IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2016-CA-01638-COA SHARON MARK APPELLANT

v. CITY OF HATTIESBURG, MISSISSIPPI, MAYOR JOHNNY DUPREE, KIM BRADLEY, DEBORAH DENARD DELGADO, CARTER CARROLL, DAVE WARE AND HENRY E. NAYLOR APPELLEES

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/02/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MICHAEL H. W ARD COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: FORREST COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: KIM T. CHAZE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: L. CLARK HICKS JR. JAMES W . GLADDEN JR. NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED: 01/08/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC. TINDELL, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Sharon Mark sued the City o f Hattiesburg ( the C i t y ) , M a y o r Johnny Dupree (the May o r), a n d the individual m em bers of the city council (collectively , the City Council) 1 f or slander, invasion of privacy , breach of i m plied contract, negligence, a n d intentional and/or

1 T h e C ity C o u n cil’s in d iv id u al m em b ers in c l u d e d K im B rad ley , D eb o rah D elg ad o , C a rter C arro ll, D a v e Ware, an d H en ry N ay lo r.negligent inf liction of em otional distress. 2 Prior to trial, the Forrest County C i r c uit Court granted the City ’s m otion f or sum m ary judgm ent. Following the conclusion of Mark’s casein-chief at trial, the circuit court entered a d irected verdict f or both the May or and the City Council. On appeal, M ark a rgues she presented suf f icient evidence to survive both the City ’s

sum m ary -judgm ent m otion and the May or and the City Council’s d irected-verdict m otion. Finding no error, we af

f irm

. FACTS ¶2. In 2 004, Mark b ecam e the City ’s m unicipal-court clerk. At all relevant tim es, Mark served as an at-will em

ploy ee. In 2012, the City received allegations of im propriety by Mark and several o f the d e puty clerks she supervised. According to t he accusations, the municipalcourt em ploy ees had hidden paperwork; shredded docum ents; a ccepted bribes in exchange
f or dism issing tickets, f

ines, and warrants; and engaged in inappropriate contact w ith judges. The reports alleged that Mark herself had personally i ntervened o n b ehalf of an acquaintance and im properly waived his expungem ent f ee. ¶3. In r esponse to the reported m isconduct, the Hattiesburg Police D epartm ent conducted

an internal investigation. Based on the Departm ent’s f indings, f

our m unicipal-court

em ploy e es were d isciplined. Mark and two deputy clerks were suspended without pay , and

2 M ark also asserted claim s f o r m e n a c e an d o u trag e. B e cau se th o se claim s are tan tam o u n t to in ten tio n al in f lictio n o f em o tio n a l d istress, w e in clu d e an y f u rth er d iscu ssio n o f t h em in o u r d iscu ssio n o f M a rk ’s in ten tio n al-in f lictio n -o f -em o tio n al-d istress claim

. S ee Jo n es v. C ity o

f H a ttiesb u r g , 2 2 8 S o . 3 d 8 1 6 , 8 1 9 n .1 (M iss. C t. A p p . 2 0 1 7 ).

2another deputy clerk was f ired. M ark was also ordered to pay the City $300 in restitution f or her alleged involvem ent in waiving the expungem ent f ee. 3 ¶4. M ark f

i led a grievance letter with h er supervisor, Hattiesburg Police Ch i e f F r a z i e r Bolton, in which she contested the disciplinar y action against her and denied any wrongdoing. Af

ter Chief B olton upheld her suspension, Mark a p pealed the decision to the May o r, who also upheld her suspension. Despite the f indings o f t he internal investigation and M ark’s at-will e m

p loy m ent status, the May o r chose n ot to term inate M ark. Instead, in January 2013, the May or r e assigned Mark t o the housing d epartm ent and appointed her the departm ent’s coordinator f or f ederal and state program s. ¶5. In J une 2013, Mark sued the C ity , the May o r, and the City C ouncil ( collectively , the Appellees) and asserted various claim s of action. Specif ically , Mark alleged that, d uring the

sum m er a nd f

all of 2012, while she was ill and recovering f rom b reast cancer, the Appellees slandered her and violated her right to privacy

