THE GROWING IMPERATIVE

TO ADOPT “FLEXIBILITY”

AS AN AMERICAN PRINCIPLE OF WA

Robert S. Frost

October 15, 1999
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ii
FOREWORD

While clearly a mark of service parochialism, 

officers are usually surprised when an Air Force O

brings forward something in the realm of the theory o

that addresses anything other than strategic bombing 

superiority. Yet here is a truly thoughtful monograph 

does just that. The author wrote this when a student 

U.S. Army War College in academic year 1998-99.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Frost makes it clea

he is not interested in throwing out the old tried and 

Principles of War, he only wants thought given to 

expansion to include a principle of Flexibility. After a

hallmark of the course of instruction at the U.S. Arm

College is the new environment in which its grad

should expect to operate—an environment that we 

War College characterize as vague, uncertain, comple

ambiguous. In such an environment, the author a

Flexibility must be an operating principle and it 

serve all the services well to recognize it as such.

Frost begins with a useful review of the developm

the existing principles and on that same basis sug

inclusion of Flexibility is more than warranted. In th

draws upon the Strategic Studies Institute’s earlier r

of the Strategic Principles of War, as well as Rob

Leonhard’s work on Principles for Information 

Warfare, among others.

Frost’s proposed short definition: “to be respons

change and adaptable to the volatility, pressure

complexities of military operations, while const

focusing on the objective” reminds us that mi

operations are subject to numerous conflicting pres

He describes those pressures, now emerging from 

current military operations other than war, in a 

century context. Especially in that future context, 

iii
principle of military operations. Finally, for those wish

study the Principles of War further and for a compilat

salient articles on those and other suggested Princ

Frost’s endnotes offer a rich source. We commend this 

to your thoughtful attention and debate.

LARRY M. WORTZEL

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studie Institute

iv
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTH

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT S. FROST’s m

career includes operational and staff duties in both th

Army and Air Force. He was commissioned as a S

Lieutenant in the U.S. Army via Officer Candidate Sch

1980. Following paratrooper and engineer officer tra

he served as a combat engineer platoon leader in t

Infantry Division in Korea. Lieutenant Colonel F

commission was subsequently transferred to the Air 

where he served as an Air Force civil engineer at Ree

Force Base, before being selected for USAF pilot tra

which he completed in 1983. His flying assignments in

Air Training Command T-37 instructor pilot duty at 

Air Force Base; Military Airlift Command C-

“Hercules” aircraft commander, instructor pilot and 

examiner duties at Little Rock Air Force Base; an

Mobility Command KC-10 “Extender” flying duties, w

he was both the 305th Air Mobility Wing Chief of Safe

subsequently the Commander of the 2nd Air Ref

Squadron, McGuire Air Force Base. He has 

operational missions in support of numerous worl

contingencies, including Operations DESERT SHIE

DESERT STORM. Lieutenant Colonel Frost’s pre

staff assignments include a tour in the Air S

Directorate of Logistics Plans and Programs, Deputy 

of Staff for Logistics and Engineering, as well as 

Directorate of Plans, Headquarters Air Mobility Comm

Scott Air Force Base. Lieutenant Colonel Frost is cur

the Chief of Rated Force Policy, Directorate of Pers

Force Management, Deputy Chief of Staff for Pers

Headquarters United States Air Force. He is a gradu

The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, with B.S

M.S. degrees in Civil Engineering. He is also a gradu

the Air Command and Staff College resident progr

Maxwell Air Force Base in 1992, as well as the U.S. 

War College in 1999.

v
THE GROWING IMPERATIVE

 TO ADOPT “FLEXIBILITY”

AS AN AMERICAN PRINCIPLE OF WA

I bend but do not break.

1

 Jean de La Fontaine

 Fables, 1668

With those six words, French author Jean d

Fontaine captures two compelling metaphors which s

not be lost on any warfighter. Resistance to breaking—

essence, resistance to defeat—is so intuitively vi

success in war that little more needs to be said abo

notion. The ability to bend, on the other hand, ma

strike the American warrior’s intuition with the 

immediacy. It should. For, as this author will 

flexibility—the ability to “bend”—is a founda

warfighting attribute which should be embraced 

adopted by the U.S. military community as a princ

war (or operations

2

). Further, due to both evolutionar

potentially revolutionary forces, the imperati

incorporate flexibility as a principle of war will only gr

the United States moves into the 21st century. Those 

represent the thesis of this monograph.

One can rightly ask whether capturing the elusive 

“true” principles of war—an effort dating to antiq

really matters. Some question the 20th cen

development of an almost prescriptive, “checklist appr

to dealing with what many believe to be the essen

unquantifiable art of winning wars.

3

 The answers to 

provocative questions have been debated for decades. 

pragmatically for this monograph’s purposes is 

realization: Adopting and codifying principles of w

doctrine is a fully institutionalized U.S. military pra

yielding an attendant influence on American military 

and Service cultures. The risk of misinterpreti

1
given the perceived benefits. Given this policy, howeve

things become crucial. One, the collective list of prin

must be free of any significant conceptual gaps. Two, t

should contain an inherent mechanism to ensur

principles are synthesized in a balanced and ra

manner. Those two imperatives guided the author’s 

formulation.

One could also counterargue that the conce

flexibility is sufficiently grounded within the existing 

principles (listed in Appendix I), particularly with

principle of maneuver, and needs no further elabor

Such embedding, however, not only fails to give flex

its full regard, but it can represent a subtle, cu

suppression of the idea. While the American w

generally understands the need for flexibility (and its 

cousin, adaptability), the degree to which the conc

appreciated, or measures up, relative to the ex

principles represents an intellectual “gap” or “blind sp

the author’s view. Adopting flexibility as a principle o

is the right solution—not only because it closes this ga

because, within the current context, it is a fundam

principle.

4

One point needs emphasizing. This monograph do

challenge the nine existing American principles of w

any appreciable way; nor does it indorse them (comp

arguments may exist for change

5

). Rather, it conclude

within the current framework created by the nine adop

principles of war, one of the most fundamen

principles—flexibility—is missing from that structure.

6

If that structure were to change, the concept of flex

must still be preserved. In the author’s view, a failure 

U.S. military community to codify flexibility as a princ

war is not just significant, it may become profou

military operations enter the highly uncertain and co

environment of the 21st century and the Information 

2
both historical and contemporary perspectives. Notab

concept of flexibility is not a complete stranger 

warfighting tenet or principle. Then, U.S. military 

doctrine is briefly examined with a focus on the 

renaissance of Joint capstone and keystone doctrine. 

a conceptual model, the author describes how 

overarching doctrine lays the foundation for inculcati

principles in the U.S. military. This becomes the intell

framework for the monograph’s thesis. Then, the E

definitions of the word “flexibility” are revie

establishing the basis for its common understanding. T

followed by the author’s proposed doctrinal definit

flexibility as a principle of war. This definition is then 

throughout the rest of the monograph, in which flexibi

a warfighting principle is developed and justified. B

end, it should become apparent the American princi

and the prospects for future military success—c

fundamentally improved by embracing flexibility 

principle of war. First, however, it is helpful to b

review the bases for the American adopted principles

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

AND THEIR DOCTRINAL INFLUENCE

A symbiotic relationship exists between princip

war and basic doctrine. This section addresses 

relationship by first examining the historical evolut

the American principles and contemporary views 

them. It then considers the recent emergence of basi

Joint doctrine and presents a model illustratin

influence of the principles, via both Joint and S

doctrine, on U.S. military culture.

Evolution of the American-Adopted Principles

The first step is to understand the historical basis f

principles of war, reflecting Americans’ “instinctive s

for valid rules or guides.” 7 This historical review is fol

3
principles found in the literature.

Lieutenant Colonel John Alger performed a va

service when he published the definitive work, The Qu

Victory: The History of the Principles of War , in 1982. 

book he chronicles the centuries of development lead

today’s nine American adopted principles, as well as th

other major countries.

8

 Russell W. Glenn, formerly 

Army officer and now a senior defense and political a

with RAND Corporation, augments Alger’s work as w

captures much of the subsequent Western contemp

thought in his comprehensive Spring 1998 Para

article addressing the principles of war.

9

Both treatises reveal the distilled insights of the 

influential military thinkers through the ages, among 

Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Niccolai Machiavelli, Antoine-

Jomini, Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, J

Fuller, B. H. Liddell Hart, Bernard Brodie, and o

Implicit in these works is the clear realization that the

never been, nor likely ever will be, one universally acc

description or set of fundamental truths, principles, 

maxims, theories, arguments, axioms, rules, or judg

about how to consistently secure victory in conflict.

surprisingly, even agreement on what defines the conc

a “principle” eludes consensus.

11

Even so, and as Alger notes below, in the 20th ce

prescriptions for principles of war began to coalesce a

the practice of developing comprehensive lists of s

word or short-phrase aphorisms:

The term “principles of war” did not always connote the idea 

list of rules intended to facilitate the conduct of war. In fact, 

distinct definitions of the term have been widely used. First, 

principles of war represented a commonly accepted philoso

concerning the myriad activities that collectively compose 

conduct of war. In the present century, however, the idea t

the principles of war are an enumerated list of consideratio

few in number, capable of being simply expressed and essen

4
accepted.

12

This latter practice is primarily a Western one

Britain and the United States most fervently employ

In 1921, the U.S. Army formally codified for the firs

such a list of nine somewhat prescriptive “principles o

in War Department Training Regulation 10-5.

13

mirrored the J. F. C. Fuller-inspired British thinking 

time, including his interpretation of the writings of J

and Clausewitz among others, reflecting a s

Napoleonic era influence and tactical focus on the ba

The American list experienced much debate and se

perturbations (including disappearing for two ext

periods) before the U.S. Army settled, in 1949, o

version in use today.

15

 Debate notwithstanding, Ta

shows the relatively minor differences between the A

1921 version and the current list. This list has also 

adopted by the other U.S. military Services and by the 

community (discussed later).

1921 Principles Current Principl

Objective Objective

Offensive Offensive

Mass Mass

Economy of Force Economy of Force

Movement Maneuver

Surprise Surprise

Security Security

Simplicity Simplicity

Cooperation Unity of Command

Table 1. Comparison of 1921 and Current Prin

of War.

16

5
Forces Staff College (AFSC) Publication 1, compare

recent-day principles of several countries (includin

former Soviet Union). While useful, the listing of wo

the last three columns should be taken only as an Ame

interpretation of the warfighting principles embrac

those countries not a cataloguing of formally adopted t

This point is made to highlight the very American 

British) tendency in the 20th century to distill princip

war into short phrases and words. This monograph do

judge the validity of that practice; rather, it s

acknowledges that this 78-year, fully institution

practice exists and will likely continue for the forese

future. That is key to this monograph, for it is the cont

existence of a highly visible and relied upon list of prin

that demands it be well conceived and carefully des

Before discussing that further, it is helpful to consider 

recent literary works addressing the American princip

war.

