IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

September 3, 2020 Session

METRO CODES DEPARTMENT v. FAROKH FANI

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County

No. 19C2105 Amanda J. McClendon, Judge

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No. M2020-00038-COA-R3-CV

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In a direct appeal from the Environmental Court for Davidson County, Tennessee (“general 

sessions court”),1the Davidson County Circuit Court (“trial court”) granted the plaintiff

agency’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction upon the trial court’s 

determination that the defendant, Farokh Fani, had untimely filed his motion for Tennessee 

Rule of Civil Procedure 60 relief in the general sessions court, rendering his appeal to the

trial court untimely. Mr. Fani has appealed. We conclude that the trial court erred by

determining that Mr. Fani’s Rule 60 motion and his appeal were untimely. Having further 

determined that a factual dispute exists concerning whether the plaintiff agency properly 

served process on Mr. Fani, we vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion, including the development of a record concerning service of process.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Vacated; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL 

SWINEY, C.J., and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., joined.

Steven G. Fuller, Madison, Tennessee, for the appellant, Farokh Fani.

Joshua Thomas and Christopher M. Lackey, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, 

Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County Codes Department.

 

1 We note that the Environmental Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, is a division of the Metropolitan 

General Sessions Court of Nashville and Davidson County. See Metro. Gov’t of Nashville v. Printer’s Alley 

Theater, LLC, Nos. M2007-00329-COA-R3-CV, M2007-00391-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 199849, at *1 n.1 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2008) (noting that the Environmental Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, is a 

division of the general sessions court).

12/10/2020
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OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County Codes 

Department (“Metro”) filed a civil warrant against Mr. Fani on April 3, 2018, in the general 

sessions court, for violations of various public nuisance laws of the Metropolitan 

Government of Nashville and Davidson County, including a section relating to failure to 

remove “open storage: junk, trash, and debris.”2 Metro sought an order from the general 

sessions court that required Mr. Fani to remedy the violations. On April 6, 2018, Davidson 

County Deputy Sheriff Greg Smiley purportedly served the civil warrant at Mr. Fani’s 

listed address. The warrant summoned Mr. Fani to appear before the general sessions court 

on May 2, 2018. The associated return identified Deputy Smiley as the process server but 

did not list his address, a fact that is undisputed by the parties.

Mr. Fani did not appear at the May 2, 2018 hearing. Consequently, the general 

sessions court entered a default judgment against him on May 9, 2018, requiring Mr. Fani 

to remedy the violation; pay a fine of $50.00 per day for each day the violation continued; 

and attend and complete “Codes Offender School,” at a cost of $90.00. In the order, the 

court also reset the matter for a second hearing on June 27, 2018. The certificate of service 

attending the general sessions court’s order indicated that a copy of the May 9, 2018 order 

was mailed to Mr. Fani.

Mr. Fani also did not appear for the June 27, 2018 hearing, resulting in the general 

sessions court’s entry of an “Order to Show Cause” on July 11, 2018, summoning Mr. 

Fani to appear before the court on August 15, 2018. Deputy Smiley allegedly served a 

copy of the order on Mr. Fani on July 16, 2018. The order again reflected Deputy Smiley’s 

name but did not include his address, also undisputed by the parties. The general sessions 

court continued the hearing until August 22, 2018. Mr. Fani likewise did not appear at 

the August 22, 2018 hearing, resulting in the general sessions court’s entry of a judgment 

against him in the amount of $5,600.00.

Nearly one year later, on August 11, 2019, Mr. Fani filed a “TRCP 60.01 Motion to 

Correct Record” in the general sessions court. In his motion, Mr. Fani requested that the 

court amend the record to reflect that proper initial service was not perfected for two 

reasons. First, Mr. Fani averred that he was not served with a copy of the civil warrant by 

Deputy Smiley and accordingly was not notified of the scheduled hearing on May 2, 2018. 

Furthermore, Mr. Fani asserted that Deputy Smiley did not identify himself with both his 

“name and address” on the civil warrant return as required by Tennessee Code Annotated 

 

2 A copy of the municipal code does not appear in the appellate record. 
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§ 16-15-901(b) (2009).

3

 Mr. Fani further claimed that the first notice he gained of this case

was on or around April 9, 2019, when he received a letter by mail from a law firm

attempting to collect the debt, stating that he owed $7,114.49 based on the default judgment 

previously entered against him. On August 21, 2019, the general sessions court denied Mr. 

Fani’s motion via a handwritten “order” on the face of the motion itself.

On August 30, 2019, Mr. Fani appealed the general sessions court’s denial of his 

motion to correct the record to the trial court. In turn, Metro filed a motion to dismiss on 

October 25, 2019, asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because 

Mr. Fani had not timely appealed the general sessions court’s August 22, 2018 judgment. 

Specifically, Metro argued that with respect to appeals from general sessions courts, 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-5-108 (Supp. 2020) requires an appealing party to file a 

notice of appeal and pay a cost bond within ten days of the general sessions court’s final 

judgment. According to Metro, because Mr. Fani did not appeal the judgment until August 

21, 2019—nearly a year following the judgment—his appeal was untimely. Mr. Fani filed 

a response opposing dismissal on November 11, 2019, positing, inter alia, that although 

Metro’s citation of the ten-day appeal period was correct, it was misapplied because the

appeal period should commence on the date when the general sessions court denied Mr. 

Fani’s motion to correct the record.

On December 5, 2019, the trial court entered an order granting Metro’s motion to 

dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In the order, the trial court found 

in relevant part:

After considering the briefs filed by the parties, the arguments of 

counsel, the record as a whole, and applicable legal authority, this Court finds 

that the motion is well taken and shall be granted. The record shows that the 

General Sessions Court entered final judgment in Case No. 18GC6697 on 

August 22, 2018. The Defendant did not file an appeal of that judgment and 

did not take any other action in the case until he filed with the General 

Sessions Court his Motion to Correct the Record on August 11, 2019. The 

General Sessions Court denied the motion, and the Defendant has filed an 

appeal to this Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108.

 

3 We note that in his motion, Mr. Fani referenced the version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-15-901(b) 

that was in effect at the time the civil warrant was filed. Section 16-15-901(b) was amended in 2020 and 

now includes the following language:

If service of process is made by a sheriff, constable, or other law enforcement officer, the 

process server must be identified by name and agency on the service return or in a 

supplemental affidavit. . . . Failure of the process server to include this information does 

not render the service invalid if the service is otherwise valid, but the court may require a 

private process server to provide the private process server’s mailing or physical address 

to the party on whom process was served.
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This Court finds that the Defendant’s Motion to Correct the Record 

was not timely filed in the General Sessions Court; therefore, this Court lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The Defendant’s filing of 

his untimely motion in the General Sessions Court is not sufficient to re-start 

the ten-day jurisdictional time period to file an appeal to this Court pursuant 

to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108.

Mr. Fani timely appealed to this Court.

II. Issues Presented

Mr. Fani has presented two issues on appeal, which we have restated slightly as 

follows:

1. Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Mr. Fani’s appeal for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction and relying on the date of the original 

judgment rather than the date upon which his Rule 60 motion was 

denied.

2. Whether the trial court erred by failing to determine that the general 

sessions court lacked personal jurisdiction to grant a default judgment 

against Mr. Fani.

Metro has presented two additional issues on appeal, which we have likewise restated 

slightly as follows:

3. Assuming that the trial court maintained subject matter jurisdiction 

concerning Mr. Fani’s direct appeal, whether Metro was entitled to a 

hearing on the merits to determine if the general sessions court 

acquired personal jurisdiction over Mr. Fani.

4. Whether the 2020 amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-15-

901, which permits a process server to correct a defect in the return of 

service of a civil warrant, has retrospective application to the initial 

filing of this action on April 3, 2018.

III. Standard of Review

We review a non-jury case de novo upon the record with a presumption of 

correctness as to the findings of fact unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. 

See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000). “In order 

for the evidence to preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact, the evidence must 
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support another finding of fact with greater convincing effect.” Wood v. Starko, 197 

S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). We review questions of law, including those of 

statutory construction, de novo with no presumption of correctness. Bowden, 27 S.W.3d 

at 916 (citing Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tenn. 1998)); see also In re 

Estate of Haskins, 224 S.W.3d 675, 678 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motions are reviewed under an abuse of 

discretion standard of review. See Spruce v. Spruce, 2 S.W.3d 192, 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1998) (citing Underwood v. Zurich Ins. Co., 854 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tenn. 1993)). “[A] trial 

court will be found to have ‘abused its discretion’ only when it applies an incorrect legal 

standard, reaches a decision that is illogical, bases its decision on a clearly erroneous 

assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning that causes an injustice to the 

complaining party.” In re Estate of Greenamyre, 219 S.W.3d 877, 886 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2005).

IV. Mr. Fani’s Rule 60 Motion

As a threshold matter, we first address the nature of Mr. Fani’s Tennessee Rule of 

Civil Procedure 60 motion, which he filed nearly a year following entry of the general 

sessions court’s judgment against him. Mr. Fani specifically styled his motion as a “TRCP 

60.01 Motion to Correct Record.” Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.01 governs 

corrections of clerical mistakes and provides:

Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record, and errors 

therein arising from oversight or omissions, may be corrected by the court at

any time on its own initiative or on motion of any party and after such notice, 

if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes 

may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and 

thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the 

appellate court.

Through his motion, Mr. Fani claimed that Metro did not perfect proper service of the civil 

warrant against him in two respects. First, Mr. Fani averred that he was neither served with 

a copy of the civil warrant by Deputy Smiley nor notified of the scheduled hearing on May 

2, 2018. Also, Mr. Fani contended that Deputy Smiley did not identify himself with both 

his “name and address” on the civil warrant return as required by Tennessee Code 

Annotated § 16-15-901(b). Mr. Fani argued that as a result of the alleged improper service, 

he was unaware of the civil warrant filed against him and ensuing general sessions court 

hearings.

Although Mr. Fani stated in his motion that it was filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule 

of Civil Procedure 60.01, our Supreme Court has previously instructed reviewing courts to 

“avoid construing pleadings in an artificial, technical sense,” and rather “construe the 
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pleading’s language fairly and naturally . . . [giving] effect to the substance of the pleading 

rather than its form.” See Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hosps., 325 S.W.3d 

98, 104 (Tenn. 2010). Upon our review of the substance of Mr. Fani’s motion, we construe

Mr. Fani’s motion as filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. See e.g.,

Burns v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. E2019-00044-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 

1131289, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2020) (construing the plaintiff’s motion to correct 

a clerical mistake as a motion to set aside the trial court’s judgment). Rule 60.02 provides:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or 

the party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding 

for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 

neglect; (2) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 

misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (3) the judgment 

is void; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior 

judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or 

it is no longer equitable that a judgment should have prospective application; 

or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 

The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1) and 

(2) not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was 

entered or taken. A motion under this Rule 60.02 does not affect the finality 

of a judgment or suspend its operation, but the court may enter an order 

suspending the operation of the judgment upon such terms as to bond and 

notice as to it shall seem proper pending the hearing of such motion. This 

rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to 

relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding, or to set aside a 

judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of error coram nobis, bills of review 

and bills in the nature of a bill of review are abolished, and the procedure for 

obtaining relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 

rules or by an independent action.

In its brief on appeal, Metro similarly posits that Mr. Fani’s motion “actually sought 

relief pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. Pro. 60.02” because Mr. Fani was not seeking to correct a 

mistake in the record or judgment. Moreover, Metro postulates that Mr. Fani’s motion, in 

substance, contained requests to set aside the judgment altogether based on lack of personal 

jurisdiction by reason of insufficient service of process. We agree. The gravamen of Mr. 

Fani’s motion is suited for analysis under Rule 60.02 because the motion sought to set aside 

the judgment itself, not merely to correct the record. Additionally, inasmuch as Mr. Fani 

alleged in his motion that the general sessions court did not obtain personal jurisdiction 

over him, we further construe Mr. Fani’s motion as one seeking to declare the judgment 

void pursuant to subsection (3) of Rule 60.02. See Johnson v. McKinney, 222 S.W.2d 879, 

883 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948) (“The general rule is that notice by service of process or in some 

other manner provided by law is essential to give the court jurisdiction of the parties; and 
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a judgment rendered without such jurisdiction is void and subject to attack from any 

angle.”).

Having determined that Mr. Fani’s motion was effectively a Rule 60.02(3) motion

seeking to relieve him from the general session court’s judgment, we now address the 

applicable timeframe within which Mr. Fani was permitted to file his motion. Tennessee 

Code Annotated § 16-15-727(b) (2009), which governs the filing of Rule 60.02 motions in 

general sessions court, provides:

(b) Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, regarding mistakes, inadvertence, excusable

neglect, fraud and other similar reasons set out in that rule, shall apply to 

all courts of general sessions. A motion under the general sessions court’s 

authority under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 shall be filed within ten (10) days 

of the date of judgment. Once filed, the motion shall toll the ten-day 

period for seeking de novo review in the circuit court until the 

determination of the motion is concluded. Thereafter, an appeal for de 

novo review in the circuit court shall be filed within ten (10) days of the 

general sessions court’s ruling on the motion to relieve a party or the 

parties’ legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding 

in the same manner as provided in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02.

Metro asserts that the ten-day filing requirement outlined in the foregoing statute applied 

to Mr. Fani’s motion, which was filed nearly a year following the general sessions court’s 

judgment, such that the trial court correctly dismissed the appeal. Mr. Fani’s argument in 

support of his motion was that service of initial process was not perfected in the general 

sessions court, resulting in a lack of personal jurisdiction.

This Court, on recent occasion, has addressed the ten-day filing requirement at issue.

In TBF Fin. LLC v. Simmons, No. E2020-00396-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 6781245, at *1

(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2020), the Knox County General Sessions Court entered a 

judgment against the defendant, who subsequently filed a Rule 60.02 motion 

approximately eight years later. Following the general sessions court’s denial of the Rule 

60.02 motion, the defendant appealed to the circuit court, arguing that he was never served 

with process in general sessions court. Id. at *2. On appeal, the circuit court held that it 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on the ten-day time period provided in Tennessee 

Code Annotated § 16-15-727(b), and dismissed the appeal. Id. 

On review, this Court concluded that the ten-day statutory time period did not 

preclude the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction to address Rule 60.02 motions based 

on a void judgment. Id. at *5. In relevant part, the court explained:

This Court has held that service of process is “an essential step in a 

proceeding.” Yousif v. Clark, 317 S.W.3d 240, 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) 
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(citing Watson v. Garza, 316 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)).

“[N]otice by service of process in a manner provided by law is essential to 

give the trial court personal jurisdiction over the parties, and without 

jurisdiction, judgment against a defendant who is not before the court is void 

and subject to attack.” Yousif, 317 S.W.3d at 246 (citing In re Estate of 

Graham, No. 85-114-II, 1986 WL 3156 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1986)). 

“[A] void judgment is one that is invalid on its face because the issuing court 

either lacked subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the 

proceedings. . . .” Hood v. Jenkins, 432 S.W.3d 814, 825 (Tenn. 2013) (citing

Gentry v. Gentry, 924 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tenn. 1996)). Thus, “[t]he record 

must establish that the plaintiff complied with the requisite procedural rules 

[for service of process]. . . . Id. Applying the foregoing principles, in the 

case of Homes v. Francis, No. M2014-00729-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 

9946265 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2015), this Court held that the 10-day 

requirement in Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-15-727(b) is not 

applicable when the basis on which Rule 60.02 relief is sought is that service 

of process was never achieved, thereby rendering the judgment void ab initio, 

to-wit:

In reliance on Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-727, Plaintiff argues 

that [the defendant’s] motion to quash and set aside the October 

6, 2004 judgment which was filed in General Sessions Court 

was untimely because it was not filed within 10 days of the 

default judgment. As set forth above, service of process in a 

manner provided by law must be achieved in order for a court 

to have jurisdiction to enter a judgment against a defendant. 

The record does not demonstrate that [the defendant] was 

personally served in a manner which complied with Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 16-15-903(1); thus, the court lacked jurisdiction 

over [the defendant] in order to render a money judgment 

against him. The judgment so entered was void.

Homes, 2015 WL 9946265, at *4.

Rule 60.02 provides several grounds for relief from judgments, 

including: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect . . .; [or] 

(3) the judgment is void.” This Court has distinguished the applicability of 

the Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-15-727(b), 10-day time period 

when the movant seeks relief under Rule 60.02(1) for “mistake inadvertence, 

surprise or excusable neglect,” and when he or she seeks relief under Rule 

60.02(3) because the judgment is allegedly void. Compare Tennessee 

Protection Agency, Inc. v. Mathies, No. M2009-01775-COA-R3-CV, 2010 

WL 2889316, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2011) (holding that by the time 
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the defendant filed his Rule 60.02(1) motion for relief on the ground of 

mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, the general sessions 

court had already lost jurisdiction to rule on the motion due to the expiration 

of the 10-day time period under Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-15-

727(b)), with Homes, 2015 WL 9946265, at *4 (supra). In Apexworks 

Restoration v. Scott, No. M2019-00067-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 5448698, at 

*4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2019), this Court succinctly explained the 

distinction between Mathies and Homes:

[T]he underlying rationale is identical in both decisions: that, 

generally speaking, there should be no time limit on seeking 

relief from a void judgment because, in the eyes of the law, 

such a judgment does not exist. Moreover, the Homes and

Mathies decisions can be distinguished from one another in a 

significant respect. . . . [I]n Homes, the defendant sought relief 

from the default judgment on the ground that it was void 

because he was never properly served. Homes, 2015 WL 

9946265, at *4. In Mathies, however, the defendant sought 

relief from the default judgment on the ground of mistake, 

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Mathies, 2010 

WL 2889316, at *1. Because the defendant in Mathies did not 

move to set aside the judgment on the ground that it was void, 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-15-727(b) required him 

to file his motion within 10 days after the entry of the 

judgment.

Id. (footnote omitted). In Apexworks, defendants’ motion for Rule 60.02 

relief was filed more than 3 years after entry of the general sessions’ 

judgment. However, the motion was predicated on defendants’ contention 

that service of process was not achieved in the general sessions court, and, 

thus, the judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, the

Apexworks case was governed by the reasoning in Homes [. . .] and the

Apexworks Court held that “the 10-day requirement is not applicable to the 

facts of the present case.” Id. at *3. Because the gravamen of defendants’ 

request for Rule 60.02 relief in Apexworks was that the underlying judgment 

was void, we concluded that, “[T]he General Sessions Court had jurisdiction 

to adjudicate Defendants’ motion to void the default judgments—and, 

consequently, that the trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate Defendants’ 

appeal of the General Sessions Court’s denial of that motion.” Id. at *5.

Id. at *3-5 (emphasis added).
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Similar to the movant in TBF Fin., the nature of Mr. Fani’s motion was a Rule 

60.02(3) motion seeking a determination that the judgment was void on the basis of lack 

of proper service of process. As such, the general sessions court had subject matter 

jurisdiction to adjudicate Mr. Fani’s motion as to whether the judgment was void and, 

consequently, the trial court maintained subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Mr. Fani’s

appeal of the general sessions court’s denial of that motion. See Apexworks Restoration v. 

Scott, No. M2019-00067-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 5448698, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 

2019). Ergo, the ten-day timeframe proscribed in Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-15-

727(b) was not applicable and did not operate to prevent the trial court from obtaining

subject matter jurisdiction to hear the motion. See Turner v. Turner, 473 S.W.3d 257, 260 

(Tenn. 2015) (“[T]he reasonable time filing requirement of Rule 60.02 does not apply to 

petitions seeking relief from void judgments under Rule 60.02(3)). We therefore conclude 

that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard when it adjudicated Mr. Fani’s motion 

as untimely. See In re Estate of Greenamyre, 219 S.W.3d at 886.

However, as we explained in TBF Fin., “[a]lthough the 10-day time period does not 

deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear [the movant’s] motion, jurisdiction does 

not, ipso facto, entitle [the movant] to relief under Rule 60.02.” TBF Fin., 2020 WL 

6781245, at *5. This Court further explained:

If [the movant] was not served [with process], then the general 

sessions judgment is void ab initio, and [the movant] is entitled to Rule 

60.02(3) relief. However, if [the movant] was properly served, the basis for 

[the movant’s] Rule 60.02 relief is negated, i.e., the judgment is not void, and 

[the movant] is not entitled to relief from the judgment.

Id.

Thus, “it is the service of process—rather than the return of service—that must be 

accomplished before a court obtains personal jurisdiction over a party defendant.” Id. 

(quoting Apexworks, 2019 WL 5448698, at *4 (emphasis in original)). In the case at bar, 

Mr. Fani has contended throughout the proceedings that he was not properly served with 

process and accordingly did not receive a copy of the civil warrant. Mr. Fani claims that

he had no knowledge of the civil warrant, the general session court proceedings, or entry 

of a default judgment against him until he received a collection letter from a law firm on 

approximately April 9, 2019. Thus, a dispute of fact exists concerning whether proper 

service occurred in this case. 

As we observed in TBF Fin., “the trial court must resolve the question of service 

before it can effectively determine whether [the movant] is entitled to relief from the 

general sessions [court] judgment.” Id. In its order granting Metro’s motion to dismiss, 

the trial court found in relevant part that Mr. Fani’s “Motion to Correct the Record was not 

timely filed in the General Sessions Court; therefore, this Court lacks subject matter 
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jurisdiction to consider the appeal.” It is evident from the trial court’s order that it made 

no determination concerning whether service of process was proper. 

Considering the existence of a factual dispute regarding service of process, coupled 

with the fact that the trial court did not make a determination concerning service of process, 

we conclude that the parties should be permitted to develop an evidentiary record for 

adjudication concerning the question of whether Metro properly served Mr. Fani in the 

general sessions court action. See id. We further conclude that inasmuch as Mr. Fani’s 

Rule 60 motion was proper and timely, his appeal to the trial court following the general 

sessions court’s denial of his motion was timely. We therefore vacate the trial court’s 

dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remand this case for further 

proceedings.

V. Remaining Issues

The parties present several additional issues on appeal, all of which concern service 

of process, including the issues of whether the general sessions court obtained personal 

jurisdiction over Mr. Fani and whether the amended version of Tennessee Code Annotated 

§ 16-15-901(b) has retroactive application. However, as our Supreme Court has elucidated, 

appellate courts “are limited in authority to the adjudication of issues that are presented 

and decided in the trial courts, and a record thereof preserved as prescribed in the statutes 

and Rules of this Court. . . .” Dorrier v. Dark, 537 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tenn. 1976). We 

therefore decline to address these issues in the absence of the trial court’s adjudication

thereof.

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand this 

matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including the 

development of a record concerning issues related to service of process. Costs on appeal 

are taxed one-half to the appellant, Farokh Fani, and one-half to the appellee, Metropolitan 

Government of Nashville and Davidson County Codes Department.

_________________________________

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE