physical and virtual world is 

transmitted by a trusted source, communications forwarded across wide 

networks by “hub individuals” become strategic issues for diplomatic, economic, 

and security planners. 

Community-Building through Information Affluence 

The power of ideas creates information affluence. Information can also bring 

individuals together. Three examples of community building through use of 

communication technology and techniques include First Voice International, 

One Laptop Per Child, and Sesame Workshop. 

First Voice International Delivers Life-Saving Information to 

Isolated Areas 

First Voice International (FVI) is a nonprofit organization with exclusive 

access to five percent of the WorldSpace Satellite Network and communication 

capacity through an expanding number of affiliated community radio stations.153

Working through partnerships with international organizations, government 

agencies, and community groups, FVI provides locally relevant, and often locally 

produced, information to audiences with the greatest need who are living in both 

the urban and the most isolated areas of Africa, Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East. 

FVI content emphasizes issues such as HIV/AIDS, reproductive health, 

good governance, natural resource management, and disaster relief. Through the 

approach of “one receiver, many ears,” listening groups in remote areas receive 

the signal directly from a shared satellite radio receiver that can be purchased for 

as little as $68 wholesale (compared to a conventional satellite dish that can cost 

over $1,000). In urban areas and their surrounding communities, FVI reaches 

many more people through 190 community radio partners in 24 countries in 

Africa and Asia. While some station operators broadcast the content stream live 

over their AM and FM transmitters, others record it for rebroadcast or translate 

the programs into local languages before broadcasting. 

Through its First Voice Multimedia Service, FVI enables transmission of 

high volumes of web-based text and multimedia material to teachers, health care 

providers, local government officials, and humanitarian organizations working in 

 

153. See www.firstvoiceint.org. 
410 I PART VII. CHAPTER 27 

areas of Africa and Asia where Internet access is unavailable, unreliable, or very 

expensive. This transmission is accomplished through the data ports on the FVIenabled satellite radios that can be connected to a personal computer through 

adapter cards. FVI supports this technical capability with community capacity 

building training in the use and maintenance of the radio and multimedia 

equipment. It has further expanded the reach of its grassroots network by 

providing Community Information Centers in extremely isolated communities 

with computers equipped with multimedia service. 

One Laptop Per Child Embraces the Collaborative Spirit of 

the Network 

In the developing world, one in three 

children do not complete the third grade and 

most receive little, if any, formal education. 

This lack of education has both personal and 

societal consequences for them, the societies in 

which they live, and the world community. 

Without access to education and the tools to 

expand their personal horizons, these children 

are faced with the prospect of growing into adults with limited opportunity to 

escape poverty. Few are able to visualize a different life for themselves beyond 

what they observe first-hand in the lives of their parents and neighbors. With an 

undereducated workforce, their communities cannot be challenged to compete 

economically in the increasingly global information economy and their 

governments are not likely to be able to provide services to large populations 

that are not self-supporting. 

One Laptop Per Child154 seeks to 

provide children in developing countries 

with new opportunities to explore, 

experiment, and express themselves. It is 

based on the premise that children have 

innate capacities to learn, share, and 

create on their own. The mission of One 

Laptop Per Child is to ensure that all 

school-aged children in the developing 

 

154. See www.laptop.org 
ENGAGING NATIONAL CAPABILITY I 411

world are able to engage effectively with their own personal laptop, networked to 

the world, so that they, their families, and their communities can openly learn. One 

Laptop per Child focuses on designing and manufacturing laptops. It works with 

national government agencies (Ministry of Education) that are responsible for the 

distribution of the laptops and for training teachers on their use. One Laptop per 

Child will also initiate a short-term “give 1 get 1” program in North America in 

November 2007. 

The XO laptop is designed specifically for children in remote and 

impoverished geographies to help them “learn learning” and includes a web 

browser, rich media player, and e-book reader. By using the XO to access and 

explore information, these children will be exposed to the full range of human 

knowledge and use it to develop their potential to contribute to their families, 

neighborhoods, and nations. 

Sesame Workshop International Creates Educational 

Television Around the World 

A ground-breaking American educational 

children’s television series when it first aired in the 

United States in 1969, Sesame Street has become one 

of the longest-running U.S. television shows in 

history. Produced by the nonprofit organization 

Sesame Workshop155, its distinctive format of live 

action, animation, and colorful characters combines 

both education and entertainment for preschoolers. In addition to letter and 

word recognition and mathematics, instructional goals have included basic life 

and social skills, delivered through a world of humor and fun. It has received 

more Emmy Awards than any other television series. Over the last 35 years, 

Sesame Street has also become one of the world’s most highly regarded educational 

programs for children. The original series has aired in 120 countries and millions 

of children and their parents around the world have watched the programs. 

Beginning 1972, Sesame Street international co-productions were developed to 

reach diverse international audiences. New York-based producers from Sesame 

Workshop work with child development experts, directors, producers, and writers 

in each country to connect the magic and fun of Sesame Street with specific local 

 

155. See www.sesameworkshop.org 
412 I PART VII. CHAPTER 27 

language and cultural needs. This collaborative effort has resulted in customized 

Sesame Street broadcasts in Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, France, 

Germany, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, 

Mexico, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Palestine, Philippines, Poland, 

Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. 

Personal Interactions as Compelling Messages 

The U.S. government and civil society have a long track record of positive 

actions and outreach toward communities across the globe. A snapshot of a few 

key programs includes the Fulbright Program, academic study abroad, the U.S. 

Agency for International Development, Peace Corps, public/private partnerships 

and inter-agency collaborations, and military-to-military exchanges. 

Fulbright Program is the Flagship International Exchange 

Program of the United States 

Since its creation under legislation introduced by 

then Senator J. William Fulbright in 1946, the 

Fulbright Program156 has sought to “increase mutual 

understanding between the people of the United 

States and the people of other countries.” Over 279,000 Fulbright scholars and 

professional experts (105,400 from the U.S. and 174,000 from other countries) 

have participated in educational and cultural exchange programs over the last 50 

years. The 35th Fulbright alumnus to be awarded a Nobel Prize was Muhammad 

Yunus, Founder and Managing Director of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, who 

was honored in 2006 for pioneering the practice of microcredit and 

microenterprise that creates opportunities for those living in extreme poverty. 

There are Fulbright grant programs for three audiences: students, scholars 

and professionals, and teachers and administrators: 

 The Fulbright U.S. Student Program offers fellowships for U.S. 

graduating seniors, graduate students, young professionals, and artists 

to study abroad. During the 2006–2007 academic year more than 

1,200 Americans studied in over 140 countries through the full or 

partial support of this program. 

 

156. www.exchanges.state.gov/education/fulbright/. 
ENGAGING NATIONAL CAPABILITY I 413

 The Fulbright English Teaching Assistantships Program

facilitates the English language abilities and knowledge of the United 

States among foreign students by placing American scholars and 

teachers near capital cities in over 20 countries. 

 The Fulbright U.S. Scholar Program supports the research and 

lecture programs in over 130 countries by approximately 1,100 

American scholars and professionals in such diverse fields as 

agriculture, business, journalism, public health and technology. 

 The Fulbright Senior Specialists Program is a short-term grant for 

a period of 2–6 weeks, designed to enhance collaboration with 

professional counterparts at non-U.S. institutions of higher learning. 

 The Fulbright Teacher and Administrator Exchange Program

primarily facilitates one-on-one exchanges between American 

administrators in K-12 schools, community colleges, and four-year 

institutions and their counterparts in more than 30 countries 

worldwide. 

While the primary source of funding for the Fulbright programs is 

Congressional appropriation ($184.6 million in fiscal year 2006), participating 

governments and host institutions also contribute financially through cost sharing 

and indirect support. Other important elements of program administration are the 

nonprofit binational Fulbright Commissions and Foundations that oversee the 

Fulbright program abroad and propose the annual programs. Over 65 Fulbright 

Alumni associations operate as private, nonprofit organizations to facilitate 

relationships among former grantees and the U.S. Fulbright associations also 

provides hospitality and outreach for visiting Fulbright students, scholars, and 

teachers during their stays in the United States. 

Foreign Student Study in the United States Expands Perspective 

In fiscal year 2007, the United States issued a record number of 591,000 

student visas for international students to come to the United States to study, 

reversing a period of decline following September 11, 2001.157 According to 

Under Secretary of State Karen Hughes, “we are actively partnering with 

 

157. U/S Hughes 11 July 2007 DOD Conference on Strategic Communication. 
414 I PART VII. CHAPTER 27 

America’s higher education community to send a clear message that we want the 

future leaders of the world to come here to study and get to know us.”158

USAID Provides Economic and Humanitarian Assistance in 

more than 100 Countries 

At its creation in 1961, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID)159 combined 

existing government agencies to become the first U.S. 

foreign assistance organization whose primary emphasis was long-range economic 

and social development assistance efforts on a country-by-country basis. 

Headquartered in Washington, D.C., USAID has field offices in many 

regions of the world. It works to improve the lives of millions in more than 100 

developing countries through technical assistance and capacity building, training 

and scholarships, food aid and disaster relief, infrastructure construction, smallenterprise loans, and credit guarantees. Through this foreign assistance, USAID 

seeks to further U.S. foreign policy interests by working to expand democracy 

and free markets while improving the lives of people in the developing world. 

USAID has working relationships with more than 3,500 American 

companies and over 300 U.S.-based private voluntary organizations. The Office 

of Private and Voluntary Cooperation “provides direct support to efforts made 

by the U.S. Private Voluntary Organization community and by its partner 

nongovernmental organizations to address critical needs in developing countries 

and emerging democracies.”160

Since January 2006, the USAID administrator has also served as the Director 

of U.S. Foreign Assistance with authority over all Department of State and 

USAID foreign assistance funding and programs charter to ensure that U.S. 

foreign assistance is used as effectively as possible. 

 

158. U/S Hughes 11 July 2007 DOD Conference on Strategic Communication. 

159. See www.usaid.gov 

160 Ibid. 
ENGAGING NATIONAL CAPABILITY I 415

Peace Corps 

The Peace Corps161 was established by President John F. 

Kennedy in 1961 to promote world peace and understanding. Its 

goals continue to be to help the people of interested countries 

meet their needs for trained men and women, to promote a 

better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples 

served, and to promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of 

Americans. Over 187,000 Peace Corps volunteers have lived and worked at the 

invitation of 139 host countries in the 46 years of the program’s existence. 

Peace Corps volunteers must be U.S. citizens and at least 18 years of age. 

Peace Corps service is a 27-month commitment. Today there are 7,749 volunteers 

working in many activity areas, including education, youth outreach and 

community development; business development; agriculture and environment; 

health and HIV/AIDS; and information technology. Specific duties and 

responsibilities vary widely and generally involve collaboration with local 

community members and nongovernmental organizations in the host countries. 

In September 2007, the Peace Corps launched a website 

(www.peacecorps.gov/minisite/50plus/) as part of a larger initiative aimed at 

attracting potential Peace Corps volunteers over the age of 50. Only 5 percent of 

current Peace Corps volunteers are age 50 or older, yet this demographic cohort of 

the American population is seen as having significant professional and life 

experience as well as an interest in finding meaningful and rewarding opportunities 

for service that fits with the Peace Corps mission and goals. 

Life Saving Outreach through U.S. Government Interagency 

and Public/Private Partnerships 

The USNS Comfort, hospital ship conducted a 

four-month humanitarian mission to 12 Central 

American, South American and Caribbean 

nations during the summer of 2007. The primary objective was to address regional 

health service support requirements ashore, and promote clinical information 

 

161. See www.peacecorps.gov 
416 I PART VII. CHAPTER 27 

sharing across the region. Other missions included outpatient shipboard health 

service support and minor construction projects in the host country. 

The USNS Comfort mission was coordinated with partner nations in the 

region, including Belize, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, 

Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago, to provide 

free outpatient health care services to communities in need. Planning, 

coordination, and implementation included representatives from several U.S. 

government departments and agencies, such as Department of State, 

Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Coast Guard, 

Department of Health and Human Services, and U.S. Public Health Service as 

well as volunteers from nongovernmental organizations such as Operation 

HOPE,162 Operation Smile,163 and Atlanta Rotary Club. 

The embarked medical crew of more than 500 doctors, nurses, and 

healthcare professionals brought a wide range of capabilities, including medical, 

dental, nursing, pharmacy, veterinarian, engineering, and environmental health 

services. These U.S. federal government and U.S. nongovernmental organization 

professionals were trained and equipped to provide general outpatient surgery, 

ophthalmology surgery, basic medical evaluation and treatment, preventative 

medicine treatment, dental screenings and treatment, optometry screenings, 

eyewear distribution, public health training, and veterinary services. 

As of early September 2007, more than 76,000 patients had been seen. Since 

so many patients need to be treated for more than one medical condition, this 

resulted in a total of 295,817 patient encounters. 

Military-to-Military Exchanges 

The DOD conducts International Military Education and Training (IMET) to: 

 encourage mutually beneficial and increased understanding between the 

United States and foreign countries, improve the ability of participating 

foreign countries to achieve greater self-reliance by effectively utilizing 

their resources (including defense articles and services obtained from the 

United States), 

 

162. See www.projhope.org 

163. See www.operationsmile.org 
ENGAGING NATIONAL CAPABILITY I 417

 increase awareness of the national publics of countries participating in 

this training of issues related to internationally-recognized human rights 

DOD also operates Regional Centers for Security Studies, such as the 

Marshall Center and the Asia Pacific Center. During 2007, military-to-military 

exchanges included 2,300 IMET participants and 1,900 Department of Defense 

Regional Center participants. 

Organizing the U.S. Government for Integrated 

Strategic Communication 

Rapid response to emerging situations is a demanding discipline requiring 

dedication of time, attention, and resources. Necessarily, the concept 

development, experimentation, and identification of new audiences and new 

vehicles all take a back seat to short-term exigencies. 

As a result of current federal funding and resource allocation levels, U.S. 

government strategic communication teams are limited in their ability to explore 

mid-range and long-range strategic communication strategies and initiatives. Nor 

do they have time to formalize lessons learned for use by other U.S. government 

teams working on similar issues, or consistently pool social and cultural 

information across departments and agencies as a shared resource for future use. 

Pockets of exceptional U.S. government expertise are interwoven with shared 

blind spots. 

The PCC on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, the Interagency 

Crisis Communication Team, and the Counterterrorism Communications Center 

all have evolved to enhance interagency coordination. However, there is currently 

no formal, centralized conduit for strategic communication exchange. Only a 

central repository for foreign public opinion data is contemplated by the U.S. 

National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication.

Without diminishing the ability of the U.S. government to manage more 

immediate challenges, improvements in four areas would facilitate the ability of 

the government to achieve integrated strategic communication as called for in 

the U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: 

1. know what the U.S. government knows 

2. increase social and cultural understanding 

3. collaborate with outside partners and experts 

4. facilitate U.S. government strategic communication integration 
418 I PART VII. CHAPTER 27 

Know What the U.S. Government Knows 

The opportunity to methodically build upon the knowledge base and lessons 

learned of past and current U.S. government strategic communication efforts 

across country teams, departments, and agencies is currently constrained by timesensitive demands, current staffing, and funding levels. 

Currently, when a department or agency faces a strategic communication 

informational need or skill set beyond the ability of its staff it will often contract 

individually with an outside supplier, not knowing that related data or skill sets 

already exist or are being simultaneously pursued elsewhere in the U.S. 

government. Not only is this wasteful in terms of time and assets, but it greatly 

reduces, if not eliminates, the opportunity to both build upon lessons learned 

elsewhere and to combine resources in a superior joint effort. 

Such government-wide situational awareness is limited by the lack of a 

central clearinghouse for information, lessons learned, and professional resources 

related to U.S. government strategic communication. The lack of such a 

clearinghouse makes it challenging and time-consuming for any individual 

strategic communication team to know what other U.S. government and industry 

experts know and to leverage that knowledge in a time-sensitive environment to 

the advantage of the nation. It also reduces the ability for coordinated 

interagency and public/private partnerships to face shared challenges. 

Similar needs for collaborative information flow and dissemination have 

resulted in the development of data fusion centers, such as the Counterterrorism 

Communications Center at the Department of State and the NCTC at the 

Directorate of National Intelligence. NCTC also hosts a repository, NCTC 

Online, that serves as a library of information across the full range of intelligence, 

law enforcement, military, homeland security, and other federal organizations 

working on associated national security issues. 

Increase Social and Cultural Understanding 

The complexity of the challenges associated with strategic communication is 

increasing. Dramatic changes in information technology and media interface 

have enabled communities of interest to proactively use the mediasphere. 

As a result of the advent of global internet connectivity with low barriers to 

participation, the prior communication model is transitioning from “top-down 

and one-to-many” to “bottom-up and many-to-many” in which one individual or 

small groups can truly shape opinion through their words and actions. 
ENGAGING NATIONAL CAPABILITY I 419

In light of the complexity associated with the successful management of U.S. 

government strategic communication today and in the future, many managers 

currently responsible for strategic communication have been working to develop 

comprehensive planning tools. In December 2006, the Army and Marine Corps 

Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM3-24/MCMP3-33.5) highlighted the importance 

of deep cultural understanding. In June 2007 the U.S. National Strategy for Public 

Diplomacy and Strategic Communication called for a central repository of information 

and analysis of public opinion in different countries. Both of these documents 

highlighted the need for greater interagency exchange within the U.S. 

government and collaboration with external partners. 

Collaborate with Outside Partners and Experts 

The United States has an exceptional range and depth of expertise among its 

corporations, universities, nongovernmental organizations, and citizens. Many 

are world-class practitioners of Strategic Communication or have skills that are 

essential to its successful implementation in various cultural contexts. Others 

have long established track records of successful programmatic implementation 

on their own initiative or in partnership with USG. Their contributions to future 

USG efforts could both complement and supplement the capacities and 

resources of current USG staffs. 

Partnering with the U.S. government to achieve shared goals can be a 

challenging bureaucratic process. Both USAID and the Department of State 

have created offices to facilitate the process. 

USAID maintains a registry of U.S. private and voluntary organizations 

seeking to work with USAID. Through a competitive grant program administered 

by its Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation, USAID provides direct 

support to efforts made by the U.S. private and voluntary organization community 

and by its partner nongovernmental organizations to address critical needs in 

developing countries and emerging democracies. Non-profit organizations based 

outside the United States work directly with USAID missions. 

In 2006, the Office of Private Sector Outreach was established at the 

Department of State to facilitate partnerships between the U.S. government and 

companies, universities, foundations, and nongovernmental organizations. 

However, on an individual expert level, the U.S. government is not organized or 

resourced to readily identify, mobilize, and fund significant collaboration with 

outside individuals who possess expertise relevant to advancing U.S. government 

strategic communication objectives. This is a time-consuming process requiring a 
420 I PART VII. CHAPTER 27 

depth of industry contacts that strategic communication practitioners cannot be 

expected to have the time to maintain or expand. 

Listed here are just a few of the professional skill sets present in the U.S. 

population that have direct relevance to strategic communication: 

 Communications technologists can provide insight toward 

methodologies that maximize utility of existing communication 

modalities as well as identify emerging technical capabilities. 

 Behavioral scientists and cultural anthropologists provide deep 

understanding of human cultures, identities, attitudes and behaviors. 

 Educators with knowledge of culturally relevant pedagogies offer 

valuable perspectives. 

 Historians are versed in cultural perspectives and can act as interpreters 

of current and future events. 

 Economists provide data models to understand and forecast financial 

events. 

 Religious scholars and leaders offer insight into important dimensions 

of cultural life. 

 Linguists and translators develop cultural sensitivities that are of great 

value in the selection of key words, messages and communication 

formats that resonate with intended audiences. 

 Political scientists provide insights into power and influence in modern 

societies. 

 Librarians and researchers provide expert information access and data 

management skills, have country- and culture-specific knowledge, 

contacts, and capabilities, and a proven track records of mission success. 

 Corporate business managers and entrepreneurs have country and 

regional cultural experience, as well as ongoing relationships with 

international audiences, government leaders, and nongovernmental 

voluntary organizations. 

 Marketing managers of products and services are accustomed to 

leading the complex and interdisciplinary management process associated 

with building and maintaining brand equity. 
ENGAGING NATIONAL CAPABILITY I 421

 Market researchers who advise U.S. global brand management teams 

have developed a wide range of measurement techniques to research and 

monitor international consumer interests, attitudes and preferences. 

 Advertising copywriters, art directors, and media planners have 

proven abilities to transform copy and media strategies into compelling 

messages, events and programs as well as identify media vehicles that 

attract target audiences. 

 Producers and directors of films, television programming, radio, video 

games, and advertising commercials are expert in crafting compelling and 

persuasive storylines and images. 

 Artists, authors, and musicians live lives of demonstrated creativity 

that transcends national boundaries, and their personal stories and bodies 

of work offer windows into the American population. 

 Retired government officials can provide historical perspective as well 

as program continuity. 

Facilitate U.S. Government Strategic Communication 

Integration 

As mandated in June 2007 by the U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and 

Strategic Communication, all U.S. government departments, agencies, and embassies 

are required to develop an agency-specific plan to implement the public 

diplomacy/strategic communication objectives of the national strategy. 

This requirement represents an important step forward in the integration of 

strategic communication across the U.S. government. However, without the time 

to build leadership and staff awareness of the “best practices” and “tactics, 

techniques, and procedures” in the private sector and social sector with relevance 

to integrating strategic communication across the U.S. government, the 

forthcoming plans are likely to reflect existing programs and trends. U.S. 

government strategic communication would benefit from shared access to 

lessons learned and knowledge of outside sources of expertise. 

With the recognition of the importance of integrated strategic 

communication in the U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic 

Communication and its contribution to successful achievement of the national 

security strategy, it becomes important to provide additional support to these 

interagency and intra-agency efforts. 
422 I PART VII. CHAPTER 28 

Chapter 28. Conclusions and 

Recommendations 

In light of the changing world and the significant impact new technology and 

media are having on information flow, effective, comprehensive, and 

coordinated strategic communication is vital to U.S. national security. Since the 

DSB last reported on this issue in 2004, positive changes were implemented in 

the DOD and Department of State. However, when compared to the private 

sector and civil sector enterprises, which have rapidly embraced the capabilities 

associated with integrated strategic communication, the U.S. government 

continues to have an underdeveloped strategic communication management 

process. As a result, much remains to be done to achieve an effective strategic 

communication approach, infrastructure, and operation. 

In order to increase the effectiveness of the U.S. government strategic 

communication enterprise, this study makes seven recommendations: 

1. Create a Center for Global Engagement. 

2. Consolidate the nation’s strategic communication leadership. 

3. Investment in critical information science and technology (S&T) 

opportunities. 

4. Significantly increase Department of State budget for public diplomacy 

and exchanges. 

5. Review the Broadcasting Board of Governors missions, structure, 

funding, and performance. 

6. Significantly increase DOD budget for strategic communication. 

7. Take immediate actions that leverage existing budgets and programs to 

achieve near and medium term benefits. 

Center for Global Engagement 

In seeking ways to enhance government-private sector collaboration in 

support of strategic communication, the study examined roles, functions, and 

organizational structures. We concluded that direction, planning, coordination, 

and programmatic implementation is a government responsibility requiring 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I 423

change at the White House and National Security Council (NSC) level. Further, 

America’s interests would be well-served by creating a Congressionally mandated 

independent, non-profit, non-partisan Center for Global Engagement (CGE). 

The center should be a hybrid organization modeled on FFRDCs, such as 

the Rand Corporation and the National Endowment for Democracy. The center 

should be a tax-exempt private 501(c)(3) corporation. Its authority should enable 

it to provide services to government departments on a cost-recovery basis and 

contract with academic, commercial, and government and non-government 

organizations. 

The NSC’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication 

and the members of the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating 

Committee should provide program and project direction to the center. The 

Center for Global Engagement should be governed by an independent 

nonpartisan board of directors that would include distinguished Americans 

drawn from relevant professions and members of Congress appointed on a 

bipartisan basis. The NSC’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic 

Communication should be an ex officio member of the board. The board of 

directors should appoint the center’s director and ensure mission coherence and 

quality of performance. 

The center should be guided by three purposes: 

1. Provide information and analysis on a regular basis to civilian and 

military decision-makers on issues vital to U.S. national security, 

including global public opinion; the role of culture, values, and religion in 

shaping human behavior; media trends and influences on audiences; 

information technologies; the implications of all source intelligence 

assessments; and non-departmental, non-political advice that will sharpen 

their judgment and provide a basis for informed choices. 

2. Develop mandated and self-initiated plans, themes, products, and 

programs for the creation and implementation of U.S. communications 

strategies that embrace diplomatic opportunities and respond to national 

security threats. 

3. Support government strategic communications through services provided 

on a cost recovery basis that mobilize non-governmental initiatives; 

foster cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and information; 

maintain knowledge management systems, language and skills 
424 I PART VII. CHAPTER 28 

inventories, and procedures to recruit private sector experts for short 

term assignments; and continually monitor and evaluate effectiveness. 

The center would perform functions in six critical areas: 

1. Perform audience polling and analysis including ethnographic, 

psychographic, demographic, behavioral and tracking research; 

hypothesis testing (focus groups); and other “listening” and assessment 

techniques used in political campaigns. 

2. Perform cultural influence analysis including values, religion, 

entertainment, and education. 

3. Analyze of media influences on audiences including content analysis, 

agendas, political/social tendencies, relevance and credibility, and media 

organization structure, ownership, and business models. 

4. Foster cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and information. 

5. Work with the commercial and academic sectors for the development of 

a range of products and programs that communicate strategic themes and 

messages to appropriate target audiences. Broad themes and messages 

would include respect for human dignity and individual rights; individual 

education and economic opportunity; and personal freedom, safety, and 

mobility. Examples of products would be a children’s TV series; video 

and interactive games; support for the distribution and production of 

selected foreign films; and web communications including BLOGs, chat 

rooms, and electronic journals. Programs might include training and 

exchanges of journalists, support for selected foreign television 

documentaries, maintenance of databases of third party validators and 

supporters for conferences, and the design and implementation of 

country and regional campaigns to support themes and messages and delegitimize extremism and terrorism. 

6. Continually monitor and evaluate effectiveness, efficiency, and message 

continuity to adapt themes, products, and programs as directed by the 

Chair of the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee 

and its members. 

Program execution and operational implementation will continue to be a 

government responsibility. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I 425

The center should receive core funding that supports steady state operations 

through a new Congressional line item in the Department of State’s annual 

appropriation. To initiate funding for the center, a new appropriation of $50 

million should be included in fiscal year 2009. This core funding should grow to 

$150 million over a five-year period. The center’s core funding would support 

basic operations (staff and administration), information and analysis (polling, 

media research, cultural studies), maintenance of databases and skills inventories, 

and self-initiated projects and programs. 

The center would also develop additional funding for projects and programs 

provided through contracts and task orders from the Strategic Communication 

Policy Coordinating Committee’s departments and agencies (e.g. DOD, AID). 

We estimate that the funds from other agencies and departments would be 

modest initially but would grow to about $100 million over five years as the CGE 

establishes its credibility. Total funding for the CGE is expected to exceed $250 

million after five years. 

The center’s success will depend on its ability to serve as a central source of 

independent, objective expertise safeguarded from special pleadings of 

organizational interests. Structures and methods must: 

 be agile, adaptable, and cutting edge 

 are multi-disciplinary and fuse capabilities from a variety of sources 

 respect past gains as they lay a strong foundation for the future 

Regular critical feedback to key decision-makers based on polling and 

research, and longer-term independent analyses that help refocus and reassess 

policy and strategic communication initiatives, will be essential. 

Therefore, we make the following recommendation: 

RECOMMENDATION 1. THE CENTER FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT

The President, Congressional leaders, and interested organizations 

outside government collaborate to create an independent, non-profit, and 

non-partisan Center for Global Engagement. 
426 I PART VII. CHAPTER 28 

Three principles should guide the establishment and work of the center. First, 

that the direction, planning, and execution of the government’s strategic 

communication instrument are government responsibilities. Second, government 

cannot succeed in carrying out its responsibilities without sustained, innovative, 

and high quality support from civil society. Third, the academic, research, business, 

and non-profit communities offer deep reservoirs of untapped knowledge, skills, 

credibility, and agility needed to strengthen strategic communication. 

The Center for Global Engagement should be a: 

 501(c)(3) corporation with an independent director and board of 

directors 

 means to motivate and attract civil society’s best and brightest 

 hub for innovation in cultural understanding, technology, and media 

 repository of expertise 

 magnet for innovative ideas 

 means to institutionalize continuity and long-term memory 

 focus for experimentation and project development 

In addition to establishing the center, Congress needs to provide the 

Department of State with $500,000 to develop a charter that will define the 

mission, structure, and operations of the CGE. The department should award 

these funds through a competitive grant to an organization or group of 

organizations that will prepare and execute a business plan leading to the creation 

of the CGE as an independent corporate entity (one option could be to extend 

the mission of an existing FFRDC or 501(c)3 corporation). 

Thereafter, Congress should provide sustained funding for the CGE through 

a line item in the Department of State’s budget. This should be new money 

appropriated to the department. Congress should provide the CGE with an 

initial appropriation of $50 million in fiscal year 2009. The objective should be 

steady funding growth, consistent with performance and use by multiple 

government agencies, to $250 million during the first five years. 

The CGE should: 

 respond to multi-agency government taskings, coordinated through a 

National Security Council Deputies Committee for Strategic 

Communication 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I 427

 provide deep understanding of cultures and cultural dynamics, core 

values of other societies, and media and technology trends 

 provide core data, best practices, and an opinion research clearing house 

in support of government sponsored strategic communication programs 

 assess the effectiveness of national strategic communication activities and 

programs 

 collaborate with independent organizations that promote universal 

values, cultural understanding, and global engagement 

 maintain a repository of strategic communication talent, skills, and 

capabilities 

 attract fellows from the academic, non-profit, and business communities 

and from government 

Strategic Communication Leadership 

To ensure that gains made in the planning and conduct of the nation’s strategic 

communication are maintained and built upon, it is crucial that the U.S. 

consolidate strategic communication leadership. We recommend that the NSC 

establish and coordinate a Deputies Committee for Strategic Communication. 

We also recommend that the position of Deputy National Security Advisor and 

Assistant to the President for Strategic Communication (DNA/SC) be established 

to provide a direct link between the leadership of strategic communication and 

the President. 

We also recommend that the current position of Under Secretary of State for 

Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs be chair of the Policy Coordinating 

Committee for Strategic Communication. 

We also recommend that the Office of Management and Budget create a 

position of Program Associate Director for Strategic Communication to allow 

effective coordination and advocacy for the overall government wide funding 

profile. 
428 I PART VII. CHAPTER 28 

RECOMMENDATION 2. LEADERSHIP

Create a permanent strategic communication structure within the 

White House with these elements: 

 Deputy National Security Advisor and Assistant to the President for 

Strategic Communication 

 Deputies Committee for Strategic Communication 

 Strategic Communication Policy Committee, chaired by the Deputy 

National Security Advisor and Assistant to the President for Strategic 

Communication, to include all departments and agencies with substantial 

strategic communication responsibilities 

 Associate Director for Strategic Communication in the Office of 

Management and Budget 

 legal and regulatory authorities as necessary for the Deputy National 

Security Advisor and Assistant to the President for Strategic 

Communication to: 

1. assign operational responsibilities, transfer funds, and concur in 

personnel appointments 

2. provide guidance on strategic communication to an independent 

CGE 

Figure 7-28 establishes the relationships between the new leadership changes 

we have recommended and the CGE. The position of NSC Deputy for Strategic 

Communication and the new Deputies Committee for Strategic Communication 

will develop policy and advise the President and Principals Committee through 

the normal NSC process. The existing PCC for Strategic Communication should 

be strengthened and maintained with the Under Secretary of State for Public 

Diplomacy and Public Affairs as chair. The PCC will receive policy guidance 

from the Deputy NSC Advisor and the Deputies Committee for Strategic 

Communication and will work with the leadership of the CGE to reach out to 

industry, academia, nongovernmental organizations, and other think-tanks to 

provide the cultural and media analyses, establish focus groups on strategic 

communication, and develop programs and projects as directed by the PCC that 

support strategic communication objectives. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I 429

 Figure 7-28. Organization for Strategic Communication

Critical Information S&T Opportunities 

There are a number of scientific and technological tools and methodologies 

that can be applied to the understanding of today’s complex information ecology. 

The Internet has created a vast universe of real-time and archival information 

and a Petri dish for experimentation that can be used and analyzed to better 

understand what the world is thinking and how this thinking can be influenced. 

Social network analysis has matured in recent years and can be applied to 

Internet traffic to identify nodes of influence in the viral flow of information. 

Who are the change agents and opinion leaders in a particular culture, region, or 

topic? The hypothesis is that there are a small number of these influential nodes, 

which reduces the problem of achieving mass influence to the more tractable 

problem of influencing a few key people. 

Machine translation is currently at a state at which it can be used to 

automatically analyze Internet content. It can also be used in the analysis of 
430 I PART VII. CHAPTER 28 

content in printed media, and to a lesser degree, that in broadcast radio and 

television. From these translations it is possible to extract not only raw 

information and opinion, but indications and metrics about attitudes and feelings 

about important issues. 

Sentiment analysis is a technique used to detect favorable and unfavorable 

opinions toward specific subjects within large numbers of documents. Using a 

syntactic parser and a “sentiment lexicon” it identifies the semantic relationships 

between the sentiment expressions and the subject of interest. Put simply, it tells 

us what the world (or some meaningful subset of the world) thinks about 

something. 

While there is much that can be done with existing tools, strategic 

communication is a field that could greatly benefit from an expanded research 

program. Because of the revolutionary changes in the communications landscape 

in recent years, the field is fertile with new opportunities for the derivation and 

application of analytical techniques. This research program can be started 

immediately with existing mechanisms at the Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA), the National Science Foundation, and within the 

Intelligence Community. We recommend an increase in funding for this area of 

$50 million. 

Finally, it must be emphasized how important it is for the people and 

organizations involved in strategic communications to share both data and 

results across the entire community. While this should go without saying, too 

often sharing becomes the exception, rather than the rule. 

RECOMMENDATION 3. CRITICAL S&T OPPORTUNITIES

The DOD needs to make greater use of existing tools and technologies 

to support strategic communication. For example, existing S&T capacity can 

be used to: 

 identify nodes of influence through network analysis 

 support communication and media analysis with machine translation 

 understand viral information flows and influences 

 utilize innovative evaluation/measurement methodologies (such as 

sentiment detection/analysis) 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I 431

We recommend that $50 million a year be invested to advance knowledge in 

these areas and that this research budget be managed by the DARPA, the National 

Science Foundation, and the Intelligence Community. We recognize the current 

but disparate efforts in these areas and recommend vigorous engagement across 

the strategic communication community to share the existing knowledge base. 

Significant Increase in Department of State Budget for 

Public Diplomacy and Exchanges 

The current position of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and 

Public Affairs needs to be strengthened. The under secretary should have the 

authority and responsibility to review, coordinate, and certify to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) agency budgets for strategic communication, 

including but not limited to State, Defense, USAID, Treasury, Commerce, and 

others. To accomplish this, it may be necessary to seek legislative changes to 

provide the DNA/SC authority to allocate, transfer, and reprogram strategic 

communication funds. The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public 

Affair should also have the authority to review and concur on key strategic 

communication/public diplomacy personnel assignments within the Department 

of State, as well as to control strategic communication resources and personnel 

currently lodged in State’s regional and functional bureaus. 

We recommend a substantial increase in the budget for public diplomacy 

programs and exchanges at the Department of State. Specifically, over a five-year 

period, beginning in fiscal year 2009, we recommend tripling the President’s 

fiscal year 2008 request. 

While we do not wish to prescribe specific allocations for these budgetary 

increases, we do suggest some specific areas of focus. For educational and 

cultural exchange programs, we believe substantial increases should go to the 

Fulbright; the International Visitor Leadership Program; youth exchanges; 

English language instruction; increased utilization of “cultural diplomats,” such 

as American sports and entertainment figures; and programs to increase 

opportunities for Americans to study and conduct research abroad and to 

provide exchange and training opportunities for key foreign influences, including 

journalists, pundits, academics, and government officials. 

For the diplomatic and consular programs/public diplomacy account, 

emphasis should be placed on the recruitment, training, and deployment overseas 

of public diplomacy positions, and in particular to make senior public diplomacy 
432 I PART VII. CHAPTER 28 

Foreign Service officers available as advisors to combatant commanders. 

Increases should also be provided for opinion, attitude, and behavioral research 

and evaluation of and for public diplomacy programs. Other areas of emphasis 

include expanded Bureau of International Information Program activities (use of 

the Internet, foreign language websites, blogging, sms), as well as more 

“traditional” programs, such as book translation programs. 

RECOMMENDATION 4. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 

should be given enhanced policy, budget, and personnel authorities. 

We recommend a significant increase in the budget for the State 

Department’s public diplomacy programs, including exchanges over a five-year 

period. The budget should be tripled and those additional funds be used in the 

following areas: 

 exchanges (such as Fulbright, International Visitor Leadership Program, 

International Military Education and Training) 

 Americans studying/conducting research abroad 

 recruitment, training and deployment of additional public diplomacy 

positions 

 support for strategic communication and public diplomacy activities of 

the U.S. military’s combatant commands 

 Internet, websites, blogging, Rapid Response Units, and Digital Outreach 

Teams 

 opinion, attitude, and behavioral research and evaluation of/for public 

diplomacy programs 

 book translation programs 

 utilization of sports and entertainment figures as cultural diplomats 

 training and partnerships with key civil society activists (journalists, local 

media, civic organizations) 

 online English language programs focused on marginalized young 

Muslim populations 

 public-private partnerships targeted at economic development and job 

creation in key strategic nations (Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, for example). 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I 433

A senior State Department public diplomacy representative should be 

assigned to each combatant command. 

Review of Broadcasting Board of Governors Mission, 

Structure, Funding, and Performance 

The Broadcasting Board of Governors oversees an array of important, global 

media that reaches tens of millions of people in 57 languages. The context in 

which these media operate is in rapid transition. The traditional distinction 

between international broadcasting (HF and MW radio) and domestic broadcasting 

(AM/FM radio and terrestrial broadcast TV) is blurring, and both international 

and domestic broadcasters are increasingly being supplanted by transnational DBSTV and a growing assortment of Internet-based media offerings. 

Audience preferences and habits are changing and U.S. national strategic 

communication priorities are increasingly focused on reaching audiences in areas 

with significant Muslim populations. The entities that provide BBG broadcast 

services (VOA, RFE/RL, RFA, Radio and TV Marti, MBN) are responding to 

this shift in audience preference and national priorities. Radio continues to be the 

dominant distribution medium, but several services are accelerating a transition 

to TV distribution. This requires new investment in production facilities, training 

and distribution. 

There is also increasing use of IP-based services (web sites, podcasts, etc.) 

Both VOA and REF/RL have achieved significant success with their web 

distribution. 

RECOMMENDATION 5. BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS

Conduct a review of the mission, structure, funding, and performance 

of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, as an integral element of the 

overall U.S. strategic communication capability. 

The review should include the following: 

 current media mix 

 relationship among the U.S. international broadcasting services (e.g., 

VOA, RFE/RL, RFA) 

 utilization of new communication media 
434 I PART VII. CHAPTER 28 

 new models for utilization and funding of news and program services 

 language priorities (currently 60 languages) 

 audience research (market research, media usage, impact) 

 management structures and relationships with the executive branch. 

This study is pleased with the passage of Section 316 of the 9/11 bill that 

provides the President new authority to support requirements for surge 

broadcasting. We urge the administration and the Congress to implement 

procedures and funding measures to utilize this much-needed authority when a 

surge requirement is identified. 

Significant Increase in the DOD Budget for Strategic 

Communication 

The Department of Defense should create a permanent leadership position 

to coordinate all strategic communication activities within the Department and 

provide representation to the PCC for Strategic Communication. We believe this 

requires a new permanent policy office led by a deputy under secretary with 

representation from the offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public 

Affairs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence. This new office would review and coordinate all strategic 

communication activities across public affairs, information operations, and the 

combatant command domains. 

In addition, the Department should make the investments necessary to create 

an off-the-shelf capability to enable joint task force personnel, in coordination with 

host nation representatives, to communicate with affected publics. Significant 

deficiencies in this critical component of stability operations existed in both 

Afghanistan and Iraq, and would most likely be the case in many of the large 

ungoverned, or marginally governed, spaces that joint task force commanders 

could encounter. We also urge the Department to ensure that planning for such 

communication shortfalls be included in both Contingency Planning Guidance and 

Security Cooperation Guidance to the combatant commands. 

Currently, DOD–funded FFRDCs such as RAND and the Institute for 

Defense Analyses, provide indirect support to the combatant commands by 

working through the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services, and 

supporting commands such as Joint Forces Command. Ongoing research 

programs on empowering moderate and countering extremist voices, for 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I 435

example, could be developed on a regional basis for application in partnership 

with country teams and local authorities. Engagement strategies for regional 

media and other influence nodes could be developed and tailored for each 

combatant command. 

We also identified more specific actions that could, if taken, provide direct 

support to security cooperation programs. Replicating the recent deployment of 

the USNS Comfort to Central and South America through activations of 

additional hospital ships would provide geographic combatant commands and 

country teams an opportunity to match words with actions about U.S. values, in 

partnership with local authorities and perhaps nongovernmental organizations 

(such as Doctors without Borders). Similarly, a cooperation program between the 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and U.S. Strategic Command to provide 

unclassified reconnaissance products for regional and local environmental 

studies, crop management, and weather forecasting, for example, to country 

teams offers an opportunity to partner with local authorities. 

There also appear to be opportunities to leverage IMET and DOD Regional 

Center programs toward improving interaction between the military and the 

private sector. At the National Defense University, the Industrial College of the 

Armed Forces has sought increasing industry representation across its annual 

future leaders class for several years. Eliminating current restrictions on DOD 

Regional Centers providing for the participation by both faculty and students 

whose origin and expertise fall outside the Security and Defense occupational 

fields (e.g. journalists, media executives and other opinion shapers). This would 

serve to significantly enrich a program that emphasizes educating the role of 

security in civilian societies, harmonizing views on common security challenges, 

de-legitimizing terrorist-driven extremism, and building support for moderate 

governments and societies. 

Finally, the negative connotation people associate with the use of the term 

“PSYOP” (psychological operations) hinders the effective application of sound 

principles and doctrine. PSYOP activities that support military operations and 

training should be relabeled “Tactical Information Operations.” PSYOP support 

to U.S. embassies and to geographic combatant commands in the context of 

security cooperation should also be renamed more appropriately, such as 

“military information support” or “public diplomacy support.” 
436 I PART VII. CHAPTER 28 

RECOMMENDATION 6. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Create a permanent Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic 

Communication, reporting to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

This new office would include senior representatives from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, the Joint Staff, and the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Intelligence. This new office would review and coordinate all 

activities across public affairs and information operation domains. 

Significantly increase the strategic communication budgets of each 

combatant command. These budgets should be tripled within a separate 

budget for each combatant command. The additional funds should be used in 

the following activities: 

 Support FFRDCs—such as the Institute for Defense Analysis and 

RAND—for cultural analysis and program development in each 

combatant commander’s area of responsibility. 

 Provide communications infrastructure in support of stability operations 

and disaster relief operations. 

 Increase public affairs presence at combatant commands to support 

security cooperation. 

 Increase collaborative planning and experimentation with 

nongovernmental organizations. 

In addition, we recommend increasing engagements in support of 

strategic communication. For example: 

 Increase hospital ship and crew activation to support security 

cooperation programs. 

 Utilize Corps of Engineers capabilities to support programs for disaster 

relief, flood control, and infrastructure development (security cooperation). 

 Release reconnaissance products for environmental studies, crop 

management, weather forecasting, food and water supply management, 

deforestation, and other similar activities. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I 437

 Create opportunities for civil sector participation (media, NGOs, 

academics) at the National Defense University, the military service 

colleges, and Centers for Regional Security Studies. 

Finally, PSYOPs should be relabeled according to whether they are in 

support of military operations or other activities such as security 

cooperation and DOD support to public diplomacy. 

Actions for Today 

Many of the specific actions identified in the previous recommendations can 

be implemented immediately, and are organized here. The Departments of 

Defense and State should implement immediate actions such as the following: 

 Establish and enhance combatant commander budgets for strategic 

communication to 

- fund FFRDCs to conduct cultural analysis and program developments 

in the area of responsibility 

- provide communications infrastructure in support of stability 

operations and disaster relief operations 

 Increase DOD support for strategic communication through, for example: 

- increases in hospital ship and crew activation to support security 

cooperation programs 

- release of reconnaissance products for environmental studies, crop 

management, weather forecasting, food and water supply 

management, deforestation 

- creation of opportunities for civil sector participation at the National 

Defense University, the military service colleges, and Centers for 

Regional Security Studies 

 Expand the Department of State’s Strategic Communication funding and 

for activities such as: 

- online English language programs focused on marginalized young 

Muslim populations 

- Internet, websites, blogging, Rapid Response Units, and Digital 

Outreach Teams 

- public-private partnerships targeted at economic development and job 

creation in key strategic regions (such as Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq). 
438 I PART VII. CHAPTER 28 

Appendix VII-A. Executive Summary and 

Recommendations from the 2004 DSB 

Report on Strategic Communication 

Below are the Executive Summary and the recommendations of the 2004 

Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication164. 

The Defense Science Board Summer Study on the Transition to and from 

Hostilities was formed in early 2004 and culminated in the production of a final 

report and summary briefing in August of 2004. The DSB Task Force on 

Strategic Communication conducted its deliberations within the overall Summer 

Study schedule and revisited a topic that was addressed in October 2001.165 The 

current Strategic Communication Task Force re-examined the purposes of 

strategic communication and the salience of recommendations in the earlier 

study. It then considered the following questions: 

a. What are the consequences of changes in the strategic communication 

environment? 

b. What Presidential direction and strategic communication means are 

required? 

c. What should be done about public diplomacy and open military 

information operations? 

The task force met with representatives from the National Security Council 

(NSC), White House Office of Global Communications, Department of State 

(DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), Broadcasting Board of Governors 

(BBG), and the private sector. Based on extensive interaction with a broad range 

of sectors in the government, commercial, and academic worlds, as well as a 

series of highly interactive internal debates, we have reached the following 

conclusions and recommendations. 

 

164. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf 

165. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination, October 

2001, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/mid.pdf. The report was briefed to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Under Secretary of State for 

Management, and the National Security Council’s Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications and 

Information and Senior Advisor for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I 439

This task force concludes that U.S. strategic communication must be 

transformed. 

America’s negative image in world opinion and diminished ability to 

persuade are consequences of factors other than failure to implement 

communications strategies. Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter. 

Mistakes dismay our friends and provide enemies with unintentional assistance. 

Strategic communication is not the problem, but it is a problem. 

Understanding the problem. Strategic communication is a vital component 

of U.S. national security. It is in crisis, and it must be transformed with a strength 

of purpose that matches our commitment to diplomacy, defense, intelligence, law 

enforcement, and homeland security. Presidential leadership and the bipartisan 

political will of Congress are essential. Collaboration between government and 

the private sector on an unprecedented scale is imperative. 

To succeed, we must understand the United States is engaged in a 

generational and global struggle about ideas, not a war between the West and 

Islam. It is more than a war against the tactic of terrorism. We must think in 

terms of global networks, both government and non-government. If we continue 

to concentrate primarily on states (“getting it right” in Iraq, managing the next 

state conflict better), we will fail. Chapter 2 of this report examines the complex nature of 

this new paradigm and implications for sustained and imaginative action.

Strategic communication requires a sophisticated method that maps 

perceptions and influence networks, identifies policy priorities, formulates 

objectives, focuses on “doable tasks,” develops themes and messages, employs 

relevant channels, leverages new strategic and tactical dynamics, and monitors 

success. This approach will build on in depth knowledge of other cultures and 

factors that motivate human behavior. It will adapt techniques of skillful political 

campaigning, even as it avoids slogans, quick fixes, and mind sets of winners and 

losers. It will search out credible messengers and create message authority. It will 

seek to persuade within news cycles, weeks, and months. It will engage in a 

respectful dialogue of ideas that begins with listening and assumes decades of 

sustained effort. Just as importantly, through evaluation and feedback, it will 

enable political leaders and policymakers to make informed decisions on changes 

in strategy, policies, messages, and choices among instruments of statecraft. 

Chapter 2 of this report addresses ways in which strategic communication can be generated and 

managed with effect.
440 I PART VII. CHAPTER 28 

We need to move beyond outdated concepts, stale structural models, and 

institutionally based labels. Public diplomacy, public affairs, psychological 

operations (PSYOP) and open military information operations must be 

coordinated and energized. Chapter 4 of this report recommends changes in the strategic 

communication functions and structures of the Departments of State and Defense, U.S. 

embassies and combatant commands.

Leadership from the top. A unifying vision of strategic communication starts 

with Presidential direction. Only White House leadership, with support from cabinet 

secretaries and Congress, can bring about the sweeping reforms that are required. 

Nothing shapes U.S. policies and global perceptions of U.S. foreign and national 

security objectives more powerfully than the President’s statements and actions, and 

those of senior officials. Interests, not public opinion, should drive policies. But 

opinions must be taken into account when policy options are considered and 

implemented. At a minimum, we should not be surprised by public reactions to 

policy choices. Policies will not succeed unless they are communicated to global and 

domestic audiences in ways that are credible and allow them to make informed, 

independent judgments. Words in tone and substance should avoid offence where 

possible; messages should seek to reduce, not increase, perceptions of arrogance, 

opportunism, and double standards. These objectives mean officials must take full 

advantage of powerful tools to measure attitudes, understand cultures, and assess 

influence structures—not occasionally but as an iterative process. Policies and 

strategic communication cannot be separated.

Swift and sustained Presidential direction is also required to connect strategy 

to structure. 

In 1947, America confronted new threats and opportunities as well. The 

President with bipartisan support in Congress carried out policy and 

organizational initiatives that shaped U.S. national security for two generations. 

Today, we face challenges of similar magnitude, made more formidable by a 

world where geography, military power, and time to react are no longer sufficient 

to ensure our security. Strategic communication and other 21st century 

instruments of statecraft require changes different in kind but similar in scale to 

the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. 

These changes will occur only with sustained, enthusiastic, and deeply 

committed Presidential leadership—and the collaborative and bipartisan support 

of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees of Congress. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I 441

Government-private sector partnership. Finding new ways to harness strategic 

communication to the flexibility and creative imagination of the private sector will be 

central to successful strategic communication in the 21st century. The commercial 

sector has a dominant competitive edge in multi-media production, opinion and 

media surveys, information technologies, program evaluation, and measuring the 

influence of communications. Academic and research communities offer vast 

untapped resources for education, training, area and language expertise, planning and 

consultative services. 

Effective sharing between government and society in the conduct of strategic 

communication is not new. Government grants to private organizations have 

long been a way to carry out international educational and cultural exchanges, 

foreign opinion polling, democratization and media training programs, and much 

of U.S. international broadcasting. Grants extend the reach of government 

programs and capitalize on the expertise and flexibility of non-government 

partner organizations. 

Recent study groups, including the October 2001 Defense Science Board Task 

Force, have recommended more extensive collaboration. These observers see 

value not only in leveraging private sector competencies but in new structures and 

a degree of distance that attracts credible messengers with non-government resumes, 

creative thinkers and talented communicators uncomfortable working with 

government agencies, and skilled, language qualified professionals available for 

temporary crisis deployment. 

Collaboration between government and the many benefits of private sector 

thinking and skills should be strongly encouraged. The complexity of strategic 

communication problems calls for balanced coordination of effort. Independent 

analysis is required in a wide range of fields: cultures and values, international 

intellectual engagement, communications studies, and applied science. Teamwork 

among civilian agencies and military services will be necessary to draw effectively 

on the seminars of universities, professional skills of non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs), and imagination of the media production industry. 

Appropriate controls and risk assessment will be needed. For all their strengths, 

private organizations represent particular interests. Investments in strategic 

communication must be grounded in the public interest as determined by 

appropriate executive branch and Congressional authorities. 

Election cycles and episodic commitment have shaped implementation of 

U.S. strategic communication for more than half a century. New thinking and 
442 I PART VII. CHAPTER 28 

new collaborative structures hold promise of a transformed and continuous 

strategic communication capability that serves America’s interests. 

The task force has made a set of recommendations listed below which we 

believe will make a significant difference. The time line and scale of their impact 

is difficult to quantify but we will not succeed in revitalizing Strategic 

Communication if we tinker around the edges. Given the enormous challenges 

we face, we can succeed only if we use all the instruments of national power. We 

should expect to see some progress within a year but we are dealing with at least 

a decade to have a significant impact. US public diplomacy efforts in the Cold 

War, the creation of the Peace Corps and the launch of a new brand or product 

within the private sector in a highly competitive environment are examples of 

efforts that have required comparable time scales and the challenges we face 

today are potentially more complex. We must begin and maintain our intensity 

and focus until we succeed. 

Recommendation 1 

The task force recommends that the President issue a directive to: 

 Strengthen the U.S. Government’s ability to understand global public 

opinion, advise on the strategic implications of policymaking, and 

communicate with global audiences; 

 Coordinate all components of strategic communication including public 

diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and military 

information operations; and 

 Provide a foundation for new legislation on the planning, coordination, 

conduct, and funding of strategic communication. 

Recommendation 2 

The task force recommends that the President should establish a permanent 

strategic communication structure within the NSC and work with Congress to 

create legislation and funding for a: 

 Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication; 

 Strategic Communication Committee within the NSC; and an 

 Independent, non-profit, non-partisan Center for Strategic 

Communication 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I 443

The Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication should 

chair a Strategic Communication Committee. Its members should have the 

equivalent of under secretary rank and be designated by the Secretaries of State, 

Defense and Homeland Security; the Attorney General; the Chief of Staff to the 

President; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the White 

House Communications Director; the Director of Central Intelligence; the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of the Agency for 

International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of 

Governors. Unlike previous coordinating mechanisms with nominal authority, 

this Strategic Communication Committee should have authority to assign 

responsibilities and plan the work of departments and agencies in the areas of 

public diplomacy, public affairs, and military information operations; concur in 

strategic communication personnel choices; shape strategic communication 

budget priorities; and provide program and project direction to a new Center for 

Strategic Communication. 

Recommendation 3 

The task force recommends that the President work with Congress to create 

legislation and funding for an independent, non-profit and non-partisan Center 

for Strategic Communication to support the NSC and the departments and 

organizations represented on its Strategic Communication Committee. The 

Center should be a hybrid organization modeled on federally funded research 

and development centers (FFRDCs), such as the Rand Corporation, and the 

National Endowment for Democracy. It should be a tax-exempt private 

501(c)(3) corporation that would receive an annual appropriation approved by 

Congress as part of the Department of State budget. The NSC’s Deputy 

National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication and the members of the 

Strategic Communication Committee should provide program and project 

direction to the Center. The Center for Strategic Communication should be 

governed by an independent nonpartisan Board of Directors that would include 

distinguished Americans drawn from relevant professions and members of 

Congress appointed on a bipartisan basis. The NSC’s Deputy National Security 

Advisor for Strategic Communication should be an ex-officio member of the 

Board. The Board of Directors should appoint the Center’s Director and ensure 

mission coherence and quality of performance. 
444 I PART VII. CHAPTER 28 

The Center should be guided by three purposes: 

 Provide information and analysis on a regular basis to civilian and 

military decision makers on issues vital to U.S. national security including 

global public opinion; the role of culture, values, and religion in shaping 

human behavior; media trends and influences on audiences, information 

technologies, the implications of all source intelligence assessments, and 

non-departmental, non-political advice that will sharpen their judgment 

and provide a basis for informed choices. 

 Develop mandated and self-initiated plans, themes, products and programs 

for the creation and implementation of U.S. communications strategies 

that embrace diplomatic opportunities and respond to national security 

threats. 

 Support government strategic communications through services provided 

on a cost recovery basis that mobilize non-governmental initiatives; foster 

cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and information; maintain 

knowledge management systems, language and skills inventories, and 

procedures to recruit private sector experts for short term assignments, 

deploy temporary communications teams; augment planning, recruitment, 

and training; and continually monitor and evaluate effectiveness. 

Recommendation 4 

The task force recommends that the Secretary of State redefine the role and 

responsibility of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public 

Affairs to be both policy advisor and manager for public diplomacy. The Under 

Secretary should serve as the Department’s principal on the NSC’s Strategic 

Communication Committee; have adequate staff for policy advice, program 

direction, and evaluation; direct the Department’s foreign opinion and media 

research activities; approve senior public diplomacy assignments; and review the 

performance ratings of public diplomacy office director and embassy public affairs 

officers. All foreign policy initiatives and directives should have a public diplomacy 

component approved by the Under Secretary. The Department’s current resources 

(personnel & funding) for public diplomacy should be tripled from current levels 

and placed under the control of the Under Secretary. The Department should 

provide a core funding grant to the Center for Strategic Communication in the 

amount of an annual appropriation in the Department’s budget. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I 445

Recommendation 5 

The task force recommends that public diplomacy office directors in the 

Department of State should be at the level of deputy assistant secretary or senior 

advisor to the Assistant Secretary. Officers promoted to Chief of Mission 

positions or the Senior Foreign Service should have served at least one tour in a 

public diplomacy assignment in the Department or in an interagency assignment 

relevant to public diplomacy. The Bureau of International Information Programs 

should be directed by an Assistant Secretary. 

Recommendation 6 

The task force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

should act as the DOD focal point for strategic communication and serve as the 

Department’s principal on the NSC’s Strategic Communication Coordinating 

Committee. The Under Secretary for Policy should coordinate strategic 

communication activities with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public 

Affairs and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. The Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy should extend the role and responsibility of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to act as the Department’s 

focal point for military support of public diplomacy and create a new Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs to coordinate all activities 

associated with military support for public diplomacy; and provide adequate staff 

for policy advice, program direction, and evaluation. 

Recommendation 7 

 The task force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensure that all military plans and operations have 

appropriate strategic communication components, ensure collaboration with the 

Department of State’s diplomatic missions and with theater security cooperation 

plans; and extend U.S. STRATCOM’s and U.S. SOCOM’s Information 

Operations responsibilities to include DOD support for public diplomacy. The 

Department should triple current resources (personnel & funding) available to 

combatant commanders for DOD support to public diplomacy and reallocate 

Information Operations funding within U.S. STRATCOM for expanded support 

for strategic communication programs. 
446 I PART VII. APPENDIX VII-B 

Appendix VII-B. Recommendations from the 

2001 DSB Report on Managed 

Information Dissemination 

Below are the recommendations of the 2001 Defense Science Board Task 

Force on Managed Information Dissemination166. 

Recommendation 1 

The task force recommends that the President issue a National Security 

Presidential Directive (NSPD) on international information dissemination to 

1. Strengthen the U.S. Government’s ability to communicate with foreign 

audiences and thereby shape understanding of and support for U.S. 

national security policies, and 

2. Coordinate public diplomacy, public affairs, and overt international 

military information. 

The directive should require all regional and functional National Security 

Council (NSC) Policy Coordinating Committees to 

1. Assess the potential impact of foreign public opinion when national 

security options are considered and 

2. Recommend or develop strategies for public information dissemination 

strategies before or in concert with policy implementation. 

Recommendation 2 

The task force recommends that the NSPD establish an NSC Policy 

Coordinating Committee (PCC) on International Information Dissemination. 

The committee should be chaired by a person of Under Secretary rank 

designated by the Secretary of State. The chair will be assisted by a deputy 

designated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. 

Members of senior rank should be designated by the Secretaries of Defense, 

Treasury, and Commerce; the Attorney General; the Chairman of the Joint 

 

166. See http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/mid.pdf 
MANAGED INFORMATION DISSEMINATION I 447

Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director of the U.S. 

Agency for International Development; and the Chairman of the Broadcasting 

Board of Governors. 

Recommendation 3 

The task force recommends that the NSPD delegate to the Policy 

Coordinating Committee and its Secretariat adequate authority to coordinate 

timely public diplomacy, public affairs, and open military information planning 

and dissemination activities, including the authority to require 

 Analysis of foreign public opinion and influence structures, 

 Development of strategic themes and messages for long-term and crisis 

response communications, 

 Identify appropriate media channels, and 

 Produce information products. 

Recommendation 4 

The task force recommends that the Secretary of State support the Policy 

Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination through a 

dedicated and expanded Secretariat in the Department of State consisting of the 

current interagency working group on international public information augmented 

by an expanded staff and budget and an executive secretary from the NSC staff. A 

robust, expanded, and multi-agency PCC Secretariat support staff, drawing upon 

expertise from DOS, DOD, the Joint Staff, 4th PSYOP Group, CIA, and 

commercial media and communications entities must be established to facilitate 

audience research and to develop channels and information products. 

Recommendation 5 

The task force recommends that the Secretary of State strengthen the 

Department of State’s International Information Bureau under the leadership of 

an Assistant Secretary; substantially increase funding for Bureau activities 

intended to understand and influence foreign publics, with much of the increase 

for contracted products and services; and make these assets available to support 

U.S. strategic policy objectives at the direction of the Policy Coordinating 

Committee’s Secretariat. 
448 I PART VII. APPENDIX VII-B 

Recommendation 6 

The task force recommends that the Secretary of State modernize and 

diversify the products and services of the Department of State’s International 

Information Bureau to include significantly expanded use of 

 Internet Web sites, streaming audio and video, and leased emerging 

satellite TV and FM radio broadcast channels; 

 American Embassy TV and radio and Washington File print services for 

both direct distribution and distribution through foreign media channels; 

 The Foreign Press Center by U.S. policymakers and military leaders to 

communicate with foreign publics though foreign press and media 

channels; 

 Interactive information networks (and the associated databases) 

containing key foreign audiences and influence structures; 

 Joint State-DOD training and increased interagency assignments; and 

 A reserve cadre of retired, language-qualified State and DOD officers 

available for crisis response deployment. 

Recommendation 7 

The task force recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish an 

International Public Information Committee within DOD under OASD 

(SO/LIC) to coordinate all DOD open information programs carried out under 

the authority of the Policy Coordinating Committee on International 

Information Dissemination. DOD membership should include senior Public 

Affairs, Civil Affairs, PSYOP and Joint Staff representatives. 

Recommendation 8 

The task force recommends that the Secretary of Defense implement DOD’s 

draft OASD(SO/LIC) guidelines to 

 Increase coordination between PSYOP forces and the CINC/JFC staff, 

 Revitalize the CINCs’ Theater Engagement Plans, 

 Strengthen PYSOP capability to support the U.S. Government’s strategic 

information programs, and 
MANAGED INFORMATION DISSEMINATION I 449

Recommendation 9 

The task force recommends that the Secretary of Defense enhance DOD’s 

information dissemination capabilities worldwide in support of the regional 

CINCs’ Theater Engagement Plans and in anticipation of crisis response 

requirements. In addition, the Secretary should make these capabilities available 

to support U.S. strategic policy objectives at the direction of the Policy 

Coordinating Committee on International Information Dissemination. 

Enhancements include 

 Expanded use of direct satellite FM radio and TV, 

 Additional use of regional magazines such as Forum and Dialogue, 

 Expanding use of regional Internet Web sites; and 

 Establishment of a public diplomacy office within the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense. 

Recommendation 10 

The task force recommends that the President and his senior national 

security advisors strengthen U.S. international information dissemination by 

 Insisting that civilian and military information capabilities be harnessed 

to the Internet revolution, 

 Taking full advantage of commercial media production methods, and 

 Significantly increasing foreign opinion research and studies of foreign 

media environments and influence structures. 
450 I PART VII. APPENDIX VII-C 

Appendix VII-C. Government and Independent 

Organization Studies of Strategic 

Communication and Public Diplomacy, 

September 2001–October 2007 

Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Changing 

Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy, October 

2003. 

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24882.pdf 

Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of 

Public Diplomacy, U.S. Department of State, September 2005. 

http://www.publicdiplomacywatch.com/091505Cultural-Diplomacy-Report.pdf 

The Aspen Institute, The Rise of Netpolitik: How the Internet is Changing International 

Politics and Diplomacy, Eleventh Annual Aspen Instititue Roundtable on 

Information Technology, 2003. 

http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/{DEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F84-

8DF23CA704F5}/netpolitik.pdf 

The Brookings Institution, The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public 

Diplomacy with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper #6, January 2004. 

http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/analysis/amr20040101.htm 

Center for the Study of the Presidency, Strengthening U.S.-Muslim Communications,

July 2003. 

http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/US-MuslimCommunications.pdf 

Congressional Research Service, Public Diplomacy: A Review of Past Recommendations,

Library of Congress, September 5, 2005. 

http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33062_20050902.pdf 

Consortium for Strategic Communication, A 21st Century Model for Communication in the 

Global War of Ideas: From Simplistic Influence to Pragmatic Complexity, Report #0701, 

Arizona State University, April 3, 2007. 

http://comops.org/publications/CSC_report_0701-pragmatic_

complexity.pdf 
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION STUDIES I 451

Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy, 

Public Diplomacy a Strategy for Reform, July 2002. 

http://129.11.188.64/papers/pmt/exhibits/579/Task-force_final2-19.pdf 

Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy, 

Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating Public Diplomacy, September 

2003. 

http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/public_diplomacy.pdf 

The Heritage Foundation, Strengthening U.S. Public Diplomacy Requires Organization, 

Coordination, and Strategy, Backgrounder No. 1875, August 5, 2005. 

http://www.heritage.org/Research/PublicDiplomacy/bg1875.cfm 

The Heritage Foundation, Reclaiming America’s Voice Overseas, May 2003. 

http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm273.cfm 

The Heritage Foundation, How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy, April 2003. 

http://www.heritage.org/Research/PublicDiplomacy/bg1645.cfm 

Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Strategic 

Communication, September 2004. 

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-StrategicCommunication.pdf 

Defense Science Board Task Force Sponsored by the Department of Defense 

and Department of State, Managed Information Dissemination, September 2001. 

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/mid.pdf 

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 

The 9/11 Commission Report. July 22, 2004. 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html 

Public Diplomacy Council. Call for Action on Public Diplomacy, January 2005. 

http://pdi.gwu.edu/merlin-cgi/p/downloadFile/d/7536/n/off/other/ 

1/name/ACAL%20LFORACTIONONPUBLICDIPLOMACY01-2005prin 

Public Diplomacy Council, Transformation Not Restoration,” Statement of 

Dissent to Call for Action on Public Diplomacy, January 2005. 

http://pdi.gwu.edu/merlin-cgi/p/downloadFile/d/7537/n/off/other/ 

1/name/Dissent%20_12-21-04pdf/ 

RAND National Defense Research Institute, Enlisting Madison Avenue: The 

Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation, Washington, 

DC, 2007. 

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG607.pdf 
452 I PART VII. APPENDIX VII-C 

United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. 2004 Report of the 

United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, September 2004. 

http://www.state.gov/r/adcompd/rls/36275.htm 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, The New Diplomacy: Utilizing 

Innovative Communication Concepts That Recognize Resource Constraints, July 2003. 

http://www.state.gov/r/adcompd/rls/22818.htm 

U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Building Public Diplomacy 

Through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources, 2002. 

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13622.pdf 

U.S. General Accountability Office, Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and 

Coordination of Research, July 2007. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07904.pdf 

U.S. General Accountability Office, US Public Diplomacy: Strategic Planning Efforts 

Have Improved, But Agencies Face Significant Implementation Challenges, Statement 

before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, 

and Oversight, April 26, 2007. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07795t.pdf 

U.S. General Accountability Office, Foreign Assistance: Actions Needed to Better 

Assess the Impact of Agencies’ Marking and Publicizing Efforts, GAO-07-277, March 

2007. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06535.pdf 

U.S. General Accountability Office, U.S. International Broadcasting: Management of 

Middle East Broadcasting Services Could Be Improved, GAO-06-762, August 2006. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06762.pdf 

U.S. General Accountability Office, Department of State: Staffing and Foreign 

Language Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps. GAO-06-894, August 

2006. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06894.pdf 

U.S. General Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts 

to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant 

Challenges, GAO-06-535, May 2006. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06535.pdf 
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION STUDIES I 453

U.S. General Accountability Office. Information on U.S. Agencies' Efforts to Address 

Islamic Extremism, GAO-05-852, September 2005. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05852.pdf 

U.S. General Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and 

Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Post- 9/11 Efforts but Challenges Remain.

GAO-04-1061T, August 2004. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041061t.pdf 

U.S. General Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination 

Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy, GAO-05-323, 

April 2005. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05323.pdf 

U.S. General Accountability Office, U.S. International Broadcasting: Challenges Facing 

the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee 

on International Operations and Terrorism, April 29, 2004. 

http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2004/FordTestimony040429.pdf 

U.S. General Accountability Office, U.S. International Broadcasting: Enhanced 

Measure of Local Media Conditions Would Facilitate Decisions to Terminate Language 

Services, February 2004. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04374.pdf 

U.S. General Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and 

Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face Significant 

Challenges, GAO-04-435T, February 2004. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04435t.pdf 

U.S. General Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department 

Expands Efforts But Faces Significant Challenges, GAO-04-435T, September 2003 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03951.pdf 

 

U.S. General Accountability Office, U.S. International Broadcasting: New Strategic 

Approach Focuses on Reaching Large Audiences but Lacks Measurable Program Objectives,

GAO-03-772, July 2003. 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03772.pdf 

U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, Strategic 

Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC),

June 2007. 

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87427.pdf 

Terms of Reference 





PARTICIPANTS I 461

Study Participants 

CHAIRMEN 

Name Affiliation 

Dr. Craig Fields Private Consultant 

Mr. Richard Haver Northrop Grumman Corporation 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

Todd Lowery OSD(P)/SOLICIC 

FUTURE OF WAR PANEL 

Chairs 

GEN Bill Hartzog Burdeshaw 

Dr. Joe Markowitz Private Consultant 

Members 

Paul Davis RAND 

Bert Fowler CA Fowler Associates 

Dr. Ted Gold Private Consultant 

MG Kenneth Israel USAF (Ret.) Lockheed Martin Aero 

Bob Mikelskas MITRE 

Bill Murray Alphom, LLC 

MG Rich O’Lear Lockheed Martin 

Dr. Joe Rosen Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center 

MG Robert Scales Private Consultant 

Dr. James Wade Defense Group 

Mike Wheeler DTRA 

Government Advisors 

LTC Kirklin Bateman Army G-35, DAMO-SSP 

COL Jeff Bearor USMC 

Peter Bechtel HQDA DCS G-3/5/7 

Thomas Behling OSD/OUSDI 

Maj Trudy Caldwell Bechtel's Staff (HQDA DCS G-3/5/7) 

Dr. James Forest West Point (USMA) 
462 I PARTICIPANTS 

Dr. Ellen Klein OSD/GSA--Detainee Affairs 

COL Daniel Klippstein HQDA DCS G-3/5/7 

MAJ John Livingstone HQDA, G-3/5/7 

Col Louis Michael USA (Ret.) Defense Group Inc 

Dr. Mac Owens Naval War College (1D) 

Charles Swett OSD Policy 

Robert Vickers ODNI 

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT PANEL 

Chairs 

Larry Lynn Private Consultant 

Bob Stein Private Consultant 

Members 

Dr. Larry Brandt Sandia National Laboratories 

Dr. Regina Dugan RedXDefense 

Dr. Kevin Fall Intel Corporation 

Dr. Milton Finger Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

Mr. Jim Gosler Sandia National Laboratories 

Dr. Bernadette Johnson MIT Lincoln Laboratory 

Dr. Duane Lindner Sandia National Laboratories 

Mr. Walter Morrow MIT Lincoln Laboratory 

Mr. Jim Shields Draper Laboratory 

Dr. Wayne Shotts Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

Dr. Ann Marie Skalka Fox Chase Cancer Center 

Dr. James Tour Rice University 

Dr. Rich Wagner Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Dr. Bruce Wald Private Consultant 

Mr. Larry Wright BAH 

Dr. Gerry Yonas Sandia National Laboratories 

Government Advisors 

Dr. Jon Calomiris United States Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency 

Mr. Christina Filarowski-Sheaks Office of the Secretary of Defense 
PARTICIPANTS I 463

Dr. Stephen Morse National Center for Preparedness, Detection, and 

Control of Infectious Diseases Coordinating Center, 

Centers for Disease Control 

Ms. Cecilia Phan The Joint Staff, Directorate for Command, Control, 

Communications, and Computer Systems 

Dr. Lisa Rotz National Center for Preparedness, Detection, and 

Control of Infectious Diseases Coordinating Center, 

Centers for Disease Control 

David Thomen Army G-3/5/7 

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PANEL 

Chair

Dr. Brad Roberts Institute for Defense Analyses 

Members

Dr. Dan Chiu Institute for Defense Analyses 

Joint Advanced Warfighting Program 

Dr. Lewis Dunn SAIC 

John Hinton Sandia National Laboratory 

Douglas Lawson OATSD(NCB/NM) 

Dr. James Miller Center For a New American Security 

Jim Thomas Applied Minds, Inc. 

Dr. Victor Utgoff Institute for Defense Analyses 

Major Stephanie Vaughn US Army Nuclear and Combating WMD Agency 

Government Advisors 

Larry Brant Sandia National Laboratories 

Melanie Elder ODNI/National Couterproliferation Center 

Ms. Rebecca Hersman National Defense University 

Col Chuck Lutes USAF National Defense University 

Mike Wheeler DTRA 
464 I PARTICIPANTS 

DEFENDING AGAINST DOMESTIC CATASTROPHE IN WAR TIME PANEL 

Chairs

Dr. Bill Howard Private Consultant 

Mr. Robert Nesbit MITRE 

Members

Mr. Jerry Buckwalter Northrop Grumman 

Mr. Evan Wolff Hunton & Williams LLP 

Government Advisors 

COL Joseph Bassani U.S. Northern Command 

Mr. Jim Caverly Director, Partnership & Outreach Division 

Mr. John Humpton HQDA ODCS G-3/5/7 

ENSURING DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY PANEL 

Chairs

Dr. Miriam John Private Consultant 

Dr. Ronald Kerber Private Consultant 

Members

Dr. John Cummings Sandia National Laboratories 

Maj Gen John Fenimore V, USAF (Ret) J.H. Fenimore & Assoc, LLC 

LtGen Rick Kelly USMC (Ret.) LMI 

Dr. Duane Lindner Sandia National Laboratories 

VADM Keith Lippert, USN (Ret.) Accenture National Security Service, LLC 

Ms. Nancy Suski Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

LTG David Teal USAF (Ret.) Accenture National Security Services 

Ms. Nancy Wilson Association of American RR 

Government Advisors 

COL Joe Bassani, USA NORTHCOM 

Mr. Bill Bryan OSD(P)/ASD/HD 

Mr. James Caverly DHS 

Mr. G. Gurvais Grigg FBI 

Mr. Lacey Hughes HQDA DCS G-4 

Mr. John Humpton Department of the Army, G3 
PARTICIPANTS I 465

WHAT WE KNOW AND DON'T KNOW: INTELLIGENCE PANEL 

Chair

ADM Bill Studeman Private Consultant 

Members

Joan Dempsey Booz Allen Hamilton 

Marty Faga MITRE 

Carol Haave 

Jeffrey Harris LMCO 

Jake Jacoby VADM, USN, (Ret.) CACI, Inc. 

Peter Marino Private Consultant 

Joseph Mazzafro EMC2 

Dave McMunn McMunn Associates, Inc. 

Barbara McNamara CACI International 

Rocky Roccanova Rock & Nova 

Earl Sheck NGC 

Dick Szafranski Toffler Associates 

Jim Woolsey BAH 

Mike Wheeler DTRA 

Government Advisors 

RC Porter OSD 

Michelle Van Cleave National Defense University 

FIGHTING THROUGH ASYMMETRIC COUNTERFORCE PANEL 

Chair

GEN Jim McCarthy, USAF (Ret.) U.S. Air Force Academy 

Members

Russ Barber Raytheon 

LT GEN David Deptula AF/A2 

VADM Dave Frost USN (Ret.) Frost & Associates, Inc. 

Greg Gardner Oracle Corporation 

Dr. Ted Gold Private Consultant 

GEN Richard Hearney USMC (Ret.) Private Consultant 

Dr. Bob Hermann Private Consultant 
466 I PARTICIPANTS 

Richard Ivanetich Institute for Defense Analyses 

ADM Greg Johnson USN (Ret.) 

Jim Kurtz Institute for Defense Analyses 

Jim Kuzmick Private Consultant 

Zachary Lemnios MIT Lincoln Lab 

Maj. Gen Tim Lowenberg Washington Army and Air National Guard 

Dr. Jerry McGinn Northrop Grumman Corporation 

Dawn Meyerriecks Private Consultant 

RADM Norm Saunders USCG (Ret.) SAIC 

GEN Eric Shinseki USA 

Government Advisors 

Col Ronald Banks USAF A9L 

LTC Alan Eckersley Army G-3/5/7 

BG David Fadok HAF 

Darrin Gilchrist 

COL Clay Hicks HQDA, G-33, Army Asymmetric Warfare Office, 

DAMO-ODA-P 

BGen Jan-Marc Jouas AF ISR Agency/CV 

COL Doug King USMC 

CAPT Forbes MacVane USN JFCC-NW J9 

Ed Martin Contractor, The Wexford Group International 

G3/5/7 

Tim Moore US Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency 

John Plant Contractor, The Wexford Group G3/5/7 

LTC Dirk Plante ARMY 

Douglas Richardson USSOCOM 

Jeffrey Sawyer DTRA 

LTC Richard Voegtly G3/5/7 
PARTICIPANTS I 467

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PANEL 

Chair

Mr. Vincent Vitto Private Consultant 

Members

Mr. Robert Coonrod Private Consultant 

Dr. Barry Fulton Private Consultant 

Prof. Bruce Gregory George Washington University 

Prof. Anita Jones* University of Virginia 

Dr. Robert Lucky* Private Consultant 

Dr. Mark Maybury The MITRE Corporation 

Ms. Leigh Warner Private Consultant 

Government Advisors 

Amb. Brian Carlson State Department and OSD Policy 

BG Mari Eder Deputy Chief of Public Affairs, US Army 

Mr. Morris Jacobs U.S. State Department 

Mr. John Matheny OSD Policy 

Mr. John Mills OASD NII / CIO 

RDML Frank Thorp Joint Communications and SCIG, OSD 

ADDITIONAL GOVERNMENT ADVISORS 

Maj Russell Buttram USMC 

COL Igor Gardner USAF ISR Plans and Resources DCS, Intelligence 

COL Brian Groft DDUSA Nuclear and Combating WMD Agency 

Dave Helvey OSD Policy 

Frank Hoffman Marine Corps Warfighting Lab 

COL Jonathan Jaffin U.S. Army Medical Research and Material 

Command 

CAPT Andrew King Chief of Naval Operations (N81) 

Dr. George Ludwig U.S. Army Medical Research and Material 

Command 

Terry Pudas OUSDP 

LTC Bryan Sparling US Southern Command 

Shawn Spencer STRATCOM G-8 
468 I PARTICIPANTS 

COL Jeffrey Springman JCS J5 

Captain Gene Wynne USMC 

DSB REPRESENTATIVES 

Brian Hughes DSB Office Executive Director 

Andrew Chappell DSB Office, USA 

Maj Charles Lominac DSB Office, USAF 

Clifton Phillips DSB Office, USN 

STAFF 

Barbara Bicksler Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Sarah Canna Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Julie Evans Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Kelly Frere Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Jennifer Howell Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Anthony Johnson Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Brian Keller Private Consultant 

Carla King Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Philippe Loustaunau Vista Consulting LLC 

Toni Marechaux Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Adam Savery Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Ted Stump Strategic Analysis, Inc. 
PRESENTATIONS I 469

Presentations to the Study 

Name Topic 

Plenary Sessions 

JANUARY 24, 2007 

Ms. Judy Kim DOD General Counsel Briefing 

Mr. John J. Hamre 

Center for Strategic and International 

Studies 

Discussion 

Dr. Stephen A. Cambone 

Former Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence 

Discussion 

Mr. Ryan Henry 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy 

Discussion 

FEBRUARY 21, 2007 

Aaron Friedberg

Princeton University 

Dan Blumenthal, AEI 

Roy Kamphausen

National Bureau of Asian Research 

China 

Mr. Richard Lawless 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asia 

and Pacific Affairs 

Discussion 

COL Joseph A. Bassani, USA 

U.S. Northern Command 

Preparing for Domestic Catastrophes: Plans and 

Exercises 

General James E. Cartwright 

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command 

Discussion 
470 I PRESENTATIONS 

MARCH 21, 2007 

Mike Vickers 

Director, Strategic Studies, CSBA

Strategic Competition and Conflict with Near-Peer 

Competitors 

Dr. Richard Danzig Biowarfare 

MG John Landry Discussion 

RADM Kenneth Deutsch 

Director, Warfare Integration (N6F) Discussion 

APRIL 25, 2007 

Mr. William Neugent 

MITRE Countering Sophisticated Cyber Threats 

Mr. Peter Bechtel 

Director for the US Army Nuclear and 

Combating WMD Agency 

Discussion 

COL Jonathan Jaffin

Acting Commander, U.S. Army Medical 

Research and Materiel Command

Future Army Medical Challenges 

JUNE 20, 2007 

Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

Discussion 

Future of War Panel 

MARCH 20, 2007 

Jim Thomas, Applied Minds, Inc. Discussion on QDR (Secret) 

Patrick Garrett, Bill Miles, & 

Joel Sepulveda, CIA Chinese ASAT Launch (TS/SCI) 

Charles Swett, OSD QDR Scenarios 

Joseph Rosen, Dartmouth-Hitchcock 

Medical Center and War Panel Member 

Theory and Practice of War: Adversaries, 

Weapons, and Recommendations 
PRESENTATIONS I 471

APRIL 24, 2007 

Maj Gen Rich O’Lear, Lockheed Martin & 

War Panel Member Red Team Perspectives and Tasks (FOUO) 

Jason M.K. Lyall 

Assistant Professor of Politics & International 

Affairs, Princeton University 

LTC Isaiah Wilson, West Point 

"Rage Against the Machines: Mechanization and 

the Determinants of Victory in Counterinsurgency 

Warfare" 

Andy Marshall, Director, Office of Net 

Assessment, OSD Past War Gaming (Secret) 

Mackubin Thomas Owens 

Associate Dean of Academics and Professor 

of National Security Affairs, US Naval War 

College 

The Logic of Future Force Planning 

MAY 22, 2007 

Dan Flynn, 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence NIC Assessment (Secret/NOFORN) 

JULY 17, 2007 

Robert O. Work 

Vice President, Strategic Studies, CBSA Thinking About Future Warfare 

Roy Evans 

Director of National Security Analysis Group, 

MITRE Corporation 

Future of War (Secret) 

Technology Assessment Panel 

FEBRUARY 20, 2007 

Norman Kahn, Program Manager 

Intelligence Technology Innovation Center 

Biological Defense Research in the Intelligence 

Community 

APRIL 6, 2007 

Roundtable Discussion 

Kirtland, Air Force Base Directed Energy Weapons 
472 I PRESENTATIONS 

APRIL 24, 2007 

Len Connell 

Sandia National Laboratories Radiological Weapons Update 

Dr. Jason Lyall, Princeton University 

LTC Isaiah Wilson, West Point Analysis of Asymmetrical Conflicts 

Lawrence Gershwin, National Intelligence 

Council 

Cyber threat technologies and Biotechnology 

Issues 

MAY 24, 2007 

Michael R. Rooney, Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency 

Understanding High-Altitude Electromagnetic 

Pulse (HEMP) Effects and Uncertainties 

JUNE 21, 2007 

Brett Giroir, Director, Defense Sciences 

Office, Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency 

Progress on Relevant Research at DARPA 

JULY 17, 2007 

John Vitko Jr, Chemical and Biological 

Division, Department of Homeland Security 

An Overview of DHS/S&T Chem and Bio 

Programs 

John MacKinney, National Homeland 

Security Research Center, US 

Environmental Protection Agency 

RDD Threat and Technology Needs 

Nuclear Proliferation Panel 

MARCH 22, 2007 

Dr. Melanie Elder (chair) 

National Counterproliferation Center 

Mr. Vann H. Van Diepen, 

National Intelligence Officer for WMD and 

Proliferation 

Ms. Marybeth Davis, 

Deputy Director for Strategy and Evaluation, 

National Counterproliferation Center 

Mr. Joseph Pritchard, 

Deputy Director for Interdiction and 

Networks, National Counterproliferation 

Center

Proliferation Pathway Analysis 

Ms. Rebecca Hersman, 

National Defense University Future Nuclear Landscape: 2006–2011

Hon. Mr. Ryan Henry, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy

Life in a Highly Proliferated World
PRESENTATIONS I 473

APRIL 17-18, 2007 

Dr. Vic Ugtoff, 

Institute for Defense Analysis Extended Deterrence 

MAY 22, 2007 

 Chuck Lutes, 

 National Defense University Pathways and Alternative Futures 

Jim Thomas, 

Applied Minds, Inc. From Scenarios to Requirements 

Daniel Chiu, 

Institute for Defense Analysis Implications for the Nuclear Deterrent

JUNE 19–20, 2007 

Mr. Greg Hulcher 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology &Logistics) 

Mr. Tom Scheber 

National Institute of Public Policy

“New Triad Implementation” (SECRET)

JULY 10, 2007 

Mr. Greg Hulcher 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology &Logistics) 

Mr. Dennis Even 

Office of the Secretary of Defense – 

Program Analysis & Evaluation

The New Triad Program of Record (SECRET)

COL Pat Sharon 

Joint Staff (J-8) Combating WMD Program of Record (SECRET)

Dr. John Hinton 

Sandia National Laboratories 

Dr. Jim Miller 

Center for a New American Security

Defining the Needed Nuclear Posture

JULY 17, 2007 

Ms. Rebecca Hersman, 

National Defense University Means to Inhibit Future Cascades
474 I PRESENTATIONS 

Ensuring Deployment and Supply 

Defending Against Domestic Catastrophe in War Time 

Joint Panel Meetings 

FEBRUARY 9, 2007 

Mr. Don Latham 2003 DSB SS on DoD Roles & Missions in 

Homeland Security 

Mr. Bob Stephan, DHS, Assistant Secretary 

for Infrastructure Protection DHS Critical Infrastructure Approach 

Dr. Miriam John/Dr. Ronald Kerber Report of the DSB Task Force on Critical 

Homeland Infrastructure Protection 

MARCH 20, 2007 

Mr. William Bryan, DCIP OASD (HD&ASA) Update on DOD Defense Critical Infrastructure 

Program 

Mr. Bob Nesbit, MITRE DSB 2005 Summer Study on WMD 

Maj Gen Tim Lowenberg, TAG for the State 

of Washington National Guard Discussion 

Ms. Nancy Wilson, American Association of 

Railroads Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security 

GEN ( R ) Reimer, DFI International Katrina Lessons Learned 

APRIL 24, 2007 

Mr. Merrick Krause, DHS 

National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis 

Center and Critical Infrastructure ProtectionDecision Support System 

Maj Gen Fenimore, Private Consultant and 

Dr. Nancy Suski, Sandia National 

Laboratory 

Citizen Preparedness 

COL Joseph Bassani, USA, 

USNORTHCOM NORTHCOM 

Mr. Jim Kish, DHS National Exercise Program 

AD Dr. Vahid Majidi, FBI FBI WMD Program 

MAY 24, 2007 

Gen (R) Mike Carns, USAF, Private 

Consultant DSB Energy Strategy Task Force 

MG (R) Barry Bates, NDIA Panel of Corporate Security Execs from 

Defense Industrial Base 

Ms. Alane Andreozzi, DTRA A Kele Exercise 

Mr. Carl Brown, DTRA BioNet 

Colonel Joseph Bassani, USNORTHCOM NORTHCOM 
PRESENTATIONS I 475

JUNE 11, 2007 

LTG C. V.Christianson, J-4 

COL Ed Hatch, JFCOM 

Mr. Alan Banghart, DLA 

OCONUS Deployment & Sustainment Panel 

Mr. Ronald Krisak, IDA Noble Resolve 

Healthcare: Mr. Chris Lake, BLU-MED 

Response 

Energy: Mr. Stan Johnson, Manager Situation 

Awareness & Infrastructure Security, North 

American Electric Reliability Corporation 

IT: Mr. Guy Copeland, CSC; Mr. Michael 

Aisenberg (EWA-IIT); Mr. Paul Nicholas 

(Microsoft); Liesyl Franz (ITAA). 

Emergency Services: Ms. Ann Davison, Int’l 

Assoc of Fire Chiefs & Mr. Tom Rhatigan, 

National Sheriff’s Assoc. Homeland Security 

Program Manager 

Sector Coordinating Council Representatives: 

PCIS Panel: Energy, IT, Commo, Healthcare, 

Emergency Services 

JUNE 12, 2007 

Dr. Til Jolly, Office of Health Affairs, DHS Pandemics: Community Mitigation and 

Implications to Planners 

Mr. Bill Bryan, Director, DCIP OASD 

(HD&ASA) Update on DoD 41 Critical Infrastructure 

Mr. Philip Sakowitz, Executive Director, US 

Army Installation Management Command 

(Accompanied by Mr. Clay Davis, Mr. Don 

Stout, Mr. Gordon Rogers) 

Installation Preparedness 

Oil & Natural Gas: Mr. Gary Forman, 

NiSource Inc. 

Highways & Motor Carriers: Martin Rojas, 

American Trucking Assoc. 

Railroads: Nancy Wilson, Assoc of American 

Railroads 

Transit: Mr. Tom Yedinak, American Public 

Transportation Association 

PCIS Panel: Transportation Sectors 

JUNE 19, 2007 

LTG (R) Peter Kind, USA Y2K Information Coordination Center 

Mr. Brandon Wales, DHS Tier 1 and 2 CI/KR Update 

BG Peter Aylward, J34 Antiterrorism and 

Homeland Defense WMD Insights 

Mr. Jim Schwartz, Arlington County Fire Chief 

Mr. Marko Bourne, FEMA 

Dr. Helen Miller, OR-1 Disaster Medical 

Assistance Team (National Disaster Medical 

System) 

Mr. Matt Bettenhausen,California Office of HLS 

Panel of State and Local Authorities 
476 I PRESENTATIONS 

JULY 17, 2007 

Mr. Allan Banghart, DLA 

Colonel Dennis D’Angelo, TRANSCOM 

Mr. Alan Estevez, OSD(LM&R) 

Logistics Panel: Ensuring Deployment and 

Supply 

LtCol Stephen Hall, USAF, Joint Task Force 

Civil Support (JTF-CS) JTF-Civil Support 

Know/Don’t Know: Intelligence Panel 

FEBRUARY 27, 2007 

Tom Behling, DUSD (I) How "Persistent Surveillance" Will Work in the 

Future

MARCH 7, 2007 

Larry Gershwin, NIO for S&T Unfolding S&T Based Challenges Confronting the 

military through 2025

Mary Margret Graham, Deputy Director of 

National Intelligence for Collection

DNI Collection Priorities for the Near Future 

Vann H. Van Diepen 

National Intelligence Office for Weapons of 

Mass Destruction and Proliferation 

ODNI/National Intelligence Council

WMD capabilities of all the known and aspiring 

nuclear (also chem/bio) States

APRIL 19, 2007 

LTG William Boykin, DUSD Intelligence and 

Warfighting Support 

Mr. John W. Perkins, Chief, Special 

Activities Division at CIA. 

MG Thomas Csmko, USA Special Forces 

Command 

LTG Michael Maples, Dir. DIA

Panel Discussion: “How SOF, HUMINT, and CA 

Interact to Generate and Use Good Intel”

MAY 11, 2007 

Ken Knight, NIO for Warning National Intelligence Warning System 

Mr. Patrick Gorman, ADDNI for Strategy, 

Plans, and Policy Results of the QICR (the IC Quadrennial Review)

Don Burke, CIA/DS&T 

Sean Dennehy, CIA/DI Intelipedia
PRESENTATIONS I 477

JUNE 12, 2007 

Phil Midland Insight on China from a Different Perspective

Hank Messick, Bill Miles, & 

Joe Sepulveda, CIA

Chinese ASAT Launch 

Dave Cattler / Josh Kerbel Navy Deep Red Intel

Dan DeMots/ CDR George Capen Asia Net Assessment

Fighting Through Asymmetric Counterforce Panel 

FEBRUARY 14, 2007 

GEN Paul Gorman, USA (Ret.) Military Intelligence Review 

MARCH 20, 2007 

COL Clay Hicks, USA Army Asymmetric Warfare 

APRIL 26, 2007 

CAPT Sam Neill, USCG Coast Guard Evergreen Project 

LTC Alan Eckersley, USA Army Irregular Warfare 

BG Robin P. Swann, USA Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) 

MAY 24, 2007 

Mr. John Plant Army Asymmetric Warfare 

CAPT Mark Mullins, USN Navy Irregular Warfare / Asymmetric Perspective 

Lt Col Tom Dobbs, USAF Irregular Warfare: Implications for the U.S. Air 

Force 

Mr. Frank Hoffman Future Warfare: Competing for Influence 

Col King, USMC (Ret.) USMC Perspective: Irregular Warfare CrossFunctional Team 

JUNE 21, 2007 

Maj Gen William Shelton, USAF AFSPACE, JFCC SPACE, USSTATCOM Brief 

Dr. James A. Tegnalia DTRA Perspective on 21st Century Warfare 

Director James Rabon, JIEDDO Network Centric ISR Fusion Capabilities in 

Support of Offensive Counterterrorist Operations 

RADM Elizabeth Hight, USN JTF-GNO Brief 
478 I PRESENTATIONS 

CAPT Forbes O. MacVane, USN Joint Functional Component Command - Network 

Warfare: Fighting Cyber Adversaries 

Dr. Lani Kass USAF Systems and Connectivity Perspective 

JULY 21, 2007 

Mr. Anthony Bargar GIG Mission Assurance 

Mr. David Aland Assessment of IA Aspects of COCOM Exercises 

Col Steve Luxion, USAF Q&A USAF Cyber Command 

Mr. James Richberg National Cyber Study Group 

Strategic Communication Panel 

MARCH 1, 2007 

Mr. Alberto Fernandez, Director, Middle-East, 

U.S. Department of State 

Mr. Thomas Skipper, Director, East Asia and 

Pacific, U.S. Department of State

Views from the Regional Bureaus

Ms. Gretchen Welch, PPR Director, U.S. 

Department of State Policy Plans and Resources (PPR)

Mr. Jeremy Curtin, IIP Coordinator, U.S. 

Department of State International Information Programs (IIP)

Mr. Thomas Farrell, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Academic Programs, U.S. Department of 

State 

Ms. Chris Miner, Managing Director for 

Professional and Cultural Exchanges Programs, 

U.S. Department of State

Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)

MARCH 23, 2007 

Mr. Robert Giesler, USD (Intelligence) 

Col Glen Ayers, J-39 IO and PSYOPS

RDML Frank Thorp, Director, OASD (Public 

Affairs) 

Ms. Alisa Stack-O’Conner, USD (Policy)

Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy

Hon. Ryan Henry, PUSD (Policy) 

Hon Dorrance Smith, ASD (PA) 

LTG Walter (Skip) Sharp, DJS JCS 

Roundtable Discussion

Mr. Michael Pease, IDA 

Dr. Caroline Ziemke, IDA Discussion
PRESENTATIONS I 479

APRIL 13, 2007 

Dr. Jon B. Alterman, Director of the Middle East 

Program at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies (CSIS)

The Lexus Hits an Olive Tree

Mr. David Brugger, CEO of Brugger Consulting 

& Brugger Global Media, former President, 

Association of America's Public Television 

Stations (APTS) 

William Siemering, President, Developing Radio 

Partners

Community-Based Media

Mr. Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, chairman of U.S. 

Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) BBG Perspective

Mr. Gary Knell, President and CEO, Sesame 

Workshop Sesame Perspective

Mr. Joe Norris, Senior Analyst/Transnational 

Issues 

Terrorism/Near East Program, DNI Open Source

Center 

Dr. William C. Hannas, Senior Officer for East 

Asia S&T, DNI Open Source Center 

The Current State of the Arab Media 

& 

The China RDA Metadata Mapping Project

Dr. Adam Powell, Director, Integrated Media 

Systems Center, USC Viterbi School of 

Engineering 

International Broadcasting: Future Trends 

and Techniques

MAY 4, 2007 

Ms. Mary Lou Jepsen, MIT Media Lab One Laptop per Child

Mr. Robert Gehorsam, CEO, Forterra Systems 

Inc. On Line Gaming

Mr. Ben Gross, Social Technologies Group, UC 

Berkeley, and UI Urbana-Champaign Social Technologies

Ms. Susan Gigli, Chief Operating Officer, 

InterMedia 

Dr. Haleh Vaziri, Regional Research Manager 

for Middle East/North Africa, InterMedia 

InterMedia

Mr. Mike Pease, IDA Enemy Use of Immersive Computer Game 

Technology

MAY 18, 2005 

Mr. Kevin Klose, President, NPR NPR Perspective

Ms. Jody Olsen, Deputy Director, Peace Corps Peace Corps Perspective

Mr. James Dobbins, Director, International 

Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Discussion

Professor Jarol B. Manheim, School of Media 

and Public Affairs, GWU Social Network Analysis

Mr. Bruce Sherman, BBG 

Mr. Brian Conniff, BBG 

BBG 2008-2013 strategy 

Radio Sawa & AlHurra TV
480 I PRESENTATIONS 

Interviews with Senior Officials 

Mr. Peter Bechtel Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, U.S. Army 

Lt. Gen. James L. Campbell Director of the Army Staff 

General James E. Cartwright Commander, U.S. Strategic Command 

General James T. Conway Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps 

Lt Gen David A. Deptula Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance, Headquarters U.S. Air Force 

Honorable Eric Edelman Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

BG Mari K. Eder Deputy Chief of Public Affairs, U.S. Army 

VADM Mark J. Edwards Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communication 

Networks 

Honorable Gordon England Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Admiral Edmund Giambastiani Jr. Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Honorable John G. Grimes Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 

Information Integration/DOD Chief Information Officer 

Honorable Francis Harvey Secretary of the Army 

Honorable Ryan Henry Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

Dr. Tom Hopkins Acting Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and 

Chemical and Biological Defense Programs 

ADM Timothy J. Keating Commander, U.S. Northern Command 

Honorable Ken Krieg Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics 

VADM Eric T. Olson Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command 

Lt.Gen. John F. Sattler Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff 

MG Eric Schoomaker U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command 

General Peter Schoomaker Chief of Staff, U.S. Army 

ADM James Stavridis Commander, U.S. Southern Command 

Dr. James A. Tegnelia Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

Mr. Peter Verga Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

Honorable Donald Winter Secretary of the Navy 

Honorable Michael Wynne Secretary of the Air Force 

Honorable John Young Director, Defense Research and Engineering 
GLOSSARY I 481

Glossary 

AESA active electronically scanned array 

APOD airport of debarkation 

ASAT anti-satellite 

ASCM anti-sub/ship cruise missile 

ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense 

ASD/HD&ASA Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 

America’s Security Affairs 

ASD/ISP Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy 

ASD/NII Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 

Integration 

AWI Asymmetric Warfare Initiative 

BG battle group 

C3 command, control, and communications 

C4 command, control, computing, and communications 

CBG carrier battle group 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive 

CDRG Catastrophic Disaster Response Group 

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command 

CEO Chief Executive Officer 

CI counterintelligence 

C3I command, control, communications, and intelligence 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

CIFA Counterintelligence Field Activity 

CI/KR critical infrastructure/key resources 

CIO Chief Information Officer 

CIPAC Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council 

C2ISR command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

C4ISR command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance 

CIW complex irregular warfare 
482 I GLOSSARY 

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJTFEx Combined Joint Task Force Exercise 

COCOM Combatant Command 

COIN counter-insurgency 

CONOPs concepts of operation 

CONPLAN Concept of Operations Plan 

CONUS continental United States 

COTS commercial off-the-shelf 

CSRT Combatant Status Review Tribunal 

CWID Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstrations 

DARPA Defense Advance Research Projects Agency 

DCA defense critical asset 

DCIP Defense Critical Infrastructure Program 

DCR DOTMLPF Change Recommendations 

DDS distributed denial of service 

DE directed energy 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DHS/EPR Department of Homeland Security, Emergency Preparedness and 

Response Directorate 

DHS/IAIP/NCS 

Department of Homeland Security, Information Analysis and 

Infrastructure Protection Directorate, National Communications 

System 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DIB Defense Industrial Base 

DIME diplomatic, information, military, and economic 

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency 

DLA Defense Logistics Agency 

DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance Team 

DNI Director of National Intelligence 

DOC Department of Commerce 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOD/USACE Department of Defense/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

DOE Department of Energy 
GLOSSARY I 483

DOI Department of the Interior 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DOL Department of Labor 

DOT Department of Transportation 

DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 

personnel and facilities 

DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 

DSA Defense Security Agency 

DSB Defense Science Board 

DT&E developmental test and evaluation 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

ED U.S. Department of Education 

EEI elements of information 

EFP explosively formed penetrators 

EMAC Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

EMP electromagnetic pulse 

EMT emergency medical technician 

ENC electronic navigation charts 

EOD explosive ordnance disposal 

EUCOM United States European Command 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FDCE Federated Development and Certification Environment 

FEDOS Federation of Systems 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FID p 77 chap 6 

GCC Government Coordinating Council 

GIG Global Information Grid 

GPS global positioning system 

GWOT global war on terrorism 

HAE-UAV high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle 

HANE high altitude nuclear explosion 

HAZMAT hazardous materials 
484 I GLOSSARY 

HE high explosives 

HHS Department of Health and Human Services 

HITRAC Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center 

HN host nation 

HSC Homeland Security Council 

HSIN Homeland Security Information Network 

HSPD Homeland Secretary Presidential Directive 

HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development 

HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Association 

IA&I Information Assurance & Interoperability 

IC intelligence community 

ICP Incident Command Post 

ICS Incident Command System 

IED improvised explosive device 

IEMS Integrated Energy Management System 

IIWG Interagency Infrastructure Working Group 

IMU inertial measurement unit 

ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

JIATF Joint Interagency Task Force 

JIC Joint Integrating Concept 

JFC Joint Forces Commander 

JFCC-NW Joint Functional Component Communications for Network Warfare 

JFCOM Joint Forces Command 

JFO joint field office 

JFT-GNO Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations 

JNTC Joint National Training Capability 

JOpsC Joint Operations Concepts 

JPEO Joint Program Executive Office 
GLOSSARY I 485

JWID Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration 

LEO lower earth orbit 

LIDAR light detection and ranging 

LRASCM long-range anti-sub/ship criuse missile 

LRSAM long-range surface-to-air missile 

LTA-UAV lighter-than-air unmanned aerial vehicle 

MANPAD man-portable air defense system 

MCA Military Commissions Act 

MCP mobile command post 

MEFEx Middle East Force Exercise 

MOPP mission oriented protective posture 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical 

NCCC National Communications and Coordination Capability 

NCO non-commissioned officer 

NCPC National Counterproliferation Center 

NDMS National Disaster Medical System 

NetWarCom Naval Network Warfare Command 

NIC National Intelligence Council 

NIMS National Incident Management System 

NIPC National Infrastructure Protection Center 

NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan 

NORTHCOM Northern Command 

NNBIS National Narcotics Border Interdiction System 

NRP National Response Plan 

NSA National Security Agency 

NSC National Security Council 

NT-ISR non-traditional intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 

NYPD New York Police Department 

OCONUS outside continental U.S. 

ODUSD (LM&R) Office of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness 
486 I GLOSSARY 

OEF/OIF Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom 

OJCS Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

ORS operationally responsive space 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OTA Operational Test Agency 

OT&E operational test and evaluation 

OTH over the horizon 

OUSD (AT&L) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology & Logistics 

PACOM Pacific Command 

PLA People’s Liberation Army (China) 

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 

RAIDRS Rapid Attack Identification Detection Reporting System 

RDD radiation dispersal devices 

RF radio frequency 

RSOI reception, staging, onward-movement and integration 

SAG Studies and Analysis Group 

SAM surface-to-air missile 

SCADA supervisory control and data acquisition 

SCC Sector Coordinating Council 

SCC-WMD Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD 

SLOC strategic lanes of communication 

SOF special operations forces 

SOUTHCOM Southern Command 

SPOD sea port of debarkation 

SSA sector-specific agency 

SSN Space Surveillance Network 

SSP sector-specific plan 

STRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

SWET sewer, water, electricity, and trash 

TCA Task Critical Asset 

TERCOM terrain contour matching 
GLOSSARY I 487

TIC toxic industrial chemicals 

TRANSCOM Transportation Command 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

UAS unmanned aerial system 

UFAC Underground Facility Analysis Center 

USA United States Army 

USAF United States Air Force 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USDA United States Department of Agriculture 

USDA/FS United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service 

USD (AT&L) Under Secretary for Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics 

USD (I) Under Secretary for Defense for Intelligence 

USD (P) Under Secretary for Defense for Policy 

USD (P&R) Under Secretary for Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

USMC United States Marine Corps 

USN United States Navy 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

WTRAC WMD Threat Research and Analysis Center