. According to Mark, the Ap p e l l ees (1) publicly characterized her, via num erous m e dia outlets, as a crim i nal, a corrupt individual, and incom

petent; (2) wrongly released her personal m e dical inf orm ation to the public; and (3) ignored the grievance she f iled f ollowing her suspension. ¶6. In response to Mark’s allegations, the Appellees f iled a sum m ary -judgm ent m otion. The circuit court granted sum m ary judgm ent f

o r the City

but denied it as to the May or and the City Council. In J u l y 2 0 1 6 , t h e circuit c ourt conducted a f i ve-day jury trial o n Mark’s

3 M ark co n f

irm ed at trial th at sh e n ev er p aid th e C ity th e $ 3 0 0 in restitu tio n . 3claim s of slander, i nvasion of privacy , and intentional i nf liction of em otional distress against the City Council and the May or in their individual capacities. A t t he c l ose of Mark’s case-inchief , the May or and the City Council m oved f or a directed verdict. Af

ter considering the evidence a nd the parties’ argum ents, the circuit court granted the di r e c t e d

- verdict m otion. Mark f i led several unsuccessf

ul m otions f

or posttrial relief

. Aggrieved, Mark appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶7. W e review de novo the circuit court’s grant of t he City ’ s sum m ary -judgm ent m otion and t he May or and the City Council’s directed-verdict m otion. See I l l

. C ent. R.R. Co. v. Brent , 1 3 3 S o . 3 d 760, 767 (¶12) (Miss. 2 013). Although m ade at dif f e r ent stages of the proceedings, both m otions challenge the suf f iciency of the e vidence a n d argue the m ovant is entitled to a judgm ent as a m a t t e r o f law. Denbury O nshore LLC v
. Precision W elding
Inc. , 98 So. 3d 449, 452 ( ¶¶10-11) (Miss. 2012); Breland v. Gulfside Casino P’ship , 736 So. 2d 446, 448 (¶¶15-16) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). W h en reviewing such m o tions, w e view the evidence in the light m ost f avorable to the n onm oving p a r t y . Breland , 736 So. 2d at 448 (¶16). Sum m ary judgm ent is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, a n swers to interrogatories and a dm issions on f

ile, together with the af

f idavits, if any , show that t here is no genuine issue as to any m aterial f

act

. . . .” M.R.C.P. 5 6(c). A directed verdict i s appropriate “when the [ n onm ovant]’s evidence is so lacking that reasonable jurors would be unable to reach a verdict in f

avor of that party .” Ground Control LLC v. Capsco Indus. Inc. , 2 14 So. 3d 232, 242 (¶35) (Miss. 2017) (internal quotation m ark om itted).

4DISCUSSION

I. The City ’s Sum m a ry -Judgm ent Motion ¶8. Mark f

irst argues that the circuit court e r r o n e o u s l y g r a n t e d t h e C ity sum m ary judgm ent.

a. Em ploy m ent ¶9. Mark appears to raise no d i spute as to h er status a s a n at-will em ploy ee. 4 She asserts, however, that the City deprived her of a grievance h earing in accordance w ith t he em ploy ee handbook and that her reassignm e nt to the housing d epartm ent “convey ed the im pression to the public that she was being punished” f or conduct she denied perf o rm ing. ¶10. The City ’s em

ploy ee hand b o o k d i r e c t e d t h e M a y o r to m e et with an aggrieved

em ploy e e “within three (3) working day s of r eceiving the grievance” and to p rovide a written
response to the grievance “within f ive (5) working day s af

ter t hat m eeting.” The handbook
f urther explained t h at the tim e l im it f or the appeal process could be e x tended with the parties’ written consent. Af ter C h i e f B o lton upheld her suspension without pay , Mark requested by letter dated Septem ber 23, 2012, that t he May or f orm ally respond to her grievance. In his response dated Septem ber 25, 2012, the May or acknowledged h is receipt of Mark’s request. The May or f urther stated that he was a ware of Mark’s health issues. As

