06/28/2017

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

January 4, 2017 Session

STEPHEN LYNN HUGUELEY v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hardeman County

No. CC-6665 J. Weber McCraw, Judge

No. W2016-01428-CCA-R3-ECN

The Petitioner, Stephen Lynn Hugueley, was sentenced to death for the 2002 first degree 

premeditated murder of a prison counselor, Delbert Steed, while the Petitioner was 

housed at the Hardeman County Correctional Facility, following two prior first degree 

murder convictions for the shotgun slaying of his mother and the later killing of another 

inmate. See State v. Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d 356, 364 (Tenn. 2006). He filed a petition 

for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that his 2013 MRI, which showed that he had 

congenital brain defects, was “newly discovered evidence” that he was incompetent at the 

time of his 2003 capital trial, as well as in 2008 when he withdrew his petition for postconviction relief. The coram nobis court concluded that the Petitioner had made an 

insufficient showing for the granting of relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the 

court erred in this determination, asserting that, had his incompetency been known at the 

time of trial, no judgment of conviction would have been entered and that, as well, he had 

not been competent to waive the presentation of mitigating evidence at trial or to waive 

his right to utilize post-conviction procedures. Further, he argues that a relative may 

pursue, in his behalf, his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Following our review, we 

conclude that the Petitioner’s claim of incompetency before and after his trial does not 

constitute “newly discovered evidence” and, further, that this claim was untimely. 

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the coram nobis court denying relief.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ALAN E. GLENN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT 

WILLIAMS and CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JJ., joined.

Amy Dawn Harwell and Kristen Marie Stanley, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, 

Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Stephen Lynn Hugueley.
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Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Jeffrey D. Zentner, Assistant 

Attorney General; D. Michael Dunavant, District Attorney General; and Joe L. VanDyke 

and Mark E. Davidson, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of 

Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

Before setting out the complicated history of this matter, as well as the Petitioner’s 

shifting and contradictory desires, we first note that the Petitioner has a history of taking 

actions which appear to be against his self-interest and later, in a series of petitions and 

motions and appeals, again visits the court system where he seeks to undo his earlier 

actions. In a previous proceeding, this court observed that the Petitioner appeared to have 

“a firm grasp of the legal process and the legal ramifications of his decisions.” Stephen 

Lynn Hugueley v. State, No. W2009-00271-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 2361824, at *41 

(Tenn. Crim. App. June 8, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 13, 2011) (hereinafter 

“state post-conviction appeal”). Further, we noted the Petitioner’s apparent “willingness 

to use his knowledge of the legal system to manipulate proceedings to further his own 

interests or agenda.” Id. His petition for writ of error coram nobis, the denial of which is 

the basis for this appeal, appears to be an attempt to relitigate a previous finding by the 

courts that he was competent. On this latest foray into the court system, the Petitioner 

argues that the opinions of two new experts that he is presently incompetent and has been 

since before his 2003 trial constitute “newly discovered evidence,” meaning that his 

conviction and sentence of death must be set aside. As we will explain, we agree with 

the error coram nobis court that these two later expert opinions are not “newly discovered 

evidence” and do not entitle the Petitioner to relief.

We note that in a parallel federal proceeding, reviewing issues very similar to 

those raised by this appeal, Chief Judge J. Daniel Breen concluded in 2015 that the 

Petitioner’s chance of success in his state coram nobis proceeding, which is the basis for 

this appeal, was “minimal.” Stephen Hugueley v. Wayne Carpenter, Warden, No. 09-

1181-JDB-egb, 2015 WL 225053, at *20 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 15, 2015) (hereinafter 

“federal habeas corpus action”). Much of the difficulty in writing this opinion is that the 

Petitioner’s extensive psychiatric history was not set out in his coram nobis petition, other 

than in a report of one of the new mental health experts, Dr. George Woods, who 

criticized the prior examinations. However, the Petitioner’s mental health history is set 

out in detail in the state post-conviction appeal and in the federal habeas corpus action, 

neither of which is revealed in either of the Petitioner’s briefs filed in this matter. The 

state post-conviction appeal reviewed in 2011 the Petitioner’s claim that he was 

incompetent to withdraw his 2008 post-conviction relief petition, while the federal habeas 
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corpus action considered essentially the same claims presented by this appeal. The 

Petitioner was unsuccessful in both of those actions.

We will set out the complicated history of this matter.

The Petitioner was convicted in 1986 of the first degree murder of his mother; in 

1992 of the first degree murder of an inmate; in 1998 of criminal attempt to commit the 

first degree murder of a second inmate; and in 2003 of the first degree premeditated 

murder of Mr. Steed, whom he stabbed thirty-six times with a homemade knife, or 

“shank,” in 2002. At his trial for the homicide of Mr. Steed, the Petitioner waived 

presenting a defense at the guilt phase or mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase.

This appeal concerns the Petitioner’s conviction, and sentence of death, only for 

the 2002 murder of Mr. Steed. In the past, the Petitioner has been evaluated by a number 

of mental health professionals. Prior to his trial, he was examined by Dr. Keith Caruso, 

who found him competent to stand trial in 2003. Dr. Caruso’s extensive examination is 

set out in great detail in Stephen Hugueley, 2015 WL 225053, at *3-5.

Following the Petitioner’s MRI in 2013, two new mental health experts 

concluded, based on the MRI results, and contrary to all other experts who previously 

examined him, that the Petitioner had been incompetent to stand trial in the capital case a 

decade earlier, as well as later when he filed and subsequently withdrew his petition for 

post-conviction relief. The Petitioner views the two opinions of incompetency as “newly 

discovered evidence,” which invalidate his third first degree murder conviction, sentence 

of death, and later withdrawal of his petition for post-conviction relief as to that 

conviction and sentence. 

As to his seeking post-conviction relief, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for 

post-conviction relief in 2008. Stephen Lynn Hugueley, 2011 WL 2361824, at *1. The

post-conviction court appointed the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender to represent 

the Petitioner, and he then wrote the post-conviction court expressing his desire to 

withdraw his petition. A competency hearing was held in November 2008. On January 

8, 2009, the post-conviction court found the Petitioner competent and entered an order 

dismissing the petition, as he had requested. A notice of appeal was filed on February 19, 

2009, and this court affirmed the post-conviction court’s determination. The Petitioner 

then filed a motion to remand the matter to the post-conviction court, predicated upon his

new desire to proceed with any and all available challenges to his conviction and 

sentence. Id.

Apparently, while that appeal was pending, the Petitioner, arguing that trial 

counsel was ineffective, filed the federal habeas corpus petition in the United States 
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District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. Stephen Hugueley, 2015 WL 

225053, at *1. Then, in November 2013, the Petitioner, through counsel, sought to 

amend his federal petition to include “claims relating to brain imaging.” Id. at *17. In 

April 2014, this motion was denied, as was the Petitioner’s request to hold in abeyance 

the federal claims, apparently to pursue in state court the brain imaging claims. With the 

federal habeas corpus matter still pending, the Petitioner next filed in the Circuit Court 

for Hardeman County a petition for writ of error coram nobis on September 26, 2014, 

citing the brain imaging claims as “newly discovered evidence.” That court dismissed 

the petition on June 7, 2016, and this appeal followed.

To explain the Petitioner’s extensive psychiatric history, we will set out a lengthy 

portion of his unsuccessful 2015 federal habeas corpus action, which, in turn, quoted

portions of this court’s 2011 opinion:

Petitioner’s competency has been addressed at various times in the 

state court. In 2003, prior to trial, neuropsychologist Pamela Auble 

conducted a records review and forensic neuropsychological evaluation of 

Petitioner at the request of counsel. (See ECF No. 43–2 at PageID 3433, 

3447.) Auble concluded that he “had a history of psychiatric problems and 

severe behavioral problems” including socialization and impulse control, 

suicidal ideation and attempts, auditory hallucinations, depression, and 

aggression. (Id. at PageID 3454.) She noted “patchy impairments” from 

the neuropsychological testing. (Id. at PageID 3453.) Auble stated that a 

CT scan in 1987 did not reveal evidence of recurrence of a tumor that was 

removed from Petitioner’s brain. (Id.) However, she recommended

medical imaging of [Petitioner’s] brain given the neuropsychological data, 

his “left arm/leg symptoms, and the frequent severe headaches.” (Id.)

In 2003, psychiatrist Keith Caruso evaluated Petitioner at the request 

of his attorney to form an opinion about Petitioner’s competency to stand 

trial, mental state at the time of the offenses, and extenuating or mitigating 

factors for sentencing. (See id. at PageID 3457.) With regard to his 

competency, Caruso stated:

Despite a severe mental disease, Intermittent Explosive 

Disorder, the [Petitioner] understands the nature of the 

proceedings against him and the possible consequences and 

can cooperate intelligently with his attorney in his own 

defense in accordance with the criteria listed in State v. 

Blackstock. He accurately stated the charge against him as 

“first degree murder,” and knew the date, victim, and location 
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of the allegation. He was aware that he could face the death 

penalty or life in prison without the possibility of parole, or 

life with the possibility of parole, although he acknowledged 

that, compounded with his earlier sentences, even the latter 

would amount to spending the remainder of his life in prison.

[Petitioner] identified his attorneys as Michie Gibson 

and T.J. Cross–Jones, stated that they “got along okay,” and 

felt that they were adequately representing his interests. He 

identified Elizabeth Rice as the prosecutor who would present 

evidence against him. He recognized that his attorneys would 

not want him to make incriminatory statements to the 

prosecutor, although he had already done so in an effort to 

ensure that he is given the death penalty. [Petitioner] knew 

that the Judge was the Honorable Jon Kerry Blackwood and 

understood the Judge’s role to be “to hear all the evidence and 

make rulings on objections and motions and instruct the jury, 

make sure Constitutional Rights aren’t violated.” He further 

acknowledged that the Judge was impartial.

[Petitioner] knew that the jury heard all evidence, 

deliberated, and decided issues of guilt or innocence and 

passed sentence in the event of a first degree murder 

conviction. He defined evidence as “proof of something,” 

and stated that witnesses “verify the accuracy of events or 

provide scientific information, such as DNA or psychiatric 

opinions.” He knew the possible please [sic] of guilty and not 

guilty and understood the concept of presenting an insanity 

defense, although he acknowledged that he did not “think that 

it would fly.” He stated that at trial, “the prosecutor puts up 

evidence proving the defendant committed the crime, and the 

defense tries to rebut it. The jury is instructed and 

deliberates.” He named potential outcomes as verdicts of 

“guilty and not guilty, as well as justifiable homicide or a 

lesser included offense.” He stated that a guilty verdict on 

first degree murder would lead to a sentencing hearing where 

aggravators and mitigators would be presented to the jury, 

who would again deliberate and pass sentence.

[Petitioner] stated that he wanted to receive the death 

penalty. He initially stated, “I’m suicidal, I just ain’t got the 
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guts to do it myself.” He later corrected himself, saying that 

he was not suicidal, but did not care whether he lived or died 

under the current conditions. He further added, “I have no 

intention of living 30 or 40 years in prison.” [Petitioner]

stated that he did not believe that life ended at physical death, 

believing that there was an after-life. He stated that he 

imagined that he would go to hell if he did not change his 

ways. He was non-committal as to whether he would change 

his ways. [Petitioner] also stated that conditions at Unit 2, 

where he would likely be housed if given a death sentence, 

were in fact better than conditions had been at other facilities. 

While this may seem unusual, it is a sentiment that I have 

heard expressed by several other inmates.

[Petitioner] further added that he understood that, if 

given the death penalty, he would be executed by lethal 

injection. He acknowledged that he would have selected this 

method over electrocution, as that may have led to a more 

painful death.

[Petitioner] understands the nature of the proceedings 

against him on a factual and rational level. He also 

understands the possible consequences of those proceedings, 

specifically that he could face the death penalty or life in 

prison. [Petitioner’s] current assertion that he wants to be 

convicted and receive the death penalty requires careful 

analysis to determine whether he has reached this stance 

rationally.

A key issue to examine in [Petitioner’s] case is the 

distinction between rational and conventional. Under most 

circumstances, we would question the reasoning of someone 

who made efforts to engineer his own death. We must 

carefully safeguard to be certain that someone is not doing so 

out of mental illness, such as Major Depression, Bipolar 

Disorder, or Schizophrenia or some other psychotic disorder. 

[Petitioner] is not psychotic at this time. He does not suffer 

currently from delusions, hallucinations, or other forms of 

disorder in his thinking. He is not seeking to end his life as a 

means of ending some imagined suffering that is the irrational 

product of a delusion or hallucination.
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Neither does [Petitioner] currently suffer from Major 

Depression or Bipolar Disorder. Depressed individuals often 

are so hopeless and tormented by their depression that they 

see suicide as the only means of escaping their intolerable 

pain. Conversely, an individual in the throes of a manic 

episode may be so grandiose as to believe that his death 

would not be permanent or would serve some other greater 

societal cause, such as saving the world. Manic individuals 

lack the insight to project themselves into the future and 

appreciate the ramifications of their impulsive decisions. In 

each of these cases, an individual may make an irrational 

decision that leads to his own death, failing to recognize that 

he is viewing the world in an irrationally distorted manner 

and in fact has a condition that may be alleviated by 

treatment.

[Petitioner’s] assertion that he wants the death penalty 

is conditional. He stated that he would be happy to live as a 

free man and raise a family, although he recognizes that this 

is not an option for him. [Petitioner’s] desire to be executed 

is also conditional in that it has arisen in the setting of 

frustration and thwarted desires. [Petitioner] is a man with 

little control over his environment. He is constitutionally a 

man who requires instant gratification; thus, his lack of 

control and the tedium of prison are difficult for him to 

tolerate. [Petitioner] never developed a sense that he could 

enact socially acceptable behavior that would lead to him 

receiving positive reinforcements. Instead, his life has been a 

series of disappointments, abandonment, broken promises, 

and frustration.

[Petitioner] realistically appreciates that his 

circumstances will not change. He feels that he cannot 

tolerate “30 to 40 more years in prison,” seeing this as 

intolerable suffering. While there certainly is a significant 

degree of suffering involved, this could in no way justify 

changing his circumstances. He acknowledges that he has 

tried treatments with various antipsychotic, mood stabilizing, 

and antidepressant medications without effect, and he does 

not meet criteria for one of these conditions. While 
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conventionally most people would elect to preserve their lives 

even in prison without the possibility of parole, [Petitioner] is 

certainly unconventional. However, his reasoning is not 

irrational, given his unconventional personality and life’s 

experience.

Finally, [Petitioner] is capable of cooperating with his 

attorneys in his own defense. At times, he has not chosen to 

do so; nevertheless, these are again unconventional choices, 

as opposed to choices driven by irrational delusional beliefs, 

psychotically disordered thinking, or hallucinations.

(ECF No. 43-2 at PageID 3466-3469.) Petitioner was considered to be 

competent stand trial in 2003.

[Petitioner] moved to withdraw his post-conviction petition after 

issues with his visitation were resolved. See Hugueley v. State, No. 

W2009-00271-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 2361824, at *4-7 (Tenn. Crim. App.

June 8, 2011). A competency hearing was held on November 14, 2008. Id.

at *11. (See ECF No. 42–12.) The post-conviction court found Petitioner 

competent to waive post-conviction review and dismissed the petition in 

2009. Hugueley, 2011 WL 2361824, at *16.

On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals heard 

Petitioner’s motion to remand the matter to the post-conviction court and 

the merits of the case contemporaneously. Id. at *1. In 2011, the court 

determined that Petitioner could not “belatedly withdraw his decision to 

dismiss his petition for post-conviction relief” and that the post-conviction 

court did not err in concluding Petitioner was competent. Id. at *1, *43.

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals thoroughly reviewed 

issues related to Petitioner’s mental health:

On August 1, 2008, the post-conviction court 

appointed Dr. Bruce Seidner to evaluate the Petitioner’s 

competency.

During a competency hearing [on] November 14, 

2008, Dr. Seidner, a licensed clinical psychologist, testified 

that he was appointed by the court in August 2008, to 

evaluate the Petitioner’s competency to withdraw his petition 
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for post-conviction relief. Dr. Seidner reported that he met 

with the Petitioner on August 27 and 28, 2008. He utilized 

the PAI, which is a self-report inventory, and administered a 

test of malingering called the VIP. Dr. Seidner also 

administered the Wisconsin Card Sort Test and the Wechsler 

Adult Intelligent Scale, 3rd Edition. As a result of this 

testing, Dr. Seidner opined that the Petitioner “presents as 

really quite capable.” Dr. Seidner determined that the 

Petitioner was not struggling with depression and talked 

about the Petitioner’s self-responsibility and self-interests. 

Dr. Seidner concluded that there was no impairment of the 

Petitioner’s capacity.

The Petitioner’s counsel elicited responses from Dr. 

Seidner delineating the differences between a psychologist 

and a neuropsychologist. Dr. Seidner acknowledged that Dr. 

Pamela Auble was a neuropsychologist and had administered 

different tests during her evaluation of the Petitioner in 2003. 

Dr. Auble did not conclude that the Petitioner was not 

competent. Dr. Seidner noted, however, that while he was 

not a neuropsychologist, there was no trauma or brain disease 

evident from Dr. Auble’s evaluation in 2003, which would 

necessitate the need for evaluation by a neuropsychologist in 

2008.

Dr. Seidner related that, upon contacting Brushy 

Mountain on August 25, 2008, he was advised by the unit 

manager that the Petitioner refused to take any tests and 

requested no-contact visitation. Dr. Seidner explained that 

while he did meet with the Petitioner, they were separated by 

a glass partition. Dr. Seidner related that the Petitioner was 

operating at a fourth grade level. He also related that the 

Petitioner’s score indicated a high risk for suicide. However, 

Dr. Seidner rejected any conclusion that the Petitioner was 

“extremely depressed and suicidal.” While he conceded that 

he had noted that the Petitioner wanted to commit “suicide by 

State,” Dr. Seidner also acknowledged that the Petitioner had 

stated that “he’s not suicidal.” Dr. Seidner explained the 

apparently-conflicting statements:
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[Petitioner] does not want to live on death row. 

Suicide is an unfortunate and . . . rather permanent 

solution to a temporary problem. There are people who 

have a permanent problem and there’s no solution. . . . 

He’s been sentenced to death . . . and he has weighed his 

self[-]interests in terms of challenging this and what he 

would get, which is continued decline and a life on 

death row[,] which he has rejected. . . .

Dr. Seidner further noted that Dr. Keith Caruso made 

the distinction clear in his 2003 report when he discussed that 

the Petitioner was unhappy about his situation. Dr. Seidner 

acknowledged the Petitioner’s history of contradictions and 

history with the criminal justice system. Dr. Seidner related 

that the Petitioner went to trial in 2003, rather than pleading 

guilty. The Petitioner then attempted to abandon his appeals. 

In 2005 and 2006, the Petitioner made statements that he was 

not filing a petition for post-conviction relief. In 2006, he 

made statements to the media that he was looking forward to 

his execution. He then filed a petition for post-conviction 

relief, which he later asked the judge to dismiss. Dr. Seidner 

described the Petitioner as dismissive of psychiatrists and 

psychologists. He stated that the Petitioner described himself 

as manipulative. Dr. Seidner conceded that the Petitioner’s 

father committed suicide and that the Petitioner had a very 

dysfunctional childhood. Additionally, he acknowledged a 

history of mental illness in both his paternal and maternal 

family members.

Dr. Seidner reported that the Petitioner described his 

current living conditions as “sensory deprivation -- breaks 

people mentally and physically . . . it’s torture.” Dr. Seidner 

had no knowledge that another inmate in the Petitioner’s unit 

had committed suicide and that only two other death row 

inmates were housed at Brushy Mountain. Dr. Seidner was 

questioned regarding the Petitioner’s destruction of two 

television sets and treasured personal items. Dr. Seidner 

noted that this behavior was “not impulsivity;” rather, the 

actions were “egregious and dramatic manipulation.” Dr. 

Seidner remarked that the Petitioner “knows exactly what he 

is doing.”
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Dr. Seidner acknowledged that on July 15, 1981, a 

report indicated that “[Petitioner] directs destructiveness to 

himself, head banging, cutting and low impulse control.” He 

acknowledged that on January 15, 1983, when the Petitioner 

was fourteen years old, a report indicated that the Petitioner 

was transferred from one juvenile institution to another, 

noting that the Petitioner “attempts to inflict self[-]injury and 

self[-]mutilation.” While a juvenile, the Petitioner was 

medicated with Mellaril, Haldol, Thorazine, Elavil, and 

Sinequan, all of which are classified as antidepressants. Dr. 

Seidner also acknowledged a psychiatric report from 

November 23, 1983, documenting at least two incidents of 

self[-]injurious behavior after which the Petitioner requested 

to be isolated. At this time, the Petitioner also indicated that 

he had huffed inhalants, had engaged in chronic substance 

abuse, heard voices telling him to do things, thought about 

suicide, and was depressed and angry. On December 9, 1983, 

the Petitioner was placed in medical isolation because he tried 

to hang himself twice with a sheet. At this time, the Petitioner 

reported family problems and that voices told him to kill his 

mother. In a report dated June 8, 1984, the Petitioner was 

certified as severely emotionally disturbed, a finding 

necessary to qualify for special education services. Four days 

later, following a disagreement with a girlfriend, the 

Petitioner was admitted to the hospital following ingestion of 

several pills with alcohol. On November 25, 1984, a report 

indicated at least six incidents of self-inflicted wounds 

resulting from the Petitioner’s swallowing thumb tacks. Dr. 

Seidner acknowledged that the Petitioner was admitted to the 

hospital on February 26, 1986, and again on February 28, 

1986, from overdoses of Sinequan. He noted, however, that 

the reports indicated that these overdoses were “not being 

anything more than a gesture and manipulative.”

Dr. Seidner stated that a CAT scan of the Petitioner on 

July 25, 1986, revealed an osteolytic lesion on the right rear 

juncture of the frontal and temporal lobes. On October 31, 

1986, the Petitioner was admitted to the Tennessee State 

Prison hospital with a history of recurrent auditory 

hallucinations. The Petitioner had surgery to remove the 
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tumor. On February 23, 1987, the Petitioner complained of 

blackouts and weakness in his left arm and leg.

On August 16, 2007, Dr. Pamela Auble provided an 

affidavit in which she stated that she performed a 

neuropsychological evaluation of the Petitioner, as authorized 

by the trial court in 2003. She noted that the Petitioner had a

long history of psychiatric illness, including major 

depression, suicide attempts, and hallucinations. Dr. Auble 

concluded that the Petitioner’s ability to engage in abstract 

reasoning was variable. She noted that a medical record 

indicated that a right frontal tumor was removed in 1986, 

without damage to the Petitioner’s brain. Due to symptoms in 

his left arm and leg and the Petitioner’s self-report of frequent 

headaches, Dr. Auble recommended medical imaging of the 

brain to rule out a recurrence of the tumor. Dr. Auble further 

noted that “[c]ompetency is not static, but rather a function of 

the individual’s present state.” Dr. Auble concluded that she 

was unable to “venture an opinion on [Petitioner’s] present 

competency” because she had not seen him in four years.

Dr. Seidner remarked that Dr. Auble did not state that 

the Petitioner lacked competence. Rather, Dr. Auble noted 

that she observed signs that could potentially be a problem. 

Dr. Seidner stated that Dr. Auble found a deficit in motor 

speed and finger tapping and related these deficits to the 

tumor which was removed.

. . . .

On August 20, 2007, Dr. Keith Caruso, through 

affidavit, stated that he evaluated the Petitioner in June 2003. 

Dr. Caruso recommended a CT scan due to the removal of a 

tumor when the Petitioner was eighteen years old. Dr. Caruso 

concluded that the Petitioner met the criteria for several 

disorders, including Intermittent Explosive Disorder. Dr. 

Caruso added that the Petitioner suffers from instability in his 

relationships, affect, impulse control, anger modulation, and 

sense of personal identity. The Petitioner has a history of 

suicidal ideation and self-injury and is prone to paranoid 

ideation and transient psychotic symptoms under stress. The 
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competency of individuals such as this can wax and wane 

depending upon the circumstances. Dr. Caruso noted that he 

could not offer an opinion as to the Petitioner’s present 

competency because he has not seen him in more than four 

years but stated that it would be prudent to reassess his 

current competency based upon prior evaluations.

On January 8, 2009, the post-conviction court entered 

an order dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. 

The order reflected the procedural history of this matter, 

including the Petitioner’s letters to the court expressing his 

desire to withdraw the petition for post[-]conviction relief. 

Specifically, the post-conviction court entered the following 

findings of fact and conclusions of law:

At an initial status hearing . . . this court inquired 

whether it was [P]etitioner’s desire to persist with his 

motion to withdraw his post-conviction petition. 

Petitioner responded that he wished to forego any 

further appeal of his conviction and sentence and stated 

that he was aware of the consequences of his actions. 

Petitioner indicated that he never intended to pursue 

post[-]conviction review. He stated that he had 

consented to the filing of his post[-]conviction petition 

in order to allow him time to resolve problems he was 

having with his visitation rights at the prison. He stated 

that those matters had been resolved; thus, he no longer 

wished to move forward with the pending litigation.

Again, prior to the start of the actual hearing to 

determine if a “genuine issue” as to competency existed, 

the court again inquired whether [P]etitioner desired to 

withdraw his post-conviction petition and [P]etitioner 

again indicated his desire to withdraw the petition. . . . 

Petitioner’s responses were coherent and showed not 

only a clear understanding of the post-conviction 

process; but, also demonstrated a remarkable ability to 

manipulate and bend the system to accommodate his 

needs and desires. . . .

. . . .
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At the “genuine issue” hearing, counsel for 

[P]etitioner was permitted to present proof which she 

argued demonstrated there was a “genuine issue” as to 

[P]etitioner’s competency to withdraw his post[-

]conviction petition. . . . She informed the court that 

[P]etitioner had a history of mental illness and brain 

damage. . . . [She] did reveal an incident in March of 

2007, where [P]etitioner was disciplined for smearing 

feces on the walls of his cell. . . .

. . . .

The court allowed the [P]etitioner to address 

counsel’s assertions on the record and Petitioner 

indicated that he could produce witnesses who would 

testify that he is rational and could say that he has not 

changed his mind on the issue of withdrawing his postconviction petition. With regard to the incident alluded 

to by [Petitioner’s counsel] regarding [P]etitioner being 

disciplined for smearing feces on the walls of his cell, 

[P]etitioner explained that such action was a form of 

protest over what he and other inmates perceived as 

mistreatment by the guards. . . . He claimed his actions 

were a form of civil disobedience aimed at forcing 

changes in prison policy. . . .

. . . .

. . . [T]his court found . . . a genuine issue existed 

as to whether [P]etitioner is competent to withdraw his 

post-conviction petition. . . . Thus, pursuant to Rule 28, 

this court ordered the parties to submit a list of mental 

health experts who could perform a timely evaluation of 

the [P]etitioner’s present competence.

The post-conviction court related that the court 

appointed Dr. Hutson, a clinical psychologist, and Dr. Brown, 

a psychiatrist, to evaluate the Petitioner for competency. Dr. 

Hutson timely submitted a report in which he indicated that 

he found the Petitioner was competent to waive post-
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conviction review. The court later learned that Dr. Hutson 

had mistakenly been compensated with funds from the 

Tennessee District Attorney General’s Conference. Although 

the court found the State made no attempt to influence Dr. 

Hutson’s opinion, the court ruled that Dr. Hutson’s report 

would be disregarded. Dr. Brown failed to begin the 

evaluation six months after appointment and indicated that he 

would need an additional seven months. In light of the delay, 

the court appointed Dr. Seidner to evaluate the Petitioner. Dr. 

Seidner found the Petitioner competent to withdraw his 

petition for post[-]conviction review. Notwithstanding, “out 

of an abundance of caution,” the post-conviction court 

scheduled an evidentiary hearing as to competency of the 

Petitioner.

. . . .

The post[-]conviction court continued to provide a 

summary of the Petitioner’s medical and psychiatric history 

relating that:

At the age of ten, [P]etitioner set his house on 

fire and was evaluated by mental health professionals of 

Northwest Tennessee Mental Health Center. While in 

juvenile custody, the [P]etitioner’s I.Q. was evaluated 

and he was found to have a full scale I.Q. of 78. Three 

years later, Petitioner was diagnosed as “socialized 

aggressive”. . . . In 1983, he was given the StanfordBinet I.Q. test and was found to have an I.Q. of 77. 

Later that year, he was evaluated by Tom Biller, Ed.D. .

. . Biller found [P]etitioner has “deeply rooted 

antisocial tendencies.” In 1986 the [P]etitioner killed 

his mother and was diagnosed with “sociopathic 

personality disorder.” He was later referred to Midtown 

Mental Health Institute (MTMHI), where he was found 

competent to stand trial.

In August of 1986 doctors discovered a benign 

tumor on the right side of [P]etitioner’s skull. At the 

same time, [P]etitioner was diagnosed with substance 

abuse and antisocial personality disorder. Notes from 
-16-

MTMHI indicate that the “CT abnormality had nothing 

to do with [Petitioner’s] thinking.” Later in 1986, the 

[P]etitioner had surgery to remove the tumor in his

front/parietal bone. Notes from Meharry Hubbard 

Hospital indicate that follow up testing revealed a small 

tumor in the right posterior bone[;] however, 

[P]etitioner refused further surgery. A later EEG 

showed normal functioning and “no evidence of brain 

damage.” Additionally, a later CT scan was negative 

for tumor.

Tennessee Department of Correction records 

indicate that the Petitioner has been previously 

diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder and 

antisocial/narcissistic personality disorder. In January 

of 2002, [P]etitioner killed a prison counselor. In 2003 .

. . Petitioner was evaluated by Pamela Auble, a clinical 

neuropsychologist. Dr. Auble found that [P]etitioner’s 

“estimated intelligence fell within the average range.” . .

. Dr. Auble indicated that she had ruled out depressive 

disorder and psychotic disorder. However, she found 

[P]etitioner may be suffering from antisocial personality 

disorder and indicated she could not rule out borderline 

personality disorder. Finally, Dr. Auble found 

[P]etitioner had no “widespread compromise in 

functioning.” . . . Her reports indicate that, at the time, 

[P]etitioner had a full scale IQ of 98. She noted that “the 

tumor that was removed in 1986 . . . without damage to 

the brain.”

During this period, [P]etitioner was also 

evaluated by Dr. Keith Caruso, a clinical psychologist. .

. . [I]n 1995, [P]etitioner was diagnosed with 

Delusional Disorder, Persecutoriy [sic] Type. . . . Dr. 

Caruso states that he found the [P]etitioner’s thought 

processes “were linear, logical and goal-directed.” . . .

Dr. Caruso stated that the [P]etitioner later indicated that 

he was not suicidal; but, had “no intention of living 30 

to 40 years in prison.” Dr. Caruso found “no evidence 

of delusions or perceptual disturbance.” . . .
-17-

Dr. Caruso concluded that the [P]etitioner 

suffered from Intermittent Explosive Disorder, which he 

described as “a severe mental disease;” however, he 

found the [P]etitioner was competent to stand trial.

Based upon this evidence, the court declined to find 

that the Petitioner’s then-current comments or desires 

indicated that he suffered from a mental disease or defect in 

the form of chronic severe depression. In addition, the court 

did not conclude that the Petitioner was suicidal or suffered 

from some other disorder or defect that might affect his 

ability to make a rational choice to withdraw from further 

post-conviction review of his conviction and sentence. The 

court continued to find that:

Even if this court were to find [P]etitioner does 

indeed suffer from a mental disease or defect either in 

the form of chronic, severe depression; brain 

abnormality or injury; or some other psychological 

malady, because this court finds that such mental 

disease or defect does not prevent [P]etitioner from 

understanding his legal position, the court would 

nonetheless find [P]etitioner is competent to withdraw 

his post[-]conviction petition.

. . . [T]his court finds [P]etitioner has a broad 

grasp of the legal ramifications of his decision. [T]he 

[P]etitioner has demonstrated a detailed understanding 

of the sentence he faces, the ramifications of 

withdrawing his current petition for post-conviction 

relief, and the legal procedures associated with such a 

decision.

The lower court further noted that the “[P]etitioner 

appears particularly adept at manipulating the system to suit 

his purpose. Thus, his choices appear both cogent and 

rational.” Finally, the lower court determined that “even if it 

were to presume [P]etitioner suffers from some mental 

disease or defect, any such affliction has not compromised 

[P]etitioner’s ability to make a rational choice amongst the 

legal options available to him.”
-18-

Hugueley, 2011 WL 2361824, at *10-16 (some alterations in original).

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals noted that, in 2008, 

Petitioner “consistently expressed a desire to withdraw his post-conviction 

petition” and drafted coherent, “extremely articulate and meticulously 

thought-out” pro se pleadings. Id. at *27. He asserted in the postconviction process that Hutson had found him competent and that “finding 

should suffice.” Id.

Seidner concluded that Petitioner suffered from antisocial 

personality disorder. Id. at *40. However, he determined that the disorder 

did not affect Petitioner’s understanding of his legal position:

[Petitioner] has no mental disease or defect that 

prevents him from understanding his legal position and 

options. His mental status and performance on objective 

measures of intelligence, executive decision[-]making 

capacity, and personality testing demonstrate his rationality 

and high level of flexible cognition that is not distorted by 

affect. He fully appreciates his position and makes rational 

choices with respect to abandoning further litigation.

Id. Seidner addressed whether Petitioner was able to make a rational choice 

amongst his legal options:

There is no observable or measurable impairment in 

[Petitioner’s] rational process as it relates to his functioning in 

this litigation. He has the demonstrated capacity to make 

rational, pertinent, and reasoned decisions. He fully 

understands and anticipates the consequences of these 

decisions from both a personal and legal perspective.

Id. at *41.

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals opined:

The records in the present case and in the Petitioner’s 

direct appeal indicate that the Petitioner has a firm grasp of 

the legal process and the legal ramifications of his decisions. 

The record further demonstrates the Petitioner’s willingness 
-19-

to use his knowledge of the legal system to manipulate 

proceedings to further his own interests or agenda. The 

Petitioner is currently serving a death sentence and two life 

sentences under severe prison restrictions because of his 

violent history. The post-conviction court’s determination of 

competency is supported by the fact that the Petitioner arrived 

at the competency hearing with a presumption that he was 

competent. This presumption was bolstered by previous 

determinations of competency. The record reflects that the 

post-conviction court had no doubt as to the Petitioner’s 

competency but merely ordered the evaluation out of an 

abundance of caution with consideration of the severity of the 

proceedings. With consideration of the evidence and the 

applicable standard of review, we conclude that sufficient 

basis exists to support the lower court’s finding that the 

Petitioner is competent to withdraw his petition for postconviction relief.

Stephen Hugueley, 2015 WL 225053, at *2-12.

The basis for the Petitioner’s latest foray into the state court system is a September 

17, 2014 letter from Dr. George Woods who opined that the Petitioner was incompetent 

at each stage of the proceedings, his trial, his withdrawal of his petition for postconviction relief, and at the present time. That letter concludes with the opinion of Dr. 

Woods:

[The Petitioner] has multiple neurological and neuropsychiatric 

symptoms, including affective dysregulation, impaired registration, 

defective problem initiation, impaired judgment, clinical perseveration, 

poor problem sequencing, grandiosity, irritability, agitation, flight of ideas, 

and circumstantiality. These symptoms are associated with neurological 

disorders. The etiology of these disorders is complex and interconnected, 

creating a depth of impaired functioning and disruptive behavior greater 

than would be predicted from any one disorder independently. The 

multiplicity of symptoms explains [the Petitioner’s] atypical presentation 

and behavioral dysfunction.

Moreover, [the Petitioner’s] symptoms are interrelated in a cognitive 

synergy that rendered him unable to function effectively as both an 

adolescent and an adult. [The Petitioner] is irrational, impulsive, and 

seemingly unable to effectively and consistently control his behavior. [The 
-20-

Petitioner’s] irrational behavior is long-standing, long pre-dating his trial on 

the instant case. His limitations rendered him incompetent to stand trial: 

his “impaired sense of reality substantially undermine[d] his judgment and 

prevent[ed] him from cooperating rationally with his lawyer.” [The 

Petitioner] was also incompetent to waive post-conviction as his brain 

defect substantially affected his capacity to “appreciate his position and 

make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further 

litigation.”

Id. at *2.

We note that both the 2011 state post-conviction appeal and the 2015 federal 

habeas corpus action include lengthy discussions of the opinions of Dr. Keith Caruso, 

who examined the Petitioner in 2003 and submitted an affidavit in 2007, and Dr. Bruce 

Seidner, who examined the Petitioner in 2008, as well as other mental health 

professionals. Accordingly, we will incorporate the findings and conclusions of those 

cases in our analysis of the present appeal.

ANALYSIS

As we have set out, the Petitioner’s claims are that he is entitled to coram nobis 

relief because of “newly discovered evidence” that he was incompetent both at the time 

of his trial and when he was allowed to withdraw his petition for post-conviction relief.

The State responds that his petition is untimely and that a coram nobis petition may not 

be utilized to challenge competency to stand trial or to withdraw a post-conviction 

petition. As we will explain, we agree with the State.

A writ of error coram nobis is an “extraordinary procedural remedy,” filling only a 

“slight gap into which few cases fall.” State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 672 (Tenn. 

1999) (citation omitted). Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105(b) provides that 

coram nobis relief is available in criminal cases as follows:

The relief obtainable by this proceeding shall be confined to errors 

dehors the record and to matters that were not or could not have been 

litigated on the trial of the case, on a motion for a new trial, on appeal in the 

nature of a writ of error, on writ of error, or in a habeas corpus proceeding. 

Upon a showing by the defendant that the defendant was without fault in 

failing to present certain evidence at the proper time, a writ of error coram 

nobis will lie for subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to 

matters which were litigated at the trial if the judge determines that such 
-21-

evidence may have resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at 

the trial.

Our supreme court has stated the standard of review is “whether a reasonable basis 

exists for concluding that had the evidence been presented at trial, the result of the 

proceedings might have been different.” State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 525-28 

(Tenn. 2007) (citation omitted).1“If the defendant is ‘without fault’ in the sense that the 

exercise of reasonable diligence would not have led to a timely discovery of the new 

information, the trial judge must then consider both the evidence at trial and that offered 

at the coram nobis proceeding in order to determine whether the new evidence may have 

led to a different result.” Id. at 527-28. The decision whether to grant or deny a petition 

for writ of error coram nobis on its merits rests within the sound discretion of the trial 

court. Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 144 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 

514 at 527-28). “A court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard 

or its decision is illogical or unreasonable, is based on a clearly erroneous assessment of 

the evidence, or utilizes reasoning that results in an injustice to the complaining party.” 

State v. Wilson, 367 S.W.3d 229, 235 (Tenn. 2012).

Petitions for writ of error coram nobis are subject to a one-year statute of 

limitations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-7-103; Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 144. The one-year 

statute of limitations may, however, be tolled on due process grounds if the petitioner 

seeks relief based upon newly discovered evidence of actual innocence. Wilson, 367 

S.W.3d at 234. In determining whether tolling is proper, the court must balance the 

petitioner’s interest in having a hearing with the State’s interest in preventing a claim that 

is stale and groundless. Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 145 (citing Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 

100, 102 (Tenn. 2001)). Generally, “before a state may terminate a claim for failure to 

comply with . . . statutes of limitations, due process requires that potential litigants be 

provided an opportunity for the presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner.” Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992). The Burford

rule consists of three steps:

(1) determine when the limitations period would normally have 

begun to run;

(2) determine whether the ground for relief actually arose after the 

limitations period would normally have commenced; and 

 

1 We note that Vasques appears to use, interchangeably, the phrase “different judgment,” as set 

out in the coram nobis statute, with the phrase “different result.” While these phrases appear to have the 

same, or nearly so, meaning, we will use the statutory phrase in this opinion. 
-22-

(3) if the grounds are “later-arising,” determine if, under the facts of 

the case, a strict application of the limitations period would effectively deny 

the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to present the claim.

Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 301 (Tenn. 1995). Whether a claim is time-barred is a 

question of law, which we review de novo. Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 145 (citation omitted). 

As we will explain, the petition for writ of error coram nobis, which is the basis 

for this appeal, has several fatal flaws. First, it is untimely by a number of years. 

Secondly, while the Petitioner denotes the additional information regarding his mental 

status as “newly discovered evidence,” it simply is a matter of his locating two mental 

health experts who disagree with the previous experts who examined the Petitioner at 

length, both prior to his trial and his being allowed to withdraw his post-conviction 

petition. Further, the new opinions that the Petitioner was not competent either at the 

time of trial or at the time of withdrawal of his post-conviction petition would not result 

in a different judgment, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105(b). 

Rather, because of his incompetency, no judgment would have been entered.

A. Timeliness of Petition

Both in the coram nobis court and on appeal, the State argues that the petition for 

coram nobis relief was untimely, because it was not filed within one year of the 

challenged judgment’s becoming final, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 

27-7-103. The Petitioner responds that his petition was timely because it was filed within 

one year of the discovery of his brain abnormalities, which had rendered him incompetent 

ten years earlier, when he was tried. 

In Wilson, our supreme court explained that the one-year statute of limitations for 

coram nobis petitions is waived for those asserting actual innocence established by the 

newly discovered evidence:

The one-year statute of limitations for a petition for writ of error 

coram nobis may be tolled on due process grounds if a petition seeks relief 

based upon newly discovered evidence of actual innocence. Harris, 301 

S.W.3d at 145 (citing Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 101 (Tenn.

2001)). In determining whether tolling of the statute is proper, the court is 

required to balance the petitioner’s interest in having a hearing with the 

interest of the State in preventing a claim that is stale and groundless. 

Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 145 (citing Workman, 41 S.W.3d at 103). Generally, 

“before a state may terminate a claim for failure to comply with . . . statutes 

of limitations, due process requires that potential litigants be provided an 
-23-

opportunity for the presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner.” Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992).

367 S.W.3d at 234.

The time period for seeking coram nobis relief began to run on January 2, 2004, 

which was thirty days after the trial court denied the Petitioner’s motion for a new trial. 

Stephen Lynn Hugueley, No. W2004-00057-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 645179, at *5 

(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 17, 2005), aff’d, 185 S.W.3d at 364. Accordingly, the 

Petitioner’s window to seek coram nobis relief expired on January 2, 2005. Because his 

petition was not filed until September 26, 2014, it was untimely by a number of years, 

unless his right to due process requires that the statute of limitations be tolled. We will 

apply the Burford test to determine if this is the case.

Initially, we note that, although evidence of the Petitioner’s brain scan became 

available on September 27, 2013, he waited until nearly the last possible moment, 

September 26, 2014, to file his coram nobis petition. Previously, this court has observed 

that the Petitioner “manipulate[s] proceedings to further his own interests or agenda,”

Stephen Lynn Hugueley, 2011 WL 2361824, at *41, and that he “orchestrated delays,” 

Stephen Hugueley, 2015 WL 225053, at *18. Additionally, the Petitioner is not claiming

that he is innocent of the homicide, rather, that he was not competent to stand trial. As 

our supreme court explained in Payne v. State, 493 S.W.3d 478, 483 (Tenn. 2016), “a 

capital defendant’s intellectual disability does not render him actually innocent of the 

death penalty offense.” The Petitioner’s mental problems were recognized and 

documented long before his trial. Prior to the trial, he was determined to be competent 

for that proceeding. He does not have a valid due process claim requiring tolling because 

he is not contending he is actually innocent of the crime. Rather, the Petitioner’s claim is 

that no judgment at all should have been entered against him because of his mental 

incompetency.

As evidence that the present claims of the Petitioner are not “late arising,” Chief 

Judge Breen noted that “Petitioner has had mental health issues since childhood, and the 

record is replete with evaluation of his mental health status and information related to his 

brain tumor. The record also indicates Petitioner’s unwillingness to be evaluated for 

competency in the state court proceedings.” Stephen Hugueley, 2015 WL 225053, at 

*16. We agree and conclude that the Petitioner’s claim of incompetency is not “late 

arising” but, simply, a repackaging of his longstanding mental health problems combined 

with locating two expert witnesses to assert that the previous evaluations, concluding that 

the Petitioner was competent, were deficient. 
-24-

Accordingly, we conclude that there is no basis for tolling of the statute of 

limitations for seeking coram nobis relief and that, as a result, the petition was untimely. 

B. Newly Discovered Evidence

In the error coram nobis petition, filed on the Petitioner’s behalf by his aunt, the 

Petitioner relies upon the determinations of two mental health experts, who based their 

opinions on the results of his 2013 MRI, which showed abnormal brain development. Dr. 

George Woods opined that, because of his mental disease or defect, the Petitioner was 

unable to consult with his trial lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. 

In the opinion of Dr. Woods, the Petitioner’s brain defects “undermine[d] his judgment 

and his ability to rationally cooperate with counsel.” Dr. Woods diagnosed the Petitioner 

as having a major neurocognitive disorder and bipolar disorder due to a medical 

condition. 

By letter dated September 16, 2014, Dr. Erin Bigler, a neuropsychologist, stated 

that, based upon the Petitioner’s 2013 MRI, the Petitioner had a “reduced hyppocampal 

volume and increased size of the temporal horn,” findings which suggested that the 

temporal lobe regions of his brain deviated from typical size. However, Dr. Bigler did 

not provide an opinion as to the competency of the Petitioner.

In a May 28, 2015 addendum to his November 26, 2014 letter, Dr. Siddhartha 

Nadkarni, Assistant Professor of Neurology and Psychiatry at the NYU School of 

Medicine, stated that he examined the Petitioner on April 22, 2015, and opined:

These functions of the frontal lobes are critical in “consulting with 

one’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” as 

required by Dusky [v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)]. [The 

Petitioner’s] understanding is inherently irrational as he cannot properly 

process external and internal cues. That is to say, because of his brain 

malformation, [the Petitioner’s] capacity to rationally understand the 

proceedings is compromised. This applies to the “rational as well as factual 

understanding of proceedings against him” as well; his actions are 

impulsive and reactionary as a result of his brain dysfunction and his 

cognitive impairments. In my opinion, [the Petitioner] is incompetent 

under the Dusky standard because of these impairments. 

We note that while the coram nobis petition included, as exhibits, records of the 

Petitioner’s behavioral problems dating back to at least 1980, it did not include, other 

than brief criticisms, reports regarding the extensive earlier examinations of the 
-25-

Petitioner, which concluded that he was competent both to stand trial and later withdraw 

his post-conviction petition. 

In the federal habeas corpus action, Chief Judge Breen concluded that the claims 

the Petitioner made, in part relating to his “competency, mental state, social history and 

intellectual capacity,” were untimely because they had not been presented “from the date 

on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” Stephen Hugueley, 2015 WL 225053, 

at *17-18. As the court explained, “[a]lthough the brain imaging conducted in September 

2013 may have provided additional information in support of Petitioner’s claims,” the 

allegations . . . did not rely on a new factual predicate.” Id. at *18. The court further 

observed:

As evidenced by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in 

2011, [the Petitioner’s] mental health and competency including issues of 

brain damage have been present in Petitioner’s cases for some time. See

Hugueley v. State, No. W2009-00271-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 2361824, at 

*13-14, 18, 36-43 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 8, 2011). Petitioner also 

presented claims that were substantially similar in his prior motion to 

amend the petition, and these claims were determined to be time barred. 

Id.

We agree with this determination by Chief Judge Breen. It was well documented 

that the Petitioner had serious behavioral problems. Mental evaluations before his 2003 

trial concluded that he was competent to be tried for first degree premeditated murder. 

Later examinations to determine whether he was competent to withdraw his postconviction petition resulted in the same finding, that he was competent to do so. This 

current appeal merely present different opinions, long after the fact, that he was 

incompetent then and even at the time of his 2003 trial. In both his coram nobis petition, 

as well as in this appeal, the Petitioner virtually ignores the previous detailed findings of 

mental health experts that he was competent. The coram nobis statute is intended to 

provide relief from what may have been an injustice, not to reward a petitioner who has 

been successful in his search to find new experts who disagree with the previous experts 

involved in the matter. Thus, this petition fails for that reason as well.

C. Merits of Coram Nobis Petition

The Petitioner’s claim that he is entitled to coram nobis relief is faulty for several 

reasons. First, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105(b) makes such relief 

available only to “newly discovered evidence relating to matters which were litigated at 
-26-

the trial.” Determinations as to a defendant’s competency to stand trial are made by the 

trial court prior to the trial and are not submitted to the jury. Thus, the incompetency 

claims presented by the Petitioner would not have been litigated during the trial and 

cannot be the basis for coram nobis relief. Such relief may be granted only for newly 

discovered evidence that “may have resulted in a different judgment, had it been 

presented at the trial.” Id. In fact, if the Petitioner had been determined by the trial court 

to be incompetent to stand trial, no judgment at all would have been entered. Rather, the 

court would have followed the procedures set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 

33-7-301 regarding possible hospitalization of an incompetent defendant. See State v.

Bailey, 213 S.W.3d 907, 911-12 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006). Since no judgment is not a 

“different judgment,” the Petitioner seeks relief which is not available through a coram 

nobis action. Another hurdle which the Petitioner cannot overcome is the requirement 

that the “newly discovered evidence” would be admissible in a retrial of the matter. 

Newsome v. State, 995 S.W.2d 129, 135 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). As the coram nobis 

court explained: “[E]vidence relating to [the Petitioner’s] competency to stand trial or 

waive sentencing would not have been admissible” at a trial. For this additional reason, 

the Petitioner’s claim is deficient.

D. Filing of Petition by Next Friend

As for whether a relative of the Petitioner may maintain this action, the coram 

nobis court concluded that it would be allowed for the limited purpose of this petition. 

On appeal, the State does not object to this arrangement, and the record on appeal is not 

sufficient for us to conclude otherwise. In view of this, we, likewise, will allow the 

procedure for the limited purpose of this appeal.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgment of the 

coram nobis court.

_________________________________ 

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE