UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ODESSA JOLLY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 96-1972

SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

James R. Spencer, District Judge.

(CA-95-794)

Submitted: December 31, 1996

Decided: February 11, 1997

Before NIEMEYER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and

BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Charles D. Bennett, Jr., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. James A.

Winn, Acting Chief Counsel, Region III, Anne von Scheven, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of General Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Helen F.

Fahey, United States Attorney, Debra J. Prillman, Assistant United

States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Odessa Jolly filed this action seeking judicial review of the Social

Security Commissioner's final decision denying her claim for disability insurance ("DIB") and social security supplemental income

("SSI") benefits from 1989 to 1994. Jolly claimed that back pain rendered her disabled during that time. An administrative law judge

denied relief, as did the Appeals Council and the district court.

Jolly worked as a custodian until May 1989, when she injured her

back at work while lifting a bag of garbage. Jolly worked intermittently until January 1990, when she ceased working entirely. Jolly

was treated by several doctors, who all diagnosed her with having a

sprained back, generally caused by poor body mechanics. Neurological tests, X-rays, an MRI, and an EMG were all within normal limits;

as were Jolly's gait, reflexes, sensation, and muscle tone. There was

no evidence of radiculopathy or nerve root compression, and all of the

doctors rejected the need for surgical intervention. One of the doctors,

Dr. Watkins, recommended that Jolly be restricted to more sedentary

type work.

Jolly filed for the first time in the district court a motion to remand

based upon allegedly new and material evidence. This evidence consisted of a psychological evaluation and a report from the examiner

stating that Jolly had a verbal IQ score of seventy-four, a performance

IQ score of eighty, and a full scale IQ score of seventy-six. Jolly

argued that her low IQ scores, coupled with her back pain, rendered

her disabled. The district court denied the motion to remand, granted

the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, and affirmed the

denial of DIB and SSI benefits.

To support a remand to consider newly submitted medical evidence, the evidence must be new, material, and relate to the period

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prior to the ALJ's decision, and there must be good cause for failing

to present the evidence earlier. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1994); Wilkins v.

Secretary, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 953 F.2d 93, 95-96 (4th

Cir. 1991). We need not address Jolly's claims that the evidence was

relevant and that she had good cause for failing to present the evidence before the ALJ, because we find that the evidence was not

material.

"Evidence is material if there is a reasonable possibility that the

new evidence would have changed the outcome." Id. at 96. Jolly's IQ

scores, coupled with her physical impairment, would only be considered disabling if her IQ scores were seventy or less. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,

subpt. P, app. 1, § 112.05(C) (1994). Since Jolly's IQ scores were all

above seventy, there would be no basis for a finding of disability by

the Commissioner.

So long as the correct law was applied and substantial evidence

supported the Commissioner's decision, we must affirm. 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g) (1994); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir.

1990). We find that the ALJ made a thorough evaluation of the evidence before him, in compliance with regulatory standards and the

applicable law. The ALJ set forth in detail his reasons for giving less

weight to Dr. Watkins's recommendation, specifically finding that

this recommendation was contradicted by the objective medical evidence, including Dr. Watkins's own objective medical findings. The

ALJ was in the best position to assess whether or not the gravamen

of the evidence supported Jolly's account of her disabilities, and substantial evidence supported his finding that it did not.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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