ARMY PROFESSIONALISM,

THE MILITARY ETHIC,

AND OFFICERSHIP IN THE 21st CENTURY

Dr. Don M. Snider

 Major John A. Nagl

Major Tony Pfaff

December 1999
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ii
FOREWORD

In the following monograph, Dr. Don M. Snider, a 

Army colonel and Professor of Political Science at West 

Major John Nagl of the Department of Social Sciences, and 

Tony Pfaff of the Department of English and Philosophy, a

what they—and many others—perceive to be a decline in m

professionalism in the Army officer corps. The author

describe the ethical, technical, and political compone

military professionalism and then address the causes 

decline. They conclude by proposing a set of principles w

adhered to, will reinvigorate the vision of the officer cor

motivate the corps to selfless service.

Dr. Snider, and others who served in the Army in th

stages of the Vietnam War, saw firsthand the deleterious 

that result when an institution loses or discards its mor

ethical compass. One of the hallmarks of a great insti

however, is its ability to recognize and deal with its defec

Army did that during the decades that followed the Vietnam 

The officers and soldiers of America’s Army rebuilt 

institution into the world’s finest army; the force of deci

Operation DESERT STORM. In the last few years, 

downsizing and vastly increased operational tempo have 

negative impact on the Army and the officer corps. B

General Eric Shinseki understands what is at stake, our 

has challenged each of us to help him reinvigorate Am

Army. Accordingly, we commend this thought-provoking es

a step in that direction.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Interim Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
C

OOSSO

The United States Military Academy activated the Center 

Professional Military Ethic (CPME) in August 1998 to bring 

cohesiveness to the United States Military Academy’s moral

training of cadets. While the cadet honor code (which states 

cadet shall not lie, cheat or steal or tolerate those who do”) and th

(“Duty-Honor-Country”) provide the underpinnings of cadets

ethos, Academy leadership established the Center to deepen 

understanding of the Professional Military Ethic and to develop 

each cadet a self concept of officership. The Center will also coo

and integrate the Academy’s officership development programs 

the curriculum. In turn, as the Center matures, it will provide en

assessment methods and resources to Academy leadership, as 

assistance to the field Army, other training centers and 

education institutions with ethical development issues, train

volunteer instructors and ethical development opportunities for 

Specifically the center will perform five functions: (1) Deve

maintain instructional materials in support of a program of inst

to the Corps of Cadets on the Professional Military Ethic; (2) As

effectiveness of the “West Point Experience” in developing within 

a professional self-concept and an understanding of the Profe

Military Ethic; (3) Conduct research on the Professional Militar

to determine its current content, the potential requirements for 

and its application to the education of cadets and ultimately 

Army; (4) Develop outreach initiatives to assist and interface w

Army, particularly schools of professional military education, an

appropriate Federal and civilian institutions on the sub

professional ethics and ethical education relating to the Profe

Arms and scholastic integrity; (5) Supervise the Cadet Hon

Respect Committees.

This paper, jointly sponsored by SSI and CPME, is intende

the first of many whose purpose is to promote scholarship on Off

and the Professional Military Ethic as well as enhance the discu

military professionalism within the Army and sister services.

Michael E. Haith

Colonel, Infantry

Director, CPME

iv
 OF THE AUTHORS

DR. DON M. SNIDER is Professor of Political Sc

teaching seminars in military innovation/adaptatio

civil-military relations in the Department of Social Sc

at West Point. He has been a member of the civilian fa

of the U.S. Military Academy since 1998, having prev

held the Olin Chair in National Security Stu

1995-1998. Earlier, he completed a military career 

included three combat tours in the Republic of Vietnam 

much later, service on the staff of the National Se

Council, The White House. He retired from the Office 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1990. Dr. Sn

current research and publications focus on military cu

and ethics, the gap between the military and Ame

society, officership, and U.S. security policy tow

Europe. 

MAJOR JOHN A. NAGL teaches international rel

and national security studies in the Department of 

Sciences at West Point. A West Point graduate, he 

Masters and Doctoral degrees in International Rel

from Oxford University, where he studied as a R

Scholar. His doctoral dissertation, “Learning to Eat 

with a Knife,” examined how military organizations 

to unfamiliar situations. An armor officer, he led a 

platoon of the First Cavalry Division during Ope

DESERT STORM and commanded an armored ca

troop in the First Armored Division in Germany. 

Nagl’s recent publications include works on arms c

policy and military innovation.

MAJOR TONY PFAFF teaches in the Departme

English and Philosophy at West Point. He received a 

Economics and Philosophy from Washington and 

University and an MA in Philosophy from Sta

University, where he was also a graduate fellow a

v
officer, he served in the 1/505 PIR, 82d Airborne from 

to 1991 with which he deployed to the Persian Gulf. H

also served in the First Armored Division from 1992

holding several brigade and battalion level pos

including Company Commander and Battalion S3. D

that time he also deployed to Macedonia for Ope

ABLE SENTRY. Major Pfaff has written and pres

several papers on a variety of topics including m

ethics, ethics of development and conflict resolution.

vi
THE MILITARY ETHIC, AND

OFFICERSHIP IN THE 21st CENTURY

Introduction: Army Professionalism and Co

within the Professional Military Ethos.

On January 25, 1999, a tall, ramrod-straight 

combat-arms officer serving in Bosnia with the 1st Arm

Division told the about-to-graduate cadets at West Po

tell my men every day there is nothing there worth 

them dying for.” It was a startling admission to the c

who were in the midst of a series of classes o

professional military ethic; the lieutenant’s admissio

utterly contradictory to what they had been studying. 

studies had led them to believe that minimizing casu

was an inherent part of every combat mission but 

mission in and of itself, particularly one which 

impede or even preclude success in the unit’s mission 

this case, peace operations within the American sec

Bosnia. Queried by a cadet in the audience as to w

communicated this to his men, the lieutenant respo

“Because minimizing, really prohibiting, casualties 

top-priority mission I have been given by my bat

commander.” 

Some time later in the presentation the bat

commander gave his perspective. “It’s simple,” he 

“When I received my written mission from Div

absolutely minimizing casualties was the mi

prioritized as first, so I in turn passed it on in my w

operations order to my company commanders. This 

mission we have, this is the environment in whi

work.”

2

Some months later an article in Army magazine 

Army major made the same point. Arriving for du

Bosnia, his brigade commander gave the majo

1
conflict, then we don’t do the mission.”3

To us, these two examples from the many commun

each week within the media and among the e-mail 

Army officer corps demonstrate that the Army’s nor

professional behavior are being corroded by po

guidance on force protection. Doubtless the ethics of 

services are being corroded by the same guidance—w

Air Force pilots flying combat missions from f

thousand feet in Kosovo and Bosnia to avoid the risk o

loss from ground fire and missiles. Yet one does no

senior military leaders defending the military 

informing the profession and the American public it s

of its utter necessity for military effectiveness. Neithe

one read in military journals significant dialogues o

personal conflicts this is causing for individual office

Placed in the larger context and stated simply, ch

in the international system since the end of the Cold 

the new nature of conflict (which we will refer to sim

military operations other than war, MOOTW) and se

changes within American society are strongly influe

the American military ethic in directions unknown. T

an issue of military professionalism, rightly under

and as such in an era of already declining 

professionalism is of vital concern to both professiona

the society they serve.

Thus this manuscript will proceed to place this issu

the context of military professionalism, a topic little st

in the military now and even less understood outsid

profession. Subsequently, we will use that framewo

analyze two issues within the profession now imp

healthy adaptations—the officer corps’ intellectual m

over the purpose of the Army and their ethical muddl

the role of self-sacrifice in the profession’s ethos. We b

these two unresolved contradictions have contribut

very significant ways to the Army’s inability thus far t

effectively with vexing issues such as force prote

2
renewed self-concept and motivation of the Army o

corps, a self-concept that, if it existed now, would lend 

different perspective to such issues as force protectio

A Framework for Analysis:

Military Professionalism. 

Our understanding of military professionali

adapted from Professor Sam. C. Sarkesian.

4

 As he no

1981, “the examination of professionalism, its bound

and substantive elements lack a generally accepte

coherent perspective.”

5

 Fortunately, Professor Sark

outlined such a framework in his book, but to our know

it has not been seen in the literature since. It is a fram

that in the more quantitative analytical environment 

would be considered a 3x3 matrix of political, socia

functional interactions inherent in the relation

between a democratic society and its Army—its m

servants. In matrix form it appears as:

Components

Level

of Analysis

Military

Technical

Ethical Politi

Society

Land mine ban,

MOOTW

missions

Post-modern or

egoist ethic

Casualty

averse,

interventi

Military

Institution

RMA,

resources,

recruiting, and

declining

professionalism 

The

Professional

Military Ethic

and force

protection

Powell Do

and force

protection

Individual

Soldier

Individual

skills, retention

Individual

values

Individua

politics,

civil-milita

“gap”

Figure 1. American Military Professionalism

3
at least three different levels. They can be viewed 

level of, or from the perspective of, the American s

sanctioning the military institution, the military insti

itself (the Army), or from the perspective of the indiv

soldier within the institution. In contrast to the ve

lines above, the horizontal lines in the diagram repr

real boundaries across which deep and ab

relationships have been created, both official (forma

unofficial (informal). These relationships and some 

contemporary issues creating tensions, both health

dysfunctional, will be delineated briefly in the section

follow in order to show their contextual reality amon

many interactions and relationships involved. T

together they provide a brief overview of the state 

military institution, its professionalism or effectiv

and its relationship with the society it serves.

