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S. HRG. 111–222 

GREENHOUSE GAS TRADING PROGRAM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

TO

EXPLORE POTENTIAL COSTS AND PRICE VOLATILITY IN THE ENERGY 

SECTOR AS A RESULT OF A GREENHOUSE GAS TRADING PROGRAM 

AND WAYS TO REDUCE OR CONTAIN THOSE COSTS 

SEPTEMBER 15, 2009 

( 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico, Chairman 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BLANCHE L. LINCOLN, Arkansas 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

ROBERT M. SIMON, Staff Director 

SAM E. FOWLER, Chief Counsel 

MCKIE CAMPBELL, Republican Staff Director 

KAREN K. BILLUPS, Republican Chief Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS 

Page 

Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator From New Mexico ........................................ 1 

Claussen, Eileen, President, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Arlington, VA .................................................................................................................. 9 

Grumet, Jason, President, Bipartisan Policy Center ............................................ 43 

Mason, Joseph R., Ph.D., Professor, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, 

LA .......................................................................................................................... 23

Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator From Alaska ............................................... 3 

Wara, Michael, Assistant Professor, Stanford Law School, Faculty Fellow, 

Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, Center Fellow, Woods 

Institute for the Environment, Palo Alto, CA .................................................... 14 

Yacobucci, Brent, Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy, Congressional Research Service ....................................................................................... 5 

APPENDIXES 

APPENDIX I 

Responses to additional questions .......................................................................... 75 

APPENDIX II 

Additional material submitted for the record ........................................................ 109 

(1) 

GREENHOUSE GAS TRADING PROGRAM 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in room SD– 

366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Senator Jeff Bingaman, 

chairman, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN, U.S. 

SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO 

The CHAIRMAN. Ok, why don’t we get started? Let me just advise 

members. We have, in addition to the hearing that we’ve got our 

witnesses for today, we have three pending nominations that we 

hope to deal with in a business meeting. 

My hope is if we get 12 members here at some point during our 

hearing we would interrupt the hearing long enough to go ahead 

and deal with those nominations in a business meeting. Until that 

happens why don’t we go right ahead with the hearing. 

Global climate change is one of the most consequential and difficult problems that we face in this Congress. It’s a problem of vast 

scale that obviously requires a solution of vast scale. More precisely 

it requires that we find a way to reinvent our energy infrastructure. 

Many members are currently absorbed by the health care debate, 

but it is important to continue to make progress on this issue as 

well. This week in our Energy Committee we will have two hearings on the issue of energy and climate change legislation. 

Today we will receive testimony on the topic of containing costs 

in a greenhouse gas emissions market. Thursday we’ll learn about 

economic analyses and what models could tell us about the expected impacts of energy and climate legislation. 

Many members of the committee have expressed an interest in 

climate legislation and its impacts on the energy sector. So I believe it’s important that the committee do its part to help the full 

Senate understand this connection, and having available the most 

current and credible information on key issues in the energy climate connection is a constructive step that this committee can take 

in moving forward on the issue. 

The discussion this week will revolve around the implementation 

of a cap and trade program for greenhouse gases. The primary goal 

of any such program must be to achieve our environmental objectives with the least possible disruption to our economy. As we contemplate cap and trade, we need to ensure that the costs of carbon 
2 

permits do not become either excessively high or excessively volatile. 

At today’s hearing we will receive testimony on policy options to 

avoid these types of unexpected and potentially dangerous costs. 

I’m very pleased with the bipartisan approach we’ve been able to 

take in the committee in putting the energy legislation together 

that we reported several months ago. We reported a bill that contained important incentives and programs for clean and efficient 

energy. I very much hope we can see those provisions enacted into 

law. 

At the same time I’m dedicated to doing what I can to enact effective greenhouse gas legislation. I have worked, as have several 

members of this committee, to help craft legislation in previous 

Congresses that would help us to achieve this result. Senator Murkowski co-sponsored a bill that Senator Specter and I introduced 

in the last Congress. 

I thought that was a contribution to the discussion. Failure to act 

on the issue does carry real costs both for the global environment 

and for the economy. The search for effective legislative proposals 

to avoid climate change involves avoiding the costs of global warming without imposing other unintended costs that would have few 

benefits and could even have negative impacts on our society. So 

we need to provide assurances that the costs of a cap and trade 

system will not go out of control either because of excessive prices 

or because of excessive volatility. 

Today’s hearing is to explore some of the mechanisms that can 

be used to address these concerns. Let me defer to Senator Murkowski. Then I’ll introduce the various witnesses, and we’ll hear 

from the panel. 

Go right ahead. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Bunning follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM BUNNING, U.S. SENATOR FROM KENTUCKY

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the hearing today to discuss some 

of the financial issues involved through enacting a cap and trade program. 

I think it is made clear in the testimony today that we need to be careful of moving too quickly in addressing climate change. 

I have long said that I do not support imposing mandatory caps on emissions. I 

believe in providing incentives for new technology, moving to lower emission technologies and improving energy efficiency. 

These immediate-impact policies accomplish the goals of a cap and trade program 

with less complication and potential opportunity for market manipulation. 

Under a cap and trade program the federal government would be forced to oversee 

yet another area of financial transactions through the trading of carbon credits. This 

is at a time when we are struggling to maintain an effective banking system. 

Supporters of cap and trade argue that they can impose cost containment mechanisms—such as offiets or price collars—to lower the financial risks and costs of implementing such a program. These proposals, however, are unworkable and unrealistic. 

Instead of focusing on ways to mitigate the negative costs of imposing a cap and 

trade system, Congress should instead focus on policies that provide incentives for 

businesses so they can create jobs and grow. 

Make no mistake. Cap and trade is an anti-growth proposal that will hurt American industries and American families more than it will help them. 

At a time when our country is struggling to come out of our longest and deepest 

economic downturn since the Great Depression, enacting a regressive energy tax is 

reckless and irresponsible. 
3 

I thank the witnesses for appearing before the committee today and appreciate 

their comments. I look forward to continuing the conversation on this issue and discussing the entire scope of the cost of enacting climate change legislation. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR 

FROM ALASKA 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 

your scheduling this hearing. I hope this will be the first of many 

constructive discussions on the issue of climate change here in the 

committee. 

Effectively dealing with the issues that we’re here to discuss, cost 

containment and price volatility in a cap and trade market, is 

clearly essential to any legislation that has a chance of passing. 

Chairman Bingaman, you have mentioned the importance of many 

of these factors last year. They played a significant role in the legislation that you mentioned that I had agreed to co-sponsor. 

But as we saw in the floor debate that followed it became clear 

that perhaps not everyone agreed with us. Provisions to contain 

costs and volatility were largely absent from the measure that was 

brought up, the Boxer/Lieberman/Warner bill. In my opinion, by 

failing to address those concerns the failure of that bill was all but 

guaranteed. 

Today it’s become even more important to control the cost of climate legislation. We’ve got millions of Americans that are struggling to find work, to pay mortgages and getting through a rough 

economy. We must make sure that climate policies do not add to 

their burdens. 

I think it’s disappointing, at least with the legislation that we 

saw coming out of the House of Representatives, that some in Congress have failed to learn this lesson from this summer. That’s 

really about the only explanation that I have with the bill that 

passed the House, by seven votes on the 26th of June. Instead of 

lightening the load for Americans it asks Americans to shoulder 

more, oblivious to how difficult life may be for so many families. 

Let me list just a few of the impacts of the House bill, which are 

projected by the Energy Information Administration. This is again, 

on the House bill. 

By 2030, the House bill could cost as much as $1,870 per household. 

Raise diesel prices by 44 percent. 

Raise electricity prices by 77 percent. 

May reduce domestic employment by up to 2.3 million people. 

I appreciate that there are other numbers from other entities 

that put the impact at different levels. But I also understand why 

so many folks have written and called to express their opposition 

to the House bill. I think they have every reason to be nervous 

about the impact it may have to them and to their families. 

It would take money that many Americans don’t have. 

Impose prices that many can’t afford. 

Destroy the jobs that our country so desperately needs. 

In my opinion, the principle reason why estimates of the House 

bill’s price tag are so high is that the sponsors did little to limit 

the costs and reduce market volatility. They relied, I think to an 

irresponsible degree, on international offsets that would give the 
4 

appearance of cost containment. They utilized a strategic reserve 

concept that is flawed. 

The House bill strategic reserve provision allows for the introduction of additional allowances into the market if prices spike to 60 

percent above the 3-year rolling average. While this may be marginally useful for blunting massive short term run ups in allowance 

prices. It doesn’t do anything to contain sustained high prices. Furthermore the protections that kick in over a 3-year period will be 

of little use if allowance prices bring our economy to its knees in 

the first or second year of the program. 

Now these are specific issues, problems, contained within a very 

large, a massive bill, a 1,400 page bill. There are many other issues 

that must be addressed and debated. I’m happy that we’ll be able 

to do so in an objective way here in this committee. 

We need to recognize that steps to contain costs and limit volatility will not be enough to fix the House bill. Those concerns are 

just the tip of the iceberg. There’s far more and far larger problems 

that lurk beneath the surface. 

We must resolve these issues in a fair, transparent, and effective 

manner. For now they simply make clear that we have got a great 

deal of work ahead. A great amount of work needs to be done before climate legislation has a chance of passage in the Senate. 

As the climate debate continues I would encourage my colleagues 

to keep a couple things in mind. 

First, climate change is certainly an important issue and one 

that must be addressed. The people of our country and certainly in 

my State of Alaska, are feeling the impacts. I believe that those impacts will only worsen in the years ahead. 

Second, I think we need to avoid what has happened in the 

House. The Senate debate should be about more than who will receive free allowances or bonus allowances or exemptions. We need 

to consider all of our options in an even handed and thoughtful 

way. Our goal should be good policy, not politics. 

For now looking at ways to reduce the costs and price volatility 

that may result from climate change legislation is a good starting 

point. It’s very clear that a policy as comprehensive as cap and 

trade could impose a tremendous burden on families, consumers 

and businesses, especially if it’s not designed properly. So I view 

this hearing, Mr. Chairman, and those we have scheduled to be an 

essential part of the sound process that can result in sound policy 

decisions. 

I look forward to the testimony from the witnesses and the questions that we’ll be able to ask. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Let me introduce the witnesses. 

First, Mr. Brent Yacobucci, who is a specialist in energy and environment policy with the Congressional Research Service. Mr. 

Yacobucci is going to make a short presentation about some of the 

different mechanisms that have been put forward or suggested as 

ways to deal with this problem; sort of give us a little short tutorial. 

Second will be Eileen Claussen, who is President of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change and has spent a lot of time on this 

issue. 
5 

Dr. Michael Wara, who is a professor of law at Stanford Law 

School. Thank you for being here. 

Dr. Joseph Mason, who is a professor at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge. 

Mr. Jason Grumet, who is a familiar witness to us here and was 

very helpful to us in our deliberations on this issue here for the 

last several Congresses. 

So Mr. Yacobucci, why don’t you go ahead? If each of you could 

take about 6 minutes and give us a summary of the main points 

you think we need to understand. Then we will have questions. 

STATEMENT OF BRENT YACOBUCCI, SPECIALIST IN ENERGY 

AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 

SERVICE 

Mr. YACOBUCCI. Good afternoon. My name is Brent Yacobucci. 

On behalf of the Congressional Research Service, I would like to 

thank the chair and ranking member for the invitation to testify 

here today. 

I’ve been asked by the committee to help frame the subject of the 

hearing first by describing some of the concepts that will be discussed. Second by relating those to H.R. 2454, the American Clean 

Energy and Security Act of 2009 as passed by the House of Representatives. I should note that CRS takes no position on legislation. In the interest of time I will forgo a discussion of the basic 

fundamentals of the cap and trade system. 

Under cap and trade the term cost containment has two components. 

First, mechanisms designed to limit or contain the overall cost of 

the program to a socially acceptable level. 

Second, mechanisms designed to limit short term volatility in the 

allowance market created by the system. 

While the two components are complementary, policies to achieve 

them may differ and may even conflict. A critical policy decision is 

whether the maintenance of the program’s overall cap is paramount or whether there are conditions under which policy concerns 

may require a relaxation of the cap. Shifting allowances across 

time is a key technique to limit short term volatility while maintaining the cap. 

Mechanisms to achieve this time shifting include banking, borrowing, multiyear compliance periods and a strategic allowance reserve auction. H.R. 2454 includes all four to some degree. Banking 

of allowances is unlimited while the bill allows entities with free 

allocations to borrow allowances from the coming year. However 

the bill places a substantial rate of borrowing beyond that first 

year. 

H.R. 2454 also contains a strategic allowance reserve. Under this 

mechanism a portion of emissions allowances from each year is 

placed in a reserve. These allowances are then available to covered 

entities at a minimum reserve price. A price set considerably higher than the average allowance price. 

With a strategic reserve firms have the option of tapping into an 

emergency supply of allowances. However this supply is limited as 

the reserve is created by shifting emissions allowances from later 
6 

years. The effect on volatility would depend on the size of the reserve, demand for the allowances and the trigger price. 

It should be noted that there is uncertainty on how effectively 

time shifting will work. Many studies suggest that it should have 

some mitigating effect. But data from existing programs have not 

fully validated the effectiveness of the primary mechanism, banking. 

On the other side of the coin attempting to prevent volatility at 

the lower limit of allowance prices have generally involved setting 

a reserve price for any allowance auctions. The bill’s quarterly allowance auctions contain such a reserve price. So far the techniques I’ve discussed are aimed at limiting volatility, not long run 

costs of the program. 

A key technique for limiting the overall cost to the program is 

to effectively expand the supply of allowances through the use of 

offsets. H.R. 2454 allows a generous offset supply, up to one billion 

tons each, of domestic and international offsets every year. Further 

expanding the offset supply would likely lower long term costs. 

According to the Congressional Budget Office doubling the supply 

of international offsets allowed under the bill lowers allowance 

prices by 30 percent or more. Conversely most studies of H.R. 2454 

find that eliminating international offsets raises the price of allowances by more than half. H.R. 2454’s offset supply is fixed. 

Another alternative would be to establish a flexible offset supply 

like that established by the regional greenhouse gas initiative. 

Under this mechanism the availability of offsets expands as the allowance price increases effectively increasing allowance supply. 

Whether this approach would work under H.R. 2454 is unclear as 

its offset limits are already quite generous and indeed some analyses of the bill suggest that the limits may never be met. 

If one decides that there are conditions where the reduction requirement should be modified possible mechanisms generally include an alternative means of compliance or a suspension of the 

cap under certain conditions. The former, commonly called a safety 

valve, essentially allows covered entities to make a cash payment 

in lieu of submitting allowances. If the allowance price is above the 

safety valve price entities would find it cost effective to make the 

alternative payment rather than by allowances on the market, thus 

a ceiling is placed on allowance prices. 

While H.R. 2454’s cap and trade program does not contain such 

a safety valve, its renewable electricity standard does. In lieu of 

meeting the RES requirement retail electricity suppliers may submit a payment to their State which the State then uses to encourage renewable energy development. Such an approach could be 

used for the cap and trade program as well where any safety valve 

payments could be used to purchase additional offsets or to do develop new, low carbon energy technology. 

Arguably the most comprehensive cost containment scheme 

would be a price collar that combined a reserve price auction to 

help establish a price floor with a safety valve to set a price ceiling. 

Such a price collar might operate to cutoff the peaks and valleys 

of the allowance price curve. Developing a cost containment scheme 

to address overall costs and short term allowance price volatility 

will require consensus on acceptable costs, acceptable volatility and 
7 

acceptable environmental protection. A key policy decision is 

whether the cap must be maintained at all times or if policies may 

allow emissions to exceed the cap under certain conditions. 

Thank you for inviting me to appear. I will be pleased to address 

any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yacobucci follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRENT YACOBUCCI, SPECIALIST IN ENERGY AND

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Good afternoon Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee. My 

name is Brent Yacobucci. On behalf of the Congressional Research Service (CRS), 

I would like to thank the Committee for its invitation to testify here today. I have 

been asked by the Committee to help frame the subject of the hearing, first by providing an explanation for some of the terms and concepts that will be discussed, and 

second by relating those to H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act 

of 2009, as passed by the House of Representatives on June 26, 2009. I should note 

that CRS takes no position on this or any other legislation. In the interest of time 

I will forego a discussion of the basic fundamentals of a cap-and-trade system to 

limit emissions. 

In a cap-and-trade system, the term ‘‘cost containment’’ has two components (as 

suggested by the title of the hearing). The first involves mechanisms designed to 

limit or contain the potential cost of the program to a socially acceptable level. The 

second involves mechanisms designed to prevent or dampen potential short-term 

volatility in the allowance market created by the system. While the two components 

of cost containment are complimentary, the mechanisms involved in achieving them 

may differ and even conflict. 

A critical policy decision that one is faced with in determining any appropriate 

cost containment mechanism is whether maintenance of the program’s overall cap 

is paramount, or whether there are conditions under which economic or energy policy concerns may mandate a change in the reduction system (at least temporarily). 

One may decide the cap must be maintained at any economic cost for a variety of 

reasons, including the need to send a consistent signal to the allowance market, a 

consistent signal to innovators of new technology, and to achieve the tonnage mandated. Likewise, a variety of economic and energy policy reasons can be posited for 

allowing those concerns to trump the cap in specific situations, including economic 

disruption, timetable to deploy emerging technology, and unforeseen international 

events. 

LIMITING UPWARD PRICE VOLATILITY—TIME SHIFTING

Shifting allowances across time is a key technique for maintaining the cap within 

any cost containment mechanism designed to prevent or dampen short-term volatility in the allowance market. Mechanisms to achieve this time-shifting include 

banking, borrowing, multi-year compliance periods, and a strategic allowance reserve auction (effectively a form of emergency borrowing). H.R. 2454 includes all 

four to some degree. Banking of allowances under H.R. 2454 is unlimited. Borrowing 

from future allocations of allowances under H.R. 2454 is free for the first year (effectively creating a two-year compliance period for those entities receiving allowance 

allocations), but places a substantial rate on borrowing beyond that first year. 

H.R. 2454 also contains a strategic allowance reserve. Under this mechanism, a 

portion of emissions allowances from each year is placed in a reserve. These allowances are then available to covered entities at a minimum reserve price—a price set 

considerably higher than the average allowance price projected under H.R. 2454. 

With a strategic reserve, firms have the option of tapping into an emergency supply 

of allowances. However, this supply is limited, as the reserve was created by shifting emission allowances from later years. The effect on mitigating price volatility 

would depend on the size of the reserve, demand for the allowances, and the trigger 

price. 

It should be noted that there is uncertainty on how effectively these mechanisms 

will work. Many studies have been conducted on them (particularly on banking) suggesting that they should have some mitigating effect. However, data from existing 

programs have not fully validated the effectiveness of the primary mechanism-banking. 
8 

* Graphic has been retained in committee files. 

LIMITING DOWNWARD VOLATILITY—RESERVE PRICES

On the other side of the coin, attempting to prevent volatility at the lower limit 

of allowance prices while maintaining the cap has generally involved setting a reserve price for any allowance auctions. H.R. 2454’s quarterly allowance auctions 

contain such a reserve price: $10 in 2012 (2009$), rising at 5% (in real terms) annually thereafter. 

LONG-RUN COST CONTROL UNDER THE CAP—EXPANDED OFFSET SUPPLY

So far, the techniques I have discussed are aimed at limiting volatility, not longrun costs of the program. A key technique for limiting the overall cost of the program is to effectively expand the supply of allowances through the use of offsets— 

reductions made by entities not covered by the cap. H.R. 2454 allows a very generous offset supply, up to 1 billion tons of domestic and one billion tons of international offsets each year. Further expanding offset supply would likely lower longterm costs. According to the Congressional Budget Office, doubling the supply of 

international offsets allowed under the bill lowers allowance prices by 30% or more. 

Conversely, most studies of H.R. 2454 find that eliminating international offsets 

raises the price of allowances by more than half. 

H.R. 2454’s offset supply is fixed. Another alternative would be to establish a 

flexible offset supply like that established by the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. Under this mechanism the availability of offsets expands as the allowance price 

increases, effectively increasing allowance supply. Whether this approach would 

work under H.R. 2454 is unclear as its offset limits are already quite generous, and 

indeed, some analyses of H.R. 2454 suggest that the limits may never be met. 

ALTERNATIVE COMPLIANCE OUTSIDE OF THE CAP—SAFETY VALVES AND PRICE COLLARS

If one decides that there are conditions where the reduction requirement should 

be modified, the mechanisms involved generally incorporate an alternative means 

of compliance, or suspension of the reduction requirement at a specific trigger price. 

The former, commonly called a safety valve, essentially allows covered entities to 

make a cash payment in lieu of submitting allowances. If the allowance price is 

above the safety valve price, entities would find it cost-effective to make the alternative payment rather than buy allowances on the market. Thus, a ceiling is placed 

on allowance costs. 

While H.R. 2454’s cap-and-trade program does not contain such a safety valve, its 

renewable electricity standard does. In lieu of meeting the RES requirement, retail 

electricity suppliers may submit a payment to their state, which the state then uses 

to encourage renewable energy development. Such an approach could be used for the 

cap-and-trade program where any safety valve payments could be used to purchase 

offsets or to develop new low-carbon energy technologies. 

As suggested earlier, combinations of these mechanisms are possible. Outside of 

a carbon tax (which would be the ultimate form of cost containment) arguably the 

most comprehensive cost containment scheme would be a price collar that combined 

a reserve price auction to help establish a price floor, with a safety valve to set a 

price ceiling. The attached figure* shows how such a price collar might operate to 

cut off the peaks and valleys of the allowance price curve. However, developing a 

cost-containment scheme to address overall costs and short-term allowance price 

volatility will require consensus on acceptable costs, acceptable volatility, and acceptable environmental protection. 

CONCLUSION

To conclude, cost containment in a cap-and-trade system generally implies one of 

two things, either limiting volatility in allowance markets, or limiting the overall 

cost of the program over its life. Different policy tools may be needed to address 

these two objectives. Further, cost control options can either maintain overall emissions at or below the cap or limit costs by allowing emissions to rise above the level 

of the cap. 

Thank you for inviting me to appear. I will be pleased to address any questions 

you may have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Claussen, please go right ahead. 
9 

STATEMENT OF EILEEN CLAUSSEN, PRESIDENT, PEW CENTER 

ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, ARLINGTON, VA 

Ms. CLAUSSEN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Murkowski, members of 

the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. 

My name is Eileen Claussen. I’m the President of the Pew Center 

on Global Climate Change. We are founding members of the U.S. 

Climate Action Partnership, a coalition of 25 leading businesses 

and five environmental organizations that have come together to 

call on the Federal Government to quickly enact strong national 

legislation to require significant reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. 

Let me start by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, not only for holding this hearing, but for your years of leadership on the climate 

issue and in particular on the issue of cost containment. I hope 

that you will see in the work of the Pew Center and USCAP, an 

effort to build on your leadership in a positive way. The Pew Center has long supported enactment of an economy wide, greenhouse 

gas cap and trade bill as a primary measure for reducing U.S. 

greenhouse gas emissions. 

A cap and trade program provides an excellent division of responsibilities. Government establishes the public policy objective to 

reduce emissions by a certain amount in a given year. Businesses 

decide how to meet the objective as cost effectively as possible. 

The Pew Center believes, as does USCAP that the most powerful 

way to contain costs is a robust cap and trade program. Cap and 

trade minimizes cost because it provides industry the flexibility to 

reduce emissions at the lowest possible cost. It also provides a powerful incentive for industry to invent and commercialize the innovative clean energy technologies that will help us to achieve our climate protection goals. 

That said. There are legitimate concerns that greenhouse gas allowance prices may either get too low or too high or be excessively 

volatile. Let me talk in particular about the second and third concerns. 

We know from a wide range of economic analyses that two factors are critical to avoid excessively high prices, the availability of 

offsets and the availability of low carbon technologies including carbon capture and storage and nuclear power. Recent economic modeling by the EIA suggests that barring the use of international offsets in a cap and trade program would increase allowance prices 

by 65 percent. We would recommend being restrictive on the quality of offsets while being liberal on quantity. 

We want to make sure that offsets meet or exceed standards for 

what qualifies while at the same time ensuring that there are adequate quantities available to support lower allowance prices. The 

potential for cost reductions is especially large from international 

offsets where there are huge opportunities for achieving low cost 

emission reductions while assisting poor countries to develop in 

more sustainable ways. We would recommend that agencies start 

now even in advance of legislation to lay the ground work for an 

effective offset program. 

Economic modeling studies show that the availability of key technologies such as CCS and nuclear power also play an important 

role in reducing the costs of climate protection. For example, EIA’s 
10 

modeling projects that when critical technology is not available, 

compliance costs could be 10 percent higher. We recommend combining a cap and trade program with increased funding and incentives for technology research development and deployment since 

the price signal for a cap and trade program alone may not be adequate to drive the low carbon innovation that we need. 

To avoid excessive allowance price volatility we recommend that 

Congress provide as much ‘‘when’’ flexibility as possible in the cap 

and trade program. The legislation should allow banking of offsets 

and allowances, along with a multiyear compliance period and 

multiyear allocations. It is clear from past cap and trade programs 

that banking and multiyear compliance periods are extremely effective tools for smoothing out price fluctuations. 

However we must also understand that some price fluctuations 

are inevitable and under some circumstances even desirable. For 

example, one particular advantage of a cap and trade over a tax 

is that if the overall economy turns down so will allowance prices. 

Reducing the economic costs of compliance under a tax regime further government intervention would be required to make similar 

adjustments. 

If allowance prices spike to a high level and stay there one obvious response would be simply to make additional allowances available thus bringing down the price. The fundamental issue is how 

to do this without breaking the cap on greenhouse gas emissions 

and therefore undermining the environmental integrity of the program. USCAP recommends an approach that meets both of these 

objectives. 

It makes additional allowances available to drive down excessive 

prices but does so by creating a pool of allowances that does not 

break the long term cap. This would be done by creating a strategic 

reserve pool that would be filled with a combination of offsets and 

allowances borrowed from future years. Both of which would ensure that the integrity of the cap is maintained over time. 

I want to stress that the strategic reserve would perform much 

the same function as a price cap, but without undermining the environmental integrity of the program. It would provide additional 

supply into the market to reduce allowance prices, increase certainty about market price, function automatically by means of regularly scheduled auctions and be adjusted to accommodate economic conditions. Neither a price cap nor a strategic reserve would 

provide perfect cost certainty. But with the strategic reserve the 

environmental outcome would be much more assured. 

Climate legislation is critical to both our future economic prosperity and our environmental well being. I am convinced that if we 

draw from experience to enact measures that reward innovation 

and limit costs, we will provide once again, that no challenge is beyond our reach. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Claussen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EILEEN CLAUSSEN, PRESIDENT, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL

CLIMATE CHANGE, ARLINGTON, VA 

Mr. Chairman, Sen. Murkowski, Members of the Committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to testify on how we can best design climate legislation to contain costs 

and minimize greenhouse gas allowance price volatility. My name is Eileen 

Claussen, and I am the President of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change. 
11 

The Pew Center on Global Climate Change is an independent non-profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to advancing practical and effective solutions and policies to address global climate change. Our work is informed by our Business Environmental Leadership Council (BELC), a group of 44 major companies, most in the 

Fortune 500, that work with the Center to educate opinion leaders on climate 

change risks, challenges, and solutions. The Pew Center is also a founding member 

of the U. S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP), a coalition of 25 leading businesses and five environmental organizations that have come together to call on the 

federal government to quickly enact strong national legislation to require significant 

reductions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 

The Pew Center has long supported enactment of an economy-wide GHG cap-andtrade bill as a primary measure for reducing U.S. GHG emissions. A cap-and-trade 

program provides an excellent division of responsibilities: Government establishes 

the public policy objective—to reduce emissions by a certain amount in a given 

year—and businesses decide how to meet that objective as cost effectively as possible. The Pew Center believes, as does USCAP, that the most powerful way to contain costs is a robust cap-and-trade program. It is clear from economic theory, from 

our experience with the U.S. acid rain program, and from a vast body of economic 

modeling analysis, that cap-and-trade will dramatically reduce the costs of reducing 

GHG emissions compared to traditional command-and-control regulatory approaches. Cap-and-trade minimizes cost because it provides industry the flexibility 

to reduce emissions at the lowest possible cost. It also provides a powerful incentive 

for industry to invent and commercialize the innovative clean energy technologies 

that will help us to achieve our climate protection goals. 

That said, there are legitimate concerns that GHG allowance prices may get either too low or too high, or be excessively volatile. Too low a price could undermine 

long-term investments critical to moving to clean energy economy. Too high a price 

could cause economic harm. Too volatile a price could create risk and uncertainty 

for businesses. 

Let us talk about each of these problems in turn. 

AVOIDING EXCESSIVELY LOW PRICES

While we would all like to keep the costs of reducing GHG emissions low, allowance prices that fall too low would discourage long-term capital investments in critical new clean energy technologies. In order to keep prices from going too low, we 

believe Congress should establish a minimum reserve price for the auction of allowances. We believe the reserve price that could accomplish this policy objective is approximately $10 per ton at the outset of the program. This price should escalate 

over time at a rate greater than inflation and then flatten out, for example, by 2025. 

The reserve price should be reviewed over time to determine whether it should be 

adjusted, stay the same, or be phased out by the program’s administrator. 

AVOIDING EXCESSIVELY HIGH PRICES

We know from a wide range of economic analyses that two factors are critical to 

avoid excessively high prices—the availability of significant quantities of domestic 

and international offsets and the availability of clean technologies, including carbon 

capture and storage (CCS) and nuclear power. 

1. The Critical Role of Offsets 

Recent economic modeling by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) suggests that barring the use of international offsets in a cap-and-trade program would 

increase allowance prices by 65 percent. (Modeling by the Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) similarly projects a price increase of 89 percent without international 

offsets.) These results are fully consistent with modeling being done by other organizations. Restricting offsets would lead to higher allowance prices and larger impacts 

on the overall economy. 

We would recommend being restrictive on the quality of offsets, while being liberal on quantity. We want to make sure that offsets meet or exceed standards for 

what qualifies, while at the same time ensuring that there are adequate quantities 

available to support lower allowance prices. The potential for cost reductions is especially large from international offsets, where there are huge opportunities for 

achieving low-cost emission reductions while assisting poor countries to develop in 

more sustainable ways. 

To be an effective cost containment measure and an effective environmental policy 

tool, however, safeguards must be in place to ensure that all such reductions are 

environmentally additional, verifiable, permanent, measurable, and enforceable. We 

recommend the following: 
12 

• The offset program administrator (which could be, for example, the EPA, the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), or a joint effort of the two agencies) 

should be directed to establish an offset program using a standards-based approach within 18 months of enactment. Under a standards-based approach, 

rules should identify specific categories of offsets that are eligible to qualify, 

along with clear procedures to achieve certification, and clear guidance to offset 

providers about how they can meet the standards. The eligible categories of offsets should be added to or modified over time based on experience, and standards should be periodically updated to ensure environmental integrity. 

• The program administrator(s) should be directed to establish a transparent 

process for evaluating and approving high-quality international offsets. These 

offsets would be approved during the early years of the program, with a schedule to assure that over time developing countries are encouraged to move as 

rapidly as possible to curb their emissions through national or sector emission 

reduction commitments, while ensuring that the overall quantities of offsets and 

international allowances are adequate for cost containment. 

We recommend the following approach for managing the amount of offsets used: 

• Set an overall upper level limit on the use of offsets for compliance in any year 

of 1.5 billion metric tons domestic and 1.5 billion metric tons international offsets and specifying that initially 2 billion metric tons of offsets in total would 

be allowed. 

• Allow the program administer (e.g., EPA, USDA or a Carbon Market Board) to 

increase the upper limit of offsets to 3 billion metric tons per year, should additional cost containment be needed. In making this adjustment to the annual offset limit, the program administrator should take into account the number of 

banked offsets in the private sector, the degree to which the criteria for offset 

quality described above have been effectively implemented, the potential supply 

of offsets in the market and the size of the ‘‘strategic reserve pool’’ described 

later in this testimony. 

While there is an inherent tension between striving to ensure adequate offset 

availability and offset quality, we believe it is in the best interest of all parties to 

ensure that a balance is reached. This balance will be easier to achieve if agencies 

start now—even in advance of legislation—to begin laying the groundwork for a 

GHG offset program. Early efforts of agency personnel could include assessing existing protocols and existing offset programs, starting work on new protocols, and identifying experts for advisory roles. With respect to international offsets, our international agencies could begin to work with developing countries to improve their 

emission inventories, develop forestry plans and generally engage in reforms currently being discussed within the existing international offset mechanisms (i.e., the 

Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation 

(JI) programs). 

Some have criticized these existing international offset mechanisms, especially 

CDM, and without a doubt, there has been and is room for improvement. Work is 

now underway to fix many of the problems that have been identified, including 

streamlining the very bureaucratic (and, some would argue, overly rigorous) process. 

We believe, for example, that movement by the CDM’s Executive Board toward more 

standardized protocols and a more efficient project review process are good steps forward. U.S. engagement could only make this tool better and more efficient. 

2. Accelerating Technology Development 

Economic modeling studies also show that the timely availability and reasonable 

costs of key technologies, such as CCS and nuclear power, play an important role 

in determining the costs of climate protection. For example, EIA’s modeling projects 

that when critical technology is not available, compliance costs could be 10 percent 

higher. EPA’s modeling shows that when the use of nuclear power is constrained, 

compliance costs increase by 15 percent. Both demonstrate the need to accelerate 

technological innovation. We recommend doing this by combining a cap-and-trade 

program with increased funding and incentives for research, development and deployment (RD&D), since the price signal from a cap-and-trade program alone may 

not be adequate to drive the low-carbon innovation that we need. Numerous studies 

indicate that a combination of ‘‘market push’’ (such as RD&D) and ‘‘market pull’’ 

(such as capand-trade) are much more cost-effective in tandem than they are by 

themselves. For example, a Pew Center study written by Dr. Lawrence H. Goulder 

of Stanford University finds that it can be up to 10 times cheaper to push and pull 

technology in tandem than relying on either push or pull by itself. We strongly recommend measures to support development and deployment of CCS technology and 
13 

clean vehicle technologies, to facilitate expansion of nuclear power and renewable 

technologies, and to create a new energy technology deployment administration. 

AVOIDING PRICE VOLATILITY

To avoid excessive allowance price volatility, we recommend that Congress provide as much ‘‘when’’ flexibility as possible in the cap-and-trade program. The legislation should allow banking of offsets and allowances, along with a multi-year compliance period and multi-year allocations. It is clear from past cap-and-trade programs that banking and multi-year compliance periods are extremely effective tools 

for smoothing out price fluctuations. Banking allows firms the ability to save their 

offsets and allowances for future use. It also promotes near-term reductions as firms 

seek to do more so they can save their allowances for a day when prices might be 

higher. The absence of banking between the initial ‘‘learning phase’’ of the EU’s 

Emissions Trading Program (2005—2007) and the current five year phase was one 

of the main reasons the EU allowance prices crashed as the learning period came 

to a close at the end of 2007. While this limit on banking between the two periods 

was intended to keep problems from the learning phase from spilling over into the 

current phase, it also clearly illustrated how not having banking can impact the 

price of allowances. Notably, today, the EU program does allow banking between the 

current phase and the next. 

The EU also has effective multi-year compliance, as does the Regional Greenhouse 

Gas Initiative (RGGI) trading program that has been established by ten northeastern U.S. states. Giving firms a compliance obligation that covers more than one 

year at a time means that firms do not have to turn in their allowances and offsets 

yearly. The EU essentially has a two year compliance window, while RGGI has a 

three year window. Multi-year compliance adds ‘‘when’’ flexibility, which in-turn can 

help control price volatility. 

With regard to multi-year allocation, EPA in the Acid Rain Program allocated 30 

years worth of allowances at the beginning of the program. I do not believe that 

we need to allocate allowances that far into the future at the beginning of a climate 

program, but we certainly need to allocate enough (maybe 5 or 10 years worth) to 

provide sufficient market liquidity. Markets just getting started tend to have a more 

price volatility, in part because people are uncertain about whether there is going 

to be adequate liquidity (supply and demand) in the market. Having more allowances in circulation, even if they cannot be used for compliance before their vintage 

year, will help provide market liquidity, increase certainty and dampen price volatility. 

We must, however, also understand that some price fluctuations are inevitable 

and, under some circumstances, even desirable. Changes in allowance prices would 

result from changes in supply and demand for allowances, which in turn could be 

affected by how fast or slow the economy grows, by shifts in the relative prices of 

fuels, and even by short-term fluctuations in the weather. One particular advantage 

of a cap-and-trade over a tax is that if the overall economy turns down, so will allowance prices, reducing the economic costs of compliance. Under a tax regime, further government intervention would be required to make similar adjustments. 

INSURANCE AGAINST HIGHER PRICES

The smart design of a domestic cap-and-trade regime, including the mechanisms 

described above (offsets, banking, multi-year compliance and multi-year allocation), 

along with proper incentives to spur technological change, should go a long way to 

minimizing the economic costs of climate protection. Nonetheless, given the uncertainties that remain (rate and costs of new technologies, availability of offsets, the 

extent that increased energy efficiency can be mobilized), and especially given the 

large role energy plays in our economy, it is also critical to include additional safeguards to insure that GHG allowance prices will not be excessively high. 

If allowance prices spike to a high level and stay there, one obvious response 

would be simply to make additional allowances available, thus bringing down the 

price. The fundamental issue is how to do this without breaking the cap on GHG 

emissions and therefore undermining the environmental integrity of the program. 

USCAP recommends an approach that meets both of these objectives—it makes additional allowances available to drive down excessive prices, but does so by creating 

a pool of allowances that does not break the long-term cap. This would be done by 

creating a ‘‘strategic reserve pool’’ that would be filled with a combination of offsets 

and allowances borrowed from future years, both of which would insure that the integrity of the cap is maintained over time. 

The offsets in the pool would include both domestic and international offsets that 

meet high quality standards and would be certified by the U.S. government. We 
14 

* Graph has been retained in committee files. 

would envision that the pool would also include ‘‘forest carbon tons,’’ offsets generated from avoided tropical deforestation. The allowances in the pool would be borrowed by the program administrator from future compliance periods. If the borrowed allowances were not used, the emissions cap over time would stay fixed; if 

they were used, future emission reduction targets would be made more stringent. 

To serve as an insurance mechanism against sustained high prices, offsets and 

allowances in the strategic reserve pool would be released into the market when allowance prices exceed a specific threshold price. This threshold price should be set 

at a level that is low enough to prevent undue economic harm from excessively high 

allowance prices but that is high enough to encourage technology transformation, 

including the deployment of CCS and nuclear power. Figure 1* illustrates how the 

strategic reserve would essentially bend the emissions cap over time, even while it 

maintains the program’s environmental objectives. 

The USCAP Blueprint recommends that a Carbon Market Board decide the 

threshold price, but USCAP is currently discussing the possibility of recommending 

a specified threshold price in the legislation, instead. The Blueprint also contains 

details on how the offsets and allowances would be brought into the strategic reserve, how the strategic reserve would be replenished, what rules would be established for auctioning off strategic reserve allowances, and what role a program administrator, like the Carbon Market Board, could play. Business as Usual Emissions 

The green line indicates the emissions goals of the program. The orange line shows 

how borrowing allowances from future years to fill the strategic reserve—if needed 

to dampen high allowance prices—bends the emissions trajectory but does not 

change the cumulative amount of emissions allowed under the cap. 

I want to stress that the strategic reserve would perform much the same function 

as a price cap (also sometimes called a ‘‘safety valve’’), but without undermining the 

environmental integrity of the program. It would provide additional supply into the 

market to reduce allowance prices; increase certainty about market price; function 

automatically by means of regularly scheduled auctions; and be adjusted to accommodate economic conditions. Neither a price cap nor a strategic reserve would provide perfect cost certainty, but with the strategic reserve the environmental outcome 

would be assured. 

CONCLUSION

Climate legislation is critical to both our future economic prosperity and our environmental well-being. I am convinced that if we draw from experience to enact 

measures that reward innovation and limit costs, we will prove once again that no 

challenge is beyond our reach. 

Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Wara, go right ahead. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL WARA, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, 

STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, FACULTY FELLOW, PROGRAM ON 

ENERGY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, CENTER FELLOW, WOODS INSTITUTE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, PALO 

ALTO, CA 

Mr. WARA. Thank you very much, Senator Bingaman and Senator Murkowski and other members of the committee for inviting 

me to testify today. My name is Michael Wara. I’m an Assistant 

Professor at Stanford Law School. My research focuses on existing 

emissions trading markets, especially the largest offset market in 

existence today, the Clean Development Mechanism. 

In my written testimony today I hope to drive home two key conclusions. 

Offsets have not and most likely cannot provide both effective 

cost control and environmental integrity. 

Second, a price collar can provide superior cost control that is 

both effective, transparent and importantly, easily administrable 
15 

while at the same time essentially providing many of the benefits 

to uncapped sectors that offsets provide. 

I think a key concern when contemplating climate legislation, especially legislation that conceives a time table out to 2050, is ensuring that we enact a durable program. My belief is that a safety 

valve or price collar can provide a much more durable program 

than offsets. Experience with the largest existing carbon offset program in the world, the Clean Development Mechanism, or CDM, 

suggests that environmental integrity while possible in theory is 

very difficult to achieve in practice, even with the best intentioned 

and well resourced regulators. 

The key problem at the heart of all offset programs, including 

the CDM and a future offset program under the American Clean 

Energy and Security Act is operationalizing the determination of 

what’s called in offset jargon, the emissions baseline. Essentially 

what would have happened in the absence of the incentive created 

by a carbon offset market. In practice the CDM has been unable 

to accomplish this objective in a cost effective way or at in large 

enough quantity to produce a reliable supply of offsets. 

This is especially true. This problem is especially difficult to resolve in heavily regulated sectors of the economy such as the energy sector in China, a place where my research is focused or within the United States potentially in the forestry sector, a portion of 

the economy that is heavily regulated by other environmental laws. 

In addition the CDM has illustrated despite good intentions and a 

focus on environmental integrity it’s very difficult to produce a 

large supply of credits. Large enough in this case to supply effective cost control for governments that are seeking to comply the 

Kyoto Protocol and perhaps more relevantly, for the EU emissions 

trading scheme which is a large, not economy wide, but covers a 

substantial fraction of the European Union’s economy especially 

the electricity sector and heavy industry. 

This is important as we think about an ACES or ACES like bill 

because the offset markets contemplated by that bill would have to 

be 20 to 50 times larger than the Clean Development Mechanism 

while at the same time requiring greater environmental integrity. 

To the credit of the House, there are significant important provisions in the bill that would strengthen the environmental integrity 

of the offset program created under ACES relative to the CDM. 

ACES is extraordinarily dependent on offsets. It’s more or less four 

times as many offsets are allowed under ACES as are allowed 

under the EU emissions trading currently. 

That translates into according to EPA modeling, that more than 

half of the reductions prior to 2030 derived from a system come 

from offsets rather than from emissions reductions by what are 

called covered entities or sectors covered by the cap. As has been 

mentioned earlier prices increase in the allowance market nearly 

two fold. If has occurred under the CDM offset supply is limited. 

More importantly real offsets, offsets that are actually an offset 

system that’s actually implemented in the real world places in significant doubt the promised theoretical benefit of an offset system. 

That is to have your cake and eat it too. Have cost control on the 

impact to the U.S. economy and also certainty as to the quantity. 

Because we don’t know, because we don’t have in practice a very 
16 

1The American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 

difficult time even with the best intentions and with the best resources in determining what would or would not have happened 

anyway under an offset system quantity certainty is placed in significant doubt. 

A price collar or symmetric safety valve sets, as has been described, a firm price, both a minimum and a maximum price for allowances. It provides superior cost certainty on both the high end 

for firm space and compliance and importantly the low end for 

firms that seek to innovate and supply new technologies to the 

market. Funds raised from a safety valve could be used to accomplish many of the environmental benefits of an offset system. 

That is they could be used to fund reductions in uncapped sectors. That might actually create substantial benefits for uncapped 

sectors in that a fund approach to those emissions reductions 

would create greater flexibility in terms of how emissions reductions are created and accomplished domestically for Ag and forestry. Also internationally allow that fund to access key strategies 

such as energy efficiency in buildings, appliances and heavy industry that are difficult to monetize by a carbon offset market. 

So in conclusion, I would urge the committee to consider a price 

collar alongside or instead of offsets as a cost containment strategy 

in implementing an effective and cost and durable U.S. climate policy. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wara follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL WARA, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, STANFORD LAW

SCHOOL, FACULTY FELLOW, PROGRAM ON ENERGY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, CENTER FELLOW, WOODS INSTITUTE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, PALO ALTO, 

CA 

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 

to testify on the potential role of carbon offsets as a cost containment mechanism 

for a US greenhouse gas emissions trading market. Overall, I believe that offsets 

hold limited promise, both as a cost control mechanism and as a method for reducing emissions beyond the sectors covered by a cap-and-trade scheme. Alternative 

cost-containment measures, such as a symmetric safety valve with revenues dedicated to a climate trust fund, are more likely to supply many of the hoped for benefits of with fewer of the risks associated with their use. This is especially likely to 

be the case for the cap and trade system proposed in Title III of the American Clean 

Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES)1. The ACES’s cap and trade system depends very heavily on the provision of unprecedented numbers of offsets from both 

domestic and international programs for cost containment ,while at the same time 

requiring that these systems meet exacting environmental standards. My research 

focuses on the implementation and function of the only existing compliance grade 

carbon offset market, the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 

Detailed analysis of this large and growing carbon offset market suggests that these 

twin objectives for an ACES offset market, of copious offset supply and high environmental integrity, are likely to be fundamentally incompatible. 

In this testimony, I will address several key lessons learned from the international experience with carbon offsets under the Kyoto Protocol so far. I will then 

describe the relevance of these lessons to the offsets program contemplated by 

ACES. Finally, I will describe an alternative cost-containment mechanism, a symmetric safety valve or price collar, combined with a climate trust fund. Based on 

experience with carbon offsets so far, a price-collar is likely to provide far more reliable cost-containment than carbon offsets. I conclude the following: 

(1) There has been and will continue to be substantial crediting of 

businessasusual behavior within the CDM. This is particularly true for sectors 
17 

such as electricity generation that are highly regulated by developing country 

governments. This crediting of counterfeit emissions reductions is likely to be 

a hallmark of any real offset program. The crux of the problem is the inability 

in practice to tell which of the many applicants for carbon offsets are telling 

a genuine story regarding emissions reductions and which would have installed 

cleaner technology even in the absence of the carbon market. 

(2) The CDM has yet to perform as a reliable costcontainment strategy. Actual issuance of offsets has been far lower than predicted because of concerns 

about environmental integrity. These concerns have led of necessity to an elaborate and time consuming regulatory process. The impact of this failure to 

produce offsets has been largely hidden by the reduction in demand for permits 

due to the global recession. 

(3) Realworld implementation of an offset market of the scale contemplated 

by ACES could not avoid the CDM’s pitfalls. ACES as passed requires an offset 

market and regulatory structure of between 10 and 50 times the size of the current CDM. While there are process efficiencies that a US system could realize, 

the potential for crediting business-as-usual behavior, for uncertain offset supply, or both, is substantial. In practice as opposed to theory, both effective cost 

control and certainty as to emissions levels are impossible to achieve under such 

a system. 

(4) A symmetric safety valve or price collar that includes both a price floor 

and a price ceiling for emissions allowances is preferable to offsets as a 

costcontrol option. A price collar would be simple to administer, would not require an elaborate regulatory system to administer, and would produce certainty ex-post as to the actual level of emissions under the cap. Offsets will deliver none of these. A price-collar would keep costs within the ACES emissions 

trading market commensurate with expectations. By doing so it would help to 

ensure the ongoing support of constituencies essential for an enduring and stable climate policy. Finally and most importantly, a price collar would provide 

a guaranteed minimum return for clean-tech innovators seeking to displace 

older fossil generation. This guaranteed return ould increase the provision of 

new and innovative technologies to the US economy. By doing so, it would also 

increase the number of green jobs created by a US climate program, and help 

to position the US as a leader in the global energy revolution. 

(5) A price collar would produce substantial revenues via the sale of extra permits. These funds could be used to produce many of the environmental benefits 

promised by offsets. While use of the safety valve would increase the level of 

emissions under the cap, the revenue could be directed into a Climate Trust 

Fund. This fund could accomplish many of the emission reduction objectives of 

an offset program and do so more costeffectively. By allowing for increased flexibility and by reducing the rents captured by offset producers a Climate Trust 

Fund would quite possibly produce greater reductions from uncapped sources 

than would be possible under a carbon offset system. 

2. CREDITING OF BUSINESS-AS-USUAL ACTIVITIES IN THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT

MECHANISM

The environmental integrity and costeffectiveness of a carbon offset system depend on the ability to rapidly, reliably, and cheaply determine how entities seeking 

carbon offsets would have behaved in the absence of the financial incentives created 

by emissions trading. The ‘‘business-as-usual’’ or baseline scenario can then be compared to what actually happens. Any reduction in emissions from the baseline to 

reality can then be credited with offsets. Offsets must, if they are to be effective, 

result in changed behavior. If not, then the result is that emissions do not fall either 

under the cap (where the offset is used as an alternative compliance tool) or outside 

the cap (where emissions remain unchanged relative to the baseline scenario). If an 

offset system performs perfectly, total uncapped and capped emissions remain unchanged. For every ton reduced outside the cap, one ton is emitted by a covered entity inside the cap. Of course, no offsets market is likely to work perfectly; in practice, a balance must be struck between the over-crediting of business-as-usual behavior and the under-crediting of real reductions. But even evaluating this type-1 

versus type-2 error requires some ability to objectively determine the counterfactual 

baseline scenario. In too many contexts, this has proven impossible to do in real offset systems. 

The Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol (CDM) is the largest 

carbon offset market in the world, both in terms of volume of credits and value 

transacted. The CDM is also the world’s first compliance grade carbon offset market. 

Firms covered by cap-and-trade regimes, most notably the European Union’s Emis-
18 

* Figures have been retained in committee files. 

2See, Michael Wara and David Victor, A Realistic Policy on International Carbon Offsets, 

Stanford Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #74 (2008), at http:// 

pesd.stanford.edu/people/michaelwara 3 Hydro and wind CDM applications exceed new capacity additions in part because some 

plants applying for credit in 2007 were built earlier and in part because some plants that applying for credit experienced construction delays. Data Sources: National Development and Reform 

Council; International Gas Union; International Energy Agency; Jorgen Fenhann, UNEP-Riso 

Centre, CDM-JI Pipeline Database. 4 4 In 2008, the first year during which covered entities could use CDM offsets as alternative 

compliance in the EU ETS, just 82 million offsets were surrendered, compared to a maximum 

allowed usage of 8% of the cap or approximately 150 million offsets. Data obtained from the 

European Commission Community Independent Transaction Log. 

sions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), can use CDM offsets in lieu of allowances for compliance. The CDM was conceived with the twin goals of lowering compliance costs 

for parties to the Kyoto Protocol and assisting in the financing of sustainable development. The performance of the CDM holds important lessons for an analogous compliance grade carbon offset system proposed for the US. 

The CDM has evolved through time as it has both grown in size, from just a few 

emission reduction projects to more than four thousand, and in complexity, from just 

a few project types to over one hundred. During this growth process, the regulators 

of the CDM have learned by doing and have improved practices. These improvements have been made mainly with the intention of insuring greater environmental 

integrity. Both anecdotal and systematic evidence suggests that substantial crediting of businessasusual projects continues to occur. The root cause of the problem 

appears to be an inability to reliably determine the baseline scenario for a particular 

project or class of projects. 

The problems in the CDM have been greatest in sectors and countries where government regulation plays an important role in economic activity. In China where 

more than half of all CDM credits originate, this is most evident in the energy sector. The Chinese energy sector, because of its strategic importance, remains largely 

state controlled and in many cases, state owned. The basic problem for the CDM 

is that state mandates and subsidy programs, along with a complicated and nontransparent interaction between state owned banks, state owned utilities, and financial and energy regulators, already strongly favor the construction of renewable and 

natural-gas fired energy production. Some small fraction of the new capacity added 

is no doubt caused by the additional finance provided by CDM. However, in practice, 

almost all new plants in the wind, hydro, and natural gas sectors apply for and receive credit under the CDM for emissions reductions (see Figure 1*)2 3

The problem for the CDM has been that in practice, there is no straightforward 

way to determine whose behavior has been altered because of offsets and therefore 

who should receive them. CDM regulators have been forced to add layers of bureaucracy in an ultimately futile effort to determine which of the many applicants 

are telling a genuine story regarding emissions reductions and which would have 

installed cleaner technology even in the absence of the carbon market. As a result, 

there are lingering uncertainties as to the quality of credits that have been and are 

being issued by the CDM. 

CDM offsets are ultimately bought for use as alternative compliance in a capandtrade system. The impact of their uncertainty quality creates uncertainty as to 

the quantity of emission reductions produced by the overall program of cap, trade, 

and offset. In the EU ETS, this uncertainty has turned out to be less than anticipated because of the global recession causing a fall in demand for electric power and 

hence for allowances and offsets. The fall in demand, combined with free allocation 

of allowances to emitters has resulted in relatively little use of offsets.4 Even so, 

approximately one third of the reduction between the cap in 2007 and the cap in 

2008 was covered by CDM offsets. To the extent that these offsets are of doubtful 

quality, we will never know whether a third of the reductions within covered sectors 

for the first year of the Kyoto Protocol were real or mere paper reductions. Unless 

ACES can somehow resolve the lingering uncertainty and criticism that has surrounded determination of baselines and consequent emissions reductions in offset 

programs, it will suffer the same fate. And ACES if enacted, would rely on offsets 

to a far greater extent than does the current EU ETS. 

3. THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM STRUGGLES TO PRODUCE A LARGE OFFSET

SUPPLY

Another surprise of the first 5 years of CDM operation has been the difficulty the 

system has had in producing large numbers of issued credits. Reliable supply of 

large volumes of offsets is a necessity for a cost-containment mechanism. The prob-
19 

5 ACES supra note 1, §§ 735, 736. 

6Data compiled by the author from the CDM issuance database, at http://cdm.unfccc.int/ 

issuance/index.html. 7 Indeed, these projects are so profitable that the carbon offsets produced by them are worth 

substantially more than the underlying products—most notably refrigerant gases for mobile air 

conditioners—being produced by the polluting industries. See, Michael Wara, The Performance 

and Potential of the Clean Development Mechanism, 55 UCLA Law Review 1759 (2008), available at http://pesd.stanford.edu/people/michaelwara. 8 Ibid. 

9The United States is a useful point of reference in this regard since it did not ratify the 

Kyoto Protocol and so is not trying to reduce emissions in order to comply. During 2008 and 

2009, the EIA estimates that offsets and the costs of not having them, averting what could have 

been a compliance crisis. 

lem for CDM offsets has been that in order to maintain environmental integrity, a 

relatively complex regulatory system has been required. The CDM system works by 

first requiring that a project apply for registration, after which it operates, producing emission reductions. Reductions claimed by a project are then audited by an 

accredited third-party verifier. Only after this verification can an offset project 

owner apply for issuance of credits that can be used for compliance purposes. The 

ACES offset program is designed to operate in a similar fashion.5

In practice in the CDM, this process has proven fraught with delay such that the 

number of issued credits is far lower than had been expected or has been promised 

in offset project application documents. Estimates vary depending on methodologies 

used to assess project and country risk, but expected deliveries of CDM credits were 

on the order of billions of tons. To the end of date, in 5 years, the program has produced just over 300 million offsets (See Figure 2)6. Further, the rate of issuance, 

which increased through the early phases of the program, has recently stabilized at 

about 12 million offsets per month (See Figure 3). At this rate, the CDM will issue 

just 800 million tons of offsets by the end of the Kyoto Protocol compliance period 

in 2012. This slow rate of issuance has been caused largely by the need to carefully 

check issuance requests prior to issuance because of concerns about environmental 

integrity. Because each request and audit trail must be checked individually before 

approval, this is not an area where significant economies of scale have been found. 

Instead, issuance has emerged as perhaps the most significant bottleneck in the 

CDM process. 

Furthermore, the composition of the projects generating credits is strongly biased 

towards those that generate large numbers of credits. This reduces the number of 

requests for issuance that must be reviewed by the CDM. Thus the current rate of 

issuance is probably unrealistically fast relative to the entire universe of offset 

projects. Shown in red in Figure 2 are the industrial gas capture projects, which 

have generated more than 70% of the issued credits to date. These offset projects 

capture high global warming potential gases at industrial facilities. Because each 

ton of high GWP gas is worth between 310 and 11,700 times a ton of carbon dioxide, 

these projects generate enormous volumes of credits. Industrial gas projects greatly 

simplify the workload for the CDM, since a few large issuances from these projects 

make up most of the issuance request throughput. Unfortunately, these are unlikely 

to be representative of either the future of the CDM or of any other large offset system. Because these projects are highly profitable, there is essentially complete global participation on the part of the eligible industries.7 The remainder of projects in 

the CDM portfolio or in any other potential offset portfolio will be significantly 

smaller in scale and so require proportionately more work on the part of regulators 

to process.8

Whatever the ultimate issuance rate achieved by the CDM, one thing the system 

has made clear is that actually producing compliance grade offsets is a complex and 

time consuming regulatory undertaking. Building the regulatory apparatus for the 

CDM has proven quite challenging, especially as concerns about quality have caused 

greater scrutiny to be applied to each project registration and request for issuance. 

This scrutiny takes time and leads to delays and hence a slower than anticipated 

production rate of offsets. Luckily for those nations and firms otherwise dependent 

on the CDM for cost containment of their Kyoto Protocol compliance obligation, the 

global recession, by reducing economic activity, substantially lowered emissions.9

This in turn has greatly reduced the need for 

4. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CDM EXAMPLE FOR ACES

The CDM is the carbon offset system about which we know the most. But how 

relevant is experience gained under the Kyoto Protocol to the ACES offset program? 

I believe that the lessons presented above, of difficulty telling good from bad credits, 
20 

10See, Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Analysis of the American Clean Energy and 

Security Act of 2009: HR 2454 in the 111th Congress (Jun 23, 2009); 11 ACES supra note 1, §§751–756. 12 ACES supra note 1, §§501–511. 13 ACES supra note 1, §§731, 739, 509, 531. 14 EPA supra note 9; Congressional Budget Office, Economic and Budget Issue Brief: The Use 

of Offsets to Reduce Greenhouse Gases (August 3, 2009); Energy Information Administration, 

Energy Market and Economic Impacts of H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security 

Act of 2009 (Aug. 4, 2009). 15 Ibid. 

and of the challenges of producing adequate supplies of credits, are likely to be highly relevant to an offset program of the scale contemplated by ACES. 

No offsets system, including the CDM or ACES, can avoid the problem of establishing emissions baselines against which actual emissions are judged. The CDM 

has illustrated the difficulty of this task. By 2020, the ACES offset program would 

likely be approximately 20 times the size of the current CDM, if measured in terms 

of issuance rate (See figure 3).10 Extrapolating from the relatively small size of the 

CDM to the much larger ACES program is necessarily uncertain. This is especially 

the case because ACES contains provisions for both a large international forestry 

offsets program11 as well as a large domestic agricultural and forestry offsets program.12 Also, ACES incorporates numerous provisions aimed at improving the quality of its offsets program compared to the CDM.13 Nevertheless, the fundamental 

conceptual and administrative challenges that have confronted the CDM are unlikely to be absent from an ACES or ACES-like offset program. Such a program will 

struggle to create offsets of undisputed high quality because of difficult baseline determination problems, both in domestic agricultural and forestry settings and in the 

international regime. Finally, it will have to confront the reality that its 

rulemakings are potentially subject to challenge in court. The CDM Executive Board 

faces no such scrutiny of its decisions, or potential source of delay, in its implementation. 

In addition, the ACES capandtrade program is, far more than the EU ETS, dependent on offsets both for costcontrol and for environmental effectiveness. Most 

analyses of the bill indicate that allowance prices will approximately double in the 

absence of a ready supply of offsets.14 In its analyses of the bill, EPA estimates that 

less than 50% of emission reductions that occur due to its enactment will be in 

capped sectors prior to 2030 (See Figure 4). That is, the majority of the bill’s environmental impact hinges on the offsets program having superb environmental quality. If not, then emissions will occur under the cap and be covered by offset credits 

that due not represent real world reductions. In order to accomplish this objective, 

the ACES offset program, both international and domestic, will have to accomplish 

a far higher level of environmental oversight than has proven possible, even with 

the best intentions, within the CDM. 

In order to avoid chronic shortages of credits, and consequently very high allowance prices for covered entities, USDA and EPA will have to accomplish more stringent environmental review of offsets at a much faster rate than the CDM—at least 

20 times the speed of the current CDM. All economic analyses of the bill suggest 

that its’ costs will nearly double if offset supply is significantly constrained or delayed.15 Failure to accomplish this issuance rate might both cause undue harm to 

the US economy and undermine long-term support for the ACES program. In the 

event that offset supply proves lower than expected under ACES, the EPA and 

USDA will come under tremendous pressure to lower standards in order to increase 

the rate of supply of new offsets into the US emissions trading market. The dependence of ACES on offsets thus exposes it to significant risks. Either that insufficient 

offset supply will drive a reduction in standards or, if the regulator is unwilling to 

increase supply in this way (or cannot on the timescale the health of the US economy demands) the undermining of political support for continued implementation. 

THE ADVANTAGES OF A PRICE COLLAR OVER OFFSETS FOR COST-CONTROL

A price collar or symmetric safety valve sets a reliable and simple upper and 

lower bound on allowance prices in a cap and trade system. A price collar places 

a hard and certain limit beyond which US permit prices would not fluctuate. These 

trigger points would increase each year at a predetermined rate in excess of inflation over the life of the program. Operating such a system would be relatively 

straightforward compared to the complexity of a high quality offsets system. If allowance prices exceeded the price ceiling, the government would sell allowances into 

the market until the price fell below the ceiling. All allowance auctions would be 

held with a reserve price such that no allowances would enter the market at a price 
21 

16The computed general equilibrium and energy system models used to estimate future allowance price and program costs are likely far more reliable at estimating differences between policies than absolute costs. For example, estimates of the difference between a case with offsets 

and without offsets is likely more informative than an estimate of the absolute cost of either. 17 A lack of quantity certainty is also the major criticism of carbon taxes. 

below the floor. If an exogenous shock caused prices in the secondary market for 

allowances to fall below the floor, the government could respond by reducing the 

number of allowances released for auction at regularly scheduled intervals until the 

price stabilized at the desired level. 

The history of emissions trading schemes indicates that ex ante predictions of permit prices are generally inaccurate and biased toward overestimation of cost. Experience with cap-and-trade programs to date indicates that a lower bound on prices 

is as important as an upper bound. The US Acid Rain Trading Program (ARTP), 

the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM), and the EU ETS have, more 

often than not, exhibited prices far below marginal abatement costs predicted prior 

to their enactment. In the ARTP case, this was because abatement costs were in 

fact far lower than predicted. For RECLAIM, the problem was early overallocation 

of allowances. In the EU ETS case, this was because of over-allocation in the first 

phase of trading (2005-2007) and due to recession in the second (2008-present). All 

three emissions trading markets have also experienced relatively brief periods of 

very high prices. The truth is that because we don’t know with much certainty what 

marginal abatement costs will be under cap and trade, what fuel prices will be, and 

the future trajectory of GDP, it is impossible to predict with any accuracy or precision what allowance prices will be. Pretending otherwise is a misuse of the models 

used to estimate differences between policy outcomes.16

A symmetric safety valve provides reliable costcontainment for covered entities 

planning for compliance with a capandtrade system. In theory, offsets provide a solution for firms worried about the costs of compliance with cap-andtrade. In practice 

as described above, the biggest carbon offset market has been unable to provide either cost-containment or the environmental integrity required to ensure quantity 

certainty. Further, there is little reason to believe that the causes of this failure can 

be avoided under ACES. In contrast, a safety valve, because it responds directly to 

the price of allowances, provides far greater certainty that costs will not exceed a 

particular level during any given compliance period. Especially under a program 

like ACES that provides emissions targets until the mid-twentyfirst century, such 

cost certainty allows for sound long-term investment planning on the part of 

vertically integrated utilities and merchant generators. In Europe under the EU 

ETS, it has proven very difficult for utilities to plan for new generation when there 

is tremendous uncertainty as to the carbon price. Such planning certainty is an important policy objective of any US climate program and a key prerequisite to charting a secure, clean, and low-carbon US energy future. 

A symmetric safety valve will also provide a reliable minimum price for allowances that will enable firms to confidently make investments in new pollution reduction technologies. The history of cap-and-trade programs is as much a story of prices 

that fell below expectation as above. This result has led the clean-tech start-ups 

that create and venture capital firms that fund new energy technologies to ignore 

carbon prices when planning and investing. A price collar that provides long-term 

certainty as to the minimum price of allowances in a US cap-and-trade would allow 

the innovative firms to count on a certain level of advantage relative to traditional 

fossil generation technologies. Providing this minimum certainty would allow 

startups to more fully capitalize on the societal benefits that their new low-carbon 

technologies will provide. As a consequence, a price floor would increase the provision of these technologies to the US economy, increase the number of green jobs created by a US climate program, and help to position the US as a leader in the global 

energy revolution. 

While a price collar does not provide absolute certainty of emissions limits, neither would a realworld carbon offset system. It’s important to emphasize what is 

not given up in the choice of cost-containment strategy. The main criticism of symmetric safety-valve proposals is that they do not provide quantity certainty for climate policy.17 That is, they do not pretend to provide certainty as to the level of 

pollution that will be allowed in any given year. As has been shown above, offset 

systems promise to provide this certainty, but in practice fail to do so. Thus the 

choice between quantity certainty under a cap, trade, and offset system like ACES 

and quantity uncertainty under cap-and-trade with a price collar is in reality, a 

false choice—neither approach can provide both cost containment and certainty as 

to the maximum pollution level. In fact, given the low allowance price history of 

emissions trading programs, it is at least likely that a price collar would provide 
22 

18See, Michael Wara, Is the Global Carbon Market Working?, 445 Nature 559 (Feb. 8, 2007). 19See, McKinsey & Company, Pathways to a Low Carbon Economy (Jan. 2009). 

superior environmental results due to its ability to reduce the supply of allowances 

when prices fall too far. 

6. REVENUES FROM A PRICE COLLAR COULD FUND ADDITIONAL COST-EFFECTIVE

REDUCTIONS

In the event that prices within a US capandtrade program exceed expectations 

and so trigger the safety valve, revenues raised from the auction of extra allowances 

could be used to accomplish many of the benefits promised by offsets. One of the 

key benefits of offsets is that they extend incentives to reduce emissions beyond the 

scope of sectors covered by the cap. Offsets create a potential financial benefit for 

reductions in uncapped sectors, such as agriculture, or uncapped jurisdictions, such 

as Brazil, to reduce GHG pollution even though they are not required to do so. This 

benefit need not be sacrificed just because offsets are not relied upon for cost-containment. The simple solution is to dedicate revenues raised by the price collar to 

reductions outside of the cap. 

Any revenues generated by a safety valve should be deposited into a Climate 

Trust Fund (CTF) dedicated to reducing emissions outside of the cap. Such a trust 

fund could be utilized as a source of funding to assist the agricultural and forestry 

sectors in reducing their emissions or to assist developing countries in doing the 

same. These goals might be accomplished via payment for the cost of particular activities that are known to result in lowered emissions or via open requests for proposal for emission reduction activities. 

Administration of an agricultural and forestry emissions reduction program by a 

CTF would be far simpler than via offsets. The two great challenges of administering an agricultural offset program are measurement and permanence. A CTF 

administered system, because it is not linked to an emissions trading market greatly simplifies both. Measurement of carbon emissions of similar accuracy and precision to covered sources is difficult and costly to accomplish on farms and in forests. 

At the same time, permanence looms large for sequestration based offsets because 

reversals threaten the integrity of the cap. In contrast, a CTF could handle both 

issues more flexibly and could more realistically shape an emissions reduction program to fit the needs and capabilities of both US farms and forests. A CTF would 

enable society to capture greater benefits from the contributions that farms and forests have to make towards reducing emissions while also simplifying the process of 

farmers and foresters gaining credit for their actions. 

Administration of a CTF would allow for far greater costeffectiveness in an international emissions reduction program. One of the major criticisms leveled at the 

CDM has been that most of the reductions in GHG emissions it has produced could 

have been had at far lower prices.18 Careful study of the emission reduction opportunities available at lowest cost in developing countries shows that these are accessible via good regulatory design and effective implementation in areas like building 

standards, industrial efficiency, and appliance energy efficiency.19 These are areas 

that are typically inaccessible to carbon offsets because regulations are part of the 

emissions baseline, because results are nearly impossible to quantify with sufficient 

certainty for offset creation, and because there is unclear title to the emissions reductions. A CTF could more easily realize these key emission reduction strategies, 

available at a cost far below the likely price of emissions in the US capand-trade 

market, without concern for what was or was not a part of the regulatory baseline. 

Indeed, the goal of a CTF would be to shape this baseline in ways that drive largescale change. Further, a CTF, because not tied to an emissions trading market, 

would be free to grasp such low-cost solutions without the need for strict quantification and clarity of ownership. In sum, a CTF, freed from the strictures of an offset 

market, could produce greater reductions at lower cost. 

7. CONCLUSIONS

A price collar will provide superior cost-containment for a US cap-and-trade system compared to offsets along a wide variety of dimensions. 

Experience with the CDM has shown that large compliance grade offset markets 

fail to provide either adequate environmental integrity or a sufficient supply of offsets. The former results in substantial doubt as to the reality of reductions promised 

by the cap on emissions; the latter in significant cost uncertainty for the program. 

A symmetric safety valve, by creating certainty as to the range of possible allowance prices allows firms to plan for a worst case compliance situation while allowing 

new technologies to fully capitalize on a minimum guaranteed return from the car-
23 

bon market. It also insures that if estimates of program costs turn out to be lower 

than expected, extra emissions reductions can be wrung from the capped sectors. 

This insures that the political calculus of costs and benefits central to the enactment 

of the program is in fact realized in practice. 

Revenues raised from the safety valve, assuming that it is employed, invested via 

a Climate Trust Fund, could be used to create a domestic agricultural and forest 

GHG pollution reduction program that better matches the needs and capabilities of 

these sectors. These funds could also be used to access the very low-cost emission 

reduction opportunities available from energy efficiency of buildings, appliances, and 

industry in the developing world. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Mason, go right ahead. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH R. MASON, PH.D., PROFESSOR, 

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY, BATON ROUGE, LA 

Mr. MASON. Thank you, Chairman Bingaman, Senator Murkowski and members of the committee for inviting me to testify 

today. 

The two major schools of thought among academics studying how 

to limit climate change are delineated primarily by whether policymakers should control either the quantity of carbon emissions via 

cap and trade policies or the price of carbon emissions via taxes. 

Theoretical economic models have been developed to support cap 

and trade. But those models of cap and trade dominate taxation 

only when optimal banking and borrowing are assumed to occur. 

The problem is that the economists advocating such banking and 

borrowing strategies are public choice economists, not monetary or 

financial economists. In practice banking and borrowing is implemented even at a relatively well understood realm of monetary policy is rarely optimal. Monetary policy uses tools like discount window borrowing, reserve requirements and quantity constraints to 

manipulate the supply of contraction order to affect economic 

growth. 

Analogous policy tools are proposed for carbon permits. But contemporary carbon market proposals rarely acknowledge the limits 

of those policy tools which are described in more detail in my 

longer written testimony which I’d like to ask to be included in the 

record. For the moment let’s clarify. Borrowing doesn’t work for 

monetary policy. So why should it be expected to work for carbon 

contracts. 

The clearest advice that’s ever been given for managing discount 

window borrowing in the banking sector is Bagehot’s Rule which 

suggests that liquidity crises should be addressed by ‘‘lending freely 

at a penalty rate.’’ Of course operationalizing Bagehot’s Rule in 

monetary policy has been tricky. What constitutes a crisis? What 

constitutes lending freely? What’s a penalty rate? 

Environmental authors therefore routinely make it seem like 

they can freely adopt a readymade policy that has in fact not yet 

been invented for hundreds of years. Reserve requirements help 

stabilize banks, but are not used to actively manipulate monetary 

policy. The problem is that reserve requirement manipulations require every bank, irrespective of its resources, to expand or more 

importantly contract reserves by a fixed amount to meet policy 

goals. 

Seeing reserve policy is too blunt the Federal Reserve moved 

away from actively using reserve requirements for policy purposes 
24 

in the 1950s. Reserve requirements are not considered a realistic 

central bank policy tool. Are probably too heavy handed for environmental policy as well. 

Open market operations are the current vanguard of monetary 

policy. But the effects and limits of open market operations are still 

largely unknown. Modern central banks influence markets primarily by purchasing and selling key market instrument, thereby 

affecting the supply of money and secondarily the price that is interest rates. 

The supply of money related to consumption demand is the most 

important for driving economic growth, the ultimate target variable 

of monetary policy. If money that is injected through open market 

operations however is merely absorbed by investment or speculative demand it doesn’t drive growth as directly as does consumption. When the money is merely held in excess reserves equivalent 

to stuffing money in the mattress the link between open market operations and economic growth breaks down completely which can 

create a liquidity trap. 

Academic proposal for carbon market designs have acknowledged 

difficulties dealing with these competing demands even if they 

haven’t yet formally adopted the vocabulary of monetary economics. 

For instance the ability to bank carbon permits may create a political problem akin to ‘‘undo wealth accumulation’’ or ‘‘hoarding’’ 

when some firms have a large residual supply of permits on hold. 

The second, some say greater problem, is that firms with large 

banked permit resources could corner markets and drive up prices. 

The risk lies in the way that some authors think of rectifying the 

problems. The simplest proposals call for an expiration date on the 

permits much like how Zimbabwe and other dysfunctional developing countries impose expiration dates on their currencies. Others 

suggest imposing more stringent project requirements on firms 

with greater wealth in terms of these banked permits. 

Even environmental authors like Murray Newell and Pizer admit 

that permit demand function is largely unknown. ‘‘There’s little 

evidence concerning how large of an allowance banked firms might 

accumulate. It could in fact be much larger than 1 year’s worth of 

allowances. How fast they might spend it down and in turn how 

much this might affect any future tightening of a cap.’’ Those are 

crucial unknowns for a system that will be so inextricably tied to 

U.S. economic growth. 

At the end of the day the situation is even more simple. Manipulating carbon permit supply via something that has at times been 

called a carbon market efficiency board that is charged with restraining emissions without unduly harming economic growth necessarily decreases the benefit certainty that is the hallmark of cap 

and trade. Without that benefit certainty the convoluted carbon 

permit market design and risk of market collapse is both theoretically and practically unnecessary because at the extreme if the carbon market efficiency board works. They peg the price of carbon 

while allowing benefits to fluctuate you get exactly the same result 

that you’d get from a carbon tax. 

So there’s no need to develop this plethora of complex institutions to get the same result. In fact, worse yet, history is rife with 

examples that suggest borrowing economic institutions from one 
25 

1 Related research has also been conducted to examine the political development of environmental regulation, the interaction between state and federal pollution control policies, and avenues of future positive research. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn, Sheila M. Olmstead, & Robert N. 

Stavins, Environmental Regulation During the 1990s: A Retrospective Analysis, 27 Harvard Environmental L. Rev. 377 (2003) (discussing the political and economic development of thought 

on environmental policies during the 1990s); Meghan McGuinness & A. Denny Ellerman, ‘‘The 

Effects of Interactions between Federal and State Climate Policies,’’ Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research Working Paper, May 2008 (exploring the interplay between state 

and federal policymaking); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: Integrating Theory and Practice, 82 AEA Papers and Proceedings 464 

(1992) (exploring avenues of research). 2Weitzman’s seminal work was among the first to examine the dichotomy between price-based 

and quantity-based pollution regulations. See Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 

Rev. Econ. Studies 477 (1974). 3 A discussion of both the cap and trade and tax approaches to pollution abatement is available in William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy (Cambridge 

University Press, 2d ed. 1988). 4See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: Why 

a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming Than Cap and Trade, 28 Stanford Environmental L. J. 3, 8 (2009), and Robert N. Stavins, Addressing Climate Change with a Comprehensive U.S. Cap and Trade System, 24 Oxford Rev. Econ. Policy 2 (2008). For related work, 

see Nicholas Brozovic, Prices vs. Quantities Reconsidered, University of California Working 

Paper, Sept. 12, 2002; James K. Boyce & Matthew Riddle, Cap and Dividend: How to Curb Global Warming while Protecting the Incomes of American Families, Political Economy Research Institute Working Paper, Nov. 2007; Sergey Paltsev, John M. Reilly, Henry D. Jacoby, Angelo C. 

Continued 

setting for use in another and rarely works. So I expect similar outcomes for central bank features applied to nascent carbon markets, 

especially when a tax can achieve the same goal of price certainty. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mason follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH R. MASON, PH.D., PROFESSOR, LOUISIANA STATE

UNIVERSITY, BATON ROUGE, LA 

THE ECONOMIC POLICY RISKS OF CAP AND TRADE MARKETS FOR CARBON EMISSIONS: A

MONETARY ECONOMIST’S VIEW OF CAP AND TRADE MARKET AND CARBON MARKET EF- FICIENCY BOARD DESIGNS

ABSTRACT

The two major schools of thought among academics studying how to limit climate 

change are delineated primarily by whether policymakers should control (1) the 

quantity of emissions via cap and trade policies or (2) the price of carbon emissions 

via direct taxation. The lack of theoretical ‘‘fit’’ between carbon pollutants and cap 

and trade, however, has given rise to notions of a management board design that 

can manipulate the carbon market to achieve the economic ideal. The idea is that 

something like a central bank, most recently referred to as a ‘‘Carbon Market Efficiency Board,’’ in the U.S., can manipulate contract supply, smoothing price volatility and dynamically adjusting carbon permit supply to policy goals. But manipulating carbon permit supply via a Carbon Market Efficiency Board that is charged 

with restraining emissions without unduly harming economic growth necessarily decreases the benefit certainty that is the hallmark of cap and trade. Without that 

benefit certainty, the convoluted carbon permit market design and risk of market 

collapse is both theoretically and practically unnecessary. At the extreme, the Carbon Market Efficiency Board pegs the price of carbon while allowing benefits to fluctuate, which is exactly the result of a carbon tax. 

Recent scholarship on climate change begins with the assumption that some adjustment mechanism is needed to limit carbon emissions.1 There are two major 

schools of thought among academics studying how to limit climate change.2 They 

are delineated primarily by whether policy-makers should control (1) the quantity 

or (2) the price of carbon emissions. The first school is commonly associated with 

command-and-control ‘‘cap and trade’’ policies, whereas the second school is usually 

associated with incentive-based carbon taxes.3

Cap and trade, as its name suggests, focuses on achieving an absolute cap on carbon emissions using special tradable carbon emissions permits. Policymakers control 

the total number of permits, so that total emissions can be set by fiat. Many policymakers and environmental theorists believe that cap and trade provides ‘‘benefit 

certainty’’ because it achieves a hard cap on carbon emissions.4
26 

Gurgel, Gilbert E. Metcalf, Andrei P. Sokolov, & Jennifer F. Holak, Assessment of U.S. Cap and 

Trade Proposals, MIT Global Science Policy Change Report No. 146, Apr. 2007; Richard G. Newell, Adam B. Jaffe, & Robert N. Stavins, The Effects of Economic and Policy Incentives on Carbon Mitigation Technologies, 28 Energy Econ. 563 (2006). 5William D. Nordhaus, A Question of Balance: Economic Modeling of Global Warming 202 

(2008). Karen Palmer, Dallas Burtraw, & Danny Kahn, Simple Rules for Targeting CO2 Allowance Allocations to Compensate Firms, Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 06-27, June 

2006, at 8 (‘‘This part argues that both a carbon tax and a cap and trade system incorporate 

the necessary carbon price signal, with a tax offering ‘price certainty’ and cap and trade offering 

‘‘benefit certainty,’’ but asserts that a carbon tax would be simpler to implement, more transparent, and less vulnerable to abuse.’’). 6See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra at 42. 

7 Roberton C. Williams III, Prices vs. Quantities vs. Tradable Quantities, NBER Working 

Paper 9283, Oct. 2002. 8 Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance 56 (McGraw-Hill Irwin 7th ed, 2005). See also Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 Rev. Econ. Stat. 387-89 (1954), and Baumol 

& Oates, Environmental Policy, supra at 14-20. 

* Figures 1–4 have been retained in committee files. 

The primary alternative to the cap and trade scheme is the flat ‘‘carbon tax’’ proposal, which sets a stable positive price for carbon emissions. Proponents believe 

that this price based mechanism provides greater policymaking flexibility.5 The 

‘‘price certainty’’ arising from a carbon tax would allow businesses to plan efficiently, because an increase in the tax rate beyond any foreseen adjustment would 

require a vote in Congress that would adjust only slowly, better smoothing business 

investment plans, employment, and economic growth.6

The economic debate has led researchers to theoretically describe conditions under 

which a cap and trade approach is more efficient than a carbon tax.7 Section I describes the economic foundations of cap and trade. While cap and trade can work 

for some pollutants, applications to carbon are less than ideal. 

Section II goes on to introduce the experience with cap and trade using carbon 

contracts to date. Even though active markets for such contracts have begun to 

trade in Europe, the contract mechanisms and price dynamics do not fit any traditional financial economic contract design. Uncertainty about the nature of the contracts has therefore led to tremendous price volatility on European markets that 

threatens the viability of that system. 

Environmental researchers and public policy economists have more recently argued that the lack of theoretical ‘‘fit’’ between carbon pollutants and cap and trade 

and the problems with European carbon price volatility can be overcome by implementing a management board design. The idea is that something like a central 

bank, most recently referred to as a ‘‘Carbon Market Efficiency Board,’’ in the U.S., 

can manipulate contract supply, smoothing price volatility and dynamically adjusting carbon permit supply to policy goals. Section III, therefore, frankly discusses 

problems of managing central bank policy that are still unresolved after hundreds 

of years of monetary economics research and policy application. Hence, manipulating carbon permits’ supply to restrain emissions without harming economic 

growth necessarily undermines the benefit certainty that is the hallmark of cap and 

trade policy, decreasing cap and trade efficiencies to levels no better than—and perhaps worse than—a simple carbon tax. Section IV provides a summary and a policy 

recommendation of a carbon tax as the most effective and efficient approach to pollution abatement. 

I. CAP AND TRADE POLICY VASTLY OVERSIMPLIFIES A TREMENDOUSLY COMPLEX

MARKET-BASED ECONOMIC THEORY

Economists first suggested cap and trade as an alternative to levying usage taxes 

to curb privately beneficial but socially undesirable action. In economic terms, the 

goal of both measures is to curb a recognized and measurable externality.8

Public finance, and more specifically the sub-discipline of environmental economics, defines the theoretical optimality of the choice between cap and trade and abatement taxes. The optimal level of emissions is found in Figure 1* at the intersection 

of the marginal costs with the marginal benefits of pollution abatement. Figure 1 

graphically depicts the intersection of these two curves and the resulting socially optimal equilibrium in the market. 

In Figure 1, the horizontal axis indicates the amount by which emissions are reduced relative to their unregulated level, while the vertical axis represents the value 

society derives from reduced emissions measured in dollars. The curve labeled MB 

represents that marginal benefit to society of pollution abatement—that is, the additional value to society derived from an incremental increase in pollution abatement 

above and beyond the pollution that has already been eliminated up to that point. 
27 

9 Baumol & Oates, Environmental Policy, supra at 59. 

10 Id. 11 Baumol & Oates, Environmental Policy, supra at 74. 12 Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra at 36. 13The Federal Reserve’s policy toward daylight overdrafts provides an example of how a small 

change in policy can have a dramatic effect on economic activity. A daylight overdraft occurs 

when a bank transfers funds that exceed its reserve balance at a Federal Reserve Bank early 

in the day and then eliminates the overdraft before the end of the banking day. In this manner, 

daylight overdrafts serve as intraday credit for banks. To curb daylight overdrafts, the Fed imposed a small fee on this activity in 1994. Originally, the Fed planned to double this fee in 1995 

and increase it again in 1996. However, the Fed ultimately decided to increase the fee by 50 

percent in 1995 and then monitor activity for two years before taking further action. (Heidi 

Willmann Richards, Daylight Overdraft Fees and the Federal Reserve’s Payment System Risk 

Policy, Federal Reserve Bulletin (Dec. 1995)). No additional increases were made, as the small 

fee sufficiently reduced overdrafts to manageable levels. 

Another example of the implementation of a small cost by policymakers resulting in a dramatic shift in economic behavior exists within the design of spectrum auctions in the United 

States. In early auctions, the Federal Communications Commission did not apply a fee to bid 

withdrawals that occurred during the auction. As a result, withdrawals were frequent, as bidders used them to signal one another in an effort to divide up the market at low prices. To curb 

this activity, the FCC imposed a relatively small fee on withdrawals. The result was a dramatic 

decline in the number of withdrawals in spectrum auctions. (For example, there were more than 

780 withdrawals during the FCC DEF block auction in 1996. By contrast, there were only 16 

withdrawals during the AWS-1 auction in 2006, which occurred years after the FCC imposed 

only a small fee on withdrawals. Data on prior FCC auctions is downloadable from the FCC’s 

website at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auctionslhome.) The experience in 

FCC auctions again shows that the imposition of only small costs on an activity that is deemed 

undesirable can have large effects on the market. Such examples suggest that imposing a usage 

tax on carbon emissions rather than cap and trade may have immediate and profound effects 

on emissions while helping policymakers better understand the effect of environmental policy 

on economic behavior. 

The curve has a downward slope because ‘‘the greater the degree of purity of air 

or water that has already been achieved, the less the marginal benefit of a further 

‘unit’ of purification.’’9 The curve labeled MAC represents the scarce resources society must expend to precipitate an incremental increase in pollution abatement 

above and beyond the pollution that has already been eliminated up to that point. 

The curve has an upward slope ‘‘because of the rising cost of further abatement as 

the zero emissions point is approached.’’10 The optimal level of pollution abatement 

is represented graphically at the point where the MAC curve and the MB curve 

intersect. Conceptually, this point is optimal because at this level of pollution abatement, represented by Q*, society has maximized the value of abatement relative to 

the cost of using society’s scarce resources to further cleanse the environment, represented by P*. 

An important point to note about the result presented in Figure 1 is that the optimal outcome can be achieved either through cap and trade or through a pollution 

charge. Specifically, capping the amount of emissions that can be produced at Q* 

results in the equality of marginal abatement costs and the marginal benefits of 

abatement. On the other hand, by creating a charge of P* for every unit of carbon 

that is emitted, producers have incentive to reduce emissions by Q* units of carbon. 

Specifically, because P* lies above the cost of reducing emissions for all points to 

the left of Q*, it is less costly to simply reduce pollutants by Q* than to pay the 

tax. Therefore, an emissions charge of P* has the same effect on the market as an 

emissions cap that results in emissions abatement of Q*. 

In reality, once P or Q is set as a policy variable, MAC and MB can fluctuate, 

similar to supply and demand curves. Hence, when setting P, Q may fluctuate due 

to market and other economic forces. Similarly, setting Q will result in P fluctuating 

due to similar influences. Setting either costs (P) or benefits (Q) with certainty is 

key to the environmental debate around carbon policy. 

It is not clear, from a purely theoretical basis, whether cost certainty or benefit 

certainty is more important in the carbon abatement debate. Some scholars have 

argued that a focus on benefit certainty is superior because it puts the emphasis 

on the environment rather than on the economics.11 But it could also be argued that 

the benefits of any policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are worldwide, while 

the cost of any policy adopted by the United States will be confined to the United 

States.12 Moreover, small taxes can have disproportionately large effects on economic behavior. As a result, a cap and trade system may, with perfect hindsight, 

be overkill, were a moderate tax on emissions found to achieve substantial effect.13

The negative consequences of environmental advocates capturing cap and trade 

programs are likely to be exacerbated by Wall Street investment firms. A recent article in Environment: Yale Magazine quotes Peter Fusaro, an energy consultant, 
28 

14See Richard Conniff, Wall Street’s Carbon Conversion, Environment: Yale Magazine 7 

(2008). 15See, e.g., generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press 

Revised ed. 1971); James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical 

Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (University of Michigan Press 1962). 16See Phil Kerpen, Cap and Trade for AIG?, Washington Times, Mar. 25, 2009, available at 

http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/mar/25/cap-and-trade-for-aig. 17 Id. 18See Peter Markussen & Gert Tinggaard Svedsen, Industry Lobbying and the Political Economy of GHG Trade in the European Union, 33 Energy Policy 245 (2005). 

who notes the climate change finance sector includes 90 hedge funds and 80 private 

equity funds, in addition to a large number of venture capitalists. Fusaro maintains, 

‘‘It’s the most complex financial market ever created.’’ Fusaro counts 38 distinct 

markets in the United States dealing in everything from acid rain emissions permits 

to California’s mobile emissions reductions credits—that is, credits for reducing tailpipe exhaust. Mutual funds and ETFs (exchange-traded funds) specializing in climate change issues have sprung up in Europe and the United States. Nonetheless, 

in 2007, $64 billion in assets was traded on the global carbon market, and in 2008 

that number was projected to exceed $100 billion.14

Of course, there is nothing wrong with financial firms profiting from making markets for stocks, bonds, and other valuable commodities. However, when a market 

is created and operated according to government fiat, it is all but certain that vested 

interests, financial firms that operate and make markets in this case, will lobby for 

socially inefficient provisions that increase their profits to the detriment of society 

as a whole. This phenomenon, where well-coordinated interest groups manipulate 

government programs meant to provide for the common good, is known as public 

choice theory.15

As far as cap and trade proposals are concerned, both Wall Street investment 

firms and environmentalists have similar goals—to restrict the number of carbon 

permits such that marginal cost to society of pollution abatement exceeds its social 

benefit. Environmentalists’ motivations are obvious. What is less apparent in the 

emotion of the environmental debate is the fact that financial firms that make markets for tradable pollution permits will be able to make higher commissions the 

scarcer the permits are. An alliance between environmentalists and Wall Street presents a particularly intractable problem as far as public choice theory is concerned. 

The empirical evidence indicates that these public choice concerns are well-founded. Indeed, two companies infamously associated with corporate malfeasance and financial manipulation, Enron and AIG, both lobbied for cap and trade programs so 

that they could reap profits by making markets for the permits.16 In 2007, Martin 

Sullivan, CEO of AIG at the time, explained that the firm would seek to ‘‘help shape 

a broad-based cap and trade legislative proposal, bringing to this critical endeavor 

a unique business perspective on the business opportunities and risks that climate 

change poses for our industry.’’17 Although systematic academic analysis of nascent 

cap and trade programs is only beginning, the initial results suggest that special 

interests have succeeded in ‘‘capturing’’ the European program. Looking at the 

greenhouse gas (GHG) market, a recent article in the journal Energy Policy concluded ‘‘Here, we find that the dominant interest groups indeed influenced the final 

design of an EU GHG market.’’18

II. CAP AND TRADE CONTRACTS ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO NUMEROUS PRICING ANOMALIES

THAT REMAIN TO BE UNDERSTOOD

A significant problem with cap and trade that has become apparent in recent 

years is that carbon prices under cap and trade systems have been far more volatile 

than originally envisioned. Part of the problem is related to carbon permit demand 

that fluctuates with weather conditions that are highly correlated with electric 

power generation. Furthermore, although monetizing and trading in various assets 

and commodities often helps to improve economic efficiency, financial market applications created additional volatility in carbon permits. 

The underlying problem is that ill-understood pricing anomalies in the price of 

carbon credits have undermined the ability of the market to properly internalize 

both short-and long-term price dynamics. As a result, a firm’s incentives to invest 

significantly in newer, cleaner technologies for the long-term are undermined when 

prices of emissions credits are extremely volatile and therefore cloud longterm price 

signals in the short-term. 

This section summarizes the European experience with cap and trade and reviews 

the complexity of emissions credit valuation and resulting pricing anomalies. As a 
29 

19 Eva Benz & Stefan Tru ̈ ck, Modeling the Price Dynamics of CO2 Emission Allowances, 31 

Energy Economics 11 (2009). 20 Id. at 11-12. 21PointCarbon, Carbon Market Monitor 2005 Review, Jan. 2006, available at: http:// 

www.pointcarbon.com/research/carbonmarketresearch/monitor/. 22 Benz & Truck, supra at 12. 23 Id. at 12-13. 

whole, exhibited anomalies are the result of both weather and political uncertainties 

as well as idiosyncrasies in the carbon permit contract. 

The European Union provides a wealth of information and data on markets that 

have developed from cap and trade programs. In the European Union’s Emissions 

Trading Scheme (‘‘EU ETS’’), both cash and futures contracts are traded in a variety 

of markets. While trade with EU Allowances (EUAs) began in 2003, the official EU 

ETS began in 2005. Prices before 2005 are therefore forward prices on a not-yettraded underlying asset. In the ‘‘pre-2005’’ period, the traded volume was quite low, 

at some days even zero as the highest bidder price was smaller than the lowest seller price. Daily EUA prices between August 27, 2003, and December 29, 2004, before 

agreement on EU-ETS, were generally stable. The price during this entire period 

was stable during any small time window, and fluctuated between 7 and 13 Euros 

over the entire 18-month period, with bid-ask spreads were quite large, often exceeding 4 Euros. By contrast, prices between early 2005 and December 29, 2006, 

fluctuated greatly. Prices spiked at nearly 30 Euros in July 2005 and again in April 

2006, and fell to lows of about 6 Euros by December 2006.19

A review of daily EUA prices shows that prices were increasingly volatile after 

2004. Figure 2 displays daily price and traded volume of futures contracts for December 2009 settlements between February 2006 and December 2008. The data in 

Figure 2 first confirms that the price of carbon futures fell significantly during 2006. 

The price then rose through 2007 and the first half of 2008, but plummeted after 

July 2008. 

Important drivers of the market seem to be a combination of short-run weather 

and political policy announcements rather than any long-term economic fundamentals. Before the EU Parliament agreed on the introduction of the EU ETS in July 

2003 and before the first suggestions for National Allocation Plans (NAPs) were 

published at the end of 2003, prices were stable. Both announcements led to an increase in prices. Because of the initially generous allocation of allowances to the 

countries, prices calmed down again between February and March 2004. Reviewing 

and accepting the NAPs in the second half of the year, prices increased to about 

9 Euros. As the main framework of the trading scheme became defined, the price 

determinants became more fundamental after January 2005.20

Chief among those fundamentals, however, is the weather. For example, prices 

fell due to mild weather and high supply of wind energy from Scandinavia and 

North Germany. At the end of January 2005, cold weather and high gas and oil 

prices in the United Kingdom coupled with low coal prices resulted in a strong price 

increase of EUAs.21 This effect was magnified by a dry summer in July 2005 in 

Southwestern Europe. Low rainfall depleted reserves and prevented full utilization 

of hydroelectric plants. The lack of cooling water for nuclear power plants resulted 

in greater utilization of high-emission-producing assets, which therefore increased 

the demand for carbon permits. By July 2005, prices peaked at 29.15 Euros. During 

the last four months of 2005, prices fell to 22 Euros. By March 2006, however, prices 

again increased to approximately 27 Euros, due to a long and cold winter between 

2005 and 2006.22

May 2006 marked completion of the first full cycle of the EU ETS. By April 2006, 

however, it was apparent that a surplus of allowances of approximately 10 percent 

existed. As a consequence, EUA prices fell by 60 percent within one week, amid 

fears that emissions prices would drop to zero. The EUA market recovered during 

the summer of 2006 as the industrial sector began selling EUAs to utilities investors 

as a dry, hot European summer increased the demand for high-emissions assets.23

The European experience outlined above is important because the primary purpose of a cap and trade-based carbon market is to provide long-term incentives for 

firms to invest in clean-air technologies. Such technologies—nuclear assets or cleanair coal assets, for example—are extremely costly to build, and they are large baseload units that are technologically intensive. Private investment in these types of 

assets only makes sense if the long-term benefits of the investment are clear. With 

carbon permit prices fluctuating wildly, long-term signals regarding the carbon-reducing benefits of investment in clean-air technology are clouded at best and nonexistent at worst. Therefore, it is not apparent that a cap and trade system resulting in a market for carbon permits is helpful in aligning private interests with pol-
30 

24 Id. at 4-15. 25Marc S. Paolella & Luca Taschini, An Econometric Analysis of Emission Trading Allowances, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series (2006) at 5-6. 26 Id. at 13-14. 27 Id. at 14-15. 

icymakers’ long-term goals: the dissemination of technologies that will reduce carbon emissions. 

In fact, numerous asset pricing anomalies can be expected to continue to frustrate 

long-term pricing signals in a market for carbon emissions, in addition to the volatility arising from weather and politics. 

A. While Carbon Permits Are Usually Thought of as a Commodity Contract Because 

the Deliverable Is a Factor of Production, Price Dynamics of the Contracts Are 

Not Those Expected for Commodities 

In many ways, cap and trade emissions contracts are commodity contracts. A commodity contract is a contract to deliver a raw product or primary input such as food, 

metal, or energy. In the case of cap and trade contracts, the deliverable is carbon 

emissions, which is a primary input for production. Emission allowances are classified as ‘‘normal’’ factors of production. Since the allowances are used for production, 

they are removed from the market as they are consumed. Therefore, the right to 

emit carbon can be compared with other commodities that are traditionally used as 

factor inputs in production, and standard commodity pricing models can be applied 

to the carbon emissions market.24

Commodity markets work on a spot and a futures basis. The spot market is the 

market for immediate delivery of the commodity. The futures market is the market 

for delivering the commodity at some point in the future. The futures market is a 

derivatives market, meaning that its value is derived from the current spot market 

for the underlying asset. The spot and futures market for the EU’s current cap and 

trade contracts exists on a number of different commodity exchanges.25 Empirical 

data from these exchanges can show whether the real-world pricing of cap and trade 

contracts conforms to price behavior of other commodities possessing similar characteristics. 

The conditions just described are the result of what are commonly referred to as 

arbitrage conditions. If, for instance, the futures price was above the spot price plus 

storage, arbitrageurs could sell futures and buy on the spot market, storing the commodity for future delivery at a risk-less profit. The opposite also generally holds 

true. 

But in the case of carbon emissions, the optimal level of emissions is stochastic, 

so that a firm’s demand for emissions allowance contracts is also stochastic.26 Because of these uncertainties and costs, a firm benefits from holding an inventory of 

the commodity to hedge against any unexpected higher prices. Therefore, allowances 

for different vintages will have different spot prices at a given point in time. 

In other words, the convenience yield is sufficiently large such that the future 

price is less than the spot price. In addition, the future price decreases as time to 

maturity increases.27

The opposite of a backwardation structure is contango—spot prices are less than 

futures prices. Empirical evidence from the EU carbon market shows that the carbon futures market illustrates characteristics not of backwardation, but of contango, 
31 

28 Id. at 15. 29 Id.; S. Tru ̈ ck, S. Borak, W. Hardle, & R. Weron, Convenience Yields for CO2 Emission Allowance Future Contracts, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia (2006). 30For a primer on financial options, see John Hull, Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives 

6 (Prentice Hall, 6th ed. 2006). 

where spot prices are less than futures prices.28 But the financial economics literature suggests that commodities with contango structures usually have readily 

available inventories that are easily accessed and stored and stable supply and demand functions. Those conditions contradict the performance of carbon markets to 

date. Even if cap and trade contracts have no cost of storage and are easily accessed, 

levels of supply and demand for carbon emissions are not easily predicted. In addition, the level of inventories for cap and trade contracts is dependent on current 

emission levels, which are stochastic and unpredictable. 

Because the empirically observed convenience yield for cap and trade contracts 

does not conform to standard finance theory for commodities, a price analysis based 

on a historically consistent theory of future-spot parity is probably not very useful.29

B. While Carbon Permits Can Be Considered an Option Contract Because the Producer Can Choose Whether to Use the Allowances in Any Given Settlement Period, Price Dynamics of the Contracts Are Not Those Expected for Typical Options 

A futures contract only allows for delivery at a specific date in the future. A carbon contract can be used for production at any time until expiration. A carbon cap 

and trade contract may therefore be more like an option than a future.30 An option 

is a contract between a buyer and a seller that gives the buyer the right, but not 

the obligation, to buy or sell an asset at a specified price on or before a specified 

date. The option to buy an asset is known as a call option, and the right to sell 

an asset is known as a put option. In the context of a carbon market, an emissions 

contract would be similar to a put option, because it allows the contract holder to 

exercise a right to emit carbon during a specific time period. 

A multi-period cap and trade contract can be characterized as a sequence of European put options (options that can be exercised at a specific expiration date in the 

future) that come into effect sequentially through the life of a contract. The decision 

of when to exercise each put option is characterized as a real option, optimal-stopping-time problem, similar to the problem of early exercise on an American option. 

Consistent with common intuition, early exercise is optimal only when the holder’s 

demand for emissions increases. 

One of the most common models to price options is the Black-Scholes model. According to the Black-Scholes valuation model, the value p of a European put on a 

non-dividend-paying asset is estimated by: 

The Black-Scholes model is commonly applied to stock options. Since contracts 

give holders a put option to produce emissions until a given maturity date, the 

Black-Scholes model could similarly be applied to a cap and trade contract. This option can be traded, just as a stock can, and a market participant could value the 

put option using the Black-Scholes model. However, the Black-Scholes model has 

numerous shortcuts and anomalies that limit its use in valuing even common stock 

options. 

Characteristics of the carbon market will most likely reveal further complications 

to the usefulness of the BlackScholes model. The Black-Scholes model for valuing 

options already contains many important limitations. First, the model is only used 

to value an option if it will be exercised at expiration (European options). Therefore, 

it cannot value American options, which can be exercised at any point in time before 

expiration. Second, the model also assumes that the return on the underlying asset 
32 

31See, e.g., B. Mandelbrot, The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices, 36 Journal of Business 394-419 (1963); E. F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock Market Prices, 38 Journal of Business 

34-105 (1965); P. Theodossiou, Financial Data and the Skewed Generalized T Distribution, 44 

Management Science 1650-1661 (1998). 32M. Rubinstein, Implied Binomial Trees, 49 Journal of Finance 771-818 (1994). 

is normally distributed, which may not be the case for carbon emissions, and has 

certainly not been the case for stocks. (Historically, stock market returns have been 

skewed or leptokurtic—exhibiting more returns in the ‘‘tails’’ of the distribution 

than would be found in a normal distribution.)31 Third, the model assumes a constant discount rate, even though the discount rate could change over the life of the 

contract. Fourth, the model assumes a constant volatility of the underlying asset, 

which market experience has already shown to vary substantially over time. 

The empirical literature testing the accuracy of the BlackScholes model is enormous. Although most studies confirm that market prices generally are close to the 

estimates resulting from Black-Scholes, several anomalies have been found. For example, because of the model’s assumption of normally distributed returns when returns are in fact skewed or leptokurtic, Black-Scholes generally undervalues deep 

in-the-money call options (or out-of-the-money put options) and overvalues deep outof-the money call options.32 Figure 3 illustrates the difference between the normal 

distribution assumed by the Black-Scholes model and a skewed leptokurtic distribution that is commonly observed in stock returns. 

As Figure 3 shows, ‘‘distribution B’’—that is, the skewed distribution with thick 

tails—is asymmetric, which leads to deviations from outcomes common to the normal distribution. For example, if both tails in the distribution of asset returns are 

thinner than a normal distribution, then the Black-Scholes model overprices out-ofthe-money and in-the-money calls and puts. If the left tail is fatter, and the right 

tail is thinner, then the Black-Scholes model overprices out-of-the-money calls and 

in-the-money puts, and it underprices out-of-the-money puts and in-the-money calls. 

If the left tail is thinner, and the right tail is fatter, then the Black-Scholes model 

overprices out-of-the-money puts and in-the-money calls, and it underprices inthemoney puts and out-of-the-money calls. If both tails are fatter, then the BlackScholes model underprices out-ofthe-money and in-the-money calls and puts. 

Several alternatives to the Black-Scholes model exist, but they each have their 

own problems. For example, Geske’s compound option model treats the equity in a 

firm as a call option on the value of the firm, making the option an option on an 

option. A second alternative model is the displaced diffusion model, which values an 

option based on the volatility of the percentage of risky assets held by the firm. A 

third alternative, the constant elasticity of variance model, assumes that volatility 

of a firm’s value is a function of its fixed costs, and the volatility of firm value increases when stock prices drop. Each of these three alternative models, however, 

overprices out-of-the-money calls and in-themoney puts, and underprices out-of-themoney puts and in-the-money calls. 

Other alternatives include the pure jump model, which assumes stock prices do 

not change continuously but jump randomly, and the jump diffusion model, which 

puts jumps together with geometric Brownian motion (also called a ‘‘random walk’’). 

However, the pure jump model overprices out-of-themoney puts and in-the-money 

calls, and underprices in-themoney puts and out-of-the-money calls. The jump diffusion model underprices out-of-the-money and in-the-money calls and puts. 

In addition to the established anomalies of Black-Scholes and other models in 

pricing stock options, the market for carbon emissions has its own anomalies that 

complicate the valuation of cap and trade contracts as options. As discussed above, 

cap and trade contracts leave holders with the risk of having too few abatement options at the end of the commitment term when they may need those options. On 

the other hand, a firm that holds more permits than it expects to need may still 

hold onto the surplus because those permits have some option value, given that purchasing options in the future may be costly. Illiquidity arises endogenously from the 

fact that firms cannot emit without having permits and thus fear that they may face 

a market squeeze at the end of the year. The combination of the general anomalies 

of commodities, and options valuation models with the anomalies in the carbon 

emissions market have the capacity to seriously complicate the valuation analysis 

of a cap and trade market. 

C. Exhibited Characteristics of Carbon Permit Prices Confirm That They Are Tremendously Complex Financial Contracts So That Financial Economics Is Unlikely to Find the True Value of ‘‘Cap and Trade’’ Permits 

Emission allowance prices have exhibited periods of high volatility, arising in part 

due to the correlation between CO2 emissions and external events such as seasonal 
33 

33Marc S. Paolella & Luca Taschini, An Econometric Analysis of Emission Trading Allowances, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series (2006), at 5. 34 Id. at 2. 35 Id. at 7-8. 36Marliese Uhrig-Homburg & Michael Wagner, Success Chances and Optimal Design of Derivatives on CO2 Emission Certificates (2006), at 23. 37 Eva Benz & Stefan Tru ̈ ck, Modeling the Price Dynamics of CO2 Emission Allowances, 31 

Energy Econ. 4, 6 (January 2009). 38 Id. 39George Daskalakisa, Dimitris Psychoyiosb, & Raphael N. Markellosa, Modeling CO2 emission allowance prices and derivatives: Evidence from the European trading scheme, J. Banking 

Fin. (forthcoming 2009). 40Marc S. Paolella & Luca Taschini, An Econometric Analysis of Emission Trading Allowances, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series N°06—26, 2006. 41George Daskalakisa, Dimitris Psychoyiosb, & Raphael N. Markellosa, Modeling CO2 emission allowance prices and derivatives: Evidence from the European trading scheme, J. Banking 

Fin. (forthcoming 2009). 42 Jan Seifert, Marliese Uhrig-Homburg, & Michael Wagner, Dynamic behavior of CO2 Spot 

Prices, 56 J. Envtl Econ. & Mgmt. 180 (2008). 

changes and environmental disasters. Those external factors increase the difficulty 

of modeling emission allowance values, making it difficult for market participants 

to plan ahead for their future carbon emissions. 

Figure 4 shows the daily allowance spot prices for sulfur dioxide (SO2) from 1999 

through May 2006. These allowances are traded on the over-the-counter market as 

well as through the Chicago Climate Exchange.33 Producers of SO2 emissions have 

been granted allowance permits through the United States Acid Rain Program since 

1995.34 The spot price for SO2, at least from June 2003 until November 2005, could 

be consistent with a stochastic mean-reverting process with a constant positive drift, 

as desired by the stated cap and trade policy. The enormous price drop after November 2005, however, indicates that an assumption that the SO2 cap and trade market 

was working correctly and that the policy was responsible for the gradual upward 

trend in price movement would most likely have been very wrong.35

Studies of the European markets for CO2 allowances have also shown the difficulty in using cap and trade for risk-management purposes. In a paper discussing 

an optimal design for emission allowance derivatives, two financial economists from 

Universita ̈t Karlsruhe note that political and regulatory uncertainties, weather, and 

fuel prices were the most important and most volatile factors affecting allowance 

prices, according to surveyed market participants.36 Weather changes (such as temperature, rainfall, and wind speed), fuel prices, and economic growth all affect CO2

production levels. Unexpected events, such as power plant breakdowns or environmental disasters that shock the supply and demand balance for CO2, and changes 

in fuel spreads shock the demand and supply side of CO2 allowances and consequently market prices.37

For example, energy consumption (and hence CO2 emissions) increases with cold 

weather. Non-CO2 power generation is affected by rainfall and wind speed. In addition, the relative costs of coal, oil, and natural gas affect the decision to move forward with CO2 abatement projects, and fuel switching costs can be high. These 

sources of price uncertainty have a short-or medium-term impact on liquidity, which 

in turn affects the volatility of emission allowance prices.38 In addition, the prohibition on banking emission allowances between distinct phases of the EU ETS significantly affects futures pricing in that market.39

As a result of the complex fundamental dynamics, forecasting models based on 

fundamentals and future-spot parity of CO2 yield implausible results due to market 

complexity and to the particular behavior of the allowances, such as inconsistent behavior of CO2 allowance convenience yield.40 Other studies have also shown that 

CO2 emission allowance prices are nonstationary and exhibit abrupt discontinuous 

shifts, short periods of high volatility, with heavy tails in the distribution.41 One 

study analyzing the dynamic behavior of CO2 emission allowance spot prices for the 

European emissions market demonstrates that a steep price increase will occur 

when the end of the trading period is approaching, in contrast to a smooth approach 

to spot prices demonstrated in typical commodity markets.42

The institutional and financial characteristics described above make the choice of 

a proper statistical model crucial (albeit perhaps impossible) for purposes of risk 

management and carbon permit securities valuation. Given the interrelationship of 

carbon prices with both fundamental and policy variables, emission allowance prices 

and returns will exhibit different periods of behavior that include price spikes, volatility spikes, and heteroskedastic returns. The ‘‘jumpiness’’ of price series neces-
34 

43 Eva Benz & Stefan Tru ̈ ck, Modeling the Price Dynamics of CO2 Emission Allowances, 31 

Energy Econ. 4, 14 (January 2009). 44 Ronald S. Borod & Madeleine Tan, Carbon: Is It Just Hot or Is It a New Asset Class?, 9 

INTL. Securitization & Fin. Rep. 11 (February 15, 2006). 45 Id. 46 Richard Newell, William Pizer, & Jiangfeng Zhang, Managing Permit Markets to Stabilize 

Prices, 31 Environ. & Resource Econ. 133-57 (2005). 47 Id. at 149 (‘‘We demonstrate that permit systems incorporating banking, borrowing, and adjustments to the quantity of outstanding permits can replicate price-based regulation. The methods do not require any monetary transfers between the government and the regulated firms, 

thereby avoiding a politically unattractive aspect of price-based policies.’’). 

sitates using not only traditional time series models, but jump and jump-diffusion 

models to analyze the statistical properties of the series.43

The dynamics discussed above are not limited to the EU. In addition to the EU 

cap and trade emission allowances, which are government-issued offsets that are 

limited in supply, other ‘‘low cost’’ emission credits that will assist the countries that 

are signatories to the Kyoto protocol in meeting their emission reduction targets include Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs). 

CERs are created from projects in developing countries such as Brazil, Mexico, 

China, and India that reduce greenhouse gas, whereas ERUs are allowances that 

have been allocated to mainly Eastern European countries that have already met 

their emission reduction targets. CERs and ERUs are both fully fungible with the 

EU emission allowances and can therefore be banked and traded within the EU 

ETS. According to an early 2006 report, some project developers had already sold 

forward their CERs for delivery in 2006 and 2007, while others were banking their 

CERs until the price became more favorable.44

An important lesson from the EU’s experience with CERs and ERUs is the arbitrage opportunities that have arisen due to the significant price difference between 

EU allowances and CERs. Funds and other entities finance energy projects that result in CERs. Then, those entities aggregate the CERs that are produced and create 

pools of carbon credits that are diversified across projects and countries.45 These arbitrage opportunities mitigate both credit and country risk, but further complicate 

efforts to price emission allowance contracts alone. 

Given the number of pricing anomalies that exist in financial markets, and the 

fact that carbon permits would share properties, at least in part, with many financial assets whose prices exhibit similar—but not identical—anomalies, valuations 

driven by financial markets are unlikely to uncover the true price of carbon permits 

in the multiple sources of statistical noise in market prices. Should a market for 

carbon permits in the United States emerge, one can be sure that investors will use 

the most innovative—and therefore untested—valuation techniques available to 

value and to trade what would be, arguably, one of the most important contracts 

in the economy and the environment. Although uncertainty may surround the value 

of such contracts ex ante, one can be sure that market participants will soon discover weaknesses in either the contract terms or the market structure and will seek 

to exploit any arbitrage opportunities that present themselves. Consequently, the 

nascent market will have to be monitored closely and carefully regulated. Market 

regulation itself, however, is far from efficient and fraught with difficulties. 

III. MANAGING THE SUPPLY OF CARBON PERMITS IS LIKE CENTRAL BANKING, AND

CENTRAL BANK POLICY HAS NOT BEEN WORKING WELL LATELY

Theoretical mathematical and economic models have been designed to show that 

a cap and trade program with sufficient banking and borrowing can, in principle, 

deliver a better outcome than taxing emissions. This conclusion has been recognized 

to some degree in papers that extended the prior work on optimal carbon permit 

banking and borrowing. More recently, public policy work for Resources for the Future by Richard Newell et al. (2005) showed how inter-temporal banking and borrowing would allow firms to smooth abatement costs across time, offsetting the traditional disadvantage of cap and trade relative to taxes.46

The results of Newell et al. (2005) in particular, however, rely crucially on several 

mechanisms borrowed directly from central bank policy. Using those features, Newell et al. (2005) claim to have written a theoretical economic model that, for the first 

time, suggested cap and trade (with appropriate dynamic modifications adopted 

from central bank theory) can achieve greater economic efficiency than tax-based approaches.47

As a result, most recent carbon market development proposals now routinely borrow institutional features from central bank design and organization that are 

thought to be able to effectively regulate and constrain carbon markets to achieve 
35 

environmentalists’ objectives. It is those institutional features, working optimally according to assumptions embedded in the economic models, which generate the models’ efficiency gains over straight carbon taxes. The problem is that—as demonstrated in markets today—central bank policy rarely achieves those ideal efficiencies because central banking is far more complicated than it looks. In fact, given 

the theoretical and practical difficulties of central bank policy and application, Newell et al. (2005), style carbon market manipulation is more likely to undermine the 

benefit certainty that is the hallmark of cap and trade policy, decreasing cap and 

trade efficiencies to levels no better than—and perhaps worse than (depending on 

political volatility)—a simple carbon tax. 

Like carbon contracts, money is a necessary input to production, and can be used 

to store value for the future and as a source of income. The fundamental source of 

value for both carbon contracts and money lies in the necessity of their use as a 

production input by government fiat. Hence, it makes sense to think of carbon permit supply management in the same light as managing a fiat money supply. 

The section below shows that monetary theory—the branch of economics that concerns itself with attempting to achieve the simultaneous objectives of maintaining 

a valuable fiat currency without stifling economic growth, typically through central 

bank operations—separates three sources of demand for money: consuming, investing and speculating. Those demands are analogous to the uses of carbon permits as 

inputs to production, savings for future production, and options on expanding production in the future. 

Those three demands create great complexity in monetary system design. Traditionally, three common ways of addressing the different needs are through discount 

window operations, reserve requirements, and manipulating the supply of fiat contracts. Contemporary carbon market proposals also include such features, but rarely 

acknowledge the limits to economists’ knowledge with regard to best practices and 

effectiveness. 

Last, therefore, I discuss the central bank’s role in monetary policy, actively monitoring hitherto unknown dimensions of the economy in attempts to smooth economic 

growth by manipulating the money supply to stabilize the relative value of the fiat 

contract against the production, investment, and speculative demands for the contract. While it is one thing for a central bank to try to operate such a system with 

a relatively-well-established instrument called money, whose supply can be both expanded and contracted over time, it is quite unreasonable to expect to efficiently 

manage innovative financially engineered markets of financial instruments with a 

long-term objective of decreasing supply and maintain reasonable economic efficiency in the short-term without substantial and sometimes repeated economic disruption. 

The section stresses throughout how little is really known by economists about 

monetary theory and central banking, even after hundreds of years of academic research and policy application. Indeed, the current credit crisis is a manifestation of 

those limits to knowledge. Hence, the section proposes that applying the principles 

and practices of monetary economics to a new fiat instrument with unknown properties can have crucially important unintended consequences. While it may make 

sense to experiment with carbon market design in a relatively constrained application in order to learn how to harness that market, reducing carbon emissions can 

best be attained in the short-term through taxes rather than cap and trade policies. 

A. Productive Use, Investment Use, and Speculative Use of Contracts Will Compete 

for Limited Supply of Contracts 

Money is thought of as having three distinct uses whose relative importance varies over time: consumption use, investment use, and speculative use. First, and most 

straightforward, money is used to buy things, that is, for consumption. A carbon 

contract can only buy one thing, carbon emissions, but the analogy is still apt. 

The second use of money is to store consumption potential over time and, more 

powerfully, until a time when that potential may be greater than today. Such activity is commonly called investment, and carbon permit holders can invest similarly 

when schemes involve banking provisions. Sometimes economies suffer from too 

much investment, that is, too little consumption. Some monies, typically in developing countries, may therefore have expiration dates to get consumers to use them 

more quickly. Usually, however, trade (legitimate or illegitimate) in different financial contracts can smooth individual inter-temporal consumption preferences despite 

such restrictions. 

Investment differs from speculation in that investment targets some goal of future 

consumption. Speculation, in contrast, merely attempts to realize the maximum 

value of exchange either inter-temporally or across contracts of different types. If 

contracts are either mispriced or expected to be of far greater value in different 
36 

48See Brian C. Murray, Richard G. Newell & William A. Pizer, Balancing Cost and Emissions 

Certainty, Resources for the Future Discussion Paper (2008) at 10. 

times or places, speculators may demand some fraction of the contracts to take advantage of those relationships. Speculators have no use of the contracts for their 

own purposes, but may rent them from others to take advantage of speculative opportunities, creating leverage. While such activity is harder to observe with money 

(since money is fungible), it may be easier to identify among carbon permit holders 

with no emissions needs. 

That fungibility is an advantage to fiat money over carbon permits. The ‘‘hard’’ 

carbon permit value makes the contract more vulnerable to demand shocks than the 

‘‘soft’’ fiat money contract—just as money backed by gold was more difficult to defend than fiat currency. This is an important point, because what is envisioned as 

a tightly controlled supply of carbon permits will not just be used for consumption 

(producing carbon this period) but also for investment (producing carbon next period) and speculation (betting on the price of carbon). 

Academic proposals for carbon market designs have acknowledged difficulties 

dealing with competing demands, even if they have not yet formally adopted the vocabulary of monetary economics. For instance, the ability to bank carbon permits 

may create a political problem akin to ‘‘undue wealth accumulation’’ or ‘‘hoarding’’ 

when some firms have a large residual supply of permits on hold. The second, some 

say greater, problem is that firms with large banked permit resources could corner 

markets and drive up prices. The risk lies in the way some authors think of rectifying the problems. The most simple proposals call for an expiration date on the permits, much like Zimbabwe (annual inflation last year of roughly 10,000 percent), 

and other dysfunctional developing countries impose expiration dates on their currency. Others suggest imposing more stringent project requirements on firms with 

greater ‘‘wealth’’ in terms of banked permits. Nevertheless, authors admit that the 

permit demand function is largely unknown, noting ‘‘...there is little evidence concerning how large of an allowance bank firms might accumulate (it could, in fact, 

be much larger than one year’s worth of allowances), how fast they might spend it 

down, and in turn how much this might affect any future tightening of the cap.’’48

B. Typical Ways of Managing the Competing Demands for Money Are Not at All 

Straightforward in Practice 

Typical proposals maintain that uncertainties about the permit demand function 

can be addressed through a central bank ‘‘discount window’’ equivalent, imposing a 

‘‘reserve requirement’’ on permit holders, or regularly intervening in permit markets 

to dynamically manipulate permit supplies in a manner similar to open-market operations. While such features appear attractive at face value, closer inspection 

quickly reveals the well-known—within the field of monetary economics—problems 

associated with using these tools to manipulate the money supply and how much 

more complex and potentially intractable the problems would be if implemented 

with carbon permits. 

1. Discount windows do not work for the money supply, so why should they 

be expected to work for carbon contracts? 

Accepted approaches to carbon permit supply management have evolved to allow 

some form of borrowing if permit costs are unexpectedly high or supply is otherwise 

unavailable. Notwithstanding the fact that such policies are generally frowned upon 

by staunch environmentalists who want emissions limits treated as rigid constraints, the question becomes when to intervene and how many permits to offer. 

Those are precisely the questions that have confounded monetary theory for hundreds of years. 

The clearest advice that has been given for managing such discount window applications is Bagehot’s rule, which suggests that liquidity crises should be addressed 

by ‘‘lending freely at a penalty rate.’’ The idea is that financial market crises are 

accompanied by liquidity difficulties arising when investors cannot sort out weak 

firms from strong ones. Firms that are otherwise sound but lack temporary liquidity 

can, therefore, be helped through discount window lending by a monetary authority 

that has inside information about firm conditions. The carbon permit problem would 

be similar, if firms did not hold enough reserve permits to meet production requirements, say, in a cold winter. Hence, the policy approach is argued to be similar, as 

well. 

Of course, operationalizing Bagehot’s rule in central banking has been tricky. 

What constitutes a crisis? What constitutes lending ‘‘freely’’? What is a penalty rate? 

Environmental authors are feeling their way around such policy problems, effectively reinventing the wheel. Some suggest allowing the regulator to ‘‘...react to spe-
37 

49 Newell, Pizer, & Zhang, supra at 148. 50 Id. at 147. 51 Id. 

cific high-permit-price circumstances by making special allocations.’’ Far from applying the penalty rate, however, such authors suggest the regulator ‘‘...give away some 

volume of additional permits, thereby lowering permit prices,’’ which is like a central bank dropping interest rates to zero. Of course, it would be desirable to only 

facilitate a temporary increase in permits (similar to facilitating only a temporary 

increase in the money supply to avoid inflation), leading some to suggest the permits be loaned instead of sold.49 All the approaches will be applied in a highly politicized environment, detracting—perhaps substantially—from economic efficiency. 

Moreover, the environmental debate ignores the fact that the importance of central bank discount window policy has waned considerably over recent decades. While 

discount window lending can help smooth typical small fluctuations in currency demand, discount window lending is not an advantageous way to address crises where 

solvency difficulties are often paramount, since more credit does not help firms become less insolvent. Similarly, additional subsidized permits will only help insolvent 

environmentally value-destroying firms hold on a little longer at the margin and 

will destabilize the carbon regulatory authority. Hence, after hundreds of years of 

experimentation, the discount window lies largely unused for significant policy purposes. The carbon market equivalent similarly holds little promise. 

2. Reserve requirements help stabilize banks but are not used to actively manipulate monetary policy 

Environmentalists have also come to advocate central bank reserve requirements 

as not only a means of smoothing permit demand, but also manipulating permit 

supply. As with other central bank applications, the principle is deceptively simple. 

Firms that use carbon permits to some substantial degree are required to hold a 

quantity of unused permits to accommodate normal production demand, perhaps 

based on a certain percentage of the allocation or based on a certain percentage of 

last year’s emissions. ‘‘These reserves would be roughly analogous to the reserve requirement that the Federal Reserve places on banks, whereby they are required to 

always hold and not loan out certain percentage of deposits. As with the Fed’s reserve requirement, firms not meeting the permit reserve requirement could be allowed to borrow from the regulatory authority in order to meet it.’’50

Again, problems arise when environmentalists read too much into central bank 

policy, unaware of the pitfalls that such policy options have demonstrated over the 

history of practical application. Some environmentalists suggest the reserves give 

‘‘...the regulator an additional policy lever to stabilize permit prices by influencing 

the effective amount of permits in circulation, in the same manner that the Fed can 

adjust reserve requirements to influence the interest rate. Raising the reserve requirement, for example, would lower the effective amount of permits available in the 

market, thereby raising the permit price. Lowering the reserve requirement would 

have the opposite effect. The regulator could take this action any time it saw prices 

deviating from the target.’’51

Central bankers long ago, however, accepted that reserve requirements were too 

heavy-handed to be used as a policy tool. In the monetary world, reserve requirement manipulations required every bank, irrespective of its resources, to expand 

or—more importantly—contract reserves by a fixed amount to meet policy goals. 

Such broad policy is obviously detrimental to institutions with even idiosyncratically 

temporarily low reserves, penalizing such banks for what may be advantageous use 

of capital. Hence, the Federal Reserve moved away from actively using reserve requirements for policy purposes in the 1950s. While undergraduate textbooks still 

correctly teach that central banks still have the authority to change reserve requirements, reserve requirements are not considered a realistic central bank policy tool 

and are probably too heavy-handed for environmental policy, as well. 

3. Open market operations are the current vanguard of monetary policy, but 

the effects and limits of open market operations are still largely unknown 

Modern central banks influence markets primarily by purchasing and selling key 

market instruments, thereby affecting the supply of money and, secondarily, the 

price (interest rates). While overall supply is affected by open market operations, 

however, the supply of money related to consumption demand is most important for 

driving economic growth, the ultimate target variable of monetary policy. If money 

that is injected through open market operations is merely absorbed by investment 

or speculative demand, it is transformed back into securities and therefore does not 

drive growth as directly as does consumption. When the money injected is merely 
38 

52See, for instance, Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the 

Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 257-76 (1983). 53Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency 

of Optimal Plans, 85 J. of Pol. Econ. 473-91 (1977). 54 Id. Rules are credible precisely because they impose discipline in the face of economic upheavals. Inflexible rules regarding gold parity of the dollar and other worldwide currencies certainly helped cause the Great Depression. While inflation—dropping the rule—helped spur recovery in every country, each inflated with the objective of reestablishing pre-Depression gold 

parity sometime in the future. It was not until 1973 that countries moved to fiat currencies (not 

based on gold), and recent crises in Latin America and Asia remind us that economists’ understanding of the relationship between rules and credibility is still in formative stages. 

held in excess reserves (equivalent to ‘‘stuffing money in the mattress’’), the link between open market operations and economic growth breaks down completely. To the 

extent such preference shifts are understood in monetary economics, the field refers 

to the conditions as a breakdown in the credit channel of monetary policy transmission, which can create a liquidity trap.52

A similar phenomenon can be imagined for carbon open market operations, where 

productive, investment, and speculative demand are more closely tied to the target 

variable of economic growth. If productive users do not receive permits sold through 

open market operations—whether because productive users do not desire such permits or because speculators desire those permits more highly than productive users 

(who value the permits at the marginal cost of fuel substitution or production cutbacks)—the link between carbon permits and production will be broken. 

Breaking a carbon market ‘‘liquidity trap’’ may involve increasing the supply of 

carbon permits dramatically. When the Federal Reserve embarks upon such action, 

it runs the risk of inflation. When the carbon market regulator embarks upon such 

action, it runs the risk of obviating the long-term carbon emissions restrictions it 

seeks to impose. Both invoke vast unknowns in the economics of engineering and 

manipulating markets for public benefit. Both are potentially damaging and even 

reckless, both economically and politically. 

4. Regulatory credibility and optimal policy consistency are not easily obtained 

Since the early days of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and many authors who followed, the risks that central banks assume in generating policy credibility, consistency, and openness have become well-known.53 With central banks, such considerations arise out of investor concern for inflation and economic growth. With carbon 

markets, similar considerations can be expected to arise with respect to long-term 

carbon emissions goals and economic growth. 

The main problem with central banks is that credibility, consistency, and openness are only measurable against long-term economic growth, which may take several years to evolve from any given policy shift. With applications to carbon markets, credibility must be maintained with respect to not only long-term economic 

growth but also long-long-term carbon emissions reduction targets, which may take 

decades to measure. 

The issue of credibility is central to academic discussions of whether central banks 

should set policy on the basis of rules or subjective judgment. Rules are attractive 

because investors can transparently weigh whether the central bank intends to meet 

their long-run policy goals by observing whether the central bank is following the 

rule to which it has committed.54 The rule therefore helps investors filter through 

the noise of short-term economic fluctuations to determine policymakers’ credibility. 

Rules, however, do not fit every situation. Hence, central banks prefer to have discretion over how to address idiosyncratic issues affecting short-term economic 

growth. Discretion can also be used, however, to eviscerate policy goals. Hence, rules 

are stronger than discretion in establishing central bank credibility. Once credibility 

is established, however, mature central banks can usually be trusted to undertake 

some level of more discretionary and effective short-term policymaking. 

Of course, setting rules precisely in the context of specific policy questions can be 

difficult. Monetary theorists have struggled with growth rules, inflation rules, and 

other monetary policy target rules. The well-published Taylor Rule is one example 

of an outside metric that is used to judge deviation from steady-state policy in a 

discretionary central bank. 

What rules would an environmental regulator set? The simplest relates to the 

benefit certainty that is thought to be the hallmark of cap and trade: reduce carbon 

emissions over time. In the short-term, however, holding tightly to such a rule may 

impose substantial costs on economic growth. Furthermore, according to the nowfamous Lucas critique, once traders figure out rules, they act accordingly. As with 

developing country central banks, the regulator may therefore be attacked by speculators buying contracts in hopes of driving prices up. As long as regulators hold 
39 

55See Marliese Uhrig-Homburg & Michael Wagner, Futures Price Dynamics of CO2 Emission 

Certificates. 

tightly to their rules, speculators gain. Hence, while the regulator seeks to establish 

credibility, the speculator seeks to push prices to levels that break the regulators’ 

resource constraints. Such was the case in the Asian and Latin American crises of 

the 1990s and George Soros’ speculation against the British Pound in 1992. 

Once the regulator deviates from its rule, it must once again establish credibility. 

After the crises of the 1990s, more countries adopted other sorts of currency pegs 

and floating pegs to allow rule-based policy with greater degrees of discretion to 

guard against speculative incursions. Some countries maintained their rules-based 

policies and defended them through capital controls, prohibiting exchange between 

foreign and domestic currency in times of necessity. Overall, however, the problem 

of establishing central bank credibility has not yet been solved in monetary economics, and policy-makers seeking to apply central bank paradigms to carbon markets 

should expect similar difficulties. 

Once credibility is established, central banks are still not free to do as they wish. 

Policy inconsistency has been shown by many authors to be as disruptive as any 

financial crisis. The regulator cannot set a discretionary paradigm or an operating 

target and then change it without expecting economic disruption as businesses and 

investors try to understand the new ‘‘rules of the game.’’ In fact, modern central 

bank policy has changed significantly across recent decades, and those changes have 

sometimes caused tremendous disruptions. Central banks have struggled over appropriate operating target variables for some time now, and ongoing financial innovation perpetuates the struggle. 

Policy inconsistency was related to the 1970s stagflationary episode. In the 1970s, 

the Federal Reserve implemented monetary policy by targeting the federal funds 

rate. Interest rates rose dramatically, however, during the 1970s. The Federal Reserve responded to interest rate increases by increasing the money supply, which 

led to historically high levels of inflation (e.g., over 10 percent in the summer of 

1979). With rapidly rising inflation, Paul Volcker (chairman of the Federal Reserve 

Board at the time) felt that interest rate targets were not doing an appropriate job 

in constraining the demand for money (and the inflationary side of the economy). 

Thus, on October 6, 1979, the Federal Reserve chose to completely refocus its monetary policy, moving away from interest rate targets toward targeting the money supply itself, and in particular bank reserves—so-called non-borrowed reserves, which 

are the difference between total reserves and reserves borrowed through the discount window. 

Growth in the money supply, however, did not turn out to be any easier to control. 

For example, the Federal Reserve missed its M1 growth rate targets in each of the 

first three years in which reserve targeting was used. Further, in contrast to expectations, volatility in the money supply growth rate grew as well. In October 1982, 

the Federal Reserve abandoned its policy of targeting non-borrowed reserves for a 

policy of targeting borrowed reserves (those reserves banks borrow from the Fed’s 

discount window). 

The borrowed reserve targeting system lasted from October 1982 until 1993, when 

the Federal Reserve announced that it would no longer target bank reserves and 

money supply growth at all. At this time, the Federal Reserve announced that it 

would again use interest rates—the federal funds rate—as the main target variable 

to guide monetary policy (initially setting the target rate at a constant 3 percent). 

Under the current regime, and contrary to previous tradition such as in the 1970s, 

the Federal Reserve now announces whether the federal funds rate target has been 

increased, decreased, or left unchanged after every FOMC meeting—previously, the 

federal funds rate change had been kept secret. 

Some signs of policy inconsistency have already shown up in European carbon 

markets. The trading period break between 2007 and 2008, institutionalized in firstgeneration carbon contracts, prohibited continuous spot trading between the two 

trading periods. The result has been two separate markets over time, and the potential EU ETS transition into a third trading period would create further disruption. 

According to European writers, the break has made ‘‘...planning or risk management 

a lot more difficult for companies active in the EU ETS. Policy makers should thus 

think about a smoother transition into a potential third trading period. ’’55

In summary, therefore, central bank operating paradigms are not as simple as 

they seem. The Federal Reserve retains one of the most impressive staffs of economists worldwide not because the governors are fans of economic research, but because that research is necessary to guide monetary policy on a path through great 

unknowns. That is also why the governance structure of the Federal Reserve is con-
40 

56See Murray, Newell, & Pizer, supra at 21. 57See Purposes and Functions of the Federal Reserve, available at http://federalreserve.gov/ 

pf/pdf/pflcomplete.pdf, at 15. 

structed to provide consistent policy across long periods of time, so that knowledge 

and experience can potentially be buffered from political demands across time. 

C. A Carbon Market Efficiency Board modeled on central bank operations will operate with all the above constraints plus additional uncertainties and political interference 

Policies to date have suggested that the supply of carbon permits be constrained 

to meet environmental goals. Problems arise, however, when considering that—as 

with monetary policy—the price of those contracts will be left to vary widely in response to market conditions. Indeed, analysis in the previous sections showed that 

we have already seen incredible price volatility in European markets, obviating efforts to push carbon prices to levels that will stimulate green investment. 

A further advantage of money market manipulation over carbon market manipulation is that there is no intended fixed constraint on money supply or consumption 

that can be used to influence economic growth. In fact, the U.S. is unique among 

countries worldwide in that roughly two-thirds of the money supply is estimated to 

be held outside the country. Hence, there is no worry about running into a hard 

constraint on the amount of money necessary to facilitate consumption while accommodating investment and speculative demands. Whereas central bankers are allowed to raise the money supply above a prespecified ceiling, the stated ideal is for 

carbon permit supply to remain constrained, which—adding complexity—will be decreased over time. 

More importantly, even central banks have learned over time that they can target 

either the price of money (interest rates) or the quantity of money, but not both. 

If the money supply is the target, variable interest rates must be allowed to fluctuate. By contrast, if an interest rate (such as the fed funds rate) is the target, then 

the money supply must be allowed to fluctuate relatively freely. 

In summary, carbon permit supply will need to be dynamically controlled to adjust for numerous unobservable influences, just like the money supply. If investment 

or speculative demand rises, there will be fewer permits available for production. 

If, on the other hand, investment or speculative demand falls, carbon overproduction 

may result. Hence, managing a carbon permit market will be far more complex than 

managing the money supply, which—indeed—is already tremendously complex, 

leading to cyclical booms and busts that remain the focus of an entire body of economic research. 

Managing a carbon permit market will therefore rely even more crucially on 

economists who can staff a Carbon Market Efficiency Board with the courage to 

stanch booms and the talent to mitigate busts, much as the Federal Reserve is expected to accomplish today. According to environmental researchers, all policy proposals ‘‘...run into a barrier of establishing some type of management board to manage the reserve allocations and otherwise administer the program.’’56 It is that 

board that is crucially responsible for the dynamic optimality of the implemented 

cap and trade solution over a carbon tax alternative. 

Like a central bank, the important issues would be the precise governing mandate 

for such a board, the tools available to it, and the degree to which it operated subject to legislated rules versus having complete discretion. Even the Federal Reserve 

faces multiple conflicting goals, including seeking ‘‘to promote effectively the goals 

of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.’’ In 

steady-state economic growth, those goals all work in tandem. But in economic 

booms and busts, the goals may conflict with one another. For instance, the only 

way to bring high inflation down is to restrain economic growth, resulting in higher 

unemployment. In such a situation, ‘‘those responsible for monetary policy face a dilemma and must decide whether to focus on defusing price pressures or on cushioning the loss of employment and output.’’57

A Carbon Market Efficiency Board is expected to face similar conflicts, at once 

protecting the environment and containing costs to firms of doing so. The board will 

therefore have to not only maintain, but define, an appropriate balance of ‘‘contract 

demand’’ and ‘‘contract supply,’’ which will take considerable time and resources in 

an environment of great political and economic demands. Even the Federal Reserve 

was politically captured during its first 40 years of existence to serve the Treasury 

by keeping interest rates low, ultimately being released from such duty only in the 

Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 1951. 

But what of the Carbon Market Efficiency Board’s mandate to restrict carbon 

emissions and contain costs to preserve economic growth? Balancing both long-run 
41 

58 Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann at 4-6. 

costs and long-run growth makes the Federal Reserve’s job look simple, in comparison. When both emissions and economic growth targets are long-term, the management of the two takes on an air of supposition beyond even that managed by central 

banks. Operationalizing the Carbon Market Efficiency Board’s mandate will require 

settling on a measure of emissions among the vast number of possibilities, as well 

as settling on a measure of costs. Like a central bank, unable to directly measure 

either, the board will have to choose target variables it thinks are related—to one 

extent or another—to the ultimate policy variable and manage to those targets 

while trying to make sense of the targets’ relationship to the ultimate policy measure. 

None of this is new: central banks still struggle with a proper definition of economic growth, since classic measures like GDP, for instance, exclude services and 

other key segments of productive activity. Central banks also struggle with the definition of inflation, relying on CPI and PPI measures that—classically now that we 

have experienced another asset bubble—exclude financial market prices and housing prices. With greater integration of financial markets and commercial banks, central banks are not even sure anymore what money is. Indeed, those uncertainties 

are why economies still experience financial crises, recessions, and depressions. 

