Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Notices 41477

1Footnote 1 in the CAS petition states: ‘‘All

speeds referred to are change in velocity of the

striking vehicle as opposed to its impact speed.’’

the revenue from a PFC submitted by

the Johnstown-Cambria Airport

Authority was substantially complete

within the requirements of section

158.25 of part 158. The FAA will

approve or disapprove the application,

in whole or in part, no later than

October 24, 1997.

The following is a brief overview of

the application.

Application number: 97–03–C–00–

JST.

Level of proposed PFC: $3.00.

Proposed charge effective date:

September 1, 1997.

Proposed charge expiration date:

December 1, 1999.

Total estimated PFC revenue:

$157,583.

Brief description of proposed projects:

The PFC funds will be utilized to fund

the local share of the following AIP

projects.

—Terminal Building Renovation

—Perimeter Security Fencing

Class or classes of air carriers which

the public agency has requested not be

required to collect PFCs: Air Taxi/

Commercial Operators filing FAA Form

1800–31.

Any person may inspect the

application in person at the FAA office

listed above under FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT and at the FAA

regional Airports office located at:

Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990)

(Public Law 101–508) and Part 158 of

the Federal Aviation Regulations (14

CFR Part 158).

On July 22, 1997, the FAA determined

that the application to impose and use

the revenue from a PFC submitted by

the Johnstown-Cambria Airport

Authority was substantially complete

within the requirements of section

158.25 of Part 158. The FAA will

approve or disapprove the application,

in whole or in part, no later than

October 24, 1997.

The following is a brief overview of

the application.

Application number: 97–03–C–00–

JST.

Level of proposed PFC: $3.00.

Proposed charge effective date:

September 1, 1997.

Proposed charge expiration date:

December 1, 1999.

Total estimated PFC revenue:

$157,583.

Brief description of proposed projects:

The PFC funds will be utilized to fund

the local share of the following AIP

projects.

—Terminal Building Renovation

—Perimeter Security Fencing

Class or classes of air carriers which

the public agency has requested not be

required to collect PFCs: Air Taxi/

Commercial Operators filing FAA Form

1800–31.

Any person may inspect the

application in person at the FAA office

listed above under FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT and at the FAA

regional Airports office located at:

Fitzgerald Federal Building, John F.

Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica,

New York, 11430.

In addition, any person may, upon

request, inspect the application, notice

and other documents germane to the

application in person at the JohnstownCambria Airport Authority.

Issued in Jamaica, New York on July 22,

1997.

Thomas Felix,

Manager, Grant In Aid Program, Eastern

Region.

[FR Doc. 97–20287 Filed 7–31–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration (NHTSA) Denial of

Motor Vehicle Defect Petition

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (NHTSA),

Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Denial of motor vehicle defect

petition.

SUMMARY: This document denies a

November 8, 1996 petition from the

Center for Auto Safety requesting that

the agency commence a proceeding to

determine the existence of defects

related to motor vehicle safety in the air

bag systems in certain vehicles. After

reviewing the petition and other

information, NHTSA has concluded that

further investigation of these vehicles is

unlikely to result in a determination

that such safety-related defects exist.

The agency accordingly denies the

petition.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

Thomas Cooper, Chief, Vehicle Integrity

Branch, Office of Defects Investigation,

NHTSA, 400 Seventh Street, SW,

Washington, DC 20590. Telephone:

(202) 366–5218.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On

November 8, 1996, the Center for Auto

Safety (CAS) submitted a petition

requesting the agency to investigate

certain motor vehicles for ‘‘defective

airbag crash sensor and/or deployment

systems which result in airbag induced

injuries in crashes below 12-mph.’’ 1

The vehicles identified in the CAS letter

are the 1991 through 1992 Chevrolet

Corsica, the 1990 through 1992 Ford

Taurus, and the 1994 through 1996

Chrysler minivan. CAS alleges that the

subject vehicles are over-represented for

air bag-caused crash deaths at low

speeds when compared to other

vehicles. CAS cites the number of

deaths of adult drivers in the Corsica

and Taurus vehicles and of child

passengers in the Chrysler minivan

vehicles.

In the same letter, CAS separately

requested the agency to ‘‘amend FMVSS

208 to set a 12 mph threshold below

which an airbag cannot trigger unless

the manufacturer establishes it will not

injure an out-of-position occupant.’’

This petition analysis evaluates only

that portion of the petition requesting a

defect investigation. The rulemaking

requested by CAS was initially

discussed in the Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking dated January 6, 1997 (62

FR at 827).

Following receipt of the petition,

NHTSA officials requested CAS to

clarify the specific issue(s) it wished the

agency to investigate. In response to this

request, on December 12, 1996, CAS

clarified its November 8, 1996 letter:

CAS does not request NHTSA to

investigate the design threshold trigger speed

specified by the manufacturer for these

vehicles but rather two other factors which

combined have resulted in 19 of the 53

known deaths caused by bags—(1) the wide

variability from the design threshold trigger

speed which may result in injurious airbag

deployments at barrier equivalent velocities

(BEVs) as low as 7-mph when the design

speed may be 12 to 14-mph BEV and (2) the

aggressivity of the airbag itself because of its

deployment velocity, trajectory or proximity

to the occupant.

After reviewing the petition, as well

as information furnished by Chrysler

Corporation (Chrysler), Ford Motor

Company (Ford), General Motors

Corporation (GM), the Insurance

Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), and

data in the agency’s possession from

ongoing rulemaking proceedings and

other sources, NHTSA has concluded

that further investigation of these

vehicles is unlikely to result in a

determination that the air bag systems

in the vehicles identified in the petition

contain safety-related defects as alleged

by the petitioner, and that a further

commitment of agency resources in this

effort is not warranted. The agency

accordingly denies the petition.

Alleged Problem And Safety-Related

Consequences

The petitioner alleges that specific

Chrysler, Ford and GM vehicles present
41478 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Notices

2The petition did not identify the ‘‘corporate

siblings’’ of the designated Ford and GM vehicles;

i.e., the Mercury Sable and the Chevrolet Beretta.

If those ‘‘corporate siblings’’ are included, the

vehicle populations would be 1,232,000 and

412,000, respectively.

3There are also a small number of all-mechanical

crash sensor systems which use the mechanical

energy of a firing pin (rather than an electrical

switch) to signal that a crash is occurring. The

subject vehicles contain systems using

electromechanical sensors which provide an

electrical signal.

4The safing sensor is a redundant sensor to add

reliability to prevent the system from deploying an

air bag in response to a faulty signal from the crash

sensor.

5 In 1970, as part of a comprehensive rulemaking

on automatic restraints, NHTSA proposed to require

that air bags not deploy when the vehicle impacts

a fixed barrier at any velocity less than 15 miles per

hour, at any angle. 35 FR 16937, at 16938

(November 3, 1970). However, after considering

opposing comments from vehicle manufacturers,

the agency did not adopt this requirement because

it determined that it was preferable to allow

manufacturers freedom in the design of their

protective systems at all speeds. 36 FR 4600, at

4602 (March 10, 1971).

6The subject Chrysler minivans have driver and

front passenger air bags. The subject GM vehicles

have an air bag on the driver side only. The subject

Ford vehicles have standard driver side only with

optional passenger side available in MY 1992.

an unreasonable risk to safety from a

combination of low speed and

aggressive air bag deployment. The

petitioner bases this view on statistics

concerning the number of fatalities

caused by air bags in the subject

vehicles compared with the number of

such fatalities in other vehicle models.

Fatalities due to air bags are

principally due to the air bag itself or

the air bag module cover making

aggressive contact with the vehicle

occupant during the inflation phase of

air bag deployment. Those individuals

who are extremely close to the air bag

module at the time of deployment are

most likely to be adversely affected.

Vehicles Involved

The petition identifies the subject

Chrysler vehicles as the Chrysler Town

and Country, Dodge Caravan and Grand

Caravan, and Plymouth Voyager and

Grand Voyager minivans for model

years (MY) 1994–96. Chrysler produced

a total of 1,569,027 such vehicles.

The petition identifies the subject

Ford vehicles as the Ford Taurus for MY

1990 through 1992. Ford produced a

total of 931,900 such vehicles.2

The petition identifies the subject GM

vehicles as the Chevrolet Corsica for MY

1991 and 1992. GM produced a total of

290,145 such vehicles.2

System Description

An air bag is a fabric bag that inflates

extremely rapidly in the event of a

frontal crash to protect an occupant

from moving forward and striking solid

parts of the interior of the vehicle and

also to absorb and distribute crash

forces. The air bag supplements the

protection provided by the manual lap

and shoulder belt. It also must protect

unbelted individuals in crashes the

equivalent of up to 30 mph into a fixed

barrier. Each air bag system contains

two or more sensors to detect the

initiation of a crash and provide an

electrical signal that a crash is

occurring.3 The sensors are designed to

discriminate between crashes or impacts

that warrant air bag inflation and those

that do not warrant air bag inflation. At

least two sensors (one safing sensor 4

and one crash sensor) must be activated

to inflate the bag. The type, location,

number, and calibration of sensors vary

by vehicle model.

Each manufacturer provides a

specification for the vehicle’s air bag

system that establishes both a ‘‘low

limit,’’ below which the air bag must not

deploy, and a ‘‘threshold,’’ above which

the air bag must deploy. Both the low

limit and the threshold are expressed in

terms of change in velocity of the

vehicle. Chrysler reports that for its

1994 through 1996 minivans, the air

bags must not deploy at 8 mph or below

and must deploy at 14 mph or above.

Ford reports that the air bag in 1990

through 1992 Taurus vehicles must not

deploy at 8 mph or below and must

deploy at 14 mph or above. GM reports

that the air bag in the 1991 and 1992

Corsica must not deploy at 7 mph or

below and must deploy at 14 mph or

above.5

All air bag systems include a

diagnostic module which performs two

functions. (1) It provides a back-up

energy source in case the battery voltage

is cut during a crash. The back-up

voltage is available to trigger

deployment of the air bag if the sensors

detect a crash requiring air bag inflation.

(2) It also performs a diagnostic check

of the electrical system components and

connections both when the ignition is

first turned on and periodically during

vehicle use.

The air bag inflator module contains

the air bag, the inflator, and the

initiator. The inflator module is located

on the steering wheel for the driver and

in the instrument panel for the

passenger (many vehicles have only a

driver side air bag).6 When the sensors

detect a crash that meets the preestablished criteria for deployment of

the air bag, an electrical current flows

through the initiator and ignites the

material in the inflator. Or, in the case

of all-mechanical sensors, a firing pin

activates a detonator that ignites the

inflator material. The gas generated by

the inflator rapidly inflates the air bag.

In order to provide continuous

electrical connection to the air bag in

the steering wheel, each driver air bag

connects to a coil assembly or clock

spring. This device allows rotation of

the air bag module in the steering wheel

while maintaining continuous electrical

contact with the sensors, the diagnostic

module, and the vehicle’s electric power

supply.

Modifications

The manufacturers’ responses to

information request letters from

NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation

(ODI) provided the following

information on vehicle modifications

related to the air bag systems in the

subject vehicles.

Chrysler

Chrysler reports that 1994 was the

first year for passenger air bags in its

minivans. In developing its passenger

air bags, Chrysler made modifications to

its pre-1994 driver air bag system.

* * * Chrysler introduced single point

electronic crash sensing internal to the airbag

[electronic] control module (AECM) rather

than the distributed system of prior years. No

other changes were made relating to

deployment or aggressivity through the end

of the vehicles’ production, [i.e., through the

end of MY 1995].

The 1996 minivan is a totally new

vehicle; with new crash sensing

algorithms in the AECM. In addition,

the 1996 Chrysler minivan passenger air

bag is mid-mounted on the instrument

panel compared with the 1994 and 1995

passenger air bags, which are topmounted. Neither the 1996 AECM nor

the 1996 passenger air bag is

interchangeable with those from the

earlier model years.

Ford

The 1990 Taurus is the first model

year Taurus with an air bag. Ford’s

response to NHTSA’s information

request (IR) states,

Ford Taurus vehicles were equipped with

five sensors in model year 1990, four in

model year 1991, and three in model year

1992.