The Functional or Military-Technical Component 

component includes those aspects of the profession tha

it unique purpose and legitimacy, what Huntington 

the “expertise” of the profession.6 He defined this func

the post-World War II era as the “management of viol

Others have at different times given it different title

the essence remains clear regardless of specific pu

statement: Armies have been created by societies th

the ages for the purpose of protecting themselves, 

territory and their way of life, and for advancing 

national interests in the regions around them. Durin

almost four centuries since the Treaty of Westphali

the appearance of the nation-state, the form

relationships between societies and their armies 

varied dramatically depending on the society, its ide

and its form of government, i.e., the state.

7

 Now 

post-Cold War era, it may be the case that once aga

formative relationships have changed, at least amon

advanced democratic nations, reserving armie

primarily defensive purposes.

8

 Such form

relationships include the purpose for which society se

4
such uses, particularly human resources—by conscr

of a mass citizen army, by soliciting/enticing volun

from among the citizenry as the United States does tod

by some combination of these methods.

At the societal level, one currently contentious iss

noted in Figure 1) is the desire of some American po

leaders and a considerable portion of the public to outl

international treaty the use of land mines as a fo

warfare. Such intrusions into the traditional sph

military professionals—how best to fight wars—i

indicator of society’s dissatisfaction with cu

professionalism. Thus the darker horizontal line separ

the societal level of analysis from the institutional 

connotes an American civil-military relationship cur

with significant tensions on many issues across all 

components of professionalism, land mines being only 

At the institutional level , the military-tech

component focuses on the overall effectiveness of the A

Is it capable of doing what society expects of it and 

manner it is expected? Such military effectiveness 

result of many things, some under the control of the le

of the military institution and others that must be pro

by a supporting society.

10

 Internally, the U.S. Army 

considers these essential inputs to combat effectiven

be the “six imperatives”: force mix, doctrine, tra

modern equipment, leader development, and q

people.

11

At this level of analysis, there are myriad 

currently demanding the urgent attention of the o

corps, those who are responsible for creating the intell

consensus and direction that sets the profess

standards which produce military effectiveness

subsequently for policing and adapting these standa

necessary. Such issues include the institution’s inabi

obtain a level of resources sufficient to the institu

needs, the demonstrable decline in military effectiven

5
need to modernize fighting forces for the inform

dominant forms of warfare potentially available i

“revolution in military affairs (RMA).”

13

 These issues

major significance for the decline in Army profession

have existed roughly in current form since shortly aft

end of the Gulf War in 1992.

At the third level of analysis, that of the indiv

soldier, professionalism in the functional comp

becomes the issue of individual competence in soldier 

and the motivation by which those skills are to be use

integrated with those of other soldiers, whether th

officer, noncommissioned officer or enlisted soldier. 

the virtual revolution that occurred in Army tra

programs in the 1980s, resulting in the remar

proficiency of our forces in the Gulf War, it mig

supposed that at this level few problems exist. But t

clearly not the case. Since the Gulf War, the se

mismatch between a military structure too large 

resources too small, when combined with an unusuall

operational tempo for MOOTW, has severely erode

trust and commitment of individual officers and so

toward both the Army and the society it serves. Th

been particularly so when the soldier’s quality of 

contrasted to a roaring American economy with an exc

good job opportunities. Thus at the individual 

declining professionalism is reflected in the sys

institutional failure to attract and retain sufficient re

from the citizenry to man the current Army force stru

along with the continuing exodus of company grade of

particularly from the combat arms.

14

The Ethical Component. The ethical component se

each level of analysis to answer questions like “what s

officers and soldiers do?” and “what kind of leaders s

the Army have?” The answers to these questions est

norms of individual and collective behavior, what cour

action, and what outcomes the officer is obligated to se

sum, they constitute a professional military ethi

6
principles or values governing a particular cultu

group.”

15 Just as with the military-technical comp

this component can be analyzed from the perspecti

American society, the military institution, or the indiv

soldier.

At the societal level, it is difficult to categorize succ

the ethics to which Americans adhere. Americans a

eclectic people who embrace a variety of ethical b

however, recently some have accumulated more wei

those in influence have embraced them. These trends

labeled inaccurately as “post-modernism,” refl

rejection by many Americans of traditional m

standards. While some skepticism regarding traditio

authority is healthy, completely rejecting tradi

standards undermines the possibility of a common na

or societal ethic on which professional organization

rely to inform their own ethics. What many call 

modernism” is best thought of as a complex collect

beliefs and theories that, in essence, reject the idea 

there is any such thing as objective truth, ethi

otherwise. Without an objective standard, “truth” is 

left to the individual or group to decide and thus be

relative to their desires and beliefs. This has underm

the earlier consensus among Americans that any part

belief can actually be wrong.

Of course, not all Americans embrace such relat

but often what arises in its place is an unreflective eg

which is best characterized as the belief that wh

morally good is “what is best for me.” Rather tha

relative standard that post modernism offers, egoism 

objective standard against which to measure condu

basic premise is everyone should do those things, an

those things, that they perceive are good for them. Su

ethic does not necessitate untrustworthiness, coward

selfishness, and, in fact, many Americans have found 

is in their interests to be trustworthy, brave, and givin

often so behave. Nonetheless, such an ethic doe

7
selfishness by describing it as morally reprehensible—

when it does not, this ethic comes into direct conflic

the professional military ethic.

Many Americans have combined this egoist ethic 

the post-modern insight that all truth is relative, an

on the contradictory ethical system that results from 

viewpoint to make ethical decisions. We cannot recou

number of students we have had who profess a be

Christianity, Judaism, or Islam but reject the possibi

objective moral truth. This experience on campuse

been noted and written about by other philosophers.

fact that the acceptability of such contradictory belie

seeped so profusely through modern religious institut

alarming evidence that reason is slowly being disreg

as important in the larger society. And to a mi

institution that values, and indeed prizes, rational th

and decisionmaking processes, the potential conf

immense. Just as our students see no problem embr

the contradictory beliefs of an objective religion along 

relative “post-modernism,” so too many officers toda

nothing wrong with embracing a personal eth

unreflective self-interest or relativism, along wit

objective ethical demands of the profession.

At the level of the military institution, this contrad

is most evident as officers attempt to reconcile 

personal ethic with that of the institution. While the b

of egoism and post-modern relativism can be 

consistently by many in America, they cannot be he

Army officers who simultaneously hold an obje

professional ethic.

1 7 One reason is that whil

professional military ethic requires that at least 

truths be held as objective, the social ethic does not. An

is that while the professional military ethic require

the officer put self-interest secondary to at least some 

considerations, the prevailing social ethic does not. T

not a new dilemma for the Army: Since the founding 

Republic with its unique social contract makin

8
and accepted that it, ironically, can never reflect inte

the essence of this contract.

18

Furthermore, the ethical obligations of the offic

objective and are not contingent on any desire held b

individual. The professional military ethic is not a re

ethic. The obligation to uphold it or any of its tenets do

arise because those in the profession said so, but r

because it is necessary if the profession is to be effect

its purpose of warfighting. In a relativist ethic what i

or bad is justified based on the desires of the individ

group; what is good is what makes one (or the group

good, while what is bad is what does not. For a profes

ethic, good and bad are determined, in part functiona

how the profession contributes to society. As noted ea

the military performs a socially useful, indeed 

function—the protection of society and its territory an

of life. This creates a moral obligation for the soldie

particularly for the commissioned officer, to re

effectively when called on to defend a defenseless so

even to the point of death.

19

Thus, where it would be improper for a manager a

to invade the privacy of her employees, the officer is m

obligated to do so. In order for the military to function 

leaders must know and have influence over many asp

soldiers’ private lives, including their health and ph

condition, how they spend their money, and where and 

whom they spend their free time. 20 This does not 

however, that rightness or wrongness of exercising 

influence is relative to the situation, or even relative 

desires of the officer corps or business professiona

means that given how the officer and the busines

contribute to the well-being of society, in every case it w

be wrong for the IBM manager to exercise such infl

and right for the military officer to do so.

The objectivity of the professional military ethic i

not contingent on any personal desire a member 

9
instrumental—they do not take the form “If I want t

soldier, then I must be willing to sacrifice.” Rather the

the form “Since I am a soldier, I must be willing to sacr

The source of these truths arise out of the moral oblig

an officer incurs when he or she accepts a public trus

when an officer accepts freely, without reservation, 

her Commission from society. The obligations m

profession specific—that is they only hold for those 

accept the Commission—but they are nonetheless obj

in nature. They hold regardless of the desires or bel

those who accept such charges.

Given this understanding of the nature o

professional military ethic, at the individual lev

problem is not just that the contradictions discussed e

may cause soldiers to mistakenly choose one ethic ov

other. Nor is the problem that soldiers may sometime

weight to the social ethic when they should have 

weight to the professional ethic though on occasion th

can be a problem, witness the Aberdeen scandal o

egregious behavior of BG Hale.

21

The fundamental problem is the existence o

contradiction itself. Logically, anything can follow f

contradiction. And if literally anything follows fr

contradiction, then any system of beliefs th

contradictory can produce any other belief. Ethical 

systems are supposed to guide our behavior. But if any

follows from a contradiction then anything could 

ethical truth and thus any belief can pass as e

guidance. And if any belief can pass as ethical guid

then ethics would not be able to guide decisions 

individually or organizationally—any decision wou

just as good as another! This renders such an ethical s

nonsensical and self-defeating.

Some officers claim that their unwillingness to 

fully the norm of self-sacrifice is motivated mo

unwillingness to sacrifice in vain, rather than relativ

10
maximizing self-interest, but rather the national int

They see many MOOTW missions as never-ending, qu

quests that are only marginally in the national intere

this view, putting soldiers’ lives at risk when it be

America so little is not just imprudent, but immoral

officers then see radical force protection 22 as inhe

moral since it limits the chances that soldiers might h

pay the “ultimate” sacrifice in vain.

Certainly, it is wrong for the civilian leadership 

soldiers’ lives in jeopardy for immoral reasons. It is j

certain that the military’s senior leadership is requi

point that out to civilian leaders when they feel the ci

leadership is doing so. What is not clear, though, is 

missions that do not serve individual perceptio

national interests are in fact immoral. It would be h

argue that intervening to prevent humanit

catastrophes such as the genocide in Bosnia and Rwa

immoral just because the national interest, how

defined, is not well-served. But more to the point, se

officers must remember that under American nor

civil-military relations, determining the national inte

the responsibility of the elected leaders and the publi

serve, and not the responsibility, nor the prerogative, 

military. 

This is not to say that acting in the national inte

not an important consideration. However, it cannot 

only, or even always the best, criteria by which to j

military intervention and by extension, the riski

soldiers’ lives. If by immoral one means, “anything not 

national interest,” one is articulating a simple vers

nationalism, which privileges one group over another 

same way that egoism privileges one individua

another. Thus, it is subject to similar criticisms as eg

Therefore, while the national interest is certain

important consideration, it cannot be the whole story 

professional military ethic. If it were, then a

11
the national interest.

Therefore, the argument that it is immoral to inte

with soldiers to stop or prevent humanitarian dis

because such activities are only marginally in the na

interest loses its force. If it is not immoral to send soldi

such missions, military leaders cannot have a 

objection to them and thus remain morally obligat

long as the military remains subordinate to ci

authority, to accept such missions.

Thus, we conclude that the post-modern 

(relativism) or an unreflective egoism (or nationalis

incompatible with being a professional military office

major ethical tension is the failure of individual offic

give up such ethics, adopting instead the necessary v

of a professional military ethic—e.g., self-sacrific

self-abnegating service. That leaders at multiple lev

not understand and act on this understanding sign

major breakdown in the acceptance and application 

professional military ethic within the United States 

Failure to recognize this can have terrible consequ

such as fostering uncritical acceptance of radical 

protection as the “right” thing to do, even at the expe

mission accomplishment!

The Political Component. This component of m

professionalism is the least understood today, pro

because of the Huntingtonian tradition withi

American profession of arms that the military should 

politics and politicization in order to retai

professionalism—Huntington’s objective control.

23 

tradition is rich with examples. Eisenhower did not re

with a political party until drafted for the presidency b

Republicans in 1951; General Marshall did not vote 

after his decades of public service, lest he be u

influenced.

24

 But regardless of the traditions, the m

institutions in America are, as Sarkesian point

inherently political institutions in their interactions 

12
governance.

25

 For example, their financial resourc

allocated annually by a political process in which they 

participate involving both the executive and legis

branches of government. Further, when executing 

unique function of warfighting, their use is determin

an equally political process involving the same branc

government, as well as by the opinion makers and 

public of American society itself. In fact, mi

institutions retain their legitimacy and standing 

profession only by their successful interaction in 

political processes and with the society they serve. 

their professionalism inherently has a political compon

At the societal level, as noted in Figure 1, 

increasingly clear that the use of U.S. armed forc

intervention abroad in humanitarian and peace-enfo

purposes is well-supported by the American people

more so than perceived by elected representatives o

political parties.

26

 It is also the case that the C

administrations have been well-appointed by l

interventionists, who, with much merit to their causes

been willing and able to pursue a more militarized 

foreign policy. The sentiment seems to be “What’s the 

of having this superb military that you are always ta

about if we can’t use it?” 27

At the societal level, there is also evident tension 

the uniqueness of military culture, a uniqueness whic

been under steady attack since the end of the Cold Wa

those of a progressive agenda. While it is not unusu

such political activism to be focused on the armed 

during periods of peace and prosperity, it is quite un

for elected political leaders not to offer informed assis

to a profession in need of selective adaptation, defendi

functional necessities of the profession’s cult

Unfortunately, it is the case that after three de

without conscription, too few Americans today

particularly those in positions of public influence, 

experiential knowledge of the instrumental val

13
need for such culture to senior military officers, a task 

have been either unable or unwilling to com

effectively.

30

At the next level of analysis, both of these iss

decisionmaking about the use of force and defense 

military culture—retain high salience withi

intellectual dialogue of the Army. So do the other 

mentioned under the military-technical compon

resourcing and readiness—and they are not unrelated

Weinberger-Powell doctrine is still held by many 

military leaders across the armed forces,

31 causin

well-publicized tensions of 1992-1994 bet

then-Chairman of the JCS, General Colin Powell, an

Clinton administration.

32 But at a deeper level all of 

major issues, from gaining the resources necessa

modernization to the use of force and to radical 

protection, reflect a renewed institutional ambivalenc

how far senior military leaders should go in opp

political guidance. When does their candid, profes

disagreement and dissent become disloyalty t

administration under which they serve? On the other 

when does its absence become disloyalty to the institu

which they are the chief stewards?33 When, if ever, ma

military leaders go beyond the three traditional functi

representing the profession and its needs, rendering c

professional advice, and executing legal orders from a

As shown in Figure 2, the roles of senior military le

today often overlap with those of civilian leaders, 

because they are elected and appointed leaders o

people, have the last say, even if wrong. In such situa

the plight of senior military leaders is not to be e

nonetheless, their duty should be clear.

At the institutional level, there is also currently a 

political issue. This is the “conventional wisdom” 

American society is casualty averse—unwilling to a

casualties in military operations supporting less-than

national interests. Such wisdom is, in fact, myth 

14
refutation of this position is in the following section), 

useful myth for political decisionmakers. And, if “cas

adversity” is becoming accepted by senior military le

it helps explain at the institutional level why the preve

of military casualties has such current salience.

Finally, at the individual level of analysis cu

concern, particularly within academia, is focused o

potential of a civil-military “gap,” a disjuncture betwe

culture and values of American society and those 

individuals composing the military, particularly the o

corps.34 While many are concerned with the r

Republicanization of the officer corps, the larger is

“how different and how separate” the military shou

from the society it serves. Whether this tension is sui g

owing to the policies of the Clinton administration re

to be seen.

35

In sum, in this section we have presented a fram

with nine perspectives across the componen

professionalism, and a brief overview of the U.S. Arm

its tensions with political leaders and the society it s

We have also noted its declining professionalism 

effectiveness. There is, as we will discuss subsequ

much behind each of these perspectives and 

inter-relationships that need to be examined if one 

understand well the reasons behind such declines. Suf

15

Figure 2. The Civilian-Military Interface.
America after every major war. Thus the Army is 

deeply involved in a necessary and vital transition f

Cold War Army focused on the “big war” in Europe 

Army of a different character to be used for a different 

missions under different priorities.

We now turn to a more in-depth analysis of two 

which we believe are significantly retarding the A

ability to get on with this vital transition of adaptat

21st century missions and environments while prese

the vital aspects of an effective land force. They ar

officer corps’ intellectual muddle over the fundam

purpose of the Army, and their ethical muddle over th

of self-sacrifice within the profession’s ethic.

Resolving the Intellectual Muddle.

After roughly five decades of almost continuous foc

land warfare in Europe, and now almost one deca

“peace,” the Army’s officer corps is, candidly speaking, 

midst of an intellectual muddle. That is, institutional

thinking and acting in a confused manner, one which 

its fundamental purpose and foundational relation

with the American society it serves. 36 Given the eno

revolutions through which American society has pas

the last decade, it should not surprise us to find th

Army is showing signs of strain; armies are such int

reflections of their parent societies that “a revolution 

one [is] bound to cause a revolution in the other.” 37 No

the causes of this muddle are of the Army’s own mak

within its control. There are, however, several impo

causes of the confusion that are within the institu

control, and, as we shall explain, it is there that the 

must start to redefine its purpose and organiza

essence. 

Preparing to Fight the Wrong War? While there is 

debate over whether true military innovation springs 

inside organizations, from external sources, or fr

16
cultural factors to a great extent determine wh

changes accord with the organizational essence 

Army.

39 Clearly, during periods of significant ex

change, it is axiomatic that public organizations s

cannot proceed with the learning and adaptation t

necessary for effectiveness in their task without a very 

vision of organizational essence and purpose. This 

function of senior leadership, to determine and artic

persuasively a coherent vision for the organization’s f

This axiom is even more applicable to mil

organizations where the histories of successful innov

disclose the absolute necessity of an engaged, well-info

officer corps conceptualizing, leading, and othe

facilitating the innovations and adaptations necessa

change. Such innovation in periods of transition is, aft

cultural in its essence rather than technological. 

clarity of vision, particularly at the strategic level, is 

by prominent theorists and historians as the essentia

step of successful military innovation and adapta

what is the new strategic task of the military instit

what is the new theory of victory for future war?

40

 Ad

William A. Moffett had a clear vision when naval av

was born in the 1930s, and there was no doubt in the 

of Generals Gavin and Howze after the Korean War 

the new need for airmobility of Army forces. But such c

of vision—realistic in its premises, coherent 

components of forces, mission and resources, and 

believable to the officer corps—we believe, has not 

provided since the end of the Gulf War and the initiat

the post-Cold War builddown of military capabilities

The two most prominent causes of the officer 

muddle are not hard to identify. Political guidance 

Army still requires conventional capabilities to ex

nearly simultaneously two major regional conflicts, 

the retention by many within the officer corps of th

Army, big war” vision and essence, and also the retent

the bulk of the Army’s Cold War force structur

17
administration has since 1993 repeatedly receive

approval of the American people for the conduct of MO

Given the reality of a desirable “can do” attitude amon

middle and lower ranks of the officer corps, it 

surprising a significant majority of those officers now a

MOOTW missions as the purpose and essence of the A

indeed, as the vision for the future.

41

 They have exper

nothing else and have been presented with no other vis

the future that is credible to them.

