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HomeAccident InvestigationsReports

# Railroad Accident Brief

**UP Train Strikes Railroad Employee    Near Laramie, Wyoming    October 5, 2005**

NTSB/RAB-07/01PDF

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|                  |
|-----------------------|
| **Accident No.:**     | DCA-06-FR-001 |
| **Location:**         | Laramie, Wyoming |
| **Date:**             | October 5, 2005 |
| **Time:**             | 6:00 p.m. mountain daylight time[1] |
| **Railroad**          | Union Pacific Railroad |
| **Property Damage:**  | None |
| **Fatalities:**       | 1 |
| **Injuries:**         | None |
| **Type of Accident:** | Maintenance-of-way employee struck by train |

## The Accident 

On October 5, 2005,            about 6:00 p.m., near Laramie, Wyoming, a westbound Union Pacific Railroad (UP)            train struck and killed a maintenance-of-way employee who was working on an            adjacent track. He had been walking on the track with his back to the            approaching train. He had been preparing to move a tamper machine. The train            was cleared through the work limits at 40 mph. 

Throughout the day, the            UP employee-in-charge notified several designated safety coordinators of            approaching trains. In turn, the coordinators notified the workers for whom            they were responsible. However, earlier in the year, the tamper operators had            made an agreement with their safety coordinator that they did not need to be            notified directly about approaching trains. They believed that (1) their            equipment did not normally enter an area that could be struck by a train            passing on an adjacent track and (2) they would monitor the radio in the cab of            the tampers and would be aware of approaching trains when the coordinator            notified other members of the work crew. On the day of the accident, the tamper            operator who was struck by the train was not inside the cab to listen to the radio            when the crews were notified of the approaching train. He was walking along the            adjacent track with his back to the striking train.

## Preaccident Events

Two gangs were working            at the accident location: a surfacing gang and a production tie gang. The surfacing            gang had three tamper machines, three ballast regulators, and a track            stabilizer. The employee who was killed was one of two experienced tamper            machine operators assigned to the surfacing gang. He was to instruct two            trainees about the operation of a tamper machine. The tamper machine was used            to compact the gravel ballast around the crossties.  

Due to heavy train            traffic, the dispatcher did not give the employee-in-charge permission to use            the No. 2 track until 11:00 a.m. The employee-in-charge held a Track Bulletin            Form B that governed the train movements on the No. 1 track between mileposts            572.0 and 583.0 from 6:30 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. While waiting to use the No. 2            track, the employee-in-charge authorized 18 trains to pass on the No. 1 track            between 6:30 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. in accordance with his Track Bulletin Form B.            After the employee-in-charge received permission to use the No. 2 track, the            gang moved its equipment onto the track and started working. While the gang was            working on the No. 2 track, the employee-in-charge authorized an additional            nine trains to pass on the No. 1 track. The eighth train struck the employee.

## Investigation

Before            starting the day’s work, the supervisors in charge of the work gangs, the            employee-in-charge, and the safety captain held a job briefing. During the            briefing, the employee-in-charge explained that he would obtain “Track and            Time” permission to occupy the No. 2 track so the gangs could start working and            that he had a Track Bulletin Form B for the No. 1 track from 6:30 a.m. to 7:00            p.m.

## Federal Regulation

The Federal Railroad            Administration’s regulations for the protection of roadway workers are in 49 *Code            of Federal Regulations*Part 214, “Railroad Workplace Safety.” These            regulations require that train approach warnings be communicated in a manner            that does not require a warned employee to be looking in any particular            direction at the time of the warning, and the warned employee, regardless of            noise or distraction of work, can detect the communication.

Federal regulations and the UP            operating rules require that employees stay clear of tracks unless their duties            necessitate that they work on or near them. However, an employee entering a            track area near a passing train must obtain a level of on-track safety that includes            positive protection from approaching trains. When employees are trained in            roadway worker protection, they receive safety-related instructions. UP records            indicated that the employees involved in this accident had been trained in            roadway worker protection.

## Postaccident Actions

Since the accident, UP            has reinforced its requirements for employee notification before trains are            allowed to pass a worker’s location. Specifically, all employees must be            notified of an approaching train on an adjacent track. A systemwide UP safety            meeting was held with the roving systemwide maintenance gangs and the            permanently assigned division maintenance workers about the circumstances of            this accident and the necessary steps to prevent its reoccurrence. UP has also            stressed to its supervisors the importance of determining employees’ compliance            with the communication rules, especially those rules that relate to approaching            trains. 

## Probable Cause

The National            Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident            was the agreement among the employees that they did not need to be notified of            approaching trains as required by rule and regulation. Contributing to the            accident was the employee’s failure to stay a safe distance from a track            cleared for passing trains.

Adopted: 04/23/07

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 [1]  All times in this brief are mountain daylight time.

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