S. Hrg. 110–588 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY STATUS 

REPORT: ASSESSING CHALLENGES AND 

MEASURING PROGRESS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 6, 2007 

Available via http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY STATUS REPORT: 

ASSESSING CHALLENGES AND MEASURING PROGRESS 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

38–841 PDF 2008

S. Hrg. 110–588 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY STATUS 

REPORT: ASSESSING CHALLENGES AND 

MEASURING PROGRESS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 6, 2007 

Available via http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BETH M. GROSSMAN, Senior Counsel 

HOLLY A. IDELSON, Counsel 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ROBERT L. STRAYER, Minority Director for Homeland Security Affairs 

LEAH Q. NASH, Minority GAO Detailee 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 16 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 18 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 21 

Senator Landrieu .............................................................................................. 32 

Prepared statement: 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 37 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 2007 

Hon. David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, U.S. Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 5 

Hon. Paul A. Schneider, Under Secretary for Management, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security .......................................................................................... 9 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Schneider, Hon. Paul A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 68 

Walker, Hon. David M.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 38 

APPENDIX 

Charts submitted for the Record by Mr. Walker .................................................. 79 

GAO Report titled ‘‘Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on 

Implementation of Mission and Management Functions,’’ August 2007 ......... 81 

Slides submitted for the Record by Mr. Schneider ............................................... 408 

Letter from Secretary Michael Chertoff to the Hon. Peter King, dated September 4, 2007, submitted for the Record by Mr. Schneider ............................ 412 

Responses to Post-Hearing Questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Walker ........................................................................................................ 428 

Mr. Schneider ................................................................................................... 430 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

STATUS REPORT: ASSESSING CHALLENGES 

AND MEASURING PROGRESS 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:34 p.m., in Room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, Landrieu, McCaskill, Collins, and Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good afternoon. The hearing will come to 

order. Welcome to everyone. I particularly want to welcome Comptroller General Walker and Under Secretary Schneider to this important hearing on the Department of Homeland Security. In this 

Committee, we hold many hearings regarding specific programs or 

policies of this critically important Department, but at this one we 

are going to step back and take the long view of the big picture and 

ask: Do we have the kind of Department of Homeland Security we 

sought to create nearly 5 years ago after September 11, 2001, with 

the passage of the Homeland Security Act? 

GAO, in its very comprehensive report, provides an answer to 

that question. I think it is fair to say that the Department of 

Homeland Security through Mr. Schneider will dissent in part, as 

they say in the courts. For us, it is helpful to remember what 

brought us here. We did not create the Department of Homeland 

Security as an academic exercise in governmental reorganization. 

Almost 6 years ago to the day, the September 11, 2001, attacks 

against the United States by Islamist extremists showed just how 

vulnerable our Nation was to attack by terrorists, how disorganized 

we were, and how the terrorists took advantage of that disorganization. The September 11, 2001, plot may have been formed 

in the caves of Afghanistan, but it was practiced and carried out 

right here in America—right in front of our eyes. 

As we learned more in the days and weeks that followed the attacks, it became clear how ill-prepared our divided governmental 

structure was to deal with this stunning new challenge. We simply 

did not have a single official or a single department focused on coordinating the various governmental agencies that had the responVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:20 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 038841 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38841.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
2 

sibility, in one way or another, to defend our citizens from threats 

to their security here at home. As a result, we had failed to adequately recognize or prepare for the terrorist threat against our 

American homeland. We lacked a system to connect the dots that 

could have forewarned us of the September 11, 2001, attacks. We 

had no clear place to turn for guidance when the attack occurred 

or in its immediate aftermath. And we had no strong hand to guide 

us in preventing and preparing for future attacks. In short, the Department of Homeland Security was born of necessity, not of 

chance or desire. 

We knew it would be an arduous and awkward undertaking to 

forge this new Department. To do so required uniting more than 

22 component agencies into a new whole, while simultaneously creating major new capabilities to address issues such as homeland 

security information sharing, State and local preparedness and coordination, critical infrastructure protection, transportation system 

protection, and R&D for homeland security capabilities. Leading 

such an effort is the kind of job that would be daunting to the most 

seasoned CEO or the toughest veteran military commander. 

In the face of this massive challenge, I would say that there has 

been tremendous work done by many people to successfully launch 

the Department of Homeland Security. I want to particularly thank 

former Secretary Tom Ridge, current Secretary Chertoff, and all of 

the DHS employees for everything they have done to bring this Department into being. We know that many people have worked tirelessly to identify the threats we face, to design measures to prevent 

or protect against them, and to put those programs into action. 

Somebody asked me earlier in the day would I say that in response to this GAO report America was not safe, and I said, and 

as we have all said before and the 9/11 Commission said, America 

is a lot safer than it was on September 11, 2001; but as this report 

makes clear, we have got a lot to do before we can say we are as 

safe as we need to be. 

This Committee’s commitment to homeland security necessarily 

includes a responsibility for honest examination of what is working, 

what is not, and what has still not come into being but should. So 

I commend Comptroller Walker and his team at GAO for the tremendous effort they have made—not only in this comprehensive, 

really unprecedented report but in the dozens of ongoing studies 

that underlie it—to help the Department of Homeland Security be 

all that it can and must be. 

Which brings me to the report itself. The report the Comptroller 

General is presenting today confirms what many of us have believed, and it does so in specifics: First, that the Department has 

made important progress establishing programs and procedures 

that make us safer today; and, second, that there remain serious 

deficiencies within the Department that require much more attention and resources than they have received to date. 

GAO tells us that DHS has made important strides in aviation 

and maritime security, both absolutely critical homeland security 

responsibilities. The report also documents how the Department is 

beginning to lay critical groundwork to strengthen border security, 

infrastructure protection, and non-aviation modes of transportation 

security. 

3 

But there are clearly serious problem areas remaining as well 

which the report documents. Almost 2 years after Hurricane 

Katrina, GAO nonetheless still finds weaknesses in the area of 

emergency preparedness and response. GAO has also documented 

the difficulties DHS has had in forging a unified department from 

its many component pieces. This is difficult, unglamorous work, but 

it goes to the very core of why we created this new Department. 

If the component agencies of DHS operate as disconnected entities 

who happen to be under the same umbrella, we will have gained 

much less than we need to gain in exchange for the effort that creating this Department has entailed. And that is something we have 

got to get right. 

I know that the Department of Homeland Security takes issue 

with some aspects of GAO’s methodology and some of its conclusions. That is not surprising given the scope and content of the report. I cannot imagine that there is any perfect way to measure a 

still evolving Department. But I hope today we can focus our discussion on the shared bottom line, which is: Where do we need to 

concentrate our energy and our resources and our leadership to ensure that we have the strongest Homeland Security Department 

possible? Because we know as recently as yesterday’s news from 

Germany that the terrorist threat is as real as it was on September 

11, 2001. 

Whatever the differences of opinion over methodology, there can 

be no difference of opinion about our shared responsibility to make 

this Department the best it can possibly be. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and, most important, to working with them to strengthen this new Department. 

Thank you. Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the U.S. Government launched the largest reorganization in its history to 

strengthen coordination among the 22 agencies with responsibilities for protecting our Nation. We established the Department of 

Homeland Security. 

More than 4 years have now passed since DHS opened for business on March 1, 2003. As Senator Lieberman noted this afternoon, 

our Nation is safer than prior to September 11, 2001. But, nevertheless, the threats continue to evolve and intensify. Violent 

extremists, both foreign and homegrown, remain determined to attack Americans. Natural disasters continue to challenge our communities’ ability to prepare, respond, and rebuild. Meanwhile, global commerce, travel, and new drug-resistant microbes raise the risk 

of pandemic disease. 

DHS officials and staff have worked hard to enhance our security. I think it is important that we take note of that. We have 

been spared a new terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 2001, and the 

people of DHS deserve a measure of credit for that. We all know, 

however, that the Department has also encountered difficulties and 

setbacks in performing its vital mission. 

Today, we will attempt to assess the Department’s performance 

fairly and accurately, noting its successes, its failures, and its inVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:20 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 038841 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38841.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
4 

completes. When Senator Lieberman and I first asked the GAO last 

year to perform a status check on DHS’s first 4 years, we knew 

that we were asking for a major assessment. And the 320 pages in 

this new GAO report are certainly proof of that. 

I also expected that DHS would receive a mixed report card, and 

it has. Reviewing the grades fairly, however, does require a word 

of context. As the GAO notes, ‘‘Successful transformations of large 

organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations 

than DHS, can take 5 to 7 years to achieve.’’ 

Applying the GAO’s measure of ‘‘performance expectations’’ to 14 

key DHS mission areas yielded indications of ‘‘moderate’’ or ‘‘substantial’’ progress in six areas, including key concerns like aviation 

security and maritime security. Four other areas were judged to 

show ‘‘modest’’ progress. 

That DHS should be a work in progress after only 4 years should 

surprise no one. But it is, nevertheless, disturbing to see ‘‘limited’’ 

progress in four areas as critical as human capital management, 

information technology management, science and technology, and, 

most of all, emergency preparedness and response. 

The limited progress grade in emergency preparedness and response particularly concerns me. The GAO does document some 

progress, such as grant programs to improve interoperable communications for first responders, a very high priority for the Chairman 

and for me. And I would also think that it is important to note that 

there are some positive developments resulting from last year’s 

FEMA reform legislation that are not reflected in GAO’s analysis. 

For example, FEMA now has regional centers with defense coordinating officers and multi-agency strike teams, multiplying its readiness to deliver rapid and effective assistance. FEMA also has improved its capability to preposition vital supplies and to track their 

deployment. I have seen these improvements firsthand in the regional exercise in New England, and they are encouraging, and 

they are not fully reflected in this report. 

But, nevertheless, I am very concerned that GAO found only limited progress in establishing an all-hazards national response plan, 

developing national all-hazards preparedness goals, and coordinating the implementation of a national incident management system. These are troubling ‘‘incompletes.’’ No amount of investment 

in technology and in aid to first responders can compensate for the 

lack of well-developed and well-understood goals and procedures for 

coordinated response. We simply must have better results in this 

area. 

Now, I am proud that the highest score GAO awarded was in an 

area that this Committee has worked very hard on, and that is 

maritime security. We held a number of hearings. We authored 

landmark port security legislation that was signed into law last 

year. And in this area, the GAO has found that DHS has achieved 

more than 75 percent of performance expectations. 

Another topic that has occupied a great deal of the time of this 

Committee is acquisition management. This Committee has uncovered appalling instances of waste and fraud in the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and in contracting in Iraq and in Afghanistan. In light of those investigations, it is troubling that GAO 

found that DHS still lacks clear Department-wide acquisition poliVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:20 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 038841 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38841.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
5 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Walker appears in the Appendix on page 38. 

cies and suffers from acquisition staff shortages. This is an area 

where the Department must redouble its efforts because faulty acquisition not only wastes scarce taxpayers’ dollars, but it also can 

literally cost lives if vital supplies are lacking or they cannot be 

moved swiftly to aid victims of natural disasters or terrorist attacks. 

Nearly 6 years after September 11, 2001, 4 years after its creation, and 2 years after Hurricane Katrina, the Department must 

pick up the pace of its progress. GAO’s report should serve as a 

useful road map in this effort. With so much at stake and with so 

many areas where progress is still required, America cannot settle 

for a mixed report card. 

I welcome our witnesses today, and I look forward to a productive discussion. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. 

I know the Comptroller General has to depart here around 3:20 

p.m., so I want to go right to the opening statements and make 

sure we get plenty of time for Committee Members to ask questions. 

As Senator Collins said, this is a report that was done by the 

GAO at the request of Senator Collins and myself pursuant to our 

oversight responsibilities. And, again, I know there are disagreements between GAO and DHS about methodology, but this is a serious piece of work that makes some tough judgments. And because 

of all that is on the line, those are exactly the kind of judgments 

we have to make about homeland security. 

So, General Walker, I thank you again for your service to our 

country and to the Congress, and this Committee in this case, and 

we welcome your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVID M. WALKER,1 COMPTROLLER 

GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, 

and other Senators. It is a pleasure to be back before this Committee again, this time to discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to implement its major mission and management reforms. As has been noted, this GAO work was done at your request. It was a major undertaking. I feel like this is ratings week, 

between Iraq and the Department of Homeland Security. Let me 

just note that both are very complex and controversial endeavors, 

both are very important endeavors, and both of them are situations 

where, quite frankly, we were mandated or requested to do them. 

Third, these represent situations where reasonable people can and 

will differ. There is no doubt about that because the stakes are so 

high. 

With that, I think it is important to know that, prior to the creation of DHS, most of the agencies that comprise DHS were not focused on homeland security or counterterrorism activities. And so, 

therefore, a lot of them had their own challenges before this agency 

was created, and they brought a lot of those challenges with them; 

and added to that was merging 22 different agencies with different 

6 

systems, different histories, different missions, different cultures, 

even different uniforms and other things of that nature that we 

have seen over time. And that made a complex undertaking even 

more complex. 

I think we have to keep in mind that even in the private sector, 

when you do a major merger and where you are trying to effectuate 

fundamental transformation that can be sustained, including an integration, that it takes 5 to 7 years at least, and in government, 

it typically takes longer for a variety of reasons. 

I think we also have to keep in mind that the Department of Defense was created 60 years ago and that while they are No. 1 in 

fighting and winning armed conflicts, they are a D on business 

practices. And I am confident DHS can do better faster than the 

Department of Defense has done, but we need to make progress on 

both. 

I think it is also important to state at the outset we clearly are 

safer than we were on September 11, 2001, and there is no such 

thing as zero risk. We can and should do better. But we will never 

have zero risk. That does not exist in today’s world, and we have 

to recognize that reality. Furthermore, this Department is not just 

about trying to prevent another event like September 11, 2001. It 

is about a lot of other things too, including natural disasters and 

border security and a variety of other issues. 

When they began back in 2003, we put DHS on our high-risk list 

not as an agency but because of the implementation, integration, 

and transformation effort. And I have talked about why we felt 

that was important to do so. This report is a major undertaking. 

Our people spent a lot of time on it. I want to thank all of our very 

capable staff who worked on it. In the report, we assess DHS’s 

progress across 14 different mission and management areas. For 

each area, we identified performance expectations based on responsibilities either set out in legislation, homeland security presidential directives and executive orders, or DHS planning documents. In a few circumstances, there were other sources, but those 

were the primary sources. 

Our analysts and subject matter experts reviewed the work of 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General and information that DHS provided us, which was extensive, in trying to 

determine whether or not DHS achieved each of those performance 

expectations. We used the performance expectation assessments to 

determine DHS’s overall progress in each mission and management 

area, and in commenting on our draft, Mr. Chairman, as you noted, 

DHS raised some concerns about our methodology, including the 

criteria that we use for assessing the extent to which DHS has 

achieved each performance expectation and our consistent application of the criteria. 

Let me note that while we changed the terminology, we did not 

change the substance. The methodology was not changed. The terminology was changed. So it was a form-over-substance change. 

The substance was the same. 

And as you noted yourself, Mr. Chairman, there are a lot of different ways you could go about doing this, and there is no way that 

is perfect. But one of the things that we did do is I am confident 

that we had a clearly defined, consistently applied, and transparent 

7 

1The charts submitted by Mr. Walker appears in the Appendix on page 80. 

methodology that we employed and that we are comfortable with. 

And I am confident that we used our best independent professional 

judgment to reach the conclusions we reached. 

We believe that our methodology provides a sound basis for our 

progress report. Overall, we appreciate DHS’s concerns and recognize that in any such broad-based evaluation there is going to be 

some level of disagreement that is inevitable. But as I said, we 

have tried to be consistent, fair, and transparent with regard to our 

judgments, and all of their comments are in our report, and what 

we did with their comments is reflected in our report as well. 

DHS has made varying levels of progress in implementing its 

mission and management areas since March 2003. If we can put 

up the first chart,1 you can see the summary table, which is—fortunately, we have a highlights page. Senator Collins, as you know, 

probably one of the best things we ever did was to take these thick 

reports and have a one-page, maximum two-page highlights page. 

And so we have that here, and, in fact, this is part of the highlights 

page. And for the 14 mission and management areas, you can see 

that there were 171 performance expectations. As you can tell, it 

is a major undertaking. We are having a tough time just with the 

table here. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is the largest chart we have ever 

had presented to our Committee. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. WALKER. We are happy to provide it for your archives, if you 

would like, if you have storage room for it. But as you can see, it 

is a massive undertaking. There are 14 different mission and management areas. There were 171 different performance expectations 

of which we judged that 78 were generally achieved, 83 generally 

not achieved, and 10 that we did not assess. We assessed based 

upon clearly defined criteria, which are on the highlights page, how 

many of the different performance expectations you needed to meet 

in order to achieve a limited, modest, moderate, or substantial rating. 

As I think I may have noted, generally they made more progress 

in mission areas than management areas. That is understandable. 

Mission is job one. And to the extent that it is trying to deal with 

counterterrorism or deal with border security or deal with emergency preparedness and response, or whatever it might be, mission 

is job one. And many times we found, especially with the Department of Defense, prima-facie evidence that the business areas, the 

management areas sometimes lagged. It is important that we do 

better than we did with the Department of Defense, and I am confident that DHS will over time do that. 

Sometimes DHS has made progress in developing plans and programs, but they faced difficulty in implementing them. After all, 90 

percent of success or failure is implementation, and it is no different in government than it is anywhere else. And some things are 

tough, no doubt about it. 

DHS disagreed with our assessments on 42 of 171 performance 

expectations, and we provided detailed responses with regard to 

those items in our report. 

8 

Given the leading role that DHS plays in securing the homeland, 

it is critical that the Department’s missions, programs, and management systems and functions are operating as efficiently and effectively as possible. It has been more than 4 years since the Department has been established. They have taken important actions. 

People are working very hard. They have made progress, more in 

the mission area than the management area, and the mission areas 

vary as well as the management areas. They have done their best 

to try to do as much as they can in this period of time. As I said, 

even for private sector entities, it is a 5- to 7-year effort, minimum, 

and in government, it is going to take longer to fully integrate and 

transform. 

But what is important is that they are focusing on the most important things and that they are allocating their limited human, financial, technological, and other resources to get the most important things done. And it is also important that Congress stay engaged to try to be able to provide reasonable oversight and to be 

able to deal with any appropriations and authorization needs that 

they might need. And I might note, as Senator Collins said, it paid 

off when you did in the maritime security area. There is no question about it. And working together, you can and have made a difference. 

We have all seen the effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We 

have all seen the concerns there. There have been a number of actions taken, I think most of which are probably reflected in our report, but evidently, Senator Collins, at least something was not, 

and we will be happy to take a look at what you mentioned. I appreciate that, and we will take a look at that. 

[The information submitted for the Record follows:] 

INFORMATION PROVIDED FOR THE RECORD BY MR. WALKER 

To what extent does the report capture progress made by FEMA with regard to 

its regional offices with Defense coordinating officers and multiagency strike teams 

and efforts to pre-position emergency supplies and equipment? 

Answer: Our report does not specifically address FEMA’s efforts to improve the 

role of its regional offices in emergency response. With regard to the pre-positioning 

of supplies and equipment, our report provides information on DHS’s Pre-Positioned 

Disaster Supply and Pre-Positioned Equipment Program. We concluded that DHS 

has generally not achieved the performance expectation under which the pre-positioning of supplies was included—develop the capacity to provide needed emergency 

assistance and services in a timely manner—as, among other things, DHS’s optimization planning efforts for its logistics capabilities are still in the preliminary 

stages. DHS also did not provide us with documentation on how it determined requirements for the pre-positioning of disaster supplies and equipment to assess 

whether FEMA has achieved its intended capacity. 

In summary, the Department of Homeland Security has thousands of very capable people working for it, trying to do the right 

thing for our country. Many people are working very hard. In some 

cases, we have had multiple people in different jobs. We have already had—I believe this is right, although I did not ask this to 

be verified before I testified—two Secretaries, three Deputy Secretaries, and two Under Secretaries for Management in the roughly 

4-year history of DHS. All capable people, but the lack of continuity 

is an issue in government, especially when you are dealing with 

major management reforms and transformation efforts. And that is 

something we may get into in the question and answer period. 

9 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider appears in the Appendix on page 68. 

2The GAO report titled ‘‘Department of Homeland Security, Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions’’ appears in the Appendix on page 81. 

We are clearly safer. We will never be 100 percent safe, but we 

are clearly safer. And I am confident that working together in a 

constructive fashion, we can continue to keep you apprised of how 

they are doing, and we can do a lot better than the Department 

of Defense did with regard to achieving implementation of integration. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Walker. That is an optimistic 

note to end on. We are at the beginning of the history of this Department, so we have a chance to really make it work well together 

before it gets, frankly, encrusted in ways that older departments 

sometimes do. 

Mr. Schneider, welcome. You are the designated representative, 

perhaps the designated defender, maybe the designated hitter. In 

any case, we welcome you. 

TESTIMONY OF PAUL A. SCHNEIDER,1 UNDER SECRETARY 

FOR MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and 

Members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you 

today. I have been the Under Secretary for about 8 months. I am 

here today to discuss the recent GAO report titled ‘‘Department of 

Homeland Security, Progress Report on Implementation of Mission 

and Management Functions.’’ 2

Without question, the most significant challenge we face is to 

continue to transform the Department into a unified force that protects the country. GAO has referred to this project as an ‘‘enormous 

management challenge’’ and to the size, complexity, and importance of our efforts as ‘‘daunting.’’ By meeting this challenge, DHS 

will be better positioned to protect the country against threats, 

both foreign and domestic. 

Although the Department has faced numerous challenges during 

the first 4 years of this critical undertaking, we have made great 

progress. The GAO report largely recognizes this progress across 14 

mission and management areas. In fact, GAO concluded that the 

Department has generally achieved 78 performance expectations. 

This is particularly noteworthy given GAO’s recognition that in 

many cases there was no anticipation that the Department would 

achieve the performance expectations by the end of the fourth year. 

Although the Department takes issue with the methodology and 

rating system employed by the GAO, there can be no dispute that 

GAO’s positive assessments of the ‘‘Generally Achieved’’ reflect the 

Department’s significant progress in four major mission areas, including securing modes of transportation; securing the border and 

administering the immigration system; defending against, preparing for, and responding to threats and disasters; and implementing management functions. 

Since my written testimony lists many of the Department’s 

achievements recognized by the GAO, I will not go into the details 

here. 

10 

I think it is worth noting, as the Comptroller General has pointed out, that many of the areas where GAO rightly recognized the 

Department’s progress were in those critical areas where we chose 

to focus our resources to secure the homeland. 

I would also like to state that we are very appreciative of the 

frank and open communication with the GAO that has been established during recent months, and especially during the final stages 

of GAO’s work on this report. I am especially appreciative of the 

efforts of the Comptroller General, the Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice, Mr. Rabkin, and their team for their 

professionalism, courtesy, and cooperation. We look forward to 

building on and continuing this cooperative approach. 

While we were pleased that the GAO recognized our progress, 

the Department continues to believe that they used a flawed methodology in preparing the report, which resulted in many of the assessments not fully reflecting the Department’s progress. 

We are particularly concerned that the GAO report is based on 

vague, shifting criteria and standards that result in an ‘‘A or Fail’’ 

grading system. It does not properly credit us for on-track implementation of long-term, multi-year goals, or constantly evolving 

programs. It is subjective and does not normalize the audit standard amongst analysts to ensure consistent assessments across the 

171 performance expectations. It does not consistently account for 

issues outside of DHS’s control. And it weighs all performance expectations equally. 

After Secretary Chertoff personally reviewed the initial Statement of Facts, he wrote to the Comptroller General expressing his 

concerns and offering to work with GAO to ensure the final GAO 

statement fully reflected the Department’s achievements over the 

past 4 years. The Department met with and provided GAO with 

thousands of pages of documents explaining how the key programs 

were on track and performance expectations were being met. 

In late May 2007, GAO officials submitted a Revised Statement 

of Facts, and, frankly, without any advance notice with the Department, indicated that the Department’s progress would now be rated 

as ‘‘Generally Achieved’’ or ‘‘Generally Not Achieved’’ rather than 

‘‘Generally Addressed’’ or ‘‘Generally Not Addressed.’’ 

Although GAO’s recent reply to our comments suggests that this 

was merely a change in language rather than substance, the practical differences between these standards are significant, reflecting, 

at a minimum, a difference in how the performance expectations 

would be perceived. ‘‘Addressed’’ suggests that a program is on 

track; whereas ‘‘achieved’’ indicates final completion. Our view is 

that GAO went from a Pass/Fail to an A/Fail grading system without explaining why. This, frankly, is like moving the goal post in 

the middle of the game. 

Based on this new standard, GAO downgraded its assessments 

of the Department in 28 performance expectations to ‘‘Generally 

Not Achieved.’’ These changes were particularly surprising in light 

of the documentation and materials that we provided. 

We are also concerned with this binary ‘‘Achieved/Not Achieved’’ 

standard. We believe it is ill-equipped to evaluate the Department’s 

progress accurately in a multi-year endeavor, and many of our efforts are multi-year endeavors. 

11 

1The letter from Mr. Schneider to Mr. Walker appears in the Appendix on page 328. 

Here are some examples. Although GAO has indicated that the 

Department’s Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is ‘‘on a trajectory’’ toward achievement, the Department received a score of ‘‘Generally 

Not Achieved’’ in this performance expectation because it had not 

yet fully completed the goals of the entire SBI program, a multiyear program. There is no obvious way, based on this criteria, to 

accurately portray the actual status, and that is perhaps the major 

flaw in the methodology. 

GAO continues to assess the Department’s efforts to detect and 

identify illegal border crossings as ‘‘Generally Not Achieved.’’ This 

assessment understates the importance of our successful efforts to 

deploy National Guard agents to the border, our efforts to increase 

the Border Patrol staffing by 30 percent since 2001, and our effort 

to begin and implement the comprehensive SBI Program. 

The Department delivered a 5-year Research and Development 

Strategic Plan to Congress on June 26, 2007, that incorporates information on milestones for fiscal year 2007 through 2011. The 

milestones, deliverables, and goals are included for every project 

within the science and technology effort of the Department. It reflects the highest-level objectives for internal departmental activities and provides overarching guidance for addressing the science 

and technology needs within each homeland security mission area. 

The plan also addresses the importance of developing a strong 

homeland security science and technology national workforce by developing professional science and technology employees. In spite of 

these achievements, this performance expectation is rated as ‘‘Not 

Achieved.’’ 

Regarding airport perimeter security, not only has DHS established standards and procedures for effective airport perimeter security, we have gone beyond meeting the performance expectation 

and are implementing those standards by executing the Aviation 

Inspection Plan, which addresses the Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act. This also is rated as ‘‘Not Achieved.’’ 

The Department issued the National Response Plan, which is in 

place and functioning. It establishes, coordinates, and implements 

a single all-hazards national response, as we saw with the successful handling of Hurricane Dean. But because it is under revision, 

as most living plans are at some point in time, GAO rates this as 

‘‘Not Achieved.’’ The enclosure of my letter to the GAO dated July 

20, 2007, which is included in the report that we are discussing 

today, contains a more detailed discussion of these and the other 

particularly problematic assessments.1

The Department has done a great deal to ensure the safety and 

the security of our country. We are proud of what DHS has been 

able to accomplish in a short time, notwithstanding the many challenges faced by the Department. Moving forward, we will build 

upon the Department’s recent program developments and successes 

while dedicating ourselves to continuous improvement. 

I look forward to maintaining the cooperative approach with the 

GAO that was followed in preparing this report. I would also like 

to thank the Congress and this Committee for your leadership and 

for your continued support of the Department of Homeland SecuVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:20 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 038841 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38841.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
12 

rity. And I would be happy to answer any questions that you may 

have. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Schneider. 

We will go to the questions now. We will do a 6-minute round 

so that everybody can get an opportunity, and hopefully we can 

even do a second one. I do want to indicate both to the Members 

and the public, I think the Members know that we are going to follow this hearing on Monday with a hearing on the eve of September 11 when we will hear testimony from Secretary Chertoff, 

FBI Director Mueller, DNI McConnell, and Admiral Redd, the head 

of the National Counterterrorism Center, an overall hearing asking 

each of these critical leaders how are we doing in the war against 

terrorism and particularly in protecting the homeland from terrorists. So I look forward to that. 

Let me proceed with the questions. Mr. Walker, as I said earlier, 

you have presented a very useful, wide-ranging report that examines many of the Department of Homeland Security’s diverse missions and integrates material from a host of previous analyses that 

GAO has done. I want to ask you at the outset to step back for a 

moment, and if you had to provide a single overall assessment of 

how the Department is doing, whether it is on track to meet our 

expectations and its statutory goals, what would your assessment 

be? And if you can, what grade would you give it at this point? 

Mr. WALKER. I would hesitate to give them a grade, Mr. Chairman, because I do not think that is really fair because there is 

variance from that grade. I would say clearly they have made more 

progress on the mission area than the management area. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. WALKER. And that is understandable. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Define that a little more. 

Mr. WALKER. By ‘‘mission,’’ what I mean is, what they are trying 

to achieve—enhance aviation security, enhance maritime security, 

and enhance border security. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. As opposed to management—— 

Mr. WALKER. As opposed to financial management, human capital management, etc. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN [continuing]. Of the overall Department. 

Mr. WALKER. Yes, like information technology management, real 

property management, and acquisition management. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Because achieving those missions also involves management of those separate tasks. 

Mr. WALKER. Correct. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But you are saying overall the Department is—— 

Mr. WALKER. I will give you an example, Mr. Chairman. Let me 

give you an example for another agency to help put it on. The Defense Department does a great job on achieving mission, but it does 

not necessarily do it in an economical, efficient manner. And so 

many times you can get things done, but the way you go about 

doing it may not be economical and efficient, and it may or may 

not be sustainable. 

So I think they have understandably prioritized their efforts to 

try to make as much of a difference as they can on mission as quick 

as they can, but they haven’t made as much progress in the area 

13 

of putting together the necessary management infrastructure—systems, controls, people, integration—that can be sustainable over 

time that will help on economy and efficiency on the general management front. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. Mr. Schneider, do you want to take 

the opportunity to grade the Department or give a brief verbal assessment, perhaps responding to what the Comptroller General has 

said? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, first off, like the Comptroller General, I 

am not about to put a grade on the table. I do agree with what he 

said because it reflects what we have done. We really have focused 

on the mission areas, and I think his chart shows it. 

So if you take a look at some of the areas, aviation security, if 

you take a look at the maritime security, these are the mission 

areas. These are the ones where we have focused our effort, and 

the report, while we may disagree with the rating, as we clearly 

do in 40-some-odd instances, the fact of the matter is the report’s 

own words frankly cite the many progresses that we have achieved 

in these particular areas. 

So I do not want our disagreement with the rating to in any way 

infer or give the impression that the report does not address many 

of the achievements. We frankly have disagreement on the rating, 

and I think that is probably true of any time somebody is given a 

grade or a rating. You end up having differing views about it. So 

we clearly have focused on exactly what the Comptroller General 

has said we have. 

Mr. WALKER. If I can? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go ahead. 

Mr. WALKER. As Under Secretary Schneider mentioned before, 

they had strong differences of opinion in some cases with regard to 

how we rated them on certain of these performance expectations. 

But we had a two-step process. We rated on the performance expectations, and then after we did that, we aggregated to determine 

what the overall progress should be in each major area. What I just 

asked my staff is, while we have not done the detailed analysis, 

would the overall progress have been dramatically different if we 

had changed a number of the ratings we are talking about? It 

would have been different, but it would not have been dramatically 

different. So I think that is what is important. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. If you are so critical—and I know in 

part you are positive, but you make some tough criticisms of the 

Department—how do you explain why we have not had another 

terrorist attack since September 11, 2001? 

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I have always been very uncomfortable with anybody who wants to assert that because we have not 

had another terrorist attack, it automatically means that we have 

done a great job and we have done everything we should do. We 

should keep in mind that based on that standard on September 10, 

2001, we were doing a great job. I do not think we can take comfort 

in the fact necessarily that we have not had another attack. Thank 

God we have not had another attack, and I think there are a lot 

of reasons that we have not, and in many cases because of efforts 

by the Department of Homeland Security, intelligence agencies, 

14 

and things going on overseas. But I do not think we should use 

that as a standard for whether we are successful or not. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I agree. That was well answered. The 

challenge, as you have talked about, of integrating 22 component 

agencies, over 200,000 employees into a Department is not easy. 

You said that in the private sector it often takes 5 to 7 years to 

achieve. And we are short on where we should be in this regard. 

What do you believe are the most important things the Department 

of Homeland Security can do to create an integrated and fully functioning Department? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, obviously, one has to have a strategic plan. 

One has to align the organization to support that plan. One has to 

be able to have appropriate goals, objectives, metrics, and measures 

that will help focus the energies and efforts of all the related parties, including tying their performance evaluation systems and 

their compensation systems to getting those things done. And one 

of the things that I know all of us have talked about, especially 

Senator Voinovich and I, is I think one of the things we need to 

think about in government on the management side is do we need 

chief management officials in some of these larger, more complex 

entities like DOD and DHS that not only have capable and credible 

people, but provide for continuity within and between Administrations to deal with issues that are inherently non-partisan and nonpolitical. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. My time is up. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Schneider, I want to focus on the four areas where the GAO 

really gave the Department unsatisfactory ratings, in other words, 

found only limited progress, the lowest rating. They are emergency 

preparedness and response, science and technology, human capital 

management, and information technology management on the 

chart. 

Now, I have indicated in my opening statement that I think GAO 

actually graded the Department too low on the emergency preparedness and response area, that one deserves at least a somewhat higher rating. So let’s go to the other three. Tell me whether 

or not you agree specifically with the ratings of only limited 

progress for those three areas—science and technology, human capital management, and information technology. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. In science and technology, we strongly disagree, 

and the basis for that is the strategic plan that I referred to in my 

opening oral statement. And the reason for that is I have looked 

at that strategic plan. One of the things that the Department was 

criticized for significantly about 2 years ago was the lack of a good 

science and technology strategic plan. 

I would say that we did not have a good plan, we did not have 

a good structure, and we did not have a good process for making 

science and technology investments. It was one of the Secretary’s 

priorities, which is why he went outside, hired a new Under Secretary, brought in a lot of people, and changed the processes 

around. 

I worked very closely with the Under Secretary for Science and 

Technology, actually a retired admiral from the Navy who used to 

15 

work with me, and you might say he actually worked for me. And 

so what we have done is we actually have instituted some of the 

very basic processes that were used in DOD and the Navy for 

science and technology investments, which is why we spent a lot 

of time making sure that the science and technology plan that we 

sent to the Hill was, in fact, what we considered to be an outstanding plan. 

If you take a look at the number of the performance expectations 

that drive from that science and technology plan, there are several. 

So I would say that we strongly disagree with that one. 

Senator COLLINS. And if I could just interrupt, that is Admiral 

Cohen who was brought in. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes. 

Senator COLLINS. And I, too, think he has made a real difference 

in that area. I think it was very weak until he was brought in. But 

I think he is making a real difference. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Most plans are living plans if they are good 

plans. This is a living plan. We changed the number of mission 

areas that we invest in. We increased it based on the changing 

threat. There are handshake agreements between the operational 

customers and those that are managing the science and technology 

so that if the science and technology is executed, it reaches a certain point in time. There is an agreement by the operator that they 

will, in fact, use it, and that basically is a handshake budget agreement, which means they will fund it. 

And so he has instituted and the Department has instituted 

what I consider to be some very rigorous and disciplined processes 

to ensure that we get a pretty good return on the investment for 

science and technology, and our plan reflects that. 

Senator COLLINS. Let us go on to the other two. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. In the area of human capital, we do not take exception to that. That is one of the weak areas that we have. I do 

not remember if we contested any of those off the top of my head. 

But the fact of the matter is in the management areas generally, 

and I used this term with the Comptroller General when I met 

with him a couple of weeks ago, I almost think we have reached 

an equilibrium of understanding, and the reason is we know what 

they look for in the management areas, be it acquisition, financial 

systems, internal controls, and the like. And the fact is we either 

produce it, the objective quality evidence, or we do not. So we have 

very few—probably I would say for the most part—disagreements 

in the management area. So we would not contest that. 

In the information technology area, that one we had a couple of 

issues—I think three associated with the enterprise architecture. 

In my 40-page letter which addressed some of these, we talk about 

the fact that we have an enterprise architecture. It is an approved 

enterprise architecture. It is being executed. We get high marks 

from OMB on the architecture, and I think that relates to, I think, 

several of those performance expectations in the information technology area. So we have some disagreement on that. 

I want to go back to the preparedness issue which you covered. 

That is our biggest exception. Roughly 25 percent of the total pages 

in my letter to the Comptroller General takes issue across the 

board with the preparation of performance expectations. And it is 

16 

all-encompassing. It talks about the various levels of response 

teams, and this is where the issue is, the grade, not so much the 

words. In their assessment, they talk about the various tiers of response teams that we have for local, regional, national disaster 

type levels. And it talks about the progress we have made, but yet 

it gives us a low score. 

There are three performance expectations that talk about interoperable communications. We strongly disagree with the rating on 

those three, and I think the GAO’s own words that describe our 

progress relative to implementing SAFECOM, implementing interoperability standards at the local and State level, we think that 

their words support our rating. 

The other issue is the National Response Plan that I talked 

about in my statement. We really have a problem with that one, 

and the reason being is we have a plan, it is being executed. One 

of the criticisms in the report was the fact that we haven’t been 

able to test it out in a large-scale disaster. Well, it is very hard to 

simulate a large-scale disaster, and thank God we have not had 

one. One of the other ones we disagree with is emergency assistance. 

So we strongly disagree with that particular area more than any 

other area in the report, and I think I have covered all four. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. We will call on 

Members of the Committee in order of arrival at the hearing—Senators Voinovich, Carper, Akaka, and McCaskill. Senator Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I 

commend you for holding this hearing as I believe it is critical that 

we continue to closely monitor the progress and remaining challenges for the Department, which this Committee created by legislation in 2002. I thank the witnesses for being here and for their 

candor. But I must say that I find it regrettable that GAO and the 

Department were unable to agree upon the basic methodology for 

this progress assessment. What bothers me is that a year from 

now, if we don’t reach agreement, we will be quibbling about 

metrics that are being used instead of solving the underlying problems. 

We have been able to achieve progress in addressing other areas 

on the GAO high-risk list, and Senator Akaka and I are very conscientious about continuing this work. 

I am pleased that Comptroller General Walker has outlined five 

overarching goals for the Department in his testimony, which I 

have repeatedly highlighted as critical to the Department’s success, 

including agency transformation, strategic planning and results 

management, risk-based decisionmaking and resource management, information sharing and coordination with Federal, State, 

local, private sector, and international stakeholders. 

I am concerned that of all of the agencies that were on the highrisk list, DHS was the last to come up with a strategic plan. The 

GAO has criticized the plan for a lack of detail, clarity, and clear 

goals. On the high-risk list, the Department still has not come up 

with a corrective action plan to get off the high-risk list. And so I 

17 

am asking the two of you, and I would ask the Chairman and the 

Ranking Member of this Committee to invite you back here in the 

next several months and see if you cannot get together and come 

up with some kind of understanding about the metrics that will be 

used to determine whether or not progress is being made in these 

respective areas. 

Second of all, I would certainly like to have a consensus from you 

on the top four or five challenges for which solutions are really 

going to make the most difference for the Department. What I am 

worried about is that we are going to have what we have had with 

the Department of Defense, and General Walker has made it very 

clear. The Defense Department has had eight areas on the highrisk list since 1990, six more that are on the general list, and they 

still have not gotten the job done. 

From my perspective, as Ranking Member on the Oversight of 

Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District 

of Columbia Subcommittee, we want to be able to determine whether or not progress is really being made. 

So I would urge the Chairman and Ranking Member that we get 

our witnesses to agree on common goals to prevent this situation 

in the future. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It is a very good idea. I accept it, and I 

echo it and make that appeal to both of you. That is the sort of 

idea that a former mayor and a former governor makes, which Senator Voinovich is. 

Mr. WALKER. I think it is a great idea. We will do that, Senator 

Voinovich. Let me just clarify that reasonable people can and will 

differ about what is the best way to do something like this, and I 

can think of other ways that we could approach it. Quite candidly, 

we laid out pretty early on what we were proposing to do, and it 

is my understanding that we did not really have strong objection 

from DHS until we were pretty far down the pike. And with the 

massive undertaking that this represents, you could not change the 

course of this battleship that far into the effort. 

Now, I think the bottom line is that what I am hearing from 

Under Secretary Schneider is the words they do not have a big 

problem with. The overall bottom-line assessment, with the possible exception of emergency preparedness and response, there is 

not a big problem there. There are concerns about how we got to 

that point. We are willing to work together to see what we can do, 

but let us not overstate the problem. I do not think there is as big 

a difference as what 47 items out of 171 would imply. 

I think the approach that we took is such that it takes moving 

a lot of those items before you are going to change the right-hand 

column. And my personal view is we ought to really look at things 

two ways: Where do you stand? And what progress are you making? And you really need to know both in order to have a true 

sense. And we will endeavor to try to do that on a prospective 

basis. 

Senator VOINOVICH. General Walker, I would like for you to comment on why you believe a term for an Under Secretary of Management is important for this Department to complete the transformation that we think it needs so that it will get the job done 

for the American people. 

18 

Mr. WALKER. I do not think that government places enough attention on management in general, and in particular, I think government has an incredibly complex job to do with regard to major 

mergers and transformation efforts that is of higher complexity 

than the private sector. In the government, you have more bosses, 

you have less flexibility, and you have much more transparency. 

All the more reason why you must not just have people who are 

competent and credible; you must have continuity. It is critically 

important to have adequate continuity in order to be able to make 

transformational change happen. And I think in the area of the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security, 

and maybe one or two others, you need a level two official with the 

right kind of background, with a term appointment, to provide continuity within and between Administrations to try to be able to 

deal with these transformation challenges. 

They can be a political appointee. If they are not doing the job, 

you can have a performance contract so that you can get rid of 

them. But I think we underestimate the degree of complexity in 

government, and we underestimate the degree of importance of 

having this type of person stay there over time. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Voinovich. 

Let me ask you, on behalf of the Committee, to report back to 

us before Thanksgiving. That gives you a period of months to work 

on that. 

Mr. WALKER. On how we would go about it prospectively, is that 

what you are saying? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, about working out the disagreement 

about methodology so we can all—we have a common goal here— 

operate together. 

Mr. WALKER. Methodology prospectively. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. Senator Carper, welcome. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thanks very much. 

Gentlemen, Mr. Walker, Secretary Schneider, thanks so much for 

being here and for the work that your folks have done at GAO, Mr. 

Walker. 

Let me start off, if I could, with a question. I do not know. I have 

been in and out so this question may have been asked. But you 

said several times—and I have read it in the testimony—that big 

transformations like this in private corporations take between 5 

and 7 years to fully integrate. Federal agencies like the Department of Homeland Security take a whole lot longer not uncommonly. I think I know the answer to this, but why the difference? 

Why the much shorter time frame with the private sector than, in 

this case, the public sector? 

Mr. WALKER. The private sector has market forces. If the private 

sector does not get things done within a reasonable period of time, 

it gets punished with regard to its stock price. It gets punished 

with regard to its ability to raise capital at reasonable rates. And 

potentially it gets punished with its existence if it does not get 

things done. 

The government does not face the same thing, at least in the 

foreseeable future. We do not have a stock price. Fortunately, we 

19 

are deemed to have a safe credit rating. If we get our fiscal act in 

order, maybe we can avoid what Standard & Poor’s said, which is 

we are headed for junk bond status within 15 to 20 years if we do 

not get our fiscal house in order. 

But I think the private sector also understands the importance 

of these basic management areas, frankly, a lot more than the government does. The private sector is a lot more outcome-based and 

results-oriented than the government is. You either get the job 

done, or you get going. And, last, as I said before, frankly it is a 

lot tougher in government than it is in the private sector to get 

things done. You have a lot more bosses, you have a lot more restrictions on you, and you have a lot more transparency. That combined with less continuity—we can at least deal with the continuity. 

Senator CARPER. Alright. Good. Thanks very much. 

I think it was former President Richard Nixon who once said 

that the only people who do not make mistakes are the people who 

do not do anything. And I have oftentimes said to my own teenage 

son, ‘‘Don’t be afraid of making mistakes. The sin is in making the 

same mistake over and over and over again and not learning from 

your mistakes.’’ 

I want to go back to one of the issues that was raised earlier, 

I think maybe by Senator Collins, and I think you mentioned—and 

it is mentioned at some length in your progress report—that one 

of the areas of significant progress was maritime security. Let me 

ask both of you to just take a minute or two on this and talk to 

us about how and why you think the Department was able to be 

especially successful in this particular area. And is there a lesson 

for the Department or for us that we can learn from the success 

as we try to apply it or the Department tries to apply it to other 

areas that are being examined? 

Mr. WALKER. I think there are a lot of reasons, and I would be 

interested in hearing Under Secretary Schneider’s comments on 

this. First, it is a mission area, and the Department provided more 

focus on mission areas than it did to management areas, for understandable reasons. 

Second, the Coast Guard is part of this, and the Coast Guard is 

probably the best managed service, and the Coast Guard is also an 

agency that has a long tradition of having multiple missions and 

having great partnerships between different levels of government 

and others in trying to achieve those missions. 

Furthermore, as has been mentioned, in addition to DHS and its 

component parts doing a better job with regard to its area, Congress was focused on maritime security with regard to oversight, 

and Congress also engaged in some authorization legislation, and 

I believe Congress also provided more funding here. 

So I think there are a number of factors that came together to 

cause this significant progress to be made. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I agree totally. I think it was the high priority 

assigned to the Department by the Congress. I think it is the fact 

that we have the Coast Guard, which is a well-established, welltrained, agile organization. They probably were in a better position 

to respond to changing missions than just about anybody. We see 

that today as recently as within the past couple of months, the deVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:20 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 038841 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38841.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
20 

ployment of these deployable operation groups (DOGs), which basically address multi-mission areas within the service. And so they 

are trained, they are operational, and they are readily adaptable. 

And I think that was the major driver, as well as the additional 

resources. 

Senator CARPER. Alright. Thank you. So maybe if we renamed 

the Department the Department of the Coast Guard and aligned 

all the different missions—no, I am just kidding. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I want to note for the record that Secretary Schneider had the expression on his face that I often have 

after you tell one of your jokes. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. WALKER. Although Secretary Schneider might like being 

called ‘‘Admiral Schneider.’’ 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think Admiral Allen would have something to 

say about that. 

Senator CARPER. That is alright. I am sure we have all been 

called a lot worse. 

Mr. Walker, my Financial Management Subcommittee, which I 

Chair and on which Senator McCaskill and others serve, held a 

hearing not long ago to examine the Department of Homeland Security and the challenges that they face in the particular area of 

financial integration, and I want to just take a minute to talk 

about the progress that has been made in integrating the Department as a whole. 

What problems has the Department leadership faced in its effort 

to bring the component agencies under the same management 

structure, the same chain of command, if you will, and the same 

culture? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, as you know, Senator, the 22 agencies 

merged. They all had their different information systems. They had 

some of their own challenges with regard to financial management. 

And so you have got the issue of multiple legacy information systems that are not integrated, thank God not as many as the Department of Defense. And you also have a number of internal control challenges that exist in that environment. Those are the two 

primary areas, I would say, and Under Secretary Schneider may 

have some additional comments. 

Senator CARPER. Admiral Schneider. I mean, Secretary Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I have a feeling that when I go back, the next 

time you have a hearing there will be a different witness. 

[Laughter.] 

The financial area is a big deal for us. At a hearing that Senator 

Akaka chaired with the Comptroller General and myself where we 

talked about some of the management challenges, one of the things 

that I talked about was that, prior to my confirmation, one of the 

great resources that I used was all the GAO reports that had been 

issued in the management areas. And so it pointed out a couple of 

things: First, that our internal controls were very weak across the 

Department; and the second thing was we had the myriad of financial management systems. 

21 

So this is a special interest item for myself, the Chief Financial 

Officer, and the Secretary. So we have laid out a road map that 

works on the two areas. 

In terms of areas of internal controls, we issued what we call the 

ICOFR Playbook, which is the Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting Playbook, which goes into excruciating detail in each of the 

operational entities of the Department, looking at where potential 

material weaknesses are. And I am not an accountant. I am an engineer by profession. But as to the business of fund balances with 

Treasury, budgetary account, operating materials and supplies, 

etc., we have worked with each of our operating components and 

layed out a get-well plan that addresses each one of these areas. 

And we worked that with the GAO, we worked that with the Inspector General. 

I report with the CFO on a monthly basis to the Secretary, and 

we go over component by component where they are on each of 

these things. And I can tell you that if a component is not making 

progress, they have got to come around. 

So we, I believe, are holding the components of the Department 

responsible and accountable for getting well in terms of internal 

controls. The financial management system—— 

Senator CARPER. I am going to have to ask you to go ahead and 

wrap it up because my time is up. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. The financial management system approach initially with e-merge was a failure. Instead, what we decided to do 

is migrate down to a couple of stable financial management platforms. So we have seven, and we are in the process over the next 

several years of migrating it down to two. And that is probably the 

No. 1 priority of my Chief Financial Officer. 

Senator CARPER. Alright. Good. Thank you both. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Carper. In the interest of 

the comprehensiveness of the record for the hearing, I do want to 

note that you are a Senator with a very good sense of humor, and 

often we all do genuinely laugh at your jokes. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. People have been laughing at me for a long 

time. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator, thank you. Senator McCaskill. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. If we are going to say we laugh at his jokes, 

I think we need to find out do we laugh at it substantially, partially, or how far along—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, we may ask for a GAO report on 

that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I am ready for that audit. 

I want to first compliment this report. I have read every page of 

it. It is an overwhelming body of work for an auditor. And I compliment the substance of what is contained in it. I want to repeat 

what you said, Mr. Walker, because what you said is that the disagreements are not about the words. The disagreements are about 

how we are characterizing those words as to level of accomplishment. And if you read the words, we have a lot of work to do, and 

I think everyone agrees with that. 

22 

I think it is also important to remember that if we get sidetracked by how we are characterizing the words, we are going to 

lose sight of some of the important messages in the words. And so 

I, for one, am going to try not to use your chart as much as I am 

some of the words that are in the report because I think they are 

important. 

I also want to make a comment before I ask you some questions, 

Mr. Walker, about the lack of a terrorist attack. I think it is really 

important. People need to remember the seat that you sit in. What 

you say in this report is here for history, and now there are people 

in this building that want to say we have not been attacked because we are doing a good job. If we were attacked tomorrow, there 

would be people in this building that would say it happened because we were doing a terrible job. And truth be known, neither 

are correct, and that is really what this report stands for. It is 

much more complicated than saying we are safe because they are 

doing a great job or we are in big trouble because they are doing 

a terrible job. And I think that—please convey from me to the individual auditors that worked on this report—quantifying this objectively is a huge challenge and had you done things differently, in 

fact, in terms of trying to pass judgment about prioritizing—which 

is one of the criticisms the Department has made—you would have 

been criticized for imposing your judgment for the judgment of 

Congress. 

The priorities are in the eye of the beholder as to what is important. I bet if we got all the Senators here and we looked at all of 

this report and they looked at it in detail, we might get 100 different opinions as to what was the most important part of this report. So I wanted to make that comment, too. 

You referenced the Inspector General at Homeland Security 

many times in this body of work, and I want to recognize the Inspector General at Homeland Security because, clearly, you believe 

they have done good work because you referenced a lot of their 

work. I am trying to make a habit of asking every Department that 

appears to put a link directly to the Inspector General on their 

home page. To find the Inspector General on DHS’s home page, you 

have to either go down through all the agencies or you have to 

know to put in the search ‘‘Inspector General.’’ And so I would certainly ask, Mr. Schneider, that you all consider putting a direct 

link to the IG on the home page of your website. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Sure. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I also want to briefly ask questions about 

access issues. I notice you did not include access issues in your 

summary, Mr. Walker, but in the report, on page 206, you talked 

about delays and issues relating to access. Could you address that 

briefly for us? 

Mr. WALKER. Two things. First, we made a conscious decision not 

to prioritize, in part because of what you said. Second, we have had 

continued challenges over a period of time to differing degrees with 

the Department of Homeland Security in getting timely access to 

information. Now, in fairness to them, they receive a lot of requests. They have a lot of things to do. At the same point in time, 

the process that they have used historically—and hopefully it is 

changing—has involved the lawyers to a greater extent than I beVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:20 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 038841 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38841.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
23 

lieve it should. Under Secretary Schneider and I have met on this. 

I also had, I believe, one conversation with the Secretary on this 

at one point in time as well. They both pledged to do better. They 

are doing better, however they are still not doing well enough, but 

they are doing better. And, interestingly, when we got to the point 

where they saw our preliminary assessment here, we had well over 

1,000 pages of information that came our way pretty quickly. 

Sometimes that happens when the assessments are not necessarily 

coming out the way that people want and, therefore, they want to 

make sure we are fully considering everything that is out there. 

But it really should not have to be that way. I mean, we really 

need to figure out a more streamlined way for us to get information, and the only thing I would say to the Department to close this 

out is, look, we are doing work for the whole Congress, and to the 

extent that they can cooperate with us, frankly, it is going to save 

them time because we can try to consolidate the requests of many 

committees, and we share our work broadly. And so while our work 

may cost them some time, it may actually save them time over 

time. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I am glad to hear that the problem is 

improving, that we are getting better on access issues. 

Let me hone in on a part of the report that I think should be 

a priority, and that is working enforcement in the area of illegal 

immigration. I was interested to see that one of the things you 

talked about in June 2006 was the decline in numbers of enforcement personnel, the decline in number of enforcement actions. 

The thing that I am, frankly, mildly critical of the audit about— 

and I think it may have to do with the performance expectation as 

to how it has been written—is shouldn’t we be separating out 

criminal investigations and sanctions against the workers and the 

employers? To me, these are two different issues. One is the magnet that is drawing the illegal immigrant over the border. The 

other is the immigrant who is coming across the border trying to 

feed his family. And I have not been able to determine from this 

audit report or, frankly, from much that has come out of ICE as 

to any kind of delineation as to—I keep reading about the sweeps 

they are doing. I never read about a criminal conviction or a jail 

sentence for an employer. You talk about, in this audit, egregious 

violations by employers. Have they defined what ‘‘egregious’’ is? 

What does it take, for gosh sakes, to be egregious as an employer 

in terms of hiring illegal immigrants? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, let me say several things, and I will provide 

some more details for the record. 

[The information provided for the Record follows:] 

INFORMATION PROVIDED FOR THE RECORD BY MR. WALKER 

To what extent does performance expectation No. 8 under Immigration Enforcement (Implement a prioritized worksite enforcement strategy to ensure that only 

authorized workers are employed) differentiate between efforts to investigate and 

arrest employers of unauthorized workers and efforts to investigate and arrest unauthorized workers? What does DHS mean by ‘‘egregious employers violations?’’ 

Answer: We did not identify separate performance expectations for worksite enforcement actions aimed at employers of unauthorized workers and at the unauthorized workers themselves. Within DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) is responsible for implementing worksite enforcement efforts and has conducted worksite enforcement actions against employers and workers, which are deVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:20 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 038841 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38841.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
24 

scribed in our report. According to ICE, ‘‘egregious employers violations’’ include 

those violations that involve multiple or widespread abuse such as money-laundering, harboring aliens, smuggling aliens, document fraud, or some form of worker 

exploitation. 

I think while there has been a recent increase in the enforcement 

of hiring of illegal workers, that is a real serious problem. I think 

we have to recognize the reality that a vast majority of illegal immigration is for economic reasons. In Mexico, for example, the average daily wage for an unskilled worker is less than $5 a day. They 

are going to come here, and they are going to come here as long 

as they can get jobs here. And so unless we end up enforcing the 

laws against hiring illegal workers aggressively, then we are not 

going to stem the tide. We are just not going to do it. We have to 

recognize that reality. They have allocated some additional resources, but I think it is still an issue. And I do think there is a 

difference, clearly a difference, between the employer and the individual. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I am out of time, but I will probably stick 

around. You know me. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is good news. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Maybe. I will not tell any bad jokes, I promise. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. We have time for a second 6-minute 

round. 

Let me just pick up on the last area that Senator McCaskill was 

talking about. In this case, I want to go to border security. The 

GAO found that the Department had not yet implemented a program to detect and identify illegal border crossings between ports 

of entry. Specifically, GAO found that the Secure Border Initiative 

and the SBInet were only in the early stages of implementation, 

and the other border security programs that predate the SBI had 

faced real difficulties in implementation. 

The report also notes that of the 6,000 miles of U.S. land border, 

only 392 miles, or 6.5 percent, were under effective control as of 

March 2007, including only 12 miles on the Northern border. Obviously we have a very large border. 

Furthermore, it has recently been reported that the launch date 

for the first phase of SBInet’s virtual fence of cameras, radar, and 

sensors, which has been much discussed and supported here in 

Congress—and I might say in various campaigns going on—is 2 

months overdue as a result of technology failures, which would 

seem to confirm GAO’s assertion that the Department of Homeland 

Security is not meeting its goals. 

So I want to ask both of you to respond. Mr. Walker, first, can 

you elaborate on GAO’s conclusions about the Department’s work 

in securing the country’s land borders? And if you can, address the 

recent delays in implementing the first 28 miles of the so-called 

virtual fence. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, first, this is a massive undertaking. I mean, 

we have thousands of miles of land border, and I would argue that 

the nature of the challenge is fundamentally different on the 

Southern border than the Northern border. Fundamentally different. And, from a practical standpoint, I think, as you said, 

25 

SBInet is in the early stages. We only have it operational in a fairly small percentage of territory. They have missed some of their 

early milestones. 

Let me tell you what the good news is. The good news is that 

unlike Deepwater, where it was a system of systems approach, 

where we had a number of challenges, there are some existing 

technologies and capabilities that exist out there already that we 

need to be able to draw upon to the maximum extent possible, and 

I will give you an example. My son used to be a Marine Corps officer, and at one point in time, right before he was in Iraq, he was 

on the border of Mexico—in Yuma, Arizona. There is a big training 

and testing facility for the Marine Corps there, and they use extensive technology to keep people off of the range. That type of technology exists. That type of technology presumably is something 

that is being looked at as one of the possibilities to use elsewhere. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Schneider, I know that DHS has challenged GAO’s conclusions in this area, so let me ask you to tell us 

why you disagree, and also if you could address the delays in 

SBInet’s 28-mile virtual fence. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Sure. The initial deployment of SBInet is what 

we call Project 28, which is roughly 28 miles of border, roughly 

southwest of Tucson. Exactly as the Comptroller General said, this 

is totally different than Deepwater. The basis for the program is 

to take available technologies and do a comprehensive system engineering effort to deploy a system. In other words, take the risk out 

of a lot of the developments. So this has ground-based radars. It 

has cameras. It has unattended ground sensors linked through a 

command and control architecture that basically the CBP can execute command and control. This contract was awarded approximately 10 months ago. 

That said, this system is up and it is running, and as part of the 

initial deployment of the system, we have found problems that 

need to be solved. Many of them have to do with slowing of the 

camera after you identify through the ground-based radar a target. 

You need to use the camera to basically do a classification of the 

target. 

And so what is happening is the synchronization of all the sensors that ultimately feed the command and control have to be 

worked out. This is no different than in the world that I come from 

in Defense what we would call ‘‘grooming the system.’’ 

So the system is up and running. As part of this initial deployment, we have CBP people that are on the ground that are learning how to use the system, learning how to develop their concepts 

of operations that will be a much more effective business process. 

As we fix these problems, that will ultimately lead to what I would 

call ‘‘established doctrine’’ by which they will basically defend the 

border. That will ultimately get incorporated into training programs, and we will adjust our business accordingly. 

The other thing about this architecture is that it is modular and 

scalable, so what we will do is literally move across the border once 

we are satisfied and we accept this system. I think we have learned 

a lot of lessons in the Department from a lot of the poor examples 

where we have had acquisition deficiencies to the tune of where we 

basically—we have minimized the government’s expenditure in 

26 

this. This is a $20 million fixed-price effort. The government will 

not spend more than $20 million. It will not accept the system until 

it is working. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So as I understand it, it is not actually 

operational now. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It is operating. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But it is not operating to the satisfaction 

of the Department. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is correct. We have refused to accept deliverance of the system, and our liability on this is capped. We have 

had some very serious conversations with the leadership of the 

company. We told them that this system will not be accepted until 

it performs satisfactorily. The leadership of the company, Boeing, 

understands that fully. They have a full-court effort underway with 

expertise that has been brought in from their entire corporation to 

get this system up and running. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me just ask you to clarify. How can 

a system be operational that the Department has not yet accepted? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. People are using it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It is actually being used to—— 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It is being used. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN [continuing]. Secure the border. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It is being used, but the fact is we have deficiencies in the system. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But it is not up to the standard—— 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It is not up to the standards where we would accept formal government acceptance of the system and then give 

them a go-ahead to go further. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Is there a time limit on how long you are 

going to work with Boeing? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes. Well, we are in the middle of reviews with 

them right now, and I want to get back to you on a date, but we 

are talking—I believe it was somewhere between 4 to 9 weeks to 

where they thought the majority of these problems could be—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. From now? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It was last week, I think, approximately. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. My time is up. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Walker, when you looked at the four areas where DHS has 

fallen most short, did you see a common pattern in these areas as 

far as the cause of the difficulties? What I am interested in, in particular, is: Did you identify that the problems were caused by resource shortages, not enough funding, leadership deficiencies, statutory barriers, institutional or cultural problems from legacy agencies? Were there common themes that prevented progress from 

being made in those four particular areas? 

Mr. WALKER. Well, first, I think to the extent that leadership at 

the Department makes something a priority, clearly you have a 

higher likelihood that you are going to see progress there. And we 

saw that. 

To the extent that there are adequate resources or more resources allocated, there is some difference. But I think it is not just 

a matter of how much in resources. It is a matter of the flexibility 

27 

that one has with those resources. To what extent are they tied? 

To what extent are they earmarked? To what extent does the Department have the ability to allocate those resources based upon 

value and risk? And so I think that is an issue where one might 

have adequate resources, but you may not have enough flexibility 

to allocate those resources based upon value and risk and, therefore, you are not going to get as much of a result. 

As I said before, to the extent that Congress has paid attention 

in a constructive way to try to be helpful and acknowledge 

progress, not just point out what is wrong, and to figure out whether or not there is enabling legislation that might be necessary, such 

as maritime security and other things, that has been a positive indicator as well. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Schneider, there is one area within the 

port security area that the GAO was very critical of, and I agree 

with the criticism, and that is that the GAO graded the Department as not achieving implementation of a national facility access 

control system for port-secured areas—in other words, the TWIC 

card. We have been talking about the Transportation Workers 

Identification Credential for years. And we are never going to 

achieve the highest level of security at our ports until we come up 

with a good system of restricting access to our ports. 

This has been a source of great frustration to me. I have brought 

it up to the Department time and time again. And I was not surprised to see GAO highlight this as an area of deficiency. 

Can you explain to us why this many years later, after the TWIC 

program was first envisioned, the Department continues to miss 

deadline after deadline and delay the full implementation? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Senator, I cannot tell you what happened before 

January 2007 and what led to all those problems. I can tell you 

what has happened since January 2007, and the reason being I 

have been personally involved in this ever since I came on board. 

This is one of those areas where I prioritize my time, what I consider to be, in terms of the acquisition procurement area, the five 

major areas that I want to spend time on. This is one of them. 

We had some deficiencies in the execution of the initial contract 

with TWIC. It was a failure. And so what we did is we went out 

and we resolicited the effort. The contractor that is currently performing that effort is Lockheed Martin, and what we did starting 

in, I believe it was, late January is set up, if you will, a schedule 

that I personally oversee every 2 weeks, with a meeting with the 

program team, and we track everything. And so what I believe is 

that we are essentially on track, based as of my meeting a week 

ago Friday, to be able to start enrollment and issuing cards early 

this fall. And what we have had to work out is software glitches. 

We have had to work out just the sheer production of the card. 

There is an awful lot of information on that card. I will not bore 

you with the details of bar coding and 1D-type bar codes and how 

you have to upgrade printers and how you have to get the software 

to actually trigger the printer. We have had issues relative to being 

able to have—somebody punch in—an applicant fill out the form on 

the computer, go through what they call a screening gateway to basically get all the checks back, if you will, so you can get a go on 

issuing the card. 

28 

1The letter to Mr. King from Mr. Chertoff appears in the Appendix on page 412. 

We believe the end-to-end test is actually completing literally as 

we speak. We are going to review the results of that at the meeting 

I am chairing tomorrow. And we also are going to be discussing the 

detailed rollout plans for—I am talking about the number of sites 

that will be used for applicants to come on board. We also have 

drafted the draft rule that would implement that. We worked with 

the Coast Guard and the rulemaking people. 

So I can tell you that since January, this has been micromanaged 

between myself and the Deputy Secretary and the head of the 

Transportation Security Administration. So we are going to wait, 

frankly, until after this rather comprehensive review tomorrow 

afternoon. And if we think the situation is a go, then we will publish the dates for initial enrollment at the first two sites. 

So I can tell you, after doing the postmortem back in January 

when I came on board, that there were a lot of false starts. There 

was a lot of poor work done on the initial contract. I think they 

have marshaled the forces with the team that is, frankly, executing 

the plan, by and large, that we put together in January, and we 

may be off by a week or so. 

So I hope to be able to tell the Secretary next week that we are 

on track. I had briefed him about a week ago on where this was 

with the team, so I am hopeful that we have turned this thing 

around. 

Senator COLLINS. I certainly hope so, too, and I hope you will 

keep us informed. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. Senator 

Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I would like to get back to one of the recommendations from the 9/11 Commission that I would like to have 

you both comment on, if possible, and that is congressional oversight. It is my understanding that we have 88 committees in the 

Congress that oversee the Department of Homeland Security. And 

I think, Mr. Schneider, you may have the number of hearings that 

you have come up here for, and the question I would like to ask 

is: What impact do these constant hearings have in terms of your 

getting the job done in your agency? Do you think it would be wise 

for us to reconsider the way we are handling the oversight so that 

we could relieve some of the pressure that you have in constantly 

having to come up here to Congress? And, Mr. Walker, I would like 

your comment on the same thing. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, sir. First off, I think my boss has done a 

pretty good job of putting this matter in a letter that he sent to 

Congressman King on September 4, and we will get you a copy of 

that letter, if we have not already provided one.1 But it goes into 

excruciating details on the number of hearings, last year’s statistics, where we are this year, number of reports, and the issues. 

I have been in this job 8 months. I don’t remember if this is my 

11th hearing or not, but it is pretty close. I have been asked to testify in front of the House a week and a half from now, and I just 

found out that there is another House committee that wants me to 

testify that morning. I have also received notice that there is anVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:20 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 038841 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38841.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
29 

other committee in the House that wants me to testify, potentially 

at the end of this month. 

So the fact of the matter is I have been in this job 81⁄2 months, 

and I conceivably will have had roughly two hearings a month. I 

think the Secretary does a great job—obviously, he is my boss—in 

talking about the fact that he enthusiastically supports the 9/11 

Commission hearing. It talks about two principal focus committees—one in the Senate and one in the House. Frankly, as one individual who appreciates congressional oversight, I think some of the 

recommendations that were made by the Committee as well as 

what he has in his letter would kind of help us all. 

Some of the committees that I have to testify in front of, frankly, 

are on the periphery of what we do. It is not the main battery. This 

Committee and your equivalent in the House are the principal committees that exercise oversight over the Department. And, frankly, 

in some areas I find myself spending what might end up being a 

disproportionate amount of time—not that I want to ever criticize 

congressional oversight—in some of these peripheral committees. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Walker. 

Mr. WALKER. Well, first, the Department of Homeland Security 

is a large, important, complex agency that gets a lot of money. It 

is in the early stages of its existence. One would expect that it 

would receive more than an average amount of oversight given all 

those factors and given the importance of its missions. 

That being said, the Congress is a lag indicator on organizing 

itself, just as the Federal Government is a lag indicator on organizing itself. I think there are too many players, but that obviously 

raises sensitive issues with regard to the client. But, I think while 

they should receive more oversight given all the factors that I said, 

I think there are, arguably, too many players that can conduct that 

oversight at the present point in time. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

One of the things that, again, people are not aware of is that the 

budget of the Department of Homeland Security since its creation 

has gone up 150 percent. In the area of border security and immigration enforcement, there has been a 160-percent increase, from 

$4.6 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $12.1 billion in 2007, including 

the $14.9 billion recommended by Senate Appropriations Committee. 

Mr. Schneider, with all of this money and the announcement of 

yet another delay in SBInet, are we allocating the money that the 

Department gets responsibly? Where should our resources be 

placed so that we get the greatest return in terms of our homeland 

security? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, let me try to address this a piece at a time. 

I believe that our future-year homeland security plan for 2008 

through fiscal year 2013 for the first time tries to capture where 

the money goes from a mission area—what I call a warfare mission 

area type of a blueprint. In looking at the previous years’ submittals, they were, frankly, very hard to understand from—again, I 

come from Defense—a warfighting perspective; we are putting it 

into anti-submarine warfare, air warfare, etc. 

What we did this year with the recent submittal of the futureyear plan was to try to follow the DOD model to show where the 

30 

resources go and to even show it at a much greater level of granularity in terms of whether we are putting it into technology or 

whether we are putting it into manpower, agents. 

So what I would offer to do is to come sit down with you and 

brief you and whoever else on the details. We think that this is the 

first year, frankly, that we have done a pretty good job of trying 

to trace the money flow so you can see that we are investing in securing the borders, we are investing and doing analysis of infrastructure, we are investing in interoperable communications—because that is how we build the budget. Relative to the $3 million, I can tell you because I was a major 

player in the discussions of working with all the components and 

the Secretary in terms of what would be our priorities and what 

would be the bang for the buck. Do you put it into agents? If you 

put it into agents, what does that mean in terms of throughput 

through FLETC? If you cannot get the throughput through—in 

other words, I call it like the NTAN model. And so where is the 

best return on—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. The reason I ask these questions is that I 

want to make sure we are not being short-sighted and our money 

is being spent to guard against not only current, but future threats 

to our homeland. I have held three round tables in Ohio on interoperability, and the biggest complaint that I have heard from the 

locals is, ‘‘We don’t have the money to pay for the interoperability. 

We don’t have the money to do it.’’ 

Now, how important is that? I mean, from a response point of 

view, it is a big deal. Congress has held hearing after hearing on 

interoperability. Should we be maybe putting more resources into 

that area versus maybe some other area? 

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I know it is almost over, but with 

your indulgence, could I have 1 minute to talk on this? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sure. I have actually been worried about 

getting you out of here on time, but if you could stay a little longer. 

Mr. WALKER. You are my primary client in the Senate, meaning 

this Committee, so I will be out in about 5 minutes, if that is OK, 

Mr. Chairman. 

First, Senator Voinovich, you are putting your finger on a much 

bigger issue. I know you are talking about a micro sense. Candidly, 

the Federal Government does not allocate money on a merit basis. 

Candidly, most of the Federal Government’s budget is based upon 

a baseline and incremental approach. And in the absence of key national indicators, outcome-based indicators—economic, safety, security, social, environmental—outcome-based indicators, which some 

countries have and we do not, then in all too many frequent cases 

what happens is the only way you can show that you care is to 

spend more money or give more tax preferences, when in reality 

what we ought to be doing is we ought to be defining what kind 

of outcomes are we looking for. Let’s link those outcomes with strategic planning for all the different departments and agencies. Let’s 

then determine how much money do we need for what and what 

outcome are we expecting to get and let’s make sure we are getting 

it. And if we are not, we get rid of it or we do something different. 

I would like to be able to work with this Committee on the need 

for key national indicators. GAO has been working with the NaVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:20 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 038841 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38841.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
31 

tional Academy of Sciences and the OECD to try to make this happen, and I think it is a strategically important thing that goes well 

beyond homeland security that could make a huge difference for 

the country. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Absolutely. We would love to work with 

you on it. 

Senator McCaskill. And then if you have a few extra moments, 

I want to give Senator Landrieu a last round of questions. Senator 

McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. Great segue because the audit 

says there are no outcome goals or measures for workplace enforcement. Do you disagree with that, Mr. Schneider? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. We have metrics that we use, and I would be 

glad to provide it in terms of the number of aliens removed, criminal arrests, criminal fines and forfeitures—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. No. I am talking about workplace enforcement. I am not talking about how many aliens were arrested. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, I am talking about the worksite enforcement. We track criminal arrests, administrative arrests, and criminal fines and forfeitures, and those are worksite enforcement 

issues, kind of like a follow-on to that discussion. I am not sure, 

frankly, what else we track. I happen to know that we track this 

at a pretty high level. I do not know if we have any other details. 

Senator MCCASKILL. ICE reported in the audit that additional 

time is needed to afford its programs the opportunity to mature 

into an outcome-based system. In other words, they are doing data 

collection now, but there is no outcome goals and measures that 

are there. And we can avoid the argument over the blue chart if 

all of the departments in Homeland Security had outcome-based 

goals and measures. Then the auditor’s job becomes relatively 

straightforward and simple. We know what your outcome goals and 

measures are, and we look to see if you are achieving them. If they 

are, success. If they are not, why not? And what is the underlying 

reasons why they are not being achieved? 

And it specifically says in here that basically the Department is 

admitting that they have not done outcome goals and measures for 

workplace enforcement. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, Senator, and I think also that has been one 

of the Comptroller General’s major complaints across the entire Department. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And that is where Senator Voinovich has been 

very aggressive in trying to help us, if you will, establish our strategic plan so we have these types of metrics that can be used. And 

we have a long way to go. 

Senator MCCASKILL. In the criminal arrests in the data that you 

provided to GAO, you said there had been 716 criminal arrests in 

fiscal year 2006. Was there any indication in those arrests how 

many of those arrests were for—and maybe you can provide this 

to the Committee. I certainly would be interested in knowing. How 

many of those arrests are for employers and how many of those 

criminal arrests are for illegal immigrants working in this country? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I will provide that. I know the number of administrative arrests, which are nearly 4,000. I will see if I can break 

32 

that down into some details, categories, as well as the over $30 million in fines and forfeitures. I will see if we can provide some granularity on that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And then in regard to the ICE Mutual 

Agreement Between Government and Employers, from reading the 

audit you have nine members. I am glad there are nine, but nine 

in the whole country, I do not think that is something that we 

should be crowing about at this point. Is there a number, is there 

an outcome goal or measure in that area as to how many employers you are targeting to participate in the ICE Mutual Agreement 

Between Government and Employers? 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I will have to get back to you on that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And while you are doing that, one of 

the things that was most troubling to me is that we have nine, but 

the problem we have is that there is a weakness in one of the key 

requirements. For the program to work, you have to have an employment eligibility verification program, and so if we get too far 

down the road in this mutual agreement and these employers are 

busy patting themselves on the back that they are participating, I 

do not think you are going to get the finding from GAO that you 

want until you tackle the ability to identify document fraud. And 

whatever outcome goals or measures that have been set in that 

area I would certainly like a follow-up in that regard also. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Sure. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I do not want to take too much time on the 

other area because I know who is going to question next, and Senator Landrieu has done an incredible job fighting for the people of 

her State with regard to the mistakes and problems that occurred 

with Hurricane Katrina. I would say just very briefly in the minute 

and a half I have left that the specifics that are in the Summary 

of Findings, particularly about ensuring the capacity and readiness 

for disaster response teams, and then, second, the specifics that are 

in the Summary of Findings about developing the capacity to provide needed emergency assistance and services in a timely manner. 

The actual words that are in those two sections should really be 

a cause for concern. Essentially, those two sections of this audit say 

that there is not the documentation available to reassure the 

American public that it would not happen again. And I bring your 

attention to those two sections. I am not going to dwell on them 

because I know that my colleague is going to be the one that will 

go into this in some detail, and I know of her great concerns in that 

area. Those were two places that I stopped for my highlighter. As 

we talk about the priorities and the metrics, clearly the demonstrated ability to respond in a timely manner, in a way that is 

appropriate to the level of the emergency is probably, I think, one 

of the most important things that we expect out of FEMA. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator Landrieu. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANDRIEU 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me thank 

my colleague for her comments and also her interest. She has been 

33 

down to Louisiana, focused on this with Members of this Committee, and I appreciate it. 

And I thank you, Mr. Walker. I know that you have to leave, and 

I thank you for waiting just a few minutes. 

This report, Mr. Chairman, is alarming. It is disappointing. It is 

not, though, surprising to me. I have observed very carefully the 

last 2 years the workings of this Department, particularly relative 

to the disaster response and recovery underway in the Gulf Coast. 

And I have said time and time again that it has been apparent 

that there does not seem to be any real serious mobilization. Although this Committee has acted and pushed for reforms and Congress in different ways has pushed reforms and there have been 

some minimum initiatives, I can say that I am not surprised with 

the findings that only 5 of the 24 benchmarks when it comes to response for disasters were met and that 18 have gone basically unanswered. But it is time again then for us to re-engage. 

I do have a few questions, Mr. Walker, on this to try to move us 

forward. When you said that the Department had made minor advances, basically, for community recovery, in your review did the 

Department note any achievements in the area of restoring public 

facilities? What is your assessment of the Department’s overall capacity to promote disaster recovery? I know it is only one mission 

of this Department, but for us, for a city that went 80 percent underwater, a metropolitan area of 1.5 million people still struggling 

to come back, the part of the recovery portion is very important to 

us. Did you observe any strong initiatives, mobilization to improve 

the recovery aspects of catastrophic disaster response? 

Mr. WALKER. My understanding, Senator Landrieu—and I will 

provide more for the record—is that we saw activity in emergency 

preparedness and response, more there than in recovery, and there 

was a lack of documentation in a number of areas. Recovery is important, especially with the type of disaster that was experienced 

by the Gulf Coast. Our sense is, from what I have seen so far— 

and I will provide some more for the record—that more emphasis 

has been given on the preparedness and response than the recovery 

so far, as far as a future event. 

[The information submitted for the Record follows:] 

INFORMATION PROVIDED FOR THE RECORD BY MR. WALKER 

When you said that the Department had made minor advances, basically, for community recovery, in your review did the Department note any achievements in the 

area of restoring public facilities? What is your assessment of the Department’s 

overall capacity to promote disaster recovery? 

Answer: DHS did not provide us with documentation on its achievements to restore public facilities. We also have not completed work at this time that permits 

us to reach conclusions about the overall capacity of FEMA and DHS to promote 

disaster recovery. We have ongoing work looking at the recovery from Hurricane 

Katrina that will provide insight into the recovery efforts in the Gulf Coast and lessons these efforts may offer regarding recovery capacity. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And, Mr. Schneider, how would you respond 

to missing 18 of the 24 benchmarks? I know that you have taken 

general issue with the report. But how would you respond to us 

about major initiatives underway by the Department of Homeland 

Security to help a major metropolitan area recover from a catastrophic disaster? 

34 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, I have some familiarity in the case of the 

Gulf Coast relative to maybe what I would call, again, the recovery 

phase versus what happened immediately after Hurricane Katrina. 

Right after Hurricane Katrina, we had no assets on the ground in 

the Gulf Coast. We had no contracting capability. We had no familiarity with local businesses. We were not prepared to go execute 

and help the community. 

What has happened since then is we have about 60 people, 

trained contracting officers, throughout the Gulf Coast. We work, 

if you will, very closely with the local industries to understand all 

their capabilities. We have significant outreach programs. We have 

in-place contracts that have already been awarded in terms of technical assistance. We are trying to spur growth in the Gulf Coast 

in the local areas. We basically restrict the solicitations of these efforts to local small business, expand it to small business, etc. And 

so the idea being is we think from an emergency standpoint that 

we are fairly well networked to be able to respond immediately 

from both providing products and services as well as the administrative contracting and financial operations. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, let me say that your Department has 

yet to go on record on getting community development block grants 

distributed based on actual damage assessments. To date, you are 

not on the record on that. That is a fundamental question. As Federal aid came through only three major sources, that is one. If we 

are not distributing it based on damage, I do not know how we are 

helping places recover. 

But my time is short. When you did, Mr. Walker, the review— 

and I very much appreciate the Ranking Member’s question about 

the barriers because we would like to help you break through barriers. We are about fixing this, not blaming but fixing. With the 

Stafford Act, did you come upon it as maybe a potential barrier or 

do you perceive it as a barrier in terms of response to catastrophic 

disasters? Because that seems to be the kind of evidence that we 

are gathering through a variety of different places. 

Mr. WALKER. Senator, as you know, you and I have had some 

conversations on this, and we have done some work in the past, 

and we are doing additional work. There are certain challenges 

with the Stafford Act. There is no question about that, especially 

when you are dealing with a catastrophic event, an event of very 

large, broad-based, and significant magnitude. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Could you elaborate on one or two challenges 

that might come to your mind? I mean, is it the reimbursement 

process of the Stafford Act? And I thank the Chairman for just giving me an additional 30 seconds. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go right ahead. 

Mr. WALKER. It is not just a matter of that, and I will be happy 

to provide more for the record, Senator. But, part of the issue is 

how quickly can you provide assistance, how can you streamline 

the provision of that assistance, and then also the issue that you 

talked about as well, when you are dealing with a catastrophic 

event of the size that we had in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. 

[The information submitted for the Record follows:] 

35 

INFORMATION PROVIDED FOR THE RECORD BY MR. WALKER 

Did you come upon the Stafford Act as maybe a potential barrier, or do you perceive it as a barrier in terms of response to catastrophic disaster? Because that 

seems to be the kind of evidence that we’re gathering through a variety of different 

places. 

Answer. In our prior work on catastrophic disaster preparedness, we raised a 

matter for Congressional consideration related to the Stafford Act. We stated that 

the Stafford Act did not explicitly authorize Federal agencies to prepare for a catastrophic disaster when there is warning before the disaster strikes, as would be the 

case with hurricanes. We suggested that Congress consider giving Federal agencies 

explicit authority to take actions to prepare for catastrophic disasters when there 

is warning. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. And let me just say in conclusion, Mr. 

Chairman, I do believe the American people are grateful for the 

work of this Department and the Administration from preventing 

attacks. And I do not say this at all lightly. It is just a huge responsibility of this Department to prevent terrorist attacks. But I 

will say again for the record it is also a great responsibility of this 

Nation to help a community recover from a catastrophic disaster, 

whether that disaster is caused by an attack or by the failing of 

critical infrastructure—in this case, levees that should have held 

but did not. And this report indicates, Mr. Chairman, that we have 

an awful lot of work to do. So I thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Landrieu. That is a 

good note on which to end. 

Mr. Walker, you and your folks at GAO have once again done a 

great public service here. I think to the credit of DHS, you have 

told us some areas, critical areas, that we were hit in on September 

11, 2001, where they have done very well for us—aviation security, 

now maritime security, surface transportation security, and I suppose we should take also comfort generally from your evaluation 

that the Department is handling the mission part of its work very 

well. The management part continues to be lacking, and we have 

to work together, hopefully with a metrics system that we can come 

to an agreement on in the next couple of months to make this as 

good as we can. The threat is out there, the danger is there, and 

we have to work together to protect the American people at home 

from that danger. And the work you have done with this report is 

a tremendous assist to this Committee in fulfilling its oversight responsibility for this Department, which the Committee played a 

leading role in creating. 

Senator Collins, would you like to say anything in conclusion? 

Senator COLLINS. I am just going to submit my remaining questions for the record, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for holding 

this hearing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. Thanks to both of 

you. 

The record for the hearing will remain open for 15 days. With 

that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:34 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(37) 

A P P E N D I X 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our distinguished panel members. 

DHS continues to face a monumental management challenge: Bringing together 

22 separate agencies with nearly 180,000 employees into a cohesive Department, 

while protecting the Nation against natural and man-made disasters. While the substantive programs that DHS implements are critical to the protection of our country, 

the effective management of DHS as a cohesive entity is central to how effective it 

is in implementing those activities. 

This May, my Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia held a hearing in which we examined 

the Department’s challenges and needed improvements. Several overarching themes 

were highlighted at that hearing. Mr. Walker’s testimony and the GAO report 

issued today underscore that a number of those same issues continue to challenge 

DHS. 

First, the Department must do more to address its human capital needs. With 

nearly half the workforce eligible for retirement in the next 5 years, the Department 

needs to focus on the recruitment and retention of skilled and talented employees, 

while addressing the unacceptably low morale within the workforce as demonstrated 

by the OPM Human Capital Survey. 

Second, the Department still has not developed a comprehensive management integration strategy. Although the Department has made progress in many areas, 

some key functions, such as acquisitions and financial management, are not fully 

integrated. 

I also remain concerned that the Under Secretary for Management does not have 

sufficient statutory authority to oversee the Department’s integration while also focusing on ongoing management challenges. The Under Secretary was given more 

authority to serve as the Chief Management Officer and the principal advisor for 

management at DHS with the approval of the Improving America’s Security Act 

(P.L. 110–53). However, the measure did not elevate the position to a Deputy Secretary level as I believe is necessary for the CMO to be most effective. That is why 

I joined with Senator Voinovich in supporting the Effective Homeland Security Management Act, S. 547, to elevate the Under Secretary for Management to Deputy Secretary for Management. With your support, Mr. Chairman, the Committee approved 

this bill, and I look forward to working with the Senate leadership to pass this bill 

and improve the state of management at the Department. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing today, and I look forward to learning more about these important issues. 

38 


38841.001
39 


38841.002
40 


38841.003
41 


38841.004
42 


38841.005
43 


38841.006
44 


38841.007
45 


38841.008
46 


38841.009
47 


38841.010
48 


38841.011
49 


38841.012
50 


38841.013
51 


38841.014
52 


38841.015
53 


38841.016
54 


38841.017
55 


38841.018
56 


38841.019
57 


38841.020
58 


38841.021
59 


38841.022
60 


38841.023
61 


38841.024
62 


38841.025
63 


38841.026
64 


38841.027
65 


38841.028
66 


38841.029
67 


38841.030
68 


38841.031
69 


38841.032
70 


38841.033
71 


38841.034
72 


38841.035
73 


38841.036
74 


38841.037
75 


38841.038
76 


38841.039
77 


38841.040
78 


38841.041
79 


38841.042
80 


38841.043
81 


38841.044
82 


38841.045
83 


38841.046
84 


38841.047
85 


38841.048
86 


38841.049
87 


38841.050
88 


38841.051
89 


38841.052
90 


38841.053
91 


38841.054
92 


38841.055
93 


38841.056
94 


38841.057
95 


38841.058
96 


38841.059
97 


38841.060
98 


38841.061
99 


38841.062
100 


38841.063
101 


38841.064
102 


38841.065
103 


38841.066
104 


38841.067
105 


38841.068
106 


38841.069
107 


38841.070
108 


38841.071
109 


38841.072
110 


38841.073
111 


38841.074
112 


38841.075
113 


38841.076
114 


38841.077
115 


38841.078
116 


38841.079
117 


38841.080
118 


38841.081
119 


38841.082
120 


38841.083
121 


38841.084
122 


38841.085
123 


38841.086
124 


38841.087
125 


38841.088
126 


38841.089
127 


38841.090
128 


38841.091
129 


38841.092
130 


38841.093
131 


38841.094
132 


38841.095
133 


38841.096
134 


38841.097
135 


38841.098
136 


38841.099
137 


38841.100
138 


38841.101
139 


38841.102
140 


38841.103
141 


38841.104
142 


38841.105
143 


38841.106
144 


38841.107
145 


38841.108
146 


38841.109
147 


38841.110
148 


38841.111
149 


38841.112
150 


38841.113
151 


38841.114
152 


38841.115
153 


38841.116
154 


38841.117
155 


38841.118
156 


38841.119
157 


38841.120
158 


38841.121
159 


38841.122
160 


38841.123
161 


38841.124
162 


38841.125
163 


38841.126
164 


38841.127
165 


38841.128
166 


38841.129
167 


38841.130
168 


38841.131
169 


38841.132
170 


38841.133
171 


38841.134
172 


38841.135
173 


38841.136
174 


38841.137
175 


38841.138
176 


38841.139
177 


38841.140
178 


38841.141
179 


38841.142
180 


38841.143
181 


38841.144
182 


38841.145
183 


38841.146
184 


38841.147
185 


38841.148
186 


38841.149
187 


38841.150
188 


38841.151
189 


38841.152
190 


38841.153
191 


38841.154
192 


38841.155
193 


38841.156
194 


38841.157
195 


38841.158
196 


38841.159
197 


38841.160
198 


38841.161
199 


38841.162
200 


38841.163
201 


38841.164
202 


38841.165
203 


38841.166
204 


38841.167
205 


38841.168
206 


38841.169
207 


38841.170
208 


38841.171
209 


38841.172
210 


38841.173
211 


38841.174
212 


38841.175
213 


38841.176
214 


38841.177
215 


38841.178
216 


38841.179
217 


38841.180
218 


38841.181
219 


38841.182
220 


38841.183
221 


38841.184
222 


38841.185
223 


38841.186
224 


38841.187
225 


38841.188
226 


38841.189
227 


38841.190
228 


38841.191
229 


38841.192
230 


38841.193
231 


38841.194
232 


38841.195
233 


38841.196
234 


38841.197
235 


38841.198
236 


38841.199
237 


38841.200
238 


38841.201
239 


38841.202
240 


38841.203
241 


38841.204
242 


38841.205
243 


38841.206
244 


38841.207
245 


38841.208
246 


38841.209
247 


38841.210
248 


38841.211
249 


38841.212
250 


38841.213
251 


38841.214
252 


38841.215
253 


38841.216
254 


38841.217
255 


38841.218
256 


38841.219
257 


38841.220
258 


38841.221
259 


38841.222
260 


38841.223
261 


38841.224
262 


38841.225
263 


38841.226
264 


38841.227
265 


38841.228
266 


38841.229
267 


38841.230
268 


38841.231
269 


38841.232
270 


38841.233
271 


38841.234
272 


38841.235
273 


38841.236
274 


38841.237
275 


38841.238
276 


38841.239
277 


38841.240
278 


38841.241
279 


38841.242
280 


38841.243
281 


38841.244
282 


38841.245
283 


38841.246
284 


38841.247
285 


38841.248
286 


38841.249
287 


38841.250
288 


38841.251
289 


38841.252
290 


38841.253
291 


38841.254
292 


38841.255
293 


38841.256
294 


38841.257
295 


38841.258
296 


38841.259
297 


38841.260
298 


38841.261
299 


38841.262
300 


38841.263
301 


38841.264
302 


38841.265
303 


38841.266
304 


38841.267
305 


38841.268
306 


38841.269
307 


38841.270
308 


38841.271
309 


38841.272
310 


38841.273
311 


38841.274
312 


38841.275
313 


38841.276
314 


38841.277
315 


38841.278
316 


38841.279
317 


38841.280
318 


38841.281
319 


38841.282
320 


38841.283
321 


38841.284
322 


38841.285
323 


38841.286
324 


38841.287
325 


38841.288
326 


38841.289
327 


38841.290
328 


38841.291
329 


38841.292
330 


38841.293
331 


38841.294
332 


38841.295
333 


38841.296
334 


38841.297
335 


38841.298
336 


38841.299
337 


38841.300
338 


38841.301
339 


38841.302
340 


38841.303
341 


38841.304
342 


38841.305
343 


38841.306
344 


38841.307
345 


38841.308
346 


38841.309
347 


38841.310
348 


38841.311
349 


38841.312
350 


38841.313
351 


38841.314
352 


38841.315
353 


38841.316
354 


38841.317
355 


38841.318
356 


38841.319
357 


38841.320
358 


38841.321
359 


38841.322
360 


38841.323
361 


38841.324
362 


38841.325
363 


38841.326
364 


38841.327
365 


38841.328
366 


38841.329
367 


38841.330
368 


38841.331
369 


38841.332
370 


38841.333
371 


38841.334
372 


38841.335
373 


38841.336
374 


38841.337
375 


38841.338
376 


38841.339
377 


38841.340
378 


38841.341
379 


38841.342
380 


38841.343
381 


38841.344
382 


38841.345
383 


38841.346
384 


38841.347
385 


38841.348
386 


38841.349
387 


38841.350
388 


38841.351
389 


38841.352
390 


38841.353
391 


38841.354
392 


38841.355
393 


38841.356
394 


38841.357
395 


38841.358
396 


38841.359
397 


38841.360
398 


38841.361
399 


38841.362
400 


38841.363
401 


38841.364
402 


38841.365
403 


38841.366
404 


38841.367
405 


38841.368
406 


38841.369
407 


38841.370
408 


38841.371
409 


38841.372
410 


38841.373
411 


38841.374
412 


38841.375
413 


38841.376
414 


38841.377
415 


38841.378
416 


38841.379
417 


38841.380
418 


38841.381
419 


38841.382
420 


38841.383
421 


38841.384
422 


38841.385
423 


38841.386
424 


38841.387
425 


38841.388
426 


38841.389
427 


38841.390
428 


38841.391
429 


38841.392
430 


38841.393
431 


38841.394
432 


38841.395
433 


38841.396
434 


38841.397
435 


38841.398
436 


38841.399
437 


38841.400
438 


38841.401
439 


38841.402
440 


38841.403
441 


38841.404
442 


38841.405
443 


38841.406
444 


38841.407
445 


38841.408
446 


38841.409
447 


38841.410
448 


38841.411
449 


38841.412
450 


38841.413
451 


38841.414
452 


38841.415
453 


38841.416
454 


38841.417
455 


38841.418
456 


38841.419
457 


38841.420
458 


38841.421
459 


38841.423
460 

Æ 


38841.424