15 -28 98 -cv

McL eod v

. The Jewi sh Gui ld for the Bl in d



### UNITED STATES COURTOF APPEAL S F O R T H E 

### S E C O N D 

### C IR C U IT 

### August Term, 2016 (Argued: March 29, 2017 D ecided: July 19, 2017)

Docket No. 15-2898- cv

E A S T E R 

### S. M C 

### L E O D 

### , Plaintiff-Appellant,

— v. — T H E 

### J E W I S H 

### G U I L D F O R T H E 

### B L I N D 

### , Defendant-Appellee, D R 

### . A L A N 

### R. M O R S E 

### , CEO E X E C U T I V E 

### O F F I C E 

### , G O L D I E 

### D E R S H 

### , VIP B E H A V I O R A L 

### H E A L T H 

### S E R V I C E S 

### , P S Y C H I A T R I C 

### C L I N I C 

### , M E L I S S A 

### F A R B E R

### , VIP H U M A N 

### R E S O U R C E S 

### ,

D O N A L D 

### D E T T M E R

### , P R O G R A M 

### C O O R D I N A T O R

### , Defendants

.

B e f o r e : H A L L 

### , L Y N C H 

### , and D R O N E Y

### , Circuit Judges.

### Plai ntiff-appellant , Easter S . McLeod, appeals fro m a judgm ent enter ed by the United States District Court for the Souther n District of New York (Pauley and Woods, JJ. ). This appeal raises the question whether a pro se li tigant forfeits her claims under Ne w York state and local discrim inati on law where sh e has all eged facts supp orting such claim s, but fails to check a blank on a form complai nt indicat ing that she wishes to bring them. We conclude that such a bright-line rule runs counter to our policy of l iberally construing pro se submissions, and that McLeod’s complai nt should have bee n read b y the district court to asser t clai ms under Ne w York state and local discrim inati on law. For the reaso ns set for th below and in a summary order issued s imu ltaneously wi th this opinion, the judgm ent of the district court is VACATED and REMANDED

.

A D R I E N N E 

### B. K O C H 

### (Elan R. Dobbs an d Joseph We iner, on the brief ), Katsky K orins LLP, New Yor k, NY forPlai ntiffAppellant Easter S. McLeod. R A V I N D R A 

### K. S H A W 

### (Jennifer B. Courtian, on the brief ), Jackson Lewis P.C., New Yor k, NY forDefe ndant-Appellee The Jewish Guil d for the Blind.

P E R 

### C U R I A M 

### : Plai ntiff-appellant

, Easter S . McLeod, appeals fro m a judgm ent enter ed by the United States District Court for the Souther n District of New York (Pauley and Woods, JJ. ). This appeal raises the question whether a pro se li tigant forfeits her claims under Ne w York state and local discrim inati on law where sh e has all eged facts supp orting such claim s, but fails to check a blank on a form

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### complai nt indicat ing that she wishes to bring them. We conclude that such a

bright-line rule runs counter to our policy of l iberally construing pro se submissions, and that McLeod’s complai nt should have bee n read b y the district court to asser t clai ms under Ne w York state and local discrim inati on law as well as under feder al l aw. A summary order issued s imu ltaneously wi th this opini on addres ses the balance of McLeod’s claims on appeal. For the r easons stated below and in that summ ary orde r, we VAC ATE the district court’s determinati on that McLeod asser ted claim s only under fe deral law, it s dismissal of cl aims against the indiv idualdefendan ts, and its dism issal of McLeod’s hostile work environment claim ; and REMAND for further p rocee dings consistent with our rulings. BACKGROUND Proceeding pr o se, McLeod filed suit in the Souther n District of New York in September 2013, all eging that she was the victim of sexual harassment while employed by defendan t-appellee, The Jewish Guil d for the Blind (“JGB”). In bringing suit, McLeod used a form discrimi nation compl aint provided by the district court’s pro se office that asks liti gants to place check marks ne xt to the laws under which they wish to bring their claims. McLeod checked a blank