United

States

Great Britain

Australia

Former Soviet

Union “Principles of 

Military Art”

France

Peop

Repub

Chin

Objective Selection &

maintenance

of aim

Selection &

Maintenance

of Aim

Offensive Offensive Action Offensive Act

Mass Concentration

of Force

Massing & Correlation 

of Forces

Concentration

of Effort

Concentratio

of Force

Economy

of Force

Economy

of Effort

Economy, Sufficiency

of Force

Maneuver Flexibility Initiative,

Mobility & Tempo

Initiative &

Flexibility

Unity

of Command

Cooperation Interworking &

Coordination

Coordination

Security Security Security

Surprise Surprise Surprise Surprise Surprise

Simplicity

Sustainability,

17

Maintenance

of Morale

Simultaneous Attack

on All Levels,

Preservation of

Combat Effectiveness

Liberty of

Action

Morale, Mob

Political Mob

Freedom of A

6

Table 2. Principles of War. 18
Any person or organization braving to pronounce 

military literature a set of “principles of war” cou

certain the list would be quickly (if not ruthl

challenged. The U.S.-adopted principles are probab

best example of that, being variously dissected, discu

supported, ridiculed, questioned, and, in general, crit

examined for nearly 80 years. That is healthy. As Ge

Frederick J. Kroesen wrote,

there is something satisfying about a set of postulates that c

be discussed, argued about, and referred to by the members 

our profession who take seriously the intellectual challenge 

war and combat operations.

19

Given their susceptibility to “intellectual attack

fact that the American-adopted principles have surviv

nearly 80 years with only minor changes is actually 

remarkable.

20

 However, as the world moves into a 

millennium, into the second decade following the colla

the Soviet Union, and into what many believe is a 

revolution in military affairs (RMA), new argumen

surfacing to modify—if not completely overhaul

American principles of war. Below are three of the 

recent treatises making such recommendations. All 

look at the issue from different perspectives.

21 Th

summarized here to give the reader a fuller perspect

current dialogue regarding the American principles of 

In 1995, five members of the U.S. Army War C

Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) published a monogr

the American principles of war focused on the strategi

operational or tactical) level of war 22 and their applica

in the 21st century.23 The authors offer a set of str

principles, within the framework of the existing 

principles, that could help guide military strategists 

more “intellectual” (read, “strategic”) aspec

warfighting.

24

 The SSI team did not directly challen

nine traditional American principles.

25 However, 

7
which, they assert, the traditional principles wer

founded—they recommend modifying the terms asso

with six of the nine principles.

26 Table 3 summariz

terminology changes.

27

Russell Glenn’s 1998 Parameters article had a dif

focus, addressing the intellectual conundrum of hav

deal with two sets of adopted principles—principles o

and now, principles of military operations other tha

(MOOTW)

28

(See Table 4). This second list was born 

the realization that a growing segment of mi

operations simply doesn’t meet the traditional definit

“war.” Hence, the principles of war were not en

applicable. Glenn suggests the U.S. Army ha

opportunity to synthesize the two lists into one 

releasing its next version of FM 100-5, Operations.

article raises many of the long-standing issues rega

the purpose, utility and application of doctrinal princip

war. Some, like below, are even recommending “wipin

slate clean.”

Traditional

Principles

“Strategic”

 Principles

Objective Objective

Offensive Initiative

Unity of Command Unity of Effort

Mass Focus

Economy of Force Economy of Effort

Maneuver Orchestration

Simplicity Clarity

Surprise Surprise

Security Security

Table 3. SSI’s “Strategic” Principles of War Ve

the Traditional Principles.

8
Objective

Perseverance

Legitimacy

Restraint

Unity of Effort

Security

Table 4. Principles of Operations Other Than 

In late 1998, Robert R. Leonhard, an active duty 

Army lieutenant colonel, released a provocative

insightful book titled The Principles of War fo

Information Age.

30

In his book, Leonhard rejects the 

set of principles of war based on what he considers both 

obsolescence and intellectual bankruptcy in dealing 

conflict.

31 Leonhard does not reject the notion of ident

and espousing principles of war. He asserts, though, 

“principle” must not be treated as an “aphorism” (wh

defined as “a truth of some sort”

32

) or a prescriptio

rather, as a basis for dialogue and argument. 33He pr

three, immutable “laws of war” underpinning his 

“principles of information age warfare.” Thes

summarized in Table 5. Though his proposed principle

at first appear to carry a format roughly similar 

traditional nine, that is where any similarity abruptly 

Unlike the first two works presented, Leonard’s calls 

radical shift in how the military uses and thinks 

principles of war, and his ideas deserve ca

consideration. In essence, the 78-year-old Ame

framework would need to be fundamentally altered

author has concluded such a change is not appropriat

presents counterarguments in Appendix II. T

arguments need not, however, detract from Leon

valuable contribution to the field.

9
LAWS OF WAR

The Law of Humanity

The Law of Economy The Law of Dua

PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION AGE WARFA

Principle of Knowledge and Ignorance

(Independent Principle)

Two Principles of

“Aggression”:

Two Principles of

“Interaction”:

Two Princip

“Control

Dislocation and

Confrontation

Opportunity and

Reaction

Option Accele

and Object

Distribution and

Concentration

Activity and Security Command 

Anarchy

Table 5. Leonhard’s Laws of War and Principl

Information Age Warfare.

34

All three works above—SSI’s, Glenn’s, and Leonha

carry relevance for this monograph in different way

are variously addressed within this monograph. 

however, it is helpful to consider the modern role o

military doctrine.

THE PRINCIPLES’ INFLUENCE THROUGH B

DOCTRINE

The right vehicle for championing the principles of 

basic doctrine.

35 That idea is succinctly stated in U.S. 

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5: “Doctrine is the engine 

drives change . . . That is so because doctrine embodi

ideas, and ideas drive change.”

36 This section examine

key relationship by first reviewing the recent “renaiss

in U.S. Joint doctrine, particularly in the developm

overarching capstone and keystone doctrinal docum

Then, the author presents a simple conceptual 

depicting how doctrinal warfighting principles are in

in the organizational culture, and how this ultim

affects warfighting ability.

10
Of the many changes brought about by 

Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986, doctrinal 

changes are now emerging as some of the most signi

and far-reaching. Title 10, United States Code, was ch

to specifically charge the Chairman of the Joint Ch

Staff (CJCS) with the responsibility for “developing do

for the joint employment of the Armed Forces.”

37 No 

individual or organization had previously been respo

for developing or promulgating Joint doctrine.

38 The 

GNA effectively established a clear doctrinal hier

shattering the operational preeminence of the sep

Service doctrines over what little Joint doctrine prev

existed.39 However, this has not, conversely, cause

“marginalization” of the Service doctrines. They re

necessarily, robust.

Most importantly, the GNA has proved the catalys

very significant and positive across-the-board refocus

all military doctrine. On the Joint side, the tangible 

has been a virtual explosion of doctrinal publications.

rapid growth has not been without problems,

41

 b

process is maturing, and the Joint doctrine framew

proving viable.

42On the Service side, doctrinal author

strive to ensure operational congruence with 

publications. References to the Joint doctrine system 

implicit submission to the Joint doctrine hierarch

clearly evident.43

This has created a heretofore-not-seen “doc

synergy” which is only recently becoming fully apprec

Though it has proved a difficult, iterative process, it ap

the Joint community and the Services, under the gu

influence of the Chairman and the dual-h

Joint/Service Chiefs, have struck a delicate but eff

balance between Joint doctrine “preeminence” and S

doctrine “freedom of expression.”

44 The resulting 

library of U.S. military Service and Joint doc

represents the doctrinal “renaissance” referred to

11
doctrine in general.

A Conceptual Model.

What that all means, in the simplest of terms, i

people are paying more attention to doctrine, and doc

in turn, is having an even stronger influence on indiv

and organizations. The following passage by Major Ge

David Sawyer, at the time the Director, J-7, Joint 

captures nicely this process of organizational influen

way of doctrine:

 The purpose of developing and disseminating authorita

doctrine under a well-regulated system is not to issue r

fighting instructions but rather to share knowledge am

warfighters. This knowledge then is internalized for use 

decisionmaking regardless of the uniqueness of the situat

rank of the individuals involved, or level of the decis

Moreover, this shared body of knowledge enables those w

must implement decisions to use their understanding of 

general principles on which they are based to achieve spe

goals.

45

 (emphasis added)

This concept of pervasive influence can be most w

applied to overarching Joint “capstone” and “keys

doctrinal documents and the Services’ “basic” doc

documents.

46 These are the same documents traditio

used to codify the American principles of war, and t

done without exception in the above Joint, Army, Air 

and Navy doctrine documents. Most notably, the Am

principles are prominently discussed in Chapter III of 

Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces 

United States,

47

as well as in Chapter II of Joint Publi

3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations , with expa

definitions in a dedicated appendix.

48

 Here, 

Publication 3-0 unabashedly states the principles o

“are the enduring bedrock of U.S. military doctr

Similar statements are made in the Service 

doctrines.

50

 That message regarding the importance 

principles, as well as the nine principles thems

12
training, through all levels of professional mi

education, operational training, policy ma

requirements, and resourcing decisions, Joint and S

planning, and ultimately operational execution

principles influence activities in some way.

The model in Figure 1 graphically portrays these 

direct and indirect influences, with basic doc

representing both the catalyst and the continu

thought. As a measure of the comprehensiveness o

influence, the model shows how all six of the traditiona

Army Doctrine, Training, Leader Developm

Organization, Materiel, and Soldier Support (DTL

domains are touched in the process.

51 Not only are tr

and leader development heavily influenced

organizational decisions, materiel procurement and s

(i.e., personnel) support are at least indirect benefic

Lastly, as can also be seen, the process is one of conti

reinforcement.

Hence, the principles of war are becoming more d

ingrained in U.S. military culture—and in the mind 

American warfighter—as basic doctrine grows in relev

Conversely, instituting any change in these fundam

cultural beliefs about warfighting must start with 

doctrine. As will be shown, one such change is in ord

13
14

Figure 1. The Cascading Influence of Basi

Doctrine on Leader Development and

Organizational Culture.
Nothing is changeless.

59

— Mao Tse-tung

Appropriately, Mao was writing about the need to 

doctrine relevant for the times. Actually, for 

monograph’s purposes, his statement carries an even 

transcendent message. The genuine conviction 

“nothing is changeless” is the essence of flexibilit

suggested previously, institutionalizing that belief 

American military culture begins with changing 

doctrine.

53 This section expands on that imperati

considering definitions of both the word and the doc

principle of flexibility, and then by justifying flexib

value as a principle of war in both conceptual and ta

ways.

Given the assumption that common or so

perceptions of a word’s meaning cannot be controlled

important to understand and appreciate flexib

common definitions. These definitions are reviewed b

followed by the author’s proposed doctrinal definition 

principle of flexibility.

Common Definitions of “Flexibility.”

The common definitions of “flexibility,” includin

word’s synonyms, represent the center point from 

individual interpretations of its meaning begin to di

Surveying the field of popular dictionaries yielded 

consistent definitions for the word “flexible” (a

dictionaries define “flexibility” [the adverb] as “the q

or state of being flexible,” or something to that effe

representative set of these three definitions of “flexible

adjective), in the order listed, is: “1. Capable of being b

flexed; pliable. 2. Susceptible to influence or persu

tractable. 3. Responsive to change; adaptable: a f

schedule.”54 Popular synonyms for “flexible” (in alphab

15
limber, malleable, resilient, plastic, pliable/pliant, sp

and supple.55 The aggregate of these definition

common synonyms captures the idea, or conce

flexibility that has to be accepted when considering h

public at large identifies with the word. Similarly

cannot stray far from this idea or concept in formula

description of flexibility as a principle of war.

Proposed Doctrinal Definition.

Below is the author’s proposed doctrinal definit

flexibility as a principle of war. It makes primary use 

third and first common definitions above (in that orde

it does not completely avoid the second, for a c

“susceptibility” to influence is deemed a positive attr

suggestive of a healthy open-mindedness. 56 The doc

definition also incorporates several of flexibility’s 

common synonyms. The bullet format of the 

definition parallels those definitions found in 

Publication 3-0 (which all begin with, “The purpose of”

term “military operations” (versus “war” or “confli

other term) was specifically chosen to permit 

application as a principle of war, or of operations other 

war, or simply, as a principle of operations.

57

Flexibility

• #1 (Short Definition): The purpose of flexibility is 

responsive to change and adaptable to the vola

pressures and complexities of military operations, 

constantly focusing on the objective.

 •#2 (Expanded, Supporting Definition): Flexibi

both a state of mind and a characteristic of eff

military units. It is an antidote to surprise, uncer

and chance. Flexibility represents the fundam

ability to avoid dogmatic rigidity and to “bend” as 

situation demands—to be receptive, responsive

adaptive—and like a flexible, resilient rod, to n

16
adapt to changing conditions in opportunisti

innovative ways, yet never lose focus on the comma

intent. Flexible leaders encourage critical, cre

thinking, ensuring all realistic alternatives and po

outcomes are considered throughout mission pla

and execution. Flexibility—the antithesis of rigidi

the crucial ability to synthesize all of the principle

to prioritize their application in each unique situat

ensure success.

It is important to immediately appreciate two tec

points about this doctrinal definition. First, the princ

flexibility is congruent with the structure of the existin

i.e., it represents a condition, activity, behavior, or 

(primarily the first three) deemed essential to succ

war. Second, the concept is similar to the other princip

that it is applicable (maybe more so than any of the 

nine) across a very broad horizontal and vertical spe

of activity. Armed with this definition, it is now instr

to consider the full power of the concept of flexibilit

principle of war.

FILLING THE CONCEPTUAL “GAP”

How forcible are right words!58

— The Holy Bible: Job

As discussed earlier, the “right” word or idea, effec

promulgated, will positively influence people 

organizations. This section focuses on the warfig

power derived from the word, and from the id

flexibility. Following that, the author postulates o

subtle yet specious reasoning that has likely prev

flexibility’s adoption as a principle of war.

17
The above doctrinal definition not only re

flexibility’s enormous strength as a warfighting pri

across the wide range of military operations, but also 

acts as an enabling mechanism to synthesize the 

principles. It underpins them, while paying due hom

the preeminent principle of objective.

59

 This represen

unique, “dual-hatted” nature of flexibility as b

principle and as a harmonizing force for the others. T

depicted in Figure 2. Note how the central focus is o

principle of objective, while flexibility synthesize

application of all the principles.

If one were forced to distill all principles of war in

thought, or one idea, the most basic would have to b

notion of “winning,” or “victory,” or “success,” or “ach

18

Figure 2. Flexibility’s “Dual-Hatted” Role as a Prin

of War and as a Synthesizer of the Other Princip
permitted to combine that with just one additiona

few if any carry the universal utility and transce

power of the concept of flexibility. 60 Conside

followingdescriptions of the essential thinking of t

history’s master strategists:

Sun Tzu believed that the only constant in war is consta

change and to illustrate this he used several figures of spee

among which is “of the five elements, none is alwa

predominant.” . . . Sun Tzu sees the business of a general 

consist, in part, of . . . manipulating [changes] to 

advantage. . . [His] theory of adaptability to existing situatio

is an important aspect of his thought. Just as water ada

itself to the conformation of the ground, so in war one must 

flexible; he must often adapt his tactics to the enemy situat

. . . [revealing] another aspect of the intellectual pliancy wh

distinguishes the expert in war.

61 (emphasis added)

[Clausewitz asserted one of the permanent characteristics 

war] was the free play of human intelligence, will a

emotions. These were the forces that dominated the chaos 

warfare . . . [He] exposed the inadequacy of prescript

systems when faced with the infinite resources of the mind a

spirit . . . The realm of genius . . . rises above all the rules 

Theory and its resultant doctrines are thus subordinate to t

great creative talent, and to the universals of reason a

feeling that it expresses.

62

While each was somewhat different in focus, bot

Tzu and Clausewitz were distilling warfighting down 

essentially intellectual pursuit of the object withi

unavoidable environments of chance, change, chaos

friction. In essence, what both theorists are str

suggesting is the fundamental need for a disposit

flexibility.

Further, the need for flexibility is equally strong 

levels of war—tactical, operational, and strate

although it can manifest itself in different ways a

different levels. The SSI monograph (discussed earli

noteworthy attempt to capture “higher level” warfig

19
framework of the last 78 years—reveals the inh

difficulty of making one set of terms apply to a

essentials and levels of warfighting. However, the au

would doubtless have found no reason to modify the te

the concept of flexibility in describing this tenth str

principle of war. On the tactical and operational leve

same holds true. The infantry scout platoon, unexpe

hit with nerve agent, suffering heavy casualties and c

from its command structure; the air expeditionary 

commander, still deploying enroute to the forward bas

forced to generate initial strike sorties 24 hours ahead 

planned H-hour due to enemy advances; the joint 

commander whose entire primary and secon

operational C

3

 links are electronically sabotaged d

combat strike operations; or the theater commander in 

(CINC) ordered to prosecute a high-risk, short-

amphibious noncombatant evacuation operation—

these units and leaders will better cope with 

situations through flexible planning, or if planning 

through flexible adaptation. Flexibility conditions the 

to accept the tactical, operational, and strategic trut

no plan survives first contact. It helps create a c

“tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity.” Cl

flexibility carries broad applicability across the wide 

of military activities.

Moreover, when taking the view that preparatio

war are an essential aspect of war fighting, the bene

adopting flexibility as a principle become greatly magn

While flexibility’s strengths are most easily conceptu

in the “post-contact” phase of conflict, i.e., as a res

flexible planning can be the vital force that shape

outcome. A flexible planning disposition is one that 

necessarily satisfied with the first answer nor the po

one. It represents a critical search for blind spot

overlooked branches and sequels within the time ava

to plan. Flexible leaders carry a healthy respect for ch

uncertainty, and friction, creating an environmen

20
during planning. Finally, flexible warfighters coupl

skill with a decisive sense of purpose and timing, a

knowing when to “move out.”

Preparations for war, however, comprise much 

than the tactical and operational planning described a

and flexibility plays a key role here, too. The Figure 1 

depicts how a doctrinal appreciation for flexibility to

all DTLOMS domains, influencing everyday though

behavior. This heightened cultural appreciatio

flexibility creates a circular pattern of reinforce

whereby adaptiveness, creativity and innovation wo

institutionalized in every facet of the organization. T

turn creates economies that free up resources. In th

preparations for war and war waging ability are enhan

Flexibility also intuitively applies to any m

operation, whether or not strictly defined as “war.” R

Glenn’s recent monograph (discussed earlier) highligh

military’s growing roles in non-warlike missions an

challenge of capturing “principles of non-war” in doc

The current six “Principles of Military Operations 

Than War” found in Joint Publications 3-0 and 3-07 (a

some Service documents) capture the MOOTW princip

a fashion similar to the nine war principles. Much lik

nine principles, a conceptual gap exists, and it is this 

synthesizing force—flexibility—which is missing. 

can be no more compelling need for flexibility than, s

the environment of a large peacekeeping operation. Un

or evolving objectives and difficult interagency coo

tion, complex regional socio-cultural and nationa

sources of hostile intent, numerous international m

forces represented under different commanders, and l

controlled private and nongovernmental organizatio

pursuing various agendas and under various sets of 

are the norm. In this environment, flexibility is not on

“antidote to surprise, uncertainty, and chance,” 

encourages a mindset that helps overcome frustr

21
military operations other than war.

Equally important, flexibility is tacit recognition 

doctrine—including the principles of war themselves—

never become dogma. Flexibility underscores the n

that every principle need not apply with equal util

every situation (some even suggest, for example, tha

[current nine] principles of war themselves in some 

contradict each other”

64

). The idea that all principles a

equally and completely useful in all cases may offend 

who believes in their inviolate sanctity. Howeve

essence of flexibility is to not take so lofty (or dogma

view. The forms that conflict can take—and henc

solutions—can be infinite. This represents the c

synthesizing function of the concept and princi

flexibility

Interestingly, and in this same vein, many works 

literature addressing the principles of war can be thou

as pleas for flexible application of the principles thems

It is as though an unwritten rule exists (discussed m

the next section) suggesting that flexibility is not to be 

as a principle.

6 5 This, in turn, drives volum

discussions on the need to flexibly apply the prin

Consider the following passage from Robert Leon

work:

. . . we usually find that most writing on principles of war

recognizes the need for flexible application. The requiremen

flexibility derives from two factors. First, . . . every milit

situation is different. Therefore, the theory and practice of a

must adapt to each unique situation. But the other fa

requiring flexible application is that the principles of 

themselves in some ways contradict each other . . . t

requiring great flexibility of thought and application.

66

This is a recurring theme in the literature. General 

A. Starry, following his tour as U.S. Army Trainin

Doctrine (TRADOC) Commander, authored a much

article on the principles of war. Like Leonhard, he m

22
using the word. Consider his statement below (c

terms are italicized by this author for emphasis):

The military professional derives from this analysis 

warfare] the fundamental principles—their combinations a

applications—which have produced success on the battlefie

of history. The principles of war thus derived are, therefore

part of the art rather than the science of war. They are neit

immutable nor causal, nor do they provide prec

mathematical formula for success in battle. Their value lies 

their utility as a frame of reference for analysis of strategic a

tactical issues.67

Author Paul Katz made the same point in a rudime

but clear fashion when he wrote, “It seems the princi

war are incomplete and that some of the principles ar

only in particular situations.”

68

 Very true, yet 

principle within the current list conveys those imp

points? His statement makes for a good point of depa

As will be discussed below, it is time to resolve both 

dilemmas he describes.

Unlocking the Concept—Overcoming Intellect

Obstacles.

As seen, strong intuitive arguments support flex

as a principle of war. That, of course, begs the question

isn’t flexibility an adopted principle? Why does it seem 

suppressed? There appear several reasons for this, ye

of them, after close analysis, justify flexibility’s exclus

a principle of war. The author must emphasize the foll

are purely intuitive arguments—little, if any, quali

support exists; therefore, the author tried not to stray t

from clear, supportable logic. On the other hand, 

extent this section simply attempts to explain 

flexibility is absent, the author takes some license. L

explore each argument.

First, one could reason that flexibility is adequ

represented within the principle of maneuver. The op

23
to support that. It states, “The purpose of maneuve

place the enemy in a position of disadvantage throug

flexible application of combat power.”

69

 Typical discu

of the concept of maneuver invariably highlight flexibi

one way or another. In fact, effective maneuver dem

high degrees of flexibility—both mental and physical

is not contestable. But the key question becomes, are t

concepts sufficiently similar to warrant exclusion of on

the other as a principle of war ? The answer is no. Flex

brings too much to the table that maneuver cannot; so 

so, that some militaries have adopted flexibility 

principle at the expense of listing maneuver .

70 Incorpo

flexibility would actually release some of the cu

“semantic burdens” on the principle of maneuver, allow

better focus on its more traditional, physical definition

“borrowing as needed” from the companion princi

flexibility. While the word “flexibility” isn’t found with

Joint Publication 3-0 definitions of the other principle

concept is nearly as prevalent as it is in maneuver, 

reflecting flexibility’s unique yet crucial synthes

value.

71

 Hence, the maneuver argument is weak at b

Second, the above logic might dangerously lead 

almost opposite and equally incorrect conclusion; i.e

flexibility is so pervasive and fundamental, that “i

without saying.” What “principle,” however, could 

“fundamental” that it “goes without saying?” The Ser

in what sometimes seems an attempt to compensa

flexibility’s absence as a principle of war, have mani

the term in other ways. The U.S. Air Force has co

“flexibility and versatility” as “tenets of aerospace pow

AFDD-1.

72

 The U.S. Army lists flexibility as a “ch

teristic” of the defense and lists the sister conce

versatility and agility as “tenets” of Army Operations.

U.S. Navy, in Chapter One of NDP-1, contains the foll

statement in the section titled, “The Character of 

Forces:”

24
political instruments in support of national policies are t

same as those that define the essence of our naval Servi

today. These qualities are readiness, flexibili

self-sustainability, and mobility.

74

Some Joint doctrine documents reflect similar e

For example, Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Lo

Support of Joint Operations , lists flexibility as one the 

Principles of Logistics.

75 Some of this can be attribu

valid uses of the term “flexibility” to describe sp

capabilities or requirements within an activity or me

i.e., not as a principle of war. However, as shown

concept of flexibility carries much broader application

an essential, immutable requirement for success, supp

by the teachings of history’s great strategists. Can any

demonstrated so fundamentally important in w

excluded as a principle of war? Clearly, the answer i

Third, could it be—and the author’s evidence h

anecdotal at best—that the notion of flexibility con

something distasteful to the psyche of the Ame

military officer? This is admittedly a weaker argumen

it may contribute in some way to a cultural suppress

the word. Recall that the second of three tradi

definitions of flexibility address a “susceptibilit

influence or persuasion. While this is the least applica

the three definitions as a principle of war, 76 the c

certainly doesn’t play well intuitively against the 

prevalent Napoleonic and Jominian era notio

annihilation, total war, if not the sometimes 

glorification of the offensive. Sun Tzu’s indirect appr

which the U.S. military never fully appreciated durin

Vietnam conflict (to its demise), seems to play more 

intuitive notion of flexibility. One could ask wh

Pickett’s Charge, or Verdun, or other large-s

force-on-force human disasters might have happene

the leaders of the day had a more ingrained appreciati

the notion of flexibility. Though these rhetorical if 

simplified questions have no easy answers, the aut

25
way be contributing to flexibility’s suppression today

Similarly, flexibility can be thought of as acti

cross-purposes with doctrine itself. Doctrine is lo

defined as “the way things ought to be done.” Flexibili

represent just the opposite! If taking this to the 

extreme notion of nonconformity, flexibility ca

perceived as heresy in a rigid, dogmatic environment. 

this author is in no way encouraging a disrega

established rules and norms, leaders must conv

appreciate the dangers of “blind” adherence—as w

leadership styles that demand it. There is plen

anecdotal evidence to suggest stifling, nonfle

dispositions exist in the military. Some believe this 

pervasive norm. Respected military academician 

sociologist Gregory Foster, in a classic think piece o

state of today’s officer corps, recently wrote the follow

As an institution, the military largely discourages independ

thought and critical inquiry. This is an unfortuna

self-defeating contradiction for a profession whose raison d’

is closely tied to outwitting adversaries and grappling w

uncertainty. Undue emphasis on obedience and loyalty to 

chain of command stifles dissent and erodes the spirit of inqu

so critical to institutional vitality. Pervasive doctr

regulations, and operating procedures breed an orthodoxy t

drives out any felt need for originality . . . Moreover, there 

few rewards for . . . “unproductive” intellectual pursuits. By 

time officers reach senior rank, they have been thoroug

schooled in what to think, yet poorly prepared in how to think

If one accepts Foster’s portrait—even if only parti

it is hard to deny the existence of some level of bu

cultural aversion to both the notion of flexibility as w

any suggestion to change basic doctrine to b

accommodate it.

There seems, in fact, an almost inescapable “gr

associated with challenging the integrity of a l

warfighting principles described in Joint keystone do

as “enduring bedrock.”78 Such a phrase is a prot

26
ideas truly prized by the institution. There is much va

that. But that also carries a certain danger which 

have recognized over the ages. Rigid adheren

prescriptive warfighting “rules” is likely as responsib

past military failures as any other general cause. Ado

flexibility as a principle of war and reinforcing that co

would introduce a moderating influence to counte

danger. “Doctrinal flexibility” need not be an oxym

Moreover, a doctrine that espouses flexibility 

fundamental principle may help warfighters 

effectively glean “true” lessons from past operation

avoid repeat mistakes. As historian Williamson M

writes:

Throughout history, military organizations . . . have tended 

extract from their experiences as well as the experiences 

others only what supported their preconceived notio

[emphasis added]. In fact, existing doctrine has in most cas

become a barrier to adaptation and improveme

Unfortunately, military historians have largely ignored 

process in which doctrine and battlefield experiences inter

and the ways in which armies adapt or do not adapt to t

changing conditions.

79

Could it be that our doctrine, in its present form, hi

that effective adaptation? Has the concept of flexibilit

principle of war, simply been missing? One thing is ce

the need to think and act in ways counter to dogmat

habitual forces will only grow as we move into the 

century.

THE GROWING IMPERATIVE

This monograph has thus far made the case for flex

as a missing principle of war. In the next millennium

need for flexibility in all military operations will s

grow. Debate over the very nature of future wa

including the forms conflict will take, is prov

consuming activity. Potentially tectonic shifts in the w

27
existing arguments for flexibility, but they will driv

ones. To effectively grapple with these points, 

important to first attempt a rational prediction of wh

future portends.

The Future Global Security Environment.

The future global security picture remains mur

best. In its 1998 Strategic Assessment, the Institu

National Strategic Studies loosely bounds its predi

with optimistic and pessimistic scenarios:

In the best plausible case, an expanded core or commonwealt

peaceful democracies could encompass most of the planet—w

U.S. partners shouldering an increased share of the burde

defending common interests and norms. China would ref

and integrate into the core, rogue states and nonstates would 

defanged, state failures would be averted, and energy 

infrastructure would be secure. In the worst case, U.S. frie

could be free riders instead of responsible partners, Chi

reforms would founder, state failures would multiply, 

rogues armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

nonstate actors would threaten the energy supplies 

infrastructure of the core—leaving the [United States] supe

but beleaguered. Well-armed enemies would be tempted 

threaten the interests of the United States, using the fea

high casualties and possible attacks on the state itsel

degrade America’s ability to project power and national wil

Narrowing that call toward the pessimistic side (a

no means alone in his view), foreign policy analyst 

Twining predicts traditional diplomacy and po

processes—and the current promise of multila

cooperation—will not be sufficient to deal with lo

global challenges due to the inability of tradi

institutions to adapt quickly enough.

81 Adding comp

to that picture, Lieutenant General Claudia Ken

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headqua

Department of the Army, suggests “historians may we

the decades surrounding the change from the s

28
and simultaneous revolutions.”

82

 In sum, the co

predictive threads for the evolving global sec

environment are: significant complexity, turbulent ch

wildly ranging scenarios of power centers and pola

multiple revolutions across several domains, and—

importantly in this author’s opinion—prof

uncertainty.

83

From a warfighting perspective, the implication

daunting. First, the spectrum of possible conflict wil

widen, and the military’s charge to “fight” and “win

take on an increasingly broader scope. This demand

U.S. military continue its relevant industrial age pra

while also adapting to new and evolving types of f

conflict, including multiple forms of asymmetrical wa

Further, many believe we are undergoing a fundam

revolution in military affairs (RMA), while others co

we are simply seeing technological change on a grand 

Regardless, there is no denying the watershed c

around us. The U.S. military must shift its think

encompass a larger spectrum of warfare to both reduc

and remain viable. Editors Barry R. Schneide

Lawrence E. Grinter come to a similar conclusion in 

recent book, Battlefield of the Future; 21st Century W

Issues: 

. . . the dangers of confronting an adversary with weapons 

mass destruction or the capacity for strategic informat

warfare may prompt a very different thinking about 

traditional “principles of war.” Preparing for such 

eventuality will require some major changes in C

3

I (comma

control, communications, and intelligence), military doctri

operational strategy, acquisition, equipment, logisti

coalition building, coalition warfare, and war terminati

Some changes may even be necessary in foreign pol

regarding the kinds of commitments that U.S. vulnerabiliti

capabilities, and interests will permit in a more proliferat

world or one where the enemy has utilized the technolog

and methods of information warfare.

84

29
warfare; namely, there is much hedging. That is 

expected, given the ambiguities, complexities

uncertainties in the coming millennium. As w

discussed, incorporating flexibility as a principle of w

the appropriate and fundamental way to help dea

these evolving challenges.

Flexibility’s Utility in the 21st Century.

In 1996, General John M. Shalikashvili, then Cha

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), unveiled his “conce

template” to address joint warfighting in the ev

post-Cold War environment. This template was titled 

Vision 2010 (JV 2010).

85 While JV 2010’s releas

sparked a vigorous debate over its relative merits,

undeniably a unique and bold attempt to provide wr

visionary direction where none previously existed

Services are, for the most part, coalescing behind JV 

and adopting the conceptual framework formed by th

“emerging operational concepts” of Dominant Man

Precision Engagement, Focused Logistics, and 

Dimensional Protection, each enabled by Inform

Superiority and Technological Innovation.

87

A salient point for this monograph is that JV 201

its follow-on, supporting publication, Concept for F

Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 20

repeatedly and pervasively use the terms “flexibility

“adaptability.” This reflects the clear realization 

flexibility is crucial to successfully negotiating the f

global security environment. Flexibility as a doc

warfighting principle would help foster open-minded

judgmental Service cultures, helping to further ove

destructive Service parochialisms while protecting S

identities. Jointness would be more clearly seen as th

enabler for flexible warfighting, encouraging deeper 

and understanding among all the Services.

30
definition as a principle of war, one can see the concep

broad utility at all three levels of conceivable future co

(as well as MOOTW operations). At the tac

operational, and even strategic levels, a prime exam

the requirement to flexibly task organize fo

conceivable contingency. U.S. Joint doctrine addressi

formation of joint and combined contingency forces i

hailed for its extreme flexibility and demonst

effectiveness. Recent emphasis on “adaptive joint 

packaging” is a good example of efforts in this deca

recapture the art of flexibly tailoring forces for any 

contingency.

89

 The Services are similarly followin

within their roles as force providers. The U.S. Air F

evolving and robust expeditionary aerospace force 

concept and the U.S. Army’s Force XXI emphas

“tailorability and modularity” reflect this emphas

flexible task organizing.

90 These efforts would be fu

and directly reinforced by adopting flexibility 

American principle of war.

Moreover, when considering preparations for w

part of the larger context of warfighting, flexibility’s 

increases. Tactically and operationally, in battle 

campaign planning, a flexible disposition demands th

reasonable courses of action, branches, and sequels be 

explored and developed in the time available. Fl

responses are often born of flexible planning. Furth

tomorrow’s unfolding environment where asymmetri

other nontraditional threats will become more prev

open-minded, nonjudgmental and critical thin

skills—at all ranks and levels of war—will become the 

to eliminate dangerous blind spots and develop eff

solutions. That is flexibility.

Flexible preparations for war can also take on a bro

more strategic shape in the form of force modernizatio

experimentation efforts. The recent creation of 

warfighting capability assessment (JWCA) team

“innovation engines” within the Joint Requirem

31
approach to solving Service interoperability 

modernization challenges.

91

 Similarly, the mili

emerging emphasis on aggressive experimentation 

simulation directly supports the principle of flexi

Conversely, adopting flexibility as a principle of war 

send a powerful message and act as a unifying force fo

efforts. Focused, innovative problem-solving appro

and creative experimentation would be routinely rew

at all levels, from the laboratory, to the Service and 

training/warfighting centers, to Service, Joint

congressional resource allocation activities, fostering 

greater releases of creative energies and yielding 

rewards.

Finally, as discussed earlier, future forms of warfa

take many paths, and much uncertainty lies a

Strategists will continue to evaluate the principles of w

this evolving security environment and judge 

relevance. To the degree new forms of warfare are ad

to existing forms, the principles will retain some le

validity. To the degree new forms of warfare repla

forms, the principles’ future validity must be re-t

Either way, one thing is certain: as we move into th

century, the need for flexibility as an adopted princ

war will only grow.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This monograph makes the case for flexibility 

principle of war, but neither challenges nor speci

indorses the other nine principles, which have ex

unchanged, for nearly 50 years. That was not the fo

this monograph. Nor does it challenge, in a more ge

sense, the long-standing practice of codifying a l

“pseudo-prescriptive” terms designed to capture our 

essential and enduring warfighting principles. Rathe

author accepts that highly institutionalized fram

while arguing the concept of flexibility is largely m

from it. Over the years, this omission has been amelio

32
which implicitly suggests a “disposition of flexib

However, that suggestion or message to the warfigh

inconsistent at best. Given the evolving, highly com

and uncertain future global security environment, su

ambiguity could prove disastrous. There will simply 

room for rigid, nonadaptive dispositions and behavio

preclude any further ambiguity in the message, ther

the principle of flexibility must be more clearly 

forcefully espoused by senior U.S. military leadership

The right end-state is formal codification of flexibi

a principle of war in the appropriate U.S. Joint and S

basic doctrinal documents. To best ensure this c

occurs in an orderly, hierarchical fashion, cap

doctrinal document Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare 

Armed Forces of the United States , and keystone doc

document Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for 

Operations, should be modified first. These are th

overarching Joint warfighting doctrinal docum

addressing the principles of war. This change mu

accompanied by aggressive oversight and coordinati

the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, working with all other 

and Service doctrinal organizations, so that similar ch

in appropriate Joint and Service doctrine documents fo

To arrive at this end-state, lively and broad debate 

first take place within the military community. This a

encourages such debate yet cautions that unlike the 

unconstrained American deliberative process, succ

warfighting strategies must sometimes be developed 

“tighter” schedules. Put simply, we need to get on wit

debate, because the time to fully embrace flexibility 

principle of war is now. Responsibility for stimulatin

dialogue rests with senior military leaders and strate

with strong backing from the literary commu

Ultimately, through this process, the Director, J-7, 

Staff, would receive the necessary guidance from 

Chairman (hopefully with full consensus and support 

33
procedure previously described.

These recommendations no doubt carry h

administrative challenges, conjuring an ima

re-chiseling age-old stone tablets of immutable truth 

military speak, “re-writing a lot of regs”). Bu

administrative cost of change pales in comparison 

long-term benefits. Doctrine must remain both nimbl

responsive to warfighting needs. One parad

implementing this change is that it will take an attit

flexibility to culturally adopt and instill one. Yet that 

challenge of senior leadership—to know and appr

what is truly right for the organization, and then

vision and determination, be the catalyst for po

change.

CONCLUSION

The difference between the almost-right word & the right w

is really a large matter—it is the difference between 

lightning bug and the lightning.

92

— Mark Twain

This monograph has focused on one word. 

specifically, it has focused on the absence of the word

the warfighting principle of—flexibility. The purpose w

underscore the seemingly subtle, yet significan

positive influence this single word would have if codif

a principle of war. Some would argue we live in a wo

sound bites and aphorisms, and the modern-day prin

of war are no more than a dangerous manifestation o

not warranting serious attention. Yet to ignore this 78

institutionalized practice is to ignore the principles

real influence on the fabrics of U.S. military Join

Service cultures. Senior leaders must understand 

appreciate that this simple list called the “principles o

carries transcendent powers to affect behavior and th

34
that speaks directly to this profession’s reason for be

U.S. military doctrine recently received a much-n

shot in the arm, sparked by the 1986 Goldwater-N

Act, resulting in a renewed emphasis on Joint and S

doctrinal publications. As a result, warfighters are p

more attention to doctrine. At the same time, titan

revolutionary changes in the global security environ

are creating uncertainties on a grand scale. “Conflic

take on new forms, yet traditional forms will re

Warfighting resources will remain at a premium

strategies to fight and win at all levels of conflict 

continue to evolve in highly adaptive, innovative

creative ways.

This all combines to underscore the imperative to 

flexibility as a principle of war in basic doctrine. Th

doctrine, a deepened cultural appreciation for flex

would be instilled, as would the capability of warfig

units to effectively adapt and respond to the prev

change and uncertainty of the times. Ultimately, flex

becomes the synthesizing force to prioritize the appli

of all of the principles of war to meet each unique chal

across the wide range of military operations.

As Mark Twain suggested, words do make a diffe

Pronouncing flexibility as an American principle of w

Joint and Service doctrine would drive a subtl

profoundly important heading change as the U.S. m

confronts its growing responsibilities into the 

millennium.

ENDNOTES

1. From Fables, Book 1, Fable 22, 1668. See Jean de La Fo

The Fables of La Fontaine, Marianne Moore, trans., New York

Press, 1954, p. 33.

2. Some doctrinal circles, particularly within the U.S. Arm

considered adopting the term “principles of operations” as a way 

fully capture the spectrum of military activities. This term

35
the principle of flexibility would apply equally to the ac

represented by either term.

3. Bernard Brodie, for example, discusses Clausewitz’s “pron

disinclination to provide formulas or axioms as guides to a

Brodie continues,

[Clausewitz] is often intent upon demonstrating the pitfall

such axioms . . . [and], on the contrary, invites his reader

ruminate with him on the complex nature of war, where 

rule that admits of no exceptions is usually too obvious to 

worth much discourse.

See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Pete

eds., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 57. Ru

Weigley, in his famous treatise, The American Way of War, sta

The principles of war tended during the 1920s, and stil

today, to receive inordinate attention. Amid the harsh pressu

of war and combat it is surely helpful to have at hand s

straightforward guides to conduct, but the principles are 

straightforwardly simple and general that they can lead ast

almost as easily as they can assist.

See Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War, Blooming

Indiana University Press, 1973, p. 214. As will be discussed 

monograph, culturally instilling the notion of flexibility wit

current framework would likely serve to obviate the very d

Brodie and Weigley, among others, are referring to.

4. This presumes the framework created by the American-a

“principles of war” is not fundamentally or radically altered in 

manner that the term “flexibility” loses parallel structure. If that 

happen, this author would assert the “essence” of flexibilit

remain an integral concept of that new structure or framework

5. Several of these arguments will be reviewed. Regardless

spectrum of conceivable forms of warfare expands, the a

principles of war must be tested for their universality. This mon

is a product of that belief.

6. Though beyond the scope of this monograph, this author 

there may exist a second, significant conceptual gap in the frame

adopted American principles—namely, the concept, or princ

“sustainment” or “logistics” (similar to the principle of “sustain

36
principle of “administration”). This relates to the widely-held 

that “resourcing” or sustaining the activities of war or conf

always prove an inherent challenge that must be effectively add

The author has not thoroughly researched this subject nor conce

and rigorously tested “sustainment” against the unde

requirement that, to be a principle, it must be a broad, enduring 

(or “basis for argument,” as will be discussed), applicable acr

range of military activities. It certainly warrants additional re

For a discussion of sustainment as an adopted principle of w

British Ministry of Defence, British Defence Doctrine, Joint W

Publication, (JWP) 0-01, London: Caldwell Prince, Ltd., 1997, 

A-8. Also see Stephanie A. Rast, The Tenth Principle, Mon

Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Marc

wherein the author argues for the principle of sustainment. Fina

Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter, eds., Battlefiel

Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Un

Press, 1998, pp. 32-36, in which Dr. Schneider argues for the prin

“logistics” (one of four proposed new principles of war, of which th

three do not qualify in the author’s view). In any case, by first a

flexibility as a principle of war, the conditions are best set for a r

and critical debate over sustainment, or any other concept consi

potential “principle” of war.

7. Marshall L. Falwell, “The Principles of War and the Sol

Military Problems,” Military Review, May 1955, p. 62.

8. Alger cites over 100 “principles” (that term is used loose

that have been proposed or embraced by various strategists, mi

and nations. See John I. Alger, The Quest for Victory: The Histo

Principles of War, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982.

9. Russell W. Glenn, “No More Principles of War?,” Para

Spring 1998, pp. 48-66. Glenn’s title is misleading, because it is 

focus of his article. His point, rather, is that (at the writing of the 

the draft of the U.S. Army’s basic doctrine manual, U.S. Arm

Manual (FM) 100-5, did not reflect any changes to the long-stan

of American adopted principles nor attempt to synthesize it w

recently developed list of “principles of military operations oth

war.” In other words, Glenn believes the Army may be mis

opportunity to make appropriate, possibly substantive change

adopted set of principles. He does not suggest, as his title impli

the principles of war be abolished in favor of no list.

10. The author uses the term “conflict” interchangeably w

term “war.” This is a more traditional use of the word, versus it

37
between “war” and “peace.”

11. Notably, Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Milit

Associated Terms, which is over 600 pages long and defines thous

terms, does not define the word “principle” nor the term “princ

war.” Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, doe

“The principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, oper

and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of U.S. m

doctrine.” See U.S. Joint Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operation

Publication 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

February 1, 1995, p. A-1.

12. Glenn, p. 48. Glenn is quoting from an earlier work wr

Alger at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Colleg

Leavenworth, KS.

13. Donn A. Starry, “The Principles of War,” Military 

September 1981, p. 5.

14. Some would argue Clausewitz, or Jomini, or both, might o

the notion of codifying principles of war in a deterministic list 

this. Others would argue these authors would allow the p

provided certain caveats accompany the list. Regardless, the

denying the list’s creation was heavily influenced by J. F. C. 

thoughts on the subject, including his interpretation of the wri

these two strategists. Much of Fuller’s matured thinking on the 

was later summarized in his 1926 work, The Foundations of the 

of War, London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1926, reprinted by U.S

Command and General Staff College Press, Ft Leavenworth, KS

15. According to Glenn, the list disappeared after 19

reemerged as a list of seven “general principles” for use dur

“conduct of war” in the U.S. Army’s 1939 FM 100-5, Tentativ

Service Regulations, Operations. There was no list of principle

1941 FM 100-5; the reader was instead presented with 

“doctrines of combat”: ultimate objective, simple and direct pla

methods, unity of effort, offensive action, concentration of s

forces, surprise, and security. Then, in the 1949 FM 100-5, the cu

adopted list of principles emerged. Interestingly, only “maneuv

“unity of command” stand in the place of the original “moveme

“cooperation,” respectively, found in the 1921 version. See Gle

50-52. Lastly, Alger notes that “as the [U.S.] turned its attenti

the humiliating lessons learned in Southeast Asia, it briefly drop

‘principles’ from official doctrinal sources. But the ‘principles’ 

38
Alger, p. 169.

16. Starry, p. 5.

17. Australian military doctrine lists the princ

“Administration” instead of this principle.

18. Primary source: National Defense University,The Joint 

Staff Guide 1997, Armed Forces Staff College Publica

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997, pp. 1

author modified the AFSC Publication 1 table to more correctly 

the Great Britain and Australian principle of “Economy of Effo

AFSC Publication 1 Table lists it as “Economy of Force”). Furthe

Britain’s previous principle of “administration” was replaced 

principle of “sustainability” (neither was listed in AFSC Publica

See JWP 0-01, p. A-8. See also: Doctrine Branch, Headquarters T

Command (Australian Army), The Fundamentals of Land W

Georges Heights, New South Wales, Australia: Ventura Pu

1993, p. 25. This publication cites Australian Defense Force Publ

(AFDP) 1, Doctrine, as its source for the Australian principles o

19. Alger, p. ix.

20. As General Starry rhetorically suggests, “Whether this 

the ultimate wisdom of their drafter, intellectual bankruptcy 

other circumstance would be hard to say.” See Starry, p. 5.

21. These are but three of a plethora of contemporary boo

articles analyzing and recommending various changes to the e

principles of war reflecting the long-standing yet healthy debat

literature. Other representative works include Barry R. Sch

essay, “Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future,” foun

book, Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, Sc

and Grinter, eds., which takes a contemporary view of th

principles and recommends adding four more: Simultaneity and 

of Attack, Logistics, Information Dominance, and Precision Ta

Edward Mann, “One Target, One Bomb: Is the Principle of Mass 

Military Review, September 1993, pp. 33-41; Paul Katz, “The Ad

Principle of War,” Military Review, June 1987, pp. 36-45 (recom

adding “behavior of the individual soldier” as a principle); and T

B. Vaughn, “Morale: The 10th Principle of War?”, Military Revie

1983, pp. 23-39.

22. Official U.S. military definitions of “strategic,” “opera

and “tactical” levels of war can be found in Joint Publication 1-

39
scrutinized at the tactical and operational levels of warfa

monograph of their applicability at the strategic level has be

exhaustive.” See William T. Johnsen, et al., The Principles of Wa

21st Century: Strategic Considerations, Carlisle Barracks, PA: S

Studies Institute, September 1995, p. 1. That being said, JW

British Defence Doctrine, in its overview of the (very similar) 

principles of war, states,

[The principles of war] are especially relevant at the milit

strategic level, where they establish a number of crit

against which courses of action affecting the national inter

including defence investment decisions and the planning 

campaign, may be tested.

JWP 0-01 goes on to say, “The principles also have a direct applic

lower levels, providing guides to action.” See JWP 0-01, p. A-1.

24. See Johnsen, et al., p. 2. As support, the autho

Clausewitz’s assertion that “war at the strategic level is an inte

process.” The applicable passage on the page of the English tran

they cite actually attributes to Clausewitz this following stateme

can already guess how great a role intellectual powers play in th

forms of military genius.” See Clausewitz, p. 101. The auth

compelled to make the following fairly obvious assertion that w

intellectual process at all levels. That being said, the point mad

SSI authors is well-taken.

25. On the other hand, they did not suggest that the curren

nine principles is immutable, written in stone. In an appen

authors described their conscious decision to take a “min

approach (similar to this author’s) and recommend incremental c

within the existing framework. They did, however, describ

appendix the opposite, or “maximalist” approach, whereby 

radical alternatives” can and should be considered from time 

“even if only to reject them after thoughtful consideratio

Johnsen, et al., p. 35.

26. U.S. Joint capstone and keystone doctrine does not spe

address differences in applicability at the various levels of w

Joint Publication 3-0 states “the principles of war guide warfig

the strategic, operational and tactical levels.” See Joint Publicat

p. A-1.

27. Though not central to this monograph, this author belie

of SSI’s six modified “strategic” principles—unity of effo

40
command and simplicity, respectively, at all levels of war. U

command, for example, may be necessary to ensure unity of effor

all cases unity of effort is essential—not necessarily unity of com

This may increasingly be the case in complex, interagen

multinational operations (the Joint Publication 3-0 definitio

speaks to this). Similarly, simplicity may be the strategy to help 

clarity, but it is clarity—not simplicity—that is essential in al

The increasing and unavoidable complexity of future operatio

obviate any attempt to satisfy the principle of “simplicity

considering the traditional meaning of the word (and this 

believes considering a word’s traditional meaning is a re

consideration to ensure a principle of war is effectively commun

In fact, attempts to “ensure simplicity” would be counterprodu

some situations.

28. Both lists are codified in Joint doctrine (Joint Publica

lists both sets of principles, and Joint Publication 3-07, Joint D

for Military Operations Other Than War, lists the princi

MOOTW); however, Glenn was addressing the issue at the U.S

doctrinal level, primarily as relating to FM 100-5. See Joint Pub

3-0, pp. V-2 through V-4 and A-1 through A-3; U.S. Joint Staf

Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub

3-07, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1

pp. II-1 to II-8. The currently adopted principles of MOOTW 

listed in other Service doctrinal manuals, for example, in FM 100

Army, and FM 100-23, Peace Operations.

29. This recommendation curiously appears to ignore t

established hierarchical authority of Joint capstone/ke

publications, implying it would be acceptable to make such a ch

principles of war in basic Service doctrine without an orig

modification to Joint capstone/keystone doctrine. This is m

administrative issue that should not detract from the otherwi

points Glenn surfaces.

30. Robert R. Leonhard, The Principles of War for the Infor

Age, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998.

31. Ibid., p. xii. Leonhard specifically uses the term “con

order to, as he says, “widen the scope of the book beyond a 

military context,” since he

[perceives] that many of the points [discussed] . . . 

applicable to all aspects of human conflict: business, polit

sports, social conflict . . . in some sense, even in love a

41
of all.

32. Ibid., p. 244.

33. See Ibid, p. 245. The author supports this approach as 

reasoned manner in which to consider and discuss princ

warfighting, vice accepting and adhering to principles as prescr

However, the author also views the current nine principle

reasonable list from which to base such discussions. Leo

complete discarding of the existing nine principles, as will be dis

likely creates unintended and untenable consequences and 

likened to “tossing the baby with the bathwater.”

34. Ibid., p. 252.

35. Joint Publication 1-02 defines “doctrine” as: “funda

principles by which military forces or elements thereof guid

actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but r

judgment in application.” See U.S. Joint Staff, DoD Dictio

Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, as a

through February 10, 1999, Washington, DC: U.S. Gove

Printing Office, p. 140.

36. Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army T

and Doctrine Command, Force XXI Operations: A Concept 

Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Arm

Early Twenty-First Century, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Fort M

VA: U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, August 1, 1994, p. 

37. Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, 10 U.S. Code, sec. 153, 

38. David A. Sawyer, “The Joint Doctrine Development S

Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, p. 37.

39. This is not to imply Joint doctrine was nonexistent prio

GNA. Joint operations are as old as our country, and hence, atte

create effective Joint doctrine have been long-standing. The firs

attempt appears to have been via the Army-Navy Board formed 

which in its first 17 years could only produce one manual, “Join

and Navy Action in Coast Defense.” From this meager beginni

throughout the years prior to the GNA, formal Joint doctr

progressed variously, often under the paralyzing influence of 

interests and parochialisms. See William C. Smith, The United 

Needs Joint Warfighting Doctrine, Monograph Project, C

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 5, 1988, pp. 4-14.

42
previously did. See U.S. Joint Staff, Compendium of Joint D

Publications, Joint Publication 1-01.1, Washington, DC

Government Printing Office, April 25, 1995, p. A-1.

41. In the early 1990s, there were persistent concerns with t

of understanding of Joint doctrine within the U.S. armed forc

John Boatman, “Spreading the Word,” Janes Defence Weekly, De

10, 1994, p. 19. There was also significant Service concern with G

Shalikashvili’s direction, in the aftermath of the 1994 f

Blackhawk helicopter shootdown in Iraq, to revise the preface

Joint Publications to state, “The guidance in this publica

authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when

judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances 

otherwise” (emphasis added). The italicized caveat seems t

sufficiently subdued Service concerns, permitting acceptance 

Service communities. See John Cushman, “In Joint Doctrine: W

Exceptional Circumstances?” United States Naval In

Proceedings, April 1995, p. 46-50. Also, consider the following pa

1996: 

The Joint doctrine development process is often maligned 

slow and unresponsive to user needs. Unfortunately, there 

some validity to that charge. In the haste to get Joint doctr

to the field, the initial publications were little more th

reworked Service doctrine between purple covers. They w

created out of need, but many were redundant or should ha

been published as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TT

See Joseph J. Redden, “Joint Doctrine: The Way Ahead,” Join

Quarterly, Winter 1996-97, p. 10. Lastly, two members of the U.S

War College Strategic Studies Institute posit that “difficultie

development and implementation of sound Joint doctrine ha

caused, in large measure, by the systemic gap in the existing s

planning process.” See Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Thomas

Young, Strategic Plans, Joint Doctrine and Antipodean In

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, p. 1.

42. Chairmen Powell, Shalikashvili, and now Shelton h

recognized their role to shepherd this monumental change thro

inertia of past doctrinal practices. Creation of the Joint War

Center and U.S. Atlantic Command’s increased roles in Joint t

and Joint force integration reflect this focus. Results are begin

show. Lieutenant General Joseph Redden, previous commande

Joint Warfighting Center, describes (General Shalikashvili’s) m

43
quickly.” As a result,

the process of developing doctrinal Publications was redu

from 48 to 23 months . . . writing groups comprised 

representatives of the Services, CINCs, and Joint S

directorates . . . draft a document that is as purple as possi

reducing coordination time . . . The new publication format 

been widely accepted . . . distribution is made to the field 

fleet based on lists developed by the Services and CINCs.

See Redden, p. 10.

43. Examples of this are found in the introductions or preface

following basic Service doctrine documents: U.S. Army Field 

100-1 (FM 100-1), The Army, June 1994; Air Force Doctrine Docu

(AFDD-1) Air Force Basic Doctrine, September 1997; Naval D

Publication 1, NDP-1, Naval Warfare, March 1994; and Marin

Doctrinal Publication 1, MCDP-1, Warfighting, June 1997.

44. This is solely the author’s opinion, which tends t

middle-ground position. Opinion on this matter, between and 

officers, Services, and other groups, varies widely. Some beli

Joint doctrine system is too constraining for the Services, stifl

development of Service-born concepts, while others believe the 

doctrines need to further conform to the Joint hierarchy.

45. Sawyer, p. 39.

46. There are currently only two Joint doctrine documents 

as “capstone” doctrine, which is the highest level of basic, over

Joint doctrine. They are Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the 

Forces, and Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Force

“keystone” doctrine documents are the next level of basic, over

documents categorized by functional field. There are currently s

documents (Joint Publication 1-0, 2-0, etc.) for each of the six fu

fields. The Services do not use the terms “capstone” and “keys

the same formalized and standardized manner; however, som

use of the terms. To avoid any confusion, the term “basic” doctr

be used when describing any overarching Joint or Service doctr

the terms “capstone” and “keystone” will be associated on

overarching Joint doctrine.

47. U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the 

States, Joint Publication 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Government P

Office, January 10, 1995, p. III-1.

44
49. Ibid., p. A-1.

50. Namely, FM 100-1, The Army, AFDD-1, Air Forc

Doctrine, and NDP-1, Naval Warfare. Additionally, the principle

are variously discussed and cascaded throughout other Jo

Service doctrine documents; for example, in Joint Publicatio

Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, and in the Army’s found

FM 100-5, Operations.

51. Considering the DTLOMS environments is helpful be

represents the U.S. Army’s attempt to cover all organizational d

during the requirements determination process. By extensi

DTLOMS review process is an excellent way to capture the tot

organizational activities. Hence, the greater the influence 

DTLOMS environments, the greater the influence on the organiz

culture. See Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S

Training and Doctrine Command, Requirements Determi

TRADOC Pamphlet 71-9, Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Train

Doctrine Command, August 1, 1999, p. 5.

52. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao T

trans. Foreign Languages Press, Peking: Foreign Languages 

1963, p. 78. Essay written in December 1936.

53. More precisely, it begins with a collective and consensual 

viewpoint by the organization’s senior leadership. Those lea

turn, agree to change basic doctrine, as depicted in Figure 1.

54. The American Heritage Dictionary, Boston, MA: Ho

Mifflin Company, 1991, p. 513.

55. Sourced from several popular English dictionaries.

56. Provided, however, that “open-mindedness” is not perm

create, or evolve into, a state of indecisiveness or lack of directi

author confronted this concern by including the following c

worded “balancing” phrases in the definition: “while constantly f

on the objective,” as well as, “nor lose orientation,” and fina

never lose focus on the commander’s intent.”

57. As previously discussed, the U.S. military community cu

subscribes to two independent lists of principles—one add

principles of “war,” and one addressing principles of “operation

than war.” Also as discussed, some have suggested merging 

lists. The outcome of that debate is not important to this mon

45
applicable across the wide spectrum of military operations and 

therefore be incorporated in any list or lists of fundamental princ

“military operations.”

58. Book of “Job” in The Holy Bible (The Oxford Self-Prono

Bible, Authorized King James Version), London: Oxford Un

Press, 1967, Chapter 6, Verse 25, p. 576.

59. See Johnsen, et al., p. 3. Most analyses of the Am

principles of war place the principle of objective on a plane a

other principles. Even so, there may be times whereby the objecti

might need—or is—changing, and only the flexible leader is pe

enough to identify the need or the change.

60. Save, maybe, for the somewhat ethereal or abstract no

offensive spirit and initiative, or determination, or moral force

however, do not provide the intellectually broad, tangible, and o

coverage of warfare that flexibility provides. Regardless, this 

need not be resolved.

61. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., L

Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 10, 43.

62. Essay by Peter Paret in Clausewitz, pp. 11-12.

63. T. Owen Jacobs, A Guide to the Strategic Leader Devel

Inventory, Second Revision, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Arm

College, n.d., p. 7.

64. Leonhard, p. 274.

65. Though, as was shown earlier, other major, indust

militaries have adopted the principle of flexibility; namely

Britain and Australia. There are others as well.

66. Leonhard, pp. 274-275. To be completely fair, Leonhard’s 

point (regarding the conflict between principles) was as m

complaint about the current structure of the nine principles as 

compelling argument for flexibility. However, Leonhard would 

quick to support Clausewitz’s, as well as his own notion (see Cha

of his book) of the duality of warfare, and that “nothing is ult

unopposed.” More succinctly, there is nothing fundamentally 

with the notion of principles opposing or conflicting with each 

That idea, of course, argues for flexibility.

67. Starry, p. 2.

46
69. Joint Publication 3-0, p. A-2.

70. Great Britain, Canada, and Australia are three. In the 1

Canadian officer made a compelling argument for flexibility a

only six “true” principles, relegating the concepts of “moveme

“mobility” (the two closest to maneuver) into a category he ter

bewildering list of other ‘principles’.” See K. C. Kennedy, “The Pr

of War,” Canadian Army Journal, November 1951, p. 72. Wh

author agrees maneuver would more appropriately be a su

flexibility given a shorter list of principles more “conden

“distilled” than the existing one, in the current framewor

principles are essential.

71. Consider the following phrases taken from the thes

Publication 3-0 definitions of other principles: “exploit the ini

(objective), “at the [right] place and time to achieve decisive 

(mass), “judicious employment and measured allocation” (econ

force), “staff planning and understanding [the enemy]” and “

risk management” (security), “speed in decisionmaking” (surpri

“greatly facilitate[s] mission execution in the stress, fatigue an

complexities of modern combat” (simplicity). All of these 

rationally connected to the proposed doctrinal definition of fle

See Joint Publication 3-0, pp. A-1 to A-3.

72. Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, Air Forc

Doctrine, Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Maxwell AF

Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center, September 1997, pp. 

73. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Operations, U.S

Field Manual 100-5, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

June 14, 1993, pp. 2-7, 2-9, and 9-2.

74. Department of the Navy, Naval Warfare, Naval D

Publication 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Offic

p. 8.

75. U.S. Joint Staff, Doctrine for Logistic Support o

Operations, Joint Publication 4-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Gove

Printing Office, January 27, 1995, pp. II-1 to II-4. Additionall

Publication 4-05, Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning, de

flexibility as one of the four Tenets of Mobilization. See Joint Sta

Doctrine for Mobilization Planning, Joint Publication 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 22, 1

II-1 to II-6.

47
essential.

77. Gregory Foster, “Research, Writing and the Mind 

Strategist,” Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1996, pp. 112-113.

78. Joint Publication 3-0, p. A-1.

79. Williamson Murray, “The German Response to Vic

Poland,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 7, No. 2, n.p.: Inter-Un

Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1981, p. 2.

80. Hans Binnendijk, ed., Strategic Assessment 1998: En

Power for Peace, Washington, DC: National Defense Uni

Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 1998, p. 153.

81. David T. Twining, Beyond Multilateralism, Lanham

University Press of America, 1998, pp. ix-xii.

82. Specifically, these revolutions are: The Information Rev

The Socio-Biological Revolution, The Efficiency Revolution, a

Revolution in Military Affairs. She goes on to note the “abund

contradictions” that this age of revolutions has already prod

terms of attempting to define future warfare. See Claudia Kenne

Age of Revolutions, Letort Paper, No. 3, Carlisle Barracks, PA: S

Studies Institute, March 1998, pp. 1-5.

83. Or, as Richard L. Kugler concludes from his 2-year 

National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) monograph, it wi

increasingly dangerous world. See Richard L. Kugler, To

Dangerous World—U.S. National Security Strategy for the 

Turbulence, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995, pp. xi

Even the title of the U.S. Army War College Autumn 1998 Par

article, “Radical Destabilizing Effects of New Technologies,” p

an unruly future and seems to capture prevailing sentime

Thomas K. Adams, “Radical Destabilizing Effects of New Techno

Parameters, Autumn 1998, p. 99.

84. Schneider and Grinter, p. 3.

85. John M. Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010, Washington, D

Government Printing Office, 1996.

86. Some, for example, charge that JV 2010 contribute

original thought; others suggest it goes too far in trying to “coale

various Service perspectives, in essence stifling them. Some a

focuses too heavily on technical solutions. For example, see F

48
Proceedings, January 1998, pp. 46-50. Many others, however, 

2010 as a brilliant and forward-looking unifying document th

releases and positively channels “tremendous energy once dedi

competing visions with little return,” as stated by Major G

Charles Link, USAF. See Charles D. Link, “21st Century 

Forces—Joint Vision 2010,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 19

69-73.

87. Shalikashvili, p. 19.

88. U.S. Joint Warfighting Center, Concept for Futur

Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010, Fort Monroe, VA: U.

Warfighting Center Publication, January 22, 1997.

89. For an overview of such efforts, see Benny G. Steagall, A

Joint Force Packaging, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Ba

PA: U.S. Army War College, April 7, 1997.

90. For an overview of the EAF concept, see Bruce D. Ca

“The New Expeditionary Force,” Air Force Magazine, Septembe

pp. 54-56. Regarding U.S. Army emerging emphasis on tailorabi

modularity, see TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, p. 3-2.

91. This process is not without controversy. For examp

William J. Toti, “It is Broken! Fix It!” Armed Forces J

International, April 1996, pp. 29-34. However, this author belie

overall JWCA design is fundamentally sound and will mature 

effective process originally envisioned. For an overview and asse

of the JWCA process by its founder, Admiral William Owe

William A. Owens, “Understanding the JWCA Process: Brin

Better Joint Warfighting Perspective To Bear On Resource Allo

Armed Forces Journal International, May 1996, p. 14. Also see W

A. Owens and James R. Blaker, “Overseeing Cross-Service Trad

Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1996, pp. 37-40.

92. Letter to George Bainton, October 15, 1888. See Justin 

ed., Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations, 16th Edition, Boston, MA: 

Brown and Company, 1992, p.527.

49
APPENDIX I

THE AMERICAN PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Below are the American Principles of War as liste

described in Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for 

Operations.

1

OBJECTIVE:

• The purpose of the objective is to direct every m

operation toward a clearly defined, decisive

attainable objective.

• The objective of combat operations is the destr

of the enemy armed forces’ capabilities and w

fight. The objective of an operation other tha

might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, 

must be clear from the beginning. Objectives 

directly, quickly, and economically contribute 

purpose of the operation. Each operation 

contribute to strategic objectives. Avoid action

do not contribute directly to achieving the obje

OFFENSIVE:

• The purpose of offensive action is to seize, retain

exploit the initiative.

• Offensive action is the most effective and decisiv

to attain a clearly defined objective. Offe

operations are the means by which a military 

seizes and holds the initiative while mainta

freedom of action and achieving decisive result

importance of offensive action is fundamentall

across all levels of war.

51
• The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effe

combat power at the place and time to achieve de

results.

• To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate 

force capabilities where they will have decisive 

in a short period of time. Mass must oft

sustained to have the desired effect. Massing e

rather than concentrating forces, can enable 

numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive r

and minimize human losses and waste of resou

ECONOMY OF FORCE:

• The purpose of economy of force is to al

minimum essential combat power to seco

efforts.

• Economy of force is the judicious employmen

distribution of forces. It is the measured allocat

available combat power to such tasks as li

attacks, defense, delays, deception, or 

retrograde operations in order to achieve 

elsewhere at the decisive point and time.

MANEUVER:

• The purpose of maneuver is to place the enem

position of disadvantage through the fle

application of combat power.

• Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation 

enemy to secure or retain positional advan

usually in order to deliver—or threaten de

of—the direct and indirect fires of the maneuv

force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off ba

52
contributes materially in exploiting succe

preserving freedom of action, and redu

vulnerability by continually posing new problem

the enemy.

UNITY OF COMMAND:

• The purpose of unity of command is to ensure un

effort under one responsible commander for 

objective.

• Unity of command means that all forces op

under a single commander with the req

authority to direct all forces employed in pursu

common purpose. Unity of effort, however, req

coordination and cooperation among all forces to

a commonly recognized objective, although th

not necessarily part of the same command stru

In multinational and interagency operations, un

command may not be possible, but the require

for unity of effort becomes paramount. Un

effort—coordination through cooperation 

common interests—is an essential compleme

unity of command.

SECURITY:

• The purpose of security is to never permit the e

to acquire unexpected advantage.

• Security enhances freedom of action by red

friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influen

surprise. Security results from the measures tak

commanders to protect their forces. Staff pla

and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactic

doctrine will enhance security. Risk is inhere

military operations. Application of this pri

includes prudent risk management, not u

53
combat power and preserves freedom of action.

SURPRISE:

• The purpose of surprise is to strike the enem

time or place or in a manner for which 

unprepared.

• Surprise can help the commander shift the bala

combat power and thus achieve success well 

proportion to the effort expended. Fa

contributing to surprise include spee

decisionmaking, information sharing, and 

movement; effective intelligence; decep

application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC

variations in tactics and methods of operation.

SIMPLICITY:

• The purpose of simplicity is to prepare 

uncomplicated plans and concise orders to e

thorough understanding.

• Simplicity contributes to successful opera

Simple plans and clear, concise orders min

misunderstanding and confusion. When other f

are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Sim

in plans allows better understanding and exec

planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clar

expression greatly facilitate mission execution 

stress, fatigue, and other complexities of m

combat and are especially critical to succe

combined operations.

54
1. U.S. Joint Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub

3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Febr

1995, pp. A-1 through A-3.

55
APPENDIX II

A Discussion of Robert Leonhard’s Boo

The Principles of War for the Information 

Authors Johnsen, et al., made the following statem

their 1995 SSI monograph on the principles of war: “In 

to revalidate continually the principles of war . . 

necessary to occasionally consider truly radical altern

. . .”1 Robert Leonhard’s provocative new work title

Principles of War for the Information Age 2 is one 

alternative deserving close review.

Leonhard, seemingly wearied with what he sugges

bankrupt intellectual framework of war principles, 

the slate clean, offering three new “laws of war” and 

new “principles of war for the information age.” The b

intriguing, and as Major General Robert Scales states 

foreword,

Robert Leonhard has done all of us monographing futu

warfare a great service by examining this issue in detail. H

arguments . . . confront long-accepted convictions. 

challenges us to strip away preconceptions and to reexam

the principles of war in a new context.3

Leonhard’s laws and principles represent an exc

list of arguments or categories of thinking 

prescriptions), as he describes them. This represe

different lens through which principles of war c

viewed. Leonhard would likely add that this lens is no

different, but it is the right lens to use now and 

evolving Information Age. He considers the cu

principles of war a prescriptive and rearward-lo

American list; principles, he argues, which have los

applicability they may have once had.

56
pragmatic and important issue of utility. By virtue 

78-year intellectual framework created by the codifi

of the American principles, strong—and 

useful—organizational and cultural norms have 

established. For example, beyond their obvious and 

tactical applications, the principles have proven extr

useful as a retrospective tool in academic and lit

settings as a basis for analyzing wars, campaign

battles.

4

 As an operational tool for the here-and-now

principles represent an excellent framework for evalu

courses of action during campaign planning.

5

 These a

two examples. Beyond these instilled norms, the curre

has likely survived this long because it seems to targ

intellectual center of the military officer population, gi

widest application. There is an obvious tradeoff her

this author believes it strikes a good balance. The prin

are not so prescriptive and rudimentary as to insult 

“kill or be killed”), yet they are not in the “ether-zo

thought reserved for only the very brightest and 

insightful of military thinkers.

This author is concerned Leonhard’s work misse

“utility” mark on both counts above (i.e., as a u

organizational norm, and on the targeted intellectual 

and should not be adopted by the U.S. Armed Force

least not without further study. First, his laws 

principles are so completely descriptive (partly beca

focuses on the duality of each of the principles), tha

seem to create, without an attendant deeper analys

almost paralyzing sense of neutrality—everything 

“cancelled out.” Leonhard would likely counter that th

misinterpretation of his message—that the principles 

be presented as intellectual arguments, each with two 

to be truly valid. He is right—principles should be disc

as arguments. But a certain “prescriptiveness,” whic

current set of principles carries, has proven over the 

an extremely useful guide in the heat of war planning

battle—when the human mind reaches for aids to org

57
principles, on the other hand, are significantly more es

and abstract than the current list—to the degree they 

likely lose the useful, wide applicability and demonst

acceptance of the current set of principles. In a sens

principle of simplicity (or clarity, as this author pref

violated. This is not to say Leonhard’s work is w

value—quite the contrary. He brings fresh thought 

admittedly stale discourse in the literature. His emp

on the humanness and the duality of warfare (thoug

original) and his notion that principles should be trea

arguments are particularly insightful. However, 

considering his proposal for formal codification and 

adoption by the U.S. Armed Forces, its broad uti

uncertain.

This gets back to this author’s pragmatic belief th

evolutionary—not a revolutionary—approach to mod

the principles is probably in order. By incorpor

flexibility within the current framework, the other 

principles actually become more like Leonh

“arguments,” because a flexible disposition, by defin

does not permit any one principle to become prescr

dogma; each principle must be weighed agains

situation at hand. Further, such an approach prese

set of principles that have demonstrated their usefu

throughout the wide spectrum of Industrial Age warfa

General Scales tactfully reminds the reader in the for

to Leonhard’s book, “much about warfare will remain t

its past.”6 But probably most importantly, by preservi

current, traditional framework of principles, the resu

be minimal stress on the organizational cultures 

minimum unintended consequences) while yie

maximum benefit.

Leonhard certainly may be onto something, b

proposed laws and principles, for now, seem best left w

intellectual sub-set inside an otherwise b

multi-constituent population that relies on the ad

principles of war. Incorporating flexibility withi

58
“manageable,” yet still fundamentally important he

change as the U.S. military moves into the 21st cent

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX II

1. This sentence ended, “even if only to reject them after tho

consideration.” The SSI team was addressing two such alter

which they called the “maximalist” approach and the “min

approach. The “maximalist” approach posits that “war has be

complex that no single set of principles can apply to all o

variations.” Conversely, the “minimalist” approach suggests th

existing principles of war can be further distilled.” See Wil

Johnsen, et al., The Principles of War in the 21st Century: S

Considerations, Carlisle Barraks, PA: Strategic Studies In

September 1995, p. 35.

2. Robert R. Leonhard, The Principles of War for the Infor

Age, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998.

3. Ibid., p. vii.

4. A recent example is Lieutenant Colonel William C. Be

analysis of Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) using the princ

war. See William C. Bennett, “Just Cause and the Principles o

Military Review, March 1991, p. 2.

5. For example, the nine principles of war are listed in the T

Analysis and Replanning Graphic Execution Toolkit (TARG

computer-based JOPES planning tool used by the warfightin

staffs as a basis for analyzing courses of action during crisis 

planning.

6. Leonhard, p. vi.

59
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Larry M. Wortzel

Author

Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Frost

Project Advisor

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler