OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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October 22, 2008

 

OPPORTUNITIES TO ENHANCE U.S. DEMOCRACYBUILDING STRATEGY FOR IRAQ

What SIGIR Found 

DoS and USAID have developed a U.S. strategy for advancing and 

strengthening democracy and governance in Iraq. The strategy contains a 

number of characteristics that are necessary for an effective strategic plan. At 

the same time, the strategy can be enhanced as a planning tool and vehicle for 

informing the Congress about progress toward achieving the plan’s strategic 

objectives. SIGIR’s analysis of the strategy shows that the strategy: 

• includes a purpose and a scope that is clearly stated and notes that U.S. 

involvement is critical to help build a responsive, representative, 

democratic Government of Iraq (GOI) 

• recognizes the need to develop a government that seeks to resolve 

Iraq’s differences peacefully while healing sectarian and ethnic divides 

• provides a comprehensive description of the strategic objectives and 

performance measures to assess progress in achieving stated goals and 

objectives 

• does not include the current and future costs to implement the strategy, 

such as the costs of building capacity of the Iraqi government at the 

provincial and national level 

• does not clearly assign accountability for implementing key aspects of 

the strategy 

• does not address how U.S. goals and objectives will be integrated with 

the GOI and international organizations 

We also noted that DoS and USAID can improve their assessments of progress 

in achieving the strategy’s strategic objectives. Although DoS and USAID 

have quarterly meetings to assess implementation of the strategy, they do not 

prepare written reports that document the results of these meetings. DoS and 

USAID officials stated that the quarterly reviews are based on the progress 

reports of their individual democracy-building programs. DoS receives 

quarterly progress reports from its grantees, and USAID receives monthly, 

quarterly, or semiannual progress reports depending on the individual program. 

Although these reports describe the progress of individual programs, they do 

not fully show progress toward the strategy’s three broad strategic objectives or 

expected outcomes such as improving the capacity and accountability of all 

levels of government. In addition, no one office is responsible for assessing 

progress toward achieving the three strategic objectives. 

In the near future, SIGIR plans to conduct follow-up work on the program 

management and oversight of selected DoS grants. 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs 

at (703) 428-1100 or PublicAffairs@sigir.mil

Summary of Report: SIGIR-09-001 

Why SIGIR Did This Study 

Since 2004, the Department of State (DoS) 

and U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) have obligated more 

than $1.9 billion for democracy-building 

programs in Iraq. In July 2007, the DoS and 

USAID issued an overall strategy for 

achieving democracy in Iraq during 2007 

through 2010. 

Our reporting objectives were to determine 

(1) the extent to which the U.S. strategy for 

democracy and governance contains the 

characteristics of an effective strategy and (2) 

DoS and USAID efforts to assess their 

progress in meeting the goals and objectives 

of the strategy. 

What SIGIR Recommends 

To increase the effectiveness of the strategy as 

a planning tool and to improve its usefulness 

to the Congress, SIGIR recommends that the 

Secretary of State direct that the following 

actions be taken: 

• Require DoS and USAID program 

managers revise the strategy to include 

the current and future costs needed for 

implementation. 

• Clarify the roles and responsibilities of 

DoS and USAID in implementing the 

strategy; state how U.S. goals and 

objectives will be integrated with the 

goals and objectives of the GOI and 

international organizations. 

• Designate an office to be accountable for 

overseeing progress towards achieving 

the strategic objectives. 

• Require DoS and USAID program 

managers to document the results of 

quarterly progress meetings during 

which they assess strategy 

implementation. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DoS 

provided comments about the overall report 

but did not specifically address the report’s 

recommendations; this report specifically 

solicits the Department’s position on the 

recommendations. 

SIGIR 

Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

October 22, 2008 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE 

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE 

COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS 

MISSION DIRECTOR-IRAQ, U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

SUBJECT: Opportunities to Enhance U.S. Democracy-Building Strategy for Iraq 

 (SIGIR 09- 001) 

We are providing this report for your information and use. We performed this audit under the 

authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and 

responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspectors General Act of 1978, as amended. 

This report is the first report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) on 

U.S. government democracy-building programs for Iraq. This report was conducted as SIGIR 

Project 8025. 

We considered written comments on a draft of this report from the Department of State and 

technical comments from U.S. Agency for International Development when finalizing this 

report. The comments are addressed in the report, where applicable. The Department of State’s 

comments are included in their entirety in appendix D. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on the report, 

please contact Glenn Furbish, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits (703) 428-1058/ 

glenn.furbish@sigir.mil. 

 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202
Table of Contents 

Executive Summary i 

Introduction 1 

Opportunities to Enhance Democracy-Building Strategy 4 

Assessment of Progress in Implementing Democracy-Building 

Strategy Can be Improved 9 

Conclusion and Recommendations 10 

Management Comments and Audit Response 10 

Appendices 

A. Scope and Methodology 12 

B. Description of the Six Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy 14 

C. Goal and Objectives of U.S. Strategy for Democracy and 

Governance in Iraq 18 

D. Management Comments 19 

E. Acronyms 22 

F. Audit Team Members 23 
Opportunities to Enhance U.S. Democracy-Building 

Strategy for Iraq 

SIGIR-09-001 October 22, 2008

Executive Summary 

Introduction

Since 2004, the Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) have obligated more than $1.9 billion for democracy-building programs in Iraq. Public 

Law 110-28 requires the Secretary of State to provide the Senate and House Committees on 

Appropriations a “comprehensive, long-term strategy, with goals and expected results, for 

strengthening and advancing democracy in Iraq.”1

 In July 2007, the DoS and USAID issued an 

overall strategy for democracy and governance in Iraq for 2007 through 2010. The overall goal is 

for Iraqi citizens, civil society, and democratic institutions to work cooperatively to reduce 

violence and build a sustainable, accountable, and responsive system of governance. To help 

achieve this goal, the strategy contains the following strategic objectives: (1) institutionalize 

democratic political and legislative processes that resolve disputes peacefully; (2) improve the 

capacity and accountability at all levels of government; and (3) foster the environment for and 

development of Iraqi’s civil society and media to operate independently, freely, and effectively 

to promote democracy, transparency, tolerance, and respect for human rights. 

SIGIR’s review of prior Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports showed that GAO has 

identified six characteristics of an effective national strategy that offer policymakers and 

implementing agencies a management tool to help ensure accountability and more effective 

results. GAO identified these six desirable characteristics based on their underlying support in 

legislative or executive guidance and the frequency with which they were cited in other sources. 

These characteristics, as adapted for this review, are: (1) a clear purpose, scope, and 

methodology; (2) a detailed discussion of the problems, risks, and threats the strategy is intended 

to address; (3) the desired goals and objectives and outcome-related performance measures; (4) a 

description of the U.S. resources needed to implement the strategy; (5) a clear delineation of the 

U.S. government roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for coordination; and (6) a description 

of how the strategy is integrated internally among U.S. agencies and externally with the 

Government of Iraq (GOI) and international organizations. These are in line with the results 

oriented principles outlined in the Government Performance and Results Act. See appendix B 

for a description of the characteristics of an effective national strategy. 

SIGIR’s reporting objectives were to determine: 

 

1

 U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans Care, Katrina Recovery and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act 2007, May 

25, 2007 (121 Stat. 112, 129-30). 

i 
• The extent to which the U.S. strategy for democracy and governance in Iraq contains the 

characteristics of an effective strategy 

• DoS and USAID efforts to assess their progress in meeting the goals and objectives of the 

strategy 

Results 

DoS and USAID have developed a U.S. strategy for advancing and strengthening democracy and 

governance in Iraq. The strategy contains a number of characteristics that are necessary for an 

effective strategic plan. At the same time, the strategy can be enhanced as a planning tool and 

vehicle for informing the Congress about progress towards achieving the plan’s strategic 

objectives. SIGIR’s analysis of the strategy shows that it: 

• includes a purpose and a scope that is clearly stated and notes that U.S. involvement is 

critical to help build a responsive, representative, democratic Iraqi government 

• recognizes the need to develop a government that seeks to resolve Iraq’s differences 

peacefully while healing sectarian and ethnic divides 

• provides a comprehensive description of the strategic objectives and performance 

measures to assess progress in achieving stated goals and objectives 

• does not include the current and future costs to implement the strategy, such as the costs 

of building capacity of the GOI at the provincial and national level 

• does not clearly assign accountability for implementing key aspects of the strategy 

• does not address how U.S. goals and objectives will be integrated with the GOI and 

international organizations 

SIGIR also noted that DoS and USAID can improve assessments of progress in achieving the 

strategy’s strategic objectives. Although DoS and USAID have quarterly meetings to assess 

implementation of the strategy, they do not prepare written reports that document the results of 

these meetings. DoS and USAID officials stated that the quarterly reviews are based on the 

progress reports of their individual democracy-building programs. DoS receives quarterly 

progress reports from its grantees, and USAID receives monthly, quarterly, or semiannual 

progress reports depending on the individual program. Although these reports describe the 

progress of individual programs, they do not fully show progress toward the strategy’s three 

broad strategic objectives or expected outcomes such as improving the capacity and 

accountability of all levels of government. In addition, no one office is responsible for assessing 

progress toward achieving the three strategic objectives. 

In the near future, SIGIR plans to conduct follow-up work on the program management and 

oversight of selected DoS grants. 

ii 
iii 

Recommendations 

To increase the effectiveness of the strategy as a planning tool and to improve its usefulness to 

the Congress, SIGIR recommends that the Secretary of State direct that the following actions be 

taken: 

• Require DoS and USAID program managers to revise the strategy to include current and 

future costs needed for implementation. 

• Clarify the roles and responsibilities of DoS and USAID in implementing the strategy; 

state how U.S. goals and objectives will be integrated with the goals and objectives of the 

GOI and international organizations. 

• Designate an office to be accountable for overseeing progress towards achieving the 

strategic objectives. 

• Require DoS and USAID program managers to document the results of quarterly 

progress meetings during which they assess strategy implementation. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

The DoS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, (DRL) provided written comments 

on a draft of this report, however, it did not address our recommendations. Since the 

recommendations were addressed to the Secretary of State, we request that DoS provide 

comments that conform to the requirements of OMB Circular No. A-50, including indicating 

concurrence, nonconcurrence, and planned actions related to the report recommendations within 

30 days. 

In its written comments, DRL raised a concern that the draft audit report does not fully reflect the 

scope of U.S. government assistance provided to meet the goals and objectives in the Democracy 

Strategy or the collaborative process that is both central to the development and execution of the 

strategy. However, SIGIR’s report covers all of the democracy-building programs funded by 

DoS and USAID. Data obtained from DoS and USAID indicates that DoS and USAID have 

provided more than $1.9 billion for democracy-building programs in Iraq. Furthermore, the 

report also describes DoS and USAID plans to award additional contracts for democracybuilding programs in Iraq. Thus, SIGIR believes that the report represents the full scope of U.S. 

government programs to meet the goals and objectives in the Democracy Strategy. Regarding 

the collaborative process use to develop and execute the strategy, SIGIR added language to 

indicate that nongovernmental organizations implementing democracy-building programs in 

Iraq attend quarterly meetings with DoS and USAID officials to review implementation of the 

strategy. SIGIR’s concern is that the progress toward the strategic objectives or expected 

outcomes is unclear because the results of these meeting are not documented. 

DoS and USAID also provided technical comments which we have addressed in this report as 

appropriate. DoS’s comments are printed in their entirety at the end of this report. 
Introduction 

Background 

This report provides information on the U.S. government program for democracy-building in 

Iraq. Public Law 108-106, as amended, mandates the independent and objective conduct of 

audits relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise 

made available in support of Iraq relief and reconstruction. Since 2004, SIGIR’s mandate was 

largely tied to the sizeable Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund; therefore, SIGIR focused 

heavily on audits of Iraq reconstruction projects. But in recent years, the Congress has increased 

SIGIR’s oversight authority over other funds that provide support to Iraq relief and 

reconstruction activities. To respond to this mandate, SIGIR has begun audits of these other 

areas, including U.S. assistance programs designed to strengthen and advance democracy in Iraq. 

Public Law 110-28 required the Secretary of State to provide the Senate and House Committees 

on Appropriations a “comprehensive, long-term strategy, with goals and expected results, for 

strengthening and advancing democracy in Iraq.”2

 In July 2007, the Department of State (DoS) 

and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) issued an overall strategy for 

democracy and governance in Iraq. The overall goal of the strategy is for Iraqi citizens, civil 

society, and democratic institutions to work cooperatively to reduce violence and build a 

sustainable, accountable, and responsive system of governance. To help achieve this goal, the 

strategy contains the following strategic objectives: (1) institutionalize democratic political and 

legislative processes that resolve disputes peacefully; (2) improve the capacity and accountability 

at all levels of government; and (3) foster the environment for and development of Iraqi’s civil 

society and media to operate independently, freely, and effectively to promote democracy, 

transparency, tolerance, and respect for human rights. 

Since 2004, DoS and USAID have obligated more than $1.9 billion for democracy-building 

programs in Iraq. USAID accounts for about $1.6 billion, or 84 percent, and the DoS accounts 

for $307 million, or 16 percent of the funding, as shown in table 1. 

Table 1—U.S. Funding for Democracy-Building Programs in Iraq ($ in millions) 

Organization Obligations Percent 

DoS $310 16% 

USAID $1,652 84% 

Total $1,969 100% 

Source: SIGIR analysis of DoS/USAID grants data, as of June 1, 2008. 

 

2

 U.S Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act 2007, May 

25, 2007. (121 Stat. 112, 129-30). 

