# F I LED

Ma rch 16, 2000 C e c i lCr o w s o n , Jr
. Appell ate Cour

t Cl er k 

## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

RICKY LEE OLDHAM, ) ) Plaintiff/Ap

pellant, ) Davidson Chancery

) No. 98-2036-II VS. ) ) TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF ) Appeal No. CORRECTION, ) M1998-00852-COA -R3-CV ) Defendant/Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY

AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE THE HONORABLE CAROL L. McCOY, CHANCELLOR

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant : Attorney for Defendan t/Appellee : Ricky Lee Oldham, Pro Se Paul G. Summers Attorney General and Rep orter Abigail Turner Assistant Attorney General



## A FFIRMED AND 

## R EMANDED

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE1 Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10( b) provides: The Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinionwhen a formal o pinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided b y memorandum

opinion, it shall

be designated "ME

MORANDUM OPINION ," shall notbe published, and shall not be cited or relied on fo r a ny reason in a subsequent unrelated case. -2-

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal involves a dispute b etween an inmate and t he Tennessee Department of Correcti

on (“Department”) regarding deductions from the inmate’s trust accountto pay the c

ourt costs ste

mming from h

is criminal con

viction. Af

ter his inmate grievance proved u ns uccessful, the inmate filed a petition for a declaratory o rder in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a declaration that the Department could

not deduct funds from his inmate trust account without a court order. The trial court dismissed the inmate’s petition because it did not state that the inmate had previo

usly sough

t a declaratory order

from the Dep

artment. Th

e inmate asserts on this appeal

that he should b

e excused fr

om this requ

irement beca

use he is undertaking to represent himself and because his grievance was tantamo unt to a petition for a declar

atory orde

r. We affirm t

he dismis sa l of the inmate’s complaint in accordance with Tenn . Ct. App. R. 10(b). 1 Ricky Lee Oldham is cu rren tly incarcerated in the Northw est Correctional Center in Tiptonv

ille, Tennes see. Beginn

ing in April

1 996, pr ison officials began deducting funds from his inmate trust account to pay for $1,692.50 in costs stemming from his criminal conviction. When he questioned the basis for

these deduc

tions, prison officials

provided him with

a document from the circuit court clerk of Madison County certifying that the total

cost in Mr. Oldham’s criminal pro ceedings amounted to $1,692.50. Mr. Oldham filed an inmate grievance con cerning t hese deductions because he believed that prison officials did not have the authority to make t hem. The grievance was dismissed on the ground th at it was inapp

ropriate be

cause it dealt

with a matter concerning an outside agency. Thereafter, Mr. Oldham filed a petition fo r a decl arato ry judgment in the Chancery Court for Davidso

n County.The Depart

ment moved to dismissthe petition-3-

because it did not contain an allegatio n that Mr. Oldham had petitio ned for a declaratory

order and that the Depar tment had refused to issue one . The trial court dism issed Mr. Oldham’s petition. The trial court also taxed the cos ts of the proceeding to Mr. Oldh

am but permit

ted him to pa

y these costs at the rate of $5.00 per month. Mr. Oldham has appealed.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225 (a) (1998) empowers the Chancery Court for David son C ounty to render declaratory judgments regarding the legal validity or applicability

of a statute, rule, or order of a n administrative agency to spec ified circumstances. However, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225(b) prevents the trial court from rendering a declaratory judgment if the person seeking it has not petitioned the agency for a declaratory

ruling in accordance with Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 4-5 -223, -224 (199 8). Mr. Oldham’s petition does not allege that he has complie d with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-223, -224, and the record contains no evidence permitting us to find that he did. Accordingly, the trial court correctly decided to dismis s his petition.
Mr. Oldham asserts that

he should be excused from complying with Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225(b) becau

se he is u ntrained in the law and is attempting to represent himself. While the courts should construe the pleadings of pro se litigants liberally, pro se litigants are not excused from following th e same procedural and substantive rules that represented parties are required to follow. See Kaylor v. Bradley , 912 S.W.2d728, 733 n.4 (Tenn. Ct.App. 199 5); Irvin v. City of Clarksville , 767 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn . Ct. App. 1988). Compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-223, -224 is aprocedural prerequisite to a Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225 petition. With out it, Mr. Oldham’s petition must be dismissed.
Mr. Oldham also asserts that the inmate griev ance proceedin

g is substanti

ally the same as a petition for a declaratory order under Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223. We disagree. The purpose of an inmate grievance is not to question the legal validity of astate statute, rule, order, or their application to a particular set of fact s. Accordingly, pursuing an inmate grievance does not amount to substantial compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-2

25(b).-4- We affirm the order dismissing Mr. Old ham’s petition and remand the case to the trial court fo

r whatever f

urther pro

ceedings may

be required . We als o tax th e costs of this appe

al to Ric ky L ee Oldham for which execu tion, if necessary, may issue.

______________________________ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
CONCUR:

________________________________ WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE

________________________________ PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE