1

The Honorable David R. Hansen stepped down as Chief Judge of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at the close of business on March 31,

2003. He has been succeeded by the Honorable James B. Loken.

2

The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Southern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-1805

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Robert Joseph Willson, Jr., *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: April 3, 2003

 Filed: April 10, 2003 

___________

Before HANSEN,1

 Chief Judge, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD and BYE, Circuit

Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Robert Willson, Jr., who was sentenced on drug conspiracy charges, appeals

the district court’s2

 denial of his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) motion for
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return of property, following remand and an evidentiary hearing. The property at

issue is a Honda automobile, $1,400 in cash, and purported bail-bond notes, all seized

during a search of his residence. Mr. Willson raises challenges to the court’s pre- and

post-hearing rulings, and to the court’s conduct of the hearing itself, all of which we

reject as meritless following our review of the district court record and the hearing

transcripts.

Specifically, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to

appoint standby counsel. Mr. Willson had refused the assistance of Attorney Alfredo

Parrish, whom the court had offered to appoint for him, and instead elected to proceed

pro se. Mr. Willson did not assert an alleged conflict with Mr. Parrish until much

later in the proceedings, nor did he adequately explain that conflict, and he showed

himself capable of presenting his case. See Rayes v. Johnson, 969 F.2d 700, 702-03

(8th Cir.), cert denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992). The court also did not abuse its

discretion in refusing to pay for an investigator to find and serve Mr. Willson’s

witnesses, or to grant Mr. Willson more time to serve the witnesses himself, given

Mr.Willson’s refusal to enlist the help of Mr. Parrish--who remained available to

assist him on request--and the length of time Mr. Willson had had to find and serve

the witnesses. 

Mr. Willson’s complaints about the government’s discovery responses and late

provision of discovery fail because he shows neither abuse of discretion by the

district court, see Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1040 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,

523 U.S. 1137 (1998), nor resulting prejudice. We also find unsupported his

assertion that the government destroyed paperwork seized from his residence as drug

notes, to prevent him from proving that the material constituted bail-bond notes. And

having carefully reviewed the hearing transcripts, we find no evidence that the district

judge exhibited bias, improperly hindered Mr. Willson’s efforts to prove his case, or

acted with anything other than proper judicial decorum.
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Further, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding (1) that

the Honda had been reported stolen, and thus, state authorities towed it from

Mr. Willson’s property and destroyed the Honda when the actual owner refused to

reclaim it, (2) that the $1,400 had been mistakenly applied to satisfy the forfeiture

obligation of Mr. Willson’s father (a co-defendant in the drug conspiracy case), and

(3) that the search team seized the purported bail-bond notes based on a reasonable

belief that the material represented drug notes. See United States v. Felici, 208 F.3d

667, 669-70 (8th Cir. 2000) (in appeal of Rule 41(e) decision, this court reviews

district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo), cert.

denied, 531 U.S. 1201 (2001). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did

not err in denying Rule 41(e) relief for a stolen car whose destruction occurred at the

hands of state authorities; for paperwork destroyed as drug notes, see id. at 670-71

(explaining limited-derivative-contraband-theory defense in Rule 41(e) proceedings);

and for a mistaken forfeiture of cash, see United States v. Hall, 269 F.3d 940, 943

(8th Cir. 2001) (discussing sovereign immunity in Rule 41(e) proceedings), cert.

denied, 122 S. Ct. 2626 (2002). 

We also conclude that the court properly entered judgment after Mr. Willson

failed to file an alternative claim for money damages against the government (for the

mistaken forfeiture of his cash) within the time frame imposed by the district court.

Finally, we find meritless Mr. Willson’s assertions that he did not file the alternative

claim because he had moved for reconsideration and had thought that the court’s

deadline would be tolled while the court entertained his reconsideration motion, or

that the court would rule on his motion in time for him to file the alternative claim

before the court’s deadline.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.