NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 14a0871n.06

No. 14-1063

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD WAYNE BOONE, II,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DANIEL H. HEYNS; JEFFREY STIEVE; JOYCE 

HUNTER; KARINA J. BEALS; BRENDA S. 

UPSTON; STEPHEN WEISS,

Defendants-Appellants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

Before: SUTTON and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges; ROSENTHAL, District Judge.

*

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. In this case the district court granted a preliminary 

injunction without any analysis of the merits of the underlying claim. For that reason, under 

binding precedent, we reverse.

Richard Boone is a state prisoner in Michigan. He began serving his current sentence in 

March 2011, complaining from the outset of pain in his knees and back. Since then, prison 

officials have provided Boone with medical care almost continuously: he sees a prison physician 

once a week, a nurse twice a day, and the Department of Corrections’ Chief Medical Officer 

personally reviewed Boone’s treatment plan. The prison’s medical staff also provided him with 

a bottom bunk, a sleep apnea machine, an early meal time, a soft foot brace, and prescriptions for 

Mobic, Mylanta, Protonix, and Tylenol. 

 

*

The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by 

designation.
No. 14-1063

Boone v. Heyns

-2-

For six months in 2013, prison officials also allowed Boone to sleep on an air mattress 

and use a knee brace. In September, however, medical staff examined Boone and concluded that 

the air mattress and knee brace were not “medically necessary” for his care. Consequently, 

prison officials took the mattress and brace away from him.

By then this lawsuit was already pending. Earlier, in 2012, Boone had filed suit against 

the defendants here—all of whom of are prison officials—claiming that his medical care in 

prison amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Three 

months later Boone filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking, among other things, to 

enjoin the defendants from taking away his air mattress. Then—after the defendants in fact took 

away his mattress in September 2013—Boone wrote a letter to the district court, requesting a 

ruling on his motion for an injunction. 

In response, the court convened an on-the-record conference with counsel. Boone 

participated via teleconference, claiming that he needed the air mattress and brace because 

otherwise his pain would make him suicidal. The State opposed the motion, citing an opinion 

from the Department’s Chief Medical Officer, who concluded, based upon Boone’s medical 

history, that his air mattress would not alleviate his pain and that his knee brace was only making 

his condition worse. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, ordering the defendants 

to return the mattress and brace. We review that decision for an abuse of discretion. Hoevenaar 

v. Lazaroff, 422 F.3d 366, 368 (6th Cir. 2005). 

In granting the injunction, the district court failed to apply or even mention the fourfactor test that governs the propriety of injunctive relief. See generally Michigan State AFL-CIO 

v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997). Thus, as in a Supreme Court case, “one searches 

the [record] below in vain for any mention of a likelihood of success as to the merits” of Boone’s 
No. 14-1063

Boone v. Heyns

-3-

claim. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 690 (2008). That omission standing alone “require[d] 

reversal and remand” in Munaf, where the court held that “it was an abuse of discretion for the 

District Court to grant a preliminary injunction . . . without even considering the merits of the 

underlying” claim. Id. at 690-91. We reverse for the same reason here.

In Miller, we held that “a preliminary injunction issued where there is simply no 

likelihood of success on the merits must be reversed.” 103 F.3d at 1249. Thus, to the extent that 

Boone continues to seek injunctive relief on remand, the district court must consider whether the 

extensive medical attention that Boone has received in prison amounts to deliberate indifference 

towards his medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (holding that a 

“medical judgment” not to order additional treatment “does not represent cruel and unusual 

punishment”).

The district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction is reversed.