With theoretical economic certainty, there would be no credit crisis, nor 10,000 percent annual inflation in Zimbabwe, nor any of the booms and crashes that inexorably repeat themselves through history. 

Instead of certainty, modern economies rely on central bank representatives who 

are thought to be wizened individuals with industry knowledge and economic backgrounds that can help them make creative and meaningful policy even where economic theory falls short. Members of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors are 

chosen in a manner that attempts to balance conflicting interests, coming from diverse backgrounds such as banking, monetary economics, and law, with practitioners and academics represented in the mix. Furthermore, the governors can rely 

upon a staff of some of the best economists in the world to undertake market and 

economic studies that help create strong central banking principles that serve as 

guideposts to our ever-evolving understanding of central banking and its relationships with markets and the economy. The diverse board composition and economic 

might are crucial to a well functioning central bank because, even after hundreds 

of years, central banking is still more art than science. We would expect no less in 

the present (infant) application of a Carbon Market Efficiency Board. 

In summary, in adopting a cap and trade system we are hinging economic growth 

on a complex contract and a convoluted market design, both of which have yet to 

be tested in the real world. In theory, therefore, cap and trade systems predicated 

upon a market stabilized by a Carbon Market Efficiency Board may be able to generate efficiency levels greater than a flat tax. In practice, however, cap and trade 

plans that rely crucially upon idealized applications of central bank operations with 

an unlimited supply of benevolent governors and a full and complete understanding 

of market characteristics and functions are rare, at best. Practical difficulties, therefore, will detract significantly from the theoretically ideal benefit certainty thought 

to be conferred under a cap and trade system for the foreseeable future. With such 

policy uncertainty, it is hard to imagine a Carbon Market Efficiency Board will be 

more efficient than a carbon tax, which is—in effect—the ultimate policy rule. 

IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The crux of current greenhouse gas emissions policy debates is whether to implement a cap and trade system or a carbon tax. Economically, the question comes 

down to which program provides the most effective means of catalyzing pollution 

abatement while limiting economic distortions. 

Based on economic research and the available empirical evidence, the most efficient policy approach would be to impose a carbon tax on all coal, natural gas, and 

oil produced domestically or imported into the United States. While both a carbon 

tax and a cap and trade system achieve the same goals in theory, a carbon tax 

would be simpler to implement, more transparent, and less vulnerable to manipulation or malfeasance.58

The present paper shows myriad benefits associated with implementing a carbon 

tax over a cap and trade program. In terms of simplicity of administration, carbon 

taxes are both easier to enforce and can more readily be adjusted if the policy is 

too weak or too aggressive. A carbon tax also reduces the time lag between the promulgation of a pollution target and its achievement, as a tax can be administered 
42 

59 Id at 4-5. 60 Id at 33. 

immediately. A cap and trade system, in contrast, requires extensive administrative 

and market infrastructure that will take decades to develop. 

Additionally, a carbon tax would result in an immediate revenue inflow, as it 

would rely on the existing federal tax structure for collection. This revenue could 

then be used to promote further environmental protection in the form of research 

grants for the development of alternative energy sources, which are not forthcoming 

from carbon permit market revenues. Carbon tax revenues could also be used to offset any regressive effects of the carbon tax, especially where small businesses will 

be adversely affected by additional production costs in a positive-carbon price 

world.59

The most important drawback of cap and trade programs is that they do not work 

in practice. The tradable permits program initiated by the European Union has been 

subject to administrative folly and disappointing results. On the other hand, carbon 

taxes have been successfully introduced in a growing number of countries, including 

Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, and the Netherlands.60 The simplicity and efficiency of carbon taxes render their use less ripe for regulatory capture than a cap 

and trade program. 

Nevertheless, if policymakers decide to ignore the clear benefits of a carbon tax 

and opt to implement a cap and trade program instead, the most direct route to preventing speculative abuse and protecting economic growth is to guard the market 

through attentive monitoring and regulation. The carbon market regulator—referred 

to in U.S. proposals as the Carbon Market Efficiency Board—must have the power 

to stanch speculative abuses and attempts to corner the market, whether by domestic or foreign traders, by requiring market participants to be registered with the 

board and giving the board adequate powers to rescind registration in cases of domestic or international abuse. 

The board also must have macro-prudential authority to play a substantial role 

in decisions about how to value and report carbon contract holdings for accounting 

purposes in order to ensure sufficient transparency in financial statements of businesses that use the contracts for production, investment, and speculation. The board 

must have the power to provide an adequate stock of carbon contracts to ‘‘lean 

against the wind’’ of global warming while ensuring economic growth and employment. 

Last, the board must have the power to change the terms of the carbon contracts 

if the original design proves flawed or ineffective. Alternative contract designs, such 

as a carbon fee or tax structure, may yet prove superior, and transition may be necessary if the present ‘‘cap and trade’’ carbon contract proves crucially flawed. Just 

like the Federal Reserve can choose its monetary policy tools and targets, limiting 

the Carbon Market Efficiency Board to one tool or target may ultimately prevent 

it from accomplishing the task for which it is established: cutting carbon emissions 

and helping the environment. 

Proposed U.S. cap and trade policies are attempting to implement something far 

different from the original cap and trade theory using complex financial contracts 

and convoluted market designs to mitigate price uncertainty at the cost of the benefit certainty that is the hallmark of cap and trade. But such mechanisms and designs will not only substantially reduce the policy’s impact on the environment; they 

may also pose significant risks to U.S. economic growth and competitiveness. In a 

world where economic outcomes are couched in uncertainty and the optimal level 

of pollution abatement cannot be established with precision, a carbon tax provides 

the flexibility policymakers need to grapple with the problems presented by climate 

change. 

In summary, manipulating carbon permit supply via a Carbon Market Efficiency 

Board that is charged with restraining emissions without unduly harming economic 

growth necessarily decreases the benefit certainty that is the hallmark of cap and 

trade. Without that benefit certainty, the convoluted carbon permit market design 

and risk of market collapse is both theoretically and practically unnecessary. A carbon tax confers far greater economic efficiency than an ill-defined, unstable, and environmentalist—and Wall Street—driven cap and trade market design. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Jason, you’re the cleanup batter here. Go right ahead. 
43 

STATEMENT OF JASON GRUMET, PRESIDENT, BIPARTISAN 

POLICY CENTER 

Mr. GRUMET. I’ll do my best, Senator. 

Chairman Bingaman, Senator Murkowski and the rest of the 

committee, it is really a pleasure to be here on behalf of the Bipartisan Policy Center. The BPC was formed a few years ago by 

former Senate Majority Leaders Daschle, Dole, Baker and Mitchell 

with the goal of providing both the motivation and the infrastructure to encourage some meaningful bipartisan engagement. Our interest is not the esoteric desire that you all play nice together, but 

rather the view that truly durable change is going to require a different kind of collective engagement that involves all members of 

this Congress. 

I will admit that some have fairly noted recently that our efforts 

to change the debate have been subtle at best. But we do believe 

that we are going to have a more collective and collaborative mood 

here. I really think that there’s no better place to start than with 

this committee. 

As you point out, Mr. Chairman, not only did you mark up bipartisan legislation this year. But in 2005 and 2007 this committee 

brought forward bipartisan legislation that passed with 74 and 86 

votes respectively. So it my great hope that this committee will 

take an even more active role in the weeks ahead. I’m going to 

focus principally on costs and then say a few words on offsets. 

On costs our flagship project, the National Commission on Energy Policy has long held that providing predictable and transparent cost containment is one of the absolute keys to moving climate legislation through the Congress. In 2004 we offered recommendations that provided a simple safety valve. Again, you 

know, not an abstract idea. But like Congress, many members of 

our group have dramatically different views on the expected and 

predicted costs of a climate program. 

Senator Murkowski, you point out that very modest differences 

of views about offset availability or natural gas prices or the speed 

and the price of new technologies lead even our national governmental institutions to reach broadly different conclusions on the 

costs of the same program. So the benefit of a cost cap is that it 

essentially allows people to agree to disagree. If the prices are low 

as many would hope then the presence of a cost cap is of no accord. 

If prices in fact are much higher than people predicted well then, 

you want a cost cap because you don’t want to have the potential 

damage to the economy. In broad strokes I think the combination 

of a cap and a price cap or collar really provides the best elements 

of both the tax proposal and a cap and trade program. That’s why 

we think it really is the obvious way forward. 

Now while this issue remains controversial. I think there is 

clearly a different mood in the Senate about a price cap then there 

has been before. I think that’s very encouraging. 

I also want to note though that our positions have evolved over 

the last few years. We now support and believe in the value of having a price floor as well as a price ceiling, having that collar. We 

have also generally comfortable with the numbers for that collar, 

if it was a true collar in the House bill. The idea of a $10 floor and 
44 

a $28 ceiling for reasons I’m happy to elaborate on seem, you know, 

within the realm of good reason. 

Also we are now supportive of a well designed, strategic reserve. 

As Ms. Claussen pointed out, that has much of the benefits of a 

true cost cap. At the same time does provide over the course of the 

50 year program an expectation of having the complete emission 

reductions realized. 

I should say that with regard to a strategic reserve we think it 

has to be simple, straight forward and easily understandable. Have 

published a paper where we make some recommendations as to 

how we think you can in fact, improve upon the House legislation 

in that regard. Because we think it does, because of the 3-year running average, really have a fluctuating price that doesn’t provide 

the predictability that we think is important both to the Congress 

and to the market. 

A final thought on cost containment. We share the very broad desire that there be aggressive oversight of this market. Understand 

that this real anxiety many of you must have at this moment in 

our Nation’s history of creating a new market that may have, you 

know, one to $2 billion of value. 

An important benefit of a price collar is that combined with the 

reforms that are generally being proposed by the Administration 

for all commodities you can dramatically reduce the price volatility. 

In doing so, dramatically reduce the potential for market manipulation and the potential for undue profits. Recognize that there are 

some who are calling essentially for cap without trade and others 

who are arguing for a very prescriptive controls on who can participate in the marketplace and what instruments are allowed. 

We would urge great caution in going down those paths. They 

are truly a return toward a command to control regulatory style 

that I think we have learned over years is not the most cost effective way to move forward. Hope that having a true price collar we 

can in fact allow the market to work, but bounded by those publicly 

intended floor and ceiling price. 

Finally on offsets, I can be very brief because I’m very much in 

accord with on our paper that we released today is very much in 

accord with what Professor Wara suggested. Though, I think our 

Energy Commission is more optimistic than Dr. Wara about the 

long term opportunities for emissions offsets to play a meaningful 

role under a truly global regime. We strongly share the view that 

there is just tremendous uncertainty in how this market will mature. 

I think of emission offsets like I think of any of the kind of 

breakthrough technologies, advanced nuclear, carbon capture and 

sequestration and dramatic increases of renewables. Many of these 

are going to work profoundly well. But it’s going to take some time. 

It’s very hard to predict. 

I think it’s much more likely that in the early years we will see 

about 100 million tons of international offsets, much more like anything we’ll see that number than the 1 billion to 1 1⁄2 billion that’s 

contemplated in the ACES bill. You know, the European Union collectively right now after 6 years has about a 300 million ton program going forward. I think that’s probably the high water mark 

for what we could imagine. 
45 

* Documents have been retained in committee files. 

So in closing I guess, Chairman Bingaman, Senator Murkowski, 

I just want to acknowledge on behalf of this entire committee that 

you have worked together. You have held workshops and numerous 

hearings that really try to understand and address the key obstacles and concerns that have served as barriers to moving legislation 

through the Congress. As I reflect on the broad political dynamic 

right now I would assume I want to close by saying we need you 

and are very hopeful that we’ll have opportunities to work with 

this committee going forward. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Grumet follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JASON GRUMET, PRESIDENT, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, 

Chairman Bingaman, Ranking Member Murkowski and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

I am pleased to be here on behalf of the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC), which 

was founded by four former majority leaders, Senators Tom Daschle, Bob Dole, 

Howard Baker and George Mitchell. BPC was created to help provide the motivation 

and infrastructure to forge the bipartisan consensus we believe is necessary for durable change. The model of principled, bipartisan compromise we pioneered with the 

National Commission on Energy Policy (NCEP) later came to serve as the founding 

idea for the Bipartisan Policy Center. Launched in 2007, the BPC has projects underway that address a broad suite of issues, including energy, national security, 

health care, transportation, financial services and science. The BPC’s mission is to 

develop and promote solutions that can attract the public support and political momentum to achieve real progress. 

Bipartisan policy is of course very familiar to this Committee. You have historically worked in a truly bipartisan way to pass legislation, including the 2005 and 

2007 energy bills that combine enhanced energy security with meaningful greenhouse gas emissions reductions. 

BPC’s flagship project, the National Commission on Energy Policy, was formed in 

2001 to bring together a diverse group of 20 nationally recognized energy experts 

to address critical energy policy issues. 

In 2004 and 2007, the Commission released reports proposing detailed bipartisan 

strategies to meet our nation’s energy challenges. Since then the Commission has 

undertaken a wide array of projects and analyses to inform the national energy and 

climate change debates. Recent reports seek to address the legitimate concerns of 

rate payers, business, organized labor, agriculture and energy intensive industries. 

The major remaining recommendation from our 2004 and 2007 reports that Congress has not yet enacted is an economy-wide cap and trade program that, in combination with other complementary measures and commensurate international action, will help prevent the most damaging potential consequences of global climate 

change. 

In furtherance of our efforts to educate the public on critical design elements of 

such a program, the Commission has recently released two papers pertinent to this 

hearing: ‘‘Managing Economic Risk’’ and ‘‘Domestic and International Offsets.’’ 

These papers accompany my testimony and I ask that they be accepted as part of 

the record.* 

The Commission’s principles for an effective economy-wide cap and trade program 

are clear: under a well-designed climate bill, emission limits would initially be modest and ramp up in a gradual and predictable way over multiple years, with effective mechanisms in place from the outset to (a) guard against high or excessively 

volatile allowance prices and (b) protect low-income households and trade-sensitive/ 

energy-intensive businesses. This approach will provide time and a favorable investment environment for robust low-carbon technology alternatives to become available, thereby reducing climate-related costs to the economy. It will also help ensure 

that the transition to a low-carbon economy provides a steady impetus for the creation of durable new industries and employment opportunities with minimal regional economic dislocation. 

We believe that Congress must act to address climate change as soon as possibleurgency must take precedence over competing views of perfection. In our mind, 

there is no question that, left unchecked, climate change will compound environ-
46 

mental and economic as well as national security risks to the United States and its 

citizens. 

Many will argue that with a struggling economy this is exactly the wrong time 

to tackle climate change. Last year some argued against acting on the basis of $4 

gasoline prices. Once an economic recovery takes hold, arguments will again center 

on China, India, and other developing nations or the lack of perfected clean energy 

technologies. There will always be an excuse to avoid confronting the single biggest 

environmental challenge of our generation, but the longer we delay acting the more 

costly the eventual solution. 

If anything, our current predicament—a recession caused in part by rising energy 

prices and a nascent recovery threatened by the next increase in energy prices— 

illustrates the danger of drifting along with the status quo. In the long run, the policies we need to address global warming are also the policies we need to regain control of our energy destiny. And with appropriate cost containment mechanisms and 

allocation designs we can be confident that the energy security and economic impacts of any climate policy we adopt now are manageable in the near term and positively beneficial in the medium and long-term. 

CONTROLLING COSTS IN A CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM

Since the cap-and-trade debate began, the ability to form a meaningful consensus 

has been hampered by disagreements over the projected costs of compliance. Taken 

together, even moderately different views on the cost of new technologies, the speed 

at which they will deploy, the availability of offset credits, and the macro-economic 

response to a price on greenhouse gas emissions can lead to dramatically different 

estimates. Such disparities point to the inherent difficulty of making predictions 

about the future, particularly when it involves complex social, economic, and technological factors. As a result, the debate over compliance costs remains a formidable 

barrier to forging a legislative consensus. 

For several years, we have advocated for a price ceiling that would set a maximum cap on the price of allowances. The initial price for this cap should be set in 

statute and increase by 5% annually above inflation. We reached this agreement to 

address the fact that members of our Commission, like Members of Congress, have 

substantially different expectations about the costs of compliance. The inclusion of 

a price ceiling enables people to essentially ‘‘agree to disagree’’ while collectively 

moving forward in support of a cap-and-trade program. If compliance costs are low, 

as many advocates believe, then the presence of a price ceiling is of no accord. Conversely, if prices are substantially higher than forecasted, the price cap limits costs 

while new technologies are developed that are capable of achieving lower-cost reductions. 

Recently, the Commission also embraced the adoption of a price floor. Just as 

some are concerned about potential high costs, others fear that allowance prices 

could dip so low that the program will fail to provide a meaningful incentive for 

technology advancement and innovation. They argue that low natural gas prices, 

significant volumes of cheap offsets, or slower-than-expected economic growth could 

lead to extremely low allowance prices. Setting a price floor provides more consistent financial incentives for sustained investment in low-carbon technologies that 

can reduce compliance costs in the long run. Rather than being subject to boom-bust 

cycles when allowance prices fall, new low-carbon technologies would be assured a 

certain level of market stability. Together, a price ceiling and floor-or ‘‘price collar’’.substantially reduces the uncertainty about the costs of a climate program. 

There are two basic approaches to determining where to set the initial floor and 

ceiling prices. One approach is to examine economic modeling of the projected price 

of a reduction target and set the collar levels at a certain percentage above and 

below these projections. The other approach is to examine the impact of different 

price levels on key factors like electricity prices, gasoline prices, coal production and 

set the ceiling at a level that prevents costs from reaching unacceptable levels. 

NCEP believes that the $10 floor and $28 ceiling set in the Waxman Markey bill 

for year one are in line with both of the above approaches. EPA’s projected 2015 

cost for the Waxman-Markey bill is $13-$15 per ton. The proposed $28 ceiling is 

therefore double the midpoint in EPA’s projection. 

As an alternative approach, a price floor could be coupled with a ‘‘strategic allowance reserve’’ that would, in effect, create a price ceiling by making additional allowances available through an auction that begins at a specified price. The allowance 

reserve would be similar to a price ceiling, except that instead of providing a potentially unlimited number of allowances at the predetermined price, the reserve would 

contain a limited number of allowances borrowed from the future that would eventually be paid back. If allowances in the reserve were used, they could be replaced 
47 

either by using the proceeds from the reserve auction to purchase offset credits or 

by tightening emission targets in later years. While the Commission continues to 

believe that a simple price ceiling coupled with a minimum price floor is the most 

straightforward approach to managing economic risks in a cap-and-trade program, 

a well-designed strategic allowance reserve and price floor offer many of the same 

benefits and may better ensure that all of the contemplated emission reductions are 

achieved over the life of the program. 

To be effective as a mechanism for managing economic risk, however, the allowance reserve must be structured to reduce uncertainty, not add to it. In our paper, 

we suggest several modifications to the reserve provision in the Waxman-Markey 

bill that would make this cost containment mechanism more predictable and effective. For example, we recommend changing the mechanism by which the strategic 

reserve auction price is set so that the price would rise over time in a transparent, 

pre-determined fashion (just as we have recommended for a simple price ceiling). 

We also suggest a larger strategic reserve and that the government be directed to 

use reserve auction revenues to pay back allowances borrowed from future years. 

With respect to the price floor there has been less debate. Most who face potential 

burdens under the program would accept a $10 allowance price and technology advocates seem comfortable that this price would provide sufficient incentives for long 

term technology development. 

Overall, a price floor coupled with a price cap, or a robust, well-designed reserve 

auction mechanism could be extremely useful for increasing public confidence in a 

new greenhouse gas allowance market. These mechanisms will limit volatility, making prices more predictable and transparent. While the presence of a price collar 

could change the market dynamics, we view these changes as improving both the 

functioning and public support for the program. 

Finally, to the extent that the Committee is concerned about the potential for 

emission credit traders to reap substantial profits at an undesirable cost to the average consumer, reducing volatility substantially reduces the ability of market participants to reap unreasonable profits from this new market. While NCEP shares concerns stated by many on this Committee that there must be aggressive market oversight, we believe that the adoption of a price collar would substantially reduce the 

need for adopting specific restrictions on market participants and trading instruments beyond the requirements the Administration is proposing for all commodities. 

The presence of a price collar ensures that there will be a functioning trading market to achieve compliance at lower costs. 

In short, we believe that a climate bill must have price certainty. It is our view 

that simplifying and strengthening the cost containment provisions in the House 

legislation with the modest and important revisions I mentioned is critical to building a bipartisan consensus for meaningful action this year. 

OFFSETS

I would also like to briefly discuss the role of offsets in managing the program 

costs. EPA’s analysis of Waxman-Markey assumes the immediate availability of substantial international offset credits (up to 1.5 billion tons). While the inclusion of 

offsets as an alternative compliance option gives emissions sources greater flexibility 

and can reduce short-and long-term costs, it also introduces an additional source of 

uncertainty since numerous difficult-to-predict administrative and environmental 

factors will affect the supply of offset credits and ultimately allowance prices. We 

are fully supportive of a robust offset market and hope that they are abundant, inexpensive, and represent real, verifiable emission reductions. However, we should 

not rely on them as our primary cost-containment mechanism. There is too much 

uncertainty about the quantity and quality of international offsets to feel confident 

about their adequacy in managing economic risk in the critical early years of a capand-trade program. The price collar mitigates uncertainty about the availability of 

offsets (just like it does with uncertainty around technology deployment). To the extent that offsets are plentiful, costs will stay below the cap. Conversely, in the event 

that sufficient offsets do not materialize quickly enough, the price cap (or robust 

strategic reserve auction) will be the tool that controls cost. In short, offsets are a 

complementary cost control measure, not a substitute for effective cost control. 

It is simply impossible to predict with accuracy how many offsets will be available 

in the early years of a U.S. cap-and-trade program. This is particularly true for 

international offsets. The number of these offsets used for compliance will depend 

on a variety of factors, including rules for ‘‘additionality,’’ administrative procedures 

for reviewing projects, policies in host countries, and the ability to negotiate agreements for broader, sectoral offsets. Based on past experience with offset programs, 

however, we would expect the international offset market to ramp up slowly com-
48 

pared to some of the more optimistic estimates associated with recent House-passed 

climate legislation. For example, consider the Clean Development Mechanism 

(CDM) set up under the Kyoto Protocol to promote greenhouse gas abatement activities in developing countries. From its inception in 2004 through May 2009, the CDM 

has registered projects that now yield a total of roughly 300 million metric tons of 

carbon dioxide-equivalent offset credits annually. We therefore believe it is unlikely 

that U.S. purchases of international offsets would exceed 300 million tons of carbon 

dioxide-equivalent credit per year during the first several years of the program, and 

while this estimate may be conservative over the long term, the five-fold increase 

(1.5 billion ton limit) contemplated by the Waxman-Markey bill seems unrealistic. 

The inclusion of a price ceiling or a robust allowance auction reserve in the early 

years of a cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gas emissions would ease the pressure for short-term reliance on international offsets as the primary mechanism for 

managing program-related economic risks. This, in turn, should make it less likely 

that there will be design and implementation decisions that prioritize quick approval of large quantities of offset credits over the objectives of maintaining environmental integrity and promoting the strategic engagement of developing countries. 

Regarding domestic offsets, we believe there should be a ‘‘set-aside’’ program that 

dedicates a percentage of allowances-say 2 percent to 5 percent-to reward eligible 

agricultural sequestration practices. Using emission permits to, in essence, ‘‘insure’’ 

new and innovative sequestration activities will make it possible to create a more 

streamlined approach than under a traditional offset regime. This can be used to 

reward early action and promote experimentation while avoiding burdensome administration and accounting rules and reducing uncertainty as new measurement 

and verification protocols are being developed. 

By reducing the pressure to process huge numbers of offsets in the early years 

of a cap and trade program, the cost containment mechanisms and soil carbon setaside will help preserve the integrity, and ultimately the viability of international 

and domestic offset provisions. Past offset programs have shown that even a small 

number of imperfectly documented offset credits can significantly undermine confidence in the emerging offset market. There is every reason to expect continued 

controversy, critical media attention, and a high degree of scrutiny by NGO’s and 

oversight bodies. This dynamic has the potential to stifle innovation and slow the 

learning that is needed to realize the full potential of domestic and international 

offsets. 

In addition to reducing costs, an international offsets program should engage developing countries in ways that induce more significant commitments on greenhouse 

gas emissions. The Commission believes that the development of sectoral offset programs and ‘‘offset aggregator’’ institutions are potentially important innovations and 

should be explored as part of a U.S. climate program. At the same time, these approaches raise a number of questions and may take time to develop. Thus, we do 

not support an approach that would rely solely on these types of mechanisms at the 

beginning of the program and believe that a robust project-based offset program 

should go forward while sectoral or aggregated offset options are being developed. 

Finally, the Commission recommends that Congress establish guidelines for an 

international offsets program and authorize the appropriate federal agencies to periodically review and, if necessary, modify the details of program design and implementation to be responsive to evolving economic, policy, and diplomatic developments. 

While we can all agree that U.S. action alone cannot solve a global problem, it 

is equally true that we have no hope of securing effective and equitable global action 

absent U.S. leadership. The key is to design a program that protects our economy, 

strengthens our security and encourages innovation in both the production of low 

carbon energy and sequestration of carbon emissions domestically and abroad. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Thank you all for your excellent testimony. I’ll start with 5 minutes of questions and then 

Senator Murkowski and other members I’m sure will have questions as well. 

Let me ask about this issue of international forestry projects. 

That’s one issue that was given a lot of attention in the House 

passed bill. I guess I’d be interested in anyone’s view as to whether 

or not this is an opportunity for very major numbers of offsets in 

the future. 
49 

Large quantities of offsets can be obtained from this source? 

What are the challenges that we face if we rely upon that? I’m just 

not clear. Dr. Wara, did you have a thought about that? 

Mr. WARA. Yes. I think I see forestry offsets, international forestry offsets as being a potential long term source. But there are 

really two significant obstacles to that coming to pass. 

The first is developing some mutually agreed upon, relatively objective framework for determining deforestation baselines. That remains a challenge. Without that we won’t know really, how to 

quantify the offsets. 

The second perhaps more fundamental and more long term challenge is solidifying property rights regimes in the key developing 

countries that would sell us these forestry offsets. In many of those 

countries currently the environmental laws are not enforced, especially with respect to the illegal logging. There’s an inability to exclude many parties from land that is in theory owned by a particular land owner. 

All of that uncertainty with respect to both property ownership 

and use creates a tremendous uncertainty as to permanence and 

also as to quite frankly, who owns the offset to be sold. Resolving 

those issues is complicated and is delicate, political process in any 

country. I think it will take time for the major developing countries, especially Brazil and Indonesia to get to the point where 

their land title regime is mature enough to allow for large scale forestry offsets. 

The CHAIRMAN. Jason, did you have a comment on this? 

Mr. GRUMET. Just briefly. I very much agree that it is extremely 

challenging. I do think that this is the most hopeful area for significant international offsets. 

I think the ability in a government to government fashion to 

have a big package that looks at tens of thousands, hundreds of 

thousands of acres as opposed to having U.S. corporations entering 

into private agreements with other individuals and assuming that 

those will all somehow become aggregated. I think it’s relatively 

much more promising approach. I agree that it’s not going to be 

available in the next, you know, 12 to 36 months. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ok. Eileen, did you have a comment on that? 

Ms. CLAUSSEN. Yes. I mean, I think I agree in principle that 

there are real challenges here. That these will most likely be of 

greatest value in the not immediate future. 

But I do think they are a real possibility for the future. I think 

they can play an important role. One of the things that strikes me 

in, for example, Dr. Wara’s comments on the CDM which I think 

are actually really useful to contemplate is that we, the United 

States, who are usually the most analytical in these international 

fora in trying to put real numbers and real analysis on the table 

have not really been involved. 

I think that if we were involved, the United States, a lot of the 

things that have been done quite as well as we might have expected would actually have been dealt with. I really do believe that 

if we engage in a constructive way on the international forestry 

thing as part of a regime we can have an enormous influence on 

making sure that the offsets that are there are real, verifiable and 

something that we can count on. 
50 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask. You referred to the problem of establishing a deforestation baseline. I believe that was the phrase that 

you used, Dr. Wara. 

My impression is that in Europe they have not, as far as their 

offset policy there, they have not been willing to recognize agricultural offsets to some extent the same kind of concerns about the 

difficulty of establishing a baseline. The difficulty of getting agreement on how you quantify the value of the so-called offset or the 

changed telling practices or whatever it is that’s being done in the 

agricultural sector. I don’t hear much discussion of that? 

I didn’t hear much discussion of that in the House when they 

were passing their bill. I think there’s a lot of expectation in this 

country that a substantial amount of our domestic offsets are going 

to be from agricultural sources. Is this a real problem? Are the Europeans seeing ghosts here or are we too Pollyannaish about our 

ability to do this? 

Mr. WARA. I think that agricultural offsets will be challenging to 

do well. Some of the toughest problems have to do with quantification. A field is not a smokestack and emissions trading works best 

when you have a smokestack that you can put a continuous emissions monitoring device on and monitor the flow of gas. 

Fields just are not amenable to that treatment. So and are sensitive to things like the history of land use, climate practice, or I’m 

sorry, the history of the weather on the site, soil type, lots of variables that are tough to monitor and practice and quantify. So 

there’s a quantification issue. 

But there’s also the fact that we have a currently existing subsidy program within the U.S. that funds conservation tillage. In 

fact the numbers that I have heard are that 52 percent of agricultural land in the U.S. is currently under conservation tillage. So 

deciding what the appropriate conservation tillage baseline and 

level of crediting should be under an offset program that’s conservative and concerned with additionality will be challenging. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murkowski. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Listening to 

this conversation about offsets it just strikes me. No wonder the 

people I talk to back home are just scratching their head saying, 

so tell me what is it that is contained in this House bill and how 

it works? Recognizing that at least with the House measure so 

much of their cost containment revolves around this issue of offsets. 

We sit here talking about what is a real offset and what is a theoretical offset or something that may materialize in the future and 

recognizing that we acknowledge there is a finite amount of offsets 

and how this all plays in. Again, you can talk to people and they 

can understand it if it’s real. But if it’s something that we’re hoping 

is going to materialize. 

This is the basis for our policy. When it comes to the issue of cost 

containment, which I think we all agree is something that we must 

be focused on. This is a big issue. 

I wanted to ask and it may be nothing more than has been provided. Jason, you mentioned it and Dr. Mason, you certainly alluded to it in your testimony. 
51 

The issue of manipulation, Robert Shapiro said as a former 

Under Secretary in the Clinton administration. Many others have 

suggested that we’re on the verge of creating a new trillion dollar 

market and financial assets that will be securitized, derivitized and 

speculated by Wall Street like the mortgage back securities market 

and the concern regarding structure in such a way that we don’t 

see market manipulation that many are concerned about. You suggested, Dr. Mason, in your opinion the best way to avoid it was just 

a straight up tax. Was I correct in hearing that? 

Mr. MASON. Yes, I suggested that if we really go all the way toward stabilizing prices we’ve effectively already adopted a tax and 

avoided this problem of market manipulation and deeper crite financial market or carbon market crises that may pose a problem 

for economic development. Just even that something as simple on 

the subject of offsets we’re today seeing a crisis and a verification 

structure for offset markets. That’s already occurring, if you think 

of that as something like the problems that we solve with rating 

agencies leading up to the financial crisis. 

So knowing what we know today to go further into that market 

without assurances and institutional preconditions that can provide 

better verification would be, in my opinion, reckless. But worse yet 

I think that Dr. Wara also mentioned property rights are crucial 

to these markets. If an individual in a country doesn’t truly have 

the property rights or stable property rights that allow them to sell 

a meaningful offset, again you run into a similar problem. 

Last, the types of countries that we’re talking about are developing countries that often have political instability. While we like 

to think that people have the best intentions and we certainly do 

in this room. We cannot assume that worldwide and all regimes 

and all states of the world. 

I can think of, right now, just as happens with typical sovereign 

risk, where a country will seize oil fields or other industrial capacity of a country’s ability to effective seize their offsets, create a scenic crisis on the order of what we saw say with AIG with credit 

default swaps where the cost of removing these offsets suddenly 

from the system will be prohibitive and will command a bailout 

from the U.S. Government. It’s not unthinkable. In fact we should 

think through some of these incentives, these ways to gain the system now so that we don’t have our backs against the wall of these 

ways to gain the system of like unexpectedly later on. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Are we thinking it through, Mr. Grumet? 

Would you like to respond? I was just given an article here. The 

headline of an article I have is ‘‘Carbon Trading Market Hit as 

U.N. Suspends Clean Energy Auditor,’’ which is certainly in line 

with what we’re discussing. 

Mr. GRUMET. So, I’ll try to give you a brief response to what is 

admittedly a very complicated topic. 

First of all there’s no question that a tax would be much easier 

to implement and reduce the potential—well there will be some tax 

evasion. But reduce the potential for market manipulation. I think 

a number of folks on this committee have voiced a lot of support 

for a tax. 

What has yet to happen is building any kind of real political coalition around that idea. I think if there was a strong, meaningful, 
52 

bipartisan, political coalition advancing a serious tax proposal it 

would garner a lot of steam. But there’s a lot of people who don’t 

think that’s likely to happen. 

In the absence of that the price collar is actually a pretty elegant 

solution. It provides, you know, a tax provides a point estimate and 

a collar provides a bit of a band. But as Senator Cantwell is—and 

very much appreciate your legislative efforts and others have pointed out. If you reduce the volume of that volatility, you reduce the 

potential for the malfeasance. So I think it is a significant, but not 

complete solution. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cantwell. 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Mason, your 

comments are almost music to my ears. Because I think this committee has had many, many hearings about manipulation of energy 

markets and to have someone who can actually provide research 

about the activities of what’s going on in the European trading I 

think is the specificity we need. 

I think with Enron it took somebody really getting a tape that 

said, you know, let’s get Grandma Milly. Then everybody really realized that there was manipulation of energy markets. I think your 

specificity gives us some understanding that these markets really 

are very vulnerable. 

In fact I guess I was going to start with Mr. Grumet and others 

to talk about the price collar. But I did want to ask you because 

obviously, I mean, we are seeing a system that is just inherent 

with special interests when you have the trading that’s been involved in Europe. Your point is it’s, you know, if you’re going to get 

to the point of removing those, and I don’t know if you think where 

Europe is going today whether they’re talking about doing that is 

the right direction. But then you get to the point of providing predictability a different way. 

So I guess I’m asking if there’s any way to avoid those special 

interests if you have a trading system? 

Mr. MASON. I don’t think there’s any way to avoid the special interests. We all know how political systems work. Of course, they 

do their best to make themselves heard. 

In my mind the best you can do is insulate both political processes and market processes from those with overt interests and 

buffer those as good as you can. In that respect when I hear talk 

about collars and bands around prices my mind, as a financial 

economist, goes to the stories of countries attempting to convert 

their currencies into the Euro, of which Britain was one. As Britain 

attempted to decrease the volatility of the pound relative to the 

Euro into a tight band, the speculator intervened and pushed them 

off of that band. 

So when you try to hold to tight bands in fact you incentivize 

speculators to put your back to the wall to see how much money 

you’re going to put up to stay in that band and try to break a country’s reserves and their pledge of maintaining that rule. That’s the 

problem with any rule. We’ve seen that time and time again. 

But one more point I’d like to make just on the subject of a tax 

is I think one of the main obstacles—— 
53 

Senator CANTWELL. Just price certainty, price predictability. 

There’s lots of ways to get a price predictability, but—— 

Mr. MASON. Yes, I’m going to call it a tax now just for colloquial 

reasons. But a set price so to speak is that many have thought that 

that set price has to fully internalize the costs of the externality. 

What a lot of research in taxation has been showing is it’s sometimes just a nominal user fee can get you 80 percent of the way 

there without trying to fully price the externality and getting into 

this tax stickiness problem that Eileen brought up where you’d 

have to reduce the tax to accommodate economic difficulties and so 

on and so forth. 

So I’d like to just say I think a system could be a lot simpler and 

get a lot of the effect today. 

Senator CANTWELL. I couldn’t agree more. 

Mr. GRUMET. Just a quick point to your original question. 

Senator CANTWELL. Can I throw out too, for you and Dr. Wara? 

Could you talk about the floor? You were talking about a price collar and the benefit of that. 

But can you talk about the benefit of a floor for emerging technologies because to me that it what, I mean, this is what we should 

be doing. I mean we’re not going to get the investment. We can’t 

subsidize our way to this transition. So having a floor is critical to 

helping us get all the type of investment that we want to see in 

various technologies. 

Mr. GRUMET. So my initial thought just on this question of special interests is that my hunch is there are a number of special interests that those of you around the table don’t really want to reward. Right? It’s the Wall Street folks who have arbitrage credits 

and you know, Wall Street, not Main Street. 

But the market actually provides incentives for a lot of other special interests like technology innovators. People who think because 

there’s a market out there they can invent a new product and 

achieve reductions more cheaply and garner credits. So there is a 

larger frame of the market which in the acid rain program and 

other places we’ve seen be very effective. So my only suggestion is 

to try very hard to find that balance where we kind of clamp down 

on what we want to avoid without stifling and going right back to 

a command and control program. 

On the point of the floor just like there is uncertainty about the 

upward price there is tremendous uncertainty about the low price. 

You know, there are those who say that because we are going to 

have a painful and ongoing recession which will limit economic activity. There was a report today that emissions have gone down 

more in the last year than in any year before. Of course, not for 

the reasons any of you desire. 

But if you combine that with very significant low cost natural 

gas and the possibility of significant influx of offsets. So if you put 

those three ideas together you could have, you know, permit prices 

in the $2 or $3 range. So as you point out you don’t want to guess 

wrong low just like you don’t want to guess wrong high. 

The $10 number, to my knowledge, has not, it’s been a little 

more art than science. It is a number that most people believe will 

in fact motivate technology. A number that’s low enough that just 
54 

about everybody would in the kind of emitting community would be 

thrilled if it stopped there. 

There may be more math behind it. But it seems to be a number 

that people have kind of rallied around. You know, we’re quite comfortable with it. 

Senator CANTWELL. Dr. Wara. 

Mr. WARA. The key issue as I see it. The reason to have a price 

floor is to provide a number that innovative firms can take to the 

bank or in the case of the firms that I work most closely with to 

the venture fund. Right now when clean tech firms, even firms that 

plan significant operations in Europe. 

So firms that operate in an environment where there is a carbon 

price. When they try to raise funding rounds the experienced and 

most knowledgeable venture funds force them to justify their business case with a carbon price of zero. That is because the venture 

funds do not believe there’s any predictability to the carbon price. 

They recognize that actually the real world experience of cap and 

trade markets has been that the downside price risk is greater 

than the upside price risk. 

In practice many emission trading markets have produced lower 

prices than predicted ex ante. Firms that are planning investments 

in technologies that are innovative and disruptive are thinking 

about that risk when they make their decisions. 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I’ll tell you what. 

This has been an outstanding hearing. 

I thank you for having these great panelists. I wish every American could have listened to the 30 minutes of testimony each of you 

gave. I think it points to, especially in this time of tremendous distrust of Washington, that we’ve earned fairly, this whole Rube 

Goldberg notion of creating this vehicle to basically not be straight 

with the American people is interesting to hear. 

I thank all of you for your testimony. I think every one of you 

are being 100 percent honest. I think all of you basically talked 

about price volatility other than CRS giving us definitions. 

I do wonder and I guess I’ll start with Eileen, who’s been certainly a leader in this cause. Why is it you think that climate 

change activists don’t have the courage just to be straight with the 

American people? Say this is about raising the price of carbon and 

setting a carbon price and everybody understanding that? 

I mean wouldn’t that build good will among the American people 

to at least be honest? Wouldn’t it do away with the issue of the 

green technology piece where in essence we have ethanol folks in 

here talking about they can’t compete because the price of oil has 

dropped. The whole issue of having a floor on the price of carbon 

certainly would cause those technology folks, the special interest 

that you like to reward, not the special interest that have come up 

here and sat at the table and calls the Waxman-Markey bill to be 

highly beneficial to their bottom line that maybe are not 

innovators. 
55 

But I just would ask the question. Why don’t—is this just sort 

of a romance and they want a date with the idea? They don’t really 

want to marry the issue? What is the answer to that? 

Ms. CLAUSSEN. I’m sorry. I’m not sure I can answer your question. I’m in favor of telling the truth and being straight with the 

American people and with Members of Congress on what we’re actually doing here and why we are doing it. 

Senator CORKER. But you—but it is to raise the price—raising 

the price of carbon—— 

Ms. CLAUSSEN. You don’t get the technology that you need to 

solve the problem. 

Senator CORKER. Would a carbon tax instead of all these folks 

sitting around the table and some people making money off of it, 

if they have good lobbyists and some people not, if they don’t. 

Would that not be a better approach for those who are climate 

change activists? 

Ms. CLAUSSEN. I mean I happen to think that there’s difficulty 

with the tax because I don’t know exactly where to set the level 

of the tax. I myself would prefer that the market set the level 

which you would get under a cap and trade program. So I mean 

if you designed a good enough tax at a high enough level to get the 

result. I would probably end up by saying let’s pass it. 

But I would rather the market set the price rather than—— 

Senator CORKER. But this is—— 

Ms. CLAUSSEN. Those in Washington set the price. 

Senator CORKER. What’s been discussed in the House is not a 

market. I mean, my gosh, anytime you have offsets, Dr. Wara mentioned that 50 percent of the reductions through 2030 are with offsets. That’s not a market. That’s like an Alice in Wonderland, make 

believe kind of thing. 

Ms. CLAUSSEN. I guess I’m not, as you know, not negative on offsets. There are—I mean what is an offset? It’s really an unregulated sector. 

So if you decide that you’re going to regulate the large emitters 

there are lots of smaller emitters who I think should be part of this 

as well. One way to bring them in rather than with command and 

control regulation which actually is a little bit in the Waxman-Markey bill. I mean there are standards there for smaller sources is to 

actually allow them to be offsets. 

So if for example you have a small methane source which you 

can verify, which could be real. I don’t actually have a problem 

with using that because it would reduce emissions of greenhouse 

gases. 

Senator CORKER. Dr. Wara, how many of the offsets you’re predicting 50 percent through 2030. I mean how much will those be 

international and how much of those will be domestic? 

Ms. CLAUSSEN. I mean the international—— 

Senator CORKER. Dr. Wara. I’ve only got a minute left. 

Ms. CLAUSSEN. Thank you. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you for your mostly honesty. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. WARA. It’s important to emphasize that that’s EPA’s prediction. That’s not my prediction. 
56 

Senator CORKER. Do you know how much of those will be international? 

Mr. WARA. The vast majority are international. 

Senator CORKER. So I’d just like to point out to the committee 

what that means in code. Is thanks to CRS giving us these great 

definitions, is that we are transferring wealth out of this country 

to other countries around the world. An absolute transference of 

wealth from our companies, from our constituents, from our citizens, to people around the world at a high level to create some 

Rube Goldberg mechanism to really get around the fact that we’re 

really trying to raise carbon prices. 

Instead of being honest with the American people where those 

revenues would actually stay in the country and actually could be 

used, I understand under certain schemes, just dollar for dollar to 

reduce another tax which it’s amazing the President of France is 

actually advocating that. You have to give him credit for his directness and honesty. But we’re not doing that. 

So I know my time is up. I hope we’ll have the opportunity to 

pursue this further. But the whole issue of looking at safety valves 

and collars is in essence a way of creating a carbon tax. But you 

still have all these mechanisms where special interests are winning 

and our citizens are losing. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman for an outstanding hearing. I hope 

many more. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess I would— 

I’m not sure that I would agree with Senator Corker that I wish 

the American public had been able to hear all of your testimony 

this afternoon. I think they would have gotten a little concerned 

about what’s being proposed because I think as Senator Murkowski 

said that what we’re talking about is a very complicated system. 

That’s part of the challenge with trying to do this is that it is complicated and so it’s hard to understand. 

But I would like to follow up on the previous questioning about 

how we set prices. I mean I appreciate and I think I share the 

point that part of setting up a cap and trade system is to try and 

establish a market. That the market is best able to set prices on 

carbon and on emissions. 

But how do we design this so that this price cap doesn’t interfere 

with market dynamics? I don’t know. Mr. Grumet? 

Mr. GRUMET. I would start by saying that the interference of the 

price collar is salutary. In other words what we want to interfere 

with is difficult volatility that allows, you know, the market traders 

to reap significant profits that don’t result in technology increases. 

We want to avoid the volatility that makes it harder for investors 

and large companies to plan forwards. I mean I think that this is 

an intervention. But it’s just the kind of intervention we want, you 

know. 

The second part of your question I think implicitly is that well 

how much, you know, where should you set the price? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

Mr. GRUMET. There’s kind of two ways you could think about it. 

You can think about it from an emissions or a cost standpoint. 
57 

You know, from an emissions standpoint the modeling that EPA 

did of the Waxman-Markey bill albeit I think under many circumstances somewhat optimistic suggests that a range of program 

prices from $13 to $15. So the midpoint, 14, double it for 28. So 

many would argue that you want to set the price ceiling at you 

know, two times the anticipated price of the program which I think 

is the reasonable way to go. 

The other way is to think from a cost standpoint. Look at if permit prices were at $20, if they were at $30, if they were at $40, 

where do you start to experience costs that you don’t want to see 

in this country and pass onto your consumers? You know, we’ve 

done some analysis that is also a little technical. 

I wouldn’t want to share it with the American public. But be 

happy to share it with you. That looks at what the costs would be 

on gasoline and electricity rates and other things at different 

prices. Our sense is that, you know, somewhere in the $25 to, you 

know, $30 range the prices are sustainable. You don’t start to see 

the really egregious impacts that I think you would all be reluctant 

to embrace. 

So for those two reasons maybe they were brilliant. Maybe they 

were lucky. But $28 a ton seems pretty reasonable. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Ms. Claussen, did you want to add to that? 

Ms. CLAUSSEN. Yes, I’d like to answer it in a slightly different 

way because one of the reasons I don’t like the safety valve or the 

upper limit. I mean I do support the lower limit. I mean for all the 

reasons about technology innovation is the same reason why I don’t 

like the tax. 

If you have a hard cap and it’s too low you lose the climate protection that you’re after. If you have a hard cap and it’s too high 

you end up with economic impacts that you don’t like. So it’s a 

guessing game for the Congress to figure out what the right level 

is. 

I mean that’s one reason we like the strategic reserve better. Because you don’t end up in that kind of a situation. 

Mr. GRUMET. Can I just add to that. I’m more comfortable with 

the reserve too. I think you can apply those numbers to either. It’s 

just a question of whether you want to pay back the future or deal 

with the present. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So as we’re talking about setting a floor then 

as Senator Cantwell talked about. Where do we set the floor so 

that we incentivize new technologies? How do we make that determination? 

I mean I’ve had, we’ve had groups suggests that what is in the 

House bill is not a high enough floor to incentivize new technology. 

So again, how do we come up with that number? 

Mr. GRUMET. I think there’s some art and some science. If you 

talk to a number of technology investors I think they’ll say something that a number of people have mentioned which is just the 

clarity that there is going to be a carbon price. It’s going to be increasing each and every year which is something that we hadn’t 

talked about. But I think most of us who support either a floor or 

a ceiling believe that there should be a ratchet at about 5 percent 

a year above inflation. 
58 

So the simple knowledge that there is a price on carbon, that the 

full faith and credit of the United States is behind it and then it’s 

going to be going up for the foreseeable future is probably as important as the precise number. But again, you know, having spoken 

to a number of technology investors, they’ve told us that a $10 floor 

that accelerates by 5 percent over inflation a year would be very 

meaningful. I mean they’d like a $20 floor, a $30 floor even more. 

But that $10 would be helpful. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Isn’t this though pretty critical because if we 

don’t—if the number isn’t high enough at the start don’t we then 

lose the potential for the market to encourage those new, very new 

technologies that we’re trying to develop? So how much time have 

we got to experiment with this? 

Mr. GRUMET. All I’ll say is this. I think that the relative comparison is to the current price floor which is Europe. So, you know, 

we’ve always felt that urgency is more important at this moment 

than perfection. 

So whether it’s 8 or 15, I think that may ultimately just be a political decision. We would support just about whatever you come up 

with. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Ok. Yes. 

Mr. Mason. 

Mr. MASON. I’d just like to build upon a point. I think you’re 

right to ask how much time do we have to consider this when the 

price is zero now. While we may risk getting the floor too low by 

moving with something like a simple call it a floor, a tax, we could 

raise that later on. But the time that we’re dithering is time that 

could be spent building familiarity with the data and understanding the system better to build even a better system. 

My objection to cap and trade, and it’s been touched upon in various elements of the discussion here. So I’d like to bring that out. 

I think and feel free to correct me if I’m wrong. I think I’m the only 

economist on the panel. 

Cap and trade was designed to work with a well identified externality problem. So if we have something in this room on this floor 

and we can decide we want one ton of that thing on this floor and 

we can measure that. We can set one ton as the cap and we can 

let the market price that. 

Part of the problem with carbon is we don’t know what that 

amount is. So right from the get go we’re violating some of the key 

economic assumptions behind the original theory that gave birth to 

cap and trade. Once we then start talking about well, we don’t like 

this price or that price, then we’re getting further away from the 

theory of cap and trade. 

While Ms. Claussen does bring up, cap and trade is the perfect 

way to control that one ton of the externality right on this floor 

here that’s easily identifiable. It is indeed, theoretically the perfect 

way. I think that we’re letting the perfect be the enemy of the good 

right here and that we could move forward very quickly with a 

simple capital charge that would get us off square one. Get us 

gathering data on the dynamics of the market so that maybe later 

on if the market was amenable we could get to that perfect. 

But right now with no data and no movement I find it very difficult to jump right to that end point. 
59 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I know I’ve gone over my time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Stabenow. 

Senator STABENOW. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, on 

this really excellent panel and all of the work that you and our 

Ranking Member have been doing on this issue. Welcome to each 

of you, a lot of important information, a lot of questions that I 

have. 

First I do want to indicate and actually put into the record, Mr. 

Chairman, a letter I just received from the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture. Just indicating that they’re—based on a letter 

I had sent with a number of colleagues about the involvement of 

the USDA in this process and what they were doing to develop 

their technical capabilities. They recently developed a climate 

change program office and their office of chief economists. 

Have indicated in the letter they’re preparing to conduct a rigorous technical and science based process to develop guidelines for 

quantifying greenhouse gas benefits of agricultural and forestry 

practices. I think that one of the things that the panelists talked 

about was getting ahead of the curve by preparing and planning 

to be ready and so I really commend the Secretary for moving forward aggressively on that process. 

I think that one of the things that a panelist talked about was 

getting ahead of the curve by preparing and planning to be ready 

and so I really commend the Secretary for moving forward aggressively on that process. When we talk about this issue and I agree 

with many of the comments concerning a price collar. It makes 

sense to me that we need both a floor so there can be confidence 

investing in new technology which is absolutely critical. That we 

need to know that there is a floor for a number of reasons in tackling what is a global crisis and also a ceiling so that we have that 

framework. 

I guess from my perspective it makes sense also to have offsets. 

That I don’t see those as mutually exclusive and would like comments related to that. Because both of those I think make sense 

to me. 

Dr. Wara, in your—I think you’ve often time been viewed as a 

critic of offsets. But when I’ve looked at your writings actually you 

talk about smart design choices which is exactly what I think we 

are trying to do and what the efforts in the House bill have been 

to deal with the deforestation guidelines and so on that you’ve 

talked about. You try to address that. We need to make sure that’s 

done right, that these are quality offsets. 

But that it’s important to do that. I think it’s important to note 

that if we were to look at completely eliminating the offsets of a 

cap and trade program which some would say that incorporating 

them have environmental uncertainties. But also not incorporating 

any offsets has environmental uncertainties with it as well. 

It would seem to me that completely eliminating the use of offsets in favor of only a price collar would simply introduce another 

set of uncertainties. I would point to the CBO analysis of the 

House bill that found that with offsets that the House bill, the allowance price of $40 a ton by 2030, approximately 1.8 billion tons 
60 

in emission reductions would be achieved with offset projects. But 

without the offsets in the House bill the price would be $138 billion 

a ton. Yet we would have lost the 1.8 billion in reductions. 

So I would like some comments about molding those two together. I understand and I share with my friend from Tennessee 

on the initial look at offsets, particularly international offsets. 

What that seems to be the reality is that this is a global crisis and 

a ton of carbon is a ton of carbon. That we benefit by the entire 

world. 

In fact I want as someone coming from a manufacturing State to 

make sure other countries are holding up their fair share so we’re 

not losing jobs to them. So I think and we have to look at this as 

a global challenge for us. Offsets are really, in my judgment, a 

bridge to get to new technologies. They don’t take the place of new 

technology and what needs to happen. But it helps us and our industries be able to get there. 

But I wonder if anyone might comment about offsets and the 

price collar and how they might fit together in a credible way. 

Mr. Wara. 

Mr. WARA. I think it’s certainly possible to imagine a system design that involves both a price collar and offsets and would have 

one important advantage over an offsets only system. That is that 

in the current experience with offsets is that multiple constituencies favor low quality issuance. Those are both at the buyer—oh, 

I’m sorry the seller, the creator of the offset because they want to 

make more money. Which is completely rational and understandable. 

But also the buyer that is the regulated entities recognize that 

the greater supply of offsets, the lower their allowance price will 

be. So they also come to the table. Put pressure on the regulators 

to use their discretion which is substantial in the creation of offset 

methodologies to favor the creation of emission reduction credits 

rather than a more conservative approach that comes down on the 

areas where there is uncertainty and favor of environmental integrity instead of issuance. 

But so you could certainly imagine the political economy of that 

regulatory process being improved by a price collar. So that actually a domestic Ag and forestry offsets program I think would be 

strengthened by a price collar. It would provide greater incentives 

to the regulators to focus on quality and make sure that farmers 

and foresters were fully compensated for the emissions reductions 

they create, but not overcompensated which everyone I think, 

thinks is fair. 

Without the worry that those decisions would create another 

problem, a spike in allowance prices that would potentially call the 

durability of the program into question. 

Mr. GRUMET. If I could just add a thought. We believe that 

they’re absolutely complementary. In fact you have to have both. 

The kind of precise concern we have is the idea of using offsets 

principally as a cost containment mechanism. We have two concerns. 

One, that it either won’t work, that you won’t get enough offsets 

in early enough to in fact provide the cost reductions that you 

hoped. I think a lot of people agree there’s just a lot of uncertainty 
61 

about how many will come, how fast. The alternative which is 

something I think Dr. Wara was alluding to is that the tremendous 

pressure to bring offsets in will in fact force us or somehow convince us to bring in lower quality offsets. 

That we will start an offset program relying on it too heavily too 

soon and they’ll be some things that investigative reporters point 

out just don’t add up. Will actually undermine the mechanism before it has a chance to start. So I think it’s a key issue just of using 

them for the right reason. We argue that if you have a cost collar 

then you should have unlimited offsets because we think then the 

system could function. It’s in the absence of a cost collar that we 

think the pressures create a real potential for undermining the integrity. 

I won’t continue but to say that we should talk about domestic 

offsets at some point because I think we’ve all spoken about international offsets. I think you’ve done a tremendous amount of work 

on the domestic issue. I think they’re very different issues. 

Senator STABENOW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I realize I’ve gone 

over. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Dr. 

Mason, if I could. I’m very concerned that any, any tax and cap 

scheme is simply going to benefit the same Wall Street elite who 

got us into this financial mess that we find ourself in today. 

We don’t have a bill yet on the Senate side. Yet we’re already debating the ways to mitigate the price volatility that any cap and 

trade bill is going to cause. So whether we’re talking about a safety 

valve or price collar as others have talked about, in reality the only 

people who are going to understand this whole new system are 

going to be the elite on Wall Street. 

I see you’re smiling and nodding your head in agreement. I am 

concerned that a cap in tax is going to be a recipe for green collar 

crime, for greed and for abuse. I know Senator Murkowski just referenced an article that appeared in the Sunday Times in the UK. 

The article is entitled, ‘‘Carbon Trading Market hit as U.N. suspends Clean Energy Auditor.’’ 

The article goes on to state, the legitimacy of the hundred billion 

dollar carbon trading market has been called into question after 

the world’s largest auditor of clean energy projects was suspended 

by United Nations inspectors. 

The article goes on to say, SGS UK has its accreditation suspended last week after it was unable to prove its staff had properly 

vetted projects that were approved for the carbon trading scheme 

or even that they were qualified to do so. 

The article goes on to say, SGS, the second such company to be 

suspended. Norway’s DNV was penalized last November for similar 

infractions. 

Dr. Wara, how are we not creating just another Enron type situation by creating such a carbon market in the Waxman-Markey bill 

or other cap and trade bills that may come to us in the Senate? 

Mr. WARA. I actually think the SGS suspension was a tremendous positive step on the part of the CDM executive board. That’s 

because the auditors to date have been operating in an environ-
62 

ment of relative impunity for their actions. Auditors, just like everyone else, respond to incentives. Part of the job of any offset regulator will be to create the right set of incentives for auditors. 

I think the CDM executive board took an important step when 

they suspended SGS. Was there behavior adequate? Absolutely not. 

It points to—I mean there’s been systematic study of auditor behavior that suggests that it’s inadequate under the CDM. 

But I think everyone who looks at the issue closely realizes that 

the solution is real penalties and real costs imposed on auditors for 

bad behavior. That hasn’t been the case to date. It’s starting to be 

the case. So that should actually help. 

Senator BARRASSO. Then Dr. Mason, would you like to comment 

on that as well? 

Mr. MASON. This pattern of inappropriate auditor behavior is all 

too familiar from the financial crisis. It is something that is a possibility we could properly incentivize in a grander system that’s described over 1,400 pages which to me undoubtedly leaves room for 

some holes for other incentive conflicts as well. I think you’re right, 

those 1,400 pages will be scrutinized with the most effort by those 

with a financial incentive to do so. 

Those holes will be found. Those holes are the principle risk that 

I see in jumping with both feet into a cap and trade system today 

as our primary means of helping the environment. I think at the 

end of the day we’re at risk of getting too little effect for the environment and placing too much risk on the U.S. economy. 

Senator BARRASSO. Then that brings up the article that appeared 

in Climate Wire on September 9. The article was entitled, ‘‘Lobbying: Chicago Climate Exchange Seeks DC Muscle on Climate 

Bill.’’ In this article it talks about the thousands of dollars the Chicago Climate Exchange paid to hire advocates who come from ‘‘influential positions within Congress and the executive branch.’’ 

I think Dr. Wara was quoted as saying that the Chicago Climate 

Exchange was ‘‘concerned that rules for trading flourish and that 

the Exchange wanted to ensure that regulation of commodities isn’t 

so strict.’’ Did I quote you correctly there? I guess the question is 

why do we want lax rules for carbon commodity trading? 

Mr. WARA. To be honest I haven’t seen the article. I do recall 

speaking with the reporter. But my sense and her concern was, you 

know, why would CCX be hiring lobbyists at this point? 

My thought on the issue was twofold. 

One, that they might be seeking to ensure that their offset methodologies are granted early action credit under a program, a U.S. 

program. 

Also that CCX is owned, at least I believe wholly by the European Climate Exchange. Is that correct? 

Senator BARRASSO. I would encourage you to take a look at this 

article if you’re Michael Wara, Law Professor at Stanford University. You’re quoted as saying, ‘‘They are concerned that rules for 

trading flourish. They want to ensure that regulation of commodities isn’t so strict.’’ 

So I would—— 

Mr. WARA. Isn’t stricter than other commodities I think is the 

concern. The concern is that for instance, limitations would be 

placed upon who can participate in the market for emissions allow-
63 

ances or offsets. That, for instance the Wall Street firms that we 

have spoken a lot about today would be forbidden from participating. 

In practice and for example the acid rain trading program, investment banks have played an important role by being essentially 

suppliers of credit. People who can afford to pulled allowances for 

the day. When prices go up they sell them. They make a profit. 

But they also are essentially an important source of stability in 

the market. That’s, I think, that’s what I was referring to. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dorgan. 

Senator DORGAN. Thank you very much. Although I was not here 

for the testimony, I’ve had a chance to look at the submissions. I 

thank the panel for being here. 

This is a very complicated and difficult issue. I guess I’ve said 

publicly that I have problems with the trade side of cap and 

‘‘trade.’’ Representatives from the Energy Information Administration sat at the table you are sitting at in a previous hearing. We 

spent $110 million funding this administration, that is staffed with 

about 400 people. 

We wanted to know from them how it was that the price of oil 

went from $40 a barrel to $147 a barrel on day trading. We asked 

them what was the cause of the price increase? The representatives 

from the Energy Information Administration sat there and didn’t 

have the foggiest idea. They didn’t have any idea what was the 

cause for the rise in oil prices. 

It was speculation in the market that caused the sharp rise in 

the price of oil. It’s rather berserk in the sense that it had no relationship to supply and demand, it just went off the charts. It’s interesting the discussion today about a price collar. 

I mean, I understand why you would never want to have a carbon trading market without a price collar. The discussion of a price 

collar itself demonstrates that the lack of confidence in a market 

for carbon. Otherwise there wouldn’t be talk about a price collar. 

It seems to me that a price collar undermines the notion of having the market make the decision. I’m not someone who supports 

having the market make that decision because I think we should 

not be heading in the direction of creating a trillion dollar carbon 

securities market. The difference, Dr. Mason, in what you described as the product here, a ton of CO2, the difference between 

a carbon market and most markets is there will be a diminishing 

product year by year. 

So you create a product that diminishes and a very large securities market on which carbon is traded. There could be a point in 

the future where we make a decision that our energy prices on 

Thursday shall be developed by some investment banks and traders on Wednesday. So the price that we’re going to pay the next 

day is consigned to the rolling seas of a carbon securities market 

in cap and trade. So I guess count me as—well, you know how to 

count me after what I’ve just said. 

Let me ask you a question, Dr. Mason. I read the piece that you 

wrote expressing great skepticism about the trade piece of cap and 

trade. What is your sense of the size of the carbon market and the 
64 

potential volatility of this market? I know that you’ve responded to 

others as well, but would you give me some more information? 

Mr. MASON. I think that the size estimates of a trillion are far 

south of the real size of the market. I think there’s far more to be 

gained in this market than one trillion. As far as the volatility, I 

find it hard to see a market without market volatility. 

The discipline that we desire to arise from having a market price 

arises from the volatility in that price. I think we should admit 

that if we don’t like price volatility than we don’t like the market 

solution here because you can’t have both. You can’t have a market 

without market volatility. 

It’s kind of like the approach that we’ve taken to the financial 

crisis where we like the upside volatility. But we don’t like the 

downside volatility. So we let traders take away the profits and 

then we bail everybody out when the prices go through the floor. 

Here we’re talking about kind of the opposite because it’s carbon. 

We let traders take the profit from the low price, but we insulate 

them from somehow defined undue high prices. Make artificial restrictions that we will prevent Wall Street firms from transacting 

in these securities so as to staunch investment or undue trading. 

I have a home office you can use if we can call that a non Wall 

Street firm. I’ll profit from this. 

I can set up a company and call it an energy company. Check off 

the right code on my tax form and I can trade. Is that the key to 

arbitrage in this market? This is what I find troubling. 

There’s money to be had. There’s numerous ways to arbitrage it. 

Senator DORGAN. Is there any doubt in your mind—and again I 

apologize for not asking the others their questions because you’ve 

raised a lot of questions. Is there doubt in your mind that, in a relatively short time, we’ll have derivatives, synthetic derivatives, 

swaps, everything that comes with a carbon market and all of the 

carnival attractions and dramatic amount of risk that we’ve seen 

developed in other markets in the last decade or so? 

Mr. MASON. We have them. We have securitization of carbon 

credits in Europe already. Markets are everywhere working and efficient and creating new innovative products. 

My only problem is hanging a substantial amount of U.S. economic growth on those new innovative products. 

Senator DORGAN. Senator Corker asked the question—I don’t 

know whether he would actually support this issue, but he asked 

the question about a carbon tax. Let me ask the question a different way, calling it a carbon fee. 

Would a carbon fee be a much more direct way of addressing the 

issue rather than creating the intricate devices that are described 

in the Waxman-Markey bill? 

Mr. GRUMET. I think Senator if you could convince everyone else 

to also call it a carbon fee, it would be. I think the concern that 

our group reached was just a concern that has been very difficult 

over the last several years, certainly since the BTU tax experience 

to generate enthusiasm there. There’s a practicality here. 

I think you do have to, you know, obviously ask from the first 

instance is this a problem that you really believe has urgency behind it? If there was the opportunity to quickly move a significant 

tax proposal I think you would see dramatic support. If you believe 
65 

pragmatically that’s not the case, then the question really is and 

you pointed out, do you want to go with the market based approach 

or a more command and control approach? 

You know, the argument is, despite all the concerns visceral that 

we’ve shared about the market, the government has got to fix that. 

Right? I mean you all have to do that not just for carbon. There’s 

going to be legislation that I hope moves quickly that will dramatically place new constraints on commodities across the board. 

Senator DORGAN. I read the papers every day. It’s a pretty pathetic record of the government fixing the markets or even addressing it. I live with the hope that you just described, but that’s a triumph of hope over experience regrettably. 

Mr. GRUMET. I think that may be fair. But I guess the question 

is if you believe this is a critical problem, do you want to accept 

the higher costs of a command and control approach which, you 

know, from an environmental standpoint it would justify or do you 

want to grapple with the very real challenges of a market. 

Senator DORGAN. Right. 

Mr. GRUMET. The idea of a collar is just that you put training 

wheels on it while you figure it out. 

Senator DORGAN. No that’s not the case. The idea of a price collar is to actually constrain the market in a way we don’t typically 

do. 

Mr. GRUMET. It’s to try to balance the desire for the benefits of 

the market without tolerating very real concerns you point out. 

Senator DORGAN. I’m not advocating having a price collar or not 

having a price collar. I approach this issue saying that I don’t support the ‘‘trade’’ side of cap and trade. I just said to the Chairman 

that I hope at some point we might have a hearing that evaluates 

what the range of alternatives are for capping carbon. There are 

more than you’ve mentioned. 

You mentioned a carbon fee or carbon tax. You mentioned command and control and cap and trade. But there are other options 

as well. We sort of moved right into this rut of one option. We’re 

going down this direction and all we can really talk about is cap 

and trade. I think there’s more to talk about frankly. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Bennett. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize to the panel that I was called out. I’ve been very interested 

in what you have to say. Most of the ground has been covered by 

the questions you’ve already been asked. 

So let me just re-emphasize a conclusion that I believe Dr. Mason 

is in the piece that came from you. Is this your piece? The highlight, you say on page 20, ‘‘In adopting a cap and trade system we 

are hinging economic growth on a complex contract and a convoluted market design both of which have yet to be tested in the 

real world.’’ 

That’s a pretty scary statement. I happen to believe it’s true. So 

let me ask this question that I don’t think has been asked that I 

keep coming back to in this whole debate. Has any cost benefit 

analysis been done on what we get if we do put, fill in the blank, 

in place? 

Fill in the blank, cap and trade, carbon tax, price collar, command and control, all of the terms that we get. Now what do we 
66 

get in terms of actual, economic benefit from controlling greenhouse gas emissions? 

Mr. WARA. If I could respond to that, Senator? 

Senator BENNETT. Sure. 

Mr. WARA. I hate to cite the work of another prominent law 

school. But NYU Law School recently came out with a report that 

attempted in the best fashion that they could because they’re not 

the EPA to apply an approach, a cost benefit analysis approach, to 

the ACES bill. Their outcome, and it’s just one, but I think it’s one 

of the few that’s been done that really looks at the benefit side of 

the ledger as well as the cost side of the ledger, indicated that 

ACES was a highly cost effective piece of legislation. 

There is significant uncertainties around the benefits of evaluating any piece of environmental legislation. I’d be the first to tell 

you that. But the work that’s been done so far suggests that the 

U.S. would come out ahead on this bill. 

Senator BENNETT. Alright. 

Ms. CLAUSSEN. Yes, let me answer it in a slightly different way. 

There have been lots of different economic analysis looking at the 

cost side of this. There are some lessons you can learn from all of 

that. 

Even where the inputs are different and the results are different, 

I think you can still take away a lot of things about how to make 

this less costly, how to do it an effective way. There is not the same 

level of analysis on the benefits side. There’s a lot of stuff that’s 

anecdotal. There’s a lot of stuff that’s region specific. But there is 

no either global or national assessment of the benefits looking at 

it in dollar terms. 

I mean, we’ve actually done a lot of work. We’ve brought in a lot 

of people to talk about how you might do it. While I believe based 

on the anecdotes and the work that has been done that if you do 

it in a relatively intelligent way, don’t try to do too much too fast 

and so on and so on. The benefits far exceed the cost, but I don’t 

think you can say we’ve got really good data on the benefit side 

that matches the quality of the data on the cost side. 

Mr. YACOBUCCI. Then Senator, it’s just worth noting that on the benefits side those ranges of value if we’re talking about $20 a ton 

or $30 a ton are the numbers that have been put out here. The 

range of benefits is anywhere from zero to hundreds of dollars a 

ton depending on whose analyses—— 

Senator BENNETT. A fairly wide delta, you’re saying. 

Mr. YACOBUCCI. You could say that. 

Senator BENNETT. Alright. Ok. I’ve tried to ask myself or tried 

to discover for myself what the environmental benefits are. Those 

become even more difficult to discover. Trying to turn it into temperature change you end up with projections of the amount of less 

warming that you would get in 100 years. You want to talk about 

a wide delta this is about as difficult as it can be. 

Every analysis I have seen says that the impact on temperature 

change is basically diminimus. Now is there any evidence to say, 

no? That’s it’s going to be dramatic if we do this? 

Mr. GRUMET. Senator I guess—and this question comes up a lot. 

I think it’s an important one. That analysis requires understanding 

kind of the dynamic nature of a global collective action problem. I 
67 

think you could isolate the U.S.’s actions in the drug war and trying to fight poverty and trying to get rid of global extremism. 

Senator BENNETT. Yes. 

Mr. GRUMET. Terrorism and say the U.S. alone can’t solve that 

problem. That is absolutely clear here. If you believe that U.S. action is a predicate for meaningful action by other countries that are 

big emitters and going to get bigger. You believe that the consequences of an action are potentially tremendously negative for 

our own population. 

Then that argues—and I think what Eileen correctly points out 

is an anecdotal way that we should get started. But I think one of 

the reasons that many of us are talking about the price collar is 

that we shouldn’t be silly. We should get started in a way that we 

have confidence, is not going to undermine our own economic 

strength and hope that that gives us the authority to negotiate 

internationally. 

If it doesn’t then I don’t think you’ll see many people advocating 

for second and third steps. But it’s a, you know, probably unsatisfactory, but the most honest answer I can give you. 

Senator BENNETT. No, it’s very satisfactory because it is an honest answer. My fear is that we put this in place, discover that it 

does not produce any significant change around the world and then 

leaves us stuck with it. If that happens then the anecdotal evidence 

that is good for our economy better be right because we will have 

paid a very significant price. 

Yes. 

Ms. CLAUSSEN. Maybe I can just make one point. I think it is absolutely clear that without us taking some steps the rest of the 

world will not. It is more of a question as to whether if we do, will 

everyone else at a level that we think is important. 

But I think the opposite is absolutely true. If we don’t take some 

steps in this there is no way that the rest of the world will do it. 

We will be faced with, I think, very serious impacts even if we can’t 

quantify them all. 

Senator BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I had a brief discussion on this 

with people who are running the cap and trade in the United Kingdom. I sat in the room where they were trading carbon credits. It 

was about 20 pounds for a ton of carbon emissions, at about $35. 

Is that? Yes, that was the price. 

I said do you have any advice for us in America? He said, yes. 

Go slow and go small and described all of the difficulties that they 

had had. So—— 

The CHAIRMAN. We’re following that advice. 

Senator BENNETT. Good. Thank you. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murkowski indicated she had another 

question or two and why don’t we just have a very short 3 minute 

round here. See if that doesn’t satisfy everybody. 

Senator Murkowski. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll be very 

brief. As I’ve been talking to people back in my State and they 

bring up the issue of climate change and the cost and it always 

comes down to what it is going to cost. 
68 

My constituents say the economy is in trouble right now. We’re 

in the midst of some really serious economic times. We’ve had great 

discussion here about the price collar and particularly the price 

floor and how that will help to incent investments in technologies. 

But is there any allowance or any consideration of how this 

works when we have a strong economy, when we have the ability 

to invest in the technology. But do you think that there should be 

some allowance or recognition for economic recovery prioritizing 

that when we’re in a time of economic recession, particularly when 

we’re talking about the mechanism and a price floor. I direct that 

to you, Jason. 

Mr. GRUMET. Senator, I think it is unmistakably clear that the 

recession has changed the debate here on Capitol Hill and as has 

the kind of implosion of our confidence in the markets. I mean I 

think we are having a very different discussion than we were having last year. A response that I think is wildly unhealthful politically, but I think somewhat important substantively is that this 

program if passed this year, by most estimations would take effect 

in 2014. 

The good people in the White House have told us basically today 

that the recession is waning. But if we’re still stuck in 2014, I 

would have a very strong confidence that you and your colleagues 

would be making a number of adjustments to the law. I think in 

some ways it is within of course, your prerogative to be adjusting 

this going forward. 

But I’m quite optimistic that by 2014 we’ll be in much better economic shape. There are some, and you should, you know, speak not 

to me, but to the major energy companies who are arguing that the 

uncertainty in climate regulation legislation on top of the current 

uncertainty in capital markets generally is just making it impossible for them to get any investment, any liquidity. They would 

argue that while they don’t want what they would call an overly 

onerous system, having some predictability going forward might in 

fact free up capital as opposed to constrain it. 

But when you go back home I don’t think any of that is particularly helpful to you. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Our difficulties when we put in place a new 

system, a new regime, it’s a new system. It’s a regime and we live 

with it. That’s what we’re talking about here with the health care 

reform and the discussions there. 

This is not just about spending money like we did in the stimulus. This is a whole new system. So whether or not we build in 

that level of flexibility that allows for reprioritization, I don’t know. 

Dr. Wara. 

Mr. WARA. I think the health care analogy is actually an apt one 

in this—thinking about this question as well in a sense that a big 

part of what motivates the health care discussion is that it’s not 

as if we’re starting from scratch. We have a system. It’s evolving 

in a particular trajectory that some parts of our society have concluded is not a good one. 

Similarly EPA is charged with enforcing the Clean Air Act. It’s 

looking very much like part of doing/accomplishing that mission is 

going to be regulating this new pollutant class that they have been 

charged with, greenhouse gases, under the existing statutory 
69 

framework. So it’s not as if there’s nothing else there that is the 

alternative. 

You know, doing nothing is not the alternative. Doing something 

that I think most regulated entities and most economists who think 

about it believe would be far more costly is the alternative. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cantwell. 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back 

to international offsets for a minute because I think my colleagues 

are talking about the complexity of the House bill in a way that— 

you know, I believe, Mr. Grumet, what you were saying about predictability and wanting to make the transition that we absolutely 

need to have that predictability. We need to make the transition. 

But it’s my understanding that EPA’s analysis of the House bill is that through 2050 we’d be spending $1.4 trillion on international 

offsets. I mean what could we be buying for $1.4 trillion? Doesn’t 

that offset just, I mean that’s money that could instead go to helping us stimulate the investment that we need to see in green technology here in the United States instead of spending $1.4 trillion 

abroad? 

Mr. GRUMET. I can’t speak on behalf of everybody on the panel. 

But we think EPA’s estimates are pretty unrealistic in terms of the 

volume of offsets. I think they are making as they, you know, kind 

of, good engineering judgments about what is the kind of theoretical volume of offsets. 

But what they’re not dealing with, you know, is what I guess the 

oil industry calls the above ground risk. So in theory there are 

those lower cost reductions around the world. In practice I think 

you’ve heard Dr. Wara, myself and others say we think it’s very 

unlikely that those will be captured. 

So EPA’s analysis because they’re presuming about a billion tons 

a year monetizes those then into about a trillion dollars. Our sense 

is that they’re going to be a small fraction of that. So that the, you 

know, money going overseas would be a small fraction of that trillion. 

Senator CANTWELL. Dr. Wara or Dr. Mason, would you like to 

comment on that? 

Mr. MASON. Thank you. It’s interesting that you raise this question after some of the discussion of offsets and your earlier question 

about special interests. Because I’d just like to pose a puzzle to the 

committee of who owns the land that’s producing much of the offsets from restrained deforestation in foreign countries? 

You have to remember other countries don’t have property rights 

like we do. One of the problems in the Brazilian rain forest is the 

lack of a fee simple, structure of land ownership. When you don’t 

have to pay property taxes on land, you own as much land as you 

can afford. You just keep it for whenever you might need it, so 

large companies own this land. Individuals don’t have a chance to 

buy this. 

What you’re doing is you’re assigning them more value to the 

large companies. These are the special interests and they’re foreign 

special interests at that. So I think that you may be missing an opportunity to impose a tax right now or a fee, if you will, to get immediate benefits. But also use at least a domestic offset system to 
70 

lower costs of businesses to U.S. businesses meeting those tax demands. 

Where I come from in Louisiana I have to say, we are grinding 

up new growth cypress forests to pelletize the wood and ship it off 

to the EU to burn in power plants to help meet their carbon goals. 

Where does that make sense at all? I think that we could benefit 

from some of these offsets directly in Louisiana. 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Dr. Mason. You made my point 

better than I could. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we’re out of time. So I appreciate your indulgence. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Again, I think all of 

you have been outstanding witnesses. I would say to the gentlemen 

about not having enough international offsets to meet the demand 

with trillions of dollars available. 

I assure you there are plenty of hucksters around this world that 

will figure out a way to take that in. As is existing today where 

in China people are doing projects that cost $100 million and 

charging $4 billion. So I assure you that with trillions of dollars 

running around there are hucksters all over this world that can figure out a way to benefit off of our taxpayers. 

But let me just ask this question. Would everybody agree in a 

perfect world that if in fact there ends up being some kind of regime to deal with carbon that the very best way to have a carbon 

regime would be for it to be revenue neutral so that there’s no net, 

not one penny that comes out of the economy? That in the event 

there is a cap and trade, I would call it a scheme, or in the event 

there’s a carbon tax that at least one principle we ought to adhere 

to is that not any of that leaves the economy that there are reductions or dividends or some other mechanism to put that same, 

exact amount of money back into American’s pockets in the event 

that something like this is pursued. 

I’d love to have comments from all of you briefly. 

Mr. GRUMET. Senator, I think that’s exactly the right goal. It’s 

simply a question of how you accomplish it since different people 

living in different regions with different lifestyles will experience 

different costs from that program. The challenge is how do you in 

fact, give the money back to people in a way that is in fact, equitable? So you’re going to have to take a kind of rough justice approach. 

I think, you know, the effort in the utility sector to allocate the 

permits not to the companies, but to the local distribution companies moves in that direction because it has State regulators trying 

to push that money back into the pockets of rate payers. But the 

idea of cap and dividend and a number of those other ideas I think 

deserve real attention. If you can tax bad things like pollution and 

reduce taxes like on good things like labor and savings, you’ve done 

a good thing for the environment and the economy. 

Senator CORKER. Dr. Mason. 

Mr. MASON. I would just like to say I’m in full agreement. My 

problem with cap and trade is that markets don’t know boundaries. 

Taxes do. 
71 

Senator CORKER. That’s right. In essence much of the flow would 

be to other countries. 

Mr. MASON. With markets you can’t control where that flow goes. 

Senator CORKER. Dr. Wara. 

Mr. WARA. I think how we distribute the revenue that is raised 

is a very complicated question that draws. It’s a political question. 

Firms have some claim on those revenues because we want businesses to flourish as well as our taxpayers. Taxpayers also have a 

valid claim. 

I think one thing that’s worth adding is that we’re looking at the 

complexities here of an emissions trading scheme. Taxes have been 

talked about in a theoretical way today, but the reality of tax policy 

and tax law in this country is it is not simple. An important consideration and important benefit that an emissions trading scheme 

provides is a single price of carbon across the market. 

In practice, for carbon taxes around the world that have been implemented that has been a very tough goal to achieve. Different 

emitters get different rates. That’s an important thing to bear in 

mind as we make this comparison. 

Ms. CLAUSSEN. I mean I like things that are simple. But I think 

this is not simple. For example I think some of the money that is 

raised here should be used for adaptation. 

I’m not just back to consumers. But to deal with the consequences of climate change which I’m not sure would fit into the 

way you said that. I really have to agree with Dr. Wara here on 

the complexities of a tax scheme,it’s not as if you’re going to not 

have people wanting to be exempted from the tax to pay a lower 

tax. It’s not as if you’re going to end up with a scheme where it’s 

just, you know, a straight tax for a unit of carbon across the board. 

So I mean, I think it’s fine if you want to explore a tax. But I 

think it’s wrong to assume that the cap and trade is really complicated and the tax is going to be really simple. Because I don’t 

think it will be. 

Senator CORKER. I’ll stop. I know my time is up. The Chairman 

has been very patient. 

It would appear to me that one of the ancillary goals of people 

who craft legislation like we saw in the House is though, to consume, to take money into government. Then make decisions on behalf of people. It does cause one to wonder about what the real 

goals, the true goals of much of this legislation is about. 

I mean the bill last year on the Senate floor was $6.8 trillion if 

you just used present day carbon cost. It was the mother of all ear 

marks. I mean every bit of that money was pre-spent through the 

year 2048. 

So I just hope that there will be some clarity in this debate. I 

think that our Chairman has helped us with that today. I think 

each of you have been outstanding witnesses. I thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Bennett. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much. Senator Corker covered 

most of the ground I had in mind. You talked Ms. Claussen about 

you want it to go for remediation or some kind of diminution of 

some good environmental purpose. 

Of course, that does take you in the direction that Senator 

Corker was talking about as an ear mark. As an appropriator I 
72 

don’t like trust funds because they begin to distort the appropriations process. Here’s money coming into the government. We desperately need it for this purpose. But it has been blocked only for 

that purpose. 

That gets us back to the discussion of fees. I do like the Highway 

Trust Fund because the Highway Trust Fund is a user fee. The 

people who are using the highways are paying for repair of the 

highways. That’s fair. 

But if now the people that are using the utilities or whatever it 

might be are seeing the money go for bike trails because everything 

else in remediation is properly funded. They’ve got so much money 

in the trust fund they have to find some way to spend it in an environmentally friendly way. It’s not the best idea for the government 

to building bike trails. 

Ok. That’s the theoretical problem. Let’s take that to the other 

thing I was told when I was in Europe. As I looked at the cap and 

trade system there I discovered to my surprise that the only thing 

they were dealing with were utilities. 

I said, you don’t have a transportation factor in here. In the 

United States everybody is excited about the automobile as being 

the No. 1 polluter and so on. They said, yeah, we only do carbon 

emissions on utilities. I said, why? He said that’s the only place we 

have any accurate data. Everything else is a guess. Now talk about 

the impact on a marketplace if we do decide that we want to go 

where you don’t have accurate data with respect to the polluters. 

I’ll close it with this very, very targeted anecdote. I saw a bumper sticker on a very serious pickup truck. It said the carbon emissions from this pickup truck are offset by and then it gave a data 

base and a website. 

As somebody pointed out to me it may be that I said how much 

is he paying? How does he know what the emissions are from his 

truck? What is he buying? Someone said, he may have only bought 

a bumper sticker. So there is that situation. 

But talk about this question of accurate data and how do you 

come up with this. Yes? 

Ms. CLAUSSEN. Yes. Let me just make a quick point. I mean one 

of the reasons that the first phase of the EU system, I mean the 

experimental phase failed, is because in fact they didn’t have good 

data. They over allocated. 

I mean, I think they figured out how to fix that. I think we’re 

seeing real improvement there. But I think part of the problem is 

no data. It’s really important that we have data from a reporting 

system in place so we actually know what we’re doing. 

Mr. WARA. I’ll respond to the—— 

Senator BENNETT. Are you comfortable with the present data 

level? 

Mr. WARA. I think actually we’re doing something as a Nation 

that’s very smart which is that EPA is currently in a rulemaking 

process to design a greenhouse gas reporting rule, so that we will 

have the data if and when we decide to implement a tax or a cap 

and trade. On the issue of mobile sources in Europe and the U.S. 

a big factor—a big reason, one main reason that they were not included in the cap and trade is the equivalent carbon tax or the gas 
73 

tax in most European countries is several hundred dollars per ton 

carbon. I know the number for Germany is $228 per ton. 

So effectively because of the high gas taxes motor fuels are already facing a very high carbon price. In the U.S. the approach 

that’s being taken in the current bill before Congress and at the 

State level is to regulate fuels at the refinery where there’s real 

certainty at something called the rack. I’m not quite clear on what 

that is at a refinery, but at the rack, about the volume of petroleum, refined petroleum products that are being sold. 

It’s there that we can get the good data we need to do this well. 

Certainly at the pickup truck we’re not going to get that data. 

You’re absolutely right. 

Senator BENNETT. You do it at the refinery you’re automatically 

raising the price at the pump to get to where the Germans are. 

Mr. WARA. Not even close to where the Germans are. 

Senator BENNETT. But it’s the same idea. You do it at the refinery you’re raising the price of gasoline at the pump. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all very much. I think it’s been a very 

good hearing. Good testimony. We appreciate your taking time to 

talk with us. 

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.] 

(75) 

1 A key component of any offset program is that the projects awarded offsets be additional— 

i.e., they would not have been undertaken in the absence of the incentive provided by the offset. 

For example, actions taken to comply with other environmental laws (e.g., air quality or water 

quality regulations) would likely not be considered additional even if they had an ancillary 

greenhouse gas benefit because the project is not optional. Likewise, financial or other incentives 

above those provided by the offset program could negate the additionality of a particular project. 

Supporters of multiple incentives, including offsets, prefer to allow ‘‘stackability,’’ that is, the 

ability to combine (‘‘stack’’) multiple incentives for the same project. For more information on 

offsets, see CRS Report RL34436, The Role of Offsets in a Greenhouse Gas Emissions Cap-andTrade Program: Potential Benefits and Concerns, by Jonathan L. Ramseur. 

APPENDIXES 

APPENDIX I 

Responses to Additional Questions 

RESPONSE OF BRENT YACOBUCCI TO QUESTION FROM SENATOR BINGAMAN

Question 1. EPA projections have indicated that there will be a very limited supply of offsets coming from projects based in the U.S., and that the vast majority of 

the offset supply will be coming from overseas. Are there policy choices we can make 

to increase the supply of high-quality domestic offsets, so a greater amount of funds 

spent purchasing offsets stays in the U.S.? 

Answer. The supply of international vs. domestic offsets will largely be driven by 

two factors: 1) the total potential for sequestration and other offset projects; and 2) 

the cost of those projects. Even if offset projects are widely available within the 

United States, there may be little interest in pursuing those opportunities if the allowance price and/or the international offset price is low relative to the domestic 

project cost. Therefore, key to increasing the supply of domestic offsets is to reduce 

their overall cost, and their cost relative to emissions reductions from covered 

sources and from offset projects overseas. One possible option would be to provide 

supplemental financial incentives for the development of such domestic projects; 

however, amendments to offset provisions in proposed legislation would likely be 

necessary so that those incentives do not negate the additionality1 of the projects. 

A second option is to effectively raise the cost of international offsets. H.R. 2454 

does this by discounting international offsets after 2017. After 2017, 1.25 international offsets are needed in lieu of one ton of emissions—there is no such discounting for domestic offsets. Raising this discount rate or applying it early could 

make domestic offsets more competitive (by effectively raising the cost of international offsets). Other factors that could play a role include: 1) limiting the quantity of international offsets, thus creating more demand for domestic offsets; and 2) 

requiring less stringent verification or other protocols for domestic vs. international 

offsets. 

RESPONSES OF BRENT YACOBUCCI TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CANTWELL

Question 1a. What role does the compliance period play in reducing price volatility? 

Question 1b. Are there any substantial differences in price volatility between rolling compliance periods and fixed compliance dates? 

Question 1c. To minimize price volatility, how much time should firms have between the emissions of greenhouse gases and the acquisition (and surrender) of allowances? One year or less? Two years? Three years? Five years? 

Answer. Allowing entities to spread their compliance over multiple years allows 

those firms to avoid purchasing allowances on the market when they perceive prices 

as temporarily high. A longer compliance period gives them more time to wait out 
76 

2For more information on RGGI and other state and regional programs, see CRS Report 

RL33812, Climate Change: Action by States to Address Greenhouse Gas Emissions, by Jonathan 

L. Ramseur. 3 H.R. 2454 gives the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) the authority to establish position limits on allowance holdings. For example FERC could determine that no entity 

could hold more than 10% (or some other amount) of allowances in the market. However, it 

seems unlikely that an individual entity’s banking decisions would be affected by such a position 

limit unless the limit were set at a very low level. 4 EPA Analysis of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009: H.R. 2454 in the 

111th Congress (June 23, 2009). EPA/IGEM ‘‘Data Annex’’ available on the EPA website at 

http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/ economicanalyses.html. 5Some analyses assume—as an input—that no banking occurs. 

6For a comparison of different analyses of H.R. 2454, see CRS Report R40809, Climate 

Change: Costs and Benefits of the Capand-Trade Provisions of H.R. 2454, by Larry Parker and 

Brent D. Yacobucci. 

perceived volatility in the market. There seems to be no consensus on how long that 

compliance period should be, or how much the length of the compliance period affects volatility. However, a period of at least a few years would seem necessary to 

mitigate against short-term allowance price shocks such as those driven by a hot 

summer (with greater demand for air conditioning) or a cold winter (with greater 

heating demand). For example, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)2 em- ploys a three-year compliance period, while the American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454) effectively creates a rolling two-year compliance period for entities that would receive free allowances under the bill’s allocation scheme. The current sulfur dioxide (SO2) cap-and-trade program established by the 1990 Clean Air 

Act Amendments has a one-year compliance period, and allows covered entities 

three months after the end of the year to settle their accounts. 

Question 2a. What is a reasonable number of allowances, as a percentage of yearly 

emissions, that firms would be able to bank for future emissions and compliance 

dates? 

Question 2b. How long are firms likely to retain allowances for future use? Is 

there likely to be a limit to their willingness to keep these assets on their balance 

sheets? 

Answer. Various bills would allow different limits on the amount of allowances 

that could be banked, and for how long. H.R. 2454 would allow unlimited banking— 

i.e., entities could bank an unlimited3 number of allowances for as long as they 

choose. Experience with previous cap-and-trade systems shows that firms will bank 

allowances in early years when emissions reductions are inexpensive relative to expected future costs, and to spend those banked allowances later as costs rise. For 

example, under the SO2 cap-and-trade program, at its peak the total bank among 

all firms reached roughly one-and-one-half times annual emissions for covered entities (it has since declined). Covered entities are apparently comfortable banking allowances over long periods of time—at least a decade in the case of the SO2 program. 

Similarly, the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) analysis of H.R. 2454 

using its Intertemporal General Equilibrium Model (IGEM) found that the total allowance bank is projected to reach nearly 20 billion allowances in 2029—roughly 

five times the allowance cap in that year.4 Under the various analyses of H.R. 2454, 

the number of allowances banked varies depending on expected compliance costs 

and allowance prices, as well as assumed discount rates—a lower discount rate results in greater banking, while a higher discount rate results in less banking.5

Question 2c. To reach the 2050 emissions targets that scientists agree are necessary to avert catastrophic climate change, is there an affordable option at midcentury that does not incorporate either a significant amount of coal with carbon 

capture and sequestration technology or a substantial expansion of nuclear power? 

Answer. It is impossible to predict what technology development will occur to 

make different compliance options in the electric power sector affordable by the middle of the century. Analyses of H.R. 2454 that assume carbon capture and storage 

(CCS) and new nuclear power are not substantially available by mid-century generally result in high consumption of natural gas—and to a lesser extent, renewable 

resources—for electric power generation. In limiting other options, those analyses 

generally result in significantly higher allowance prices, and overall costs to the 

economy.6

Question 3a. From a strictly economic viewpoint, how can the pathway of the 

emissions reductions or the trajectory of the cap’s emissions reductions affect the 

costs of a climate policy? 

Question 3b. For a fixed amount of cumulative emissions, what might the optimal 

shape of that emissions pathway be? 
77 

7The key exception is if there are ‘‘tipping points’’ beyond which changes become irreversible. 

8 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Inventory of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 

Sinks: 1990-2007 (April 15, 2009), p. ES-14. 

Answer. In terms of the environmental benefit from reductions, the trajectory of 

emissions reductions (i.e., the shape of the emissions curve) is arguably immaterial,7

what matters is the total aggregate emissions over time (i.e., the area under the 

emissions curve). There are generally two camps on the optimal shape of the emissions curve: 1) those who argue that the curve should be relatively steep early (and 

flatter later on) to force the development of technology more quickly, reducing overall compliance costs in the future; and 2) those who argue that it will take time for 

technology to develop, and that requiring fewer reductions early on will allow entities to delay reductions until more cost-effective options are available. To some degree, entities’ individual decisions on banking reflect their view of technology. A 

firm that believes low-cost technology will be available in the future will be less 

likely to bank allowances early, while a firm that believes low-cost technology will 

not develop would be more likely to make early reductions and bank those for the 

future. 

Question 3c. Why do you regard the inclusion of a price floor as particularly important for investment in new energy technologies under a climate policy? 

Answer. CRS holds no position on this or any other policy. Those who support a 

price floor argue that, in the absence of a price floor, technology developers may be 

unwilling to invest due to the risk of an allowance price below the cost of the technology in question. A price floor allows technology developers certainty that their 

technology will always be competitive if it is less expensive than that floor. Opponents of a price floor tend to argue that it unnecessarily raises the cost of the program—if allowance prices are below expectations, that shows that the cap-and-trade 

system is working effectively and efficiently. 

Question 4. Since cap-and-trade programs are so inherently complex and farreaching: 

a) How can we be sure that any scheme is workable and can be implemented by 

the executive branch? 

b) How great are the risks of unintended consequences—for the economy and the 

environment? 

c) What sort of growth are we likely to need in federal agencies, particularly EPA, 

if the House-passed bill became law? 

Answer. Like any other regulatory policy, the regulating agency will need budget 

and other resources to implement the policy. EPA has some history implementing 

cap-and-trade programs such as the SO2 program. While it is unclear how much additional capacity EPA or other government agencies will need, it could be significant. As CRS states in our report on H.R. 2454: 

Compared with the complexity of implementing a greenhouse gas cap-and 

trade scheme, the SO2 program was simple. Conceptually, a CO2 tradable 

permit program could work similarly to the SO2 program. However, significant differences exist between the acid rain process and possible global 

warming factors that affect current abilities to model responses. For example, the acid rain program involves up to 3,000 new and existing electric 

generating units that contribute two-thirds of the country’s SO2. This concentration of sources (and the fact that they are stationary) makes the logistics of allowance trading administratively manageable and enforceable. 

The imposition of the allowance requirement is straightforward. The acid 

rain program is a ‘‘downstream’’ program focused on the electric utility industry. The allowance requirement is imposed at the point of SO2 emissions 

so the participant has a clear price signal to respond to. The basic dynamic 

of the program is simple, although not necessarily predictable. 

A comprehensive greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program would not be as 

straightforward to implement. Greenhouse gas emissions sources are not 

concentrated. Although over 80% of the greenhouse gases generated comes 

from fossil fuel combustion, only about 34% comes from electricity generation. Transportation accounts for about 28%, direct residential and commercial use about 11%, agriculture about 7%, and direct industrial use about 

19%.8 Thus, small dispersed sources in transportation, residential/commercial, agriculture, and the industrial sectors are far more important in controlling greenhouse gas emissions than they are in controlling SO2 emis-
78 

9 CRS Report R40809, Climate Change: Costs and Benefits of the Cap-and-Trade Provisions 

of H.R. 2454, by Larry Parker and Brent D. Yacobucci, p. 17. 10 CRS Report R40242, Carbon Tax and Greenhouse Gas Control: Options and Considerations 

for Congress, by Jonathan L. Ramseur and Larry Parker, Table 2, p. 31. 11 CBO, Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 2454 American Clean Energy and 

Security Act of 2009, Washington, DC, June 5, 2009, p. 4, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/102xx/ 

doc10262/hr2454.pdf. 12For more information on the regulation of allowances in a cap-and-trade program, see CRS 

Report RL34488, Regulating a Carbon Market: Issues Raised By the European Carbon and U.S. 

Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Markets, by Mark Jickling and Larry Parker. 13For more information, see CRS Report RL34488, Regulating a Carbon Market: Issues 

Raised By the European Carbon and U.S. Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Markets, by Mark Jickling 

and Larry Parker, and CRS Report RL34150, Climate Change and the EU Emissions Trading 

Scheme (ETS): Kyoto and Beyond, by Larry Parker. 

sions. This greatly increases the economic sectors and individual entities 

that may be required to reduce emissions.9

To some degree, the potential complexity of H.R. 2454’s program is limited 

through decisions made on the point of regulation. For example, instead of requiring 

emissions monitoring of over 200 million motor vehicles, the bill requires roughly 

400 petroleum refiners and importers to report their emissions and submit allowances.10 In total, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that roughly 

7,400 entities would be covered under H.R. 2454’s cap-and-trade program.11

To implement a program such as that in H.R. 2454, new government capabilities 

would likely include: monitoring and reporting of emissions from currently 

unmonitored sources (currently, only electric power plants are required to report 

their carbon dioxide emissions); a system for counting and awarding offsets under 

the cap-and-trade program (and certifying third-party verifiers); systems for determining the imbedded carbon content of imported goods; and procedures for determining that allowances allocated to non-covered entities are disposed of in accordance with the requirements of the bill. 

Question 5. Given the complexity and intricacy of some of these policy proposals, 

I am particularly concerned about the opportunities they might create for market 

manipulation, fraud, and for the development of arcane financial instruments that 

will lead us to the next major global financial crisis. Do you believe that these concerns are justified? How might opportunities for market manipulation be reduced 

through climate policy design? 

Answer. Currently emissions allowances (e.g., SO2 allowances) are regulated as 

commodities. H.R. 2454 contains provisions to more stringently regulate all commodities (not just allowances).12 Provisions include limits on the amount of allowances any single entity can purchase at a given auction, a limitation that only covered entities may participate in strategic reserve auctions, and the authority for the 

FERC to set position limits on overall market holdings. Other broad commodity regulation provisions include a requirement that over-the-counter swaps and other derivative transactions be settled and cleared through a clearinghouse. Whether those 

provisions would be sufficient to prevent market manipulation is unclear. 

Question 6. I understand that last December, the European Union made auctioning the default future allocation method for its emission trading system. 

a) Was that a tacit recognition that the best way to allocate carbon permits or 

emission allowances is by auction? 

b) What other ways is the European Commission working to correct the windfall 

and overallocation it experienced in the early years of the European emission trading system? 

c) What lessons can Congress learn from the European experience to avoid pitfalls 

in designing and implementing a carbon trading system? 

Answer. Currently, in the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), 

the vast majority of allowances are given to covered entities at no cost. In later periods, the EU has determined that a larger share of allowances will be auctioned.13

Problems encountered in the early phases of the ETS were largely driven by an 

over-allocation of allowances caused by poor data which overestimated the EU countries’ emissions. Arguably, the key lesson from that experience is that good emissions monitoring data is necessary to implement the program. 

Question 7. One of my concerns is that, as far as I can tell, allowances that are 

given away under cap-and-trade could be sold on the secondary market at a price 

that would undercut the government auction reserve price. 

a) Is this accurate, and do you see this as a potential problem for energy investments under such price uncertainty? 
79 

b) What happens if or when strategic allowance reserves run out in a cap-andtrade program? 

c) If a strategic reserve is used instead of an explicit price ceiling, then what happens if the strategic reserve is continually depleted? Do costs skyrocket at that 

point? 

Answer. If low prices in the secondary market undercut the reserve price in the 

primary market, then presumably firms would choose not to purchase allowances 

through the government auction. This seems unlikely to be sustained in the long 

run, as this would reduce total allowance supply since the number of new allowances entering the market would decline. Eventually the reduced supply of allowances should cause prices to rise above the reserve price, restoring demand for allowances from the primary auction. 

H.R. 2454 employs a strategic reserve as a sort of ‘‘relief valve’’ for allowance 

prices. If allowance prices run up too quickly, firms could tap into an additional supply of allowances at a relatively high reserve price. Under H.R. 2454, this emergency supply has been skimmed off the top of each year’s allocation. Under a strategic reserve system, once the reserve has been depleted, its ability to mitigate 

against high allowance prices is eliminated. Thus, the strategic reserve is not an 

explicit price ceiling, and may be used to mitigate against volatile allowance prices, 

but is unlikely to affect the long-run costs of the program. 

RESPONSE OF JOSEPH R. MASON, PH.D., TO QUESTION FROM SENATOR BINGAMAN

Question 1. EPA projections have indicated that there will be a very limited supply of offsets coming from projects based in the U.S., and that the vast majority of 

the offset supply will be coming from overseas. Are there policy choices we can make 

to increase the supply of high-quality domestic offsets, so a greater amount of funds 

spent purchasing offsets stays in the U.S.? 

Answer. It is surprising to me that domestic offset opportunities are thought to 

be so limited compared to those available internationally. Necessary preconditions 

for genuine and reliable offsets lie in property rights of the country of origin, such 

that ownership of the rights can be perfected and recompense mandated in the 

event of violation of the offset contract. While we take such property rights for 

granted in the US, such property rights are relatively rare in developing countries 

targeted for offset supply. 

Many of the countries of origin for proposed and actual offsets such as China, 

India, and Brazil, are less politically stable than the US, have weaker ownership 

rights over intangibles such as offsets, and otherwise present contract rights, labor 

rights, and human rights challenges that make them poor candidates for offset earnings subsidies created in the largest carbon program in the world. 

International sourcing of offsets seems to be more of a development allocation that 

is designed to keep those countries from pursuing high-carbon projects that can otherwise fuel their economic growth. Unlike even the traditional ‘‘Dutch disease’’ problem, however, it is doubtful in such unstable political environments that the gains 

from offsets will trickle down to economic development and growth even in the short 

term. 

Moreover, in the long term struggles for the cash flows in perpetuity can make 

political regimes ripe for conquest, both internally and externally. Internally, countries may rationally default on previously agreed offset deals in order to extract 

higher rents from developing countries that need those offsets for their carbon goals. 

Such strategies are akin to current too-big-to-fail problems in the financial industry, 

and present substantial holdup problems for US economic growth. Externally, military struggles for ‘‘passive’’ value can create further political instability in regions 

that are the proposed main sources of offsets. 

Those international dynamics, as well as the current economic and financial crisis, 

suggest that it may be wise to pursue more forcefully a credibly verifiable domestic 

offset supply that can provide a substantial share of offsets necessary for proposed 

policy. Such a policy can fuel domestic growth and conservation efforts, and will be 

necessary to provide an offset ‘‘bank’’ that can buffer shocks to international sources 

of offset supply, ranging from tsunamis, earthquakes, and forest fires, to military 

incursions to domestic unrest. 

In summary, it is imperative to construct a domestic offset system that can provide a sizeable portion of offset demand before pursuing a cap and trade policy relying crucially upon such terms. 
80 

RESPONSES OF JOSEPH R. MASON, PH.D., TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR MURKOWSKI

UTILIZATION OF REVENUES

Question 1. We should be honest about what a cap-and-trade program for reducing 

greenhouse gas emissions will do. Such a policy would essentially create a new form 

of currency and generate massive amounts of revenue through auctions, or financial 

largesse to be doled out in the form of free allowances. 

What do you think those revenues should be spent on and who should receive that 

money? 

Answer. As an economist, my reply is that it does not matter what the revenues 

are used for. Once the revenues are injected into the economy, they flow through 

individuals and financial institutions and feed economic growth. Along the way, they 

become available for investment in carbon-reducing technology or other projects valued by business and society. 

For example, let’s say the revenues are dividended to taxpayers. Every individual 

recipient now has more money to spend or save. If individuals spend the money, 

it is (eventually) saved by the recipient of the funds in the chain of transactions. 

Savings is motivated into investment through the US financial system. A carbon 

project entrepreneur, needing investment funds, now goes to her bank to borrow and 

receives a lower interest rate resulting from the increased supply of funds available 

to be lent. The carbon entrepreneur, faced with favorable business prospects, is likely to face an advantage over a carbon producer, who now faces higher costs of production. Hence, the carbon entrepreneur is likely to have an advantage in the market, exactly as intended. 

If desired, tax or interest subsidies can be targeted to carbon technology projects 

to further incentivize investment. Nonetheless, the total economic effects of the revenues have already cascaded through the economy. Only if the new investment is less 

productive than the one that would occur take place if the money were returned to 

taxpayers, it would be a net economic negative. Of course, it is difficult to tell 

whether this is the case with any one policy. Hence, the system is best kept simple. 

As an individual, and recognizing the boundaries of economic theory, there exists 

a fairness criterion that must be addressed in the allocation. That is why, in economics, we refer to a ‘‘helicopter drop’’ of money into the economy. Hence, policy options run the gamut from dividending the funds to individual taxpayers (along what 

distributional criterion that must, again, satisfy a fairness test), funneling those to 

social programs, or targeting those to clean energy projects. Barring the identification of an obvious market failure that prevents a hyper-productive industry from receiving funding and using the funds to address that shortcoming, the economic effect is the same for any allocation: only the fairness criterion is important, no matter what the distribution. 

TRANSPARENCY IN COMPLIANCE COSTS

Question 2. Price volatility in any climate policy—outside of a carbon tax—is inevitable, and may not be reflected transparently in bills or fees, but embedded in the 

price at the pump, the grocery store, and elsewhere. 

Should we require these additional costs to be identified and printed on utility 

bills and elsewhere, so that consumers know exactly how much their contributing 

to climate change mitigation efforts? 

Answer. I see no economic value to requiring the additional costs to be identified 

and printed on utility bills and elsewhere. 

In contrast, such a requirement—multiplied by hundreds of millions of bills and 

receipts printed annually—will impose substantial compliance costs on firms with 

little obvious benefit. Just, for instance, multiply the average number of terminals 

at each gas station (as I recall, about twelve) by the number of gas stations (115,223 

(in 2008)) times the cost of the terminals (about $200 each) to get the cost of terminal replacement. The numbers are familiar to me because the industry went 

through a similar replacement when the credit card associations restricted the card 

number information from being printed in full on each receipt, necessitating such 

a change. The cost to a single large oil company for that change was in the billions 

of dollars. Compliance costs (do you have to report today’s carbon price or an average, where do you get the data from, etc. . .) will add to that bill. 

Moreover, such policy will undoubtedly contribute to waste of ink and toner 

(which contain trace heavy metals) and paper (we want save the trees to produce 

the carbon) in ways that are contrary to the intent of environmental consciousness, 

in general, and carbon reduction, in particular. 
81 

SUSCEPTIBILITY OF OFFSETS TO FRAUD

Question 3. A recent UK Telegraph article highlighted the value-added tax (VAT) 

fraud that has recently occurred in their offset market. A total of 7 arrests were 

made and many more investigations into carbon credit fraud are underway. 

How can the United States prevent a similar type of fraud from occurring if we 

were to adopt a mandatory cap-and-trade program that includes widespread use of 

international offsets? 

Does the considerable volume (up to 1 billion tons per year, or more) envisioned 

by the House bill lend itself to an offset market that is even more difficult to control? 

What organization do you think is capable of regulating that large of a market? 

Answer. Good question. I recently had a dialog with one of the largest VAT refund 

firms in the world on just this topic. They view the issue of pursuing fraud in the 

growing market as a valuable business opportunity. 

As mentioned in my reply to Sen. Bingaman, China, India, and Brazil, the three 

main countries of origin for proposed and actual offsets, are generally less politically 

stable than the US, have weaker ownership rights over intangibles such as offsets, 

and otherwise present labor and human rights challenges that make them poor candidates for offset earnings subsidies created in the largest carbon program in the 

world. 

The undeveloped legal and political institutions in those countries are the 

lynchpin of an economically and environmentally meaningful role of offsets in US 

carbon policy. Hence, I would not expect to proceed without substantial frictions. 

More importantly, as you bring up here, there currently exists no international 

body of law that can settle sovereign contract disputes. We felt the effects of that 

shortcoming in the recent financial crisis, when the inability to pursue international 

assets of US firms in bankruptcy necessitated bailouts of several large international 

financial institutions. At best, treaties and agreements could eventually be worked 

out to cover some of the difficulties among developed countries, but developing countries would most likely abrogate treaty terms in the event of a shock sizeable 

enough to be of economic importance. 

Hence, we need to assume—even with treaties in place with developing countries—that there is no body of law to rely upon to enforce offset contracts in the 

event of a major dispute. Sovereigns default on debt and expropriate assets in other 

realms—to expect carbon offset markets to develop without similar shocks would be 

heroic. 

TRANSFER OF WEALTH

Question 4. The European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme began implementation in 2005. In the first phase, emissions covered under the Scheme rose by 0.8% 

across the EU as a whole. Additionally, the price of carbon fell to almost zero. 

Since not all member countries had the same requirements, the European Scheme 

acted as a transfer of wealth. It simply forced countries with higher requirements 

to pay more to countries with lower requirements to purchase their credits. 

If the U.S. takes a ‘go at it alone’ approach, are you concerned that the same 

transfer of wealth will occur from our American businesses to foreign entities as 

they purchase carbon credits? 

Answer. While I am not sure from the form of your question whether you are referring to requirements in terms of allocation levels, carbon limits, or initial price 

levels, I think I can get to the root of the economic principle that you seek. 

We would expect prices and permits to gravitate from where those are less valuable to where they are more valuable in the short term. In the long term, if factors 

of production (of which carbon permits are intended to be one) are inflexible, production may flow abroad, as well. 

But whether we are talking about production, financial flows, or carbon permits, 

all markets work to allocate products efficiently, defined as flowing from those who 

value the good relatively less to those who value the good relatively more. While 

international economics takes this flow as a fundamental condition of labor availability, resource allocations, and productivity (among other things), carbon policy inherently applies a value to abatement that is unobservable until held in comparison 

to that of other countries through the market mechanism. Get the value too low, 

and your carbon permits merely flow out of the country. Get the value too high, and 

others’ permits flow to you. If we value carbon abatement ‘‘too low’’ in the US, we 

fully expect to fail to achieve the reduced domestic production of carbon that is 

sought under the policy. 
82 

RESPONSES OF JOSEPH R. MASON, PH.D., TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CANTWELL

Question 1a. What role does the compliance period play in reducing price volatility? 

Question 1b. Are there any substantial differences in price volatility between rolling compliance periods and fixed compliance dates? 

Question 1c. To minimize price volatility, how much time should firms have between the emissions of greenhouse gases and the acquisition (and surrender) of allowances? One year or less? Two years? Three years? Five years? 

Answer. In my view, it is not the compliance period construct that reduces volatility so much as market liquidity. The compliance period, in contrast, is merely a 

method of restraining the costs of recordkeeping and regulatory compliance efforts. 

That said, real time compliance is the most economically efficient and meaningful, 

but also the most costly, compliance paradigm. Let me explain. 

The reason for my view of the relationship between price volatility and compliance 

lies in the fact that in order to meet compliance requirements firms will keep a 

stock or permits to meet expected production demand and then an ‘‘excess’’ reserve 

to meet unexpected demand. Excess reserve demand will be a function of price volatility, not a cause of that volatility. If volatility is high or markets are illiquid, excess reserve demand will be high. If volatility is low and or markets are liquid, excess reserve demand will be low. 

As for the efficiency of real-time compliance, longer compliance periods need to address the problem of what happens if a firm enters bankruptcy between the reporting and compliance deadlines? Such an occurrence (and one will occur, even 

intraday), will have to be dealt with by regulators and bankruptcy courts, especially 

since no one will lend to the bankruptcy entity for compliance and it may have sold 

its own permits to raise cash prior to default. 

In summary then, the compliance period should be as short as practical after the 

reporting period and has little to do with price volatility. 

Question 2a. What is a reasonable number of allowances, as a percentage of yearly 

emissions, that firms would be able to bank for future emissions and compliance 

dates? 

Question 2b. How long are firms likely to retain allowances for future use? Is 

there likely to be a limit to their willingness to keep these assets on their balance 

sheets? 

Answer. Similar to my response above, it is important to allow firms to bank excess reserves that meet their own needs and management preferences. Some firms 

will choose to manage permit needs aggressively, preferring to borrow to meet idiosyncratic needs when they arise. Others will choose to keep a large stock of reserves 

on hand. Choices of management styles will probably break down according to industry and economic conditions, varying over time as well as across the economy. 

One size of policy cannot, therefore, be expected to fit all. 

As for how long permits should remain valid, I don’t think you want to force them 

to be used, but you may wish to know how may remain outstanding year to year. 

Hence, while you may wish to force last years’ permits to be redeemed for this 

years’, in my opinion you would want to reward, not punish, the firm for economizing on carbon output. 

Question 3. To reach the 2050 emissions targets that scientists agree are necessary to avert catastrophic climate change, is there an affordable option at midcentury that does not incorporate either a significant amount of coal with carbon 

capture and sequestration technology or a substantial expansion of nuclear power? 

Answer. I am not an expert in this area. My lay reading of the literature is that 

renewable such as wind, wave, and solar cannot make up a substantial portion of 

production assuming reasonable growth in productive capacity per installed unit or 

operation. I defer to the climate scientists for a more detailed and informed explanation. 

Question 4a. From a strictly economic viewpoint, how can the pathway of the 

emissions reductions or the trajectory of the cap’s emissions reductions affect the 

costs of a climate policy? 

Question 4b. For a fixed amount of cumulative emissions, what might the optimal 

shape of that emissions pathway be? 

Answer. We know little about the projected pathway from an economic standpoint. 

Given what we know about the costs and availability of major carbon reducing tech 

(new nuclear capacity, carbon capture and storage) plus the time frame for turnover 

of capital we would expect a reduction curve that’s flatter in the near term (i.e. less 

aggressive) and steeper in later years (i.e. past 2030) to be less costly overall. 

The whole point of cap and trade theory is to let the market decide the most efficient path, allowing markets to bid up permit prices to the highest marginal value 
83 

of emissions, incentivizing firms that are best able to cheaply economize on emissions to rationally do so. The expense of carbon permits prevents additional investment where emissions are difficult to restrain, leading to reductions in carbon emissions from those most expensive sources. Without the market, only an omnipotent 

central planner can come close to the efficient path of adjustment in lieu of the market mechanism. 

Hence, cap and trade without the cap—that is cap and trade with an overlaid carbon market efficiency board used to manipulate prices—can only deviate from the 

most efficient path of adjustment, hindering the creative destruction created by 

market forces to stanch the creativity and mitigate the destruction, which effectively 

draws out the adjustment for longer than need be the case. 

Question 5. Why do you regard the inclusion of a price floor as particularly important for investment in new energy technologies under a climate policy? 

Answer. I think it is important to place a price on carbon emissions in order to 

even begin to price the externality of carbon emissions and nudge firms to investment decisions consistent with policy decisions. A tax, in this regard, is a price floor 

and works toward policy goals. 

Moreover, it appears that Europe is headed toward a hybrid tax and cap and 

trade system, whereby France is moving to set a tax-based floor in parallel with the 

existing cap and trade framework. It seems to me that, knowing what we know now 

about price volatility and market dynamics, if setting up a system today we would 

start with a nominal tax to set that floor and then gradually implement the cap and 

trade market structure on top of the tax overlay. That way you get immediate benefits and can learn about the intricacies of cap and trade in a controlled fashion as 

implementation proceeds. In a way, you don’t have all of your climate change policy 

eggs in one basket, helping to ensure economically and environmentally meaningful 

results. 

Question 6. Since cap-and-trade programs are so inherently complex and farreaching: 

a) How can we be sure that any scheme is workable and can be implemented by 

the executive branch? 

b) How great are the risks of unintended consequences—for the economy and the 

environment? 

c) What sort of growth are we likely to need in federal agencies, particularly EPA, 

if the House-passed bill became law? 

Answer. The first part of this question is exactly the point: we cannot be at all 

certain that the type of cap and trade-program we are developing will work at all, 

due in combination to the less-than-perfect fitting externality that is carbon, the 

complexity and dynamics of the contract design, and the management of the carbon 

market efficiency board. 

We are discussing the issue of carbon emissions reductions because we believe 

such reductions are important to the environment. Hence, I think it is wisest to rely 

to various degrees on a mix of policies, weighing more on traditional taxes and less 

on innovative cap and trade schemes, to ensure an environmentally meaningful solution. 

The risks if a carbon market crisis are very real, and the costs of regulation of 

that market and its participants, as well as carbon emissions, is likely to be very 

high. Moreover, while much discussion has centered around how to distribute revenues from initial allocations of carbon permits, I do not recall any discussion of paying for monitoring and infrastructure needs before distributing revenues to the public. 

The costs of the regulation and monitoring system—which will span firms emitting carbon as well as carbon markets—are likely to dwarf those of something like 

the existing banking system, and those costs are likely to be incurred through multiple regulatory agencies, including but not limited to EPA. The reason for my opinion is that the system will require multiple layers of ‘‘carbon examiners’’ to verify 

monitoring technology, ‘‘collections officers’’ to verify the forms of payment for emissions, and ‘‘market regulators’’ to police trading market participants. All of those 

tasks will be carried out according to an, as yet, unknown body of regulatory rules 

that will have to be constructed and will evolve through decisionmaking with comment periods and review. We are creating an entire industry by government fiat, 

from the instruments of value through the mechanism of trade. That will not be 

cheap. 

Question 7. Given the complexity and intricacy of some of these policy proposals, 

I am particularly concerned about the opportunities they might create for market 

manipulation, fraud, and for the development of arcane financial instruments that 

will lead us to the next major global financial crisis. Do you believe that these con-
84 

cerns are justified? How might opportunities for market manipulation be reduced 

through climate policy design? 

Answer. While it is difficult to say a priori how market manipulation and fraud 

may evolve, one can be sure that millions of traders with dollars at stake will examine the contract and trading rules thoroughly and discover loopholes no relatively 

small (in comparison) set of policymakers can detect. The concerns are very justified, and a system will have to be set in place to police nefarious activity and modify 

the system quickly in response, where needed. Hence, even a carbon market efficiency board will not be a passive entity, merely looking after the permit supply, 

but passive in addressing market dynamics as they evolve. 

Question 8. I understand that last December, the European Union made auctioning the default future allocation method for its emission trading system. 

a) Was that a tacit recognition that the best way to allocate carbon permits or 

emission allowances is by auction? 

b) What other ways is the European Commission working to correct the windfall 

and overallocation it experienced in the early years of the European emission trading system? 

c) What lessons can Congress learn from the European experience to avoid pitfalls 

in designing and implementing a carbon trading system? 

Answer. As state previously, auction mechanisms or ‘‘free’’ allocations are equal 

in the mind of an economist, barring overt redistributional policy goals. To an economist, the money moves through the economy either way. The only difference being 

whether it starts in the hands of the government as a result of the auction or in 

the hands of businesses as a result of the ‘‘free’’ allocation. 

The windfall and overallocation problems are related to the inability to set a hard 

‘‘cap’’ for the cap and trade to regulate. I reiterate, the essence of cap and trade is 

that cap—which forms benefit certainty—and the lack of price limits that discipline 

firms to work within the cap. Without agreed upon scientific evidence to properly 

identify the size of cap necessary in any one period or any one country to achieve 

long term environmental goals, there will always be debate about moving that cap, 

creating price volatility from the policy variance. 

Question 9. One of my concerns is that, as far as I can tell, allowances that are 

given away under cap-and-trade could be sold on the secondary market at a price 

that would undercut the government auction reserve price. 

a) Is this accurate, and do you see this as a potential problem for energy investments under such price uncertainty? 

b) What happens if or when strategic allowance reserves run out in a cap-andtrade program? 

c) If a strategic reserve is used instead of an explicit price ceiling, then what happens if the strategic reserve is continually depleted? Do costs skyrocket at that 

point? 

Answer. The concern you voice is nothing more than the difference between spot 

and future prices. The only permits that would sell on secondary markets are those 

not immediately needed for compliance. Until it is established that they are not 

needed, they must be ‘‘carried’’ at a positive opportunity cost, the interest rate representing the cost of capital. Hence, the all-in futures price should be the spot price 

plus storage cost. 

Sometimes, as is common with commodities, the futures price is persistently more 

than the spot price plus storage, representing the ‘‘convenience yield’’ of having the 

spot contract on hand if needed. This process, known as backwardation is a common 

characteristic of many commodities contracts where the underlying is a production 

input and seems to be the focus of your question. Such market conditions are normal for production inputs and should not be a concern. 

The opposite of a backwardation structure is contango—where futures prices are 

less than spot prices plus storage. Empirical evidence from the EU carbon market 

shows that the carbon futures market illustrates characteristics not of 

backwardation, but of contango But the financial economics literature suggests that 

commodities with contango structures usually have readily available inventories 

that are easily accessed and stored and stable supply and demand functions. Those 

conditions contradict the performance of carbon markets to date. Even if cap and 

trade contracts have no cost of storage and are easily accessed, levels of supply and 

demand for carbon emissions are not easily predicted. In addition, the level of inventories for cap and trade contracts is dependent on current emission levels and availability of offsets, which are stochastic and unpredictable. 

What happens when strategic reserves run out is a policy question. If more reserves are added, nothing need happen. If policy prevents reserves from being 
85 

added, prices necessarily rise. Only uncertainty around the chosen policy path will 

dictate the degree of price volatility along the adjustment curve. That is why central 

banks often precommit to policy rules that can smooth adjustment in undue circumstances. 

Question 10. Under the House bill, I understand that the strategic reserve fund 

in H.R. 2454 is replenished using international forestry offsets. But with all of the 

other offsets proposed in the House bill are these likely to be available in sufficient 

numbers to rebuild the reserve, especially in the longer-term? What would this 

imply for cost control and for the overall viability of the cap-and-trade policy? 

Answer. If the system is implemented before sufficient offsets are available the 

lack of such offsets could induce substantial disruptive price dynamics. As discussed 

above, it is imperative to construct an offset system that can provide a sizeable portion of offset demand before pursuing a cap and trade policy relying crucially upon 

such terms. 

Question 11. Could you please summarize the pitfalls of carbon market design 

that you have observed in the EU ETS and other emissions trading systems that 

you would want to avoid in U.S. climate policy architecture? 

Answer. First, as discussed previously, it appears that price volatility and continued price pressures in Europe has resulted in its heading toward a hybrid tax and 

cap and trade system, whereby France is moving to set a tax-based floor on top of 

existing cap and trade framework. It seems to me that, knowing what we know now 

about price volatility and market dynamics, if setting up a system today we would 

start with a nominal tax to set that floor. Later, if desired, we could experiment 

with limited applications of a cap and trade market structure on top of the tax overlay. That way you get immediate benefits and can learn about the intricacies of cap 

and trade in a controlled fashion as implementation proceeds. In a way, you don’t 

have all of your climate change policy eggs in one basket, helping to ensure economically and environmentally meaningful results. 

Second, our own experience with the SO2 system in the US has taught us the perils of policy uncertainty. When a court case challenged the validity of the system 

prices plummeted, only to rebound when the case upheld the existing policy approach. Nonetheless, the uncertainty led to a lengthy disruption in price dynamics 

in the market. 

Third, policy implementation periods and targets need to be linked to smooth implementation over time. 

Overall, however, the biggest lesson is that we really don’t know what to expect, 

given the demonstration of contango price dynamics with policy and weather volatility, trending ever lower until necessitation a flat tax to maintain even the spectre 

of a reasonable user fee. The important thing to know is that there is still a lot we 

don’t know. 

Question 12. Is it even possible to avoid creating a carbon market that is so vulnerable to manipulation? 

Answer. Probably not. The only markets traders don’t try to manipulate are the 

ones that don’t matter. Even if policymakers create the perfect market, there will 

always be fraud. We will have to stay forever vigilant to maintain this market if 

we are to see it confer meaningful economic and environmental benefits. 

RESPONSES OF JASON GRUMET TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BINGAMAN

Question 1a. In your testimony, you discuss using allowance revenue to directly 

fund offset projects and other projects that will reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 

Do you expect that this will deliver greater reductions at lower cost than through 

the use of an offsets market? In other words, are offsets necessarily the most costeffective way to obtain reductions? 

Answer. Offsets reduce program costs and increase regulatory flexibility by allowing companies to take advantage of low-cost abatement opportunities outside the 

cap-and-trade system. Offsets are an effective way to obtain reductions. Domestic 

offsets also promote innovation in offset markets and ensure that money moves to 

agriculture and forestry projects even if the bureaucracy moves slower than hoped. 

However, any offsets program must balance the need for investor certainty, reasonable transaction costs, and administrative simplicity (all of which can affect offset 

price) with assurance that offset projects have environmental integrity. 

The crucial difference between offsets and allowance set-asides is that whereas 

offset credits are additional to the cap, set-aside allowances are taken from under 

the cap. Since set-aside allowances are already part of the cap, total emissions from 

regulated sources do not rise above the cap level under the set-aside approach. Con-
86 

versely, in certain instances, offsets may allow regulated entities to increase their 

emissions. 

The advantage of a set-aside approach is that it would allow for a less rigorous 

demonstration of emissions reductions: while applicants for a share of the set-aside 

pool would still need to document emissions reductions commensurate with the 

quantity of allowances they wish to claim, there would be less pressure to precisely 

measure these reductions. Likewise, reliance on allowance set-asides rather than 

offset credits could allow for a less rigorous approach to issues like additionality and 

permanence. 

Question 1b. Are there certain types of projects that this method of funding is 

more suited to that an offsets market would not deliver? 

Answer. Many agricultural and forestry sequestration projects in the U.S. require 

complex carbon accounting. A cap-and-trade program that provides for both offset 

credits and set-aside allowances will give agricultural producers the flexibility to 

choose different levels of rigor in documenting emissions benefits and will help to 

deliver maximum economic and environmental benefits from low-cost mitigation opportunities in the agriculture sector. Offset credits should be available for agriculture-based mitigation projects—including soil carbon sequestration projects—that 

can meet rigorous standards for assuring measurement, additionality, and permanence. Set-aside allowances taken from under the cap provide a particularly effective mechanism for rewarding these types of projects that provide important carbon 

benefits, but that may have more difficulty meeting these tests, such as no-till practices undertaken before the cap-and-trade program goes into effect (so-called ‘early 

action’ projects). A hybrid approach can respond effectively to the twin imperatives 

of (a) ensuring overall program integrity and (b) allowing for maximum participation 

by the agricultural sector. 

Question 2. EPA projections have indicated that there will be a very limited supply of offsets coming from projects based in the U.S., and that the vast majority of 

the offset supply will be coming from overseas. Are there policy choices we can make 

to increase the supply of high-quality domestic offsets, so a greater amount of funds 

spent purchasing offsets stays in the U.S.? 

Answer. Since offsets come from sources outside the cap, exempting more sectors 

from the cap would increase the potential supply of domestic offsets. But there are 

countervailing policy considerations that must be weighed against such an approach. EPA’s analysis of H.R. 2454 (Waxman-Markey) indicates that the majority 

of domestic offsets will come from domestic afforestation, forest management, utilization of animal waste methane, and other agricultural methane and nitrous oxide 

management strategies. Agriculture and forestry sector offsets share many of the inherent challenges of offsets in other sectors, and several additional ones. 

Dedicating—or ‘‘setting aside’’—a percentage of allowances from within the emissions cap or overall budget under a cap-and-trade program could allow the U.S. to 

essentially undertake a large-scale demonstration program aimed at resolving some 

of the issues specific to awarding offset credits for carbon sequestration in agricultural soils, while both allaying concerns about program integrity and creating new 

economic opportunities in rural communities. A variation on this approach would be 

to have provisions for both regular offset credits and set-aside allowances for soil 

carbon sequestration. Regular offset credits would only be available for soil carbon 

projects that can meet rigorous standards for measurement, additionality, and permanence. Set-aside allowances that are taken from under the cap could reward 

projects that provide important carbon benefits, but that may have more difficulty 

meeting these tests. A requisite for awarding set-aside credits would be careful monitoring and evaluation so as to determine benefits with more confidence and learn 

from the experience. 

RESPONSES OF JASON GRUMET TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR MURKOWSKI

UTILIZATION OF REVENUES

Question 1. We should be honest about what a cap-and-trade program for reducing 

greenhouse gas emissions will do. Such a policy would essentially create a new form 

of currency and generate massive amounts of revenue through auctions, or financial 

largesse to be doled out in the form of free allowances. 

What do you think those revenues should be spent on and who should receive that 

money? 

Answer. As you note, allowance allocation is a highly contentious issue in the climate debate due to the significant value of emission allowances at stake. Yet despite 

the intense debate, we believe it is possible to design an allocation program that 

includes an equitable distribution centered on the principle of mitigating economic 
87 

harm. We believe that the focus of free allocations should be to help enable the transition by entities and communities to a lower carbon future. 

An allowance allocation program should: 

• Protect households, especially low-and moderate-income households, from adverse economic impacts as a result of higher energy prices under a climate program; 

• Support energy-intensive industries in making a viable transition to a lower 

carbon footprint without resulting in the significant export of jobs and emissions 

to our trade competitors; 

• Provide incentives for increased investment in the research, development, and 

deployment efforts needed to advance critical no-and low-carbon technologies 

and for investment in needed adaptation measures; 

• Phase out quickly, with most of the funds raised through the allowance auctions 

then going to the general treasury. 

There are compelling arguments for using a portion of the allowance value 

(whether through a free allocation or the use of auction revenues) to compensate for 

the economic impacts on utilities and industry, in particular energy-intensive industries. These firms will undoubtedly bear a significant portion of the cost of the program, and mitigating energy price impacts in the early years of the program would 

allow firms needed time to invest in new capital and adjust to changes in relative 

energy prices. Allowances should be distributed to impacted sectors, including enduse consumers, according to relative cost burden. After the allocations have phased 

out, auction revenue could serve a similar purpose. 

EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATION VERSUS INCENTIVES

Question 2. The bill sent over to us from the House not only caps emissions from 

sources emitting more than 25,000 tons annually, but imposes command-and-control 

style regulation of sources below that threshold. 

Do you think it is better to provide incentives for the reduction of these smaller 

emissions, through offset projects and other means, than to subject relatively insignificant sources to complicated and inflexible regulation? 

What ability would these newly regulated sources, under the House bill, have to 

contain costs? 

Answer. It is quite possible that there is a good economic/environmental argument 

for excluding sources under 25,000 tons altogether. There are a couple of ways, however, to address sources smaller than 25,000 tons (but above 10,000 tons). Your 2007 

Bingaman-Murkowski-Specter cap and trade bill solved that problem by taking an 

upstream approach for regulating the carbon content of fuels. 

Another option is to lower the emissions threshold for stationary sources to 10,000 

tons so those smaller sources would be able to trade allowances just like the larger 

sources, rather than being included under an EPA mandated command and control 

program. You can simply allow such sources to participate in the offset market. 

EFFECTIVENESS OF LDCS FOR COST CONTAINMENT

Question 3. Under the auspices of cost containment, the House bill relies heavily 

on a requirement that savings associated with free allowances given to Local Distribution Companies be passed on to their customers. The Center for Budget Policy 

and Priorities has pointed out that more than 60% of the LDC customers are business, not residential consumers. And CBO has concluded that businesses receiving 

this relief as a fixed rebate on their bill would retain that relief as added profit, 

rather than pass it on to their own customers in the form of lower prices for their 

products. 

Do you believe this is a flawed approach to cost containment and, if so, how can 

we more explicitly limit the exposure of Americans to the costs of a cap-and-trade 

regime? 

Answer. NCEP supports a price collar (with either a hard price cap or a properly 

designed strategic allowance reserve) as a robust cost containment mechanism for 

overall program costs. As a related but separate provision, NCEP also supports use 

of allowance allocation to protect consumers from the economic impacts of higher 

energy costs. The value of allowances allocated to electricity LDCs can help offset 

higher energy costs without dampening incentives for efficiency and conservation. 

All classes of electricity consumers (households, business, and industrial entities) 

will experience price increases—small businesses and U.S. manufacturers are particularly vulnerable—and should receive the value of allocated allowances. You raise 

an important question with respect to LDC pass-through and we would encourage 
88 

the Energy Committee to hold a hearing focused on how LDC allocations would 

work in practice. 

NCEP also supports added protection for low-and moderate-income families. The 

CBPP actually proposes several suggested mechanisms to reach these consumers, 

particularly those who would not benefit from tax rebates. 

RESPONSES OF JASON GRUMET TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CANTWELL

Question 1a. What role does the compliance period play in reducing price volatility? 

Answer. In general, longer compliance periods for regulated entities could help 

marginally in reducing volatility, but should not be relied upon to play an integral 

role in reducing price volatility. A price collar or safety valve is a stronger means 

of reducing volatility. 

Question 1b. Are there any substantial differences in price volatility between rolling compliance periods and fixed compliance dates? 

Answer. Rolling compliance periods create the equivalent of banking, which would 

help to smooth volatility. 

Question 1c. To minimize price volatility, how much time should firms have between the emissions of greenhouse gases and the acquisition (and surrender) of allowances? One year or less? Two years? Three years? Five years? 

Answer. We fully support unlimited banking. We don’t believe that drawing out 

the surrender time will have that great of an effect on volatility. The SO2 program 

has achieved success with a twelve month compliance period followed by a 90 day 

true up period. We strongly believe that a price collar or well-functioning strategic 

reserve would provide a more comprehensive solution to volatility. 

Question 2a. What is a reasonable number of allowances, as a percentage of yearly 

emissions, that firms would be able to bank for future emissions and compliance 

dates? 

Answer. We don’t see a rationale for limiting banking, as a limit will simply discourage early action. 

Question 2b. How long are firms likely to retain allowances for future use? Is 

there likely to be a limit to their willingness to keep these assets on their balance 

sheets? 

Answer. A firm’s willingness to hold future vintage allowances is based on its assessment of regulatory risk and the future supply/demand balance for the commodity. As long as a firm is confident in the long term sustainability of the climate 

program, there is no reason it should not be willing to keep allowances on its balance sheet. 

Question 3. To reach the 2050 emissions targets that scientists agree are necessary to avert catastrophic climate change, is there an affordable option at midcentury that does not incorporate either a significant amount of coal with carbon 

capture and sequestration technology or a substantial expansion of nuclear power? 

Answer. The role of a cap-and-trade program is not to pick technology winners, 

but to put a price on carbon that allows the market to make informed decisions 

about which technologies to deploy. It is impossible to predict exactly what technological breakthroughs may occur between now and mid century. Based on current 

knowledge, large amounts of nuclear or coal with carbon capture and sequestration, 

or a combination thereof, are likely necessary to achieve emissions goals while preserving abundant, affordable and reliable electricity. 

Question 4a. From a strictly economic viewpoint, how can the pathway of the 

emissions reductions or the trajectory of the cap’s emissions reductions affect the 

costs of a climate policy? 

Answer. One of the reasons the Commission believes that U.S. action on climate 

change is needed now is that sustained inaction creates a situation whereby the 

emission cuts needed over the next few decades to avoid dangerous levels of warming must be that much deeper and costlier. Under a well-designed climate bill, emissions limits would be initially modest and ramp up in a gradual and predictable way 

over multiple years, with effective mechanisms in place from the outset to (a) guard 

against high or excessively volatile allowance prices and (b) protect low-income 

households and trade-sensitive, energy-intensive businesses. This approach will provide time and a favorable investment environment for robust low-carbon technology 

alternatives to become available, thereby reducing climate-related costs to the economy in the long run. It will also help ensure that the transition to a low-carbon 

economy provides a steady impetus for the creation of durable new industries and 

employment opportunities. 

Most importantly, a successful bill will deliver clarity about U.S. climate policy 

and certainty about carbon costs going forward. This is the critical issue for busi-
89 

nesses attempting to make strategic investments in new energy technology and 

long-lived infrastructure. It is also the central priority from the standpoint of engaging major developing countries in a re-invigorated international process. 

Question 4b. For a fixed amount of cumulative emissions, what might the optimal 

shape of that emissions pathway be? 

Answer. Because it is cumulative global emissions that are critical, determining 

whether there is a single optimal shape of the emissions pathway from an economic 

perspective is complex. The Commission has long advocated beginning in a moderate and achievable manner to begin reducing emissions, which will provide more 

flexibility later on as uncertainties around necessary cumulative emissions limits 

are reduced. It will also send a clear signal to speed technology development and 

then steepen the slope as those technologies take hold. 

Question 5. Why do you regard the inclusion of a price floor as particularly important for investment in new energy technologies under a climate policy? 

Answer. Along with a cap on allowance prices at the high end, the Commission 

supports the concept of a floor, or lower limit, on allowance prices in case abatement 

costs prove significantly lower than expected. A price floor along with a price ceiling 

should be considered because allowance prices in past market-based regulatory programs have more often proved to be lower than expected, rather than higher than 

expected—in some cases because emissions budgets were inflated, in some cases because other factors (such as slower-than-expected economic growth) temporarily reduced demand for allowances. 

Some price stability at the low end, as well as at the high end, would assure that 

there are sufficient—and sufficiently consistent—incentives for investment in lowcarbon technologies over time (along with sufficient disincentives to new investment 

in long lived carbon-intensive infrastructure). Combining a price floor with a price 

ceiling could thus be quite important to the successful development of new climatefriendly industries and could help ensure that artificially low prices in the short 

term don’t lead to significantly higher costs in the long run, when deeper emission 

reductions are needed to achieve program goals. 

Question 6. Since cap-and-trade programs are so inherently complex and farreaching: 

a) How can we be sure that any scheme is workable and can be implemented by 

the executive branch? 

Answer. It has been the Commission’s considered view for some time that the benefits of prudent but imperfect action profoundly outweigh the arguments for further 

delay. Debate on the critical substantive issues has narrowed. In fact, viable solutions to six of the most contentious features of a national climate policy—cost-containment, state/federal harmonization, international participation and competitiveness, offsets, allowance allocation and revenue recycling, and market oversight—can 

be found in existing legislative proposals. We also have confidence in the ability of 

Congress to oversee the program and make necessary adjustments. 

b) How great are the risks of unintended consequences—for the economy and the 

environment? 

