The Honor able Sandr a S. Be ckwith, Senior United States District Judge for the Southern * District of Ohio, sitting by desig nation. NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON

File Na me: 10a0647n.06 No. 09-5390 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. DE AN GE L US H AY ES, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE U NI TED ST ATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR T H E WE ST E RN D I ST RI CT OF TENNESSEE

Be fore : KETHL EDGE a nd WHI TE, Circuit J udg es; BE CKWI TH, Senior District Judge. * KETHL EDGE, Circuit Judge. O n September 27, 2007, A mber How e wa s standing outside her boy friend’ s 2001 Buic k Century , looking for her c ellphone. A man a pproac hed her , threatened her w ith a revolve r, and then stole the car. A j ury later determined that Dea ng elus Hay es wa s that man, and f

ound him guilty

of ca rjac king, see 18 U.S.C. § 2119, and of bra ndishing a

firea rm during the commi ssion of a crime of violence, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) . The district cour t sentence d Hay es to 170 months’ imprisonm ent. Hay es now c halleng es his convictions and sente nce. Hay es ar g ues that the e vidence was insuffic ient to convict. Alt houg h he does not dispute that Amber H owe wa s the victim of the ca rjac king, he say s that he wa s not the car jacker. But How e twice identifie d Hay es as he r carjac ker—onc e in a photogra phic line-up, a

nd later in ope n court. See Tr ia l T r. a t 81 , 7 6. Th e se ide nti fi c a tio ns , b y the mse lve s, are e no ug h to su pp or t Ha y e s’ s c on vic tio ns .No. 09-5390

United States v. Hay es

-2- See U nited States v. Caraway , 41 1 F .3 d 67 9, 68 2- 83 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) ; United States v. Tipton , 11 F.3d 60 2, 60 9 ( 6th

Cir . 1 99 3) . M or e ov e r, the te sti mony of Ha y e s’ s ex-g ir lf

ri e nd , B ra

nd y No lan, a lso

c on ne c te d H ay e s to the c arj a c kin g . Whe n N ola n n oti c e d a

B uic k p ark e d in

he r g ara g e , H ay e s to ld her that he g ot the car from “Ridg ecr est”—the apar tment c omplex wher e t h e c ar j ac king

occur red—a nd showed he r a r evolver that was similar to the one Howe descr ibed. See Trial Tr. at 191, 196-98. Ha

y es re spond s t h at Nolan a nd Howes w ere not cre dible witnesses at trial; but that deter mination wa s for the jury , not us. See U nited States v. Bailey , 553 F.3d 940, 946 ( 6th Cir. 2009). Hay es’s re maining c halleng e to his convictions is that the district court improperly denied his moti on for a

mistrial. As Bra

ndy Nolan wa s leaving the witness stand at trial, she sa id: “Your Honor, I am kind of conc erne d about go i n g o u t t h er e.” Trial Tr. at 252. The district court responde d, “[w]e can’t talk a bout that he re,” and then told Nola n and the attorney s to come to the sidebar. O nce the re, N olan explained that she wa s afr aid of Ha y es’s fa mily members, who w ere waiting outside the courtr oom. After the district c ourt arr ang ed for Nolan to be e scorted to he r ca r, Hay es’s law y er moved for a mistrial. The district cour t denied the motion, decidinginstead to g ive

a c ur a tiv e ins tr

uc tio n. I n H ay e s’ s v ie w, tha t in str uc tio n w a s in su ff

ic ie nt b e c a

us e No lan’ s c omm e nts “irre para bly prejudice d” the jury

ag ainst him. Hay es’s B r. at 21. We reviewthe denial of a mistrial motion for an abuse of discre tion. U n ite d States v. W imbley , 553 F.3d 455, 460 ( 6th Cir. 2009). Here , No lan’s initial comment was unsolicited and unrelated to any of the g overnme nt’s questioning. The comment was a minor part of the testimony

a t tr ia l. A nd

the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ins tr

uc tio n w a s im me diate , c le ar, and fo rc e fu l:No. 09-5390

United States v. Hay es

-3- L a die s and

g e ntl e me n, that ve ry

la st r e mark

by the wi tn ess was an in a

pp ro pr ia te re mark , I tol d h e r t hat, a nd we have take n c are of that. B ut you mus t di sr e g ard

that, it i s a s t ho ugh y ou ne ve r h e ard the re ma rk , it ha s to c ome fr om a

wi tne ss s tand , it c an’ t c ome a s so me bo dy

wa lks awa

y , th e y c an’ t make a

c omm e nt t o y ou or

me , it is not appropr iate. I will not allow that. I f somebody bring s that up, y ou just say that is i na pp ro pr ia te , w e c ou ldn ’t

re c e ive it, it i s a s th ou g h w e ne ve r h e ard it. Tr ia l T r. a t 25 4. No lan’ s in iti a l c omm e nt t he re fo re did no t re qu ir e a mis tr ia l. See U

nited States v. Fo rre st , 17 F.3d 916, 920 ( 6th Cir. 1994). Ha y e s a lso argue s th a t he wa s p re jud ic e d b y Nolan ’s c omm e nt during the sidebar confe renc e—that she was afr aid of his family members wa iting outside the c ourtroom. Hay es cites United States v. Poindex ter , 94 2 F .2 d 35 4 (6 th Cir

. 19 91 ), wh e re we sa id that “ thi s c ourt wi ll a ssume that the [sidebar] confer ence is w ithin the jury ’s hea ring unless the re cord shows othe rwise.” Id. at 360. The re cord he re, H ay es say s, does not show otherwise

. As an initial mat t er, it is unclea r whe ther Poindexte r

is good la

w on this point. An earlier de c isi on fr om thi s c ourt se e ms t o r e je c t th e pr e su mpt ion

that Po ind

e x te r adopts. See United States

v . S mi th , 928 F.2d 740, 743 ( 6th Cir. 1991). I f so, the ea rlier c ase c ontrols. See Sowards v . Loudon Cou nty , 2 03 F .3 d 4 26 , 4 31 n. 1 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 0) (“ Whe n a

la te r d e c isi on

fr om t his c ourt c on fl ic ts w ith its p rior dec isions, the earlier case s control”) . Moreove r, the Poindexte r panel itself late r showed a willingne ss to rely

on repor ters’ note s when it modified its holding on re hear ing in a companion

case . See U

nited States v. Day , 956 F.2d 124, 125 ( 6th Cir. 1992). I n any event, the r ecor d here shows that t h e j u ry could not hear

the sidebar

confe renc e. During the conf

ere nce, the district court stated: “I ’m g oing to tell [the jury ] t hat it was an inappropriate re mark . . . a n d s o t h ey wo n ’t know whethe r we wer e over here chew ing he r out orNo. 09-5390

United States v. Hay es

-4- what we wer e doing .” Tria l Tr. at 254. The court’s statement—that the jury would not know “what

we we re do ing ” a t side ba

r— make s cle ar that the jur

y c ou ld not

he ar t he sid e ba r. No lan’ s st a te me nts , there fore , did not prejudice H ay es. The district c ourt proper ly denied the mistrial motion. That leaves Ha

y es’s c halleng e to his sentence . Hay es’s c arja cking sent en ce

— whi ch comprised 86 months of his 170-month sentenc e—wa s based i n p art on a two-level e nhance ment for “ phy sically

restra in[ ing]” a

person “ to fac ilitate commission of the offense [.] ” U.S.S .G. § 2B3.1( b)(4) (B ). Ha

y es ar g ues the e nhance ment was improper

. The pa rties dispute the standar d of re view. The g overnme nt c ontends that we should re view this iss ue only

for plain e rror , since the e nhance ment was disclosed in Ha y es’s Prese ntence Report and Hay es never objected to it. The rules require d him to do so. See Fe d. R. Crim. P . 32(f) (1). B ut Hay es re sponds that the district court fa iled to comply with U n i t e d S t ates v . B os tic , 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004). Ther e, we cre ated “ a new proce dural rule , requiringdistrict courts, af ter pronouncingthe def

e n d a nt’ s s e nte nce but be fore adjourning the sentenc ing he aring , to ask the par ties wheth e r th e y h a v e an y o b je c ti o n s to th e s e n te n c e ju s t p r o n o u n c e d th at h a v e n o t p r e v io u s ly b e en raised.” Id. a t 872. I f the dis tr ic t court do e s not as k this qu e sti on or its e qu iva le nt, the pa

rt ie s “ wi ll not have f

orfe ited their objec tions and t h u s wi l l n o t be re quired to demonstrate plain er ror on appea l.” Id. Her e, af ter the district c ourt announc ed its intent to im pose a 170- month s en t en ce, the following exchang e occ urre d: THE COURT: Okay . Any thing f rom the def

ense? I know that y ou wanted a little lower sente nce, but I think --No. 09-5390

United States v. Hay es

-5- [De fe ns e Couns e l]: No ob je c tio n to the te c hn ic a l c a lc ulatio n o f t he g uid e lin e s. Snt’g Tr . at 20. Th e re a lity he re is that H ay e s’ s c ouns e l did interpre t the district court’s que stion—“Any thing from the de fense ? ”—as a reque st f or a least a cer

tain ty pe of obje ction, namely , “objec tion[ s] t o the technica l calculation of the g uidelines.” And t hat i s prec isely the ki nd of obj ection that Hay es make s
no w. Th e re is n o p oin t in a llo wi nga

pa rt y , w ho e xpre ssl y st a te d th a t he ha d n o o bje c tio ns , to

c omp la in l a te r t

hat he did no t have an o pp or tun ity to o bje c t. T he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s qu e sti on se rv e d it s purpose with re spect to the i ssue presented her e; and thus, eve n without considering Hay es’s fa ilure to comply with Rule 32(f)( 1), we revie w the enha nceme nt only

for plain e rror . Th e Se n te n c in g G u id e li n e s p r o v id e f o r a tw o - le v e l e n h an c e me n t “ if an y p e r s on was phy sically restra ined to f

acilitate the commission of the offe nse[.] ” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b) (4)( B) . The enhanc ement wa s appar ently based on H ay es’s t h re ats to Howe dur ing the car jacking : “[I ]f y ou
scre am, I will shoot y ou. I f y ou try to run awa

y from this car , Iwill shoot y o u . ” T ri al T r. at 126. Hay es con te n d s th a t “ thr e a te n in g a c ar ja c k in g v ic ti m w it

h a f ir e ar m d o e s n o t a

mo u n t t o ‘ p h y sical restra int.’” Ha

y es’s B r. at 21. T h e c i rc u i t s a r e s p l i t o nt h i s i s s u e. S o m e h av e a d o p t edHa y es ’s p o s i t i o n : t h re at en i n g a person at g unpoint is not itself a phy sical re straint. See, e .g. , United States v. Dre w , 200 F.3d 871, 8 8 0 (D

. C

. C i r. 2 0 0 0 ) ( “[ P ] hy sic al re s t ra i n tre qu i re s t h e d ef en d an tei t h er

t o re s t ra i nt h e v i ct i m t h ro u gh bo dil y c on ta c t or to con fi ne the vic tim in som e wa y ” ); Un ite d S

tat es v . A ng lin , 169 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 1999). Others have adopted the g overnme nt’s position: holding a person at gunpoint and te lli ng he r n ot t o mo ve do e s amou nt t o a ph y sic a l r e str a int

. See, e .g. , United States v. W allace , 461No. 09-5390

United States v. Hay es

-6- F

. 3 d 1 5 , 3 3 ( 1 s t C i r . 2 0 0 6 ) ( a p p l y i n g t h e e n h an c e m e n t w h e n d e f e n d an t s “ r e n d e r e d t h e vic tim s ph y sic a lly

imm ob ile by

ke e pin g the ir

g un s p oin te d d ir e c tly

a t e a c h v ic timin c los e ra ng e ” ); United S ta te s v . F ishe r , 1 32 F.3d 1327, 1330 ( 10th Cir. 1997) (“[P] hy sical re straint occur s whene ver a
v i c t i m i s s p e c i f

i c a l l y p r e v e n t e d

a tg u np o i n tf

r o m m o v i n g , t h e r e b y

f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e c ri me ” ); Un ited States v. W

i lson , 198 F.3d 467, 472 ( 4th Cir. 1999). The only authority from our c ircuit is an unpublished opinion that adopts the g overnme nt’s position. See United States v. Morgan , 16 F.3d 12 22 (t a ble ), 19 94 WL12 65 1, a t *3 (6 th Cir . 1 99 4) (“ Court s h a ve de te rm ine d ‘ ph y sic a l r e str a int ’ to include holding vic tims at gunpoint, or eve n at knifepoint” ( internal c itations omi tted)). Wha te v e r t h e m e r i t s o f

H ay e s ’ s ar g u m e n t , “ t h e c i r c u i ts p l i tp r e c l u d e s a f i n d i n g o f p l a in

err or.” United States v. W illiams , 53 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 1995). That is all we ne ed dec ide her e. Finally , the enha

nceme nt did not plainly constitute “impermissible double counting ” in light of Ha y e s’ s c on vic tio n f

or br and ish inga

fi re arm . A lth ou g h th e e nh anc e m e nt and the c on vic tio n a

ro se fr om the same c on du c t, t

he y punis he d “ dif

fe re nt as pe c ts of t he defenda

nt’s conduct.” United States v. Pe rkins , 89 F.3d 303, 310 (6th Cir. 1996) (e mphasis in origina l). The fir st was his brandishing of the g un; the second was the phy sical restra int. So ther e was no double-c ounting. See U .S. v. Ev e rso le , 487 F.3d 1024, 1030 ( 6th Cir. 2007). Hay es’s c onviction and sentenc e ar e af firmed.