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Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study on Challenges to Military

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DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD 2007 SUMMER STUDY

20090327438

SHSO7 >UMMER !>TU

Challenges to Military Operations

In Support of National Interests

Volume 1 Executive Summary • December 2008

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, D.C. 20301 -3140
Report ofthe

Defense Science Board

2007 Summer Study

Challenges to Military

Operations in Support

of U.S. Interests

Volume I

Executive Summary

December 2008

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB).

The DSB is a federal advisory committee established to provide

independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions,

conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not necessarily

represent the official position of the Department of Defense.

The DSB Task Force on Challenges to Military Operations in Support

of U.S. Interests completed its information gathering in August 2007.

This report is unclassified and cleared for public release.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD

9 Dec 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR

ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study on

Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. Interests

I am pleased to forward the final report ofthe Defense Science Board 2007

Summer Study on Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. Interests.

The report offers important considerations for the Department of Defense in

response to future threats to our nation's security.

This study, robust in scope, concerns itself with challenges the U.S. military

might face in the future, emphasizing areas where the nation is less well prepared.

Future adversaries are more likely to attack the nation with asymmetric tools of

war, employed using non-traditional concepts of operation. Thus, challenges from

nuclear weapons, from cyber warfare, in and from space, to force deployment and

resupply, and on U.S. soil, may well dominate in the decades ahead. Addressing

U.S. vulnerabilities in these and other areas is the focus ofthe study's effort,

leading to actions for the Department that can improve the nation's posture against

future threats.

I endorse all of the study's recommendations and encourage you to forward

the report to the Secretary of Defense.

William Schneider, Jr.

DSB Chairman
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3140 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140

DEFENSE SCIENCE

BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Defense Science Board

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study on

Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. Interests

U.S. conventional military capability remains unmatched by any state. As a result,

nations and powerful non-state actors, weaker in conventional weaponry, will face the

United States with unconventional weapons. Further, these asymmetric tools of war may

well be employed using non-traditional concepts of operation. And the battlefield may

no longer be limited to regions afar, but may include the U.S. homeland. The United

States could well confront the possibility of going to war abroad in the face of significant

devastation in the homeland—dividing forces between homeland catastrophe relief

operations and combat abroad—even facing the possibility that deploy and supply of

U.S. military forces could be delayed and disrupted.

How to contemplate this future, over the next two decades, was the focus of the

Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study. The question asked by the study is this:

Is the United States maintaining its capability to deter and defeat a nation or

non-state actor who might employ unconventional as well as conventional means,

in non-traditional as well as traditional ways, to thwart U.S. interests?

To focus on challenges for which the United States might be less well prepared, the

study investigated seven topic areas, making recommendations for actions in each of them:

• Future of war. The character of war is changing—it is irregular,

catastrophic, disruptive and no longer confined to the traditional battlefield.

This changing character of warfare calls for considerations about how the

nation's military capabilities should evolve—the type of forces, reliance on

information infrastructures, protection to forces and critical infrastructure,

new capabilities. At the same time, other instruments of national power

must be brought to bear, which will involve strengthening relationships

between the Department of Defense and other federal partners.

• Unconventional weapons and technology proliferation. The technology

equation, between the United States and potential adversaries, is key to the

nature of future warfare and the ability of our nation to prevail. The range

of possible destructive weapons is vast, but three stand out as the most

critical: nuclear weapons, biological agents, and cyber warfare. There are
steps that can be taken—in prevention, attribution, mitigation, and

recover)'—that can improve the U.S. posture against such attacks.

Nuclear proliferation—a special case. The nuclear threat stands in a class

by itself in terms of its potential for damage, disruption, and devastation.

Thus, managing the challenge of nuclear proliferation deserves special

attention. History has shown that it is possible to influence the decision to

acquire nuclear weapons. Thus emphasis should be placed on developing

tailored approaches to proliferation prevention to shape the nuclear

environment. At the same time, the United States needs to prepare to cope

with the military operational challenges of a more proliferated world—

closing the sizeable gap between current capabilities and future needs.

Unconventional operational concepts and the homeland. The capable

adversary of the future will execute "one game"—attacking U.S. interests

wherever the nation is most vulnerable, and that could mean the homeland.

Overseas deployment, simultaneous with responding to a significant scale of

attacks in the homeland, will stress DOD capabilities. Roles and

responsibilities are not clearly defined, and adequate resources have not

been invested in the homeland defense missions. Furthermore, the problem

extends beyond DOD to the interagency and response communities, where

the handoffs and roles are not well understood—in part because they are

not effectively exercised.

What we know and don't know about adversary capabilities:

intelligence. It is not possible to plan and prepare for all possible futures;

nor is it possible for an adversary to exercise all of the opportunities to

which they might take advantage. Thus, with good intelligence, the United

States can focus its investments on the most likely cases. Strategic issues

should command top level focus in the Intelligence Community, and the

attention of some ofits best resources. Improvements are also needed in

foreign and domestic intelligence collection, analysis, and support;

countering foreign intelligence; net assessments and gaming; and methods

for improving intelligence related to the threat ofweapons of mass

destruction (WMD).

Fighting through asymmetric counterforce. While the range of potential

asymmetric attacks is wide, this study identified three as particularly

challenging: conducting military operations in WMD environments,

countering attacks on U.S. and allied space capabilities, and cyber warfare

against information networks. DOD needs to take steps to enhance the

capabilities of general-purpose forces to operate in an environment where

WMD have been used. Further, the ability to operate in and from the global

commons—space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace—is

critical to DOD's ability to conduct operations and project power anywhere
in the world. Thus, the Department must act to mitigate vulnerabilities in

these areas.

• Strategic communication—another instrument of U.S. power.

Defending U.S. interests against future adversaries will require more than

just military might—involving other instruments of U.S. power such as

diplomacy, economic and financial sanctions, and strategic communication.

Strategic communication is vital to America's future and must be

transformed at strategic and operational levels. The range of future threats

varies greatly and requires a strategic communication instrument with

sustained impact and far greater capacity to understand, engage, and

influence global populations on issues of consequence—an instrument that

emphasizes actions that are consistent with what national leaders say.

Taken together, the issues addressed in this study point to the fact that the cost to

deter or defeat future adversaries is rising—costs defined not only in financial terms but

also along other dimensions to include military lives, civilian lives, money, civil liberties,

daily comfort, economic health, and global reputation. Thus, instruments of national

power, other than military, will assume greater importance.

The nation is unprepared and is making little progress in reducing these costs. But

circumstances can be materially improved. The United States can achieve its national

objectives by taking a combination of actions that will have an impact on costs—actions

that are detailed in the recommendations of this report. DOD must begin to act, even as

it fights the current war, to make sure it is ready for the next war, one that could well be

even more stressing than the war the nation fights today.

v

o^

Dr. Craig Fields

Co-Chair

Mr. Richard Haver

Co-Chair
TABLE OF CONTENTS I ix

Table of Contents

Volume I. Executive Summary

Major Themes xi

The Future ofWar 2

Unconventional Weapons and Technology Proliferation 9

Nuclear Proliferation: A Special Case 20

Unconventional Operational Concepts and the Homeland 27

What We Know and Don't Know about Adversary Capabilities:

Intelligence 42

Fighting Through Asymmetric Counterforce 46

Strategic Communication: Another Instrument of U.S. Power 57

Final Thoughts 70

Terms of Reference 73

Study Participants 77

Presentations to the Study 85

Glossarv 97

Volume II. Main Report

Part I. The Future of War

Part II. Unconventional Weapons and Technology Proliferation

Part III. Nuclear Proliferation: A Special Case

Part IV. Unconventional Operational Concepts and the Homeland

Part V. What We Know and Don't Know about Adversary

Capabilities: Intelligence

Part VI. Fighting Through Asymmetric Counterforce

Part VII. Strategic Communication: Another Instrument of

U.S. Power
MAJOR THEMES I xl

Major Themes

Nations and powerful non-state actors, weaker in conventional weaponry,

will face the United States with unconventional weaponry. The most

challenging are:

• nuclear weapons, worsened by proliferation

• self-replicating biological weapons

• cyber weapons to disrupt net-centricity, including in space

They will also exploit vulnerabilities in our homeland security by:

• attacking our homeland to disrupt military deployment and supply

• dividing our joint forces between domestic civilian relief and foreign

military operations

We are unprepared:

• At best, our policies and actions will be severely constrained.

• Worse, we will enter the fray and then quit when we come to appreciate

the full cost ofsuccess.

• These costs are defined not only as financial costs, but also along broader

dimensions, such as military lives, civilian lives, money, civil liberties,

daily comfort, economic health, and global reputation.

Instruments of national power other than the military, such as strategic

communication, will assume greater importance.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I

Executive Summary

U.S. conventional military capability remains unmatched by any state. As a

result, no adversary—peer, near peer, or powerful non-state actor—with

objectives in conflict with U.S. interests will oppose our nation with conventional

military means. The United States is too strong and capable. Yet, this strength in

the conventional arena does not mean that the nation is unmatched across the

spectrum of conflict.

The proliferation of technology, technical information, and technical skills

facilitates access to a range of weaponry, other than conventional, that can be

used to attack the United States both at home and abroad. These include

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as biological, chemical, nuclear,

radiological, electromagnetic pulse, directed energy, and high explosives, as well

as cyber warfare. No longer are adversaries limited to nation states. Technology

proliferation has afforded access to the tools of warfare to non-state actors, such

as terrorists, insurgents, and groups not bound by geography and the traditional

trappings and vulnerabilities of statehood.

These asymmetric tools of war may well be employed using non-traditional

concepts of operation. Moreover, the battlefield may no longer be limited to

regions afar, but may include the U.S. homeland. The United States could well

confront the possibility of going to war abroad in the face of significant

devastation in the homeland—dividing forces between homeland catastrophe

relief operations and combat abroad, or even facing the possibility that deploy

and supply of U.S. military forces could be delayed and disrupted.

How to contemplate this future over the next two decades was the focus of

the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study. The question asked by the study

was this:

Is the United States maintaining its capability to deter and defeat a

nation or non-state actor who might employ unconventional or

conventional means, in non-traditional as well as traditional ways to

thwart U.S. interests?
2 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The study, necessarily robust in scope, concerns itself with challenges the

U.S. military might face in the future for which the nation is less well-prepared.

To approach the investigation into U.S. capabilities, capability gaps, and

necessary actions to improve the nation's ability to prevail against the future

described herein, the subject matter was divided into seven topic areas, with no

attempt to ensure that they were mutually exclusive. Each is treated in turn in the

summary that follows.

the future ofwar

unconventional weapons and technology proliferation

nuclear proliferation, a special case

unconventional operational concepts and the homeland

what we know and don't know about adversary capabilities: intelligence

fighting through asymmetric counterforce

strategic communication: another instrument of U.S. power

The Future ofWar

For five centuries, it has taken the resources of a state to destroy another

state. For nearly two centuries, the U.S. homeland has been immune from attack

(with the exception of Pearl Harbor). It has been a quarter of a century since the

United States had a serious peer competitor. However, things are changing. The

globalization of transportation and communication; over-dependence on a

vulnerable, interconnected infrastructure; increasingly affordable weapons of

mass destruction; and the likely emergence of a near-peer promise new

challenges to the nation's security.

In fact, challenges of the sort anticipated in the future are already occurring to

a certain degree (Figure 1). Plots to kill U.S. soldiers at Ft. Dix and cyber attacks in

Estonia are suggestive of the type of asymmetric tools and tactics that could be

employed. China's exploration into unrestricted warfare has been widely

publicized. And the challenges the nation has faced recently in responding to

domestic catastrophes while fighting abroad illustrate the reality of how difficult it

can be to allocate scarce resources to meet U.S. interests both at home and abroad.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I

Figure 1. The First Glimpse that It's Already Happening

What is a peer or near-peer competitor? A peer or near-peer is any adversary,

or network of adversaries, whose capabilities are such that in a supreme test of

wills with the United States, the outcome is uncertain. The peer relationship—

military and/or economic—might be symmetric, where their capabilities mirror

those of the United States, or asymmetric, where their strengths play to U.S.

weaknesses. A peer's instruments of national power need not be at parity with

our own, even in the symmetric case. It is really a question of whether, in such a

context, the United States could prevail at an acceptable cost. History shows that

in a contest between nations the winner is not necessarily the most endowed

nation, but the one whose government can muster and sustain the necessary

treasure and commitment from its people.

The U.S. military is presently engaged in stabilization and reconstruction

efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, combating terror and facing up to the global

challenge of radical Jihadists. Despite these preoccupations, or perhaps because of

them, it is important to ask whether these are independent actions, or of a larger

piece, and whether this is the future or merely an interlude "between wars." The

degree of effort, mental and physical, focused on these immediate concerns, is

perhaps distracting the United States from more serious potential conflict.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the conclusion of the current deployments, the United States will take the

opportunity to "reset the force." The question looms: reset for what

eventualities—a reprise of recent events, a return to major power standoff, major

regional or even global conflict, or something new and as yet inexperienced? To

answer these questions this study began with a review of U.S. military history to

identify trends that could extrapolate into the future. It also considered plausible

scenarios that, unanticipated, could confound the U.S. military. And in the context

of future scenarios, another question emerges: what does it mean to win in the

future? The answer, from this study's perspective, is that winning or losing is

defined by whose national interests prevail and whose military objectives are met.

If that is what defines winning, an important element is "at what cost."

National objectives enabled by military prowess have certain value but incur

certain costs. The cost equation is changing. Nations and powerful non-state

actors are raising the "cost" of employing military force to support national

interests. Some, like materiel costs, are calculable in dollars. But there are other

costs as well—human life, depletion of moral capital, infringement on the rights

of the citizenry, economic health, global reputation—and these are harder to

measure. We, as a nation, must either pay the cost or find ways to reduce it.

In general, things that the nation fails to anticipate and, in turn, does not

prepare for, distort the cost equation disproportionately. If the nation is able to

anticipate adversary strategies to increase costs, it may be possible to develop

new weapons and tactics to counter those strategies and reduce costs.

Potential Game Changers

The character of war is changing. The 2004 Defense Strategy and subsequent

Quadrennial Defense Review identified four categories of war—traditional,

irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive—arguing that, given the U.S. dominance in

the first category, future adversaries would focus their strategies on the others.

While there is no scientific approach to determine the future, several

developments are anticipated.

Irregular Warfare

Likely to be especially troublesome to the United States is the "hybrid"

complex irregular warfare that combines state-like capabilities—more

sophisticated missilery and anti-armor systems, armed unmanned aerial vehicles,

and signals intelligence—with skillful guerilla warfare. Nor is there reason to
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

think that a future peer would restrict military competition with the United States

to "traditional" warfare. Complex irregular warfare has political dimensions, too,

and exploits "lawfare"—the use of rules of engagement against the United States

(while ignoring those rules, themselves). Another non-traditional form of warfare

may involve manipulation of the media, which tends to be to the advantage of

U.S. adversaries who are willing to engage in spectacular acts (generally involving

loss of life) that attract media attention.

Nonlinear Battlefield, Including the Homeland

For years, U.S. military planners have predicted the "nonlinear battlefield" in

which the concept of the forward line of troops goes away. In fact, that has

already happened. In Iraq today, for example, combat forces are dispersed to

many locations with potentially hostile areas in between them. There is no single

"line," and no large secure rear area. In the future, the situation is likelv to be

even more complex, as what the United States has traditionally regarded as

completely secure (the homeland), becomes a target, as well as the homelands of

many allies. The commander in such a context must have a 360-degree view and

must operate without the luxury of simple demarcations.

It is unlikely that future U.S. military engagements can be limited to a

geographically isolated theater of operations and a well-defined forward edge of

battle. The front line has Ween replaced by a 360-degree battlespace. Military

technology increasingly affords medium- and high-end conventional adversaries

the reach to leap over traditional battle lines and into the U.S. heartland, no

matter where the primary clash of arms is located. Moreover, both traditional

(i.e., symmetric) and irregular (asymmetric) adversaries can achieve such reach

using the commercial infrastructure and technology of globalization to reach

"behind the lines." This is especially true when cyber warfare is a component of

the batde, since "cyber-space" does not map at all well into geography.

Potential adversaries have studied U.S. military operations, dissecting doctrine,

strategy, and tactics. They are remarkably adaptive at imposing cost-incurring

strategies upon the United States. The expeditionary nature of the U.S. military

faces an increasing challenge from over-the-horizon targeting, quiet diesel

submarines, anti-ship missilery, and related technology. As the launch point for a

projecting force moves further from its target, the challenges multiply.
6 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Technology Innovation

The relentless advance in technology will be another factor in future warfare.

The United States, for a long time, led in the development and application of

new technologies to the battlefield. This occurred largely because investments in

military technology have been expensive and the United States has been able and

willing to make the required investments. The fruits of technology have been

greater efficiency and, thus, lower cost. This is especially true as technological

advancements migrated from heavy industry to information technologies. In

either case, the buy-in cost for opposing forces has lowered dramatically.

Today, off-the-shelf weaponry and/or easily adaptable commercial

technologies enable a less-resourced, but more agile adversary to catch up and

sometimes to pull ahead. Moreover, most improvements in technology can be

seen to favor the asymmetric offense of certain adversaries and U.S. defenses

suffer by comparison. Certainly this is true for offensive WMD technologies—

chemical, biological, and nuclear. Technology is continually making them cheaper

and more potent, but technology has comparatively low yield for defense against

these agents. Note, too, that the United States does not benefit from offensive

improvements because our nation is self-restraining—a double-edged sword.

Information Space as a Battlefield

Asymmetries in information space derive from U.S. reliance on information

technologies for command, control, computing, communications, intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). "Cyber-war" can be a low-budget

affair for many adversaries, wreak substantial havoc on U.S. operational

capabilities, and be relatively immune to a response in kind, insofar as no

adversary depends as much on their information technology infrastructure.

Absent strong measures the United States could be the victim of its own

success in information technologies, especially C4ISR, that enable speed of

maneuver and synchrony of action. The use of technological advances against

the nation will almost certainly mean that some of the gains implicit in netcentricity and the commercial-off-the-shelf revolution will be lost. Getting

serious about information assurance is necessary, but not sufficient; it is

necessary to reduce, or offset, over-reliance on information systems.

An interesting characteristic of some cyber "weapons" is that they are "selfreplicating" and generally "self-deploying," traits they share with biological

weapons. While nuclear weapons may be the "ultimate" weapon of mass
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 7

destruction, radiological the most obtainable, and explosives the old standby, the

self-replication of both cyber and biological weapons make them especially

fearsome. Coupled with their increasingly lower buy-in costs, they are especially

attractive to the would-be adversary. Restraint has been the hallmark of

biological, chemical, nuclear and, so far, radiological weapons, while explosive

and cyber attacks are a daily nuisance. Can this state of affairs continue?

We Still Have Nuclear Weapons

Through the latter half of the 20th century, nuclear weapons held a special

place in nation-state warfare. Used only twice in anger, they forced an adversary's

capitulation in the world's worst conflict and played a powerful role in deterring

further conflicts of that scale. They allowed us to extend deterrence to allies,

empowered our foreign policy, and restrained it, as well. Deterrence and restraint

stemmed from the parity we consciously sought with the Soviet Union and our

own sizeable, capable nuclear arsenal. Despite their fears, most Americans came

to believe, correctly, that, should it ever come to that, our nuclear weapons could

be relied upon to do the job.