4 U n d er M ississip p i’s em p lo y m en t-at-w ill d o c t rin e, “eith er th e e mp l o y e r o r th e em p lo y ee m ay term in ate th e em p lo y m en t relatio n sh ip at w ill u n less t h e p arties are b o u n d b y an em p lo y m en t co n tract o r a co n tract p ro v id i n g f o r a t erm o f em

p lo y m e n t.” C o llin s v. C ity o f N ew to n , 2 4 0 S o . 3 d 1 2 1 1 , 1 2 1 6 -1 7 (¶1 4 ) (M iss. 2 0 1 8 ) (q u o tin g S en sen ey v
. M

i ss. P o w er C o
. , 9 1 4 S o . 2 d 1 2 2 5 , 1 2 2 8 (¶8 ) (M iss. C t . A p p . 2 0 0 5 )). 5a result, the May or asked Mark to contact h i s a d mi n i strative assistant t o schedule a

convenient tim e to discuss her grievance. ¶11. On October 9 , 2012, the May or m ailed M ark another letter acknowledging that he had received her “letter of October 5, 2012, concerning scheduling an appointm ent tim e to m eet.” The May or provided that he expected to hear f rom Mark whenever she was ready to schedule the appointm ent. The f

ollowing m onth, by letter dated Novem b er 13, 2012, the May or wrote
t h a t h e h ad attem

pted to schedule a m eeting b ut that Mark had been unavailable. W hile
convey ing t o Mark his c o ntinued wishes f or her recovery , the M ay or com m unicated his desire t o c o mp l e te t he grievance process as soon as possible. T he May or theref ore again asked M ark to contact his a dm inistrative as s i s t ant between Novem ber 1 3, 2012, and
Novem ber 26, 2012, to schedule a m eeting. At trial, the May or testif ied t hat he attem

pted

to com ply with the City ’ s e m

ploy ee handbook a nd provide Mark with a grievance hearing. Despite his r epeated r equests that Mark call t o schedule a convenient t im e to m eet, however, she never did so. ¶12. On cross-exam ination, Mark acknowled g e d t h a t s h e received each o f the May or’s l etters. She also adm itted that she never contacted the May or’s adm inistrative ass i s t a n t t o schedule an appointm ent. I nste ad, Mark testif ied t hat she chose to hire a n attorney and
pursue l itigation. M a rk also acknowledged during cross-exam ination t hat the em ploy ee handbook provided f

or disciplinary action, up to and including term ination, f or an em ploy ee who eng a g e d i n conduct unbecom ing of a City em ploy ee. Though Mark denied any

6wrongdoing, the f i ndings of t h e police departm ent’s internal investigation led Mark’s supervisors to suspend h e r and two other e m ploy ees and to f

ire a f ourth e m ploy ee. Because Mark was an at-will e m

ploy ee, the May or could have term inated her em ploy m ent. Instead, the May or chose to reassign her. ¶13. Based on the e vidence i n the record, we f i nd no s upport f

or Mark’s assertions that the City im properly denied her a grievance hearing and wrongf u lly transf erred her. W e theref

ore

a f f i r m t h e circuit court’s g rant of sum m ary judgm ent t o the City on Mark’s e m ploy m entrelated issues.
b. Intentional and Malice-Based Claim s ¶14. Mark a l s o a s s e r t e d c l a i ms a g a i nst the City f or slander, i nvasion of privacy , and intentional inf

liction of em otional d i s tress. The M ississippi Tort Claim s Act (MTCA) provides governm ental entities i m m unity “ f o r any conduct of its em

ploy ee if t he em

ploy ee’s conduct constituted f

raud, m alice, libel, slander, def am ation[ ,] or any crim i nal of f ense other

t h a n t r a f f i c violations.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-5 (Rev. 2012). Thus, the City clearly possessed im m

unity f rom Mark’s slander claim

. In a d dition, t o the extent Mark based her

rem aining claim s on the alleged m alicious c onduct of City em ploy ees, the MTCA clearly bars those claim s against the City as w ell. S ee J ones , 228 So. 3d at 819 (¶9). Malice-based

torts “are not within the c ourse and scope of em ploy m ent” and f

a ll “outside t he scope of the
MTCA’s waiver of im m

u nity

. . . .” Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Oliver , 235 So. 3d 75, 82 (¶30) (Miss. 2017). Litigation against governm ent em ploy e es f or these intentional torts m ust

7theref

ore proceed against them

in their individual rather than of f icial capacity

. Id. ¶15. In considering whether to grant sum m ary judgm ent, t he c ircuit court f ound that Mark, in her desire f

or a jury trial, had i n d e ed f ram ed her claim s against the City in term s of intentional and m a licious acts com m itted by the May or a nd the City Council. As a result, the circuit court granted the C ity sum m ary j udgm e nt but allowed M a r k t o proceed with her cl a i ms against the May or a nd the City Council in their individual capacities. Because we f ind no e rror in the circuit court’s grant o f s um m ary judgm ent to t h e City on Mark’s intentional and m alice-based claim s, we af f irm

.

c. Negligence-Based Claim s ¶16. As an alternative to her argum e nt that the Appellees intentionally inf licted em otional distress on her, Mark asserted bef o re the c ircuit court that the Appellees’ conduct am ounted

to n egligence and negligent i n f l i c t i on of em o tional distress. “Though the MTCA perm its negligence a ctions against a governm ental entity , t o challenge the v iability of a governm ental
actor’s im m

u nity under the MTCA, a plaintif f m ust f irst s tate a valid claim upon which relief

m ay be granted.” Horton ex rel. Estate of Erves v. City o f Vicksburg , No. 2016-IA-01595- SCT, 2018 W L 2439659, at * 3 (Miss. May 3 1, 2018). “ It i s only af te r t h e plaintif

f has established a prim a f

a cie case against the entity that the MTCA and its im m unity provision will be addressed.” Id. ¶17. To establish a c laim o f negligence, Mark had to show (1) the duty owed to h er by the City ; (2) a breach of t hat d uty ; (3) dam ages; and (4) “ a causal connection b etween the breach

8and the d am ages, such that the breach [ was] the proxim ate cause of [ her] injuries.” Sharrieff

v. DBA Auto. Two LLC , 2 4 2 So. 3d 944, 947 (¶9) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2018). As f or her negligent-inf

l iction-of -em otional-distress claim , Mark w as r equired “to ple a d and prove

som e sort of injury or d e mo n s t r a b le harm , whether it be phy s i cal or m ental, a n d t hat harm

m ust have been reasonably f oreseeable to t he def

endant.” O rr v
. Morgan , 230 So. 3d 368,
377 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) ( internal quotation m arks om itted). “To withstand sum m ary judgm ent, the party opposing the m otion m ust present s uf

f i cient proof to establish each elem ent of

each claim .” Sharrieff

, 242 So. 3d at 947 (¶9). ¶18. As previously discussed, the circuit court c oncluded t hat, a lthough Mark asserted an alternative argum ent based on negli g e nce, she had actually presented her issues in the context of intentional acts. 5 S ubstantial credible evidence supports the circuit court’s conclusion on this issue. Furtherm ore, even af ter viewing the evidence in the light m ost f avorable to Mark,

we f i nd she f a i l e d t o e s t a blish the essential elem ent of dam ages to prove her negligencebased claim s. Despite Mark’s various allegations against the Appellees, she f ailed to of

f er

5 I n its s u m m ary -j u d g m en t m o tio n , th e C ity asserted th at th e e x c lu siv e-rem ed y p ro v isio n o f th e M ississip p i Wo rk ers’ C o m p en sat i o n A c t ( th e A ct) b a rred M ark ’s n eg lig en ce-b ased claim s ag ain st it. S e e P etty v. B a

p tist M em ’ l H ea lth C a re C o rp
. , 1 9 0 S o . 3 d 1 7 , 2 5 (¶2 7 ) (M iss. C t

. A p p . 2 0 1 5 ) (reco g n izin g th at, ab sen t ev id en ce o f “th e em p lo y er’s d elib erate in ten t an d d esig n to in j u re th e e m

p l o y e e,” th e A ct’s ex clu siv ity p r o v isio n b arred th e em p lo y ee’s n e g lig en t -in f

lictio n -o f -em o tio n al-d istress claim ). O n a p p eal, h o w ev er, th e A p p e llees m ak e n o m en t io n o f th is arg u m en t i n th eir ap p e l late b rief

. F u rth er, a s th e circu it co u rt ex p lain ed at trial, it d ism issed th e C ity f ro m th e litig atio n b e cau se M ark f ram ed h er claim s in term s o f i n t en t io n al an d d elib erate acts. We th eref o re co n f in e o u r ru lin g o n th is issu e to t h e r e a s o n i n g p r o v id ed b y th e circu it c o u rt f o r its d ecisio n an d t o th e arg u m en ts raised b y th e A p p ellees’ ap p ellate b rief

. 9substantial proof of any i njury o r dem onstrable harm , whe t h e r phy sical or m ental, arising

f rom t he Appellees’ conduct. S ee Orr , 230 So. 3d at 377 (¶23). M a r k t e stif ied the Appellees’ conduct devastated h er, caused her to n ot w ant to see visitors, resulted in a loss of appetite and weight, and m a de her phy sically ill. However, she presented no evidentiary support f or h e r claim s of phy sical and m ental i njury a rising f rom the Appellees’ conduct.
W i thout proof of the e ssential elem ent of dam ages, Mark could n ot create a genuine issue of

m aterial f act suf f icien t t o s u r vive the City ’s sum m ary -judgm ent m otion. Theref ore, with regard to Mark’s negligence-based c l aim s, we also a f f irm the circuit court’s grant of

sum m ary judgm ent to the City

. II. The May or and the City Council’s Directed-Verdict Motion ¶19. Af ter granting the City sum m a ry judgm ent, the circuit court allowed Mark t o proceed

to trial on her claim s of (1) slander, (2) invasion of privacy , and (3) intentional inf liction of

em otional distress against the May or and the City Council in their individual capacities. On appeal, Mark argues the c ircuit c ourt erroneously g ranted the May or and the City Council a directed verdict on these claim s.

a. Slander ¶20. Mark argues the May o r and the City Council slandered h er and injured her reputation by (1) characterizing all clerks, includi n g h e r , a s having engaged i n m isconduct; (2)

m entioning “cl erk num

b er 4,” which she claim s specif ically ref erred to her; and (3) identif y ing her by her m edical-leave f orm , which she s t at e s was attached to the police

1 0departm ent’s internal-af f airs report that Councilm an Bradley released to the m edia. ¶21. “Slander is the spoken f o rm of the tort of def

am ation.” W

eible v
. U niv. of S. Miss. , 89 So. 3d 51, 65 (¶43) (Miss. C t. App. 2011). “The question whether said-to-be-of f ending words are def

a m atory m ay be decided by the [ c]ourt w ithout s ubm ission to t he trier of f act.” Chalk v. Bertholf

, 980 So. 2d 290, 296 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2007). To successf ully prove slander , a plaintif

f m ust prove: “(a) a f

a l se statem ent that has the capacity to i njure the plaintif f ’s reputation; ( b) an unprivileged publication, i.e., com m u nication to a third party ; (c) negligence or g r eater f ault on part of publisher; and (d) either actionability of statem ent irrespective of special harm or existence of special harm caused by p ublication.” C ollins v. City of Newton , 240 So. 3 d 1211, 1 222 (¶35) (Miss. 2018). As our caselaw e stablishes, “the words used m

ust have been clearly di r e cted a t the plaintif f [ ,] and the def

a m ation m

ust be clear and unm istakable f rom the words them selves and not the product o f i n n u e n do, speculation[ ,] or conjecture.” C halk , 980 So. 2d at 296 (¶12). ¶22. Following c o m

plaints of alleged m isconduct in the m unicipal-court sy stem , the police departm ent launched its int e r n al investigation. The City ’s attorney prepared an executive

sum m ary of the Departm ent’s f indings f or th e M a y o r, who then p rovided t he d ocum ent to the City Council. T h e d ocum ent discussed th e mi s c o n duct allegations m ade against the

m unicipal-court em

ploy ees. Although l ater m ade available to the p u b lic, the executive

sum m ary never ref

erenced a ny one specif

ically when discussing the allegations. The docum ent instead ref

erenced the m

unicipal-court em

ploy ees as an entire group. The sam e

1 1applied to a letter the City C ouncil signed and sent to the May or on Septem ber 18, 2012. The City Council’s letter a ddressed the need f or transparency

and decisive action regarding the allegations. However, the letter only ref erenced the m

unicipal-court em

ploy ees as a whole and never ref

e rred to any

specif ic em p loy ees. ¶23. In response to m edia questions about the reported m isconduct, t he M ay or and the City Council discussed the f

indings o f the police d epartm ent’s in t e r n a l investigation. Mark introduced into evidence a video com pilation of the May or’s and the City Council’s rem arks in r esponse to t h e me dia questions. W hile the May or and t he City Council ref erenced the entire group of clerks as a whole, the r ecording f ailed to s h ow that they ever s landered Mark by m aking f

alse statem ents about her or b y specif ically ref erencing her b y her nam e or position as the m

unicipal-court clerk. W e also f ind no evidence to s u

pport Mark’s assertion that the May or or City

Council m entioned “clerk num ber 4” or that “clerk num ber 4” even ref erred to M ark. U pon review, we f ind no m erit to Mark’s assertion that t h e s e p u b l i c

com m ents regarding the clerks as an entire group som e how specif ically slandered her. ¶24. In addition, Mark argues the May o r a n d the City Council identif ied her by the release

o f h e r m edical-leave f

o rm , which she claim s they tied t o a nother publicly disclo s e d document. Councilm a n Bradley testif ied that he inadvertently disclosed M ark’s m edicalleave f orm when he p rov i d e d t h e m edia a copy of the police departm e nt’s internal-af f airs

r eport without realizing that Mark’s m edical-leave f orm was attached to the back o f t h e report. Mark’s one-page m edical-le a v e f o r m showed her request f or tim e of

f work f or

1 2breast-cancer surgery . Although the disclo s ure of Mark’s m e dical-leave f orm m ay have been regrettable, we f

ind n o evidence that t he disc l o s u r e w a s actually def am atory

. Mark never alleged t he d ocum ent was f alse, and we cannot see how its d isclosure in any way injured her. ¶25. Mark also appears to take issue with the public disclosure of the two-page internalaf f airs report t o which her m edical-leave f orm w as a ttached. W e n ote, however, that neither party subm itted the report into evidence. As a result, we have no w ay to determ ine whether the report was indeed def am atory

. ¶26. Because Mark f

ailed to provide any evidence that the May or or the City Council m ade
f alse or def

am atory statem e nts about h er that were injurious to her reputation, we af f irm the circuit court’s grant of

a directed verdict to the May or and the City Council on this claim

. b. Invasion of Privacy ¶27. Invasion of p rivacy includes the f our f ollowing “distinct and separate sub-torts”: (1) “[ t]he i ntentional intrusion upon the solitude o r seclusi o n o f a n o ther”; (2) “[ t]he appropriation of another’s identity f or an u nperm itted u se”; (3) “[ t]he p ublic disclosure of private f acts”; and (4) “[ h ]olding another to the public ey e in a f alse light.” W

illiamson ex rel. W i lliamson v. Keith , 786 So. 2d 390, 396 (¶24) (Miss. 2001). ¶28. Although Mark asserts the conduct of the M ay or and t he City Council triggered all
f our sub-torts, her argum ents seem to f ocus m ainly on “[ t]he public d isclosure of private f acts

. . . .” Id. “‘One who publicizes a m atter concerning the private lif e o f another is subject to liability if the m a tter p ublicized ( a) would be highly of f ensive to a reasonable person, and (b)

1 3is not of legitim ate concern to the public.’” Grey v. To w n o f T e rry , 196 So. 3 d 211, 220 (¶34) (Miss. C t. App. 2016) ( q u o ting W illiamson ex rel. W

i lliamson , 786 So. 2d at 396 (¶25)). ¶29. Mark argues the May or and the City C ouncil invaded her p rivacy by disclosing (1) the City Council’s Septem

b e r 18, 2012 letter to the M ay or, ( 2) the e xecutive s um m a r y , and (3) the p olice departm ent’s internal- a f f a irs r eport with h er m edical-leave f orm attached. According t o M ark, t he May o r and the City Council acted j o i n t l y t o p ublicly r elease her conf idential personal and personnel inf orm ation. ¶30. Despite M a r k ’ s a s s e r t i o n s , w e f i n d t h at the allegations of m isconduct in the

m unicipal-court sy stem constituted a m atter of legitim ate p ublic concern. Both the City Council’s Septem

ber 18, 2012 letter and the executive sum m ary dealt with t he investigation of the allegations. Furtherm ore, neither docum ent ref erenced M ark sp e c i f

ically , let alone publicized a m atter concerning her private lif e. For these reasons, we f ind t he disclosure of these docum ents f

ails to support Mark’s invasion-of -privacy claim

. W ith regard to the internal-af

f airs report, as previously discussed, neither party entered the docume n t into evidence, and it is theref

ore not part of

the record bef

ore us. ¶31. Like the circuit court, we f i nd the only cognizable part of Mark’s invasion-of -privacy claim involved the disclosure of her m edical-leave f o rm . Even though the circuit court f ound

t h e d i sclosure to b e wrongf ul, it still concluded the disclosure was n ot actionable. Wh i l e Mark contends the disclosure was highly of f ensive to her , the applicable standard requires

1 4the m atter publicized—i.e., Mark’s breast-c ancer d iagnosis and surgery —to “be highly

o f f e n s ive to a reasonable person .” See Grey , 196 So. 3d a t 220 (¶34) ( em phasis a d d e d )

. Because we f

ind n othing to show that the disclosure of o n e ’ s b r e a st-cancer d iagnosis and
surgery would in f

act “be h i ghly of

f ensive to a reasonable person[ ,]” w e a f f irm the circuit court’s grant of

a directed verdict on this issue. 6

c. Intentional Infliction of Em otional Distress ¶32. Mark also asserts the c ircuit court erred by granting a directed verdict t o t he May or and the City Council o n her claim of i ntentional inf liction of em otional distress. T o prevail

on such a claim , “the severity of the conduct at issue m ust be so outrageous in character, and

so e xtrem e in degree, as to go bey ond all possible bounds o f decency , and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly

intolerable in a civilized com m unity .” W

eible , 8 9 So. 3d at 64 (¶41) (internal quotation m ark om itted). “Liability does not e xtend to m er e i n s u l t s, indignities, threats, annoy ances, petty oppression, o r other trivialities.” Id. at 65 (¶41) (quoting Brown v. Inter-City Fed. Bank for Sav. , 738 So. 2d 262, 265 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)). ¶33. Becau s e t h e May or transf erred Mark f

r om her position as m

unicipal-court clerk to another position with a lower salary , the circuit court v iewed the transf er as a dem o tion that

6 We f u rth e r n o te t h at, ev en if M ark in t en d e d t o k eep h er m ed ical co n d itio n relativ ely p riv a te, th e reco rd ref

l ects th at sh e w as p laced o n a c h u rch p ray e r list im m ed iately f o llo w i n g h er su rg ery a n d t h at o th er C i ty em p lo y ees, in clu d in g th e M ay o r, learn ed o f h er d iag n o sis an d su rg e ry . In f

act, in h i s v ario u s l etters to M ark ab o u t sch ed u lin g an a p p o in tm en t to ad d ress h er g riev an c e, th e M ay o r ex ten d ed h is sy m p ath y f o r M ark ’s d iag n o sis an d h is w i sh es f o r h er reco v ery . 1 5brought Mark’s claim into the em ploy m ent r ealm

. Although Mark claim e d t hat, f or over six

m onths, the A p p e l l e es acted in an “incessant, continuous, and unrelenting” “pattern of conduct” that devastated her, Mark agreed o n cross-exam ination t hat she nev e r s o u g h t or received m edical treatm ent r elated to the Appellees’ alleged conduct. Mark also agreed that the May or and the City

Council never said or did any t hing negative to h er d irectly and that she only based her inf

orm ation on what she saw in the m e d ia. Af ter considering the evidence and testim ony , the circuit court f ound no proof o f a pa t t e r n of deliberate and repeated harassm ent. According to the circuit court, there w a s no “ evidence whatsoever that any conduct b y any [ Appellee] was so extrem e in d egree as to be bey ond all possible bounds of decency ” o r to be “atrocious and utterly intolerable.” Even viewing the e vidence in the light

m ost f a vorable t o M ark, w e can f ind no evidence to support h er claim of intentional inf liction of e m otional distress. As a result, we a f f irm the circuit court’s grant o f a directed verdict on this issue.
CONCLUSION ¶34. Because we f

i nd no error in the circuit court’s grant of s u m m ary judgm e nt to the City and grant of

a directed verdict to the May or and the City Council, we af

f irm

. ¶35. AFFIRMED. GRIFFIS, C.J., B ARNES AND C ARLTON, P .JJ., AND GREENLEE, J., CONCUR. WILSON, J., C O N C U R S IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WESTBROOKS, M cD O N ALD, L AWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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