DoD Procurement Policy for Body Armor

Report No. D-2008-067 March 31, 2008
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To suggest ideas for or to request future audits, contact the Office of the Deputy 

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ODIG-AUD (ATTN: Audit Suggestions) 

Department of Defense Inspector General 

400 Army Navy Drive (Room 801) 

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Acronyms 

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command 

DAPs Deltoid and Axillary Protectors 

DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 

ESBIs Enhanced Side Ballistic Inserts 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

FAT First Article Testing 

FSS Federal Supply Schedule 

GSA General Services Administration 

IBA Interceptor Body Armor 

ICE Infantry Combat Equipment 

IG Inspector General 

MCSC Marine Corps Systems Command 

OTV Outer Tactical Vest 

PDM Preliminary Design Models 

PEO Program Executive Office 

PM ICE Program Manager Infantry Combat Equipment 

PM SEQ Project Manager Soldier Equipment 

RDECOMAC U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command 

Acquisition Center 

SAPIs Small Arms Protective Inserts 

SOUM Safety of Use Message
INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE

ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

March 31, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF T,HE ARMY

PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICE SOLDIER

COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT

AND ENGINEERING COMMAND

SUBJECT: Report on DoD Procurement Policy for Body Armor,

(Report No. D-2008-067)

Weare providing this report for review and comment. This report is the second in

a series of congressionally requested audits. We considered management comments on ,

the draft when preparing the final report.

DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly.

The comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary ofthe Army (Policy and

Procurement), responding for the 'Assistant Secretary ofthe Army (Acquisition, Logistics,

and Technology) are partially responsive. The comments from the Program Executive

Office Soldier are nonresponsive. Therefore, we request that the Assistant Secretary of

the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and T'echnology) and the Program Executive Office

Soldier provide additional comments on Recommendations 3. and 1., respectively, by

April 30, 2008. As a result of comments from the Commander, U.S. Army Research,

Development and Engineering Command, we revised draft Recommendation 2. to show

the correct command structure. The Commander's comments were responsive and no

further comments are required.

Ifpossible, please send management comments in electronic format (Adobe

Acrobat file only) to A'U'DROS@dodig.nlil. Copies ofthe management comments must

contain the signature ofthe authorizing official. We cannot accept the / Signed / symbol

in place ofthe signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, they

must be sent over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Questions should be directed

to me at (703) 604-8863 (DSN 664-8863) or Mr. Kenneth W. Sokol at (703) 602-0676

(DSN 332-0676). The team members are listed inside the back cover. See Appendix H

for the report distribution.

J~;xJ N--IIATrT"~J~ Donald A. BI orner

Deputy Director

Joint and Overseas Operations
 
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General 

Report No. D-2008-067 March 31, 2008 

(Project No. D2007-D000LA-0054.000) 

DoD Procurement Policy for Body Armor 

Executive Summary 

Who Should Read This Report and Why? DoD acquisition and contracting personnel 

should read this report because it concerns procurement decisions for body armor 

components used by DoD in the Global War on Terror. 

Background. A member of Congress asked the DoD Office of Inspector General to 

review DoD procurement of body armor and armored vehicles to determine whether 

officials followed contracting policies. In addition, the member asked the DoD Office of 

Inspector General to provide information on why DoD issued contracts to Armor 

Holdings and Force Protection and to determine the effect the Army’s ban on privately 

procured body armor had on the safety of our Service members. This is the second of 

two reports issued in response to the request. This report discusses the procurement of 

various body armor components by the Army and the Marine Corps, and the effect of the 

ban on privately procured body armor (Appendix C). The first report, 

Report No. D-2007-107, “Procurement Policy for Armored Vehicles,” June 27, 2007, 

covered the procurement policy for armored vehicles and why DoD issued contracts for 

armored vehicles to Armor Holdings and Force Protection. 

Results. The Army and Marine Corps issued contracts and Federal Supply Schedule 

orders valued at more than $5.2 billion for body armor components. The Federal 

Acquisition Regulation requires contracting organizations to maintain adequate contract 

documentation to provide a complete acquisition history. Specific information 

concerning testing and approval of first articles was not included in 13 of 28 Army 

contracts and orders reviewed, and contracting files were not maintained in 11 of 28 

Army contracts to show why procurement decisions were made. As a result, DoD has no 

assurance that first articles produced under 13 of the 28 contracts and orders reviewed 

met the required standards, or that 11 of the 28 contracts were awarded based on 

informed procurement decisions. We recommended that the Program Executive Office 

Soldier direct testing and evaluation of first articles for contract conformance before 

production on all contracts, update purchase descriptions, and document contractual 

actions for all body armor contracts. In addition, we recommended that the U.S. Army 

Research, Development and Engineering Command ensure First Article Testing 

instructions are included in contracting documents when applicable, and document 

contractual actions. We also recommended that the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) ensure proper use of non-DoD contracts to 

ensure that the contracts are in the best interest of the Government. Recommendations in 

this report, if implemented, will correct deficiencies identified, and ensure the DoD 

receives the best value in the body armor it procures. See the Finding section for the 

detailed recommendations. 

Scope Limitations. The audit scope was limited to Army and Marine Corps contracts 

and orders awarded between January 2004 and December 2006 for body armor 
ii 

components. We divided the acquisition process into three phases: presolicitation, 

solicitation and evaluation, and contract administration. The scope was limited to 

reviewing the presolicitation and the solicitation and evaluation phases of the acquisition 

process for specific contracts. We also reviewed contracting files as necessary to 

determine requirements for First Article Testing. We did not evaluate the contract 

administration phase of the acquisition process, which includes activities performed after 

contract award, such as quality control and testing,1 deliverable requirements, and 

monitoring and measuring performance and end-user satisfaction, to determine whether 

the contractor met the requirements of the contract. We also did not visit contractor 

facilities during the audit. See Appendix F for a summary of the contracts reviewed.

Management Comments and Audit Response. The Program Executive Office Soldier 

neither concurred nor nonconcurred with Recommendation 1. Specifically, the Program 

Executive Office Soldier stated that for Recommendations 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c. no action 

would be required because all of the recommended actions are already regular and 

consistent current business practices that his office follows in accordance with the 

Federal Acquisition Regulation. However, our audit results show that testing and 

evaluation of first articles for contract conformance before production, updating of 

purchase descriptions, and documenting of all contractual actions for all body armor 

contracts are not consistently occurring. The Program Executive Office Soldier also 

provided comments on the draft report and finding, and stated that although not in the 

scope of our audit, the Army also conducts lot acceptance testing and post issue 

surveillance testing, both critical parts of the body armor testing program. In an 

additional meeting with Army officials, the Program Executive Office Soldier stated that 

the Army has no evidence of deaths that can be attributed to defective body armor. We 

request that the Program Executive Office Soldier provide additional comments on 

Recommendations 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c. in response to the final report by April 30, 2008. 

The Commander, U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command 

concurred with Recommendation 2. The Commander also provided comments on the 

draft report and finding. The comments of the Commander, U.S. Army Research, 

Development and Engineering Command on the recommendation were responsive, and 

no additional comments are required. 

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement), responding for 

the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), concurred 

with Recommendation 3. Although he concurred, the Deputy Assistant Secretary’s 

comments are only partially responsive because he did not identify what actions will be 

taken to ensure that policies and procedures are enforced. We request that the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) provide additional 

comments that address the proposed actions for Recommendations 3.a.1., 3.a.2., 3.a.3., 

and 3.a.4. in response to the final report by April 30, 2008. A discussion of the 

management comments is in the Finding section of the report; the complete text of the 

comments is in the Management Comments section; and management comments on the 

draft report and finding, along with audit response, are in Appendix G. 

 

1

 Quality control and testing (acceptance testing) involves testing each item or manufacturing lot of items 

to verify that each particular item meets its specification requirements. The purpose of acceptance testing 

is to catch random defects on a particular item that are not systemic in the manufacturing process; 

because of our scope limitation, we did not examine acceptance testing. 
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i

Background 1

Objectives 2 

Review of Internal Controls 3 

Procurement History for Body Armor 4

Findings 

Army Procurement of Body Armor 9 

Appendixes 

A. Scope and Methodology 20 

Prior Coverage 21 

B. Congressional Request 23 

C. Effect of Body Armor Ban 25 

D. Guidance for Contracting Officers 28 

E. Interceptor Body Armor 30 

F. Summary of Interceptor Body Armor Contracts Reviewed 31 

G. Management Comments on the Draft Report and Audit Response 36 

H. Report Distribution 46 

Management Comments 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) 49 

Program Executive Office Soldier 51 

U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command 55 

1 

Background 

This report responds to inquiries by Congresswoman Louise M. Slaughter, 

28th District, New York (Appendix B). Congresswoman Slaughter asked the DoD 

Office of Inspector General (IG) to review DoD procurement of body armor and 

armored vehicles to determine whether officials followed contracting policies. 

Congresswoman Slaughter also requested specific information on the effect the 

Army’s ban on privately procured body armor had on the safety of the warfighter. 

This is the second of two audit reports issued in response to her request. This 

report discusses the procurement of various body armor components by the Army 

and the Marine Corps. The first audit report covered the procurement policy for 

armored vehicles and why DoD issued contracts for armored vehicles to Armor 

Holdings and Force Protection.2 

Interceptor Body Armor. Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) is a vest protecting the 

upper torso from ballistic threats. It can be configured to defeat the predicted 

mission threat at minimum weight. IBA consists of: 

• an outer tactical vest (OTV), which includes the base vest, outershell 

carrier, collar assembly, and throat and groin protectors; 

• deltoid and axillary protectors (DAPs) for the upper arm and underarm 

that attach to the OTV and provide protection in the shoulder area; 

• small arms protective inserts (SAPIs), which are interchangeable 

contoured plates inserted into front and back pockets on the OTV, and 

• enhanced side ballistic inserts (ESBI),3

 a pair of carrier assemblies and 

ballistic inserts. The carrier assemblies attach to the sides of the OTV. 

All of the components attach to the OTV. The OTV provides protection from 

conventional small arms munitions. Attachment points on the front of the OTV 

allow soldiers to carry a limited amount of equipment. See Appendix E for the 

various components of the IBA. 

Program Management and Contracting Responsibilities. The Project 

Manager Soldier Equipment (PM SEQ), under the Program Executive 

Office (PEO) Soldier, manages the Army’s acquisition of body armor 

components. The U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering 

Command’s Acquisition Center (RDECOMAC) is the contracting activity for the 

Army contracts reviewed. The Program Manager Infantry Combat 

Equipment (PM ICE), under the Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC), 

manages the Marine Corps’ acquisition of body armor components. The Office of 

the Assistant Commander for Contracts, MCSC, is the contracting activity for the 

Marine Corps contracts reviewed. 

 

2

 Report No. D-2007-107, “Procurement Policy for Armored Vehicles,” June 27, 2007. 

3

 The Marine Corps has also referred to the ESBI as the Secondary Small Arms Protective Insert (S-SAPI). 
2 

Product Testing and Evaluation. Testing and evaluation occur throughout the 

acquisition process. Solicitations can require bid samples to be tested and 

evaluated against factors listed in the solicitation before contract award. The bid 

samples are evaluated against the evaluation factors in order to rank the different 

bid samples. The bid samples that represent the best value to the Government are 

awarded a contract. The bid samples are used to determine only the 

responsiveness of the bid and not to determine a bidder’s ability to produce the 

required items. 

After contract award, first article testing (FAT) can be performed to prove that the 

contractor can furnish a product that meets the contract specifications. The 

contracting officer can waive FAT if the contractor is already producing the item 

under contract. The contracting officer should include FAT instructions in the 

contract documentation to place responsibility on either the Government or the 

contractor to perform FAT. 

First Article Testing. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 2.1, 

“Definitions,” March 9, 2005, defines the “first article” as an initial production 

sample, and FAT as a testing and evaluating process before or in the initial stage 

of production to determine whether the proposed product conforms with contract 

requirements. During FAT, the proposed product is evaluated to determine the 

contractor’s ability to produce a product that can meet or exceed evaluation 

criteria specified in the contract. FAT ensures that contractor-produced items: 

• meet operational requirements, 

• satisfy contractual requirements, and 

• perform in a simulated working environment. 

FAR Subpart 9 “Contractor Qualifications,” January 3, 2006, explains that 

solicitations shall provide the performance specifications that the first article must 

meet for approval, the detailed technical requirements for the tests that must be 

performed for approval, and the necessary data that must be submitted to the 

Government in the first article test report. The FAR allows contracting officials 

to use their judgment as to when to require FAT, but advises contracting officers 

to use discretion on implementing FAT. Contracting officers should consider the 

risk to the Government if FAT is not required; the FAR recommends performing 

FAT on items described by performance specifications, such as body armor. FAT 

is also recommended on commercial items that will be fielded in an environment 

that is different from the one in which they were designed to work. See 

Appendix D for FAR guidance for contracting officers. 

Objectives 

Our overall audit objectives were to evaluate: (1) the procurement history of body 

armor and (2) the effect that the Army’s decision to ban the use of personally 

purchased body armor had on the safety of Service members. See the Finding 
3 

section for discussion of objective (1), Appendix C for a discussion of objective 

(2), and Appendix A for a discussion of the scope and methodology and for prior 

coverage related to the objectives. 

Scope Limitations 

The audit scope was limited to Army and Marine Corps contracts and orders 

awarded between January 2004 and December 2006 for body armor components. 

We divided the acquisition process into three phases: presolicitation, solicitation 

and evaluation, and contract administration. The scope was limited to reviewing 

the presolicitation and the solicitation and evaluation phases of the acquisition 

process for specific contracts. We also reviewed contracting files as necessary to 

determine requirements for FAT. We did not evaluate the contract administration 

phase of the acquisition process, which includes activities performed after 

contract award, such as quality control and testing,4

 deliverable requirements, and 

monitoring and measuring performance and end-user satisfaction, to determine 

whether the contractor met the requirements of the contract. We also did not visit 

contractor facilities during the audit. See Appendix F for a summary of the 

contracts reviewed. 

Review of Internal Controls 

We reviewed the adequacy of management controls as they applied to our audit 

objective. Specifically, we reviewed body armor component contract files to 

determine whether they contained the elements required by the FAR. We 

identified material internal control weaknesses at RDECOMAC, as defined by 

DoD Instruction 5010.40, “Managers’ Internal Control (MIC) Program 

Procedures,” January 4, 2006. The weaknesses related to the documentation of 

FAT requirements and results in 13 of 28 Army contracts reviewed. Although 

RDECOMAC had internal control procedures in place, we identified weaknesses 

resulting in decisions not always being properly documented in the contract files. 

Specifically, RDECOMAC officials did not follow the FAR in maintaining 

contract files to support FAT decisions and results. Implementing our 

recommendations will improve the quality of the contract files to support 

informed decisions. A copy this report was provided to the senior official in 

charge of internal controls at RDECOMAC. 

 

4

 Quality control and testing (acceptance testing) involves testing each item or manufacturing lot of items 

to verify that each particular item meets its specification requirements. The purpose of acceptance testing 

is to catch random defects on a particular item that are not systemic in the manufacturing process; 

because of our scope limitation, we did not examine acceptance testing. 
4 

Procurement History for Body Armor 

RDECOMAC and MCSC issued 35 contracts and 5 Federal Supply Schedule 

(FSS) orders valued at more than $5.2 billion between January 2004 and 

December 2006 for body armor components. Specifically, the Army and Marine 

Corps awarded: 

• 21 full-and-open competitive contracts, valued at $4.8 billion; 

• 7 sole-source contracts, valued at $143.9 million; 

• 7 simplified acquisitions, valued at $10.0 million; and 

• 5 FSS orders, valued at $301.1 million. 

The contracts were for components or modifications to IBA, such as enhanced 

ballistic protection and refurbishment of the existing system. In all, contracts 

were awarded to 14 manufacturers to provide the various individual components 

of body armor. The contracts either were for specific quantities of items or were 

indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contracts.5

 Appendix F contains a 

summary of the contracts reviewed. 

Outer Tactical Vests. The Army awarded one FSS order and one full-and-open 

competitive contract for OTVs, with a combined value of $214.7 million. The 

FSS order was in response to a July 1, 2004, Army Statement of Urgency to 

provide additional OTVs to deployed personnel. The Army awarded the full-andopen competitive contract for the initial and follow-on fielding of OTVs. (See 

Table 1.) 

Table 1. Army Contracts and Orders for Outer Tactical Vests

Contractor

Contract/Order 

Number

Maximum 

Quantity

Contract Value 

 ($ millions)

Point Blank Body 

Armor Inc. W91CRB-04-F-0126 50,000 $24.76 

Point Blank Body 

Armor Inc. W91CRB-05-D-0003 840,000 189.96

Total 890,000 $ 214.72 

Outer Tactical Vest Conversion Kits and Conversion Services. The Army 

awarded two simplified acquisitions and four full-and-open competitive contracts 

for OTV conversion kits and conversion services, with a combined value of 

 

5

 An indefinite-quantity contract provides for an indefinite quantity, within stated limits, of supplies or 

 services during a fixed period. The Government places orders to meet particular requirements as they 

 arise. Quantity limits may be stated as number of units or as dollar values. 
5 

$374.7 million. The Army initially fielded the OTV in woodland or desert 

camouflage patterns. In 2005, the Army changed the camouflage pattern of 

combat uniforms from woodland and desert camouflage to the universal 

camouflage pattern. The deviation in color scheme between the fielded OTVs 

and the soldiers’ new uniforms helped the enemy sight its target. The Army 

awarded the two simplified acquisitions in September 2005 to address this safety 

issue for deployed personnel. The Army then issued the four full-and-open 

competitive contracts to switch all OTVs to the new pattern. (See Table 2.) 

Table 2. Army Contracts for OTV Conversion Services and Conversion Kits 

Contractor Contract Number

Maximum 

Quantity

Contract Value 

($ millions)

Point Blank Body 

Armor Inc. W91CRB-05-P-0204* 11,265 $2.03 

Point Blank Body 

Armor Inc. W91CRB-06-D-0024* 10,000 1.90 

Point Blank Body 

Armor Inc. W91CRB-05-P-0215 28,900 4.99 

UNICOR Federal 

Prison Industries W91CRB-06-D-0027 120,000 24.40 

Point Blank Body 

Armor Inc. W91CRB-06-D-0030 864,000 169.43 

Specialty Defense W91CRB-06-D-0031 864,000 171.97

Total 1,898,165 $ 374.72 

* Contract was for conversion services. 

Deltoid and Axillary Protectors. The Army awarded one simplified acquisition 

and two FSS orders6 for DAPs, with a combined value of $245.3 million. In 

2004, the Army determined that IBA left the soldier vulnerable in the upper arm 

and underarm; DAPs were designed to counter the threat and increase the level of 

protection to the soldier. The Army awarded a simplified acquisition for the 

research and development of DAPs. Later, the Army placed the two FSS orders 

to meet the Army’s acquisition objective. (See Table 3.) 

 

6

 Contract W91CRB-04-D-0014 was an order off the FSS according to the issuing contracting officer. 

Contracting actions were placed under GSA contract number GS-07F-8942D. 
6 

Table 3. Army Contracts and Orders for Deltoid and Axillary Protectors 

Contractor Contract/Order Number

Maximum 

Quantity

Contract Value 

($ millions)

Point Blank Body 

Armor Inc. W91CRB-04-P-0169 10,000 $2.85 

Point Blank Body 

Armor Inc. W91CRB-04-D-0014* 840,000 239.40 

Point Blank Body 

Armor Inc. W91CRB-05-F-0072 96,000 3.09

Total 946,000 $ 245.34 

* Contract was FSS order.

Small Arms Protective Inserts. The Army and Marine Corps awarded 

17 contracts and orders for SAPIs, with a combined value of $3.087 billion. 

There were 11 full-and-open competitive contracts, 4 simplified acquisitions, 

1 FSS order, and 1 sole-source contract. (See Table 4 for Army Contracts 

and Table 5 for Marine Corps Contracts.) 

The Army awarded 13 of the 17 contracts: 7 were full-and-open competitive 

contracts, 4 were simplified acquisitions, 1 was an FSS order, and 1 was a solesource contract. The seven full-and-open competitive contracts were awarded in 

2004, after the Army increased its acquisition objective. In an effort to meet the 

new objective, the Army decided to maximize production capacity by awarding a 

SAPI contract to all capable contractors. In 2005, the Army placed an FSS order 

with a new contractor to increase output quickly. Afterward, the Army awarded 

the sole-source contract to the new supplier. The contract was not competed 

because all other capable contractors were already under contract to produce 

SAPIs. The four simplified acquisitions were awarded for additional testing of 

the SAPIs. 

The Marine Corps awarded 4 of the 17 contracts; they were full-and-open 

competitive contracts. These contracts were awarded in 2004 because of an 

increase in the Marine Corps’ acquisition objective. The Marine Corps competed 

the acquisition to identify new and multiple sources of supply. 
7 

Table 4. Army Contracts and Orders for Small Arms Protective Inserts 

Contractor Contract Number

Maximum 

Quantity

Contract Value

($ millions)

Ceradyne Inc. W91CRB-04-D-0039 829,000 $461.00 

Armor Works LLC. W91CRB-04-D-0040 829,000 461.00 

Force One, LLC. W91CRB-04-D-0041 829,000 461.00 

Simula Inc. W91CRB-04-D-0042 829,000 461.00 

Cercom Inc. W91CRB-04-D-0043 829,000 424.47 

Composix Co. W91CRB-04-D-0044 829,000 362.12 

Armacel Armor 

Corp. W91CRB-04-D-0045 829,000 204.46 

Protective Material 

Grp. W91CRB-05-F-0086 10,000 14.96 

Simula Inc. W91CRB-05-P-0147 18 0.01 

Cercom Inc. W91CRB-05-P-0148 15 0.01 

Armacel Armor 

Corp. W91CRB-05-P-0159 50 0.04 

Patriot Performance W91CRB-05-P-0191 50 0.03 

Protective Material 

Grp. W91CRB-06-D-0004 47,003 60.00

Total 5,860,136 $2910.10 

Table 5. Marine Corps Contracts for Small Arms Protective Inserts 

Contractor Contract Number

Maximum 

Quantity

Contract 

Value 

 ($ millions)

Armor Works LLC. M67854-04-D-3005 80,000 $32.66 

Ceradyne Inc. M67854-04-D-3116 120,000 41.25 

Simula Inc. M67854-04-D-3117 120,000 54.06 

Armor Works LLC. M67854-04-D-3118 120,000 48.96

Total 440,000 $ 176.93 

Enhanced Side Ballistic Inserts and Carriers. The Army and Marine Corps 

awarded 12 contracts for ESBIs and carriers, valued at approximately 

$1.315 billion. There were five full-and-open competitive contracts, six solesource contracts, and one FSS order. (See Table 6 for Army contracts and 

Table 7 for Marine Corps contracts.) 

The Army awarded 4 of the 12 contracts: 1 sole-source contract, 1 FSS order, and 

2 full-and-open competitive contracts. The sole-source contract and the FSS 

order were awarded to meet the requirement addressed in a September 12, 2005, 
8 

Operational Needs Statement. That requirement was for additional protection 

from bullet penetration to the side of the body. Afterward, the Army awarded the 

two full-and-open competitive contracts to meet the Army’s acquisition objective. 

(See Table 6.) 

The Marine Corps awarded 8 of the 12 contracts: 5 sole-source contracts and 

3 full-and-open competitive contracts. Three of the sole-source contracts were 

awarded to meet a July 11, 2005, Urgent Statement of Need. Like the Army 

Operational Needs Statement, the Urgent Statement of Need was to address 

injuries and deaths of Marines caused by bullet penetration of the OTV on the 

side of the body. The other two sole-source contracts were issued in response to a 

change to the original Urgent Statement of Need, which increased the requirement 

from 33,000 to 50,500. Afterward, the Marine Corps awarded three full-and-open 

competitive contracts to meet the Marine Corps acquisition objective. (See 

Table 7.) 

Table 6. Army Contracts and Orders for Enhanced Side Ballistic Inserts and Carriers 

Contractor

Contract/Order

Number

Maximum 

Quantity

Contract Value 

 ($ millions)

Ceradyne Inc. W91CRB-06-C-0002 200,000 $70.00 

Ceradyne Inc. W91CRB-06-D-0028 1,782,000 611.71 

Armor Works, LLC. W91CRB-06-D-0029 1,782,000 543.07 

Point Blank Body 

Armor Inc. W91CRB-06-F-0098 130,000 18.88

Total 3,894,000 $1,243.66 

Table 7. Marine Corps Contracts for Enhanced Side Ballistic Inserts and Carriers 

Contractor Contract Number

Maximum 

Quantity

Contract Value 

($ millions)

Ceradyne Inc. M67854-05-C-3062 6,000 $1.56 

Source One Distributors M67854-05-C-3063 12,000 2.11 

Diamondback Tactical M67854-05-C-3065 6,000 2.42 

Ceradyne Inc. M67854-06-C-3019 19,646 4.19 

Source One Distributors M67854-06-C-3020 39,236 3.67 

Simula Inc. M67854-06-D-3031 78,420 23.92 

Armor Works, LLC. M67854-06-D-3071 78,420 19.83 

Armor Works, LLC. M67854-06-D-3072 52,279 13.22

Total 292,001 $ 70.92 
9 

Army Procurement of Body Armor 

Army officials did not follow FAR requirements in procuring body armor 

components. We identified deficiencies in 16 of the 28 contracts and 

orders reviewed. Specifically, officials did not: 

• include requirements for or perform FAT of body armor 

components in 13 contracts and orders7, or 

• adequately maintain files for 11 contracts reviewed. 

As a result, DoD has no assurance that first articles produced under 13 of 

the 28 contracts and orders reviewed met the required standards, or that 

11 of the 28 contracts were awarded based on informed procurement 

decisions. 

FAR Contract Requirements 

FAR Part 9, “Contractor Qualifications,” allows contracting officials to require 

contractors to perform FAT. Testing and approval offer proof that the product 

conforms to all contract requirements prior to acceptance. During testing, the 

specific product (for example, body armor components) is evaluated against 

performance and technical evaluation criteria specified in the contract and 

purchase description. Testing and approval of the first article occur after contract 

award. 

FAR Part 4, “Administrative Matters,” requires contracting officials to maintain 

adequate contract documentation. A contract file should constitute a complete 

history of the transaction and support actions taken, and provide a basis for 

informed decisions taken during the acquisition. Additionally, the contract file 

shall provide information for reviews and investigations and furnish essential 

facts in the event of litigation or congressional inquiries. The following are 

examples of the records normally contained, if applicable, in contracting files: 

• purchase request, 

• acquisition planning information, 

• solicitation and amendments, 

• list of sources solicited, 

 

7

 With regard to first article testing, our review determined that instructions regarding testing and approval 

of first articles were not included in acquisition documents, and Army officials accepted preliminary 

design models as contractually compliant before contract award and production. Although not in the 

scope of our audit, the Program Executive Office Soldier stated that the Army also conducts lot 

acceptance testing and post issue surveillance testing, both critical parts of the body armor testing 

program. 
10 

• copy of each offer or quotation, 

• source selection documentation, 

• cost or pricing data and analysis, 

• original signed contract or award and modifications, 

• determination of the contractor’s responsibility (first article testing), 

• contract completion documents, and 

• any additional documents that reflect actions by the contracting officer 

pertinent to the contract. 

Table 8 shows the number and types of deficiencies identified in Army contracts 

reviewed. Marine Corps contracts reviewed contained requirements for FAT and 

adequate documentation to support contractual decisions. 

Table 8. Summary of Contract Deficiencies by Service

 Deficiencies Identified 

Service

Contracts 

Awarded* FAT

Market 

Research

Acquisition 

Plan

SourceSelection 

Plan

Discounts 

Requested

Army 28 13 8 2 1 2 

Marine 

Corps 12 0 0 0 0 0 

Total 40 13 8 2 1 2 

 * See Appendix F for a complete list of the contracts. 

FAT for Body Armor Procurements 

Army contracting officials did not require or perform FAT for 13 of the 28 Army 

contracts and orders reviewed. Specifically, instructions regarding testing and 

approval of first articles were not included in acquisition documents, and Army 

officials accepted Preliminary Design Models (PDMs) as contractually compliant 

before contract award and before production. 
11 

Contracting officers use FAT to reduce the risk of the Government receiving a 

product that does not conform to contract specifications. In all procurements, 

contracting officers must consider the risk to the Government, impact on time or 

cost, and the availability of less costly methods of quality assurance. These risks 

can be monetary and quantifiable or intangible. It is the responsibility of the 

contracting officer to mitigate these risks to ensure quality products are received 

from contractors and to protect DoD’s interests. 

Contract Requirements. Although Army contracting officials stated that they 

were aware of the requirement for FAT, it was not always included in contracts. 

For example, Contract W91CRB-06-C-0002 for ESBI is vague regarding FAT. 

The contract does not include FAR contract clause 52.209-4 for First Article 

Approval (FAT)—Government Testing.8 However, the purchase description for 

ESBI (CO/PD 06-20, dated January 12, 2006) states: 

Unless otherwise specified in the contract or purchase order, the ESBI 

supplier is responsible for all first article and conformance inspections 

and tests herein. 

According to paragraph 4.2.1 of the ESBI purchase description, the contractor is 

required to perform FAT of a production item for the ESBIs unless the contract 

states otherwise. The contract includes an attachment describing FAT for ESBIs. 

Because the delivery schedule indicates a delivery of the ESBIs occurred on the 

same day the Army issued a letter stating that the ESBIs had passed FAT and 

authorizing production, we could not determine whether the testing performed 

was for preliminary design acceptance or for initial production authorization 

FAT. 

The contract also included a purchase description for IBA. The IBA purchase 

description did not include the same paragraph 4.2.1 as the ESBI purchase 

description. Lastly, the contract did not include an attachment with FAT 

instructions for the OTV. 

Production Authorization. Solicitation number W91CRB-04-R-0033, issued on 

May 19, 2004, required prospective contractors to submit PDMs for evaluation. 

The Government, using testing procedures in accordance with body armor 

purchase descriptions, conducted technical qualification testing for each offeror’s 

PDM. 

According to FAR Subpart 14.202-4, PDMs will be used to determine only the 

responsiveness of the bid and will not be used to determine a bidder’s ability to 

produce the required item. Further, PDMs may be examined for any required 

characteristic, whether or not such characteristic is adequately described in the 

specification. 

 

8

 FAR Subpart 52.209-4, “First Article Approval—Government Testing,” June 28, 2006, states that the 

contracting officer shall insert a clause into the contract defining the number of units the contractor shall 

deliver within a predefined number of days from the date of this contract to the Government for FAT. 

The characteristics that the first article must meet and the testing requirements are specified elsewhere in 

the contract. 
12 

For this solicitation, RDECOMAC contracting officials issued FAT “production 

is authorized” letters of approval based on bid responsiveness evaluation 

procedures performed during source selection for six contracts awarded on 

August 19, 2004. The “production is authorized” letters were issued to the 

prospective contractors on August 5, 2004. After body armor contract award, first 

article units produced at the contractor’s facility may not have been tested. There 

is no evidence of FAT after contract award for those designs in the contracting 

file. While testing and evaluation performed on the PDM may have followed the 

same test procedures as a FAT, the bid sample was evaluated as part of source 

selection, and the first article was not tested. 

Waived Requirements. Contracts W91CRB-05-P-0204 and 

W91CRB-06-D-0024 were awarded for the retrofit of OTVs returning from the 

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) theater. The solicitation and contract 

incorporated clauses requiring FAT. The solicitation required prospective 

vendors to submit either PDMs for evaluation testing, or a certification stating 

that the vendor had previously passed FAT. The statement of work was for 

retrofitting OTVs; therefore, a certificate for FAT for manufacturing OTVs would 

not apply to this process. Contracting officials should have required the 

prospective vendors to submit the required units for preliminary design evaluation 

testing as the solicitation requested. 

When questioned, PM SEQ officials indicated that FAT would not be appropriate 

for retrofitting services because this process does not involve new manufacturing. 

Solicitation officials included FAT certifications or lack thereof as part of their 

evaluations. The vendor that was awarded the contract submitted a FAT 

certification from 1999 for the complete manufacture of OTVs. As a result, rating 

officials evaluated the vendor’s “strengths” as “major” because all of the vendor’s 

ballistic packages passed FAT. The rating officials evaluated a competing 

vendor’s offer as “deficient” because the vendor would be required to pass FAT 

for its ballistic packages. Subsequent Contract W91CRB-06-D-0024 was 

awarded to the vendor based on the W91CRB-05-P-0204 contract award and the 

FAT certification from 1999. Further, neither of these contract files contained 

any evidence that any testing and evaluation occurred on these products after 

contract award. As a result, the Army purchased 21,265 retrofitted OTVs that 

were not tested under testing and evaluation protocols as called for in the contract. 

Federal Supply Schedule Orders. Army programming and contracting officials 

did not require FAT of body armor components ordered through the FSS. Army 

contracting officials stated that they believed the General Services Administration 

(GSA) conducted FAT on items before awarding a contract on the FSS. GSA 

contracting officials stated that they do not test items before awarding contracts 

on the FSS and that FAT is the responsibility of the ordering activity. 
13 

Contract Documentation 

FAR Subpart 4, “Government Contract Files,” prescribes how to establish, 

maintain, and dispose of contract files. Contract documentation in the files must 

provide a complete history of the acquisition and the award. If applicable, 

contracting office files normally include: 

• a purchase request, 

• acquisition planning information, 

• the solicitation and amendments, 

• a list of sources solicited, 

• a copy of each offer or quotation, 

• source-selection documentation, 

• determination of the contractor’s responsibility (first article testing), 

• original signed contract or award and modifications, 

• contract completion documents, and 

• any additional documents on which action was taken or that reflect 

actions by the contracting office pertinent to the contract. 

Army contract documentation was deficient on 11 of the contracts and orders 

reviewed. The deficient areas included inadequate or no: 

• market research, 

• acquisition plan, 

• source-selection plan, and 

• request for discounts on FSS orders. 

Market Research. FAR Subpart 2.1, “Definitions,” March 9, 2005, defines 

market research as collecting and analyzing information on commercial market 

capabilities to satisfy an agency’s needs. Market research can help ensure that the 

Government gets the best product for the best price. Officials can use a variety of 

market research techniques to identify potential sources, including reviewing 

recent market research for similar products; publishing formal requests for 

information; querying Government databases; querying Internet information 

sources; obtaining source lists; reviewing catalogs; and holding presolicitation 

conferences. The only documented evidence in 8 of the 28 contract files was a 

statement by program officials that market research had been performed; the 

research was not documented as required by the FAR. Although Army officials 
14 

complied with other statutory and regulatory provisions regarding competition, 

we believe market research was inadequate. See Appendix D for a list of the 

contract actions. 

Acquisition Plans.9 Contracting officials did not prepare a written acquisition 

plan for the purchase of DAPs before awarding FSS Order W91CRB-04-D-0014. 

Army officials stated that they did not create an acquisition plan for the order 

because they considered the acquisition to be a final buyout. This acquisition, 

however, was an FSS order. The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 

Supplement (DFARS) Subpart 207.1, “Acquisition Plans,” March 23, 2004, 

which waives an acquisition plan for final buyouts, does not apply to FAR 

Subpart 8.404(c)(1), which states, “Orders placed under a Federal Supply 

Schedule contract are not exempt from the development of acquisition plans.” 

Thus, an acquisition plan was required. 

Contracting officials did not prepare a written acquisition plan for the purchase of 

OTVs before awarding FSS Order W91CRB-04-F-0126. The officials stated that 

they did not create an acquisition plan because the FSS order value was lower 

than the threshold that would require an acquisition plan. In fact, this order 

requires an acquisition plan because the value for one fiscal year of this order was 

$24.7 million, well above the threshold of $15 million. 

Source-Selection Plan.10 The Request for Quote for FSS Order 

W91CRB-04-D-0014 contained inadequate evaluation factors. Ordering officials 

included the evaluation factors for award as an amendment to the solicitation. 

Those evaluation factors were technical performance, delivery time, and cost. 

The amendment instructed offerors to provide product samples for evaluation; 

however, the amendment did not provide criteria or a purchase description as a 

basis for the technical design. Despite the lack of design evaluation criteria, 

ordering officials wrote in the technical evaluations that competing designs 

deviated from the design prescribed in the solicitation and were therefore 

technically unacceptable. 

Requests for Discounts. The Army placed two orders from the FSS without 

requesting discounts even though the orders exceeded the maximum order 

threshold. For example, ordering officials did not request a discount for FSS 

Order W91CRB-04-D-0014 even though this order was for $239 million for 

840,000 DAPs. Although the order is listed as an indefinite-delivery, indefinitequantity contract, contracting files identify it as an order from the FSS. The 

solicitation stated that discounts were encouraged; however, the vendor did not 

offer a discount in the quoted price, nor did Army officials actively request a 

discount or document why one was not requested. Similarly, Army officials did 

not request a discount for W91CRB-05-F-0072, an order for DAPs valued at 

 

9

 An acquisition plan lists the specific actions necessary to execute the approved acquisition strategy and 

implement the contract. Its purpose is to ensure that the Government acquires items it needs in the most 

effective, economical, and timely manner possible. 

10 Source-selection plans are prepared to evaluate a bid or proposal. The source-selection plan contains 

evaluation factors and significant subfactors. These factors and significant subfactors help evaluators 

select the proposal that represents the best value.
15 

$3.09 million. Contracting officials pursued discounts only by stating in the 

solicitation, “Discounts off of GSA schedule prices are allowed and encouraged”; 

no discounts were offered by the manufacturer, and none were obtained. 

Determining a Reasonable Price. The contracting officer must make sure that 

items are bought at a fair and reasonable price. Contracting officials are 

prohibited from obtaining certified cost or pricing data when contracting for 

commercial items. Instead, contracting officials should rely on market-based 

pricing supported by evidence of commercial sales to determine fair and 

reasonable prices. The FAR also allows prior purchase history to be used when 

making theses comparisons. 

There was no evidence that the price was reasonable in Orders 

W91CRB-04-D-0014 and W91CRB-04-P-0169, valued at approximately 

$242 million. The Army paid $285.00 each for an initial order of 10,000 DAPs 

from W91CRB-04-P-0169. In subsequent Order W91CRB-04-D-0014, the Army 

procured 840,000 DAPs from the same manufacturer at the same price as the 

10,000, for a total value of $239 million. 

For Order W91CRB-04-P-0169, contracting officials indicated that the $285.00 

price was fair because the offeror could have charged a higher price. The officials 

maintained that contracting officials using simplified acquisition procedures were 

allowed to make that choice. Further, for Order W91CRB-04-D-0014, the 

contracting officer stated that the price was reasonable based on Order 

W91CRB-04-P-0169 and because the FSS already determined the price to be “fair 

and reasonable.” Contracting officials accepted the offer with the same price 

despite the substantial quantity ordered. 

We believe RDECOMAC contracting officials were not prudent in determining 

price and in using the Government’s funds. We believe a prudent contracting 

official should, as a rule, use validated historical prices as a basis to determine 

price reasonableness for current and future procurements. RDECOMAC officials 

did not ensure the validity of the comparison or the reasonableness of the 

historical price. Price comparisons were made when volumes were dissimilar. 

The disproportionate volume order of 840,000 as compared with 10,000 should 

have alerted the contracting officer to obtain a volume quantity discount after 

receiving the offer. Based on evidence presented in the contracting file, the 

contracting officer’s rationale for selecting this offer was not supportable. 

Further, no evidence exists to substantiate that the historical price used was 

reasonable. 

Conclusion 

We cannot determine whether body armor components purchased under 13 Army 

contracts and orders met FAR requirements because FAT for body armor 

components could not be verified. Normally, a first article is tested to verify that 

the manufacturing process has generated an acceptable item and to catch and 

correct any defects in the manufacturing process before more items are produced 

using the same manufacturing process. First article testing would have assisted 
16 

Army officials in determining whether the contractor could furnish an acceptable 

product. Further, we cannot determine whether procurement decisions were 

informed by best-value criteria in 11 contracts reviewed. The Army should 

maintain contract files in compliance with the FAR and the DFARS. Wellmaintained contract files support informed decisions and ensure DoD receives the 

best value in the body armor it procures. Because the period of performance for 

the contracts we reviewed has ended, recommendations made in this report are 

intended to prevent similar problems from recurring. 

Management Comments on the Finding and Audit Response 

Summaries of management comments on the finding and audit responses are in 

Appendix G. 

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit 

Response 

Redirected Recommendation. As a result of comments from the Commander, 

U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command, we revised draft 

Recommendation 2. to show the correct command structure. Specifically, 

Recommendation 2. is redirected to the Commander, U.S. Army Research, 

Development and Engineering Command to direct the U.S. Army Research, 

Development and Engineering Command Acquisition Center to execute actions in 

2.a., 2.b., and 2.c. 

1. We recommend that the Program Executive Office Soldier: 

a. Direct testing and evaluation of the first article for conformance 

with contract requirements before the initial stage of production on all 

contracts for body armor components. 

b. Update the purchase description to identify the appropriate first 

article and the number of units to be furnished. 

c. Provide adequate documentation to support all contractual actions, 

including issuing waivers for first article testing. 

Program Executive Officer Soldier Comments. The Program Executive Office 

Soldier (hereafter the PEO) neither concurred nor nonconcurred. The PEO stated 

that for Recommendations 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c., no action would be required 

because all of the recommended actions are already regular and consistent current 

business practices in accordance with the FAR. 

Audit Response. The PEO’s comments on Recommendation 1.a. are not 

responsive. While we agree that procedures exist for testing and evaluation to 

ensure contract conformance, our audit results show that those procedures are not 

consistently followed. For example, the PEO states that his office requires two 
17 

levels of performance verification tests prior to acceptance (FAT and lot 

acceptance tests), while in the PEO’s comments on the draft report the PEO lists 

FAT verification conducted on December 3, 2004, for Contract 

W91CRB-05-D-0003 as the basis for a waiver of FAT on three additional 

contracts.11 Another example includes the purchase description for Contract 

W91CRB-06-D-0024, which is part of the contract and states, “current production 

items submitted with qualifying FAT data may be considered in the determination 

of reducing additional FAT verification by the Government.” This contract 

language indicates that the FAT may be reduced, not eliminated, and our review 

of the contract file indicated the FAT was never performed after contract award. 

These examples, and our additional audit response to the PEO’s comments in 

Appendix G, support the need for Recommendation 1.a., which if implemented 

would ensure contract FAT compliance if applicable to the contract. We request 

that the PEO reconsider his position on Recommendation 1.a. and provide 

comments on the final report in accordance with DoD Directive 7650.3. 

The PEO’s comments on Recommendation 1.b. are not responsive. The PEO 

stated that current business practices ensure that purchase descriptions identify 

the appropriate first article and the number of units to be furnished. However, we 

found purchase descriptions that did not contain this information. For example, 

as noted in the report, the ESBI purchase description states, “Unless otherwise 

specified in the contract or purchase order, the ESBI supplier is responsible for all 

first article and conformance inspections and tests herein.” This example, and our 

additional audit response to the PEO’s comments in Appendix G, supports the 

need for Recommendation 1.b., which if implemented would ensure that purchase 

descriptions are specific in identifying the appropriate first article and number of 

units to be furnished for FAT. We request that the PEO reconsider his position on 

Recommendation 1.b. and provide comments on the final report in accordance 

with DoD Directive 7650.3. 

The PEO’s comments on Recommendation 1.c. are not responsive. The PEO 

stated that current business practices ensure the documentation of all contractual 

actions, including issuing waivers for FAT, in accordance with the FAR. 

However, we found actions that were not documented. For example, the 

justification to support the waiver requested for Contract W91CRB-04-D0039 

consisted of a copy of a previous FAT authorization included in the offeror’s 

proposal. Neither the program office nor contracting office provided a document 

to state that a waiver was granted based on a previous test. Further, in Contract 

W91CRB-05-P-0204, awarded September 26, 2005, the offeror’s proposal 

contained a copy of official FAT authorization issued in February 16, 1999, and 

the offeror’s self-certification that the product passed FAT. Again, no official 

waiver was present in the contract file. However, in the source-selection 

evaluation form, the selecting official cites as an example of the offeror’s 

strengths that “ballistic packages have all passed FAT.” These examples, and our 

additional audit response to the PEO’s comments in Appendix G, support the 

need for Recommendation 1.c., which if implemented would ensure that adequate 

documentation is maintained to support all contractual actions. We request that 

the PEO reconsider his position on Recommendation 1.c. and provide comments 

on the final report in accordance with DoD Directive 7650.3. 

 

11 W91CRB-05-F-0072, W91CRB-04-D-0204, and W91CRB-06-D-0024. 
18 

2. We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Research, Development 

and Engineering Command direct the U.S. Army Research, Development 

and Engineering Command Acquisition Center to: 

a. Require contracting officers to include specific instructions in 

acquisition documents for first article testing when required, and maintain 

documentation to support contractual actions in accordance with the Federal 

Acquisition Regulation Part 4, “Administrative Matters.” 

b. Require contracting officers to require body armor manufacturers 

and subcontractors to provide preproduction body armor components for 

testing and evaluation before the Government authorizes production. 

c. Reevaluate the circumstances surrounding the price determination 

for Orders W91CRB-04-D-0014 and W91CRB-04-P-0169 to determine 

whether administrative remedies are necessary or available.

Commander, U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command 

Comments. The Commander, U.S. Army Research, Development and 

Engineering Command (hereafter the Commander) concurred with 

Recommendations 2.a., 2.b., and 2.c. The Commander stated that for 

Recommendation 2.a., guidance would be issued to contracting officers no later 

than February 29, 2008; for Recommendation 2.b., guidance would be issued to 

contracting officers no later than February 29, 2008, for handling a requirement 

for body armor manufacturers and subcontractors to provide preproduction 

components for testing and evaluation before production; and for 

Recommendation 2.c., reevaluation and determination would be accomplished by 

February 29, 2008. 

Audit Response. The Commander’s comments were fully responsive, and no 

additional comments are required. Additionally, based on the Commander’s 

suggestion, we redirected the recommendation to show the correct command 

structure. 

3. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology/Army Acquisition Executive: 

a. Require contracting officers who conduct direct acquisition for 

amounts greater than the simplified acquisition threshold to: 

(1) Determine whether the use of non-DoD contracts is in the 

best interest of the Government, and verify that the required goods cannot 

be obtained as conveniently or economically by using a DoD contract. The 

contracting officer or another official designated by the agency head should 

document those conclusions in writing. 

(2) Request discounts when placing orders from the Federal 

Supply Schedule. 
19 

(3) Document their requests for discounts. If discounts were 

received, document how the discounts were determined to be fair; if 

discounts were not received, explain why the vendor was chosen. 

(4) Fully document decisions not to consider all potential 

sources when awarding orders using the Federal Supply Schedule. 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology) Comments. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy 

and Procurement), responding for the Assistant Secretary of Army (Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology), concurred with Recommendation 3., stating that 

policies and procedures are already fully in place. The Deputy Assistant 

Secretary stated that guidance on acquiring supplies and services through 

contracts or orders issued by non-DoD agencies is contained in the DFARS, the 

U.S. Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, and other policy issued 

by the DoD and the Army. Specific Army policy includes the ASA(ALT) 

memorandum, “Proper Use of Non-Department of Defense (Non-DoD) 

Contracts,” July 12, 2005. This memorandum requires a written certification for 

using non-DoD contract vehicles on or after January 1, 2005, for acquisitions 

above the simplified acquisition threshold. 

Further, the Deputy Assistant Secretary stated that guidance on requesting 

discounts is contained in FAR 8.404, and an Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) memorandum, “Use of Federal 

Supply Schedules and Market Research,” January 28, 2005. This guidance 

reminds contracting officers to seek discounts for orders exceeding the maximum 

order threshold. The guidance also requires contracting officers to explain in the 

contract file how the discount was determined to be fair and reasonable or the 

reason for not obtaining a discount. Finally, the memorandum discusses the 

importance of conducting market research for acquisitions above the simplified 

acquisition threshold and advises contracting officers that they “should document 

the contract file on the market research efforts conducted in support of each 

acquisition.” 

Audit Response. The Deputy Assistant Secretary’s comments are partially 

responsive. Although the Deputy Assistant Secretary concurred with the 

recommendation and we agree that policies and procedures are in place to ensure 

supplies and services acquired through contracts or orders issued by non-DoD 

agencies are adequate, the Deputy Assistant Secretary did not identify steps that 

will be initiated to ensure that these policies and procedures are enforced. 

During our review, we observed the application of the Army’s policy for 

reviewing and approving the use of non-DoD contracts. For Order 

W91CRB-05-F-0072, issued June 2, 2005, the application of Army policy was 

not evident. However, for Order W91CRB-06-F-0098, issued January 19, 2006, 

the policy was properly applied. Although this example shows that Army 

officials may be making progress on uniform implementation of Army policy, we 

request that the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology) reconsider his position on Recommendation 3. and provide 

comments on the final report in accordance with DoD Directive 7650.3 indicating 

what actions will be taken to ensure the policies and procedures are enforced. 
20 

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2006 through March 2008 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. 

We evaluated whether contracting officials with the Army’s RDECOMAC and 

the Marine Corps’ MCSC awarded contracts for IBA according to the FAR and 

the DFARS. We reviewed the procurement of body armor between January 2004 

and December 2006. Specifically, we evaluated documentation of contracts for 

body army components from presolicitation to solicitation and evaluation. 

We collected, analyzed, and reviewed documents dated December 1997 through 

April 2007. We collected the acquisition documents of 40 contracts and orders 

for body armor components. We analyzed contracting files, which contained 

acquisition plans, requests for proposals, proposal evaluation plans, price 

negotiation memorandums, notifications to unsuccessful bidders, sole-source 

award justifications, award letters, contracts and modifications, and protests 

against award. 

We interviewed contracting officials at the Army’s RDECOMAC and Marine 

Corps’ MCSC. We interviewed program office personnel from the Army’s PEO 

Soldier and PM SEQ, and from the Marine Corps’ PM ICE. We also interviewed 

officials at the Service headquarters. We coordinated with Government 

Accountability Office personnel who were conducting a concurrent review of 

body armor issues. 

We reviewed contracting regulations in the FAR, the DFARS, Public Laws, and 

the United States Code. We also reviewed Service regulations, instructions, 

handbooks, and field manuals. 

The audit scope was limited to Army and Marine Corps contracts and orders 

awarded between January 2004 and December 2006 for body armor components. 

We divided the acquisition process into three phases: presolicitation, solicitation 

and evaluation, and contract administration. The scope was limited to reviewing 

the presolicitation and the solicitation and evaluation phases of the acquisition 

process for specific contracts. We also reviewed contracting files as necessary to 

determine requirements for FAT. We did not evaluate the contract administration 

phase of the acquisition process, which includes activities performed after 

contract award, such as quality control and testing,12 deliverable requirements, 

and monitoring and measuring performance and end-user satisfaction, to 

 

12 Quality control and testing (acceptance testing) involves testing each item or manufacturing lot of items 

to verify that each particular item meets its specification requirements. The purpose of acceptance testing 

is to catch random defects on a particular item that are not systemic in the manufacturing process; due to 

our scope limitation, we did not examine acceptance testing. 
21 

determine whether the contractor met the requirements of the contract. We also 

did not visit contractor facilities during the audit. See Appendix F for a summary 

of the contracts reviewed. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not rely on computer-processed data 

to perform this audit. 

Use of Technical Assistance. We did not require technical assistance to perform 

this audit. 

Government Accountability Office High-Risk Area. The Government 

Accountability Office has identified several high-risk areas in DoD. This report 

provides coverage of the DoD Contract Management high-risk area. 

Prior Coverage 

During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the 

DoD IG, and the Department of the Army have issued six reports discussing body 

armor. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed on the Internet at 

http://www.gao.gov. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at 

http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports. Dissemination of Army reports is prohibited 

except as authorized by Army Regulation 20-1. 

GAO 

GAO-07-662R, “Defense Logistics: Army and Marine Corps’s Individual Body 

Armor System Issues,” April 26, 2007 

GAO-06-943, “DoD Excess Property: Control Breakdowns Present Significant 

Security Risk and Continuing Waste and Inefficiency,” July 25, 2006 

GAO-05-275, “Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of 

Critical Items during Current and Future Operations,” April 8, 2005 

DoD IG 

DoD IG Report No. D-2007-107, “Procurement Policy for Armored Vehicles,” 

June 27, 2007 

Army 

Department of the Army, Inspector General, “Special Inspection of the Processes 

Used to Provide Body Armor to U.S. and Coalition Forces in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom and Enduring Freedom, December 2003–February 2004,” April 20, 

2004 

Army Audit Agency, Audit Report A-2004-0202-AMA, “Interceptor Body 

Armor,” March 17, 2004 

Appendix B. Congressional Request 

23 
24 
25 

Appendix C. Effect of Body Armor Ban 

Request 

Determine the effect of the Army’s ban on personally procured body armor 

on the safety of our Service members.

To respond to this request, we reviewed the Army’s ban on personally procured 

body armor, and determined whether the Army had enough body armor in 

inventory to protect its soldiers. 

Policies Banning Commercially Available Body Armor 

The Army issued a Safety of Use Message (SOUM) on March 17, 2006, banning 

the use of personally procured, commercially available body armor products in a 

combat zone. Titled “Discontinued Use of Unauthorized Body Armor, Dragon 

Skin,” the SOUM states: 

There may be Soldiers deployed in OIF/OEF who are wearing commercial body armor 

called “Dragon Skin,” made by Pinnacle Armor, in lieu of their issued Interceptor Body 

Armor (IBA). Media releases and related advertising imply that Dragon Skin is superior 

in performance to IBA. The Army has been unable to determine the veracity of these 

claims.

The message continues: 

The Army has been involved in the development of the Dragon Skin and the different 

technology it employs. Dragon Skin’s capabilities do not meet Army requirements. In 

fact, the Dragon Skin has not been certified by the Army for protection against small 

arms threats being encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan today. . . . Although this 

message specifically identifies Dragon Skin, it applies to other commercially available 

body armor products (such as commercial police vests) that are not Army approved and 

issued.

According to Army officials, the SOUM was issued to address concerns raised by 

the Army Chief of Staff that deployed soldiers may be using nonstandard body 

armor. The Army found that units had bought nonstandard body armor, and the 

SOUM directed units to turn in nonstandard body armor. Commanders were 

required to replace all other types of body armor immediately with IBA. The 

Marine Corps issued policy on the wear and purchase of body armor and personal 

protective equipment on April 17, 2007. The Army and Marine Corps issued the 

policies to enhance the safety of military personnel by ensuring that their body 

armor meets established military ballistic standards. 

The SOUM made soldiers aware that commercially available body armor did not 

meet military specifications for ballistic protection. The Services require that 

ballistic testing be performed by an independent certified National Institute of 
26 

Justice testing facility. The testing facilities confirmed that IBA reduces the 

effects of fragmentation and ballistic projectiles. As a result, troops are equipped 

with modular body armor certified as meeting Government test standards. 

Inventory of Body Armor 

According to Army officials, an adequate supply of body armor was available and 

issued at the time of the ban. An October 2003 CENTCOM message states that 

each Service member and DoD civilian in the CENTCOM theater was to be 

issued one suit of body armor. We evaluated the Army’s inventory against the 

CENTCOM requirement to determine whether the Army had sufficient stocks of 

IBA on hand at the time of the ban. The table provides information on theater 

requirements and quantities fielded by the Army. 

Outer Tactical Vests Fielded 

Date

CENTCOM Theater 

Requirement

OTVs Fielded by 

the Army

SAPIs (sets) 

Fielded 

by the Army

December 2005 231,738 885,787 729,171 

March 2006 198,130 909,623 825,424 

June 2006 193,046 953,079 896,069 

Sufficient stocks of IBA were available for Service members at the time of the 

Army ban. Although there may have been isolated instances of IBA not being 

readily available, reported quantities on hand were sufficient to issue one suit of 

body armor to each Service member and DoD civilian in the CENTCOM theater. 

The figure on the next page provides a timeline showing when standards were 

issued and when body armor components were required and fielded by the Army. 

The timeline illustrates the period June 1999 to June 2006. 
 27

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command ESBI Enhanced Side Ballistic InsertOTV Outer Tactical Vest SAPI Small Arms Protective Insert 

OCT 2003

CENTCOM

 Publishes

Standard for Body Armor: 

One OTV per U.S. Service 

Member/DoD Personnel

In Theater

MAR 2003

Operation Iraqi 

Freedom Initiated 

JUN 1999

Army Started Fielding

Interceptor Body Armor 

System DEC 2003

Army 

Procurement Objective Change

One OTV & Two SAPI 

per Army Soldier 

DEC 2001

Operation Enduring 

Freedom Initiated 

2005

DEC 2005

CENTCOM

OTV Requirement

231,738

Army 

Fielded

885,787 OTV, 

729,171 SAPI

2005

MAR 2006

CENTCOM

OTV Requirement

198,130

Army

Fielded

909,623 OTV, 

825,424 SAPI

Army 

 Issued 

Safety of Use Message 

“Discontinue Use of Unauthorized Body Armor, Dragon Skin”

2005

JUN 2006

CENTCOM

OTV Requirement

193,046

Army

Fielded

953,079 OTV, 

896,069 SAPI
28 

Appendix D. Guidance for Contracting Officers 

The FAR and DFARS provide guidance to contracting officers and Government 

contractors. Specifically, the FAR and DFARS define duties and responsibilities 

for all personnel involved in the pre-award and award of Federal contracts. The 

following sections of the FAR and DFARS pertain to the administration of the 

contracts and orders we reviewed. 

FAR Part 2, “Definitions of Words and Terms.” FAR Part 2.000(a)(1) Defines 

words and terms that are frequently used in the FAR; (2) Provides crossreferences to other definitions in the FAR of the same word or term; and (3) 

Provides for the incorporation of these definitions in solicitations and contracts by 

reference. 

FAR Part 4, “Administrative Matters.” FAR Part 4 prescribes policies and 

procedures relating to the administrative aspects of contract execution, contractorsubmitted paper documents, distribution, reporting, retention, and files. 

FAR Part 7, “Acquisition Planning.” FAR Part 7 prescribes policies and 

procedures for (a) Developing acquisition plans; (b) Determining whether to use 

commercial or Government resources for acquisition of supplies or services; 

(c) Deciding whether it is more economical to lease equipment rather than 

purchase it; and (d) Determining whether functions are inherently governmental. 

FAR Part 8, “Required Sources of Supplies and Services.” FAR Part 8 deals 

with the acquisition of supplies and services from or through Government supply 

sources. 

FAR Part 9, “Contractor Qualifications.” FAR Part 9 prescribes policies, 

standards, and procedures pertaining to prospective contractors’ responsibility; 

debarment, suspension, and ineligibility; qualified products; first article testing 

and approval; contractor team arrangements; defense production pools and 

research and development pools; and organizational conflicts of interest. 

FAR Part 12, “Acquisition of Commercial Items.” FAR Part 12 prescribes 

policies and procedures unique to the acquisition of commercial items. It 

implements the Federal Government’s preference for the acquisition of 

commercial items contained in Title VIII of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining 

Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-355) by establishing acquisition policies more 

closely resembling those of the commercial marketplace and encouraging the 

acquisition of commercial items and components. 

FAR Part 13, “Simplified Acquisition Procedures.” FAR Part 13 prescribes 

policies and procedures for the acquisition of supplies and services, including 

construction, research and development, and commercial items, the aggregate 

amount of which does not exceed the simplified acquisition threshold. 

Subpart 13.5 provides special authority for acquisitions of commercial items 

exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold but not exceeding $5.5 million 

($11 million for acquisitions as described in 13.500(e)), including options. 
29 

FAR Part 15, “Contacting by Negotiation.” FAR Part 15 prescribes policies 

and procedures governing competitive and noncompetitive negotiated 

acquisitions. 

FAR Part 16, “Types of Contracts.” FAR Part 16 describes types of contracts 

that may be used in acquisitions. It prescribes policies and procedures and 

provides guidance for selecting a contract type appropriate to the circumstances 

of the acquisition. 

FAR Part 52, “Solicitation Provisions and Contract Clauses.” FAR 

Part 52.000 (a) Gives instructions for using provisions and clauses in solicitations 

and/or contracts; (b) Sets forth the solicitation provisions and contract clauses 

prescribed by the FAR; and (c) Presents a matrix listing the FAR provisions and 

clauses applicable to each principal contract type or purpose (for example, fixedprice supply, cost-reimbursement research and development). 

DFARS Subpart 207.103, “Agency-head responsibilities,” March 31, 2003.13 DFARS Subpart 207.103 instructs the agency head to prepare written acquisition 

plans for acquisitions for production or services when the total cost of all 

contracts for the acquisition program is estimated at $30 million or more for all 

years or $15 million or more for any fiscal year. Written plans are not required in 

acquisitions for a final buy out or one-time buy. The terms “final buy out” and 

“one-time buy” refer to a single contract that covers all known present and future 

requirements. This exception does not apply to a multiyear contract or a contract 

with options or phases. 

 

13 DFARS Subpart 207.103, March 31, 2003, was in effect at the time the Army awarded contract 

W91CRB-04-D-0014. The revision issued March 27, 2007, raised the dollar thresholds. 
30 

Appendix E. Interceptor Body Armor 

Currently, soldiers and Marines use IBA, the model name for multiple-threat body 

armor. Body armor is designed to offer increased protection to the soldier by 

stopping or slowing bullets and fragments and reducing the number and severity 

of wounds. 

The modular pieces of IBA consist of the Outer Tactical Vest (OTV); Small Arms 

Protective Inserts/Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPIs)/(ESAPIs); 

Deltoid and Axillary Protectors (DAPs); and the Enhanced Side Ballistic Inserts 

(ESBIs), labeled “Side Plates” in the diagram. The body armor, which is unisex, 

is equipped with removable throat and groin protectors, as well as with front and 

back removable plates, which can defeat rifle-fired threats. See the diagram for 

the various components of IBA. 

Interceptor Body Armor Diagram 

Outer Tactical

Vest (OTV)

ESAPI Ballistic 

Inserts (set)

Deltoid Axillary Protector 

(DAP)

Side Plates

Source: PEO Soldier
31 

Appendix F. Summary of Interceptor Body 

Armor Contracts Reviewed 

Discounts 

Requested

X* 

Source -

Selection 

Plan

X* 

Acquisition 

Plan

X* 

X 

Market 

Research

X X X X X X X 

Deficiencies Identified 

FAT

X X X X X X X 

ProductDAPs SAPIs SAPIs SAPIs SAPIs SAPIs SAPIs SAPIs OTVs 

ContractorPoint Blank Body Armor Inc. Ceradyne Inc. Armor Wor

ks, 

LLC. ForceOne, LLC. Simula, Inc. Cercom, Inc. Composix Co Armacel Armor 

Corp. Point Blan

k Bo

dy 

Armor Inc. 

Contract /Order Number Army Contracts W91CRB-04-D-0014 W91CRB-04-D-0039 W91CRB-04-D-0040 W91CRB-04-D-0041 W91CRB-04-D-0042 W91CRB-04-D-0043 W91CRB-04-D-0044 W91CRB-04-D-0045 W91CRB-04-F-0126  X Inadequate documentation was in the contract file to support decisions made by contracting officials.  * No documentation was included in the contract file. 

Δ Product procured was either OTV conversion kits or OTV conversion services (CNV). 
32 

Discounts 

Requested

X* 

Source 

Selection 

Plan

Acquisition 

Plan

Market 

Research

Deficiencies Identified 

FAT

X X X 

Product

DAPs OTV DAPs SAPIs SAPIs SAPIs SAPIs SAPIs OTV CNV Δ

OTV CNV Δ

Contractor

Point Blank Body Armor Inc. Point Blank Body Armor Inc. Point Blank Body Armor Inc. Protective Material Group Simula Inc. Cercom, Inc. Armacel Armor Corp Patriot Performance Point Blank Body Armor Inc. Point Blank Body Armor Inc. 

Contract /Order Number

W91CRB-04-P-0169 W91CRB-05-D-0003 W91CRB-05-F-0072 W91CRB-05-F-0086 W91CRB-05-P-0147 W91CRB-05-P-0148 W91CRB-05-P-0159 W91CRB-05-P-0191 W91CRB-05-P-0204 W91CRB-05-P-0215 

 X Inadequate documentation was in the contract file to support decisions made by contracting officials.  * No documentation was included in the contract file. 

Δ Product procured was either OTV conversion kits or OTV conversion services (CNV). 
33 

Discounts 

Requested

2 

Source 

Selection 

Plan

1 

Acquisition 

Plan

2 

Market 

Research

 X 

8 

Deficiencies Identified 

FAT

X X X 

13 

Product

SAPIs SAPIs OTV CNV Δ

OTV CNV ΔESBIs & Carriers ESBIs & Carriers OTV CNV ΔOTV CNV ΔESBIs & Carriers 

Contractor

Ceradyne Inc. Protective Material Group Point Blank Body Armor Inc. UNICOR Federal Prison Ceradyne Inc. Armor Works LLC. Point Blank Body Armor Inc. Specialty Defense Point Blank Body Armor Inc. 

Contract /Order Number

W91CRB-06-C-0002 W91CRB-06-D-0004 W91CRB-06-D-0024 W91CRB-06-D-0027 W91CRB-06-D-0028 W91CRB-06-D-0029 W91CRB-06-D-0030 W91CRB-06-D-0031 W91CRB-06-F-0098  Army Subtotal

 X Inadequate documentation was in the contract file to support decisions made by contracting officials.  * No documentation was included in the contract file. 

Δ Product procured was either OTV conversion kits or OTV conversion services (CNV). 
34 

Discounts 

Requested

Source 

Selection 

Plan

Acquisition 

Plan

Market 

Research

Deficiencies Identified 

FAT Product

SAPIs SAPIs SAPIs SAPIs ESBIs ESBIs & Carriers ESBIs ESBIs ESBIs & Carrier 

Contractor

Armor Works LLC. Ceradyne Inc. Simula Inc. Armor Works LLC. Ceradyne Inc. Source One Distributors Diamondback Tactical Ceradyne Inc. Source One Distributors 

Contract /Order Number Marine Corps Contracts M67854-04-D-3005 M67854-04-D-3116 M67854-04-D-3117 M67854-04-D-3118 M67854-05-C-3062 M67854-05-C-3063 M67854-05-C-3065 M67854-06-C-3019 M67854-06-C-3020  X Inadequate documentation was in the contract file to support decisions made by contracting officials.  * No documentation was included in the contract file. 

Δ Product procured was either OTV conversion kits or OTV conversion services (CNV). 
35 

Discounts 

Requested

0 

 2 

Source 

Selection 

Plan

0 

 1 

Acquisition 

Plan

0 

 2 

Market 

Research

0 

 8 

Deficiencies Identified 

FAT

0 

 13 

Product

ESBIs & Carriers ESBIs & Carriers ESBIs & Carriers 

Contractor

Simula Inc. Armor Works, LLC. Armor Works, LLC. 

Contract /Order Number

M67854-06-D-3031 M67854-06-D-3071 M67854-06-D-3072  Marine Corps SubtotalService Total

X Inadequate documentation was in the contract file to support decisions made by contracting officials. * No documentation was included in the contract file. 

Δ Product procured is either OTV conversion kits and/or OTV conversion services (CNV). 
36 

Appendix G. Management Comments on the 

Draft Report and Audit Response 

Management comments on the draft report and finding from the Program 

Executive Office (PEO) Soldier and U.S. Army Research, Development and 

Engineering Command, and our detailed response to the comments, follows. The 

complete text of these comments is in the Management Comments section of the 

report. 

The Program Executive Office Soldier Comments on the Draft 

Report and Audit Response 

The PEO Soldier (hereafter the PEO), also the Commanding General, Natick 

Soldier Systems Center, provided management comments on the draft report. 

PEO Comments. The PEO stated that the Army requires and conducts FAT and 

lot acceptance tests, which verify performance parameters of ballistic limit and 

resistance to penetration. These tests also verify that body armor meets Army 

standards before it is issued to soldiers and ensure that the production processes 

remain in check. The PEO also stated that the Army conducts post-issue 

surveillance testing to ensure no degradation of body armor performance over 

time. The PEO acknowledged that lot acceptance tests and surveillance testing 

were not in the scope of this audit, but stated that they are a critical part of the 

body armor testing program. In an additional meeting with Army officials, the 

PEO stated that the Army has no evidence of deaths that can be attributed to 

defective body armor. 

The PEO nonconcurred with the report’s finding that the Army did not conduct 

FAT after contract award on 15 of 28 contracts reviewed14. He stated that the 

FAR does not mandate a specific time to conduct FAT to ensure body armor 

meets standards. The PEO also stated that the FAR defines “first article” as an 

initial production sample, and FAT as a testing and evaluation process to 

determine whether a proposed product conforms to contract requirements before 

the initial stage of production. He further stated that the Army complied with the 

FAR by conducting FAT on initial production samples and verified contract 

specifications of every delivered lot prior to Army acceptance through lot 

acceptance tests. 

Further, with regard to conducting FAT on every new body armor design, the 

PEO stated that if a body armor item had a previous FAT qualification, the 

contracting officer would provide a waiver by issuing a letter verifying a previous 

 

14 We identified deficiencies in 15 of 28 contracts and orders that did not include requirements for or 

perform FAT on body armor components in our draft report. Based on comments and evidence received 

after our review, we updated the report to remove one contract and one order from our list, Contract 

W91CRB-04-D-0039 and Order W91CRB-05-F-0086. 
37 

FAT qualification, as authorized by the FAR. Specifically, the FAR states that 

the Government may waive the requirement for first article approval test where 

supplies identical or similar to those called for in the schedule have been 

previously furnished by the offeror/contractor and have been accepted by the 

Government. The PEO stated that all Army contracts to procure body armor have 

been in strict compliance with the FAR, which grants authority to the contracting 

officer to grant a waiver for FAT. The PEO stated that, although disputed by the 

DoD IG, FAT was conducted or waived by the contracting officer for each of the 

following 15 contracts: 

1. W91CRB-06-C-0002 (ESBI) – verification of FAT was certified by the 

contracting officer in a letter dated February 1, 2006. 

2. W91CRB-04-D-0039 (SAPI) – verification of previous FAT was certified by 

the contracting officer in a letter dated March 11, 2003 (supplies and 

manufacturing processes are identical). 

3. W91CRB-04-D-0040 (SAPI) – verification of previous FAT was certified by 

the contracting officer in a letter dated February 24, 2003 (supplies and 

manufacturing processes are identical). 

4. W91CRB-04-D-0042 (SAPI/ESAPI) – verification of previous FAT (SAPI) 

was certified by the contracting officer in a letter dated December 29, 2003 

(supplies and manufacturing processes are identical). The PEO also stated 

that subsequent verification of FAT on ESAPI was certified by the contracting 

officer in a letter dated February 24, 2005. 

5. W91CRB-04-D-0043 (SAPI) – no FAT letter was issued by the contracting 

officer; FAT was verified by test data from H.P. White Laboratory, 

Incorporated, an independent National Institute of Justice-certified ballistic 

laboratory, from July 13 to 17, 2004 (supplies and manufacturing processes 

are identical). 

6. W91CRB-04-D-0044 (SAPI) – FAT was verified by test data from H.P. 

White Laboratory, Incorporated from July 13 to 16, 2004. The PEO also 

stated that the contracting officer waived FAT after the fact in a letter dated 

December 20, 2004. 

7. W91CRB-04-D-0045 (SAPI/ESAPI) – verification of FAT was certified by 

the contracting officer in a letter dated September 6, 2005. 

8. W91CRB-04-F-0126 (OTV) – no FAT letter was issued by the contracting 

officer; FAT was verified by test data from H.P. White Laboratory, 

Incorporated on March 13, 2003 (supplies and manufacturing processes are 

identical). 

9. W91CRB-05-D-0003 (OTV) – FAT was conducted on December 3, 2004, at 

H.P. White Laboratory, Incorporated and was certified after the fact by the 

contracting officer in a letter dated June 16, 2006 (supplies and manufacturing 

processes are identical). 
38 

10. W91CRB-05-F-0072 (DAPs)15 – FAT was conducted on December 3, 2004, 

at H.P. White Laboratory, Incorporated and was certified after the fact by the 

contracting officer in a letter dated June 16, 2006 (supplies and manufacturing 

processes are similar). 

11. W91CRB-05-F-0086 (ESAPI) – verification of FAT was certified by the 

contracting officer in a letter dated September 7, 2005. 

12. W91CRB-04-D-0204 (OTV Retrofit) – FAT was conducted on December 3, 

2004, at H.P. White Laboratory, Incorporated and was certified after the fact 

by the contracting officer in a letter dated June 16, 2006 (supplies and 

manufacturing processes are similar). 

13. W91CRB-04-D-0014 (DAPs) – no FAT letter was issued by the contracting 

officer, and FAT was verified by test data from H.P. White Laboratory, 

Incorporated on March 13, 2003 (supplies and manufacturing processes are 

similar). 

14. W91CRB-06-D-0024 (OTV Retrofit) – previous FAT was conducted on 

December 3, 2004, at H.P. White Laboratory, Incorporated and was certified 

after the fact by the contracting officer in a letter dated June 16, 2006 

(supplies and manufacturing processes are similar). 

15. W91CRB-06-D-0029 (ESBI and Carrier) – verification of FAT was certified 

by the contracting officer in a letter dated August 16, 2006. 

Audit Response. FAR Subpart 4.8, “Government Contract Files,” states that 

contract files shall be sufficient to constitute a complete history of the transaction, 

furnishing essential facts in the event of litigation or congressional inquiries. We 

evaluated contract files for FAR compliance with regard to FAT, to include 

approvals or disapprovals of waivers or deviation from contract requirements. 

There was no evidence of this kind in contracting files for 15 of 28 contracts and 

orders during our review. 

In his management comments, the PEO stated that the Army complied with the 

FAR by conducting FAT on initial production samples, and also stated that if a 

body armor item had a previous FAT qualification, the contracting officer would 

provide a waiver by issuing a letter verifying a previous FAT qualification. The 

PEO provided an explanation of the FAT conducted or waivers granted for the 

15 contracts and orders in question (as seen in 1 through 15 above); below is our 

response to the PEO’s explanation. 

1. W91CRB-06-C-0002 (ESBI) – The PEO stated that a FAT was verified and 

certified by the contracting officer in a letter dated February 1, 2006. 

However, this contract did not contain the FAR clause requiring FAT to be 

conducted. Additionally, this letter was not maintained in the contracting file. 

 

15 Although the PEO indicated that this order was for OTV Conversion Kits, it was originally awarded on 

June 3, 2005, for deltoid protector outershell, universal camouflage pattern. So, we grouped this order 

with DAPs. The order was subsequently modified on June 10, 2005, to cancel the original line and add a 

new line ordering OTV Conversion Kits.
39 

Further, documentation obtained from the PEO states that FAT and lot 

acceptance tests were both conducted on January 31, 2006. According to a 

test facility official, lot acceptance tests of production Lot 0001 were 

conducted on January 31, 2006, even though the contracting officer did not 

authorize production as a result of the FAT until February 1, 2006. Because 

the FAR defines FAT as a testing and evaluating process to determine 

whether the proposed product conforms to contract requirements before or in 

the initial stage of production, it is clear that the contracting officer did not 

conform to the FAR requirements for contract W91CRB-06-C-0002. 

2. W91CRB-04-D-0039 (SAPI) – The PEO stated that verification of previous 

FAT was certified by the contracting officer in a letter dated March 11, 2003. 

This contract was awarded from a May 2004 solicitation. In this solicitation, 

we believe that the Army intended to obtain first article approval by 

requesting prospective offerors to submit PDM samples along with their bids 

for evaluation. However, after the contract was awarded, the contracting 

officer did not follow FAR Subpart 9.308 requiring the contracting officer to 

insert one of two clauses. Specifically, the FAR states that the contracting 

officer should use the clause specified in FAR 52.209-3, “First Article 

Approval—Contractor Testing” when it is intended that the contract require 

first article approval conducted by the contractor; or the clause specified in 

FAR 52.209-4, “First Article Approval—Government Testing” when it is 

intended that the contract require first article approval conducted by the 

Government. Although FAT was not a requirement in the contract, the PEO 

stated that verification of a previous FAT was certified in a letter dated 

March 11, 2003; however, this letter and documentation to support the FAT 

results were not included in the contracting file; the letter was provided by the 

PEO after we completed our review. As stated in our draft report, we 

evaluated contract files for approvals or disapprovals of requests for waivers 

or deviation from contract requirements. Although the contracting officer has 

the option to request a waiver, there was no evidence in the contract file of 

any formal waiver procedure. However, we updated the report to remove this 

contract from the list of contracts that did not complete FAT. 

3. W91CRB-04-D-0040 (SAPI) – The PEO stated that verification of previous 

FAT was certified by the contracting officer in a letter dated February 24, 

2003. The verified FAT letter states that the product was evaluated against 

specifications defined in the purchase description (CO/PD 00-03A). 

However, the solicitation, issued on May 19, 2004, stated that CO/PD 00-03D 

included the specifications against which the offeror’s product should be 

evaluated. Based on FAR Subpart 9.303, the contractor should have furnished 

a product for FAT because there were subsequent changes in the 

specifications. 

4. W91CRB-04-D-0042 (SAPI/ESAPI) – The PEO stated that verification of 

previous FAT (SAPI) was certified by the contracting officer in a letter dated 

December 29, 2003. This contract was awarded with two contract line 

numbers: line 0001 for the SAPI and line 0002 for overweight SAPI. The 

PEO provided verification of a previous FAT for the SAPI, and that 
40 

verification was in the contract file. However, there was no verification of 

FAT conducted on the overweight SAPI, and no evidence of a waiver for FAT 

on the overweight SAPI in the contract file. 

5. W91CRB-04-D-0043 (SAPI) – The PEO stated that no FAT letter was issued 

by the contracting officer, and that FAT was verified by test data from H.P. 

White Laboratory, Incorporated from July 13 to 17, 2004. However, this 

occurred prior to contract award on August 19, 2004. Additionally, for this 

contract, the contracting officer used the PDMs submitted under the 

solicitation to authorize production. However, FAR Subpart 14.202-4 states 

that PDMs will be used to determine only the responsiveness of the bid and 

will not be used to determine a bidder’s ability to produce the required items. 

For this contract, the bid sample was evaluated as part of source selection, and 

the first article was not tested. There is no evidence in the contracting file of 

FAT for this design after contract award. 

6. W91CRB-04-D-0044 (SAPI) – The PEO stated that FAT was verified by test 

data from H.P. White Laboratory, Incorporated from July 13 to 16, 2004. 

However, this occurred prior to contract award on August 19, 2004. 

Additionally, for this contract, the contracting officer used the PDMs 

submitted under the solicitation to authorize production. However, FAR 

Subpart 14.202-4 states that PDMs will be used to determine only the 

responsiveness of the bid and will not be used to determine a bidder’s ability 

to produce the required items. For this contract, the bid sample was evaluated 

as part of source selection, and the first article was not tested. The PEO also 

stated that the contracting officer waived FAT after the fact in a letter dated 

December 20, 2004. During our review, there was no evidence of this waiver 

in the contracting file. 

7. W91CRB-04-D-0045 (SAPI/ESAPI) – The PEO stated that verification of 

FAT was certified by the contracting officer in a letter dated September 6, 

2005. This contract was originally awarded on August 19, 2004, with 

contract line number 0002 for overweight SAPI. Our review of the 

contracting file showed that FAT on the overweight SAPI was based on PDM 

testing conducted prior to the contract award. Contract line number 0002 was 

subsequently cancelled on February 23, 2005, and contract line number 0003 

for ESAPI was added on August 15, 2005. The FAT letter that the PEO 

mentioned referred to the FAT conducted on the ESAPI. There was no 

verification of FAT conducted on the overweight SAPI in the contract file and 

no evidence of a waiver for FAT. 

8. W91CRB-04-F-0126 (OTV) – The PEO stated that no FAT letter was issued 

by the contracting officer, and that FAT was verified by test data from 

H.P. White Laboratory, Incorporated on March 13, 2003. However, the 

contracting file and additional documentation collected from RDECOMAC 

did not provide evidence of FAT. RDECOMAC contracting officials stated 

that testing and evaluation was performed by GSA because this order was 

placed against GSA Contract GS-07F-8942D. To validate the contracting 

officials’ statement, we contacted a GSA official who said it is the 

responsibility of the customer to verify that a product meets specifications. 
41 

Based on this information and the lack of documentation in the contracting 

file, we cannot validate the PEO’s statement that FAT was verified on 

March 13, 2003. 

9. W91CRB-05-D-0003 (OTV) – The PEO stated that FAT was conducted on 

December 3, 2004, at H.P. White Laboratory, Incorporated and was certified 

after the fact by the contracting officer in a letter dated June 16, 2006. We 

agree that a test was conducted on a PDM sample on December 3, 2004, as 

part of the source-selection process. However, the purchase description, 

which is part of the contract, requires a complete item to be tested as a first 

article. Specifically, the purchase description states that after FAT an 

alternative simulant/shoot pack16 may be used for testing purposes. However, 

the contracting officer accepted a PDM as contractually compliant prior to 

contract award. The purchase description also states, “Current production 

items submitted with qualifying FAT data may be considered in the 

determination of reducing additional FAT verification by the Government.” 

This contract language indicates that the FAT may be reduced, not eliminated, 

and our review of the contract file indicated the FAT was never performed 

after contract award. As a result, although the contracting file included the 

FAT letter that the PEO mentioned, we do not believe it met the intent of the 

FAR or the requirements of the purchase description. 

10. W91CRB-05-F-0072 (DAPs)17 – The PEO stated that FAT was conducted on 

December 3, 2004, at H.P. White Laboratory, Incorporated and was certified 

after the fact by the contracting officer in a letter dated June 16, 2006. See 

No. 9 for our audit response. 

11. W91CRB-05-F-0086 (ESAPI) – The PEO stated that verification of FAT was 

certified by the contracting officer in a letter dated September 7, 2005. As 

stated in our draft report, we looked through contract files for approvals or 

disapprovals of requests for waivers or deviation from contract requirements. 