Ford adds,

Although there were a number of minor

changes made to 1990–1992 model year

Taurus vehicles and the driver side air bags

installed in those vehicles, there were no

modifications or changes in the design or

manufacture of the vehicles or air bag system

components made to address either air bag

system ‘‘deployment variability or air bag

aggressivity,’’ as no need has been identified

for such changes or modifications.

Ford states that it reduced the number

of sensors from five to three to reduce
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Notices 41479

7 In a letter dated March 24, 1997, CAS asserted

that Ford failed to fully respond to NHTSA’s IR

letter. CAS requested NHTSA to ask Ford for air bag

system modifications to its Taurus vehicles

subsequent to the subject MY 1990–92 Taurus.

NHTSA responded to CAS indicating that such

information was not needed for the purpose of

evaluating this petition.

8 The Chevrolet Corsica and Chevrolet Beretta

share the same vehicle platform and restraint

system (with the Beretta having only two doors).

Likewise, the Ford Taurus and Mercury Sable share

the same vehicle platform and restraint system.

system complexity and cost. According

to Ford, these reductions ‘‘were made

possible by ongoing improvements in

technology of air bag crash sensor

design.’’ 7

GM

The 1991 Corsica is the first model

year Corsica with an air bag. In its

response to the agency’s IR, GM states,

The vehicle design or the subject

components were not changed or modified

on the 1991–92 Corsica vehicles to address

either air bag deployment variability or air

bag aggressivity.

Crash Reports

As of May 15, 1997, NHTSA is aware

of the following reports of low speed

motor vehicle crashes in the subject

vehicles in which fatalities and injuries

have been attributed to deployment of

the air bags. These reports have been

obtained from agency field crash

investigations and from data provided to

the agency by the respective vehicle

manufacturers. For the MY 1994–96

Chrysler minivan vehicles, the agency

has reports of 11 such crashes, resulting

in 9 deaths and 2 injuries to occupants

in the front passenger seat. For the MY

1990–92 Ford Taurus, the agency has

reports of 24 such crashes, causing 5

deaths and 19 injuries to drivers. For the

MY 1991–92 GM Corsica, the agency

has reports of 11 such crashes, resulting

in 4 deaths and 7 injuries to drivers. The

agency is aware of no fatal crash reports

for the MY 1990–92 Sable or MY 1991–

92 Beretta.8

NHTSA prepared a Special Crash

Investigation (SCI) report for each of the

air bag-related fatal crashes. In most, the

report provides a calculation of the

change of velocity in the longitudinal

direction of the vehicle. For the subject

Ford Taurus, there are 5 fatal crashes in

which the change of velocity ranges

from a low of 7.7 mph to a high of 12.5

mph, with an average of 10.4 mph. For

the GM Corsica, there are 4 fatal crashes

in which the change of velocity ranges

from a low of 7 mph to a high of 16

mph, with an average of 11.2 mph. For

the Chrysler minivans, there are 9 fatal

crashes in which the change of velocity

ranges from a low of 8 mph to a high

of 17.5 mph, with an average of 13.3

mph.

For the non-subject vehicles, there are

33 fatal crashes for which the change in

velocity is reported. The change of

velocity ranges from a low of 7 mph to

a high of 20 mph, with an average of

12.6 mph. The SCI reports indicate that

the average change in velocity for the

crashes leading to air bag-related

fatalities in the subject vehicles is not

significantly different from the change

in velocity in crashes in which there

were air bag-related fatalities in nonsubject vehicles.

Testing

Manufacturers have performed

considerable testing in the process of

developing and improving air bag

systems. NHTSA has also performed

tests in research programs, in its

compliance programs, and as part of the

New Car Assessment Program (NCAP).

This data has provided additional

technical understanding of both the

potential benefits of air bags and the

potential risks associated with their

deployment.

FMVSS 208—NHTSA

All new passenger cars and light

trucks must comply with Federal Motor

Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208,

‘‘Occupant Crash Protection.’’ This

standard specifies minimum occupant

protection performance levels for the

restraint systems in those vehicles.

Starting with MY 1987, manufacturers

were required to phase in automatic

occupant restraints to meet specified

injury criteria. Beginning with MY 1990,

all vehicles were required to meet the

automatic restraint injury criteria and

manufacturers began to make significant

numbers of vehicles with driver air

bags. Then in 1991, the Intermodal

Surface Transportation Efficiency Act

directed the agency to amend FMVSS

208 to require air bags as the form of

automatic crash protection in light

vehicles. The agency accordingly

amended the standard in 1993 to require

air bags for both front seat positions in

all automobiles by MY 1998, and in all

light trucks by MY 1999. Subsequently,

manufacturers continued on an

accelerated program to install both

driver and passenger air bags.

On March 19, 1997 the agency

temporarily amended FMVSS 208 to

allow manufacturers to quickly depower

air bags so that they inflate less

aggressively. The agency took this

action in response to the growing

number of air bag-related fatalities and

injuries to young children and adults.

Prior to March 19, 1997 in a FMVSS 208

test, the test vehicle carried

instrumented unbelted test dummies

and the vehicle impacted a fixed flat

barrier at 30 mph. Data recorded from

the test dummies provided information

to determine if the vehicle complied

with the Standard. All of the subject

vehicles were produced prior to the

March 1997, FMVSS 208 amendment.

Table 1 presents a summary of the

results of the relevant FMVSS 208

compliance testing performed on the

subject vehicles by NHTSA. The air bag

principally acts on the surfaces of the

upper body to protect it from harm. The

injury criteria, ‘‘Head Injury Criterion

(‘‘HIC’’), and ‘‘Chest G,’’ predict the

level of human injury to the upper body

that could occur in a crash. The

maximum allowable HIC and Chest G is

shown at the bottom of Table 1. All of

the subject vehicles met the dummy

injury criteria requirements when tested

by NHTSA. The FMVSS also contains

injury criteria for the lower body

(femur), but because the air bag does not

impact this region of the body, the

femur data results are not shown.

TABLE 1.—FMVSS COMPLIANCE TEST

RESULTS

Model HIC 9 Chest

G 10

1990 Taurus (driver) ..... 249 53

1991 Beretta 11 (driver) 172 52

1994 Caravan (pass.) ... 148 51

1996 Caravan (pass.) ... 129 39

FMVSS Requirement .... 1000 60

9 HIC is a measure of the potential for injury

to the brain. 10 Chest G is a measure of the potential for

injury to the chest. 11 NHTSA did not conduct FMVSS 208 compliance tests on either the 1991 or 1992 Corsica.

NCAP—NHTSA

NHTSA conducts the New Car

Assessment Program (NCAP) to provide

information on the crash performance of

vehicles at speeds greater than the test

speed specified in FMVSS 208. The

program is different from the FMVSS

testing in two principal areas: (1) the

vehicle crash speed into the barrier is

higher (35 mph), and (2) the test

dummies are restrained with manual

safety belts in addition to the passive

restraint system provided in the vehicle.

The NCAP results for the subject

vehicles are shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2.—NCAP TEST RESULTS

Model HIC Chest G

1990 Taurus (driver) ..... 735 46

1991 Corsica (driver) .... 493 41

1991 Taurus (driver) ..... 480 44

1994 Caravan (pass.) ... 422 45
41480 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Notices

12Ford reports, ‘‘the bags installed in 1993 Taurus

vehicles are the same configuration as those

installed in 1990–92 Taurus vehicles.’’

13The agency’s latest full year of fatal crash data

is calendar year 1995.

TABLE 2.—NCAP TEST RESULTS—

Continued

Model HIC Chest G

1996 Caravan (pass.) ... 403 46

Leading Edge Deployment Speed—IIHS

In a March 21, 1997 letter to ODI,

Ford provided a copy of a report issued

by IIHS in January 1995 titled ‘‘Leading

Edge Deployment Speed of Production

Air Bags.’’ The purpose of this report

was ‘‘To assess the relative potential of

different air bag designs to cause skin

abrasions * * *.’’ The report describes

a series of tests and presents data

showing the speed at which the front or

leading surface of the air bag emerges

from the air bag cover during the

inflation process. The data also reports

the maximum excursion values—the

distance that the bag reaches beyond the

plane of the steering wheel during its

inflation process. The report provides

data on driver side air bags in 15 MY

1993 passenger cars, including the Ford

Taurus. 12

Although there are many variables

that could affect the likelihood of air bag

injuries, contact with a deploying air

bag may be more likely in those systems

with greater air bag excursion distances

during inflation. In the same manner,

the impact force of air bag contact

during inflation with the occupant

might be greater in those systems

presenting a higher leading edge speed.

The data show that the leading edge

speed of the 1993 Ford Taurus fell

within the range of leading edge speeds

measured for all of the tested vehicles.

For all vehicles, the measured leading

edge speed ranged from a low of 170

km/h to a high of 328 km/h. For the

Ford Taurus, the speeds were recorded

as 266 and 291 km/h (two tests).

The maximum excursion of the Ford

Taurus air bag also was within the range

of all of the models tested. The Ford

Taurus air bag excursion values were

370 and 378 mm (two tests). The values

for all models tested ranged from 297 to

487 mm.

Neither the Corsica nor the Chrysler

minivans were included in this IIHS

study.

Rulemaking Research—NHTSA

In preparation for possible regulatory

action to amend FMVSS 208, the agency

conducted tests to determine the

effectiveness of depowering air bags on

adult drivers and child passengers who

are in close proximity to the air bag at

the time of deployment. These tests are

described in NHTSA’s February 1997

report, ‘‘Actions to Reduce the Adverse

Effects of Air Bags, FMVSS No. 208,

Depowering’’ by the Office of Regulatory

Analysis, Plans and Policy (p. III –1 to

III–29). The tests included driver and

passenger static air bag deployments in

sled bucks representing vehicles of MY

1994 and 1996 vintage. The testing

focused on the effects of air bag inflation

on out-of-position (OOP) occupants.

International Standards Organization

(ISO) procedures were used as a

guideline for determining the

positioning of the OOP test dummy.

This testing program gathered baseline

data representing production air bag

systems from different manufacturers

and also gathered data on depowered

inflators for comparison to the baseline

results.

OOP Testing—Ford

Although ODI did not specifically

request data on OOP occupant testing,

Ford provided such data comparing the

performance of the air bag system on the

1992 Taurus with that of seven other

passenger vehicles. This testing was

conducted by Ford for potential use in

litigation. The results show the Taurus

performance as within the range of

results for the other vehicles. Neither

GM nor Chrysler conducted OOP testing

of the subject vehicles.

Crash Data

NASS

NHTSA’s National Automotive

Sampling System (NASS) has records of

a sampling of crashes and an analysis

that includes a computation of the

change in velocity (based on

measurements of vehicle crash damage)

of the vehicle during the crash impact.

A review of this data shows that the air

bags in many vehicles, in addition to the

subject vehicles, deploy in low speed

crashes. The NASS file for calendar

years 1989 through 1996 (a partial file

for 1996 is now available) contains

reports on 412 vehicles in which the air

bag deployed in a crash at a computed

longitudinal change in velocity of less

than 10 mph. More than 50% (221) of

the 412 crashed vehicles involve a 7-

mph change in velocity or less and these

include over 70 different non-subject

model vehicles.

IIHS

In a letter dated December 20, 1996,

IIHS submitted an analysis of all crashes

in which a driver or passenger death has

been attributed to the air bag. IIHS

provided a series of tables ‘‘listing

airbag inflation fatalities and the

exposure of the vehicles in which these

fatalities occurred.’’ The IIHS data is

based on NHTSA data (SCI). The IIHS

analysis compares the subject vehicles

identified in the CAS petition with

other vehicle models for which deaths

have been attributed to air bags. The air

bag-related fatality rate for each model

is expressed as the number of deaths, as

of September 30, 1996, divided by the

number of million registered vehicle

years. This provides an exposureadjusted basis for comparing the air bagrelated fatality rates of one model to

another.

In its analysis, IIHS constructed

vehicle groups from the subject vehicles

and from other vehicles in which there

has been an air bag fatality. The IIHS

placed the MY 1991–92 Corsica into a

group consisting of the MY 1991–93

Corsica and Beretta; placed the MY

1990–92 Taurus into a group consisting

of the MY 1990–93 Taurus and Sable;

and split the MY 1994–96 Chrysler

minivans into two groups, the MY

1994–95 minivans, and the MY 1996

minivans. Non-subject vehicles were

placed into appropriate groups as well.

IIHS’s rationale for placement of

vehicles into particular groups is

presented in its December letter and

elaborated on in its April 8, 1997 letter

to ODI. In the December letter, IIHS

states, ‘‘Additional model years without

known changes in the airbag sensor or

deployment system are included in the

exposure counts to provide a complete

picture of the relative exposure. Also

included are corporate ‘‘sibling’’ models

with the same airbag systems during the

same model years (for example, Taurus

and Sable) for a true reflection of the

exposure of each airbag system.’’ The

April letter provides more a specific

description of the reasons for the choice

of groups for the subject Taurus, Corsica

and Chrysler minivans vehicles. ODI

has reviewed the IIHS methodology and

finds it to be a reasonable approach for

evaluating the relative performance of

the subject vehicles compared to other

air bag-equipped vehicles.

The air bag fatality rates for various

vehicles as stated below are derived

from a small number of fatalities

spanning as much as 6 years. To expand

on this further, consider that in just

calendar year 1995 alone,13 NHTSA’s

Fatal Analysis Reporting System (FARS)

files indicate a total of 41,798 traffic

crash fatalities from all causes. Of these,

NHTSA is aware of 12 air bag-related

fatalities. The total traffic fatality rate in

1995 for all causes is 212.6 fatalities per

million registered vehicles. The specific
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 1997 / Notices 41481

air bag-related fatality rates for the

subject vehicles compared with various

other vehicles is discussed below.

Adjusting for exposure, the subject

vehicles do not have the highest driver

air bag-related fatality rates, even

though they have more individual

fatalities than other vehicles. For

example, the MY 1990–93 Taurus shows

a lower driver air bag fatality rate per

million registered vehicle years (0.80)

than the MY 1990–91 Cadillac El

Dorado (4.57), MY 1990–92 Pontiac

Firebird (2.20), MY 1993–94 Toyota

Tercel (1.82), MY 1989–93 Dodge

Daytona (1.16), MY 1994 Ford F150

(0.95) and the MY 1990–96 Mazda Miata

(1.28). Similarly, the rate of the MY

1991–93 Corsica (2.18), while higher

than that of the Taurus, is lower than

that of the El Dorado and Firebird. Thus,

the data indicate that the rates for many

vehicles, while subject to the

uncertainties due to the extremely

limited amount of data, are as high or

higher than those of the subject

vehicles. Furthermore, adding corporate

siblings to the rate calculation for each

of the above subject vehicles brings

down the rate for each of them, since

there have been no air bag-related

fatalities in either of those siblings.

The IIHS analysis of child passenger

deaths (excluding rear-facing infant

seats because the injury mechanism is

different) reveals that models other than

the Chrysler minivans present the

highest air bag-related fatality rates per

million registered vehicle years. The

highest is the MY 1995–96 Hyundai

Sonata (29.01) followed by the MY

1995–96 Isuzu Trooper (22.94), the MY

1995–96 Hyundai Accent (13.32), the

MY 1995–96 Toyota Avalon (8.86), the

MY 1993–94 Lexus LS400 (7.41), the

MY 1995 Geo Metro (6.90), and the MY

1995–96 Mazda Protege (6.76). The

highest rate for one of the subject

Chrysler minivans is 6.67 deaths per

million registered vehicle years for the

MY 1996 Dodge Caravan and the rate is

3.48 for the MY 1996 subject minivans

as a whole. The rate for the MY 1994–

95 Dodge Caravan is 3.88 and for the

MY 1994–95 Plymouth Voyager is 2.52,

while the overall rate for the MY 1994–

95 Chrysler minivans is 3.06. Again, as

with the driver air bag-related fatalities,

the data indicate that the rates for many

vehicles, while subject to the

uncertainties due to the extremely

limited amount of data, are as high or

higher than those of the subject

vehicles.

Using the known deaths and the

registered vehicle years for each model,

and the grouping of models, model

years and siblings as listed in the IIHS

letter, NHTSA applied a statistical test

to ascertain whether any of the subject

vehicles is over-represented compared

with all other vehicles (compared as a

single group) having at least one air bagrelated fatality. The data do not

demonstrate that any subject vehicle is

over-represented.

IIHS also provided crash data

concerning the likelihood of the air bags

in the subject vehicle deploying in

crashes, compared with the air bags in

other vehicles. Based on insurance crash

data, the rates of air bag deployments

per 100 collision claims in frontal

crashes are essentially the same for the

subject vehicles as for several other

identified models. In its December 20,

1996 letter, the IIHS reports, ‘‘The

deployment rates per 100 collision

claims for 1990–93 Ford Taurus/

Mercury Sable models are no different

from those for the 1992–96 Toyota

Camrys or 1994–96 Honda Accords.’’

The rate per 100 collision claims for the

MY 1990–93 Taurus/Sable is 12, for the

MY 1991–93 Corsica /Beretta is 10, for

the MY 1992–96 Camry is 12, and for

the MY 1994–96 Accord is 12. The same

holds true for the Chrysler minivans.

The rate per 100 collision claims for the

individual models of the MY 1994–95

Chrysler minivans ranges from 6 to 9

and for MY 1996 Chrysler minivans

ranges from 8 to 11. By comparison the

rate for the MY 1995–96 Ford Windstar

is 22 (The IIHS did not provide data for

any other non-Chrysler minivan).

Findings

1. When adjusted for exposure, the air

bag-related fatality rates for the subject

vehicles are not statistically different

from the air bag-related fatality rates for

non-subject vehicles.

2. NHTSA’s SCI reports indicate that

the average change in velocity for the

crashes leading to air bag-related

fatalities in the subject vehicles is not

significantly different from the change

in velocity in crashes in which there

were air bag-related fatalities in nonsubject vehicles.

3. NHTSA’s SCI reports indicate that

in the air bag-related fatal crashes

involving the subject vehicles, the

average change in velocity is within the

design range specified by each

manufacturer.

4. The NASS data indicates that the

air bags in many non-subject vehicles

have deployed in crashes having a 7

mph or less change in velocity. Those

crashes involved over 70 non-subject

model vehicles.

5. IIHS data show that the subject

vehicles have rates of air bag

deployments per 100 collision claims

that are similar to that of many other

vehicles.

Based on the information available at

the present time, there is no reasonable

possibility that an order concerning the

notification and remedy of a safetyrelated defect in the 1990 through 1992

Ford Taurus, the 1991 and 1992

Chevrolet Corsica, or the 1994 through

1996 Chrysler minivan vehicles would

be issued at the conclusion of an

investigation. Therefore, in view of the

need to allocate and prioritize NHTSA’s

limited resources to best accomplish the

agency’s safety mission, the petition is

denied.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162 (d); delegations

of authority at CFR 1.50 and 501.8.

Issued on: July 28, 1997.

Kenneth N. Weinstein,

Associate Administrator for Safety

Assurance.

[FR Doc. 97–20295 Filed 7–31–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs

Administration

[Notice 97–6]

Safety Advisory: Certified IM 101 and

IM 102 Steel Portable Tanks With

Bottom Outlets Without Internal

Discharge Valves or Shear Sections

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs

Administration (RSPA), DOT.

ACTION: Safety advisory notice;

correction.

SUMMARY: RSPA published a safety

advisory notice in the Federal Register

(62 FR 37638) under notice 97–6 on July

14, 1997. The words ‘‘capable of being

closed from a location’’ were

inadvertently omitted in the advisory

notice for material quoted from 49 CFR

173.32c(g)(2). This document corrects

this error and, for the convenience of

readers, reprints the text of the July 14,

1997 notice in its entirety, as follows:

This is to notify owners and users of

DOT specification IM 101 and IM 102

portable tanks with filling or discharge

connections below the normal liquid

level that these tanks may be used for

shipping hazardous materials only if

they have internal discharge valves and

shear sections. Internal discharge valves

and shear sections are safety devices

required on the bottom-outlets of IM

portable tanks in hazardous material

service to prevent significant release of

lading when damage is sustained at the

filling/discharge connection. Without

those safety features, damage to a

bottom outlet is far more likely to result

in loss of a tank’s entire lading.