RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0100-17T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JERRY A. JONES,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

Submitted October 16, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Rothstadt and Natali.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Union County, Indictment No. 12-12-0865.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Amira R. Scurato, Designated Counsel; 

William P. Welaj, on the brief).

Michael A. Monahan, Acting Union County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Milton S. 

Leibowitz, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 26, 2018
2

A-0100-17T3

Defendant Jerry A. Jones appeals from a July 31, 2017 order denying his 

petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We 

affirm.

On March 1, 2013, by negotiated agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to 

one first-degree and two second-degree sexual assault offenses, and one fourthdegree count of criminal sexual contact. The State agreed to dismiss the 

remaining twenty-one counts of the indictment and recommended an aggregate 

thirteen-year term in prison subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

7.2. Defendant appealed and an excessive sentencing panel affirmed defendant's 

sentence. State v. Jones, No. A-0644-13 (App. Div. Jan. 14, 2014). 

On June 9, 2016, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition and an amended 

petition on February 15, 2017, which he supplemented by appointed PCR 

counsel's February 6, 2017 brief and May 1, 2017 letter. Before the PCR court,

defendant maintained he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and was 

"innocent of [the] charges . . . [but] was coerced by trial counsel to plead guilty." 

PCR counsel added that defendant was denied effective assistance because 

"[trial] counsel failed to competently prepare defendant's case" and "conduct a 

full and complete pre-trial investigation", including interviewing witnesses, 

which would have demonstrated that a guilty plea was unwarranted.
3

A-0100-17T3

Further, in his May 1, 2017 letter to the PCR court, PCR counsel asserted 

that defendant's petition should be granted because "he established a colorable 

claim of innocence and he has strong grounds to withdraw his plea" under the 

test set forth in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009). At oral argument, however, 

PCR counsel explicitly advised the court that he was not making a motion to 

retract defendant's guilty plea but merely cited Slater "in conjunction with the 

argument that the guilty plea [was not] voluntary." 

The PCR court denied defendant's petition for reasons detailed in a

comprehensive oral decision. The court noted that defendant failed to present 

any evidence, by way of certification or otherwise, to support his claim that trial 

counsel failed to investigate his case. As to defendant's claim that trial counsel 

failed to interview central witnesses, the court noted that defendant failed to 

identify specifically any such witnesses. Further, the court explained that 

defendant's claim that he was coerced into pleading guilty was nothing more 

than a bald, unsupported allegation and was belied by the plea colloquy where

defendant admitted his guilt, gave a detailed factual basis for the crimes, stated 

his plea was given voluntarily without coercion, and was satisfied with his 

counsel's representation. The court also denied defendant's request for an 

evidentiary hearing. 
4

A-0100-17T3

Defendant appeals, arguing:

POINT I

THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF COURT ERRED 

IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR 

POST CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT 

AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE 

FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL 

REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL.

We find insufficient merit in defendant's arguments to warrant extended 

discussion in a written opinion, Rule 2:11-3(e)(2), and add only the following 

brief comments.

As for defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective because he was 

unprepared for trial and coerced him to enter the plea, the PCR court correctly 

applied the Strickland/Fritz1test and concluded that defendant only made 

unsupported assertions expressing his subjective belief about the state of 

counsel's preparation. Defendant failed to supply a certification that specifically 

identified anything in the record that established a prima facie case of 

ineffectiveness or otherwise suggested the need for an evidentiary hearing. See

State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997). 

 

1 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J.

42, 58 (1987).
5

A-0100-17T3

Further, defendant's claim that counsel coerced his guilty plea is belied by 

the colloquy between the trial court and defendant during the plea hearing. The 

trial judge patiently and carefully reviewed the matter with defendant who 

acknowledged that he understood he was waiving his right to trial. Defendant 

also affirmed that no one forced him to enter into the plea agreement or to plead 

guilty. 

Finally, defendant's reliance on Slater is misplaced. A motion to withdraw 

a guilty plea must be made before sentencing, "but the court may permit it to be 

made thereafter to correct a manifest injustice." R. 3:21-1. Here, defendant 

never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and when the PCR court inquired 

of PCR counsel if his May 1, 2017 letter was a request by defendant to withdraw 

his plea, PCR counsel explicitly stated it was not. Thus, we reject any attempt 

by defendant to raise the issue for the first time on appeal. Zaman v. Felton, 

219 N.J. 199, 226-27 (2014). 

However, even were we to address the issue substantively, our review of 

the record confirms there is no basis under Slater to vacate defendant's plea. 

Nowhere in the record does defendant establish a colorable claim of innocence

and as we have detailed, any claim that defendant was coerced into entering his 

plea is baseless. Finally, the plea was on extremely favorable terms for 
6

A-0100-17T3

defendant. Thus, neither Slater nor Strickland/Fritz provide any support for 

defendant to withdraw his negotiated plea.

Affirmed.