1
Approximately $686 million, or 46 percent, of USAID’s funding was for democracy programs 

that have been completed. The remaining $966 million in funding is for the following six active 

democracy programs: 

• A $370 million local governance program to strengthen local governments; program ends 

in December 2008

• A $339 million national capacity development program to build the capacity of Iraqi 

national government ministries; program ends in July 2009

• A $150 million community assistance program to promote and provide economic and 

social stability in Iraqi communities; program ends in September 2008 

• A $30 million component of the quick-reaction fund program to support civil society and 

building democratic practices through provincial reconstruction teams; program ends in 

December 2008 

• A $53 million program to provide technical assistance to the International High Electoral 

Commission in preparation for elections; program ends in December 2010 

• A $24 million legislative strengthening program focused on the Iraqi Council of 

Representatives; program ends in September 2010 

Approximately $90 million, or 29 percent, of DoS’s funding was for democracy programs that 

have been completed. The remaining $220 million is for 3 grants funded by the Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs for about $3 million, and $217 million for 14 active grants funded by the Bureau 

of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Three grants account for about 78 percent of the total 

of obligated funds for the following ongoing democracy programs: 

• A $71 million grant with the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to assist 

democratic transformation in Iraq and to promote the development of a legal civil society 

and media to operate independently; grant ends in March 2009 

• A $50 million grant with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) $50 million to 

encourage constructive political dialogue and participation of the Government of Iraq; 

grant ends in March 2009 

• A $50 million grant with the International Republican Institute (IRI) to assist in training 

for Iraqi governance, civil society, and political parties; grant ends in March 2009 

The remaining 11 grants average about $4 million each and fund activities such as support for 

independent media in Iraq, national reconciliation training, and democratic transformation 

assistance. 

We reviewed the U.S. Strategy for Governance and Democracy in Iraq using the six 

characteristics of an effective national strategy developed by GAO. The six characteristics 

developed by GAO are based on underlying support in legislative or executive guidance and the 

frequency with which they were cited in other sources. The six characteristics are (1) a clear 

purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) a detailed discussion of the problems, risks, and threats the 

strategy intends to address; (3) the desired goals and objectives, and outcome related 

performance measures; (4) a description of the U.S. resources needed to implement the strategy; 

2
(5) a clear delineation of the U.S. government roles, responsibilities and mechanism for 

coordination; and (6) a description of how the strategy is integrated internally among U.S. 

agencies and externally with the GOI and international organizations.

Objectives 

This report assesses the effectiveness of the U.S. government strategy for democracy-building in 

Iraq. Our reporting objectives were to determine: 

• The extent to which the U.S. strategy for democracy-building programs contains the 

characteristics of an effective strategy and 

• DoS and USAID efforts to assess the progress in meeting the goals and objectives of the 

strategy. 

SIGIR plans to conduct follow-up work, in the near future, on the program management and 

oversight of selected DoS democracy grants. 

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, see Appendix A. For a description of the 

six characteristics of an effective strategy, see Appendix B. For the goal and strategic objectives 

of the U.S. Strategy for Democracy and Governance in Iraq, see Appendix C. For a list of 

acronyms used in this report see Appendix E. For a list of audit team members, see Appendix F. 

3
Opportunities to Enhance Democracy-Building 

Strategy 

The DoS and USAID have developed a U.S. strategy for advancing and strengthening 

democracy and governance in Iraq. The plan generally includes the characteristics associated 

with an effective strategic plan. However, there are some areas where the strategy can be 

improved to enhance its usefulness as a management tool for the implementing agencies as well 

as a vehicle for informing Congress about the costs and progress towards achieving the plan’s 

strategic objectives. As figure 1 indicates, our analysis shows the strategy generally addresses 

three of the six characteristics of an effective strategy but does not fully address three others. 

Figure 1: Extent to Which U.S. Democracy-Building Strategy for Iraq 

Contains the Characteristics of an Effective Strategy 

Characteristic of an Effective Strategy Extent Addressed 

Not Partially Fully 

1. Clear Purpose, Scope, Methodology 

• Purpose 

1a. Identifies the impetus that led to the strategy being written, such as statutory 

requirement, mandate, or key event. z

1b. Discusses the strategy’s purpose. z • Scope 

1c. Defines or discusses key terms, major functions, mission areas, or activities 

the strategy covers. z • Methodology 

1d. Discusses the process that produced the strategy. X 

1e. Discusses assumptions or the principles and theories that guided the 

strategy’s development. z

2. Detailed discussion of problem, risks, and threats

• Problem definition 

2a. Includes a detailed discussion or definition of the problem the strategy 

intendeds to address. z

2b. Includes a detailed discussion of the causes of the problems. z

2c. Includes a detailed discussion of the operating environment. z • Risk assessment

2d. Addresses a detailed discussion of the threats at which the strategy is 

directed. 

2e. Discusses the quality of data available, e.g., constraints, deficiencies, and 

“unknowns.” 

3. Desired goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures

• Goals and subordinate objectives

4
Characteristic of an Effective Strategy Extent Addressed 

Not Partially Fully 

3a. Addresses the overall results desired, i.e., an “end-state.” z

3b. Identifies strategic goals and subordinate objectives. z • Activities

3c. Identifies specific activities to achieve results. z • Performance measures 

3d. Addresses priorities, milestones, and outcome-related performance 

measures. z

3e. Identifies processes to monitor and report on progress. X

3f. Identifies limitations on progress indicators. z

4. Description of future costs and resources needed 

• Resources and investments 

4a. Identifies what the strategy will cost. X

4b. Identifies the sources and types of resources or investments needed. X

• Risk management 

4c. Addresses where resources or investments should be targeted to balance 

risks and costs. X

4d. Addresses resources allocation mechanisms. X

4e. identifies risk management principles and how the implementing parties 

prioritize and allocate resources. X

5. Delineation of U.S. government roles and responsibilities 

• Organizational roles and responsibilities 

5a. Addresses who will implement the strategy. 

5b. Addresses lead, support, and partner roles and responsibilities of specific 

federal agencies, departments, or offices. X

• Coordination 

5c. Addresses mechanism and /or processes for parties to coordinate efforts 

within agencies and with other agencies. X

5d. Identified process for resolving conflicts. X

6. Description of strategy’s integration among and with other entities 

6a. Addresses how the strategy relates to the strategies of other institutions and 

organizations’ and their goals, objectives, and activities (horizontal). X 

6b. Addresses integration with relevant documents from other agencies and 

subordinate level (vertical). X 

Source: SIGIR analysis of U.S. Strategy for Democracy and Governance in Iraq, 2007-2010 

5
Strategy Addresses Purpose and Scope, Risks, Goals and Objectives 

Our analysis as displayed in figure 1 shows the strategy provides (1) a clear statement of its 

purpose and scope, (2) a discussion of problems the strategy intends to address, and (3) an 

explanation of its goal and objectives. 

Clear Purpose and Scope 

This characteristic addresses why the strategy was produced and the scope of its coverage. The 

strategy identifies that it is critical for the United States to help build a responsive, 

representative, democratic government that defends its constitution and works toward achieving 

national reconciliation. Specifically, the strategy identifies U.S. involvement as critical to 

making progress toward the goal of Iraqi citizens, civil society, and democratic institutions 

working cooperatively to reduce violence and build a sustainable, accountable, and responsive 

system of government. To help achieve this goal, the strategy has three strategic objectives that 

indicate the United States will help institutionalize democratic and political legislative processes 

that resolve conflicts peacefully, improve the capacity and accountability at all levels of 

government, and foster an environment for the development of Iraq’s civil society and media that 

can operate independently and freely. 

Risks and Threats Discussed 

This characteristic addresses the particular risks and threats the strategy is directed at. The 

strategy generally addresses some of the problems and risks found in Iraq. For example, the 

strategy notes that Iraq must overcome an insurgency and strengthen the key institutions of a 

democracy while going through the painful process of national reconciliation. Furthermore, the 

strategy recognizes that the government must seek to resolve Iraq’s differences peacefully, while 

healing sectarian and ethnic divides; have increased respect for the rule of law and human rights 

and; disperse power to regions, provinces, and localities. Finally, the strategy also indicates the 

need to have an engaged citizenry that is less polarized and fully prepared for reconciliation. 

Explanation of Goal and Objectives 

This characteristic addresses what the strategy strives to achieve, milestones, and outcomerelated performance measures to gauge results. In addition, identifying and measuring outcomerelated performance measures rather than output measures allow for more accurate measurement 

of the program results and assessment of program effectiveness. 

The strategy generally addresses objectives by including 3 strategic objectives, 11 anticipated 

immediate results, 37 anticipated outcomes, and 187 measurable indicators. The immediate 

results define the components that are necessary to achieve each desired objective. For example, 

the strategic objective to improve capacity and accountability of all levels of government 

includes the following three immediate results: enhance government capacity to perform core 

functions of national institutions; improve efficient and legitimacy of sub-national government 

and; strengthen the policy, legal, and regulatory environment to promote a more responsive and 

accountable government at all levels. The strategy then identifies some metrics to assess 

progress; for example expanding the national capacity for training in public administration; 

6
delivery of government services delivered in accordance with agency strategic plans and; the 

enactment of laws and constitution reforms, enabling the legislature to operate as an independent 

and democratic body. 

Strategy Can Be Enhanced by Fully Addressing Costs, 

Accountability, and Cooperative Efforts 

Our analysis as displayed in figure 1 shows the strategy does not fully (1) identify the cost to 

implement the strategy; (2) delineate DoS and USAID roles and responsibilities; and (3) describe 

how the strategy will be integrated between the Iraqi government and international organizations. 

Current and Future Costs Are Not Addressed 

This characteristic addresses what the strategy will cost and where resources will be targeted to 

achieve the desired goals and objectives and how the strategy balances benefits, risks, and costs. 

The strategy neither identifies the current and future implementation costs, nor does it identify 

the sources of funding (U.S. government, international donors, or Iraqi government) needed to 

achieve the three strategic objectives outlined in the strategy. DoS and USAID officials stated 

that the resources required to implement the strategy were not included because of the 

uncertainty about congressional approval of funding, and the political and security environment 

in Iraq. These costs would include the costs of building the capacity of national ministries, the 

Council of Representatives, and the 18 provincial governments, as well as helping to strengthen 

the capability of political parties and non-governmental organizations. DoS officials noted that 

they plan to include the costs for future democracy program in their base budget request starting 

in fiscal year 2010, rather than in supplemental budget requests. In commenting on a draft of 

this report, DoS noted that the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor established two 

Foreign Service officer positions in Baghdad to monitor and coordinate with their 

nongovernmental partners, which is recognition of the resources needed to implement the 

strategy. 

For fiscal year 2004 to 2008, the DoS and USAID have obligated about $1.8 billion for U.S. 

democracy programs in Iraq. In the fiscal year 2008 supplemental budget, DoS received 

additional $75 million and USAID an additional $180 million for democracy programs in Iraq. 

DoS officials stated they plan on awarding $65 million of their additional funding for democracy 

programs in Iraq by the end of October 2008. DoS officials stated they plan to use the remaining 

$10 million to support national elections in 2009. Likewise, USAID officials stated they plan to 

award a $139 million contract for phase three of its community assistance program in October 

2008 and has received $54 million for phase three of its local governance program. The strategy 

also fails to include costs and contributions for non-U.S. sources, and does not address the extent 

to which the Iraqi government will contribute financially to democracy-building efforts. 

Roles and Responsibilities Are Not Defined 

This characteristic addresses which U.S. organizations will implement the strategy and their 

roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for coordinating their efforts. The strategy does not 

7
delineate the roles and responsibilities of DoS and USAID in implementing the strategy or 

assessing progress toward the strategic objectives. Consequently, the strategy does not assign 

accountability for achieving progress toward the strategic objectives. DoS and USAID officials 

stated that although not documented in the strategy, it is understood that DoS has the lead for two 

objectives–– to institutionalize democratic political and legislative processes and develop civil 

society, and USAID has the lead for one objective––to improve the capacity and accountability 

of all levels of government. However, no office has overall accountability for monitoring 

implementation of the strategy. While DoS and USAID program officials expressed certainty 

about their respective responsibilities, the lack of documented responsibilities creates a 

vulnerability to ineffective and inefficient program implementation as program personnel change 

over time. 

Integration with the Government of Iraq and International Donors 

Not Addressed 

This characteristic addresses how a strategy relates to other goals and objectives of other 

strategies and to other government and international entities. A clear relationship between 

strategies helps governments and international organizations understand their roles and 

responsibilities and promote accountability. The strategy states that the U.S. government will 

need to coordinate with other agencies and the international community, particularly coalition 

partners and the United Nations. However, the strategy does not discuss how U.S. goals and 

objectives will be integrated with the goals and objectives of international donors and the Iraqi 

government, how coordination will be accomplished, and who within the U.S. government is 

responsible for accomplishing this task. 

8
Assessment of Progress in Implementing DemocracyBuilding Strategy Can Be Improved 

DoS, USAID, and the non-governmental organizations implementing democracy programs in 

Iraq have quarterly meetings to discuss implementation of the strategy for democracy and 

governance in Iraq; however, they do not document the results of these meetings. In addition, no 

one office is responsible for assessing progress toward the three strategic objectives included in 

the strategy. DoS and USAID officials stated that the quarterly reviews are based on the 

progress reports of their individual democracy-building programs. While these reports describe 

progress of individual democracy programs, they do not fully address progress toward the three 

strategic objectives or expected outcomes of the U.S. strategy. 

DoS monitors performance through periodic field trips to Iraq and quarterly performance reports 

submitted by each grantee. DoS officials also stated that they have almost daily contact with 

some grantees to discuss issues that may arise. Each grantee submits to DoS a quarterly progress 

report that describes the progress toward meeting the short and long-term objectives of its grant. 

These reports also identify any issues or concerns that impact the grantee’s ability to achieve the 

goals and objectives. Based on these quarterly reports, DoS assigns each grantee an overall 

progress rating for the performance period on a 5-point scale.3

 Our review of the files for the 

three largest DoS democracy grants–Independent Republican Institute, National Democratic 

Institute, and National Endowment for Democracy– show that that the grantees submitted 

quarterly progress reports, as required, that describe progress towards the objectives outlined in 

each grantee’s statement of work. Our review also found that DoS’s assessment of the grantees’ 

quarterly progress reports indicated that all three grantees were on target to meet their goals and 

objectives. DoS officials also make periodic field trips to Iraq throughout the year to meet with 

grantees to monitor performance. 

USAID monitors performance through monthly, quarterly, or semiannual progress reports 

submitted by its contractors. These various reports describe the contractors’ progress of 

individual democracy program as defined in the respective statement of work. USAID also has 

quarterly portfolio reviews during which it compares the actual progress to the expected progress 

for each program. However, the expected outcomes and measurable indicators used by USAID 

to monitor contractor performance are not the same as those included in the U.S. strategy for 

democracy and governance in Iraq. USAID officials stated that the indicators they use to 

evaluate contractor performance are linked to USAID’s overall strategic objectives. Finally, 

USAID officials stated that even though USAID implicitly has the lead for strategic objective of 

the U.S. strategy, it is not collecting any information that would enable them to assess progress 

toward the measurable indicators included in the strategy. 

 

3

 The five categories are: (1) project significantly above target to meet goals and objectives; (2) project slightly 

above target to meet goals and objectives; (3) project on target to meet goals and objectives; (4) project slightly 

below target to meet goals and objectives and; (5) project significantly below target to meet goals and objectives. 

9
Conclusion and Recommendations 

Conclusion 

The DoS and USAID have developed a U.S. strategy for advancing and strengthening 

democracy and governance in Iraq that establishes a useful framework for guiding the programs. 

Further, it generally includes the characteristics GAO identified as necessary for developing an 

effective strategy for programs of this nature. Additionally, we believe there are opportunities to 

build on the current plan to make it more effective and useful to department managers and the 

Congress, Some areas were the strategy can be improved to enhance its usefulness include 

identifying the costs and progress towards achieving the strategic objectives. 

Recommendations 

To increase the effectiveness of the strategy as a planning tool and to improve its usefulness to 

the Congress, SIGIR recommends that Secretary of State direct the following actions be 

accomplished: 

• Require DoS and USAID program managers to revise the strategy to include current and 

future costs needed to implement the strategy. 

• Clarify the roles and responsibilities of DoS and USAID in implementing the strategy; 

state how U.S. goals and objectives will be integrated with the GOI and international 

organizations. 

• Designate an office to be accountable for overseeing progress towards achieving the 

strategic objectives. 

• Require DoS and USAID program managers to document the results of quarterly 

progress meetings during which they assess strategy implementation. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

DoS’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor provided written comments on a draft of 

this report; however, it did not address our recommendations. Since the recommendations were 

addressed to the Secretary of State, we request that DoS provide comments that conform to the 

requirements of OMB Circular No. A-50, including indicating concurrence, nonconcurrence, and 

planned actions related to the report recommendations within 30 days. 

In its written comments, DRL raised a concern that the draft audit report does not fully reflect the 

scope of U.S. government assistance provided to meet the goals and objectives in the Democracy 

Strategy or the collaborative process that is both central to the development and execution of the 

strategy. However, SIGIR’s report covers all of the democracy-building programs funded by 

DoS and USAID. Data obtained from DoS and USAID indicates that DoS and USAID have 

provided more than $1.9 billion for democracy-building programs in Iraq. Furthermore, the 

report also describes DoS and USAID plans to award additional contracts for democracybuilding programs in Iraq. Thus, SIGIR believes that the report represents the full scope of U.S. 

10
government programs to meet the goals and objectives in the Democracy Strategy. Regarding 

the collaborative process use to develop and execute the strategy, SIGIR added language to 

indicate that that nongovernmental organizations implementing democracy-building programs in 

Iraq attend quarterly meetings with DoS and USAID officials to review implementation of the 

strategy. SIGIR’s concern is that the progress toward the strategic objectives or expected 

outcomes is unclear because the results of these meeting are not documented. 

DoS and USAID also provided technical comments which we have addressed in this report as 

appropriate. DoS’s comments are printed in their entirety in Appendix D of this report. 

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Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

The audit was performed by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction under the 

authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporated the duties and 

responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. It was completed 

during the period June thought September 2008. It addresses the U.S. strategy for democracy 

and governance in Iraq. Our reporting objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which the 

U.S. strategy for democracy building in Iraq contains the characteristics of an effective strategy, 

and (2) DoS and USAID efforts to assess the progress in meeting the goals and objectives of the 

strategy. 

To determine whether the U.S. strategy for democracy and governance in Iraq contained the 

characteristics of an effective strategy, we reviewed prior Government Accountability Office 

reports to identify the desirable characteristics of an effective strategy.4 GAO developed six 

desirable characteristics based on their underlying support in legislative or executive guidance 

and the frequency with which they were cited in other sources. The six characteristics of an 

effective national strategy are: (1) a clear purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) a detailed 

discussion of the problems, risks, and threats the strategy is intended to address; (3) the desired 

goals and objectives and outcome-related performance measures; (4) a description of the U.S. 

resources needed to implement the strategy; (5) a clear delineation of the U.S. government roles, 

responsibilities, and mechanisms for coordination and; (6) a description of how the strategy is 

integrated internally among U.S. agencies and externally with the Iraqi government and 

international organizations. We gave each characteristic and supporting element a rating of 

either: addresses, partially addresses, or does not address. According to our methodology, a 

strategy addresses an element of a characteristic when it explicitly cites all parts of the element, 

and the document has sufficient specificity and detail. Within our designation of partially 

addresses, there is a wide variation in a strategy that addresses most parts of an element of a 

characteristic. A strategy does not address an element when it does not explicitly cite or discuss 

any parts of the element or implicit references are either too vague or too general to be useful. 

To determine the extent to which DoS and USAID have assessed whether their ongoing Iraq 

programs are achieving the goals and objectives of the strategy, we interviewed DoS and USAID 

officials regarding their policies and procedures for monitoring and evaluating grantees’ 

performance on individual programs as well as how they assess progress toward achieving the 

overall U.S. strategy for governance and democracy in Iraq. We also reviewed progress reports 

on the three largest DoS democracy grants– The International Republican Institute, the National 

Democratic Institute, and the National Endowment for Democracy–for fiscal years 2007 and 

2008 as well as DoS assessments of these progress reports. In addition, we compared the 

objectives and expected outcomes of ongoing DoS and USAID democracy programs to those 

outlined in the overall U.S. democracy strategy for Iraq to determine the extent that these 

 

4 Rebuilding Iraq, More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, GAO-06-788, July 11, 2006 

Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T, 

 February 3, 2004.

 

 

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programs supported the overall strategy. Finally, we interviewed DoS and USAID officials 

regarding the process for monitoring implementation of the U.S. strategy for democracy and 

governance for Iraq. 

We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the work performed the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on out audit objectives. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data 

We obtained funding data for DoS and USAID democracy-building programs in Iraq from the 

DoS Payment Management System and USAID Phoenix financial management systems. Since 

this data was used for background purposes, we compared the funding documents for selected 

DoS and USAID grants and cooperative agreements to data obtained from their respective 

financial management system. 

Internal Controls 

We reviewed the internal controls for democracy-building programs from the context of the 

overall strategy and processes in place to assess progress toward the strategic goals. Our followon audit work will assess internal controls at the individual grant program management level. 

Prior Coverage 

SIGIR is also issuing a report on USAID’s Local Governance Program in October 2008. 

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Appendix B—Description of the Six Characteristics of 

an Effective National Strategy 

Table 2 provides these desirable characteristics and examples of their elements. 

Source: GAO 

14
15
16
Source: GAO 

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Appendix C—Goal and Objectives of U.S. Strategy for 

Democracy and Governance in Iraq 

Goal: Iraqi citizens, civil society and democratic institutions work cooperatively to reduce 

violence and build a sustainable, accountable, and responsive system of governance. 

Strategic objective 1: Institutionalize democratic political, and legislative processes that resolve 

disputes peacefully 

Immediate results 

o Encourage movement towards internally democratic, socially integrated, and issuesbased political organizations 

o Facilitate the development of institutions, laws, and procedures that promote free and 

fair elections 

o Foster transparency, public dialogue, and responsiveness in the legislative process

o Promote citizen participation and individual and community responsibility 

Strategic objective 2: Improve capacity and accountability at all levels of government 

Immediate results 

o Enhance government capacity to perform core functions of national institutions 

o Improve efficiency and legitimacy of sub-national governments 

o Strengthen policy, legal, and regulatory environment to promote a more responsive 

and accountable government at all levels 

Strategic objective 3: Foster the environment for and development of Iraq's civil society and 

media to operate independently, freely, and effectively 

Immediate results 

o Support and promote the development of a legal environment for civil society and 

media that reflects international standards 

o Strengthen the organizational capacity, sustainability, and accountability of civil 

society to effectively engage in the democratic process 

o Encourage and facilitate dialogue and interaction among Iraqi civil society, Iraq local 

and national government, and international actors 

o Support the development of professionalism, sustainability, and editorial 

independence of Iraqi media. 

Source: United States Strategy for Democracy and Governance in Iraq, 2007-2010, USAID and Department of State 

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Appendix D─Management Comments 

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20
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Appendix E—Acronyms 

DoS Department of State 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

IRI International Republican Institute 

NDI National Democratic Institute 

NED National Endowment for Democracy 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

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Appendix F—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared, and the audit work conducted, under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. The staff members who contributed to the report include: 

Ziad Buhaissi 

Mike Kennedy
SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, 

and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and 

objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive 

audits, inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention 

and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of 

State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, 

and the American people through Quarterly 

Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go 

to SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Kristine Belisle 

Director of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil 

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