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T H R E AT S O L D A N D N E W

A significant development in Africa over the 

past decade has been the generalized lessening of 

violent conflict. Revitalized, expanded international 

peacekeeping, bolstered by a newly launched African Union (AU) determination to tackle security 

challenges, has reinforced this trend.

In most cases, however, progress made in 

peacemaking remains fragile and tentative. More 

often, rebellions and insurgencies have been contained by negotiated agreements that have not 

been followed by meaningful political accommodations and other forms of compliance. It is thus far 

too soon to assume that African states have found 

permanent solutions to the political rivalries and 

governance problems that lie at the root of most 

recent conflicts. A reminder of the difficulties facing peacekeeping operations can be seen in the ongoing disintegration of Somalia, which now rates 

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

U.S. Security Engagement in Africa

By William M. Bellamy

A P U B L I C AT I O N O F T H E A F R I C A C E N T E R F O R S T R AT E G I C S T U D I E S

◆ Despite significant recent gains, Africa’s security environment remains fragile with a wide array of 

ongoing and emerging threats placing great strains on already overburdened governments.

◆ United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa have realized some success in recent years, especially 

when they have involved direct support from members of the Security Council.

◆ Much more cohesive interagency coordination under strong White House direction is required if the 

United States is to contribute to Africa’s sustained stability given the region’s persistent conditions 

of poverty, inequality, and weak governance.

H I G H L I G H T S

N O . 1 / J U N E 2 0 0 9

as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, the rebellion and repression in Darfur that continue to generate international outrage, and the prospect of a 

renewed north-south civil war in Sudan, where a 

referendum on secession is scheduled for 2011.

The 9/11 attacks also awakened U.S. officials 

to Africa’s broader vulnerabilities. With its porous 

borders, ungoverned spaces, societal tensions, and 

law enforcement shortcomings, Africa appeared to 

offer ideal territory in which terrorist or criminal organizations could seek refuge, acquire and stockpile 

weapons, recruit members, conduct training, and 

plan operations without much fear of official interference. Many observers also consider Africa potentially vulnerable to Islamist extremism. More Muslims live in Africa than in the Middle East. Where 

they live in communities undermined by poverty, 

unemployment, and a sense of exclusion and official 
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neglect (a situation that applies to many non-Muslim communities in Africa as well), it is arguable 

that they are prey to extremist messages and eventually to terrorist recruitment.

Thus, chronic weaknesses that had previously 

attracted the attention mainly of humanitarians 

and development experts—poverty, joblessness, 

disease, illiteracy, corruption, and weak governance—were discovered to have new strategic importance. This situation fed a tendency to conflate 

all forms of U.S. assistance to Africa—security, developmental, and humanitarian—with overriding 

counterterrorism objectives.

Less spectacular but equally important will be 

a host of new and less conventional security challenges. Piracy is dramatically up in African waters, 

threatening commerce and disrupting humanitarian 

assistance operations. A growing number of African 

states are becoming important transit points for narcotics serving European markets, though the drug 

bosses and networks controlling this trade are rarely 

African. Other criminal activities, including illegal 

fishing, human trafficking, and grand scale theft of oil 

in the Niger Delta, have expanded markedly, threatening to destabilize already fragile governments.

Official corruption remains an important contributing factor to the spread of criminal activities in 

Africa. Yet even when governments are determined 

to combat criminal influences, profound institutional deficiencies often prevent effective action. Africa 

has the lowest percentage of police officers (180 per 

100,000 population) and judges per capita of any 

global region. And the effects of these problems do 

not remain localized: the United Nations (UN) Office of Drugs and Crime estimates that 58 percent of 

fraudulent insurance claims in the United States are 

made by Nigerians.

Adding to this litany is the uncharted danger 

that the worsening global financial crisis will reverse the strong economic growth that Africa has 

realized in recent years. Shortages of affordable food 

and fuel, intensified competition for diminishing 

natural resources such as water, and dislocations 

caused by environmental stress and climate change 

seem certain to bring more pressure to bear on already overburdened African governments.

PEACEKEEPING SUCCESSES

In recent years, the United Nations has quietly 

improved the effectiveness of its conventional peacekeeping operations in Africa. The first turnaround 

was in Sierra Leone where, despite initial humiliation 

at the hands of rag-tag Revolutionary United Front 

militias, a credible UN force was deployed to contested areas of the country by mid-2001. Large UN 

peacekeeping operations also scaled up in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2001, in Liberia in 2003, 

and in Côte d’Ivoire in 2004. All were Chapter VII 

missions authorizing the use of force. All were generally “successful” in that they either checked violence, 

helped establish conditions in which conflict could be 

contained, or contributed to postconflict stabilization.

UN operations were most successful where they 

were effectively “sponsored” by members of the Security Council willing to unilaterally deploy resources in support of them. Thus, the United Kingdom 

military presence in Sierra Leone, French military 

activities in Côte d’Ivoire, and strong U.S. backing 

for the UN operation in Liberia all appear to have 

worked to create a more permissive operating environment for international peacekeeping forces.

This was also a period in which the newly 

formed African Union legitimized for the first time 

the principle of collective armed intervention under AU auspices to restore peace or rectify egregious 

violations of human rights or humanitarian law. A 

new Peace and Security Council was established 

to oversee peace support operations, institute sanctions, and facilitate humanitarian action. Armed intervention capabilities were to be provided by five 

Ambassador William M. Bellamy (Ret.) is the Director 

of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. He was U.S. 

Ambassador to Kenya from 2003 to 2006 during which 

time he directed U.S. security programs in the Horn of 

Africa. He served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (2001–2003). 

“this situation fed a 

tendency to conflate all forms 

of U.S. assistance to Africa—

security, developmental, and 

humanitarian—with overriding 

counterterrorism objectives”
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standby brigades, one in each African subregion, 

supplemented by a continent-wide reserve force of 

observers, police, and civilian personnel.

Consistent with this new regional thinking, the 

AU launched several peace support operations after 

2000. A small, 1-year deployment to Burundi provided some measure of security following a ceasefire 

in 2003, although it failed to achieve its main objective of disarming rebels and facilitating political 

dialogue. AU missions to embattled Darfur and Somalia were far more ambitious and less successful.

While security gains are visible and encouraging across Africa, they are fragile. In many places, 

the underlying causes and drivers of conflict have not 

changed. Improvements in UN peacekeeping are encouraging, as is AU willingness to shoulder more responsibility. But a deficit of real African peacekeeping 

capacity remains. UN peace operations appear at their 

upper limit in Africa, and globally: close to 90,000 UN 

peacekeeping personnel are today committed to 16 UN 

operations worldwide. Some 70 percent of those personnel are in Africa for seven operations. Serious uncertainty persists regarding Africa’s capacity to respond 

to the next big crisis. The growing gap between expectations and demands placed on peace operations argues 

strongly for a broad reassessment of UN peacekeeping 

in Africa and a new strategy for easing current excess 

commitments. It also argues for renewed multilateral 

thinking on how to assist the African Union to sustain 

confidence and enthusiasm for playing an active operational role in ending conflicts on the continent.

U.S. SECURITY ENGAGEMENT

The United States has significantly enlarged 

its security engagement in Africa in recent years. 

This includes a U.S. military base in Djibouti, active counterterror programs, support for a massive 

expansion of UN peace operations, and the launch 

of the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). By 

explicitly designating security resources to Africa and 

consistently meeting its assessed obligations to UN 

peacekeeping, the United States has helped put African peacekeeping on more solid footing than at any 

time in the recent past. Yet this security enlargement 

has not been effectively integrated with U.S. diplomatic and long-term developmental aims. Indeed, 

stark tensions persist across these three domains.

Traditional security assistance and counterterrorism programs do not adequately address many of Africa’s emerging security challenges. Lawlessness and 

escalating crime, for example, are not security trends 

that U.S. or African militaries can be expected to 

resolve. Nor are there traditional security assistance 

solutions to the chronic instability that affects many 

parts of Africa due to persistent conditions of poverty, inequality, and governance failures. Within the 

U.S. Government, the State Department’s Bureau of 

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL) is charged with combating international 

drug trafficking and organized crime, money laundering, human trafficking, and building the capacity of 

partner nation law enforcement and criminal justice 

systems. However, the $34 million that INL commits 

to Africa annually is clearly too little to qualify as a 

coherent program of nonmilitary capacity-building.

More vigorous, better resourced diplomacy will 

be essential to an effective U.S. response to Africa’s 

security challenges. Well-targeted and sustained assistance programs are likewise needed. But the United 

States will be called upon to move beyond traditional 

remedies. Too often, U.S. interventions have been 

reactive and compartmentalized, a weakness typified 

by post-9/11 counterterrorism programs in Africa and 

by almost all forms of nonmilitary security assistance. 

To adequately address increasingly complex security 

challenges in Africa, the United States will need to be 

more anticipatory in its actions and more coherent in 

bringing civilian and military resources to bear. Without improvement in interagency planning and execution, stronger State Department leadership, and more 

forceful and effective White House oversight, the impact of greater U.S. engagement on African security 

issues will likely be limited.

SIX U.S. PRIORITIES FOR AFRICA

Create an Updated, Baseline Assessment 

of U.S. Security Interests in Africa. During the 

“traditional security assistance 

and counterterrorism programs 

do not adequately address 

many of Africa’s emerging 

security challenges”
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Cold War, some strategists considered access to 

Rhodesia’s and South Africa’s mineral resources vital to U.S. interests. Today, some experts assign the 

same importance to West Africa’s oil. After 9/11, 

Africa emerged as a potential hotbed of international terrorist activity. That perception has shifted 

significantly in recent years to a more focused and 

realistic appreciation of actual terrorist threats. At 

the same time, new nonconventional threats have 

proliferated, and UN peace operations and the aspirations of the African Union have become critical components of security in Africa. Some argue 

that China’s enormous commercial and diplomatic 

investment in Africa will inevitably set off both a 

scramble by outside powers for access and influence 

in sub-Saharan Africa and a strategic rivalry with 

the United States.

Others see areas of convergence in U.S. and 

Chinese interests in Africa and argue for greater 

collaboration with China in enhancing African 

peacekeeping capacity, for example, or strengthening maritime security. Above all, the United States 

needs a clear-sighted consensus on the security 

stakes in Africa today, one that is realistic and encompasses new threats and links between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. It should include an 

appraisal of UN and AU peace operations and multilateral strategies for easing current overstretched 

conditions. If one concludes that Africa’s strategic 

importance in coming years will be linked less to 

the threats of war or terrorism than to questions 

of socioeconomic advancement and effective governance, then enhancing African security will inevitably be a more complex undertaking involving 

major nonmilitary and developmental components.

Balance and Integrate Military and Civilian 

Initiatives in Africa under Stronger White House 

Direction. A striking feature of U.S. global engagement in recent years has been the steady growth 

of authority, responsibilities, and resources of the 

U.S. military as civilian diplomatic and development capacities have declined. Initial resistance 

to USAFRICOM from African governments and 

development partners stemmed in part from the 

concern that a large and well-resourced command 

would inevitably overshadow and “militarize” U.S. 

diplomatic and development programs across the 

continent. The Obama administration will need to 

address these fears and ensure that U.S. policy in 

Africa is carefully balanced among defense, diplomacy, and development. The administration will 

need a policy framework in which resources and 

capabilities across the U.S. Government are identified and brought to bear in coordinated fashion.

Complex security situations in individual countries and subregions are an emerging reality in Africa. It is not hard to envision a scenario in which 

multiple African governments must cope simultaneously with crises as diverse as increased urban lawlessness, resource depletion and unrest in rural areas, 

the intrusions of international narcotics and organized crime syndicates, and chaotic refugee flows 

from neighboring conflict zones. In such circumstances, the United Sates cannot afford a dispersal 

of the authorities and resources needed to mount an 

effective response. American policymakers should 

create an ongoing interagency coordination effort 

(State, Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development) at the regional level, under 

firm White House guidance, to pursue the highest 

regional priorities.

Develop a More Coherent Approach to Combating Terrorism in Africa. At present, the threat 

of international terrorists originating or operating 

in sub-Saharan Africa is limited. Policies should 

acknowledge and reflect this reality rather than 

continue to routinely depict sub-Saharan Africa 

as a zone of high terrorist risk and critical concern. Where active international terrorist threats 

do exist—as in the Horn—the most effective U.S. 

countermeasures will involve working closely 

with local partners who share U.S. strategic goals. 

Among the most common mistakes made by U.S. 

planners is to assume that a robust American 

“among the most common 

mistakes made by U.S. 

planners is to assume that 

a robust American military 

presence is both a reassurance 

to friendly governments and 

a deterrent to extremists and 

potential terrorists” 
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military presence is both a reassurance to friendly 

governments and a deterrent to extremists and 

potential terrorists. In fact, many friendly African 

governments regard a large and visible U.S. military presence as a handicap and potential magnet 

for both domestic political opponents and terrorists in search of high-value targets in an otherwise 

target-poor environment. Both Defense and State 

should devote more attention to correctly calibrating the size and visibility of the U.S. security 

presence in African host nations.

As a matter of policy, military operations to engage individual terrorists or small groups should be 

undertaken only when more discreet means fail and 

after consideration of the implications of such actions on other aspects of U.S. policy. The lack of a 

clear chain of command has been a persistent problem with U.S. counterterrorism policy in Africa. 

Among the highest priorities should be to clarify 

the respective authorities of Defense and State, and 

specifically of the regional combatant commander, 

other relevant combatant commands, and U.S. Ambassadors in Africa with respect to theater counterterror policy and programs. As matters now stand, 

considerable uncertainty exists in the field, among 

civilian and military authorities alike, over respective responsibilities in this area.

Take a Hard-nosed Look at Traditional Military Assistance Programs. Despite years of effort 

and hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance from 

the United States, most African militaries today are 

only marginally more professional and more capable 

of operating in peacekeeping roles than they were 10 

years ago. Some militaries have regressed over the 

same period. The net effect is that while African 

states continue to contribute forces to UN peacekeeping operations at a high rate, these forces remain less well trained, equipped, and led than most 

U.S. observers hoped when peacekeeping assistance 

programs began in earnest. The AU remains far from 

the goal of security self-sufficiency.

Donor assistance has not always helped this process. Donors seldom effectively coordinate their security assistance to African states, and often pitch it 

to meet their own localized security concerns rather 

than the longer term needs of recipient states. To 

improve and integrate U.S. security assistance in 

Africa, overall responsibility for security assistance 

programs should rest with the State Department, 

with USAFRICOM brought into the planning process at the outset and given substantial responsibility 

for the co-design and implementation of military-tomilitary capacity-building. More emphasis needs to 

be placed on strengthening institutions and capabilities in African militaries rather than simply imparting mission-specific skill sets. Better criteria should be 

developed for assessing the effectiveness of assistance 

programs, and less use should be made of U.S. private sector contracts. Finally, renewed efforts should 

be made to harmonize U.S. assistance with those of 

other major donors, notably the United Kingdom, 

France, and other European Union states.

Develop Clear Strategies to Address the Rapidly Growing Importance of Nonmilitary Security 

Needs in Africa. Weak or nonexistent laws, inadequate police forces, shortages of trained prosecutors 

and judges, and pervasive corruption render many 

African states nearly defenseless against rising domestic and international crime. While African 

militaries are generally better organized and better 

resourced than civilian providers of security, tasking them to perform law enforcement duties is not a 

viable strategy. A top priority for U.S. Africa policy 

should be to develop a clear interagency consensus, under the shared leadership of the INL and the 

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, on 

priorities and modalities for delivering nonmilitary 

security assistance in a more predictable, measurable and sustained manner.

Better Define the USAFRICOM Mission 

and Configuration. Despite significant progress 

under USAFRICOM commander General William 

Ward’s leadership, misgivings persist in Africa and 

internationally about the command’s role. To improve both USAFRICOM’s reputation and effectiveness, the United States should:

“more emphasis needs to 

be placed on strengthening 

institutions and capabilities 

in African militaries rather 

than simply imparting 

mission-specific skill sets”
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AFRICA CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC STUDIES

Director: Ambassador William 

M. Bellamy (Ret.)

National Defense University

300 Fifth Avenue, Building 21

Fort McNair

Washington, DC 20319-5066

Phone: + 1 202 685-7300

Website: www.africacenter.org

AFRICA CENTER 

REGIONAL OFFICE 

IN DAKAR

Regional Manager: 

Elisabeth Feleke

Phone: 221 33 869 61 00

Email: felekee@ndu.edu

AFRICA CENTER 

REGIONAL OFFICE 

IN ADDIS ABABA

Regional Manager: 

Kevin Crawford

Phone: 251 11 517 42 05 

Email: CrawfordKK@state.gov

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEFS

Editor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Phone: + 1 202 685-7300

Email: Sieglej@ndu.edu

This Africa Security Brief was synthesized from 

Ambassador Bellamy’s “Africa Policy: Recommendations for the Obama Administration,” in 

U.S. Africa Policy Beyond the Bush Years: Critical 

Challenges for the Obama Administration (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, 2009).

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For more information on ACSS visit the Web site at 

http://www.africacenter.org.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports the 

development of U.S. strategic policy toward Africa by providing highquality academic programs, undertaking policy-relevant research 

and analysis, and fostering awareness of and open dialogue on U.S. 

strategic priorities and African security issues. Toward these aims, the 

Africa Center is committed to building networks of African, American, 

European, and international military and civilian leaders and articulating 

African perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

CENTRE D’ETUDES STRATEGIQUES DE L’AFRIQUE

http://www.africacenter.org

◆ Determine (and emphasize publicly) that 

the USAFRICOM core mission is cooperation with 

African partner states in traditional areas of security 

assistance—and that the command’s greatest comparative advantage will be its ability to cooperate 

in a more coherent, effective, better resourced, and 

sustainable fashion. At the same time, the administration should not downplay the USAFRICOM status as a combatant command. The likelihood of the 

command conducting combat operations in Africa 

may be remote, but this capability and potential role 

should not be dismissed or disguised.

◆ Single out maritime security cooperation 

as a special USAFRICOM priority. The importance of offshore oil and gas production in West 

Africa is well known. Of increasing international 

concern are piracy, grand-scale oil theft schemes, 

narcotics shipments, human trafficking, and illegal immigration in Africa’s mostly unpoliced 

coastal waters. Unchecked illegal fishing threatens 

the livelihoods of millions of Africans, as does severe environmental degradation in many maritime 

zones. African governments are beginning to confront these challenges, although maintaining navies 

and coast guards is still a low military priority for 

most of them. Many African states would welcome 

US AFRICOM programs to improve maritime surveillance and enforcement capabilities. By helping 

to restore physical security, USAFRICOM could 

become an enabler of more broadly based “human 

security” initiatives in coastal Africa

◆ Increase both budgetary and personnel 

support for State Department security assistance 

programs in Africa. Just as Secretary of Defense 

Robert Gates has urged that more resources be 

made available to the State Department for stabilization and reconstruction missions worldwide, 

so too should USAFRICOM call for a doubling of 

the roughly $250 to $300 million that the State 

Department now spends annually on security programs in Africa. Increases in Foreign Military Financing, the International Military and Education 

Training program, and peacekeeping operations 

funding should be used to fund USAFRICOM engagement initiatives.

◆ Connect USAFRICOM priorities more directly to UN and AU peacekeeping in Africa. The 

AU now has an organizing structure through which 

all international partners can coordinate. Moreover, 

with the UN present in virtually every corner of 

Africa, often in a security-building or peacekeeping 

capacity, it will be impossible for USAFRICOM to 

operate for long without intersecting in some way 

with UN activities. Whatever its operational shortcomings, the UN and its specialized agencies command respect and support from almost every African 

government and from all levels of African society. To 

the extent that USAFRICOM is perceived as supportive of UN security and peacekeeping missions, 

international acceptance of the command will grow.