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53–837 PDF 2010

S. Hrg. 111–351 

SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM: MOVING 

FORWARD ON MODERNIZATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, 

THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 15, 2009 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL 

WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

LISA M. POWELL, Staff Director 

EVAN W. CASH, Professional Staff Member 

SHELLEY K. FINLAYSON, Legislative Fellow 

JENNIFER A. HEMINGWAY, Minority Staff Director 

TARA SHAW, Minority Counsel 

BENJAMIN B. RHODESIDE, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 1 

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 2 

Senator Burris .................................................................................................. 4 

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2009 

Hon. Jeffrey D. Zients, Deputy Director for Management and Chief Performance Officer, Office of Management and Budget ............................................... 5 

Hon. John Berry, Director, U.S. Office of Personnel Management ..................... 7 

Hon. James R. Clapper, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, U.S. 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 8 

David R. Shedd, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Policy, Plans, 

and Requirements, Office of the Director of National Intelligence .................. 10 

Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 11 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Berry, Hon. John: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35 

Clapper, Hon. James R.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Joint prepared statement with Mr. Shedd ..................................................... 41 

Farrell, Brenda S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48 

Shedd, David R.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Joint prepared statement with Mr. Clapper .................................................. 41 

Zients, Hon. Jeffrey D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29 

APPENDIX 

Background .............................................................................................................. 63 

Questions and Responses to questions: 

Mr. Zients with an attachment for question 13 ............................................. 70 

Mr. Berry ........................................................................................................... 83 

Mr. Clapper ....................................................................................................... 91 

(1) 

SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM: MOVING 

FORWARD ON MODERNIZATION 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT

MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Akaka, Burris, and Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Good afternoon. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia is called to order. 

I want to welcome you to our sixth hearing on reforming the security clearance process, which has been on the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) High-Risk List since 2005. Since we 

began this line of hearings, much progress has been made in laying 

the groundwork for reform. Now is the time to move forward with 

modernizing the security clearance process in the Federal Government. 

When this issue was originally placed on the High-Risk List, it 

was designated as a problem with the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) clearance process. However, through our oversight, it has 

become clear that this problem must be looked at through a government-wide lens and in conjunction with suitability screening. 

The last Administration, with the support of dedicated career civil 

servants on the front lines of this issue, worked hard to reduce 

processing times for security clearances. The backlog of security 

clearance determinations has all but vanished, but the investigations still rely on outdated, paper-based processes. 

We must use this opportunity to make fundamental changes to 

the process to ensure that we do not experience the same problems 

in the future. Modernizing also will lead to more efficient operations and will help with another key priority of mine, streamlining the Federal hiring process and making it more user friendly. 

It is also time to further examine the quality of clearance investigations and adjudications. This means creating and implementing 

meaningful metrics that can be audited so that we know the sysVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:19 Apr 09, 2010 Jkt 053837 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\53837.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
2 

tem is working. The security of our Nation depends on ensuring 

that security clearance decisions are based on thorough, modern, 

and risk-based determinations. 

With metrics in place, it will become clear that one of the biggest 

barriers to modernizing the clearance system is reinventing and 

modernizing the information technology (IT) infrastructure at the 

Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Department of Defense, and within the intelligence community. I have been concerned for years about the outdated systems in use throughout the 

clearance process. Some of these systems date back over 20 years. 

Every change in the Administration brings inevitable delays, as 

new leaders are put into place and get up to speed. Some of the 

reforms outlined by the Joint Reform Team made up of government 

stakeholders involved in issuing clearances and suitability determinations at our hearing last May are behind schedule. 

It is important, after years of work put into reform, that it continues to move forward in a meaningful way. We must work to 

modernize the clearance process in order to remove it from the 

High-Risk List as soon as possible. 

While progress has been made, with timeliness greatly improved 

and backlogs reduced, meeting the Intelligence Reform Act’s milestones alone should not be the ultimate goal. This will require the 

buy-in of all stakeholders, a willingness to collaborate, and the 

knowledge and skills that the reform team has brought to the 

table. 

I again want to thank all of our witnesses for appearing today. 

I also want to recognize the dedicated career professionals, those 

sitting behind our witnesses, as well as those who are not here 

today, who have been working on this issue for years. I again want 

to thank you all for your service. 

I especially want to thank Kathy Dillaman, who has worked with 

this Subcommittee for many years and who I understand will be 

eligible for retirement in the coming years. 

I also want to thank Senator Voinovich for his continued dedication to this issue. We have worked together on this issue 

seamlessly, no matter who was the Chairman, and I think we have 

shown that great progress can be achieved through oversight. I 

know that Senator Voinovich is anxious to resolve some of these 

pressing government management problems as he looks forward to 

retirement, so I would urge you all to work hard on this issue over 

the next year. 

With that, I will recognize Senator Voinovich for his statement. 

Senator Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the 

witnesses for being here today. 

We are continuing to review the Federal Government’s effort to 

reform the security clearance process. We have worked on this for 

a long time. This is our sixth hearing. This goes back 5 years—we 

started in 2005—so if some of our words today are from a little bit 

of exasperation about things, you will understand, for the newcomers here. 

3 

More than 4 years after our first hearing, the DOD’s security 

clearance process remains on GAO’s High-Risk List and I see little 

evidence of progress thus far in furtherance of Congressional security clearance reform mandates. I am anxious to hear from our new 

people about this. 

Reforming the security clearance process and removing DOD’s 

personal security clearance process from GAO’s High-Risk List are 

priorities for me in, as Senator Akaka said, my final Congress. I 

have always believed that the Executive Branch could get DOD’s 

clearance process off the High-Risk List, and I want to see that 

happen. I intend to closely monitor efforts in this regard and have 

told my staff I want weekly updates on progress made to get DOD’s 

personnel clearance process off the High-Risk List before I leave. 

There are many reasons this is important, perhaps most notably 

because of the cost of the security clearance process. Mr. Chairman, 

I cited this statistic before, but I think it bears repeating. An August 2007, Department of Defense report on security clearance investigations estimated it took an average of 208 days to process 

‘‘secret’’ clearance requests for industry. For every day a contract 

employee is on the job without the appropriate clearance, it costs 

the taxpayer approximately $684 in lost salary and benefits because the contractor is not able to do the job he is being paid to 

do. Over 208 days, a secret clearance for one person costs more 

than $140,000, about three times the 2007 median U.S. household 

income of $50,000. This is pretty serious business. 

Some real headway has been made to reduce this time. As the 

Government Accountability Office noted in its May report, Executive Branch agencies responsible for investigating or adjudicating 

clearances have made significant progress in improving the timeliness in clearance processing. Specifically, in 2004, top secret clearance investigations took almost 400 days and today they take less 

than 80 days. Similarly, initial secret clearance investigations took 

about 200 days in 2004, and today they take less than 50. This is 

significant progress, and I recognize and appreciate that. But it remains to be seen whether the 2009 benchmark for processing clearance requests in 60 days will be met. 

Additionally, even if that benchmark is met, timeliness is just 

one aspect of the security clearance reform that Congress called for 

in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). 

The law also calls for a number of other actions, including uniform 

policies regarding the security clearance process, reciprocal recognition of security clearances among agencies, and an evaluation of 

the use of technology to expedite security clearance processes. Senator Akaka, I think, did a pretty good job of outlining what we 

need to do there. 

I am particularly concerned about the lack of progress being 

made regarding reciprocity. I still consistently hear from individuals who have problems having one agency accept another agency’s 

clearance. I am also concerned about the lack of progress in, as I 

mentioned, implementing technology. I believe the Executive 

Branch needs to do more to address these requirements. As GAO 

noted in May, problems related to the quality of security clearance 

investigations and adjudication determinations, reciprocity of clearance determinations, and information technology persist. 

4 

The Joint Security and Suitability Reform Team recognized that 

more work regarding the security clearance process is needed 

when, in December 2008, it issued a report with tasks to be 

achieved during 2009, including implementing a revised electronic 

questionnaire (e-QIP); deploying an automated records check 

(ARC), capability in the Department of the Army, and developing 

a strategy for further ARC use; developing a curriculum for training national security clearance professions; and revising the questionnaire for national security positions. 

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) tells me it is coordinating interagency review of these and other proposals and I 

am anxious to hear about the results of that review. I also want 

to know when that review will be complete and when all of the 

called-for-reforms will be implemented. To that end, I expect OMB 

to report to us in writing about any changes that are made to the 

December 2008 Joint Reform Team Plan, including a specific implementation timeline for each of the initiatives called for in that plan 

so we know that this is down in writing and there are goals that 

are being set. 

