UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA MA RY JANE PI ET SCH , : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 09-0390 (RMU)

: v. : Re Docume nt Nos.: 3, 7, 12

: MCKI SSAC K & MCKI SSAC K, : : Def endant. : M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION G R A N TI N G TH E P LA INT IF F ’ S S E COND M OT I ON T O A M END THE C OM P L AI NT ; D E NYI NG A S M OO T THE P LA INT IF F ’ S F I R ST M OT I ON T O A M END THE C OM P L AI NT ; D E NYI NG W I T HOU T

P R EJUD I C E THE D E F E NDANT ’ S M OT I ON T O D IS M IS S

I. IN TR OD UC TIO N This matter come s befor e the c ourt on the plaintiff’s se cond motion to amend the complaint and the de fenda nt’s motion to di smiss. The plaintiff alleg es that the de fenda nt, an
e ng ine e ri ngfi rm

re ta ine d a s a

c on tr a c tor

by the Natio na l Ins tit

ute s o f H e a lth(“NI H” ), ne g lig e ntl y supervised a

nd reta ined one of

its employ ees, D ougSedon, who worke d in close proximi ty to the plaintiff and a lleg edly

hara ssed her

over a period of mor e than a

y ear . The de fenda

nt filed a motion to di smiss, and in response, the plaintiff f iled a motion to amend the complaint, which the defe ndant opposed on the grounds that the plaintiff ha d not alleg ed an unde rlying tor t as the pla int if f’ s th e or y of re c ov e ry re qu ir e s. Rathe r t

ha n f ili nga re ply in s up po rt

of he r m oti on

to amend the c omplaint, the plaintiff filed a se cond motion to amend the complaint, alleg ing that Se do n’ s a c tio ns c on sti tut e d th e un de rl yingtor t of int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss (“I I ED”) . The de fenda

nt opposed the plaintiff’s se cond motion to amend the complaint, ar g uing that amendment would be futile.F or th e purp os es o f ru li ngo n th es e m ot io ns , th e co urt a ss um es th at th e pl ai nt if

f’ s al le g at io ns are 1 true. See Atherto n v. D .C . O ffice of the Mayo r , 5 67 F
. 3d 6 73 , 6 81 ( D
. C
. C ir
. 2 00 9)
. 2 Be cause the cour

t determines that the pla intiff’s alleg ations suffice to make out a c laim of neg lige nt supervision and re tention at this stage of the proc eeding s, the court grants the plaintiff’ s
se c on d mo tio n to ame nd

the c omp la int . A s a

re su lt, the c ourt

de nie s a s mo ot t

he pla int if

f’ s f ir st mot ion to a me nd the c omp la int

and de nie s w ith out pr e

jud ic e the de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to dis mis s the orig inal complaint.

II. BACKG ROUND A. F ac tu al A lle ga ti ons 1 The de fenda

nt employ ed the plaintiff f rom 2000 to 2006. Proposed 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Fr om 2006 throug h 2008, the plaintiff wor ked for other c ontrac tors but continued to work in the same location, Trailer 30B at the NI H. Id. ¶¶ 7- 9, 13 . Se do n b e g an w or kin gfo r t he de fe nd ant i n Trailer 30B in August 2003. Id. ¶ 15. At some point betwee n 2003 and 2006, the plaintiff a nd Sedon had an intimate r elationship, which the plaintiff e nded in August 2006. Id. ¶ 17. Followingtheir bre akup, Sedon beg an har assingthe plaintiff. Id. ¶ 18. Sedon beg an sendinghara ssing e -mails to the plaintiff in the summer of 2007. Id. ¶ 19. When the plaintiff did not respond, Sedon bec ame more ag g ressive, sug g esting that the plaintiff “nee ded ther apy

and wa s sick and twisted.” Id. ¶ 23. On numer ous occa sions, Sedon sent the pla int if f o bs c e ne e -m a ils and

te xt me ssa g e s, inc lud ingme ssa g e s c onta ini ngse xua lly g ra ph ic pictures. Id. ¶¶

24 -2 5. Se do n ma de ru de and humil iatin gc omm e nts a

bo ut t he pla int if

f, pu bli c ly humiliated her, ve rbally

assaulted he r and stalke d her at her re sidence
. Id. ¶ ¶ 2 8 , 3 4
- 3 6
. InU nd er Mary land

law , a p ea ce o rd er

p ro v id es p ro te ct io n fo r in di v id ua ls e xp er ie nc in g c erta in 2 k inds of ab use, inclu dingassau lt, h arassm ent an d stalking
. See M D . C TS . & J UD . P ROC . C OD E § 3- 8A- 19. 1. 3 addition, Sedon once wa

ved a utility

knife in fr ont of the plaintiff’s f ace . Id. ¶ 3 7. In Augus t 2008, Sedon sent the plaintiff seve ral e -mails in which he state d he wa s still drea ming a bout her and in which he disparag ed her rec ently dece ased boyfriend. Id. ¶ 33. The ha rassment e scalated to the point that the plaintiff soug ht a pea ce or der ag ainst Sedon. Id. ¶ 38. 2 Throug hout the time that Sedon hara ssed the plaintiff, the pla intiff complained to Da n Cushing, the de fenda

nt’s Ex ecutive V ice Pre sident and Sedon’s immediate supe rvisor. Id. ¶ 29. Cushing re sponded to the plaintiff’s c omplaints by stating va

riously that the plaintiff and Sedon
wo uld “ have to g e t a lon g ,” that th e de fe nd ant’ s c lie nt l ike d Se do n a nd that Cu sh ingwo uld

ta lk t o Sedon about his behavior Id. ¶¶ 30- 32. On August 22, 2008, the plaintiff repor ted to Cushing seve ral inappr opriate a cts that Sedon had committed the pre vious week. Id. ¶ 42, 46-49. Thr ee da y s later, on August 25, 2008, Cushing told the plaintiff that she w ould be transf err ed to a diff

ere nt building to separ ate he r from Sedon. Id. ¶ 5 0. Th e same da y , th e de fe nd ant p la c e d Se do n o n a tw o- we e k unp a id suspension. Id. ¶ 52. B. P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound The plaintiff or igina lly

commence d this action on J anuar y 14, 2009 in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleg ing that the defe ndant had ne g lige ntly supervised a

nd reta ined Sedon. See ge ne ra lly

Com pl. On F e br ua ry 26 , 2 00 9, the de fe nd ant r e mov e d th e c a se to t his court. See Notice of

Removal. On Mar ch 3, 2009, the de fenda nt then filed a motion to dismis s. Se e ge ne ra lly

Def .’s Mot. to Dismis s. In response , the plaintiff filed a motion to amend her4

complaint on April 7, 2009, seePl.’s Mot. t o Amend, which the defe ndant opposed, seeDef .’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Amend. Be fore the cour t issued a rulingon either pe nding motion, the plaintiff filed a

second motion to amend he r complaint on April 24, 2009, seePl. ’s 2d Mo t. t o Amend, which the defe ndant opposes as f utile, seeDef

.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s 2d Mot. to Amend (“ De f. ’s Op p’ n” ). Th e c ourt no w t ur ns to t he a pp lic a ble le g a l st and ard

and the pa rt ie s’
argume nts .

III . A NA LY SIS

A. Le ga l St anda r d fora M ot ion forLe av e to Am e nd t he Co m pla int Un de r F e de ra l Ru le of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 15 (a ), a

pa rt y ma y ame nd its ple a din gon c e a s a matter of c ourse at any

time before a re sponsive pleadingis served. F ED . R. C IV . P. 15(a)
. Additionally , Rule 15(a) allows a pa rty to amend its pleadingto add a ne w par ty . Id .; W iggins v. Dist. Cablevision, Inc ., 853 F. Supp. 484, 499 (D.D .C. 1994); 6 F ED . P R AC . & P R OC . 2d § 1474. Ac c or din gto d e c isi on s o f t his c ir c uit , Ru le 15 (a ) “ g ua ra nte e [s] a pla int if f a n a bs olute ri g ht” to amend the c omplaint once at a ny time so long a s the defe ndant has not ser ved a r esponsive pleadingand the c ourt has not dec ided a motion to dismi ss. Jame s V. Hurson Assocs., Inc . v. Glickman , 2 2 9 F. 3 d

2 7 7 , 2 8 2 -8 3 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g F ED . R. C IV . P. 15(a) ). I f there is more than one de fenda

nt, and not all have se rved r esponsive plea dings, the plaintiff may amend the complaint as a matter of c ourse with re g ard to those de fenda nts that have yet to answe r. 6 F ED . P R AC . & P R OC . 2d § 1481. Motions to di smiss and for summary judgme nt do not qualify

as responsive ple ading s for the pur poses of Rule 15. J

am es V . H ur so n A sso cs. , 229 F.3d at 283;5

Bowden v. United States , 1 76 F .3 d 5 52 , 5 55 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 9) ; U. S. In fo. Age nc yv . Krc , 905 F.2d 389, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1990). On c e a re sp on siv e ple a din gis s e rv e d, ho we ve r, a pla int if f m ay ame nd the c omp la int

on ly by leave of the c ourt or by

written conse nt of the adve rse pa rty . F ED . R. C IV . P. 15 (a ); Foman v. Da v is , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The g rant or de nial of leave lies in the sound discre tion of the district court. Firestone v. Fire stone , 7 6 F .3 d 1 20 5, 12 08 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 6) . T he c ourt mus t, howeve r, hee d Rule 15’s mandate that leave is to be “fr eely g iven when justice so require s.” Id. ; Car ibb e an Broa d. Sy

s. , Lt d. v . Ca ble&W

ire le ss P .L. C. , 148 F.3d 1080, 1083 ( D.C. Cir. 1998). Indeed, “ [i ]f the underlying f acts or c ircumstance s relied upon by a plaintiff may

be a pr oper subject of r elief, he oug ht to be aff orded a n opportunity

to test his claim on the merits.” Foman , 371 U.S. at 182. Denial of leave to amend ther efor e constitutes an a buse of discr etion unless the court g ives sufficie nt rea son, such as futility of ame ndment, undue dela y , bad fa ith, dilatory motive, undue pre

judice or r epea

ted fa ilure to cure defic iencies by previous ame ndments. Id. ; Car ibb e an Broa d. Sy

s. , 148 F.3d at 1083. Denial of leave to amend base d on futility is warr anted if the proposed c laim would not survive a motion to dismiss
. J am es M ad iso n Lt d. v . Lu dwi

g , 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 ( D.C. Cir. 1996). An amended c omplaint is futil e if it mere ly restate s the same f

acts a s the orig inal complaint in differ ent terms, re asser ts a claim on which the court pre viously ruled, fa ils to st ate a leg al theory

or could not withstand a motion to dismi ss. Robinson v. Detroit News, Inc. , 2 11 F. Supp. 2d 101, 114 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting3 F ED . P R AC . 3d § 15.15[3] ); W illoughby v. Potomac Elec. Powe r Co. , 100 F.3d 999, 1003 ( D.C. Cir. 1996) (af firmingthe district court’s de nial of leave to amend g iven the “little cha nce” that the plaintiff would succ eed on his c laim).6

B. T he Co ur t G r ant s t he P lai nt iff’s Se c ond M ot ion to Am e nd t he Co m pla int In support of her

second motion for le ave to amend the complaint, the plaintiff emphasizes the lenient standa rd the c ourt should employ when r uling on suc h a motion. Pl.’s 2d Mot. to Amend at 1. The plaintiff a rgues that none of

the g rounds for de nial exis ts in thi s case . See ge nerally id. Anticipatingthe def endant’ s argument that amendment would be futile, the plaintiff maintains that Sedon’s beha vior constituted I I ED, the tort under lying he r neg lige nt supervision and re tention claims. See id. at 1-2. Th e de fe nd ant c on te sts the pla int if f’ s a sse rt ion

that he r a lle g atio ns are su ff ic ie nt t o withstand a motion to dism iss. See ge nerally Def .’s Opp’n. F ocusingon the under lying tor t of I I ED, the de fenda

nt argues that Sedon’s c onduct “c ould not plausibly amount to ext reme or outrag eous conduc t.” Id. at 3. The de fenda nt urg es the c ourt to employ a heightened standa

rd for outra g eous conduc t beca use this case took place in the e mploy ment context. See id. at 4. The de fe nd ant d e c lare s th at “ [e]mp loye r- e mpl oye e c on fl ic ts g e ne ra lly do no t, a s a

matte r o f l aw, ri se to the level of outra g eous conduc t.” Id. Attempting to illuminate the contours of its proposed heig htened standa

rd, the de fenda

nt cites a number

of ca ses, mostly

employ ment-re lated, in which courts have dismiss ed I I ED cla ims. See id. at 5-7. F inally , in addition to contesting the plaintiff’s alleg ations of extreme and outra g eous conduc t, the defe ndant ar g ues that the plaintiff has not alleg ed emotional distress in suffic ient detail. See id. at 7.Beca use the ev ents g iv ingrise to the plain tiff’s claim s too k place in Mary land, Mary land law 3 arg uably

g ov erns th e plain tiff’s claim s. See Prop osed 2d Am . C om pl. ¶ ¶ 1- 2. Y et bo th parties’ subm issions rely

on D istrict of Colum

bia law
. See generally P l. ’s 2 d Mo t. to A m en d; D ef
. ’s Opp ’n to Pl.’s 2d Mot. to A m end; Def. ’s Mot. to Dism iss; Pl. ’s O pp’n to D ef.’s Mot. to D ism iss. The standard for neg lig ent su perv ision and retention unde r Mary land law is iden tical to that unde r D istrict of Colum

bia lawfor purpo ses o f rulingon the instant m otions. See Alexa nder v. W ash. G as L ight C

o. , 4 81 F. Sup p. 2d 16, 41
- 42 (D. D. C. 20 06) (observ ingthat “[u]nde r Mary land law, ‘[i]n order to esta blish a claim

for neg lig ent h iring or retention, a plaintiff m ust pr ov e th at

th e em pl oy er o f th e in di v id

ua l who c om

m it te d th e al le g ed ly

to rt io us a ct

o w ed ad uty to the plain tiff, that the em ploy er brea ched that d

uty , th at there w as a causal relationsh ip be tween the h arm suffere d an d the brea ch o f the em ploy er’s duty , and that the plain tiff suffered da mages ’ ” ) (c i t i ng P en ho ll ow v . B d. o f C om m ’r s fo r C ec il C ou nt y , 6 95 A. 2d 1268 (Md. Ct. Sp ec. App . 1 99 7) ; C

ra m er v . H ou s. O pp or tu ni ti es C

om m ’n o f M on tgom er y C ou nt y , 5 01 A. 2d 35 (Md. 1985 )). Therefore, the co urt ne ed n ot reso lv e this discrepancy and w ill apply

the law of the District of C olum

bia. C f. Phela n v. City of Mount R ainier , 8 05 A. 2d 930, 93 8 n .8 (D. C. 20 02) (apply ingD istrict of Colum bia rath er than

Mary land law becau se the parties had relied o n District of C olum

bia lawand

it w as unnece ssary , in

lig ht of the co urt’s rulin g , to resolv e the co nf li ct o f law is su e)
. 7 Un de r t he law o f t

he Di str ic t of

Col umb ia , an e mpl oye r m us t 3
us e re a so na

ble c are to s e le c t e mpl oye e s c omp e te nt and fi t fo r the wo rk a ssi g ne d to them and t o r e f

r a in f r o m r e ta in in gth e s e r

v ic e s o f anun f it e mp lo y e e . Wh e nan employ er ne g lects this duty and as a result injury

is occa sioned to a third person, the employ er may be liable even though the injury was brought about by

the willful act of the e mpl oye e be y on d th e sc op e of e mpl oy me nt. Griffin v. Acacia Life Ins. Co. , 925 A.2d 564, 575 (D.C. 2007). To e stablish a neg lige nt
su pe rv isi on or re te nti on c la im, a pla int if f m us t sh owthat “ the e mpl oye r b re a c he d a duty to pla int if f t o u se re a so na

ble c are in t

he su pe rv isi on or re te nti on of an e mpl oye e wh ic h p ro ximate ly
cause d harm to plaintiff.” Phelan v. City of Mount Rainier , 8 0 5 A
. 2 d 9 3 0 , 9 4 0 ( D
. C
. 2 0 0 2 )
. In
a dd iti on , th e c la im mus t be pr e dic ate d o n a “ c omm on

law c a us e of a c tio n o r d

uti e s o the rw ise imposed by

common law.” Gr iff

in , 925 A.2d at 576. In her pr oposed sec ond amende d complaint, the plaintiff alleg es that the de fenda nt acted
ne g lig e ntl y

by fa ili ngto r e sp on d to the pla int if f’ s r e pe ate d c omp la int s a

bo ut S e do n’ s c on du c t,
seeProposed 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29-32, and that as a re sult, S edon continued to torme nt her, see id. ¶¶ 72, 81. The plaintiff’s cla im is predicated on the underly ing c ommon law tort of I I ED.Con trary to the d efendant’s co ntention , th e alleg ed c ondu ct did no t tak e plac e w ithin an 4 em

ploy er- em

ploy ee relatio nship. See Prop osed 2d Am . C om pl. ¶ ¶ 7- 9, 13, 15
. Rath er, Sedo n and the p laintiff w ork ed in the sam e trailer for differe nt co ntractors whe n the alleg ed c ondu ct took place
. Id. 8 See id. ¶¶ 62- 65. In support of her alleg ation of I I ED, the plaintiff c atalogues a pattern of offe nsive behavior by

Sedon beg inning in June 2007 and extending through August 2008. See 4 ge ne ra lly Proposed 2d Am. Compl. The plaintiff ave rs that for mor e than a y ear , Sedon made sexually sug g estive, deme aningand humiliating c omments and sent the plaintiff ha rassingand obscene e-ma ils and tex t messag es. Id. The plaintiff a lso maintains that Sedon’s actions wer e intentional and that she suff ere d emotional and phy sical injury as a r esult thereof

. See id. ¶¶ 60, 64. Gi ve n th e pla int if f’ s d e ta ile d a lle g atio ns re g ard ingthe de fe nd ant’ s f a ilure to r e sp on d to her r epeated complaints, alongwith her a lleg ations reg ardingthe emotional distress that Sedon’s actions ca used, the c ourt conc ludes that the plaintiff ha s made out a c laim of neg lige nt supervision and re tention at this stage of the proc eeding s. See A shcroft v. Iqbal , 1 29 S. Ct
. 19 37 , 1 94 9 ( 20 09 ) ( ob se rv ingthat “ [t]o su rv ive a mot ion to d ism iss , a

c omp la int

mus t c on ta in sufficie nt fac tual matter, a cce pted as true , to ‘state a c laim to relief that is plausible on its fac e’” ) (qu o t i n g Be ll A tla nti c Cor p. v . Two mb ly , 5 50 U. S. 5 44 , 5 70 (2 00 7) ); c f. Khan v. Parsons Global Se rv s. , 521 F.3d 421, 429 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (re versingthe district court’s dismissal and
co n cl u d i n g th atth e p l ai n t i ff ’s al l ega t i o n s we re s u ff

i ci en tt o m ee tth e c ri t er i a f o r II E D, al th o u gh th e p l a i n t i f

f m a d e o n l y l i m i t e d

a l l e g at i o n s r e g ar d i n gh e r e m o t i o n a l d i s tr e s s )
. A c c o r d i n g l y,As a co nsequ ence, the court denies as m oot th e plain tiff’s first m otion to am end the co m plaint. 5 I n ad dition, bec ause the am ended com plaint s upersed es the orig inal co m plaint, the co urt de nies witho ut pre

j udice the d efendant’s m otion to dis m iss the orig inal co m plaint. See Ban coult v. McNam ara , 2 14 F
. R
. D
. 5 , 1 3 (D
. D
. C
. 2 00 3)
. 9 ame ndme nt w ou ld n ot b e futil e , a nd the re fo re the c ourt

g ra nts the pla int if

f’ s se c on d mo tio n to
ame nd the c omp la int
. 5

IV . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the c ourt g rants the plaintiff’ s second motion to amend the complaint, denies a s moot the plaintiff’s first motion to amend the complaint and de nies without prejudice the def

endant’ s motion t o dismiss . An Orde r consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separa

tely and conte mporane ously

issued this 12th day

of January , 2010.

RI CARDO M. URBI NA Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge