23 March 1961

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Tasks, Para-Military Plan, Cuba

1. The Working Group assigned to work out the detailed tasks for the
planning and conduct of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, and act as
members of a Central Office for the operation, has agreed upon the tasks
to be accomplished by the representatives of your respective departments
and agency. The tasks are set forth for three phases: Pre-D-Day Phase;
D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase until Recognition; and Post-Recognition
Phase.

2. The tasks for the Pre-D-Day Phase are set forth in Enclosure
A hereto.

3. The tasks for the D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase until Recognition
are set forth in Enclosure B hereto. :

4, The tasks for the Post-Recognition-Phase are set forth in
Enclosure C hereto. \

5. The proposed time schedule for the Pre-D-Day Phase is attached
as Enclosure D hereto.

Department of State Representative
Department of Defense Representative
CIA Representative

Atts: Encls. A-D as stated

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i
1
!

|

‘DCI or the D/DCI on Cuban Project matters. including the above shall be

24 October 1960

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: A/DDP/A

C/WH Division

C/WH/4

AC/DP Division at

The following procedures shall apply to all Cuban overflights
undertaken under. the Cuban Project, with the exception of any: Ur2 > =
reconnaissance missions. Approval for the latter shall be obtained and
instructions issued in accordance with standard U-2 procedures,

1. . Prior to sending any notification to the field, the DD/P and
A/DDP/A (or one of them if either is. unavailable) shall be briefed.on the
operational plan. If possible DDP/EBM shall be included in the briefing
in order to be informed when the matter. is presented to the Special Group.

2. WH/4 should be responsible for arranging this. briefing. Asa
rule it should. cover at least the following aspects of the. proposed operation:

a. Status and means.of communication with reception party.
b. Detailed flight plan.
c. Communications plan.

A representative of DPD should always be included.to cover the second
aspect,

3, The DD/P, or A/DDP/A on his behalf, shall make arrangements
for an appropriate briefing of the D/DCI on.each such flight. Normally such
briefing will occur after a DD/P plan has. been decided upon following the
briefing referred to in paragraph.1 above. In case of urgency, however, the
DD/P, or A/DDP/A on his behalf, may. decide to combine these. briefings into
a single briefing in order to save time. /N. B.: All briefings of either the

arranged through the Oftice,of the DP/P..



BOP-SECRE?T
-22-

it was not the Agency's decision and, as the above cited actions
suggest, the pressure to strengthen deniability in the last few weeks
came from outside the Agency and led to decisions which were un-
welcome to the Agency. To suggest, as the Survey seems to do,
that the Agency was responsible for this clinging to deniability is
demonstrably false.

G. Government vs. Agency Decisions

The same comment applies in some degree to the three other
alleged major errors of judgment. (These have to do respectively
with the treatment of the Cuban exiles, the adequacy of the military
planning, and the appraisal of the chances of success, They have
been touched upon above and are discussed at some length in Section
V below.) In the context of the decision making process, the most
important conclusion that emerges is that, whether they were wise
or unwise, they were Governmental decisions in a very real sense.
As to the handling of the Cubans, this was a matter of the most
intimate consultation with the State Department, especially in the two
months preceding the invasion when the CRC was in process of forma-
tion. As to military planning, the record clearly shows that there
was detailed consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the JCS

considered the successive plans both formally and informally, and

that these were the subject of review and discussion at the highest

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B. H. Vandervoort E.O.D. September 1947 G/SI Unit (FI/D), Cuban
Task Force

Mr. Vandervoort's outstanding military background is well known to
all in the Clandestine Services. He possesses area knowledge in WE, FE
and WH Divisions and he has good Spanish. He is a competent reporter.
Earlier personnel reports note his exceptional qualifications for participa-
tion in contingency task force operations. He had also earlier been recom-
mended as a Senior War Planner.

U. S, Army service from 1939 to 1946 and was discharged with the
rank of Lt. Col. He gave outstanding service in the ETO and was decorated
by Generals Gavin and Ridgeway as "outstanding WW I Battalion-Co., 82nd
Airborne", Decorations; two DSC's, two Bronze Stars, three. Purple Hearts,
plus French, Dutch, Belgian Decorations.

Robert Reynolds E.O.D. October 1949 COB/Miami Base

Mr. Reynolds' career has been spent largely with WH Division

beginning with his assignments in OSO, He served in a.
a and later as a. Mr. Reynolds had returned to WH/3 at
the time of his assignment to the Project and was one of the first senidr
officers so assigned. Serving first as DC/Cuban Task Force he was later

transferred to‘Miami Base as Chief of Base. Mr. Reynolds possesses fluent
Spanish ability.

TS #181884

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3

staff of the Commander, 7th Fleet, where he also received an outstanding
rating and was looked upon as a source of strength on the staff. Had earlier
been a Battalion Commander and was rated an outstanding Artillery Battalion
Commander. Col. Mallard carried the brunt of liaison with the military
services and heavy responsibility with the State Department on military
matters.

Poco E.O.D. June 1951 Chief /Intel/PM Section/Cuban Task Force

reported to the Project from the FI Staff. His earlier. assign-
ments had included that of senior FI Case Officer in orl Chief /aaiz
EEF 22: Chief Instructor, Resistance Ops Course/OTR. -He has
received numerous commendations for his performances in Headquarters, in
the field, and in Agency liaison activities.

His military service was with the USMC where he served overseas as
Bomb Disposal Officer from 1943 to 1945 at New Caledonia, Guadalcanal, and
Northern Solomons. He is a Major in the USMCR.

Albert C. Davies, Lt. Col., USA E.O.D. March 1960 DC/Intel/PM Section/
Cuban Task Force

At the time of his assignment to the Project Col. Davies (a regular
infantry officer) had been serving as Army’G-2, USACARIB from 1956. He
is rated by his service as an Infantry Staff Officer. Served in the European
theatre during World War Il and in Korea. He holds the Silver Star and the
Bronze Medal with two oak leaf clusters. Prior to his assignment to USACARIE
he had been an infantry instructor at Fort Leavenworth, Battalion Executive
Officer, and Battalion Commander in the Far East, and had been a student
at the Army Command and General Staff Officers Course in Oklahoma.

Col. Davies' assignment with the Cuban Task Force included that of Post
Command at Et. RaAgdlpin did tiater: DepufhGiief, Intel Unit- PM Section.

He has broad area familiarity with Latin America and has some fluency in
the Spanish language. He is currently serving as Chief/Intel, Research, and
Reports/WH/4.

E.O.D. February 1952 C/FI Section/Cuban Task Force

: experience included ten years with the Department of
State with whom he served in Tegucigalpa, Madrid, and Santiago, Chile, the

TOR-SEGRET
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PeOPshoRat—
-26-

Washington to Miami officers. As to Special Intelligence (para. 16, page 79),
the Miami Base was supported by a whole Staff D unit at another location.
Miami did not, it is true, have a Staff D officer in Base Headquarters. An
FI officer, however, was given the responsibility of digesting all Special
Intelligence material in order to pass it to operations officers if important.
In addition, he briefed the operations officers on this material twice a week.
3.) Security is attacked (paras. 1 et seq., page 135). Obviously
many aspects of the Cuban project were public knowledge. With the required
relations with many Cubans, politicians, military, and otherwise; recruit-
ment efforts; press, magazine, radio and other propaganda programs, a
substantial amount of undesired publicity along with the desired was unavoid-
able. Otherwise, it is believed that the security record of the project was
not too bad. For example, it is now known that any case officer was ever
"blown" by true name. The Useppa Island operation was never disclosed.
U. S. training sites were mentioned in the press but not located specifically
and were not, it is believed, identified. The movement of the brigade from
Guatemala to Nicaragua and from Nicaragua to Zapata was not discovered.
In view of the efforts to find out everything by the Cubans and the U. S,
press, these were significant accomplishments. Sending agents to Cuba who
had known each other in training is criticized and blame is registered for one
radio operator who knew "'almost every paramilitary operation in Cuba from

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-3- -Enclosure D

{5) Complete review of Psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day
and post-D-Day phase.

5. D-8
a. CIA Representatives:

(1) Complete support of a white paper to be issued by the Free
Cuba Government and arrange to have that Government issue same.

6. D-7
a. CIA Representatives:
(1) Complete review of cover plans.
7. D-6

a. CIA Representatives:

(1) Conduct an interrogation of two or three members of the Cuban

Volunteer Force to determine full extent of their knowledge of actual facts
and provide information to the President as soon as possible.

a. DOD Representatives:
(1) Brief CINCLANT and CONAD planners.
b. CIA Representatives:

(1) Complete contingency plan for the disposition, if necessary,
of the Cuban Volunteer Force.

(2) Complete preparation of final briefing on entire operation.
9. D-3
a. Department of State Representatives:
(1) Provide policy guidance to USIA to support this plan.

TS #181884
—ter-sEcREe Copy # /



until 1954. He then served at until 1958 first as an Instructor,
then Chief of the Maritime Branch, later as Instructor, and ultimately, Chief
of the Ops Course. He was commended as an outstanding instructor and
capable administrator. Prior to his assignment to the Cuban Task Force he
served as Chief/Cover Training (i where he set up and administered
a highly competent tutorial facility. His performance was noted as being out-
standing.

Jacob Scapa, Capt., USN E,O.D. February 1961 C/Maritime Ops/
Cuban Task Force

Assigned to the Cuban Task Force as a Special Assistant for Military
Matters:by the CNO, Capt. Scapa appeared on the scene in the late stages of
Project development. He.was at the time of his assignment on the Staff of the
Commander, Amphibious Training Command, Atlantic Fleet. He had earlier
served as Commanding Officer of the USS Walke and served aboard the USS
Wisconsin, and had been on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic.
Capt. Scapa quickly reviewed and made himself familiar with all maritime
operations and plans. He participated in pre-invasion briefings and added a
significant touch of professionalism to maritime matters.

TDY visit to Miami Basc review problem of Maintenance
Facility for LCI's and Small Boats. On return recommended and assisted in
acquisition of Navy CPO's (Machinists). ~

Then assigned to Plans and Strike Operations Unit where he assisted”
greatly in liaison with Navy components and in preparation of sailing instruc-
tions, etc. He participated in final briefings of Brigade and maritime personne}
Active during actual strike in War Room, Headquarters, Cuban Task Force.
Currently Chief of Naval Mission, Ecuador.

(GEE =.0.D. September 1951 C/CI Section/Cuban Task Fore

Entered on duty with the Agency as an instructor in the Ops Course in
1951. He remained with OTR until his assignment to
He served there as a Training and Intel Officer and Director of jperations.
Returning to OTR in 1956 as an instructor in the CE/CI Training Course, he
was responsible for the training of two @Pservices. He became Chief
Instructor in the Agency Orientation, CI Familiarization and Security Officer
Courses. All reports indicate he was a superb instructor, a good executive
and supervisor. He has been noted as being the outstanding instructor on the
Headquarters Operations School faculty.

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2orsrerer”
-9-
Department pamphlet referred to above. Some significant examples
(and only examples) are:

Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, once Prime Minister of the Revolutionary
Government.

Dr. Manuel Urrutia y Lleo, hero of the Revolution, Provisional
President of the Revolutionary Government. Under house
arrest after being forced to resign.

Manuel Ray Rivero, organized anti-Batista underground in Havana.
Castro's Minister of Public Works.

Humberto Sori Marin, Castro's first Minister of Agriculture.

Major Huber Matos Benitez, hero of Sierra Maestra, revolutionary
commandante of Camaguey Province, then thrown in jail.

Manuel Artime )

Nino Diaz ) Sierra Maestra heroes.

Justo Carrillo )

Raul Chibas, fund raiser for the Revolution and fought with Castro
in the hills.

Felippe Pazos, represented the 26th of July on the Junta of Liberation,
and was appointed by Castro as President of the National Bank
of Cuba.

Pedro Diaz Lanz, chief of the Cuban air force and Castro's personal
pilot.

—tersrerss— TS #181884
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TOP sSLCREeT
~12-

Given these limitations, the only way in which there was the slightest
possibility of achieving control and maintaining control of the air was by
destruction of the Castro Air Force on the ground before the dawn of
D-Day when vulnerable shipping would be exposed to air strikes. The
one air strike on D-2 was not expected to be, and in fact was not,
sufficient to accomplish this purpose. Only one other strike was
planned for this purpose and that was cancelled. Moreover, in the
interests of making the air strikes appear to have been done by the Castro
Air Force, a restriction was placed on the number of aircraft that could
be committed to these strikes by the invasion force.

Even after the very considerable damage done on D-Day itself by
enemy air, it is possible that a determined and major strike on the
night of D/D+1 would have crippled the Castro Air Force, the final
destruction of which might have been completed the following night. By
the evening of D-Day, however, the Cuban air crews were exhausted
and dispirited and the opportunity could not be fully exploited.

Even if things had gone better on D-Day, it is questionable whether
the 17 Cuban air crews that constituted the air arm of the strike force
would have been adequate to accomplish all of the tasks for which

reliance was placed on the air arm. The chance of success would have

TS #181884
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Seer Tt

3

3, Supplementary Conclusions: It is concluded that DPD
as an organizational unit cannot be split into two parts, one of
which would have full and exclusive responsibility for Cuban
Project activities and be placed under the command of C/WH-4,
Taking this conclusion in conjunction with those stated in para-
graph 4 of the reference it would appear that a solution must be
sought not by splitting DPD, but by placing the whole of that
Division under the control of the CTE Commander with respect
to air activities which are in fact Cuban project operations. This
solution will have the added and vital advantage of making avail-
able to C/WH-4 as a senior staff officer, AC/DPD who is the
senior air commander in the Agency.

4, Physical Separation: The considerations set forth in
paragraph 2 above suggest that no modification of command
relationships will overcome the major difficulties that grow out
of the physical separation of WH-4 and DPD. It is manifestly
infeasible to house the whole of DPD in the Cuban Project
headquarters. The physical location of the DPD Air Support -
Section with WH-4 may be desirable but obviously will leave the
DPD Operations Control Room and its Logistics and Adminis-
trative Branches in a remote location. Accordingly, such
matters as the devising of cover stories, the working out of
budgets and funding arrangements, certain security business,
and the clearance of many cables will still have to be done between
officers who are housed some distance apart. It should be em-
phasized that this is inherent in any arrangement whereby the
full resources of DPD are employed in support of the Cuban
Project. Perhaps the most serious problem is that presented
by the remoteness of AC/DPD's office from that of C/WH-4.
This can only be overcome by reasonably frequent meetings ,
between these two individuals. The inconvenience which is the
cost of this solution is the price that must be paid for the em-
ployment in the Cuban Project of the best technical talent
available to the Agency under circumstances that will permit
that talent to be used parttime for the performance of other
essential tasks.

5. Task Force Concept: A solution along the lines outlined
in paragraph 3 above is in the main consistent with comments

en



ZOR-BEGRET
3

individual about whose release there was some question, C/WH would
advise the A/DDP/A who would examine the case with the DD/P,
Obviously carte blanche could not be given but a rapid procedure
was established for resolution of difficult cases. In this connection,
it is not clear if the Survey in paragraph 1 on page 41 is criticizing
a failure to give carte blanche, but, if so, the conclusions suggest
an organizational concept with which we disagree.

The Chief of the Clandestine Service Personnel Office (CSPO)
also had meetings with the A/DDP/A in which the DCI's views were
discussed (at least one of which is recorded in a Memorandum for
the Record, dated 22 April 1960) and the CSPO arranged a pro-
cedure with WH-4 whereby personnel requests were brought to him
either by name or by skill requirement, then by him to the appro-
priate Panel and finally to the element in question. The under-
standing was, as indicated above, that difficult cases would be
brought to the DD/P via the A/DDP/A. The purpose of this pro-
cedure was to avoid the need for WH-4 negotiating directly with
other elements regarding personnel thereby eliminating any
potential divisional conflicts.

On 16 May 1960, COPS sent an EYES ONLY memorandum to
Staff and Division Chiefs and Chief, Operational Services indi-

cating the need of WH for clerical assistance as well as imposing

sonsReRer= TS #181884
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Dobe
13

c. As to infiltration of teams (para. 11, page 128), there
were some difficulties but again the situation must be examined in regard to
all the existing facts. In the first place through the summer, fall andcéariy:
winter of 1960, the Havana Station was in existence (the Embassy and thus
the Station was closed in early January). Consequently, internal Cuban
contacts and communications were excellent. Moreover, legal travel was
relatively easy and as pointed out by the Survey, some 8 radio operators
were put into Cuba legally. In addition, defectors, as indicated in an
earlier section, were exfiltrating in large numbers. Many of these held
responsible positions in the Castro Government or in the community and
were in close touch with resistance groups. Moreover, the Miami exile
community, many of whom were U.S. representatives of internal resistance
groups, had their own communications through couriers or otherwise.
Consequently, the six maritime operations mentioned by the Survey in Sep-
tember, October, and November must be assessed in relation to this back-
ground, Also, in addition, in the summer and fall of 1960 (ending in
December) the RIO ESCONDIDO was used to infiltrate and exfiltrate as many
as 16 people. The ship had a smuggling compartment in the boiler room
which could take two individuals, preferably one. The Survey does not
mention these movements, probably because they were not considered
maritime operations, rather arrangements with the ship's captain. Five of
the 16 people infiltrated during this period were key resistance leaders
and their W/T operators. Another factor during this period was that

—FOR6SSRae
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was farther from the U.& and during this period supplies had to come

from the U.S.; the trainees were in Guatemala, so that by using the
same country the logistic support was simplified; and a separate country
for the strike base was desired. Moreover, it was advisable to keep
pre-strike activities out of the country providing the strike base.

b. U.S. airmen could not be used. The Cubans
recruited had extensive experience and were given a lot of training.
Their air background, however, was commercial flying which, as it
turned out, did not provide them with the kind of night flying navigational
precision desired. Moreover, Geing Cuban and emotionally involved,
their discipline was not good. For example, they often violated
orders by remaining over targets too long in an effort to find the DZ
and help their countrymen.

c. Reception committees were either untrained or
performed under difficult conditions. Even a trained individual, other
than perhaps a surveyor, can make a slight error in figuring the
coordinates of a DZ, particularly in rough terrain. A small mistake
is enough‘to destroy the effectiveness of an air drop.

d. The recent and productive experience of making drops
in difficult areas, such as a. has convinced us that com-
munications with the receiving group, including ground to air communi-
cations from the DZ to the dropping aircraft (whether by radio, W/T or

hte TS #181884
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FOrR-SESCRET—
-4-

In addition, these operational aircraft were concentrated by the
Cubans at San Antonio with the possible exception of 1 B-26 at Libertad.
With the potent fire power carried by the B-26's flown by the Brigade,
and based on the results of the D-2 strikes, the elimination of these
seven aircraft could reasonably have been anticipated as suming surprise,
Since the landing achieved surprise and since the Cubans had no effective
anti-air warning system, surprise would almost certainly have been
achieved.

With regard to the ability of the Brigade to maintain itself once
ashore (assuming the elimination of hostile aircraft), the theory was
that the Zapata area was so difficult of access via only three exposed
roads across swamps that a small force could easily defend it against
vastly superior forces for ''several weeks" as stated by the JCS.

Hostile concentrations and artillery would have been almost impossible
to conceal from the air due to the terrain and the B-26 fire power would
have been devastating against these. This is confirmed by the one actual
encounter of B-26's against Cuban tanks. The Brigade's fire power was
also heavy and could have prevented passage of any Cuban troops or
equipment down the narrow access roads. As long as the ammunition
lasted the Brigade actually succeeded in doing this. Supplies, absent

FORSECREE TS #181884
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themselves. Whether in important matters of this sort any one other

than the President himself can resolve the conflict between the
requirements for effectiveness of action and acceptability of the
political consequences remains to be seen. Perhaps the most useful
lesson about Government decision making to be learned from the
Cuban case is that one must be prepared for and philosophical

about this process.

A third lesson of lesser generality has to do with the covertness
or deniability of paramilitary and other large scale operations. An
operation can be said to be covert only so long as the knowledge that
it is being performed can be restricted to authorized individuals.

This is possible if an activity can really be concealed (e.g.,
photography of a document without the knowledge that the document
has been reproduced) or if that part of the activity which is observable
by unwitting people can be made to appear to them to be perfectly
normal (the black movement of bodies or cargo from place to place
through the use of false documentation). Unfortunately, a good many
large projects including notably most paramilitary operations cannot
be covert in this sense. Journalists and other unwitting people are
almost certain to learn that something untoward is afoot. The only

TS #181884
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@

Nee,

-10-

Perhaps the echelon was too low but this is a matter of judgment.
Actually the C/WH/4 was at the third not the fourth echelon, the first
being the DCI and the DDCI and the second the DD/P. If the Agency
alone is considered, it is believed that the echelon was not too low. If
all of the Executive Department elements involved are considered,
numerous other factors are introduced which involve so different an
organizational concept as to make any relative analysis impossible. This
overall organizational problem has been mentioned and is now under
Governmental study so that it would seem preferable here to discuss only
the internal Agency relationships.

At any rate, C/WH/4 for reasons already discussed was obviously not
free to make all decisions on his own whatever the Survey may advocate
in this respect. He was, however, very much the Task Force Commander.
All elements of WH/4 in and out of Washington responded to his command.
The extent to which he had to clear decisions with higher authority has
been indicated. It is a matter of judgment whether or not the delegation
of authority was adequate but it must be re-emphasized that-the :judgment
of most non-delegated items lay outside of the Agency (i.e., as
General Taylor's memorandum said, "there was no single authority
short of the President capable of coordinating. . ."), and within the

—FoP-skoRilw TS #181884
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from the interior by an impassable swamp penetrated only by three roads

from the north and flanked by a coastal road from the east.'' (Page 30,
para. 89).

The landing which occurred during the night of April 16-17 was sub-
stantially unopposed. In addition, shortly after daylight an "airborne
infantry company was successfully parachuted from C-46 aircraft to
four of the five scheduled drop zones where its elements were given the
mission of sealing off approach roads." (Page 30, para. 91).

Air support prior to the landing was given by raids by eight B-26's
on three Cuban airfields on 15 April and "destruction of half of Castro's
air force was estimated on the basis of good post-strike photography".
(Page 27, para. 81). Air strikes planned for dawn on 17 April in order
to knock out the rest of the Cuban air force were ''called off...late on
16 April". (Page 28, para. 83).

Early morni~ ; enemy air attacks on 17 April resulted in sinking
a supply ship and beaching a transport as well as damage to an LCI.

(Page 30, para. 92), Ground attacks by Cuban militia occurred during

the day of 17 April. ‘While ammunition lasted, these attacks were beaten

off with heavy enemy casualties, and several of Castro's tanks were halted
or destroyed by ground or friendly air action. On the morning of 18 April,

the Red Beach Force, nearly out of ammunition, retired in good order to

TOP sEeRee TS #181884
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prepared. Paramilitary personnel had to be recruited, screened, and

trained. Boats had to be procured, crewed, and maintained. Air crews
had likewise to be selected and trained and air operations mounted. Two
bases had to be built in Guatemala. There was the large and continuing
task of logistic support. All of these tasks would have had to be performec
in one form or another even if the major emphasis had continued to be on
the internal resistance rather than on the preparation of a strike force.
The FRD never came close to achieving the capability to take the major
initiative in planning, directing, or conducting these activities. The
hope entertained in the summer of 1960 that the FRD would soon evolve
into an organization which could take increasing responsibility for the
direction of the effort, relying on the Agency mainly for financial and
logistic support and for some help in training, proved completely
illusional. It is fair to say that by mid-autumn of 1960, the choice was
between a degree of initiative and control by the Agency recognized at
the time to be undesirable and, as the only feasible alternative, the
abandonment of any serious effort to accomplish the end in view.

Against this background one can examine whether the FRD's political
and military elements were reduced to the status of puppets and whether

the advantages of their active participation was lost by this.

TORS TS #181884

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@ -2- Enclosure B

e. Introduce representatives of the Revolutionary Council and of the
Free Cuba Government into Cuba at an appropriate time.

2 Xe TS #181884
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2

He has also had broad experience in public affairs, writing, editing,
and publishing. His prior Agency experience included assignments to OPC/PW,
P&P Staff, and PP Staff. Assigned as an instructor and ultimately Chid&5f
Headquarters Training, Ops School/OTR. Mr. Stanulis instructed in and
assisted in the revision of PP, FI, and PM courses.

Richard D. Drain E.O.D, March 1951 Chief of Operations, Cuban Task Force

Mr. Drain‘reported to the Project from an overseas assignment in
where he was Chief of Internal Operations and on occasion

His military record includes service as an officer. with the U. S. Army,
Field Artillery (Armored). His active duty extended from April, 1943 to May,
1946. His training included the Ground Forces Intelligence Course #1, with
special emphasis.on O. B. and the Armored-Command Hgtrs. Combat Intelli-
gence Course.

Among other assignments he conducted Basic Training; served as
Assistant and Acting Battalion S-3; was an Instructor at the Armored School;
and was Battery Officer in Advanced Training.

In combat (ETO) he was Forward Observer with a-Combat Team and a
Platoon Commander.

His decorations include the Silver Star and Bronze Star.

He is a lawyer and practiced in D. C. prior to Agency. EOD. His Govern-
ment experience also included Agency assignments as-Executive Asst. to the
DD/I, Staff Officer for O/IC (Office of Intelligence Coordination), Secretary,
Intelligence Advisory: Committee; and he was detached from the Agency for two
extra-Agency assignments. In the first he served on the White House Staff of
the Planning Coordination Group under Mr. Nelson Rockefeller. In the second
he served with the Department of State as a Special Asst., Multilateral Affairs.

John F. Mallard, Col., USMC E.O.D. August 1957 SA Military, Cuban Task For<

Prior to his assignment with this Agency, Col. Mallard had served with
the Office of the CNO, Assistant Head Naval War Plans Section. His performanc
was outstanding with comments indicating an excellent background of staff ex-
perience and professional capabilities. Noted as diligent, thorough and possess-
ing mature judgment. He had earlier served as Assistant Plans Officer on the

POR Seek
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-32-

air strikes as it could. Another possibility might have been to use
U.S. aircraft for a night strike. No one proposed either course of
action at the time. They are mentioned here as theoretical possibilities
only to illustrate the kind of conclusion that might have flowed from
a more realistic assessment of the achievable degree of covertness
and of the benefits to be obtained by maintaining only that limited degree
of covertness.

There may be a fourth lesson to be drawn with respect to the
assessment of the chances of success of any inherently risky
operation. As stated above, a conclusion of this paper is that the
assessment may have been faulty. Generally, this has been attributed,
both in the Survey and elsewhere, to the circumstance that those
responsible for conducting the operation were doing the appraising
and exhibited a predictable bias. But this diagnosis ignores the role
of the JCS who were directed by the President to review the prospects
for the operation:principally so that there would be an independent
and professionally competent judgment. It is also true that in judging
the temper of the Cuban people, principal reliance was placed ona

National Estimate. Nevertheless, it is probably true that the views

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-2- Enclosure D

3. D-10
a. DOD Representatives:

(1) Complete letter of instruction to the Services, CINCLANT
and CONAD for support of this operation.

4, D-9
a. Department of State Representatives:

{1) Provide Working Group with Policy Statement as to what
"recognition" really means.

(2) Have approved policy position regarding action, if any, to
be taken regarding disclosures to foreign countries.

(3) Complete plans for overt moral and other possible nonmilitary
support prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives
of the Cuban Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary Council, etc.

e@ (4) Complete plans for Post-D-Day actions.
b. «DOD Representatives:
(1) Complete logistics plans for DOD follow-up support.
c. CIA Representatives:

(1) Finalize detailed plans for the employment of the Cuban
Volunteer Force.

(2) Complete detailed plans for establish
internal opposition and for establishing such control, coordination and

ing contact with the
support of this opposition as may be desirable and feasible.
(3) Initiate effort to arrange defection of key Cuban personnel.

(4) Complete review and implement a pre-D-Day psychological
Warfare Plan for D-Day and post-D~-Day phase.

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aa OP SPORE YT
14

legal movement was relatively easy for individuals legally in Cuba so
that the desirability of putting in individuals who had to live and leave
black was reduced. In view of all these factors, it was decided to
keep out many of the teams originally planned for infiltration, The
reaction of trained teams to such inactivity was, what might have
been expected, anger, discouragement and lowered morale. On top
of this the ill-fated trip of the "Barbara J"'.was unfortunate since 3
teams were aboard who were not put ashore in Cuba, Consequently,
the attitude of this group of Cuban trainees was at times bad. After the
Havana Station was closed, however, the infiltration efforts picked up
despite being thwarted by bad weather through January. By the end of
March or early April, the paramilitary agent infiltration had achieved
an adequate total. Moreover, thirteen communicators was a satis-
factory number although it is probably fair to say that there is no
such thing as too many communicators.

d., The Survey alleges that small boat operations were
not planned (para. 17, page 14). Probably under the press of events
the paper work was not as tidy as might be found in normal charter
parties. Planning, however, was, itis believed, what was possible.
Maritime operations can only be planned in relation to known facts such
as an available reception, an available boat and a moment timely fora

mission, Overall plans are obviously possible and it is believed that

Fer-sreREt TS #181884
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JQ
lo
to
I

19 January 1962

Dr. James R. Killian, Jr.

Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board

297 Executive Office Building

Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Dr. Killian:

Attached is copy of the CIA Inspector General's "Survey Of
Cuban Operations" together with comments thereon by General C.
P. Cabell,. Deputy Director of CIA and "Analysis Of The-Cuben -
Operation" by Deputy Director (Plans). This latter report is
intended as.a- comment on the Inspector General's report..

As you readily understand, I am not in a position to render
a@ personal opinion concerning the validity of the IG's report or
the statements by the DDCI and the DDP because I was not in CIA
at the time. However it is my personal opinion as a result of
examinations I have made of this operation after the fact that
both the report and the rebuttals are extreme. I believe an
accurate appraisal of the Cuban effort and.the reasons for failure
rest some place in between the two points of view expressed in
the reports.

I believe it is safe to say the failure of the Cuban'operation
was Government-wide and in this respect the Agency must bear its
full share (though not the entire) responsibility.

For this reason I would recommend that your board, in review-
ing the Inspector General's Survey also review the comments and
analysis of the DDCI and.the DD/P.

Yours very truly,

/s/ John A. McCone

«= John A. McCone
Director”
Attachments
As stated



-ll-

Agency (once the problem of non-Agency clearances is recognized and
accepted) the powers reserved by the DD/P and the DCI were in keeping
with normal relationships between command echelons. Moreover, the
DD/P, supplemented by the A/DDP/A, was able to expedite decisions
so delay was held down as much as possible. Admittedly, the U.S.
organizational structure as a whole was not satisfactory for this type of
operation. The Government, as indicated, fully appreciates this and is
attempting to find a solution.

The Survey makes another point regarding too many echelons,
namely, that "the top level had to be briefed by briefers who themselves
were not doing the day-to-day work."" (Para. 5, page 37). This con-
clusion is another statement of a troublesome problem of senior
governmental management in the complex modern world. How can the
individuals informed on details communicate to the top policy decision-
makers the relevant parts of their knowledge in a timely and fully
informative way? In the Cuban project, it can only be said that the top
level saw more of the detail people than is usual. The DCI and the DD/P
brought C/WH/4 or the project's Paramilitary Chief with them to sub-
stantially all the Presidential meetings on Cuba. Moreover, the Chairman
of the JCS brought General Gray (and often another member of his team)
with him. Detail knowledge was, therefore, represented.

~LOR-SEGRETTM TS #181884
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desirable. A partnership with divergent views among the partners is not

the best mechanism for decisive action. Thus, U.S. contacts suggested
in September 1960, the creation of the position of an FRD General
Coordinator, a suggestion accepted in principle by all Cubans concerned.
The Cubans, however, wanted their U.S. colleagues to declare their
preferences for a particular person. Again this was not done because of
the principle of non-U.S. interference in strictly unilateral exile Cuban
affairs. The exile internal warfare on this leadership issue assumed
rather remarkable proportions but finally the FRD Executive Committee
selected Antonio de Varona as General Coordinator on 27 September 1960.
f) The concept of permitting the FRD Cubans to run their
own show as much as possible coupled with their own preoccupation on
mending their political fences and creating their own political machines,
caused many tactical difficulties to those Agency elements charged:with
day-to-day propaganda activities whose successful implementation hinged
on immediate action without protracted negotiations on each detail. Thus,
of necessity unilateral Agency operations had to be created in substantially
all the action fields (e.g., propaganda, intelligence collection, para-
military) which were impossible to conceal from the FRD. The FRD

leadership resented what they considered competition and demanded

FOR-SSGRET TS #181884

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VI - Annex B

EYES ONLY 12 October 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH-4

SUBJECT: Organization and Command Relationships -
WH-4 and Development Projects Division

REFERENCE: Memo for C/WH-4, dated 5 October 1960,
from C/WH/4?PM, subject: Study on
"Organization and Command Relationships
of Cuban Task Force (CTF) for Air
Operations"

1. Comment on Reference: The referenced study I find pene-
trating and well expressed. The facts set forth in paragraph 2 are
accurately presented and the considerations elaborated in para-
graph 3 have great force. On the other hand, certain additional
considerations bearing on the problem appear to have been ignored.
When these are taken into account, the conclusions as stated in
paragraph 4 require slight modification and the recommendations
set forth in paragraph 5 must be substantially modified in order to
be acceptable.

2. Additional Considerations Bearing on the Problem:

a. As stated in the reference. present command
relationships do not give the Cuban Task Force Commander (C/WH/4)
control over all the major assets committed or proposed to be com-
mitted to this operation. In particular, air capabilities are under the
control of AC/DPD, a separate component subject to no common
command below the level of the DD/P. Although the referenced
paper does not specifically refer toother resources required for
the CTF which are not under the command of C/WH-4, it is im-
portant to emphasize that this project will require extensive support
from other organizational components and that no contemplated
arrangements will give C/WH-4 command authority over all the
resources and supporting activities upon which the success of the
project depends. Accordingly, the issue raised by the paper is
whether with respect to air assets the dividing line between assets
under the command of the C/WH-4 and other assets remaining under
separate command but used in support of the Cuban Project should
be drawn as at present or should be redrawn in such a way as to
place part of DPD under command of C/WH-4

6-2-2



~3-

the regime without substantial outside support,

As early as November, therefore, the Government decided to continue
to aid the internal resistance as much as possible but to begin to plan for the
introduction into Cuba of a trained force from the outside. Unquestionably,
Castillo Armas in Guatemala was an analogy and precedent. Over the
period from November until April the possibility - indeed the probability -
of a military type invasion was continuously a generally approved part of the
concept, In addition, by common consent of all involved, the size of the
Brigade was increased bit by bit until the final 1500 total was reached,

(Page 65, para. 54). There was no magic in any particular number.
Nevertheless, factors such as features and size of terrain to be attacked
desired fire power and logistics were carefully weighed by officers
experienced in guerrilla and special force actions with the result that a
minimum basic force of 750 was decided in December 1960 to be the proper
size for the requirements. Thereafter, the increase was undertaken to
provide extra strength on the simple theory that as long as flexibility

was retained more men and guns would inevitably be useful.

Although the decisions involving size and use of the Brigade were in
general based on its employment as a single force, the possibility of
piecemeal use through infiltrations in small groups was seriously studied,
Obvious political advantages would have been gained with such use rather

than the larger "invasion" e landing. Nevertheless, the considered
g& &

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TOURSECreT
-17-

(Admiral Burke and Mr. Dulles), however, differed with this statement
on the grounds that there was "insufficient evidence to support the
conjectures of this paragraph."

A footnote on their views at the foot of page 75 went on to say:

"The well motivated, aggressive CEF fought extremely well without
air cover and with a shortage of ammunition. They inflicted very severe
losses on the less well trained Cuban Militia. Consequently, it is
reasonable to believe that if the CEF had had ammunition and air cover,
they could have held the beachhead for a much longer time, destroyed
much of the enemy artillery and tanks on the roads before they reached
the beachhead, prevented observation of the fire of the artillery that
might have been placed in position and destroyed many more of the
local. Militia en route to the area. A local success by the landing party,
coupled with CEF aircraft overflying Cuba with visible control of the air,
could well have caused a chain reaction of success throughout Cuba with
resultant defection of some of the Militia, increasing support from the
populace and eventual success of the operation."

Therefore, even in retrospect the Brigade's inability to hold the .
beachhead for some time was not clear to well-informed individuals who
had soaked themselves in all the available evidence. A prospective
judgment in favor of success prior to the event would, therefore, seem

understandable.
FOR-SESGRET TS #181884

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effectiveness with a remarkably low percentage of individuals who had
to be eliminated for unsuitability and with high morale later proven in
combat. This force was airlifted to a staging base, the location of which
was never revealed until after the finish of the operation. It was loaded
on ships which sailed on dispersed courses and achieved complete
surprise five days later. The Brigade then successfully carried out
what had been described as the most difficult type of military operation,
a landing on a hostile shore, carried out largely at night. Finally, as
the battle was joined, adequate supplies of all sorts were available within
a few hours of the beaches, had conditions permitted their off-loading.
These various results were accomplished in such a way that only a
small number of Agency staff officers were ever exposed to the Cuban
participants and the true identities of these Americans have never been
revealed. Moreover, the entire build-up was accomplished under the
limitation that it contemplate no use of Americans in combat and no
commitment of American flag shipping. As the event proved (and the
Survey remarks), "This was not enough". Nevertheless, a recital

of affirmative accomplishments suggests that whatever shortcomings
there were in organization, personnel, and execution were not the
decisive reasons for failure. It will be necessary to return to this point
later.

TS #181884
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION (Indicated by Blue Tabs) PAGE
L INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 1-33
A. Organization and Execution 3
B. Errors of Judgment 6
C. The Decisions that Led to Failure 9
D. Washington Decision Making 13
E. Agency vs. Government Responsibility 16
F. Why an "Overt" Operation 19
G. Government vs. Agency Decisions 22
H. Conclusions 23
I. Lessons for the Future 25
IL THE SURVEY'S STATEMENTS OF THE
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 1-4
@ TIL WHY A MILITARY-TYPE INVASION 1-4
Iv. THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS 1-10
23
Annex A - Memorandum dated March 1961
for Secretary of State, Secretary
of Defense, Director of Central
Intelligence Agency, ''Tasks, Para-
Military Plan, Cuba."
V. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ADEQUACY OF
THE PLAN 1-18
Annex A - Cable from C/WH/4/Paramilitary
dated 13 April 1961 to CIA
Headquarters,
TS-181884
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4

latter two as Second Secretary. He has fluent Spanish, Portuguese, and
French, and has wide experience in Latin American affairs with a thorough
knowledge of economic matters.

His WH Division assignments include the following

He is now preparing to assume duties | iy.

Ralph G. Seehafer E,.O.D. August 1952 DC/FI Section/Cuban Task Force

Mr. Seehafer entered on duty with the Agency in . August of 1952 and has
served.exclusively with WH Division. His overseas tours of duty included an
assignment He possesses fluent Spanish and also
speaks Portuguese and German. Mr. Seehafer took his undergraduate
degree in Hispanic studies. He is noted for his deliberate and untiring

efforts and was a source of strength to the several senior officers who
served as-Chief of the FI Section.

David A, Phillips E.O.D. April 1955 C/PP Section/Cuban Task Force

Originally a contract agent and. covert associate int
Mr. Phillips became a staff employee with the Agency on assignment to P&P
Staff and PP/Operations. He then had assignments to the Havana Station.and
(QP Noted as an outstanding propagandist with excellent supervisory
qualities. Mr. Phillips has fluent Spanish with excellent area knowledge as
evidenced by the fact that he often speaks publicly on the area, including
having been on the Town Hall of the Air".

Philip A. Toomey E.O.D. December 1951 DC/Propaganda Section/Cuban
Task Force

Entered on duty with the Agency in December 1951 and has had prior
assignment with OPC/WE/Plans and Ops, served abroad (QE as 2
PP Ops Officer, returned to the PP Staff in Headquarters and was serving

Se
TS #181884

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politically-minded exiles realized that the overthrow of Castro without

specific plans and preparations to fill the vacuum created by his departure
would be an immense error. They agreed with the activists that the over-
throw could only be accomplished by violent action but they feared that
during the fighting one or more of the military leaders would emerge whos
politico/economic postures were unknown quantities and who--in the
exuberance of victory--might be accepted by the population as the new
political chief of Cuba. Consequently, the political and military exile
elements grew apart despite the existence of bonds of friendship and
loyalty between individuals in one element and people in the other, Thus,
when speaking of ''exile leaders"! a distinction must be made between
political and military leadership.

Also within the political and military groups a high degree of
competition existed. Personal ambitions were rampant. Each individual
claimed larger followings inside and outside Cuba than the next man;
each tried to belittle the potential and capabilities of the other; each
proselyted the other's assets. In the early autumn of 1960, over sixty
different anti-Castro political groups were active and vocal, almost all
of them in the Miami area. They ranged in size from an individual

exile with three or four personal henchmen to sizeable bodies with

PoP-6Herst—— TS #181884

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Foner T
-3-

The failure to knock out Castro's airpower (particularly his T-33 jets)

was fatal. How reasonable was the assumption that the D-Day strikes
would have eliminated this airpower or at least made it non-operational
for a period of time?

The best estimates based on all sources, including photography,
(later confirmed as substantially accurate) were that prior to D-2
Cuban combat aircraft strength was 36 aircraft, i.e.:

17 B-26's

13 Sea Furies
5 T-33's
1F-51

All of these were at three airfields - San Antonio, Libertad, and
Antonio Maceo. The in-commission rate was assumed to be 50%
(believed to be slightly high) so that presumably 18 combat aircraft
were operational at the time of the initial D-2 strikes.

Based on all sources reports, including COMINT and photography,
the Cubans subsequent to the D-2 strikes were able to launch only 7
aircraft against the beachhead, namely:

2 B-26's
2 Sea Furies
3-T-33's

Photography, of course, cannot determine serviceability but
photography of aircraft movements post D-2 were consistent with, and,

it is fair to say, confirm the above figures.

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—=ePssere

-12-

terminal, bus terminal, militia barracks, railroad train.

4) Approximately 200 nuisance bombs in Havana Province.

5) Derailment of six trains, destruction of microwave
cable and station, and destruction of numerous power
transformers.

d. The view of many of the Brigade who had been members of
the militia which confirmed the official estimate mentioned above,
i.e., that only a small percentage of the militia would fight against
a resolute opposition with strong fire power. This hard core was
considered to number 5,000 - 8,000 at the most. The Army was
considered to have been too disrupted to fight.

e. Students and their professors were in revolt, e.g., two
thirds of the faculty of the University of the Oriente in December 1960
openly condemned Castro in a public statement. Other students were
actively engaged in acts of disruption and subversion working with
groups supported by the Agency.

f. Labor was in opposition. Not only was David Salvador in jail
as indicated above, but open acts of opposition occurred, e.g., the
electrical workers in December 1960 marched from union head-
quarters in Havana to the Presidential Palace to protest reductions,
while on 18 January 1961 workers' wives were attacked by Castro's
strong arm squads for demonstrating against the execution of workers

OSCR TS #181884
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CHA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
: RELEASE AS SANITIZED

ann
1997

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
of the
CUBAN OPERATION
and

ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS

Part 2 of 2 Parts



.orsSeRae=
15

internally in the Agency, the PRC is only advisory to the DCI and it is
doubtful if its normal procedures were intended to apply to this type of
project.

The Agency, particularly the DD/P, is criticized for failing
to deprive the Development Projects Division (DPD), the Agency's air
arm, of its independence by placing it within the organizational structure
of the project. The proper organizational positioning of an air commander
in relation to the ground commander has long been a matter of argument
in the Armed Services. The same difference evidenced itself in the
Cuban project with WH-4 favoring the Marine view of complete sub-
ordination of air conflicting with the DPD air view advocating a separate
command with responsibility to support. This conflict was never fully
settled and did cause friction (and probably in a broader sense never will
be to the full satisfaction of all the services). It is not felt that it created
any more serious difficulties. At any rate, the DD/P dealt with this
difference in the only possible practical way in early October 1960. On
5 October the Paramilitary Chief sent a study through C/WH to DD/P
expressing at length his views on the command relationships for air
operations. On 12 October 1960, the DD/P wrote an answer which set
forth the controlling dectsions. A copy of this memorandum is attached
as Annex B, Operational control of air forces and facilities required
for the project was assigned to Chief of the Task Force, An air staff

er sea TS #181884
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faulty though usually mistakes occurred in the difficult area after

hitting the Cuban coast-in point.

d. Pilots were often told, as indicated by the Survey,
to drop if they had any reason to believe that they were close to their
targets. Often the need was so urgent that any effort to deliver
supplies was justifiable. Moreover, capture of materiel by Castro's
forces was a matter of no consequence as the Cubans had more equip-
ment than they could use. Also, there were cases where recovery
was by non-resistance Cubans who then passed the materiel to the
resistance. Consequently, this chance was always present. If the
blind drop theory was wrong, at least it was consciously adopted by ali
concerned at the time.

e. The so-called "tardy corrective action" (para. 33,
page 108) was misunderstood by the Survey. In late February or early
March a review of drops was made to try to see what, if anything, could
be done to improve results. The findings merely confirmed the problems
but really provided no solutions. Some suggestions were made which,
in effect, were merely a restatement of existing procedures. Blind
drops, as already indicated, were continued as a matter of policy when
conditions were urgent, even though the review recommended their
elimination. The other study made in January 1961 (para. 31, page 107)

was stopped by the Paramilitary Chief as he knew that a solution by use

—hen-skcRns TS #181884
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As will be shown in the following paragraphs, the generalized

criticism that the exile leaders were treated as puppets hag little if any
basis in fact. As to the two more specific criticisms, the facts are
correctly stated, but as explained below there were plausible reasons for
both decisions and even with the benefit of hindsight these decisions
appear to have been wise. This does not mean that no disadvantages
attached to them. The Survey is correct in pointing out that relations wit!
the FRD were strained by the decision to support certain non-FRD groups
and that the lack of contact between the political leaders and the Brigade
gave rise to difficulties on both sides. What is omitted from the Survey's
discussion, however, is any explanation of the considerations that made
these two decisions seem necessary, let alone any attempt to balance the
risks and costs of different courses of action against the disadvantages of
those actually pursued.

The press has carried many stories especially after the events of
April 1961 citing the sentiments of Cuban exiles to the effect that they
were disenchanted with their role in the affair. It is understandable that
after the defeat these Cubans would look for scapegoats and allege that

they had been used as puppets. It is, on the other hand, disturbing that

ZORseGRET TS #181884
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AN

ANALYSIS OF THE CUBAN OPERATION

BY THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 January 1962

TS-181884
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opera
15

it can be shown that such plans existed. In the same way what was
desired in the way of boats was known but actual purchases were only
feasible as particular craft materialized on the market.

Cc, TRAINING UNDERGROUND LEADERS

The major criticisms of the training were that the sites
were inadequate and in some cases too remote; training on foreign
soil would have been better accomplished in the U.S.; some of the U.S.
training was with haphazard facilities and trainers; and the training
was piecemeal without plan.

Before responding to the particular allegations, it must be
noted that, with all due respect, the Survey's criticism suggests the
attitudes of a dweller ina secure and well-ordered academic "'Never-
never Land" who assumes that all training must be similarly con-
ducted or it is poorly managed. It is the Harvard Law School trying
to comment on the advantages of sandlot training for baseball players.
The only difference being that the HLS would be judiciously analytic
which is a point of view never achieved by the Survey.

The facts are that none of the project's training sites
were ideal or picked solely for the accomplishment of the training in-
volved. Security considerations, or, in other words, political con-
cerns, played a vital role.

FOr-sECRreTTM TS #181884
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mo oOo :



FOP-BERGRRP
16
section for air operations was created in the Task Force. The Acting
Chief of DPD was designated chief of the new air section which was to in-
clude all DPD personnel when actually employed on project business.

Since DPD had many air commitments to service outside of the
Cuban project, AC/DPD was directed to report to the DD/P in the usual
manner as to this non-Cuban business.

In view of the foregoing, the Survey is simply wrong when it says
"The project chief had no command authority over air planning and air
operations. The DPD unit established for this purpose was completely
independent." (Para. 7, page 39).

The Survey is also wrong in stating that there was no day-to-day
continuing staff relationship. Two DPD officers (one, an air operations
officer) were assigned full-time from DPD to the project and were physi-
cally located with it. In addition, a senior air operations officer attended
daily staff meetings. He also spent all of his tine with and on the project.
Consequently, the air unit was organized to be completely responsive
to the requirements of the Task Force with the exception of air safety
considerations. In addition, DPD facilities (e.g., weather, communications
mapping and planning air operations, photographic intelligence and related
interpretation services) were made available as needed, These were not
physically moved as they were more effective in place and were able by

remaining to service other Agency requirements as well. In fact the DPD
¥

LORSECRE SE” TS #181884
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The feeling has been widespread that another major lesson to be

learned has to do with respect to the decision making process in the
Executive Branch. In any major operation involving the actual exercise
of power by the U.S. Government (as distinguished from the threat to
exercise power), some branch of the Government will be responsible
for execution, preoccupied with the achievement of success, and
therefore generally the advocate of a massive and effective exercise
of power. At the same time, the U.S. will always be in pursuit of a
variety of essentially political objectives which will impose a
requirement to maintain a certain public posture {notably in the UN).
This requirement, in turn, will imply limitations on the manner in
which and the scale on which power can be exercised. The guardian
of the public posture whose primary responsibility it will be to devise
and support restrictions on action will typically be the Department of
State, or policy makers outside the action organization. In such a
situation there is almost bound to be a succession of operational decisions
that present (or appear to the participants to present) major issues

of policy and, since there is an inevitable, and in a sense legitimate,
conflict of interests between departments reflecting the conflict of
objectives, there will typically have to be an arbiter who is himself
neither the activist operator nor the statesman-like guardian of the
country's political posture.

TS #181884
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SPOS er

>. The Inspector General's report suffers from the
fact that his investigation was limited to the activities of
one segment of one agency, namely, the C.I.A. Opinions based
on such a partial review fail to give the true story or to
provide a sound basis for the sweeping conclusions reached by
hin.

ce. Judgments could not properly be rendered in this
matter without a full analysis, as was made by the Taylor
Committee, of actions of all of the participating elements in
the operation and the influences brought to bear outside of
the Agency which affected the operation. This applies partic-
ularly to the participation of the Department. of State, the
Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to certain
elements of the Executive Department of the Government.

d. At no time during the preparation of his report
did the Inspector General request any information from me and
he makes certain serious errors in areas where my direct
responsibility was clearly involved.

5. ‘Two major areas of criticism in the I.G. report cover
(1) the operational arrangements for the organization, training,
transportation and deployment of the Brigade and, (2) the
relations of Agency personnel to the Cuban emigration and their
political organization. As to these points, I submit the
following: :

a. First, while certain organizational matters, in
the light of developments, may be open to some criticism, the
Brigade. with its entire complement of men and equipment reached
the landing area on schedule and under circumstances which
achieved complete surprise. The situation in the landing area
was substantially as predicted. The enemy battle order intelli-
gence was essentially correct. The failure to get the ammmition
and supplies ashore was due to circumstances beyond the control
of the Brigade commander or its personnel.

b. . Second, with respect to the organization of a Cuban
emigre political committee in support of the operations, I would
point out that prior to engaging in the operation a broad coalition
of Cuban leaders, and one acceptable to our State Department, was
realized.

These two important achievements covered major areas of C.I.A. |
responsibility.



| Section V-Annex Audis



‘aera

#20

ce. It is malicious, or, to put it alternatively,
it is intentionally biased. Admittedly, this is a serious
charge and is, at best, merely a statement of opinion. ‘I
can only say that I hold such opinion firmly. In ny ylew
it could be supported solely on the basis of the Survey's |
total omission in many places of significantly relevant '
evidence. Such omissions are so excessive and one-sided :
as to substantiate the conclusion that they mst have been .
intentional. In addition, however, I would like to mention
four other points:

1) The fact that the inspectors, in making
their investigation, omitted any discussions
of their findings with the senior officers
responsible for. the project. Although, techni-
cally, the I.G. can accurately state that he
talked to the DD/P and the then A/DDP/A about
the Survey, the fact is that these discussion
were exceedingly brief and covered none of the
real issues in the Survey. ‘The AC/DPD was not
spoken to at all. The Security Officer of WH/k
was not spoken to at all. Other senior officers ?
such as C/WH and C/WH/4, were never given an
opportunity to express their views in relation
to statements in the Survey.

2) Some officers with whom the inspectors
had discussions felt after they had a chance to
see the Survey, that it did not impartially ex-
press the information which they had provided
and left out mach of the relevant information
given. Moreover, some officers have reported
that the attitude of the inspectors and their
line of questioning indicated a desire to obtain
facts or views to support judgments already
formed. Opinions contrary to these judgments
were not only disregarded but resisted.

3) The distribution of the final Survey
was so peculiar and contrary to normal practice
that it raises an inference of intended partiality.
The method of distribution is known and will not
be repeated here. It might be added that there



-14-

had to await knowledge of the exact situation. As indicated, the Brigade,
it was considered, could maintain itself on the beachhead for a substantial
period assuming no hostile air. Consequently, large reserves of supplies
and materiel could have been landed; air attacks against enemy con-
centrations could have been flown; and an attack following heavy air
strikes could have been executed when the time was considered most
propitious. Such attack could also have been supported by concurrent

air strikes, plus, if desired, the dropping of a small airborne force back
of the enemy lines to cause disruption. Similarly, air drops of individuals
or teams plus supplies could have been made to any active resistance
throughout the island.

A further possibility was overt U.S. support in the form of supplies
on the basis that the opposition government (the Cuban Revolutionary
Council) would have landed on the beachhead, declared itself as the rightful
government of Cuba, and requested and received recognition from the
U.S. Such recognition could have been accorded on the theory that Castro's
regime was a Soviet-dominated dictatorship and, therefore, not
representative of or the choice of the Cuban people while the opposition
government was democratic, as representative as possible, and offered
a program for choice by the Cuban people, if it attained power, Conversely,
the Castro regime by its dictatorial actions had removed from the people

Co a TS #181884
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sufficient to know that certain activities were (or were not) incompetently

performed and certain mistakes were (or were not) made. With many of
the deficiencies it is essential to understand why they existed. And with
all of them it is important to know what part they played in causing the
outcome to be what it was. The central weakness of the Survey is that
it is often misleading in its implications as to why certain things were \
done and it is grossly incomplete in its analysis of the consequences of
mistakes alleged to have been made. Accordingly, before proceeding
to the detailed discussion beginning in Section Hf of this paper which
supports the conclusions summarized here, it has been felt necessary
to make good in some degree these errors of omission by commenting
on the nature and causes of the failure in a manner which will be in

part alternative and in part supplementary to the Survey.

Cc. The Decisions That Led To Failure

It has been suggested not only in the Survey but elsewhere that
the operation against the Castro regime should never have been allowed
to take the form that it did of a military invasion. It ultimately did take
this form, however, and it was in this form that it failed. The military
failure has been analyzed far more exhaustively and with greater

authority by General Taylor and others than this paper can pretend to do.

TS #181884
WLOR.SEGRETTM Copy /



Ci

inspector general reports should be forwarded to them automat-
ically. I don't believe it was.a week after the Cuban operation
that the direct question came from that Board as to whether an
inspection was going to be done to which an affirmative reply
was given. The Attorney General's source I do not know.

Finally, as far as to what should be done next, you and Dick
should know that at the conclusion of my discussion with the
President's Board I urged that a group, or individual, who had
not in any way been associated with the operation be charged with
taking the Taylor Report » our report and your comments and all
background material and writing a truly national and detailed
report. I believe that would be a far better solution than trying
to develop a CIA position, which really is not very practical
inasmuch as there were so many outside factors affecting this
operation.

/s/ Kirk
lyman B. Kirkpatrick



-7-
Volunteer Task Force), This latter report recommended that an instructor
“experienced in operational logistics" be assigned to the training unit
“immediately for the final phase of training. '' A Marine Colonel with these
qualifications was so assigned.

Thereafter, General Gray and his team were intimately connected
with all plans and moves of Colonel Hawkins' PM Section. In fact, it would
not be inaccurate to say that General Gray and his team were the equivalent
of a full partner of the Agency in this phase from mid-February 196] until
17 April. (This did not, of course, affect the primary CIA responsibility).
During this period General Gray briefed General Lemnitzer at frequent
intervals and also briefed the JCS at formal JCS meetings.

When DD/P headquarters elements went on 24-hour duty on 13 April
1961, General Gray's staff did likewise and assigned a full time liaison
officer to sit with Colonel Hawkins' section in order to be able to brief
General Gray fully each day. General Gray, in turn, briefed General
Lemnitzer.

The Trinidad Plan was always the plan preferred by the military, i.e.,
the JCS, General Gray and Colonel Hawkins and his staff. It was, however,
considered unacceptable in certain aspects for political reasons so that on
or about 1 March 1961, President Kennedy decided that it should not be
executed, A further study of the entire Cuban shore line was then conducted
by CIA, mainly WH/4, from 13 through 15 March, As indicated in the Survey,
this study resulted in a shift from Trinidad to Zapata, Two alternate concepts

FOR SECREL TS #181884
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TOP SECRET

14

were many visits of the political leadership, and if these visits were not
carefully controlled when they were permitted, a real cleavage would
have opened up between the military force and the political committee 'witk
the possible disruption of the Brigade, the one essential asset at the time.
The decision to isolate the Brigade from the political leadership for a
considerable period was obviously a difficult one and no one can state
with certainty that the course of action actually followed was the wisest.
It did, however, produce a situation on D-Day in which the Brigade was
unified and the political leadership had, at least superficially, accepted
their relationship to it.

h) As the deadline for the Project approached the need
to broaden by democratic means and strictly by Cuban action the FRD
base and to evolve a provisional government became pressing. Continuou:
negotiations were conducted during February 1961 and March 1961, and or
22 March 1961 the CRC was created. Every Agency position paper
prepared on this matter stressed the need for letting the Cubans have
their own say. Indeed it was felt that only Cuban selection could have
any:real value. This policy had the approval of the Department of State
and was carried out to the letter. The following excerpts from an

address by an Agency representative to the Cuban Revolutionary Assembly

TOP SECRET TS #181884
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The DCI allegedly ''delegated his responsibility for major project

decisions to a considerable extent." (Para. 4, page 37). The Survey
appears to support this statement on two grounds, first that the DCI
relied on the DDCI "for policy matters involving air operations" and for
"military advice he relied on the military officers detailed to the project."
The consequence of this ''reliance" according to the Survey was that the
DCI was deprived "of completely objective counsel."

“Reliance on", according to normal usage, does not mean the same
thing as "delegation of responsibility". Whatever the Survey intends to
say in this connection, it is a fact that the DCI never delegated any portion
of this responsibility at any moment during the project. Naturally he
relied on others for many things (he could hardly run the entire project

himself) and he even delegated authority (not responsibility) in some

limited respects.

He did, for example, authorize within clearly understood limits the
DDCI to approve certain aspects of Cuban overflights for him. It should
be noted in this connection that the clearance of overflights resided in the
first instance with the Special Group or the White House and was requested
through briefings by the DCI or the DCI plus one of his people, normally
the DDCI, the DD/P or both. Thereafter, whether or not an overflight

top-cEeRBE— TS #181884
Copy 4



De ee ee ee
9

existing requirements, urgencies and availabilities (i,e., of both
equipment and people), the judgments exercised were reprehensible.
Admittedly, the Agency fleet cost a substantial amount of money.
Moreover, as stated, the craft were not ideal. The issue, however,
is what else wes possible. It is doubted that anything could have
been done at the time which would have materially altered the
situation.

Admittedly, as indicated in the Survey (para. 41, pages 123-124),
the Agency capability in the maritime field at the start of the Cuban
project was not very substantial. This, however, is no great
surprise in view of the unlikelihood pre-Cuba that the Agency would
become involved in a project requiring this type of maritime capability.
It should be noted that for two years prior to Cuba DD/P officers
examined all aspects of PM requirements, including maritime, to
determine what preparatory steps, if any, could be constructively
taken in advance of an actual project requirement. Although a number
of actions were taken, the Cuban maritime needs were not anticipated.

In this connection, in retrospect it would probably have been wise

to have requested Captain Scapa or some other senior Navy officer

earlier in the project. A Marine Colonel was, of course, the Paramilitary

Chief and had charge of maritime operations. Also, continuous liaison

Oe el TS # 181884
Copy,



this policy. During these months, as the crucial role of the strike force

was recognized by all concerned, the competition between the political
leaders to secure control of it was at its maximum. Varona used the
FRD recruiting machinery to try to insure a preponderance of loyal
personnel that would be acceptable to and have some loyalty to him.
Other members of the CRC were equally anxious to insure the inclusion
of recruits loyalto them. Most (but not all) of the FRD leaders resented
the inclusion of men who had not been supplied through their own
recruitment machinery. The FRD leadership, and later some members
of the CRC, were determined to try to displace the senior military
officers of the Brigade with political appointees acceptable to them.
During the four months before the invasion, no one of the political leaders
could have been allowed to visit the camps alone without accusations of
favoritism. Meanwhile, the Cuban military leaders in training and the
American training officers who were endeavoring to fashion the Brigade
into a cohesive and powerful force, feared above all any encouragement
of factionalism in the ranks. Moreover, although the troops needed
indoctrination in the ideology for which they were going to risk their
lives, it was known that some members of the FRD and later of the CRC

were unpopular in the camps. There was a real possibility that if there

TORsEcREe TS #181884
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SePrss6ReTTM

-5-

hostile air, could have been landed in large quantities since ships could
have been brought in to the beachhead.

The accuracy of this conclusion depends, of course, gn technical
considerations and must be based on experienced military judgments
assessing such matters as the terrain involved; the size and capacity
of friendly and opposing weapons involved; and the capacity particularly
of the attacking force to maintain logistic support. Such an analysis
could again be made but it would seem sufficient to support the
reasonableness of the judgment reached in April by reference to the
judgments reached by the Agency military planners and supported by the
JCS and its staff.

Although it was believed that the Brigade under the assumed
conditions could maintain itself on the beachhead almost indefinitely,
still for ultimate success internal support was obviously needed. The
concept of the plan was as indicated that at some point (not immediately)
the existence of the Brigade would be recognized and Castro's quiescent
opposition would become active.

As far as internal opposition was concerned, there was essentially
general agreement regarding the situation. Such disagreement as has
existed has been with respect to the accuracy of the prognosis regarding
internal support the Brigade might expect after landing.

ser-srenss— TS. #181884
Copy /



of men deeply involved in the operation received too much weight

in the assessment of the probable outcome, though it is far from clear

where and how additional skeptics could have been introduced into the

process of judgment without simply adding to the confusion. The

only clear lesson is that policy makers should not make mistakes,

which is scarcely helpful.

Finally, there are various lessons to be drawn with respect to

Agency organization, procedures, and resources. No attempt will be
_ made here to elaborate them, partly because to do so would require

rather detailed exposition and partly because these are not among the

really important lessons. It must be repeated still again that errors of

execution did not have much to do with the failure and it must be

emphasized that ways were found of bringing to bear on the conduct

of the operation professional talent of a high order, especially in the

military field. The mistakes were mainly those of judgment which

a different organization would not have forestalled.

TS #181884
Opa Copy _/



ZOPSECRET
5

resistance. Probably too much food was dropped and the agent was
disturbed and angry. He continued, however, to work for the resistance
and with the Agency, coming to Miami at a later date and returning again
to Cuba thereafter.

c. Reception procedures (para. ll-12, pages 101-102)
were the best that could be devised in each instance, given the circum-
stances, i.e., the DZ, the local situation, the communications and the
materiel available or that which could be used, (e.g., bonfires often
were impossible, thereby making flashlights necessary). As to dif-
ferences of view, there is no doubt that before a final flight plan was
decided upon in particular cases there were often varying suggestions
as to what should or should not be done. The clearance procedures
already described were fully understood, however, and, it is believed,
worked. In view of all the circumstances, they were not cumbersome’,
as alleged by the Survey. The Special Group gave the overall clearance;
the Task Force made the request for a drop and recommended the time,
the place and the load; DPD handled the preparation of the flight plan and
suggested any changes prompted by air safety considerations; and the
DDCI gave the specific flight plan and final operational clearance. The
crews were briefed in Guatemala. Their air discipline, as already
indicated, was poor but how to correct it was difficult, Pilots and crews
were hard to find so that they could not be fired. Navigation also was

—ePshenae— TS #181884
Copy_/ _



Iv. THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS

In order to place the Agency's role in the proper perspective and
to indicate the general participation of the Executive Department, it is
essential to examine the planning process that was involved. The Survey
is highly critical of this aspect but it should be noted that the Survey is
particularly incomplete in the discussions of decision-making and
planning.

Regarding the planning process, for example, the Survey comments
that in January 1961 "the Agency was driving forward without knowing
precisely where it was going." (Page 33, para. 13). Whatis meant is
unclear, particularly as in the next paragraph the Survey states:

“At this meeting (28 January 1961) there was a
presentation, largely oral, of the status of the operation, and
President Kennedy approved their continuation. " (Page 50, para.14).
In the same connection, the Survey states that at the end of November

1960, the Agency presented a revised plan to President Eisenhower
and his advisors and "President Eisenhower orally directed the Agency
to go ahead with its preparations with all speed." (Page 48, para. 8).

Some direction, therefore, was visible to two Presidents even

though no definitive decisions were made until the very last minute.

The fact, however, that the Survey could make such a statement and at

the same time include only the barest facts suggests a lack of understanding
of the decision-making process,

TS #181884
| OP SSRN Copy _/



had infiltrated 79 bodies and exfiltrated 51 bodies. Admittedly, much of

the material, though by no means all of it, was landed on the north shore
jn Havana Province since this was a resistance center. Consequently,
those who wanted it and those who could handle it were concentrated there
- particularly in the early days. Of the 88,000 lbs. total, however, about
45,000 lbs. was in provinces other than Havana, i.e., about 19,000 ibs.
in Matanzas and 26,000 lbs. in Pinar del Rio, Las Villas and Camaguey.
In addition, some materiel was landed on the south coast at both the west
and east ends, i, e., a small amount, perhaps 800 lbs. in Oriente and
20, 000 lbs. “in Pinar del Rio. In the early days after a ship with the range
was available, a few efforts were made to land some materiel in the central
part of the south coast but connections were never made with the reception
parties, For a substantial period (at least two months) prior to the landing
the central south coast was intentionally avoided since it was felt to be
vital not to provide even the slightest suggestion of operational interest
near possible landing areas.

Some of the specific criticisms of the Miami Base should be mentioned.

1.) Conflict and confusion between Headquarters and Miami was said
to exist, resulting in duplication of effort (para. 5, page 68) and division of
control as to both agents and in the maritime field as well as high phone bills
and unnecessary cables. The duplication of effort undoubtedly existed to some

TS #181884
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On the military side, General Lemnitzer with the approval of

the Secretary of Defense designated General Gray of the JCS on 4
January 1961 as the chief military liaison for the project. General
Gray, thereafter, became closely associated with the military planning.
From 31 January to 6 February a complete, detailed review of the
operations plan was made by General Gray and a team of officers, This
involved a thorough briefing by Esterline, Chief/WH/4 and Colonel Hawkins,
Chief/WH/4/PM, and officers of their staffs plus several days of study
by the JCS team. The Trinidad plan was the one reviewed on this occasion.
During the review a memorandum was prepared by the team, approved
by the JCS, and sent to the Secretary of Defense. (JCS Memo 57-61 of
3 February 1961, to Secretary of Defense, Subject: Military Evaluation
of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba).

This memorandum reached a favorable assessment of the plan,
It stated, however, that it was unable to evaluate the combat capabilities
of the Cuban Brigade and Air Force except on the testimony of others
since the Team had not seen these themselves. As a result, a team of
3 officers, a Special Forces Colonel, a Marine Colonel, and an Air Force
Colonel, were selected by General Gray from among the officers briefed
and sent to Guatemala from 25 through 27 February to examine the air and
ground forces personally. A subsequent report to the Secretary of Defense
confirmed their finding that the forces were capable. (JCS Memo 146-61 of
10 March 1961, to Secretary of Defense; Subject: Evaluation of CIA Cuban

TS # 181884
-FOP-SRGREE Copy__/



U

22 January 1962

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL
— eye EAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. C. Tracy Barnes

Dear Tracy:

Thank you for your courtesy in sending me a copy of your
memorandum of 19 January concerning the Inspector General's
Survey of the Cuban Operation. I do hope that Dick forwards
it to the DCI, and I am enclosing a copy of this note to you
in case you wish to send a copy to Dick.

I have not had time to study your memorandum, or even in
fact do more than glance at the DD/P analysis in view of the
meeting with the President's Board all day Friday and the fact
that I am going to be away all this week. However, I will make
the following comments. Weedless to say, I completely disagree ~
with your statement that it is an incompetent job. I feel that
it is competent and I believe that the more than one file
cabinet drawer full of background documents will prove its
competence. Ido not believe that it is biased. We made it
very clear at the start of the report that it would only deal
with inadequacies and failures and would not purport to be a
thorough analysis of the operation.

Most of all I object most strongly to your third observa-
tion, namely that it is mlicious and intentionally biased. I
have asked the men who did this survey to review your memorandum
and comment on the reasons you believe that it is biased. I
should perhaps acknowledge that more time should have been spent
with you or Bissell, but inasmuch as this devolved on me, if
there is a fault, it is mine Personally. But to imply that for
some reason, unknown to me, that we would slant this report is
an unfair comment. You apparently feel there was something
unusual in the distribution of the final report. The only thing
unusual in it was that we had two Directors at the time, and
Mr. McCone having asked for it received it as he was leaving for
the West Coast on the day before Thanksgiving and everybody else
got their copies on the day after Thanksgiving. Your concern
as to how the President's Board and the Attorney General knew of
the survey's existence can be answered very simply. In 1956
the President's Board in writing advised all agencies that all

ERE



—enereT

7

recognized that in a fast moving situation an informed junior officer,
who has lived with the project often is more effective than an unin-
formed senior officer, At any rate, further factual support of the
criticism must be produced before any more thorough answer can
be provided.

2. None of the three GS-16 officers assigned to the project
was given top-level managerial responsibilities (Page 42, para. 3).

Actually, there were four GS-16 officers with the project.
One, however, was detailed for a special assignment. Cne of the
other three was Chief of Station, Havana until the Embassy was
closed in January 1961 when he returned and became the senior
man dealing with the Cuban political elements. Another GS-16
was Deputy Chief of Station in Miami. The Chief in Miami was
junior to him in grade but he had been with the project from the
start (having initially been the project deputy); he was an old hand
in the WH area and was performing well. All, including the GS-16,
agreed that the Deputy Chief of Station, Miami was appropriate for
the GS-16 since it was a high enough post to permit him to be
effective and still did not upset a situation by changing purely for
reasons of grade an officer, performing well, in favor of a late-
tOR.55eR2T q

TS #181884
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SOR-SECRET

-2-

The Special Group prior to 20 January 1961 (Messrs. Dulles; Gray;
Herter until appointed Secretary, then Merchant; Douglas, with Irwin
sitting for him 6n occasion) reviewed the entire situation on numerous
occasions and considered special issues on others. Cuban discussion in
the Special’ Group started in 1959 when concerns about the political
situation and the undesirability of Castro were aired. Covert actions
(e.g., radio broadcasting, economic actions, possible sabotage) were
discussed at several meetings in January, February and March 1960 in-
cluding the examination of a detailed "General Covert Action Plan for
Cuba" on 14 March 1960. This plan was approved by the Special Group,
then partially rewritten and finally approved by President Eisenhower
on 17 March 1960, (Page 46, para. 3., and the Survey's Annex A),

Between mid-March and 20 January 1961, the Special Group had
discussions of Cuba at 37 meetings, of which at least 8 to 10 in the
period during and following November 1960 were detailed discussions.
Gordon Gray, as the President's representative on the Special Group,
reported to the President regularly on such Special Group activities,
Moreover, at a general briefing on the project at the Special Group
meeting of 8 December 1960, Assistant Secretary Mann and Mr. Joseph
Scott of State also attended as did General Lansdale from Defense. In
addition, C/WH regularly held weekly meetings with the Assistant Secretary

of State at which Cuba was often discussed; liaison with Mr. Scott's office

Fen-—2enamm TS # 181884
Copy__/_





.describe weaknesses within the Agency which .contributed .to. the

1a
lo
I
{rq

26 January 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kirkpatrick

SUBJECT : The IG's Cuban Survey and the DD/P's
Avalysis of the Cuban Operation

1. ‘The scope of the IG Survey is briefly and clearly stated
in the Introduction. .The Survey's intent was to identify and

final result and to make recommendations for their ‘future avoidance.
The IG had no authority to conduct a survey of the machinery for
making decisions and policy at other levels of government. This

-field was covered by the group headed by Gen. Taylor. The Survey

expressly avoided detailed analysis of the purely military phase

.of the operation.

2. Much of the DD/P's Analysis 1s deyoted, however, toa
discussion of governmental decision-making and to a rehash of the
military operation. It criticizes the Survey for insufficient
attention to these matters, putting the mijor blame for the opera-
tion's failure on factors beyond the control of the Agency.

3. The Analysis attempts to refute most of the weaknesses
described by the Suryey. .The few which it admits were, it contends,
not significant to the final result. It rejects the Survey's
statements that intelligence was inadequate and misused and that
staffing was inadequate. It blames the failure of the air drops
on the Cuban reception crews and air crews. It states that sml1l
boat operations could not well have been handled in any other way.
And it states that other weaknesses were not important because
they were not the decisive reason for failure.

4, There is a fundamental difference of approach between the
two documents. While the Analysis is preoccupied with interdepart-
mental policy-making and military strategy, the Survey is minly
concerned with the failure to build up internal resistance in Cuba
through clandestine operations. The Analysis fails to shed any
further significant light on this fundamental issue.



i
i
i

la
lo
I
IH

19 February 1962

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen:

I have received your memorandum of 15. February 1962
containing your comments on the Inspector General's Survey
of the Cuban Operation. Copies of this memorandum, together
with the pp/P analysis of the survey, the comments made by
General Cabell, Mr. Kirkpatrick, and the personal views
expressed, by Mr. Tracy Barnes, will be bound in the report --
and therefore will be known to anyone who might have occasion
to read it.

Sincerely,

signed

Jobn A. McCone
Director



-8-

(The above quotations are all from SNIE 85-3-60, page 5).

The militia numbering at least 200,000 was estimated to have been
drawn largely from the lower income peasants and urban workers.

"Thus far, the militia's overall combat efficiency is low; many
units are still on a part time training basis. However, a basic cadre
of well organized well equipped, and trained units is emerging and on
a number of occasions the militia has been used effectively to control
mobs and to perform other security duties."

“The regular forces are still disrupted as a result of successive
purges, and rehabilitation has been delayed by the employment of
substantial army and navy detachments in construction and other public
works. At present, the combat effectiveness of the air force is
virtually nil, that of the navy poor, and that of the army at best fair,
although it probably now exceeds that of all but the best militia units."

(Above quotes from SNIE 85-3-60, pages 3-4. For similar
conclusions approved by the USIB on 7 February 1961, see "A report
prepared by an Ad Hoc Committee of the USIB."" OCI No. 0592/61-C,
Part I, para. 6, page 3, and Part I, para. 8, page 4.)

Further evidence of the instability of the Castro regime was apparent
in the constantly growing list of individuals once close to Castro who

were defecting from him. Many of these were referred to in the State

—LORSEGRET TS #181884
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Cee
~18-

Finally, regarding the question of intelligence failures, the supporting
memoranda to General Taylor's oral report state that the effectiveness
of the Castro military forces, as well as that of his police measures, was
not entirely anticipated or foreseen. Memorandum No. 3, however,
setting forth conclusions says:

"Although the intelligence was not perfect, particularly as to the
evaluation of the effectiveness of the T-33's, we do not feel that any
failure of intelligence contributed significantly to the defeat."'

(Memorandum No, 3., para. l.i., page 3).

omen TS #181884
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tOR-sPeRerT

Ul. WHY A MILITARY-TYPE INVASION,

The answer is based ona number of factors. First, it became
clear through the summer of 1960 that Castro was more firmly settled
as Chief of State than nad originally been hoped. Moreover, it became
apparent that he was receiving and would continue to receive significant
support from the Soviet Bloc (including the Chinese) economically, in
military materiel, and in much needed advisers, e.g., military, internal
security, positive intelligence and communications (to name the main
fields). Thus, it was recognized that it was becoming more and more
difficult to organize and maintain internal opposition, and, moreover,
it was daily becoming more apparent that forceful evidence of outside
support was needed to cause the internal opposition to show its hand.

During the summer and fall of 1960, some guerrilla resistance
continued in the Escambray Mountains and in some of the provinces.
Although poorly fed and equipped, this resistance was respected by the
the militia which despite vast superiorities in number would not engage
the resistance in direct combat. Rather, the militia surrounded
resistance pockets, staying on the main roads away from the hills; kept
food and supplies out of resistance areas, and captured the guerrillas
when they came out of the hills singly or in small numbers seeking
food or other aid. Nevertheless, until the morale of the militia could

—FOR-SECRETTM TS #181884
Copy /



Geer

4

on the military task force concept contained in paragraph 3.b.
of the reference. In particular, the proposed solution will permit
unity of command. It must be recognized, however, that this
solution will in effect provide C/WH-4 with a large air section
and with the services of a senior staff officer for air activities.
It is the size and competence of the air section thus provided
that precludes physical integration as explained in paragraph 4
preceding. Moreover, if such an air section is to be used
efficiently and to make its full contribution, C/WH-4 must
practice substantial delegation to his air section and should
recognize that it is competent to handle details in the imple-
mentation of broad instructions issued by him. It is especially.
desirable that full use be made of DPD in its capacity as the

air section of the Cuban Project, along with other staff sections
of WH-4 as appropriate, in the development of military plans.
It will be necessary, if high professional standards are to be
maintained, for several military specialists, of which air
represents one, to be made use of in planning as well as in
operations.

6. Approved Action:

a. Operational control of all air forces and
facilities required and employed in the Cuban Project will be
assigned to Chief, CTF.

b. Chief, CTF will exercise this control through
a newly created staff section for air operations in the CTF.

c. AC/DPD will serve as the Chief of the CTF Air
Section. The staff of the Air Section will include any and all DPD
personnel when actually employed on Cuban Project business.

ad, For DPD business unrelated to the Cuban Project,
AC/DPD will continue to report in the usual manner to the DD/P.
When and if questions arise concerning the allocation of DPD
resources as between the Cuban Project and other réquirements
and activities, such questions will be resolved by the DD/P.



some propaganda activities, some special training, and the handling of

the Cuban exile leaders. The Survey apparently does not find major fault
(except as noted in the following paragraphs) with respect to Headquarters-
Miami organizational relations in these fields, whatever the Survey may
say about these activities in other respects.

The Survey does to some extent criticize the training run by Miami
by saying that there was no full-time chief of training, no training objectives
or plan and that much of it was merely a case officer doing the best he
could, (Paras. 24-26, pages 133-134). The results allegedly were
haphazard. For example, "one man was trained in a hotel room to make
a parachute jump". (Para. 25, page 134). Obviously a full jump course
would have been preferable but the Survey's comment indicates a lack
of understanding of the problem. In WWII, many officers did successful
operational jumps with only minimal ground training. Combat pilots and
air crews, when forced to jump, did so without having even been trained
in a hotel room. Anyhow, as the Survey says the hotel-trained jumper
“made one (jump) successfully!" It might also have been stated by the
Survey that the man in question was in his early thirties, in excellent
physical condition and an expert tumbler. Moreover, his one successful
jump was the only one he was asked to do. This case, unimportant in
itself, is referred to because it brings out several relevant points, i.e.,

POP-S8HGREt= TS #181884
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Section VI-Annex A

rc cee tt - pee nee



i
i
{

5. The Analysis shows a poorer grasp of what was going on
at the case-officer level than of events in policy-making circles.
This is apparent in a number of inaccuracies in the Analysis. For
example, the discussion of activities in Miami is inaccurate and
misleading. .Conduct of training in Miami is defended although it
was not criticized by the Survey. The 178 trainees alluded to in
the Analysis as trained in Miami were in fact trained in Guatemla.
The PM section in Miami was being built up beginning in November
1960, rather than being de-emphasized. These and other inaccuracies
Jsuggest that the Analysis should be read with caution where it
deals with events on the working level of the project.- +"

.6. -The IG investigators centered their, inquiry on certain.
‘phaéés which are sigiificant to the successor fale”
operation and.of the Agency's over-all mission itself... The:
cannot“be ignored or argued.away just because“pf ‘poli:

“made outside the Agency. **



Shoe

2

b. The reference argues that the proper place to
draw the line is between the Air Support Section of DPD, which
should be transferred to the control of C/WH-4, and the other
elements of that component. It is believed that this judgment is
erroneous. In actual fact, the Cuban Project will require at one
time or another the performance of operational and supporting
activities by most of the branches of DPD, The reason is that
DPD has been developed as a largely self-sufficient, intergrated
organization which includes staff sections for not only operations,
but logistics, personnel, finance, security, and administration --
all of which may have some part to play in the Cuban Project.
Specifically, it will probably be desirable for logistic support
of air operations to be managed by DPD, As for operational
planning and Headquarters monitoring of operations, it may well
be desirable to use the DPD control room and communications
facility. The DPD Cover Officer certainly has important contri-
butions to make as does the Security Section, Even the Air
Proprietaries Branch will be concerned with the Cuban Project
because of the need for some of its resources. In order, there-
fore, to place under the command of C/WH-4 all of the air assets
he may require it would be necessary to transfer a substantial
part of DPD,

c. The foregoing suggests that the proper dividing
line between the authority of C/WH-4 and that of AC/DPD should
be redrawn in such a way that perhaps half of the latter component
would be under the command of the Cuban Task Force Commander.
In fact, however, it would be inefficient and probably wholly in-
feasible to draw a dividing line in this fashion. All of the Branches
of DPD which have responsibilities for the Cuban Project, and most
of the personnel who will discharge these responsibilities, also
have concurrent duties which fall outside of the responsibility
of C/WH-4. If DPD were a large Headquarters it would at least
be feasible to split each Branch into two pieces but such is not the
case. Moreover, the burden of the Cuban Project activities and
of other business will vary from day to day and week to week,
Efficient utilization of personnel requires that in many cases the
same individuals perform both sets of duties.



BOh-SEGRET

5

with WH/3 at the time of his assignment to the Project. He has native
Spanish and possesses ability to handle a tremendous amount of work.
Mature judgment and skill in the propaganda field are only a couple of his
attributes.

Jack Hawkins, Col., USMC E.O.D. October 1960 C/WH/4/PM

Col. Hawkins was serving on the staff of Marine Corps School,
Quantico, Virginia at the time of his appointment by Commandant, USMC to
the Cuban Task Force. He is a Naval Academy graduate and saw service in
the Philippines at Bataan and Corregidor until taken prisoner. Having escaped
from his prison camp, he joined guerrilla forces and led raiding parties in
attacks against the enemy for which action he was awarded the DSC. He was
later awarded a Bronze Medal for the Okinawa campaign. Following World
War Il he served as a member of the Naval Mission to Venezuela and later as
Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, Ist Marines in combat in Korea. He was
there awarded the Silver Star. Served as an instructor in Quantico for three
years and then as G-3 at Camp LeJune where he was promoted to his present
rank of Colonel. Col. Hawkins possesses native fluency in Spanish. He was
personally selected for the assignment by General Shoup, C7G.,~USMC

Frank J. Egan, Lt. Col., USA E.O.D. June 1960 C/SPU/PM/WH/4

Col. Egan reported to the Cuban Task Force with a background of ex-
perience in Special Forces, U. S. Army. He had on earlier occasion worked
in a liaison capacity with this Agency and always showed a true appreciation
of the peculiar requirements of covert action. Serving originally as Chief of
the Strikes and Plans Unit/PM Section, Col. Egan later proceeded to Guatemal:
where he assumed command of all indigenous Brigade training. He held this
position with the help of a few staff and contract employees until the arrival
of the group of Special Forces Trainers. His capacity for work was outstandin;
and the rating he received by his senior officer, Col. Hawkins, reflects
Col. Hawkins' respect for his abilities. Comments particularly pertinent
refer to his ability to influence and inspire the confidence and respect of
troops.

Ernest Sparks E.O.D. August 1954 Sr. Cuban Task Force Rep/Guatema

Entering on duty as Ops Instructor in 1952, Mr. Sparks departed for
Korea with the USMC and remained there as an IO/PM and Maritime Officer

Terteehiak
TS #181884

Copy # /



| Section VII-Annex B



DD/P-2-0779
23 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the DCI, Mr. Chapin

SUBJECT : Return of Available Copies of "An Analysis of the
Cuban Operation by the Deputy Director (Plans), "
TS #181884.

1. Transmitted herewith are all the completed copies available to us
of subject document. Included are copy 5 and copies 7 through 20.

2. To confirm our original understanding: Copies 1, 2, and 3 went
to the DCI on 18 January; copy 4 went to Mr. Dulles on 18 January; copy 6
went to the Inspector General on 19 January; and copies 21 through 25’are
unassembled, with the pieces residing in the DD/P Registry. We will
destroy these latter materials if you have sufficient copies without assembling

the last five.

ROBERT W. KING
Assistant to the DD/P

Attachments:

As stated
*DD/P Registry (Margaret Porter) advised that these copies were being
destroyed.

rem



RehtseR
14

officers close to him thought that he left in a pretty good frame of mind.
Of course, it must be remembered that his experiences might well have
caused some discouragement. He was flown on short notice from his
shipboard Navy assignment to detail with another Agency with which he
had no previous experience. He arrived in February 1961 so that the
project was well along and he had to fit himself to it in a great hurry
and under pressure. He was, however, able to provide substantial help
and his assignment was distinctly worthwhile. He examined such ships
as the project had; went to Vieques and inspected the Cuban crew train-
ing; spent a substantial amount of time at Project Headquarters working
on the maritime aspects of the Trinidad and Zapata plans and finally
accompanied the Paramilitary Chief to Puerto Cabezas to participate
in the final briefing of the Brigade and the ships' crews. Thereafter,
he returned to Project Headquarters and spent night and day in the war
and operations rooms working on all maritime aspects of the final days
of the effort. Such employ ment of Captain Scapa, it is submitted,

was sensible and constructive.

TS #181884
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Teo ae
oe)

3) The Project Review Committee did not review the project.
(Para. 6, page 38).

These allegations are so "extraordinary" (to borrow the Survey's
word) that it is difficult to accept a serious intent on the part of the Survey's
authors. Quite naturally COPS spent little time on the project. The DD/P
office was a three-man office, one of whom (A/DDP/A) was spending
essentially full-time on the project and another of whom (DD/P) was spending
a very substantial part of his time. Consequently, it was only logical, if
not essential, that COPS devote his time to the rest of the world as well as
to the numerous remaining issues of internal management.

As to the statement about express warnings of perilous mismange-

ment, it is indeed strange that such a charge should not be idenfified at least
sufficiently to permit some assessment of how responsible the warnings
were and of what they consisted. COPS remembers receiving no such warnir
Of course, COPS, as well as many other people were told on numerous
occasions that some mismanagement as well as other mistakes were
occurring in‘the project. In what project does this not‘occur, particularly

if itis urgent, complex, and disruptive of normal procedures? These
"warnings" were given such attention and recognition as the facts in each
instance warranted. Actually, the Survey is unclear as to what it believes
COPS should have done though the inference is that he should have used the
alleged "warnings" as a basis for taking the project away from the DD/P.

OP-SSEREE TS # 181884
Copy _/



SEP=SBERETTM

ENCLOSURE D
TIME SCHEDULE
1. D-14
a. Department of State Representatives:
{1) Complete White Paper for Presidential approval.

(2) Provide policy guidance for all aspects of the Free Cuba
Government (continuous).

b. Department of Defense Representatives:

(1) Continue to provide training and logistic support to the Cuban

Volunteer Force as requested by CIA.
c. CIA Representatives:
(1) Establish a Central Office.

(2) Continue to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible and
required (continuous).

(3) Assist in organization of Free Cuba Government.
(4) Continue to train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force.

(5) Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-up
support requirements (continuous).

(6) Intensify UW activities in Cuba.

2. D-11

a. Department of State Representatives:

(1) Provide assistance to Mr. Schlesinger in preparation of
material for Presidential statements (continuous).

(2) Complete plans for overt moral and other possible non-
military support of the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when
established.

TS #181884
—Por SECURE Copy # /



General Gray from the JCS; and the DD/P were present. Such meetings

were held on:

28 January

17 February

11 March

14 March (smaller meeting)

15 March

4 April

12 April
(Special communications regarding action under the Plan were alga héld wil
the President on 14 and 16 April via McGeorge Bundy and the Secretary
of State).

In addition to the foregoing, the President on 7 March met with the

Ambassador from Guatemala to the U.S, and the Ambassador's brother,
a special emissary from President Ydigoras, who presented President
Ydigoras' views, Numerous meetings also were held with Messrs. McGeo1
Bundy, Berle and Mann, and Mr. Berle met with Miro Cardona, President
of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. Also in the second week in April due
to attacks in the UN by Foreign Minister Roa of Cuba and stories in the
press, mainly the New York Times, a substantial amount of time had to
be spent with the State Department preparing material for use by the USUN
delegation including a briefing of Ambassador Stevenson. It is fair to say,
therefore, that the senior members of the Administration were personally

and intimately familiar with the status of the project and the issues and

problems involved.

OPR-SEOCRET TS #181884
Copy



were exploited to the fullest (an outstanding example is the great number o

laws and plans which were ready for promulgation and implementation
upon the assumption of power in Cuba by the Provisional Government).
Such limitations as existed on active participation by Cubans in post-Castr
plans for Cuba were created by their own preoccupation with matters
relating to personal ambitions, long-standing personal biases and exile
politics Caribbean style. Indeed as: pointed out above, politicians had
little to do with the military aspects of the operation since they lacked

by their own admission technical competence. Just before the landing,
however, the politico-military understanding was at its best. The Brigade
and its leadership recognized the political leadership of the CRC and
Manuel Artime, a leading member of the CRC, stayed and landed with

the Brigade as a representative of the CRC.

2. The FRD Military Element.

a) The military element similarly enjoyed freedom of
action consonant with traditionally accepted rules of military discipline
and order. Although American advisors, of necessity, directed the
planning of the troop training from the basic stage through advanced large
unit exercises and maneuvers, the Cuban military leadership participated
in this planning and was solely responsible for the conduct of the training
and for the control of the troops. In this latter connection, the Cuban

—POrSECRET TS #181884
Copy /



a diminished role." (Para. 2, page 36). All of this is essentially true
(C/WH, however, was not in the chain of command except on certain
specified well-understood matter s) although the Survey fails to state that
C/WH also sat in on substantially all of the DD/P and DCI meetings on

the project attended by any WH personnel, and handled many of the policy
negotiations with the State Department as well as some of the more difficult
special problems with the Cuban political leaders and some other special
negotiations, i.e. those involving possible economic sanctions (with the
Treasury and some leading U.S. businessmen and lawyers) and those with
particular individuals such as William D. Pawley. Also, of course,
interrelationships with the many Agency stations throughout the Hemisphere
and their activities were supervised by C/WH.

Even in retrospect, this arrangement with C/WH is believed to have
been organizationally sound and would again be adopted under similar
circumstances. Black and white organizational answers often do not meet
the complex interplay of problems in a project involving as many facets
as the Cuban one. Granted, each echelon, starting with the DCI, should
have one individual in the next lower echelon to hold responsible for all

decisions of that echelon but such individual responsibility was quite

clearly identifiable in the project.

ORSEoRET TS #181884
Copy LZ



FOR-sSGRt=
-23-

levels of Government. The chances of success were assessed
favorably by the Joint Chiefs (minus, of course, the last minute
cancellation of the D-Day strike) as well as by the Agency. The
Agency must accept a sizable share of the blame for whatever
mistakes were made in these three areas but no one who studies
the record with care can assert (and no one who has done so has
asserted) that the responsibility was narrowly focused on any one
of the participants in the decision making process.
H. Conclusions

This introductory and summary section began with a re-
statement of the main allegations of error made in the Survey and it
followed with a summary of the conclusions reached in this paper
(partly in the foregoing discussion but principally in the later more
detailed sections) with respect to these allegations. For the most
part the allegations are rejected. In concluding this section it may
be useful first to list, for comparison and contrast with the Survey,
what in the judgment of this paper do appear to have been the
strengths and weaknesses of this undertaking and second to suggest
some of the lessons to be drawn therefrom. The list is as follows:

1) Small boat infiltration and exfiltration operations were

slow to start (but by and large were effective and well run in the last

three months). Moreover, due to the existence of the U. S. Embassy

TS #181884
—FOP-sH6REE= Copy #/



-en6sen
-19-

impairment of the political requirement of deniability explains why the
final plan (and most of the variants considered in the last six weeks)
was a compromise.

F. Why An 'Overt'' Operation

Against the background of these remarks on the way decisions
were made and on the nature of policy issues involved, it is worth
commenting briefly on one of the major errors of judgment alleged
by the Survey: the decision to "convert the project into what rapidly
became an overt military operation beyond the Agency's capability."
In part this "decision" was compelled by the failure of the internal
resistence the reasons for which are discussed in later sections and
are not germane to the current context, As for the Agency's capa-
bility, enough has already been said to suggest that the operation was
not so much beyond the Agency's capability as it was beyond the scope
of activities judged to be acceptably deniable. The question that is
highly relevant to the policy making process is how and why the pro-
ject was allowed to become overt and, when this had happened, why
it remained the responsibility of the Agency.

That it did become "overt" in the sense that there was extensive
public discussion of the preparations for invasion and that the military
action was widely attributed to the United States Government, both
before and after it took place, there can be no doubt. Nor is there
any mystery as to why this happened. It was quite out of the question

TS #181884
Tens 6eRa Copy # /



FOPSTOERET

12

Moreover, of course, briefings at high levels within each interested
element were numerous, General Lemnitzer and the Secretary of Defense
received daily briefings in the period immediately prior to 17 April, The
Assistant Secretary of State (ARA) and the Secretary of State were constantly
briefed throughout the project. McGeorge Bundy, Rostow and Schlesinger
had almost daily contact with the DD/P or the A/DDP/A. The DCI and the
DDCI, of course, also were kept current on details. In view of this and the
extensive interdepartmental coordination involved in this project and described
in another section, the amount of top level detailed information was unusually
complete. Admittedly, however, this does not mean that it was satisfactorily
complete on all issues and this is one of the problems involved in the above-
mentioned Governmental study on organization for projects of this nature.

Three other Washington Headquarters factors are described as
"extraordinary" by the Survey, namely, that:

1) COPS played "only a very minor part in the project". COPS also
allegedly "declined to involve himself with the project" although on at least
two occasions he was given "express warning that the project was being
perilously mismanaged";

2) The DD/P Senior Staffs, the Agency's top level technical advisors,
"were not consulted fully" but "they allowed themselves to be more or less

ignored"; and

TS #181884

Copy_f



substantial organizations still active within Cuba itself. The Agency
representatives were in contact with many of these and its constant
effort was to induce as many groups and individuals as possible to support
a broadly based unified movement which would exclude only the supporters
of Castro on the left and the Batistianos on the right. The Agency exerted
pressure on the Cubans throughout the whole period from mid-1960 up
to the invasion in only two ways: to promote the greatest and most
inclusive unity of effort and to promote the greatest feasible effectiveness.
Decisions, however, as to who should be the dominant leader and what
the political platform of the opposition should be were studiously left to
the Cubans themselves.

Despite the pressure for unity, it remained true up to the election
(by the Cubans) of Jose Miro Cardona as president of the CRC in March 19
that exile Cuban leadership--if taken in the broadest meaning of the term--
consisted of the spokesmen of a great number of anti-Castro groups
whose prominence, importance and capabilities for active participation in
the operation varied greatly and whose claim for leadership remained
highly controversial. If the term is to connote the FRD Executive
Committee then it is highly pertinent to keep in mind the barrier between

the ''Politicians'" and the "Militarists'' mentioned above and the very

oe ae a oe TS #181884

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1, The FRD political element.

a) From the outset, the basic principle was established to
respect the independence of the Project's Cuban collaborators and, for all
intents and purposes, to treat and deal with them as equals; no orders wer
to be issued, results were to be accomplished by persuasion and by the
application of normal, generally accepted practices of political intercours¢
The 11-12 May 1960 New York meeting which resulted in the formation of
the FRD is but one example of the application of this Agency's posture:
Agency representatives served as hosts for the assembled Cubans, stated
unequivocally the view that formation of a unified opposition to Castro
was strictly a Cuban affair and then withdrew leaving it to the delegates
to establish their organization in terms. upon which they could agree.

b) The staffing of the FRD working elements and the
initiation of activities via these elements was in the hands of the Cubans
who were not obliged to check their moves with their U.S. contacts. In
fact, the inclusion of Aureleano Sanchez Arango in the Executive
Committee on 10 June 1960, which took place without Agency consultation
and was at that time at least considered an undesirable development, is
another example of the freedom of action the Cubans enjoyed. It might

also be said that Sanchez Arango never had any assets of any kind to offer.

FOP-SECRET TS #181884
Copy /



12

This action was in line with the realities of the situation, i.e., the
inability of the political elements to tackle the military tasks as speedily
and effectively as necessary and the aforementioned unwillingness of the
military (or activists) to accept the political leadership. (Only after the
election of Miro Cardona as CRC President did the Liberation Army
support and accept the political structure.) Thus, political personalities
retained their independence in their specialty and the military (and
activists) worked--with the guidance of U.S. military specialists--in
theirs. If closer coordination had been possible between the political and
the military it would clearly have been desirable. Only the political
urgencies of an actual attack were sufficient to achieve any real unity
and this was in many ways a mirage and a “sometime thing".

It is true as stated in the Survey that the Agency intervened
actively to prevent visits by the political leaders to the training camps
in December and January, and that this was deeply resented by the

political leaders. It is also true that this lack of contact with the political

leadership left the Cuban military personnel unsure of what and for whom th.

were going to fight, even though being activists not political scientists
they were generally satisfied with a mere 'Down with Castro" slogan.

There were, however, the most specific and urgent reasons for following

FOLSECREE TS #181884
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The lesson suggested by these remarks is that in future

clandestine operations of any size, it behooves all concerned to
assess realistically the degree to which the operation is, and is
likely to remain, clandestine. If the very scale of the activities
makes it impossible to conceal them, can they be made to appear

to suspicious journalists and others to be perfectly normal? If

it is becoming apparent that something newsworthy is going on, can
suspicion of Government involvement be kept to an acceptably low
key? Or is the only-option that remains open that of firm, repeated,
public official disclaimer of a responsibility which will generally

be attributed to the Government anyway? A corollary is that the
advantages of whatever degree of deniability that remains feasible
should not be overestimated. With hindsight, the U.S. did not

buy very much political advantage with all the restraints imposed

on air activity in the Cuban operation. Had it been decided even

ten days before the invasion that responsibility for the operation
would be unanimously attributed to the U.S. and that only official
deniability could be preserved, consideration might have been

given to recognizing the Cuban Revolutionary Council as a
government in exile and allowing it to make as many and as powerful

TS #181884
ee ee oe Copy /



POP-SECRET

18

officers dealing with the Cuban leaders, five had fluent Spanish and the
one officer who did not. succeeded nevertheless in achieving a close
relationship with a number of the top Cubans including Miro Cardona.

Paragraphs 42-50 on pages 94 to 97 of the Survey contain a series
of criticisms and preachments which are so general, unsupported or
unconnected to some specific consequence that we can only comment
that they have been noted with dismay and that we regret that until more
detail is furnished, an answer is not possible.

The remainder of the Survey's section on the political front and
the relations to the Cubans starting on page 81 is mainly factual. It is
only unfortunate that it treats so complex a problem so superficially and
fails to include any of the extensive Agency relationships with the State
Department and the White House with respect to the proper line to take
with the Cuban leaders and the correct interpretation of the political views
of these leaders. Also, what political attitudes were the most desirable
from the point of view of the U.S? In addition, the Agency did considerable
work on the preparation of political documents. Moreover, some non-
Agency experts were obtained to work with the Cuban leaders at their
request in the development of the planks for their political platform. The
absence of this whole story and the problems faced as it unfolded makes it
difficult to have any real understanding of what was.involved on the politica
side.

—hePsrenc Le TS #181884
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operators) had been trained in security, intelligence collection, and

reporting, propaganda and agitation, subversive activities, resistance
organization, reception operations, explosives and demolitions, guerrilla

action, and similar matters."

This would seem reasonably complete and
organized. Granting a normal complement of faults and failures, it is
still believed that the Miami PM operational and training record is a
good one and that this will be supported by the results.

After November 1960 the PM focus was away from Miami. Under
the "invasion" concept training, air operations, and planning were the
major problems and these were primarily located outside of Miami.
Nevertheless, Miami had much to do in connection with portions of these
activities. Recruitment was largely done in Miami. Despatching of
materiel and recruits took place from Opalocka; PM agents were infil-
trated from and exfiltrated to Miami; communications and certain other
limited training was handled in Miami, and the efforts to find and maintain
maritime assets centered in Miami.

As between the two offices, Headquarters retained the final decisions
on any operation activity directly involving Cuban soil or territorial
waters. The concern of non-Agency elements of the Executive Department,
already described, meant that it was inadvisable to permit operational
decisions involving Cuba to be made outside of Washington. Moreover,
with the speed of communication the extra time required was normally

~—POr-sheRst TS #181884
Copy /



SOP store

The Survey, as indicated, also salleges that training could have
been more effective and secure if done in the United States (Paras. N-12,
page 138). The Survey points to tank and communications training which
did take place in the U.S. to support its conclusion. What is not said is
that the tank training only involved 25 men and was done ata U.S, base
accustomed to training foreign groups and quite able to assimilate a
small group of this size. Similarly, communications could be and
were taught in small classes. Political clearances, therefore, were
granted specifically for these classes, i.e., a U.S. base for tankers
and U.S, safehouses for communicators, but as a recognized exception
to the basic rule of generally denying the use of the U.S. for any kind of
training. The Nino Diaz group at New Orleans was obviously another
exception and one which was somewhat inconsistent with the general
rule, but the clearance was given nevertheless because time was short
(the invasion was imminent) and an attempted diversionary operation was
considered important. Moreover, no other site was available that was
either better or usable, taking all factors into account.

The question of haphazard facilities and trainers has been discussed
earlier. Obviously, there is a good deal of adjusting to the needs of the
moment in a project of this sort. It is believed, however, that the record
will show that the training plans were reasonably detailed and complete.
Moreover, that wherever a training course of any length was involved,
there was a specific training plan.

—HenpReRSae TS #181884
Copy _/



De ee ee aaa

5
is ever wholly satisfactory. Conversely, no project can take any
officer regardless of other commitments, The attached roster,

it is believed, establishes that on an impartial judgment the

project'was served with officers of experience and competence.
Obviously the requirements of the Project were unusual and
urgent, but a review of the pace at which officers (i,e., staff not
contract) were assigned and detailed has revealed no more than
the usual problems, e.g., a requesting officer wanting help more
rapidly than provided and some junior officers being less qualified
than desired. On the whole, however, assignments and details
were kept pretty well up-to-date and the caliber adequate. In
a number of cases the performance of many officers responded
to the challenge of the project, and, consequently, was better
than might have been anticipated. In this connection, it might
be noted that despite the enormous time demands, inconveniences,
family separations, and other difficulties imposed on personnel
the project's record for sick leave or absenteeism was so good
as to be spectacular.
It might be noted that the CSPO, one of the few senior officers
with whom the 1.G. or his representatives had any discussions on

this matter, asked the chief investigating officer what officers

ter sTerRErT
TS #181884
Copy # vA



1X, AIR MARITIME OPERATIONS

The Survey only has a one sentence conclusion regarding the
carrying out of paramilitary operations (as distinguished from the
basic military concept), namely, "Air and boat operations showed
up poorly." (Para. 4., page 143). The body of the Survey, however,
has three chapters on this point dealing with "Air", "Maritime",
and "Training Underground Leaders". (Page 98-134), The major
points in these chapters will be considered below,

[ NB: Three maps have been kept and are available, if desired,

which show all air and maritime deliveries into Cuba plus all

PM assets on Cuban soil as of 17 April 1961, These can be

examined at any time. They are believed relevant to these

paramilitary points. /

A, AIR

1. Before discussing the many specific criticisms of the Survey,
a few background points shaild be presented.

a. For reasons already discussed, U.S. bases could
not be used. Consequently, drop missions had to be flown the longer
distance from Guatemala, the only foreign soil within range for which
permission from the local government was possible. Conceivably,
President Somoza might have approved Nicaragua, but for many
reasons Guatemala was preferable for these missions, e.g., a usable
base in Nicaragua was not ready until late in the project; Nicaragua

FOP-6heine TS #181884
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Section IV-Annex A |



4

DO Rati

-19-

The PM side involves a more complicated picture. The Survey is
critical of the fact that Headquarters in Washington kept too tight a control
on Miami. Consequently, too little authority was delegated to enable
Miami to function effectively. There is no doubt that a number of Miami
officers felt that they were being over-controlled. No good operations
officer ever feels differently or if he does, he is not doing his job.
Consequently, the normal, healthy operating effort to shake the bit and
run free was part of the attitude held by Miami operators ‘increlation to
Washington.

Washington, on the other hand, was anxious to avoid moving
Headquarters functions to Miami or treating Miami as a field station
which it clearly was not. Miami was not Cuba. Communications from
target areas could be received and handled just as fast in Washington as
in Miami. Many aspects of operational planning could be handled just as
well, if not better, in Washington than Miami. Coordination with other
operating areas was better handled in Washington. There were, of course,
exceptions. Some of the more obvious exceptions were that Miami was a
center for Cubans and an active interchange by sea between Miami and
Cuba was a fact of life. The project organizational concept, therefore,
was to provide Miami with people and the authority needed to take advantage
of these potentials. Mainly, of course, this meant FI and Cl activities,

SOPSRGR Ei TS #181884
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Len. Shera
~6-

The December 1960 U.S. estimate regarding the internal situation was
that Castro was firmly in control; that his regime had consolidated its hold;
that Cuban internal security was being rapidly built up; that Bloc assistance
in the form of military technicians and instructors was about 200; that
Cuban pilots and other specialists had been taken overseas by the Bloc
for training; that the Cuban Communist Party controlled key positions;
and that no one group or combination of the regime's enemies seemed
well enough organized or sufficiently strong to offer a serious threat
without outside help to Castro's authority (SNIE 85, 3-60: Prospects
for the Castro Regime).

Essentially the same facts were presented in the pamphlet released
in early April by the State Department on Cuba, the facts in which were
worked on jointly by all interested departments and agencies, (Department
of State publication 7171, Inter-American Series 66, entitled "Cuba",
pages 19-25).

Again the same conclusions were stated by the Agency in its
presentations. An example is the memorandum, dated 17 February 1961,
Annex B of the Survey which ses forth the view on these points consistently
presented by the Agency throughout this period and up to 17 April 1961.

What then was the Agency prognosis? The Zapata plan took the view
that there was evidence to justify the conclusion that once it could be

TOb-5eeRE TS #181884
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Sena
~25-

assembled more U. S, nationality air crews in the hope that their
commitment would be permitted in an emergency,

5) There should have been more pre-D-Day air strikes
and they should have employed the full strength of the air arm, The
D-Day strike should not have been cancelled,

6) The military plan was a good one (except for the re-
strictions on, and possible inadequacy of, the air arm). It was prop-
erly worked out as between the Agency and the Joint Staff and was a
product of highly competent, professional military planning.

7) The appraisal of the chances of success was probably
faulty for reasons summarized above (para. d, page 8).

8) The important decisions were Governmental not those
of one Agency, It was frustrating but of little practical consequence
that the decision making process was at times cumbersome and did
not promote tidiness. It was inevitable that the whole shape of the
operation was determined as a compromise between the conflicting
goals of deniability and effectiveness.

L Lessons For The Future

What are the lessons for the future to be drawn from this unhappy
experience? Perhaps the main one is that the U.S. should not support

an operation such as this involving the use of force without having also

TS #181884
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VIL

ace g ee

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

The Survey reaches the flat conclusion that the project was "badly
organized."' The reasons given are:

"Command lines and management controls were ineffective and

unclear. Senior Staffs of the Agency were not utilized; air support

stayed independent of the project; the role of the large forward

basis was not clear.'"' (Para. 6, page 144).

The Survey directs these criticisms exclusively at the Agency
structure making essentially no effort to relate Agency organization and
managerial problems to the participation in the project by other elements
of the Government. Before responding, therefore, it should be stated
that we share the views set forth in one of General Taylor's supporting
memoranda and quoted in another section of this paper that ''the Executive
Branch of the Government was not organizationally prepared to cope with
this kind of a paramilitary operation" and that "there was no single
authority short of the President capable of coordinating the actions of
CIA, State, Defense, and USIA."' In other words, it was a U.S. rather
than a CIA project.

The real organizational problem. is one of the basic dilemmas of the
U.S. Government, namely, how to manage military or quasi-military

operations in peacetime - a dilemma accentuated in those instances

FORSEGREE TS #181884

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B. Errors of Judgment

The second set of criticisms, those described above as allegations
of major errors of judgment and the third, relating to the Agency's
relationships with the rest of the Executive Branch, are more complex.
Their validity is discussed in separate sections below (Section III on
Why a Military Type Invasion and IV on The Decision Making Process,
Section VIII on The Relationships with the Cubans, and Section V on
The Assessment of the Adequacy of the Plan and on the Appraisal of its
Success.) Summarized in flat statements, the conclusions there reached
are these:

a. The basic reason for placing increasing emphasis as the
build-up progressed upon the planned military operation and decreasing
emphasis on the internal resistance is that for a number of reasons the
capacity of the resistance to achieve an overthrow without a significant
assist from the outside appeared to be diminishing rather than growing
despite the best efforts of which the Agency was capable to support it.
Moreover, preparation for the military operation was not intended to
reduce support of the resistance and the two efforts became truly
competitive only in the last week before the invasion was mounted.

b. The decision to deny the Cuban political leadership control

of or close contact with the Brigade and to withhold from them knowledge

TS #181884
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FOPSECRETTM
-7-

shown to the Cubans that a Cuban force in opposition to Castro, having
Cuban political leaders of political stature and democratic views, was
capable of maintaining itself on Cuban soil, there would be substantial
defections from the Castro regime in all walks of life, private and
governmental.

In December the USIB had estimated that, despite the hold established
by Castro and his regime, “Internal resistance to the Castro regime has
risen sharply in the last six months."

"The Catholic Church, the only major institution not brought to its
knees by the regime, has taken an increasingly firm stand against Castro."

"The middle and professional classes are now for the most part
disaffected. Some campesinos are disgruntled, notably over the regime's
failure to redistribute large landholdings as it had promised; thus far
only token allotments have been made."

‘A number of anti-Castro guerrilla groups are operating in the
Sierra Escambray area and in Oriente Province, but the regime has
demonstrated its ability to contain these bands."

“Within the Army, Navy, and Air Force, there probably remains a
measure of dissidence and probably considerable resentment at the
regime's decided preference for the civilian militia, but this may decline
as more Bloc equipment is made available to them."

—TOUP"STerat= TS #181884

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TOPSECRET
-13-

(as traitors") alleged to have sabotaged the Havana power plant.

Since the issue of what the internal reaction would have been under
the conditions assumed necessary for effective internal support never
arose, it is impossible to evaluate the accuracy of the prognosis. It can
be said that no one expected an immediate uprising; no advance warning
was given to the internal resistance, as a security precaution, to avoid
any disclosure of D-Day; ample supplies existed to support uprising had
groups showed themselves; communications existed that could have identified
areas of resistance (though no communicator was able to join the resistance
in the Escambray); no one expected the resistance to join the Brigade on
the beach in anything but very small numbers; and it was estimated that
the psychological impact of unopposed heavily armed B-26 aircraft flying
up and down the island would be significant - an assumption based, of
course, on control of the air.

Whatever the correct conclusion, in fact, might have been, the
situation was such as to render the judgment (mentioned above) regarding
internal support a reasonable one. Surely it was one painfully reached
by many informed observers.

Post-invasion planning did exist contrary to the Survey's contention.
Some of it has been discussed above. In addition plans for a breakout from

the beachhead had been generally worked out recognizing that precise details

tep-srereT” TS #181884
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Third, the Survey is critical of the Agency's failure to insure that

the decision making process in the Executive Branch was orderly and
effective. The Agency, it is alleged, “failed to keep the national policy
makers adequately and realistically informed of the conditions considered
essential for success, and it did not press sufficiently for prompt policy
decisions in a fast moving situation". Asa corollary of this judgment,
the Survey attributes the blame for incompetence of execution and for
errors of judgment essentially to this Agency alone.

It is almost self-evident that some of these allegations are true,
at least in part. In any large and rapidly organized undertaking there
are certain to be errors of organization and of execution. In all likelihood
major errors in judgment were committed. Similarly, the decision
making process in the Executive Branch of the Government operated in
a manner that left something to be desired. Nevertheless, this paper
argues: that a large majority of the conclusions reached in the Survey
are misleading or wrong; that the Survey is especially weak in judging
what are the implications of its own allegations and, therefore, that
its utility is greatly impaired by its failure to point out fully or in all cases
correctly the lessons to be learned from this experience. This

generalized rejection can be made more meaningful by an elaboration

TS #181884
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for evaluation purposes. In view of the above conclusions, however, it

would seem fair to say that admitting failures (which indeed is done) they
were not as obvious as the Survey suggests. In fact a case can still be
made that the estimates were right.

The Survey's other criticism regarding WH/4 intelligence activities
will be dealt with briefly. The creation of a G-2 in the paramilitary unit
rather than with the Project FI Section is strongly criticized. (Pages 77-79
The alleged bad consequence of this error, i.e., improper estimates, has
just been discussed. In other respects on this point the Survey is inaccurate
The Chief of the FI Section did attend WH/4 staff meetings (Para. 10, page 77
There was liaison between the G-2 and FI Sections (Para.11, page 77). The
both saw cables (Para.10, page 77). They exchanged intelligence and
generally supplemented each other (Para.11, page 78).

The remaining criticism regarding intelligence is directed at a failure
to support the Miami Base. Since the Base raises a number of other
considerations, they will be discussed together.

The Survey, in effect, commends many of the operational results
achieved by the Miami Base. The FI and Cl activities are mentioned in
paragraphs 10 and 11 on page 70 and, it is believed, that these accomplish-
ments are commendable.

GePp-SkECeREa= TS #181884

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Sor-sEGnee—
-lL-
Camaguey (two groups totaling 400 men); Las Villas (three groups
totaling 400 men); and Pinar del Rio (50 men),

b. Manuel Ray Rivero, the organizer of the anti- Batista
underground and a member of the Cuban Revolutionary Council took
the view that the internal resistance was so strong that Castro could
be overthrown without an "invasion" from the outside, His view was
not officially accepted but represented the informed view of an
individual experienced in this field regarding the opposition potential.
The disagreement with his conclusion had to do with what action was
necessary to persuade the opposition to rebel, not as to its existence.

c. Sabotage from October 1960 to April 1961 was evidence of
internal opposition activists even though aside from psychological
benefits to the opposition, the sabotage caused insignificant damage
in and of itself to the regime. Examples were:

1) Approximately 300, 000 tons of Sugar cane destroyed
in 800 different fires.
2) Approximately 150 other fires, including the burning

of 42 tobacco warehouses, two paper plants, 1 sugar refinery,

two dairies, four stores, twenty-one Communist homes.

3) Approximately 110 bombings, including Communist

Party offices, Havana power station, two stores, railroad

SOLSEGRETTM TS #181884
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FOP-SECRES
12

employee had to be backed or lost. Due to the employee's importance
to the mission, the fact that he was a very good officer, and the short-
ness of time, he was backed and the Master discharged, On further
investigation, it was found that the Master not only denied all the alle-
gations against him but claimed that he could find men to substantiate
his story and asked in writing to vindicate himself. In view of his
superior MSTS record and faced with serious issues of fact plus obvious
security problems and with no time or opportunity to hold hearings

to resolve these issues, it was decided to give the Master his contract
pay and to explain the facts to the Industrial Relations Officer of MSTS,
This was done. Thereafter, at the last moment it became essential to
obtain a Master for one of the reserve supply ships. Due to the

urgency of the situation, the Master's background and the very good
impression that the Master had made following the other incident

he was asked to take the job. Knowing of the problems at the beach-
head including the dangers from enemy air attack and despite his

strong disagreement with the decision resulting in his discharge, the
Master still immediately accepted, took command of the ship and put

to sea. Due to subsequent events beyond his control, he was recalled.
In view of all these facts, his name was later included in the general
letter to MSTS commending the performance of the more than 20 officers
provided by MSTS, On this record, the action taken still seems correct.

FOR-GEGREE TS #181884
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Jonsson tT
14

The criticism regarding consultation with the Senior Staffs obviousl
is directed at a failure to obtain available competent advice, Undoubtedly,
the Senior Staffs had good officers who could have been helpful. The judgme
involved, however, was at what point do you draw the line when you have
operational activities to be accomplished. Each of the Senior Staffs assigne:
officers to work with the project staffs. No Senior Staff officer not so
assigned could have been kept sufficiently well-informed without full and
constant briefings. In view of the briefing obligations already in existence,
it was decided that additional briefing burdens were unacceptable. Moreove
as indicated above, a line had to be drawn and it was felt that sufficient seni:
personnel were fully involved. The Survey's criticism in this connection
is based on a concept of a normal DD/P project rather than an extraordinary
one like Cuba. In this connection, it should again be emphasized that
participation by other elements of the Government is wholly omitted by the
Survey.

The Project Review Committee's (PRC) clearance at the most
under PRC procedures would have involved a review of the proposed project
in its early stages with a view to determining whether or not it should proce:
The peculiar nature of the Cuban project resulted, as already indicated, in
clearances throughout the Government at levels which make it hard to com-
prehend how the PRC would have affected the process. Moreover, even

TS # 181884
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TIDE 519
-3- (IN 3197)

7. THIS CUBAN FORCE IS MOTIVATED STRONG WELL TRAINED
ARMED TO THE TEETH AND READY. I BELIEVE PROFOUNDLY THAT
IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO

DETER IF FROM ITS INTENDED PURPOSE.

*Requested if experiences the last few days had in any way changed
Colonel Hawking¢ evaluation of the brigade.

enercretTTM copy / _



TOR SBCRET
4

not successful, nor is it clear that any permissible action would have
done any good, Some 27,800 lbs. of materiel were actually delivered
(somewhat more than stated by the Survey). (See para. 9, page 101).
The major deliveries, however, as already explained, were by boat.
Only one body drop was made. The reason for this was that drops
were obviously going badly and individuals could be infiltrated more
successfully by boat.
2. Specific allegations of the Survey follow:

a. The first drop was close but missed by 7 miles as
stated by the Survey (para. 1, page 98). A contributing factor was
an unknown dam construction marked by lights. No U-2 flights had been
approved at this stage of the project and knowledge of the construction
was not available. On return the plane hit the proper coast-in point
in Guatemala, and the crew captain then turned the plane over to thé
co-pilot. The latter took a short cut, climbed above some cloud cover,
was lost when he came down and landed on the first field he found, i.e.,
in Mexico, even though he still had sufficient fuel to return to Guatemala.
Obviously, this was bad procedure and poor crew discipline.

b. The rice and beans drop (para. 4., et seq., page 99)
is an exaggerated case. In order to fill out the load, the DDCI decided

to drop some food, as food shortages were clearly a problem with the

POPrP-“SsECRSs— TS #181884

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of American pilots was politically unacceptable no matter how desirable

operationally.

In conclusion it might be said that the DPD overall air drop
record is a good one and will stand close examination. The failures in
Cuba were not the result of lack of competence nor of poor organization.
They were rather the result of many complex factors, some beyond Agency
control, some undoubtedly within Agency control. During the project,
the only real solutions were believed to be in the area of political in-
feasibility, although an improved record might have otherwise been
achieved. Surely if better communications could have been provided
with the resistance elements at the time of drops, there would have been
greater success. It must be remembered in this connection that during
the early months in 1961 the communications picture improved materially.
Moreover, during the last two or three weeks before the invasion some
15 drop requests were received which could not for other reasons be
fulfilled. The groups making these requests were, however, well equipped
and capable.

B. MARITIME

In the maritime field, it should be noted that the Survey

makes no mention of the operational atmosphere or difficulties. This,
of course, is true throughout the Survey, but, because of the particular
difficulties encountered in connection with ships and crews and the amounts

FOR SEERE? TS #181884
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SeP-sRERRS-

@ ENCLOSURE A

PRE-D-DAY PHASE

1. Department of State representatives will:
a. Prepare White Paper for Presidential approval.

b. Provide assistance to Mr. Schlesinger in preparation of material
for Presidential statements.

c. Provide Working Group with Policy Statement as to what "recognition"
really means.

d. Determine action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosures to
Latin American countries - e.g.,

(1) Guatemala
(2) Nicaragua

co and other countries, e.g.,
@ {1) United Kingdom
(2) France
'
e, Provide policy guidance for all aspects of the development of the
Free Cuba Government.
f. Prepare plans for overt moral and other possible nonmilitary support
prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives of the Cuban
Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary Council, including possible action
in the United Nations or in the Organization of American States.
g. Prepare plans for overt moral and other possible nonmilitary
support of the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when established.
h. Provide policy guidance to USIA to support this plan.
i. Prepare plans for Post-D-Day actions.
- —FOP-s56Ret.
) Ne TS #181884
~ Copy # /



presented to the JCS on 15 April which was too late for its review by the JCS

as a body,

The only reference in the Survey to JCS Participation states that
"members of the JCS" have stated ''in the course of another inquiry
(1) that the final plan was presented to them only orally, which prevented
normal staffing; (2) that they regarded the operation as being solely CIA's
with the military called in to furnish various types of support and the chief
interest of the JCS being to see to it that every kind of support requested
was furnished; (3) that they went on the assumption that full air support
would be furnished and control of the air secured and on the Agency's
assurances that a great number of insurgents would immediately join
forces with the invasion forces; and (4) that, in the event the battle went
against them, the Brigade would at once 'go guerrilla' and take to the hills."

Neither the "members of the JCS" nor the other "inquiry" are
identified nor is there any citation supporting the alleged testimony.
Being unable, therefore, to locate the full text from which the quotation
was taken, it is not possible to analyze or clarify the points made. Pre-
sumably the "inquiry" referred to was that conducted by General Taylor
although no verbatim minutes were kept. At least no transcript or full
report of these hearings is available to the writer. In response, therefore,
it can only be repeated that the JCS, as indicated, did review the Zapata

7eP-ssene TS #181884
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encouraged it and permitted air support coupled with continued

effectiveness in the face of heavy casualties of the Castro militia.
Either of these possible developments would have confirmed the
errors of intelligence and assessment that are alleged but would
have given no support to the view that errors of organization

and execution in the build-up phase were responsible for the
military defeat. Despite whatever mistakes of this character there
were, the Agency did after all (with the invaluable help of the
Department of Defense) build up, train, equip, and deploy a

force that proved itself in combat to be of high quality.

TS #181884
—FeOR-sEGRES Copy /





FOR-B2ERET
-4-

The work of this Task Force resulted in the creation of a special JCS
team headed by General Gray (discussed below) to review military
planning and a committee to keep track of non-military aspects of
planning consisting of Defense (General Gray), State (Mr. Braddock, last
Charge in Havana prior to the break in relations) and CIA (A/DDP/A).
This latter committee met regularly from about mid-February and
prepared a list of tasks. to be discharged by the Agency and each
Department. This paper was approved by the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense and the DCI and was used as a check list. A copy
is attached as Annex A, As noted, it contained no reference to the
military or Brigade action.

The new Administration was brought into the picture as soon as
possible. President Kennedy was given a general briefing by the DCI
and the DD/P on 18 November 1960 and Secretary of State Rusk was
briefed by the DCI prior to inauguration on 17 January 1961. Rusk was
again briefed on 22 January by the DCI and the DD/P ina group including
the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General.

Thereafter, there were a number of meetings with the President
at which the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of
the JCS, the Attorney General, the DCI were present. In addition,
Messrs. McGeorge Bundy and Schlesinger from the White House Staff;

Berle and Mann from State; Nitze and William Bundy from Defense;

FOD-SRERET TS #181884
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David Salvador, labor leader, "anti- Yanqui'' pro-Castro secretary

general of the Cuban trade union federation. Castro inter-
vened on the Communist side against Salvador's free labor
movement and jailed Salvador.

Miguel Angel Quevedo, editor of Bohemia.

Luis Conte Aguero, radio and television commentator.

Jose:Pardo Llada, radio official famous for attacks against U.S.

on Castro's behalf.

Further available evidence supporting the conclusion that internal
support would be forthcoming if an effective internal opposition force
could be established was:

a. Many requests for aid during the period 22 March to

17 April were received through Agency communications channels,

some of which are noted in the Survey at pages 108-109. The

issue discussed by the Survey as to why aid was not given is not

here involved. The messages, however, do emphasize the number

of groups anxious to engage in active opposition. For example,

between 22 March and 17 April there were 15 unfulfilled drop requests

in support of a claimed total of 5,000 men. Even after the landing
between 17 and 22 April seven groups totaling about 3,350 men begged

for support in order to fight. These groups were in Oriente (2,500 men);

—FOPSECKET TS #181884
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FOP-SECRETTM

l

As to others dealing with the Cubans, the officers working with
the Cuban politicians were all fluent in Spanish with one exception,

a senior officer who had no difficulty dealing with the Cubans in Eng-
lish and who was relied on very heavily by many of the senior Cubans.
His lack of Spanish, therefore, did not prevent his achieving a
position of personal confidence.

The officers in propaganda had native Spanish and in addition
the publications, the newspapers and the radio scripts were written
and produced by Cubans who, in the case of most of the newspapers
and publications, had run and produced the same items in Cuba
immediately prior to defecting.

The senior FI and Cl officers had fluent Spanish. In Miami,
an officer with native Spanish organized a corps of 35 to 40 Cubans
into a CI organization af considerable competence. Even the Survey
called this a "responsive and useful instrument'', (Para. 55, page 19;
paras. 57-58, page 20).

C/WH-4 and his Paramilitary Chief had fluent Spanish, as
did the Chief in Miami. To generalize, of the sixteen senior mana-
gerial officers listed in Annex A, eleven had fluent Spanish. During
the last four months,, the Project operated its own Signal Center and
its own Cable Secretariat providing 24-hour coverage. Two of the

three post-duty Duty Officers had fluent Spanish, Also, a Translation

TOR-SEGRER
TS #181884

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BORGPCRET
4
certain requirements on the addressees for help in this request.
A copy is attached as Annex B,

Again on 25 August 1960 at the DD/P weekly staff meeting
attended by Division and Staff Chiefs of the CS, COPS, in order
to re-emphasize the above, announced that the DD/P wanted
to be sure that WH-4 was receiving "enough first class people

to assure success in their efforts. '' The solution announced

was:

‘We have staffed WH-4 thus far without seriously inter-
fering with other operations and activities. The serious-
ness of the situation demands your most sympathetic
consideration of requests for temporary assistance to

ro them, They now have about a dozen critical officer

vacancies. We have agreed to having WH-4 suggest the
names of those officers whom they would prefer to have
particular jobs. The CS Personnel Office will be in touch
with you on the names produced by WH-4 and on others
identified as being qualified. If you can possibly spare
them for the next few months, I urge you to do so. If

you feel you cannot spare them, please tell the CSPO

your reasons. Mr. Barnes, Mr. Bissell or I will then
attempt to judge the relative priorities and make a decision
respecting such assignments, "

In view of the foregoing, there can be little doubt that senior
CS officers knew of the CIA policy to support WH-4 in its personnel
requirements. The success or failure of the application of the policy
is, of course, a matter of judgment, Obviously no personnel roster

cor SECRET
TS #181884

WO
Copy # f



—SOPSECRET
-10-
Nevertheless, certain conclusions as to the nature of the military failure
must be restated here if its causes are to be understood.

There is unanimous agreement that the proximate cause was a
shortage of ammunition on the beachhead and that this shortage was
directly traceable, in turn, to the effective interdiction of shipping and
air resupply by the Castro Air Force. It has been less emphasized
that Castro's command of the air deprived the Brigade of its capability
for battlefield reconnaissance, of the equivalent of field artillery, and of
close air support against enemy ground forces. It deprived it, too, of
the possibility of "strategic" strikes against enemy lines of supply and
communications. Finally, reliance had been placed on daytime and
virtually unopposed air and sea resupply as a necessary condition for
the activation of resistance groups throughout the Island. It is
incontrovertible that, without control of the air, and the air crews and
aircraft to exploit that control of the air, the whole military operation
was doomed. Even with control of the air it might have failed but without
it there could not have been any chance of success. If, then, one wishes
to learn what actually caused the military operation to fail, rather than
what might have done so, the starting point must be an inquiry into why

control of the air was lost and never regained. Of equal significance

TS #181884
—FOR.SEERE - Copy _/



BORE

6
were considered poor, One PM officer was named, The CSPO
then demonstrated that, although this officer was disliked by
some people, he had been specifically requested by WH-4, had
performed extremely well and in fact was continued in WH-4
after the misfortunes of April 1961 because of his performance
in the project. No more was then said about this individual
but no other examples were offered despite a specific request
for names.

In view of the foregoing, it is suggested that the Survey
allegations be at the very least set aside until specific evidence
be introduced to which an answer can be addressed.

The few minor points listed by the Survey regarding per-
sonnel are discussed below:

1, A basic mistake was made by filling key spots early
without realizing how much the project would grow with the result
that officers often ended up supervising three to four times as many
people as orginally anticipated.

The inference of supervisors beyond their depth is clear.
It can only be said that supervision during the project in no place
seemed to require change due to inability. Moreover, it must be
OP-SEGRaie

TS #181884
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-8-

were sketched out but the Zapata area concept was the only one which met
the political requirements and provided a reasonable chance of success.
This concept was fully described to General Gray and his team and passed
on by the JCS as the best alternate to the Trinidad plan (JCS Memo 166-61
of 15 March 1961 to Secretary of Defense; Subject:Evaluation of Military
Aspects of Alternate Concepts of CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba.) The
covering memorandum from General Lemnitzer as Chairman of the JCS
states in part:
"3, The conclusions of the evaluation of the military

aspects of the three alternative concepts are as follows:

n

c, Alternative II" (substantially the final Zapata
Plan) "has all the prerequisites necessary to successfully
establish the Cuban Voluntary Task Force, including air
elements, in the objective area and sustain itself with outside
logistic support for several weeks; however, inaccessibility

of the area may limit the support from the Cuban populace.

"4, It is recommended that:
“a. the Secretary of Defense support the views of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in the above conclusions."

After 15 March, the JCS reviewed the Zapata plan as a body four

times. The final plan was reviewed by individual Chiefs since it was only

POP SEC TS # 181884
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SECTION

VL

VIL

VIII.

x

PAGE

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND
RELATIONSHIPS 1-28

Annex A - Memorandum dated 24 October
1960 for A/DDP/A, et, al., Procedures
for Cuban Overflights.

Annex B - Memorandum dated 12 October 1960
for Chief, WH/4, "Organization
and €ommand Relationships - WH/4
and Development Projects Division,"

PERSONNEL 1-14

Annex A - Biographic Summary of Certain
Senior Officials.

Annex B - Memorandum dated 16 May 1960
for Chiefs of All Special Staffs and
Operating Divisions, ''Clerical
Assistance for WH Division."

THE POLITICAL FRONT AND RELATIONS

WITH THE CUBANS 1-18
AIR MARITIME OPERATIONS 1-18
A. Air
B. Maritime
C. Training Underground Leaders 15
LOR SeeRETTM TS-181884
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FOPGESRE
17

military leaders were responsible for the maintenance of law, order and
discipline and in the discharge of these responsibilities meted out
disciplinary punishment ranging from "company punishment" to
incarceration.

b) Without coercion on our part, the Liberation Troops
pledged their loyalty to the Cuban political leadership as represented by
the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

c) The traditional cleavages of military versus political
leadership naturally were evident in this operation as they are in almost any
organized state in the world. There is no evidence, however, to support
any contention that the gap between their respective objectives and methods
to be employed to achieve these objectives was any wider than would be
expected given the circumstances that existed. Merely because those like
Manuel Ray who never favored an invasion said after the defeat "I told you
so" to all available newspapers did not mean that the D-Day unity was
not sufficiently strong to have provided a platform on which to build.
Failure, quite naturally, provided the most potent fuel to the flames of
dissension which lay only just below the surface.

3. Miscellaneous. Other than the main conclusion mentioned above,
there are some minor criticisms in the Survey. Project officers are
criticised for not speaking Spanish. This point is discussed else-
where but it might again be noted that of the six senior

BOPSRCREE TS #181884
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19 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Survey of Cuban Operation

1. My work in support of your “Analysis of the Cuban
Operation" gave me an unusual opportunity to study with care
the document which caused the Analysis to be written, namely,
ie "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation, October
1961".

2. My consideration of the Survey has forced me to reach
certain conclusions which I feel that I mst record. I do so
in writing because these conclusions are, in my opinion, of
sufficient significance to demand the discipline of a written
expression. Moreover, I feel that those who disagree with me
should have the opportunity to direct any replies that. they may
choose to make to specific identifiable comments.

3. I may say that my decision to write this memorandum
was reached with considerable reluctance and only after long
deliberation. The deciding factor was my belief that the
suggestions for action in paragraph 6 below are worthwhile
and should be submitted. They would have been meaningless
without the reasons set forth in the earlier paragraphs. The
yiews expressed are, needless to say, exclusively mine.

4, In my opinion the I.G. Survey is most unfortunate for
three reasons:

a. It is an incompetent job. The authors
never understood the problems with which they were deal-
ing and failed to express their views with any precision
or proper use of relevant facts.

b. It is biased. Basically relevant evidence
on vital issues was not only left out but never even
mentioned. The Survey undertook only to present those
items which suggested failures or inadequacies. These
items, however, were not fully depicted so that a false
picture was given. Admittedly, an I.G. mist expose fault
but it is also his job to do so accurately.



remarkable checks the FRD Executive Committee members imposed on

each other. For rather obvious reasons they attempted to make. the FRD
an "Exclusive Club" by restricting, if not closing, membership in it and
they insisted on a system of parity throughout all FRD working elements,
that is to say that each Executive Committee member placed the same
number of his followers, as did any one of his fellow members, on any
working group. This concept of leadership--not surprising in exile
politics and somewhat reminiscent of past Cuban history and practices--
had, of course, its effect on dynamic action and puts the term leadership
in a somewhat different context. Moreover, the U.S. and the Agency did
not feel that a different concept could be forced on the Cubans.

As the pace of the build-up and of current operations accelerated in
the autumn of 1960, it became increasingly apparent that any approach
to the effectiveness which was the second of the two objectives of Agency
pressure would require a higher degree of control over and direction of
the anti-Castro movement by the Agency than had originally been hoped.
The Cubans never did succeed in creating a Cuban organization
sufficiently free of internal divisions and competently enough staffed to
perform the rapidly expanding operational tasks. Radio broadcasts had

to be organized, publications arranged, and propaganda material

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LORSRCRETTM

-2-

To the extent that there was a failure to communicate this to the appropriate
political levels, blame should be attached. Quite candidly, it is unknown
where this failure occurred, if, in fact, it did.

Before analyzing the reasonableness of the view that the D-Day air
strikes could have changed the result it is important to examine the basic
theory of the operation and what was accomplished, what failed and what
was not tested. As to the last the only possible judgments are whether
the theory based on existing evidence was sensible. The operational theory

in outline was:

a. To destroy the enemy air force. Not tested though

partially accomplished.

b. To land the Brigade on the Zapata beachhead achieving

surprise. Accomplished successfully.

c. To maintain the Brigade on the beachhead perhaps for
several weeks. Not tested.

d. To persuade the Cuban populace (both private individuals
and governmental, including military) actively to oppose the regime.
It was never expected that this would happen until the populace was
convinced that an opposition force supporting democratic leadership
receiving outside support was able to maintain itself on Cuban soil,
How long this would take was unknown. Not tested.

FOP-SEGRET TS #181884
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~ZA-

in Havana, defectors and legal travel, the need for illegal infiltration
was comparatively slight until January 1961.

2) Partly for this reason, the effort to place trained commu-
nicators, paramilitary types, and other agents with resistance groups
inside the Island, and thereby to create a reception capability for air
and maritime resupply, never caught up with Castro's improving secu-
rity measures. This impaired the build-up not only of guerrilla groups
but of intelligence nets. It is doubtful, however, whether significantly
more could have been accomplished in building up an effective internal
resistance particularly in view of the timing of the whole operation
and the lead time involved in recruiting and training.

3) Aside from these weaknesses, alleged defects of organiza-
tion and execution had little to do with the unsuccessful outcome. In
particular, the limiting factor on air operations in support of the re-
sistance was not bad management but the limitations of the reception
parties and competence of Cuban air crews.

4) The air arm should have been stronger by the time of the
invasion in numbers of air crews, type of equipment, availability of
U. S, bases, or some combination of all these. If relief could not
have been obtained from any of the politically motivated restrictions,
and if a larger number of competent Cuban air crews could not have

been recruited, the Agency should on its own responsibility have

TS #181884
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@)
@

( \



om | Section VII-Annex A
a a -

co



FOP SPORT T

r ENCLOSURE B

D-DAY AND POST-D-DAY PHASE UNTIL RECOGNITION

1. Department of State representatives will:

a. Take such steps as may be feasible for the protection of U.S. citizens
in Cuba.

b, Execute plans for support of the Revolutionary Council or Free
Cuba Government in the United Nations or Organization of American States
and to counter communist and/or Castro charges in the United Nations or
Organization of American States, as appropriate.

c. Lend support to the objectives and actions of the Cuban Volunteer
Force and the Free Cuba Government.

d. Revise plans as necessary for support of the Free Cuba Government.
e. Recognize Free Cuba Government as appropriate.
e : 2. Department of Defense representatives will:

a. Provide follow-up logistic support as requested by CIA and/or in
accordance with logistics plan.

b. Provide support from operational forces as directed.

c. Prepare detailed plans to support the U.S. aid plan for the Free
Cuba Government for implementation when overt support is given.

d. Coordinate support by DOD agencies and commands.
3. CIA representatives will:
a. . Execute and support over-all paramilitary plan.
b. Inform DOD representatives of logistics requirements.
c. Continue execution of psychological warfare plan.

d. Be responsible for the continuous operation of the Central Office
and present briefings of the situation as required or directed.

r TS #181884
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TORSESRSS
-17-

If complete deniability had been consistent with maximum
effectiveness, there would theoretically have remained no conflict
of goals but in fact this could not be (and never is) the case. The
most effective way to have organized operations against the Castro
regime, even if they would have been carried out exclusively by
Cubans, would have been to do so perfectly openly, on the largest
scale and with the best equipment feasible. Practically every
departure from this pattern of behavior imposed operational diffi-
culties and reduced effectiveness. Inherent in the concept of
deniability was that many of these restrictions would be accepted
but at every stage over a period of many months questions had to
be answered in which operational effectiveness was weighed
against the political requirement of deniability.

As these decisions presented themselves week after week,
the Agency as the executive agent for the conduct of the operation
was usually and naturally the advocate of effectiveness. The State
Department and, with respect to certain matters, the Department
of Defense were the guardians of the correctness of the country's
political posture and thus the advocates of deniability. There was
obviously no way in which a generalized policy could have been
laid down which would have furnished guidance as to the way the many
successive decisions ought to be made. There was no quantitative

TS #181884
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C@



plan and continued to be closely associated through their representatives

and briefings with all actions taken thereon,
It is quite clear from the four memoranda supporting General
Taylor's oral report mentioned above that the Cuban Study Group con-
sidered the operation to be one by the United States, not by the Agency,
even though the Agency was the Executive Agent. Memorandum No, 2.,
entitled "Immediate Causes of Failure of Operation Zapata", says on
this point:
"The Executive Branch of the Government was not
. organizationally prepared to cope with this kind of paramilitary
r ) operation, There was no single authority short of the President
capable of coordinating the actions of CIA, State, Defense and
USIA."' (Memorandum No, 2., Para. ll, page 4).
As far as the concurrence of the JCS is concerned, Memorandum
No. 3, entitled "Conclusions of the Cuban Study Group", concluded:
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff had the important
responsibility of examining into the history of the operation.
By acquiescing in the Zapata plan, they gave the impression to

others of approving it...'' (Memorandum No. 3, para. l.h., page 3).

oe Son-shene TS # 181884

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-20-

to infiltrate men and arms by sea and air for months, recruit, train
and arm a strike force of some 1800 Cubans, to organize the political
fronts, first the FRD then the CRC and run a major propaganda cam-
paign, without at least reports and rumors of these activities becoming
widespread. Nor were there any illusions either in the Agency or
elsewhere in the Executive Branch as to the degree to which the facts
were surmised and accepted as true by journalists and other informed
persons, Why, then, would anyone continue to regard the involvement
of the United States as plausibly deniable and why was the undertaking
not converted into an overt operation, which presumably would have
become the responsibility of the Department of Defense?

The answer to the first part of this question is that up to and
through the invasion itself the operation remained to an extraordinary
degree technically deniable, Funds were disbursed in such a way that
their U. S. Government origin could not be proved. No Agency case
officer who played an active role was publicly revealed as such by
true name. No Americans were captured (although the bodies of an
American B-26 crew were probably recovered after its loss on the
second day of the invasion). In short, even the best informed corre-
spondents in Miami who published what purported to be detailed, factual
reports could substantiate them only by quoting Cubans who themselves

were often not well informed,

TS #181884
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FOP SECRET

13
The "stevedore'' reference is elsewhere expanded by the Survey to the
effect that the "technical and training abilities" of several Navy Chief
Petty Officers who were borrowed in connection with work in certain

of the Project's ships were "'

grossly misused" as "much of their
time was spent at stevedore or deckhand labor." (Paras 33-34, pages
120-121). It is quite true that some Navy personnel on duty with the
Agency were made available by their components to represent the
Agency interests and keep an eye on maritime repairs and modifications.
Unquestionably, they were not fully employed though their presence at
moments was very important. In all likelihood, therefore, this was a
situation where some inefficiency of employment resulted. One Chief
Petty Officer was upset by the assignment and asked to be returned to
his regular duties. Others, however, accepted the situation as special
and largely unavoidable, and served without complaint as long as their
experience was needed.

c. The Navy Captain assigned at Agency request to the Project

to handle maritime activity was "'

reported to have been not entirely
happy with his brief Agency tour. In any event, he was another example
of poor handling of people in this project, and he was not given a chance
to solve the problems of maritime operations .''(Para. 40, Page 123).
It is not know who "reported" the Navy Captain (Captain Scapa) as "not

entirely happy'', but we are surprised at the statement since Agency

TOR-SEGRER—
TS #181884

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x
TeMerereT =# - Annex & A

TIDE 519

(IN 3197)
13 April 1961

1. MY OBSERVATIONS LAST FEW DAYS HAVE INCREASED MY
CONFIDENCE IN ABILITY THIS FORCE TO ACCOMPLISH NOT ONLY
INITIAL COMBAT MISSIONS BUT ALSO ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF
CASTRO OVERTHROW.

2. REF* ARRIVED DURING FINAL BRIEFING OF BRIGADE AND
BATTALION COMMANDERS. THEY NOW KNOW ALL DETAILS OF
PLAN AND ARE ENTHUSIASTIC. THESE OFFICERS ARE YOUNG
VIGOROUS INTELLIGENT AND MOTIVATED WITH A FANATICAL URGE
TO BEGIN BATTLE FOR WHICH MOST OF THEM HAVE BEEN
PREPARING IN THE RUGGED CONDITIONS OF TRAINING CAMPS
FOR ALMOST A YEAR. I HAVE TALKED TO MANY OF THEM IN
THEIR LANGUAGE. WITHOUT EXCEPTION THEY HAVE UTMOST
CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO WIN. THEY SAY THEY KNOW
THEIR OWN PEOPLE AND BELIEVE AFTER THEY HAVE INFLICTED
ONE SERIOUS DEFEAT UPON OPPOSING FORCES THE LATTER WILL
MELT AWAY FROM CASTRO WHO THEY HAVE NO WISH TO SUPPORT.
THEY SAY IT IS CUBAN TRADITION TO JOIN A WINNER AND THEY
HAVE SUPREME CONFIDENCE THEY WILL WIN ANY AND ALL
ENGAGEMENTS AGAINST THE BEST CASTRO HAS TO OFFER. I

SHARE THEIR CONFIDENCE.



on 18 March 1961 just prior to the start of the selection of the CRC

exemplified this: "Naturally, the procedures employed in the election
of your leader or Provisional President must remain entirely in your
hands... Obviously we are not trying to tell you whom you should
elect--that is your responsibility and yours alone... The decision is

up to you. I am confident you will make the right one."' Thus, acting
independently the Cuban exiles elected Miro Cardona as their provisional
President.

i) It is quite true that CRC members went into isolation
during the 17 April invasion; it is also true that statements on the
invasion were issued in their names. On the former, CRC members
were briefed and counseled by two high ranking Agency officials and
the Cuban agreement was given voluntarily and without coercion and
in recognition of the demands of the hour. In fact Miro Cardona was told
that he might stay in New York City over the fateful weekend of 14-17
April. He, however, asked to be isolated with the other members of the
CRC.

j) In summary, the facts prove that FRD (and later CRC)
members were. not reduced to the status of puppets--regardless of their

feeling in the ice cold reality of defeat--and that their action capabilities

OP-SESC Ris tae TS #181884
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be shaken, it seemed clear that, due to its vast superiority in numbers,

it could continue at least to contain the resistance. Moreover, it became
evident through the fall and early winter that the outside force to be
successful needed to be self-sustaining since small bands or elements
would, due to numerical inferiority in all likelihood, be cut off, surrounded
and overwhelmed or rendered harmless by the militia.

In addition, difficulties of supplying the opposition soon became
apparent. Air drops were rarely successful which is not an unusual
operational experience. Under much simpler conditions approximately
the first 12 or 13 drops in support of Castillo Armas were wholly unsuccessful
in Guatemala. Thereafter, slight improvement occurred but mainly due
to the fact that the drops were made in daylight and directed to terrain
held by the invaders who were in open conflict and not in hiding. Even
in France during WW II at a time when experienced pilots were dropping
to experienced reception committees in vastly more favorable terrain than
available in most of the attempted Cuban drops the rule of thumb was that
only 50% success should be expected. At any rate the lack of success by
air and the difficulty of distributing within Cuba the substantial amount of
materiel landed by boat (plus, of course, the restrictions imposed by the
constantly increasing and improving internal security) made it clear that
no internal resistance buildup could achieve adequate size to eliminate

FOR-SEGRES
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petecevstad

POPCESRET
~~ A15-

all methods of effecting a change except forceful overthrow. Such U.S.

recognition, it was believed, would justify U.S. materiel support, if not

active support to an offensive. It should be emphasized that U.S.

recognition was not considered an essential part of the plan (useful as
it would have been) since materiel support could have been provided
anyhow. --

The planning for failure was, it is believed, all that was possible.

If, as happened, the failure occurred before the consolidation of the

beachhead, there was little that could be done except an effort to salvage
what little was possible. Had the beachhead been established, a number
of possibilities were planned, none too satisfactory because a failure of

the beachhead was at any time a serious blow. If the Brigade or parts

thereof could move together, they were to attempt to reach the Escambray.
Assuming some help from the country people, this might well have been

feasible. “Another possibility was the removal of individuals, conceivably

units, by air and sea while teams and materiel could have been airdropped

in other parts of Cuba, if resistance had become apparent.
As to the Agency's capability and the adequacy of the plan, the best
answer - since the military aspects are the sole consideration - is to

refer to thé supporting military judgments which were based on full

"thie

knowledge of the facts. Scme evidence of attitudes just prior to D-Day

ee Shee TS #181884

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“~

COPY

15 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John McCone
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: The Inspector General's Survey of the
Cuban Operation

1. Upon receipt of the Inspector General's report of
October 1961, on the Cuban Operation, which reached my desk
prior to my resignation as Director of Central Intelligence,
I immediately transmitted a copy to the Deputy Director (Plans)
for his comment. This was in line with the practice I had
consistently followed in dealing with the reports of the
Inspector General: namely, the Office which is the subject
of the inspection is given an opportunity to comment on the
I.G. report before the Director determines the action to be
taken thereon. The reply of the Deputy Director (Plans),
dated 18 January 1962, of which I have received a copy, was
submitted to you following my resignation.

2. Meanwhile, I have also received and considered the
comments of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,
General Cabell.

3. I remain at your disposal for any comments you may
wish me to submit on any phases of this matter relating to
C.I.A. responsibilities. Hence I will not submit detailed
written.comment on the Inspector General*s report.

4, At this time, however, I wish to make certain
general comments:

a. As a member of the Taylor Committee appointed
by the President, I participated fully in the: work of his
Committee and joined in his Memorandum and oral reports to
the President on this subject. While I do not now have a
copy of these documents, I made only one or two reservations
to the general conclusions and recommendations of these
reports. I consider them to be sound and believe they. should
be accepted as the best available Survey of this particular
operation.

BOBS ECR



-5-

surveys such as the Cuban one which fail to present
a full factual picture regardless of the conclu-
sions reached.

7. %I am addressing this memorandum to you as my immediate
superior. I hope, however, that you will agree with my request
that the memorandum be passed to the DCI for his consideration.

I do not, of course, ask that you associate yourself with it or
any part of it merely because you transmit it.

/s/C.T.B.

C. TRACY BARNES

Original & 1 = DD/P



-3- Enclosure A

i. Cozxtinue detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities
throughout Latin America particularly his efforts to export revolution.

j. Support the preparation of a White paper to be issued by the Free
Cuba Government.

k. Review cover plans.

1. Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-up support
requirements.

m. Review and implement a pre-D-Day psychological warfare plan.

n. Review Psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and Pos-D-Day
Phase.

o. Intensify UW activities in Cuba.

p. Prepare contingency plan for the disposition, if necessary, of the
Cuban Volunteer Force.

q- Prepare final briefing on entire operation.

TS #181884
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LORSRCRETTM
-16-

is the message sent by Colonel Hawkins from Puerto Cabezas regarding
the desirability of despatching the Brigade. (Attached as Annex 4).

This message is significant as it received wide circulation at the time in
Washington, including the White House, and was accepted as essentially
accurate.

The allegation of failure to appraise the chances of success realis-
tically may be accurate but it is submitted that the available facts at
least made the judgments reasonable. Moreover, what actually occurred
supports these judgments. The Brigade landed with the benefit of surprise;
it held its own while ammunition lasted (even though it failed to land some
of its firepower); the B-26's when they got a shot at the Cuban tanks
demolished them; and the attitude of many of the militia during the early
states of the fight was favorable to the Brigade, including defections by
militia men to the Brigade even at this early indecisive moment of the
engagement. All serious damage was inflicted by the Cuban's air,
essentially the three T-33 jets.

The supporting memoranda to General Taylor's oral report are
relevant on these points. Memorandum No. 1, in discussing the operation
expresses the view in paragraph 75 on page 26 that ''the beachhead could
not have survived long without substantial help from the Cuban population

or without overt U.S. assistance." Two of the Cuban Study Group

aeoPsEectras TS #181884
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-or sso
-28-

all the circumstances the officer had made a mistake but an understandable
one and not one requiring action other than a warning to increase future
safeguards, As to screening recruits, it was impossible to use the same
precautions regarding recruits to the camps, particularly toward the end
when the recruiting rate was high (para. 7, page 137), as was used with
individual agents. In camp, however, they were members of a group
making individual activity difficult and even if they had known something,
they had no means of communication. The pre-landing movements and

the landing, it must be remembered, remained unknown. Also, the
brigade members discharged their duties well. Bad consequences, there-

fore, of the looser procedures were not too evident.

TS # 181884
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lace, { - —_——

ASR
~ ~ - :
EE



4, Following the above briefings an appropriate message, or
messages, will be sent to the field. Since an approval of the operation
and of specific operational plans will have been obtained in the briefings,
messages may be released by C/WH/4 (and AC/DPD as appropriate),
provided they communicate plans reviewed at the briefings. If, however,
any message includes important instructions the substance of which has
not already been reviewed then it should be released by the DD/P or
D/DCI as appropriate.

5. No flight shall be dispatched until the Special Group has been
advised of the plan or the DCI has specifically waived this requirement.

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)



-28-

Such issues are continuously brought to top levels for resolution.
The result is a very human tendency on the part of the decision makers
to decide not only the policy matters which only they can handle but also
operational matters in which they have little of the expertise necessary
for judgment and can rarely acquire through briefings enough depth
of factual detail for a full understanding. Admittedly, expert advisors
can be used but under pressure of time compounded by the unavoidable
ambiguity of committee considerations, decisions are often made by
the policy makers without full concurrence of the experts based on an
inadequate understanding of the issues or their implications.

These are of course eternal problems of high level decision
making and minor changes in governmental structure will not cause
them to disappear. Nor are they in any sense unique to clandestine
operations conducted by this Agency. Whenever something like the Cuban
situation arises, what seem to the operators to be operational decisions
will in fact raise policy issues. The issues will be real because they
arise out of a real conflict of objectives. The decision making process
could be tidier than it usually is and a meticulous written record would
minimize recriminations after the fact, but tidiness and a good written
record will have little bearing on the substantive wisdom of the decisions

TS #181884
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VII AnnexB

16 May 1960

EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of All Special Staffs and Operating Divisions

SUBJECT: Clerical Assistance for WH Division

1. Certain activities of the WH Division require experienced clerical
personnel. It is desired that all CS components contribute to this effort to
the maximum extent possible.

2. Requirements now exist for first-class stenographers and typists,
grade inmmaterial, who have had general experience in the Clandestine Services
for temporary detail to WH Division for an indefinite period. It is requested
that you provide at least one such person from your component. Please notify
the Clandestine Services Personnel Office (Ext. 4541) of your selection so
that the necessary arrangements may be made. The CSPO will notify you
several days in advance of the date when your nominee should report to WH
for duty.

Richard Helms .
Chief of Operations, DD/P



LORSSORET
3

beacon), is essential to any assurance of success. In the Cuban sit-
uation, communications at best were difficult. For example, although
contact was established with groups in the Escambray by courier, efforts
to infiltrate a trained radio operator with equipment were never success-
ful. In other cases it was advisable, if not necessary, to keep the radio
operator away from the DZ in order to avoid risking so scarce a com~-
modity. This meant an unavoidable delay with respect to last minute
messages between the senders and the actual receivers. In no case were
the desired communications mentioned above ever possible.

e. The Cuban land mass is not easy for drops. Either
the terrain is rough and DZs are few as in the Escambray or the area
is relatively crowded making an isolated spot difficult to find. In addition,
Castro, as a former guerrilla leader, had surveyed possible DZs and
was thoroughly familiar with their location.

f. Drop operations without all aids are inherently
difficult. As already stated even toward the end of WW II skilled crews
dropping to skilled and experienced reception committees were accorded,
as a rule of thumb on the basis of lessons learned, only a 50% chance
of success. The technical facilities in Cuba were less good than those
in France in 1944-45 and the human capabilities much less good,

Having made the foregoing comments, it should then be admitted that

the drop record in Cuba was poor. Efforts to improve it, however, were

EORSerE— TS #181884

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The greatest operational weaknesses were in the early phases of

maritime operations and, possibly, in the failure to place trained
paramilitary agents with resistance groups, although it must be
recognized that major efforts were made to accomplish this result
and even with hindsight it is not clear that any different operational
procedures or any greater effort could have achieved greater results.
The ultimate test of any project such as this is, of course, its
outcome but if a judgment of the effectiveness of organization and
execution is to be made, the deficiencies need to be balanced by the
accomplishments. As even the Survey remarks, 'There were some
good things in this project". After a slow start, a sizable number of
small boat operations were run efficiently and a large number of
persons and volume of cargo were infiltrated successfully into the
Island. In the last weeks before the invasion, a political organization
was formed which covered a remarkably broad spectrum of political
opinion and brought together what was described by a State Department
officer at the time as the best group of exile leaders that could be
assembled and that left outside no important politically acceptable
element. In the military build-up, a force was created that was twice
as large as originally envisaged and larger than any paramilitary force
ever developed by the Agency. It was brought to a high state of combat

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POPSECRET

8

comer who was not an area expert. The third GS-16 was a DD/I
officer, not a DD/P officer, who performed well in a responsible
overt post. To have made him a manager would have created
problems since he did not have operational experience.

3. Of the 42 officers "holding the principal operational
jobs in WH-4 in Grade GS-12 through GS-15" a large percentage
were rated in a low position in the initial "Relative Retention Lists".
(Paras. 4-5, page 42).

Without analyzing specific cases, it is submitted that these
statements are completely deceptive as possible evidence of poor
quality of personnel. The reasons are:

a. The ranking of individuals under the above
procedure in many cases had nothing to do with competence or ability
in given assignments. Rather the criteria were the needs of the ser-
vice over the years to come. A high grade specialist in a little
needed field, therefore, might be rated very low. A specific example
is a paramilitary officer assigned to WH-4 from another division who
served in the project with distinction. Nevertheless, since his parent
division had no foreseeable need for such officers, he was ranked low

in the initial list. More generally a similar result might well be true

of paramilitary officers since the feeling is that the Agency, particularly

POP "SECRET—
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VI --ANNEX A

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY OF CERTAIN SENIOR OFFICIALS

Jacob D. Esterline E.O.D, February 1951 Chief, Cuban Task Force

Mr. Esterline's prior Agency experience included an assignment as a __
senior official on the anti-Arbenz project in Guatemala and b acemraseorereal
meer eamerrenererecrommat Mr. Esterline had fluent Spanish.
He has.since been assigned as Chief of Operations, WH Division.

During World War Il he had 20 months with OSS including two tours. behind
the lines.in Burma. He was a Captain and commanded guerrilla units up to
battalion strength.

1951-52, Chief Instructor at Guerrilla Warfare School at Fort Benning
1953, Chief Instructor r.té‘“‘i‘*? in Guerrilla Warfare i

Edward A. Stanulis E,O.D. September 1952 Deputy Chief, Cuban Task Forc

Mr. Stanulis served in succession as Chief, Plans and Programs, Chief
of Operations, and ultimately as Deputy Chief of the Cuban Task Force.

His military service was with the U. S. Army from 1942 to 1950 wherein
he progressed in rank from 2nd Lt, to Major.

He is now permanently retired for combat incurred disability (loss of
leg). His assignments prior to combat duty included:

Asst. Reg. Intelligence Officer, Eastern Defense Command
Regimental Adjutant, Instructor, Intel. School

Asst. Plans and Ops Officer

Training Officer, Infantry Tactics

In combat (ETO), with the rank of Captain and Major, he served as
Commanding Officer of an Infantry Co. (Rifle) with tactical control of battalion
attacking elements. Having been wounded, he was a POW for six months.

On return to active duty in Washington he served as a‘Major in Public
Information Divisions of the Army and the Department of Defense until his dis-
charge in 1950.

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7

Gerard Droller E,0.D, September 1949 C/PA/Cuban Task Force

Extremely capable PP Officer, original, enthusiastic, aggressive,

Requires challenge, Outstanding PA man. Long time EE Officer. Entered
on duty with the Agency in 1949 in OPC tour in -54 excellent
reports, Respectively. C/Ops Aue, c/ eee DC aap

, C

Bernard'E, Reichhardt E.O,D. November 1947 P&P Officer/Cuban Task
: : Force (Later C/FI Section)

Mr. Reichhardt's earlier Agency assignments included that of Finance
Officer, later Chief/Cover Division. He served FE Division in SEES and as
Chief/Branch 1/Headquarters. Later assignments were to the PP Staff and
with Branch 3 WH Division, His assignments with the Project included a
stint of duty at Miami Base before returning to Headquarters as DC/PA Section/
Cuban Task Force. He was then moved up as Plans and Policy Officer and
ultimately served as Chief/FI Section. Mr, Reichhardt has native fluency in
Spanish. He is currently

E.O.D. September 1947 Special Asst/WH/4/Cuban Task Fo:

Prior assignments included §
Department of State (Mexico) 1931-41. panish. Was
commended for extraordinary performance €& by C/WHD, Characterized
as dependable and resourceful, and having the ability to get the most out of
employees,

E. Howard Hunt E.O.D. November 1949 PP/PM/Cuban Task Force

Mr. Hunt's background prior to his service with the Agency was.working
as a writer and as a correspondent for Time, Inc, He was assigned to OPC
and served in pe three (3) years, was then reassigned to SE/P & PW
Staff, He was then assigned as a PP Officer to y before being
selected as : He was rated, before his assignment to the
Cuban Task Force, as having outstanding ability in the covert action field.

He is exceptionally talented and imaginative in the PP field. His assignment
in Bezeew outstanding reports. He has fluent Spanish.

CORSEGRER
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military judgment (i.e., of both Agency and JCS staff and military officers)
was that small groups would not be able to prevent the large numbers of
militia from either isolating or gradually eliminating them. Moreover, it
was felt that the state of the internal opposition was such that they would not
respond aggressively to the undramatic and, at best, slow impact of small
bands of this sort. Consequently, such a plan could only result ina
wasting of assets and a failure to use effectively the trained manpower

of the Brigade. The military-type concept of introducing the entire

Brigade into Cuba as a single force, therefore, emerged as the most

feasible possibility.

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at this point, which will at the same time serve the purpose of outlining
the structure of this paper and summarizing certain of its main conclusions.

A. Organization and Execution

As to the first set of allegations, there is not too much that can be
said short of detailed discussion which is contained in later sections, except
to make the obvious point that perfection in organization and execution is
never attained and that the real question is whether the mistakes that were
made were worse than they reasonably should have been and justify
blanket condemnation. Stated flatly, the conclusions reached here on the
main substantive points are:

a. That Agency command and organizationalrelationships
were what they should have been.

b. That any shortcomings in the internal planning process
reflected, for the most part, the difficulty of securing clear policy guidance
from outside the Agency and prompt, willing, support based on that
guidance.

c. That the failure of most air operations in support of the
resistance was the result of circumstances completely beyond the control
of the air arm and probably not remediable by any action that the Agency
could have taken.

d. That the intelligence on the Castro regime and on the internal

opposition thereto was essentially accurate.

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-3-6

Blue Beach without being pressed by the evening. '' (Page 31, para. 94).
Adequate resupply (whether by sea or air) became increasingly
difficult and finally impossible due to enemy air action (page 3l, para. 96)

with the inevitable collapse resulting. The Survey, referring to air
support attempted for the Brigade on 18 and 19 April:

"In spite of this air action, however, and in spite of a
reported 1800 casualties suffered by the Castro forces, the
Brigade's ability to resist depended in the last resort on
resupply of ammunition, which had now become impossible. "
(Page 32, para. 98).

[NB: No mention has been made of a separate landing planned for D-2
at a point 30 miles east of Guantanamo. Nino Diaz, who had a following
in Oriente Province, was to land with 170 men with the idea of starting
a fairly large scale diversion by drawing to him his followers and the
resistance known to exist in Oriente. Although the Diaz group put to sea
and reached its Cuban landing area on schedule, it never in fact landed
due to a number of factors beyond U.S. control. Since the group played
no role, no further discussion seems warranted. /

/NB: By letter, dated 22 April 1961, the President charged General
Maxwell D. Taylor with the responsibility of investigating among other
things the Cuban operation and of reporting the lessons to be learned
therefrom. General Taylor, in association with Attorney General

Kennedy, Admiral Burke and Mr. Allen Dulles (known as the Cuban

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the beginning of the project". In reply, it can be said that every effort

was made to send agents trained together to different parts of Cuba.
Admittedly, there were cases where they may have moved together after
arrival (e. g., working their way into the city of Havana), No case is
known, however, where two agents trained together were despatched to-
gether to the same place. As to the knowledgeable radio operator, it is
quite true that there was a man with exclusive knowledge of operations.
He served under three resistance chiefs, the first two having been killed.
Each of these chiefs chose him as their command communications channel,
thereby evidencing the utmost confidence in him. He managed to escape
and is now an instructor for the Agency. No reason is known as to why
the belief in him was not justified. The disregard of security rules by
trained agents (para. 4, page 136) was regrettable but Cuban, or indeed
human, discipline is fallible. No instance is reported or known where
such indiscipline was too serious or could have been avoided, As to
American lack of discipline the Survey cites only one case, i. e., that

of a case officer in a Miami motel (para. 6, page 136). The Survey might
also have said that this case was thoroughly investigated immediately and
reported on long before the project was completed. Had the Survey men-
tioned this, it might also have indicated that unfortunate as the incident
was, the DCI on the recommendation of the DD/P, decided that in view of

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6. As Director, I deemed it desirable and necessary in
view of my other duties to delegate certain responsibilities
within the Agency for the day-by-day management of the operation,
and on military matters and judgments I relied heavily on military
personnel assigned to C.I.A. and on Department of Defense personnel
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, I assumed throughout full
responsibility for the Agency's participation and actions and kept
currently advised of all important developments. During the con-
cluding days of the operation, I was particularly influenced by
the judgments in.Col. Hawkins dispatch, dated April 13, 1961,
relating to the high state of readiness of the Brigade (Annex A
to Chapter IV of DDP report).

7. Whether or not the operation would have succeeded if
the Brigade had landed with its entire personnel and equipment
is a matter which can be debated and on which even today military
experts differ. Certainly, the responsibility for ?ailure does
not lie primarily in the main areas of criticism stressed in the
Inspector General's report.

8. Of course, there are lessons to be learned as pointed
out in the Taylor Reports. These Reports, I believe, should be

taken as the main basis for any review of the Agency's actions
in support of the operation.

/s/ Allen W. Dulles

Allen W. Dulles



LORSECR EP
-16-

E. Agency vs. Government Responsibility

Another notable feature of the decisions that together were
responsible for failure to achieve control of the air (in addition to
the fact that they were all Washington policy decisions) is that they
were all interdepartmental decisions. Other elements of the
Executive Branch were involved along with the Agency in making
them, This is not to imply that in all cases they were imposed on
the Agency. Regardless, however, of how blame should be assessed
between the Agency for accepting restrittions and the policy makers
outside the agency for imposing them, it is necessary to have clearly
in mind the nature of the decision making process in a project of
this sort in order to understand how the ultimate failure came about.

Inherent in this situation was a clear conflict between two goals,
a conflict of the sort familiar in recent American history. One ob-
jective was that, mainly through the various activities comprised in
this project, the Castro regime should be overthrown. The other
was that the political and moral posture of the United States before
the world at large should not be impaired, The basic method of
resolving this conflict of objectives that was resorted to was that of
attempting to carry out actions against Castro in such a manner that
the official responsibility of the U. S. Government could be disclaimed.

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for an understanding of the whole operation is an awareness of the
circumstances that did not contribute to the failure in the air.
Fortunately, it is possible to list without much possibility of
controversy the circumstances that led to the outcome in the air. First,
the nearest real estate that could be used was Puerto Cabezas in
Nicaragua a distance of over 800 miles from the target area. The
only way to avoid this: severe limitation on the capability of any but the
most modern aircraft would have been to use a base on U.S. territory.
Second, in choosing types of aircraft, no sort of plausible denial could
be maintained unless the project limited itself to the kinds of obsolete
aircraft that might plausibly be found in the hands of a privately financed
Cuban force. There was the further argument that it was desirable to
use types of aircraft that could have defected from the Castro Air Force.
The choice was thus rapidly narrowed down to B-26's. Third, policy
guidance throughout the project was to the effect that no U.S. air crews
could be committed to combat or placed where they might be involved in
combat. This restriction was not relaxed until the second day of the
invasion and then only in desperation. This had implications not only
for the quality of the air crews but also for the number that could be
assembled, screened for security, and trained within the time period

available.

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VIL

PERSONNEL

The Survey is critical of the Project's personnel management
in two major respects:

1) The Project was not staffed throughout with top-quality
people; and

2) A number of people were not used to the best advantage.
(Page 144, para. 7).

There are three basic difficulties common to the entire Survey
which are equally and perhaps especially applicable to the sections
on personnel and which make specific responsive answers almost
impossible. They are the existence of:

1) Unsupported allegations of fact as in paragraph 5 on page
42, which will be discussed further below.

2) Conclusions unsupported by facts as in paragraph 13 on
page 45 where a number of "obstacles" are stated in such general
terms as to make their understanding difficult or in paragraph 3 on
page 42 where it is stated that as a result of a number of factors
“none _of the most experienced, senior operating officers of the
Ag ency participated full time in the project. '' (Underlining supplied).

3) An admixture of allegations some of which apply to the DD/P
generally (e.g., lack of Spanish linguists, para. 9, page 44;

defective nature of entire CS staffing system, para. ll, page 44);

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17

relationship with WH was much closer than quite effective relationships
which it had with other Area Divisions having similar requirements.

The Survey devotes several pages to criticism of the WH-4
intelligence collection (pages 75-80) covering a number of points.
The most serious allegation is that the interpretation of intelligence
was "entrusted to officers who were so deeply engaged in preparations for
the invasion that their judgments could not have been expected to be
altbgether objective.'' (Para. 13, page 78). One of the essential items
referred to is the estimate regarding the effect of the strike force
landing in triggering ''an uprising among the Cuban population". (Para. 13,
page 78). The Survey's lack of understanding of the project's theory
on this point and the evidence for the judgments reached has been dis-
cussed in detail elsewhere.

It might be noted again that one of the supporting memoranda
to General Taylor's oral report concluded "we do not feel that any
failure of intelligence contributed significantly to the defeat", Moreover,
two members of General Taylor's four-man Cuban Study Group, even
in retrospect, still felt after hearing all the evidence that the operation
might have been successful had the Cuban air power been eliminated.

Probably if any similar effort were to be attempted in the future

an even greater association between DD/P and DD/I should be worked out

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-4- Enclosure D

b. CIA Representatives:

(1) Complete detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities
throughout Latin America.

10. D-2

a. DOD Representatives:

(1) Complete plans for provision of support from operational
forces as required.

b. CIA Representatives:

(1) Present final briefing on entire operation (if not given prior
to this date).

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27 January 1962

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Mr. Barnes' Memorandum on the IG Survey of the
Cuban Operation

1. As you are aware, Mr. Tracy Barnes did a mijor part of
the work in preparing our comments on Mr. Kirkpatrick's Survey
of the Cuban Operation. At the conclusion of the task, Mr. Barnes
wrote me the attached memorandum which I hereby pass on to you.

2. I may say that I am in agreement with Mr. Barnes that
the Survey, largely by reason of the omission of material relevant
to its conclusions, constitutes a highly biased document and that
the bias is of such a character that it must have been intentional.

3. Iwill be glad to discuss this with you if you so desire.

/s/ Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

Attachments
1. Barnes' Memo
2. %IG Memo to Mr. Barnes



This limited and purely technical maintenance of deniability

was less important to the decisions of the Executive Branch, however,
than the fact that no one in the Executive Branch was ready at any
point until after the defeat officially to avow U. S. support, Indeed,
this alternative was never seriously considered. Even the most in-
adequate fig leaf was considered more respectably than the absence

of any cover whatsoever. Indeed, the final changes in the operational
plan made in March, the official announcement in April that the
United States would not give support to the rebels, and the cancella-
tion of the D-Day strike were all last minute efforts to shore up the
plausible deniability of an enterprise for which Governmental support
was bound to be conclusively surmised even if it could not be proved.
These decisions were made by the senior policy makers of the
Government who were reading the newspapers every day and knew
well to what degree the project had in fact become "overt". These
men simply were not willing to state officially either that the United
States itself was about to make war on Cuba or that the U. S. Govern-
ment was openly supporting a group of Cubans, not even recognized

as a Government in exile, in a military invasion. In the aftermath of
failure this decision may have seemed a wrong one. Had the operation
succeeded reasonably quickly and without too much bloodshed, the

decision would probably have seemed a correct one. Be that as it may,

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12
Unit of seven people was developed to provide 24-hour coverage of direct
communications.

It can be asserted that Spanish speakers were available for all
needed uses. Some inconvenience may have been caused on occasion due
to not having even more Spanish speakers, but a lack of adequate Spanish
speakers cannot honestly be alleged as a ground for any major failure
in the project.

5. "Some of the people who served the project on contract were
incompetent." (Para. 10, page 44).

Undoubtedly, this statement has some basis in fact, but since
no more is said and the consequences to the Project not explained, a
reply is not possible in any manageable context.

6. Regarding the improper use of skilled personnel, the Survey
has little to say. Inadequate use of GS-16's is discussed above, The
only other comments in the Survey are:

a. "In a number of instances, those senior operating per-
sonnel in the field stations that did speak Spanish had to be interrupted
in their regular duties merely in order to act as interpreters." (Para. 9,
page 44). This is answered above.

b. "In many instances, case officers were used as ‘hand-
holders! for agents and technical specialists as stevedores."'

Surely any case officer does some handholding. Wherein this was

particularly serious in the project is not known nor indicated by the Survey.

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of the impending invasion was based on two considerations. First, it was
believed at the time that if the Brigade was to achieve unity and esprit de
corps, it must not be split by political rivalries and its officers must be
chosen on professional grounds. This clearly precluded control of the
Brigade, or even free access to it, by the political leaders. Second, the
insecurity of the Cubans was notorious. It was quite inconceivable that
they could know the details of times and places without the gravest risk
that the essential advantage of surprise would be lost. It was clear at
the time that the Agency assumed a significant risk in denying responsibility
to the Cubans and inevitably assuming this responsibility itself. No
evidence that has come to light during or since the invasion suggests

that military effectiveness and security could have been obtained without
paying that price.

c. The conclusions of this paper on the adequacy of the
military plan are really too complex to be summarized in a sentence or
two. All that can be said here is that (1) there was solid reason to believe
that it had a good chance of at least initial success; (2) the last minute
cancellation of the D-Day air strike significantly reduced the prospects
of success; (3) there was never a test of whether internal support for the
invasion would materialize on the scale and in the manner anticipated;

and (4) the main deficiencies in the plan and in the capabilities of the

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aorssern aT

10

later lists and, more specifically, what relation the rating for retention
purposes had to the performance on the Cuban Project. Obviously, the
teverse might also be true, i.e., an officer could receive a top rating
for retention purposes but still have poor qualities for the type of ur-
gent rather peculiar requirements existing in the Cuban Project.

4. "A very few project personnel spoke Spanish or had Latin-
American background knowledge." (Para. 9, page 44).

Obviously, it would be desirable for most officers ina project
of this sort to have both the language and area knowledge. Admittedly,
the Agency has not achieved this capability to the extent desired, and
probably never will. It must also be recognized that in special projects
like Cuba the personnel demands must be met in substantial part by
assignments based on functional experience even though the individual
assigned lacks area or language qualifications.

As to the Project itself, the need for Spanish should also be
analyzed. Obviously it was necessary primarily for those dealing with
Cubang.. Not all such officers, however, needed Spanish, since, for
example, PM instructors were quite able to perform effectively without
the language since they taught by showing and example. Actually, there
were Spanish-speaking trainers in Guatemala so this point is made only
for purposes of analysis. Moreover, the training job both on the ground
and in the air was never an issue as it was generally conceded to have been
excellent.

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FOP-Gaona—
8

of money involved, the omission of realities seems perhaps more
conspicuous in the maritime field.

One major omission, for example, is the effort made by the
Agency to find boats in the Navy and the Coast Guard. Although
such effort was made and both Services were thoroughly cooperative,
no usable boats could be found. Consequently, although the Agency
fleet was not what might have been desired, it was, of necessity,
obtained out of what could be found,

Another omission is any review of performance in relation
to difficulties. For example, under the circumstances, it is
suggested that the infiltration of 88,000 lbs. of materiel plus 79
bodies and the exfiltration of 51 bodies is a perfectly reasonable
performance. Moreover, the transportation of the Brigade to the
beachhead without hitch was surely a commendable operation.

As to supplies, the Survey criticizes the limited distribution
achieved geographically in Cuba, but the fact is that the distribution was
fairly good. This has been explained in an earlier section along with the
reasons why the central south coast was not covered.

As to the condition of ships and the money required for their
purchase and repair, no detailed discussion seems justified, although
the Survey devotes considerable space to these items. The only signi-
ficance of these allegations, it is felt, would be if, in the light of the

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made the decision to use whatever force is needed to achieve success.
If the political decisions necessary to facilitate the effective use of
force on an adequate scale, up to and possibly including the overt
commitment of U.S. military forces, are too difficult to make, then
the operation should be called off unless the odds in favor of success
within the politically imposed restrictions are very great.

It is a fact of life that the use of force by the U.S.(or any
major Western nation--the Communists seem to be judged by a
different standard) in an effort to influence the course of events in
another country is deeply unpopular with an important body of opinion.
Most of the damage to the political posture of the U.S. that is done
by such action occurs when the action is identified, whether on the
basis of evidence or of pure surmise, with the U.S, Once this point
of identification has been passed, it will almost invariably be true
that ultimate failure not only means loss of the original objective
but further exaggeration of the political damage. Ultimate success,
on the other hand, is the only way partially to retrieve and offset
the political damage. It is, therefore, only the part of wisdom to
reassess an undertaking of this sort when identification of the U.S.
Government with it has begun to occur or appears imminent and to

determine at that time either to insure success or to abandon it.

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He had a longstanding friendship with "Pepe" Figueres of Costa Rica and
President Betancourt of Venezuela which enabled him to muster some
pressure in the early days for a high position. In view, however, of his
lack of following, his resignation was of no significance whatsoever
contrary to the statement of the Survey (Para. 16, page 85).

c) From the moment the FRD was formed in May 1960 in
New York, the Cubans were aware of the importance attributed in the early
stages of the Project by their U.S. contacts to having FRD Headquarters
moved to Mexico. The Cubans opposed this move for a variety of
reasons--mostly personal and some, from their view point, political.
Had the Agency treated its counterparts as puppets, this move could have
been accomplished within a matter of weeks. However, in spite of
considerable pressures on the Agency, the principle of tactfyl persuasion
was relied upon and it was not until August 1960 that the FRD got to
Mexico and then it was only for a short time.

d) The establishment of FRD branch offices in numerous
Latin American countries was accomplished by the FRD Executive
Committee, with U.S. contacts merely playing an advisory role.

e) The aforementioned self-imposed system of parity and c

running the FRD by Committee resulted in less dynamic action than was

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SOP-SECRET
10

with the Navy and Navy officers in Defense was taking place. Nevertheless,
a full time Navy Captain in the project could have resulted in the adoption
of more imaginative methods which might possibly have produced greater
performance, Even in retrospect, however, it is not known what these
would have been.
1, The main specific criticisms of the Survey are:

a. Difficulties with crews particularly the'Barbara J".
There is no question that trouble was experienced with the Cuban crews.
One problem was that the Cubans, when recruited, thought that they were
going to control the ships. This impression could have been
given by Agency officers in good faith. At any rate, it soon became
apparent that such control was impossible, particularly for the landing
operation, Clearance was, therefore, requested by the Agency and
obtained to hire American masters plus a few American officers for
special posts (e.g., chief engineer, communications) on the main landing
ships. The heads of MSTS went to extensive pain and trouble to help the
Agency find such officers. When hired, however, they were resented
by the Cuban seamen, who felt that they had been deprived of their own
command and control, and time and circumstances did not permit shake-
down cruises. The consequence, particularly when the crews were first
put on board ship, was trouble, partly for the reason given and partly

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Moreover, the DCI, almost without exception, held three staff

meetings a week attended by his senior officials including the DD/P,
COPS, and A/DDP/A, When any significant matter relating to Cuba
needed approval or clarification, the DCI was briefed after one of these
meetings, These briefings and meetings plus continuous telephone
communications, plus cable traffic, kept the DCI current on all but

the smallest details.

The DD/P is criticized by the Survey for. "in fact directing the
project, although this was only one of his many responsibilities."

(Para. 1, page 36). Presumably the Survey did not mean to suggest
that the DD/P should have given up his other duties to be full time Task
Force Commander. Consequently, his alleged fault must have been a
failure to make a broad enough delegation of authppity.

The Survey defines the limitations on the DD/P delegated authority
by stating that C/WH/4 had "to apply constantly for the decision of policy
questions and important operational problems" to the DD/P. It is
suggested that, except in very unusual or certain "hot war" situations,
such reservation of authority is the normal one between any unit
commander and his next higher echelon. Moreover, until 17 April 1961
(the landing date) urgencies, although great, were never such as to make
this sort of review impossible. Undoubtedly it was irksome to C/WH/4

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9
post-Cuba, will in all likelihood have few similar projects in the
future, Surely this view would be reflected in initial lists prepared
by Divisions and would tend to be corrected as necessary during the
elaborate policy level review of the lists.

b. Ranking is competitive, and since many of the
project officers were not WH officers, they were ranked in the
retention lists initially by WH officers in competition with WH
officers for long term WH assignments. On this scale, they might
well come out badly regardless of their competence for the Cuban
Project. In the first place, if paramilitary officers, their speciality
is not in future demand; and if not WH area specialists, they would
be poor competitors with area specialists looking to a long term
future. They might, however, have been excellent officers in many
Cuban Project assignments without area knowledge.

ce. The initial lists were substantially revised for
the above and other reasons in subsequent reviews. Consequently,
by themselves they are of little validity.

Again, therefore, it is recommended that at the very least the
Survey's allegations in this respect be set aside until a more detailed
examination is possible covering the specific individuals in question;
why they were rated low on initial lists; did their ratings change on

Tension
TS #181884
Copy # /



oN

-2- TIDE 519
(IN 3197)

3. THE BRIGADE IS WELL ORGANIZED AND IS MORE HEAVILY
ARMED AND BETTER EQUIPPED IN SOME RESPECTS THAN U.S.
INFANTRY UNITS. THE MEN HAVE RECEIVED INTENSIVE TRAINING
IN THE USE OF THEIR WEAPONS INCLUDING MORE FIRING
EXPERIENCE THAN U.S, TROOPS WOULD NORMALLY RECEIVE. I
WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE SERIOUS ATTITUDE OF THE MEN AS
THEY ARRIVED HERE AND MOVED TO THEIR SHIPS. MOVEMENTS
WERE QUIET DISCIPLINED AND EFFICIENT AND THE EMBARKATION
WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH REMARKABLE SMOOTHNESS.

4, THE BRIGADE NOW NUMBERS 1400 A TRULY FORMIDABLE
FORCE.

5. IHAVE ALSO CAREFULLY OBSERVED THE CUBAN AIR
FORCES. THE AIRCRAFT ARE KEPT WITH PRIDE AND SOME OF THE
B-26 CREWS ARE SO EAGER TO COMMENCE CONTEMPLATED
OPERATIONS THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY ARMED THEIR AIRCRAFT.
GERMOSEN INFORMED ME TODAY THAT HE CONSIDERS THE B-26
SQUADRON EQUAL TO THE BEST U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON.

6. THE BRIGADE OFFICERS DO NOT EXPECT HELP FROM THE
U.S. ARMED FORCES. THEY ASK ONLY FOR CONTINUED DELIVERY

OF SUPPLIES. THIS CAN BE DONE COVERTLY.

COPY _/



SORE ORET
17

as stated by the Survey (para. 12, page 129) and mentioned earlier,
training in "security, basic clandestine tradecraft, intelligence col-
lection and reporting, propaganda and agitation, subversive activities,
resistance organization, reception operations, explosives and demo-
litions, guerrilla action and similar action."

There was, therefore, no lack of training doctrine or planning.
Incidentally, since it has been raised by the Survey (para. ll et seq.,
page 101), the air reception procedures taught to all agents were
those taught in the Agency School on this subject.

Regarding sites, it should be pointed out that, whether good or
bad, the Guatemala sites were the only ones available. The U.S.
was politically unacceptable and the Guatemala government was the
deciding element as to the sites in Guatemala that could be used.

The Survey says that the ground training base in Guatemala "obviously...
could not " accommodate 500 individuals. (Para. 10, page 127). The
fact was that it did plus many more and worked.

Similarly the initial situation at New Orleans was difficult.
(Para. 23, page 133). Again, however, the problems were adequately
corrected to provide adequate training. It took work and some help
from the Armed Services to get the base functioning but both occurred
and prevailed.

BER-BROREP TS #181884
Copy _/ _



Cuban force which may have contributed to the defeat have not been
touched on in the Survey.

d. The appraisal of the chances of success may well have
been faulty. The intelligence was generally good but it may have under-
estimated the skill with which the Castro forces would be directed, the
morale of the militia units he would deploy against the Brigade and
the effectiveness of any T-33's that remained in operation. There was
some exaggeration of the capabilities of both ground and air forces of
the invasion. It is impossible to say how grave was the error of
appraisal since the plan that was appraised was modified by elimination
of the D-Day air strike. Had the Cuban air been eliminated, all of these
estimates might well have been accurate instead of underestimated.
Probably, therefore, the primary fault lay in having one factor (i.e.,
the elimination of Cuban air) achieve so vital a significance to the whole
plan. Although the D-Day air strikes were essential to the destruction
of the Cuban air, no guaranty of such destruction was possible even
had there been authority for the strikes.

The conclusions summarized above bear on the correctness of
the Survey's allegations of deficiencies of execution and major errors
of judgment but for the purposes either of understanding what happened

or of learning how to avoid such a failure in the future, it is far from

TS #181884
Copy /



was within the terms of the top level approval and was operationally
sound was cleared by the DDCI on behalf of and at the direction of the
DCI,

The DCI never released the authority regarding over-all air planning
recommendations. The word "recommendations" is used because final
air plans decisions lay at a higher level outside of the Agency. Before
presentation to such outside authority (the Special Group or the White
House) these recommendations were first passed on within the Agency
by the DCI,

As far as reliance on military officers is concerned, the DCI obviously
received briefings which were mainly given by the DD/P but often the
DD/P presentation was expanded by statements from C/WH/4 (the Task
Force Commander) his Paramilitary Chief or other individuals connected
with the project as appropriate.

Both with regard to air and ground, the DCI also insisted upon and
received the advice and judgment of air and ground military officers
assigned by the Pentagon to study project plans and activities; of the JCS
as a body, and of individual members of the JCS. This entire process
has been explained elsewhere in this paper and is developed in considerable
detail in the supporting memoranda to General Taylor's oral report.

—teP-sESCRET— TS.#181884
Copy_f



ed

because of differences between the Cubans themselves. These latter

conflicts were unfortunate, but it is unknown how they could have
been discovered or anticipated during the recruitment unless more
time had been available. These problems, moreover, were ironed
out before the landing movement.in which these particular ships were
involved. In addition, the crews were effectively given good training
at Vieques as evidenced both by Captain Scapa's examination and the
later performance of the crews.

b. The Survey makes a great deal of the case of
one of the Masters of the ''Barbara J" who was discharged and sub-
sequently had his name included in a letter of commendation. (Paras.
24-25-26, pages 117-118). This case had a long history known to the
inspectors which unfortunately the Survey does not choose to mention.
Briefly, the Master was considered by MSTS as one of their best
men. In fact he was one of the youngest of their men (about 35) to
be made a Master. A strong personality difference arose between
him and one of the senior Agency contract employees who was to be
a central figure in the landing. This employee made charges against
the Master including a charge that the Master had been drinking on an
operational trip. He, therefore, demanded that the Master be dis-
charged. The case was such that under the circumstances the Agency

Sok seeRe TS #181884
Copy_/



C/WH could have been the Task Force Commander but the DCI,
having discussed the matter with C/WH, decided that, since C/WH could
not be the Commander and also run the rest of WH Division, it was
preferable for him to do the latter. Nevertheless, C/WH had long and
wide experience in the WH area; connections with many Latin Americans
as well as Americans with WH associations; intimacy with the WH
Division, its personnel and activities, and had been for many years at
a policy level in the Agency. Consequently, his advice and reactions
were wanted in the Cuban project and he was asked to stay as close to
project activities as he could while performing his other duties. The
matters listed above were, therefore, covered by C/WH pursuant to
this concept. Actually, C/WH had substantially the same relationship
to this project as he had to the Guatemalan anti-Arbenz project which
worked well. Nothing new, therefore, was involved.

The Chief of the Task Force (i.e. C/WH/4) is not criticized but his
superiors are criticized for selecting for this post only a GS-15 at the
fourth echelon in the organization of the Agency. With regard to grade,
the C/WH/4 was a senior GS-15 or, in other words, the equivalent of a
senior full colonel in the Army. More grade could hardly be required
for the top operational command job. As to competence and experience
for the post, it is felt that he will compare favorably with any officer in
the CS,

FOP Stet TS #181884
Copy _/



SECRET ae

-h.

a. The DCI should resolve to his own satisfaction
the conflicts on major issues between the I.G.'s Survey and
your Analysis. Since both these documents are internal to
the Agency, there is no Agency position on the Cuban opera-
tion unless the conflicts are resolved. In view of the
importance of and the continuing interest in the operation
at high levels of the Government, an Agency position seems
essential. Such a position is also-important for the
future. The operation is bound to be studied for various
reasons and there should be an Agency position at least as
to what happened,.what were the mistakes and what were the
lessons. Moreover,.the DCI, having assumed office after
the operation was thoroughly finished,. has every reason for
wanting: to have some definitive findings and conclusions.

b. If the DCI agrees with a. above each recipient
of.the Survey. and Analysis (and it is-understood that they
will only be distributed together) should be advised. of the
fact that such an Agency position is being sought. This
might help to avoid independent conclusions outside of the
Agency being reached first.

ec. The following requirements should be imposed
on all future I.G. surveys at least on any aspects of the
DD/P area of responsibility.

1) _No survey shall be undertaken without
specific written terms of reference approved by
the DCI.

2) The DD/P shall be satisfied that in each
future survey covering any portion of his area of
responsibility the I.G. or his staff will inter-
view at least all officers having had responsibility
for any part of the activity inspected by the
I.G. and prior to the distribution of the survey
the DD/P and each such officer will be given an
opportunity to express his views on points in-
cluded in the Survey. Obviously the I.G. need not
accept these views. Such procedure, however, will
save an enormous amount of time required to answer



POP GECRET
16

Moreover, if results are any criteria, the training sites were
adequate. As far as the Brigade and its air arm are concerned, the
conclusions of impartial experts (i.e., the JCS team) regarding the
competence achieved are recorded in writing. The performance of
the trainees on the beachhead is further proof. The training of the
landing ships' crews at Vieques was good and effective in operation.
The training in Panama was excellent on all reports as was the
screening and handling of personnel to be trained at Useppa Island,
The Nino Diaz group at New Orleans was, according to all observers,
well trained and ready to fight. Its failure to land was due to poor
leadership and not the fault of the troops.

The communications training has always been reported as
excellent and the Survey itself commends the communications effort,
Practice also established that the trained agent communicators in
Cuba had far fewer garbles in their messages than normally found in
such transmissions.

The agents, who were trained (and all those who were infiltrated
as agents were given training), received courses in how to live black;
some weapons and demolitions training; some CE; air reception and
how to handle drops; resistance organization and how to contact

underground groups. The teams who were to be infiltrated received,

—POP-sBGRS TS # 181884

Copy_/ _



extent, particularly in the summer and fall of 1960 as the organization

was being set up, but the Survey does not give enough specifics to enable
direct answer, and undue or serious duplication is not remembered. As

to confusion of channels, there was surely some confusion in the early days
on Washington-Miami calls, but in the fall of 1960, rules were established
which, it is believed, adequately clarified this problem. The division of
control on maritime assets was intended, namely, the small boats were
considered tactical and were under Miami control, the big boats strategic
and were, therefore, kept under Headquarters control in order to keep them
available for and ready to support the main landing. As far as is known,
this division of control, which is considered to have been sound, caused no
real difficulty.

2.) Miami allegedly received almost no intelligence support (paras.
15-18, pages 79-80). The general nature of these allegations plus a failure
to indicate what the alleged consequences of the errors were once more
make it difficult to answer directly. Obviously, there was no intention to
deprive Miami of needed support and no Miami operation is known to have
failed because of lack of operational intelligence. Beach areas and the in-
ternal Cuban situation were as well known to Miami as to Washington.

(See para. 17, page 80). U-2 photography did not go to Miami, but it was
not needed for any of the Miami decisions. Also, it was available in

TS #181884
Copy # /



~FOn-SHERETTM

@ ENCLOSURE C
. POST RECOGNITION PHASE

The Departments and the Agency will prepare, coordinate and execute,
as appropriate, such contingency plans as may be required and will,
moreover, plan for the resumption of their regularly assigned functions in

relation to the new Cuban government.

- TS #181884
e Por sEeneL. Copy # 7



POP SSSREP

V. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE PLAN

As stated above one of the considerations raised by the Agency's
capability to perform the operation is the question of what it thought the
chances of success to be and if, as was the case, these were thought to
be good, how reasonable this conclusion was in the light of the known
facts. An examination of the adequacy of the military plan is essential
to a resolution of this latter point.

Whatever conclusions or inferences may be drawn from the defeat
of the Brigade, no one can deny that, in the absence of the planned D-Day
dawn air strikes, the operational plan was never tested. Perhaps these
air strikes would have had no significant effect but in view of the essentiality
of eliminating Castro's air force, it can be asserted that without these
air strikes the plan never had a chance. No issue has received more
thorough analysis since the failure of the operation than the decision to
cancel, Although the Survey fails to tell the full story, it is felt that
nothing can be gained from further review. There. is no doubt, however,
that the informed military view without exception and at all times was
that complete control of the air was absolutely vital.

(N.B. The Survey's statement indicating that ''two of the

President's military advisors, both members of the Joint

Chiefs" did not understand this principle is considered

inaccurate.)

POPSECRET— TS #181884
Copy _/



-3-

were other facts with respect to the distribution
of the Survey worthy of mention. C/WH/I was
called one day and asked if he wanted to read the
Survey. He said that he would like to do so but
since both C/WH and DC/WH were away he could not
‘Jeave since he was Acting Chief of the Division.
Particularly, he could not meet the requirements
of the offer which were that he would only have
an hour from the time of the telephone call to
see the Survey (including travel time) since it
then had to be sent to the printer. Why the
urgency was so great is not clear. As far as.is
known, only one individual outside of the I.G.
Steff saw.the Survey in final or substantially
final form before it was distributed, namely, an
officer who was the Chief of Operations for WH/4
during the project. Why. he was selected instead
of one of his superiors who was connected with the
project is not known.

4) Since this particular operation, without
question, involved more political interest and
dynamite than any in which the Agency has ever
participated, there was every reason for following
regular procedures meticulously. In addition to
the distribution point mentioned above, it seems
relevant to wonder how Dr. Killian and the Attorney
General knew of the Survey's existence 50 a5 to
request a copy.

5. I should say that, whatever the appearance of the fore-
going, I have not been trying to I.G. the I.G. The information
reported came to me unsolicited and in the normal course of my
work with you and your Analysis. Maybe there is additional
evidence of importance, but I have not looked for it and do not
plan to do so.

6. The significance of the foregoing is to provide the

reasons for the main purpose of this memorandum, i.e., the sub-
mission of the following recommendations for action.



FORGHGRET
-13-

been greater (with or without the D-Day strike) if it had been possible to

assemble and commit to action more trained Cuban or U.S. air crews.

D. Washington Decision Making

These, then, were the circumstances which together led to defeat
in the air and made inevitable a defeat on the ground. Several things are
notable about them. In the first place, it should be emphasized that these
all trace back to Washington decisions. The defeat in the air cannot be
blamed on bad maintenance at Puerto Cabezas, or ona shortage of spare
parts or fuel. It cannot be blamed on a shortage of B-26's, inasmuch as
it proved possible rapidly to replace losses from the U.S. It cannot be
blamed on the cowardice or lack of skill of the Cuban air crews, who
by and large gave a good account of themselves. Nor can it be attributed
to bad tactical decisions made either at Puerto Cabezas or in the
Washington command post. The crucial defeat in the air was to no
significant degree the result of bad execution. It was directly and un-
ambiguously attributable to a long series of Washington policy decisions.

Before exploring the touchy question of whose decisions these
were and how they were made, the implications of this conclusion deserve
emphasis and elaboration. It suggests that the bad organization,

improperly drawn lines of command, low quality personnel and operational

TS #181884
POR-SEGREE Copy /



these Cuban utterances in the press are accepted as fact in the Survey,

particularly when considerable documentary evidence to the contrary was
available to the Survey team.

Before analyzing the Survey's above conclusions, it is important to
examine various aspects and complexities of what the Survey calls "exile
leaders". First, one must differentiate between the political and
military leaders. Second, one must recognize the pressures which
existed within each of these two groups. Third, one should understand
what the term "leadership" meant within the Miami Cuban exile
community.

From the very beginning of the Project it was evident that there wer
considerable differences of opinion--on almost all important questions--
among Cuban exiles of varying political shades and leadership capabilities
Clearly, there was unanimity on the desirability and need to overthrow
Castro; but during the great debate on how to accomplish this, two main
trends became discernible: the activists, principally the military element
in this category, wanted to fight. Political considerations meant little
to this segment of exiles who believed political solutions would evolve
automatically after Castro's demise. As a matter of fact, they had the

greatest contempt for "the politicians". On the other hand, the

FOP-SECRET— TS #181884

Copy _/



in the same way that any higher authority is considered a problem to a
commander who is anxious to push ahead without hurdles or outside
restraint.

Quite apart from these considerations, however, the DD/P, because
of the requirement to clear outside of the Agency many issues (including
details) as policy questions, had to maintain a close control over the
project in order to guard against omissions of such outside clearances
and to be in a position to request them through the DCI,

To avoid delays in communications between WH and the DD/P, the
A/DDP/A spent substantially full time on the project. His position was
thoroughly understood by all involved though a purist chart-maker might
have felt some concern as to the proper designation of the job on a chart.
A/DDP/A was, in fact, an extension of the DD/P arm. He was physically
located next to the DD/P; saw him constantly; had immediate access to
him whenever he was available, and, therefore, knew instinctively what
the DD/P reaction to most problems was and would be.: Consequently,
he could act for him in many instances while at the same time being fully
aware of those situations which should be brought to the DD/P for decision.
If chart terms are necessary, he was a senior special assistant with a
perfectly clear and understood delegation of authority on matters which
he could decide for the DD/P. This individual's availability plus the

FCOR-SECRET— TS #181884

Copy _/



OR SeRiat
-18-

measure of either the improvement in the chances of success that would
have resulted from say, permission to use American air crews in over-
flights or of the decrease in deniability that would have resulted there-
from. Each of many such decisions had to be discussed and made on
its own merits, and in almost all of them several agencies had to take
part.

One of the consequences of this state of affairs was that prompt
decisions were hard to obtain. Another was that, like so many inter-
departmental decisions, these were subject to differing interpretations
by different participants in the process, Delays and differences of
interpretation were compounded by the constantly changing situation
both of Cuba and the Castro regime on the one side and of the opposi-
tion on the other, which would have rendered rigid and entirely orderly
planning difficult under the best of circumstances.

The nature of the decision making process had other consequences
as well, It explains in large measure the failure to write tidy and com-
prehensive plans and have them properly approved in writing by compe-
tent authority well in advance, It explains why there was a long
succession of alternate plans and of modification to plans under consid-
eration, Above all, the constant weighing of costs and benefits in the

effort to satisfy the military requirements for success without excessive

TS #181884
ToRcEeRET Copy _/



in State by A/DDP/A and others was almost ona daily basis on Cuba

alone; and members of WH/4 also had substantially daily contact (on
Cuba) with General Erskine's office in Defense (General Lansdale, the
Deputy) regarding Defense support and details of the preparation for the
possible "invasion".

President Eisenhower, in addition to the 29 November 1960 meeting
referred to in the Survey, held a further detailed meeting on 3 January
1961 so that with these plus the reports which he received from Mr. Gray
and others he was personally familiar with the status of the project at the
time he left office.

Also as the result of an understanding first worked out with
General Bonesteel of the JCS and later adopted by the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Defense and the DCI, a Task Force (or committee) was
created chaired by Ambassador Willauer with representatives of State
(Assistant Secretary Mann and his deputy, Mr. Coerr); JCS (General
Gray and other military members of his staff); and CIA (A/DDP/A and
C/WH/4 or when absent, his deputy). Later William Bundy of Assistant
Secretary of Defense Nitze's office joined the Task Force. The Task
Force was responsible for examining the project with a view to determining
what actions should be considered which were either not covered by existing
plans or necessary to support existing plans. Ambassador Willauer
reported to the Special Group at its meetings of 12 and 19 January 1961.

Ponto TS #181884
Copy_/



POPSECRET
-2-

-involving an effort to maintain clandestinity. Since most of the opera-
tional acts involved in paramilitary projects of this nature raise or could,
under certain circumstances, raise significant political issues, they
normally require high level political clearance prior to being undertaken.
Such clearance involves at least the State Department, often the White
House, and, due to military implications, the Defense Department plus
one or more of the military services. The description in another section
of this paper of the extensive participation by and with other elements of
the Government indicates that the Cuban project was clearly of this
troublesome type.

The Survey's failure to examine or consider these relationships means
that most of its criticisms limited as they are to Agency consideration
alone, are too localized or provincial to be realistic or fully understandable
An analysis will, however, be attempted.

The criticism of command lines is, if properly understood, directed
essentially at two major defects, one that the project lacked a single,
high-level full time commander possessing stated broad powers and
abilities sufficient for carrying out the mission; the other that there was
a fragmentation of authority between the project chief, the military chief
of the project's Paramilitary Staff and several high level officials, whose

~wide responsibilities elsewhere in the Agency prevented them from giving

the project the attention it required. (Para. 5, page 37).

POR SECREF~ TS #181884
Copy_/



~30-

aspect in which such operations can be kept clandestine is by
successfully concealing :the part played by the U.S. Government.

It is a necessary condition for the preservation of such
deniability that no unwitting individual acquire hard evidence of
Governmental participation but this is by no means a sufficient
condition. If it comes to be widely believed even in the absence
of hard evidence that the U.S. Government is assisting or
participating in an illegal activity, then a considerable part of the
benefit that accrues from deniability has already been lost. After
all, the effect on public opinion depends on what is believed by that
part of the public with which the policy makers are for the moment
concerned. There may still remain, however, a benefit to be
derived from deniability after the public has decided that the denials
are false because the Governnient can still maintain a formally
"correct" posture. The Soviets frequently derive advantage from
this limited official deniability. As a rule,however, the advantages
that accrue to a Western Government, with a lively and at least
partly hostile press and with statesmen who shrink from the

utterances of flat untruths, are limited.

TS #181884
—POP-SEGCRET Copy _/



exclusive control of these activities; they also demanded that the FRD be
the only channel for U.S. dealings with any segment of the internal
Cuban opposition or the Cuban exile community. On the latter point the
Department of State did not agree; on the former, the Agency could not
acquiesce because of operational considerations. Moreover, on the former
point there was a strong feeling throughout the U.S. Government that it
would be wrong to permit the FRD to be ina position to rule out any

Cuban elements which might have usable internal Cuban assets. It was
clear at least by December 1960 that the effort to broaden the member-
ship of the FRD to the point where it included all political acceptable
elements of the opposition had failed and that the effort of its members

to use it to advance their own political fortunes within the exile

community was resented. All elements of the U.S. Government were
agreed that it could not be an exclusive chosen instrument with a

monopoly of governmental support. These problems were certainly not

the product of coercion.

g) The inability of the FRD Cubans again--because of their
incessant preoccupation with political advantage--to establish an effective
paramilitary recruiting mechanism within the Project deadlines called

for the utilization of Cuban officers and men outside the FRD channel.

—0R-fsenkle TS #181884
Copy _/



TOP SECRET

2

some of which apply to the government or the Department of Defense
(e.g., problems with Armed Forces, para. 13, page 45); and some
relate to the Project.

An effort, however, will be made to be specific in reply and
where this is impossible to indicate the difficulty. Regarding in-
adequate competence in staffing, it should be stated that the Survey
mentions no names. A somewhat general response is, therefore,
unavoidable, but to be reasonably specific, it has been felt that
the names and the backgrounds of a number of the senior officers
in the project, excluding the DD/P, A/DDP/A, and C/WH, would
be helpful in determining the managerial judgments in this selection.
(See Annex A). Support personnel, including communications, have
not been included since the Survey is rightly complimentary of their
performance. (Page 45, para. 12; page 145, lines 5-7).

A major criticism by the Survey in connection with personnel
assignments was an alleged failure to carry out a statement made
by the DCI in April 1960 that he would do anything necessary to
provide the personnel needed for success. In fact, this was given
substantial recognition. On 15 April 1960, the practice was estab-

lished that if the Project wished to secure the services of a particular

TOP SECRE T
TS #181884

Copy # /



-PUPSECRET
~14-

inadequacies alleged by the Survey were not in the actual event
responsible for the military failure. If organization and execution
had approached perfection, the invasion would still have failed in the
absence of more and larger pre-D-Day air strikes or the use of more
modern aircraft from U.S. bases.

To be sure, this conclusion derives from anzanalysis only of the
failure to gain control of the air. It is arguable that even if control
of the air had been achieved, maintained, and exploited, the beachhead
would not have been consolidated nor the Regime ultimately overthrown.
Without arguing that point here, however, the evidence strongly suggests
that if the Brigade had been defeated by ground action under these
more favorable circumstances, it would have been because of errors of
planning and conception rather than by errors of execution. The Brigade
fought long enough to prove its determination and tactical skill. It
appears to have been well handled by its officers. There were ample
supplies at hand to support continued ground action. And Castro himself
has admitted that the terrain was well chosen. Given control of the air,
the Brigade might ultimately have been defeated by a complete failure

of any resistance to materialize under conditions which would have

TS #181884
—FOP-SECRET Copy /



-2- Enclosure A

2. Department of Defense representatives will:

a. Continue to provide training and logistic support to the Cuban
Volunteer Force as requested by CIA.

b. Prepare logistics plans for arms, ammunition, and equipment
support beyond the capabilities of the initial CIA logistics support.

c. Prepare plans for provision of support from operational forces
as required.

d. Prepare letter of instruction to the Services, CINCLANT and
CONAD for support of this operation.

e. Keep CINCLANT planners informed.

3. CIA representatives will:

a. Establish a Central Office from which Executive Department and
Agency representatives will coordinate planning and conduct operations.

b. Continue to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible and
required.

c. Assist in the organization of a Free Cuba Government.

d. Conduct an interrogation of two or three members of the Cuban
Volunteer Force to determine full extent of their knowledge of actual facts
and provide information to the President as soon as possible.

e. Finalize detailed plans for the employment of the Volunteer Force
in Cuba and follow up plans. Execute these plans on order.

f. Continue to recruit, train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force.

g. Prepare detailed plans for establishing contact with the internal
opposition, establishing such control, coordination and support of this
opposition as may be desirable and feasible.

h. Exert effort to arrange defection of key Cuban personnel.
(N.B: The defection of the military commander of the Isle of Pines, or
at least officers who could control the Isle, would be particularly desirable. )

TS #181884

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e. The Cuban Task Force as presently constituted
has a unified force with a single Headquarters. If and when it
should seem desirable to establish a forward Headquarters or
a Field Command having responsibility for military operations
in which air and other forces will be employed, the constitution
of any such Field Command and its command channels to CTF
Headquarters will require careful consideration. The desirability
of such a combined Field Command and relationship between the
CTF Air Section (DPD) and air assets committed in Field operations
will be considered when military plans are more nearly complete,

(signed)
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)



in projects of this kind operating necessities are handled in the best possible
way. Agents are often used without adequate training in the hope of getting
some benefits; training sites are often inadequate but are accepted as the
only available ones in view of all applicable conditions; operational equip-
ment is not selected as being the best for the job but the best for the job

in the ‘light of applicable limitations; drop zones, reception committees
and internal organization are rarely what would be described as ideal in
the training text book. Communications are difficult, zones hard to
identify and agents are on the run and harassed. Since the Survey at no
point suggests the existence of these problems, some reference to their
presence seems essential.

The hotel room as a training site for parachute jumping is only one of
many examples of the Survey applying unrealistic criteria. We repeat
what has been previously stated that the project surely had many faults
but they should be tested against what was possible not against a theoretical
and impossible ideal.

Moreover, the Survey provides some evidence inconsistent with the
foregoing. In paragraph 5 on page 126 the care taken in Selection and
screening of Useppa Island trainees is described. Paragraph 12 on page
129 sets forth the training given to 178 trainees originally prepared for
infiltration. "In all," the Survey states, "178 men (including 23 radio

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acceptable, since not operationally fatal, even though aggravating to those
involved (i.e., mainly Miami officers). Of course, overflight decisions
had_to come to Washington as did landings of any substantial amounts of
materiel. Small exfiltration and infiltration operations could have been
decided in Miami but policy limitations, such as no entry into Cuban
territorial waters of boats having Americans aboard, made close
Washington supervision advisable. Moreover, delay in obtaining decisions
on these latter type operations was especially minimal since in substantially
all of these cases WH/4 was authorized to make the decision. Actually,

as pointed out by the Survey, Headquarters seldom had any difference of
view with Miami. (Para. 27, pagel18).

As far as PM results were concerned, the statistics were that in
mid-April 1961, 43 trained PM agents (these are in addition to the 31 FI
agents mentioned in Para. 10, page 70 of the Survey) were on the ground
in Cuba of which 13 were regularly functioning, non-doubled radio operators
and four more were radio operators but in reserve since they had no sets
of their own. The geographic distribution of both these agents and radio
operators was pretty good, covering most of the island.

The maritime operations handled by Miami had by mid-April landed
88,000 pounds of materiel (which with the 27,800 lbs. actually delivered
by air provided the resistance up to 17 April with a total of 115,800 lbs. ),

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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to an understanding of the
nature of and the reasons for the failure of the Cuban operation and in so
doing to suggest what are the correct lessons to be learned therefrom. It
is prompted by and is, for the most part, a commentary on the IG Survey.

That document gives a black picture of the Agency's role in this
operation. It makes a number of different kinds of allegations.

First, there are numerous charges of bad organization and incompete:
execution, including specifically criticisms of: command relationships;
the quality of personnel; the internal operational planning process; the
conduct of maritime and air operations; and the collection and evaluation
of intelligence. These deficiencies are portrayed as responsible for the
failure to build up and supply resistance organizations under rather
favorable conditions.

Second, and more serious is the allegation of major errors of
judgment, notably (a) the decision to convert the project into what rapidly
became an overt military operation beyond the Agency's capability, (b)
the treatment of the Cuban exiles as "puppets", (c) the inadequacy of the
military plan for the invasion, and (d) the failure "to appraise the chances
of success realistically".

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I, THE SURVEY'S STATEMENTS OF THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

The Survey quite accurately refers to changes in the "military" plan
which occurred on a number of occasions prior to the adoption of the final
plan (i.e., the Zapeta plan), The final plan, however, is the only one
here considered except that earlier plans will be discussed to the extent
that they are relevant to it.

As described by the Survey, the attack involved about 1500 ''combat-
trained and heavily armed soldiers" in an "overt.assault-type amphibious
landing" (page 46, para. 4) on certain beaches on the Zapata Peninsula
on the south coast of Cuba. The troops had been moved by air on three
successive wights from a Guatemalan training camp to the staging area
in Nicaragua where they embarked ¢1 ships which had been pre-loaded at
New Orleans.

"The ships had rove? on separate courses from

Nicaragua, under unobtrusive Navy escort, to the rendezvous 40

miles offshore in order to avoid the appearance of a convoy. From

there they had moved in column under cover of darkness to a

point 5000 yards from the landing area, where they met the

Navy LSD, These complicated movements were apparently

accomplished in a secure manner and without alerting the enemy. "

(Page 29, para. 87).

The intention was to seize a "coastal strip about 40 miles long, separated

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Vit.

THE POLITICAL FRONT AND RELATIONS WITH THE CUBANS.

One of the conclusions of the Survey (as stated in para. 3 on page 143
was "as the project grew, the Agency reduced the exile leaders to the statu
of puppets, thereby losing the advantages of their active participation".
This summarizes the Survey's general criticism of the handling of the
Cuban leaders. Two more specific criticisms are made at least by
inference in the discussion of this matter in the body of the Survey. The
first was that the decision in November 1960 to consider requests for
paramilitary aid from groups other than the FRD "complicated relations
between Project case officers and the FRD leaders," and "appears to
have resulted in some diffusion of effort". It also "seriously hampered
progress toward FRD unity, sharpened internal FRD antagonisms, and
contributed to the decline in strike force recruiting efforts". The second
criticism is that the Agency prevented close contact between the political
leaders, first of the FRD and later of the CRC, and the military forces in
training in Guatemala. The Survey states (para. 36, page 92) that "this
was probably a mistake and an unreasonable interference in the Cubans’
management of their own affairs. Controlled contact between the FRD
and the troops would have done much to improve morale and motivation

of the troops and make the training job easier".

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amount of time accorded the project by the DD/P personally meant that

the Task Force was able to obtain decisions from the DD/P level rapidly
provided that they were in the DD/P's jurisdictional competence. The
many decisions already mentioned which required outside clearance had

to be obtained either in accordance with regular procedures as in the case
of the Special Group or by special arrangement if some other tribunal

such as the White House was involved. The DD/P and the A/DDP/A were
both positioned effectively with respect to the senior Agency or non-Agency
officers involved to be able to arrange on the most expeditious basis
possible whatever high level consideration might be required in given
situations.

All existing decision-making procedures were, itis believed, well
understood or if a new clearance procedure was needed for recurring
activities, a special procedure was created. An example is the procedure
for clearance of Cuban overflights, dated 24 October 1960, which is
attached as Annex A.

The Survey criticized C/WH because he was "in the chain of command"
but "only in a partial sense". (Para. 2, page 36). He signed many outgoing
cables, supervised staffing activities and attended some of the meetings of
the Special Group. "But the DD/P and his deputy dealt directly with the
project chief, and gradually the Ghief of WH Division began to play only

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Study Group) immediately held continuous hearings receiving testimony
from all possible informed witnesses including a number of individuals
who had been on the Zapata beachhead, General Taylor filed no written
report but gave the President an interim oral report on 16 May 1961 and
wrote the President on 13 June 1961 that he was ready to make his final
report orally, which he did thereafter. The oral reports were supported
by four memoranda which are here referred to as they provide a far more
complete review of all aspects of the military portion of the operation than
given above or in the Survey. Brief references to certain of these

memoranda are made hereafter. /

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