MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2016 ME 186 Docket: Ken

- 16

- 21 Argued : November 9,	2016 Decided: December	22,	2016 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and MEAD, GORMAN , HUMPHREY, and	CLIFFORD, JJ.
JASON	BEGIN

v. STATE	OF	MAINE

GORMAN ,	J. [¶1] Jason	 Begin appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 the Superior Court ( Kennebec	 County , Marden ,	 J. ) denying	 his petition for	 release	 from	 the custody	 of	 the	 Departme nt	 of	 Health	 and	 Human Services , to	 which	 he	 was committed in	2004	based	on	a	finding	that he was	not	criminal ly responsible for	certain	crimes	by	reason	of	insanity. Begin	argues	that	the	court	erred	by
continu ing the	final	hearing on his	petition, excluding	evidence	at	that hearing, and	issuing	a	decision	in	 the	absence	of	any	 testimony	 from	an	independent psychiatrist.		He	also	challenges	the sufficiency	of	the	evidence	supporting	the court’s	determination	 that	he	is	not	entitled	 to release	pursuant	 to 15 M.R.S. § 104

- A	(201 5)

. We	affirm	the	judgment.2 I.		BACKGROUND [¶2 ] In	2003 , Begin	was	charged	with theft and	violation	of	a	condition of	release ,	 for	which	 the	Superior	Court ( Androscoggin	County, Delahanty,	J. ) found him not	 criminally	 responsible by reason	 of	 insanity (NCR) in	 2004

. S ee 15 M.R.S. A. §	 103	 ( Supp. 2002 ) ;	 17

- A M.R.S.A.	 §	 39	 (Supp.	 200 3 )

. 1 Begin

was placed	in	 the	 custody	 of	 the	Commissioner	 of	 the	Department	 of	Health and	 Human	 Services	 and	 committed	 to	 the	 Riverview	 Psychiatric	 Center. 2
See 15	M.R.S.A.	§ 103. [¶3 ] Between	 2005	 and	 2015,	 Begin	 filed	 in	 the	 Superior	 Court (Kennebec	County)	a	series	of	petitions	for	modified	release	treatment	orders seeking	 further	 institutional	 privileges. S ee 15	 M.R.S.	 §	 104

- A(2)

. In the resulting	 orders,	 Begin	 was	 gran ted	 some	 additional	 privileges,	 and periodically	 also	 had	 his	 privileges	 suspended	 or	 revoked. Eventually,	 by

1 Title	17

- A	M.R.S.A.	§	39,	which	sets	out	the	affirmative	defense	of	insanity,	has	been	amended since	 the	 court	 issued	 its	 NCR	 judgment

. P.L.	 2005,	 ch.	 263,	 § § 5 ,	 6 (effective	 Sept.	 17,	 2005) (codified	at 17

- A M.R.S.	§	39	(2015) ). Nevertheless,	the	oper ative	language	of	section	39	on	which we	rely	in	this	case	is	identical in the	2003 and	2015	versions	of	the	statute

. Section	103	details	the	procedure	for	commitment	after	an	NCR	judgment	is	entered. 15	M.R.S. §	103	(2015) .		When	the	NCR	judgment	was	en tered	in	this	matter,	15	M.R.S.A.	§	103	(Supp.	2002) was	 in	 effect.	 	 Section	 103	 has	 been	 amended	 on	 several	 occasions	 since	 2004, e .g. ,	 P.L.	 2013, ch. 424,	§	B

- 3	(effective	July	16,	2013),	but	the	substance	of	section	103	is	not	at	issue	in	this	appeal.

2 The	 Department	 of	 Behavioral	 and	 Developmental	 Services was	 incorporated into	 the Department	 of	 Health	 and	 Human	 Services shortly	 before	 Begin’s	 NCR	 judgment	 was	 entered	 in 2004.	 	 P.L.	 2003,	 ch.	 689,	 §	 B

- 1 (effective	 July	 1,	 2004) ; s ee Beal	 v.	 State ,	 201 6	 ME	 169,	 ¶	 2 n.1,

--- A.3d

--- .3 order	dated	October	3,	2013,	 the	court	 ( Murphy,	J. )	allowed	Begin	 to	enter	a group	 residential	 program	 with	 continuing	 outpatient	 services	 from
R iverview. [¶4 ] On	July	29,	2015,	Begin	filed	the	petition	now	at	issue,	requesting “a	 hearing	 on	 [his]	 fitness	 for	 release	 and	 return	 to	 permanent	 residency	in the	 community	 pursuant	 to	 Title	 15	 §104

- A	 (1)	 and	 (2).” Th e	 court ( Marden, J. ) conducted	a hearing	at	which	it admitted numerous	exhibits	and the	 testimony	 of	 a	 Riverview	 staff	 psychiatrist, a psychiatric	 nurse practitioner, Dr.	 Debra	 Baeder	 of	 the	 State	 Forensic	 Service,	 four	 mental health	workers, a	detective	sergeant	with	the	Augusta	Police	D epartment, two of	Begin’s	employers,	an	elder	in	Begin’s	church,	and	Begin’s	mother

. [¶5 ] T he	 court	 made	 the	 following factual findings,	 which	 are supported	 by	 competent	 record evidence.	 	 Begin ,	 who was	 raised	 by	 a grandmother	 with	 schizophrenia , began	 ex hibiting	 antisocial	 and	 psychotic symptoms	 at	 an	 early	 age. Since	 childhood,	 he	 has	 been	 diagnosed	 with schizophrenia,	 attention	 deficit	 hyperactivity	 disorder,	 post

- traumatic	 stress disorder (PTSD) , major	 depressive	 disorder,	 oppositional	 defiant	 disorde r, mixed	 developmental	 disorder,	 bipolar	 affective	 disorder, evasive developmental	disorder, Asperger’s	Syndrom e , borderline	mental	retardation,4 major	 depressive	 disorder,	 pedophilia,	 cannabis	 abuse,	 and	 personality dis order	not	otherwise	specified. [¶6 ] Although	 Begin	 denies	 having	 any	 violent	 tendencies,	 he	 has	 a history	of	perpetrating	physical	and	verbal	violence	when	his	wishes	are	not

met. In	 one	 such	incident	 on	 January	 12,	 2015,	 Begin’s	 outpatient	 services team	 confronted	 him	 about	 suspected	marijuana	 use	 or	 distribution. After Begin	 realized	 that	 the	 team	 intended	 to	 send	 him	 to	 Riverview while	 they investigated	 the	 reports ,	Begin	 brand ished	a	 knife	and	 slashed	 his	 own	arm. When Begin then “appeared	to	be	attempting	to	assault”	a	police	officer	who was	 the re	 to	 escort	 Begin	 to	 Riverview, the	 police	 officer	 shot	 Begin;	 Begin was	hospitalized	for	some	time	for the injuries he	incurred

. [¶ 7 ] The	 court	 found	 that	Begin	 “has	 no	 primary	 psychotic	 disorder,” but , as	 a	 symptom	 of	 his	 PTSD ,	 he experiences	 “tangent	 psychotic	 or	 quasi psychotic	 symptoms”	 when	 confronted	 with	 severe	 stress. In	 the	 midst	 of such	reactions,	Begin	experiences	“a	high degree	of	cognitive	distortion”	and can	no	longer	realistically	or	rationally	perceive	the	circumstances. Based	on the	 recommen dations	 of	 Riverview staff and	 the	 State	 Forensic	 Service ,	 the court	 denied	Begin’s	 request	 for release and	instead	 reinstated the	 terms	 of the	October	3,	2013,	order	allowing	him	to	return	to	the	group	home	as	long5 as	he	could	first	demonstrate	“an	acceptable	period	of	behavioral	stability”	at
Riverview. Begin	appeals

. II.		DISCUSSION [¶8 ] When	 a	 person	 is	 found	 not	 guilty	 by	 reason	 of	 insanity, see 17

- A M.R.S.	§	39	(2015) , he is	committed	to	the	custody	of	the	Commissioner of	 the	 Department	 of	 Health	 and	 Human	 Services	 “to	 be	 placed	 in	 an appropriate	 institution	 for	 the	 care	 and	 treatment	 of	 persons	 with	 mental illness	 or	 in	 an appropriate	 residential	 program, ” 15 M.R.S.	 §	 103 (2015)

. S ee Taylor	v.	Comm’r	of	Mental	Health	&	Mental	Retardation ,	481	A.2d	139,	142 (Me.	1984) .		When	the	acquittee	seeks	release	or	discharge	from	Department custody, 3 it	 is	 the	 acquittee’s	 burden	 to	 establish,	 by	 clear	 and	 convincing evidence,	that	he “may	be	released	or	discharged	without	likelihood	that	[he] will	 cause	 injury	 to	 [himself]	 or	 to	 others	 due	 to	 mental	 disea se	 or defect.” 15 M.R.S.	§ 104

- A(1) ,	(3) ; see Beal	v.	State ,	2016	ME	169,	¶	5,

--- A.3d

--- ; James
v.	State ,	2015 ME	111,	¶	8,	121 A.3d	1290

. We	have	imported into	title	15 the

3 “Release”	refers	to	a	“termination	of	institutional	inpatient	residency	and	return	to	permanent residency	 in	 the	 community,”	 and	 is	 ordered	 with	 conditions	 for	 outpatient	 treatment	 and supervision,	 and	 for	 return	 to	 the institution	 upon	 violating	 the	 conditions	 of	 release. 15	 M.R.S. § 104

- A(1)(A)	(2015) ; see	Beal ,	2016	ME	169,	¶	2	n.2,

--- A.3d

--- ; Taylor	v.	Comm’r	of	Mental	Health &	 Mental	 Retardation ,	 481	 A.2d	 139,	 143

- 44 (Me.	 1984) .	 	 A	 “discharge”	 refers	 to	 an	 “outri ght discharge”	 from	 the	 custody	 of	 the	 Commissioner	 without	 conditions. 15	 M.R.S.	 §	 104

- A(1)(B) (2015) ; Taylor ,	 481	 A.2d	 at	 142 ; see	 Beal ,	 2016	 ME	 169,	 ¶	 2	 n.2,

--- A.3d

--- .	 	 In	 this	 case,	 Begin purported	to	seek	only	release.		The	procedure	and burden	o f proof	are	the	same	for	both	discharge and	release.		15 M.R.S.	§ 104

- A(1).6 definition	 of “mental	 disease	 or	 defect” set	 forth	 in	 the criminal	 statute according	 to	which an NCR	judgment is issued

— that	is, 17

- A M.R.S.	 §	 39(2 ), which	 defines	 “ mental	 disease	 or	 defect”	 as	 “only	 those	 sev erely	 abnormal mental	conditions	that	grossly	and	demonstrably	impair	a	person’s	perception or	 understanding	 of	 reality.” 4 Beal ,	 2016	 ME	 169,	 ¶	 7,

--- A.3d

--- ; Green v. Comm’r	 of	Mental	Health	&	Mental	 Retardation ,	 2000	ME	 92,	 ¶ 27,	 750	 A.2d 1265

. [¶9 ] In	 short,	 as	 the	 petitioning	 acquittee,	 it was	 Begin’s	 burden to demonstrate ,	by	clear	and	convincing	evidence,	that	he	is	no	longer	dangerous to	 himself	 or	 others	 as	 a	 result	 of a mental	 disease	 or	 defect. See 15	M.R.S. § 104

- A(3); Beal ,	 2016	 ME	 169,	 ¶	 5,

--- A.3d

--- ; James ,	 2015	 ME	 111,	 ¶	 9,
121 A.3d	 1290; In	 re Beauchene ,	 2008 ME	 110,	 ¶¶	 7,	 9,	 951 A.2d	 81 ; Green , 2000 ME	 92,	 ¶	 12,	 750 A.2d	 1265. Begin challenges	 the court’s determination	 that	 he	 did	 not	 meet	 this	 burden

. Because	 Beg in was	 the

4 The	 procedural	 aspects	 of	 the	 release	 or	 discharge	 proceeding	 are	 governed	 by 15	 M.R.S. § 104

- A	 (2015) ,	 the	 current	 version	 of	 the	 statute. See James	 v.	 State ,	 2015	 ME	 111,	 ¶ ¶ 2, 4, 121 A.3d	1290 (applying	 the	2014	version	of	section	104

- A	 to	a	2007	NCR	judgment); Michaud	v. N. Me.	 Med.	 Ctr. ,	 436	 A.2d	 398,	 400	 (Me.	 1981) (holding	 that	 amendments	 to	 procedure	 apply	 to both	 pending and	 future matters ) .	 	 The	 trial	 court,	 and we ,	 ar e	 bound	 to	 apply	 the	 definition	 of “mental	disease	or	defect”	 that	existed	at	 the	 time	 the	NCR	judgment	was	entered,	however, In	re Beauchene ,	2008 ME	110,	¶	10,	951	A.2d	81,	and	therefore	it	is	technically	the	version	of	section	39 that was	in	effect	at	t he	time	that	Begin’s	NCR	judgment	was	entered

— 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	39(2)	(Supp. 2003 ).		Because	the	definition	of	“mental	disease	or	defect”	in	section	39(2)	has	remaine d	constant since	 1985,	 P.L.	 198 5 ,	 ch.	 796,	 §	 5	 (effective	 July	 16,	 1986),	 the	 2015	 version	 of section	 39(2)	is identically	applicable.7 unsuccessful	party	with	the	burden	of	proof	at	trial,	he	can	prevail on	any such factual	challenge	on	appeal only	if we conclude	that,	viewing	the	evidence	and all	reasonable	inferences	in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to	 the	court’s	judgment, the	 trial	 court	 nevertheless	 was	 compelled	 to	 find	 in	 his	 favor. See Beal , 2016 ME	169,	¶	6,

--- A.3d

--- ; In	re	Williams ,	2010	ME	121, ¶ 10,	8	A.3d	666 ; Green ,	2000 ME	92,	¶¶	30

- 31,	750	A.2d	1265

. [¶1 0 ] Multiple mental	health	professionals	 testified	 that	Begin	 suffers from	 a	 severe	 form	 of	 PTSD that	 causes	 him, when	 stressed, to exhibit psychotic	 behaviors	 accompanied	 by	 cognitive	 disto rtions	 that render him both unable	to	discern	reality	and	prone	to	violence. This	evidence supports the	court’s	findings	that	Begin	is	a	danger	to	himself	or	others as	a	result	of his mental	 disease	 or	 defect. In	 fact,	 t he	 legal	 definition	 of	 “mental disease	 or defect”	 expressly	 refers	 to an	 impairment	 of	 the	 ability to	 perceive	 reality, from	 which	 the	 court	 found	 Begin	 suffers	 when	 he	 is	 under severe stress. 17

- A	M.R.S. A. § 39(2) (Supp.	 200 3 ); see 17

- A	M.R.S.	 §	 39(2)	 (2015) .	 	 Begin’s dangerousness	 is also	 amply	 supported	 by	 the	 evidence	 of	 numerous incidents	in	which	he	has	threatened	himself	or	others

— most	notably,	by	the incident	 that	 occurred	just	last	 year	in	which	 he	 brandished	a	 knife,	 slashed his	own	arms,	and	lunged	at	a	police	officer.8 [¶1 1 ] Contrary	to	Begin’s	suggestion,	a “mental	disease	or	defect”	does not	 refer	 to	 any	 particular	 diagnosis	 on	 any	 particular psychiatric	 axis

. See,
e.g. , Beal ,	2016	ME	169,	¶ 8,

--- A.3d

--- (discussing	acute	episodes	in	which	the acquittee	 was	 no t	 fully able	 to	 assess	 reality	 and	 suffered	 from cognitive distortions,	a	personality	disorder,	and	encephalopathy); Beauchene ,	2008	ME 110,	¶ 6 ,	951 A.2d	81	(personality	disorder); Green ,	2000	ME	92,	¶ 4,	750 A.2d 1265	 (bipolar	 disorder	 and	 poly

- substance abuse ); Roberts v.	 Comm’r	 of Mental	 Health	 &	 Mental	 Retardation ,	 562 A.2d 680, 68 2

- 8 3 (Me.	 1989) (antisocial	behavior,	dysthymic	disorder,	and	alcohol	abuse); LaDew	v.	Comm’r of	 Mental	 Health	 &	 Mental	 Retardation ,	 532	 A.2d	 1051,	 1055	 (Me.	 1987) (antisocial	 pers onality	 disorder	 and	 schizoaffective	 disorder).	 	 That	 the acquittee	 is	 “asymptomatic”	 or	 that	 he	 is	 “no	 longer	 in	 the	 same	 state	 as existed	 at	 the	 time	 of	 [his]	 crime”	 also	 does	 not	 necessarily	 establish	 the absence	of	a	mental	disease	or	defect. Green ,	2 000 ME	92,	¶¶ 28,	31,	750 A.2d 1265	 (concluding	 that	 the	 court’s	 finding	 of	 a	 continuing	 mental	 disease	 or defect	 was	 supported	 even	 though	 the	 acquittee	 had	 not	 had	 symptoms	 for months). [¶1 2 ] Although	Begin	points	to	evidence	of	his	stable	mental	state and lack	 of	 dangerousness ,	 the	 court simply was	 not	 required	 to	 believe	 Begin’s9 proffered	testimony. See Roberts ,	562	A.2d	at	683; Dionne	v.	LeClerc ,	2006 ME 34,	¶	15,	896	A.2d	923

. Indeed ,	the trial court	may	conclude	that	the	acquittee has	not	met	his burden	even	when	all	 the	 testifying	professionals	opine	 that he	no	longer	suffers	from	a	mental	disease	or	defect. Roberts ,	562	A.2d	at	683 (stating	 that	 the	 court	 is	 free	 to	 reject	 even	 uncontradicted	 psychiatric evidence); see	also LaDew ,	532	A.2d	at	10 55.		As we	have explained,	whether the	acquittee	suffers	 from	a	mental	disease	or	defect	“is	ultimately	a	legal,	as opposed	 to	 a	 medical,	 determination	 to	 be	 made	 by	 the	 court.” Green , 2000 ME	 92,	 ¶ ¶	 28, 31,	 750	 A.2d	 1265	 (“The	 crux	 of	 the	 issue	 .	 .	 .	 is	 not whether	the	acquittee	must	be	ill	in	the	medical	sense,	but	whether	his	mental state	fits	a	constitutionally	valid	legal	definition.”	(quotation	marks	omitted)) ; see	Beal ,	2016	ME	169,	¶	6,

--- A.3d

- -- . [¶1 3 ] W e	 conclude that	 the	 trial	 court	 was	 not	 compelled	 to	 find	 in Begin’s	favor	on	his	petition	for	release. 5

5 We	are	also	 not	 persuaded	 by	Begin’s	additional	 contentions , that	 the	 court’s	 procedure	 for considering	 his	 petition	 violated	 his	 substantive	 and	 procedural	 due	 process	 rights, see Green	 v. Comm’r	of	Mental	Healt h	&	Mental	Retardation ,	2000	ME	92,	¶¶ 14, 16,	20,	24,	750	A.2d	1265 ;	that the	court	erred	by	granting	the	State’s	motion	to	continue	the	final	hearing	on	Begin’s petition, see Daud	v.	Abdullahi ,	2015	ME	48,	¶¶	5

- 10,	115	A.3d	77 ; that	the	court	was preclud ed from	denying	his petition	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 testimony	 of	 an	 independent psychologist	 or psychiatrist, see 15 M.R.S.	 § 104

- A; 34

- B	 M.R.S.	 §	 1212(2)(B)	 (2015) ; James ,	 2015	 ME	 111,	 ¶ 3,	 121	 A.3d	 1290; Roberts	v.	Comm’r	of	Mental	Health	&	Mental Retardation ,	562	A.2d	680,	682

- 83	(Me.	1989) ; or	that the	 court	 erred	 by	 excluding	 anecdotal	 testimony	 regarding	 another	 Riverview	 patient	 who	 was released	from	Department	custody, see M.R.	Evid.	401; State	v.	Adams ,	2015 ME	30,	¶	11,	113	A.3d 583 ; State	v .	York ,	564	A.2d	389,	390	(Me.	1989)

.10 The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.

Rory	A.	McNamara,	Esq.	(orally),	Drake	Law,	LLC,	Lebanon,	for	appellant	Jason Begin Maeghan	 M aloney,	 District	 Attorney,	 and	 Da vid M. Spencer,	 Asst.	 Dist.	 Atty. (orally), Kennebec	 County District	 Attorney,	 Augusta,	 for	 appellee	 State	 of Maine

Kennebec	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	CV

- 2005

- 150 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY