IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON GENE ALFRED PALMER II, ] No. 70868-6-1 en Appellant, ] DIVISION ONE IP

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## ANDYLEEandJANEDOELEE, \ UNPUBLISHED OPINION x^~
husband and wife, and their marital ] community, Respondents. FILED: November 16, 2015 Schindler, J. — Representing himselfpro se, Gene Alfred Palmer II appeals 

### from the adversejury verdict in his personal injuryaction againstAndy Lee. Palmer contends the trialcourt committed evidentiary and instructional error. But for mostof 

### the alleged errors, Palmer has failed to provide a sufficient record for review. And because Palmer's remaining contentions are without merit, we affirm. FACTS 

### Gene Alfred Palmer II filed a complaintfor personal injuries againstAndy Lee 

### following an altercation on May 28, 2010. Palmeralleged that he was riding his bicycle

on NE 50th Street in Seattle when Lee's car struck him. Palmer claims that he was 

### severely injured when Lee got out of his car and repeatedly punched and kicked him.No. 70868-6-1/2 

### Followingthe trial inAugust 2013, thejuryentered a special verdictfinding that any negligence by Lee was not a proximate cause of Palmer's injuries. Palmer appeals.
ANALYSIS Palmerwas represented by an attorney during the trial. Because he is representing himselfpro se on appeal, we must hold him to the same standards as an attorney. See In re Marriage ofOlson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993). A party seeking appellate review has the burden of providing us with all evidence inthe record relevant to the issues before us. RAP 9.2(b); Storv v. Shelter Bay Co.. 52 

### Wn. App. 334, 345, 760 P.2d 368 (1988). Palmer has provided only limited record for review. The partial verbatim report ofproceedings does not contain all ofthe trial 

### testimony, including Palmer's own trialtestimony. Nordoes itcontain closing 

### arguments. Without an adequate trial record, we cannot review challenged evidence and trial court rulings in their propercontext. SeeAllemeierv. Univ. ofWash., 42 Wn. App. 465, 473, 712 P.2d 306 (1985). An insufficient record on appeal generally 

### precludes appellate review. Bulzomi v. Dep't of Labor &Indus., 72 Wn. App. 522, 525, 864 P.2d 996 (1994). 

### In addition, Palmer's briefs fail to comply withvarious provisions of the Rules of Appellate Procedure including RAP 10.3(a)(6). RAP 10.3(a)(6) requires a party to 

### support arguments with "references to relevant parts of the record." The failure to complywith this requirement is not a mere technicality. Anappellate courtwill not 

### search through the record forevidence relevant to a litigant's arguments. See Mills v. Park, 67 Wn.2d 717, 721, 409 P.2d 646 (1966).No. 70868-6-1/3 Proposed Willful Misconduct Jury Instruction Palmer contends that the trial court erred in failing to give a modified version of 6 Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil 14.01, at 177 (6th ed. 2012) (WPI), on willful 

### and wanton misconduct.1 Palmer argues thatthe evidence ofLee's physical assault supported the proposed instruction. Ifthe trial court's refusal to give an instruction is based upon an issue of law, our review is de novo; ifthe court's decision is based upon a factual dispute, we review for

an abuse of discretion. State v. Walker. 136 Wn.2d 767, 771-72, 966 P.2d 883 (1998). But inorderto preserve an instructional errorfor review, a party must objectto the trial 

### court's refusal to give the proposed instruction. See Trueax v. Ernst Home Ctr.. 124 Wn.2d 334, 340-42, 878 P.2d 1208 (1994). CR 51(f) requires thatthe party "state 

### distinctlythe matterto which he objects and the grounds of his objection." A specific objection allows the trial court to rectifyany error before instructing thejury, avoiding the need for a retrial. Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain, Inc., 93 Wn.2d 127, 134, 606 P.2d 1214(1980). 

### After distributing the latest set of jury instructions, the trial court asked counsel: All right. Have counsel had a chance to lookthrough the now numbered instructions? Ireceived the supplemental that you all submitted after courtyesterday. And I've incorporated most ofthem inhere.

1WPI 14.01 provides: [Willful misconduct is the intentional doing of an act which one has a duty to refrain from doing or the intentional failure to do an act which one has the duty to do when he or she [has actual knowledge of the peril that will be created and intentionally fails to avert injury] [or] [actually intends to cause harm].] [Wanton misconduct is the intentional doing of an act which one has a duty to refrain from doing or the intentional failure to do an act which one has a duty to do, in reckless disregard of the consequences and under such surroundingcircumstances and conditions that a reasonable person would know, or should know, that such conduct would, in a high degree ofprobability, result in substantial harm to another.]No. 70868-6-1/4
Ididn't incorporate Plaintiff's new instruction on willfuland wanton for a couple of reasons. One is there's no instruction submitted as to what 

### thejury should do ifthey findwillful wanton. So, it's kind of sitting out there without any ties to anything else and the rest ofthe instructions. So, I did leave that off. 

### The court then asked ifthere were any objections to the court's instructions. 

### Palmer's attorney did not objectto the court's refusal to give the willful misconduct instruction or respond to the court's rationale. Rather, he objected only to the court's refusal to give a proposed instruction on the apportionment ofdamages. Contrary to Palmer's assertions on appeal, the limited record establishes that his attorney raised no objection to the trial court's refusal to give the proposed willful misconduct instruction. Nor has Palmer identified any objection inthe record. We therefore decline to review the alleged instructional error. Witness Testimony by Skype Palmer contends the trial court erred in refusing to permit his "starwitness" to the alleged assault, apparently a University ofWashington professor, to testify by Skype.2 We review the trial court's decision to permitwitnesses to testify by Skype for an abuse ofdiscretion. In re Marriage of Swaka, 179 Wn. App. 549, 553, 319 P.3d 69 (2014); see also CR 43(a)(1) (trial court has discretion to "permittestimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location"). Palmer does not explain why the witness was unavailable and needed to testify 

### by Skype. Palmerdoes not identifythe arguments that he made to the trialcourtorthe trial court's reasons for refusing to permitthe testimony. Nor has Palmer identified any 

### portion ofthe record supporting his claims of error. Palmertherefore fails to

2Skype is a live video chat and long-distance voice calling service.No. 70868-6-1/5 demonstrate any error or abuse ofdiscretion inthe trial court's alleged refusal to permit the witness to testify by Skype. Limitations on the Length of Palmer's Testimony Palmercontends thatthe trial court erred in limiting his direct trial testimony to 68 minutes after he failed to appear in courtfor his scheduled testimony on Monday, August 12, 2013. Palmer asserts that he failed to appear "because his house and the road were cut off from the world by a huge mudslide and the road [was] inaccessible for miles and eventually he and his dog were airlifted out." Palmer argues thatthe restriction violated his right to a fair trial and demonstrated the trial court's bias. On the day of Palmer's scheduled testimony, Monday, August 12, 2013, his 

### attorney informed the trialcourtthat Palmerwas unavailable because he was trapped behind "a major river of mud" in Eastern Washington. During a lengthy discussion, the court and counsel discussed how to rearrange the schedules for the remaining 

### witnesses. On the afternoon ofAugust 12, Palmer's attorney informed the courtthat Palmer had been "airlifted out" and would be incourtthe following morning "at 9." Counsel then informed the trial court that he would need 90 minutes for Palmer's direct testimony. 

### On the morning ofAugust 13, Palmer's counsel toldthe court that he would use only 75 minutes for Palmer's direct testimony. Although Palmerwas late, the court 

### permitted Palmer's direct testimony to continue until 11:00 a.m., which included a lengthy break requested by Palmer's attorney.No. 70868-6-1/6 The limited record before this court indicates that the trial court granted Palmer's 

### counsel essentially all ofthe time he requested for Palmer's directtestimony. Moreover, 

### Palmer has not provided this court with a verbatim report of his trialtestimony. Norhas he identified any portion ofthe record supporting his allegations thatthe trial court was biased or thatthe time allotted for his directtestimony was inadequate. Palmer has therefore failed to identify any error. ER 904 Documents Palmer contends thatthe trial court erred in not admitting medical records and 

### billings that he submitted under ER 904. We review the trial court's evidentiaryruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. Garcia, 179 Wn.2d 828, 846, 318 P.3d 266 (2014). 

### ER 904 provides that certain documents "shall be deemed admissible" ifproperly 

### proposed as exhibits unless the opposing party objectswithin 14 days. ER 904(a), (c). A party need not object on the grounds of relevancyuntil trial. ER904(c)(2). Lee objected to Palmer's ER 904 designation noting, among other things, that Palmerhad notattached the proposed exhibits as required by ER 904(b). The trial 

### courtinformed counsel that in lightof the objections, itwould rule on the admissibility of the exhibits when they were introduced at trial. Palmer has not identified what exhibits he offered at trial, whetherthe trial court 

### admitted or excluded the exhibits, orthe rationale forthe trialcourt's exclusion of any 

### proposedexhibits. Nor has heidentified anyportion oftherecord supporting his allegations oferror andprejudice. Underthecircumstances, we cannotreviewthe alleged error. Hernandezv. Stender, 182Wn. App. 52, 59, P.3d (2014)No. 70868-6-1/7 (appellant's failure to provide relevanttranscript or identify supporting portions ofthe record precluded review of alleged ER 904 error). Admission of Prior Conviction Under ER 609(a)(2) Palmer contends that the trial court erred in admitting his prior conviction for false information by a claimant under ER 609(a)(2). Palmer argues the prejudicial effectof the evidence far outweighed any probative value. Crimes involving "dishonesty or false statement" are per se admissible for impeachment purposes under ER 609(a)(2). See State v. Ray. 116 Wn.2d 531, 545-46, 806 P.2d 1220 (1991). The trial court "does not engage in a balancing ofprobative 

### value against prejudicial effect." State v. Brown, 113 Wn.2d 520, 533, 782 P.2d 1013, 787 P.2d 906 (1989). Crimes ofdishonesty and false statement involve " 'acts ofdeceit, 

### fraud, and cheating, which impinge on one's reputation forhonesty.'" State v. Newton, 109 Wn.2d 69, 84, 743 P.2d 254 (1987) (quoting State v. Thompson, 95 Wn.2d 888, 

### 891, 632 P.2d 50 (1981)). When determining whether a conviction is a crime of 

### dishonesty orfalse statement, "a trial court is limited to examining 'the elements and date of the prior conviction, the type of crime, and the punishment imposed.'" Garcia, 179 Wn.2d at 847 (quoting Newton, 109 Wn.2d at 71). 

### In2011, Palmer pleaded guilty to one count of felony false information by a claimant. RCW 51.48.020(2) provides: 

### Anyperson claiming benefits under this [Industrial Insurance Act, Title 51 RCW], who knowingly gives false information required in any claim or application underthis title shall be guilty of a felony, or gross misdemeanor in accordance with the theft and anticipatory provisions of Title 9A RCW.No. 70868-6-1/8 

### Because false information by a claimant clearly constitutes a crime ofdishonesty, the trialcourtdid not abuse its discretion inadmitting Palmer's conviction for impeachment under ER 609(a)(2). See State v. Hull, 83 Wn. App. 786, 794, 924 P.2d 

### 375 (1996) (theft and labor and industries fraud, RCW 51.48.020(2), are the same offense for doublejeopardy purposes). Subpoena for State Farm Records Palmer contends the trial court erred indenying his post-trial motion for a subpoena for State Farm records. Palmerclaims the subpoenaed records would provide new evidence that Lee engaged in criminal conduct. Palmer has not provided this court with any record ofthe trial court's alleged denial of his motion. Moreover, the motion clearly involves posttrial matters that are outside the scope ofthis court's review. We therefore willnot considerthem. See State

v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (court will not consider matters outside ofthe record). Discrimination During Voir Dire and Violation ofthe Americans with Disabilities Act Palmercontends the trial court discriminated against him; violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; and tainted thejury pool by commenting on his bipolardisorderduring voir dire and trial. But once again, Palmer has not identified the specific portions ofthe record that support these sweeping allegations. Nor has he identified the specific objections that he raised or the specific trial court comments or rulings that he is challenging. We therefore decline to consider his contentions. See Saunders v. Lloyd's of London, 113 Wn.2d 330, 345, 779 P.2d

8No. 70868-6-1/9 

### 249 (1989) (appellate court will decline to consider issues unsupported bycogent legal argument and citation to relevant authority).
Affirmed. 

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WE CONCUR: 

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