COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Lemons 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

YOLANDA RAMOS WILSON 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2781-98-1 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 FEBRUARY 15, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GLOUCESTER COUNTY 

William H. Shaw, III, Judge 

 Matthew G. Krumtum (Stone & Associates, P.C., 

on brief), for appellant. 

 Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Yolanda Ramos Wilson (appellant) appeals from her bench 

trial conviction for the neglect or abuse of her child, "J.", 

pursuant to Code § 40.1-103. On appeal, she contends (1) the 

trial court abused its discretion and violated her 

constitutional rights by permitting the Commonwealth to amend 

the indictment and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support 

her conviction where the trial court said no single event 

justified a guilty verdict. We hold that the amendment to the 

indictment did not constitute reversible error and that the 

evidence was sufficient to prove appellant willfully caused J. 

to be injured and cruelly treated. Therefore, we affirm her 

conviction. 
I. 

BACKGROUND 

A. 

MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT 

 By indictment returned May 4, 1998, the Gloucester County 

grand jury charged that, on or about February 11 to 13, 1998, 

appellant 

did unlawfully and feloniously, while having 

custody, willfully and negligently, cause or 

permit the health of [J.], a minor child, to 

be injured, or willfully or negligently, 

cause him to be placed in a situation that 

his life or health was endangered, or cause 

or permit him to be tortured, or cruelly 

treated. 

This indictment roughly paralleled the language of a portion of 

Code § 40.1-103 but alleged the child's "life or health was

endangered," whereas the statute used the language "may be

endangered."1 (Emphasis added). 

 1

 The statute provides as follows: 

It shall be unlawful for any person 

employing or having the custody of any child 

willfully or negligently to cause or permit 

the life of such child to be endangered or 

the health of such child to be injured, or 

willfully or negligently to cause or permit 

such child to be placed in a situation that 

its life, health or morals may be 

endangered, or to cause or permit such child 

to be overworked, tortured, tormented, 

mutilated, beaten or cruelly treated. 

Code § 40.1-103. 

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 Appellant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground 

that it contained an invalid attempt to rewrite a portion of the 

statute which this Court declared unconstitutional in Carter v. 

Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 150, 462 S.E.2d 582 (1995). She 

asserted that Carter declared unconstitutionally vague the 

portion of the statute which read "or willfully to cause or 

permit such child to be placed in a situation that his life, 

health or morals may be endangered." (Emphasis added). 

 The trial court denied appellant's motion to dismiss the 

indictment and amended it to remove the portion declared 

unconstitutional in Carter. Following this amendment, the 

indictment charged that appellant "did unlawfully and 

feloniously, while having custody, willfully and negligently, 

cause or permit the health of [J.], a minor child, to be 

injured, or cause or permit him to be tortured, or cruelly 

treated." 

 Appellant continued to object, maintaining that the 

language removed required only appellant's passive involvement, 

whereas the remaining portions required more active involvement, 

and that the court could not be certain the grand jury would 

have issued the indictment if the indictment had included only 

the amended language. Appellant declined a continuance, arguing 

instead that the indictment should be dismissed. 

 The trial court held that the amendment of the indictment 

was permissible because it did not change the nature of the 

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offense. It then arraigned appellant on the amended indictment, 

still drafted in the disjunctive but omitting the language 

tracking the portion of the statute previously declared 

unconstitutional. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 

B. 

THE OFFENSE 

 The evidence admitted at trial established the following: 

On the morning of February 13, 1998, Kelly Wilson, father of the 

three-year-old victim, "J.", a learning disabled child, dropped 

J. off at "handicap preschool," putting him directly into the 

arms of Cynthia Finley, J.'s teacher's assistant. A few minutes 

later, when Finley rolled up J.'s sleeves prior to breakfast as 

she did every school morning, she saw two roughly two-inch-long 

parallel bruises running lengthwise on J.'s left forearm. 

Finley had not noticed any injuries on J.'s arms when she rolled 

up his sleeves the previous day. Subsequent examination of J. 

in the school nurse's office indicated that, in addition to the 

bruises on J.'s left forearm, J.'s right elbow was swollen, was 

tender to the touch and had scratches on it and he had scratches 

on his back. Nurse Becky McDaniel described the bruises on J.'s 

left forearm as red and opined, based on their color, that they 

had been incurred within the previous twenty-four hours. 

 The guidance counselor called social services, and social 

worker Joe Wayland responded to J.'s school to begin an 

investigation. In addition to the bruises on J.'s left forearm 

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and his swollen right elbow, Wayland observed a purple mark on 

one of J.'s upper arms, which was about two to three inches 

long, a large purple mark on J.'s upper back, and scratches 

across J.'s back. The scratches were in various stages of 

healing, and three were "very fresh." Wayland observed "some 

marks on J.'s forehead and on his face" and described several 

marks on J.'s leg which also were in various stages of healing. 

Wayland took photographs of J.'s injuries. 

 When Wayland questioned appellant about J.'s injuries, 

appellant "was very certain" J. had sustained the injuries in a 

fall from the jungle gym at school. When Wayland told her that 

J. could not have injured himself on the jungle gym at school 

because it had been removed from his classroom, appellant said 

J. could have fallen between the slats of a bunk bed at home. 

When Wayland asked appellant if she had noticed any injuries on 

the child, she said the child had no injuries when she bathed 

him the night before. Mr. Wilson told Wayland he had helped 

appellant bathe J. the night before and that he cleaned J. up 

and dressed him for school on the morning of February 13. Mr. 

Wilson said there were no marks on J. at either of those times. 

 Other evidence established that appellant may previously 

have abused J. and had been investigated by social services on 

several occasions. In October 1996, one-year-old J. was treated 

for a broken left femur, which required a cast. When Wayland 

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questioned them, appellant and Mr. Wilson reported that J. broke 

his femur stepping off a four-to-six-inch step. 

 Deann Dixon testified that she visited the Wilson home 

sometime in 1996. The Wilsons had just learned that J. had a 

learning disability, and Dixon heard appellant tell J. that he 

was stupid and was going to ride the "stupid bus." Dixon also 

observed appellant repeatedly pick J. up by his feet and swing 

him around in circles as J., screaming and crying, asked her to 

stop. While spinning him, appellant "came very close a lot of 

times to hitting his head on the coffee table." Dixon made an 

anonymous report to social services. 

 In February 1997, Mr. Wilson's cousin, Darryl Tyler, and 

his family were living with Mr. Wilson and appellant. Mr. 

Tyler, his wife Robin, and their ten-year-old son Christopher 

Brown all observed appellant "pluck" J.'s penis, which made him 

cry, and "smack him in the head." Mrs. Tyler testified that, on 

one occasion, appellant beat J. with a wooden spoon for about 

twenty minutes as he lay crying on the kitchen floor in a fetal 

position. Mr. Tyler also observed appellant use her foot to 

pick J. up by his shirt and "slam[] him down on his butt," which 

appellant said J. did not like. Deann Dixon confirmed the 

"smacking" incident and said appellant told her that she hated 

J. 

 On July 5, 1997, Mr. Wilson's cousin, Felissa Leisure, 

changed J.'s diaper at a family reunion. While she was doing 

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so, J. "seemed to wince and say, 'ow, ow, ow,'" which prompted 

Leisure, the daughter of a former social services worker, to 

examine J. more carefully. Leisure saw marks "all over" J.'s 

arms, legs, back and face. Some were dark marks two to three 

inches long, some were "fresh wounds with scabs," and some were 

healed. She also observed, on J.'s upper left back, a bite mark 

which appeared to have been caused by an adult. When Leisure 

asked appellant about the bite marks, appellant laughed and said 

her younger daughter, Edy, who was about two years old, had done 

it. Leisure reported her observations to social services. 

 When social worker Wayland investigated Leisure's report on 

July 7, 1997, he observed and photographed two sets of bite 

marks on J.'s back. When Wayland questioned appellant, she said 

J.'s cousin, Asia, had bitten him a year earlier. 

 Dr. Robin Foster, the director of the pediatrics emergency 

room and child protective team at the Medical College of 

Virginia, examined the photos of J.'s injuries from February 13, 

1998, and photos of earlier injuries also investigated by social 

services. She also examined J. on April 16, 1998. Foster 

testified extensively about the marks she observed in the 

photographs, stating that they were "purplish in color" and were 

"consistent with bruises." She explained that bruises usually 

are "blue and purple through anywhere from 48 to 72 hours out to 

two weeks in the healing process." She testified that the 

location of the bruises and their shape and number caused her to 

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be "concern[ed] that they were not accidental injur[ies]." 

