COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Benton and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

TROY L. PARHAM 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2876-95-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 DECEMBER 3, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SUSSEX COUNTY 

Robert G. O'Hara, Jr., Judge 

 Connie Louise Edwards for appellant. 

 Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 The trial judge convicted Troy L. Parham, a previously 

convicted felon, of possessing a firearm in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-308.2. Parham contends that the conviction was barred by 

the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Due Process Clause, and Code 

§ 1-16. We disagree and affirm the conviction. 

 I. 

 The undisputed evidence proved that in April 1995, 

Lieutenant Raymond R. Bell of the Sussex County Sheriff's Office 

received a shotgun from Frank Owen. Owen testified that he 

purchased the shotgun from Parham in November 1994. 

 The evidence further proved that Parham was convicted in 

1988 of three felonies -- breaking and entering with intent to 

commit assault, felonious assault, and breaking and entering with 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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intent to commit larceny. In 1988, when Parham was convicted of 

those felonies, Code § 18.2-308.2 barred individuals who had been 

convicted of specific enumerated felonies from possessing 

firearms.1

 None of Parham's felonies were among those specified 

in the statute. In 1989, Code § 18.2-308.2 was amended to 

prohibit any felon from possessing a firearm.2

 1In pertinent part, the statute read as follows in 1988: 

 It shall be unlawful for any person who has 

been convicted of a Class 1, 2, or 3 felony, 

rape or robbery, or a felony involving the 

use of a firearm under the laws of this 

Commonwealth, or any other state, the 

District of Columbia, the United States or 

any territory thereof, to knowingly and 

intentionally possess or transport any 

pistol, revolver or other handgun. 

 2In pertinent part, the statute as amended provides as 

follows: 

 It shall be unlawful for (i) any person who 

has been convicted of a felony or (ii) any 

person under the age of twenty-nine who was 

found guilty as a juvenile fourteen years of 

age or older at the time of the offense of a 

delinquent act which would be a felony if 

committed by an adult, whether such 

conviction or adjudication occurred under the 

laws of this Commonwealth, or any other 

state, the District of Columbia, the United 

States or any territory thereof, to knowingly 

and intentionally possess or transport any 

firearm or to knowingly and intentionally 

carry about his person, hidden from common 

observation, any weapon described in 

 § 18.2-308 A. A violation of this section 

shall be punishable as a Class 6 felony. Any 

firearm or any concealed weapon possessed, 

transported or carried in violation of this 

section shall be forfeited to the 

Commonwealth and disposed of as provided in 

 § 18.2-310. 
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 The trial judge rejected Parham's arguments that the statute 

in effect in 1994 could not be applied to Parham. Finding that 

Parham possessed the shotgun in 1994 and that Parham was a 

convicted felon when he possessed the firearm, the judge 

convicted Parham of violating Code § 18.2-308.2 and sentenced him 

to one year in prison. 

 II. 

 The principle is well settled "that any statute . . . which 

makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its 

commission, . . . is prohibited as ex post facto." Beazell v. 

Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925). Simply put, "[l]egislatures 

may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase 

the punishment for criminal acts." Collins v. Youngblood, 497 

U.S. 37, 43 (1990)). 

 Parham contends that the statute's ban on the possession of 

a firearm increases the punishment for his past criminal act. We 

disagree. This Court has previously held that the purpose of 

Code § 18.2-308.2 is not to punish, but rather "to interdict the 

availability and use of firearms by persons previously convicted 

of felony offenses." Mayhew v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 484, 

490-91, 458 S.E.2d 305, 308 (1995). The statute was enacted to 

reduce a threat of harm to the public. See Jones v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 354, 357-58, 429 S.E.2d 615, 617, aff'd 

on reh'g en banc, 17 Va. App. 233, 436 S.E.2d 192 (1993). 

Therefore, we hold that the statute as amended in 1989 did not 
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increase the punishment for Parham's earlier conviction. 

 Moreover, the statute is not retrospective. Parham 

mistakenly asserts that the statute was based only on his status 

as a convicted felon. The statute, by its explicit terms, is not 

so narrow. It proscribes a felon's act of possessing a firearm, 

i.e., conduct that is distinct from a felon's status. 

 Furthermore, the statute became effective in 1989, and 

Parham violated the law when he possessed the firearm in 1994. 

Thus, the statute was not applied as a "new punitive measure to a 

crime already consummated" prior to the effective date of the 

statute. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937). As we 

ruled in Dodson v. Commonwealth, Va. App. , S.E.2d 

 (1996), "[n]o ex post facto violation could have occurred . . . 

because 'the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm 

was not committed until after the effective date of the statute 

under which [Parham] was convicted.'" Id. at , S.E.2d at 

 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we hold that Parham's 

conviction did not result from a retrospective application of 

Code § 18.2-308.2 and, therefore, could not have violated the Ex

Post Facto Clause. 

 Parham next contends that his conviction violated the Due 

Process Clause. Parham argues that when he committed the 

felonies in 1988, he lacked notice that by committing felonies he 

would lose his right to possess a firearm. That argument lacks 

merit. 
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 "Pursuant to the state police power, the legislature may 

'restrict personal and property rights in the interest of public 

health, public safety, and for the promotion of the general 

welfare.'" Rainey v. City of Norfolk, 14 Va. App. 968, 973, 421 

S.E.2d 210, 213 (1992) (quoting Alford v. City of Newport News, 

220 Va. 584, 585-86, 260 S.E.2d 241, 242-43 (1979)). The 

legislature must use means that are reasonably related to the 

stated purpose. See Alford, 220 Va. at 586, 260 S.E.2d at 243. 

Because "lessons of common experience [reveal] that possession of 

firearms by felons presents a high risk of harm to others," 

Mayhew, 20 Va. App. at 491, 458 S.E.2d at 308, we hold that 

barring felons from possessing firearms is reasonably related to 

the goal of protecting the public from harm. Moreover, Parham's 

contention that the statute violates his Second Amendment right 

to bear arms is also without merit. See United States v. 

Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974). Therefore, Code 

§ 18.2-308.2 was a valid exercise of the state police power and 

Parham's conviction does not violate the Due Process Clause. 

 Parham also argues that his conviction violated Code § 1-16. 

 That statute states as follows: 

 No new law shall be construed to repeal a 

former law, as to any offense committed 

against the former law, or as to any act 

done, any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment 

incurred, or any right accrued, or claim 

arising under the former law, or in any way 

whatever to affect any such offense or act so 

committed or done, or any penalty, 

forfeiture, or punishment so incurred, or any 

right accrued, or claim arising before the 

new law takes effect; save only that the 
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proceedings thereafter had shall conform, so 

far as practicable, to the laws in force at 

the time of such proceedings; and if any 

penalty, forfeiture, or punishment be 

mitigated by any provision of the new law, 

such provision may, with the consent of the 

party affected, be applied to any judgment 

pronounced after the new law takes effect. 

 As this Court recently stated, "'[t]he general principle 

that statutes should be given a prospective rather than a 

retrospective construction has been given statutory approval in 

Code § 1-16.'" Collins v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 

21 Va. App. 671, 677-78, 467 S.E.2d 279, 282 (citation omitted), 

aff'd on reh'g en banc, 22 Va. App. 625, 472 S.E.2d 287 (1996). 

Because Code § 18.2-308.2 was applied prospectively, it did not 

affect any right that had previously vested in Parham or any 

punishment imposed upon Parham as a result of his prior 

conviction. Thus, the evidence failed to establish a violation 

of Code § 1-16. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.