In the case of nuclear weapons, the future may depart from the past.

Worrisome evidence suggests the "nuclear club" could expand substantially,

inasmuch as many are viewing it as a cost-effective counter to U.S. conventional

superiority. Proliferators conceivably could include some non-state actors.

Current U.S. policy dictates that our nuclear arsenal is stuck in time—aging and

of uncertain but likely declining reliability. Our deliver)' systems are approaching

end-of-life and our weapons inventory is shrinking in number and variety,

constraining alternatives in the event of operational reliability problems. Contrast

this with other key nuclear-capable nations who are modernizing substantially

their nuclear weaponry and couple it to a future in which the number of nuclearcapable actors may double or triple.

Our lack of nuclear weapons production capability—and our stricture against

not only development, but design—holds our future hostage. Reestablishing such

capacity from a standstill would be a very lengthy process, perhaps ill-matched to

the pace of world events. We will have lost personnel and unique skills as well as

physical plant and production know-how for a generation, or two.

This atrophy and the relative diminution of our nuclear capability may call

into question America's ability to deter, extend that deterrence, and to prevail, in

the event. It could embolden others and change the future of warfare to our
8 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

dismay. To secure our place may require reliable replacement warheads as well as

new designs for new missions that uniquely require powerful weapons such as to

destroy, with certainty, a deeply dug WMD facility.

Recommendations here are hard to come by. Starting sooner to reverse any

decline rather than postponing endlessly could prove important but calibrating

the urgency is ever so difficult. Righdy, our policy on nuclear testing consigns us

to uncertainty about reliability and intelligence can be unreliable in gauging

percepdons of adversaries. Indeed, what matters most is the certainty our

decision-makers have that our arsenal could do the job and the uncertainty of the

adversary that it cannot—perception, vice fact. Curiously, unless we have the

capacity to promptly rectify the situation, a resumption of testing could work to

our disadvantage should our expectations not be met. We know how long it

would take to regain lost momentum should we choose, and we should take

measures to reduce that lead time.

Impact on Civilians

A tentative forecast is that the impact of war on civilians will increase. War in

the 21s' century may be less murderous than in the 20th century, but armed

violence, creating disproportionate suffering and loss, will remain endemic—

occasionally epidemic—in a large part of the world. But the importance of this

expectation is the fact that many adversaries have a different perspective toward

civilian deaths than does the United States. For the United States, civilian deaths

are a negative aspect of war. For some adversaries, their view may be neutral or

even positive. Their objective may well be to increase civilian deaths, amplified

by the impact of such casualties on the media. One death or casualty "on

camera" has the impact of hundreds of actual casualties.

Preparing for the Future

Although U.S. conventional prowess is unmatched, the increasing cost in

blood and treasure of military interventions argues against use of the military to

protect each and every U.S. interest. Prioritization and realism are essential. The

changing character of warfare calls for considerations about how to balance the

force—special forces versus general forces; about planning and preparing for

degraded C4ISR capabilities; about force protection and critical infrastructure in

the homeland; about the capabilities needed to fight through an attack using

weapons of mass destruction; about new intelligence requirements.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 9

At the same time, other instruments of national power must be brought to

bear and the Department must make good on its promise to strengthen its other

federal partners (Figure 2). Attributes of the military's "organize, train, and

equip" capabilities could well be brought to bear in the interagency

environment—capabilities such as discipline and organization; obligation to duty;

command and control; planning, training, and exercises; and resourced for

contingencies. The fulJ-spectrum of homeland defense requires civilian defense

partners that are disciplined, organized, and resourced.

Figure 2. The Inter-Agency at War

Unconventional Weapons and

Technology Proliferation _

The technology equation, between the United States and potential

adversaries, is a key element in evaluating U.S. capabilities to effectively and

successfully wage war in the future. Access to technology will have a critical

impact on the future battlefield. As a result, the study placed significant effort on

understanding adversary use of various technologies in developing weapons, the

technical issues underlying such development, and how the United States might

combat that use.
10 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There are many ways an adversary might attack. Nuclear weapons are not the

only means by which an adversary can cause mass destruction or disruption.

Used effectively, high explosives can have tremendous destructive power.

Destruction of the Hoover Dam, for example, would destroy irrigation of one

million acres of U.S. farmland, deprive 22 million U.S. citizens of water, and

eliminate over 50 percent of the electrical power in southern California. Thus,

eight destructive modalities, capable of achieving such effects, were evaluated:

nuclear, radiation dispersal devices (Rad), biological (Bio), cyber warfare,

chemical (Chem), high explosives (HE), electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and

directed energy (DE).

What the adversary will do depends not only on the technologies available

but also on the strategic objectives to be achieved. Strategic objectives might

range from increasing hegemony in a new region to eroding political support for

continuation of a war effort conducted by the United States and its allies.

Strategic objectives could also be directed toward attacks on the homeland to

diminish U.S. ability to deploy and resupply troops abroad or even to attack the

U.S. civil infrastructure and population.

Because the range of possible technologies, the ways in which they might be

used, and the spectrum of strategic objectives is so vast, the study evaluated

subsets of these factors in an attempt to identify the most likely options an

adversary might employ while, at the same time, considering the consequences of

such attacks on the United States. The result of this assessment, for 20 generic

attacks, is illustrated in Figure 3.

Such an assessment is important because the United States must make choices

in how to invest resources to best prepare for such a future. It is simply not

possible to prepare for each and every possibility that might arise. In the judgment

of this study, when comparing the attractiveness of weapon alternatives to the

adversary against the consequences of their use against the United States, it allies or

friends ("blue"), the most critical modalities are: nuclear weapon, biological agents,

and cyber warfare. Examples of how attacks using these three modalities might

play out, what the United States can do in response, and what can be done to

improve the U.S. posture in the future are described below.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 11

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Figure 3. Assessing Adversary Attacks: Nuclear, Bio, and Cyber Stand Apart

Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons are in a class by themselves due to their destructive power.

But access to such weapons is not as difficult as one might imagine. Modern

nuclear weapons are small and transportable. Weapon design is well documented

in the open literature. With access to special nuclear material, weapons can be

easily manufactured.

To understand the destructive power of nuclear weapons, consider a nuclear

attack on an urban area in the United States. Such an attack could be motivated

by a terrorist group that wants to enhance their status by creating a spectacular

event in the U.S. homeland. How might it come about? A non-state actor

acquires or improves a nuclear weapon. The weapon could be delivered via nonconventional means such as a small private vessel, aircraft, or SUV-sized vehicle.

A surface burst would maximize fallout casualties. The attack would be

unannounced followed by threats of additional detonations, with technical

countermeasures employed to confuse attribution. Such an attack, using a 10

kiloton yield weapon detonated on the ground in the evening, could result in

total fatalities of 40,000 persons, with 80,000 casualties (Figure 4). Daytime levels

would be much larger. This size weapon is a reasonable size for a terrorist or

state surrogate to obtain.
12 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Integrated Fallout Dose (48 hr)

26 Kllom«.ri

Source: Compiled by Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Figure 4. 10 Kiloton Surface Detonation of a Nuclear Weapon, Washington D.C.

A "blue" response falls in three areas—prevention, mitigation, and

attribution and response. Emphasis should be placed on prevention programs,

but the nation should be prepared to respond. The primary effort to reduce the

nuclear threat to the United States is on preventing nuclear weapons from getting

into the hands of adversaries who are not likely to be deterred by cold-war

approaches. The critical steps to address this goal include the improvement in

security—such as the deployment of mobile detection networks during

heightened alert—and the drawdown of existing fissile material stocks. Programs

in these areas include securing special nuclear materials that are most at risk in

Russia; strengthening international standards to secure weapons-usable nuclear

materials, including those in transit; and developing nuclear reactors to burn

weapons-usable nuclear materials.

In the mitigation area, protocols to guide situation awareness and action by

local responders are needed. These protocols should be formulated and exercised

with federal assets charged with supporting the response. Mitigation therapeutics

can minimize radiation effects provided they are administered within about

twelve hours of radiation exposure. More research in this area could save many

lives should such an attack occur.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 13

Attribution and response capabilities are no less critical. If a non-state actor

acquires a weapon, it will often be with the support of a state sponsor to provide

the necessary technological support or fissile material. Technical forensic

activities following a detonation can assist in identifying the perpetrator of an

attack as well as those who assisted in the design or acquisition of materials for

the weapon. The robustness of these forensic processes should be improved,

both by shortening the timelines associated with the rad/chem analyses central to

the technical analysis, and by improving the databases used to identify the source

of the materials following the analyses. The overall crisis action system to guide

national response decisions based on technical forensics and other attribution

information should be exercised, using realistic constraints so that decisions on

retribution and international action can be swift.

In addition to current efforts to prevent proliferation and otherwise reduce

the probability of a nuclear attack, recommendations emphasize two areas:

attribution and consequence management. It is these areas where the nation is

most underinvested and where DOD is a major player.

RECOMMENDATION: NlCEEAR

Attribution. Develop post-detonation attribution capabilities to enable

initial national assessment of responsible parties within 48 hours after

attack:

• Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to assume responsibility for

robustness of post-detonation technical forensics; triple current budget

of $10 million in fiscal year 2007 for this mission.

• Intelligence Community populate nuclear materials databases per NSPD

17, Annex IV'

• U.S. Strategic Command/DTRA to plan and execute realistic response

exercises with senior leadership, reflecting constraints and uncertainties

of realistic attribution environment

Consequence Management. Post-detonation consequence management goal

is local capability for major U.S. cities for initial one-to-three days of

response:

1. National Security Presidential Directive 17, on "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of

Mass Destruction." Issued 11 December 2002.
14 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Deputy Secretary of Defense direct the National Guard to work with local

authorities to ensure detailed response plans (radiation hazards, shelter/

evacuation decisions, pragmatic decontamination for thousands of people)

Exercise with National Guard Civil Support Teams and U.S. Northern

Command assets upon completion of plans

Biological

A great variety of materials (pathogens and toxins) could be employed for a

biological attack. The effectiveness of actually using these many materials in a

biological attack is a function of a biological material's characteristics and how they

would suit a particular release scenario (Figure 5). Medical factors to consider

include infectious dose data, virulence and lethality, diagnosis, and treatment.

Weapons factors include stock availability, weaponization, dissemination, and

persistence. Materials such as anthrax, small pox, and ricin rank high with respect

to potential as an agent. However, under certain circumstances, lower ranked

materials (such as salmonella, shigella, or E. coli released in food or water) could

pose a formidable threat.

With the availability of so many materials, there is clear potential for an

increased bio threat in the next five years using modified or engineered bio

materials. For example, a biological attack could involve the use of bioagents

against deployed military targets, strategically releasing bioagents to debilitate

troops and diminish U.S. military effectiveness and strength. The most effective

approach would be multiple releases of a variety of agents' to contaminate

vulnerable food and water supplies and/or contact infection of troops. By using

a lot of different agents, each release is different.

Potential agents might include norovirus, salmonella, shigella, E. coli,

protozoan parasites, and toxins such as botulinum or ricin. The characteristics of

such a threat make it easy to prepare for frequent, successive multiple attacks

that could yield profound effects. Stocks of these agents are available worldwide;

they are easy to produce and disseminate; the effective dose is low; illness is

debilitating and prolonged, even potentially fatal (toxins); and they require

minimal equipment and training. Furthermore, the use of multiple organisms and

their confusion with naturally occurring disease could make attribution difficult.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 15

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Figure 5. Ranking Biological Threat Agents

From "blue's" perspective, prevention is unlikely since it would require strict

control of a variety of possible sites that could be accessed for agent release—

food, water, air, and local populace contact. Simple control measures, such as

chlorination and controlled supply chain, could minimize the effect of intentional

or natural introduction of multiple pathogen types.

Rapid diagnostics and therapeutics could be employed to mitigate and recover

from an attack. DOD needs to maintain an arsenal of rapid diagnostics for

endemic and opportunistic pathogens. Other steps include expanding access to

existing real time PCR, isolating infected troops quickly, maintaining treatment

stockpiles, and investing in portable ventilators and other palliative care methods.

Over the longer term, there is a need to develop smart tools for the field, such as

rapid diagnostics for high-likelihood diseases, using techniques such as

immunioassays, protein microarrays, fast DNA microarrays, and wearable soldier

health-status sensors for early detection.
16 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Attribution and response could be difficult to achieve in the event of multiple

attacks with different biological agents or confusion with naturally occurring

pathogens. Bioforensics and global reference databases are needed to distinguish

released agents from natural pathogens and identify the attributes of the agents

(virulence, drug resistance). In essence, focus is needed on rapid, treatmentdirecting diagnostics and other tools that can minimize the impact of attack.

RECOMMENDATION: BIOEOGICAE

Interdiction. DTRA/Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) to develop

sensor networks in critical enclosed spaces of DOD (such as critical

command, control, and communication nodes) for real-time

triggers/identifiers integrated with heating, ventilation, and air

conditioning systems to control and contain contamination.

Mitigation. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs advance

DOD medical surveillance and response program for biological attack and

coordinate with civilian program.

• Rapid diagnostics and networked reporting to contain/control

• Rapid distribution of treatments/prophylaxis (1-2 days)

Attribution. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &

Logistics (USD (AT&L)) expand earlier Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency (DARPA) bioforensics/global reference database to

identify specific bioagents and attributes.

Recovery. USD (AT&L):

• Expand earlier DARPA programs for standoff mapping of contaminated

surfaces using laser-induced fluorescence detection systems, SERScoated nanoparticles, and colormetric foam

• Continue development of diagnostics and broad-spectrum

antimicrobials/vaccines and effective decontamination systems

(DTRA/DARPA/JPEO)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 17

Cyber Warfare

Computer network operation is the third of the most critical modalities.

Elements of cyber warfare include computer network defense, computer network

exploitation, and computer network attack. Against a sophisticated adversary, the

state-of-the-art in information assurance is significantly outmatched. The United

States does not overpower the potential peer adversary in cyber warfare in the wav

it does currently in conventional military power. The best defenses and closely

coupled offense—known as active defense—will midgate the impact of a

concerted attack by an adversary. But cyber warfare attacks are ongoing.

Net-centric warfare creates a dependence on remote sensors and services,

making the Global Information Grid (GIG) an attractive cyber warfare target.

Because the GIG employs commercial off-the-shelf hardware, malware introduced

in manufacture or early in the supply chain could be widely disseminated. When

triggered, the malware could disable much of the U.S. command and control

network and destroy confidence in what remains. Combining such an attack with

potential use of directed energy or electromagnetic pulse and selected high

explosive attacks would be even more devastating.

Preventing such attacks is unlikely because there are seemingly infinite points

in the GIG for an adversary to gain access either by successful penetration or by

an insider. Upon gaining access, it is not difficult to propagate mischief more

broadly. Efforts to mitigate attacks are difficult as well, but could be successful.

For the nations' most critical systems, protection of some supply chains may be

needed in view of offshore production of information technology components.

Another approach is to design and operate cyber systems for assured capabilities.

Designing these systems to degrade to protected citadels, perhaps akin to wartime

reserve modes, is an important approach, but a difficult one to achieve. Critical to

effective operations in the wake of a cyber attack is to test and exercise operations

in a degraded mode so that troops learn how to operate under such circumstances.

U.S. reliance on effective information technology, especially in C4ISR

systems, places huge premiums on the integrity of system data at all times. Thus,

an ability to recover and reconstitute data integrity will be crucial and must be

part of the initial design of system development. Some elements of such

capabilities include hot back-up for critical systems, highly trained systems

administrators, dynamic encryption/re-encryption, and out-of-band order wire.

Today there is no effective deterrence to limit or prevent adversary attacks.

Attribution and response, while critical, are particularly difficult. Some work is
18 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ongoing regarding attribution, but great success is not forecasted. Further,

permission for active cyber response is held at the most senior levels of

government. An important element in the recommendations put forward is the

need to make tough choices in designating systems as "mission-critical." These

systems need to be treated, designed, and built differently, and they need to be the

focus of exercises and operational tests. Without making such choices, resources

that can be devoted to information technology security will be spread around

equally and too thinly, and result in countermeasures with little or no effectiveness.

RECOMMENDATION: CYBER WARFARE

Identify DOD's mission-critical systems and make their protection a

priority:

• The Y2K process model for identifying and ranking critical systems

could serve as a model for the selection process.

• Design, build, test, exercise, and operate differendy, beginning early in

the acquisition cycle, during operational test and evaluation, and

continuing through the life cycle. Make extensive use of red teams

throughout the process.

Educate industry on its vulnerabilities and adversary capabilities, to the

extent possible.

Other Modalities

In addition to the single modality attacks described as examples of what a

potential adversary could initiate, multiple, coordinated attacks are possible as

well. Such attacks could take many forms. One is an attack using multiple

modalities. An example might be multiple attacks on U.S. satellites using directed

energy attacks to blind the satellites and jam communications, high-explosive

attacks against the uplinks, and cyber attacks against any component of the

architecture. Another form might be a sequence of attacks using a single

modality, such as high explosives, where the impact of each successive attack

becomes more devastating.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 19

Thus, to raise the bar for other modalities, the best approach is to focus on

large-scale events and campaigns. The study recommends that the Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P)) advocate an interagency program to

strengthen regulatory control processes for stock substances, such as bio, chem,

hazardous materials, and high explosives. Also, the Under Secretary of Defense

for Intelligence should coordinate with the Director, National Intelligence, to

identify' and track critical weapons expertise.

In addition, the Department and the nation should address all "low hanging

fruit," e.g., eliminate the dominant radiological dispersal device (RDD) threat

from the use of cesium-137 in blood irradiators, research irradiators, and

calibration irradiators (Figure 6). Over 1,000 such sources, with 1,000 Ci or

greater, exist in the United States today. Violation of any one of these sources

could shut down 25 square kilometers anywhere in the United States for 40 or

more years. An investment of $200 million over a five-year period to buy up the

Cs-137 machines and replace them with e-beam irradiators or cobalt sources

would eliminate the most dangerous domestic RDD threat. This study urges the

Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense to lead DOD advocacy to replace

these devices.

Blood Irradiator

Research Irradiator

Calibration Irradiator *1 »2» 2 «2»3

Alaska Hawaii Puerto Rico

$200M investment over 5 years will totally

eliminate the most dangerous domestic

RDD threat

Total Self-Contained

Cs-137 Irradiators:-1,117

Nominal Activity: -1,000 Ci

Any one of these 1,000+

sources could shut down

25 sq km, anywhere in US,

for 40+ yrs

25 sq km in Manhattan

Figure 6. Low Hanging Fruit: Eliminating the Dominant RDD Threat
20 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The recommendations presented here for nuclear, biological, cyber warfare,

and other modalities are not a panacea and do not totally eliminate the threats.

However, by implementing these recommendations the potential consequences

of attacks from these modalities can be lowered significantly and can be made far

less attractive to the adversary (Figure 7). Both are important to reducing the risk

to the country, either directly or through the increased degree of deterrence that

may be established.

