No. 244, July 2009 Strategic Forum 1

for several higher priority objectives—for 

example, incentivizing China to participate in a 

wider follow-on strategic nuclear arms reduction process, or bringing greater international 

pressure to bear on nuclear proliferators such 

as Iran. However, these spinoff benefits would 

not be sufficient to warrant high costs in terms 

of major concessions of U.S. strategic interests 

relative to Russia. Any such costs could only be 

justified by the inclusion of favorable external 

linkages, meaning explicit Russian offsets 

to address higher priority nuclear dangers in 

return for concessions favoring Moscow’s strategic interests. The Obama administration will 

therefore need to carefully weigh this overarching cost-benefit equation as it navigates the 

complexities of the first major strategic arms 

control talks in almost a decade.

(Re)launching 

Negotiations

Although the strategic arms reductions 

required by the Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (START) have long since been fulfilled, 

there are sound reasons to preserve aspects of 

this legacy treaty beyond December 5, 2009.1

While few have seen this as a top national 

security priority, there has been no real dispute about the desirability of trying to extend 

at least some START elements, most notably its longstanding verification provisions. 

If nothing else, these proven mechanisms 

underpin the standalone reductions in operationally deployed strategic warheads that the 

Confronted by a daunting array of 

nuclear threats, and having pledged to 

reinvigorate the application of disarmament 

tools to address these dangers, the Obama 

administration has decided to focus its initial 

efforts on negotiating a new bilateral agreement with Russia to replace the Cold War–era 

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), 

which expires at the end of this year. 

Critics have suggested that reviving the 

U.S.-Russian strategic disarmament agenda 

is at best a distraction from a host of more 

pressing security challenges that the United 

States needs to address now and in the years 

ahead. There is no debate that it would be 

useful from a U.S. perspective to preserve 

the transparency that START provides. But 

Washington has little to gain directly, at least 

in traditional military terms, from further 

reductions in the legacy arsenal of its erstwhile 

Cold War adversary. By contrast, for reasons 

both political and military, Russia has an urgent 

incentive to achieve a strategic parity through 

negotiations that it otherwise could not sustain. 

The key issue thus becomes whether the Obama 

administration can achieve a modest agreement 

at little cost, or alternatively leverage the 

negotiations to gain a wider set of benefits 

beyond the straightforward bilateral reductions 

in question.

The analysis deduces that a positive outcome would provide modest ancillary benefits 

 Strategic Forum No. 244

July 2009

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

Aligning Disarmament to Nuclear 

Dangers: Off to a Hasty START?

by David A. Cooper

more recent Moscow Treaty requires by 2012.2

As then–Secretary of State Colin Powell noted 

in submitting the Moscow Treaty to President 

George W. Bush in 2002, “START’s comprehensive verification regime will provide the 

foundation for confidence, transparency and 

predictability in [these] further strategic offensive reductions.”3

 Largely with the aim to preserve this transparency infrastructure, the 

Bush administration responded positively 

to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s call 

in 2006 for talks on a new treaty to replace 

START, which began in March 2007. However, 

this effort never produced a common understanding on the basic shape of a new agreement. Both sides agreed early on that they did 

not want to extend START per se. But whereas 

the United States simply wanted to enhance 

the Moscow Treaty with transparency measures drawn from, or, in some cases, going 

beyond START, Russia sought an entirely 

new treaty that would effectively supersede 

the Moscow Treaty. Its main goal was to shift 

the operative unit of account for Moscow 

Treaty reductions from deployed warheads to 

the START formula focusing on delivery systems.4

 Fundamentally, the Bush administration viewed the Moscow Treaty approach as 

advantageous to U.S. interests, and therefore 

was unwilling to contemplate superseding this 

basic framework merely for the sake of extending verification measures.5

Breaking through this impasse soon after 

taking office, President Barack Obama in April 
2 Strategic Forum No. 244, July 2009

jointly announced with his Russian counterpart a mandate for new bilateral negotiations to conclude a legally binding treaty by 

December that would reduce strategic offensive 

arms below Moscow Treaty levels with effective verification measures.6

 The President in 

essence relaunched the negotiations by readily 

acceding to a key Russian aim—a new treaty 

to replace START and de facto to supersede the 

Moscow Treaty—with the dramatic additional 

incentive of deeper cuts. In agreeing to this 

mandate, President Obama raised the stakes 

significantly over his predecessor’s efforts, not 

least by setting an aggressive negotiating deadline that all but ensured that these negotiations would loom large as his administration’s 

first defining disarmament test.7

The initial joint presidential statement 

was conspicuously open to interpretation on 

whether the further reductions at the heart of 

a new post-START treaty would be based on 

START counting rules, the Moscow Treaty formula, a hybrid approach, or an entirely novel 

framework.8 Several months of negotiations 

only partially resolved this most fundamental 

of questions. The framework agreement that 

emerged from the July 2009 Moscow summit 

provides for reductions in strategic delivery 

vehicles below START limits (on the face of it, 

a major additional U.S. concession), as well 

as parallel cuts in warheads below Moscow 

Treaty limits. However, only broad numerical ranges are specified (500–1,100 strategic delivery vehicles, 1,500–1,675 warheads), 

leaving the actual numeric ceilings for negotiation.9

 Significantly, the summit agreement 

also suggests that new or modified definitions will be developed (that is, new counting rules), but here too defers this issue to 

the negotiations.10 Beyond needing to resolve 

these basic questions of what is being limited and to what levels, the negotiators will 

face a variety of complex and thorny technical issues, possibly even including longstanding START compliance disputes.11 Moreover, 

this will all need to be worked through in 

an unprecedentedly truncated negotiating 

timeframe.12 As veteran Russian arms control expert Pavel Podvig notes, “Let’s hope it 

works, because the road to a new treaty won’t 

be easy.”13

Indeed, the challenges are such that, 

realistically, to conclude an agreement, the 

Obama administration will likely confront 

a choice among lowering its sights, postponing its timeline, or striking a hard bargain on 

a multifarious package of reciprocal concessions that is sure to include difficult tradeoffs, 

including possible linkages to cognate issues. 

This begs the fundamental question: What 

does the United States stand to gain from this 

new treaty, and what costs should it be willing to pay to get it?

Before examining post-START through 

the prism of U.S. interests, it is important 

to understand the analogous calculus in 

Moscow, where these negotiations represent 

a vital national priority. Partly this reflects 

the understandable political attraction for 

the Dmitriy Medvedev–Vladimir Putin government—with its proclivity to score points 

domestically by being perceived to restore 

Russian clout internationally—to share a 

spotlight on the world stage as a coequal of 

the United States. Just consider the presidential signing ceremony for the post-START 

framework agreement, replete with summit imagery evoking nostalgic echoes from 

two world orders ago. But underneath this 

political symbolism lies a deeper military 

imperative. Russia still openly views the 

United States and its North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) Allies as latent adversaries and relies on nuclear weapons to offset 

its substantial conventional military disadvantage. However, because even in this regard 

it lacks the wherewithal to maintain its strategic force levels over time, it needs deeper 

reciprocal reductions, particularly in delivery 

vehicles, to maintain any semblance of strategic equivalency with the United States. As 

an article co-authored in 2008 by the current 

U.S. chief negotiator for post-START observes, 

“The Russian triad has been shrinking and, 

regardless of any treaty, will have no more 

than 1,800–2,000 warheads by 2012, of 

which about 70 percent will be deployed on 

obsolete delivery systems or launchers with 

an extended service life.”14 Russia’s overarching goal is therefore to use these post-START 

negotiations to attain a greater level of military parity than it could otherwise hope to 

sustain under current arrangements.

Specific Russian objectives for the negotiations are predictable and to some extent 

already discernable in the nascent talks.15

These are likely to include:

■ locking in quantitative strategic parity 

at a level that Russia can sustain (which presumably is no higher than the 1,500 warhead 

upper limit that Russia sought during the 

fruitless START III talks in the late 1990s)

■ eliminating the hedge that the United 

States preserves to rapidly reconstitute its strategic forces by “uploading” stored warheads 

on existing delivery platforms while at the 

same time preserving the vast advantage that 

Russia enjoys in its capacity to reconstitute its 

warhead numbers through new production16

■ avoiding qualitative restrictions so 

Russia can continue its aggressive modernization program within new numeric limits17

■ excluding entirely any constraints 

on nonstrategic nuclear forces where Russia 

enjoys a staggering advantage.18

In sum, Russia will likely push for an 

outcome that, while reciprocal on its face, 

would in reality provide a net nuclear forces 

advantage over the United States. Additionally, 

the Russians are aggressively seeking to 

leverage the negotiations to gain restrictions 

on U.S. military programs that they see as 

Russia’s overarching 

goal is to use these postSTART negotiations to 

attain a greater level of 

military parity than 

it could otherwise 

hope to sustain under 

current arrangements

Dr. David A. Cooper is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the 

National Defense University and a former Director of Strategic Arms Control Policy at the Department of Defense. 

Comments may be directed to cooperd8@ndu.edu.
No. 244, July 2009 Strategic Forum 3

closely linked to the bilateral nuclear balance, particularly missile defenses and conventional global strike capabilities.19 Putting 

it mildly, it is difficult to imagine how any 

outcome that even approaches this presumed 

Kremlin blueprint would contribute to U.S. 

national security interests. And yet the negotiating framework that emerged from the July 

summit implicitly leaves the door open to virtually all of these Russian objectives.20 So 

what could Washington possibly hope to gain 

from this exercise?

Gauging the Initiative

Critics were quick to dismiss President 

Obama’s post-START initiative when it was 

unveiled in April 2009 as at best an irrelevancy. “Good grief,” harrumphed Charles 

Krauthammer, “of all the useless sideshows.”21 George Will meanwhile opined, 

“Today in a world bristling with new threats, 

the president suggests addressing an old 

one—Russia’s nuclear arsenal.”22 As daily 

headlines since the launch of the negotiations have swirled with news of successful 

North Korean nuclear and Iranian missile 

tests and fears about Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands, it is easy to 

understand this viewpoint. For its part, the 

Obama administration from the outset has 

characterized the post-START initiative as 

setting the stage for a broader and deeper 

arms reduction process that would encompass all nuclear weapons states, which it 

hopes in turn may pave the way for creating a radically new global security architecture to address and eventually eradicate the 

threat of nuclear weapons in all its incarnations.23 What is striking about these ostensibly 

rival perspectives, however, is that they actually share the same fundamental assumption. 

The administration is not arguing that postSTART is especially important in and of itself, 

but rather avers that it will prove valuable as 

a means to achieve wider disarmament goals. 

Thus, for all intents, there is a general consensus that, from a U.S. perspective, the measure of post-START’s value lies beyond its 

immediate purpose (that is, a largely superfluous and potentially disadvantageous reciprocal reduction in the number of U.S. and 

Russian strategic offensive forces).

Importantly, any prospective wider benefits of post-START (along with the associated 

costs against which they must be weighed) 

could vary greatly depending on the results of 

the current talks. Once the framework agreement was unveiled in Moscow, some knowledgeable observers expressed dismay that the 

Obama administration had acceded to potentially costly concessions regarding delivery 

vehicles, missile defense linkages, and other 

lesser issues.24 However, all of these apparent concessions have been cast in ambiguous 

enough formulations so as to leave considerable negotiating latitude. Likewise, the 

corresponding dearth of external linkages 

favorable to U.S. interests, while notable, still 

does not preclude their introduction in the 

next decisive negotiating phase. Consequently, 

it is premature to hazard a verdict on the 

merit of the initiative until the ultimate contours of a final deal are more apparent. 

Critics who initially denounced post-START 

as an irrelevancy may well be proved correct, 

or could even discover that they were overly 

sanguine if the United States ends up paying high costs for a treaty of direct value to 

the other party but only marginal utility for 

itself. On the other hand, if a deal emerges 

that plausibly addresses a wider set of nuclear 

perils, even at a steep cost in terms of the 

U.S. strategic posture relative to Russia, then 

it could represent a net security gain for the 

United States.

Of course, a simplistic perspective might 

be that any reduction in existing nuclear 

arsenals intrinsically helps to lessen the panoply of dangers that these weapons pose; that 

fewer weapons anywhere equals less danger 

everywhere. However, a more sophisticated 

approach would consider nuances across the 

array of nuclear weapons issues, in the first 

instance in terms of the relative hierarchy 

of danger that they pose to the United States 

and its allies, as well as inevitable tradeoffs 

among the tools to address them. For example, if Iran succeeds in obtaining an entrylevel nuclear arsenal capable of targeting U.S. 

allies and forces, and if this were deemed a 

greater danger than Russian nuclear missiles 

capable of reaching the U.S. homeland, then, 

assuming all other factors as equal, trading 

European theater missile defenses for Russian 

strategic offensive reductions would not make 

much sense. But flip the ranking priority, and 

this becomes a perfectly justifiable accommodation. As this example illustrates, assaying 

negotiating tradeoffs and outcomes requires a 

framework for analysis based on a clear hierarchy of nuclear dangers.

A logical ranking of nuclear threats from 

a U.S. perspective follows:

■ “Loose nukes” or fissile material. 

Terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons or 

materials (including through theft, corruption, or in the context of a failed weapons of 

mass destruction state) poses the greatest risk 

of nuclear or radiological attack against U.S. 

and other populations.

■ Horizontal nuclear proliferation. The 

emergence or expansion of new nuclear weapons states (particularly those with hostile 

or unstable governments) would profoundly 

degrade U.S. geopolitical interests by significantly increasing the risk of nuclear weapons 

being threatened or used in regional conflicts involving the United States or its allies, 

and ultimately increases the odds of terrorist 

acquisition.

■ Expansion of Chinese nuclear forces. 

Continuation of the decade-long buildup of 

Chinese nuclear forces could eventually alter 

the strategic balance between the United 

States and a potential regional or even peer 

rival (particularly as Washington pursues 

further strategic reductions).

■ Russian tactical nuclear weapons. 

Russia’s widely deployed nonstrategic nuclear 

forces pose a significant “loose nuke” threat, 

the Obama administration 

from the outset has 

characterized the postSTART initiative as 

setting the stage for a 

broader and deeper arms 

reduction process that 

would encompass all 

nuclear weapons states
4 Strategic Forum No. 244, July 2009

of its strategic posture. Moreover, depending 

on what counting rules apply, the reductions 

considered would not necessarily translate into fewer aggregate warheads; neither 

START nor the Moscow Treaty currently limits nondeployed warhead stockpiles. Indeed, 

from a nuclear security perspective, warheads 

deployed on strategic delivery platforms may 

be more secure in the near term than those 

removed (whether permanently or temporarily while awaiting dismantlement) to potentially less secure storage facilities. Moreover, 

the physical removal itself raises heightened 

risks because transportation is inherently 

the most vulnerable link in a nuclear weapon’s custody chain. Finally, post-START will 

not apply to the sources of Russia’s greatest 

nuclear security risks: several thousand nonstrategic nuclear weapons and stockpiles of 

weapons-grade fissile material.

In terms of transparency, some marginal benefit might accrue if verification 

provisions were to emerge from the postSTART negotiations that included warhead 

inventories, since this would cast a wider net 

than START’s platform-centric measures. 

However, Russia has traditionally resisted 

intrusive warhead verification schemes, as 

witnessed during START III talks in the late 

1990s. Nor would the nuclear security benefits justify this as a key U.S. negotiating aim, 

since arguably Cooperative Threat Reduction 

and similar programs provide a more effective means for enhancing transparency and 

enabling the Russian government to improve 

nuclear security in accordance with its own 

self interests.

Finally, loose nuke dangers extend well 

beyond Russia and its neighbors, as recent 

even as Russian nuclear doctrine lowers 

the nuclear threshold by relying on these 

as warfighting tools to offset imbalances in 

conventional forces relative to both NATO 

and China.

■ Russian strategic forces modernization. To the extent that Russian strategic nuclear forces pose a residual threat due 

to resurgent Russian belligerence, it is an 

active force modernization program, and not 

already declining aggregate numbers of warheads or delivery vehicles, that represents the 

chief concern.

While this ranking represents a necessarily subjective judgment, it is broadly 

consistent with the preponderance of U.S. 

strategic thinking.25 More to the point, it is 

nearly inconceivable that the aggregate number of Russian strategic forces—the very 

problem that post-START seeks to address—

would rank anywhere other than at the low 

end of virtually any mainstream hierarchy of 

nuclear dangers from a U.S. perspective. This 

validates the implicit assumption that the key 

metric for evaluating post-START will be its 

wider ramifications, specifically as measured 

by its cumulative sway in countering this 

array of more pressing nuclear perils.26

Wider Effects

“Loose Nukes.” Russia’s sprawling nuclear weapons complex remains 

a key aspect of the loose nukes threat. 

Notwithstanding considerable progress that 

has been achieved to improve overall nuclear 

security conditions, the situation remains 

a cause for concern. Moreover, despite the 

transparency provided through arms control verification and cooperative efforts such 

as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, sizeable parts of Russia’s nuclear weapons complex remain opaque.27 However, the 

potential impact of post-START on this problem-set is likely to be inconsequential.

In theory, further strategic offensive 

reductions should equate to fewer nuclear 

weapons to worry about. However, in practice post-START is unlikely to result in any 

Russian cuts that would not have happened 

in any case through the continuing attrition 

events in Pakistan aptly illustrate. But postSTART will not address this dimension of the 

problem even indirectly. It would not even 

offer a useful template for others to emulate, since the global solution lies not in Cold 

War–era verification archetypes, but rather 

in expanding the cooperative threat reduction model and in improving national capacities and multinational collaboration in law 

enforcement, border security, and maritime and air interdiction.28 Nor do the negotiations offer a potential lever with which to 

pry better Russian cooperation since Moscow 

is already foursquare behind such efforts, 

as exemplified by its co-leading the U.S.-

sponsored Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 

Terrorism. On balance, then, post-START 

offers little, if any, remediation for nuclear 

security dangers.

Nuclear Proliferation. The international system may well be standing at 

the precipice of a wholesale collapse of the 

nuclear nonproliferation regime. But whether 

disarmament can help solve this problem 

has long been a subject of fierce debate. As 

one analyst observes, “Foreign policy realists have argued that disarmament steps 

were irrelevant to other countries’ calculations concerning their aspirations for nuclear 

weapons, while nonproliferation advocates 

argued that such steps were still relevant for 

the balance and sustainability of the nonproliferation regime as a whole.”29 On one 

hand, the empirical evidence does not bolster the premise that arms reduction begets 

nonproliferation; a succession of significant reductions in nuclear armaments over 

the past two decades—including the 1987 

Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, 1991 

START Treaty, 1991 and 1992 Presidential 

Nuclear Initiatives, and 2002 Moscow Treaty, 

as well as unilateral cutbacks by Britain and 

France—have occurred in parallel to a rising drumbeat of nuclear proliferation by 

countries such as India, Iran, Libya, North 

Korea, Pakistan, and Syria. However, some 

would discount these disarmament instances 

as insufficiently far-reaching to produce the 

desired nonproliferation effects. For analytic 

purposes, though, it hardly matters. PostSTART is envisioned as a modest incremental 

step toward deeper disarmament, and therefore cannot in itself seriously be ascribed as 

despite the transparency 

provided through arms 

control verification and 

cooperative efforts such 

as the Cooperative Threat 

Reduction program, sizeable parts of Russia’s 

nuclear weapons complex 

remain opaque
No. 244, July 2009 Strategic Forum 5

an audacious enough stroke to sway hitherto 

determined proliferators.

What a successful post-START outcome can realistically do is provide a moderate tactical advantage to the United States 

and its allies in the diplomatic maneuvering that will occur at next year’s Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review 

Conference. Whatever the tangible merit of 

leading by example as a nonproliferation 

strategy, the linkage of disarmament by the 

five sanctioned nuclear weapons states and 

nonproliferation by everyone else is formally 

enshrined in the basic NPT bargain, and proliferators and their apologists have always 

alleged that it is the failure of the nuclear 

powers to pursue disarmament sufficiently 

that undermines the NPT (and by inference 

justifies their own behavior). By arriving at 

the conference with a new arms reduction 

treaty in hand and the promise of more to 

come, the United States should be in a stronger position to turn the tables on Iran in particular by demonstrating that Washington is 

living up to its part of the bargain, and that 

Iranian cheating is the real problem. But 

whereas this dynamic would be useful, the 

benefits should not be exaggerated. In the 

larger scheme of things, a strongly worded 

condemnation of Iran emerging from the 

2010 NPT Review Conference, or even structural improvements in NPT verification and 

compliance tools, are unlikely to persuade 

Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions (and 

would have no direct impact on India, Israel, 

North Korea, or Pakistan). Furthermore, a far 

greater influence on the Review Conference’s 

outcome than this or anything else that the 

United States might do will be the extent 

of Tehran’s own flagrancy in carrying forward its nuclear weapons and missile programs while maintaining the fiction that it is 

abiding by NPT.30 In a nutshell, a successful 

post-START outcome as such would be helpful from a nonproliferation perspective, albeit 

modestly so.

Where post-START does have the potential drastically either to help or to harm in 

countering nuclear proliferation is through 

the lever that the negotiations provide for 

extracting tangential tradeoffs, depending on 

which side does the leveraging and for what. 

For example, although Russia remains a secondary player to China on the North Korea 

nuclear issue, it has been an indispensible 

enabler for Iran. Brushing aside U.S. concerns, Russia has profited from building Iran’s 

Bushehr nuclear reactor complex, while at the 

same time using its United Nations Security 

Council veto to stand as a bulwark against 

tough international sanctions in response to 

Iran’s parade of nuclear provocations. It is 

debatable whether even the harshest sanctions would be enough to deflect Iran from 

its nuclear path, if only because Tehran has 

never faced truly painful consequences of economic, or even diplomatic, isolation. A disadvantageous treaty on strategic offensive 

reductions that was obtained in exchange for 

Russia getting serious about bringing stringent 

sanctions to bear on Iran and North Korea 

could be an appealing tradeoff that Russia 

might conceivably accept if the United States 

drives a hard bargain. Or to take another 

example suggested by a former U.S. disarmament envoy:

U.S.-Russian-NATO missile defense cooperation . . . would send a very strong signal to Iranian leaders that if they actually 

acquire nuclear weapons, the great powers will act together to ensure that Iran will 

not gain from that move. . . . Proposing 

joint missile defenses would be a good test 

of the potential nonproliferation payoffs 

for the United States of addressing Russian 

strategic concerns.31

Given that the Bush administration 

was never able to gain traction with Russia 

on this idea, any leverage gained from postSTART talks might prove helpful.

On the negative side of this equation, external linkages that Russia is seeking (apparently with some success) could be 

damaging from a proliferation response perspective. Iran’s recent test of a new mediumrange solid-fuel missile serves to underscore 

the growing importance that European missile defenses could play in reassuring allies 

and denying Iran bullying rights if it successfully crosses the nuclear weapons finishing 

line. While President Obama has indicated 

that the future of U.S. missile defense programs will depend on technical feasibility 

and cost effectiveness, it would nonetheless be 

harmful for Washington to make concessions 

in a post-START context before these issues 

can be resolved by forgoing a potential means 

to mitigate the impact of Iranian acquisition 

of nuclear weapons.32 Likewise, the Prompt 

Global Strike program, which would use 

intercontinental missiles to deliver conventional payloads, represents a negligible factor in the U.S.-Russian strategic balance, but 

could be a critical tool for responding militarily to threats from emergent nuclear powers without having to resort to the first use of 

nuclear weapons.33

Chinese Nukes. Inducing Beijing to 

engage in some type of nuclear arms control 

process is plainly one of the Obama administration’s goals for the post-START initiative. Just days after announcing post-START 

with his Russian counterpart, President 

Obama used a major overseas speech to 

declare, “This will set the stage for further cuts, and we will seek to include all 

nuclear weapons states in this endeavor.”34

Presumably, Great Britain and France were 

not at the top of his mind.

China has been in the throes of a sustained strategic buildup for the past decade 

and its expansion and modernization program is gaining notable momentum.35

Until now, Beijing has deftly expanded its 

nuclear forces while still eating its proverbial disarmament cake. Official Chinese 

policy has embraced nuclear disarmament 

in principle, but with a preclusive caveat: 

“The two countries possessing the largest 

nuclear arsenals bear special and primary 

responsibilities . . . to create conditions for 

it is debatable whether 

even the harshest 

sanctions would be 

enough to deflect Iran 

from its nuclear path, 

if only because Tehran 

has never faced truly 

painful consequences 

of economic, or even 

diplomatic, isolation
6 Strategic Forum No. 244, July 2009

stockpiles) in return for a package of tangible 

and significant gains from Russia on higher 

priority issues (such as getting serious about 

Iran, cooperating on missile defense, limiting tactical nuclear weapons, and so forth) 

could be an advantageous deal, assuming it 

proved balanced and enforceable. Failing that, 

a “low hanging fruit” outcome that satisfies 

the minimum expectations that have been 

raised—for example, limits at the high end of 

the ranges under consideration (1,100 delivery 

vehicles and 1,675 warheads), using counting 

rules that avoid or minimize actual cuts in 

current inventories of deployed strategic delivery vehicles and stockpiled warheads, and with 

no concrete U.S. concessions on external linkages—could on balance be marginally beneficial as impetus for wider initiatives affecting 

other priorities, especially as compared to the 

costs that a failed negotiation would inflict 

in those areas. That said, any further U.S. 

concessions beyond these parameters would 

quickly tilt the scales away from U.S. interests. In other words, absent Russian tradeoffs 

in other areas, the modest wider benefits 

of new strategic reductions would not justify paying more than moderate costs in the 

strategic nuclear sphere and on no account 

should undercut higher priority goals. Thus, 

an outcome that leans toward Russia’s narrow 

interests (that is, cuts in U.S. strategic delivery 

platforms and warhead stockpiles) and that 

does not also include favorable counterbalancing Russian linkages would be disadvantageous. Throw in U.S. concessions on external 

linkages that could undermine higher priority 

U.S. nuclear weapons interests (for example, 

constraints on missile defense), and the result 

would be positively pernicious.

What is the likely outcome? Notwithstanding an apparent pattern of lopsided 

U.S. concessions in the early phases, the trajectory of these negotiations still appears 

largely up for grabs. The good news is that 

the Obama administration is negotiating in 

a seller’s market. After all, it is Russia that 

wants bilateral strategic offensive reductions 

as such, whereas President Obama is merely 

priming the pump for other things. That 

bodes well, provided that the administration 

appreciates this dynamic and keeps its eye 

on the big picture.

achieving the ultimate goal of complete 

and thorough nuclear disarmament.”36

It would be specious to imagine that 

another incremental round of strategic 

reductions by the United States and Russia 

could persuade China to reverse or even 

to slow the upward trajectory of its strategic force posture. As one prominent Chinese 

academic expert candidly observed in 

response to this very question, “It is not 

our agenda to reduce, it is our agenda to 

increase.”37 But some observers posit that 

a successful post-START outcome could be 

used as a vehicle to cajole China into tentative first steps, for instance, considering 

informal transparency or confidence-building measures.38 And while China may fall 

back on reiterating that it should not be 

expected to constrain capabilities until and 

unless the U.S.-Russia arsenals approach 

Chinese levels, this familiar refrain could 

ring newly hollow against the backdrop of a 

successful post-START outcome, particularly 

heading into the diplomatic glare of the 

2010 NPT Review Conference.

As a gambit to step up pressure on China 

to curtail expansion of its strategic forces, 

the mere fact of new U.S.-Russian cuts would 

probably be more important than the particulars. But there are details that could affect 

this equation. For example, on the negative 

side, U.S. missile defense capabilities are a 

central variable in China’s thinking about its 

own nuclear posture. Any negotiating tradeoff 

with Russia that curtails these capabilities 

would thereby undercut a crucial element of 

U.S. leverage with China in any future talks. 

Likewise, U.S.-Russian cuts that go too deep 

hypothetically could incentivize China’s unilateral buildup by putting a hitherto unattainable path to strategic parity within reach. 

Conversely, on the positive side, it would be 

manifestly helpful if Russia could be convinced to jointly announce at the conclusion 

of post-START that this newest treaty represents the end of the line for bilateral strategic offensive reductions, and that any further 

reductions will need to be negotiated in a 

broader context.

Russian Tactical Nukes. Post-START 

seems likely to undermine Washington’s ability to address the most worrisome and unregulated element of Russia’s nuclear forces. By 

agreeing to fast-track a strategic treaty that 

Moscow wants without any concrete reference 

to nonstrategic measures, the United States 

has almost certainly forfeited any leverage that 

it may have had to induce Russia to bring its 

tactical nuclear weapons to the arms control 

table. Moscow’s current attitude is succinctly 

captured by its Washington ambassador, who 

recently quipped, “When it comes to non-strategic nuclear weapons, I would say that if you 

decide to move to the world free of nuclear 

weapons, at some point it needs to be dealt 

with.”39 The message is clear: nobody should 

be holding his breath. Barring some type of 

interim outcome that preserves the option of 

including tactical nuclear forces in a follow-on 

negotiation, probably the most that the United 

States can hope to leverage from the postSTART process is a hortatory pledge to take up 

this issue at some future juncture (very much 

along the lines of a similar pledge that accompanied the Moscow Treaty). The fact that the 

negotiating framework agreed at the Moscow 

summit did not contain even a passing allusion to nonstrategic nuclear forces is not reassuring even in this small regard. On the other 

hand, if post-START really does end up paving 

the way for wider nuclear arms reduction talks 

as the Obama administration hopes, then the 

United States might well find common cause 

with China on this issue.

Potential Outcomes

A “grand bargain” wherein the United 

States concedes to Russian interests on strategic nuclear reductions (for example, relatively 

deeper cuts in delivery vehicles and/or warhead 

U.S.-Russian cuts that 

go too deep 

hypothetically could 

incentivize China’s 

unilateral buildup 

by putting a hitherto 

unattainable path 

to strategic parity 

within reach
No. 244, July 2009 Strategic Forum 7

Notes

1

 START is formally known as the Treaty 

Between the United States of America and the Union 

of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and 

Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. It is also sometimes referred to as START I to distinguish it from the 

subsequent START II (which never entered into force) 

and the later START III negotiations (which never 

produced a treaty). Although signed in 1991 as a bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union, following its collapse, the 1992 Lisbon Protocol transformed START 

into a multilateral treaty with Belarus, Kazakhstan, 

the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United 

States as equal States Parties. START entered into 

force on December 5, 1994, and unless extended by 

its own terms automatically expires 15 years later, on 

December 5, 2009.

2

 The Moscow Treaty is formally known as the 

Treaty Between the United States of America and the 

Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions 

(May 24, 2002).

3

 Colin L. Powell, “Letter of Submittal,” in 

Moscow Treaty (Washington, DC: Department of State, 

2002), 7.

4

 Interview with Paula A. DeSutter, former Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, 

Compliance, and Implementation, who for a period 

served as the Bush administration’s chief negotiator for 

START follow-on talks.

5

 START counts warhead totals based on agreed 

warhead capacities of delivery platforms (for example, missiles and bombers) rather than the actual 

number of warheads deployed or stockpiled, whereas 

the Moscow Treaty limits operationally deployed strategic warheads. Because the Moscow Treaty unit of 

account permits retention of excess warheads in storage as well as excess delivery capacity (by keeping 

excess delivery vehicles and/or deploying fewer warheads on them than they are capable of carrying), 

stored warheads could be “uploaded” to these platforms once the treaty expires (which occurs on the 

same day that its limits take effect). Thus, the Moscow 

Treaty preserves a “hedge” for the United States since it 

has sustainable excess delivery capacity within START 

limits. This makes force reconstitution in the event of 

changed circumstances a quicker and cheaper option 

under the Moscow Treaty framework than would be 

the case for equal reductions under START counting 

rules. Additionally, limits based on delivery vehicles 

can extend constraints beyond strategic offensive forces 

(for example, by counting missile defense interceptors 

and decommissioned or conventionally armed missiles, 

bombers, and submarines against strategic nuclear 

warhead totals).

6

 “Joint Statement by Dmitriy A. Medvedev, 

President of the Russian Federation, and Barack 

Obama, President of the United States of America, 

Regarding Negotiations on Further Reduction in 

Strategic Offensive Arm [sic] (April 1, 2009),” available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/

Joint-Statement-by-Dmitriy-A-Medvedev-and-BarackObama/>.

7

 Notwithstanding the President’s commitment to conclude a treaty by December 2009, this 

deadline was not highlighted again during July’s 

summit in Moscow. Moreover, senior U.S. officials 

have publicly suggested from early in the process 

that this deadline could be extended if necessary. 

See comments by Assistant Secretary of State Rose 

Gottemoeller during a panel discussion on April 6, 

2009, entitled “Whither U.S.-Russian Relations?” 

at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation 

Conference in Washington, DC, available at <www. 

carnegieendowment.org/files/npc_us_russia4.pdf>. 

At least one informed observer has speculated that 

any outcome by December would be no more than 

an interim arrangement, leaving difficult issues to 

a second phase of bilateral negotiations (see Daryl 

G. Kimball, “Background Briefing for Reporters: 

The START Follow-on Agreement and Beyond, June 

19, 2009,” available at <www.armscontrol.org/

node/3711>).

8

 The April joint presidential statement refers to 

“reductions in strategic offensive arms that will be 

lower than those in the 2002 Moscow Treaty.” While 

this appears to suggest using the Moscow Treaty’s 

unit of account, the inclusion of strategic offensive 

arms in the formulation could be interpreted as suggesting START counting rules since this term is verbatim from START’s formal name and yet does not 

appear anywhere in the Moscow Treaty. Undoubtedly 

aware of this, President Obama a few days later in 

his Prague speech deftly reformulated the description 

of the post-START goal as reducing “warheads and 

stockpiles,” suggesting that the United States may 

have initially been aiming for a modified Moscow 

Treaty approach that reduces total warhead numbers 

(versus merely restricting the number that are operationally deployed) while steering clear of a framework focusing on delivery systems. See “Remarks by 

President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Czech 

Republic,” available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the_

press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-ObamaIn-Prague-As-Delivered>.

9

 These ranges almost certainly represent negotiating positions that will be narrowed (with Russia 

favoring something at the lower end and the United 

States seeking a higher number). Even the 1,100 ceiling at the high end of the potential range for strategic delivery vehicles is well below the 1,600 ceiling 

allowed under START. However, that does not necessarily mean that it would require deep cuts. Without 

knowing the new counting rules that will apply, any 

numerical limit is largely meaningless. For example, 

according to one analyst, by some counts the United 

States currently has only 798 strategic delivery vehicles and therefore might not have to make any actual 

cuts within the upper half of the range of limits 

under consideration (see Hans N. Kristensen, “START 

Follow-on: What SORT of Agreement,” available at 

<www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/7/start.php>).

10 For the complete text of the Joint 

Understanding framework agreement signed at the 

Moscow summit, see <www.whitehouse.gov/the_

press_office/The-Joint-Understanding-for-The-StartFollow-On-Treaty/>.

11 During its nearly decade and a half of existence, START has been the subject of a continuous 

negotiating process in the form of a Joint Compliance 

and Inspection Commission, which carries on its books 

the seeds of many obscure complications for U.S. postSTART negotiators.

12 The Moscow Treaty was negotiated in a similar 

timeframe. However, this treaty merely codified unilateral cuts that had already been announced in a treaty 

so simple that using 6-point type, it can literally fit on 

two sides of a standard business card.

13 Pavel Podvig, “Reaction to the ObamaMedvedev Joint Statement on Arms Control,” Bulletin 

of the Atomic Scientists, April 3, 2009, available at 

<www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/pavelpodvig/reaction-to-the-obama-medvedev-joint-statement-arms-control>.

14 Alexei Arbatov and Rose Gottemoeller, “New 

Presidents, New Agreements? Advancing U.S.-Russian 

Strategic Arms Control,” Arms Control Today (JulyAugust 2008), available at <www.armscontrol.org/

act/2008_07-08/CoverStory>.

15 For a current and comprehensive review of 

Russia’s nuclear arms control goals from the Soviet 

Union onward, see Andrei Shoumikhin, Goals 

and Methods of Russian Arms Control Policy: 

Implications for U.S. Security (Washington, DC: 

National Institute Press, 2008). For a revealing analysis 

of the political forces that shaped Russia’s post–Cold 

War disarmament agenda, see John W.R. Leppingwell, 

“START II and Politics of Arms Control in Russia,” 

International Security 20, no. 2 (1995), 63–91.

16 “Joint Statement by Dmitriy A. Medvedev, 

President of the Russian Federation, and Barack 

Obama, President of the United States of America, 

Regarding Negotiations on Further Reduction in 

Strategic Offensive Arm [sic] (April 1, 2009).”

17 Russian strategic modernization includes the 

ongoing production and deployment of the Topol-M 

(SS–27) to replace earlier generation intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), development of 

the Bulava (SS–NX–30) submarine-launched ballistic missile, and development of the RS–24 heavy 

ICBM with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, the latter of which is explicitly intended 

to defeat U.S. missile defense systems. See “Nuclear 

Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces, 2009,” Bulletin of 

the Atomic Scientists (May-June 2009), 55–64. That 

said, this Russian goal may be shared to some extent 

with Washington; although Russia’s modernization 

plans are both more urgent and farther along, the 

Pentagon also envisions modernizing its own strategic forces. See Amy F. Woolf, U.S. Strategic Nuclear 

Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 

2009).

18 Russia does not provide official information on 

the number or disposition of its nonstrategic nuclear arsenal. One current estimate is that Russia has approximately 5,380 nonstrategic warheads, of which some 2,050 

are deployed, compared to a U.S. total of 500 nonstrategic warheads, all of which are deployed. See “Nuclear 

Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces, 2009,” 61.

19 See, for example, press reports on a statement by Russian President Medvedev on June 20, 2009, 

available at <http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090620/

ap_on_re_eu/eu_netherlands_russia_us>. For a 
8 Strategic Forum No. 244, July 2009

fuller explanation, see the transcript of statements by 

Russian ambassador to the United States and former 

chief disarmament negotiator Sergey Kislyak during 

a panel discussion on April 6, 2009, with U.S. postSTART chief negotiator in Gottemoeller.

20 The inclusion of delivery vehicles as a unit of 

account for reductions appears to represent a major 

U.S. concession. Additionally, the Joint Understanding 

agrees to consider both missile defense and conventional global strike in the context of strategic reductions. See <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/

The-Joint-Understanding-for-The-Start-Follow-OnTreaty/>.

21 Charles Krauthammer, “It’s Your Country Too, 

Mr. President,” The Washington Post, April 10, 2009, 

available at <www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/09/AR2009040903367.html>.

22 George F. Will, “Potemkin Country,” The 

Washington Post, April 19, 2009, available at 

<www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/17/AR2009041702321.html>.

23 See, for example, “Remarks by President 

Barack Obama, Hradcany Square”; Deputy Secretary 

of State James B. Steinberg, “Address to the Carnegie 

International Nonproliferation Conference,” April 6, 

2009, transcript by Federal News Service, Washington, 

DC, 4.

24 See, for example, Keith B. Payne, “Arms 

Control Amnesia: The New Talks with Moscow Could 

Put the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent in Jeopardy,” Wall Street 

Journal, July 7, 2009, available at <http://online.wsj.

com/article/ SB124693303362103841.html>.

25 Consider that the five “challenges” framing 

the Obama administration’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense 

Review include violent extremist movements (with 

nuclear terrorism presumably integral to that concern 

and very much highlighted in the President’s April 5 

disarmament speech in Prague), the spread of weapons 

of mass destruction (with nuclear weapons presumably topping this list), rising powers with sophisticated 

weapons (widely understood to be a polite reference to 

China), and failed or failing states (with the potential 

for failed nuclear weapons states such as Pakistan or 

North Korea presumably topping this list). For details, 

see “2010 QDR Terms of Reference Fact Sheet (April 

27, 2009),” U.S. Department of Defense Office of Public 

Affairs, 2009.

26 The United States has other national security interests beyond nuclear dangers, as well as other 

national interests beyond national security. One could 

argue that post-START would be useful if it did nothing more than set U.S.-Russian relations on a more 

cooperative keel. Or one could imagine any number of 

specific quid pro quo tradeoffs that would be defensible. A trenchant real-world example is Russia’s surprise 

agreement at the July summit in Moscow to allow supply of U.S. forces in Afghanistan through its airspace, 

which some speculate may have been a concession to 

offset U.S. concessions in the post-START mandate. But 

in light of the pains that the Obama administration 

has taken to highlight the singularly grave threat that 

nuclear weapons represent to the American people, and 

given that it has explicitly and exclusively linked postSTART to reducing this threat, it seems reasonable to 

take this metric at face value.

27 For a sobering examination of one particularly worrisome aspect of this issue, see Igor Khripunov 

and Nicolas N. Fernandez, “Open Sesame—Risk from 

Russia’s Closed Nuclear Cities,” Jane’s Intelligence 

Review, July 2008.

28 For a discussion in particular of the wider 

applicability of the Cooperative Threat Reduction 

model, see Kenneth N. Luongo, “Loose Nukes in New 

Neighborhoods: The Next Generation of Proliferation 

Prevention,” Arms Control Today (May 2009), available at <www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_5/Luongo>.

29 Sharon Squassoni, “The New Disarmament 

Discussion,” Current History (January 2009), 34.

30 India, Pakistan, and Israel have never 

belonged to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 

and thus have no international obligation against pursuing and possessing nuclear weapons. North Korea 

developed its nuclear weapons program covertly while 

a party to NPT, but then withdrew from the treaty. With 

the termination of covert Iraqi and Libyan programs, 

only Iran and Syria are believed to be pursuing nuclear 

weapons illegally from within the NPT. Because Syria’s 

nuclear weapons program is thought to have suffered 

a major setback as a result of a September 2007 Israeli 

airstrike, only Iran stands poised to attain nuclear 

weapons capability while remaining a party to NPT.

31 Lewis A. Dunn, “Reshaping Strategic 

Relationships: Expanding the Arms Control Toolbox,” 

Arms Control Today (May 2009), available at <www.

armscontrol.org/act/2009_5/Dunn>.

32 For an excellent discussion of the relationship between European missile defenses, U.S. national 

missile defense, and Iranian nuclear proliferation, 

see Peppino A. DeBiaso, “Missile Defense and NATO 

Security,” Joint Force Quarterly 51 (4th Quarter, 

2008), 46–51.

33 However, it should be said that the Prompt 

Global Strike concept does have important implications for strategic stability. Namely, it will be essential to ensure that launches for conventional strikes are 

not misinterpreted as a nuclear attack. It is incumbent 

on the United States to address this problem with both 

Russia and China before this capability is ever used.

34 Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama, 

Hradcany Square.”

35 For an up-to-date summary of Chinese strategic modernization, see Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “Red 

Alert—China Modernises its Nuclear Missile Force,” 

Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 14, 2009; for an 

authoritative summary of China’s overall strategic 

force posture, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the 

People’s Republic of China 2009 (Washington, DC: 

Department of Defense, 2009), 24–28, available at 

<www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_

Power_Report_2009.pdf>.

36 China’s Endeavors for Arms Control, 

Disarmament and Nonproliferation (Beijing: 

Information Office of the State Council of the People’s 

Republic of China, 2005), available at <www.china.

org.cn/english/features/book/ 140320.htm>.

37 Shulong Chu, Tsinghua University, responding to questions on April 6, 2009, during the Panel 

on U.S.-China Strategic Stability of the 2009 Carnegie 

Nonproliferation Conference, available at <www.carnegieendowment.org/ files/npc_us_china3.pdf>.

38 Christopher P. Twomey, “Chinese-U.S. Strategic 

Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism,” Arms Control Today

(January-February 2009), available at <www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_01-02/china_us_dangerous_dynamism>.

39 Sergey I. Kislyak during panel discussion 

on “Wither U.S.-Russia Relations?” at the Carnegie 

Nonproliferation Conference, April 6, 2009, available 

at <www.carnegieendowment.org/files/npc_us_russia4.pdf>.

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