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CHINA’S HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS: 

CURRENT CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 

ROUNDTABLE 

BEFORE THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 

COMMISSION ON CHINA 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 10, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov 

(II) 

CO N T E N T S 

Page 

Opening statement of Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Staff Director, CongressionalExecutive Commission on China ........................................................................ 1 

Grob, Douglas, Cochairman’s Senior Staff Member, Congressional-Executive 

Commission on China .......................................................................................... 1 

Pitts, Hon. Joseph R., a U.S. Representative from Pennsylvania, Member, 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China ................................................ 2 

Cohen, Jerome A., Professor, New York University School of Law; Codirector, 

U.S.-Asia Law Institute; and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations ....................................................................................... 4 

Turkel, Nury, Attorney with Kirstein & Young, PLLC ........................................ 9 

Feinerman, James V., Professor of Asian Legal Studies, Georgetown University Law Center, Codirector, Asian Law and Policy Studies Program ............ 11 

Fu, Bob (Xiqiu), Founder and President, ChinaAid Association (CAA) .............. 16 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Cohen, Jerome A ...................................................................................................... 28 

Feinerman, James V ................................................................................................ 31 

Fu, Bob (Xiqiu) ......................................................................................................... 39 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Final Compilation of Translated Lawyers’ Statements, submitted by Bob 

(Xiqiu) Fu .............................................................................................................. 41 

(1) 

CHINA’S HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS: 

CURRENT CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 

FRIDAY, JULY 10, 2009 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA, Washington, DC. 

The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., 

in room 628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Charlotte OldhamMoore, Staff Director, presiding. 

Also present: Representatives Joseph Pitts and David Wu. 

Also present: Douglas Grob, Cochairman’s Senior Staff Member 

and Kara Abramson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHARLOTTE OLDHAM-MOORE, 

STAFF DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. We’ll get started. We’re going to be joined 

shortly by Congressman Pitts, who is a Commissioner. 

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS GROB, COCHAIRMAN’S SENIOR 

STAFF MEMBER, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION 

ON CHINA 

Mr. GROB. Thank you. Good morning, everybody. Welcome to the 

CECC’s eighth roundtable this year. 

Before we get started, I would just like to say, on behalf of the 

Chairman and Cochairman of the Commission, that we are deeply 

saddened by the recent reports of deaths and injuries in the 

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, and express heartfelt sympathy to Uyghur and Han Chinese individuals, and all individuals and their families who have suffered. 

We are delighted this morning to have a distinguished panel of 

experts to discuss China’s Human Rights Lawyers: Current Challenges and Prospects. I would like to gratefully acknowledge the 

presence of Representative Joe Pitts. Thank you, Commissioner 

Pitts, for joining us here this morning. 

At this roundtable our distinguished panel will discuss China’s 

human rights lawyers and their role in advancing the rule of law 

in China. We will examine the relationship between these lawyers, 

the Chinese government, and the Communist Party, and explore 

why Chinese authorities recently have stripped some prominent 

rights lawyers of their lawyers’ licenses. We will delve into documented incidents of increased harassment of human rights lawyers 

in China, and ask what the future now holds for them, and also 

2 

ask what their treatment suggests about the development of the 

rule of law in China more generally. 

I’d like just to share with you this month’s issue of Chinese Lawyer magazine, which features a cover story on a leading criminal 

defense attorney at a major Chinese law firm, a firm that has hundreds of attorneys in four cities, now in its 16th year of operation. 

Just two decades ago, such a law firm would have been somewhat 

unimaginable, and represents an important development in many 

ways. So does China’s revised Lawyers Law, which took effect last 

year, and which contains provisions aimed at combating some of 

the difficulties that criminal defense lawyers in China face in representing their clients. Some provisions of the Lawyers Law conflict 

with China’s Criminal Procedure Law, but overall the revision of 

the Lawyers Law too, is an important step. 

Yet at the same time, we gather here today to discuss Chinese 

authorities’ failure to renew the professional licenses of some 

prominent lawyers who take on what the government deems to be 

politically sensitive cases. So, for those who see a threat to justice 

anywhere as a threat to justice everywhere, it’s only natural to ask 

the question: What does this portend for the future of procedural 

law in China in general in areas beyond what is classically known 

as human rights law, and extending as far as to commercial law 

and other areas of civil law and criminal law in China? 

And so I now would like to turn the floor over to Representative 

Pitts and ask if you have a statement or remarks to make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. PITTS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, MEMBER, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

Representative PITTS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Grob. I really 

appreciate your holding this important roundtable discussion. 

I am disturbed by the recent reports regarding human rights 

lawyers in China. More than 18 lawyers, I’m told, who have been 

representing sensitive human rights cases have not been able to 

renew their law licenses, according to Human Rights Watch. This 

number is unprecedented. Some reports even indicate that lawyers 

have been arrested and beaten, in some cases even kidnapped, because of their involvement in human rights cases. 

Human rights attorney Gao Zhisheng, a prominent lawyer who 

has worked on religious freedom cases, has been missing since February 4 of this year. Li Heping, another lawyer who has defended 

Christian house church leaders, and Gao Zhisheng have been 

among the lawyers to be denied renewal of their law licenses. I personally met with some of these lawyers, including Li Heping. I’m 

very concerned with the effects that this trend will have on the 

rule of law in China and the basic human rights of the people, the 

Chinese people. 

In addition, law firms are being pressured to provide authorities 

with ammunition to deny the licenses of lawyers involved in these 

sensitive human rights cases. On May 28, the New York Times reported, ‘‘In some cases the law firms were told that they could 

avoid difficulties by giving the lawyers failing grades in their annual performance evaluation.’’ At least three law firms have not 

been allowed to pass inspection because of lack of cooperation with 

3 

the government. These actions are clearly intended to intimidate 

lawyers and law firms into not taking these sensitive human rights 

cases. 

So I look forward to hearing from our distinguished roundtable 

witnesses, receiving their insights and recommendations on the 

steps that we in the Congress, the U.S. Government, should take 

to further support the fundamental rights of the Chinese people 

and the attorneys who are seeking to uphold their human rights. 

I would like to extend a special welcome to my good friend, Bob Fu, 

who I’ve worked with for many years, and thank him for his work 

and dedication on behalf of human rights and religious freedom in 

China. 

Thank you, Mr. Grob. I yield back. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you, Congressman Pitts. We’re really grateful that you are here today. 

I’m going to do a quick introduction of our extraordinary group 

of panelists today. 

We must always begin with Professor Jerome Cohen, who is an 

American treasure. Professor Cohen is a leading American expert 

on Asian law, has been a professor at the New York University 

School of Law since 1990, where he is also the codirector of the 

U.S.-Asia Law Institute. 

Mr. Cohen is also an Adjunct Senior Fellow for Asia Studies at 

the Council on Foreign Relations. Before retiring from a partnership at Paul, Weiss, Rivken, Wharton at the end of 2000, Mr. 

Cohen represented many companies and individuals in contract negotiations, as well as in dispute resolutions in various Asian countries. He writes a biweekly column for Hong Kong’s South China 

Morning Post and Taiwan’s China Times and is a frequent pro 

bono consultant in human rights and criminal justice cases relating 

to China and Taiwan. 

Mr. Cohen formerly served as Jeremiah Smith Professor and Director of East Asian Legal Studies, and Associate Dean at Harvard 

Law School. He has published several books, including ‘‘The Criminal 

Process in the People’s Republic of China: 1949–1963,’’ ‘‘People’s 

China and International Law,’’ and ‘‘Contract Law of the People’s 

Republic of China,’’ and many articles on Chinese law, as well as 

a general book, ‘‘China Today,’’ coauthored with his wife, Joan 

Liebold Cohen. 

Today Mr. Cohen continues his research and writing on Asian 

law, specifically focusing on criminal justice reform, dispute resolution, human rights, and the role of international law. 

Mr. Cohen also served in government, first as an Assistant U.S. 

Attorney in Washington, DC in the late 1950s, and then as a consultant to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Mr. 

Cohen is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Yale College and a graduate of Yale Law School, where he was editor-in-chief of the Yale 

Law Journal. He was law secretary to Chief Justice Earl Warren 

of the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1955 term, and law secretary to 

Justice Felix Frankfurter of the Supreme Court in the 1956 term. 

Next to Mr. Cohen is Mr. Nury Turkel, who is an attorney at 

Kirstein & Young. Mr. Turkel is an attorney there and his practice 

focuses on commercial and regulatory matters. 

4 

Prior to joining Kirstein & Young, Mr. Turkel managed a Washington-based nonprofit organization, the Uyghur-American Association, which works to promote democratic freedoms of Uyghur people 

in China and Central Asia. He has testified before the U.S. Congress and given many presentations, including at the U.S. Military 

Academy, the National Defense University, and Columbia University. He has also published many columns and op-eds. 

To my right is Professor James Feinerman, who we are very fortunate to have with us today. Professor Feinerman joined the 

Georgetown University Law Center faculty as a visiting professor 

for the 1985–1986 academic year. Immediately after law school he 

studied in the People’s Republic of China. Subsequently he joined 

the New York firm of Davis, Polk & Wordwell as a corporate associate. 

During 1982–1983, Professor Feinerman was a Fulbright lecturer 

on law at Peking University. In 1986, he was a Fulbright researcher in Japan. In 1989, he was awarded a McArthur Foundation Fellowship to study China’s practice of international law. 

During the 1992–1993 academic year, he was a fellow at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. From 1993–1995, on 

leave from the Law Center, Professor Feinerman was the director 

of the Committee on Scholarly Communication with China. Professor Feinerman served as the editor-in-chief of the American Bar 

Association’s China Law Reporter from 1986 to 1998. He spent 

spring 2006 as Fulbright senior distinguished lecturer at Tsinghua 

University Law School in Beijing. Professor Feinerman is the author of numerous journal articles and opinion pieces on the rule of 

law in China and has coauthored two books. 

Finally, Mr. Bob Fu, president of the ChinaAid Association. He 

is one of the leading voices in the world for the persecuted church 

in China. He was born and raised in mainland China, and graduated from the School of International Relations, People’s University in Beijing. 

He was a pastor at a house church in Beijing until he and his 

wife, Heidi, were jailed for two months for illegal evangelism in 

1996. They fled to the United States as religious refugees in 1997. 

Mr. Fu founded the China Aid Association in order to draw international attention to the Chinese Government’s human rights violations against house church Christians. He is now a visiting 

professor in Religion and Philosophy at Oklahoma Wesleyan University, and a Ph.D. candidate at Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia. He has written numerous pieces, including as 

a guest editor for the China Law and Government Journal by the 

University of California, Los Angeles. 

Lots of information there. Let’s get right to it. Professor Cohen, 

we’d be delighted to hear your statement. 

STATEMENT OF JEROME A. COHEN, PROFESSOR, NEW YORK 

UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW; CODIRECTOR, U.S.-ASIA LAW 

INSTITUTE; AND ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW FOR ASIA STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you very much. I want to thank Representative Pitts for coming here and showing such concern for the lawyers of China who are worried about human rights. I want to 

5 

thank, of course, Ms. Oldham-Moore, Mr. Grob, and the staff for organizing this. 

In 1977, a former student of mine, Victor Li, published a very interesting book called, ‘‘Law Without Lawyers.’’ His thesis was, 

China has a distinctive political-legal culture, it’s not one, as in 

Western countries or elsewhere, that requires a prominent role for 

lawyers, and the world should be open to recognizing China’s distinctive characteristics. 

Deng Xiaoping and company, soon after, took a different view. 

They resurrected the Soviet model that China had imported during 

its first decade of Communism. They modified the model for economic purposes, but they retained it for political-legal purposes. 

That included reliance on lawyers. 

Of course, the reliance on lawyers that China soon demonstrated 

throughout the 1980s and 1990s had many virtues. One of the 

problems, however, was when it came to human rights matters, the 

lawyers were subjected to restraints, just as Soviet lawyers were. 

This has been a continuing problem. 

I have a formal statement; some of you may have a copy. I’m not 

going to read it, but I thought I would try simply to summarize it 

in the time allotted. 

The 2007 amendment to the Lawyers Law offered some greater 

hope to lawyers that they would be able to take part in criminal 

cases to a greater extent, and that they would have more autonomy 

in governing their own affairs. 

It has been an improvement in some respects. In other respects, 

however, there is vague language in the law about state security, 

et cetera, that is easily subject to manipulation to use against lawyers. What we have found, although China has about 150,000 lawyers, only a very tiny minority have shown an active interest in 

human rights matters, and perhaps not more than 1 percent make 

human rights matters the bulk of their professional concerns. That 

is natural. Lawyers have to make a living. 

The problem is, the human rights lawyers who are active have 

consistently run into difficulty from the Ministry of Justice that 

controls them and from the local lawyers associations that operate 

with the guidance and instruction of the Ministry of Justice. 

That is why, in Beijing and Shenzhen, and a few other places, 

rights lawyers have tried to gain democratic control over the local 

lawyers’ association. They have only made modest progress. If 

you’re interested, there is a recent issue of China Rights Forum 

about the rule of law that is one of the sources for following the 

struggle of human rights lawyers for autonomy and governing 

themselves. 

In the real world, these lawyers’ associations work under the 

Ministry of Justice and impose discipline, as Representative Pitts 

has already recognized, on lawyers. Normally they operate quietly. 

They try to have chats, informal talks, with lawyers to discourage 

them from taking part in a broad range of cases. If they do not discourage them from taking part, they certainly require them to report, to accept guidance, in the handling of sensitive cases. These 

cases include highly controversial, sensitive political cases, like 

those involving Xinjiang and Uyghur independence claims, or 

Tibet, or people who want to organize democratic parties. 

6 

Falun Gong has been one of the most controversial categories. 

The systematic abuses received by the Falun Gong worshipers have 

been a highly sensitive point, and most lawyers are not permitted 

to represent Falun Gong defendants, and those who do are highly 

controlled. 

‘‘House church’’ people have also often found legal advice is not 

available to them, or is inadequate. There have been many cases 

involving claims against government for rather mundane activities. 

Corruption questions involving local officials, attempts to subject 

women to arbitrary birth control procedures, forced eviction of people from their housing and relocating them to places they don’t 

want to be. Even civil cases encounter interference with lawyers on 

occasion. 

Professor Feinerman’s statement, which I looked at briefly before 

the hearing, has many good examples of land transactions, environmental disputes, collective labor disputes, compensation for tainted 

milk products, earthquake victims; all of these cases have been 

cases where many lawyers—public interest lawyers, human rights 

lawyers—have wanted to take part and have often been refused or 

restrained in their effort to take part. The most recent case involves the Charter 08 organizer, Liu Xiaobo, who was not permitted to retain the famous rights lawyer, Mo Shaoping. 

Now, lawyers who don’t follow the informal advice/suggestions/ 

instructions of the local lawyers’ association or the judicial bureau 

of their city suffer many sanctions. Their license to practice law 

may be suspended, it can be revoked. 

A most recent technique used is to get the local lawyers’ association, as Representative Pitts recognized, not to approve the renewal 

of lawyers’ licenses and that effectively denies these people the 

ability to practice law. And as has been indicated, their law firms 

are coerced to restrain them, stop them, or fire them, move them 

out; there are a variety of techniques we do not have time to consider. 

Moreover—and this is rarely focused on—there are Communist 

Party organizations in these law firms. These law firms have Party 

organizations, like every social unit in China. They have been 

strengthened so that most law firms now will have a Party organization, a Party branch, that may reinforce discipline. 

Now, for the lawyers most unresponsive to the guidance of the 

authorities, criminal process has been invoked. A number of people 

have been sent to prison on a variety of pretexts. Criminal law in 

every country tends to be rather broad, and in China it is especially vague. That is how lawyers who have already lost their 

license, like Gao Zhisheng in Beijing and Zheng Enchong in Shanghai, have been sentenced to prison. 

In Shenzhen, a lawyer, Liu Yao, was sentenced to prison, and 

only the petition of over 500 local lawyers got him out after 16 

months. But in all such cases, these people who are convicted of 

crime lose their right to practice law forever, and that certainly 

makes a major inroad on their ability to earn a living and their capacity to carry out public interest work. 

Moreover, even self-taught, ‘‘barefoot’’ lawyers, who aren’t really 

licensed lawyers but who, through self-study and experience and 

practice, have managed to learn something about law and who play 

7 

an important role in some places in the countryside, have been sent 

to prison. 

Chen Guangcheng is the most famous example. He’s still got 

about a year to serve. I know all these people. I know Gao, I know 

Zheng, I know Liu Yao, I know Chen Guangcheng. These are marvelous people. They don’t deserve criminal punishment. 

Another case involves Guo Feixiong, I didn’t have space for it in 

my introduction, but should mention it. He’s another ‘‘barefoot’’ 

lawyer, convicted for operating a business without a license because he published a book about eight years ago without having 

the requisite approval. He got five years for that, an unusually 

heavy sentence. 

The worst aspect of this from my point of view is the physical 

intimidation that many ‘‘rights’’ lawyers are informally exposed to. 

Today is the 156th day since Gao Zhisheng was ‘‘disappeared,’’ to 

use the English version of Latin American parlance. You remember 

the techniques of Latin American dictatorships? Well, is China 

starting that? 

Gao had been convicted. He’d been released on a suspended sentence, but he didn’t comply with all the demands made on him, especially not to reveal torture he had already suffered, and he has 

not been heard from since his abduction. Absurdly, the Chinese 

Embassy in Washington, in response to congressional inquiry, has 

said he’s on probation and he’s free. Well, if he’s free, no one knows 

where he is. Many people fear he’s dead. So, this is not a happy 

situation. 

Of course, many lawyers have been beaten. Professor Feinerman 

gives some details on that. I know some myself. I’ve seen the 

bruises just a few weeks ago in Beijing on some of the lawyers who 

were more recently attacked. And, of course, I know Professor Teng 

Biao, who was kidnapped, a hood put over his face, taken to a remote place, held for hours, and threatened. This is Hitlerian, 

thuggish behavior. It’s not appropriate, given China’s accomplishments, China’s great progress in economic and social matters and 

the desire of the Chinese leadership to have their country recognized as having a civilized government. It should stop. 

And, of course, in their daily lives, many ‘‘rights’’ lawyers are 

monitored. If I call a rights lawyer up and say, ‘‘Can you come for 

dinner tomorrow? ’’ He says, ‘‘I have to ask my keeper who’s outside.’’ He calls back and says, ‘‘No, they won’t permit me to come. 

If I want to go to the office tomorrow I can’t go to dinner with you 

tonight, but maybe I can send a substitute.’’ It’s their daily life. 

The worst case of this type I know is Zheng Enchong’s. He already served three years in prison. He also finished one year of restriction on his political rights. Nevertheless, he is daily living a 

nightmare in terms of being restricted, being beaten, having his 

family discriminated against. His daughter had to flee to America 

because the authorities made it plain she had no future in China. 

Zheng Enchong does not deserve this. He is a splendid person. 

I tried to visit him in 2006. Six policemen stopped me from going 

into his apartment. I kept saying to them, ‘‘What’s your authority 

for doing this? There’s no legal basis for this that I know of.’’ They 

simply said, ‘‘We’re police.’’ I asked again and they said, ‘‘We’re police.’’ I said, ‘‘Look, in Shanghai you’re always saying that you’re 

8 

better than the rest of the country with respect to the rule of law. 

‘We’re police’ isn’t a good enough answer.’’ 

So it makes me think, if Victor Li were to have a sequel to his 

stimulating 1977 book, called ‘‘Law Without Lawyers,’’ maybe we 

should call it ‘‘Lawlessness Without Lawyers.’’ If you don’t have 

human rights lawyers, what you get is lawlessness. 

There are only a few minutes left. I just want to comment briefly 

on three other important aspects. One is human rights lawyers and 

political reform. There is an understandable debate going on in 

China among the human rights law community: should human 

rights lawyers take part in active political reform? Should they call 

for an end to the monopoly of power of the Chinese Communist 

Party? Or should they simply try to make the best of their bad professional situation, fighting for the public interest and human 

rights with one arm tied behind their back because of all the restraints they suffer? 

Most of the lawyers take the latter position. Gao Zhisheng did 

not. I talked with him about this and I said I admired his view that 

without political reform of a significant nature there never would 

be a genuine rule of law in China. But I also said, ‘‘If you take this 

position in public, you’re not going to be available to help people 

any more. You’re not going to be on the street.’’ Within four 

months, he wasn’t, and he has suffered terribly. 

Some other ‘‘rights’’ lawyers take the view that they are professionals, not political figures. Yet they’re not merely like dentists, 

they recognize the need for law reform. They take part in legislative reform. They handle individual cases the best they can. Most 

of them remain on the street, and even though they’re punished in 

the ways I’ve indicated, this valiant group continues. 

Mo Shaoping has been the embodiment of the professional lawyer who publicly keeps his nose out of politics. Yet even he was so 

frustrated last year that he signed the famous Charter 08, which 

surprised people. But I think he will continue to be in the professional mode, not looking for active political reform and leaving that 

to others. 

There are a lot of restrictions on lawyers’ daily practice. Of 

course, this Commission has considered them before, and many 

people have written about them, including myself, and my statement refers to them. I won’t linger on that. 

I will just say that the active human rights lawyers, not only in 

criminal prosecutions, are limited in what they’re allowed to do and 

are subject to a considerable number of unfair restrictions. Many 

basic questions have yet to be dealt with, for example: should witnesses come to court in a major criminal case so they can be crossexamined or should the statement they gave the police be sufficient 

evidence and essentially unchallenged? 

There are also problems with supposedly ‘‘non-criminal’’ sanctions. The infamous laodong jiaoyang, ‘‘reeducation through labor,’’ 

for example. Lawyers have generally not been allowed to play a 

role in the process of determining whether somebody should be 

sent off for as many as three years of what amounts to criminal 

punishment under a different name. 

There is pressure now to try to improve the procedures because 

the Ministry of Public Security is desperately trying to retain ‘‘reVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Mar 25, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\51189.TXT DEIDRE
9 

education through labor,’’ which gives the police alone the power to 

put you away for as long as three years; no lawyer, no prosecutor, 

no judge is necessary. 

In reviewing such police determinations, there is a modest role 

for courts and lawyers but it is modest. Constitutional questions 

also are not open to lawyers at this point. The courts cannot consider them, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 

which can, is not really functioning in this respect, so lawyers are 

also frustrated there. If China adheres to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the role of lawyers will be expanded, at least in principle, and we hope in practice. 

Just a final point about ‘‘barefoot’’ lawyers. The Chinese countryside is sadly lacking in legal services. Some counties—a few years 

ago, 206 counties—had no lawyers whatever. People need legal advice. ‘‘Barefoot’’ lawyers are one response to this, people who do not 

have formal legal education and are not qualified lawyers, but who, 

nevertheless, can play a role when regular lawyers fail to do the 

job. Unfortunately, some members of the legal profession oppose 

‘‘barefoot’’ lawyers. They think they’ll only make the reputation of 

lawyers worse regarding corruption and incompetence. 

I think that is short-sighted. I think we should follow the example of the former dean of Tsinghua Law School, Wang Chenguang, 

in training ‘‘barefoot’’ lawyers to play a role in the rural areas, otherwise people in the countryside will often have no way to challenge arbitrary rule, whether it’s a question of arbitrary taxation, 

land deprivation, or whatever. 

There are many questions that ought to be considered here, and 

I am grateful to the Commission for giving us the opportunity to 

discuss them. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen appears in the appendix.] 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. Commissioner Pitts 

had to go vote. He’ll be back. 

Nury Turkel has an obligation that he cannot avoid. He’ll give 

brief remarks, and then he unfortunately has to depart. 

Please, Nury. 

STATEMENT OF NURY TURKEL, ATTORNEY WITH KIRSTEIN & 

YOUNG, PLLC 

Mr. TURKEL. Thank you very much for organizing this panel discussion. 

I’m going to use one minute of my time to clarify a couple of 

things about what is happening in Urumqi. First of all, we oppose 

any type of violence for any reason. I’d like to make it absolutely 

clear that the Chinese Government’s accusation of Uyghur organizations instigating the incidents in Urumqi is false. 

The other point I’d like to clarify is the number of casualties. The 

government says 156 deaths. They haven’t broken down the ethnic 

numbers. From what we heard through a Radio Free Asia interview with a Uyghur individual from Urumqi, several hundred 

Uyghurs have been shot in front of Xinjiang University, Xinjiang 

Medical University, and in Central Square. 

I wanted to clarify another point. The Guangdong incident 

sparked the incidents but that’s not the only reason as to why the 

Uyghurs took to the streets to demonstrate. In the last six decades, 

10 

particularly since 9/11, the Uyghurs lose out on every front; political, economic, and social. 

Considering the Chinese history of heavy-handed and brutal 

crackdowns on political dissenters, the Uyghurs took to the streets 

carrying the Chinese flags last Sunday. They did not intend to turn 

the demonstration into a violent incident. It turned into violence 

after the Chinese started firing tear gas and shooting at the demonstrators. The demonstration was mostly organized by students. A 

week ago, the Turkish President delivered a very interesting 

speech at Xinjiang University and most of the students who participated in the demonstration were from Xinjiang University. 

Today, we’re discussing the lack of access to lawyers and Chinese 

Government harassment of rights lawyers in China. I’d like to 

point out that there will be a mass arrest, torture, and execution 

in the coming weeks and months. Those detained and accused will 

not have access to fair judicial process or lawyers. 

Speaking of which, the Uyghur political prisoners or demonstrators participating in the 1997 uprising in Ghulja are still languishing in prison. I don’t believe that any of them have had access 

to fair judicial process. I had a chance to interview two of the 

former political prisoners who participated in the 1997 demonstration. One of them happened to be a former Guantanamo inmate 

who now lives in Albania. He said he didn’t have any access to lawyers. He was subject to torture and long imprisonment. 

For Uyghurs, representing or being represented is extremely difficult, because anything Uyghurs have done could be easily translated into a political crime that is separatism or terrorism. So any 

Chinese or Uyghur lawyers cannot even get close to representing, 

or even talking to, the Uyghur prisoners in Chinese prisons. It’s 

simply too risky to represent Uyghur cases. 

Recently, there has been one other legal need that has emerged 

for Uyghurs: losing their properties, particularly in Kashgar. As 

you may have read recently, the Chinese Government is demolishing the Old City of Kashgar, and that has resulted in many 

Uyghurs losing their real properties. And they’re not being fairly 

compensated. 

When they ask for their lawyers’ help, their response is that ‘‘it’s 

a government policy and if I represent you, I’ll be in trouble. I cannot get involved, even though this is a property interests and compensation-related issue. If I represent you and go to the courts with 

you, then the government will take away my license. Sorry, I cannot help you.’’ That has been a typical response from lawyers. 

Recently I’ve conducted interviews and found out that there are 

no Uyghur rights lawyers. Basically, there is no Uyghur Gao 

Zhisheng. There are some Uyghurs who represent cases involving 

petty crimes. As long as it does not involve criticizing government 

or criticizing government officials, the Uyghur lawyers take cases 

involving petty crimes. 

I’d like to use a few examples to highlight the situation, particularly the political prisoner situation in Xinjiang. The most famous 

case is the case of Rebiya Kadeer’s children. They were initially 

taken into custody for tax evasion. When that happened, Rebiya 

Kadeer’s family tried to get a lawyer. And most of them flatly rejected it because of her name, because of her family history. 

11 

They initially thought that it might be all right to represent 

them since it was tax-related issues. Then later, the government 

charged Ms. Kadeer’s sons for crimes of separatism and endangering state security. They made the lawyers keep their hands off 

the cases. So one of her children was sentenced to seven years in 

prison and the other one was sentenced to nine years in prison. 

One other famous case involves a Canadian citizen—his name is 

Hussein Celil—who traveled to Uzbekistan with a Canadian passport. At the request of the Chinese Government, he was deported 

to China. To this day, Canadian officials, Canadian lawyers cannot 

get access to him. It’s been more than three years since his arrest. 

A couple of years ago, he was sentenced to life in prison. 

I talked to his lawyer last week. His name is Chris McLeod. He 

said he even tried to hire a local lawyer, with the help of a group 

of Falun Gong practitioners who have access to a local rights lawyer. They invited the Chinese lawyer from Beijing. But that courageous lawyer was harassed and even received death threats. His 

family was upset that he’s representing a separatist and terrorist. 

Then the lawyer backed off. 

So I wish I could tell you good stories. But there’s literally nothing good coming out of the Uyghur region. Last night I was doing 

research to find out what is happening to this brave ‘‘barefoot’’ lawyer that Professor Cohen was mentioning. His name is Ilham 

Tohti. He is an economics professor at Beijing Nationalities University. He has been an outspoken critic of the Chinese officials in 

Urumqi. His point is that China has a constitution and autonomy 

laws. These officials, including Nur Bekri and Wang Lequan are 

making it difficult not only for the Uyghurs, but also the central 

government. They are the root cause of all the Uyghur resentment 

and ethnic tension. 

He is the owner of a blog that the Chinese Government has accused of being used by the so-called separatists and rioters to plan 

Sunday’s demonstration. We’ve found out last night that he has 

been taken away. We don’t know his whereabouts. He said, right 

before his arrest on his blog, that ‘‘I always tell myself to be cool, 

calm, and make rational analysis. Going to the courts to resolve 

disputes is something that should be lawful in this society. I am 

my own lawyer. When my trial comes up, they’ll appoint a lawyer 

for me. I will not trust the government to appoint a lawyer.’’ 

I’d like to end my remarks there. Thank you. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you, Nury. We’re very grateful that 

you were able to get here today. I know you had a number of other 

obligations. Thank you. 

Professor James Feinerman, we’re honored to have you. Please 

go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES V. FEINERMAN, PROFESSOR OF ASIAN 

LEGAL STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, 

CODIRECTOR, ASIAN LAW AND POLICY STUDIES PROGRAM 

Mr. FEINERMAN. Thank you. I am very glad that I’m here today 

and that the Commission has convened this roundtable on this very 

important topic. I’m grateful to Representative Pitts for coming 

here and demonstrating with his presence the importance that is 

attached to this issue. I am, of course, very glad to be here with 

12 

my colleagues on the panel, particularly my teacher and mentor, 

Mr. Cohen. 

I am glad that he began by both quoting Victor Li—I’ll come back 

to that in a second—and by saying that he was going to depart 

from his prepared remarks. I have some too, and I will likewise depart from them since you can read what I had to say there, and 

I will try to summarize them and hit a few other points along the 

way in the brief time that is allotted to me. 

I am glad that Jerry mentioned Victor Li because I actually 

spoke before another hearing of this Commission about five or six 

years ago, and the title of my presentation then was ‘‘Lawyers 

Without Law,’’ turning around the title of Victor’s famous book. 

The point that I was making then, which I think is still valid 

today, is that China has lawyers. It has lots of lawyers compared 

to what it had when Victor wrote his book, and even for decades 

afterward. 

But the point is that they don’t really operate in a system which 

has the rule of law that makes the practice of what they do meaningful in the sense of promising justice to the widest range of the 

Chinese citizenry, although many lawyers do what lawyers do in 

this country and many other countries in representing clients in 

court and carrying out business transactions and advising people 

about things like taxes and family law. 

But what is missing is the sense that there is an obligation on 

the part of lawyers and the organized bar in general to do something about the overall enjoyment of justice by the citizens of their 

country. I think that that’s an important thing to take home from 

the presentations that you’re roundtable today in a variety of 

different circumstances, whether it’s the mistreatment of ethnic 

minorities in Xinjiang, whether it’s the continuing illegal harassment—even given China’s constitutional law—of religious practitioners, or some of the other cases that I’ll talk about, highlighting 

what is in my prepared remarks. 

I think it’s also an important event to have this roundtable 

today, this month, because this month marks the 30th anniversary 

of China’s determination to embrace the rule of law. Often the criticism that China makes or tries to deflect when it is criticized by 

others for lacking the rule of law is that this is a Western concept 

and we don’t really have to explain ourselves. We’re our own country, we have our own sovereignty, we have our own very long historic tradition, and we do things our way, you do things your way. 

But I think as the embrace of the rule of law that began with 

the publication of China’s first seven laws, really after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1979 on July 1, illustrates this is a choice the Chinese have made themselves. If they 

believe in their own propaganda, they have to then follow the laws 

that they’ve created for themselves. 

It just isn’t on to say that we can violate our own constitution 

because we’re the final determiners of what it means. That’s an objective document that other people are perfectly qualified to interpret and to call them out when it’s clear hypocrisy as to what the 

Chinese are actually doing with regard to their own legal system. 

But the fact that they decided to embrace law those three decades ago indicates that there is a need to create, and China did creVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Mar 25, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\51189.TXT DEIDRE
13 

ate, courts and lawyers to practice before them. So let me just 

briefly note those two things. China revived a system of courts that 

it actually had for a short period in the 1950s. In fact, Professor 

Cohen’s famous book about the criminal justice system described 

what existed in lieu of formally organized criminal courts in that 

brief period of embrace of a Soviet legal model in the 1950s and 

early 1960s. 

But when China passed these new laws in 1979, one of those 

laws was an organic law for the organization of People’s Courts, 

and it made it clear that there was going to be a court system, including a full hierarchy of trial courts, appellate courts, and even 

a Supreme People’s Court, that was going to operate in a different 

way than the justice system had operated previously. 

But coming down to today, we can see that the court system has 

been consistently underfunded, starved of resources. The first 

judges, almost for two decades, were very poorly trained, often demobilized military officers and former police officials. You can just 

imagine what kind of justice a judiciary made up solely of those 

sorts might mete out. It’s only really been in the last decade that 

legally trained graduates of university law faculties are beginning 

to assume important roles in the bench. 

Just this past year, China removed a well-qualified, highlytrained former chief judge, the Supreme People’s Court president, 

Xiao Yang, and replaced him with a totally unqualified Party hack 

who has no legal training, Wang Shengjun. As a result, the legal 

system is headed at the top by someone who lacks genuine legal 

qualifications and commitment to the rule of law, although we can 

guess from his Party background what he’s probably committed to. 

Also, as for lawyers, China went from a handful, fewer than a 

couple of hundred lawyers in 1979, many of whom had been 

trained even before the 1949 Communist takeover, to a system 

today that boasts somewhere between 130,000 and 140,000 lawyers. 

But what do those lawyers do? What were they trained to do? 

Here, I don’t mean to unjustly criticize China. In this country and 

many other countries as well, it’s only a small handful of lawyers 

who go into what we call pro bono representation, representing unpopular causes, doing the Lord’s work, so to speak, in areas like 

dealing with human rights victims, taking seriously violations of 

human rights, calling their own legal systems to account. 

It isn’t lucrative, it isn’t remunerative as law practice in other 

areas can be. Even in countries other than China it can be fraught 

with dangers, some not quite so dire as they are in China, but dangers nonetheless, including possible threats to the lawyers themselves and their families. 

But in China, it’s been pretty clear that they have moved from 

a system where every lawyer was a state legal worker working in 

a state-run legal advisory office to a system where there are, today, 

private law firms. I was looking at the Web site of one of them 

yesterday that had offices or corresponding relationships on five 

continents, every bit as big and all-embracing as the largest multinational law firms based in New York or London. 

It’s clear that lawyers in China may be doing something very different than what we might hope, at least a reasonable representaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Mar 25, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\51189.TXT DEIDRE
14 

tion of them would be doing with regard to protecting their citizens’ 

rights. And here I’ll just tell you two anecdotes that I think reveal 

what is actually been the rule with lawyers’ training in China. 

I remember going when I was a young associate myself in New 

York to an event at Columbia Law School that was organized by 

our colleague, Professor Randle Edwards. He had hosted the first 

group of Chinese who had come to be trained in law. This was 

1981. The legal profession hadn’t really been reestablished. None 

of these people had been trained as lawyers, but they were going 

to be expected to return and do law-related jobs in China. They 

spent four months at Columbia Law School getting a very thorough 

introduction to American law, and then they spent six months in 

New York City law firms learning what lawyers did, shadowing 

senior lawyers, and seeing a range of legal practice. 

At the reception, the oldest of them, who later went on to become 

the head of the All China Lawyers Association, a man named Gao 

Zongze, handed me his card. The card had his name on it, and underneath in English it said ‘‘senior partner.’’ I turned it over to see 

what it said in Chinese, and the translation was something like, 

‘‘high-class lawyer.’’ [Laughter.] 

I said, ‘‘Mr. Gao, aren’t you a little worried about going around 

representing yourself as a partner? ’’ Chinese lawyers don’t practice 

in law firms. Law firms aren’t partnerships. There is no partnership law. He said, ‘‘Well, I learned one thing in the six months that 

I spent at my New York City law firm.’’ I was eager to learn what 

that was. I said, ‘‘Oh really? How interesting. What was that? ’’ He 

said, ‘‘The only people who get respect are senior partners.’’ 

So, if that’s what it took, that’s what he was going to call himself. He went on to quite a career as a practicing lawyer in China, 

but I think that on his agenda, and on the agenda of the organization that he headed, the human rights or civil rights of Chinese 

citizens was quite low, maybe even non-existent. 

Likewise, I’d just mention, a few years later in 1991, actually, 

when I went back with the leadership of the American Bar Association to meet with our Chinese counterparts—it was a visit muchdelayed for two years because of what happened in Tiananmen 

Square in 1989. We were meeting with people who purported to be 

the organizers of the first genuine private law firm in China. The 

firm is called Jun He, and it’s gone on to some prominence in Chinese legal practice. 

The incoming president of the American Bar asked one of the 

lawyers, a young man who had been trained at UCLA Law School 

and obviously had some experience in the United States before 

going back to China, whether or not someone like him or someone 

from his law firm would take on the representation of the various 

defendants that were accused of misdeeds in Tiananmen Square. 

He very quickly saw his opening, leapt up and said, ‘‘No, no. You 

have to understand that given the training that we’ve had and all 

the advantages that we have and what we’ve learned, having us do 

that kind of work would be like having a brain surgeon do veterinary medicine.’’ The room got very quiet and the incoming president became very red-faced. He was a former dean of the Florida 

State University Law School and a partner in a Miami law firm. 

He said, ‘‘I’m the incoming president of the American Bar AssociaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Mar 25, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\51189.TXT DEIDRE
15 

tion and senior partner at Steel, Hector & Davis, and I do veterinary medicine.’’ [Laughter.] 

So the young man realized he had misstepped and tried to pull 

back, but it was pretty hard to retreat. 

In the few moments that are left to me, let me just tick off the 

few things that I think are worth highlighting from the center of 

my report that you have before you. The first is to focus on the 

steps that the Chinese have been taking with increasingly virulent 

results to try to discourage lawyers from taking on these representations. It begins with harassment. It leads, in some unfortunate 

cases, to severe beatings, some that are permanently disfiguring 

and crippling to the Chinese lawyers who experience them. 

It has also involved detention and jail, the illegal detention that 

Professor Cohen described with people such as Gao Zhisheng, but 

also criminal charges and jail terms, totally unjustified by all 

rights, and then recently this non-renewal of licenses, which basically destroys the livelihood and any future promise of these people 

returning to practice. 

Likewise, the range of cases that I talk about in my prepared remarks is remarkably broad and it doesn’t even cover the waterfront. You’ll hear from other people on this panel about things that 

I don’t mention, but people who, for example, took on representation of the Falun Gong, people who represented other disfavored 

groups—some of them, by the way, these representatives, these 

rights defenders, are not even trained lawyers. 

Hu Ja, who took on the representation of HIV patients, was not 

a lawyer by training but has suffered the same kind of fate because 

he took as his cause defending the rights of these people because 

there are very few lawyers who are willing to take them on as clients in China. 

The absolute prohibition, really, by legal means of class action 

lawsuits, a guiding opinion that was issued in 2006 that basically 

says you have to get permission if you want to represent more than 

10 clients collectively, makes it impossible for large groups of aggrieved citizens to get together and seek legal representation. 

There are problems with those who have tried to defend people who 

have suffered grievous wrongs, for example, the tainted food and 

baby formula cases, or the Sichuan earthquake cases—the parents, 

family members of victims there. 

The lawyers have been brought together and told in no uncertain 

terms that they are not to represent these people, that if they do 

represent these people there will be serious consequences, and that 

they should think not of human rights, civil liberties, or even provisions of Chinese law, but rather creating a harmonious society and 

making sure that there is national unity, doing nothing to damage 

the overall impression that the situation is excellent and constantly 

improving. 

So at the very last, I would just mention three things that I 

think we should do. This goes a little bit beyond my own prepared 

remarks’ conclusion. First, is I think that the American Bar Association and other bar associations, state and local, and bar associations in foreign countries as well, should voice their concerns about 

this, develop resolutions, and make it clear that we have our counterparts in China and we’re concerned about them. I don’t think 

16 

that this has been done enough to bring home the seriousness. 

China would respect, for example, the prominence of American lawyers who occupy a somewhat different and more protected position 

in their society than lawyers do in China. 

I think, second, the United States and other foreign governments 

should make it clear through their foreign ministries, through their 

ministries of justice, and also through their congresses and parliaments, as Representative Pitts has done here, that this is a matter of great concern to political leaders and this is something that 

we will take seriously in our future dealings with China if they 

don’t make some progress on this front. 

Finally, I think that, as with fora like this here at the Commission, that in every other place where we can possibly get a hearing 

it’s important to keep up the publicity and the outreach to people 

who are in these dire circumstances in China. I know Professor 

Cohen, for example, and a number of my counterparts, law professors in the United States, have done our best to try and make sure 

that we remain in contact in whatever way we legally can with our 

Chinese colleagues, especially those in the practicing bar who have 

experienced these very severe repressions. 

But it’s hard, and it requires persistence. It will be helpful to 

have a lot of other people doing this work as well rather than relying on just a small group of interested people who have been trying 

to carry out this enterprise under very adverse circumstances for, 

unfortunately, a very long period of time. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feinerman appears in the appendix.] 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you, Mr. Feinerman. 

Before turning to Bob Fu, at 11:10 we’ll open the floor to questions from the audience. 

Bob, please begin. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF BOB (XIQIU) FU, FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, 

CHINAAID ASSOCIATION (CAA) 

Mr. FU. Thank you. Thank you for the invitation to this panel 

with Professor Cohen, Professor Feinerman, and Mr. Turkel. I very 

much appreciate the hard work and concern of the CECC Commissioners, including Congressman Pitts and many others, and, of 

course, the CECC senior staffers. 

I have been involved with the training of human rights lawyers, 

especially in the areas of international law, since 2004. We actually 

invited the first delegation, in 2005, to the United States. We had 

some training with the NYU Law School. Professor Cohen has been 

involved. 

Recently I have been receiving many messages from lawyers in 

China about their license cancellations or their licenses have not 

been renewed by the Beijing Lawyers Association. This is not only 

unnecessary and unjust, but also an unprecedented development. 

As far as I know, that we can confirm, so far, 19 lawyers were already imprisoned and this year the 19 lawyers at this time are unable to practice their law. They are: Jiang Tianyong, Li Heping, Li 

Xiongbing, Li Fuchun, Wang Yajun, Guo Shaofei, Cheng Hai, Tang 

Jitian, Yang Huiwen, Tong Chaoping, Liu Guitao, Xie Yanyi, Wen 

17 

Haibo, Liu Wei, Zhang Lihui, Zhang Chengmao, Zhang Xingshui, 

Wei Liangyue, and Sun Wenbing. 

These attorneys have always persisted in providing legal assistance for clients to safeguard their legitimate rights. The report I 

have seen, in an open letter to the Ministry of Justice on July 2, 

most clearly explains the situation with the license denials and 

points out the root problems and effects of this on the national 

level. 

This letter was written by 31 Chinese intellectuals, 23 in Beijing, 

7 in other areas in China, and 1 Australian. I request that the full 

text of this open letter be entered into the record. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes. 

Mr. FU. Thank you. 

I will read a few key points of this letter. It says, 

We think this case is entirely a violation of the law. As a social 

organization in the legal industry, the Beijing Lawyers Association has no right to restrict or deprive its members of their 

right to practice. In the past, there were cases in which the 

Beijing Lawyers Association deprived some human rights lawyers of their qualifications to practice, but that was considered 

an illegal overstepping of its authority. Now it has forced many 

law firms to stop the practice and made several hundred lawyers unable to practice, which is all the more astonishing. Such 

illegal, absurd, and perverse acts that violate common sense 

will bring serious, bad consequences to society. 

On July 18, 2008, the Ministry of Justice promulgated management methods in attorneys’ practice and management methods 

on law firms which officially annulled the annual registration 

system of the attorneys. This time, the Beijing Lawyers Association issued a notice and changed ‘‘registration’’ to ‘‘register’’ 

and totally disregarded the principles of the Ministry of Justice 

in that the specific methods for annual evaluation shall be provided by a Ministry of Justice. 

First of all, it will further worsen the environment for rule of 

law in society by taking advantage of the authorization from 

Beijing’s Bureau of Justice and the Beijing Lawyers Association suppresses and takes revenge on human rights lawyers as 

it wishes. Most of these attorneys are top-notch, outstanding 

attorneys who have the highest awareness of the rule of law 

among 10,000 attorneys in Beijing. 

Second, cancellation of licenses of a large number of attorneys 

has undermined to a great extent the strategic elements for 

building a harmonious society. 

Third, canceling the right to practice of so many rights defense 

attorneys is a provocation on the social conscience. 

The first part of my recommendation for the congressional response is to base the response on this recommendation from this 

open letter to the Ministry of Justice. It is a very clear, straightforward framework on which I think U.S. congressional response to 

Beijing can be based. 

I will read part of this recommendation letter, the recommendation from the open letter. It says, 

18 

It is our belief that as the highest traditional administrative organ of our country, the Ministry of Justice should 

not ignore such a violation of law by the Beijing Municipal 

Bureau of Justice and the Beijing Lawyers Association, 

worsening the environment for rule of law, undermining 

the social harmony, and challenging the social conscience. 

We hope the Ministry of Justice can, in the principle of upholding the spirit of the rule of law as proposed at the 

17th People’s Congress, order the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice and Beijing Lawyers Association to withdraw their decision, correct their mistakes, and restore the 

rights lawyers’ right to practice, and apologize to the people in various circles of life so as to solve this problem in 

a fair, reasonable, and legal way. 

I appreciate the clear statements in this letter which really explains not only their concern, but also the national effects of these 

licensed denials. The effects which ultimately concern—especially 

because unfortunately they show an utter disregard for the rule of 

law by the largest country in the world. 

One question to be addressed by this panel is, what is the relationship between these lawyers, the Chinese Government, and the 

Chinese Communist Party? This brings up an intriguing point because these human rights lawyers have been moving forward according to the proposal from the 17th People’s Congress to promote 

the spirit of the rule of law and the realization of the rule of law 

in various jobs of state. 

A simple list has been compiled of each lawyer whose license has 

been revoked or not renewed and the important incidents and the 

cases the lawyers have been involved with, and the categories mentioned in this list, including the poisonous milk incident, the abnormal deaths while the victim was in custody, representing house 

churches and Falun Gong practitioners, and reeducation through 

labor cases, the rights of migrant workers and ethnic minorities, 

and rights of HIV patients, and the cases of underground brick 

kilns in Shanxi Province. 

Which of these cases should the government shrink from having 

represented by a professional lawyer? Does not rule of law necessitate the vulnerability to transparency? Transparency and the rule 

of law, in some of these cases, might necessitate acknowledgement 

of unjust measures or inappropriate use of authority. That is unfortunately a consistent possibility in any government because of 

human nature. What is not a necessity or acceptable is repression 

of lawyers who are implementing the rule of law. 

So, I will mention briefly about Gao Zhisheng’s case. Professor 

Cohen already mentioned it, but we have launched a campaign 

called FreeGao.com, a campaign since March. So far, we have received over 102,000 signatures up until today, from Bosnia to 

Saudi Arabia, from Turkey to Zimbabwe. People from all over the 

world signed to urge the Chinese Government to tell us where Gao 

is and what his condition is about. 

So of course, these developments strengthen the play of the U.S. 

Congress, to publicly affirm the truth and justice, investigate these 

issues. I understand, after meeting with the chairman, Congressman 

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19 

sion, he will write a joint letter, along with a Member of Congress, 

today or tomorrow to send to the Chinese Ambassador to ask the 

whereabouts of Mr. Gao. 

Finally, I want to urge the Obama Administration officials and 

the senior U.S. diplomats at the Embassy in Beijing to publicly, 

regularly, and frequently meet with these freedom fighters in and 

outside China when they are available. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you. 

Mr. FU. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fu, the Open Letter, and the 

Final Compiled Translated Lawyers’ Statements appear in the appendix.] 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. The ChinaAid Association has done a tremendous job raising the profile of the Gao case on the Hill. Thank 

you. 

We’re delighted to have Congressman Wu with us. It’s nice to see 

you, sir. He’s just rejoined the Commission this year. So, we’re delighted to see you here today. 

Now at this stage in the proceedings we open it up to the audience for questions. 

Congressman Wu, would you like to say something? 

Representative WU. No. I think I will—— 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. I think we hijacked you. 

Representative WU. I will listen very happily to the Q&A for as 

long as I can before my next obligation. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Terrific. Thank you so much. The first 

question from the audience. Do we have anybody? Yes, sir; in the 

front. 

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. Thank you. Mr. Feinerman, you’ve commented that you felt it was necessary that American lawyers, bar 

associations, and so forth get involved in this process to try to help 

the situation, rights defenders. I’ve been trying to work on that for 

about a year now with Dr. Fu and we’re not having a lot of success. 

Do you have any suggestions on how we get these bar associations 

to come on board and understand that lawyers across the world are 

our brothers and sisters and that we need to let them know that 

we will stick with them? 

Mr. FEINERMAN. Well, I have two practical suggestions based on 

my own experience doing this. Twenty years ago in the aftermath 

of Tiananmen, we did get the American Bar Association, as well as 

the New York City Bar, to make statements that were formal resolutions adopted by the Bar Association and such about what happened in the aftermath then. I think that the time has come to try 

and refire those sorts of connections. 

Bar associations in general usually have two ways of doing this. 

One is to contact the top bar leadership, the executive director or 

whoever is in charge of the bar association, and try and get a resolution on the table, usually at their annual meetings, but sometimes they can do it outside of that forum as well. 

Then second, they almost all have at least one committee, and 

sometimes multiple committees, that are involved with questions of 

human rights, contact with foreign bars. The American Bar Association, for example, has as one of its enumerated goals Goal VIII, 

which is fostering the rule of law around the world. So, there is a 

20 

Goal VIII group inside the American Bar Association, but there is 

also a separate committee on individual rights and responsibilities. 

The Section on International Law has a China law group, although because of their interest in pursuing practice and contacts 

with China and clients both in the United States and China who 

want to stay on the right side of the government, they may not be 

your first point of contact or your best ally with regard to this. 

But I agree, there are like-minded people in these organizations, 

even in the China law subcommittees, who would say that this has 

reached such a stage and the conduct is so outrageous, that we believe a general statement that talks about the kinds of concerns 

that lawyers abroad have for their counterparts in China is certainly well within the limits that even a restrictive government 

might place on those kind of undertakings. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you. 

Yes, sir? Congressman Wu, then Jerry Cohen, I know, wants to 

say something. 

Representative WU. If I may just add a point to that response. 

I’ll just speak up a little bit. When we were dealing with the Pakistani situation where lawyers were taking such a leading role, I 

found that law schools were especially valuable venues and many 

of the deans were quite amenable to contacting their faculty. One 

might find a little bit more hesitation in those law schools that 

have extensive programs in China, but I think that the academic 

community is a good source of help in addition to the bar organizations. 

Thank you. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you. 

Professor Cohen? 

Mr. COHEN. I think those ideas we just heard from both speakers 

are excellent. Committees have formed in various places to try to 

be helpful. Hong Kong has taken the lead with its human rights 

lawyers group to support Chinese human rights lawyers. The Taipei Bar Association and the Taiwan Bar Association have been supportive. The International Bar Association has just issued a good 

statement about the problems of Chinese lawyers. In New York, 

our city bar association has an active human rights committee and 

a committee on Asian law that are concerned. 

A group of us in New York last year formed a Committee to Support Chinese Lawyers that is centered at Fordham University Law 

School’s Leitner Center. It does just what the Congressman has 

said should be done. The American Bar Association [ABA], of 

course, does very good work in Chinese law reform, including 

human rights, criminal justice, lawyers’ problems, and that is to be 

commended. NYU Law School cooperates closely with the ABA in 

this respect. 

I think our deans and our university presidents have to seize 

more occasions. For example, this year there will be a number of 

anniversaries of Chinese law schools being established 30, in some 

cases, 100 years ago. American deans are invited. I think, instead 

of passing up those occasions, they should participate and make 

very strong statements about the importance of protecting human 

rights lawyers and the importance of protecting law faculty people 

who not only teach, write, and publish to the extent they’re allowed 

21 

to, but often take part in active cases and therefore suffer sanctions. So I think this is a very good question to have raised. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you. 

Next questioner. Jim Geheran is up next. 

Mr. GEHERAN. Hi. Jim Geheran—questions to Professor Cohen— 

lawyers do not—characterize—the situation in China. One of the 

issues that I see before us as—China is that our foreign policy 

tends to compartmentalize the issue of human rights and we fail 

to see—to make human rights the centerpiece of our foreign policy 

in regard to—this morning—essentially exists in terms of, without 

the rule of law—make a conforming argument to support the statement that—that the world community should not rely on countries 

who do not rely on their own citizens. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Okay. 

Mr. GEHERAN [continuing].—That statement really supports—— 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you. 

Professor Cohen? 

Mr. COHEN. Well, we have witnessed the struggle of every new 

Federal administration in this country to adopt an appropriate 

human rights policy, one that will be good across the board, that 

is not selectively applied. One complaint China has sometimes justifiably made is that we’re very selective in our targets for human 

rights. We neglect many of our friends, so-called, for their human 

rights violations but we focus only on certain other countries. So, 

consistency is important. 

Second, our own behavior is crucial. I think one of the most profound things anybody has ever said was the Scottish poet Robert 

Burns, who said, ‘‘Oh wad the Lord, this giftie gie us to see oursels 

as ithers see us.’’ Our own conduct, especially recently in the Bush 

Administration, the second Bush Administration, has made us very 

vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy when we start to point out the 

human rights weaknesses in other countries. 

I think one good thing China has done is to issue an annual 

human rights report on U.S. Government behavior. As long as it’s 

factual, I think it’s very helpful. If it’s merely propagandistic, onesided, et cetera, then it isn’t. But we all benefit from criticism of 

that nature. Our own conduct is very important. 

Now, we’ve watched Secretary Clinton try to come to grips with 

the question, where does human rights in China fit into our broader China needs, because we need Chinese cooperation just as China 

needs our cooperation? I’m hoping to see a more vigorous, case-oriented discussion between the United States and China and one 

that will include not only government officials from both countries, 

but also non-officials who are more specialized, who have more 

knowledge than officials. 

This Commission could recommend an idea that was floating 

around the State Department at the end of the second Bush Administration, which would be to initiate a real human rights dialogue, one that discusses concrete cases. Chinese officials love to 

talk in the abstract. They don’t like to deal with concrete cases. In 

the extreme case of Gao Zhisheng, we see they’re not prepared to 

tell the truth even if they choose to respond on concrete cases, but 

I think this would be important for the Commission to encourage 

that kind of dialogue. 

22 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you. 

Kara Abramson, please. 

Ms. ABRAMSON. Thank you. Kara Abramson with the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. I will direct this question 

to Mr. Cohen. 

I understand the sensitivities of working on an issue like 

Xinjiang, which you raised in your testimony, but many issues are 

sensitive. Falun Gong is sensitive, and yet lawyers take on cases 

defending Falun Gong. So my question is, as rights defense lawyers 

pursue sensitive cases despite the risks, why are they not actively 

pursuing cases involving Xinjiang. I recognize that cases involving 

issues like separatism are extremely sensitive, but I wonder if 

there might be areas where there is room to push the envelope, 

such as cases involving employment discrimination based on ethnicity. I am interested in hearing your thoughts on that, please. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COHEN. There are lots of needs in China for lawyers that are 

not yet being filled. You’re pointing out some of them. Labor law 

is an opportunity. There are a number of firms operating not only 

from the management side, but from the migrant labor, the human 

rights, side. But there is much more that can be done. 

Environment. Think of all the environmental challenges China 

confronts and the role that litigation might assume. Litigation that 

is happening is interesting, important, but merely a drop in the 

bucket. Every issue you turn to needs much more Chinese legal talent. The problem is how to create the conditions that make it attractive, not merely permissible, for lawyers to take part in these 

matters. 

Professor Feinerman has alluded to the fact that most lawyers 

in China are not big moneymakers. There are some firms that do 

very well. They charge international-type fees, but they’re a minority. Most lawyers are struggling to make a living. We have to 

figure out ways of making human rights practice possible, like compensating lawyers for successful environmental litigation or successful labor litigation. These ideas are gradually developing. 

So there’s a law practice area between a commercial practice 

with no political implications and a human rights practice that 

deals with things that are highly sensitive, like Falun Gong or democracy. There’s quite a broad area of important cases, including 

open government information, where the Chinese Government is 

not necessarily going to be oppressive and where it increasingly 

will see the benefits of having law and lawyers. 

Ms. ABRAMSON. Thank you. Do you think that as this space 

you’ve discussed opens up, there will be more of an interest in pursuing cases in Xinjiang, particularly in less sensitive areas like employment discrimination? 

Mr. COHEN. As has been pointed out, the attempt to use lawyers 

in Xinjiang, Tibet, Mongolia, these highly sensitive so-called ‘‘separatist’’ areas, has proved to be very difficult. The Communist Party 

is led by people who do not have much understanding of the rule 

of law. Even Li Keqiang, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee who is a graduate of Peking University Law School in the 

class of 1982, has not taken a law reform role. 

23 

The people who run the legal system are police and Party activists who reflect their experience. The head of the Chinese Communist Party Central Political Legal Committee is the former 

Minister of Public Security. He doesn’t know much about law, but 

he knows what he likes. What he likes is ‘‘harmony.’’ They are 

quick always to use repression as the way to give the appearance 

of harmony. 

The new head of the courts is not a legal specialist but a party 

person who is there to reinforce party controls on the courts. The 

new head of the Ministry of Justice is a Party Apparatchik, a nice 

woman who really hasn’t got much interest in the kinds of problems we’re discussing today or much sensitivity about them. This 

is too bad. 

So the prospect immediately after the 17th Party Congress has 

not been good for promoting the kinds of things we eventually hope 

the Party leadership will come to see. There will someday be leaders in the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Party who 

will see the importance of better legal institutions to stability, to 

harmony. We’ve been through this in South Korea under General 

Park. We’ve been through this in Taiwan under Chiang Kai-Shek. 

Dictators always talk about stability and therefore the need for repression, but eventually modernization comes, education, many 

other factors, and we see their successors take a more enlightened 

view. In the Communist system you never know what the highest 

leaders will do until they become the highest leaders. 

Nobody knew what Khruschev would do before he introduced deStalinization in 1956. Nobody knew what Gorbachev, who was 

trained in law, would do based on his previous record until he got 

to the top. Someday there will be leaders in China’s Politburo who 

will try to do for law what Zhu Rongji did for economics and economic reform. We have to rely on that. There’s enormous support 

for law reform and better legal institutions in the Chinese people 

now, especially the poorer people, the disenfranchised people, not 

the elite. Bourgeois law in the West has always resulted from the 

rising bourgeoisie. In China, the rising bourgeoisie, the entrepreneurs, resort to other methods. They are benefiting from the 

system. They don’t want to use law, they use connections, they use 

money, et cetera. 

I remember asking the businessman-husband of a Chinese judge 

I knew: ‘‘Do you ever use lawyers? ’’ He said, ‘‘No.’’ I said, ‘‘Why 

not? ’’ He said, ‘‘I don’t need them for contracts.’’ I said, ‘‘What 

about disputes? Don’t you have disputes? ’’ He said, ‘‘I have a lot 

of disputes. But why would I use lawyers for disputes? My wife is 

a judge.’’ [Laughter]. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you. 

Jim Feinerman, please. 

Mr. FEINERMAN. This is just a footnote on the question about 

lawyers in Xinjiang. I think there is a problem here both with ethnicity and language that needs to be recognized. The problem is a 

tri-fold one. On the first point, there are probably very few lawyers 

trained in Xinjiang, Tibet, or other ethnic minority regions in 

China who represent their own people, so having to rely on Han 

lawyers creates a problem. Second, the capacity of these areas in 

terms of courts and the ability to allow people to access the legal 

24 

system, even having a well-staffed bar in those localities, is very 

poor compared to the rest of China, and that may be purposely so 

to limit the kinds of claims that people in those areas might make. 

Then finally, I think it is going to wait until people rise up from 

these groups to assume their place. In the United States, we had 

the great civil rights revolution that we had largely because we had 

black lawyers who were pursuing a cause that they were personally 

very invested in. 

With Thurgood Marshall arguing, you get a kind of representation that I think—even though very capable white lawyers were 

working behind the scenes and up front with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP]—other 

groups just couldn’t do. I think that that is what has to happen in 

China for those groups, those ethnic communities to sort of feel 

that they have genuine access to the legal system. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you. We’re going to go for 10 more 

minutes. 

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. Good morning. Thank you for allowing 

me. My son has been—— 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. This is a question? 

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. Yes. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you. 

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. My son has been imprisoned in China 

since March. We were just informed by the U.S. Consulate, so this 

is a very personal nature and I prefer not to introduce myself in 

a public forum. 

So the question is, is there a lawyer somewhere that can help our 

son be repatriated to come back home to the United States? We 

have the U.S. Consulate able to visit him once a month so far, but 

the letters that he has written us have been blocked from our eyes. 

Several Chinese lawyers have written to him, asking to represent 

him, but the prison authorities have blocked him from receiving 

those letters. So, there is only so much the U.S. Consulate can do. 

How do we proceed in the face of what this panel can share? Perhaps Professor Cohen, Professor Feinerman, or anyone would have 

a suggestion. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. It’s a complex question, and I’ve talked to 

your husband about this. Her son is in jail in China. She’s having 

difficulty getting access to counsel. Her son has had consular access, with a good consulate officer. What should she do next? 

Mr. COHEN. Well, if you need help finding a good Chinese criminal lawyer, certainly some of us can make suggestions. That’s the 

first thing one does. You’re already getting the active help of the 

American Citizen Services Unit within the Embassy, I take it, or 

the local consulate. But the first thing is to try to secure Chinese 

legal advisors and then work with them. 

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. It’s really hard to know how to pick a 

Chinese lawyer, given all the things you’ve discussed about the limited role that they play and the limited freedom they have to practice their law. How do we, from here, pick one? 

Mr. COHEN. There are people who have lots of experience in this 

field, unfortunately. 

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. That’s wonderful. Thank you. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes. Thank you. 

25 

Mr. FEINERMAN. Can I just add one thing about this? 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes. 

Mr. FEINERMAN. This is not an uncommon experience, unfortunately. Professor Cohen and I were just quoted yesterday in an article in the Wall Street Journal involving business people who have 

been detained basically because contract negotiations didn’t turn 

out in a way that was favorable to the Chinese party, and the solution was to imprison a Chinese who had foreign nationality, but 

was originally born in mainland China, and three Chinese employees, and basically say you’re going to get out when we get the deal 

that we want. 

This is a big, multinational company that has access to highclass legal representation, has probably already retained lawyers 

both inside and outside of China to deal with this. So I wish I could 

offer you more consolation in that this thing will be resolved very 

quickly, but as you already know from your experience to date, this 

is something that can drag on for quite a while. 

It seems that justice will not be forthcoming, although sometimes 

the one word of positive advice I can provide is that if there’s a pretext that allows a kind of face-saving way out for the Chinese, such 

as a medical condition that justifies parole or something like that, 

that often—so if your son has anything from diabetes to serious 

acne, I would say, start working that for all that it’s worth, because 

that may be a way to say, we call on your mercy for medical leave. 

It’s sort of a subterfuge and it doesn’t address the underlying injustice of the system, but your main goal now probably is getting your 

son out and home. 

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. Right. Thank you so much. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you. Thank you. 

Professor Cohen, some last remarks, then we’ll close down. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes. The first thing, and what you say makes me 

recognize the importance of stating it, is what kind of a case is it? 

If it’s like this Australian case in which Rio Tinto executives are 

involved, the first question is, is it a ‘‘state secrets’’ case? If the 

State Security Agency or the Public Security Agency decides to call 

it a ‘‘state secrets’’ case, then the lawyer has no access unless the 

police agree to it, and usually the police don’t until their investigation is over. It may take many months. At the point that their investigation is over and they recommend prosecution, often a lawyer 

can’t do too much, and certainly is very limited. 

One of the troubling aspects of the Chinese system is that there 

is no effective means for challenging the ‘‘state secrets’’ claim of the 

investigators or the certification by the National State Secrets Bureau that any documents or information involved are indeed state 

secrets. That is why I hope that, in the revision of the state secrets 

law that is about to occur 20 years after the first one came into 

being, there will be some improvement, but it’s not clear that that 

will be the case. 

Second, we need to consider the question of fairness, of how universal are standards of what we call ‘‘due process.’’ China now is 

awash in nationalism. There is a new Chinese pride, a new feeling 

of, ‘‘we don’t need these foreigners to tell us what to do, we’ll do 

it our way.’’ In principle, this may sound attractive, but in practice, 

in detail, what does it mean for fairness, for due process for a legal 

26 

system? Will it meet at least the minimum standards of the world 

community? What do China’s leaders and people want in this respect? 

I was just reading the memoir of Zhao Ziyang, who was, after the 

1989 Tiananmen incident, put under de facto house arrest that 

lasted for 16 years, the rest of his life. What struck me was, although the press and the world rarely focused on this aspect, this 

was a case, of course, of administrative detention with no legal authorization. Law reformers generally worry about Chinese citizens 

losing their freedom for three years under ‘‘reeducation through 

labor.’’ Zhao in effect got a life sentence with no legal process whatever. 

Zhao Ziyang was the leader of China. He was Prime Minister. He 

was the boss. He was head of the Party, and a highly intelligent 

man who did a lot of good for China. When you read his memoir, 

you see the reaction of a Chinese leader to a total denial of due 

process. Zhao never went to law school, but he had no trouble recognizing in his own case that he wasn’t given an adequate statement of the charges against him. He wasn’t given anyone to advise 

him, to defend him. He wasn’t given an opportunity for the hearing 

that he kept requesting. 

He wasn’t given a statement of reasons of why he was being confined in this way and deprived of his rights under the Party Charter, as well as the national Constitution. When it happens to you, 

even if you’re Chinese and the highest leader of the Party, or used 

to be, you have no trouble seeing a denial of due process of law, 

of fairness. These are universal values and demands. 

When farmers in 1958–1959 had their property taken away from 

them—kitchen implements, doorknobs, even—so that China could 

have metal for backyard furnaces to produce steel that was to enable China to overtake England—it was a crazy ‘‘Great Leap Forward’’ idea, of course—they knew, with no education at all, that 

they had been denied property unfairly. Most Chinese are like most 

of us when it comes to deprivation of liberty or property. 

We should respect China’s call for recognition of its many virtues 

and accomplishments. On the other hand, what kind of a legal system is it going to have? If China’s leader’s say they will have their 

own, fine. But what is it, and how fair is it in the eyes of the Chinese people? That is the question that is still before the house 30 

years after the initiation of the ‘‘open policy.’’ 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. There’s not much 

else to say after that, except, thank you very much, Bob Fu, Professor James Feinerman, Professor Cohen, and also to our staff 

person, lead staffer on criminal justice issues, Andrea Worden, who 

was instrumental in putting this event together, but has a bad case 

of the flu and could not be present the entire time today. 

Thank you for coming. On July 30 the CECC will host another 

roundtable on press freedom. Jocelyn Ford from the Foreign Correspondents Club in China and her colleagues will be here, so it 

should be very interesting. 

Thank you very much. [Applause]. 

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m. the roundtable was adjourned.] 

(27) 

A P P E N D I X 

28 

1For a selection of essays and materials relating to sanctions against human rights lawyers, 

see e.g., ‘‘Rule of Law,’’ China Rights Forum (No. 1, 2009). 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEROME A. COHEN

JULY 10, 2009

I am delighted that the Congressional-Executive Commission on China is devoting 

today’s Round Table to a discussion of China’s human rights lawyers. 

LAW WITHOUT (HUMAN RIGHTS) LAWYERS?

In 1977 Victor H. Li published a stimulating book entitled ‘‘Law Without Lawyers.’’ China’s Communists, he suggested, because of their country’s distinctive tradition and culture, might blaze a new trail toward modernization, one that, unlike 

their former Soviet model, had little need for lawyers. 

Yet Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues soon demonstrated that they thought otherwise. After Chairman Mao’s death ended the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, China’s new leaders altered the Soviet model for economic development, but resurrected 

its political-legal system, including its reliance on ‘‘socialist lawyers.’’ Indeed, during 

the past three decades, the post-Mao leadership has increasingly expanded the roles 

of lawyers to help settle disputes, promote the evolving ‘‘socialist market economy,’’ 

foster international business cooperation and legitimate the punishment of serious 

offenders. 

In principle, contemporary Chinese lawyers are no longer Soviet-style ‘‘state legal 

workers’’ but independent professionals tasked with protecting citizens, including 

those at odds with the state. In fact, however, although their numbers, education 

and responsibilities have burgeoned, Chinese lawyers, like their Soviet predecessors, 

remain subject to significant restraints. 

The Law on Lawyers amended in 2007 seemed to promise greater autonomy to 

human rights lawyers. Yet their plight has actually worsened in the twenty months 

since the 17th Communist Party Congress. The reconfirmed Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao 

leadership placed veteran Party officials, without legal education or experience but 

with a strong police background, in charge of the Ministry of Justice and the courts 

as well as the Central Party Political-Legal Committee that instructs all legal institutions. These new appointees seem determined to eviscerate the country’s ‘‘rights 

lawyers,’’ who constitute a tiny fraction—perhaps one percent—of China’s almost 

150,000 licensed lawyers. 

Local officials under the Ministry of Justice, and the local lawyers associations 

they control, quietly press activist lawyers not to participate in a broad range of 

‘‘sensitive’’ matters or at least to follow their ‘‘guidance.’’ Such cases include not only 

criminal prosecutions of alleged Tibetan or Uyghur ‘‘separatists,’’ democracy organizers and Falun Gong or ‘‘house church’’ worshipers, but also claims against government for many kinds of misconduct and corruption, birth control abuses and 

forced eviction and relocation. 

Even civil cases involving land transactions, environmental controversies, collective labor disputes and compensation for tainted milk and earthquake victims are 

off limits or controlled. The refusal to allow famous lawyer Mo Shaoping to defend 

public intellectual Liu Xiaobo against criminal charges arising from Charter ’08’s 

call for political reform is only the best-known recent example of this interference. 

Lawyers who fail to heed such ‘‘advice’’ suffer many sanctions.1 Their license to 

practice law is frequently suspended or, as in many current instances, their local 

lawyers association simply fails to give the endorsement required for annual license 

renewal. Their law firms are coerced to dismiss them or risk being closed, as some 

have been, and Party organizations within law firms have been reinforced. 

Often, ex-lawyers who remain undeterred from assisting controversial clients are 

prosecuted and sent to prison by authorities who stretch the vague language of 

criminal law to cover their actions. Unfrocked Beijing lawyer Gao Zhisheng was convicted of ‘‘inciting subversion.’’ Former Shanghai lawyer Zheng Enchong served 

three years for ‘‘sending abroad state secrets.’’ Shenzhen lawyer Liu Yao’s four-year 

sentence for ‘‘destroying property’’ was only reduced after an extraordinary petition 

from over 500 lawyers persuaded the authorities to end his 16-month detention. 

In each case conviction means permanent disbarment and loss of livelihood. Moreover, even self-taught ‘‘barefoot lawyers,’’ who are not licensed but play an imporVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Mar 25, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 U:\DOCS\51189.TXT DEIDRE
29 

2The above remarks are a slight expansion of an article that I published in the July 9, 2009 

South China Morning Post in Hong Kong and China Times in Taiwan (in Chinese). See 

www.usasialaw.org. 3See, e.g., Jerome A. Cohen, ‘‘Law in Political Transitions: Lessons from East Asia and the 

Road Ahead for China,’’ July 26, 2005, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/hearings/072605/Cohen.php. 

tant role in the countryside, have been sent to long prison terms on trumped-up 

charges, as in the case of the courageous blind man, Chen Guangcheng. 

Perhaps most troubling is the frequent, physical intimidation of ‘‘rights lawyers.’’ 

Today is the 156th day since the ‘‘disappearance’’ of Gao Zhisheng. His torture while 

previously detained makes many fear that he is now dead, although the Chinese 

Government ridiculously claims he is free on probation. 

Many lawyers, while seeking to meet with clients, have been beaten by police and 

their thugs. The well-known professor/activist Teng Biao not only lost his license to 

practice law but also was kidnapped and threatened by police. I can testify from 

various personal experiences that many ‘‘rights lawyers’’ are closely monitored and 

restricted in their movements. 

Since release from prison, Zheng Enchong’s life has been a nightmare of incessant 

summoning for questioning, illegal house arrest and casual police beatings, in addition to harassment of his wife and daughter. When six policemen barred me from 

visiting him and I asked for their legal authority, they merely kept repeating ‘‘We 

are police.’’ A sequel to Victor Li’s book might appropriately be entitled ‘‘Lawlessness Without Lawyers.’’ 2

THREE RELATED ASPECTS

Before closing, I should mention three other aspects of today’s topic that deserve 

Commission attention. 

1. The Relation of Human Rights Lawyers to Political Reform 

There has been a difference of opinion among ‘‘rights lawyers’’ concerning the 

extent to which they should take part in political reform efforts. Some have maintained that, unless China undergoes democratic reforms that eliminate the Communist Party’s monopoly of power, prospects for a genuine rule of law will remain 

dismal. They therefore believe that ‘‘rights lawyers’’ must play an active role in promoting peaceful but major revisions to the political system. Others—a majority so 

far as one can tell—agree that significant political reform is crucial to achievement 

of the rule of law but, given the prevailing climate of repression in China, they believe that at present lawyers should dedicate their energies to defending rights 

within the existing legal system, despite its defects and limitations. This does not 

preclude working for legislative improvements within the system as well as taking 

part in individual cases. But it does preclude direct challenges to the Party’s monopoly of power. 

Among ‘‘rights lawyers,’’ the unfortunate Gao Zhisheng was perhaps the leading 

proponent of opting for political reform. He not only represented Falun Gong and 

many other controversial clients but also courageously challenged Party rule, condemned the systematic torture of Falun Gong adherents and called for genuine 

democracy. As a result, as previously indicated, he was deprived of his license to 

practice law, tortured, convicted of ‘‘inciting subversion’’ and, 156 days ago, ‘‘disappeared.’’ 

Yet the frustrations confronted by ‘‘rights lawyers’’ occasionally tempt even those 

who operate within the system to enter the political fray. Many an eyebrow was 

raised when Mo Shaoping, previously an exemplar of the ‘‘professional,’’ non-political view, signed Charter ’08’s call for political reform. 

2. Legal Restrictions on the Professional Conduct of ‘‘Rights Lawyers’’ 

Earlier testimony before the Commission has detailed the plight of Chinese criminal defense lawyers.3 The extent to which the newly-amended Law on Lawyers may 

have improved the situation remains unclear. Some provisions in the amended Law, 

which was adopted just before the 17th Party Congress led to enhanced Party controls over the legal system, were designed to strengthen the rights of criminal defense lawyers and their clients. Yet other language in the new Law can easily be 

manipulated to restrict those rights in fact and to place vigorous lawyers in peril. 

This is especially true of Article 37, which makes lawyers vulnerable to criminal 

punishment for courtroom ‘‘language that endangers state security’’ among other 

things. In the absence of extensive empirical research, which, because of the sensitivity of criminal cases, is difficult even for Chinese scholars to conduct, any assessment of the ‘‘law in action’’ is problematic. 

30 

Yet even the ‘‘law on the books’’ plainly needs improvement. The Criminal Procedure Law, which last underwent substantial revision in 1996, must be updated to 

eliminate inconsistencies with the amended Law on Lawyers, and to deal with many 

long-unresolved issues concerning the lawyer’s access to his client and to relevant 

files, freedom to gather evidence and greater opportunity to participate in the trial. 

Fundamental questions, such as whether key witnesses should be made to appear 

at trial and thus be subject to cross-examination, have still not been answered sixty 

years after establishment of the People’s Republic! 

Moreover, the formal criminal process is not the only area where ‘‘rights lawyers’’ 

encounter frustrations. Daily press reports remind us that Chinese police continue 

to resort to the notorious but supposedly ‘‘non-criminal’’ system of ‘‘re-education 

through labor’’ (RETL), which authorizes police—without participation of lawyers, 

prosecutors or judges—to sentence people to as long as three years of imprisonment 

for a broad range of ill-defined activity. The Ministry of Public Security, in its efforts 

to beat back proposals before the National People’s Congress to abolish RETL, has 

occasionally experimented with allowing lawyers to take part in RETL proceedings, 

but generally they are excluded. Usually, the lawyer’s only possible role is to assist 

people who have already been sent off to RETL confinement with an appeal for judicial review in the relatively few cases when the detainees are able to contact and 

hire counsel. Because China’s courts are not allowed to consider challenges to government actions on Constitutional grounds and because the Standing Committee of 

the National People’s Congress has been reluctant to utilize legislatively-authorized 

procedures for entertaining Constitutional challenges, lawyers have not succeeded 

in demonstrating RETL’s Constitutional flaws. 

If the People’s Republic should ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which it signed in 1998, that would, at least in principle, expand the 

role of lawyers in criminal justice and other sensitive matters. As things stand 

today, however, lawyers are even restricted in their ability to represent the increasing number of groups who need legal assistance in seeking government relief for 

their grievances and in settling disputes. For example, the 2006 Guiding Opinion 

of the All China Lawyers Association forbids lawyers from helping groups of ten or 

more to petition government agencies; and they are required to inform, consult and 

heed local judicial administration officials and lawyers associations as well as other, 

unidentified ‘‘relevant agencies’’ regarding cases in which such groups retain them. 

3. Licensed Lawyers and ‘‘Barefoot Lawyers’’ 

By ‘‘barefoot lawyers’’ I mean laymen, not licensed lawyers, who have informally 

acquired some legal learning and who apply it, usually in the countryside, in advising people and representing them before courts and other agencies. Until his persecution by the local government in Shandong Province, the blind social activist Chen 

Guangcheng, now in prison, was a classic and famous ‘‘barefoot lawyer.’’ Unable to 

enlist the help of the few lawyers who practice in rural Yinan County, Chen, who 

wanted to persuade the county court to order the local government to cease various 

discriminatory acts against himself and other disabled people, decided to rely on his 

own efforts. He learned through practice and from several ‘‘do it yourself’’ handbooks on litigation that were read to him by his family. 

China has far too few lawyers in the countryside, and some counties have no lawyers at all. Furthermore, some lawyers do not want to take on certain types of cases, 

whether for financial, political or other reasons. Yet the demand for legal services 

is rising in the countryside because of economic and social progress and the rising 

‘‘rights consciousness’’ among ordinary Chinese that has accompanied this progress. 

Other important factors are the growing sense of injustice and popular anger 

against official corruption, plus the government’s own propaganda that emphasized 

ruling the country according to law. Meeting the increasing need for legal services 

is a huge problem, and ‘‘barefoot lawyers’’ are an understandable, if insufficient, response. 

Yet China’s legal profession has not uniformly welcomed ‘‘barefoot lawyers,’’ fearing 

that, through incompetence or corruption, they would further sully the reputation 

of a profession that has experienced difficulty overcoming traditional Chinese distrust and disrespect. Some rural lawyers worry that ‘‘barefoot’’ competition may infringe upon their income. Even some ‘‘rights lawyers’’ who hail from the countryside 

are wary of relying on ‘‘barefoot lawyers.’’ 

Until the need for legal services in the countryside has substantially diminished, 

however, the wiser path would seem to be to offer basic legal training and perhaps 

certification to the many thousands of ‘‘barefoot lawyers’’ who are urgently required. 

An experiment worth emulating is the training program organized by Wang 

Chenguang, former Dean of Tsinghua Law School, with Ford Foundation support. 

Certainly the issue deserves empirical research and greater attention. 

31 

1 Jamie P. Horsley, ‘‘Rule of Law in China: Incremental Progress,’’ in C. Fred Bergsten, N. 

Lardy, B. Gill & D. Mitchell, The Balance Sheet in 2007 and Beyond. Center for Strategic and 

International Studies and The Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007. 2 Randall Peerenboom, China’s Long March Toward the Rule of Law, Cambridge University 

Press, 2002. 

I hope that these brief introductory remarks are useful and look forward to the 

presentations of my colleagues and the subsequent discussion. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES V. FEINERMAN

JULY 10, 2009

This month marks the 30th anniversary of the path-breaking decision of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to turn its back on almost three decades of Maoist 

antinomian rule and to embrace publicly a new role for law in China’s governance. 

On July 1, 1979, the PRC government promulgated seven new laws—including a 

criminal code, criminal procedure code and a law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures—indicating a new determination to use law in the promotion of the PRC’s 

opening to the outside world and domestic economic reform. Thus it is appropriate 

that the Congressional-Executive China Commission convene this hearing today to 

consider the current state of development of China’s legal system and the legal profession which serves it. 

As members of the Commission already know, China’s Communist Party under 

its current leadership emphasizes building a ‘‘harmonious socialist society.’’ One of 

the stated key components of this project has been enhancing the rule of law. Despite considerable progress over the past almost three decades, China today is hardly a ‘‘rule of law’’ society by Western lights. Unfortunately, for the past several years 

and even in recent months, activist lawyers, intrepid journalists and those who take 

on unpopular causes, or represent the disadvantaged and unfortunate, are arrested, 

intimidated, and silenced. China’s nascent bar and weak, poorly trained judiciary 

offer scant promise of redress. 

Why then should we be so concerned with the development of law and the somewhat fitful improvements of the Chinese legal system? Well, from China’s perspective, establishing the ‘‘rule of law’’ is critical to China’s political stability and further 

economic growth. We should not forget that this process of legal modernization 

began on the heels of a devastating, decade-long Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This was a time of great disorder in every aspect of Chinese society. The leaders who set China on its current course were, many of them, also victims of the 

rampant lawlessness and political insanity of that era. So their interest in reform 

and legality was keen, even if China lacked the usual societal underpinnings for the 

‘‘rule of law’’ concept. 

If by ‘‘rule of law’’ we mean a system where law restrains state and private power, 

subjecting even the rulers to its limits, China is still far from realizing such a system. The top leadership—not only in the national and lower-level governments—but 

more importantly in the all powerful Communist Party are very unlikely to accept 

such constraints in the foreseeable future. Consistent rules, independent courts and 

a powerful bar to protect civil and political rights will be a long time coming. Market economy legal rules, on the other hand, have been drafted and put into place 

much more quickly. Administrative rules to rein in the bureaucracy (and to attempt 

to force it to follow central government dictates) have been developing apace.1

Despite this mixed picture, anyone who (as I did as a participant in the initial 

student exchange program) saw the reality of China in the late 1970s—when the 

legal reform developments began—must admit that China has indeed made a ‘‘new 

Long March’’ from the Maoist era ‘‘rule of man’’ and rampant lawlessness of the Cultural Revolution.2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

At the famous Third Plenum of the Eleventh Communist Party Congress in December 1978, Deng Xiaoping not only opened China to the world and decreed its 

economic reform but also called for a rule of law. Since that time, there has been 

an exponential growth of national legislation, provincial and local lawmaking, and 

accession to international treaties and institutions. China’s entrance to the World 

Trade Organization (WTO), by itself, required the promulgation of thousands of 

laws and rules. 

Institutions of national scope, such as the National People’s Congress (NPC) and 

its Standing Committee, the State Council, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and 

32 

3 Xin Ren, Tradition of the Law and Law of the Tradition: Law, State, and Social Control in 

China, Greenwood Press, 1997. 4 Benjamin Liebman, China Quarterly, Vol. 191, pp. 620–638 (September 2007). 

5Gerard J. Clark, ‘‘An Introduction to the Legal Profession in China in the Year 2008,’’ Suffolk University Law Review, Vol. 41, p. 833 (2008). 

the Supreme People’s Court were either revived or re-established. Over time, they 

have become much more professional than they were not only thirty years ago but 

even ten years ago. Throughout China, a small coterie of lawyers and legal reformers promoted legal change and protection of basic rights. Legal aid has become— 

at least theoretically—available to China’s citizens, some of whom avail themselves 

of such assistance and even make use of the media to assert their rights and try 

to achieve their objectives even against the government. 

Nonetheless, the Communist Party remains in ultimate control; more significantly, the Party and its leadership remain outside the reach of the law, relying 

upon Party discipline and other mechanisms to maintain a separate superior status. 

The government bureaucracy—including the courts and other legal institutions—are 

dominated by Communist Party appointees at every level, despite some autonomy 

for independent actors to develop the rule of law.3

A PRELIMINARY NOTE ON CHINA’S COURTS

Continuing political interference by the Communist Party insures that China’s judicial system is far from enjoying the judicial independence that other legal systems 

take as axiomatic. The implications for legal practice and protection of citizens’ 

rights are ominous. The replacement of the former President of the Supreme People’s Court, Xiao Yang, by a man who not only lacks legal training but has long 

been a Communist Party hack has set back efforts to improve the quality of judges 

and reform the judiciary. Poorly training and meager compensation of judges leads 

to corruption which plagues the court system, diminishing its respect and prestige 

among the Chinese public. 

It is also worth noting that China’s courts not an independent branch of government. The Standing Committee of the NPC has the final authority to interpret national law. Communist Party adjudication committees inside the courts oversee the 

work of the judges, particularly in politically sensitive or important cases. Judicial 

independence is non-existent in China.4

WHAT ROLE FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION?

The modernization of the PRC legal system has required a massive training effort 

to increase the quantity and the quality of legal professionals. These new lawyers 

have many roles: to familiarize the general public with the emerging legal system; 

to draft and to improve the laws themselves; and to serve in government and the 

private sector as practicing attorneys. Having begun with fewer than a thousand 

lawyers and less than a dozen law faculties when it began legal modernization in 

1979, China now boasts over 130,000 lawyers (with a stated goal of having 150,000 

qualified lawyers by 2010) and—depending on how they are counted—anywhere 

from 400 to 600 law faculties. Compared to the United States and other developed 

countries, the number of practicing lawyers in China is quite low on a per-population basis, the rapid growth of the bar is remarkable. Many obstacles stand in the 

way of creating a truly independent legal profession in China. Through the All 

China Lawyers Association and local-level organizations, PRC lawyers are subjected 

to Party discipline. The Ministry of Justice and local judicial bureaus exercise strict 

‘‘supervision and guidance’’ over practicing lawyers and judges. Nevertheless, a few 

fearless lawyers and legal scholars have taken courageous positions, often contrary 

to government and Party dictates, to pushing for legal changes and greater ‘‘rule 

of law’’ in China.5

Along with the increasing number of lawyers, legal education institutions have 

also mushroomed in China since 1979. While these new faculties have the potential 

for advancing the ‘‘rule of law’’ in China, many are simply riding a wave of interest 

rooted in careerism as the profile of law and the legal profession has risen. Law is 

seen as a lucrative career path for those who pursue certain avenues, as it is in 

many developed countries. With a hidebound curriculum controlled at the national 

level by the Ministries of Education and Justice, law schools are usually not too adventurous in training their graduates to consider what might be characterized as 

‘‘public interest’’ law. While some, mostly elite, law faculties have introduced clinical 

legal education, combining hands-on representation of clients with classroom instruction, such programs have had limited impact in communities beyond their immediate environs. A few leading law faculties have also established research centers 

33 

6Pamela N. Phan, ‘‘Clinical Legal Education in China: In Pursuit of a Culture of Law and 

a Mission of Social Justice,’’ Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 8, pp. 117– 

152 (2005). 7 Xu Jianxin, ‘‘Justice and the Need for Legal Aid NGOs in China,’’ China Rights Forum, No. 

3, pp. 71–73 (2005). 

for topics of great public interest—such as worker and consumer rights, women’s 

status in society and the rights of the disabled and disadvantaged—but these programs have so far induced very little change in the larger societal and legal problems facing Chinese society today.6

The role of legal academics in the PRC has also been constrained by political 

realities. While many Chinese legal scholars have studied abroad in countries with 

more developed legal system, their new ideas about law and legal reform often 

present a source of controversy in China. Their assistance may be sought in certain 

narrow areas of legal drafting, but their ideas are often quite suspect when it comes 

to policymaking. Even when local people’s congresses and government legal affairs 

seek scholars’ input, they remain more likely to accept the advice of private law 

firms and lawyers’ associations as more practical. There has been a limited program 

to employ a few law professors as consultants to governments, but law professors 

and lawyers are far less likely to work for government agencies than is the case in 

the United States or other countries. Given the relative lack of legal expertise in 

most government sectors, and the growing need for legal advice in a society with 

the stated goal of basing government actions on law, the need for legal professionals 

to advise the government is obvious. The likelihood that the need will be filled is 

less certain. 

Unlike their counterparts in the United States, Chinese lawyers have very little 

direct engagement in politics. While a few lawyers serve as local people’s congress 

deputies and on people’s political consultative congresses, their impact thus far has 

been quite limited. Presumably, their legal expertise could help to professionalize 

the law drafting and other work of these legislative bodies. At the national level, 

it will be interesting to see whether the ascent of a legally trained leader, Li 

Keqiang, who is likely to become China’s next Premier several years from now will 

have an impact on the involvement of other lawyers in Chinese political life. 

As is true in many other countries, the vast majority of China’s law graduates 

go to work as private lawyers. Nevertheless, a few seek to represent the underrepresented groups in Chinese society. Criminal defendants are supposed to be given 

legal assistance as a matter of national law. With the assistance of various foreign 

and domestic organizations (including the United Nations Development Program 

and the Ford Foundation), legal aid clinics have been sponsored to assist disadvantaged citizens, rural migrants and people with disabilities. Legal aid has become 

firmly rooted in China’s changing legal culture and has helped to raise rights consciousness among sectors of society that have not had much access to the formal 

legal system in the past. Over a thousand centers have opened in cities across China 

and are estimated to employ several thousand full-time legal aid workers at a considerable cost to the government. However, these seemingly impressive figures may 

conceal more than they reveal. Researchers have discovered that these centers often 

have no real substance and no dedicated employees but rather are often local government offices of the Ministry of Justice with new signage. Moreover, the number 

of people actually receiving legal aid has not grown at the same rate as expenditures on legal aid which grew more than five-fold from 1999 to 2003, while the number of people receiving legal aid only increased by fifty percent. Despite considerable 

progress, experts continue to lament the shortage of funds and low access to legal 

aid.7

The reluctance of Chinese lawyers to pursue unconventional areas of practice may 

be explained by the consequences for those who find themselves in opposition to 

state and Communist Party. A series of cases over more than a decade have demonstrated that those who undertake criminal defense or politically sensitive cases 

may face dire consequences. Some criminal defense lawyers have been accused and 

convicted on trumped up charges of falsifying evidence or committing perjury. Others have been accused of revealing ‘‘state secrets’’—often nothing more ‘‘secret’’ than 

newspaper clippings or published maps. This may result in the loss of their jobs and 

the suspension or cancellation of their licenses to practice law. Just these past few 

months, the Chinese government has been forcing human rights law firms to shut 

down. This has not involved a formal crackdown; authorities have not seized files 

or sent attorneys to labor camps. Instead, the justice authorities are simply using 

administrative procedures for licensing lawyers and law firms, declining to renew 

the annual registrations, which expired May 31, of those it deems troublemakers. 

Human rights groups say dozens of China’s best defense attorneys have effectively 

34 

8 Human Rights in China, ‘‘Human Rights Defenders: Harassment and Other Unfavorable 

Treatment,’’ cited at http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/press?revision—id=62625&item— 

id=62623#hrd. 9 China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (CHRLCG), An NGO Submission to the UN 

Committee Against Torture for the 41st session for the Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of 

the People’s Republic of China on the Implementation of the Convention Against Torture and 

Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment , October 2008, accessed at 

http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/ngos/CHRLCG—China—cat41.pdf. 10 Id. 

been disbarred under political pressure.8 In the time-honored Chinese tradition of 

‘‘killing the chicken to scare the monkeys,’’ these actions were clearly designed to 

put the brakes on activism by other individuals and firms. 

WHAT HAPPENS TO LAWYERS WHO TAKE ON CONTROVERSIAL CASES AND CLIENTS

The maltreatment of lawyers involved in defending unpopular people and causes 

is nothing new in China’s modern legal system. For years, the Chinese authorities 

have increased restrictions on lawyers who work on politically sensitive cases or 

cases that draw attention from the foreign news media. The typical means of harassment is to intimidate lawyers defending criminal defendants by charging them, 

or threatening to charge them, with various crimes. If that does not work, authorities 

have also used harassment and violence against those who participate in criminal 

or civil rights defense in sensitive matters. Detention, house arrest and even imprisonment on manifestly false charges are commonly employed. Pettier forms of 

harassment have also kept lawyers incommunicado, prevented friends and family 

members from contacting controversial lawyers and even turned on spouses and 

children of targeted attorneys. 

These practices have excited concern of lawyers elsewhere in the world for the 

lives and livelihood of Chinese lawyers. In Hong Kong, the China Human Rights 

Lawyers Concern Group (CHRLCG) made an NGO Submission to the United 

Nations Committee Against Torture for the 41st session for the Fourth and Fifth 

Periodic Reports of the People’s Republic of China on the Implementation of the 

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 

Punishment in October 2008. It noted that although China had ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the Convention) in October 1988, dissidents and human rights defenders have 

continued to be subjected to various forms of torture. In addition to China’s failure 

to effectively implement all the relevant provisions on torture in domestic laws, the 

report noted, law enforcement officers are usually the ones who violate the domestic 

laws and the international convention. Recently, CHRLCG became alarmed that the 

situation was becoming even more worrying because a number of human rights lawyers and legal rights defenders have become the subjects of torture by public security officers and prison officers merely because they provide legal assistance to 

human rights defenders or took up cases considered ‘‘politically sensitive’’ by the 

government. Therefore, the CHRLCG expressed concern about how bad the situation 

is and what problems ordinary Chinese citizens encounter since even lawyers are 

subjected to torture and harassment by law enforcement officers.9

In drawing the Committee’s attention to individual cases to illustrate how China 

has violated the Convention, the CHRLCG noted: 

[These] are more well-known cases about mainland Chinese human rights 

lawyers and legal rights defenders being illegally and unreasonably harassed by 

law enforcement officers. It is only the tip of the iceberg. There are many more 

cases involving lesser known human rights legal practitioners. These lawyers 

were targeted because they took up cases regarded by fellow legal practitioners 

as highly politically sensitive, such as defending political dissidents, rights defenders and Falun Gong practitioners. Falun Gong is banned in China. These 

lawyers are only using their professional skills to help people in need. They 

shouldn’t be subjected to oppression and torture by the authorities. If [China] 

is committed to developing universally accepted principles and the rule of law, 

it should stop harassing and attacking legal rights defenders and human rights 

lawyers. Only an independent judiciary and a credible legal system can ensure 

that these abuses won’t happen again. In order to ensure that lawyers, legal 

rights defenders and ordinary citizens will be free from arbitrary attacks and 

harassments by law enforcement officers and thugs hired by law enforcement 

officers, [China] should ensure that law enforcement officers comply with provisions of the Convention.10

35 

11 Human Rights in China, ‘‘Beijing Lawyers Beaten for Representing Falun Gong Case,’’ May 

13, 2009, cited at http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/press?revision—id=164835&item— 

id=164831. 

With this background in mind, it may be worthwhile to consider briefly a few examples of individual rights defenders in representative cases who have suffered 

these abuses. 

Falun Gong 

Human Rights in China (HRIC) has reported on the cases of Beijing rights defense lawyers Zhang Kai and Li Chunfu who were violently beaten at their client’s 

home in Chongqing by local police on May 13, 2009. They were then brought to the 

local police station for interrogation and were locked up in an iron cage and slapped 

in the face. A month earlier, Beijing rights defense lawyer Cheng Hai was also violently beaten by the police in Chengdu, Sichuan for handling a Falun Gong case. 

Zhang Kai is a lawyer with Beijing Yijia Law Firm and Li Chunfu is a lawyer 

at Beijing Globe Law Firm. On the afternoon of May 13, they met with relatives 

of Jiang Xiqing at their home in Jiangjin District, Chongqing to discuss Jiang’s 

death while serving a Reeducation-Through-Labor (RTL) sentence. Jiang Xiqing, 66, 

was arrested by the police on May 14, 2008, and sentenced to one year of RTL for 

practicing Falun Gong. On January 28, 2009, the Chongqing Xishanping Reeducation Center informed Jiang’s family that Jiang had died of a heart attack. He was 

then cremated without consent by his family. The family, suspicious of the cause 

of death, hired a Chongqing lawyer for legal assistance. But after inquiring formally 

with the police, the lawyer declined to be retained by the family. 

Li and Zhang agreed to represent the family, notwithstanding the implied threats 

experienced when the family had previously tried to retain counsel. Sources inside 

China informed HRIC that around 4 p.m. on the afternoon of May 13, four policemen came to the home of Jiang’s relatives and said they were delivering materials 

from the public security bureau’s judicial administrative office. They started to interrogate the lawyers, asking the lawyers to produce their identity cards. Soon afterwards, about 20 more people from the state security unit of the Jiangjin District 

Public Security Bureau and Jijiang Police Substation also arrived. Jiangjin State Security squadron leader Mu Chaoheng asked Jiang Xiqing’s relatives, ‘‘Who told you 

to hire lawyers? Your dad died a natural death.’’ 

After Li Chunfu presented his lawyer’s license and Zhang Kai presented his passport, the police announced, ‘‘We only accept identity cards.’’ The police surrounded 

Zhang Kai and Li Chunfu and began pulling their hair, twisting their arms, tripping them, and beating them while pinning them on the ground. The police then 

handcuffed them and hauled them into their vehicle. They also took away Jiang 

Xiqing’s son, Jiang Hongbin. After arriving at the police station, Zhang Kai was 

hung up with handcuffs in an iron cage and Li Chunfu was slapped in the face by 

the police. During the interrogation, the police threatened the lawyer to stop defending Falun Gong cases. When the lawyers argued that everyone had a right to legal 

counsel, the police said: You absolutely cannot defend Falun Gong; this is the situation in China. Lawyer Zhang Kai later said, ‘‘This is typical hoodlum behavior. They 

just wanted to intimidate us and force us to withdraw from the case. They are so 

frightened; they must be hiding something about this case.’’ 

Zhang Kai and Li Chunfu were released at 12:40 a.m. on May 14. Their hands 

were covered with bruises and scars. Zhang Kai’s hands were numb and swollen, 

and Li Chunfu had troubling hearing in one ear. Subsequently, they had to be taken 

to be examined at Jiangjin District People’s Hospital.11

HIV patients 

Hu Jia was a rights defender, not a lawyer, who worked for the rights of those 

suffering from HIV/ AIDS in rural China. He is the co-founder of the Beijing 

Aizhixing Institute for Health Education, a non-governmental organization which 

promotes public awareness and education on the issue of HIV/ AIDS. On March 18, 

2008, Hu Jia was tried in the First Beijing Intermediate Court on charges of subversion against the Chinese Government in relation to his on-line writings and has 

pleaded not guilty. He faced up to five years’ imprisonment and is expected to be 

sentenced in the coming week. Hu Jia’s lawyer, Li Fangping, reported that he was 

allowed only twenty minutes in which to defend Hu Jia and was consistently interrupted by the judge when giving his defense. In addition, several foreign diplomats 

and members of Hu Jia’s family were prevented from attending the trial and many 

of his supporters were reportedly forced by the authorities to leave Beijing for the 

duration of the trial in order to prevent them from speaking with journalists. 

36 

12 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Hu Jia Chronology: Key events, February 2006–present,’’ Beijing 

2008 China’s Olympian Human Rights Challenges, cited at http://china.hrw.org/press/news—release/hu—jia—chronology. 13 All China Lawyers Association, ‘‘Guiding Opinion of the All China Lawyers Association Regarding Lawyers Handling Cases of a Mass Nature,’’ March 20, 2006, English translation available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=53258. 

Hu Jia was detained on December 27, 2007 after giving his public testimony to 

the European Parliament in which he gave details of human rights violations reportedly being committed in China. He was officially arrested on January 30, 2008 

and charged with ‘‘incitement to subvert state power’’. On April 3, 2008, Hu was 

sentenced to three years and six months in prison. Hu’s wife Zeng Jinyan, after an 

April 2009 prison visit with Hu Jia, noted that his health is deteriorating because 

of inadequate nutrition and medical care. Following his arrest his wife, Zeng Jinyan, 

and his daughter were reportedly prevented from leaving their apartment in Beijing. Several other writers who have published their work on the Internet and are 

considered cyber-dissidents by the authorities were arrested at the same time. 

These arrests have been interpreted as a campaign of intimidation on the part 

of the authorities against human rights defenders in order to dissuade them from 

publicizing information about human rights abuses in China during the period of 

the Olympic Games. Hu Jia has written of human rights abuses committed against 

those suffering from HIV/ AIDS in rural China, as well as of issues of religious freedom and the human rights situation in Tibet. His lawyer, Li Fangping, a prominent 

human rights activist, has also been harassed both for representing Hu Jia and for 

other controversial cases.12

Class-action cases 

In 2006, the All China Lawyers Association (ACLA) issued a guiding opinion that 

restricts and subjects to punishment any lawyer who gets involved in a ‘‘mass’’ case. 

The ACLA Executive Council approved the Guiding Opinion of the All China Lawyers Association Regarding Lawyers Handling Cases of a Mass Nature, which went 

into effect on March 20, 2006. The following passage, drawn from a translation prepared by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China of the ‘‘Guiding Opinion 

of the All China Lawyers Association Regarding Lawyers Handling Cases of a Mass 

Nature,’’ distributed by the All China Lawyers Association on March 20, 2006, sets 

forth the new policy to restrict and inhibit class actions: 

At present and hereafter, during this important era in which our nation is 

constructing a socialist harmonious society, the correct handling of cases of a 

mass nature is essential to the construction of a harmonious society. Cases of 

a mass nature more commonly occur in land requisitioning and levying of taxes, 

building demolitions, migrant enclaves, enterprise transformation, environmental pollution, and protection of the rights and interests of rural laborers, 

among other areas. Cases of a mass nature generally have comparatively complicated social, economic, and political causes, and have effects on the state and 

society that vary in degree and cannot be ignored. Thus, there is a need to 

standardize and guide lawyer handling of cases of a mass nature.13

This Guiding Opinion uses the term ‘‘mass’’ cases to describe those that involve 

representative or joint litigation by 10 or more litigants, or those in which the matter is handled through a series of litigation and non-litigation efforts. While it notes 

that mass cases ‘‘more commonly occur’’ in the safeguarding of rights and interests 

of disadvantaged groups, it clearly seeks to control and to minimize them. Also noteworthy is that the Guiding Opinion instructs law firms to assign only ‘‘politically 

qualified’’ lawyers to conduct initial intake of these cases, and to obtain the approval 

of at least three partners before taking them on. Such collective responsibility increases the likelihood that firms will be unwilling to take on these cases. Moreover, 

lawyers who handle mass cases must ‘‘promptly and fully communicate’’ this information to the local justice bureau, accept supervision and guidance by judicial administration departments, attempt to mitigate conflict, and propose mediation as 

the method for conflict resolution. Thus, the case will almost certainly never get to 

court if the tortuous path that the Guiding Opinion sets out is followed. As a final 

twist, the Guiding Opinion says that local lawyers associations may sanction any 

lawyer or law firm that fails to follow these guidelines and causes a ‘‘negative 

impact,’’ or report them to the relevant judicial administration department for punishment. 

The Guiding Opinion was only one in a series of opinions that restricted the participation of lawyers in specific categories of rights defense work. In addition to 

‘‘mass’’ cases, other categories that triggered restrictions included ‘‘major,’’ ‘‘difficult,’’ and ‘‘sensitive’’ cases. For example, the Henan Provincial Justice Bureau and 

37 

14See, e.g., ‘‘Henan Justice Bureau Establishes a Rule for Lawyers: No Stirring Up of Sensitive Cases’’[Henan sifating wei lushi ding ‘‘guiju’’ mingan anjian jin chaozuo], Henan Daily, 

reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 10 April 06. Cited at <news3.xinhuanet.com> 15 Edward Wong, ‘‘Courts Compound Pain of China’s Tainted Milk,’’ New York Times, October 

17, 2008, cited at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/17/world/asia/17milk.html?ref=asia&p. 

Shenyang Municipal Justice Bureau (in Liaoning province) each issued opinions governing the range of activities permitted in ‘‘sensitive’’ cases, according to reports in 

April, 2006.14

Tainted food and formula cases 

In 2007 and 2008, China was rocked by scandals involving tainted milk and baby 

formula which poisoned hundreds, causing kidney stones and other medical problems, and even killed a number of children. The products had been adulterated increase its protein count; this in turn revealed a web of corruption and lack of proper 

oversight in China’s food processing industries. A group of 90 lawyers from Hebei, 

Henan and Shandong—the three worst affected provinces—had made pro bono offers to assist victims, and a list of their names was published. Organizers of the 

group declared that they had come under pressure from officials to not to get involved in the issue. The Beijing Lawyers’ Association, a part of the Communist 

Party apparatus, asked its members ‘‘to put faith in the party and government.’’ 

Other members of the group reportedly received less subtle requests. Authorities 

were said to fear social unrest if law suits were unleashed. The Pro-Beijing Hong 

Kong journal Ta Kung Pao reported that central authorities, fearful of the effect of 

mass law suits, held a meeting with lawyers’ groups in September, 2008, asking 

them to ‘‘act together, and help maintain stability.’’ 

Chang Boyang, one of the group of volunteer lawyers, said he had filed a suit in 

Guangdong against the chief offender, the Sanlu Milk Company, on behalf of the 

parents of one victim. One had already filed in Henan. Chang said that Henan’s justice department had ordered 14 Henan lawyers to stop helping the kidney stone victims, saying it had become a political issue. He claimed he was told by the official 

to ‘‘follow the arrangements set out by the government,’’ and was further threatened: ‘‘If this suggestion is disobeyed, the lawyer and the firm will be dealt with.’’ 

Zhang Yuanxin, lawyer and officer in the Xinjiang Lawyers’ Association said that 

the actions of certain departments in government have ‘‘set back the development 

of the legal profession.’’ He said that it was ‘‘intolerable’’ for government to interfere 

in the affairs of the judiciary, denying the right of ordinary citizens to sue.15

An official said that central government had issued instructions placing the cases 

on hold, pending a decision on how to handle the cases in a unified manner. Furthermore, that court was instructed not to give any written replies or accept Sanlurelated cases in the meantime. 

Sichuan earthquake parents 

In the spring of 2008, a terrible earthquake struck China’s Sichuan province. 

Building were leveled, towns destroyed and many citizens killed or injured. Later 

it was discovered that many of the building were improperly constructed and—had 

they been built according to applicable regulations—should have withstood the 

earthquake. Relatives of Sichuan earthquake victims attempted to sue those responsible but became victims yet again. Some were even imprisoned, such as an eight 

year-old boy who was among those imprisoned by Chinese police attempting to silence protests by the relatives of thousands of children who died in last year’s earthquake, according to a new report by Amnesty International. He was held as anger 

among bereaved parents in Sichuan Province intensified when the authorities went 

back on their promise to hold a full inquiry into why so many schools were destroyed. The boy was detained overnight last June, along with his father, by police 

in Shifang City who were looking for his uncle, who had been planning to petition 

the local authorities over the death of his two sons during the May 12 earthquake. 

Roseann Rife, Amnesty’s Asia-Pacific Deputy Programme Director, said: ‘‘It’s absolutely extraordinary that the police would detain a child of that age. It’s a violation 

of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which China has signed up to, 

as well as Chinese law.’’ Almost five thousand children are known to have died 

when their schools crumbled to the ground last May in what was the strongest 

earthquake to hit China in 50 years. Parents of the children have blamed the substandard construction of the schools, many of which collapsed while the buildings 

around them stayed upright, for the deaths. But officials in Sichuan claim that the 

38 

16 Amnesty International, China: Justice denied: Harassment of Sichuan earthquake survivors 

and activists, May 2009, archived at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA17/018/2009/ 

en/dbf100fd-c9f7-4675-91b4-e85e25460809/asa170182009eng.pdf. 17 Id. 

force of the earthquake was the primary reason why 9,145 schools in the province 

were destroyed or damaged.16

The government has offered 60,000 Yuan compensation to the parents for each 

dead child, but only if they agree not to press for an inquiry into the construction 

of the schools, or to bring court cases seeking damages from the state. According 

to Amnesty International, an unknown number of those who have petitioned the authorities for an investigation have been detained in unofficial ‘‘black jails’’ for up to 

21 days at a time. Lawyers and activists who have assisted them have also been 

harassed or detained. For example, Luo Guoming claims he was imprisoned for a 

week last September. His 16 year-old daughter Luo Dan died with another 600 or 

so children, when the Juyuan Middle School in Dujiangyan collapsed. 

‘‘A dozen of us parents were on the way to the provincial capital Chengdu to petition the authorities when the police stopped us and turned us back. The next day, 

they came to my home and took me away,’’ he said. Mr Luo said he believed his 

mobile phone was being monitored. He has given up his job as a carpenter to devote 

his time to seeking justice for his daughter. ‘‘I want the authorities to do what they 

said they would do, which is investigate the construction of the schools, find out who 

was responsible for such shoddy building work and punish them,’’ he said. 

Human rights activists who have offered assistance to the victims, given out information about the earthquake or represented parents in negotiations with authorities have been harassed and arbitrarily detained. Huang Qi was detained because 

of his work to help the families of five primary school students who died when their 

school building collapsed during the earthquake. He has been in detention since 

June 2008, with no access to his family. He Hongchun, a representative of parents 

whose children died during the earthquake, was detained in September 2009 after 

he organized a protest outside an insurance company. Tan Zuoren was detained on 

28 March 2009, and it is believed that his detention is related to his intention to 

issue public materials on the first anniversary of the earthquake, including a list 

of the children who died on 12 May 2008.17

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

China’s evolving legal system is a substantial change to both long Chinese tradition and the politics and practice of Maoist Chinese political culture. Lawyers and 

a legal profession are equally new to China and can only become rooted in China 

slowly. Chinese citizens nonetheless seek ways to obtain redress of governmental 

abuses of power, to oversee government behavior, and to participate in their society. 

However reluctantly, the Chinese leadership has decided to foster a growing legal 

profession and to employ it, suitably constrained, in modernizing China, developing 

its economy and creating a ‘‘harmonious society,’’ with the support of law. 

Establishing the rule of law with the help of lawyers is not that easy to control. 

While welcoming the predictability of legal order, and hoping that legal means can 

help to curb corruption, China’s leaders have already learned that legal activism is 

difficult to channel. Once ordinary Chinese citizens begin to feel that they have the 

legal right to courts to enforce their rights, it becomes problematic to tell them that 

only certain rights warrant protection, especially when those rights are at least 

theoretically protected by existing laws and regulations. 

China’s judiciary has thus far served as a lackey for state and Party leaders, 

heeding their call and accepting the restrictions placed on it. As it becomes stronger, 

and as lawyers’ activism begins to promote judicial independence from government 

and Party interference, judges may be able to fulfill their roles and reframe Chinese 

jurisprudence. A more credible Chinese judiciary would also help increase domestic 

and foreign respect for the Chinese legal system. 

The rule of law in China has long been something of an oxymoron, or as Mao used 

to stress, a ‘‘contradiction.’’ The Communist Party remains the final arbiter of not 

only the rule of law but of all lawful government and refuses subject itself and its 

minions to the discipline of the law. A professional class of lawyers—well educated, 

comfortably middle class and increasingly self assured—may eventually be able to 

wrest greater power over the legal system. And, in contrast to the experience of previous decades, the sunlight of a more active foreign and international press, homegrown human rights defenders (many of them NOT lawyers) and the advantages of 

modern modes of communication—the cell phone, fax and Internet—assure continued scrutiny of a system about which we know a great deal in detail. That alone 

39 

may assure continuing pressure to extend the promise of the rule of law to ever 

larger swathes of Chinese society. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF XIQIU ‘‘BOB’’ FU

JULY 10, 2009

Thank you for the invitation to this panel with Professor Jerome Cohen, Professor 

Feinerman and Mr. Turkel. I very much appreciate the hard work and concern of 

the CECC Commissioners, including Congressman Pitts who is with us today, and 

the CECC staff. 

I have been receiving many messages from lawyers in China about their law 

license cancellations or that their licenses have not been renewed by the Beijing 

Lawyers Association. This is not only unnecessary and unjust, but also an unprecedented development. As far as we can confirm, 19 attorneys at this time are unable 

to practice law. They are Jiang Tianyong, Li Heping, Li Xiongbing, Li Fuchun, 

Wang Yajun, Guo Shaofei, Cheng Hai, Tang Jitian, Yang Huiwen, Tong Chaoping, 

Liu Guitao, Xie Yanyi, Wen Haibo, Liu Wei, Zhang Lihui, Zhang Chengmao, Zhang 

Xingshui, Wei Liangyue and Sun Wenbing. These attorneys have always persisted 

in providing legal assistance for clients to safeguard their legitimate rights. Of the 

reports I have seen, the Open Letter to the Ministry of Justice on July 2nd most 

succinctly and clearly explains the situation of the license denials and points out 

the root problems and effects of this on a national level. This letter was written by 

31 Chinese intellectuals—23 in Beijing, 7 in other regions of China, and 1 in Australia. I request that the full text of this Open Letter be entered into the Congressional Record. I will read a few key points of the letter: 

We think this case is entirely a violation of the law. As a social organization 

in the legal industry, Beijing Lawyers Association has no right to restrict or deprive its members of their right to practice. In the past, there were cases in 

which Beijing Lawyers Association deprived some human rights attorneys of 

their qualifications to practice, and that was considered an illegal overstepping 

of its authority. Now, it has even forced many law firms to stop their service 

and made several hundred attorneys unable to practice, which is all the more 

astonishing. Such illegal, absurd and perverse acts that violate the common 

sense will bring serious bad consequences to the society. 

On July 18, 2008, the Ministry of Justice promulgated ‘‘Management Methods 

in Attorneys’ Practice’’ and ‘‘Management Methods on Law Firms’’ which officially annulled the annual registration system on the attorneys. At this time, 

Beijing Lawyers Association issued a notice and changed ‘‘registration’’ to ‘‘register’’ and totally disregards the principles of Ministry of Justice in ‘‘the specific 

methods for annual evaluation shall be provided by Ministry of Justice.’’ 

. . .First of all, it will further worsen the environment for rule of law in the 

society. . . . By taking advantage of the authorization from Beijing Bureau of 

Justice, the Beijing Lawyers Association suppresses and takes revenge on 

human rights lawyers as it wishes. . . . Most of these attorneys are the topnotch outstanding attorneys who have the highest awareness of rule of law 

among about ten thousand attorneys in Beijing. 

. . .Second, cancellation of the licenses of a large number of attorneys has undermined to a great extent the strategic elements for building a harmonious society. 

. . .Third, canceling the right to practice of so many right defense attorneys 

is a provocation on the social conscience. 

The first part of my recommendation for Congressional response is to base the response on this recommendation from the Open Letter to the Ministry of Justice: it 

is a clear, straightforward framework on which U.S. Congressional response to Beijing can be based. I will read from the Open Letter: 

It is our belief that as the highest judicial administrative organ of our country, the Ministry of Justice should not ignore such a violation of law by Beijing 

Municipal Bureau of Justice and Beijing Lawyers Association in worsening the 

environment for rule of law, undermining the social harmony and in challenging 

the social conscience. We hope the Ministry of Justice can, in the principle of 

‘‘upholding the spirit of rule of law’’ as proposed at the 17th CPC National Congress, order Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice and Beijing Lawyers Association to withdraw their decision, correct their mistakes, restore the right defense 

lawyers’ right to practice and apologize to the people in various circles of life, 

so as to solve this problem in a fair, reasonable and legal way. 

40 

I appreciate the clear statements in this letter which explain not only their concern but also the national effects of these license denials—effects which ultimately 

concern each one of us especially because of the unfortunately utter disregard to 

rule of law by the largest regime in the world. 

One question to be addressed by this panel is, ‘‘What is the relationship between 

these lawyers and the Chinese government and the Communist Party? ’’ This brings 

up an intriguing point—because these human rights lawyers have been moving forward according to the proposal from the 17th CPC National Congress to ‘‘promote 

the spirit of rule of law’’ and ‘‘realization of rule of law in various jobs of the state.’’ 

A simple list has been compiled of each lawyer whose license has been revoked or 

not renewed, and the important incidents and cases the lawyer has been involved 

with: the categories mentioned in this list include the Sanlu poisonous milk powder 

incident, abnormal deaths while the victim was in custody, representing house 

churches, re-education through labor cases, rights of migrant works and ethnic minorities, cases of Falun Gong practitioners, rights of HIV patients, and the case of 

the underground brick kilns in Shanxi province. 

Which of these cases should a government shrink from having represented by a 

professional lawyer? Does not rule of law necessitate the vulnerability to transparency? Transparency under rule of law, in some of these cases, might necessitate 

acknowledgement of unjust measures or inappropriate use of authority—and that is 

unfortunately a consistent possibility in any government because of human nature. 

What is not necessitated or acceptable is repression of the lawyers who are implementing rule of law. 

Not only have human rights lawyers experienced this challenge to their licenses, 

but some have also experienced actual physical harassment. We have received statements from seven attorneys which I request be entered into the Congressional 

Record. For example, on May 13, 2009, attorneys Zhang Kai of Kaifa Law Firm in 

Beijing and Li Chunfu of Globe-Law Lawyers in Beijing were forcibly detained while 

visiting with a client in a personal residence. They were physically hurt, and thrown 

in prison for a few hours. 

Gao Zhisheng’s case continues to baffle and sadden us. He has now been missing 

for 156 days, since February 4, 2009. The last time he was forcibly taken and hidden in 2007, he experienced 58 days of unspeakable torture. His written account of 

this torture provides the factual basis for the ‘‘FreeGao’’ DVD available on the table. 

To date about 100,000 people have signed the online petition at www.FreeGao.com, 

requesting that accounting be made of Gao’s situation and well-being. Why is it that 

Ambassador Zhou states about Gao that, ‘‘The public security authority has not 

taken any mandatory measure against him? ’’ Why are the officials emboldened to 

take him, keep him, and refuse to account for him? 

Attorney Gao has taken bold stands for freedom and truth in China; he has appealed to the Congress for their support, and it is feared he could be on the verge 

of death now. Many human rights lawyers in China do not feel they will take the 

exact approach that Gao has and have made intentional steps to stay generously 

within the limits of Chinese law—yet, the repression is not even limited to Gao’s 

dramatic moves, but instead we see in the developments with law licenses that even 

these lawyers’ very basis on which to continue work is being threatened. 

These developments strengthen the plea to the U.S. Congress to publically investigate these issues, affirm truth and justice, and actively stand for freedom with 

freedom-fighting, law-loving lawyers in China. Also, I urge the Obama Administration officials and the senior U.S. diplomats in our Embassy in Beijing to publicly, 

regularly and frequently meet with these freedom fighters in and outside China 

when they are available so that an unambiguous strong signal can be sent to both 

these courageous rights defenders and the Chinese government that the American 

people will stand in firm solidarity with any freedom fighters in any part of the 

world. Thank you. 

41 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

FINAL COMPILATION OF TRANSLATED LAWYERS’ STATEMENTS

THE CHALLENGES RIGHTS DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN CHINA FACE AND ITS FUTURE

PROSPECT

LI FANGPING

July 5, 2009 

We are now living in the China set against such a dramatic background of the 

times: First, the economic system is fast evolving while its political system has seen 

little changes over the years. Second, its legal system is increasingly improving, but 

the public power is often not restrained by the law. Third, the citizens’ awareness 

of their rights is increasing and the more the awareness to defend one’s rights, the 

more prominent the abuse and the shirking of responsibilities by the public power 

becomes. 

With the advent of the Internet in China, the first widespread and passionate participation by the citizens in political matters occurred in 2003 during the ‘‘Sun 

Zhigang Incident,’’ which successfully made the State Council announce the annulment of the system of ‘‘internment and deportation.’’ In the next year, ‘‘The State 

respects and safeguards human rights’’ was solemnly written into the Constitution. 

In the next five years, right defense attorneys have, as a professional social group 

committed to promoting rule of law and safeguarding human rights, presented 

themselves before the world. 

Certainly, in a country where rule of law is still far from realized and where there 

is full of terrible things against ordinary citizens, the work and life of right defense 

attorneys must be full of obstacles and frustrations. Just because we engage in work 

involving human rights, government departments not only do not understand the 

significance of our existence, they also regard us as the targets of their domestic 

defense. We seem to have become personae non gratae in the eyes of the government and we are often treated unfairly. Some of us have been beaten and kidnapped. The personal freedom of some of us is illegally restricted and some of us 

are illegally stalked by force. Some of us are forced to report our activities and some 

are driven out by our landlords due to pressure from the government. Some are 

threatened and given a disciplinary warning by Bureau of Justice and lawyers’ associations. Some are simply fired by their law firms due to pressure from the government. 

This year, the right defense attorneys as a social group are enduring more pressure 

than ever before. As far as I can confirm, 19 attorneys at this time are unable to 

practice law. They are Jiang Tianyong, Li Heping, Li Xiongbing, Li Fuchun, Wang 

Yajun, Guo Shaofei, Cheng Hai, Tang Jitian, Yang Huiwen, Tong Chaoping, Liu 

Guitao, Xie Yanyi, Wen Haibo, Liu Wei, Zhang Lihui, Zhang Chengmao, Zhang 

Xingshui, Wei Liangyue and Sun Wenbing. These attorneys have always persisted 

in providing legal assistance or defense services for clients to safeguard their legitimate rights. They include victims of Sanlu poisonous milk powder, parents of children victimized in the earthquake, HIV carriers, peasants who have lost their land, 

detained Tibetans, house church Christians, Falun Gong practitioners, right defense 

activists, political dissidents, victims of violent family planning policies and clients 

from other various areas. 

Judicial administrative departments in Beijing and other places have terminated 

attorneys’ rights to practice on the ground that these right defense attorneys have 

not passed the so-called ‘‘annual evaluation’’ or that the law firms where they work 

have not passed the ‘‘annual inspection.’’ However, the ‘‘annual evaluation’’ for attorneys and the ‘‘annual inspection’’ for law firms themselves are not the administrative penalty that can terminate the right to practice of the attorneys or of their 

law firms. We can see that the ‘‘annual evaluation’’ for attorneys and the ‘‘annual 

inspection’’ of law firms have degenerated into an illegal, disorderly and remediless 

administrative penalty in disguised form that overrides the disciplinary penalty in 

the industry and administrative penalty on the practicing attorneys. 

What delights us is that on the one hand, the right defense attorneys have not 

given up their idea of safeguarding rule of law and human rights. Each time they 

negotiate with judicial administrative departments, they express their criticism on 

the illegal administration and their firm belief that China will certainly develop into 

a country under rule of law. On the other hand, the disadvantaged social groups 

whose rights are harmed also express their desire of ‘‘attorneys for us, and we for 

42 

attorneys.’’ It is my belief that the appeal for rights by the ordinary people whose 

rights are harmed, and the sense of mission of the attorneys, will combine to form 

a powerful synergy in promoting the progress of our country in human rights and 

rule of law. Though the road to rule of law and human rights in China will be hard 

and long, yet the long march of this time is attracting more and more people, including you, us and them. Given this situation, I, as a member of this social group of 

defense attorneys, personally am full of confidence for the ‘‘Same World, Same 

Human Rights.’’ 

Finally, let me express my gratitude for all my friends who are concerned about 

the rule of law in China and the progress in human rights. 

* * * 

JOINT DECLARATION OF RIGHTS DEFENSE ATTORNEYS

ZHANG KAI AND LI FUCHUN

Night, July 6, 2009 

Some of us rights defense attorneys hereby ask ChinaAid Association to publish 

the following declaration to the international community on our recent sufferings 

and the worsening prospect for the rule of law in China: 

Recently, the rights defense attorneys in China are suffering unprecedented largescale repression. Rights defense attorneys are a particular social group in China, 

and they can also be referred to as human rights attorneys. The work the rights 

defense attorneys do is mainly using the relief of law to safeguard citizens’ basic 

rights within the framework of the Constitution such as freedom of speech, freedom 

of belief, personal freedom and freedom of property from illegal infringement by the 

public power, etc. In such a country as China where there is a tradition of thousands of years of autocratic rule and where law is not clearly defined, rights defense 

attorneys have always been regarded by the authorities as aliens to be expelled and 

suppressed. Recently, the authorities have become more and more brazen and wanton in such attacks and suppression that the professional licenses of some attorneys 

were unreasonably rejected during the annual inspection, resulting in their inability 

to practice their law. A few attorneys were even violently beaten. 

The prominent human rights attorneys from Beijing Zhang Kai and Li Chunfu 

were besieged by over 20 local policemen and met with violence and beatings at the 

residence of their client when they were in Jiangjin, Chongqing, Sichuan province 

to investigate the case of Jiang Xiqing who died an abnormal death during custody 

at a labor camp. Zhang Kai and Li Chunfu were taken away in handcuffs and were 

detained for six hours. The police illegally examined the computers and the materials the attorneys brought with them as evidence. They tried to force the attorneys 

to cancel the contract with their clients. As of today, the two attorneys still have 

not recovered from their injuries. The two attorneys are still trying to talk with relevant departments with reasonable and legal means that they have always used in 

defending the rights of other people. So far, however, they have not given any official explanations. 

We expect the international community to show more concerns on the rights defense attorneys in China. Because the legal system in the Chinese society advances 

so slowly or even goes backwards, the social conflicts are increasingly intensifying 

and the ways by which the people seek relief thereof are full of barriers. Given this 

situation, rights defense attorneys are making great efforts and are paying a great 

price for the progress of the Chinese law, for which they have made indelible 

achievements in the history of the progress of rule of law in China. They not only 

provide legal relief in individual cases, but rights defense attorneys have also played 

a role in neutralizing social conflicts and in easing tensions between the government 

and the people. They provide legal assistance and moral support for the miserable 

Chinese people and are truly promoting the balanced and orderly development of 

the society. 

We also hope the Chinese government can correct its errors in its administration 

out of its own will and give the rights defense attorneys a legal and sufficient professional environment. Law is the bottomline in guaranteeing that a government 

wins the support of its people. It is also the last line of defense with which the people can enjoy the freedom and safety in their life. They should give the rights 

defense attorneys more encouragement and support, not suppression or injury. Otherwise, such an injury can affect the image and dignity of the Chinese government 

itself. 

Doubtlessly, every human being created in the image of God the Creator enjoys 

the rights of freedom and equality. The Constitution is the reality of protection of 

43 

such rights which no one or no government has the right to deprive the people of. 

This type of rights is natural and has universal values. Rights defense attorneys adhere to the basic spirit endowed by the law and plead on behalf of the people for 

freedom and equality. And such rights originated from the authorization of God and 

transcend all countries and races, whether they are Chinese, Americans or tribes 

in Africa. When man’s rights and dignity are hurt, it is the loss on the glory of the 

Creator. Every one of us has the obligation to strive for improvement on this issue. 

We hope there will be changes in the Chinese society and we are willing make our 

efforts in building a free and democratic country under rule of law based on the law 

of China and the spirit endowed by the law. 

Zhang Kai, attorney (Yijia Law Firm of Beijing) 

Li Fuchun, attorney. 

* * * 

HUMAN RIGHTS ATTORNEYS IN CHINA VERY ACTIVE BUT FIND THEMSELVES IN A DIRE

SITUATION

JIANG TIANYONG

Since 2005, the social conflicts in China have been intensifying, but people are 

fast awakening in the awareness of their rights. Given such a background, the rise 

of the right defense movement has produced a group of human rights defenders 

such as Gao Zhisheng, Chen Guangchen, Guo Feixiong, Hu Jia, Li Heping, etc. 

Human rights attorneys are an important group of these people. The human rights 

attorneys in China work in a wide range of fields such as the freedom of religious 

belief, freedom of speech, freedom of association, residential rights (objection to 

forced removal), land rights, rights of ethnic minorities (such as Tibetans), etc. On 

the one hand, they are becoming more and more active and are more and more 

needed and depended upon by victims whose human rights are abused. On the other 

hand, they suffer harassment, repression and persecution from the government. 

Following is my experience to demonstrate this situation: 

My name is Jiang Tianyong, and I’m a male of Han nationality. I was born in 

Henan province, PRC in 1971. Currently, I’m residing in the Haidian District of Beijing, China. Because I wanted to engage in work of defending human rights, I quit 

my work at a middle school in Henan province and came to work at Beijing Globelaw Firm in 2004. In 2005, I got my attorney’s license and became a practicing 

attorney. After that, I’ve taken a large number of human rights cases, both individually or in partnership with my associates. As a result of this, I’ve suffered various 

forms of persecution from the government. Except 2007, I met troubles in renewing 

my attorney’s license at Beijing Bureau of Justice during the annual inspection/registration/annual evaluation in 2006, 2008 and 2009. 

In 2006, as I was involved in right defenses cases of migrant workers, Gao 

Zhisheng’s case, victims of violent family planning policies in Linyi, Chen 

Guangchen’s case, I was harassed and threatened by the secret police of Domestic 

Security Protection Squad of Beijing. They tried to prevent me from participating 

in these so-called sensitive cases, claiming that it was not good for me. They also 

said that if I wanted to make a fortune, they could help. Their demands were not 

unfulfilled. People from Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice found me through my 

law firm and told me they forbad me to get involved in some cases. They even used 

special means in getting to know that I had bought a train ticket to go to Linyi for 

the violent family planning case. They called me many times and forbad me from 

going there. Even my wife who was living far away in Zhengzhou, Henan province 

was harassed on the phone by them in the middle of the night. In the meantime, 

as my landlord could not endure the pressure from the secret police, and he refused 

to continue renting the house to me. I had to move out. In the same year, the registration of my attorney’s license and Li Heping’s license got into trouble and were 

delayed. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice illegally forced me and my law firm 

to write a statement of guarantees. 

Starting from August 2006, I was illegally stalked because of Gao Zhisheng’s case 

and was placed on house arrest for five months. 

In 2008, I continued engaging in cases of human rights and began to provide legal 

assistance to people sentenced to re-education through labor and HIV carriers. I also 

provided legal support for NGO organizations that defend human rights—for example, Aizhi Research Institute of Beijing (www.aizhi.net) and Open Constitution Initiative (OCI) (www.gongmeng.cn). After the March 14 Incident in Tibet, I signed a 

declaration to express my willingness to represent the arrested Tibetans. In that 

year, I met with serious troubles from Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice during 

44 

the annual inspection and registration of my attorney’s license. They unequivocally 

told me the reason: ‘‘You have gotten involved in sensitive cases.’’ They said they 

wanted to ‘‘unleash their wisdom’’ and ‘‘break the livelihood’’ of us human rights attorneys. Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice tried illegally to force me to write a 

statement of guarantees in which I would promise not to get involved in sensitive 

cases again and not to have interviews with the media. Because their demands lack 

legal basis, they were rejected by me. After widespread concerns from people both 

in China and abroad, I finally passed the annual inspection and registration on 

June 30 of that year. At this time, I have not been able to engage in attorney’s work 

for a month now. 

From July 2008 to May 2009, I represented a large number of people in cases 

ranging from Falun Gong, HIV carriers in defending their rights, earthquake victims (such as Hong Chun case), Tibetans (such as Phurbu Tsering Rinpoche the living Buddha and Jigma Lama). I also participated in the direct election of Beijing 

Lawyers Association. Because of this, I was seriously persecuted by Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice and Beijing Lawyers Association. They joined forces in trying 

to force the law firm where I worked not to renew our contract. From the end of 

2008 to March 2009, the head of Globe-Law Lawyers where I worked talked with 

me on many occasions and told me that ‘‘since we work under them, we have to 

yield.’’ ‘‘We really can’t endure the pressure from the above (referring to Bureau of 

Justice and Beijing Lawyers Association) and ‘‘We shouldn’t be closed (by Beijing 

Municipal Bureau of Justice and Beijing Lawyers Association) just because of you 

(representing people in cases involving human rights), etc.’’ In the 2009 ‘‘Annual 

Evaluation’’ of attorneys, the great majority of Chinese human rights attorneys who 

strictly adhere to law have failed to pass. Six human rights attorneys from our law 

firm are all among these attorneys who have failed to pass. They are myself, Li 

Heping, Li Xiongbing, Li Fuchun, Wang Yajun and Guo Shaofei. May 31, 2009, the 

expiration date for the annual evaluation and we haven’t been able to engage in jobs 

as an attorney since then. Now, we not only can’t accept new human right cases, 

but we also have to stop on cases that we have already accepted before this date, 

such as the case of Li Zhigang of Shenyang (Falun Gong), He Hongchun case (a case 

from the earthquake disaster areas), the case of Phurbu Tsering Rinpoche (case involving Tibetan issues) and other human rights cases. When human rights attorneys themselves are bogged down in a difficult situation, the rights of the clients 

in human rights cases also lose their protection instantly! Other human rights attorneys and I myself have made inquiries at the relevant people at Beijing Municipal 

Bureau of Justice and Beijing Lawyers Association, but nobody has given us an official reply. So far, we still have not received any documents in writing related to the 

result of our annual evaluation results. Yet, the hints we have received from Beijing 

Municipal Bureau of Justice, Beijing Lawyers Association and our own law firm 

show that our current predicament has something to do with the cases we have accepted. At about 11:20 a.m. on July 3, Attorney Zhang Xuebing, president of Beijing 

Lawyers Association told us in the capacity as an ‘‘attorney of our own kind’’: 

‘‘I know something about your issues. This issue is actually very complicated. As 

the old saying goes: ‘Rome was not built in a day. Doubtlessly, every human being 

enjoys the rights of freedom and equality because of the creation by God’ and it is 

not that easy to solve this problem. You’d better talk with your superiors, and I’m 

afraid you still have to find a way to win the trust of the Party and the government! ’’ 

Starting from 2006, I have always been placed on house arrest on June 4 anniversaries, October 1, the Beijing Olympics and state visits by important diplomats 

(including China—Africa Forum on Cooperation, visit in 2008 by Congressmen Wolf 

and Smith). Though I was in America when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 

visited China, my family was harassed on many occasions by the police. From June 

3 to June 7 of 2009, the police were deployed at my door and prohibited me from 

leaving the house. They threatened me with my personal safety and the safety of 

my wife and my daughter. 

No matter how we suffer, we the human rights attorneys will still adhere to our 

own belief and will never give up our efforts in winning and defending human 

rights. In the meantime, we also call on the people who live in the free world and 

under rule of law to show concern to the efforts made by Chinese people in winning 

and defending human rights. This is because as long as there are still members of 

the human race who live in fears and lack of freedom, the enjoyment of freedom 

and human rights is very likely to be short-lived. 

* * * 

45 

FIGHTING FOR RIGHTS CONTINUES EVEN AS PERSECUTION ESCALATES—A HUMAN

RIGHTS ATTORNEY’S EXPERIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE

TANG JITIAN

My name is Tang Jitian. I am male of Han nationality. I was born in Jilin, China, 

on September 1, 1968. I am currently residing in Chaoyang District, Beijing Municipality, China. I started practicing law in 2005 and relocated from Guangdong to 

practice law in Beijing in 2007. I am now a practicing attorney with Anhui Law 

Firm of Beijing. 

Since August 2008, my normal law practice has been seriously interrupted. At the 

beginning, I was notified several times by my former law firm (Beijing Haodong 

Law Firm) that my contract would be terminated ahead of schedule or I should 

cease my practice. The reason was that the Beijing Municipal Judicial Bureau and 

Beijing Lawyers Association were infuriated by my and other colleagues’ call for direct election of Beijing Lawyers Association. I found my current law firm before my 

contract of employment expired, but during the course of transfer, my case was unreasonably delayed for nearly twenty days by the judicial administrative department and Beijing Lawyers Association. (The processing clerk said in private that the 

same thing happened to all those on the blacklist.) Since June 2009, the government 

has again, in a disguised form, deprived me of my right to practice law. But I have 

not committed any violation of law or regulations. And my work as an attorney has 

never been criticized or complained about by my clients. On the contrary, many people, including my clients, often spoke to me directly or on the phone or in their letters about my work, praising me for defending human rights in accordance with 

law. They encouraged me to overcome the pressure and oppression from the government by giving me their support. They, of course, also felt worried about my situation. 

The reason I was suppressed and persecuted by the government is that as an attorney I was involved in quite a lot of work defending human rights. About a week 

before I was forced to stop practicing law, a police officer named Wang from the 

General Domestic Security Protection Squad of Beijing Municipal Public Security 

Bureau called to make an appointment for a talk with me. His demand was rejected 

by me. (In April, Wang, together with Sun Di, head of the Domestic Security Department and a police officer surnamed Han, had already talked with me regarding 

the issues such as Charter 08, representation of cases, and the direct election of Beijing Lawyers Association.) After that, Sun Di again called me, demanding that we 

have a talk. After he was rejected by me, he threatened me by saying that he could 

find me through other methods. 

Soon afterwards, after six o’clock on the morning of June 3, 2009, under the pretext that we needed to cooperate with an investigation of a case of so-called burglary 

that had taken place, Attorney Lan Zhixue and I were first prohibited from going 

out freely. Then we were taken to the Sijiqing Police Station in Haidian District, 

Beijing Municipality. After they had interrogated me and taken a written record, 

the police officers at that station unreasonably and illegally detained me till eight 

o’clock in the evening. That night when I was on my way back to my residence, I 

was followed and stalked by police officers Lu Yonghui and Zhang Jian from the 

Domestic Security Protection Squad of Public Security Branch of Haidian District, 

Beijing Municipality as well as police officers Li Jing and Shi from Sijiqing Police 

Station. This continued till dawn on the 4th. Later, these police officers sent for additional police officers. Blocking attorney Dong Qianyong, who was with me, they 

forcibly pushed me into the car and drove me to their secret detention spot. (It is 

now known that this place is called Kao Fu Te Sports Training Center and is in 

the vicinity of the Linglong Bridge in Haidian District.) In the few days that followed, they arranged police officers and security guards to keep watch over me, forbidding me to contact the outside world. Furthermore, I was not allowed to step out 

of the room at all. During my detention, Lu Yonghui from the Domestic Security 

Protection Squad and the police officer named He who later joined him held several 

rounds of what they called exchange of communications, asking me not to get involved with human rights cases (such as the cases of Falun Gong), and not to demand rights from the Judicial Bureau and the Lawyers Association, and not to take 

part in any social affairs that will irk the government. They stated several times 

that if I did not cooperate, I could have trouble living and working in Beijing. On 

June 6, I was transferred to a hotel (I later learned that it was called Dong Lun 

Xin Xing Hotel) in Chaoyang District where I was held in custody till the evening 

of June 7 when I regained my freedom. In the past few days, at the request of the 

police, the owner of the house that I have been renting has asked me to move out 

and relocate somewhere else. 

46 

Over the past few years, as an attorney I have been mainly engaged in defending 

citizens’ right to freedom of expression, right to freedom of religion, right to housing, 

right to land, and other fields of human rights. It is exactly for these works that 

I was repudiated and treated with hostility by the government. These works include 

legal defense for persecuted believers such as Falun Gong practitioners, representation of Wang Zhaojun whose right to freedom of speech and expression was infringed upon by Sina.com (Wang’s blog site was shut down by Sina.com because he 

published ‘‘A Letter to the Chinese People’’), and advocacy of the rights of the farmers who have lost their land as well as advocacy of the right to equal employment. 

With regard to defending our own rights as attorneys, my efforts focusing on 

pushing for direct election of Beijing Lawyers Association have also become one of 

the major reasons why some officials have identified me as a ‘‘non-mainstream’’ attorney. 

Since April 2009, making illegal use of the annual evaluation, Beijing Municipal 

Bureau of Justice and Beijing Lawyers Association have instructed the Judicial Bureau of Chongwen District several times to have the law firm under its jurisdiction 

fire me, stating that if attorneys like me were not fired, then the law firm would 

be subject to rectification and reform indefinitely. 

As of today, there has been no change whatsoever in my situation where the government, by subjecting me to an illegal annual evaluation, has in a disguised form, 

deprived me of my right to practice law. 

* * * 

PRACTICING LAW UNDER UBIQUITOUS PRESSURE

LI XIONGBING

My name is Li Xiongbing, and I am male of Han nationality. I was born in Hubei, 

China, on September 18, 1973, and I’m currently residing in Tongzhou District, Beijing Municipality, People’s Republic of China. Since 2005 I have been working as 

a practicing attorney at Beijing Globe-Law Firm. 

After the registration of my attorney license was postponed in 2008 by Beijing 

Municipal Bureau of Justice on the grounds that I had ‘‘handled sensitive cases,’’ 

my qualification as an attorney and my right to practice law has again been arbitrarily revoked by Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice since June 2009. However, 

I have never committed any violations of law or regulations, and my work as an 

attorney has never been blamed or criticized by my clients. On the contrary, many 

of my clients and members of the general public often call me or write to me to 

praise my work, encouraging me to overcome the pressure from public powers and 

become an outstanding human rights attorney. 

The frequent suppression and persecution I have suffered while working as an attorney are directly linked with my advocacy for human rights. Precisely on the 

morning of May 31, 2009, the day when my work as an attorney was about to be 

illegally terminated, two police officers from Domestic Security Protection Squad 

from the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau made an appointment to talk 

with me. They expressly gave me two warnings. First, that I should not defend 

Falun Gong practitioners ever again. Second, that I should not participate again in 

the relevant work of a non-governmental organization dedicated to pushing for the 

rule of law and human rights progress. I persisted in practicing my profession independently in accordance with law and rejected their unreasonable demands. 

As expected, soon afterwards, I failed to pass the annual evaluation for my attorney license, and I was unable to practice law. Starting from June 2, I was monitored 

and followed by police officers or police cars for eight days in a row and was not 

allowed to go to any place without prior approval from the police and meet with 

anyone without prior approval of the police. It was not until the evening of June 

9 that I regained my freedom. In addition, on the evening of June 5, at the request 

of the police, the owner of the house that I was renting came to my home, asking 

us to move out and leave Beijing. The kindergarten my child was attending was also 

harassed by the police and had to relocate to a place far away from my residence. 

My pregnant wife was also questioned and investigated several times by the relevant departments due to her lack of a so-called ‘‘pregnancy permit’’ and, she received warnings and threats. 

Over the past few years, my work as an attorney has been mainly concentrated 

on these areas: advocacy of civil rights such as citizens’ right to freedom of expression, the right to freedom of religion, and equal rights as well as public legal services. It is exactly for the work in these areas that I was repudiated and treated with 

hostility by the government. My work includes the case of Qi Chonghuai, a journalist for Legal Times, involving the freedom of speech; the case of Yuan Xianchen, 

47 

a human rights worker in Heilongjiang province, involving instigation of the subversion of the government; the case of providing legal assistance to victims of Sanlu 

poisonous milk powder; the case of providing legal assistance to victims of child 

slavery in ‘‘illegal brick kilns’’ in Shanxi, as well as legal defense cases involving 

religious persecution of believers such as those of ‘‘Falun Gong’’ and the faction of 

‘‘Three Grades of Servants.’’ 

At the end of 2008, because I provided legal assistance to the victims of toxic 

Sanlu milk powder, I was warned and threatened several times by Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice, Beijing Lawyers Association, and other departments. In the 

summer of 2008, I was also suppressed and threatened several times by Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice, because I had provided legal assistance to the families of 

children victimized in the earthquake disaster area, and was forced to stop providing legal aid. 

As recently as the morning of June 30, 2009, Huang Weizhong, a believer of Falun 

Gong in Jiamusi Municipality of Heilongjiang Province, was detained and tried. I 

took the case in April 2009 and acted as a defense attorney for Huang Weizhong. 

However, when the court trial started on the morning of June 30, the People’s Court 

in the suburbs of Jiamusi Municipality blocked me from entering the court to perform my job as an attorney on the grounds that I failed to pass the annual evaluation Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice. Without having me present as his defense 

attorney, Huang Weizhong was sentenced to three years of imprisonment. 

* * * 

DEFENDING RIGHTS IN HARDSHIP AND ON A THIN LINE

WEN HAIBO

Personal resume: Wen Haibo is a male of Han nationality. He was born in 

Liaoning, People’s Republic of China in 1980. Currently, he resides in Chaoyang 

District, Beijing Municipality, PR China. He started his career as an attorney in 

2004 and once worked at Shengzhi Law Office and Yitong Law Firm. Currently, he 

is a practicing attorney in Shunhe Law Firm of Beijing. 

From November 2005 to March 2009, Shengzhi Law Office and Yitong Law Firm, 

both places where I once worked, were given administrative penalties of ‘‘suspending business for reorganization’’ due to different but groundless reasons given 

by judicial authorities of Beijing. The true reasons were none other than that these 

law firms had gotten involved with or had participated in some cases and incidents 

with which the authorities were not pleased. 

I started working with Attorney Gao Zhisheng in April 2004 until the law firm 

was shut down in November 2005, and I was forced to leave. During this time, both 

Attorney Gao and I represented a large number of people from socially disadvantaged groups in defending their rights. When we began to defend the rights of Falun 

Gong adherents in 2005, the suppression we suffered escalated gradually. At first, 

the judicial authorities or the people working in Beijing Lawyers Association constantly made appointments with us for talks where they gave us a warning of ‘‘not 

allowing you to accept Falun Gong cases.’’ After that, the police constantly harassed, 

stalked us and videotaped us without permission. At the end of 2005, after Attorney 

Gao launched a campaign of ‘‘hunger strike to fight against violence,’’ I and several 

other people working in the law firm were one by one placed under house arrest. 

When I was under house arrest,, several plainclothes policemen stayed downstairs 

24 hours a day, and they did not allow me to go out. When I had to go out (such 

as for shopping), someone shadowed me closely. This lasted 45 days. 

I left Shengzhi Law Office at the end of 2005 and went to work at Yitong Law 

Firm. During this time, besides defending the rights of Falun Gong adherents, I also 

signed in with the attorneys’ delegation to provide legal assistance for the Tibetans 

arrested during the March 14 Incident in Tibet. The signatures for that delegation 

brought such a great repercussion that about 10 attorneys who joined the delegation 

all received warnings from the judicial authorities and the police. The police station 

in charge of my area also made an appointment with me for a talk. They threatened 

me and told me to leave Beijing. I flatly refused. In the second half of 2008, I also 

joined the movement of calling for ‘‘the direct election of Beijing Lawyers Association.’’ The mention of ‘‘direct election’’ obviously touched the frail nerves of some 

people in the judicial departments. They counterattacked in a high profile way, and 

denouncing us as ‘‘linking up with each other in private, using democratic election 

as a signpost, publishing seditious remarks, spreading rumors among the lawyers 

in Beijing to bewitch the people,’’ ‘‘attempting to break away from the supervision 

and guidance of the judicial administrative departments and the administration of 

48 

the Lawyers Association in order to deny full-scale the current administrative system on attorneys, the judicial system and even the political system.’’ 

As many attorneys from Yitong Law Firm joined in calling for ‘‘direct election,’’ 

the judicial authorities intended to ‘‘kill one as a warning to many others’’ and suspended Yitong Law Firm for reorganization. 

When Yitong Law Firm was shut down at the end of 2008, I was again forced 

to transfer, this time to Shunhe Law Firm. Since I did not stop getting involved in 

various cases of human rights and mass groups defending their rights, I brought 

suppression here, too. Since I did not pass the annual evaluation by Beijing Lawyers 

Association, I cannot practice normally at this time, and several cases I have accepted before were forced to stop. 

Though I have met temporary (possibly long-term or permanent) difficulties in my 

work, I have received the encouragement and support from my clients and other 

friends. With this encouragement and support, I do not feel lonely and will continue 

walking along this road! 

Æ