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P.2 

22A-5S.G/1-75-0C1 

• 

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Haaual 

Projective Ac:ioa Guides 

aad # - « -. 

Protective Actions 

for 

Suclear Iseideacs 

j 

September 1375 

(Revise d Juae 1930) 

^^-•.^...traaamam,' ?rstaction Ajgeac: 

Office of Sadiatics Programs 

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attests 

P.3 

Chapter 1 - Perspectives for Protective Action 

1.0 Introduction 

1.1 tie Heed for Planting 

1.2 Nature of Protective Action Guides, Protective Action, 

and Restorative Action 

1.3 Protective Action Decision Hairing 

1.3*1 Action Factors 

1.3*2 Incident Determinations 

1.3*3 Snpcsurs Pathways 

1*3*4 Populations at Rial: .... 

1.3*5 ?*adiation ifTeets 

1.4 Response Plan Action tinea 

1.4.1 Preparation of Plans ... 

1.1.2 Irplenentatica cf Plans 

1.5 t7pes of Action 

1.5 Goals of Protective Action 

.1 

.1 

.2 

.3 

.3 

.11 

.13 

.14 

. IT 

.17 

*19 

1.5.1 Ba^arflrg "actors to Achieve Protective Goals 

1 .i.2 Constraints cn Goal Attainment 

1.5.3 Evaluation of Constraints 

aaa 1 

1.6.3.' Constraints cn Evacuation •• 

1.6.3*2 Seeking Shelter 

1.6.3*3 Access Control 

l.S.3** inspiratory Prctection 

1.5.3.5 PrepayliBTis (Thyroid Protection) 

1.5.3*5 Milk Ccntroi 

1.5.3*7 Food Control 

l.S.3.3 Water Coatrol 

1.5.3.9 Restorative Acticns 

Protactire Action Guides fcr Exposure to Airborne 

Radioactive Materials . 

.26 

.25 

.25 !Is 

.23 

.33 

.40 

.40 

.41 

.42 

.46 

2.2 Introduction 

2.1 xbole 3ody Sztereai Exposure 

2.2 Inhalation Dose .' 

2.2.1 Zzposurs to radioiodines in a Plune 

2.2.2 Exposure to Particulate Material ia a Plune 

»••«• • 

»*••• • 

2.1 

» 

2.1 

2.2 

2.4 

2.4 

2.6 

2.3 Interpretation cf ?AGs 
Centents (Continued; 

Paxre 

Chapter 3 - Protective Actiss Guides for Exposure fron Foodstuffs 

or Water' 3.1 

Chapter 4 - Protective Actiss Guides for Expoaure from Material 

Deposited en Property or Scuipaent 4.1 

Chapter 5 • Application of Protective Action Guides for Exposure to 

Airtcrae Radioactive Materials froa aa Accident 

at a Huclear Power Facility 5.1 

5.0 Introduction FM; 5.1 

5.1 Release Assuaptions 5.2 

5.1.1 Radioactive Hob-la Gas and Radioiodine Releases 5*4 

5.1.2 Radioactive Particulate Material Releases 5.5 

5.2 Sequence of Events 5.5 

5.2.1 Accident notification 5.7 

5.2.2 Isaediata Actions 5.3 

5*3 Sataolishaent of Exposure Rata Patterns 5.9 

5.4 Dose Projection 5.12 

5.4.1 Suratisa of Exposure 5.14 

5.4.2 Whole 2edy Dose Projection 5.15 

5.4.3 thyroid Dose Projection 5.13 

5.4.3.1 Concentrations Eased oa Release Rates 5.21 

5*4.3*2 Concentratiens Based on Gaisa Exposure 

Rate Measurements 5.24 

5*5 Protective Action Decisions 5.30 

Chapter 5 - Application cf PAGs fcr Fccdstuffs and Watar 

Ccataniaatica 5.1 

Chapter 7 - Applloatica of PAGs far Ccntair!-nted Property er 

Eeuipsent 7.1 

Chapter 3 • Application of PAGs for transportation Incidents ........ 3.1 

References £-1 
P.5 

Contents (Continued) 

Paas 

Appendix A - Suaaary of lateria Guidance ea Offsite Eaergeacy 

Radiation Measurenent Systeas A-1 

Appendix 3 - Planner's Svaiuatioa Guide far Protective Actions 3-1 

Appendix C - Sussary of Technical 3ases fcr Protective Action 

Guides C-l 

Appendix D - Technical 3ases for Doae Projection Methods 5-1 

r 
_Pi_ 

Tables 

?ZB9 

tails 1.1 Exposure Pathways aad Appropriate Responses 1.5 

Table 1.2 Actios and Health Effects Versus Exposure Pathways 1.16 

Table 1.3 Protective aad Restorative Actions for Nuclear Incidents 

Resulting ia Airborne Releases 1.29 

Table 1.4 Initiation Tines for Protective Actions 1.30 

Table 1.5 Apprcaisata Range of Tine Segaeats Making Op ths 

.Evacuation Tine 1.36 

Table 1.6 Paraaeters Affecting the Cost of Evacuation 1.3? 

Table 2.1 Protective Action Guides for Whole 3ody Exposure tc 

Alrborae Radioactive Materials 2.3 

Table 2.2 Protective Actios Guides for thyroid Dcse Due to 

Inhalation fron a Passing ?l-.=s '. 2.5 

Table 5.1 Receaended Protective Actions to Reduce Whole 3ocy snd 

Thyroid Dcse froa Exposure ts a Gaseous Plans 5*31 

Figures 

Figure 1.1 Sequence of Events for Response Planning and Respeadlag 

ta Hueiear Incidents 1.18 

Figure 5.1 Projected Whole 3ody Caeca Dose as a Function of Gaaaa 

Exposure Rate and Projected Duration of Exposure 5.T7 

Figure 3.2 Projected Thyroid Dcse as a Fuacaica cf Either C2aaa 

Exposure Rate, or Radioiodiae Concentration ia Air and 

the Projected Exposure Tine 5.19 

Figure 5.3 Typical Values for X^ C aa a Function cf Acasspcerie 

Stability Class and Downwind Distance 5.22 

Figure 5.4 Radlcicdise Release Correction Factor 5".27 

Figure 5.5 Caaa Exposure Rate Finite Cloud Correction Factor ."5.28 
P.7 

Prssaca 

This manual has been prepared to provide practical guidance 

to State, local, and ocher officials on criteria to use in planning 

protective actions for radiological eaergendes that could present 

a hazard to the public. The guidance presented here is aot intended 

as a substitute for, or an addeedua to, a Stats radiological eaergency 

response plan. Ic is intended oaly ta provide 'inxotratlon for use 

In the development of such a plan. 

In canfoxeance with a Federal Register Notice of interagency 

responsibilities for nuclear incident response planning dated 

January 1?, 1573, S A is responsible for (1) estabiishaenc of proaeective action guidelines, (2) recsxaendasioas as ts appropriate 

protective actions, (2) assistance to State agencies in the developaent ox eaergency response plans, and (•>) establiscaent of radiation 

detection and neasureaent systeas. This docuaent is intended to be. 

responsive ts these assigned responsibilities. 

The Tn*Tmal is organised to provide first, a general discussion 

cf Protective Action Guides and their use ia planning for the iapieneatation of'protective acticns ts protect the public. This is followed 

by chapters dealing vith Protective Action Guides for specific exposure 

pathways and tlae periods. The application sf Protective Action Snides 

snd protective actions is discussed separately for various categories 

of source tsras. Support inforaation that has tot been previously 

cuclishai is orc-rldec es aooeadiees. 
P.8 

The loose leaf foraat was chosen for flexibility. Copies of 

additional or ravlsed wctioafi will be forsaraed routinely to aaaual 

raeipiaats casigaatftd as having responsibilities for developing or 

updating State radiological enargeacy response plans. 

Users of this manual are encouraged ta provide congests and 

suggestions for iaproviag the content. Cosaents should be seat to 

tha EPA Office of Radiation Pro grains, Eavlroaasntal Analysis Division, 

Washington, S. C. 20460. 

y 
P.9 

C2APTZ2. 1 

Perspectives for Protective Action 

1.0 latroductiaa 

Ic eaergency preparedness planning for a mirlpnr incident with 

potential for exposing the general public to haraful radiation, 

public health officials require criteria to detexaine the aeed for 

protective actions aad for choosing appropriate protective actions. 

3 A is responsible for providing these criteria and for assisting 

the States in preparing eaergency response plans to iapleaent these 

criteria. 

After a nuclear incident occurs, an estisate is aade of the 

radiation dose which affectad population groups aay potentially receive. 

This dose esciaace is called tne projected dose. A protective action 

is an action gaVren ta avoid or reduce this projected dose when the -

benefits derived froa such action are sufficient ta offset any 

tadesirafale features of the protective action. The Protective Action 

Guide (PAG) is the projected dose es individuals in the population 

which warrants taking arotacaive action. 

A Protective Actios Guide isder ao circaastances iaplies an 

acceptable dose. Since the PAG is based on a projected doee, it is 

used only in an ex post facto effort to alniaite the risk froa an 

event which is occurring or has already occurred. 
P.10 

Exposures so populations froa aa incident nay well be above 

acceptable levels, ia an absolute sense. Ecwever, since the event 

has occurred, PAGs should be iapleneatad to meliorate the iapact 

oa already exposed or yec-ea-be esposed populations. 

Oa this basis there is aa direct relationship between acceptable 

levels of societal risk and Protective Action Guides. PAGs balance 

risks aad easts against the benefits obtained froa protective action, 

assualag that ehe projected threat will transpire. The responses 

aade in a given situation should be based oa PAGs and the spectrta 

'of possible protective actions, available at that tiaa. 

i.i The Heed fcr Plsr-irg 

Vithls the general framework of providing raring health protection for aa endangered public, the public official charged with response ts a hazardous situation aay be faced with a cumber sf decisions 

which aast be aade in a short tlae. A auaber of possible alternatives 

for action aay be available, but the information needed to select the 

optima alternative say aot be available. In those situations where 

a public official suss rapidly select the best of several alternatives, 

it is helpful if tha tender of decision points caa be reduced during 

cha accident response 9lasting thase. 

The efforts ox planning activities can usually be based cc the 

need for iaaediaca response. Therefore, the objective is ts alnlaise 

tha auaber of possible responses so. that resources are expended only 

on viable alternatives in eaergsaey situations. During planning it 

is sossible tc assess valua rudtrests .2nd datarrlra vhich stcrs in 
P.11 

response are aot required, which steps can be answered on the basis 

of prior judgasats, and which reaala ts be decided in an actual 

emergency. From this exercise, it is then possible to devise a 

set or several sets of operational plans which cas be called out to 

answer the speccrua of hazardous situations which say develop. 

Is the case of aa accident at a nuclear reactor, a bacarious 

situation could develop which aay have public health iapllsations 

over a large area with diverse populations aad population deasltles. 

Probably little tlae will be available to sake decisions. The 

availability of "action guides" based oa advance planning will facilitate rational decisions in emergency situations. During the planning 

stage, the responsible public official nusc consider the total range 

ox possible release scenarios and consider in each what goals are 

achievable keeping in sind both "fiscal and societal costs. 3ecause 

ox this ictcwledge of iocal conditions, he will be aware sf any constraints which nay restrict his scope of response, such as specific 

industries, institutions, traffic patterns, etc. ie vill then be able 

ts select the optiaua response for aach situation. 

1.2 Hatura of Protective Actios Guides. Protective Action, and P.ascoraclve 

Action 

Protective Action Guides are the nuaerical projected doses which 

act as trigger points ts initiate protective action. ' 

PAGs must be provided for three broad pathways of radiation '' 

exposure: 

(I) Exposure from airborne radioactive releases. This type of 

exoosura could occur within a short serine following an 
incident as a result of inhalation cf radioactive aaterials 

Or froa external whale body exposure. 

(2) Exposure through the food chain. This esposura will be 

from ingestion of cancamiaaced foodstuff and water. It 

aay esameace shortly aftar the passage ox airborne radioactive aaterials and aay continue for a long or 3hort 

tisa depending an the radionuclides involved. 

(3) Exposure froa radioactive aaterials deposited on the ground.. 

Sera we are dealing with a change ia background radiation 

levels, and exposure pathways aay include inhalation, 

ingestion, and external whole body exposures. 

Differant PAGs aust be developed for each pathway of exposure 

since different criteria of risk, cost, and benefit are involved. 

Each essesure pathway would isvoive different sess of protective or 

restorative actions as indicated in table 1.1. Each action listed 

applies to the general population except for prophylaxis, respiratory 

protection, and protective slothing. These actions would primarily 

apply to emergency workers. 

Exposure eo the airborne piuae is related ts the duration cf a 

release into tha atmosphere. Tuiie release durations as long as 

20 days or sore are theoretically possible, for emergency purposes, 

release durations of a few hours us to a few days are aore realistic. 

Protective action to be caken for this pathway aay include any or all 

of the following: 
Evacuation 

Shelter 

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S^spiratory 

Protection 

Clothin? 

Control Access 

Stop Protective 

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P.14 

(1) evacuation, . 

(2) respiratory protection, 

(3) snaltsr, 

(4) prophylaxis (thyroid protection), aad 

(5) controlled accass. 

Restorative actions would than include: 

(1) reentry first Sy survey and decontamination taaas, 

(2) removal of respiratory protection, 

(3) exit froa she!tars, 

(4) stopping prophylactic uaasures, and 

(5) allowing free access by the population. 

Exposure through the food chain nay be either short tera or 

chronic depending ca the characteristics and half-lives of the 

radionuclides involved. Contrsl of this pathway of exposure would 

be by: 

(1) eontrol of accass to contaminated anl^a1 feeds, 

(2) dacostaaiaacion of certain foodstuffs, 

(3) diversion aad storage eo allcw decay of short half-iifa 

radionuclides, and. 

(A) destruction of eoacaalsased foods. 

Exposure from aaterials deposited on the ground night also be 

either short seta or ehrsnic depending on the radionuclides, involved. 

Protective actions would include: 
P.15 

(1) evacuation, and 

(2) controlled access. 

Since the probiea for ground contamination involves an increase 

in background levels, denial of aceess sight eoncinue for extended 

periods of tlae. Decontaainatlon nay then be the only action which 

will allow free access to aad utilisation of contaminated areas within 

a short tine. Restorative actions would be reentry, decontaainatlon, 

and lifting- of controls. 

The PAGs are to provide standardised criteria for selecting 

predetermined actions at the sacrifice of some flexibility in 

balancing the risk cf health effects versus the effects of protective 

actioss during an emergency. The loss of flexibility in response is 

expected ts be within the Halts of accuracy of determining the 

factors involved. The loss of flexibility is also offset by the 

advantage of being able to respond cs the issediaey of the risks in 

the case ox an eaergency. 

The range of PAG values allows consideration for local constraints 

curing planning for implementation. PAGs should be assigned far each 

site to assure that local constraints are properly introduced. 

1.3 ^ro^active Action Decision Siskins 

A nuclear incident as defined herein refers ts a series of events 

leading ts the release of radioactive aaterials into the environment of 

sufficient magnitude to warrant consideration of protective actions. 

Protective acticns are those actioss taken following a nuclear incident 
P.16 

that are intended to sininica 

public resulting froa incidents. 

Tha decision ts initiate a protective action say be a complex 

process with the benefits of taking the action being weighed against 

the risks and constraints involved in taking the action. In addition, 

the decision will likely be aade under difficult eaergency conditions, 

probably with little detailed inforaation available. Therefore, • /» 

considerable planning is necessary ts reduce to aanageable levels the ' 

*j£m-

a-tjgj4acislana igadicg -- *--*£r^£va responses to protect the 

public in ehe event cf a auclaar incident. 

1.2.1 Action "actors 

Vithin the contest of nuclear incidents, a wide variety of 

possible situations nay develop. Scaa perspective of the needs of the "~N 

responsible planning officer eas ba shown in a brief description of 

the factors involved. Basically, the officer aust balance problems 

involving identification of ths magnitude of the release, possible 

pathways ts the population at risk, how auch cine is available to take 

action, what action :o cake, aad what the effects sight be. 

1.3.2 Incident Datamirtations 

The first prsbiaa ta arise will be that of identifying tha type of 

incident and the sagsicuda cf ehe release. Nuclear incidents' aay be 

extremely variable and say range frsa very saall releases having ao 

aaasurabla consequences offsite to large scale releases possibly 

involving large populations and araas. .-.aspeasas susc ba approprlata 

ts the incident resorted. 
P.17 

One of the variables will ba tha source tarn, which refers to 

the characteristics and release rata of the radioactive material. 

The amounts and types af radionuclides available for release should 

be iaaediately calculable by site personnel. What is actually being 

released to the environment can be estiaated but aay not be eonflraed 

for soae time aftar the incident. 

The nagnitude and duration of the release say be estimated by 

site personnel from plans conditions or froa knowledge of the type 

of incident that has occurred. Eowever, the estimate may be highly 

uncertain and nust be updated on the basis of onsite and offsite 

monitoring observations and operational status of engineered safeguards. 

If source tarn information is nst available i=aediately, default 

values should be available from planning efforts. These values could 

be based on accident scenarios fron VAS3-i<*00 (.1), design basis acei- -

dents evaluated in the NSC safety evaluation report for individual 

facilities, or ocher scenarios appropriate for a specific facility. 

The second aajor variable will be where the released material is 

expected to go. Meteorology aad geography will affect this variable. 

Currant, aetaorslogicai conditions can be observed diraetiy ac the sita 

and reiavant locations. However, conpiata netaorslccical data will 

never be available, and axtansion of observed daca nust be aade ts 

a 

precict the course ot released raceriai. 

Current weather conditions aay restrict the options for response, 

e.g., evacuation in a blistare say be reduced or impossible. Weather 
P.18, 

forecasts have all of the inherent uncertainty cf the currant condition 

estimates since they are derived froa thasa. 

Geography is iaportant both ia its influence on neteoroiogy and 

on demography and ia its influence oa value judgments to be aade. 

The plannlag for a coastal sita or a river valley sita say be diffareas 

due ts road patterns and nethods for csr-nmicasing or applying protective . actions . 

Demography is a variable es be considered during the planning 

stags. Demography is of aost Importance in helping ts a.ss&aa the 

possible impact af an incident. Population numbers, age distribution, 

distribution within an area, etc., will have soae influence on responses 

available in aay situation. 

Providing for the ability to detect and aeasure a release are 

iaportant factors for planning. Although it aay be possible to detect 

releases and aeasure-release rates at the sita, inforaation from eavirauaeatal measurements will be needed to esafIra aay estimates made on the 

basis of onsite aeasuraaanas. Detection and aeasuraaeat at locations 

offsite are necessary to update and/or eonflra predictions about the 

movement sf the release in the environment, locations for installed 

equipment nust be planned, probably on the basis cf average area 

setaorologv. Instrumentation needs ara cisc-m-sad in aora detail ia 

Appendix A. 

Tha source term, aeteerology, and geography parameters ara 

utilized in taking a prediction of ehe path and time profile for tha 

1.13 
P.19 

release. This preditticn, in combination wleh demography data, will 

be used to select the best responses for the situation. The nest 

reasonable approach is to plan path aad tiae profiles (isopleths) 

for unit release situations and then to modify thea as real data 

are obtained. 

1.3.3 Exoosure Pathways 

The next decision aftar the deteralnatloa of an accident situation will probably concern identification of iaportant pathways of 

radionuclides to the papulation. Exposure pathways of iaaediate 

importance and the tiae available ts interrupt thea can be decided 

es a large extent on the basis of planning judgrants. 

The single nost important pathway during the emergency phase 

is probably by air. The air pathway will be via inhalation sf 

either gases or particulates and whole body exposure to the plune. 

Released gases will be either radioactive noble gases, organic 

iodides, inorganic iodides, or vciasil's inorganic' aaterials. Particles will probably fora by the eaadeasaaioa of vaporised saterlal. 

Water is a pathway for exposure by ingestion or iaaersion. Released material say enter the water directly cr in tha form of fallout 

or ralnout followed by surface runoff. Tha immersion pathway sf 

exposure is unlikely to have significance except ia very specialised 

circumstances. Ingestion of watar is probably only a sinor pathway 
P.20 

of exposure in tha short run. However, the gastrointestinal systsa 

aost be eonsidersd for longer tara ingestion of eontaalnated dr*1 Tiki rig 

watar. 

Ingestion of food is an important exposure pathway. However, 

with the possible exception of drinking water, allk, and esneaalnatad 

leaf7 vegetables, entry of released uatarials into food and passage 

along this pathway is delayed. Identification of sensitive points ' . •m»"' 

for control should be aade during planning« 

Characterisation of release aaterials involved in air, water, 

aad food pathways will not be done for soma time after an accident. 

The •*—'-••'gi decisions will have ts be nade on the basis of estimates 

developed in planning and codified as real information becomes 

avallabia, y 

Direct external whole body radiation exposure aay be a hasard. 

Released aaterial deposited in soil or water or suspended in air and' 

material still ac the site serve as sources of direct radiation, mostly 

by ganaa and beta radiations. Although exposure rate aay be neasured 

directly at specific locations, the distribution nust be estimatad and 

the estimates updated on tha basis of aonitsring data. Fairly coaplata 

scnitorlng will be needed during implementation of rastorative actions. 

Soil contamination, in addition to providing part of the dlract 

whole body exposure, also provides a contribution ts the air pathway. 

Released saterial deposited on soil can be resuspended, thus possibly 
P.21 

entering the air, watar, and food pathways. Evaluation sf thase 

hasards will be particulariy iaportant in deciding appropriate 

actions during the restoration phase, e.g., level of decontamination 

needed. 

1.3.4 Populations at Risk 

The next consideration of iaportaaca to the responsible official 

is what population is ts be protected. Prior judgment and planning 

based os the geography and desography of the area around the site 

and on critical pathways ara essential to identifying populations 

at greatest risk. 

The average population is asde us of persons with varying 

sensitivities to radiation exposure, and responses say be keyed ts 

the aost sensitive, or responses aay be restricted, depending on 

characteristics of the local population. 

(1) For purposes of response planning, the general population 

will be evaluated on the basis of risk ts individuals within 

the population, usually cn the basis of avoiding clinical 

effeets. However, the papulation as a whole will also be 

considered in planning seme responses on the basis of 

statistical risk of somatic and/or genatic affects. 

(2) Sensitive populations may be considered cn a special basis. 

f 

Children, Intend •fag the fatus and unborn children, are 

generally sore sensitive than healthy adults. For thi 

reason, such cambers of the population nay be selected 
P.22 

either as the sost sensitive receptors or as a special 

group for protection. 

(3) Selected populations will also be present. These 

populations nay be selected os voluntary or involuntary 

bases. Workers as a nuclear facility are classified 

as radiation workers and fall under differenc criteria for 

protection than the general population. Those persons .who 

are engaged ia public service activities during or after 

the accident ara voluntarily placing themselves under . 

different criteria for protection than the general population. F*-rally, soae persons ara involuntarily included 

linear different criteria because the risk of taking action 

is different than for the general population. This . 

involuntarily selected population nay include bedridden ^J 

and critically ill patients, patieats in. intensive care 

units, prisoners, etc. 

1.3.5 Radiation Effact3 

A final parameter which scst be considered is radiation effects. 

These aay fall into rwo categories, early or delayed, but are not 

mutually exclusive. 

. (1) Early (acuta) effects, occurring within 90 days, nay induce 

fatalities, syaptsas ef radiation sickness, or clinically 

detectable changes. Efforts to protect selected populations 

will extend to prevention of fatalitias, nininisatiOn of 
P.23 

syapeoas of radiation sicistass in radiation workers and 

public service personnel, and prevention of clinically 

detectable changes of uncertain significance in the rest 

of the papulation. The basis for decisions regarding early 

effects is cot hard to justify because of the imminence 

of such effects. However, they nust be aade rapidly under 

conditions of competing needs ts protect the public. 

(2) Delayed statistical effeets (i.e., biological effects which 

can only be observed on a statistical basis) will occur 

at random in a population after exposure to released 

aaterials. These effects say be fatalities or disabilities 

of somatic or genetic origin. Tna incidence of these 

effects is estiaated on the basis of statistical evaluation 

» 

cf epidemiological studies in groups sf people who had been 

exposed ts radiation. Decisions concerning statistical 

effects on populations will be note difficult because 

of the lack of iaaedlaey of the effects, out in the long 

run, these effeets sight cause the greatest impact on the 

general population. 

Tha response timas, actions to consider, and possible health 

effaces fsr each pathway ara shown in tabla 1.2 for a typical popular!: 

Effects on animals, vegetation, or real estate are also possible 

but aay be controlled or alleviated to the extent that decontaainatioa 

is employed sr that dastructioa of the affactad itans is ampioyed. 

i.U 
Table 1.2 Action and Health Effaces 

Versus Exsosure Pathways 

Exposure 

Pathway. 

Air -

Watar 

Particulate 

Gas 

- Particulate 

Raiaout 

Fallout 

Tima-sion 

?ecd - Milk 

Driakin? Water 

Sevesaoss 

Foodstuffs 

Scil - Resuspenslon 

Direct 

Direct - Facility 

Air 

Watar 

Raspeasa 

Tiaa 

Mia - Sr 

Min —

 3— 

Hr - Da 

Mia - Hr 

Cay 

Da - Me 

as - MC 

Da - Ma 

Da - Mo 

Da 

Mia - Ca 

Min 

Min - Hr 

•Saa 

Action 

5 

TS 

7ZSL 

?52 

PSA 

R 

?5?. 

?S» 

? 

?5£ 

Public 

Health 

Effects 

D 

F.E.D 

S 

0 

D,F,S 

0 

D 

3 

E,j,r 

?,2„D 

F.2,3 

0,*,5 

Actionsi ? - Protective 

Effects: F - Sapid Fatality 

R - Rasssrative 

S - Early 3 - Delayed 

..-3 
P.25 

1.- Resoer.se ?lar. Action Tines 

A typical sequence of events for developing eaergency plans and 

responding to andear incidents is shown in figure 1.1. This figure 

illustrates the general order of events bus not relative lengths of 

tlae for each event. These will vary according to individual elrsuastaneas. 

.4.1 Preparation of Plans 

Considerable preparation will be required to ensure the adequacy 

of emergency response plans. This preparatory time induces the 

following eleaents: 

(1) The decisloa aust be aade. to prepare emergeacy response plans 

according to the legislative aaadaces or needs within a 

given State. 

(2) Than basic plans should be developed using appropriate 

guidance froa this annua1 aad the AEC "Guide and Checklist" (2) 

These plans should induce emergency response actions for 

coping with audear incidents and directions on the use of 

E?A Protective Action Guides for these situations. 

(3) These plans should be approved by responsible persons or 

agencies. 

(4) Scenarios must be developed from the basic plans ts cover 

aajor contingencies which can be identified. ' 

Methods of implementation nust be prepared aad tested so that 

nonviable responses aad contingency plans nay be identified and discarded. This discarding ef tssvlabia raspssses aay be based in part 
I " 

flESfONS E 

riANNiN a 

NIICLEAII 

INCHlENi 

Develop emergency response 

plan 

Prepare ei|iii|Mient, 

train personnel 

And lest pljii 

Review of 

plan 

Decision lo 

prepare etueryency response 

plan 

Acceptance 

of 

plait 

(j) Notification time 

Mespunse time 

Implementation time 

¥. 

RESPONS E 

EMEIIQENCV 

Preliainary evaluation of Incident 

•nil projected doses 

PIIOIECTION flESIOflAltON 

Activate State 

emergency p|*n 

Hel d monitoring and continuing evaluation 

of exposure pathways, population at risk, dose 

projections. PAGs, and protective actions 

-Protective action decision 

Protective Action 

Initiated Implemented 

Restorative 

Action 

llotlfy'State 

authorities 

0) 

Cir 0 

Badlatlon 

returns to 

guide levels 

(S> 

Projected Dose lime 

(\j line hefore population exposure 

(Ideally protective actions would be Implemented during this time.) 

(S) Possible accumulation of projected dose before Initiation of protective action 

(iT) Partial accumulation And partial avoidance of projected dose 

(?) lime In which projected dune Is avoided by protective action 

(ft) Partial accumulation of projected dose during restoration 

Fir.tiiic l. l SEQUENCE OE EVEIIIS FOK HESHOMSE I'IAIUIIHG 

AND nESPumiiNu ro Unci tAn INCIDENIS 

MJ u 

ho 

0) 
on evaluation of .local constraints. For eaaapia, avacuacieu of 

prisoners or critically ill persons night not be considered viable 

while alternative protective actions aay be at least partially 

effective. 

Development of the basic eaergency response plaa aay r m a course 

of several aonths or longer. Sowever, planning should be a eantinf.itg 

activity after tha basic plans are developed. Advances in neceoroiogy, 

development of new protective actions, changing demography, etc., 

should be used in reevaluation of the original scenarios. And of 

course, recurrent testing of iapleaensatisn sethods should be carried 

out. 

,i.2 lapleraesratlea cf ?lans 

A sequence of steps to isipleaent a response plan following a 

'nuclear incident-is also shown .in figura i.i. Tne tiae after an incident aay be divided into three phases which are called eaergency, 

protection, aad restoration. These phases are not necessarily distinct 

consecutive tlae periods, but they do serve to indicate the general 

nature .of activities ia a typical response sequeace. 

The eaergsacy phase includes all those activities leading to 

initiation of protective actions. This phase involves assasssent cf 

tha situations aad is characterised by urgency in determining the seed 

rr 

far protective action and getting the action initiated. In general, 

this aay be considered to be tha first few hours following notification 

of an incident and deals priaarlly with protection ox the population 

'• m 
P.28 

froa exposure to ehe airborne plune. 

The aost iaportant step in emergeacy response is the proapt 

notification that an incident has occurred that could result ia an 

offsite exposure such that there is a need for initiating protective 

action. It is tha facility operator's responsibility to notify State 

or local authorities that such an incident has occurred. It is 

iaportant .that agreements be reached during ehe planning phase on ... 

who is to be notified, data to be provided, offsite aeasureaeats that •• „ 

will ba aade, aad actions eo be initiated ae the site so that there 

will be a aininum tiae loss ia starting isrpleaentation of protective 

action ia the offsite area. Proper planning nust include incentives 

ts prevent delays ia notification. Huciaar facility operators have 

the •'Tilr'al responsibility for accident assessment. This includes —sproapt action necessary eo evaluate public health and safety both v ' 

onsite and offsite (.2) . Ideally, this notification should occur as 

soon as conditions in the facllisy are such chat an iasending accidental 

release potential arises. Vhile such notification could lead to false 

alaras cn rare occasions, they could also peraic sore timely protective 

1 

actions than postponing ehe notification until a release has occurred.' 

The sequence of events during ehe eaergency phase includes the 

notification of responsible authorities, evaluation and racoaaandatlons 

for action, and warning ox tha public. In this early phase of response, 

the tiae available for effective actios will probably be quite Halted. 

"As part of their plans, tha Sesta should establish wish tha facility 

operator a strict protocol for sstificstion of tha State such that early 

responding of possible intending raiaasas would not involve- disincentives 

:o. ehe facility ooeracor. 

1.20 
ataly uses besoming awara that an incident has occurred 

that aay result ia asposure of the offsita population, a preliainary 

evaluation should be aade by the facility operator to detasalne 

the nature and potential magnitude of the incident. This evaluation, 

if possible, should determine potential exposure pathways, population 

at risk, and projected doses. At this tiae, projected doses aay be 

estiaated from monitoring data at ehe point of radionuclide release 

or froa releases anticipated for particular'types of nuclear incidents. 

The incident evaluation inforaation should then be presented to the 

proper authorities. If authorities were notified earlier and have 

aobilisad resources, protective actions can be started iaaediately in 

predesignated araas or in the areas indicated by proj ected dose based 

on facility operator inferaasion. In the absence cf detailed inforaation froa the facility operator as indicated above, the eaergency. plans 

should provide for action in the iaaediate downwind area of the facility 

based on notification that a substantial release has occurred or that 

plant conditions are such that a substantial release potential exists. 

The next step is to gather additional inforaation on radiation 

levels in the environment, meteorology, and environmental conditions. 

Further actions cr codifications to actions airaacy taker should ba 

sased on chase data as.d ?rotactive Action Guides considaring constraints 

discussed in section 1.5 of this chapter. ,-

The State should continue ts seek information on radionuclide 

releases and eavlrocasstai monitoring data. In fact, an evaluation of 
P.30 

such information, as well as exposure pasawavs, population at risk, 

dose projections, aad ?A6s should b'e a continuing activity in 

both the eaergency and protection phases in order to modify protective actions as needed. 

The protection phase begins with ehe initiation of protective 

action and continues until thst action is teralnated. Tigura i.i 

indicates that ideally the protective action such as evacuation would 

ba implemented before aay population exposure. Sswever, the action 

aay aot be initiated in tiae ta avoid all ox the projected dose, 

and soae dose aay be received during iapieeentatioa of the action. 

The restoration phase includes those actions taken to restore 

conditions to "normal". Restorative actions include the halting of 

protective actions, the lifting of restrictions, and possible decontamination procedures. 

I.i Tvoes of Action 

The action taken- may be, as previously indicated, either protactive or restorative. It aay- also be voluntary or involuntary, or no 

action ac all say be taken. 

(1) No actlaa would usually be cakau by Scata authorities if 

ehe risk ox undesirable radiation effeets is anticipated to 

be auch less than the risk of taking action. 

(2) Voluntary action nay be suggested for the population at 

risk, or it aay be taken by thea anyway on the basis of 

public inforaation provided during an accident situation. 

"oiuacarv action sav be valid in the grav araa vhara the 
P.31 

risk of exposure es ralaased aatarial and the risk of taklag 

actioa ara not too differant. Ie nay also be taken at 

lower levels of exposure by individuals to alleviate their 

fears. The negative aspects of passible confusion and 

possible panic where incomplete knowledge exists aust be. 

considered during decisions to inpieaent protective actions. 

(3) Involuntary (mandatory) action by Seats authorities should 

be implemented when the risk of undesirable effects exceeds 

the risk of taking actioa to such an extent that public 

well-being can be adversely affected. This is when action 

nust be taken in the public interest. 

Tne types cf action which can be takan include: 

(1) Protective actions, such as evacuation, taking shelter in 

hones or civil defense shelters, controlling food and watar 

distribution, prophylaxis (e.g., thyroid protection), or 

individual protective actions (e.g., gas masks, protective 

clothing, etc.); and 

"""*"^'( 2j~~'.-.astorativa action where everything is returned to "nemal". 

This action includes lifting restrictions or halting 

activitias initiated as orotactiva actions. It also 

includes decontamination whera necessary. 

The acticns to be taken should be evaluated and set in prisriry or 

sequence with identification of ranges for appropriate action and of 

decision points during planning. Based on prior judgment of which 
P.32 

actions nay be effective in aay given situation, scenarios can be 

prepared which will indicate which actions or ala of actions are 

approprlata for various situations. 

1.6 Goals of ?roeegtlve Action 

Tha "I rinal goal of protective action in an emergency is eoaplese 

protection of the endangered population. However, various constraints 

aay prevent attaining this ideal, so a aore realistic goal is alniaisation of harmful effects. 

In the case of an eaergency involving a radiological canard, 

efforts are directed towards aislaislng: 

(1) early somatic effects such as death within days or development of extensive sytsptoas of radiation sickness; • 

(2) delayed scaacic effeets, such as increased probability 

of death due to radiation related cancer; and. ""N 

(3) - genetic effects such as increased prsaacai aortal-!sy or 

increased probability of hereditary defects in future 

generations. 

The minimisation of effasts implies that the radiation exposure under 

consideration is an avoidable exposure. However, for purposes of 

determining whether :o take a protective action on the basis of 

projected dose fron an airborne plume, ehe orojectad dose should tot 

include unavoidable dose that has been received prior to the tlae the 

dose projection is doae. If a situation should occur where the unavoidable 

dosa would be very large as coapared to the avoidable dose, diffarant 

protective actions night ba warranted. 

1.24 
P.33 

,6.1 Balancing Factors to Achieve .Protection Goals 

The ideal goal is ^trriavn protection, ef the public with - the 

least cost and disruption. Vithin the need to protect the public 

several constraints, including physical, social, and fiscal, will 

be operating. 

The planner should balance the cost, of not taking action (risk 

of radiation exposure) against the cost ox taking action fron both 

fiscal aad societal aspects. Ia particular, the fiscal costs of 

preparing for action, as well as the costs of all actions ts be taker., 

should be balanced against the aeed for response to protect the public. 

Also, the societal eosts such as panic and disruption of life style 

should be balaacad against tha risk to society cf not taking action. 

This balancing of costs and risks will place constraints on the 

options available for action. This balancing also implies that ia 

plaanlng, certain cut-off poiats can be identified, e.g., a sarglnal 

increase ia protection probably aay not justify the required expenditures or extensive disruption of fsallies or daily activities. 

These eosts and constraints should be evaluated in planning by the 

responsible public officials - in determining the responses to be made 

in a given situation. 

Even if the balance of costs imdioatas that a response or set 

of actions is reasonable, other constraints aay preclude their use. " 

These additional constraints on action are priaarlly physical ia 

nature (e.g.., la the ease of a puff release, exposure tiae nay be 

too short to allow effective orotactiv* action). 

1..1S 
P.34 

Constraints ct 1cal..,Att^-t;rmtt 

aaaaaaaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaamamaaaa.^ma^^maaaaramaaamaaaaa 

The constraints which- operate ts prevent attaining tha ideal 

goal include those of environmental, deaographic, teaporal, resource 

availability, and crpn^T-r- duratioa. 

invironaeatai constraints will incline aeteorologlc anc 

geographic considerations. Protective action options aay be restricted by severe veasher conditions, windstorms, biissards, tornadoes, 

large, accaaulasions of snow, etc. Options ara also restricted by _« . 

ambers, types and directions of mads, and obstruction of easy 

egress froa a sita by rivers, aouasalns, or other geologic formations. 

Options are further constrained by the density and distribution 

ox population, the total site, of the population involved, the age 

and health status of segaents of the population, and other deaographic 

cousinerations. 

Teaporal constraints will be present cueisg all phases of 

protective actios and soae situations during restorative action. Tiae 

available for action say be. a real constraint for evacuation1 of 

close-in populations, particulariy in the ease of short eera: (puff) 

raloases. Aftar an incident, exposures of the population dose to ehe 

sita aay. occur before control of tha situation is established. Even 

aftar a decision for action has been nade, notification of the population 

and implementation of the action nay raqulre enough time such that substantial exposures occur. Tha constraint of tiae ia restorative action 

will probably be sore related eo reduction of eosts rather than to 

diract protaction cf the teoulaticn. Sasid decontamination to allow 

1.25 
accass to utilities, food stores, crops, etc., will reduce the total 

cost due ts the accident. 

Hesourtss will be ene of the largest constraints on viable 

options for action. The best planting will fail if the resources 

to implement actions are not available. Resources needed are 

fiscal, manpower, and property, although fiscal will probably be 

ehe

 1 l-rFr-'-iz factor. Given sufficient fiscal investment, then 

manpower, equipment, and training, all will be available in adequate 

quantities. However, since only limited amounts of fiscal support 

say be available, the lack of equipment and manpower with sufficient 

training and practice in implementation of protective actions will 

limit the nuaber of viable options for protecting the public. 

In general, as the population to be protected increases, less 

protection is available for the saae total east (equal levels of 

protection require greater fiscal investment in large populations 

than in saall populations). Likewise, as the level cf preparedness 

increases, the cost of obtaining and ^a-'nn1n,,ng this preparedness 

increases. Ths cost of protective actioa, however, will probably be 

a step function. Zach decision eo eaka an action or extend an action 

will cause an incremental step increase in the cost. All of these 

constraints nust be considered in planning operations 30 that the 

optiaua protection of the public can be obtained with the least ~ 

expenditure, both social and fiscal, commensurate with the goal of 

orotective action. 
P.36 

1.6.2 Evaluation of Constraints' 

Local officials involved in developing eaergency response plans 

aust be thoroughly isistnad on what protective actions are available 

for 1f-r*r-,-:g the radiation exsosure of tha general public during a 

sadaar incident. Thes* aetiacs are a vital part of the eaergency 

response plan and should be specified during the planning phase 

rather than at the tiae of the incident. There are, however, iocal 

constraints associated with each, protective action which will influence = * •-

:

 % 

the decision ea iapieaent a given protective action. The iocal planner 

•3—«. .'—-*•*%.- ? aust also be faniliar with aad apply these constraints es any eaargeacy 

situation. Ideally, it should be possible to balance these constraints 

in some analytical fashion which would placa each constraint in its 

proper perspective on a common scale. Since many of the constraints 

cannot be auantifiad, local planners nust use rational, subjective 

y' 

judgaent in evaluating thea. 

Tables 1.2 and 1.4 Us t protective acticns that ara available 

for various types of reactor incidents as a function of asprsximsta 

tlae periods following the incident, and the following discussion 

attempts to avaiuata constraints such as costs, elsa, societal considerations, etc., that relate ts each protective action* This iafsraatisa should be valuable to the local planner in making the value 

judgments that ara necessary to plan actions during sn eaergency. 

1.6.3.1 Constraints on Evacuation 

While evacuation say seem eo be the protective action of choice 

following a nuclear iaeidant at a fined nuclear facility, constraints 

i.23 
P.37 

.aO« a msamt Prot active and Restorative Actions for Suciaa: 

Incidents Resulting in Airborne Releases 

Nuclear Incident 

Protection Phase 

Approxiaate Tlae of Imitation 

0-4 hr. 4-3 hr. > 8 hr. 

Restoration 

Phased 

(a) Puff Release -Gaseous 

or Gaseous and 

Particulate 

" (b) Continuous Release 

Gaseous or Gaseous 

and Particulate 

1,2,3,4,3 

1,2,3,4,5 

3,4,5 

1,2,3,4,5 

3,4,3,6, 

7,3 

1,2,3,4, 

5,6,7,3 

9,10,11 1 

1 

9.10.11' ! 

1 

1 Evacuation 

2 Shelter 

3 Access coatrol 

4 Respiratory protection for 

eaergency workers 

5 Thyroid protectioa for emergency 

workers 

6 Pasture control 

7 Hilk control 

3 Food and water control 

9 Lift protection controls 

10 Reentry 

11 Decontamination 

<*> M ,- uff release - less than 

to 

(c) 

Continuous release -

2 hours or mors 

Restoration phase aay begin 

at any time as appropriate 
Table 1.4 Initiation Times for Protective Actions 

o 

Approx luute 

Initiation Time 

0-4 hours 

4-40 hours 

2-14 days 

\ \ 

Exposure Pathway 

Inhalation of gases or 

particulates 

direct radiation 

in Ilk 

harvested fruits and 

vegetable 

drinking water 

unharvested produce 

harvested produce 

milk 

drinking water 

Action to be Initiated 

evacuation, shelter, access control, respiratory 

protection, prophylaxis (thyroid protection) 

evacuation, shelter, access control 

take cows off pasture, prevent cows from drinking 

surface water, quarantine contaminated nil Ik 

• 

wash all produce, or Impound produce 

cut off contaminated supplies, substitute from 

other sources 

delay harvest until approved 

substitute uncoil tarn Ina ted produce 

discard or divert to stored products, such as 

cheese 

filter, dcnilnerallze 

u . ) 
associated with a specific site could render tha evacuation ineffective 

or undesirable. Other optional protective actions such as taking 

shaltar should be esnsldarad. Tha.planner nust taka into consideration 

all local constraints eo determine whether or not evacuation is a 

viable protective action for the given situation. Ixaaoles of the 

affects of constraints could be provided oa a general basis. However, 

it reaains the responsibility of the planner to -determine ehe aost 

reasonable protective actions for each site. 

A. Effectiveness of Evacuation 

The effectiveness of evacuation in limiting radiation dose is 

a function of the tiae required to evacuate. If a radioactive cloud 

is present, tha dose will increase with the tins of exposure; if the 

evacuation is completed before the cloud arrives, then evacuation 

Is obviously 100 percent effective. Anything that delays an evacuation 

is therefore a constraint, and such constraints are- likely to be very 

sach a function ef.local sita conditions and planning. The planner 

should be aware of these constraints in order to minimize their 

impact, thus maximising she effectiveness of the evacuation. 

The evacuation tlae, T(EV), at a particular site is defined as 

the time froa ehe start of tha euciaar incident eo ths tine whan evacuees 

have cleared the affactad araas. It aay be expressed as: 

T(ZV) -T ^ + TJJ + TJ,* ^ 

where: 

T_ • tlae delay after occurrence of the incident associated with 

1.31 
P.40 

notification of responsible officials, interpretation of data, and 

the decision ts evacuate as a protective action. 

TL " eiae required by officials ts notify people ts evacuate. 

Tyj, • tlae required for people eo mobilise and get underway. 

T» • travel time required to leave the affected areas. 

a, 

T_ includes several separata tlae eleaents as defined above, 

and all of then can be reduced by effective planning. Moalnal values 

for T_ aay range froa 0.2 hours up to 1.5 hours and possibly longer ' 

depending on the adequacy of planning and whether the decision is ts 

be based on onsite information sr offsite environmental measurements. 

The least well defined tiae constraint is s-, which is strongly 

•-.-Iv icsced by local populacion, geographic conditions, and planning. 

IF has been postulated to be inversely proportional eo population 

density; the closer people are together, the quicker it is to notify 

thea ts evacuate. Par fast developing incidents, news awdia warnings 

aust be augaented by talaphoae, pulls address, and door knocking, the 

effectiveness of which is a function of local planning and resources. 

There are new innovations such as coaputer calaphoning, planes with 

loud speakers, etc., which the local planner aay find worthwhile 

to explore. The value of T„ under ehe best conditions of local pisnnins 

is estiaated eo range froa 15 minutes co 1 hour or cote. 

r , the tiae required for people ts prepare es leave, depends on 

such parameters as: 

1.22 
P.41 

(1) is the family together? 

(2) Rural or urban comaunity? Some farms or industries require 

more shutdown tlae than others. 

(3) Special evacuations — special planning effort is required 

ts evacuate schools, hospitals, nursing homes, penal 

institutions, and the like. 

(4) There will be some people who will refuse to evacuate. 

The best tiae for Ty for an urban faaiiy together might be C.2 ta 

0.5 hours, while co shut down a farm or factory night take hours. 

The evacuation travel tiae, T„, Is related eo: 

(1) Total number of people to be evacuated. 

(2) The capacity cf a lane of traffic. 

(3) The auaber cf lanes of highway available. 

(4) Distance of travel. 

(5) Roadway obstructions such as uncontrolled merging of traffic 

or accidents. 

The total nuaber of people to be evacuated depends cn the population density and affactad area. It is an advantage if good planning 

can keep the area and thus the nuaber of people to as saall a value 

nuaber of people on the move at one tiae is within ehe capacity of ehe 

ra 

reads. 

The capacity of a lane of traffle depends on the nuaber of vehicles 

per hour and the eapaeltv of each. Surveys during evacuations found 

. J J 
P.42 

4 persons/ear' ss, the average indicating that at 2,-30 cars/hr at 

35 spa, the capacity of a lane is 10,000 persons/hr. Commuter traffic, 

however, contains about 1.2 parsons/car, lowering the capacity to 

about 3,000- pers«ns/ar-iasa. Use of buses exclusively, if this is 

practical, iacreasas the lane capacity by a factor of about 10 such 

that 100,000 persons/hr-iana could be noved. However, if buses are 

used, the increase, in' tlae caused by getting ehe buses ts the evaeua-. 

tion area and by ratura trips aust be considered. If the average 

s?maA of traffic: Is lass than^5 aph, _eapacitW iare-hr_islswer ed in 

proportion* 

The saasar of lanes of traffic is ordinarily sufficient for evacuation froa the low population some around fixed nuclear facilities. 

Lanes aay be increased by using lanes that ordinarily carry traffic —s. 

into tha area. All these lanes cannot be used, however, sicca soae, - S 

at ths optica of the planner, aust be held open for eaergency vehicles 

coming isss the area. 

Traffic control will be effective in reducing the evacuation 

travel tiae. If Lamas ordinarily inbound ara usad for outbound traffic, 

traffic officers will be required to direst vehicles :o thea; otherwise 

they will tot be used. Traffic barriers, signs, traffic light over- • 

rides, disabled vehicle removals, etc., will be required eo keep 

traffic speeds high. 'Traffic contrsl ac bottlenecks will be of particular importance. Allowing single lanes to run airareata!/ rather 

than having ears dovetail through an intersection will significantly 

1.24 
P.43 

increase traffic flow. Access controls to keep unauthorised vehicles 

and persons out of the evaeuatad araas will be needed also. 

Exaalnation of specific sectors around four different lightwater power reactors indicates that T_ aay range froa 0.2 to as such 

as 1.5 hours under exceptional conditions where the road systae is 

inadequate compared ts the population to be evacuated. An average 

traffic speed of 35 mph was assuaed if road capacity was great eacugh 

to preclude traffic jams. 

Table 1.5 summarises the various tine segaents that act as 

constraints oa evacuation. These values ara rough estimates.chat 

should be improved upon by ehe iocal planner for each site. An 

exaaple of a one—hour evacuation might be ehe evacuation lata in the 

evening of a rural area including a saall town,(250 persons). In 

such a case the population is saall, concentrated, and at that tlae 

the families would be united. Aa exaaple sf aa evacuation ia the 

longer tlae range night be evacuation during the daytime of a rural, low 

population tone containing farms. Warning would be time consuming, 

and the preparation for farm shutdown sight be lengthy. Tha road 

system is adequate, but families nay be separated during tha day, 

racuiriag longer evacuation travel distances. Emergency plans for 

areas located near State boundaries would require interstate cooperation 

and planning. High population, high density areas such as those around 

Indian Point present a different situation, and evacuation tiaes are 

aore complex, probably longer, aad oust be analysed on a case by case 

basis. In these araas, notification tina anv ba short but aetata 
P.44 

Table 1.5 Approximate. Range of Tlae Segaents 

Hiking "s the Evacuation Tine'^ 

Approaiaaca 

Tiae Segment Range 

Hours 

T) ' 0.5 - i.5( b) 

Zg 0.2 - 1.0( c ) 

T^ 0.2 - 2.0( d ) 

0.2 - 1.3( a) 

i.i - 6.0 

(a) 

High population, high density areas such as 

those around Indian Point, present a different 

situation, and evacuation. times are tare complex, 

probably longer, and aust be analysed on a ease 

by case basis, 

Maceimua tlaa' aay occur when offsite radlasloa 

aeasureaeats sad dose projections are required 

before protective actioa is taken. 

(c) 

liaxiavsa tine say occur when population density is 

low and evacuation area is large. 

(d) 

v*-r-rma~i z±3a aay occur when fsallies ara separated,, 

a large auaber of .faras or industries aust be 5hut down, 

aad special evacuations are required. 

Masdaua tlae nay occur whea road systaa is inadequate 

for ehe large population eo be evacuated and there are 

bottlenecks. 

«.^o 
P.45 

Halted* Appendix E provides techniques fcr evaluating the various 

tine periods involved in evacuation. 

3. Risk of Seath or In-turv 

If evacuation were likely ts greatly increase aa individual's 

risk of death or injury, this would act as a significant constraint 

on the use of evacuation as a protective action for a nuclear incident. 

Fortunately, examination of numerous evacuations indicate that risk 

of death or injury is not likely to.be increased when evacuation is aade 

by aotor vehicle (2) • ?femacure childbirth is routinely encountered 

ia eaergeaeles and subsequent evacuations, and ia at least oae State 

emergeacy aiaa, prior arrangements are aade for this probiea. 

C. Evacuation Costs 

Por evacuations caused by storms or floods, cost is not usually 

a constraint because hasard ts life aad limb is obvious aad because 

ehe evacuation cost is judged to be saall coapared to the daaage 

caused by the disaster. However, in the event of a nuclear incident 

where there aay be ehe strong inslinatlon to evacuate eves though the 

radiation dose to be ssvei is vaaishiagly saall, the economic cost of 

the evacuation nay act as a constraint. Therefore, the planner aay 

wish to estimate this cost for various kinds of evacuation. 

Evacuation costs aay be broken into four categories: 

a 

(1) easts involving evacuees, 

(2) easts involving avacaasors, 

(3) financial losses of fata areas, aad 

(4) financial losses sf urban and industrial araas. 
P.46 

Limited inforaation on estiaated eosts is given in refaranca (3.) • 

Par a specific sita, tha various costs probably can be ascertained 

with aore accuracy. Parsaeters that would affect the costs of an 

evacuation around a specific sita are listed in table 1.6. Consideration of these paraaccars aad how they affect cost should allow ehe 

planner eo calculate the approximate monetary cost of an evacuation 

and thus estimate and evaluate this constraint. 

1.6.3.2 Seeking Shelter 

The local constraints on seeking shelter as a protective action, 

such as tiae to taka action, east of taking ehe action, and societal 

considerations, intuitively tend ts support taking such action since 

the cose in each ease is relatively saall. However,'if ene compares 

the affect of seeking shelter with soaa other action such as evacuation 

oa tha basis of dose savings, it aay be concluded that evacaatlan will 

save a far greater dose than seeking shelter. Generally, shelter 

provided by dwellings with windows and doors closed and ventilation 

turned off would provide good protection froa inhalation of gases and 

vapors for a short period (i.e., one hour or lass) but would be generally 

ineffactive aftar about two hours cue to natural ventilation of the 

shelter. 

Hot every constraint can ba evaluated using established'* techniques; 

therefore, a certain amount of subjective judgment aust be'aade on the 

part of the local piaster. The iaportant thing is that the local 

planner be awara of tha constraints associated with aaeh action and 

that these tonstra^nts :a balanced on whataver basis ocssibie in order 

1.23 

y 
P.47 

Tabla 1.6 Parameters Affacting ths Cost of Evacuation 

Area 

Sire of area affected 

Location 

Population 

Nuaber 

Distribution 

Makauo 

Institutions 

Type 

Population in 

Care required 

Sine 

Type 

Product values 

Business and Industry 

Type 

Sine 

Sork fores 

Product value 

Hode of Travel 

Huxaer of Evacuators 3.equirad 

Shelters deeded 

Duration cf the Evacuation 

Anti-looting Efforts 

1*39 
P.48 

to arrive at a 

l.S.3.3 Access, •Contra. 

Accass eontrsl ess be a ver? affective protective action to 

avoid exposure of personnel who sight otherwise enter high exsosure 

areas uanaeasaarily. Whether or noe it eas be applied effectively 

at all sites will depend upon several considerations which are site 

specific. Por example, the tiae required ts establish ehe necessary 

roadblocks aay be longer than ehe exsosure rise. The cost of aala-

/ 

I 

"n-fn^-g the capability for roadblocks and central of accass points 

nay be prohibitive. Furthermore, personnel that would be used in 

maintaining roadblocks, sight be aore effectively used for other 

emergency functions. All of these factors sust be considered in 

deciding whether to plan for full or partial access control during 

the early phases of sn incident. ) 

1.6.2.4 Respiratory Pretension 

Radiation exposure froa inhalation of gaseous or particulate 

radionuclides aay be reduced by the use of respiratsrs. These devices 

protect the wearer by raaoviag radioiodines (ehe primary gaseous sueiida 

of caneam) on activiatad charcoal and by removing particulate material 

by filtration. Several types of raspir3tors ara essaessiaiiyvavailable 

for use by adult aale workers in eontaalnated atmospheres. However, 

respirators designed for women and children, i.e., the assc radiation 

sensitive part of tha population, nay aot be readily available. The 

first constraint oc the use of respirators, therefore, is whether 

suitable devices are available. Secsnciv for rasoiraeors :o ba 

1.40 
P.49 

affective for the general population, they should be kept on hand by 

each person for iaieciace use upoa notification and they aust have been 

individually fitted. This means they should be distributed to the 

population at risk prior to a nuclear incident, and training should be 

provided for their use. The logistics of distributing such devices 

after an incident would greatly reduca their effectiveness by limiting 

their,time of use. The cost cf providing respiratsrs for the entire 

population at risk is also a constraint, especially for large-populations. Additional constraints include upsetting the population by 

ackxiowiedgiag the danger with visible n?ar.s and the failure of 

individuals cs have their respiratsrs personally available over long 

periods (years). Even if funding is available ts provide the necessary 

respiracors, it should be noted that use of such devices can only be 

a short teas action cf 2 co 3 hours. Therefore, they sight blast be 

used in conjunction with other protective actions such as seeking 

shelter or evacuation. It should also be kept in nine that respirators 

would not be of value whera the exposure of concert was from direct 

radiation snd not fron inhalation of iodines or particulate natariai. 

Respirators aay be most effective for eaergency workers cr ocher 

parsons rasuirad tc remain in evacuation tttas. 

,6.2.5 Praohviaals 'Thyroid Protection) 

The uptake of inhaled or ingested radioiodine by the thyroid 

gland aay be raducad by the ingestion of stable iodine. The oral 

administration of about 100 milligrams ef sotassiua iodide vill result 
P.50 

in sufficiant acsuaulaeion of stable iodine is the thyroid to prevent 

significant uptake of radioiodine. The aala constraint in tha use 

of this means of thyroid prctection Is that poeasslaa iodide is 

noraally adalnistared only by prescription and would have eo be distributed in accordance with State health laws. Potassiua iodide as 

a prophylaxis is only effective if the exposure of concern is frsa 

radlolodlae and only If the stable iodine is adainistered before or -

shortly aftar tha start of intake of radioiodine. All eaergency 

workers far araas possibly involving radlolodlae csntaaiaation should 

receive this kind cf thyroid protection, especially if appropiraca 

respiratsrs are not available. The cost constraint would not be 

significant for potassiia iodide itself, but the cost for administering 

this aaterial shsuld be considered, including the cost of tasting 

emergency workers for sensitivity to iodine prior eo issue or use. 

Tha use of stable iodine as a protective action for emergency 

workers has been raeotrsended by EPA, bus only in accsrdance with Stata 

health laws and undar the direction of Stata medical officials as indicated above. However, ehe efficacy of administering stable iodine as a 

protective action for the ganeral porulation is still urdar consideration 

by government agencies and should not be construed eo be ehe policy of 

EPA at this time. 

1.6.2.6 Milk Control 

In order to protect the population froa exposure to ingestion of 

eontaalnated silk, the planner has rwo basic alternative actions, which 

ara: 
P.51 

(1) Cow-feed or pasture control to prevent' the ingestion of 

radioactive aaterials by dairy cattle, or 

(2) Milk eontrol either by diverting the allk to other uses 

that allow the radioactivity to decay before ingestion or 

by destroying the allk aad substituting unesucanisated allk 

froa other araas. 

The optimum action would be to prevent, through pasture and feed 

control,, contamination of the allk. This would be followed up by 

milk control enly in eontaalnated areas whera pasture and feed control 

were not carried out or were not adequate. Local constraints cay reduce 

the acceptability or effectiveness of these two protective actions. 

The alternatives to taking these actions include: 

(1) Peraitting the population to receive higher dosage. 

(Thyroid cancer is generally sot fatal.) 

(2) Suggest voluntary avoidance of the use of eontaalnated allk 

by children and pregnant women. (Children are mora sensitive 

than adults because of greater intaka of allk and greater 

concentration within the thyroid.) 

(3) Administer stable iodine as discussed earlier under thyroid 

prctection (section 1.5.3.5). 

The iocal constraints on the eontrsi of dairy cow feed or pasture 

raay include the following: 

(1) A shortage of uacontaminated feed. 

ly: 
(2) A shortage of personnel to carry out faed and pasture controls 

in evacuated areas. 

(3) Tha short tlae available to implasent feed aad- pasture controls over a large area (possibly huadreds of square alias) 

aay create communication prsbisas aad uncertainties as ts 

the areas where pasture and feed contrsl should be implemented. 

(4) The ease of the stared feed and the cost of transporting it 

to needed areas sight be prohibitive. 

Local constraints on the eanssol of allk aay include: 

(1) The shortage sf nearby processing plants. 

(2) Inadequate storage capacity to wait for radioactive decay. 

(3) Objections ts shipment of contaminated allk to other jurisdictions for processing. 

(4) Pollution froa disposal of large volumes of allk. 

(5) Shortage of aonitoring personnel and equipment for all allk 

producers. 

(6) Shortage of ailk for critical users. 

(?) Costs associated with transporting, storage, or disposal of 

allk. 

The dose es the thyroid of a child frea drinking milk contaminated 

wish radioiodine through the acaospbere-paseure-cow-oiik exposure path--

way aay be huadreds of tiaes tha chyrold dose that would be received 

by the saae child froa breathing the air that caused the contamination 

cf ehe pastura. Therefore, ehe sine of the area over which ailk .night 

D 
P.53 

have ta be controlled could be auch larger than the sine of the area 

that would be evacuated to prevent inhalation of the iodine. 

To avoid the probleas and constraints assoleated with ailk 

storage, transport, or disposal, the planner should prepare for pasture 

or feed control in all directions froa the plant out to five tiaes the 

distance planned for evacuation and in predominantly downwind directions 

out to about 50 to 100 miles. Controls over greater distances could 

be needed if the wind persisted in a single direction for an extended 

period. If pasture and feed eontrol actions have been implementad (even 

if only partially implemented), noncontaalaatad ailk supplies may be 

available at least for critical users. 

All ailk producers in the affected area should be restricted froa 

using or distributing ailk until aoaitored. If monitoring of all ailk 

supplies is a constraint, monitoring efforts could be csneentratec os 

ailk supplies where pasture and feed control had been implemented and 

on the fringes of the contaminated area. 

The planner can. reduce the effect of constraints related to uncontaminated feed supplies and processing plants by identifying their 

locations and procedure for access, 

producars to p rst active actions for mill: nay 

be reduced by tha planner having answers to questions ragarding raiar 

bursements of eosts incurred by the producer. 
1.6.3.7 Pood Control 

Pood exposed to airborne radioactive aaterials say become 

eantaalaated by deoositioa of radioiodine and particulate aaterial. 

To avoid population exposure froa ingestion of these materials, the 

response planner should eoasider ehe following prscective actions for 

short term protection. 

(1) Prohibition on use of potentially eontaalnated food such 

as field and orchard crops and substitution frsa uneontaaiaar 

ted supplies. 

(2) Decontaainatlon. 

The primary constraint on ehe use of these controls will be ehe 

availability of adequate substitute susolies ac a reasonable cast. 

If other supplies are not available or ehe cost is high, then it aay 

be necessary es iapieaent decontamination procedures. Por protection 

beyond a few days where availability and esse constraints would be 

aore critical, thea decontamination aay be even core cost effective. 

The primary aaaaa of decontamination would be through washing and 

peeling (whera appropriate) of fresh fruits and vegetables. The constraints on such procedures would be the ability to monitor the dececeaesaatad i.zaas to assura adequate decontamination. Monitoring of 

food will likely be a auch demanded service both by the individual 

fasaar-consuaer and by ehe distributor. 

Other alternative controls would be eo impound food stocks and 

store thea es allow decay of radiation levels or destroy chem eo prevent 

csnsuastion. Tha tain constraint on ehasa alternatives would be ssoilasa 
P.55 

and tha value of tha food stocks in relation to the costs of storage 

or destruction. 

,6.3.3 Vater Control 

Water aay be contaminated either by direet release of radionuclides eo surface waters or by deposition froa an ataospherie 

release. Watar reservoirs supplied by land surface run-off cr 

cisterns supplied by roof run-off would be aost severely affected 

by atmospheric deposition, whereas reservoirs supplied froa streaas 

and lakes would be aost affectad by contaminated liquid effluents. 

Spring and well watar should not be affected by an accidental release 

of radioactive aatetlal eo ehe atmosphere or co waterways. However, 

springs -or walls chat appear muddy aftar a rain night be suspect and 

should be nonitsred after a rain if they are in the area receiving 

heavy deposition. Soae aeeidant scanaries involve fuel melting its 

way into the soil, and"such a condition could contaminate underground 

water supplies. 

The protective actioss for water can be either ts prevent contamination or decontamination of tha watar supply or to eendesa the use of 

tha water fcr consumption. 

In the case of rasarvcirs supplied fron surface or roof run-off, 

prevention of reservoir contamination would tst !;e possible unless 

methods existad for diverting tha run-off. Reservoirs receiving their 

supply from a stream or lake noraally are filled through pumping .'and 

filtration stations which are controlled by operators. These stations 

eouie be shut off if the sourta of the varar supply became contaminated. 
P.56 

This say also be trua for food processors using a stream or lake 

directly for their water supply. Many reservoirs supply watar to 

nuaicipal systeas through a filtration plant. Such a plant would 

tend cs dacontaaiaata the water supply, aad monitoring of watar aftar 

filtration would provide data that should be taken into consideration 

in ehe process of deciding whether or not to condemn ehe supply. 

Tha constraints associated with restrictions on supplies to 

reservoirs or condemnation of water systeas ara related ts the 

difficulties, hardships, aad costs associated with ehe resulting 

shortage of water supplies. If the planner determines that these 

protective actions may be appropriate for particular water systeas, 

he should also identify the hardships that aay result and plan nethods 

for alternative supplies. These say include rationing of uncsnsaainased 

supplies, substitution of other beverages, inserting watar froa other j 

uncontaminated areas, and the designation of certain critical users 

that could be allowed to use eontaalnated supplies. These sighs be 

fire-water systeas and process cooling systeas. 

,o.3.9 Restorative Actions 

A. Lifting Protectlsn Controls 

The lifting of controls for protective actions may be justified 

on the basis of cost savings when the corresponding health risks have 

been adequataly reduced. Por example, tha coses to the public aad 

the Stata in aalntalnlng access contrsl, pasture control, allk contrsl, 

or fsod and water control will exceed the risk reduction value cf 
these controls aftar some period, and then the controls should be 

lifted. The costs for maintaining these controls will be relatively 

constant with respect to tiae while their significance in reducing 

risk will decrease as cha source of radionuclides is" halted and 

tha released nuclides disperse or decay away. Therefore, it aay be 

desirable ts lift controls even though some additional dose say be 

accrued. 

3. Reentry 

After evacuation, persons will be allowed ts reenter the cone 

whea the potential radiation risk has been averted or reduced to 

guide levels for members of the general population. However, it aay 

be necessary for certain essential personnel ts racum even before 

the dose is reduced to these guide levels. In addition, reentry 

aay be allowed earlier for less radiosensitive persons suss as adule 

sales who nay need to rstum to their hones or j obs. ' The criteria 

for reentry will require a balancing of remaining radiation risk 

such as froa ground contamination and the cost of disrupted services, 

_lo_s^-incoae_. etc*, r.ssuj JgjCj ^ga tha evacuation. Tiae is not a 

constraint on reentry except as a factor in ehe cost cf remaining cut 

of the evacuated area. 

C Decontarlnasion 

The movement of radionuclides along several pathways involving 

silk, food, and water aay result in prolonged csntaaiaation. Each of 

these eleaents aay require processing ts reaove radioactive contaminants 

1.49 
P.58 

prior to eanauaption. In-each case, the radionuclide concentrations 

would be reduced to levels "*$ lav as practicable" commensurate with 

treatnent easts. 

1.50 
P.59 

•APTZ2. 2 

Protective Action Guides for Exposure 

to Airborne Radioactive Materials 

2.0 Introduction 

Following an incident involving a release of radioactive 

aaterial to the ataosphere, there may be a need for rapid action 

to protect the public froa radiation exposure frea inhalation 

and/or froa whole body external radiation. This chapcar provides 

Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for whole body extamal gamma 

radiation and for inhalation of radioactive material in an airborne plume. A person who is exposed to the plume of airborne 

radioactive materials aay also be exposed at a later data froa 

contaminated food, water, or other pathways. However, the PAGs 

ia this chaptar refer only to the exposure received diractly 

froa the airborne piuna. The emergency response situation addressed 

in this chapter is the period froa initiation of an atmospheric 

release until perhaps two to four days after the event occurs. 

During this period, the principal effort would be directed toward 

protection of the public .from diract exposure eo ehe piuae or froa 

inhalation of radioactive natarial in tha piiona. 

It is iaportant to recognise that the PAGs ara defined in 

tarns of projected dose. Projected dose is the dose that would be 

received by the population if co protective action were taken. Por 
thasa PAGs, cha projected dose does not include dcse that say have 

been received prior to the time of estimating the projected dose. 

Por protective actlotls to be aost effective, they aust be instituted 

'

 ba f ° T a exposure to the pluae begins. PAGs should be considered 

aaadatory valaes for purposes of planning, but under accident conditions, the values are guidance subject ts unanticipated conditions 

aad eonstraiats such that considerable judgment aay be required for 

their application. 

2.1 Whole 3odv Extamal Exsosure 

A radioactive pluae will consist of gaseous and/or particulate 

material. Either of these csn result is whole body external exposure. Measurements or calculations of environmental levels of 

radioactivity are usually in tesas of exposure. To translate froa 

whole body gasssa exposure to whole body dose requires a correction 

factor of approximately 0.67. However, due to the many uncertainties in projecting dose froa exposure to a pluae, it is generally 

conservatively assuaed that gasaa exsosure and whole body gamma 

dose are equivalent. 

Recommended PAGs for emergency response in tha case cf whole 

body extamal exposure to radionuclides in tha amosphara ara 

summarised in table 2.1. These guidelines' raprasent numerical 

values as to when, under the conditions aost likely cs occur, 

intervention is indicated tp avoid radiation exposure that would 

otherwise result froa the incident, "aes. ranges ara shewn, tha 
P.61 

Table 2.1 Protective Action Guides for uncle 2ody 

Exsosune to Airborne Radioactive Materials 

Projected Whole 3ocy 

Population at Risk Gamma Dose (Ran) 

General population 1 to 5*-^ 

Eaergency workers 25 

Lifasaving acsivitias 73 

(

a)when ranges are shewn, the lowest value should be used if 

there are no major local constraints in providing protection at 

that level, especially to sensitive populations. Local constraints may sake lower values impractical to use, but ia no 

case should the higher value be axnseded in determining the need 

for srotactive action. 
P.62 

lowest value should be used if there are so major local constraints 

in providing protection at that level, especially ts sensitive populations. Local eonstraiats nay aaks lower values impractical ta use, 

but in ao ease should the- higher value be exceeded ia deteraialng the 

aeed fsr protective action. The rarisnala aad technical bases for the 

numerical guides and their ranges are described ia greater detail in 

Reference (£) and are suasarised in Appendix C. It is recommended 

that aayone responsible for applying these guides in a saclear eaergency 

become faailiar wish the rationale on which the guidance was based. 

2.2 Inhalation Poae 

-*Cgk-a"-=- - —. **< myaeSgBseous •'"parties of a radioactive pluae nay consist of 

noble gases and/or vapors such as radioiodines. The noble gases 

will sot cause as auch dose frsa inhalation as froa whole body 

external exposure and therefore need not be considered as a 

separate contributor ts inhalation exposure* The principal 

inhalation dose- will ba froa the iodines and particulate aaterial 

ia the plane. 

2.2.1 Exsosure to Radioiodines in a Pluae 

Due to eha ability of the thyroid to esncastrate iodines, 

the thyroid dose due to

 J""»'-'7 radioiodines say be hundreds 

of r'TtPs graasar than ehe corresponding whole body extamal 

gaaaa dose that would be received. The PAGs fsr thyroid dose 

due to inhalation froa a passing pluae.are shewn in tabla 1.1, 

The technical support fsr their development is provided ia 

reference (4) and is stsansrised in Appendix C. 

•t 
P.63 

.Table 2.2 Protective Action Guides for Thryoid Dose 

D ue to Inhalation froe a Passing Plume 

Projected Thyroid Dose 

Population at Risk rem 

General population 5-25^ 

Eaergeacy workers 125 

Lifasaviag activities (•-,) 

^

a 'When ranges are shown, the lowest value should be used if 

thera ara no aajor local constraints in providing prstactisn at 

that level, especially es sensitive populations. Local constrainjes may make lower values isaractisal to use. bus ia ao 

ease an'ouoc cne rugnaa vaxua oe excesses in uecaraaaing uia need 

for protective action. 

(b) 

No specif ie upper limit is given for thyroid exsosure .^. 

sinca ia the axtreaa. ease eoasleta thyroid loss sight be' an "* 

acssywaoxa penalty for a life sav-d. However, tnis should 

not be necessary if respirators and/or thyroid protection for 

rescue personnel are available as the result of adequate 

olannins. 

:. J 
2.2.2 Ensosura to Partlsalara Matarlal la a Plane 

This section is being developed. 

2.3 Interaratation of PAGs 

The guides for the general population listed in tables 

2.1 aad 2.2 were arrived as in consideration of protection of 

ehe public froa early effects of radiation and aalntalnlng the 

delayed biological effects at a low probability. Consideration 

has been made of the higher sensitivity of children and' pregnant 

women and the aeed ts protect all aeabers of ehe public. Consideration has also been aade that personnel nay continue to 

be exposed via soae pathways aftar the plume passes, and that 

ariri'i,tional PAGs aay have to be applied ta these exposure pasmways. 

Where a range of values is presented, the lower guide is a 

suggested level as which the responsible officials should consider 

-"Ttrtarf-g protective action particulariy fsr the more sensitive 

populations indlcatad above. The highp? guide is a mandatory 

level ae which the respective governmental agency should plan to 

cake affective action ts protect the general public unless the 

action would have greater risk than the projected dose. 

At projected doses below ehe lower guide, responsible 

officials may suggest voluntary action available to the public 

at risk. This should be done with ehe philosophy chat population doses be kept as low as possible as loag as the affects of 
P.65 

action are not mora hasardous than the'prejectad dose. The 

concept of voluntary action and the types of actioa that nay be 

considered were riinn-seed in Chapter 1. 

The need for selected populations, such as eaergency response 

team members and persons involved ia iifasaving activities, ts be 

allowed higher exposures than the general public is in line wish 

policies wherein these categories of individuals noraally assent 

greaser risk. Public safety and trnclpar plant personnel will be 

essential ts provide services for the public even though they nay 

receive a greater radiation exposure. 

In the event greater exposures to selected populations ara 

required ts save lives, these should be taken. However, if ths 

radiation injury in these iifasaving activities is excessive, 

the hara aay exceed the good, so soae restrictions aust be aade. 

Because of tha variations in sensitivity of the population 

to radiation effects aad in local conditions (weather, etc.), a 

range of values is recommended fsr the general population. Where 

selective protective actions (i.e. evacuation) for the general 

population is possible, children and women of chiidbesriag age 

3hould be protected at the lower levels of the range, A further 

interpretation of ehe range is that plans should be made to consider 

organised protective action at the lower ead cf the range whereas it 

is sandatsry that plans be aade ts implement protective action at tha 

upper end. Hovever, if no constraints existed, the lower range should 
P.66 

always be used. Slaca esnstralnts exist on a local basis uader 

different easeiScss, the range allows adjustnant by local. 

officials during she planning stage fsr special iocal problems 

as discussed in Chastar 1. 

The values gives for emergency workers recognise the seed 

for some civil functions to continue in the event of an evacuation of the geaeral populatjoa. The risks are considered to be 

warranted whea necessary on the basis cf the individual exposure 

and the benefits derived. Is such eases, precautions should be 

trto»n ts aimiaice exposures to eaergency workers. 

PAGs for iifasaving missions are given for those.persons 

whose normal duties sight involve such missions, i.e., police, 

fireaan, radiation workers, etc. These guides would normally 

ba iimitad to healthy e^iss. Xo specific upper limits are 

gives for thyroid exposure since in the extreme ease, eosaieta 

thyroid loss sight be aa acceptable penalty for a life saved.' 

Hovever, this should not be necessary if appropriate protective 

measures fsr rescue personnel are available as the result of 

adequate planning. Por example, respiratory protection and/or 

stable iodine for blocking thyroid uptake of radioiodine should 

be available to the extent possible far personnel involved' in 

lifesaving missions and other emergency actions. The issuance 

of stable iodine nust be in aceordanca with state medical srseednras. 
P.67 

C2APT22, 3 

Protective Action Guides for Exposure froa Foodstuffs or Water 

3.1 Whole 3ody Extamal Exposure 

3.2 Ingestion 

3.2.1 Mlii 

2.2.2 Pood 

2.2.2 Water 

(Guidance to be Developed) 
P.68 

CHAPTZ3L 4 

Protective Action Guides 

for Exposure frsa Material Deposited oa Property or Equipment 

4.1 Reentry and Release 

4.2 Decontaainatioa 

4.3 Lead Use 

(Guidance ts be Developed) 
P.69 

Application of Protective Aetisa Guides 

'cr Exposure es AirPerae Radioactive Materials 

froa aa Aesidest at a Nuclear Power Facility 

5.0 latroduetisa 

This chapter deals with aethods 'or sstiaatiag populatiea dose 

froa pluae ejacsurs based oa release rates aad aeteorsloglcal 

conditions er based ea offalte radiologics! aeasureaeats. It also 

provides guidance for eseparisca of projected dose with PAGs fsr 

cecisiecs ea protective actieas. These dose projection aethods are 

recoaseaded for use by State aad local officials 'er deveispaest ef 

operatlsaal plans fsr respeadisg ts insideats at nuclear pewer 

facilities. 

Pollswing a radiological incident involving aa ataespherlc 

release that aay require protectiss sf ths public, Stata authorities 

will seed iafcrmation ts sake deeisicss ea what protective actieas 

ta iapieaent aad where they should be implemented. The inforaation 

seeded includes (1) Protective Actio. Guides adjusted fcr local 

situations and (2) projected doses is specific areas fcr esapariaea 

to ths Guides. Protective Action Guides

 -«ere provided in 

Chapter 2. Projected coses rust be tetermined cn the tasis of data 

available following the incident. These data say came froa 

(1) plant conditions, (2) release rates and aeteoroicgical ' 

cenditiens, er (2) offsite radiological aeasureaeats, er 

eeatinatlcas thereof. 

Revised 5/79 
P.70 

The aetheca preaeated in this Chapter fsr relating data as the 

tlae of tha incident to projected esse are rsecsaeaded fsr use ia 

dev-jlocaenc ef operaticcal reap esse plans fsr ataospherie releaaes 

as nuclear power facilities. 

Planners are esesuragsd ts improve es the sechods where 

possible aad ts alto* thea as necessary es rsz?cat ta special 

eircuastaaces. State planners ahauid specifically eanslder the use . 

of any iaproved dose projection aethods developed sy ths nuclear 

facility operatar. 

5*1 ?telaaae Assissosises 

Tha guidance ia this Chapter is directly related ts releases ts 

the ataesphere that hare been postulated fcr nuclear power 

facilities. VASH-UWO O) isdieates that should there be an 

accident at a sua!ear power statioa, there ia aa eatreaeiy wide 

spestrta'Of different kinds of possible releases ts the asassphere 

aad different time fraaes fo* releases departing ea the severity and 

'tae exact sequence of the failure nodes. 

A nuclear power reactor aay suffer a isss ef coolant tut. 

without a aeltdewn cf the rssstsr cere. Fcr this class cf aeaidact, 

tha release ts ths ataesphere should be =ssti7 radioactive noble 

gases aad iodines. Accidents of increasingly larger environmental 

iapaet would occur in asseelatlos with a selsdeua of She reactor 

ssre aad eventual isss of esatalsaent integrity. This class of 

".evised i/" 
P.71 

accident could release quantities of radioactive particulate 

aaterial as well as the radlsactive sobla gases and icdinss. 

However, fcr planning purposes, it is resosaeaded that radioiodines 

be assuaed ts represent the principal contributor to inhalation 

esse, and fsr situatieas where whole body dose frsa the pluae rauld 

be the controlling essesure pathway, it should be assuaed that nsbie 

gases would be the prinsisai ssstrihutsrs. 

Guidance ca tiae fraaee fcr releases eassot be very specific 

.because ef the wide range of tiae fi-zcea that could be associated 

with ths potential speetr s of accidents that could occur. 

Therefore, it will be necessary fcr planners ta consider ihe 

possible differest tiae periods between the initiating event and 

arrival of ths pluae aad possible tiae periods of releases ia -

relationship ts time needed ts iapieaent protective acticns. The 

Reactor Safety Study.indicates, fsr example, that sajer releases say 

begin is the range of one-calf hour ts as auch as 30 hours after an 

initiating event aad that tiie curatiea of ths releases aay range 

froa eae-half hour es several days with ehe sajer portion cf the 

release occurring within tns first day. In addition, significant 

pluae travel tinas z-n associated with the nest adverse 

meteorological osnditicna that siast result in iargs potential 

exposures far fron the site . For exarpie, under poor dispersion 

conditions associated with low windspeeds., two hours er sore eight 

:vis ; 
P.72 

be required i'tr las pluae ts travel a distance of five tiles.-

Sister windspeeds would result in shorter travel times but weald 

provide acre dispersisa, saving high e^csures at long distances 

sues laib likely. Additional informatics ea tiae fr%aes fsr 

releases say ce f sssd- ia Reference- -7). 

5.1.' Radioactive Mb ale. Gas and Raciciodise Releases 

amammm^^aaawmaaaammmammmmmm^aamma^mammaammmaaammamaaaaaaa^^m^^mmm^a^a^^^^ 

Per. aa ataospherie release at a nuclear power facility that 

involved cai7 sable gases asd radioiodines, it would usually be 

conservative- ts assume that *00 percent of the equllihriua soble gas 

4-

invested .asd 25 screens of the. equilibriua rtdisiadias isveatory' 

vaulc :• available fcr release frsa ecntaisaest. Is the absence of 

sore accurate informatics frea the facility-operator regarding ths 

release esspesltles,. it should be assuaed that this caapesitisn is 

released ta ths eavlrtaaeat. Ihe relative abundance of radioiodines 

and table gases ia ss actual, release frea cectalnaest wcuid.be a 

fuaetica S f .-he effectiveness of eagiseered safeguards (9. g., 

filters, spray systeas, and scrubalng systeas) in .-moving each 

coepcoent. 

"This assuratlca-- is in agrwaaas with KRC guidance (£•?>£) os 

assuaptlcBS that cay be used in evaluating ths radiological ~ 

esssequeaeas ef a loss of coolant aesideat at a light vatar cooled 

nuclear power facility. 

.-.evtsec 

y 
Table 2-1 of Appendix Z suaaarissa the total quantities cf 

radiological!/ significant gaseous radionuclides that would be in 

inventory under equllihriua conditions for a "COO >5ie plant. 

Calculations of the projected population esse based ca a release 

alxture consisting sf IOCS of ths soble -gases aad 2s" of ths 

radioiodines indicate that the thyroid dese froa inhalation of 

radioiodine ranges .up ts "CO tiaes greater thaa ths whole body gaasa 

dose froa sable gases and radioiodines. However, if ths engineered 

safeguards function as designed, they should reduce the iodine 

concentration such that ths wheie bedy gaasa radiation exposure'froa 

noble gases would be the controlling pathway. 

5.1.2 Radioactive Particulate .taterial Releases 

Except far ths most sever: and iaprsbaaie accidents postulated 

by VASS-'tOC, protective actieas (prophylaxis iodise excepted) 

chosen ea the basis sf assuming the iodina e^osure pathway is 

critical (figure 5*2) shsuid be suffieiaat to provide protectionfrsa radioactive particulate material. This particulate aaterial 

will deliver an additicsai esse ts tha iaag and ts ths whole body 

frea aaterial iscatad in the '•••?—" However, it is aot anticipated 

that lung e«osure '-ould .-sorsaest the controlling essesure pathway 

for accidents at nuclear power facilities. 

5.2 2ecuease cf Events 

Poilowlng aa incident at a suclaar power facility involving a 

release es the atmosphere, ths aost urgent protective actions is 

tarts cf respense tine will be these seeded ta protect the 

r.evissd 5/7? 
P.74 

populatiea frsa ishalatlcn df mdicactive materials 1= the pluae and 

frea airect wheie bocy e^osurt ta gaasa radiatica froa the pluae. 

The tlae of espesars ta the pluae can be divided into rwo periods; 

(1) tha period immediately following the incident whea littl e cr ae 

environmental data are available, ia confirm the seriousness of 

populatiea eapesures, and (2) a period whea environmental levels 

and/or concentrations are known. During the first period, speed fercsapietlag such acticns as evaesatlen, sesxlns shelter, acd access 

eaBtroi aay be critical ts tialaits erepesure in areas wnere PAGs are 

postulates es be exceeded. Purtheraore, eavirosaestal aeasureaeats 

saae during this period say have littl e meaning because of 

uncertainty concerning- pluae location whs: aeasureaeats were tads er 

vteeartaiaty ecacemitr csanges ia release rata due ts changes in 

pressure aad radicsuciics concentrations withia containment. 

Therefore, it would generally be advisable ts initiate early 

predetermined protective actioss an ehe basis of dose project!cas 

provide* by the facility operator. During the second period when 

eavircsaental ievQls are known, these actions cas be adjusted as 

appropriate. 

"or accidents involving a release to the ataesphere at a 

nuclear power facility, the fallowing sequence of events is 

suggested ts dniais e populatiea e^esure. 

Revised c/"*? 
P.75 

(1) Notification by the facility operators that aa insiders 

has occurred with potential to cause offsite projested 

doses that esseed the PAGs. This salification should be 

provided as seen aa possible fallowing the incident and 

prior ta the release if possible. 

(2) Iaaediate evacuation er shelter of populations in 

predesignated areas without waiting fsr confirming relsaae 

rata aeasureaeats cr ecvirtnaental radiatiea aeasureaeats. 

(3) Monitor gaasa espesure rates (acd iodine esaeeatratieas if 

possible) ia tbe esvimaaest. The facility spera tar 

should monitor release rates aad plant conditions. 

(*») Calculate pluae centerlite exposure rate.at various 

distances downwind froa ths release point, sr use prepared 

isopleths ts estimate exposure rates is- dewpwiad areas. 

(5) Ose exposure rates', airberae esseeatratieas, sad estimated 

exposure duratioa ta convert to projected dose. 

(5) Coapare projected dose ta PAGs and adjust areas for 

protective actieas as indicated. 

(7) Continue ts cake adjustnests as sere data beeose availabia. 

5.2.i Accident Notification 

The first indication that a nuclear accident has occurred 

should ecae ts State authorities frea the facility operator. The 

notification frsa a nuclear power facility ta ths State and local 

Revised 5/7? 

5.7 
P.76 

response arganltatiass should include at estimate sf ehe projected 

dose ca tha populatiea at the site boundary vat at sore distant 

locations alcng with estiaated tiae frames. The Stata emergency 

response planners should sake arrangements with the facility 

operator ts assure thia infersatiea will be sade available ca a 

tiaeiy basis (within 1/2 hour er lass following the iseideat and 

prior ts the start of the release) aad that it will be prevised in 

units that can be compared ta PAGs (i.e. , projected dsse ia ras ta 

the whale body or thyroid). 

5.2.2 Z=eaiate Actions 

The Planning Basis (?) reectaaescs that States designate as 

Saergeasy Plassisg lone (IPZ) fsr protective acticns fcr pluae 

exposure out ta abcut 10 miles free a susisar power facility. 

Vithin this distance it aay also be practical ea plan an area for 

iaaediate response prior ts the availability sf informatics fcr 

raki-g dcse projections. This could be a circular area described by 

a, designated radial dictates frsa the facility. Actieas would be 

takes within approxiaately a 90 degree sector downwind out to the 

dasi^atec distance based ca sstifisatic s frea the facility operator 

that plant conditions exist wcica present a potential fcr offsita 

esses in exsess cf the PAGs. The remaining area cut ts the .72 

would be placed ox alert pending aore inforsatlsa. When additional 

information cr forecasts ea wind direct!ca aad setaoreiogy became 

available, decisions could be sate ca additional areas far 

Rev* *ed 5/~t 

5.2 

3 
P.77 

protactive actions. With good setecrsisgisai and wind direction 

inforaation, it algae be possible to reduce the width ef the sector 

fsr protective actieas. However, if wind direction ia variable er 

if tha start ef the release is delayed, er if the release duration 

. 3 — O , the width of the aeetsr aay increase or possibly extend ts 

a ssapleta elrtle . The importance of good informatics and forecasts 

ca wind direction cannot be overeashasisad. 

The designated distance fcr. iaaediate actieas would be uaed 

aal7 in situations wnere ths facility operator could not estimate 

sffalte projected deaes. If ths facility operator provides 

projections of populatiea esse, taea these should be used by the 

Stata to detertlss the downwind distance fcr iaaediate action in 

lieu ef ehe predesigsaeed distance. Tbe outer edge of the low 

populatiea sons is a suggested radial distance Car iaaediate actions 

ia the absence of reasons for other distances. 

5.3 Estaelishaett ef Exsosure P.ate Pattema 

During er fallowing initial actieas es protect the eieae-ia 

populatiea, environmental esposur? rate aeasureaenta should be aade 

ta provide a data base fcr projecting teas and fcr reevaluating the 

need fsr additional prttactivs actions or tarminatica af these 

assises already taken. Planning guidance far the ceilectiss of 

these data is provided ia Appendix A. (Sota: Appendix A is stil l '' 

ode r development. Reference (5) will fcra ths basis fsr Appendix A 

and is reeosaesdsd as sa alternate source ef inforaation.) 

.-.e vis ad t/75 

5.3 
P.78 

After cotaisiag exposure rases cr concentratiens at selected 

loeatiecs ia tha environment, these aust be translated ts additional 

loeatieaa to ideatlfy the patters of tha exposed area. Exposure 

rata patterns based a i far dswswlsd aeasursaests can be estisated 

in a variety of ways. One simple way is to seaaure pluae canter lire 

exposure rate as srousd level at soae Icawa distance fron ths 

release point acd use tfcese data ta calculate exposure rates ' at 

ether designated distances dswnwiad by assuming that tha cloud 

centerline enpesun rate is inversely proportional ta the distance 

froa tha release peist. 

The fallowing reiatiaaship can be used fcr this calculation: 

V

B<fty 

Where: D, 3 essesure rate aeaaured at distance R. 

3_ = e^csurs rate at distance ?.„ 

x s rata of diffusion aa a funetlan af distance. 

Thia relationship can be used ea develop a aruda pattern of 

estiaated espesurs rates by assuming that r = 1.5 and that the 

^The center lias e^csure rata can be deearmlsed by traversing 

the pluae at a point sufficiently far dswnwiad (usually greater thaa 

Revisec 5/"? 

s

 ' 0 

J 
P.79 

exposure rate calculated far the p_uae cecterline wou^.d a_so exist 

at poiats equidistant fres ths scursa ia tha general downwind 

direction. Ts use this aethod, one aust be ziit-a that the 

exaosure rata aeasureaent ia takea at cr near the pluae eeateriiae. 

A secoad and easier aethod fsr estimating exposure rate 

patterns is to use a series of prepared exposure rate isopietas 

(maps with Unas connecting points of equal exposure rates) piottad 

ea transparencies. These isopieth plots are frequently available 

froa tha licensee, thus ellalsatlag tha aeed far the State ts 

develop then. Since bath the aetecroisglcal stability class acd the 

wisdspeed existing at tha tiae sf the release affect tha shape sf 

the essesure rate isopieth curves, several sets of curves would be 

neeeed ta represent the variety of stability conditions aad 

wisdspeeds likely ts exist at that sita. The appropriate 

transparency -can be selected cn the basis of windspeed aad 

netecrsiogisai conditions at the tins ef the incident. The 

transpnreney can thea be placed over a aao of the area that has the 

saae scale as the isopieth curves such that the curves are properly 

oriented with regard ts wind direction. The isopiath curves are 

tTha value of 1.5 fcr r ia fcr average aetecrological 

conditions. If the secearoicgieai stability condition is known, 11 

would be sere accurate to use x - 2 for stability classes A and 3; 

s s 1.5 for classes C and D; acd x s i fcr classes S and ?. 

Revised i/' 
P.80 

used ea est ina ta exposure race ay alerting the exsosure rates known 

at specific iccaticas ea tha carves. Exposure races at ethar 

iacat!ess are simple multiples of tha known exposure rates as 

indicated by the auiiialiara associated with each curve. 

A third alternative for deteralaiag' s^osure r3ta patterns ia 

ea obtain gnasa expcsure rate aeasureaeats at a larga auaaer of 

loeatieaa aad plot theaa data ca a sap of the area. This aethod 

would provide the aest aesurate data but would require a larga 

auaser of radiation instruments asd trained persons ea sake the 

measurements aa well as a netted far centra: lasting the data to the 

central center cn a continuing basis. Thia nethod is priaarlly . 

receaaesded for developing information fsr deteralaiag ihe aeed ta 

revise previous protective aetiaa recesaectatlsaa. Protective 

actions fcr pinna exposure should be takes prisr to' pluae arrival, 

if possible. 

5*5 Cose Projection 

The projected isae (or dsaa cocaitaeat ia the C3se sf inhaled 

radionuclides) should te cairuiated enly Tor ehe early phase of an 

emergency. Early phase includes :hs duration of the pluae exsosure 

fsr iahaiatiaa PAGs and up ta 2 ta 4 daya foilawing ths accident far 

wal e body erasure. Exposures that aay have occurred before the 

dose projection ia aade are set Barsally ta be used for evaluating 

the aeed fsr protective actieas. Radiatisa coses that sight be 

Revised s/79 
P.81 

received at later tines following an accident also should sot be 

Included withia the projected dcse fsr thia guidance. These latter 

doses, which aay be froa reentry operations, feed pathways, cr long 

tara grouadshlse are committed over a 1eager time period aad will 

require different kinda of protective actisas. Therefore, they will 

require separate guidance reccaaecdations ta be addressed in 

subsequent chapters. 

The best aethod far early deteraiaatisa of the teed for 

protective aetiacs iaetediateiy following an incident asd prior ta 

the start cf the release ia fcr the facility operator eo estimate 

potential offalta dose based ca iafcraatiee ia the control rooa 

using relationships developed during the planning,stage that relate 

abnormal plant eesditiens and aeteorolegisal esaditlesa ts poteatlal 

offsita esses. After ths release starts and ths release rate ia 

measurable and when plant eesditiens sr instruaeatatisa aaa be used 

ta estimate the characteristics of the release and release rate as a 

function af tiae, £hen thee- factors, aiesg__witt^setaerologlcai 

.eesditiens and windspeed and direction, can be used with techniques 

presented here ea estimate projected dcse. Projected dose can also 

be dacartlnad cn ths basis cf environmental measurements whan these 

are available. Procedures are provided herein ta use either reiaase 

rates er scvirsnaestai aeasureaeats ts project esse. Supporting 

docuaeatatica fcr tha procedures is provided ia Appendix D. 

'.avised 6/"9 
P.82 

5Fi.] Duration of Sxscaure? 

^mmmasmmaa—aaaaa—aaaaaaaaaaaaamm—maam 

Dose projection is a fuactioa of the tlae integrated expoaure 

rate er ef the tiae integrated concentration. Although exposure 

rate would aest likely vary with tlae, thia relationship cannot ba 

predicted. ?or purposes of' these calculations, exposure rata is 

assumed ea be constant over the exposure period. Therefore, 

projected dose becoaes a product sf erasure rate, duratioa of 

expcsure, and a dase eeaversica factor. 

The tiae period of expcsure nay be difficult ts predict. 

Expcsure would start at a particular site when the pluae arrived and 

'would be ended ty a change in wind dlrescicn er by an ens to the 

release. It ia very important chat arrangements be aade far the 

Stata cr local weather forecast canter to provide informatics ca 

curreat seteorological aad wind conditions aad predicted wind 

direction persistence curing the incidents ia addltiea ta 

informatics received frsa the facility -operator. If neither wind 

change ser tea time until the. end of the release can be predicted, 

the period of expcsure could be ecaservatireiy assuned ts be equal 

to the ?9* probable maximum duratioa of wind direction persistence 

Tzr that site and fcr existing necaorological stability csnditicna. 

Historical data ca wind direction persistence aa a function af 

ataespherle stability elans for a partleular sits are available ia 

tha Pinal Safety Analysis Report prepared by the facility operator. 

.Vsat s/75 
5.>*.2 Whale Rosy Doae Projection 

Having established esepcaurs rate patterns ia the environment 

aad having determined (er estimated) ths tiae period ef exposure, 

the sext task ia- ta estlaate the projected whole body aad thyroid 

dose to aeabera of the populatiea so that the projected dose can be 

coapared with appropriate PAGs. 

Aa alrbeme release froa a light water reactor would be 

expected ts consist priaarlly sf radioactive noble gases and 

iodises. If engineered safeguards operate aa desired, they say 

reduce iodine concentratlona ta levels such that the whsle body 

gaasa radiation dose froa sable gases will be ths controlling 

pathway. Otherwise, the controlling pathway will be inhalatiea af 

radieisdinea resulting in cceectited thyroid dose ranging u? ts 

huadreda of tiaes tha weale body saesa dosa depeading aa tha 

effectiveness of the engineered safeguards. 

To avoid the necessity for ralmlatlng projected dose at the 

tlae of the incident, it ia recommended that dose projectionoaaograaa be developed. Figures 5.1 and 5*2 (pages 5.17 and 5.19) 

are esaaalea of such aoacsraas. Appendix 3 provides details 

regarding their development. Other shortcut dcse projection nathoda 

say have been developed by the facility operators that are fully as 

accurate aa these sethoda aad should be uaed if appropriate. 

Revised c/79 
P.84 

The projected whole body saasa dose can be estiaated ty simply 

suitlpiyirg tha gaaaa expoaure rata at a particular iseaticc by ehe 

tiae period of exposure. (The dose conversion factar ia assuaed ts 

be 1). Figure 5.1 provides thia tuitiplicatisc . This figure also 

provides a relationship between espcsure rate is aS/hr and the table 

'gaa csnesatratica baaed ea the tixaure of radlsactive sable gases 

that would be expected ts exist at about H.5 houra after shutdown. 

If tha soble gases save decayed for a laager tlae, eheae curves 

would significantly overestimate the ;rejected dcse aa determined 

froa concentrations aad expcsure tiae. If tha gaaaa exposure rate 

frea a seal-infinite cloud of airborne noble gases is ts be 

determined froa known alxturea other than these assuaed, ehe 

fa Hewing relatleaahlp say be uaed: 

. a 

a s 9 S 103 I C : 

1

 a ° 

where: R a erepesure rata (nR/hr) 

C a eeaeeatratian in air (Ci/a-) for radionuclide "a" 

a 

2„ = average gaasa aaarsr r^" disistasration (MeV) fcr 

radlcauclide "a". See sable 3-1-of Appendix 2 for 

values of 2 for specific radisaueildaa. 

9 x 10 s a diaeaaieaiess constant. 

Revised £773 
X X ra ~tz 7?.~. st*??. 

S. VM i i 

i I 

.Ir... mm 

10s-

X 

V X "Trie : eta poms reprs-.er.Sim; jssaa 

rari Ucion sxaosurs rasa (ni/hr) aad 

projacsed duration oi mepojura (ass). 

Isciatvea she projaesad wool* iodv doaa 

iPara 5iia earvas aaova aad baiow cha 

poias. 

\ \ • N < • i ^r'vs>r 

N IN i Xl iN y ' iX~ \ ' , i ! M y \ 

X I X IN.j\ll V K"e-I i i I I'll 

I I I ! I l i ' 

Ml 

§ 

- ? 

X I X I lXMi| X I X N iXM X X I I 1 i 

\1\I11U. XlXIXiX \ \ 

• 10*^ 

-7 

• - 4 

a 

•2 -

sal 

5 

•4 * 

N- • N< V i \ 

ei 1- . 

X X ' v T l 

.N i fN M I : iNJ \ : rNi

 ! i • iN i\ i\; ,N; I vi 

X I (\MI| \ » | XlNill l X J X X' iXTT j 

I I ' I i ' I N I N . I •N • \ i I I ' i 

Mil l I X i N M i I X l X ! Nl ! 

? - . 

10 

X im WHJ 

•10-3 ^ 

•7 "I 

rHiirxiKmum aa:3 

Cl 

I t I II I I II I 

.4 .7 1 2 4 7 10 2.0 40 70 100 

projected exposure duration (hours) 

Figure 5.1 Projectsd whole body gamma dose as a -function of gamma 

exposure rata and projected duration of sxpcsurs . 

revised ..' F 

p.i. 
P.86 

This equation ia ths faaiiiar expresaiss Tsr 52=3. expcsure rate 

frea a seal-inflnlta cloud, 5 a .25C2, vita the units far 3 changed 

frsa .Vaec ta a2/hr. 

5.*.3 Tirrrtid Pcse ?re44ctian 

Thyroid dsse ccsstitnent frsa insaiaticn ia primarily a function 

af ths eonaantratlesa ef radioactive iodises ia the air integrated 

over, the suratien of exposcre. Thia section provides techniques fcr 

projecting the thyroid ieatx using a variety of typea of data ehat 

aay be availatle. The bases *er these techniques are provided in 

Appendix D. 

* " """^Traaic" tata.7-cetdaStratiisHf icdinss in the air and 

duration of expoaure, aay be obtainec frea a variety cf sources. 

The concentration say te ssasured either aa grass iodises or as 

specific isotopes. The concentration say also be calculated baaed 

•ca release rates and characteristics and aeteareiosleal conditions 

or baaed es seasured SSES. exposure rates. The duration cf exposure 

say be predicted aa discussed in section 5.1.1. 

Figcre 5.2 provides a faail7 of curves for projected thyroid 

doae aa a function of airtcrte concentration (risht ordinate) and • 

duratiea af exposure (abscissa). 

Ta estiaats projected thyroid isss fcr a particular cite, plat 

ehe point ea figure 5*2 eorreapcadiag ta the radiaiedine 

3 ' 

ceneeatratisaa ia ZL/tv and the expected tina period ef sxpeaure 

fsr persona at that location. Using a iogarithsic interpolation, 

.-.3vises 3/ ; 

s.iS-
10 -

4 -

m £ X I NJ I ' ! I ' l i 

X X IX II lllladi.lt 

X 

:oJ 

LS 

\ 

i i 

X 

N 

i ttnyroia 

I Idoaa I 

X 

i 

1 

7 -

- E 

^ N . -N •• i . • \ y v » •• N ; 

N IN I l r>p i J I :N? N N^ I I I I ! i | 

X Xi I IX 11 X> i\ | \ 

Sia2. 

e 

i i j cnvroic LXIX iXliife. X N X III,o, . I 

INHmXNMIK 

•10 -3 

lm 

i i 

N . -i \ -

o u x . 

*— 

N I N,- i IS 

X X IX I lXi'x-y \ i X I ! 

: -M x • ^ i 

Xi X« Xj 

\\!Mi!k\! XlX!!iHOx 

[ITHfl^N 

• X' i 

i rs. 

H 

U-2 i 

i i 

1 1 . 

y.. • \ •• : -\l • • \ a. . y ^ 

' V . N ; i I N ' i N . \ ! • j 

IV ii \ -X i X i i -Xi I X>. N i 

to'4 I 

i 

si 

s* 

5 

a 

!>v. X X NilH-X 1 M"

 l 

ii Xi XiX;iXi Xi X U-«-* 

Ml 

10* -

i II I N j I I • --sfs. 

I I I I . 

ta esz rats <nure* •Xi . Xi \ 

lee saa pels* rnpraaaaclas :Sa o-tomrs j j j N*^ j X. 

> mea a* esneanerasion tad aepaasra :laa 

cad aaClaaca cha prejacsad iSyTold doaa 

by lararpoLac.oa. 

i II I 

M XI 

I i il l IIII I I I 

Cl .2 .*> .7 IZ 2 3 -> 7 : c 13 30 

-3 — -. 4 .raramam^i 

Figure s-2 Projectsd thyroid doss <a 3 ^unction tf zrr^r 

gamma exposure rata, sr radioisains cnr.senrr 

in air ana r:e cmisceac axp«urs r..Ti 

• —a<=^ 3 / isJ 
P.88 

eatmate the projected thyroid dose frsa the doae values'sa ths 

curves below and aeove ehe polst. Far exaaple, if she iodine 

-5 ' 

esaceatratioa is 10 Ci/n" and ia espested ea last two hours, 

then the projected adult thyroid doae would be apprsxistatei7 5 res, 

and the child thyroid dose would be as?raxinatai7 *2 ren. Nose ehae 

the child thyroid dose ia T**. tinea ths adult thyroid dose. Ths " 

child dose would apply es seaerai populaslens while the adult dose 

would apply ta esersesey teaas er ts other adults. 

Sose ccsversicc faetsrs ea essvert frea tine integrated 

airborne concentrations to projected doae would vary aa a function 

of the tine aftar rsaetsr ssutdovn that concentrations were 

daterslaed. the dose conversion factors fcr iodise eeasentratisns 

used in figure 5*2 are baaed ea a nix of radioiodines that would be 

expected ta exist at aficut 4 hours after .-!aecsr shutdown. If ths 

concentration were deeeralaed as soae ocher tlae, tbe- doae 

ccaversicn factor (aad thus ths projected,dose) would be ia amr. 

Thia error would be less than *0* far aeaauresesta aade ia the range 

of 1 to "2 houra as shown ia figure -i.t sf Appendix 3. This error 

ia considered too snail ts Justify the use ef a correction factsr, 

but fisare 4. - froa Appendix 3 csuld be used fcr this zxir^azs., if 

desired. 

Air saspies would provide the* best source of concentration data 

fcr use in figure 5.2. However, with present day ecuipnent, field 

seasurerenta cf «Tiretnantai radisicdine csncentrations sav ia 

?.e vised £/?' 
P.89 

difficult and too tine csssunisg fcr quiax decisions ss 

ispieaestatisn of protective actlsna. la the asaesse af aeaaured -

iodine asacestratiesa in air, one say calculate the eenssstratissa 

based ea release rates and aeseorslogieai esaditlesa ar baaed -cs 

gaaaa exposure rata aeaauresents ia the enrircsaent. 

5.4.3.1 Caneeatrationa Based cs Release Rataa 

If isfsrsatisa ia available ss the total curies released er 05 

the release rate and duratica of release, sae can uae these data 

with aeteoralcsisal inf email ca ts calculate concentratiens at 

specific loeatieaa downwind. Similarly, this infersatisa cas be 

uaed to det amine ths downwind distance at wnich a particular 

csacentratica --odd occur. These aethsda are discussed below. 

Figure 5*3 provides the atscsthsrie dilution factcr, x^/i, as 

a functiaa of downwind distance and for different atasoapheris 

atability classes. Thia factsr ia ths esneeatraticn (x) ia CL/m-" 

that would exist far sn average windspeed (Z) sf 1 a/3ec acd for a 

release rate (Q) of t curie/see. To find ths dswnwind concentration 

(X) for' a 3peeifia windspeed and release rata, divide ths value af 

xO/C by the wiasapeed ia a/see and auitipiy ty the release rate ia 

C I a car. 

To iisd the projected thyrsii dose associated with a particular 

eoneentration, find ths peist corresponding ts the eancsstraties and 

the estisated duratica of eapesure es the aoaograat ia figure 5.2.' 

Interpolate legarithsicaiiy between the dose Use s aa necessary. 

Revised 5/7? 
P.90 

0.5 1 2 5 10 2C 

31st3."ica Downwind (Mi 1st) 

3m. 

Lyure 5. 3 Typical value s for XU/Q as 3 function cr 

ataaspherfc stability class and dcvmvrind iistanca 
P.9VL 

If the reieaae is eicpreaaed is total ruries aa appeaed ts 

Cl/sec, asy release period cas be assuaed fsr purposes af uaing 

figure 5.2 ta estlaate the projected doae. Admiring a reieaae 

period of ene hour, the total release is curies can be converted ts 

reieaae rate is Ci/aee by dividisg by 3600 aec/hr. 

A aore canaca problem say be ts dstersd.se the downwind distance 

at which a partleular doae would occur. The following steps would 

be appropriate for sclvisg this prebias. 

1. . Frsa figure 5.2 (page 5.19) deteraise ths iodise 

eancestratisa in Ci/a^ that wculd cause the thyroid dose ef 

eaacera fcr the estiaated duratica ef the exposure. 

2. Multiply thia eenceatratica *x" by the wisdapeed

 WT3" ia 

s/aec aad divids by tha reieaae rate "C" is Ci/sec. This provides a 

dilutic s factor, x^/Q (a"2), which cas be applied ia figure 5-3 

(page 5.22). 

3. Osiag figure 5.3, fallow the value fsr x^/Q acreas ta the 

existiss stability class acd fallow thia poist down ts flsd the 

earrespesdlng distance. . Thia ia the downwind distance where ths 

dose of eaneern ahsuld occur at the pluae centerline. 

Asaase as accidect involves a puff release ef 20, COC curies af 

iodises. Tbe release occurs at two hsura after reactsr shutdown, 

the wlsdspeed la 3 spc = 4 a/sec, and the ataespherle stability 

clasa ia D. Detarslss the downwind distance at which ths projected 

dsae would be 5 res ts tha child thyroid. 

Revised c/75 
P.92 

Solution 

Sine* aa duratlsa of erasure waa given, eae can assuae ene 

•-our a 36OO aecenda far purposes of caiculatlcas. 

Froa figure 5-2 (page 5.19) aste that the ceaeeatratlca, x> 

ess-responding to a 5 res dcse to the child thyroid frea a one tour 

exposure would be about 3 x 10 Cl/a . 

The reieaae rate, Q, cas be.assuaed ts be 

20.000 curies . _ . „ 

3,o00 seconcs

 _ 3 '3

 ~

/

-

e c 

Therefore: 

yd . 3 r .0"° Ci/s 2 

IT* * ^^aa^m—m^mamamaa^mam ^^S. s =.3 x .0"* a" 2 

Q 5.5 Ci/sec 

Frsa figure 5*3 (page 5.22) the distance corresponding ts a dilution 

-6 -2 

factor cf ;. c x 10 a -~sder stabilit y class D is about i 2s 

cr 5 ailes. 

5*4.3*2 Concantraeicns Rased cn "a—i Zxscsurs Rata Hessursrstts 

If savireanentai concentrations of radicicdines are iaeemiaed 

froa air saaples at selected loeatieaa, it would be useful ,ts obtain 

aiaultaaeoua average sasaa expcsure rata seasuresests at .the saae 

locations ia accordance with reeesaeadatiens sf the Taaie "ores ea 

l33truaentatica (3). Tha ratio of =a=ca exsosure race ts isdine 

.-avised :/;> 
P.93 

eaneentraties should be apprsxiaataiy cssssast fsr differest 

loeatieaa if the seaaureeesta are sst apread cut over sere than 

about 2 tours. Ths process of collecting and analysing a few air 

aasples snd estlaatisg eoncsctratiana baaed os gassta expcsure rate 

aeasureaeats at ether Ioeatlosa eauld aave considerable sesitsriss 

If so air saaple aeaaureaenta are available, it ia pessible ts 

obtain a crude eatinate of radioiodise air concentrations frsa sasaa 

exposure rata aeasureaeats. Because of the large poteatlal fsr 

errara, thia would be the laat choice of ssthods for eaaisatisg 

airberae iodise concentrations. 

The left ortisate is figure 5*2 (.page 5."9) providea a 

relatiosahip between ths gaisu expcsure rata froa airborne 

radioactive noble gases plus iodises asd the radialodiss 

csscestratisa (right ordinate) that would sentribute ts this dsae. 

This reiationahip changes with the ratio of iodises to noble gases 

ia the release, the atacapheris stability clasa, tiaa aftar 

shutdown, the gasaa expcsure easing frea aaterial already dspcaited 

cc surfaces, and the gasa. exposure froa airbeme particulate 

nacerial. 

Because of the assuaptions tbat were aade is the developasat of 

a* 

figure 5.2, its use ta eatinate thyroid issalatien dsae solely es 

the basis of sasaa exposure rates without ecafirsatsry eaneentratisc 

Revised 5/7* 

\.2S 
P.94 

seaaureaesta or without correction facesra would generally result in 

projected thyreid deses higher than those that would actually 

occur. Ths rslaticashipa ia figure 5.2 between gaaaa, exposure rate 

and iodise caacentratlen are based on tha following asauaptloca: 

1. .The ratio of concentrations af iodises ts sable gases would 

be about 0.3 which is tbe ratio that corresponds to a alxture 

csaslstisg sf 255 of the iodises aad 100? of the noble gases is a 

nuclear power reactor at full power ecuiiibriun easnitleas. Figure 

5*4 provides correction factors that can be sulciplied tinea the 

fftma espesure rate before its use is flgare 5*2 is situations where 

actual values are provided ia? iodine ts noble gas activity ratio. 

2. Tha ascspaeris stability tiaaa would be "A". Figure 5.5 

providea esrreeelen faetara aa a functicn of downwind diatanee and 

ataospherie atability class fcr use in situations where these data 

are teown-" 

3* Meaaureaents would be aade within the range of 1 es 12 

houra after reactor ahutdewn. Csaeactratisns based en aeasureaeats 

aads daring the first 4 baura after ahutdewn would be slightly lower 

than estisated, thus ffan.*ir.g a eeaservative dese estinaee. 

Ccecsntratints based cc ssasureoeiss adds i or -.art tours after the 

reactor shutdown would produce lew dose estisatea. However, this 

aoncanaervatlve error would be sooewtas csspessated ty ths ' 

eeaaervatlve error introduced by the asstaptisa that there' would be 

Ra*«taed 5/70 

5.15 
6I/S »SPA* S 

CORRECTION PASTOR 

e 

ST 

e1 

L 

li 

1 1 

1 

I 

i 

I i iiii 

I X ! Il l Mill 1 ! ! MMII iii i iiii ! 

! . \ i 1 1 Ijii l i i | 1 I I M | 1 ! I | i ! 1 .! | 

I i N< i 1 ' ' •i i i 1 i i i • • i : i i i i i i i i i 

i : v :;••• : : ••••;•• ; ••„•; • : .•;•• ; 

> 

a

 u 

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am * 

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ma 

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ca 

> >> 

•npr. aa C> am — — j ; L _ -;—-~r 

SsSSlSRs ? F < J !. 

< : 

S • 

2: 

S ^ rr » 

£ > * = 

rr s 

> - p 

S S m 

> n > 

fr O M 

5 5 > 

ISI 

rr 

« X 

fs 

Es 

s = 

C m 

—' — 

m ^ 

^ rs 

Ii 

\ 

\ 111 

\ i i i 111 1 • 

:> E 

1 

I MM!! 

i 1 M Ml 

i IIIII . 

1 ..'!. : 

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— • •><••<•• > \ 1 

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*3*V lATi 

\ I \l I l \ I I 

xi \ i i X i 

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I X IV •* tx! 

I i ! Il l 

i l i II I 

I I I I I I 

i I 

i II I 

I I 

I I 

TO USS THIS CHART, FIND 

THE CaRRESTlON FACTOR 

OTRaES?0H0IJI6TCTHE 

BISTAKCS AMD ATHCS7HS31C 

STABIUTf OA S AT WHICH 

THE CCCSSaE HSASSaEHEHT 

' WAS MAUS. A»8 KOtfTlY IT 

3T THE MEASURES 3AMMA 

' SffcsuaE RATS. 3S?oas rrs 

USclNFTCUaS 2.2 

I I I 

! I M 

i I 

I I 

i I 

I I I I I I 

I 11 

I I 

I ! 

I 

I I 

M M 

i Ml ! 

I i i 

Mil l 

i i i 

• •' I 

: 4 S 3 7 J 318 IS 23 

BS7AMCS (X.UMET2ESJ 

3 « a) 70 1SD 

0.6 3 S 18 

SUSTA.1CS GXUS. 

a 

Figure 5. J Gamma sspssurs..tr. Sr.ia n'sus sarrschon factsr 

.13 Revised 5/30 
ao eaatrihutisn ta gaaaa exposure rata frsa radiaisdiaea deposited 

cr tha ground. 2oth af these errors would increase ia intensity 

with tlae aftar the start af ths release. 

Caution should ae exercised la thia aethed of estimating 

thymld dose ta avoid projecting thyroid inhalation loses sa tha 

basis of gaasa ezposure eaa-ing essirely frea deposited aaterial 

aftar the plune aaa passed. Tar thia situation the gaasa exposure 

rata would iaareaae aa the detector approached ths srouad. 

Ssagala Probles 

So iedlaw concentration seaaureaents hare been aade. est gaasa 

exposure rata aeesursaeata indicate Taris"^ levels of 10 aS/hour at 

2 alias dswnwiad. The atability clasa is D, and tha tnaiear utility 

reports the iodise ta scale gaa ratio in tha release in 0.1. *hat 

ia ths projected child thyrsi! dsse for a 2 hcur exposure? 

.Scission 

Referring'ta figure 5.2 (page 5.19) tha projected dcse withsut 

eerreetlcn faetara for 10 aS/hr and 2 hours ia about S rea ta.the 

child thyrsi!- ?rca figsrs 5.5 (pags 5*23) the ssrrectisn faster 

far D stability and 2 ailaa s 1.5. ?rca Figure 5.4 (paga 5.27) tha 

carrectira faatar fsr isdlas ta ssbie sas ratio sf 0.1 = 0.U5. 

"0 aS/sr a l.s a .-Jo a 7.2 a£/hr. «2farrins ts f* "^ir*

 sa2 tha 

csrreeted thyroid dsse ia projected ta ie slightly tare thaa 5 rea, 

fcr a 2 ieur expcsure. 

Revised a/7; 

a.-s 
P.98 

5.5 Protective Action..SecisisnaTha scat effaeti7e protective actieas for tha pluae ecpoeure 

pathway are evacuation and shaltar. Access central ia alao 

eff aatiTe aad appropriate but generally would be taken ia 

ceajusctiai with oss of the other wo acticns. '*ses eeataalnatien 

of the sicin ia suspected, protective acticns such as washing, and 

changes ef clothing are justified without the seed fcr planned 

procedures because thane actions are easy ta take and involve littl e 

or aa rlale. Cap ser 1 provides a general discussina of protective 

actions, and Appendix » -will prs.vise plannlag guidance vith regard 

Pa evacuation acd ahelter. (Appendix 3 baa aot bees puaiished as sf 

thia reviaiea). 

After esse projections are- aade and essatraista are identified, 

reapcnalhla officials nust decide what protective actieas sheuid be 

isplaaeated and ia '.-cat areas. Thsy suae also deeids which of the 

eaergency acticns that vera taieea prier ts saving release 

infer-aatice froa tha facility sr scviroansntal aeasureaesta should 

be * landed, saintalnsd, cr casual sd. 

Table 5.1 provtdss broad niiiasss fcr .tasn decisions en the 

basis sf ceaparisg prejeeesd cases zs ?.-.Cs. This guidance ia 

priaarlly fcr planrr.rrg purposes. Acespnacie raiues Tor enerjecey 

dsaea ta tha pupils uader actual eesditiens of a nuclear accident 

cannot be predetermined. Protective actioa recesseneacicss is any 

iadiTiduai case mat be based ca the actual cccslticna that exist 

s d are ;.-cj3eiac a: :zs zLzs cf :aa accitast. 

?.svissc :/" " 

5.10 
( ) 

Tabla 5.1 Muuouauiidod proleutlva aot Ions to raduua idiolo body and thyroid doaa froa eipoeura to a gaaeoua pluaa 

s 

Projeotad Poae (Ran) ta 

tha Population 

Miola body <l 

Thyroid <5 

Uliola tody 1 to <5 

Thyroid S to <25 

Uliola body 5 and utiuva 

Thyroid 25 and abova 

Projeoled Doaa (Ron) to 

taergenoy Teau Uorkora 

Uliola body 25 

Thyroid 125 

Uliola body '15 

Reootuaunded lotlona'*' 

Uo planned protuotlva aotlona.C1*

1 

Stata tauy taauo mi advisory to aetk ahaltcr and aualt 

furlhai* Inatruallone. 

Monitor euvlronneutal radiation lavala. 

Suult ohultor os • -.Intmua. 

Cunaldur evnouatlon. Evucuata unleaa oonatralnts nak* 

It tmpraulloal. 

Hun1lor environmental radiation lavala. 

Control aocaaa. 

ConJnut Mandatory uvaouatloo. 

1 lun 1 lor environmental rudlutlon levalo and adjust area 

for mandatory ovucuullon busud on thaao level a. 

Control aacaaa. 

Control axpoaura of ewurgenoy teuu raoubora to theaa 

lavala etaept for llfeaavlng ulsaloua. (Approprlata 

oonlrola for eaargeucy worker a, InoluJa tlua 

llnilatlona, roaplratora, and alabla Iodine.1 

Control oupoauia of ••aerganoy team aembera perforating 

llfaaavlng olaatuna to thia lavel. (Cuntrol of line 

of oipoaura will ba aioat affuollva.) 

Conuenta 

Previously reoonnaiidod 

proleutlva aotlona aay 

La raoonaldarad or 

teralnaled. 

If oonatralnta o»lat, 

apealal oonalderatlon 

aliould ba given for 

evaauatlon of chtldrau 

and pregnant uoaon. 

Seeking aim Iter uould ba 

an aUariullve If 

ovaoiiatlun were not 

liuudlalely poaalbla. 

Although raapiratura and 

alabla lodlna aliould ba 

uaed uhera affuollva to 

control doaa to 

anargonoy tea* uorkara, -

thyroid doaa M y not ba 

a Hulling faotor for 

llfaaavlng alaatona. 

•"'Theaa aotlona ura g-oooiuuninlod for planning purpnaaa. Proteollve uotlon daolalona at tha tlua of tlia Incident 

must take.ealatIng condition*. Into aonaltlorotloii. 

'

LJ*t tha tlna of the Inultloiit, offlolala may luplenunt lou-lapuol prolootlva aotlona In keeping ulth tba 

prlnolpla of maintaining i-kdlatUil «>poaiirua ka IUM aa reaebuubly aohlevablo. 
?ACa cannot be uaec ts aasure taat a gives level cf erasure ta 

isdlTtaaals- in tha populatiea is prevented. Ia any particular 

respeaae situation, a range of c\03ta aay be a^serienced, depending 

aosely ea ths distance frea the point of reieaae. Soae of these 

doaea say be in excess of the ?AC levels and clearly warrant tha 

Initiation of any feasible protective actions. Ihis dees sot aean, 

however, that all caaes above PAG levels can be prevented. . 

Furthersore, ?AGa represent only trigger- levels and are sot intended 

ta represses arceptable dsse levels. ?ACs are tsola ts be uaed in 

plaml-g acd as deeiaica aids in ths actual resposse sltuatlcn far 

purposes ef iesa savings. 

?sdar eaerseacy cesditleaa all resacsasla seaaures should be 

takea ts alnlaise rajtiaaian ezpesures ts the general public asd ts 

eaergency uerteera. Ia tha absence af alga if leant constraints and ia 

ccsaidarattica of the generally accepted public baalth practice of 

Halting radiaeica exposures ta as lew aa reasonably achievable 

levels, rsapeasihla authorities say wast ta iapieaent low ispacs 

protective actieas at projectsd dosea bales* the PACa. 

Tha rscensesdaticas provida a rsaga cf PAG values because • 

iapiaaentacioa of ths gaidaace will always require the use of seed 

juegaent acd a ecealderatlea of iocal assasraisaa. Ths levees ralue 

should be uaed if there are co sajer local caassraista ia prevldiag 

protection as that level, especially ta sensitive peculations. 

P.evised £/" 

5.22 
p.1 

Iccai csaatraiata aay aaka lever valuea irpractiaai ta use, but ia 

co case ahould the higher value be exceeded in deteraialng the need 

far protective action. The question inevitably arises, then, at 

wiat projected dsae belsw ths sialstas PAG valuea abould protective 

act!ana ao icnger be considered. This is a value judgaest ea the 

part of tha eaergeaey coordinator but ahould be baaed ea ths 

fallowing ecnslderatleaa: 

a. Are the risks associated with taking protective aetiea at 

low projected doaea greater than tha risks aaaociated with the low 

projected radiation dsa.es? 

b. Ia there a reasonable probability that the protective 

action being considered can be successfully iapiaaeatad without 

treasonable coat er bardshi? en the participants? 

e. At very lew projected deaea, efforts ta protect tha 

populatiea aay do acre cam thsn good. 

Ths intent ia ts allcw far flexibilit y in ths ispiaaeetatlaa sf 

ths guidance because local conditions will' vary and because special 

inferaatlca aay be available. But above the upper PAG range, there 

ia significant risk ta tbe erpesed poculatieca, and reapenaibia 

agencies ahculd consider it —andntnrv zs oiaa zs iapieaent effective 

protective acticns, rees^itis g tbat when an acsidsnt actually 

eccura, unforeseen cenditiona or csaatraiata nay prevail auch that', 

professional judgaent will be required with regard ta prisritiaa -far 

protecting the public. 

Revised 6/7? 
L2_ 

Cuidsaca far eergsccy workers ia gives aa tsaa Halts because 

is is reecsaiaed that eritiaal civil funetleaa aaaa eontlaue while 

protective actieas are takes for tha geaeral populatiea, and this 

say reejcira eaergency workers ta receive radlatlsa exposures daring 

emergencies that otherwise would aot be permitted. 2s?osure ef 

eaergency workers ta any dose level ia aot Justified unless it ia 

detarslaed that benefits ta society are belag achieved and efferta 

are belag aade ta llalt their doses ta levels as lew aa reasonably 

achievable. Znergency workers should consist ef healthy adults and 

ahcold not include venen that eauld potentially be pregnantSaergeasy reapease- planning should provide for specialised 

protection far eaergeaey workers darlag eaergeaey activities. Thia 

would lscV.de respiratory protestlsa, if needed, ta reduce iatairaai 

organ acd thyroid deaes froa inhalation and perhaps prophylactic 

drtgs that prevent thyroid exposures frea inhaled radioledlaa. 

There should be appropriate inatr-caestatiea ts rerify exposures and 

cscsastiaaciea techniques ta prevent overexposures by warning 

eaergKacy warxera whea ta withdraw froa radiatiea fields. 

Tha beaith risk asaesiatad with dcse Halts r^cssasndad far 

iifaaavisg aisaicas are estrenely high, asd such hi ^ dsaes scculd 

be received enly ca a voiaatary basis by individuals aware at the 

risks involved. LLfeaaviag actioss should be performed by persons 

ia geed beaith whose coma ! duties save trained thea far such 

sisalens. 

Pevised £/?c 
P.3 

HSTS3S3CSS 

(J.) CS . 3CCL2A2 aSBOUKar CSSfiSSSajS. An Aasessaeat of Accident 

"" Hlaita ia C5 . Csaaaerciai Huaiaar Power Plants. (VA5H-14C0), 

U.S. Suclaar P-egulatsry Csaaiasioa, Washing tan, S.C, 

Cctaber 1973. 

(2) CS . STCLSAJ. 3SGSU7CSI CCHMI2SISN. Guide aad Checklist far 

"* tha Sevelepsent and Evaluation of State and Local Goveraaeas 

Radiological saergeacy Hespoase Plans is Support of Fixed 

Nuclear Facilities (VASH-'2S3). CS . Suclaar Reguiattsry 

Cassias isn, Washington, D.C. Deceaoer "97-i. 

(3) 2AHS, JQSsTS «., JH., AHD T3CM4S C. S2LL. svacaatioa Risks -

"" aa Evaluation (Z?A-520/6-7s*-002). CS . Eavironasaial 

Protectioa Agency, Washington, D.C. June 157s*. 

(JO 5ELSCS, S. S. Approaches ta Populatiea Protection ia Case cf 

"~ Hucisar Acsideata. 5.5. sSTironrestai Protaetisn Agency, 

Cffiaa af P-adiaaisa Prograas, Washington, D.C. (Draft, 

Deeesher 1971*). 

(5) C.5. ATC^IC -2Z2GI CCTSGSSICS. Regulatory Guide ,.Z. 

~~ Assuaptions used far Evaluating ths Potential Radiological 

Csnsequesces sf a Lass sf Coolant Accident fsr saiiiag Watar 

Heactars. Directorate of Regulatory Standards., Hucisar 

Ragaiatsry Ccaaisaisa, Washington, D.C. Juae 1973* 

(5) U.S. ATSMIC SIZSGT CZW-ZS-ZZZ... Hegulatary Guide 1.1. 

*" Aasuarptisaa Uaed fsr Evaluating ths Potential ?.adiaisgisai 

Caasequeases af a Lass of Caclaat Accident fcr Pressurinad 

Watar Heactars. Directorate sf Regulatory Standards, Nuclear 

Regoiattsry Ccasiasisa, Washington, D.C. Juae 1973* 

(7) U.S-. .TCCLZA3 ?J:CdAT02T ccccssi-:: A>ro U.S. zi77z-.c.wnr:iL 

~ ??.C7ZCIZ£ll ACZNCT. Task Fores Report. Plaraiag .oasis fsr the 

Deveiopaest of Stata and Local Gcvemaent Padi'siogisal 

laargsssy P.sapeaae Plans ia Support cf Light Watar .'Iuciaar 

farmer Plants, •iu?.sG-03?c cr IZ?1~5Z0/"--7c—3"o, 

Waanlagssa, D.C. 20-cO, Hoveneer 197S. 

(3) 3.5. SECLZ1H R2GSL1TCRT CSeilSSICir. Intarla Guidasee ar. • ' 

Offalta Padlatiss Measureaeat Svrteas, A Report ta Deveicpera 

of State .Raaiaisgisal Eaerganey .Response Plana by the Federal 

Zataragensy Taak Feroe oa (offsite) Eaergeaey lastruaaatatisa 

far Nuclear Incidents at Fixsd Facilities, B.S. Nuclear 

Regalatary Csasiaaisa, Washington, D.C , August '977 

Revised c/7; 
P.4 

CZAPT22. 6 

Application oi PAGa fsr ?eodsrnff3 and "Watar Csntaninaticn 

6.1 Salocatisa 

6.1.1 Whale 3ody 

6.1.2 Organ Exposure 

6.2 Shaltar 

6.2.1 Thole 3ody 

6.2 Access Control 

5.4 -jflJk Control 

6.5 Food Contrsl 

6.6' Vater Control 

(Guidance ta be De-veloped) 

6.1 
P.5 

C3APTZ2 7 

Application oz ?AGa for Caafatrfnatad Property or Equipment 

7.1 2alaase and 2eeatT7 

7.2 Decontamination 

7.3 Land Use 

(Guidance to be Developed) 
P.6 

s 

OAPTZ2 S 

Applicacisn of PAGa for Transportation Incidensa 

(Guidance ea be Developed) 

3.1 
P.7 

APPENDIX A 

Sunmary of Intsrla Guidance on 

Offsite Eaergency Radiation neasuresens Systsais 

(to be de-veloped) 
P.8 

APP2SDIZ 3 

Plaaaer'a Evaluarion Guide for Protective Actions 

(to be developed) 

O—J. 
P.9 

AP7S3T.IZ C 

Sussary of Technical Bases for 

Pratecri've Action Guides 

(ta be develoned) 

C-l 
P.10 

APPSEDH D 

to the 

Manual of Protective Actioa Guides 

aad Protective Actieas 

for Nuclear Incidents 

T2CSHICAL 2ASZS FCH DCSS PROJECTION MESOaS 

January 197? 

Saviroaaental Protectioa Agancy 

Office of Radiatica Prograna 

Eavircaaental Analyaia Divisiea 

Washlagtsa, D.C. 2C»«0 
P.11 

Contests 

Pars 

Techaiaal Eases for Methods that Sstlaats tha Projected Thyroid Dose 

aad Projected Whole 3ody Gaaaa Dose froa Exposure ta Airborne 

Radioiodines and Radioactive Sobla Gases D-1 

1.0 Introduction D-1 

1.1 Approach D-5 

2.0 Oaits , s-5-

2.1 Radionuclide Concentration la Air D-7 

2.2 Dose Calculaticns D—11 

2.2.1 Whole 3cdy Cloud Gaaaa Deses 3—11 

2.2.2 Thyroid Inhalation Dcses 3-15 

2.2.3 Finite Claud Correction D-22 

3*0 Input Parameters D-21-

3.1 Radisaualids Source Taras 3-2 « 

3.2 Thyroid Dcse Caaversisa Factors for Radieisciaa lahaiatisa . . . D-27 

3.2.1 Dependence of Thyroid Mass acd Breathing Rats ec Age . . D-28 

3.2.2 Bptake of lahaiad Radioiodine lata the Thyroid D-30 

3.2.3 Effective Dec3y Saergies ef 1-131, 1-132, 1-133, 

7^_?1 ' 1-134, aad 1-135 ia Huaan Thyroid u-$\ 

2a2.-> Effective Decay Constants cf Isdiae Isotopes I-131 

through I-*3S in the H-nan Thyroid as a Function of 

Subject Age 3-35 

3-2.5 Dependence cf Thyroid Dcse Ccaversiss Factor ca Age . . .'.3-35 

4.0 Results C-39 

. *.1 Whole 3cdy Dose D-S3 

'•i.2 Thyroid Dcse Z---5 
P.12 

Contents (est n 

3.0 Accuracy sf Doee Projection Sacacda D—51 

3.1 Calculational Zsrora Associated with Reieaae lata 

Aasuapelo&s D-41 

5.1 Cilealacional Errors Assoexaced with Asaisspcisoa oa Release 

Characteristics 3-62 

5.2.1 Errors ia Whole 3ody Dose 3—52 —" -

3.2.2 Errors ia Thyroid Oose D-eS 

5.2 Errors Aasociacad wich Issue 3aea • 3-4«* 

5.2.1 Duration of Exsosure 3-4* 

5.3.2 Errors in Reieaae lit a Data . 2—-5 

5.3.3 Errors ia Oaaa ea Reieaae Characteristics 3-46 

5.3.4 Errors is Ssvirsnaencsi haaaureaents and Indorsation .'. D—id- '"""N 

3.4 Suns-ary . ". 3-47 

References 3-69 
P.13 

rabies 

Page 

Section 3 

3.1 Radionuclide scums data 3-25 

3.2 3ciy aass, thyroid aass, aad breathlag rata as a function 

of age 3-29 

3.3 Absorbed fraeticns (?) ia the thyroid as a fuaeticn of age aad 

icdiae isotope 3-36 

3.4 Effective decay energies for 1-131 through 1-135 present ia the 

thyroid as a faction of age 3-37 

3.5 Effective decay constants of 1-131 through 1-135 ia the huaan 

thyroid aa a function of age 3-38 

l.S Thyroid ease conversion factar as a' function of age acd ladlae 

iactape 3-40 

Section 4 

4.1 Nobis gaa and iodine inventory ia the reaotsr core aad 

csctaiaaent as a fuaeticn ef tlae 3—41 

4.2 Iodine ta acbis gas acti7lby ratio as a fuactiss of isdiaa 

release fraction aad tlae after ahutdewn ' 3-42 

4.3 Ratio ef soble gas gaasa dose rate ta coble gaa csaeentratiea, 

HGC^, as a fhaetica af tiae aftar ahutdewn B-4a 

4.4 Ratio of a ehild thyroid' iahaiatioa doae ta radisiedlae 

eaneentratica, HI", as a fuaeticn sf tins after reactar 

shutdown at which exposure begins aad tne inhalation SX?CSVT9 

duratica / • y 3 • \ D-47 

4.3 Hadioiedlae ceseeatratisa ia air vhich would result ia a 3 rea 

thyroid iahaiatioa doae ta a child aa a fuastisa cf tiae aftar 

• .» W «•• « *•***-»•**•«*••• *14at,f ta><^ j A 4a> «&_••«• , C* f «SW a P >Cfti— 3 A** « *** S 

inhalatica tlae (Ci/a-3) 3-49 

a* 

4.5 Ratio of isdlas scasentratiaa ta total iediae aad-sobla gas 

gasaa dsse rata aa a ftaatiaa cf iadiae release fraction 

aad tlae after shutdown I CJJ-a.2 \ D-'53 

I res/or 

3.1 Eatiaatad errors assceiatad with teas calculation nethed3 ... . D-oe 

r j j 
P.14 

Plysrea 

Page 

Section 3 

3.1 Radioiodiae and sable gaa decay chains 0-25 

Section 4 

4.1 Projected whole body gaasta dose aa a inaction of gamta radiation _ ^ 

doae rata aad projected tine period of exsosure ~D-4c __- : 

•> 

4.2 Five rea isodose line for child thyroid as a faaetloa of 

radioiodise concentration as the sears of exposure, exposure 

duratica aaa and cine afsar jduedove ae which expoaure 

begins, c a C-50 

4.3 Projected chyrold cose aa a function of either ^aii.-na sxscaure rata or 

radioiodise cosesnsraticn in air and she projeccad exsoaura cine . . D-54 

4.4 Correction factors for thyroid inhalation doae as a function of tine 

aftar reacts? shutdown chat radioiodine aancentraclou ia aeaaured . . 3-56 

4.5 Gjraa expoaure race finita cloud, csrrsetioa factor D-53 

4.6 Radioiodine reieaae correction faesor . . D-o0 
P.15 

Appendix D 

Tachaical 3ases for Methods that Essiaata 

:he Praiectad Thyroid 3oae and ?ro'eetac Whole 3ocv G-»—-3 Doae 

trea Ixsosure cs Airsome -Ucxeieeisaa 

ana iLacioactive Ncoie Gaaea 

1.0 Introduce!sn 

If an incident vere ta occur as a reactor reaultlag ia 

aobiilsacicn of the fiasica product inventory, the radioactive 

iaoeopea of iodine aad the soble gases plus a saailer quantity of 

particulates sighs be released ea the esvirenaene in quantities 

exceeding noraal operating liaits. Under these conditions, it vould 

be saeeaaary for responsible public officials eo quickly daeessine 

vhether protective actions should be taken ts protect the publis. 

The decision ta inplaneas protective actieas vould be baaed, ia 

X 

part, on the projected radiacioa doae'' that night be received by 

individuals in the population. Doae projections aay be determined 

frea oaa of three inforaation bases or conninations thereof: 

(1) reactor systea status, (2) release rase of radioactive 

aatarlala, and (3) esvirosaental aaaaurssensa. Dose projection 

baaed ea raactor systsa status viii be prtsarliy the responsibility 

of nuclear facility officials and viii not be discussed here. The 

'Projected radiacioa dose is defined as the dose the exposed 

persona would receive in the absence sf protective actions and 

includes ccrasissed doae that aay be received as a result cf ingested 

or inhaled radioactive uatarial. 
P.16 

eaciaatlsa of projected doae baaed on reieaae races aad 

cnvircamantal aeaauresanes vill ts seme axteat be tha responsibility 

of Seats sad local jovemaent officials. Procedures for aakisg 

theaa aaeisaCas vere given in Chaptar 5, aad chls Appendia providea 

the technical basea far those procedures. ..... 

Tvo expoaure paeavxya are considered: (1) vhole body gassa - „"* 

expoaure frsa radioactive noble gaaaa and iodinea in the pltse, aad ' 

(2, inhalation of radlsiediaea in the pluae. Additional vhole body 

axsersal exposure would occur frsa deposited radioactive 

particulates and iodiasa. Over an extended period of days cs weeks 

or non cha this -ourca could be significant or aven don-inane. 

Hovever, during ehe parted of place passage, exposure frsa deposited __ 

aaeariala La ooc ansaetad :o be significant ccssared cs exposure __J 

frsa the plune. Therefore, separate procedures fsr estinacing ths 

whole body dose froa deposited aatarlala are noe provided ia this 

Appendix. 

The envirscnentai neasurasens cachuiques considered ara gsnaa 

axpeaurs -rasa naaaursnencs and gross radioiodine concantr3tion 

saaauraneat3. riachsda are developed for.aatinating tha projaccad 

chyroid dosa coswri saeas froa aithar of chase ueasureaeuta. Although 

tha astiaasica ef thyroid dosa corrri, —was frsa gas a exposure rata 

aeasureaeats is rseoguised as a crude approsinacion, it is a 

earrently isaleeeatabla and raoid nethod. Fiaii instruaancatier. 
P.17 

capable of aeaauring gross radioiodine eoneentration in the presence 

of noble gases ia under development. Thia aethod should replace or 

supplement the gaaaa expoaure race aethod for eseisuting projected 

thyroid dose conxrf —n»ng as socn aa possible. Projected vhole body 

gasraa dose frsa external exposure to the pleae is sispiy the 

integral of dose rate over the duratioa of exposure. 

1.1 Acoroach 

Calculated values for projectsd thyroid doae eoaaiaaeae and 

projected vnole body doae are a function of the isoespis composition 

of the radionuclide bearing cloud. This cloud composition is, in 

turn, deteradnad by the respective release rates of specific 

radionuclides frea the reactor coneaiasent and the age of the 

fission products. In addition, the projected dose frsa inhalation 

aecng' arrnan recepesrs viii vary aa a function of the pertinent 

physiological and netabolic characteristics ascribed to the 

individual incurring the dose.' 

Given sufficient tine, one eauld project the thyroid dose 

ccraaicnent by neasuring er caieniating Che airborne concentration of 

each iaoeope of radioiodine, integrate these concentrations ov-r the 

period of exposure, aultiply by the appropriate dcse conversion 

factor for each isotope, and then sua these values. Hovever, during 

tha eaergency period folloving an incident, such analyses vould be 

too tiae-consmsing. and nor a sinple nethods aust be used. 
_PJ8 

The recesseaded siapLifiad approach for dose projection is ta 

sake oae of charts or aeoograaa ea srssalaee ealeulased or aeaaured 

esvirenaassal paraaaears iaso astiaatad projected dose. Easinasing 

tha vhole body external doae ia enly a aaetar of integrating the 

gaaaa axposure rata over cha eaeinased duration of exposure. Tha 

corresponding aethod for p-rojeeslng thyroid dose ia aisxlxr vith the 

addition of factors ts convert frsa tine integrated coneestraeisa ea 

dose aad eorrecsioa factors ta adjuae for variables thaa aay be 

This Appeadin is a presentation of cha processes aad 

aasTsspcicus uaed ta develop seaagrsss fsr projecting boeh chyraid . 

inhalation dose csteaieaeae and whole body gaasa dose. Tne nemo grans 

ara based ca releases defined for a design basis accident without 

eh* benefits of engineered safagsards eo rsduee csaeaneraeisns ia 

containment. Correesiea factor charts are provided for adjusting 

the doae projections fsr (1) different release characteristics, (2) 

tiae fcr radioactive decay, and (3) actuai aacacrslogieai ccnditiccs 

aa ehe sine of :he aeeidase. Cedar nethods isvclvisg diffaranc 

types of charts m d censgrens for projaccing dsae cava been 

developed by suclaar facility operators and others. Such sechoda 

aay be fully as aesurate and acceptable as chose developed in this 

Appendix. 
P.19 

*3ir= 

Ste charts aad soaograas developed ia thia Appendia allow one 

ts quickly estlsata projected whole body dsse or projected thyroid 

dose eeaaltaeat froa aay of the fallsvlag data vhen these data are 

used vith the estiaated duratien of exposure: 

whols Soar Proiected Dose 

1. Calculated ^oss concentrations of iodine aad/or coble 

gases. 

2. Measured gasaa exposure rates. 

Thyroid Dose Caaaltaect 

1. Caieulatad gross concentration of iodises. 

2. Measured gross eoneentration af iodines. 

3* Measured gnirffi exposure rate. 

Because ths dcse projection acaograas (1) are based ea gross 

coceantratieas, (2) consider caiy a specific tiae far radioactive 

decay, acd (3) do set esasidar differlag dlasnsional characteristics 

of ths pirate, the resulting dose projections are subject ts gross 

errors. Ecwever, ths aethods are based ca generally conservative 

asstaptlaah, acd therefore, the dcse projectisa errors are likaly ts 

be conservative. Correction factar curves are provided far use ia 

situations where actual data are available ta substitute far thaae 

assts^sices so that dsse projectisa estlaates can be aore acanrata. 
2.0 Tales 

All radiacioa •jaita uaed are those defined by cha IC2T (1). 

Hovever, the IC3Z7 has yee es dafisa eha concept of dsse csmaicnaat 

aad prepoaa a symbol for is even though ehe ICS? utilises ehe 

csacspc. 

Picsardson (2) 'aaa traced the history df eha dosa csaaicaene 

eonespe; ehe folloving deflaities is taken frsa bis vork. "Dose 

Csaaisaess ia a fusuxe dose inplied by a specific evens in ehe paae." 

Xaeheaaeieaiiv, this eonespe is defined by tha folloving 

iaaagrai equation: 

'-./ H 3 (:)dt (1.1) 

where D ia the da*a essaitsenc in rad aad D i . s initial er 

o 

reference dose rate. 

As shewn here, dose eessitnanc snd dsae race are averages. 

These average vaiue(s) result frea application of :he aasuapcica 

that radieaccive nacariai is ceeesicad ai i oral 7 throughout cha' 

eart»es organ. 

? vill be deeerained by ehe values selected fsr ehe liaihs of 

integration. Tha lover value, : , is eakau aa caro which defines 

o 

a refaranca eiae or scartiag ooint at which cine a value for 3 is 

0 

inevn. The ZZ27 has suggescad uspar linics of :0 75303 as ehe value 

-J 
P.21 

ts be used fsr occupational considerations and 70 years fsr senders 

of the general puslie* E?A uaes 100 yeara (3) vhen eoapucing 

environaencal dose eeaaicsaasa. Is selecting aa upper linit for use 

ia ealeulattiag tha doae coaaitaenta correlated vith iodine 

concentration, it is recognised that due ts tha short half Uvea for 

ehe radioiodines of concern, noac of the doae ceaairaent to the 

thyroid vill be delivered ia ieaa than oae acuta. Therefore, the 

difference in- doae delivered in 50 or 100 years or inftaity ia 

affectively 0, aad infinity ia used far convenience. The 

calculational foraula becoaea: 

D - J D a

 itadt - yS. (1.2) 

ft « A . 

X ia the effective reaoval coefficient ia reciprocal tine units. 

2.1 Radienuclide Concentration ia Air 

The air concentration of fission products downwind froa the 

point cf release is derarained by chair rata of release ires tiie 

r-actor esntniassut, their manner of dispersal in ehe ataesphere, 

and tha ai-apsed tins sines reactor shutdown. For a given inventory 

of radionuclides in the rsactsr core as the tine of shutdown, the 

contaiaaent reieaae race of a particular radienuclide dependa oa 

three factors: (1) the fraction of the core inventory af the 
P.22 

nuclide which is released ea the csntaitseas; (2) the rata of its 

removal frsa eha ceacsisnans asaesphase by ehe engineered safety 

syaeaas aad by such seehaaisaa as precipitation, surface deposition, 

and radioactive decay; aad (3) tha csacaisneuc leakage rasa. These 

three factors can vary widely depending en eha sagnituda of the 

accident aad eha functional status of ehe aagiaeered safaey 

syaeaas. 'However, if oae assumes thae a given fraction cf the esre A 

inventory of a specific radionuclide is available fer release to the *, *-

eoaeaisseac isadiasaly aftar reactor sauedotra (_^>5) and thae the 

gngisaersa safary systeas act :a reduca tha- eonsaiaswss inventory of 

tha radionuclide by soae fixed factor within a short tine after cha 

radienuclide reieaae iaco eoasaisseas, than the analysis of the 

radionuclide release froa the ceataiaaane can be sinsliflad. Coder 

those assuaptions, the rsacvai. of a radionuclide frea the i 

consair-lane acaoaphera by tha engineered safaey systeas can be 

regarded ia aa additional barrier, or filter , affeasing ehe fraesisa 

of eha esre irveatary ef the radionuclide which is released to eha 

eonsaiaaese. If ?,, is the fraction of the core inventory of ehe 

stsh radionuclide which is released eo 'ehe eoataisness, F... is the 

fraesisa of eha releases radionuclide which is cce rsaoved by the 

engineered safaey systems, aad A. is ehe activity cf ehe '<sh 

* a' 

radienuclide in caries, ehen the containaaac inventory of the '«h 

radionuclide at tine t, C (*), ia given by 
a. 

C (t) - F.. • ?„ • A. (t) curies. (2.1) 

& *a*» «»Ja •» 

Conbining the product of ?,. aad F_ inns a tseal reieaae 

saecion F^, 

C. (e) - ?, A. (t) caries. (2.2) 

& k * 

Assuadng thaa 100 percent of the containment inventory ia 

availabia for reieaae ta the enviroaaene via containment leakage, 

the radionuclide reieaae rate from the eonsniaaent is dataraiaed by 

the product of the radionuclide esre inventory, ita tseal release 

fraction, aad the esntaisaens leakage rata. In these cams, the 

reieaae rate frsa the eeneaiaaeat of the ksh radionuclide nay be 

vritten a3: 

QkCs') - A^t') • \ • L(t') , (2.3) 

vnere: 

Q,(e') m oontainaene reiaaae race of ehe ksh radionuclide 

(Ci/s) 

t' * tine of reieaae aster reactor shutdown (s) 

A. (a') • esre inventory of ksh rsdienueiida as tiae t' (Ci) 

F. • tstai release fraction of the ksh radionuclide 

!(:') » contsinnent fractional leakaga rata at tine t' (s *) 

3-9 
Aftar ehe fission products have baea released ea ths 

•nvironaane, their concentration, as a faaetloa sf dowewiad 

distance, is dapendeoa ea eha acsespherie conditions ae tha tina of 

reieaae and ea chair respective deposition velocities. Ecvevar, if 

ehe deposition velocity of the radionuclides is cegieetad and the 

eoneainmaae leakage rasa is assuaed cs be conscant, eha air 

csucascrasica of ehe ksh radisauelxde is given by ehe following 

aquation: 

«•"» —mt$Sm!'-z- ** ~ . *""-'• tSf 

-, 4 (r,t) - Q.Je) X/Q(r) 

A (t) • ' • L • X/Q(r) , (2.4) 

where: ; ^J 

X. (r,t) * esncantraeicu of ksh radioausiida ae point'r ' 

relative cs eha poise of release aad else e after 

reactor shuedcwn (Cl/ar*). 

.</Q(r) • sisa invariant acsespherie diffusion function • 

relative -cs "ha point of release (s/'a ), and A. is 

avaiuatad aa :he same eine as X. co allow for 

fission produce decay aad ingrsvth during tine of 

flight. 

3-10 

. 
P.25 

The total radionuclide eoneentration of a cloud consisting cf M 

radionuclides is given by ehe sua of concentrations of ita 

individual components. Thus, 

H 

x(r,a) - S A, (t) 7. t X/Q(r) 

k-1 * * 

- 1 X/Q(r) S A.(t)?v . (2.5) 

k-1 * * 

2.2 Doaa Calculations 

The dose projection aechoda developed in this Appendix are 

United ts esssiderasiea of thyroid doses due to inhalation sf 

radioiodines and vhole body cloud gnuna doses due ta radioiodines 

aad nobis gases vhich night be released in a potential nuclear 

reactor accident. Doses to other organs are noe considered. 

2.2.1 Whole 3eev Cloud Ca=a Doses 

Tha cloud ga=aa doae is a dose vhich ia received as a 

consequence of external exsosure ts gaaaa radiation aaitted by ehe 

airborne radioactive fission products. In soae cases, the vhole 

occy dsse vould ba projected baaed ca aeaaureaenes of exposure rasa 

in the anvirsnnens and an eseinaeed duration of exposure. In ocher 

eases, arojessed vhole body dose aay be baaed ca•calculated 

eanesntratiens ia ehe environsent and estiaated duration of 

exposure. Sinca gaaaa rays can travel great distances in air, 
P.26 

calculations of vnole body gacaa dosaa frsa airsoma concentration* 

anac essaidar the radioauclida coapoaitioa and eancaneraeloa spatial 

diacrihucioas within Cha cloud. Rigorous calculations of cloud 

gaaaa doaea require three diaensiaaal insagraeloa of apprspriaea 

dosa aetaauaeion kernels vith respaes ea spaca, aa well aa vith 

respect es tine . However, if the cloud can be considered to be 

seai-iafinic a in extant (reference (6), section 7.4.1.1), ehas, for 

a point located ea ehe ground, ehe gaaaa doaa rata in air frea the 

ksh radionuclide ia given by 

0,; (T,Z) - 0.23 E.^ X^r.a ) , . (2.5) 

vbera: 

3.' (r,e ) - garma dose rase froa eha ksh radioauclida 

distributed in a seai-infinis a cloud (rad/s) 

Z. B average garra energy par disintegration of the 

ksh radionuclide (ha7/disintagraeion), and X.(s,e), 

which has bees defined previously, has ehe uui:3 cf 

Ci/a . 

Using Sq. (2.5), and assisting that eha whole body garma doaa 

raee is equal es tha gssea exposure rata in air , oaa could eaieuiasa 

tha whole bedy gacaa dose thae would be received by aa individual 

J 

0-12 

J 
exposed to an infinite cloud of gaseous fission products by 

integrating Che dose race wich respect co tiae over ehe duration of 

expoaure. However, since ic ia expected that Che cloud gaasa 

exposure race vould be aeaaured as a given location vithia a short 

tine after pluae arrival, the doae as thae location can be 

conservatively estiaated by 3imply sultipiyiag the aeasured gassa 

exposure race by ehe expected duration of exposure. This doae 

projection nethod vould eend to be conservative because the 

radiological decay ox ehe fission products after the aeaaureswac 

vould be neglected. Other factors such as changes ia pluae 

direction, changes in netaorological conditions, or changes in 

reieaae rata eauid «3use either high or low dose projections. 

A nethod can also be developed for projecting vhole body ;«—= 

doaes based ea known or ealeulased fission product concentrations. 

Since the gama doae rasa frsa a seal-infinite cloud consisting of S 

gaseous fission products ia equal ta the sua of the doses frea the 

various.radionuclides, the tssal vhole body dose race is defined by 

D~(r,c) -IS . (r,t) 

k-1

 A 

Z 0.23 t? X, (r,a) rad/s. (-2.7) 

k-l * * 

M 
Since X.(r,e ) ia given by Eq. (2.4), 'substitution of that 

axpseaaiaa into Eq. (2.7) yields eha following: 

D

r

 (r,t) - 0.23 fi Z, A. (t) 7. L x/q(r) 

- 0.23 t X/q(r) £ ZT A,(t) ?. rad/s. (2.3) 

k-1 * * * 

Furthasaora, since ehe eseal radienuclide esaessrrasicu ae 

(r,e ) is given by Eq. (2.5), the ratio of ehe seai-isfiait a cloud 

gaaaa doae race ea ehe tseal radicsuelide concentration, (RCC ) , ia 

given by 

* , r 0.23 I. X/Q<r) fi i' A (:) F, 

k-L * * SCC'(C) - **' 

a 

L X/Q<r) E A(s ) 7. 

k-t * * 

0.23 2 2^ A./SJ ? k 

fi A. (t) 7V 

k-1 * * 

raa/sge 

Ci/a* 

(« a) 

Thus, given a knowledge of gaseous fission product 

ccncantratisa ae a gives location seen aftar placa arrival, ehe 

•-•hola body cloud ;aasa- dosa *s sn individual st thae lcs5ei;o 0^7 ': 

proj acted by suieipiyiag the conca-tratior. by eha feceer ?.CZ '.z'; ir 

D—14 

" ^ 
P.29 

by the expected duration of exposure. This aethod nay also be usee 

ta project whole body cloud gasssa doaea frea noble gaaea which night 

be released in a reactar accident. 

2.2.2 Th'/.'uid Inhalation Doses 

The thyroid inhalation doae is an internal doae eosaiaens 

which is reeeived za a consequence of inhaling radioiodines present 

in the air as ehe point of exposure.' (The tsra inhalation dose or 

thyroid dose aa uaed in this report aeana thyroid dose esmaitaene.) 

The inhalation dose daa ta ehe expoaure eo air containing, the 

ksh iodiae iaocope is given by the iategral ef the concentration 

over the period of exposure, 

c * t 

a e 

a?C--.V--.)-/iw.f V B ) '

d 8 (2.10) 

vnere: 

D. (r,c ,c ) • thyroid inhalation dose resulting fron 

a. a a 

exposure cs ehe ksh iodine isocope (rad) 

t " tine after reacrsr shutdown at vhich exaosure 

a 

commences (a) 

t • duration of exposure, sr the inhalation tiae (a) 

6 

th DC7. • thv—aid inhalation dcse conversion factor fsr the 

it 

.... . . rnd/3ec . .,, v . 

Ath iccxaa ucespe , • , ane .sCr.t; cas ceen 

W«,< n 

defined previously. 

3-15 
P.3(L 

If ehe radisiodiaa concaaeracien ia air ia esasosed of ?T iodine 

isoespes, eha eha inhalation dose is equal ea eha SUB of cha doses 

received frea inhaling ehe iadivtdoal iodine isocooas. Thus, ehe 

combined doae is 

iC—i 

s • e 

a E / CCT.T* X(T,C) dz rad. (2.11) 

k-l J * 

6

a 

Substituting the txorssaica for X. (r,t) frea Eq. (2.4) iste ; 

Sq. (2.11), oee obtains 

e a a 

'*y-y -1 f ~? A-^t) ?^ :. x/q(?)dz 

.a e 

1 X/q(r) fi / Dcyr1 A.'C) ?. dt rad. (2.12) 

,k- , j * iC .< l 

e 

*am ' * 
P.31 

The ratio, SZC(t ,t ,c ), of the essoined chyrold 

•a* 6 C 

iahalacioa dose, D(r,c ,c ), to tha eseal radioiodine 

eoneentration, X(r,t ), as point r, aad else c , where 

t < t < t + tt , eaa be obtained by dividing Sq. (2.12) by 

A C m' Q 

Eq* (2.5). IS can be vritten aa 

c * c 

IT * 8 

X. X/Q<r) I / DC7. A (t) F. dt 

k-l J * * * 

tt 

2ic(c .e .e ) 5—' 

a a* c 

X. X/Q<r) 2 F, A (c ) 

k-1 ' * c 

c * tt 

DC?^ ?l6At(c) dt £*/ 

e

a • rad 

1 ?kA

-a(c c

) 

k-1 * * c 

"(2.13) 

Ci/o 

Since SIC's ,t ,t ) is the ratio of thyroid inhalation 

4 3 C 

dose co radioicdizc concentration, given a knovledge ox the canal 

racioiocine concentration ae a siven Location, as else ca axter 

reaesar shnedeva, one can project the thyroid inhalaaisa dose 

resulting froa aa exposure beginning ic t, sacasda aftar reaesar 

shutdown. aad lasting fsr a period of c seconds, by siaply 

auitislyiag 2IC(c ,t ,t ) by the known radioiodire 

• ' " ae e 
P.32 

Expressed satbaajacically, 

D(r,t .a ) - HXC(e .e ,e ) • X(r,e ) rad. (2.14) 

a e a a e c 

Sinca aiCCe ,e ,e ). is independent of position, ehis 

procedure aay ba used anywhere viehin ehe radioactive pltae, 

provided chac ehe eoeal radioiodise esneeaeraeica in air is 

datasained as tha loeasiss fsr vuica ehe ehyraid inhalation dose is 

projected, and thaa ehe eeaporal paraaaears e , e , and t are 

a a c 

kncwa. 

Oslng a aimmmilxs aeehod, ic is also possible eo escisaca 

projected thyroid inhalaeica doses ca the basis of anviresaensai 

aaaauraaenes of cloud gaaaa dosa rasas. To do ehis ie is necessary 

ts develop a relationship beeveen gasaa dosa races aad iodine 

concentrations ia the pine aad then ss use ehis ts dacarnica ehe 

proi«esed ehyraid dose. 

If ehe gaseous fission -product csneaneraeion ac a given 

posicisa is composed of :? radioiodines and % cobLa gases, ehes ehe 

ratio of eoeal iodine esneeaeraeica es ehe seai-infinit a cloud gasaa 

a* 

dosa race, EIC"(c), is given by 

• \ « ml \ mi 

la ea.\ mlS • 

. \ \ . } m J __ - ^ . 

3 s.,m. ,_. < Jf , j 

. . .-: .< .'. 

iC- 1 

Ci/=3 

rac/sec 

/ -i i t > 

3-13 
P.33 

Since ehe racio of ehyraid inhalation dose to radioiodine 

concentration is given by the factor 2!C(t ,c ,t ), she 

a s c 

thyroid inhalation doae 

D

=a(r,t ,t ) • [3IC<t ,e ,t ) • 3IC"Ct )] • D^(r,t ) rad. (2.15) 

a e a a e c e 

Thus, if ehe tine that has elapsed since reactor shutdown ia 

known, the radioiodise thyroid inhalation doae can be projected at a 

given location for an expected inhalation period by aeaauring the 

cloud gaasa dose rate at that location and by nuitiplying it by the 

expression in parentheses in the above equation. 

. Vhile ehe factors EEC and EEC vere expressed as functions of 

radionuclide core inventories and release fractions, in view of 

Eq. (2.4),. it should be recalled that they are actually functions of 

fission product release races frea tha centaiaaent. Since the 

reieaae race of ehe ksh radionuclide froa the esstainsanc is given 

by Q, (t1), the factor EEC, in particular, cas be expressed in 

tarns of release rasas as 

I Q,<c) 

» TM - ^i=r~r <*'" 

0.23 I IV Q. Cs) 

k-1 * * 

3-13 
P.34 

or, ia eassa of coaeaisnant radioiodine and nobla gaa iaveneoriaa, as 

2T 

z c,(e) 

KG'Cc) -i^—1 - , (2.13) 

0.23 'fi If C. (c) 

k-l * * 

vfaera qT(6 snd C.^ are evaluated ac tine t ta allow for 

radiological decay during efssa ef flight. 

Defining the average gasaa eaergy released per disiaeagra.ee 

of a radioiodise asea es b« 

C I? q..(t) 

r

(=) 5 '-"l 

fi q.(c ) 

i - l

 x 

and tha average grma enarg7 released par disincagracica of a tsai. a 

gas acca es be 

I T. q.(e) 

9* f. l r, l-l . l J 

: q,(s) 

:-io 
P.35 

Eq. (2.13) aay be vritten as 

X 

Z q\(c) • 4 

2ic"(t) - alL-— 

s

 w 

tL.t) z Q.(c) + EL(C) I q.(t) 

- > 1 * *G j- i J 

(2.19) 

Z q.(t) 

?\t ) -> "T (-)

 W J 

-T^ C ; -^C 1 " ' N 

: a* <c) 

i-l " 

Sq. (2.19) iliustracss the obvious faet thaa the ratio of 

iodine concentration ta gaaaa cose rate depends on the relative 

release rates of the iodines and aobie gases frsa the reactor 

eoneainaent or, assuaing a radionuclide independent esntainaest 

leakage rasa, oa their relative inventories in the csntaiasans. 

Thus, in order eo be able ts project thyroid inhalation doses cn ehe 

basis of cloud jrii.ira dcse rates, it is only necessary to know eha 

relative eoneainaent reiaase rates of radioiodines and sobla gas as 

and not their absolute nagnitudes. Furthermore, since release fron 

the eoneainaent vould reduce the radioiodine and noble gas 

inventories by the saae fractional aaounsx, their deoletioa by 

leakage into tha envirocaens need not be considered in assessing 

their relative release rasas-. 

D-21 
P.36 

2.2.. 3 Flalta .gates" Cerreetiea 

Tha above aeehad far projecting thyroid iahaiatlsn deses by 

* 

aeasuting eleud gaasa dcsa rates was based es ths assuaption that 

the cloud is aeai-iafisiia la- extant. However, for a particular 

esseentrstlea, ths actual gaaaa dese rate frea a finite pluae would 

tand ts be ssaller than that frsa aa infinite eleud. Thus, =* : 

r 

projeetleas of whole body gasaa doses based ea calculated 

radionuclide esaeeatratieas la the plena would tend to overestiaate 

ths dsses. Conversely, projections ai thyroid ishaiatiea deses 

based ca aeasureaenta at gaasa dese rates would tead to 

uaderestlaate the inhalatiea doses because ef reduced gaaaa dcse 

rates. 

Tha ratio of gaasa dose rata ia a flalta cloud to ths 

aaaa rate ia an iafialta cloud saving ths saae concentration as the 

centerlias af ths finite eleud fsr 0.7 Ms7 gaaaa photons ia shsva ia 

flgare 7.m at refarenes (i). It depends only slightly ca gaaaa 

photon energy and say be aaatssad ts be valid fcr the gasm ss.ar"ST 

spectrin at radisicdirss and tabis gases. This ratio is piettad aa 

a function cf r, the staadard deviation cf ths cloud ccacsncration 

Tar tha cloud caster lias and fcr Iscaticaa off ehe canter lite'. Fsr 

a stund level release, the value ef a can te replaced by r' averaga 

which is (r • O* . Figures 3*'0 and 3.:: of refarenes ;_£"' 

provido valuea fcr r.. aad ?_ aa a function of dsvcviad distance 
P.37 

far tha Faaquill stability classes A through F. Tha resulting 

values for a can be uaed in figure 7.14 of reference (a) co 

dacaraina ehe ratio of cha gaaaa doae rate in a finite cloud eo the 

gj-osa doae race in a seai-infinita cloud for the different stability 

classes and as different downwind distances. 

Thia functional dependence can be expressed aaeheaaeieally as 

2-- («, x, 12) , (2.20) 

D

7 

vnere: 

D

T 

-5— - ratio of gaaaa dose rase froa a finite cloud ts chat 

D' 

froa aa infinite cloud 

- > downwind distance of exposed location frsa point of 

release 

EZ • ataospherie stability elaaa (A, 3, C, D, S, or F) 

a • average radionuclide eoneentration standard deviation. 

3y dividing the aeasured cloud gacaa dose rasa by ehe ratio 

D' *y 

- ^ , or oy nultiplying it by its inverse, -r—i one can csaaensaca 

D' DT 

for ehe reduced gaaaa dose race frsa a finite eleud in projecting 

radioiodise ehyraid inhalation doses baaed on eavirocaencai 

aeasureaeats of gasaa dose races in air. 
P.38 

3.0 Zagat "Pwsftvrr 

3.1 Badlssnclida Sctgpe.. Tessa, 

Tahla 3*1 gives the flsalsa product source laveatsry aad 

assodated data vhlah was used, ia this Appendia ta develsp whole 

body aad thyroid issalatistv isaa projection aethods. 

Ths radionuclide searos terra are essentially the aaae aa those 

given- la WASH-1*00, Appendix 7* (7), exeept fsr the iaveatcries of 

aetaatable Ie-1323 acd I*-T-33a, which are baaed ca 3SAC cede 

eaicalatlcas (£). They are also la geed agreeaeat with aeuroa taras 

calculated by Ansa, at al. (,»).', atsl represent ths equillbriua cere 

laveatsry ot radisiedisas aad- coble gases ia a typical 1,CC0 K5»e 

(3,2C0 M5it) power reacter. These '^i^^l esre isventsrles vere \iaad 

to calculate radleauellde act!vlties aa a function of tlae according 

ta decay reiatisashlps presented is flgsre 3.1. Since Ca-135 sac --a 

regarded as atahle (half-Ufa s 2.3 x 10" years), eleven decay 

stairs 2 are af sufficient length to describe tha teaporal behavior 

sf radionuclides listed ia tails 3*'•'* 

^Eleven chairs were -isai is account fcr suitipia decay 

sodes. The fraction cf a aueiids in a decay chain ia datarsined by 

amaj Wmaaaaarama- aa ra ^mmaraaaa maa -•».«. Amrarsra -^* *-. J . . V»a a. „i . 

.l!a 
P.39 

Table 3.1. Eadionuslide source can* 

Nuclide 

2T-33 

£r-35a 

Er-37 

£r-38 

la-123 

2e-I33a 

Ia-125 

2e-123n 

; 1-131 

^ ~ 1-132 

1-123 

1-134 

1-133 

3ali-liia * 

(hr) 

9.4 x IO4 

4.43 . 

1.27 

2.3 

127 

53.3 

9.17 

0.27 

193 

2.29 

20.3 

0.377 

6.39 

Tal r* a 7. Inventory 

(108 ci) 

0.0036 

0.24 

0.47 _ 

o.sa 

1.7 

0.04 

0.34 

0.19 

0.33 

1.2 

1.7 

1.9 

1.5 

Average Seen Energy4 

per Disintegration 

S3 G£a7) 

0.251 

0.226 

1.33 

0.249 

0.102 

0.0 

0.310 

.0.0 

0.133 

0.525 

0.417 

0.591 

0.394 

Average Cama Energy 

pas Dislntagration 

Sy (2£a7) 

0.0022 

0.13 

0-79 

2.2 

0.030c 

0.020s 

0.25 

0.53 

0.29 

2.2 

0.60 

2.6 

1.5 

?rsa table 7X1, refaranca ("I'D) 

Eased on references (7) "and (3). 

"Carractad for internal conversion (table 71, rafarancs (10)), 

0-23 
Sr. 

(0.21) 

70; 

3 * 

r-^S 

Sb3 5 (ssabla) 

Sr 

Sr 

37 

33 

31 

22 

S~ 

3" 

3* 

3a ' (stable) 

^ 3 8 ." •Sr 3 8

 (ssabla) 

5*" (stable ) 

Za (scabie) 

V12 3 -t>«_3 (stasia ) 

^ 

^ 

.134 •2a U 4

 (stable ) 

.123 (0.13) 

3ased on data i n rafarsnca (1£). 

IT - isocari c transition. 

Iranchic5 ratio s in parentheses. 

Ta •maamam, 1 

• -*— 3 - * 

fjiA-t-i' -A-L iodine anc ceil a ges cacav ehalns. 

5-25 
P.41 

3.2 Thyroid Dese Conversion Factors far F.adleisdiae "relation 

To use the thyroid iahalatlsa dcse trojeotlea aethods discussed 

la aeetlea' 2.2.2 cf this Appendia, it is necessary ta deteralae the 

appropriate dose conversion factors far the individual radlcicdine 

isotopes which sight be present ia air al the point of exposure. 

th The thyroid iahalatiaa dose conversion factar, DC. , haa been 

defined ts be equal to ths iahaiatica dcse to the thyroid resulting 

froa the exposure to a unit integrated activity ia air of the leth 

radioiedlae isotope. It aay be vritten as 

DCr 1 a 5.92 x IO2 

22 - " /\-pC -

; 2 T)cl t 

-* 'ale "Te J sxp "* 

. 5.52 x 102 2-lN ^ .- (3*0 

where: 

DC?,^ s thyroid iahalatiaa isse -conversion factar far the 

Seta iodise iaotspe (rad-a'/Ci-a) 

H?. - breathing rata (sJ/a) 

*ak " "ractic a 3* itta^^ activity af the Jeta 

radioiodine iaotspe vhich dapesita ia the thyroid. 

a s aass af the thyroid (g) 

5-27 
P.42 

E. * effaetive csers? absorbed is eha ehyraid per 

disintegration of the ksh radioiodine acsa 

Cha7/dis) 

3.92 x IO2 - 1.6 x 10"* rad-g/>le7 x 3.7 s 101 0 dis/s-Ci 

(rad-g-dis/Ha7-a-Ci) 

*-,, - affective decay eonstant of ehe ksh radioiodine 

in ehe thyroid (s*1) 

- 0*693 ^ 0.693 

\mm »- mam^amam * _•» _ 

where: 

e.^,- - saclear half-lif a of tha kail radioiodine (s) 

t - g k - biological baif-iif a in eha thyroid of the iah 

- radioiodiaa (s) . 

3.2.1 Deseadanea of Thyroid Haas and Breaching itaea on Aste 

Since the thyroid aass, as veil as neeabolie activity , depends 

on a person's age, ehe doae conversion factor eaa ba asaectad eo ba 

a function sf age, and, es properly avaiuaca it , tha age dasesdensa 

of the paraaaears 22, f , X, a, aad y euac be deearained. 

Table 3.2 praseacs valuaa of eoeal body nass, ehyrois nass, and 

3-ra3ehiug rata as a fusecies of aga. -Vii vai-^ea ara 3*st,d ca data 

ia refaraaca (11). Ths valaes of breaching rate are charsetaristis 

of the "light activity" phase, which ia graaeer than eha daily . 

average breathing raea, especially ic eha case cf a aevbera. The 

braathing rates cf eha 5 year rid sad If ~asr eld vera daeaminad by 

'rscdieai iscarsoiiticn on tha iaois af ;cdv ccs3. 

D-Z3 

~> 
Table 3.2. Body nass, thyroid aass, aad breathlag rasa 

as a function of aga 

Age 

Tears 

Newborn 

1 

3 

10 

13 

Adult 

3ody Mass 

*3 

3.3 

10 

19 

22 

60 

70 

Thyroid Mass 

S 

1 

1.8 

3.6 

7.4 

12.1 

16 

Braaching Ease 

a

3/s . 

2.5 E-05 

6.9 2-03 

1.3 S-04(a) 

2.2 S-04 

3.2 E-04(a) 

3.3 2-04 

Ineersolasad on she basis of body aass. 

•29 
P.44 

3.2.2 Tstaka of Ishalad aadioiodiae into tha Thvroid 

^ammma—mam—m^^aaaaaaammmaaamaaamama—aammmmammaawa^maammmaaamaaamama^mmaaaaam 

Thyroidal iodise uptake ia dependeas eo a large extant on eha 

eseal iodine in eha disc . The Federaeiea ef American Societie s fsr 

Experiaental 3iology prepared a report oa "Iodine ia Foods" fsr the 

Food and Drug Aiaisistration (12). Is ehis report, iodis e was aoesd 

aa eeaiag frea diac wish a range of 332 eo 454 ug l/day; and frea 

ehe aeaoaphere, 5 eo 100 ug l/day. The eoeal ascinaead inc'aica is 

aore thaa ewiea ehe reessaended daily allowance of 35 eo 150 ug 

l/day. 

The reflection of variation in dietary intake of iodine in the 

fractional upeaka of iodise is well known (13,14,1*). zta effects 

of ehe changing dietary iediue values have been reflaesed is ehe 

24-hour thyroid uptake values recently reported fcr iodise-131 

(12,l£-22). The sew vaiuas reported include 21.32 a 62 OS), 

12.12 h 6.12 (19J, iSS s 33 (23), 13.52 s 4.J2 (21), 13.42 s 5.32 

(22), 20.02 a 6.32 (23), and 17.42 s (--) 7.22 (24). The average of 

eheae values is 17.32 upeaica. 

Sarhausec, es al. (23), ravieved ehe raporcs in ene iitarstura 

aad coapared ehe 24-hour 1-131 upeaka vaiuas reporead in chiidran 

frea birth es 20 jaara ai age wieh chair own daca. The rasuita 

support ehe thesis ehat froa birth eo about 1 year of age ehers is a 

a 

reduceion in ehe thyroid uptake value. Ac birth, ehyrsid uptake is 

^ 

D-2C 
P.45 

frsa 1.5 es 2 tiaes higher than the aduic value, but by 1 year of 

age it has dropped down ta abouc tha adult value (in Sarhausen, et 

al. (23), frea 40 eo 702 uptake ac birth down ta % 202 upeaka ac 1 

year of age and older). The particularly high values (60-702) have 

been observed in the first few daya after birth (24). 11'in, ec al. 

(25), found in their review of the literature that after 2 years of 

age the thyroid uptake value vasvrelatively constant. Veliaan, 

ec al. (26), reported sisilar findings. 

Oa eha basis of this literscure survey, the fraction of 

ingested radioiodine activity vhlah deposits in the thyroid, f. , 

is assuaed ta be 20 percent for individuals less than 1 year old and 

17 percent fsr individuals above ehe age of 1 jaas. Since thia 

value ia based es data for 1-131, it should be eaaservstive for the 

shorter lived iodine isotopes. If the fraction of iahalad 

radioiodine vhich reaches ths thyrsid, f , is asstsed ts be 75 

percent of f (27), thes f is equal to 23 percent fsr 

individuals under 1 year of age and 13 persens for individuals 1 

.3r--y**i -fc m j~m .*. *-. T-..' 

year oid and older. 

2.2.3 Effective Deeav Energies of 1-131, 1-132. 1-133, 1-134, and 

I-iji in iussn Thvroic 

fluclei of iodiae isotopes 1-132 through 1-135 ail decay by the 

eaiasicn of beta (£) particles. In general, vhen a nucleus eeits a" 

beta partieia, it ia left in aa excited state and sheds ita excess -

eaergy by either eaittiag a gaasa (?) ray or by internally 

converting an orbital electron (23). 

D-31 
P.46 

Conservatively arwtrr'.rg that the total beta aad electron energy 

is locally absorbed la tha thyroid, the effective decay energy of 

each radionuclide la the aiaa of the average beea energy, ths energy 

of tha converted and Auger electrons, aad the fraction of ealtted 

x-ray aad gaea-ray energy which is absorbed locally in the thyroid. 

Thaa, the- affective daesy energy 

S

'

S E * 2

e*t*i Sr , , (3*2) 

vhere: 

"z. a the average beea eaergy 

2, a the energy ef the esnvertad and Auger electrons 

S «.the «nerg7 ef ths ita' x or ga=a-rsy, aad 

T l 

t-x 9 the fraction I which' ia locally absorbed ia the 

1 

thyroid. . 

For radionuclides which have eeapiieatad decay scheaes, 

rigorous calculation of E can becene quite tedious. Hence, an 

apsrexiaats sethod of calculating t.h.e affactive decay energies cf 

1-13" through 2-'35 '-as developed which, at a substantial savings in 

effort, ylelda values of 1 which are beiiaved ta be sufficiently 

accurate far accident dsse calculations. 

i *-

~ > 

5-32 
Table 3.1, in sectioa 3.1, presents the radioactive half-live s 

and average beta aad gasaa energies eeicted per disintegration by 

nuclei of 1-131 through 1-135. The value of E^ in cable 3.1 is the 

total transition energy aad includes aay internal conversion 

energy aa well as the average gaaaa energy emitted per 

disintegration. 

In radionuclides under consideration, ehe process of internal 

eoaveraion is relatively uainportant. England, es ai. (10) (tables 

TT and TTI), indicate chac ia 1-131 and 1-135 the internal 

eooversiea energy (energy of ejected electrons and associated 

x-rays) accounts fsr only 0.0104 and 0.0236 of ehe total transition 

energy of the tvo radionuclides, respectively. Conservatively 

aastaling that all of the internal conversion energy is inserted eo 

ejected electrons, ths energy of these electrons vould account for 

only abouc 2 persens of the average 1-121 beta energy and 

approxiaately 9 pereent of ehe average 1-135 beta energy. Dillnan, 

ee al. (23), iadisaca that eha sua of ehe energies of the converted 

and Auger electrons accounts far as auch as.5 pereeat of ehe average 

1-131 beea eaergy and for abouc 1 pereent of the average 1-133 beta 

eaergy. Considering ehe ralacive csueribusicus af ehe five iodine 

isotopes in a raactor grade isocopie aisaure to the thyroid 

^Eaergy liberated in transition frea an excited state eo the 

ground stata. 

:*,_•;•• 
P.48 

iahalatica dsse (flgare 71 13-4, reference (7)) aad the degree ef 

accuracy repaired far projecting deses is accident situations, 

internal eoaveralea can clearly be tegieeted ia -ealaalatlag the 

effective decay energies of I-131 through 1-135 la ths huaan thyroid. 

As indicated ia Eq. (3.2), the absorbed fraction, i, is a 

functi ca ef gaaaa photon eaergy. . sswever, as a first 

approxiaaticn, a say be taken ta be a constant, equal ta its -value. 

at the average photon energy, E,, . Then, the effective decay 

* 4 

m 

energy is 

S a Sa * sSY (3*3) 

where a a s(2v ),-and Sv a I E-

"i ' i 1 

7aiues of S*v fcr 2-131 through 1-135 are presented beicw and, 

except fcr 2-13*. vere ail takea froa table I, reference (3). The 

value ai Tv for I-13a •-'aa estisated frea decay data -in table 1, 

' X 

reference (29). 

laocspe 1-131 1-132 1-133 --'34 1,-135 

(Me7/?haccn) 0.4 0.79 0.5S C.9 .' 1.5 
P.49 

Talues of s aa a function of individual age and iodine isotope, 

vhich vers det amis ed by thia aethod, are presented in cable 3.2. 

Tabla 2.4 presensa ehe ealcniaced effective diainsegrasisn energies 

of Che five iodise isotopes ia ehe thyroid as a function of age. 

Tha accuracy of this aethod of calculating effective decay 

energies vaa eeaeed by eoapsring the values of ? for 1-131 and 

1-133, fsr a five year old, es values of f calculated rigorously 

according to Eq. (3.2). Tha conversion process vaa fully 

eoaaidered, decay dasa in reference (22) vaxa uaed, and values .of a 

aa a functicn of thyroid aaaa aad photon eaergy vere obtained by 

graphical interpolation of daca in table 22.1, reference (30). 

To vithin TJO significant figures, the values of 1 vere found 

sa be 0.20 HeT aad 0.42 for 1-131 and 1-133, respectively. The 

differences are aaiaiy dna za slight discrepancies in decay energies 

ia references (10) and (28), and to round off errors. 

3.2.4 Effective Decay Constants of Iodine Isotsoes 1-131 through . 

I-ija in tne sirra-n Thyroid as a Junction of auo-act Aze 

Tabla 3.5 shews the age dependence of the effective decay 

constants (A,'s) of the five iodine isotopes uader consideration 

in the huaan thyroid. These values vere calculated uaing the 

nueiaar decay half-lives in cable 3.1 and esc.rtacas of biological 

half-lives in refaranca (3D. 

D-35 
P.50 

fabia. 3.3 . Abserbad fractions (4) i a eha chyrold 

as a faacaioa of age aad iodine Isotope 

Hewbora 

^ 

5 

1 

1.3 

3.6 

0.0043 

.0060 

.013 

0.0043 

.0060 

.017 

Tsyraid 

Age "ase Absorbed ?T3cslos (.)^> fsr 

Taars g 1-131 1-132 1-133 1-134 >12 5 

5.0050 0.0047 0.0043 

.0062 .0059 .C054 

.013 .017 .013 

10 7.4 .023 .023 .023 .023 .021 

13 U. I ' .023 .027 .023 .025 .023 

Adult Is .031 .029 .022 .329 .025 

^This .nfomatisa was deriv&d frea isfersaties in table 22.1, 

raf sr ance (20). The absorbed frscslon for a. 1 sran thyroid was obtained 

by aultlplylng ehe value of •> fsr a 2 gran thyrsld by eha r3sio sf cube 

roots of tha uasses. Poiuaa of . for specific chosen energies and 

thyroid naaaes vera obtninad by either choosing ths closest vaiuas 

prasensad ia cha raxerases or by isserpolaeicn. 
P.51 

Table 3.4. Effective decay energies for 1-131 through 1-135 

present In the thyroid as a fuacsioa of age 

Age 

Tears 

Hewbotn 

1 

5 

10 

13 

Adult 

Effectiv e Decay Eaergy E Q£a7) for 

1-131 1-132 1-132 1 1-134 1-133 

0.19 

.19 

.19 

.19 

.20 

.20 

0.54 

.54 

.56 

.58 

.59 

.59 

0.42 

.42 

.43 

.43 

.43 

.44 

0.70 

.70 

.74 

.73 

;76 

.77 

0.40 

.40 

.42 

.42 

.43 . 

'.43 

0-3" 
Tabla 3.5 Eff aesive decay cssssanss of 1-131 through 1-135 

la ehe tuaaa ehyraid as a function of age 

Age 

Tears C-131-

Eff acsiva Decay Cons tans (s j 

1-132 1-133 • 1-134 1-123 

Newborn 1.42-06 3.3E-03 9.7S-06 2.22-04 3.02-03' 

1.32-06 3.32-05 3.32-06 2.22-C4 3. 02-05 

1.32-06 3.52-05 9.32-06 2.22-04 

10 1.12-06 3.42-03 9.4Z-C6 2.22-04 2.92-05 

13 1.12-36 3.42-05 9.4E-06 i. 22-04 2.92-05 

Adult .12-06 3.4S-05 9.22-06 2.22-04 2.52-33 

D-23 
P.53 

3.2.5 Dasendenca of Thyroid Do3e Conversion Factor cn Age 

Tha age dependent thyroid doae eoaveraion factors fsr iodine 

iaocopes 1-131 through 1-135 have been calculated according ta 

Sq. (3.1) aad are presensed in cable 3.6. Ths age group waiea would 

receive ehe greaceae thyroid inhalation doae froa sn expoaure ts a 

given radioiodine activity concentration in air appears ts be 

comprised of nswbora babies whose dose conversion factor is frsa 1.5 

ts 2 tines greaser than the doae conversion factor far adults. 

Table 3.6 also indicates thae the variation of ehe doae conversion 

factar vith age is rasher saall, especially below eo the age of 10 

yeara. 

Aa ia tha ease of vnole body ;»—•• dose calculations, it ia 

aaataed chac the ehyraid dose equivalent in rsaa is equal eo the 

absorbed doae ia rads. 

4,0 Eesults 

Table 4.1 presents ehe eoabined care and eancaiaaenc inventory, 

A. (t), of nobis gases and halogens aa a function ef tiae after 

shutdown. The eonsainaenc leakage rase is aasased to be sera, and 

thus, cha decrease of tha radioiodine and noble gss inventories vith 

else is due only to radioactive decay. 

Hiaed on dasa ia table 4.1, table 4,2 presents the ratio of 

iodine ta noble gas inventory in the esasaisaens as a function of 

cine aftar shutdown and the iodine release fraction. Assuring a 
Tabla 3.6. Thyroid dose conversion factar 

aa a fuacsioa of age acd isdlna Isoeopa 

Age 

Tears 

lasalaclon Dosa Par Tnit Activity Exposure, 

rads 

Ci-sac/uJ 

2-131 1-132 1-133 1-134 1-133 

Xsvbota 450 22 120 11 45 

430 19 130 9.7 39 

5 

10 

400 

400 

13 

i s 

130 

UO 

9.4 

7.; 

15 

Adult 

380 

290 

14 .93 7.0 30 

5.5 

Maninua Age Croup 

liavbom 

.50 150 -o 

latio of y^nlnun 

Age Croup eo Adul: 

1.6 2.0 2.0 2.0 

:-4o 
Tabla 4.1 . Hobla gas and iodine iavenssry ia ehe reactor csra 

and eaneaiaaens as a fnaesisa of tlae* 

H a s After 

Shutdown 

(hr) 

. 0.0. 

1.0 

2.0 

3.0 

4.0 

6.0 

12.0 

Tseal Iodine 

Iavenssry 

(10a Ci) 

7.2 

5.6 

A-7 

4.1 

3.3 

.

 2

-

2 

2.4 

Tseal Noble Cas 

Iavenssry 

C10a Ci) 

3.7 

3.4 

3.2 

3.0 

2.9 

2.3 

2.5 

~3ased oa tha shutdown equilibriun cora inventory of a typical 

1,000 stfe- (2,200 iSfc) power raacnar and cere containment leakage ras 
o 

1 

tt 

V 

loillnu Uultiaau 

.... _o""ift£t_i«»»» 

1.0 

o.s 

0.2 5 

0 . 1 

0.0 5 

0.02 5 

0.0 1 

0.005 

0.01125 

0.0U1 

0.0005 • 

0.00025 

0.000 1 

Tulilo 4. 

0 . 0 

2 . 0 

0.9U 

.49 

. 2 0 

.0911 

.049 

.020 

.0090 

.1)049 

.0020 

.00090 

.00049 

.00020 

2. Iodine t o 

JodJno reieaae 

1.0 

1.6 

a.2 

. 4 1 

. 16 

.002 

.04 1 

.016 

.0002 

.004 1 

.0016 

.00002 

.00041 

.00016 

noble gau 

fructlu n 

act! 

and 

Tliou 

2 . 0 

l . S 

. 1 1 

.37 

.15 

.on 

.017 

.015 

.007 ) 

.0037 

.0015 

.00073 

.00037 

.00015 

U 

vlt y rati o 

tlu a utter 

-i 

oa a functio n 

ultutdoun 

afte r tibutdoun 

(l.r) 

i:!» 

1.4 

.60 

.34 

.14 

.060 

.034 

.014 

.0060 

.0034 

.0014 

.00060 

.00034 

.00014. 

A 

* 

(' 

r 

4 . 0 

1.3 

.66 

. 3 1 

.13 

.066 

.033 

.013 

.0066 

.0033 

.0013 

.00066 

.00033 

.00013 

i 

i 

; S 

ixt 

6 J) 

1.1 

.57 

. 2 9 

. 1 1 

.057 

.029 

.011 

.0057 

.0029 

.0011 

.00057 

.00029 

.00011 

i 

i 

i 

1 

12. 0 

. 9 6 

. 4 8 

.24 

.096 

.040 

.024 

.0096 

.0040 

.0024 

.00096 

.00040 

.00024 

.000096 

) 
radienuclide independent caatalaaent leakage rata and X/Q, this 

aould also be the ratio of iodlae ta noble gas release ratss aad 

4 

concentrations ia air. The release fraction of aobls gases is 

takea .ta be equal ta one. 3eeause of their alsilar cheaical 

properties, all iodlae isotopes are assuaed to have equal release 

fractions.. 

The values la table 4.2 indicate that the ratio of total 

iodines to scale gases varies frsa. approxiaately 2 at shutdown ts 1 

at 12 hours. At aa iodine release fraction equal ta 0.25, 

corresponding ta a design basla accident (£,£), thia ratio varies 

HTcm approxiaately 0.5 ta 0.25 over the 12-hour period after 

shctdswn. 

•4.1 Vhole 5edv Dose 

Table 4.2 presents the ratio of tha aeai-iaflaita aloud gaaaa 

dcse rate ts the coble gas concentration (ECC*) as a function af 

a 

tine aftar anutdsvn calculated in accordance with the aethods 

presented ia seetian 2.2.. at thia Appendix. Sines they are highly 

volatile, table gases resulting froa decay of the esre equllihriua 

4Although a particular iodlae fraction aay be released ta 

csstaiaaeat, deposltlea of the iodines ea surfaces aad the eperatioa. 

of aay engineered safsgcards ta reduce the alrtcrae aaacaatratlaas 

la eoctaiaaent would reduce the fraction ef r3diaiediaes released ta 

ths eavirocaeat. These factors will influence the correction 

faetara regarding ths ladlse ta astla gaa activity ratio aa 

discussed later. 

D-43 
P.58 

4.3. Saeia of noble gas gasaa doae ras 

2CC^. as a fssetioa of dse af1 

Tab-a -*.3. Saeia of noble gas gasaa doae rasa ea nabla gaa concentration, 

aftar shucdown 

2Cq 

aftar Shutdown ren/hr 

(hr) . Cl/a-> 

0 5.33*02 . iO 

1.3 5.0Z+02 

2.3 4.32+02 

3.3 3.7Z+02 

4.3 3.12+02 

6.5 2;2E-H32 _J 

12.3 I.2TH32 
P.59 

laveatsry ai radisisdlaes are assv=ed ts contribute ts the noble gas 

source tarn, and the ^»—-» dose rata also includes a coaponent froa 

Hb-38, which ia a daughter product of Sr-8S. Also, the tlae uaita 

ia HCC* have beea converted froa aeeoads ta hours. 

Figure 4.1 (figure 5.1 of Chapter 5) presents a graph ef tha 

projected vhoia body gaasa dose as a function ef gaasa dsse rata ia 

air acd the projected duration of exposure. The projected vhcia 

body dose is alapiy the result of aultlplylng the gaaaa dese rate ia 

air by tha projected exposure duration. Ths projected exposure 

duration ia in hours, aad the gaaaa dose rata is ia area/hr 

(10"3 rea/hr). The srdis3te ca the right, noble gas concentration 

in air, vas added by assuring a gaaaa dsse rats ta noble gas 

2 —/> -

ecacsntratiea ratio cf 3.1 x >0 •'•' •,"•• This particular value was 

C1/BJ 

calculated ta eorrespcad ta radiaauclide alxtures that would exist 

at 4.5 houra after reactor ahutdewn,. as indicated la table 4.3. For 

shutdown tiaes greater thaa 4.5 hours, thia ahcias cf 3GC" for 

n 

coble gases vill tend ta overestiaate the gaa a dose rats relative 

ts noble gas concentration. Ia instances of long decay periods 

vcere enly the lang lived tools rases reaaia, epuasisa 2.7 acd the 

gasaa decay energies listed in table 3*' aay be ••isetL ta calculate 

dcse rate aore accurately than those la figure 4.:. 

4.2 Thyr-eid Dcse 

The ratio of ths thyroid halatio n dose ta the total 

radioisdiaa csaaaatratian is air, (212), calculated by aethada 

—•essrtad

 ir ,oct*' •*— ~ r * -.*. *hia i—°—dir *9

 -'-a . *— ta^*

 a

 — •• 

as a faction cf tiae aftar ahutdewn at vnich expcsure begins, t_, 

3-45 
2 

:a5 

X X i. I l.l Mil 

K XXniii i 

7~ 

Iff4. 

1 

10*-

•«sr 

to tsz rats caAgg 

Tlae eSa paiae ?«oraa*meia-{ 3«aa 

radlamlim spoaoxa rxca (aaVhr) aea

 ! 

jewjactad liara-ita-i ai axpoaora Cora). 

Zsetaaf cSa ywjeesad ut».U body ioaa 

£?ss sSa cusvaa aecv*» aac b«iow sta 

patae. 

. y .'' ' -

 vi \ i \ • Vi i \ i t i ix„ \ i i i i i i r. i I I i i j- ij! 

x i x ix Xn ^ Xo-i M i MI i i i i i i i,i 

p 

r 

XI' XXPft. X^iUH I 1 I I Ml 

X l L X i -X

 ! 

" < '! • 

•&*• 

•i.a 

•7 

^i > S i • \ ; \ 

\ : \ I .Nj I I i I I W . !' \ ' \ l 'X. > I : ;N \ ' I ! i • i.i' I 

X i X i IXIMI X I- X N IXM X \ I 

X iXl X 

I i i LU 

X I XXI X XX I lii!i 

Kimxt KiMKX>^iiiiig-

•10-1 

•7 

r

4 

s 

•ia-2 : 

•7 " 

3 

2 -

• ',«, ' . k S L 

x. • x ;-

^s> \ i , \ i . . . • vj \ j N Ni ' II 'vJ 

iX~" 'X I .\ i I i i ' l \ i \ i\ ! 'Ni' 

i X I lX; Ml X>: X I 'N Mil X ! X~X iXij! I I "ml 

1

 !XMXi.. X -i\ j ihil X sXiWflS,:' 1 

•••"VNBJ -

: i 

^ ^

 ! j

-

! X ^ ' ^: 

I i l i ! H X ' N ;!; l X I X I N i ; I 

N 

l ! I lllili i 1X1 X X IXMXIB. 

NH - ixiC" 

.T-.zv.zia «: 

: 7 ;: :. : 

zzur. i'mr.Z'.zr. I'C-r.) 

:o :c 

"!;-jr» 4.1 '"oisetap1 •«!«!« sccv- taswa scse is i ^nrrien cf srana 

»xcosurs -its inc- rrsjKtw rjrstisn zf wcosurs 
("). . 

Table 4.4 . Il/itio of a child thyroid Inhalation doae to radlotodluo concentration, 

UIC. MU u function of tliua afte r reactor aliutdowu at which 

expouuro Iteglnu and thu luhalutlon expoaure duration (—;-,—T) 

y 

Time after 

uhuldoun 

at which 

uvpouure atartu 

(l») 

1.0 

2.0 

3.0 

4.0 

6.0 

12.0 

1.0/l.r 

5.0EI0S 

5.6EI05 

6.1KI05 

6.5EIOS 

7.1EI0S 

0.4EIO5 

2.0/hr 

9.0EIOS 

1.1EI06 

1.2EI06. 

1.3EI06 

1.4El06 

1.7EI06 

3.0/ht 

1.4EI06 

1.6EI06 

1.HEI06 

1.9EI06 

2.1EI06 

2.5EI06 

4.0/hr' 

1.9EI06 

2.IE106 

2.3KI06 

2.5EI06 

2.8E106 

3.3E106 

6.0/hr 

2.0EI06 

3.2EI06 

3.4E106 

3.7EI06 

4.IEI06 

4.9EI06 

12.0/hr 

5.2EI06 

5.9EI06 

6.SEI06 

7.OK106 

7.7EI06 

9.3EI06 

I I 

j ' 

i ; 

! i 
and the inhaiation erasure daraeiaa, t . the tine t is the 

itsa of the tiae after ihucdcvn as which release oescrs and she ?L«w 

travel das . the projected essoaure duration vould be deeessaaed by 

the sssssioaal seacus of the; engineered saxaey systeas or the vind 

directioa persistence ac cha tiae of the aeeidens. It ia aaaisaed 

thae aonicsrina. personnel vould be able co reach the projected 

essoaure poise such thae enviroeaencal seasuresests esuid be taken •=.** V 

», 

vithin approzcsacely 0.5 hours after plow arrival. A change in cha 

tine of saaauzeaent, 5 , of Q.5 bouts vaa found to change SIC by 

ae scat 10 percent ar. t equal to 1 hour and by 2 percent at t 

equal to 12 house. 

table 4.5 preaenea ehe 7ali.es of radioiodise concentration ia 

air vales vouid deliver a 5 rea thyroid inhalation dose to a cevbom _,,. 

baby (critical age jrous) aa a function of inhalaeiea tine and sin / 

difiarens tines after shutdown, vhen the expoaure is assuaed :s be 

seartad. these values vere obtained by dividing 5 rea by ehe ratio 

af projected thyroid dose cs radioiediss cssssssratisn, 220, and are 

plotted is figure 4.2. 

. . . . . . i 

.is vQuia ce aspsscas, zzz cescenaraci-cn :r raaicicamss 

required ts deliver a 5 rem thyroid cose decreases vich increase in 

"isa aster shutdown sicca cha short-lived isotopes decay, and chiy 

the 1eng-lived isotopes 1-121 and 1-122 (vith large dsse conversion 

factors) rssain in cha radioiodise sixsurs. 
<;. ) 

Tuhle 4.5. Hudloludluu concentration In air which would raault In a 5 reti thyroid Inhalation duuo 

to a child au a function of time after rouclor uhutdown, tu, at which 

expoauru hegluu and tha luhalatlou tlniu (Cl/w^) 

i 

Time ufter 

Shutdown, tu 

(hr) 

1.0 

2.0 

3.0 

4.0 

6.0 

12.0 

1.0/hr 2.0/hr 

lnhulutl 

3.0/hr 

on Time 

4.0/hr 

Radtulodlne concentration yielding S rem thyroid 

1.0E-05 

U.9U-06 

U.2E-06 

7.7E-06 

7.1E-06 

5.9E-06 

S.1E-06 

4.5E-06 

4.2E-06 

3.9E-06 

3.6E-06 

3.0E-O6 

3.5E-06 

3.1E-06 

2.BE-06 

2.6E-06 

2.4E 06 

2.0E-06 

2.6E-06 

2.3E-06 

2.1E-06 

2.0E-06 

1.0E-06 

1.5E-06 

6.0/hr 

doae to child 

l.BE-06 

1.6E-06 

1.5E-Q6 

1.4E-06 

1.2E-06 

1.0E-06 

12.0/hr 

(til/»3) 

9.5E-07 

1 

8.4E-07 

7.7E-07 

7.2E-07 

* 

6.SE-07 

S.4E-07 

I II 
P.64 

w 

mt 

aa 

mX 

All O 

?roj ected axsasura dumelon (br) 

'igure 4.1. Five res isodose Us e fsr child thyroid as a function -i 

radioiodine concentration ac tbe start cf arrosura, 

expoaura duration and tine after sbucdevc at vhich 

exposure begins, t . 

--;u 
Given a knovledge of the cine after reactor shutdown at vhich 

expoaure begins and ehe projected inhalation period, figure 4.2 say 

be uaed to determine the radioiodise concentraticn vhich vould 

deliver a 5 res dose to the thyroid by sispiy locating the ordinate 

of the appropriate t lise ae the projected inhalation else t . 

For any different thyroid doae the iodine concentration can be 

scaled linearly. ?sr exaaple, ii the pluae arrival tine at a given 

location were about 4 hours and the projected expoaure tiae vere 

alao 4 houra, the radioiodine eoneensracion vhich vould deliver a 5 

res thyroid inhalation doae co a child vould be equal ts 

—o 3 approximately 2 s 10 Ci/a of air. 

Figure 4.2 can alao be used ts project thyroid doaea baaed os 

radioiodine concentrations estiaated froa eoneainaent release rate 

and aeteorologieal conditions ae the tiae of the accident. However, 

figure 4,2 should sot be uaed co project inhalation doses froa 

single iodine isotopes because in its derivation a five eoaponene 

„^£^ES*arJBsef radioiodines has been assuaed. Fcr that purpose, the 

dose conversion factors listsd in table 3.5 nay be used (auitipiied 

- -J 

by 3.6 x 10" ts convert -jnits cf tine froa seconds tc hours). 

Similarly, figure 4.2 vould not be suitable fcr projecting thyroid 

doae ii the release oecssred froa a reactor that had been shut dovu, 

fsr a period such thae the shorter-lived isotopes of iodise had 

decayed. Is such a case, the dose conversion factor for iodine-131 

frm tabla 3.5 vould be sere ansrooriata. 

D-5i 
P.66 

the ratio of iodine ceneessraticn ts ehe seai-isfinita eleud 

gasaa doae rasa froa iodises and soble gaaea, 2IC*, vhich vas 

diacsaaed ia secsioa 2.2.2, ia presented in table 4.6 as a fuaesion 

of tine aftar reactor shuedows and iodise reieaae fraction, the 

increase of 2ZS* vith tiae is dae ts ehe decay of ehe short-lived. 

bus asergecic (is gasaa eaergy) £r-38, 1-132, and 1-134. 

the values is table 4.6 iadieasa thae ehe ratio of iodine 

eoeeentrseien ts seai-isfinite cloud gasaa dose raee frsa both sobla 

mat, 

gaaea aad iodines varies froa approxiaaeely 5 s 10 as. shutdown 

eo 1.3 x 10 as 12.5 hours. For an iodise release fraction equal 

to 0.25, thia ratio varies frea aperoxiaaealy 4 x 10 eo 

-4 

9 x 10 over a 12.5 hour period aftar shutdown. 

Figura 4.3 presents a graph of projected thyroid dose as a 

fssetioa of the projected tine period ef exposure and either the 

radioiodise concentraticn cr the gaasa doae rase in air. the 

ralacicasai? baeveea thyroid dose and radioiodine concentration vas 

established by selecting tha 5 ras. 'Lisa frsa figure A.2 vhich 

corresponds to a 4 hour period aftar reactor shusieve ac vhich 

exposure is assessed eo begin, this line vas chosen because ever an 

ishalasics perisd cf 12 hours, aii ehe ether lines are vithin;4 c 32 

persens range of ehe 4 hour lise. For different thyroid doses, ehe 

iodine cencenersties has bees sealed linearis. Fcr csnesseraeim 

3 
I ) 

V 

Xrl 

T<ilili! 4.6. Hut lo of IoJlnu concuntrutloii to total Iodine and nohla gua gauuua doae rata ua a function 

ol lodinu luleuua fraction und tluu ufter uhutdoun /*•£/]»;[_ \ 

\rcm/hr/ 

loilln.: Ilulouae 

l-'ructlou 

1.0 

0 . 5 

0.25 

0.1 

0.05 

0.025 

0.01 

0.005 

0.0025 

0.001 

0.0005 

0.00025 

0.0001 

0.0 (hr) 

6.OK-04 

5.IE-04 

4.0K-04 

2.4E-04 

1.5E-04 

B.2E 05 

3.5E-05 

l.UE-05 

9.IE 06 

3.7B-06 

l.UE-06 

9.2E-07 

3.7E-0/ 

Time ufler Shutdown 

1.5 (hr) 2.5 (hr) 3.5 (hr) 4.5 (hr) 6.5 (hr) I 12.5 (hr) 

lodinu concentrut Ion to \ doue rat e ratio /ci/w * \ 

\ rcut/hr / 

6.9E-04 

5.6E-04 

4.1E-04 

2.3B-04 

1.3E-04 

7.1E-A5 

3.0E-05 

1.5E-05 

7.6E-06 

3.1E-06 

I.5E-06 

7.7E-07 

3.1E-0/ 

7.6B-04 

6.2K-04 

4.5E-04 

2.5E-04 

1.4E-04 

7.6E-05 

3.2E-05 

1.6B-05 

0.2E-06 

3.3E-06 

1.6E-06 

0.2E-07 

3.3E-07 

8.4B-04 

6.UE-04 

4.9E-04 

2.7E-04 

1.6B-04 

0.4E-O5 

3.5E-05 

l.flE-05 

9.0E-06 

3.6E-06 

1.0E-06 

9.1E-07 

3.6E-07 

9.IE-04 

7.4E-04 

5.4E-04 

3.0B-04 

1.7E-04 

9.3E-05 

3.9E-05 

2.0E-05 

1.0E-05 

4.0E-06 

2.0E-06 

1.0E-06 

4.0E-O7 

1.0E-03 

0.5E-O4 

6.4B-04 

3.6E-04 

2.1E-04 

1.1E-04 

4.0E-O5 

2.4E 05 

1.2E-05 

4.9E-06 

2.5E-06 

1.2E-06 

5.0E-07 

1.3E-01 

1.1E-03 

tt.BE-04 

5.2E-04 

3.1E-04 

1.7E-04 

7.5E-05 

3.0E-O5 

1.9E-05 

7.UE-06 

3.9E-06 

2.0E-06 

7.0E-O7 

i ' 
P.68 

. 3 " 

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P.69 

ssasurements sade less than 4 hours after reactor shutdown, figure 

4.3 viii slightly overestiaate tha thyroid dose; aad for 

aaasureacnes sade sore than 4 hours after reactor shutdown, the dose 

viii be undereseiaaced. Figure 4.4 provides sn indication of the 

error invoived. the ordinate of this figure provides a correction 

factor. 

3ecause of shifts is wind direction, it is unlikely that 

thyroid inhalation doees wotsid be projeesed for cine periods beyond 

the range considered is table 4.2. Hovever, for those instances 

vhen that range sighs be exceeded, the lines save been extended frea 

0.1 to 30 hours is figure 4.3. 

the adult thyroid inhalation doses which have been indicated is 

figure 4.3 have been obtained by dividing the newborn infant doses 

by a factor of tvo, is accordance vith discussion is sectien 3.2.5 

of this Appendix, the use of the aaaa faeter fsr 1-131 as fsr the 

oeher iodise isotopes (see tabla 3.6) introduces an error is the 

adult dose of as aost 23 percent, vhich is veil vithin the 

uncertainty range of the overall dose projection nethod. 

As discussed previously, the iodine reisasa fraction vouid 

depend cs Che functional scstua of the engineered safaey systeas, 

acd significant fractions cf the esre inventory of radioiodines 

vould be expected to be released ts the esvirsssest only is chs aost 

severe types of accidents. Hovever, if, fsr the purpose of 

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:-«5 
P.71 

analysis, a G.23 iodine release fraction is assuaed , then cable 

4.5 indicates chat over a else period of 12.5 hours after reactor 

shusdovn the ratio of iodise concentration es elsud gasssa dose rasa 

is equal to 6 x 10 s 30 percent \rAm/nj)- Shis ratio has been 

used eo establish ehe functional dependence of thyroid inhalation 

dose on the garoa exsosure race is air, is area/hr, as indicated is 

figure 4.3. . FF 

Sinse she relationship besveeu garmia exposure raee in air and 

thyroid inhaiaeion dose in fignra 4.3 is baaed en the seai-infisit e 

eioud assisseien, ehe use of gaasa exposure raee frsa a finit e eleud 

to eacr-arn thyroid dsse by means of figure 4.3 vii i tend co 

s— underestimate ths thyroid dose, to compensate fsr-thia effect, the 

' ._ aeasured eioud gasssa exsosure rasa should be sulci?lied by the 

fiaisa pitas correction factor -plotted in figure 4.3 before being 

applied is figure 4.3 to estisaee projected thyroid dose, this 

factor, which has been plotted as a fuaeticn of distance frea 

• reactor and aesospherie stability elass, is eq^al to c^e racio of 

gasssa exposure race froe an infinite cloud co chat frost a finit e 

eioud, aa discussed in section 2.2.3 cf this Appendix. Ihe finite 

cloud correction faccor aay also be used cs reduce ehe vhola body 

gsesu dose frea a given noble gas concentration vhich has been 

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estisated by aeasa of figure 4.1. to do this, the estisated whole 

body dosa should be-divided by the finite elsud correction factor. 

Cbvlotisiy, whole body doae projections baaed on aeasureaeats of 

gasaa expcsure rare Is air should not be aodified. 

Is tha development of figure 4.3, the iodise reieaae fraction 

vaa aaaused ta ba Q.2S, and the noble gaa reieaae fraction vaa 

aaaused ts be 1.0. thia corresponds ts as iodise ts noble gaa ratio 

of about 0.3* 

Per aeeiderta ia vales tha iodise reieaae fraetlen cr the 

iodise ta noble gaa ratio la known ts ba different froa that vcisa 

has been aaauaed is preparation sf figure -1.3, a seecsd 

suitialieative correetisa factcr could be uaed ta correct the 

thyroid issalaticn doses projected en the baaia of aeaauresenta of 

gasaa dose rata la air and figure -1.3* Thia correetisa factar haa 

been plotted ia figure 4.5 aa a function of tha ratio cf iodise ta 

noble gaa activities , and haa been obtaiaed by diTidisr the ratio 

cf icdise ecacentratien ta gaasa dose rata at isdise reieaae 

fraetlen e^ual'to 0.25 by the ratio ef iodise cscsantratlon ts gasaa 

dsse rate at ether icdisa release fraeticns. Ths isdiss release 

eerreetlcn factor varies by at aost 23 pereent ever Che 12.5 hcur 

tfse period after reactsr ahutdewn, and ita value at 4. 5 hears haa' 

been selected fcr figure 4.5. 

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P.75 

3.0 Accuracy of 3ose Projection Methods 

The ealculaeioral aethods thae have been presented ere intended 

fsr uaa ia escisaeing projected population doea froa exposure ta the 

pluse. These doee projections would ba needed very quiekiy 

folloving eailecsion of cha data on vhich the calculations vould ba 

based. Therefore, niaerous assumptions have been aade ta reduce Che 

need for collection of different types of daea, and wish each 

aaauaption, tha poeancial exists for introduction of error. Several 

cutsactioa factor carves have bean provided co reduce ehe error for 

eases where daea sight be available to determine theee factors. 

In addition ts errors associated vith eaieulasional 

assumptions, there- is a poeancial for aajor eerors ia the dasa used 

aa a basis for the calculations. Both types of errors are 

eonsidersd. 

5.1 Calculational Zrrors Associacad vith Release Rate Assuaptions 

It has been assuaed thae the release viii be continuous and ae 

a constant sate. Ho eairelational error vould result froa this 

aasuspeica if chs release actually occurred in ehis sanner. 

Hovever, there are an infinite nuaber of release race 

characteristics that could occur. This introduces a poeancial error 

ia the issue daca vhich viii ba discussed later. 

0-31 
P.76 

5.2 Calculations! Irrwa Aaaeclatad with Asauaotieas on Helease 

Characteristics -'•••- • 

Matthoda have been provided for projecting dosa ta both the 

thyroid and ts tha wncle body baaed, en tao different types ef data. 

Ose type ef data vould be greaa airborne concentratlona, and the 

other would be gaaaa. exposure rata aeasureaeats. Data oa 

esacentratlcn could be froa either envlronsental aeaauresenta or 

frea calculations based, ts release rates, diataaea, aataeroiogleal 

eonditicsa, and wlstspeed. ^m ..^_ ^ _ mmZ - - >—c.^- ? 

5.2.1 Srrore is Vhtlg 3cev 3ose 

If whole body dese prelections- are baaed ea gasaa exposure .-ate 

aeaauresenta, the only aaausptica affeetlsg talsuiatisaai error 

would ba that of seetiag -exposure rata equal ts dese rata, vhies ia 

eeaaervatlve, by a faster of about 1..23. 

If the expoaure rata ia based ea noble gaa concentrations, a 

possible ealeuiatleaal «rrar factcr of s.S aver a iisa period sf 1 

Co 12*5 hours aftar shutdevT. tay be eaceustared because cf changes 

is the ecapositiea ef cha pluse resuicisg frea dspiatiea cf Cha 

shorter-Lived isotopes frea radioactive tecsy. 

Tha whole body gasaa exposure- rata aaaociated with aa airborne 

concentration ef noble gaaea and icdinss aa shovn is figure 4.f vas 

provided so perait the use of gasaa exposure rata seasurasenta ts 

satlsata projected thyroid dsse frea- Ishaiatics ef radisisdlnea. I: 

vaa tot intended fsr astisaciig gssra sxpesure -tea frea grtss 

J 

3~5; 
P.77 

concentration seasureaencs or calculations. However, by appropriate 

use of correction factsrs provided ia figures 4.4, 4.,5, and 4.6, one 

eould eseiaate exposure rasa froa gross concentration daea. The 

error associated with eha calculations would be prisiariiy associated 

with the accuracy of ehe daea used eo obtain correction factsrs and 

not with assumptions regarding sixturee of. iodines and noble gases 

in cha release. 

Aa additional consideration for whole body dose would be the 

contribution froa particulate aaterials. Baaed on information ia 

reference (32), airborne particulate aaterials would esstribute 

about 20 percent of the external dose frsa the place with the 

remaining being contributed by iodines and noble gases. This eould 

cause the whole body dose projections based en concentrations of 

iodiaes and soble gases in air eo be about 20 percent low. 

2*2.2 Sisurs in Thyroid Dose 

Two aethods of projecting thyroid inhalation dose are 

provided. Cne aethod uses gross iodine eoneentration as a basis, 

and the ocher uses gasaa exposure rate daca as a basis. 

The relative abundance cf Che diffarant isoespes of iodine 

changes as a function of tiae aftar shusdovn vhich changes cha dose 

conversion factor. If Che correction factor curves are used to 

eorreet this' error, there should noe be significant error assoeiaeed 

wich changing characteristics due ts decay of short-lived isotopes 
P.78 

prior es sears of exposure. However, 4 gap releasa aa apposed ts t 

core salt releasa could cause' cha iodise aix ta have a relative 

concentration of iodise-111 higher thaa aaaxmatd due cs ehe decay of 

short-lived isotopes during cha. process of leaching frea ehe fuel 

pallaes ss she gaps. This could cause thyroid dose projections frea 

gap releases ta ba usdereseisaeed by a aaxiaisa of about 30 persens. 

Tha uaa of gasaa exposure race aeasureaeats eo project ehyroid 

dose requires assua?tiens regarding she characteristics of ehe 

release, and if she characteristics are different thaa assuaed, ehe 

resulcing dose esstsates could include large errors. This vould soe 

b« the preferred data base fsr eseiaaeisg ehyroid dose bus eould be 

used ii iodise esaseasrasics data vere soe available. To rsduca the 

error involved, correction factor charts fsr isotonic csapositien 

have been included aa figures 4.4 and 4.a. If daea are availabia co 

perait determination of these correction fassors, the only 

significant errors should be. a possible 20 percent usdarascisaca 

associated wish a gap release aa discussed above snd a possible "0 

percent oversscisata frea particulats nacariai contribution co £=sa 

exposure rata. 

5.3 Srrors Assoeiasad -rich -nous Oata 

Daca will ba collected uader pressure of eaergeaey conditions, 

aad the associated errors say severely affset ehe accuracy cf dose 

prejaeeicn. Irrers caused by inaccurate caca raiasing zz (I) 
P.79 

eavironaantal levels as a fuaesion of tiae, (2) the duration of 

esposura, or (2) the radiolesieai characteristics es the release 

eould seriously affect the dosa-projection results. Additional 

errors esa ba aaaociated with iafessation on windspeed aad 

direction, ataospherie stability, precipitation, aad with 

interpretation of iascruaeacatioa readiags. 

3.3.1 Duration of issosura 

To project doae based on concentrations or exposure rates, ic 

is always necessary to '.enow the duration of exposure. It haa been 

aastaad fsr purposes cf chase caieaiaeioas chat chis parsaeter viii 

be known, whea in fact the duration-night range frea a value of caro 

due to errors ia wind direction daca or co a value equal ca the 

duratioa of release if wind direction ia persistent ia the predicted 

direction. The resultiag error ia the projected dose eould be 

either positive or negative and would be proportional co she error 

ia the estiaated duration except as affected by ehe changes ia 

concentraticn as a function of tiae. It is noe possible ts put 

bounds on ehis ssurss ef error. 

5.3.2 Errors in ?.aleasg Rata Data 

The release rasa csuid have assy diffaraas characteristics due 

ts pressure transients caused by changes in ehe csra conditions, 

operation of engineered safeguards, or changes in eoneainaent 

integrity. These conditions could introduce one sr ncre ordars cf 

nagnitude errors in ehe projected dose depending on vhsthsr cha data 

D-5i 
P.80 

foraicg ehe basis for dose projection ware ebeaiasd frea' a high or 

lev poiat ia the transient. This error could be reduced by frequent 

updating ef dasa. 

5.3.3 Srrors ia Daea on ?.elaase Characteristics 

If gaaaa dose races are used cs aseiaacs projected ehyroid 

inhalation doses, correction factor curves are provided vhich 

ueiiisa tha raiaeive aaouacs of iodises aad soble gases ia chs ' . 

release. If ehe dasa are eoe available cs perait use of chese 

csrreesicc factors, arrors could be issrcducad ia projected ehyroid 

doses ranging frea a factcr of 2 too lew es a factor of ICO ar sora 

coo high. 

5.3.4 Srrars is Saviramaaatai Seasuresests and 'afaraaticn 

isvirocaencai iafossasica would iaslude js=a radiation "*"\ 

exposure rats, airborne concentrations oc radioactive uatariai, 

acaospherie seabilisy class, windspeed, ass predicted nesaorsiagicai 

condisiens. 

heasuraaencs of axporurs ratss and csncaneracicns vcuic be 

raprasecsacive af a particular laeatien ac a particular cine, and 

they say nee represent richer ehe average or -"•'•"-' eesditiens at 

chae iocaeiou. Lavels at a particular location viii change as a 

function of eiaa depending on wind direction stability, localised 

dispersion conditions, and fluctuaeiens ia reiaase rats. "To liaits 

can be assigned co ehe errors assoeiasad vith such aeasureaests, but 

ehay csuid aasil/ /ary ovar 1 :r sera srdars tt nssrieuca. 
P.81 

5.4 Surmarv 

A suaaary of the poeeneial errors associated with dosa 

projection aachods presented here is provided in tabla 2.1. The 

poeeneial error faetors are vaiuas that eould ba divided into the 

calculated dosa ts gee tha true dose. Due es ehe aany unknowns 

associated wich input data and inforaation, ic is not possible to 

assign limits eo cha poeeneial errors. However, ie is apparent thae 

Che potential errors associated wish inaccurate input daea overvhela 

those associated wish calculational assumptions, and therefore, 

further refinement of assuaptions dees not appear co be necessary. 

D-o7 
Tabla 5.1. Satlsatad errors aaaeelatad with dese caleulatioa saehoda 

P.82 

Calcalatlsnal Aaauaptlsaa 

Aaauastlaa 

Whole body deaa rata. 

equals exposure rata 

Vhole body dose rata 

froa noBle gaa 

cencaatrattiea ia net a 

function of the si^ture 

over a 1 ta '2 hr period 

Whole body doae rata 

frea alxture of' sobla 

Saaea =md iodises ia tot 

influenced by 

particulates is tha 

pluae 

Thyrcid desa will tst 

ba influenced ty a 

ccncsscratlcn aarichsd 

is I-*31 

Potential 

Srror 

Factor 

1*33 

sC.5a 

1 ta 0.3 

1 ts 0.7 

Input Data 

Type of Data 

Duration af expcsure 

eatisatea 

Helease rata 

2eleaaa characteristics 

isvlronssstal 

seasuresests asd 

Potential 

ji'ror 

Facto? 

unknown 

0.1 ta 70 

sore sr lass 

• tl ta 100 

sere er lass 

0.0:1 ta 100 

aTha uae of these pre^ecsien nathocs far tobia gases which had decayed 

fcr veeia cs tenths (aa nlgnt be Chs case fcr accidental reiaaaea frea^vaats 

gaa decay Casks) could cause sverestisatea ef Cha whole bedy dese by a factor 

of 10 er aore. 

D~53 
P.83 

RLS"s~gNC3S 

U ) ISTSSHAnCNAL CCKSCSSION CN RADIATION UNITS Aim «£ASU222NTS * 

"* ICSU Report 19. Sadiasion quaaeities and Units. International 

Coaaisaien on Radiation Units aad Measurements, Washington, 

D.C. 20014 (July 1, 1971). 

(2) 21C3A2DSCN, A. C. 3. "Tha 3istoric Devalopaent of Concepts of 

~ Radiation Doae Cctsoisseas." Snvironaancal Protection Agency, 

Offies of Sadiation Programs, Washington, D.C. 20460. 

Published in the Proceedings of the Eighth Midyear Topical 

Syoposiua of she Health Physics Society (October 1974). 

(2) U.S. tNVT30NKEStAL PSCTSCT2CN AC2NC7. 40 CTl 190, 

"~ laviroaaental Radiation Protection Raquireaeaes for Noraal 

Operation* of Activities ia the Uranius Fuel Cycle, Final 

Znvironaencai Stataaent. Zaviroaaeatal Protection Agency, 

Office of ladiaeion Pragmas, Washington, D.C. 20460 

(November 1976). 

(4) U.S. AXC2GC ENE2G7 C3KKISSI0N. Regulatory Guide 1.3. 

"* Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radioiogisai 

Consequences of a loss of Coolant Accident for Soiling Water 

Reactors. Directorate of Regulatory Standards, Nuclear 

Regulatory Ccaaissisn, Washington, D.C. 20555 (June 1972). 

(5) U.S. ATOXIC HSZ2C7 COMMISSION. Regulattery Cuida 1.4. 

" Aastapeisns Used for Evaluating tha Potential Radiological 

Consequences of a- Loss of Coolant Accident fsr Pressurised 

Waser Reactors. Directorate of Regulatory Seasdares, Nuclear 

Regulatory Csssaissien, Washiagtsn, D.C. 20555 (Juae 1973). 

(a) D'. SLA3E, ed. "Meteorology aad Atomic Energy - 1963," U.S. AZC 

~ Report TT3-24190. Environmental Science Services 

Acaiaiacraeion, Air Resources Labs (July 1963). 

(7) U.S. NUCLZA3. RSCULATCST CCMMISSION. Reactor Safety Study: As 

Assessaeas of Accident Risks ia U.S. Cccsereial Nuclear Power 

Plants, WASE-14C0 (SU?.£S-75/Q14), Appendix 71, Calculation af 

Reactor Accident Consequences. Suclaar Regulatory Coaaission, 

Washington, D.C. 20555 (October 1975). 

(3) S2C2A23SCN, L. C. "User's Manual for Che Fortran Version of 

RSAC - A Radiological Safety Analysis Coapucar Prograa," 

ITO-17261, AZC Research- aad Develooaent Report, hatheaatics and 

Computers, Health aad Safety, TT3-4500 (Juae 1963). 

D-69 
P.84 

(?) AJBJC, C 3 . ASS M» --• 2032.. The Effectiveness of She!earing as 

"" a Procaetivfj Measure Against Suclaar Accidents Involving 

&as«ous Releases-. Pacific-Sierra Research Csrporaeioa, 

prepared' fs r She U.S. Esvirsttsmatal Protection Agency, Contract 

Ua. 63-01-3223 (Deceaber 1975). 

(10) E3CT.A.YC, t* 2>. JxSO 2. 2Y SCSNT23. "S3DF/3-I7 ?ission-?raducs 

"~" Files: Surssary of Major Nuclide Daea," Los Aiaaos Seiansifi c 

Laboratory of the Uaiversity cf California, Haeiouai Technical 

lafarsacica Serriea,. Soriagfiaid, Virginia 22151 

(Qershas 1973). 

(11) 3T3SNAJT0NAL, CCXKISSICN CN RADIOLOGICAL FS0T5CTI0N. "Report 

~~ of the Task Croup on Rafarence Man," ICS? Publication 23, 

Per.gamon Press, Saw Torie (1975). 

(12) FTSZSa, S. D. iSD C. J. CARS. "Iodise ia Foods; Cheaical 

Methodology i-zs. Soureas .af Iodine in the Sun an Diee." Contract 

So. F2A 71-254 prepares; for Division of Nutrition, 3uraau of 

Foods, FDA. Federation af American Soeiaeias af Experiaental 

3iology, 3eehssda, Maryland (1974). 

(13) 322SCN, S. A. "Faehways of Isdina Meeaboiiaa," Aaeriean 

Journal of Medicine, 20:653-663 (1956). ; 

(W COTC, T. 3. , D. A. FISHES, W. M. MeCCNASTf, AOT C. S. THOMPSON. 

"Iodise Intake ia ehe United Staeas: A Reassessment, J. Clin. 

Zsdccriaol, 30:659-663 (1970). 

(13) C2AZSCN, R. J. "Factors Which lafluenee ehe Radioactive Iodine 

Thyroid Upcaka Tase," Aaarieaa Journal of Medicine, 23:297-415 

(1960). ~~ 

!, 

(IS) 3L2M, M. AOT R. CEANESA. lowe r Normal Values far

 iZlZ 

Thyroid Upcaka. .lot Reiacad so the Ingescion af Whica 3r3ad,'' . 

Journal of Nuclear Medicine, ^.-743.-745 (1970).. 

(17) CA7LA.I, R. 2. AuQ- R. SUJAS. "Thyroid Uptake oi Radioactive 

Icaise : A Reevaiuasiau," J., iaericaa Medicine Associatian, 

215:Sla-vl3 (1971). 

(1£) A1AZ3AZI, N. F., 5. Z. 3ALFS23, AND W. L. ASH3C2N. "A 

Reevaluation of

 i3l I Thyroid Uaeaka," Radial. 105:611-614 

(1972). 

3-70 
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