Marks on J.'s back, right leg and thigh were linear, and on the 

leg, there were "some looped marks visible," which were 

"consistent with whip marks." Foster testified that J.'s left 

and right arm bruises were consistent with a non-accidental 

injury caused when a child's arm is "grabbed hard and the 

person's hand actually" causes the injury. 

 Regarding J.'s 1996 broken femur, Foster testified that the 

femur is a very large bone in the body and not easily fractured 

in children because a child's bones are less brittle than an 

adult's. 

 Foster also examined the July 7, 1997 photos taken of the 

bite marks on J.'s back. She testified that the nature of the 

bite on J.'s left shoulder was consistent with the dental 

pattern of an adult and inconsistent with the dental pattern of 

a child. 

 The Commonwealth also offered the testimony of Investigator 

Vance Richards, who took a statement from Mr. Wilson upon his 

arrest on March 4, 1998. Wilson said that on the evening of 

February 12, 1998, 

[J.] disobeyed my verbal commands to quit 

packing the toilet with toilet paper after 

several times. I then grabbed his arm and 

spanked him on his butt being upset for the 

water and feces on the floor. In reference 

to the picture where there is swelling from 

the left ear is where I had grabbed him by 

the ear numerous times because he tends to 

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walk away when I'm verbally disciplining 

him. 

 In appellant's case-in-chief, she offered the testimony of 

Mr. Wilson, who also had been charged under Code § 40.1-103 but 

pleaded guilty to a lesser offense in exchange for dismissal of 

the greater charge. Mr. Wilson, a convicted felon, repeated the 

statement he had given to Investigator Richards, saying he had 

punished J. on the evening of February 12, 1998, when J. caused 

the toilet to overflow. Mr. Wilson said, "I pretty much just 

grabbed him and smacked him on his butt." He did not think he 

grabbed or hit J. hard enough to bruise him. He said appellant 

did not see him administer the spanking and that he did not tell 

her about it. Mr. Wilson said that when he dressed J. for 

school the following morning, J. did not have any marks, bruises 

or scratches and that he did not know where the marks came from. 

He denied ever seeing appellant "do anything inappropriate" to 

J. and testified that he knew she would not abuse him. 

 In convicting appellant, the trial court commented 

extensively on the evidence: 

[W]e start in '96 with a broken femur 

. . . . [I]t's unusual. But I don't draw 

really any conclusion from that. 

 The next incident we hear about, the 

incidents in February [1997], I suspect that 

they happened, but not to the extent that 

Darrell Tyler and his wife say. . . . I 

think [appellant] flicked [J.'s] penis. I 

think she slapped him on the head. Again, 

but not to the extent that the testimony led 

to. 

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 We come to the bite . . . marks . . . . 

And what Dr. Foster was saying, that these 

bite marks, the ones that she looked at show 

adult bite marks. And what bothers me is 

that [appellant] comes up with that the 

child was bitten by two different people, 

both children[,] at two different times. 

 So when we get to February of '98 we 

have a history, or certainly a suggestion of 

a history of abuse. And it takes it beyond 

that parent overdoing it on one occasion, or 

even two occasions. . . . 

 Now, Mr. Wilson testified that he 

grabbed [J.'s] . . . left arm, but even he 

said it wasn't enough to cause the bruising. 

But the doctor is also describing what 

appear like whip marks on the . . . back of 

the legs. And we know they exist and we 

have heard no explanation for that. 

 The parties, especially [appellant], 

gave inconsistent stories as to how these 

got there. So the conclusion that I'm 

drawing from this is that [J.] is an abused 

child. I don't know why [appellant] does 

what she does. . . . 

* * * * * * * 

 . . . I think there is sufficient 

evidence to find her guilty based on all the 

evidence, and I understand why the 

Commonwealth presented the background that 

it did. It set up the attitude, the feeling 

that [appellant] had for the child. I think 

she has no one incident. I don't think 

there is any one incident that I heard that 

would give rise in and of itself to a 

conviction. 

 But I think all of these things that 

occurred around February 13th[, 1998,] are 

too overwhelming, especially given the 

history of her attitude toward the child in 

matters of discipline. 

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II. 

ANALYSIS 

A. 

AMENDMENT OF THE INDICTMENT 

 An accused has a constitutional right, under both the 

United States and Virginia Constitutions, to be informed of the 

"cause and nature of the accusation against him." Hairston v. 

Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 211, 213, 343 S.E.2d 355, 357 (1986) 

(citing Va. Const. art. I, § 8); Ronald J. Bacigal, Virginia 

Criminal Procedure § 13.1 (3d ed. 1994) (noting that Due Process 

Clause of United States Constitution also requires accused be 

given clear notification of offense charged). However, one 

accused of a violation of the laws of the Commonwealth has no 

constitutional right to indictment by a grand jury.2 See

Farewell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 475, 484, 189 S.E. 321, 325 

(1937) (noting that Virginia's constitution does not mention 

grand jury). Code § 19.2-217 provides that "no person shall be 

put upon trial for any felony, unless an indictment or 

presentment shall have first been found or made by a grand jury 

 2

 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a 

capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 

indictment of a Grand Jury." U.S. Const. amend. V. However, 

the United States Constitution's grand jury requirement has not 

been made applicable to the states. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 

U.S. 1, 4 n.2, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1491 n.2, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964) 

(citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S. Ct. 111, 28 

L. Ed. 232 (1884)). 

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in a court of competent jurisdiction or unless such person" 

waives, in writing, the right to indictment or presentment. 

"[T]he requirement for indictment is not jurisdictional and 

constitutionally imposed but is only statutory and procedural." 

Triplett v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 649, 650-51, 186 S.E.2d 16, 17 

(1972). 

 Although the complete absence of an indictment, where not 

waived, may be reversible error, see id. at 650-51, 186 S.E.2d 

at 16-17 (decided under Code § 19.1-162, predecessor to Code 

§ 19.2-217), the legislature has provided for liberal amendment 

of indictments once returned by a grand jury, see Code 

§ 19.2-231. 

If there be any defect in form in any 

indictment, presentment or information, 

. . . the court may permit amendment . . . 

at any time before the jury returns a 

verdict or the court finds the accused 

guilty or not guilty, provided the amendment 

does not change the nature and character of 

the offense charged. . . . [I]f the court 

finds that such amendment operates as a 

surprise to the accused, he shall be 

entitled, upon request, to a continuance of 

the case for a reasonable time. 

Id. Pursuant to Code § 19.2-231, therefore, the indictment to 

which an accused is entitled under Code § 19.2-217 "includes an 

indictment which has been properly amended by the court." 

Farewell, 167 Va. at 485, 189 S.E. at 325 (decided under 

predecessors to Code §§ 19.2-217 and 19.2-231, § 4866 of the 

Code of 1887 and § 4877, enacted in 1919). 

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 "'If a statute . . . makes it a crime to do this, or that, 

or that,' mentioning several things disjunctively, 'the 

indictment may . . . embrace the whole in a single count; but it 

must use the conjunctive "and" where "or" occurs in the statute 

. . . .'" Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 541, 551, 127 S.E. 

368, 372 (1925) (quoting 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 334). 

Code § 19.2-231 permits amendment of an indictment which 

includes various intents improperly drafted in the disjunctive. 

See Slusher v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 440, 83 S.E.2d 719 (1954) 

(decided under Code § 19-151, predecessor to Code § 19.2-231). 

In Slusher, the indictment alleged that the accused did 

"'attempt to maliciously, unlawfully and feloniously assault, 

cut and wound . . . with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable 

or kill.'" Id. at 446, 83 S.E.2d at 722 (emphasis added). When 

the accused objected during trial to this disjunctive drafting, 

the Court applied former Code § 19-151 to uphold the trial 

court's actions in amending the indictment to charge in the 

conjunctive, rearraigning the accused, and allowing him to enter 

a new plea. See 196 Va. at 446, 83 S.E.2d at 722. 

 Implicit in this conclusion is that the disjunctive 

drafting of the intents was merely a "defect in form" subject to 

remedy by amendment and that amending the indictment to charge 

these intents in the conjunctive did not change the nature or 

character of the offense. Therefore, the fact that the grand 

jury may have indicted the accused for having acted with one 

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intent did not preclude his conviction for violating the statute 

with a different intent, also included in the indictment. 

 Although the disjunctive drafting of multiple criminal 

intents in Slusher is not identical to the disjunctive drafting 

of the multiple criminal acts in appellant's case, we hold that 

the facts in Slusher are sufficiently analogous to be 

controlling. In Slusher, the grand jury found probable cause to 

believe appellant committed the charged criminal act with at 

least one of four enumerated criminal intents. In appellant's 

case, the grand jury found probable cause to believe appellant 

committed at least one of the three criminal acts listed in Code 

§ 40.1-103. The fact that the trial court may have convicted 

Slusher for acting with a different one of the four enumerated 

criminal intents or appellant for committing a different one of 

the three enumerated criminal acts is not dispositive.3 Our 

analysis is not altered simply because, prior to trial, the 

trial court struck from the indictment one of the three acts 

 3

 Here, the trial court amended the indictment to strike the 

portion of the statute declared unconstitutional. Unlike in 

Slusher, it did not amend the indictment to charge the two 

remaining acts in the conjunctive rather than the disjunctive. 

However, appellant did not specifically object to the 

indictment's disjunctive language, focusing instead on the 

argument that the indictment, as amended, could not be said to 

have been found a true bill by the grand jury because it was 

drafted in the disjunctive and one of the three alternative 

grounds, upon which the grand jury could have relied, had been 

struck. Other than arguing the entire indictment should be 

dismissed, appellant did not object to proceeding to trial based 

on the fact that the remaining language was drafted in the 

disjunctive. 

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appellant was alleged to have committed, based on the 

unconstitutionality of that portion of the statute. 

 Appellant contends that the amendment changed the nature 

and character of the offense charged. We disagree. 

 Appellant was aware, upon the return of the indictment by 

the grand jury, that she was charged with serious acts of child 

abuse under Code § 40.1-103. Under the indictment as originally 

drafted, appellant was charged with having violated the statute 

in any of three different ways: by willfully and/or negligently 

(1) causing or permitting the health of the victim to be 

injured; (2) causing the victim to be placed in a situation in 

which his life or health was endangered; or (3) causing or 

permitting the victim to be tortured or cruelly treated.4

Appellant was on notice that she could be convicted of violating 

the statute based on having committed any of the three 

categories of enumerated acts; that she did not know under which 

clause or clauses the grand jury returned a true bill is not 

material to the issue on appeal. Cf. Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 

238 Va. 389, 397-98, 384 S.E.2d 757, 762-63 (1989) (upholding 

indictment drafted in the disjunctive under which accused "was 

on notice that he had to defend against seven possible groupings 

of murder victims, any one of which was sufficient to constitute 

 4

 We note, under the facts of this case, that whether the 

indictment was drafted in the disjunctive or conjunctive is not 

relevant to whether it provided appellant with notice of the 

nature or character of the offense. 

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capital murder" and that, under that indictment, "there's no way 

[the accused did not] know what [he was] charged with"); 

Slusher, 196 Va. at 446, 83 S.E.2d at 722 (holding implicitly 

that amending indictment alleging four intents in the 

disjunctive to charge those same four intents in the conjunctive 

did not change the nature or character of the offense). We hold 

that when the trial court struck the second clause as 

unconstitutional, this amendment merely narrowed the scope of 

the indictment. It did not change the nature or character of 

the offense charged in the indictment. Further, appellant made 

no claim that the amendment operated as a surprise and declined 

the court's offer of a continuance. 

 Appellant contends that, by eliminating the possibility of 

conviction under clause (2), the amendment changed the nature of 

the offense from passive to active, thereby changing the nature 

and character of the offense. Again, we disagree. As set out 

above, appellant could originally have been convicted of 

violating the statute in any of three ways. However, after the 

amendment, if the trier of fact found that appellant violated 

the second clause of the statute, it could not convict her at 

all; it could convict her only if her actions violated the first 

or third clauses of the statute. Thus, the amendment narrowed 

the scope of the indictment and did not change its nature or 

character. 

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 For these reasons, we hold that the trial court's refusal 

to dismiss the indictment was not error. 

B. 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

 When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal 

in a criminal case, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Higginbotham v. 

Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). The 

credibility of a witness, the weight accorded the testimony, and 

the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters solely 

for the fact finder's determination. See Long v. Commonwealth, 

8 Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). The judgment 

of the court will not be set aside unless it is plainly wrong or 

without supporting evidence. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. 

App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). 

 The indictment alleges that appellant violated Code 

§ 40.1-103 by willfully or negligently causing or permitting the 

health of J. to be injured or willfully or negligently causing 

or permitting him to be tortured or cruelly treated. The trial 

court, in saying, "I don't know why [appellant] does what she 

does," implicitly found that appellant caused the injuries to J. 

and did not simply permit someone else to inflict them. The 

evidence supports a finding that she did so willfully. 

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 "Willful, when used in a criminal statute, 'generally means 

an act done with a bad purpose; without justifiable excuse 

. . . . The word is also employed to characterize a thing done 

without ground for believing it is lawful.'" Richardson v. 

Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 93, 99, 462 S.E.2d 120, 123 (1995) 

(quoting Snead v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 643, 646, 400 S.E.2d 

806, 807 (1991)). "'[T]he correct application [of willfully] in 

a particular case will generally depend upon the character of 

the act involved and the attending circumstances.' . . . In the 

absence of direct evidence of intent, willfulness must be 

established through circumstances." Lambert v. Commonwealth, 6 

Va. App. 360, 363, 367 S.E.2d 745, 746-47 (1988) (quoting Lynch 

v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 762, 766, 109 S.E. 427, 428 (1921)). 

 "Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to 

as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently 

convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of 

guilt." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 

864, 876 (1983). However, "the Commonwealth need only exclude 

reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, 

not those that spring from the imagination of the defendant." 

Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 

29 (1993). 

 Here, the evidence is sufficient to prove that, on or about 

February 11 to 13, 1998, appellant willfully caused J.'s health 

to be injured and willfully caused him to be cruelly treated. 

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Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 

evidence established that J. displayed multiple fresh bruises on 

his arms, back and legs when he arrived for pre-school on 

February 13, 1998. During that period of time, J. resided with 

appellant and his father. No evidence established that anyone 

else had care or custody of J. during that time other than his 

teachers at pre-school, and no evidence established that J. 

sustained any injuries at school during that period of time. 

Mr. Wilson said he had disciplined J. on the evening of 

February 12, 1998, by grabbing his arm and spanking his bottom, 

but Wilson denied that his actions could have caused the 

bruising. The medical testimony indicated that on February 13, 

1998, J. had extensive linear bruising on his arms, shoulder, 

back, buttocks and right leg. The bruises were purplish in 

color, which indicated they were fresh, and some of them bore 

loop marks, which were consistent with J.'s having been whipped 

and inconsistent with accidental injury. The bruises on J.'s 

arms, which were circumferential, were inconsistent with an 

accidental injury and consistent with a non-accidental injury 

occurring when a child's arm is "grabbed hard and the person's 

hand actually" causes the injury. The only reasonable 

hypothesis flowing from this evidence is that appellant 

inflicted J.'s injuries. 

 Other evidence established that appellant acted willfully. 

Appellant previously had said she "hated" J., who was learning 

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disabled, and she had abused him on several occasions during the 

previous year. She "pluck[ed]" his penis, making him cry, on at 

least one occasion while changing his diaper and "smack[ed] him 

in the head" on another. On a third occasion, she used her foot 

to pick him up by his shirt and "slam[] him down on his butt." 

On a fourth occasion, she beat him with a wooden spoon for about 

twenty minutes as he lay in a fetal position, crying, on the 

kitchen floor. On several of these occasions, social services 

conducted an investigation. Although these prior incidents do 

not constitute direct evidence that appellant was responsible 

for J.'s extensive bruises on February 13, 1998, they were 

relevant to establish appellant's feelings toward J. and her 

intent in that she knew her actions were unlawful and likely to 

produce injury and she engaged in them anyway. See 1 Charles E. 

Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 12-15 (4th ed. 1993). 

 Further, despite appellant's contentions, the trial court's 

statement that no single incident alone would give rise to a 

conviction does not compel the conclusion that the evidence was 

insufficient to support her conviction. "While no single piece 

of evidence may be sufficient, the 'combined force of many 

concurrent and related circumstances, each insufficient in 

itself, may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a 

conclusion.'" Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 273, 257 

S.E.2d 808, 818 (1979) (quoting Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 

758, 764, 99 S.E. 562, 564 (1919)). As long as those 

- 20 -
circumstances exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence 

flowing from the evidence, they are sufficient to support a 

criminal conviction. The circumstantial evidence here meets 

that standard. 

 For these reasons, we hold the trial court did not err in 

refusing to dismiss the indictment or in holding the evidence 

was sufficient to support appellant's conviction. Therefore, we 

affirm. 

Affirmed.

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