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i

40–396 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–99]

CURRENT STATUS OF THE JOINT MINE

RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP)

VEHICLE PROGRAM

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

SUBCOMMITTEE

MEETING JOINTLY WITH

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

NOVEMBER 8, 2007

(II)

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii

RICK LARSEN, Washington

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado

JESSE TOLLESON, Professional Staff Member

JASON HAGADORN, Staff Assistant

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

ADAM SMITH, Washington

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

KATHY CASTOR, Florida

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

JEFF MILLER, Florida

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

TOM COLE, Oklahoma

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member

BEN KOHR, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Thursday, November 8, 2007, Current Status of the Joint Mine Resistant

Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program .................................................... 1

APPENDIX:

Thursday, November 8, 2007 .................................................................................. 53

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 2007

CURRENT STATUS OF THE JOINT MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH

PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLE PROGRAM

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Chairman, Air and

Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................................. 3

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking Member,

Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee .......................................... 6

Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Ranking Member,

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................... 6

Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman, Seapower

and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee ........................................................... 1

WITNESSES

Heebner, David K., President, General Dynamics Land Systems ....................... 32

Hudson, Linda P., President, Land & Armaments Systems, BAE Systems ....... 27

Massicotte, Archie, President, International Military and Government, LLC ... 34

McGilton, Gordon, CEO, Force Protection, Inc. .................................................... 29

Young, Hon. John J., Jr., Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology, and Logistics, Director, MRAP Task Force; Bill Greenwalt,

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy; and Captain

Cloyes R. ‘‘Red’’ Hoover, Commanding Officer, Space and Naval Warfare

Systems Center (SPAWAR) Charleston, U.S. Navy .......................................... 8

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Heebner, David ................................................................................................. 99

Hudson, Linda P. .............................................................................................. 76

Massicotte, Archie ............................................................................................ 106

McGilton, Gordon ............................................................................................. 87

Young, Hon. John J., Jr., joint with Bill Greenwalt and Captain Cloyes

R. ‘‘Red’’ Hoover ............................................................................................ 57

Page

IV

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 128

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 129

Mr. Taylor and Mr. Abercrombie .................................................................... 117

(1)

CURRENT STATUS OF THE JOINT MINE RESISTANT

AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLE PROGRAM

House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,

Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, Meeting

Jointly with Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, Washington,

DC, Thursday, November 8, 2007.

The joint subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:04 p.m. in

room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gene Taylor

(chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary

Forces) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. TAYLOR. The joint subcommittee will come to order.

Congresswoman Carol Shea-Porter, a member of the full committee, has requested permission to join us today during this important briefing.

Without objection, I would like to make it in order for her to participate. So moved.

Today, the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee

joins the Air and Land Forces Subcommittee to receive testimony

on the current status of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, MRAP. This hearing continues our formal series of oversight

activities on the mine resistant vehicle. Force protection will always be at the forefront of these subcommittee meetings and brings

us here today.

The United States of America has over 164,000 troops still operating in Iraq. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED’s) constitute

about 70 percent—or are responsible for about 70 percent of the

casualties in Iraq; and, regrettably, more than half of those, or

close to half of those, are caused by underbelly attacks on vehicles

in Iraq.

The MRAP family of vehicles offers significantly more protection

and survivability for our troops. This is due to several factors: vehicle height, increased weight of the vehicle, the V-shaped underbody

which helps deflect the force of the blast away from the body of the

vehicle.

We are aware that a total, integrated approach using all available technologies to combat IEDs is vital, but the last line of defense for our troops in the IED chain is an armored vehicle. Right

now, MRAP should be that vehicle.

It is no secret that I, along with many other members of this

committee, have not been satisfied with the response of this administration to force protection needs of our troops. During our last

2

hearing, we raised concerns over settling an artificially low theater

requirement, repeating past mistakes in terms of vehicle production, adequately mobilizing the industrial base, and failing to properly fund the program.

Three weeks ago, I had the pleasure of meeting with Secretary

Young in my office; and the information he briefed me on showed

me a substantial improvement in DOD’s execution of the mine resistant vehicle program. At the time of the July 19th hearing, just

over 240 MRAPs had been produced and only 176 had been fielded

to Iraq. There is an unfunded requirement of over 5 billion.

Today, over 1,500 MRAPs have been produced and close to 700

vehicles have been fielded. The Department of Defense requirement

now stands at 15,000 vehicles, up from the initial request by this

administration just 1 year ago of only 4,000. The amended supplemental now requests full funding for this new equipment.

From day one, Congress has said to tell us what it would take

for MRAP and we will provide the money you need. We want to reiterate that statement.

Now is not the time to be complacent. We still have major production fielding and sustainment challenges ahead of us. Over the

next few months, there will be a steep increase in the production

of MRAPs. Over the next two months, production is scheduled to

jump from 440 vehicles per month to a steady 1,100 per month.

This 700-vehicle increase is critical to the MRAP fielding, and

these subcommittees seek to be reassured that this increase will

proceed without a hitch.

If there are any potential problems that might disrupt these ambitious goals, now is the time to state those concerns so that we

can help mitigate them. The subcommittees expect to be reassured

that industry has been mobilized to meet these ambitious production goals.

The issue of MRAPs goes a heck of a lot farther than just vehicles and people and production lines and kids in theater. This

young man is Sean Cooley; and, to my knowledge, he was the first

Mississippi guardsman to die. He was deployed in February of

2003—I’m sorry February of 2005—his unit, the 155th; and he died

in a Humvee from a blast underneath that vehicle.

A few months later, the day after Easter to be exact, this young

man, William Brooks, was the driver of a Humvee. His vehicle was

blown up, again from a blast from underneath. William lost both

legs. To tell you what a unique individual this young man is, he

was saved by the heroic work of a Sergeant Anthony and another

sergeant who were able to get two tourniquets on him in a minute.

While recovering from his wounds at Walter Reed, William volunteered to help in my office to man the phone after Hurricane

Katrina.

William is walking, as seen in this shot, on his prostheses. His

short-term goal is to finish Mississippi State University and to

walk across the stage to get his diploma on these legs.

I think the sad fact is that Sean would probably be alive and

William would probably have his legs if MRAPs had been fielded

sooner.

Now there are 168,000 Seans and Williams in theater today. So

if this committee loses its temper, gets a little short for people who

3

aren’t working as fast as we think they should or funding that isn’t

there when it should be, I hope you understand why.

I have had the pleasure to visit two of the facilities that are

building MRAPs in the past week. I want to first say, as someone

who has worked on a production line, I was impressed by how hard

the individuals were working. There is absolutely no complaint

there.

I was not impressed by the facilities themselves. There was good

equipment. There was a pretty good plan. But, quite frankly, particularly what was done at Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWARs), where they are putting the government-furnished

equipment onto these vehicles, looked more like a custom cycle

shop than Honda mass producing motorcycles.

This isn’t a jobs program. This isn’t about feathering somebody’s

nest or putting some jobs in somebody’s district. This is a rescue

mission.

The most likely way for a young person serving our country in

Iraq or Afghanistan to die or be maimed is from an underbody

blast to a Humvee. We know that, and the enemy knows that, and

we have got to solve that problem.

Now, as someone who has been through a product of base closure

and having to lay off 1,300 people in my district, believe me, I understand the misery of having to let people go. But this isn’t a jobs

program, and we want the vendors to know this. We want the Congress to know this. But, above all, we want the troops to know this

is a rescue mission; and we are expecting the folks to tell us today

how they are going to perform this mission quickly, efficiently, and

then we move on to other challenges that face our Nation.

With that, I yield to the ranking member—I’m sorry—to the subcommittee chairman of Air and Land, Mr. Abercrombie.

STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND FORCES

SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. Thank you very much, Gene.

At our hearing July 1st, I indicated that we were having difficulties reconciling MRAP vehicle program office provided data on production schedules. At the time, I noted this as indicative of the

challenges involved with a program of this size moving at such a

rapid pace.

Since July, the program office and the Department seem to have

made significant improvement in responding to those difficulties

and providing accurate information; and I commend that effort.

However, the MRAP vehicle program continues to present a major

acquisition challenge that has broader implications regarding the

Department of Defense’s tactical vehicle acquisition strategy, expected future combat environments and, of course, how that relates

to future budget requirements.

Mr. Chairman, I don’t propose at this hearing to pursue with our

guests today the question of capital budgeting, but I can assure you

that at some point we have to come to grips in the Department of

Defense and the Congress has to come to grips with the question

of how we finance what we are doing, particularly in capital acquisition of assets such as MRAPs.

4

We have to have a differentiation between a capital budget and

an operational budget; and failure to do that I think is severely undermining everything that Mr. Young, for example, is going to try

to accomplish, I can assure you. We will pursue that at another

time, but I think it is fair to say that at not quite subliminal level

in today’s hearing the question of how we finance affects policy

with regard to what we finance and when we finance it.

In any event, not so many months ago the Army was reluctant

to embrace major procurement for MRAP vehicles and has only recently done so, with the caveat that the MRAP program is not a

program of record, indicating that the MRAP vehicles only apply to

the current circumstances in Iraq and implying possibly no further

use of the vehicles after their use in Iraq.

I know that that is not necessarily the full intention, and for

those who are not necessarily familiar with what a program of

record is and why we have it and what its implications are, this

may seem a bit esoteric. But I think it is fundamental to our discussion not just about MRAPs but in the broader discussion that

I have already alluded to.

I am perfectly aware of the fact that the Army is going to have

further uses and sees a bigger picture but is also constrained by

the institutional requirements that it has, especially if it does not

have a program of record, precisely because you get into conflicts

over what gets funded and when.

Given that the Department of Defense has determined that the

MRAP vehicles are its number one acquisition requirement of the

moment, how is it that it appears that future combat requirements

are so much different than an MRAP-like vehicle capability will not

be required?

Now, again, I won’t pursue that at any great length during this

hearing, but I assure you that I am going to need and I think the

committee is going to need—the committees will need some indication as to why these kinds of vehicles with the kind of armament

protection that is proposed in the design protocols that are proposed will not be useful in multiple environments wherever—in

warfare, guerrilla warfare—the current kind of proclivities of those

we might find ourselves in conflict with might be utilizing.

The DOD has characterized the MRAP as a major defense acquisition program in the highest category, with Secretary Young as

the primary acquisition executive, which, parenthetically, I am

very happy with and glad of, which probably sends him on a path

of doom almost immediately.

I am curious as to why shouldn’t this program be considered a

program of record? Where do the MRAP vehicles fit into future tactical wheeled acquisitions? Will the fiscal 2009 budget and future

years’ defense program include appropriate levels of operations and

maintenance funding for the MRAP vehicle inventory?

If we are going to make demands on the private manufacturing

sector of this Nation, they need to know just exactly what it is that

we want, what kind of priority are we giving it and what plans can

they make accordingly. That is absolutely fundamental, it seems to

me, if we are going to ask the Nation to mobilize on behalf of the

soldiers that Gene has indicated are utterly and totally and completely dependent on our good judgment.

5

I might note that the Stryker vehicle was once considered an interim solution. I think that bears repeating, Mr. Chairman. Other

instances can be cited where something of the instance became

something of permanence.

Given the planned $25 billion commitment to MRAP vehicles, a

commitment that is likely to grow if history holds precedent, and

given the lack of proven armored technology that significantly

changes current correlation between weight, height and vehicle

protection, we had better plan on MRAP vehicles as more than an

interim throwaway solution for force protection.

I am also curious as to when and how MRAP–2 vehicles fit into

the current strategy and what impacts this program will have on

the industrial supply base. Will the MRAP–2 vehicle program be a

program of record?

One other issue is that the MRAP program—that this program

has highlighted and which is of continuing concern to me is fundamental to the broader issue of joint programs. Many of the current defense acquisition programs are called joint programs. Anytime, by the way—I’m sorry to say, Mr. Young, I keep looking at

you here—I’m sorry to say every time I see the word ‘‘joint’’ in front

of it I figure, uh-oh, the smoke screen is going up. We will use the

word ‘‘joint’’ and then watch all the in-fighting take place. They are

labeled joint programs. However, if you peel back a layer, you find

that the program is joint only in name.

While MRAP vehicles are being procured jointly, there is a lack

of standardization among the mission-essential equipment being integrated into the vehicles. The MRAP vehicles are all being used

against the same threat in similar operational environments, yet

each military service and Special Operations Command has its own

specific equipment package. As a result, a facility doing the installation work is potentially having to integrate, at least by my count,

now 24 different vehicle configurations.

I don’t see how that can be done. I am not sure it should be done.

I am open, I am not an engineer, I am not an automotive engineer,

certainly not an expert in this by any stretch of the imagination

in terms of manufacture and configurations, but it strikes me that

24 different vehicle configurations at a minimum causes enormous

logistical difficulties for the manufacturer and those we are asking

to do the production, let alone what the doctrinal implications of

that are in terms of jointness.

As monthly production numbers increase dramatically, these

many configurations could generate, I believe, major problems once

the basic vehicles are delivered to where the final integration is

done. Ultimately, this I think will result in delay in the vehicles

being delivered to Iraq or elsewhere.

If there was one standardized mission equipment package or at

least fewer configurations than currently planned for all the services and the Special Operations Command, this could potentially

accelerate, I believe, the installation process and, in turn, get more

vehicles to Iraq and elsewhere at a much faster rate. It is imperative in my judgment that the civilian leadership and the Department of Defense effectively address the problem of joint acquisition

programs which may be in name only.

6

I am hoping the witnesses today will be able to respond to these

issues, particularly the programs of record and the question of joint

acquisition programs and their efficacy, and assure the subcommittees that every option is being pursued to produce and field these

vehicles since what we are really discussing today, as the chairman

has so eloquently expressed, is the protection of our men and

women in uniform.

Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you Mr. Abercrombie.

The Chair recognizes the ranking member and former chairman

of the Seapower Subcommittee, Mr. Bartlett.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND

EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I also want to thank our panel for being with us

today. Mr. Chairman, thank you for continuing to have these

MRAP hearings. The information we learn is invaluable.

During the last two MRAP hearings, I mentioned in my opening

statements that I wanted to hear assurances from our witnesses

that the industrial base was being positioned to support this critical MRAP requirement. Based on the increased requirement and

the recent decision to down-select from five to three MRAP vendors, I still have questions about the industrial base; and I am very

pleased that we have two distinguished panels before us today to

address my concerns. We need to gain a better understanding of

any industrial base constraints and what mitigating measures are

being pursued to remedy potential choke points.

Thank you for being here, and I look forward to your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, the

Ranking Member of the Air and Land Subcommittee, Mr. Saxton.

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM

NEW JERSEY, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES

SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SAXTON. Today he is the cleanup guy.

Thank you all for being here. This is indeed an important hearing and an important topic.

I often think to myself of the changes, the dramatic changes in

warfare that have occurred since I first sat here in this room at

hearings like this one; and today is a hearing that is intended to

help us develop the capability to deal with some of those changes.

The MRAP program obviously is important for those reasons.

At end of the day, I think we need to know the following: Number one, is the recent decision to down-select from five to three vendors in the best interest of our warfighters? Two, is the defense industrial base postured to meet the current requirement of approximately 15,000 MRAPs and by when? Three, what are the potential

bottlenecks and how can we help alleviate them if there are some?

And, finally, four, have we provided you with the necessary funding

7

in a timely manner to execute all of the necessary requirements

that you have?

I would like to just for a moment turn to another subject. As I

mentioned just a minute ago, things change quite rapidly. One of

the changes that I have seen happen is that this year we will

spend approximately 70 percent of our Defense budget on operations and support and 30 percent on modernization. This is different. In 1985, this was not the case. In the 1980’s, we spent about

55 percent of our budget on operations and support and 45 percent

on modernization. We established a 30 percent modernization

budget in the 1990’s, and that is where we are today.

Recently, General Casey and Secretary Geren were here; and

their message was that the Army is out of balance. I believe that

it is not just the Army that is out of balance, I believe that it is

our defense structure that is out of balance. It seems to me that

the situation that we are in today in terms of our tactical wheeled

vehicle fleet is a microcosm of this out-of-balance theme.

And, without prolonging this, let me just say that it seems to me

that as we proceed down the road with MRAP, which we all believe

is a necessary element to protect our warfighters and help them be

successful, we also have recognized, as one of the previous speakers

said, that MRAP does not provide us with all the answers. It has

problems in urban terrain. It has problems being agile. And it

seems to us seems to me at least that we need a fleet of MRAPtype vehicles or at least with MRAP-type armor with different capabilities to enable our warfighters to do the variety of tasks that

we expect them to do.

This is not the place to talk about a future program, but I want

to make sure that in the future, regardless of the type of mission

environment that these light tactical vehicles must go into, that

every soldier and every marine has MRAP-like or better protection,

not just the heaviest variants. In other words, the lighter vehicles

that we have armored up today have some advantages and the

MRAP vehicle also has some advantages, but they all can’t do the

same mission.

So it seems to me that what we ought to be looking at beyond

today, beyond today’s hearing, is a vision for where we need to go

with armored vehicles and the various types of missions that we

expect our warfighters to carry out with them.

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chairman thanks the gentleman from New Jersey.

We are fortunate to have a very distinguished panel of witnesses

with us today, and I mean that. We are also lucky to have you gentlemen working for our Nation. I hope you understand that.

First is the Honorable John Young, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the Director of

the MRAP Task Force. Second is Mr. Bill Greenwalt, Deputy

Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy. Third is Captain

‘‘Red’’ Hoover, United States Navy, Commanding Officer, Space and

Naval Warfare Systems Center, pronounced SPAWAR, Charleston,

South Carolina.

Mr. Young, we have about 10 minutes before we have to go for

these votes. It is going to be three votes. That is going to kill about

a half an hour, I regret to say. So I will leave it up to you. If you

8

would like to get started, we can do that. If you prefer to wait, we

can do that, too.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., ACTING UNDER

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY,

AND LOGISTICS, DIRECTOR, MRAP TASK FORCE; BILL

GREENWALT, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR

INDUSTRIAL POLICY; AND CAPTAIN CLOYES R. ‘‘RED’’ HOOVER, COMMANDING OFFICER, SPACE AND NAVAL WARFARE

SYSTEMS CENTER (SPAWAR) CHARLESTON, U.S. NAVY

Secretary YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I will make a brief opening

statement, probably well less than 10 minutes; and then proceed

as you will.

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair recognizes the Under Secretary of Defense.

Secretary YOUNG. Chairman Taylor, Chairman Abercrombie,

Ranking Members Bartlett and Saxton and distinguished members

of the subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle program with you again.

I will try to be brief while highlighting a few key points.

Since I was last here, Secretary Gates has continued to push the

Department to build and deliver the maximum number of MRAPs

possible this year. In response, the MRAP team has labored tirelessly to move forward aggressively while ensuring the quality and

effectiveness of these vehicles in theater.

The Congress has truly been integral in our MRAP efforts. The Congress moved the MRAP reprogramming in days, provided $5.2

billion in a continuing resolution, and has included $11.2 billion in

the fiscal year 2008 defense appropriations conference report.

These are unprecedented actions. With these funds, we are making

significant progress in delivery and production of MRAPs.

In December of 2006, we had the industrial capacity to build less

than 10 MRAP vehicles per month. We produced 161 vehicles in

July. Between October 1st and November 4th, we have taken delivery of about 550 vehicles. We are closing in on our goal of producing roughly 1,100 MRAPs per month by the end of the calendar

year. In doing so, the defense industrial base is displaying remarkable agility and exceeding commercial industrial standards.

For example, I am told that Toyota took three years from concept

to manufacturing to reach a rate of 2,000 vehicles per month for

the Prius hybrid vehicle. Our industry partners are leaning forward to accelerate deliveries, and the men and women serving this

Nation are counting on their continued success.

The MRAP program is perhaps the most significant rapid acquisition program the Department has conducted since the end of

World War II; and, as a result, we are constantly confronted with

new challenges.

If we execute our plans, we will build over 15,000 MRAPs by October of 2008. With each challenge, the Department has proved to

have the agility to adapt and react. The dedicated MRAP team has

worked to address the availability of steel, tires, axles, transportation to theater and within theater, government-furnished equipment installation, spare parts, maintenance, operator training, and

9

all the other issues necessary for the program to deliver reliable,

safe, and survivable vehicles.

Our unprecedented journey will inevitably include challenges we

cannot foresee today, but everyone is committed to fielding these

vehicles on time. We know our warfighters are counting on us.

I want to recognize and thank all the members of the MRAP enterprise, starting with Paul Mann of the joint MRAP program office

and his team, General Brogan and the Marine Corps Systems Command, the vehicle manufacturers and their raw material and subcomponent suppliers, the men and women of Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center in Charleston, the entire network of transportation professionals represented by U.S. Transportation Command,

the vast network of logistics experts from the Pentagon to Iraq and

the talented military and civilian staff in the services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense involved with this program.

Finally, I would again like to thank you and the other Members

of Congress and their staffs for your clear and unambiguous support for this vital program. Together, we should be able to increase

and maintain a high level of production, fielding, and sustainment

of these vehicles and provide them to our soldiers, sailors, airmen

and marines.

Thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward to

your questions.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Secretary Young.

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Young, Mr. Greenwalt

and Captain Hoover can be found in the Appendix on page 57.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Will there be any other members of your panel

speaking?

Mr. GREENWALT. No, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. Secretary Young, thank you again for being here;

and I do value your service and each of the panelists’ service to our

Nation.

My frustration comes in that it was about two years ago when

a former head of the Army Liaison Office came to me, Colonel

Littig, and said that we need to be doing better, that the South Africans came up with a vehicle 20 years ago to deflect mine blasts

and the Russians came up with it in approximately the same time

line and then here we were two years into a very, very—conflict in

Iraq where people were dying on a daily basis and we as a Nation

had not responded.

Like everyone else in this room, I am pleased that finally we are

getting into line, but I am still not convinced that we are doing everything that we can do. Like I said, I was able to visit a facility

in Charleston last week. I was able to go to SPAWARs. In both instances I saw people who were working hard, and I know the difference between people going through the motions and people

working hard. These guys were working hard and these ladies were

working hard. There was a lot of good equipment on those production lines, and I would invite each of the members of the committee

to visit not only that plant but the other plants.

But, as somebody who came from manufacturing, what I did not

see was that process being done in the most expeditious manner.

Congressman Abercrombie touched on it, and he raised an excellent point. Why are there 24 different variants? Not that long ago,

10

a former Secretary of the Navy came before the committee and

talked about the need to build ships or build anything, airplanes,

in series. When we are trying to rush something to the theater so

that people don’t lose their life or their limbs, what in the heck are

we doing coming up with 24 variants? Part of me says that somebody is trying to do this on the cheap. Why don’t we just build the

best variant and make it available and those people that don’t need

all of those features just don’t use them?

I will use the example that I tend to buy common cars. I have

an old Chevy Malibu. It has the same wiring harness as if I had

bought every nice option for that vehicle, because the folks at GM

know that it is cheaper to buy a whole lot of one thing and run

it through the factory and if you need those additional wires for

things then they are there. Why are we coming up with the equivalent of 24 different wiring harnesses and why are we coming up

with so many different shapes?

Believe me, I very much appreciate and I want the American

people to appreciate the difficulty of your task. I could very quickly

understand the importance of a V-bottom to deflect the blast. I did

not see the importance—and I appreciate you folks walking me

through the importance—of getting rid of the fuel tanks. Because

it makes no difference if you survive the blast only to incinerate

the crew inside.

So you have got some challenges. I want to walk this committee

through those challenges. But there are simple manufacturing

processes that I don’t see in place that need to be in place.

And, again, I have got to believe that it is very difficult to hire

somebody and tell them this is just to get a job done. This isn’t forever. This is a task that is going to be for one year. That is just

the way it is. This is a rescue mission for 168,000 Americans in

Iraq and the other 30,000 in Afghanistan. And you know what?

People did come down to south Mississippi and New Orleans for

one-year jobs cleaning up after Katrina.

This can be done and absolutely has to be done. What I want to

hear today is what steps are we going to be taking every day to

make that process faster, to make it more efficient? And what do

we as a Congress need to do to help you in your job? Because this

is not about beating you up. This is about solving a problem.

Secretary YOUNG. Maybe I will offer a few comments, Mr. Chairman, and see if I have addressed your question.

One of the ways—I mentioned we delivered 161 vehicles in July.

We did that because we had multiple vendors. And, indeed, we

have two categories of variants. The Category 1’s carry two operators and four passengers. The Category 2’s carry two vehicle operators and eight passengers. So five vendors and most of them have

both categories, so you are up to 8 or 10 different types. And then

if you have Army and Marine Corps unique installations of those

vehicles, a lot of variants.

We took the approach to get vehicles as fast as possible to utilize

all the manufacturing capacity that could produce safe vehicles and

get that 161. It was with some careful thought that we made a decision with the October orders for which the Congress provided

funds in the continuing resolution that we went down to three venVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:02 Sep 12, 2008 Jkt 040396 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-99\40396.TXT HNS1 PsN: HNS1
11

dors, two category 1 types and two category 2 types. They are the

vehicles with the largest payload.

At that point in time, there were two factors to that. One, those

vehicles having the largest payload have the best capacity to carry

additional armor and additional equipment; and, two, because we

have now moved from July to August, September and October,

those vendors can now keep and build toward that rate and satisfy

the desire to build 1,100, 1,200 vehicles a month.

So we believe this is the fastest path to the most vehicles at rate

and to address the issues you are properly raising. Those were exactly our choices in making that decision, is if we reduce the number of variety of vehicles we can process them through the

SPAWAR installation process of government-furnished equipment

faster, get them to the field faster and reduce the burden on the

troops in the field of having different vehicles, each with some different installation which might have to be repaired. They have a

job to do, and it is not to work on these vehicles.

So we are making choices to get there; and it also addresses

Chairman Abercrombie’s point as we studied this and make the decision, if we make this choice now, our long-term inventory at end,

the 15,000, will be mostly of single types of vehicles that have large

payload capacities and can potentially serve us in the long term.

So we tried to address the short-term demand to get as many vehicles as fast as possible if they provided better protection than

uparmored Humvees. We did that. We are now narrowing the

scope to continue to build as fast as possible but deliver a smaller

set of variants so that they can be more easily outfitted in Charleston and more easily supported in theater.

Those are the two strategies that we have addressed to address

both of your concerns, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Young, again, as I mentioned, we have three

votes. We will try to get through them as quickly as possible.

The committee is going to declare a 30-minute recess. We will be

back at five minutes after the hour. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. TAYLOR. The hearing will come to order again. We want to

again thank our witnesses for being here.

Secretary Young, I want to open this up to you, either you or the

Captain. It is obviously a frustration to a number of us that we are

delivering these vehicles one at a time, that we are putting several

of them on an airplane. I think all of us would much prefer to see

shiploads of these vehicles being delivered to ports in Kuwait or

coming down from Turkey. And one of the things that I feel is a

part of this jam is what is going on in SPAWARS.

I, for one, am frustrated that we have 24 different variants, and

I am curious as to why we are doing that. I am also frustrated—

Captain, I want to give you an opportunity to comment on this—

that when you have 24 different variants, that means in many instances different brackets, different holes that have to be drilled

through high-tempered steel, just a lot of things that are done on

a custom, one-by-one, very slow basis, when we have a problem

that needs a mass production answer.

I am told by Retired Colonel Roach, and my observation in Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding in Ingalls is that government-furVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:02 Sep 12, 2008 Jkt 040396 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-99\40396.TXT HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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nished, very high-tech, very classified equipment is installed on

those destroyers, on those fighters, at the manufacturer. I am curious, why, on a program where we really need to be moving—as a

former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) said, at the speed of

light—why we are building the vehicle in one place, shipping it to

another, then adding the government-furnished equipment. And in

some instances, I have got to admit it, it kind of reminded me of

the middle of the night before Christmas assembling my kids’ toys,

someone looking at a manual and walking over to the vehicle.

Again, we need to be doing better than that.

So why don’t you walk the committee through why we are doing

this, why so many variants, and what can we do to move this along

faster.

Secretary YOUNG. Maybe I could start and let the Captain add

to it; and this gives me an opportunity to continue part of the answer I offered before.

We have, I want to assure you, made a pretty determined effort

to create common equipment installations for these vehicles. And

there is a common turret; the Army and Marine Corps agreed to

install the same turret on these vehicles. Both services will have

Blue Force Tracker; both services are using the same radio racks;

and for a period of time we had an agreement to install the same

intervehicle intercom system or radio system. But then the Army

came back through the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and said,

Army soldiers are trained on their particular system; it is in all

their other vehicles. The common decision was to go with the Marine Corps system. The Army was very worried about having to do

differential training for their soldiers in the field and their nextto-deploy, and they said, can we please go back.

So I am pushing as hard as I can to get common to ease installation issues at SPAWAR, but at the end of the day I have to respect

the senior military leaders’ decision that says certain things have

to be unique.

And another piece of uniqueness is the jammers. The Marine

Corps has a different operating concept in theater, and so it is currently using a different jammer than the Army is. That is a significant difference, because the differences between those two jammers

are substantial in size, weight, and power. That forces another different install.

If we get to the new Joint IED defeat organization CREW 2

jammer, which will be common between the Army and Marine

Corps, we will be able to ease that problem.

So all of these are those challenges. We are confronting them, we

are dealing with them as fast as we can.

To your specific question about installation, the jammers and

other things create circumstances—I only want to go so far in the

open hearing, and would be happy to talk to you more, but there

are a lot of radio emissions from this vehicle. And so SPAWAR is,

I think I would say, uniquely qualified from a facility point of view

and all to install this equipment, test it on a range, make sure

there are not interferences, make sure the radio patterns that are

produced by the vehicle are sufficient for all the purposes desired,

and move forward.

13

Every manufacturer doesn’t have that kind of facility, and so you

would find yourself shipping vehicles from a manufacturer where

the equipment is installed; test it; if it doesn’t work, ship it back;

and other things.

So I believe there are some significant efficiencies to massing the

government furnished equipment (GFE) at SPAWAR, having people that have installed GFE in one vehicle install it in the next vehicle and the next vehicle. Even though the vehicle is somewhat

different, it doesn’t involve differential training.

But to assure you of the next step, the team is making those

choices every day. They look at what could be done at the vendor,

and they are pushing things back to vendors that can be done at

the manufacturing site and, I believe legitimately, only trying to do

the things at SPAWAR that they feel they have to do, or that are

most efficiently done there because one person can install all the

jammers, all the radios, all the other things.

Let me please give the Captain a chance to add to that.

Mr. TAYLOR. Captain Hoover.

Captain HOOVER. Yes, sir. To add to the part about commonality.

We are already seeing successes every day in the improvements of,

the commonality of the various different vehicles and the systems

we are putting in. Our role, obviously, is in the area of electronic

engineering and integration, and that is what we specialize in, in

our expertise in the testing and understanding of putting complicated systems together in a small, confined area.

The biggest challenge that we have had to the different configurations was doing the prototyping and getting through those processes for all the different configurations.

The good side of where we are at today is, we have completed

a large number, especially a large volume of the vehicles that we

are going to be seeing; and so now—as a matter of fact, every day—

we are seeing a marked improvement on the speed of that integration getting to those vehicles.

We still have challenges in working through those with a very

good teaming arrangement with our manufacturers. We have recently seen a large number of engineering changes that we have

put changes back for brackets and those sorts of things, and cable

penetrations for the manufacturers—for those, to do those in line

with their processes, so that we can improve the speed that we can

do the electronic integration.

We have also had, working with a large group of industrial engineers, to come in and look at our processes, seeing what else we

can do. And, again, that is a daily review, looking for opportunities

to continually improve.

And so the continual process, improvement, the engineering

changes back to the manufacturers. And then the learning curve

from now that we are through the biggest bulk of the prototyping

that we will see every day. Again, every day, our numbers of production of doing the electronic integration are improving.

Mr. TAYLOR. Captain, as a quick follow-up, and Secretary Young

touched on this: I very much appreciate the challenges of the need

for interoperability of the different electronic components; and the

folks that work with you did a very good job for talking about the

need for stand-off distances. But once you have made the deterVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:02 Sep 12, 2008 Jkt 040396 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-99\40396.TXT HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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mination that this is where this antenna needs to go, this is where

the jammer needs to go, why not send that work back to the factory?

It is my understanding that in the fall of 1989, Charleston was

hit with a very significant hurricane. It is also my understanding

that sometime in the history of that city they have had a very dramatic earthquake there and that people in the Charleston area still

worry about that sort of thing.

Does it really make sense to have that as one focal point where

five or six manufacturers all send their equipment to be put together? Doesn’t that become a vulnerability? And what are we

doing? Since, again, I recognize that vulnerability, I would hope

you would.

So what are we doing to spread the work and to get this—and,

again, the whole idea is to get it done right and to get it done

quickly.

Captain HOOVER. Sir, as far as the natural disaster from the

Charleston area, we have another alternate facility about 60, 70

miles outside of Charleston in a different part of the State, the

same square footage size, the same type of industrial capability

from an electronic integration-type facility. So that is what we have

in place.

And we are putting right now—between now and Christmas, we

will have in place an additional capacity for another 305 lines, actually above what our current plan was of the 50 lines that we

have already told folks about. And that will be additional capacity

and a backup plan if there ever was a natural disaster, with a 72-

hour plan to be able to relocate to another continuing operationstype facility.

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair will yield to the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

How many MRAPs will be in theater by year’s end?

Secretary YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I believe in a previous press

conference, Secretary Gates indicated that he thought there would

be at least 1,500 in theater. I think we will do much better than

that, but I would really rather not predict at this time.

But our production schedule calls for us to produce—for industry

to build and deliver almost 3,600 MRAPs by December 31.

I think Chairman Taylor rightly pointed out that if SPAWAR is

very successful, and they have plans and they have applied Lean

Six Sigma processes to it, that they can process those vehicles.

Then you have to factor in the shipment times and some variability

in the vessels.

So I have been very hesitant to put a final number. I think it

is significantly more than that 1,500, but if need be, we could get

you something for the record that we would be, I think, conservative and comfortable with until we get closer to December.

Because the other thing is, I have to build 1,000 vehicles in November and 1,200 vehicles in December. That is the real goal. Having built 500 in the last month, we are optimistic about that, but

I am very dependent on my industry partners to be able to make

the next jump from 500 to 1,000 and then to 1,200.

15

That is critical before I can answer your question as to how

many will be in theater.

Mr. BARTLETT. It will be somewhere between the 1,500 and the

3,600?

Secretary YOUNG. That is probably a good estimate.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

Acknowledging the significant work that has been done to

produce MRAPs, how are you dealing with the variation that you

find when the trucks arrive in Charleston that are not ready for

integration?

Secretary YOUNG. Maybe I would ask Captain Hoover. He would

be best able.

Captain HOOVER. Yes, sir. That has been a very good teaming arrangement between DCMA, the vendors. We have field service reps

from each of the vendors right in Charleston working with us. And

in almost all cases we are able to get the prototyping done, we can

get the integration done in a parallel process, working with the

manufacturers to get the vehicles done in a short amount of time.

Mr. BARTLETT. Are they not inspected before they are shipped?

Or what is the problem that they arrive not ready for integration?

Captain HOOVER. Yes, sir, they are inspected. It is not a problem.

It is basically that some of the vehicles were awaiting some components, for some of the equipment like an air conditioning unit or

whatever. And so, due to the speed that we are trying to go and

paralleling our processes, we go ahead and conditionally accept the

vehicles. And then, again, the field service reps come and work

alongside our folks in our facilities so that we can work together

in a teaming arrangement so that we can complete the vehicles.

Mr. BARTLETT. Is there anything that we can do to help?

Captain HOOVER. Continuing to support our efforts on what we

are doing I think is a great thing.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Taylor asked the next question I was going

to ask, and that is, why can’t you have the C4I equipment installation done at the manufacturers and avoid this additional step?

And I think that you answered that question.

Is SPAWAR Charleston opening an MRAP integration facility in

Orangeburg, South Carolina?

Captain HOOVER. Sir, in Orangeburg, South Carolina, is where

we have our continuing operations facility that we have put in

place. Again, it is similar, as far as capacity, to the building that

we are using now. And it is meant to be the emergency backup facility if there was a natural disaster.

But also what we are doing in order to make that run as smoothly and efficiently as possible, if we ever need to call upon it, we are

putting a limited number of lines over into that facility. The other

benefit of that is, it gives some additional capacity above what we

currently have.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, I have an obvious question to ask.

If we were really wanting to get MRAPs as quickly as possible and

if we have this fallback facility that we could use in the event that

we lost the primary one due to a natural disaster, why aren’t we

using both of them so we are producing more vehicles?

Captain HOOVER. Yes, sir. That is the plan. Right now, the other

important portion of the location of the facility that we are using

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now is the closeness to the testing, the electronic testing that we

need to do, only a couple miles away. And now that is part of the

prototyping; it is also part of the engineering change process that

we need to do for the electronic testing.

As we get over the major hurdles in the completion of all that

testing, then we will be able to do more, basically, at a more remote site away from the testing facility.

Mr. BARTLETT. Is it a manpower shortage that prohibits you from

manufacturing at both facilities now?

Captain HOOVER. No, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. I am just curious. We have a fallback location

that we could ramp up very quickly in the event we lost the primary one. If we really want to get MRAPs in the field very quickly,

I think the obvious question is, why aren’t we using both of them

now?

Captain HOOVER. Yes, sir. Again, it is just the time it is taking

us to get the other facility up and running and ready to go, and

also where we are at in the prototyping process and the maturity

of the process.

Mr. BARTLETT. I am still not getting a clear understanding of

what keeps us from doing it.

Secretary YOUNG. Congressman, maybe I might add a couple of

comments to that.

One, we are anxious about some of the issues you all are raising.

I asked recently that the Army look, given its experience in handling up-armored Humvees and kitting them with Frag Kits, to

look at what facilities they have and whether they could participate

in the MRAP program GFE equipment installation.

So they are taking a look at that, and I am waiting for an answer

about that, because I would see them as either a backup facility

or a potential augmentation to the current capacity.

SPAWARS’s estimates say that at the single Charleston facility

they can process the full vehicle rate of 1,200 per month. I think

we all have—you know, this is one of the risk areas and a continuing learning experience. We need industry to deliver 1,200. Then

we need to see SPAWARS progress 1,200. They are making very

good process and have demonstrated the ability to process as many

as 20 a day right now, I think.

So it is not clear to us SPAWARS won’t be able to handle the

workload, but we are looking at options for backup, either through

the alternate SPAWARS facility and/or Army facilities.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Captain, if I could follow up, I heard this comment

last Friday and I heard you say it again today when you talked

about 50 different production lines. My observations were that

there were, indeed, 50 lines, but it looked more like 50 different

custom, one-of-a-kind events going on, as opposed to even one

straight production line where, at this station, this is done; at the

next station, the antenna is added; at the next station, the weapons

are added.

Truly—and, again, I very much respect your service to our Nation, but I don’t think we are going to get anywhere near the results that this Nation needs with the situation that exists at

SPAWARS.

17

And I was curious, to what extent have you gone out to the private sector, to folks who work at Toyota, Ford, GM, whoever, folks

who are in the business of mass production? You are in the business of being a great sailor, and I understand that we have asked

you to do something on top of your normal role. But to what extent

have you tried to involve industry experts to expedite this process?

Because I am not saying this to belittle the efforts of anyone in

your organization. I am saying this because kids are dying in Iraq

for lack of these vehicles, and we need to do better. Tell me how

you are going to do better.

Captain HOOVER. Yes, sir. We have teamed with a large group

of outside industrial experts.

Mr. TAYLOR. Walk us through this. This is a chance for this committee to learn something.

Captain HOOVER. Yes, sir.

George Group, for one, who are experts in the Lean Six Sigma

processes, understands industrial engineering processes, have

teamed with them, have come in and are continually observing our

processes.

We also have local resident experts in the area of Lean Six

Sigma and process engineering.

And so that is a daily effort, to look through our processes, to

look for that continual improvement. And, again, there are numerous examples on where we have had those improvements in the

tooling areas, in measuring the drumbeat, the rate of the vehicles

going through those efforts.

Also, working with the manufacturers on those engineering

changes and working with their team, their team of engineers, on—

already putting more of the brackets and the drilling and the welding and those sort of things back into the inline process of the

building of the vehicles.

Mr. TAYLOR. Are you certain that when, on the industrial side,

on the manufacturing side, they get to full production, that you

have the people, the equipment, and the process in place to match

their production so as to field these so that every time one rolls

into Charleston, you are ready to take it, and within a day or two

it is going out to the field?

Captain HOOVER. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. You have everything you need? If you come back before this committee in March, are you going to tell me that you

don’t need any additional equipment, you don’t need any additional

resources, you don’t need any additional people? Because now is

the time to clear the air on this.

Captain HOOVER. We have the people and the resources. We

need to continue the teaming relationship; and we need a tight,

close, working relationship effort with the manufacturers, obviously, for us all to be successful.

That is a very important team, and I fully expect that that will

continue and only continue to improve.

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas,

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Young, thank you for being with us today—all three of

you.

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As chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, we want to be sure

that our troops get the best equipment that we can give them. And

I understand that the MRAP contains some of the newest, latest

technology. But I see a chess game. We move, they move. We come

up with a new technology or new equipment, then they come up

with different ways to destroy our equipment.

I am pretty sure that as we are moving along and we are using

the MRAPs—and I know that there have been some attacks on

some of the MRAPs and, thank God, that some of our Marines and

soldiers have been able to walk away and not to be maimed or injured like before. But the enemy has always been able to adapt real

quick.

Can we avoid that? As we are learning from experiences with the

MRAP there, are we telling our engineers, do they know exactly

what happens? How can we provide the information learned from

these experiences so that we can—because we are providing the

same vehicle all the time. It defeats the purpose. We need to make

adjustments as we move along. And maybe you can give me a little

insight on that.

Secretary YOUNG. Congressman, probably a couple important

points to that.

One, the MRAP team has a competition under way for an MRAP

2 vehicle, giving people—to provide vehicle options against a higher

standard of protection.

Then I think you would be encouraged to hear that we are testing the existing MRAPs against that higher standard, and that

testing is informing the team and leading people to make changes

on some of these vehicles. So the next orders of vehicles will potentially have changes that will make them more like this MRAP 2

standard we would like to achieve.

And so we are constantly testing and providing that data. And

then we get information from the field, as you said, and we have

the opportunity to make changes to the vehicles.

I would tell you, as General Brogan told me just during the

break in the hearing, the second series of development testing on

the existing MRAPs is going very well and showing that these vehicles are very capable.

In addition to that process, we are working with the supplemental funds that you all have provided to add additional armor

protection to those vehicles, to pace some of the threat we see in

the theater.

So we are taking all those steps, and we will probably provide

you with additional details in a different forum.

Mr. ORTIZ. You know, we read in the newspaper about individuals saying, well, we might be able to use it here in this type of

terrain. But if we go someplace else, we might not be able to use

it. But I am pretty sure that as we move along, we will be able to

make some changes to where, if we fight—and I hope that it never

happens that we have to fight a different war, different techniques—that maybe we can continue to use some of these vehicles.

Secretary YOUNG. Maybe I would add a couple of additional comments to that.

I mean, the vehicles have good survivability because of the features that Chairman Taylor mentioned and, also, they are heavy.

19

They range from 30,000-plus pounds to 80,000 pounds at the extreme end. That gives them some of the survivability also.

That also deters to some degree their mobility and their speed,

and in certain terrain environments MRAPs are proving not as effective for soldiers. And we are getting reports from the field that

some places they want to keep the up-armored Humvees. They

need those for mobility and speed and other factors.

So the force is going to keep informing us about what best lets

them do their mission, and we will work toward that. And then out

of both of these programs, we are pulling knowledge—I think it

goes to Chairman Abercrombie’s comment—we are going to build

a replacement for the Humvee. We call it the Joint Lightweight

Tactical Vehicle.

I recently urged that we look at building prototypes of those vehicles and testing to see how survivable we can make those vehicles. There is a desire for those vehicles to be small and light and

mobile like Humvees, but have MRAP-like protection. Well, those

are inconsistent goals, but with some technology and design work,

maybe we can get part of that. We need to build prototypes, test

them, and see how close we can come; let that inform the requirement. And if any vehicles are successful, we will move forward

with developing those vehicles to have a Humvee replacement.

So it is constantly improving the MRAPs. We will continue.

There is a Frag Kit 6 now for Humvees. We will keep gathering

information, test in the theater and make improvements on what

we have.

And then we are looking forward to the next generation of vehicle.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Texas.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me work backwards, Mr. Young. You just mentioned the

question of prototypes, which takes me to a—some of the area that

I don’t want to go into at great length today, because I don’t think

the hearing warrants it.

But you have a unique background. I won’t go over all of your

biography, but for those in the audience and those listening in or

paying attention to this today, they may not be fully aware of it.

You have, I think, a unique and very useful background in the

sense of having worked on the Defense Appropriations Committee.

Your familiarity with acquisition comes from both an academic

background and familiarity with the engineering side of things, as

well as the political side of things. And I don’t mean that in a pejorative sense. I am talking about the process that is necessary, particularly from an appropriations point of view; you are familiar

with the history, the legislative history.

So when you mentioned the prototype, I think—if you are not

aware, you will be at the end of my remarks that I am very much

in favor of what you are trying to achieve because I think it makes

good sense. That is why I wasn’t quite sure what you meant when

you said that someone might, with regard to Humvee replacement

20

and the Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle, that the prototype

might be seen by some as looking at inconsistent goals.

Could you enlighten me? Or did I misunderstand what you were

trying to get at? I do not see, in other words, the establishment of

a prototype process as being inconsistent with anything other than

good fiscal—sound fiscal policy and sound legislative policy with regard to what we should fund and how we should do it.

Secretary YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I am very grateful for your

comments. I think what you sensed in my comments is, the Department had embarked on a strategy that said we would like to have

a competition, pick someone based on a paper proposal to build a

vehicle to replace the Humvee, and have that vehicle cost half or

less of what MRAP cost and be more survivable or as survivable

as an MRAP.

I said, I am not sure technology supports that. Even if it does,

I think, consistent with your comments, I, as the acting under secretary, said it is a better strategy, given the times we have gone

into later stages of development with immature technology, to do

prototyping work and convince ourselves that technology will support and meet the requirement and we understand about what it

will cost, and then move into that later stage of development to try

to avoid schedule slips, cost growth, and the other bad things.

So across the Department, I am urging we look very hard at applying prototyping strategies, which I am actually very glad to hear

that might be consistent with your view.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Too bad I am not a Senator that can confirm

you.

Secretary YOUNG. I would agree with that also, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But I have an idea that anybody in the listening public, listening to what you are saying, would be a little bit

shocked and maybe a little perturbed that that is not what we are

doing right now.

The assumption, I expect, particularly in the private sector,

would be, let alone in the taxpaying public, would be, isn’t that the

way we do things anyway? And, of course, the answer is ‘‘no.’’ So

what you are really talking about here, are you not, is a change

of culture.

Secretary YOUNG. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. A change in approach?

Secretary YOUNG. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is more than tinkering with the process.

It is an entirely different concept of what constitutes the capacity

to utilize—even create technology, let alone utilize technology, on

behalf of the national security mission.

Secretary YOUNG. Maybe I could add more.

What I particularly want to do is, I want to learn lessons and

make mistakes. Because we do have to learn, especially in technically risky things. I want to learn those lessons and make those

mistakes when I am spending at lower monthly rates of taxpayer

dollars’ expenditure in a prototyping phase, and hopefully, not

learn those lessons when I am spending money at much higher

rates in the very costly design and development phase.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Not only that. But you are also dealing with

the context of the military industrial complex. And, again, I don’t

21

use that in the pejorative sense. I use that in the sense of the

warning that was issued by President Eisenhower at the end of his

term.

As someone who understood, as much as he helped create, the

military-industrial complex, he understood that there were consequences and implications of it. There are sound reasons for that,

right?

And that is why I said, it is not pejorative on my part. It is too

easy a philosophical or ideological position to take.

But the reason I want to just pursue it a moment or two more

in this context of the MRAP. We don’t want to be in a situation,

whether it is MRAP or anything else you may be contemplating,

what these subcommittees will have to deal with.

Hasn’t part of our difficulty been that we hand out these contracts, have a goal on a piece of paper, and then say, okay, you go

try to accomplish this? And what happens is, we start spending not

thousands or millions but sometimes billions of dollars. You then

create—and Mr. Taylor made it very clear, this is not a jobs program we are looking at here. Some jobs will come, some jobs might.

They might be in some districts, they might not be in others. They

might change.

I have had discussions with some of the people on our second

panel, for example, saying, are you prepared, do you understand

that you may gear up to a very high percentage of turnout—buildup and overhead both in terms of personnel and investment—

which may have a termination point, which may have some kind

of serious consequences for you financially? That is one of the reasons that I am so interested in the question of capital budgeting

and so on.

But in this instance, then what happens—this is my understanding of what you are driving at here—is that you then get a vested

political interest in continuing what is going on. And it is hard, and

I have full understanding of any Member’s situation when somebody comes and says, look, Congressman, look, Senator, we have

got 1,000 jobs here and this investment is going.

Of course, nothing is being accomplished. We are not really getting the helicopters, we are not really getting the planes, we are

not really getting the tanks. We think we are. Maybe we will. Or

we have got to slip it another four years or five years, but you have

got to keep giving us the money.

And then what happens is that the capacity to do what we are

talking about right now, this rescue mission that Mr. Taylor is

speaking of, is compromised. And it finds itself in extraordinary

difficulty or requires us then to move very rapidly in another direction in terms of funding which, more often than not, will involve

a supplemental budget because we didn’t anticipate it during the

regular budget process.

Am I being unfair in characterizing this?

Secretary YOUNG. It is very fair.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And if I am not, am I correct in saying that

you want to try and change that, that kind of doing business?

Secretary YOUNG. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Does that then apply toward the MRAP

2?

22

Secretary YOUNG. I think most aspects of MRAP are aligned with

some of the things we are talking about.

They asked multiple vendors to bring vehicles to test in the first

phase of MRAP. And, indeed, we leaned forward and bought vehicles from some of those vendors, and one or two of those vendors

didn’t pass the testing. And we have some of their vehicles——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And that’s the way it is.

Secretary YOUNG [continuing]. We are going to use for training

purposes so the taxpayer money is not wasted. But they are not

going to get more contracts.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So if Members of Congress are serious about

wanting to limit government and wanting to spend the dollar in

the correct way, of wanting to utilize, we are going to have to rely

on some cold, hard judgments being made; and that means some

of us may have to say to our people, we don’t get this, maybe we

will get something else. We will have to move in another direction,

as Mr. Taylor already indicated.

More than one of us have been through a situation where you

told 1,300 people or whatever it is, this is not going to happen any

longer. So, okay. So we are going to get rid of that jobs approach

here, per se.

Then the last question I have—thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing it—we are getting lessons. You are talking about, like, the

24 variations and so on. Without taking a whole lot of time, maybe,

that would be better spent in another hearing, is it fair for me to

say, or do you have then a kind of lessons-learned concept or approach with regard to your experience now with this singular focus

on MRAPs and the congressional push that is going on with it in

the sense of applying lessons in terms of the survivability?

Are you testing out in the field? That is what I am trying to get

at. Are we following up? Do I understand you correctly that we are

following up in the field, asking for the soldiers in the field to give

us information as to whether or not what we are giving them actually is accomplishing what they need?

Or because I gleaned from what you were saying, in some instances, a lighter vehicle, maybe not quite as armored, is something that is seen as useful and applicable; and in other instances,

they are going to need something else.

Secretary YOUNG. We are looking for that feedback. For the

MRAP program, per se, there has been a first round in development tests; a second round which four of the vehicle vendors are

still in the process of.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am not talking about testing in a field

sense. I am talking about testing in a theater sense.

Secretary YOUNG. Right. I wanted to, if I could, gradually work

my way there.

There is a third round. Those development tests are defined by

what we are seeing in the theater in terms of explosive types and

other things.

And then the actual results and experience in the theater, we get

that data and process that, both to define our tests and to learn

what we need to do about vehicles going forward.

So, yes, sir, that happens.

23

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And, Mr. Greenwalt, you escaped most of the

attention today. I presume you are Mr. Young’s strong arm or his

associate in this? Do you associate yourself with this approach?

Mr. GREENWALT. Yes, sir, I do. And I think it is the lessons

learned from this particular procurement: that our industrial base

is agile, that we rely on commercial products and commercial vendors, and we have been able to pull together in a very rapid period

of time so you can rapidly prototype with existing technologies and

existing manufacturers.

And I think——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I think the country and the Department will

be well served, Mr. Young, if you are able to move forward with

this.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Hawaii.

We now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank all of you for being here today. I am so interested in

the MRAP program. And I am interested as a Member of Congress.

I am a veteran myself, but I am particularly interested in that I

have four sons serving in the military. One served for a year in

Iraq, another is on his way to Iraq, and so I am interested for our

troops. And so much of the feelings that I have are to provide the

best equipment we can to protect our troops. And what you are

doing is so important; and I want to thank you for your efforts.

In particular, I have had the opportunity, thanks to Congressman Abercrombie, to recently be in Iraq and Afghanistan. My National Guard unit is in Afghanistan. In my visits—eight times to

Iraq, four times to Afghanistan—as he was talking with persons in

theater to find out how successful and how helpful the equipment

that our young servicemen and -women have, it is just really heartwarming. And so you are making such a difference.

Also, Captain Hoover, I want to thank you. I have had the opportunity to visit SPAWAR. You have excellent personnel. They are so

enthusiastic.

And, of course, I am a bit partial. The chairman has had two

daughters go to the College of Charleston. I had the extraordinary

opportunity to be born in Charleston. So I am very pleased about

what you all are doing.

As we look ahead, I am very interested in finding out, what is

the planning for long-term sustainment of the MRAP program?

And any of you could answer that.

Secretary YOUNG. Congressman, I think, unfortunately, none of

us is exactly the right person to answer that question. The service

chiefs have indicated and Secretary Gates has asked them to think

about that very issue: How will you, long term, integrate MRAPs

in the force structure? And I think those deliberations have not

concluded yet.

In general, the chiefs have indicated these are heavy and large

vehicles, and for some of their operational concepts—very expeditionary, mobile—they don’t fit well. They fit very well, obviously,

for the circumstances in Iraq. So some of the vehicles, the service

chiefs have indicated, will be stored for a period of time.

24

We might not need as many as we are buying for the Iraq situation if we are successful in continuing to stabilize Iraq and the

force mission changes there. But those decisions are being deliberated on and made as we talk; and Secretary Gates is working on

it.

I can’t give you much more commentary than what I have offered.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Abercrombie touched on this, too. And that is,

when do you require another influx of funds in order to preclude

a possible production break in the MRAP program?

Secretary YOUNG. The funds that I understand are in the fiscal

year 2008 Defense Appropriations conference report that is before,

I believe, the Congress—today, even—give us what we need for fiscal year 2008, which is really, to be candid, awesome and incredible. In a matter of months here, the Congress has provided $22

billion to buy these vehicles. It is far and away the biggest program

activity in a space of time in the Department. So the Congress has

been extraordinarily helpful on this program.

Mr. WILSON. And, again—I know I am very supportive of what

this can mean to protect our troops.

The final question I have: Are you experiencing any supply problems at the sub-tier supply base?

Mr. GREENWALT. In April and then just recently, a few months

back, I tasked the Defense Contract Management Agency to look

for potential bottlenecks, and they have identified a number of

them. But the most recent report is that these problems are manageable, and that we are able to work our way through them.

But there are potential choke points in steel, in tires, in axles,

and a few subcomponents. But, again, these problems are being

worked through on a daily basis.

And because the MRAP program has a DX rating, which is essentially the MRAP program obtains priority to all of these components and materials, we are not seeing the supply disruptions that

could have occurred.

So I think we are doing—it is a tremendous job that is going on

out there by the vendors and by government personnel, and we

have got our hands on it.

Mr. WILSON. Again, I want to thank you as a veteran and thank

you as a member of a military family. We want the best for our

troops, to protect our troops.

And thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentleman from South Carolina.

We want to thank our witnesses.

We also want to recognize we are lucky to have former Representative Dave Martin with us today, keeping us on our toes.

Captain, last question. I am curious, what was your flow-through

SPAWAR in September? How many vehicles? In other words, how

long did it take a vehicle to enter your facility, to leave your facility

in theater, in September?

How long would it take that same vehicle to flow through your

facility today? And what is your anticipated time for January?

Because, again—I hope I am dead wrong; I hope you are exactly

right; I hope there is not a train wreck on the way—but I want to

25

hear from you that you have a plan. And give me an idea how

these things are proceeding through your facility quicker, so that

we don’t have a problem there.

Captain HOOVER. Yes, sir. Right now, I will start with our goal.

Our goal is to get from time of receipt to embarkation in seven

days, a seven-day flowing process. I do not recall the exact numbers on average for the month of September. For the end of the

month of October, it was roughly 21 days; and the reason for that,

the difference—September was a little slower than that. And the

reason for the difference and the reason why it is much longer than

what we want it to be or require it to be is because in August, September, even up through October, we have been heavily involved

in the prototyping process which goes into the average flow rate,

the calculation of those numbers. And so when we have a group of

vehicles coming in from the manufacturers, as we are going

through the prototyping process, which takes us several more days

than just doing the integration itself, basically we have vehicles

there that are waiting to get into the integration process once the

prototyping is done.

Now that we are over the majority of those hurdles and we are

over the majority of those prototyping processes, from the raw vehicle number at over 80 percent that now we are seeing—and we are

right where we thought we would be at this point, knowing that

November was our big month, knowing that we needed to get

through most of the prototyping so that when, in November, the

largest volume that we have seen to date, starts to flow, we can

continue to narrow down that 21-day time.

And it is not 21 days of integration, but that is from the time

that it arrives to the time that it departs, basically, to get that

down to that 7-day process. And now we are seeing daily an improvement on that speed. And, again, that is due a lot to the successes in getting through the prototyping, working with the manufacturers, and now working on just that continual process improvement to make sure we are making our goals.

Mr. TAYLOR. When do you anticipate your facility will be at that

7-day target?

Captain HOOVER. Sir, by the end of the month of November, we

should have the capacity we estimate, that our capability will be

at 40 vehicles a day. So it is more that we are tracking it, than

the whole entire process, because we are looking more at keeping

up with the flow of, the drumbeat of, the number of vehicles processing through. And then, by mid-December is when we believe—

we are showing right now that we will be at the full 50-a-day vehicles, which is what we are required to do to keep up with the

drumbeat of, the flow of the vehicles—keep pace.

Mr. TAYLOR. I have got to believe that you supply these numbers

of what is flowing through your facility to someone on almost a

daily basis. Is that correct?

Captain HOOVER. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. I would like to request that you also supply those

numbers to this committee.

Would you have a problem with that, or would Mr. Young have

a problem with that? Okay.

And, again, we very much appreciate all of you.

26

Yes, Mr. Young.

Secretary YOUNG. Could I just add, every time I brief the Secretary, he shares the concern you have.

I have also visited SPAWAR. They are pacing the vehicles. They

have had to deal with the fact that we contracted for new vehicle

types that showed up. But this is the metric we want to watch, and

this is why it is important for us to have some backup plans, too.

It is of concern to Secretary Gates. And I share your concern; I

am happy to share that data with you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 117.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Captain, either you or somebody in your organization last Friday mentioned that you see on the deliveries that come

to your facility, that it starts out kind of slow and then toward the

end of the month you tend to get a wave of vehicles coming in,

which certainly makes it harder on your organization to process

them in a straightforward, timely manner. What is being done?

And I am also going to give our vendors an opportunity up front

to let them know this is part of their questioning.

What is being done to change that, to get it more balanced out,

one-quarter of a month’s production in each week coming from your

vendors, again, to lessen the load on your people so that it is neither too little nor too much?

Captain HOOVER. Sir, I am only going to speak from what we are

seeing in our facility.

In the month of October, we saw an improvement, although at

the end of the month of October we did have a bigger bulk at the

end of the month, but not as bad as it was in the month of September. Already in the month of November we are seeing marked improvement on a steady flow, almost a daily delivery of vehicles

coming through.

So the program office has done a great job on changing that. And

we are seeing—again, at our facility, we are already seeing a significant difference. Especially this month right now in just this

short month that we have started, we are seeing an improvement

in that area.

Secretary YOUNG. Maybe I can add, because that is a challenge

for SPAWAR, and in anticipating this, I tried to get that data. In

the first 5 days of October, 21 vehicles were delivered. In the last

5 days of October—maybe, actually, 7 days—231 vehicles were delivered. That was a very big wave at the back end.

In the first seven days of November, so far, already 100 vehicles

have been delivered from industry. That is a very positive sign.

Paul Mann and General Brogan and the MRAP team have tried to

move the contracts to be weekly-based deliveries and are even looking at daily-based deliveries.

So we are going to try to force, through the contract, that discipline, and work with the vendors to get to that steadier flow.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Any additional questions?

Mr. Secretary, we very much appreciate you and this panel being

here. We appreciate your service to our Nation.

And I want to give you one last opportunity. If there is anything

you need from this committee, tell us now.

27

Secretary YOUNG. I have one thing I need, but it is better to talk

to you.

Mr. TAYLOR. If you prefer to do it off the record.

But, again, this is a United States of America problem, and we

want to do our part. We expect you to do your part. If there is anything this Congress is not doing, we need to know about it.

Secretary YOUNG. Let me not leave you with the wrong impression. If the appropriations bill provides that $11 billion, we have

the tools we need. We will have to work some processes in the Department to execute it, and we will do that and move forward.

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, we want to thank the panel for being here.

Thank you for your service to our Nation. The first panel is dismissed.

The Chair would now like to welcome before the committee our

second panel. We are very fortunate to have a number of representatives from industry, who are involved in the manufacture of the

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle. They include Ms. Linda

Hudson, President of Land & Armaments Systems, BAE Systems;

Mr. Gordon McGilton, Chief Executive Officer of Force Protection;

Mr. David Heebner, President of General Dynamics Land Systems;

and Mr. Archie Massicotte, the President of International Military

and Government (IMG), LLC.

We want to welcome you here. It is normally the practice of this

committee to limit witnesses to five minutes. I am willing to be

flexible on that, but I would hope that you keep in mind that there

will be additional votes today. So, in fairness to all of our witnesses, please try to do it as expeditiously as you can, but we are

willing to be flexible on the five-minute rule.

The Chair now recognizes Ms. Linda Hudson.

STATEMENT OF LINDA P. HUDSON, PRESIDENT, LAND &

ARMAMENTS SYSTEMS, BAE SYSTEMS

Ms. HUDSON. Thank you. Chairman Taylor, Chairman Abercrombie, Ranking Member Bartlett, I appreciate the opportunity to

address your committees. Having submitted my statement for the

record, I would like to provide a few opening comments.

I appear before you today to discuss the MRAP systems produced

by BAE Systems. Before beginning, on behalf of BAE Systems, I

would like to thank the subcommittees and this Congress for your

support of the MRAP program.

I am the President of BAE Systems Land & Armaments Operating Group. During my 35 years in the defense industry, I have

never seen industry and government accomplish so much so fast.

My organization has 18,000 employees across 17 States in the

United States, as well as the United Kingdom, Sweden, and South

Africa. All of my employees and the employees of the greater BAE

Systems Corporation have made MRAP our number one priority.

Our global business designs, produces, resets, upgrades, and provides worldwide support for combat vehicles, tactical vehicles, military armaments, naval fire support systems, advanced armor solutions, and individual soldier survivability systems for the United

States and our allies. We bring all of those resources to the MRAP

program.

28

Having recently acquired Armor Holdings, we now provide the

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, or FMTVs, and have played

a major role in improving Marine and soldier survivability by uparmoring Humvees and providing advanced body armor on an accelerated schedule to meet the evolving threat. The combination of

BAE Systems and Armor Holdings has resulted in unmatched capabilities in warfighter and vehicle survivability. To date, we have

received orders for 2,933 MRAP vehicles. Allow me to summarize

our three MRAP systems currently under contract.

First, the RG–31 vehicle has been produced since 1996 in our

Land Systems South Africa business. Our legacy of building mineresistant vehicles in South Africa goes back 30 years. We have a

business relationship with General Dynamics to allow them to market and coproduce the RG–31. I will defer to my colleague from GD

to comment further on this contract.

Second, building upon our RG–31 experience in South Africa,

technology was transferred to our ground systems business here in

the United States, and a next-generation mine-resistant vehicle

called the RG–33 was developed by BAE Systems. This design incorporates unprecedented survivability features tailored for our

U.S. forces. The RG–33 is currently being supplied in four different

variants, including the generic Category I and II systems, and an

ambulance and a SOCOM variant. The contracted production currently under way runs through April of 2008.

And, finally, as I mentioned previously, in July 2007 BAE Systems acquired Armor Holdings. That acquisition added an MRAP

variant known as the Caiman, based upon the design of the U.S.

Army’s Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles. In addition to meeting

the MRAP survivability requirements, this vehicle has been designed to have parts commonality with the FMTV, resulting in enhanced supportability. The contracted production for Caiman runs

out in February of 2008.

Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the services

should be commended for recognizing this critical need to protect

our troops and providing the necessary priority and funding.

BAE Systems has been leaning forward, often self-funding activities in advance of contract, with the sole focus of rapidly delivering

the most survivable vehicles to protect our troops. These efforts

have been challenging, with requirements to deliver vehicles within

weeks of contract award and only months after initial design.

For example, we delivered Caimans 43 days after contract

award. We designed and delivered RG–33 in less than 7 months;

and subsequently, the ambulance variant, 13 weeks after contract

award.

We have five principal MRAP manufacturing sites: York, Pennsylvania; Aikin, South Carolina; Sealy, Texas; Fairfield, Ohio; and

Johannesburg, South Africa. Assuming receipt of additional orders

in time to ensure continuous production, we will achieve our currently planned maximum rate of 600 vehicles per month in April

of next year.

Moreover, activity is under way to ensure that components of our

MRAP variants can be built in all of our major facilities. BAE Systems is prepared to make additional capital investments to increase capacity.

29

Last, we stand ready to further expand monthly MRAP production by allowing other manufacturers to produce our MRAP design

variants under license if so desired.

I would like to single out the MRAP program manager, Mr. Paul

Mann, for his unceasing leadership. It is noteworthy that normal

contractual practices could not possibly keep up with the fast pace

of this program. We have maintained an open, direct, and professional relationship with Mr. Mann and his program office. This collaboration within the framework of the contract deserves commendation.

We are prepared to collaborate with the other prime contractors

to improve survivability, accelerate production and fielding, and enhance sustainment of the MRAP vehicles. We are already collaborating with the other prime contractors here to cross-train our field

service representatives on all the vehicle variants to optimize intheater support. We stand ready to work with our colleagues here

today to better meet the needs of the troops.

In closing, and on behalf of BAE Systems and the Land & Armaments team, I would like to thank you for this invitation to come

tell our MRAP story. We are very proud to be a part of the MRAP

program, providing these highly survivable vehicles to the

warfighters, and we are well positioned to respond rapidly to the

continuing program needs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Ms. Hudson.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hudson can be found in the Appendix on page 76.]

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Gordon McGilton,

Chief Executive Officer of Force Protection.

STATEMENT OF GORDON MCGILTON, CEO, FORCE

PROTECTION, INC.

Mr. MCGILTON. Thank you, Chairman Taylor, Chairman Abercrombie, and members of the House Armed Services Committee.

Force Protection Industries appreciates this opportunity to update

with regard to the critical MRAP program.

As of the 1st of November, Force Protection has delivered 1,389

Cougar and Buffalo mine protected vehicles to our servicemen and

-women. They are as follows: 146 Buffalo route clearance vehicles;

153 Cougar Iraqi light armored vehicles; 28 Cougar hardened engineer vehicles; 216 Cougar joint EOD rapid response vehicles; 5

Cougar engineered vehicles delivered to Canada; 108 Cougar Mastiffs for the United Kingdom; and 734 Cougar MRAP Category I

and II vehicles.

In order to put the delivery of those vehicles into some perspective, I will provide a brief synopsis of our history relative to building mine protected vehicles.

Force Protection’s sole mission is to manufacture, deliver, and

maintain vehicles that feature the best protection available to the

American and Coalition servicemen and -women facing the threat

of improvised explosive devices. MRAP manufacturing is not an additional business line for us; it is our only job. Every action we

take, including investments and partnerships, is designed to help

fulfill this mission.

30

Force Protection Industries was incorporated in early 2005. At

that time, we employed 200 people and occupied 100,000 square

feet of manufacturing space in South Carolina.

By the end of 2005, we expanded to 250,000 square feet of space

and 350 employees. Most importantly, we had delivered 60 vehicles. By the end of 2006, we had quintupled the number of vehicles

delivered to 296. In 2006, we also had expanded our manufacturing

facilities to 450,000 square feet and added 400 employees for a

total of 750 employees.

Today Force Protection employs 1,800 workers and occupies

nearly a million square feet of manufacturing space in four facilities in South Carolina and North Carolina. These manufacturing

facilities are also supported by a significant research and development facility and a 300-acre blast and ballistics testing facility also

located in South Carolina.

In addition, we formed a new company, Force Dynamics, through

a joint venture with General Dynamics Land Systems. This partnership gives us access to General Dynamics’ substantial manufacturing capabilities and as a result there are now multiple facilities

manufacturing Cougars. Our supply chain has been expanded and

our ability to rapidly incorporate design improvements is greatly

enhanced.

Of particular note, we have been able to reduce the price of a Cougar by roughly $150,000 per vehicle to a current price of under

$490,000. We have expanded the enterprise to include additional

manufacturing by using subcontracting and licensing agreements.

Because of the potential demand for MRAP we focused on two

program goals. The first was to establish enough manufacturing capacity within our joint venture with General Dynamics so that we

could deliver roughly 500 vehicles a month. The second goal was

to license production to other commercial and military industrial

contractors to expand or contract our delivery capacity as necessary

to meet the demands that are likely to change periodically.

Additionally, teaming allows us to spread our manufacturing capability to ensure that we are not too reliant any one supplier or

any one plant. In fact, Mr. Chairman, this kind of teamwork has

been a hallmark of Force Protection’s story. It has provided tremendous benefits for our men and women in harm’s way.

The following is a summary to date of Force Protection’s interaction with other manufacturers. Through our joint venture with

General Dynamics, Force Protection has increased capacity across

all functional areas, including engineers manufacturing supply

management logistics planning and execution and sustainability.

GDLS produced more than 60 Cougar vehicles in the month of October 2007 and will reach 194 vehicles a month by February of

2008.

Through Force Protection’s cooperation with Spartan Chassis we

have been able to expand our robust automotive and final assembly

capability. As a consequence, our enterprise can now rely on Spartan to help us deliver several hundred Cougars per month.

Working with Armor Holdings, formerly Stewart and Stevenson

and now BAE, Force Protection today has delivered 200 additional

Cougar vehicles. This capacity could be available for continuing delivery should sufficient orders require.

31

Force Protection along with Marine Corps Logistics Base at Albany, Georgia, performs Cougar capsule manufacturing. This military depot is in production and is a valuable part of our enterprise.

By licensing our Cougar designs to BAE Ground Systems Division, we have jointly delivered over 350 additional ILAV vehicles

to the Iraqi Army. Force Protection continues to produce and support these vehicles in conjunction with BAE.

Ongoing discussions between Force Protection and Red River

Army Depot will facilitate the establishment of an Army MRAP

maintenance and training facility. We have also looked into Red

River’s manufacturing capacity in some fashion to manufacture

Cougars should the demands dictate.

Likewise, Force Protection has an existing agreement with Textron to manufacture Cougars. Although this agreement has not

been executed due to the lack of orders the opportunity is still

available to us. Should the demands of the program warrant it, we

will quickly add Textron to our team and expand the manufacturing base for Cougar MRAPs.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, Force Protection is working with the

Medical University of South Carolina, MUSC, to help fund the establishment of a research center to improve the medical technology

available for diagnosing and treating traumatic brain injury resulting from IED attacks. Through this agreement, MUSC will learn

more about the physics of a blast using our South Carolina test

range. We hope to learn more about the physical effects on the soldiers, thus enhancing the vehicle designs in an effort to prevent the

injuries from occurring in the first place and also to try to minimize them before they happen.

In June of 2007, representatives of the Department of the Navy

asked Force Protection to determine the maximum production rates

we could achieve by December 31st of 2008. Our exhaustive review

of every production aspect, including availability and training of

new employees and access to critical parts for the Cougar, led us

to conclude that the Force Protection led team could produce 500

vehicles per month by April of 2008 and 1,000 vehicles per month

by July of 2008. That would be for a total of 12,100 MRAPs by the

end of 2008.

Our analysis did find two areas of concern: Tapered roller bearings which are used to manufacture our transfer cases and axles.

The conclusion of the DX DPAS rating has eliminated the roller

bearing concern and we have identified alternative axle suppliers.

Our analysis found no other show stoppers that would prevent us

from achieving production rates of approximately 1,000 vehicles a

month, including steel, armored steel, engines, transmission, glass,

tires and wheels.

Force Protection has enjoyed a highly professional relationship

with all of our customer program offices throughout three-plus

years of providing these vehicles. Each and every one of the program offices has undertaken ways to facilitate our ability to deliver

more efficiently. I would like to publicly express my appreciation to

Brigadier General Brogan, Major General Catto,along with Mr.

Barry Dillon at Marine Corps Systems Command; Mr. Paul Mann,

the current MRAP Program Director and his predecessor, Marine

Colonel Michael Micucci, along with their staffs; brigadier General

32

John Bartley and his staff at the Army Tank Command and the

Defense Contract Management Agency that works so well with us

to get these vehicles out the door in the quality they need to be in.

The kind of growth that we have been able to maintain is replete

with challenges which stem from establishing the requisite capacity, acquiring the necessary facilities, and deploying the needed

processes and procedures to manufacture in a reliable repeatable

fashion. Despite these challenges each and every one every of our

customer agencies has demonstrated a willingness to focus on the

end result: Delivery of these lifesaving vehicles.

Today we have an established open line of communication with

our Marine Corps, Army, and DOD customers and work closely

with them in forecasting future demands to the maximum extent

that it is known.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have been asked what can the government

do to help? The government can provide greater visibility into the

long-term plans for this program. That is crucial for us to know

what is coming down the pike. I think it would be the same for all

of us.

By the second half of this fiscal year the government can facilitate the introduction of friendly foreign customers as a means to

further stabilize the program and allow industry to achieve maximum utility for the capacity we are creating. Likewise, the government can take advantage of long lead time material orders as a

means of enabling us to secure critical supply deliveries in advance

of production orders.

It has been and remains our distinct pleasure and privilege to be

able to play a small but critical role in helping to ensure our servicemen and servicewomen execute their missions and come home to

their loved ones. We are rightly proud of the efforts of our people

and of their dedication to such an inspiring cause.

Both Cougar and Buffalo vehicles perform extremely well in our

active theaters of operation. But as I said, Force Protection’s most

important measure, the one that we take home at the end of every

day is simple: It is the number of lives that our vehicles save. That

is the mission that we live with.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this update. On behalf

of all of the employees of Force Protection and all of our partners,

we look forward to continuing being a part of this strategically important program. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McGilton can be found in the Appendix on page 87.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. McGilton. The Chair now recognizes

Mr. David Heebner, President of General Dynamic Land Systems.

STATEMENT OF DAVID K. HEEBNER, PRESIDENT, GENERAL

DYNAMICS LAND SYSTEMS

Mr. HEEBNER. Thank you, Chairman Taylor, Chairman Abercrombie, Ranking Members Bartlett and Saxton, for inviting us to

testify today. My name is David Heebner and I am President of

General Dynamics Land Systems.

It is an honor for me to represent General Dynamics Land Systems employees and our component suppliers who are building

MRAP vehicles for American forces. My objective here today is to

33

report to you that GDLS and our partners are focused on meeting

or exceeding the extremely aggressive plan to deliver MRAP vehicles to our fighting forces.

We have added manufacturing facilities, hired and trained employees and qualified suppliers, and are helping suppliers increase

their capacity. We have encountered issues common to start-up

programs, but we have dealt with them and have continued to

ramp up production.

I know you are aware that I have submitted a written statement

for the record, so in the interest of brevity please let me simply address your specific questions in the next few minutes.

I am going to answer the last question in your letter first. Specifically, are we willing to communicate and interact with our other

MRAP suppliers to share best practices for MRAP vehicles? The

answer, Mr. Chairman, is absolutely. There are minor contract

terms that would need to be worked out, but we are ready to collaborate if doing so improves the survivability or production rates

of these vehicles.

We are already cooperating in specific ways. For example, at the

Red River Arsenal our service employees and those of other manufacturers are being cross trained in performing maintenance on all

MRAP vehicles that are being deployed. So are the military mechanics. That means that no matter which vehicle they might need

to support the maintenance personnel will have the training to

keep MRAP vehicles in service.

In response to your question about relationship with the program

office, communication and cooperation with the MRAP program office has been highly intense, professional and effective. While we

would have preferred earlier larger contract awards, the program

office provided early insights of potential awards to enable our

planning and rapidly issued contracts as soon as funds became

available.

Our product performance feedback from field testing and insights

on emerging threats has been shared. GDLS compliments the program office for its responsiveness to changing conditions and for

their energetic and timely resolution of issues requiring immediate

attention.

You also asked about our industrial capacity, material

chokepoints at the subtier supplier level and the expansion of

GDLS Canada’s industrial capacity. GDLS Land Systems is producing two different types of vehicles for the MRAP program: The

improved RG–31 vehicle is under contract to General Dynamics

Land Systems Canada. We have established a U.S. production site

at Demmer Corporation in Michigan which will allow us to deliver

600 RG–31 MRAP vehicles by March 2008. This is an example of

cooperation between two major defense companies, General Dynamics and BAE, to provide urgently needed capability to our

forces.

The Cougar MRAP Category 1 and 2 vehicles are built in partnership with Force Protection Industries of South Carolina. With

FPI’s full support and less than 120 days following contract award,

GDLS capitalized, installed tooling, established process documentation, hired and trained hundreds of employees, and delivered its

34

first complete MRAP vehicle from a new production site in Alabama.

In addition, we established production at Spartan Motors in

Michigan which, together with our Alabama site, will produce 105

vehicles this month and their combined monthly rate will be 226

by April of 2008.

The Force Dynamics joint venture has combined the strengths

and full capabilities of both companies to better manage, produce

and successfully deliver MRAP Cougar vehicles. We are currently

55 Cougar MRAP vehicles ahead of schedule and will continue to

accelerate production. Together the joint venture will deliver more

than 2,700 vehicles by April of next year.

Addressing your question about material chokepoints at the

subtier supplier level, axles and high hard steel supplies have been

challenges for us at times, and we are developing alternative supply lines to overcome the issues.

For vehicle axles we are work with Arvin Meritor, American Axle

& Manufacturing, Axle Tech, Dana Corporation and Magna to augment our current suppliers.

Similarly, we are bringing on second source for high hard steel,

Algoma, to complement the existing supplier, Mittal. We constantly

take the pulse of our supply chain monitoring to ensure orders are

placed inside our material lead times.

In summary, permit me to assure you that we share your commitment to protecting our warfighters through the MRAP program.

We are doing everything possible to meet or exceed planned deliveries and we are willing to share best practices among MRAP suppliers. Maintaining high quality production momentum is our most

critical objective, which means that funding for new orders must be

in place and contracts awarded by early December to avoid disruption at the Alabama, Michigan, Ohio, and South Carolina production plants.

Thank you for this opportunity, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heebner can be found in the Appendix on page 99.]

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentleman. The Chair now

recognizes—you are going to have to help me out, sir. Mr.

Archie——

Mr. MASSICOTTE. Massicotte. You got it right.

Mr. TAYLOR. President, International Military and Government.

STATEMENT OF ARCHIE MASSICOTTE, PRESIDENT,

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT, LLC

Mr. MASSICOTTE. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, it is an

honor to be here in front of the committee, and thank you for all

you are doing in support of this program and the oversight.

I am Archie Massicotte. I have 30 years experience with the company within Navistar both from the engine side as well as the

truck manufacturing side. I have since taken over as President of

the Defense Group here, and it is quite an honor.

People may recognize us as International Harvester back in our

day, and for over 100 years we have been manufacturing vehicles.

In fact, in 2006 we manufactured 160,000 commercial vehicles and

35

560,000 diesel engines that have been in all our products, as well

as supported other customers, and you see our product all over the

streets today.

When you look at our global presence, we have dealers in over

a thousand different states as well as in North America and outside of the globe. And when you look at the dealers that we have

in other countries, we are in over 75 different countries, including

Iraq and Afghanistan. When you look at the spare parts support

and the things that we bring, we bring a global presence from a

commercial base.

We are not new to the defense business. We have been in the defense business since World War I. In you look at the trucks that

were in World War I and World War II and some of the other conflicts, we have been there. But the MRAP experience that we have

experienced, on May 31 is when we first received our first contract.

Since that date, May 31, 165 days later, we have delivered 407 vehicles and 95 of those vehicles today are in theater and there is

more in the pipeline, obviously you heard with SPAWAR as well

as our manufacturing facility.

We are on the path to achieve 500 per month by the end of February, and that is what we are under contract to deliver. We have

parts on the ground today within the military. We have delivered

58,000 part numbers to Red River Army Depot to be deployed.

In response to your questions regarding some of the adequate

funding and of the other concerns we have, I think as my other colleagues here, we are concerned beyond April as to whether or not

there is going to be adequate funding to keep these lines hot and

making sure that we don’t have a disruption or a hiccup in the system that would cause us to idle the facility.

When you look at the industrial base and where we are at today,

our issue is not building chassises, it is not getting product, and

it is not manufacturing at West Point. Our issue today is bringing

the supply base with us to achieve that 500 a month goal. And

when I talk about the supply base I am primarily talking about armored steel and manufacturing that armored steel into our product.

When you look at the cooperation that we see from the program

office, I, like my colleagues, General Brogan, Mr. Dillon, and Mr.

Mann, it has been outstanding. It has been an open door policy. We

pick up the phone if we have an issue, the phone rings, they answer it and we get a resolution fairly quickly.

The SPAWAR integration process that we are working with that

you spoke about today, we have had a collaborative relationship

with them and we are on the ground with them today doing integration from our facility today and we have been since September.

So we have been incorporating some of that SPAWAR integration

into the product and so it does speed through SPAWAR.

Leaning forward, that is one of the things that got us the depth

that we have today in being able to aggressively go out and manufacture vehicles. We as a corporation took that risk and we continue to take that risk. When we look at the collaboration with the

Red River Army Depot and doing all the collaborative training,

that has been a very wholesome environment and I think working

with TRACOM and some of the folks there to get that message

36

across and get field training done across all of our products, and

being able to train at Red River Army Depot folks as well as putting FSRs in theater has all been working very well.

Mr. Chairman, we took this contract on back in May. We told our

people, this isn’t a contract, this is a privilege. And we today at

International look at that as truly a privilege. We welcome the opportunity to continue. We look for the continued support with the

armed services that we are working with today.

And I close with, Mr. Chairman, you asked me to provide a

video, I don’t know where that fits in this committee but we are

able to provide that if you choose.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Massicotte can be found in the

Appendix on page 106.]

Mr. TAYLOR. With unanimous consent, since most of the members of the subcommittee have not had an opportunity to see one

of these facilities I would like to give the gentleman the opportunity to show it to give us some idea and give the American public

some idea of what is involved in building an MRAP if there are no

objections. Without objection.

Mr. MASSICOTTE. Thank you.

[Pause.]

Mr. TAYLOR. In the interest of time, if it starts we will go ahead

and we will stop. Again I want to thank all of our witnesses for

being with us. I hope they can get this going.

Mr. McGilton, while they are working on this and we certainly

want this to be shown, you mentioned some challenges with long

lead items and I would ask that you could clarify that at this time.

The point of this hearing is to express our frustration, but it is an

American frustration. And anything that this Congress can do to

help you in your efforts, we would like to know now. If you could

while we are waiting for the video, walk us through what those

frustrations are and let us know what we can do to help with that.

Mr. MCGILTON. Well, sir, I am not sure who would be the responsible people, so I will tell you what the challenges are and you can

determine if you are the right people. The four of us that you see

sitting on the panel today we had lunch before we came to this and

we had a telephone conversation prior to that lunch. And the two

things that we all agreed: First of all, the cooperation on this has

been tremendous. The barriers that we have are the visibility. I believe that many of the members have asked questions about visibility, how this program needs to be a program of record. There

needs to be visibility.

I think that this particular committee appears to have a great

understanding of what is necessary in manufacturing. So the thing

that we need most is visibility. We need to know what is going to

happen with the program. We can’t operate month to month. That

is extremely difficult for us to make these investments. I believe

each and every one of us at this table have leaned forward. We

have purchased steel and components and very expensive items in

the belief that there was going to be a need for these vehicles.

So the single most important thing for us is visibility going forward. If we can resolve that issue, we are all professional manufacturing people. That is the part that we need. Everything else is up

to us. Everything else is up to us. We have resolved those issues

37

up to this point by writing checks out of our own small checkbooks

at some times. Our particular company does not have the luxury

of some of these companies. We have been around for three years.

So when we write a check for tens of millions of dollars, it is a big

deal.

So I would say, visibility. There is nothing else that would be

more valuable to us than that.

Mr. TAYLOR. As I am sure you know,—just a second, I am sure

the gentleman knows that just today by a very large vote the

House approved the defense appropriations bill for next year, approximately $435 billion.

Mr. MCGILTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. Do the provisions of that bill give you the certainty

that you seek to keep your program going for the next fiscal year?

And if not, what else do you need?

Mr. MCGILTON. Sir, I would have to see the provisions of the bill.

I am not familiar with it. Once I see the provisions of the bill I

could give you a better answer.

Mr. TAYLOR. For the record we would welcome your comments toward that, because I would guess that there will be a supplemental

at some point. If we need to address it we need to know specifically

what you need.

Mr. MCGILTON. Yes, sir. We will get back to you with that information. As soon as I see the details and we can understand how

the business is going to be awarded, I can give you an accurate answer.

Mr. TAYLOR. I think we are ready. Could we have some confirmation from down below? Are you ahead to show this?

[Pause.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, I apologize that this is taking longer than

anyone would have liked. So let me ask the next question.

About a month ago I was able to visit Aberdeen. I thought that

the folks there gave an excellent briefing. One of the documents

that they provided to me that unfortunately is classified, but that

each of you are probably familiar with, is it listed the potential

vendors across the top. And about eight different requirements for

each of the vehicles that they sought. It gave a pass or failing

grade and it even rated it within the passing and failing whether

it was marginal or did the job well. And it was things like getting

rid of the fuel tank in the event of an explosion, are the seats designed the best way to minimize the casualties to men and women

on board.

What I found interesting was that one company only did one

thing well, but they got like an A-plus on that one criteria. Several

of your companies did several things well. And I asked the people

at Aberdeen then who were government employees working with

your products to what extent were they sharing the information to

all of the vendors and saying okay, you are doing five things really

well. This company over here is doing that better and we want you

to do that because at the end of the day it is all about the troops.

It is not about your companies. It is not about this Congress. And

it was about the troops, and I was assured at that time that they

were going to be sharing that information, that they were going to

38

get together with each of your companies and get with your legal

staffs.

The Nation is paying for this information and the Nation is paying for these vehicles. To what extent has that happened? To what

extent are they maximizing things that each of your companies

does well, but also enable to you do something better if they say

see another company managing a little bit better than you? Or is

that happening at all? Because I was told it was going to happen.

You want to start, Ms. Hudson?

Ms. HUDSON. We have not received any test result or information

about our colleagues’ test results. To the best of my knowledge, we

have not seen any of that comparative data. Let me confirm that

with my colleagues.

They confirmed that we have not received.

Mr. TAYLOR. Ms. Hudson, as the President of one of the competitors, would you object or would you approve of sharing that information? Since at the end of the day it is about saving lives and

limbs in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Ms. HUDSON. We are willing to support anything, sir, that supports improving the survivability of MRAP and saving lives.

Mr. TAYLOR. Speaking on behalf of your organization?

Ms. HUDSON. Absolutely.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. McGilton.

Mr. MCGILTON. Yes, sir, we are certainly willing to share it.

Mr. HEEBNER. Yes, sir, we are.

Mr. MASSICOTTE. Absolutely.

Mr. TAYLOR. What I would ask is for the other vendors who may

not be with us today, I am going to ask the staff to get with them.

If you could submit something to this committee and to the DOD

in writing to that effect, again I think it is in the best interest of

everyone.

The gentleman of Hawaii has some questions, and I yield to him.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. McGilton, I want to make sure I understand. You said you have two points, and I think we got to one.

[Phone rings.]

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I have got domestic tranquillity to handle.

‘‘I’ll call you right back.’’

Mr. MCGILTON. Sometimes when the message comes in from the

mother ship you have to take it.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Can I get a witness on domestic tranquillity?

Didn’t someone running for President do that? Have to answer the

cell phone? I commute 5,000 miles one way, so you better believe

that I am going to preserve domestic tranquillity.

You said visibility. By that did you mean that you would like

some clarification on whether this is going to be a program of

record?

Mr. MCGILTON. Certainly, if it became a program of record that

would be a vehicle through which we would all have clarity. Without assuming that it is a contract or a commitment to us, the more

visibility we have to the total program, the better off we all are.

Certainly, anything that is specific to our company or any of my

colleagues’ companies, that is a further help.

The next thing is that the program actually have some duration

to it. Managing a program from month to month is extremely difVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:02 Sep 12, 2008 Jkt 040396 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-99\40396.TXT HNS1 PsN: HNS1
39

ficult. I personally am delighted regardless of how the mix of contracts are awarded, I am personally delighted that we have down

selected to three, with a fixed universe of vehicles that you are

going to buy. To spread them out over a large number of people can

do nothing but introduce variation and reduce the size of the opportunity that we get to invest in.

So those two things. It was have visibility to the program in

large, but make the orders—don’t manage the program on a

monthly basis with a series of small orders. I think you do that in

the beginning so that you get an understanding of who can perform

and who can’t. But once you get that understanding, it is to everyone’s benefit to then issue long-term, larger orders so we can gear

up. We have built these machines. Let us turn them on. Let us

turn them on. So it was a two-part; basically the same thing.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.

Mr. McGilton, you have an extraordinarily interesting background, I think, in terms of you are someone who can say literally

that you started out and where you are today is the result of a very

extensive line of experience going back to being in the Marine

Corps in the 1960’s. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. MCGILTON. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Now obviously being an infantryman in the

1960’s is not necessarily the same thing today. But some of the

principles still apply; right?

Mr. MCGILTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Can you give me your perspective from where

you sit today based on, from my point of you, your extraordinary

experience as a tool maker subsequent to your service in the Marine Corps and on through all the various manifestations. You have

been through almost every manufacturing existence there is. Is

that a fair statement? I don’t think I have seen anyone come before

the committee that has more extensive experience than you with

regard to literally every aspect of manufacture leading to this

MRAP manufacture today. In fact, it almost seems that what you

are doing today is almost the culmination of a lifetime of experience. Is that a fair characterization?

Mr. MCGILTON. Well, sir, when my family characterizes it they

call me unstable. But to answer your question seriously, yes, sir,

everything I have done to date prepared me for what I had to do,

which is take a company that virtually did not exist three years

ago. We had to build a company while building the product and it

wasn’t one thing that had to be done. Everything had to be done.

Any system that we needed had to be created before we could use

it. And we had to introduce a product that did not exist before and

ramp up the production capability to support this enormous demand that is created.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What is your evaluation of the MRAP vehicle?

We all think we know what we are talking about but it is a mine

resistant vehicle, right? And it is assault protective vehicle. What

does that mean? There are people listening to us, taxpayers, interested citizens. What does it mean? What are you doing? And what

is your evaluation of the vehicle that you are building?

Mr. MCGILTON. My evaluation of the vehicle that we are currently building is we have applied all of the technology. The threat

40

that we are seeing today in this war is not a threat that is new

in the world. We have become aware of it in the Western world as

a result of the most recent conflict. But all of the terrorist countries

around the world have been experiencing these threats. So the

threat is more than 40 years old.

The vehicles that we build today at Force Protection and that our

colleagues build, our vehicle is under license and their version of

the same vehicle, it is generally building around a ballistic capsule.

We build a ballistic capsule to protect the people and the equipment that is inside of it. We consider everything on the exterior to

be expendable and we also design it in such a way that it is reusable.

The total cost for the reuse of a monocot construction, which is

the kind of construction we use to built our ballistic capsule, the

vehicle goes into harm’s way and experiences a threat that takes

place in such a short time frame you cannot imagine the speed

with which these events take place.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And what happens?

Mr. MCGILTON. Well, sir, I am going to describe it, I am going

to try to describe it as best I can without running afoul of any of

the restrictions that are placed on me relative to describing the

performance of the vehicle.

Either from the side or below the vehicle there is an explosive

force that can vary by tremendous amounts. The speeds with which

this takes place, there can be energy traveling at maybe up to

7,000 meters per second. Everything that is in the path of this energy is going to turn into a projectile. It can come from the side

or the bottom. There is an enormous blast of hot gas. The force and

the concentration of the force will take just about anything in its

way and it will do one of two things. It will either rip it apart or

hurdle it at great speeds.

The acceleration that takes place in one of these vehicles during

one of these events it is almost unimaginable. That is why the people inside have to be buckled in and you have to put them in a capsule that regardless where it is thrown, they still have to be safe

when it lands.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And the human bodies inside are subject to

explosive trauma; is that right?

Mr. MCGILTON. It is more acceleration. If there is a penetration

it could be explosive trauma by something coming through and

damaging the tissue. But by and large, if you can maintain the integrity of the hull and keep the people strapped in, they may suffer

from injuries but they are likely to come home alive.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So this is about as basic as it can be for an

infantryman in a vehicle; is that correct?

Mr. MCGILTON. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. I would draw this analogy.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All right, draw the analogy.

Mr. MCGILTON. The analogy between the feelings I had when I

was in the military and the people that followed me was looking

at a life of 24 hours a day 365 days a year of terror. Because no

matter where you were someone was trying to kill you. They might

be your friend during the day but at night they might be your

enemy. They would kill you while you were sleeping or they would

kill you while you were on liberty. And to have that kind of fear

41

for such an extended period of time and to wonder is the government doing everything that they can do to protect me?

And I think that awareness of that fear when I walked into

Force Protection the first time, I wasn’t looking for a job, I did not

need a job, and I did not want a job. But when I walked in and

saw how much this technology could address the fear that I know

people feel when they are at war, and that somebody had to stay

and get the government to buy these vehicles, and then build a

manufacturing facility to build these vehicles, it was a moral imperative for me to not go home.

I arrived at my company with one pair of trousers, two pair of

underwear and two shirts. That was three years ago. I haven’t

been home since. I came just to give some advice, and when I saw

how effective this technology was and I understood how much alleviation of fear we could give to anyone that climbed into one of our

vehicles, I couldn’t go home. And I still can’t go home and I won’t

be able to go home until the last person comes back from there or

until there is enough trucks over there that I feel that the people

that need to go on patrol without fear will have the ability to go

on patrol without fear.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. Sometimes when you submit your

background, you might think who is going to read this? But I did.

Mr. MCGILTON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And I appreciate it. I think people who may

not know exactly what we are doing here now have a good idea

what this is all about and why this is important.

Mr. MCGILTON. Sir, I would add this one thing. What I do is far

less important than what the people at the company that have

their names over their pocket do. If I did not show up, it probably

wouldn’t make that much difference. But if they did not show up

things would not happen. And so I come here as their representative. And I don’t deserve any of the credit of what is going on, but

I represent the people who do deserve the credit.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I think you have done that very well here

today.

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks Mr. Abercrombie. Apparently our

technical difficulties have been solved and thank you, sir, for excellent responses to his questions and for excellent questions. Technical problems have been solved.

Mr. Massicotte, if you could narrate what is going on, please.

[Video shown.]

Mr. MASSICOTTE. Sir, this is our Melrose Park engine plant. This

is where we produce the engines that are going into the MRAP

today. But this is also going back to our commercial base as well.

And this is just the manufacturing facility that produces MRAP engines about three days before the chassis is manufactured in Garland, Texas, and you will see that when it comes up in the next

slide.

It is very lean manufacturing. Just-in-time. All engines are tested prior to being shipped and when they arrive at the factory they

arrive in the Garland assembly plant in Garland, Texas. This is

where the assembly line is that builds the chassis. This chassis

plant alone produces 60,000 vehicles a year. And this is where the

42

first truck could be a garbage truck, a cement mixer and the third

truck in the line could be an MRAP.

And this plant has plenty of capacity. We are running it 4 days

a week, 10-hour shifts, so we have plenty of capacity either to go

to a second shift or a Friday or Saturday in overtime.

This is where the vehicle gets the integration done with the

armor. And this is the West Point, Mississippi, facility. This was

coengineered with Mississippi State University that helped us do

the process integration in that factory. And this is literally an assembly line. This plant is facilitized for 500 a month and we are

right now running at the current rate next month of about, I think

it is 250 vehicles is what we are obligated to by contract.

We have got roughly 500 employees in that facility today. When

we get to the 500 a month coming in February, we will be roughly

about 900 employees strong. Many of the employees on that line

today have either relations or brothers or sisters serving in Iraq.

And these people are very proud people to be able to provide this

type of service.

This is the other line that we have just established when we are

doing the SPAWAR integration where we are taking the work that

we spoke to earlier and putting the SPAWAR integration into the

vehicle before it leaves our facility. Every truck is road tested and

BCMA goes through that. That is our first delivery in theater. And

I guess that is the real test right there when the soldiers get in

it and, as Mr. McGilton said, bring them home safely, and we are

not done until we get everyone home.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much. The Chair now yields to the

gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I don’t

know how much more quickly we could have manufactured these

vehicles if there was no limitation on the availability of subcontractors with the materials they need or if you had no limitation on the

materials that you need. As we are sitting here discussing this, I

thought back through my 81 years of life and I am probably the

only person in the room here that lived through World War II. And

I will tell you, Mr. Chairman, our country is not at war. The military is at war, our military families are at war. But our country

is not at war.

Had this been World War II, we would have stopped turning out

these silly SUVs and pickup trucks for personal transportation and

those assembly lines would have been producing these MRAP vehicles.

I think that might have been good for the American people because they are not at war. Our military is at war. Our military

families are at war, but the average person in this country, you

know all they know about the war is what they see on television

and their life has not been impacted one bit. And I think it would

have been nice, Mr. Chairman, if we had had high enough priority

that maybe we could have impacted the lives of the citizens of our

country. I think they might have appreciated the sacrifice that is

made by our service people and our service families.

I want to thank you all very much for the contribution that you

are making. You are kind of forced to do this at the fringes. Thank

43

you very much for your contribution, and I hope that if we have

another war, Mr. Chairman, that our country will be at war.

We haven’t been at war since World War II. We have fought a

number of wars since then but the country has not fought those

wars. Thank you very much for your service to our country.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett, for some excellent remarks. The gentleman from Hawaii.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Heebner and Mr. Massicotte and Ms.

Hudson, in terms of size, if you will, in terms of reach, corporate

reach, the three of you as opposed to our friend who spoke previously are in much different corporate positions. And I just want

to make sure, especially in the context that Mr. Bartlett has just

enunciated for us, if I understood particularly Mr. Massicotte’s remarks. Do we have the assurance, regardless of whether we move

forward on a policy side about program of record and legislative activity that assures funding and reach, what about the question of

the logistics of supply? I believe steel was mentioned and of course

we have a particular kind without going into the classified side of

things, the steel not—all steel is not created equal. And what is required of the components in the Mine Resistant Assault Protected

vehicles is different than the SUVs that we are talking about, et

cetera.

Are we assured or are you assured, particularly so with International’s reach, are we assured that your cooperative agreements

with one another are such that the supply side of things will be

there, that the materiel side of things will be there and if we are

able to achieve the kind of visibility and continuity, if you will, in

terms of policy that you will be able to complete the task of providing these vehicles?

Mr. MASSICOTTE. Congressman, if I may, we have today secured

adequate supply throughout our contract that we have today. When

we get into the expanded capability of the next threat level where

it is going to require more steel, there is a concern that we are tapping the industry and we believe that there is going to have to be

a global review of where else can we get high hard steel. I think

when you look at the capacity constraints, I am sure all of us here

are using a lot of the same supply chain. That supply chain only

has got so much capacity. And I think one of the concerns I have,

and I am sure my colleagues do as well, is that when you get into

the next threat level and it requires more steel, more capacity——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What do you mean when you say the next

threat level? What universe are you looking at?

Mr. MASSICOTTE. I am going to talk about that without getting

into the threat itself, but more of MRAP 2, it is going to require

much harder, broader base on the armor side. That is going to

bring——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In other words, this will have logistical implications in terms of supply, possibly in terms of pricing?

Mr. MASSICOTTE. I think we are going to exceed capacity—that

is where I am coming from—of the steel supply.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Heebner, do you have an observation that

you can share in that context?

Mr. HEEBNER. I would like to make an observation that relates

back to the comment that you made in the earlier panel about

44

whether or not program of record was an important element of this

program. As we look at the program of record issue, what it really

means is that you have the opportunity to gain insight into the

program’s future. That allows you to communicate with your supplier base, inform them of your needs, and to ensure that the capacity is there when you need it.

The first point I would make is that is—my compliments to Paul

Mann and his team, because to the degree they have information

they did share it with us early in the process that allowed us to

communicate with our supply base. That is what allowed us to go

from an empty factory to production in less than 120 days.

The second issue that once you have that supply base conditioned

for your program, having the timely receipt of funding is imperative to be able to keep that supply base going so that we have continuity of effort on their parts.

That is why in my comments I made the comment that the earlier and the larger the contract elements can be, the more we can

condition that supply base to make the investments necessary to

move forward more quickly.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You too in your biography you bring some

unique characteristics to the table. You have more than three decades of experience in the Army, much of which prepared you or

caused you during your professional life in the service to direct

your attention to items like this; right? So when you speak about

the program of record you are not just speaking from the point of

view of what is convenient for you now in your present capacity,

but from your experience, I take it, from your, as you say, your

more than three decades of professional focus.

Mr. HEEBNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for mentioning that. I

did spend more than 32 years on active duty with the United

States Army. And in that period, I fell in love with soldiers. And

my concern for soldiers continues today in what I do.

But the point that I would make with you that is most relevant

to the discussion of this committee today is that the employees of

General Dynamics today who I oversee, and those I am sure in

other panel members’ employ, share the same concern for the soldiers that are out there in harm’s way in the global war on terror.

So having worn the uniform does give me a special credential, and

I am proud of that, but working with the employees who care as

much about what they do in providing a service to our deployed

forces is equally rewarding.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the program of record is not just a phrase

of art that we are tossing around here today; it has real consequences on both sides of the equation then, both in the private

sector and in terms of the direction for the military service for

which the term is being employed?

Mr. HEEBNER. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, and just making

sure that we see as far as possible into the future of the program

needs allows us to harness the full capabilities of our companies

and our employees to be there when we are needed.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Ms. Hudson, in your testimony you paid particular attention to the discussion we are having now; is that a fair

summary?

45

Ms. HUDSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it is. And with regard to your

questions about the supply chain, at the moment we have been

able to ramp up our supply chain where we are able to meet our

commitments and our supply chain is committed to the production

schedules that we need to execute the contracts that we have

today.

But I echo Mr. Heebner’s comments about the need to have some

visibility. Chairman Taylor talked about production planning and

execution. Where you are going to have the most effective production, where we can have the opportunity to maximize our production rate, we need insight into what is going to come so that we

can place orders for material in a timely way, so that we don’t

ramp up to max production and then have to stop for a month and

then pick it back up again to meet the coming orders and needs.

So to the extent any of you and our program management staff

on the government side can assist us with information that will

allow us to plan more effectively to keep these production lines that

we have worked so hard to get in place and ramped up to maximum speed, to keep them going for as long as the MRAP need requires, that would be very, very helpful in executing the balance

of the requirements for this program.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair yields to the gentleman from Maryland,

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to note what I

meant by a country being at war.

We had daylight savings time in World War II so you could grow

a Victory garden, and if you did not you weren’t a patriot. Everyone

I knew had a Victory garden. There were no automobiles made in

1943, 1944, and 1945. Gasoline was rationed. Sugar was rationed.

We saved our household grease and took it to a central repository.

Everybody knew we were at war because everybody sacrificed.

Today, I am afraid that the images of war that we see on the television has little more relevance to many of us than the images on

a video game. I think it is quite unfortunate that our military and

our military families are bearing such a heavy burden and life continues just as it did before for most of the citizens of our country.

I hope the next time we are in a war, Mr. Chairman, that our

country is at war, and not just our military and our military families. Thank you.

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Maryland.

Captain Hoover, and again I want to thank him for his service

to our Nation. But he didn’t get to be a captain by saying, ‘‘I can’t

do it,’’ or, ‘‘We can’t do it.’’ He was rewarded for getting things done

and saying he could get things done, and that is why he has

achieved the very high rank.

I have got to admit that, having seen that facility, I remain concerned that when each of your organizations is up to full capacity,

that they will lack the capacity to keep up with you, and, therefore,

the vehicles won’t be delivered on time. I hope I am wrong.

My question to each of your organizations is what could your organization do that is now being done at SPAWAR in an effort to

minimize what has to happen there, speed up production, make

46

best use of your facilities? I will open it up to any of you or all of

you.

Mr. MASSICOTTE. If I may.

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir, Mr. Massicotte.

Mr. MASSICOTTE. We have worked with Captain Hoover and his

team up at SPAWAR in a very collaborative effort, and one of the

things that we were able to do with our engineering groups that

have been up there is that we have been able to integrate back into

the manufacturing processes at our West Point facility the things

that they were doing. And I echo what he said earlier: The process

is improving, and I am sure that the vehicles are getting through

that operation much quicker than they were.

With regard to could we do more, we would be happy to look at

it and see what opportunities there are, whether or not the entire

integration could be done. We would be happy to look at that and

come back to Paul Mann and his group and work with him and see

what could be done. I am sure there is more that could be done.

Right now we are willing to step up and do what is needed. So,

right now we are integrating that kind of tech into our vehicle

today in the process. And whether or not we take on the additional

load of doing what they are doing up at SPAWAR, that is going to

have to be done through the program office.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. McGilton, just one ‘‘for instance’’ was for some

of the variants that they had to go back and use an acetylene torch

or possibly plasma cutter to make some holes in the vehicle. They

expressed the problem that, well, we have to now wait to put the

wiring harness on later so they wouldn’t burn it during this process. To what extent did they make their predicaments your knowledge; and to what extent did they include you in that process and

give you or any of you vendors the opportunity to say, we can do

that at the factory?

Mr. MASSICOTTE. Sir, we are doing that. And I think with Captain Hoover’s people, that was one of the things that we looked at

together. If we are sending a vehicle up there, and they are taking

it apart to install their equipment, we are now integrating their

equipment or that harness in our vehicle before it leaves the factory. So I think that kind of integration and the cooperation that

we are getting with Captain Hoover’s team is working quite well.

Ms. HUDSON. Just like Mr. Massicotte’s team, we have been

working with the SPAWAR people as well, moving work that was

done there back into the factory, and that is an ongoing dialogue

as we all learn with these initial vehicles what can be done better

earlier in the process.

Mr. TAYLOR. Ms. Hudson, let me ask you a real simple question.

Is there anyone from your organization who is given access to what

is done at SPAWAR who can actually walk that assembly line and

say, we could have done that back at the factory?

Ms. HUDSON. We have had a number of people at SPAWAR

working with the team there, and suggestions have come out of

that activity back into the factory.

Mr. TAYLOR. Would other members of the panel wish to comment

on that?

Mr. MCGILTON. We have the luxury of being just down the road

from SPAWAR, as you know, and we have a manufacturing engiVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:02 Sep 12, 2008 Jkt 040396 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-99\40396.TXT HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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neer that is either full-time there or near full-time there, and his

only job is to identify opportunities like that and bring them back.

We have processed within the last 30 days—I think we initiated 9

engineering change requests, 7 of which, I believe, have been implemented, 2 of which may be implemented by the time we get

back. And every time we find one, we will put it in. We have someone assigned to do just exactly that.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Heebner.

Mr. HEEBNER. I think the particular motivation that we have is

to make sure that in the processes that are performed at SPAWAR,

that there is not any disassembly work done and then reassembly

required. Trying to minimize that.

Mr. TAYLOR. I can assure you, there is disassembly going on.

There are holes being cut, and then things get welded, things have

to be reassembled, things have to be repainted, which is what leads

me to believe many of these things should be getting done at your

facilities before they get to Charleston. So my question is to what

extent are you, the manufacturer, given an opportunity to make

that observation and fix that problem before it gets to Charleston?

Mr. HEEBNER. My comments on a direct answer to that would be

exactly parallel with Mr. McGilton’s, because we are joint-ventured

to produce the same Cougar vehicle, so we use the same processes.

And as he suggested, there have been a number of engineering

changes already in place because of that, which simply reflects the

fact that there is a process in place to do that. And the integration

or interaction between the SPAWAR people and our own people is

not inhibitive in any way that I am aware of.

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South

Carolina Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I regret I had to

run off to another meeting, but wanted to come back. And I particularly wanted to come back, Mr. Chairman, because I appreciate

the private sector, how they have really come to play such an effort

to protect our troops. And I have actually visited the facilities of

BAE and am really grateful. I was present, Mr. Chairman, at the

25th anniversary of the BAE existence. It is adjacent to the district

I represent in Aiken. Wonderful people, dedicated, working there.

And then Force Protection, I feel like I was with them when they

were born. And so I have had the privilege of even going ahead of

the Chairman to drive one of the Cougars and Buffalos. It is hard

to get ahead of Chairman Taylor, but I was. But we appreciate so

much, and General Dynamics and all of what you are doing to protect our troops and provide for protection.

There has been discussion about the monthly production contracts and working with SPAWARs and how to avoid the end-ofthe-month congestion. Is there any way to move toward weekly production on contracts or even daily? And any of you who could answer that would be good.

Mr. MCGILTON. I would be glad to answer that.

Earlier in the meeting we provided the statistics to show how

much of an improvement there had been to get away from the

hockey puck production delivery. Last month, by the middle of the

month. We delivered half of our vehicles, exactly what we should

have done.

48

In Force Protection, we are moving in the direction of doing

weekly and even daily production schedules. It is fraught with a lot

of risk when you do that, because on any given day, if anything

goes wrong, it is going to be a really bad day, and there is going

to be a lot of visibility relative to what went wrong on that day.

That is not necessarily a bad thing. All of us in manufacturing understand that every day when you go in it is a street fight. The

number of variables that can work against you, any one of them

can stop the entire system. So we are willing to do it. That is the

direction we are working in.

But just the act of going to a daily production schedule won’t

solve the problems that are created. You have got to modify the

processes that make it possible to do a daily production schedule.

But that is exactly what we are doing. That is what all of us are

trying to do. There is nothing that would make us happier than

every day when we go in, everything happens on autopilot. It just

isn’t the case when you bring in a new technology with as many

variables as we have as fast as we have to bring them together.

So any resistance to doing it is not founded in a resistance to do

it, it is that we may not in every case have our entire supply base

in a state that they can operate that way. And there are varying

processes. You don’t make steel by the day; you make steel by the

heat. So somebodyis going to deliver you 10,000 pounds of steel,

and that has all got to be processed. And so it is kind of the Catch–

22. Some things come to you in big bulks and you have got to manage them, and sometimes the bulks don’t show up. But there certainly isn’t any resistance to doing it from our side, but there certainly is a lot of difficulty in doing it.

We are not a mature industry, and that is why it is difficult to

set up the daily consistent process. If we were building Hondas or

Camrys, and we had five years to design the processes and get the

supply chain in place, it would be a snap. It is not that we are unaware that that is a better way to run a business, it is that the

time in order to get the stability necessary to let your business operate that way has not been afforded to any of us. The war didn’t

wait for us to do it.

Mr. WILSON. And, Mr. McGilton, you itemized the different vehicles that have been provided to American forces, Iraqi forces, allied

coalition forces, the different types of vehicles. And I think, I know

it would be reassuring to persons who have young people serving

overseas; can you tell us how the performance of your vehicles have

been that have been deployed?

Mr. MCGILTON. I have certain restrictions placed on me about

discussions of the performance of the vehicles. I think everybody in

this room can understand why.

Our belief and understanding is that within our vehicles, when

properly used, properly deployed, and the people properly belted in,

the survivability rate is amazingly high. I can’t get any more precision than that. It is amazingly high. We are very proud of our

record of survivability, and we won’t compromise in that measurement of interest in any way, shape, or form.

The second thing I will say relative to the performance of the vehicle; thus far, we have been able to enjoy a 95 percent vehicle

readiness rate. That is extremely important, because these vehicles

49

are only valuable when they are available. The design of our vehicles allows the vehicle to experience a blast, to sacrifice the external components. A truck comes and picks up the capsule, but we

protect the engine, the transmission, the transfer case, and the important drive line items. We take it back to the motor pool, and

then the field service reps from our company and those of our associates restore that vehicle and put the vehicle back into service.

Very few of our vehicles have been taken completely out of service.

So the total cost to operate a ballistic capsule-type design is significantly less than any other style of vehicle because it is reusable.

Mr. WILSON. Again, I thank all of you for what you are doing to

protect the American and coalition forces. Thank you very much.

Mr. TAYLOR. I thank the gentleman from South Carolina.

I got the impression that Ms. Hudson wanted to say something.

Ms. HUDSON. I was just going to comment on the weekly deliveries versus the monthly deliveries. And Mr. McGilton’s comments

were absolutely correct. Early on we were not in a steady production flow. It was difficult to get material in, and I believe that exacerbated the problem you mentioned. But I did want to state that

on our Caiman, MRAP system, we started performing to a weekly

delivery schedule in September, and we plan to go to a weekly delivery schedule in February on our RG33 variant as well. So it is

important to us to have a steady flow in the factory, as important

as it is to our customers and to SPAWAR in terms of receiving the

vehicles. So that is the direction we are heading in.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Heebner.

Mr. HEEBNER. Mr. Chairman, if I might add just a slightly different aspect in response to that question, and I do this both for

the committee’s benefit and also for the employees who work on

MRAP vehicles around the country and, frankly, around the world,

and that is we do not need additional motivation to build these vehicles as quickly as we possibly can. Our employees are committed

to doing this as rapidly as it is possible.

What happens on occasion is that we will nearly complete a vehicle, and there will be a component that is deficient because the

supply system hasn’t gotten there quite on the schedule that we

had anticipated, and that occasionally results in the delivery to

SPAWAR of a significant number of vehicles at one time. Obviously, we try to minimize that. But our commitment and the commitment of our employees is to move just as quickly as we possibly

can. And, believe me, we are motivated to do that, and it would not

take a different type of contract to cause us to do that.

Mr. TAYLOR. I very much appreciate that, which leads to one of

the final questions.

Former Chairman Hunter, I think, did this committee a very

good service in looking into the delays in the up-armored Humvees.

One of the things that he and the staffers that he dispatched to

look into the problem discovered was that in many instances the

supplier did not know that what they were making was going into

something that was going to save the lives of young Americans in

Iraq and Afghanistan. And, quite frankly, the committee was very

disappointed to hear that.

Since that problem has already happened once, we sure don’t

want it to happen again. Are you confident that each of your supVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:02 Sep 12, 2008 Jkt 040396 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-99\40396.TXT HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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pliers is aware of what that component is expected to do, why it

is there, why we need it, and why they should be given a priority?

And I hope you are also aware that our President and the Secretary of Defense has the legal authority right now to walk into

any factory in the United States of America and say, the troops

need this, and I want you to put it to the top of the list. And we

want you to know that. I am sure you already do. But we want

each of our suppliers involved in this program to know that. And

we want this committee to be notified if that is the message we

need to relay to the Secretary of Defense or the President to make

sure that you get the things that you need to make the product

that is so important to troops.

So I guess going back to the first question: Do you feel like your

suppliers know the importance of what they are doing and how important the product you are making is for the troops?

Mr. HEEBNER. Mr. Chairman, I don’t believe I could answer that

question with certainty for all of our suppliers. What I can tell you

is that in those areas where we have felt challenged for the supply

of specific components, the fact that these parts are a part of the

MRAP program and the importance of velocity in developing and

completing these vehicles has been communicated throughout our

supply chain, and that we get a very positive and prompt response

from any inquiries we have about the conditions of the supply base.

Ms. HUDSON. Mr. Chairman, if I may add as well, given that this

program has a DX rating, the most important rating in the country, and we have had the opportunity to work with our suppliers

on the implementation of the important priority through a contractual arrangement and also through informal arrangements, part of

that is a discussion of why we are doing what we do.

At BAE, we have a saying: We protect those that protect us, and

that the only thing that matters is doing the best thing for the

troops in the field. We talk about that every day. Our employees

embrace it, and our supply chain embraces it as well.

We do know why we are doing what we do, and it matters. We

talk every day about what we do is saving lives in theater and protecting family members and friends, and it is ingrained in each and

every one of us.

And to Mr. Bartlett’s comments. The general public may not feel

like we are at war, but I can assure you that we at BAE Systems

do. We have people that haven’t had a day off since the day MRAP

started. We work around the clock, 7 days a week, and there is absolutely no question that we understand the importance.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.

Mr. MASSICOTTE. We supply a lot of our product that we put into

the vehicles. So as it goes across the various divisions within the

corporation, we absolutely know the importance of this program.

When you reach out beyond that to the supply base, our dealer

counsel and the people that we work with in the supply community, we make sure that they understand what the parts they are

supplying and the DX rating, as you stated, is absolutely out there

in front of the curve of any production material that we use today.

We have a solid supply chain behind us, and right now, just getting

the production base up to speed at the levels that we talked about

51

earlier to get to the higher levels of production is really all we have

to do.

Mr. TAYLOR. To what extent—now that the vehicles are being deployed and hopefully will be deployed in much larger numbers,

what is your mechanism for staying in touch with the field so that,

as things wear out, be it tires, ball joints, whatever, as things wear

out, that the factory becomes aware of that and can replace those

things in a timely manner? What do you have in place to make

sure that that happens?

Mr. MCGILTON. Currently Force Protection alone has approximately 200 field service reps in theater. We have in excess—I believe we have almost $100 million in inventory in our warehouse

awaiting to be shipped at any time it is requested. We cross-trained

with all of our partners. General Dynamics have an enormous infrastructure of technical people to do the restoration on the vehicles. We can’t think of another thing that we could do to address

the issue. It is those actions that have allowed us to keep our 95

percent readiness rate. And we are not happy with 95 percent, so

we are going to continue to improve things. But it is the relationship that we have with our partners that have this massive reach

that allows us to accomplish that.

I would also like to go back and address what Mr. Heebner said;

your question, and then one thing that Mr. Heebner said. The way

we made sure that all of our suppliers understand how important

it is, we had a supplier conference and we brought in 100 percent

of our suppliers. And I didn’t want their salesmen. I brought in

someone that was in a significant position of management, and

they spent a day with us. And we explained to them what we were

doing; we showed them videotapes; we explained to them about our

theory and our philosophy for running our business, what part they

played in it, and how they could make our entire system fail. No

matter how big or small the part was that they manufactured, the

entire system stops if they don’t perform. We spent a great deal

doing that.

I would like to talk about Mr. Heebner’s statement about motivation. At one point in the program not too long ago, people were concerned that we weren’t motivated enough at Force Protection. And

in an effort to get us to work faster and harder, the United States

Government saw its way fit to offer a $1 million incentive payment

if we would improve our performance. I am afraid I am going to

cause significant chaos, at the risk of challenging my relationship

with Mr. Dillon. When we got the offer, we felt insulted. And what

we said was that we weren’t interested in an incentive; if you needed us to do more, just tell us, and we will do everything we can.

We are already doing everything we can.

The more that they asked us to do we were able to accomplish.

And they came back to us again and said, you are causing a problem because you won’t agree to accept a contract that has an incentive built into it. After a lot of deliberation, I agreed that I would

accept a contract with the offer of the $1 million acceleration incentive in it as long as I didn’t have to invoice for the $1 million after

I accelerated.

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So we accelerated, we improved the delivery, and we still to this day have not submitted the invoice to claim the $1 million. We

were going to do it anyway. The money didn’t make any difference.

Ms. HUDSON. With regard to getting feedback from the field, we

have an established infrastructure for the Bradley fighting vehicle

with field service reps in theater. We are also supplying field service reps for the MRAP program in theater as well. And even

though we have multiple variants of MRAP, we have one program

manager in charge of all the BAE Systems field service reps working on MRAP. So we get daily feedback on what is happening in

theater so we know if we need to make any changes or fixes into

our manufacturing processes or our design.

And I might also add that we have had two of our senior executives in Iraq in the last month to personally assess the situation

and make sure there were no barriers that we couldn’t control and

in having an effective infrastructure set up in Iraq.

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, I do want to thank each of you for what you

are doing. I very much appreciate your walking this committee and

the American people through the importance of this program, how

we are addressing it. I want to extend the invitation that anything

that this committee can do to help you be more productive as you

encounter challenges, we want to extend that invitation.

And, last, I want to apologize. I misspoke earlier. I am certain

that Sean Cooley wasn’t the first Mississippi guardsman to die in

Operation Iraqi Freedom. And any pain I may have caused to his

family or any other family by misspeaking, I want to apologize

now.

So with that, this committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

NOVEMBER 8, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

NOVEMBER 8, 2007

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR AND MR. ABERCROMBIE

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. There has been a lot of debate about the ability of the industrial base to meet MRAP production requirements. Concerns include

having sufficient ballistic steel, tires, axles, transmissions, and engines to name a

few. What is the most likely production rate that the base can support and how confident are you that it can be achieved? How does this match up with the rate necessary to meet current requirements?

Secretary YOUNG. Reaching a production rate above 1,000 vehicles per month by

the years end is a significant challenge. However, it is achievable. By engaging with

prime contractors, their key suppliers, and with prospective new suppliers, we have

helped industry put plans in place to grow capacity in order to achieve our aggressive MRAP delivery schedule.

Over the past nine months we have worked closely with the armor steel, tire, and

other industries to develop aggressive production and delivery ramp-up rates to sustain MRAP growth. In particular, ballistic grade steel plate for the MRAP baseline

vehicle has required close scrutiny. Production rates above 1,000 vehicles per month

and simultaneous fielding of add-on armor kits for MRAP and other ground vehicles

in our fleet will likely result in some temporary, but manageable, steel plate shortages the first quarter of 2008. However, in the broader sense, industrial capacity

is sufficient to meet current requirements.

As necessary, we will use the Department’s Priority Allocation of Industrial Resources Task Force to evaluate and manage shortages of steel and any other MRAP

commodities. With the assistance of the Department of Commerce, we will use the

Defense Priorities and Allocations System to execute the decisions of the Task Force

by managing the distribution of steel and other critical components and materials

to ensure our highest priority needs continue to be met.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. To what extent did DOD’s assessment of the

industrial base include vendors for the various items of mission equipment? What

are the potential challenges in producing this equipment?

Secretary YOUNG. The MRAP Joint Program Office monitors mission equipment

requirements and vendor delivery status with the help of the mission equipment

buying activities and the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center at Charleston.

The MRAP industrial capability assessment performed by the Defense Contract

Management Agency did not include mission equipment except for the ballistic steel

used in the fabrication of gun shields. There are no known challenges at this time

with receiving timely delivery of mission equipment except for ballistic steel which

has been mitigated through other proactive measures.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. An adequate supply of ballistic grade steel appears to be a major concern. Is there sufficient global capacity to meet the needs

of the baseline MRAP vehicle in the context of DOD’s other demands for the same

kind of steel? What about meeting the demand if a more robust design dictates the

need for more steel?

Secretary YOUNG. There is enough global production capacity of ballistic steel to

meet MRAP program needs. This is because when a delivery conflict for ballistic

steel occurs, an MRAP order automatically gets filled first. The joint MRAP and

similar Army Route Clearance vehicles are the only ground vehicle programs currently authorized to use the Defense Priorities Allocations System (DPAS) ‘‘DX’’ priority rating on their contracts and purchase orders. This highest priority designation means that MRAP and MRAP-like orders for ballistic steel receive preferential

treatment over all other DPAS lower rated ‘‘DO’’ and unrated orders.

Over the next few months, ballistic steel mills may not be able to accept or meet

delivery need dates for some new DO rated and unrated ballistic steel orders. This

is because the combined demands of MRAP production, MRAP armor kit development, and all other DoD requirements are expected to temporarily exceed available

steel mill capacity. However, when an unacceptable delivery delay occurs, a program

may request DPAS Special Priorities Assistance and adjustments are made to delivery schedules to best meet operational needs.

To minimize delivery disruptions on DO rated orders that compete with MRAP

for ballistic steel, a DPAS Priorities and Allocations of Industrial Resources

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taskforce has been monitoring and maintaining a Department-wide forecast of thin

gauge steel armor plate requirements and an inventory of available steel mill production capacity. Working closely with the Services and the ballistic steel producing

mills has enabled the task force to gradually expand production capacity and balance the timing and placement of orders.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Ramping up to meet requirements will include hiring additional workers and some will need specialized skills and certifications, such as in welding. How many more workers will be needed in the coming

months to support production rates and how will they be trained to ensure they

have the necessary skills?

Secretary YOUNG. Current production rates show that the manufacturers’ production ramps are not being affected by lack of labor, hiring or training of personnel.

Individual manufacturers can provide their further assessment if desired.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. MRAP vehicles have been undergoing developmental testing since early this year and operational testing is scheduled to start

soon. DOD has on order about 8,000 vehicles and the JROC has approved up to

15,000. The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation has expressed some concerns

about certain aspects of testing, including the low number of armor ‘‘coupon’’ samples and the low number of miles for the automotive tests. How are you addressing

these concerns? Has the department granted any waivers?

Secretary YOUNG. In March 2007, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation

(DOT&E) recommended that the MRAP Program add additional test vehicles to get

more automotive miles and survivability testing. The Program Office accepted these

recommendations and modified the testing approach. DOT&E concerns have been

addressed. DOT&E approved the MRAP Test and Evaluation Master Plan, the

MRAP Live Fire Strategy, and the MRAP Initial Operational Test and Evaluation

(IOT&E) Test Plan in September 2007. No Live Fire or Operational Testing waivers

have been requested or granted.

The Joint Program Office (JPO) and the DOT&E organization have established

a Joint testing Integrated Product Team (IPT) to determine the path forward for

all testing of MRAP vehicles and to develop test plans.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What human factors issues have been raised

by developmental testing, such as limits on the size of the crew or passengers or

their ability to get in and out of the vehicles safely?

Secretary YOUNG. Some non-mission critical human factors were identified during

testing and accepted temporarily in order to rapidly field MRAP vehicles. We are

pursuing Engineering Change Proposals to correct deficiencies and improve performance. In the interim, these issues have been mitigated by placing appropriate limitations on vehicle operations.

The JPO recently stood up the Human Systems Integration—Integrated Product

Team (HIS–IPT) which had its first meeting on 13 Dec 07. The HIS–IPT will be

the focal point for addressing all human factors issues—those raised during developmental testing and any issues encountered in the field and will work with the manufacturers to implement the changes necessary to incorporate human factors improvements.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What is the status of the material safety release for the variants currently on order? What human factors issues have been

raised for vehicles already in the field?

Secretary YOUNG. Every fielded MRAP vehicle has completed the ‘‘Urgent’’ safety

release process and continues through our safety program in order to complete the

full safety release process.

In order for the Department to urgently obtain MRAP vehicles as fast as we have,

we accepted commercially designed, and commercially manufactured vehicles. These

vehicles vary and all have some human factors issues. Issues that have been identified are: door handles facing the wrong way, fire extinguishers placed in odd places

or not covered adequately, and lack of internal storage spaces or tie down points.

The Joint Program Office (JPO) recently stood up the Human Systems Integration-Integrated Product Team (HSI–IPT) which had its first meeting on 13 Dec 07.

The HSI–IPT will be the focal point for addressing all human factors issues and will

work with the manufacturers to implement the changes necessary to incorporate

human factors improvements.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Orders for these vehicles were placed without

being fully informed of the vehicles capabilities and limitations. What risks are you

assuming if these vehicles are fielded without this knowledge?

Secretary YOUNG. Risks associated with our aggressive fielding schedule are mitigated by a phased testing plan and the use of temporary, non-mission critical operational limitations. To mitigate these risks, safety directives are prepared and proVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:02 Sep 12, 2008 Jkt 040396 PO 00000 Frm 00122 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-99\40396.TXT HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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mulgated to the Joint Forces that prescribe operating limits until correction via vehicle modifications are complete.

Early testing, which informed initial production orders, ensured that vehicles

were survivable, and that no major limitations relative to mission requirements

were present. The current phase of testing fully characterizes vehicle capabilities

and limitations. Issues identified by the follow-on operational tests would be addressed through retrofit of engineering change proposals (ECPs) on fielded vehicles

and with cut-in of the ECPs to production lines as they are identified.

Capabilities and Limitations (C&L) reports are being written and updated as we

continue through the test phases. We do not view the C&L Report as a one time

event, but consider it a living document populated with the latest information to inform Commanders (owners) of the MRAP vehicles once fielded.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Even as MRAP production began, DOD acknowledged that the threat was changing and is now developing a solution for that

threat. How will this impact the current test schedule and resources?

Secretary YOUNG. Completion of testing for initial MRAP vehicle designs is, and

has remained, our priority. The original MRAP designs are completing the developmental testing phase of the testing regimen and migrating to operational test. These

tests require different assets and resources.

Testing for additional survivability solutions to meet the changing threat have

been, and continue to be, worked into the testing schedule. While this has been difficult, and not without challenges, the personnel at Aberdeen Test Center have conducted all testing within the timelines required to provide decision makers with the

data to make appropriate decisions.

While this effort has required long hours, hiring of additional personnel, and some

prioritization of efforts, the schedule and resource impact has been managed to ensure rapid fielding of survivable vehicles to theater.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. MRAP vehicles come from the manufacturers

without any mission equipment. That is being integrated under contract at the

Naval Space and Warfare Center. The equipment is being bought under other contracts and then shipped to the center for installation. From there, vehicles are

shipped to theater by air for fielding. However, DOD is considering an option for

contractors to install the mission equipment at their own facilities. How many vehicles can be equipped with the mission equipment that is already on hand at the integration facility? How much more equipment is needed to outfit the vehicles on

order and is that equipment on order? How confident are you that the vendors that

produce the mission equipment can meet the demand?

Secretary YOUNG. In cooperation with mission equipment system managers, the

MRAP vehicle Joint Program Office (JPO) developed a detailed plan that supports

the current integration schedule. Equipment on hand plus equipment that has been

reserved from on-going production lines is sufficient to support mission equipment

integration for MRAP vehicles per the current delivery schedule. Because of the

pace and flow of individual pieces of equipment, it is better to discuss the availability of critical pieces of equipment to meet integration schedules. The JPO attempts

to maintain at least a 30-day supply of critical equipment. While we watch this

closely, we have not seen any issues suggesting contractors will be unable to meet

the required flow.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How long is it taking to equip vehicles with

the mission equipment once they arrive at the center? How much of that time is

‘‘non-value added’’, or time that a vehicle is just sitting around waiting for parts or

repair or a place in the queue? To what extent is once-a-month delivery of vehicles

contributing to non-value added time and how can this be mitigated?

Secretary YOUNG. I would like to take a broad view to this question. The time

it takes to integrate a vehicle at SPAWAR varies from variant to variant, but since

the hearing, we have data from late November to mid December which provides a

sense of where we are with respect to integration time. Many of the MRAP variants

are now taking only one to two days to fully equip a vehicle once integration begins.

SPAWAR integration is pacing manufacturer deliveries.

The JPO continues to work with the vendors to deliver a smooth delivery of vehicles. Additionally, the vehicle processing throughput at SPAWAR has expanded to

between 40-50 vehicles a day. This production rate is sufficient to maximize airlift

and provide MRAPs for sealift.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What is the status of your effort to prototype

installation of mission equipment on each version of the vehicle DOD is buying and

fielding?

Secretary YOUNG. Prototyping is complete on all vehicles except for General Dynamics Land Systems—Canada’s (GDLS–C) RG–31s.

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Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What are the advantages and disadvantages

of installing mission equipment at other locations, such as the prime contractors—

facilities?

Secretary YOUNG. All mission equipment (also referred to as C4I equipment or

Government Furnished Equipment—GFE) is currently installed at SPAWAR,

Charleston, SC.

Potential Advantages to Integration Performed by Manufacturers:

• DOD receives fully integrated vehicles direct from manufacturer

• No one choke point for GFE installation

• May experience some cost savings due to competition between GFE installing

entities

• May cut down on total enterprise integration over time as manufacturers go

through learning curve

Disadvantages:

• Tracking and accounting for GFE in numerous locations is complicated and reduces flexibility in creating GFE kits. Manufacturers are armored truck builders not GFE installers.

• Manufacturers would need to ramp up capabilities, personnel, space, integration process, etc. The program would be managing numerous learning curves

rather than maximizing process and progress made at SPAWAR.

• New secure space for GFE would need to be located, established and managed

at multiple locations across the country.

• All transportation times, inspections, and other steps are still required (time

to get vehicles to theater is still the same).

• Having to gather and input transportation management data gets more difficult due to multiple sources of the data vice one—SPAWAR.

• SPAWAR represents a unique, tested capability for C4I installation and has

ramped up a skilled workforce to meet MRAP program needs. Establishing integration sites at multiple additional locations would require a similar investment of time, facilities and personnel.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If SPAWAR were to reach capacity or if facility had to shut down or was unable to operate for more than a few days, where else

could integration of the OFE take place and what would be the challenges?

Secretary YOUNG. The Joint Program Office (JPO) and SPAWAR established a

Continuity of Operations (COOP) site for this exact purpose. The COOP facility is

set up to serve as a complete SPAWAR Charleston replacement of all 25 lines within 72 hours. Several sites were examined, and the Orangeburg, SC location was chosen due to its large square footage and immediate availability for occupancy.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What can the committee do to help all stakeholders meet this urgent need?

Secretary YOUNG. The strong support and commitment of the Committee and the

Congress has been the key to our success in producing and fielding these life-saving

vehicles at a rate that will result in more than 1,500 MRAPs in theater by the end

of this calendar year. Your support of budget requests, reprogramming actions and

an unprecedented allocation of funds in the Continuing Resolution has allowed us

to ‘‘lean forward’’ in a program that is essential to our brave men and women in

harms way. The Department asks for continued support for this program to the

same degree that has been demonstrated thus far. On behalf of the men and women

protected by these vehicles, we thank you.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are there any plans to offer an MRAP configured cargo/logistics variant to Army and Marine Corps forces in the immediate future?

Secretary YOUNG. No, there has been no requirement from the operating forces

to configure MRAP vehicles into a cargo variant. MRAP vehicles could be made capable of carrying cargo instead of personnel at the discretion of commanders.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What is the near term acquisition strategy

for the MRAP II program, e.g. when do you plan to stop ordering MRAP I vehicles

and begin ordering MRAP II vehicles? Is the industrial base primed to support large

contract orders for the MRAP II vehicle?

Secretary YOUNG. The acquisition strategy for MRAPs (both MRAP I and MRAP

II) is continually being shaped by the operational requirements from theater. The

significance of MRAP II is that this vehicle provides options for the commanders in

terms of protection and mobility. We are progressing with MRAP II testing as the

theater is undertaking requirement reviews.

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Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How are you capturing the lessons teamed

from the performance of MRAP vehicles in theater and how are you applying those

lessons in terms of survivability to the existing fleet of tactical wheeled vehicles?

Secretary YOUNG. The Army and Marine Corps have ‘‘Centers for Lessons

Learned’’ that assess forward area operations and report trends, findings and issues

to combat developers and program managers. The MRAP Joint Project Office also

has a ‘‘forward presence’’ to evaluate MRAP performance in the theater and note

any shortcomings.

In addition, The National Ground Intelligence Center produced an extensive predictive threat analysis of likely adversary actions during the next 12-48 months. The

classified report of the analysis was distributed to combatant commanders, senior

decision makers and program managers within the Department and was used to energize Science and Technology; Research, Development and Testing communities;

and industry to proactively develop and produce counter-measures to mitigate emergent threat weapons and tactics. Examples of these proactive efforts include incremental development of armor protection and electronic warfare capability.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Have you engaged with industry about the

sharing of technical designs in order to produce the most effective and complete

MRAP vehicle?

Secretary YOUNG. There are several methods by which the Government may encourage ‘‘best of breed’’ data a sharing between MRAP contractors. These include

encouraging MRAP contractors to enter into cross licensing technical data sharing

agreements; and structuring future MRAP contract competitions to allow Government evaluation of MRAP technical data lifecycle costs as part of the contract source

selection evaluation process.

To facilitate sharing of best practices among MRAP vehicle manufacturers, the

Joint Program Office (JPO) recently held a unique performance review session consisting of two days of discussions on test results and technical data. The first day

consisted of one-on-one reviews with each manufacturer of test results, successes or

challenges. This was followed by development of a briefing package for the manufacturer to share with the other MRAP vehicle manufacturers. During the second day,

we briefed these packages to all manufacturers and discussed issues and possible

solutions. The interchange was open and honest, and included feedback from the

government engineering and test teams. It led to improved insights on vehicle performance and design, and identified potential solutions. Issues discussed included

vehicle floor and seat designs, and potential solutions to improve recovery capability. We encouraged the manufacturers to work together to share solutions and intend to continue regular performance and design exchange meetings.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How are you incentivizing industry to accelerate production and facilitate their production and manufacturing processes?

Secretary YOUNG. Companies that demonstrate readiness to produce vehicles that

meet MRAP requirements receive significant production orders. This incentive has

been effective for a highly competitive industry. After delivery orders are issued, the

Navy and DCMA work closely with contractors to monitor production progress to

ensure that promised performance is delivered.

We’ve also worked directly with MRAP suppliers to help them accelerate production. For example, the Department authorized a DX industrial priority rating for the

MRAP program to assure priority access to available material. Additionally, to increase the availability of armor steel plate and thin gauge, quenched and tempered

steel from about 8,400 tons per month to about 21,000 tons per month, the Department made slight specification changes to increase throughput and encouraged steel

producers to make modest capital investments. In the cases where domestic source

restrictions limited access to the steel we need, the Department used the available

waiver processes to tap otherwise non-compliant domestic sources as well as reliable

non-domestic sources. We’ve also worked directly with industry to increase tire capacity from about 1,000 tires per month to about 17,000 tires per month by adding

Goodyear as a second source and supporting the addition of more tire molds at both

Michelin and Goodyear.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How is the theater receiving, processing, and

distributing MRAPs?

Secretary YOUNG. Once MRAP vehicles receive Government Furnished Equipment

(GFE) integration at SPAWAR, SC, they are prepared for shipping into the U.S.

Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Operations. Up to 360 vehicles per

month will be shipped via strategic airlift from the United States to destinations

in Iraq. The destination depends on the fielding location. Three major hubs employ

strategic airlift (Forward Operating Base (FOB) Balad, FOB Liberty, and Al Asad).

MRAP vehicle shipments, beyond the 360 designated by strategic airlift, depart via

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seagoing vessels to Kuwait. Once in Kuwait, the vehicles are de-processed and loaded into intra-theater aircraft and sent into Iraq.

The Joint Program Office (JPO) MRAP develops the fielding schedule in coordination with USCENTCOM priorities and objectives and JPO MRAP production capabilities. MRAP vehicles are distributed in line with the fielding schedule at the direction of USCENTCOM’s priorities.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Does the theater possess adequate capacity

to process the influx of MRAPs that will surely result from the dramatic increase

in production from now through February.

Secretary YOUNG. Central Command developed and implemented a fielding process with the capacity to support the fielding of MRAP vehicles at a flow-rate based

on the current production schedule. This effort has been accomplished in coordination with the MRAP Joint Program Office (JPO), and US Transportation Command.

Theater validated the fielding process through the conduct of two Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drills and shipment of 48 vehicles by surface in early Nov 07.

The MRAP JPO, serving as the Department of Defense lead agency, will ship

MRAP vehicles from the Space and Naval Warfare Systems (SPAWAR) Center in

Charleston, SC via strategic air and sealift directly to Theater. There will be a total

of nine fielding sites. The first four fielding sites also serve as Regional Support Activities sites where all limited Depot level maintenance and repairs will be conducted in Theater. The strategic air shipment delivers MRAP vehicles directly to Air

Port of Debarkation (APODs) in the vicinity of each MRAP fielding site. MRAPs delivered via sealift to the Surface Port of Debarkation (SPOD) in Kuwait will be

transported to a local facility for deprocessing and staging for onward intra-theater

movement to the fielding sites in Iraq. Intra-theater transport from Kuwait to fielding sites will be primarily completed via contract air. Surge vehicles will be moved

via ground Common User Land Transportation (CULT) assets. The Marine Corps

and Navy have been fielding vehicles in Iraq since Mar 07 and plan to continue

under their current concept of operations. Upon arrival at the appropriate fielding

site, and completion of vehicle deprocessing, USMC and USN vehicles are delivered

to the user. The Army and Air Force conduct delivery of vehicles to the user in a

more centralized manner at each of the fielding sites. As each Company arrives at

one of the fielding sites, they begin the five day process of equipment turnover and

user and maintenance training before returning to their bases with the MRAP vehicles as a unit.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What are the positives and negatives to moving from monthly production contracts to weekly production contracts? What about

daily?

Secretary YOUNG. The intent of moving from monthly to weekly production contracts is to provide an even flow of vehicle deliveries from the manufacturer to

SPAWAR and allow for a smooth throughput throughout the vehicle pipeline from

production to end user.

Benefits of Weekly Production Deliveries:

• Causes manufacturers to stabilize their production processes.

• Provides SPAWAR with a steady stream of vehicles.

• Reduces wait time for integration at SPAWAR.

• Expedites DCMA inspection and acceptance.

• Provides smooth, predictable flow of vehicles throughout the pipeline from production, through integration, to transportation and deprocessing and into the

hands of the end user.

Potential Challenges to Contracted Weekly Production Deliveries:

• Manufacturers were pursuing steep production ramps to meet aggressive

monthly delivery schedules and may experience challenges in shifting—production processes, timing, supplier orders, supplier deliveries, etc.—to meet equally aggressive weekly schedules.

• Manufacturers may experience initial delays in meeting weekly targets during

the transition; the risk increases if we require a contract that binds them to

new or changed requirements.

• Increases management and transaction demand on the Joint MRAP Program

contracting team.

Daily:

• Contracted daily delivery schedules would not provide benefit to the Department or the program schedule to counter the increased cost in managing such

deliveries.

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• Manufacturers are shipping vehicles on a regular basis and deliveries to

SPAWAR are leveling throughout the month.

• Daily delivery schedules would be difficult to negotiate with the individual

manufacturers and would put an undue burden on both the manufacturers and

the government contracting personnel required to manage daily delivery schedules.

• Manufacturers are still transitioning to a weekly schedule, as described above,

and realigning their processes, supply chains, orders, deliveries, etc. would

take an additional amount of time and would not impact the system until several months from now if at all.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Do you expect MRAP vehicle requirements to

increase in the preceding months?

Secretary YOUNG. Assessment by the military services of future vehicle requirements is in progress. Tie final MRAP requirement will be shaped by continual theater commander’s evaluation of the vehicles capability, the threat and the strategic

landscape.

The Marines have been operating their vehicles in Anbar province for several

months and have made assessments based on the operational performance as well

as tactics used and will brief their proposed requirements change to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in the near future.

The Army will perform an operational assessment of the vehicles in February

2008 after all variants have been fielded. Any change in the Army’s vehicle requirement from their current interim requirement of 10,000 vehicles will be predicated

on the results of the operational assessment, evolving force structure, and vehicle

tactics, techniques and procedures used in Theater.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Producing enough vehicles to meet DOD requirements will necessitate a steep ramp up of production between now and February next year. How confidant are you that you can achieve the ramp up necessary? Are your sub-tier contractors on board, especially considering you have some

in common with one another?

Ms. HUDSON. From the perspective of Caiman we are already at the contract-required rate of production for the most recent award. We have a high level of confidence that we’ll continue to deliver on schedule. Regarding our sub-tier contractors, XPA armor is inhouse and the government has funded the setting up of extra

lines for XPA production.

From the perspective of RG33, the rate of production has been negatively impacted due to the scope of customer changes, to the SOCOM vehicle variant.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Ramping up to meet requirements will include hiring additional workers and some will need specialized skills and certifications, such as welding. How many more workers will be needed in the coming

months to support production rates and how will they be trained to ensure they

have the necessary skills?

Ms. HUDSON. We are fully staffed and fully trained to deliver the required numbers.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What are the advantages and disadvantages

of installing mission equipment at other locations, such as the prime contractors’ facilities?

Ms. HUDSON. We have already worked with the Joint Program Office (JPO) and

SPAWAR to cut into production most of the required changes. The integration of

Government Furnished Equipment is still being done at SPAWAR and SPAWAR

have no difficulty in coping with that task.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Have you been by the MRAP Task Force or

MRAP program management office regarding the sharing of technical designs in

order to produce the most effective and complete MRAP vehicle? Would you be willing to share this type of information with your fellow prime contractors?

Ms. HUDSON. Yes, we have had two sessions with the JPO. The first involved the

sharing of data and the second was specifically aimed at increased levels of protection. As for sharing this information with our fellow contractors, we are willing and

have already done so during the JPO session.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How are you incentivizing industry to accelerate production and facilitate their production and manufacturing processes?

Ms. HUDSON. The supply base is set up to sufficiently supply the required volumes and do not need further incentivizing.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How do you feel about moving from monthly

production contracts to weekly production contracts? What about daily?

Ms. HUDSON. The Caiman vehicle has been on a weekly production schedule since

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tract award and are contracted to it. We do not feel that anything can be more significantly achieved going to a daily production schedule, considering the transportation requirements associated with the delivery of each vehicle to SPAWAR.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Producing enough vehicles to meet DOD requirements will necessitate a steep ramp up of production between now and February next year. How confident are you that you can achieve the ramp up necessary? Are your sub-tier contractors on board, especially considering you have some

in common with one another?

Mr. MCGILTON. We were supremely confident in our ability to achieve the ramp

and had all mechanisms in place to ramp up to a delivery schedule of 500 vehicles

per month. All of our sub-tier contractors and suppliers were fully prepared to execute this ramp. The actions we took, at the urging of both the Under Secretary of

Defense and the U.S. Congress, led us to create a network of manufacturing capacity that is today the only organization reliably producing ahead of schedule. We

have been led to believe that the Department is no longer planning to have us continue our ramp. We are consequently initiating planning and actions to reduce the

network and scale back our manufacturing capacity to achieve rates of roughly half,

or less, of our original estimates. The information that we have access to, appears

to indicate that there is no further level of demand that will sustain the need for

our production capacity. This seems, from our perspective, inconsistent with the

message we have repeatedly been given relative to the MRAP program; specifically

at a time when we are the only OEM reliably producing ahead of schedule for what

has been described as a ‘‘rescue mission,’’ it defies our understanding as to why we

would now be asked to halt our efforts and eliminate precious manufacturing capacity.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Ramping up to meet requirements will include hiring additional workers and some will need specialized skills and certifications, such as in welding. How many more workers will be needed in the coming

months to support production rates and how will they be trained to ensure they

have the necessary skills?

Mr. MCGILTON. We had plans in place to continue the steady increase in manpower across all functional skills (welders/fitters, mechanics, integrators/assemblers,

engineers) at each of our network and subcontractor locations. Based on the Department’s current direction, we have halted all hiring and are planning to initiate

workforce reductions across the next 90-120 days in order to scale back the workforce to the size needed to meet the diminished demand placed against our vehicles.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What are the advantages and disadvantages

of installing mission equipment at other locations, such as the prime contractor’s facilities?

Mr. MCGILTON. The advantages are reducing the delays in fielding the vehicles

and offering the potential for elimination of a single point of failure by introducing

multiple sites for installation of government furnished equipment (GFE). Disadvantages include multiple ship to locations of materials and causing the potential complexity from having to provide GFE to multiple locations (vice a single location as

it is currently executed) and potentially introducing multiple points for failure.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Have you been contacted by the MRAP Task

Force or MRAP program management office regarding the sharing of technical designs in order to produce the most effective and complete MRAP vehicle? Would you

be willing to share this type of information with your fellow prime contractors?

Mr. MCGILTON. Yes, before and since our appearance at the HASC, we have been

in contact with the MRAP Joint Program Office and participated in a joint OEM

review of test data. As we said during our appearance, we are fully committed to

any and all actions that will lead to the improvement of MRAP vehicles across all

OEMs. As a result of this review, we have, however, uncovered what appears to be

potential inconsistencies in the application and gathering of the test data and are

responding through the MRAP program office with the aim of ensuring decisions

made are a result of accurate and consistent evaluation. Without the urging of your

committee to see that the test data was shared, we feel strongly that we would not

have become aware of these issues. The HASC deserves credit for the oversight it

exhibited on this specific issue.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How are you incentivizing industry to accelerate production and facilitate their production and manufacturing processes?

Mr. MCGILTON. Mr. Chairman, as I stated in my previous testimony, and I can

only speak for Force Protection, Inc., ‘‘no incentives were necessary, nor would they

have helped us do a better job than we did’’. We viewed it as our job, our only job,

to do everything we could to get these vehicles into the hands of the troops! The

only additional assistance necessary from the DOD was having a firm understanding of the long term plan for this critical program, so we could invest in material

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and other resources to meet the need. As my peers and I said repeatedly, small incremental orders would be the worst possible scenario for ALL contractors. It now

appears that the pleas for ‘‘visibility’’ and ‘‘larger orders’’ fell on deaf ears, at least

as it relates to Force Protection. To date, we still do not have visibility or substantial orders for our vehicles. What we do have, is what was requested, the capacity

to deliver hundreds of vehicles each month. Our repeated monthly performance of

shipping ahead of schedule is the objective evidence of that capacity. Our expectation, and what we were repeatedly told, was that ‘‘business would be awarded to

those that performed’’. The majority of the business has now been awarded to those

that we outperformed, and continue to outperform.

Sir all of these issues may NOT be of concern to you, but some of them certainly

should be. I trust the wisdom of the committee to decide which is which.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How do you feel about moving from monthly

production contracts to weekly production contracts? What about daily?

Mr. MCGILTON. We are already entering into weekly production contract schedules with the MRAP program office but with the reduction of orders we are experiencing it hardly seems to matter now.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Producing enough vehicles to meet DOD requirements will necessitate a steep ramp up of production between now and February next year. How confident are you that you can achieve the ramp up necessary? Are your sub-tier contractors on board, especially considering you have some

in common with one another?

Mr. HEEBNER. We have positioned ourselves to meet the ramp-up goals at our

manufacturing sites and within our supply base. This effort is apparent in our current production, where we are ahead of schedule on the production of Cougars by

about 56 vehicles. Startup of North American production of the RG31 is proceeding

with expected completion of contract deliveries in March 2008. In addition, we have

identified external vendors for items that would typically be handled internally, providing us with the necessary flexibility to support both MRAP vehicle demands.

We are confident the General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) and GDLS-Canada

enterprise can successfully attain previously stated surge rates. We’ve already increased monthly production rates for Cougar. The RG-31 North American and South

African suppliers are well established and producing products to support vehicle

production in two locations.

Major Cougar assembly elements (such as capsule fabrication, auto integration

and final assembly) are mature and stable, inclusive of the workforce and facilities.

RG–31 production is on the same path.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Ramping up to meet requirements will include hiring additional workers and some will need specialized skills and certifications, such as in welding. How many more workers will be needed in the coming

months to support production rates and how will they be trained to ensure they

have the necessary skills?

Mr. HEEBNER. We have been able to hire the additional manpower required and

we have developed internal training programs for required specialty skills such as

welding to support both our internal and external manufacturing needs.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What are the advantages and disadvantages

of installing mission equipment at other locations, such as the prime contractors’ facilities?

Mr. HEEBNER. There are essentially four advantages to installing mission-equipment packages at prime contractor/original equipment manufacturer facilities: experience, reach-back, facilities and accountability.

Experience comes in two forms. The first is experience as the manufacturer of the

vehicle. An OEM’s thorough knowledge of the vehicle’s manufacturing process flow,

assembly operations sheets and skills required in production allow them to integrate

mission equipment packages in the most efficient and economical manner. The second and equally important aspect is experience as a systems integrator. OEMs have

years of experience integrating complex subsystems and components into vehicles.

OEMs understand their systems’ performance better and have a better ability to

model, analyze and assess system level-impacts of integration strategies in order to

ensure the most effective integration scheme for a given mission equipment package

or a combination of them. OEMs completely understand how mission-equiprnent

packages impact a vehicle’s weight, space and power capacities and the subsequent

impact they have on system-level performance in mobility, survivability, lethality

and supportability.

The second advantage that integration of mission-equipment packages at OEM facilities provides is reach-back to the point of installation on the vehicle assembly

line. Should problems arise during integration, OEM have on-site systems engineers, design and manufacturing engineering expertise, plant equipment and procVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:02 Sep 12, 2008 Jkt 040396 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-99\40396.TXT HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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ess and quality experts, logisticians and a responsive supply chain all with experience focused on the vehicle and similar vehicles/products. They combine with a dedicated program manager to form a team that can easily and quickly meet in the

manufacturing facility if necessary, analyze problems and develop solutions. Such

a rapid response minimizes the impact to production flow, system-level performance

and cost. This team’s experience makes them better prepared to react and adapt to

unknowns because of their experience and broad perspective on the system.

An additional advantage to the integration of mission-equipment packages at

OEM locations are the facilities. OEMs production facilities are geared toward providing integrated products. The facilities are flexible, expandable and in most cases

already equipped for the work. That allows us to streamline the production process

and adapt to change quickly. The production facilities are already structured for an

efficient vehicle flow and incorporating mission-equipment package integration into

that flow would also be done with efficiency in mind. Plants also have the capability

to fully check integrated system performance through their quality system before

handing off to the government.

Finally, having the OEM serve as mission equipment package integrator establishes a single point of ownership and accountability for the vehicle before it is

handed off to soldiers and marines. The OEM has responsibility for the entire vehicle and its performance. As a result, the company must coordinate with its vendor

network and the mission equipment package provider to ensure the system meets

government needs. The use of a third party integrator complicates the process and

increases the likelihood for errors and slower response times.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Have you been [approached] by the MRAP

Task Force or MRAP program management office regarding the sharing of technical

designs in order to produce the most effective and complete MRAP vehicle? Would

you be willing to share this type of information with your fellow prime contractors?

Mr. HEEBNER. General Dynamics Land Systems remains open to sharing technology across the MRAP fleet given that the proper contractual terms and conditions exist, especially in areas where we do not own the intellectual property.

I have expressed my corporate and individual commitment to supporting the

MRAP program to Secretary Young and the Joint Program Office. General Dynamics has not been approached by the government about sharing MRAP vehicle designs.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How are you incentivizing industry to accelerate production, and facilitate their production and manufacturing processes?

Mr. HEEBNER. The GDLS strategy to accelerate the current production rate is to

utilize existing idle capacity throughout industry, and involve the current GDLS

supply base from legacy products such as Abrams and Stryker. We also explained

to a select group of suppliers that future business with GDLS is contingent on demonstrated performance in the manufacturing of MRAPs. This approach coupled, with

an established Cougar supply base, enhanced our ability to achieve and exceed

monthly contract schedules.

A similar approach was used by GDLS–C in its relationship with BAE Systems

OMC, and the established supply base in North America.

Communication and loyalty to our key partners has been the cornerstone for moving forward. Through efficiency already achieved, the supply chain focus is to reduce

current product span time and increase core capacity for these platforms.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How do you feel about moving from monthly

production contracts to weekly production contracts? What about daily?

Mr. HEEBNER. We have structured our delivery plan to support the need for mission-package integration at Space and Surface Warfare Charleston, realizing that

large-quantity, month-end deliveries do not support the overall program objective.

In most cases we have been able to provide a uniform delivery rate of MRAPs to

Charleston throughout each month and will continue to pursue uniform vehicle delivery rates to assure the components are available for mission-package integration.

As responded to in question three, by performing mission-package integration at the

manufacturers’ facility, we gain efficiencies in several areas. That could result in

faster vehicle delivery to the theater.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What impact is the UAW strike having on

the IMG MRAP production and delivery schedules?

Mr. MASSICOTTE. On December 16, 2007, International Truck and Engine Corporation and the UAW settled their dispute and all aspects of production have returned to normal. There was no impact to MRAP or to our delivery schedule.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Producing enough vehicles to meet DOD requirements will necessitate a steep ramp up of production between now and February next year. How confident are you that you can achieve the ramp up necVerDate 22-MAR-2001 07:02 Sep 12, 2008 Jkt 040396 PO 00000 Frm 00130 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-99\40396.TXT HNS1 PsN: HNS1
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essary? Are your sub-tier contractors on board, especially considering you have some

in common with one another?

Mr. MASSICOTTE. Since the date of our testimony we have successfully increased

MRAP production and in December 2007 we exceeded our monthly commitment of

349 MRAPs. This monthly total is the highest total vehicles produced by any contractor in any month.

We plan to produce 430 vehicles in January and 500 vehicles in February. These

increases in production remain a challenge that we work towards achieving each

and every day. Additionally we work closely with each of our subcontractors individually to ensure they are prepared to increase demand along with us. This is not an

easy task but I am confident that we will produce and deliver our future commitments. Furthermore I assure you that we will maintain an open channel of communication with the MRAP Program Office to identify potential problems as soon as

possible and work together to resolve issues before they affect production.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Ramping up to meet requirements will include hiring additional workers and some will need specialized skill and certifications, such as welding. How many more workers will be needed in the coming

months to support production rates and how will they be trained to ensure they

have the necessary skills?

Mr. MASSICOTTE. The MaxxPro is a unique MRAP vehicle. The chassis is assembled in our Garland Assembly Plant, in Garland Texas. This plant is a commercial

plant and the assembly of the MaxxPro chassis does not require any unique skills.

In addition, the MaxxPro incremental volume to this facility does not have a staffing

impact. The armored capsule of the MaxxPro is assembled in our dedicated armoring facility in West Point, Mississippi. Our armoring process requires no welding

and is assembled by bolting and bonding armored parts on the chassis. Our workforce in West Point, Mississippi, that assembles the armored capsule is 750 strong

and can produce at our practical plant capacity of 600 per month with little or no

additional hiring. We have invested in the existing workforce by carefully interviewing, screening, selecting and training our employees to build the MaxxPro vehicle.

The skills required are basic automotive assembly skills. We’ve matched individual

aptitude with appropriate production tasks. Our employees take great pride in the

vehicles we produce and the support we provide to our armed forces.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What are the advantages and disadvantages

of installing mission equipment at other locations, such as the prime contractors’ facilities?

Mr. MASSICOTTE. The advantages of installing mission equipment at our factory

are significant and include time savings, reduced government costs and expedited

delivery of vehicles to the Warfighters. Working closely with SPAWAR we have already identified and implemented 19 GFE (government furnished equipment) preintegration activities that are being performed at West Point which enable the Government to perform only ‘plug-and-play’ tasks at SPAWAR and to ship the trucks

to theater more expeditiously. These activities have been performed on all vehicles

delivered since October. IMG is also poised to integrate the full suite of GFE if this

is desired by the government.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Have you been contacted by the MRAP Task

Force or MRAP Program Management office regarding the sharing of technical designs in order to produce the most effective and complete MRAP vehicle? Would you

be willing to share this type of information with your fellow prime contractors?

Mr. MASSICOTTE. Yes, we have been contacted and have in fact had an open session with the Program Management office and our fellow prime contractors regarding vehicle test characteristics and results. Even though each prime contractor has

different survivability systems embedded in their designs, I believe there is a shared

interest in collaborating and in providing the Warfighters with the very best equipment possible. International is willing to participate in any event sponsored by the

Program Office or MRAP Task Force that promotes product improvement and effective sharing of lessons learned.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How are you incentivizing industry to accelerate production and facilitate their production and manufacturing processes?

Mr. MASSICOTTE. As a worldwide leader in commercial truck manufacturing, we

have a dedicated and attentive supply base that is well positioned to meet our production needs. For our new or non-commercial suppliers we have advanced millions

of dollars to subcontractors, at our own risk, to prebuy and prepare for production;

we have hired outside manufacturing expert consultants and assigned them to work

specifically on improving sub-contractor manufacturing capabilities; we have dedicated significant engineering resources to suppliers to develop capabilities and set

up pre-agreements to perform as required. In short we have worked very closely

with each supplier of critical components to ‘bring them along with us’ to meet the

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steep production challenges. The incentive for all our suppliers is to be with IMG

as IMG continues to grow in the military arena and also it’s the potential to either

expand their current relationship or to become a new supplier to Navistar’s multibillion dollar commercial truck business.

Mr. TAYLOR and Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How do you feel about moving from monthtly

production contracts to weekly production contracts? What about daily?

Mr. MASSICOTTE. We are building MaxxPro MRAP vehicles as quickly as we are

able. At IMG we are motivated to get them built and delivered so that we can complete the transaction and move on to produce more vehicles. For right now, during

an aggressive launch phase, I do not think that moving to a more definitive schedule would enable us to move any more quickly. But, once we achieve a successful

ramp-up and our suppliers are stabilized IMG will provide and deliver to a more

definitive schedule. Please note that IMG is communicating daily with Program

Management office and DCMA to ensure that downstream activity is coordinated

with vehicle delivery.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. FORBES. Are you finding variation in trucks that arrive in Charleston, SC

that are not integration ready? If yes, how are you dealing with that variation? Is

there any congressional action that can help you in this area?

Secretary YOUNG. We are not experiencing variation of trucks arriving at

SPAWAR Charleston, SC wit m each manufacturer’s vehicles. The Defense Contracts Management Agency conducts quality assurance checks prior to acceptance

of the vehicles. Additional quality checks are conducted during the integration process.

There is variation between the manufacturer’s vehicles that required us, in the

past, to conduct a prototype install of Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) for

each manufacturer’s variant. At this point, all vehicles except General Dynamics

Land Systems—Canada’s (GDLS–C) RG–31s, have been through prototyping and

are progressing steadily through the integration pipeline.

The Department does not need congressional action with regard to vehicle variations.

Mr. FORBES. Why shouldn’t we have C4I equipment installation done at the manufacturers rather than sending the trucks to Charleston?

Secretary YOUNG. All C4I equipment, referred to as Government Furnished

Equipment (GFE), is procured by the individual Services. We determined it would

be prudent for the Joint Program Office (JPO) to have one common place to receive,

store, inventory, account for, secure, and integrate this GFE. That entity is

SPAWAR. Completing all these tasks at multiple sights would have complicated the

GFE tracking and accounting process.

Armored vehicle manufacturers do not inherently have the requisite skills at their

vehicle manufacturing plants for detailed installation of C4I equipment or GFE. The

JPO focused each manufacturer on its ‘‘core’’ capability to produce MRAP vehicles

as fast as possible. The production ramp was very steep and included some level

of risk. Asking a vehicle manufacturer to ramp up a specialized integration capability as well as produce MRAP vehicles would have increased the risk of receiving

these trucks on time.

Now that the vehicles have all been prototyped (except General Dynamics Land

Systems—Canada (GDLS–C)) and the manufacturers are achieving production

ramps, the JPO is initiating an integration pilot with one manufacturer. Transition

to integration by a manufacturer must be handled with great precision and planning

to avoid any disruption to the pipeline of MRAP vehicles to theater.

Mr. FORBES. Is SPAWAR Charleston opening a MRAP integration facility in

Orangeburg, SC? And if so, what is the purpose for doing so?

Secretary YOUNG. Yes. The Joint Program Office (JPO) and SPAWAR established

a Continuity of Operations (COOP) site for immediate relocation of the entire integration effort from SPAWAR in the case of natural disaster such as a hurricane.

Several sites were examined, and the Orangeburg, SC location was chosen due to

its large square footage and immediate availability for occupancy. Establishing several integration lines at this COOP facility allows for seamless and continuous operations of MRAP vehicle integration without impacting the flow of MRAP vehicles

to theater.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER

Mr. SHUSTER. In response to my questions at the July 19 hearing on Department

of Defense plans to sustain and maintain the MRAP and what depots are involved

in the planning process, I received a response that vehicles would initially be sustained and maintained via contractor logistics support (CLS). However, the Department would conduct a Depot Level Source of Repair (DSOR) analysis and a core logistics capabilities assessment, which will also consider Performance Based Logistics

and public-private partnerships in determining the most effective sustainment support. Has the Department of Defense started the Depot Level Source of Repair Analysis (DSOR) and, if not, when do you plan to begin this analysis? Will you consider

the Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) as a sustainment site? As you know,

Letterkenny finished number one in military value for tactical vehicles in the 2005

BRAG analysis.

Secretary YOUNG. Yes, we have started the Depot Level Source of Repair Analysis

and the Core Logistics capabilities assessment.

Yes, Letterkenny Army Depot, Red River Army Depot, Marine Corps Depot at Albany, GA and Barstow, CA are all being considered by the Joint community as potential depots for MRAP vehicle sustainment.

Mr. SHUSTER. Please tell me under your current contract when production of your

vehicle ends. Would there be a production break if you received orders for new vehicles by the end of November. If so, what would that break be? Would there be an

additional cost to you of ending and then restarting production?

Ms. HUDSON. Since my testimony at the 8 November MRAP hearing, BAE Systems has received two additional contracts, thus pushing forward contract end-dates

and, consequently, anticipated breaks in production. Dates and production details

for both the RG33 and Caiman vehicles are outlined below.

RG33: The follow-on contract for RG33 has a projected completion date of July

2008. We do not anticipate any break in production for current contracts.

Caiman: The follow-on contract for Caiman is schedule to be produced in May,

June, and July 2008. We do not anticipate any break in production for current contracts.

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