Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-2722 | April 25, 2019 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Edward L. Murphy, Jr.

Lauren R. Deitrich

ROTHBERG LOGAN & WARSCO LLP

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

WRECKS, INC.

Thomas F. O’Gara

James R. A. Dawson

TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Amy D. Martin,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Lawrence A. Maurer, et al.,

Appellees-Defendants.

April 25, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CT-2722

Appeal from the Boone Circuit 

Court

The Honorable J. Jeffrey Edens, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

06C01-1711-CT-1414

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CT-2722 | April 25, 2019 Page 2 of 8

Case Summary

[1] Amy D. Martin (“Martin”) filed a declaratory action naming as defendants her 

ex-husband Lawrence A. Maurer (“Maurer”)1 and Wrecks, Inc. (“Wrecks”). 

Wrecks moved to dismiss, asserting—inter alia—dismissal was proper under 

Trial Rule 12(B)(8) because the same action was pending in a different court. 

The trial court dismissed the action, citing Rule 12(B)(8) and other grounds. 

Martin filed a motion to reconsider and a motion to correct error, which were 

denied. Martin now appeals, challenging dismissal of the action and alleging 

invited error. Concluding that dismissal was proper under Trial Rule 12(B)(8) 

irrespective of any alleged invited error, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Martin and Maurer dissolved their marriage in 2010 pursuant to a settlement 

agreement in which Maurer represented and warranted having a 20% interest in 

“real estate and other assets related to” Wrecks. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 60. 

The settlement agreement—incorporated into a dissolution decree entered in 

Hamilton County—specified that Martin would receive 55% “of the net 

proceeds of sale and/or any asset distribution and/or any other form of 

distribution of value” from Maurer’s represented 20% interest in Wrecks. Id.

 

1 Maurer did not appear in this action and does not actively participate on appeal.
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[3] In early 2015, Martin filed a motion for proceedings supplemental in the 

Hamilton Circuit Court. Martin named Wrecks as a garnishee defendant and 

alleged that Wrecks recently sold real estate, refused to pay Martin any portion 

of the proceeds, and had denied that Maurer had any interest in the proceeds. 

Martin alleged that “Wrecks should be summoned to answer regarding any 

property of [Maurer’s] in its possession.” Id. at 72. Wrecks filed a responsive 

pleading in which it denied Maurer had any interest in Wrecks or its assets. 

Thereafter, Martin petitioned to set aside the dissolution decree, alleging that 

Maurer fraudulently misrepresented his interest in assets pertaining to Wrecks.

[4] At some point, Wrecks moved to bifurcate the fraud claim and the garnishment

claim, seeking a stay of action against Wrecks until a ruling on the petition to 

set aside the decree. In March 2016, the Hamilton Circuit Court bifurcated the 

claims and ordered a stay of further proceedings against Wrecks as a party. In 

its bifurcation order, the court reasoned that “if Martin is successful in having 

the Divorce Decree set aside for fraud, then no judgment potentially involving 

Maurer’s purported interest in Wrecks would exist, and there would no longer 

be a basis for Wrecks to be included as a garnishee defendant.” Id. at 126-27.

[5] In November 2017—during the stay concerning Wrecks in Hamilton County—

Martin filed the instant Boone County action against Wrecks and Maurer. In 

her Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Martin referred to the dissolution 

decree and asserted that “[a]n actual controversy exists as to whether Maurer 

holds a 20% interest in the proceeds of real estate sold by Wrecks.” Id. at 25. 

Martin noted the pending Hamilton County action but alleged that Wrecks—in 
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moving to bifurcate claims—“argued that . . . proceedings supplemental was 

not the proper forum for the claim asserted by Martin” and that the matter 

should be dealt with in a separate action between Maurer and Wrecks. Id. at 

26. Martin sought “a declaratory judgment determining that Maurer has an 

enforceable interest in the proceeds of real estate sold by Wrecks which would 

be subject to the Property Settlement Order in the Dissolution Action.” Id.

[6] In January 2018, Wrecks filed a motion to dismiss the Boone County action, 

alleging—inter alia—dismissal was proper under Trial Rule 12(B)(8). A few 

months later, during the pendency of Wrecks’s motion to dismiss the Boone 

County action, Martin filed a motion in the Hamilton Circuit Court, requesting 

a lift of any stay so that Martin could withdraw her claim against only Wrecks. 

The Hamilton Circuit Court denied this motion in April 2018.

[7] On June 28, 2018, the Boone Circuit Court granted Wrecks’s motion to dismiss

the declaratory action. A few days later, on July 3, 2018, the Hamilton Circuit 

Court reconsidered its refusal to lift the stay and granted Martin’s motion to 

withdraw the claim against Wrecks, dismissing that claim without prejudice. In 

light of this development, Martin moved the Boone Circuit Court to reconsider 

its dismissal or, in the alternative, correct error. These motions were denied.

[8] Martin now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision

[9] Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(8) permits dismissal of an action where “[t]he same 

action [is] pending in another state court of this state.” This rule “applies where 

the parties, subject matter, and remedies are precisely the same, and it also 

applies when they are only substantially the same.” Beatty v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 

Grp., 893 N.E.2d 1079, 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Whether two actions are the 

same under the rule “depends on whether the outcome of one action will affect 

the adjudication of the other.” Kentner v. Ind. Pub. Employers’ Plan, Inc., 852 

N.E.2d 565, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Vannatta v. Chandler, 810 N.E.2d 

1108, 1110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)), trans. denied. “[I]nasmuch as it is a question 

of law,” we apply a de novo standard of review to the grant or denial of a motion 

to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(8).2 Id.

[10] At the time the Boone Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(B)(8), there was a pending action in the Hamilton Circuit Court involving 

the same parties: Martin, Maurer, and Wrecks. After the stay ordered in the 

Hamilton County case, the litigation would initially concern whether to set 

aside the decree because of a fraudulent misrepresentation that Maurer had an 

interest in certain assets of Wrecks. Relatedly, the Boone County case was 

 

2 Thus, to the extent Martin notes that the Hamilton Circuit Court characterized the matters as “separate and 

independent,” Br. of Appellant at 19, we owe no deference to that determination. Further, to the extent 

Martin suggests Wrecks relies on matters outside the record, we have constrained our review to the record.
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designed to answer whether Maurer made a misrepresentation at all, as Martin 

sought a declaratory judgment “that Maurer has an interest in the proceeds of 

the sale of real estate by Wrecks which is therefore subject to the Property 

Settlement Order in the Dissolution Action.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 26.

[11] In arguing that the matters are not substantially the same and that the Boone 

Circuit Court erred in dismissing the action, Martin focuses on language in the 

July 2018 order of the Hamilton Circuit Court—entered subsequent to the Trial 

Rule 12(B)(8) dismissal. In that order, the Hamilton Circuit Court determined 

that the declaratory action “is a separate and independent claim from the 

dissolution of marriage action” pending before it. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 7. 

Martin suggests, without citation, that the Boone Circuit Court erred by failing 

to “explain that conflict,” Br. of Appellant at 17, or otherwise “interpret the 

Hamilton Circuit Court Order” when ruling on Martin’s motions, id. at 18. We 

disagree, however, because events subsequent to an order do not render that

order erroneous. See Styck v. Karnes, 462 N.E.2d 1327, 1331 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1984) (noting that events subsequent to trial did not constitute newly discovered 

evidence and that “[t]he proper method . . . to enlighten the trial court is 

through T.R. 60(B) which specifically provides [for] relief from a judgment”).3

 

3 Martin briefly argues that the Boone Circuit Court erred in paragraph 29 of its written order concerning the

motion to reconsider. Therein, the Boone Circuit Court determined that the motion had been “deemed 

denied” under Trial Rule 53.4(A). Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 20. Martin argues that the court incorrectly 

applied the rule. Yet, this argument is unavailing because the court nevertheless “in the alternative denie[d] 

the Motion to Reconsider.” Id.; see Ind. App. R. 66(A) (“No error or effect in any ruling or order or in 
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[12] Martin also argues that the practical effect of contradictory rulings in Boone 

County and Hamilton County is to “deprive [her] of a court to hear her claim 

against Wrecks.” Br. of Appellant at 17. Yet, when the Hamilton Circuit 

Court dismissed Wrecks as a party, it did so without prejudice. Martin further

asserts that “[i]n view of the Boone Circuit Court Order, [Martin] is without a 

court to determine [Maurer’s] interest, if any, in Wrecks.” Id. at 19. Yet, in the 

proceedings supplemental against Maurer, Martin and Maurer could litigate 

whether Maurer has an interest in Wrecks.

[13] We conclude that the matters were substantially the same. Although framed 

differently, the predicate for both matters was Martin’s purported interest—

conferred by dissolution decree—in any assets distributed to Maurer from his

represented interest in Wrecks.4 Further, factual determinations in the Boone 

County case would bear on an issue central to the Hamilton County case:

whether there was a misrepresentation. Because the actions were substantially 

the same, dismissal was proper under Trial Rule 12(B)(8). Moreover, even after 

the Hamilton Circuit Court dismissed Wrecks as a party, dismissal remained 

proper because the outcome of the Boone County case would affect the 

 

anything done or omitted by the trial court . . . is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its 

probable impact . . . is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.”).

4 Martin characterizes the scope of the Boone County action as potentially encompassing “improper actions” 

on the part of Wrecks: “If it is shown by the evidence that Wrecks also knew of the provisions of the Property 

Settlement Agreement, and endeavored to circumvent that agreement by compensating [Maurer] in other 

manners, Wrecks would have liability for those improper actions.” Br. of Appellant at 19-20. Martin asserts 

that she “is attempting to establish” that wrongdoing, Reply Br. at 7, and that she “is entitled to have that 

claim heard,” Br. of Appellant at 20. Yet, Martin did not allege tortious conduct in her Complaint for 

Declaratory Judgment. Rather, Martin sought a declaratory judgment regarding an interest in Wrecks.
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adjudication of the other case—and potentially lead to incompatible results. See 

Kentner, 852 N.E.2d at 570. That is, one court could determine that Maurer 

lacked any interest in Wrecks while the other court could determine that 

Maurer possessed the represented interest.

[14] Martin argues Wrecks invited any procedural irregularity in its arguments to the 

Hamilton Circuit Court when seeking bifurcation. Thus, according to Martin, 

Wrecks cannot avail itself of a Rule 12(B)(8) defense. Yet, Trial Rule 12(B)(8)

implements principles underlying a sound judiciary, including “comity between 

and among the courts of this state . . . and judicial efficiency.” Thacker v. 

Bartlett, 785 N.E.2d 621, 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In light of these principles, 

even if Wrecks had invited a separate proceeding, we conclude that the Boone 

Circuit Court did not commit err in granting the timely Rule 12(B)(8) motion.5

[15] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

 

5 Having reached this conclusion, we need not address arguments concerning other grounds for dismissal.