U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

55–156 PDF 2010

S. HRG. 111–291 

COUNTERING THE THREAT OF 

FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Craddock, GEN John, U.S. Army (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander– 

Europe, Myrtle Beach, SC ................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Crocker, Hon. Ryan, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and Pakistan, U.S. 

Charge ́ d’Affaires to Afghanistan, Department of State, Spokane, WA .......... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Hosseini, Khaled, U.S. Envoy for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR), San Jose, CA ...................................................................................... 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 23 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1 

Lockhart, Clare, cofounder and director, Institute of State Effectiveness, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Russell D. 

Feingold ......................................................................................................... 52 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3 

(III)

(1) 

COUNTERING THE THREAT OF FAILURE IN 

AFGHANISTAN 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Casey, Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Lugar, Corker, Isakson, Barasso, and Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

Let me explain to folks that originally this hearing had been set 

for 10 o’clock today. It is our hope that somewhere around 10 

o’clock we will have a quorum so that the Foreign Relations Committee can conduct its business meeting. We have some nominations business to report out. So, I hope colleagues, and their staffs 

particularly, can ensure that if we aim for 10 o’clock, it can be a 

very, very minimalist requirement on everybody’s time. 

Meanwhile, we will go into the substance of today’s hearing; the 

second in a series of hearings that we’re going to have with respect 

to Afghanistan. Yesterday was the first hearing. We heard three 

compelling cases, each of them making strong arguments, individually, for how America should proceed. And the prescriptions 

ranged from dramatically reducing the footprint to expanding our 

commitment of troops and money to a level that would basically 

constitute pretty significant nation-building. 

John Nagl, a coauthor of the military’s counterinsurgency manual—who worked very closely with General Petraeus—argued that 

victory could require as many as—according to the Field Manual 

for standard counterinsurgency operations—600,000 troops and a 

commitment of at least 5 years. The bulk of those troops—up to 

400,000—would eventually be Afghan. But, it was clear, and 

stated, that United States forces would be needed for years as 

trainers, as combat mentors, in order to fill the security gap before 

the Afghans were able to take over. 

Stephen Biddle argued that the benefits of a stepped-up counterinsurgency campaign outweighed the costs, but that it was a very 

close call. He acknowledged both the need for more troops and the 

genuine possibility of failure, even if we do up the ante. In his 

view, there could be no effective counterterrorism without an effecVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:27 Mar 03, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\AFGH0917.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
2 

tive counterinsurgency. And he agreed with Dr. Nagl about the 

need for significant United States military involvement in Afghanistan to help prevent the destabilization of the country—of Pakistan. 

Finally, Rory Stewart challenged key assumptions of the administration’s policy. Instead of escalation, he recommended that we 

maintain a small counterterrorism capacity to deny a safe haven 

to al-Qaeda, and continue providing development aid on a low-key, 

but long-term, basis. He argued that we need not physically block 

al-Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan, we just have to keep 

Afghanistan from providing al-Qaeda with conditions of security 

and operational ease that they couldn’t get in Pakistan, Somalia, 

Yemen, or elsewhere. He argued that Pakistan would stand or fall 

on its own, regardless of events across the border. 

Listening to these distinguished experts argue their cases, and 

listening to the important and, I think, very penetrating questions 

of my colleagues, it was obvious that there are fundamental disagreements that need to be resolved in order to try to build a consensus around a policy for going forward in Afghanistan. Despite 

the differences, I believe there are some central truths on which we 

can all agree. 

First, we need a winning civilian strategy. I’ve said repeatedly 

that we will not force the surrender of the Taliban by military force 

alone. Therefore, any strategy that lacks a strong civilian component is doomed. 

Second, our greatest national priority here is to ensure that 

Afghanistan does not destabilize Pakistan. As we debate how to 

succeed in Afghanistan, we must evaluate the impact of every decision on our beleaguered allies in Islamabad. 

But, history tells us that the challenge is not only from the East. 

Afghanistan shares a 1,300-mile northern border with Central 

Asian countries that have suffered from instability themselves. 

Iran and Russia have also—have vested interests in Afghanistan. 

Unless we find common ground with them, I would think that we 

will continue competing instead of cooperating. 

Third, we need to counter the growing narcotics problem. As we 

described in a committee report released last month, senior military and civilian officials believe it will be extremely difficult to defeat the Taliban and establish good government without disrupting 

Afghanistan’s opium trade. Afghanistan supplies more than 90 percent of the world’s heroin and generates about $3 billion a year in 

profits; money that helps to finance the Taliban and other militant 

groups. 

We need to be realistic and pragmatic. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan 

is not a ‘‘reconstruction’’ project. It is a ‘‘construction’’ project in one 

of the poorest and most corrupt countries in the world. We have to 

come up with concrete goals, and be clear about what and how 

much we are prepared to do to achieve them. 

I might add, there may well be a fourth thing on which we can 

agree, and that is that the problem of governance may even be in 

fact, more serious than the challenge of the Taliban. And many 

people suggest, and I’m not sure it isn’t now becoming more clear, 

that the absence of governance, the inadequacy of governance, the 

corruption of the governance in Afghanistan is perhaps one of the 

3 

most demoralizing and defeating components of what may drive 

some people to the Taliban or elsewhere. And that is something we 

need to address. 

Today, we welcome four witnesses who will take us deeper into 

this debate by sharing their ideas for what should change on the 

ground in order to succeed in Afghanistan. I might say three of 

them have traveled a very long distance, and we are very, very 

appreciative. Dr.—the Honorable Ambassador Ryan Crocker flew 

from the west coast to be here just for this. And General Craddock 

drove all the way up from North Carolina to be here. And I’m not 

sure of everybody else’s travel arrangements, but we’re enormously 

appreciative for everybody being here. 

We’re going to hear from General Craddock first. He was the 

Supreme Allied Commander–Europe until a couple of months ago, 

when he retired from the Army. He will be followed by Ambassador 

Ryan Crocker, our former Ambassador to Iraq and Pakistan, and 

Charge ́ in Kabul. And there are probably very few people who have 

as much understanding and experience in this region and in these 

challenges as Ambassador Crocker. Ms. Clare Lockhart, the 

coauthor of ‘‘Fixing Failed States,’’ and a former adviser to the 

Afghan Government, will discuss her recommendations for a successful civilian strategy. And finally, Dr. Khaled Hosseini, the wellknown author of ‘‘The Kite Runner’’ and ‘‘A Thousand Splendid 

Suns,’’ who has just returned from Afghanistan as U.N. Special 

Envoy for Refugee Issues. 

And we’re delighted that each of you could be here with us today. 

Thank you. 

Senator Lugar. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Since President Obama’s inauguration, his administration has 

taken a series of steps to reorder American foreign policy priorities. 

The President identified the war in Afghanistan as his administration’s highest combat priority, and has thus shifted emphasis and 

resources from Iraq to Afghanistan and Operation Enduring Freedom. He argued that the United States effort in Afghanistan had 

been neglected in favor of our intervention in Iraq. President 

Obama made an important effort to sustain continuity of command 

and control of our Defense Department at the highest levels by 

retaining an effective and respected Secretary of Defense and promoting General Petraeus from Commander of United States forces 

in Iraq to Commander of Central Command, where he heads our 

military efforts across the region. Both men have identified civilmilitary coordination as essential for progress toward U.S. goals in 

the region. 

At a more operational level, President Obama named Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as special representative for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. He leads our strategic engagement with the governments of the region while our able Ambassadors, Ann Patterson in 

Pakistan and Karl Eikenberry in Afghanistan, work tirelessly in 

carrying out their respective duties. 

4 

The U.S. diplomatic effort is joined in cause by ADM Mike 

Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Beyond his responsibility for 

assuring the fitness and readiness of our fighting forces worldwide, 

he is closely engaged in the delicate and essential security discussions across South Asia. In his many visits to Pakistan, India, and 

Afghanistan Admiral Mullen has worked to forge a closer, more 

confident relationship between our Government and each of theirs. 

These leaders are seized of our commitment to Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, and strengthening the foundations for stability. They, 

along with Secretary of State Clinton, National Security Advisor 

James Jones, and Vice President Biden, are together in the final 

stages of a crucial review of our strategies and policies in the 

region. 

But, the President is the Commander in Chief and he is the one 

who will make the final choices from the options he is presented. 

It is widely hoped that he will produce a coherent operational strategy for United States engagement in Afghanistan. Such an integrated strategy has yet to be unveiled, despite the many high- and 

low-level reviews, and none has been described by the President 

with the force and conviction necessary to persuade the American 

people to endorse what will likely be a much longer, albeit necessary, commitment to achieve stability in the region. 

As he formulates his new strategy, I strongly urge the President 

to make a concerted effort to work personally with the Congress, 

which will control the purse strings for our endeavors in the region. 

We in Congress have heard of general outlines of an approach to 

the region, highlighted by the President and his senior advisers in 

March of this year, namely that we intend to, ‘‘disrupt, dismantle, 

and defeat’’ al-Qaeda and their allies. 

We have also received extensive requests and notifications, 

through several supplemental appropriations and the fiscal year 

2010 budget requests, identifying billions of dollars in assistance 

and operations funding for Afghanistan and the region. But, many 

questions have arisen surrounding troop levels, civilian force levels, 

and contractor roles and behavior. And considering the important 

role of development for the region, I’m troubled that there is still 

no USAID administrator. As a member of both this committee and 

the Agriculture Committee, I’m concerned about reports that $170 

million in USAID money will be transferred to the Department of 

Agriculture to develop an expeditionary agricultural development 

capacity for Afghanistan. This, I believe, is normally the job of 

USAID. 

For the moment, the committee has been informed that General 

McChrystal’s suggestions for a future strategy and tactics are being 

studied in the administration. We are led to believe that after the 

administration has studied the McChrystal report for an indefinite 

period of time, the General may suggest appropriate troop levels 

for the United States and our NATO allies necessary to achieve the 

administration’s final decision on objectives. 

The committee hearings this week offered the administration an 

opportunity to explain the challenges and difficult decisions to be 

made after nearly a year of study. Invitations were issued, but they 

were declined. Thus, we have turned today to key actors and 

former officials experienced in government, war zones, AfghaniVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:27 Mar 03, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\AFGH0917.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
5 

stan, and the region, to provide their insight and recommendations. 

We are deeply grateful they have accepted our invitation to present 

timely information to our committee and to all Americans in an 

extensively covered public forum. I hope that the administration 

will soon decide on the time for its views to reach the American 

people. 

In any event, it is critical that the full force and voice of the 

President lead the discussion around this national strategic priority 

with so many American lives and hundreds of billions of dollars at 

stake. Only he can lay the foundation that will gain the confidence 

of Congress and our soldiers, development experts, diplomats, and 

partners. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

We’re going to begin with General Craddock and run right across 

the table. So, General, if you would be good enough—your full testimonies will be placed in the record as if read in full, so if you could 

summarize in approximately 5 minutes or so, it would be helpful, 

and then we could have more time for discussion. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN CRADDOCK, U.S. ARMY (RET.), 

FORMER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER–EUROPE, MYRTLE 

BEACH, SC 

General CRADDOCK. Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member 

Lugar—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just comment, we need five more Senators, if we can get them here, for the quorum, and we’ll be in good 

shape. 

Thank you, General. 

General CRADDOCK. Thank you for the opportunity to appear 

before you here today. I think the focus of this hearing—Afghanistan—is important, timely, and essential. As I’ve been requested to 

provide insight on the counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, I 

will focus my short opening remarks in that area. 

Before exploring the counternarcotics challenge, I would like to 

emphasize that the NATO commitment to Afghanistan, as an alliance, is strong. I would also point out that the commitment differs 

among individual NATO members. Continued U.S. leadership in 

this mission is essential to both deepen the level of support of 

NATO and to ensure continued participation of all alliance members. 

With regard to the issue of counternarcotics in Afghanistan, may 

I preface my comments and responses to your later questions with 

the understanding that my perspective is from my last assignment 

on Active Duty with the United States Armed Forces, that of the 

Supreme Allied Commander–Europe: a NATO perspective. 

In October 2006, NATO assumed responsibility for the security 

for the entire country of Afghanistan. The authority to do so was 

provided to the Supreme Allied Commander by the North Atlantic 

Council. The means of granting that authority was through the 

Council’s approval of the NATO military operations plan for 

Afghanistan. The strategic operations plan contains specific instructions, to all subordinate commands responsible for conducting 

operations in Afghanistan, concerning counternarcotics operations. 

6 

Specifically, NATO forces were not to conduct counternarcotics operations or activities, to include eradication of poppy crops. What 

was permitted was support to the Afghan counternarcotics forces. 

Support in terms of information, intelligence, logistic support, and, 

if required, in extremis support and medical support for Afghan 

counternarcotics forces, all upon request by those forces. 

In February 2007, the current intelligence assessments, discussions with Afghan authorities, and consultations with United Kingdom and United States counternarcotics authorities all combined to 

establish a strong link between the narcotics traffickers and the 

Afghan insurgents, particularly the Taliban. A growing body of evidence indicated that much of the funding of the Taliban insurgency 

was being generated by the narcotics industry in Afghanistan. U.N. 

experts estimated upward of $200 million narcodollars going into 

insurgent coffers. It was at that point, as the strategic commander, 

I began to urge for the approval of additional authorities for NATO 

forces in Afghanistan to conduct operations against both narcotics 

facilities and facilitators. Our assessment was that reducing the 

money available to the insurgents would make it more difficult for 

them to hire soldiers, pay bomb and improvised explosive device— 

the IED makers, and buy weapons and materiel. All were essential 

in reducing the level of violence and providing enhanced security. 

And it was not until November 2008, some 18 months later, that 

NATO, via a defense ministerial meeting, approved these additional authorities. The ministers concluded, the preponderance of 

evidence to that date supported the assessments that the narcotraffickers were providing support to the insurgency. Subsequent guidance and orders were issued, and NATO forces began using these 

expanded authorities. As of mid-June this year, some 25 counternarcotics operations have been conducted, either by NATO forces 

alone or in conjunction with Afghan counternarcotics forces, with 

favorable results. 

Many processing facilities, the laboratories, have been destroyed, 

precursor material confiscated and destroyed, opium paste and 

refined heroin confiscated, and personnel apprehended. 

While much has been accomplished, much more remains to be 

done. 

First and foremost, NATO ISAF forces must continue to conduct 

operations against the facilities and the facilitators, not only to 

reduce the money available to the insurgents, but also with the secondary effect of reducing the level of corruption countrywide. 

Second, NATO and NATO Member Nations, on a bilateral basis, 

must continue to partner and support the development of the 

Afghan security and counternarcotics forces. The end state for this 

effort are fully competent, capable Afghan security forces that minimize the impact of narcotics on the Afghan society. 

Once again, thank you for this opportunity to appear before this 

committee, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Craddock follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN CRADDOCK, U.S. ARMY (RET.), FORMER

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER–EUROPE, MYRTLE BEACH, VA 

Chairman, ranking member, may I first thank you for the opportunity to appear 

before you here today. The focus of this hearing—Afghanistan—is important, timely, 

7 

and essential. As I have been requested to provide insight on the counternarcotics 

(CN) efforts in Afghanistan, I will focus my short opening remarks in that area. 

Before exploring the counternarotics challenge, I want to emphasize that the 

NATO commitment to Afghanistan—as an alliance—is strong. I would also point out 

that the commitment differs among individual NATO members. Continued U.S. 

leadership in this mission is essential to both deepen the level of support and to 

ensure continued participation of all alliance members. 

Wth regard to the issue of counternarcotics in Afghanistan, I must preface my 

comments and responses to your later questions, with the understanding that my 

perspective is from my last assignment on active duty with the United States 

Armed Forces—that of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In that capacity, 

I was the commander of all NATO operational forces including those in Afghanistan. 

Therefore, my observations and assessments will be from a NATO perspective. 

In October 2006, NATO assumed responsbility for security for the entire country 

of Afghanistan. The authority to do so was provided to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, by the North Atlantic Council. The means of granting this authority was through the NAC’s approval of the NATO military operations plan for 

Afghanistan. 

The strategic operations plan contained specific instructions to all subordinate 

commands responsible for conducting operations in Afghanistan concerning counternarcotics operations. Specifically, NATO forces were not to conduct conternarcotics 

operations or activities—to include eradication of poppy crops. What was permitted 

was support to Afghan counternarcotics forces. Wthin means and capabilities, NATO 

forces could provide information and intelligence on narcotics activities to Afghan 

CN forces, they could provide transportation and logistical support, they could provide operations planning support, and they could provide in extremis and medical 

support—all upon request by the Afghan counternarcotics forces. 

In February 2007, the current intelligence assessments, discussions with Afghan 

authorities, and consultations with United Kingdom and United States counternarcotics authorities—all combined to establish a strong link between the narcotics 

traffickers and Afghan insurgents—particularly the Taliban. A growing body of evidence indicated that much of the funding for the Taliban insurgency was being generated by the narcotics industry in Afghanistan—all the way from the poppy farmer 

to the movement of refined heroin through and out of the country. United Nations 

experts estimated upward of $200 million narcodollars going into insurgent coffers. 

It was at that point, as the strategic commander, I began to urge for the approval 

of additional authorites for NATO forces in Afghanstan to conduct operations 

against both narcotics facilities and facilitators. Our assessment was that reducing 

money available to the insurgents would make it more difficult for them to hire soldiers, pay bomb and improvised explosive device (ied) -makers, and buy weapons 

and materiel—all essential in reducing the level of violence and providing enhanced 

security. 

It was not until November 2008—some 18 months later—that NATO, via a defense ministerial meeting, approved these additional authorities. The ministers concluded that the preponderence of evidence to that date supported the assessment 

that the narcotraffickers were providing material support to the insurgency—and 

that based on the original operations plan which directed action by NATO forces 

against the insurgents and those who supported it—adequate authority was provided without any revision or amendment to the existing plan. 

Subsequent guidance and orders were issued over the following 2 months and by 

early spring of this year, NATO forces began using these expanded authorities. As 

of mid-June, some 25 counternarcotics operations had been conducted either by 

NATO forces alone or in conjunction with Afghan counternarcotics forces with significantly favorable results. Many processing facilities (labs) have been destroyed, 

precursor materiel confiscated and destroyed, opium paste and refined heroin confiscated, and personnel apprehended. 

While much has been accomplished, much more remains to be done. First and 

foremost, NATO/ISAF must continue to conduct operations against the facilities and 

the facilitators—not only to reduce money available to the insurgents—but also with 

the secondary effect of reducing the level of corruption countrywide. Second, NATO 

and NATO Member Nations, on a bilateral basis, must continue to partner and support the development of the Afghan security and counternarcotics forces. The end 

state for this effort are fully competent, capable Afghan security forces that minimize the impact of narcotics on the Afghan society. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General Craddock. 

Ambassador Crocker. 

8 

STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN CROCKER, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ AND PAKISTAN, U.S. CHARGE ́ D’AFFAIRES 

TO AFGHANISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SPOKANE, WA 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Lugar, members of the committee. 

It’s an honor to be before you today. I have had that honor a 

number of occasions in the past as a witness for the administration. Today is the first time I can honestly say that in addition to 

it being an honor, it’s also a pleasure. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan is a critical national security interest 

for the United States, for the region, and for the international community. General Craddock has addressed some of the NATO perspective. I would comment briefly on a regional perspective, focusing particularly on Pakistan, where I was Ambassador from 2004 

to 2007, and Iran, where I was involved in direct discussions with 

the Iranians on Afghanistan, from 2001 to 2003. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know so well, our relationship with Pakistan is vital for our Nation’s national security, as well as for stability in Afghanistan. We were closely allied with Pakistan in the 

effort to force the Soviets out of Afghanistan in the 1980s, but once 

the Soviets were out, so were we, and Pakistan went from being 

the most allied of allies, to being a sanctioned pariah. After 9/11, 

we are back. Pakistanis welcome that renewed engagement, but 

they ask, again, ‘‘For how long?’’ 

