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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-1410

U N I T E D S TAT E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v

.

M A R T I N J. J O N A S S E N , Defen dant-Appellant

.

A p p e a l f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r t h e N o r t h e r n D i s t r i c t o f I n d i a n a , H a m m o n d D i v i s i o n

. N o

. 2 : 1 1 c r 1 6 3

- 0 0 1

— J a m e s T

. M o o d y , J u d g e

.

A R G U E D F E B R U A R Y 20, 2014

— D E C I D E D J U L Y 16, 2014

Before E A S T E R B R O O K , M A N I O N , and S Y K E S , Cir cui t Judges

. S Y K E S , Cir cui t Judge

. Mar tin Jonass e n kidn apped hi s 21-y ear -old daughter E.J. from her home in Mis souri and too k 1 he r t o a motel i n Indi ana, where he held her again st her wi ll

A p s e u d o n y m

. 12 No. 13-1410

a nd sexually assau lted her

. On the thi rd day of her capti vity , E.J. managed to escape and w as seen fleeing naked from the motel, ro pe sti ll tied aro und her leg, desperately screaming for help. Jonass en chas ed her thro ugh the street and into a nearby li quor stor e, and after a violent strugg le, recaptured her

. Polic e respondi ng to the scen e arr ested him in the li quor stor e p a r k i ng lot. E.J. described the or deal to poli ce, and Jonasse n faced s erious federal felony charg es. Almost i mmedi ately after he w as arr ested, Jonass en began

a concerted effort t o get E.J. to recant. She di d not do so, but the i nti mi dation w as suc cess ful in the sens e that i t made her

unav ai lable as a wi tness. Although she had cooper ated wi th the government wh en Jonass en w as indi cted and t hrougho ut the pret rial peri od, she suddenly clammed up when cal led to testif y at tr i al, sayi ng “I don’ t r e me mber” (or something equi v alent) i n response to all of the prosecutor ’s questi ons. The government mov ed to admi t her statements to p olic e under Rule 804(b) (6) of the Federal R ules of Evi dence, whi ch allows admi ssi on of hearsay again st a party who wrongfully procures
a wi tness’s unav ai labi li ty

. The di stric t co ur t gr anted the

mo tion. The jury convic ted Jonass en of kidn apping, s e e 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)( 1), and obstruction of just i ce, see id. § 1512(b) (1), and the court i mposed a lengthy pris on sentence. Jonass en rais es three i ssu es on appeal. First, he arg ues that the di st ri ct court should hav e conduc ted a competency hearin g under 18 U.S.C. § 424 1

. S econd, he challen ges the court’s deci si on to admi t E.J .’s prior statements u nder Rul e 804(b) (6). Fin ally , he argues that t he court er red in denyi ng h i s posttr i al motion regar ding Jencks Act material

. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500.No. 13-1410 3

W e rej ect these a r g um ents and affi rm. The di stric t court proper ly declined to conduc t a competency hearin g. Although Jonass en asserted biza r r e l egal theor i es based on hi s clai m of “sov ereign citi zen ship,” that alone does not prov i de a reason to doubt hi s competence to stand tr i al, and the recor d does not other wi se suggest that he lacked the abi li ty to understand the proceedings. The court’s evidenti ary ruli ng also w as sound. The government lai d an ample foundati on for admi ssi on of the hearsay statements under Rule 804(b) (6); the evidenc e establi shed that Jonass en used bribery , gui lt, and v arious forms of psychologic al i nti mi dation to procure E.J.’s unav ai labi li ty

. Fin ally , becau se Jonass en di d not request Jencks Act ma t e r i al befo r e t he close of tr i al, hi s clai m for relief under the Act

necess arily fai ls.

I. Background E.J. w as bo r n i n Nov ember 1989 to Mar tin and Ali ce Jonass en i n the back of their fami ly v an. She led what appears to hav e been an i solated li fe; she w a s ho meschooled and had only once seen a doctor before her kidn apping. The recor d suggest s that Mar tin subjected the fami ly to harsh di sci pline and physi cal, e mo t i onal, and sexual abus e. Her parents separated when E.J. w as y oung, and sh e ther eafter liv ed wi th her m other and three of her b ro thers on a farm near J ameson, Mis souri . Mar tinJonass en also li v ed i n the area.
On Sat urday

, Sept ember 10, 2011, Jonasse n pi cked up E.J. from the farm ostensibly to take her shopping. When E

. J. di d not ret urn as planne d for her brot her’s bi rt hday celebration, her mother began to w or ry and tr i ed uns ucc essf ully to contact4 No. 13-1410

he r

. Jonass en had driv en her to P or tage , Indi ana, where he chec ked i nto a motel on Sunday ev ening. At aro und ten-thi rt y
on Monday mornin g, tw o motel employ ees saw E.J. running naked down the motel service ro ad wi th a ro pe tied to her leg. Jonass en emerge d from the motel ro om and chas ed her on foot, pulling up hi s pants as he ran (he w a s w e aring nothin g else) before get tin g i nto hi s car to follow her

. A wi tness w ould later testify t ha t E.J. look ed li ke she w as “running for her li fe,” frantic ally dart ing thr ough tr affi c on a v ery bus y r oad. E.J. ran i nto a nearby li quor stor e screaming “help me, help
me, please help me” to the sto re clerk. Jonass en follow ed her i nto the stor e and told the clerk that hi s daughter w as on drugs. He strugg led violently to recapture her , and they fell to the gr o und, knocking ov er merchandi se in the process. Jonass en suc ceeded in ov erp o w ering hi s daughter , and he dragg ed her back to hi s car

. P or tage poli ce o ff icer s respondi ng to a 911 call about the i nci dent arr i v ed at the scen e and arr es ted Jonass en in the li quor stor e park i ng lotbefore he w as able to leav e wi th E.J. He told poli ce that he w as taking hi s daughter to Mi chi gan to prev ent her fro m dati ng a 60-y ear -old man, whom he later refer red to

as “some Hugh Hefner .” After secu ring Jonass en, offi cers then sought to assi st E.J., who w as huddled in t he back of the car crying. E.J. told Offi cer Flor a R y an that Jonass en had take n her to Indi ana ag ai nst her wi ll because he tho ug ht she w as g oin g to hav e sex wi th an older man. When aske d i f she w as r aped, she fi rst shook her head no. But she told the office r that she had been tied up i n the motel ro om and nodded when asked i f her father had sex wi th her , and the offi cer observ ed the ro peNo. 13-1410 5

sti ll aro und her ankle. After the on-sc ene int erv i ew wi th the poli ce, E.J. w as take n to the hospi tal where s he w as exami ned by nurse Jani ce Ault, who observ ed abrasi ons, cuts, a rash, and brui ses all ov er her body

. E.J. also told Ault that J onassen had take n her from her home in Mi ssouriagain st her wi ll.
The poli ce searched the mo t el ro om, whi ch w as in tot al di sarray

. There w as ro pe aro und a chai r , a nd mo r e ro pe w as found in Jonass en’s car

. A table had been m ov ed to a lo cati on consi stent wi th i t bei ng u sed to block the door

. Near t he table

w as a toilet-tan k cov er

, also apparently used as a door block. The bedding w as sub mi tte d to the Indi ana St ate Crime Lab for testing. Jonass e n’ s semen w as found on the sheets, and one stai n contained both Jonassen ’s and E.J .’s DNA.
The day after hi s arr est, Jonass en began what w ould be an ext ended campai gn to get E.J. t o ret ract her statement s t o the poli ce. Igno ring a no-contact or der prohibi tin g any commu ni

cati on wi th E.J.—inclu ding by lette r , phone, or intermediary— Jona ss e n contacted her both di rectly and thro ugh sev eral fami ly members. Over a seven-month period, Jonassen made

more t ha n 75 calls and sent 20 lette rs atte mpting to di ssu ade E.J. from testif

yin g. As the di stric t judge characterized the calls and lette rs, Jonass en v arious ly used gui lt, bribery , v ei led threat s, and other forms of psychologic al inti mi da t io n in a persi stent effort to get E.J. to recant. For exa mp l e , when speaki ng di rectly wi th E.J. on the phone, Jonass en told her that he lov ed he r and di d not w ant to spend y ears in pris on. Through multi ple chann els he offered her money (up to $14,000), a moped, and p a r t o f his proper ty in Michi gan. Hi s lette rs reiterat ed these offers, promis ed to stay out of her li fe,6 No. 13-1410

and clai med he w as being mi streat ed i n jail. H e characterized the whole epi sode as nothin g more than a fami ly spat and suggested that she w ould be bless ed for lyin g to the poli ce li ke the Jewi sh mi dwi v es who li ed to Pharaoh to sav e newborn chi ldren and Rahab who li ed to so l d iers in Jericho to prot ect Jewi sh spi es. He also offered to pay hi s sons Michael and Eli jah i f they could persuade E.J. to si gn a statement—dic tate d w or d for w or d by Jonass en—indi cati ng that she freely accompan i ed hi m to Indiana.
The U nit ed St ates Att or ney in Nort hern Indi ana indi cted Jonass en on one count of kidn apping, see 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)( 1), and one count of obstruction of justic e, s e e id. § 1512(b) (1). Jonass en w ai v ed hi s right to couns el and repr esented hi mself , although the court appoi nted atto rney John Mar tin to serv e as standby couns el. Jonass en atte mpted to mount a “sov ereign ci tizen” defense, fi ling many mot io ns asserti ng v ariati ons on thi s fri v olous lega l t he or y

. Att or ney Mar tin mov ed for a 2 competency hearin g, advis ing the court that “[a]l t hough [ Jonass en] at tim es appears to hav e rat i onal thought s concerni ng thi s matter

, more often than not hi s thought s are i rr ational and hi s thought process appears to be scramb led.” Mar tin also state d t hat Jonass en “conti nues to adv ance i rr elev ant and i nconsequ ential theor i es of d e fense instead of understanding

D e f e n d a n t s c l a i m i n g t o b e “ s o v e r e i g n c i t i z e n s ” a s s e r t t h a t t h e f e d e r a l 2
g o v e r n m e n t i s i l l e g i t i m a t e a n d i n s i s t t h a t t h e y a r e n o t s u b j e c t t o i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n

. T h e d e f e n s e h a s “ n o c o n c e i v a b l e v a l i d i t y i n A m e r i c a n l a w

. ” U n i t e d S t a t e s v. S c h n e i d e r , 9 1 0 F

. 2 d 1 5 6 9 , 1 5 7 0 ( 7 t h C i r

. 1 9 9 0 )

.No. 13-1410 7

and comprehending the tr ue nature o f the allegations and appears to lack interest in rati onal defenses .” A magi strat e judge held a hearin g on the motion and questi oned Jonassen ab out his understanding of the pr oceedi ngs. Jonass en i ndi cated that he unders to od the ch a rg es again st hi m and acknowledged that he w as facing “qui te a numb er of yea r s” i n pris on. He explain ed that he w as refusing the assi stance of couns el to av oid losing the abi li ty to assert that he

w as “a natural person, common law ci tizen” ov er whom the court lacked jurisd i cti on. He also told the judge that he had

nev er been tr eated for a ny m e n ta l

- h e a l th i s s u es. The magi strat e judge found no basi s for a competency hearin g and deni ed the motion. Mart i n fi led an objection wi th the dis tr i ct court. The di stric t c ourt addressed the atto rney’ s concerns about Jonass en’s competence dur ing a pret rial conference. After conduc tin g an ext ended colloquy wi th Jonass en and questi oni ng Mar tin

about hi s conc erns, the court concluded that ther e

w as no reasonable caus e to beli ev e that Jonass en w as sufferin g from a mental i llness that w ould prev ent hi m from under

standing the proceedings. The court reje cted the re quest for a competency hearin g, and the case mov ed forw ard to tr i al. Up to thi s poin t i n the proceedings, E.J. had been cooper ati ng wi th the government and had t alked to inves tigator s and prosecutor s on sev eral occasi ons. On the ev ening before t rial, E.J. met wi th P or tage P olic e Detecti v e Jani s Regnier , FBI Agent Matt hew Ch ica nt ek, and tw o Assi stant Uni ted St ates Att or

neys. They w ent ov er her stor y in detail in prepar ation for her tes t imo ny

. E.J. confi rmed that Jonass en had tied her up and take n her from Mis souri again st her wi ll. She also descri bed for8 No. 13-1410

the fi rst tim e the ev ents of a multi w eek tr i p she had take n wi th Jonass en to Michi gan the sum mer before the kidn a pping. During that tr i p, Jonass en made sex ual adv ances tow ard her that i nclu ded lyin g on top of her and masturbati ng in front of her

. When tr i al began t he ne xt day , how ev er

, E.J. refused to
answer any questi ons put to her by the prosecutor

. Instead, she

answered ev ery questi on wi th “I don’t remember” or “not that I kno w of” or “I don’t know what y ou are t alkin g about” o r a si mi lar phrase. She responded in thi s w ay ev en wh e n asked si mple questi ons about her age, her d a t e of bi rth, her ni ckname, and her p a r e nts’ names. When the prosecutor asked i f she w as refusing to answer becau se she feared her father , she

answered, “I ’m not afraid of anything or anybody .” In li ght of thi s unus ual dev elopment, at the end of the fi rst day of tr i al the j ud g e e xcused the jury and hear d the government’s motion to admi t E.J.’s statemen t s t o poli ce under Rule 804(b) (6) of the Feder al Rules of Eviden ce, whi ch permi ts the admi ssi on of hearsay again st a party who wrongfully procures the unav ai labi li ty of the declara nt as a wi tness. The hearin g ext ende d i nto the ev ening and continued the next mornin g. The government presented ev idence of Jonass en’s elaborat e effort to get E.J. t o recant, inclu ding the phone calls and lette rs playi ng on her e mo tions wi th gui lt, bribery , and

v arious forms of i nti mi dation. Ali ce Jonass en testifi ed about wh y E.J. w ould hav e reason to fear her father

. Speci al A g e nt Eric Field testifi ed that E.J. told hi m that she thought her father

w as facing too much tim e in pris on and that hi s tim e serv ed inNo. 13-1410 9
pret rial detention plus a ter m of probat i on should be suffi ci ent puni shm ent. Ruling on the government’s motion, the judge noted that E.J.’s testim ony w as unli ke anythin g he had seen in ov er 40 y ears on the bench

. He conclu ded that E.J.’s perfor manc e on the wi tness stand—professing a “ t o t a l lack of recall of anythin g”— ma de her unav ai lable as a wi tness wi thi n the meaning of Rule 804(a). See F E D

. R. E V I D

. 804(a)( 3) (stati ng that

a declar ant i s consi dered unav ai lable i f she “testifi es to not rememberin g the subject matt er”). He further conclu ded that Jonass en had procured E.J.’s unav ai labi li ty thro ugh wrongful acts and wi th speci fi c intent to achi ev e that result, sati sfying the cri ter i a for admi ssi on of her he a r say statements under Rule 804(b) (6).
When the jury ret urned to the courtr oom, the government i ntro duced E.J.’s prior st atements thro ugh Agent Chi cantek and Detecti v e Re gni e r

, a n d a l s o intro duced a si gned, handw ritten statement from E.J. describing her abduct io n. The rest of the government’s case consi sted of testim ony from e yew i tness es, i nv esti gato rs, Ali ce Jonass en, and Jani ce Ault, along

w i th recor dings of Jonass en’s phone calls from jail, s u rve i l l a n c e video from the li quor stor e, and phy sic a l evidenc e from the motel.
The jury convic ted Jonass en on both counts and also found by speci al v erdic t that Jonass en’s obstructiv e conduc t w as “i ntended to influence, delay , or prev ent” E.J.’s testi mony

. Foll o wing tr i al, the probat i on offi ce sub mi tte d a presentence repo rtto t he court. The repo rt refer red to E.J.’s meeting wi th prosecutor s on the ni ght before tr i al. Mor e speci fi cally ,10 No. 13-1410

t he p r obation o ffi ce r epor ted that E.J. “met wi th law enfor cement and government couns el the ni ght before she w as sch eduled to testif

y” and “gav e her most detailed sum mary to date” of the kidn apping. The repo rt w ent on to sum mari ze the i nformation sh e pro vided du ring that interv i ew

. After re v ie wing the presentence repo rt, Jonass en fi led a “motion” objecting that he had not receiv ed any repo rt or notes about thi s meetin g

. Th e motion i s capti oned “Gov

. Admi ts T

o Wi thholding Eviden ce” and i s v ague about the gr ounds for relief, but i t does clearly request a new tr i al or judgment o f acqu i ttal. The courtor dered a response from the government. The g ov ernment int erpr eted the “motion” as a Jencks Act

r e que st for a copy of any wri tte n statement prov i ded o r adopted by E.J. duri ng the meetin g. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500. The government adv i sed t he court that E.J. “di d not prov i de, and

no one else created, a wri tte n d o cument consti tuting a stateme nt by her .” The government also noted that the Assi stant Uni ted St ates Att o r ney in charge of the case w as “the only person present who too k notes duri ng t he meetin g,” and her notes w ere recor ded on a “draft di rect exami nati on outlin e” prepar ed for us e at tr i al. These notes, the government explained, w ere “privi leged atto rney w or k product rat he r than

a di scov erable wi tness statement.” Fin ally , the go ver nment explain ed that the i nformation E.J. prov i ded d ur ing the meetin g w as nei ther exculpator y nor inconsi stent wi th her prior s tate ments and thus w as not subject to di scl osure under Brady v

. Maryla nd, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v

. United States , 405 U.S. 150 (1972).No. 13-1410 11

After re ce i ving the government’s response, the judge conclu ded that the notes w e re not subject to di scl osure and deni ed Jonass en’s mo t io n for a new tr i al or judgment of acqui ttal. Sente ncing proceeded, and the judge i mposed a sentence o f 4 8 0 months on the kidn apping convic tion and a
concu rr ent ter m o f 240 months o n t he co nvic tion for obstruction of justi ce. Thi s appeal f ollow ed. 3

II. Disc uss ion A. Competency Hearing
When presented wi th a motion requestin g a co mpetency hearin g, a dis tr i ct court shall gr ant the motion

... i f ther e i s reasonable

caus e to be l iev e that the defendant may presently be sufferin g from a mental di sease or defect render i ng hi m mentally incompetent to the ext ent that he i s unabl e to understand the nature
a n d c on s e qu e n c e s of the proceedings again st hi m
or to assi st proper ly inhi s defens e. 18 U.S.C. § 4 2 4 1 (a ); see also United States v

. W ooda rd, 744 F .3d 488, 493 (7 t h Ci r

. 2014) (“A di stric t court i s not required to
or der an exami nati on or a competency hearin g unles s there i s
a bona fi de doubt that aris es as to a defendant’s competency before t rial.”)

.

J o n a s s e n a c c e p t e d t h e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l o n a p p e a l

. T h o m a s L

. S h r i n e r , 3
M i c h a e l A

. B o w e n , a n d K a t e E

. G e h l , o f F o l e y & L a r d n e r L L P , a c c e p t e d t h e
a p p o i n t m e n t

. T h e y h a v e a b l y d i s c h a r g e d t h e i r d u t i e s

.12 No. 13-1410

The di stric t jud g e deni ed Att or ney Mar tin ’s motion for a competency hearin g and did not or der one sua sponte at any poin t i n the proceedings. Jonass en arg ues t ha t the di stric t court’s tr eatment of J on a s s e n ’s c om p e te n cy wa s b ot h procedur

ally and sub stanti v ely flaw ed. Becaus e the di stric t court i s in the best posi tion to asses s the mental status of a defendant, w e
rev i ew for abus e of di screti on. United States v

. Alden , 527 F .3d 653, 659 (7th Ci r . 2008). Jonass en’s procedural arg ument i s that Mar tin ’s motion for

a competency hearin g w as denied wi thout suffi ci ent findings st a t e d on the recor d. W e di sagree. Although the magi stra t e judge’ s ruling w as cursory , the di stric t judge adequately explain ed hi s conclu si on that a co mp etency hearin g w as not
necess ary

. After a colloquy wi th Jonass en, the judge turned to Mar tin , Jonass en’s standby couns el, and questi oned hi m about the basi s for the motion and Jonass en’s relev ant perso nal hi stor y

. During thi s di scuss ion, i t becam e clear that Jonass en had no known hi stor y of ment a l illness, and Mar tin w as prim arily concerned about Jonass en’s insi stence on pursuing i di osyncratic and fri v olous legal theor i es. The judge remark ed that Jonass en’s behavi or di d not suggest that he w as sufferin g from a mental-health pro bl e m t hat w ould require a full

co mp etency ev aluati on; instead, hi s conduc t w as more li kely

ro ote d i n obstructioni sm. Although the judg e di d not make formal “findings” as such, he refe r r e d back to the colloquy wi th Jonass en and th e e x p lorat i on of standby couns el’s concerns, and stated that the f acts di d not sh ow that Jonas sen

w as i ncapab le of understanding the proceedings against hi m. A more formal ruling may hav e been preferabl e , bu t the judge’ s ruling i s not pro cedurally insu ffi ci ent.No. 13-1410 13

On the merits the di stric t court di d not abus e i ts di screti on i n declining to or der a competency hearin g. Appellate couns el arg ues that Mar tin ’s observ ations, Jonass en’s acti ons at tr i al, and the d ist r i ct judge’ s own statements duri ng tr i al created reasonable caus e to beli ev e Jonass en w as incompetent to stand tr i al, necess i tating a hearin g. Thi s a rg ument, li ke Mar tin ’s arg ume nt below

, relies heavily on Jonass en’s persi stent asserti on of a sov ereign-c i tizen defense. But w e hav e held that adherence to bi zarr e legal the or i es, whether they are “sincerely held” or “adv anced only to annoy the other side,” does not “i mply mental i nstabi li ty or concrete intellect

... so defi ci ent that tr i al i s i mpossi

ble.” United States v

. James , 328 F .3d 953, 955 (7th Ci r

. 2003); see also Alden , 527 F .3d at 659–60 (ho lding that the defendant’s “obsessio n with i rr elev ant i ssu es and hi s paranoia and di strust of the crimin a l justic e system” di d not require a di stric t court to sua sponte or der a competency hearin g). Crim in a l d e fe n d a n ts of te n in s i s t on a s s e rting defenses wi th li ttle basi s i n the law , particu larly where, as here, there i s sub stanti al evidenc e of their gui lt.
And standby couns el’s assert i ons turned out to be much

more equi v ocal than they or i gin ally seemed. For example, Mar tin acknowledged whe n questi oned by the judge that Jonass en’s behavi or could show “that he i s just being obstructioni st to some degr ee and that he i s just int entionally not di rectly answering questi ons and refusing to cooper ate

... . I thi nk i t’s

... possi

ble that he completely understands ev ery

thi ng and hi s acti ons are si mply to be obstructio nist and there fore he do es und erstand.”14 No. 13-1410

As for Jonass en’s perfor manc e at tr i al, i t’s tr ue that he often strugg led to effecti v ely questi on wi tnes se s a nd parts of hi s closing arg ument w ere stric ken. But these problems often aris e when someone wi thout legal tr aining repr esents hi mself ; the rules of evid e nce and cri minal procedure are not alw ays straightforw ard. See Gideon v

. W ainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). Consi dered as a whole, and in li ght of hi s pro se status, Jonasse n’ s conduc t at tr i al demonstrate s that he gr asped the key elements of the charges again st hi m. For e xample, he frequently asked wi tnesses wheth e r the y h a d s e e n h i s d a u ghter
cross state lines, a necess ary element of the kidn apping charge. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)( 1). He also lodged relev ant objections to hearsay and testim ony i mpli cating mari tal pr ivilege. Mor eov er , hi s intense effort before tr i al to get E.J. to si gn a statement sayi ng that she had wi llingly accompan i ed hi m to Indi ana demonstrate s that he un d e rsto od the central elements of the kidn apping charge.
Fin ally , a p p e l late couns el poin ts to tw o statements by the tr i al judge as ev i dence suggestin g t he need for a competency hearin g. First, after Jonass en made a fli ppant remark, the judge chas tis e d him by sayi ng, “I sti ll don’t know that y ou know how seri ous thi s cas e i s.” Consi dered ag ainst the backdrop of Jonass en’s other obstructioni st beha vi or , thi s statement i s more li kely the product of the judge’s frustration that Jonass en w as choosing not to take the proceedings seri ously, and not evidence that Jonass en lacked the mental capac i ty to understand them. Second, the judge suggested mi d-trial that Jo na ssen could benefit fr o m letting Mar tin step in to conduc t the defense: “Y

ou sure y ou don’t w ant [standb y co un sel] to take

ov er for y ou? He’s competent. He’s ski lled. He knows wh atNo. 13-1410 15

he’s doin g. Y

ou hav e none of those attr i butes.” Thi s statement sh o ws only that the judge thought Jonass en w ould benefi t from the help of tr ai ned co unsel—an unremarkable propo si

tion—and not that he thought Jonass en w as inc apable of understanding the pr oceedi ngs. These sni ppets from the re co r d do not establi sh that the judge abus ed hi s di screti on in declining to conduc t a competency hearin g. Jonass en had no hi stor y of mental i llness , and sub stant i al evidenc e supp or ts the judge’ s conclu si on that he

w as competent to st a nd tr i al. As Jonass en explic i tly told the court: “I’m w ell aw are of the charges and th e nature of the charges and the consequen ces.” The recor d does not establi sh reasonable caus e to beli ev e that Jonass en w as sufferin g from a mental di sease or defect that render ed hi m incompetent to stand trial. 4

J o n a s s e n ’ s o p e n i n g b r i e f o b l i q u e l y s u g g e s t s t h a t e v e n i f J o n a s s e n w a s 4

c o m p e t e n t t o s t a n d t r i a l , h e w a s n o t c o m p e t e n t t o r e p r e s e n t h i m s e l f a t t r i a l

a c c o r d i n g t o I n d i a n a v. E d w a r d s , 5 5 4 U

. S

. 1 6 4 ( 2 0 0 8 )

. J o n a s s e n ’ s r e p l y b r i e f d o e s n o t r e t u r n t o t h i s s u b j e c t , a n d J o n a s s e n ’ s c o u n s e l r e t r e a t e d f r o m t h e p o i n t a t o r a l a r g u m e n t , a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h a t E d w a r d s d o e s n o t r e q u i r e a j u d g e t o o v e r r i d e a d e f e n d a n t ’ s d e c i s i o n t o r e p r e s e n t h i m s e l f o n c e t h e d e f e n d a n t i s f o u n d c o m p e t e n t t o s t a n d t r i a l u n d e r t h e D u s k y s t a n d a r d

. S e e D u s k y v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 3 6 2 U

. S

. 4 0 2 ( 1 9 6 0 )

. R a t h e r, t h e c a s e a l l o w s t h e j u d g e “ t o i n s i s t

u p o n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n b y c o u n s e l f o r t h o s e c o m p e t e n t e n o u g h t o s t a n d t r i a l

u n d e r D u s k y b u t w h o s t i l l s u f f e r f r o m s e v e r e m e n t a l i l l n e s s t o t h e p o i n t

w h e r e t h e y a r e n o t c o m p e t e n t t o c o n d u c t t r i a l p r o c e e d i n g s b y t h e m s e l v e s

. ” E d w a r d s , 5 5 4 U

. S

. a t 1 7 8 ; s e e U n i t e d S t a t e s v. B e r r y , 5 6 5 F

. 3 d 3 8 5 , 3 9 1 ( 7 t h C i r

. 2 0 0 9 ) ( “ T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n m a y h a v e a l l o w e d t h e t r i a l j u d g e t o b l o c k [ t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s ] r e q u e s t t o g o i t a l o n e , b u t i t c e r t a i n l y d i d n ’ t r e q u i r e i t

. ” ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. B e r n a r d , 7 0 8 F

. 3 d 5 8 3 , 5 9 0 ( 4 t h C i r

. 2 0 1 3 ) , c e r t

. d e n i e d , ( c o n t i n u e d

. . . )16 No. 13-1410
B. Admiss ion of Hearsay Under Rule 804(b) (6)
Rule 804(b) (6) permi ts the admi ssi on of a hearsay s ta te m ent when i t i s “offered again st a party that wrongfully caus ed

... the d e c l a rant’s unav ai labi li ty as a wi tness, and di d so intendi n g that result.” F E D

. R. E V I D

. 804(b) (6). E.J. w as unav ai lable wi thi n the meaning of the rule becau se she “testifi e[d] to not rememberin g the subject matter .” F E D

. R. E V I D

. 804(a)( 3). T o a d mit a hearsay statement under Rule 804(b) (6), the government mus t demonstrate : “(1) that the defendant engaged or acqui esced in wrongdo i ng, (2) that the wrongdo ing w as intended to procure the declarant’s unav ai labi li ty , and (3) that the wrongdo ing di d procure the unav ai labi li ty .” United States v

. Scott

, 284 F .3d 758, 762 (7th Ci r

. 2002). Jonass en challen ges the di stric t cour t’s conclu si on that hi s wrongdo ing procured E.J.’s unav ai labi li ty

. W e rev i ew for clear er ro r

. Id

. And w e find no err or

. The recor d easi ly supp or ts the court’s conclu si on that Jonass en suc ce ssf ully procured E.J.’s

unav ai labi li ty by i nces sant pret rial mani pulati on. As w e hav e recounted, Jonass en w or ked tireless ly for sev en month s t o persuade E.J. to recant. Hi s tactic s ra ng e d fr om pleas for sympat hy to bribes. He bombarded E.J. wi th phone calls,

(

. . . c o n t i n u e d ) 4
1 3 4 S

. C t

. 6 1 7 ( 2 0 1 3 ) ( “ E d w a r d s i t s e l f r e a f f i r m e d t h a t a c o u r t m a y c o n s t i t u

t i o n a l l y p e r m i t a d e f e n d a n t t o r e p r e s e n t h i m s e l f s o l o n g a s h e i s c o m p e t e n t t o s t a n d t r i a l

. ... A t b o t t o m , E d w a r d s d o e s n o t s t a n d f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t

a s t a t e m u s t d e n y t h e r i g h t o f s e l f

- r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o a d e f e n d a n t o f q u e s t i o n a b l e m e n t a l c o m p e t e n c e o r t h a t d i s t r i c t c o u r t s m u s t c o n d u c t a n
a d d i t i o n a l ‘ E d w a r d s ’ i n q u i r y i n t o t h e c o m p e t e n c y o f e v e r y d e f e n d a n t w h o

r e q u e s t s t o p r o c e e d p r o s e

. ” )

.No. 13-1410 17

lette rs, and mess age s d e li v ered thro ugh sev eral fami ly members. All thi s effort w as in clear violati on of a court or der and di rected at a y oun g w o ma n who w as sus ceptible to hi s mani pulati on: Accordin g to Ali ce Jonassen’s t esti mony at the hearin g, E.J. had long been subjected to abus e by her father

. Th e e vi d ence ov erwhelmingly supp or ts the ju d ge ’s c on c l u s i on

. Jonass en a rgu e s th a t the e vi dence i s ci rcums tantial and thus i nadequate to supp or t the di stric t court’s conclu si on. T rue, E.J. di d not t e st i fy that her father’s acti ons led to her fei gned memory loss, and when asked whether she feare d her father , she r esponded t hat she did not fear any one or anythin g. Thi s
r e sp onse does not undermine the judge’ s r uling. The ev i dentiary foundati on fo r a dmi tting hearsay under Rule 804(b) (6) wi ll almost alw ays be cir cum stanti al, and i t w ould be odd to expect t he wi tness herself to corr obor ate it: It seems almost certain that, in a case inv olving coerci on or threat s, a wi tness who refuses to testif y at tr i al wi ll not testif

y to the act io ns p r ocuring hi s or her unav ai labi li ty

. It w ould not
serv e the goal of Rule 804(b) (6) to hold that

c i rcums tantial evidenc e cannot sup p or t a fin d in g of coercion.
Scott, 284 F .3d at 764.
Mor eov er

, fear w as not the only tactic Jonass en used—h e also playe d on E.J.’s sense o f g ui lt. He complained in g raphi c detail about being sexually assau lted and malnouri shed in jail. And E.J.’s statement to Agent Field that she thought her father had spent enough tim e behind bars suggests that tactic w as
suc cess ful. There w as mor e than enough evidenc e to supp or t18 No. 13-1410

the judge’ s conclu si on th a t J on a s s e n w rongfully procured E.J.’s

unav ai labi li ty

.

C. Jencks Material
The Jencks Act requires, on the defendant’s motion, that any statements of a government wi tness be produced after that wi tness testifi es on d ir e ct exami nati on. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b)

. Jonass en assert s that he may hav e been deni ed acces s to materials he w as enti tled to under the Act.
Before sentencing, Jonass en receiv ed a dr a ft co py of hi s presentence repo rt, whi ch refer red to notes take n by one of the prosecutor s duri ng the interv i ew wit h E

. J. the ni ght before tr i al. Jonass en fi led a cryptic motion clai ming that he w as deni ed acces s t o the notes and sho ul d be g r anted a new t rial, mi strial , acqui ttal, di smi ssal, or “di ssoluti on of thi s matter .” The government responded that the notes w ere atto rney w or k product and di d not consti tute a st a t ement of any wi tness as defined by the Je ncks Act, and were in no w ay exculpator y wi thi n the meaning of Brady and Giglio

. The g o vernment offered to produce th e notes for in camera inspec tion. The di stric t court declined the offer and deni ed Jonass en’s motion. Jonass en’s arg ument on appeal doesn’t get out of the gate

. It’ s tr ue that a presumpti on aris es in fav or of a n in camera i nspec tion i f the defendant makes “a reasonable arg ument that i f the document says what he beli ev es i t says, based on the testim ony of th e wit ness on di rect exami nati on, then i t can possi bly be used to i mpeach that wit ne ss.” United States v

. Allen , 798 F .2d 985, 994–95 (7t h C ir

. 1986). But a request forNo. 13-1410 19 Jencks Act material mus t be made before or during tr i al; the Act prov i des no posttr i al procedure or remedy

. In other 5

w or ds, the Jencks Ac t d oe s n ot p l a c e an independent obli gation

on the government to di scl ose wi tness statements

. See 1 8 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (Th e co urt shall produce wi tness statements “on motion of the defendant.”). A de fe nd ant mus t make a tim ely

r equest to tr i gge r an in camera inspec tion and, i f w arr a nt e d , production o f the documents. See United States v

. Fragoso , 978 F .2d 896, 899 (5th Ci r

. 1992) (“If the defense makes a tim ely request and there i s some indi cati on in t he r ecord that the materials meet the Jencks Act’s defini tion o f a statement, the di stric t court has a duty to inspec t the documents in camera.”). A reques t made after the jury has render ed i ts v erdic t i s not t imely

. See United States v

. Clay, 495 F .2d 700, 709–10 (7t h C ir

. 1974); United States v

. Petito , 671 F .2d 68, 73–74 (2d Ci r

. 19 8 2 ). Absent a preex i sti ng agr eement wi th the government concerni ng di scl o su r e of wi tness statements, see, e.g. , United States v

.

J o n a s s e n ’ s a p p e l l a t e c o u n s e l s t a t e d a t o r a l a r g u m e n t t h a t i t i s “ p o s s i b l e ” 5 J o n a s s e n m a d e a b r o a d r e q u e s t f o r J e n c k s m a t e r i a l d u r i n g t r i a l

. C o u n s e l w a s

r e f e r r i n g t o o n e o f 4 0 a r g u m e n t s l o d g e d b y J o n a s s e n i n a n o r a l m o t i o n f o r j u d g m e n t o f a c q u i t t a l m a d e a t t h e c l o s e o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s c a s e :

P e r

... F e d e r a l R u l e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e 3 5 0 0 ( a ) [ , ] n o

s t a t e m e n t o r r e p o r t m a d e b y p r o s p e c t i v e w i t n e s s e s s h a l l b e t h e s u b j e c t o f s u b p o e n a o r d i s c o v e r y o r i n s p e c t i o n u n t i l

s a i d w i t n e s s h a s t e s t i f i e d o n d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n s [ ]

— t h a t ’ s
a d i r e c t q u o t e t o a l l m y s t o l e n p a p e r s y e s t e r d a y t h a t w e p l a y e d w i t h f o r t h r e e h o u r s

. J o n a s s e n d o e s ( i n a c c u r a t e l y ) c i t e t o t h e J e n c k s A c t a n d r e c i t e s o m e o f i t s t e x t

. H o w e v e r, h e i s c l e a r l y r e f e r r i n g t o p a p e r s o f h i s o w n t h a t h e w a n t e d b a c k , n o t t o s t a t e m e n t s b y a n y p a r t i c u l a r g o v e r n m e n t w i t n e s s

.20 No. 13-1410

McKenzie, 768 F .2d 602, 609 (5 t h C ir

. 1985), a Jencks motion

mus t be made after the relev a nt wi tness testifi es on di rect exami nati on and at a mini mum before the close of evidenc e, see Un i te d S tates v

. Knapp , 25 F .3d 451, 461 (7th Ci r

. 1994); United States v. Carter

, 613 F .2d 256, 261 (10th Ci r

. 1979) (holding that defendant fai led to make a tim ely asserti on of hi s rights under t he Je ncks Act when he requested the materials before tr i a l , whi ch w as t oo early

, and ag ain aft er tr i al, whi ch w as t oo late, but not during trial after the re lev ant wi tness testi fi ed).
The Jencks A ct prov i des for di scl osure of wi tness statements that can be used to cross-examine gove rnm e n t w i tnesses at trial

. There can be no err or in refusing to or der their production, much less refusing to inspec t them in camera, when the i ni tial request i s made after t r i al has conclu ded. See Clay, 495 F .2d at 709– 1 0 (“Becau se the defendants could only proper ly us e [an alleged Jencks] statement to i mpeach the te sti mony of [the wi tness] duri ng cross-examinati on, the motion for producti on m ade at the conclu si on of the tri al w as not t i mely

. Therefore , w e find no error in the c ourt ’s deni al of the motion.”). Nor does the Jencks Act prov i de a remedy o f a

new tr i al on an unti mely motion. In short, Jonass en mi ssed hi s chanc e to request Jencks statements by fai ling to do so duri ng tr ia l , and t he di stric t court di d not err in r efus ing to gr ant hi s unti mely motion.
Ev en i f t he notes qualif ie d as Jencks A ct material and had been r equested i n a ti mely fashi on, fai lure to di scl ose them at the conclu si on of E.J.’s di rect exami nati on cannot hav e been prej udi ci al. Jonass en has not explain ed how he could possi bly hav e used any statement of hers to hi s adv a nt a g e

. It i sNo. 13-1410 21

unc ontested that E.J.’s stor y the ni ght before tr i al w as entirely i ncu lpat o ry and consi stent wi th her prior statements. The amnesi ac nature of E

. J. ’s testim ony made i mpeach ment by Jonass en counterpr oducti v e. Sim ply put, E.J.’s effecti v e refu sal to testif y w as the best outcome Jonass en could hav e hoped for

. In sum, to rais e the pr e su mp t i on in fav or of an in camera i nspec tion, Jonass en had to make both a t ime l y request for Jencks Act material and a reasonable arg ument that i f the notes sai d what he beli ev ed they sai d, they could possi bly hav e been used to i mpeachE.J.’s testi mony . He di d nei ther

. A F F I R M E D

.