DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

LISANDRA SOTO GUTIERREZ,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D2023-0106

[July 17, 2024]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Andrew L. Siegel, Judge; L.T. Case No. 16004372CF10A.

Robert David Malove of the Law Office of Robert David Malove, P.A., 

Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sorraya M. SolagesJones, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

KLINGENSMITH, C.J.

Appellant Lisandra Soto Gutierrez appeals her convictions and 

sentences for first degree grand theft (count 1) and second degree grand 

theft (count 2) following a jury trial. As part of its case, the State presented

evidence of appellant’s alleged fraudulent actions during her bankruptcy 

case. Appellant argues the admission of this evidence was error because 

any fraudulent actions purportedly committed during the bankruptcy 

proceedings were not relevant, as such actions were not similar to the theft

offenses at issue. We agree and reverse for a new trial.

During trial, the State called the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee 

assigned to appellant’s bankruptcy case in the summer of 2016. At some 

point, appellant and the trustee had a meeting which was recorded. In 

that recorded meeting, the trustee confronted appellant for failing to 

indicate in her bankruptcy documents that she had transferred ownership 

of her house to an entity in which she had an ownership interest. 

Appellant explained that she had transferred ownership of her house to 

avoid liens from creditors. Defense counsel objected to the admission of 

the recording at trial, stating that the acts described in the recording were 
2

dissimilar from appellant’s alleged grand theft offenses. However, the trial 

court admitted the recording over defense counsel’s objections.

We review a trial court’s decision to admit collateral crime evidence, 

also known as Williams rule1 evidence, for an abuse of discretion. Stav v. 

State, 860 So. 2d 478, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citing Geldreich v. State,

763 So. 2d 1114, 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). “Williams rule evidence is 

evidence of other conduct, which, pursuant to section 90.404(2)(a), Florida 

Statutes, is similar to the charged offense and is relevant to prove a 

material fact in issue, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Thompson 

v. State, 76 So. 3d 1050, 1053 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Williams rule evidence 

is “inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character 

or a defendant’s propensity to commit a crime.” Id. (citing § 90.404(2)(a), 

Fla. Stat.).

Collateral crime evidence, even if dissimilar to the crime charged, may 

be admitted if it is both relevant and probative of a material fact in issue.

See Jones v. State, 296 So. 3d 447, 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020). Similarity of 

offenses is only a requirement to admit collateral crime evidence if the 

similarity between the collateral crime and the charged offense is what 

gives the evidence probative value. See id. at 450–51.

Evidence of a collateral crime is inherently prejudicial “because it 

creates the risk that a conviction will be based on the defendant’s bad 

character or propensity to commit crimes, rather than on proof [the

defendant] committed the charged offense.” Fesh v. State, 328 So. 3d 359, 

362 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (quoting Jones v. State, 944 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 

5th DCA 2006)). As a result, the improper admission of Williams rule 

evidence is presumed to be harmful error, especially when the State relies 

on the improper evidence in its closing argument. See id. at 363; Pastor v. 

State, 792 So. 2d 627, 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). 

To prove grand theft, the State must establish that the defendant 

knowingly obtained or used, or endeavored to obtain or use, the property 

of another with intent to deprive that person of a right to the property or 

benefit therefrom. See Tinker v. State, 341 So. 3d 1136, 1145 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2022) (quoting Pizzo v. State, 945 So. 2d 1203, 1207 (Fla. 2006)). The 

defendant must have had the specific intent to commit theft at the time of, 

or prior to, the taking. See Segal v. State, 98 So. 3d 739, 742 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2012). 

1 See Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
3

The State argues the evidence of appellant’s alleged fraudulent actions 

in the bankruptcy case was relevant and admissible to establish her 

intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident in committing the 

theft offenses charged. Specifically, the State asserts that appellant’s 

shielding of her own property to avoid creditors’ liens in the bankruptcy 

case is similar to her alleged act of knowingly depriving the alleged victims 

of money or property in the underlying case. Alternatively, the State 

argues appellant’s statements under oath to the bankruptcy trustee were

admissible as a party admission under section 90.803(18)(a), Florida 

Statutes (2022).

We disagree. Appellant’s alleged fraud in the bankruptcy proceedings 

appears more akin to a fraudulent transfer rather than the theft offenses 

charged by the State. See § 726.105(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). A debtor 

commits a fraudulent transfer if the debtor transfers property “with actual 

intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.” Id. Such

transfers are distinct from theft because a fraudulent transfer involves a 

defendant transferring her own property to avoid having to pay a creditor. 

Id. In contrast, theft involves a taking of property belonging to another. 

See § 812.014(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015).

Appellant’s sworn statement to the bankruptcy trustee was also not 

admissible as a party admission. Section 90.803(18)(a), Florida Statutes 

(2022), provides that a party’s admission may be admitted for the truth of 

the matter asserted if it is offered against a party, and it is the party’s own 

statement in either an individual or representative capacity. However, to 

be admissible, the admission must also be relevant by “tending to prove or 

disprove a material fact.” Ring Power Corp. v. Condado-Perez, 219 So. 3d 

1028, 1033 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (quoting § 90.401, Fla. Stat.). As 

explained, appellant’s statements were not relevant to any issue in this 

case.

The State offers no argument regarding whether the admission of this 

evidence constituted harmless error. As we have said, the improper 

admission of collateral crime evidence is presumed to be harmful. See 

Fesh, 328 So. 3d at 363. This is especially true not only where, as in this 

case, the State relied on appellant’s statement in its closing argument, but 

also because the jury requested to hear the recording of the interview with 

the bankruptcy trustee again during deliberations. This tends to establish

the reasonable possibility that the jury not only considered the improper 

Williams rule evidence, but also may have relied on such improper 

evidence in determining appellant’s guilt. Thus, the improper admission 

of evidence regarding the bankruptcy fraud could not have been harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 
4

(Fla. 1986) (stating that the burden is on the State, as the beneficiary of 

an error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 

contribute to the verdict).

In sum, appellant’s alleged fraud in the bankruptcy case does not tend 

to prove or disprove that she knowingly obtained or used, or endeavored 

to obtain or use, the property of another with the intent to deprive them of 

a right to the property or a benefit of the property. Therefore, such 

evidence was not probative as to any material issue in this case.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial on counts 1 and 2.

Reversed and remanded.

GROSS and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.