COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

ANTOINE D. PITTMAN, S/K/A 

 ANTOINE DAUNTE PITTMAN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 1666-96-1 BY JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES 

 JUNE 24, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 

Norman Olitsky, Judge 

 Brenda C. Spry, Deputy Public Defender, for 

appellant. 

 Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Antoine D. Pittman (appellant) was convicted by a jury of 

robbery and using a firearm in the commission of robbery. 

Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 

his convictions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

 In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction where a witness' identification is challenged, we look 

to the reliability factors enunciated in Neil v. Biggers, 409 

U.S. 188 (1972), as significant circumstances that may be 

considered, along with other evidence. See Smallwood v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 527, 530, 418 S.E.2d 567, 568 (1992) 

(applying the Biggers analysis even though the accused did not 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

appeal trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the 

identifications). These factors include 

 the opportunity of the witness to view the 

criminal at the time of the crime, the 

witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of 

the witness' prior description of the 

criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated 

by the witness at the confrontation, and the 

length of time between the crime and the 

confrontation. 

Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200. 

 "On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 

4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). So viewed, the 

evidence proved that around 2:20 p.m. on October 23, 1995, Ladrew 

Dennis was robbed at gunpoint after he returned to his delivery 

truck. Dennis testified that he clearly saw the robber, who was 

less than a foot away from him. Twenty to thirty minutes after 

the robbery, Detective David Dempsey showed Dennis loose 

photographs and a book containing mugshots. At the time, Dennis 

was "nervous" and "excited," and, although some of the photos 

"were close," he did not identify anyone because he was "[n]ot 

absolutely" "100 percent sure at that time." Dennis described 

the robber as having short hair, however, he could not say 

whether the robber's hair was braided. He initially described 

the robber as weighing between 150 and 170 pounds. On November 

1, 1995, nine days after the robbery, Dennis viewed a six-man 

photo array containing appellant's photograph from the mugshot 
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book, and he positively identified appellant as the robber. The 

other five photos in the array had not previously been viewed by 

Dennis. Dennis unequivocally identified appellant at trial as 

the man who robbed him. 

 Detective Dempsey testified that Dennis described the robber 

"as a black male, approximately 18 years of age, 5'10" to 6 foot, 

150 pounds, brown eyes, black hair, and the hair was short and 

curly." According to Dempsey, appellant was "about 5'9", [and he 

weighed] something like, 200 pounds" on November 1, 1995, the day 

of his arrest. Dempsey also stated that at the time of arrest, 

appellant's hair was not the same as it was in court. Dempsey 

testified that, on November 1, 1995, appellant had "corn-row type 

hair." Dempsey elaborated, "I wouldn't call it braided. No. I 

wouldn't call it braided. Well, braided close to the head 

maybe." 

 The Commonwealth's evidence showed that Dennis had an 

adequate opportunity to view the robber at close range, that he 

paid a great deal of attention to the robber and that he 

unequivocally identified appellant's photograph in a photo array 

nine days after the crime. Moreover, Dennis positively 

identified appellant in court as the robber. The fact that 

Dennis failed to identify appellant's photo just after the 

robbery or that he erred in estimating appellant's weight went to 

the weight of the evidence and were for the fact finder to 

resolve. Moreover, the description of the robber's hair style at 
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the time of the crime was not so incongruous with Dempsey's 

description as to render it unreliable or incredible. The fact 

finder is capable of "measuring intelligently the weight of 

identification testimony that has some questionable feature 

. . . . The defect, if there be one, goes to weight and not to 

substance." Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116-17 (1977). 

 The fact finder believed the Commonwealth's evidence and 

rejected the alibi evidence presented by appellant. "It is 

fundamental that 'the credibility of witnesses and the weight 

accorded their testimony are matters solely for the fact finder 

who has the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses.'" 

Collins v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 177, 179, 409 S.E.2d 175, 

176 (1991) (quoting Schneider v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 379, 382, 

337 S.E.2d 735, 736-37 (1985)). The Commonwealth's evidence was 

competent, was reliable, was not inherently incredible, and was 

sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was 

guilty of robbery and use of a firearm. Accordingly, appellant's 

convictions are affirmed. 

 Affirmed.