42

The major positions contributing to the muddl

shown in Figure 3.

Fighting and Winning the Nation’s Wars—

or Military Operations Other Than War?

Big Army, Big War MOOTW

Political leaders Yes Yes

Military leaders Yes No . . . Perhaps 

(1997)

Mid-, lower-officer

corps

No, not credible Yes

Figure 3.

As the diagram shows, America’s political leade

telling the Army its essence is to do both big war

MOOTW; and senior Army leaders are in turn tellin

institution the same thing. But at the lower level, whe

bulk of the officer corps accepts MOOTW as the way 

present and the future, it is a quite different story du

least four other causal factors:

• The resources, both financial and human, requi

placing both missions within the core purpose of the 

have not been forthcoming. Whether that is a fail

responsibility of political leadership or of senior mi

leaders is now largely irrelevant. To the majority 

serving officer corps it is simply inconceivable, gi

18
declining funds for collective training over the same p

that senior leaders, whether uniformed or not, can e

“more with less.” In fact this issue is one of the 

frequently mentioned as cause of the unprecedented

growing, gap in trust and confidence between the 

echelons of the Army officer corps and its s

leadership.

44

• The Army’s operational tempo, caused by a 37 pe

reduction in force structure since the Gulf War coupled 

repeated MOOTW, is up roughly 300 percent over Col

levels. Army-wide, soldiers are deployed an average o

140 days per year away from families and home pos

average is well over 200 days per year for those soldie

families assigned within Europe. Understandably

unsustainable rate has increasingly demoralized so

and their families, contributing heavily to the exod

junior officers and likely, to the current recruiting cri

the volunteer force.

• The Army officer corps, until the onslaught of MO

in the mid-1990s, generally held the self-concept, and 

the motivation, of leader-trainers. This was the succ

result of the TRADOC-led training revolution in the 

and 1980s.45 To be an officer was to be a leader and tra

soldiers, practically regardless of the officer’s branch

self-concept correctly placed great emphasis on ach

positive results from rigorous training in individua

particularly, collective skills. Unfortunately, give

multiplicity of missions and paucity of training reso

currently confronting the Army, those same officers, se

now in or selected for battalion and brigade comman

leaving the service in almost unprecedented numb

They echo the refrain, “It isn’t fun any more.”

47

regrettably yet, their junior officers are also leaving, s

that “I’ve seen what my commander has had to deal wi

past two years, and I don’t want to do that.”

48

It is a su

of a military profession in trouble that junior officers 

aspire to serve in their commander’s position . 

19
past seven years the amazing success of the Ame

economy, but have not participated in its benefits 

commensurable rate. More importantly, sociologicall

is not the Army of the 1970s or even the 1980s; roug

percent of the soldiers are now married with 85 perc

spouses working outside of the home. Thus, the imp

the excessive operation tempo on the current “married 

working spouse” force has no precedent in Army hi

Although some redress is on the way in FY 2000 in the 

of across-the-board and focused pay increases, the fail

the Army to provide adequately for quality of life iss

cited by enlisted soldiers as the main reason—far abov

other—for the lowest state of soldier morale in the 199

These facts about the current organizational cl

within the Army, particularly within the operationa

structure, document the consequences of an amazingly 

mismatch between resources and missions. To be sure

have been quantitative analyses aplenty describin

degree to which the Army lacks funding for moderniz

alone, and offering comparable explanations of why t

Force is now flying the oldest fleet of aircraft in 

service’s young history.

50

 Yet until 1999, wit

appearance of a systemic failure of recruiting fo

volunteer force and the unremitting exodus from the 

officer corps, the magnitude of the overall danger to m

professionalism was not so clear. It is now evident, ho

that the option of continuing to “muddle through

transition is no longer an option.

One Solution: Fight the Wars American So

Approves. Since this monograph is focused on pr

identification and analysis rather than solutions, whi

the purview of current uniformed leaders, we offer her

brief insights as to how this intellectual muddle 

organizational purpose and essence might be resolved

way among many, we are sure.

20
missions it accepts—at least, no professional army 

The hesitancy of the U.S. Army to accept wholehea

the missions it is currently being given strikes the au

of this paper as cause for concern in the context of mi

professionalism. We believe that means defining the A

organizational purpose, its essence, simply as servin

American society, and fighting the conflicts they ap

when they approve them. Any other essence or pu

statement places the institution in the illegitimat

unprofessional position of declaring its intelle

independence from the society it was formed to serve

as we have deduced from the evidence presented, 

Army continues to resist organizing, training

equipping itself to fight and win the “wars” it is cur

being asked to fight, it may no longer have a suffic

professional officer corps when the next big war occu

The Army can create a vision and an organiza

climate that accepts the importance of MOOTW 

maintaining much of its desired focus on training/ada

for future regional wars. But for that to occur, Army le

must resolve the resources-missions gap in ways th

credible. This must be done very quickly. There are 

options, from gaining relief/change in the “two-

guidance, to obtaining increased resources, to red

unneeded structure and infrastructure, to specializing 

within the total Army. None are easy nor without cost

it is equally clear that radical action to close the gap i

past due; the cost in declining professionalism is alrea

great. 

In light of these facts, it is encouraging that Army 

of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki recently addressed 

of the problems with which we have expressed conce

this monograph, and explicitly articulated a visi

“adjust the condition of the Army to better mee

requirements of the next century.”

51

 That vision is 

about the need to dramatically change the Army; a vis

“Soldiers on point for the Nation transforming this, th

21
force that is dominant across the full spectru

operations.”

52

To accomplish this transformation, General Sh

has promised that by the end of FY 2000, the A

divisions and armored cavalry regiments will be man

100 percent of authorization, removing some of the str

units as soldiers no longer have to do the job of two or 

Even more importantly, General Shinseki establis

vision of a lighter, more strategically deployable 

which will “allow us to put a combat capable br

anywhere in the world in 96 hours once we have rec

‘execute liftoff’, a division on the ground in 120 hours

five divisions in 30 days.”

The missions to which these lighter-weight unit

respond—and which their presence and capability s

help to deter—are the very peacekeeping and sta

operations which have confounded the Army’s 

structure and manning system since the end of the 

War. General Shinseki intends to begin procuring we

systems to man two new “middle-weight” bri

immediately. Changing the institutional culture, whic

looks askance at peacekeeping missions, however, wil

longer—but the need for change has been recognized

the process has begun. It will take time to see whethe

vision will prove credible and motivating to the bulk 

officer corps. As we have noted earlier in this monog

such a credible vision has been missing, contributing 

morale and diminishing trust between officers serv

the field and their leaders in Washington. In our 

solving the gap between missions and resources remai

unsecured, critical link to turning this new vision into 

than simply another declaratory policy.

The Comfortable Myth of a “Casualty Averse” Am

Public. Despite the promise of substantial change 

structure and organization of the Army to meet the ne

the new world order in which we find ourselves, ther

22
another component of military professionalism, the e

component. That is the trend for senior military lead

accept, as political leaders have accepted since the 

1990s, the myth that the American society is “cas

averse.” 

As we noted earlier, the issue of force protection 

some of its salience from the accepted conventional w

that the modern American public is very averse to acce

U.S. casualties in operations abroad. This “wisdom” is 

often cited in reference to the participation of U.S. a

forces in humanitarian and peace operations. On 

occasions it is presented as a broadly accepted w

applicable to all military operations abroad, regardl

purpose. It is a wisdom held by, and almost always v

by, influential elites in the nation’s foreign p

community, opinion makers such as elected politi

members of the press, columnists, and the ubiqu

chattering classes of Washington talk shows. As we 

see, not all scholars agree with this myth, partic

serious academics and serious polltakers.

The origins of such wisdom are varied, but one 

often cited is the incident in Mogadishu in October of 

Eighteen U.S. Army Rangers were killed in that action

television coverage in the United States subsequ

showed the body of an American soldier being dr

through the streets surrounded by jubilant Somalis.

5

days later President Clinton announced the end o

involvement in the operation, ostensibly because 

public’s adverse reaction to the casualties. He 

announced a rapid timetable for withdrawal of al

forces. The incident ultimately led to the sacki

Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, fu

heightening the understanding within the p

community that because of the public’s sensitiv

casualties could not be tolerated.54 At about the same 

sociological explanation for the American public’s av

to military casualties was offered by an American scho

23
Affairs.

55 Thus the myth grew—the public’s intolera

casualties results in quick reversals of public suppo

military operations abroad. Political leaders therefore 

to factor into their foreign policy decisions the risk o

reversal, and the political costs potentially to be inc

Subsequent political guidance to U.S. military leade

not ceased to emphasize the urgency and importa

absolutely minimizing U.S. casualties, and by exte

any collateral damage to civilian populations.

The most recent example—Kosovo, a war with

ground campaign and with U.S. pilots flying at f

thousand feet—is a clear manifestation of such po

guidance. The point here is that the conventional wisd

a myth. In fact, the American public is quite will

accept casualties, and doubtless, political leaders are a

of this. Recent scholarly research demonstrates, once 

convincingly, that there are two conditions that mu

apparent in order for the U.S. public to accept casual

they must be convinced there is a consensus among po

leaders that the operation is in the nation’s interest

that this same consensus among political leade

sufficient to see the venture through to a succ

conclusion (Lincoln’s, “that these dead here shall not 

died in vain . . .”).

57 The elite consensus was obv

missing, and thus in the public’s mind so als

willingness to see it through successfully, both in the c

Somalia in 1993 and in Kosovo in 1999.58 It has be

unwillingness, or inability, of the Clinton administrat

create an elite consensus that leaves their policy “ho

to the public’s recoiling from the loss of American so

lives. But this is not the doing of the public. Researc

repeatedly demonstrated that there is room for po

leaders to shape public opinion and create a foru

deliberation and debate of intervention decisions. 

sure, in that debate the public will consider in a ra

calculus the risks to American lives as well as other 

24
foreclosed because they are “casualty averse.”

