[Cite as State v. Rogers, 2021-Ohio-2575.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 

 vs. 

KEVIN ROGERS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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: 

: 

APPEAL NO. C-200236 

TRIAL NO. B-9906905 

O P I N I O N.

 

 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Appeal Dismissed 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: July 28, 2021 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Stier, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Kevin Rogers, pro se. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

 2

ZAYAS, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Kevin Rogers appeals the Hamilton County 

Common Pleas Court’s judgment overruling his 2020 “Motion for Relief from 

Judgment.” Because we lack jurisdiction to review that judgment, we dismiss the 

appeal.

{¶2} Rogers was convicted in 2000 of murder, felonious assault, and 

aggravated robbery. He unsuccessfully challenged his convictions on direct appeal 

and in postconviction motions filed with the common pleas court in 2o17, 2018, and 

2020. State v. Rogers, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-000299, 2000 WL 1886627 (Dec. 

29, 2000); State v. Rogers, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170599 (Dec. 19, 2018); State v. 

Rogers, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190051 (Mar. 31, 2020).

{¶3} In his 2020 “Motion for Relief from Judgment,” Rogers sought relief 

from his convictions on the ground that he had been denied the effective assistance 

of counsel in his direct appeal. He asserted that his appellate counsel had failed to 

meet with him or to challenge on appeal the trial court’s jurisdiction, the legality of 

his arrest, defects in his indictment, and trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in 

investigating and presenting his defense at trial and in failing to pursue 

postconviction relief.

{¶4} In this appeal, Rogers presents three assignments of error that may 

fairly be read together to challenge the denial of that motion. We conclude that the 

common pleas court had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion, and that this court 

has no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.

No Common Pleas Court Jurisdiction

{¶5} Rogers failed to designate in his motion a statute or rule under which the 

relief sought may be granted. This left the common pleas court to “recast” the 

motion “into whatever category necessary to identify and establish the criteria by 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

 3 

which the motion should be judged.” See State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-

Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 431, ¶ 12 and syllabus. 

{¶6} R.C. 2953.21 et seq., governing the proceedings upon a petition for 

postconviction relief, permit a common pleas court to grant relief from a conviction 

based on a constitutional violation during the proceedings resulting in that 

conviction. See R.C. 2953.21(A)(1). Rogers’s motion alleged a constitutional 

violation during the appeal from his convictions. The appropriate vehicle for such a 

claim is an appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court or an App.R. 26(B) application to this 

court to reopen the direct appeal. See State v. Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 

N.E.2d 1204 (1992), paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. Therefore, the 

postconviction statutes did not confer upon the common pleas court jurisdiction to 

entertain Rogers’s ineffective-appellate-counsel claim. 

{¶7} Nor was Rogers’s motion reviewable under Crim.R. 32.1 as a motion to 

withdraw a guilty or no-contest plea or under Crim.R. 33 as a motion for a new trial, 

because Rogers was convicted following a jury trial, not upon guilty or no-contest 

pleas, and the motion did not seek a new trial. The motion was not reviewable under 

R.C. Chapter 2731 as a petition for a writ of mandamus, under R.C. Chapter 2721 as a 

declaratory judgment action, or under R.C. Chapter 2725 as a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus, because the motion did not satisfy those statutes’ procedural 

requirements. See R.C. 2731.04, 2721.12(A), and 2725.04. And Crim.R. 57(B) did 

not require the common pleas court to entertain the motion under Civ.R. 60(B), 

because Rogers’s convictions were reviewable, and had been reviewed, under the 

procedures provided for a direct appeal. 

{¶8} Finally, the common pleas court could not have afforded Rogers relief 

from his convictions under its jurisdiction to correct a void judgment. See State ex 

rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 18-

19 (holding that a court always has jurisdiction to correct a void judgment). A 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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judgment of conviction is voidable, not void, if entered by a court having personal 

and subject-matter jurisdiction. State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 4. The trial court had personal jurisdiction by virtue of 

Rogers’s appearance before the court under indictment on murder and felony 

charges. And the trial court acted within its subject-matter jurisdiction in convicting 

him of those offenses. Thus, appellate counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness, even if 

demonstrated, would not have rendered Rogers’s convictions void. See id. at ¶ 23-

25. 

No Appeals Court Jurisdiction

{¶9} Moreover, this court has no jurisdiction to review the common pleas 

court’s judgment denying Rogers’s “Motion for Relief from Judgment.” Article IV, 

Section 3(B)(2) of the Ohio Constitution, confers upon an intermediate appellate 

court only “such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, 

or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of 

appeals within the district.”

{¶10} Under R.C. 2953.02 and 2953.08, a court of appeals has jurisdiction to 

review a judgment of conviction entered in a criminal case. Rogers appeals here not 

from his judgment of conviction, but from the common pleas court’s entry denying 

his postconviction motion for relief from his judgment of conviction. 

{¶11} An appeals court also has jurisdiction under R.C. 2953.23(B) to review 

an order awarding or denying postconviction relief. But as we determined, the 

postconviction statutes did not confer upon the common pleas court jurisdiction to 

entertain Rogers’s motion. Accordingly, the entry denying the relief sought in that 

motion was not appealable under R.C. 2953.23(B). 

{¶12} An appeals court also has jurisdiction under R.C. 2505.03(A) to review 

and affirm, modify, or reverse a “final order, judgment or decree.” A “final order” 

includes an order that “affects a substantial right” in “an action,” when that order “in 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

 5

effect determines the action and prevents a judgment,” R.C. 2505.02(B)(1), or when 

that order is “made in a special proceeding,” that is, in “an action or proceeding that 

is specially created by statute and that prior to 1853 was not denoted as an action at 

law or a suit in equity.” R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) and (A)(2). A “final order” also includes 

an order that “grants or denies a provisional remedy,” that is, a remedy in “a 

proceeding ancillary to an action,” when that order “in effect determines the action 

with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor 

of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy,” and when “[t]he 

appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal 

following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the 

action.” R.C. 2505.02(A)(3) and (B)(4). 

{¶13} The judgment overruling Rogers’s motion was not reviewable by this 

court under R.C. 2505.03(A) as a “final order.” The entry was not “made” in any 

“special” statutory proceeding. See R.C. 2505.02(B)(2). Nor can the judgment be 

said to have effectively determined or prevented a judgment in any proceeding, when 

the motion was not filed in any action, or in any proceeding ancillary to an action, 

then pending before the common pleas court. See R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) and (B)(4)(a). 

Appeal Dismissed

{¶14} This court has no jurisdiction to review the common pleas court’s 

judgment denying Rogers’s “Motion for Relief from Judgment.” Accordingly, we 

dismiss this appeal.

Appeal dismissed. 

CROUSE and HENDON, JJ., concur.

SYLVIA S. HENDON, retired, from the First Appellate District, sitting by assignment. 

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.