SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2154-17T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JUAN R. MARTORI, 

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Submitted December 19, 2019 – Decided 

Before Judges Suter and DeAlmeida.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Bergen County, Indictment Nos. 15-09-1171

and 17-01-0135.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Daniel S. Rockoff, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for 

respondent (Ian C. Kennedy, Assistant Prosecutor, of 

counsel and on the brief; Catherine A. Foddai, Legal 

Assistant, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

March 11, 2020
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Defendant Juan R. Martori appeals his November 17, 2017 judgment of 

conviction, challenging only the order from November 3, 2016, that denied his 

motion to suppress a search warrant. We affirm the order and the judgment.

I.

In 2015, defendant was charged under Bergen County indictment 15-09-

1171 with two counts of third-degree possession of heroin with intent to 

distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3); and first-degree

maintaining or operating a drug manufacturing facility, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4. 

In 2017, defendant was charged under Bergen County indictment 17-01-

0135 with third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), 

fentanyl, with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

5(b)(13); third degree possession of CDS, fentanyl, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1);

third-degree possession of CDS, heroin, with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 

2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3); third-degree possession of heroin, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); and four counts of second-degree endangering the 

welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2).

In 2017, defendant pleaded guilty to both indictments. On indictment 15-

09-1171, he pleaded guilty to first-degree maintaining and operating a CDS 

production facility, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4. On indictment 17-01-0135 he pleaded 
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guilty to third-degree possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 

2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(13).

The judge sentenced defendant to a ten-year term in prison with a fortytwo-month period of parole ineligibility on indictment 15-09-1171 and to a fiveyear term with a thirty-month period of parole ineligibility on indictment 17-01-

0135. The sentences were to be served concurrently.1

In 2016—after the first indictment was returned, but before the second—

defendant sought to suppress a warrant, issued on May 27, 2015, that authorized 

the police to search for CDS and drug distribution paraphernalia in defendant's 

apartment. The search warrant was supported by the affidavit of Detective 

Michael Klumpp. Based on his affidavit and testimony, the trial court denied 

the suppression motion. 

The trial court found that the Bergen County Narcotics Task Force was 

advised by a confidential informant (CI) that "Raymond," later identified as 

defendant, was known to distribute CDS (heroin) in Cliffside Park. The CI 

provided defendant's address and phone number, indicating he could purchase 

CDS from defendant. At Klumpp's instruction, during the week of May 11, 

1

 The judge imposed statutory fines and penalties; his driver's license was 

suspended for twenty-four months. 
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2015, the CI contacted defendant to arrange to purchase heroin. The CI was 

searched prior to the transaction and provided with currency. Defendant and the 

CI met at a prearranged location and surveillance was established at defendant's 

address and the location of the drug buy. "[S]urveillance personnel observed 

[defendant] exit the residence . . . and proceed directly to the prearranged 

location where the CI" and Klumpp were located. Defendant sold CDS to the 

CI in Klumpp's presence; tests revealed the substance was heroin. Klumpp 

identified defendant from his driver's license. 

Klumpp's affidavit described two individuals in Cliffside Park who had 

been revived by the use of Narcan after an overdose. The CI indicated these 

individuals purchased heroin from defendant. The affidavit included 

defendant's criminal history and that based on information from the Post Office, 

defendant accepted mail at the specific apartment address. Defendant also was 

observed by the police driving his daughter's vehicle, registered at the 

apartment. Detectives also confirmed defendant's residence through the Motor 

Vehicle Commission. Klumpp's supporting affidavit included his employment, 

education, training and experience as a police officer. He stated in the affidavit 

that "narcotic traffickers are known to keep narcotic records, money, 

paraphernalia, and other instrumentalities used in furtherance of narcotics 
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distributions, as well as, actual controlled dangerous substances at residences in 

which they have control."

The trial court conducted a hearing on the suppression motion limited to

what appeared to be an error about the specific address. Klumpp testified that

surveillance was established at defendant's residence at the specific address. 

The other address mentioned in the search warrant was a typographical error. 

Klumpp further testified he had been inside of the specific building previously

and believed defendant's apartment was on the second floor.

On November 3, 2016, the trial court denied defendant's motion to 

suppress the search warrant for the specific apartment. The trial court found the 

CI "provided detectives with significant details about the defendant such as his

alias, phone number and address." The CI also contacted defendant to make a 

controlled buy of heroin and that purchase was made in Klumpp's presence. The 

court found the detectives did not fail to "corroborate the information supplied 

to them by the CI[,] which resulted in the investigation and subsequent arrest of

the defendant."

With respect to defendant's argument there was no probable cause to 

search the specific apartment, the trial court found Klumpp to be credible in his 

testimony that defendant was seen leaving the apartment building prior to the 
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controlled buy, even though there was a typographical error in the search 

warrant affidavit. This error did not require suppression of the search warrant. 

On appeal, defendant raises one issue:

POINT I

BECAUSE A STREET SALE DID NOT CREATE 

PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH AN APARTMENT 

IN A MULTI-UNIT BUILDING, THE WARRANT 

APPLICATION WAS DEFICIENT, AND THE FRUIT 

SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED. U.S. CONST., 

AMENDS. IV, XIV, N.J. CONST., ART. I, PAR.7. 

II.

Our review of the denial of a suppression motion is limited. State v. 

Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44 (2011). We review a motion judge's factual findings in 

a suppression hearing with great deference. State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 

(2016). We "must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's 

decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence 

in the record." State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014) (citing State v. Elders, 

192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). We defer "to those findings of the trial judge which 

are substantially influenced by [the] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses 

and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Elders, 

192 N.J. at 244 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). We owe no 

deference, however, to the trial court's legal conclusions or interpretation of the 
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legal consequences that flow from established facts. Our review in that regard 

is de novo. State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015).

Defendant argues the street sale of narcotics, although providing probable 

cause to arrest defendant, did not give rise to probable cause to search 

defendant's apartment. Defendant contends no one saw him store or sell 

narcotics there. He therefore argues there was no probable cause that a search 

of that apartment would yield contraband.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution "protect [the State's] citizens against 

unreasonable police searches and seizures by requiring warrants issued upon 

probable cause 'unless [the search] falls within one of the few well-delineated 

exceptions to warrant requirement.'" State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 482 

(2001) (second alteration in original) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 

U.S. 218, 219 (1973)). "A search that is executed pursuant to a warrant is 

'presumptively valid,' and a defendant challenging the issuance of that warrant

has the burden of proof to establish a lack of probable cause 'or that the search 

was otherwise unreasonable.'" State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 427 (2017) 

(quoting Watts, 223 N.J. at 513-14).
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Probable cause is "consistently characterized . . . as a common-sense, 

practical standard for determining the validity of a search warrant." State v. 

Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 120 (1987). It is met when police have "a 'well

grounded' suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed." State v. 

Waltz, 61 N.J. 83, 87 (1972) (quoting State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 387 (1964)). 

The United States Supreme Court similarly described probable cause as a 

"practical, nontechnical conception." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) 

(quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). Probable cause 

requires more than mere suspicion; it requires a showing of a "fair probability"

that criminal activity is taking place. State v. Demeter, 124 N.J. 374, 381 (1991) 

(quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). Courts must base a probable cause 

determination on the totality of the circumstances and consider the probabilities. 

State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 389 (2004) (citing Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 

336, 361 (2000)).

We disagree with defendant's arguments because there was ample 

evidence to support probable cause for the search of this apartment. A CI 

provided information that defendant was selling heroin in Cliffside Park. The 

CI provided defendant's name, address and cell phone number. A controlled buy 

was arranged between the CI and defendant; they exchanged text messages. The 
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detective was with the CI when defendant sold heroin to the CI. Defendant was 

kept under surveillance. He left his apartment building and went directly to 

meet the CI. The drugs were field tested and determined to be heroin. The Post 

Office provided information that defendant accepted mail at this apartment. 

Defendant had a criminal history involving narcotics. He was seen driving his 

daughter's vehicle, who had the same apartment address. The detective also 

attested, based on his experience, that narcotics traffickers keep records, money, 

paraphernalia and other instrumentalities for drug distribution at the residence 

where they have control.

Defendant relies on State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417 (2017) to support his 

arguments. In Boone, the defendant contended there was not enough 

information to support a warrant to search an apartment. Id. at 421. The Court 

agreed stating that judges must review the warrant application to tie specific 

evidence to the property to be searched. Id. at 431.

Boone is factually distinguishable because in that case there was no 

information in the search warrant application about how the police knew the 

defendant lived in one specific apartment in the building, nor did the search 

warrant application indicate the building was a thirty-unit apartment building. 

Id. at 422. In the present case, defendant accepted mail at this specific apartment
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address; his daughter and wife lived there. Surveillance showed him leaving 

directly from that building to go to the controlled buy with the CI.

Defendant argues the search warrant was supported solely by the 

detective's assertion that drug traffickers are known to keep CDS at their 

residences. Defendant argues this type of support has been rejected in other 

cases. However, this search warrant was not based just on the fact that drug 

traffickers keep drugs in their residences or places they control. It was based on 

information from a CI, a controlled buy and defendant's surveilled conduct 

where he went directly from the building where he resided to the prearranged 

location. Looking at this search warrant affidavit and the totality of the 

circumstances, we agree with the trial judge there was probable cause for the 

search warrant and that defendant's motion to suppress what was seized in the 

search was properly denied. 

Affirmed.