Therefore, if it is understood that such behavi

political leaders who as a class, and forthrightly so, are 

concerned with reelection than with accomplishment 

military mission,

59 it becomes even more imperative 

why senior military officers are signing operational o

with the identical guidance. As we discussed i

introduction, such is the case today with Army di

commanders in Bosnia, and by implication of more 

commanders, also. Is it possible that senior Army o

have adopted the policy attitudes of political leade

more of concern, their behavioral norms? Clearly that 

impression the junior officers have, and as well one h

those of the public interested in the issue. Even 

perplexing than occasionally bowing to political press

senior officers’ intellectual acceptance of such a myth

true that political leaders are going to behave as thoug

myth was real; it is often in their individual self-inter

do so. Thus for practical purposes senior military le

must accept the myth as a real influence. It is influ

irrespective of its validity. But precisely because i

myth, senior military leaders must be articulat

persuasive in advice to civilian leaders that the public 

fact, not so casualty averse. Only then can they fulfil

profession’s responsibility for candid and forthright a

to political leaders as well as their responsibili

preservation of the profession’s ethic.

The gap between top military leaders and j

officers—and the public at large—is instructive here. 

mid-career officers and the American public believe 

while casualties should obviously be minimized, 

remain an inevitable part of any deployment. The

believe that the accomplishment of MOOTW mission

under certain circumstances as noted above, worth th

of loss of American lives. This perspective is demonst

in Figure 4.

25
An Analysis of Casualty Aversion

Is the U.S. Public

Casualty Averse?

Why?

Political Leaders

Yes Intervention is 

risk

Military Leaders

Echo High risk; less

preferred form 

Junior Military

Officers

No Willing to sacri

American Public

No Will accept, un

two conditions

Figure 4.

Again, the solution appears straightforward. S

Army leaders should replace all service guidanc

doctrine that treats the prevention of U.S. casualt

anything other than an inherent component o

operational mission.

60 The trust in operational comma

ability to accomplish missions prudently and compet

irrespective of the number of American casualties, m

restored, and immediately so.61 Without that, few o

aware of the profession’s need to maintain its own u

ethic will seek command. Ultimately there will 

profession, only an obedient military bureaucracy w

autonomy, one which responds in an unthinking 

uncritical manner to the requests and directives of ci

leaders. We doubt the military effectiveness of s

bureaucracy.

Resolving the Ethical Muddle.

Both history and present research confirm that 

during times of uncertainty and change in m

requirements that a firm foundation of sh

understanding of professionalism is most needed to su

the military organization.

 62We therefore offer severa

on how to refocus individual officers, and thus the o

corps itself, on the ethical foundations of professiona

26
addressing the issue of risk as an inherent part 

officer’s concept of duty. In other words, if an offi

morally obligated to lead her unit to successful m

accomplishment (the moral claim of the mission) 

obligation of, and thus the risk of, self-sacrifice inh

within that duty? And if so, what happens to the of

moral obligation, and thus to the profession’s et

political leaders proscribe such risk as part of a po

“radical force protection?” In the paragraphs that foll

address the first question by a review of the origins 

American military ethic, and subsequently answe

second by using examples of the recent NATO operat

Kosovo and Serbia.

The Inherence of Self-sacrificial Risk: Sacrifice I

Always Above and Beyond the Call of Duty . 

sacrificing may sometimes be above and beyond the 

duty, it is not always the case. We often apply word

“saint” and “hero” in a variety of situations, all of 

involve sacrifice, but not all of which involve circumst

that are above and beyond the call of duty. We do call h

people who do their duty even when consideratio

self-interest or self-preservation would cause most oth

fail. For example, consider the terrified doctor who re

with his patient in a plague stricken city. Clearly 

heroic, but it is still his duty to tend to his patien

presence or absence of the plague does not alter the fac

a doctor’s duty is to remain with his patient.

63

 It only a

how we judge the character of the doctor who does so

Nevertheless, it is not sufficient to simply asser

there are conditions when sacrifice can be obligator

must spell out what those conditions are. Just as 

actions in war, we must not think our concept of sa

must either permit everything, or allow nothing. It is 

to argue, for example, that the soldier who falls on a gr

to save his fellow soldiers was merely doing his duty

an action seems to be beyond the call of duty. If it is not

it is not clear that any action ever could be. Neverthel

27
who lead them, are obligated to risk their lives to accom

legitimate missions. What remains is to give a prin

account of this distinction.

In giving such an account, it is important to resi

temptation to justify such obligations by virtue of th

that one agreed to take the job. A trucker, for example

contract to deliver specified goods to a certain destinat

a certain time.64 However, he cannot be morally obliga

drive at high speeds over a dangerous shortcut, even 

means he may not be able to fulfill the provisions 

contract. The trucker, while he may have ce

contractual obligations, cannot be morally obligated 

his and others’ lives at risk to fulfill them. He will s

have to live with the penalty, and the customer will s

have to live without the goods. The officer, however, c

simply live without the victory that he or she may 

otherwise achieved. For this reason, especially give

kinds of sacrifices that the officer is required to mak

important that the obligation run much deeper than a 

“contract.” 

In fact, the obligation does run more deeply. It is r

ultimately in the fact that the service the officer 

provides is essential if human beings are to thriv

flourish. When officers play their roles well by effec

defending a defenseless society, they are contributing 

well-being of fellow citizens. If it were otherwise, we 

not be able to justify their obligation to make the s

sacrifices officers are often called upon to make.

But these sacrifices are justified. Human being

among other things, social creatures. If they are to 

they must form the kind of societies and structu

governance that permit, if not promote, the good life fo

its members. In any socio-political setting, a tension 

between the needs of the community and the needs 

individual. That tension is resolved in the Ame

constitutional system by recognizing that individuals 

28
liberty. A socio-political setting that recognizes such r

even if it sometimes resolves specific issues imper

would be one worth defending as is the American Repu

But rights entail obligations. If someone has a ri

something, someone else has an obligation to provide 

If a person has a right to life, the obligation falls 

someone to safeguard that life. If someone has a ri

liberty, then it falls onto someone to safeguard that li

This is why states have an obligation to raise and ma

armies.

65 Armies then perform a morally nece

function: safeguarding the rights to which the memb

that society are entitled vis`a vis external threats to 

security, individually and collectively.

Since it is a tragic, but no less true, fact that some h

societies feel a need to destroy other human societ

must then be a necessary feature (at least as long as th

is true) of a good society that it be able to defend itself

also means that it will be a good thing, though pe

under some conditions not morally obligated, to use fo

stop or prevent violent conflict, since the cessation of v

conflict is a necessary condition for a good society.

Since the authority to decide when the use of fo

appropriately in the hands of the civilian autho

professional soldiers have a prima facie obligat

accomplish the missions civilian authorities assign 

Since it can be morally permissible, if not obligatory, 

force outside national boundaries to stop or prevent v

conflict, professional soldiers are then obligated to pe

such missions, as long as they are not blatantly immor

we have argued earlier, humanitarian interventions a

blatantly immoral.

Furthermore, this issue goes to the deeper issue 

ongoing redefinition in America of what it means t

good citizen. While some may reject the idea that ci

owe any service to their country, our argument sug

otherwise. If America is a good society in the relevant 

29
time must either support the defense through the pay

of taxes or offer themselves for service in the cas

national emergency.

And those who answer the call for service incur s

moral obligations. As we have shown, what justifies 

obligations is that they are necessary if the state is 

properly defended. Since a successful defense depen

successful accomplishment of certain missions

accomplishment of those missions has moral force

means those who undertake such missions, unlike the 

truck driver cited earlier, are morally obligated to see 

through to success—even if that means putting them

and their soldiers at risk to do so. The only thing that 

negate this is some weightier moral claim.

This obligation to sacrifice is not limited to tim

conflict. Many, if not most, missions undertaken 

defense of a state engender some risk. Even in peace

training missions often have the potential to result in 

or death of those who participate. Thus by exte

self-sacrifice on the part of the officer corps to make po

realistic training which ultimately contributes to m

accomplishment is also morally obligated.

All of this is not to say that officers can ev

indifferent to friendly casualties. Rather, it is an of

duty to consider the risk of casualties, as well as se

other factors when planning how best to accom

assigned missions. The point is that the considerati

casualties, as well as other relevant factors, are inher

the moral duty to defend a defenseless society.

Hence, a coherent view of the officer’s duty is pres

in Figure 5.

As stated before, the moral claim of the mission ca

be superseded by a weightier moral claim. Self-interes

even sometimes self-preservation, cannot ser

weightier moral claims. If they could, the possibil

30
defending society would be undermined. And, as ind

earlier, that is not morally permissible. But, that the

be such claims must be understood before we h

complete conception of sacrifice for the mil

professional. The Just War Tradition (JWT), upon 

the Laws of Land Warfare are founded, embody one su

of obligations. JWT recognizes that everyone has the 

to life and liberty, regardless of the nation to which 

belong. This right can be mitigated, even negated, bu

under a certain set of conditions .

One of the fundamental principles that underli

JWT is that soldiers are obligated to take risks to pre

the lives of noncombatants. By gaining the right 

(which is necessary if they are to properly serve and d

the state), soldiers have given up the right not to be k

Noncombatants have not gained the right to kill, a

such, still retain their right not to be killed. While th

be mitigated somewhat by the application of the doctr

double effect,

66

 that doctrine requires, among other t

that soldiers take extra risks to preserve civilian live

This may seem counterintuitive to many mi

leaders. We often hear officers claim that their soldiers

are more valuable, and thus more worthy of protection

the lives of noncombatants.

68

 But those who make 

claims clearly misunderstand the extent of a soldier’s 

obligations. A soldier exists to defend on behalf of the 

the individual rights of its citizens. It makes no sense 

31

Figure 5. A Coherent View of the Officer’s Du
harmed, may enjoy additional protection at the expe

the lives of civilians, who do have a right not to be ha

Still, it is not the case that to preserve civilians

soldiers are obligated to take any and all risks. Their 

limited by the following conditions: by taking this ris

one cannot accomplish the mission, or (2) one will not b

to carry on future missions.

To illustrate this point, consider the following exa

In World War II, French pilots flying for the Allies 

France) had the problem that if they bombed high

could destroy their target with little risk to themselve

at a high cost in civilian casualties. If they bombed low

could destroy their target and their bombing wou

accurate enough to minimize civilian casualties, but 

casualty rate would be very high. The casualty rate wo

so high, in fact, that they might be able to carry out 

two “suicide” missions, but would not long be able to su

the effort and the Germans would have emerged victo

To resolve this tension, the French pilots bombe

enough to reduce civilian casualties but high enoug

their casualty rates would allow for not only m

accomplishment, but also for sustained operations a

the Nazis. Since all noncombatants—regardless of 

nationality—retain their right to life, soldiers (or airm

this case) are obligated to accept these extra ris

inherent within their duty.

69

This illustrates well the problem a policy of radica

protection poses for the professional military 

Consider the recent bombing of Kosovo and Serbia, w

Allied air forces bombed high enough to be out of ra

Serbian anti-aircraft weapons and Allied ground 

would not even mount a ground campaign for fe

casualties.

To our understanding these tactics, driven by Al

and domestic political considerations, were more des

to preserve soldiers’ and aviators’ lives than to rapid

32
civilian casualties than would have otherwise bee

case.70

By not using Apache helicopters, A-10s, or NATO g

troops to destroy Serbian military capacity, NATO 

failed to take risks they should have taken. Certainly 

forces were more vulnerable than high altitude bom

but by keeping them out of harm’s way, soldier

aviators placed risks they could have taken onto civ

But soldiers and aviators, as we have discussed befor

obligated to take risks, at least up to the point of c

failure, that civilians are not. If it was the case that N

could have accepted the additional risk without doomi

mission, then NATO was obligated to do so.

By not taking the risks necessary to destroy Serb 

and other military and paramilitary forces, NATO forc

not diminish the Serb capability to carry out their b

policies. By aiming at Serbian infrastructure and m

bases (resorting to the World War II strategy of attr

NATO forces failed to stop the continued slaugh

innocent civilians, and, as some have argued, might 

accelerated it. If this is the case, that by adopting t

with more risk for allied soldiers they could have deg

more rapidly Serb military capacity and thereby 

innocent lives, then NATO air forces were obligated t

those extra risks. This last point is important. Und

rules of land warfare, NATO forces had at least a prim

obligation to take risks to preserve innocents’ lives, an

did not do so.

These tactics may have been justified if the po

consequences of increased NATO military casualties 

have precluded intervening on behalf of the Albania

all. If political pressure in Germany or Italy, for exa

would render NATO incapable of conducting oper

against Serbian efforts to ethnically cleanse Kosovo A

failing to intervene would still result in a Kosovo clean

ethnic Albanians (though the cleansing would undou

33
of action, at least with respect to preserving soldier

airmens’ lives at the expense of rapid accomplishment 

mission, would be morally permissible. We sug

however, that was not the case. It is quite clear th

operation could have continued as a “coalition of the w

from within NATO, much as did the initial phases 

Bosnian campaign.

The problem for the professional military ethic s

now be obvious. Servicemen and women are not only m

required to take those risks necessary to accomplis

mission, they are morally required to take some addi

risks to preserve the lives of noncombatants. Even 

wants to argue that the priority mission was, in fact

protection, the claims to the rights of life and liberty 

part of the noncombatants supersede in this case the 

claims of force protection as a mission. Thus, und

imposition of a policy of radical force protection we h

situation where while serving the interests of the state, 

officers are obligated to do, the state places the officer co

a position from which it cannot fulfill its other 

obligations. This creates a contradiction that rende

professional ethic incoherent and ineffective at its most 

purpose: to provide moral guidance for behavior to bo

institution and individual members. 

This incoherent view of duty as currently implem

is shown in Figure 6; note the cracks in the duty co

caused by the extraction of casualty minimization an

placing of it as a supererogatory mission.

Reconceiving the Officer as Self-sacrificing Se

of Society.

It should now be clear that what is needed is a prin

approach to officership. We recommend principles 

foundation from which consensus can be built, edu

can proceed and officers can apply moral reasoning 

issues and problems they face in the course of their 

duties. We do not presume that the set of principles be

34
the very best one. We have given it considerable tho

but doubtless this set can be improved. Our point, how

is that there is insufficient intellectual consensus with

Army today as to what it means to be an officer. Cre

that consensus is the responsibility of the officer corp

therefore encourage readers to develop a better 

principles and to enter a dialogue in the profes

literature with a view toward creating consensus with

officer corps.

Adopting a principled approach to officership wi

believe, assist in the necessary recasting of the institu

role and the self-concept of the officer, and thus of the o

corps itself. We believe this is needed at every level, fro

pre-commissioning cadet to the Chief of Staff an

colleagues as they guide the institution through 

transition. Our basic reasons for believing that thi

necessary corrective, regardless of where the 

eventually exits the transition, are drawn from our 

and understanding of the Army as a fighting organiz

with a very unique culture.

As such, we understand that the process of resolvi

issues outlined in this monograph is essentially po

and organizational. It is political in that the institut

35

Figure 6. An Incoherent View of the Officer’s 

(as currently implemented in MOOTW).
intense and rapid change imposed through po

processes. It is organizational, and thus cultura

ethical, because the organization retains in its in

environment extensive autonomy to remake itself, to 

to the necessities of its new missions and priorities . Le

the institution and effecting change within it via po

and organizational processes are the raison d’être 

officer corps! By their public trust, they are respons

all times for both the current state of the Army a

professionalism; they lead every single soldier in the A

every day, in every installation around the g

maintaining the most effective organizational cli

possible. They are also responsible for those plan

policies that adapt the institution to changing realities

be sure they are assisted and supported by legions o

professional Army civilians and by the most profes

noncommissioned officer corps in the world, without 

they could not fulfill their responsibilities. But th

remains that commissioned officers, motivated by a c

self-concept of who they are and what they are to do on 

of American society, are the dominant force in m

organizational change, intellectually and ethically.

A Principled Approach to Officership.

72

Thus we offer the following set of principles from 

all officers, and particularly those at pre-commissi

levels, should draw both their vision and their motiv

1. The officer’s duty is to serve society as a wh

provide that which they cannot provide 

themselves—security. Thus a moral obligation 

between the officer and the society he or she serves, a 

obligation embodied in the officer’s “commis

Officers act as agents of society, both indivi

accountable to them and, as well, serving to strengthe

claim of the service on the affections of the American pe

36
subordinating their personal interests t

requirements of the professional function. They serve 

unlimited liability, including life itself. When assig

mission or task and particularly in combat, its succ

execution is first priority, above all else, with of

accepting full responsibility for their action

orders in accomplishing it.

3. Officers, based on their military expe

determine the standards of the profession, e.

tactical competence, for equipment specification

standards of conduct for all soldiers. With

professional self-policing role, officers set/chan

profession’s standards, personally adhere to the stand

make the standards known to all soldiers, and enfor

standards. 

4. The officer’s motivations are noble 

intrinsic, a love for his or her craft—the tech

and human aspects of providing the nat

security—and the sense of moral obligation t

this craft for the benefit of society. These motiv

lead to the officer’s attainment and maintenance 

highest possible level of professional skil

knowledge.

5. Called to their profession and motivated by 

pursuit of its expertise, officers are committed 

career of continuous study and learning.

6. Because of both the moral obligation accepted an

mortal means employed to carry out his or her duty

officer emphasizes the importance of the group 

that of the individual. Success in war require

subordination of the will of the individual to the task 

group—the military ethic is cooperative and cohes

spirit, meritocratic, and fundamentally anti-individua

and anti-careerist.

37
is subject to civilian authority and do not involve them

or their subordinates in domestic politics or policy b

the exercise of the basic rights of citizenship. Senior m

officers render candid and forthright profess

judgments when representing the profession and ad

civilian authorities (there is no public or political ad

role). 

8. The officer’s honor is of paramount import

derived through history from demonstrated co

in combat—the professional soldier always fights 

called on—and it includes the virtues of honesty 

integrity. In peace, the officer’s honor is reflect

consistent acts of moral courage.

9. The officer’s loyalty is legally and professio

to an office, rather than individual incumbents, a

every case is subordinate to their allegiance t

ideals codified in the Constitution.

10. The officer’s loyalty also extends downwa

those soldiers entrusted to their command and to 

welfare, as persons as well as soldiers, and that of 

families during both peace and war.

11. Officers are gentle-men and -women—pers

character, courtesy and cultivation, possessing the qua

requisite for military leadership.

12. Officers lead by example, always maintaini

personal attributes of spiritual, physical and mental f

requisite to the demands of their chosen profe

Through leadership, officers invest in 

subordinates, both as soldiers and as persons

particularly in the vital noncommissioned officer corp

the end that they grow in character, maturity and sk

Further, we believe that the vocation of office

should be understood and executed, indeed lived

consistent and principled manner. Given the importa

38
professionalism, the connection between the A

professional military ethic and the principles of office

is very relevant. If a principle cannot logically be de

from elements of the professional military ethic, t

should not be part of the self-concept as an o

Conversely, however, if the principles of officershi

correctly consistent with the professional military eth

supportive of it, then all officers regardless of rank s

reflect seriously on how many of these principles they 

inculcated—are these principles imbedded in thei

self-concept? Those commissioned by society 

remember that only to the extent that an officer cor

each one, loyal to its professional military ethic, can 

considered professional.

If it is the case, as we believe, that true character is 

accurately seen in adversity than in success, the

application of these principles can, perhaps, be most re

understood in the context of recent issues within or cl

the profession of arms—Iran-Contra, Tailhook, K

Towers, Aberdeen, and the Commander-in-C

impeachment. In these particular cases, three applic

of the principles come immediately to mind: the profes

concept of selfless service, the relevance to the profess

the difference between morality and legality, and las

most important, the officer’s valuation of truth.

The concept of service is central to a princ

understanding of officership. It holds that the profe

serves the American people by providing a socially 

and necessary function: defending Americans and 

interests by being schooled in war and hence able to 

effectively protective violence at their request. As no

this monograph, this meeting of a societal need creat

moral dimension of the Army’s professionalism as w

the noble character of the individual officer’s service 

fellow citizens. Embodied explicitly in the commissio

implicitly in the unwritten contract with society, this 

obligation requires of the officer unlimited liab

39
put service before self. Therefore, if involved in the t

crisis noted above, there should never be in the of

mind the need to preserve self nor to take any actions 

in that direction. To the officer, self is always 

abnegated to the higher calling through the discip

application of moral or physical courage. A self-abne

officer has no legacy save the character and quality of 

her service, and to attempt to create or maintain s

legacy would violate the basic concept of service inher

the profession and to a principled understandi

officership.

Secondly, just as the officer’s commitment to serv

grounded morally in his or her obligation to society, 

our form of government it is also grounded in law, b

the Constitution and in subsequent statutes. Bu

because the commitment has two overlapping founda

does not mean that both are to be valued equally b

officer, nor equally available to the officer dealing 

crisis. Particularly within an increasingly legalistic so

the officer’s reaction to crisis must always be to 

fulfillment of the moral obligation over that of the 

obligation, even at personal or professional expense. 

her role must be to do the right thing, to pursue the 

outcome on behalf of those served, American society

clear that any issue of intense divisiveness, pushe

enough by hyper-legalism and equivocation, becom

political issue resolvable only by political means—rea

discourse and compromise aimed, rightly, at the reso

of principled disagreements. But for the officer to p

such resolutions is to politicize the profession, exact

opposite of what is needed for professionalism to surv

principled understanding of officership requires in

that officers strive to attain the highest of moral stand

regardless of the minimum that the law might allow.

Third, and last, is the issue of truth. Not only 

commissioned officers always revere the truth, they 

also never be in fear of it. The crises being discussed h

40
disagreement because of epistemological concerns

issues in political-military crises are much more mun

but no less important—what happened, when, where

were the causes, who responded and how? Since the 

as well as the absence of fear about it, cements the b

trust between officer and society, it is always to be pu

and displayed with exceptional vigor. Utter transpare

the desired, indeed obligated, state betwee

accountable officer and the American people. That mea

a matter of highest principal that the officer speak

truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth” 

times because he or she is perpetually under moral 

upon accepting the commission. Given this attitud

behavior, coupled with the concept of selfless service 

above, fear of the truth holds no power whatsoever ov

officer. It is, in fact, his or her very best companion duri

long journey of service.

Thus, application of the principles yields attitude

behavior often at odds with those within the socie

officer has chosen to serve. Does this then mean th

officer is in any manner better than those in Ame

society? We do not believe so. It means only that the off

different, and has unreservedly chosen to b

Triumphalism and self-righteousness do not becom

serving officer nor the profession any more than self-se

actions, appeal to legalisms, and disdain for the power 

truth. It is better, we believe, for the officers, operat

camaraderie under the imperatives of their commiss

tend in a principled manner to each other, to 

profession and to its ethos.

Conclusion.

We trust this monograph demonstrates that w

deeply concerned by the cracks in the edifi

professionalism in the United States Army. We re

confident that a refocus on the framewo

41
we see as serious corrosion, even violation, o

professional military ethic. And we are encouraged b

recent creation of a Center for the Professional M

Ethic (CPME) at the U.S. Military Academy, West 

Hence we offer through that Center this monograph 

starting point for the officer corps’ review, reflectio

dialogue on their, and the Army’s, purpose and eth

believe such to be essential to help the Army refocus 

key role as the willing and effective servant of the Ame

people.

ENDNOTES

1. For the traditional understanding, see Michael Walze

Kinds of Military Responsibility,” in Lloyd Matthews and Dale 

eds., The Parameters of Military Ethics, Washington: Per

Brassy’s, 1989, pp. 67-72.

2. Comments in quotations are either exact quotes or from m

paraphrases of the lecture dialogue attended by all three of the 

of this monograph.

3. Major Mark L. Kimmey, “After the Deployment: The Im

Peacekeeping on Readiness,” ARMY, July 1999, p. 11.

4. Sam C. Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield: The New M

Professionalism, New York: Pergamon Press, 1981.

5. Sarkesian, p. 21.

6. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State, New 

Harvard University Press, 1957, chapter 1.

7. Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State, New Yo

Free Press, 1994. For the American experience, see particularly 

7. 

8. Christopher Dandecker, “A Farewell to Arms? The Milit

the Nation-State in a Changing World,” in James Burk, e

Adaptive Military: Armed Forces in a Turbulent World, 2d ed

Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998; and Michael W. 

“Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” in Michael E. 

42
Democratic Peace, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996.

9. Don Snider and Miranda Carlton-Carew, eds., U.S. Civil-M

Relations: Crisis or Tensions?, Washington, DC: Center for S

and International Studies, 1995.

10. The division of labor between military leaders and p

leaders is not always clear, but what is accepted is that the role o

military leaders includes the persuasiveness needed to obtain ne

resources. See Allen Millett, Williamson Murray and Kenneth W

“The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” International S

Summer 1986, pp. 37-71.

11. Louis Caldera and General Dennis Reimer, A Statemen

Posture of The United States Army Fiscal Year 2000, Washingt

Government Printing Office, February 1999, p. 26.

12. See testimony by Colonel John D. Rosenberger, Com

Opposing Forces, National Training Center, Ft. Irwin, CA, be

Military Readiness Subcommitee, Committee on National S

U.S. House of Representatives, February 26, 1999, accessed on

13. The potential of the RMA remains quite debatable. 

excellent overview, see Colin Grey, The American Revolution in M

Affairs: An Interim Assessment, Camberley, Surrey: Strate

Combat Studies Institute, 1997.

14. Steven Lee Myers, “Drop in Recruits Pushes Pentagon 

Strategy,” The New York Times, September 27, 1999, accessed on

15. Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the 

Language, New York: Gramercy Books, 1996, p. 665.

16. Louis Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 

Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998, p. 27.

17. We reject the notion held by a few that one can co

mentalize life into different roles, hold different ethics for each r

yet lead a morally consistent life. See Malham W. Wakin, “Profe

Integrity,” Sixth Annual Alice McDermont Lecture in Applied 

U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado, April 3, 1996.

18. We are indebted to Colonel Dan Kaufman for this obser

19. Huntington, chapter 3.

43
custom, or intrusion into the lives of soldiers that cannot be defe

the basis of a clear contribution to military effectiveness is, prim

questionable.

21. One only has to recall the recent controversies surround

sexual escapades of Brigadier General Hale and the office

noncommissioned officers at Aberdeen to see the damage that 

done to professionalism by embracing an inherently contradictor

In both cases, leaders placed personal interest and gratificatio

the needs of the service. This is not to say that society condones 

abuses of power, and clearly some of the activities of those at Ab

transgressed even the most lax versions of “post-modern” o

ethics. However, the judgment society makes on most of these a

is much different than what the military must make if it is to f

well. 

22. We define “radical force protection” as placing the preve

friendly casualties at a higher operational priority than 

accomplishment. Such “radical” force protection is not to be c

with sound Army doctrine that requires commanders

accomplishing the assigned missions as first priority, to prote

forces prudently by the judicious application of the appr

elements of combat power. See Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 

2, July 1993, for a more complete discussion.

23. Huntington, chapter 4.

24. The apolitical tradition has not been without critiques. 

“fusionist” debate of the 1970s and 1980s, see John H. Garriso

Political Dimension of Military Professionalism,” American 

Policy, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, pp. 472-478. For 

recent criticism, see Christopher Gibson and Don M. S

“Civil-Military Relations and the Ability to Influence: A Look 

National Security Decisionmaking Process,” Armed Forces and 

Winter 1999, pp. 194-218.

25. Sarkesian, chapters 8, 9.

26. Steven Kull and I. M. Destler, “Misreading the American 

on International Engagement,” Center for International and S

Studies, University of Maryland, Program on Internationa

Attitudes, October 18, 1996, pp. 1-5.

44
Powell. See Colin Powell, My American Journey, New York: R

House, 1995, p. 576.

28. The absurd response by the Senate Majority Leader, 

Trent Lott, to the Air Force’s courts martial of Lieutenant Kel

for disobedience and conduct unbecoming of an officer is instru

this regard. See Elaine Sciolino, “Air Force Chief has Harsh W

Pilot Facing Adultery Charges,” The New York Times, May 22, 

A1.

29. William Bianco and Jamie Markham, “Vanishing Vetera

Decline in Military Experience in the U.S. Congress,” TISS 

forthcoming, see endnote 35.

30. Don M. Snider, “The Uninformed Debate on Military C

Orbis, Winter 1999, pp. 11-25.

31. Deborah D. Avant, “Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Co

Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, Winter 1996/7.

32. Richard Kohn, “Out of Control,” National Interest, V

Spring 1994, pp. 3-17; Richard Weigley, “The American Military 

Principle of Civilian Control from McClellen to Powell,” Jou

Military History, Vol. 57, October 1993, pp. 27-58.

33. This is certainly not a new issue for senior officers in th

See, for example, Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, W

CT: Greenwood Press, 1959; Matthew Ridgway, Soldier, New 

Harper and Brothers, 1956, pp. 217-219. For a more recent era, s

McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, New York: Harper Collins, 1997

34. Ole R. Holsti, “A Widening Gap between the U.S. Milit

Civilian Society: Some Evidence, 1976-96,” International Secur

23, No. 3, Winter 1998/99.

35. The results of a major, 2-year study by 28 scholars un

direction of Richard H. Kohn and Peter D. Feaver and the auspic

Triangle Institute of Security Studies (TISS) into the existen

potential implications of such a gap were initially presented in 

1999. The 20 individual studies will be published during 2000

summary digest of survey results and study conclusions, see P

Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, “Project on the Gap Between the M

and Civilian Society—Digest of Findings,” www.poli.duke.edu

accessed on-line.

45
Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki of his vision for reform

Army, address to the Eisenhower Luncheon at the Associatio

United States Army (AUSA) annual meeting on October 12, 19

arguments presented in this monograph, we believe, support hi

to do just that.

37. Michael Howard, War in European History, Oxford: 

University Press, 1976, p. 75.

38. See Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: 

Britain, and Germany between the World Wars, Ithaca, NY: 

University Press, 1984; Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Ne

Innovation and the Modern Military, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Un

Press, 1991; Kimberly Martin Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organ

Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991, Princeton: Pr

University Press, 1993; Williamson Murray and Allan R. Mille

Military Effectiveness, Three Volumes, Boston: Unwin Hyman

See also Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. W

“The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” Interna

Security,Vol. 11, No. 1, Summer 1988.

39. John A. Nagl, “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Brit

American Army Counterinsurgency Learning during the M

Emergency and the Vietnam War”, World Affairs 161/4, Sprin

Alastair Ian Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Cu

International Security 19/4, Spring 1995; Carl H. Builder, The M

War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis, Ba

Johns Hopkins, 1989.

40. See Rosen; Williamson Murray and Allen R. Millet

Military Innovation in the Inter-War Period, London: Cam

University Press, 1996. 

41. Deborah Avant, “Officer Attitudes and Change in the Po

War U.S. Armed Services,” in Theo Farrell and Terry Tarriff, e

Sources of Military Change: Military Organisations and 

Changing Environments in the Modern Era, forthcoming.

42. Given the paucity of resources used to exploit its un

potential, the vision of high-technology, major-power war

portrayed in Joint Vision 2010 and Army Vision 2010 has, we 

proved thus far to be incredible to the majority of the Army officer 

43. The decision in 1997 by Chief of Staff of the Army G

Dennis Reimer to deploy one of the Army’s premier heavy divisi

46
evidence that the senior leadership of the Army eventually accep

importance of performing MOOTW missions. It can also be inte

as evidence of the extreme stresses placed upon the institution 

post-Cold War world.

44. In addition to the TISS study discussed in endnote 35, a 

multi-year study of the U.S. military will be completed in lat

Conducted independently by the Center for Strategic and Intern

Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC, but with the cooperation 

separate services, it examines empirically by field resea

organizational climate within the armed forces today and recom

policies and adaptations to maintain service cultures most suppo

future military effectiveness. For a discussion of the g

“perceptions gap” between senior Army leaders in Washington 

junior grade officers in the field, see American Military Cultur

21st Century, Executive Summary and chapter 6, Center for S

and International Studies, forthcoming.

45. For the training revolution see Robert K Griffith, Today

Wants to Join You: The U.S. Army’s Transition from the Dra

All-volunteer Force, Washington DC: Center for Military Histor

and Anne W. Chapman, The Army’s Training Revolution, 197

Ft. Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, 1990. For 

research into the importance of self-concept in motivati

leadership, see Robert G. Lord, Douglas J. Brown, and St

Friedberg, “Understanding the Dynamics of Leadership: The 

Follower Self-Conceptions in the Leader/Follower Relatio

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 78

June 1999.

46. For an analysis of the impact of the reduction in officer n

on the officer corps, see David McCormick, The Downsized W

America’s Army in Transition, New York: New York University 

1998.

47. CSIS, American Military Culture.

48. Ibid.

49. The data on Army morale in the 1990s is taken from Depa

of the Army, DCSPER QOL Survey, September 1998-June 199

50. Michael O’Hanlon, “The Pentagon’s Unrealistic Procu

Plans.” Available at www.brookings.edu/views/articles/oh

1998af.atm, accessed on-line.

47
throughout the Army over email on October 13, see endnote 

speech was covered by the media on the same day, drawing ge

favorable reviews; see Steven Lee Myers, “Army is Restructuri

Brigades for Rapid Response,” The New York Times, October 13, 

A16.

52. Emphasis added.

53. For a thorough treatment of this incident, see Mark B

Blackhawk Down: A Story of Modern War, New York: Atlantic M

Press, 1999.

54. For the relief of Secretary Aspin, see chapter 24 of El

Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency, New York: S

Schuster, 1995.

55. In fact, Edward Luttwak’s theory as presented inForeign 

was largely an assertion without empirics to support 

subsequently has been clearly refuted. For his theory, see 

Luttwak, “Where are the Great Powers?,” Foreign Affa

July/August 1994, pp. 23-28; “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,” 

Affairs, 74, May/June 1995, pp. 109-122; and “A Post-Heroic M

Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 75, July/August 1996, pp. 33-44

devastating critique of Luttwak, see James Burk, “Public Sup

Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Cas

Hypothesis,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 1, 19

53-78.

56. The recent research is Steven Kull, “Americans on Kosov

Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Ma

May 27, 1999. This research into American public opinion on 

specified a successful outcome for U.S. goals, and in turn a sub

majority of Americans responded they would continue to supp

effort, notwithstanding 250 U.S. military casualties. The two con

cited in the text have been well-known for years by public 

scholars, most of whom also hold that the relationships betwee

and elite opinion are extraordinarily complex. See, for ex

Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public, C

University of Chicago Press, 1992; Bruce Russett, Controll

Sword, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.

57. See Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus, Santa 

CA: Rand, 1996.

48
aware of predictions of a significant number of casualties. B

then, the Bush administration barely created the elite consen

public sought; the Senate vote to support the intervention pass

52-48.

59. The “Mayhew hypothesis,” which suggests that the first 

of any political leader is his or her reelection, was first prese

David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, New Have

University Press, 1974.

60. This issue of “radical force protection” eroding service eth

point to a serious flaw in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 19

may be a case of political guidance and military orders flowing 

joint channels of communication/command which are at serious 

odds with the service’s Title 10 responsibilities to “man, equ

train” forces which embody an ethical culture supportive of e

warfighting. 

61. It should not be lost on senior Army leaders, as it has n

lost on the Army officer corps in general, that this was one 

principled reasons for the resignation of Air Force Chief of Staff G

Ronald Fogelman.

62. Andrew Gordon, “The Doctrine Debate: Having the Last 

in Michael Duffy, Theo Farrell, and Geoffrey Sloan, eds., Doctr

Military Effectiveness, Exeter, UK: The Strategic Policy Studies 

1997, p. 47.

63. J. O. Urmson “Saints and Heroes,” in A. I. Melde

Monographs in Moral Philosophy, 1958, pp. 199-202.

64. The authors are grateful to Colonel Anthony Ha

assistance in developing this example.

65. See Porter, particularly chapter 7; and Huntington, part

chapters 1 and 2.

66. Originating with Catholic theologians in the Middle A

principle of double effect is the view that there is a difference b

the consequences of our actions that we intend and those we 

intend, but still foresee. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust W

Basic Books, 1992, p. 152. While it has a variety of application

applied to military situations, it explains when a military force 

in such a way as to bring about the deaths of noncombatan

principle has four conditions: (1) the bad effect is unintended, (2) 

49
is not a direct means to the good effect, and (4) actions are t

minimize the foreseeable bad effects, even if it means accep

increased risk to combatants.

67. By extra risks, we mean those risks not minimally nece

accomplish the mission.

68. This, in fact, was Lieutenant Calley’s defense during his 

atrocities he and his platoon committed at My Lai. He claimed, “

is one thing I am guilty of, it is valuing my soldiers’ lives over tha

enemy.” Since by enemy, he meant more than 400 women and c

most of whom posed no threat to his unit, we can see that, in fa

claiming that no noncombatant’s life that was worth that of a s

We can also see by this example, the absurdity of such a claim. W

may have killed, with minimal risk, some people who would la

some of his soldiers, such an action is not morally defensib

Frontline Episode, “Remember My Lai,” March 5, 1989.

69. Walzer, p. 157.

70. See “Foreign Policy: The ABC Club,” Economist, May 2

pp. 30-31; Michael Debbs, “Post-Mortem on NATO’s Bo

Campaign,” The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, Jul

1999, p. 23. For more detail, see Paul Kahn, “War and Sacr

Kosovo,” Philosophy and Public Policy, Vol. 19, No. 43, Unive

Maryland, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, Spring/S

1999, pp. 1-6.

71. See Don M. Snider, “An Uninformed Debate on M

Culture,” Orbis; John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a 

British and American Army Counterinsurgency Learning Dur

Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War, Oxford: Unpu

Doctoral Dissertation, 1997.

72. This list was compiled by Dr. Snider in 1996 from m

sources within the literature of civil-military relations, military 

and military professionalism. It has been improved by commen

several senior officers and refined in class discussions and r

projects during 2 academic years, during which time it reac

present form. 

50
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Interim Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

Dr. Don M. Snider

Major John A. Nagl

Major Tony Pfaff

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler