GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

RESERVE FORCES

Army Needs to 

Finalize an 

Implementation Plan 

and Funding Strategy 

for Sustaining an 

Operational Reserve 

Force 

September 2009 

GAO-09-898 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2009

RESERVE FORCES

Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and 

Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational 

Highlights of GAO-09-898, a report to Reserve Force 

congressional committees 

Since September 11, 2001, the 

Army has heavily used its reserve 

components—the Army National 

Guard and Army Reserve—for 

ongoing operations even though 

they were envisioned and 

resourced to be strategic reserves. 

A congressional commission, the 

Department of Defense (DOD), and 

the Army have concluded the Army 

will need to continue to use its 

reserve components as an 

operational force. The transition 

will require changes to force 

structure as well as manning and 

equipping strategies that could cost 

billions of dollars. The 2009 

Defense Authorization Act directed 

GAO to study this transition. This 

report provides additional 

information on (1) progress and 

challenges the Army faces, (2) to 

what extent the Army has 

estimated costs for the transition 

and included them in its projected 

spending plans, and (3) the effect 

of the operational role on the 

Guard’s availability to state 

governors for domestic missions. 

GAO examined planning, policy, 

and budget documents, and 

relevant sections of Titles 10 and 32 

of the U.S. Code; and met with 

DOD, Army, reserve component, 

and state officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Army 

finalize an implementation plan and 

cost estimates for the transition to 

an operational force, and include 

transition costs in its funding plans. 

In comments on a draft of this 

report, DOD agreed with GAO’s 

recommendations. 

The Army is changing the organization and missions of some of its reserve 

units to provide more operational forces, and is increasing their personnel and 

equipment, but faces challenges in achieving the predictable and sustainable 

mobilization cycle envisioned for an operational force, primarily due to the 

high pace of operations. The Army is reorganizing its reserve units to match 

their active counterparts, is changing the missions of some units, has made 

plans to add over 9,000 personnel by 2013, and has requested almost $23 

billion for reserve equipment since 2003. To guide the transition, DOD has 

established principles and policies, such as a 1-year limit on reserve 

mobilizations, and set a goal of providing reservists 5 years between 

mobilizations. However, heavy operational demands have meant that many 

reservists have had significantly less than 5 years between mobilizations. To 

make the most of the limited mobilization time available, DOD directed the 

services to provide sufficient resources to support reserve forces to be nearly 

ready to deploy before mobilization. In the past, reserve component forces 

often required significant time after mobilization to prepare individuals and 

units for deployment. However, the Army is continuing to need to improve 

readiness after mobilization by addressing medical and dental issues, or 

transferring personnel and equipment from nondeployed units to fill 

shortfalls. Until demand eases, it seems unlikely that the Army will be able to 

achieve the mobilization cycle it initially envisioned for the reserves. 

The Army developed initial cost estimates for transitioning its reserve 

components to an operational role, but has not budgeted for most of the costs 

it identified. A 2008 estimate identified costs of about $24 billion over a 6-year 

period from 2010 to 2015 to increase full-time support personnel, training 

days, recruiting and retention incentives, and installation support, among 

others. However, because the Army has not yet established the specific 

equipping, manning, and training levels required of an operational reserve, it is 

difficult to assess the estimate’s validity. The Army established a task force to 

develop an implementation plan for the transition, and Army leadership is 

currently reviewing a draft plan and awaiting the results of other studies, such 

as a review of full-time support needs. However, pending the results of these 

studies and agreement on an implementation plan, the Army does not expect 

to budget for such costs until 2012. Best practices have shown that effective 

and efficient operations require detailed plans outlining major implementation 

tasks, metrics and timelines to measure success, and a comprehensive and 

realistic funding strategy. Until the Army finalizes an implementation plan 

and fully estimates the transition costs, and includes these costs in its 

projected spending plans, it will be difficult to assess the Army’s progress in 

transitioning its reserve component to a sustainable operational force. 

The operational role has reduced the Guard’s availability for domestic 

missions, but the effect on the states remains unclear because states mitigate 

shortfalls with mutual support agreements and requirements for some 

domestic missions remain undefined. 

View GAO-09-898 or key components.

For more information, contact John 

Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or 

PendletonJ@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-09-898 

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 6 

The Army Has Taken Steps to Adapt the Reserve Components, but 

It Faces Challenges in Achieving a Sustainable Mobilization 

Cycle and Meeting Premobilization Readiness Standards 11 

The Army Has Estimated and Budgeted for Some Costs to 

Transition Its Reserve Components to an Operational Force, but 

Has Not yet Finalized an Implementation Plan and Funding 

Strategy 28 

States Use Mutual Support Agreements to Mitigate Effects of 

National Guard Deployments, although Some Domestic 

Requirements Remain Undefined 36 

Conclusions 37 

Recommendations for Executive Action 38 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 41 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 44 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 47 

Related GAO Products 48 

Tables 

Table 1: Mobilization Authorities for Reserve Forces 7 

Table 2: Cost Estimates to Transition the Reserve Components to 

an Operational Force 31 

Figures 

Figure 1: Army Force-Generation (ARFORGEN) Model 9 

 Reserve Forces 
Figure 2:Army Reserve Component Members on Active Duty from 

September 2001 to June 2009 in Support of Operations 

Noble Eagle, Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring Freedom 22 

Figure 3: Number of Army Reserve Component Soldiers Available 

for Deployment in Fiscal Year 2011 under Currently 

Planned Force Structure at Varying Average Amounts of 

Time between Mobilizations 23 

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Page ii GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
Page 1 GAO-09-898 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

September 17, 2009 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Chairman 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the demand for Army 

forces has been high, and the Army has relied heavily upon its reserve 

components—the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve—to meet 

operational requirements. As of May 2009, about 475,000 members of the 

Army’s reserve components had been activated for ongoing operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other missions worldwide, representing 

the largest activation of reservists since the Korean War. The high pace of 

operations has meant that the reserve components’ Cold War role has 

evolved from a strategic reserve that would be used to supplement active 

 Reserve Forces 
 

duty forces in the event of extended conflict to an operational force 

characterized by ongoing rotational deployments.1

As a strategic reserve, the reserve components were not maintained to be 

immediately ready for deployment, and it was expected that they would 

receive additional equipment, personnel, and training after they were 

mobilized.2

 However, as an operational force, reserve units need to build 

and maintain readiness prior to mobilization to support recurring 

deployments. Some capabilities that have been in especially high demand 

for stability and counterinsurgency operations, such as civil affairs and 

psychological operations, reside heavily in the reserve component, 

creating an especially high pace of operations for reservists with these 

skills. In 2006, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Quadrennial Defense 

Review established that to use the reserve components as a viable 

operational force, reservists and units must be more accessible and readily 

deployable.3

 In 2008, the congressionally chartered Commission on the 

National Guard and Reserves found there was no reasonable alternative to 

increased reliance on the reserve components given the current threats, 

fiscal challenges, projected demand for forces, and the unique capabilities 

resident in the reserves.4

 In that same year, U.S. Army Forces Command 

similarly concluded that using the reserve components as an operational 

force was the Army’s best option for meeting its needs. According to the 

Army, other options available including full mobilization, significantly 

enlarging the active component, and maintaining or adapting the strategic 

reserve were infeasible, impractical, or unsustainable.5

 DOD has 

acknowledged that the reserve component is now an integral part of the 

operating force, in addition to its strategic reserve role, and the Army is 

undertaking initiatives designed to enhance the capability of both active 

 

1

Deployment is the movement of forces and materiel to desired operational areas. 

2

Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing personnel and equipment, 

activating units and members of the reserves for active duty, and bringing the armed forces 

to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. 

3

Department of Defense, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C., 

Jan. 6, 2006). 

4

Commission on National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary 

of Defense, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century 

Operational Force (Jan. 31, 2008). 

5

Commanding Officer, United States Army Forces Command, Memorandum, Concept Plan 

for Army Initiative 4 (AI4); Transition the Reserve Components (RC) to an Operational 

Force (Feb. 25, 2008). 

Page 2 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

and reserve forces and to provide a more predictable deployment 

schedule. 

Over the last few years, we have examined the effects of expanded 

mission requirements on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, 

including their new operational roles in supporting both large-scale, longduration overseas operations and emerging domestic requirements. In July 

2005, we reported that, while the Army Reserve has provided ready forces 

to support military operations since September 11, 2001, it was becoming 

increasingly difficult to continue to provide these forces due to personnel 

and equipment shortages.6

 In October 2005, we reported that the high pace 

of operations has also caused a strain on the Army National Guard’s 

equipment inventories that could be used for domestic missions.7

 In 

September 2006, we testified before the congressionally chartered 

Commission on National Guard and Reserves8

 that equipment shortages 

and personnel challenges have increased in the National Guard and Army 

Reserve, which if left unattended may hamper the reserve components’ 

preparedness for future overseas and domestic missions.9

 In January 2007, 

we further reported that planning for the National Guard’s response to 

large-scale, catastrophic events is not complete and that the National 

Guard may not be prepared to respond as efficiently and effectively as 

possible to domestic events.10 We have also previously reported that the 

operational readiness of reserve forces has been hampered by longstanding problems with reservists’ medical and physical condition and that 

DOD is unable to determine the extent to which the reserve force has 

 

6

GAO, Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel 

and Equipment Shortages, GAO-05-660 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005). 

7

GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment 

Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives, 

GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2005). 

8

Congress chartered this commission to assess the reserve component of the U.S. military 

and to recommend changes to ensure the National Guard and other reserve components 

are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the needs of 

U.S. national security. 

9

GAO, Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st 

Century Challenges, GAO-06-1109T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2006). 

10GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment 

Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007). 

Page 3 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

complied with routine examinations due to a lack of complete or reliable 

data.11 A list of related GAO products is included at the end of this report. 

The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

200912 directed GAO to report on the use of the Army’s reserve 

components as an operational reserve. Specifically, we were asked to 

include in our report a description of current and programmed resources, 

force structure, and any organizational challenges that the Army’s reserve 

components may face serving as an operational reserve including 

challenges related to force structure; manning; equipment availability, 

maintenance, and logistics issues; and any conflicts with requirements 

under Title 32 of the United States Code.13 We satisfied that mandate by 

providing a briefing on our preliminary observations addressing these 

issues to the congressional defense committees in June 2009.14 This report 

provides additional information related to the questions addressed in 

response to the mandate. Specifically, this report examines: (1) steps the 

Army has taken and the challenges it faces in transitioning its reserve 

force structure, manning, and equipping, and logistics strategies,15 (2) the 

extent to which the Army has estimated costs required for the reserve 

components’ transition to the operational role and included these in its 

budget and Future Years Defense Program,16 and (3) the effect of the 

 

11GAO, Military Personnel: Top Management Attention Is Needed to Address Longstanding Problems with Determining Medical and Physical Fitness of the Reserve Force, 

GAO-06-105 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 2005). 

12Pub. L. No. 110-417, §343 (2008). 

13We were also directed to evaluate the extent to which the Army’s training facilities and 

ranges—including the combat training centers, military schools, and skill training 

courses—support the transition of the reserve components to an operational force. 

Training issues are addressed in GAO, Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Reevaluate Its 

Approach to Training and Mobilizing Reserve Component Forces, GAO-09-720 

(Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2009). 

14GAO, Preliminary Observations on Army’s Transition of Its Reserve Components to an 

Operational Role, Briefing for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the 

House and Senate Appropriations Committees’ Subcommittees on Defense, GAO-09-780R 

(Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2009). 

15For purposes of this report, we define the transition of the Army’s reserve components to 

an operational force as including those steps necessary to adapt the Army’s institutions and 

resources to support cyclical readiness requirements and implement the “train-mobilizedeploy” model consistent with Annex I (Transition the RC into an Operational Force) to 

Army Campaign Plan 2009 (Coordinating Draft) (May 1, 2009). 

16The Future Years Defense Program is DOD’s centralized report on current and planned 

resource allocations. 

Page 4 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

National Guard’s federal operational role on its availability to state 

governors for domestic missions. 

To determine the extent to which the Army has modified the force 

structure as well as the manning and equipping strategies of its reserve 

components to meet the requirements of the operational role, and to 

identify the challenges, if any, the Army faces in completing the transition, 

we reviewed Army plans and policy documents, reports of the 

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, and DOD reports to 

Congress on related initiatives and issues. We also reviewed program and 

policy documents and interviewed officials with DOD, Army, National 

Guard Bureau, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, U.S. Army Forces 

Command, and First Army. Further, we incorporated information from 

surveys of a nonprobability sample of 24 Army National Guard or Army 

Reserve units, as well as follow-up interviews with officials from 15 of 

these units.17 The surveys and interviews addressed a range of training, 

equipment, and personnel issues. To evaluate the current and projected 

resources for transitioning the reserve components to the operational role, 

we reviewed current Army plans, policy and budget documents, DOD’s 

fiscal year 2009 supplemental appropriations request, and DOD’s fiscal 

year 2009 and 2010 budget requests. To determine the effect of the 

National Guard’s federal operational role on its availability to state 

governors for domestic missions, we reviewed relevant sections of Titles 

10 and 32 of the United States Code and conducted interviews with the 

National Guard Bureau and offices of the Adjutants General of four states 

(Virginia, Missouri, Washington, and Florida). We selected states that had 

a history of major disaster declarations and that also contained units that 

are in demand for both overseas and domestic missions. We conducted 

this performance audit from July 2008 through July 2009 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. The scope and methodology used in our review are 

described in further detail in appendix I. 

 

17Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a 

population, because in a nonprobability sample some elements of the population being 

studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample. 

Page 5 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

In fiscal year 2008, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard had about 

197,000 and 360,400 soldiers, respectively, comprising 51 percent of the 

total Army, which also includes the active component. The Army 

organizes, trains, and equips its reserve components to perform assigned 

missions. The Army Reserve is a federal force that is organized and trained 

primarily to supply specialized combat support and combat service 

support skills to combat forces.18 The Army National Guard is composed of 

both combat forces and units that supply support skills, but in contrast to 

the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard has dual federal and state 

missions. When not called to active duty for a federal mission, Army 

National Guard units remain under the command and control of the 

governors, typically training for their federal mission or conducting state 

missions. In addition, National Guard forces can be mobilized under Title 

32 of the United States Code for certain federally funded, domestic 

missions conducted under the command of the governors such as 

providing security at the nation’s airports in the immediate aftermath of 

the September 11 terrorist attacks and assisting the Gulf Coast in the 

aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Both reserve components are composed 

primarily of citizen soldiers who balance the demands of civilian careers 

with part-time military service. 

Background 

Reserve forces may be involuntarily called to active duty under three 

mobilization authorities. As shown in table 1, the President may 

involuntarily mobilize forces under two authorities with size and time 

limitations. Full mobilization, which would authorize the mobilization of 

forces for as long as they are needed, requires a declaration by Congress. 

 

18Combat support units provide fire support and operational assistance to combat forces, 

whose primary missions are to participate in combat. Combat service support refers to the 

essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of 

operating forces on the battlefield (e.g., supply, maintenance, health, transportation, and 

other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to assist those units in 

accomplishing their combat missions). 

Page 6 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

Table 1: Mobilization Authorities for Reserve Forces 

Statute Provisions 

10 U.S.C. 12301(a) 

“Full Mobilization” 

Declared by Congress: 

In time of war or national emergency 

No limit on numbers of soldiers called to active duty 

For duration of war or emergency plus 6 months 

10 U.S.C. 12302 

“Partial Mobilization” 

Declared by the President: 

In time of national emergency 

No more than 1,000,000 reservists can be on 

involuntary active duty 

No more than 24 consecutive months 

10 U.S.C. 12304 

“Presidential Reserve Call-up” 

Determined by the President: 

To augment the active duty force for operational 

missions or to provide support to certain emergencies 

No more than 200,000 members of the Selected and 

Individual Ready Reserves can be on active duty 

No more than 365 days 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Code provisions. 

In September 2001, following President Bush’s declaration of a national 

emergency resulting from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOD 

issued mobilization guidance that, among other things, allowed the 

services to mobilize reservists for up to 24 cumulative months under the 

President’s partial mobilization authority. In January 2007, the Secretary of 

Defense issued updated guidance on the utilization of the force that, 

among other things, limits involuntary reserve component mobilizations to 

no more than 1 year at a time.19

During the Cold War, the Army’s reserve components principally operated 

as a force in reserve, or strategic reserve, that would supplement active 

forces in the event of extended conflict. Members of the reserves generally 

served 39 days a year—1 weekend a month and an additional 2 weeks of 

duty. In addition, the reserve components have a small number of full-time 

personnel, Active Guard and Reserve personnel and military technicians, 

that perform the necessary day-to-day tasks such as maintaining unit 

equipment and planning training events that reserve units need to 

accomplish in order to maintain readiness for their mission and be able to 

 

19Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Utilization of the Total Force (Jan. 19, 2007). 

Page 7 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

deploy.20 The Army’s resourcing strategy for a strategic reserve provided 

reserve units with varying levels of resources according to the priority 

assigned to their federal warfighting missions. Most reserve component 

units were provided with between 65 and 74 percent of their required 

personnel and 65 to 79 percent of their required equipment. This approach 

assumed that most reserve component forces would have a lengthy 

mobilization period with enough time to fully man, equip, and train their 

units after they were mobilized to attain the high level of operational 

readiness necessary for deployment. 

Since September 11, 2001, however, the demand for Army forces and 

capabilities has been high, especially to support ongoing operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. Recognizing that its forces were being stressed by the 

demands of lengthy and repeated deployments, the Army has adopted a 

new force-generation model intended to improve units’ readiness over 

time as they move through phased training to prepare to be ready for a 

potential deployment. This contrasts with the previous approach in which, 

as a strategic reserve, units’ personnel and equipment levels were 

maintained below warfighting readiness levels until they were mobilized. 

Under the Army’s new model, the early phases of the cycle will entail 

formation and staffing of the unit and beginning individual and collective 

training, while later phases will concentrate on larger unit training. Figure 

1 illustrates the planned movement of units through the reset, train/ready, 

and available phases of the Army force-generation model. 

 

20Full-time Active Guard and Reserve personnel are Army National Guard and Army 

Reserve soldiers who are on voluntary active duty or full-time National Guard duty 

providing full-time support for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, 

instructing, or training the reserve components. Military Technicians are federal civilian 

employees providing full-time support for administration, training, and maintenance in 

reserve component organizations/units. Dual-status military technicians are required to 

maintain membership in a reserve component as a condition of employment, while certain 

non-dual-status technicians are not subject to that requirement. 

Page 8 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

Figure 1: Army Force-Generation (ARFORGEN) Model 

Train/Ready 2 Phase

This phase takes the individually trained 

soldiers and the unit leadership and integrates

their technical skills into a full-spectrum, culturally 

aware, tactically proficient unit. The unit will 

conduct battle staff exercises and collective 

training from the platoon through the battalion 

level. The units will participate in a highintensity exercise intended to allow the 

units to test their collective skills, and, 

through an external evaluation, 

determine areas to focus training 

efforts during their 

Train/Ready 3 phase.

Train/Ready 1 Phase

Activities in this phase are 

initially centered on acquiring 

personnel skills, such as

professional military training, 

equipment upgrades and 

improvements, and changing leadership 

at the unit. Once these small-team and 

section tasks are complete, the unit will 

focus on low-level collective tasks or 

mission-specific tasks, if known.

RESET Year

The RESET force pool begins when 51 percent of a

unit’s personnel return to home station. Reserve 

component units are in the RESET force pool for 

at least 365 days. During this time there is

soldier-family reintegration, block leave, 

unit reconstruction, training, and 

receipt of new personnel and 

equipment. Units retain 

homeland defense and 

homeland security 

capabilities.

Available Year

Units in the Available phase 

typically are mobilized to meet 

specific mission requirements or 

are on short notice for potential 

contingency missions. Soldiers not 

activated support homeland defense 

missions, mobilization centers, and 

medical centers in the continental United 

States.

ARFORGEN is a structured progression of increased unit readiness over time resulting in periods of availability of trained, ready, 

and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of civil authorities and combatant commander requirements.

Train/Ready 3 Phase

The focus of the Train/Ready 3

phase is to gain full tactical proficiency 

in the unit’s geographically oriented, missionspecific tasks. The unit will continue to train 

collectively with a focus on their directed 

mission-essential tasks and may receive an 

opportunity to receive validation of their 

tactical proficiency at one of the Army's

training centers. In addition, these units

provide depth and strategic capability 

that can be surged to meet 

unexpected operational 

demands.

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Under the Army’s force-generation model as designed, reserve component 

units would be available for deployment for 1 year with 5 years between 

deployments. After returning home from a deployment, units remain in the 

Page 9 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

reset phase for a fixed 1-year period and focus on restoring personnel and 

equipment readiness so that they can resume training for future missions. 

Following the reset phase, units enter the train/ready phases in which they 

progressively increase their training proficiency by completing individual 

and collective training tasks. As designed in the force-generation model, 

reserve component units remain in the train/ready phases for 4 years, 

although the amount of time is not fixed and may be reduced to meet 

operational demands. Upon completion of the train/ready phases, units 

enter the available year in which they can be mobilized to meet specific 

mission requirements. Under current DOD policy, involuntary reserve 

component mobilizations are limited to no more than 1 year in length. The 

force-generation process requires increasing resources for units to use in 

training to gain higher levels of proficiency prior to mobilization. 

In 2008, DOD published a new directive on managing the reserve 

components as an operational force. The directive provides the following 

definition of the reserve components as an operational force: 

“The reserve components provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. 

defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, 

reserve components participate in a full range of missions according to their Services’ 

force-generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established 

cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the 

Services, Service members, their families and employers. In their strategic roles, reserve 

component units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the 

national defense strategy. As such, the reserve components provide strategic depth and are 

available to transition to operational roles as needed.”21

 

21Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an 

Operational Force (Oct. 29, 2008). 

Page 10 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

The Army has made a number of changes to its force structure, as well as 

to its manning and equipping strategies to better position its reserve 

components for the operational role. However, given the current high pace 

of operations, the Army has faced challenges in achieving sustainable 

mobilization rates for its citizen soldiers and in readying personnel and 

units before they are mobilized in order to maximize their availability to 

operational commanders after deployment. 

The Army Has Taken 

Steps to Adapt the 

Reserve Components, 

but It Faces 

Challenges in 

Achieving a 

Sustainable 

Mobilization Cycle 

and Meeting 

Premobilization 

Readiness Standards 

Reserve Forces

The Army has made four force-structure changes to better position its 

reserve components for the operational role. 

• First, the Army is undertaking a major reorganization—called the modular 

force initiative—designed to make Army forces more flexible and 

responsive by reorganizing combat and combat support forces from a 

division-based force to smaller, more numerous, modular brigade 

formations with significant support elements. In contrast to the Army’s 

previous division-based force with many different types of unique forces, 

the modular forces were designed to be standardized and interoperable so 

forces could be more easily tailored to meet operational needs. Under the 

modular reorganization, National Guard and Army Reserve units are to 

have the same designs, organizational structures, and equipment as their 

active component counterparts so that they can be operationally employed 

in the same manner as active component units. The Army reported in its 

2009 Campaign Plan that it has converted or begun converting 256 (84 

percent) of the 303 planned brigade formations.22 However, the Army has 

been focused on equipping and staffing units to support ongoing 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the equipment and personnel levels 

in nondeployed units have been declining. Further, as previously reported, 

the Army does not have a plan with clear milestones in place to guide 

The Army Has Taken Steps 

to Modify the Reserve 

Components’ Force 

Structure for the 

Operational Role 

 

22Department of the Army, The Army Campaign Plan 2009 (FOUO) (Feb. 19, 2009). 

Page 11 GAO-09-898 
 

efforts to equip and staff units that have been converted to the modular 

design,23 and the Army now anticipates that the converted modular units 

will not be fully staffed and equipped until 2019—more than a decade 

away. Furthermore, without adequate planning, the Army risks cost 

growth and further timeline slippage in its efforts to transform to a more 

modular and capable force. 

• The Army is changing the missions of some Army organizations and 

retraining soldiers to produce more soldiers and units with high-demand 

skills. For example, the Army is decreasing its supply of air defense, 

armor, and field artillery capabilities in order to increase its supply of 

special operations, civil affairs, and military police capabilities. The Army 

began these rebalancing efforts in fiscal year 2003 after military operations 

in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks generated high 

demand for certain forces. Among those forces in high demand were 

certain combat support and combat service support forces such as military 

police and transportation units. These support forces, which are also 

called enablers, reside heavily in the reserve components. The goals of 

rebalancing included helping to ease stress on units and individuals with 

high-demand skills and meeting the Army’s goal of executing the first 30 

days of an operation without augmentation from the reserve component. 

As part of the rebalancing plan, the Army National Guard is converting six 

brigade combat teams into four maneuver enhancement brigades24 and two 

battlefield surveillance brigades25 that will perform combat support roles. 

As of February 2009, the Army reported that it had completed rebalancing 

70,400 positions, about 50 percent of the approximately 142,300 positions 

scheduled to be rebalanced by 2015 across the active and reserve 

components. 

• The Army is also increasing personnel within the reserve components. In 

January 2007, the Secretary of Defense announced an initiative to expand 

the total Army by approximately 74,200 soldiers to better meet long-term 

operational requirements, sustain the all-volunteer force, and build 

towards a goal of 5 years between mobilizations for the reserve 

components. This initiative is expected to add 8,200 soldiers to the Army 

 

23GAO, Force Structure: The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to Equip and Staff 

Modular Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Their Capabilities, GAO-09-131 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2008). 

24Maneuver enhancement brigades are designed as a unique multifunctional command and 

control headquarters to perform maneuver support, consequence management, stability 

operations, and support area operations for the supported force. 

25Battlefield surveillance brigades are designed to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, 

target acquisition, and intelligence operations to build the common operational picture in 

order to focus joint combat power and effects. 

Page 12 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

National Guard by 2010; 65,000 soldiers to the active component by fiscal 

year 2010; and 1,000 soldiers to the Army Reserve by 2013. The Secretary 

of Defense expects that with a larger force, individuals and units will, over 

time, deploy less frequently and have longer times at home between 

deployments. However, we have previously reported that the Army has not 

developed a comprehensive funding plan for the expansion initiative and 

that, lacking a complete and accurate plan, Congress and other decision 

makers may not have the information they need to consider the long-term 

costs and benefits associated with increasing Army personnel levels or 

gauge the amount of funding that should be appropriated to implement the 

initiative.26

• The Army eliminated some reserve force-structure positions that 

previously had been intentionally unfilled, largely for budgetary reasons. 

Specifically, the Army’s force-structure rebalancing, which began in fiscal 

year 2003, and the modular transformation efforts that began in 2004 

reduced the force structure allowances for the Army National Guard by 7 

percent from 376,105 to 349,157 and Army Reserve by about 4 percent 

from 213,324 to 205,028 between 2005 and 2009.27 Concurrently, the Army’s 

Grow the Force plan increased the Army National Guard’s size by almost 2 

percent from 352,700 soldiers in fiscal year 2007 to 358,200 by fiscal year 

2010 and the Army Reserve’s size by 3 percent from 200,000 soldiers in 

fiscal year 2007 to 206,000 by 2013. When the reserve components were 

solely a strategic reserve, the Army routinely authorized units to be 

assigned fewer personnel than would be required for their wartime 

mission under the assumption that units could receive additional 

personnel when mobilized. By reducing the number of units, the Army was 

able to authorize the remaining units to be more fully manned. 

DOD established a policy in 2008 to promote and support the management 

of the reserve components as an operational force.28 The policy directed 

the services to align reserve component force structures, to the extent 

practicable, with established DOD goals for frequency and duration of 

utilization for units and individuals. In addition, the policy instructs the 

service Secretaries to manage their reserve components such that they 

provide operational capabilities while also maintaining strategic depth to 

 

26GAO, Force Structure: Need for Greater Transparency for the Army’s Grow the Force 

Initiative Funding Plan, GAO-08-354R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2008). 

27Force-structure allowances are the number of unit spaces that can be manned with 

personnel. 

28Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an 

Operational Force, (Oct. 29, 2008). 

Page 13 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

meet U.S. military requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. 

Further, the policy directs the Secretaries to ensure sufficient depth of 

reserve component unit and individual capabilities to meet DOD’s 

established force-utilization goals. Those goals include planning for 

involuntary mobilizations of guard and reserve units such that they receive 

5 years at home for every 1 year they are mobilized. 

The Army Has Adapted 

Personnel Strategies for 

the Reserve Components’ 

Operational Role, but It 

Has Not Modified 

Requirements for FullTime Support Staffing 

The Army has adapted the strategies that it uses to staff its reserve 

components for the operational role, which requires Army reserve 

component units to achieve higher levels of personnel readiness and 

maintain a more stable cadre of personnel than they did as part of a 

strategic reserve. The Army has increased the number of personnel in 

reserve component units, given units higher priority for personnel as they 

near availability for deployment in the rotational cycle, established some 

personnel readiness goals, and modified its recruiting and retention 

strategies. 

The operational role has several implications for how the Army staffs its 

reserve component units. First, as an operational force, Army reserve 

component units are now expected to be available to deploy for 1 year 

with 5 years between deployments and more frequently when the Army 

faces increased demand for forces by the combatant commanders. To 

prepare for regular deployments, the Army now expects its reserve 

component units to progressively increase their personnel readiness on a 

cyclical basis as they near availability for deployment. The Army 

determines a unit’s personnel readiness level by comparing the unit’s level 

of available strength to the number of personnel required by the unit. 

Available strength is the portion of the unit’s assigned strength that is 

available for deployment to accomplish the unit’s assigned wartime 

mission. To be available, these personnel must meet a number of 

administrative, medical, and dental requirements and must meet their 

individual qualifications.29 As an operational force, reserve component 

units need to make efficient use of training time before deployment and 

build a cohesive force needed to achieve collective training proficiency. 

 

29For example, Army guidance currently requires combat arms units to deploy with at least 

90 percent of their assigned personnel, and combat support and combat service support 

units to deploy with at least 80 percent of assigned personnel. In addition, 100 percent of 

the soldiers who mobilize and deploy with a unit must meet Army soldier readiness 

requirements, including medical and dental standards, administrative criteria, and 

occupational specialty qualification. 

Page 14 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

DOD’s policy that the service Secretaries program and execute resources 

as required to support a “train-mobilize-deploy” model means that units 

need to achieve high levels of personnel readiness and complete most of 

their training requirements prior to mobilization. This approach to training 

and mobilization contrasts with the strategic reserve’s “mobilize-traindeploy” approach in which units would be brought up to full personnel 

strength and soldiers’ medical and dental issues would be addressed after 

mobilization. To implement the train-mobilize-deploy model, the Army has 

found that it needs to stabilize unit personnel by the time the unit is 

alerted for deployment or as early as possible in the force-generation cycle 

so that the unit can attain as much collective training proficiency as 

possible prior to mobilization. This approach allows the unit to minimize 

postmobilization training time and provide as much availability as possible 

to theater commanders. 

To staff reserve component units more fully, the Army has increased the 

percentage of required personnel that are assigned to reserve component 

units above strategic reserve levels and has established a long-range goal 

of achieving full personnel strength throughout the force-generation cycle 

for reserve components.30 As discussed previously, the Army decreased the 

size of its reserve components’ force structures while also increasing their 

end strength,31 which allowed remaining units to be more fully manned. 

Also, the Army has modified its approach to assigning personnel to reserve 

component units by giving units nearing deployment priority over other 

units in the assignment of soldiers and establishing some personnel 

readiness requirements for deploying units.32

The Army Has Increased the 

Number of Personnel in 

Reserve Component Units 

Despite these changes, the Army has not adopted any overarching, 

uniform personnel readiness levels that units must achieve as they 

progress through each phase of the force-generation cycle. The Army has 

established some interim personnel readiness goals for units participating 

 

30Department of the Army, The Army Campaign Plan 2009 (FOUO) (Feb. 19, 2009). 

31End strength is the maximum number of personnel each of the military services is 

authorized to have on the last day of a fiscal year. 

32Deploying combat units must have 90 to 100 percent of their required personnel available 

for deployment, and 85 to 100 percent of their required senior-grade personnel and 85 to 

100 percent of their personnel qualified in their military occupational specialty upon arrival 

to their mobilization station. Deploying support units must have 80 to 89 percent of their 

required personnel available for deployment, and 75 to 84 percent of their required seniorgrade personnel and 75 to 84 percent of their personnel qualified in their military 

occupational specialty upon arrival to their mobilization station. 

Page 15 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

in a “RESET pilot” program.33 However, the Army reported in its 2009 

Campaign Plan that current high global demands for Army forces are 

preventing units from achieving specific readiness levels as they progress 

through the phases of the force-generation cycle.34 The Army plans to 

evaluate units in the pilot program through 2010 and use this information 

to identify lessons learned and determine what levels of personnel 

readiness will be required of reserve component units as they progress 

through the force-generation cycle. 

The reserve components have established several new initiatives to meet 

the recruiting and retention goals of an operational force. Both 

components have established incentives for current soldiers to recruit 

others. The Army National Guard established the Guard Recruiting 

Assistance Program in which every Army National Guard member can 

function as a recruiter. The program provides a $2,000 monetary incentive 

to Guard soldiers for every new person they recruit who begins basic 

combat training. The Army Reserve’s Recruiting Assistance Program also 

provides a $2,000 monetary incentive to soldiers for every new person they 

recruit. Both components are also implementing targeted bonus programs 

to increase retention for soldiers with high-demand occupational 

specialties and for certain officer grades. 

The Reserve Components Have 

Established New Recruiting 

and Retention Initiatives 

Other Army National Guard recruitment and retention efforts include 

• the Recruit Sustainment Program, which is designed to keep recruits 

interested in the Army National Guard as well as increase their 

preparedness while awaiting training, and 

• the Active First Program, which is a pilot initiative in which soldiers are 

recruited to serve for an 8-year period which includes serving 3 years in 

the active component and 5 years in the Army National Guard. 

Additional Army Reserve recruitment and retention initiatives include 

• a conditional release policy designed to control the number of reservists 

who leave the Army Reserve to enter the active Army, Army National 

Guard, or other service components; 

 

33Interim goals for all units in the pilot program are to have 80 percent of their aggregate 

assigned personnel and 75 percent of senior grade personnel by the time they exit the 

RESET phase and to attain the highest level of personnel readiness as they enter the last 

phase of the cycle when they are available for mobilization and deployment. 

34Department of the Army, The Army Campaign Plan 2009 (FOUO) (Feb. 19, 2009). 

Page 16 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

• an education stabilization program which synchronizes new soldiers with 

a unit in the appropriate phase of the force-generation cycle so that the 

soldier can complete his/her college degree without the interruption of 

mobilization; and 

• an employer partnership initiative in which soldiers are recruited to train 

and serve in the Army Reserve for a particular occupational specialty and 

work in a related occupation for one of the civilian employers that 

participate in this initiative. 

Further, the Army and its reserve components have begun several other 

initiatives to improve personnel readiness and unit stability prior to 

mobilization and improve the execution of the “train-mobilize-deploy” 

model required by DOD for an operational force. Although these initiatives 

are in various stages of implementation, and it is too early to assess their 

effectiveness, some of the steps that the Army and its reserve components 

have taken include the following: 

The Army Has Established 

Initiatives to Improve Reserve 

Component Personnel 

Readiness and Unit Stability 

• The Army has established a goal of issuing alert orders to reserve 

component units at least 12 months prior to their mobilization in order to 

provide them enough time to attain required levels of ready personnel for 

deployment. Army data show that the Army has increased the amount of 

notice it provides to mobilizing Army National Guard units from an 

average of 113 days in 2005 to 236 in 2008. 

• The Army Reserve began implementing the Army Selected Reserves 

Dental Readiness System in 2008 to reduce the number of nondeployable 

soldiers across the force by providing annual dental examinations and 

dental treatment for all soldiers regardless of their alert or mobilization 

status. 

• To reduce personnel attrition and increase unit stability prior to unit 

mobilizations without the use of stop-loss, 35 the Army National Guard’s 

Deployment Extension Stabilization Pay program, when implemented, will 

make some soldiers eligible to receive up to $6,000 if they remain with 

their unit through mobilization and 90 days following demobilization. The 

initiative is scheduled to begin in September 2009. The Army Reserve is 

considering a similar program. 

 

35Stop-loss refers to a policy the Army initiated in June 2004 and applies to personnel in 

units identified for deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation 

Enduring Freedom. The policy prevents soldiers from separating or retiring from the Army 

from 90 days prior to mobilization for reserve component soldiers until 90 days after they 

return from deployment. The Secretary of Defense has announced that stop loss will be 

phased out in August 2009 for Army Reserve soldiers and September 2009 for Army 

National Guard soldiers. 

Page 17 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

To improve medical readiness across the reserve components, the Army 

National Guard is pilot testing an initiative—the Select Medical PreDeployment Treatment Program—that will provide limited medical 

treatment at no cost to eligible36 medically nondeployable soldiers in Army 

National Guard and Army Reserve units alerted for deployment. If the 

Army determines that the pilot is successful, it will consider expanding the 

program across the reserve components. 

Although the shift to the “train-mobilize-deploy” model increases the 

importance of the premobilization readiness tasks performed by full-time 

support staff, the Army has not modified its full-time support staffing 

requirements to reflect the needs of the operational role, and the reserve 

component units face difficulties in performing key readiness tasks at 

current staff levels. As of May 2009, the Army had not reevaluated the 

reserve components’ requirement for the full-time staff that are needed to 

perform key readiness tasks on a day-to-day basis in light of their new 

operational role. With most members of the Army National Guard and 

Army Reserve serving 2 days a month and 2 weeks out of the year, the 

reserve components rely on a small number of full-time personnel to 

perform the day-to-day tasks such as maintaining unit equipment and 

planning training events that reserve units need to accomplish in order to 

maintain readiness for their mission and be able to deploy. The Army 

Reserve Forces Policy Committee,37 U.S. Army Forces Command,38 and the 

Commission on National Guard and Reserves have reported that 

insufficient full-time support levels place the operational force at risk.39

The Army Has Not Established 

Full-Time Support Staffing 

Needs for the Operational Role 

 

36TRICARE is the health care program serving active duty service members, National Guard 

and Reserve members, retirees, their families, survivors, and certain former spouses. To be 

eligible for treatment under the pilot, soldiers must have correctable medical conditions 

and must not otherwise be eligible for care provided under TRICARE. 

37Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee, ARFPC White Paper on Full-time Support 

(Washington, D.C., 2007). Governed by Section 10302 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, the Army 

Reserve Forces Policy Committee is a committee within the Office of the Secretary of the 

Army. The committee is responsible for reviewing and commenting on any major policy 

matters directly affecting the reserve components and mobilization preparedness of the 

Army. The committee’s comments on such matters are forwarded to the Secretary of the 

Army and the Chief of Staff. 

38Commanding Officer, United States Army Forces Command, Memorandum, Concept Plan 

for Army Initiative 4 (AI4); Transition the Reserve Components (RC) to an Operational 

Force (Feb. 25, 2008). 

39Commission on National Guard and Reserves, Transforming the National Guard and 

Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force (Jan. 31, 2008). 

Page 18 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

The Army’s reserve components are not authorized the number of full-time 

personnel needed to meet the requirements established for their strategic 

role, and requirements for the operational role have not been determined. 

For fiscal year 2010, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve required 

about 119,000 full-time support positions but were only authorized 87,000 

positions, or about 73 percent of the requirement. The current full-time 

support requirement is based on a manpower study conducted in 1999 

when the reserve components were still primarily a strategic reserve. In 

subsequent years, the Army reviewed and adjusted the manpower analysis 

but it did not conduct an analysis that incorporated the needs of an 

operational reserve. The last review performed was completed in 2006, 

prior to the issuance of the Secretary of Defense policy that limited 

involuntary mobilizations to 1 year and before an increased emphasis was 

placed on premobilization readiness. In 2007, the Army directed a study 

designed, in part, to measure the readiness benefit to the Army of 

increasing its reserve components’ full-time support. However, because of 

data limitations, the Army could not quantify the effect of full-time support 

on unit readiness. As a result, the Army initiated an additional study to 

determine the link between full-time support levels and unit readiness 

before including additional funding for full-time support in future budget 

requests. Specifically, the Army has commissioned a study to assist it with 

identifying the existing requirements for full-time support, determining 

how the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have met these 

requirements in the past, and developing analytical links between full-time 

support and unit readiness. The Army does not plan to make any decision 

on full-time support resource levels until after this study is completed in 

September 2009. 

Mobilization of certain full-time support staff with dual roles as full-time 

support staff and deployable members of reserve units who perform key 

logistics and maintenance tasks has also created maintenance and 

readiness challenges for the Army’s reserve components. In the National 

Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for 2009, DOD reported that the 

average staffing of Army Reserve maintenance activities40 is at 

approximately 60 percent of requirements, and currently about 25 percent 

of the assigned staff is deployed. According to the report, mobilization of 

Army National Guard full-time support staff has resulted in an overall 

reduction of 71 percent of maintenance technician staffing during 

 

40The Area Maintenance Support Activities perform unit-level maintenance beyond the 

unit’s capability to perform due to time restraints and required training. 

Page 19 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

mobilization. The Army National Guard often hires temporary technicians 

to replace maintenance technicians who are mobilized. However, state 

National Guards, on average, hire only one temporary technician for every 

five maintenance technicians mobilized, due to the cost involved. To 

mitigate the maintenance backlog, the Army Reserve continues to use 

contractors, contracted maintenance support, and commercially available 

services. 

The Army Has Adapted Its 

Strategy for Equipping 

Deploying Reserve Units 

The Army has adapted its strategy for equipping its reserve components 

for the operational role by establishing a long-term equipping goal and, 

until it reaches this goal, giving units priority for equipment as they near 

their availability for deployment. Over the long term, the Army has 

established a goal of equipping all reserve units with 100 percent of their 

requirements by the end of fiscal year 2019. However, because the Army’s 

need for equipment currently exceeds the available supply, and equipment 

shortages are expected to continue for a number of years, the Army 

prioritizes the distribution of equipment to units that are deployed and 

preparing to deploy consistent with its force-generation model.41 In 

addition, under the new “train-mobilize-deploy” model, reserve component 

units are also expected to complete most of their training requirements 

prior to mobilization so that they can provide as much time as possible to 

theater commanders within the 12-month limit on involuntary 

mobilizations. To accomplish these goals, the Army has established 

interim policies and guidance for equipping reserve component units. 

First, the Army intends for a unit to have 80 percent of its required 

equipment 365 days after the unit returns from deployment. Second, the 

Army has directed commanders to ensure that units report to the 

mobilization station with 90 to 100 percent of their required equipment.42

 

41The Army determines a unit’s equipment readiness based on the extent to which a unit 

has been assigned its required warfighting equipment and those items are in working order. 

42According to The 2009 Army Campaign Plan, current operational demands are 

preventing the Army from reaching specific readiness goals established through the forcegeneration cycle at this time. 

Page 20 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

The Army faces challenges in limiting the frequency of mobilizations and 

increasing both personnel and unit readiness given the high pace of 

current operations. 

Despite changes to its force structure, manning, and equipping strategies, 

at the current pace of operations, the Army’s reserve component force 

structure does not allow the Army to reach the Secretary of Defense’s goal 

of providing reservists 5 years demobilized for each year mobilized. As 

figure 2 shows, the Army’s reserve components have experienced a 

continued high level of mobilizations since 2001 in support of Operations 

Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.43

Given Current Operational 

Demands and Army ForceSizing Decisions, Reserve 

Component Forces Face 

Challenges in Achieving 

the Secretary of Defense’s 

Goals for a Sustainable 

Mobilization Schedule and 

Premobilization Readiness 

The Army Faces Challenges in 

Achieving a Sustainable 

Mobilization Schedule 

 

43Operations to defend the United States from terrorist attacks are known as Operation 

Noble Eagle. Overseas operations to combat terrorism are known as Operation Enduring 

Freedom, which takes place principally in Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

which takes place in and around Iraq. 

Page 21 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

Figure 2: Army Reserve Component Members on Active Duty from September 2001 

to June 2009 in Support of Operations Noble Eagle, Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring 

Freedom 

Numbers of

soldiers mobilized

Date

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

Army reserve components total

Army National Guard

Army Reserve

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

140,000

160,000

Au

Feb. 2009

June 2009

g. 2008

Au

Feb. 2008

g. 2007

Au

Feb. 2007

g. 2006

Au

Feb. 2006

g. 2005

Au

Feb. 2005

g. 2004

Au

Feb. 2004

g. 2003

Au

Feb. 2003

g. 2002

Feb. 2002

Sept. 2001

Major combat 

operations in 

Afghanistan

Major 

combat 

operations

in Iraq

Iraqi 

National 

Assembly 

elections

Transfer of 

government 

to Iraq Iraqi vote 

on 

constitution

Surge in Iraq and 

Afghanistan 

As of June 2009, more than 110,000 Army National Guard and Army 

Reserve soldiers were mobilized in support of these operations. Due to 

this high demand for forces, the Army has only been able to provide its 

reserve component soldiers with less than 4 years at home between 

mobilizations on average. For example, many capabilities such as civil 

affairs, psychological operations, military police, transportation, and 

adjutant general companies and detachments are in high demand, so units 

with these skills are being mobilized much more frequently, sometimes 

with less than 3 years between deployments. Although unit mobilization 

frequency differs on a case-by-case basis, nearly all types of units are being 

mobilized more frequently than the Secretary’s goal of no more than 1 year 

mobilized every 5 years. For reserve component forces to be provided 5 

Page 22 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

years at home between mobilizations given the current force structure, the 

total number of Army reserve component soldiers mobilized would have 

to decline by about 54 percent of the soldiers mobilized as of June 2009 to 

approximately 51,000 soldiers. As figure 3 below shows, the number of 

reserve component soldiers that could be available for deployment 

decreases as the required average amount of time between mobilizations 

increases. 

Figure 3: Number of Army Reserve Component Soldiers Available for Deployment 

in Fiscal Year 2011 under Currently Planned Force Structure at Varying Average 

Amounts of Time between Mobilizations 

Note: Data are from the Department of the Army Force File (July 1, 2008). 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

5 years between

4 years between

Less than

mobilizations

mobilizations

4 years between

mobilizations

74,500

60,600

51,000

3

brigade 

combat 

teams, 

38,700 

enablers

4

brigade 

combat 

teams, 

45,500 

enablers

5

brigade 

combat 

teams, 

57,000 

enablers

The Army’s current plans for its reserve component force structure would 

provide soldiers about 4 years at home between mobilizations, which is 

more than the current pace allows but less than the 5 year goal. According 

to Army officials, the current high pace is not expected to be permanent 

and the Army must balance mobilization frequency goals with the need to 

meet current operational demands, maintain capabilities to perform the 

full range of missions expected under the National Military Strategy, and 

remain within the constraints of mobilization policies and force-size 

limitations, as well as expected future budgets. The Army currently 

Page 23 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

projects that the high pace of operations will continue through fiscal ye

2013, but it does not project when the Army will be able to achieve the 

Secretary’s goal of 5 years between deployments. As a result, the Army

accepted the risk more frequent reserve mobilizations may pose to its 

personnel recruitment a

ar 

 has 

nd retention in order to be better positioned to 

achieve its other goals. 

ty in 

s 

ness and unit stability but it is too 

early to evaluate their effectiveness. 

, and 

een 

l training 

lization 

e Army’s stop-loss policy 

prevented them from leaving the Army. 

 

Although officials report that the Army reserve component units are 

meeting the Army’s required levels of ready personnel by the time that 

they deploy, the reserve component units continue to have difficul

achieving goals for personnel readiness and unit stability prior to 

mobilization. As a result, the Army has had to continue to take steps to

build readiness after mobilization. However, the Army has found that 

addressing issues such as medical and dental problems after mobilization 

may disrupt predeployment training and reduce the amount of time unit

are able to be provided to theater commanders under current limits on 

involuntary mobilizations. The Army has begun to implement additional 

initiatives to improve personnel readi

Reserve Forces

Reserve component units continue to have difficulty in achieving 

personnel readiness and unit stability goals before they are mobilized 

because of the number of soldiers who do not meet medical, dental

individual training qualification requirements as well as personnel 

attrition. A 2008 Army study of the pre- and postmobilization preparation 

of five Army National Guard brigade combat teams that mobilized betw

October 2007 and January 200844 found that none of the five units met 

deployment standards for the levels of personnel with individua

qualifications and medical readiness when they arrived at their 

mobilization stations. The study also found that these units had 

experienced significant attrition, with an average of 59 soldiers leaving 

their units per month between the time they were alerted for mobi

and 90 days before mobilization when th

l Readiness and Unit 

Stability 

Challenges Remain in 

Achieving Desired Levels of 

Personne

44Army Forces Command, Pre- and Post-Mobilization Comprehensive Review: 4+1 

Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), 2008. Forces Command conducted this review at the 

request of the Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army between March 

and May of 2008. The review focused on the four most recent Army National Guard BCTs 

to mobilize, as well as the 39th BCT from Arkansas, which was specifically requested by 

the Secretary of Defense. The other four BCTs studied included the 27th BCT from New 

York, the 37th BCT from Ohio and Michigan, the 45th BCT from Oklahoma, and the 76th 

BCT from Indiana. 

Page 24 GAO-09-898 
 

As a result of the challenges faced in achieving desired personnel 

readiness levels, the Army and its reserve components have had to 

continue taking steps to improve individual and unit readiness late in the 

force-generation cycle and after mobilization. Such steps include 

addressing medical and dental issues and transferring personnel from 

nondeployed to deploying units to fill shortages. For example, according 

to Army mobilization officials, one unit that mobilized in September 2008 

required the transfer of more than 900 soldiers, or 22 percent of the 4,122 

required personnel, from other units within 2 weeks of its mobilization 

date in order to fill shortages and man the unit to a deployable level. 

Further, our surveys of and interviews with 24 recently deployed reserve 

component units found that nearly all of those units had to receive 

personnel transfers from outside their units to achieve the required 

personnel levels for deployment. According to Army officials, such 

transfers disrupt unit stability and cause personnel turbulence at a time 

when the units are working to attain collective training proficiency in 

preparation for deployment. Additionally, Army officials stated that 

personnel transfers disrupt premobilization training plans when they 

occur within the last 6 months prior to a unit’s mobilization date because 

more training has to be done after mobilization, which reduces operational 

availability to theater commanders. For these reasons, one of the chief 

lessons learned reported in a 2008 Army study of pre- and postmobilization 

is that early assignment of personnel and stabilization of deploying units is 

necessary to make efficient use of training time and build a cohesive force 

so that the units can efficiently achieve required levels of collective 

training proficiency and provide as much operational availability as 

possible to theater commanders. 

Although the Army has taken steps in recent years to improve reserve 

component equipment inventories, it faces challenges in equipping units 

for training while supporting current high operational demands and, over 

the long term, may face challenges in meeting its equipment goals amid 

competing demands for resources. From 2003 to 2010, the Army requested 

$22.7 billion in its annual appropriations to equip the Army National Guard 

and Army Reserve.45 Despite this effort, the Army National Guard reported 

in October 2008 that it had 76 percent of its required equipment with only 

The Army Faces Challenges 

Providing the Equipment 

Needed to Train Reserve Units 

for Ongoing Operations and 

Meeting Longer-Term 

Equipping Goals 

 

45The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (Material and Facilities) reports that from 2003 to 2009 Congress 

added $7.3 billion in funding for Army National Guard and Army Reserve equipment in 

either DOD’s appropriations or in the National Guard and Reserve Equipment 

Appropriations. We did not evaluate the accuracy or reliability of these amounts. 

Page 25 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

63 percent of the required items located within the United States and 

available for training use. Similarly, the Army Reserve reported that it had 

74 percent of its required equipment with only 67 percent of the required 

items located within the United States. 

The Army is finding it difficult to provide units access to the same 

equipment for training that they will use overseas so they can attain 

training proficiency before they deploy. The demand for some items, such 

as mine resistant ambush protected vehicles and night vision equipment, 

has increased across the Army as operations have continued, and 

equipment requirements to support ongoing operations continue to evolve. 

As previously reported, these evolving requirements have made it difficult 

for the Army to communicate to deploying units what equipment will be 

needed in-theater and has challenged the reserve components to identify 

and transfer the right items.46 Moreover, the Army has directed reserve 

component units returning from overseas deployments to leave in-theater 

certain essential equipment items that are in short supply for use by 

follow-on forces. While this equipping approach has helped meet 

operational needs, it continues the cycle of reducing the pool of equipment 

available to nondeployed forces for unplanned contingencies and for 

training. We have previously reported that the continuing strategy of 

transferring equipment to deploying forces hampers the ability of 

nondeployed forces to train for future missions.47

Furthermore, the transformation to the modular structure has also placed 

demands on the Army’s equipment inventories because it requires modular 

units to have modern equipment as well as increased quantities of some 

items. Similarly, the initiative to expand the Army, which added six 

brigade combat teams and additional modular support units48 to the overall 

Army force structure, required equipment and placed additional demands 

on the Army’s inventories. 

A 2008 Army study of lessons learned from the deployment of five Army 

National Guard Brigade Combat teams found that equipment shortages 

adversely affected the deployment training of these units and increased 

 

46GAO-06-111. 

47GAO-06-111. 

48The modular support units include two combat support brigades, one fires brigade, one 

air defense brigade, one engineer brigade, and two sustainment brigades. 

Page 26 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

the amount of time required to obtain collective training proficiency.49 This 

study noted that training on the equipment a unit will use in-theater is 

essential to ensure tasks, conditions, and standards are met during 

premobilization training. However, the Army has not been able to provide 

some equipment to units to accomplish their training either prior to 

mobilization or deployment. 

During our interviews with reserve component units that had returned 

from deployment within the past year, we found several instances where 

units did not train with the same equipment before they deployed that they 

used in theater. As a result, they had to accomplish this training in-theater, 

effectively reducing their operational availability to theater commanders. 

For example: 

• A National Guard transportation company did not have the opportunity to 

train before mobilization with the armored trucks they drove in-theater. 

According to unit officials, these models maneuver differently and drivers 

need to practice driving the armored version. To accomplish this training, 

soldiers trained with armored versions upon arrival in-theater. 

• A National Guard engineering battalion told us they did not have access to 

the heavy equipment transporter or cranes used in-theater when it was 

training at the mobilization station. Instead, soldiers trained with similar 

equipment before they deployed and then trained on some of the 

equipment upon arrival in-theater. 

• National Guard officials from an aviation battalion told us that they did not 

have an opportunity to train on some equipment they used in-theater, 

including global positioning systems, communications systems, and 

intelligence systems. Instead, they trained on the equipment with the unit 

they were relieving after they arrived in-theater. 

• An Army Reserve transportation company had to wait until it was intheater to train on a pallet loading system. 

Over the long term, the Army faces challenges in meeting its equipping 

goals amid competing demands for resources. The National Guard and 

Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2009 included estimates of the 

resources required for the Army National Guard to achieve the 100 percent 

equipping goal by 2019. The report estimated that the Army National 

Guard will require an additional $6 billion each year from 2014 to 2019 to 

achieve the 100 percent goal, not including the $36.8 billion included in the 

Future Years Defense Program from 2005 to 2013 to purchase equipment. 

 

49Army Forces Command, Pre- and Post-Mobilization Comprehensive Review. 

Page 27 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

In addition, this report estimated that the Army Reserve will need $1.6 

billion each year over its 2009 to 2015 projected spending plan to reach its 

equipping and modernization goals. 

Despite the magnitude of the Army’s projected investment in its reserve 

components, until operational demand eases, it seems unlikely that the 

Army will be able to achieve DOD’s goal of a sustainable mobilization 

cycle for its reserve forces or fully implement the train-mobilize-deploy 

model. It is also not clear how long reserve component forces can sustain 

the current high pace of operations without difficulties in recruiting and 

retaining reserve component soldiers or compromising the viability of the 

all-volunteer citizen soldier reserve components, which are an important 

national resource critical for both domestic and overseas missions. 

The Army has estimated and budgeted for some costs that relate to the 

transition of its reserve components to an operational force, but the full 

cost of the transition remains uncertain and could vary widely from the 

initial estimates depending on Army decisions. The Army has decided to 

include the majority of funding needed for this effort in its fiscal year 2012 

to 2017 projected spending plans50 after costs are clarified by ongoing 

studies. However, the Army has not yet completed an implementation plan 

and funding strategy that fully describe the key tasks necessary for the 

transition, establish timelines for implementation, and identify metrics to 

measure progress. 

The Army Has 

Estimated and 

Budgeted for Some 

Costs to Transition Its 

Reserve Components 

to an Operational 

Force, but Has Not 

yet Finalized an 

Implementation Plan 

and Funding Strategy 

 

50The Army’s projected spending plans are contained it its Program Objective 

Memorandum, which defines what the Army intends to do over a 6-year program period 

and presents the Army’s proposal for a balanced allocation of its resources within specified 

constraints. 

Page 28 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

Army Has Prepared Some 

Preliminary Cost 

Estimates for the 

Transition to an 

Operational Role, but 

Actual Costs Could Vary 

Widely Depending on 

Army Decisions 

The Army has developed and updated a preliminary estimate of the costs 

that are not already included in its budget and Future Years Defense 

Program for the operational transition, but actual costs could vary widely 

from the estimates depending on Army decisions, such as which cost 

categories are essential for an operational reserve and the level of 

resources that will be required. In response to initiatives established by the 

Chief of Staff of the Army in April 2007, the Army formed a working group 

to develop a concept plan to complete six critical transition tasks. These 

tasks include (1) adapting pre- and postmobilization training; (2) adapting 

forces that perform key functions such as training, equipping, 

construction, and maintenance; (3) providing Army incentives to retain 

citizen soldiers and support their families; (4) modifying reserve 

component premobilization equipping strategies; (5) updating human 

resource management processes; and (6) revising statutes, policies, and 

processes. 

As a part of this effort, the Army developed a preliminary cost estimate for 

those transition tasks that were not already included in the Army’s budget 

or program. The intent of the preliminary cost estimate was to determine 

the magnitude of the additional costs required to complete the transition 

in order to assess the feasibility of the effort and provide estimates that 

Army leadership could use in developing its projected spending plans for 

fiscal years 2010-2015. The working group estimated an incremental cost 

of about $28 billion for fiscal years 2010-2015 for the transition. However, 

the Army continued to examine the estimates for pre- and 

postmobilization validation, training support, and installation support. As a 

result of ongoing studies, the Army decided to report a cost range of 

between $24.4 billion and $28.1 billion depending on implementation 

decisions. Of that total, the primary cost driver was for increasing full-time 

support, estimated at $12.8 billion over the period. 

In 2009, the Army revised its estimates to incorporate updated 

assumptions for some cost categories. Specifically, the estimates 

• increased costs for medical readiness to reflect expanding medical 

treatment to reservists throughout the phases of the force-generation 

cycle; 

• decreased costs for full-time support, which, according to Army officials, 

will provide 80 percent of the strategic reserve requirement rather than 

100 percent of the strategic reserve requirement; 

• increased costs for the Army Reserve homeland defense pilot program to 

include the cost of incentives for high-priority units; and 

Page 29 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

• increased premobilization training costs to incorporate updated cost 

factors for items such as participation rates, pay and allowances, and 

inflation. 

At the time of this report, the Army had not completed updates for other 

cost categories such as recruiting and retention, information technology, 

predeployment training equipment, new equipment training, seconddestination transportation, premobilization training, and community 

services. The most recent Army estimates show a cost range from $12.7 

billion to $27 billion over a 6-year period. Table 2 shows the cost 

categories and the amounts the Army estimated in 2008, categories 

updated in 2009, and a summary incorporating the most recent Army 

estimates. 

Page 30 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

Table 2: Cost Estimates to Transition the Reserve Components to an Operational Force 

Dollars in millions 

Cost category 

2008 Army cost 

estimatea

2009 updates to 

the estimate 

GAO summary using 

the most recent 

Army estimate

Pre- and postmobilization validation and training support 0 to 481b Under studyc 0 to 481c

Installation support 0 to 144bUnder studyc0 to 144c

Predeployment training equipment, new equipment training, 

second-destination transportation 

4 Not updated 4

Recruiting and retention 563 Not updatedd 563

Medical readinesse147 170 to 930 170 to 930

Unit validation tracking system 5 Not updated 5

Additional days for generating force 6 Not updated 6

Defense health program for full-time support 142 Under studyc142c

Full-time supportf 1,996 0 to 1,000c 0 to 1,000c

Army Reserve homeland defense pilot program (i.e., ready 

response reserve unit pilot program) 

9 16 16

Information technology / secure internet / bandwidth 89 Not updatedg89

Premobilization training 349 370 370

Duty military occupational specialty qualification and schoolhouse 

support 

42 Not updated 42

Temporary full-time support 122 Under studyc122c

Increase annual training and inactive duty for training 560 Under studyc560c

Increase surge capacity in training pipeline Not included Under studyc No estimate yet 

availablec

Providing Army community services to reserve components 

(includes Yellow Ribbon) 

31 Not updatedh31

Annual total $4,065 to $4,689 $2,120 to $4,505

plus costs not yet 

estimated

Total over 6 years $24,388 to 

$28,136

$12,720 to $27,030i

plus costs not yet 

estimated

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

a

The costs in this column were obtained by dividing the total costs the Army identified over the fiscal 

years 2010-2015 time period by 6 to obtain a per year cost. The cost categories, assumptions, and 

methodology for the 2008 estimate were based on the Army’s 2007 reserve component utilization 

technical guidance memorandum. This memorandum outlines program intent with respect to 

resourcing the Army’s vision and provides instructions for building the budget. 

b

These costs were still being studied by the Army at the time of the analysis. 

c

Ongoing studies are examining these potential costs. 

d

According to Army officials, the Fiscal Year 2010 President’s Budget Request includes $1.9 billion for 

reserve component recruiting and retention. 

Page 31 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

e

The 2008 estimate included man-days for medical and dental screening only. The 2009 estimate 

includes medical treatment for soldiers; the cost range depends on whether soldiers in all phases of 

the force-generation cycle are provided treatment or just those in the later phases. 

f

Amount varies depending on the number and rate of increase. 

g

According to Army officials, the Fiscal Year 2010 President’s Budget Request includes $176 million 

for this category. In addition, $43.6 million was included in the Fiscal Year 2009 Supplemental 

Request for Overseas Contingency Operations. 

h

According to Army officials, the Fiscal Year 2010 President’s Budget Request includes $123 million 

for this category. 

i

The 6-year totals were obtained by multiplying the per-year cost by 6 to obtain a rough order of 

magnitude for comparison purposes only. These costs have not been adjusted for inflation, and some 

fixed costs, such as secure internet, may decrease over the period. 

According to Army officials involved in cost estimating, the transition 

costs could vary widely from the initial estimates for four key reasons. 

First, the Army has not yet defined which cost categories are essential for 

an operational reserve component, so costs could be added or removed 

from the estimate. For example, the Army has not decided whether 

activities recommended by the Commission on National Guard and 

Reserves, such as providing housing allowance for activated reservists and 

reimbursing certain reservists for travel, are essential for an operational 

reserve and should be included as transition costs. Estimated costs for 

implementing these recommendations were not included in the 

preliminary estimate or the 2009 updates and, if included, could 

significantly increase costs. The Army has estimated that providing 

housing allowance for activated reservists could add from $170 million to 

$400 million annually and reimbursing travel expenses for certain 

reservists participating in individual training would add about $580 million 

annually. The Army has not estimated costs to implement other 

commission recommendations, such as the costs to increase the capacity 

of training institutions and increase staff support to the Employer Support 

of Guard and Reserves program.51 Second, the Army has not decided on 

the level of resources that will be required in other cost categories. For 

example, the Army has not established the specific personnel, training, 

and equipment levels its reserve components will require in each phase of 

the force-generation cycle. Third, several studies are underway to examine 

the level of resources required for full-time support, medical and dental 

 

51The Department of Defense carries out its responsibilities for educating servicemembers 

and employers about their rights and responsibilities under the Uniformed Services 

Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (38 U.S.C. Sec. 4301–4334) and 

assisting reservists in resolving problems with their civilian employers related to reserve 

component service, largely through its National Committee for Employer Support of the 

Guard and Reserves. 

Page 32 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

benefits, and incentives changes for the operational role. If readiness 

requirements, full-time support, medical and dental benefits, or incentives 

are increased above current levels, costs for the transition to the 

operational role could increase. Finally, neither estimate includes any 

recurring or sustainment costs beyond 6 years; costs for incentives, policy, 

or legislative changes required for the operational role; or costs for 

implementing the human resource initiatives designed to increase 

flexibility for reservists transitioning to and from active duty—referred to 

as the “continuum of service initiatives”—that the Army has identified as 

critical to the transition.52 Moreover, costs that the Army considered part 

of other Army initiatives, such as increasing reserve component equipping 

levels or expanding the Army, were not included. 

The Army Plans to Include 

the Majority of Estimated 

Transition Costs in Its 

Fiscal Year 2012 to 2017 

Projected Spending Plans, 

but It Has Not Finalized an 

Implementation Plan and a 

Funding Strategy for 

Achieving Its Goals 

According to Army officials, The Fiscal Year 2010 President’s Budget 

Request includes some funding that supports the reserves’ operational 

role, but the Army plans to include the majority of funding for transition 

costs in its fiscal year 2012-2017 projected spending plans after it obtains 

more information on the resources needed to support the operational role. 

Army officials identified $2.2 billion in The Fiscal Year 2010 President’s 

Budget Request that the Army considers as supporting the transition to the 

reserves’ operational role. Specifically, the fiscal year 2010 budget includes 

$123 million for community services (family support); $34 million for 

dental care to facilitate timely mobilization; $176 million for information 

technology, secure internet, and bandwidth; and $1.9 billion for reserve 

component recruiting and retention.53

In addition, Army officials stated that $779 million of the funds requested 

in DOD’s fiscal year 2009 supplemental request for overseas contingency 

operations will also contribute to the transition to an operational force. 

For example, Army officials identified funding requested for items such as 

installing secure internet capability to reserve component units, temporary 

full-time support staff, additional training days, and other costs as 

contributing to the transition. However, it is not clear from Army 

documents how much of the transition costs identified in the preliminary 

 

52Facilitating a “continuum of service” refers to a variety of human resource initiatives that 

are intended to increase the efficiency of Army human resource management processes 

that affect a reservist over the course of a career. 

53At the time of this report, Army officials stated that DOD had not developed and provided 

to Congress its future budget and program plans. 

Page 33 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

cost estimates are included in the fiscal year 2009 supplemental or 2010 

budget request. 

Although, in an information paper provided to Congress in February 2008, 

the Army stated that its fiscal years 2010 to 2015 projected spending plans 

would capture the required capabilities to begin the formal transformation 

of the reserve components to an operational force, the Army has decided 

to defer including the majority of those resources until the fiscal years 

2012 to 2017 projected spending plans. According to Army officials 

involved in estimating transition costs, the Army needed more information 

on the resources required for the reserve components to meet operational 

readiness requirements, such as levels of medical support and full-time 

support. Army officials noted that accurately estimating costs for the 

transition is challenging because specific information about the levels of 

personnel, equipment, training, and full-time support required of an 

operational reserve component in each phase of the Army’s forcegeneration cycle has not been developed. Army officials have stated that 

more specific metrics, such as the level of training proficiency required in 

each phase of the cycle, would help them to develop a more refined cost 

estimate for the transition. 

In February 2008, the Army formed a temporary task force to develop a 

comprehensive, coordinated implementation plan to transition the Army’s 

reserve components from a strategic reserve to an operational force. At 

the time of this report, the task force had developed a draft 

implementation plan that identifies some of the key tasks, an approximate 

10-year timeline to complete transition tasks and incorporate associated 

costs into the base budget, and some measures of success. According to 

Army officials, the Army is awaiting agreement on this plan, as well as the 

results of several ongoing studies, before it incorporates any additional 

transition costs into the fiscal year 2012 budget and program. 

In the meantime, the Army continues to utilize its reserve components as 

an operational force without a complete and approved implementation 

plan that clearly defines what tasks and costs are essential to the 

transition or a comprehensive funding strategy that identifies a timeline 

and funding sources for key transition tasks. According to DOD’s directive 

that governs managing the reserve components as an operational force, it 

is DOD policy that the reserve components shall be resourced to meet 

readiness requirements of federal missions and that resourcing plans shall 

ensure visibility to track resources from budget formulation, 

appropriation, and allocation through execution. Additionally, best 

practices for strategic planning have shown that effective and efficient 

Page 34 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

operations require detailed plans outlining major implementation tasks, 

defined metrics and timelines to measure progress, a comprehensive and 

realistic funding strategy, and communication of key information to 

decision makers. However, at the time of this report, the task force had 

not yet identified specifics for key tasks such as adapting the training base 

and institutional support functions, identifying measures of success for all 

transition tasks—such as synchronizing training cycles, sustaining 

volunteerism, and implementing human resource initiatives—and 

developing a resourcing strategy. In addition, the draft implementation 

plan does not explain how other Army initiatives, such as increasing the 

Army’s end strength or transforming to the modular force contributes to 

the overall goal of transitioning the reserve components to an operational 

force. 

According to Army officials, the task force is scheduled to disband in 

September 2009, and it is not clear who will have responsibility for 

managing the implementation of the transition to the operational role and 

tracking progress over the long term. Without an approved 

implementation plan that fully describes the key tasks necessary for the 

transition, establishes timelines for implementation, and identifies metrics 

to measure progress, it will be difficult for the Army to gauge whether it is 

moving toward its goal of fully supporting the transition of the Army 

National Guard and Army Reserve to operational roles. Furthermore, 

Congress will continue to have only a partial view of the potentially 

substantial cost and time required to complete the transition. 

Page 35 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

The deployment of National Guard units as a federal operational force has 

reduced their availability for domestic missions, but the effect on the 

states remains unclear because states have mitigated shortfalls through 

mutual support agreements and requirements for some domestic missions, 

such as responding to large multistate events, remain undefined. In 

general, National Guard members may only serve in one duty status at a 

time.54 Unless they are activated under Title 10, Guard members remain 

under command and control of the state governors in either state active 

duty or Title 32 status. When National Guard members are activated for 

federally controlled Title 10 duty, their Title 32 status generally stops and 

then begins again when they are released from Title 10 active duty. 

Under the Army’s force-generation model as designed, there is the 

potential for units to be unavailable to state governors for 1 year with 5 

years between federal mobilizations. However, according to Army and 

state National Guard officials, the reality of the current operational 

environment is that National Guard units deploy more frequently and are 

unavailable to state governors for about 1 year every 3 years. For example, 

Washington’s brigade combat team deployed in 2008 after 3-1/2 years at 

home. 

States Use Mutual 

Support Agreements 

to Mitigate Effects of 

National Guard 

Deployments, 

although Some 

Domestic 

Requirements Remain 

Undefined 

The effect of the operational role on the National Guard’s domestic 

readiness remains unclear because states have taken steps to mitigate any 

known shortfalls and, as we have previously reported, DOD, the 

Department of Homeland Security, and the states have not defined 

requirements, readiness standards, and measures for the National Guard’s 

domestic missions that are likely to be conducted in Title 32 status.55 Since 

National Guard units have begun deploying for their federal missions, 

 

54Section 325 of Title 32 of the U.S. Code provides members of the National Guard with 

relief from Guard duty when ordered to active duty. It also provides an exception that 

allows a National Guard officer to continue to serve in Title 32 status after activation under 

Title 10 if the dual status is authorized by the President and consented to by the officer’s 

state governor. 

55Prior GAO work found that, although states plan for the National Guard’s use in missions 

within their borders, they have only planned to a limited extent for the Guard’s use in largescale, multistate events such as those described in the Homeland Security Council’s 

national planning scenarios. We also reported that, while DOD is taking steps to better 

assess the National Guard’s preparedness for its domestic missions, these efforts are not 

yet complete and are limited by the lack of fully identified requirements for the Guard’s 

domestic missions. We further concluded that until the National Guard’s required 

capabilities are better defined and tracked, decision makers will lack information on 

whether the Guard has the equipment it needs to respond effectively to large-scale, 

multistate events. 

Page 36 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

states have made plans to compensate for any shortfalls in availability of 

their Guard forces either by relying on other capabilities and resources 

within the state or by relying on assistance from other states obtained 

through mutual support arrangements. National Guard officials from all of 

the four states that we visited reported that they routinely coordinate with 

other states and utilize mutual assistance agreements to ensure they can 

respond effectively to domestic requirements when state forces are 

deployed. For example, officials in Florida voiced a particular concern 

because a brigade combat team of more than 3,400 people would be 

deployed during the 2010 hurricane season. However, they noted that they 

routinely coordinate with other southeastern states to ensure that forces 

and capabilities that could be needed to respond to hurricanes are 

available within the region, and they anticipated being able to respond 

effectively. In addition, according to Washington National Guard officials, 

while they have typically been able to assign domestic response missions 

to units that are outside their deployment window, this becomes 

increasingly difficult when a large percentage of the state’s forces are 

mobilized. At the time of our visit, the state had almost 50 percent of its 

forces mobilized. Similarly, Guard officials in Virginia told us that its 

brigade combat team, comprising about 54 percent of the state’s National 

Guard forces, will be deployed at the same time as the state’s aviation 

battalion resulting in a large loss of forces and essential capabilities for 

domestic response missions. To mitigate for this loss, Virginia National 

Guard officials stated they rely on mutual support arrangements with 

other states and cross training of the state’s soldiers. In addition, state 

National Guard officials told us that they would have to rely on other 

states to provide support in the event of a catastrophic disaster regardless 

of the number of soldiers the state had mobilized for federal missions. 

The Army’s reserve components are likely to be used as an operational 

force supporting regular overseas rotations for the foreseeable future, and 

several studies and commissions have determined there is no viable 

alternative to the Army’s continued reliance on reservists. Although the 

Army has taken steps to modify its force structure and adapted its 

personnel and equipping strategies for the operational role, heavy 

operational demands have hampered the Army’s efforts to implement the 

force-generation model as intended. For example, the Army has not 

established firm readiness requirements for an operational reserve 

component or fully incorporated the resources needed to support the 

operational role into its budget and projected spending plan. Although the 

Army continues to study key costs, incorporating the necessary resources 

into its budget and projected spending plan is needed to effectively 

Conclusions 

Page 37 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

implement the force-generation model and support the reserve 

components in their new role. Adapting the Army’s institutions and 

incorporating the resources needed to support the cyclical readiness of an 

operational reserve component into its base budget will be a long-term 

effort estimated to take more than 10 years to complete. The 

implementation of these changes will span multiple administrations and 

Congresses and require many billions of dollars and, therefore, needs 

sound management controls to guide the effort and ensure success. The 

Army currently plans to request the majority of funding to complete the 

transition to an operational force in its fiscal year 2012-2017 budget; 

however, it has not finalized a cost estimate or detailed implementation 

plan that identifies what specific requirements have been and remain to be 

filled. The lack of outcome-related metrics also hampers the Army’s ability 

to measure its progress towards fully operationalizing its reserve 

components and justifying the large expenditure of funds required to 

implement the transition. Until the Army adopts an implementation plan 

outlining its requirements for transitioning its reserve components to an 

operational force, identifying progress made to date, and detailing 

additional personnel and other resources required, DOD decision makers 

and Congress will not be in a sound position to determine the total costs 

to complete the transition and decide how to best allocate future funding. 

Moreover, without effective management controls over these initiatives to 

help measure progress and to accomplish effective and efficient 

operations, the Army risks continued challenges in preparing ready units 

and providing reservists a sustainable balance between military and 

civilian careers, which, over time, could threaten the viability of the allvolunteer citizen soldier force. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Army to take the following three actions: 

• Finalize an implementation plan for transitioning its reserve components 

to the operational role that describes the key tasks necessary for the 

transition, assigns responsibility for these tasks, defines metrics for 

measuring success, and establishes timelines for full implementation. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Complete a cost estimate for the transition that, at a minimum, should 

include 

• a clear definition of what costs the Army does and does not consider to be 

related to the transition to an operational force; 

• estimates for key cost drivers; and 

• identification of any uncertainties in the estimates due to pending changes 

to the reserve components’ force structure, personnel, training, and 

Page 38 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

equipping strategies or other decisions that may affect costs, and updates 

to the plan as these decisions are made. 

• Include the costs of the transition in the Army’s budget and Future Years 

Defense Program. 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written 

comments on a draft of this report. The department agreed with each of 

our recommendations. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in 

appendix II. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Secretary of the Army to finalize an implementation plan for 

transitioning its reserve components to the operational role. In its 

comments, it cited DOD Directive 1200.17 that directs the Secretaries of 

the military departments to manage their respective reserve components 

as an operational force such that they provide operational capabilities 

while maintaining strategic depth. However, this directive does not 

provide detailed direction on how the services should transition the 

reserve forces, and we believe that a detailed plan is necessary to ensure 

key tasks in managing the reserves as an operational force are completed. 

DOD also drew a distinction between managing the reserve components as 

an operational force and transitioning reserves to an operational force. In 

this report, we defined transitioning reserves to an operational force as 

implementing those steps necessary to adapt the Army’s institutions and 

resources to support the cyclical readiness requirements and implement 

the “train-mobilize-deploy” model. We believe that completing a detailed 

implementation plan that describes key tasks necessary for the transition, 

assigns responsibility for these tasks, defines metrics for measuring 

success, and establishes time lines for full implementation is an essential 

part of transitioning the reserve components to an operational force. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Secretary of the Army to complete a cost estimate for the 

transition that includes a definition of costs, estimates for key cost drivers, 

and areas of uncertainties, such as pending policy decisions, that may 

affect costs. However, the department did not describe the steps it will 

take to complete the estimate. We therefore believe the Secretary of 

Defense should provide specific direction and guidance as outlined in our 

recommendation. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Secretary of the Army to include the costs of the transition in 

Page 39 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
 

the Army’s budget and Future Years Defense Program. In its comments, 

DOD noted its published guidance, Directive 1200.17, that resourcing plans 

should ensure visibility to track resources from formulation, 

appropriation, and allocation through execution. However, as discussed in 

the report, the Army does not plan to include the majority of the estimated 

costs for transitioning its reserve components to an operational role until 

fiscal year 2012. Until the Army includes the resources required in its 

future spending plans it will be hampered in its ability to transition its 

reserve components to the operational role. 

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional 

committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Should 

you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this 

John H. Pendleton 

report are listed in appendix III. 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 40 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, reviewed 

documentation, and interviewed officials from the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense Comptroller, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters Department of the 

Army, U.S. Army Forces Command, First Army, the National Guard 

Bureau, the Army National Guard, the Office of the Chief of the Army 

Reserve, the U.S. Army Reserve Command, RAND Corporation, and the 

Institute for Defense Analysis. We also reviewed documentation and 

interviewed officials from offices of National Guard Adjutants General in 

four case-study states: Florida, Missouri, Virginia, and Washington. These 

states were selected because they had a history of major disaster 

declarations; are geographically dispersed across the United States; have a 

brigade combat team presence or a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force 

Package (CERFP) team (which are units that are dual-tasked with 

domestic responsibilities) or both; face a range of homeland security risks; 

and present a range of population sizes. 

To identify the extent to which the Army has made progress but faces 

challenges in modifying the force structure, manning, and equipping 

strategies of its reserve components to meet the requirements of the 

operational role, we reviewed prior GAO work, reports of the Commission 

on the National Guard and Reserves, reports to Congress on related 

initiatives and issues, current Army plans and policy documents, including 

the Army Campaign Plan, Army Structure Memorandums, Army Forces 

Command’s concept plan for Army Initiative 4 (transition the reserve 

components to an operational force), Army Forces Command’s 4 + 1 Army 

National Guard Brigade Combat Team Comprehensive Review, the 

National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, DOD Directive 1200.17, 

Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force, and 

Headquarters Department of the Army Execution Order 150-18 Reserve 

Component Deployment Expeditionary Force Pre- and Post-Mobilization 

Training Strategy. We also reviewed Army data on actual and planned 

modular unit restructuring, total force structure changes, and the expected 

number of reserve component soldiers available each year at varying 

mobilization rates under the currently planned rotational force structures 

in order to assess changes made to the reserve components’ force 

structure for the operational role. In addition, we reviewed Army National 

Guard and Army Reserve force-structure allowances, personnel end 

strength, and equipment on hand to assess the extent to which the Army 

and reserve components have made changes to more fully man and equip 

Page 41 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

units for the operational role. Further, we incorporated information from 

surveys of a nonprobability sample of 24 Army National Guard or Army 

Reserve units, as well as follow-up interviews with officials from 15 of 

these units. We selected units of different types and sizes that had 

returned from deployments in the last 12 months. In addition, we chose 

the proportion of Army National Guard and Reserve units for our sample 

based on the proportion of mobilized forces from each of the components. 

The surveys and interviews addressed a range of training, equipment, and 

personnel issues. We supplemented this information by reviewing 

documents and interviewing officials from DOD, Army, National Guard 

Bureau, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, U.S. Army Forces 

Command, and First Army to discuss planned and ongoing policy and 

strategy changes for transitioning the reserve components to an 

operational force. Further, we incorporated information from interviews 

with officials from offices of National Guard Adjutants General in casestudy states. 

To determine the extent to which the Army has estimated costs for the 

transition of the reserve components to an operational force and included 

them in its current budget and Future Years Defense Program, we 

reviewed DOD’s fiscal year 2009 supplemental appropriations request and 

DOD’s fiscal year 2009 and 2010 budget requests. We also examined the 

Army’s cost estimates for operationalizing the reserve components, 

including Army Forces Command’s concept plan for Army Initiative 4 

(AI4)—transitioning the reserve components to an operational force—and 

a Center for Army Analysis cost-benefit analysis of the AI4 concept plan. 

In addition, we interviewed officials from DOD, the Army, Army Forces 

Command, the National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard, and the 

Army Reserve in order to understand assumptions made in estimating the 

cost for transforming the reserve components to an operational force, to 

assess the extent to which those costs have been included in DOD’s 

budget and Future Years Defense Program, and to identify whether the 

Army has an implementation plan that includes the full cost of the 

transition. 

To determine the effect of the National Guard’s federal operational role on 

its availability to state governors for domestic missions, we reviewed 

relevant sections of Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. Code, and DOD directives 

regarding management of the reserve components as an operational force 

and National Guard homeland defense activities. We also conducted 

interviews with the National Guard Bureau and offices of National Guard 

Adjutants General in the four states chosen for our case study concerning 

the possibility of conflicts between the states’ National Guard 

Page 42 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

requirements and Title 32 requirements related to the operational role of 

the National Guard. Further, our review of prior GAO work, along with the 

interviews with officials from the National Guard Bureau and case-study 

states, allowed us to assess whether the requirements of the National 

Guard’s operational role may affect the availability or readiness of 

National Guard forces for domestic missions. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 through July 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

Page 43 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 44 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 45 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 46 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 47 GAO-09-898 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

John Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant Director; 

Melissa Blanco; Susan Ditto; Nicole Harms; Kevin Keith; Susan Mason, 

Charles Perdue; John Smale, Jr.; Suzanne Wren; and Matthew Young made 

key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

 Reserve Forces 
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach to Training and 

Mobilizing Reserve Component Forces. GAO-09-720. Washington, D.C.: 

July 17, 2009. 

Military Personnel: Reserve Compensation Has Increased Significantly 

and Is Likely to Rise Further as DOD and VA Prepare for the 

Implementation of Enhanced Educational Benefits. GAO-09-726R. 

Washington D.C.: July 6, 2009. 

Military Personnel: Army Needs to Focus on Cost-Effective Use of 

Financial Incentives and Quality Standards in Managing Force Growth. 

GAO-09-256. Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2009. 

Global War on Terrorism: Reported Obligations for the Department of 

Defense. GAO-09-449R. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2009. 

Military Training: Improvement Continues in DOD’s Reporting on 

Sustainable Ranges, but Opportunities Exist to Improve Its Range 

Assessments and Comprehensive Plan. GAO-09-128R. Washington, D.C.: 

December 15, 2008. 

Force Structure: The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to Equip and 

Staff Modular Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Their Capabilities. 

GAO-09-131. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2008. 

Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil 

Support Missions May Depend on DOD’s Implementation of the 2008 

National Defense Authorization Act. GAO-08-311. Washington, D.C.: April 

16, 2008. 

Force Structure: Restructuring and Rebuilding the Army Will Cost 

Billions of Dollars for Equipment but the Total Cost Is Uncertain. 

GAO-08-669T. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2008. 

Military Readiness: Impact of Current Operations and Actions Needed 

to Rebuild Readiness of U.S. Ground Forces. GAO-08-497T. Washington, 

D.C.: February 14, 2008. 

Force Structure: Need for Greater Transparency for the Army’s Grow the 

Force Initiative Funding Plan. GAO-08-354R. Washington, D.C.: January 

18, 2008. 

Page 48 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
Related GAO Products 

Force Structure: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Oversee the 

Army’s Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve 

Accountability for Results. GAO-08-145. Washington, D.C.: December 

2007. 

Defense Logistics: Army and Marine Corps Cannot Be Assured That 

Equipment Reset Strategies Will Sustain Equipment Availability While 

Meeting Ongoing Operational Requirements. GAO-07-814. Washington, 

D.C.: September 19, 2007. 

Guard and Reserve Personnel: Fiscal, Security, and Human Capital 

Challenges Should be Considered in Developing a Revised Business 

Model for the Reserve Component. GAO-07-984. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 

2007. 

Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army’s 

Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address Implementation 

Challenges. GAO-07-936. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2007. 

Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Establish a Strategy and Improve 

Transparency over Reserve and National Guard Compensation to 

Manage Significant Growth in Cost. GAO-07-828. Washington, D.C.: June 

20, 2007. 

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic 

Equipment Requirements and Readiness. GAO-07-60. Washington, D.C.: 

January 26, 2007. 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 

21st Century Challenges. GAO-06-1109T. Washington D.C.: September 21, 

2006. 

Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted 

Personnel Recruitment and Retention Challenges. GAO-06-134. 

Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2005. 

Military Personnel: Top Management Attention Is Needed to Address 

Long-standing Problems with Determining Medical and Physical 

Fitness of the Reserve Force. GAO-06-105. Washington, D.C.: October 27, 

2005. 

Page 49 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
Related GAO Products 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and 

Equipment Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, D.C.: 

October 20, 2005. 

Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard 

Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force 

Transformation Initiatives. GAO-06-111. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 

2005. 

Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan is Needed to Address Army Reserve 

Personnel and Equipment Shortages. GAO-05-660. Washington, D.C.: July 

12, 2005. 

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for 

Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. GAO-05-21. Washington, D.C.: 

November 10, 2004. 

Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas 

and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2004. 

(351378) Page 50 GAO-09-898 Reserve Forces
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