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55–551 2010

ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF 

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE 

ON INTELLIGENCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, FEBRUARY 3, 2010 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee 


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PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas, Chairman 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

RUSH D. HOLT, New Jersey 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

MIKE THOMPSON, California 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

NANCY PELOSI, California, Speaker, Ex Officio Member 

JOHN A. BOEHNER, Ohio, Minority Leader, Ex Officio Member 

MICHAEL DELANEY, Staff Director 


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ANNUAL THREATS ASSESSMENT, PART I 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2010 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, the Honorable Silvestre Reyes 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Reyes, Eshoo, Holt, Ruppersberger, 

Thompson, Schakowsky, Langevin, Schiff, Hoekstra, Gallegly, 

Thornberry, Rogers, Myrick, Blunt, Miller, Conaway, and King. 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. The committee will please come 

to order. 

And Director Blair, welcome again to our committee. As always, 

we are happy to have you here and glad that you were able to navigate through all the snow we got overnight, and I see that we have 

some members and hopefully other members will be able to come 

in. I don’t know how many are affected by the weather today. 

Today marks the fourth annual threat assessment hearing that 

I have chaired. It is one of the rare opportunities for our committee 

to receive open and unclassified testimony on the threats the Intelligence Community is working to address throughout the world. 

Our purpose here today is to address the threats we will face in 

the future. It is not an effort to Monday-morning quarterback. 

What has happened in the last year obviously is not irrelevant. The 

challenges we have faced are in some ways indications of what we 

will face in the near future. 

We have seen in recent months the tragedy of self-radicalization 

and home-grown threats, both in the attacks on the soldiers and 

civilians at Fort Hood and the incident on Christmas Day. We have 

seen, of course, the continued efforts of al Qaeda to strike us. That 

was evident in the attempted bombing on Christmas Day and in 

the conspiracy of Najibullah Zazi in New York. 

In the Christmas Day attempt, we saw that we still have a ways 

to go to improve our defenses against terrorism. In the Zazi case, 

frankly, we saw that, I believe, sometimes we get this right. And, 

really, the times that we have gotten things right and have not 

publicized it, are, for national security reasons, are important to 

note today as well. 

Finally, on December 30th, in Khost, Afghanistan, we saw the 

grave risk faced by the men and women of the Intelligence Community. They paid the ultimate price and made a sacrifice that we as 

Americans must never forget. 


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The central lesson of all these things is clear. Today, more than 

8 years after September 11th, our principal challenge is the same: 

Identify terrorist plots and stop them before they harm American 

citizens and American interests. 

Al Qaeda and its affiliates are as determined today as ever to 

harm the United States. Addressing that threat, I think, involves 

attacking the problem on three fronts: at home; in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan; and, finally, in emerging terrorist safe havens around the world. 

On the home front, we have to address the threat of terrorism 

within the United States and the problem of self-radicalization. 

The shootings at Fort Hood were a devastating reminder of the 

threat posed by self-radicalized extremists that are inside the 

United States. 

So this morning, Director Blair, one, among some of the questions that I would like to have you address are, what steps will you 

take to identify and address terrorist threats within the United 

States? How will we strike the proper balance between law enforcement and intelligence? I fully understand and know that this issue 

has been hotly debated lately, but I want to know what your plan 

is and what you will do going forward. 

In the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, our efforts to 

fight extremists are greatly dependent on cooperation from both 

governments. Those governments struggle with the challenges of 

both internal threats and corruption. Despite the best intentions of 

our allies, the Afghan Taliban is gaining strength. This presents 

one of our biggest challenges to date, fighting extremism in the nation that continues to struggle to provide basic services to its own 

citizens. Again, what are our plans for turning back the Taliban 

and building stability in Afghanistan? 

Over the past 7 years, the war in Iraq placed a huge burden on 

the Intelligence Community’s resources. While the IC continues to 

support our warfighting operations in Iraq, today I am particularly 

interested to hear how you are supporting the President’s strategy 

of increased operations in Afghanistan as the United States continues to draw down its troops in Iraq. 

In Pakistan, the government recently claimed that, due to a 

strain on its military, Pakistan could not launch any new offensives 

against extremists in North Waziristan for at least 6 months. What 

effects do Pakistan’s limitations have on the Intelligence Community’s ability to counter extremism in that volatile region? 

A comprehensive approach to terrorism has to deal with emerging terrorist safe havens. We only have to remember the bombing 

of the USS Cole in October of 2000 to remind us that the threat 

from terrorist activities in Yemen is not a new threat. However, 

Yemen is not the only area of the world that affords terrorists relative safety to plan, to train and to launch potential attacks 

against the United States and our allies. 

In past years, this committee has taken particular interest in Somalia and areas of North Africa. The Horn of Africa has been a 

particular concern for many years because they have weak central 

governments or experienced great instability that might allow the 

creation of safe havens to develop. Our primary concern in raising 

this issue is one of sufficient resources. So the questions are, does 


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the Intelligence Community have sufficient collection and analytical resources directed at understanding the political, the economic, 

the military and the leadership dynamics of these nations in this 

conflictive part of our word. 

Terrorism, sadly, is not the only threat that we face. Iran and 

North Korea still pose significant threats to U.S. interests and to 

international security. I remain extremely concerned about Iran’s 

nuclear weapons program, especially in light of the revelation of a 

second nuclear enrichment facility, near Qom. It seems that the 

prospects for diplomatic dialogue are diminishing as the Iranian 

government’s crackdown on its people becomes more violent. 

Just overnight, the Iranians claim to have the ability to launch 

satellites into space. Those are all daunting challenges on many 

different fronts but certainly affect our ability to have a clear understanding of the intelligence challenge that it is to us. 

I am also quite concerned about North Korea’s nuclear and missile program. In January, North Korea issued two statements posing peace treaty talks and sanctions removal before it returns to 

nuclear talks. However, just last week, North Korea exchanged fire 

with South Korea, raising tensions on a regional basis. What is the 

Intelligence Community’s current assessment of this program and 

this region, and have we seen any willingness from North Korea 

to dismantle the program as a precondition to negotiations? 

China, a U.S. ally, still clearly poses a threat to our national interest. Although the President has promised a more conciliatory 

era in U.S.-China relations, we cannot ignore the Chinese-oriented 

cyber attacks and the continued and significant buildup of the Chinese navy. Despite reports to the contrary, I hope that China remains a top priority for our Intelligence Community. 

The United States continues to be a victim of a disturbing increase in the scope, virulence and potency of cyber attacks. Whether the perpetrator is a terrorist organization or a state actor, the 

threat to our energy, financial, communications and security infrastructure remains the same. The Intelligence Community has a 

critical role to play in understanding the threat, securing our classified information technology systems and working with the business community to secure our critical infrastructures. 

In the last year, we have stepped back from the brink of financial 

ruin and even of a potential global financial depression. While 

times are still hard and the greatest threat has passed, we still 

have many challenges on those fronts. I fear that one cyber attack 

could put us right back where we were a year ago on the brink of 

potential economic disaster. 

Finally, I am interested to hear your assessment of a situation 

that I continue to monitor closely, and that is the rampant violence 

in Mexico related to drug-trafficking organizations and criminal 

gangs and the Calderon administration’s willingness to take those 

organizations on. 

While Mexico has seen a number of encouraging successes this 

year, including the arrests of Teodoro Eduardo Garcia Simental 

and Carlos Beltran Leyva, and of course the death of Arturo 

Beltran Leyva, a number of us still remain very concerned about 

that situation. 


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As you know, Director Blair, right across the border from my district is Ciudad Juarez, a city that has seen a staggering number 

of murders, kidnappings and other violent crimes. Just last Saturday, several gunmen brazenly murdered 16 people, most of them 

below the age of 20. The brutality of this attack was shocking even 

to the people of Juarez, who over the course of the last 2 years 

have witnessed a tremendous amount of violence and mass shootings, and that raises the level of concern to our national security. 

This is not just a matter of Mexico’s national security. Those of 

us who live on the border know that our futures are linked and 

that narco-related criminal activity is just as much our problem as 

it is Mexico’s. To that end, I am interested to hear how the Intelligence Community is coordinating with the Government of Mexico 

in the continued fight against narco traffickers and criminal gangs. 

Again, Director Blair, I thank you for being here this morning. 

I know I have given you a lot to respond to. But, as you know, we 

have many challenges coming at us from varied and different areas 

globally, and so we appreciate your willingness to come here and 

share your thoughts with the committee. 

So I will close by noting that I have great respect for the men 

and women of the Intelligence Community who are working under 

your guidance throughout the world. I take great pride in working 

on their behalf in Congress, and I am committed to making sure 

that they have the resources that they need to protect our Nation 

from the many threats that face us all collectively. 

With that, let me now recognize the ranking member for any 

comments that he may wish to make in his opening statement. 

[The statement of the Chairman follows:] 


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Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Blair, it is good to have you here today. 

Mr. Chairman, I have a written statement that I would like to 

submit for the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Then I will just kind of speak for a couple of minutes. 

I want to kind of change the tone a little bit, and I want to talk 

about accountability. I want to talk about inability of the community to hold itself accountable for its performance and what I see 

as an increasing, from my perspective, an increasing demonstration 

that this community is unwilling to be held accountable by Congress and this committee. 

How do I come to this conclusion? You know, we are coming to 

a close on a very painful chapter in the Intel Community. The 

shoot down of Americans, the death of a mother and a daughter in 

Peru almost 9 years ago. The accountability board has recently finished its work. But if there is ever an example of justice delayed, 

justice denied, this is it. 

The justice or the accountability board was empaneled too investigate the wrongful deaths of these two Americans, misleading, and 

some might say lying, to Congress by the Intel Community. And 

the result of this is, after 8 years, there has been minimal accountability. I think the only reason that there has been any accountability is because of the work of people on this committee. Myself, 

Ms. Schakowsky, who has been a stalwart in working with me, and 

Mr. Miller, in continuing to press the issue forward. 

You know, you go through this whole process, and then you add 

what I consider insult to injury. You know, I have asked the community, what information can be shared with the surviving family 

members? And, again, Ms. Schakowsky is working with us to get 

them a full accounting of exactly what happened on that fateful 

day of 2001. 

But the information that I have been told that I could share with 

the family was, mistakes were made; people were held accountable; 

and it won’t happen again. 

That is totally unacceptable, and I hope that, under your leadership, the leadership of Director Panetta, this family will get a much 

more complete accounting of what happened to their wife, their 

daughter, and their grandchild on that day. 

The community’s performance in terms of accountability has 

been unacceptable. From my perspective, you could almost say that 

the bureaucracy won. 

These were Americans that were killed with the help of their 

government. The community covered it up. They delayed investigating. It took 3 years—3 years—for the IG to complete its report, 

so the accountability board really wasn’t empaneled until 7 years 

after the incident, and it took more than 8 years before any sanctions were ever proposed and implemented. 

From my perspective, it is a failure of all levels of leadership 

within the community to hold itself accountable in perhaps the 

most tragic of circumstances where people and family members 

were killed by their own government or with the help of their own 


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government. Maybe you can explain today why it took 8 years, 

more than 8 years, for there to be any type of accountability. 

My second point is, this committee can’t do its job if you don’t 

share information with us. It was last week that we began a hearing by holding up the Washington Post, because the Washington 

Post had more information than this committee had about what the 

Intel Community might be doing in regards to targeting Americans. 

Today, we get a story from the New York Times. The White 

House hastily called a briefing on Tuesday evening to discuss the 

new details of this case. I wish you would hastily call a meeting 

or a conference call with this committee to share information on 

terrorist cases. That might help, but it is interesting that, you 

know, to get your best information on what is going on in the Intel 

Community today, it appears you go to the newspapers. 

And these are not the only two instances. It also concerns Fort 

Hood. It took us weeks to get information on Fort Hood. It took us 

weeks to get information on the Christmas Day bomber. 

Even you, yourself, admitted or said a couple of weeks ago that, 

Congressman, that they played games with you when they went to 

Yemen, when they wouldn’t share information with you on the specific instructions from people from the Intel Community and the 

administration saying, you know, when Congressman Hoekstra is 

in Yemen, and he asks questions about these areas where he has 

oversight, tell him that you can’t answer those questions, and that 

information will be forthcoming when he comes back to Michigan— 

or, excuse me, when he comes back to Washington D.C. 

What is the community unwilling to share with this committee? 

What policies can’t pass public scrutiny or pass the scrutiny of this 

committee? 

Finally, I do want to get back to the story, excuse me, I want to 

get back to the story that was in the Washington Post last week, 

targeting of Americans. It is a very sensitive issue, but, again, 

there has been more information in the public domain than what 

has been shared with this committee. 

We know the spokesman for bin Laden, Godahn. He has been the 

spokesperson for bin Laden for years. He is an American. He has 

been charged with treason. 

We know of, more recently, the Northern Virginia Five, the people who are now under arrest in Pakistan for, again, supposed terrorist connections. 

We all know about Awlaki, the American-born radical cleric who 

is connected in certain ways with Fort Hood and is connected to 

the Christmas Day bomber in Detroit. 

What is our policy towards them? They are terrorists. They are 

traitors. You know, when we dealt with these kinds of issues previously about how we deal with Americans, we went through a 

painstaking process to develop that policy and hopefully get by and 

by the administration and Congress. 

You know, probably the best example of that is the Terrorist Surveillance Program, about how tools could be used against various 

targets, including Americans. But we went through a very painstaking process, so that we all on this committee kind of understood 


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the rules and the Intel Community understood what those rules 

were going to be and the box that they had to operate within. 

In other cases, we had congressional Gang of Eight briefings on 

some of the most sensitive issues, but it was an attempted partnership between the administration and this committee or representatives of this committee on the most sensitive of U.S. policies. I can’t 

think of anything that is more sensitive in this threat that we face 

today of this emerging trend of them targeting Americans for recruitment and sometimes being successful and how we will respond 

to those Americans who are successfully recruited and have decided 

that they are now part of a radical jihadist movement targeting 

their fellow citizens. 

We need to understand and develop that policy. We need to understand it, because we need to do the oversight. We need to know 

and understand and help shape the box that the Intel Community 

and the U.S. Government has when it is dealing with Americans. 

It is obvious in the case, you know, in 2001, that the rules may 

have been clear, but the policy was not implemented very well 

when we shot down that plane in Peru. The concern that I have 

today is that I am not sure that the box is very clear or very well 

understood as to what you and the people in your organizations can 

do when it comes to Americans who have joined the enemy. 

We have asked the questions. The chairman has indicated he has 

a genuine interest in getting to the answers and understanding 

this. 

The question that I have, when will the answers be forthcoming? 

When will the administration submit itself to having that dialogue 

with this committee so that we can understand and help shape 

that box, and then we will be in a position to do the oversight that 

needs to be done? 

I can’t think of anything that is more important for this committee to do at this point in time than to answer those questions, 

because there is nothing more dangerous to this country than 

Americans who have joined the enemy and have as their goal to 

attack us, and we need to understand and implement that policy. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Hoekstra follows:] 


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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hoekstra. 

And I just want to remind our members and witnesses that we 

are in open session this morning. 

Clearly, some of the questions that Mr. Hoekstra asked, you can’t 

respond to in open session. 

I, too, if you have a magic formula on how to stop leaks to the 

press, I am interested in hearing what you propose to do. But, 

frankly, it has been something that we have wrestled with for the 

last two administrations, the amount of information that gets 

leaked. 

And then I would remind all of us that, although sensational, 

some of that information that gets reported in the media, we have 

known and have heard from our experts in closed session that a 

lot of that information is wrong; a lot of that information is embellished; a lot of that information is untrue. So while it is aggravating and irritating, let’s make sure we keep that in perspective. 

The other thing I want to mention before I recognize Director 

Blair is that when Mr. Hoekstra talks about lack of information, 

I have, and I believe he has, been contacted by members of the administration. I know on Christmas Day, when that incident occurred, I got an extensive briefing from Mr. Brennan on that night. 

Then subsequent to that, we have had information. But I also 

know, I guess it is based upon my law enforcement experience, that 

we need to give our professionals that you work with, Mr. Director, 

the time to fully investigate, to find out what all the circumstances 

are, and then bring people in and get the correct information rather than information that is misreported and misconstrued and misused in some cases. 

So, with that, I just want us to keep things in perspective. We 

do have serious challenges that we have to face. I think it is a legitimate issue, and I am awaiting the subcommittee’s report on the 

issue that Mr. Hoekstra brought up about the shooting in Peru. I 

know that Director Panetta is taking that issue very seriously. 

I can remember back to the initial hearing that we held where 

I raised some issues that, the circumstances of that shooting really 

didn’t make sense to me because you had a dynamic in there where 

people were having to translate several times before the action was 

taken. 

So those are all things that we hope will come out in this subcommittee investigation, and I look forward to those results and 

then moving forward with, how do we make sure that that never 

happens again? 

With that, Director Blair, your written testimony will be made 

part of the official record of this hearing, and now you are recognized for any opening statement that you may wish to make. 

STATEMENT OF DENNIS C. BLAIR, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 

INTELLIGENCE 

Admiral BLAIR. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Reyes, 

Ranking Member Hoekstra. 

There are two different sets of questions and issues that have 

been raised in your opening statements, one having to do with the 

overall threat assessment to the United States going into the future; the second, these questions of accountability and procedures, 


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especially those involving the way the Intelligence Community 

treats Americans. 

I will be glad to go in more detail in questions and especially in 

more detail in the closed session, and some of the matters I think 

are best discussed there. 

But before talking about the overall threat, let me just say, Congressman Hoekstra, that in both the collecting of intelligence and 

certainly in the use of force in direct action by the Intelligence 

Community and in the support that we give to the Department of 

Defense, which is the other branch of government which blows 

stuff up and kills people, we follow a set of defined policy and legal 

procedures that are very carefully, carefully observed. 

And when there are questions, they are raised, and we give guidance down to the field so that we know that they are acting towards Americans. That has been the experience in the year that 

I have been director. Director Panetta and I have had direct conversations about things going on now. 

As far as the issues that you raise of the past, the Peru shoot 

down, the grinding on of that process, I agree with you; that is an 

awfully long time to do that, and I will take another look at it. 

I know Director Panetta has. I will look over his shoulder and 

make sure that we are doing the right thing. But I just want to 

share with everybody in open session that we take American citizens’ status and rights as Americans seriously. We spend a lot of 

time making sure we are doing the right thing, whether it is in collection or in direct action, and we can discuss some details subsequently. 

But let me turn to the overall threat assessment. You have seen 

my extensive written report on it, but let me just summarize some 

of the highlights and, first, by emphasizing that it is the product 

of the work of the thousands of patriotic, skilled brave professionals 

that I have the honor of leading as the world’s finest intelligence 

team. And the work that they do, as I think particularly brought 

into relief by the seven deaths that we have had recently of officers 

and the dozen more who have been wounded in recent weeks who 

we are caring for, it is a serious business that we are in. 

All of these Intelligence Agencies, the 16 in the Intelligence Community, participated in the statement that I submitted for the 

record and in the remarks that we will make. 

Let me start with the subject of information technology, since we 

all know, on a personal and on a business basis, every day there 

are new gadgets, there are new services, which make our lives faster and more efficient. But I think what we don’t quite understand 

as seriously as we should is the extent of malicious cyber activity 

that is growing now at unprecedented rates, extraordinary sophistication. 

The dynamic of cyberspace, when you look at the technological 

balance, right now it favors those who want to use the Internet for 

malicious purposes over those who want to use it for legal and lawful purposes, and we have to deal with that reality. 

An additional important factor is the growth of international 

companies in supplying both software and hardware, not only to 

private companies in this country but also for our sensitive U.S. 


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Government networks. This increases the potential for a subversion 

of the information in those systems. 

The recent intrusion of Google is yet another wake-up call about 

just how seriously we have to take this program. 

Cybercrime is on the rise. Global cyber bank and credit card 

fraud has serious implications for economic and for financial systems worldwide. Attacks against networks that control the critical 

infrastructure in this country and in others, energy, transportation, 

attacks on those infrastructures could wreak havoc. 

Cyber defenders, right now, it is simply the facts of the matter, 

have to spend more and work harder than the attackers do. And 

our efforts, frankly, are not strong enough to recognize, deal with 

that reality. The United States Government and the private sector—and we are deeply intertwined in this matter—have to do 

more to ensure that adequate cyber defenses are in place. 

Let me turn to the global economy, where the trends are more 

positive. A year ago, I was here warning about the dangers of a 

global depression. But in that year, an unprecedented policy response by both governments around the world and by central 

banks has laid the foundation for a global recovery that most forecasters expect will continue through this year, although unemployment will persist. 

Not all countries, however, have emerged from the slump, and 

several of them are important to the United States. Pakistan and 

the Ukraine are still struggling to put their economic houses in 

order. Our allies, who have forces with us in Afghanistan and elsewhere, are dealing with budget cuts, which affect their ability to 

participate. 

China is emerging from the events of the past year with enhanced clout. Its economy will grow from being approximately a 

third of America’s to about half by 2015, faster than we had previously forecast, if current trends continue. Last year, Beijing contributed to the G–20’s pledge to increase International Monetary 

Fund resources. It deployed naval forces to the international antipiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden, and it supported new U.N. Security Council sanctions against North Korea. That is all very positive. 

Nonetheless, Beijing still believes that the United States seeks to 

contain it, to transform its society, and that reinforces their concerns about internal stability about perceived challenges to their 

sovereignty claims. China continues to increase its defense spending. Preparations for a Taiwan conflict involving a U.S. intervention continues to dominate their modernization and their contingency plans, and they are also increasingly concerned about how to 

protect their global interests. 

Turning to violent extremism, we have been warning in the past 

several years that al Qaeda itself—its affiliates and al Qaeda-inspired terrorists remain committed to striking the United States. 

And in the past year, we have some names that go behind these 

warnings. 

As the chairman mentioned, Najibullah Zazi, two coconspirators 

were allegedly trained by al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Umar Faouk 

Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian who allegedly attempted to down a 

U.S. airliner on Christmas Day, represents an al Qaeda-affiliated 


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group. And Major Nidal Hasan at Fort Hood, a homegrown, selfradicalized extremist. 

The violent extremist threat is evolving. We have made complex 

multi-team attacks very difficult for al Qaeda to pull off. But as we 

saw with the recent rash of attacks last year, both successful and 

unsuccessful, identifying individual terrorists, small groups with 

short histories, using simple attack methods is a much more difficult task. 

We in the Intelligence Community did not identify Mr. 

Abdulmutallab before he boarded Northwest Flight 253 on Christmas Day for Detroit. We should have. And as we have discussed 

with this committee, we are working hard to improve so that we 

can. 

On a more positive note, only a decreasing and ever smaller minority of Muslims support violent extremism, and that is according 

to a number of polls taken in many Muslim countries. But still, al 

Qaeda’s radical ideology seems to appeal strongly to a disaffected 

group of young Muslims, and this is a pool of potential suicide 

bombers, and this pool unfortunately includes Americans. 

Although we don’t have the high-level home-grown threat facing 

Europeans, we have to worry about the appeal that figures like 

Anwar al-Awlaki exert on young American Muslims. 

However much we improve, we cannot count on intelligence to 

catch and identify every threat. Intensified counterterrorism efforts 

in the Pakistan theatre, as well as around the world, Yemen, Somalia, elsewhere are crucial to diminishing this threat. So, too, is 

working with allies and partners, enhanced law enforcement and 

other security measures, including immigration and visa controls, 

aviation and border security. All of these can disrupt terrorist 

plans. We need a multilayered dynamic defense supported by good 

intelligence. 

Let me then turn to the outlook in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

where the Intelligence Community is putting extraordinary efforts 

forth in combination with both Department of Defense deployments 

and with civil teams. 

Since January 2007, that is 3 years ago, the Taliban has increased its influence and expanded its insurgency while holding on 

to its strongholds in the Pashtun belt in Afghanistan. 

So the challenge is clear: 

First, reversing this Taliban momentum while holding onto security gains elsewhere. 

Second, improving Afghan security forces, governance, economic 

capability, so that as security gains are made, they can endure, and 

responsibilities can be turned over to the Afghans themselves. 

Now, early successes in places like Helmand, where the Marine 

units have been deployed for several months, where there is an aggressive counter-drug program, economic programs in place, where 

local governance is competent; these show us that we can make 

valid progress, we can make solid progress. Even where the threat 

is great. 

The safe haven that the Afghan insurgents have in Pakistan is 

the group’s most important outside support. And disrupting that 

safe haven won’t be sufficient by itself to defeat the insurgency in 

Afghanistan. But disrupting that presence in Pakistan is necVerDate Nov 24 2008 23:47 Apr 01, 2010 Jkt 055551 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\E551.XXX E551

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essary. It is a necessary condition for making overall progress in 

Afghanistan. 

The increase in terrorist attacks against their country has made 

the Pakistani public more concerned about the threat from Islamic 

extremists, including al Qaeda. Pakistanis continue to support the 

use of military force against insurgents in their country, and 

Islamabad has demonstrated determination and persistence in 

combatting the militants that it perceives are dangerous to its interests. But it has also continued to provide some support to other 

Pakistani groups that operate in Afghanistan. 

Looking to the future, U.S. and coalition successes against the insurgency in Afghanistan could provide new long-term incentives for 

Pakistan to take steps against Afghan-focused militants. Increased 

Pakistani cooperation is more likely if Pakistan is persuaded that 

the United States is committed to stabilizing Afghanistan and is 

capable to doing so. 

Let me finally turn to Iran, where the available intelligence indicates that Tehran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear 

weapons. This is being done in part by developing various nuclear 

capabilities that bring it closer to the ability to produce weapons. 

One of the key capabilities Iran continues to develop is its uranium enrichment program. Published information from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, indicates that Iran has 

significantly expanded the number of centrifuges in its facility at 

Natanz. It also has had problems operating these centrifuges, 

which has constrained the production of low-enriched uranium. 

The United States and other countries announced last September 

that Iran for years had been building in secret a second enrichment 

facility near the City of Qom. We assess that Iran has the scientific, the technical, the industrial capacity to produce enough 

highly enriched uranium for a weapon in the next few years and 

eventually to produce a nuclear weapon. The central issue is a political decision by Iran to do so. 

Meanwhile, Iran continues to improve its ballistic missile force. 

The chairman mentioned another step it took recently, and this enhances its power projection, provides Tehran the means for delivering a possible nuclear payload. 

We do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear 

weapons. We continue to judge that it takes a cost-benefit approach 

to making decisions on nuclear weapons, and we judge that this offers the international community opportunities to influence 

Tehran’s decision making. 

Meanwhile, apart from these nuclear decisions, which are a great 

concern to us, the Iran regime has found itself in a weaker internal 

political situation following last June’s disputed presidential election and the ensuing crackdown on protesters. Reacting to the 

stronger-than-expected opposition in the regime’s narrowing base of 

support, Supreme Leader Khamenei, President Ahmadinejad and 

their hard line allies appear determined to retain the upper hand 

by force. 

They are moving around in a more authoritarian direction to consolidate their power. However, they have not been successful so far 

in suppressing the opposition. 


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Mr. Chairman, this is the top layer of threats. There are other 

areas which you mentioned in your statement that continue to demand our continued attention and focus including continued security in Iraq, the Korean Peninsula, weapons of mass destruction 

proliferation, and challenges right here in the Western Hemisphere, as you have mentioned, working with Mexico against the 

drug cartels and also other developments in Latin America. 

I am also prepared to discuss important transnational issues like 

global health. Indeed, the very complexity and number of these 

issues, the large number of actors, both countries, nonstate actors, 

increasingly constitutes one of our biggest challenges, as they all 

mix together in forming the international environment in which 

the United States operates. But I am very encouraged by what I 

have seen in the past year on the job about how the Intelligence 

Community is organizing both to collect intelligence and then to 

analyze this complexity. 

The 100,000 military and civilian intelligence professionals I 

have the honor to lead work hard on these problems. They produce 

good results, and I believe they are providing a tremendous contribution to the security of the country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer questions. 

[The statement of Admiral Blair follows:] 


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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Blair. 

Just for the record, we have a hard stop for the director at 1 

o’clock. So we are going to—I would ask all members to look at the 

clock in front of your station. When the amber light comes on, 

know that you have got a minute to wrap up, so please. In order 

for us to get every member the opportunity to ask questions, everybody has got to respect that 5-minute limit. 

Director Blair, well, first of all, do you wish to comment on the 

issue of leaks? I mean, do we have any plan to be able to identify 

those that are leaking information to the media? Is there anything 

that can be done to debunk the erroneous information that inadvertently gets reported in those stories? 

Admiral BLAIR. Mr. Chairman, we have talked about this before. 

Starting last year, we have undertaken a new set of initiatives to 

try to clamp down on it within the Intelligence Community. This 

involves putting more emphasis on administrative measures within 

the Intelligence Community than in turning over a crimes report 

to the Department of Justice. So far, the crimes report method has 

resulted in delayed justice, if it has achieved justice at all, and the 

track record is very, very disappointing in terms of actual convictions. 

So, we are emphasizing administrative measures which we can 

take within each agency to investigate quickly, to check the various 

ways we have of keeping track with what our people are doing and 

to investigate administratively very, very quickly. 

There are, we have seen some early results in the Intelligence 

Community. There are several cases which I think we can—which 

we can take care of pretty quickly, and I think the example of 

being able to identify someone and take appropriate action have a 

very salutary effect on others who think they are smarter than the 

people who lead these agencies and think that they want to pass 

them to the press. 

As far as the Washington sport of using leaks for policy posturing, I am less sanguine, frankly. My primary concern is sources 

and methods and making sure that we don’t leak things that take 

us hundreds of millions of dollars to compensate for since our adversaries then quickly change their ways of operating. 

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement, your written statement, you 

make an observation that radicalization of groups and individuals 

in the United States has done more to spread jihadist ideology and 

to generate support for violent causes overseas than it has produced terrorists targeting the homeland. 

However, given the incident of Fort Hood, as I see it, the threat 

from home-grown terrorists, if anything, has increased, the potential has increased, one of the big reasons being the Internet and 

the availability of information that can lead to radicalization, individual radicalization. 

So I have a couple of questions. One is, what is the community 

doing to better understand that threat of radicalization? And, second, why does the Intelligence Community think that 

radicalization has done more for efforts overseas than for plots attacking the homeland, as you observed in your statement? 

Admiral BLAIR. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, this use of the Internet 

is, it is growing quickly, as you state. The use of the Internet for 


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foreign-based organizations trying to organize attacks, give instructions, arrange logistics, arrange financing, that, heretofore, has 

been the most dangerous use of the Internet. 

The home-grown radicalization of people in the United States 

reading these Web sites, then corresponding with the spokesmen of 

the organizations overseas, as happened with Major Hasan, and so 

it is a relatively—as a significant force, is relatively new. We 

might, as you suspect, be shooting behind the rabbit here, and it 

is moving faster than we thought, and we are spending a lot of additional effort on that now to try to understand it. There are some 

technical things which are making it more difficult with the use of 

social networking, as opposed to simply looking at a Web site and 

responding by e-mail. 

So I think you are pointing at a threat which may be increasing, 

we are taking it more and more seriously, and this is something 

that is potentially very dangerous to us for all of the reasons of the 

rights that American citizens have. 

The CHAIRMAN. I know that the military is taking these kinds of 

internal threats very seriously. Is there a strategy between perhaps 

DOD and the Intelligence Community to address these kinds of 

issues? 

Admiral BLAIR. Yes, sir. Within the Intelligence Community, we 

have taken measures so that intelligence information that is gathered lawfully on Americans that indicates that a member of the Department of Defense or someone who also works for other national 

security agencies will be—that information will be forwarded to the 

investigative branch of that service, whether it be in DOD or elsewhere, so that it can be put together with information within that 

agency, and we can bring together the agency information plus intelligence information to identify threats. 

The investigation by Admiral Clark and Secretary West had 

some internal DOD recommendations for our part. We are going to 

make sure that we don’t set a high threshold on sharing of that information so that we can catch these people. 

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, what is the status of the HIG, the High 

Value Interrogation Group, and the policy? Where are we in implementing that group for interrogation purposes? Also, is the FBI 

also part of that group? 

Admiral BLAIR. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. Last week, the charter 

for the High Value Interrogation Group was signed. It sets out the 

procedures. The FBI has the lead for it. There are deputy directors; 

one from CIA, and one from the Department of Defense. 

The principles of it are to bring together the best interrogators 

with the best intelligence backup professionals to interrogate important detainees. We haven’t completed all of the training and the 

setup, but even as we do, we have sent teams to, actually, to interview some high-value detainees who exist now. And we are using 

those principles in all interrogations, including that of Mr. 

Abdulmutallab, although the formal HIG is not being used in his 

case. 

So I am encouraged now by the speed with which that is coming 

online, and I think it represents the best practice that we want to 

achieve. 


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And I should mention, the other part of the HIG’s charter, right 

now it operates under Army Field Manual, both guidance and restrictions, but we have given it the responsibility of doing a scientific research to determine if there are better ways to get information from people that are consistent with our values. So it has 

a research budget. It is going to do scientific research on that longneglected area. 

The CHAIRMAN. And who will take the lead in training the interrogators? 

Admiral BLAIR. The head of the HIG, who is an FBI official, will 

have the responsibility for certification. Those of us who oversee it 

will have to make sure that we approve of the procedures that he 

sets up. 

The CHAIRMAN. So the FBI has the lead on training? 

Admiral BLAIR. The FBI has the lead on training, but it will be 

using best practices from DOD interrogators as well as from the 

FBI. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Hoekstra. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Just answer a couple of questions following up on 

that. Has that FBI person been appointed who is heading it up? 

Admiral BLAIR. Yes, sir, he has been; Andrew McCabe his name 

is. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. And the procedures have been approved and outlined? There was some confusion, I think, a couple of weeks ago as 

to whether the HIG actually existed or not with the Detroit case. 

I think some people said, and I think it might have been you that 

said the HIG should have been used with Farouk, and others said 

it is not up and running yet. And listening to you answer, I am not 

sure if we captured someone else today, whether you could call the 

HIG and somebody would be there in a few hours. Is that the case? 

Admiral BLAIR. Yes, sir. You now can. You couldn’t have done 

back in late December. It was forming, but not formed. It has 

formed now. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. All right. Thank you. 

I appreciate the discussion on the leaks. I think it is kind of interesting. You know, the briefing last night was not a leak, all 

right? I mean, this was an administration, you know, it was at the 

White House, speaking to reporters at the White House on the condition of anonymity, and the White House hastily called a briefing 

on Tuesday night to talk about what was going on with the Christmas Day bomber. 

I do find it an interesting strategy that we hastily call a briefing 

to let America and our friends and our enemies in the Middle East 

know that he is now singing like a canary. Someone will someday 

have to explain that to me from an intelligence standpoint, why we 

would communicate that. And if we believe it is so important to 

communicate that, I am assuming we invited Al Jazeera to be 

there last night to get that information out there quickly. 

Also, the Washington Post, you know, sources, senior administration officials, these are not low-level people that are necessarily 

sensationalizing those types of things. 

I want to go back to the issue of targeting Americans. You said, 

hey, there is a—your comments were along the lines of, we have 


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a framework, and we have a legal framework that we follow. I can 

tell you that when we have asked people from the Intel Community 

about these types of questions and types of issues, the one thing 

that is consistent, there is no clarity as to how they operate, what 

their box is that they operate within, or they have a great inability 

to articulate that with any type of clarity. If it is there, it may be 

there, but they are not able to communicate it with any clarity. 

And so what clarity can you add in terms of, you know, exactly 

what is the legal framework? What are the laws that govern this? 

Admiral BLAIR. We take direct action against terrorists in the Intelligence Community. If that direct action—we think that direct 

action will involve killing an American, we get specific permission 

to do that. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. And what goes into factoring that decision, the 

parameters? 

Admiral BLAIR. Primarily it has to do with the ones that you outlined in your statement, whether that American is involved in a 

group that is trying to attack us, whether that American is a 

threat to other Americans. Those are the factors involved. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. So there is a framework and a policy for a, hypothetically, a radical-born cleric who is living outside of the United 

States; there is a clear path as to when this person may be engaging in free speech overseas and when he may have moved into recruitment or when he may have moved into actual coordinating 

and carrying out or coordinating attacks against the United States? 

There is a relative clear path as to where that person hypothetically will have crossed the line and then will be targeted? 

Admiral BLAIR. I would rather go into details in closed session, 

Mr. Chairman, but we don’t target people for free speech. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Okay. 

Admiral BLAIR. We target them for taking action that threatens 

Americans or has resulted in it. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Yes. I am actually a little bit surprised you went 

this far in open session. But I do hope that in the next hour, or 

when we get into closed session, you can provide that clarity. Because other people in the community have not been able to provide 

us with that transparency or that clarity that I think that at least 

I would like to have. 

Admiral BLAIR. The reason I went this far in open session is, I 

just don’t want other Americans who are watching to think that we 

are careless about endangering—in fact, we are not careless about 

endangering lives at all, but we especially are not careless about 

endangering American lives as we carry out the policies to protect 

most of the country, and I think we ought to go into details in 

closed session. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. I believe that to be true 99 percent of the time. 

The reason that I believe that it needs this kind of stringent oversight in discussion and dialogue is that, it is one thing to say that, 

you know, we are not careless. 

That is why I started talking about Peru, because, in Peru, we 

were careless, and we were reckless. I want to make sure that this 

committee does everything that it can and within its power that it 

does not allow the community to be reckless and careless again. 


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Admiral BLAIR. Okay. I absolutely share the committee’s determination that while I am in charge, we will not be careless and 

reckless, and I look forward to supervision from the committee on 

that score. We have got to get this right. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. All right, thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Eshoo. 

Ms. ESHOO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Mr. Director, it is good to see you. There are so many 

issues to talk about, and there is an overarching hearing on threat 

assessments. I just want to raise two, and then I have some other 

questions when we go into closed session. 

I think that we are all very concerned, obviously, yourself and 

the entire community, about archaic computer systems and the disconnect between our computer systems and the attempted attack 

on Northwest Airlines 253. 

We know that Google uses what is called a fuzzy logic to match 

names that aren’t spelled exactly the same way. I can’t help but 

think that if we had some kind of system in place, that 

Abdulmutallab’s name might have been flagged despite the spelling. 

So can you tell us, in the upcoming, in the new budget that has 

been submitted, the President’s budget, what you have included in 

that budget that will address the disparities that we have in what 

I think is a disconnected system? I think it is a key issue that we 

have to look at. If you might take a moment to describe exactly 

what progress you expect to make through the fiscal year 2011 

budget under the information integration plan, that is number one. 

Number two, there have been reports in the last few days about 

moonlighting in the Intelligence Community. I think that this is a 

bad policy for many reasons. Why there would be CIA agents that 

are working with reportedly hedge funds to teach them the art of 

deception, I think we have had enough deception on the part of the 

financial community that has brought so much down around our 

ears in the country. 

But this is a troubling policy. We have had a reliance on contractors. If we are not paying people adequately, then I think that it 

is the responsibility of the community to come forward. But I think 

that this is a policy that needs to be revisited. I would like to hear 

what you think of it. 

As I said, I think that the reports that have come out in the last 

couple of days, I find them disturbing. I really find them disturbing, and it is my understanding that employees in your office, 

you know, the DNI’s office, may moonlight with permission. I don’t 

know ‘‘with permission,’’ I don’t know what that policy is, but I 

think that we need to discuss it. I think we need to review it, and 

I would also like you to comment on it. 

So those are the two things that I would like to raise. 

Admiral BLAIR. Congresswoman Eshoo, let me in closed session 

talk about some of the specifics of the technical upgrades to both 

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scribed Arab names that we have, because there are some good 

things happening, and we are speeding them up. 

But, in general, we are allocating additional—additional money, 

and we are going—we had a plan of gradual increases of technology, and we are speeding up that plan and putting more resources into it and putting more people onto the problem. I will 

talk about those in closed session. 

On the issue of moonlighting, sometimes I, too, am surprised by 

what I read in the press about my own organization, I will tell you. 

And this was a case of that. When I went into it, I found that we 

do have rules within all of the Intelligence Community branches, 

which comply with the overall government rules. 

The main activity of which I am personally aware, I know some 

of our officials on the ODNI staff do, is teaching, and, frankly, I 

favor that. Some of them teach evening classes on national security 

matters. 

Ms. ESHOO. Well, I think the teaching is different than moonlighting with other jobs relative to security, because people have security backgrounds. I think you know what I am driving at. 

If people go out and teach, that is one thing. But what I have 

read—maybe it is not accurate, but that is why I think we need 

to have a full review of it. We have people going out and working 

for hedge funds and other places so that they can make more 

money, but they are government employees. 

I think that there is a real potential for conflict. So I think we 

need to know what the policy is across the Intelligence Community; 

not only in your office but the CIA and any other part of the Intelligence Community. We have 16 agencies. I don’t know how many 

people are moonlighting or what they are doing. 

But I was stunned to read about it, I have to tell you. It sounded 

more like fiction to me than fact, and that is why I raise it, and 

that is why I think we need to take a good strong look at it. 

Admiral BLAIR. I certainly shall. But I do know that the rules 

are that you have to have approval from your supervisor; it can involve no conflict of interest; can’t use classified information; and 

they are very strict on it. But I will make sure that we will get a 

report to you. 

The CHAIRMAN. We will do some follow up. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director, I want to get back to this White House briefing for a 

second because I think it is really extraordinary that we have a situation where there was a leak that the Christmas Day bomber was 

giving us information. He was read his rights, and then he quit 

talking. Political controversy developed about reading the rights to 

non-Americans in those situations, enemy combatants and the rest. 

And to help squash the political controversy, the White House 

hastily calls a briefing with a senior administration official to say, 

oh, no, he is singing his guts out. I can’t figure out a reason that 

would happen other than political cover. 

Can you tell me a national security reason that it would be helpful to the people in the Intelligence Community to have it broadcast from the White House, basically, that, yes, he is telling us everything he knows? Is there any way that could be a helpful thing? 


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Admiral BLAIR. Let me just say, Congressman Thornberry, that 

I have been surprised by the combination of reality and politics 

having to do with this issue. I just try to do the job, to do the right 

thing for the country, and I just can’t control all of the politics. I 

just want to protect the country. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I appreciate the position you are in. 

I just think it is extraordinary to use something like this for political cover. 

And then I have got exhibit 2. Two days ago, Mr. John Brennan 

sent a letter to the Speaker talking about recidivism at Guantanamo. Now, much of the last year, some of us on this committee 

have been arguing that we should give more information to the 

public about recidivism rates at Guantanamo, and so the people 

could more accurately assess the dangers of closing that facility. 

But this letter, which he—is unclassified, and he says at the end 

that he invites the Speaker to make the contents available to any 

Member who has an interest. This letter talks about a 20 percent 

recidivism rate. It gets rather specific on some of these things. It 

tries to argue, oh, it was all stuff the Bush people did; we are doing 

it better. Of course, the Obama administration hadn’t been in long 

enough to know whether we have recidivism or not from people 

they may have let loose. 

But my real point on this is, isn’t this another example of declassifying things for political advantage? It is kind of like the memos 

that were declassified last year, despite the objections of five CIA 

Directors, of bringing things out into the open just for the political 

argument, not considering the national security implications? 

Admiral BLAIR. I think that the recidivism rates should be available so that people can judge what the stakes are that are involved 

in dealing with these Guantanamo detainees. So I am basically in 

favor of doing it, and I think we need to. I think this ought to be 

a joint decision between the—that should be something that those 

of you in the Intelligence Community, the Intelligence Committees 

know a lot about, and we are partners in these tough decisions. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I agree, sir, that is the way it should be, 

but the timing of some of these disclosures leads me to question 

some of that. 

Let me turn to one last question I have got for you. It is clear, 

from recent events, that terrorists are spreading out in various 

places around the world, some of which get a lot of attention like 

Yemen, some of which do not get as much attention. 

We had to concentrate a tremendous amount of resources in Afghanistan and Iraq in the past few years, but as terrorists spread 

out over the world, it seems to me that there is a danger of United 

States, particularly human intelligence collectors, being relatively 

thin in many places where terrorists may spread out to. 

Can you comment about whether we have adequate coverage all 

over the world to make sure that, wherever they go, we can stay 

on top of those developments and not be caught some day wishing 

that we had had more coverage in a particular area after an event 

occurs? 

Admiral BLAIR. I can assure you, Congressman Thornberry, that 

what we do is specifically focused on what other places we don’t 

have covered and then do something about it. 


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For example, Yemen, which on Christmas Day popped into our 

consciousness, was something I would say 6 months earlier we had 

identified as a place that needed attention, and we, in fact, flowed 

both intelligence resources and other government attention onto 

that. We keep that running list to try to be ahead of the rabbit. 

So although I can’t assure you that we will catch every single 

new country in which it came up, I think that we devote the right 

attention to that problem, and we push resources. And I will be 

back if we don’t have enough resources to do it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

And just for the record, that letter to the Speaker was in response to a question that Congressman Wolf asked Mr. Brennan— 

remember when we had the joint classified session here. And as I 

understand it from the staff, there is a classified annex to that letter. But that is the response that Mr. Brennan agreed to make because of the questions that he was asking. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Unclassified. 

The CHAIRMAN. But there is a classified annex part to it. 

Mr. Holt. 

Mr. HOLT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Director, for coming, and for trying to keep 

us informed all along the way. 

I would like to turn to Afghanistan. With all of the many things 

on your plate, this could consume everything, and there are clearly 

problems; Kabul’s, as you say, inability to build an effective, honest 

and loyal institution or set of institutions. Afghans perceive the police to be corrupt and more dangerous than the Taliban. In short, 

you say that the Taliban has increased its influence. In other 

words, it sounds like we are not succeeding. 

Where you come in is, help us understand to what extent we are 

or are not succeeding. And I am trying to understand just how good 

the intelligence coordination is with Afghan coalition and Pakistan 

forces. I want to understand how, whether you think our intelligence is structured to support the surge that is under way for our 

forces. Well, let me ask you those two questions first. 

Admiral BLAIR. Congressman Holt, I would say that we have it 

almost all right. But there are a couple of areas that I still think 

we need to increase, and I will be glad to talk in closed session specifically, but in the area of supporting not military but civil units 

who have important responsibilities, provincial reconstruction 

teams, the agricultural development, governance development, increasing the, increasing the military intelligence skills of the Afghan national army, I think we have a good plan, but we are not 

quite where we want to be. 

I am quite satisfied with the understanding of what intelligence 

is needed. The resources are adequate, I would say, to do that job 

right. We just haven’t quite finished putting all the pieces into 

place. 

Mr. HOLT. To understand just where we stand with respect to 

the Taliban, we have to have a good presence and a good understanding out in the hinterlands. We have frequently been disappointed in the level of our language capabilities. It is not just, 

you know, it is not just Pashtu. It is not just Dari. Where are we 


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in this? Can we reasonably claim to know what is going on outside 

of Kabul? 

Admiral BLAIR. Yes. 

Mr. HOLT. Okay. Now, going on, in Afghanistan, how do you determine the balance between the resources devoted to what I will 

call traditional intelligence activities, collection and analysis, and 

the other activities that seem more military than paramilitary? I 

am not sure they are mutually supportive. In fact, I think they at 

times tend to be contradictory, and I also think that perhaps one 

can grow so large as to take resources and attention from the 

other. How do you—how are you determining that balance? 

Admiral BLAIR. I think, again, we need to talk in closed session 

more about that. But it is something that I and the other leadership of the Intelligence Community are very conscious of, and we 

need to do both. And we make adjustments as we go along. Although you can always tweak it, I think we have the balance about 

right, and I don’t think we are giving short shrift to the support 

for the various components that we need to be successful in Afghanistan. 

I think that all of us realize that the ultimate solution in Afghanistan is not either a military or an intelligence solution, but it is 

fundamentally an Afghan solution of that country having the governance, the economic development and the security forces. For 

most Afghans, I think it is a good deal for them to be in charge 

rather than for the Taliban to be in charge. So nobody is thinking 

that either support for military intelligence or support for paramilitary activities is the end state. 

The end state we know has a lot more to do with Afghan governance and economic development, and that very much influences our 

intelligence support to reach that final goal. 

Mr. HOLT. Thank you. 

I do appreciate your conscientious attention to your job and your 

commitment to do a better job to keep us informed. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Director, for coming. 

Given the risks of the Pakistan Government being unduly impacted or failing as a result of pushing from Taliban otherwise, do 

you still assess that the Pakistan military adequately controls their 

nuclear weapons and the use of those weapons in any event that 

the civil government has struggles? 

Admiral BLAIR. Yes, sir. The Pakistan army takes very seriously 

the security of its weapons, and they know the catastrophic consequences—primarily for Pakistan—if they were to get loose. So it 

is correctly incentivized, and from what we see of the measures 

that they take, they are keeping them safe. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Can you help me understand what Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan are that would be different from 

ours that would incent either their intelligence service and/or their 

military to continue to support Taliban and Haqqani network activities and mischief in Afghanistan? Why is there a difference of 

interest there that we aren’t, in effect, on the same side? 


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Admiral BLAIR. I think one of the main things affecting Pakistani 

thinking is the events of the early 1990s when, after the Soviet 

Union left Afghanistan, the United States left Afghanistan, and 

then the Taliban came back and took it over in 1993. The Pakistanis, I think, understandably feel that they do not want an unfriendly country on their western border that is hostile to them. 

And so they, having felt that the United States left once before, 

they are concerned that we might not be as serious again. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So they are playing both ends against the middle? 

Admiral BLAIR. They have got a backup plan, and I think our job 

is to work together so that their plan and our plan is the same one. 

But it has its roots in historical memories and in the geographic 

strategic position of Pakistan. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Right. Language is important, starting with, I 

think, the State of the Union assessment of threats to that day 

here in Washington. The first time I had seen it was the reference 

to a lone offender. Offender seems to be an awfully gentle term to 

apply to someone like a Hasan or like the Christmas Day bomber. 

Was that a phrase you are familiar with? I prefer to use Islamic 

jihadists or terrorists or other things that more accurately describes the intent than someone that might offend me. Any comment about the phraseology? 

Admiral BLAIR. I am not sure about that word, sir. We have used 

words like lone wolf to describe their motives, the way they operate, but violent extremist is the word that using terrorist tactics is 

what—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. I think we have run the risk of gently— 

using words like lone offender, I think, lessens the intensity with 

which we ought to go after these guys. 

One final thing, in terms of the radicalization processes, do we 

have programs in place—the point I want to get to is madrassas 

and hate that is taught there, can be taught there. None of us 

would put up with hate being taught in any of our public schools. 

We wouldn’t look to the Federal Government to stop that. We, as 

parents, would take that on. 

How do we incentivize moderate Muslims to address things that 

are being taught in madrassas either in the United States or other 

places that incents radicalization? Do we have any kind of way, 

any insight into how—because it is not our problem. We can’t go 

into a madrassa and have any impact whatsoever, but a parent 

who sends their child there, I think, would have great incentive to 

stop that. Is there any way to incentivize that? 

Admiral BLAIR. I think you grabbed exactly the right end of the 

stick there, sir. It is the working with Muslim parents who want 

their children to be—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Educated. 

Admiral BLAIR. Educated is the right way to do it. 

I am not familiar with either U.S. Government or private or 

international programs that do that. But in the conversations that 

I have had with some Muslim officials, parents, influential officials 

in other areas, they would see it exactly the way you do, and I 

think we ought to support them. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Conaway. 


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Mr. Schiff. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Director, I wanted to ask you about Yemen and Somalia. 

And starting with Yemen, are there plans to establish a mission 

manager for Yemen with a focus on Yemen? Are there equivalent 

plans to put that kind of focus on Somalia? I am concerned, have 

been some time, with the problem in Somalia, and I worry that we 

don’t wait to have an attack originate from Somalia to give Somalia 

the kind of attention we are paying to Yemen right now. 

So can you comment on how the focus on Yemen has intensified 

and whether we are paralleling that in Somalia; how you view the 

comparative threat emanating from both countries? 

In your open, written statement, you mention that Al Shabab, 

which maintains ties to the small number of al Qaeda members 

who continue to operate in East Africa, is certain to continue planning attacks. How do you estimate the comparative number of al 

Qaeda in Somalia to Yemen? So if you could start with those questions? 

Admiral BLAIR. Yes, sir, and I would like to talk a little bit 

longer when we get to closed session. 

But in general, the Intelligence Community focus on Yemen has 

intensified, as I mentioned to Congressman Thornberry, not just 

now, but had been previously. It is a mission, and we are organizing to give it the focus that it deserves; similarly for Somalia. 

Right now, I would rate the al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

operating out of Yemen as a better developed and more direct 

threat against the United States and against the American interests in that part of the world than Al Shabab. Al Shabab has a— 

it has both a Somali ambition. It wants to be the Government of 

Somalia. It also has a jihadist ambition which involves attacking 

the United States. 

And for the reasons I can go into more in closed session, I would 

rank Yemen as somewhat a more concern. But that is not to say 

we are spending any less attention to both of them. It is just that 

is how I would rank them right now. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Aren’t there problems of a different scale in Somalia 

in the sense that, as you point out, you have Al Shabab poised, potentially, to take control of that country, I think, unlike the situation in Yemen, where the Yemeni Government is at least not presently at risk of falling to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula? We 

also have a much more limited opportunity for cooperation in Somalia or for a physical presence in Somalia. So, in that respect, 

aren’t the risks greater and our ability to address them less than 

in Somalia? 

Admiral BLAIR. You are absolutely right. President Salih is 

seized with the threat to his country, as is the United States. So 

we have a good partner there who wants to work with us, whereas 

in Somalia, the TFG is just barely hanging on and trying to work 

its own process. So both the intelligence and the support job is 

much more difficult in Somalia; you are right. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I just worry we sometimes focus on fighting the last 

battle. And we do it—we did it after 9/11, focusing on aircraft and 

the same kind of aircraft plans and then confront—we were confronted with other kinds of challenges. I worry that we are going 


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to focus right now on Yemen, and then there is going to be an attack emanating out of Somalia. And then we are going to put our 

focus on Somalia, but I look forward to exploring it further with 

you in closed session. 

I think that is all the time that I have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Schiff. 

Mr. King. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Director Blair, for your service. 

I would like to go back to the Christmas Day bombing, because, 

to me, of the questions it raises about the coordination of the Intelligence Community, looking at it at the time and looking at it now, 

it was not clear to me who was in charge during those days. For 

instance, we have learned that apparently it was the Attorney General or the Attorney General’s Office which made the decision on 

Miranda, without asking advice from DNI, CIA, NCTC, the Homeland Security. 

Then, I don’t know who was briefing the President, but when the 

President did appear on the fourth day, December 28, I believe it 

was, to discuss it, he referred to Abdulmutallab as an isolated extremist. As Congressman Hoekstra and Congressman Thornberry 

have referenced, last night, there was a briefing at the White 

House on the status of the investigation. 

So for the purpose of clarifying who does what or who is in 

charge, could I ask, were you involved in briefing the President between Christmas Day and when he made his statement from Hawaii on Monday the 28th? 

Admiral BLAIR. Yesterday, Director Mueller and I and Director 

Panetta briefed the Intelligence Committee in the other Chamber 

on the events of this day. And Director Mueller gave a pretty good 

account of what went on in those fast-moving days of—I know, 

those fast-moving hours of Christmas Day and then in subsequent 

days. 

And during that day, the FBI agent said the Joint Terrorism 

Task Force were the people on the scene who were dealing with 

this developing situation. They were in touch with a team back 

here in Washington—— 

Mr. KING. Mr. Director, if I could jump ahead, really what I am 

talking about was the statement the President made on Monday 

the 28th. Who was in charge of briefing him for that day, and who 

signed off on the term isolated extremist? Would that have been 

you? 

Admiral BLAIR. The staff—— 

Mr. KING [continuing]. Places. 

Admiral BLAIR [continuing]. Was an interagency team, representatives of the Intelligence Community who worked for me were on 

that team that fed the information to the President. So we had an 

input on that. 

Mr. KING. The actual statement the President made to the world, 

did you sign off on that statement? 

Admiral BLAIR. I am not going to talk about those internal processes, Representative King. 

Mr. KING. At the meeting last night at the White House, the 

briefing that was given, as I see, some of the information that has 


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been made public is, we are told that two family members convinced the terrorists to cooperate. Was that cleared with you as to 

whether or not it is appropriate to discuss publicly that two family 

members are cooperating or urged them to cooperate? 

And, also, I would ask, the fact that they did speak to a number 

of family members in Nigeria, that was made public. Is that much 

the type of information that should be made public? And if so, was 

it cleared with you or Director Panetta? 

Admiral BLAIR. Again, Congressman King, I am not going to 

comment on the internal processes for this investigation right now. 

Mr. KING. Director, I can understand your position. I am really 

asking these questions to get them on the record, because I have 

a concern, from talking to various people in the Intelligence Community, that, number one, the Attorney General may have a disproportionate influence. But beyond that, the White House is very 

much involved in the weeds of policy. I don’t know whether it is 

John Brennan or someone else, but the fact is that a lot of policy 

has been directed from the White House, which is cutting into what 

should be done by the DNI, by the CIA, the NCTC, and Homeland 

Security. 

I think we should look at that especially since, obviously, we do 

not have jurisdiction over Mr. Brennan, being a White House employee. 

And this does seem to be a marked difference from the previous 

administration. It might be the right thing to do, but if so, I think 

we should be consulted on that. Because it just seems to me that 

there were a number of decisions made, leaving aside the 

Mirandizing, just statements by the President, who was doing the 

actual briefing of the President, and the decision made last night 

at the White House to the releasing of what I would consider to 

be—could be considered as classified information or damaging information. And I just wonder if the entire Intelligence Community 

was consulted on that before these political decisions were made to 

release that information? 

Admiral BLAIR. I understand your question, sir. 

As I said before, the political dimension of what to me ought to 

be a national security issue has been quite, quite high. I don’t 

think it has been very particularly good, I will tell you, from the 

inside, and in terms of us trying to get the right job done to protect 

the United States. 

And we are just trying to bring intelligence and law enforcement 

to bear to get the right information to make sure that those who 

threaten our country get behind bars. And I just don’t want to go 

into the political side of it. 

Mr. KING. Again, thank you for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Director, just to be clear and to make it part of our record, 

the briefing that occurred last night that has been referred to this 

morning, was that in response to a leak that occurred that the information was going to come out about Farouk talking to the FBI, 

the FBI getting the information, and so the decision was made to 

brief members of the media? Is that correct? Is that how it happened? 


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Admiral BLAIR. I don’t know exactly what the origins of that 

event were, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can you check on that and have somebody get 

back to us? 

Admiral BLAIR. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Because I am curious myself. 

Apparently, there was a leak, and they decided to do this briefing. Just based on the words that we used, hastily called, leads me 

to believe that they are reacting to some kind of information that 

was leaked out there and wanted to mitigate the damage, perhaps. 

Admiral BLAIR. Let me not make it up here but try to get back 

to you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Schakowsky. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Good morning, Director Blair. Thank you for 

being here. 

I have been concerned that the United States has been too prone 

to outsourcing our security in various ways to contractors. And I 

wanted to ask you about this, what do we call it, the HIG, the 

High-Value Interrogation Group and wonder, to what extent this 

group is using contractors, if at all? 

Admiral BLAIR. The use of contractors by the HIG will be absolutely minimal. The only circumstances that we have discussed in 

internal deliberations where it might be used is if there is some 

language capability, which is, some interpretation, interpreting capability that is required that we don’t have a government employee 

who has the level of skill required. We then would look to contracting. That is the one area in which we have talked about using 

contractors, but the High-Value Interrogation Group will be government employees. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. But we have also talked about, for years it 

seems, increasing internally our language capacity. Is that still 

happening? 

Admiral BLAIR. Yes. That is a very aggressive program. I just 

don’t like to say that there will never be some obscure dialect that 

we don’t have the best, that we don’t have a 3–3 person available 

to do, that we might want to go outside to get someone so we get 

the nuance. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you. 

We have been told in the past that the CIA is out of the interrogation business. Will the CIA help or be part in any way of the 

HIG program in doing interrogations? 

Admiral BLAIR. The CIA is a part of the team that has an interrogation and an intelligence support. As Director Panetta had said, 

the CIA as a body independently is out of the interrogation business, but they are part of this team under the direction of the 

structure we set up. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Will the CIA be conducting interrogations? 

Admiral BLAIR. They may be participating in interrogations, yes. 

As I said, all interrogations are guided by the Army Field Manual. 

There will be a uniform level of training, so we have not ruled out 

CIA officials with the right experience being part of the team. 


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Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. But this is new. We were told that the CIA is 

out of the interrogation business, that the CIA is not doing interrogations, so this is a change in policy? 

Admiral BLAIR. I think it is the distinction between the CIA 

being the—running these sites that we had in the past, and being 

a member of the team. And they are members of the team. They 

are not running any kind of an independent interrogation capability. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Has the Intelligence Community determined 

or considered whether interrogations would be videotaped? 

Admiral BLAIR. I don’t know the answer to that question. I will 

get back to you. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Would you? 

General Alexander and the NSA, I had questioned issues of preventing in advance situations where they had to come to us and 

say, mea culpa, certain databases shouldn’t have been touched, et 

cetera. 

In the issue of reporting to Congress, have you considered someone being in charge, a compliance officer who watches to make sure 

that there are situations so that you as Director of National Intelligence, that it is not you that is responsible but that someone is 

preventing a situation where you have to come back and talk to us 

about why it didn’t happen? 

Admiral BLAIR. Right. I don’t enjoy those sessions any more than 

you do—— 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Sure. 

Admiral BLAIR. Congresswoman Schakowsky, and we have established a compliance official within the NSA directly in the chain of 

command of that program whose job it is to ensure that we are 

doing it right ahead of time when at all possible, and then certainly 

fixing it. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Well, that is just one. That is the NSA. But 

I am just wondering if there are any others, so that we don’t continually—and it does seem to be continually—ask, how come we 

read it in the paper? How come Congress wasn’t informed? And 

there are a number of things we can’t even talk about here where 

we say, why weren’t we told in a timely way? 

Admiral BLAIR. Right, let’s talk some more about specifics in 

closed session, but the emphasis on compliance and on not saying 

oops is much greater than it was, and we will continue to pursue 

that. I just cited that one example within NSA, since that has been 

the source, as you know, of several of the things we have had to 

fix later. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I think that is an important improvement. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Blunt is not here. 

Mr. Rogers. No. 

Mrs. Myrick. 

Mrs. MYRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

But we have got votes coming up. And since the Director has to 

leave at 1 o’clock, I would like to be able to go into closed session, 

so I am not going to ask anything here. 

The CHAIRMAN. Great. Well, I was just conferring with the ranking member. 


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It looks like we are going to be voting at 12:15. We will have five 

votes, one 15-minute and four 5-minute votes, which will effectively 

close out the time that we have the Director here. 

So what I propose to do is close this session, close the open session, reconvene in our hearing room. It is now 16 till 12 p.m., and 

reconvene there 10 minutes to 12 p.m. and then go into closed session so that members can follow up with some of the issues. 

With that, we are recessed and will reconvene in our own hearing room. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

Æ 


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