We have an urgent need to build a stable, sustained relationship 

with Pakistan. And, Mr. Chairman, you, Senator Lugar, and this 

committee have shown the way, through your sponsorship of the 

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act. It’s precisely the type of 

long-term undertaking both our nations need. 

Pakistan today faces an interrelated set of insurgencies. Kashmiri militants to the east, al-Qaeda and Taliban to the west, and 

an internal insurgency that targets Pakistan’s principal cities. It 

can be argued that much of this insurgency is of Pakistan’s own 

making. But there is also a Pakistani narrative that says, in the 

case of support for the Taliban, they had no choice, after we withdrew in the 1990s. 

Mr. Chairman, during my time in Pakistan, I came to know a 

large number of mainstream political figures and senior military 

officers. None of them share the Taliban’s vision for Pakistan and 

Afghanistan, yet many remain uncertain over the long-term prospects for our relationship. We need to learn from our past experience, and build for a better future; and your legislation, Mr. Chairman, shows us all the way. 

Afghanistan’s western neighbor, Iran, poses a very different set 

of challenges. The multiple differences between the United States 

and Iran need no elaboration from me. On Afghanistan, however, 

we have at times found room for cooperation. In the wake of 9/11, 

when I sat down with Iranians under U.N. auspices, I found them 

fully supportive of United States military action to bring down the 

Taliban. United States-Iranian agreement on the Afghan interim 

authority was at the core of the success of the U.N.-sponsored Bonn 

Conference. And after I reopened our Embassy in Kabul in January 

2002, we discussed with the Iranians, again under U.N. auspices, 

9 

ways to strengthen the interim administration and to reduce the 

power of warlords. 

The Iranians hedged their bets, however, also providing sanctuary for al-Qaeda figures later implicated in attacks in the Arabian Peninsula that brought to an effective end that dialogue with 

Iran. 

Mr. Chairman, the administration has stated its willingness to 

engage in a dialogue with the Iranians. I think this is a positive 

step. I certainly support it. And I hope Afghanistan will be on the 

agenda, that the Iranians will take a strategic look at their own 

interests, because I think those interests also lie in a stable 

Afghanistan. 

Mr. Chairman, I would offer just a couple of thoughts based on 

my experience in Iraq. And one must be careful, as you note, not 

to draw too many parallels. Construction in Afghanistan, reconstruction in Iraq, I think, is a very good point. It is going to be very 

hard in Afghanistan. That does not mean hopeless. We have some 

very fine people in the fight. General McChrystal, Ambassador 

Eikenberry in Afghanistan, Ambassador Patterson in Pakistan, and 

my old comrade from Baghdad, General Petraeus, now overseeing 

both wars, I think, can give all Americans confidence that the right 

people are in the right place. 

It is the President, as Senator Lugar said, who must show the 

way. When he does, I hope that this committee and counterparts 

in the Senate and the House will seek from my former colleagues 

that irreplaceable perspective which is the view from the field. 

The stakes are very high, indeed, in Afghanistan, and, Mr. 

Chairman, I think all of us in America are indebted to you and the 

committee for helping us illuminate these issues. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crocker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN C. CROCKER, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO

IRAQ AND PAKISTAN, U.S. CHARGE ́ D’AFFAIRES TO AFGHANISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF

STATE, SPOKANE, WA 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for the 

honor of appearing before you today. Afghanistan is a critical issue for America’s 

national security. Eight years ago this week, we paid a horrific price for allowing 

a strategic enemy the freedom to operate in Afghanistan. We are engaged against 

the same enemy today in the same area. That enemy is hoping that our patience 

will wear thin, that we will decide the cost is too high, that we will give them back 

the space they lost after 9/11. Mr. Chairman, that must not happen. 

Al-Qaeda and its Taliban supporters are a threat not to the United States alone 

but to the region and the entire international community, as the sad record of their 

terrorist attacks makes all too clear. It is a threat that requires an international 

and a regional response. General Craddock is addressing the NATO perspective. On 

the basis of my experience as Ambassador to Pakistan from 2004 to 2007 and my 

involvement in discussions with the Iranians on Afghanistan from 2001 to 2003, I 

offer a few thoughts on the regional environment. 

Mr. Chairman, our relationship with Pakistan is vital for our own national security and for stability in Afghanistan. We understood this clearly after the Soviet 

invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Our efforts against the Soviet occupation were 

largely staged from Pakistan. But once the Soviets were out so were we, and Pakistan went almost overnight from our most allied of allies to a sanctioned pariah. 

After 9/11, we were back and major military and economic assistance programs were 

resumed. Pakistanis welcome our reengagement. They also wonder how long we will 

be around this time. We need a long-term, stable relationship with Pakistan, one 

in which both nations and peoples can have confidence. Such a relationship can only 

be built up over time, overcoming past suspicions and mistrust on both sides. 

10 

Mr. Chairman, you, Senator Lugar, and this committee have shown us all the way 

forward through your sponsorship of the Enhanced Relationship with Pakistan Act. 

This is precisely the type of long-term undertaking we both so badly need. 

Mr. Chairman, Pakistan today faces a triple set of interrelated insurgencies: 

Kashmiri militants to the east; the Taliban, its supporters and the al-Qaeda terrorists it shelters to the west; and an internal militancy that strikes at the heart of 

Pakistan’s principal cities. Some of this militancy is of Pakistan’s own making. In 

the Pakistani narrative, some of it, like Pakistani support for the Taliban in the 

1990s, grew from a lack of other options based on our estrangement. The history 

of that estrangement, and fear of its repetition, drives some in Pakistan to continue 

to hedge their bets. 

Mr. Chairman, during my time in Pakistan I came to know a large number of 

mainstream politicians and senior military officers. None of them share the 

Taliban’s vision for Afghanistan or Pakistan. Yet many remain uncertain over the 

long-term prospects for our relationship. We need to learn from our past experience 

and build for a better future. Your legislation, Mr. Chairman, charts the course. 

Afghanistan’s western neighbor, Iran, presents a very different set of challenges. 

The multiple and profound differences between the United States and the Islamic 

Republic need no elaboration from me. On Afghanistan, however, we have at times 

found room for cooperation. The Taliban in Afghanistan was an enemy to both of 

us—Iran almost went to war with the Taliban-led Afghan Government in 1999. In 

the wake of 9/11, I found Iranian negotiators fully supportive of U.S. military action 

to bring down the Taliban. United States-Iranian agreement on the Afghan Interim 

Authority was at the core of the success of the U.N.-sponsored Bonn Conference on 

Afghanistan in December 2001. And after I reopened our Embassy in Kabul in January 2002, we discussed with the Iranians ways to strengthen the interim administration, to reduce the power of the warlords, the handover of al-Qaeda operatives, 

and even coordination of assistance projects. But the Iranians hedged their bets, 

also providing sanctuary and support for al-Qaeda terrorists who were later linked 

to lethal attacks in the Arabian Peninsula, actions that effectively ended our 18- 

month dialogue. 

Mr. Chairman, the Obama administration has stated its willingness to engage in 

talks with the Iranians. The Iranians have signaled a positive response. I support 

this initiative, and believe it offers an opportunity to reengage with Iran on Afghanistan. Iranian support for the Taliban, its existential enemy, is purely tactical, a 

weapon in their confrontation with us. A renewed dialogue on Afghanistan could 

afford Tehran the opportunity to think strategically on an issue of great importance 

to its own long-term national security. 

Mr. Chairman, I am no expert on Russia or Central Asia. But these states, too, 

play an important role in Afghanistan. The previous and current administrations 

have worked to foster trade and communication links between Afghanistan and the 

former Soviet Republics. It is important these efforts continue, and it is important 

that Afghanistan continue to be a part of our dialogue with Russia. We have no 

desire to repeat the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. Neither is there anything in 

our current effort in Afghanistan that is inimical to Russian interests. To the contrary, the defeat of an Islamic militancy close to Russia’s borders should be very 

much in Moscow’s interests. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion I offer a few thoughts based on my experience in 

Iraq from 2007 to 2009. One must be very careful in attempting to draw connections. They are very different countries with different histories. Iraq is largely 

urban; Afghanistan predominantly rural. In many respects, the challenge in Afghanistan is even greater than in Iraq. Thirty years of conflict have devastated an 

already poor country, leaving few services, virtually no middle class and no functioning state institutions. But hard does not mean hopeless, neither in Afghanistan 

nor in Iraq. Where I do see similarities is in how the United States approaches the 

challenges. We cannot get to the end in either fight on half a tank of gas. In Iraq, 

we went all in, and it made a difference. The President must lead. We have our 

finest people in the fight—General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry in 

Afghanistan, Ambassador Patterson in Pakistan. General Petraeus, my comrade in 

Baghdad, now oversees both wars and there is simply no one in uniform more qualified to do so. Under their charge are the thousands of committed Americans, military and civilian who are putting their lives on the line. But it is the President who 

must make the commitment and show the way. When he does, I hope that this committee and counterparts in the Senate and the House will seek from my former colleague that irreplaceable perspective, the view from the field. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for the privilege of testifying on this critical 

issue. The American people have consistently shown a willingness to make great 

sacrifices when they understand the stakes and have confidence in their leadership. 

11 

The stakes are very high indeed in Afghanistan, and all of us are indebted to you 

and the committee for illuminating the issues. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

I don’t think I did justice, in introducing you, to the outstanding 

service that you provided us in Iraq and in Pakistan and through 

your career, and we are very, very grateful. I know how much 

value two Presidents had in your advice, and we’re very grateful 

to you. 

Ms. Lockhart. 

We—I think we have two Senators? 

VOICE: Two more, one’s on the way. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. We’re two Senators away from an interruption. 

STATEMENT OF CLARE LOCKHART, COFOUNDER AND DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF STATE EFFECTIVENESS, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Ms. LOCKHART. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the 

committee, I thank you for the opportunity to address you. 

There is now an emerging recognition that there is no purely 

military resolution to the situation in Afghanistan, and that governance and development are as, if not more, important tools. I 

believe that the establishment of Afghan sovereignty, by which I 

mean enabling Afghans to exercise self-rule through Afghan institutions that can provide their own security, governance, and revenue-raising capability, provides the framework that we need. And 

it will provide, first, a means of stabilizing Afghanistan and critically denying space for the Taliban, who, as Senator Kerry recognized, derive their strength primarily from the weakness of Afghan 

institutions. 

Second, it provides basis for an exit—an honorable exit—for 

American forces and presence on the ground, or a transition strategy, if we don’t want to call it an ‘‘exit strategy.’’ 

And third, it demonstrates to the Afghan population that the 

United States and allied presence is not an occupation. It’s not an 

occupation at all, nor is it open-ended occupation. 

The military have now articulated a clear strategy for building 

up the Afghan security forces and protecting the population. And 

I believe we now need a similar articulation of a strategy for governance and development that matches the one the military’s put 

forward in rigor and detail. 

First, I’d like to reflect on the mistakes made. I think that over 

the last years we have not had a clear strategy for the civilian component—for governance and development. Afghan institutions have 

been catastrophically underresourced. When I was on the ground 

in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2005, the first Afghan budget for 

a civil service that had 240,000 civil servants in 2002, was 

resourced to the level of $20 million. And this was enough to pay 

fuel for a month, but not to pay the doctors, teachers, and policemen, even salaries of $50 a month. 

And much activity from the aid system has been counterproductive. The provision of billions of dollars, with very little 

accountability, particularly to U.N. agencies and NGOs—not underestimating some of the great work that many U.N. agencies have 

12 

done—and from the perspective of an Afghan citizen with no hope 

for a job or an education, there has been little outlet but to join 

the narcotics industry or sign up with the Taliban, in many parts 

of the country. 

Moving forward, I think the first question to address is, What 

does good-enough—or appropriate—governance look like? The first 

component is certainly security; building up the Afghan National 

Army, the police force, the Afghan intelligence services, and justice 

institutions, law enforcement institutions. 

But, security institutions alone won’t make an Afghan Government capable of exercising authority and maintaining stability in 

the country. This will allow the drawdown. It requires, in my view, 

three other components. The first of these is rule of law; the decisionmaking institutions across the Cabinet and across the levels of 

Afghan governance—the capital city Kabul, but at province level, 

district level, municipalities and villages. 

The second component is public finance. We hear a lot about corruption, and I think we need to take a clearheaded look at the 

other side of that coin. How do we build the systems of accountability in revenue-raising and public expenditure that will allow 

Afghanistan to raise its own revenue and expend its own resources 

on its institutions for the decades to come? 

And the third component is basic services. And we’re not talking, 

here, about a Valhalla or a Switzerland, but the basic services at 

the village level, in irrigation, to allow for agriculture, livelihoods, 

health, and education that will allow Afghans to live lives with dignity. And this will require investment in education. Another critical 

lacuna has been only to educate Afghans up to the age of 11; and 

if one only educates up to the age of 11, we’re not going to have 

a civil service or a market economy capable of being self-sufficient. 

I think we have grounds for optimism. I question the myth of 

Afghanistan as an inherently corrupt culture full of warlords. 

There is an Afghan demand for rule of law rooted in their culture. 

There was a reasonable standard of governance in the middle decades of the 20th century. When I arrived in Kabul, there were 

240,000 civil servants in place across the country, administering 

the country fairly well. I think the culture of corruption has been 

one that’s been allowed to fester in recent decades, but is not of the 

culture. 

And finally, there was a series of successes between 2001 and 

2005, where a political framework, articulated through Bonn, 

allowed for a number of governance initiatives to be successful; 

most notably, the creation of the Afghan National Army from 

scratch and a number of national programs, including the National 

Solidarity Program that saw block grants issued to every village in 

the country, now across 23,000 villages, that allows villages to 

maintain their own affairs. 

I think we also have grounds for pessimism. There is a legacy of 

decades of war and a lost generation. And corruption was allowed 

to set in at the heart of government institutions. Back in 2004, the 

group of us who were assisting the government realized that it was 

probably inevitable in those circumstancs that this corruption 

would continue to fester and allow the country to fall back to the 

13 

Taliban. I don’t think this was inevitable, had a different approach 

been taken, and I don’t think it’s too late to put it right. 

I’ll conclude with some short reflections on the emerging strategy. I think we can be encouraged to see that there is a strategy 

emerging from Kabul under the leadership of Ambassador Eikenberry and his excellent team, and in coordination with General 

McChrystal, to put in place a strategy that will support the creation of the adequate and necessary Afghan institutions. And I 

think this is balanced with understanding that we can’t just focus 

on state institutions, we must also allow the space for Afghan civil 

society to hold that government accountable and invest in market 

institutions to create, in the short term, jobs that will pull people 

away from illicit activities and, over the medium term, lay the 

basis for an economy that will make Afghanistan self-sufficient. 

And I think we face two immediate challenges. Very sadly, the 

elections recently held did not renew the governance settlement in 

the country. And this is tragic, I think, because it was avoidable. 

And I do think some questions need to be asked of the way that 

the election was managed by the U.N., so that those mistakes can 

be avoided in future in Afghanistan and in other countries. 

But, we now face a paradox, because the COIN strategy requires 

there to be a host-nation government with a vision that the people 

can sign up to, and that government is not yet in place. I think we 

have different options for how a government that is good enough 

can be put in place. And once that political settlement is in place 

that will allow for the process of reconciliation with groups across 

the country, then I think the second key need is to articulate the 

governance and development strategy that is necessary. It is possible to put it into place, and then it must be resourced with the 

adequate resources that have been so sorely missing the last few 

years. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lockhart follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CLARE LOCKHART, COFOUNDER AND DIRECTOR, THE

INSTITUTE FOR STATE EFFECTIVENESS, WASHINGTON, DC 

INTRODUCTION

The central foundation for stabilizing Afghanistan is the restoration of Afghan 

sovereignty. The current imperative is to identify a framework and process to 

rebuild the legitimacy and credibility of Afghanistan’s institutions so that Afghans 

can govern themselves, maintain security, and raise their own licit revenue. This 

will in turn provide a viable exit strategy for foreign forces and allow for lessening 

dependence on financial support. Exiting responsibly depends on the increase in 

capability of both Afghan security forces and public finance institutions. Credible 

governance is also the means by which the Taliban will be reduced and eliminated, 

as it is widely agreed that it is the vacuum of governance that provides their space 

of operation. 

Governance is currently in crisis in Afghanistan. A combination of two decades 

of war, followed by international actors’ lack of focus and unquestioning support 

have allowed corruption and the illegitimate economy to expand unchecked. The 

elections have not produced a legitimate winner, and rather have laid open to global 

public scrutiny the flaws in the conduct of elections and the organization of governance in general. It is not Afghan governance alone that is to blame. To date, much 

international activity and assistance has been misdirected and even counterproductive, often undermining rather than working to build up Afghan capability 

and sovereignty. Now that the key problems of governance by both Afghan leaders 

and their international partners are widely recognized, we have one final and preVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:27 Mar 03, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\AFGH0917.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
14 

cious opportunity to address the fundamental issues of how to restore Afghan sovereignty. 

There is now the making of a good civil-military strategy on the ground. It is clear 

that the new administration, across military and diplomatic arenas, recognizes the 

depths of the problem and has identified what needs to be done. The new plans 

emerging from the field articulate exactly the type of actions and approaches that 

have been sorely missing to date to achieve stabilization. The type of initiatives that 

the Bonn team never saw resourced in 2001 to 2005 are now finally being supported. Realizing their objectives now requires a clear step-by-step plan for operationalizing these goals, and making a set of realistic targets clear to Congress and 

the American public. 

Recognizing that development and governance are key foci means almost a reversal of what we have done in previous years. Whereas our large civilian institutions 

have been geared toward replacing native capacity, they now must be turned toward 

building it; the civilian actors require the same internal reflections and overhaul of 

instruments and policies that the military has undertaken, having arrived at the 

reformed counterinsurgency doctrines through much loss of life and treasure. I will 

focus on what standards of governance and development are realistic to aim for, the 

mistakes that we must learn from, and some suggestions for moving forward. 

There has been much discussion about what will qualify as the United States 

reaching its strategic objectives. Denying al-Qaeda sanctuaries is a clear goal, but 

the question of how that is done remains. To do so will require an Afghan Government that is functional and legitimate enough to be able to hold the country 

together as the United States drawsdown, as it eventually must. I propose as a 

starting point, that a criterion for success could be that momentum is turned decisively against the Taliban, by use of military force, economic development, building 

of civilian institutions, and by strengthening the Afghan National Security Forces 

to the point where they can hold their own against the insurgents. We do not need 

a perfect Afghan Government; just one that is stable enough. Leaving behind a failing or failed state will certainly lead to civil war and probable eventual Taliban victory. Given what has happened in this last election, the goal of an effective Afghan 

state may seem a tall order, but I remain convinced it can be done. 

It should be stressed that billions of dollars have been wasted on futile and ineffective measures, and that one cannot judge state-building in the future by what 

has happened in the past. Real focus on letting Afghans do the work of building 

their own future, except for some sputtering and inconsistently supported efforts, 

has only just begun. Stereotyping Afghans as somehow incapable of living in a modern state is only an excuse for our previous, misdirected policies. The Afghans I 

know are proud, practical people who, despite all their frustrations, are still willing 

to give us a chance, and certainly desperately wish to avoid the fate of living either 

under an oligarchy of violent drug lords or the Taliban. 

WHAT IS GOOD ENOUGH GOVERNANCE IN AFGHANISTAN?

There is a much-touted myth that justice and public administration are an elusive 

dream in Afghanistan, with corruption endemic to the country and its people. This 

narrow view overlooks four factors. 

First, central to Afghan culture is an ancient appreciation of justice and fairness. 

The concept of the Circle of Justice emphasizes the need for a ruler to rule justly 

in order to raise revenue from citizens to pay for the army. Afghan villagers and 

townspeople I have met across the country complain bitterly about the repressive 

corruption that they insist is alien to their culture, which puts their families constantly at risk of kidnapping and intimidation. 

Second, through much of the 20th century, Afghanistan had a reasonable standard of public administration. A manual from the 1950s shows Afghan professionals 

running schools, clinics, and road and irrigation projects. When I traveled across 

Afghanistan in January 2002, in most provinces there were functioning provincial 

offices, with trained civil servants successfully carrying out their work. 

Third, to the extent that a culture of corruption has set in, this was in large part 

a result of empowering militia commanders with weapons and money to pursue the 

jihad and then failing to bring them into the fold of rule of law once the Russians 

withdrew, resulting in a massive assault on the country’s peace, women, and assets 

throughout the 1990s. Warlords are not the product of Afghan traditional society, 

but rather, the product of the decimation of traditional Afghan tribal governance 

through Afghanistan’s role as a proxy for struggle by foreign powers on its soil, and, 

more recently, by Afghanistan having being abandoned once the short-term security 

goals were achieved. 

15 

Between 2001 to 2004, there were a series of examples of success in building institutions in Afghanistan, led by Afghans in partnership with small teams of international experts. The word ‘‘partnership’’ must be emphasized, as all too often various international actors have simply imposed their own formulas upon Afghans. On 

the other hand, the cooperative efforts between Afghans and mentoring organizations, with the emphasis on empowering Afghans to take over their own future as 

soon as practicably possible, succeeded then and efforts like them can succeed now. 

These include efforts to build the Afghan National Army, the National Health Program, and the National Solidarity Program (NSP), which enabled the creation of 

Community Development Councils in 23,000 villages, and which now will expand to 

the remaining 9,000 villages, many in the southeast where security and lack of 

funding had prevented the expansion of the program. Other successful reforms during the 2001 to 2004 period included the public finance system and currency 

exchange which saw the creation and countrywide acceptance of a new currency in 

4 months, the GSM telecoms licensing which created 7 million mobile phones and 

now more than $lbn (USD) in investment, and an infrastructure program that laid 

a template for reconnecting Afghan markets and people internally and regionally. 

WHAT SHOULD WE BE AIMING FOR?

To say that Afghan governance is central to stability is not to argue for an impossible goal, whether Switzerland or Valhalla. Rather, it recognizes that the way that 

rule of law is enforced is critical to the daily lives of Afghans and whether they 

choose to live within, or challenge, the sitting authority. Naturally, our goals must 

be realistic and attainable. Choice in standards will depend on four factors: The type 

of Afghan leadership in place, the strength of U.S. commitment, the agreement 

reached with Afghan stakeholders regarding redlines and goals, and the choice in 

the toolbox employed for implementation. While a team of reformers might be able 

to achieve one set of goals even if the leadership is not committed to reform, there 

is the possibility of getting governance in certain areas right, especially if a tough 

approach to benchmarks and conditionalities is used and if the right instruments 

are implemented. To recognize that governance is central also means understanding 

that the most critical factor is not what we, as outsiders, do but how the Afghans 

are organized to govern themselves, even if financing, advice, and benchmarks from 

the United States and its allies are key. 

It is important to start discussion from an understanding of how the Afghan state 

is actually set up and how it functions. At least for now, Afghanistan is a unitary 

state, with all provinces governed according to the same legal framework. A provincial and district education or health officer reports to Kabul through the line ministries, not to a local governor. Many efforts now take place without understanding 

the set of Afghan laws and organizations that already exist. Unless and until the 

Afghan Constitution and legal framework change, efforts should work within this 

framework of laws and procedures. A ‘‘light touch’’ form of governance is possible, 

where formal structures, including line ministries, can ‘‘mesh’’ with local and traditional networks and social organizations. The National Solidarity Program, which 

feeds block grants to the local level from the center, but lets the village organize 

themselves how they wish, is one such example. Networks of traditional birth 

attendants, hawala dealers, traders, ulema and teachers can all be mobilized or 

partnered with for different tasks. 

What type of Afghan governance will permit the stabilization of the country and 

provide the foundation for allocation of troops and money to be drawn down? It is 

necessary to articulate an ‘‘exit strategy’’ to demonstrate to the American public that 

the effort is not open-ended and to the Afghan population that the presence is not 

an occupation. However, an exit strategy must not be conveyed as abandonment of 

the country to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. A ‘‘transition strategy’’ might be a more 

appropriate term. 

The components of appropriate governance in Afghanistan can be roughly characterized by five pillars. The first pillar certainly is the provision of security, through 

the operation of Afghan Security Forces. This will involve expanding and strengthening the Afghan National Army and the Afghan Police Force; reforming the 

National Directorate of Security and Afghanistan’s intelligence service; and provision of law enforcement through courts, judges, and prisons. Provision of security 

must be embedded within a concept of rule of law and justice, otherwise this can 

lead to a repressive regime, thus fueling the insurgency. 

The second pillar is the creation of structures and processes to ensure fair and 

accountable decisionmaking within a framework of rule of law. The Constitution for 

Afghanistan agreed upon in 2003 provides a workable basis to build upon. However, 

much work needs to be done to improve the functioning of the Presidency and the 

16 

Cabinet, as well as to ensure appropriate selection criteria for the appointments in 

key personnel including mayors, governors, and district heads. A series of checks 

and balances from Parliament and civil society, particularly over revenue-raising 

and budget allocations, are also needed. 

The third pillar is to build systems of accountability in public finance, across revenue and expenditure. Afghanistan will improve its ability to function when it can 

raise its own revenue and spend it justly and in a way that satisfies the population. 

Afghanistan has the potential for wealth, most notably with its mineral wealth documented in the recent U.S. Geological Survey. This, together with customs revenue 

as well as land and large taxpayer revenues would provide Afghanistan with revenue many times today’s figures. Reaching the revenue potential will reduce the 

cost of intervention and act as a forcing function to grow the economy and create 

jobs. Currently, much of Afghanistan’s revenue is leaking, either by not being collected or by being illegitimately collected. Licensing and procurement are areas 

where much corruption occurs and are areas where more robust systems of transparency and oversight could bring significant financial gains. Finally, ensuring that 

Afghanistan’s budget resources—both from domestic revenue and from international 

donations—are well spent across the services the population so desperately need, is 

key to the stability and development of the country. The State Department’s efforts 

to ensure more funding is spent through Afghan institutions is centrally important: 

Not only is it much more cost efficient, an Afghan teacher costing less than two 

hundredths of a foreign project worker, but only by using the system will it begin 

to function. The Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund contains a set of benchmarks 

and transparency and audit requirements that make the budget function like a dual 

key system. American funds should either be channeled through this vehicle, or 

another similar mechanism should be established directly with each line ministry. 

Already ARTF, through its leverage over the Afghan budget, has brought about 

major increases in transparency in the Ministry of Water and Power and in the 

Ministry of Education. 

The fourth pillar is basic services for the Afghan population. Roughly, a village 

can reasonably expect five sets of services: Irrigation, that allows them to grow their 

crops and sustain their livelihoods; access to transportation (a road), to permit 

movement to the nearest town to access markets and health care; basic health and 

education; access to water for drinking, and electricity. Villages are capable of organizing many of these services themselves, and the National Solidarity Program was 

set up in 2002 as the vehicle to channel funding and technical support to the villages in order to support these efforts. This program allows the villages to choose, 

design and implement projects that suit their own needs. A set of National Programs which complement National Solidarity Program now need to be created and 

implemented—including those for agriculture, power, education and skills, and 

water. Each of these will set out a national framework of policy and a package of 

basic services for each district, to be implemented through the most efficient mechanism whether through local government, private sector or NGO. Existing National 

Programs currently function effectively, but all will need constant review and 

adjustment. 

There is often debate about whether the ‘‘central government’’ can carry out the 

services discussed and whether decentralization is necessary. This is a false debate. 

The real question is for each function, who needs to do what and at which level, 

across the five levels of Afghan governance—capital, province, district, municipality, 

and village. For example, in health, the capital city will monitor disease and provide 

the large specialized hospitals, but every district requires its own hospital and villages will need basic clinics so that travel times can be reduced. This is especially 

necessary as Afghanistan remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world 

for a woman to give birth, and much of this problem has its roots in the long distances that must be traveled. NSP can build the clinic building, but the Ministry 

of Public Health will have to provide the staff. Tightly coordinated ministerial 

actions are needed. In public finance, only the capital is authorized to issue money 

supply, but every province has a finance office to collect and distribute revenue. 

With National Solidarity Program, each village designs and manages its own 

project, but engineers are available at the district level and the accounts are kept 

at the capital level. In the original terminology, ‘‘national’’ means countrywide, not 

confined to the capital city. 

To enable the Afghan civil service to carry out these functions, we will need to 

invest significant sums in education as this sector has been severely neglected. You 

cannot transition a handoff of governing authority if there is no professional class 

and no trained middle class. There is a crisis of education and training, owing to 

the lost generation of the 1980s and 1990s and the failure to invest in Afghan education and training post-2001. There is an urgent need for a properly resourced Civil 

17 

Service training school, with branches across the country. However, if basic education only reaches to age 11, it is just as important to ensure that the pipeline of 

education from age 11 up to professional age exists. It is just not possible to train 

a doctor, engineer or accountant without proper institutional resources. If sufficient 

skills are to be created to manage Afghanistan’s civil service, private sector and civil 

society, we need an urgent inquiry into the degree to which Afghanistan’s secondary 

and tertiary education and vocational training system is functioning and where the 

gaps are. I might mention finally that building up the ANSF, both ANP and ANA, 

requires the formation of officer classes, and so few are literate that this is an 

immediate bottleneck on our ability to put an Afghan face on security operations. 

Last, building the state cannot be seen as the total solution. As in any society, 

the key is the balance between the state, market, and civil society institutions. Significant attention is required to nurture Afghanistan’s market institutions, to help 

create the space for the vibrant civil society and public discussion that will hold the 

government accountable, and to allow for infusions of foreign and domestic capital 

and the building of sustainable economic growth. 

THE EXTENT OF THE CHALLENGE

To express guarded optimism is not to underestimate the challenges in building 

governance. The legacy of three decades of war has left an entrenched set of actors 

and networks deeply embedded in flows of illicit trade. While there was considerable 

progress in building legitimacy and foundations for institutions after 2001, to such 

an extent that key powers could claim in 2005 that the country was stable and plan 

for troop withdrawals, after 2005, stability in Afghanistan began to decline. In 2004, 

a memo (the ‘‘Cairo memo’’) was discussed by the key ground representatives of the 

United States, the United Nations, and Afghanistan, detailing the growing factors 

of disorder and corruption in the governance arrangements that would lead to the 

revitalization of the Taliban and loss of trust of the Afghan people. This was primarily owing to the failure to adequately resource legitimate institutions. The memo 

documented how supporting the ‘‘reform team’’ to continue an agenda of institutionbuilding would have required an urgent financial commitment of $200m and/or 

facilitating control of two border posts and their customs revenue to pass to the 

national treasury. As support for this agenda nor funds for it could be found, the 

reform team left office in 2005, recognizing that the internal systems of governance 

would most likely begin to collapse. 

Back in 2002, during the preparation of Afghanistan’s first post-Bonn budget, 

Afghanistan required a budget of $500m for the year to be able to pay its 240,000 

civil servants (including doctors, teachers, and engineers) their basic salaries of $50 

per month and to cover essential running costs. As the Treasury was empty, assistance was required. Unfortunately, donors initially committed only $20 million to the 

2002 Afghan budget, meaning that Afghanistan’s leaders could never in the 2002– 

2004 period meet the basic costs of sustaining services. At the same time, $1.7 billion was committed to an aid system to build parallel organizations, which ended 

up employing most of the same doctors and teachers as drivers, assistants, and 

translators to operate small projects at significant multiples of their former salaries. 

While some additional funds were later committed to the World Bank-run Afghan 

Reconstruction Trust Fund, this was never enough to sustain basic governance, and 

the civil service atrophied. 

Rather than support the essential nationwide services and programs within a 

framework of rule of law and policy, donors launched thousands of small, badly 

coordinated projects. Billions of dollars were spent through the aid complex, resulting in little tangible change for most Afghan citizens. Their perception of aid 

projects was most vividly captured for me in a story told to me by villagers in a 

remote district of Bamiyan, who described their multimillion dollar project to provide wood to build homes literally going up in smoke. 

The prescriptions of the ‘‘aid complex’’ not only bypassed, but actively undermined 

Afghan capability: For example, it was the aid donors who forbade any investment 

in the Afghan budget for education or training over the age of 11, citing the overriding imperative of investing in primary education. Similarly, a $60 million provincial and district governance program designed to restore policing and justice services 

was turned down for funding in 2002 on the basis that governance was not ‘‘povertyreducing.’’ 

At the same time, regional strongmen were strengthened over the last 8 years. 

This was a way of ‘‘solving’’ the vacuum of power left by the exit of the Taliban, 

but this solution has led to the arbitrary exercise of authority, predation, and fantastic levels of corruption which, by preventing the government from functioning, 

have left an opening for every possible destabilizing element, from cartel members 

18 

to simple criminal gangs to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. A strategy for negotiating 

with them is necessary in order to bring them within the rule of law through a combination of sanctions, the application of justice, and incentives to cooperate with 

legitimate state and market activities. 

Partly as a result of the underfunding of Afghan institutions, the failure to build 

a robust enough set of accountabilities for either the government or the aid system, 

the reempowerment of jihadi commanders to whom operations were farmed out, and 

the failure to set out a comprehensive water and agriculture policy to restore what 

the Russians destroyed, narcoinfluence and other forms of corruption set in at the 

heart of government institutions. This was most clearly manifested in the police, 

customs and the way that government assets were stripped, ranging from land and 

mines through to licenses for a range of the country’s assets. It is no wonder that 

the two top concerns of Afghans all over the country are insecurity and corruption. 

Often they are more afraid of the police and the judiciary than they are of the 

Taliban. 

WHAT WILL IT TAKE

The U.S. Embassy team on the ground under the leadership of Ambassador 

Eikenberry has moved rapidly to develop approaches and strategies to support good 

governance and deliver development. Under current plans, ministries will be held 

to standards with funds conditional upon performance, as was done successfully 

with Afghanistan’s health program. Accountability systems are going into place. 

There are large-scale plans for the rapid delivery of basic services to cleared villages, through the National Area Based Development Program, which involves the 

cooperation of key ministries to get basic services down to the district level, and the 

National Solidarity Program, which gets basic means of life all the way to the village level. Delivery is planned in such a way that Afghans are actually asked what 

they want (and this is the most crucial change of all: Consultation is security) and 

are employed to build it. Participation of the populace and the building of civil society go hand in hand with economic aid. Employment is crucial, and the new model 

of assistance being put into place emphasizes keeping money flowing in the local 

economy, rather than exporting funds as subcontracting percentages to Washington 

and Brussels. If young Afghans have legitimate opportunities for employment, 

recruitment opportunities for the Taliban can be rapidly reduced. The very formation of competent village councils and the existence of district councils immediately 

allow opportunities for reconciliation. Once a new Afghan Government is in place 

and agreement can be reached on a roadmap for governance and development, it 

will be vital to finalize and resource these plans for governance and development. 

A robust plan for building the capability of the Afghan National Army now exists. 

The same type of rigorous plan needs to exist for each of the other key ministries, 

including Finance, Education, Health, Water, Power, Agriculture and Mining. This 

does not mean that the United States needs to resource trainers or funding for each 

of these. On the contrary, for many of these ministries, resourcing should come from 

domestic Afghan revenue and only a small number of advisers will be necessary. 

However, if governance and development is to be taken seriously, it is necessary for 

each ministry, its laws, policies, personnel and organizational maps to be understood. All too often in the past, aid planning has completely bypassed these existing 

structures and built thousands of small projects in parallel, ignoring for example 

that there is already a health or education service in place that requires strengthening. 

The key steps for supporting each function are first to understand the existing 

context, including the organization, and then to agree upon a plan for strengthening 

its capability with the relevant officials, whether through financing, technical expertise, or other resources. The concept of the ‘‘National Program’’ harnesses such inputs into actual delivery of services, so that accountability for outcomes is built into 

the system. As Afghans need to see results broadly, at scale, national programs 

allow for implementation at scale, rather than boutique projects that, while in certain cases desirable, will not have the impact in a short timeframe. This approach 

will allow for progressive ‘‘Afghanization,’’ while making resourcing dependent on 

meeting standards of accountability, transparency, and delivery. The face that delivers development must be Afghan, even if actual delivery takes place from whoever 

can get things done. Planning must start from the outset for what and how will be 

handed over. This means train up and mentor, rather than build big operations that 

cannot be maintained. 

Such plans for reconstruction and development can only work if the military provides security. Insecurity has now spread across much of the country and additional 

19 

forces will be required to protect the population. Accordingly, resourcing the military 

plans is central to the success of efforts in governance and development. 

On the civilian side, changes in how aid is designed and spent are needed. The 

models of the National Health and Solidarity Programs should be generalized. 

Greater commitments to ARTF are needed, or adoption of a ‘‘ministry certification 

scheme’’ whereby funding to a ministry’s national program can flow, dependent on 

certain standards being reached in phases. At the moment, there appears to be a 

greater focus on sending in consultants and experts, rather than focusing on how 

we can equip Afghans to make Afghan institutions self-sufficient. Our experience in 

designing national programs has shown that the most successful programs often 

involved thousands of Afghans but only a handful of foreign experts. It will be a 

considerable task for the United States to unite the thousands of fragmented aid 

agencies—many of which it finances—behind one coherent, rule-based, restructured 

delivery system. 

Changes are required in the way that foreign assistance is delivered, but also in 

the leadership style and policies and priorities of the Afghan Government. It can 

be debated whether governance and development initiatives will succeed if there is 

not an Afghan Government in place that is sufficiently committed to serving its citizens and building its own capability. It is certainly evident that the more committed 

and competent the government leaders are, both at the top, and throughout the system, the more effective development and governance initiatives will be. Therefore, 

current discussions to form a new Afghan administration are critical. Use of strict 

conditionalities and benchmarks can help to incentivize this new administration and 

encouraging the new administration to include competent and honest leaders in key 

positions will be fundamental to the ability to make core government services work. 

Where there are reformers in place, allowing them the space to formulate and execute their own programs, rather than substituting for them, is desirable. 

As described above, concrete plans are also required to grow the economy and create jobs, and to open the space for public discussion and civil society. Afghanistan 

does not have to be poor. It has an abundance of natural gas, lapis lazuli, copper, 

lime, and wonderful agricultural land along with some of the most plentiful water 

resources in the world. With the right system Afghanistan could become a net 

exporter of electricity. Building value chains and webs around key assets including 

agriculture, fruit and vegetable processing and livestock; mining and jewelry; textiles production; and urban services will create jobs and revenue. To support these 

activities, new instruments are required. OPIC has run a very successful program 

offering risk guarantees to investors. This program should be expanded. Other, similar, programs are required to provide small- and medium-sized loans, risk guarantees and insurance. We should also look to using bond financing, enterprise funds 

and other vehicles, in conjunction with careful examination as to how key assets 

and licenses should be allocated. A regional perspective for investment in key economic assets, including water, power, transportation and trade, could catalyze economic growth and build incentives for political cooperation. 

WHO DOES WHAT?

A joint civil-military plan is needed to reflect these plans. The plan should be in 

the nature of a ‘‘sovereignty strategy’’ designed to restore Afghan institutional capability for each key function. The strategy should be negotiated with the new Afghan 

Government, and have clear commitments, benchmarks and redlines for the short 

and medium term. Clear mechanisms of accountability on use of financing should 

be agreed upon, especially regarding collection of revenue, licensing, and procurement. Efforts should be made to ensure that the military and civilian components 

fully understand and are satisfied with each other’s plans, and that the means to 

coordinate at all levels are in place. 

While the United States has the clear lead in the Afghanistan effort, choices as 

to how to build partnerships with other countries and multilateral organizations 

must be made. For a narrative of a global partnership, a U.N. mandate, as obtained 

in late 2001, is important, and can provide the basis for partnership with China, 

Russia, Japan and the gulf, each bringing important contributions. NATO is clearly 

critical to the security effort, but to avoid a West-East narrative, NATO’s efforts 

should be embedded within a U.N. mandate. 

While the United Nations is clearly important for its mandate, and in carrying 

out some key tasks, its operational capability—particularly in management and 

financial accountability—is very questionable. If it had one task to carry out over 

the past 2 years, it was to manage the recent election, and it spent more than 

$250m on a badly organized process. In my view, 80 percent of the flaws in the process were avoidable, with simple planning and design and these same flaws were eviVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:27 Mar 03, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\AFGH0917.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
20 

dent and documented during the 2004 elections and had all been pointed out to the 

United Nations in advance in a letter to the Secretary General. Back in 2001, when 

a small team (of which I was a member) were preparing for the political framework 

and reconstruction process in Afghanistan, U.N. agencies claimed that they would 

use the appeals for Afghanistan to generate the funds to pay off their arrears from 

the 1990s, and much money remains unaccounted for. U.N. agencies still for the 

most part refuse to share their accounts and audits with their governing boards. 

Therefore allocating operational tasks to the U.N. and its agencies, especially in the 

area of aid coordination, should be done with great caution. The U.N. mandate could 

cover the international presence, but tasks will be better allocated to other groups 

best suited for each task. 

Alternative mechanisms should be found for key tasks. The Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, managed by the World Bank, is an important coordination mechanism that is already in place and that backs the Afghan budget. This mechanism 

ensures transparency in audit reports and in the review of the Afghan budget. This 

mechanism should be strengthened. An additional possible mechanism would be a 

World Bank/IMF plan for accountability, which could certify accountability on a regular basis. Dedicated agencies could be established for two activities: The first, the 

establishment and oversight of reconstruction plans and activities. Such an agency 

existed in Afghanistan 2001–04, called the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority, which served to design and launch the key National Programs. A similar entity 

could be established, perhaps as a Joint Commission between the United States and 

Afghanistan. PRTs could then report to such a structure. Another entity dedicated 

to planning and supervising education could be established to train and mentor 

Afghans across its civilian institutions. 

A strategy for Afghan civilian institutions could be, but does not necessarily need 

to be driven by foreign civilian actors: The important factor is that there is a plan. 

A mistake in logic is often to assume that because Afghans need a functioning polity, government and institutions, it is going to be foreign aid bureaucracies that will 

deliver this to them. This is a fatal flaw in logic as these organizations themselves 

are broken and often make the situation worse. A clear strategy and process for 

rebuilding legitimate Afghan governance, regardless of who delivers it, is required. 

From there, functions and tasks can be allocated to different actors. 

CONCLUSION

Getting Afghanistan right rests fundamentally on establishing good enough governance. Gearing the international presence to partner with Afghans in their 

attempt to stabilize their country through reclaiming their sovereignty, only for as 

long as this is required, will reset the partnership and lay the basis for exit of the 

United States and its allies. Now is the time to finalize such a plan, set benchmarks 

for its realization, and ensure it is resourced and supported to enable its implementation. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Ms. Lockhart. An important point of 

view, and I’m confident people will want to follow up on it. 

Dr. Hosseini, again, thank you very, very much for being with us 

and sharing your very important and, you know, on-the-ground 

vision here. We appreciate it. 

[Business meeting takes place from 10:04 a.m. to 10:06 a.m.] 

STATEMENT OF KHALED HOSSEINI, U.S. ENVOY FOR THE U.N. 

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), SAN JOSE, CA 

Dr. HOSSEINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. 

On behalf of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 

for Refugees, I would like to express my appreciation for this 

opportunity to appear before you and to offer my perspectives and 

concerns on the Afghan refugee situation and the overall conditions 

in Afghanistan. 

In the way of background, UNHCR currently has 12 offices 

inside Afghanistan, and it’s had a presence in Afghanistan since 

the late 1980s, and maintained an office in Afghanistan during the 

21 

Taliban rule in the 1990s. At the peak of the Afghan displacement 

crisis in the mid-1990s, some 8 million Afghans fled home and 

went to neighboring Pakistan and Iran. And after the fall of the 

Taliban in 2001, UNHCR began the largest repatriation operation 

in the history of the agency, repatriating, since 2002, some 5 million Afghans. UNHCR also has offices in Iran and Pakistan, 

through which it assists some 2.6 million Afghan refugees who 

have yet to return home. 

I came back yesterday from a 5-day trip to Afghanistan, where 

I met with ordinary Afghans, where I met with refugees, displaced 

people, aid workers, and officials. And I will focus my comments 

today first on the needs of the Afghan refugees, particularly those 

who have recently returned to Afghanistan from neighboring countries, and then on the needs of the Afghan people, in general. 

On the issue of refugees, some have reintegrated successfully and 

have resumed relatively settled lives. But many that I met continue to struggle. It has been a major challenge, to say the least, 

for many returnees to restart their lives in a country where basic 

services have collapsed. Some of the returnees that I met last week 

lived in squalid, abandoned public buildings or in tents or on government land in dry, remote, and inaccessible areas. They complained to me of the lack of basic services, like water, food, schools, 

clinics, and, most importantly, jobs. Some had a great fear of the 

coming winter. 

Given these difficult realities, maybe it’s not surprising that 2.6 

million Afghans still live in exile in Iran and Pakistan. Eighty percent of them have lived there for more than two decades, and half 

of them were born there. And after 30 years of living in exile, and 

giving the difficult conditions inside Afghanistan and the state’s 

low absorption capacity, many of them may not wish to ever come 

home. 

It is important, however, that return and reintegration be made 

as attractive as possible to Afghan refugees. And for that to happen, existing conditions inside Afghanistan have to be remedied so 

the environment within the country is more conducive to the social 

and economic well-being of refugees. That means Afghan authorities, in partnership with the international community, have to 

work on critical pull-factors like security, employment opportunity, 

access to land, water, shelter, education, and health facilities, in 

order for repatriation to become a more attractive option, and for 

refugees to become self-sufficient and reintegrate successfully. The 

needs of returning refugees and IDPs have to be included in national programs. 

UNHCR can help, but its expertise lies in emergency response 

and in legal, physical, and material protection. As part of the initial reintegration process, UNHCR provides shelter, water, transport and family grants. But, returning refugees need more. They 

need security, they need stability, they need economic and social 

opportunities. And though UNHCR can certainly act as a partner 

and as an advocate for these needs, it cannot provide them, and it 

has to rely on reconstruction and development partners to create 

the socioeconomic conditions and opportunities that are required 

for durable return. And so, to that end, donor support and continuing engagement of the international community is indispensable. 

22 

On a broader front, let me say that Afghanistan has been in a 

state of conflict for almost 30 years. The country and its population 

made huge sacrifices during the Soviet occupation. Every family 

that I met and that I spoke to had been touched by tragedy, tragedy on a scale that few of us here can imagine. 

Many Afghans believe that the final and violent chapter of the 

cold war was inked with their blood. Today, my impression is that 

Afghanistan faces yet another critical and pivotal moment in its 

recent unstable history. I believe there’s an opportunity in Afghanistan—an opportunity to build on the progresses that have been 

made since 2002. And despite the sobering realities, we shouldn’t 

lose sight of the fact that there has been progress. For instance, 6 

million children are enrolled in some 9,000 schools around the 

country. Afghans have greater access to the health sector. Millions 

of kids have been vaccinated. Commerce and enterprise inside 

Kabul are appreciably increased. Infrastructure is booming. And 

technology, especially telecommunication, appears poised to leapfrog Afghan business development. There’s free press and greater 

personal freedom. 

But, progress hasn’t been fast enough or deep enough, and all of 

us would like to see it reach more Afghans. And there are many 

challenges that can undermine the progress that we have seen. The 

decline in refugee repatriation this year, for instance, is an indicator that security remains a major obstacle, and that the economy 

has not grown quickly enough, especially in rural areas. Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Poverty, in 

fact, is the No. 1 killer in Afghanistan. Average life expectancy is 

one of the lowest in the world. Twenty-five-thousand-plus women 

die every year during childbirth. That’s more deaths than those 

caused by all the suicide bombs, IEDs, and airstrikes combined. 

And though, historically, there is no tradition of extremism in 

Afghanistan, poverty can make people—especially unemployed, 

aimless, young people—more vulnerable to exploitation by extremist groups. 

Military intervention is an important part of counterinsurgency, 

but it’s only part of it. Counterinsurgency has to include social and 

economic intervention, as well. When people have a roof over their 

head, food on the table, and a school to send their kids to, they’re 

less likely to be influenced by extremist forces. 

These are huge challenges to be addressed, and they shouldn’t be 

minimized. During my visit, all the Afghans that I encountered expressed their concerns about the future and some disappointment 

about the present. They clearly expected more from their government, but none of them wanted to go back to the past. And I see 

no reason why we should allow ourselves to be defeatists and let 

the country slide back toward its troubled past. The Afghan people 

don’t want the moon, and we should secure the modest levels of improvements in people’s lives that will earn us such good will and 

make such a difference in Afghanistan’s stability. 

There are opportunities to be seized, then, if all parties accept 

the responsibilities. That begins, first and foremost, with the 

Afghans themselves. They have to do their part. This is their country, after all. Afghan leaders have to acknowledge that their people 

23 

expect more from them, and rightfully so. They have to restore people’s faith in governmental institutions. 

But, I stress this, that the international community, for its part, 

must maintain its continued support for the Afghan people, and it 

has to be patient. I’m aware of the current debate in this country 

about the Afghan war, and I feel deep empathy for the families 

who have lost loved ones in Afghanistan. I know I speak for most 

Afghans when I say how grateful Afghans are for their service and 

sacrifice. And contrary to what some have said, Afghans are not an 

ungrateful people. But, let’s not let the sacrifices of our servicepeople—men and women—be in vain. Let’s be patient. Let’s consider that no country in history has been able to establish a functioning state, a performing government, a strong economy, and a 

stable society in just a handful of years. 

Afghans are a proud people, and they don’t want to be a source 

of regional and international instability. They don’t want to be 

known for producing refugees and economic migrants around the 

world. They want no more and no less than other people in developing countries want for their children and themselves. If the basic 

essentials can be provided—housing, education, and health care— 

I truly believe that this closure can be brought to this dark chapter 

of the country’s recent history. 

Mr. Chairman, I again appreciate the opportunity to testify 

before you, and I’m happy to answer any questions that you or 

other members of the committee may have. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hosseini follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. KHALED HOSSEINI, U.S. ENVOY FOR UNHCR, SAN

JOSE, CA 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on behalf of the Office of the 

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) I would like to express 

our appreciation for the opportunity to appear before you today to offer our perspectives and concerns regarding the Afghan refugee situation. 

My name is Khaled Hosseini, and I am the U.S. Envoy for UNHCR, a position 

that I have held since 2006. 

UNHCR currently has 12 offices inside Afghanistan. It has been working inside 

Afghanistan since 1989 to support the return and integration of Afghan refugees. 

Since 2002, more than 5 million Afghans have returned to their homeland, including 

more than 4 million with UNHCR’s support. UNHCR also has offices in Pakistan 

and Iran, through which we continue to assist some 2.6 million Afghan refugees. 

I returned yesterday from a 5-day trip to Afghanistan, where I met with returned 

refugees, ordinary Afghans, aid workers, and officials. I will focus my comments 

today first on the needs of Afghan refugees, particularly those who have recently 

returned to Afghanistan from neighboring countries, and on the needs of the Afghan 

people in general. 

In a nutshell, my impression is that Afghanistan faces yet another pivotal moment in its recent, unstable history. There is an opportunity to consolidate the clear 

progress that has been made since 2002 in a number of areas—education, health, 

energy, trade, communications, and construction. Progress in these sectors has 

assisted one of the largest repatriation movements in history. 

No country in history has been able to establish a functioning state, a performing 

government, a strong economy, and a stable society in just a few years. After the 

level of conflict that a poor country like Afghanistan has suffered for three decades, 

we should not be surprised that recovery and development will take some time. 

To address these issues, my strongest recommendation is that the international 

community maintain its continued support for the Afghan people. During my visit, 

all the Afghans that I encountered expressed their concern about the future and 

some disappointment about the present. They clearly expected more from their govVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:27 Mar 03, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\AFGH0917.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
24 

ernment and more from the international community. But none of them wanted to 

go back to the past. And I see no reason why we should allow ourselves to become 

defeatists and let the country slide back toward the past. I see no reason why we 

cannot secure the modest level of improvement in people’s lives that would earn us 

some good will and make such a difference to Afghanistan’s stability. 

In my judgment, the international community—not just the U.S. Government— 

must press the Afghan Government to demonstrate greater commitment to improving the lives of its citizens. But we, the international community, must also hold 

ourselves accountable. Could we have organized ourselves more coherently? Could 

we have worked more cost-effectively? Could we have prioritized our support more 

logically to address the most pressing needs? I believe the answer to all these questions is ‘‘Yes.’’ I am nevertheless convinced that the challenges Afghanistan faces 

can be overcome, difficult though they may sometimes appear. 

BACKGROUND

UNHCR is charged by the international community with ensuring refugee protection and identifying durable solutions to refugee situations. The agency’s mandate 

is grounded in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 

Protocol (hereinafter ‘‘the Refugee Convention’’), which define a refugee as a person 

having a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 

political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. 

UNHCR has had a presence in Afghanistan since the late 1980s and maintained 

an office during the Taliban rule in the 1990s. At the peak of the Afghan displacement crisis in the mid-1990s, some 8 million refugees had fled their homes to neighboring Pakistan and Iran. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, UNHCR began the 

largest repatriation operation in the history of the agency. Since 2002, UNHCR has 

repatriated more than 5 million Afghans. Despite such a large number of returns, 

approximately 1.5 million Afghans remain in Pakistan and approximately 1 million 

in Iran. In recent years, there has been a decline in returns, which peaked in 2006. 

Security remains of great concern to Afghans residing in the surrounding region, 

and surveys demonstrate that the major additional challenges to return are primarily social and economic in nature. 

UNHCR ACTIVITIES

Upon returning to Afghanistan, families face difficulties establishing a new home 

and securing employment. The single most pressing need of the returnees is shelter. 

UNHCR has established a shelter program in Afghanistan in close cooperation with 

the Afghan Government. Since 2002, we have built close to 200,000 houses for 

returning refugee families in rural areas. The government’s own National Land 

Allocation Scheme offers the potential to assist landless returnees who so far have 

not been able to benefit from UNHCR’s shelter program. To date, more than 300,000 

plots of government land have been identified in 29 provinces. 

UNHCR focuses its efforts in helping the Government of Afghanistan and local 

communities develop strategies to address the reasons for displacement. In addition, 

the office assists the government in strengthening its capacity to plan, manage and 

assist the return, reintegration, and protection of refugees and internally displaced 

persons (IDPs). 

UNHCR also provides protection and assistance to IDPs. The displacement situation inside Afghanistan is highly complex, with factors such as insecurity, economic 

hardship, and cultural traditions providing a backdrop. In 2008, more than 235,000 

IDPs were identified throughout the country. The majority of these individuals were 

displaced due to protracted conflict, poverty, and livelihood failure in the southern 

region of Afghanistan. 

Any refugee or IDP return and reintegration operation is a complex process. 

Afghanistan’s is perhaps the most challenging of all. It was clear on this recent visit 

that security and employment are the most essential requirements. It was also evident, however, that resolving land and property issues in rural areas is assuming 

greater importance as enlarged families return to their places of origin. 

After 6 years of some of the highest levels of return ever achieved by a UNHCR 

operation, signs of limited absorption capacity were apparent. As such, continued 

high levels are unlikely until greater security allows a more stable government and 

a more vibrant economy to take root. Overloading the fragile reintegration conditions would be counterproductive and could generate internal displacement and 

even out migration. It will require the coordinated interventions of assistance actors 

and government authorities to build greater absorption capacity in the future. 

25 

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Although I met with some refugees who have reintegrated successfully and have 

resumed relatively settled lives, many continue to struggle. It has been a major 

challenge for many returnees to restart their lives in a country where basic services 

have collapsed. The returnees that I met lived in squalid, abandoned public buildings or in tents, or on government land in dry, inaccessible areas. They complained 

to me of the lack of basic services like water, food, schools, clinics, and jobs. They 

had a great fear of the coming winter. This isn’t entirely surprising. Afghanistan’s 

population increased by 20 percent in a mere 6 years. This would be a huge challenge for any country, even a developed one. For a poor nation like Afghanistan, 

decimated by 30 years of war, this is an absolutely enormous figure. Given these 

difficult realities, maybe it’s not surprising that 2.6 million Afghans still live in exile 

in Iran and Pakistan. Eighty percent of them have lived there for more than two 

decades, and nearly half of them were born there. After 30 years of exile, and given 

the difficult conditions inside Afghanistan and the state’s decreased absorption 

capacity, many of them may not wish to return home. 

It is important, however, that return and reintegration is made as attractive as 

possible. For that to happen, existing conditions inside Afghanistan have to be remedied, so that the environment within the country is more conducive to the social 

and economic well-being of refugees. That means that Afghan authorities and the 

international community have to work on critical pull factors like security, employment opportunities, and access to land, water, shelter, education, and health facilities, in order for repatriation to become an attractive option and for refugees to 

become self-sufficient and reintegrate successfully. The needs of returning refugees 

and IDPs have to be included in national programs. 

It is also important that UNHCR continue to view repatriation and reintegration 

as an important and achievable solution for as many Afghans as possible who wish 

to return. This will have the additional virtue of addressing the concerns expressed 

by the neighboring asylum countries that repatriation receives insufficient support. 

To that end, it is essential that both the Afghan authorities and the international 

community provide both political and financial support to Afghanistan’s National 

Development Strategy for the return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs. 

UNHCR’s expertise lies in emergency response and legal, physical, and material 

protection. Returning refugees also need security, stability, economic, and social 

opportunities. UNHCR can act as the advocate for these needs. However, beyond the 

initial reintegration assistance that UNHCR provides in shelter, water, transport 

and family grants, we depend very much on our reconstruction and development 

partners to create the socioeconomic conditions and opportunities required to sustain return. To that end, donor support and the continued engagement of the international community and the Government of Afghanistan will be critical to sustaining refugee repatriation in the years to come. 

I believe there is an opportunity to build on the progress that has been made 

since 2002. And despite the stream of negative news, we should not lose sight of 

the fact that there has indeed been progress, in a number of areas. For instance, 

over 6 million children are enrolled in some 9,000 schools around the country. 

Afghans have greater access now to the health sector; millions of children have been 

vaccinated against preventable illnesses. Commerce and enterprise are appreciably 

increased. Infrastructure is booming in cities like Kabul, and technology, particularly telecommunications and wireless technology, appear poised to leapfrog business development in Afghanistan. There is free press and greater personal freedom. 

But progress has not been as fast and as deep as all of us here would like, and 

it has not reached as many people as we would like. And there are many challenges 

that can undermine the progress that we have seen. The decline in refugee repatriation this year, for instance, is an indicator that security remains an obstacle and 

that the economy has not grown quickly enough, especially in rural areas. Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Poverty is in fact the No. 

1 killer in Afghanistan. More than 25,000 women die during childbirth every year. 

That’s more deaths than those caused by all the suicide bombs, IED attacks, and 

air strikes combined. And although historically there is no tradition of extremism 

in Afghanistan, poverty can make people, especially young people, more vulnerable 

to exploitation by extremist groups. It has been stated many times that improved 

security alone will not end the insurgency. Investment in the political, economic, 

social, and cultural spheres is also necessary. 

There are opportunities that can be seized if all parties accept their responsibilities. The Afghans, certainly, have to do their part. This is their country after all. 

Afghan leaders have to acknowledge that their people expect more of them, and 

rightfully so. They have to restore the people’s faith in the state institutions, and 

26 

demonstrate leadership, vision, and a greater commitment to improving the lives of 

the population. For its part, the international community will need to organize its 

assistance more coherently around commonly agreed objectives. 

CONCLUSION

Afghanistan has been in a state of conflict for almost three decades now. The 

country and its population made huge sacrifices during the Soviet occupation. 

Almost every family has been touched by tragedy on a scale that few of us can imagine. Many Afghans believe that the final violent chapter of the cold war was inked 

with their blood. 

Yes, Afghans do not want to be a source of regional and international instability. 

They do not want to be known for producing refugees and economic migrants 

around the world. They want no more and no less than other people in developing 

countries want for themselves and their children. If the basic essentials can be provided—housing, education, health care, and job opportunities—I sincerely believe 

that a new chapter of hope and happiness can be brought to the Afghan people. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much. 

And thank you, all of you, for helping to set the stage. There are 

a lot of questions that flow out of your testimonies, and I’m confident that colleagues here will pursue them. 

What’s interesting to me is—I was sitting here thinking—I was 

listening to your testimony, Dr. Hosseini, and to you, Ms. 

Lockhart—both of you describing, obviously, an urgent humanitarian need, an urgent challenge, in terms of nation-building— 

state-building—the challenge of governance. On the other hand, 

we’ve had troops on the ground and we have been in Afghanistan 

for 8 years now—we’re nearing the 8-year anniversary right now— 

and the test for us, in terms of policy—I mean, if you took away 

the al-Qaeda, and you took away the attacks, then there would be 

a challenge to us as to what our foreign policy aid program ought 

to be and what the levels of assistance we might give are. But, 

right now, our challenge is also to try to figure out what the level 

of military involvement—troop involvement—ought to be; indeed, 

what our security interests are, and how they can be furthered 

with respect to Afghanistan. 

The President of the United States has defined the mission in a 

more limited fashion, really, by saying that our goal is to take on 

al-Qaeda, dismantle them and/or eliminate them, and to prevent 

them from having a safe haven and a sanctuary from which they 

can attack the United States, and to prevent the destabilization of 

Pakistan, where we have an even larger and more vital interest. 

So, the test for us, here, as we think about our policy, going forward—and we need to ask you questions about the nation-building 

and the relationship of it to those interests—but, the key here is 

really to try to hone in, I think, on those interests, and how we best 

serve them. 

One of the essential questions we need to get at—I think, 

Ambassador Crocker, you can, perhaps, help us do that—is, sort of, 

you know, while you were there for a period of time, the Pakistanis 

proved themselves capable of living pretty comfortably, with a 

pretty awful Taliban regime. It didn’t end Pakistan’s capacity to 

govern, it didn’t threaten them existentially. Now, today that’s 

changed a little bit, obviously, because of the Haqqani network, the 

Baitullah Mehsud network, the presence of al-Qaeda, and other 

things. But, the question for us—and I want to ask you to begin 

here—is—help us to understand—define for us what the real 

impact of the Taliban is today, and might be, on the stability of 

27 

Pakistan. And would it, in fact, be an existential challenge to them 

if the Taliban took over in Afghanistan today? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. That is, indeed, a key question. And, as you rightly point out, we’ve seen an 

evolution. During the 1990s, Pakistan did, indeed, work out a 

modus vivendi with a Taliban-led government in Afghanistan, and 

had relative stability at home. But, that has changed. We have 

seen the evidence—you pointed to the Haqqani network, the efforts 

of the now late Baitullah Mehsud, the developments in the Swat 

Valley. We have seen an increasing militancy within Pakistan, not 

restricted just to the border areas, that is growing to the point 

where, for many Pakistanis, it does raise at least the question of 

an existential threat. 

Now, I think there are other questions in Pakistan—again, about 

our staying power—that still cause some hedging of bets there. The 

ultimate nightmare in Pakistan would be to see us once again 

decide we’re done—we’re done in Afghanistan and we’re done in 

Pakistan, a repeat of the 1990s—leaving them with what, by that 

point, may be a truly dangerous enemy. So—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me—can I just interrupt you for a moment 

there? I don’t think—I mean, let me make it clear, from my point 

of view, Senator Lugar’s point of view—I think, the committee— 

there’s no talk, here, and there is—I don’t want anybody even 

beginning to think that there is a contemplation of not being committed to Pakistan, or of understanding the challenge of Pakistan. 

And there—the legislation we passed, which you referred to, states 

that commitment, and we understand the importance of Pakistan. 

There’s no talk of diminishing that. 

What the question really begs is this, To what degree is Afghanistan, in fact, left to its own devices or with a lesser footprint, at 

jeopardy? Are our interests, in fact, challenged if we had a different 

approach to Afghanistan? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I think they would be challenged. Simply 

put, Mr. Chairman, I see reciprocity, here. I don’t think long-term 

stability can be brought to Afghanistan without Pakistan also stabilizing. But, the reverse is also true. I don’t think that Pakistan 

can face up to the challenges of militancy—not just on its western 

borders, but in the center of the country—if that militancy succeeds 

in Afghanistan. We all know the history of the Durand Line, its 

porosity, its artificial nature. There are more Pashtuns in Pakistan 

than there are in Afghanistan. So, a militant ascendency in 

Afghanistan, I think, will be severely destabilizing for Pakistan. 

The CHAIRMAN. And is there any degree—yesterday it was suggested by Rory Stewart that perhaps the presence of troops and the 

manner of the mission in Afghanistan is, to some degree, destabilizing Pakistan, that it’s adding to the capacity—coupled with the 

corruption of the governance, it’s adding to this ability of the 

Taliban to, kind of, you know, find recruits and make mischief. 

Ambassador CROCKER. My experience is now somewhat dated. I 

left Pakistan in 2007. But, as of that time, I knew of no senior Pakistani figure, military or civilian, who was advocating a United 

States withdrawal from Afghanistan. There was lots of criticism 

over how well we were prosecuting the mission, but it was taken 

as a given—it—in my contacts there—that that mission needed to 

28 

be prosecuted; perhaps in better or different ways, but that we 

needed to stay engaged there. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I’m not suggesting—I mean, I think, just 

a plain old withdrawal would be disastrous on any number of different fronts. I think what we’re trying to figure out is how to accomplish the mission, what level of mix of military and governance 

improvement and nation-building, et cetera, is appropriate. I think 

some people are very fearful that right now there’s sort of this nondescript, you know, loosey-goosey, ‘‘We’ve got to do this here and 

do this here and build this, and we’re going to train the military, 

and we’re going to do this and that,’’ and—we heard, yesterday, 

that to properly effect a counterinsurgency—which has grown—I 

mean, the Taliban are now in control of 37 percent of country; 

whereas, a year ago, they were in control of 20-something percent. 

And that growth, you know, has to make you pause and say, ‘‘OK, 

you know the western part, the northern part haven’t yet reached 

it,’’ but we heard fears expressed that that may happen. Therefore, 

to be successful, you have to begin to think about what’s the real 

troop ratio that you need to provide the security for adequate 

counterinsurgency. And counterinsurgency, we heard yesterday, is 

a distinctly different mission from counterterrorism. 

The mission, as I understood it from the President, was more 

counterterrorism in Afghanistan and stabilization with respect to 

Pakistan. So, we’ve got to figure out if we’re, sort of—you know, is 

there a—automatic and unavoidable mission creep, here? Or is 

there an inadvertent mission creep, here? Or is there something in 

our automatic response to how we protect Pakistan that requires 

us to, you know, sort of feel that you have to do the counterinsurgency? That’s the—I think the biggest tension here is, What level 

of counterinsurgency do you need to support the counterterrorism 

effort and the destabilization piece? And we need to, you know, 

kind of, obviously, pursue it further. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to explore this thought the chairman has mentioned, 

which came up in our hearing yesterday, that—essentially, as one 

witness said, the major reason why we ought to have stability in 

Afghanistan is to help perpetuate stability in Pakistan, that one 

reason for having troops in Afghanistan is simply because Pakistan 

has nuclear weapons. In the event of the disintegration of governance in Pakistan, various factions might take hold of the weapons. 

The threat of al-Qaeda, or whatever the group it may be, gaining 

control of warheads or other instruments that change the situation 

a great deal is more harrowing than anything we’ve discussed. 

Now, this is sort of a change in context from most of our discussions of Afghanistan. Of course, we’ve looked at Afghanistan in 

terms of how villages could become more sufficient, how agriculture 

yields might rise, how drug abuse might be curtailed; in essence, 

how more children could go to school and how women’s rights 

would be fostered. This is the nature of the sort of discussion we’ve 

been having. The notion that Afghanistan is important strategically to the United States because of Pakistan is a different twist. 

Furthermore, there have been discussions in the press—even in 

today’s press that the stability in Afghanistan may be threatened 

29 

if the people do not accept President Karzai as their leader. It’s not 

farfetched, some would say, that, given that next door in Iran, people continue to take to the streets to protest the results of the June 

12, 2009, elections. There is a situation in which, even with our 

government, we want to have dialogue with Iran, as you’ve suggested, but the question remains as to with whom it should be conducted. Furthermore, if we reach an agreement, are the internal 

conditions there stable enough to ensure it is implemented given 

the situation I’ve described? 

What I want, I suppose, from each of you is some idea of the stability of potential governance at the highest levels, quite apart from 

the regional levels and so forth, in Afghanistan? And what would 

it mean for this stability in the event of, as the Europeans are 

quoted in the press today as saying, a third of the votes for President Karzai possibly being invalid? That is a very significant 

charge, and it suggests that the ballots that we heard, yesterday, 

that have been prepared for a runoff, might be used. But, then others say, ‘‘Well, no, you don’t understand. The weather gets bad. The 

difficulties of conducting a November election in Afghanistan are 

not the same as they are in the United States.’’ And furthermore, 

the whole thing might get shifted into next year, which would lead 

to continued discussion about stability in Afghanistan, when we 

were originally talking about how Afghanistan helps Pakistan 

remain stable. 

Now, finally, in preface, people are saying Pakistan, all things 

considered, has been pretty stable this past year. Despite the predictions that President Zardari might have grave difficulties after 

3 months, he seems to be sailing along. However, we may have to 

worry much more about stability in Afghanistan. So, no wonder, 

perhaps the President says, ‘‘OK, we’d better hang on for a while 

before we get into a recommendation of troop levels, and a national 

debate with the public opinion in this country that seems to have 

a different timeline.’’ And what I’m wondering is if we’re not kicking the can down the road, even in our decisionmaking. I did not 

want to be hypercritical in my opening statement, but I just 

observed that General McChrystal’s report always seems to be 

there. We going to discuss and discuss and discuss it, and digest 

it, and all sorts of people are going to look at it, and so forth, and 

then suddenly we come along, after an indefinite period, and begin 

to talk about troop levels. 

Now, does anyone have any comment? General Craddock, do you 

have any thoughts about these ruminants that I have suggested? 

General CRADDOCK. Well, thank you, Senator Lugar. 

Indeed, it’s a bit of a conundrum; there’s no doubt. I think Senator Kerry’s opening comments, ‘‘This is not winnable by military 

means,’’ absolutely; I have said that for the past several years. The 

military—the security effort will set the conditions, then, for goodenough governance, as Clare Lockhart said, for investment, for 

development, for the creation of jobs. 

As you go about the country—and I also have gone about—it’s 

about clean water, education, a job, electricity. How hard can that 

be? Obviously, it takes some security to do that. 

I think, from the security perspective—and this is, again, a 

NATO perspective—security and stability—there are two fundaVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:27 Mar 03, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\AFGH0917.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
30 

mental issues there. One is the funding the insurgency, whether it 

be the Taliban, HIG, Haqqani, whatever the case may be. And 

that’s largely—and has been largely; it’s down somewhat—from the 

narcotics business, and it has to be addressed, and it continue to 

be addressed, and we have to take away the wherewithal, the contributions, from that, after the value is added, and that’s in the 

processing from the raw opium paste into the heroin, and that’s 

why the facilities are so important to be attacked. 

Senator LUGAR. General, let me interrupt that point, because 

many would allege that, in addition to the insurgents getting the 

money, the government is getting the money, that the—— 

General CRADDOCK. Yes, sir. 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. There are two great recipients. 

General CRADDOCK. And that—that’s in my opening statement, 

and indeed, it fuels the corruption. Now, I know the numbers are 

down. Right now, the latest estimates—a $3 billion industry, of 

which some $1 billion stays in country and $200 to $300 million to 

the insurgents. Where does the rest go? Corruption. Private and 

public. Has to be addressed. 

But, the security will only create the conditions, then, for what 

Rory Stewart says the Afghan people are morally bound to do for 

themselves, which is govern better. 

Senator LUGAR. So, that’s the basis for our security, then, to 

give—— 

General CRADDOCK [continuing]. It is. We—— 

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. A framework for Afghan people to 

progress. 

General CRADDOCK. I think it is protect the people, put an umbrella—a security umbrella around the municipalities, around the 

villages and towns, so that there can be investment, development, 

jobs created. And when the people get that, they will push the 

insurgents out. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, my time is completed, but I appreciate that 

answer. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, for holding all these 

hearings on one of the most important questions facing our Nation 

at this time, and we’re honored to have all these distinguished witnesses here. 

These hearings have contributed to a much-needed debate 

regarding our efforts in Afghanistan. And while there may be disagreement on some issues, one point of consensus that has clearly 

emerged, and that the chairman just restated, is that no one thinks 

we should abandon Afghanistan. The United States must remain 

engaged in helping the Afghan people resolve the many difficult 

issues facing their country, through diplomatic means and through 

ongoing assistance. 

However, I do believe that we need to examine whether the current military strategy may potentially be counterproductive. I’m 

concerned that our massive military presence may be contributing 

to instability in the region, and could be unwittingly undermining 

our chief national security priority, which is, of course, relentlessly 

pursing al-Qaeda’s global network. 

31 

Helping the Afghan people build a stable nation for themselves 

is an important long-term goal. We must consider how best to 

achieve this and whether this requires a departure from our current, overly military-centered approach. 

Ambassador Crocker, Admiral Mullen, and Special Envoy 

Holbrooke have acknowledged at these hearings that there is a 

danger that U.S. military operations in Afghanistan could drive 

militants into Pakistan and further destabilize that nuclear-armed 

country. And the DNI—Admiral Blair—has testified that, ‘‘no improvement in Afghanistan is possible without Pakistan taking control of its border areas and improving governance, creating economic and educational opportunities throughout the country.’’ Do 

you agree that the key to preventing the spread of militancy in the 

Afghan-Pakistan border region is improved governance and effective counterterrorism in Pakistan, as opposed to our military operations in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, I would certainly join General 

Craddock—and, I think, most of the members—in the strong view 

that there is no purely military solution to problems in Afghanistan, or, indeed, in Pakistan. There is a military component to a 

broader solution. The military—and I apologize for treading in 

General Craddock’s area—talks about ‘‘troops to task.’’ Defining the 

task, I think, is absolutely essential at this point. And again, Mr. 

Chairman, I commend the committee for its focus on this. What is 

it that we believe needs to be done to bring, as Ms. Lockhart puts 

it so well, good-enough governance to Afghanistan or to allow the 

Afghans that opportunity? That is where long-term stability will 

lie. The military then becomes a component of that. We need to 

define our goals, our end states, the milestones along the road to 

that end state, if you will, and then—but, I think, only then—can 

we really talk in a coherent way about force levels and force 

composition. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, sir. 

Dr. Hosseini, recent polls have shown the majority of Afghans 

oppose an increase in U.S. troops. Do you think there’s a danger 

that our disregard for this preference could provoke more militancy? 

Dr. HOSSEINI. I think there’s no question that there’s a shade of 

public opinion in Afghanistan that is beginning to see the security 

forces in Afghanistan as an occupation. My sense is that, compared 

to a few years ago, there are more people now who view the security forces in a negative light. And the civilian casualties have a 

very, very significant impact on that public opinion. 

That said, on balance, I think most Afghans know that if the 

security forces were to leave, things would be a whole lot worse. 

And this is because they understand that the Afghan institutions 

and the Afghan security forces are not strong enough to assure the 

country and its people of a normal, or even seminormal, state of existence. At the end of the day, you know, any state has to exercise 

a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in the greater interest 

of the civilians at large. And the Afghan state, at this point, is not 

in the position to do that. 

So, do the Afghans want foreign troops on their land? No. I 

mean, they really would prefer that there not be. They’re, you 

32 

know, independent, sovereign people. But, do they see it as a necessary thing still today? I think most Afghans would concede that 

point. 

Senator FEINGOLD. But, as to the question of an increase in 

troops? 

Dr. HOSSEINI. I think, when you speak to Afghans on the ground, 

their fear is not more engagement, their fear is that there will be 

less engagement. There is a fear of abandonment, in Afghanistan. 

People have a very long memory, and they remember back to what 

happened at the end of the civil—I’m sorry—the Soviet invasion, 

where, for what—as you can put it, we’ve decided that it was no 

longer in our strategic interest who ran Afghanistan. At this point, 

I think the Afghan concern is with less engagement, not with more 

engagement. 

That said, Afghans do have a concern with how troops do behave. 

You know, that’s not to say that they approve of everything. You 

take an 18-year-old from this country and send them to Afghanistan, and what seems like a rudimentary and poor and unsophisticated society is, in fact, very nuanced and sophisticated in the way 

in which customs, manner, speech, posture is transmitted and understood. So, there’s a steep learning curve for the troops there, but 

I think the current leadership is addressing that. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Of course, I have tremendous respect for your 

knowledge and views on this. All I can say, for the record, is that 

these polling numbers, that may or may not be accurate, certainly 

reflect a view against our troops staying there for too long, and certainly against an increase. 

General Craddock, in a recent letter to President Obama, the 

heads of state of Great Britain, Germany, and France said it was 

time to discuss metrics and timelines for international activities in 

Afghanistan. And while I understand that you favor staying the 

course in Afghanistan, do we at least agree that, by making clear 

that we do not intend to occupy the country indefinitely, we may 

be better able to build support among the American and European 

people for our efforts in that country? 

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Senator. 

Yes, I would definitely agree with that. I don’t believe the intent 

there is to ever occupy and stay. The key, as has been pointed out, 

is the enabling and development of the Afghan national security 

forces. As the SACEUR for the last 21⁄2 years, I repeatedly told 

NATO nations, the very first thing we need are more trainers for 

the army and the police, particularly the police. The issue is more 

a public security issue than a national security issue for the people 

of Afghanistan. And a competent, trained, noncorrupt police force 

is important. 

So, I think that what we have to do is to lay out, then, a timeline 

for development of the Afghan security forces, and hold both international support to that and the Afghans to that, so that we can, 

one, establish some parameters, some milestones—and meet 

them—and then measure effectiveness. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Corker. 

33 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And thank each of you. I think this is an outstanding panel 

and—as we had yesterday—and each of you have unique contributions. 

Ambassador Crocker, I want to thank you, especially, for your 

tremendous service. And I think the testimony that you and General Petraeus gave as we looked at a new strategy in Iraq was most 

important. And I think you alluded, in your opening testimony, 

how having people from the field here may be the most important 

thing we can do to actually ascertain what is the next best step. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I hope that’s going to happen soon. I hope it’s 

going to happen in the next few weeks. I notice there’s a resistance, 

for some reason, for that to happen, but I could not agree more. 

I would also say that the themes that—before you move to our 

strategic interest in Afghanistan—seems to me there are two 

themes that—sort of underneath that. One is that we’re there; 

meaning that—something for us, I think, to remember into the 

future—once we put our flag up in a country, our flag is up, and 

we’re very resistant to ever leaving. So, that’s an underlying theme; 

and, No. 2, that we’re sort of trying to prove to Pakistan and 

Afghanistan that we’re not fair-weather friends. So, there are, sort 

of, two underlying themes that make—that I know weigh much of 

what’s happening, before you even get into the strategic-interest 

piece, and that’s pretty prevalent in both countries when you’re 

there. 

So, let me just ask you this, Ambassador Crocker. What expectations should we have in Afghanistan? What worries me, to some 

degree, is, we had a success in Iraq, based on a surge; we had a 

political movement, that you helped create with the Sunni Awakening and getting them working on our side. There have been discussions about doing the same with the Taliban. We’re obviously 

talking about additional troops. What are the things that we 

should expect in Afghanistan? And what are the lessons that are 

not necessarily transferable, and those that are? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, sir. 

I’m probably the least qualified person in the room to talk about 

Afghanistan in that degree of depth. I would say, though, that I 

think there is—as the chairman alluded to earlier, there is a linkage between terror and insurgency. My experience has been that 

terror can find a nest within a broader insurgency. In other words, 

I cannot see how, if we define our interests narrowly, as eliminating a terrorist threat—out of Afghanistan—that we can do that 

with any real degree of assurance without also having a successful 

counterinsurgency strategy. And that, again, in my not very well 

informed view, takes us into the range of issues that Ms. Lockhart 

and Dr. Hosseini touched on. I don’t think there is much of a 

record anywhere in the world of successful counterinsurgencies 

without good-enough government—governance. 

Now, how far does this go? There, I am absolutely unable to 

state, but clearly there is, I think, an obligation for the administration to so state. That review is obviously underway. I think the 

sooner it can be brought to the point of articulation—again, what 

are our goals, why they are important, how they will be achieved, 

34 

and how the different components link up—I think, is essential for 

the American people. 

Senator CORKER. I think, in fairness, the administration has 

been rhetorical about this narrow mission, to make it sound good; 

but, in essence, all the things Ms. Lockhart has laid out are components of a counterinsurgency. 

And so, Ms. Lockhart, I think you did a very—I mean, basically 

you’re talking about, in some degree, state-building or nation-building. I mean, I think we all know that those are the metrics that 

have been laid out. And so, we have this very poor country, that’s 

been very poor for a long time. There are no oil resources, like 

there were in Iraq. And so, we’re talking about building an education system and a health system, a water system, an electricity 

system, a security system, a police system. What are your thoughts 

about how we should view our long-term financial commitments? 

Because, let’s face it, on the budget they have now, they couldn’t 

pay for even a fraction of just the police that they have there. I’m 

just wondering if you might help us there. 

And I’m not sure we see any future for resources to do that in 

Afghanistan, for the midterm. 

Ms. LOCKHART. Certainly. I think, as we’ve discussed, the civilian 

governance effort has been significantly underresourced, and an increase in resources is certainly going to be necessary. 

I think we probably need to look at two different scenarios for 

resourcing. One scenario is, if there is a process for rebuilding a 

legitimate government and a team of Afghan leaders in place who 

can govern responsibly. And, I think, in that scenario we’re looking 

at far fewer external resources that will be needed, because 

Afghanistan will move more rapidly to collecting its own revenue. 

And while Afghanistan doesn’t have oil, it does have the potential, I believe, to be raising somewhere between $5 to $10 billion 

a year in its own revenue, because it does have very rich mineral 

resources, including copper, gold, lapis, amethyst, iron. It does have 

the basis for a successful agricultural economy. It was the largest 

exporter of fruits and nuts to the region, if not the world, in the 

1970s. And it has a hardworking population and the potential for 

textile production, urban services, and a construction industry is 

certainly there. So, I think we need to move to put in place an economic strategy that will gear it to collect its own revenue. 

To answer your specific question on what resources are needed, 

I believe that we need to be looking at a medium- to long-term 

commitment of resources of probably roughly a doubling of existing 

resources on the civilian and governance side. But, if we move aggressively to raise Afghan revenue, or to enable the Afghans to collect their own revenue, that commitment could taper down in the 

second 5 years of the decade. 

Senator CORKER. If I could ask one more brief question. 

Thank you very much. 

General Craddock, how many al-Qaeda are there in the world? 

General CRADDOCK. Senator, I have no idea. Card-carrying 

al-Qaeda? I have no idea. Sympathizers, logistics support, finance 

support? I have no idea. 

Senator CORKER. Card-carrying. Give me—— 

35 

General CRADDOCK. I don’t know. I think that the—one of the 

reasons it’s so difficult in our search is because of—there’s no hierarchy that we would recognize. 

Senator CORKER. You know, the number 2,000 has been thrown 

out, and people dispute that, and I don’t want—I don’t know what 

the number is. 

The reason I asked the question—it’s somewhat rhetorical—our 

efforts toward al-Qaeda have now created a situation where we’re 

involved in two major nation-building/state-building efforts—Iraq 

and Afghanistan. And—it’s just a fact—and I hope that, somehow 

or another, we’ll figure out a different strategy, versus going 

around the world building states and nations almost out of whole 

cloth. 

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator 

Corker. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank our witnesses for your presence here today, 

and the contribution you’re making to this discussion and debate. 

I think we can have a real debate about these policies, and I think 

it’s critical that we do. 

I want to especially thank General Craddock and Ambassador 

Crocker for your service to our country under the most difficult of 

circumstances. 

And I wanted to start with you, Ambassador Crocker, about a 

conversation that you and I had. And I don’t expect you to remember any of this—I know a lot of Members of Congress visited you 

while you were in Iraq—but this was August 2007. Senator Durbin 

and I were with you at that time, and we had a dinner meeting. 

And General Petraeus was with us, as well. And I was very critical 

at the time—and I still am—about the language of Washington 

when we describe the conflict in Iraq, but also, now, the conflict in 

Afghanistan. Language like ‘‘victory and defeat,’’ ‘‘win or lose,’’ 

which, in my judgment, is both inaccurate and misleading. And I 

think it’s important, as we get the policy right on troop levels and 

on nonmilitary commitments, as well, that we also get the language right, because the American people don’t have, will not, and 

should not, have patience for a political debate in Washington that 

doesn’t ask and answer some tough questions. 

At the time, you said something I’ll never forget. I want to ask 

you if the language that you used then is still relevant here, in 

what you learned from, not just your service in Iraq, but other 

service, as well. You said, at the time, that the words you used to 

describe success in Iraq were two, ‘‘sustainable stability.’’ And I’d 

ask you, in the context of Afghanistan and how we deal with this 

strategy with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan, are those words 

still operative? And anything else you can tell us about how you 

think we can achieve that. 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Senator. 

I do, indeed, remember the conversation, and I would share your 

view about the use of language. Language does count. I think, if 

anyone ever cared to go through the interminable records of the 

testimony that General Petraeus and I provided to the Congress on 

several occasions, I don’t think you’ll find a single occasion in 

36 

which either of us used those terms—to ‘‘win,’’ to ‘‘lose,’’ ‘‘victory,’’ 

and ‘‘defeat’’—because, in many respects, those are not for us to 

determine, as—— 

Senator CASEY. I said ‘‘Washington’’ to leave out some names. 

[Laughter.] 

Ambassador CROCKER. Thank you, Senator. 

Yes, I believe the concept of ‘‘sustainable stability’’ is valid, 

although I may now shamelessly steal Ms. Lockhart’s phrase of 

‘‘good-enough governance,’’ which I think is another way of saying 

much the same thing, of steps taken, measures taken, that will 

work, in terms of the society in which it counts, be it Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan. It may not be our model, and it may be very far 

from perfect; but, if it provides a situation in which the security 

forces of that country are capable dealing, themselves, with whatever challenges to stability there are, then I think you’ve got ‘‘sustainable stability.’’ 

What that will look like in Afghanistan—and, again, what the 

steps are to achieve it—I’m simply not competent to provide. I do 

think we’ve got the people out there who can do that, and I think, 

again, that what the administration needs to do is to lay out that 

framework. And then, since I had the experience of testifying 

before Congress, I would like to spread the opportunity to my current colleagues in the field to come and do the same, because I do 

think that field view is extremely important. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

And I have questions that I won’t get to, for both ends of the 

table. But, I probably have time for one more. I wanted to ask Ms. 

Lockhart a question about what’s sometimes referred to as a ‘‘civilian surge,’’ an increase in the number of nonmilitary personnel on 

the ground, which is a low number now in Afghanistan, and is 

building. 

I was very impressed, as we always are, in August, when I visited both countries and saw the respect that General McChrystal 

had for the nonmilitary folks, but how well-integrated they were, 

and how central they are to the mission—State Department folks, 

Department of Agriculture, USAID, DEA, and so many others. I 

know this is a hard question to answer, but if you can do your best 

in the minute or so we have left—one, how many civilians do you 

think are needed or, do you have a sense of those metrics? And, 

two, how do we get it right with regard to our international partners, who, candidly, in some places are helping us a lot, and in a 

lot of significant parts of the world they’re not doing much at all 

to help us. So, if you can address that, in terms of numbers or in 

terms of commitment. I know that’s a hard one—— 

Ms. LOCKHART. Certainly. I think one of the first principles to 

work from is that what we’re seeking to build is the space and tools 

for Afghan leadership and Afghan ownership. And I believe that, 

while the key focus on the civilian side is institution-building, it actually requires quite a small number of civilians. Certainly more— 

we need more civilians than there are at the moment. I probably 

wouldn’t want to put a number on it. It probably isn’t more than 

1,000. But, the key—— 

Senator CASEY. In terms of ‘‘1,000,’’ is this what we would need 

eventually, or kind of where we are now? 

37 

Ms. LOCKHART. A total number, particularly if there’s going to be 

U.S. leadership. There are, actually, tens of thousands of foreign 

civilians in the country at the moment, but most of them are fragmented amongst NGOs, U.N. agencies, and—— 

Senator CASEY. OK. 

Ms. LOCKHART [continuing]. All sorts of efforts. But, I think, a 

total of 1,000. 

What is required, though, is a really thorough look at the skills 

gap on the Afghan side. And I think we should regear our focus to, 

What does it take to build up Afghan capability? And that does 

mean vocational training, secondary education, and tertiary education. Back in 2001, no investment was made in secondary and 

tertiary education, and vocational training; and if you’re educating 

Afghans to age 11, you’re not going to get a competent civil service. 

So, that’s the lacuna I think we should be looking at. 

In terms of getting the international partnership right, I think 

that relates to your earlier comment very much, that we should 

move away from the language of war, of victory, and of loss to— 

back, perhaps, to some of the original language used in the 2001– 

02 period of a global effort to assist the Afghan people establish 

stability or legitimate governance. And then, based on that, look at 

a division of labor and burden-sharing. I think we need, perhaps, 

to look more to the economic multilateral organizations, like the 

World Bank and the ADB, that have robust approaches to accountability, while a U.N. mandate remains important. And then look at 

a division of labor with Europe and what countries like China, 

Saudi Arabia, and gulf countries and Japan can do to contribute as 

part of a global alliance. 

Senator CASEY. Doctor, I had a refugee question, and, General, 

I had a question for you, but I’m out of time. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Casey. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

I want to get back to one of the many excellent points that Senator Lugar mentioned during his extensive question, and ask about 

the election. 

Now, today is the 17th. We’re supposed to hear some definitive 

results. I’m told the Afghan Central Election Commission has 

released the results, showing that President Karzai has received 

54.62 percent of the vote. Now, the international community is still 

waiting for the Independent Election Commission to make its 

assessment. 

Senator Lugar raised the possibility that as many as one-third 

of President Karzai’s votes might be invalid. I wonder if any of you 

can tell me when we can expect to hear something from the Independent Election Commission. It seems to me that in listening to 

the administration, that there’s almost a resignation that President 

Karzai is going to be the President for the next term, and that 

somehow those results will be allowed to stand, to the extent that 

either he will be reelected on the first go-around or he will win a 

runoff. So, I hope several of you can comment on this. 

But, let me start with Dr. Hosseini. You’re here on behalf of the 

UNHCR, I realize. But still, you’ve been in the area. You’ve talked 

38 

extensively—I assume you’ve talked across the spectrum of the ethnic groups in Afghanistan. So, what is your assessment of the support among the populace for President Karzai—of their feeling with 

regard to the validity of the election results and what might 

happen? 

Dr. HOSSEINI. Well, I think, when you speak to ordinary 

Afghans, there’s no question that they express some disappointment in the performance of the Afghan Government so far. I think 

many of them expected more, and I—again, rightfully so. 

As far as the elections, clearly there have been some irregularities with these elections, and they’ve been well publicized. Precise 

scale of these irregularities, and whether they will force a second 

round of the elections, is up to the ECC and the IEC to determine. 

And they’re, you know, examining the suspect ballots, and doing a 

recount. 

In my view, it’s important, obviously, that this investigation be 

thorough, but also that it be relatively expeditious. And I say this 

as an individual and not as a—with my UNHCR hat on. You know, 

I think it’s to the detriment of the country to have a prolonged 

period of political paralysis. It’s to the detriment of the legitimacy 

of the elections, and I think it would exacerbate the Afghan people’s already high level of anxiety about the elections, and cast 

doubt on the credibility of the outcome. So, I think it must be done 

relatively quickly. And, of course, the outcome has to be acceptable 

to most Afghans, and have at least the semblance of credibility. A 

difficult task, indeed. 

On the elections, I do want to put the entire process in some kind 

of perspective and say that, as flawed as the elections are—and we 

shouldn’t compare the second-ever Presidential elections in Afghanistan to a process here in the States or in France; let’s be clear 

about that—but it was an extraordinary logistic achievement to 

even hold these elections; even more so than the last time around. 

Three thousand donkeys carrying ballots; thousands of people who 

had to be trained in the middle of conflict in insurgent-wracked 

areas, under the threat and intimidation of the Taliban; hundreds 

of female searchers that had to pat down anybody in a burqa, to 

make sure it’s not a man carrying a suicide jacket. Those are the 

sorts of logistics we’re talking about. So, from a logistical standpoint, it was an extraordinary achievement. 

And the second point of perspective that I would offer is that, for 

30 years now, the traditional means of the transfer of power in 

Afghanistan has been through violence, through the gun. With 

these elections, the Afghans have an opportunity to demonstrate 

that those days are in the past and that they can effect a peaceful 

transition of power. And maybe we, the international community, 

ought not to rush to judgment, and we ought to wait and let the 

Afghans resolve this peacefully. 

Senator WICKER. Ms. Lockhart, would you like to comment about 

that? And do you believe President Karzai has majority support 

among the population of Afghanistan? 

Ms. LOCKHART. I think that if the European Union’s announcement today is correct, that they suspected a third of the votes were 

invalid, then it will be demonstrated that the incumbent doesn’t 

have majority support. And I would agree with Dr. Hosseini, that 

39 

I think there is considerable anxiety amongst the population, and 

a loss of trust in their government over the last few years. What 

we’re seeing at the moment on the ground is the Electoral Complaints Commission investigating the irregularities of process that 

may take several weeks, and I very much agree that that process 

should be resolved as quickly as possible, because the vacuum in 

leadership will be problematic on the ground. 

I think there are four options, very quickly, from here on: 

One is to accept the victory of the incumbent. The risk of this 

approach is that given the alliances with illegitimate forces that 

have been made, I don’t think this will assure good-enough governance over the coming months and years, and rather, may see a further deterioration in governance. 

A second approach is to accept that and then have a robust counterinsurgency effort to build good governance, bottom-up. That 

hasn’t been tried in other insurgencies in the past, and the jury 

will be open as to whether it could be successful. 

A third option, I think, would be to accept the victory of the 

incumbent, but have a robust agreement on benchmarks for 

accountability, going forward. And I believe that the Afghan people 

will be looking for the international community to take a robust 

approach on asking for standards of accountability and benchmarks 

of reaching good governance. 

And the last option would be to—almost to go back to the drawing board. If the ECC is to invalidate a sufficient number of ballots 

or one or more of the candidates or the process as a whole, that 

will open the question of moving to new elections, a new peace 

agreement or—a new Bonn-type agreement. 

Senator WICKER. Well, I’m sure you agree that it should be done 

expeditiously. You have any idea when we might hear something 

definitive from the ECC? 

Ms. LOCKHART. I believe that’s specified in the ECC regulations, 

that they must report back within a specified amount of time after 

the certification of results. I believe that’s a month, but I could 

check that. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Anyone else on the panel wish to touch on this? 

[No response.] 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Wicker. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Senator Lugar. And I would like to 

express my appreciation to the chairman and to you for having put 

together this extraordinary variety of expertise in the panel today. 

I don’t know any American public servant who has had more 

time on the ground, intellectual dedication, and emotional commitment than Ambassador Crocker, and it’s great to see you here 

today, sir. 

And, Dr. Hosseini, as someone who spent a good part of his life 

as a novelist, and also having worked in the dread Hollywood off 

and on for about 15 years, I have incredible admiration for the literary achievement that you were able to bring in ‘‘Kite Runner.’’ 

I’ve often said that you can communicate to people on an emotional 

level through a piece of literature in a way that they come to unVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:27 Mar 03, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\AFGH0917.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
40 

derstand things probably better than any other way, and it’s just 

an amazingly powerful film, and I congratulate you what it took to 

put together all of that. It’s so rare to see a piece of literature that 

can hit all the issues of loyalty and respect and father-son relationships and all those sorts of things. It was just an amazing achievement. 

I would like to begin by expressing my appreciation, actually, for 

what Senator Corker said, because it does address the difficulty 

that we have up here in this particular issue. And that is, when 

you look at where we seem to be going, here, from a national strategic perspective—I mean, from a perspective of American national 

interest, in terms of how to use our assets, where we put our 

expenditures, and in terms of national treasure, whether we should 

build up an infrastructure to address an enemy that is basically a 

mobile enemy. 

And we saw this in Iraq, quite frankly. You know, we built up 

a huge infrastructure to address two different sets of problems. 

One was the issue of international terrorism, which is intrinsically 

mobile, and decided to relocate, after a period of time. But then 

also to have to pick up the pieces of what we had done following 

our invasion, and try to repair relationships and move Iraq forward. In terms of the advantage that the forces of international 

terrorism wished to have, that was pretty good for them, long-term. 

We spent hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars, and they 

remain active. 

We’re looking at something similar here in Afghanistan, and I 

know we’ve got national mission creep going on now, you know, 

talking about whether we really are going to attempt to, basically, 

build a state here. And there’s going to be a debate about this. 

And, you know, I look at what happened in Somalia a couple 

days ago. You know, if you’re really talking about going after the 

forces of international terrorism, that was a pretty effective way to 

do it—coming over the horizon, hitting an element of international 

terrorism, leaving, not leaving behind an infrastructure, and being 

able to have the same maneuverability as your enemy has. 

On the other hand, we are moving forward with a different 

debate here, and we will have that debate. The question is not 

whether there is no military solution, which has sort of been 

agreed upon; it is whether the military component of this solution 

is one that is going to work. And I say all that because I would 

like to ask you, on your panel here, to look at this from two different perspectives. First, at what point do we reach a tipping point 

with the United States military, where the presence and the operations might actually be counterproductive? This has been raised 

before. But, there’s an additional component to this that I have a 

good deal of concern on, and that is, to what extent, in Afghanistan, can we actually build a national army? 

I’ve asked this question to General Petraeus and General 

McChrystal. I asked it to Admiral Mullen the other day. This is not 

a country that has had experience with a national army. It’s a 

country with a lot of national pride. But, the best that I can see 

is that, at one period in the mid- to late-1900s, there was a national army of about 90,000. If you take the police with this, we’re 

talking about 250,000. 

41 

So, on the one hand, at what point does our presence reach a tipping point, where it’s counterproductive, where people believe that 

we are an occupying force, or whatever you want to put on it? And 

then, can we actually do the other piece of this, in terms of the history of the country? 

And, Ms. Lockhart, I’d actually like to get your views on that, as 

a starting point. 

Ms. LOCKHART. I do believe that there is potentially a point at 

which presence may be counterproductive, but I don’t believe we’ve 

reached that yet; and I think the only way that can be tested or 

ascertained is through polling and observation of the population. 

I believe, like Dr. Hosseini, that, on balance, while there are 

shades of narrow criticism that the presence is an occupation, those 

are very much in the minority, and the majority of the population 

seeks very much and hopes very much that the U.S. commitment 

remains, and the international partnership remains, for the longterm stability of the country. 

In terms of the possibility of building national institutions, 

whether the army or other institutions, I believe it absolutely is 

possible, and the remarkable success of the efforts since 2001 to 

build up the Afghan National Army—I had the honor to observe 

the first battalion graduate and walk down the street, and it was 

welcomed literally with the cheers of the population. And the pride 

of the people in that institution was remarkable, because they 

deeply understand that it’s through institutions like that that their 

daily needs, most basically their security, can be met. And we’ve 

seen that in the Afghan National Army and then across the different institutions where Afghans, with a minimal commitment to 

training and education, do rise to the challenge of managing their 

own institutions. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Ambassador Crocker, I remember you and I had an exchange 

several years ago with the situation in Iraq, and one of your 

strongly made points was that the Iraqis of all different ethnicities 

had come together in a national army. In fact, your point had been 

that, I think, more than 200,000 Shia had actually died fighting in 

the Iran-Iraq war. What are your thoughts about the situation with 

respect to Afghanistan? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Well, the fortunate thing for me, Senator, 

is that I represent no one but myself these days, so as uninformed 

as my opinions may be, at least I’m entitled to have them. And 

since you asked to express them, I do believe that what we have 

seen thus far shows us, with all of the shortcomings in terms of 

manpower, materiel, and even abilities, that the Afghans are capable of developing and fielding national forces; as I understand it, 

perhaps the army more so than the police, but even with the police. 

And as you noted, sir, while Afghanistan has a history of challenges to central governments, it also has a history of a national 

military. And my sense is that Afghans are quite proud of the tradition of that military in the country’s history. 

So, I think it can be done. I think it is being done. But, as we 

saw in Iraq, this takes time. The early tests that—as you know, 

that the Iraqi security forces faced almost took them apart. So, I 

think that we and the Afghans have to be careful not to put more 

42 

of a burden on these developing forces than they can bear at this 

time. Like so many things in this part of the world, whether its 

Iraq, Pakistan, or Afghanistan, this will take time. And nowhere, 

I think, is that more the case than it is in the development of these 

security forces. 

Senator WEBB. My time has expired, but I appreciate both of 

your answers. And, of course, the difficulty is the other side of that, 

that the more time we have with the size of the American presence, 

the more risk we have of being viewed in a different light. But, I 

thank you for your comments. 

Thank you. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Webb. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Lockhart, thank you for all the work that you’ve done in 

Afghanistan, and especially in the post-September 11th period, 

when you were there on the ground, helping to lay out the foundation on which we can move forward in Afghanistan. 

You laid out four distinct options for governance in this post-election, but you didn’t say whether you thought there was a preferred 

means of action. Do you think one of those options is preferable? 

Ms. LOCKHART. I think the—well, thank you, for your kind 

words—I think the first two options I outlined, of letting the current governance arrangements continue unchecked, or that plus 

trying to build governance bottom-up while we have a vacuum, in 

essence, at the top, are not going to be desirable, and probably 

would not lead to success. 

I think the two other options, one of accepting the victory of the 

incumbent, but putting in place very strict conditions—a roadmap 

and agreeing on benchmarks, particularly on financial accountability, and asking for some devolution of power, and putting in 

place checks and balances—would be one preferred option; and the 

other would be to go back to the drawing board, and putting in 

place a new transitional authority, which would probably govern 

for a 2-to-4-year period, and one of whose central tasks will be 

organizing a more robust set of elections next time, which will 

require, I think, this inquiry into what went wrong and what the 

institutions that are necessary to have a successful election, one of 

which will be a census. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And does that run the risk of creating a perception that the international community is making the determination about the future of Afghanistan and sort of erasing the elections, even recognizing that the elections might be flawed? 

Ms. LOCKHART. I think that option would only be possible if the 

ECC, which is a domestic Afghan—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. OK. 

Ms. LOCKHART [continuing]. Institution would first rule that 

either one of the—one or more of the candidates, the process, or a 

certain number of the ballots were invalid. So, it would have to rest 

on that domestic determination. And then, a lot of care would have 

to be taken to ensure that the process moved forward in accordance 

with the Afghan Constitution; and there are provisions within the 

Constitution that would allow that to take place. 

Senator SHAHEEN. OK. Thank you for that clarification. 

43 

Dr. Hosseini, this question is really both for you and for Ms. 

Lockhart, I think. And I, like Senator Webb, very much appreciate 

your books, and think that they’re wonderful and have probably 

done as much as any policy in this country to make Americans care 

about what happens in Afghanistan. So, thank you for that. 

What do you see happening on the ground, in terms of coordination of aid among the international entities that are in Afghanistan 

and the United Nations? And several of you have referenced that. 

And what should be done better to improve that coordination and 

to deal with the corruption and the fraud that seems to be happening too much there. 

Dr. HOSSEINI. Thank you for your kind words. And I may have 

to defer a good chunk of this question to my more qualified colleagues on the panel. But, there’s a perception in Afghanistan, 

among civilians, that of the billions of dollars that have come to 

Afghanistan, not a whole lot of it has reached the Afghans themselves. There’s a sense of disappointment, that even though 

Afghanistan has been the focus of international attention now for 

several years, by and large, for average Afghans, the quality of life 

has not improved significantly. Most Afghans are still lacking for 

basic social services, the same as they were a number of years ago. 

I will just say that, of much of the money that comes to Afghanistan, only a fraction of it ends up in the pocket of the Afghans 

themselves. So much of the money is spent on providing security 

for the foreign presence, the—within the aid organization and the 

bureaucrats—to paying the salary of, you know, consultants. Much 

of the resources and the services that are utilized in Afghanistan 

are outsourced and therefore don’t provide opportunity and employment for the Afghans themselves. And, of course, much of the 

money bypasses the Afghan Government itself, kind of reinforcing 

the image of the government as sort of being an impotent bystander. And I think those are all issues that have to be addressed. 

But, I’m going to defer to my other colleagues about more on the 

issue. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

I don’t know—Ms. Lockhart, Ambassador Crocker, General 

Craddock, who would like to take a shot at that? 

Ms. LOCKHART. Just a few observations. 

I think it’s a terribly important point, because I think the failure 

to coordinate aid has actually fed into the corruption within the 

Afghan institutions. 

I think the first requirement is not being afraid of putting a 

robust set of conditions for aid, either through a World Bank IMF 

program or a U.S. or multilateral agreement. And central to that 

will be insisting on transparency, particularly in licensing and revenue, as well as expenditure and audits that should be released to 

the Afghan public. 

Second is putting the Afghan budget and institutions central. 

The Afghan budget is the policy coordination mechanism on the 

ground. I think we’re making a mistake when we ask the U.N. to 

coordinate. U.N. mandate is important. The U.N. cannot coordinate; it’s the Afghan budget. And we need a roadmap for each ministry. We’ve got a roadmap for the Afghan National Army; we need 

the same type of roadmap for the other institutions. 

44 

And then, I think, we have got a coordination mechanism; it’s the 

ARTF, the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which is managed 

by the World Bank, and it acts as a dual-key system on the flow 

of money. And using that, or developing a parallel type of trust 

fund for U.S. resources, would be essential. 

And then where NGOs, U.N. agencies, or private companies are 

contracted, then I think we need to apply the same set of robust 

requests for transparency and accountability, which, to date, have 

not been in place. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador Crocker, do you have anything that you want to add 

to that? 

Ambassador CROCKER. No, ma’am. 

Senator SHAHEEN. OK. 

Thank you both, Ambassador Crocker and General Craddock, for 

your service, as well. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Senator Kaufman? 

Senator KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the 

ranking member for holding these hearings right now, right in— 

timely. I mean, I think this decision that’s going to be made right 

now is one of the most important decisions we’re going to be dealing with in a Senate where we’re dealing with a lot of important 

decisions. And bringing the light to this thing is just—and having 

the panels we did—panels today and the panel yesterday have been 

excellent, just the right people. And so, I just want to—I cannot 

commend you enough for doing this. 

And I want to thank everybody on the panel. I mean, just having 

the ability of listening to what you have to say is so helpful in trying to deal with this. 

I just have a few questions. One of them is—it’s mentioned by 

a number of Senators, and also in the popular press—that the 

Somalia raid is kind of a model for United States operations in 

Afghanistan. Is the Somalia raid a model for United States operations in Afghanistan? 

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Senator. 

A complex question. I’m not sure it’s a model. I think it’s a tool. 

And I think it has already been going on in Afghanistan over the 

past several years, through the United States counterterrorism 

forces, not so much the NATO counterinsurgent capability, with 

significant results. But, again, with a hierarchy that’s amorphous— 

cells operating, as opposed to a vertical hierarchy—it’s very difficult to be able to make long-term gains, because someone always 

then steps up. However, it is an ongoing, day-to-day operation done 

very precisely. It’s what you don’t hear that’s probably more important than what you hear. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Great. 

Anyone else? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, I think that’s a very important 

question, that certainly is beyond my expertise to adequately answer, but it is, I think, worth posing to those in the administration 

more qualified. 

My sense is that the Somalia model, if you will, probably cannot 

be successfully replicated in Afghanistan. I think the dynamics 

there are more complex. I also think, frankly, that given that the 

45 

ISAF in Afghanistan, General McChrystal, is perhaps the most 

capable special operations commander that this country has ever 

produced, that if he thought it could be done that way, I think we’d 

be seeing different sets of recommendations. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Great. Thank you. 

There’s a discussion about expediting the elections, that Senator 

Wicker raised, and I think, obviously, that would be key to everyone. Does anyone on the panel—I met with Abdullah Abdullah 

last—2 weeks ago. I don’t think—there’s always a chance that he 

might throw in with Karzai, but I think it’s remote. But, just for 

the sake of this question, can anybody think of any way to expedite 

the end of this election without considering that there’s a—some 

kind of a coalition government? 

Ms. LOCKHART. Senator, it’s a very important question. I’m not 

sure there is a way to expedite it. I think there will be a tendency 

to allow the ECC to complete its investigations and then make a 

determination on whether the process has met the standards of a 

‘‘fair enough’’ election. I think the only thing that could bring it to 

a resolution earlier would be the coming together within the 

Afghan political elite of enough of the candidates—critically, 

Abdullah and Karzai, but potentially others within the political 

elite and—who would agree to form a type of unity government. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I mean, I think it’s key that—I mean, this is 

the worst possible time for this to happen. So, if anybody comes up 

with any ideas—I hear a lot of talk about expediting it, but I’ve not 

heard a single person give us a way to, kind of, get to where we 

have to get to. So, I’d—if you come up with anything, I would—I 

would very much appreciate it. 

Let’s talk about the civilian surge for a second, because Senator 

Lugar’s raised that a number of times, and it’s really, really important. How—one of the problems is recruiting people—how do we 

improve recruitment of Civil and Foreign Service officers, to move 

away from—as we move away from reliance on contractors? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Senator, if I could just take one element 

of that, that I—drawing from my experience in Iraq, we need more 

efficient mechanisms in government to be able to respond to complex contingencies like Iraq and Afghanistan. Simply put, there are 

not enough people, period—not enough people with the skill sets 

that are required in these contingencies—within the Foreign Service, either State or USAID. It requires a process to bring in able 

talent from other agencies and from the private sector. And that 

still, frankly, does not work very well. It’s the—it’s called the ‘‘31/ 

61 process’’ and I can tell you that it’s painful in the extreme to 

make that work—work quickly—getting the right people in the 

right places. 

I know that the administration has put more emphasis on building up what’s called SCRS within the State Department, as a 

means of providing a civilian reserve, if you will. I would applaud 

that. But, a great deal more needs to be done to put in place the 

structures that will allow an administration to identify and quickly 

bring to the field the numbers and the skill sets that simply do not 

exist within the established foreign affairs agencies. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I think it’s good you point out the difficulty 

of this. People kind of glaze over this. Senator Lugar’s been talking 

46 

about this quite a while, and this is really key. If we’re going to 

be fighting wars of counterinsurgency in the future—we just kind 

of glaze over this—it isn’t there. You know, we’re trying to get people now, and we’re having a hard enough time in Afghanistan. But, 

planning down the road is really, really important. 

Can I just ask you another question, kind of, on your experience 

in Iraq? And it’s two things. One is, how is—we’re trying to get the 

Taliban to come over, kind of like we did with the Sons of Iraq in 

Anbar province. Would you comment on whether you think that’s 

possible in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador CROCKER. I do think it’s possible. Again, I’m not in 

a position to comment with any detail on the dynamics there. But, 

once again, I think we’ve got the right people in this fight. Both 

General McChrystal, of course, with his substantial experience in 

Afghanistan and in Iraq, where I had the privilege of serving with 

him; and then General Petraeus—in many respects, the architect 

of the Awakening strategy—of course, now has oversight of both 

campaigns. So, I have a high level of confidence that we do have 

the people engaged on this that can figure out what can be done 

and how to do it. 

All of that said—and again, my colleagues, Ms. Lockhart and Dr. 

Hosseini, are far more qualified to speak to it—it is—it’s going to 

be a very different and more difficult process. The Sunni insurgency in Iraq was not deeply rooted in time or in ideology. The 

Taliban, of course, are both. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you very much. And I want to tell you, 

I think everyone agrees that our success in Iraq was based on the 

people we had there, and obviously one of the very, very best people was you. And the people we have in Afghanistan—General 

McChrystal, Eikenberry, Rodriguez, McChrystal—we’ve got a 

good—Holbrooke covering the whole region—we’ve got a good team 

over there, too. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kaufman. 

Let me follow up on a few things, if I can. The—sort of a parallel 

to a couple of questions that Senator Kaufman was asking—but, on 

the issue of the Taliban, which is central to this—actually, before 

I get to that, I want to ask you, General Craddock, because it’s important to our understanding of what the options are and the 

Taliban, as Supreme Allied Commander you were commanding 

NATO forces, and you’re very familiar with the tensions within 

that block at this point. My sense is that we are losing our allies’ 

enthusiasm for this effort and that a number of them—I won’t go 

into the details here, but—have been very reluctant all along to engage. Their troops don’t engage. And looking to them for additional 

support, here—I mean, I think, essentially, we’re going to kind of 

be on our own, here, and I think we’ve got to kind of—you know. 

Is that a fair assessment? 

General CRADDOCK. Senator, I think that’s a fair assessment, 

from a military perspective. I would agree, there is unequal burden-sharing among the alliance with regards to those who will and 

those who won’t. I do think, however, there’s opportunity with 

NATO allies to ask for trainers in areas where it may not be as 

risky and they may have some political viability. I think they 

47 

should be asked for civilian surge capability. There’s plenty of that 

in Europe. If you knock down the wall between NATO and the EU, 

you might be able to access a lot of that capability that we need 

there. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I’d like to examine—that’s a good thought 

there, but I want to examine this attitude a little bit. Do they know 

something that we don’t know? 

General CRADDOCK. Well, I can’t speak for them, in terms of 

what they know. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, but you’ve had these conversations. I’ve 

had these conversations, and you have too. There is an attitudinal 

difference about the threat. There’s a threat-definition difference, 

isn’t there? 

General CRADDOCK. Indeed. They—— 

The CHAIRMAN. But, isn’t that important for us to understand? 

General CRADDOCK. Well, I think it’s—I think it’s been discussed 

here. In Europe, terrorism is viewed as a police issue when it’s visited upon their people, and you deal with it then, as opposed to 

stopping it before it gets into your country. So, the military generally does not deal with terrorism to the extent that we do here 

because of the attacks. 

The CHAIRMAN. But, I think their perception goes, actually, 

deeper than that; I think there is a sense—there’s a different sense 

of, sort of, how you manage this over a period of time. 

You’re nodding your head, Ms. Lockhart. You want to share your 

perception, then? 

Ms. LOCKHART. Um—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Your body language got you in trouble, here. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. LOCKHART. I think—twofold. I would agree that there is 

absolutely a waning enthusiasm amongst public opinion in Europe. 

I think that’s partly because there has yet to be a credible articulation of exactly what the strategy is going to be, and particularly the 

failures in Helmand, in Britain, is infecting the public debate. And 

that’s, again, partly because in Helmand there was not a credible 

articulation of a governance and development strategy. So, it 

remains open to convince Europe. I do believe the public opinion 

could be reconvinced if that strategy was articulated, because 

the—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Your strategy involves a pretty significant commitment of resources, investment, personnel, civilian side—I mean 

it really is a nation-building strategy. 

Ms. LOCKHART. It is. And I believe that there will be more appetite in Europe and other countries for engagement on training, as 

General Craddock articulated, and on the civilian surge elements, 

particularly in areas like capacity-building and economic investment. So, a sensible division of labor, going forward, may be to look 

to support from allies, particularly in Europe and Japan, for that 

civilian type of assistance, recognizing that the United States will 

continue to bear the brunt of effort on the military side. 

The CHAIRMAN. And, General Craddock, we’re going to get some 

folks who are more, hopefully, operational, with respect to Afghanistan itself, as we go down the road, here. But, from the military 

perspective, in order to do the kinds of things that Ms. Lockhart, 

48 

and others, have talked about doing, in building the governance, 

building the—the capacity-building and so forth—you’ve got to 

have some security. But, is it possible to do the security without 

the kind of current engagement in civilian collateral deaths that we 

currently have, or is that a—are the insurgents always capable of 

guaranteeing that you have that, even if you don’t want it? And is 

that a great danger, here? 

General CRADDOCK. It’s my judgment that, in irregular warfare, 

and given what we know about the insurgents, that they were 

always capable of arranging that situation. I can give you chapter 

and verse, over and over again, of operations and targeting that 

looked fine, but didn’t turn out that way, for myriad reasons; but, 

again, the use of civilians as shields is very difficult to combat. 

Now, having said that, I think we can continue to work to minimize. I think that the tactical guidance put into place by General 

McChrystal recently has gone a long way, and will continue to do 

that, to minimize that pushback. 

If I may, a point that Ms. Lockhart raised. The British strategy 

in Helmand; the Dutch strategy in Uruzgan; the strategy here or 

there; the United States strategy in Paktika or in Nangarhar—one 

of the problems we face is the arrangement of NATO. Nations view 

their own provinces as a fiefdom—or provinces, as the case—unlike 

the United States which has a regional command, so they deal with 

that at the expense of dealing with the country as a whole. And 

it has caused us problems over time. 

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that. I think one of the most significant problems has been the absence, for almost 8 years, of unified 

command and a unified strategy. In fact—and people need to 

understand this; this is important as we think about Afghanistan— 

we have traveled this journey for almost 7 years without a strategy. There was sort of a—you know, just a continuum, at the 

expense of Iraq. And I think most people have agreed that troops 

were diverted, resources were diverted, focus was diverted. So, it 

has only been in these last months that people have begun to really 

hone in and say, ‘‘How do you adjust?’’ 

The challenge, as I wrote, back last February, is the clock ticking, the amount of time that’s been lost to the corruption, to the— 

you know, to the other things—and can you make it up? 

And I want to come back to that for a moment, Ambassador 

Crocker, if I can. With respect to the Taliban, you made a very perceptive observation in answer to Senator Kaufman’s question, and 

you noted the historical cultural depth of the Taliban versus the insurgency in Iraq. There are different—however, we keep hearing 

about, sort of, different shades of Taliban. And can you share with 

us, perhaps, you know, to what degree can the Taliban be sort of 

divided, in a way, here? Can you—is there a diplomatic, slash, 

civilian ability to reach out to them and, in fact, give them something that they want more than being Taliban, and therefore isolating the really hardcore Taliban? Or are we dealing with a monolithic entity? 

Ambassador CROCKER. Mr. Chairman, I would make a few observations on the methodology, if you will, and then perhaps Dr. 

Hosseini or Ms. Lockhart could—would have some comments more 

49 

on the nature of the Taliban as they see it, because that’s not my 

area of expertise. 

The principle we followed in Iraq was exactly what you suggest. 

It was talking to anyone who would talk to us, without regard to 

what they may have done to us in the past, trying to find splits, 

fissures, differences of view, people who would be susceptible to 

whatever blandishment we might offer, to break up an insurgency, 

if you will, to pull people either to our side or at least into the neutral zone. And we did that without spending a tremendous amount 

of time trying to figure out what ideological persuasion might exist 

here or there. We just kind of went at it. We—you know, the 

word—we got the word out that we’re open for discussion. 

It seems to me that a similar approach has great potential also 

in Afghanistan, because the Taliban is not a monolithic organization, they are not card-carrying members. There have to be many 

different motivations and levels of commitment, so it’s by seeking 

ways to engage, to discuss—direct, indirect—that I think will find 

what the limits are of shrinking an adversary down to the smallest 

possible number of irreconcilables. As we put it in terms of Iraq, 

you want to reduce the number of people who absolutely have to 

be killed to the smallest number possible. And I think, again, the 

same methodology will work in Afghanistan. 

But, my colleagues would be far more knowledgeable on the nature of what we’re dealing with there. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to comment, either of you, on 

what—just quickly? I want to try to—— 

Dr. HOSSEINI. Sure. I agree with the Ambassador. The Taliban 

are not a monolithic movement, if they ever were. The term 

‘‘Taliban’’ now refers to a cluster of different groups that more or 

less answer to different leadership. So, part of the challenge of— 

and again, I’m sort of out of my element here, but—just part of the 

challenge of negotiating with these people is that there’s no—in the 

absence of clear leadership structure, it’s difficult to determine who 

exactly you speak to. 

And, in addition, at the present time, it seems to me, the Taliban 

have no incentive, really, to negotiate, because the perception is 

that they’ve managed to frustrate the coalition. 

In addition, the United States would likely ask the Taliban to 

sever their ties to the more radical groups, like al-Qaeda; and they 

may be reluctant to do that. And the Taliban, in exchange, may say 

to the Afghan Government that, ‘‘We’ll negotiate, but we need the 

foreigners to leave the country.’’ And again, these are very difficult 

and challenging preconditions. 

That said, I think that there’s an opportunity to at least engage 

some of the more so-called ‘‘moderate’’ members of the Taliban. 

These would be the more Afghan, the more reconcilable elements. 

If there’s a tradition in Afghanistan, it’s switching allegiances. We 

saw that over and over again during the civil war in Afghanistan. 

And, if anything, Afghans are a pragmatic people, and if certain 

elements of at least the Afghan movement can be convinced that 

it’s in their self-interest and in their pragmatic interest to come 

over to the other side, they may be interested in doing that. 

But, I will say that, on my recent trip to Afghanistan, I spoke 

to a lot of people on the street, and my sense is that, by and large, 

50 

a lot of people, although they don’t feel any—necessarily any kinship with the Taliban, they are in favor of some kind of negotiation 

between the West and the Taliban. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Lugar, do you have any more questions? 

Senator LUGAR. No, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, I know we have to move on, but 

I felt guilty that I had not asked the doctor and the general a question. So, at the risk of delaying things—just two quick questions. 

Doctor, I want to commend the work of UNHCR across the 

world. We held hearings, at the subcommittee level, on refugees in 

both Iraq and Pakistan, and I was very interested in what you said 

about the refugee challenge in Afghanistan. I guess I’d ask you this 

question: What’s the short-term or the near-term challenge with 

regard to ‘‘reintegration’’ of Afghanis? Second, what is the likelihood that there’s going to be a dramatic increase in the number of 

refugees in Afghanistan? Which becomes, in all refugee situations 

as I saw this firsthand on the ground in Pakistan, where I visited 

an IDP camp there—internally displace people were for the most 

part treated well, and seemed to be moving back to their communities. But, if it doesn’t go well, you have both a humanitarian and 

a security problem. 

Doctor, what is your sense of the increase that may occur in 

Afghanistan, in terms of the number of refugees; and second, the 

challenge of reintegration. 

The CHAIRMAN. I’d just—before you answer, I need to go down 

to the Finance Committee for a few minutes on the health care 

thing, but I just want to thank the panel for your contributions 

today. It’s been very, very helpful. We have a distance to go yet, 

but I think we’re beginning to shed some light on it, and we’re very 

grateful to you for taking time to be here today. 

And I thank my colleagues. 

And whoever wants to be last questioner, just close it out. 

Thanks. 

Senator CASEY [presiding]. Thank you, Chairman Kerry. 

Dr. HOSSEINI. Reintegration of Afghan refugees continues to be 

a very difficult challenge. And to put it in perspective, let’s remember that Afghanistan, even in its heyday, ranked at or very near 

the bottom of the global index for human development. Now, put 

that country through 30 years of successive civil conflict that saw 

the destruction of virtually every meaningful institution, and then 

increase its population, in a span of 6 years, by 20 percent. I would 

propose to you that if we increased the population of even a developed nation, like France or the United Kingdom, by 20 percent— 

How would they be able to handle it? Frankly, it would be chaotic. 

But, in Afghanistan, the lack of public administration and lack of 

effective governance has allowed that to happen. And so, what 

we’re seeing in Afghanistan, in regards to refugee reintegration, is 

the stresses and strains of a government that is sort of more or less 

buckling under the strain of reabsorbing the millions of people who 

have come back. 

So, for the refugees who have come back, reintegration in 

Afghanistan is a serious challenge. For some, they have more or 

51 

less been able to resume their lives in a relatively settled fashion. 

But, for many refugees, they continue to face the lack of basic social services; foremost among those, land, shelter, jobs, and then 

water, education, and access to health facilities. 

I believe that the era of spontaneous, voluntary return is over. 

We saw 5 million people coming from—since 2002. Last year, 

280,000 Afghans returned home. This year, a fraction of that; only 

50,000. The reasons for that have to do partly with the low absorption capacity in Afghanistan; partly with security, particularly the 

refugees who are in Pakistan or originate from the Pashtun belt 

and who have concerns about returning to the place of origin, 

where the insurgency activity is very strong; part of it has to do 

with lack of employment opportunity. This is particularly the case 

for the refugees in Iran, who have relatively better living conditions, and where there is—in Iran, they’ve been able to make a life 

for themselves. 

So, 2.6 million Afghans remain still abroad; 1.6 million, roughly, 

in Pakistan, and 1 million in Iran. And it is far from clear whether, 

or if, they will return from Afghanistan. As I said—to Afghanistan—as I said earlier, 80 percent of those refugees who remain 

abroad have lived there for more than 20 years. They no longer feel 

like Afghans, for many of them. They feel no personal kinship with 

Afghanistan, they don’t dress like Afghans, they don’t speak like 

Afghans. And the idea of uprooting their lives and resettling to a 

remote region in that country is not particularly attractive to them. 

So, it’s a major challenge for the Government of Afghanistan, for 

UNHCR, and the governments of Pakistan, but particularly with 

Iran, to negotiate and to come to a resolution as to the ultimate 

fate of the refugees. 

As far as the increased number of refugees, we are seeing far 

more displacement than we were a few years ago. We are now— 

we have over a quarter of a million Afghans who are displaced. 

And the reasons for displacement within Afghanistan have to do 

partially with the conflict, particularly in the south and the southeast, where, again, the insurgency is strong. But, part of it has to 

do also with land dispute, with lack of economic opportunity, and 

so on and so forth. So, for the foreseeable future, I think this will 

be a challenge for UNHCR. 

Senator CASEY. One of the more interesting parts of the challenge—or the results, I should say—in Pakistan was that you had 

about 80 percent of the internally displaced people, who were displaced because of the military conflict in places like the Swat Valley and other places go into homes. People would take them in, 

based upon both, I think, Pashtun tradition and the welcoming way 

that they bring people into their homes; and second, because of the 

experience of the 2005 earthquake. So, you had a 2 million-plus in 

Pakistanis who were displaced, 80 percent of them were brought 

into homes. So, maybe the challenge there was a little different 

than it might be in other places, including Afghanistan. 

I know we don’t have a lot more time—but, General, the last 

question is for you and then we’ll wrap up. And you may not have 

an opinion about this yet, because it’s about 24 hours—as we do 

in Washington, we want opinions on something that’s barely out, 

but the administration has put forth, now, a draft, or at least a 

52 

starting point, on metrics, what they call ‘‘evaluating progress’’ 

with regard to Afghanistan, both military and nonmilitary. I know 

you may not have had a chance to review it yet, but do you have 

an opinion on what they’ve produced? And, if not, what’s your 

sense of how we should go about that? Because we need people that 

have the kind of experience you have to weigh in on what metrics 

are valid, what metrics are ones that we should use. And we have 

to have a—I believe—‘‘we,’’ meaning the Congress, the administration, both—have to give a lot of frequent, frequent, frequent reporting on progress if we want to sustain support for any kind of an 

effort. 

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Senator. 

I have not seen the metrics. I know that the—it’s been a work 

in progress for some time. I am a strong supporter of metrics. What 

we have done to date, in my judgment, has been measure performance. How many miles or kilometers of road, how many children 

are in school, how many vaccinations? But, we haven’t measured 

the effect of the performance. And these metrics have to go to the 

next step. What is working? How do we measure it? Do we measure what we can measure, because it’s easy to measure, even 

though not relevant, or do we measure what’s important, to determine the effect, and then reinforce success, stop failure, and find 

something else? NATO has struggled with this. They’re still working on it. The ISAF forces are working on metrics. 

I think we need to pull together some good analytical minds and 

determine—critically determine what it is we’ll focus on, both in 

security, governance, and this development process. They all bleed 

over into each other’s field. You can’t get one without the other. 

So, I will be looking for this closely. I think that it will behoove 

us, in the coming very near term here, to come to grips with this. 

The hard part will be going out, getting the data, and then the critical objective analysis. 

Senator CASEY. I hope all four of you will weigh in on that as 

time goes by. We need your help. 

Thanks very much. 

This hearing is adjourned, unless Senator Kaufman has something else. We’re all set? 

Hearing adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF CLARE LOCKART TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. Ms. Lockhart, I strongly believe that we should help the people of 

Afghanistan combat corruption but it is not clear to me that our anticorruption 

efforts require—or necessarily benefit from—a large foreign military presence. 

Indeed our historical experience is that the exigencies created by large military 

operations, such as the rush of aid and contracting money, can create a war economy that actually feeds corruption. Do you agree that this is a possible danger in 

Afghanistan? 

Answer. Senator, like you, I strongly believe that combating corruption is a high 

priority. 

When I traveled across the country in 2002, I found a largely functional civil service (the Taliban had just been the top layer) of 240,000 civil servants, and my and 

53 

my colleagues’ analysis showed that the standards of accountability were quite high 

in the culture; at the same time crime levels in society were very low. 

Since then, corruption was allowed to set in and has festered. I believe this comes 

from 4 main sources: 

First, the decisions in 2002 to 2004 not to ensure the budget of Afghanistan was 

resourced: as a consequence, for several years it was not possible to meet the basic 

salaries of the Afghan civil service, even at the base rate of $50 per month. As a 

result, many key officials left, leaving the system open to abuse; and others were 

most likely forced into corruption in order to survive. 

Second, the decision to support the ‘‘regional strongmen’’ with large amounts of 

funding channeled to them as individuals, without calling them to account for their 

actions. This led to the revival of the 1980s/1990s culture of warlordism, where a 

small number of men considered themselves to exist beyond the realm of accountability and rule of law. I have personally witnessed several events where such-used 

intimidation and threats of actual violence, expropriating resources (usually in multiples of millions of dollars) from officials who were distressed at the notion of putting national resources in private hands. The Loya Jirgas of 2002 and 2003 saw the 

population bitterly complain about the representation of such people within a 

national discussion, given the violations they had committed against the population 

in general and women in particular. The commanders have now been encouraged 

and permitted to build up a huge power and resource base, as opposed to 2001 when 

they were down to their last supplies. Bringing them within the fold of rule of law 

is going to be an enormous challenge. 

Third, the massive funding of contractors, NGOs and U.N. agencies, which create 

not only a war, but an aid, economy, which channels money outside the normal governance processes of making decisions through a budget process. At the same time, 

this rush creates hundreds of thousands of positions in parallel organizations for 

Afghans, usually as drivers, assistants, and translators, so they are attracted away 

from their frontline positions as civil servants, doctors, teachers, engineers, along 

with nurses, professors to become support staff. This wage inflation from overreliance on contracting is one of the primary causes of undermining Afghan capacity, 

by creating incentives for people to leave low-paid public jobs for high-paid private 

jobs as translators and drivers. There should be regulations to prevent such ‘‘poaching,’’ both in DOD and DOS contracting. 

Fourth, the failure to understand systems of accountability (positively) or systems 

of corruption (negatively) through the process of public finance, from revenue collection through to budgeting, payroll, procurement, payments, accounting and auditing. 

The World Bank’s Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund is in my view the main 

driver of accountability, as it operates through a dual key system requiring audit 

reports before reimbursements for expenditure can be made, and in my view this 

should be the main channel for U.S. assistance. I find that the work of the World 

Bank in building the crucial systems of accountability and partnering in the design 

of the national programs with the government is not well understood, and I would 

encourage the World Bank team urgently to provide information briefings to key 

Congress committees, staff, media and the think-tank community on how this 

operates. 

If the civilian strategy is not firmly oriented around building Afghan sovereignty, 

then military operations and the provision of large funding streams going to thousands of different contractors risk creating exactly the situation you describe. I 

think this is what has happened, especially in the last 5 years, the good news is 

that I see real evidence that there is wide recognition of this danger by the administration, and in Congress, and a real desire to fix it. The question is, Do we have 

time to turn it around? I believe we must try. 

The plans emerging from the ground team in Kabul seem to be to hold ministries 

to strict standards of accountability and transparency, and to keep flows of money 

from being expropriated. 

In my view, the following steps would be essential and/or helpful: 

1. Ensure that the budget of Afghanistan is robust and adequately funded to meet 

key expenses (with maximum contribution coming from Afghanistan’s revenue). 

2. Request IMF to prepare realistic revenue estimates for Afghanistan’s future 

revenue, including different scenarios for different levels of corruption and political 

will to grow the economy and reduce leakage in revenue. 

3. Ask IMF and World Bank to prepare a plan with strict conditionalities for fund 

disbursements based on standards of transparency and competent execution. 

4. Prepare a framework for reducing project funding outside the Afghan budget, 

and preventing poaching of government staff. NGOs can be contracted through the 

Afghan budget; e.g., the National Health Program by which NGOs and private comVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:27 Mar 03, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\AFGH0917.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
54 

panies are contracted province by province to provide services, but with clear standards for wages and accountabilities. This model should be generalized. 

5. Mandate U.S. contributions to the U.N. be conditional on the U.N. revising its 

wage levels for support staff so that they are on a par with Afghan Government salaries. There is a procedure for doing this. It is astonishing that much U.S. funding 

is going to support programs where drivers, assistants, and translators are paid upward of $600 per month when teachers, doctors, nurses, and judges are paid a fraction of this. This must be urgently investigated. 

6. Investigate and prepare ways for the CERP/PRT and USAID funding to be 

channeled so as to maximize Afghan job creation and the basis for small- and 

medium-sized construction industry. There are precedents from other countries 

where external financing was channeled to lay the basis for a construction industry 

most noticeably in Singapore of the 1960s and Spain of the 1970s. This requires 

moving to adopt Afghan Building code and working to nurture increase of the capacity of these firms. There are often four or five levels of subcontracting, resulting in 

very high overhead, with Afghans being the 4th or 5th link. It would be better for 

all parties if they were first, and if they do not have the capacity to do so, to focus 

on building this capacity. I have a concrete set of proposals as to how this can be 

done if there is interest in following up. Valuable efforts have been made for ISAF 

NATO troops would buy their water from Afghanistan. Such programs could be extended to food and other essential supplies, which could mitigate the negative effects of troop presence by using them as a market force to grow the Afghan economy. 

Regarding the question of presence of troops; I believe that given our previous 

turning a blind eye to the growing power of the ‘‘regional strongmen’’ or warlords, 

and our previous badly managed campaign which has permitted the incursions of 

the Taliban into previously stable areas, the presence of the threat of force and the 

actual use of force is going to be necessary to create conditions of stability and rule 

of law. Commanders in the field must use their presence judiciously, not to ‘‘support 

the government’’ in a blanket way, but rather to understand which actors are committed to working within rule of law, and how to move toward reassertion of the 

culture of ‘‘laws not of men’’ that the population is demanding, which the Taliban, 

in a brutal and simple way, is currently claiming to offer, via dangerous parallel 

governmental structures (courts and police). 

Question. Ms. Lockhart, there is a common assumption that we must provide security before we can do development. I think this fails to recognize that our military 

presence can actually create a violent backlash that undermines development 

efforts. Would you agree that this is a serious concern. 

Answer. With regard to the first part of your question, I believe that ‘‘we must 

provide security before we can do development,’’ is an assumption that should be 

challenged. I think this assumption has two flaws: First, that ‘‘we’’ can provide either security or development. If security or development are to be provided, it is Afghan institutions and people who will provide their own security, and development 

is an endogenous process which must be driven by Afghan people, processes and 

leaders. Many of the mistaken policies of the last years have been driven by the 

faulty conception that security and development can be done for a native population 

by international actors tout court. Having said that, given the deterioration in the 

situation to where we are today, the ANSF are not capable of providing security for 

the population, most (but not all) of Afghan ministries are not funded or equipped 

to provide social services on a large scale, and the Afghan political elite has now 

subverted the civil society that could have underpinned a vibrant economy. So the 

question now is this: given ultimately that there is agreement that it is Afghans 

and their institutions that will ensure the level of security and sustained economic 

growth, and indeed rule of law itself, how do a foreign presence, and a foreign exit, 

and foreign resources and advice, help establish the conditions for Afghan sovereignty to be responsibly exercised. 

The second flaw in the ‘‘security before development thesis’’ is that security must 

precede development: in my view, development is inherently about processes of 

change—economic, social and political—through creation of institutions and organizations. Security and development are thus symbiotic and require each other. For 

example, to have an army, one must be able to have finance organizations—that 

have a budget and payroll to underwrite the costs—and a basic education and 

health system, and proper nutrition, to ensure there are viable recruits to that 

army, and a possible officer corps. In some cases, security can be achieved through 

societal compacts at the local level for groups to cooperate. This therefore points 

again to the need for a political process to be articulated that frames all efforts 

made. 

55 

I agree that there is a serious concern that military presence can prompt a backlash, or at least is being portrayed as an occupation by some actors. This is why 

it is imperative that the presence should not be framed as an occupation, nor should 

the presence be an occupation. To the extent that presence continues, my view is 

that the presence should be framed in line with the Bonn Agreement and U.N. mandates of 2001, which saw the presence of international actors including the U.N., 

as a global effort to assist the people of Afghanistan to establish a sovereign government so they can govern themselves. The participants of Bonn requested ISAF 

forces to provide stability while their own forces were being established. The legal 

basis for presence is extremely important as this informs the view of legitimacy of 

presence. What we need to do is to examine this basis, and once policy clarifications 

are made, to communicate this to the global and Afghan public. It is more likely 

that presence would provoke a backlash if that presence is perceived to be backing 

up a corrupt and predatory Afghan Government. 

While the overarching framing is the most important factor, the second factor is 

the way that any troops actually operate on the ground. Initially, ISAF forces were 

strongly welcomed by the population. I personally witnessed many interactions 

where Afghans actively praised them and asked them to stay. Where ISAF, which 

then came under NATO command, were initially directed only at stability or peacekeeping operations, the OEF forces were initially a separate operation, directed at 

combating the Taliban. In my view, confusion came when the two operations were 

merged in 2006 and 2007, just as the Taliban reemerged, provoking need for use 

of force, without explaining to the population that ISAF/NATO would not only be 

doing peacekeeping but would now also be doing heavy combat operations. One 

option would be to separate the two missions with a clear demarcation, as it is 

indeed bewildering for the Afghan population that the same mission is engaged both 

in peacekeeping and offensive operations. The other is to face a reality that the mission is complex, and mixes various elements, but to compensate for this by explaining the rules of engagement clearly to the population. Now, the change in strategy 

through the McChrystal doctrine of protect the population and establish ANSF, 

while avoiding civilian casualties, is a clear and significant shift in strategy, 

matched by tactical guidance. McChrystal has also recently emphasized the necessity of good communications. If these two innovations can properly be operationalized, whereby troops win the trust of the population, then there will not be a backlash, or it will be small enough to be manageable. This is what has been discovered 

in former COIN campaigns. And indeed, if we are to ask Afghans to buy into a new 

political settlement, and turn their backs on the Taliban, for this request to be believable it would be imperative that they would be protected, either through Afghan 

or international forces. 

Finally, if Afghan forces are to be credible, competent and trusted, then serious 

problems with the way they operate must urgently be addressed. The ANA needs 

to become more balanced, as it is perceived by Pashtuns as a northern-dominated 

institution, and the ANP are notoriously corrupt and often not aligned to upholding 

and enforcing rule of law. 

Æ