This letter and documentation to support the FAT results were not included in 

the contracting file; the letter was provided by the PEO after we completed 

our review. Although we were not able to validate the test results, we updated 

the report to remove this order from the list of contracts that did not complete 

FAT. 

12. W91CRB-04-D-0204 (OTV Retrofit) – The PEO stated that FAT was 

conducted on December 3, 2004, at H.P. White Laboratory, Incorporated and 

was certified after the fact by the contracting officer in a letter dated June 16, 

2006. See No. 9 for our audit response. 

13. W91CRB-04-D-0014 (DAPs) – The PEO stated that no FAT letter was issued 

by the contracting officer, and that FAT was verified by test data from H.P. 

 

16 A simulant/shoot pack system is an alternative to the OTV that can be used to represent the ballistic 

resistant materials of the OTV for testing purposes. 

17 Although the PEO indicated that this order was for OTV Conversion Kits, it was originally awarded on 

June 3, 2005, for deltoid protector outershell, universal camouflage pattern. So, we grouped this order 

with DAPs. The order was subsequently modified on June 10, 2005, to cancel the original line and add a 

new line ordering OTV Conversion Kits. 
42 

White Laboratory, Incorporated on March 13, 2003. This order contained no 

purchase description to accompany the contract; therefore, if testing was 

completed, the test facility would not have known what specifications to test 

against. Based on this information and the lack of documentation in the 

contracting file, we cannot validate the PEO’s statement that FAT was 

verified on March 13, 2003. 

14. W91CRB-06-D-0024 (OTV Retrofit) – The PEO stated that previous FAT 

was conducted on December 3, 2004, at H.P. White Laboratory, Incorporated 

and was certified after the fact by the contracting officer in a letter dated 

June 16, 2006. See No. 9 for our audit response. 

15. W91CRB-06-D-0029 (ESBI and Carrier) – The PEO stated that a FAT was 

verified and certified by the contracting officer in a letter dated August 16, 

2006. For this contract, the FAT “production is authorized” certification was 

based on PDM samples submitted to the testing facility on May 12, 2006, 

prior to contract award. As noted in the report, the FAR states that PDMs will 

be used to determine only the responsiveness of the bid and not to determine a 

bidder’s ability to produce the required items. Further, the contract states, 

“The contractor shall deliver 35 unit(s) of lot/item ESBI within 90 calendar 

days from the date of this contract to the Government at H.P. White 

Laboratory or U.S. Test Laboratory for first article tests.” Our review of the 

contract file indicated that this action was never completed, and the contract 

file did not contain any documentation to indicate the required FAT was 

waived. 

The U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering 

Command Comments on Draft Report and Audit Response 

The Commander, U.S. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command 

(hereafter the Commander) provided comments on the draft report and the 

finding. 

Comments on the Adequacy of Management Controls. The Commander 

nonconcurred with the statement in the draft report that RDECOMAC had an 

internal control weakness in regards to not following the FAR in testing body 

armor and documenting contract decisions. The Commander stated that 

U.S. Army Research Development, and Engineering Command officials 

specifically nonconcur with the testing of body armor, and that the problem is that 

the contracting files may not have been documented to reflect the testing 

decisions and results, which RDECOMAC had planned to document no later than 

February 29, 2008. The Commander requested that the report be changed to 

remove the assertions that the RDECOMAC had an internal control weakness. 

Audit Response. Based on the Commander’s comments, we revised the 

discussion on internal controls in the final report. The report now states, 

“Specifically, we reviewed body armor component contract files to determine 

whether they contained the elements required by the FAR. We identified material 

internal control weaknesses at RDECOMAC, as defined by DoD Instruction 

5010.40, “Managers’ Internal Control (MIC) Program Procedures,” January 4, 
43 

2006. The weaknesses related to the documentation of FAT requirements and 

results in 13 of 28 Army contracts reviewed. Although RDECOMAC had 

internal control procedures in place, we identified weaknesses resulting in 

decisions not always being properly documented in the contract files. 

Specifically, RDECOMAC officials did not follow the FAR in maintaining 

contract files to support FAT decisions and results. Implementing our 

recommendations will improve the quality of the contract files to support 

informed decisions. A copy this report was provided to the senior official in 

charge of internal controls at RDECOMAC.” 

Comments on Market Research. The Commander nonconcurred with the 

statement in the draft report that market research was not documented as required 

by the FAR. The Commander stated that FAR Part 10 prescribes policies and 

procedures that agencies must take with regard to market research. Specifically, 

FAR 10.002(e) states that agencies should document the results of market 

research in a manner appropriate to the size and complexity of the acquisition. 

Further, FAR 4.803 provides examples of records normally contained in contract 

files and, while market research is not specifically mentioned, acquisition 

planning information is mentioned. The Commander stated that, in accordance 

with the FAR, PM SEQ is the appropriate body for conducting and maintaining 

documentation on body armor market research, and a RDECOMAC review of the 

contract files indicated that market research was conducted and documented as 

required. 

Audit Response. Market research is the foundation for building an effective 

solicitation and a successful contract. FAR 10.002(a) states, “Acquisitions begin 

with a description of the Government’s needs stated in terms sufficient to allow 

conduct of market research.” Because market research is the foundation for 

building an effective solicitation and a successful contract, agencies are required 

to conduct market research at the earliest stages in the acquisition process. The 

goal of market research is to develop the most suitable approach to acquiring, 

distributing, and supporting supplies and services. 

Given the value for the eight contracts and orders identified in the report 

(approximately $2.9 billon), and the complexity of the body armor components 

purchased, the information provided in the respective acquisition plans does not 

adequately describe the most suitable approach for acquiring, distributing, and 

supporting body armor components. The respective acquisition plans merely 

stated that market research was conducted; the statement does not satisfy FAR 

requirements to document the results of market research in a manner appropriate 

to the size and complexity of this acquisition. Specifically, market research 

should summarize the activities undertaken by those conducting the market 

research so that the contracting files constitute a complete history of the actions 

taken and provide a basis for informed decisions made during the acquisition. To 

accomplish this, market research should, for example, document the methodology 

used for compiling and refining the lists of potential suppliers, a summary of the 

industry sources contacted, the types of information obtained, the price ranges 

discovered, the possible reasons for variations, and the potential for determining a 

fair market price. 
44 

Comments on Source Selection. The Commander nonconcurred with the 

determination in the draft report that the Request for Quote (solicitation) for FSS 

Order W91CRB-04-D-0014 contained inadequate evaluation factors. The 

Commander stated that the solicitation and an amendment to the solicitation 

together provided the offerors with a purchase description and evaluation factors, 

which were considered adequate by the contracting officer and the customer. 

Audit Response. The Request for Quote is a request for information, used in 

simplified acquisitions, to communicate Government requirements to prospective 

contractors. The Request for Quote describes what the Government is buying, 

what information the offeror must provide, and what strategy will be used to 

evaluate proposals. 

FAR Subpart 15.3 states that the source-selection authority shall approve the 

source-selection strategy before the solicitation is released, a step that was not 

evident during our review of this FSS order. Specifically, evaluation factors were 

not issued until May 12, 2004, in an amendment to the solicitation. It is 

understood that solicitations and amendments reflect total information regardless 

of their effective dates. However, such inconsistencies may result in less 

advantageous offers, delay the acquisition, or undermine offerors’ confidence in 

the process. Therefore, we stand behind the statement made in the draft report. 

Issuing these evaluation factors during the solicitation facilitates an equitable, 

impartial, and comprehensive evaluation against the solicitation requirements. 

Comments on Price Reasonableness and Requesting Discounts. The 

Commander nonconcurred with our statements that Army officials did not 

actively request a discount and document why one was not requested, and that 

there was no evidence that the price was reasonable for two orders. The 

Commander specifically stated that the Army requested and received discounts 

and encouraged discounts from all vendors, and that the price the Army received 

was reasonable with sufficient evidence to support the decision. 

The Commander stated that the awardee for W91CRB-04-P-0169 proposed a unit 

price of $285.00, which was already discounted from the FSS published price of 

$325.00 per unit, resulting in a 12.3-percent discount. For Contract 

W91CRB-04-D-0014, the Commander stated that the documentation indicated 

that four offers were received. The awardee was the only offeror determined 

technically acceptable, and the awardee’s price further reflected a 12.3-percent 

discount from its FSS historical published price. The Commander also stated that 

the awardee further discounted the price by maintaining it for the entire 36-month 

contract period, thereby absorbing all price increases for inflation in materiel, 

subcontractor wages, and shipping and testing. The Commander stated that 

RDECOMAC also considered the Army’s critical need for the DAPs and the fact 

that the awardee was the only vendor technically qualified to meet the Army’s 

accelerated delivery schedule. According to the Commander, the awardee of 

Contract W91CRB-04-D-0014 offered multiple discounts; hence, any further 

requests for discounts would have been futile. The Commander stated that the 

contracting officer determined that the awardees price was fair and reasonable 

based on a comparison of the competitive prices received and the discounts 

offered. As a result, the Commander disagreed with the statement that 

RDECOMAC contracting officials were not prudent in price determination and 
45 

the use of Government funds. He concluded that the contracting officer exercised 

sound business judgment in all business cases, ensuring that the interests of the 

taxpayer and the warfighter were well served. 

Audit Response. Contracting officials have the responsibility to ensure that fair 

and reasonable prices are paid. For fixed-price contracts, the evaluation is usually 

as simple as comparing the offered prices to ensure they are fair and reasonable. 

Fixed-price contracts should also be evaluated for appropriateness to what is 

being offered. During our review, we determined that contracting officials 

inadequately determined price reasonableness for Contract W91CRB-04-D-0014 

based on the price history of Contract W91CRB-04-P-0169, a contract that did 

not require price analysis because it was awarded using simplified acquisition 

procedures. While there was evidence the previous price was used, there was no 

evidence in the contract file that the historical price was fair and reasonable. 

Because we have only statements from the Commander and other officials 

regarding the discounts and price determination, we cannot determine whether a 

fair and reasonable price was paid. 
46 

Appendix H. Report Distribution 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Director, Acquisition Resources and Analysis 

Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy 

Joint Staff 

Director, Joint Staff 

Department of the Army 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) 

Auditor General, Department of the Army 

Program Executive Officer, Soldier 

Commander, U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command 

U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command Acquisition Center 

Department of the Navy 

Naval Inspector General 

Auditor General, Department of the Navy 

Combatant Commands 

Commander, U.S. Central Command 

Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command 

Inspector General, U.S. Joint Forces Command 

Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command 

Other Defense Organizations

Director, Defense Logistics Agency 
47 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member 

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations 

Senate Committee on Armed Services 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

House Committee on Appropriations 

House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations 

House Committee on Armed Services 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement, 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 

 Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

The Honorable Louise M. Slaughter 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, 

Logistics, and Technology) Comments 

49 
50 
Program Executive Office Soldier Comments 

51 
Final Report 

Reference 

52 

Revised 

pages 31 

& 39 
Final Report 

Reference 

53 

Revised 

pages 32 & 

41 
54 
U.S. Army Research, Development and 

Engineering Command Comments 

55 
Final Report 

Reference 

56 

Revised 

page 3 

Revised 

page 17 
Final Report 

Reference 

57 

Revised 

page 17 
58 
59 

Team Members 

The Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing, 

Joint and Overseas Operations prepared this report. Personnel of the Department 

of Defense Office of Inspector General who contributed to the report are listed 

below. 

Paul J. Granetto 

Robert F. Prinzbach II 

Donald A. Bloomer 

Deborah G. Crosier 

Melinda M. Oleksa 

Kenneth W. Sokol 

Shaun B. Jeffery 

Andrea L. Hill 

Leon D. Bryant 

Jessica R. Frederick 

Bryan M. Chavez 

Alan J. Woolard 

Jessica R. Crotts 

Monica L. Noell 

Allison E. Tarmann