Least Red Attractiveness Most Least

State Actor NonState Actor

Overseas Homeland

Figure 7. Red-Blue Perspective: After Recommendations

Nuclear Proliferation:

A Special Case

The previous section, which provided a broad overview of the technology

landscape, illustrated the ways in which nuclear, cyber, and biological threats are

separate and apart from the host of other problems in the emerging military

landscape. That overview identified actions the nation should take to best

position itself, should an attack using one of these modalities occur. In the case

of the nuclear threat, recommendations focus on improving capabilities for

attribution and consequence management. But, as was established in this

assessment, and in previous ones by the DSB, the nuclear threat stands in a class

by itself in terms of its potential for damage, disruption, and devastation. Thus,

the matter of prevention—of managing the challenge of nuclear proliferation—

deserves special attention.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 21

Trends

The proliferation of nuclear weapons to a larger number of states is

proceeding. The exact form it will take over the next two decades cannot be

known at this time. Yet there are strong views over the course it might take.

Some believe that proliferation is inevitable—that the historical pattern of

weapon acquisition ever)' few years implies that this is so. By this view, the

temptation to throw in the towel on proliferation prevention is strong but not

sound. Another view suggests that the cascade is imminent—that the world is at

another tipping point and spillover effects in several regions (North Korea and

Iran) are inevitable with the potential for 20 or 30 nuclear-armed states in a

decade or two. If this latter vision were to be realized, the world would be

changed profoundly, and for the worse, by nuclear proliferation

While the world may well stand at another tipping point, a cascade of

proliferation is not inevitable. History has shown that not every state that starts

out wanting nuclear weapons ends up acquiring them (Figure 8). States make

many decisions regarding the acquisition of nuclear capabilities and these

decision points offer opportunities to influence the outcome. Many states have

been persuaded to exercise restraint. Some of these states were U.S. friends and

allies, who were persuaded with security guarantees. Others were less friendly,

and they were persuaded by sanctions, threats, and other means. Regime change

has been helpful too, among many other factors. But these experiences suggest

that it is not necessary to accept proliferation as inevitable. What should be done

in anticipation of more nuclear proliferation? What more can be done to prevent

such proliferation?

As a starting point, this study identified four alternative proliferation futures,

based on how trends evident from the first 60 years of the nuclear era might

manifest themselves in the next 20 years.

1. More latency. In this future, there will be more states with weapons

potential, more advanced weapons potential, and increasing risks of short

cuts. Technology diffusion will accelerate, as will risks of smuggling and

terrorist access.

2. More minimum deterrents. This future builds on the previous one,

plus a few more states cross into production for the purpose of

minimum deterrence.
22 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Potential

for Serial

Production

High

Weapons

Potential

Modest

Weapons

Potential

Nil

Weapons

Potential

Figure 8. Of 24 Aspirants, Only Four Have Weapons Today

3. New nuclear competition. This future adds intensifying competitions

within and among regions and, in a few cases, with the United States.

4. New anarchy. This future is separate and apart from the three above.

While not a case of hyper-proliferation, in this alternative a nuclear

revolutionary emerges who is willing to employ and share nuclear

weapons.

Considering alternative futures is useful as it illuminates the demands that

nuclear proliferation will impose on the U.S. military. It bounds the plausible

problem space within which military operational challenges could arise and, in

turn, points to needed military capabilities.

Needed Military Capabilities

The toolkit needed to cope with the military operational challenges of a more

proliferated world is large and diverse. It includes three basic types of

capabilities. First, a joint force that is able to execute the missions associated with

combating nuclear proliferation. Second, a strategic posture that is able to meet

the demands of assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and defeat. The third is the

capacity to integrate all tools of national power.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 23

The joint force must be able to perform the following missions effectively:

• Interdiction to locate and seize nuclear materials and weapons in transit

• Elimination to eliminate weapons captured from terrorists or collapsing

or defeated states and the programs that produced them

• Attribution to provide a national assessment to the U.S. President within

24 hours of an unclaimed nuclear explosion and an international

technical assessment to the United Nations Security Council shortly

thereafter (within 120 hours)

• Passive defense to allow sustained operations in a nuclear contaminated

environment (though not under sustained nuclear attack)

• Consequence management to prepare and protect civilian populations

in affected areas

• Intelligence to provide timely access by the President of the United

States, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commands to

comprehensive, technically informed, actionable nuclear intelligence to

support crisis action, network suppression, and longer-term planning

The strategic posture must be able to meet the demands of assurance,

dissuasion, deterrence, and defeat with the following capabilities:

• Non-nuclear kinetic strike to hold at risk enemy nuclear assets and

other high-value targets by non-nuclear means

• Active defense to defeat enemy preemptive or retaliatory strikes with

active defenses

• C4ISR to find and track mobile systems, coordinate complex high-speed

operations, and provide prompt situational awareness

• Nuclear to deter nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland and extend

deterrence to allies and friends that they deem credible by nuclear and

other means

• Stewardship to demonstrate high standards of responsible nuclear

ownership

" Infrastructure capacity to respond to geopolitical change, technology

surprise, and new mission requirements with new capabilities from a

responsive infrastructure.
24 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The third basic capability is the capacity to comprehensively integrate the

tools of national power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic—

across all phases of operations. Without such integration, the military will be

called upon to do things that it is ill-equipped to do alone. Such integration is

also essential for all of the Phase Zero activities (shaping operations aimed at

conflict prevention) associated with proliferation prevention, assurance, and

extended deterrence.

Assessing Current Capabilities

In the assessment of this study, the gaps between current capabilities and

future needs are large. Today's joint force lacks the necessary robustness to deal

with plausible emerging threats in the nuclear arena. An evaluation of current

investments to combat weapons of mass destruction shows that the vast majority

of spending is for passive defense against chemical and biological attack, threat

reduction cooperation, and missile defense. Spending on nuclear programs,

within this portfolio, represents roughly 10 percent of the total. This investment

seems too small and ill-balanced to generate major capability increases. But it is

just enough effort to create the impression that enough effort is underway. In

fact, the current level of effort is not consistent with the requirements of current

national strategy, which makes it a priority now to be able to confront

proliferators, dissuade their capability development, and extend deterrence and

assurance to allies and friends.

Furthermore, the institutional capacity to deliver needed capabilities is

underdeveloped. Over the past two decades, in which proliferation has emerged

as a military planning problem, there has been much top-level guidance, but

strikingly little progress in closing capability gaps. Part of the problem is that

institutions that should guide the development of future capabilities seem illsuited to the purpose. Three problems seem to dominate:

1. OSD is not able to direct resources effectively.

2. Capability-based planning is slow to deliver on this problem.

3. Improved intelligence outputs require much improved collaboration

between intelligence and military communities.

More Effective Proliferation Prevention

Actions can be taken by multiple actors in the defense community to accelerate

capability and capacity development. In the view of this study, two objectives need

to be met. The first is to accelerate the development of needed technical
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 25

capabilities by increasing the overall level of effort. Second is to enhance DOD's

institutional capacity to advance capability and capacity development. Toward

enhancing institutional capacity, the following recommendations are offered.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

USD (AT&L) designate portfolio managers for combating WMD and

New Triad2; stand-up needed analytical capability.

USD (P) recreate a focal point for combating WMD at a more senior level

(currently this is one issue in a very broad assistant secretary portfolio)

and restore needed staff capabilities.

Joint Staff address misalignment of functional capability boards (force

protection is too narrow).

Joint Staff get the front end of concept development right by completing

the Joint Integrating Concept on Combating WMD and Joint Operating

Concept on Shaping in ways that address proliferation requirements.

DTRA and Defense Intelligence Agency partner with National

Counterproliferation Center to accelerate "over the horizon" analysis;

complete five in two years.

U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD exercise one

combatant command war plan with intelligence denied; assess how

operations at all phases will be influenced.

If successfully implemented, these recommendations should help to ensure

that nuclear weapons will not be embraced by enemies of the United States as

their premier asymmetric capability.

Beyond these steps, more can be done to support proliferation prevention. A

clear view of the past reveals that tipping points have been encountered before—

in the 1960s and again in the late 1970s and 1980s. Although many experts

anticipated a rapid spread of nuclear weapons in those periods, actual proliferation

was far more modest. It proved possible to persuade most states to accept

2. The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review unveiled a new strategic triad, consisting of nuclear and precision

non-nuclear strike forces; passive and active defenses; and a revitalized defense infrastructure.
26 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

alternative solutions to their security problems, such as security guarantees from

the United States, or to accept a level of capability well short of actual weapons

production potential.

Despite the stubborn character of the proliferation problems in North Korea

and Iran, the participants in this study are hopeful that the present tipping point

can again be managed in such a way as to minimize repercussions among their

neighbors and beyond their subregions. This will again require sustained U.S.

policy engagement and innovation employing the tools of deterrence and the

treaty regime. It will also require that DOD develop tailored approaches to

proliferation prevention for Combatant Command Phase Zero activities and that

DOD work to energize an interagency process on these issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS: PROLIFERATION PREVENTION

With USD (P) in the lead, DOD should develop tailored approaches to

proliferation prevention that span the full problem space and work to

energize an interagency process on these issues:

• Compose country campaign plans

• Ensure participation of needed interagency partners

• Integrate into planning for theater security cooperation and Concept of

Operations Plan (CONPLAN) 8099 Phase Zero

• Execute, assess, and adapt as theater security cooperation and

CONPLAN cycles and circumstances require

• Develop capabilities and capacities that underwrite policy and strategy

Will nuclear proliferation endow a new tier of states with peer-like

capabilities to limit U.S. freedom of action? Possibly. But whether this proves to

be so is largely up to the United States. There is much that the nation can do

militarily and otherwise to reduce the leverage others might gain with nuclear

weapons and to shape their incentives and capabilities to acquire, threaten, and

employ them. In the end, leadership matters. The United States must stay

engaged in the effort to prevent proliferation and DOD must stay engaged in the

U.S. effort. The recommendations offered here highlight the most important

opportunities for doing so at this time.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 27

Unconventional Operational Concepts

and the Homeland

The capable adversary of the future will execute "one game"— attacking U.S.

interests wherever the nation is most vulnerable, and that could mean the

homeland. When a determined adversary succeeds in attacking the homeland at

the scale imagined in this study, the nation will call on DOD to "provide for the

common defense" through both defense at home and offense abroad. DOD has,

in fact, acknowledged such a future in its 2005 Strategyfor Homeland Defense, which

states unequivocally that DOD must be prepared to defend the homeland:

The Department of Defense must change its conceptual approach to homeland

defense. The Department can no longer think in terms of the "home" game

and the "away" game. There is only one game. ... Defending the US

homeland—our people, property, and freedom—is our most fundamental duty.

Failure is not an option.

How well has the department progressed in turning that strategy into reality?

This can be broken into three more specific questions as follows:

• How well do DOD and others understand what's expected of them?

How well prepared is DOD to execute across a range of homeland

defense missions?

• Given the "one game" nature ofthe capable adversary, can DOD have

high confidence that it will be able to ensure deployment and supply in

whatever set of missions it undertakes, within and from the homeland?

• Success, in both the current scope of homeland security and defense and

the more stressing environment of the future, depends on teaming and

integration unprecedented in recent history: across and among all levels

of government, with and across the private sector, as well as individual

actions for preparedness. Where does the nation, and especially DOD,

stand in building the "one team" needed for success?

DOD Roles and Responsibilities

Overseas deployment, simultaneous with responding to a significant scale of

attacks in the homeland, will stress DOD capabilities. The public expects that

DOD will defend the homeland. DOD will be ordered to participate in

homeland incident prevention, mitigation, and remediation through the U.S.

domestic political process, regardless of the intentions of pre-incident military

leadership. Legislation and directives support this approach.
28 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

However, at the next level, many responsibilities and missions are not so

clearly acknowledged within DOD, resulting in the application of inadequate

resources to the homeland defense mission. The problem extends beyond DOD

to the interagency and response communities, where the handoffs and roles are

not well understood—in part because they are not effectively exercised.

Scope of Roles and Responsibilities

Defending the homeland includes a range of activities, most often discussed

in terms of support to the civil authorities. But these activities can also progress

to include a leadership role in response and consequence management efforts if

or when the scope of an attack is severe enough. Even in a more limited support

role, DOD leadership, both civilian and military, has been slow to accept this

apparently expanded scope of responsibilities. A principle reason is that these

responsibilities come with significant resource demands and financial costs that

are not likely to be adequately supported. As a result, the resources and

capabilities that DOD has to offer have not yet been effectively applied. DOD

does not really know what is expected of it and the homeland security

community does not know what to expect from DOD. The transition of

responsibility across the various supporting and leading roles—and the handing

off of these roles from one agency to another—are not well understood among

the interagency and response communities.

A focus on specifics helps to better assess progress and gaps—the approach

taken in this study. Reasonable roles for DOD in homeland defense include

sharing intelligence, sharing infrastructure assurance standards (to support their

mission), sharing operational doctrine and training, and providing consequence

management support in case of an isolated terrorist attack or a natural disaster,

such as Hurricane Katrina. Clearly DOD has lead responsibility for defense

against air, missile, and maritime (with the Coast Guard) attack and for

protection of its bases. DOD is in a lead role to assure the protection and

resiliency of the defense industrial base, but it also must take a strong supporting

role to assure protection and resiliency of other infrastructure that supports its

missions (at least until a first significant attack(s) where it may be called upon to

assume the lead). Roles that are not appropriate for DOD include protection of

the country from internal threats like isolated terrorist attacks, production of

WMD, or border monitoring for smuggling or illegal immigration.

To assure seamlessness among response elements and DOD, the

Department must expand its concept of "jointness" to include other federal,

state, regional, local, and tribal entities. This can best happen through leadership
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 29

and practice. But homeland security and defense leaders, both within DOD and

other agencies, need to be developed, just as DOD has so carefully developed its

leaders for the "away game." Planning, exercises, and training have yet to be

conducted among all actors at all levels in any meaningful way.

Force Capabilities and Capacities

The study's assessment of DOD's capabilities to execute its homeland

defense roles is not a positive one (Figure 9). In the more traditional roles of air

defense, missile defense, and maritime defense, DOD has or is developing a

capability for these roles, but is far from having a well-exercised national set of

capabilities. For example, while DOD maintains the best air superiority force in

the world, its capabilities are not well suited to protect the nation from general

aviation or unmanned aerial vehicle threats. Protection of DOD installations has

been a focus of force protection programs for some time, but addressing cyber

threats and WMD remain major shortfalls. In too many other cases, DOD

preparedness falls woefully short. Combatant commanders, especially U.S.

Northern Command, have made many of these capability requirements known,

but priorities within the Department have placed resources elsewhere.

The situation is even more serious when the panel looked into force

capacities that might be required to deal with a major event or adversary

campaign in the homeland while also prosecuting offensive actions abroad. This

dual mission alone infers a change in the estimates of total force requirements,

and only worsens when the "double counting" of the reserve component, who

might also be first responders, is added to the equation. As a benchmark,

-80,000 troops were deployed in response to Hurricane Katrina, a large fraction

of which were National Guardsmen. Another 33 percent of the guard was

deployed simultaneously in Iraq. Further, the National Guard is counted on to

support their states, other states through mutual aid agreements, and to meet

federal requirements.
30 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Figure 9. DOD Capabilities for Homeland Defense

Currently there is no ability to track the "double counting" or the "day job"

skills of guardsmen and reservists. Many are first responders. Many have critical

skills from their civilian jobs that would be useful in consequence

management—skills such as telecommunications and utilities. Databases with

.such information could help tremendously in understanding how scarce assets

are being allocated or help to identify the personnel with the best skill sets in

response to emergency needs.

RECOMMENDATION: DOD FORCES AND CAPABILITIES FOR HOMELAND

DEFENSE

Addressing the shortfalls will require significant resources, sustained

commitment, and greater involvement with other agencies, especially the

Department of Homeland Security. As first steps:

The Secretary of Defense should task the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs (ASD

[HD&ASA]) to revise and implement DOD policies and procedures

covering homeland defense requirements.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 31

This tasking should include clarifying relationships, roles, and missions of all

elements of homeland defense (federal agencies, civilian and private sectors, state

and local responders, law enforcement, and others). This information would go

far to eliminate the uncertainty and/or confusion about what is expected of

DOD and what others can indeed expect of DOD. The scope should expand to

include the contingency where DOD assumes the lead response role in the

homeland. Only those policies and procedures that lower the barriers to

planning, exercising, information sharing, cooperation, and coordination across

the entire homeland defense community should be approved.

Service Chiefs and the National Guard Bureau assess force

requirement and adjust/adapt/expand force structure to meet the "one

game" demands of the future.

Force structure should be built not just to support the regional command

war plans for overseas contingencies, but also for those being developed by U.S.

Northern Command. The effort will involve the development of accurate

databases to understand the civilian skills and job commitments of the reserve

components in order to assess and address the "double counting" issue. It will

also require close planning and coordination with the service secretaries across

the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities

spectrum in order to ensure that shortfalls are addressed.

Assuring Deployment and Supply

This study considered two critical warfighting aspects occurring simultaneously

in the homeland: defending against domestic catastrophe and ensuring deployment

and supply. Domestic catastrophes can occur in an environment of large,

undisciplined populations, which, can result in the destabilizing effect of violent

attacks on society. On the other hand, military deployment and supply take place

in a disciplined organization, trained to accomplish the mission. Yet the two are

linked—military deployment and supply is critically dependent on infrastructure

elements that may be destroyed or severely compromised in a domestic

catastrophe. Three areas seemed most important for DOD attention: (1) critical

infrastructure protection and/or resiliency, (2) logistics, and (3) family and

individual preparedness. A fourth area, military installation protection and

preparedness, was the subject of a recent DSB task force.
32 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Critical Infrastructure

DOD has responsibility for not only the protection and assurance of its own

military installations and facilities, but it is also the lead agency for assuring the

protection and resiliency of the defense industrial base infrastructure sector. In

addition, DOD has a supporting role for 14 other critical infrastructures/key

resources: transportation; information technology; telecommunications; energy;

chemical; commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; government

facilities; emergency services; public health and healthcare; drinking water and

water treatment systems; dams; postal and shipping; food and agriculture; and

national monuments and icons.

DOD is starting to make progress in identifying what is critical through the

leadership of ASD (HD&ASA)/Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP),

supported by the Naval Systems Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Virginia. Together

with the combatant commanders, they have developed and are implementing a

"mission assurance" process that incorporates many of the recommendations of a

prior DSB study regarding risk management and mitigation.1 The process focuses

first on identifying critical functions and capabilities—command and control;

ballistic missile defense; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and power

projection, for example. This step is followed by identification and assessment of

those few assets or facilities necessary to ensure the functions or capabilities.

The process also provides guidance to assess a number of critical

infrastructures "outside the fence" on which DOD might depend and/ or need

to defend. The (classified) list of mission-critical assets appeared logical, but not

complete or consistent in the application of the criteria against which criticality

was judged. Further, it does not capture cascading effects and infrastructure

interdependencies. Recognizing that it is still a process getting started, this study

concludes that more effort must be applied to get it right and complete. The

biggest gap, however, is that no one is charged with the responsibility or

authority to ensure that corrective actions are taken.

Despite nearly six years since September 11, 2001, many U.S. critical

infrastructures remain vulnerable. For the DOD, many critical supply chains—

meals ready to eat, missiles, munitions, and fuel, for example—are not as resilient

as they should be. Critical infrastructure and sources of supply are owned largely

3. Defense Science Board Task Force on Critical Homeland Infrastructure Protection, January 2007.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 33

by the private sector—security and assurance is their responsibility, which is

monitored by other parts of the government.

DHS has the broader mission to lead infrastructure protection across all the

agencies and sectors involved. While DHS has led the interagency and the private

sector councils in developing a risk-based protection approach, so much remains

to be done that it is not possible to say with confidence that the nation's

infrastructure vulnerabilities have been adequately addressed. In general, the

department lacks the regulator}' or legislated clout to direct the private sector to

consistent levels of security and/or resiliency.

DHS has, however, done a good job at leading the national planning and grant

processes, as well as overseeing lead agency activities with their sectors, in order to

spotlight progress and gaps. At this point, DHS has identified 36 highest prioritv

infrastructure assets and over 2,500 next level assets on which to focus attention,

and, where appropriate, investment—under the constraint that much of the

infrastructure is owned privately and therefore not eligible for public funds.

Of particular concern, however, is the difficult job of information assurance.

There appears to be no national improvement plan in spite of countless

admonitions to, and within, the government that such a plan and its

implementation is a must. An important consideration for each federal sector

owner is the fact that improvements in resiliency of the infrastructure will come

about largely by its private owners. Developing a public-private partnership is no

more important than in this area, and some attention to incentives to the private

sector for improving its posture is warranted.

Logistics

The study was pleased to learn that a number of the problems plaguing the

DOD logistics community for years appear on their way to being solved—at

least those within the domains of the Defense logistics Agency (DLA) and U.S.

Transportation Command. Enabled by the introduction of modern information

systems, the two agencies are now able to understand inventories in their depots,

and track supplies in transit to the warfighter and their delivery to transfer points

to the services (Figure 10). Redundancy and/or alternatives exist for movement

of supplies within and out of the United States.
34 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Acquisition

DLA/Services DLAl A/Swvtap . TRANSO

Shortfalls

COCOMs/DLA/l

Protection of critical industries

Protection of transportation from

industry to DOD facilities

IT systems vulnerabilities

Joint roles and responsibilities

Interoperable logistics systems

Common performance metrics

Inadequate end-to-end visibility and availability

Figure 10. Progress in Integrated Logistics, but Still Many Shortfalls

The weak links in the system are at the start and end points, with respect to

the information system "glue" that integrates it end-to-end. Strategies are not yet

developed to assure the availability of materials from the private sector within the

homeland and of transportation routes required for their deliver}' from industry

to DOD facilities in the event of attacks on the homeland. In addition, many

spare parts for critical weapon systems are produced either by sole source

companies or by companies with limited competition. Protection of critical

sources of supply has not been planned. Diversion of supplies and materiel to

civil priorities has also not been planned as a contingency in the event of major

incidents at home.

On the other end of the supply chain, there has not been a coordinated

effort to implement a single asset visibility system for the "last tactical mile" that

would allow for tracking and reporting consumption to the DOD national

provider or the end-user. The visibility inherent in the upstream steps is, at this

point, lost, so that the individual requestor often does not see what has been

ordered in a timely fashion, or sometimes not at all.

Cross-cutting the entire enterprise is the information management system.

DLA is paying considerable attention to its network defense, but has further to

go in addressing a wider spectrum of cyber threats.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 35

Military Installation Protection

In addition to ensuring that DOD can get material for warfighters from a

robust private supply and internal distribution system, DOD must also assure

the security of the forces it expects to deploy. The first step is assuring the

inherent security of the installation itself. Fach of the military services

approaches base security and force protection differently, but almost all of

them plan on the support of the local community emergency response

resources in a serious incident.

For example, in the Army, mission commanders establish what is missioncritical. All garrison commanders have memoranda of understanding with the

local community for first response capabilities. Both garrison and mission

commanders coordinate plans for deployment under catastrophic scenarios.

Annual exercises and training test commanders' ability to respond to incidents.

The civilian capabilities, on which military installations rely, will not be

available if the incident is an attack of a serious scale, such as an attack using

weapons of mass destruction—a particular concern of this study. Consequence

management is the biggest gap in dealing with weapons of mass destruction.

Project Guardian provides basic response capabilities to installations—chemical,

biological, radiological, and nuclear—but is not scoped for anything of major

consequences to the installation or surrounding community.

The DSB Task Force on Critical Homeland Infrastructure Protection

assessed best practices for protecting U.S. homeland installations and

recommended various approaches to enhance security and protection of these

facilities. This task force determined that DOD has many facilities that are

vulnerable to the threats considered in this study, but that a rational focus should

be on protecting its critical military mission capabilities and functions. It also

found that the degree to which DOD facilities are dependent on non-DOD

infrastructure is not entirely known. Further, until recently DOD lacked policies

and standards to guide installation commanders in securing or creating

contingencies around the infrastructure on which thev depend.

The critical infrastructure protection task force made many recommendations to improve DOD capabilities. This summer study agrees with and

endorses those recommendations and, as a result, did not revisit the issue in its

deliberations. But through information gathering related to installation risk

assessments and management, the study believes that while progress is being
36 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

made, resources remain limited and priority remains highly dependent on the

installation commander.

Family and Individual Preparedness

There are many examples where individual preparedness proved pivotal in

mitigating the consequences of a natural disaster (Florida's resiliency to

numerous hurricanes since Hurricane Andrew versus Louisiana's response to

Hurricane Katrina), and also how strong a role it played in the early days of the

Cold War. In the event of coordinated asymmetric attacks in many parts of the

country and/or simultaneously with a natural disaster or avian flu pandemic,

emergency responders and relief organizations may not be able to move across

local or state borders. Resources will be severely strained and responders will be

busy dealing with or preparing to deal with disaster on their home turf.

The situation with military families deserves special attention. DOD must

recognize that soldiers, sailors, airmen, "and Marines will not likely be effective

warfighters if they are simultaneously worried about the security of their families.

While obvious steps, such as increased base protection, can be implemented, too

many families live outside the installation. Instilling and promoting a culture of

preparedness can provide both physical and psychological benefits to members

and their families. There is much that can be done without great expense or

effort to better prepare for both natural and man-made disasters.4 Greater hazard

awareness, training, home storage, and family communication/evacuation plans

can provide greater peace of mind, strengthen mental resiliency, and empower

DOD families to carry on through a disaster. Preparedness also reduces the

impact of a crisis and likelihood that these families will have to depend only upon

the emergency relief infrastructure. Self-sufficiency also empowers members and

families to help others and set an example the community can follow.

4. Events include such things as floods, mudslides, hurricanes, tornados, fires, severe snow or ice

storms, earthquakes, volcanoes, infectious disease outbreaks, severe power and fuel outages,

hazardous chemical releases, nuclear or radiological incidents, and acts of terrorism and/or civil

disturbance.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 37

RIXOMMI;NDATION: ENSURING DHPLOYMUNT AND SUPPLY

Recommendations in this section are limited to those that affect DOD,

although there are many related items that DHS should address, as well.

To better ensure deployment and supply, the Secretary of Defense

should direct:

• ASD (HD&ASA)/DCIP to extend the mission assurance process to the

defense industrial base and recommend approaches for addressing

shortfalls

• USD (AT&L) to work with defense industrial base owners to develop

and implement corrective action plans

• ASD (HD&ASA)/DCIP to develop a prioritized action plan for

addressing identified risks to DOD-owned assets

• U.S. Northern Command to lead implementation of actions identified by

ASD(HD&ASA)/DCIP for critical function assurance

• Service secretaries to fund actions for mission assurance in owned

functions

• Deputy Under Secretary' of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness

to ensure resourcing of logistics shortfalls:

- to assure sources of supply and movement to DOD depots

- to eliminate the last tactical mile issues

- to make the information management system interoperable, robust,

and resilient to attack, from both within and outside

Service Chiefs should actively promote the ability of military

families to shelter at home for two weeks, or evacuate on short notice.

They should:

• Reinforce the message via noncommissioned officer leadership

academies, on-base medical community, Armed Forces Network, unit

town-hall meetings, movie/TV celebrities, veterans organizations

• Assure base commanders export this capability to adjacent civilian

communities.
38 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Building the National Team

The third dimension of this assessment of homeland defense addressed the

status of the "national team" and DOD's involvement. This is not a good news

story. Homeland security organizations responsible for dealing with national

calamities are a diverse lot: federal agencies, state and local authorides, and

private firms. DHS, as the lead agency for creadng that level of response, is still

in its infancy. At the state and local level, there appears to be little that is posidve

about the relationship with federal "partners."

DHS continues to reorganize, changes points of contact frequently, and

brings to the table too much of a "we're in charge" attitude. This judgment is

shared by the private sector, although DOD's relationship with the defense

industrial base seems to be better than between many other sectors and their

federal agency lead. U.S. Northern Command, DOD's principal operating "face"

to the homeland security community, has been restrained by DOD leadership's

view that the priority is—and should be—the "away game." Its low profile start

has produced serious percepdon problems that must be overcome among the

partners with whom it will be called upon to work.

The Team Members and Relationships

Interagency. In the interagency arena, a posidve example of how things

should work can be found in the Joint Interagency Task Force — South. This

pairing of military and civilian government agencies under a unified command

structure provides for routine interaction between the entides that will need to

work together effectively during a crisis. The DSB believes that the complex

network of interdependent roles, responsibilities, and relationships demands a

full-time integrated approach to homeland security and homeland defense

activities through a number of similar standing operational task forces.

Federal-State-Local. In the case of a point attack, the first manifestation—

and response—will occur locally. If or when those resources are overwhelmed,

requests to the state will be made, and the governor can call out the National

5. Joint Interagency Task Force - South has the mission of monitoring and interdiction of illicit

trafficking from Latin America. Membership includes Customs and Border Patrol, Central

Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence

Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, National

Security Agency, and the National Geospatial Agency.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 39

Guard, as well as exercise mutual aid agreements with other states for additional

response resources. When those avenues of response are tapped out, appeals for

federal help can and will be made. However, during its investigation, the study

team heard from several state and regional response leaders that federal support

can be slow in coming and what they can expect is largely unknown.

With respect to prevention, state and local response leaders noted how much

they can contribute, provided they have adequate threat information on what

they should be anticipating. In other words, a strong partnership with their

federal counterparts can contribute significantly to threat mitigation and/or

apprehension. Posidve examples of preparation and monitoring for Y2K and

state/local threat assessment centers bear out the power of such partnerships.

Public-Private. Possibly the most neglected member of the homeland

security/defense team is the private sector. The private sector owns most of the

infrastructure and will be the most effective in protecting (given timely and

adequate threat information) and restoring its function after an attack. As such, it

must be an integral member of the team alongside government actors in federal

planning and information-sharing activities.

Relationships between sector owners and operators and their federal agency

interfaces are uneven—a striking condition that emerged during the course of

this study. In some cases, especially where there is a history of a non-regulatory

partnership, like the defense industrial base and energy sectors, relationships

were positive, characterized by open and frequent communication and

information sharing. Others were more one-way, with the federal "partner" more

controlling and didactic. The realization that the sectors have more intimate

knowledge of not only their own sectors, but their ties to other sectors, has vet to

be well understood and embraced at the federal level.

Leadership. Forming a truly joint homeland security and defense team starts

with developing leaders with a joint perspective—both through education and

career experiences—building an interagency cadre of leaders, whose

understanding of homeland defense transcends their immediate position.

Homeland security and defense, regardless of agency, level of government, or

public or private sector, must be seen as a professional opportunity for those

seeking to lead in this critical field. However, there is no recognition of the need

to develop homeland security leadership in the same manner as the nation has

invested in developing national security leadership.
40 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Plans and Exercises

While numerous doctrinal and operational plans exist, most with embedded

processes for review and revision, there are no processes to ensure that the plans

are practiced and capabilities measured against readiness metrics. While there are

many exercises (possibly too many), the exercises are highly scripted,

unconnected to each other, and typically focus on a top-down approach (where

the supporting organizations are "training aids" to the senior-level players)

instead of bottom-up approach (focusing on an integrated and layered response

beginning with the initial event). Even the national level exercises have not been

effective—more often broad than deep, where the real lessons get learned.

Furthermore, these exercises often stop before the more difficult issues—

transfer of command, employment of specialized assets, or unknowns such as

public panic—come into play. Even more worrisome than the disjointed nature

of the exercises is the lack of any process for effectively "learning from" the

lessons of these exercises. This gap extends to DOD, where the numerous

exercise programs do not appear to be effectively Linked to national objectives.

Crisis Communications

Communications is almost always at the top of the list of recurring issues in a

crisis. It can make or break a successful response. It starts with the basics of

compatible equipment and language among response communities. It extends to

the public-private Linkage, where both the pre-emptive and response actions by

private sector owners of critical infrastructure can mitigate significant problems,

yet they are, more often than not, kept in the dark or not allowed access. (This

was an acute problem in recovery and restoration post-Katrina.) It covers also

communications to the public. Too often it is developed "real time" without

benefit of factual vetting and without coordination, such that what is

communicated to the public can be misleading or just outright wrong (as

example, the anthrax attacks in 2001). The DSB believes that if there is only one

thing that DHS and DOD ought to improve among the national team, it should

be crisis communication.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 41

RECOMMENDATION: BUILDING A NATIONAL TEAM FOR HOMELAND

DEFENSE

Secretary of Defense leadership in the interagency is needed to address

current deficiencies in national plans and strategies and support for

domestic threat assessment. DOD needs to step up to its preparedness

responsibilities in the broad set of communications issues.

To address deficiencies in plans and communications, the Secretary

of Defense should:

• Promote the combination of the National Security Council/Homeland

Security Council to coordinate and integrate a national strategy and

response for global asymmetric engagement

" Request a national intelligence estimate on the scope of the projected threat.

- direct the Office of Net Assessment to conduct a capabilities-based

net assessment

" Request that DHS work with DOD to codify the transition from D( )D

support to DOD lead for a war at home

• Direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense to develop a comprehensive

DOD communication system and public affairs strategy for homeland

defense preparedness and crisis/consequence management.

- develop an equipment and concept of operations architecture

compliant with the National Incident Management System

- ensure availability of DOD communication assets compatible with

civilian responder community

- work with DHS to develop messages, and coordinate and educate

those who deliver them, appropriate to the full range of contingencies

The Secretary of Defense should direct U.S. Northern Command to

work with the National Exercise Program at DHS to design and execute

more effective exercise programs that address:

• Unified management of national capabilities

" Communication and information sharing across public and private

boundaries

• Regional planning and coordination

• Interoperable and response capability shortfalls

• Transition from DOD support to DOD lead scenarios
42 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the layered approach to DOD's Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil

Support, one of the layers—"Enable"—is directly focused on improving domestic

capabilities through sharing DOD expertise and technology. The military is

recognized for its unsurpassed training, exercise, and doctrinal programs.

ASD (HD&ASA) should take the initiative to help establish a

strategically-managed, interagency homeland defense/homeland security

leader development program with the following attributes:

• Graduate-level, senior service DHS-sponsored "war" college developed

in conjunction with the National Defense University

• An Executive Exchange Program modeled on the President's Executive

Exchange Program

• Recognition as credit equivalent to senior service schools and for

flag/senior executive service promotions in DOD

Training expanded to state and local levels

What We Know and Don't Know about

Adversary Capabilities: Intelligence _

This study's "Know/Don't Know" analysis was designed to assess U.S.

knowledge and gaps related to weapons of mass destruction, cyber, and highleverage asymmetric threats—and, where baps exist, to make recommendations

for closing them. The "Know/Don't Know" formulation was used rather that a

more conventional assessment of the nation's intelligence posture in order to

ensure that the "Don't Knows," particularly at the levels of strategic threats, are

unambiguously used by the Intelligence Community. To drive or compel

response, actions in collection, analysis, and customer interaction are offered.

The study concluded that improvements are needed in number of areas:

foreign intelligence collection, analysis, and customer support activities; domestic

intelligence associated with foreign-inspired threats to the U.S. homeland;

countering foreign intelligence; net assessments and gaming; and methods for

improving intelligence related to the threat of weapons of mass destruction and

other high-leverage adversary means.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 43

Know/Don't Know Posture

While much of the assessment of the community's know/don't know

posture is classified, this study does concur with the sentiments of the 2005

WMD Commission, which asserted that "strategic issues" such as these should

command top level focus in the Intelligence Community and, further, that the

community should devote some of its best collection, analysis, and customer

interactions to these topics.6 Yet, two years later, it is still not clear that the

community has internalized these observations, nor taken deliberate steps in the

areas of collection, analysis, and customer support efforts to devote the

necessary resources to strategic threats.

RIXOMMKNDATION: KNOW /DON'T KNOW POSTURE

To better position itself to close strategic information gaps, the

intelligence community should create a set of X-treme intelligence teams,

staffed with some of the community's top talent, to focus on a small

number of hard problems.

Intelligence on Foreign-Inspired Domestic Threats

Among the most stressing challenges to U.S. military operations are threats

to homeland-based forces, operations, resources, and assets. Foreign-inspired

domestic threats remain largely unknown to U.S. intelligence and, therefore, will

present high-order challenges to U.S. military operations in future engagements.

DOD is responsible for force protection (and critical defense infrastructure

on which it is dependent, including the industrial base) but does not have and

cannot presently acquire sufficient understanding of the threat within the United

States—adversary plans, intentions, and capabilities to disrupt or deny critical

defense assets. The bottom line is that the nation does not have the intelligence it

needs to protect mission-critical DOD activities at home. Moreover, DOD has

not adequately defined its requirements for intelligence support at home.

U.S. intelligence lacks situational awareness and sophisticated understanding

of foreign-inspired threats or operations within the United States. Intelligence on

6. Final Report ofthe Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities ofthe United States Regarding Weapons ofMass

Destruction, March 2005.
I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

foreign-inspired domestic threats must be derived in part from contributions of

independent law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, and local level. But

many of these organizations lack the training or established processes needed to

function as intelligence producers. Without change, DHS, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, and other law enforcement organizations, along with the existing

intelligence community entities, will not be able to provide adequate domestic

intelligence to meet DOD mission needs.

In the course of its assessment, this study reviewed the model used by the

New York City Police Department (NYPD) in dealing with this threat. The

NYPD has adopted an approach for utilizing strong intelligence collection and

analysis methodologies, which may be an ideal "franchise model" across localities

critical to DOD missions.

RECOMMENDATION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE •

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, working with the Under

Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD [I]), should ensure that DOD

identifies military capabilities in localities where the New York Police

Department model may be more aggressively applied.

The USD (I) should strengthen his role as the DOD focal point for

intelligence in support of defending U.S. military homeland-based

capabilities, assets, facilities, and functions.

Countering Foreign Intelligence Threats

Foreign intelligence operations against the United States are now more

diffuse, more aggressive, more technologically sophisticated, and potentially

more successful than ever before. In particular, the use of human intelligence

operations by weaker powers to achieve advantage is a classic "asymmetric

strategy," which increasingly will challenge future U.S. military operations as

adversaries learn from past successes. Given DOD's global responsibilities,

activities to identify, assess, and defeat foreign intelligence activities are an

ongoing defense mission, spanning peacetime to wartime.

Today, defense counterintelligence is a collection of disaggregated and

service-driven operational programs, each with distinct doctrinal and

organizational bases that are grounded in history and the differences in service
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 45

missions. The Secretary of Defense does not have unity of command with

respect to the counterintelligence forces that are assigned to identify, assess, and

defeat these threats. Operational intelligence on foreign intelligence activities is

poor. And while military service counterintelligence components provide support

to individual combatant commanders, the command structure is ill-suited to

undertake global operadons against an adversary intelligence service. A genuine

Goldwater-Nichols-like transformation is needed to create true joint operations

with strategic-level focus.

RECOMMENDATION: COINTKRINC,

The Secretary of Defense should establish a joint operational component

within DOD with the standing mission of detecting and degrading foreign

intelligence capabilities that threaten U.S. military operations while

retaining the focus of the service counterintelligence organizations.

This new organization should be responsible for robust planning, developing

doctrine, assigning resources, and directing and executing operations to achieve the

mission of degrading foreign intelligence capabilities. This organization should

galvanize intelligence community support for the defense counterintelligence effort

and provide the nucleus for a serious national-level strategic capability.

Needfor Strategic Analysis

Net assessment (blue on red interaction) has proven itself in identifying

important gaps in complex and multi-dimensional military problems. Given the

poor state of knowledge of stressing wars in the future, net assessment, gaming,

and simulation techniques should be employed to identify and understand

intelligence gaps, the implications of those gaps, and commensurate intelligence

opportunities. Employing such tools would also sensitize the blue side to the

existence of such intelligence gaps.
46 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

RECOMMENDATION: STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

The Office of Net Assessment, USD (I), and the Director of National

Intelligence should establish a capability to assess big complex peer

problems (e.g., space anti-access) for net assessment and modeling of future

stressing war.

The recommendations described herein are targeted to improve U.S.

intelligence capabilities in support of future stressing wars. The challenges ahead

will require broad emphasis on counterintelligence, foreign-inspired domestic

threats, and the other challenges described in this section. Many of these

recommendations involve new ways of doing business, improved collaboration

among community organizations, and attention from the community leadership

to ensure adequate resources are directed to these efforts.

Fighting Through

Asymmetric Counterforce

The United States has plans to improve its conventional military capability

that should enable our nation to retain its advantage in force-on-force capability

through the next several decades. Faced with this conventional advantage,

potential adversaries will likely seek asymmetric methods to undermine and

ultimately deter or influence U.S. military operations. Such asymmetric methods

might include attacks on U.S. vulnerabilities, the use of deception to avoid a

direct U.S. response, use of non-attribution, and intimidation of allies. Such

methods might be employed, for example, to attack command and control assets

of deployed military forces, interrupt logistics lines of communication, or attack

the U.S. homeland, as previously discussed.

Not only might adversaries employ such methods in single attacks, they may

also seek to employ multiple asymmetric attacks that simultaneously impede or

deter U.S. military operations in multiple locations abroad, or both abroad and at

home. It is possible that an adversary may be sophisticated enough to optimize a

series of asymmetric attacks that could cripple U.S. military operations and do so

while maintaining anonymity. There are numerous potential combinations that

planners must imagine and consider in order to prevent or counter an adversary's

attempt to undermine U.S. military capabilities at home and abroad.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 47

While the range of potential asymmetric attacks is wide, this study chose to

focus its work on a small set of the most compelling challenges, selected based

on the following criteria: (1) possible catastrophic effect on military operations,

(2) adversaries will have the means to provide these challenge, and (3) DOD is

not doing enough to prepare for dealing with them.

The three challenges are:

1. Conducting military operations in WMD environments. This

challenge includes the threat of or actual use of WMD (biological, nuclear,

chemical, radiological, and others) against U.S. forces and/or those of an

all}'. Countering this threat involves protecting critical bases of operations

and projecting and sustaining forces in distant anti-access environments.

2. Countering attacks on U.S. and allied space capabilities. Critical to

this challenge is gaining and maintaining space situational awareness,

conducting defensive and offensive counter space operations, and

conducting combat operations when space capabilities are degraded.

3. Cyber warfare against information and networks. The challenge of

keeping pace with this ever-advancing threat is real. Counters include

learning how to operate with degraded networks and corrupted

information and developing integrated applications of cyber defense,

attack, and exploitation.

The ability to operate in and from the global commons—space, international

waters and airspace, and cyberspace—is critical to DOD's ability to conduct

operations and project power anywhere in the world. The two domains of the

global commons that are most at risk are space and cyberspace. Space is vulnerable

because of new tbreats; cyber because an increased dependence on rapidly

evolving information networks creates new vulnerabilities that adversaries are

already seeking to exploit.

The future will likely bring an enlarged set of players, both state and non-state,

with incentive and capability to use WMD, either to disrupt U.S. military operations

or to intimidate or even attack their regional neighbors. To meet this challenge

DOD will need to enhance U.S. capabilities to: (1) dissuade possession of WMD, (2)

deter WMD attacks and threat of attacks, (3) disarm adversaries possessing WMD

weapons, (4) enhance capabilities of general purpose military forces to operate in a

WMD environment, and (5) mitigate the damage done by a WMD attack. Combat

in a WMD environment is not the same as combating WMD. Thus, the focus of

the recommendation herein is to enhance the capabilities of general-purpose forces

to operate in a WMD environment—to fight through the asymmetric counterforce.
48 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Fighting an Adversary Possessing WMD

DOD needs to take steps to make its military operations less fragile to WMD

attacks. This assertion, on the part of this study, is not meant to suggest that U.S.

forces be prepared to operate against massive and protracted WMD attacks

where U.S. retaliatory capabilities play a critical deterrent role. Rather, U.S.

military operations should not be held hostage to limited WMD attacks that may

not even be attributable. Three areas were emphasized in the study deliberations:

building partnership capacity, preparedness to fight in WMD, and vulnerability to

small-scale nuclear attacks.

Building Partnership Capacity

U.S. military operations depend on host nations for bases and logistics

support, and on contractors, host nation populations, and other critical civilian

personnel to deploy and sustain the force. For the most part, however, these

elements lack the protection afforded U.S. forces from chemical, biological, and

radiological attacks and, as well, lack the same capability to manage

consequences—though they are subject to the effects of WMD attacks against

U.S. forces. Host nations and supporting forces may be less willing to support U.S.

military operations in the face of WMD threats if they perceive that they will suffer

disproportionate losses. Loss of partner support could have catastrophic effects on

the outcome of a conflict.

Helping partners prepare for and manage the consequences of WMD attacks

is a key element in any strategic communication plan. The 2006 National Military

Strategy to Combat WMD states that, "[DOD] must assist international partners to

build capacities to combat WMD effectively." While DOD has made initial steps

toward building partnership capacity, it is under-resourced and does not focus on

fighting through WMD. Further, some current authorities—such as the

prohibition of National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams to operate

overseas—limit DOD's ability to build partner capacity for WMD.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 49

RECOMMENDATION: BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY TO FIGHT

THROUGH WMD

DOD should establish a discrete funding line of not less than $500 million

to enhance partners' capability to fight through WMD.

USD (P) should direct recurring and stable programmed funding of $18

million per year for the National Guard State Partnership Program.

Secretary of Defense should request that Congress rescind the current

statutory provision that prohibits the use of the National Guard Civil

Support Teams.

Preparedness to Fight in a WMD Environment

U.S. forces routinely trained during the Cold War for operations in a WMD

environment—fighting through chemical, biological, and even nuclear effects.

Since the end of the Cold War, the WMD environment has changed, but

concepts and doctrine have not kept pace. As a result, U.S. forces are better

organized and equipped but not as well trained to fight in a WMD environment

today. The demands of current operations have reduced the dme that most

forces are able to train for operations in a WMD environment. Exercises are

infrequent and seldom continue past the point where WMD are used against U.S.

forces. The exception, perhaps, is Korea, where the proximity of a major

chemical threat motivates readiness.

Strategies and concepts that provide the framework for fighting in a WMD

environment are incomplete and inconsistent. The "combating WMD" construct

embodied in DOD directives and joint doctrine identifies the need to tailor

capabilities and operations to perform in WMD environments. But

implementation to date has emphasized interdiction and defeat of the weapons

themselves, with little attention to the capabilities needed to fight in a military

campaign against an adversary armed with and willing to use WMD.

In the absence of concepts and doctrine to drive capability-based

assessments that would determine needs and identify gaps, U.S. forces may not

be adequately prepared for fighting through the effects of WMD. This could

result in U.S. forces suffering massive losses or even being rendered combatineffective in the event of such attack. Further, plans not validated through

realistic exercises may be ineffective in the face of WMD attacks.
50 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

RECOMMENDATION: PREPAREDNESS FOR COMBAT IN WMD

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council should direct a series of

capabilities-based assessments to identify capability needs and gaps for

operating in a WMD environment.

Joint Forces command should conduct a series of experiments, with the

support of U.S. Strategic Command's Center for Combating WMD, to

explore WMD-related issues associated with operations in a WMD

environment.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, should direct the combatant commands to

place particular emphasis on joint and multinational exercises where

"fighting through WMD" is a main objective.

Small-Scale Nuclear Attacks

Given current methods of operation, forces overseas are vulnerable to the

use of tactical nuclear weapons by adversaries who may not be deterred.

Deployment and resupply capabilities force reliance on vulnerable, easily targeted

nodes. Maritime forces are operating more in littorals but concepts of operation

do not reflect their increased vulnerability in nuclear, biological, or chemical

environments. Since the end of the Cold War, attention to hardening equipment

against the threat of blast, thermal, and electromagnetic pulse effects has abated

due to a combination of expense and pressures to cut costs. Command and

control networks, which vary considerably from theater to theater, based on

geography and availability of systems, are not subjected to nuclear vulnerability

analysis that is essential to identifying potential single points of failure.

As mentioned previously, U.S. forces are better protected against chemical

and even biological attacks than the civilians and foreign nationals on whom they

depend. But nuclear attacks pose a much larger challenge. Even a single nuclear

weapon could render key nodes unusable for extended periods, and

electromagnetic pulse effects from a limited nuclear attack could blind sensors

and shut down key command and control systems.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 51

RECOMMENDATION: SMAIT-SCAI.I:NI CI.KARATTACKS

U.S. Strategic Command help combatant commands anticipate nuclear

effects and plan to fight through them.

The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) develop tools for

C4ISR network analysis to reduce critical node vulnerability, establish

redundancy requirements, and identify options for degraded

operations/reconstitution.

Secretary of Defense direct DISA and DTRA to assess utility of nuclear

hardening techniques for critical network elements.

Countering Attacks on U.S. and Allied Space Capabilities

U.S. military operations have become dependent on space assets to enable

command and control; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);

navigation; precision attacks; beyond line-of-site communications; and weather

and environmental information. Adversaries are well aware of this dependency

and are developing threats to these assets. For example, the Chinese conducted

an anti-satellite test on January 11, 2007. Currently, the United States and its allies

are not well-prepared to defend against such attacks as space has been long

perceived as a peaceful sanctuary. But if critical space assets are not properly

defended, the results may be catastrophic not only for the United States and its

allies, but for the world economy as well. Thus, the nation must be prepared for

both defensive and offensive counter-space operations.

Due to the dependency on space assets, a successful attack, would severely

impact U.S. and allied military capabilities. Conducting joint warfighting operation?

in an environment where command and control, ISR, navigation, and

communication and other systems are either degraded or denied would be

extremely challenging at best. At worst, it could mean defeat for the United States

and its allies. The effect on the global economy could be equally severe with

telecommunications, transportation, and commercial navigation degraded as well

as disruption of financial transactions. Moreover, political alliances, coalitions, and

partnerships may be undermined if the United States is not well trained, equipped,

and prepared to respond.

s
52 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Space Situational Awareness

The growing number of objects in space will make maintaining space

situational awareness more challenging. In the late 1950s, there were only four

objects in low earth orbit to track and catalog. In the last forty years, that picture

has changed dramatically. Forty-four nations and several commercial enterprises

have objects in space. Low earth orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous earth orbit

(GEO) positions are becoming increasingly crowded. Tactical, mini, and nano

satellites are now being launched by both government and commercial endties.

All together, the evolution in the use of space, which is expected to continue

apace for decades to come, complicates the job of maintaining space situational

awareness. Space debris is another problem as well. Government and commercial

satellites have to be maneuvered to avoid collisions with other space objects.

During such maneuvers, satellite services are normally suspended, consuming

precious on-board fuel and interrupting operations.

The current space surveillance network is struggling to keep track of 11,000-

plus cataloged objects (satellites and debris), a number that could grow

dramatically over time, especially if satellites are physically destroyed by adversary

attacks. The complexity of the situation in space can pose significant challenges

for military operations. If DOD forces cannot assess, characterize, or attribute an

attack to its source, then executing an effective response will be all but

impossible.

RECOMMENDATION: SPACE SITUATIONAE AWARENESS

DOD needs to field an improved Space Surveillance Network that

produces an automated single integrated space picture; incorporates

southern hemisphere coverage and new sensor capabilities; and supports

distributed, collaborative space command and control operations.

The services need to begin incorporating attack assessment/attack

reporting sensors on key space assets.

USD (I) request the Director of National Intelligence to focus additional

national intelligence resources on collecting and analyzing space

intelligence.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 53

Space Control

The Department of Defense needs to take more seriously the prospect of

conducting offensive and defensive operations in space and rapidly

reconstituting space assets. Today the processes for determining post-attack

response options are not well defined. The intellectual foundation—doctrine;

concepts or operations; tactics, techniques, and procedures—dating back more

than five years has not kept pace with changes in the security' environment.

Current joint exercises do not emphasize space control. In addition, tools or

systems for countering attacks are insufficient.

RECOMMENDATION: SPACE CONTROL

USD (P) articulate policy on protecting U.S. and allied space capabilities,

including guidance on sharing space situational awareness information

and coordinating response options.

U.S. Strategic Command develop join space control doctrine; concepts of

operations; and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Services improve both defensive and offensive space control capabilities.

Harden satellites, add attack detection sensors, improve ground station

physical security, and add redundant and secure communication means.

Develop a rapid global strike capability.

U.S. Joint Forces Command incorporate realistic space threats and space

control play into education, training, and exercise programs. Also upgrade

information operations range to incorporate space range capabilities.

U.S. Strategic Command develop a responsive space reconstitution

program.

Operating in a Degraded Space Environment

U.S. forces need to be better prepared to conduct campaigns when space

assets are degraded. The U.S. space architecture will remain fragile for a decade or

more; thus DOD should initiate actions to lessen reliance on space while

developing capabilities to reconstitute critical lost or degraded space assets within

hours (Figure 11). Some of the options that could be considered entail non-space

alternatives. For example, ISR sensors, communications, and other payloads could
54 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

be flown on "near-space" lighter-than-air unmanned aerial systems. Research and

development work already has been conducted in this area. What is needed is a

research approach leading to fielded operational platforms and systems.

Likewise, next-generation weapon systems such as the F-22 Raptor and the

Joint Strike Fighter, as well as certain other/older platforms like the F/A-18 and

F-15E, are being fielded with highly capable radar and other sensors. Networking

these potential sources of "unconventional ISR" via common data-linked

airborne and surface communication gateways could complement space-based

capabilities in high demand. Another area worth investigating is launch-ondemand, operationally responsive space capabilities. These small, lower earth

orbit satellites could provide an ability to rapidly reconstitute at least some

capability in the wake of a catastrophic attack against space-based assets. Efforts

to flight test and field such systems should continue.

Vulnerability Reconstitution Reconstitution Need

Space Capability Orbit Kinetic/Non-kinetic Alternate Sources Priority iwithm hoursi

Imagery

Intelligence

LEO H Aircraft and UASs 2 UAS, NT-ISR,

LTA UAS

Satellite LEO&GEO 1 Terrestrial towers, 4 ORS, HAE UAS,

Communications GEO Low/High nne-ot-signt ana

airborne relay

LTA UAS

Precision

Navigation

MEO Medium/ Medium No alternate source 1 Pseudolites,

LTA UAS

Signals

Intelligence

LEO & GEO LEO High/High Aircraft and UASs 3 ORS, UAS,

LTA UAS GEO Low/High

Weather LEO & GEO LEO High/High Terrestrial observations 5 ORS, LTA UAS

GEO Low/High

and aircraft

Figure 11. Reconstituting Degraded or Lost Space Capabilities
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 55

RECOMMENDATION: OPERATING IN A DEGRADED SPACE ENVIRONMENT

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information

Integration ASD (Nil), (DISA), and the Services should field a GIG that

has redundant communication means and waveforms with autocommunication rerouting capabilities.

Services field systems with highly accurate and reliable inertial

measurement units and incorporate "atomic clocks on a chip" for timing

signal.

Services ensure a mix of terminal guidance systems and weapons in the

nation's arsenal—not only GPS-guided weapons.

Joint Forces Command incorporate realistic exercise scenarios into joint

and combined exercises that emphasize degraded space capabilities.

Services incorporate training in degraded space environment on live-fire

training ranges.

Cyber Warfare Against Information and Networks

Potential adversaries have growing capability to disrupt, compromise, and

corrupt the information and networks that have become so critical to U.S. military

operations. Not only are U.S. military forces vulnerable, but cyber attacks against

civilian infrastructure also have significant coercive and destructive potential

against the United States, its allies, and partners. Such attacks may offer adversaries

a high-leverage option to coerce the United States or deter U.S. actions.

In some cases, adversary capabilities may exceed U.S. cyber capabilities,

especially in terms of the workforce that can be brought to bear for cyber

warfare. The relevant technology is global and accessible, which means that the

United States is unlikely to have a significant advantage. Moreover, highly-skilled

technical people are a critical component of the capability and some potential

adversaries have a much larger base of such people than does the United States.

Highly visible Internet attacks tend to focus attention on remote access

attacks. But close access penetration and life cycle insertion may be the most

serious threats, because they are the hardest to defend against and can affect the

most sensitive U.S. systems. The nation should expect that peer and near-peer

adversaries will be well-practiced in close access and life cycle insertion, as well as

remote access attacks. Yet this area is getting the least attention.
56 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There are many ongoing efforts to improve the U.S. cyber warfare posture,

but significant shortcomings remain. Findings from this study suggest that there

is little operational understanding of the consequences of cyber attacks, as well as

major information assurance deficiencies. There is a lack of "traditional"

intelligence support for cyber defense. Cyber command and control concepts are

at rudimentary stages and situational awareness is weak. Programmatic

development and acquisition program test and evaluation shortfalls exist.

Organizational authorities—policy and legislation—are at odds with borderless

cyberspace. Further, the nation lacks a tenable deterrent capability.

Confronting the cyber threat requires not only an effective cyber defense, but

also preparation of operational forces to function in the degraded environment

caused by cyber attack. Contingency plans and processes must be carefully

considered and practiced in advance.

RECOMMENDATION: U.S. CYBER WARFARE POSTURE

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and service

chiefs provide greater buy-in and participation by operations community

in countering cyberspace threats. Principal emphasis should be on more

rigorously addressing cyberspace threats in exercises and experiments to

understand operational effectiveness in the face of such threats.

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in conjunction

with ASD (NII)/DOD Chief Information officer (CIO) and the service

chiefs, implement efforts to establish an adequate workforce for

cyberspace defense to include personnel requirements and sources,

establishing career fields, and ensuring enhanced training and leader

development.

USD (AT&L), working with the. Director, Operational Test and

Evaluation and the ASD (NII)/DOD CIO, establish an information

assurance test and evaluation process that spans the life cycle of systems.

The Secretary of Defense, with the Secretary of Homeland Security,

determine how DOD can best contribute to national cyber defense

planning and be prepared to assume greater responsibilities during major

cyber attacks affecting U.S. government and civilian infrastructure.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 57

Cross-cutting Considerations

In each of the cases described here, military forces must be able to operate

effectively and successfully for extended periods of time in degraded

environments. This is a tall order but critically important. Potential asymmetric

capabilities will have catastrophic consequences in future combat operations

unless the nation takes action now to offset current vulnerabilities. DOD must

reconsider investments in countering WMD and prepare to conduct operations

in space and cyberspace.

Warfighting against adversaries who employ these asymmetric capabilities

will be a new experience for the United States. Thus, it is necessary to develop an

intellectual foundation for the concepts of operations and rules of engagement

that will serve to enhance training and leadership development, and bridge the

gaps in asymmetric aspects of operational warfighting that currently exist. Both

offensive and defensive operations must be integrated if U.S. forces are to be

optimally effective. Enhanced experimentation, exercises, and assessments are all

necessary to gain experience, measure progress, and refine operational concepts.

Strategic Communication: Another

Instrument of U.S. Power

Defending U.S. interests against future adversaries will require more than just

military might. It may also call for the United States to rely on other instruments of

U.S. power—such as diplomacy, economic and financial sanctions, and strategic

communication. The instrument of strategic communication is vital to America's

future, and must be transformed at strategic and operational levels. The United

States and its partners face an array of transnational and state-based threats, as

well as an abundance of opportunities. These threats and opportunities varv

greatly in their nature and potential effect, but they present a common challenge.

That is, they require a strategic communication instrument with sustained impact

and far greater capacity to understand, engage, and influence global populations

on issues of consequence.

Strategic communication is a dynamic process that integrates the development,

implementation, assessment, and evolution of public actions and messages in

support of America's interests at home and abroad. Too often, political and military

leaders treat strategic communication only as crafting and disseminating messages, as

something done by someone else, or as an afterthought in determining strategic

priorities. But strategic communication today calls for a radically different

approach—one that incorporates persuasive, cooperative, and coercive instruments
58 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

of national power. It is necessary before, during, and after armed conflict and is

essential to formulating executive national strategies. Strategic communication is a

proactive, sustained, and coherent set of activities in support of U.S. strategic

objectives that includes:

• Understanding global attitudes and cultures

• Advising policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders on public opinion

implication of policy choices

• Engaging in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions through

programs that support the national interest

• Influencing attitudes and behavior through communication strategies

• Measuring the impact of activities

Strategic communication is a central responsibility of the President and senior

government leaders, and is conducted by a wide variety of civilian and military

practitioners. Its successful use depends on shared knowledge and strong, adaptive

networks both within government and between government and civil society.

Success in strategic communication depends on:

• deep comprehension of the identities, attitudes, cultures, interests, and

motives of others

• awareness by leaders and practitioners that what we do matters more than

what we say

• institutionalized connections between a wide variety of government and

civil society partners in the United States and abroad

• a durable model of strategic direction that adapts quickly, transforms

stovepipes, integrates knowledge and functions, and builds next

generation skills and technologies

While "all politics is local," all communication is now global. Gaps between

what national leaders say and what the nation does and gaps between what

national leaders say and what others hear have strategic consequences. These

"say-do" and "say-hear" gaps affect U.S. interests in ways that can be measured

in lives, dollars, and lost opportunities. In general, the nation continues to

underestimate these impacts, to the disadvantage of the United States.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 59

Successful strategic communication requires an interactive relationship

between senders and receivers. People understand and relate to ideas and

information when they identify with what is conveyed. Successful

communicators enlist interest through credible symbols (actions, images, and

words) and evoke common ground by focusing on culturally independent

concepts that are valued globally—human dignity, health, personal safety,

education, the environment, and economic well being—and thus form the basis

for building support and mobilizing allies.

An important aspect of strategic communication is realizing that what we say

and value is not always what others hear. Words such as "democracy," "rule ot

law," and "freedom" have different meanings in different cultures at different

stages of their development. Understanding these differences is a crucial first step

in successful strategic communication. Also crucial is an understanding that actions

are more important than carefully crafted messages. Images, body language, and

media context are messages too, and can conflict with actions and words.

Strategic Communication Must Be Agile

F.vents and actions provide the opportunity for interpreting long-lived

themes in new, fresh, and particularly effective ways. Some events and actions—

by the United States and by adversaries—can be anticipated. In those cases,

messages can be thought out and prepared for use at an appropriate time. But

other events and actions are surprises and require messages to be adapted in light

of the situation. Thus, agility is critical.

Events and adversary actions present opportunities both to improve the

effective communication of overall messages as well as to delegidmize actions

and messages of our opponents (Figure 12). But 24 hour-a-day media operations

make rapid response to events challenging. Delayed response allows the media to

interpret the meaning of events, and each organization's interpretation is affected

by different cultural context. In the end, reports and messages can be conflicting

and in competition.

Thus, offensive strategic communication can use opponent's inconsistencies

as opportunities to put forward a consistent and compelling story that can

change beliefs of those looking at the situation from the outside. As a result, it is

important to strengthen current efforts in offensive communication that exist in

the Department of States (Counter Terrorism Communication Center), the
60 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

combatant commands (Rapid Response Units), and to enhance tools and training

for interagency media engagement.

De-legitimize our opponents'

messages and actions

Emphasize positive events

and activities

Figure 12. Strategic Communication Must Be Agile

While surprise events and actions require agility in strategic communication,

the media transformation that has been underway for the past two decades has

changed the way people access and share information, further supporting the need

for agility and speed. Information today is viral, not broadcast, driven principally

by the rise of the Internet and the global spread of satellite television. Google,

YouTube, Wikipedia, blogs, chat rooms, and other sources of information abound

through the Internet, where users pull information that is of interest to them as

individuals. In contrast, traditional media pushes information to the listener. But as

satellite and cable television have opened an abundance of alternative channels to

international audiences, audiences are becoming polarized into smaller, targeted

interest groups. As a result, traditional media are losing their influence.

Today, information spreads from user to user with tremendous speed and

terrorists have asymmetric advantage in the use of media. They have fast

response and great flexibility, enabled by a decentralized leadership with local

autonomy. Moreover, they are unconstrained by considerations of truth. Their

concern with communication is exemplified by actions that seem to have been

planned with media attention as the primary objective. News is, by nature, bad

news—so bombs sell, good deeds do not.

Because of the rise of the Internet and satellite television, state censorship of

content is becoming much less effective and will ultimately become impossible.

It is quite difficult to control information access on the Internet. Even though
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 61

some countries limit Internet connectivity through proxy servers that filter

content, many users know how to circumvent these filters and the information

they access gets passed along in other ways.

With so many pathways allowing information to reach people, the emphasis

today should be much less on the physical mechanism for delivery than it has

been in the past. The focus should be on message, credibility, and presence.

But today, America suffers an image problem around the globe. This includes

attacks on America's policies as well as suspicions of the nation's intentions.

Thus, the challenge is to craft messages that will travel through this complex

and variegated landscape.

Despite Progress, Much Remains to be Done

When the DSB investigated the topic of strategic communication in 2004, it

found "tactical achievements" in strategic communication, notably in publicaffairs coordination, U.S. broadcasting to the Middle East, and the embedded

media policy of DOD. The board concluded, however, that despite the promise

of statements calling for significant change in the President's National Security

Strategy (2002), "the U.S. had made little progress in building and transforming

its strategic communication assets."

Nearly four years later the board's view is more positive at the departmental

level. The State Department has had strong, consistent leadership for more than

two years in the office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public

Affairs. There is new leadership in the Broadcasting Board of Governors. The

2005 Quadrennial Defense Review included a Strategic Communication

Working Group, which led to approval of a Strategic Communication Roadmap

and creation of a Strategic Communication Integration Group bv the Deputy

Secretary of Defense. In May 2007, the interagency Strategic Communication

Policy Coordinating Committee issued a "U.S. National Strategy for Strategic

Communication and Public Diplomacy." These developments and a number of

positive changes at the operational level are discussed in this report.

Nevertheless, the current study finds reasons for continued concern. Positive

changes within organizations are real, but they depend to a considerable extent

on the skills and imagination of current leaders. These changes must be

evaluated, and those that work should be institutionalized. Resistance from

traditional organizational cultures continues. Resources for strategic communication have increased, but they faU substantially short of national needs.
62 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The primary concern is that fundamental transformation in strategic

communication has not occurred at the strategic and interagency level. Reforms

within organizations are important, but they are not a substitute for strong White

House leadership and enduring, flexible networks that connect strategies and

capabilities, departments and agencies, government and civil society.

Leverage National Capacity

The challenges associated with strategic communication are increasing in

complexity. As described, information technology and media interface have been

transformed. Instead of top-down "one-to-many" in which limited media vehicles

communicated with the masses, today's environment is a bottom-up "one-tomany" in which one individual is able to reach many individuals with a

sophisticated communication package at negligible expense.

The United States will fail in meeting 2V century national security challenges

if it does not take existing government collaboration with civil society to a new

level—leveraging national capacity. Challenges of the kind and magnitude the

world now faces cannot be met by states alone. This will mean strengthening

traditional partnerships with non-profit organizations in exchanges, broadcasdng,

and other government functions. Much more needs to be done to harness the

knowledge, skills, creativity, and commitment of academic, non-profit, and

business communities in more imaginative ways.

Thus, talent, resources, expertise, and creativity must be mobilized and

utilized both within and outside of government. Resources such as Sesame Street

Workshop, Community Radio, Peace Corps, and DOD Regional Centers can

play a role. Stronger public-private partnerships should be encouraged along with

engaging capabilities of new philanthropy and social entrepreneurship (such as

the Gates Foundation). Marketing and entertainment talent can be brought to

bear as well as relevant celebrities. "Individuals as nodes" are becoming

networked communicators, making public engagement a strategic, diplomatic,

and economic imperative.

For the U.S. government to accomplish this more challenging task will require

a comprehensive discipline that includes situational awareness, sustained action,

unity of messages, and resources commensurate with the task. Government

departments alone cannot develop the deep understanding of cultures, influence

networks, or information technologies that can be achieved through close

collaboration with civil society. Their efforts will benefit from the expertise,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 63

methods, core data, and best practices available outside government. In

recommending the creation of an independent Center for Global Engagement, the

intent is not to duplicate or draw funding from effective government strategic

communication activides. Rather, the goal is to create an entity that is accountable,

that operates in the public interest, that is outside but closely connected with

government, and that will gready enhance an instrument tiiat can only succeed witb

shared knowledge and adaptive networks between government and civil society.

Sustained White House Leadership

Strategic communication requires sustained senior leadership at the White

House level that focuses exclusively on global communication and directs all

relevant aspects of national capacity. These leaders must have authority as well as

responsibility—authorities to establish priorities, assign operational responsibilities,

transfer funds, and concur in senior personnel appointments. Importantly, these

senior leaders must have direct access to the President on critical communication

issues when policies are formulated and implemented.

After looking closely at this issue for nearly a decade, the DSB has reached

the following conclusions. Presidents shape the nation's strategic communication

in powerful ways. They require permanent structures within the White House

that will strengthen their ability to understand and communicate with global

audiences. Coordination committees may occasionally work well, but they are not

a substitute for strategic direction that is durable and empowered. leaders in

departments have full-time management responsibilities that limit their abilitv to

direct and coordinate at the interagency level. Departments and agencies have

constraints that make it difficult for them to think and act in interagency terms.

Ad hoc "czars" and incremental changes to national security structures designed

generations ago are not the answer. There is no such thing as a "perfect"

strategic direction model. Talented, competent leadership will determine success,

but good leaders function best in good structures.

Election cycles and episodic commitment have shaped and limited strategic

communication for decades. Today, America needs a new vision, new structures,

and new legislated authorities. These can only be achieved with Presidential

direction and the focused actions of leaders in Congress.
64 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations

RECOMMENDATION: THE

The President, congressional leaders, and interested organizations outside

government collaborate to create an independent, non-profit, and nonpartisan Center for Global Engagement (CGE).

Three principles should guide the establishment and work of the Center for

Global Engagement. First, that the direction, planning, and execution of the

government's strategic communication instrument are government responsibilities.

Second, that government cannot succeed in carrying out its responsibilities without

sustained, innovative, and high-quality support from civil society. Third, that the

academic, research, business, and non-profit communities offer deep reservoirs of

untapped knowledge, skills, credibility, and agility needed to strengthen strategic

communication.

The Center for Global Engagement should be a:

501(c)(3) corporation with an independent director and board of

directors

means to motivate and attract civil society's best and brightest

hub for innovation in cultural understanding, technology, and media

repository of expertise

magnet for innovative ideas

means to institutionalize continuity and long-term memory

focus for experimentation and project development

The study recommends that Congress provide the Department of State with

$500,000 to develop a charter that will define the mission, structure, and

operations of the CGE. The Department should award these funds through a

competitive grant to an organization or group of organizations that will prepare

and execute a business plan leading to the creation of the CGE as an independent

corporate entity (one option could be to extend the mission of an existing federally

funded research and development center or 501 (c)3 corporation).

Thereafter, Congress should provide sustained funding for the CGE through

a line item in the Department of State's budget. This should be new money

appropriated to the Department. Congress should provide the CGE with an
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 65

initial appropriation of $50 million in fiscal vear 2009. The objective should be

steady funding growth, consistent with performance and use by multiple

government agencies, to $250 million during the first five years.

The CGE should:

respond to multi-agency government taskings, coordinated through a

National Security Council Deputies Committee for Strategic

Communication

provide deep understanding of cultures and cultural dynamics, core

values of other societies, and media and technology trends

provide core data, best practices, and an opinion research clearing house

in support of government-sponsored strategic communication programs

assess the effectiveness of national strategic communication activities and

programs

collaborate with independent organizations that promote universal

values, cultural understanding, and global engagement

maintain a repository ofstrategic communication talent, skills, and

capabilities

attract fellows from the academic, non-profit, and business communities,

and from government

RliCOMMIiNDATION: LlCADIiRSHIP

Create a permanent strategic communication structure within the White

House.

This structure should have the following elements:

• Deputy National Security Advisor and Assistant to the President for

Strategic Communication

• Deputies Committee for Strategic Communication

• Strategic Communication Policy Committee, chaired by the Deputy

National Security Advisor and Assistant to the President for Strategic

Communication, to include all departments and agencies with substantial

strategic communication responsibilities
66 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Associate Director for Strategic Communication in the Office of

Management and Budget

legal and regulatory authorities as necessary for the Deputy National

Security Advisor and Assistant to the President for Strategic

Communication to:

(1) assign operational responsibilities, transfer funds, and concur in

personnel appointments

(2) provide guidance on strategic communication to an independent

Center for Global Engagement

RECOMMENDATION: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OPPORTUNITIES

The Department of Defense should make greater use of existing tools and

technologies to support strategic communication.

For example, existing science and technology capacity can be used to:

• identify nodes of influence through network analysis

• support communication and media analysis with machine translation

• understand viral information flows and influences

• utilize innovative evaluation and measurement methodologies {e.g.,

sentiment detection/analysis).

The study recommends that $50 million a year be invested to advance

knowledge in these areas and that this research budget be managed by DARPA,

the National Science Foundation, and the intelligence community. The task force

recognizes the current but disparate efforts in these areas and recommends

vigorous engagement across the strategic communication community to share

the existing knowledge base.

RECOMMENDATION:

The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs

should be given enhanced policy, budget, and personnel authorities.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 67

The study recommends a significant increase in the budget for the

State Department's public diplomacy programs, including exchanges over

a five-year period. The budget should be tripled and additional funds used

in the following areas:

exchanges {e.g., Fulbright, international visitor leadership program,

international military education and training)

Americans studying/conducting research abroad

recruitment, training, and deployment of additional public diplomacy

positions

support for strategic communication and public diplomacy activities of

the U.S. military's combatant commands

Internet, websites, blogging, Rapid Response Units, and Digital Outreach

Teams

opinion, attitude, and behavioral research and evaluation of/for public

diplomacy programs

book translation programs

utilization of sports and entertainment figures as cultural diplomats

training and partnerships with key civil society activists (journalists, local

media, civic organizations)

online English language (English as a second language) programs focused

on marginalized young Muslim populations

public-private partnerships targeted at economic development and job

creation in key strategic nations (Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq)

In addition, the study recommends that a senior State Department

public diplomacy representative be assigned to each combatant

command.

RECOMMENDATION: BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS

Conduct a review of the mission, structure, funding, and performance of

the Broadcasting Board of Governors, as an integral element of the overall

U.S. strategic communication capability.
68 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The following should be part of the review:

current media mix

relationship among the U.S. international broadcasting services (such as

Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Libert)', Radio Free Asia)

utilization of new communication media

new models for utilization and funding of news and program services

language priorities (currently 60 languages)

audience research (e.g., market research, media usage, impact)

management structures and relationships with the executive branch

The DSB is pleased with the passage of Section 316 of the 9/11 bill that

provides the President new authority to support requirements for surge

broadcasting. The administration and Congress are urged to implement

procedures and funding measures to utilize this much-needed authority when a

surge requirement is identified.

RECOMMENDATION: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Create a permanent Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic

Communication, reporting to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Significantly increase the strategic communication budgets of each

combatant commander.

This new office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic

Communication would include senior representatives from the Office of the

Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, the Joint Staff, and the Under Secretary

of Defense for Intelligence. The office would review and coordinate all

information activities aimed at foreign governments across public affairs and

information operation domains.

Strategic communication funding for each combatant commander should be

tripled above current levels and identified within a separate budget for each

geographic conabatant command. Additional funds should be used for the

following activities:

• task federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), such

as the Institute for Defense Analyses and RAND, to conduct cultural
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 69

analysis and program development in each combatant commander's area

of responsibility

• provide communications infrastructure in support of stability operations

and disaster relief operations

• increase public affairs presence at each combatant commander to

support security cooperation

• increase collaborative planning and experimentation with

nongovernment organizations

Increase engagement in support of strategic communication. For

example:

• increase hospital ship and crew activation to support security cooperation

programs

• utilize Corps of Engineers capabilities to support programs for disaster

relief, flood control, and infrastructure development (security

cooperation)

• release reconnaissance products for environmental studies, crop

management, weather forecasting, food and water supply management,

deforestation, and other similar activities

• create opportunities for civil sector participation (e.g., media,

nongovernment organizations, academics) at the National Defense

University, the military service colleges, and Centers for Regional

Security Studies

Finally, the study recommends that psychological operations be relabeled

according to whether they are in support of military operations or other

activities, such as security cooperation and DOD support to public diplomacy.

Rl-COM.MI-NDATION: ACTIONS FORTODAY

Many of the specific actions identified previously can be implemented

immediately and are identified here.

The DSB recommends that the Department of Defense and Department of

State implement immediate actions as follows:

• Establish and enhance combatant commander's budgets for strategic

communication to:
70 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- fund FFRDCs (such as the Institute for Defense Analyses, RAND) to

conduct cultural analysis and program developments in the area of

responsibility

- provide communications infrastructure in support ofstability

operations and disaster relief operations

• Increase Defense Department support for strategic communication by,

for example:

- increasing hospital ship and crew activation to support security

cooperation programs

- releasing reconnaissance products for environmental studies, crop

management, weather forecasting, food and water supply

management, deforestation

- creating opportunities for civil sector participation (e.g., media,

nongovernment organizations, academics) at the National Defense

University, the military service colleges, and Centers for Regional

Security Studies

• Expand the Department of State's strategic communication funding and

for such activities as:

- online English language programs focused on marginalized young

Muslim populations

- Internet, websites, blogging, Rapid Response Units, and Digital

Outreach Teams

- public-private partnerships targeted at economic development and job

creation in key strategic regions (e.g. Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq)

Final Thoughts

In the future, more nations and some non-state actors will be able to

challenge U.S. interests. Technology proliferation, which provides access to an

increasingly wide range of weapons, tools, and skills, on balance, favors U.S.

adversaries whose adaptable characteristics enable them to more quickly take

advantage of this evolving environment. Further, the U.S. homeland is not easily

secured and, therefore, is a potential area of attack, with considerable

consequences. Attacks on critical military infrastructure in the homeland will

impede deployment and supply. Attacks on civilians will split U.S. forces

between fighting abroad and responding to catastrophes at home. Taken
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 71

together, the cost to deter or defeat future adversaries is rising—-costs defined

along many dimensions to include military lives, civilian lives, money, civil

liberties, daily comfort, economic health, and global reputation.

Although costs are rising, the United States is not making material progress

in reducing the costs. Intelligence is inadequate to motivate and prioritize

investments. No adversary can exercise all options, but the nation has little

insight into what capabilities or options can be exercised or are likely to be.

Furthermore, lack of action on the part of adversaries has become an excuse not

to prepare—as it is true that, by and large, unconventional weapons and

operational concepts have not been used by adversaries (with cyber attacks being

the exception). In addition, DOD's combat capabilities abroad depend on other

federal, state, and local capabilities at home, so reducing costs will have to be

done in partnership with many others. But perhaps most important, is the fact

that the nation does not conduct realistic exercises of the sort that would

illuminate the degree to which military capabilities will be degraded. As long as

the nation chooses inaction, circumstances will continue to worsen.

Despite the challenges described herein, however, circumstances can be

materially improved. The U.S. can achieve its national objectives bv taking a

combination of actions that will have an impact on costs. The first set of needed

actions are to reduce the "cost" to the United States of the non-traditional

weapons and non-traditional operational concepts that future adversaries are

likely to use. As described in this summary, and in further detail in the main

report, key actions include:

• Institute a vastly better exercise regime with unfettered red teams.

Challenges to U.S. forces should include fighting through a limited

nuclear attack or other WMD attack; fighting with degraded information

infrastructure and disrupted space assets; responding to attacks on

civilians in the homeland with the aid of local, state, and federal

organizations; and maintaining deployment and supply even with attacks

on critical defense infrastructure in the homeland.

• Reduce the likelihood that the information system will be a target.

• Prepare for war in space.

• Manage the malignancy of nuclear proliferation.

• Improve foreign intelligence, addressing the most critical intelligence

gaps.
72 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Improve domestic intelligence to protect "the exposed rear." The New

York Police Department's successful domestic intelligence efforts can

serve as a model.

• Prepare to work with local, state, and federal domestic organi2ations in

event of an attack on the homeland.

• Take the dominant radiological threat "off the table"

The second set of actions involves shaping U.S. will and the will of

adversaries and neutral parties to pay the costs. This will involve strengthening

other instruments of foreign policy, in particular strategic communication.

If not prepared for the worst, and not backed by strong political will, the

Department of Defense could find itself on the losing side of the next stressing

war. Thus, DOD must begin to take immediate action, even as it fights the

current war, to make sure it is ready for the next—a war that could well be even

more stressing than the war the nation fights today. If America is ready, there is a

good chance that the next war will not have to be fought, as readiness will serve

to deter our adversaries from acting. If the nation is not ready, the probability of

fighting the next war is high and the outcome likely to be uncertain.
Terms of Reference
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACQUISITION. __,_

TECHNOLOGY P£g Q g 2007

AND LOGISTICS fc"

V

• COUf

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms ofReference - Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study on

Challenges to Military Operations in Support ofNational Interests

The United States capability in conventional warfare is unmatched by any other

state for now and the immediate future. The success in Operation DESERT STORM

followed by even greater success a decade later in the initial phases of Operations

ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrate an overwhelming ability

to continually grow conventional capability and outmatch opponents.

However, the same overmatch does not exist across the conflict spectrum and is

unlikely to exist in the conventional space forever. For example, the Soviet Union

threatened the existence ofthe United States along nuclear and ideological lines and

seriously threatened U.S. interests with conventional arms. Russia retained sufficient

nuclear capability to threaten U.S. existence, but that threat is no longer coupled with the

same ideological and conventional threat. The growing proliferation of nuclear weapons

may challenge U.S. conventional forces in some regions or thwart U.S. interests. Finally,

we have to expect WMD proliferation, e.g., biological, in general. Will WMD

proliferation transform unexpected adversaries into challengers sufficiently capable to

threaten the existence ofthe U.S. or at least thwart U.S. interests?

Asia's economic growth may enable several states to compete along conventional

lines ifthey so choose. An important part of Asia's growth is driven by globalization of

technology and manufacturing prowess that discounts historical DoD advantages in these

areas. The worst-case scenario results in. a technologically inferior U.S. vis a vis an

opponent. There are also indications that opponents may not choose to confront the U.S.

head to head with conventional forces: asymmetric warfare is the province ofstates as

well as ofterrorists and insurgents, e.g., the recent conflict in Lebanon demonstrated gaps

in conventional vs. asymmetric forces. Finally, the U.S. may choose capabilities and

resultant force structures that provide opponents unrecognized vulnerabilities for their

exploitation. Although these types of challenges may not threaten the existence ofthe

United States, they may prove sufficiently challenging to justify serious consideration and

planning to mitigate the effect on U.S. interests.
In addition, the U.S. Armed Forces will likely face: continuing and long lasting

stabilization and reconstruction operations; an increasing number of humanitarian

missions driven by epidemics and AIDS, climate change, famine and water shortages,

religious and tribal strife; and more instances of domestic catastrophe support, like

Katrina. These responsibilities will inevitably detract from capabilities for deterring and

defeating competitors who could challenge military operations.

Further, nowadays competition is intrinsically global. On one hand, we need the

capability for very swift deployment anywhere on Earth to counteract "blitzkreig" tactics,

capability for decisive deployment of massive force to counteract a peer, and capability

for sustained deployment for operations that might take years. On the other hand, attacks

on our homeland must be not only anticipated but expected; and the very same resources

needed for foreign expeditions, e.g., the Reserve, might be needed for protection at home.

As the world evolves in the 21st century, the Department of Defense must

anticipate future stressing wars. What would a challenger look like and how would it

successfully challenge military operations? Will states attempt to achieve peer status in a

conventional force-on-force conflict, or will some other strategy prove successful? If not,

what will they attempt to enable them to maintain their interests? Under what

circumstances might a coalition or transnational group successfully challenge military

operations? What are the metrics for success in this environment? Are there innovative

technologies, systems or operational concepts that can be applied to this subject before it

becomes a national crisis?

Specifically the Summer Study should:

(1) Review previous and ongoing studies regarding stressing wars;

(2) Identify defining parameters for challenges to military operations (e.g.,

physical size, population, technological prowess, and denial and deception);

(3) Assess capability gaps;

(4) Identify possible solutions. At a minimum, the Summer Study should

assess technological, operational, and policy oriented solutions.

The study will be co-sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition

and Technology and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Dr. Craig Fields and Mr.

Rich Haver will serve as Chairmen ofthe Task Force. Mr. Todd Lowrey, OUSD(P) will
serve as Executive Secretary; and Commander Cliff Phillips, USN, will serve as the DSB

Secretariat Representative.

The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the

"Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DoD Directive 5105.4, the "DoD Federal

Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force

will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning oftitle 18, U.S. Code,

section 208, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a

procurement official.
Study Participants

PARTICIPANTS I 77

CHAIRMEN

Name Affiliation

Dr. Craig Fields Private Consultant

Mr. Richard Haver Northrop Grumman Corporation

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Todd Lowery OSD(P)/SOLICIC

FUTURE OF WAR PANEL

Chairs

GEN BillHartzog Burdeshaw

Dr. Joe Markowitz Private Consultant

Members

Paul Davis RAND

Bert Fowler CA Fowler Associates

Dr. Ted Gold Private Consultant

MG Kenneth Israel USAF (Ret.) Lockheed Martin Aero

Bob Mikelskas MITRE

Bill Murray Alphom, LLC

MG Rich O'Lear Lockheed Martin

Dr. Joe Rosen Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center

MG Robert Scales Private Consultant

Dr. James Wade Defense Group

Mike Wheeler DTRA

Government Advisors

LTC Kirklin Bateman Army G-35, DAMO-SSP

COL JeffBearor USMC

Peter Bechtel HQDA DCS G-3/5/7

Thomas Behling OSD/OUSDI

Maj Trudy Caldwell Bechtel's Staff (HQDA DCS G-3/5/7)

Dr. James Forest West Point (USMA)
78 I PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Ellen Klein OSD/GSA--Detainee Affairs

COL Daniel Klippstein HQDA DCS G-3/5/7

MAJ John Livingstone HQDA, G-3/5/7

Col Louis Michael USA (Ret.) Defense Group Inc

Dr. Mac Owens Naval War College (1D)

Charles Swett OSD Policy

Robert Vickers ODNI

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT PANEL

Chairs

Larry Lynn Private Consultant

Bob Stein Private Consultant

Members

Dr. Larry Brandt Sandia National Laboratories

Dr. Regina Dugan RedXDefense

Dr. Kevin Fall Intel Corporation

Dr. Milton Finger Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Mr. Jim Gosler Sandia National Laboratories

Dr. Bernadette Johnson MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Dr. Duane Lindner Sandia National Laboratories

Mr. Walter Morrow MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Mr. Jim Shields Draper Laboratory

Dr. Wayne Shotts Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Dr. Ann Marie Skalka Fox Chase Cancer Center

Dr. James Tour Rice University

Dr. Rich Wagner Los Alamos National Laboratory

Dr. Bruce Wald Private Consultant

Mr. Larry Wright BAH

Dr. Gerry Yonas Sandia National Laboratories

Government Advisors

Dr. Jon Calomiris United States Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency

Mr. Christina Filarowski-Sheaks Office of the Secretary of Defense
PARTICIPANTS 79

Dr. Stephen Morse National Center for Preparedness, Detection, and

Control of Infectious Diseases Coordinating Center,

Centers for Disease Control

Ms. Cecilia Phan The Joint Staff, Directorate for Command, Control,

Communications, and Computer Systems

Dr. Lisa Rotz National Center for Preparedness, Detection, and

Control of Infectious Diseases Coordinating Center,

Centers for Disease Control

David Thomen Army G-3/5/7

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PANEL

Chair

Dr. Brad Roberts Institute for Defense Analyses

Members

Dr. Dan Chiu Institute for Defense Analyses

Joint Advanced Warfighting Program

Dr. Lewis Dunn SAIC

John Hinton Sandia National Laboratory

Douglas Lawson OATSD(NCB/NM)

Dr. James Miller Center For a New American Security

Jim Thomas Applied Minds, Inc.

Dr. Victor Utgoff Institute for Defense Analyses

Major Stephanie Vaughn US Army Nuclear and Combating WMD Agency

Government Advisors

Larry Brant Sandia National Laboratories

Melanie Elder ODNI/National Couterproliferation Center

Ms. Rebecca Hersman National Defense University

Col Chuck Lutes USAF National Defense University

Mike Wheeler DTRA
80 I PARTICIPANTS

DEFENDING AGAINST DOMESTIC CATASTROPHE IN WAR TIME PANEL

Chairs

Dr. Bill Howard Private Consultant

Mr. Robert Nesbit MITRE

Members

Mr. Jerry Buckwalter Northrop Grumman

Mr. Evan Wolff Hunton & Williams LLP

Government Advisors

COL Joseph Bassani U.S. Northern Command

Mr. Jim Caverly Director, Partnership & Outreach Division

Mr. John Humpton HQDA ODCS G-3/5/7

ENSURING DEPLOYMENT AND SUPPLY PANEL

Chairs

Dr. Miriam John Private Consultant

Dr. Ronald Kerber Private Consultant

Members

Dr. John Cummings Sandia National Laboratories

Maj Gen John Fenimore V, USAF (Ret) J.H. Fenimore & Assoc, LLC

LtGen Rick Kelly USMC (Ret.) LMI

Dr. Duane Lindner Sandia National Laboratories

VADM Keith Lippert, USN (Ret.) Accenture National Security Service, LLC

Ms. Nancy Suski Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

LTG David Teal USAF (Ret.) Accenture National Security Services

Ms. Nancy Wilson Association of American RR

Government Advisors

COL Joe Bassani, USA NORTHCOM

Mr. Bill Bryan OSD(P)/ASD/HD

Mr. James Caverly DHS

Mr. G. Gurvais Grigg FBI

Mr. Lacey Hughes HQDA DCS G-4

Mr. John Humpton Department of the Army, G3
PARTICIPANTS I 81

WHAT WE KNOW AND DON'T KNOW: INTELLIGENCE PANEL

Chair

ADM Bill Studeman Private Consultant

Members

Joan Dempsey Booz Allen Hamilton

Marty Faga MITRE

Carol Haave

Jeffrey Harris LMCO

Jake Jacoby VADM, USN, (Ret.) CACI, Inc.

Peter Marino Private Consultant

Joseph Mazzafro EMC2

Dave McMunn McMunn Associates, Inc.

Barbara McNamara CACI International

Rocky Roccanova Rock & Nova

Earl Sheck NGC

Dick Szafranski Toffler Associates

Jim Woolsey BAH

Mike Wheeler DTRA

Government Advisors

RC Porter OSD

Michelle Van Cleave National Defense University

FIGHTING THROUGH ASYMMETRIC COUNTERFORCE PANEL

Chair

GEN Jim McCarthy, USAF (Ret.) U.S. Air Force Academy

Members

Russ Barber Raytheon

LT GEN David Deptula AF/A2

VADM Dave Frost USN (Ret.) Frost & Associates, Inc.

Greg Gardner Oracle Corporation

Dr. Ted Gold Private Consultant

GEN Richard Hearney USMC (Ret.) Private Consultant

Dr. Bob Hermann Private Consultant
82 I PARTICIPANTS

Richard Ivanetich Institute for Defense Analyses

ADM Greg Johnson USN (Ret.)

Jim Kurtz Institute for Defense Analyses

Jim Kuzmick Private Consultant

Zachary Lemnios MIT Lincoln Lab

Maj. Gen Tim Lowenberg Washington Army and Air National Guard

Dr. Jerry McGinn Northrop Grumman Corporation

Dawn Meyerriecks Private Consultant

RADM Norm Saunders USCG (Ret.) SAIC

GEN Eric Shinseki USA

Government Advisors

Col Ronald Banks USAF A9L

LTC Alan Eckersley Army G-3/5/7

BG David Fadok HAF

Darrin Gilchrist

COL Clay Hicks HQDA, G-33, Army Asymmetric Warfare Office,

DAMO-ODA-P

BGen Jan-Marc Jouas AF ISR Agency/CV

COL Doug King USMC

CAPT Forbes MacVane USN JFCC-NWJ9

Ed Martin Contractor, The Wexford Group International

G3/5/7

Tim Moore US Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency

John Plant Contractor, The Wexford Group G3/5/7

LTC DirkPlante ARMY

Douglas Richardson USSOCOM

Jeffrey Sawyer DTRA

LTC Richard Voegtly G3/5/7
PARTICIPANTS I 83

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PANEL

Chair

Mr. Vincent Vitto Private Consultant

Members

Mr. Robert Coonrod Private Consultant

Dr. Barry Fulton Private Consultant

Prof. Bruce Gregory George Washington University

Prof. Anita Jones* University of Virginia

Dr. Robert Lucky* Private Consultant

Dr. Mark Maybury The MITRE Corporation

Ms. Leigh Warner Private Consultant

Government Advisors

Amb. Brian Carlson State Department and OSD Policy

BG Mari Eder Deputy Chief of Public Affairs, US Army

Mr. Morris Jacobs U.S. State Department

Mr. John Matheny OSD Policy

Mr. John Mills OASDNII/CIO

RDML Frank Thorp Joint Communications and SCIG, OSD

ADDITIONAL GOVERNMENT ADVISORS

Maj Russell Buttram USMC

COL Igor Gardner USAF ISR Plans and Resources DCS, Intelligence

COL Brian Graft DDUSA Nuclear and Combating WMD Agency

Dave Helvey OSD Policy

Frank Hoffman Marine Corps Warfighting Lab

COL Jonathan Jaffin U.S. Army Medical Research and Material

Command

CAPT Andrew King Chief of Naval Operations (N81)

Dr. George Ludwig U.S. Army Medical Research and Material

Command

Terry Pudas OUSDP

LTC Bryan Sparling US Southern Command

Shawn Spencer STRATCOM G-8
84 I PARTICIPANTS

COL Jeffrey Springman JCSJ5

Captain Gene Wynne USMC

DSB REPRESENTATIVES

Brian Hughes DSB Office Executive Director

Andrew Chappell DSB Office, USA

Maj Charles Lominac DSB Office, USAF

Clifton Phillips DSB Office, USN

STAFF

Barbara Bicksler Strategic Analysis, Inc.

Sarah Canna Strategic Analysis, Inc.

Julie Evans Strategic Analysis, Inc.

Kelly Frere Strategic Analysis, Inc.

Jennifer Howell Strategic Analysis, Inc.

Anthony Johnson Strategic Analysis, Inc.

Brian Keller Private Consultant

Carla King Strategic Analysis, Inc.

Philippe Loustaunau Vista Consulting LLC

Toni Marechaux Strategic Analysis, Inc.

Adam Savery Strategic Analysis, Inc.

Ted Stump Strategic Analysis, Inc.
PRESENTATIONS I 85

Presentations to the Study

Name Topic

...

Plenary Sessions

JANUARY 24, 2007

Ms. Judy Kim

Mr. John J. Hamre

Center for Strategic and International

Studies

Dr. Stephen A. Cambone

Former Under Secretary of Defense for

Intelligence

Mr. Ryan Henry

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy

FEBRUARY 21, 2007

Aaron Friedberg

Princeton University

Dan Blumenthal, AEI

Roy Kamphausen

National Bureau of Asian Research

DOD General Counsel Briefing

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

China

Mr. Richard Lawless

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asia

and Pacific Affairs

COL Joseph A. Bassani, USA

U.S. Northern Command

Discussion

Preparing for Domestic Catastrophes: Plans and

Exercises

General James E. Cartwright

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

Discussion
86 I PRESENTATIONS

MARCH 21, 2007

Mike Vickers Strategic Competition and Conflict with Near-Peer

Director, Strategic Studies, CSBA Competitors

Dr. Richard Danzig Biowarfare

MG John Landry Discussion

RADM Kenneth Deutsch

Director, Warfare Integration (N6F) Discussion

APRIL 25, 2007

Mr. William Neugent _ „ ,„ . T,

M|TRF

3 Countering Sophisticated Cyber Threats

Mr. Peter Bechtel

Director for the US Army Nuclear and Discussion

Combating WMD Agency

COL Jonathan Jaffin

Acting Commander, U.S. Army Medical Future Army Medical Challenges

Research and Materiel Command

i

JUNE 20, 2007

Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,

Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Discussion

Future of War Panel

MARCH 20, 2007

Jim Thomas, Applied Minds, Inc.

Patrick Garrett, Bill Miles, &

Joel Sepulveda, CIA

Charles Swett, OSD

Joseph Rosen, Dartmouth-Hitchcock

Medical Center and War Panel Member

Discussion on QDR (Secret)

Chinese ASAT Launch (TS/SCI)

QDR Scenarios

Theory and Practice of War: Adversaries,

Weapons, and Recommendations
PRESENTATIONS I 87

APRIL 24, 2007

Maj Gen Rich O'Lear, Lockheed Martin &

War Panel Member Red Team Perspectives and Tasks (FOUO)

Jason M.K. Lyall

Assistant Professor of Politics & International

Affairs, Princeton University

LTC Isaiah Wilson, West Point

"Rage Against the Machines: Mechanization and

the Determinants of Victory in Counterinsurgency

Warfare"

Andy Marshall, Director, Office of Net

Assessment, OSD Past War Gaming (Secret)

Mackubin Thomas Owens

Associate Dean of Academics and Professor

of National Security Affairs, US Naval War

College

The Logic of Future Force Planning

MAY 22, 2007

Dan Flynn,

Office of the Director of National Intelligence NIC Assessment (Secret/NOFORN)

JULY 17, 2007

Robert O. Work

Vice President, Strategic Studies, CBSA Thinking About Future Warfare

Roy Evans

Director of National Security Analysis Group,

MITRE Corporation

Future of War (Secret)

Technology Assessment Panel

FEBRUARY 20, 2007

Norman Kahn, Program Manager Biological Defense Research in the Intelligence

Intelligence Technology Innovation Center Community

APRIL 6, 2007

Roundtable Discussion

Kirtland, Air Force Base Directed Energy Weapons

APRIL 24, 2007

Len Connell

Sandia National Laboratories Radiological Weapons Update
88 PRESENTATIONS

Dr. Jason Lyall, Princeton University

LTC Isaiah Wilson, West Point Analysis of Asymmetrical Conflicts

Lawrence Gershwin, National Intelligence

Council

Cyber threat technologies and Biotechnology

Issues

MAY 24, 2007

Michael R. Rooney, Defense Threat

Reduction Agency

Understanding High-Altitude Electromagnetic

Pulse (HEMP) Effects and Uncertainties

JUNE 21, 2007

Brett Giroir, Director, Defense Sciences

Office, Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency

Progress on Relevant Research at DARPA

JULY 17, 2007

John Vitko Jr, Chemical and Biological

Division, Department of Homeland Security

An Overview of DHS/S&T Chem and Bio

Programs

John MacKinney, National Homeland

Security Research Center, US

Environmental Protection Agency

RDD Threat and Technology Needs

Nuclear Proliferation Panel

MARCH 22, 2007

Dr. Melanie Elder (chair)

National Counterproliferation Center

Mr. Vann H. Van Diepen,

National Intelligence Officer for WMD and

Proliferation

Ms. Marybeth Davis,

Deputy Director for Strategy and Evaluation,

National Counterproliferation Center

Mr. Joseph Pritchard,

Deputy Director for Interdiction and

Networks, National Counterproliferation

Center

Proliferation Pathway Analysis

Ms. Rebecca Hersman,

National Defense University

Future Nuclear Landscape: 2006-2011

Hon. Mr. Ryan Henry,

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy

Life in a Highly Proliferated World
APRIL 17-18, 2007

PRESENTATIONS I 89

Dr. Vic Ugtoff,

Institute for Defense Analysis Extended Deterrence

MAY 22, 2007

Chuck Lutes,

National Defense University Pathways and Alternative Futures

Jim Thomas,

Applied Minds, Inc.

From Scenarios to Requirements

Daniel Chiu,

Institute for Defense Analysis

Implications for the Nuclear Deterrent

JUNE 19-20, 2007

Mr. Greg Hulcher

Office of the Secretary of Defense

(Acquisition, Technology &Logistics)

"New Triad Implementation" (SECRET)

Mr. Tom Scheber

National Institute of Public Policy

JULY 10, 2007

Mr. Greg Hulcher

Office of the Secretary of Defense

(Acquisition, Technology &Logistics)

Mr. Dennis Even

Office of the Secretary of Defense -

Program Analysis & Evaluation

The New Triad Program of Record (SECRET)

COL Pat Sharon

Joint Staff (J-8)

Combating WMD Program of Record (SECRET)

Dr. John Hinton

Sandia National Laboratories

Dr. Jim Miller

Center for a New American Security

Defining the Needed Nuclear Posture

JULY 17, 2007

Ms. Rebecca Hersman,

National Defense University

Means to Inhibit Future Cascades
90 I PRESENTATIONS

Ensuring Deployment and Supply

Defending Against Domestic Catastrophe in War Time

Joint Panel Meetings

FEBRUARY 9, 2007

Mr. Don Latham 2003 DSB SS on DoD Roles & Missions in

Homeland Security

Mr. Bob Stephan, DHS, Assistant Secretary

for Infrastructure Protection DHS Critical Infrastructure Approach

Dr. Miriam John/Dr. Ronald Kerber Report of the DSB Task Force on Critical

Homeland Infrastructure Protection

MARCH 20, 2007

Mr. William Bryan, DCIP OASD (HD&ASA) Update on DOD Defense Critical Infrastructure

Program

Mr. Bob Nesbit, MITRE DSB 2005 Summer Study on WMD

Maj Gen Tim Lowenberg, TAG for the State

of Washington National Guard Discussion

Ms. Nancy Wilson, American Association of

Railroads Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security

GEN ( R ) Reimer, DFI International Katrina Lessons Learned

APRIL 24, 2007

Mr. Merrick Krause, DHS

National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis

Center and Critical Infrastructure ProtectionDecision Support System

Maj Gen Fenimore, Private Consultant and

Dr. Nancy Suski, Sandia National

Laboratory

Citizen Preparedness

COL Joseph Bassani, USA,

USNORTHCOM NORTHCOM

Mr. Jim Kish, DHS National Exercise Program

AD Dr. Vahid Majidi. FBI FBI WMD Program

MAY 24, 2007

Gen (R) Mike Cams, USAF, Private

Consultant DSB Energy Strategy Task Force

MG (R) Barry Bates, NDIA Panel of Corporate Security Execs from

Defense Industrial Base

Ms. Alane Andreozzi, DTRA A Kele Exercise

Mr. Carl Brown, DTRA BioNet

Colonel Joseph Bassani, USNORTHCOM NORTHCOM
PRESENTATIONS 91

JUNE 11, 2007

LTG C. V.Christianson, J-4

COL Ed Hatch, JFCOM

Mr. Alan Banghart, DLA

OCONUS Deployment & Sustainment Panel

Mr. Ronald Krisak, IDA Noble Resolve

Healthcare: Mr. Chris Lake, BLU-MED

Response

Energy: Mr. Stan Johnson, Manager Situation

Awareness & Infrastructure Security, North

American Electric Reliability Corporation

IT: Mr. Guy Copeland, CSC; Mr. Michael

Aisenberg (EWA-IIT); Mr. Paul Nicholas

(Microsoft); Liesyl Franz (ITAA).

Emergency Services: Ms. Ann Davison, Int'l

Assoc of Fire Chiefs & Mr. Tom Rhatigan,

National Sheriffs Assoc. Homeland Security

Program Manager

Sector Coordinating Council Representatives:

PCIS Panel: Energy, IT, Commo, Healthcare,

Emergency Services

JUNE 12, 2007

r% -i-, i mi ,,, . .« • „,,„ Pandemics: Community Mitigation and Dr. Til Jolly, Office of Health Affairs, DHS . .. ,. . -.. '

M

' Implications to Planners

Mr. Bill Bryan, Director, DCIP OASD

(HD&ASA) Update on DoD 41 Critical Infrastructure

Mr. Philip Sakowitz, Executive Director, US

Army Installation Management Command

(Accompanied by Mr. Clay Davis, Mr. Don

Stout, Mr. Gordon Rogers)

Installation Preparedness

Oil & Natural Gas: Mr. Gary Forman,

NiSource Inc.

Highways & Motor Carriers: Martin Rojas,

American Trucking Assoc.

Railroads: Nancy Wilson, Assoc of American

Railroads

Transit: Mr. Tom Yedinak, American Public

Transportation Association

PCIS Panel: Transportation Sectors

JUNE 19, 2007

LTG (R) Peter Kind, USA Y2K Information Coordination Center

Mr. Brandon Wales, DHS Tier 1 and 2 CI/KR Update

BG Peter Aylward, J34 Antiterrorism and

Homeland Defense WMD Insights

Mr. Jim Schwartz, Arlington County Fire Chief

Mr. Marko Bourne, FEMA

Dr. Helen Miller, OR-1 Disaster Medical

Assistance Team (National Disaster Medical

System)

Mr. Matt Bettenhausen.Califomia Office of HLS

Panel of State and Local Authorities
92 I PRESENTATIONS

JULY 17, 2007

Mr. Allan Banghart, DLA

Colonel Dennis D'Angelo, TRANSCOM

Mr. Alan Estevez, OSD(LM&R)

Logistics Panel: Ensuring Deployment and

Supply

LtCol Stephen Hall, USAF, Joint Task Force

Civil Support (JTF-CS) JTF-Civil Support

Know/Don't Know: Intelligence Panel

FEBRUARY 27, 2007

Tom Behling, DUSD (1) How "Persistent Surveillance" Will Work in the

Future

MARCH 7, 2007

Larry Gershwin, NIOforS&T Unfolding S&T Based Challenges Confronting the

military through 2025

Mary Margret Graham, Deputy Director of

National Intelligence for Collection

DNI Collection Priorities for the Near Future

Vann H. Van Diepen

National Intelligence Office for Weapons of

Mass Destruction and Proliferation

ODNI/National Intelligence Council

WMD capabilities of all the known and aspiring

nuclear (also chem/bio) States

APRIL 19, 2007

LTG William Boykin, DUSD Intelligence and

Warfighting Support

Mr. John W. Perkins, Chief, Special

Activities Division at CIA.

MG Thomas Csmko, USA Special Forces

Command

LTG Michael Maples, Dir. DIA

Panel Discussion: "How SOF, HUMINT, and CA

Interact to Generate and Use Good Intel"

MAY 11, 2007

Ken Knight, NIO for Warning National Intelligence Warning System

Mr. Patrick Gorman, ADDNI for Strategy,

Plans, and Policy Results of the QICR (the IC Quadrennial Review)

Don Burke, CIA/DS&T

Sean Dennehy, CIA/DI Intelipedia
PRESENTATIONS I 93

JUNE 12, 2007

Phil Midland Insight on China from a Different Perspective

Hank Messick, Bill Miles, &

Joe Sepulveda, CIA

Chinese ASAT Launch

Dave Cattler / Josh Kerbel Navy Deep Red Intel

Dan DeMots/ CDR George Capen Asia Net Assessment

Fighting Through Asymmetric Counterforce Panel

FEBRUARY 14, 2007

GEN Paul Gorman, USA (Ret.)

MARCH 20, 2007

APRIL 26, 2007

MAY 24, 2007

JUNE 21, 2007

Military Intelligence Review

COL Clay Hicks, USA Army Asymmetric Warfare

CAPT Sam Neill, USCG Coast Guard Evergreen Project

LTC Alan Eckersley, USA Army Irregular Warfare

BG Robin P. Swann, USA Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC)

Mr. John Plant Army Asymmetric Warfare

CAPT Mark Mullins, USN Navy Irregular Warfare / Asymmetric Perspective

Lt Col Tom Dobbs, USAF Irregular Warfare: Implications for the U.S. Air

Force

Mr. Frank Hoffman Future Warfare: Competing for Influence

Col King, USMC (Ret.) USMC Perspective: Irregular Warfare CrossFunctional Team

Maj Gen William Shelton, USAF AFSPACE, JFCC SPACE, USSTATCOM Brief

Dr. James A. Tegnalia DTRA Perspective on 21st Century Warfare

Director James Rabon, JIEDDO Network Centric ISR Fusion Capabilities in

Support of Offensive Counterterrorist Operations

RADM Elizabeth Hight, USN JTF-GNO Brief
94 I PRESENTATIONS

CAPT Forbes 0. MacVane, USN Joint Functional Component Command - Network

Warfare: Fighting Cyber Adversaries

Dr. Lani Kass USAF Systems and Connectivity Perspective

JULY 21, 2007

Mr. Anthony Bargar GIG Mission Assurance

Mr. David Aland Assessment of IA Aspects of COCOM Exercises

Col Steve Luxion, USAF Q&A USAF Cyber Command

Mr. James Richberg National Cyber Study Group

Strategic Communication Panel

MARCH 1, 2007

Mr. Alberto Fernandez, Director, Middle-East,

U.S. Department of State

Mr. Thomas Skipper, Director, East Asia and

Pacific, U.S. Department of State

Views from the Regional Bureaus

Ms. Gretchen Welch, PPR Director, U.S.

Department of State Policy Plans and Resources (PPR)

Mr. Jeremy Curtin, IIP Coordinator, U.S.

Department of State International Information Programs (IIP)

Mr. Thomas Farrell, Deputy Assistant Secretary

for Academic Programs, U.S. Department of

State

Ms. Chris Miner, Managing Director for

Professional and Cultural Exchanges Programs,

U.S. Department of State

Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)

MARCH 23, 2007

Mr. Robert Giesler, USD (Intelligence)

Col Glen Ayers, J-39

10 and PSYOPS

RDML Frank Thorp, Director, OASD (Public

Affairs)

Ms. Alisa Stack-O'Conner, USD (Policy)

Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy

Hon. Ryan Henry, PUSD (Policy)

Hon Dorrance Smith, ASD (PA)

LTG Walter (Skip) Sharp, DJS JCS

Roundtable Discussion

Mr. Michael Pease, IDA

Dr. Caroline Ziemke, IDA

Discussion
PRESENTATIONS I 95

APRIL 13, 2007

Dr. Jon B. Alterman, Director of the Middle East

Program at the Center for Strategic and

International Studies (CSIS)

The Lexus Hits an Olive Tree

Mr. David Brugger, CEO of Brugger Consulting

& Brugger Global Media, former President,

Association of America's Public Television

Stations (APTS)

William Siemering, President, Developing Radio

Partners

Community-Based Media

Mr. Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, chairman of U.S.

Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) BBG Perspective

Mr. Gary Knell, President and CEO, Sesame

Workshop Sesame Perspective

Mr. Joe Norris, Senior Analyst/Transnational

Issues

Terrorism/Near East Program, DNI Open Source

Center

Dr. William C. Hannas, Senior Officer for East

Asia S&T, DNI Open Source Center

The Current State of the Arab Media

&

The China RDA Metadata Mapping Project

Dr. Adam Powell, Director, Integrated Media

Systems Center, USC Viterbi School of

Engineering

International Broadcasting: Future Trends

and Techniques

MAY 4, 2007

Ms. Mary Lou Jepsen, MIT Media Lab One Laptop per Child

Mr. Robert Gehorsam, CEO, Forterra Systems

Inc. On Line Gaming

Mr. Ben Gross, Social Technologies Group, UC

Berkeley, and Ul Urbana-Champaign Social Technologies

Ms. Susan Gigli, Chief Operating Officer.

InterMedia

•^ u , uw • n m u.i InterMedia Dr. Haleh Vaziri, Regional Research Manager

for Middle East/North Africa, InterMedia

,. .... _, ._, Enemy Use of Immersive Computer Game

Mr. Mike Pease, IDA T^K/^I Technology

MAY 18, 2005

Mr. Kevin Klose, President, NPR NPR Perspective

Ms. Jody Olsen, Deputy Director, Peace Corps Peace Corps Perspective

Mr. James Dobbins, Director, International

Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Discussion

Professor Jarol B. Manheim, School of Media

and Public Affairs, GWU Social Network Analysis

Mr. Bruce Sherman, BBG

Mr. Brian Conniff, BBG

BBG 2008-2013 strategy

Radio Sawa & AlHurra TV
96 I PRESENTATIONS

Interviews with Senior Officials

Mr. Peter Bechtel Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, U.S. Army

Lt. Gen. James L. Campbell Director of the Army Staff

General James E. Cartwright Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

General James T. Conway Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps

Lt Gen David A. Deptula Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance, Headquarters U.S. Air Force

Honorable Eric Edelman Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

BGMariK. Eder Deputy Chief of Public Affairs, U.S. Army

VADM Mark J. Edwards Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communication

Networks

Honorable Gordon England Deputy Secretary of Defense

Admiral Edmund Giambastiani Jr. Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Honorable John G. Grimes Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and

Information Integration/DOD Chief Information Officer

Honorable Francis Harvey Secretary of the Army

Honorable Ryan Henry Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Dr. Tom Hopkins Acting Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and

Chemical and Biological Defense Programs

ADM Timothy J. Keating Commander, U.S. Northern Command

Honorable Ken Krieg Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,

and Logistics

VADM Eric T. Olson Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

Lt.Gen. John F. Sattler Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff

MG Eric Schoomaker U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command

General Peter Schoomaker Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

ADM James Stavridis Commander, U.S. Southern Command

Dr. James A. Tegnelia Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Mr. Peter Verga Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

Honorable Donald Winter Secretary of the Navy

Honorable Michael Wynne Secretary of the Air Force

Honorable John Young Director, Defense Research and Engineering
GLOSSARY 97

Glossary

ASD(HD&ASA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and

Americas' Security Affairs

ASD(NII) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information

Integration

CGE Center for Global Engagement

CIO Chief Information Officer

C4ISR command, control, communications, and computing and

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

COCOMs combatant commanders

CONPLAN concept of operations plan

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DCIP Defense Critical Infrastructure Program

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DSB Defense Science Board

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

FFRDC federally funded research and development center

GEO geosynchronous earth orbit

GIG Global Information Grid

GPS Global Positioning System

HAE UAS high altitude endurance unmanned aerial system

IED improvised explosive device

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JPEO Joint Program Executive Office

LEO low earth orbit

LTA UAS lighter than air unmanned aerial system

MEO mid-earth orbit

NCR National Capitol Region

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive

NT-ISR non-traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

NYPD New York Police Department

ORS operationally responsive space

RDD radiological dispersal device

SERS surface-enhanced Raman scattering

TRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command

UAS unmanned aerial systems

USD (AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics

USD (1) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

USD (P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

WMD weapons of mass destruction

Y2K Year 2000
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS, WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3140