J-S64020-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JEFFREY PELKOFER,

Appellant No. 408 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered February 19, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0003262-2009

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and LAZARUS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2014

Appellant, Jeffrey Pelkofer, appeals from the order of the trial court 

denying his motion for the removal of sex offender registration 

requirements. For the reasons that follow, we reverse. 

On February 1, 2010, Appellant entered a negotiated plea to one count 

of statutory sexual assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1. At the time of his plea, the 

registration of sex offenders was governed by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9791 et. seq., 

colloquially known as “Megan’s Law.” Pursuant to that law, offenders 

convicted of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1 were not subject to a registration 

requirement.

New statutory provisions regarding the registration of sex offenders 

became effective on December 20, 2012. These provisions, known as the 

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799 
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et seq., required individuals convicted of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1 to register as a 

sex offender. Appellant remained on probation at the time SORNA became 

effective and, thus, was subject to this new registration requirement.

This Court issued an en banc decision on December 12, 2013, holding 

that a defendant who negotiated for non-registration as a term of their plea 

bargain was entitled to specific performance of that bargain. See 

Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 276 (Pa. 2014). On February 10, 2014, 

Appellant filed a motion seeking an order excluding him from sex offender 

registration requirements pursuant to this Court’s holding in Hainesworth.

1

 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant construed this pleading as a “Motion to Enforce Terms of Plea 

Agreement / Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” We have held that such 

pleadings are not PCRA petitions:

We note that the within petition is not an attack on Appellant's 

sentence, nor is he alleging that he is innocent of the offenses of 

which he was convicted. Appellant is not asserting that his 

conviction or sentence resulted from a violation of the 

Constitution, ineffective assistance of counsel, an unlawfullyinduced plea, obstruction by government officials of his right to 

appeal, newly-discovered evidence, an illegal sentence, or a lack 

of jurisdiction. In short, we agree with Appellant that his claim 

does not fall within the scope of the PCRA and should not be 

reviewed under the standard applicable to the dismissal of PCRA 

petitions. Furthermore, it is not subject to the PCRA's time 

constraints, and hence, we have jurisdiction to entertain it. 

Commonwealth v. Partee, 86 A.2d 245, 247 (Pa. Super. 2014).
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The trial court denied this motion on February 19, 2014. Appellant filed a 

timely appeal, raising the following claims for our review:

1. Did the PCRA/Trial Court err[] in dismissing Appellant's 

Motion to Enforce Terms of Plea Agreement/Petition for PostConviction Collateral Relief, without an evidentiary hearing, 

which sought to enforce Appellant's 2010 plea agreement 

with the Commonwealth, where the Commonwealth withdrew 

charges that would have required Appellant to register as a 

sex offender, permitting Appellant to then plead guilty to one 

charge that did not require him to register as a sex offender?

2. Did the PCRA/Trial Court err[] in dismissing Appellant's 

Motion to Enforce Terms of Plea Agreement/Petition for PostConviction Collateral Relief where Appellant pleaded guilty to 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1, where SORNA only requires 

registration of those convicted of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3122.1(a)(2)?

Appellant’s claims in the instant appeal have been mooted by a 

subsequent amendment to SORNA relieving Appellant of a duty to register, 

as conceded in the Commonwealth’s brief. See Commonwealth’s brief at 

10, 12. Accordingly, the Commonwealth also asks this Court to reverse the 

trial court’s order. 

On March 14, 2014, SORNA was amended, retroactive to December 

20, 2012. This amendment removed individuals convicted of 18 Pa.C.S. § 

3122.1, who had been convicted between January 23, 2005 and December 

19, 2012, from the class of individuals required to register as sex offenders. 

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(3.1). Appellant clearly falls into this class of 

individuals. Consequently, he is now statutorily exempt from registration. 

As such, we reverse the trial court’s order on the basis of this statutory 
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authority, and direct that Appellant no longer be required to register as a 

sex offender. 

Order reversed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/22/2014