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### indicat ing that she wished to bring claim s under Tit le VIIof the Civil Ri ghts Act

of 1964 (“Titl e VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , but did not check blanks

corre sponding to the New Yor k State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. , or the Ne w York City Human Rights Law (“NYCH RL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq. McLeod also checked b lanks refer ring to other bases of discrimi nation, but fail ed to check the b lank for “gender /se x,” even though the complai nt elsewher e re fers to “sexual harass ment.” A. 34. Appended to the form complai nt were McLe od’s handwritten allegati ons detailing her direct supervisor ’s conduct, which included sexually suggesti ve re marks as well as comments insinuati ng that McLeod worked par t-tim e as a pr ostitut e or stripper. The complaint did not name JGB as a defendant, instead naming McLeod’s super visor and three other individualexec utives of JGB. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e )(2)(B), the district court dismi ssed sua sponte McLeod’s claims agai nst the individu al defendants on the ground that indivi dual defendan ts cannot be h eld li able under Title VII, and directed that the caption be amended to name JGB as a defendan t. Thereafter , JGB moved for partial judgment on the pleadings. In rul ing on the moti on, the district court noted that “[o]n her pre-pr inted complai nt form, McLeod indicates that she is suing only

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### under Title VII,” Dkt. No. 46 at 3, appare ntly referr ing to the fact that M cLeod

had only checked the b lank on the form complai nt corre sponding to Tit le VII

. The district court then dismi ssed McLe od’s claim s base d on age, color, and disabili ty, and stated that the case would procee d only with res pect to her claims under Title VIIon the bas is of sex. The district court later dismissed those claims at summ ary judgment. This ti mely appeal fol lowed. DISCUSSION As we have r epeatedly stated, “[w]e liberally construe pleadings and br iefs submitt ed by pr o se liti gants, reading such s ubmissions to raise the stronge st arguments they sugges t.” Bertin v. United States , 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal citat ion and quot ation marks omi tted). “The policy of l iberally construing pro se submissions is driven by the under standing that i mpli cit i n the right to self-repre sentation is an obligat ion on the part of the cour t to make

reaso nable allowances to protect pro s e liti gants from inadvertent for feiture of important rights because of their lack of legal traini ng.” Abbas v. Dixon , 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007) (alterations and internal quotati on marks omitt ed). Here , had the district court considered McLe od’s handwritten factual all egations alone, it woul d have be en re qui red to cons true McLeod as having

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### asser ted claim s under the NYSH RL and NYCHRL. McLeod’s allegati ons clearly 1 

### suggest claim s under the NYSH RL and NYCHRL, which affor d protections unavail able under fe deral law to di scriminati on plainti ffs who can “plead and prove that the alleged discriminatory conduct had an im pact” withi n the state and city respectively. Hoffman v. Parade Publ’ns , 15 N.Y.3d 285, 289 (2010). The 2 

### NYCHRL, for example, applies a more lenient standard than Title VI I to discrimi nation and hostil e work en vironment clai ms, see Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc. , 715 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2013), and the N YSHRL and NYCHRL b oth provide less str ingent statutes of li mit ations than those applicable under fe deral law, see Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc. , 496 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2007). More over, the N YSHRL and NYC HRL permit suit s against indiv idual supervisor s, which McLeod clearly sought to bring, while Ti tle VIIdoes not. See Feingold v. New York

, 366 F.3d 138, 157-59 (2d Cir. 2004). As a pr o se liti gant,

If the di stric t court then deter mined that McLeod had pre vious ly fi led a complaint 1 wi th the r elevant stat e or ci ty ag enci es, any such NYSHRL and NYCHRL clai ms w ould be di smi ssed u nder election of remedi es princi ples. See De sardouin v. Ci ty of Rochester , 708 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Ci r. 2013). That requi rement was clearly met inthi s cas e, where McLeod allege d i n her complaint 2 that she li ved in the Bronx, and that t he i ndi vidu al defendants w or ked wi th her at JGB’s offi ce in Manhattan, where t he purport edly di scri minator y conduct allegedly to ok place. 6

### McLeod could not be exp ected to under stand such fine-grained distinctions

between local, stat e, and fede ral law, and woul d “inadvertent[ly] forfeit[] . . . important rights,” Abbas , 480 F.3d at 639, if the district court were not r equired to construe h er complaint to stat e claim s under the NYSH RL and NYCHRL. 3 

### That McLeod used a form complaint provided by the district court’s pro se office and failed to check the appropr iate blanks should not dict ate a contrary result. As we have n oted in analogous circum stances, “[t]he failu re in a

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### complai nt to cite a statu te, or to cite the corr ect one, in no way affects the merits

The di stric t court appropr i ately constr ued other aspects of McLeod’s c omplai nt to 3 rais e the str ongest ar guments they suggested. When asked inthe for m complaint to i denti fy the bases f or defendants’ di scri minator y conduct, McLeod checked only the box for “dis abi li ty o r per cei ved dis abi li ty.” S he di d not check the boxe s for “age” and “color,” but suppli ed i nformation in the blanks c or respondi ng to those catego ries . She also fai led to check the box for “g ender/sex” dis cri minati on and di d not supply any i nformation in the blank corr esponding to that categ or y. The di stric t court nonetheless construed her complai nt to rais e di scri minati on clai ms on the bas i s of all four categor i es, based on her handw ritten factual allegati ons. In addi tion, the court amended McLeod’s capti on to assert clai ms against JGB , as would be proper under Ti tle VII, alt hough McLeod di d not name JGB as a defendant. We see no reason to di sti ngui sh McLeod’s apparent er ro rs wi th respect to the source of her clai ms fro m these other err or s and omi ssi ons, whi ch the di stric t court appropr i ately cor rected o n the basi s of McLeod’s handw ritten factual allegati ons to r eflect the appropr i ate leg al bases for her clai ms. Of course, i f pri or to constr uing McLeod’s complaint, the dis tr i ct court had speci fi cally 4 advis ed McLeod of her abili ty t o seek r ecourse under the NYS HRL and NYCHRL and she had expressly di savowed any in tention to assert claim s un der t hose bodi es of law, thi s would be a di fferent case. However, t he di stric t court construed McLeod’s complaint as not r ai sing such clai ms w i thout consulti ng her. 7

### of a claim .” Albert v. Carovano , 851 F.2d 561, 571 n.3 (2d Cir. 1988) (e n banc).

Rather, “[f]actual all egations alone are what matters.” Id. That principl e carr ies particular force wher e a pro s e liti gant is invol ved. Accordingly, because 5 

### McLeod’s factual all egations suggested claims under the NYS HRL and NYCHRL, the district court was requi red to cons true her complai nt as asser ting claim s under those laws, even if she failed to check the appropr iate blank. 6 

### We note that our holding is rooted in our well-worn prece dent concer ning a district court’s obli gation to l iberally construe pro s e submissions. We do not expand that obligation here, nor do we purpor t to task di strict courts with the resp onsibili ty of scouring obscure bodies of law in order to come up with novel claim s on be half of pro se litigant s. Rather, we c onclude that in thi s case, whe re

We note, mo reo ver , that t he form di scri minati on complaint pro vided b y the S outher n 5 Di stric t of New Yor k’s pro se offi ce has been revised s i nce McLeod fi led sui t, and that the for m di scri minati on complaints offered by each of the di stric ts i n New Yorkdi ffer i n var i ous respects. Suchci rcums tantial variati ons should not dic tate the subs tantive rights of pro se li tigants. Of course, a di stric t court may decline to ex erci se su pplemental juris di cti on ov er stat e 6 and local lawclai ms i f i t has di smi ssed al l clai ms over whi ch i t has origi nal juris di cti on. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). E ven insuch a cas e, however , the di stric t court ’s recogniti on that a complai nt asserts state and local law c lai ms c an affec t a pro se li tigant’s ri ghts becau se doing so preser ves the t i meliness of such clai ms an d permi ts those clai ms to be later brought i n state court . See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 205(a); Dun ton v. Suff olk Cty., Sta te of N.Y. , 729 F.2d 903, 911 n.8 (2d Ci r. 1984). 8

### McLeod’s factual all egations supported claims under the well-known antidiscrimi nation provisions of the NYSHRL and N YCHRL, our e xisting preceden t required the district court to construe McLeod’s complaint as asser ting cl aims under those laws, regardless of her f ail ure to check the appropr iate blank on a form complai nt. CONCLUSION For the r easons stated above and in the s umm ary orde r issued simul taneously with this opinion, we VACATE the district court’s determinati on that McLeod asser ted claim s only under fe deral law, it s dismissal of cl aims against the indiv idualdefendan ts, and its dism issal of McLeod’s hostile work environment claim ; and REMAND for further p rocee dings consistent with our rulings.

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