Answer. With appropriate program design and particularly cost control, the risks 

of considerable ecological and economic consequences from inaction are far larger 

than any risk from acting. In recent testimony before Congress, Dr. R.K. Pachauri, 

Chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), noted that 

evidence for warming of the climate system is now ‘‘unequivocal’’ and warned that 

‘‘[d]elayed emission reductions significantly constrain the opportunities to achieve 

lower stabilization levels and increase the risk of more severe climate change impacts.’’ Already, experts warn that the more protective stabilization goals often discussed in recent years are moving rapidly out of reach. Moreover, the latest developments in climate science lend greater urgency to the case for action: effects on natural systems are already being observed and recent findings concerning the potential scope and magnitude of damages from future warming are increasingly worrisome. 

A diverse group of stakeholders that includes military experts, CEOs of major oil 

companies and electric utilities, labor leaders, state governments, religious leaders, 

sportsmen, and environmental advocates recognize that the intolerable (and probably far more costly) alternative to a clear federal policy is continued uncertainty, 

international paralysis, and reliance on highly imperfect regulatory mechanisms 

such as those triggered by EPA’s recent finding that greenhouse gases endanger 

human health and welfare under the Clean Air Act. 
90 

c) What sort of growth are we likely to need in federal agencies, particularly EPA, 

if the House-passed bill became law? 

Answer. In June, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that fully 

funding federal agencies’ administrative costs for implementing the House-passed 

bill would require gross appropriations totaling $540 million in 2010 and $8.2 billion 

over the 2010-2019 period. Their estimate is based on historical information on how 

large regulatory programs have been implemented and on information provided by 

EPA, FERC and other federal agencies with significant administrative responsibilities under the House bill. 

Question 7. Given the complexity and intricacy of some of these policy proposals, 

I am particularly concerned about the opportunities they might create for market 

manipulation, fraud, and for the development of arcane financial instruments that 

will lead us to the next major global financial crisis. Do you believe that these concerns are justified? How might opportunities for market manipulation be reduced 

through climate policy design? 

Answer. We share your concerns about the need for market oversight and, in the 

coming months, NCEP will release a set of recommendations addressing this issue 

in detail. We believe It is possible to limit opportunities for market manipulation 

without implementing excessive regulations that compromise the efficiency of a capand-trade program. A carbon market shares both the benefits and potential pitfalls 

of financial markets in general. Therefore, carbon market controls will be addressed 

in the context of broader market reforms being considered today and, once created, 

may require additional regulatory oversight. 

The design of climate policy can significantly reduce the opportunity of market 

manipulation. NCEP strongly supports a robust cost containment mechanism—such 

as a price collar or strategic allowance reserve—that will limit price volatility in addition to controlling overall program costs. An upper and lower bound on allowance 

prices can limit opportunities for market speculation. 

Question 8. I understand that last December, the European Union made auctioning the default future allocation method for its emission trading system. 

a) Was that a tacit recognition that the best way to allocate carbon permits or 

emission allowances is by auction? 

Answer. The allocation approach taken in Europe—where national governments 

distributed nearly all allowances for free to entities directly regulated under the EU 

trading system—does not provide a good model for an economy-wide U.S. program. 

Rather, to address equity concerns and avoid excessive windfall profits in some industries, a much larger fraction of emissions allowances or permits should be auctioned. It is worth noting however that much like Europe’s transition from phase 

1 to phase 2, we propose beginning with a large allowance program and ending with 

a full auction. 

Given that both energy producers and the general public bear some burden under 

a greenhouse-gas trading program, an allocation approach that auctions all allowances and recycles the proceeds in the form of tax relief will have the overall effect 

of transferring some wealth from energy producers to the broader public (in this 

case taxpayers). Conversely, an allocation approach that gives all allowances for free 

to directly affected industries will have the overall effect of transferring some wealth 

from the broad public (in this case consumers) to those industries. 

An allocation that does both could end up leaving both groups roughly equally 

well off. In other words, compared to either a pure auction or pure grandfathering, 

a mixed strategy—in which some allowances are auctioned and others are given 

away for free—may create opportunities to realize broader public benefits while also 

addressing legitimate industry concerns about cost impacts. Moreover, a phased approach, wherein a substantial portion of allowances is grandfathered in the early 

years of program implementation but that share gradually diminishes in subsequent 

years to allow for a larger auction, may offer particular advantages in terms of creating a transition period for energy-intensive industries (especially those with a 

long-lived capital assets), while eventually securing the social welfare and efficiencymaximizing benefits of an auction. 

b) What other ways is the European Commission working to correct the windfall 

and overallocation it experienced in the early years of the European emission trading system? 

Answer. The EU-ETS is proceeding in three stages: 

Phase 1, from 2005-2007, was a pilot phase, which was focused on generating data 

for establishing an accurate price on carbon, developing infrastructure such as emissions registries, and gaining valuable experience with regulating a carbon market. 
91 

Phase 2, from 2008-2012, involves a tightening of the cap and fewer allocations 

to industry and the power sector. The price of carbon has fluctuated, but mainly 

mirrored global markets. To reduce the number of free allowances given to industry 

and power sectors, larger amounts of international offsets were made available. 

Phase 3, from 2013-2020, will involve moving toward a 20% emissions reduction 

goal for 2020. All utilities, unless they are at risk of carbon leakage, will face 100% 

auctioning. 

c) What lessons can Congress learn from the European experience to avoid pitfalls 

in designing and implementing a carbon trading system? 

Answer. One important lesson is the need for accurate emissions data so that 

over-or under-allocation of allowances does not occur. We have better data and a 

new reporting rule in the U.S., which should hopefully inoculate us from some of 

the troubles experienced in the first phase of Europe’s program. Another lesson is 

that a trading system must provide enough certainty to allow technology investment. Third, the EU-ETS experience highlights the important effects of allowance 

allocation. 

Question 9. One of my concerns is that, as far as I can tell, allowances that are 

given away under cap-and-trade could be sold on the secondary market at a price 

that would undercut the government auction reserve price. 

a) Is this accurate, and do you see this as a potential problem for energy investments under such price uncertainty? 

Answer. Allowances (whether initially auctioned or freely allocated) can be traded 

on the secondary market at a price below the price floor but this would assume 

drastically lower prices than current projections. It would of course be good news 

if technological breakthroughs are so effective that regulations become unnecessary. 

However, this would have no long-term effect on the emissions price floor and 

thus does not present a significant problem for energy investment certainty. A price 

floor is enforced through the periodic regular auctions, where no allowances will be 

sold below the specified minimum price. If allowances are trading on a secondary 

market below the floor price, bids at the regular auction would not reach the floor 

price and allowances would not be sold. As long as there is a sufficient number of 

auctioned allowances, prices would rise again in response to the tightened supply 

of allowances in the market. 

b) What happens if or when strategic allowance reserves run out in a cap-andtrade program? 

c) If a strategic reserve is used instead of an explicit price ceiling, then what happens if the strategic reserve is continually depleted? Do costs skyrocket at that 

point? 

Answer. In our recent paper addressing economic risk in a cap-and-trade program, 

NCEP made several suggestions to strengthen the design of the strategic allowance 

reserve included in the Waxman-Markey legislation. These recommendations address both the size of the reserve and the proposed mechanism to replenish the reserve. 

A strategic allowance reserve differs from an explicit price ceiling in that only a 

limited number of allowances are available at the trigger reserve allowance price. 

Therefore, there is no guarantee that the pool of strategic reserve allowances will 

not be depleted. If this pool is depleted, the prices can rise above the trigger reserve 

allowance price. We believe that roughly 6 billion tons of allowances should be available in the first ten years of the program. We are undertaking additional analysis 

regarding the reserve size required to manage long-and short-term cost concerns. 

The Waxman-Markey allowance reserve is structured to be replenished annually 

through government purchases of international forestry offsets. NCEP is uncertain 

about the availability of international offset credits, particularly in the early years 

of a program, and does not recommend that the size and effectiveness of the reserve 

be fully reliant on the offsets market. An alternative may be to have the government 

purchase offsets to ‘‘pay back’’ the allowances borrowed from future years. 

RESPONSE OF EILEEN CLAUSSEN TO QUESTION FROM SENATOR BINGAMAN

Question 1. EPA projections have indicated that there will be a very limited supply of offsets coming from projects based in the U.S., and that the vast majority of 

the offset supply will be coming from overseas. Are there policy choices we can make 

to increase the supply of high-quality domestic offsets, so a greater amount of funds 

spent purchasing offsets stays in the U.S.? 
92 

Answer. We believe it is important to encourage cost-effective domestic offset 

projects from uncapped and unregulated sectors, particularly in the early years of 

a cap-and-trade program. There are several policy choices that can be made to increase the availability of these domestic offsets. 

First and foremost, directing the administering agencies to start now to develop 

the foundation of an offset program in anticipation of legislation is important. 

Foundational issues which can be addressed in advance of program implementation 

include establishing: 

• A clear and consistent definition of key GHG offset quality criteria; 

• A priority list of offset project types to be considered by the program; 

• A framework for methodology review and approval; 

• A review and approval process of existing offset methodologies; 

• A scientific advisory board; and 

• A review of the quality of offsets from existing programs. 

Some types of offsets projects are easier to do than others. Reducing emissions 

from coal mines, landfills, and natural gas systems provide some of the most readily-available offset opportunities. In fact, EPA has said that including these types 

of actions as offsets would increase the domestic offset supply by 45%. We recommend that these types of reductions be included as offset projects rather than utilizing the House proposed NSPS for small sources. In addition, another potential 

type of offset credit could be the ‘‘destruction of Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS)’’. 

In the House bill, these credits could only be used in the separate HFC cap, and 

not in the main capped system until an EPA review and finding after the market 

has already been operating for a number of years. 

RESPONSES OF EILEEN CLAUSSEN TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR MURKOWSKI

UTILIZATION OF REVENUES

Question 1. We should be honest about what a cap-and-trade program for reducing 

greenhouse gas emissions will do. Such a policy would essentially create a new form 

of currency and generate massive amounts of revenue through auctions, or financial 

largesse to be doled out in the form of free allowances. 

What do you think those revenues should be spent on and who should receive that 

money? 

Answer. At the Pew Center, we use the term ‘‘allowance value’’ to mean the economic value of either auction revenues or free allowances. As part of USCAP, we 

believe that the distribution of allowance value should achieve the following overarching objectives: 

• enable a smooth transition to a low-carbon economy by providing financial relief 

to consumers and businesses who bear the costs of climate change mitigation 

• transform technology and the nation’s workforce to support a new energy economy by subsidizing the early deployment of climate-friendly technologies and 

the creation of clean energy jobs 

• enhance our resilience and ability to adapt to climate change impacts by funding adaptation planning and investment at all levels of government. 

With regard to transition assistance we recommend helping those who actually 

bear the cost, and not those who can easily pass those costs on to others, and to 

concentrate assistance on those consumers and businesses who are the most vulnerable to the secondary price cost impacts effects of a cap, such as low-income consumers. We also recommend providing this assistance without undermining the capand and-trade program’s incentive to reduce emissions. This free distribution of allowance values would be phased out over time. 

For example, we recommend providing allowance value to energy-intensive, tradeexposed industries that cannot easily pass on their compliance costs due to lack of 

action by other countries whose businesses compete with ours. Such assistance 

should be structured so that it rewards improved environmental performance in 

comparison to a benchmark for each particular industry, and should be phased out 

as other nations adopt comparable climate policies. It is important to help such industries not only for competitiveness reasons, but also for environmental reasons— 

if compliance costs for such industries cause them to shift production overseas, we 

will ‘‘leak’’ not only economic activity, but also emissions, thus hurting the environmental integrity of the cap cap-and and-trade program. 

We also recommend providing assistance to regulated local electric and gas distribution companies, to condition that assistance on their providing relief to their 

customers, and to require that state Public Utility Commissions certify that the al-
93 

lowance value is indeed being used to help customers. Providing relief in this way 

takes advantage of existing business and institutional arrangements, creates incentives for utility-based energy efficiency programs, and tends to target more relief to 

regions that are harder hit by the program. 

With regard to technology transformation, we recommend providing allowance 

value to emerging technologies that are not sufficiently incentivized by the cap capand -trade program itself, such as energy efficiency and carbon capture and storage. 

With regard to workforce transformation we recommend providing both transition 

assistance for those who must change their jobs as well as support for businesses 

to create new jobs. 

Finally, we recommend proving support for activities to enhance both human and 

ecological resiliency to future climate change and for government at all levels to 

take steps to adapt to the impacts of climate change that we are already beginning 

to experience. This includes impacts on public health, infrastructure, fish and wildlife habitats, and other affected communities in the United States. In addition, we 

support the use of allowance value as a mechanism to promote international engagement and cooperation to help developing countries adapt to unavoidable climate 

change. 

ELIGIBLE OFFSET PROJECTS

Question 2a. There is a great variety of offset projects that can be undertaken, 

some more reliable than others. We risk creating an incentive for loosely constructed 

offset rules given the cost containment objectives we have and the extent to which 

some would have us rely upon offsets to meet it. 

Should there be a list of allowable offset project types spelled out in legislative 

text, or not? 

Answer. In order to ensure early supply, offset project developers need guidance 

on the types of offset projects that will be eligible to produce emission reductions 

and the standards that will be used to evaluate those projects. A positive list of eligible project types would help to provide developers with such guidance, and provide 

further incentive to invest in projects early on in the program. 

Question 2b. What standards should apply whether there is such a list or not? 

Answer. The Pew Center has published a Congressional brief on offsets, available 

at our website (http://www.pewclimate.org/policy-brief/Offsets), and we are also a 

member of the Offset Quality Initiative, which has published a brief on this issue 

titled ‘‘Ensuring Offset Quality: Integrating High Quality Greenhouse Gas Offsets 

Into North American Cap-and-Trade Policy’’ (http://www.offsetqualityinitiative.org/ 

pdfs/OQIlEnsuringlOffsetlQualityl7l08.pdf). In those documents and elsewhere, the following criteria are often cited as essential to ensure that offsets are 

of high enough quality to be credibly included in a cap-and-trade program. Offsets 

should be: 

• Real.—GHG emission reductions should represent actual emission reductions 

and not simply be artifacts of incomplete or inaccurate accounting. 

• Measurable.—Emission reductions from offset projects must be accurately quantified. In some cases direct measurement may be difficult, but imprecise and/ 

or unreliable accounting will impinge on the integrity of the offset. 

• Additional.—Offset project reductions must be shown to be ‘‘in addition to’’ reductions that would have occurred without the offset project or the incentives 

provided by offset credits. This criterion is often considered not only the most 

important attribute, but also the most difficult to determine. To be considered 

additional, the revenue gained from selling the project’s emission reductions 

should be the main fiscal incentive behind the project’s implementation. Determining additionality is an essential but imperfect process. No single approach 

is the best for all project types. A standardized methodology for this determination is usually considered the best approach. 

• Permanent.—Offset emission reductions can sometimes be reversed either by 

human activity and/or by acts of nature (the most common example being a forest fire). Because offset credits in emission trading programs will be used for 

compliance in lieu of an on-site reduction, it is important to ensure that the offset credits either represent a permanent reduction or contractually require replacement if they are reversed. Alternatively, there are other mechanisms to address permanence, including pooling, aggregation, and insurance. A standardized methodology for this determination is usually considered the best approach. 

• Monitored.—Offset projects must be monitored to ensure that emission reductions are occurring. Each project must have a unique monitoring plan that defines how, when and by whom data will be collected and emissions quantified. 
94 

These plans should be developed with experts familiar with the specifics of a 

project and should use established standards. 

• Independently Verified.—All GHG reductions should be verified by either a 

third party or a government agency according to accepted methodologies and 

regulations. Monitoring reports issued after the emission reductions have occurred (ex-post) should be used as the basis for issuing offset credits. For credibility purposes, verifier compensation should not in any way depend on the outcome of the verifier’s decisions. 

• Measured From a Credible Baseline.—A credible baseline, or ‘‘without-project’’ 

emissions, must be established in order to measure an offset project’s reductions. The difference between this baseline case and the actual emissions level 

represents the reductions achieved by the offset project, and determines the 

amount of offset credits issued. 

• Protected From Leakage.—Leakage is defined as an increase in GHG emissions 

outside of the project’s boundary that occurs as a result of the project. For example, avoiding deforestation through an offset project in one area could simply 

push the deforestation (and resulting emissions) to a different region or country. 

Leakage minimization through monitoring and verification plans and protocols 

should be addressed in offset program design. A standardized methodology for 

this determination is usually considered the best approach. 

• A Clear Property Right.—Clear and uncontested title to offset credits is necessary, and transfer of ownership must be unambiguous and documented. Once 

sold, the original owner must cede all rights to claim future credit for the same 

reductions in order to avoid double counting. Offset credits should be serialized 

and accounted for in a registry or other approved tracking system. 

DECERTIFICATION OF AN OFFSET PROJECT

Question 3a. It is all but inevitable that at least some offset projects, if allowed 

as part of a climate program, will be exposed as flawed or useless as it relates to 

verifiable greenhouse gas reductions. Forests can burn down, fraud can take place, 

and countries could even nationalize these projects for their own financial gain. In 

the event that this occurs, a process of de-certification will need to be developed. 

How should such a process work, and under what circumstances should it be 

done? 

Answer. Changes in the overall program design, as well as details of assessment 

protocols for different project types, should be evaluated and incorporated regularly 

to ensure the environmental integrity and effectiveness of an offset mechanism. Policy and regulatory reviews should occur at long enough intervals to allow for investment certainty. Except under extreme circumstances, policy changes should not be 

applied retroactively or without ample warning, in order to avoid leaving market 

participants with stranded investments that were made in good faith under existing 

rules. 

Question 3b. Should we be concerned that the need to contain costs may provide 

an incentive to look the other way and fail to pursue de-certification? 

Answer. A centralized authority that will administer and implement an offset program should be established, and decisions of this sort should be done by regulation, 

using a transparent process with public input. This authority should have the ability to make necessary decisions, such as those regarding any de-certifications, and 

should be capable of doing so in a timely and transparent fashion. 

DIFFICULTIES OF CERTIFYING INTERNATIONAL OFFSETS AND ENSURING COMPLIANCE

Question 4. It is apparent that many difficulties ay emerge in attempting to develop an accurate tracking system for a worldwide carbon market. The House bill 

creates a litany of requirements that must be met before international offsets can 

be used. In order to host offset projects, a developing country must meet several criteria: 

• They must negotiate a treaty with the U.S. to assure certain, minimum requirements are met; 

• They must establish an emissions baseline and set targets to achieve zero net 

deforestation within 20 years; 

• They must design offset projects to account for the interests of communities, indigenous peoples, and vulnerable groups with equitable profit-sharing; and 

• The U.S. must certify the establishment and enforcement by the host country 

of laws, processes and standards to assure these rights. 

• The developing country must develop a strategic plan for addressing the drivers 

of deforestation and identify reforms to national policies. 
95 

There is nothing wrong with these criteria, per se, but they make timely availability of international offsets impossible. It is also unclear if foreign governments 

would acquiesce to these conditions or not. 

How do we ensure that American entities are buying legitimate carbon credits 

without creating an impenetrable, bureaucratic process like we’ve seen in the House 

bill? Is it even possible? 

Answer. The criteria above are challenging to meet but represent a core set of requirements that have developed over years of from international discussions aimed 

at making international offsets a reality. With respect specifically to international 

forestry, some key developing countries have, or are close to having, deforestation 

policies and the necessary institutional capacity to establish national baselines, 

change national policies, and move to net-zero deforestation over time. Deforestation 

accounts for approximately 20% of global emissions and putting domestic policies in 

place that drive private investment towards reducing international deforestation our 

planet benefit us all. 

Forestry projects, however, are not the only type of international offset project 

that are possible. Similar to domestic offsets, international offsets projects can be 

done in a number of categories outside of the forestry sector, including agriculture, 

energy fuel switching, and transportation—to name just a few. Measured against 

the same quality criteria as domestic offsets, i.e. additional, permanent, monitored, 

independently verified, and addressing leakage—international offsets can be assessed by an international body if our program administrator determines that this 

international body has a thorough and credible assessment process. The role of 

international offsets in containing the cost of a cap-and-trade program is significant, 

as EPA modeling shows that without these offsets, costs may be as much as 89% 

higher. Therefore, it is crucial that international offsets be a part of our cap and 

trade system. It is also critical that international offsets be of high quality for our 

program and for others. U.S. involvement in the international process can help ensure this high quality and if it is not forthcoming we can require additional measures and be selective. 

LONGEVITY OF TREES AS CARBON OFFSETS

Question 5. Scientists tell us that carbon dioxide remains in the atmosphere for 

roughly a century before it fades away. If a tree claimed as a source of offset credits 

were cut down even a few decades after that occurring, then the carbon credits it 

had produced would be environmentally worthless. 

How can anyone realistically ensure that a tree that creates a carbon offset credit 

isn’t later destroyed anyway, particularly in foreign countries in which the U.S government has no say in the way those resources are managed? 

Answer. First, it is important to understand that a carbon offset credit is not tied 

directly to a particular tree in a forest. Forests generating offset credits may have 

trees dying and growing back at all times, and on the whole still be a net sink for 

carbon. The key is avoiding large scale degradation or deforestation over a reasonable period of time. 

The issue of permanence is a difficult one for offset projects but there are options 

to address reversals to ensure the environmental integrity of offset credits from forestry. One option would include establishing an offsets reserve. Here the offset Administrator could simply subtract and hold (from the credits that would have been 

issued for a project) a quantity of credits that account for the risk that the biological 

sink was destroyed. These ‘‘reserve’’ credits could then be retired if necessary to 

fully account for the tons of carbon that are no longer sequestered. Alternatively, 

the offset Administrator could create an insurance mechanism that provides dollars 

to purchase replacement carbon tons if a sink is destroyed. 

Other ways to address permanence could include discounting the credits that are 

issued for offset projects (reducing the value of the credit to reflect carbon that is 

measurably sequestered in a given year); explicitly requiring project developers to 

surrender credits in the event of reversals; and providing strong contractual and liability arrangements. 

Internationally, the same options to deal with permanence apply—the key difference being that the U.S. government may not be the regulator. Depending on how 

the program is structured, the party responsible for issuing credits (and ensuring 

permanence) could be a multilateral organization (UN) or potentially the U.S. program administrator. In the international context we believe it is especially important to build robust measuring and monitoring capacity and good governance practices in developing countries as this can help prevent reversals from occurring in 

the first place. Moreover, encouraging such things as the development and implementation of strong, long-term contract design with liability provisions, effective au-
96 

thorities to implement and enforce forest governance, and clear incentives for landowners to maintain carbon stocks on their land will be important elements of any 

international carbon offset program. 

RESPONSES OF EILEEN CLAUSSEN TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CANTWELL

Question 1a. What role does the compliance period play in reducing price volatility? 

Answer. Although only one factor, the length of the compliance period can affect 

volatility—a multiyear compliance period (say 24 months instead of 12 months) 

would reduce price volatility by giving firms a greater number of allowances (2 yrs 

worth) and more time flexibility to deal with any short-term price fluctuations and 

the ability to optimize their reduction schedule and minimize their compliance costs 

over time 

Question 1b. Are there any substantial differences in price volatility between rolling compliance periods and fixed compliance dates? 

Answer. Market volatility in part depends on supply availability (see above answer). To the extent that a rolling compliance period gives greater flexibility to the 

program and access to greater supply, (in comparison to a fixed compliance period), 

the result should be less price volatility. 

Question 1c. To minimize price volatility, how much time should firms have between the emissions of greenhouse gases and the acquisition (and surrender) of allowances? One year or less? Two years? Three years? Five years? 

Answer. Time and experience with the program will improve (lessen) volatility but 

too many years between emissions and surrender of allowances may reduce the effectiveness of the program. We think that a multiyear year compliance period (e.g., 

2-3 years) would decrease volatility. However, if the compliance window is too long, 

a scenario could arise in which large numbers of buyers are in the market for allowances at the same time (as the compliance deadline is reached). If firms have delayed taking action until the end of the long compliance period, the result could be 

a large temporary spike in the price of allowances, and potentially even an increased risk of non-compliance. In addition, we think that it is important to allow 

firms a short window of time or ‘‘true-up’’ period following the end of the compliance 

period, during which they can reassess their emissions compliance obligations and 

ensure that adequate surrender of allowances has occurred. 

Question 2a. What is a reasonable number of allowances, as a percentage of yearly 

emissions, that firms would be able to bank for future emissions and compliance 

dates? 

Answer. Firms should be able to bank all allowances not used in each period. 

There should be no limit. Banking is likely to be utilized by firms if they believe 

that the price of allowances or offsets will be higher in the future or that the quantity of available allowances will be lower. There is no reason to limit banking because it has multiple benefits: it reduces allowance price volatility, provides firms 

with the flexibility to optimally time their investments, and encourages early reductions. 

A significant benefit of this approach is that it motivates early action by encouraging sources to make larger emission reductions in the near-term than needed to 

satisfy compliance requirements, thereby advancing environmental objectives. In periods with relatively low allowance demand (e.g., a mild winter, an economic down 

turn, low technology costs), banking will prevent prices from falling too far, helping 

to alleviate volatility on the lower end and preserve incentives for innovation. Over 

the longer-term, this intertemporal flexibility results in lower economy wide impacts 

because firms are able to optimize their reduction schedules over time. 

Question 2b. How long are firms likely to retain allowances for future use? Is 

there likely to be a limit to their willingness to keep these assets on their balance 

sheets? 

Answer. As long as firms understand that there is a declining cap and expect 

prices to go up in the future, firms will make a calculation on the value of holding 

allowances or using them. As with any financial decision, a part of this calculation 

will be a discount or interest rate that allows firms to compare the value of an allowance today with the expected value in the future. 

Question 3. To reach the 2050 emissions targets that scientists agree are necessary to avert catastrophic climate change, is there an affordable option at midcentury that does not incorporate either a significant amount of coal with carbon 

capture and sequestration technology or a substantial expansion of nuclear power? 

Answer. Delaying the availability of new nuclear power and CCS will increase the 

cost of achieving mid-century GHG emission goals, though perhaps not to a level 

that is ‘‘unaffordable.’’ Multiple scenarios for future low-carbon U.S. and global en-
97 

ergy systems that rely to varying extents on energy from new nuclear power and 

fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage (CCS) have been explored. If major lowcarbon technologies prove technically, economically, or politically infeasible, the cost 

to society of achieving a given GHG emission reduction goal will be greater than 

in the case of a broader portfolio of mitigation options. A significant body of unbiased analyses indicates that a broad portfolio of low-carbon technology options is required to meet U.S. and global GHG emission reduction goals at the lowest cost to 

society. Below we discuss results from some of these analyses. 

The U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) recent analysis of H.R. 2454, 

the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACESA) [see http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 

oiaf/servicerpt/hr2454/index.html] modeled a core ‘‘Basic’’ policy case and a sensitivity policy case (called the ‘‘Limited Alternatives’’ case) that restricted the deployment of new nuclear power, coal with CCS, and biomass power generation to the 

very low levels projected under ‘‘business as usual.’’ EIA projected that severely limiting the deployment of these technologies increased the cost of complying with the 

GHG cap-and-trade program. In particular, cap-and-trade allowance prices were 

projected to be 14.5 percent higher in all years in the Limited Alternatives case. 

While the overall economy was projected to grow robustly in both policy cases, the 

GDP impact in 2030 of the Limited Alternatives case was projected to be more than 

40 percent greater than that of the Basic policy case. When restricting new nuclear 

and CCS, EIA projected fewer GHG emission reductions from sources under the cap 

and a greater reliance on offsets. For electricity, compared to the Basic policy case, 

EIA projected lower total electricity demand in the Limited Alternatives case and 

a greater reliance on natural gas (generation almost 80 percent greater in 2030) and 

renewables (13 percent greater generation in 2030), with national average electricity 

prices projected to be about 11 percent higher in 2030. 

A 2009 analysis from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Joint Program 

on the Science and Policy of Global Change (Paltsev, Reilly, Jacoby, and Morris, 

2009, The Cost of Climate Policy in the United States, MITJPSPGC Report 173) 

modeled a generic carbon emissions pricing policy (e.g., cap and trade) with an emission reduction pathway consistent with an 80 percent reduction below the 2008 

emissions level by 2050. The researchers analyzed several technology scenarios out 

to 2050 including one that assumed no nuclear or fossil fuel with CCS technology 

was available for deployment at all. The MIT report found that excluding nuclear 

and CCS as abatement options led to carbon prices that were 15-16 percent higher 

than in the core policy scenario across the model run years while the impact on aggregate economic welfare in 2050 was about 18 percent greater. The MIT researchers reported that: 

The exclusion of CCS and nuclear rule out two big low-carbon options, 

which should make the task of achieving these goals much harder. While 

excluding these options raises the cost substantially the simulation results 

suggests it does not make the target unachievable. Since raising the price 

of one option, or even making some options unavailable, just leads to use 

of other options, the cost impact is moderated. If neither advanced nuclear 

nor the CCS technologies are available then renewables and gas provide 

about two-thirds of the generation. (p. 18-20) 

The MIT researchers also make the point, however, that extending the analysis 

timeframe beyond 2050 makes the heavy reliance on natural gas, which has lower 

GHG emissions than coal but is still a significant source of emissions, ‘‘probably not 

tenable’’ given that climate stabilization requires even greater emission reductions 

post-2050. The MIT analysis suggests that if the availability of new nuclear or CCS 

is delayed the cost of achieving mid-century GHG emission reductions may still be 

moderate or ‘‘affordable’’ but that if both of these technologies are forever precluded 

as economically, technically, or politically infeasible, achieving mid-century GHG 

emission reduction goals would likely prove much more costly. 

Question 4a. From a strictly economic viewpoint, how can the pathway of the 

emissions reductions or the trajectory of the cap’s emissions reductions affect the 

costs of a climate policy? 

Answer. For a given cumulative emissions cap, the more rapid the reduction in 

emissions—in other words, the steeper the decline of the emissions trajectory—the 

higher the economic costs of climate policy. This is because early reductions will 

likely take place before advanced low-and zero-carbon technologies have been developed and deployed. Also, under the standard convention of discounting, the costs of 

emissions reduction occurring today are valued more than the equivalent reduction 

occurring at some point in the future. 

Question 4b. For a fixed amount of cumulative emissions, what might the optimal 

shape of that emissions pathway be? 
98 

Answer. In general, a smoothly declining emissions trajectory leads to lower overall costs. The optimal shape of the emissions pathway will on the one hand take 

into account the likelihood that early reductions may increase costs (see 10a), but 

on the other hand, will need to ensure the technological feasibility of meeting the 

cumulative target. A trajectory that entails a later peaking point in emissions will 

make it more difficult to meet the cumulative emissions target. Delaying the timing 

of peak emissions will require greater annual reductions in years following the 

peaking point. If the peak occurs sufficiently late in the pathway, this may require 

negative emissions in some years. 

Question 5. Why do you regard the inclusion of a price floor as particularly important for investment in new energy technologies under a climate policy? 

Answer. A price floor is important because it ensures that the strength of the carbon price signal is maintained at a sufficient level to stimulate investment in new 

energy technologies. These investments are made with a long planning horizon. If 

the carbon price signal routinely falls to too low a level, this will create an uncertain 

return for long-term investments and decrease the likelihood that those investments 

are undertaken in a timely fashion. 

Question 6. Since cap-and-trade programs are so inherently complex and farreaching: 

a) How can we be sure that any scheme is workable and can be implemented 

by the executive branch? 

Answer. There is a growing body of national and international work supporting 

the case that the proposed cap-and-trade program can be successfully implemented. 

In the United States we have learned from the acid rain trading program the key 

ingredients to making trading work and believe it is possible to scale up that program to cover more sources and sectors as required to address greenhouse gas emissions. We have also watched closely and learned from the European Union’s experience—from both the success they have had and the problems they have encountered. For example, one major problem they encountered in their initial trading period had to do with a lack of baseline emissions data for many sources. EPA is about 

to finalize a rule that will collect that data for the United States and make sure 

we avoid this problem. 

b) How great are the risks of unintended consequences—for the economy and 

the environment? 

Answer. Allowance prices under a cap-and-trade program will be influenced by a 

wide range of factors including the rate of growth of our economy, the pace and costs 

of new technologies, how consumers and industry respond to putting a price on carbon, shifts in the relative prices of fuels, and even such factors as the weather. None 

of these can be predicted with certainty. Nonetheless, a cap-and-trade program can 

be designed to provide safeguards to prevent unintended consequences. Smart program design can avoid unintended economic consequences by allowing greater flexibility to minimize compliance costs through the use of banking, borrowing and 

multiyear compliance periods. In addition, a minimum allowance price provides 

needed certainty for those investing in new technologies. A strategic reserve can 

provide insurance against a spike in allowance prices while at the same time preserving the environmental integrity of the program. 

c) What sort of growth are we likely to need in federal agencies, particularly 

EPA, if the House-passed bill became law? 

Answer. We do not have and are not aware of any specific estimates of the added 

resources that would be required at EPA and other federal agencies for implementing the House-passed bill. We do believe, however a cap-and-trade program requires fewer agency resources than achieving similar reductions through traditional 

command and control regulations. 

Question 7. Given the complexity and intricacy of some of these policy proposals, 

I am particularly concerned about the opportunities they might create for market 

manipulation, fraud, and for the development of arcane financial instruments that 

will lead us to the next major global financial crisis. Do you believe that these concerns are justified? How might opportunities for market manipulation be reduced 

through climate policy design? 

Answer. At the heart of any successful cap-and-trade program is a well-functioning market for the trading of emission allowances and related financial instruments. The recent high-profile market crises highlight the critical need for appropriate market design, transparency and oversight. A number of lawmakers and the 

Administration have introduced proposals that would tighten oversight of commodity markets in an effort to reduce excessive risk taking, and more generally ad-
99 

dress what they view as weak spots in market regulation. These proposals would 

establish a legal framework for overseeing financial markets in general and by extension, carbon trading activity. 

As with any regulation, this oversight must strive for a balance between regulating and over-regulating. Policymakers should encourage transparency, seek to 

prevent excessive speculation that can drive large swings in commodity prices and 

further seek to restrain efforts to interfere with and manipulate market activity. We 

believe that these goals should be achieved in large part through tightening of regulation directed at financial markets as a whole and not by regulating carbon market 

separately. More extensive reporting by market participants (including those buying 

and selling carbon commodities), position limits and collateral requirements (which 

both can be used to reduce excessive risk taking), and even restrictions on who can 

buy and sell in a market are options that can be applied to ‘‘exchange-based’’ transactions (e.g., NYMEX, Green Exchange, et al.) and to some extent to transactions 

that occur between parties not through an exchange. We know that a carbon market 

can be a cost effective mechanism for reducing GHG emissions and spurring innovation in low carbon technologies, but like any financial market, they need oversight 

to ensure that they are effective and efficient. 

Question 8. I understand that last December, the European Union made auctioning the default future allocation method for its emission trading system. 

Answer. The EU plans to increase auctioning in Phase III (2013-2020) of their 

GHG trading program with a move towards much greater auctioning over time. 

From 2013 onward, the EU anticipates that overall more than 50% of allowances 

will be auctioned but this percentage will vary by sector (and by country). Notably 

in the power sector, the intent is to have 100% auctioning by 2020. For industrial 

sectors not at high risk of carbon leakage (because of their carbon intensity and 

international competition) the intent is to have 20% of allowances auctioned in 2013, 

70% by 2020, increasing to 100% by 2027. However, in the industrial sectors at high 

risk of carbon leakage, the intent is to give these companies free allocation equal 

to 100% of allowances needed by the best performers in each sector. The EU is now 

working on developing benchmarks for determining these allocation levels. Thus 

while there is a move toward more auctioning, less than 100% auction is anticipated. 

a) Was that a tacit recognition that the best way to allocate carbon permits 

or emission allowances is by auction? 

Answer. The decision concerning the initial allocation of the emission allowances 

is very important to the design of a cap-and-trade program. However, this decision 

will not affect the environmental effectiveness of the program-this is primarily a distributional question. Therefore the important question that any government enacting a cap-and-trade system will have to grapple with is how to distribute the value 

associated with the allowances. In the U.S. Acid Rain program, policy makers distributed most of the allowances to regulated entities based on their historical fuel 

use multiplied by a benchmark emission rate. The EU decided to base allocations 

on historical emissions in the initial (trial) phase of their ETS. However, because 

good data on emissions were not yet available, more allowances were distributed 

than necessary to cover emissions and there were reports of excessive windfall profits, particularly in the electricity sector. In order to avoid these concerns, EU officials have decided to shift to a greater use of auction in Phase III (2013-2020) and 

to prohibit the use of free allowances in the electricity sector. 

Most of the U.S. domestic cap-and-trade proposals (including USCAP’s Blueprint 

for Legislative Action) propose some free allocation of allowances in the early years 

of the program that phases out over time to an auction. The free allowances would 

initially be distributed to capped entities and consumers particularly disadvantaged 

by the secondary price impacts of a cap. 

b) What other ways is the European Commission working to correct the windfall and overallocation it experienced in the early years of the European emission trading system? 

Answer. Based on experience in the first phase, the EU commission made several 

modifications in the second phase (2008-2012) including a significant reduction in 

the cap and, less free allocation, both of which result in significantly fewer allowances issued to facilities. Current emission targets in the ongoing second phase are 

designed to reduce total emissions in covered sectors more than 6% below 2005 levels by 2012. Going forward in the period 2013-2020, the target is 20% below 1990 

levels by 2020 (equivalent to 14% below 2005 levels by 2020). The target can decrease to 30% below 1990 if other industrialized nations take comparable action. 
100 

Likely the most significant issue that contributed to the allowance price collapse 

of the first phase of the program was that the EU did not have good emissions data 

prior to program start up and as a result they subsequently issued too many allowances. 

c) What lessons can Congress learn from the European experience to avoid 

pitfalls in designing and implementing a carbon trading system? 

Answer. The EU-ETS has succeeded in setting up the infrastructure, determining 

country specific and industry specific targets, defining the commodity, implementing 

a fairly consistent set of rules and verification requirements such that carbon trading of billions of allowances among 12,000 regulated facilities and other market 

players has become a reality. Carbon emissions in the EU now have a recognized 

price—which will go up and down as happens in all markets. 

The creation of this market though has not been free from difficulties and many 

lessons can be learned: 

• First and foremost, the EU experience demonstrated the importance of good 

data on which to base cap-setting and allowance allocation decisions. 

• Free allocation does not necessarily protect consumers from price increases; allocation must be targeted to those who bear the costs and not to those who can 

simply pass their costs on to others. 

• Allocation decisions do not impact the environmental outcome of the program. 

• The rapid development of carbon markets is facilitated by a rapid dissemination 

of information about emissions and allowance demand and price. 

• Allowance price volatility can be dampened by including allowance banking and 

borrowing and allocating allowances for longer trading periods. 

• The interaction between allowance allocation, allowance markets, and the unsettled state of electricity sector liberalization and regulation must be confronted as part of program design to avoid mistakes and unintended consequences—-especially where 50% of the electricity is generated with coal as it 

is in the United States. 

Question 9a. One of my concerns is that, as far as I can tell, allowances that are 

given away under cap-and-trade could be sold on the secondary market at a price 

that would undercut the government auction reserve price. 

Is this accurate, and do you see this as a potential problem for energy investments under such price uncertainty? 

Answer. Prices in the secondary (as well as primary) market will reflect the overall state of supply and demand, decisions about banking and expectations about program duration and ambition. As long as program targets are expected to continually 

get more stringent, carbon prices would be expected to rise over time. As long as 

firms can bank unused allowances, future expectations about higher prices will ensure that price does not go too low. 

In the U.S. Acid Rain program, for example, concern about higher future prices 

actually pushed firms into earlier deployment of scrubbers than required by the program and resulted in a sizable ‘‘bank’’ of SO2 allowances. Prices in this market did 

not go too low though because banking was allowed and firms expected the program 

to become more stringent (and they expected higher future prices). 

Question 9b. What happens if or when strategic allowance reserves run out in a 

cap-and-trade program? 

Answer. We do not expect a strategic reserve to run out if it is designed well; in 

particular if it includes sufficient quantities of both offsets and allowances borrowed 

from the future. If allowances and offsets in the strategic reserve were auctioned, 

the price would act as the distribution mechanism, meaning that the allowances 

would go to the highest bidder. Program flexibility, including ample offsets (domestic and international), the ability to borrow from future allocations, multiyear compliance and multiyear distribution of allowances, can help to contain the costs of a 

cap-and-trade program. The strategic reserve should act as an insurance against 

sustained higher price and to do so there must be sufficient supply in the reserve 

and there must be sufficient ability to ‘‘borrow’’ more from the future should the 

need arise. 

Question 9c. If a strategic reserve is used instead of an explicit price ceiling, then 

what happens if the strategic reserve is continually depleted? Do costs skyrocket at 

that point? 

Answer. See above. 
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RESPONSES OF MICHAEL WARA TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BINGAMAN

Question 1a. In your testimony, you discuss using allowance revenue to directly 

fund offset projects and other projects that will reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 

Do you expect that this will deliver greater reductions at lower cost than through 

the use of an offsets market? In other words, are offsets necessarily the most costeffective way to obtain reductions? 

Answer. Offsets are not necessarily the most cost-effective way to obtain reductions. This is true because of the additionality problem—not all reductions that are 

paid for will be real, and because of the high transaction costs associated with producing offsets. It is also true because the price of offsets is set by the allowance 

price in the cap-and-trade market. The difference between allowance price and the 

costs of offset production (inframarginal rent) is captured by the offset producer (or 

offset value chain). Using a Carbon Truse Fund to reduce emissions outside the cap 

might in the net, produce lower costs per ton because a market mechanism, such 

as a reverse auction, could be used to disburse funds. This would keep most 

inframarginal rents for the fund while paying offset producers enough to induce 

them to produce reductions but no more. In addition, because the program would 

not be linked to the cap-and-trade, additionality concerns, while still present, would 

be less central and so transaction costs could be much lower. In combination, these 

two effects might lead to lower average costs per ton of CO2e reduced. 

Question 1b. Are there certain types of projects that this method of funding is 

more suited to that an offsets market would not deliver? 

Answer. Offsets are ill suited to delivering reductions that are achievable by improved policy design or implementation, by correction of market failure, or where 

differentiation of marginal from BAU projects is in practice impossible. An example 

of the first type of project is improved building standards that produce energy efficiency improvements in new construction. An example of the second is energy retrofits of rental housing. An example of the third is finance of renewable energy 

projects in China, where other policies are already supportive of new wind and solar 

builds and the energy tariff paid to generators is set by opaque agency decision 

rather than by markets or a public rate making procedure. 

Question 2. One primary benefit of an international offsets market is that it engages developing nations in the process of achieving global emissions reductions. 

Are there better ways to spend money internationally that could achieve even greater reductions and engage these nations in a similar manner? 

Answer. There are far better ways to spend these revenues that would both 

achieve reductions in global emissions and build greater levels of international cooperation on climate change. Some of the best examples of the type of work that 

could be funded by a Carbon Trust Fund are capacity building activities to promote 

energy efficiency. McKinsey has estimated that reductions from energy efficiency are 

enormous in developing countries, especially China, and assuming relatively conservative discount rates, will pay for themselves. Examples of small scale experiments in implementing these types of programs include the China Program of the 

Natural Resources Defense Council, the 1000 Enterprises Program in China, which 

grew out of a collaboration between one province and the Energy Foundation. These 

energy efficiency opportunities are the true low-hanging fruit but they do not make 

good offsets because ownership of the carbon reduction is unclear, because monitoring is difficult, and because additionality is hard to prove since they have a positive NPV. 

Question 3. EPA projections have indicated that there will be a very limited supply of offsets coming from projects based in the U.S., and that the vast majority of 

the offset supply will be coming from overseas. Are there policy choices we can make 

to increase the supply of high-quality domestic offsets, so a greater amount of funds 

spent purchasing offsets stays in the U.S.? 

Answer. Most US emissions are under the cap in the current US proposals. What 

is left—the 15.5% of GHG emissions not associated with fossil fuels—is relatively 

difficult to reduce using offsetting methods. Capturing a greater fraction of the revenue for domestic producers will be very tough because the best potential offset 

types also lend themselves to being capped—and so they are within the US under 

the current legislation. In contrast, these types of emission sources are uncapped 

in developing countries. This dynamic is likely to be exacerbated by relatively high 

environmental integrity in the offsets program. Indeed, the only way I can imagine 

the US capturing most of the offset revenue would be by largescale crediting of nonadditional agricultural or forest practices and/or overcrediting of same. 
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RESPONSES OF MICHAEL WARA TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR MURKOWSKI

UTILIZATION OF REVENUES

Question 1. We should be honest about what a cap-and-trade program for reducing 

greenhouse gas emissions will do. Such a policy would essentially create a new form 

of currency and generate massive amounts of revenue through auctions, or financial 

largesse to be doled out in the form of free allowances. 

What do you think those revenues should be spent on and who should receive that 

money? 

Answer. Ideally, this revenue would be used to reduce other distortionary taxes 

within the US system. Probably the lowest hanging fruit here would be the payroll 

tax. Using revenue from allowance auctions to offset payroll tax revenue would increase both the willingness of US firms to hire new workers and of the US labor 

force to work. Using a cap-and-trade (or carbon tax) to reduce other distortionary 

taxes, especially when these taxes directly reduce behaviors that we want more of 

in our economy, is the best use of revenues. This produces what my colleague Larry 

Goulder has famously called a ‘‘double dividend.’’ Society benefits both by avoiding 

climate changes and by increased rate of economic growth. 

A second best option would be to directly rebate these revenues to consumers 

(note that the LDC rebate in Waxman-Markey is not the same as this). Direct rebates of revenues raised by allowance auctions would at least not distort economic 

activity, would offset the costs of the program for at least the lower 40% of income 

earners in the US (see Dallas Burtraw’s work on this issue for RFF), and would give 

citizens a direct incentive to reduce their energy consumption relative to the average. 

There is some justification for grants of free allowances to firms. Studies indicate 

that somewhere between 5 and 10% is required to fully compensate firms for the 

costs of a cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases (again see Burtraw’s work 

on this issue). Anything in excess of this value is windfall profit for shareholders 

that is produced by higher energy costs for everyone. 

SUPPLY OF INTERNATIONAL OFFSETS

Question 2. In the long-term, the supply of international offsets is finite. As these 

offsets become more important, there will be fewer of them. Furthermore, as time 

goes by, I suspect that a desire to see other countries take action will be hampered 

by Americans having used up many of the affordable offsets, and particularly in developing countries. 

Do you see this as a problem going forward, if we adopt an approach to cost containment that is similar to that contained in the House bill? 

Answer. I believe that the supply of international offsets may well be constrained 

both in the near term, by the administrative constraints in the system, and in the 

long term, by developing countries accepting caps. My understanding is that assumptions along these lines are built into the EPA supply curves that underlie its 

analysis of HR 2454. That being said, it is highly likely that a large number of socalled least developed countries will not accept caps for some time, potentially not 

before 2050. If these countries begin to develop at an accelerated rate, then it is possible that they might become important sources of offsets as the key source nations 

(China, India, Brazil) accept commitments that are similar to developed countries. 

In any case, you are absolutely right that the source nations for offsets will have 

to evolve over the length of the program if key developed countries are to accept 

caps. 

DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC OFFSETS

Question 3. I am concerned that a full appreciation of the differences between 

international and domestic offsets has not sunk in with many of us involved in the 

climate change debate. 

Can you please elaborate on the similarities and differences between domestic and 

international offset projects, with an emphasis on the effectiveness of them, the 

availability of them, and the logistical issues associated with approving/monitoring 

them? 

Answer. International offsets typically come (with the exception of forestry) from 

sources that would be under the cap in the US. These offsets can be challenging 

to administer, as my testimony indicates, because telling the difference between 

crediting of business as usual and real reductions is challenging, even for well resources and intentioned regulators. Nevertheless, once baseline and additionality 

issues are resolved, monitoring and verification are generally relatively straight-
103 

forward (this is the reason that these sources tend to be under the cap in a US program). 

Domestic offsets (and international forestry) face all of the challenges of baselines 

and additionality plus important monitoring and verification challenges. Accurately 

estimating the amount of carbon stored in soil or in a forest is simply not possible 

with the accuracy at which power plant emissions are measured. Furthermore, the 

risks of reversal are real and difficult, as yet, to quantify and hence insure against 

(although this should get better as we gain experience with these offsets). If anything however, domestic offsets, because of their sources, will be intrinsically more 

challenging than international offsets. 

DIFFICULTIES OF CERTIFYING INTERNATIONAL OFFSETS AND ENSURING COMPLIANCE

Question 4. It is apparent that many difficulties may emerge in attempting to develop an accurate tracking system for a worldwide carbon market. The House bill 

creates a litany of requirements that must be met before international offsets can 

be used. In order to host offset projects, a developing country must meet several criteria: 

• They must negotiate a treaty with the U.S. to assure certain, minimum requirements are met; • They must establish an emissions baseline and set targets to achieve zero net 

deforestation within 20 years; • They must design offset projects to account for the interests of communities, indigenous peoples, and vulnerable groups with equitable profit-sharing; and • The U.S. must certify the establishment and enforcement by the host country 

of laws, processes and standards to assure these rights. • The developing country must develop a strategic plan for addressing the drivers 

of deforestation and identify reforms to national policies. 

There is nothing wrong with these criteria, per se, but they make timely availability of international offsets impossible. It is also unclear if foreign governments 

would acquiesce to these conditions or not. 

How do we ensure that American entities are buying legitimate carbon credits 

without creating an impenetrable, bureaucratic process like we’ve seen in the House 

bill? Is it even possible? 

Answer. I would argue that there is no way to assure both adequate supply, or 

at least supply commensurate with expectations, and environmental integrity. Supply requires efficient, low-cost administrative practices; environmental integrity requires time-consuming and costly analysis of each and every project. 

VERACITY OF FORESTRY AS OFFSETS

Question 5. When we look at the offset credits envisioned by so many here in Congress, it is difficult to get a clear picture of how it is all supposed to work. If a tree 

would have remained standing despite the enactment of climate legislation that allows offset credits, then any emission reduction attributed to that tree would be 

false. Despite that fact, just having ‘‘bought’’ it as an offset would allow the holder 

of an offset credit to put more greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. 

What should the burden of proof be for someone generating or selling offset credits that a tree really would have been cut down were it not for the sale of a carbon 

credit? 

Answer. Something approximating the clean and convincing evidence standard 

(the party with the burden must prove that the fact asserted is substantially more 

likely than not) seems appropriate for establishing that a credit is backed by a real 

reduction. It is my belief that this standard will be impossible to meet for individual 

projects for the reasons that you allude to but may be possible to meet for provincial 

or national programs that focus on deforestation rates across large areas. 

TRANSFER OF WEALTH

Question 6. The European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme began implementation in 2005. In the first phase, emissions covered under the Scheme rose by 0.8% 

across the EU as a whole. Additionally, the price of carbon fell to almost zero. 

Since not all member countries had the same requirements, the European Scheme 

acted as a transfer of wealth. It simply forced countries with higher requirements 

to pay more to countries with lower requirements to purchase their credits. 

If the U.S. takes a ‘go at it alone’ approach, are you concerned that the same 

transfer of wealth will occur from our American businesses to foreign entities as 

they purchase carbon credits? 

How can we prevent this from happening? 
104 

Answer. The international transfers that would occur under a US system along 

the lines of HR 2454 would likely be substantial but it must be remembered that 

both sides benefit from trade in this circumstance. The presence of international 

credits lowers allowance price so that all domestic firms benefit while the seller of 

the offset receives revenue he would otherwise not have obtained. 

I am less concerned about the magnitude of wealth transfers under the bill than 

that the money we spend overseas be effective in reducing emissions rather than 

simply subsidize activities that would have occurred anyway. 

EFFECTIVE ENGAGEMENT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Question 7. You have said that you doubt the Clean Development Mechanism 

(CDM) is an effective means of engaging developing countries due to the CDM’s general ineffectiveness and that it rewards exactly the opposite behavior. 

In your opinion, what is the best way to encourage these developing countries to 

participate in a global reduction of GHG? 

Answer. The best way to engage developing countries currently involved in the 

CDM in reducing emissions is to fund (via allowance allocation) investments in energy efficiency (industrial, buildings, appliances) and in the capacity to identify and 

implement domestic energy efficiency programs. This approach has the advantages 

that (1) the reductions produced are less expensive than in the CDM and (2) they 

are in the national interest of the developing countries and (3) they leverage funds 

by increasing developing country capacity to produce such reductions on its own. 

LOGISTICAL HURDLES TO EFFECTIVE OFFSET VERIFICATION

Question 8. The European Union’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), has 

run into problems approving projects that qualify for credit. Not only is their Executive Board extremely under-staffed and forced to rely on third party verifiers, but 

it also would be very time consuming to properly investigate each request. 

Is there any way that this type of situation could be resolved if the U.S. were to 

implement a cap-and-trade system? 

Answer. The logistical hurdles to proper implementation of an international or a 

domestic offset program are substantial. The rulemakings will be protracted and 

contested. The actual implementation of the program will require substantial and 

sustained attention from whichever agencies (EPA/USAID/USDA) are tasked with 

implementation. In general, the stronger the environmental integrity of the program, the greater the scrutiny required by regulators, and the more challenging the 

logistical hurdles. My basic perspective is that US entry into the system will actually make this problem worse because US demand will be so large relative to current supply. That being said, there are certainly process reforms that the US might 

push for in an international program that would lead to reduced workload. One 

would be a greater reliance on benchmarking rather than project by project evaluation of additionality. This is only a good idea if benchmarks are set conservatively 

enough that they guarantee that the credits are real. A good proposal is to set 

benchmarks such that they undercredit projects but to provide the option for project 

developers to prove an additionality case that would then allow full crediting of reductions. Probably the most important way to reduce the workload, at least for EPA 

and other US implementing agencies, will be to implement sectoral programs that 

do not rely on any sort of project-by-project implementation. These programs have 

the potential to produce enormous numbers of credits that, so long as sector baselines are set conservatively, will be additional. Sectoral programs are still 5 to 10 

years away from being ready to grow to scale so this is really a medium term solution to the logistical issues that plague the current CDM. 

RESPONSES OF MICHAEL WARA TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CANTWELL

Question 1a. What role does the compliance period play in reducing price volatility? 

Answer. Its important to distinguish between compliance period and banking. The 

ability to bank emissions across periods, provided that there are allowances to bank, 

can significantly reduce price volatility. This has been proven in the current EU 

ETS, where the 5-year trading phase (thus allowing 5-year banking) has reduced 

the price volatility that otherwise would have occurred due to the recession. At the 

same time, there is no reason that banking can’t coexist with relatively frequent 

compliance—annually or even subannually. For example, the EU requires annual 

compliance but allows banking for 5 years during the current period. Frequent compliance in the US is important because environmental liabilities are given low priority in bankruptcy proceedings. 
105 

Question 1b. Are there any substantial differences in price volatility between rolling compliance periods and fixed compliance dates? 

Answer. Without a model, I think this question is difficult to answer with any 

confidence. Also, it will depend on how effectively both physical and paper positions 

are communicated to the market. My suspicion is that rules on banking and/or borrowing would totally dominate as sources of volatility relative to the choice of a rolling or fixed compliance period. My major concern with a rolling compliance period 

would be the costs to firms and the regulator of compliance and enforcement. 

Question 1c. To minimize price volatility, how much time should firms have between the emissions of greenhouse gases and the acquisition (and surrender) of allowances? One year or less? Two years? Three years? Five years? 

Answer. For an industry covered by a cap-and-trade market, allowances are just 

like any other input used in the production process. It takes this much coal, that 

much payroll, and this many allowances to produce 1 megawatt hour of electricity, 

etc. Therefore, I think the most sensible option is to set relatively frequent true-ups 

for firms. The longest I would recommend is 1 year but I would encourage you to 

consider quarterly true up. This will force firms to think about and account for allowance costs as just another input in the production process, which is exactly how 

we want firms to respond to the incentives created by cap-and-trade. The danger 

with long periods between true-ups is that there will be volatility at the end of the 

period as covered entities scramble to acquire the needed allowances, and many derivatives contracts expire in a short time frame. 

Question 2a. What is a reasonable number of allowances, as a percentage of yearly 

emissions, that firms would be able to bank for future emissions and compliance 

dates? 

Answer. My belief is that there is no convincing justification for limiting firms 

ability to bank allowances. I would allow firms to bank as many allowances as they 

want to given their other choices regarding capital allocation. 

Question 2b. How long are firms likely to retain allowances for future use? Is 

there likely to be a limit to their willingness to keep these assets on their balance 

sheets? 

Answer. The honest answer is that it depends. It depends on the expectations that 

firms have about increases in the value of allowances, it depends on the firms’ financial structure and state, it depends on firms’ access to credit, it depends on who 

in the firms is responsible for compliance—energy firms with trading desks behave 

differently from industrial firms where environmental compliance departments are 

responsible for handling acquisitions and surrender of allowances. 

Question 3. To reach the 2050 emissions targets that scientists agree are necessary to avert catastrophic climate change, is there an affordable option at midcentury that does not incorporate either a significant amount of coal with carbon 

capture and sequestration technology or a substantial expansion of nuclear power? 

Answer. I don’t think that we really know the answer to this question. It may 

be that new solar and wind technologies, combined with smart grid, will allow for 

us to achieve the deep reductions that will be required to avoid catastrophic climate 

change. On the other hand, if these new technologies do not emerge, then certainly 

nuclear and/or CCS will be required. Since we don’t know what will work, we should 

set clear technology neutral incentives and fund research into all areas. 

Question 4a. From a strictly economic viewpoint, how can the pathway of the 

emissions reductions or the trajectory of the cap’s emissions reductions affect the 

costs of a climate policy? 

Answer. The optimal pathways are those that start immediately but very gradually increase the level of effort to high levels at later stages of the program. The 

actual rate of reduction is subject to a number of uncertainties, most notably, the 

rate of technology development and deployment. 

Question 4b. For a fixed amount of cumulative emissions, what might the optimal 

shape of that emissions pathway be? 

Answer. The optimal shape will balance net present value of costs and benefits. 

In practice this is hard to do because both are quite uncertain. In practice, sending 

credible market signals may be more important than a theoretically optimal path. 

Credible commitment requires strong political support, long-term pathways that require immediate action now rather than deferring effort until late in the day, and 

some mechanism to insure that costs don’t get out of control. 

Question 5. Why do you regard the inclusion of a price floor as particularly important for investment in new energy technologies under a climate policy? 

Answer. A price floor is particularly important under a cap-and-trade approach 

in order to create a guaranteed rate of return for low-carbon investments. Without 

some minimum but certain value for carbon, in the phase of the regulatory uncertainty that ultimately drives the carbon price, many firms have opted to assume a 
106 

carbon price of $0 in their planning. Moreover, sources of debt or equity financing 

for these startups assume a price of zero in considering their financing proposals 

and business plans. Thus regulatory uncertainty leads to price uncertainty which 

leads to a barrier to investment. The way around this is to provide certainty on the 

low end of the carbon price spectrum. This proposal has the added advantage of potentially increasing the environmental performance of the program if there is a miscalculation on the part of the regulator as to how large the allocation should be (for 

this see EU ETS Phase 1). 

Question 6. Since cap-and-trade programs are so inherently complex and farreaching: 

a) How can we be sure that any scheme is workable and can be implemented 

by the executive branch? 

Answer. Cap and trade programs are not inherently more complex than traditional command and control regulation and might be much simpler. The key advantage, and one reason that EPA favors them, is that they avoid the complexity and 

contention associated with designing and implementing technology standards for 

each class of regulated polluters. They then also avoid the costs and contention of 

permitting each and every facility. All that is required is monitoring and reporting— 

and this would be required anyway under a command and control system. It is the 

optional offset component that adds the regulatory complexity. My own view is that 

the way to implement successful cap and trade is the way that the EPA has historically done it under the Acid Rain Trading Program—to do so without the inclusion 

of a complicated and administratively costly offsets program. 

b) How great are the risks of unintended consequences—for the economy and 

the environment? 

Answer. Unintended consequences, both good and bad, are likely for a US cap and 

trade program, especially one as complex as that proposed under HR 2454. With so 

many different sources, actors, and interactions with other regulatory structures, 

both financial and environmental, predicting the performance of the system is impossible. This is not a bad thing. Unintended positive consequences—for instance 

discovery of low cost abatement opportunities—is a very positive effect of a system 

like the one proposed. The key to managing the negative unintended consequences 

is to create structures that can both detect and respond to them as they develop. 

The EU ETS does this very well for its cap-and-trade system via periodic review 

and revision; the CDM less well, mostly because it is a creature of international law 

and multilateral agreement and so difficult to change without the consensus of nearly 200 nation states. The US system design should focus on building both the detection mechanisms and the ability to respond to new information about unintended 

consequences into its structure. See my March, 2009 testimony before House Energy 

and Commerce for more on this issue. 

c) What sort of growth are we likely to need in federal agencies, particularly 

EPA, if the House-passed bill became law? 

Answer. Substantial growth. The largest staffing demands will likely fall to EPA 

and USDA as they both develop and then implement and enforce the offset components of the bill. The cap-and-trade provisions will also require additional FTEs but 

will likely be less cumbersome in the long run, similar to the ARTP under the Clean 

Air Act, which relative to the number of sources regulated, is not terribly staff-intensive. 

Question 7. Given the complexity and intricacy of some of these policy proposals, 

I am particularly concerned about the opportunities they might create for market 

manipulation, fraud, and for the development of arcane financial instruments that 

will lead us to the next major global financial crisis. Do you believe that these concerns are justified? How might opportunities for market manipulation be reduced 

through climate policy design? 

Answer. The concern that market participants might exploit weaknesses in the 

regulatory system to manipulate prices is potentially justified. The solution to this 

concern is to encourage participation in the markets by as many firms as possible 

and to insure, via well resourced and tough market oversight, that abuses do not 

occur. 

Question 8. I understand that last December, the European Union made auctioning the default future allocation method for its emission trading system. 

a) Was that a tacit recognition that the best way to allocate carbon permits 

or emission allowances is by auction? 
107 

Answer. The EU ETS has made auctioning the default allocation mechanism for 

electricity generators but not for industry. Industries that are subject to international competition will still receive substantial free allocation of allowances during Phase III of the EU ETS. Auctioning makes sense for sectors that can pass 

through the costs of permits to consumers—primarily electricity generators. For 

those who, either because of regulation or competition with firms in uncapped jurisdictions, cannot pass through costs, there is at least some justification for free allocation. 

b) What other ways is the European Commission working to correct the windfall and overallocation it experienced in the early years of the European emission trading system? 

Answer. It’s important to distinguish between the windfall profits issue and the 

overallocaiton issue. Windfall profits are best corrected by reduced free allocation of 

permits. Overallocation in the EU ETS has been corrected by the European Commission in two ways. The first is by collection of better monitoring data. The key 

to successful startup of a cap-and-trade program is high quality data to base the 

first cap and allocation upon. After the first compliance deadline, good data is available via the reporting of covered installations. The second is by lowering the cap. 

Overallocation occurred partly because the cap was so close to business as usual 

emissions. Once the cap fell 8% in order to assist the EU in meeting its Kyoto Protocol obligations, overallocation was far less likely because permitted emissions were 

substantially below what they otherwise would have been. Overallocation will always be a possibility, even with excellent data, when the cap is set close to expected 

emissions, because variation in business activity can influence the actual level of 

emissions relative to what was expected. This is especially true when the cap is set 

far in advance of compliance. 

c) What lessons can Congress learn from the European experience to avoid 

pitfalls in designing and implementing a carbon trading system? 

Answer. I believe that the single most important lesson is to expect the unexpected. No system, however carefully thought out, is likely to avoid both positive 

and negative unintended consequences. The take away from this is that institutional structures that can learn from experience and implement mid-course correction are important to a good design for an emissions trading market. 

Question 9. One of my concerns is that, as far as I can tell, allowances that are 

given away under cap-and-trade could be sold on the secondary market at a price 

that would undercut the government auction reserve price. 

a) Is this accurate, and do you see this as a potential problem for energy investments under such price uncertainty? 

Answer. This is possible; but in this circumstance, no allowances would be sold 

at auction until the market clearing price rose above the reserve price. Market expectations would likely price in this reduced supply, thus leading to higher prices 

in the spot market because of expectations of higher future prices. 

b) What happens if or when strategic allowance reserves run out in a capand-trade program? 

Answer. It depends on the design of the strategic reserve. Under the Kerry-Boxer 

proposal, prices in the cap-and-trade would be allowed to rise above the price set 

for the strategic reserve once the reserve was depleted. Under a true safety-valve, 

since there would be no limit on the number of allowances that might be sold at 

the safety-valve price, this would not occur. 

c) If a strategic reserve is used instead of an explicit price ceiling, then what 

happens if the strategic reserve is continually depleted? Do costs skyrocket at 

that point? 

Answer. The strategic reserve is not intended to limit the long-run price of allowances. Instead, it is intended to reduce short-term price spikes in the allowance 

market. If the system as designed, produces a long-term price of abatement that is 

higher than the strategic reserve, then the reserve would be depleted relatively 

quickly and prices would rise to balance the supply of allowances (the cap) and their 

demand (the cost of abatement). 

Question 10. Under the House bill, I understand that the strategic reserve fund 

in H.R. 2454 is replenished using international forestry offsets. But with all of the 

other offsets proposed in the House bill are these likely to be available in sufficient 

numbers to rebuild the reserve, especially in the longer-term? What would this 

imply for cost control and for the overall viability of the cap-and-trade policy? 
108 

Answer. My sense is that a large supply of strategic reserve forestry offset is unlikely to be available in the short-term. It will take 5 to 10 years to develop the 

necessary regulatory and enforcement infrastructure to bring a large supply of 

REDD credits to market. That being said, it’s not clear that the strategic reserve 

will actually be needed in the near-term. By the time that the level of abatement 

under the cap might produce high enough carbon prices to trigger the reserve, I believe that there will likely be REDD credits available. 

Question 11. In your testimony you seem to suggest that a price collar with a 

dedicated climate trust fund to finance additional climate mitigation projects outside 

the cap could serve as a more effective cost control mechanism than an offset program, both in terms of price certainty and environmental integrity. 

a) Could you explain how you view these two mechanisms as potential substitutes? 

Answer. Offsets serve to lower prices within the cap and to, if they work as intended, lead to cost-effective reductions outside the cap. A price-collar accomplished 

the first objective with greater certainty than offsets because it sets hard limits outside which the regulator will not allow prics to vary. A climate trust fund would 

accomplish the latter by creating incentives for those outside the cap to apply for 

funding to reduce emissions. Using a technique such as a reverse auction to select 

proposals for climate trust fund funding would insure that only cost-effective reductions occurred. By delinking the outside the cap reductions from those occurring inside the cap, the program would insure that if reductions outside the cap weren’t 

real and/or permanent and/or verifiable, no harm to the cap would occur. To the extent that the safety valve was triggered, thus effectively raising the cap, the trust 

fund could be used to lower outside of cap emissions, thus counterbalancing the increase in emissions. 

b) Are additional emissions reductions through agricultural and forestry 

projects, for example, more efficient as offsets against the cap or as subsidized 

projects funded by a climate trust fund that are outside of the cap? 

Answer. I believe that agriculture and forestry projects could be carried out more 

cost-effectively via a climate trust fund than via offsets. That is, more reductions 

could be generated for less money—because farms and forests would be paid for the 

marginal cost of reductions outside the cap rather than for the marginal price inside 

the cap. Furthermore, because the transaction costs of a subsidy program would be 

lower than for compliance grade offsets, more of the revenues would go to the farmer or land owner actually producing the reduction, rather than being captured by 

lawyers, consultants, and brokers at other levels of the offset value chain. One recent study shows that just 31% of CDM revenues actually reach the entity producing the reduction while 69% are kept by other parties. Thus reductions could be 

more cost-effective AND farmers and land-owners might receive more revenue under 

a Climate Trust Fund. 

Question 12. Given the current state of the offset market, and the 45 pages of requirements governing offsets in the House passed bill, do you think there will be 

sufficient offsets available -domestically and internationally-to contain costs under 

a cap-and-trade bill over the next 20 years? 

Answer. This is very difficult to predict at the present time—before the rules governing offset creation have been written. That being said, my best guess is that the 

rules will be written to insure that there are sufficient offsets available. If this 

means sacrificing the environmental integrity of the program, my evaluation of the 

political economy of the offsets rule making process is that it will be sacrificed. 

There is simply too much discretion on the part of the agency writing the regulations and too much pressure to keep costs down to avoid this outcome. 

Question 13. I was struck by your testimony that we would need to process offsets 

20 times faster than the CDM. How did you arrive at this conclusion? 

Answer. This estimate is based on the fact that the CDM currently issues approximately 10 million tons of offset credits per month or about 120 million credits per 

year. The US system, in order to issue 2.4 billion tons per year (including for the 

4/5 write down of international offsets), would need to issue 20 times this amount, 

including all of the additional regulatory process required to create higher environmental integrity than currently exists within the CDM. 
(109) 

APPENDIX II 

Additional Material Submitted for the Record 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, 

Washington, DC, September 10, 2009. 

Hon. DEBBIE STABENOW, 

U.S. Senate, 133 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC. 

DEAR SENATOR STABENOW: Thank you for your letter of June 1, 2009, cosigned 

by your colleagues, in support of the Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) efforts to 

encourage farmers, ranchers, and forest landowners to address climate change and 

provide ecosystem services. USDA is uniquely positioned to provide farmers, ranchers, and forest landowners with the information needed to evaluate their options 

and quantify the benefits of greenhouse gas reduction alternatives and other services. We also have the technical capabilities to construct a robust, environmentally 

sound system that ensures real and lasting greenhouse gas benefits. 

We are preparing to conduct a rigorous technical and science-based process to develop guidelines for quantifying the greenhouse gas benefits of agricultural and forestry practices. I have asked a newly formed Climate Change Program Office, within the Office of the Chief Economist, to coordinate this effort, working with the Natural Resources Conservation Service, the Agricultural Research Service, the Economic Research Service, the Forest Service, and the newly formed Office of Ecosystem Services and Markets. 

In 2006, we released guidance to farm and forest landowners to allow them to estimate their greenhouse gas footprints. This work relied on the support of the research and program agencies across USDA. We continue to work on this front and 

are developing user-friendly tools that can help farmers and landowners make these 

calculations. The Department of Energy adopted USDA’s technical greenhouse gas 

methods for use in its Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting Registry. 

Looking forward, we envision a process that can engage the public and the technical experts at every step to ensure that the most recent information is included 

and that there is high confidence in the emissions reductions produced through agricultural and forestry offsets. 

The specifics of the plan are being finalized. In general, our plan is that these 

methods will be stand-alone and will be designed to: 1) quantify the emissions and 

sinks associated with specific source categories; 2) quantify emission reductions and 

carbon sequestration from conservation and land management practices and technologies; 3) support the development of entity and farm-scale greenhouse gas inventories; 4) develop prototype reporting systems; and 5) ensure compatibility with any 

new Federal incentive-based or offset-based greenhouse gas reduction system to the 

extent possible. 

We would like to make these guidelines available for use in public and private 

registries and reporting systems. We plan to use them in assessing the performance 

of conservation and renewable energy programs. Finally, the guidelines will be prepared to facilitate their adoption and use in a Federal regulatory greenhouse gas 

offsets market The guidelines will be designed to provide reliable, real, verifiable, 

estimates of on-site greenhouse gas emissions, carbon storage, and carbon sequestration, They also will be designed so that they can be applied to quantify on-site 

greenhouse gas reductions and increases in carbon storage due to conservation and 

land management activities. 

Thank you again for your interest and commitment to working with USDA as we 

move forward on these important efforts. We will make every effort to keep your 

offices and staffs informed of our progress. Please do not hesitate to contact us if 
110 

you have any questions or would like additional information, l am sending a similar 

letter to your colleagues. 

Sincerely, 

THOMAS J. VILSACK, 

Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF ROGER WILLIAMS, VICE-PRESIDENT OF BLUE SOURCE, LLC, AND

CHAIR OF CARBON OFFSET PROVIDERS COALITION, SALT LAKE CITY, UT 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, my name is Roger Williams, and I am a vice-president of Blue 

Source, LLC based in Salt Lake City, Utah. I also serve as Chair of the Carbon Offset Providers Coalition (‘‘COPC’’). On behalf of Blue Source and the Carbon Offset 

Providers Coalition, I thank you, the Ranking Member, and the Committee for this 

opportunity to provide written testimony for the record of proceedings. 

About Blue Source 

Blue Source is the oldest and largest investor and developer in the U.S. of projects 

that reduce greenhouse gas, promote domestic energy production, and construct the 

physical infrastructure that will be needed to transition to a clean energy economy. 

Over the last 10 years, Blue Source has created the largest portfolio of emission reduction credits and projects in North America. We have offices in Salt Lake, San 

Francisco, Houston, New York, Calgary (Alberta), and North Carolina, and employ 

over 30 environmental and business professionals. We are not environmentalists, 

but environmental capitalists, working at the intersection of the environment and 

business to solve global and local environmental problems through market mechanisms and capital investment in ecosystem services, primarily low-carbon clean energy infrastructure projects. We have two primary businesses. 

First, we have built an extensive portfolio of carbon credits representing over 100 

million tons of greenhouse gas reductions. We invest in a wide variety of sustainable 

low-carbon projects such as geothermal, advanced transportation logistics, on-farm 

wastewater management, landfill gas energy, forestry management, and organic 

waste composting. We have developed the first protocols in numerous carbon categories and invested in over 20 project types in 48 states and Canada. Just one specific example is our coal mine methane project in the Powder River Basin of Wyoming, in which Blue Source provides the necessary working capital to support predraining of mine methane at a large surface mine. This project has reduced CO2e by 1.75 million tons through the capture of otherwise wasted natural gas, which is 

then cleansed to pipeline quality and becomes a domestic clean energy resource. 

Blue Source has been very active in Federal and state carbon advocacy leadership, 

sharing our on-the-ground experience in environmental markets to help governments develop sensible market rules that encourage transformational changes in behavior that will accelerate America’s progress to energy independence and a clean 

energy economy. Blue Source also has a project development business with over $1 billion in available funds ready to deploy today in Carbon Infrastructure investments. For example, our management team has developed projects that gather approximately 340 

million cubic feet per day (6.8 million metric tons per year) of industrial vent-stacksourced carbon dioxide that delivers the CO2 to various sites for geologic sequestration. Instead of venting into the atmosphere, Blue Source projects are transporting 

these emissions to Enhanced Oil Recovery projects in Canada, Wyoming, Texas and 

New Mexico. Our newest project will take over 250,000 tons annually of waste carbon dioxide from the LaVeta gas processing project in Colorado, separate and compress the gas, and pipe it 16 miles to connect to the existing Sheep Mountain CO2

pipeline which supplies CO2 for enhanced oil recovery in the Permian Basin of 

Texas. These kinds of projects support increased domestic energy production, recover oil resources otherwise stranded underground, and directly reduce oil imports. 

Our blended engineering, finance and transactional skills make such projects possible through carbon finance where traditional economics and market barriers will 

not. We have 60∂ projects in the pipeline and intend to be a key contributor to the 

development of a new, national CO2 ‘‘carbon highway’’ infrastructure. More information about our company is available at our website at www.bluesource.com and further examples of our projects are included in the addendum. 

About the COPC 

The Carbon Offset Providers Coalition www.carbonoffsetproviders.org is an alliance of the leading companies in the carbon offset market, including those involved 
111 

1 U.S. Department of Agriculture, A Preliminary Analysis of the Effects of HR 2454 on U.S. 

Agriculture (July 22, 2009). 2Source: U.S.EPA Analysis of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 

2454) (June 23, 2009); U.S.EPA Preliminary Analysis of the Waxman-Markey Discussion Draft, 

The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 in the 111th Congress (Apr. 20, 2009); 

U.S.EPA, Analysis of the Low Carbon Economy Act of 2007 (Bingaman-Specter, S. 1766) (Jan. 

15, 2008); U.S.EPA, Analysis of the Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007 (McCainLieberman, S. 280) (July 16, 2007). 3McKinsey & Company, Reducing U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions: How Much at What Cost, 

U.S. Greenhouse Gas Abatement Mapping Initiative (Dec. 2007). 4Source: US House of Representatives, The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009: 

By the Numbers. 

in financing, producing, generating, providing, aggregating and/or marketing greenhouse gas emission reductions for sale as offsets in existing and emerging voluntary 

and compliance greenhouse emission trading markets. 

COPC members offer their collective experience from hundreds of offset projects 

in the U.S. and abroad that have achieved millions of tons of greenhouse gas reduction. COPC members have been actively managing climate change for the last 15 

years, and are leaders in reducing greenhouse gases in the United States through 

carbon offsets, renewable energy, and clean tech markets. In anticipation of greenhouse gas regulation—and encouraged by states such as California and federal 

agencies such as EPA—our members have invested tens of millions of dollars in 

hundreds of offset projects in nearly all 50 states here in the U.S. and in Canada 

and Mexico, which collectively have helped America significantly reduce its carbon 

footprint. Our members are ready to invest billions of dollars more if the right public policies, market signals, and legal certainty are provided. 

Many of these projects directly benefit farmers and the agricultural community 

by providing an additional revenue stream as payment for environmental services 

and greenhouse reductions achieved through advanced manure management, digesters and lagoon covers that generate green ‘‘cow power,’’ soil management techniques 

that improve soil carbon stocks, precision farming and fertilizer reduction, and land 

management and conservation.1 We do these projects not only as environmental investors, but also as participants, like Blue Source’s CEO, Bill Townsend and his 

family, who are 4th generation Indiana farmers. 

THE ROLE OF OFFSETS IN CONTAINING ENERGY COSTS

Blue Source and the COPC support a cap-and-trade approach that contains robust 

provisions for carbon offsets and low-carbon energy investments. Appropriately, 

most of the climate bills that have been considered in this Congress and the last 

have recognized the vital role that carbon offsets play in providing necessary cost 

containment and early investment in clean technology, carbon-reduction infrastructure and green jobs. Blue Source and COPC are ready and willing to invest in 

projects that serve this cost containment function, but we need investment certainty 

from Congress in order to do so. Both in the specific area of carbon offsets and the 

broader market for emissions allowances, the key to encouraging investment, managing cost and achieving price stability is for Congress to craft sensible and pragmatic regulatory structures support by clear and unambiguous market rules 

A. Carbon Offsets Have Been Shown to Significantly Lower the Costs of Capand-Trade and Provide Other Co-Benefits 

Economic analyses by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (‘‘EPA’’) and others have shown that incentivizing a robust market in offset reductions (i.e., emissions reductions from diverse sources outside a mandatory cap) can effectively reduce the overall cost to American taxpayers and consumers of meeting the goals of 

global warming legislation. Conversely, failing to incentivize offsets could double the 

price of allowances and dramatically increase the cost of cost of cap-and-trade to 

American families.2 These studies have consistently shown that the cost of compliance with a greenhouse gas cap could be up to 96% higher if there is not sufficient 

investment in offset projects. Accordingly, offsets provide critical costcontainment 

and price stability by providing flexibility to covered industries to find the lowest 

available cost emissions reductions across a range of options. Greenhouse gas reduction opportunities are diverse and spread across the entire economy,3 and thus offset trading is the best means to tap these opportunities and create real change by 

overcoming market barriers, investment needs and misaligned incentives. 

Jobs created by greenhouse gas emissions reductions projects are part of the 1.7 

million jobs expected to be added by ACES.4 As just one example, EPA estimates 

that a typical landfill green energy project—many of which are made possible by 

carbon offset revenue funded by COPC members—increases national GDP by $14 
112 

5Source: U.S. EPA Landfill Methane Outreach Program, An Overview of Landfill Gas Energy 

in the United States. 6 Ibid. 

million ($3 million local benefit) and creates nearly 70 full-time equivalent green 

jobs.5 Landfill gas projects nationally generate 10.5 billion kilowatt hours of electricity and 79,000,000,000 cubic feet of biogas for direct use application—thereby 

displacing 177 million barrels of conventional oil.6

A great illustration is our Sarpy County Landfill project in Papillion, Nebraska, 

which captures 100,000 tons CO2e each year from fugitive methane gas. This municipal landfill opened in 1990 and has 2.8 million tons of waste in place, but had no 

current revenue and was not required by EPA rules to capture landfill gas. Because 

the county did not have the money or access to financing or technical know-how to 

install a collection system, methane from the landfill was seeping out into the atmosphere, adding to global warming. Blue Source partnered with the county to overcome these barriers by using carbon credits recognized by the California Climate Action Reserve to provide the necessary revenue to finance the gas collection project. 

The residents of Sarpy County also benefit from improved odor control which is expected to pave the way for economic and industrial development around the landfill. 

We are currently evaluating a supplemental biogas-to-energy project that would sell 

green power to the Omaha Public Power District, which would further reduce greenhouse gas and fossil-fuel use from electric utilities. 

In addition to providing cost-containment and price moderation, by energizing innovation and market forces, offset projects provide an essential bridge to a low-carbon economy. Offset projects are already providing jobs and opportunity for the U.S. 

economy through a robust voluntary market. Such projects have provided important 

incentives and revenue to many corners of the economy, including family farmers 

and small businesses, and have already demonstrated their ability to bring about 

real, positive changes in the way America generates electricity (for example, renewable energy from wind, biomass, landfill gas and solar), grows crops (though advanced farming practices and manure management), and manufactures products 

(through cleaner, smarter industrial processes and pollution control). In addition to 

reducing carbon emissions, offsets have funded the development of commercially viable methods of sequestering carbon through tree planting, agricultural advances, 

and long-term storage in geologic formations. 

Offsets also deliver important co-benefits over and beyond combating global warming, including reduction of conventional air pollutants, improved water quality, and 

energy security that improve the lives of all Americans. Many offset projects directly 

benefit disadvantaged urban and rural communities, such as urban tree canopy 

projects that reduce ‘‘heat island effect’’ and beautify our inner cities. In addition, 

offset projects can incentivize the development and adoption of new, low-carbon 

technology developed by American industry and research institutions, which may be 

exported to the rest of the world. 

Finally, offsets provide critical flexibility to those heavy industry sectors covered 

under an emissions cap as they transition to a carbon-constrained economy. If properly incentivized, offset projects are available to begin achieving greenhouse gas reductions immediately—giving regulated industry time to phase in new technology 

and capital investment while avoiding premature retirement of assets that could result in unnecessary economic hardship and avoidable life-cycle costs. In short, the 

potential of offset projects should be ‘‘unleashed’’ to help attain the goal of mitigating climate change and achieving America’s energy independence. 

Ironically, the gains achieved over the last 10 years through the voluntary carbon 

market are being seriously undermined by current federal legislative uncertainty, 

as investors who funded these projects in anticipation of federal action are now 

doubting whether Congress will provide the needed incentives. Accordingly, investment in low-carbon projects is dropping as a result of weak market signals. The consequence is that there will be comparatively fewer greenhouse gas reductions this 

year, even though investment in greenhouse gas reductions ought to be growing, 

and could be growing with Congressional leadership. 

B. Congress Should Ensure Cost Containment Through Sensible Market Rules 

We congratulate the U.S. House of Representatives for passing the American 

Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, and encourage the Senate to 

take up similar legislation as soon as possible. Although H.R. 2454 is a major step 

forward, the bill as currently drafted does not fully accomplish its goal of launching 

America onto a new low-carbon and clean energy pathway, particularly in the near 

term over the next 3-5 years, due to impracticalities in the way market rules are 

drafted which artificially constrict the effectiveness of the offset market and create 
113 

* Addendum has been retained in committee files. 

ambiguities that may foreclose opportunities for cost-effective emission reductions. 

However, this vision can be achieved with a few simple but key changes to the bill, 

which will allow billions of dollars of now-ready investment to start flowing immediately into the U.S. economy through low-carbon and clean energy markets. The 

COPC has offered detailed comments on H.R. 2454 to address these concerns, which 

I have included in the addendum to my testimony. 

The central theme of these comments is that market rules need to be clear, predictable, and workable from an investment standpoint. The changes to H.R. 2454 

proposed by Blue Source and the COPC will accomplish several important goals: 

• The proposed changes will allow emission reduction projects, such as collecting 

methane from livestock manure or landfills for green energy, to continue capturing this methane under H.R. 2454’s offsets program, without arbitrarily cutting off projects that were built prior to 2009 (or in some cases 2001), so that 

we don’t tell the owners of these beneficial projects (who risked their hardearned capital) that they should abandon or dismantle those projects. 

• We encourage Congress to expressly recognize early emissions reductions registered with the American Carbon Registry (ACR), the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS), and the Climate Action Reserve (CAR), as well as other state and 

federal programs. These are nationally and internationally recognized, effectively governed and operated offset registries which have pedigrees of excellence 

with founding stakeholders such as: Environmental Defense Fund who started 

ACR; the States of Illinois and New Mexico, the City of Chicago and the Iowa 

Farm Bureau which helped establish the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX); numerous industry, academic and nonprofit stakeholders that collaborated to develop the VCS; and state-led legislative initiatives that led to CAR and RGGI. 

• The proposed changes will also allow early projects under established offset programs to continue operation under their original crediting period (which is usually 10 years) before transitioning to EPA’s offsets program. Otherwise, ACES 

will unintentionally cause the forfeiture of millions of dollars of existing project 

investments. No investors will put additional money in a project that has only 

3 years of confirmed economic qualification, as is the case in H.R. 2454 as drafted. The consequence is that investment is currently frozen and there will be no 

gains in the battle against global warming for the next 3-5 years until EPA has 

its program up and running. 

• We have also proposed to allow covered industrial facilities the opportunity to 

start making emissions reductions investments now, instead of 5 years from 

now when compliance obligations commence, and to be awarded tradable and 

bankable credits for early reductions, without fear of being penalized or losing 

transitional assistance. 

• Our proposed changes will also give limited, one-time recognition to those early 

actors that can prove that they reduced emissions prior to enactment of this 

bill. To reward these early movers, 5% of the allowances from the first year of 

the allowance pool (only the first year) should be set aside for pro rata distribution in recognition of this leadership, vision, and early, higher risk investment 

in climate change solutions that have shown that it is possible to tackle climate 

change and helped make serious consideration of climate legislation possible. 

In short, America needs policies that start tackling climate change now—not in 

5 years—with protection of existing investments and clear incentives for continued 

investment in early reductions, not only for the sake of the climate, but for green 

jobs, economic stimulus, technology advancement, revenue for farmers, small businesses, and landowners, and myriad environmental benefits including cleaner air, 

cleaner water, and enhanced wildlife habitat. America needs policies that will bolster, maintain and protect the early action efforts of pioneering environmental entrepreneurs; and not so easily forget or set aside their contributions. 

ACHIEVING ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND CLIMATE GOALS THROUGH ENERGY POLICY

In addition to a cap-and-trade approach, energy policy is essential for promoting 

investment in the clean, low-carbon economy. We encourage this Committee to seriously consider progressive changes to current energy policy that will better recognize the value of U.S. domestic energy production, better manage our domestic energy resources, and at the same time significantly reduce carbon emissions. There 

are several enormous opportunities for domestic energy growth that need further incentive and policy support. 
114 

A. Promote Domestic Energy Production Through Enhance Oil Recovery 

First, the United States has some 85 billion barrels of stranded, domestic, onshore 

oil that is physically recoverable only using enhanced oil recovery (‘‘EOR’’). EOR involves injecting carbon dioxide into depleted oil and gas wells to force previously unrecoverable oil to the surface. This volume of available oil production is equal to the 

approximately 17 years of current total imports of foreign oil, or 42 years equivalent 

current U.S. production. The market value of this new production is projected to be 

$6 trillion at $70 per barrel, which will provide significant revenue to the U.S. 

Treasury. Today, EOR is produced primarily using underground CO2. The U.S. has 

less than 30% of the underground CO2 it needs to produce this oil, and at the same 

time, each day is venting billions of cubic feet of CO2 from industrial facilities as 

a byproduct—an enormous waste of resources which many believe is also a serious 

environmental hazard because of its contribution to global warming. Because CO2

injected during the EOR process can be sealed underground at the conclusion of production activities, EOR will also pave the way to commercially viable carbon capture 

and storage technologies that will allow hundreds of millions of tons of CO2 to be 

safely stored underground in perpetuity, and thus allow the U.S. to achieve real reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. 

Instead of using underground CO2, we need to provide meaningful incentives to 

capture ‘‘ventstack’’ CO2 and construct a ‘‘carbon highway’’ to transport the CO2 to 

EOR fields in order to expand domestic energy production and recover these otherwise stranded natural resources. This could be accomplished through a mix of new 

federal (and state, where necessary) tax and nontax incentives that are targeted towards companies that develop and finance EOR infrastructure for anthropogenic 

CO2. We applaud Congress for taking steps in this direction already by, for example: 

(1) the new Section 45Q CCS tax credit; (2) expansion of MLP rules to include the 

pipeline transport of anthropogenic CO2; and (3) the CCS-related stimulus dollars 

that have been provided recently, all of which include EOR. 

Those efforts, while admirable, are generally targeted towards industrial sources 

of CO2, not the companies that are building EOR infrastructure. And to the extent 

that entities other than industrial sources are eligible (i.e., pipelines/MLP), the incentives are proving to be insufficient to spark the needed capital flows. We thus 

propose that consideration be given to a new package of incentives that might include, for example, a new investment tax credit (‘‘ITC’’) for the construction of CO2- EOR infrastructure. That new ITC, in turn, should be eligible for the recently enacted ITC/grant conversion mechanism to accommodate the current state of the capital markets and corporate revenue positions. The amount of the new ITC should 

be set at a sufficient level to drive projects forward while recognizing the energy 

independence, trade balance, national security, and green energy production benefits that such projects would deliver to the Nation. 

B. Incentivize Renewable ‘‘Energy’’ Production of All Forms, Not Just Electricity 

An estimated 1.4 trillion cubic feet of uncaptured methane emissions leak into the 

atmosphere every year—an amount equal to 30% of annual imports of natural gas 

worth $4 trillion per year at gas prices of $3 per mmBtu. Of this amount, over 300 

billion cubic feet (or about 8% of U.S. imports) escapes from landfills, coal mines, 

wastewater treatment facilities, and potential manure management projects annually. This ‘‘biogas’’ is a critically important energy resource that could be captured 

by projects funded with greenhouse gas carbon offsets, renewable energy certificates 

(RECs), and/or tax incentives; however, under most state and federal energy incentive programs, if a project doesn’t generate energy in the form of electricity (i.e., if 

the biogas is instead used to generate heat, power, or vehicle fuel), there is no incentive under most state renewable electricity programs or the federal tax credit for 

renewable energy. 

Because biogas used in lieu of natural gas is as important to our domestic energy 

and environmental goals as the use of such gas to produce electricity, we need to 

define renewable energy more broadly to include productive use of such gas independent of electricity generation. Specifically, we recommend that Congress: (1) 

allow the production of such gas for beneficial use to receive the full spectrum of 

grant funding and tax benefits available to renewable energy, including reauthorizing the now-lapsed Section 29 biogas tax credit; (2) recognize the Btu value of 

biogas by expanding the current federal Renewable Fuel Standard (‘‘RPS’’) to include nontransportation biofuels; and (3) include in any federal Renewable Energy 

Standard (‘‘RES’’), such as that proposed in this Committee’s S.1462, equal credit 

for non-electricity energy value from biogas or other renewable sources. 

In addition, Congress should recognize that methane biogas projects also deliver 

significant environment benefits due to the ‘‘global warming potential’’ of methane 
115 

7See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(4). 

which is estimated to be between 21-25 times more powerful than carbon dioxide 

in terms of climate change effects. In addition to the energy value of biogas projects, 

investments in the destruction of methane emissions should be given additional incentives to reflect this added environmental benefit. In absence of a cap-and-trade 

program, this could be achieved in the form of bonus credits under the federal RFS 

or proposed RES programs, similar to bonus credits given to cellulosic biofuels 

under the renewable fuels program.7

C. Incentivize Energy Efficiency in the Use of Fuel 

The country needs additional incentives to accelerate energy efficiency, not just 

in the electricity sector, but also the efficient use of fuels used for heat, power, and 

transportation. Reducing fuel use is essentially the equivalent of expanding domestic energy production. If Congress passes a renewable energy standard, energy savings of all kinds (not just electricity) should receive a credit that would count toward 

renewable energy targets. Similarly, Congress should extend programs offering 

grants and other government support to electricity energy efficiency to cover fuel 

savings as well. In addition, the federal RFS program for transportation fuels 

should be amended to recognize avoided impacts thru vehicle fleet efficiency, advanced logistics, and other conservation measures. 

Thank you for the opportunity to submit this written testimony, and we would 

be delighted to provide further information to the Committee. 

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