I want to thank our witnesses again for their participation. I am 

confident that if we all work together, we can achieve security 

clearance that saves the Federal Government time and money. 

I am particularly glad to have the Government Accountability Office here today, because last year, I expressed concern that the Department of Defense security clearance process, which was added 

to the GAO’s High-Risk List in 2005, would remain on the list in 

2009. My prediction proved true. In January, GAO continued the 

designation of DOD’s clearance process on the High-Risk List. As 

I mentioned earlier, getting DOD’s security clearance process off 

the High-Risk List is a priority for me. Again, I look forward to 

hearing from you today. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. 

It is really a pleasure for me to welcome our witnesses today. But 

before I introduce our witnesses, let me call on Senator Burris for 

his opening statement. Senator Burris. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, to Ranking Member 

Voinovich and to our distinguished panel. I am very anxious to 

hear all this great testimony from this distinguished panel. 

I am aware that this Subcommittee has held several hearings on 

the topic of security clearance reform. I look forward to hearing 

from our witnesses and discussing ways to further improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the security clearance process. Having 

been through the security clearance process many years ago, I am 

interested to see what updates have been made. 

Considering that the government conducts roughly 800,000 security clearances and investigations each year, I was pleased to learn 

about the progress we made in cutting down on the investigative 

time, improving database technology, and bolstering interagency 

cooperation. Nevertheless, our efforts are far from over. 

Just recently, as Senator Voinovich mentioned, I had a problem 

with my own office relating to the reciprocity of one staffer who 

5 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Zients appears in the Appendix on page 29. 

had a security clearance from a Federal agency which was not reciprocal here in the Senate. I witnessed firsthand the challenges 

this presented for the staffer as well as the impact it had on the 

office as a whole. Work was delayed, certain briefings could not be 

attended, and the questions arose that could have been avoided if 

ongoing problems surrounding their agency reciprocity security 

clearance was resolved. 

So I am eager to learn more about this issue as well as the other 

obstacles that could be avoided with better oversight and management of our security clearance process. I look forward to working 

with the entities here today in implementing a proper reform goal 

needed for improvement. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I will then have some 

questions. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Burris. 

Now I will introduce our witnesses: Jeffrey Zients, Deputy Director for Management and Chief Performance Officer at the Office of 

Management and Budget; John Berry, Director of the Office of Personnel Management; Lieutenant General James Clapper, Under 

Secretary for Intelligence at the Department of Defense; David 

Shedd, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Policy, Plans, 

and Requirements for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and Brenda Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and 

Management, Government Accountability Office. 

It is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses, 

so I ask all of you to stand and raise your right hand. 

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 

so help you, God? 

Mr. ZIENTS. I do. 

Mr. BERRY. I do. 

Mr. CLAPPER. I do. 

Mr. SHEDD. I do. 

Ms. FARRELL. I do. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Let the record show that 

the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

Although statements are limited to 5 minutes, I want all of our 

witnesses to know that their entire statements will be included in 

the record. 

Director Zients, will you please proceed with your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JEFFREY D. ZIENTS,1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

FOR MANAGEMENT AND CHIEF PERFORMANCE OFFICER, 

U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 

Mr. ZIENTS. Thank you. Chairman Akaka, Ranking Member 

Voinovich, and Senator Burris, thank you for inviting me here 

today. It is my privilege to testify on behalf of the Office of Management and Budget to discuss the Administration’s ongoing security clearance reform efforts and the status of implementing those 

reforms. 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 

challenged the Federal Government to address longstanding probVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:19 Apr 09, 2010 Jkt 053837 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\53837.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
6 

lems with the timeliness and the coordination for granting national 

security clearances. Executive Order 13467 reinforced the goals of 

IRTPA and recognized OMB as the lead agency to ensure coordination across the Federal Government. 

OMB, OPM, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), along with the Department of Defense, comprise 

the Joint Reform Team and together provide leadership regarding 

reforms to policy, processes, and information technology which affect the approximately 2,000,000 security and suitability determinations conducted by the government each year. 

Much has been accomplished to reform the process and improve 

timeliness. Of note, processing times for initial clearance investigations are down sharply since 2004 and the backlog of pending 

clearance investigations, once over 100,000 cases, is now gone. 

These accomplishments are significant and testify to the dedication 

of the staff at the agencies representing the security and suitability 

community, as well as to your leadership and persistent focus on 

these issues. 

However, much remains to be accomplished. By the end of 2009, 

IRTPA requires that, to the extent practicable, 90 percent of security clearances must be completed within an average of 60 days, 

providing 40 days, on average, for investigations and 20 days, on 

average, for adjudications. To achieve this goal with sustainable solutions that also enhance quality, we must continue to reform and 

modernize existing processes. These ongoing efforts will require 

focus and execution, but I believe we have a strong plan from 

which to move forward. 

Since beginning work at OMB in late June, I have worked with 

the leadership of the reform effort to finalize the plan updates to 

the standard forms that support the security and suitability clearance processes. These updates will support better alignment between security and suitability processes and thus drive greater efficiencies and higher quality for both. 

Upon review, we determined that certain suitability positions 

would not require investigations as detailed as the security investigations with which they had been aligned under the original plan. 

As a result of this determination, it is necessary to modify the underlying investigative standards and make the appropriate changes 

to the appropriate forms, Standard Forms 85 and 86. 

I am pleased to report that I expect the revised Standard Form 

86, which is used in national security investigations, will be available for public comment by the end of this month. And following 

a review of any comments received, we will make final revisions to 

the Federal Investigative Standards. We will make any changes to 

our overall development and implementation schedule as a result 

of these changes. However, I remain committed and confident that 

the reforms will be substantially operational across the Federal 

Government by the end of calendar year 2010. 

Later this month, in my role as Chairman, I will lead a meeting 

of the Performance and Accountability Council to underscore the 

importance of this effort, reinvigorate leadership among participating agencies, and reinforce the close partnership necessary between the executive agents for security and suitability, as well as 

DOD and OMB. From my experience in the private sector leading 

7 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Berry appears in the Appendix on page 35. 

transformational projects such as this, the participation of major 

project champions is essential for success. 

With this support, the other keys to successfully driving this reform effort include the development of detailed work plans among 

the Joint Reform Team and all partners; establishing appropriate 

metrics for the measurement and management of the initiative; 

identifying problems early and thinking creatively about solutions; 

and holding people accountable for outcomes. I will ensure all of 

these elements are in place and will maintain a relentless focus on 

the overarching goals of improved timeliness, reciprocity, and quality. 

In summary, our shared goal of improving the suitability and security clearance process is one of tremendous importance to me 

personally and all the agencies at this table. It will remain a high 

priority for this Administration. 

I also want to recognize the important role that the Government 

Accountability Office plays in the reform initiative. I look forward 

to working with them toward our common objective of improved 

performance and toward the goal of removing the DOD security 

clearance program from their High-Risk List. 

The advances to date are certainly commendable, but much work 

remains. With the commitment of this cross-agency team and the 

continued support of this Subcommittee, I am confident we will 

meet our goal of improving the timeliness, reciprocity, and quality 

of clearance decisions for the security of the American people. 

Senators, we indeed will work very hard. Once again, thank you 

for the opportunity to speak with you today. I would be happy to 

answer any questions you have. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Director Zients. 

Mr. ZIENTS. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Now, we will hear from Director Berry. Will you 

please proceed? 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN BERRY,1 DIRECTOR, U.S. OFFICE 

OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you. And Mr. Chairman, I want to echo sentiments that you 

made in your opening remarks. Ms. Dillaman, who sits behind me, 

is our career Senior Executive who has been working on this over 

the years, and all of the good news that I have to report to you 

today is largely the work from her and her team. She has been a 

phenomenal leader and I want to thank her for her incredible efforts on this issue and recognize its importance. 

Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to underscore some of the 

numbers. When OPM took over these investigations 5 years ago, 90 

percent of the cases were taking over 300 days per year. In fact, 

in many cases, approaching 400 days per year. I am very proud to 

come before this Subcommittee today and tell you that we are 

ahead of schedule in meeting the December goal. We will reach this 

year 90 percent of investigations being completed in 40 days or 

less. That is not due until December, but we are ahead of schedule. 

So that is significant progress, and that is largely due to Ms. 

8 

1The joint prepared statement of Mr. Clapper and Mr. Shedd appears in the Appendix on 

page 41. 

Dillaman’s efforts and the efforts of her team and all of the folks 

at this table. 

The other thing that is, I think, important to point out is the 

costs in addressing this over the 5 years have remained within the 

inflation rate, within 1 percent. So there has not been a significant 

increase in costs, we have been able to do this responsibly. 

Senator Voinovich, at my confirmation hearing, I promised you 

that I would look into these issues. You raised the forms at that 

point, that there was an issue involving a logjam on these form 

issues. I have to tell you, it has been an honor and a pleasure 

working with David Shedd and General Clapper on that issue and 

I am pleased to report to this Subcommittee today, we have 

reached consensus on the forms, and those are ready to go. OMB 

is in their final review, and I think they will be in print and you 

will see them done. So I am very pleased to report that that logjam 

has been broken. 

It doesn’t mean we are all the way there, especially on IT and 

reciprocity, two issues which this Subcommittee has been dogging 

from the beginning. 

On the automation efforts, at least on the investigations front, 

we are well on our way. We are more than halfway there, and we 

fully expect that we will be on schedule in meeting the objectives 

of the plan. Obviously, if this is going to work, we have got to be 

able to make this information accessible electronically, and we will 

not rest until that is done. But Ms. Dillaman and her team are well 

on the way. 

And then the last thing I just want to do is to tip my hat again 

to Mr. Shedd and General Clapper. They have been at this issue 

for many years. They have been persistent in wrestling these 

issues to the ground with us. Our team, working closely with 

theirs, has developed a great comradeship in this effort. My pledge 

to you is I will stay engaged and involved with this, with Mr. 

Zients, General Clapper, and Mr. Shedd, until the job is done. 

So we won’t rest until the GAO can sit at the end of the table 

and say this has been removed from the high-risk category, and I 

think that is within striking distance. We aren’t at the goal line 

yet, but we are within 10 yards. So I am very optimistic. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Director Berry. That has 

been great news. 

Now, I would like to call on General Clapper for your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR.,1 UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. CLAPPER. Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich, and Senator 

Burris, the Department of Defense shares the Subcommittee’s 

great interest in and focus on security clearance reform. It is a top 

transformation priority for the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense. 

9 

I met with the Secretary yesterday and he specifically asked me 

to thank you for your sustained support for clearance reform. You 

can appreciate why we are so vitally interested. Our volume of security clearance cases is approximately 1.2 million at a cost of 

nearly $1 billion a year. 

While a lot of progress has been made in reducing the security 

clearance backlog through Herculean efforts, it is clear that end-toend transformation of the security clearance process is necessary if 

we are going to meet, and importantly, sustain, the 2009 goals required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. In 

other words, said perhaps more bluntly, I think we pretty much 

squeezed the blood out of our current turnip and we need to go to 

a modernized system using modern technology and focused investigations on what actually produces relevant security data. 

Earlier this year, the Government Accountability Office identified 

several improvements needed in the adjudication of Department of 

Defense security clearances, and I wanted to make known that in 

response, we have taken the following actions. 

First, the Department’s Personal Security Research Center, 

which I happened to visit last Thursday, worked with select Central Adjudication Facility representatives to develop a formal, professional certification program for adjudicators. The program includes a governing board charter, business rules, and an experience 

requirements checklist. 

Second, we developed guidance for documenting adjudicative rationales. This ensures that adjudicators will more thoroughly document relevant information used to make their decisions and help 

promote consistency among our Central Adjudication Facilities 

(CAFs). This tool will be fielded by the end of the year. 

Third, we developed an automated tool that gathers specific information about incomplete security investigations or investigations that do not meet adjudicator needs. By the end of this month, 

this tool will provide visibility to improve the investigative process. 

It will also provide an automated request for additional investigative work, which reduces the number of forms adjudicators must 

complete. 

We took another significant step in transforming the adjudication 

process last November when the Army implemented electronic adjudication which applies decision support technology to assist in 

the processing of secret cases. The e–Adjudication System screens 

all secret-level cases for military members and automatically mediates so-called clean cases, which are cases with no issues or acceptably minor issues. Since the Army fully implemented e–Adjudication earlier this year, almost 70,000 eligible cases were screened. 

Nearly one-third of those clean cases were automatically adjudicated. This means these cases required no human review, which 

results obviously in significant efficiencies. 

Earlier this month, e–Adjudication was expanded to our industrial cases, which represents almost 180,000 additional cases annually. We expect that a quarter of these will qualify for automatic 

adjudication, illuminating the need for human intervention. The 

Department plans to roll out this capability to Air Force and Navy 

adjudications by the end of the year. 

10 

1The joint prepared statement of Mr. Clapper and Mr. Shedd appears in the Appendix on 

page 41. 

We plan to co-locate the Department of Defense adjudication facilities by 2012 as required by Base Realignment and Closure 

(BRAC). As part of that effort and in anticipation of it, we plan to 

move all adjudicators to a standardized case management system. 

This will enhance efficiency, enable consistency, and allow for better performance measurement and management. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich, and Senator Burris, thank 

you again for the opportunity to be here today. This concludes my 

remarks, and I look forward to addressing your questions. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, General Clapper, for your 

part of a joint statement with Mr. Shedd. 

And now for the other part of the statement, Mr. Shedd. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID R. SHEDD,1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF 

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR POLICY, PLANS, AND REQUIREMENTS, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 

INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. SHEDD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich, Senator Burris, for the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon. Let 

me assure you that the goals of this reform, to transform and demonstrably improve the effectiveness and efficiency of these important processes, remain a high priority for the Director of National 

Intelligence (DNI) and for the intelligence community in which I 

serve. 

As Director Dan Blair’s Deputy for Policy, Plans, and Requirements, the DNI has entrusted in me the implementation of these 

critical reforms. These improvements are badly needed to put the 

best skilled and trusted personnel to work in timely fashion in the 

defense of our Nation, as you have pointed out. 

Our commitment is evident in our assignment of expert personnel exclusively to this effort, the dedication of other resources, 

including serving as the host facility for the Joint Reform Team in 

its efforts since the inception. 

Each of us understands the role the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 played in establishing the first ever 

performance goals for this process. I note also that the very same 

law established the Director of National Intelligence and established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, so these 

goals and other organizational changes are linked in fundamental 

ways. 

That linkage was enhanced in 2008 when the DNI took on the 

responsibilities of the security executive agent, consolidating policy 

and oversight responsibility for clearances in ways both necessary 

and new. It is this perspective on reform across the Executive 

Branch that I am pleased to share with you today, along with my 

colleagues. 

As Mr. Zients has noted, progress has been made, but work remains to be done. In order to achieve the transformational change 

we all want, and in order to reach the 2009 IRTPA goals, we need 

to modernize the underlying security clearance processes across the 

11 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Farrell appears in the Appendix on page 48. 

Executive Branch. This will require an alignment of policies, process, and information technology. 

To that end, our reform plan’s key features are collecting security-relevant information earlier in the process. Second, leveraging 

the technology to significantly reduce manual activity, as General 

Clapper has pointed out and is already well underway at the Department of Defense, by using modern data sources, making decisions based on modern analytic methods that manage rather than 

avoid the risk. Third, tailoring field investigative activity to better 

focus on the relevant data that has been collected. Fourth, enhancing the alignment of the investigation process in subsequent hiring 

and clearing decisions, thereby reducing duplicative work. And finally, applying these new capabilities to more frequently assess the 

risk within the populations that already have a security clearance. 

The reform plan published in December 2008, Senator Voinovich, 

that you cited, includes implementation timelines intended to make 

these changes substantially operational across the Executive 

Branch by December 2010. While an Administration review of certain elements of the reform plan has resulted in some temporary 

delays to that time table, we remain committed to that goal and 

ask your support and attention in helping us achieve it. 

As the review concludes, we look forward to resuming an ambitious pace of achievement, resuming activity in a number of areas, 

including additional revisions to the Federal Investigative Standards, continuing the development of automated record check capabilities, changes to the automated systems that will collect the SF– 

86 forms, information online, changes to the automated systems to 

streamline management for future investigations and the adjudication processes, and finally, the guidance to enable agencies to execute their own implementation plans as needed. 

So last, I note that much work has continued even in the Administration’s review as it has been undertaken and I highlight the 

work of all my partners as they pursue improvements to organizational case management systems, online repositories of clearance 

data, the electronic transmission and adjudication of investigative 

cases, and the additional meaningful performance measures to the 

suite of tools the Performance Accountability Council will use to 

monitor our collective progress. 

Chairman Akaka, Senator Voinovich, and Senator Burris, this 

concludes my prepared remarks and I submit this for the Subcommittee’s record. Thank you very much. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your statement, Mr. 

Shedd. 

And now, we will receive the testimony of Ms. Farrell. 

TESTIMONY OF BRENDA S. FARRELL,1 DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 

CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. FARRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich, and 

Senator Burris, for the opportunity to be here today to discuss 

DOD’s security clearance process and the government-wide reform 

efforts. 

12 

We have testified on clearance-related issues in five prior hearings that this Subcommittee has held since January 2005, when we 

first placed DOD’s personnel security program, which represents 

the vast majority of clearances adjudicated, on our list of high-risk 

government programs. At that time, DOD was experiencing significant backlogs and delays. Over the years, we have conducted a 

broad body of work on clearance issues that gives us a unique historical perspective. 

My remarks today draw from two recently issued GAO reports. 

My main message today is that progress has been made to reduce 

delays in granting clearances, but further actions are needed to enhance quality and sustain the reform efforts. 

My written statement is divided into three parts. The first addresses the progress at reducing delays in DOD’s clearances. DOD 

and OPM have made significant and noteworthy progress in reducing delays in making clearance decisions and met statutory timeliness requirements for DOD’s initial clearances completed in fiscal 

year 2008. Currently, 80 percent of initial clearances are to be 

made within 120 days, on average. We found that OPM and DOD 

made initial clearance decisions within 87 days, on average. This 

represents significant progress from our finding in 2007, when we 

reported that industry personnel waited more than one year, on average, to receive a ‘‘top secret’’ clearance. Challenges do lie ahead 

to meet the requirement that by December 2009, a plan be implemented in which, to the extent practical, 90 percent of initial clearances are made within 60 days, on average. 

The second part of my statement addresses opportunities for improving the Executive Branch annual reports to Congress. For example, the Executive Branch’s 2009 report does not reflect the full 

range of time it takes to make all initial clearance decisions and 

has provided little information on quality. Under the current requirements, the Executive Branch can exclude the slowest 20 percent and then report on the average of the remaining differences. 

Without taking averages or excluding the slowest percentages, we 

analyzed 100 percent of initial clearances granted in 2008 and 

found that 39 percent still took more than 120 days. The absence 

of comprehensive reporting means that Congress does not have the 

information about remaining delays that continue to exist, or importantly, about the reasons for their occurrences that could help 

with corrective actions. 

With respect to quality, the reports to Congress provide little information. However, the most recent report on the reform efforts 

identified quality measures that the Executive Branch proposes to 

collect. We have stated that timeliness alone does not provide a 

complete picture of the clearance process. For example, we recently 

estimated that with respect to initial ‘‘top secret’’ clearances adjudicated in fiscal year 2008, documentation was incomplete for most 

OPM investigative reports. 

The third part of my written statement addresses the extent to 

which the joint reform efforts reflect key factors for reform. For example, initial joint reform efforts reflect key factors for organizational transformation that we have identified, such as having committed leadership and a dedicated implementation team. But the 

Joint Reform Team’s reports do not provide a strategic framework 

13 

that contains important elements of a successful transformation, 

including long-term goals with outcome-focused measures, nor do 

they identify potential obstacles to progress and possible remedies. 

In the absence of a strategic framework that is outcome-focused 

with clearly-defined performance measures, the Joint Reform Team 

is not in a position to demonstrate to decisionmakers the extent of 

progress it is making toward achieving desired outcomes. 

Let me conclude by noting we are looking forward to working 

with OMB’s newly-appointed Deputy Director for Management as 

he oversees the joint reform efforts. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I will be pleased to 

take questions when the Subcommittee so desires. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ms. Farrell, 

for your statement. 

Ms. Farrell, I want to ask you a question that I believe Senator 

Voinovich asked last year, and I am sure that we are both eager 

to ask it again, and here is the question: What progress has DOD 

and other security clearance stakeholders made in getting this 

issue off the High-Risk List? 

Ms. FARRELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The good news is that DOD 

and others are moving in the right direction, as we have just discussed. Backlogs and delays in granting clearances is what was behind GAO putting DOD on our High-Risk List in 2005, and we do 

see the numbers have moved in the right direction, and DOD and 

OPM are meeting statutory time frames. 

What remains ahead is issues of quality, which we reported in 

our 2007 and 2009 high-risk reports. The good news is, although 

there has been little done in terms of defining quality and building 

that into each step of the security process, the Joint Reform Team 

Subcommittee on Performance Measurement and Management has 

identified some metrics that they propose to collect, and those are 

what we will be watching very carefully. Those have not been finalized. 

What we would want to see for the personnel security clearance 

process to get off of the High-Risk List is more defined measures 

of quality, the correction action plan that identifies the root causes 

of problems with quality, what steps DOD and the other agencies 

are going to take to correct those, not just in the investigative 

phase but the adjudicative phase and the other phases of the clearance process, along with how they plan to measure that effectiveness, and steps toward their own measurement toward meeting 

that end. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ms. Farrell. 

I would like to direct this next question to Director Zients, 

though others may want to respond to this question, as well. Director Zients, the Joint Reform Team report issued last December had 

specific benchmarks and milestone dates, some of which are scheduled for this month. Some delay was no doubt due to the transition 

and changes in leadership. At this point, after the transition, how 

many months has the process fallen behind, and when will we see 

a rebaselining of milestones. 

Mr. ZIENTS. As to the ultimate goal of being done, or substantially complete by, I guess it is 141⁄2 months from now, I feel very 

confident that we are going to make that goal. So as we rebaseline, 

14 

we will start with the answer that we are going to be done on 

schedule. And I think that is doable. 

I think that the place where we need to spend the most time rebaselining is around IT. The milestones for IT were generally 

spaced throughout 2010, some in the first half, some in the second 

half, and we are going to have to make sure on the IT front that 

we set new deadlines that allow us to hit the ultimate end of next 

year’s timeline, but I think we do have some work ahead of us 

across the next month or two to ensure that we rebaseline the IT 

piece of it. 

Overall, I am confident that we will be where we wanted to be 

at the end of next year. It will be in good shape for your retirement, Senator Voinovich, and for removal from the GAO High-Risk 

List in January 2011. 

Senator AKAKA. Are there any other comments? Ms. Farrell. 

Ms. FARRELL. We would like to see a strategic framework, as we 

noted in our May 2009 report, that outlines very clearly what the 

goal is of the reform effort, along with identifying roles, responsibilities, and how progress will be measured. We found in the course 

of our work last year that when we asked senior leaders with the 

reform effort and agency officials involved in the clearance progress 

that the goals were not clear. Some referred to the IRTPA requirements with reciprocity. Some would refer to timeliness. 

And I do not mean to imply that there are no goals that the Joint 

Reform Team has had. We feel that they have a number of reports, 

the ones that they issued last year, April, as well as in December, 

as well as the IT strategy and other memorandum that present certain aspects of the goals. But if those goals were brought together, 

very clearly agreed to, and there was a consensus by those who are 

at this table, that is the goal of this effort and who is responsible, 

especially for the IT strategy, that would help sustain the momentum of the reform effort and get it done. 

Senator AKAKA. Director Zients, as I said at your confirmation 

hearing, security clearance reform has been an important oversight 

priority for this Subcommittee. Your predecessor, Clay Johnson, 

made it one of his highest priorities, as well, and your position was 

designated as head of the Performance Accountability Council 

(PAC) for reforming clearances. You were just confirmed in June 

and you have a lot on your plate at OMB, including additional responsibilities as the first Chief Performance Officer for the Federal 

Government. 

In your role as head of the PAC, how do you plan to prioritize 

this important issue and provide sustained leadership to ensure 

that this effort keeps moving forward? 

Mr. ZIENTS. This is absolutely a top priority for me. I actually am 

lucky as to the point in the process that I am coming on board in 

that this team and the group of career folks behind us have really 

not only made a ton of progress, but have teed up a plan that I 

believe is a good plan, a detailed plan, and one that is doable. 

So having been—as I mentioned in my opening remarks—part of 

these larger transformational efforts, there is a lot of work ahead, 

but there is a clear line between where we are today and where 

we need to be 141⁄2 month from now, and I pledge to dedicate the 

time and the resources and the attention to make sure that we get 

15 

there. But with this team, I feel very confident that we can get it 

done and I commit to doing so. 

Senator AKAKA. My time has expired. We will have a second 

round. Senator Voinovich, your questions? 

Senator VOINOVICH. First of all, I am really impressed with the 

testimony that I have heard today. There seems to be an urgency 

and seriousness about this issue and you seem to portray that. I 

think it is worthy, again, to thank Ms. Dillaman for the good job 

that she has done. The folks at the table are only as good as the 

team that sits behind them, and those of you that have had something to do with this, we appreciate the effort that you have made. 

One of the questions I was going to ask is what are the largest 

risks to successfully implementing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act’s security clearance reform mandates, and I 

think, Ms. Farrell, you have kind of laid out in your report some 

of your concerns about what it is that could stand in the way of 

moving forward. Is it possible that the team could go through those 

specific things that have been mentioned in the GAO report and 

come back to us and let us know, frankly, whether or not you think 

they are as severe as they have been represented to be and what 

you intend to do to move on those issues? It certainly would be 

comforting to know whether you agree with what GAO has said 

and what priorities you are going to set in order to make sure that 

those things are taken care of. Do you think you can do that? 

Mr. ZIENTS. Yes. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I would be appreciative. 

The other question I have, a big question, is about the resources 

that you have available to you. I am very concerned when you start 

talking about technology, you are talking about spending some 

money. And in your respective budgets, has money been allocated— 

I am on Appropriations now—for you to do that portion of the assignment? 

Mr. ZIENTS. Why don’t I start and then others can fill in. We believe, as an overall effort, yes, that within the OPM budget and the 

DOD budget, we have sufficient funds in the budget to do the technology piece. We also need to make sure that we are interfacing 

with the agencies to ensure that they understand the technology 

implications for their systems and that their systems are modernized and ready to accept, not in any way to underestimate the IT 

piece, because I do think it is one of the areas we have to pay special attention to. But this is not very difficult, complex IT applications. This is on an IT scale difficult, but not very difficult. 

So I believe, bottom line, that we have the budgets and the resources, but I will defer to my colleagues, too, if they want to add 

anything here. 

Mr. BERRY. Our IT piece is really the investigations portion of it, 

and the good news is we are halfway through that project. We have 

been through the rate increases and have been accumulating the 

funds necessary to complete that project. We are at a place where 

we believe we can do that. We are on a reimbursable basis, if you 

will, as we do the investigations. 

And so this year, I am very pleased to announce, and I don’t 

know if Mr. Shedd and General Clapper have heard this yet, but 

there won’t be any rate increase for investigations from OPM this 

16 

year. So we will be holding our rates at what they were last year, 

and those levels will allow us to maintain what we need to do to 

finish the IT upgrades that are necessary on the investigations 

piece of this. 

Now, obviously, there is more work on the adjudication side that 

will have to be done, as well, but I think in terms of the investigations piece, we are well on track. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. You have got that portion of it. I just 

assume that the plan to go forward with the IT part of this, the 

technology you are going to use, you have already identified it, correct? 

Mr. BERRY. Yes. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. And you have the money to do it. 

General Clapper, your shop is going to have to interface with 

OMB and OPM, and the question I have for you is have you been 

spending the time to talk about how the two of them work together, and do you have the wherewithal to take care of your end 

of the bargain? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir, I believe we do. This is not new and unknown. I don’t think we have spent a lot of time on research and 

development (R&D). It is largely a question of executing what we 

already know we have to do. And I can assure you that, based on 

the interest of both the Secretary and the Deputy, if we need more 

money, we can get it, because of their high interest in this. 

I guess I would be remiss if I didn’t take mild exception to Ms. 

Farrell’s commentary. Obviously, where you stand depends on 

where you sit. But having worked this pretty hard for the time I 

have been in office since April 2007, I think we have made substantial progress. I do think we have a strategy, as represented by the 

report that was submitted in December, and I think we are pretty 

well along it. I tried to outline in my previous remarks some additional things that the Department is doing, even during this pause, 

to address some of the issues that the GAO has appropriately 

raised. 

One of the major things here, of course, to Mr. Berry’s comment, 

is a major feature of what we want to do in the reform effort is 

not to do so many investigations, which has huge impacts not only 

on the money that we have to convey to OPM for doing investigations, but in the interest of saving time and efficiency by capitalizing on what is available to us in today’s IT. 

Senator VOINOVICH. And I assume that there is no problem with 

human capital? You have the people that you need to get the job 

done, that is not a problem? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I don’t think so, sir. That is one thing that DOD 

has, is lots of people. So yes, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Ms. Farrell, would you agree with that? 

Ms. FARRELL. Well, human capital hasn’t been identified as an 

issue right now. It has in the past, as you know, with the investigations, and OPM did make great progress in building up that capacity. 

But regarding the clear mission and goals, during our review, the 

last one, looking at the Joint Reform Team’s effort and what is the 

purpose and what are they trying to accomplish, what we found 

was differences of opinion about the overall mission of improving 

17 

the security process. We were referred to the report that General 

Clapper just referred to now. We were also referred to a 2007 

memorandum between DOD and ODNI, which is not publicly distributed, in the comments on our report regarding what the mission is of the reform effort. 

Again, there are aspects and principles in the three key reports 

that the Joint Reform Team has issued in the last year and a half, 

as well as other memorandum. So we are not saying that there is 

not direction. We are saying if there was a very clear road map 

with a very defined mission and that these principles that are reflected in the other documents were linked to that, it would help 

move the reform effort forward and it would make it much more 

easier to tell what progress they have made. Are they halfway 

there? Are they 75 percent of the way there? Are they 99 percent 

there? We just can’t tell right now without that strategic framework in place. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, could I just follow up on 

that? This is kind of repetitious of many of these hearings that we 

have had over the years. The Government Accountability Office has 

some ideas, suggestions that aren’t acted on. I know we have such 

a problem with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). If 

you recall, we are still trying to work out some metrics that we can 

look at to determine whether or not the changes that are supposed 

to be made are being made. 

So I would urge you, again, GAO has made some suggestions and 

has some criticisms, constructive, and I think that you should all 

sit down, or have somebody really spend some time on this to work 

this thing out in terms of the differences of opinion, to see if you 

can get some kind of consensus because the bottom line is after 

this is all over and done with, we are going to look to GAO to find 

out whether or not they think this thing has gotten done. And the 

sooner you get at it, the better it will be for everyone. 

So at least you all agree that, pretty much—I mean, I am not 

saying that there won’t be some differences, there certainly will 

be—but I think, overall, you can agree that these are the metrics 

that ought to be looked at and this is what we expect to be judged 

on, and then you carry the ball from there so we don’t end up 8 

months from now saying, well, that is not what we understood the 

situation to be. I would be very grateful if you would do that, and 

I would like to see that within a reasonable time, Mr. Chairman, 

so that we can see that they have gotten together and they are on 

relatively the same page. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Senator Voinovich. Senator Burris, 

your questions. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would just like 

to commend the Subcommittee and their staff for bringing good 

news. I mean, I want to echo what Senator Voinovich has said. In 

my short time here in the Senate, I hear reports or testimony from 

witnesses and there are always problems. But I am really impressed with the progress that has been made here, so I urge you 

to keep up the good work and let us keep moving forward. 

Ms. Farrell, in your written testimony, you stated that the greater attention to quality would increase the instance of reciprocity, 

and what circumstances currently allow for interagency reciprocity? 

18 

I have a couple more questions in that regard, too. What does a 

process of moving a clearance from one agency to the other agency 

involve? And second, what factors prevent interagency reciprocity? 

So you may want to try your best at that, or whoever on the panel 

can best help me out on this reciprocity question. 

Ms. FARRELL. Certainly. During the course of our body of work 

on the personal security clearance process, the quality of investigations has arisen as a possible underlying reason for why there is 

not this sharing of clearances between or among agencies, and 

there have been steps toward using the same common guidelines 

for investigations as well as for adjudications to move toward that 

end. 

But reciprocity is one of the issues that is listed in the IRTPA 

that has not been addressed yet. As we talked about, there has 

been progress with timeliness. There has been progress in other 

areas. But reciprocity is one that is still under evaluation by the 

Joint Reform Team and is the type of issue that we would like to 

see more fully addressed in a strategic framework. 

Senator BURRIS. OK. Mr. Berry. 

Mr. BERRY. Thank you, Senator. If I could, I agree with Ms. 

Farrell, and I think all of us would, that is one of the remaining 

poles in the tent we have got to get up. I mean, we have to do better on reciprocity, and so we are all wrestling with that as to assuring that gets done. And I think you have hit on the key to that, 

and that is the quality of the adjudications. 

One of the things I want to recognize is that we also share GAO’s 

emphasis on this, that this is not one where we can be right 98 percent of the time. We have to be right 100 percent of the time. 

Senator BURRIS. Sure. 

Mr. BERRY. One mistake could cause untold damages. And so we 

have got to nail this. We have put in place some things this year, 

and I think it is good for the Subcommittee to be aware of this. 

We have been working with the Performance Accountability 

Council. One of the things I set up with Ms. Dillaman is a hotline 

that the adjudicators can use to get their questions resolved. We 

do the investigations and then it goes to the agencies, and then 

they have people who take our investigation, look through the information, and decide whether this is the quality person that they 

want to assign the level of clearance that is being sought, and 

whether the case has been made that this person is worthy of that. 

Well, the adjudication is not our call, it is the agency’s call. And 

we have created a hotline so that, if at any point they have any 

questions about information in the investigation, their call goes directly to Ms. Dillaman’s office and they can have direct access to 

Ms. Dillaman so that we can get to the bottom of this. 

And, Ms. Farrell, you did identify that there was some missed information in a number of the cases that have been done. I think 

it is important for the Subcommittee to understand that in context. 

If somebody, for example, is on military duty in Iraq or one of 

a subject’s references is on duty in Iraq, we would make all due efforts to try to get in touch with that person. But rather than hold 

up the investigation, we would see if there were other ways that 

we could verify the information. So, for example, sometimes when 

one neighbor might not be home, we will see other neighbors, or 

19 

maybe two other neighbors in order to justify moving forward and 

establishing a comfort level with that information. 

And so I don’t want to give the impression to the Subcommittee 

that we do not have a strong emphasis on quality. We do. And in 

all of the cases that GAO identified where there was missing information, we went back and reinvestigated all of those. None of those 

resulted in a negative determination through the adjudication process. 

We do emphasize this. We do try to rate 100 percent. But, as you 

are working these, there does need to be some flexibility with the 

investigator. We hire professionals and we do give them some discretion. We allow them to use their judgment. 

I think as we lift that standard and assure all of the agencies 

about the quality of the investigation, the goal of reciprocity is 

going to be reachable, and I think that is where people will start 

to trust sharing the information across the government. 

I apologize for the length of that, but I think that was important 

to clarify. 

Senator BURRIS. Mr. Berry, I am sitting here with a little concern in terms of what factors are there to prevent reciprocity from 

being granted? I mean, is it the level of the position that is being 

applied for in the agency? If they do the investigation, they do the 

adjudication, does DOD have a different—I think a ‘‘top secret’’ security clearance would be a ‘‘top secret’’ security clearance. 

Mr. BERRY. Reciprocity has three levels to it, and I will defer to 

Mr. Shedd and General Clapper, who have been working on this 

a lot longer. But sometimes someone will come in for a ‘‘secret’’ 

clearance and then seek an upgrade in the clearance level. Well, 

you can’t give the ‘‘top secret’’ clearance based only on the investigation at the ‘‘secret’’ level. 

Senator BURRIS. That is correct. 

Mr. BERRY. We have to go back and do more rigorous investigation. But what we have been trying to do is to standardize all the 

questions so that we don’t have to go back and do the work that 

was done on the ‘‘secret clearance.’’ We can just do the difference, 

and that is what we are striving to do, is to achieve a consistency 

there so that, as people move around the government and as their 

security clearances change, agencies will recognize the work that 

has been done beforehand so that we don’t have to start over from 

ground zero every time, as has been the case in the past. 

Senator BURRIS. Mr. Clapper, can you comment on that situation? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I think one of the things that contributes to 

obstacles to reciprocity has to do with transparency of the data, 

whether investigative or adjudicative. So to the extent that we can 

promote through automation so that appropriate officials either 

within, in our case, the Department of Defense or with other departments of the government can have access uniformly and consistently to the basic investigative data if they require it or factors 

used in adjudications, that those who are appropriate for that 

would have uniform access to it so that if they have a question 

about someone, they can go to the original source data. 

Senator BURRIS. Are you saying there is a privacy question here 

in reference to the—— 

20 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I don’t think that enters into it necessarily, 

because once you—if you agree to enter into a position that requires a clearance—— 

Senator BURRIS. We have got to know everything about you. 

Mr. CLAPPER [continuing]. Then you sort of, having been one of 

those people for a long time, then you give that up. 

Senator BURRIS. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I can stay, 

I might have a second round. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your first round questions. 

Director Berry, the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 requires, and 

you mentioned this, that OPM conduct 90 percent of its investigations in an average of 40 days by December 2009. According to 

your testimony, you are on track to meet or exceed this benchmark, 

and I want to commend you and the agency and all of those who 

had a part in this for making remarkable progress on completing 

security clearance investigations as promptly as you have. 

GAO’s written testimony states that in 2008, the slowest 11 percent of initial clearance decisions still took more than 300 days to 

complete. Can you tell me about why some investigations still take 

a long time to complete and what is being done to speed the most 

difficult investigations? 

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a great question, and 

I think it is one that counsels caution for all of us. I think that is 

why the Subcommittee, and the GAO, and we use that standard of 

90 percent, because we are not giving out drivers’ licenses here. As 

you are well aware, we are giving out, in some cases, the highest 

security clearances possible. 

There are some people who will not successfully pass. And if we 

cannot verify the information, and if we cannot get to the bottom 

of it, and in some cases it is hard to do that, we can’t go forward. 

Now, recognizing that in some cases that also denies someone a position if they are already in the government, we have got to make 

every effort. 

But I think we need to recognize in our performance standards, 

that if there are problems, we must take the time to do it right. 

I think we always need to be looking at that pool of cases and making sure that it is legitimate, that the delay is real and justified. 

But we do need to recognize there will probably always be some 

pool of cases like that. So I don’t want to mislead you. 

That being said, we still need to watch that very closely, and it 

has to be, I think, one of the performance metrics that GAO, OMB, 

and OPM are going to have to watch. 

Senator AKAKA. Are there any other comments? Ms. Farrell. 

Ms. FARRELL. Well, we recognize that some clearances are going 

to take longer than 120 days, or come December, longer than the 

60 days. The reason we were focusing attention on the slowest 10 

percent or 20 percent is that there is currently not any reporting 

of that to monitor to see what is going on with 100 percent of the 

clearances, not necessarily that 100 percent of the clearances will 

have been completed in 120 or 60 days, but what is going on with 

that pool that is not meeting it. And we feel by reporting the total 

100 percent, it would bring visibility and thus maybe corrective action, if necessary. 

21 

Perhaps some of these cases are going to drag on and there will 

be no clearance granted for the final result. But until you determine what is going on with that population that is taking longer 

than 120 and whether corrective action be done, it is an unknown. 

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I will pledge that we will 

report on those cases. I believe it is important. The transparency, 

as General Clapper has mentioned, is critical, we must be held accountable on this. If we are not reporting already, as the Director 

of OPM, my pledge to this Subcommittee is that we will report on 

it. So we will develop the metric necessary to get that job done. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for that. 

Director Zients, you testified that the interagency review process 

determined that few changes would be made in plans for clearance 

reform. However, you did say that you plan to reexamine overlaps 

between suitability and security clearance investigations. Can you 

discuss this further and describe how this is different from the 

original reform plan? 

Mr. ZIENTS. Yes. The original reform plan envisioned three tiers 

of investigation based on increasing levels of risk. So the bottom 

tier, all exclusively around suitability, is the Form 85, and the topmost tier around national security and the Form 86. 

It envisioned a middle tier that I think, upon review, was too 

broad in that it included, as an example, an HR executive at an 

agency and a Border Patrol who carries a gun all in the same tier. 

And what we have found is that it probably is better to break that 

middle tier into two tiers which will allow for a better and more 

efficient process. And that determination to break the middle tier 

into two has led to some changes to the Form 86. 

Senator Voinovich, you had asked about that up front. That will 

enter a 30-day public comment stage by the end of the month. And 

therefore, once we incorporate those comments, we should be done 

with that, certainly by the end of this year. 

So that we have largely completed the review, it will result in 

two tiers rather than one in the middle, and I think, ultimately, 

a more effective and more efficient process that will also allow for 

better reciprocity across the system. 

Senator AKAKA. Secretary Shedd, last December, ODNI, along 

with OPM, updated the Federal Investigative Standards for Security Clearance Investigations. These standards had not been updated since 1995 and little has been said about the updates. Can 

you describe why the update was necessary and how the standards 

changed? 

Mr. SHEDD. Mr. Chairman, the reason for looking at the standards was to align them into a process or a system of risk management into three tiers, in that the top secret SCI, the ‘‘sensitive compartmented information’’ clearance being tier three, the lowest 

level being tier one for general access, below ‘‘confidential’’ level, 

and the middle level, tier two, being ‘‘confidential secret’’ level. This 

was done in such a way that as we moved forward with an E process (and what I will term to be the flagging of issues of concern 

that would require additional investigation), the process, of the 

standards for leading to that built off of the new SF–86, would kick 

in and be brought to bear on that investigation. 

22 

As General Clapper has said, one of the big objectives is to lower, 

or minimize, the amount of time spent on clean cases, those cases 

where there is no issue that has been identified. 

At the Top Secret Sensitive Compartmental Information (TS-SCI) 

level, an interview of that individual, that applicant requiring a 

TS-SCI will still be required. However, much earlier in the process 

because of this flagging system off of the E-based identification of 

the data that is discovered on the individual, you can go to a much 

more targeted way of doing that investigation and thereby cutting 

down the number of days that leads to the clearance and the adjudication of that clearance. So that was the purpose behind that. 

We will now go back to that with whatever realignment occurs 

with OPM and under OMB’s leadership and relook at that if, in 

fact, it impacts on the standards that were issued in 2008 under 

Director McConnell. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SHEDD. You are welcome. 

Senator AKAKA. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Aren’t there still some agencies that do their 

own clearance? 

Mr. SHEDD. Yes, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So they are not in this main area? In other 

words, they are exempt from this whole process. They do their own 

thing—— 

Mr. SHEDD. No. They fall under the direction of the DNI in terms 

of the standards for doing it, even though they do their own investigations and don’t fall to OPM. So, for example, the National Reconnaissance Office does its own investigations, but they must follow the process laid out—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. The guidelines. But the fact of the matter is 

that in certain areas, they do their own investigations so that—— 

Mr. SHEDD. Correct. 

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. The kind of investigations that 

the OPM does—there is a kind of standard investigation of just 

generally people that want to come into the Federal Government 

at a certain level of security clearance. 

Mr. SHEDD. That is correct, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH. And there is a consensus about the information that you need to have investigated so that you get to that 

level. 

Mr. SHEDD. That is correct, and I might add, they rely on the 

standards for suitability that are published or issued by the Office 

of Personnel Management, as well. So they don’t get to go outside 

of the suitability part of that security clearance data collection. 

Mr. ZIENTS. I think we are talking about roughly 10 percent, is 

that correct? 

Mr. SHEDD. It is closer to 5 to 7 percent, total, for the intelligence 

community (IC), for about a total of 82,000 cases per year. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So the majority of them go through the regular system—— 

Mr. SHEDD. Yes. Correct. 

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. In terms of the investigation. I 

recall when we got into this whole investigation that the people 

that were doing it were doing it on a part-time basis. Obviously, 

23 

you have got a new system and more trained people so that the 

quality overall, would you say, General Clapper, is better than 

what it was 2 or 3 years ago? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I think that is a fair statement, yes, sir. 

Mr. BERRY. Senator, if I could, I would just like to point out the 

scale. As Mr. Shedd mentioned, OPM is doing, in terms of investigations, 2.2 million investigations a year, and that is not just for 

suitability. We do suitability, secret, top secret, and SCI investigation levels. So we meet that standard throughout. As was mentioned, there is about 8 percent still outside that, but—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. You have different standards for investigations depending on what the call for is with the agencies—— 

Mr. BERRY. Yes, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. And you have the people on 

board that can review those investigations to make sure that they 

meet high standards, so once you send them over to the agency, the 

agency doesn’t look at them and say, we don’t want them. 

How often, General Clapper, do you have to go back to them and 

say, you have got to do some more work? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I don’t know the exact number, but it is relatively 

small, but I would have to get the exact number of referrals. 

Mr. ZIENTS. Across the system, it is less than 1 percent. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I didn’t hear you. 

Mr. BERRY. Less than 1 percent, Senator. 

Mr. ZIENTS. Less than 1 percent are returned by the agency to 

the investigative process. And that doesn’t mean that there was an 

error. It might mean that sometimes a return is—you only talked 

to four neighbors, because this is important—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. Oh, I have to tell you, 1 percent, it is amazing. 

Is this review of the SF–86 that you are doing pretty much over? 

In other words, the security clearance reform initiative of the 

former Administration, you have kind of looked that over and you 

have got some changes that you want to make and now the procedure is you have to send it out for comment? Is that where we are 

at right now? 

Mr. ZIENTS. Yes. 

Senator VOINOVICH. When do you think that will get done? 

Mr. ZIENTS. By the end of the month, we hope to have the Form 

86 out for public comment. We are going to do a 30-day public comment period, and then we need to absorb those comments, so certainly by the end of the calendar year. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes. I would be interested, one of the things 

that many of us were concerned about is whether or not the DNI 

could reconcile some of the differences between the agencies in 

terms of reciprocity. Has that been pretty well worked out? Are 

there any hang-ups yet there? 

Mr. SHEDD. There are some hang-ups because bureaucracies resist being told to accept something that either for them is not 

transparent: Fully transparent in terms of the reciprocity, the adjudication and so forth. But within the intelligence community, tremendous progress has been made in a system called Scattered Castles, which is a repository, then, of all the security clearances of the 

individuals. 

24 

We need to modernize that database with additional information 

to further increase the level of confidence of the intelligence community’s leadership confidence that when they are getting someone 

who is transferring from one particular agency in the intelligence 

community to another one, that all the information that General 

Clapper talked about is available to the receiving end for the individual who doesn’t belong to that agency. 

Senator VOINOVICH. And that understanding among the agencies 

is part of this review that you are doing? 

Mr. ZIENTS. Yes. I believe that the reciprocity issue is around 

standardization and consistency, and therefore is right at the heart 

of everything that we are doing here. We are using IT and process 

reengineering to simplify this process and make it more standard, 

and that has a big advantage when it comes to reciprocity because 

of the cultural challenges that Mr. Shedd is outlining. Historically, 

everybody has done it a different way, and as we get that consistency and standardization, I believe that, coupled with making the 

information available and transparent, which we are making a lot 

of progress on, will lead to big gains in reciprocity, because I think 

so far, we haven’t experienced those, but so far, we haven’t completed the effort around standardization and consistency. And once 

we do, reciprocity will follow. 

Mr. SHEDD. Senator, I—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. I am sure this is something you are going 

to—go ahead. 

Mr. SHEDD. I wanted to add one other perspective. Something 

that is of high concern to the DNI is that the agency heads in the 

intelligence community not add additional layers that amount to 

being barriers even beyond the reciprocity on the security clearance 

basis alone. In other words, standards for the suitability and so 

forth that don’t ultimately act as a deterrent outright from a transfer from one agency to another because they are added on top of 

the security clearance issue. And so that is preeminent in Director 

Blair’s mind and something that we are addressing by way of policy. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. So you think you are making progress, 

and a year from now, when people feel a lot better, with the help 

of the IT and other things, people will be comforted because of the 

quality of the information and be much more willing to rely upon 

it in terms of their concerns? 

Mr. SHEDD. Yes, combined with policies that make it very clear 

what the terms are under which that transfer occurs, as well. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Senator Burris. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am a little concerned about, are there statistics on how many 

apply for, let us say, a top secret security clearance and is, in fact, 

rejected? Now, there is an investigation and then it goes back to 

the agency for adjudication. Who does the rejection? What, then, is 

the process of this applicant—is it follow-up steps to attempt to try 

to correct situations, or what generally happens if there is—how 

many are rejected and what happens? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I, again, don’t have the exact number of how many 

actually fail to get a clearance for one reason or another. I will tell 

25 

you, though, that either in the case of an initial clearance or it 

probably happens more often of people who are already cleared and 

then have an update periodically, the requirement now is at least 

every 5 years, and if derogatory information turns up in the course 

of either the initial or a subsequent update, there are appeal processes, at least within the Department of Defense. There is a board 

that is overseen by the Office of General Counsel that allows due 

process for such appeals. They can be quite drawn out and quite 

extensive because there is a balance here between national security 

and then deference to people’s rights. I can get you the numbers, 

say, for a typical year—— 

Senator BURRIS. Just a guesstimate. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Well, I would say it is, for the whole Department, 

which would include the four intelligence agencies that are embedded in the Department and the four services, I would guess on the 

order of 200 or 300, maybe, and that is out of thousands of—— 

Senator BURRIS. Is it a very small number? 

Mr. CLAPPER. Yes. An even smaller number that actually goes 

through an appeal process. 

Senator BURRIS. Very good. And this is probably for Mr. Berry. 

The investigators, in your assignment of their investigating of a 

person, are they assigned to the same agency or do they do various 

agencies? And if so, if they do, then why not try to have them to 

do more than one agency? What is your routine process for an investigator? 

Mr. BERRY. Senator, if I could, we can respond to that in more 

detail for the record for you, but we have approximately 2,000 Federal Government employees and then a contract force about double 

that size in terms of investigators who are handling cases. And so 

it is quite a complicated operation to manage, especially to make 

sure there is no backlog, which is where we are right now, and to 

meet these timelines, as you can imagine. 

Senator BURRIS. You said you are letting contracts out to private 

sources to do the investigations? 

Mr. BERRY. Absolutely. Part of this job is managed with private 

sector employees, and they are—it is something we watch very 

carefully and we work in hand—— 

Senator BURRIS. Are we investigating the investigators in the 

private sector? 

Mr. BERRY. Absolutely. All of our investigators have to have 

clearances before they are involved in the investigations. We can 

get you more information about the details of that—— 

Senator BURRIS. Do you get consistency, then, in their reports? 

I mean, I am seeing that if a person is assigned to do the Defense 

Department, Health and Human Services (HHS), or the White 

House, and they know the routine, if you switch them off somewhere else, it might delay the process. 

Mr. BERRY. It goes to both making sure that all of the investigators are trained, that their systems are in place—and the transparency of the data. At the end of the day, the investigation we are 

providing to the client; OPM makes no determinations on the clearance level. 

Senator BURRIS. Right. 

26 

Mr. BERRY. That is done by someone—so, essentially what we 

are doing is—— 

Senator BURRIS. Collecting the data. 

Mr. BERRY [continuing]. Collecting the data and making sure 

that data is accurate, and then transferring that to the client, who 

then makes the determination, or adjudication, which is the term 

of art. So there is that consistency. In other words, the client is 

used to it and knows what data to expect, and if something, for example, is missing, the explanation is fully transparent and made 

available so that the client has the ability to say, no, we want you 

to go back and do something else. 

Mr. CLAPPER. Let me just reiterate or emphasize a point made 

here, is that regardless of who does the investigation, whether it 

is in the case of the intelligence agencies doing their own or OPM 

doing the investigations—and by far the lion’s share of the investigations particularly for all of the services, are done by OPM— 

they are operating using the same investigative standards. So 

there is consistency across the board in terms of how these investigations are done, be they by OPM or one of the agencies, at least 

the four agencies in DOD. 

Senator BURRIS. Ms. Farrell, are there any other agencies that 

are on your list other than DOD that you are having problems 

with? 

Ms. FARRELL. Well, when we first put DOD on the list, DOD was 

responsible for the investigations as well as the adjudications, and 

I think the Chairman said it best. The personnel security process 

has to be looked at now through a government-wide lens. There are 

many players besides DOD. The roles and responsibilities have 

changed, as evidenced by the Performance Accountability Council’s 

involvement. So it is beyond DOD at this point in terms of the personnel security clearance process. 

Senator BURRIS. Well, I was talking about other agencies. Do you 

have HHS? 

Ms. FARRELL. Are there other agencies that we have concerns 

about? 

Senator BURRIS. Yes. 

Ms. FARRELL. It is more the concern of the roles and responsibilities of who is doing the investigations and who is doing the adjudications. Our focus has been on DOD and the reform efforts. We 

have met with other agencies, at the Department of Homeland Security, for example, and others that issue clearances and have 

heard concerns expressed about the sharing of investigations, as 

well as what we started talking about earlier, the role and the mission of the Joint Reform Team to improve the process. So we have 

heard from other agencies’ concerns, but it is limited. Does that answer your question, sir? 

Senator BURRIS. There is a limited number. I mean, you don’t 

have a watch list that you are looking at with reference to some 

of the other agencies that might not be following through or having 

a major backlog? 

Ms. FARRELL. We are not aware of backlogs with other agencies, 

no, sir. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

27 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Burris. I will 

have a third round here, but thank you for your questions. 

Director Berry, I want to follow up on some information that Mr. 

Zients mentioned about SF–85 and 86. While updating the forms 

is important, the goal is to have applicants use an electronic application, usually e–QIP. Has OPM taken steps to update e–QIP and 

the Personal Investigations Processing System (PIPS) system to accommodate the new forms as soon as they are finalized? 

Mr. BERRY. Senator, we are at a place now where 97 percent of 

that 2.2 million investigations are using that electronic system. So 

we are getting close to the finish line on that. And yes, those forms 

will be updated once—obviously, not until it has made it through 

the public process—but we will be ready to adjust and can modify 

that system to accommodate that once that process is completed. 

Senator AKAKA. General Clapper, you testified that the Department of Defense has begun to use electronic automatic adjudication 

of some investigation files that were not flagged with any outstanding issues. According to the Joint Reform Team benchmarks, 

this is set to be more broadly deployed. What quality checks or audits has the Department conducted in order to validate that the 

electronic adjudications are as reliable as adjudications completed 

by a DOD employee? 

Mr. CLAPPER. I know the research that we have done, which I 

think is crucial to the whole reform effort, in which we have compared what would be revealed through automatic records checks 

versus what was on cases that have already been adjudicated 

under the old system, and there is a very close correlation. In other 

words, they are congruent. And we believe that the sample used 

was statistically reliable as done by the Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) to make that case, that we can rely on 

automatic records checks. And that, of course, is a major feature 

of what was intended with the overall personnel reform. 

I am told that we did a 100 percent audit for the Army pilot that 

was run between November 2008 and February 2009, and we are 

now doing on a regular basis a 10 percent audit. Of course, I would 

just repeat what I said earlier in my opening remarks about the 

tools that we are building, one to assess the completeness and accuracy of investigatory data, a tool called RAISE, and then another 

one called RADAR, which we are in the process of fielding, which 

will help assess the quality and rationale for adjudications. 

Senator AKAKA. And I should have mentioned, I guess you can 

call it clean cases, where there are is no negative investigative information. 

Mr. CLAPPER. In the case of the secret clearances done for military personnel. That is right. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Director Berry, the Intelligence Reform Act called on agencies to 

use an electronic form to apply for a security clearance. I understand that currently e–QIP is the only format OPM will accept 

from agencies submitting the electronic investigation requests. 

Would OPM be open to allowing agencies to use third-party electronic applications that conform with OPM submission standards 

rather than having e–QIP as the sole and only option? 

28 

Mr. BERRY. Senator, I think we need to reach the targets that 

we have set. I think bringing in new players, new systems at this 

point in time could greatly complicate the timelines and our ability 

to reach our goals. I think you always need to be thinking ahead 

and looking more broadly, but at this point in time, I think we 

need to maintain that centrality so that we can have the consistency and have the ability to have the transparency that customers 

should demand and should require. So my sense would be, this is 

not the time to try to expand that, sir. 

Mr. CLAPPER. If I might, Senator, I would just strongly endorse 

what Mr. Berry just said. From a DOD perspective, as large as we 

are and as globally deployed as we are, I think it is very important 

that we hew to the tenet of consistency here in both the applications and all the way through the process. So I would strongly endorse what Mr. Berry said. 

Senator AKAKA. Are there any other comments on this particular 

question? 

[No response.] 

Senator AKAKA. I have specific questions about the status of several information technology systems, and I will just tell you that 

I will submit it for the record to all of you. 

Your responses have been really helpful and all of you should be 

commended for the progress that we have made. I want to thank 

all the witnesses for appearing today. Security clearance reform 

continues to be a critical issue. I have confidence that progress is 

being made, but much, as we agree, needs to be done. This will require dedication, commitment, and modernization of existing systems and processes, and I look forward to seeing this issue removed from the GAO’s High-Risk List in the near future. Again, 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for your continued efforts. 

The hearing record will be open for 2 weeks for additional statements or questions other Members may have pertaining to this 

hearing. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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