1

The district court dismissed claims against these

defendants in their official capacities on Eleventh Amendment

grounds except to the extent that Williams sought prospective

injunctive relief. Williams also named Alabama State University

and the Board of Trustees as defendants, and all claims against

them were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. 

 2The background facts are taken from the amended complaint. 

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-6432.

Patrice D. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ALABAMA STATE UNIVERSITY, Board of Trustees of Alabama State

University, Defendants,

T. Clifford Bibb, individually and in his official capacity,

Roosevelt Steptoe, Dr., individually and in his official capacity,

Alma S. Freeman, Dr., individually and in her official capacity,

Defendants-Appellants.

Jan. 6, 1997.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of Alabama. (No. CV-94-A-434-N), W. Harold Albritton, III,

Judge.

Before ANDERSON and COX, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit

Judge.

PER CURIAM:

The individual defendants in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action

appeal the district court's order denying their motion to dismiss

the claims against them in their individual capacities on grounds

of qualified immunity.1

 The district court held that the complaint

alleges a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

We reverse.

BACKGROUND2

Patrice Williams was employed as an English instructor at
Alabama State University ("ASU") from 1980 to 1986, and again from

1988 to 1993. In 1990, Williams's request for a promotion was

denied. In 1991, Williams's application for tenure was denied, but

she was granted a promotion to Assistant Professor. Pursuant to

ASU's "up or out" tenure policy, Williams worked her final year at

ASU under a temporary contract and received a termination letter in

May 1993.

Following her termination, Williams sued Dr. T. Clifford Bibb,

Dr. Alma S. Freeman, and Dr. Roosevelt Steptoe in both their

individual and official capacities. Williams alleges that the

defendants, who hold various administrative positions at ASU,

reduced her hours, denied her tenure, and terminated her in

retaliation for her constitutionally protected speech.

Specifically, Williams contends that the defendants retaliated

against her because she criticized a grammar textbook written by

Bibb and other faculty members.

The defendants moved to dismiss Williams's complaint on the

grounds that they were entitled to qualified immunity and that

Williams failed to meet the heightened pleading standard applicable

in § 1983 actions against individuals. The district court

concluded that Williams's complaint failed to meet the heightened

pleading standard, but granted her leave to amend. Williams filed

an amended complaint, in which she alleges that (1) she

"criticized" the textbook because it contained "numerous

substantive grammatical mistakes," (2) she "spoke out against" and

"instigated debate" about the use of the textbook, (3) she voiced

these concerns to defendant Bibb, the other authors of the book,
 3

Because we conclude that defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity, we need not address defendants' contention

that Williams's amended complaint fails to meet the heightened

pleading standard. We are, however, aided by the greater

specificity of Williams's amended complaint in determining

whether she alleges the violation of a clearly established right. 

and other faculty members, (4) her 1990 request for a promotion was

denied by the defendants, (5) Bibb chaired the 1991 tenure

committee, and his influence over the committees resulted in the

denial of her tenure application, (6) defendant Steptoe signed the

letter informing her that her tenure application was denied, and

(7) defendants Bibb, Steptoe, and Freeman "approved and authorized"

the denial of her tenure application. (R.10 at 3-6). The

defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint, again asserting

that they were entitled to qualified immunity and that the amended

complaint failed to meet the heightened pleading standard. The

district court denied the motion, holding that the amended

complaint adequately alleged a violation of Williams's right to

free speech, and that further factual development was required

before the qualified immunity issue could be resolved. The

defendants appeal the district court's denial of their motion to

dismiss the claims against them in their individual capacities.

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

 The defendants assert the defense of qualified immunity in a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and they are entitled to qualified

immunity at this stage in the proceedings if Williams's amended

complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly established

constitutional right.3 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526,

105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Siegert v. Gilley,
 4

Williams filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of

jurisdiction, arguing that the district court's denial of the

defendants' motion was not an appealable final decision under

Johnson v. Jones, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238

(1995). In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that a district

court's summary judgment order in a qualified immunity case based

on a question of "evidence sufficiency" is not an appealable

order. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2156. The purely legal issue

raised by defendants on this appeal is part of the core qualified

immunity analysis. See Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087, 1091

(11th Cir.1996) (distinguishing core qualified immunity issue

from evidence sufficiency issue); see also Siegert v. Gilley,

500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991)

(whether violation of clearly established right is alleged is

purely legal question). Thus, we have jurisdiction to hear this

appeal and Williams's motion to dismiss this appeal is denied. 

500 U.S. 226, 232-33, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793-94, 114 L.Ed.2d 277

(1991). Whether the amended complaint alleges a violation of a

clearly established right is a question of law, Ansley v. Heinrich,

925 F.2d 1339, 1348 (11th Cir.1991);4 thus, we review de novo the

district court's order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss.

Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th

Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 810, 112 S.Ct. 55, 116 L.Ed.2d 32

(1991).

 In deciding whether the complaint states a claim, we accept

all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and draw all

inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Oladeinde v. City of

Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507

U.S. 987, 113 S.Ct. 1586, 123 L.Ed.2d 153 (1993).

DISCUSSION

 Qualified immunity shields government officials sued in their

individual capacities who act pursuant to discretionary authority

"insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established ...

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18, 102 S.Ct.

2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The question of qualified

immunity should be resolved in the defendant's favor on a motion to

dismiss if the plaintiff fails to allege the violation of a clearly

established constitutional right. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232-33, 111

S.Ct. at 1793-94. For a constitutional right to be clearly

established so that qualified immunity does not apply, "[t]he

contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that

right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034,

3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

 In determining whether Williams has alleged a violation of a

clearly established right, we look to the prevailing First

Amendment law at the time of the defendants' alleged conduct.

Under that law, a state employer could not retaliate against a

state employee for engaging in constitutionally protected speech.

Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2896, 97

L.Ed.2d 315 (1987); Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562,

1565 (11th Cir.1989). For a public employee's speech to be

constitutionally protected, the employee's interest in commenting

on matters of public concern must outweigh the employer's interest

in promoting efficiency by suppressing the speech. Pickering v.

Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734-35, 20

L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Because the law in this area employs a

balancing test rather than a bright-line rule to determine when a

public employee's right to free speech is violated, "the employer

is entitled to immunity except in the extraordinary case where
Pickering balancing would lead to the inevitable conclusion that

the discharge of the employee was unlawful." Dartland v.

Metropolitan Dade County, 866 F.2d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir.1989).

 In performing the Pickering balancing test, a threshold

question is whether the employee's speech involves a matter of

public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct.

1684, 1690, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). The district court erred in

holding that, under clearly established law, Williams's alleged

speech involves a matter of public concern, thereby triggering

First Amendment protection. We have not been provided nor has our

research revealed any case holding that a professor's in-house

criticism of a particular text is constitutionally protected

speech. Decisions addressing analogous issues suggest the law to

be otherwise. A professor's criticism of a required course

syllabus was held not to be a matter of public concern in Ballard

v. Blount, 581 F.Supp. 160 (N.D.Ga.1983), aff'd, 734 F.2d 1480

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1086, 105 S.Ct. 590, 83 L.Ed.2d

700 (1984):

The plaintiff claims that this speech was related to a matter

of public concern, since the decision regarding the syllabus

would have an eventual, derivative effect on the freshman

English students. Taken to its logical conclusion, the

plaintiff's argument means that any time a person's speech

will have an effect on the public, regardless of how small or

unlikely that effect may be, that speech relates to a matter

of public concern. This was a specific concern of the Connick

Court, and the Court wisely rejected this identical argument.

581 F.Supp. at 164 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103

S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983)). In addition, in Feldman v.

Bahn, a complaint against university officials who allegedly

discharged a professor in retaliation for his accusing a colleague
of plagiarism was dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. 12 F.3d

730 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 571, 130

L.Ed.2d 489 (1994).

Maples v. Martin, 858 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir.1988), upon which

the plaintiff relies, does not clearly establish that plaintiff's

speech activities here were of public concern. In Maples, we found

that plaintiffs' speech involved matters of public concern. But

that speech involved much more than just criticism of the

curriculum. 858 F.2d at 1553. Plaintiffs also spoke out about

inadequate facilities, low faculty to student ratio, poor

performance of graduates on a licensing exam, the ability of his

department to prepare students for professional careers, and the

status of accreditation. Id. Unlike the plaintiffs' speech

activities in Maples, the plaintiff's activities in the present

case, as specifically set forth in her amended complaint, do not

"directly affect[ ] the public's perception of the quality of

education in a given academic system." Id. at 1553. Plaintiff's

activities more closely "concern[ ] internal administration of the

educational system and personal grievances." Id. at 1552.

Therefore, we hold that whether Williams's activities involved a

matter of public concern is not "sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates" the First Amendment. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107

S.Ct. at 3039.

 Moreover, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity

because the Pickering balancing test does not inevitably weigh in

Williams's favor. Under Dartland v. Metropolitan Dade County, "the
employer is entitled to immunity except in the extraordinary case

where Pickering balancing would lead to the inevitable conclusion

that the discharge of the employee was unlawful." 866 F.2d at

1323. In applying Pickering, we must look to whether the

employee's interest in commenting on the matters at issue outweigh

the employer's interest in promoting efficiency by suppressing the

speech. 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. at 1734-35. Williams clearly

had some interest in speaking about the fitness of the text she was

using to teach her students. But, just as clearly, the university

had an interest in making efficient academic and administrative

decisions. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 151, 103 S.Ct. at 1692 ("[T]he

Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control

over the management of its personnel and internal affairs. This

includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders

efficient operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged

retention of a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee can

adversely affect discipline and morale in the work place, foster

disharmony, and ultimately impair the efficiency of an office or

agency.") (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168, 94 S.Ct.

1633, 1651, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part)).

Given these competing interests, we cannot say that the Pickering

balancing test inevitably weighs in Williams's favor. Dartland,

866 F.2d 1321.

For these reasons, we conclude that defendants in their

individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity. The

order of the district court denying qualified immunity to the

defendants is reversed, and this case is remanded to the district
court with instructions to enter judgment for defendants on the §

1983 damage claims against them in their individual capacities.

REVERSED and REMANDED.