IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–0321

Filed September 16, 2016

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

TERMAINE DESHAWN TOLES,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, 

Joel A. Dalrymple, Judge.

The defendant challenges his sentence on the ground that the 

sentencing judge should have recused himself from the proceedings. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND 

VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik and Bridget 

Chambers, Assistant Attorneys General, Linda Fangman, County 

Attorney, and Peter Blink, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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PER CURIAM.

Termaine Deshawn Toles pled guilty to carrying weapons, an 

aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 724.4(1)

(2013). At his sentencing hearing, the judge made the following remarks: 

All right. Mr. Toles, I used to sit in Mr. Blink’s shoes. I used 

to sit as a prosecutor and do the gun crime, and I can tell 

you your name is a name that has come across my desk as 

both a prosecutor and a judge for a long time. I am not—

your name is not unfamiliar to me. The fact that I know 

your middle name is not a good thing.

. . . .

. . . And not that I gauge individuals, but I do have a 

tendency to recognize when I know somebody’s middle name, 

it tells me I have been—I have been confronted with their 

name or presented with their name far, far too many times.

In this appeal, Toles claims the judge should have sua sponte 

recused himself from the matter based on his prior familiarity with Toles. 

In the alternative, Toles claims his counsel was ineffective for not 

requesting the judge recuse himself from the matter for the same reason.

We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of 

appeals affirmed Toles’s sentence, reasoning that Toles did not establish 

the judge was required to recuse himself because the record contains no 

information concerning the exact nature of the judge’s prior involvement 

with Toles. The court of appeals noted that even if the record had 

established the judge had previously prosecuted Toles in an unrelated 

matter, the mere fact of that prior prosecution, standing alone, would not 

establish that the judge was required to recuse himself. Rather, to 

establish the judge was required to recuse himself, Toles needed to 

demonstrate the judge was biased or prejudiced against him. In this 

case, the court of appeals concluded the judge’s remarks merely revealed 
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that he had a level of familiarity with Toles and did not reveal bias or 

prejudice against Toles. We agree with this analysis and affirm the 

sentence for the reasons stated in the portion of the court of appeals 

decision addressing Toles’s claim that the judge should have recused 

himself.

The court of appeals also concluded Toles’s counsel was not 

ineffective for failing to file a motion for recusal at the sentencing 

hearing. However, an appellate court can resolve a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if the record is adequate. 

State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 704 (Iowa 2016). We conclude that the 

record on direct appeal in this case is inadequate to determine whether 

Toles’s counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for recusal at 

the sentencing hearing. Had counsel made a timely motion for recusal, 

counsel could have requested a hearing at which Toles may have learned

additional facts regarding any bias or prejudice the judge might have had

towards Toles. Because we cannot determine whether Toles’s counsel 

was ineffective on this record, we leave his ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim for another day.

Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the court of appeals decision 

affirming the judgment and sentence of the district court on the ground 

that the judge was not required to recuse himself and vacate the portion 

of the court of appeals decision concluding Toles’s counsel was not 

ineffective. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND 

VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

This opinion shall be published.