PIN : 085143–000

U.S. Army in the Cold War

Bricks, Sand, and Marble

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Construction in the 

Mediterranean and Middle East, 1947–1991

by

Robert P. Grathwol

Donita M. Moorhus

Center of Military History

and

Corps of Engineers

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2009
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Grathwol, Robert P., 1939–

Bricks, sand, and marble : U.S. Army Corps of Engineers construction in 

the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1947–1991 / by Robert P. Grathwol, Donita 

M. Moorhus.

p. cm. — (U.S. Army in the Cold War)

 Includes bibliographical references.

1. United States. Army. Corps of Engineers—History—20th century. 

2. Military engineering—Mediterranean Region—History—20th century. 

3. Military engineering—Middle East—History—20th century. 4. Military 

architecture—Mediterranean Region—History—20th century. 5. Military 

architecture—Middle East—History—20th century. 6. United States—Military 

relations—Mediterranean Region. 7. United States—Military relations—Middle 

East. 8. Mediterranean Region—Military relations—United States. 9. Middle 

East—Military relations—United States. I. Moorhus, Donita M., 1942– II. 

Center of Military History. III. United States. Army. Corps of Engineers. IV. 

Title. V. Series.

 UG23.G69 2009

 358’.22091822—dc22

2009038077

CMH Pub 45–2
iii

Reina J. Pennington

Norwich University

William T. Allison

Georgia Southern University

James J. Carafano

The Heritage Foundation

Brig. Gen. Edward C. Cardon

U.S. Army Command and General

Staff College

Brig. Gen. Patrick Finnegan

U.S. Military Academy

John F. Guilmartin

Ohio State University

Michael S. Neiberg

The University of Southern Mississippi

Mark P. Parillo

Institute for Military History

Larry Stubblefield

Deputy Administrative Assistant to the 

Secretary of the Army

Col. Bobby A. Towery

U.S. Army War College

Lt. Gen. David P. Valcourt

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

Command

Steve Vogel

The Washington Post

Paul M. Wester Jr.

National Archives and Records

Administration

U.S. ARMY IN THE COLD WAR

Richard W. Stewart, General Editor

Advisory Committee

(As of October 2009)

U.S. Army Center of Military History

Jeffrey J. Clarke, Chief of Military History

Chief Historian

Chief, Histories Division

Editor in Chief

Richard W. Stewart

Joel D. Meyerson

Keith R. Tidman

v

Contents

Page

Foreword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

The Authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii

Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix

Part I: The Mediterranean and the Origins of the Cold War. . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter

1. Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Army Engineers in Greece, 1947–1949. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Army Engineers in Turkey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

 U.S. Engineer Group in 1950. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

 Beginning Work. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

 Broadening Military Construction Under the

 U.S. Engineer Group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

 Administrative and Procedural Issues in Turkey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

The Middle East District in Libya and Saudi Arabia, 1950–1951. . . . . 28

 Preliminary Planning and Mobilization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

 Construction in Libya. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

 Construction in Saudi Arabia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

 Administrative Issues at Wheelus and at Dhahran. . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

2. The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Planning for Moroccan Bases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Mobilizing the East Atlantic District. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

 Negotiating New Sites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

 Emergency Construction Underway. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

 Inadequate Funding and Recurring Delays. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Congressional Investigations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Assessing the Moroccan Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
vi

3. Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Organizing the Mediterranean Division. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

 The Middle East District in Libya and Saudi Arabia,1951–1952. . 80

 Converting the Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contract in Morocco. . . . . . . 83

 Transferring Operations in Turkey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

The Mediterranean Division at Mid-Decade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

 Middle East District. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

 New Construction at Asmara. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

 The Mediterranean Division’s Center of Gravity Changes. . . . . . . 93

 Changing Priorities in the Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

 The Trans-East District in Pakistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

 The Gulf District in Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

Relocating the Mediterranean Division to Italy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Part II: The Mediterranean Division in Italy, 1957–1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

4. Headquarters and the Southern District, 1957–1960. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Operating from Livorno. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Southern District, 1957–1960. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

 Waning Activity in North Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Southern District Work in Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Disposing of Surplus Materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

 Closing the Southern District. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

5. The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Trans-East District Construction Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

 Living and Working in Pakistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

 Overhead Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

 Potential Work in Burma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

 Prospects in Saudi Arabia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

 Royal Saudi Air Force Training School in Riyadh. . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

 Deactivating the Trans-East District. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

The Gulf District in Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

 Living Conditions and Support Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

 Managing the Work. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

 Gulf District Projects Under Construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

 Mehrabad and Hamadan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

6. The Gulf District, 1961–1967. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

Work Centered in Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

 Kharg Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

 Construction at Hamadan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

 Regimental Combat Team Installations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Chapter Page
vii

 Gendarmerie and National Police Projects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

 Construction at Mashhad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

 Standards of Design and Construction in Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

The Gulf District Outside Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

 Work in Pakistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

 Burma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

The Gulf District and Saudi Arabia, 1961–1963. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

 Training for the Royal Saudi Air Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

 Repairing the Dhahran Air Terminal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Highways in Afghanistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

 Kandahar-Spin Baldak Highway. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

 Kabul Kandahar Highway. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

 Herat–Islam Qala Highway. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

Declining Workload. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

7. The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

Programs Under Mediterranean Division Management. . . . . . . . . . . . 224

 Troposcatter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

 USAHOME. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

 Support for NATO’s Southern Flank. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

 Somalia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240

New Work in Saudi Arabia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

 Television Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

 Engineer Assistance Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

 Ordnance and Vehicle Support Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262

Relocation to Camp Darby. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

The Mediterranean Division in 1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

8. Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

Waning Operations in the Mediterranean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

NATO Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

Work in North Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

Operations in Saudi Arabia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

 Saudi Arabia District. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281

 Completing the Saudi Television Network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286

 Radio Broadcast Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

 Building Cantonments for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation. . . 294

Khamis Mushayt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

 Tabuk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302

Saudi Arabia Mobility Program, 1967–1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

 First Years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308

 Maintenance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309

 Supply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309

 Training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310

Chapter Page
viii

 The Ordnance Corps Center and School. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311

 Construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312

 Personnel and Funding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315

 Extending the Program, 1969–1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315

The Mediterranean Division in 1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318 

Part III: Army Engineers in Saudi Arabia, 1972–1988. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319

9. New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977. . . . . . . . . . . . 325

The Burgeoning Workload. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

Continuing Work, 1972–1975. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

 The Saudi Ordnance Corps Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328

 Questions Concerning the Role of the Corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332

 Cantonments at Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334

 Third Cantonment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334

 New Medical Center and General Hospital for

the Ministry of Defense and Aviation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336

 Other Projects for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation. . . . . . . . 337

 Funding the Projects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339

 Emergency Water System Repair in Jiddah. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340

Transition to the Middle East Division. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341

 Handling the Growing Volume of Materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342

Staffing for the Expanding Workload. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344

 Reorganizing Engineering Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

Implementing the Move to Saudi Arabia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349

 Locating the Division Rear in Virginia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349

 New Staff in Berryville. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351

The Middle East Division’s Initial Years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355

 New Districts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357

 Engineer Logistics Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358

10. Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation in the

1970s and 1980s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363

Upgrading Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364

 Medical Support Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366

 Schools. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368

Area Commander’s Headquarters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372

VIP Complexes and Family Housing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372

Providing the Infrastructure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374

Closing Out the Projects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376

 Peace Hawk and Peace Sun. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379

Headquarters Complexes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384

Royal Saudi Air Force Headquarters Complex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385

Ministry of Defense and Aviation Headquarters Complex. . . . . . . 387

Chapter Page
ix

Executive Office Building. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387

Design and Construction of the Headquarters Complex. . . . . 388

Officers Club in Riyadh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391

Designing Medical Centers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394

11. Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard. . . . . . 399

Saudi Naval Expansion Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399

 Initiating the Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400

 Ports at Jiddah and Jubayl. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401

 Headquarters of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411

 Naval Program Constrained. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413

Modernizing the Saudi Arabian National Guard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418

 Design Phase. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420

 Headquarters Complex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420

 Military Cities at Al Qasim and Al Hasa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423

 Construction Phase. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430

Training Facilities at Khashm al An. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430

Request for a Camel Racetrack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431

Building the Headquarters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434

Ground Settlement Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439

12. King Abdulaziz Military Academy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445

Beginning Construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447

Procuring Equipment, Furniture, and Furnishings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449

Getting the Program on Track, 1981–1983. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451

Completing the Academy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454

13. King Khalid Military City. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465

New Master Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465

Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contracting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468

 Preparing a Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contract. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470

 Finding the Right Contractor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473

 Progress at Ras al Mishab. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474

Organizing for the Construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476

 Mobilization of the Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia Consortium. . . 477

 Responsibilities of the Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia

 Consortium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479

Life Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479

Construction Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482

Management Assistance and Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489

Supervising the Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia Consortium. . . . 489

Controversy Over Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490

 CS-Squared. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490

 Tensions Over Management Decisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492

Chapter Page
x

 Implications for Progress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 494

 Network Analysis System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 495

 Shortcomings of the Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia

Consortium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496

 Allegations of Corruption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497

Ending the Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contract. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498

Completing King Khalid Military City. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 502

 Packaging Construction Tasks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503

 Pace of Construction, 1981–1983. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504

 Facing Crises in Funding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509

 Completing First Brigade Facilities, 1984. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511

Part IV: Changing Geopolitics in the Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513

New U.S. Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513

 Adjusting the Work in Saudi Arabia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514

 Iran-Iraq War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515

Collapse of Bipolar Geopolitics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516

Iraq’s Attack on Kuwait. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517

14. Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519

The Middle East Division in the Region. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519

 Jordan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 520

 Oman. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525

Design for the Oman Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 528

Masirah Island Construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 529

Khasab. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 532

Seeb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 533

 Thamarit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 536

Program Status in Oman by the Mid-1980s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538

 Kuwait. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539

 Bahrain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541

 Egypt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 543

 Sudan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553

 Other Occasional Work. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555

Refocusing the Organization, 1981–1986. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557

 Extending the Engineer Assistance Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557

 Adjusting Staff Size. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 558

 Managing Work from Forward and Rear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560

 Relocating Command Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563

15. From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991. . . . 567

Transition to the Middle East/Africa Projects Office. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 567

 Arguments for Division Status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569

Chapter Page
xi

 Status of Projects in December 1985. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572

 Adjusting to a New Entity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 575

 Ordnance Program Division. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 577

Closing Out the Saudi Program Under the Middle East/Africa

Projects Office. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581

Projects Throughout the Region. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 582

 Oman. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 582

 Kuwait. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584

 Bahrain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585

 Egypt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 588

 Sudan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 593

 Voice of America. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595

 Africa Civic Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600

Department of Defense Dependent Schools. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 605

Status at the End of the Decade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 608

Major Administrative Actions, 1986–1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 610

Lifecycle Project Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 610

Rethinking the Future of the Middle East/Africa Projects Office. . . 614

International Events Intervene. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 616

Transatlantic Division. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 617

Tying Up Loose Ends. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 618

Coming Full Circle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 619

Conclusion: Army Engineers Overseas: Challenges, Opportunities,

and Changing Times. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 621

Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 629

Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 639

Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 645

Tables

No.

1. Personnel Engaged in Turkish Air-Base Construction Program. . . . . . . . . . 28

2. Personnel Employed in Wheelus Air Base Construction Program,

1 September 1951. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

3. Personnel Employed in Construction Program at Dhahran, September 1951. . . 40

4. Mediterranean Division Personnel, 1 September 1957. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

5. Mediterranean Division, Contractor Safety and Accident Record,

1952–1960. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

6. Design Firms Contracting with Southern District, 1957–1960. . . . . . . . . . 132

Page
xii

7. Trans-East District Project Status, 31 August 1960. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

8. Staff Strength, Trans-East District’s Final Months. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

9. Mediterranean Division Actual Construction Progress by Location,

Fiscal Years 1967–1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

10. Mediterranean Division Personnel, End of Fiscal Year Strength. . . . . . . . . 318

11. Al Batin District Active Construction Contracts, 1 December 1980. . . . . . 494

12. Middle East Division Customers, December 1985. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 573

13. Sample of Projects Under the Africa Civic Action Program. . . . . . . . . . . . 606

14. Annual Funding for Africa Civic Action Program,

Fiscal Years 1985–1990. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 607

15. MEAPO Program Project Cost Estimates, June 1990. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 608

Maps

1. Mediterranean Sea, 1946. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2. Reconstruction Program: Greece, 1947–1949. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

3. The U.S. Engineer Group (TUSEG): Turkey, 1950s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

4. Middle East District: Libya, 1956. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

5. Middle East District: Saudi Arabia, 1950s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

6. Moroccan Air Base Program: Morocco, 1952–1957. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

7. Ethiopia, 1956. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

8. Trans-East and Gulf Districts, Military Assistance and ICA/AID

Program: Pakistan, 1956–1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

9. Gulf District Construction Program: Iran, 1957. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

10. Mediterranean Division Area of Responsibility, 1958. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

11. Southern District Construction Program: Italy, 1957–1960. . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

12. Burma, 1960. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

13. Gulf District Construction Program: Iran, 1958–1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

14. Overseas Internal Security Program, Gulf District: Iran, 1957–1962. . . . . 192

15. Surplus Commodity Housing Program, Gulf District: Iran, 1960s. . . . . . . 194

16. Gulf District Military Assistance and AID Program: Saudi Arabia, 

1957–1964. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

17. Gulf District Highway Construction Programs: Afghanistan,

1960–1967. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

18. Mediterranean Division Port Work: Somalia, 1960s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

19. Saudi Arabia Area Office Work for Ministry of Information, 1963–1975. . . 253

20. Saudi Arabia District, Saudi Arabia Mobility Program (SAMP),

1960s–1970s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311

21. U.S. Army Engineer Division, Middle East District, 1977. . . . . . . . . . . . . 356

22. Middle East Division Design and Construction Program:

Saudi Arabia, 1970s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364

23. Middle East Division Military Construction for Foreign Governments: 

Persian Gulf Area, 1980s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 520

No. Page
xiii

24. Middle East Division: Egypt, 1980–1990s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545

25. Middle East Division: Sudan, 1980s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554

Illustrations

Reconstruction of the breakwater in Volos Harbor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Corinth Canal under excavation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Gorgopotamos Bridge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Construction of a drainage culvert, Wheelus Air Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Communications center under construction at Wheelus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Family housing under construction at Wheelus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Reservoir under construction at the Nouasser airfield. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Six-plane hangar at Nouasser. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Armaments and electronics shop at the Benguérir air base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Elevated water tower at Benguérir. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Power plant at the Sidi Slimane air base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Vice President and Mrs. Richard M. Nixon in Morocco. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Mediterranean Division commander’s quarters at the Nouasser air base. . . . . . 70

Fighter planes flying over camels in Morocco. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Maj. Gen. Emerson C. Itschner observing construction at Nouasser. . . . . . . . . 78

Aerial view of Wheelus Air Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Aerial view of the Dhahran airfield. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Cooling towers under construction at the Dhahran airfield. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Concrete blocks drying at the Dhahran airfield. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Local laborers at Kagnew Station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Worker housing at Kharian. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Workers using animals to carry materials to construction sites. . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Young boys employed in making bricks at Dezful. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

General Itschner addressing employees at Tripoli. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Palazzo Grande, Livorno. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

Local laborers in Pakistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Post exchange at Kagnew Station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Storage igloo under construction at the Sidi Slimane air base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Surplus commodity housing under construction at Sidi Slimane. . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Mess hall and barracks in Vicenza. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Concrete roof under construction for the Air Force, San Vito. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Batch plant for construction at Sigonella Naval Station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

Fire station constructed at Brindisi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

Ammunition storage in Karachi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Using donkeys to move bricks at the Kharian cantonment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

Site plan for the Multan cantonment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Multan Residency Office. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

Dhahran Civil Air Terminal under construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

Interior of Dhahran Civil Air Terminal under construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

No. Page
xiv

Corps of Engineers employees at Naqadeh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

Officers quarters under construction at Naqadeh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Bricks drying at the Dezful depot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

Buildings under construction at Behshahr, Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Breakwater under construction at Kharg Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

Rock-screening plant at Kharg Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Steel framing for officer quarters at Kharg Island. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

Recompaction during construction of Hamadan Airfield. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

Panoramic view of construction at Quchan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

Noncommissioned officers quarters under construction at Quchan. . . . . . . . . . 191

New apartment construction at Naziabad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

Construction of highway in Afghanistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

Laying asphalt for highway in Afghanistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Culverts constructed for the Afghan highway. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

Malta resident office. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

Construction for Troposcatter system on Malta. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

Troposcatter site in Brindisi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Monitor station for long-range navigation, Cagliari. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

USAHOMEs constructed in Asmara. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

USAHOME apartment construction in Brindisi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

Airmen’s dormitory under construction at Cigli Air Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

Workmen laying floor tiles at Asmara. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

Administration and supply buildings at Kagnew Station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

Chisimayu Port construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

Reviewing the contract for the Saudi Arabia Mobility Program. . . . . . . . . . . . 265

Mediterranean Division offices at Camp Darby. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266

Resident office in Karamursel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

Asphalt paving in a housing area in Karamursel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

Saudi Arabia District Office, Jiddah. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282

Mediterranean Division aircraft. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

Television studio building in Dammam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288

Jamil Hujaylan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

Mosque under construction at Khamis Mushayt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299

Site plan for VIP complex at the Tabuk cantonment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

Prince Sultan at groundbreaking ceremony, Tabuk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305

Saudi Arabia Mobility Program training complex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314

Saudi Arabia District Office, Riyadh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329

District engineer’s quarters in Riyadh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330

Bachelor officers quarters, Taif. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331

Silos at Ras al Mishab. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343

Division rear echelon in Mt. Weather, Virginia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351

Corps employees having a traditional Middle Eastern dinner. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355

New headquarters for the Riyadh District. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358

Page
xv

Col. Ray Williamson at Riyadh District headquarters dedication. . . . . . . . . . . 359

Housing built in Riyadh for lieutenants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361

Concrete batch plant at Khamis Mushayt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365

Sand mining for construction at Khamis Mushayt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366

Outpatient clinic at Khamis Mushayt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367

Swimming pool at Khamis Mushayt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368

Mosque at the Airborne and Physical Training School, Tabuk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370

Solar panels, Tabuk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371

VIP villa at Khamis Mushayt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374

Construction for Peace Hawk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381

Construction of a potable-water tank, Riyadh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382

Model of the Royal Saudi Air Force headquarters, Riyadh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386

Headquarters, Ministry of Defense and Aviation, Riyadh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391

Ministry of Defense and Aviation officers club, Riyadh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393

Placing a beam for the wharf at Jiddah. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402

Cutterhead dredge at Jiddah. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403

Syncrolift in operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406

Pier piles at King Abdulaziz Naval Base, Jubayl. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410

Residence for the commander of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . 413

Geodesic dome at the Saudi Naval Expansion Program headquarters. . . . . . . . 417

Construction using precast concrete. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427

Briefing for Prince Abdullah. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436

Prince Abdullah touring construction site. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437

Model of the Saudi Arabian National Guard headquarters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 440

Sunshades at a Saudi Arabian National Guard facility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442

Construction at King Abdulaziz Military Academy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451

Utility trench excavation at King Abdulaziz Military Academy. . . . . . . . . . . . 452

Precast concrete panels at King Abdulaziz Military Academy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456

Crane used for construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457

Library, King Abdulaziz Military Academy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458

Parade ground, King Abdulaziz Military Academy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460

Mosque at King Abdulaziz Military Academy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461

Settlement problems at King Abdulaziz Military Academy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462

Model of King Khalid Military City. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467

Children of Corps employees attending school. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480

Mobilization housing at King Khalid Military City. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481

Mobilization camp at King Khalid Military City. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482

King’s villa and compound at King Khalid Military City. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483

VIP villa at King Khalid Military City. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483

Rock crusher at Hafar al Batin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484

Generator turbines at Hafar al Batin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485

Precast concrete stacked for storage at Hafar al Batin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486

Lifts for moving precast concrete from storage to trucks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487

Page
xvi

Test house built at Hafar al Batin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488

Bachelor enlisted quarters at King Khalid Military City. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503

Centrum under construction at King Khalid Military City. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505

Completed centrum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507

Mosque at King Khalid Military City. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 508

Armor-rebuild facility in Jordan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 523

Corps of Engineers villa in Muscat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527

Site plan for Masirah Air Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 531

Truck arriving on Masirah Island by boat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 532

Aircraft shelters at Masirah. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 533

Mobilization camp at Khasab. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534

Plan for Khasab Airfield. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 535

Khasab Airfield. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 536

Aircraft shelter at Thamarit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537

Ammunition storage igloos at Thamarit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538

Biomedical research lab in Cairo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546

Egypt Area Office. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550

Housing built in Liberia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 575

Bahrain Resident Office. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 586

Shaikh Isa Air Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587

Corps employee with Egyptian military members. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590

Maintenance facility near completion in Sudan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 594

Voice of America site in Morocco. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 597

Old pier in Gambia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600

Construction workers at Camp du Kassai Bridge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 601

Project site in Kenya. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 603

Foundation wall for medical center in Malawi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 604

Illustrations courtesy of the following: pp. 12, 14, 16, 35, 36, 38, 52, 53, 63, 64, 65, 

67, 70, 76, 78, 81, 82, 89, 92, 93, 102, 103, 110, 112, 118, 126, 131, 134, 135, 137, 

144, 148, 150, 151, 152, 166, 178, 179, 180, 181, 214, 216, 230, 232, 248, 265, 

271, Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; 139, 140, 

165, 184, 185, 186, 187, 190, 191, 196, 208, 225, 228, 229, 230, 232, 233, 235, 

239, 242, 266, 270, 282, 284, 288, 289, 303, 305, 314, 329, 330, 331, 343, 355, 

359, 436, 467, Records Holding Area, Transatlantic Programs Center; 299, 351, 

358, 361, 365, 366, 367, 368, 370, 371, 374, 381, 382, 386, 391, 393, 402, 403, 

406, 407, 410, 413, 417, 427, 437, 440, 442, 451, 452, 456, 457, 458, 460, 461, 

462, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 503, 505, 507, 508, 523, 527, 

531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 550, 575, 586, 587, 590, 594, 597, 600, 

601, 603, 604, Public Affairs Office, Transatlantic Programs Center; 546, Haines 

Lundberg Waehler Architects.

Page
xvii

Foreword

For more than four decades after the end of World War II in 1945, the security 

interests of the United States focused on tensions with the Soviet Union. The 

contest, which became known in 1948 as the Cold War, pitted two fundamentally 

opposed ideologies and political systems against one another across the so-called 

Iron Curtain in Europe.

As tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union mounted, the 

United States increased its overseas military presence. The North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO), established in 1949, created an alliance led by the United 

States for the mutual defense of Western Europe. NATO embodied the two foreign 

policy cornerstones of the United States—deterrence and containment of Soviet 

expansion of influence and control.

The attack in June 1950 by North Korea on its neighbor, South Korea, prompted 

the United States to extend its policy of geographic containment of Soviet ambitions. 

Through negotiations with several Mediterranean countries, the United States 

established air bases that placed U.S. military aircraft in position to strike the Soviet 

Union should any conflict of arms threaten world stability.

This history examines the work of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in military 

construction in the Mediterranean Basin (including northern and northeastern Africa) 

and the Middle East, which created the infrastructure that made the policies of 

deterrence and containment possible. This work included not only construction in 

support of the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force in these areas but also work executed 

on behalf of our Middle East allies paid for with funds they provided. A remarkable 

story in its own right, the history becomes even more important, given events in the 

region since 1990, by providing a background understanding of the present role and 

position of the United States in that vital region.

This is the second volume in the U.S. Army Center of Military History’s series 

U.S. Army in the Cold War. It is a companion study to the first volume in the series, 

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991, also written by 

Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhus.

ROBERT L. VAN ANTWERP DR. JEFFREY J. CLARKE

Lieutenant General, USA Chief of Military History

Chief of Engineers
xviii

The Authors

In 1988, Robert P. Grathwol, Ph.D., and Donita M. Moorhus formed a 

partnership to conduct historical research and provide services in organizational 

development. They are coauthors of Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in 

Europe, 1945–1991 (2005); Berlin and the American Military, A Cold War Chronicle

(1999); American Forces in Berlin, Outpost of the Cold War, 1945–1994 (1995); and 

Oral History and Postwar German-American Relations: Resources in the United 

States (1997, with Douglas J. Wilson). 

Grathwol has more than four decades of experience as a professional historian 

and publishing scholar. He has worked extensively with archival documents in 

Europe, as well as in the National Archives, federal records centers, and the Library 

of Congress. He taught twentieth century European history at Washington State 

University, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Virginia 

Polytechnic Institute and State University, and the University of Arkansas. Academic 

publications include Stresemann and the DNVP and numerous scholarly articles 

and book reviews in both English and German. Grathwol studied in France on a 

Fulbright Scholarship and spent two years as an Alexander von Humboldt Foundation 

Research Fellow in Germany. He holds a Diplôme Supérieur from the Centre 

des Hautes Études Européennes, Université de Strasbourg, and a Ph.D. from the 

University of Chicago.

Donita Moorhus is an oral historian, researcher, and writer. In addition to 

managing historical research projects, she has written historical reports on the activities in Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1988–1992 and 1992–1996. 

For the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, she was coauthor of “Annual 

Historical Review, Fiscal Years 1990–1991,” principal author of “Annual Historical 

Review, Fiscal Years 1992 through 1995,” and sole author of a “Historical Report 

of the Investigations of Sexual Misconduct in the Army, September 1996 through 

July 1997,” “Annual Historical Review, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2005,” “Annual 

Historical Review, Fiscal Year 2006,” and “Annual Historical Review Fiscal Year 

2007.” Ms. Moorhus has conducted oral history interviews with officers of the U.S. 

military, civilians in government service, members of Congress, business leaders, 

foreign nationals, journalists, senior scientists, artists, and museum administrators. 

She has an M.S. from Fordham University.
xix

Preface

This book traces the activities of American military engineers in the 

Mediterranean and Middle East from the reconstruction that began in Greece after 

the end of the war in 1945, through the construction of air bases in North Africa, 

the massive building program in Saudi Arabia, and support for the liberation of 

Kuwait in 1991. Numerous civilian and military engineers who participated in the 

programs described here suggested a written history. 

Two historians at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Office of History, Dr. 

William C. Baldwin and Dr. Paul Walker, initiated the project that led to this 

book. Col. Leon Yourtee, commander of the Transatlantic Division, successor to 

the Mediterranean Division, the Middle East Division, and the Middle East/Africa 

Projects Office, approved funds for the project in 1993. Yourtee died unexpectedly 

before the division awarded the contract. During the preparation of the draft manuscript, which we submitted in 1998, the division had three commanders, Col. Charles 

S. “Stoney” Cox, Col. Anthony V. Nida, and Col. Donald T. “Tim” Wynn. 

Dr. Baldwin administered the contract and provided critical assistance and 

support. He helped locate documents and photographs, suggested interviewees, 

monitored our progress, read all drafts of each chapter, chided us about using passive 

voice, and caught inconsistencies in the text. He advised us about graphic material 

and arranged a much-needed extension of the time period specified by the original 

contract. In addition to attending every meeting of the History Committee, he met 

with us frequently at the Humphreys Engineer Center near Fort Belvoir—guiding, 

encouraging, and prodding. When the Corps of Engineers was unable to print the 

manuscript, he continued to champion the project and ultimately persuaded the U.S. 

Army Center of Military History to publish it. Dr. Baldwin died in August 2009 

after a short illness. We deeply regret that he will not see the finished book. 

We were fortunate to have support from many people in the Transatlantic 

Division headquarters in Winchester, Virginia. Paul Rosensteel, the executive 

assistant, and Ruby Pierce and Judy DeCristofaro, secretaries in the executive office, 

provided good advice as well as access to the command leaders. The information 

management specialist, Elizabeth “Libby” Stearn, guided us through the thousands 

of boxes in the Records Holding Area. Joan Kibler and her staff in the Public 

Affairs Office provided both materials and visibility for the project. Others in the 

headquarters set up interviews, configured the computers, taught us the quirks of 

the copy machines, and negotiated a succession of security systems to ensure that 
xx

we had access to the records. Ms. Kibler in particular continued to advocate for 

publication of the history in the decade after we completed the manuscript.

The History Committee of the Transatlantic Division participated actively in the 

project. Committee members suggested people for oral history interviews, tracked 

down additional documents, caught typographical errors, and offered encouraging 

words. The deputy commander, Lt. Col. Nicholas “Nick” Kolar, enthusiastically read 

the draft chapters and presided over meetings of the History Committee. Committee 

members, including Bruce Anderson, Ron Friestad, Larry Graham, Wayne Henry, 

Mike Keller, Joan Kibler, Ollie Werner, and Dick Wiles, reviewed each chapter. 

The manuscript benefited enormously from their attention to detail. 

We are particularly grateful to the dozens of current and former employees 

of the Corps of Engineers and its contractors for their willingness to share their 

experiences with us through oral history interviews. Without exception, they were 

proud to have been a part of the overseas mission of the Corps of Engineers. Their 

words enabled us to understand unusual situations and working conditions as well 

as the work they did. Several people provided photographs, slides, documents, and 

artifacts. The bibliography lists all of the people interviewed. 

Dr. Paul Walker, chief of the Office of History during the research and writing, 

and Dr. John Lonnquest, chief of the Office of History at the time of publication, 

were unfailingly supportive. Dr. Martin Gordon, archivist in the Office of History, 

facilitated our search for documents both in the Research Collections at the 

Humphreys Engineer Center and at Washington National Records Center (WNRC) 

in Suitland, Maryland. Jean Diaz and the late Marilyn Hunter offered editorial 

advice and suggestions. 

Four individuals—Douglas J. Wilson, Ruth Heller, Chadwick Fleming, and Eileen 

O’Pray—provided help during the research and writing phase of almost five years. 

Doug worked with us for the duration of the project. He sorted and copied hundreds 

of documents from the Records Holding Area in Winchester, Virginia; set up the 

bibliographies; abstracted pertinent information; transcribed all of the oral history 

interviews; and drafted sections of chapters 11, 14, and 15. Ruth and Chad sorted 

and copied documents in dusty boxes at the WNRC in Suitland and at the Corps of 

Engineers Research Collections in Alexandria, Virginia. Chad also prepared a draft 

section of chapter 11. Eileen assembled a basic bibliography of secondary sources on 

the Middle East, culled relevant information and colorful descriptions from dozens of 

oral history interviews, and recommended photographs and maps from among scores 

we assembled. Ten years after completion of the manuscript, Doug helped prepare 

the manuscript for publication. Joan Kibler at the Transatlantic Programs Center, 

successor to the Transatlantic Division, provided slides taken in the 1980s and early 

1990s of the division’s work in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, and Egypt.

Staff at the U.S. Army Center of Military History under the leadership of Keith 

R. Tidman, Beth MacKenzie, and Diane Sedore Arms guided the manuscript to 

publication. Diane M. Donovan carefully reviewed the text, clarified ambiguous 

language, and made certain that we explained all terms. S. L. Dowdy prepared the 

maps; and Gene Snyder designed the layout of the text, maps, and illustrations.
xxi

Conventions for transliterating geographical names change. The Center of 

Military History uses as its authority for publications the designations provided 

by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names. The documents we consulted and the 

interviewees who spoke with us during our research used slightly different place 

names than those referenced in this book. In all but a few cases, the similarities 

are clear enough that no confusion should arise for anyone consulting our original 

sources.

This project has expanded our understanding of the people, the geography, and 

the history of more than a dozen countries in the Mediterranean, Africa, and the 

Middle East. We hope this book conveys through words, maps, and photographs 

our fascination with the projects we describe and our appreciation of the people 

who built them. 

30 September 2009 Robert P. Grathwol

Donita M. Moorhus

Bricks, Sand, and Marble

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Construction in the 

Mediterranean and Middle East, 1947–1991

The Mediterranean and the Origins of the Cold War 1

In the late 1940s, the United States adopted the complementary policies of 

containment and deterrence—containing the Soviet Union and world communism 

and deterring military attack by positioning nuclear weapons within airstrike 

distances of virtually any point on the globe. As part of its military strategy, 

between 1947 and 1958, the United States constructed a necklace of air bases that 

extended around the world. The chain included bases in the Caribbean, Greenland, 

Iceland, western and southern Europe, Morocco, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, 

Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, and back to the North 

American continent across Canada. The bases provided advantageous positions 

for U.S. military aircraft armed with atomic weapons.

U.S. Army engineers went to the Mediterranean and the Middle East in the late 

1940s and early 1950s to construct one strand of the necklace. There, they created 

an organization that continues to operate in the region today. They designed and 

constructed much more than airfields, but the origins of their organization trace 

to that work and date from the beginnings of the Cold War.

The geography of the Mediterranean Sea determines its historic strategic 

importance: It links the continents of Europe, Africa, and Asia. At its western end, 

the Mediterranean connects with the Atlantic Ocean through the Straits of Gibraltar, 

which the British have fortified and controlled since 1704. The northern waters of 

the Mediterranean wash the shores of Spain, France, Italy, the Balkan countries, 

Greece, and Turkey. (See Map 1.) At Istanbul, the Mediterranean connects with 

the Black Sea and Russia through the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the 

Bosporus. To the southeast, the Suez Canal ties the Mediterranean to the Red Sea 

and the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian Ocean, and the Far East. The Mediterranean’s 

southern shore encompasses the entire north coast of Africa.

The global scope of World War II destroyed the Eurocentric balance of 

power that had characterized world affairs for nearly two centuries. The rise of 

Germany as an aspirant to world power in the late nineteenth century had thrown 

the existing system into disarray. World War II completed the rupture of that 

system, leaving Germany and Japan defeated and Britain and France exhausted. 

Only two states emerged from the war with their positions enhanced: the Soviet 

Union and the United States of America. Both were extra-European powers, and 

both had interests and ambitions that reached around the globe. The collapse of 

the old system was not fully evident when the war ended in 1945. Neither was 

PART I

The Mediterranean and the 

Origins of the Cold War
2 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

it evident what system would replace the multipolar balance of power that the 

European states had dominated. 

For a short time after 1945, the U.S. government and the American people believed 

that an ordered world would be achieved in cooperation with their wartime allies: Britain, 

France, and the Soviet Union. Within months, conflicts arose among these nations as 

the Soviet Union sought to use its military triumph to influence and control adjacent 

territories. Prompted by the actions of the Soviet Union, Britain’s wartime prime minister, 

Winston Churchill, speaking in Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946, sounded an alarm. 

Using the ringing rhetoric that had strengthened the resolve of his compatriots when 

they stood alone against Hitler, Churchill declaimed: 

M E D

I

T

E

R

R

A

T L A

N

T I C

O

C

E

A

N

Sicily

S a rdini a

Corsic a

MORO CCO

FRENC H

W EST AFRIC A

S P A NISH

SAHAR A

S P ANISH

MORO CCO

INTERNATIONAL

ZONE

IFNI A L G ERIA

TUNISIA

I T A L Y

SWITZERLAND

ANDORR A

A USTRIA 

FRANCE

S P AIN

P O R T U G A L

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

1946

Map 1
The Mediterranean and the Origins of the Cold War 3

Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization 

intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and 

proselytizing tendencies. But the facts about the present situation in Europe are clear. 

From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended 

across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of central 

and eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and 

Sofia, all these famous cities, and the populations around them lie in what I must call the 

Soviet Sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but 

to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow. . . .

Turkey and Persia [Iran] are both profoundly alarmed and disturbed at the claims 

which are being made upon them and at the pressure being exerted by the Moscow 

government.

R

A

N

E

A

N

S E A

B L A C K S E A

R E D

S

E A

Crete

LIB Y A

EGYPT

YUGOSLA V I A

ROM ANIA

BUL GARIA

A HUNGAR Y

ALBANI A

GREECE

T URKE Y

UNION OF

SOVIE T SOCIALIST

REPUBLICS

SYRIA

I R A Q PALESTINE

LEBANO N

CYPRU S

S A UDI ARABIA

J O

R

D A N
4 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Churchill extended his analysis to the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern 

realms by including Turkey and Iran. Although these countries were not cut off in 

the same way by the soon-famous Iron Curtain, Churchill surely saw their potential 

incorporation into a Soviet sphere, a development that represented a threat to 

the West. He concluded his speech by calling for an alliance of strength among 

English-speaking peoples to remove from the Soviet Union any “temptation to 

ambition and adventure.”1

The ambition and adventure that Churchill described seemed borne out by the 

course of events. As the Red Army advanced near the end of the war and occupied all 

the states of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Communist Party installed local Communists in 

positions of power; between 1946 and 1948, they came to control key government offices 

throughout the region. The Soviet Union also applied its influence to the south. From 

Turkey, the Soviet Union sought freer passage for its warships from the Black Sea into 

the Mediterranean. In Iran, the clash involved both political and economic issues. First, 

near the end of the war, the Soviet Union sponsored a separatist movement in Azerbaijan 

that threatened to remove that province from the control of the Iranian government. 

Second, the Soviet government demanded concessions relating to Iran’s rich petroleum 

resources such as Iran had granted to Britain and the United States during the war. 

Traditionally, Britain had balanced Russian interests in the Middle East; but 

the war had undercut its ability to continue this role. By war’s end, Britain had lost 

two-thirds of its sales from exports, one-fourth of its merchant marine, one-half of its 

investments overseas, and one-fourth of its financial reserves. As the crises involving 

Soviet pressure on Turkey and Iran unfolded, it became apparent that Britain was no 

longer a match for the Soviet Union in the Middle East. In April 1946, the United 

States stepped in directly by sending the battleship USS Missouri to the waters off 

Turkey. As the crisis continued into the autumn, President Harry S. Truman ordered 

the aircraft carrier USS Franklin D. Roosevelt, four cruisers, and a flotilla of destroyers 

to the eastern Mediterranean. In the case of Iran, the United States crafted a diplomatic 

settlement in the United Nations (UN) that induced the Soviet Union to withdraw 

support from the separatist movement in Azerbaijan on the prospect (never fulfilled) 

of receiving Iranian oil concessions. In the absence of any other balancing force in the 

Middle East, only action by the United States could block Soviet expansion.

A crisis in Greece precipitated a new policy and a formal extension of American 

power into the Mediterranean. During World War II, two rival factions—a Marxist 

guerrilla movement and a pro-West group sympathetic to the British—had vied 

for control of Greece. The two groups clashed openly near the end of the war, but 

Britain managed to put down the Communist-led insurrection. In February 1945, 

the Communist faction accepted an amnesty and Greece formed a non-Communist 

government. In 1946, the Communists rejected the results of a national plebiscite 

that restored the Greek monarchy. From mountain bases in the north, they reopened 

the civil war. Communist insurgents received material support and safe haven from 

1 Churchill speech quoted at length in Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold 

War, 1945–1950 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1970), pp. 76–78.
The Mediterranean and the Origins of the Cold War 5

the Balkan states Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania, which were Communist at 

that time. 

Because the governments of the three Balkan states shared the Communist 

ideology with the Soviet Union, the civil war in Greece appeared to be a provocation 

and a further extension of Soviet influence. The struggle occurred contemporaneously 

with—and seemed to parallel—the progressive extension of the Soviet Union’s 

domination over Eastern Europe. Western statesmen saw in the two developments a 

combination of a Communist commitment to international revolution and the traditional Russian policy of controlling bordering states to ensure its own security.

It appeared by the end of 1946 that only resolute action would prevent the Iron 

Curtain of Churchill’s oratory from extending deep into the Mediterranean and the 

Middle East. On its own, Britain could no longer counterbalance Soviet expansion in 

the eastern Mediterranean. The Greek civil war drove home to the political leadership 

in Britain the full extent of the nation’s exhaustion. In February 1947, the British 

government delivered to the United States a secret communiqué asserting that it 

could no longer sustain the pro-West faction in Greece. On 3 March, the Greek 

government formally requested American assistance.2

American policymakers feared that a British withdrawal of support would ensure 

a victory for the Communist forces in Greece and that the momentum of success 

would threaten the pro-West governments in Turkey and Iran. Before a joint session 

of Congress on 12 March 1947, President Truman enunciated a new policy to meet 

the crisis and to counter Soviet ambitions. He outlined an American commitment to 

help any free peoples defend against internally or externally sponsored aggression. 

The president specifically asked Congress to approve emergency foreign aid for both 

Greece ($300 million) and Turkey ($100 million) so they could resist the pressures 

that threatened their sovereignty. In vivid terms, he described the aid as part of a 

global struggle “between alternate ways of life.” One system functioned by the will 

of the majority expressed through free institutions, the other was driven by the will 

of a minority wielding terror and oppression to maintain control. “If we falter in 

our leadership,” Truman added, “we may endanger the peace of the world—and 

we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.”3

 Eight months later, the 

National Security Council, established by the National Security Act of 1947, adopted 

a policy statement asserting that “the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of 

the Middle East is vital to the security of the United States. . . . The security of the 

whole Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East would be jeopardized if the Soviet 

Union should succeed in its efforts to obtain control of any one of the following 

countries: Italy, Greece, Turkey, or Iran.”4

This policy, the Truman Doctrine, became the cornerstone of a new American 

foreign policy to contain the expansion of Soviet influence. It combined diplomacy 

2 Charles H. Donnelly, United States Defense Policies Since World War II (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 14. 3 Truman speech extensively quoted in Feis, From Trust to Terror, pp. 192–95. 4 Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

National Policy, 1947–1949 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Joint History, 1996), p. 16. 
6 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

with economic and military aid for American allies to counterpoise the ultimate 

threat of American military intervention to protect the interests of the United States 

in the region. The Truman Doctrine expressed what became known as the policy 

of containment.

Truman’s speech presented a fundamental conviction that had developed in 

U.S. policy-making circles since 1945: The Soviet Union sought expansion beyond 

its own borders. It made little difference whether this arose to satisfy Soviet needs 

for security, for reasons of its Marxist ideology of international revolution, for 

national aggrandizement, or out of motives of power politics. Even if the Soviet 

Union’s tactics shifted from confrontation to infiltration and subversion, the threat to 

freedom and open world markets remained. The Truman administration concluded 

that the Soviet Union would use every means short of war to achieve its objectives.5

Tensions between the two countries and ideologies became known as the Cold War. 

The rhetoric of Truman’s speech set the tone for American foreign policy over the 

next five decades.6

Events over the following two years reinforced the image of two systems 

clashing for power and influence. In June 1947, U.S. Secretary of State George 

C. Marshall sketched his plan to extend American aid to the countries of Europe 

still recovering from the devastation of the recent war. The West European states 

accepted the terms of the Marshall Plan. The East European states, under pressure 

from the Soviet Union, declined to participate. 

During 1948, the attempts of the wartime allies to cooperate in Germany, never 

very successful, broke down completely. In late June, the Soviet army of occupation 

in eastern Germany blockaded the western sectors of Berlin, isolating the city from 

the West and threatening it with economic and moral strangulation. The Americans 

responded by airlifting food, coal, and all the supplies necessary to sustain life in a 

city of 2 million inhabitants. The airlift preserved West Berlin from absorption into 

the Communist system. On 4 April 1949, the United States signed the North Atlantic 

Treaty joining Canada and the countries of western Europe in a formal alliance for 

mutual defense. On 8 May, the West Germans, with the encouragement of their West 

European neighbors and the United States, approved a new constitutional document 

establishing a democratic and pluralistic government. On 12 May, having failed to 

prevent the establishment of a West German government, the Soviet Union lifted 

the Berlin Blockade. These events confirmed and reinforced the general American 

impression that two ideological systems were locked in a monumental struggle. 

The end of the Berlin Blockade brought no slackening of the Cold War. Indeed, 

geopolitical events of 1948 and 1949 convinced U.S. policymakers that the threat 

from the Soviet Union reached far beyond Europe and the Mediterranean. While 

5 Howard Jones, A New Kind of War: America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in 

Greece (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), preface. 6 For a detailed discussion of the relationship between events in the eastern Mediterranean and 

the formulation of the Truman Doctrine, see Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the 

Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton: Princeton 

University Press, 1980), esp. ch. 6.
The Mediterranean and the Origins of the Cold War 7

the Soviet blockade of Berlin had heightened tensions in Europe, the armies of 

the Chinese Communists led by Mao Zedong progressively gained the upper hand 

in their civil war against the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek. By October, 

the Chinese Communists had won full control of the mainland areas of China and 

declared a new People’s Republic. As control of China swung to the Communists, 

American intelligence learned that the Soviet Union had exploded its first atom bomb 

in July 1949, thus ending the American monopoly of atomic weapons. The airlift to 

relieve West Berlin enhanced American prestige; the fall of China to the Communists 

and the Soviet Union’s acquisition of atomic weaponry challenged it.

In 1949, the U.S. National Security Council declared deterrence through military 

readiness to be the nation’s military strategy.7

 In early 1950, President Truman 

ordered a reexamination of American policy overseas. The National Security 

Council undertook a comprehensive review of the premises of the administration’s 

foreign policy. The document that emerged from the study, NSC–68, cast the 

geopolitical situation as a polarization of power between the “slave society [and] 

the free.” In this contest, “the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, 

is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its 

absolute authority” in its own territory and in adjacent states. “To that end,” the 

National Security Council study asserted, “Soviet efforts are now directed toward 

the domination of the Eurasian land mass.” To meet this challenge, the United 

States had to mount a global strategy to return the initiative in world affairs to the 

non-Communist nations. The contest demanded that the United States “mobilize 

its own and its allies’ economies for a vast military effort.”8

President Truman received NSC–68 in its final form in April 1950. The report 

recommended that American policy include an increased commitment to the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe, the stationing of American 

airpower with atomic capability in Europe and around the periphery of the Soviet 

Union, increased cooperation between allied and American military forces, and a 

strong alliance system under the leadership of the United States.9

 The document 

proposed not just the reactive policy of containment, but also active military and 

diplomatic initiatives to put U.S. armed forces in the best possible position and state 

of readiness to meet Soviet aggressions.

The analysis behind NSC–68 became more credible when on 25 June 1950 North 

Korea attacked South Korea across the 38th Parallel, the line established after World 

War II to demarcate the zones of Soviet and American occupation. North Korea 

had evolved since 1945 into a Communist dictatorship allied with the Soviet Union. 

When North Korea launched its unprovoked attack, America’s allies in Europe 

7 Karen Lewis et al., “A Systemic Study of Air Combat Command Cold War Material Culture,” 

vol. 1, “Historical Context and Methodology for Assessment,” 1995, pp. 23–107, HQ, Air Combat 

Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va. 8 The passages from NSC–68 come from Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 

1945–1980 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980), pp. 98–99. 9 LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, pp. 98–99; William R. Keylor, The TwentiethCentury World, An International History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 287–88.
8 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

became anxious. They feared that the aggression in Asia, if successful, would lead to 

similar attacks in Germany or Austria. The attack on South Korea seemed to confirm 

the assumptions expressed in NSC–68. But even before the outbreak of hostilities in 

Korea, the Department of Defense (DoD) took steps to support militarily the more 

proactive policy outlined in NSC–68. The department ordered the construction of 

overseas air force bases in three countries where United States Air Force (USAF) 

units already operated—Turkey, Libya, and Saudi Arabia—and in one country where 

they had had no presence since the end of World War II—French Morocco. 

The following chapters trace the story of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ 

involvement in the military construction that put the weapons in place around the 

Mediterranean. The engineers’ first assignment came in Greece as a direct extension 

of the Truman Doctrine. There, the Corps operated a district between 1947 and 

1949. The formulation of NSC–68 and the outbreak of the Korean War transformed 

the Corps’ role from temporary instrument to permanent presence in the region. In 

Turkey and in Libya, the Corps established district operations to manage military 

construction in the two host countries and in Saudi Arabia. Chapter 1 covers these 

early manifestations of the Corps’ activity in the Mediterranean basin. Chapters 2 

and 3 trace the development of the largest Corps of Engineers undertaking in the 

region—the construction of air bases in Morocco—and the elevation of the engineer 

organization to full-fledged division status.
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 9

1

Army Engineers in the 

Mediterranean, 1942–1952

During World War II, the Mediterranean region was a major theater of 

operations involving nearly all the states that touch that sea. Only Spain remained 

neutral throughout the war. Early in the war, North Africa became a battlefield 

between Italy and Britain as Italy sought to expel the British from Egypt. In late 

1942, American and British forces launched amphibious landings on the shores 

of Morocco and Algeria in French North Africa. From there, the Allies fought 

their way east against Italian forces, aided by their German allies, to link up with 

British armies from Egypt. By May 1943, the anti-Hitler coalition controlled all of 

North Africa, which then provided the staging area for the invasions of Sicily in 

July and the southern Italian peninsula in September. North Africa gave the Allies 

safe airfields from which to launch air attacks against German and Italian forces 

in southern Europe and the Balkans. Throughout the provinces of the Middle East 

where British influence predominated, from Egypt to the Persian Gulf, the Western 

powers enjoyed similar basing arrangements. The airfields and naval installations in 

North Africa also made convenient points of transit for goods passing to the Soviet 

Union, an ally of the United States and Britain after 1941. 

At the end of the war, the United States showed little inclination to maintain 

a strong military presence in the region. Once the war ended, the United States 

demobilized and withdrew its military forces from around the world. In the 

Mediterranean and the Middle East, the United States, which had around one hundred 

military installations in 1945, reduced its presence to seventy-four installations in 

1947 and to fewer than thirty by 1949.1

France and Great Britain, major colonial powers in the Mediterranean and 

Middle East, both retained significant roles in the region. Free French Forces under 

General Charles de Gaulle replaced the pro-German Vichy government in France 

at the end of the war. As one of the four victorious powers, France retained control 

of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. (See Map 1.) Britain retained its influence in the 

areas from Egypt through the Middle East and acquired the former Italian colony 

of Libya as a trust territory under the United Nations.

1 James R. Blaker, United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma (New York: 

Praeger, 1990), pp. 31–32.
10 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Army Engineers in Greece, 1947–1949

When President Truman decided to extend help to Greece, the State Department 

turned to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to put its technical expertise at the 

service of the U.S. Mission for Aid to Greece. Alone among government agencies, 

the Corps possessed the capabilities of design, contracting, and engineering needed 

to restore the country’s infrastructure.2

 For most of the early decades of the century, 

the Army Corps of Engineers had concentrated on civil works projects such as 

dredging harbors, regulating waterways, building canals, and controlling floods. In 

1941, the Army transferred the mission of military construction for the Army and 

the Army Air Forces from the Quartermaster Corps to the Corps of Engineers. The 

Corps of Engineers thus became the agency that organized, managed, and executed 

the construction needed to support U.S. military forces. From its experience using 

private companies for design and construction in supervising civil works programs, 

the Corps had developed the capacity to manage the even-larger task of supervising 

the rapid construction of the base camps, airfields, and other installations, at home 

and abroad, needed to win World War II. 

When called into service in Greece in 1947, the Army engineers faced the task of 

rebuilding transportation and harbor systems to support that country’s economic and 

military needs. While retreating from Greece in late 1944, the Germans had destroyed 

roads and bridges, rail lines, and canal and port facilities. The principal ports at Piraeus, 

Volos, and Thessalonika remained only marginally functional. (Map 2) To block the 

Corinth Canal, German demolition teams had set explosives that had triggered two 

massive slides and filled the waterway with debris. The system of roads and bridges 

had suffered during the war and from rebel attacks after 1945. The Greek government 

had undertaken repairs, but it lacked money, equipment, and experienced engineers 

to clear the debris and to rebuild.

At the request of the State Department, two joint ventures of American contractors undertook the work in Greece. Atkinson-Drake-Park (ADP) consisted of the 

Guy F. Atkinson Company of San Francisco, California; Johnson-Drake and Piper 

of Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Starr-Park and Freeman of New York. This joint 

venture accepted the contract for the reconstruction of highways and railroads. 

The second joint venture—Steers-Grove, consisting of the J. Rich Steers Company 

and Grove, Shepherd, Wilson, and Kruge of New York—accepted a contract to 

reconstruct the port facilities at Piraeus and to reopen the Corinth Canal. The U.S. 

State Department awarded the contracts; by agreement between the State Department 

and the Department of the Army, the Corps of Engineers administered them.3

2 Frank N. Schubert, “A Helping Hand: Three Decades of Corps of Engineers Involvement in 

Foreign Assistance Programs,” p. 4, Office of History (OH), HQ, United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Alexandria, Va. 3 D. W. Griffiths, “Reconstruction in Greece,” Military Engineer (July-August 1949): 252; 

Typescript Rpt, 22 Oct 48, sub: Reconstruction and Rehabilitation—Grecian Program, p. 1, Research 

Collections, Mil Files XII-4, OH, HQ USACE.
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 11

Because the full extent of the work was difficult to define before the work 

actually began, the Corps and the State Department agreed to make the awards 

on a cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) basis.4

 CPFF contracts were widely used during 

World War II because they offered benefits for both parties. By preselecting 

qualified contractors and negotiating a contract to pay a fee as well as all direct 

4 Typescript Rpt, 22 Oct 48, p. 1.

I O

N I A

N

S

E

A

A

E

G

E

A

N

S

E

A

TRIPOLIS

ELEOÚSA

ATHENS

VÓLOS

PIRAEUS CORINTH

PÁTRAI

THESSALONÍKA

LÁRISA

LAMÍA

Dráma

Iráklion

Lévkas

C Y C L ADES

CRETE

YUGOSLA VIA

ALBANIA

B U L G A RIA

TURKEY

GREECE

RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

1947–1949

Program Headquarters

Area Oce

Air Base

Port Facility

0

0 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

Map 2
12 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

costs, the government could begin a project quickly, even before design could be 

completed. Companies could accept a project in which the costs and the risks were 

very difficult to calculate. CPFF contracts required close government audits, which 

made supervision and administration difficult and expensive; and the government 

had to dispose of equipment and materials at the completion of the project. The 

biggest disadvantage was that the contractor had little incentive to curb waste or 

extravagance because the contract guaranteed his costs and a profit. Also, a contractor 

could overload the job with his own equipment and pad his profits by charging the 

government a rental fee.5

In the atmosphere of the early months of the Cold War, the advantages of CPFF 

contracts outweighed the disadvantages. From the first application of the Truman 

Doctrine in Greece in 1947, CPFF contracts became a standard feature of overseas 

military construction as the U.S. government hastened to contain the Soviet Union.

On 1 August 1947, the Army engineers established the Grecian District under 

the Corps of Engineers’ North Atlantic Division in New York. Ten days later, the 

district engineer, Col. D. W. Griffiths, set up his headquarters in Athens. Griffiths; 

his deputy, Lt. Col. Paul D. Troxler; and the skeleton staff of the district worked 

with the contractors to plan the reconstruction. At the same time, the district 

5 “Military Construction in Continental United States and Permanent Overseas Bases,” Dec 51, 

p. 40, Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Va., Gen Files VII-19-10, OH, HQ USACE. 

During World War II, the Germans destroyed much of Greece’s infrastructure. An American 

contractor reconstructed an area of the breakwater in Volos Harbor.
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 13

established a rear-echelon office in New York City to expedite procurement and 

to handle stateside activities. Both ventures also established offices in New York. 

Eventually, the Grecian District set up area offices in Thessalonika, Larisa, Lamia, 

Patras, Corinth, and Piraeus to supervise the initial program: work at three ports, 

rebuilding the highway and railroad systems, and clearing the Corinth Canal. The 

plan divided the tasks among the contracting companies and the Greek government 

agencies that had the capability to assist in executing the work.6

From the beginning, the American contractors faced difficulties in assembling 

both equipment and personnel to carry out the construction in Greece. It took six 

months of sustained effort to put an effective organization at the sites. Nonetheless, 

629 American contractor and government personnel and 12,131 Greek nationals 

worked on the construction projects at the peak of activity.7

Steers-Grove did repair work at the ports of Piraeus, Volos, and Thessalonika. 

Before the war, the port at Piraeus could simultaneously accommodate sixteen 

transport ships, each with a capacity of ten- to fifteen thousand tons. In 1947, only 

two ships could dock in the port. The war had left quay walls damaged, parts of walls 

and the gates to the drydocks demolished, docks clogged with debris, and nearly all 

port equipment destroyed. Only three hundred fifty yards of quay were usable when 

reconstruction began. From wreckage on the harbor floor, the contractors salvaged 

enough material to build two heavy-duty cranes; but they also had to import floating 

cranes. By December 1948, Steers-Grove had rebuilt over two thousand three 

hundred yards of quay walls. Crews cleared debris to reconstruct drydocks and to 

open the waterways. By the end of the operation, Piraeus harbor could accommodate 

seventeen large vessels at a time. Work also progressed at Volos and Thessalonika 

where damage to the ports was less severe.8

Clearing of the Corinth Canal began in November 1947. The Isthmus of Corinth 

is a narrow strip of land that links the Peloponnese Peninsula with Attica, the 

main land mass of Greece. The canal, built between 1882 and 1893 and less than 

four-and-a-half miles long, reduced the distance for ships traveling between the east 

and west coasts of Greece by about one hundred twenty-five miles. In addition to 

slides touched off by demolition teams, the Germans had dumped bridge wreckage, 

locomotives, and railroad cars into the canal to complicate eventual excavation. After 

eight months of work, the canal opened on 7 July 1948 for shallow-draft traffic and 

in September for all traffic.9

The Greek railroads had suffered the same disruption as the ports and canal. 

Retreating Germans had systematically blown up bridges and demolished rolling 

stock in 1944, virtually paralyzing the system. Thirty-three railroad bridges needed 

reconstruction before normal rail service could resume. The U.S. aid program assigned 

6 Typescript Rpt, 22 Oct 48, pp. 1–2; Griffiths, “Reconstruction in Greece,” p. 252.

7 Christ Mentzelopoulos, “The Work Performed in Greece Under the Direction of the Corps of 

Engineers,” address at Polytechnic School, 1 Apr 49, reprinted in Technika Chronika (April 1949); 

Griffiths, “Reconstruction in Greece,” p. 253. 8 Typescript Rpt, 22 Oct 48, pp. 2–3.

9 Griffiths, “Reconstruction in Greece,” p. 254. 
14 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

rehabilitation of the railroads to Atkinson-Drake-Park. The American contractor turned 

repair of the tracks over to the Greek railroad companies, ordered twelve bridges 

fabricated in the United States, and undertook the reconstruction from salvaged materials 

of twenty-one others. The railroad project also included repair of two tunnels.10

10 Ibid., pp. 256–57; Typescript Rpt, 22 Oct 48, pp. 4–7.

By April 1948, excavation of the Corinth Canal was over half complete.
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 15

The Greeks had never modernized their highways for motorized transportation. 

Of the 6,521 miles of roadways shown on maps of the national highway system, 

around 75 percent could be used by motor vehicles and only at very low speeds. 

Since rebuilding the whole system went far beyond the scope of the American aid 

program, ADP and the Army engineers decided to address only the 1,100 miles 

of roads essential to the country’s immediate needs for economic recovery and 

military communications. After a guerrilla raid destroyed an asphalt plant and 

equipment valued at $90,000, engineers eliminated almost 250 miles of road from the 

rehabilitation program for reasons of safety. Road construction involved extensive 

patching of existing base courses and resurfacing with asphalt. It also included 

repair of about 90 percent of the highway system’s bridges and culverts. To support 

the paving, contractors purchased or acquired nine asphalt plants from surplus 

equipment and military depots in the United States. Army engineers supervised 

the laying of 656,015 tons of aggregate and 29,512 tons of asphalt, as well as the 

surfacing of more than 750 miles of highway before they turned the job over to the 

Greek Ministry of Public Works in 1949.11

After work on the road and rail systems began, the Greek Air Ministry asked 

the Corps of Engineers’ Grecian District office to engage Atkinson-Drake-Park to 

work on eight airfields where runways already existed and to build two completely 

new airfields. The airfield work included construction of parking aprons and control 

towers and installation or rehabilitation of lighting and drainage systems. ADP laid 

almost ten thousand square yards of runway, nearly 60 percent of which was piercedsteel plank. Almost four thousand square yards of runway had an asphalt surface. 

The contractor began work in April 1948 on the longest runway, the 1,500-foot 

strip at King Paul Airfield near Tripolis, and completed it on 30 July. Construction 

also began in April at a new field, Bisdouni, in northwest Greece near the Albanian 

border; the 1,200-foot runway began operating on 4 October.12

Frequent delays characterized the early months of work in Greece. Motor 

vehicles to transport goods and personnel and other construction equipment arrived 

late; in December 1947, bad weather limited operations. Guerrilla activity and 

shortages of certain critical materials forced the extension of the program beyond the 

planned completion date of 30 September 1948. Despite the civil war, the engineer 

and contractor personnel worked unarmed. Guerrillas did not attack Americans 

directly; but they carried out acts of sabotage against construction equipment, motor 

vehicles, existing facilities, and facilities under reconstruction. Rebels or bandits 

kidnapped some Americans and held them for ransom, but no Americans were 

reported killed. The Greek workers fared badly: 28 died, 102 were wounded, and 

474 were reported missing. Rebel attacks also damaged or destroyed eighty-one 

pieces of equipment valued at about $350,000.13

11 Typescript Rpt, 22 Oct 48, pp. 4–5; Griffiths, “Reconstruction in Greece,” p. 254. 12 Typescript Rpt, 22 Oct 48, p. 7; Griffiths, “Reconstruction in Greece,” pp. 255–56; Mentzelopoulos, “Work Performed in Greece.” 13 Mentzelopoulos, “Work Performed in Greece.” Griffiths, “Reconstruction in Greece,” pp. 252–53, 

gives a slightly lower dollar figure for the loss of equipment.
16 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

During the entire Greek construction program of 1947–1949, the two American 

firms spent about $56 million, well below the $70 million budgeted for the program. 

In April 1949, a closeout team arrived at district headquarters in Athens; by summer, 

the Grecian District had closed its offices.14 The close of the Grecian District 

removed the only organization in the Mediterranean directly under the command 

of the Corps of Engineers, but Army engineer officers remained in the region to 

assist U.S. military aid programs to other nations.

In June 1950, the American ambassador to Greece, Henry F. Grady, assessed 

the aid program on behalf of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 

He reminded the senators that many in Congress had doubted the advisability of 

appropriating funds for aid to Greece in 1947; some had even labeled the undertaking 

Operation Rathole. By 1949, he asserted, one could see a relatively stable economy 

in Greece and a trained and partially equipped Greek armed services. A year later, 

the Greek Army had been “completely victorious” over the Communist guerrillas. 

When speaking of the aid program to Greece, Grady concluded, “We can honestly 

use the word ‘success.’”15

14 Memo, D. W. Griffiths, 9 Apr 49, sub: Status of Overseas Construction for the Month of March 

1949, Mil Files XII-4, OH, HQ USACE; Mentzelopoulos, “Work Performed in Greece.” 15 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, Mutual Defense 

Assistance Program, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, p. 77. 

The Gorgopotamos Bridge in Greece, shown here in October 1947, was damaged during 

World War II.
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 17

Army Engineers in Turkey

Turkey had figured almost as prominently as Greece in President Truman’s 

speech of March 1947 enunciating the new policy of containment of the Soviet 

Union. The same appropriations process that furnished aid to Greece also provided 

for financial and technical support to Turkey. In both countries, the aid supported an 

immediate need to shore up political and military structures as a deterrent to Soviet 

expansion into the Mediterranean.16

The challenges of 1948 and 1949 changed the relative importance of the U.S. 

military presence in Turkey. The policy of commitment to active defense initiatives 

enhanced the importance of Turkey to American strategic interests. Turkey had 

common borders in the east with the Soviet Union and in the west with the Soviet 

satellite state of Bulgaria. Turkish control of the strategic water route from the Black 

Sea to the Mediterranean Sea positioned the country on the flank of possible Soviet 

passage to the oil-rich regions of Iran and Saudi Arabia. 

With the original program of aid for Turkey, the U.S. government had established 

an umbrella organization named the Joint American Military Mission for Aid 

to Turkey (JAMMAT). Subordinate elements—The United States Army Group 

(TUSAG), The United States Air Force Group (TUSAFG), and The United States 

Navy Group (TUSNG)—worked under the mission to administer the aid program.17

When aid began in 1947, no Army engineer element served in Turkey.

Initially, most of the U.S. aid went to the Turkish Army, which numbered five 

hundred thousand in 1947. By 1950, American advice and assistance had helped 

Turkey increase the combat capabilities of its armed forces and cut its numbers by 

half. But Turkey needed additional help to create a truly modern and mobile army 

and to reduce its expenditures on defense from 35 percent of its national budget to 

more manageable proportions.18

As part of the aid package, USAF personnel sought to train Turks to operate and 

maintain the construction equipment to modernize the country’s military airfields. 

They also initiated and supervised a maintenance and supply program for the Turkish 

Air Force. In 1948, TUSAFG began construction at two sites, providing supervision, training, and guidance to the labor force of Turkish troops. The construction 

equipment came from surplus Army engineer supplies, but the Corps of Engineers 

had no direct role in the aid program.19

16 Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

National Policy, 1947–1949 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Joint History, 1996), p. 36. 17 Lewis McBride, “A Brief History of The U.S. Engineer Group (TUSEG), U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Ankara, Turkey, 1950–1954,” p. 1, Construction Div, Office of the Chief of Engineers 

(OCE), M-2-2/16, Europe Division–Record Holding Area (EUD-RHA). 18 U.S. Senate, Mutual Defense Assistance Program, pp. 78–79, statement submitted 9 Jun 50 by 

George Wadsworth, U.S. ambassador to Turkey. 19 “History of the United States Engineer Group, Ankara, Turkey,” p. 1 (hereafter cited as TUSEG 

Hist), Encl no. 7 in OCE, “Historical Summary, 1950–1951,” Gen Files 2-1, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited as OCE, Hist Sum, 1950–1951); McBride, “Brief History,” p. 1.
18 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

In 1949, Congress appropriated more funds for military construction in Turkey; 

but by that year, it had become apparent that TUSAFG had achieved disappointing 

results. Continuing deterioration of the airfields threatened to jeopardize the Air 

Force’s prospects to use the facilities jointly with the Turks. JAMMAT needed more 

rapid and efficient construction. An Army engineer assigned to JAMMAT, Col. 

Thomas H. Lipscomb, recommended activating an engineer district like the one in 

Greece. The U.S. ambassador worked with Turkish authorities to shape an agreement 

whereby the U.S. military mission furnished management personnel (construction 

engineers, technical staff, and American contractors with their employees) to support 

an expanded construction program. The government of Turkey agreed to assume 

responsibility for real estate; for the cost of all rail transportation; for the shipment 

of materials and equipment within Turkey; for all construction equipment, spare 

parts, and materials from stocks previously furnished; and for the services of a 

Turkish aviation engineer unit.20

U.S. Engineer Group in 1950

With the agreement in place, the chief of engineers, Maj. Gen. Lewis A. Pick, 

established The United States Engineer Group (TUSEG) on 10 May 1950. Although 

the U.S. Engineer Group operated as an engineer district, its name conformed to the 

nomenclature used by other groups operating under the joint U.S. military mission to 

Turkey. From headquarters in Ankara, TUSEG supervised and executed all military 

construction in Turkey assigned by the chief of engineers under the Mutual Defense 

Assistance Program approved by Congress in 1949.21

Lt. Col. Arthur H. Frye Jr. commanded TUSEG, working first with a small 

staff in the Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) in Washington. Frye sought to 

recruit people who could adapt to a 24-month tour in a country where the living 

conditions, customs, religion, language, and political environment demanded 

flexibility. Using a unique procedure approved by General Pick, the chief of the 

TUSEG Engineering-Construction Division, Lewis W. McBride, personally selected 

candidates who combined experience in both design and construction.22

Because of the Air Force’s urgency, the Corps of Engineers awarded a costplus-fixed-fee contract similar to the contracts used in Greece in the late 1940s. 

Three firms participated in the joint venture called Metcalf-Hamilton-Grove: Metcalf 

Construction Company; Gordon Hamilton Contracting Company Inc.; and Grove, 

Shepherd, Wilson, and Kruge Inc. The initial CPFF contract, signed on 25 May 1950, 

anticipated a construction program lasting two years and estimated at $10,766,864 

20 TUSEG Hist, p. 2; McBride, “Brief History,” p. 2; Condit, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National 

Policy, 1947–1949, pp. 231–32; Interv, Herbert M. Hart with Maj Gen (Ret) Thomas H. Lipscomb, 

12 Nov 83, pp. 136–53. 21 McBride, “Brief History,” p. 2; Condit, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947–1949, 

pp. 231–32. 22 McBride, “Brief History,” pp. 2–3.
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 19

with a fee of $460,000. TUSAFG determined the needs and established the types of 

construction that TUSEG and Metcalf-Hamilton-Grove were to execute.23

At a series of meetings in Washington, representatives of OCE, MetcalfHamilton-Grove, and TUSEG defined the levels of support and responsibility. The 

contractor procured equipment and materials and recruited personnel with only minor 

help from the Corps of Engineers’ North Atlantic Division and New York District. 

The Corps suggested that contract personnel working in Iceland and Newfoundland 

would be attractive recruits for the Turkish program when work slackened in those 

North Atlantic locations.24

The chief of engineers, General Pick, defined Colonel Frye’s authority as 

comparable to that “usually vested in district and division engineers.” TUSEG would 

operate under JAMMAT for administrative purposes but would report directly to 

the chief of engineers in Washington. TUSEG received authority to suspend the 

“administrative regulations of the Department of the Army applicable to military 

procurement and construction” and to proceed under civil regulations. Frye was 

encouraged to shift “functions normally considered government activities” to the 

contractor if he thought it would produce savings. TUSEG also received explicit 

instructions that “criteria and standards of construction will be in accordance with 

the desire of the U.S. Air Force Group and may be less than OCE standards if 

sound engineering principles and practices are not thereby violated.”25 The special 

status, the special exemptions, and the suggestion that standards could be lowered 

all emphasize the unusual character of the military construction program for Turkey 

and the urgency that leaders in Washington assigned to it.

On 28 May 1950, TUSEG established a rear-echelon office in New York City 

to facilitate procurement of construction materials and recruitment of personnel. 

This office, under a deputy contracting officer, worked with the New York District 

of the North Atlantic Division to monitor and coordinate work with the New York 

office of the joint venture, Metcalf-Hamilton-Grove.26

By early June, the contractor had received an outline of the construction program 

calling for work at eight sites, six of which had existing facilities: Bandirma on 

the Sea of Marmara; Erzincan, east of Ankara; Balikesir, about fifty miles south 

of Bandirma; Afyonkarahisar, southwest of Ankara; Kayseri in central Turkey; 

and Merzifon, southwest of the Black Sea city of Samsun. (See Map 3.) In those 

locations, Metcalf-Hamilton-Grove would rehabilitate existing runways, install 

distribution systems for aviation fuel, and add support facilities including hangars, 

23 “Synopsis of TUSEG Construction Program Under Joint American Military Mission for Aid to 

Turkey as of 1 Aug 52,” p. 1, Mil Files XII-33-8 (hereafter cited as TUSEG Construction Synopsis as 

of 1 Aug 52); Memo, Brig Gen G. J. Nold to Ch, U.S. Engineer Group, Ankara, Turkey [TUSEG], 9 

Jun 50, sub: The U.S. Engineer Group, Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, Mil Files 

XII-4-1; Memo, Robert F. Jacobs to Policy, Regulations and Procedures Br, 26 May 50, sub: Request 

for Exception to CPR P19.6 and Item 9, CPPL 3-50, Mil Files XII-4-1; all in OH, HQ USACE. 24 Memos, Col Robert E. Cron to Div Engr, 22 May 50, sub: Support for the Engineer Group in 

Turkey, and Nold, 25 May 50, both in Mil Files XII-4-1, OH, HQ USACE. 25 Memo, Nold to Ch, TUSEG, 9 Jun 50. 26 TUSEG Hist, pp. 2–3.
20 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

airmen’s housing, and additional fuel storage. At two other locations—Diyarbakir 

(in eastern Turkey on the Tigris) and Eskisehir (in western Turkey)—the program 

called for new air bases with concrete runways capable of accommodating modern 

jet aircraft and the appropriate support facilities.27

Beginning Work

Personnel from TUSEG and Metcalf-Hamilton-Grove arrived in Ankara on 25 and 

26 June 1950, just as the North Korean attack on South Korea began. The mission of 

the Army engineers in Turkey suddenly became more compelling. TUSEG’s advance 

party opened offices in an apartment building in a residential section of Ankara. The 

building provided office space insufficient to accommodate both the Army engineer 

staff and the contractor personnel, so the contractor rented additional space in the Cehan 

Palace Hotel. TUSEG arranged to have the U.S. Army Group handle all shipments 

of materials through Turkish ports. The Turkish government furnished rail shipments 

from the ports to job sites. The TUSEG staff had assumed they would receive office 

equipment and furniture from the joint U.S. military mission, but JAMMAT had very 

little to offer. Frye tried to get the items he needed from the New York District, but 

the supplies he received were in such poor condition that the entire lot “could not be 

sold for junk or otherwise for enough money to even pay for the packing charges, 

much less the freight costs.” Without the proper office equipment, the administrative 

management of the construction program suffered.28

Disregarding the obstacles, the Americans set to work. To ascertain what engineering equipment and supplies were available in Turkey, Metcalf-Hamilton-Grove 

sent a small party to the JAMMAT supply depot at Cumaovasi, near Izmir. They 

discovered that only about 25 percent of the spare parts and materials that had arrived 

under the aid program had ever been unpacked. The inventory of approximately seven 

thousand items presented a problem of property control and a potential commitment 

of time that diverted the effort from starting construction. Confounding matters for 

the team, all the property documents were written in Turkish.29

In addition to inventorying spare parts and other materials, TUSEG and the 

contractor sought to locate and gather the construction equipment available in 

Turkey. They found that the U.S. ambassador had lent equipment to the Turkish 

Ministry of Public Works, which was using it on civilian airfields at Istanbul and 

Ankara. The Turkish Air Force used some other equipment on projects that had 

a much lower priority for TUSEG than the bases for the U.S. Air Force. It took 

persistence on the part of Colonel Frye to recover this equipment, and then it was 

not always in usable condition. None of the thirty American trucks that the Turks 

27 Memo, Nold to Ch, TUSEG, 9 Jun 50. 28 TUSEG Hist, pp. 2–4; McBride, “Brief History,” p. 11; TUSEG Construction Synopsis as of 1 

Aug 52, p. 5. Quotation from Memo, A. J. Evans, Ch, Audit Div, Ofc of the Engr Comptroller, to Div 

Engr, North Atlantic Div, 5 Dec 50; “Inspection of U.S. Engineer Group, Ankara, Turkey,” 3 Nov 

50, p. 4; both in Mil Files XII-4-1, OH, HQ USACE. 29 TUSEG Hist, p. 3.
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 21

had used, for example, came back with functioning brakes; the Turks had filled 

the brake systems with motor oil rather than with brake fluid, thereby dissolving 

all the rubber seals.30

TUSEG personnel succeeded in moving the program forward by cooperating 

with a Turkish liaison group at Ankara, Coordinating Bureau no. 2, commanded 

by a Turkish Air Force colonel with a Turkish Army engineer colonel as deputy. 

The Turkish officers helped to solve customs problems and to transport equipment, 

supplies, and personnel. The liaison group assigned Turkish troops to provide labor 

for construction projects, acquired the necessary real estate, helped reconnoiter sites, 

and provided other services to TUSEG and the contractor.31

TUSEG, having made the administrative and logistical arrangements that it could, 

organized a reconnaissance visit to the proposed construction sites. Concurrently, 

personnel from TUSEG and the contractor’s staff drew up a preliminary schedule 

to accomplish the work within the 24-month deadline set by TUSAFG. MetcalfHamilton-Grove had trouble recruiting and mobilizing qualified design engineers, 

especially engineers with knowledge and experience with Corps of Engineers 

practices and procedures. To accelerate the progress of the project, TUSEG assigned 

several of its personnel to work with the contractor’s staff.32

Design of the runways and facilities proceeded simultaneously with the tasks of 

assembling construction equipment and crews and launching construction. The large 

open space of the Cehan Palace Hotel’s ballroom became the engineering-drafting 

room. Personnel from TUSEG’s Engineering-Construction Division supervised 

the design work of the contractor, interpreting the Air Force’s criteria, suggesting 

preliminary layout, and checking all drawings and specifications. Incorporating the 

facilities that the reconnaissance party identified, the contractor drafted plans for 

the rehabilitation or conversion of runways, taxiways, and facilities to be used by 

the U.S. Air Force.33

The TUSEG staff soon learned that TUSAFG had already made changes to 

reflect additional requirements or revisions by JAMMAT. Diyarbakir in the east 

and Balikesir in the west received the highest priority. Runway surveys began at 

Diyarbakir in July and August 1950. Initial specifications called for a 9,000-foot 

runway with supporting taxiways, twenty-six hardstands for parking vehicles, and 

14,000 square yards of parking apron. The plan left housing, utilities, and hangars 

for later development. Construction included a distribution system for aviation 

fuel, but the Air Force had provided no criteria for the system. At Balikesir, the Air 

Force wanted resurfacing to begin on the 4,900-foot runway as soon as possible. 

The survey revealed that many of the failures of the existing runway had occurred 

30 McBride, “Brief History,” pp. 14–15. 31 Ibid., p. 19. 32 TUSEG Hist, pp. 3–5; TUSEG Construction Synopsis as of 1 Aug 52, p. 5. 33 McBride, “Brief History,” pp. 2–3, 6–7, 11; TUSEG Construction Synopsis as of 1 Aug 52, p. 

5; TUSEG Hist, pp. 2–4. 
22 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

B 

BANDIRMA

ÇIĞLI

KARAMÜRSEL

BALIKESIR

AFYONKARAHIS

CUMAOVASI

ESKIŞEHIR

İZMIR

Ortaköy

Çorlu

Çakmaklı

Istanbul

Köseköy

Denizli 

İzmit

BUL GARIA

R O M A N I A

GREECE

because of poor drainage, so designers 

incorporated a new drainage system and 

adequate surface drainage.34

In the first week of September 1950, 

TUSEG established area offices at Diyarbakir 

and Balikesir.35 Metcalf-Hamilton-Grove 

began initial grading operations at Diyarbakir 

on 11 September and runway rehabilitation 

at Balikesir on 1 October. At the outset, work 

progressed slowly because the contractor 

lacked sufficient crushing and screening 

equipment. Just below the surface at 

Diyarbakir, construction crews encountered 

large boulders that required more blasting 

than anticipated, thus delaying progress on 

the drainage system. While the construction 

proceeded, work continued on design until 

the draft plans for this phase were completed 

in December.36

The Air Force’s tight schedule forced 

the Army engineers to take risks. TUSEG’s 

command group decided to have the 

contractor continue construction through 

the winter even though Balikesir’s winters 

were typically wet and Diyarbakir usually 

received heavy snow and freezing cold. The 

American audacity impressed the Turks, 

especially when the moderate 1950–1951 

winter allowed the construction to progress. 

Many Turks saw this as a sign that Allah had 

blessed the endeavor. To the Americans, it 

appeared a lucky outcome to a calculated 

risk. The following winter was very severe, 

but by then work could progress on facilities 

less sensitive to the weather than runway 

construction.37

Even though Metcalf-Hamilton-Grove 

had begun work, neither the contractor nor TUSEG had received a proposed overall 

program of construction for Turkey by November 1950. Lack of a plan made any 

coherent projection of operations, staffing, and distribution of materials or equipment 

34 TUSEG Construction Synopsis as of 1 Aug 52, pp. 6–7. 35 TUSEG Hist, p. 5. 36 TUSEG Construction Synopsis as of 1 Aug 52, p. 6; McBride, “Brief History,” p. 6. 37 McBride, “Brief History,” p. 6.
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 23

Euphrates R

Lake

Van

L A C K S E A

Tigris R

AR

MERZIFON

SAMSUN

TRABZON

ERZINCAN

KAYSERI

DIYARBAKIR BATMAN

INCIRLIK

Konya

ANKARA

Sinop

Adana

Erzurum

Muş

Karataş

SYRIA

I R A Q

IRAN

UNION OF

SOVIE T SOCIALIST

REPUBLICS

U S S R

CYPRUS

TURKEY

THE U.S. ENGINEER GROUP ( TUSEG)

1950s

Construction Sites

General Supply Depots

0

0 100 200 Miles

100 200 Kilometers

300

300

impossible. TUSEG had drawn up a budgetary sketch, but it covered only the 

administrative costs for the organization itself. Because of lack of data, the budget 

could not reflect payments to the contractor or other payments necessary for an 

accurate cost estimate. To no avail, Colonel Frye had called on TUSAFG to provide 

a comprehensive plan for the construction program. The problems of administrative 

control were compounded because the contractor had started work hurriedly and had 

Map 3
24 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

focused on recruiting construction personnel. As a result, the staff lacked sufficient 

competent personnel to manage property accounting and time checking. Contractor 

personnel also had bought and issued materials without adequate control. Colonel 

Frye was aware of the contractor’s problems with staff, and he recognized the 

difficulties in recruiting qualified personnel for work in Turkey.38

In early December 1950, Frye discussed the problems at a conference of division 

engineers. The chief of engineers, General Pick, could do little more than call for 

prompt action to get additional contract personnel to Turkey. He placed the problem 

of aiding Frye and Metcalf-Hamilton-Grove in the hands of Col. Frederick F. Frech, 

commander of the North Atlantic Division, which had taken over supervision of 

TUSEG on 1 December.39

Despite the problems, the contractor completed work on the first phases of 

runway and taxiway rehabilitation at Balikesir in January 1951. Between April 

and June 1951, crews stripped, graded, and placed a base course on the existing 

asphalt section of the runway at Diyarbakir and added a drainage system. Over the 

winter and into the spring of 1951, contractor and TUSEG personnel worked on 

modifications ordered by TUSAFG. Drawings for modifications at Balikesir began in 

February 1951 and were completed by September. In March, the Air Force ordered 

modifications to the specifications for Diyarbakir. The contractor received directives 

to add ten hardstands, twenty-five housing units, utilities, and additional facilities 

for 164 officers and 1,237 men. Modifications delayed design completion from 

mid-March to July, when TUSAFG asked for still more changes. Final approval of 

the modified design came in August 1951.40

In November 1950, comparable work had begun at the air base at Eskisehir 

with a preliminary survey. Construction began the following summer, but additional 

changes in TUSAFG priorities and a modification of the proposed location of the 

runway delayed grading for the runway until April 1952. Construction of Quonset 

huts and erection of prefabricated hangars advanced simultaneously.41

Broadening Military Construction Under the U.S. Engineer Group

Late in 1950, it became clear that Congress would approve the Air Force’s 

expanded construction program for Turkey. With this new appropriation, the Air 

Force planned an entirely new airfield, later known as Incirlik Air Base, near Adana. 

Specific information about the Adana project had reached TUSEG early in 1951, 

38 Memo to Ch of Engrs, 3 Nov 50, sub: Inspection of [TUSEG], and Memo [in Reply], Lt Col 

Arthur H. Frye Jr., 20 Nov 50, both in Mil Files XII-4-1, OH, HQ USACE. 39 Memo, Col F. F. Frech, 7 Dec 50; MFR, Brig Gen G. J. Nold, 11 Dec 50, sub: Turkey Project 

(Telephone Call to Colonel Frech); GO no. 17, 29 Nov 50, sub: Change in Jurisdiction of U.S. Engineer 

Group in Ankara, Turkey; all in Mil Files XII-4-1, OH, HQ USACE. 40 Memo, Lt Col William G. Steffey, 20 Jun 51, sub: Narrative Report on Status of Construction, 

Report Control ENGKM-21 (16 May–15 June 1951), Mil Files XII-33-9, OH, HQ USACE; TUSEG 

Construction Synopsis as of 1 Aug 52, pp. 2, 6–7; “History of the Mediterranean Division,” [Apr 57], 

box 19, access. no. 77-92-0002, Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md. 41 Memo, Steffey, 20 Jun 51, p. 5; TUSEG Construction Synopsis as of 1 Aug 52, p. 10. 
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 25

allowing staff to initiate planning and reconnaissance surveys. On 28 February 1951, 

the directive for the facilities arrived; TUSEG established an area office at Adana 

the following week. Based on the information gathered through the advance work, 

design began for a runway, taxiways, aprons, hardstands, and a drainage system. 

TUSEG negotiated with Metcalf-Hamilton-Grove for the additional construction and 

by 1953 had added $15 million in construction to the original 1950 contract.42

Construction crews set up Quonset huts as a campsite and for temporary use as 

operations buildings. By June 1951, they had completed twenty-six huts; five more 

were under construction for use as a hospital, a recreation hall, and living quarters. 

The contractor continued to build housing, shops, roads, a railroad spur, utilities, 

and other facilities to support a future contingent of 1,365 airmen. Because of the 

high priority assigned to work at Adana, Metcalf-Hamilton-Grove diverted a major 

portion of its personnel, equipment, and effort to rapid construction of the facilities 

there. Over the summer of 1951, much of the equipment needed for the construction 

arrived at a port seventy-five miles southeast on the Mediterranean. The contractor 

completed construction of the concrete runways in May 1952.43

In June 1952, the U.S. Air Force Group added a second new airfield to the 

construction program. TUSAFG selected a site at Batman after a reconnaissance 

trip that included representatives of TUSAFG, TUSEG, and the Turkish Air Force. 

The contractor conducted surveys for runways there in late June. In mid-August, 

TUSAFG issued a directive for design and construction to include a paved runway, 

taxiways, parking aprons, and a hydrant system for aviation fuel.44

The Army engineers initiated design work in February 1951 for two other sites 

named in the original directive: Bandirma and Kayseri. At Bandirma, on the southern 

coast of the Sea of Marmara, the contractor completed laying asphalt on existing 

runways on 9 June. With paving work at Bandirma completed, the construction 

crews dismantled the asphalt plant and moved it to Balikesir.45

At the Kayseri field, the Air Force suspended work in May 1951 because of 

poor approach angles for landing and takeoff.46 The contractor had built one hangar 

and paved a small area of apron; but in March 1952, the Air Force canceled the 

Kayseri project completely. Similarly, at Afyonkarahisar, where design had begun 

on housing for the Turkish Air Force in January 1951, the Air Force suspended 

work in May 1951 and then canceled the project in March 1952. One other project, 

at Erzincan, also dropped out of the construction program. At Merzifon, another of 

the original sites, design work began in July 1951.47

42 McBride, “Brief History,” p. 10; TUSEG Construction Synopsis as of 1 Aug 52, pp. 9–10; Memo, 

Steffey, 20 Jun 51, p. 2. 43 Ibid. 44 TUSEG Construction Synopsis as of 1 Aug 52, p. 12. 45 McBride, “Brief History,” p. 10; TUSEG Construction Synopsis as of 1 Aug 52, pp. 2–3, 

11–12. 46 Memo, Steffey, 20 Jun 51, p. 1. 47 McBride, “Brief History,” p. 10; TUSEG Construction Synopsis as of 1 Aug 52, pp. 2–3, 11–12, 

14–15. 
26 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Administrative and Procedural Issues in Turkey

The expanding and changing scope of the construction program introduced for 

Turkey in 1951 exacerbated problems and created complications for TUSEG and 

Metcalf-Hamilton-Grove. The contractor had to revise personnel and recruitment 

plans. Turkish suppliers could not meet the new requirements for cement, and 

Metcalf-Hamilton-Grove had to seek new suppliers and sign new contracts in 

Europe. The Air Force’s added construction demanded more equipment, which the 

contractor had to procure from sources in the United States. The Turkish government 

had to purchase additional land, arrange rights of way, and find new sources of 

aggregate. All these issues complicated the administration of a program that had 

originated before the outbreak of the Korean War as a peacetime undertaking. By 

1951, pressure increased on the staffs of TUSEG and the contractor to speed up 

progress on the work and to advance the completion dates.48

The Korean conflict stimulated construction in the United States and in strategic 

locations abroad. This made labor, equipment, and materials more expensive 

and harder to acquire. Competent engineers and managers who might have been 

available for work in Turkey received attractive opportunities elsewhere. The fate 

of construction equipment located in Newfoundland illustrates the problem that 

the pressure of combat in Korea created for procurement. The engineers in Turkey 

had assurances that they would receive the equipment as work in Newfoundland 

diminished; but with the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the scope of work in 

Newfoundland expanded and the equipment stayed there. The contractor in Turkey 

had to rush orders for similar equipment to manufacturers in the United States. The 

manufacturers, of course, had a flood of comparable orders from other jobs.49

Additionally, communications between personnel in the field and the administrative offices maintained by TUSEG or the contractor in Ankara were virtually 

impossible. Local mail service was unreliable; telegraph service proved equally 

unsatisfactory. Placing a telephone call from Ankara to the field could take from one 

to three days. Telephone calls to the United States were rare because the chances of 

making a connection were small. Radio equipment might have alleviated the isolation 

within Turkey, but the Turkish government resisted assigning radio channels to 

foreign military units. The communications problems increased the general sense 

of frustration among the staff and put a greater burden of responsibility on the field 

personnel.50

Living conditions in Ankara were stark. The Americans lived on the local 

economy because no government quarters existed. In general, housing in Turkey 

offered shelter but little comfort. At construction sites, employees sometimes lived in 

mud huts that were hot in the summer and cold in the winter. Hotel accommodations 

in smaller cities were marginal. One contract employee wrote that the first sentence he 

48 TUSEG Hist, p. 7. 49 Ibid., pp. 7–8. 50 McBride, “Brief History,” pp. 17–18; Memo, Steffey, 20 Jun 51, p. 10.
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 27

had spoken completely in Turkish had been “There is a rat in my room!”51 Americans 

purchased day-to-day provisions from the local economy, but they depended on the 

Sears, Roebuck catalog for clothing. The U.S. military provided only a small canteen 

in Ankara, and other locations had no military support facilities. Water shortages 

and fuel rationing were common. Whether in spite of these hardships or because 

of them, the Americans maintained remarkably high morale and developed close 

relationships among one another.52

The workforce for design and construction in Turkey was small, and the numbers 

remained relatively constant. (See Table 1.) To supplement the labor force, Turkish 

troops occasionally worked on TUSEG projects.53

By the end of the summer of 1952, construction scheduled under the initial 

program was virtually complete at Balikesir, Bandirma, and Diyarbakir. Construction 

for the field near Adana was at 75 percent completion, and Eskisehir was over half 

complete. The Air Force, however, had canceled projects at Kayseri, Erzincan, and 

Afyonkarahisar; no construction had begun at either Merzifon or Batman.54

U.S. aid to Turkey in the early 1950s sought to provide the country with the 

means to resist a Soviet attack and to manage a holding action against the Red 

Army should an attack occur. The work managed by U.S. Army engineers through 

TUSEG supported these strategic objectives. The air bases on which TUSEG worked 

remained under the authority of the Turkish Air Force; American personnel used 

them with the permission of the Turkish military and government.55 In 1951, to 

attach Turkey more firmly to the Western security system, NATO members invited 

Turkey to join the alliance. Turkey accepted; in early 1952, NATO expanded its 

membership and security perimeter by simultaneously incorporating Turkey and 

Greece as new members. 

In June 1952, Col. Bruno L. Jakaitis succeeded Colonel Frye as TUSEG 

commander. Work under the 1950–1951 programs neared completion, but Jakaitis 

received hints that additional work might come from NATO. This created a 

dilemma for TUSEG and for the contractor: The existing volume of work no longer 

justified the levels of personnel and equipment on hand. Although there was no 

commitment for additional work, the Air Force urged that the construction crews 

and the equipment be retained at TUSEG’s disposal. The issue remained open 

during 1953. In May 1954, TUSEG became part of the Joint Construction Agency 

(JCA), headquartered in France, which supervised and managed construction in 

51 John D. Tumpane, Scotch and Holy Water (Lafayette, Calif.: St. Giles Press, 1987), p. 3. 52 McBride, “Brief History,” pp. 16–17; Interv, Stuart Rochester with Maj Gen (Ret) Daniel A. 

Raymond and Barbara L. Raymond, 9, 11 Jan 80, p. 29. 53 USTAP [United States Technical Assistance and Productivity Program] Rpt no. 64, 31 Mar 52, 

sub: The U.S. Engineer Group, Progress Report for March 1952, an. 4; Col Bruno L. Jakaitis, an. 4 to 

USTAP Rpt no. 67, [Jun 52], sub: TUSEG, Progress Rpt for June 1952, p. 3; both in Mil Files XII-34, 

OH, HQ USACE. Memo, Steffey, 20 Jun 51, p. 2. 54 TUSEG Construction Synopsis as of 1 Aug 52, pp. 14–15; Memo, Steffey, 20 Jun 51, p. 6. 55 McBride, “Brief History,” p. 19; Melvyn P. Leffler, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: 

The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945–1952,” Journal of American History (March 1985): 

807–25. 
28 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

NATO host countries.56 Work in Turkey continued as a JCA responsibility under 

the European Command. 

The Middle East District in Libya and Saudi Arabia, 1950–1951

Even before the Korean War, the U.S. defense establishment had formulated 

plans and taken steps to accelerate the rehabilitation and expansion of existing 

airfields in Turkey. The outbreak of the Korean conflict created additional imperatives to expand the American military presence overseas. By 1950, the American 

policy of national security relied heavily on the U.S. Air Force’s capacity to 

discharge atomic bombs on the Soviet Union. Deterrence thus made positioning 

56 McBride, “Brief History,” pp. 1, 5. Memos, Col Bruno L. Jakaitis, 12 Feb 52, sub: Disposal of 

USAF-MDAP Construction Equipment in Turkey; Col Frank X. Krebs, 15 Aug 52, sub: Disposal of 

USAF-MDAP Construction Equipment in Turkey; Brig Gen John R. Hardin, 27 Aug 52, sub: Funds 

for Construction in Turkey; Col William E. Leonhard, 4 Sep 52, sub: Funds for Construction in Turkey; 

all in Mil Files XII-34, OH, HQ USACE. 

Table 1—Personnel Engaged in Turkish Air-Base Construction Program

15 June 1951 1 March 1952 30 June 1952

The U.S. Engineer Group

Officers 4 6 5

U.S. nationals 57 57 52

Other 19 25 23

TUSEG Subtotal 80 88 80

Contractor

U.S. nationals 277 246 176

Other 3 — —

Indigenous 2,170 2,641 2,242

Contractor Subtotal 2,450 2,887 2,418

Total Employed 2,530 2,975 2,498

Source: Adapted from Memo, Lt Col William G. Steffey, 20 Jun 51, sub: Narrative Report on 

Status of Construction, Report Control ENGKM-21 (16 May–15 June 1951), p. 2, Mil Files 

XII-33-9; USTAP [United States Technical Assistance and Productivity Program] Rpt no. 64, 

31 Mar 52, sub: The U.S. Engineer Group, Progress Report for March 1952, an. 4, Mil Files 

XII-34; Col Bruno L. Jakaitis, an. 4 to USTAP Rpt no. 67, [Jun 52], sub: TUSEG, Progress Rpt 

for June 1952, p. 3, Mil Files XII-34; all in Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Alexandria, Va.
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 29

U.S. airpower within flight distance of that country critically important. Libya and 

Saudi Arabia, which offered strategic locations on either side of Egypt and the 

Suez Canal, became part of the plan to expand the U.S. Air Force overseas. The 

Corps of Engineers organized the Middle East District to manage U.S. military 

construction in the region.

In 1950, the U.S. Air Force already had operating bases in both Libya and Saudi 

Arabia. The base near Tripoli, Libya, built in 1923, had been Italian but was captured 

by U.S. forces in 1943. (See Map 4.) Used by the Army Air Corps until the end of 

the war, the base was renamed in 1945 after Lt. Richard Wheelus, who had been 

killed on a training flight earlier that year. When the U.S. military withdrew from 

the base in June 1947, the British, who held Libya as a UN protectorate, remained. 

In February 1948, the U.S. Air Force returned, reactivated the base, and rededicated 

it as Wheelus Air Base.57

The American presence at the airfield in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, also dated back 

to World War II. (See Map 5.) In 1942, the Japanese cut air routes from Hawaii across 

the Pacific to the China-Burma-India Theater. The United States therefore shifted 

its supply efforts to a South Atlantic trans-African route through Cairo, Iraq, and 

Iran to Karachi to distribute materiel throughout the China-Burma-India Theater. 

Looking to shorten the route, the Army Air Forces recognized the advantages of 

the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The United States had few diplomatic or commercial 

relations with the Saudis; but during 1943, the two nations developed diplomatic 

contacts and concluded a treaty of friendship. The United States received permission 

to survey a route across the country. King Abdulaziz ibn Saud, who had unified 

the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula into Saudi Arabia in the 1920s and 1930s, 

granted permission to the United States to locate an airfield in the kingdom. The 

survey showed that the small airfield built by the Arabian-American Oil Company 

(ARAMCO) near its administrative offices in Dhahran was the best site. A military 

installation there would save about two hundred air miles over the customary route 

from Cairo to Karachi. The war ended before the airfield was completed, but the 

U.S. Army Air Corps retained a presence there. In January 1946, construction to 

expand the facilities at Dhahran began; a month later, the Air Corps activated a 

military installation at the site. By May, air traffic between Cairo, Dhahran, and 

other sites in the Middle East had begun. In June 1946, the U.S. Air Force’s Air 

Transport Command (ATC) flew forty-four flights out of Dhahran and Trans World 

Airlines another twenty flights.58

57 R. L. Swetzer, Wheelus Field: The Story of the U.S. Air Force in Libya, The Early Days, 1944–

1952 (Ramstein, Germany: Historical Division, Office of Information, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, 

1965), pp. 1–12; George M. Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab 

States, Part II: Egypt, The Sudan, Yemen and Libya (New York: Robert Speller & Sons Publishers 

Inc., 1973), p. 311. 58 Ofc of History, U.S. Air Force, “Historical Data Pertaining to Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia,” 

n.d., R&D File no. 2477; HQ, Strategic Air Command, Intel Brief no. 28, 1 Dec 47, sub: Dhahran, Saudi 

Arabia; both at Office of Air Force History Library, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. 
30 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Between 1946 and 1950, ATC and United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) 

alternately commanded units stationed at the Dhahran airfield. Relations between 

the United States and Saudi Arabia cooled during these years because the Truman 

administration supported the creation of the state of Israel in Palestinian territory. 

Nonetheless, in June 1949, the governments of the United States and Saudi Arabia 

concluded an agreement that defined limited use of the Dhahran airfield by the U.S. 

Air Force. The field remained under Saudi military command although American 

aircraft booked 4,992 takeoffs and landings there in 1949, over half of which were 

by C–47s and C–54s.59

When the Air Force apprised the chief of engineers, General Pick, of its plans 

for Libya and Saudi Arabia, Pick designated Col. Paul D. Troxler to establish the 

Middle East District. Troxler had directed construction during the war at the field 

that became Wheelus Air Base and between 1947 and 1949 had served as deputy 

district engineer in Greece. On 12 September 1950, Pick ordered Troxler to report 

to the assistant chief of military construction to receive a briefing on the proposed 

mission in Libya and Saudi Arabia. The British Foreign Office quickly approved 

the American request for six hundred acres of land adjacent to Wheelus field, giving 

the U.S. Air Force a base in Libya.60

Preliminary Planning and Mobilization

Between September and November 1950, Colonel Troxler identified design 

and construction contractors to execute the overseas construction program. For 

preliminary design work, he chose Knappen-Tippetts-Abbett Engineering Company 

(KTA) of New York. On 27 November, he led a party on a three-week trip to 

Wheelus and Dhahran to prepare an engineer reconnaissance report. The advance 

party included Tippetts and another engineer from KTA; the prospective area 

engineer for Dhahran, Col. T. F. Airis; the proposed supply officer for the Middle 

East District; and Troxler. The initial outline of projects estimated $12.22 million 

of work at Wheelus for the Military Air Transport Service (MATS, the Air Force’s 

successor to the Air Transport Command) in fiscal year (FY) 1951 and another 

$48.86 million for FY 1952. The estimate for Dhahran for the MATS and the 

Strategic Air Command was $10.5 million for FY 1951 and $30.1 million for FY 

59 Thomas S. Snyder and Shelia A. Shaw, United States Air Forces in Europe, Historical Highlights, 

1942–1992 (Ramstein, Germany: Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, 1993), pp. 34, 37; Ofc of 

Info Svcs, HQ, 2d Air Div, United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), “Saudi Arabia: Information 

Pamphlet,” 1 Aug 59, p. 6, box 15, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC (hereafter cited as Saudi Arabia 

Info Pam). On the frequency of use by American aircraft in 1949, see Col Paul D. Troxler, Rpt on 

Test Result Data for Airfield Pavement Eval, Dhahran Airfield, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, Jan 52, no. 

77-84-2400, box 61, Transatlantic Division–Records Holding Area (TAD-RHA), Winchester, Va. 60 “Historical Summary, Middle East District, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army (Period 25 June 

1950–8 September 1951),” p. 1 (hereafter cited as Middle East Dist Hist Sum, Jun 50–Sep 51), in 

OCE, Hist Sum, 1950–1951; Swetzer, Wheelus Field, p. 5; Memo, Col Fred O. Easley Jr., 10 Mar 51, 

sub: Conference on Land Requirements, Wheelus Field, Mil Files XII-30-3, OH, HQ USACE. The 

Middle East District was officially activated on 1 January 1951.
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 31

1952. The program also anticipated work at several other sites, mainly in Libya; 

but those projects had a lower priority.61

The day after Christmas 1950, Colonel Troxler received authorization from the 

chief of engineers to issue a letter contract to KTA for a more complete design at 

Wheelus Air Base. Similarly, on 3 January 1951, he received approval to issue a 

contract to Fluor Corporation Ltd. of Los Angeles, California, for construction of 

facilities at Dhahran. Fluor held contracts with the Arab American Oil Company 

61 Middle East Dist Hist Sum, Jun 50–Sep 51, pp. 1–2.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

G ulf of Sir t e

TRIPOLI

WHEELUS AIR BASE

MIŞRĀTAH (MISURATA)

BANGHĀZĪ (BENGHAZI)

Ghadāmis

Murzuq

Ghāt

Darnah (Dérna)

Tobruk

A L G E R I A

E G Y P T

TUNISIA

FRENCH

WEST AFRIC A

FRENCH

EQU A T ORIAL

AFRIC A SUD A N

LIBYA

MIDDLE EAST DISTRICT

1956

Middle East District Headquarters

Air Base

USAF Air Control and Warning Station

0

0 100 200 300 Miles

100 200 300 Kilometers

Map 4
32 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

for planning and construction, so it already had a presence in Saudi Arabia; the 

Dhahran airfield was adjacent to the ARAMCO oilfields.62

The Military Air Transport Service had signed a contract earlier with KTA to 

prepare a master plan for Wheelus and Dhahran, but the master plan proved impossible to formulate. Air Force instructions were to build facilities with a ten-year life 

expectancy, but the Air Force had no fixed set of requirements in January 1951. Over 

the next year, it changed requirements for the two fields frequently and radically. 

The changes made it extremely difficult, slow, and costly for KTA—or anyone—to 

follow through on many of the specific line item tasks.63

62 Ibid., pp. 4–5; “History of the Mediterranean Division,” [ca. 1957], pp. 29–30, box 19, access. 

no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 63 Middle East Dist Hist Sum, Jun 50–Sep 51, pp. 2, 4–5, 14–15.

DHAHRAN

R E D S E A

G U L F O F A D E N

G U L F O F O M A N

S OCOT RA

E G Y P T E G Y P T

S U D A N

YEME N

ADEN PR O T E C T O R A T E

I R A Q

IRAN

IRAN

OMAN

Q ATA R

BAHRAIN

K U WAI T

ISRAEL

E T HIOPIA

J O R D A N

O

M

A N

T R U C I A L O M A N

FRENCH TERRITO R Y

OF AFARS AND ISSA

RIYADH Medina

Mecca

Ad Dammām

SAUDI ARABIA

MIDDLE EAST DISTRICT

1950s

Air Base

0

0 300 Miles

300 Kilometers

Map 5
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 33

On 4 January 1951, Troxler and KTA personnel traveled to Andrews Air 

Force Base near Washington, D.C., to meet with representatives from USAF 

headquarters, from MATS, and from the Office of the Chief of Engineers to review 

the available information and the program in general. The preliminary data from 

the reconnaissance trip and the early stipulations of the program provided a general 

framework for construction at Wheelus Air Base. KTA’s architect-engineers had 

begun design on six projects: a warehouse, the water supply, family housing, a 

power system, night lighting, and a global communications installation. They had 

not yet received the directive for the project to which the Air Force assigned its 

top priority—widening, strengthening, lengthening the runway to measure 11,000 

by 200 feet, and laying the supporting taxiways.64

After the January meeting, KTA’s architect-engineers continued to prepare 

sketches, layout plans, and cost estimates for these seven projects. Eventually, a 

150-bed hospital also became a part of the facilities at Wheelus. With distressing 

frequency the Air Force changed designs, rejected KTA’s proposed designs, 

or introduced new criteria that the contractor had to incorporate. Between 18 

January and August 1951, Troxler recorded thirty-seven changes for Wheelus. 

In roughly the same period, plans for facilities at Dhahran underwent thirty-one 

changes.65

Mindful of the Air Force’s insistence on expediency, Troxler planned the initial 

work around certain assumptions. First, the construction contractors would have 

to ship all equipment to the job sites; they could not count on finding equipment 

available in the area. Second, the contractors would be able to find unskilled labor 

in the country but skilled labor had to come from the United States. From the 

preliminary survey trip, Troxler assumed that good building materials would be 

available locally or from European markets. Finally, using data from the designers 

and the initial survey, Troxler projected three months to assemble the equipment 

and personnel and nine months to complete the initial phase of construction.66

Throughout the winter and early spring, Troxler worked with the Corps of 

Engineers’ North Atlantic Division and with the contractors to prepare for the 

construction programs in Libya and Saudi Arabia. On 2 February 1951, he issued a 

letter contract for construction in Libya to the joint venture of Crow-Steers-Shepherd 

(CSS), comprised of William L. Crow Construction Company and J. Rich Steers Inc., 

both of New York, and Shepherd Construction Company Inc. of Atlanta, Georgia. 

64 For this and the following paragraph, see Knappen-Tippetts-Abbett Engineering Co. (KTA), 

Prelim Rpt, 15 Jan 51, sub: Improvement of Wheelus Air Force Base, Tripoli, Warehouse, box 56, 

77-84-2400, TAD-RHA; “Chronological History, Middle East District (Through 30 April 1953),” p. 

3, box 51-83-8379, Richard T. Farrell Papers, OH, HQ USACE; “Air Force Directive to the Chief 

of Engineers Concerning the Work on the Runway at Wheelus,” 8 Jan 51, box 51-83-8379, OH, HQ 

USACE. 65 Middle East Dist Hist Sum, Jun 50–Sep 51, pp. 5–5e; Memo, Lt Col Robert M. Tarbox, 6 Mar 

51, sub: Wheelus Field—Additional Work, Mil Files XII-30, OH, HQ USACE. 66 KTA, Prelim Rpt, 15 Jan 51; “Chronological History, Middle East District (Through 30 April 

1953).” 
34 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

The letter contract, to be converted to a definitive cost-plus-fixed-fee contract within 

ninety days, designated $1.25 million in construction work.67

Construction in Libya

In mid-February 1951, four months after preparatory work had begun, the Air Force 

sent to the chief of engineers preliminary specifications for the work on the runway at 

Wheelus Air Base. The Air Force instructed the designers that “any siting data and/or 

functional and operational characteristics needed to base design which are not furnished 

in these instructions will be obtained from the Installation Commander.” So great was 

the premium on speed that the architect-engineer firm had barely two weeks to work on 

the design phase before construction began. On 1 March, Crow-Steers-Shepherd started 

work to extend the runway by 2,000 feet using construction equipment borrowed from the 

Air Force.68 The first construction equipment for CSS, 770 tons, arrived from the United 

States at the port of Tripoli on 29 March with government-owned camp equipment and 

construction materials. A ship arrived on 4 April from Yugoslavia laden with 50,000 

bags (2,300 metric tons) of cement. Another ship reached Tripoli on 11 May with 2,000 

tons of heavy equipment and general cargo.69

As construction began in Libya, Troxler and his district staff in New York City 

operated out of temporary offices borrowed from the North Atlantic Division. Troxler 

had to coax the Air Force into providing the money needed to keep construction on 

schedule. In early April, after his requests for an immediate transfer of $182,000 

had produced only $100,000 for the acquisition of land, Troxler asked for help from 

the chief of engineers. Unless the Air Force took immediate action, Troxler pointed 

out, a lack of funds would delay construction seriously. The money continued to 

come, but haltingly; the Air Force never managed to provide a steady flow of funds 

for the program.70

The district headquarters opened in Libya on 4 May 1951 at Porta Benito, where 

British military forces provided space. On 15 May, General Pick issued the order 

making Troxler’s appointment as district engineer permanent.71

By late June, the Libyan project faced another complication. Cargo ships, 

whose arrival had been infrequent during the early months of construction, began 

67 Memo, Col William C. Ready, 12 Feb 52, sub: Authority to Issue a Letter Contract, Mil Files 

XII-30, OH, HQ USACE; “Chronological History, Middle East District (Through 30 April 1953).” 68 Quotation from Memo, 13 Feb 51, sub: Authorization—Design and Construction of Airfield 

Pavement and Parking Apron, Wheelus Field, Tripoli, Libya, unmarked box, Karl C. Dod Papers, 

OH, HQ USACE; Middle East Dist Hist Sum, Jun 50–Sep 51, p. 9. 69 “Chronological History, Middle East District (Through 30 April 1953),” pp. 47–48b-2. 70 Memo, Col Paul D. Troxler, 11 Apr 51, sub: Procurement of Real Estate, Wheelus Field, Tripoli, 

Libya, Mil Files XII-30-3, OH, HQ USACE. For the recurrent delays, see “Chronological History, 

Middle East District (Through 30 April 1953),” pp. 3a, 3d, 48a–48b-1a; Memo, OCE to Chief of Staff 

(CS), United States Air Force (USAF), 7 Jan 52, sub: 1952 Funds for Construction at Wheelus Air 

Force Base, Mil Files XII-30, OH, HQ USACE. 71 Middle East Dist Hist Sum, Jun 50–Sep 51, p. 9; “Chronological History, Middle East District 

(Through 30 April 1953),” p. 1. 
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 35

arriving with a frequency that overtaxed the limited harbor facilities at Tripoli. The 

shipments included asphalt, dynamite, equipment, general cargo, and much-needed 

vehicles. At Troxler’s request, the U.S. Army Transportation Corps sent an officer 

to survey the port and its operations. Based on the officer’s report, a detachment of 

Transportation Corps specialists arrived in Tripoli to aid operations.72

72 Ibid. 

Concrete was poured over steel reinforcement to construct the arch for a drainage culvert 

at Wheelus Air Base.
36 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

As Troxler had predicted, assembling the labor force presented a problem. 

Although local workers cost very little in wages—the equivalent of $0.55 to $1.40 

a day—they lacked the skills needed to execute the construction. As a result, the 

project imported skilled laborers and craftsmen from other countries, principally 

from Italy and Malta. The British administration, acting under United Nations 

authority as a caretaker government while the Libyans organized self-rule, raised 

no objections to non-Libyan labor. As of 1 September 1951, with 41 percent of the 

construction programmed for 1951 at Wheelus field completed, the project employed 

2,162 people.73 (See Table 2.)

Construction in Saudi Arabia

The Middle East District encountered numerous problems in organizing the 

military construction at Dhahran. First, the diplomatic situation inhibited the 

commencement of work. Because the construction represented an expansion of 

American privileges beyond the 1949 agreement with Saudi Arabia, the parties 

needed a new agreement. The U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia conducted the 

negotiations, assisted by the commanding general of the U.S. forces assigned to 

the Dhahran Air Transport Station. The ambassador and the State Department 

73 Middle East Dist Hist Sum, Jun 50–Sep 51, p. 10. 

For the communications center, under construction at Wheelus Air Base in August 1951, 

native limestone blocks were placed to the first bond beam level and reinforced steel was 

used for a section of the bond beam.
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 37

feared that any influx of American military personnel, construction personnel, or 

equipment while the negotiations proceeded would offend the Saudis and complicate 

the bargaining, so they urged that the advance party remain small.74

Another factor dictated a small advance party: Dhahran had very few facilities 

and could offer little support to an incoming construction force. With these factors 

in mind, Colonel Troxler selected only three people to gather data in the field. On 30 

May, Saudi Arabia and the United States reached a level of agreement sufficient to 

allow the ambassador to approve a more visible operation. With clearance from the 

U.S. commanding general at Dhahran, Troxler authorized construction of additional 

billets for district and contractor personnel and sent people to Saudi Arabia as the 

billets became available. On 18 June 1951, the two governments signed an agreement 

renewing and extending usage rights of the Air Force at the Dhahran airfield.75

To speed construction of facilities, the district shipped to Dhahran about 320 

tons of Quonset huts, knockdown warehouses, and other materials for a construction 

camp, labeling the shipments as Air Force supplies. The district personnel also 

spent considerable time securing air-conditioning equipment, a necessity in almost 

all structures because temperatures of 130 ̊F were common at Dhahran. As a result 

of the early shipment and procurement of equipment and supplies, construction 

crews had the camp about 75 percent complete by September 1951. As late as 

October, however, the lack of air-conditioning units for quarters made recruitment of 

construction personnel more difficult.76 (See Table 3.) Despite the austere conditions, 

recruitment succeeded in staffing the project. 

Construction on the main facilities for Dhahran had barely gotten underway by 

September 1951. Fluor had begun two permanent barracks for the Air Force and had 

initiated work on a parking apron adjacent to the runway. Even this modest progress 

depended on Fluor’s established relationship with ARAMCO; the contractor rented 

a good portion of its equipment from the oil company.77

A number of problems complicated development and retention of an effective 

labor force in Saudi Arabia. Local workers could do rough masonry and carpentry, 

but practically no skilled native craftsmen worked in the area of Dhahran. ARAMCO 

had trained a small number of Saudis as mechanics and equipment operators but 

needed all of them for its own program. The Muslim workers’ productivity dropped 

significantly during Ramadan, the month of religious fasting, and during the period 

of recovery after the fasting. The severe summer temperatures made prolonged 

physical exertion outdoors a serious health risk, thus affecting productivity for 

another six months of the year. The civilians working with the Corps of Engineers 

74 Ibid., p. 11. 75 Ibid., pp. 11–12; Saudi Arabia Info Pam, 1 Aug 59, foreword, pp. 6–7. 76 Middle East Dist Hist Sum, Jun 50–Sep 51, p. 12. See also “Engineer Division Mediterranean: 

Information Booklet,” 15 Aug 59, p. 7, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited as Engr Div 

Mediterranean Info Booklet: 1959); Karl F. Bobzien, Rpt of Inspection (OCE) Dhahran Area, Middle 

East District, 15 Oct 51, p. 2, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE. 77 Middle East Dist Hist Sum, Jun 50–Sep 51, pp. 12–13.
38 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

and the contractor came under the Islamic Sharie Court and local tribal law, the 

severity of which inhibited recruitment of American civilians.78

As with the program for Wheelus, construction at Dhahran suffered from 

frequent changes requested by the Air Force. The Air Force redefined the mission 

of the Dhahran base three times in 1951. The changes in the projected population 

of the base and in the facilities required to execute the changing missions forced 

substantial redesigns, and the estimated costs jumped from $9.4 million to $19.1 

million.79

Administrative Issues at Wheelus and at Dhahran

Certain practices and procedures characterized the Middle East District’s 

supervision of construction at both Wheelus and Dhahran. The prime contractor 

on both jobs used local subcontractors, supervised all construction activities, and 

provided a substantial portion of the equipment and all imported materials such as 

plumbing, lighting fixtures, and mill work. Throughout the district, contractors used 

78 Ibid., pp. 13–14. 79 Ibid.

Contractors used native limestone in the construction of family housing at Wheelus Air 

Base, September 1951.
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 39

asphaltic concrete, often laid on macadam, for paving. The prime contractor’s own 

labor force had to install the imported materials and lay all the paving.80

In Libya, acquiring land for U.S. military facilities represented a delicate 

problem. Arab attitudes toward land and tenacity in holding onto it made long-term 

leases more palatable than outright purchases. The need to resettle tenants required 

land acquisition away from the bases and provision of huts and water wells for the 

resettled people. Complicating matters further, many Muslims viewed Americans 

and Englishmen with skepticism and even distrust, especially because the U.S. and 

U.K. governments supported the new state of Israel. By contrast, relations between 

American and the local British elements of the caretaker government established 

as a result of the UN trusteeship were far better. The British cooperated with Air 

Force personnel to acquire the land. In Saudi Arabia, although the same Muslim 

mistrust of Westerners existed, treaty provisions covering the acquisition of desert 

land eased the difficulties.81

Changes in the requirements defined by the Air Force, the using service, hindered 

construction programs in both Libya and Saudi Arabia. A part of the difficulty derived 

from internal conflicts within the Air Force. Five separate—at times competing—Air 

Force agencies had direct interests in the construction supervised by the Middle East 

District: the Military Air Transport Service, the Strategic Air Command, the Airways 

and Air Communications Service (AACS), U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and USAF 

headquarters in Washington. The multiple interests among the various echelons of 

command delayed and confused the coordination of requirements for construction. 

The attempt to develop master plans simultaneously with the progress of construction 

added to the confusion. Only in late December 1951, nearly a year after work on 

80 Ibid. 81 Ibid., p. 16. 

Table 2—Personnel Employed in Wheelus Air Base Construction

Program, 1 September 1951

Middle East District Office U.S. personnel 44

Knappen-Tippetts-Abbett Engineering Company 23

Crow-Steers-Shepherd 204

Native/local nationals 1,875

Other foreign nationals 16

Total 2,162

Source: Adapted from Office of the Chief of Engineers, “Historical Summary, 1950–1951,” p. 10, 

Gen Files 2-1, Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alexandria, Va.
40 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Wheelus had begun, did the design contractor, Knappen-Tippetts-Abbett, receive 

a copy of an approved, revised master plan.82

Change orders disrupted the coherent execution of the construction program. 

When the Air Force revised the layout of a taxiway at Wheelus, running it through 

storage sheds and shops used by the contractor, the Middle East District staff had to 

arrange additional space to accommodate the displaced contractor. Fortunately, the 

British could provide a barracks that they were vacating; but the taxiway construction 

had to wait until the British completed their new quarters. Such situations wasted 

effort, added to costs, and created a sense of frustration among the people trying to 

respond to the Air Force’s pressure for quick results.83

Similarly, the Air Force’s inability to provide a continuous and dependable 

flow of funding led to additional costs, confusion, and demoralization. At one point, 

Colonel Troxler asked Crow-Steers-Shepherd to prepare new working estimates for 

all projects in the 1951 construction program in Libya. Troxler planned to use the new 

estimates to revise the monthly reports on construction progress and cost summary 

that tracked the work. CSS calculated their estimates on two sets of assumptions. 

First, they applied all overhead and indirect costs exclusively to the 1951 program in 

Libya in the event that they did not receive 1952 funds. Alternatively, they divided 

the overhead and indirect costs between the 1951 and 1952 programs. Given the 

sporadic flow of funds from the Air Force, the two calculations seemed prudent; 

but preparing two estimates compounded administrative costs. On the basis of the 

revised cost estimates, Troxler sent a request on 6 September 1951 to the chief of 

engineers appealing once again for help to secure outstanding funds from the Air 

Force. To cover existing deficiencies of funds, Troxler asked for $3.5 million. He 

requested a minimum of at least $1.3 million so that procurement could proceed 

82 Ibid., pp. 15–16. 83 “Chronological History, Middle East District (Through 30 April 1953),” pp. 3f, 11c; Middle 

East Dist Hist Sum, Jun 50–Sep 51, pp. 15–16.

Table 3—Personnel Employed in Construction

Program at Dhahran, September 1951

Middle East District (1 military, 11 civilians) 12

Fluor Corporation (Americans) 66

Local contractor personnel 533

Third-country nationals 21

Total 632

Source: Adapted from Office of the Chief of Engineers, “Historical Summary, 1950–1951,” 

p. 12, Gen Files 2-1, Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Alexandria, Va.
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 41

without further delay. In November, Troxler had to advance $45,000 from the 

district’s own budget to the Wheelus project to avoid halting the procurement of 

land and idling men and equipment.84

Procuring construction materials proved very difficult. All steel items, particularly if they had to be fabricated, required lead times of nine to twelve months. 

Specialized building materials and electrical materials such as generators and cables 

required the same lead time. All items had to be processed through an American port, 

and then the ocean voyage took three to six weeks. Delays increased when plans 

changed, the mission underwent revision, or modifications occurred. The frequency 

of such changes made ordering all the more difficult in a market for construction 

goods made tight by the economic boom induced by the Korean War.85

Recruiting qualified civilian personnel proved challenging in the face of the 

increased tempo of military construction and civilian production in the early 1950s. 

The Middle East District faced an acute shortage of qualified personnel for project 

design, for construction work, and for administrative tasks, especially those associated with CPFF contracts. The shortages of personnel increased the burden and the 

range of the responsibilities of personnel from Corps of Engineers districts.86

CPFF contracts characterized the military construction throughout the 

Mediterranean region in the early 1950s. The lack of specific plans from which to 

derive firm estimates, coupled with the imperative to begin construction quickly 

and deliver projects early, made CPFF contracts almost mandatory. For supervisory 

personnel, these contracts imposed a more burdensome system of checks and controls 

to govern expenditures and monitor property than did lump-sum or unit-price 

contracts. The costs of managing CPFF contracts overseas were far higher than 

comparable costs in the United States.87

The necessity of simultaneously conducting the normally sequential phases of 

mobilization, planning, and initiation of construction also brought administrative 

complications. To permit the district engineer and his staff to supervise a CPFF 

contract properly, the contractor ought to have his staff assembled on site before 

the arrival of materials or the start of construction. That staff ought to include 

accountants, timekeepers, auditors, cost-management and clerical personnel, and 

warehouse personnel to receive, register, and store government-furnished equipment. 

District staffs that discharge parallel functions should be in place in the field at the 

same time. Such timely staffing did not happen in the Mediterranean basin in the 

early 1950s—not in the Middle East District, not in Turkey, not in any other Corps 

element supervising military construction in the area. The district engineer and the 

prime contractor both operated with the overriding concern to begin construction 

as quickly as possible. As a result, construction began as soon as partial plans 

became available. Administrative staff came later. Government inspectors who later 

identified administrative deficiencies and leveled criticisms against contractors and 

84 “Chronological History, Middle East District (Through 30 April 1953),” pp. 3a, 3d, 3f. 85 Middle East Dist Hist Sum, Jun 50–Sep 51, pp. 16–17. 86 Ibid., p. 17. 87 Ibid., pp. 17–18.
42 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

the personnel of the Corps of Engineers often ignored the exigencies of the situation 

in which work had begun.88

Colonel Troxler recognized the difficulties of mounting an appropriate 

administrative structure in an emergency situation, and he offered OCE several 

suggestions to improve the Corps’ ability to respond effectively. He urged the 

formation of a permanent group of experienced American civil service personnel 

under the jurisdiction of the chief of engineers. The group would include engineers; 

construction specialists; auditors; and supply, administrative, and legal personnel. 

These civilian specialists would have the talent and experience to put a project or 

program in operation in an emergency or until recruitment of a more permanent 

staff, and all would be subject to tours of duty overseas. From this group the Corps 

could draw the nucleus of trained personnel necessary to establish an overseas 

engineer district.89

Troxler also urged that the government try to encourage additional American 

construction and engineering firms to take on overseas construction. He pointed out 

that since only a few American firms bid on overseas construction in normal times, 

these companies were likely to become overextended in an emergency. Troxler 

contended that because the United States’ role in world politics had expanded, 

the country required an ever larger segment of its construction industry to have 

experience in overseas work, as well as the capability to handle the special problems 

such work imposed.90

Colonel Troxler also proposed that district engineers be given greater authority 

to shift funds between line items in the construction program so funds that became 

available through savings on one element of the work could be applied immediately 

to some other element where deficiencies had arisen. Finally, he proposed simplification of “the present cumbersome and expensive procedures governing accountability 

of government property for overseas districts.”91

Troxler raised these suggestions just before the North Atlantic Division sent 

an inspection team to Tripoli and Dhahran in October 1951 to review the state 

of construction and administration in the Middle East District. The inspection 

highlighted many of the problems that Troxler had catalogued in his own reports to 

OCE.92 It contained no surprises, but it did pinpoint certain areas for improvement. 

District and contractor personnel worked quickly to correct problems. In midDecember, the U.S. Army Audit Agency conducted its own audit of the district’s 

operations and came away satisfied. The district and the contractor prepared new cost 

estimates based on six months’ experience. They anticipated rising costs because 

of predicted higher wages, increasing material costs, and local inflation due to the 

pressure of the construction program for 1952. They also anticipated the need to 

88 Ibid., p. 18; “Chronological History, Middle East District (Through 30 April 1953),” p. 48b-1. 89 Middle East Dist Hist Sum, Jun 50–Sep 51, p. 19. 90 Ibid., p. 19. 91 Ibid., pp. 19–20. 92 See Rpt of Inspection (OCE) Dhahran Area, Middle East District, 15 Oct 51. The responses 

from the area engineer and the district engineer are attached to the inspection report.
Army Engineers in the Mediterranean, 1942–1952 43

import skilled and semiskilled labor from Europe at higher costs as the local labor 

pool neared depletion. December brought the welcome assurance that the district 

would receive the $3 million that Troxler had requested in September.93

The Middle East District’s situation could hardly be described as normal, but 

at least the construction effort at Wheelus and, to a lesser extent at Dhahran, were 

beginning to settle down. Quite the opposite atmosphere characterized the work in 

Morocco, the other area where U.S. Army engineers launched a program of military 

construction in the Mediterranean basin during 1950–1951.

93 “Chronological History, Middle East District (Through 30 April 1953),” pp. 48b-2, 48b-4, 3g, 3h. 

The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 45

2

The Moroccan Air-Base Program

1950–1954

By 1950, the Cold War dominated the formulation of American foreign policy. 

U.S. policymakers interpreted the actions of Soviet leaders as threats to the very 

existence of the open, liberal, democratic, and capitalistic system of values on which 

Western freedoms rested. The expansion of air bases in Turkey, Libya, and Saudi 

Arabia translated this conviction into military strategy. French Morocco hosted the 

most ambitious effort to position the U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command (SAC) 

within striking distance of the Soviet Union.

About the size of Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia combined, Morocco lies 

in northwest Africa with coasts on both the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean 

Sea. From Morocco, the Strategic Air Command could send its bombers directly to 

targets in European Russia, including Moscow, the Ukraine, the Caucasus oilfields, 

and the Donetz-Dnieper industrial region. Farther from the Soviet Union than Turkey, 

bases in Morocco put American aircraft out of reach of Soviet armed forces given 

America’s air superiority and the Soviet Air Force’s limits.1

Port Lyautey (now Kenitra) and Casablanca, sixty-five miles farther south on 

Morocco’s Atlantic coast, both had well-developed harbor facilities capable of 

handling the influx of men and materiel that a buildup of American bases would 

entail. Between the two cities lies Rabat, important as an administrative center since 

1912 when the French formally established their protectorate over the country. 

In addition to the benefits of geography, Morocco offered political advantages. 

By the late 1940s, the United States and France were deeply engaged in diplomatic 

and military discussions. The talks aimed to strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance 

and to create a credible military defense for Western Europe through NATO. The 

North Atlantic Treaty had come into effect in August 1949, and President Truman 

had signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act in October. Throughout the winter 

of 1949 and into 1950, the United States and France held diplomatic negotiations 

to create a line of communications and supply from France’s Atlantic seaports to 

Germany’s western border. The moment the two governments signed a Line of 

Communications Agreement on 6 November 1950, U.S. forces started to pour into 

1 On Morocco’s strategic position, see James P. O’Donnell, “What’s Behind the Air-Base Scandals?” Saturday Evening Post, 28 June 1952, pp. 18–19, and “Morocco: American Invasion,” Time

(31 March 1952): 32. Gerald M. Adams, A History of U.S. Strategic Air Bases in Morocco, 1951–1963

(Omaha, Nebr.: Moroccan Reunion Association, 1992), pp. xiii–xviii. 
46 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

France to begin constructing the necessary installations. Within two years, U.S. 

troop strength in France and Germany would nearly triple to over two hundred fifty 

thousand.2

 The establishment of air bases in Morocco and the augmentation of U.S. 

forces in Europe constituted complementary elements in the American policy to 

contain the Soviet Union. 

Planning for Moroccan Bases

In 1948, when Western Europe faced the challenge of the Soviet blockade 

of Berlin, the U.S. Air Force began to think of returning to Morocco to position 

itself closer to the Soviet Union.3

 USAF headquarters in Washington even sent a 

preliminary survey team to French Morocco in January 1950 to reconnoiter possible 

air bases. When North Korea attacked South Korea, five months later, the Air Force 

pushed the idea of bases in Morocco more vigorously. Air Force headquarters 

estimated that it would need five large airfields and a depot to support SAC operations 

in Morocco as a deterrent to the Soviet Union.4

In August 1950, USAF headquarters informed the chief of engineers, General 

Pick, that it anticipated a large and urgent construction program in Morocco. This 

was the first mention to the Army engineers of the major construction plans for 

North Africa. Pick selected Col. George T. Derby to assist the Air Force with its 

planning for the construction program.5

 A West Point graduate, Derby had spent 

World War II as an engineer officer in the Pacific. Since 1946, he had commanded 

the Norfolk District for the Corps of Engineers.6

In September 1950, USAF headquarters selected a reconnaissance team to 

assess the situation in Morocco. Before the team arrived in North Africa, Congress 

appropriated $22.8 million for a Moroccan construction program. Air Force Col. 

Stanley T. Wray led the reconnaissance party, which traveled first to United States 

Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) headquarters in Wiesbaden and then, with French 

2 This development is covered in Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhus, Building for Peace: 

U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2005), pp. 86–93, 110–14, 121. See also Brig Gen David H. Tulley, 

“The Military Construction Program,” Military Engineer (1954): 403–08, esp. p. 405. 3 U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Military Public Works of the Committee on Appropriations (John J. Riley, Chairman), Moroccan Air Base Construction, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 1952, p. 3 

(hereafter cited as Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases). The committee also published testimony 

given during its hearings: U.S. Congress, House, Investigation of Military Public Works, Part 4, Moroccan Air Base Construction, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 

82d Cong., 2d sess., 1952 (hereafter cited as Riley Comm Hearings). See also O’Donnell, “What’s 

Behind the Air-Base Scandals,” pp. 18–19. 4 Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 3. 5 “The Moroccan Story” [mid-1953], p. 1, Mil Files XII-29-7, Office of History (OH), HQ, United 

States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Alexandria, Va.; Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, 

p. 3; Interv, Herbert M. Hart with Col (Ret) George T. Derby, 19, 20 Dec 84, pp. 1–2, 81–82. 6 Interv, Hart with Derby, 19, 20 Dec 84, pp. 1–2, 81–82; George T. Derby, “Memo on Growing 

Pains of East Atlantic District,” 9 May 51, in Mil Histories (vol. 1 of 2, Jan–May 51), box 51-83-8377, 

Richard T. Farrell Papers, OH, HQ USACE. 
The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 47

diplomatic clearance, to Morocco. Colonel Derby accompanied the group to 

familiarize himself with the scope of the program. In mid-October, the group returned 

to Washington and advised that a construction program in Morocco was feasible.7

The French air bases at Salé, Meknès, Marrakech, and Khouribga had facilities left 

from World War II that the Air Force could expand and strengthen for SAC use. 

(See Map 6.) The team proposed new construction only at Nouasser, where the Air 

Force anticipated building an airfield and supply depot. The Air Force construction 

program would support an offensive force of three medium bomber wings, a strategic 

reconnaissance wing, two tanker squadrons, and an escort fighter wing.8

Talks began in November 1950 between France and the United States concerning 

air bases in Morocco. On 9 November, the assistant secretary of the Air Force and 

high-level representatives from the Strategic Air Command, the U.S. Air Force 

Materiel Command, and the U.S. Air Force in Europe met with General Pick and 

his senior staff from the Corps of Engineers. Everyone at the meeting wanted the 

Moroccan program to begin without delay: The Corps of Engineers should start 

negotiations for an architect-engineer contract and for a construction contract even 

before American and French diplomats had concluded their talks. The Air Force 

and the Corps of Engineers also agreed to use a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract such 

as was being used for construction in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Libya.9

The deepening crisis in Korea spurred the urgency to make air bases available in 

Morocco. The UN forces led by General Douglas MacArthur had driven the North 

Korean armies to north of the 38th Parallel. As they approached the border between 

China and North Korea, the government of the People’s Republic of China massed 

three hundred thousand soldiers along the frontier. On 26 November, thirty-three 

divisions of Chinese troops launched a massive attack across the Yalu River into 

North Korea, driving the UN troops back toward the South. It appeared that the 

troops defending South Korea might be overwhelmed.

Before the November meeting on the Moroccan air bases, in September the Air Force 

had diverted all the funds Congress appropriated for Morocco to other projects, leaving 

the Army engineers with no money for contracts. After the meeting, Derby worked with 

the secretary of the Air Force, Thomas K. Finletter, and the Air Force staff to salvage 

enough money to begin the Moroccan work. Finletter drafted a letter, and Derby carried 

it to USAF offices in the Pentagon to beg them to transfer funds from other projects. 

This effort proved successful: On 29 November, the Air Force transferred to the chief 

7 George T. Derby, “History of the Corps of Engineers Activities in French Morocco” [Sep 51], 

pp. 1–2, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE; “Utilization of Selected Airfields,” attached to Letter of 

Instruction (LOI), Lt Gen Lauris Norstad to Lt Gen John K. Cannon, 5 Sep 50, Mil Files XII-27, OH, 

HQ USACE. 8 Col Stanley T. Wray, Rpt of Survey Gp to French Morocco, 19 Oct 50, Mil Files XII-27, OH, 

HQ USACE; LOI, Norstad to Cannon, 5 Sep 50. 9 Derby, “History of Corps of Engineer Activities,” pp. 1–2, and “Memo on Growing Pains”; 

“Important Dates in French Morocco,” 1 May 52, in Mil Histories (vol. 3 of 4, 1952), box 51-84-6364, 

Farrell Papers.
48 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

of engineers $11.4 million, half of the funds originally appropriated by Congress for 

the construction.10

On the same day, the Air Force issued a directive to the Corps of Engineers 

emphasizing urgency and its “immediate need” for the airfields. The directive 

conveyed the Air Force’s conviction that the survival of the Western alliance depended 

on the rapid completion of the bases as a deterrent to Soviet aggression:

It is definitely recognized that the work is to be prosecuted at a faster than normal rate 

requiring the mobilization of more than the usual amount of equipment for a job of this 

magnitude. It is desired that sufficient equipment be mobilized to insure the completion 

10 “Construction for USAF, French Morocco,” 13 Mar 51, Mil Files XII-27, OH, HQ USACE. 

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

A T L ANTIC

OCEAN

NOUASSER

SIDI SLIMANE

BENGUERIR JEMA SAHIM

BOULHAUT

MECHRA BEL KSIRI (not built)

CASABLANCA

RABAT

Meknès

Fès

Khouribga

Port-Lyautey

Briech Mellila

Fedala

Salé

Sa

Marrakech

Agadir

Tiznit

Beni Mellal

Oujda

Bou Arfa

Tangier

Gibraltar 

A L GERIA

S P ANISH SAHAR A

IFNI

S P AIN PORTUGAL

MOROCCO

MOROCCAN AIR BASE PROGRAM

1952–1957

Mediterranean Division Oce

East Atlantic District Oce

Air Base

Fuel Transmission Pipeline

Fuel Transmission Pipeline (not built)

0

0 200 Miles

200 Kilometers

Map 6
The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 49

of the 6-month phase of the program within 6 months of the date when clearance to 

enter the country . . . is obtained. The work should be prosecuted in such a manner as to 

produce the maximum of operational facilities in a minimum of time.11

The directive specified a first six-month phase to provide facilities sufficient to 

support limited operations: landing, takeoff, and refueling. Later construction would 

enhance the level of operations at the bases. The directive specifically designated 

the project as an “emergency construction” program.12

Colonel Derby took seriously the mandate “to produce the maximum of 

operational facilities in a minimum of time.” As soon as the Air Force transferred 

money, Derby began to assemble a team of civilian employees and contractors to 

execute the construction. He turned to people in the Norfolk district office whom 

he knew and trusted professionally; in asking for civilian volunteers, he indicated 

that the program involved construction of air bases in Morocco and that the initial 

phase of construction had a deadline of 1 June 1951. Several people from Norfolk 

formed the nucleus of what would become a new Corps of Engineers district.13

Derby simultaneously pursued the normally sequential stages of finding 

companies to execute design and construction. Throughout December, he held 

discussions to preselect firms qualified by experience to do the work and developed 

the terms of the CPFF contract. Derby settled on the architect-engineer firm of 

Porter-Urquhart Associates and on 22 December 1950 awarded them a CPFF letter 

contract to design the air bases and the supply depot. One of the principals in the 

firm, O. James Porter, had developed the California bearing ratio test to evaluate the 

capacity of soils, base course aggregates, and pavements to support the weight of 

various vehicles. Porter had initially applied the test method to highway construction 

in California. During World War II, he had applied his formula to airfields and gained 

extensive experience in runway design, construction, and testing.14 His experience 

in developing and installing weight-bearing pavement added a particularly relevant 

dimension to his firm’s qualifications for the contract.

On 27 December, Derby learned that five days earlier French and American 

negotiators had signed an agreement for the construction of air bases in French 

11 The directive is quoted extensively in U.S. Congress, Senate, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services (Lyndon B. Johnson, Chairman), Investigation of 

the Preparedness Program: Interim Report on Moroccan Air Base Construction, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 

1952, p. 3 (hereafter cited as Johnson Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52). 12 “Moroccan Story,” pp. 1–2, gives the full text of the directive of 29 November and an amendment from mid-December. Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 4; “Important Dates in French 

Morocco.” 13 Memo for Files, Jack E. O’Connor, 25 Feb 51, sub: Narrative History of the Establishment of 

East Atlantic District, Nov. 1950–Feb 1951, box 51-83-8377, Farrell Papers. O’Connor, the district 

supply officer, was recruited from the Norfolk District. 14 “Atlas Contract History,” p. 2, Mil Files XII-29-5, OH, HQ USACE; “Moroccan Story,” pp. 

1–2; Johnson Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52, pp. 2–3; Anthony Turhollow, 

“Airfields for Heavy Bombers,” in Builders and Fighters: U.S. Army Engineers in World War II, 

ed. Barry W. Fowle (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1992), pp. 

210–12.
50 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Morocco. The United States would bear all costs for building the bases and turn 

the facilities over to the French when they were no longer needed for the common 

defense. The French agreed to allow an American contractor to undertake the 

construction in Morocco; in the Franco-American construction agreements regarding 

metropolitan France, only French firms could be awarded contracts for construction 

for the U.S. military. To balance their concession, French negotiators insisted that 

subsidiary technical agreements be negotiated with the French governor general in 

Morocco, giving him complete control over the specific terms that would regulate 

when construction started and how it proceeded. The complicated negotiations 

on the technical terms continued over several months and delayed the start of 

construction.15

On 3 January 1951, Derby awarded a letter contract for construction to Atlas 

Constructors, a joint venture consisting of Morrison-Knudsen Company Inc. of 

Boise, Idaho; Nello L. Teer Company of Durham, North Carolina; Ralph E. Mills 

Company Inc. of Salem, Virginia; Blythe Bros. Company of Charlotte, North 

Carolina; and Bates & Rogers Construction Corporation of Chicago, Illinois. Derby 

also arranged a letter subcontract between Porter-Urquhart and Fay, Spofford & 

Thorndike of Boston, Massachusetts, for work on facilities to handle petroleum, 

oil, and lubricants (POL) to support the air bases. None of the contracts contained 

final terms; negotiations on the specific cost figures and fees continued throughout 

1951 as the work progressed.16

Propelled by the urgency of the project, Derby worked through the Christmas 

holidays to recruit a team of Corps of Engineers civilians, design and construction 

engineers, and construction management personnel to launch the Moroccan air-base 

program. The Air Force provided only general directions rather than master plans and 

specifications. Neither designers nor construction engineers had seen the proposed 

sites for the air bases, but they absorbed Derby’s intensity and commitment.17

Mobilizing the East Atlantic District

With the contracts in place, Derby concentrated on two tasks. First, he had to 

move rapidly to establish the headquarters of the new East Atlantic District. Second, 

he had to represent the interests of the Corps of Engineers during the negotiations 

for the technical agreements that would govern construction of the air bases in 

Morocco on a day-to-day basis. 

15 “Moroccan Story,” pp. 1–2; Grathwol and Moorhus, Building for Peace, pp. 86–88; Johnson 

Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52, pp. 3–4. 16 The provisional character of the contracts is evident from memos regarding later negotiations 

in Mil Files XII-27, OH, HQ USACE. See, for example, Memos, Maj Gen Lewis Pick, 9 Jul 51, sub: 

Request for Authority to Award a Definitive Contract to Atlas Constructors; Col George T. Derby, 

11 Jul 51, sub: Request Approval of Award of CPFF Contract no. DA-30-082-eng-5; Col George T. 

Derby, 12 May 51, sub: Request for Approval of Award of CPFF Contract for Construction. 17 “Moroccan Story,” p. 3. 
The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 51

Building an air base involves a series of steps that are usually taken in sequence: 

exploration of the site, negotiations to acquire it, award of a design contract, master 

planning, preliminary design, preparation of drawings and specifications, award of a 

construction contract, acquisition of materials and equipment, and, finally, construction. The process includes site visits, testing of soils and available materials, and 

research to determine the best supplies and the cheapest means of delivery. For the 

Moroccan program, the Army engineers and their contractors had to take these steps 

as simultaneous processes because time was the team’s scarcest commodity. Even 

without master plans from the Air Force, the engineers had to make decisions. 

After receiving the letter contract, Atlas Constructors’ management team 

mapped a plan for completing the first six-month phase of construction. Atlas would 

reinforce and extend the existing runways at four sites and build new runways and 

depot facilities at Nouasser. Atlas alerted Derby that, in the limited time allotted, 

they could not acquire the equipment needed to produce the highest quality base 

courses of carefully graduated rock. Using rock crushers, they could reduce local 

rock to four inches or less; but the base laid would have to be thicker than one laid 

with more carefully sized particles. The crushers would also yield an aggregate 

satisfactory for asphaltic concrete, the surface layer that Atlas recommended for 

the runways; but the level of control of particle size would not be as precise as that 

achieved by feeding carefully graded aggregate into the asphalt plant.18

Mindful of the six-month deadline, Derby accepted the Atlas proposal and 

chose asphalt. Layers could be added to strengthen the initial asphalt base during 

those times of day and night when the runways were not in use; the Army engineers 

had done this in Berlin during the airlift in 1948 and 1949. To strengthen concrete, 

however, the runway would have to be taken out of service. Another advantage 

of asphalt was its availability in Morocco; cement would have to be shipped to 

North Africa. Emphasizing speed over cost, Derby instructed Atlas to suspend 

conventional procurement and advertising procedures and to assemble the personnel 

and equipment it needed, including the rock crushers called for in their plan.19

Derby’s focus on the priority of completing the air bases quickly led him to make 

decisions that fixed the nature of the foundation course for the runways in Morocco 

and “irretrievably limited the project specifications” that the Air Force formulated 

only months later. The Air Force issued a second directive on 10 January 1951 and 

set the following 1 July as the date for completing facilities capable of supporting 

landing, refueling, and takeoff.20

The chief of engineers activated the East Atlantic District and appointed Derby 

as district engineer effective 15 January. Like the Middle East District managing 

construction in Libya and Saudi Arabia, the East Atlantic District operated under the 

18 Ibid. 19 Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 5; Derby, “History of Corps of Engineer Activities,” p. 4. 20 “Moroccan Story,” p. 3; “Important Dates in French Morocco.” Quotation from Riley Comm 

Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 5. 
52 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

North Atlantic Division. Derby left Washington immediately to work on the technical 

agreements with the French and arrived in Rabat, Morocco, on 17 January.21

While Derby assisted at the diplomatic negotiations with the French, the staff 

of the East Atlantic District began to acquire the equipment and supplies necessary 

to run an overseas office. In early January, Atlas Contractors opened operations in 

Norfolk in temporary quarters. To limit potential loss of time later in the project, 

Atlas purchased equipment before the specific construction tasks were defined. 

Throughout the spring, the company bought what it could find, competing for scarce 

equipment with construction companies working elsewhere overseas and in the 

United States. Atlas asked dealers and manufacturers of construction equipment to 

come to Norfolk to negotiate sales of equipment. The first scheduled shipping date 

was 26 January 1951.22

21 General Orders (GO) no. 1, 9 Jan 51, sub: Establishment of the East Atlantic District; Derby, 

“History of Corps of Engineer Activities,” p. 4; Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 5. 22 Memo for Files, O’Connor, 25 Feb 51, pp. 1–3; Derby, “History of Corps of Engineer Activities,” p. 4; Memo, William L. Cary to Secretary of the Army, 25 Apr 52, sub: Moroccan Air Bases, 

pp. 1–2, Mil Files XII-28, OH, HQ USACE; Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, pp. 4–5; Memo, 

Col John E. Ray for Inspector General (IG), 5 May 52, sub: Interim Report, Investigation of Army 

Water reservoir under construction at the Nouasser airfield, 16 December 1953
The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 53

In mid-January, at the insistence of the North Atlantic Division, the East Atlantic 

District moved its temporary offices to New York City to facilitate coordination 

with division personnel. Atlas moved its shipping operations to Newark, New 

Jersey, which forced the postponement of the initial shipping date by three weeks. 

By mid-February, Atlas had purchased $25 million worth of equipment—its best 

guess of what it would need—and put it on ships bound for Morocco. The equipment 

included 150 heavy trucks and other vehicles, 500 generator plants, 200 earthmovers 

and compactors, 200 welding machines, 175 compressors and pumps, 125 tractors, 

60 concrete mixers, 50 cranes and steam shovels, and 35 rock crushers and asphalt 

plants.23

Concurrently with preparations in the United States, the Army engineers opened 

operations in Morocco. On 23 January, the East Atlantic District’s deputy district 

engineer, Lt. Col. Leonard L. Haseman, arrived with a party of seventeen to establish 

the district office in Rabat. A graduate of the University of Missouri in 1936 and 

U.S. Military Academy in 1940, Haseman had served in the Southwest Pacific 

during World War II. After completing a master’s degree in engineering at Cornell 

University, he had served in MacArthur’s postwar administration of Japan, first as 

chief of the Aerodrome Section and later as chief of military construction.24

Participation in the Construction of the United States Air Bases in French Morocco, Mil Files XII-28, 

OH, HQ USACE. 23 Memo, O’Connor, 25 Feb 51, p. 3; O’Donnell, “What’s Behind the Air-Base Scandals,” p. 90; 

“Construction Overseas in Mediterranean Division,” [1957], box 51-83-8377, Farrell Papers. 24 Memo, Ray for IG, 5 May 52; Riley Comm Hearings, p. 151; “Important Dates in French 

Morocco.”

Six-plane hangar at the Nouasser airfield
54 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

The advance party in Morocco, including people from Porter-Urquhart and 

from Atlas Constructors, began inspecting the sites designated for airfields. By 

late February, Haseman had about one hundred twenty-five Americans (Corps and 

contractor personnel) and thirty Moroccans working in and out of the district office 

securing transportation and conducting surveys of local resources and facilities. 

The rear-echelon office in New York, staffed with two engineer officers and a 

Transportation Corps officer, coordinated activities with the North Atlantic Division 

and assisted with stateside procurement.25

Derby worked to resolve the technical agreements still pending with the 

authorities in France and with French colonial authorities in Morocco. These 

agreements governed issues of great concern to the local French population: How 

many Americans would come to Morocco, and would they be military or civilian 

contract personnel? Where would the Americans locate construction camps and 

other facilities to support the thousands of construction workers? 

The negotiations proved tedious and difficult. When the French government 

approved an accord in December 1950, it had anticipated modest contingents of Air 

Force personnel at the five air bases. After the negotiations, the Air Force raised 

its estimates and spoke of fifteen- to twenty thousand airmen, more than four times 

the number initially proposed. The French governor general in Morocco feared 

that a strong American influence would disrupt the local economy by increasing 

the demand for labor and would disturb the delicate cultural balance. Metropolitan 

French authorities showed similar sensitivities in their negotiations concerning the 

expansion of NATO and U.S. forces and insisted on many of the same restrictions 

in continental France that the French governor general sought in Morocco.26

Negotiating New Sites

In mid-February, the negotiating parties abandoned four of the five sites 

originally programmed for airfield construction. These sites had been located near 

cities, and French Moroccan officials objected that proximity to urban centers would 

increase the impact of the American presence on the local population. From the list 

of sites proposed in September 1950 and approved by the French in December, the 

negotiators retained only the airfield and depot at Nouasser. The French wanted to 

keep Nouasser on the list because they anticipated that the facilities would eventually 

serve as the commercial air terminal for Casablanca.27

25 MFR, 21 Feb 51, sub: Need for Automobiles, Mil Histories (vol. 1 of 2, Jan–May 1951), box 

51-83-8377, Farrell Papers; Memo, Ray for IG, 5 May 52; Memo, O’Connor, 25 Feb 51, p. 5. On 

the rear-echelon office, see Rpt, Brig Gen G. J. Nold, 17 Nov 51, sub: Morocco Visit, p. 3, Mil Files 

XII-41, OH, HQ USACE. 26 Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 5; Johnson Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52, p. 4; O’Donnell, “What’s Behind the Air-Base Scandals,” p. 19. On French sensitivities, 

see Grathwol and Moorhus, Building for Peace, pp. 86–93, 111. 27 “History of the Mediterranean Division,” [ca. 1957], pp. 13–14, box 19, access. no. 77-92-0002, 

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md. See also handwritten comments by Leonard L. 
The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 55

The decision to abandon the original sites marked a dramatic departure from 

the original plan to expand airfields and had far-reaching implications. French 

Moroccan authorities restricted the numbers of Americans and the quantities 

of equipment allowed into Morocco until the parties agreed on alternate sites. 

Initially, the authorities had agreed to admit construction equipment, about 

one hundred employees of Porter-Urquhart, and unlimited numbers of Corps 

employees to staff the East Atlantic District. On 18 February, the governor 

general imposed a total freeze on the admission of contract construction 

employees. Derby instructed Atlas to discontinue recruiting personnel but to 

continue to acquire equipment.28

The restriction on personnel sharply affected the hiring of workers and the flow 

of goods needed for construction. Atlas had to delay recruiting American workers 

until the spring labor market; by the time hiring could take place, the best-qualified 

workers had already taken jobs. Atlas had to devote more time to recruiting and 

ultimately had to pay higher wages. In late February, the equipment purchased 

in the United States began to arrive in Morocco; but Atlas did not have enough 

supervisors to inventory the incoming property, transfer it to the scattered storage 

sites, and guard it.29

Abandoning the original sites also meant that the Army engineers and the 

design and construction personnel had to find new locations for the airfields. In the 

weeks after the mid-February decision, they surveyed eighty-one sites to identify six 

tentative locations that satisfied the Strategic Air Command. With the concurrence 

of the French Air Force, the Americans proposed Sidi Slimane, Benguérir, Mechra 

bel Ksiri, and El Djema Sahim.30

The relocation of the bases also changed the fundamental nature of the construction program. Rather than expanding existing facilities, the architect-engineers 

and contractors had to plan entirely new facilities. Atlas had bought its equipment 

expecting to expand and upgrade existing airstrips, and the equipment was inadequate 

in quantity and unsuited in capacity for constructing new bases. Plans had to be 

drawn and cost figures recalculated. Atlas had construction crews ready to start 

work in March; they could not be kept idle while the U.S. Air Force worked out the 

detailed master plans or list of specifications that would guide the work of design 

and construction.31

The Air Force had chosen Brig. Gen. Pierpoint M. Hamilton, recipient of 

the Medal of Honor for his participation in the 1942 invasion of Morocco, as its 

negotiator with the French governor general in Morocco. During the first three 

Haseman on Karl C. Dod, “Airfield Construction in North Africa: Morocco,” n.d, p. 14, Mil Files 

XI-4-3, OH, HQ USACE. 28 Derby, “History of Corps of Engineer Activities,” pp. 4–5; Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air 

Bases, p. 5. 29 Derby, “History of Corps of Engineer Activities,” p. 5; Derby, “Memo on Growing Pains.” 30 “History of the Mediterranean Division,” [ca. 1957], pp. 13–14, 20. 31 “Air Force Directive Relative to Moroccan Air Base Crash Program,” n.d., file 306, box 48, Lt 

Gen Samuel D. Sturgis Jr. Papers, OH, HQ USACE; Haseman comments on Dod, “Airfield Construction in North Africa,” p. 14; Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, pp. 2, 12, 18. 
56 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

weeks of March 1951, Hamilton and his French counterparts agreed to prepare for 

construction at Nouasser and at three substitute sites: Sidi Slimane, 25 miles east 

of Port Lyautey; Benguérir, 50 miles north of Marrakech; and Mechra bel Ksiri, 

200 miles east of Rabat. The negotiators agreed to select a fifth site after further 

study.32

Through all these modifications of the original construction program, the 

Air Force maintained the deadline for having operational bases. Other Air Force 

commands issued directives detailing levels of completion to be achieved in later 

months, but none of the memorandums superseded the fixed date of 1 July 1951 for 

minimum combat readiness that USAF headquarters had issued in the directives of 

29 November and 10 January.33

Derby decided that Porter-Urquhart lacked the manpower and experience needed 

to handle the business management and accounting for the enlarged construction 

program. To meet the demands of the changed program, he brought Skidmore, 

Owings, and Merrill of New York into the design team; the new joint architectengineer venture became known as PUSOM.34

The technical negotiations continued for another five weeks after negotiators 

reached agreement on the location of the four bases. Colonel Haseman continued 

to deal with local French authorities in Rabat whose concerns were parochial, not 

global.35 They worried about which parcels of land the Air Force wanted, how to 

avoid inflating wages in the Moroccan labor and contracting markets, and whether 

the Americans would compensate land owners for the loss of crops. Voicing 

concern about the number of American cigarettes appearing in Morocco, French 

officials proposed that the French tobacco monopoly take control of all American 

tobacco allowances to prevent an influx into the local black market, a suggestion 

that Haseman rejected.36

32 Memo, O’Connor, 25 Feb 51, p. 5; “Important Dates in French Morocco”; “History of the 

Mediterranean Division,” [ca. 1957], p. 20; Derby, “History of Corps of Engineer Activities,” p. 5; 

Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 6. 33 “Air Force Directive Relative to Moroccan Air Base Crash Program,” n.d.; MFR, Lt Col Leonard 

L. Haseman, 19 Apr 51, sub: Construction Authorization, Mil Histories (vol. 1 of 2, January–May 

1951), box 51-83-8377, Farrell Papers; Memo, L. S. Coy to Lt Col Leonard L. Haseman, 8 May 51, 

sub: Main Events in French Morocco with Relation to the Construction of USAF Air Bases, Mil 

Histories (vol. 3 of 4, 1952), box 51-84-6364, Farrell Papers; Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, 

pp. 2, 12, 18. 34 Memo, Cary to Secretary of the Army, 25 Apr 52, p. 6; Johnson Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air 

Base Construction, Aug 52, p. 5. 35 Adams, History of U.S. Strategic Air Bases in Morocco, p. 2; “Important Dates in French Morocco”; MFR, Lt Col Leonard L. Haseman, 2 Feb 51, sub: Security Classification, box 51-84-6364, 

Farrell Papers. 36 MFR, Lt Col Leonard L. Haseman, 2 Mar 51, sub: Tobacco Rationing, box 51-83-8377, Farrell 

Papers; MFR, Col Leonard L. Haseman to Col George T. Derby, 5 Mar 51, sub: Site Selection and 

Wage Rates, box 51-83-8377, Farrell Papers. This and other folders in this box and in box 51-84-6364, 

Farrell Papers, have numerous memos that detail the difficulties the local French officials placed in 

Haseman’s way. 
The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 57

Emergency Construction Underway

During much of the spring of 1951, Colonel Derby shuttled between Rabat and 

Paris, the site of negotiations for the final phase of the technical agreements. On 11 

April, he left Paris to return to the United States knowing that the parties were close 

to an accord. Two days later, he requested that USAF headquarters issue revised 

directives commensurate with the expanded scope of construction and release 

additional funds to the Corps of Engineers. On 17 April, Derby met with Air Force 

leaders at the Pentagon. General Pick had instructed him to be sure that the Air Force 

understood the new cost estimates of $390 million for the revised scope of work 

that now included four new sites. Pick also wanted Derby to obtain from the Air 

Force a commitment concerning the specific facilities it wanted and by what date. 

During the 17 April meeting, the Air Force deputy chief of staff for operations, Lt. 

Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, reemphasized the 1 July ready date but was less clear on 

specific facilities. Derby insisted that he needed a steady flow of funds to continue 

the program. The minutes of the meeting note that “at that time a lot of AF officers 

began to talk, each one trying to convince every other one that there was plenty of 

money and nobody needed to worry.”37

On 14 April, Derby had received word that negotiators in Paris had reached 

an accord that allowed construction to start. As Derby and General Hamilton had 

agreed, Derby immediately wired Haseman in Morocco. Haseman received Derby’s 

cable on 16 April and contacted the senior Air Force officer in Morocco, Col. 

Wilfrid H. Hardy of the Air Force Materiel Command. The bases were intended for 

the 5th Air Division of the Strategic Air Command, activated in mid-January 1951 

and commanded by Brig. Gen. Archie J. Old Jr., who was in England pending the 

mobilization and transfer of his division to Morocco.Colonel Hardy did not consider 

Derby’s cable to Haseman authoritative because it bypassed his chain of command; 

and he refused to permit construction to begin. When Haseman protested the delay, 

Hardy threatened that, if work began, he “would initiate immediate action to have 

me [Haseman] court-martialed and replaced” for disobeying the orders of a senior 

officer. Haseman instructed Atlas Constructors at Nouasser and at Benguérir to 

refrain from any construction activities pending further notification. At Sidi Slimane 

and Mechra bel Ksiri, the French had not yet procured the necessary land, so Atlas 

could not begin construction at those locations either.38

Hardy had never endorsed General Hamilton’s choice of Benguérir as one of the 

air-base sites. While awaiting instructions through channels that he could accept as 

authoritative, Hardy made his case against Benguérir to two visiting special assistants 

37 Quotation from MFR, 18 Apr 51, sub: Extract of Minutes of Meeting 17 Apr. 1951, USAF, Held 

at Request of Col. George Derby, p. 3, Mil Files XII-27, OH, HQ USACE. See also “Important Dates 

in French Morocco”; Derby, “Memo on Growing Pains”; “Important Dates in French Morocco.” 38 Derby, “Memo on Growing Pains”; Adams, History of U.S. Strategic Air Bases in Morocco, p. 

2; “Important Dates in French Morocco.” Quotation from MFR, Lt Col Leonard Haseman, 17 Apr 51, 

Mil Histories (vol. 1 of 2, Jan–May 51), box 51-83-8377, Farrell Papers. The incident is mentioned 

in both congressional reports and in other sources.
58 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

to the secretary of the Air Force. He argued that local conditions—temperatures to 

140°F, an elevation of over one thousand five hundred feet, and lack of water in the 

area—made Benguérir a poor site. On 17 April, the assistants cabled the argument to 

Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad, USAFE commander in Wiesbaden since January 1951 and 

the Air Force vice chief of staff in Washington when the Moroccan plan had taken 

shape in September 1950. Two days after Hardy voiced his reservations, Norstad 

cabled his reply. He accepted Hardy’s objections and ordered that no construction 

start at Benguérir pending further investigation.39

The interventions of Hardy and Norstad reflect an internal struggle within the Air 

Force. The Moroccan bases were purportedly to serve the Strategic Air Command 

and its long-range bombers. But the Air Materiel Command and USAFE both had 

reservations about the perception and scope of the SAC mission in French Morocco. 

This competition among Air Force commands lasted well into the 1950s.40 The 

struggle played out largely behind the scenes of the Moroccan construction program, 

but it complicated the engineers’ task.

On 19 April, Hardy received orders that he found sufficient to authorize 

construction at Nouasser, Sidi Slimane, and Mechra bel Ksiri. Still, no construction 

began that day. Atlas Contractors actually began moving earth at Nouasser on 22 

April, after the French authorities had cleared the local population from the area.41

Crews who had been at the site since early March to construct their workers camp 

now started around-the-clock operations. By 28 April, they had stripped the runways 

of all vegetation, the first stage of construction. The plan for Nouasser projected 

a major air transport terminal, an air depot to stockpile reserve materiel in case of 

war, and general support facilities for a wartime bomber unit. The most urgent need 

was for an airstrip to support strategic bombers.42

At Sidi Slimane, where Atlas had established its construction camp in early April, 

the French had not yet acquired the needed property, in part because local landowners 

wanted the Army engineers to shift the runway’s position. In addition, the Air Force 

had run into technical difficulties in operating communications equipment at Port 

Lyautey, Sidi Slimane, and Mechra bel Ksiri, raising the possibility of having to 

reorient runways. Construction finally started at Sidi Slimane on 9 May 1951; but as 

construction crews began work, half a dozen storks returned from southern Africa 

to find their nests destroyed. To remove the birds as an obstacle to construction, the 

contractors had to weave six artificial nests.43

39 Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 7; O’Donnell, “What’s Behind the Air-Base Scandals,” 

p. 97. 40 Quoted passages from Adams, History of U.S. Strategic Air Bases in Morocco, p. 3; see also pp. 

5, 26. 41 MFR, Haseman, 19 Apr 51. 42 Memo to Haseman, 8 May 51; “Important Dates in French Morocco”; O’Donnell, “What’s 

Behind the Air-Base Scandals,” p. 90. 43 Memo, Haseman, 19 Apr 51; MFR, Haseman, 19 Apr 51; MFR, Lt Col L. L. Haseman, 17 Apr 

51, sub: Technical Questions Concerning Airbase Construction, Mil Histories (vol. 1 of 2, Jan–May 

1951), box 51-83-8377, Farrell Papers; “History of the Mediterranean Division,” [ca. 1957], p. 5. The 

story of the storks comes from O’Donnell, “What’s Behind the Air-Base Scandals,” p. 90. 
The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 59

Through all of the delays, the Air Force did not deviate from its directive to 

complete at least minimum facilities by 1 July; but progress was slow. During May, 

the Air Force revised its master plans for the construction program to catch up with 

the changes in the agreements with France and to incorporate the new sites. Master 

plans for Nouasser arrived on 4 May, two weeks after initial groundbreaking. Master 

plans arrived later in the month for Sidi Slimane, for Benguérir, and for Mechra bel 

Ksiri.44 On 14 May, the Air Force told Atlas to abandon the Benguérir site. At Mechra 

bel Ksiri, the French had problems acquiring the land; other than construction of 

a workers camp, no work began there until very late May. The Air Force was still 

unable to agree with the French on an acceptable site for the fifth base.45

The construction program in Morocco continued to suffer because of the 

terms of the technical agreements. Near the end of the diplomatic negotiations, the 

French had introduced a stipulation reserving all off-base contracting for French 

or Moroccan contractors. Although Atlas had assembled four hundred skilled 

workers, the company could not build the pipeline from Morocco’s Atlantic ports 

to the airfields and POL facilities except for the fueling stations on the bases 

themselves. Local French authorities argued with the Americans about purchasing 

local bitumen—at above-market prices—and insisted that Atlas equipment entering 

the country be subjected to French taxes. From Casablanca, where the East Atlantic 

District moved in mid-April, Haseman conducted a seemingly unending series of 

meetings with local French officials and businessmen to keep construction moving 

and costs contained.46

On 25 May, General Old arrived in Morocco with the staff of the SAC 5th Air 

Division. The same day, Atlas Constructors gained access to the land at Mechra bel 

Ksiri. On 1 June, with the Air Force deadline less than a month away, Atlas laid the 

first rock in the base course for the airstrips at Nouasser. On 3 June, Atlas began 

operating an asphalt plant at Nouasser and laid base-course rock at Sidi Slimane. 

Colonel Derby realized that the contractors could not meet the 1 July deadline, but 

he thought they could have landing strips ready at Nouasser and Sidi Slimane two 

weeks later.47

As the ready date approached, Derby, the district staff, and the contractors faced 

a dilemma. The Air Force’s imperative to provide operational airfields in the shortest 

time possible conflicted with customary construction standards. Any construction 

project involving Corps personnel represents three considerations—timeliness, 

quality, and cost—as three apexes of an equilateral triangle. When the three are 

equally emphasized, with costs reasonable, quality high, and completion on schedule, 

44 MFR, 18 Apr 51; Memo to Haseman, 8 May 51. 45 “Important Dates in French Morocco”; Derby, “Memo on Growing Pains”; Adams, History of 

U.S. Strategic Air Bases in Morocco, p. 3. 46 Johnson Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52, pp. 4–5; O’Donnell, “What’s 

Behind the Air-Base Scandals,” p. 97; Memos from 27 Apr, 3 May, 8 May, 10 May, 19 May, and 21 

May 51, box 51-83-8377, Farrell Papers; “Important Dates in French Morocco.” 47 “Important Dates in French Morocco”; “Air Force Directive Relative to Moroccan Air Base 

Crash Program,” n.d.
60 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

it is as though the three considerations meet at the center of the triangle. A marked 

emphasis on one particular factor distorts the balance and compromises the other 

two factors. In the case of the Moroccan air bases, Derby had received instructions 

to subordinate all other considerations to timeliness.

On 9 June, Harold M. Simmons, a supervisor from the architecture-engineer 

firm Porter-Urquhart, ordered Atlas construction crews at Sidi Slimane to halt 

work on the runways. Simmons objected that the aggregate going into the base 

course contained too much clay mixed with the gravel to remain stable over time. 

He notified Atlas in writing, and Atlas appealed his order to Derby. Derby knew 

that no more-satisfactory aggregate existed close enough to the construction site to 

allow completion of the runway by the deadline. In a conference on 11 June, Derby 

acknowledged that individual loads of gravel had too much clay. He agreed that 

Simmons and his inspectors could maintain quality by rejecting such loads as they 

arrived. Nonetheless, he overruled the order to stop work and instructed Atlas to 

proceed. Derby reasoned that the contractor could upgrade the base course at a later 

date but that any delay at that moment would compromise timely completion of his 

mission.48 Less than a week after Derby overruled Simmons’ order to stop work, 

the East Atlantic District contacted Porter-Urquhart about Simmons, whose wife 

worked in the accounting office that he supervised. The district felt that Simmons 

had tried to obstruct an audit team’s review of his wife’s work. After reviewing the 

report of this incident, the company fired Simmons.49

On 19 June, General Old ordered all work stopped at Mechra bel Ksiri. He found 

the terrain at Mechra bel Ksiri unfavorable because a hill obstructed the approach 

and takeoff patterns and a portion of the area designated for the runway flooded 

during annual rains.50

On 21 June, USAF headquarters in Washington transferred command responsibility for the Moroccan bases to the U.S. Air Forces in Europe and instructed 

General Norstad to deal directly with Derby. In late October, the Air Force 

transferred command of the bases back to the Strategic Air Command and restored 

the appropriate relationship with the Corps of Engineers.51

On 25 June, a few days after the first transfer of command, Derby met with 

General Old and USAFE commander General Norstad in Casablanca and reported 

that Atlas Constructors was laying asphalt at record speeds at both Nouasser and 

Sidi Slimane. Derby proposed that the Air Force fly the first combat aircraft to the 

Moroccan bases on Bastille Day, 14 July. The generals seemed delighted with the 

idea. The Army engineers would miss the deadline of 1 July, but not by much; and 

48 See Derby’s testimony, Riley Comm Hearings, p. 181; “Important Dates in French Morocco.” 49 Ltr, Lt Col Leonard L. Haseman to Porter-Urquhart Assoc., 14 Jun 51, Mil Files XII-27, OH, 

HQ USACE. 50 “Important Dates in French Morocco”; Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 8. 51 Memos, to Brig Gen Colby M. Myers, 21 Jun 51, sub: USAF Construction, French Morocco, 

and to CinC USAFE [Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe], 21 Jun 51, both in 

Mil Files XII-27, OH, HQ USACE; Maj Gen Lewis A. Pick, “U.S. Air Forces Construction, French 

Morocco,” 7 Jul 51, Mil Files XII-28, OH, HQ USACE; Rpt, Nold, 17 Nov 51. 
The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 61

the selection of Bastille Day would have symbolic importance for the French. The 

Air Force had delayed construction at Benguérir, had suspended construction at 

Mechra bel Ksiri, and had not even selected a fifth site. Nonetheless, two key bases 

would soon be ready for the demonstration of U.S. military power.52

On 13 July 1951, six F84E jet fighters of the 36th Fighter Bomber Wing from 

Fürstenfeldbrück, West Germany, landed at Sidi Slimane. The next day, as part of 

the Bastille Day festivities, this USAFE aerial demonstration team known as the 

Skyblazers performed precision aerobatics over Casablanca and then Nouasser. 

Five B–50 bombers and four KB–29 tankers from the 2d Bomb Wing in England 

also participated in the show. The heavier planes landed and stayed overnight at 

Nouasser. These were the first combat aircraft to use the Moroccan air bases, and 

their presence signaled the combat readiness of the fields.53

The first and most critical phase of the construction had ended. Construction 

crews had excavated 5 million cubic yards of dirt—as much as had been estimated 

for all five bases under the Air Force’s original plans. The Strategic Air Command 

had two airfields that it could use to reach the Soviet Union in the event of war. Each 

base had one 9,000-foot runway for takeoff and landing and a parallel taxiway of 

equal length with connecting taxiways between them. Each field had one bulk storage 

tank for 55,000 barrels of fuel and a second for 10,000 barrels. Camp facilities were 

rudimentary; the first flight crews that visited stayed overnight in tents. Within a 

week, however, construction crews had put up the first Dallas hut at Nouasser, the 

beginning of more permanent facilities. Another 320 Dallas huts were already in 

use at other locations in Morocco.54

The overall program in Morocco represented the largest single construction 

program undertaken by the Corps of Engineers to that date. The entire workforce 

included over 4,000 American workers, 4,000 skilled European artisans, and about 

18,000 Moroccans. They had worked long hours to bring the two new bases to 

minimal operational standards in record time—eighty-four days for Nouasser and 

sixty-seven days for Sidi Slimane. During World War II, Army engineers received 

praise for moving 4.4 million cubic yards of earth in seven months to build the air 

base on Saipan from which superfortresses raided Japan.55 To build the two air bases 

in Morocco, crews displaced more earth in less than half as much time. 

With construction underway at two bases and the other sites still undetermined, 

the Air Force decided to renegotiate the remaining locations with French Moroccan 

officials. Derby instructed the East Atlantic District’s architect-engineer personnel 

to furnish technical advice as the Air Force reexamined seventy-one potential sites. 

52 “Important Dates in French Morocco.” 53 Adams, History of U.S. Strategic Air Bases in Morocco, p. 4. 54 O’Donnell, “What’s Behind the Air-Base Scandals,” p. 90; “Important Dates in French Morocco.” 55 O’Donnell, “What’s Behind the Air-Base Scandals,” p. 90; Derby, “History of the Corps of 

Engineers Activities.” On Saipan, see Lenox R. Lohr, “Engineer Shortage and National Security,” 

Military Engineer (September-October 1954): 343–46. Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 8, 

estimates displacement of earth at 5 million cubic yards. The calculations here of the days to completion begin with actual construction at the sites.
62 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

In September, the Air Force, the staff of the East Atlantic District, and the French 

finally settled on the sites for three additional bases: Benguérir (returned to the list); 

Boulhaut, thirty-five miles northeast of Casablanca; and El Djema Sahim, just east 

of Safi. On 11 September, supporting General Old’s decision, the Air Force insisted 

that Atlas abandon Mechra bel Ksiri and move its crew two hundred miles southwest 

to Benguérir. As a part of their study of possible airfield sites, the contractors had 

located both water and stone for base courses at Benguérir after Hardy had ordered 

it abandoned in April. Mechra bel Ksiri was now dropped from the list even though 

the contractors had completed some preparatory work there in May and June at 

Hardy’s insistence. The move from Benguérir to Mechra bel Ksiri and back cost 

$361,800 and contributed to a loss of morale that eroded the construction crews’ 

enthusiasm for the work.56

Despite the changes from one site to another, work continued. Construction crews 

and the staff of the East Atlantic District still felt the imperative of the emergency 

directives from the Air Force even though the first six-month deadline had passed. 

Runways, taxiways, and temporary housing were all usable. Warehouse space 

remained incomplete, and supplies arriving from the port at Casablanca remained 

at times stacked in the open. The first airmen’s dining hall, a temporary structure 

that accommodated nine hundred, opened at Nouasser on 8 August 1951. Airmen 

lived in tents with wooden floors; but by October, construction crews completed 

fifty-five Dallas huts for lodging, permitting some of the tent accommodations to 

be dismantled. A USAF-sponsored grade school opened at Nouasser on 1 October 

with fifty-nine students enrolled. Clubs and a commissary opened in November.57

At Sidi Slimane, airmen found two hundred eighty double Dallas huts ready 

for them in September 1951. They had thirteen Quonset huts for maintenance and 

for administrative offices and six Quonset-hut latrines. Late in September, a base 

hospital replaced the temporary medical dispensary. Although the hospital was in a 

tent facility, an Air Force medical group moved in to serve the growing community. 

The hospital unit relocated to a new Quonset hut in October, just as cooler and 

wetter weather arrived. In mid-October, construction crews also completed the first 

warehouse space at Sidi Slimane; by November, about 50 percent of the facilities 

for a rotating bomber wing were complete there and the number of Dallas huts had 

increased to 433.58

Airfield construction advanced further when the East Atlantic District opened 

an area office at Benguérir in September 1951. Atlas began building its construction 

camp there on 22 September; but construction crews undertook little work on 

facilities until the French transferred land to the Air Force in late November. On 3 

56 Memo, Cary to Secretary of the Army, 25 Apr 52, p. 2; Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, 

pp. 8, 11; Adams, History of U.S. Strategic Air Bases in Morocco, p. 6; “History of the Mediterranean 

Division,” [ca. 1957], p. 6; Derby, “History of Corps of Engineer Activities,” pp. 6–8; Engr Hist Div, 

OCE, “Summary of Major Events and Problems, Fiscal Year 1954,” Sep 54, Gen Files, files 3ff, box 

3, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited as Major Events, FY 1954). 57 Adams, History of U.S. Strategic Air Bases in Morocco, pp. 6–8. 58 Ibid., pp. 7–9; “Important Dates in French Morocco.” 
The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 63

December, Atlas put the first asphalt plant in place at the construction site; a week 

later, runway construction began. From the spring of 1951, when work had begun, 

to the end of the year, Atlas had completed about $48 million in construction at 

all sites.59

As the construction program progressed, the Air Force continued to shift plans. 

At Nouasser, for instance, the Air Force relocated facilities a half a dozen times 

over the summer of 1951. These actions prevented the contractor from laying proper 

drainage pipes and fields, which led to severe drainage problems when the autumn 

rains began. The saturation of the area also contributed to later problems. None of 

the runways failed, but tests indicated that the moisture compromised the runways’ 

capacity to support the stresses of repeated use by heavy aircraft.60

Other problems arose from decisions Derby made to force the pace of construction. At times he approved suspension of the standard practice of spraying a coating 

of liquid asphalt, which was not always readily available, over the base course of 

runways. This decision lowered the quality of the surface layer, a tradeoff the costs 

of which became more apparent in later months. In another instance, Derby accepted 

an educated guess that the rainy season would start no earlier than late November. 

Taking a calculated risk, Atlas laid the asphalt binder course at Nouasser over a very 

large area before it changed equipment to put on a sealing coat for waterproofing. The 

more conventional method laid the binder course over a smaller segment and then 

sealed it before laying more. Derby approved the riskier method to speed up paving, 

much as the Army engineers in Turkey had gambled on mild weather when they 

continued construction at Diyarbakir and Balikesir through the 1950–1951 winter. 

59 “Important Dates in French Morocco”; “Atlas Contract History,” p. 6. 60 Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 11. 

Armaments and electronics shop at the Benguérir air base, as seen from

the parachute tower
64 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Derby anticipated having time to complete the sealing process before the rains, but 

the weather failed to cooperate in Morocco. The rains started in early November, and 

water penetration weakened small areas of the pavement at Nouasser by saturating 

and softening the base course and subsoil. Suspecting the problem, the engineers 

tested the paving with a 200-ton roller that subjected the pavement to pressures four 

times greater than the wheel weight of any of the Air Force’s heavy bombers. The 

roller produced five small breakthroughs. Derby recognized that repairs would be 

necessary later, but the approach had yielded more landing surface in a short time. 

In the worst case, repairs could be undertaken while the fields were in use.61

Clay in the gravel laid for the base course at Sidi Slimane meant that runways 

were serviceable but not as durable as a sounder base course would provide. As 

indicated earlier, Derby had decided to expedite completion and deal with any 

compromises in quality with later repairs. Similarly, procurement of screens to 

allow proper sizing of the gravel would have delayed the project by four or five 

months. If not corrected, these potential deficiencies might have involved increased 

maintenance costs; but none of the compromises Derby made left the runways too 

61 On problems with asphalt and paving, see Memos, A. R. Butler (PUSOM) to Dist Engr, 17, 25 

Jul 51; F. Holloway (PUSOM) to A. R. Butler, 20 Jul 51; all in Mil Files XII-27, OH, HQ USACE. 

On the early rains, see Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 10. 

Elevated water tower at the Benguérir air base
The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 65

weak to handle the landing and takeoff of the bombers that they were designed to 

serve.62

Fully aware of the potential problems in the construction, in July 1951, Colonel 

Derby had engineers begin testing to determine where the asphalt needed reinforcement. By that autumn, Atlas had instructions to implement a repair program during 

the summer of 1952 when temperatures would again allow the work to be effective. 

Derby requested expert help from soil and pavement specialists. The Corps sent a 

two-person inspection team that worked the latter half of October 1951 and found 

faults in the pavement at Nouasser and at Sidi Slimane: rough spots, weaknesses, 

and a need for further compaction and for waterproofing. Although the deficiencies 

came as no surprise, the inspection report focused attention on them in a way that 

no one had anticipated.63

By late summer 1951, the urgency that drove the Air Force initially had abated. 

The course of the Korean War had changed. After months of indecisive fighting 

around the 38th Parallel, the warring parties had begun armistice negotiations on 10 

July; but in late August, the talks broke down. Chinese and UN forces jockeyed for 

position. Truce negotiations resumed on 25 October. No one felt confident about a 

rapid settlement, but neither side seemed willing to pay the price necessary to shift 

the military balance decisively. During these months, a financial crisis overtook 

the Moroccan project.

62 Staff Conference, 2 Feb 52, Mil Files XII-28, OH, HQ USACE; Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan 

Air Bases, pp. 10–11. 63 Riley Comm Hearings, pp. 154–56, 194; Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, pp. 10, 18; 

Johnson Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52, pp. 7, 9, 10–11, 16.

Power plant at the Sidi Slimane air base, Morocco
66 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Inadequate Funding and Recurring Delays

For months the irregular flow of funds for the Moroccan project had created 

difficulties for the Corps of Engineers and the construction contractor. On 19 

April 1951, just as construction began, the Corps had requested that the Air Force 

transfer $51.25 million to support the Moroccan construction through June and an 

additional $10 million for the first quarter of the fiscal year beginning 1 July 1951. 

In July, Derby asked for $35 million more to cover costs of the oil pipeline. The 

Air Force inexplicably decided to ask Congress for less than the Corps indicated 

it needed; Air Force commanders shifted back to the Moroccan program only the 

$11.4 million that had been diverted to other activities in November 1950. By the 

time this allotment of money reached the field, Derby and his staff had committed 

all available funds.64

In late August 1951, the project ran into a serious discrepancy between available 

and required funds. Derby cabled the Air Force chief of staff, General Hoyt S. 

Vandenberg, to advise that he had to suspend procurement and the recruitment 

of critical personnel because of lack of money. Air Force headquarters replied 

that Congress was holding up the money needed for construction in Morocco, but 

Vandenberg arranged for an immediate transfer of $40 million.65

In June 1951, the Bureau of the Budget had informed the secretary of defense 

that it had concerns about the Moroccan program. The Bureau observed that its 

accompanying request for a more precise accounting “need not further delay the 

requests for authorization by Congress” that the Air Force planned to submit for 

future work. Nonetheless, the Bureau wanted a detailed report on how money 

had been spent to date. The secretary of defense’s comptroller relayed the request 

to the service secretaries. The Air Force commander in Morocco, General Old, 

received a cable in the early autumn of 1951: “Request you immediately provide 

this headquarters with the authorization and appropriation of funds required by base 

and by line as it appears in the fiscal year 1952 construction budget to permit your 

construction program to proceed uninterrupted through November 1951.”66

Feeling increasing pressure from the Bureau of the Budget and the Department 

of Defense to curb costs, the Air Force questioned the money being spent to provide 

family housing for the personnel in Morocco. The contractors and the Army engineers 

had had trouble attracting qualified civilian supervisory personnel to the Moroccan 

project, and as an incentive they extended assurances that their wives and families 

could accompany them. The Corps had expected that the workers and their families 

64 Mil Files XII-27 and XII-28, OH, HQ USACE, contain documents from 1951 on the crisis in 

Air Force funding. See esp. Derby to Brig Gen Archie J. Old Jr., 22 Jun 51; Derby to NAD Engr, 23 

Jul 51; Lt Col Abromovitz (USAF) to Dir Budget, DCS/Comptroller (USAF), 3 Aug 51; Memo for 

Gen Timberlake, 3 Aug 51. Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 9. 65 Telgs, Col George T. Derby to Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, 5 Sep 51, and HQ USAF to Col George 

T. Derby, 8 Sep 51, both in Mil Files XII-27, OH, HQ USACE; Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air 

Bases, p. 11. 66 Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 12. The date of the telegram and its receipt, which 

the Riley committee report does not give, are surmised. 
The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 67

could find housing on the local economy; but the French prohibited this, fearing that 

Americans would drive up local rents. Thus, dependent travel had to be suspended 

in early 1951. To solve the problem, General Hamilton, the Air Force’s negotiator in 

Morocco, had approved construction of a temporary construction village at Nouasser. 

The contractor built this housing as a part of the expense of construction. Although 

the Corps of Engineers frequently provided housing at remote construction sites in 

the United States, officers at USAF headquarters were unfamiliar with the practice. 

As a result, with concerns about costs increasing, the construction of one hundred 

houses at Nouasser attracted the wrong kind of attention. In early September 1951, 

the assistant secretary of defense, Lyle S. Garlock, asked the chief of engineers to 

explain the need for the housing.67

The Office of the Chief of Engineers marshaled arguments to justify the housing 

at Nouasser, but it was difficult to provide the detailed cost accounting demanded 

by the Bureau of the Budget and the Air Force for the Moroccan project. Line 

67 Memo, Brig Gen John Hardin to Lyle S. Garlock, 23 Oct 51, sub: Construction of Temporary 

Construction Village at Nouasseur Air Base, French Morocco, Mil Files XII-27, OH, HQ USACE; 

“Moroccan Story,” p. 5; Interv, Hart with Derby, 19, 20 Dec 84, p. 87; Haseman comments on Dod, 

“Airfield Construction in North Africa: Morocco,” p. 30.

Construction of the air bases in Morocco attracted political attention, including a visit in 

the mid-1950s from Vice President and Mrs. Richard M. Nixon, here being greeted by Brig. 

Gen. Charles Heim (right) and a base commander.
68 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

justification of costs was not possible because the program had no fixed plans 

and specifications even in the summer of 1951 after six months of activity. The 

original program called for five bases; but at the time of the request for line-item 

information, construction had begun at only two bases. The Air Force still had three 

sites to select, and estimates of costs for their construction based on hypothetical 

considerations were perforce imprecise.68 Neither the contractors nor the Corps of 

Engineers staff could account even for money already spent. Ascribing all overhead 

costs and equipment purchases to the two bases under construction rather than the 

five bases planned would be inaccurate. The nature of the construction program in 

Morocco precluded the kind of accounting that the Bureau of the Budget requested. 

At this date, however, the emphasis on cost accounting began to displace the sense 

of urgency that characterized the Moroccan program initially.69

For a time, personnel in the field continued to hear more encouragement 

and praise than reflections of the growing pressure for financial accountability 

in Washington. In early October, Colonel Derby received a personal note from 

the SAC commander, General Curtis LeMay, about the “very fine verbal report” 

that General Old had given him on the construction program in North Africa. 

LeMay spoke of the accomplishment as “a direct contribution to the SAC combat 

capability” for which he wanted to express his appreciation. In a letter to the Air 

Force chief of staff in Washington, LeMay praised Derby’s “extraordinary” results 

on the Moroccan job and suggested that Derby supervise any other projects the Air 

Force decided to undertake in Africa. He also recommended Derby for promotion 

to brigadier general.70

By the beginning of November, Derby again had to plead for funds. On 8 

November, Atlas Constructors gave notice that, after having spent millions of dollars 

of their own money and with no funds in sight to cover these or future expenses, the 

company would suspend operations. On 9 and 14 November, the Corps of Engineers 

outlined its immediate needs—$33 million to continue work from the middle to the 

end of November, $28.25 million for December, and $22.45 million for January—a 

total of $83.7 million.71

In Washington, perceptions of excessive costs for the Moroccan air-base 

program began to obscure both the original imperative for emergency construction 

and the real accomplishments of the Army engineers and the contractors. On 16 

November, several Air Force general officers, civilian representatives of the Bureau 

of the Budget, a colonel from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and a Corps of 

Engineers lieutenant colonel met in the Pentagon. Congress had just appropriated 

68 Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 13. 69 Ibid., pp. 13–14. 70 Ltr, Gen Curtis LeMay to Col George Derby, 9 Oct 51, Mil Files XII-27, and Nold’s paraphrase 

of “letter from Lieutenant General LeMay to the chief of staff, Air Force, praising Colonel Derby” 

in Rpt, Brig Gen G. J. Nold, 21 Nov 51, sub: Recommendations on East Atlantic District (Morocco), 

Mil Files XII-41-6, both in OH, HQ USACE. 71 Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, pp. 13–14; Brig Gen John R. Hardin, “Critical Overseas 

Projects,” 14 Nov 51, Mil Files XII-27, OH, HQ USACE. 
The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 69

$178.67 million for the project. The men at the meeting decided that the Bureau 

of the Budget would apportion only $100 million for the Moroccan project—$45 

million less than the Air Force had just requested. The Office of the Secretary of 

Defense further reduced the money that would reach the engineers in Morocco by 

requiring that $44 million of the $100 million go to re-fund projects from which the 

Air Force had borrowed to keep the Moroccan program operating.72

The DoD deputy comptroller issued to Air Force planners overseeing the 

Moroccan program a memorandum summarizing the decisions: “Your request 

for $145,762,500 has been reduced to $100 million. No further funds will be 

reapportioned until the Air Force reviews this program and presents to this office a 

program showing the work which has been accomplished with former appropriations 

and the work proposed with the $178,760,000 appropriated in Public Law 254.”73

These were impossible conditions. Derby received $56 million of the $61 million 

he requested just to keep construction in Morocco going through December 1951. 

The $56 million would surely be exhausted before anyone could supply the figures 

that the Bureau of Budget requested.74 A priority other than rapid completion of 

construction had taken over in Washington.

Late in 1951, a parade of inspectors arrived in Morocco; negative judgments 

about the program increased. The U.S. Army Audit Agency reported that Atlas’ 

management procedures were weak. A special assistant to the Air Force inspector 

general raised questions about the quality of the paving and the excessive overtime 

put in by construction workers.75 In response, the Corps of Engineers reorganized its 

management of overseas construction. In mid-November, General Pick created the 

East Ocean Division with headquarters in Richmond, Virginia, and placed the East 

Atlantic District, the Middle East District, TUSEG, and other work in the Atlantic 

region under it. Pick named Brig. Gen. Robert G. Lovett as the new division engineer; 

in December, Lovett undertook his own inspection of the operation in Morocco. 

Despite progress in constructing the air bases, Lovett found a crisis in morale and 

efficiency brought on by the financial squeeze.76

In the last months of the year, the predominant concern in USAF headquarters 

about the Moroccan program shifted from rapid construction to costs and the 

prevailing assessment changed. In October, General Old praised Colonel Derby’s 

accomplishments to General LeMay; in November, he voiced satisfaction with the 

work on the air bases. On 6 December, Old’s tone shifted, when he wrote to Derby 

that he was “greatly perturbed over the cost of construction of the American bases 

in French Morocco.” Old demanded an immediate report “showing by line item use 

72 Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 15. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. Quotation from Memo, Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) Materiel (USAF) to DCS Opns (USAF), 

19 Nov 51, sub: Air Base Development, French Morocco, Mil Files XII-27, OH, HQ USACE. 75 Johnson Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52, pp. 7, 9, 10–11, 16; Riley 

Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 18; Riley Comm Hearings, pp. 154–56. 76 Memo, Brig Gen Robert G. Lovett to Maj Gen Lewis A. Pick, 27 Dec 51, Mil Files XII-27, OH, 

HQ USACE, covers much of the same ground as the report paraphrased and quoted in Riley Comm 

Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 14.
70 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

made of funds expended by Atlas Constructors up to and including 30 November 

1951” and attached a list of fifteen categories of expenses. He also asserted that 

“entirely too large a percentage of each dollar is spent for the convenience, comfort, 

and pleasure of Atlas Constructors’ personnel.”77

On 3 January, General Pick met with representatives of PUSOM and with Atlas 

Constructors. Atlas agreed to send Lyman D. Wilbur, a senior vice president and 

partner in Morrison-Knudsen, to Morocco to help restore administrative control 

to the contractor’s work on the project. The PUSOM director, O. J. Porter, took 

exception to the suggestion that the architect-engineers had spent “extravagantly” on 

the Moroccan job; he prepared a long refutation for delivery to General Lovett.78

On 8 January, General Pick met with General Old, Maj. Gen. Patrick W. 

Timberlake, and Brig. Gen. Colby M. Myers from the Air Force to discuss the 

letters from Old to Derby demanding the detailed accounting of the costs. Pick 

objected that Old’s requests intruded upon the appropriate role of management of 

the construction reserved to the Corps of Engineers. General Timberlake requested 

a thoroughgoing audit of the expenditures related to Morocco. Old voiced his 

concern that Derby, for whom he expressed the “highest personal regard,” had lost 

control of the project, that the contractors were wasteful and inefficient, and that the 

construction was substandard. Old further criticized the 100-unit housing village 

at Nouasser as extravagant and unnecessary. General Myers asserted that an audit 

was necessary to satisfy the Bureau of the Budget and to gain the release of the 

77 Ltr, Brig Gen Archie J. Old Jr. to Col George T. Derby, 6 Dec 51, Mil Files XII-27, OH, HQ 

USACE. 78 MFR, 3 Jan 52, sub: Meeting with Atlas Constructors and PUSOM; Ltr, O. J. Porter to Brig Gen 

Robert G. Lovett, 4 Jan 52; both in Mil Files XII-28, OH, HQ USACE.

The commander of the Mediterranean Division lived in these quarters at the Nouasser air 

base until the division office moved to Livorno, Italy, in November 1957.
The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 71

funds appropriated for the project. At this, Pick exploded. If the gentlemen wanted 

an “investigation”—for that is what the Air Force seemed to be demanding—they 

should be prepared. An investigation would ask why funds had been so slow in 

reaching the Army and why the planning for the Moroccan bases had been so 

“dilatory” from the beginning. The meeting became heated and personal. Timberlake 

demanded “no whitewash, but an investigation as to the extravagances on the job.” 

Pick retorted that the Air Force had rushed the job, planned it poorly, and still had 

not selected two of the sites.79

Congressional Investigations

The changing attitude in the Pentagon toward the Moroccan construction 

coincided with the increasing scrutiny by congressional committee staffs. Official 

reports on the project’s shortcomings accumulated. Investigators for congressional 

committees heard from former project participants. Harold Simmons, the engineer 

overruled by Colonel Derby in June 1951 at Sidi Slimane and later dismissed over 

a conflict of interest concerning his wife’s employment with one of the contractors, 

complained to the staff of a Senate subcommittee chaired by a freshman senator 

from Texas, Lyndon B. Johnson. The committee received other complaints about 

the project from “current and former contractor employees” and others.80

Senator Johnson opened public hearings on the Moroccan air-base program in 

January 1952. On 15 January, the Air Force rescinded its “emergency” order and 

directed that work in the Moroccan bases continue at a more normal pace.81 The 

accusations aired before the Johnson committee touched off a flurry of newspaper 

headlines about corruption and waste in Morocco, one of which quoted Senator 

Johnson’s characterization of the program as “one sordid mess.” Air Force officers 

unhappy with the project blamed the Corps of Engineers for substandard work. Air 

Force civilian engineers had inspected the airfields in late 1951, and the Johnson 

committee publicized their charge that the project suffered from “1. flagrant disregard 

of specifications; 2. mismanagement, waste and loafing; 3. bad materials used in 

some cases, such as inferior gravel.” Complaints increased to a “veritable flood,” 

according to the committee’s public report.82 Allegations fell into several categories: 

79 For two parallel accounts of the meeting, see MFRs, Brig Gen John Hardin, 10 Jan 52, sub: East 

Atlantic District Work, and Col Craig Smyser, 11 Jan 52, sub: Conference on Proposed Independent 

Audit by Air Force of Casablanca Project, both in Mil Files XII-28, OH, HQ USACE. Both men 

participated as part of Pick’s staff. 80 Quotation from Johnson Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52, p. 2. For 

negative reports on Morocco, see Ltr, Col Louis B. Grossmith Jr. to Brig Gen Archie J. Old Jr., 28 

Dec 51, Mil Files XII-27, OH, HQ USACE; Memo for Gen Craig, 2 Jan 52, sub: Inspection of Airfield 

Construction Program, East Atlantic District, French Morocco, Mil Files XII-28, OH, HQ USACE; 

and reports mentioned in the Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 14, passim. 81 Johnson Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52, p. 11. 82 For a summary, see Adams, History of U.S. Strategic Air Bases in Morocco, p. 17; Johnson 

Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52, passim; enumerated list of complaints from 

p. 17 of the committee’s report; second quotation from p. 15.
72 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

failure to comply with specifications in constructing runways, taxiways, and aprons 

at Nouasser and Sidi Slimane that created unsatisfactory surfaces; failure to maintain 

adequate property accounts, controls, and procedures; inadequate cost control; laxity; 

improper procurement procedures resulting in excessive payment for equipment and 

local services; and possible kickbacks, bribes, and collusion.83

Senator Johnson called the secretary of the Army, Frank Pace Jr., and the chief of 

engineers, General Pick, before his committee to respond to the charges. The senator 

called representatives of Atlas Constructors and PUSOM, the architect-engineer 

contractors. He did not call either Derby or Haseman.

The Johnson committee’s very negative treatment of the project and the media 

interest provoked General Pick to action. He visited Morocco twice in January 

1952 to gain firsthand information. It was Pick who handed Derby a copy of the Air 

Force notice rescinding emergency status for the Moroccan construction. Derby, 

who had not received a copy from the Air Force, then instructed Atlas to adjust its 

construction schedule.84 To provide closer supervision of the overseas construction, 

Pick decided to establish a division with headquarters in Casablanca. He officially 

activated this new Mediterranean Division on 14 February and gave it responsibility 

for all construction in the Mediterranean region, including the East Atlantic District, 

which had just moved its offices to Nouasser, and the Middle East District in Tripoli. 

The East Ocean Division, established the previous November, continued to supervise 

overseas construction in Greenland, Iceland, Bermuda, and the Azores.85

On the same day that he established the Mediterranean Division, General Pick 

met with the under secretary of the Army and with Army and Air Force leaders to 

discuss the changes. The Air Force made clear that it had “lost faith in Colonel Derby, 

believing that the job has got away from him and is being run by the contractor.” 

Pick defended Derby as a “brilliant officer” and insisted that the commander of the 

Mediterranean Division would make any personnel changes necessary for effective 

execution of the construction program.86

On 21 February, General Pick testified before Senator Johnson’s committee and 

stated that he intended to send Brig. Gen. Orville E. Walsh to Morocco as division 

engineer of the new Mediterranean Division. Pick defended the Moroccan program 

and attributed its problems and mistakes to the accelerated pace of construction 

necessitated by the Air Force’s insistence on speed. He contended that the deviations 

from normal standards and procedures had been minor and within allowable limits. 

Army Secretary Pace responded in a similar tone; in a letter to Senator Johnson on 20 

83 “Moroccan Story,” p. 6. 84 Riley Comm Hearings, p. 308. 85 GO no. 4, 14 Feb 52, sub: Establishment of the Mediterranean Division; Johnson Comm Rpt 

on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52, p. 11; “Important Dates in French Morocco”; John W. 

Chambers II, The North Atlantic Engineers (New York: North Atlantic Division, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, 1980), pp. 86, 91. 86 MFR, 19 Feb 52, sub: Construction of Air Bases in Morocco, Feb. 19 Report on a Meeting of 

Feb. 14, 1952, Mil Files XII-28, OH, HQ USACE.
The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 73

March, he said, “I feel that there have been exaggerations in some of the testimony 

and a tendency to forget the speed element which was uppermost at the time.”87

The testimony from Pick and Pace did not mollify Senator Johnson, who saw 

flagrant departures from specifications, the use of substandard construction materials, 

mismanagement, waste, even corruption. Johnson attributed these failures directly to 

the district engineer, Colonel Derby, and his deputy, Haseman. The staunch defense 

of the program by Pick in his public testimony and by Pace in his letter of 20 March 

provoked Johnson. Within hours of receiving Pace’s letter, Johnson made clear his 

intention to shut down the Moroccan operation completely “until irregularities and 

wasteful practices had been corrected.”88

Johnson’s threat brought results. Pace wrote a letter dated 21 March that was 

delivered to Johnson by hand that afternoon. Pace informed the senator of the 

“remedial steps” that he had implemented or would soon implement to address the 

committee’s concerns, including ordering Derby and Haseman relieved of their 

command responsibilities in Morocco. Pace urged delaying “any further action” 

against the two officers until after they had aided their successors, General Walsh 

and Col. Jack P. Campbell, in taking over the project. Derby and Haseman were 

formally relieved of duty on 5 April and returned to the United States. Walsh took 

command at the headquarters of the Mediterranean Division in Casablanca, and 

Campbell took command at the East Atlantic District offices at Nouasser.89

On 9 April 1952, a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 

chaired by Congressman John J. Riley (D–South Carolina), opened hearings 

concerning the Moroccan air bases. The hearings continued through the summer; 

the committee issued a summary report on 26 September, a month after the Senate 

Committee issued its “Interim Report on the Moroccan Air Base Construction.” The 

conclusions reached in the two reports could hardly have been more different. 

In contrast to Senator Johnson’s committee, the House committee called Derby 

and Haseman to testify. It also called Pick and other Corps officials. Congressman 

Riley let them give detailed explanations of the difficulties they had encountered 

with the Moroccan project and the compromises that they had made to complete 

the mission according to the Air Force’s emergency schedule. The deputy for 

installations from the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force testified: “You have 

some deficiencies . . . but what are they against the whole show, and what are they 

going to be against the whole show when it is done 2 years from now? They are 

minor. All the charges of venality and false bookkeeping and some of the silly 

things that have been said about some of these office[r]s are just pin pricks. They 

mean nothing.”90

87 Johnson Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52, pp. 12, 39. Quotation from 

Ltr, Frank Pace Jr. to Lyndon B. Johnson, 20 Mar 52, p. 18, Mil Files XII-28, OH, HQ USACE. 88 Johnson Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52, pp. 38–39. 89 Ibid., p. 19; “Important Dates in French Morocco.” A copy of Pace’s letter to Johnson bears the 

notation “4:25 P.M. 3-21-52 Hand-carried to Sen. Johnson by Carey.” 90 Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, p. 18.
74 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

The Riley committee paid particular attention to the pressures placed on the 

Army engineers and the contractors by the Air Force’s insistence on speed. The 

committee noted that the Air Force had rescinded its order for emergency programming of the construction only after Senator Johnson’s committee hearings began to 

focus public protests on the endeavor.

The Riley committee reconvened hearings in September after receiving an 

outside evaluation of the construction ordered by the secretary of the Army early in 

the summer. A consortium of construction contractors led by Glen W. Maxon and 

Fred I. Rowe conducted the evaluation. Both Maxon and Rowe were presidents of 

highly respected companies with experience comparable to the Moroccan program. 

The consortium examined between six- and seven thousand tests on the pavement 

already laid at Nouasser and Sidi Slimane and concluded that the faults in base 

course affected a very small portion of the pavement. 

Referring to the consortium’s report, the Riley committee observed that “all 

phases of the nature of the tests and the availability of current information were 

discussed by the many engineers present, and those who have the responsibility 

for the work agreed that the costs of corrective action will not exceed $2 million. 

. . . This testimony came as a surprise to members of the committee but stands 

uncontroverted.” The committee “pressed” O. J. Porter, a recognized expert on 

paving, “to state his opinion of the construction performance of the job, the type 

of opinion that is normally expected from an architect-engineer.” The committee 

report included Porter’s reply without comment: “I think that with all the difficulties 

the job as a whole sets a record [of accomplishment] that has never previously been 

reached or approached, even in my experience during wartime.”91

The Riley committee concluded that the unprecedented amount of criticism 

directed against the Moroccan air-base program remained largely unjustified. The 

committee acknowledged that some of the negative reports were accurate but argued 

that they had negligible significance and had received disproportionate attention 

when weighed against the work that had been accomplished. The committee went 

on to detail the scope of what the construction crews had achieved in just one year: 

9.9 million cubic yards of earth excavated or filled, over 1 million cubic yards of 

base rock laid, and 1.99 million square yards of asphalt binder course and over 1 

million square yards of asphalt surface course put in place. Crews had erected 32 

warehouses providing 1.125 million square feet of floor space as well as 1,147 other 

buildings; another 512 buildings were under construction by April 1952. Further, at 

two airfields, Atlas Constructors had completed POL systems with storage tanks, 

pipelines, and refueling hydrants. The company had installed 10.5 miles of sewer 

line, 17.5 miles of water line, 40 miles of power line, and over 45 miles of roads. 

The 200-mile POL pipeline, on which the French did not allow American firms to 

bid, was also “well under way.” The Riley committee concluded:

91 For this and the preceding two paragraphs, see Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, pp. 18–21, 

quotations from p. 21.
The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 75

In short, where one year before there had been nothing, there existed at two 

locations in Morocco at the time these hearings began in April 1952, usable air bases, 

and there was in the process of establishment an important link in the defense of the 

West. . . . So far as Morocco is concerned, the committee feels that a substantial 

injustice has been done by making the Corps of Engineer [sic] officers the whipping 

boys of this operation.92

This seeming exoneration left Secretary of the Army Pace undeterred. In late 

November 1952, he officially “admonished” General Pick, Colonel Derby, and the 

commander of the North Atlantic Division, Colonel Frech, for failure to supervise 

the Moroccan program properly.93

Assessing the Moroccan Program

Although construction on the air bases in Morocco continued until the mid-1950s, 

congressional and public interest in the bases waned after the committees issued their 

reports. In late July 1953, the warring parties in Korea signed an armistice, thereby 

relaxing international tensions and reducing the threat of war. Near the end of 1953, 

the United States negotiated an agreement with the government of Spain to build 

American bases there. Congress approved a scaled-down construction program for 

Morocco as the need for additional bases in North Africa lessened markedly.

By mid-January 1954, the cost of the Moroccan projects amounted to $340.2 

million. The cost of the entire program eventually reached about $412 million. 

Neither figure diverges drastically from the $390 million projection that Derby 

presented to the Air Force in mid-April 1951 for the construction of new bases 

rather than the rehabilitation of existing bases.94

The charges of waste and substandard construction were greatly exaggerated. 

Senator Johnson’s subcommittee seemed to acknowledge this when it issued its 

second report on Morocco. The first report of August 1952, echoing testimony 

gathered early in the year, began by leveling charges of “flagrant disregard 

for specifications and sound engineering practices” and of “the indifference of 

92 Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, pp. 21–22, 24, quotation from p. 24. For reports that 

support the Riley committee’s judgment, see MFR, 31 Jan 52, sub: Inspection of Mssrs. Kalette and 

Perry; Min, Conference Held 2 Feb 52 to Discuss Construction Progress; Memo, Col Charles F. Ivins 

for the Inspector General, 15 Apr 52, sub: Interim Report, Investigation of Army Participation in the 

Construction of the United States Air Bases in French Morocco, and an amplification of that report, 

with the same title and undated [30 Apr 52?]; all in Mil Files XII-28, OH, HQ USACE. Memo, Cary 

to Secretary of the Army, 25 Apr 52. 93 Riley Comm Rpt, Moroccan Air Bases, pp. 21–22, 24; Adams, History of U.S. Strategic Air 

Bases in Morocco, p. 25; Ltr, Pace to Johnson, 20 Mar 52, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Second Report 

on Moroccan Air Base Construction [19 Feb 1953], 44th Report of the Preparedness Investigating 

Subcommittee [Lyndon B. Johnson, Chairman] of the Committee on Armed Services, 83d Cong., 1st 

sess., 1953, p. 33 (hereafter cited as Johnson Comm Second Rpt, Feb 53). 94 MFR, 18 Apr 51.
76 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

officialdom to the squandering of public funds.”95 The report of February 1953 used 

more temperate language: “Much stress has been laid by the services on the critical 

world conditions at the time of the initiation of the construction project in Morocco. 

. . . Whether all that occurred in Morocco was justified by that sense of urgency is 

highly questionable.”96 The committee also observed: “It is our view that no useful 

purpose will now be served by additional investigation of the errors of the past in 

Morocco.”97 This is far removed from Senator Johnson’s early public charges of 

“waste, inefficiency, and outright graft.”98 Despite the more moderate tone and the 

disclaimer that additional investigations were unwarranted, the Johnson Committee’s 

early charges had received broad public attention.

At the instigation of the Johnson committee, Secretary of the Army Pace did 

have a lawyer from his office investigate the Moroccan program. The lawyer 

95 Johnson Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52, p. 1. 96 Johnson Comm Second Rpt, Feb 53, pp. 26–27. 97 Ibid., p. 4. 98 Johnson Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52. Johnson’s public charges are 

quoted in John G. Norris, “Pace Removes Engineers on African Bases,” Washington Post, 22 March 

1952. 

Progress versus the primitive: fighter planes fly over camels in Morocco. 
The Moroccan Air-Base Program, 1950–1954 77

examined the conduct of the program, the charges of graft and corruption, the 

charges against the Corps of Engineers, and the personal charges leveled against 

Derby and Haseman. He concluded that, far from having acted in dereliction of 

duty, “the small group of Engineering personnel demonstrated a real drive in getting 

construction going and two runways operational by 14 July [1951].” In examining 

“the collusion and kickback cases which were brought before the committee,” he 

found that “the evidence of bribes and fraud are not an outstanding defect of the 

Morocco project.”99

What extant evidence of illegal activity exists reflected only petty violations 

that were minuscule when compared with the overall costs of the program; none 

involved the Corps of Engineers. Local French courts convicted two French nationals 

of soliciting bribes; one worked for the local French government, the other for Atlas, 

which promptly fired the offender. Two American employees of Atlas were convicted 

in Consular Court in Morocco, one of soliciting a $300 “approval” fee from a local 

contractor, the other of demanding gifts from local contractors. The Consular Court 

dismissed cases against two other American employees of Atlas for lack of evidence; 

one case had alleged “misappropriation of a table lamp.” In light of the magnitude 

of the program, the lawyer from the Office of the Secretary of the Army concluded 

that none of the cases seemed “to be of shocking proportions.”100

The lawyer dismissed the personal charges raised against Derby and Haseman 

in a strongly worded statement:

There is no evidence of any personal wrongdoing on the part of either Col. 

Derby or Col. Haseman. . . . [I] believe that a number of the allegations represent 

the views of disgruntled persons and do not have an adequate foundation. I further 

believe that the Committee has not been fully informed of the urgency, and the bona 

fide psychology of urgency, which prevailed at the time. My own conclusion and 

recommendations would be that the engineers should present these points to Senator 

Johnson’s subcommittee.101

Senator Johnson never called either Derby or Haseman to testify.

The cost of remedial work to correct deficiencies on the hastily built runways 

showed that the flaws in construction were minor. Strengthening the runways cost 

less than $3 million in a $400 million program. The cost of repairs represents only 

7.5 percent of the $40 million spent on the construction completed at the first two 

air bases in 1951. For the Army engineers who worked on the Moroccan air bases, 

and for many personnel in the Air Force as well, that additional cost could be seen 

99 Memo, Cary to Secretary of the Army, 25 Apr 52. 100Ibid. For the cases themselves, see Memo, Brig Gen G. J. Nold to William L. Cary, 21 May 52, 

sub: Court Cases in French Morocco Regarding the Airbase Construction, Mil Files XII-41-6, OH, 

HQ USACE. 101Memo, Cary to Secretary of the Army, 25 Apr 52.
78 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

as the price of “war risk insurance.”102 The bases were ready when most needed, 

in the summer of 1951.

Both Derby and Haseman continued their Army careers after being recalled 

from Morocco. In 1953, Colonel Derby became district engineer in Huntington, 

West Virginia. He retired in 1956, feeling that the House committee investigation 

had largely vindicated him.103 Nonetheless, the initial sensational charges damaged 

reputations and shortened military careers. The promotion to brigadier general that 

Air Force General Curtis LeMay had favored for Derby in the summer of 1951 

never came. As for Haseman, he returned from Morocco, served in and around 

Washington for the rest of his career, and retired as a colonel in 1966. 

Time verified that the Moroccan air-base program was neither excessively expensive nor wracked by corruption or profiteering. The Army engineers accomplished 

the mission they were assigned. The Air Force acquired strategic bases at what it 

judged to be a crucial moment in the Cold War, and no runway ever failed in use 

as a result of the compromises made during the crash phase of the construction. It 

is ironic that the program to build American air bases in Morocco is remembered 

more for investigations and false accusations than for its accomplishments.

102Quotation and percentage figures from Waldo G. Bowman, “Aftermath in Morocco—Good 

Bases,” Engineering News Record, 27 August 1953, pp. 30–36, 39–41. 103Interv, Hart with Derby, 19, 20 Dec 84, p. 83.

In September 1956, Chief of Engineers Maj. Gen. Emerson C. Itschner (right) visited 

Mediterranean Division headquarters at Nouasser, where he observed concrete 

paving of the taxiway with Lt. Col. John W. Chesley Jr., area engineer, and Paul Erskine 

of Atlas Constructors.
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 79

3

Shifting the Locus of Work

1952–1957

The Mediterranean Division, activated in February 1952 by the chief of 

engineers, General Pick, became the first postwar division of the Corps of Engineers 

to have its headquarters in the overseas area for which it had responsibility. The 

general officer commanding the division had an advantage that Colonel Derby 

never enjoyed: rank comparable to the senior Air Force officer in the area. The 

Mediterranean Division assumed responsibility for the East Atlantic District in 

Morocco, the Middle East District in Libya, and The U.S. Engineer Group in Turkey. 

Over the following six years, the Office of the Chief of Engineers expanded the 

division’s area of responsibility farther east to include Iran and Pakistan.

Organizing the Mediterranean Division

General Walsh arrived in Morocco to assume command of the division 

in February 1952, just weeks after the Air Force had ended the emergency 

designation for the Moroccan construction program. Between February and 

May, until the new commander could assemble his staff, the three districts 

continued to report to the East Ocean Division. In that interim, Walsh developed 

plans to improve the administrative operations of the division, the East Atlantic 

District, and contractor organization. The addition of the administrative layer 

of a division-level staff freed the East Atlantic District engineer to concentrate 

on managing and supervising the construction. Walsh worked with Lyman 

Wilbur of Morrison-Knudsen, who assumed management of Atlas Constructors, 

to improve the level of cooperation between the contractor and the Corps of 

Engineers’ field organization.

After May 1952, Walsh assumed full responsibility for the division’s programs.

Now that speed of construction was no longer the dominant factor, he could focus 

his attention on establishing control, especially in Morocco. He implemented 

competitive bidding for local supplies, a standard practice that Colonel Derby had 

suspended in 1951 to save precious time. Walsh also ordered fencing for areas used 

to store supplies and equipment and tightened security in general. Walsh was not 

sure that the property records kept by Atlas Constructors could ever accurately reflect 

the equipment on hand, but he knew that congressional investigators, and therefore 

the secretary of the Army, gave the highest priority to inventory control. Walsh 

instructed Atlas Constructors to end excessive overtime of construction workers, to 
80 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

eliminate extra personnel, and to establish more effective supervision. Walsh fully 

expected these measures to reduce costs over the duration of the project.1

When Lt. Col. Curtis W. Chapman Jr. arrived in August 1952 at headquarters 

in Casablanca, Walsh put him in charge of the division’s operations. Chapman 

became convinced that the problems in Morocco were operational and that proper 

inspections could correct them. Was the work in accordance with the plans and 

specifications? Was it on schedule? If not, what help could the division provide 

to the district staff to improve the situation? Chapman was able to deploy half a 

dozen civilian engineers to increase the frequency of inspections. He sent them to 

the Middle East District in Libya and to TUSEG in Turkey as well as throughout 

the East Atlantic District in Morocco.2

Gradually, the division’s staff increased. By the winter of 1952–1953, the staff 

of about eighty had taken over the inspection and control of construction, duties 

that PUSOM had handled since early 1951. PUSOM, the joint architect-engineer 

venture with a multinational staff of 568, retained its planning and design functions.3

In January 1953, after less than a year in command of the Mediterranean Division, 

General Walsh was reassigned to the Joint Construction Agency in France, 

established that month to consolidate construction activities in Europe. Colonel 

Campbell, commander of the East Atlantic District, took over as interim commander 

of the division.

The Middle East District in Libya and Saudi Arabia, 1951–1952

During Walsh’s short tenure as division engineer, he worked to improve cooperation between the district engineers’ staffs and the contract personnel managing design 

and construction. To become acquainted with the staff and to monitor construction, he 

made inspection tours to the U.S. Engineer Group in Turkey and to the construction 

sites at Wheelus and Dhahran.4

1 “Chronological History, Middle East District (Through 30 April 1953),” p. 3, box 51-83-8379, 

Richard T. Farrell Papers, Office of History (OH), HQ United States Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE), Alexandria, Va.; U.S. Congress, Senate, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the 

Committee on Armed Services (Lyndon B. Johnson, Chairman), Investigation of the Preparedness 

Program: Interim Report on Moroccan Air Base Construction, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 1952, pp. 24, 41 

(hereafter cited as Johnson Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52). 2 Interv, Paul K. Walker with Maj Gen (Ret) Curtis W. Chapman Jr., 28–30 Sep 81, pp. 100–

104.3 “History of the East Atlantic District,” p. 4; “Who Is Doing the Work,” p. 8; “The Mediterranean 

Division,” p. 10; all in Moroccan Courier, 3 July 1953. The second article gives figures for PUSOM 

for 15 January 1953. The third article gives a total staff strength for the division as of July 1953 of 8 

officers, 53 American civilians, and 24 local or third-country nationals, that is, citizens of a country 

other than the United States or the host country. 4 Johnson Comm Rpt on Moroccan Air Base Construction, Aug 52, pp. 21, 24, 27; Memo, Col 

William E. Leonhard, 4 Sep 52, sub: Funds for Construction in Turkey, Mil Files XII-34, OH, HQ 

USACE; Col Bruno L. Jakaitis, an. 4 to USTAP Rpt no. 67, [Jun 52], sub: TUSEG, Progress Rpt for 

June 1952, p. 3, Mil Files XII-34, OH, HQ USACE. 
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 81

The construction program outlined in 1950 and 1951 was just beginning to 

produce visible results. As of mid-August 1952, the construction contractor at 

Wheelus Air Base, Crow-Steers-Shepherd, had completed almost 60 percent of the 

building program scheduled for 1951 and about 25 percent of the 1952 program. 

The slow delivery of construction materials to the worksites compounded delays in 

funding by the Air Force and delays in procurement. At Dhahran, the contractor had 

assembled 75 percent of the materials for the 1951 program but only 40 percent for 

the 1952 program. Although the fiscal year had already ended, construction crews 

at Wheelus had on hand only 15 percent of the materials necessary to complete the 

construction of barracks and bachelor officers quarters.5

Construction moved slowly at Wheelus in part because of the changing political 

situation in Libya. In late December 1951, this former Italian colony, since war’s end 

under British administration on behalf of the United Nations, became the first such 

country to receive full independence. The implementation of Libyan sovereignty 

compelled the Middle East District to begin in May 1952 to negotiate with the new 

Libyan government, as well as with the holdover British functionaries, more than 

5 Memo, Col Paul D. Troxler to Div Engr, Mediterranean Div, 4 Sep 52, sub: Narrative Report on 

Overseas Construction, August 1952, Mil Files XII-34, OH, HQ USACE; “Chronological History, 

Middle East District (Through 30 April 1953).”

Aerial view of Wheelus Air Base looking west, with the Mediterranean Sea to the north
82 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

one hundred fifty new leases needed to increase the area of the air base from 1,264 

to 3,400 acres. Unfortunately, the new Libyan administration was irritatingly slow in 

processing the requests. The district enlisted help from the U.S. diplomatic legation, 

but delays continued to hinder construction.6

The work at Dhahran made little better progress. The extreme temperatures 

caused the concrete mix used in the construction to set so rapidly that the crews 

could not transport it by truck the five or six miles from the batch plant to the job 

site. Even adding excess water did not offset the evaporation due to the heat, so 

the crews poured concrete at night. One participant tells of a night pour starting 

about 8:00 p.m. after a daytime temperature of 130 ̊F. Around midnight, the wind 

direction changed and the temperature began to drop. Suddenly “freezing to death,” 

he donned a jacket, which he wore until his shift ended at 2:00 a.m. The next day, 

he learned that the low temperature overnight had been 105 ̊F.7

6 R. L. Swetzer, Wheelus Field: The Story of the U.S. Air Force in Libya, The Early Days, 1944–1952

(Ramstein, Germany: Historical Division, Office of Information, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, 1965), pp. 

28, 34; Charles B. Faulkner Jr., Rental Re-Eval Rpt: Agreed Areas, Libya, 4 Jun 55, pp. 2–3, unmarked 

box, OH, HQ USACE; Memo, Troxler to Div Engr, Mediterranean Div, 4 Sep 52. 7 Interv, Richard T. Farrell with Wilbur Sheehan, Aug 75, p. 2.

Aerial view of the Dhahran airfield looking south, September 1954.

Note the absence of vegetation.
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 83

By early September 1952, the Fluor Corporation had completed approximately 

three-quarters of the construction program scheduled at Dhahran for FY 1951 and 

almost half the work scheduled for FY 1952. The U.S. Air Force had redefined 

specifications for strengthening and widening the runway; but as of September 1952, 

the area office at Dhahran had not received the new specifications.8

Converting the Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contract in Morocco

From the beginning of the construction program in Morocco, East Atlantic 

District personnel had intended to convert the CPFF arrangement to a fixed-price 

contract; but they knew that the conversion had to wait until the Air Force had lifted 

the emergency directive and the pace of work had slowed. After the first two years, 

the government managers and the contractors were able to price the work equitably 

and to plan for conversion to a lump-sum, fixed-price contract.9

By early 1953, the idea of conversion had won general approval. On 22 

January, the Air Force requested that the Corps of Engineers end all overseas CPFF 

contracts. A week later, Atlas Constructors expressed their willingness to submit a 

fixed-price, lump-sum proposal if they could get a clear definition of the scope of 

the remaining work and a settlement of invoices that they had submitted under the 

cost-plus contract.10

Maj. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis Jr., who succeeded General Pick as chief of 

engineers in March 1953, strongly advocated converting the Atlas contract. 

Sturgis appointed Brig. Gen. Walter K. Wilson Jr. as the new commander of the 

Mediterranean Division, in part because of his extensive experience with CPFF 

contracts, and instructed him to develop a plan for the conversion. In meetings 

with the secretary of the Army, the new chief of engineers emphasized the need 

for a clear plan from the Air Force for the remaining construction and asked the 

secretary to order the steps necessary for conversion. On 9 April, Sturgis asked 

Atlas Constructors to submit a report discussing the issues involved in converting 

the contract.11

A few days after General Wilson arrived at Mediterranean Division headquarters 

in Casablanca, in mid-April 1953, he asked his staff to prepare a study exploring 

the positives and negatives of converting the Atlas Constructors’ contract. Colonel 

Chapman headed the team, which strongly recommended against conversion; team 

members remained convinced that the vagaries of the construction program still 

made calculating a fixed price very difficult. Wilson praised the thoroughness of the 

8 Memo, Troxler to Div Engr, Mediterranean Div, 4 Sep 52. 

9 Memo, Lt Col Leonard L. Haseman to Col George T. Derby, 4 Dec 51, sub: Renegotiation of 

Atlas Contract, box 51-84-6364, Farrell Papers; “The Moroccan Story” [mid-1953], p. 8, Mil Files 

XII-29-7, OH, HQ USACE. 10 “Moroccan Story,” p. 8; “Atlas Contract History,” p. 8, Mil Files XII-29-5, OH, HQ USACE.

11 Paul K. Walker, Interviews with Lieutenant General Walter K. Wilson, Jr. (Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1984), p. 135 (hereafter cited as Walker, Interviews with Wilson); 

“Atlas Contract History,” p. 9; “Important Dates in French Morocco,” 1 May 52, in Mil Histories 

(vol. 3 of 4, 1952), box 51-84-6364, Farrell Papers.
84 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

report, thanked his staff, and called Chapman into his office. “Damn it!” he said, 

“You don’t understand. We’re going to do this! . . . The chief wants this done.”12

Wilson announced that he would be taking a three-week tour of the division’s 

operations in Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. In his absence, he expected Chapman 

and the staff to prepare an equally thorough and conscientious examination that 

emphasized the positive elements of conversion. General Wilson returned from 

his tour to find the study that he wanted but a skeptical staff. Over the following 

weeks, Wilson convinced at least senior members of the division staff, including 

Chapman, that the proposed conversion could be advantageous for the government 

and fair to the contractor.13

The study prepared under Chapman’s direction analyzed more than fifty potential 

issues, including pricing, property, supply, legal affairs, security, and the various 

services that the contractor had performed under the terms of the CPFF contract. For 

each problem, the plan offered several possible solutions and listed the advantages 

and disadvantages of each. In June, Wilson and Chapman presented their plan to 

General Sturgis and to officials at the Pentagon. They returned to Morocco with 

a letter approving the conversion in principle but authorizing the step only if the 

actual negotiations with Atlas Constructors confirmed that the conversion would 

bring economic advantages to the government. The assistant chief of engineers for 

military construction and a representative from the OCE legal office accompanied 

Wilson and Chapman to Morocco to assist in negotiations leading to approval of 

a final contract.14

The parties had to resolve the difficult issue of assessing the equipment and 

supplies on hand in Morocco or on order. In theory, anything Atlas had purchased 

constituted a part of its “costs.” The government paid for it, and the materials became 

government property. Because equipment and supplies had reached the country with 

very little inventory control, it was difficult to tell what was in country, what was 

in transit, and what had never arrived. To inventory all the supplies on hand would 

have taken too much time, involved too many people, and still not determined what 

the government had paid for and thus owned and what still belonged to Atlas. Under 

Chapman’s direction, division and Atlas employees inventoried about 10 percent of 

the supplies on hand and projected an estimate based on the sample.15

Division staff finally calculated the total cost of the remaining construction 

and compensation for the inventoried materials at about $21 million, less than half 

12 Ltr, Brig Gen W. K. Wilson Jr. to Lt Gen Samuel D. Sturgis, 6 May 53, file 328, box 51, Lt Gen 

Samuel D. Sturgis Jr. Papers, OH, HQ USACE; Walker, Interviews with Wilson, pp. 137, 298–99; 

Interv, Walker with Chapman, 28–30 Sep 81, pp. 105–06. Chapman’s recollections provide the more 

vivid language, but the accounts agree in detail. 13 Walker, Interviews with Wilson, pp. 137, 298–99. 14 “Atlas Contract History,” pp. 9–10; Walker, Interviews with Wilson, pp. 301–02; Memo, Maj Gen 

B. L. Robinson, 16 Jun 53, sub: Conversion of CPFF Contract with Atlas Constructors for Construction 

of Bases in Morocco, and similar memos from Tulley, 23, 30 Jun 53, and Robinson, 29, 30 Jun 53, in 

Mil Files XII-41-6, OH, HQ USACE; “Summary of Major Events and Problems, Fiscal Year 1954,” 

Sep 54, files 3ff, box 3, Gen Files, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited as Major Events, FY 1954). 15 Interv, Walker with Chapman, 28–30 Sep 81, pp. 106–07.
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 85

the figure Atlas proposed. Throughout late June and July, the staff worked with 

the contractor’s management team to determine fair unit prices for equipment. 

The teams assessed the requirements of each construction project to determine the 

number of people, the amount of materials, the associated costs, and the potential 

savings that would accrue under a new contract. They took into account the need 

for remedial work at some sites. At one point, Atlas indicated that it had made all 

the concessions it could; the figures on the table represented the contractor’s final 

offer. Wilson, saying that he could not accept a settlement at that level, proposed a 

competitive bidding process for the remainder of the construction in Morocco. This 

was an unattractive option because the technical agreements with the French named 

Atlas Constructors as the authorized contractor. Wilson’s firm stand prompted Atlas 

negotiators to reconsider. Wilson and Jack Bonny of Atlas negotiated further cuts, 

prompting Wilson to say, “I’m scared we’ve cut too much.” He put a little back into 

the contract amount because he did not want Atlas strapped for cash.16

Wilson agreed to a figure of $32.4 million. To protect the government, he 

insisted on a “redetermination” clause that allowed the government to renegotiate 

if the amount agreed upon produced excessive profits. The contract provided that 

Atlas would accept all work for which plans and funds were available prior to 1 

January 1954; the contractor retained the right to decline work not specifically 

contracted before that date. Practically, this meant that the new contract applied only 

to Nouasser, Sidi Slimane, and Benguérir, all of which were already under construction. The government agreed to purchase the surplus at the end of the construction 

program; to furnish camps, plants, and equipment to Atlas without charge; and 

to assume any added costs due to the actions of the Moroccan government. The 

new arrangement came into effect on 1 August 1953 by means of a supplemental 

agreement to the original contract.17

Renegotiating the contract for a lump sum brought immediate savings to Atlas; 

through the redetermination clause, the government saved money also. After the 

conversion, Atlas cut its workforce by nearly four thousand, eliminating personnel 

who had monitored the cost-plus contract, including security guards, timekeepers, 

supervisors, and inventory checkers. Overtime work fell sharply. Atlas also saved 

by finding items at prices lower than those used in calculating the conversion. In 

mid-October 1953, Atlas and the Mediterranean Division applied the redetermination 

clause, reduced the prices set in the contract, and saved the government $4.9 million. 

Over the first year, the government saved a total of $6 million. Although a firm 

dollar figure for total savings was not possible because of the changing dimensions 

of the project, other savings accrued over the next several years. General Sturgis and 

General Wilson (who became chief of engineers in 1961) each judged the conversion 

of the Atlas CPFF contract to be a major career accomplishment.18

16 Ibid.; Walker, Interviews with Wilson, pp. 301–03. 17 Walker, Interviews with Wilson, pp. 301–03; “Moroccan Story,” p. 9; “Atlas Contract History,” 

pp. 11–16; Major Events, FY 1954. 18 “Atlas Contract History,” pp. 17–22, 23–30; “Who Is Doing the Work,” p. 8; Walker, Interviews with Wilson, pp. 144, 302, 306, 314; “Moroccan Story,” pp. 9–12; “Major Accomplishments 
86 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Transferring Operations in Turkey

The Mediterranean Division’s area of responsibility also extended to Turkey, 

where the U.S. Engineer Group in Turkey had received the assignment in 1950 to 

build two bases, to rehabilitate five bases, and to build a fuel storage and distribution 

system at one other site. By 1952, only five of the original eight sites remained in 

the program and the total number of sites had dropped from eight to seven.19

The government had awarded a CPFF contract for the work in Turkey. This 

contract never attracted the notoriety that the Moroccan CPFF contract gained, partly 

because the program in Turkey was much smaller. Also, TUSEG’s financial officer 

learned from the Corps’ experience in Morocco. In 1950, TUSEG had hired Stuart 

Wagman as chief of its Audit Branch; by 1952, he had become principal financial 

officer. Wagman recognized that he faced many of the same problems administering 

the CPFF contract in Turkey as those that had drawn criticism in Morocco. With the 

help of Orhan Cankardes, a Turkish engineer from TUSEG’s Engineering Division, 

Wagman worked with the project managers to refine cost estimates of various 

construction activities. Using a self-designed reporting form, Wagman matched 

expenditures with construction progress and compared costs as a percentage of the 

estimate with the percentage of project completed. The cost-versus-progress reports 

allowed TUSEG to identify potential cost overruns. Wagman’s analytical initiative 

and the form that he developed for reporting won him a letter of commendation 

from General Walsh.20

In December 1953, General Wilson and Lewis McBride, chief of the 

Engineering-Construction Division in TUSEG, met in Frankfurt with the commander 

in chief of United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), who wanted command 

authority over all military construction assigned to his area of responsibility. 

With Turkey and Greece in NATO, the transfer of TUSEG’s operations to the 

Joint Construction Agency seemed logical. General Sturgis expressed his concern 

that this action and the Department of Defense’s recent decision to give the Navy 

responsibility for construction of bases in Spain left the Corps of Engineers with 

“the more remote, costly, and difficult places where arrangements and controls are 

particularly harsh.” The Mediterranean Division’s support for TUSEG continued 

through the early months of 1954. On 1 May 1954, the JCA absorbed TUSEG, and 

the work in Turkey continued under an area office supervised from a JCA district 

headquarters in Athens.21

of the Chief of Engineers for the Six Months Period 26 July 1953–25 January 1954,” file 391, box 

61, Sturgis Papers. 19 Major Events, FY 1954, p. 189.

20 Interv, authors with Stuart Wagman, 11 Jan 94, pp. 18–19.

21 Memo, Lt Gen Samuel D. Sturgis for DCE—Construction, 9 Dec 53, sub: Letter from Gen. 

Wilson, Med Div, 2 Dec 53, file 378, box 59, Sturgis Papers; Major Events, FY 1954, p. 189; Lewis 

McBride, “A Brief History of The U.S. Engineer Group (TUSEG), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Ankara, Turkey, 1950–1954,” p. 1, Construction Div, Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE), M-2-

2/16, Europe Division–Record Holding Area (EUD-RHA); Ltr, Wilson to Tulley, 8 Apr 54, unmarked 

box, Karl C. Dod Papers, OH, HQ USACE. 
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 87

The Mediterranean Division at Mid-Decade

At the end of 1953, Wilson and Sturgis had given some thought to closing out 

the entire Mediterranean Division. The major portion of the Moroccan program was 

securely on track, and no work in the region remained to be done. Sturgis therefore 

instructed Wilson to advise his personnel that the chief of engineers was “counting 

strongly on them” to supervise the initiation and rapid construction at Boulhaut, 

the completion of work under the Middle East District in Tripoli, the transfer of 

TUSEG, and the initiation of new projects. Wilson responded that his personnel 

were “gearing ourselves to being in existence for at least another year.”22

In January 1954, General Wilson moved the division offices from Casablanca to 

Nouasser to consolidate operations with the East Atlantic District and to reduce staff. 

He appointed a deputy, Col. Gunnard W. Carlson, to succeed Colonel Campbell as 

district engineer and to prepare to draw down the district’s staff and operations. In 

November 1954, after Wilson’s division staff had reassumed direct responsibility for 

the work in Morocco, the East Atlantic District closed.23 In January 1955, the Corps 

of Engineers deactivated the East Ocean Division based in Richmond, Virginia; the 

Mediterranean Division remained active.24

Middle East District

As the only district under the Mediterranean Division, the Middle East District 

pressed construction forward at Wheelus Air Base in Libya and at Dhahran in Saudi 

Arabia. The period of most intense employment on the Wheelus project had come 

between December 1952 and August 1953, when the workforce ranged between 

three thousand seven hundred and four thousand five hundred. In January 1954, 

district personnel took over design, inspection services, and preparation of plans 

and specifications from the architect-engineer firm of Knappen-Tippetts-Abbett. In 

April, district personnel also took over design work for the projects at Dhahran.25

At Wheelus Air Base, Crow-Steers-Shepherd installed utilities; paved the 

runways; added lighting; and built POL facilities, troop and family housing, a 

dependent school, and a swimming pool. The use of locally acquired building 

materials—limestone, concrete blocks, and rubble masonry—expedited construction and saved money by obviating the purchase of lumber, which was scarce and 

expensive. Using local materials, contractors could build a three-story dormitory 

22 Sturgis quotation from Memo, Sturgis to DCE—Construction, 9 Dec 53; Memo, Brig Gen W. 

K. Wilson Jr. to Maj Gen Samuel D. Sturgis, 5 Jan 54, unmarked box, Dod Papers; Major Events, 

FY 1954, p. 71. 23 Engr Hist Div, OCE, “Summary of Major Events and Problems, Fiscal Year 1955” [Oct 55], 

pp. 59–60, file 4, box 3, Gen Files, OH, HQ USACE. 24 Major Events, FY 1954, p. 71.

25 “History of the Mediterranean Division,” [ca. 1957], p. 24, box 19, access. no. 77-92-0002, 

WNRC; Crow-Steers-Shepherd, Final Closing Rpt, Contract no. DA-30-082-Eng-8 [Libya], pp. 

125–26, box 51-83-8378, OH, HQ USACE; “Middle East District: Tripoli, Libya,” p. A2, box 51-

83-8379, Farrell Papers.
88 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

for $338,000; typical American wood construction would have cost $435,000. The 

structures at Wheelus built of masonry were plastered inside and covered with stucco 

outside. Local subcontractors supplied aggregate, placed base course for roads and 

parking areas, and constructed building shells. Crow-Steers-Shepherd performed the 

more skilled work of plumbing, electrical installation, sheet-metal work, and airfield 

grading and paving. American companies subcontracting under CSS erected elevated 

water tanks, drilled and developed water wells, and constructed a 550,000-barrel 

prestressed concrete underground storage facility for fuel.26

Additional construction for Libya included three Air Force aircraft control and 

warning (AC&W) stations and facilities for global communications (Globecom). In 

addition to AC&W stations placed in the vicinity of Tripoli, the Air Force located 

other such facilities in Misratah, one hundred miles southeast of Tripoli, and in 

Banghazi, three hundred fifty miles east of Tripoli across the Bay of Sidra. Each site 

required operational facilities, utilities, troop housing, and administrative buildings. 

As of October 1954, Crow-Steers-Shepherd had awarded 148 subcontracts for work 

around Wheelus Air Base and 14 subcontracts for work on the AC&W projects. Total 

allocations for Wheelus Air Base by the autumn of 1954 amounted to $60,330,041 

for construction and $934,270 for design. Another $4.7 million supported the three 

Libyan AC&W stations.27

At Dhahran, the Fluor Corporation handled construction for runway paving 

and lighting, troop housing, POL facilities, base utilities, Globecom facilities, a 

refueling system, and administrative buildings. By late 1954, the company had 

awarded twelve labor subcontracts valued at $3.6 million and two small construction 

subcontracts that together totaled $12,210. Fluor completed the work at Dhahran 

in September 1955.28

New Construction at Asmara

During General Wilson’s tenure as commander of the Mediterranean Division, 

construction began on one new program: an Army communications installation 

at Asmara, the capital of Eritrea. The project at Asmara was part of the original 

construction program set for the Middle East District in 1951, but it received a lower 

priority than the airfields at Wheelus and Dhahran.29 The political situation in the 

region caused additional delays, and the construction at Asmara did not begin for 

several years. 

An Italian colony since the late nineteenth century, Eritrea had passed to British 

administration after Italy’s defeat in World War II. In December 1950, the UN 

General Assembly voted to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia; in September 1952, with 

a constitution drawn up by a UN commission, Eritrea became a federal province 

26 “Middle East District: Tripoli, Libya,” pp. 28, F1–F3.

27 Ibid., pp. 28, A1, F1, F3.

28 Ibid.

29 “Historical Summary, Mid. East Dist., 1950–51,” Gen Files 2-1, OH, HQ USACE; “History of 

the Mediterranean Division,” [ca. 1957], p. 25. 
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 89

under the Ethiopian government headed by Emperor Haile Selassi. In 1953, the 

U.S. and Ethiopian governments signed a base rights agreement that covered the 

proposed construction at Asmara; in February 1955, the two countries signed a lease 

agreement for the land needed for construction.30

Eritrea stretches along the southern third of the Red Sea’s African coast, 

across from southern Saudi Arabia and Yemen. To the north and west lies Sudan; 

to the southeast lie Djibouti and the Gulf of Aden. (See Map 7.) The province’s 

eastern coastal plains and western lowlands rise rapidly to a central mountain 

ridge. Asmara is situated on this ridge seven thousand six hundred feet above 

sea level; the elevation and unique atmospheric characteristics made the area an 

ideal communications center and listening point for monitoring electronic traffic 

worldwide.31 With one hundred thirty thousand inhabitants in 1955, Asmara lay 

two thousand miles by air from the Middle East District headquarters in Tripoli 

and one thousand miles from Dhahran, the nearest Mediterranean Division 

construction site. 

30 Lt Col Edward J. Bielecki, “Project History: 1954–1958 [Asmara Residency],” n.d., p. 8, box 

24, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 31 Walker, Interviews with Wilson, p. 142; Interv, Alfred Beck with Maj Gen (Ret) Robert F. 

Seedlock, 25–26 Oct 79, pp. 279–80. 

Cooling towers for an air-conditioning plant under construction at the Dhahran airfield
90 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

In September 1954, representatives of the Mediterranean Division, the 

Army Signal Corps, and the Army Security Agency discussed the construction 

program with the designated Asmara project engineer at the Middle East District 

headquarters in Tripoli. Because no one had given the district a complete set 

of specifications, it had developed preliminary plans from standard designs. 

The district had then sent these plans to the division headquarters, to the post 

commander at Kagnew Station (the existing U.S. Army facility in Asmara), and 

to the project liaison officer for the Signal Corps. The district incorporated their 

comments and established a year-long timetable, to begin in October 1954, for 

R E D S E A G U L F O F A D E N

Asmara

Gura

ADDIS ABABA

ERITREA

TEGRÉ

B A GĒMDER

GOJĀ M

W ALA G Ā

W ALL O

SHA W Ā

ARUSI

HĀRARGÉ

SID Ā M O

GAMO-GOFA

JIM Ā

I L UBABOR

SUD A N

S A UDI

ARABIA

Y EMEN

ADEN PRO TEC T O R A T E

BRITISH

SOMALILAND

I T ALIAN

SOMALILAND

FRENCH

SOMALILAND

UGAND A KEN Y A

ETHIOPIA

1956

Federated Territory

0

0 200 Miles

200 Kilometers

Map 7
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 91

completing the drawings as additional data on the site and specifications for the 

project became available.32

The decisions reached at the September 1954 meeting made many revisions 

inevitable during the initial stages of the construction. The revisions, the 

difficulties of communicating between Asmara and Tripoli, and the normal 

time lag involved in review and approval provoked problems with the timely 

procurement of critical materials. At the end of the project, the participants 

would conclude that “an increased engineering authority and capability [at the 

local level] . . . in the early stages of operations” might have served the project 

more effectively than leaving design in the hands of the district staff who were 

far away from the site.33

The construction at Asmara involved three discrete locations. To create a larger 

installation at Kagnew Station, the engineers planned to rehabilitate an Italian 

Fiat automotive assembly center dating from the prewar Italian colonial period. 

Called the CINTIA site from the abbreviation of the Italian company’s name, the 

installation consisted of industrial workshops and repair facilities, administrative 

buildings, and housing facilities targeted for rehabilitation. This center provided 

support for two outlying installations: a transmitter site and a receiver site. The 

majority of the CINTIA buildings were single-story masonry structures with 

either wooden or steel roofing. The plan envisaged a new three-story barracks, 

a 500-person mess hall, a gymnasium, laundry and drycleaning facilities, new 

family housing, and all-new utilities. The mainsite and the outlying facilities 

would each have its own power plant. The program had a preliminary budget of 

$8.543 million. On 11 October 1954, the Middle East District awarded a costplus-fixed-fee contract to the joint venture of Crow-Steers-Shepherd, which held 

the construction contract for Wheelus Air Base. The district opened the Asmara 

Area Office in November 1954, which grew to include two military assistants and 

fifteen American civilians.34

Advance elements of Crow-Steers-Shepherd traveled from Tripoli in early 1955 

to begin operations in Asmara. The Ethiopian government gave immediate clearance 

to all of the Americans but barred eight Italian CSS employees from entering the 

country. On 18 February, the Ethiopian government finally issued permits to admit 

all CSS employees. At that time, Crow-Steers-Shepherd had 22 American civilians 

and 14 European employees on its staff with plans to add 29 Americans and 15 

third-country nationals.35

32 Bielecki, “Project History [Asmara],” pp. 35–36. 

33 Ibid., p. 47. 

34 “Middle East District: Tripoli, Libya,” p. A8; “Design Analysis for Water Supply and Distribution 

System at CINTIA Site, Asmara, Eritrea,” [1950s], box 52, Transatlantic Division–Records Holding 

Area, Winchester, Va.; “History of the Mediterranean Division,” [ca. 1957], p. 25; Bielecki, “Project 

History [Asmara],” pp. 14, 38–40; Virgil H. Wintrode, “Report on Survey of Middle East District 

May 1, 1955,” 1 Jun 55, p. 13, OH, HQ USACE. 35 Bielecki, “Project History [Asmara],” pp. 14–16. 
92 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Construction began at Asmara the first week in March 1955, but approved 

drawings for various elements of the construction continued to arrive until 

October. Construction crews used readily available local materials. Surplus 

materials, supplies, and equipment were shipped from Nouasser, Morocco; 

Dhahran, Saudia Arabia; and Tripoli, Libya.36 Crow-Steers-Shepherd planned 

to use local labor for much of the construction work; these workers seldom 

used modern equipment or power tools, but their low wages and long working 

hours—nine to ten hours a day, six days a week—compensated for the relative 

inefficiency of their hand labor.

Beginning with twenty-eight local workers with general construction and driver 

classifications, CSS increased the number to 1,021 by the end of 1955. In February 

1956, the local labor force peaked with 1,220 workers on the payroll. By October 

1957, CSS had reduced its local labor force to 201 with 9 professional staff. On 

18 April 1958, the last two CSS administrative employees discharged the final 15 

local workers and closed the company’s Asmara office.37

36 Ibid., pp. 1, 19–21, 24–26; Memo, Brig Gen David H. Tulley to Lt Gen Samuel D. Sturgis, 19 

Jul 55, sub: Status of Work, Mediterranean Division, as of 15 July 1955, file 328, box 51, Sturgis 

Papers. 37 Bielecki, “Project History [Asmara],” pp. 11, 15–16, 33–34. 

Concrete blocks drying in front of the batch plant at the Dhahran airfield
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 93

The Mediterranean Division’s Center of Gravity Changes

Late in 1954, the Mediterranean Division became both an operating and 

a supervising division. In addition to supervising the work of the Middle East 

District, the division executed the remaining work in Morocco. But even the 

“routine” situations in North Africa challenged the engineers. At Benguérir, 

a minor paving operation had to be suspended when a huge swarm of locusts 

descended on the work site; the asphalt could not be laid over the bodies of the 

locusts without compromising the integrity of the paved surface.38

By mid-1955, the Air Force operated from four bases in Morocco that were 

virtually complete: Benguérir, Nouasser, Sidi Slimane, and Boulhaut. In April, 

the SAC commander, General LeMay, visited Boulhaut, the base most recently 

turned over to the Air Force. He pronounced it “one of the most scenic and livable 

bases” in the command with the “smoothest pavement and best looking asphalt in 

Morocco.” In Saudi Arabia, the project at Dhahran was in its final stages; in Libya, 

38 Ltr, Jack Baylor to authors, 1 Dec 95, p. 5, Transatlantic Programs Center (TAC), Winchester, Va.

Local laborers place rocks, creating the base for the transmitter site road at Kagnew Station.
94 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

construction for the three air-traffic control and warning stations also approached 

completion.39

Brig. Gen. Benjamin B. Talley succeeded General Wilson as Mediterranean 

Division commander on 28 June 1955 and administered the division for ten 

months. On 1 May 1956, Talley ceded place to Brig. Gen. Lawrence J. Lincoln 

Jr., who commanded the Mediterranean Division until July 1958. Generals Talley 

and Lincoln oversaw the shift of attention of the Mediterranean Division from 

North Africa to the Middle East. By the mid-1950s, North Africa had become less 

strategically significant and considerably less hospitable for Americans, both civilian 

and military. The French in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia faced the challenge of 

anticolonialism. Algerian nationalists had launched a guerrilla war against France 

in 1954. In Morocco, nationalists rioted and agitated for independence. France 

refused to abandon its position in Algeria but granted independence to Morocco 

and Tunisia in 1956. The situation for the American forces in Morocco became 

increasingly tenuous.

Changing Priorities in the Middle East

In the Middle East, the ferment of nationalism—fueled by resentment against 

American support of the state of Israel—also brought instability and an antagonism 

toward the Western powers and the United States. American policymakers defined the 

Middle East as extending from Egypt to Pakistan and from the southern shore of the 

Black Sea to the Gulf of Aden and Sudan. The United States and Britain looked upon 

the region as a focus of strategic concern and of economic interest. The Middle East 

provided existing or potential military bases close to the Soviet Union in the event of 

a general war, and it contained the world’s largest known oil resources. Iran, which 

bordered the Soviet Union, ranked as the leading regional producer of oil; Britain 

controlled Iranian oil production through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Since the 

1870s, when the government purchased a majority interest in the Suez Canal, Britain 

had controlled the canal; most of the sixty-four thousand troops Britain garrisoned in 

the area remained concentrated there. In 1955, forty ships a day carried 108 million 

tons of cargo, about 11 percent of the world’s total international trade, through this 

critical economic and strategic passageway. To reroute the ships around the horn of 

Africa would add five thousand miles to each trip.40

After World War II, ambitious nationalists challenged the British position both 

in Iran and in the Suez Canal Zone. Nationalists in Iran found it offensive that the 

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company avoided paying most taxes. In April 1951, the shah 

of Iran appointed a strongly nationalist leader, Mohammed Mossadegh, as prime 

minister. Although Mossadegh had many affinities with the West, he pursued an 

39 Major Events, FY 1954, p. 72; Ltr, Brig Gen W. K. Wilson Jr. to Maj Gen Samuel D. Sturgis 

Jr., 8 Apr 55, file 328, box 51, Sturgis Papers; Ltr, Brig Gen Benjamin B. Talley to Maj Gen Samuel 

D. Sturgis Jr., 18 Nov 55, file 306, box 48, Sturgis Papers; Memo, Tulley to Sturgis, 19 Jul 55. 40 Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 6, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

National Policy, 1955–1956 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Joint History, 1992), p. 151.
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 95

increasingly assertive policy toward the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that quickly 

led to its nationalization. Initially, American policymakers showed sympathy for 

Iran’s desire to control its own oil production; but they became progressively 

more concerned about the security of strategic supplies of oil should the Iranian 

government pursue an anti-West policy.

The upsurge of Iranian nationalism paralleled a similar development in Egypt. In 

July 1952, a coup by military officers overthrew King Farouk I, who had become a 

symbol of the corrupting influence of Western domination. Mohammed Naguib, the 

nominal leader of the coup and a hero of the 1948 war against Israel, became prime 

minister and president. The real figure of power among the Egyptian Army officers, 

Gamal Abdel Nasser, remained in the background. The new nationalist government of 

Egypt set as one of its goals the elimination of what Naguib called the “destructively 

persistent stationing of British armed forces on Egyptian territory.”41

In Iran, the challenge to British control of oil continued unresolved into 1953, 

when John Foster Dulles became secretary of state under President Dwight D. 

Eisenhower. Fearing that the Iranian crisis would invite Soviet meddling in the 

Middle East, Dulles charted a policy to resolve the situation in a way favorable to 

American interests. With American encouragement, the shah dismissed Mossadegh 

in August 1953. Mossadegh’s nationalist policy had gained a substantial popular 

following, and his supporters demonstrated in the streets. Fearing for his life, the 

shah fled to Italy. Counterdemonstrators, supported by the Iranian Army and with 

covert American involvement, clashed with crowds sympathetic to Mossadegh; 

several hundred people were killed in the melee. With the Iranian Army firmly 

behind him, the shah returned and had Mossadegh arrested. Two weeks later, the 

United States extended a $45 million loan to Iran. 

In 1954, the parties resolved the issue of control and disposition of Iranian oil. 

Mossadegh had created the National Iranian Oil Company to manage Iran’s oil 

assets; this company now signed an agreement with a new consortium in which the 

United States and Britain held 40 percent interests and France and other investors 

held lesser shares. The National Iranian Oil Company retained half the profits of the 

production of oil, a substantial gain over the 15 percent that the Anglo-Iranian Oil 

Company had paid the Iranian government. The consortium gave the United States, 

which had had no prior holdings, an interest in Iranian oil equal to Britain’s.42

The Iranian settlement brought no respite from crisis in the Middle East; from 

the American point of view, the situation in Egypt deteriorated as the leadership 

of the new regime turned more radical. In 1954, Nasser displaced Naguib, first as 

prime minister and then as president. Nasser had an ambitious agenda that included 

economic and military expansion for Egypt and pan-Arab nationalism led by Egypt. 

41 André Fontaine, History of the Cold War from Korea to the Present (New York: Random House, 

1969), p. 154, quoting a 1953 letter from Egyptian President Mohammed Naguib to President Dwight 

D. Eisenhower. Fontaine’s source is Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years 1953–1959, 2 

vols. (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 1: 104. 42 For the crisis in Iran, see Fontaine, History of the Cold War from Korea to the Present, pp. 

144–52. 
96 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

His ambitions put him at odds with Britain and France, the long-standing colonial 

powers in the region. In July 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. 

Secretary of State Dulles saw this situation as he had the battle for oil in Iran—as 

part of the West’s struggle with the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1953, he instituted 

policy reviews involving the State and Defense Departments, the National Security 

Council, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The studies proposed political and economic 

measures to persuade the Arab states that the United States supported their interests 

and would provide economic and military aid for friendly countries in the region. 

Militarily, policy planners suggested a system of collective defenses to link Iran, 

Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan. The National Security Council also suggested plans for 

military operations to deter or end any large-scale Arab-Israeli hostilities.43

From these proposals Dulles shaped a policy of active engagement that sought 

to align the states of the region with the Western powers and to exclude Soviet 

influence. In 1955, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Britain formed the Baghdad 

Pact, an alliance for mutual defense. This pact became the Middle Eastern link 

between NATO, which covered Europe, and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 

(SEATO) in the Far East. The United States did not join the Baghdad Pact but 

held observer status in the organization’s policy-making body. The agreement by 

members of the pact, to use the indigenous land and air forces of the individual 

nations to defend the region, put a premium on the modernization and development 

of these forces.44

The Trans-East District in Pakistan

Within weeks of General Talley’s arrival in Morocco as division engineer in late 

June 1955, Pakistan became a consequential element in U.S. foreign policy. This 

development presented the Mediterranean Division with a new challenge. 

Pakistan achieved independence from India as a result of a bitter civil war 

in 1947 and 1948 over religious differences between Muslim Pakistanis and 

non-Muslim Indians. At its creation, Pakistan contained two zones, West and East 

Pakistan, which were separated by one thousand miles of territory controlled by the 

Republic of India. West Pakistan covered over three hundred ten thousand square 

miles, about twice the size of California. East Pakistan had fifty-four thousand five 

hundred square miles, comparable in size to Florida. East Pakistan, which became 

independent as Bangladesh in 1972, is a part of Southeast Asia; West Pakistan is a 

part of the Middle Eastern Islamic world.

After Pakistan’s independence, hostilities continued across the West 

Pakistan–India border. With India emerging as a powerful force for neutralism in the 

mid-1950s, Pakistan represented a potential counterweight to the neutralist appeal 

for a “third way” between the East and West in the Cold War. Pakistan’s strongly 

43 Condit, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955–1956, p. 152. 44 Ibid., pp. 152–64, 237.
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 97

Muslim identity could make it a bulwark against Communist penetration into the 

Islamic world of the Middle East and thus an avenue for American influence.

All these considerations came to bear when the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 

included Pakistan among the countries to benefit from Direct Forces Support 

(DFS), a military aid program designed to overcome the deficiencies of the armed 

forces of the United States’ regional allies. Geographically close to both the Soviet 

Union and Communist China, Pakistan was strategically positioned; by helping the 

Pakistanis to develop modern facilities and methods of training, the military aid 

program would strengthen the Pakistani armed forces. The U.S. government offered 

$535 million in direct aid administered through the Military Assistance Advisory 

Group (MAAG) in Pakistan. 

Pakistan signed a military assistance agreement with the United States in May 

1954 and in September joined SEATO. On 1 July 1955, the U.S. State Department 

transferred DFS programs for supporting the military forces of friendly countries 

from its International Cooperation Administration (ICA) to the Department of 

Defense. Late in August, the Department of Defense assigned responsibility for 

supporting military construction under the DFS programs in Iran and Pakistan to 

the chief of engineers, who ordered the Mediterranean Division to begin planning 

for construction in West Pakistan.45

Because of the United States’ competition with the Soviet Union, the State 

Department urged the Corps of Engineers to implement the program in Pakistan 

quickly. The Department of Defense designated this a “crash” program and assigned 

the highest priority to improving an existing airfield at Mauripur. Members of the 

Military Assistance Advisory Group in Pakistan also pressed for quick action by the 

Army engineers. They needed action: Although the MAAG had been in Pakistan 

for a year, it had as yet delivered no visible sign of U.S. aid.46

In October 1955, before funds for the construction were approved, General 

Talley took key members of the division to Karachi to confer with the MAAG and 

45 Engr Hist Div, OCE, “Summary of Major Events and Problems, Fiscal Year 1956,” Mar 57 

(hereafter cited as Major Events, FY 1956), Gen Files 4-1, OH, HQ USACE; DF, Maj Gen Chas. G. 

Holle, 12 Sep 56, sub: Funding DFS Construction Pakistan and Iran, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE; 

Memo, Col W. Roper to Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), 12 Oct 55, sub: Direct 

Forces Support Program for Pakistan, Fiscal Year 1955, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE; Security 

Br, Mediterranean Div, “Mediterranean Division Supplemental Intelligence Studies No. 4—Pakistan: 

An Introductory Survey,” 18 Nov 55, pp. 1–2, 5, box 51-84-9377, OH, HQ USACE; Condit, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955–1956, pp. 152–56. 46 On the urgency of construction, see Ltr, Brig Gen William R. Shuler, Cdr, Mediterranean Div, to 

Maj Gen E. C. Itschner, 16 Sep 58, unmarked box, Dod Papers; MFR, Col A. D. Chaffin Jr., Mediterranean Div Cdr, 20 Feb 61, sub: Recollections on Military Assistance Construction in Pakistan, and 

other testimony in unmarked box, Dod Papers. On Mauripur as a priority, see Msg, MDDVA 2906 to 

COFENGRS [Chief of Engineers], 29 Oct 55, sub: Pakistan Direct Forces Support Program, and DF, 

Alfred S. Kurtz to DCSLOG, 5 Dec 55, sub: DFS Construction—Pakistan and Iran, both in unmarked 

box, Dod Papers. On the MAAG’s eagerness for quick action by the Corps, see Memo, Col William 

A. Davis, 28 Jan 56, sub: Construction RPAF Station, Mauripur, Karachi, and the statement “dictated 

over long distance telephone by Col. Davis, New Orleans, to Gen. Lampert, this date, concerning the 

subject of Construction in Pakistan,” 20 Feb 61, both in unmarked box, Dod Papers.
98 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

with the Pakistanis.47 In November, Soviet leaders Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita 

Khrushchev made a state visit to Afghanistan—Pakistan’s neighbor—leading to 

a Soviet loan equivalent to $100 million, $40 million of which was for arms. The 

competition between the two superpowers for influence in the region had become 

very public.

As soon as the initial allotment of DFS money for Pakistan became available, 

General Talley returned to Karachi with a party of fifteen engineers and three 

secretaries; on 21 November, he activated the Trans-East District. Talley established 

a district laboratory for materials testing to support the anticipated construction; with 

two of his engineers, including Jack Baylor, the chief of the division’s Materials 

Branch, Talley visited and inspected the airfield at Mauripur. Baylor then prepared 

preliminary design specifications for the overlay paving of the airstrip. Talley 

assigned Col. A. D. Chaffin Jr., commander of the Middle East District, to serve 

temporarily as the Trans-East District engineer. Chaffin and the civilians from 

division headquarters had as their immediate priority the preparation of contract 

plans for a rehabilitation and extension of the airfield at Mauripur and development 

of a scope of work for negotiations with architect-engineer companies.48

In early December 1955, the Office of the Chief of Engineers sent a list of 

potentially qualified contractors to the new district with instructions to solicit bids 

without public advertising—a strategy formulated to accelerate the contracting 

process. On 24 December, the Corps signed a contract with an architect-engineer 

joint venture of Grad, Urbahn, and Seelye; the designers had one hundred twenty 

days to complete their work. The contract included a provision that the design firm 

assist in developing specifications rather than depending on standard American 

criteria. Within a week, contract personnel arrived in Pakistan to examine local 

construction practices; the availability of materials and equipment; the capabilities 

of local workers and mechanics; and the availability of power, water, and transportation. Although Grad, Urbahn, and Seelye designed most of the facilities, the 

Mediterranean Division’s Engineering Division prepared designs to strengthen 

pavement and extend runways at the airfields.49

On 7 January 1956, a new district engineer, Col. William A. Davis, arrived in 

Karachi. The chief of the MAAG briefed Davis on the projects and said that he wanted 

47 “Mediterranean Division Builders,” 1 Jan 58, pp. 18–19, box 18, access. no. 77-92-0002, 

WNRC. 48 Memo, Talley to Sturgis, 18 Nov 55; Ltr, Baylor to authors, 1 Dec 95, p. 6. MedDiv Research 

Docs, TAC; MFR, Chaffin,18 Jan 61, sub: Conference on Military Construction with Representatives 

of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, unmarked box, Dod Papers; Department of the Army 

(DA), Comments on Draft Rpt, “U.S.-Financed Housing for Pakistan Forces” (House Committee on 

Foreign Affairs), unmarked box, Dod Papers, CEHO Research Collections, OH, HQ USACE; MFR, 

Chaffin, 20 Feb 61, sub: Recollections on Military Assistance Construction in Pakistan, unmarked 

box, Dod Papers. 49 MFR, Chaffin, 18 Jan 61; Memo, Lt Gen Samuel D. Sturgis, 6 Jan 56, sub: Urgent Fund Requirements, DFS Construction, Pakistan and Iran, unmarked box, Dod Papers; “Brochure for Inspection 

Party from OCE and Mediterranean Div,” May 57, box 51-84-5389, Farrell Papers; DA, Comments 

on Draft Rpt, “U.S.-Financed Housing for Pakistan Forces”; MFR, Chaffin, 20 Feb 61.
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 99

the expanded facility at Mauripur ready as soon as possible after 1 July. The district 

also had plans to rehabilitate airfields at Drigh Road near Karachi, at Sargodha, and 

at Peshawar in northwest Pakistan near the Kyber Pass to Afghanistan. (See Map 8.) 

Other projects included a tank-rebuilding workshop and a printing plant at Rawalpindi 

and an ammunition-storage facility at Karachi. Between January and May 1956, the 

district commissioned additional designs for projects totaling $40 million.50

Colonel Davis favored a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the work in Pakistan. 

Contractors who visited the country noted the uncertainty of the situation and 

were leery of committing to a fixed price for the work. Davis also felt that the time 

allowed for design was insufficient to get the best results from a fixed-price contract. 

The chief of engineers, General Sturgis, opposed CPFF contracts on principle and 

on the practical grounds that they were susceptible to retrospective criticism and 

investigation.51

The district worked with the Office of the Chief of Engineers to identify qualified 

construction firms for a fixed-price contract. Of the thirty-five companies OCE listed 

in December 1955 as qualified and likely bidders, sixteen expressed interest in the 

work in Pakistan; but only four companies submitted sealed bids to the Mediterranean 

Division’s rear-echelon office in New York City. On 27 June, Davis awarded 

a negotiated, fixed-price contract for $29,616,958 to Oman-Farnsworth-Wright 

(OFW), a joint venture of Oman Construction Company of Nashville, Tennessee; 

R. P. Farnsworth Company of New Orleans, Louisiana; and Wright Contracting 

Company of Columbus, Georgia.52

The criteria for the urgent project at Mauripur Airfield were modified in late 

January 1956 so that the airfield could accommodate heavy aircraft. The project 

modifications and delays in funding the Pakistani program made 1 July 1956, the 

date first requested for operational readiness of the airfield, impossible. Construction 

finally began on 1 September.53 Within weeks, a new Middle East crisis overtook 

events in Pakistan.

In the autumn of 1956, the confluence of Soviet-American competition for 

influence in the Middle East, Nasser’s desire to be rid of the British, and the 

Arab-Israeli conflict over the existence of the state of Israel exploded in the Suez 

50 Memo, Davis, 28 Jan 56; “Statement by Col. Davis, New Orleans, dictated over long distance 

telephone, to Gen. Lampert concerning the subject of Construction in Pakistan,” 20 Feb 61; Memo, 

Sturgis, 6 Jan 56; Major Events, FY 1956. 51 Ltr, Talley to Sturgis, 30 Mar 56, including Sturgis’ marginal notation that “we have constantly 

discouraged all contracting on CPFF,” file 328, box 51, Sturgis Papers; MFR, Brig Gen W. K. Wilson 

Jr., 27 Feb 61, sub: Construction Standards at Kharian, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE; Col F. J. 

Clarke, Discontinuance of Construction Contract Negotiating, 4 Oct 57, Mil Files XII-2-2, OH, HQ 

USACE. 52 Memo, Brig Gen W. K. Wilson Jr., 4 Jun 56, sub: Request for Approval of Award of a Negotiated Fixed Price Construction Contract, Pakistan FY-56, Direct Forces Support Program, unmarked 

box, OH, HQ USACE. 53 Memo, Col William A. Davis, 22 Jun 56, sub: Construction Contract no. DA-92-462-Eng-5, 

unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE; Trans-East Dist Brochure for OCE Bfg, [Col Frederick J.] Clarke 

Remarks, 16 Jan 58, tab E, box 51-83-8379, Farrell Papers. 
100 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

SAMUNG

MAURIPUR 

KARĀCHI 

ARABIAN

SEA

UNION OF SOVIE T

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

IRAN

AFGHANIS

Crisis. On 29 October, Israel, provoked 

by repeated raids upon its territory from 

Egypt and with tacit support from the 

British and French governments, attacked 

Egypt across the Sinai Peninsula and 

advanced rapidly toward the Suez Canal. 

Invoking treaty rights to protect the canal 

in time of war, the British and the French 

landed troops a few days later to reinforce 

the British garrison in the Canal Zone. The 

United States opposed the military action, 

thus creating the astonishing alignment 

between the United States and the Soviet 

Union, which also opposed the military 

measures taken by the Israelis, the French, 

and the British. 

The uncharacteristic concordance 

of U.S. and Soviet policy in opposition 

to the action in Suez was all the more 

paradoxical given the simultaneous crisis 

in Eastern Europe. On 21 October, eight 

days before the Israeli attack, Hungarians 

had taken up arms against the Soviet 

Union. The Soviet Army counterattacked 

and crushed the Hungarian independence 

movement. As the Red Army invaded 

Hungary, new contingents of British and 

French troops entered the Canal Zone. 

Faced with the combined opposition 

of the United States and the Soviet 

Union, France, Britain, and Israel ended 

their military action. A cease-fire took 

effect in Suez on 6 November 1956, and 

French and British forces withdrew on 22 

December. The Israelis withdrew in early 

March 1957 but retained control of the 

Sinai Peninsula. The Suez Crisis eased, 

but the military intervention in support 

of Israel by France and Britain and the 

opposition of the United States seriously 

damaged Western solidarity at the very 

moment that the Hungarian uprising in 

October 1956 made Soviet control of 

Eastern Europe seem both fragile and 

vulnerable. 
MULTĀN

KHĀRIĀN

SARGODHA

PESHĀWAR

GLI AIR BASE

DRIGH ROAD

KARĀCHI CIVIL AIRPORT

KĀLA

RĀWALPINDI

JHELUM

HAVELIĀN

QUETTA

Indus R

Indus R

Indus R

AREA UNDER DISPUTE

Lahore

Jammu

Gilgit

Hyderābād

Bahāwalpur

Srīnagar

CHINA

INDIA

T A N

CHINA

USSR

PAKISTAN

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ICA/AID PROGRAM

TRANS-EAST AND GULF DISTRICTS

1956–1966

Airfield

Cantonments

Construction Site

0

0 100 200 Miles

100 200 Kilometers

Map 8
102 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

The Suez Crisis disrupted the flow of supplies to the military construction in 

Pakistan, but it did not stop the program. U.S. aid to Pakistan had allocated $32.5 

million for construction in FY 1956 and $26.7 million in FY 1957: 70 percent 

in dollars and 30 percent in Pakistani rupees. Construction at Mauripur Airfield 

involved strengthening the existing runway; extending it from 6,100 to 9,000 

feet; adding lighting for the field; and installing two tanks for jet fuel, each with a 

10,000-barrel capacity. In July, the Army engineers opened the new facilities and 

turned the completed project over to the Military Assistance Advisory Group, which 

passed it on to the Pakistani Air Force early in 1958. In 1956–1957, contractors 

completed about half the work at a naval pier and 95 percent of the construction on 

a naval facility for ammunition storage, both in the vicinity of Karachi. Near the 

end of 1957, they began to strengthen and extend the runway at the Drigh Road 

airfield; during 1956 and 1957, work began on projects for the Pakistani Air Force 

at Peshawar and at Sargodha.54

The Trans-East District’s largest single project was a totally new army cantonment 

for an armored division of fifteen thousand Pakistani soldiers. Work on the facility, to 

be built at Kharian in the Western Punjab region, began late in 1956 with construction 

54 Trans-East Dist Brochure, Clarke Remarks, 16 Jan 58, tabs F, H, I; “Construction Overseas in 

Mediterranean Division” speech with slides, [1957], p. 15, box 51-83-8377, Farrell Papers; Memo, 

Brig Gen David H. Tulley, 10 Feb 56, sub: DFS Construction, Pakistan, unmarked box, OH, HQ 

USACE. 

Housing the contractor furnished for workers at Kharian, mid-1950s
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 103

of roads, railroad lines, fuel-storage tanks, a sewage system and treatment plant, and 

the initial complement of buildings to house the first five thousand troops. By the 

end of 1957, the contractor had completed over three hundred fifty buildings and had 

work pending for another two fiscal years to complete the facilities. The most difficult 

problem at Kharian was finding an adequate supply of water.55

The Suez Crisis of October–November 1956 closed the canal and lengthened 

the supply line for imported construction materials, slowing construction at both 

Mauripur and Kharian. The Trans-East District also found itself competing for 

supplies with the Pakistani government, which had requisitioned 70 percent of the 

country’s cement production for its own use. This further delayed progress at both 

sites.56

All the construction contracts that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers negotiated 

for work in Pakistan contained clauses referring to the construction agreement 

and the defense agreement between the United States and Pakistan. The Army 

engineers argued for a strong supplemental technical agreement that would permit 

the contractors to award contracts directly to qualified subcontractors “free of import 

duties and taxes.” The engineers also insisted that the technical agreement clearly 

give them the right to extend to these firms and to their employees the tax relief 

55 Trans-East Dist Brochure, Clarke Remarks, 16 Jan 58, tab G. 

56 Ibid.

Local workers using animals to carry materials to construction sites at the Kharian 

cantonment
104 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

and immunities that United States agencies, including the Army engineers and their 

civilian staff, enjoyed.57

The construction agreement signed 28 May 1956 had provisions covering taxes 

that satisfied neither the Corps of Engineers nor the American contractors. Pakistan 

required the contractor to pay the taxes initially on all imported material or goods. 

The contractor could then apply through the district engineer to the Pakistani Ministry 

of Defense for a certificate of exemption. The certificate had no monetary value; 

it was only a promise to refund the taxes paid. The system was cumbersome and 

prone to delays in the hands of the Pakistani bureaucracy.58

Developing government-to-government construction agreements was a perennial issue for the Corps of Engineers, which frequently felt that other government 

agencies ignored its interests. The chief of engineers, General Sturgis, contended in 

private ruminations that the “State Department has never been realistic in connection 

with any of our international dealings on construction; and the Air Force . . . has 

always been willing to sacrifice us on the block instead of standing up for logical 

construction procedures.”59

By the end of 1957, the Trans-East District had the equivalent—including 

rupee-financed work—of $55,698,114 under contract and another $34,571,190 

programmed for FY 1958. The construction program in Pakistan, well on its way 

to completion, displayed what one observer called a “unique combination of local 

subcontractors, American capital, native workers, imported supervisors, foreign 

materials, on-site fabrication, the latest machinery, and the most ancient hand 

methods.”60

The Gulf District in Iran

The reorganization of the aid programs that followed the State Department’s 

transfer of Direct Forces Support to the Department of Defense in July 1955 also 

prompted formation of the Gulf District in Tehran.

Iran, with an area of about six hundred thirty thousand square miles—the 

equivalent of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and most of California—occupies 

57 Quotation from Memo, Roper to DCSLOG, 12 Oct 55. For repeated expressions of concern by 

the Army engineers regarding this issue, see Msg, MDDVE 3097, [21?] Nov 55, sub: DFS Program 

Pakistan, Requesting Comments; Msg no. MDTVE 916003, to COFENGRS, 19 Jan 56; Memo, 

Seedlock, [23?] Jan 56; Memo, Col G. A. Finley, 23 Jan 56, sub: Inter-Governmental Construction 

Agreement—DFS Program, Pakistan; all in R&D File 2544, unmarked box, Dod Papers. 58 Trans-East Dist Brochure, Clarke Remarks, 16 Jan 58, p. 2. Telg, Brig Gen Lawrence J. Lincoln 

Jr., 17 Jan 58, sub: Request Authority to Negotiate FY ’58 Construction Program . . ., p. 2, box 23; 

“History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” Jun 65, box 21; both in access. no. 77-92-

0002, WNRC. 59 Memo, Lt Gen Samuel D. Sturgis to ACE-MC [Army Corps of Engineers–Military Construction], n.d., sub: Letter from Division Engineer, Mediterranean Division, 5 Dec 55, file 306, box 48, 

Sturgis Papers. 60 Robert E. Snetzer, “Pakistan: Newest Construction Area,” Military Engineer (September-October 

1958): 335. 
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 105

the western portion of a great plateau that stretches between the Indus and Tigris 

Rivers. The country lies just south of the Caspian Sea and in the 1950s bordered 

the Soviet Union on either side of that sea. (See Map 9.) The climate of the country 

ranges from extreme heat in the southern plains, where inhabitants took to caves 

for relief in the summer, to bitter winter cold and heavy snows in the north. The 

central plateau has an elevation from three- to more than five thousand feet, with 

a desert extending for eight hundred miles and varying in width from one- to two 

hundred miles cutting across it from northwest to southeast. The Elburz Mountains 

just south of the Caspian Sea in northern Iran and the Zagros Mountains in the west 

have peaks that range from ten- to eighteen thousand feet high. 

During the 1950s, Iran had a population of 18–20 million, two-thirds of which 

consisted of nomadic tribesmen or peasant farmers working land owned by the 

wealthy. About a third of the population lived in towns of five thousand or more; 

one-tenth of the total population lived in the capital city, Tehran. Although of 

Indo-European rather than an Arabic/Semitic ethnicity, 98 percent of Iranians are 

Muslim. 

The reigning emperor, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlevi, had come to the throne in 

1941, when the British deposed his father because of his suspected collaboration with 

the Nazi regime in Germany. The United States had supported the new shah’s regime 

in its disputes with the Soviet Union after the war and in the troubles surrounding 

the tenure of the nationalist Premier Mossadegh. The shah saw common bonds 

between the U.S. foreign policy of containment and the security of his country. In 

keeping with the policy of containment, Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955. The 

American Direct Forces Support program of the mid-1950s sought to strengthen 

and modernize the Iranian armed forces. 

Primitive conditions existed for construction in Iran. Transportation depended 

on unsurfaced roads and a single-track rail line from the Persian Gulf to the 

Caspian Sea with branches to Mashhad in the northeast and to Tabriz and Turkey 

in the northwest. The country’s supply of electricity was erratic and lacked any 

standardization. Cement production was unreliable, and there was little wood. All 

metal building materials had to be imported. The only abundant building material 

was handmade bricks, either fired or sunbaked and of no standard size.61

Organizing the Gulf District in Iran proceeded more slowly than establishing the 

Trans-East District in Pakistan. Discussions concerning the construction program 

for Iran began in the autumn of 1955, but funding delays meant that work could 

not start before the end of the fiscal year in June 1956. To staff the new district, the 

division hoped to recruit personnel from Morocco, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, where 

work had declined; but delays in initiating the work in Iran created a dilemma. In 

mid-January 1956, General Talley faced the prospect of imposing a divisionwide 

reduction in force to cut personnel costs, even though he would soon need the 

personnel in Iran. In correspondence with Sturgis, Talley described the situation 

61 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 19–20; “Construction Overseas in 

Mediterranean Division,” p. 22. 
OSHNAVĪYEH

MEHRĀBĀD

NAQADEH

TEHRĀN

DEZFŪL

KHĀNEH

P

E

R

S I A

N

G U L F

G u l f o f 

C ASPIAN

SEA Tabrīz

Rasht

Hamadān

Kermān

Shīrāz

Yazd

Eşfahān

Ahvāz

Bandar ‘Abbās

Qom

S A UDI ARABIA

BAHRAIN

Q A T A R

OMAN

TRUCIAL

OMAN

KUW AIT NEUTRAL

TERRIT O R Y

NEUTRAL

TERRIT O R Y

T U R K E Y

USSR

I R A Q

UNIO

SOCIAL

IRAN

GULF DISTRICT CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

1957

Gulf District Headquarters

Construction Site

0

0 100 200 Miles

100 200 Kilometers

Map 9
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 107

and emphasized the “importance of an early decision 

on what we shall do in Iran.”62

Preparations to establish an engineer presence 

in Iran had begun at the Office of the Chief of 

Engineers. Col. Leigh C. Fairbank Jr., district 

engineer for the prospective Gulf District, arrived 

in Tehran on 23 January 1956. Almost simultaneously, the twenty-seven technicians of the 30th 

Engineer Battalion’s Topographic Section received 

permission to enter Iran to begin instructing and 

assisting Iranian Army personnel in surveys. The 

Gulf District assumed responsibility for supporting 

this topographic training team.63

Colonel Fairbank coordinated Corps of Engineers 

activities with the U.S. Army Mission and Military 

Assistance Advisory Group to Iran (ARMISHMAAG). On 12 March 1956, the Corps officially 

activated the Gulf District, initially with a staff of 

twelve American civilians. In a compound outside 

Tehran, the Iranian Imperial Army provided space, 

vehicles, utilities including phone service, and 

equipment. Military personnel of the Imperial Iranian 

Army served as drivers, janitors, guards, and other 

support staff. On 16 March, General Talley took to 

Tehran a group of twenty-eight support personnel, 

two of whom remained and joined the district 

staff. The aircraft that carried Talley’s party also 

transported 4.3 tons of equipment and supplies for 

the district.64

As a first order of business, Colonel Fairbank 

sought a qualified design firm. Negotiations lasting 

62 Ltr, Brig Gen David H. Tulley (OCE) to Brig Gen Benjamin 

B. Talley, 18 Jan 56, file 306, box 48; quotation from Ltr, Brig 

Gen Benjamin B. Talley to Lt Gen Samuel D. Sturgis Jr., 20 Jan 

56, file 388, box 61; both in Sturgis Papers. 63 “Mediterranean Division Builders,” 1 Jan 58, pp. 15–16; 

Major Events, FY 1956; Data for the Orientation of Maj Gen E. 

C. Itschner, 12 Nov 58, box 51-83-8379, Farrell Papers (hereafter 

cited as Data for Itschner, 12 Nov 58). 64 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 

7, 13; “Engineer Division Mediterranean: Information Booklet,” 

15 Aug 59, p. 7, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited 

as Engr Div Mediterranean Info Booklet: 1959); Ltr, Talley to 

Sturgis, 30 Mar 56; Data for Itschner, 12 Nov 58, pp. 1, 12; DF, 

Holle, 12 Sep 56.

O m a n

Mashhad

Zāhedān

P A K I S T A N 

AFGHANIST A N

N OF SOVIE T

IST REPUBLICS
108 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

almost three weeks began in Tehran on 1 April with Ammann and Whitney–Husted, 

a joint venture of two New York firms: Ammann and Whitney and Ellery Husted. 

The program for Iran involved building installations for three branches of the 

Imperial Armed Forces of Iran: the Air Force, the Army, and the Gendarmerie 

(Iran’s national guard).65

With the contract for design awarded, the district addressed its deficiencies in 

staffing. Recruiting American civilians proved difficult because the district had to 

compete for recruits with other districts and with the division itself. The employment 

contract for civilian staff was twenty-four months, longer than many wanted to 

accept in an isolated country without amenities. Housing, household goods, and 

appliances were difficult and expensive to acquire on the local economy. With the 

approval of the division engineer, the district began to provide incoming personnel 

with safe drinking water, refrigerators, space heaters, electric transformers, and 

cook stoves.66

In May 1956, in addition to 13 openings in the Gulf District, the Mediterranean 

Division had 54 positions open: 6 at headquarters, 9 in the Middle East District, 

and 39 in the Trans-East District.67 General Sturgis recognized the problem that 

Talley and his district engineers faced in filling crucial positions. On one of 

Talley’s letters, Sturgis wrote in the margin that “the situation for engineers in 

the US is bad enough since we can’t compete with civil life—but overseas where 

the best people are needed to meet not only new conditions of terrain & weather 

but international problems, we have never done an even fair job of recruiting.” 

He concluded with the discouraging observation, “For 3 years I have reported on 

this situation to DCSLog & G-1 w/o results.” Processing took at least five weeks; 

but by July 1956 the Gulf District had a staff of 55 persons, including 6 military 

and 29 American civilians.68

After more than a year of negotiations, the U.S. and Iranian governments 

concluded formal construction arrangements on 19 September 1956. On 10 October, 

the district received instruction that cut funds for future planning. By late October, 

when the Suez and Hungarian crises broke, the imperatives behind the aid to Iran 

became more compelling. Funds that had been curtailed shortly before these incidents 

were released in late November.69

Once money became available, the division and the district worked out final 

plans and specifications with the design firm and the district assembled a list of 

65 “Mediterranean Division Builders,” 1 Jan 58, pp. 15–16. 

66 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 7, 12; Ltr, Brig Gen Benjamin B. 

Talley to Lt Gen Samuel D. Sturgis Jr., 17 Feb 56, file 328, box 51, Sturgis Papers. 67 Ltrs, Talley to Sturgis, 30 Mar, 30 Apr 56; Memo, Ploger, Actng Asst Ch of Engrs, for Personnel, 

21 May 56, sub: Status of Recruitment—Mediterranean Division; Ltr, Col C. H. Dunn to Lincoln, 23 

May 56; all in file 328, box 51, Sturgis Papers. 68 Quotation from marginal note on Talley to Sturgis, 30 Mar 56; Engr Div Mediterranean Info 

Booklet: 1959. 69 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 3–4; Data for Itschner, 12 Nov 

58, pp. 4, 8; Data for Cmd Inspection by Mediterranean Engr Div, 4–18 Jan 63, box 22, access. no. 

77-92-0002, WNRC. 
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 109

thirty-one American construction companies as prospective bidders. The Gulf 

District issued an invitation for bids on 1 February 1957. Two bids were opened 

on 22 March at the division’s rear-echelon office in New York, one proposing 

$62.1 million, the second $44.3 million. After negotiations that lasted several 

weeks, the district signed a fixed-price construction contract for $44 million with 

a joint venture of five firms: Morrison-Knudsen Company Inc. of Boise, Idaho; 

Henry J. Kaiser Company of Oakland, California; Oman Construction Company 

Inc. of Nashville, Tennessee; R. P. Farnsworth and Company Inc. of New Orleans, 

Louisiana; and Wright Contracting Company of Columbus, Georgia. The joint 

venture, known as Morrison-Kaiser-Oman (MKO), quickly opened an office in 

Tehran and began work at Mehrabad, the municipal and international airport near 

Tehran, on 1 May. Over the remaining months of 1957, construction began on 

army facilities at Khaneh, Naqadeh, and Oshnaviyeh in northwest Iran and on 

facilities for the Iranian Air Force at Dezful Airfield in southwestern Iran near the 

border with Iraq. Funding for the construction amounted to 60 percent in dollars 

and 40 percent in rials.70

Simultaneously with these contract negotiations, the commanding general of 

the Military Assistance Advisory Group and the Mediterranean Division engineer 

worked out an agreement, signed in late April 1957, to govern the relationship 

between the ARMISH-MAAG and the Corps of Engineers, represented in Iran by 

the Gulf District.71

The district still had a staff shortage; with construction underway, it needed 

a technical liaison office to help monitor the contractors’ work. The terms of the 

contract for new American civilian employees changed in March 1957, with a 

reduction in tour from twenty-four to eighteen months. By May, because turnover 

remained high, the district asked the Mediterranean Division to assign personnel 

from the division’s design, construction, and comptroller sections to temporary 

duty in the district. The district also requested that its need for personnel be “given 

highest priority by the Office of the Chief of Engineers.” By the end of 1957, the 

district had a staff of 138 U.S. civilian employees, 27 European nationals, and 300 

local nationals; but problems of recruiting continued.72

70 MFR, Hillman, 25 Jan 57, sub: DFS Program—Pakistan and Iran, unmarked box; Memo to 

Div Engr, Mediterranean, 31 Jan 57, sub: Initiation of Construction in Iran (U), unmarked box, Dod 

Papers; Memos and related docs, 8, 28 Feb, 4, 6, 26 Mar 57, in same box; Ltr, Brig Gen Lawrence 

J. Lincoln Jr. to Col William A. Davis, 18 Feb 57, Mil Files, XII-2-2; “Construction Overseas in 

Mediterranean Division,” p. 16; Engineer Hist Div, OCE, “Summary of Major Events and Problems, 

Fiscal Year 1957,” May 58, p. 71, file 2, box 4, Gen Files; Data for Itschner, 12 Nov 58, pp. 3–4; L. 

W. McBride, “U.S. Army, Engineer Division, Mediterranean,” [Aug 58], p. 5, box 51-84-6364, Farrell Papers; all in OH, HQ USACE. 71 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965.”

72 Gulf Dist, Corps of Engrs, U.S. Army, Bfg Book, Tehran-Iran [May 57], pp. 3–5, 9–10, box 

25, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 

7–8. The staff numbers are in Gulf Dist Bfg for Gen Lincoln, 19–22 Jan 58, p. 33, box 22, access. 

no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 
Primitive construction methods in Iran included using young boys to carry material to 

make bricks at Dezful.
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 111

Relocating the Mediterranean Division to Italy

The granting of independence to Morocco in March 1956 and the French withdrawal from that country created an uncomfortable situation for the Mediterranean 

Division. The agreements that gave the U.S. Army engineers legal status in Morocco 

had been signed with the French government; the United States had no legal agreement with the new government in Morocco. This political anomaly, coupled with 

the changing locus of the division’s work, led General Talley to suggest moving 

the division headquarters. He raised the issue with General Sturgis in November 

1955, and Sturgis quickly agreed.73

Over the next two years, the division engineer in Morocco and the OCE staff in 

Washington considered alternate sites. In December 1955, Talley proposed Tripoli, 

Cairo, and Beirut as possibilities. A month later, he sent his deputy, Col. Robert F. 

Seedlock, to Pakistan to aid Colonel Davis in establishing the Trans-East District. 

He asked Seedlock to investigate cities between Nouasser and Karachi as possible 

locations for the division headquarters.74 General Lincoln, Talley’s successor, 

initially favored Beirut, but Athens emerged as a leading contender; in October 

1956, Lincoln sent a team there to gather information. The city already supported 

the Joint United States Military Aid Group Greece (JUSMAGG), the U.S. Air Force 

7206th Support Group, and the Joint Construction Agency’s Southeastern Division. 

The team’s report recommended Athens, and team members attached an appendix 

that argued strongly against relocating to Rome.75

Early in 1957, it became apparent that the Department of Defense planned to 

reorganize construction in Europe and to disband the Joint Construction Agency. 

A logical part of the reorganization included having the Mediterranean Division 

assume the construction that the JCA had supervised in the Mediterranean countries 

that were also NATO members: Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The JCA commander, 

Maj. Gen. Bernard L. Robinson, favored relocating the Mediterranean Division 

headquarters to Livorno, Italy, where the JCA maintained its Southern District.76

General Lincoln concluded that Livorno offered the best location, given the 

division’s prospective work for NATO and the support services available. Lincoln 

also concluded that the Southern District offered the best organizational structure for 

supervising the remaining work in North Africa. He proposed that the Southern District 

remain in Livorno with the districts in Morocco and Tripoli reporting to it.77

73 Ltr, Talley to Sturgis, 18 Nov 55, file 306, box 48, Sturgis Papers; Interv, Lawrence Suid with 

Lt Gen Lawrence J. Lincoln, Dec 79–Jan 80, pp. 193–201, app. H; Interv, Richard T. Farrell with 

Robbie Wilson, Oct 75, p. 3. 74 Ltr, Talley to Sturgis, 15 Dec 55, file 392, box 61, Sturgis Papers; Ltr, Talley to Sturgis, 20 

Jan 56. 75 Memo, Col Vincent P. Carlson, 2 Nov 56, sub: Report of Visit to Athens, Greece, 21–27 Oct. 

1956, box 51-84-6364, Farrell Papers; Interv, Suid with Lincoln, Dec 79–Jan 80, pp. 193–201. 76 Ltr, Brig Gen E. A. Brown Jr to Brig Gen Lawrence J. Lincoln Jr., 4 Jan 57, unmarked box, 

Dod Papers. 77 Ltr, Brig Gen Lawrence J. Lincoln Jr. to Maj Gen E. C. Itschner, 15 Feb 57, unmarked box, 

OH, HQ USACE. 
112 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Lincoln planned to move the division to Livorno in two phases. First, an advance 

task force joined the Southern District in June 1957 to identify office space for the 

division and to gather information on housing for incoming personnel. Near the end 

of the month, Lincoln authorized the lease of half of the first floor and the entire fourth 

and fifth floors in the Palazzo Grande, a six-story building in downtown Livorno. 

The building was attractive in part because a former tenant, the Southern European 

Task Force (SETAF), had installed a cable line for international communications. 

The central location was also ideal. Moreover, the division’s chief of real estate 

could find no other building in the city with sufficient office space.78

In June 1957, the secretary of defense approved the reorganization of military 

construction in Europe that gave the chief of engineers responsibility for the southern 

European members of NATO. Directives issued in July transferred the JCA’s 

Southern District to the Mediterranean Division; assigned to the Southern District 

the work in Morocco, Libya, and Eritrea; and confirmed its continuing mission for 

work in Italy, Greece, and Turkey. About the same time, supervision of the work 

by the U.S. Army engineers at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, passed from the Middle East 

District to the Trans-East District.79

78 MFR, C. B. Faulkner Jr., 26 Jun 57, sub: Leasing of Palazzo Grande Building; C. B. Faulkner 

Jr., Summary Appraisal Rpt, 27 Jun 57; both in box 51-83-8376, OH, HQ USACE. 79 Memo, Brown, 25 Jul 57, sub: Military Construction in EUCOM Area, unmarked box, OH, 

HQ USACE; General Orders no. 12, 5 Jun 57, sub: Change in Responsibility for Construction in 

Saudi Arabia. 

On 21 September 1956, the chief of engineers, Maj. Gen. Emerson C. Itschner, addressed 

employees of the Middle East District, Mediterranean Division, at Tripoli.
Shifting the Locus of Work, 1952–1957 113

Bureaucratic delays within the Italian government held up clearance of the 

Mediterranean Division’s move from Nouasser to Livorno, putting it off weeks 

longer than anyone had expected. As of 7 August, the division had only three people 

in Livorno. Finally, in late October, the Italian government approved the move; by 

17 November, the division had transferred all personnel and records to Livorno.80

The relocation involved 150 persons in 67 families and 2,000 tons of household 

goods and office equipment. About half the people, 20 tons of high-priority files 

including classified materials, and essential office equipment made the trip in 

fifteen separate flights. Some personnel and equipment traveled by ship and some 

by car. From a logistical point of view, the move proceeded smoothly. In a letter 

dated 18 November, General Lincoln described the situation as “over the hump,” 

with “about 90 percent of people and things in Livorno beginning to assume some 

semblance of order.”81

The relocation in late 1957 followed the shift in focus for the Mediterranean 

Division. In the six years since the U.S. Army engineers had begun work in Morocco, 

the division and its predecessor districts had supervised construction worth about 

$630 million. The bulk of that spending, over $400 million, had gone into Morocco. 

The Middle East District in Tripoli had supervised another $120 million of work 

in Libya, Eritrea, and Saudi Arabia. Construction in Turkey had cost about $36 

million between 1950 and 1953. In Morocco, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, the 

construction had involved thirty-five major programs for the U.S. Air Force, from air 

bases to air-traffic control and warning stations, oil pipelines, and fueling facilities. 

In 1956, the division initiated a $29 million construction program in Pakistan; the 

following year, the division launched a $46 million program in Iran.82

During the North African years, the Mediterranean Division had dealt with 

severe criticism, particularly concerns about the early work in Morocco. It had 

also achieved significant successes. Reflecting more than two decades after his 

service with the division, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Lawrence J. Lincoln observed: “Few 

organizations, in construction or other missions, could rightfully claim as much 

success in performing difficult and unusual tasks; and few could cite as many 

80 Ltr, Col John T. Poffenberger to Col C. Santone, Genio Militare Italiano, 6 Dec 57; Memo, Brig 

Gen Lawrence J. Lincoln Jr. to Brig Gen W. K. Wilson Jr., 6 Aug 57; MFR, Col John T. Poffenberger, 

7 Aug 57, sub: Telephone Conversation with Commander Bostenero, CCO, and Mr. White, MDAP 

. . .; all in box 20, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. A dozen memos in this box sketch the delays encountered in the Italian and American bureaucracies concerning the Mediterranean Division’s request 

to relocate to Livorno. Telex, Col Robert J. Kasper, 29 Oct 57, box 20; Div Engr, Mediterranean Div, 

Press Release, 29 Oct 57, box 26; both in access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 81 Interv, authors with Wolfram Wolz, 24, 29 Nov 93, pp. 5–6; Ltr, Baylor to authors, 1 Dec 95, 

p. 9. Quote from Ltr, Brig Gen Lawrence J. Lincoln Jr. to Col Frederick J.Clarke, 18 Nov 57, Mil 

Files XII-2-2, OH, HQ USACE; Interv, Farrell with R. Wilson, Oct 75, p. 8; Ltr, Brig Gen Lawrence 

J. Lincoln Jr. to Brig Gen L. L. Mundell, 20 Dec 57, unmarked box, Farrell Papers. This is one of 

several thank-you letters from Lincoln to commanders of elements that had assisted the division during the move to Livorno. 82 “Construction Overseas in Mediterranean Division,” p. 5; “Synopsis of TUSEG Construction 

Program Under Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey as of 1 Aug 52,” p. 1, Mil Files 

XII-33-8, OH, HQ USACE; Engr Div Mediterranean Info Booklet: 1959. 
114 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

interesting and unusual, or even unbelievable, situations and episodes.”83 He 

also remembered “hundreds of unsung people [who] found ways to cope with the 

varied foreign laws, currencies, environments, materials, customs, and languages.” 

General Lincoln’s remarks serve as a fitting characterization of the Mediterranean 

Division’s first six years.

83 Appendix/Annex to Interv, Suid with Lincoln, Dec 79–Jan 80, pp. H2–H3. 
The Mediterranean Division in Italy, 1957–1972 115

American foreign policy concerning the Mediterranean and the Middle East 

coalesced during the 1950s around three guiding concepts. First, strategic airpower 

gave the United States preponderance in the balance of military forces and that 

airpower required bases near the Soviet Union. Second, collective security, such 

as was developing between the United States and the countries of Western Europe, 

could be extended to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Americans, in 

cooperation with the British, built a military alliance that linked Turkey, Iran, and 

other Middle Eastern states to the West. The Baghdad Pact of 1955 and its successor 

the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) resulted from this effort. Finally, U.S. 

policymakers believed they could with effort maintain cordial relations with all of 

the powers of the region. This final assumption became harder to achieve when 

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser began aggressively to assert his secular Arab 

nationalism against Arab regimes based on traditional and religious associations. 

The Suez Crisis of October 1956, the Eisenhower Doctrine of January 1957, and 

the pro-Nasser coup in Iraq in July 1958 brought a perceptible shift in the Middle 

Eastern alignment. Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Jordan moved closer to the United 

States, with Egypt, Syria, and Iraq (after the 1958 revolution) remaining hostile to 

American influence in the region.1

In keeping with these circumstances, the United States redirected its foreign 

aid. In the early 1950s, the United States had built air bases for the United States 

Air Force (USAF) Strategic Air Command (SAC). In the second half of the decade, 

the United States programmed aid for Direct Forces Support (DFS), administered 

by the Department of Defense (DoD), to strengthen the military forces of selected 

American allies on the periphery of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic 

of China. To implement this shift in emphasis, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

continued its work in Turkey and began to build modern army cantonments, airfields, 

and naval wharves in Iran and Pakistan. As the 1960s began, the U.S. government 

refocused its aid again by using Development Loan Funds (DLF) administered by the 

1 John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy, 2d ed. (New York: 

Harper, 1960), pp. 228–29.

PART II

The Mediterranean Division in 

Italy, 1957–1972
116 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

State Department to increase economic assistance to such countries as Afghanistan 

and Somalia.2

These changes involved the Corps of Engineers in a widening range of projects. 

In addition to building for the armed forces of Iran and Pakistan, the Corps accepted 

assignments from the State Department for nonmilitary projects. Through them, the 

Corps built civilian air terminals in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran; developed 

a modern road system in Afghanistan; studied a similar undertaking for Burma; 

and planned an expansion of Burmese university facilities. In Somalia, the Corps 

supervised the creation of modern port facilities to allow increased export trade for 

the country’s banana growers. The Corps also supervised the completion of work 

begun earlier in the 1950s in Morocco, Libya, and Eritrea. 

Beginning in November 1957, the Mediterranean Division of the Corps of 

Engineers directed this wide range of construction efforts from Livorno, Italy. The 

relocation from Morocco coincided with new responsibilities for the division in the 

southern European and NATO states of Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Chapter 4 covers 

the division’s move to Italy and its wrap-up of work in North Africa. Chapter 5 deals 

with the two new districts that operate in Pakistan and Iran between 1958 and 1960. 

Chapter 6 extends the coverage of the Gulf District into the 1960s, when its work 

expands to include Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. Chapter 7 returns the focus to the 

division, operating from Livorno but covering projects throughout southern Europe, 

the Middle East, and East Africa. Finally, Chapter 8 brings the division story into 

the 1970s as work in Saudi Arabia grows to dominant proportions.

2 “Work for Other Nations,” in The History of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1986).
Headquarters and the Southern District, 1957–1960 117

4

Headquarters and the Southern 

District, 1957–1960

With the move to Italy in November 1957, the Mediterranean Division set 

aside its role as an operating division, a status it had assumed in 1954 when it 

absorbed the East Atlantic District. As part of the reorganization, the division 

transferred responsibility for its Moroccan projects to the Southern District, 

giving the division a more typical Corps of Engineers structure. Between 1957 

and 1960, the Mediterranean Division had three principal districts: Southern, 

Trans-East, and Gulf. In addition, minor districts in Libya and Morocco 

reported to the Southern District. Through the districts, the Mediterranean 

Division continued to supervise the engineering, planning, and administration 

of design and construction programs to serve the objectives of American 

foreign policy in the region.

Between 1958 and 1960, a succession of three Army officers commanded 

the Mediterranean Division. Brig. Gen. Lawrence J. Lincoln Jr. left Livorno in 

the summer of 1958. Brig. Gen. William R. Shuler commanded from August 

1958 to the summer of 1960, and Col. Arthur C. Nauman arrived in September 

1960. All three men had to contend with the huge span of the territory, with 

the diversity of cultures, and with a variety of American and allied military 

personnel. The division engineer dealt with the NATO command in Italy 

and Northern Europe, the commanders and staffs of the U.S. military joint 

commands, the chiefs of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs), 

and U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy commanders in the countries where 

Military Assistance Programs (MAPs) extended American aid. In each country, 

the division engineer maintained close contact with the U.S. ambassador and 

his diplomatic staff.

Operating from Livorno

From the Palazzo Grande building in the Italian port city of Livorno, the 

Mediterranean Division commander supervised work from the Atlantic coast 

of North Africa across Southern Europe to the Pakistani border with India. 

The territory, stretching four thousand five hundred miles from west to east 

and one thousand two hundred miles north to south, equaled about one-and-ahalf times the size of the United States. In 1958, the Mediterranean Division 
118 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

served nine countries: Italy, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Libya, Ethiopia, Iran, 

Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.1

To manage the work throughout this vast area of responsibility, the division 

apportioned its territory among its three districts. (See Map 10.) The Southern 

District, the largest geographically, had operated from Livorno under the European 

Command’s Joint Construction Agency (JCA) since 1954. With the closing of the 

JCA, the Southern District became a part of the Mediterranean Division on 1 August 

1957. The district supervised projects for the U.S. Air Force, Army, and Navy; 

allied forces in NATO; and the armed forces and governments of states allied with 

the United States. In 1957, these projects totaled $550 million.2

The Southern District retained supervision of construction in Italy, Greece, and 

Turkey from its JCA days and took over responsibility for construction in North 

Africa. When the Mediterranean Division left Nouasser, Morocco, in November 

1957, a small cadre of its personnel remained behind to form the Morocco District. 

The Middle East District staff in Tripoli, Libya, continued to oversee the work 

in Libya and Eritrea. The Corps offices in Morocco and in Libya reported to the 

1 “Construction Overseas in Mediterranean Division,” speech with slides, n.d. [internal evidence 

indicates 1957], pp. 3–6, box 51-83-8377, Richard T. Farrell Papers, Office of History (OH), HQ 

United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Alexandria, Va. 2 “Mediterranean Division, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, 1957,” p. 7, box 51-84-7361, Farrell 

Papers. 

Beginning in mid-1957, the Corps of Engineers leased several floors in the Palazzo Grande 

in Livorno for the headquarters of the Mediterranean Division.
Headquarters and the Southern District, 1957–1960 119

Southern District. The division designated both as districts to maintain continuity 

in contracting and in relations with the host governments.

The Trans-East District, established late in 1955 with headquarters in Karachi, 

supervised military construction to implement the U.S. military aid program to 

Pakistan. The Direct Forces Support (DFS) program provided equipment and 

facilities to promote modernization of the Pakistani Army, Navy, and Air Force. 

The Trans-East District also supervised new work for the U.S. State Department’s 

International Cooperation Administration (ICA) in Saudi Arabia that developed 

toward the end of the decade. In late 1957, the Trans-East District managed programs 

totaling about $60 million. The Gulf District’s mission was to develop the empire of 

Iran as a strong American ally on the Soviet border by modernizing and improving 

facilities for its armed forces. As of August 1957, the Gulf District administered a 

program of DFS-funded construction with a budget of around $50 million.3

The Mediterranean Division also maintained a rear-echelon office in New York 

City. In addition to serving as a liaison with the Office of the Chief of Engineers 

(OCE) and other stateside headquarters, it purchased materials for the districts, 

negotiated and supervised architect-engineer contracts with American firms, and 

performed other contracting functions. When the division moved to Italy, OCE 

suggested that the rear echelon’s functions be reassigned to the East Ocean District 

of the North Atlantic Division. The reorganization, which took place in June 1958, 

reduced the rear office from thirty-four persons in March 1958 to three in September. 

The liaison office remained staffed at about this level to 1975.4

To provide additional technical support for construction, the Mediterranean 

Division opened a materials-testing laboratory in Athens, Greece, in early March 

1959. An experienced Greek-American chemist, C. N. Tragakes, headed the laboratory staff of materials engineers and technicians, most of whom were Greek. At the 

laboratory’s opening symposium on problems of airfield design and construction, 

representatives from the Southern, Trans-East, and Gulf Districts attended discussions led by the division’s chief of engineering, Lewis W. McBride, and by Jack 

Baylor, chief of the division’s Geology, Soils, and Materials Branch.5

Because of difficulties in transportation and communication across the division’s 

geographic expanse, a typical inspection trip to all the district offices lasted three 

3 Ibid., p. 8; “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” Jun 65, p. 3, box 21, access. 

no. 77-92-0002, Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md. 4 General Orders (GO) no. 3, 6 Dec 54, sub: Transfer Functions Rear Echelon Office; “Chronological Division Organizational History by Country,” n.d., box 36; both in access. no. 77-92-0001, 

WNRC. Brig Gen E. A. Brown Jr. to Shuler, 29 Aug 58, box 51-84-7361; Brown to Lincoln, 15 

Nov 57, unmarked box; Lincoln to Lt Col Harry A. Savigny, 18 Dec 57, unmarked box; Lincoln to 

Brown, 18 Dec 57, unmarked box; all in Farrell Papers. GO no. 2–58, 11 Jun 58, box 36, access. no. 

77-92-0001, WNRC. 5 Technical Liaison Br, Mediterranean Div, Press Release, “Athens, Greece, Engineer Laboratory 

Draws Paving Engineers from U.S. and Middle East for Symposium,” 13 Mar 59, box 20, access. 

no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; Ltr, Jack Baylor to authors, 1 Dec 95, p. 8, Transatlantic Programs Center 

(TAC), Winchester, Va.
120 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

weeks and involved ten visas and six or more currencies.6 Arranging the appropriate 

visas for a trip might take several days, and actual travel time was grueling. In 1959, 

6 Press Release no. 2/1958, Technical Liaison Br, Mediterranean Div, Livorno, Italy, 28 Jan 58, 

box 20, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC.

MIDDLE EAST DISTRICT TRIPOLI

SOUTHERN DISTRICT

MEDITERRANEAN DIVISION

LIVORNO

TU

ATHENS AREA OFFICE ATHENS

MOROCCO DISTRICT NOUASSER

LIB Y A

MORO CCO

I T A L Y

GREECE

Map 10
Headquarters and the Southern District, 1957–1960 121

a trip from Livorno to Burma required a four-hour train ride to Rome and plane 

flights of twenty-two hours from Rome to Rangoon.7

7 “Construction Overseas in Mediterranean Division,” [1957]; Howard J. Schulte, “Construction 

Experiences in Europe, Asia, and Africa,” pp. 3–7, box 51-83-8377, Farrell Papers. Schulte, chief 

safety engineer in the Mediterranean Division between 1957 and 1959, delivered this address to the 

Construction Section, 47th National Safety Congress and Exposition, in Chicago on 21 October 1959. 

Farrell Papers, box 51-84-7361, OH, HQ USACE.

GULF DISTRICT

TEHRĀN

TRANS-EAST DISTRICT KARACHI

SAUDI ARABIA

AREA OFFICE

DHAHRAN

ERITREA

RESIDENT OFFICE ASMARA

SEG AREA OFFICE ANKARA

E T HIOPIA

TURKE Y

IRAN

P A KIST A N

S A UDI ARABIA

AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

MEDITERRANEAN DIVISION

1958

District Oce

Area Oce

Resident Oce
122 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Electronic communications with the Mediterranean Division’s outlying areas 

proved as difficult a problem as transportation. Telephone and telegraph links 

were limited; voice transmission was poor in quality; and the time needed to make 

a connection by phone impeded contacts and cut productivity. Mail service was 

unreliable. Whether sent by mail, telephone, or telegraph, many messages never 

reached their destination.8

Communications between the division and its districts or other field offices was 

still easier than communications between the United States and division offices. 

Because of the distances, noon in Washington, D.C., was 6:00 p.m. in Livorno, an 

hour later in Iran and Saudi Arabia, and an additional hour later in Karachi. Only a 

small portion of the workday in Washington overlapped with that of offices in the 

Mediterranean. Communications were further complicated by the work schedule in 

Muslim countries, which observed the Sabbath on Friday. Corps personnel in Saudi 

Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan staffed the offices Monday through Thursday and on 

Saturday. The discrepancies in time zones and work schedules created frustrations 

on both sides of the Atlantic.9

Through the Mediterranean Division’s first several years, its staff made trips 

from Morocco on a space-available basis aboard U.S. Air Force aircraft.10 To make 

travel across the geographic expanse easier and more efficient, Brig. Gen. Benjamin 

B. Talley asked, without success, that the Office of the Chief of Engineers provide 

airplanes. His successor, General Lincoln, renewed the request for special aviation 

support; in May 1957, after a survey of the division’s needs, OCE concluded that 

it could justify an Army Aviation detachment. The following October, the Army’s 

deputy chief of staff for logistics approved the request. The division received nine 

personnel positions for four aviation teams to fly five L23D aircraft, each capable 

of carrying six passengers. The Italian Air Force, the Joint United States Military 

Mission for Aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT), the Iranian Air Force, and the Military 

Assistance Advisory Group in Pakistan promised maintenance facilities and other 

support.11

The first L23D aircraft for the division arrived in July 1958; a second aircraft 

arrived in mid-November. General Shuler, who took command of the division in 

August, assigned the planes to Turkey and Italy. Three other aircraft arrived in 

1959. The projects that would have justified the continued use of a plane in Italy 

failed to materialize, so Shuler assigned 2 planes to Turkey, 2 to Iran, and 1 to West 

Pakistan.12

8 “U.S. Army Engineer District, Southern,” 1 Sep 59, p. 15, box 51-84-5389, Farrell Papers.

9 Interv, Moorhus with Robert E. Hall, 24 Mar 95, p. 9. Several other interviewees comment on 

the disruptions and frustrations in communications. 10 Ltr, Baylor to authors, 1 Dec 95, pp. 4–5. 

11 Draft, “Rear Echelon Office, U.S. Army Engineer Division, Mediterranean” [1958], box 51-

84-7361, Farrell Papers. 12 On the aircraft scheduled for Italy, see Shuler to Brig Gen E. A. Brown Jr., 19 Aug 58; Brown 

to Shuler, 29 Aug 58; and Shuler to Brown, 3 Sep 58; all in box 51-84-7361, Farrell Papers. On other 

aspects, see Shuler to Itschner, 11 Dec 58, p. 3, box 51-84-7361; Lincoln to Itschner, 19 Feb, 11 Mar 
Headquarters and the Southern District, 1957–1960 123

Although critical for efficiency, air transportation affected relatively few of 

the Mediterranean Division’s staff, which numbered just under 1,500 when the 

headquarters moved to Italy in November 1957. (Table 4) By the following spring, 

the number increased to about 1,800, with 80 military officers, 800 American 

civilians, and 900 non-American employees. By the end of the fiscal year, staff 

strength had reached 1,957.13 Most of the time, fewer than 100 Americans, military 

and civilian, served in any one country, monitoring work directed by contractors who 

employed another 10,000 to 15,000 workers. Two other categories of employees 

filled out the division and field office staffs—European continentals (or other 

non-American nationalities, often referred to as “third-country nationals”) and local 

nationals. The accountants and payroll keepers maintained four different categories 

of compensation: military pay, Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) pay, a 

58, box 51-84-7361; “U.S. Army Engineer District, Southern, Livorno, Italy,” 1 Nov 58, p. 3, box 

51-84-5389; all in Farrell Papers. 13 L. J. Lincoln, “Construction in a Cold War Theater of Operations,” Army Information Digest

(July 1958): 18. A chart of personnel strength between 1956 and 1972, prepared in 1974, is in Susan 

I. Gray, “Ambassador Division: History of the United States Army Corps of Engineers, Mediterranean 

Division, in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Near East,” app. 5, box 19, access. no. 77-92-0001, 

WNRC. 

Table 4—Mediterranean Division Personnel

1 September 1957

Military U.S. 

Civilians

Non-U.S. 

Employees Totals

HQ Office 7 116 73 196

Southern District

(southern Europe only) 24 110 65 199

Morocco District 5 25 67 97

Middle East District 5 58 56 119

Trans-East District 21 160 312 493

Gulf District 18 128 196 342

Rear Echelon 2 29 0 31

Totals 82 626 769 1,477

Source: Adapted from “Mediterranean Division, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, 1957,” p. 7, 

box 51-84-7361, Richard T. Farrell Papers, Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, Alexandria, Va.
124 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

continental wage schedule for Europeans, and a local wage rate. Different rules, 

laws, and levels of compensation governed each category.14

The Mediterranean Division, including staff at headquarters, in the districts, 

in field offices, and the workforce employed by contractors, logged an impressive 

amount of work. During each of two consecutive months in 1958, the personnel 

under division supervision put in 11 million work hours. For the entire calendar 

year 1958, the division recorded 97.4 million hours of work compared to the 

average stateside division’s 25 million hours. The 97.4 million hours represents the 

equivalent of 46,800 workers on the job each day, based on a forty-hour work week. 

The division’s total workforce, including workers hired by contractors, numbered 

closer to 20,000 than 46,000 in 1958, but workers averaged many more than forty 

hours in the normal six-day week.15

The supervisory and technical staff of around two hundred at division headquarters included active Engineering and Construction Divisions. General Lincoln 

encouraged frequent contacts between staff at the division and in the districts. 

The Engineering Division staff reviewed all designs, furnished guidance in the 

development of criteria and standards, and provided special assistance for the Gulf 

and Trans-East Districts in negotiating their large design contracts. The division also 

loaned geologists to the districts to assist in identifying and developing local water 

supplies at project sites. During FY 1958, personnel from the Construction Division 

spent 35 percent of their time in the field, either on inspections or on temporary 

duty. These visits and Engineering Division field inspections exposed weaknesses 

and deficiencies in operations that the division could then address.16

The Mediterranean Division’s responsibilities across its sizable region created 

myriad difficulties of management and supervision. For instance, normal engineering 

manuals outlined specifications, standard designs, and construction techniques; but 

the manuals had little applicability at construction sites where the workers thought 

and labored much as their ancestors had for hundreds of years. Because the manuals 

were irrelevant to the local circumstances, division and district engineers had to 

formulate guidelines and standards for construction that took on-site conditions 

into account. At the same time, the engineers had to use extraordinary ingenuity to 

preserve quality in construction. An OCE inspection team that visited the division 

in January 1958 acknowledged that these aspects of engineering and design had no 

counterpart in the workload of a district in the United States.17

14 “The Mediterranean Division,” n.d., Gen Files 54-1, OH, HQ USACE.

15 William R. Shuler, “Safety in the Middle East Construction Program,” Military Engineer

(September-October 1959): 367; “Construction Overseas in Mediterranean Division,” [1957], p. 3; 

Schulte, “Construction Experiences in Europe, Asia, and Africa,” 21 Oct 59, p. 2, box 51-84-7361, 

Farrell Papers. The figures on hours worked come from Schulte, who gives no figures for the division’s 

total or average workforce. That information is extrapolated from Shuler. 16 Mediterranean Div, “Engineering [Inspection],” [Jan 58], pp. 23–24, box 24, access. no. 77-

92-0002, WNRC; Lincoln to Itschner, 19 Feb 58, p. 6, and 9 Jun 58, p. 2, both in box 51-84-7361, 

Farrell Papers. 17 Mediterranean Div, “Engineering [Inspection],” pp. 23–24. 
Headquarters and the Southern District, 1957–1960 125

Altogether, the complexity of cultures, economies, and laws in the Mediterranean 

Division’s area of responsibility created problems unlike any faced by Corps divisions in the United States. On one project site in West Pakistan, the prime contractor 

was American, the architect-engineer Swiss, the mechanical subcontractor Lebanese, 

the electrical subcontractor British, the building subcontractor Pakistani, and the 

administrative and labor force a mix of at least fifteen different nationalities. Local 

customs governing work encouraged subcontracting to three, four, or even five 

subordinate levels. U.S. law held the prime contractor responsible for the entire 

job, but subcontractors often had little regard for Western guidelines. Expectations 

of punctuality and consistent attendance at work ran counter to habits and attitudes 

developed in cultures that saw little virtue in a life regulated by a time clock. 

Moreover, by local custom, women and children accompanied men to work, further 

complicating management on site.18

The technical sophistication required to execute Mediterranean Division projects 

created odd juxtapositions at job sites, where engine-driven trucks, tractors, and 

cranes operated side by side with local laborers using hand tools and muscle power. 

Concrete commonly went from a mechanical mixer into pans that workers carried on 

their heads.19 Large, motor-powered construction machinery fascinated local workers 

in less-developed countries. Many Middle Eastern and African manual laborers 

wanted to drive a vehicle even though they had no driving experience—trained and 

experienced vehicle operators learned to take the ignition keys with them. At desert 

construction sites, workmen often sought shade under large pieces of equipment. 

After several instances in which workers fell asleep and were crushed when the 

machines restarted, division safety engineers required drivers to inspect underneath 

tractors and even rail cars before moving them.20

As the experience with mechanized vehicles shows, the multicultural environment in which construction projects took place created particular challenges related 

to worker safety. Directives concerning safe work clothes or protective devices such 

as gloves, hardhats, and goggles made little impression on workers who did not even 

wear shoes on the job. In many areas, local dress included skirt-like wraps and tied 

turbans for men; for safety, contractors installed shields and guards over sprockets, 

gears, and belts. Communicating with workers by employing techniques common 

in the West, such as posters, had little effect on a workforce with an illiteracy rate 

estimated at 85 percent. To compensate, the division and the districts conducted 

regular training for safety inspectors and modified procedures related to the types 

of activity that accounted for the highest incidence of recurring accidents: using 

ladders and scaffolds and handling construction materials.21

18 “Construction Overseas in Mediterranean Division,” [1957], p. 3; “Engineer Division Mediterranean: Information Booklet,” 15 Aug 59, pp. 7–9, unmarked box, Farrell Papers (hereafter cited as 

Engr Div Mediterranean Info Booklet: 1959); Shuler, “Safety,” p. 368. 19 Schulte, “Construction Experiences,” pp. 3–7.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.; Engr Div Mediterranean Info Booklet: 1959, pp. 7–9; Interv, Lawrence Suid with Lt Gen 

(Ret) Lawrence J. Lincoln, Dec 79–Jan 80, p. H-3.
In Pakistan in the mid-1950s, the use of local laborers, many wearing turbans and loose 

clothing but no shoes, increased safety concerns for contractors.
Headquarters and the Southern District, 1957–1960 127

The Mediterranean Division’s efforts to reduce time lost and the number of 

deaths attributed to accidents on the job did bring improvements. (Table 5) In 1952, 

the division experienced an average of one fatal accident for every 2 million work 

hours. From 1952 to 1957, the rate improved to one death in 5.7 million work hours. 

By 1958–1959, the rate stood at one death in 6.8 million work hours.22

One contract on which the Southern District issued a request for bids during 

1958 further illustrates some of the complexities of operating overseas. The project 

involved work at Sinop, a small town on the Black Sea in north-central Turkey. Seven 

firms submitted bids, and all proposed costs below the government estimate of $2.47 

million for the project. The lowest four bids came from Turkish contractors. Both 

the division engineer, General Shuler, and the Southern District engineer, Col. Joe 

A. Clema, were reluctant to award the contract to the low bidder because Turkish 

contractors had a poor record of completing contracts. At a meeting to review the 

Turkish contractor’s capabilities, they discovered that, contrary to their expectations, 

the company, Eti Yapi Ltd., did fully understand the scope of the work. 

22 Schulte, “Construction Experiences,” p. 10. 

Table 5—Mediterranean Division, Contractor Safety and Accident

Record, 1952–1960

Man Hours No. Injuries Days Lost Fatalities

1952 60,476,382 1,116 221,287 30

1953 51,417,121 722 96,754 13

1954 29,484,041 398 38,425 5

1955 22,131,511 211 33,751 5

1956 22,117,969 104 22,195 3

1957 46,540,001 135 not given 15

1958 97,381,482 249 not given 17

1959 102,812,042 187 not given 15

1960 92,535,540 128 not given 13

Source: Mediterranean Div, “Comparative Table, Accident Experience, 1952–1956,” n.d., 

box 51-83-8377, Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alexandria, 

Va.; 1957–1960 figures from “Government and Contractor Accident Experience Record, 14 

February 1952–30 June 1973,” in Susan I. Gray, “Ambassador Division: History of the United 

States Army Corps of Engineers, Mediterranean Division, in Europe, Africa, the Middle East 

and Near East,” app. 6, box 19, access. no. 77-92-0001, Washington National Records Center, 

Suitland, Md.
128 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

The discussions with Eti Yapi prompted the division to reexamine the government estimate of the cost of the job. The estimate, it turned out, made certain 

assumptions that, while reasonable, were inaccurate. It assumed that Turkish lire 

would be exchanged at the official rate of 2.8 to the dollar; but the Turkish government had approved a policy allowing construction dollars to be exchanged for lire at 

a 9:1 ratio, much closer to the real market exchange rate. In addition, Eti Yapi had 

obtained commitments from European suppliers to provide electrical and mechanical 

equipment meeting required specifications at prices lower than the government 

estimate. Further, the government estimate had projected a high overhead, reflecting 

costs of salaries and fringe benefits incurred by U.S. companies; Turkish companies 

paid less and provided fewer benefits. The reexamination reduced the government 

estimate to $1.69 million, not out of line with Eti Yapi’s bid of $1.46 million. The 

Turkish contractor won the award.23

Problems in executing the construction program went beyond complications 

in contracting. Both Generals Lincoln and Shuler emphasized the “extraordinary 

conditions imposed by geopolitical, physical and military factors” that made fulfilling 

the division’s mission more difficult than similar operations in the United States.24

Shuler admonished his staff that “the varying political climates, ancient customs 

and religions in the numerous countries where we operate create potential areas of 

difficulties which we must recognize and accept in our dealings with representatives 

of foreign governments.” As Shuler cautioned, “regardless of the circumstance, 

display of impatience or irritation in their presence must be avoided.”25

Not every officer or civilian employed by the Mediterranean Division had the 

disposition or interpersonal skills necessary to meet this challenge. In July 1959, 

the Southern District engineer, Colonel Clema, received a letter from the deputy 

chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Tripoli expressing concern over a Corps 

of Engineers major serving there. The Army officer had “an excellent and quick 

intellect and unusual professional competence”; but he had become a problem 

because, “like many quick-witted, forceful men, [he] appears impatient, intolerant 

of slower mentalities.” He lacked what the diplomat described as “the infinite 

patience [necessary] to deal with his Libyan counterparts on a continuing and 

intimate basis without handicapping the relationship by a display of his forceful 

instinct to lead the way.”26 Colonel Clema passed on the concern to General Shuler, 

who recommended to the chief of engineers, Maj. Gen. Emerson C. Itschner, that 

the Corps reassign the major to the United States to “salvage a young officer with 

high potential.” Shuler used the occasion to underscore for the chief of engineers 

the difficulties of working in the remote locations far removed from any support 

by the division or district offices.27

23 Shuler to Itschner, 8 Jan 59, Mil Files XXI-2-7, OH, HQ USACE; Shuler to Itschner, 11 Dec 

58. 24 Lincoln, “Construction in a Cold War Theater,” p. 20. 

25 Shuler to Col H[artsell] H. Northington, 3 Sep 59, Mil Files XXI-2-4, OH, HQ USACE.

26 J. Paul Barringer to Clema, 31 Jul 59, Mil Files XXI-2-7, OH, HQ USACE.

27 Shuler to Itschner, 7 Aug 59, Mil Files XXI-2-7, OH, HQ USACE.
Headquarters and the Southern District, 1957–1960 129

The division headquarters also provided the districts’ legal support, letting the 

districts concentrate on such recurring problems as taxes on goods imported for 

the construction projects. Despite the exemptions written into many agreements 

in the late 1950s, host governments in Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and even Italy 

raised the prospect of imposing customs fees, income taxes, and other charges. 

Negotiations to resolve these issues were time-consuming, complicated, and at 

times exceedingly vexing.28

In each country where the Mediterranean Division managed and supervised 

construction, division and district personnel maintained close contact with the 

American ambassador and members of the U.S. mission. The Mutual Security Act 

of 1954 and DoD directives specified the creation of a “country team.” In each 

country, the U.S. ambassador headed the team, which included the commanding 

officer of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group and other key American 

representatives in the country. The country team cleared all materials, supplies, and 

services associated with military construction managed by the division regardless 

of the source of funds supporting that construction. The country team also cleared 

all proposed contractors.29

General Shuler was the last general officer to command the Mediterranean 

Division. By September 1960, when his successor, Col. Arthur C. Nauman, took 

command, the division’s geographic area of responsibility had expanded to include 

Burma, Afghanistan, Somalia, and East Pakistan, a total of thirteen nations. As the 

workload shifted, the division redistributed responsibilities among its districts.30

The tempo of the division’s projects dictated the adjustments, and that tempo is 

best seen from the perspective of the districts themselves.

Southern District, 1957–1960

The Southern District, an amalgamation of staff elements that lasted only three 

years, had responsibility for work in Italy, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Libya, and 

Eritrea. The district personnel included people who had served under the Joint 

Construction Agency in Italy, Turkey, and Greece. Most had never worked for 

the Corps of Engineers either in the United States or overseas, and they followed 

the methods and procedures developed by the Joint Construction Agency. The 

reorganization and relocation of the division brought an influx to the district of 

people from Morocco and from the offices in Libya and Eritrea as these areas 

reduced their staffs. The Mediterranean Division wanted the district to adopt the 

methods and procedures of the Corps of Engineers, so they put people with “Corps 

experience” into top positions in the district. The changes in procedures created 

28 See, for example, Memo, Lt Col Joseph C. Dyer, 10 Apr 58, sub: Import Duty and Sales Tax 

Refund, Mil Files XXI-2-3, OH, HQ USACE. 29 Hist Rpt, U.S. Army Engr Dist, Southern, 1 Aug 57–30 Jun 60, [1960], p. 20, box 51-83-8379, 

Farrell Papers (hereafter cited as Hist Rpt–Southern). 30 Shuler to Heil, 11 Feb 60; Nauman to Itschner, 7 Oct 60, both in Mil Files XXI-3-1, OH, HQ 

USACE.
130 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

tension, and the changes in personnel left some branches of the district overstaffed 

and others with too few people to carry the workload comfortably. District staff 

who had worked under the JCA judged the accounting procedures brought from 

Morocco less rigorous than they had used; some in the district found the newcomers 

“unprofessional.” One person even commented on the shabbiness of the office 

furnishings transported from Nouasser.31

When the Southern District became part of the Mediterranean Division, it had 

around two hundred people. In late 1957, the district had thirty-eight people in its 

Construction Division, a level of staffing barely adequate to cover its responsibilities 

of inspection and supervision in six countries with an estimated annual rate of 

construction placement of almost $17 million.32

Livorno was an attractive location, with good housing and other support 

facilities. In addition to rich historical and artistic resources, Italy boasted a robust 

economy in the late 1950s. The district’s offices were at the Corallo Hotel, a former 

resort hotel adjacent to the railroad station in Livorno. Most district employees 

looked to the local economy, where they found satisfactory housing comfortably 

within their allowance for lodging. Some Americans lived in Livorno; and a sizable 

group chose to live in Tirrenia, a small seashore community about seven miles 

north of Livorno.33

In North Africa, living conditions were less gracious. In Morocco, the presence 

of eighteen thousand United States Air Force (USAF) personnel meant that support 

facilities were above average for overseas assignments. The housing situation in 

Libya became tighter between 1957 and 1960; but, as in Morocco, the Air Force 

maintained local support facilities. Asmara was remote, but the local economy 

provided adequate housing. The community services supported by the U.S. Army 

at Kagnew Station were satisfactory. Athens offered access to the world of classical 

Greek civilization and adequate modern facilities. By contrast, Turkey, while rich 

in history, presented serious recruitment problems for the district and the division. 

Few qualified American civilian engineers wanted the isolated posts at Sinop, 

Samsun, Trabzon, Diyarbakir, and Adana. Only unaccompanied males were 

assigned to these locations, where living conditions were substandard, recreational 

opportunities minimal, and support facilities rudimentary or nonexistent. Employees 

31 Hist Rpt–Southern, p. 23. Intervs, Moorhus with Richard Wiles, 21 Oct 93, 7 Feb, 5 May 94, 

p. 39; with Paul Wheeler, 31 May 95, p. 25; authors with Stuart Wagman, 11 Jan 94, p. 33; Moorhus 

with W. Justin Long, 14 Mar 95, p. 12. Interv, Suid with Lincoln, Dec 79–Jan 80, pp. 193–98. 32 Lincoln to Davis, 4 Jun 57, Mil Files XII-2-2, OH, HQ USACE; Mediterranean Div, “Engineering 

[Inspection]”; Memo, Lt Gen Lawrence J. Lincoln, 6 Jan 58, sub: Reductions Personnel on Former JCA 

Functions, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE; “Summary of Major Events and Problems, FY 1957,” 

May 58, Gen Files 4-2, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited as Major Events, FY 1957); “Summary of 

Major Events and Problems, Fiscal Year 1958,” Dec 58, pp. 1–2, file 3, box 4, Gen Files, OH, HQ 

USACE (hereafter cited as Major Events, FY 1958). 33 Intervs, Moorhus with Wiles, 21 Oct 93, 7 Feb, 5 May 94, and with Long, 14 Mar 95; Ltr, 

Richard Wiles to authors, 3 Feb 96; Hist Rpt–Southern, pp. 23, 41, 46.
Headquarters and the Southern District, 1957–1960 131

who depended on local eating facilities or food supplies often suffered from diarrhea 

and dysentery.34

Between 1957 and 1960, the Southern District contracted with architect-engineer 

firms for about 90 percent of its design work but also retained its own design staff. 

(See Table 6.) Both Italy and Greece had sufficient numbers of draftsmen and design 

engineers to support the demand created by American projects in those countries. 

Turkey also supplied a number of graduate engineers and draftsmen.35

Waning Activity in North Africa

By the late 1950s, new bases for bombers of the U.S. Air Force’s Strategic Air 

Command had become available in Spain. Faced with public protests from Moroccan 

nationalists, the United States came to consider its position in Morocco useful but 

not essential. In December 1959, President Dwight D. Eisenhower reached an 

34 Hist Rpt–Southern, pp. 23, 41, 47. One of the best accounts of life for Americans in Turkey during 

this period is John D. Tumpane, Scotch and Holy Water (Lafayette, Calif.: St. Giles Press, 1987). 35 Hist Rpt–Southern, p. 40; “U.S. Army Engineer District, Southern, Livorno, Italy,” 1 Nov 58, p. 7.

The post exchange at Kagnew Station—visited in May 1957 by Brig. Gen. E. A. Brown Jr. 

(front, right) and Maj. Gen. W. K. Wilson Jr. from the Corps of Engineers

in Washington, D.C.—provided support for Corps employees.
132 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

agreement with King Mohammed V of Morocco that all U.S. military forces would 

withdraw from the country over the subsequent four years.36

Construction at the four principal USAF bases—Nouasser, Sidi Slimane, 

Benguérir, and Boulhaut—was 95 percent complete when the Mediterranean 

Division moved to Livorno in November 1957. The unfinished construction 

was minor: utilities; water storage, treatment, and distribution; minor roads and 

railroads; and some on-base refueling facilities. Construction continued on global 

communications facilities and on aircraft control and warning (AC&W) sites; and 

work remained on community facilities such as dependent schools, storage, and 

officers dining halls. The total budget for this construction was under $1 million 

for FY 1958 and just under $2 million for FY 1959. These projects simply put the 

finishing touches on the existing installations.37

36 Gerald M. Adams, A History of U.S. Strategic Air Bases in Morocco, 1951–1963 (Omaha, Nebr.: 

Moroccan Reunion Association, 1992), pp. 80, 127–30. See also news articles on the Moroccan bases 

that appeared in July, September, and October in the Washington Post and Times Herald, U.S. News 

and World Report, Newsweek, and Time. 37 “Part II: Morocco District,” [1957], pp. 22–24, box 51-84-7361, Farrell Papers; “Morocco 

District,” n.d., map, chronology (which extends to Dec 61), figures, p. 1, box 25, access no. 77-92-

0001, WNRC.

Table 6—Design Firms Contracting with Southern District

1957–1960

Number of 

Contracts

Total $ in ArchitectEngineer Fees

Lublin, McGaughy, and Cie 12 483,649

Ammann and Whitney 12 998,473

Frank E. Basil Co. 14 583,775

Litchfield, Whiting, Bowne & Associates 5 263,047

Pedersen and Tilney 4 192,350

Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall 2 382,517

The Ralph M. Parsons Co. 1 329,500

Ebner Associates 1 8,800

A & P Dufau 1 13,481

Source: Hist Rpt, U.S. Army Engr Dist, Southern, 1 Aug 57–30 Jun 60, [1960], p. 29, box 51-83-

8379, Richard T. Farrell Papers, Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Alexandria, Va.
Headquarters and the Southern District, 1957–1960 133

New construction in Morocco included a complicated and slow undertaking 

called surplus commodity housing, which operated under the Agricultural Trade 

Development and Assistance Act, Public Law (PL) 480, passed by the U.S. Congress 

in 1954.38 The act authorized the sale of $700 million of surplus farm commodities 

to friendly nations over a period of three years initially (Congress later extended 

the authority). The Commodity Credit Corporation, which the U.S. government 

set up to manage the sales, oversaw purchase of surplus agricultural goods from 

American farmers and subsequent sale of these commodities to various nations, 

which paid in their own currency. The currencies that accrued from the sales funded 

loans to promote economic development in the respective countries. The American 

military used this program to finance construction of housing for service personnel 

and their families in the purchasing country. The program provided a mechanism 

through which the U.S. government could in effect pay for military construction 

with surplus agricultural products rather than with dollars that might inflate the local 

economy. American military personnel lived in the facilities rent free; their housing 

allowance went to cover the cost of utilities and maintenance and to reimburse the 

Commodity Credit Corporation.39

In the late 1950s, the U.S. European Command had surplus commodity housing 

programs scheduled throughout its area of responsibility. In both France and 

Morocco, French firms contracted for the construction of the housing. The surplus 

commodity housing for the Moroccan bases was prefabricated in Austria. The 2-, 

3-, and 4-bedroom houses were constructed of wood frames with gypsum board 

over plywood on the interior, stucco on the exterior, concrete floors with terrazzo 

surfacing, and corrugated asbestos-cement roofs. Other features included central 

forced-air heating, evaporation cooling, and the plumbing and electrical systems 

expected by Americans at the time. Plans in late 1957 called for 500 housing units 

in Morocco; but as the likelihood of a long-term American presence in the country 

diminished, that figure dropped to 140, with 100 units at Benguérir and 40 units at 

Sidi Slimane. By August 1959, contractors had completed 90 percent of the 140 

units in Morocco.40

Reductions in personnel accompanied the completion of work in Morocco. 

The Morocco District reduced its staff from 116 in the summer of 1957 to 53 at the 

end of 1958. On 1 January 1959, the district closed and the Moroccan Area Office, 

under the Southern District, took its place. By the end of the calendar year, only 15 

people staffed the area office. In the winter-spring of 1960, the office closed out its 

38 See Congress and the Nation, 1954–64: A Review of Government and Politics in the Postwar 

Years (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), pp. 173, 177, 737, 742–43. 39 James S. Arrigona and W. R. Karsteter, “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, Historical 

Report, 15 January 1953–31 July 1957,” U.S. European Command, 1958, pp. 206, 207 (chart), 213. 

See also Congress and the Nation, 1954–64, pp. 173, 177, 737, 742–43. 40 Memo, Col John T. Poffenberger, 20 Oct 57, sub: Surplus Commodity Housing, Morocco, 

unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE; “U.S. Army Engineer District, Southern,” 1 Sep 59, p. 9; Shuler to 

Itschner, 11 Feb 59, Mil Files XXI-2-7, OH, HQ USACE; “Morocco Data,” n.d., p. 8, box 51-84-7361, 

Farrell Papers; Hist Rpt–Southern, p. 29; “Morocco District,” n.d., p. 5.
134 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

remaining contracts except for the unfinished work on housing at Sidi Slimane that 

was completed in December 1961.41

The Middle East District, also under the Southern District, continued its work 

in Libya and in Asmara. By the spring of 1957, construction under contract was 

93.7 percent complete in Libya and 84 percent complete in Asmara.42 The USAF 

program for FY 1958 consisted of three items with a total value of $650,000, plus 

a small operations and maintenance budget. For FY 1959 (beginning in July 1958), 

current projects represented a contract value of $1.52 million at Wheelus Air Base 

and another $1.2 million for a road from Tripoli to Wheelus. At the air base, the 

Corps supervised an addition to a school, a theater, a new apron for aircraft on alert, 

and modifications to hangars and other facilities to support alert status.43

As work wound down at Wheelus Air Base, the Middle East District and the 

contractor, Crow-Steers-Shepherd (CSS), encountered disruptions from workers 

41 Shuler to Itschner, 11 Dec 58, p. 11; “Part II: Morocco District,” [1957], p. 18; GO no. 28, 22 

Dec 58, sub: Abolishment of U.S. Army Engineer District, Morocco, OCE Changes in MDD Org., 

box 24, access no. 77-920-0002, WNRC; part of the chronology, Meddiv, 1950–1973, key dates in 

Organizational Changes, copy of file in R&D Files 1372 and 1133, TAC; Shuler to Itschner, 11 Aug 

59, Mil Files XXI-2-7, OH, HQ USACE. 42 “History of the Mediterranean Division,” n.d., p. 7, box 19; “Mediterranean Division Builders,” 

1 Jan 58, p. 2, box 18; both in access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 43 Engr Div Mediterranean Info Booklet: 1959, p. 13; Mediterranean Div, “Engineering [Inspection],” p. 17. 

Construction of a storage igloo for ordnance at the Sidi Slimane air base, shown here in 

February 1957, was completed later that year.
Headquarters and the Southern District, 1957–1960 135

being laid off. To forestall reprisals from workers during their final days on the 

job, CSS changed its procedures, notifying men as they were leaving for the day 

that their jobs had ended and that the wage envelope they were handed contained 

two weeks’ severance pay, which fulfilled the local law that a worker receive two 

weeks’ notice of termination.44

On 15 May 1958, the Middle East District ordered CSS to halt all construction 

work, except for limited work on a gunnery range, and to close its books on 30 

June, thus ending the cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract initiated in 1951. The total 

value of the construction completed in Libya between 1951 and the end of August 

1959 was about $66 million.45

In September 1958, the Mediterranean Division issued an order to convert 

the Middle East District to an area office reporting to the Southern District 

effective 1 November. Thereafter, the office at Wheelus supervised small projects 

including construction of a dependent school and a theater, as well as minor 

44 Hist Rpt–Southern, p. 19.

45 Crow-Steers-Shepherd, Final Closing Rpt, Contract no. DA-30-082-Eng-8, 10 Jul 58, p. 1, 

and attached Ltr, Lt Col Artha D. Williams, box 51-83-8378, Farrell Papers; “U.S. Army Engineer 

District, Southern,” 1 Sep 59, p. 9.

Plans called for forty units of surplus commodity housing with aluminum roofing at Sidi 

Slimane, shown here in May 1959.
136 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

improvements in the combat facilities. In June 1960, a construction contract was 

finally awarded for the Al Mellaha Road from Wheelus Air Base to Tripoli.46

In 1955, the Middle East District had begun building a signal facility at Kagnew 

Station in Asmara for the U.S. Army Security Agency. In October 1957, as the 

work neared completion, the district reduced the area office at Kagnew Station to a 

resident office. The contractor, Crow-Steers-Shepherd, successfully terminated local 

employees at the construction-site gate as it had in Libya. CSS closed its Asmara 

office in April 1958, having fulfilled its contract valued at $8.1 million.47

Southern District Work in Europe

In late 1954, the American military construction program in Italy began; by 

agreement between the two governments, only Italian firms could bid on the projects. 

All construction contracts were approved by a joint commission of Americans and 

Italians with the Southern District engineer serving as the senior American member. 

Under the Joint Construction Agency, the district supervised projects for the Southern 

European Task Force (SETAF), created in October 1955 to accommodate U.S. troops 

moving out of Austria as the four-power postwar occupation of that country ended 

by diplomatic agreement. SETAF had initially concentrated its activities around the 

port of Livorno and at nearby Camp Darby; in 1956, it installed its headquarters at 

Verona. As part of the Mediterranean Division, the Southern District continued to 

manage construction for SETAF.48

Late in 1958, Italy expanded its role in NATO by accepting the stationing on 

its territory of U.S. Jupiter missiles capable of delivering atomic weapons. Richard 

“Dick” Wiles, who had joined the JCA Southern District as a mechanical engineer, 

became project engineer for Project Ebony Forest, the construction of Jupiter sites in 

southern Italy.49 For Wiles, it was the first of many assignments as project manager 

for the Corps during a career that continued into the 1990s. 

Other projects for SETAF included a small airstrip at Bosco Mantico, near 

Verona; a hospital and cold-storage facilities for the logistics element at Camp Darby; 

and facilities at Camp Ederle, near Vicenza. The district managed construction of 

surplus commodity housing, supervised the construction of an Air Force base and an 

airfield at Aviano, and oversaw work at Brindisi. The district also worked on a U.S. 

46 Engr Div Mediterranean Info Booklet: 1959, p. 13; Rpt on Rehabilitation and Additional Construction, Marble Arch Airfield, Libya, 5 Jun 59, box 56, access. no. 77-84-2400, WNRC; “Chronological Construction History by Country: Libya,” n.d. [list runs to June 1970], p. 3, box 35, access. 

no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 47 Lt Col Edward J. Bielecki, “Project History: 1954–1958, Asmara Residency, U.S. Army Engineer District Middle East, Asmara, Eritrea,” n.d., pp. 14, 31, 38–40, box 24; Misc Docs pertaining to 

Asmara/Eritrea from 1959 to 1970, pp. 1–2, box 26; both in access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 48 “Mediterranean Division Builders,” 1 Jan 58, pp. 7–8; E-mail, Cheril Marcuri, Southern European 

Task Force Historian, to author, 26 Feb 09. 49 D. J. Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 1953–63 (U.S. Army, Europe, Operations Division, Historical Section, 1964), pp. 74–75; Interv, Moorhus with Wiles, 21 Oct 93, 7 Feb, 5 May 94, 

pp. 41–42.
Headquarters and the Southern District, 1957–1960 137

Naval Air Station at Sigonella, near Catania on Sicily’s east coast, and another at 

Capodichino near Naples. It designed facilities planned for Montechiari, Tombolo, 

Foggia, San Vito dei Romanni, and Treviso although several of these projects never 

went beyond the design stage. The Southern District also supervised construction 

for an installation of the U.S. Coast Guard near Catanzaro.50 (See Map 11.)

The program for surplus commodity housing in Italy called for units near 

Vicenza and near Catania. The development at Vicenza, at the eastern edge of 

Camp Ederle on an 87-acre wooded tract of land, cost an estimated $5.4 million 

and included 371 new units for SETAF personnel and their families. The Southern 

District scheduled five phases and delivered the first sixty-eight units for occupancy 

late in 1959. The 2-, 3-, and 4-bedroom houses, similar to those constructed in 

Morocco, contained American-style kitchens, picture windows, and concrete 

floors with terrazzo finish. An Italian contractor, Maltauro-Marini of Verona and 

Vicenza, constructed the units based on designs prepared by the Southern District. 

The project included all of the community infrastructure and utilities: streets and 

50 Hist Rpt–Southern, pp. 18, 28; Engr Div Mediterranean Info Booklet: 1959, pp. 14–15; “U.S. 

Army Engineer District, Southern,” 1 Sep 59, pp. 12–14; Shuler to Itschner, 10 Jun 59, p. 10, Mil 

Files XXI-2-7, OH, HQ USACE.

Mess hall (front) and barracks constructed in Vicenza
A D R I A T I C S E A

T Y RRHENIAN

S E A

I ONIAN

S E A

M

E

D

I

T

E

R

R

A

N

E A N

S E A

VICENZA

VERONA

LIVORNO

AVIANO

NAPLES

CAPODICHINO AIR BASE

BRINDISI

CATANZARO

SIGONELLA NAVAL AIR BASE

CATANIA

Sicily

Sar dinia

C orsic a

YUGOSLA VIA

SWITZERLAN D

A U S TRIA

HUNGAR Y

F R A N C E

MONACO SAN MARINO

A L GERIA

TUNISIA M A L T A

Genoa

Turin

Milan

Florence

Bologna

Pescara

Venice

Trieste

Zagreb

ROME

Palermo Messina

ITALY

SOUTHERN DISTRICT 

CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

1957–1960

Mediterranean Division and 

Southern District Headquarters

Construction Sites

0

0 100 Miles

100 Kilometers

Map 11
Headquarters and the Southern District, 1957–1960 139

sidewalks, a central heating plant, a community water supply, a sewage system 

and treatment plant, and swimming pools and other recreational facilities.51

The Southern District maintained a Northern Area Office to supervise housing 

construction and other projects around Vicenza. SETAF had contracted for $1.6 

million in facilities for FY 1960, including an addition to the post exchange, a 

bakery, warehouse space, and a cold-storage unit. Contracts also called for barracks, 

a mess hall, roads, hangars, aprons, and taxiways at Bosco Mantico, near Verona. 

All of this supplemented the $3.27 million in facilities that the district had already 

completed for the command in the Vicenza-Verona area.52

At Sigonella, the Southern District managed work for the U.S. Naval Air Facility 

(NAF–1) that paralleled the projects in the Vicenza-Verona area: a bakery, a dining 

hall, an infirmary, and surplus commodity housing. The first 44 of 122 planned 

housing units were ready in June 1959 when the district turned over the other 

51 Press Release no. 16/1959, 23 Sep 59, box 20, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. Several versions 

of this announcement exist in different depositories. See also Itschner to Shuler, 1 Jul 59, p. 4, Mil 

Files XXI-2-7, OH, HQ USACE. 52 Press Release no. 16/1959, 23 Sep 59. 

Form for concrete roof under construction for the U.S. Air Force at San Vito, March 1970
140 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

facilities; the remaining 78 units were ready by the end of the year. The construction 

program for NAF–1 cost about $3.4 million.53

In Greece, U.S. military construction had begun in 1947 as a part of the 

Truman Doctrine. The Army engineers had closed the Grecian District in 1949, 

but construction was reinitiated under the Joint Construction Agency in 1954. At 

Iraklion, on the island of Crete, work for the U.S. Air Force costing $4.8 million was 

essentially complete by 1958. The same was true of Athenia Airfield near Athens, 

which cost $2.5 million. During FY 1958, the Southern District Athens Area Office 

supervised placement of $1.9 million; most of the money went into the expansion 

of communications facilities and airfields. In August 1959, the engineers completed 

a $200,000 hospital. Total placement for the Athens Area Office during FY 1960 

53 Various pages on the history of Joint Construction Agency, box 24, access. no. 77-92-0002, 

WNRC; MDD [Mediterranean Division] Internal Organizational Changes, Chronology with GO 

numbers, handwritten, Aug 58–Jan 71, n.d., box 24, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; L. W. McBride, 

“U.S. Army, Engineer Division, Mediterranean,” [Aug 58], p. 13, box 51-84-6364, Farrell Papers; 

“U.S. Army Engineer District, Southern, Livorno, Italy,” 1 Nov 58, p. 12; Shuler to Itschner, 10 Jun, 

11 Aug, 10 Dec 59, Mil Files XXI-2-7, OH, HQ USACE.

Batch plant and water tank for construction at Sigonella Naval Station, July 1965
Headquarters and the Southern District, 1957–1960 141

amounted to $650,000; by that year, only communications facilities remained as 

active construction projects.54

The U.S. Engineer Group (TUSEG) had launched the ambitious construction 

program in Turkey in 1950. Although TUSEG ceased to exist officially when the 

JCA took over construction in 1954, the label TUSEG survived as the common 

designation for the Army engineer offices in Turkey. Metcalf-Hamilton-Grove, an 

American joint venture, had executed the early construction using Turkish labor and 

subcontractors. In 1955, the Army engineers converted the CPFF awards made to 

Metcalf to lump-sum contracts.55 The negotiations to convert the original contract 

proved difficult and lengthy, and construction slowed. After the conversion of the 

contract, the Southern District awarded subsequent construction through competitive 

bidding. 

When bidding for the contracts in Turkey broadened, Turkish construction 

companies wanted to participate. The division engineer, General Shuler, expressed to 

the chief of engineers, General Itschner, his reservations about Turkish companies. 

Turkish companies often lacked the appropriate financial credit outside Turkey, and 

securing it frequently proved a stumbling block and a source of delay in completing 

projects. Turkish construction companies had trouble hiring and retaining skilled 

craftsmen and supervisors; their finished work met only minimum standards. 

Personnel in Turkish firms commonly had limited knowledge of the English language 

and of American standards and practices. Difficulty in securing adequate equipment 

and tools also created delays. General Shuler asserted that all these factors obliged 

Corps of Engineers personnel to spend disproportionate amounts of time supervising 

Turkish contractors. Nonetheless, the Mediterranean Division would have found 

itself, as Itschner observed, “in a difficult position from a diplomatic standpoint” if it 

excluded Turkish contractors.56 The division did find qualified Turkish contractors, 

as in the case of Eti Yapi Ltd.; but the problems that Shuler had enumerated proved 

real, even for this seemingly sound contractor.57

New activity in Turkey involved about two dozen construction contracts 

between 1958 and June 1960, and construction placement rose from $4.5 million 

in FY 1958 to about $11 million in FY 1959. The Army engineers had managed 

the earlier construction for several customers: the Turkish government; components 

of the Joint United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (JUSMAAG, the 

54 “U.S. Army Engineer District, Southern,” 1 Sep 59, p. 11; Engr Div Mediterranean Info Booklet: 

1959, pp. 11, 16. 55 “U.S. Army Engineer District, Southern,” 1 Sep 59, p. 12. 

56 For the list of problems and Itschner’s reply quoted above, see Shuler to Itschner, 10 May 59, and 

Itschner to Shuler, 1 May 59, both in Mil Files XXI-2-7, OH, HQ USACE. More generally, Shuler’s 

periodic reports to Itschner repeatedly mention problems with Turkish contractors and the delays that 

the problems provoked. See Shuler to Itschner, 18 Apr, 11 Aug, 12 Oct 59, all in Mil Files, XXI-2-7, 

OH, HQ USACE. Hist Rpt–Southern, p. 43. 57 Engr Div Mediterranean Info Booklet: 1959, p. 17; Karamursel Residency, Construction Inspection Bfg, Mar 67, “Main Site and Samsun,” p. 1, box 24, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. On Eti Yapi’s 

deficiencies, see Nauman to Lambert, 8 Jan 63, Mil Files XXI-3-3, OH, HQ USACE; “Hos Geldiniz 

[Welcome to] TUSEG,” 17 Oct 62, p. 4, box 24, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC.
142 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

successor to the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, or JAMMAT); 

and the U.S. Air Force. The new program involved construction for the U.S. Navy 

as well. Many of the projects in Turkey remained classified, including preparations 

to install Jupiter missiles.58

In the late 1950s, the TUSEG Area Office found one attractive way to enhance 

the quality of work by Turkish nationals. An internship program set up by the area 

office brought students from Robert College, an American school established in 

the mid-nineteenth century in Istanbul, into the construction management program. 

During the summer months, English-speaking students from the college served as 

supplementary personnel on site inspections and in other capacities. The Turkish 

students gained experience; the Corps of Engineers expanded its contacts with 

the Turks, augmented its staff during the busiest construction season, and built 

goodwill.59

The construction program of the early 1950s had projected a complex of bases 

in Turkey, with Karamursel, on the southeastern coast of the Sea of Marmara, as a 

main base with five smaller subsidiary bases. Only two of the subsidiary bases were 

constructed: Samsun, on the coast of the Black Sea about halfway across northern 

Turkey, and Trabzon, even farther east along the same coastline. The main site at 

Karamursel (often referred to simply as Mainsite) served as a joint base for the 

U.S. Navy and Air Force; the satellite bases farther east were exclusively for Air 

Force use.60

By 1960, much of the basic construction at Karamursel had been completed. 

Construction at Samsun had gotten off to a slow start under an American contractor, 

the Vinnell Corporation of Alhambra, California. Vinnell had failed to comply with 

Turkish customs procedures to clear the materials that it imported, proving that 

delays were not limited to Turkish contractors. The work at Trabzon, contracted 

between June 1958 and June 1960 at Cigli, at Incirlik/Adana, and at Diyarbakir, 

had progressed to varying degrees. Additional contracts, including construction 

of surplus commodity housing near Karamursel and at Incirlik/Adana, were close 

to being awarded. Despite difficulty in recruiting, TUSEG maintained nearly one 

hundred persons on staff in offices around the country.61

Disposing of Surplus Materials

In many of the areas in which the Southern District managed construction, it 

inherited the unenviable task of disposing of the surplus property (sometimes called 

58 “U.S. Army Engineer District, Southern,” 1 Sep 59, p. 12; “U.S. Army Engineer District, Southern, 

Livorno, Italy,” 1 Nov 58, p. 15; Engr Div Mediterranean Info Booklet: 1959, p. 17; Interv, Moorhus 

with Wiles, 21 Oct 93, 7 Feb, 5 May 94, pp. 42–43. 59 Southern Dist, Press Release no. 10/1958 [1958], box 15, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Hist 

Rpt–Southern, p. 24. 60 “U.S. Army Engineer District, Southern,” 1 Sep 59, p. 12.

61 TUSEG Area Ofc, “History of TUSEG, 1958–1965,” [Dec 65], R&D File 1134, TAC (hereafter 

cited as TUSEG Hist, 1958–1965); Shuler to Itschner, 10 Dec 59, Mil Files XXI-2-7, OH, HQ USACE; 

Nauman to Itschner, 9 Dec 60, Mil Files XXI-3-1, OH, HQ USACE; “Hos Geldiniz TUSEG,” p. 4.
Headquarters and the Southern District, 1957–1960 143

idle or excess property) that had accumulated under CPFF contracts. Contractors 

who undertook the crash construction in Morocco, Libya, and Turkey had bought 

large quantities of materials and equipment to ensure they had what they needed for 

the construction. In converting from CPFF to fixed-price contracts, these materials 

became a point of contention. In negotiations, the contractors insisted that the 

government pay for and assume custody of all materials ordered: this would protect 

the contractors from significant financial losses. The government, however, had no 

clear need for the surplus materials.

To reduce the surplus in Morocco, where more than $60 million in excess property 

had accumulated, the Mediterranean Division transferred equipment and materials to 

the Navy for use in construction of the Spanish bases. The division also used surplus 

materials on other construction projects in Morocco and shipped some to Pakistan. 

In August 1957, when the Southern District assumed responsibility, $9.7 million in 

surplus materials remained on hand in Morocco, $2.2 million in Turkey, and $3.5 

million in Libya. The Southern District supervised transfer of the entire surplus in 

Libya to other U.S. government agencies before closing the Middle East District in 

July 1958. By the autumn of 1959, the Southern District had reduced the Moroccan 

surplus to $180,000 through public sales of the materials and equipment.62

In Turkey, the lack of any agreement to cover the tax status of surplus materials 

sold at public auction blocked their disposal. In November 1959, the Mediterranean 

Division reached an agreement with the Turkish government; but political events 

in Turkey delayed the sale of the surplus. Over the summer of 1960, the Southern 

District transferred 328 pieces of equipment worth $2.1 million to the State 

Department’s International Cooperation Administration to use in training. During 

October and November 1960, another forty pieces of equipment with an acquisition 

value of $263,000 were offered in the first such sale of its kind in Turkey. Under 

the terms of the agreement, only one company, the Turkish Scrap Company, had 

permission to buy the equipment. Sixteen pieces of equipment with a value of about 

$67,000 remained on the division’s accounting records at the end of 1960.63

Closing the Southern District

By January 1959, the field offices in both Morocco and Libya had become 

area offices under the Southern District. Other district offices remained open but 

with limited prospects of future work: the Northern Area Offices in the VeronaVicenza region, the Athens Area Office, the TUSEG Area Office in Turkey, and 

smaller field offices near Catania (the Sigonella Residency) and near Brindisi.64 In 

late 1959, the division engineer, General Shuler, ordered a reorganization of the 

62 Hist Rpt–Southern, p. 53; “U.S. Army Engineer District, Southern,” 1 Sep 59, p. 5; Shuler to 

Itschner, 11 Dec 58, pp. 3–4; “Part II: Morocco District,” [1957], pp. 23–24. 63 Nauman to Itschner, 7 Oct 60, p. 5, and 9 Dec 60, p. 5, Mil Files XXI-3-1, OH, HQ USACE; 

Hist Rpt–Southern, p. 53. 64 Hist Rpt–Southern, p. 1; Engr Div Mediterranean Info Booklet: 1959, p. 14; “U.S. Army Engineer 

District, Southern,” 1 Sep 59, p. 2.
144 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Southern District, abolished several branches (Technical Liaison, Safety, Design, 

and Program and Planning) and redistributed their work.65 Reduced work in the 

field offices and the reorganization eliminated 156 civilian employees (30 percent) 

from the district’s staff by the end of the year.66

The district began a formal reduction in force on 5 February 1960. About the 

same time, Shuler received the report from a study he had commissioned on merging 

the staffs of the Southern District and the Mediterranean Division headquarters. 

The report indicated that combining the two operations would eliminate another 

forty-two positions and save several hundred thousand dollars a year, even if the 

two staffs retained separate office space: the division in the Palazzo Grande and the 

district in the Corallo Hotel.67

65 Dist Order no. 14, 31 Dec 59, sub: Reorganization—Southern District, box 682799, Record 

Group (RG) 77, access. no. 77-004, Federal Records Center, Bayonne, N.J. (hereafter cited as Bayonne FRC). 66 “U.S. Army Engineer District, Southern,” 1 Sep 59; Shuler to Itschner [mid-Apr 59], Mil Files 

XXI-2-7, OH, HQ USACE. 67 Memo, Clema, 16 Feb 60, sub: Study and Plan for Maintaining Reduced Government Costs, 

RG 77, box 682799, access. no. 77-004, Bayonne FRC; “Study and Plan for Maintaining Reduced 

Government Costs,” 19 Feb 60; Memo, W. J. Long to E. J. Fuller, 15 Feb 60, sub: Staff Study of 

Operating Division, pp. 1–3, box 682799, RG 77, access. no. 77-004, Bayonne FRC. 

Fire station constructed under the supervision of the Brindisi field office
Headquarters and the Southern District, 1957–1960 145

General Shuler reluctantly concluded by early March 1960 that he could not 

retain the Southern District. The district’s prospects for new construction had 

virtually evaporated. Family housing projects had either dropped out of the USAF 

construction program entirely or had been curtailed. Projects planned for Asmara, 

Eritrea, and Cigli, Turkey, had been held up by political and security factors 

involving the low bidder on both, the Israeli company Solel Boneh. Construction of 

a road between Wheelus Air Base and Tripoli in Libya had become mired in State 

Department red tape. A freeze imposed on design for the Air Force program of FY 

1961 had eliminated additional work. Shuler decided to merge the Southern District 

with the Mediterranean Division headquarters, thus re-creating an operating division. 

He showed little enthusiasm for the decision, nor did General Itschner in endorsing 

it; but both accepted the need to adjust costs in light of potential income.68

The Southern District had begun its life under the Mediterranean Division in 

August 1957 with eighty-three contracts valued at about $175 million carried over 

from the Joint Construction Agency. By early 1958, it supervised construction at 

forty sites on three different continents. During its existence, the district awarded 

143 contracts worth $51 million. By mid-1960, it had completed 151 contracts with 

a total value of $158 million.69 From a high of 550 positions, the district had only 

316 when the division headquarters incorporated it. After 30 June 1960, only the 

two engineer officers, Colonel Clema and his deputy, remained in the district. On 

the third anniversary of its activation, 1 August 1960, the Southern District ceased 

to exist, leaving the Mediterranean Division as an operating division with two 

districts: the Trans-East and the Gulf.70

68 Shuler to Itschner, 3 Mar 60, and Itschner to Shuler, 16 Mar 60, Mil Files XXI-3-1, OH, HQ 

USACE. 69 Hist Rpt–Southern, preface.

70 Memo, Shuler, 16 May 60, sub: Merger of the Division Office and the Southern District, box 

682799, RG 77, access. no. 77-004, Bayonne FRC; Shuler to Northington, 25 May 60, Mil Files XXI-2-

5, OH, HQ USACE; GO no. 12, 3 Jun 60, sub: Abolishment of U.S. Army Engineer District, Southern 

and Realignment of Responsibilities of the U.S. Army Engineer Division; “Mediterranean Historical 

Rpt, Southern District, Aug 57–Jun 60,” [1960], box 51-83-8379, Farrell Papers; Nauman to Itschner, 

7 Oct 60, p. 1, Mil Files XXI-3-1, OH, HQ USACE; Hist Rpt–Southern, preface, pp. 1, 25.

The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 147

5

The Trans-East and Gulf

Districts, 1958–1960

The Mediterranean Division had established the Trans-East District in Karachi 

in late 1955 and the Gulf District in Tehran in early 1956 to supervise Americanfinanced construction for the armed services of Pakistan and Iran. While the Southern 

District supervised the late stages of a waning American construction program in 

North Africa, the Trans-East and Gulf Districts supervised growing programs in 

southwest Asia. 

Trans-East District Construction Program

Construction in Pakistan for the Pakistani Air Force, Navy, and Army began 

in the summer of 1956; by the beginning of 1958, it had advanced noticeably. The 

Trans-East District turned the airfield at Mauripur over to the Pakistani Air Force in 

July 1957 and all supporting facilities in February 1958. In June 1958, the district 

turned over an improved airfield at Peshawar; late in the year, the contractor, OmanFarnsworth-Wright (OFW), completed the facilities at the airfield near Sargodha. 

That same year, the contractor completed construction of ammunition storage and 

inspection facilities for the Pakistani Navy in the vicinity of Karachi and an extension 

of the existing berth for fitting out ships. Construction continued on a naval storage 

depot, a two-story structure of one hundred sixty thousand square feet.1

The construction plan for the large army cantonment at Kharian called for 

a multiyear project to build facilities on a 4,000-acre tract to accommodate the 

fifteen thousand troops of a Pakistani armored division. At the outset of 1958, new 

facilities constructed by the Trans-East District provided space for five thousand 

troops. The work programmed for FY 1959 projected facilities for another five 

thousand soldiers.2

The military forces of Pakistan had been part of the British colonial army in 

India before the civil war and were accustomed to the standards maintained by 

the British. The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, which commissioned 

1 Trans-East Dist Info for Bfg General Lincoln, Jan 58, tabs F, H, I (hereafter cited as Lincoln 

Bfg–Trans-East); Hist Rpt, U.S. Army Engr Dist, Trans-East, 21 Nov 55–30 Jun 60, Aug 60, pp. 98, 

103, 105 (hereafter cited as Hist Rpt–Trans-East); both in box 51-83-8379, Richard T. Farrell Papers, 

Office of History (OH), HQ United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Alexandria, Va. 2 Lincoln Bfg–Trans-East, tab G; Hist Rpt–Trans-East, p. 62.
148 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

the construction, set standards for construction under American Direct Forces 

Support (DFS) aid that would compare favorably with British colonial standards. 

The Trans-East District understood the Military Assistance Advisory Group’s 

(MAAG’s) instructions to mean that the facilities would be somewhat below the 

American standards for modified emergency construction with a ten-year life 

expectancy. The district expected the contractors to use local construction materials 

and techniques.3

As construction progressed, criticism arose that the Corps of Engineers provided 

too high a standard at Kharian. In August 1957, the Army colonel newly assigned as 

chief of the MAAG’s Army element began to complain that the Corps was “wasting 

money by giving the Pak[istani]s more than they required.”4

 The construction was 

not extravagant; but the facilities looked good, and their quality exceeded what 

had been imagined when the criteria were established. Col. Frederick J. Clarke, 

Trans-East District engineer between 1957 and June 1959, observed later that the 

facilities looked so good in part because the “brick work and the plastering” had a 

thousand years of Pakistani artisan tradition and quality behind it. In addition, the 

contractor used teakwood for the door and window frames and in the built-in lockers 

because teak resisted the termites prevalent in the area. The teak came from East 

Pakistan and was far less expensive than metal or any other solution to the termites. 

3 Lincoln Bfg–Trans-East, Remarks by Col Frederick J. Clarke, 16 Jan 58, p. 4; Shuler to Itschner, 

16 Sep 58, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE. 4 Shuler to Itschner, 16 Sep 58.

Ammunition storage in Karachi, January 1958
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 149

Without exceeding the criteria, the Corps insisted on “finished” construction, that 

is, covered wiring and plastered walls.5

At the time of the construction, Clarke corresponded with both his division 

commanders, Brig. Gens. Lawrence J. Lincoln Jr. and William R. Shuler, concerning 

the criteria and the criticism. General Shuler in turn alerted his commander, the 

chief of engineers, Maj. Gen. Emerson C. Itschner. The district and division on their 

own initiative undertook studies to determine how they might reduce costs while 

maintaining the standards set for the facilities in Pakistan.6

 The criticism persisted, 

resulting in a congressional committee report, published in March 1961, charging 

that the Corps of Engineers had delivered facilities at Kharian that exceeded the 

“appropriate” standards and therefore had wasted taxpayer money.7

As with so much of the construction supervised by the Mediterranean Division, 

the construction at Kharian combined the elements of very modern techniques and 

very ancient practices. Before construction could begin, the contractor had to build 

a two-mile railway spur to get equipment and materials to the job site. At the same 

time, much of the earth moved during the project was shoveled by hand into bags 

hanging over the backs of donkeys. Over a two-and-a-half month period, donkeys, 

carrying about two cubic feet of earth on each trip, moved thirty-five thousand 

cubic yards of dirt.8

 That amounts to about one hundred fifty-seven thousand five 

hundred donkey trips in ten weeks or over two thousand five hundred trips a day 

during the standard six-day week.

As Clarke noted, Western Punjab, the region where the Kharian cantonment 

was located, had a long tradition of construction with bricks and manual labor. 

Laborers mixed mud and filled handmade molds. The bricks baked for six hours 

and then cooled for fifteen days. Whole families worked on the Kharian project, 

and the average family group produced about one thousand to one thousand five 

hundred bricks a day. Brick makers received 5 rupees for one thousand bricks. The 

“burning coolies” who stoked the kilns that fired the bricks earned 2 to 2.5 rupees 

a day. A single kiln could average sixty thousand bricks a day, but 20 to 40 percent 

of the bricks failed the quality standards set by the Americans. Porters carried the 

5 Clarke to Col R. J. Kasper, 27 Jun 58, p. 2, box 51-84-7361, Farrell Papers.

6 In addition to the sources cited in notes 3, 4, and 5, see Lincoln to Clarke, 15 May 58, and Clarke 

to Kasper, 27 Jun 58, both in box 51-84-7361, Farrell Papers; Kasper to Clarke, 8 Jul 58, and Clarke 

to Shuler, 9 Jan 59, Mil Files XXI-2-3 and XXI-2-4, respectively, OH, HQ USACE. 7 MFR, Col A. D. Chaffin, 18 Jan 61, sub: Conference on Military Construction with Representatives of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, unmarked box, Karl C. Dod Papers, OH, HQ 

USACE, R&D File 2543, Transatlantic Programs Center (TAC), Winchester, Va. This box includes 

commentaries on the standards applied at Kharian drawn from several participants including Cols. 

William A. Davis and Frederick J. Clarke, General Walter K. Wilson, General Lincoln, General Shuler, 

Col. Robert J. Kasper, and Colonel Chaffin. In spite of these rebuttals, the committee published its 

unfavorable assessment. Roy J. Bullock and Cromer, Rpt to the House Foreign Affairs Committee of 

U.S. Financed Military Construction at Kharian and Multan in West Pakistan, Mar 61, in Hist Rpt–

Trans-East, Addendum for Period 1 Jul 60–31 Dec 60, May 61, box 51-83-8370, Farrell Papers, OH, 

HQ USACE, R&D File 2598, TAC. 8 These details of construction come from Robert E. Snetzer, “Pakistan: Newest Construction 

Area,” Military Engineer (September-October 1958): 335–39. 
150 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

bricks on their heads from the kilns to the construction sites. One worker carried 

twenty to twenty-four bricks at a time, a weight of 120–144 pounds, and earned 

1.25 rupees per one thousand bricks delivered. Skilled bricklayers earned 5.5 to 6 

rupees a day. A rupee was worth 21 cents, so an hour’s work in the United States 

at the minimum wage of $1.00 an hour earned about the same as a full day’s pay 

for Pakistani brick makers at the Kharian site.

By April 1960, Pakistani Army units occupied the Kharian cantonment, 85 

percent of them in permanent facilities and 15 percent bivouacked on site.9

 A year 

later, the contractor completed all remaining facilities.

The Trans-East District supervised the construction of a second cantonment 

located at Multan, two hundred miles southwest of Lahore. Construction had been 

scheduled on a cantonment at Jhelum, one hundred five miles north-northwest 

of Lahore on the Jhelum River; but because of possible flooding by a proposed 

dam downstream, the United States and Pakistan agreed to cancel the Jhelum 

cantonment and shift the resources to expand facilities at Multan and at Kharian. 

Construction on the cantonment at Multan, to accommodate eight thousand 

five hundred soldiers of the Pakistani Army, began in the summer of 1959. The 

contractor, OFW, completed the Multan cantonment in June 1961, nine months 

9 Shuler to Itschner, 7 Apr 60, p. 3, Mil Files XXI-3-1, OH, HQ USACE.

At the Kharian cantonment, workers used donkeys to move sun-dried bricks to the kilns 

for firing.
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 151

ahead of schedule. The army post, situated on 270 acres of land, included 310 

structures, with 60 barracks, 27 mess halls, 35 administrative buildings, 25 schools, 

and all of the supporting utilities.10

10 Hist Rpt–Trans-East, pp. 36, 57, 71; MFR, Clarke, 22 Jun 59, sub: Additional Facilities at Multan 

and Kharian, p. 6, Mil Files XXI-2-4, OH, HQ USACE; Northington to Shuler, 28 Jan, 26 Mar 60, p. 

6, Mil Files XXI-2-5, OH, HQ USACE; “Multan Cantonment,” Bfg for Col A. C. Nauman, Jan 61, 

p. 5, box 35, access. no. 77-92-0001, Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md.; 

Cameron to Nauman, 4 May 61, box 51-83-8379, Farrell Papers. 

Site plan for the Multan cantonment, late 1950s
152 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

The Corps also supervised construction of facilities in Pakistan to support 

a United States Air Force (USAF) communications facility near Peshawar, the 

so-called Sandbag Operation for the surveillance of Soviet activity. Beginning in 

July 1958, OFW and subcontractors built facilities in four phases with contracts 

awarded in four fiscal years. In all, the project comprised eighty-nine buildings and 

one hundred family-housing units with a total value of $5.35 million, including 

Pakistan’s contribution of 3.1 million rupees (the equivalent of $651,800).11

In May and June 1958, the Pakistani secretary of defense approached members 

of the American military mission about obtaining “the advice and counsel of the 

Corps of Engineers on their problems in constructing a new Jet Age air strip” at the 

civilian airport in Karachi. The Trans-East District engineer, Colonel Clarke, who 

advised division headquarters about the inquiry, correctly assessed it as “a prelude 

to their asking the U.S. to finance and construct the field.”12 Although the Pakistani 

government’s defense ministry had jurisdiction over the Karachi airport, the program 

11 Hist Rpt–Trans-East, p. 58; Interv, Paul Walker with John Coony, 9 Feb 85, p. 14.

12 Clarke to Lincoln, 3 Jun 58, Mil Files XXI-2-3; Northington to Amb W. M. Rountree, 30 Apr 

60, Mil Files XXI-2-5; both in OH, HQ USACE.

Multan Residency Office
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 153

to improve the runways and facilities at the terminal came within the purview of the 

U.S. Department of State’s International Cooperation Administration (ICA).13

Negotiations over several months drew together the International Cooperation 

Administration, the MAAG, the U.S. embassy in Pakistan, and the Corps of 

Engineers to shape the project with the Pakistani government; on 19 November 1959, 

the two governments signed an agreement. By December, the United States had 

extended a credit to Pakistan of $4.8 million, with 60 percent from the Department 

of State’s Development Loan Fund (DLF) and 40 percent from rupee accounts 

generated by the Pakistani government’s participation in the American program 

built around the sale of surplus agricultural commodities.14 The Trans-East District 

acted as the contracting agent for the government of Pakistan in constructing a new 

jet runway, corresponding taxiways, and support facilities at the existing Karachi 

civilian airport. Under the terms of the government-to-government agreement, 

once the Pakistani government awarded contracts, the district engineer became 

the contracting officer with complete responsibility and authority to administer 

the contracts, including supervising, inspecting, and accepting work. He even 

countersigned payment vouchers.15

Paralleling these negotiations, the Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) 

developed a new contracting procedure whereby OCE publicly advertised 

certain high-priority projects but restricted bidding to a list of preselected and 

prequalified construction firms. For the Karachi airport construction, OCE 

identified forty American contractors as qualified to bid and informally notified 

the Pakistan Ministry of Defence of twenty-one that the minister might ask to 

submit proposals. Four firms submitted bids, including OFW, which held virtually all other contracts for the construction program in Pakistan. At the opening 

of proposals on 14 January 1960, the Pakistani government identified the Vinnell 

Corporation as the low bidder.16 The process had worked, as OCE had hoped it 

would, to encourage truly competitive bidding. Colonel Clarke’s successor as 

Trans-East District engineer, Col. Hartsell H. Northington, observed, “To say 

that OFW people were shaken by Vinnell Company’s low bid on this contract 

is putting it mildly.”17

On 1 February 1960, Vinnell signed a contract for $4,369,256, well below the 

$4.8 million loan commitment that the Pakistani government had gotten from the 

13 Hist Rpt–Trans-East, p. 57.

14 See correspondence between Clarke and Kasper, Clarke and Shuler, Northington and Shuler, 

Shuler and Itschner between June 1959 and the extension of the loan by the United States to Pakistan in 

December 1959 in Mil Files XXI-2-3, XXI-2-4, XXI-2-7, and box 51-84-7361, Farrell Papers; Memo, 

Col E. E. Wilhoyt, 25 Aug 59, sub: Corps of Engineers Status, Karachi Runway, box 51-83-8378, 

Farrell Papers; Hist Rpt–Trans-East, p. 13; “Corps of Engineers Military Construction Activities, 1 

January 1960–31 March 1960,” n.d., p. 1, Mil Files XXI-2-5, OH, HQ USACE. 15 “Mediterranean Division, Corps of Engineers, United States Army,” [1967], unmarked box, 

Farrell Papers; Northington to Rountree, 30 Apr 60. 16 Hist Rpt–Trans-East, p. 36; Northington to Shuler, 28 Sep 59, Mil Files XXI-2-4, OH, HQ 

USACE. 17 Northington to Shuler, 28 Jan 60, p. 4, Mil Files XXI-2-5, OH, HQ USACE.
154 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

U.S. Development Loan Fund. Because Vinnell had no experience in Pakistan, work 

began slowly; but by late September, construction had reached 35 percent and by 

the end of 1960 was at 90 percent. On 25 January 1961, the Pakistani government 

held a ceremony attended by the U.S. ambassador and other dignitaries to inaugurate 

the new runway, completed ten months ahead of schedule. The first modern jet 

passenger plane to depart from the runway was a Pakistani International Airlines 

Boeing 707 bound for London.18

By June 1960, the Trans-East District had administered a total of $128.3 

million in American construction funds in Pakistan. The district had thirty-six 

projects completed, under construction, or under contract award, including five 

major construction contracts totaling more than $120.1 million and four very small 

construction contracts together worth slightly more than $100,000. The balance 

included 19 design contracts with architect-engineer firms valued at $3.26 million; 

2 inspection contracts; and 6 other contracts for engineering reports, exploratory 

drilling, dredging, and other tasks. The district also administered on behalf of the 

Pakistani government the contract worth $4.37 million to improve the Karachi 

civil air terminal.19

Living and Working in Pakistan

The Trans-East District’s headquarters staff, which fluctuated generally between 

one hundred thirty and one hundred sixty positions and reached one hundred eighty 

at its peak, oversaw and administered programs from its offices in Karachi. The 

city had had a population of around two hundred thousand before the civil war 

with India in 1947; but refugees flooded the city, which had become the temporary 

capital of the new nation of Pakistan. By 1957, the city’s population had jumped to 

1.5 million with no improvement in its infrastructure.

The Trans-East District was a hardship post, where recruiting and retention 

of qualified personnel were extremely difficult. In the first two years of existence, 

from late 1955 to the end of 1957, the district lost two-thirds of its staff each year 

because people rarely extended beyond the initial eighteen-month employment 

agreement.20 Because of overcrowding in the city, rental housing was scarce and 

generally far below American standards. Karachi had an insufficient water system 

and a minimal and undependable power supply; open sewers flowed from the refugee 

camps; and amoebic dysentery affected virtually everyone in the organization. 

Medical facilities were minimal in Karachi and below standard in the field locations. 

18 Hist Rpt–Trans-East, p. 36; Northington to Shuler, 28 Sep 59, Mil Files XXI-2-4, and 25 May 

60, Mil Files XXI-2-5; Col H. H. Northington to Col A. C. Nauman, 27 Sep 60, Mil Files XXI-2-5; 

all in OH, HQ USACE. Karachi Morning News, 26 January 1961, in box 17, access. no. 77-92-0002, 

WNRC; Info for GED [Gulf Engineer District] BiMonthly Ltr to MDD for Jan 61, Mil Files XXI-2-6, 

OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited as GED Info Ltr, Jan 61). 19 Hist Rpt–Trans-East, pp. 36, 57.

20 Mediterranean Div, “Engineering [Inspection]” [Jan 58], p. 9, box 24, access. no. 77-92-0002, 

WNRC; Clarke to Shuler, 9 Jan 59, p. 2.
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 155

Afternoon temperatures in district headquarters frequently rose above 100 ̊F. To 

relieve incoming personnel of having to deal with the housing situation on their own, 

in 1956 the Mediterranean Division approved a program under which the district 

signed housing leases and made accommodations available to staff. The district 

created the office of headquarters commandant to negotiate leases and maintain 

government-furnished housing.21

Colonel Clarke arrived in Karachi in June 1957 as the district engineer. He 

resolved to improve the housing arrangements; in January 1958, he authorized the 

headquarters commandant to identify buildings under construction and to negotiate 

with the owners or builders. The commandant could guarantee a lease at a certain 

price per month provided the finished facility included European-style baths; a 

large, one-room kitchen; large underground water tanks; proper plumbing; and an 

electrical system of sixty or more amps. The district then provided window screens, 

water heaters, air conditioners, large kitchen appliances, and basic furniture. At 

the height of the housing program, the district engaged about one hundred service 

personnel—plumbers, masons, carpenters, and mechanics—to maintain the facilities. 

As a result of this program, the district obtained better-quality housing at no more 

than standard rental rates.22

The district made government vehicles available for staff and their families 

because the public transportation system was inadequate. In another effort to reduce 

turnover and facilitate recruitment, Clarke promoted a sponsor system through which 

an employee from the district corresponded with a prospect in the United States, 

provided him with information about Karachi, and then assisted him upon arrival. 

Clarke personally met many new employees at the airport.23

Recruitment remained difficult. It took eight months to replace a high-ranking 

manager (GS–15) for the district’s Engineering Division when Clarke “cleaned 

house” of several people whom he judged incompetent. It took nearly as long to 

find a chief for the district’s Management Branch.24

Overhead Costs

The personnel problems, issues of morale, and the steps that Clarke took 

to remedy them raised the Trans-East District’s overall operating costs. Clarke 

responded forcefully when anyone suggested comparisons between costs in his 

district and districts in the United States, asserting that he faced problems unknown 

in stateside districts. In January 1958, he itemized the costs to support the average 

employee as follows:

21 Interviews with Lieutenant General Frederick J. Clarke (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief 

of Engineers, 1980), pp. 126–28; Hist Rpt–Trans-East, pp. 18, 27. 22 Hist Rpt–Trans East, p. 18.

23 Clarke to Shuler, 9 Jan 59; Lincoln to Itschner, 9 Jun 58, box 51-84-7361, Farrell Papers; Interv, 

Walker with Coony, 9 Feb 85, p. 12. 24 Lincoln to Clarke, 2 Jun 58, box 51-84-7361, Farrell Papers; Clarke to Shuler, 6 Aug 58, Mil 

Files XXI-2-3, OH, HQ USACE.
156 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Basic salary, GS–9 $5,440

20 percent foreign differential 1,088

Cost of living (with one dependent) 210

Housing allowance per year 2,200

The extra costs amounted to $3,498, an additional 64 percent over salary at the 

GS–9 level. Clarke also calculated that it cost $5,333 to mobilize and demobilize an 

American civilian employee on the normal eighteen-month tour, including roundtrip 

travel and moving expenses. This increased the overhead cost for a midlevel 

employee to $8,831, or 162 percent in addition to the base salary. He pointed out 

that travel within Pakistan to construction sites or to other countries further increased 

operating costs for the district. Moreover, to avoid large staff fluctuations, the district 

held people in positions even as work slackened; letting people go and then having 

to replace them when the work increased was even more expensive.25

General Itschner raised the issue of high overhead when he visited the 

Mediterranean Division and the districts in November 1958. The division engineer, 

General Shuler, passed on Itschner’s written comments to Clarke: “We must 

devote more attention to the engineering and construction aspects of work and be 

less concerned about providing emoluments for the district personnel.”26 In March 

1959, Shuler ordered the Gulf and Trans-East Districts to curtail the procurement 

of furniture and to limit employee use of official vehicles to one trip per family 

per week to the commissary or other necessary facilities. In April, Shuler gave 

instructions to end the government-leased housing program.27

Colonel Clarke took strong issue with the new policy concerning housing. He 

argued that it would mean the loss of key personnel in the Trans-East District, that 

it would have an “explosive effect on the morale” of the staff, and that it would 

confront his successor with “serious repercussions.” “There is not a vacant unleased 

house in Karachi today that would be suitable for early occupancy by an American 

family,” Clarke wrote. The cost to American families of installing such utilities as 

stoves, refrigerators, and water heaters—improvements that Clarke had negotiated 

with builders—would add to the prohibitive costs of private leasing. Clarke asked 

that he be allowed to “hold off any actions involving the people already here” until 

General Shuler had had a chance to review Clarke’s facts and arguments. In early 

June, Shuler authorized Clarke to continue the government-leased housing program. 

The Trans-East District’s best year for retention of staff was FY 1959, the final year 

of Clarke’s tour, when 43 percent of those whose transportation agreements expired 

renewed their contracts.28

25 Clarke to Lincoln, 31 Jan 58, Mil Files XXI-2-3, OH, HQ USACE. 

26 Shuler to Clarke, 12 Dec 58, Mil Files XXI-2-3, OH, HQ USACE. 

27 Shuler to Itschner, 15 Mar 59, Mil Files XXI-2-7, and Clarke to Shuler, 8 May 59, Mil Files 

XXI-2-4, both in OH, HQ USACE. 28 Clarke to Shuler, 8 May 59, and Shuler to Clarke, 4 Jun 59, both in Mil Files XXI-2-4, OH, HQ 

USACE; Hist Rpt–Trans-East, p. 22.
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 157

Maintaining an adequate staff with sufficient technical qualifications to 

supervise the construction projects remained a problem in Pakistan. The projects 

were widely dispersed, and the local laborers who followed traditional production 

procedures required far closer supervision than workers in the United States and 

Europe. The district compensated for its limited staffing by contracting with private 

architect-engineer companies to provide supervisory services and to inspect the 

work at construction sites under what are called Title II contracts. Title II contracts 

covered inspection services at Kharian, Multan, and Peshawar. To improve liaison 

with various elements of the Pakistani government, Colonel Clarke added a former 

Pakistani Army officer to the district’s staff in August 1958.29

The district’s first L23D airplane, received in February 1959, facilitated operations. In the seventeen months between its arrival and 30 June 1960, the aircraft flew 

over 200 missions, carried about 650 passengers, and logged over 500,000 passenger 

miles. Most frequently, the passengers were supervisory personnel and technicians 

traveling to construction sites. The district had space for parts, maintenance, and an 

office for the aviation crew at the Pakistani Air Force’s Drigh Road Airfield near 

Karachi.30

Potential Work in Burma

Early in 1959, President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved a grant of economic 

assistance to Burma. To implement the aid program, the International Cooperation 

Administration, which funded the Karachi civil air terminal, asked the Corps of 

Engineers to conduct a feasibility study for the construction of a major highway 

from Rangoon to Mandalay (See Map 12.) and for construction of buildings at the 

Rangoon University campus. The State Department turned to the Corps because the 

Army engineers had an office in Pakistan, the Corps could begin the studies quickly, 

and the costs would be lower than if the ICA sought to contract the studies directly 

with architect-engineer firms. High-ranking officials within the Burmese government 

told the American assistant secretary of defense for intelligence that they looked 

upon the Corps as the only agency they could depend on to remain incorruptible in 

dealing with the substantial sums of money involved. The ICA anticipated that the 

project to construct the 430-mile highway would begin with about $750,000 in FY 

1959 for a preliminary study and design. The actual construction of the highway 

would stretch over five years, with annual expenditures of about $10 million.31

29 Hist Rpt–Trans-East; Col Robert C. Bahr, William H. Koidal, and William J. Long, “Study to 

Analyze the Past and Possible Future Use of Architectural Engineer Inspection Services (Title II) in 

the Gulf and Trans-East Districts of the Mediterranean Division, as Opposed to the Customary Use 

of Corps Personnel,” 16 Dec 59, box 17, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Shuler to Itschner, 10 Jun 

59; Hist Rpt–Trans-East, p. 13. 30 Hist Rpt–Trans-East, p. 11. 

31 D. A. Fitzgerald to Itschner, Jun 59, Mil Files XXI-2-7; Northington to Shuler, 27 Nov 59, Mil 

Files XXI-2-4; Itschner to Shuler, 1 Jul 59, Mil Files XXI-2-7; all in OH, HQ USACE.
Irrawaddy R

Irrawaddy R

Chindwin R

Salween R

Mekong R

Yangtze R

Brahmaputra R

RANGOON

A ndaman

Islands

Putao

(Ft. Hertz)

Myitkyina

Shwebo

Mandalay

Magwe Akyab

Pegu

INDIA

BHUT A N

CHIN A

CHINA

L A O S

THAILAN D

EAS T

P A K IST A N

BURMA

1960

Area Oce

Proposed Highway Route

0

0 300 Miles

300 Kilometers

Map 12
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 159

Information on the proposed Burmese projects reached the Mediterranean 

Division in June 1959; in July, the Trans-East District received the assignment to 

begin work on the preliminary study and design. General Itschner alerted General 

Shuler that, although the division already had other ICA work, the undertakings 

in Burma “are the first major projects in ICA’s normal field of activity on which 

they wish to make use of the Corps’ services. As a consequence they look upon 

this Burma work as a pilot program.” Itschner urged Shuler to give the projects in 

Burma his personal attention “to insure that they will be constructed and completed 

to the full satisfaction of both ICA and the Government of Burma.” He instructed 

Shuler to open an area office in Rangoon headed by a lieutenant colonel with good 

experience and an outstanding record. Itschner wanted Shuler to exercise “great 

care” in selecting the personnel and in identifying the architect-engineer firm to 

conduct the studies and to prepare the designs for the projects.32

In late July, a study team from the Trans-East District traveled to Burma to 

gather preliminary data. The team concluded that the cost of construction of both the 

highway and the university project had been seriously underestimated. The director 

of the ICA mission in Burma had estimated that both projects would cost no more 

than $30 million; the district’s team estimated the cost at $45 million at a minimum. 

Members of the team worked with the ICA mission to draft an intergovernmental 

construction agreement, which they left with the U.S. ambassador as a basis for the 

United States’ position in conversations with the Burmese government.33

The Burmese projects became more doubtful when Shuler and his staff 

determined that funds designated in Burma for the project might not be available. 

On balance, Shuler decided that the Corps ought to make no commitment to the 

projects without firm estimates and a realistic plan for funding. Shortly after the 

division reached this decision, the Trans-East District engineer, Colonel Northington, 

learned that the engineering faculty at Rangoon University had successfully argued 

to the Burmese government that engineering professors could draft the design 

more cheaply than an American contractor working with the Corps of Engineers. 

This development made Corps participation in the university project unlikely. The 

construction of the Rangoon-to-Mandalay highway still seemed a possibility, but 

Northington remained skeptical. Despite this skepticism, the Mediterranean Division 

established a Burma Area Office on 1 October 1959 and OCE assigned a lieutenant 

colonel as area engineer.34

Burmese officials cooperated with Corps of Engineers representatives who 

visited the country, but they remained reluctant to make any binding commitments 

on either project.Based on Northington’s reports on the situation, Shuler concluded 

32 Itschner to Shuler, 2 Jul 59, Mil Files XII-2-7, OH, HQ USACE.

33 Northington to Shuler, 27 Jul 59, Mil Files XXI-2-4, and Shuler to Itschner, 12 Aug 59, Mil 

Files XXI-2-7, both in OH, HQ USACE. 34 Memo, Col Milton M. Miletich, 10 Sep 59, sub: Problem Statements, Mil Files XXI-2-4, OH, 

HQ USACE; Northington to Shuler, 28 Sep 59, OH, HQ USACE; Hist Rpt–Trans-East, p. 133, and 

Addendum, May 61, p. 10.
160 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

that Burmese officials “seem to be suspicious of everyone, including each other, 

but the Corps’ prestige rating is increasing.”35

In January 1960, Dr. Louis Berger, whose architect-engineer company held 

the contract for the study of the highway, visited Burma. In the same month, the 

Trans-East District, at Burma’s request, sent three staff members to review designs 

for the university prepared by the Burmese National Planning Board. The team 

spent several weeks in Rangoon and returned with the expectation that the ICA 

mission in Burma would ask the district to perform engineering inspection on 

the university project, an endeavor General Shuler regarded as “very delicate and 

troublesome.” Shuler feared that to provide the Burmese with technical assistance 

under circumstances where the Corps had responsibility without authority constituted 

a “risky arrangement,” and he urged Northington to exercise extreme caution before 

making any commitments.36

Berger and Associates completed the study of the Burma highway in February 

1960; the district submitted it, with modifications, to the ICA mission in Burma. The 

Corps received no formal response through the spring and summer. With no directive 

to begin construction for either the highway or the university and with indecision 

from the Burmese government concerning any future studies, the district closed 

the Burma Area Office on 5 August 1960. The Burmese work, for which General 

Itschner had entertained such high hopes, stalled after only two small projects: about 

$750,000 for the feasibility study for the highway, and about $250,000 for advising 

the Burmese government on the university construction project.37

Prospects in Saudi Arabia

American military construction had ended in Saudi Arabia in October 1955 with 

the Fluor Corporation’s completion of work on the Dhahran Airfield. As the end of 

the project approached, the Saudi government claimed that Fluor and its individual 

employees owed both current and retroactive income taxes. When the company 

agreed to pay these, Saudi officials demanded additional payment of retroactive 

charges for work permits, visa fees, and quarantine fees. When the company refused 

to accept these additional charges, the Saudis responded by barring the departure 

of the remaining Fluor employees from the country.

The matter did not involve the Corps of Engineers directly until U.S. Ambassador 

George Wadsworth intervened. He persuaded the Saudi government that the presence of the Mediterranean Division’s area engineer in Saudi Arabia would provide 

sufficient assurance of a settlement. The Saudis accepted the arrangement and 

allowed the Fluor employees to leave. The tax issue seemed no nearer settlement 

when, in the spring of 1956, the area engineer’s tour neared completion. The division 

35 Northington to Shuler, 27 Nov 59; quotation from Shuler to Itschner, 10 Dec 59. 

36 Northington to Shuler, 28 Jan, 16 Mar 60, Mil Files XXI-2-5; quotation from Shuler to Itschner, 

10 Feb 60, Mil Files XXI-3-1; all in OH, HQ USACE. 37 Hist Rpt–Trans-East, p. 133, and Addendum, May 61, p. 10; Northington to Nauman, 25 Nov 

60, Mil Files XXI-2-5, OH, HQ USACE. 
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 161

engineer, Brig. Gen. Benjamin B. Talley, suggested to the chief of engineers, Maj. 

Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis Jr., that the engineer officer’s tour be extended until a 

replacement officer could arrive in Saudi Arabia. General Lincoln, who replaced 

Talley in May 1956, asked Maj. William Bailey, who was assigned to the division and 

had served under Lincoln previously, to take over the area office in Dhahran.38

With the tax problem still unresolved, Major Bailey arrived in Dhahran and the 

Saudi police confiscated his visa and passport. Monthly, between June and November 

1956, Bailey received a summons to appear before the police chief of the eastern 

province of Dammam, whose governor, a cousin of the king, was responsible for 

collecting the tax. Each time, the police demanded that Bailey pay the debt attributed 

to Fluor. Each time, Bailey explained that he simply represented the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers in the country and that the Corps did not agree that the tax assessment 

was legitimate but that it had authority to negotiate a settlement. 

The Saudis grew impatient; when their tone in one meeting became threatening, 

Bailey, accompanied by an American consular officer, protested and announced he 

would not appear at police headquarters again. A few weeks later, he received a 

notice through the U.S. Consulate in Dhahran summoning him to appear before the 

Sharie Court of the government of Saudi Arabia. In this court, Bailey, a non-Muslim, 

would have no rights and no status. “I would not be allowed to speak in my behalf or 

have any defense. They would just merely call me up before the bench and demand 

the money and if I couldn’t produce it, I would be confined. [The Saudis] don’t feed 

their prisoners or bring them water. That’s all done by relatives, and I didn’t have 

any relatives [in Saudi Arabia].”39

Bailey radioed Ambassador Wadsworth in Jiddah and cabled General Lincoln. 

The ambassador said that he would drive to Riyadh to ask King Saud to intervene 

with the governor on Bailey’s behalf. Lincoln made immediate plans to fly to 

Dhahran; he contacted the U.S. Navy, which had a fleet stationed near Bahrain and 

planes that flew in and out of Dhahran daily. A few days later, in a scenario worthy 

of a spy novel, Navy pilots went to Bailey’s quarters, gave him a Navy uniform, 

and flew him out of Saudi Arabia before sunrise. 

Once Major Bailey had been debriefed in Naples and returned to Morocco, 

Lincoln sent him to Suez to serve as liaison officer for the division with a retired 

chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler. Wheeler had been charged by 

the UN secretary general with clearing the Suez Canal of the debris from the recent 

war. Ambassador Wadsworth demanded Bailey’s return to Saudi Arabia, but he 

and the Saudis backed down rather than remove Bailey from the highly visible UN 

operation. Ultimately, the U.S. government paid the taxes that Saudi Arabia had 

levied against Fluor. The incident created a legacy that for several years shaped the 

attitudes of Mediterranean Division officials toward work in Saudi Arabia.40

38 Interv, Richard T. Farrell with Col (Ret) William Bailey, Aug 75, p. 3; Talley to Sturgis, 30 Mar 

56, file 328, box 51, Lt Gen Samuel D. Sturgis Jr. Papers, OH, HQ USACE. 39 Interv, Farrell with Bailey, Aug 75, p. 3.

40 On the Saudis and taxes, see Intervs, Farrell with Bailey, Aug 75, pp. 2–8; Richard T. Farrell 

with Lt Gen (Ret) Lawrence J. Lincoln, 4 Aug 75, pp. 9ff; Lawrence Suid with Lt Gen (Ret) Lawrence 
162 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

A few months after Bailey’s clandestine departure, President Eisenhower hosted 

King Saud in Washington, D.C., where the two leaders discussed American military 

use of the airfield at Dhahran. In return for a renewal of the arrangement, Eisenhower 

proposed aid to the Saudi kingdom. In a formal agreement dated 2 April 1957, the 

United States pledged to provide construction support to help the Saudis improve 

their commercial air facilities at the Dhahran Civil Air Terminal and to assist, 

advise, and train the Saudi Army, Navy, and Air Force. To accomplish the tasks of 

assistance and training, the United States redesignated the Military Assistance and 

Advisory Group, in Saudi Arabia since 1949, as the United States Military Training 

Mission (USMTM). The USMTM staff, with headquarters at the Dhahran terminal, 

consisted of three sections representing the American armed services. Each section 

worked with the corresponding Saudi military service.41

U.S. Military Assistance Program funds supported the USMTM operations, but 

the International Cooperation Administration sponsored the work on the Dhahran 

Civil Air Terminal, just as it did similar work at Mehrabad in Iran and at Karachi in 

Pakistan.42 In early May 1957, representatives of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, 

the U.S. Air Force, and the Mediterranean Division met with Ambassador Wadsworth 

in a three-hour conference in Dhahran. Wadsworth repeatedly emphasized the 

importance to King Saud of President Eisenhower’s offer to help build the civil air 

terminal. Because of the personal aspect of the commitment, Wadsworth asserted that 

this was the most important item in the agreement. He also clearly favored having 

the Corps of Engineers involved in the construction rather than leaving management 

in the hands of the International Cooperation Administration.43

In the spring of 1957, ICA requested that Tudor Engineering Company of 

Washington, D.C., conduct a field reconnaissance investigation and survey of airport 

facilities at Dhahran. Tudor concluded its survey and reported on 30 June 1957 

that the facilities that existed at Dhahran were “completely inadequate” to meet 

the requirements of civil aviation but that a new terminal could be built with the $5 

million that ICA had available. On 21 May, five weeks before Tudor Engineering 

submitted its report, the Mediterranean Division transferred responsibility for 

J. Lincoln, Dec 79–Jan 80, pp. 204–08, H2–H3; Alfred Beck with Maj Gen (Ret) Robert F. Seedlock, 

25–26 Oct 79. The episode is a delicate one; descriptions conflict, and at least one journalist was denied 

permission to publish an article on the incident even twenty years later. On resolution of the tax issue, 

see “Saudi Arabia” [Oct 57], box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers. 41 MFR, [Brig Gen Lawrence J. Lincoln], 15 May 57, sub: Meeting with Ambassador Wadsworth 

at Dhahran Consulate, 2000–2300 hours, 9 May 57, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE; Ofc of Info 

Svcs, HQ, 2d Air Div, United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), “Saudi Arabia: Information 

Pamphlet,” 1 Aug 59, foreword, pp. 6–7, box 15, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; “U.S. Military 

Training Mission to Saudi Arabia,” n.d., foreword by Brig Gen A. P. Clark, U.S. Air Force, p. 2, box 

51-84-5389, Farrell Papers. 42 Hist Div, Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE), “Summary of Major Events and Problems, 1 

July 1959–30 June 1960,” Apr 61, p. 86, Gen Files 4-5, OH, HQ USACE. 43 MFR, Lincoln, 15 May 57.
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 163

all future work in Saudi Arabia from the Middle East District to the Trans-East 

District.44

In subsequent months, the U.S. embassy in Saudi Arabia tried to work out an 

agreement that would exempt the contractor for the Dhahran civil air terminal from 

taxes, endeavoring to avoid the situation that the Fluor Corporation had faced. On the 

issue of taxes, the Saudis balked. By October, Ambassador Wadsworth concluded 

that the Saudis would remain adamant that the United States build the commercial 

facilities at Dhahran without a new agreement. Colonel Clarke, the Trans-East 

District engineer who would administer the project, reached the same conclusion.45

In negotiations, the Saudis insisted that a Saudi contracting company participate 

in the bidding for both the Dhahran terminal and the training school for the Royal 

Saudi Air Force in Riyadh. The Saudis made clear that they viewed these projects 

not as grants in aid but rather as the quid pro quo for the U.S. Air Force’s continued 

use of the military facilities at Dhahran. They wanted to “get their money’s worth” 

out of the construction contracts.46

The two sides formulated a tentative working document in December, but 

the Saudis repudiated it several months later and negotiations continued. Despite 

the lack of a satisfactory agreement, design on the terminal began in April 1958 

under a contract the Corps awarded to Ralph M. Parsons Company of Pasadena, 

California. As the Americans and the Saudis pursued their discussions, Colonel 

Clarke became increasingly convinced that the Saudis were not negotiating in good 

faith. He even questioned whether the United States could in good conscience ask 

American or international contractors to submit competitive bids. He predicted 

“that any knowledgeable contractor will so load his bid with contingencies that the 

price of construction will be out of reason.”47 In the autumn of 1958, planning for 

the Royal Saudi Air Force Training School was suspended; but discussions and 

planning continued on the Dhahran terminal, which the Saudis insisted be built 

under the Dhahran Airfield Agreement of 18 June 1951.48

Despite the difficulties, the Trans-East District managed to draw up bidding 

specifications for a construction contract on the basis of the Parsons Company 

design and to issue a request for proposals. The successful bid for the construction 

of the terminal came from Oman-Farnsworth-Wright, which signed a contract 

for just under $4 million in early May 1959. The contract called for a building 

of approximately seventy thousand square feet to include space for immigration 

44 Tudor Engineering Co., Rpt on Port/Airfield Facilities, Dammam & Dhahran, pp. 31, 78, 84; 

General Orders (GO) no. 12, 5 Jun 57, sub: Change in Responsibility for Construction in Saudi Arabia; 

both in box 51-83-8379, Farrell Papers. 45 Clarke to Lincoln, 3 Oct 57, box 27, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC.

46 MFR, Brig Gen A. P. Clarke, 21 Dec 57, sub: Conversations with Chief, Mediterranean Division 

Engineer, General Lincoln, and Staff and with AFIR, Col. Cantor, Leghorn, Italy, 21 Dec 57, box 27, 

access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 47 “Corps of Engineers History in Saudi Arabia,” Apr 66, box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers; quotation from Clarke to Lincoln, 3 Jun 58. 48 “Saudi Arabia,” [Oct 57]. The Dhahran Airfield Agreement is also referred to in Corps of Engineers documents as the Dhahran Base Rights Agreement and the Dhahran Air Base Agreement.
164 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

offices, operational and administrative areas, lunchrooms, other facilities associated 

with an international air terminal, and supporting utilities. In addition, the building 

had to have special accommodations for the Saudi royal family such as a throne 

room for diplomatic receptions. The contract required the successful bidder to give 

preference in subcontracting to Saudi firms and in employment to Saudi nationals. 

Any subcontractor that was not a Saudi firm had to be approved in writing by the 

contracting officer, the Trans-East District engineer.49

The difficulties continued. Oman-Farnsworth-Wright’s discussions with Saudi 

subcontractors indicated that costs would run $3 million more than the face value 

of the contract. The tax issue remained unsettled. By mid-June, OFW still had not 

received clearance to land the company plane at Dhahran to begin work. The Saudi 

Arabia Area Office, activated by the Trans-East District over a year earlier, finally 

opened in Dhahran on 9 June 1959.50

By the end of the summer, the project had bogged down even more. The Saudis 

were either “unable or unwilling to understand” why a project nominally valued at 

$5 million did not translate into $5 million in contracts. They objected to channeling 

portions of the money to administrative costs or to profits for American contractors. 

In addition, the Saudi government continued to insist on payment of customs duties 

on equipment, goods, and materials imported for the construction. They had further 

gone on record as intending to impose taxes on the construction itself. In August 

and September 1959, Saudi government officials at the port of Dammam impounded 

all construction equipment and materials imported by Oman-Farnsworth-Wright. 

Other Saudi officials had made known their dissatisfaction with the dollar amounts 

of the subcontracts with Saudi firms. At this point, the Mediterranean Division felt 

that it could make no further progress without diplomatic intervention.51

In talks with the Saudi government, the U.S. State Department made concessions 

that Army engineers felt compromised the Corps position. The State Department 

agreed that the contractor would furnish cost statements for construction goods 

brought into Saudi Arabia, although the Dhahran Airfield Agreement had specifically 

exempted these goods from such procedures. The diplomatic concessions did allow 

the project to move forward. Late in 1959, the subcontractor, Saudi Enterprises, 

imported Egyptian laborers to accelerate the pace of work.52 By the spring of 1960, 

Oman-Farnsworth-Wright had gone on double shifts to try to speed up the work; 

but the project was still three months behind schedule. The company had also 

49 Clarke to Fluor Corp Ltd., 22 Jan 59; Construction Contract (Advertised), Standard Form 23, 6 

May 59; both in box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers. 50 Clarke to Shuler, 20 and 25 May 59, both in Mil Files XXI-2-4, OH, HQ USACE; “History 

of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 75–76, box 21, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; 

Shuler to Itschner, 10 Jun 59. 51 Lt Col Edward E. Bennett to Oman-Farnsworth-Wright, 17 Aug 59, box 51-83-8378, Farrell 

Papers; Memo, Miletich, 10 Sep 59, an. dtd 25 Aug 59, Civil Air Terminal, Saudi Arabia, Mil Files 

XXI-2-4, OH, HQ USACE; Brig Gen James C. McGehee to His Excellency Sheikh Hamad Mubarrak, 

22 Sep 59, box 51-83-8378, Farrell Papers. 52 Memo, Miletich, 10 Sep 59, an. dtd 25 Aug 59; Northington to Shuler, 28 Jan 60, p. 1, and 

Shuler to Itschner, 10 Feb 60, p. 7.
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 165

virtually taken over the basic responsibilities of their subcontractor, including his 

payroll. Trans-East District personnel and OFW engineers made frequent visits to 

the project site to keep work advancing. Clarke’s successor, Colonel Northington, 

commented to the division engineer, “Now I know what Colonel Clarke meant 

when he told me in New York in April 1959 that he was probably leaving me a 

‘can of worms’ on this job.”53 The contract remained behind schedule throughout 

1960; but the Saudis accepted the terminal in September 1961, only four months 

after the original target date.54

The story of the civil air terminal at Dhahran carries with it a revealing commentary on style and aesthetic perception within the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

In April 1959, General Itschner gave a public address to the Newcomen Society in 

Washington, D.C., in which he described the terminal design as “too imaginative 

for Disneyland,” characterized by “a number of concrete, monolithic mushrooms 

35 feet tall.” He told his audience that he had lectured the Mediterranean Division 

53 Northington to Shuler, 29 Mar 60, p. 10, Mil Files XXI-2-5, OH, HQ USACE.

54 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 73–74; Memo, Col Harry F. 

Cameron Jr., 20 Dec 61, sub: Periodic Letter Report to Chief of Engineers, p. 2, Mil Files XXI-3-2, 

OH, HQ USACE.

South face of the Dhahran Civil Air Terminal under construction, January 1961
166 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

about “building soundly but without embellishment,” only to be told that King 

Saud had loved the design and would accept no other. The distinctive design of the 

terminal’s main building was unlike most Corps of Engineers projects. However, 

an analysis comparing the design with a conventional reinforced concrete structure 

showed that the elaborate design was cheaper to build. The American Institute of 

Architects sided with King Saud’s aesthetic judgment when, in 1963, it bestowed 

its First Honor Award on the Dhahran International Air Terminal and its architect, 

Japanese-American Minoru Yamasaki.55

Royal Saudi Air Force Training School in Riyadh

The discussions concerning American training of the Saudi military suspended 

in the autumn of 1958 became active again a few months later. The U.S. Military 

55 Quote from Itschner’s speech from P. S. Bennett [of the Ralph M. Parsons Company that designed 

the terminal] to James Vanek, 9 Sep 59, box 51-83-8376, Farrell Papers. A copy of the American 

Institute of Architects’ citation is in the same box. The comparison of designs is mentioned in Hist 

Rpt–Trans-East, p. 15. See also Interv, Walker with Coony, 9 Feb 85, pp. 14–15.

Interior of Dhahran Civil Air Terminal under construction
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 167

Training Mission took the lead in this program, which seemed a much more important 

project than the construction of a civil air terminal.56

By the autumn of 1959, talks concerning the Saudi Royal Air Force Training 

School had progressed and the Army engineers had designs for facilities at Riyadh. 

The Trans-East District and Mediterranean Division engineers reluctantly agreed to 

have the project built under the terms of the 1951 agreement only because, as General 

Shuler put it, “I believe it is about the best agreement we can get with the Saudis.”57

Shuler was not comfortable with the situation. In a letter to the chief of 

engineers, General Itschner, in June 1960, just days before bids on the construction 

of the Training School were to be opened, Shuler repeated the “apprehensions and 

misgivings” that he and his staff had been raising for two years with the OCE, 

USMTM, U.S. embassy, and State Department concerning the terms of the agreement 

governing construction. Shuler reiterated the catalog of problems and characterized 

the situation as one of “considerable difficulty.” He acknowledged that the customs 

issue “was finally resolved in our favor, at least temporarily,” so that materials and 

equipment now entered the country duty free; but the Saudis were still requiring 

certificates of origin and price verification, which at least raised the “possibility of 

future trouble.”

General Shuler objected to the insistence that all work be subcontracted to 

Saudi firms and predicted that the Corps could expect “claims from the [prime] 

contractor for time and money.” He also feared that Corps employees “could be 

subjected to the medieval criminal jurisdiction of the Saudi Arabian Government,” 

such as had threatened Major Bailey. He lamented that the Dhahran Airfield 

Agreement “was never designed for our needs” and predicted that working under 

its terms would “prove difficult, costly and slow.”58 General Itschner replied in late 

June that the State Department was prepared to instruct the U.S. ambassador in 

Saudi Arabia to bring Shuler’s concerns “to the attention of the highest elements 

of the Saudi Arabian Government”; he did not otherwise address the division 

engineer’s anxieties.59

On 20 June 1960, Oman-Farnsworth-Wright received the contract to build the 

Royal Saudi Air Force Training School. The construction of the new installation in 

Riyadh involved more than a dozen buildings, the supporting utilities, and a perimeter 

wall. The subcontract went to Saudi Enterprises, the same company that subcontracted 

for the work at the Dhahran terminal. Construction commenced in September 1960; 

by December, only 6 percent of the construction was complete.60

56 See comment in “Mediterranean Division Builders,” 1 Jan 58, p. 19, box 18, access. no. 77-

92-0002, WNRC, that “the most important project [in Saudi Arabia] involved . . . a military pilot 

training mission.” 57 Quotation from Shuler to Itschner, 10 Dec 59; Northington to Shuler, 28 Sep 59, p. 5, and 27 

Nov 59, p. 5. 58 Shuler to Itschner, 10 Jun 60, p. 12, Mil Files XXI-3-1, OH, HQ USACE.

59 Itschner to Shuler, 22 Jun 60, p. 2, Mil Files XXI-3-1, OH, HQ USACE.

60 Hist Rpt–Trans-East; Nauman to Itschner, 9 Dec 60, p. 9, Mil Files XXI-3-1, OH, HQ 

USACE. 
168 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Deactivating the Trans-East District

The total workload for the Trans-East District faced decline after 1959, as 

General Shuler had anticipated. Although the proposed work in Burma changed 

that prospect marginally, Shuler had his staff prepare a study for the deactivation 

of the district. After Colonel Northington arrived in Karachi in June 1959 as district 

engineer, Shuler sent him the study with a request that he develop a detailed plan to 

draw down the district. Northington generally concurred with the division’s plans to 

reduce the district to an area office even though with a staff of 120 people he had only 

90 percent of the personnel required for the existing volume of work. Northington 

restricted the information on the probable drawdown to those directly responsible 

for planning it; but word leaked to the staff and departures increased.61

On 3 November 1959, with no more than the possibility of work in Burma, 

Shuler ordered Northington to submit to the division his plan to deactivate the 

district by 1 January 1960 (later amended to 1 February). Northington proposed 

deactivating the district on 31 December 1960, transferring administrative and 

managerial functions to the Gulf District on the following day, and simultaneously 

opening an area office in Karachi. The area engineer in Karachi would retain contract 

authority over active contracts for projects in Pakistan. The Trans-East District’s 

responsibilities for the area office in Burma and the work in Saudi Arabia would 

pass to the Gulf District.62

While awaiting approval of the deactivation plan, the Trans-East District 

continued to manage the projects that remained active, including the cantonments 

for the Pakistani Army at Kharian and Multan, work just beginning for the Pakistani 

Navy near Karachi, and work for the U.S. Air Force on the Sandbag construction 

program to construct a communications facility near Peshawar. During the winter 

and spring of 1960, Northington liquidated lease arrangements as they expired, 

advised the American ambassador and other U.S. agencies of the district’s declining 

capabilities, and prepared staff for the coming reductions. On 3 May, Northington 

told his staff officially that they faced a formal reduction in force. Some staff 

members would have the option to transfer to the Gulf District in Tehran. If the 

total of qualified people available exceeded the Gulf District’s needs, all names 

from both districts would be pooled and positions would be filled by competitive 

civil service rating, considering such factors as longevity, veteran’s status, and 

qualifications for the particular job.63

61 Northington to Shuler, 27 Jul 59, p. 5, and 28 Sep 59; Shuler to Clarke, 28 Apr 59, Mil Files 

XXI-2-4, OH, HQ USACE. 62 Memo, Col H. H. Northington to Div Engr, 4 Feb 60, sub: Deactivation Plan–Trans-East District, 

p. 11, box 682799, Record Group 77, access. no. 77-004, Federal Records Center, Bayonne, N.J.; 

Northington to Shuler, 27 Nov 59; Northington to Rountree, 30 Apr 60, p. 5. 63 Memo to Employees, Gulf Dist, 3 May 60, sub: Deactivation of Trans-East District, box 17, 

access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 169

As the deadline for closing approached, the Trans-East District felt the pinch 

of staff attrition. At the end of August 1960, the district still had ten active projects 

in Pakistan and another four outside Pakistan. (See Table 7.)

By the end of September 1960, the Trans-East District had identified fifty-one 

members of its headquarters staff whose functions would pass to the Gulf District. In 

mid-October, the Trans-East District headquarters received the official order setting 

31 December as the date to convert to the status of an area office and to abolish the 

district. Over the next ten weeks, the staff at district headquarters declined even 

though the district continued to supervise over $119 million in contracts and even 

took on new responsibilities. (See Table 8.) The U.S. International Cooperation 

Administration and the Pakistani government had begun talks to have the Trans-East 

District survey transportation facilities in East Pakistan. In anticipation of this work, 

the district established a project office in Dacca, East Pakistan, in September, and 

assigned a project manager who arrived in Dacca on 18 October. In late October, 

the ICA and Pakistan reached an agreement; on 30 November, ICA commissioned 

the Trans-East District to award a contract for the study. The district thus acquired 

a new contract, with Transportation Consultants Inc. of Washington, D.C., on 21 

December 1960.64

The Trans-East District faced a familiar experience as it prepared to deactivate: 

The host government tried to impose retroactive taxes and duties. In September 

1960, Colonel Northington reported to the new division engineer, Colonel Nauman, 

that Pakistani officials had advised the district that vehicle registration charges and 

road taxes had to be paid on all vehicles belonging to subcontractors and Title II 

contractors who had worked in the country. Through similar actions, such as sales 

tax on the disposal of surplus property and excise taxes on cement, the Pakistanis 

were searching for more revenue at the district’s expense. Northington sought the 

aid of the American ambassador, who pressed the government of Pakistan for a 

solution to the tax issue and other administrative differences. On 12 December, the 

ambassador and the Pakistani secretary of defense exchanged letters that became 

the basis for staff action: the disposal of surplus property, certification of the use of 

imports in approved projects, royalties on quarried stone, landing fees and hangar 

charges, refunds of duty and tax payments, sale of surplus vehicles, payment of 

sales taxes, motor vehicle licensing and registration fees, and the audit of accounts 

for the Karachi Civil Air Terminal project. By late January 1961, all nine issues 

had been “essentially resolved.”65

On 31 December 1960, the Trans-East District ceased to exist; on 1 January 

1961, the Pakistan Area Office, with residency offices in Karachi, Kharian, Multan, 

and Peshawar, assumed responsibility for all of the Mediterranean Division’s work 

in Pakistan. Colonel Northington stayed on in Karachi as area engineer until May. 

64 Hist Rpt–Trans-East, Addendum, May 61, pp. 1–10; Interv, William C. Baldwin with Col (Ret) 

Harry F. Cameron Jr., 27–29 Mar 89, pp. 341–47. 65 Northington to Nauman, 27 Sep 60; Nauman to Itschner, 9 Dec 60; GED Info Ltr, Jan 61; Hist 

Rpt–Trans-East, Addendum, May 61, p. 10. 
Table 7—Trans-East District Project Status

31 August 1960

FY Project Under Construction CWE ($000) % Complete BOD Remarks

1959 Karachi (PN) Marine railway 1,247 60 6/61 Marine railway 1959 Karachi (PN) Navy wharf 1,336 6 6/61 Navy wharf1959 Multan (PA) corps cantonment 3,919 60 3/62 Facilities for 6,000 troops, 1 corps1959 Kharian (PA) augmentation 5,367 85 3/61 Provides facilities for corps HQ and 2,200 troops. 1959 Multan (PA) augmentation 12,668 57 6/61 Provides facilities for 2,300 troops.1959 Dhahran Civil Air Terminal

(U.S. International Cooperation Administration) 5,000 33 5/61

1960 Karachi Civil Air Terminal

(Development Loan Fund) 5,270 19 6/61 BOD applies to runway.

1960 Riyadh (USMTM) RSAF training school 4,801 0 2/62 Notice to proceed 27 June 19601960 Sandbag (USAF) 228 8 4/61 Officers quarters 5 percent complete, NCO mess 10 percent 1960 Sandbag (USAF) housing 2,526 0 6/62 Commissary, housing, NCO mess hall 0 percent 1960 Sandbag (USAF) swimming pool 92 15 1/611960 Sandbag (USAF) on-base roads 49 0 2/61

Total Under Construction $42,503,000

1961† Air Force Technical Applications Center (USAF) 629 0 Uncertain Lack of criteria & siting

1961† Sandbag (USAF) 973 70 6/62 Design completion October 1960, 4 items from FY 1960

Total Under Design $1,602,000

CWE = Current Working Estimate; BOD = Beneficial Occupancy Date; PN = Pakistani Navy; PA = Pakistani Army; USMTM = U.S. Military Training Mission; 

RSAF = Royal Saudi Air Force.

†Projects under design for FY 1961 construction program.

Source: Table, n.d., box 35, access. no. 77-92-0001, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md.
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 171

Unlike the other residency offices, which were abolished in June 1961, Peshawar 

became a separate area office in July because of the volume of continuing work.66

During its five years, the Trans-East District had placed $136 million in 

construction. A fitting commemorative epitaph for its achievements comes from a 

postscript that Colonel Northington added to his report to the division engineer in 

late November 1960: “I have just had my attention invited to an interesting fact—this 

district could have celebrated its 5th birthday on 21 November, but unfortunately 

everybody was so busy that the day passed without notice.”67

The Gulf District in Iran

The Mediterranean Division’s Gulf District, headquartered in Tehran, Iran, 

supervised military construction in cooperation with the U.S. Army Mission and 

Military Assistance Advisory Group to Iran (ARMISH-MAAG). Under the terms 

of their agreement, the district gave technical assistance to the ARMISH-MAAG, 

which was responsible for initiating actions to fund the projects by the Iranian 

government. The Mediterranean Division and the district issued the appropriate 

design and construction directives once the ARMISH-MAAG had determined the 

requirements. When projects were completed, the district turned them over to the 

MAAG, which delivered them to the Iranian using agency. The ARMISH-MAAG 

handled all incoming supplies; both the district and the advisory group provided 

representatives at the main points of entry into Iran. The ARMISH-MAAG also 

66 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” p. 67. 

67 Northington to Nauman, 25 Nov 60, p. 11. 

Table 8—Staff Strength, Trans-East District’s Final Months

27 Nov 60 31 Dec 60* 1 Jan 61 1 Feb 61 

(est.)

Military 17 15 12 12

Department of the Army Civilian 68 56 49 33

Continental wage scale 11 8 8 8

Local wage rate 295 244 209 180

Totals 391 323 278 233

*December statistics exclude personnel terminated during the month.

Source: Info for GED [Gulf Engineer District] BiMonthly Ltr to MDD for Jan 61, Mil Files XXI-2-

6, Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alexandria, Va.
172 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

handled all real estate issues. The U.S. ambassador in Iran had a special staff assistant 

to maintain liaison with the district.68

Most of the projects for which the Gulf District provided its management services 

came under the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Direct Forces Support program; 

the district assisted the Imperial Iranian Army, Air Force, and Gendarmerie (Iran’s 

national guard) in developing construction projects to modernize their forces and to 

enhance their capabilities and readiness. The district directly supported projects for 

the government of Iran and the U.S. State Department, such as offering help after 

earthquakes hit the Kurdistan area in November 1957. The district sent a team into 

the area to make a detailed survey and to take photographs of the devastation. Team 

members discussed their findings with the head of the Red Cross and others to help 

implement relief and to improve structures against future earthquakes.69

Like the Trans-East District, the Gulf District had organizational elements that 

distinguished it from Corps of Engineer districts in the United States. Both districts 

maintained a transportation branch; a headquarters commandant managed logistics 

and support to cover housing, local transportation, health, and general welfare for 

district personnel.70 The Gulf District’s Transportation Branch helped maintain the 

supply lines that supported construction in Iran. Most equipment had to be imported, 

and freight from the United States required four to six months to reach Tehran 

from New York, a distance of over six thousand miles. Some arrived in Iran by 

truck from the Mediterranean port of Beirut through Syria and Iraq. Disturbances 

in Beirut and the Iraqi coup of 14 July 1958 disrupted the supply lines; the need to 

establish alternate routes through Turkey delayed construction and increased costs 

for the contractors.71

The district’s Transportation Branch dealt with the Iranian military and 

bureaucracy to facilitate customs clearance for construction materials entering the 

country, efficient unloading and movement from seaports to and within Iran, and 

adequate transportation on the single-track rail system and the limited roads that 

constituted the country’s transportation network. The movement of workers was 

equally as important and as complex. At moments of major construction activity, 

projects might involve as many as ten thousand workers who had to be fed and 

sheltered at work sites.72 During active construction periods, the Transportation 

68 “History of the [Gulf] District, Supplement History Covering Period July 1965 to September 

1968,” 6 Nov 68, pp. 4–6, Paul Wheeler Papers, R&D File 2475, TAC (hereafter cited as Gulf Dist 

Supplement Hist, 1965–1968). 69 “Gulf District Briefing for Gen. Lincoln, January 19–22 1958,” p. 25, box 22, access. no. 77-

92-0002, WNRC (hereafter cited as Lincoln Bfg–Gulf Dist). 70 Data for the Orientation of Maj Gen E. C. Itschner, 12 Nov 58, box 51-83-8379, Farrell Papers. 71 Ibid., p. 9; “Engineer Division Mediterranean: Information Booklet,” 15 Aug 59, pp. 27–28, 

unmarked box, Farrell Papers. 72 Lawrence J. Lincoln, “Construction in a Cold War Theater of Operations,” Army Information 

Digest (July 1958): 21; Dale Bentley, “Gulf District, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, Tehran-Iran” 

[May 57], p. 3, box 25, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; “History of the [Gulf] District, March 

1956–June 1965,” pp. 12, 20. 
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 173

Branch handled monthly averages of 100 passengers at Tehran’s Mehrabad Airport, 

100,000 pounds of cargo, and 120,000 vehicle miles. The branch operated with one 

commissioned officer and a civilian staff of about one hundred.73

The Gulf District headquarters commandant, like his counterpart in Karachi, 

Pakistan, worked to make the living conditions as comfortable as possible for district 

personnel. At the beginning of 1958, the district had 465 civilian employees: 165 

were Department of the Army civilians or third-country nationals and the rest were 

Iranian nationals. The district’s total workforce reached 797 in March 1961 after it 

absorbed personnel from the deactivated Trans-East District. From that high point, 

the Gulf District’s staff declined steadily as projects reached completion.74

Living Conditions and Support Facilities

Throughout the 1950s, the amenities of life were limited in Iran. As in Karachi, 

most available housing was below American standards. The supply of electricity 

was undependable; water could not be assumed to be potable, and its supply was 

erratic. Indoor sanitation facilities—if they existed—were minimal. Despite these 

deficiencies, the cost of leased housing exceeded housing allowances. Household 

goods took so long to arrive that Gulf District personnel might live in unfurnished 

accommodations for as long as six months. The first district personnel in Tehran 

rented housing on their own. In April 1957, the district engineer received authorization from the division to begin leasing residences and to equip them with American 

appliances for incoming personnel.75

The Gulf District’s offices lay in a military complex at the edge of Tehran, 

so staff needed transportation to work from their quarters dispersed throughout 

the city. The ARMISH-MAAG and the U.S. embassy had overcome the limits of 

public transportation by assigning each employee a government vehicle; Americans 

serving in other U.S. agencies could bring a personally owned vehicle to Iran at 

government expense, a privilege the civilian employees of the Corps of Engineers 

did not have initially. The district tried to alleviate transportation difficulties by 

creating a transportation pool for essential activities, supplemented by commercial 

buses hired to make scheduled trips to and from district headquarters. The district 

also made government-owned vehicles, especially station wagons, available for 

carpooling. Ultimately, district civilian employees did receive the right to import 

privately owned vehicles.76

For the benefit of the Gulf District’s American and European civilian and military 

employees, the headquarters commandant secured government-leased housing, 

provided for housing maintenance and fire prevention and protection services, 

73 Harold B. Day, “Data for Command Inspection by Mediterranean Engineer Division,” 4–18 Jan 

63, p. 5, box 22, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 74 Lincoln Bfg–Gulf Dist; “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” foreword, pp. 

7–8; “The Mediterranean Division,” n.d., pp. 4–7, Gen Files 54-1, OH, HQ USACE. 75 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” p. 12. 

76 Ibid., p. 13; Interv, Baldwin with Cameron, 27–29 Mar 89, p. 248.
174 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

assisted in negotiating private leases for some employees, and even provided 

reimbursement to the occupants for certain repairs and charges for utilities under 

these private leases.77

Corps employees with American passports willing to deposit 5 percent of 

their annual salary into a capital fund could use the small commissary at the U.S. 

embassy. The embassy discontinued the commissary in January 1959 when a 

cooperative of American government employees, the United States Employees 

Association (USEA), took over the service. Costs ran 50 percent higher than for 

the same goods in the United States because of the long supply line, putting a 

particular burden on continental wage scale (CWS) employees, who had never 

had access to the embassy commissary. However, the district’s major contractors, 

Morrison-Kaiser-Oman (MKO), and later J. A. Jones Company, maintained their 

own commissaries and voluntarily made them available to the district’s CWS 

employees. When these companies closed their commissaries in 1961, the USEA 

extended membership privileges to the CWS personnel. Fruits and vegetables were 

available in local markets; but Col. Harry F. Cameron Jr., district engineer from 1960 

to 1962, remembered: “You had to be very careful. My wife washed everything in 

chlorine water.”78

A U.S. Army hospital in Tehran provided medical services to the district’s 

American and CWS personnel and their families, but it did not serve Iranian 

employees. Until the mid-1960s, the district operated a dispensary at the headquarters 

compound where all employees could get medical service under contract with 

an American-trained Iranian doctor. A variety of schools provided educational 

opportunities for the children of district employees. Families could choose from 

religiously affiliated schools; French, German, and British schools; an international 

school; a U.S. embassy school; and several other schools supported by private 

organizations in Tehran.79

The U.S. military had established clubs for officers and noncommissioned 

officers before the Gulf District opened in Tehran, and Corps of Engineer military 

personnel had all the rights of their rank in the clubs. In 1956, the U.S. embassy 

organized an “American Club” open to all persons in the city with American 

passports. American employees of the district participated in this club, which offered 

a restaurant, a swimming pool, movies, and social functions. In September 1958, 

in an effort to foster cohesiveness among the staff and to overcome the division 

between Americans and non-Americans, personnel organized the Castle Club and 

invited all district employees to join. The district engineer made space available 

within the district compound for this private club, which sponsored weekly dances, 

bingo, movies, amateur theater productions, and similar recreational activities. The 

77 Day, “Data for Command Inspection,” 4–18 Jan 63, p. 5; Col Carl M. Sciple to Brig Gen E. A. 

Brown, OCE, 2 Jul 58, box 51-84-7361, Farrell Papers. 78 Interv, Baldwin with Cameron, 27–29 Mar 89, p. 279; “History of the [Gulf] District, March 

1956–June 1965,” p. 13. 79 Ibid.
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 175

Castle Club also operated the post restaurant as a concession. The district viewed 

the Castle Club as a contribution to staff morale and esprit de corps.80

Managing the Work

At the beginning of 1958, the Gulf District maintained field offices in Dezful, 

Shahabad, Sanandaj, Manjil, Hehrabad, and Tehran, as well as a Gendarmerie Area 

Office. (See Map 13.) These seven offices supervised eleven construction projects 

that had begun in 1957 and another thirteen projects that began in 1958. Initially, 

the Gendarmerie Area Office supervised construction at twenty-eight border sites; in 

subsequent years, this grew to a total of seventy-three sites widely scattered around 

the country. In the spring of 1960, the district closed the Gendarmerie Area Office 

and assigned personnel from its Construction Division to supervise the work.81

The Gulf District’s three largest projects cost between $10 million and $14 

million each: division cantonments at Khaneh and Sanandaj and the airfield at Dezful. 

Ten other projects ran between $5 million and $10 million each, and another dozen 

cost between $1 million and $5 million each. These projects included facilities for 

regimental combat teams at Naqadeh, Oshnaviyeh, Kushi, and Ajab Shir; depots at 

Dezful and Shahabad (the latter for ammunition); a brigade site at Manjil; a light 

division/battalion site at Chehel Dokhtar; and airfields at Hamadan and Mashhad. 

The Gulf District administered another seventy projects with costs varying from as 

low as $4,000 to around $1 million. The total of more than ninety contracts, many 

of them quite small, placed heavy administrative demands on the district staff.82

Between 1957 and 1958, the number of hours of district-supervised work jumped 

from 7 million to over 35 million annually. During this period, the district recruited 

personnel in the United States and sent three teams to Europe to recruit technical 

staff; the number of American civilians and third-country national employees in 

the district nearly doubled, bringing to twenty-two the number of nationalities on 

the district payroll.83

The Gulf District found few contractors in Iran who could handle the construction 

work programmed for the country. Only local contractors could be awarded contracts 

for the Gendarmerie border sites, where the vast majority of the projects were valued 

at under $1 million each. The Iranian contractors repeatedly failed to maintain 

construction schedules, thereby adding to overall costs. Both American and local 

contractors had difficulty finding skilled labor in Iran, especially during the early 

years of the construction program. The region had many experienced masons, but their 

methods did not conform to Western standards. Contractors could find some drivers, 

equipment operators, and mechanics trained by the British oil companies; but they 

were scarce. Contractors provided on-the-job training but could not always retain 

80 Ibid., p. 15; Interv, Baldwin with Cameron, 27–29 Mar 89, pp. 262–65.

81 Lincoln Bfg–Gulf Dist, p. 15; “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965”; Gulf 

Dist Supplement Hist, 1965–1968, p. 7; Shuler to Itschner, 7 Apr 60, pp. 8–9. 82 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965.”

83 Ibid., pp. 46–48.
KHĀRG ISLAND

‘AJAB SHĪR

QŪSHCHĪ

MANJĪL CHEHEL DOKHTAR

SARĀB

SANANDAJ MEHRĀBĀD

HAMADĀN

KERMĀNSHĀH

DEZFŪL

OSHNAVĪYEH

NAQADEH

TEHRĀN

KHĀNEH

P

E

R

S I A

N

G U L F

G u l f o f 

C ASPIAN

SEA Tabrīz

Rasht

Kermān

Shīrāz

Yazd

Eşfahān

Ahvāz

Bandar ‘Abbās

Qom

S A UDI ARABIA

BAHRAIN

Q A T A R

OMAN

TRUCIAL

OMAN

KUW AIT NEUTRAL

TERRIT O R Y

T U R K E Y

USSR

I R A Q

UNIO

SOCIAL

IRAN

GULF DISTRICT CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

1958–1966

Gulf District Headquarters

Cantonments

Airfield

Regimental Combat Teams

Other Construction Site

0

0 100 200 Miles

100 200 Kilometers

Map 13
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 177

their trained workers. In early 1958, the Iranian Army 

descended on the Khaneh project and conscripted into 

its ranks nearly all of the skilled laborers assembled by 

MKO and its subcontractors.84

The wide dispersion of projects over a land area 

slightly larger than the state of Alaska made supervision of work difficult for both district and contractor 

personnel. On projects beyond commuting distance 

from Tehran, contractors were required to provide 

messing and lodging for government personnel. 

Until the district got its own aircraft in May 1959, 

contractors also furnished air transportation between 

sites and Tehran.85

Gulf District Projects Under Construction

The cantonments at Khaneh, Oshnaviyeh, 

and Naqadeh concentrated Army facilities in a 

geographic triangle about twelve miles on each side 

in a 5,000-foot-high mountain valley in the Kurdish 

areas of northwestern Iran close to the borders with 

Iraq and with Turkey. The Khaneh project, to provide 

facilities for a division headquarters and about five 

thousand one hundred troops, involved two hundred 

ninety buildings. Naqadeh and Oshnaviyeh each had 

about one hundred eighty buildings to accommodate 

regimental combat teams of three thousand three 

hundred troops. The workforce attached to contractors 

in the area peaked at about ten thousand in October 

1958, with about sixty Americans supervising and 

inspecting the work. MKO began construction in the 

spring of 1957, and the initial contracts valued at $29.2 

million concluded in April 1960.86

The Dezful area, where work also began in the 

spring of 1957, lies about fifty miles east of the Iraqi 

border and three hundred miles south of Tehran on 

a sandstone coastal plain just south of the Zagros 

84 Ibid.; Day, “Data for Command Inspection,” 4–18 Jan 63, 

p. 11; Lincoln to Clarke, 15 May 58. 85 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” 

p. 12. 86 Ibid., p. 24; “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf District, 

Khaneh Area, Iran,” 1 Nov 58, pp. 1, 16, 19, box 23, access. no. 

77-92-0002, WNRC. 

MASHHAD

QŪCHĀN

f O m a n

Zāhedān

P A K I S T A N 

AFGHANIST A N

N OF SOVIE T

IST REPUBLICS
178 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Mountains. The region is semidesert with summer temperatures up to 130 ̊F. The 

team from the division that arrived in August 1956 to do preliminary soil and water 

testing was greeted by a sign above the entrance to the cave-like headquarters that 

read “Welcome to Hell.” With the indoor temperature at 85 ̊F and the humidity 

at 85 percent, the team members elected to sleep outdoors where the temperature 

rarely fell below 100 ̊F but the humidity was less than 5 percent.87

Projects under the area office included the Dezful Airfield, an air depot, taxiways 

and lighting, hangars, parking aprons, shops, living quarters for about two hundred 

fifty officers and one thousand two hundred enlisted personnel, and a drainage 

system, all for the Iranian Air Force. For the Iranian Army, in the same location, the 

district supervised the construction of an ordnance depot with 295 buildings. The 

installations also included a deep-well water supply with storage and distribution 

system, sewage collection and disposal, power generators and distribution facilities, 

and a network of roads. Work continued to the end of 1963. The projects at Dezful 

had a combined value of $23.3 million.88

The Gulf District also maintained an area office in Sanandaj (also known as 

Sinneh), the capital of Iran’s Kurdistan province, 325 miles west of Tehran and 65 

87 Ltr, Baylor to authors, 1 Dec 95, pp. 7–8, TAC. Baylor was chief of the Foundation and Materials Branch, Engineering Division, Mediterranean Division. 88 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” p. 22. 

Corps of Engineers employees, Gulf District, Khaneh Area, Naqadeh Project, July 1959
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 179

miles east of the Iraqi border, at an elevation of 5,250 feet above sea level. There, 

the district supervised construction of a divisional cantonment of 213 buildings and 

support facilities including water, power, and sewage systems and ammunition storage. 

The project included remodeling some existing buildings. The contractors used native 

stone for masonry construction. The prime contractor, Morrison-Kaiser-Oman, set up 

operations at the Sanandaj jobsite in April 1958. The Corps of Engineers area office 

opened the following June and operated until January 1961 with an average of five 

men. Continuity of contract administration suffered under the turnover of leadership; 

five area engineers and three acting area engineers served over the thirty months, with 

tenures ranging from one to eleven months. Contractors worked ten- to twelve-hour 

days, seven days a week, with a maximum workforce of about three thousand 

five hundred. The district contracted with the American joint venture of Ammann 

and Whitney–Husted for Title II field supervision and inspection. The intensity of 

construction strained the capacity of government employees, whose nominal work 

week was forty hours, and Title II personnel, whose work week was forty-eight hours. 

The discrepancies in the schedules between contract laborers and inspectors made 

adequate supervision and inspection difficult.89

89 Peter W. Schinkel, “Completion of Construction Report, Sanandaj Area,” 31 Jan 61, pp. 1–2, 

4, 6–7, box 23, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 

1965,” p. 28. 

Officers quarters under construction at Naqadeh, January 1959
180 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

As facilities were completed, it became apparent that the Iranian military did 

not have trained personnel to operate and maintain utility systems and mechanical 

installations. In the summer of 1960, the Gulf District initiated a training program 

for post engineers. Field personnel in the district organized, planned, and conducted 

two-week training courses. In addition to training operators for power plants, water 

and sewage systems, and individual items of equipment, the training emphasized 

the organization and functions of the office of post engineer. MAAG provided some 

interpreters; contractor personnel on site provided mechanical skills for the more 

technical classes and gave on-the-job operational training.90

Mehrabad and Hamadan

As with the construction program in the Trans-East District, funds for the Gulf 

District’s activities came from the Department of Defense’s Military Assistance 

Program and from the State Department’s International Cooperation Administration. 

In Iran as in Pakistan, the major ICA program supported the development of civil 

aviation. The Gulf District had begun to plan for improvements in the facilities at 

Mehrabad, the municipal airport for Tehran, in 1957. Increased commercial use of the 

airport and the need to accommodate larger jet passenger planes created additional 

90 “Post Engineer Training in Iran,” 27 Mar 61, box 51-84-7361, Farrell Papers. This article was 

apparently written to be submitted for publication.

Bricks drying at the Dezful depot
The Trans-East and Gulf Districts, 1958–1960 181

work. The directives to proceed, issued by the Mediterranean Division in the spring 

of 1958, instructed the district to improve existing utilities to provide a modern 

facility. This involved laying a runway extension and new taxiways and widening 

taxiways and holding aprons. Construction was scheduled in phases to permit 

continual operation of the airport, but all aspects of the work were incorporated 

into a single project.91

During the second half of 1958, the Mediterranean Division prepared the 

designs for the Mehrabad expansion and improvements and the Gulf District 

solicited bids. MKO won the award, received its notice to proceed with construction in July 1959, and finished most of the work by the end of 1960 (though 

various small tasks continued to 1963). The modernization of the Mehrabad airport 

91 “Mediterranean Division Builders,” p. 21; Col Robert J. Kasper, MDD [Mediterranean Division] Directive nos. 1 and 2, 3 Apr, 13 Jun 58, sub: Authorization—GOI—FY 58—Modification to 

Mehrabad Airfield, box 23, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 

Partitions for buildings at Behshahr, Iran, were put up first while contractors waited for 

face bricks for the exterior walls.
182 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

cost about $5 million.92 The ICA also financed a part of the development of an 

airfield at Hamadan, about one hundred ninety miles west-southwest of Tehran. 

When the Gulf District opened bids for Hamadan construction on 31 March 1960, 

MKO had once again submitted the low bid and won the contract at a price of 

$5.9 million.93

By the beginning of 1961, many of the Mediterranean Division’s construction 

programs had passed their peak. The division had closed the Southern and Trans-East 

Districts and needed to reorganize to adjust to the changing imperatives.

92 Lt Col John A. Hughes Jr., Bfg, Mehrabad Airport, 15 Dec 60, box 23, access. no. 77-92-0002, 

WNRC; Memo, Col Harry F. Cameron Jr., 29 Jan 61, sub: Bi-Monthly Letter to the Chief of Engineers, pp. 1–3, Mil Files XXI-2-6, OH, HQ USACE; “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 

1965,” pp. 27–28; “Mediterranean Division, Corps of Engineers, United States Army,” [1967], p. 21; 

Mediterranean Div, “Engineering [Inspection],” pp. 12–13. 93 Itschner to Shuler, 2 Jul 59, p. 1, and 23 Dec 59, p. 2, Mil Files XXI-2-7, OH, HQ USACE; 

Shuler to Itschner, 7 Apr 60, p. 7, and 10 Jun 60, p. 9.
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 183

6

The Gulf District, 1961–1967

After the close of the Southern and Trans-East Districts in 1960 and throughout 

most of the decade, the Gulf District in Tehran remained the only active district 

in the Mediterranean Division. In 1961, the district took over responsibility for 

Pakistan, Burma, and Saudi Arabia and added a major new program in Afghanistan. 

The district also managed engineering design and construction of projects for the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) and the United States Air Force 

(USAF). Still, most of the district’s effort went toward the program begun in 1956: 

construction funded under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in support of 

the Iranian armed forces.

Work Centered in Iran

Under the Military Assistance Program, the Gulf District had completed 

cantonments for an Iranian Army division and two regimental combat teams 

(RCTs) in and around Khaneh in early 1960. In December, the district also turned 

over the construction at the Mehrabad airfield. The RCT installations at Ajab Shir 

and at Kushi begun in 1959 were completed in late 1961. In the early 1960s, the 

district took on work for the Iranian Navy at Kharg Island, constructed an airfield 

at Hamadan, oversaw construction of four new RCT installations, continued work 

for the Gendarmerie, and built housing for the national police. The last large project 

was an air base and support facilities at Mashhad.

Kharg Island

As 1961 began, the Gulf District anticipated new construction for the Iranian 

Navy at Kharg Island, in the Persian Gulf about forty miles northwest of the 

coastal city of Bushire. The project involved both on- and off-shore facilities 

for a complete naval base. The on-shore facilities included a barracks with 

laundry, bath, and latrine installations for two hundred men; a fully equipped 

kitchen and mess hall; an administration building; quarters for five officers and 

their families; ammunition magazines; and warehouse space. The construction 

included electrical, water distribution, and sewage disposal systems and the roads 

necessary to support the installation. A pier and breakwater about one thousand 

four hundred feet in length to enclose a mooring basin, mooring facilities, and 
184 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

dredging for the basin and a channel comprised the elements of the off-shore 

construction.1

In February 1961, the district issued an advance notice of the project and 

specified that it would issue invitations to bid only to firms that demonstrated a 

record of satisfactory completion of comparable projects. The district identified 

twenty-nine American firms as qualified. The contract, let in May 1961, went 

to Brown Engineering International of New York City for just over $2 million. 

Construction began on 24 June 1961, and the Gulf District opened a resident office 

for the Kharg Island work in July. At the peak phase of the construction, the office 

staff numbered seven persons.2

Resident office personnel had to cope with minor difficulties because two firms, 

Amman & Whitney and Frederic R. Harris, had been selected to design elements 

1 U.S. Army Engr Dist, Gulf, “Advance Notice: Construction of Facilities for Imperial Iranian 

Navy at Kharg Island, Iran,” 9 Feb 61, box 38-Iran, Transatlantic Division–Records Holding Area 

(TAD-RHA). 2 Ibid.; Memo, Col Harry F. Cameron Jr., 30 Mar 61, sub: Bi-Monthly Letter to the Chief of Engineers, p. 1, Mil Files XXI-2-6, Office of History (OH), HQ United States Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE), Alexandria, Va.; “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” Jun 65, pp. 42–43, 

box 21, access. no. 77-92-0002, Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md.

Breakwater on Kharg Island under construction, January 1962
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 185

for the 200-man barracks. This meant that construction crews had two different 

types of specifications for the same structure. In addition, the construction contract 

required the contractor to carry the lines for distribution of water and electricity 

only as far as a source point to be provided by the Iranian Navy. When the rest of 

the construction reached completion in March 1963, the Iranian Navy had still not 

specified the source point, so the contractor turned over the facilities and the resident 

office closed. Brown Engineering completed all remaining work by the first week 

of June. Over the next six months, an Iranian firm added another $12,000 worth of 

facilities to the Kharg Island installation.3

Construction at Hamadan

Construction on the airfield at Hamadan began in May 1960 under a competitively bid contract awarded to the joint venture of Morrison-Kaiser-Oman. The 

project encompassed runways, overruns, taxiways, and cross taxiways of asphaltic 

3 Maj Marvin W. Rees, “Completion Report, Kharg Island Naval Base, June 1961–March 1963,” 

p. 1, box 25, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; Lt Col E. L. Waddell Jr., Continuing Memo to Col W. 

G. Trainer, 10 Sep thru 12 Sep 62, p. 4, box 51-83-8376, Richard T. Farrell Papers, OH, HQ USACE; 

“History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 42–43. 

Rock-screening plant at Kharg Island
186 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

concrete; warmup aprons, end-of-runway segments, and operation aprons of Portland 

concrete; access and interior roads surfaced with gravel; facilities for jet fuel and 

aviation gasoline; an operations building with control tower; and airfield lighting. 

Located at five thousand five hundred feet elevation and subject to extremely cold 

winter temperatures, the runways at Hamadan were reinforced to provide a minimum 

of thirty inches of frost-free material below the surface of the pavement.4

The elevation, the remoteness of the site, and MKO’s poor logistical planning 

created problems with mobilization and logistical support. Construction lagged 

because the contractor had difficulty getting heavy earthmoving equipment to 

the area.5

 Equipment arrived seemingly in no particular order, often out of phase 

with the progress of the work. Additionally, a very severe winter in 1960 forced 

postponement of construction on the runway, taxiways, and roads.

The contractor’s choice of aggregate triggered more delays. Gulf District 

personnel conducted a design analysis in September 1958 that identified aggregate 

some distance north of the construction site; but the contractor gambled that aggregate 

from a source closer to the site would be acceptable. The contractor extracted and 

4 Lt Col E. L. Waddell Jr., “Construction Completion Report on Imperial Iranian Air Force Facility, 

Hamadan Airfield,” 24 Feb 62, pp. 1–2, box 23, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. Unless other sources 

are cited, all information on this phase of construction at Hamadan comes from this report. 5 Nauman to Itschner, 9 Dec 60, Mil Files XXI-3-1, OH, HQ USACE.

Steel framing for single-family officer quarters at Kharg Island, April 1962
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 187

stockpiled a substantial amount of this base material only to discover that when it 

was compacted it failed to meet the Corps’ specifications (it was frost-susceptible 

material). This became apparent, of course, only after aggregate had been laid and 

rolled. When district inspectors rejected all of the subbase laid with this material, 

the contractor had to suspend work to locate and extract acceptable aggregate.

Another major construction problem arose when the contractor left exposed a 

stretch of excavation for the subgrade. When the inevitable rains came, they soaked 

the earth; the soil had absorbent qualities that made drying out the subgrade impossible even after months of exposure to the hot, dry air. As a result, the contractor had 

to excavate a 600-square-yard section to remove and replace the wet layers of earth 

to a depth of four-and-a-half feet. Other problems involved drainage; the difficulty 

of working during the cold, windy winter months; and complications in laying the 

access road. These were all solved with less trouble and expense than the problem 

of the unstable subgrade.

The most active construction period at Hamadan Airfield came in September–

October 1961, when MKO employed eight hundred fifty laborers daily and paid out 

approximately $95,000 a month in wages. At its peak, the area office had forty-one 

employees, half of whom were Iranian technicians. The office also included three 

Iranian students from the Abadan Institute of Technology employed during school 

vacations. The most difficult administrative problem involved scheduling the staff 

to coordinate with the contractor’s schedule. At Hamadan Airfield, the workload 

Recompaction during construction of Hamadan Airfield
188 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

was eleven hours a day, seven days a week. The Corps staff had to try to cover these 

hours while staying within the stringent limitations on supervision and inspection 

costs—4 percent of the total cost of construction—set for the project. The office 

used several strategies to maintain adequate supervision and inspection within cost 

limits, including compensatory time, extra time worked without compensation, and 

a very judicious use of paid overtime that could not exceed an average of twelve 

hours per pay period for an employee.

Favorable weather in the winter of 1961–1962 allowed the contractor to recoup 

some lost time, and MKO completed the construction late in February 1962. Col. 

Edward L. Waddell Jr., who served as area engineer for the project from August 

1961 to February 1962, criticized the MKO management; but he also observed that 

despite the delays the contractor never compromised the quality of construction to 

recover lost time.

After the initial work at Hamadan had been completed, the Gulf District 

administered a $4.5 million contract for additional operational and support facilities 

at the base, newly renamed Shahrokhi Air Base. The district began planning and 

design for this work in the spring of 1962 and submitted its projections to the 

Mediterranean Division for review in June. A year later, on 18 June 1963, the 

district awarded a contract to J. A. Jones Construction Company of Charlotte, 

North Carolina. Construction involved about 1,300 family-housing units, a 200-man 

dormitory, a squadron operations building, a theater, a post exchange, a commissary, 

a cold-storage plant, an officers club, a noncommissioned officers club, a hospital, 

a school, and a base headquarters building.6

Gulf District personnel criticized the Jones management of this later work much 

more severely than they had MKO for the early phase. Jones proceeded with no 

identifiable management plan, and its superintendents operated with no discernible 

coordination or cooperation. The organizational structure changed constantly. The 

contractor failed to conduct adequate inspections of work in progress. When Corps 

inspectors called the contractor’s attention to faults in the masonry, plumbing, 

plastering, and painting, the supervisors were uncooperative about correcting the 

deficiencies. The contractor used his compacting equipment improperly; although 

supervisors asked for advice from the Corps’ materials engineer, they refused to 

accept it. When the materials in place failed, the company’s paving superintendent 

first insisted that his effort had been adequate and then tried to bargain with the 

resident engineer, suggesting that he correct one deficiency provided that the 

Corps conduct no further testing. The resident engineer emphatically rejected this 

proposal.7

Jones failed to coordinate deliveries to have materials and equipment in place 

when they were needed. At one building site, windows and door frames arrived after 

6 Memo, Col Harry F. Cameron Jr., 19 Jun 62, sub: Periodic Letter Report to Chief of Engineers, 

p. 5, Mil Files XXI-3-2, OH, HQ USACE; “Contract Completion Report . . . Hamadan (Shahrokhi) 

Air Base, Hamadan, Iran,” [Jun 65], p. 3, intro by Maj Gilbert L. Burns, box 25, access. no. 77-92-

0002, WNRC. 7 “Contract Completion Report . . . Hamadan,” [Jun 65], pp. 1, 7–8.
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 189

the masonry walls had already been erected. Fitting these items into the structure 

damaged the work in place. For precasting concrete elements, the contractor also 

reused plywood forms beyond their effective life, resulting in unacceptable sills, 

lintels, canopies, and columns.8

With constant attention from the Corps of Engineers personnel on the jobsite and 

their repeated insistence on corrective action to replace deficient work, Jones brought 

the construction at Hamadan/Shahrokhi to acceptable standards. Corps engineers 

demanded that the contractor institute a more-rigid inspection system. Only when 

that system took effect and quality could be assured with less frequent inspections 

did the resident engineer reduce the number of inspectors on his staff.9

With constant prodding, construction advanced to the point that the facilities 

could be turned over to ARMISH-MAAG in early June. In a ceremony held on 

16 June 1965, the U.S. ambassador to Iran, Armin H. Meyer, officially presented 

the Hamadan/Shahrokhi Air Base facilities to the Iranian government. Including 

modifications, the contract’s value at completion of the work amounted to $4.8 

million, an increase of about 11 percent over the award price.10

Regimental Combat Team Installations

During the early 1960s, the Gulf District supervised construction of four RCT 

installations in Iran. The Jones Construction Company won the principal contracts 

for construction of the installations at Hamadan; at Kermanshah, ninety miles west of 

Hamadan; and at Sarab in northern Iran. Williams Brothers constructed facilities at 

Quchan, a small farming town on the Atrak River about forty miles south of Russian 

Turkistan. Other companies, including Iranian contractors, worked on supply points, 

electrical installations, or other facilities at these sites.11

The four RCT installation designs had seventy to ninety-nine buildings, yielding 

contracts from $4.1 million to $5.2 million. All locations included troop billets and 

officer and noncommissioned officer quarters. Hamadan had motor-pool facilities 

and ammunition igloos. Kermanshah had a corral for one hundred fifty animals; 

a petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) facility with storage tanks and the related 

pumping, loading, and dispensing equipment; and administrative offices to support fuel 

distribution. An advance supply point consisting of sixteen warehouses, an open storage 

area, and a road network extended the complex of installations in the Kermanshah 

region. The facilities for the combat team and a tank battalion at Sarab included 

fuel storage; sewage, water, electrical, and telephone systems; and an ammunition 

storage area. An advance supply point, the POL facility near Sarab, and a hangar at 

Tabriz for the Gendarmerie completed the plan in the area. Construction at Hamadan, 

8 Ibid., pp. 9–10. 

9 Ibid., p. 5, passim. 

10 Col A. D. Chaffin to Lt Gen William F. Cassidy, 15 Jul 65, p. 4, Mil Files XXI-3-4, OH, HQ 

USACE; “Contract Completion Report . . . Hamadan,” [Jun 65], pp. 5, 2. 11 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 33–41, list of construction contracts 

in appendixes.
190 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Kermanshah, and Sarab began during the summer of 1961 and was completed before 

the summer of 1963.12

Williams Brothers began construction of the RCT site at Quchan in July 1962, 

making it the last such project undertaken by the Gulf District for the Iranian Army. 

In September, the district opened a resident office at Quchan that varied in strength 

from eight to eleven persons. The office was headed by a sequence of four lieutenant 

colonels who averaged about seven months’ tenure each.13

As with most projects in Iran, the contract for Quchan provided that the contractor 

furnish dependable air connections to the site. Building a gravel-surface airstrip at 

Quchan, four thousand five hundred feet long and one hundred feet wide, therefore, 

constituted one element of the contractor’s responsibilities. Heavy rains and a flood 

in April 1963 damaged construction underway at Quchan, and the landing strip 

had to be partially relocated and shortened. Because of poor planning, inadequate 

organization, and improper management, Williams Brothers was “seriously behind 

schedule” before the floods. With all its problems, the contractor still produced good 

12 Ibid., pp. 33–41.

13 Ibid., pp. 41–42. Unless otherwise noted, information on Quchan comes from this source. 

Panoramic view of the Quchan regional combat team site during construction, March 1964
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 191

construction, especially in the concrete, brick masonry, and electrical elements. 

Williams Brothers completed the project in April 1964.14

Gendarmerie and National Police Projects

The Gulf District also extended the construction for the Gendarmerie through 

the 1960s. Iranian firms continued to hold exclusive rights to all projects except 

construction of airfield facilities. The mandate to use Iranian construction firms 

created management problems for the Gulf District, because the Iranian companies 

consistently failed to meet schedules and Corps standards in the quality of work. In 

addition, the principal contractor at twenty-two sites, Sherkat Tazamoni Neamatollah 

Jahan-Bin and Company, had serious financial difficulties in 1962 and completed 

construction at only three sites.15

14 Memo, Col W. G. Trainer, 18 Mar 63, sub: Periodic Letter Report to Chief of Engineers, p. 3, 

Mil Files XXI-3-3, OH, HQ USACE. 15 Interv, Moorhus with Col (Ret) Peter Grosz Jr., 19 Mar 96, pp. 19–21; Cameron to Cassidy, 7 

Jun 67, p. 2, Mil Files XXI-3-6, OH, HQ USACE; “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 

1965,” pp. 46–48; Memo, Cameron, 19 Jun 62, p. 4; Memo, Col W. G. Trainer, 19 Sep 62, sub: 

Periodic Letter Report to Chief of Engineers, pp. 2, 4, Mil Files XXI-3-2, OH, HQ USACE; Harold 

Noncommissioned officers quarters under construction at Quchan, October 1963
192 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Because the Gendarmerie handled border 

security and customs, most construction sites were 

remote and widely scattered. (Map 14) The Corps 

assigned junior engineer officers to keep in touch 

with the construction in progress at these sites. 

Claude D. Boyd, serving in Iran as a first lieutenant 

for nine months in 1962 and 1963, was assigned 

with two Iranians and a Pakistani to Zahedan near 

the Pakistan border. To inspect construction at the 

five sites he oversaw, once a month Boyd and one 

or two Iranian inspectors loaded a vehicle with 

as many gas cans as it could carry and a dozen 

or so live chickens. At each site, they inspected 

the work and made in-progress payments. They 

ate or traded the chickens as they traveled, and 

they carried cigarettes and whiskey as gifts for the 

village leaders in the areas where they camped. A 

village leader would “kill a goat or cook a bunch of 

chickens, and rice, and feed us. We’d sit there and 

talk at night. Of course, I was speaking English, and 

he was speaking Baluchistan or Farsi, and I didn’t 

have any idea what he was saying and he didn’t 

know what I was saying, but it was friendly.”16

After completing each inspection tour, Boyd 

headed for Tehran to report to the district personnel 

and stock up on provisions.

In April 1963, the district agreed to supervise 

construction of family housing for officers 

and noncommissioned officers serving in the 

Gendarmerie, the Iranian Army, and the Iranian 

National Police. Funding for the projects came in 

part from the sale of surplus American agricultural 

commodities under the Agricultural Trade 

Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 

[PL] 480) and from an American loan. The district 

estimated the total cost of the housing program 

at $6.3 million. The construction produced 604 

housing units and several bachelor officers quarters 

at more than a dozen widely scattered sites, some 

B. Day, “Data for Command Inspection by Mediterranean 

Engineer Division,” 4–18 Jan 63, p. 6, box 22, access. no. 

77-92-0002, WNRC. 16 Interv, Moorhus with Col (Ret) Claude D. Boyd III, 9 

Nov 95, p. 9. 

DEZFŪL

BĪJĀR

MALĀYER

RAZĀN

SŪSANGERD ĪZ

MĪĀNEH

FŪMAN 

HASHTPA

ARDABĪL

NAQADEH

ĀSTĀRĀ

MAHĀBĀD

TABRĪZ

AHVĀZ

KHORRAMSHAHR

HAMADĀN

KERMĀNSHĀH

Rash

BAHR

KUW AIT NEUTRAL

TERRIT O R Y

T U R K E Y

USSR

I R A Q

S A UDI ARABIA NEUTRAL

TERRIT O R Y

IRAN

GULF DISTRICT

OVERSEAS INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM

1957–1962

Gulf District Headquarters

Gendarmerie Site

0

0 100 200 Miles

100 200 Kilometers
Map 14

BANDER-E PAHLAV

VARĀMĪN

BEHSHAHR

SARĪ BĪĀJOMAND

BĪRJAND

SEFĪDĀBEH

SĪRJĀN

MĪNĀB

PĪP

NĪKŪ JAHĀN

‘ALĪĀBĀD

MARV DASHT

DEH BĪD

ĀBĀDEH

ARDESTĀN

DĀRĀN

ARDAKĀN

QOŢBĀBĀD

DAR MAZĀR

ZĀBOL

HORMAK

TORBAT-E JĀM

GONĀBĀD

FERDOWS

SHĪRVĀN

SHĀHRŪD

QŪCHĀN

BOSHRŪYEH

KORŪK

NŪRĀBĀD

EH

BANDAR-E BŪSHEHR

KAHNŪJ

MANŪJĀN

MŪMĀN

SABZEVĀR

BĀBOL

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R

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TEHRĀN

MASHHAD

KERMĀN

ZĀHEDĀN

SARĀVĀN

KONĀRAK

SARBĀZ

BANDAR ‘ABBĀS

SHĪRĀZ

EŞFAHĀN

QOM

P

E

R

S I A

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G U L F

G u l f o f O m a n

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SEA

ht

Yazd

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Q A T A R

OMAN

TRUCIAL

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P A K I S T A N 

AFGHANIST A N

UNION OF SOVIE T

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

M
KHĀRG ISLAND

MARĪVĀN

MARAND

SAR DASHT

BANDER-E LENGEH

SARĪ

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QŪSHCHĪ

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SARĀB

CHEHEL DOKHTAR

P

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G U L F

G u l f 

C ASPIAN

SEA Tabrīz

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Kermān

Shīrāz

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Bandar ‘Abbās

Hamadān Qom

Dezfūl

S A UDI ARABIA

BAHRAIN

Q A T A R

OMAN

TRUCIAL

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KUW AIT NEUTRAL

TERRIT O R Y

T U R K E Y

USSR

I R A Q

UNI

SOCIA

IRAN

SURPLUS COMMODITY HOUSING PROGRAM

GULF DISTRICT

1960s

Army Housing

Naval Housing

Gendarmerie Housing

Police Housing

0

0 100 200 Miles

100 200 Kilometers

Map 15
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 195

located in the army cantonments that the Gulf 

District had constructed. (Map 15) Each location 

required electrical, water, and sewage systems to 

support the new housing.17

Two features of the police housing project 

at Naziabad in south Tehran were unique. The 

six four-story apartment buildings were the 

tallest constructed to date for the Iranian Military 

Assistance Program. The central heating plant and 

district heating system were also firsts for Iran. 

Although the construction was “beautiful,” the 

Iranian contractor encountered difficulty procuring 

the U.S. materials specified by the designer. Finally, 

the division agreed to purchase the materials and 

ship them to Iran. Unfortunately, that did not solve 

the contractor’s problems. More than a year later, 

in September 1967, the contractor still had not 

obtained all the parts he needed; for the second 

winter, the buildings remained without a functional 

heating system. Frustrated by the delays, the division engineer, Col. Harry F. Cameron Jr., faulted 

the architect-engineer for specifying an “exotic 

heating system, the only one of its type in Iran.”18

Construction at Mashhad

The Gulf District’s last large project in Iran 

funded by the Military Assistance Program was 

an air base and supporting facilities at Mashhad, a 

center of Shiite Muslim devotion and worship since 

the ninth century. The city, which counted about 

two hundred sixty-four thousand inhabitants in 

1960, lies 462 miles northeast of Tehran. Because 

of its location on several important caravan routes 

and near the Soviet border, Mashhad became a point 

of strategic interest during the Cold War.

17 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” 

pp. 53–54. 18 “Brief History of Police Housing Project, Naziabad, 

Tehran,” 29 Oct 66, p. 1, box 51-83-8376, Farrell Papers; 

“History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 

53–54; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 20 Oct 65, 27 Jun 

66, Som-29, TAD-RHA; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 

18 Jan, 19 Sep 67, box 51-83-8379, Farrell Papers.

EMĀM QOLĪ

ĪRANSHĀHR

TORBAT-E JĀM

o f O m a n

Zāhedān

Mashhad

P A K I S T A N 

AFGHANIST A N

ON OF SOVIE T

LIST REPUBLICS
196 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Between 1961 and 1964, the Gulf District supervised construction for the 

Gendarmerie in the Mashhad region. Initially, the district supervised this construction out of a project office in its Construction Division. After September 1962, the 

resident engineer at Quchan assumed responsibility for the work at Mashhad. In 

the summer of 1964, the district let a new contract to strengthen and expand the 

Mashhad Airfield. In the 1950s, Army engineers had reinforced a landing strip 

built in 1929. The construction proposed in 1964 involved laying a runway twelve 

thousand five hundred feet long, an operational apron for parking aircraft, warmup 

aprons, and taxiways. The design called for fifteen buildings, including a pull-through 

maintenance hangar; ten thousand square feet of warehouse space; rocket-storage 

facilities; two airmen’s dormitories; post engineer facilities; headquarters and 

operations buildings; sewage, water, and power systems; and a road network. The 

principal military runway, for use by F–5s and C–130 transport planes, had eight-inch 

concrete paving.19 Jones Construction won the $6 million contract, and the Gulf 

District issued the notice to proceed on 16 July 1964. By timely coincidence, Jones 

completed the work at Hamadan as the work at Mashhad began. 

19 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” p. 45; Area Engr’s Completion Rpt 

[Mashhad Air Base], 4 May 66, pp. 1–4, Mixed Files, TAD-RHA. Unless otherwise noted, information on the construction at Mashhad comes from this source.

New apartment construction at Naziabad, ca. 1965
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 197

The military facilities were built adjacent to the older, commercial air terminal 

and apron, so planners divided the airfield construction into two phases to allow 

continuous operation of the commercial facilities. Between July and September, 

Jones built its construction camp on site and started earthwork. Late in September, 

construction began, with work on buildings and utilities done simultaneously. 

During Phase I, the old commercial section of the airfield remained in operation 

while the southern 6,000-foot segment of new runway was laid. In early November 

1965, the contractor completed Phase I paving and the access road from the 

highway between Tehran and Mashhad, providing a route to and from the new 

runway. On 2 December, the authorities closed the old runway and opened the 

new, thus officially ending Phase I. 

Phase II began immediately and consisted of placing the base course over the 

old runway, which could be used as a base because it showed no signs of failure. In 

compacting the final lift, the contractor encountered problems with the underlying 

subgrade and finally chose to cut out the unsatisfactory sections and replace them 

with entirely new fill. Paving on the reconstructed old runway, the aprons, the 

hangar, hangar access aprons, connecting taxiways, and the apron and civil aviation 

taxiways began in early March 1966 and was completed in late April. 

Constructing a bridge culvert system to accommodate runoff of water descending 

from the mountains to the west constituted a major element of the work at Mashhad. 

The culvert system crossed the 12,500-foot runway at about midpoint. The system 

involved reinforced concrete footings, stone masonry piers, and a reinforced concrete 

deck that formed the final runway section connecting the old and new portions.20

The contractor began work on the bridge and culvert before finishing Phase I 

construction. With the outer sections of the bridging in place by mid-November, 

the contractor began the inner one hundred yards. When the new runway opened 

on 2 December, the old runway closed and work proceeded vigorously to upgrade 

the old runway and to complete the connecting bridge over the drainage culverts. 

The contractor placed concrete for the last deck section of the bridge in early May 

1966. At one point between December and May, two hundred fifty stone masons 

and laborers laid an estimated one hundred sixty thousand stones to line the walls 

of the culvert under the bridge.

In support of the construction, the Mashhad Area Office’s Materials Branch 

laboratory performed thirty-six tests a day, putting a heavy burden on lab personnel. 

The contractor had problems maintaining a supply of acceptable cement from the 

local production plant. When the Mediterranean Division’s lab in Athens tested 

cement for strength, testing errors indicating substandard material led to the 

unnecessary rejection of some batches of cement. The rejections created a minor 

crisis that was resolved when the contractor called in a consultant to run further 

tests. Once the adjustments were made, the cement produced excellent structural 

and paving concrete. 

20 Interv, Moorhus with Grosz, 19 Mar 96, pp. 39–40.
198 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

When construction mobilization began in July 1964, the Gulf District opened 

an area office at Mashhad. The organizational plan called for twenty-three civilian 

spaces and one military position, but civilian strength in the office never exceeded 

sixteen. In August 1965, as part of a general reorganization, contracting authority 

passed from the district engineer in Tehran to the Mediterranean Division in Livorno. 

The reductions in Gulf District personnel drastically limited the technical and 

administrative support the district could offer the Mashhad Area Office.

In addition to monitoring staff and the progress of construction, the area 

engineer in Mashhad maintained liaison with the local Iranian and American officials 

interested in the project. He coordinated on a regular basis with the director of the 

Mashhad Civil Airfield, the commander of the Iranian Air Force base at Mashhad, 

the commanding general of the Iranian Army’s 6th Division, the U.S. consul in 

Mashhad, the commander of the U.S. Army Signal Training Team in the area, and 

the commanding general of the regional Iranian Gendarmerie. 

Beyond supervising construction, the area office also trained Iranian engineers 

and army officers. During the summer of 1965, the office hosted four student 

engineers from the University of Abadan who served in the Materials, Operations, 

and Engineering Branches. Six Iranian Army engineers also served with the area 

office, two at a time, to learn about large-project construction. 

Standards of Design and Construction in Iran

In managing construction in Iran and Pakistan, the Gulf District applied several 

sets of standards. For projects to serve the U.S. Air Force and for all airfields, the 

district used the same standards of design and construction that would apply in 

the United States. For facilities serving the Iranian military forces, the district, 

taking its guidelines from ARMISH-MAAG, applied austerity criteria that adapted 

local construction practice and the use of local materials to provide simple, usable 

facilities.21

Experience with the MAP projects in Iran in the late 1950s led the district staff to 

conclude that, without compromising structural adequacy, it could modify designs to 

reduce standards but still improve the living and working conditions for the Iranian 

military. The standard in the United States for enlisted troop barracks, for instance, 

called for 125 square feet per man. In the 1960s, the Gulf District built enlisted 

barracks in Iran to a standard of 47 square feet per man. Similarly, in designing 

the water supply, the district used a standard of 500 gallons per minute (GPM) per 

single fire rather than the 1,000 GPM applied in the United States and a total of 50 

rather than 100 gallons per person per day. All these standards, while remaining 

below the quality used in the United States, represented a marked improvement over 

21 Data for Lt Gen W. K. Wilson Jr., Ch of Engrs, 8–12 Sep 64, pp. 3–4, unmarked box, TAD-RHA 

(hereafter cited as Data for Wilson).
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 199

existing Iranian conditions. The design also minimized the number of fire hydrants, 

valves, and fittings.22

At many of the construction sites, finding an adequate supply of water presented 

a problem and an added cost. The entire region was arid or semiarid. When the 

Corps began drilling for wells, it had little information on the geology, hydrology, 

or soil conditions, so it assigned personnel to conduct a systematic program of field 

investigations. As information accumulated, the Gulf District awarded contracts and 

eventually completed over forty wells in Iran of depths from 50 to 502 feet.23

Traditional water systems continued to serve and even to be adapted by the Army 

engineers during their construction in Iran. The traditional ghanat technique, also 

used in Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Morocco, involved digging one or several wells 

on a hillside and then drawing water from these wells by means of underground 

tunnels running downhill at an angle sufficient to provide a gravity flow to the area 

to be served. The hand-dug tunnels had a diameter of about three feet, just enough 

to allow the tunnel digger minimal movement. Vertical shafts from the tunnel to 

ground level at intervals provided ventilation and permitted removal of earth as the 

digging progressed. Both shafts and tunnels remained unlined, so they were subject 

to frequent cave-ins. Ghanats in Iran varied in length from one hundred yards to 

fifty miles.24

As part of the $11 million project to build a division cantonment at Sanandaj, 

near the border with Iraq, the contractor, MKO, incorporated a ghanat system. 

The contractor ran several ghanat tunnels to a single point and constructed a large 

reservoir there. Construction crews installed electrical pumps at the reservoir to lift 

the water to a holding tower from which it flowed throughout the system of pipes 

that supplied the entire 200-building installation. The finished system thus integrated 

ancient and modern systems.25

The district’s austerity criteria also appeared in the sewage disposal and treatment 

systems installed at Iranian facilities. When the construction program began in 

Iran in the late 1950s, the Gulf District commissioned the architect-engineer joint 

venture of Ammann & Whitney–Husted to prepare standard design packages for 

utilities, including sewage-treatment systems. Anticipating that the Corps would 

build a number of installations at which populations would vary, the firm designed 

at least two standard plans for each installation component. The standard plans were 

then modified for specific sites. The battalion camp at Rheneh, for example, had an 

22 Ibid., pp. 3–6; Edward L. Waddell Jr., “Military Construction Aid in Iran,” Military Engineer

(January-February 1963): 43; “Hamadan, Iran, Site Adapt Design,” Sep 62, p. 3, box 74, access. no. 

77-84-0004, TAD-RHA. 23 In general, see James A. Roy, “Water Supplies in the Mid East,” Military Engineer (March-April 

1961): 126–28, and Victor E. Muse, “From Ancient ‘Ghanats’ to Modern Water Wells for Iran, U.S. 

Army Engineers are Providing Arid Old Persia with Up-to-Date Water Supplies for Military Bases,” 

Water Works Engineering (November 1961): 962–63. See also “History of the [Gulf] District, March 

1956–June 1965,” p. 18; Waddell, “Military Construction Aid in Iran,” pp. 43–45. 24 Roy, “Water Supplies in the Mid East,” pp. 126–28; Muse, “From Ancient ‘Ghanats’ to Modern 

Water Wells,” pp. 962–63; “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” p. 18. 25 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 28–29.
200 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

anticipated population of 830 men and used an adaptation of the standard design for 

a 630-man sewage treatment plant. At Sahneh, the construction contractor installed 

a 4,400-man treatment plant. A third site, with an expected population of only 210, 

used a septic-tank system rather than a sewage-treatment plant.26

In all cases, the district calculated flow on a basis of thirty-five gallons per 

capita, considerably less than assumed in the United States. The systems depended 

on conveying sewage by gravity flow rather than by electric pumps. Designs located 

the sewer mains a minimum distance from the buildings and limited crossings under 

roads and the number of manholes. The design completely segregated storm water 

from sewage, in some instances using open ditches for storm drainage. The larger 

sewage-treatment systems used Imhoff tanks for simple settling, sedimentation, 

and anaerobic digestion to process the raw sewage, combined with open lagoons 

and sludge-drying beds. Throughout the sewage systems that the Gulf District put 

in place, the district strove for economy of installation and simplicity of operations 

and maintenance.27

On roads and walkways, district designs specified gravel, which was less 

expensive than asphalt or concrete. Plans incorporated no landscaping, sodding, 

or planting. Contractors generally installed kerosene-fired water heaters and space 

heaters rather than electrical equipment or central heating. The resulting construction 

was Spartan but functional, and the district completed installations at a cost of only 

about $100 for each soldier in the unit.28

The Gulf District Outside Iran

While the Gulf District managed the construction projects in Iran, it also 

administered projects in Pakistan, Burma, and Saudi Arabia left incomplete when 

the Trans-East District closed at the end of 1960. 

Work in Pakistan

When the Trans-East District closed, the Gulf District assumed responsibility for 

five projects in Pakistan with a value of over $1 million each. The largest contract 

was for the cantonment at Multan, where $15 million in construction had begun in 

June 1959. All projects were well advanced when the Gulf District took them over, 

and all were completed by early 1962. Between 1962 and 1965, the Gulf District 

awarded a dozen new contracts in Pakistan, several of them involving additional 

26 Design analysis documents for sewage-treatment plants and other utility systems and facilities, 

including dispensaries, dated 1957–1961, may be found in boxes 76 and 78, access. no. 77-84-2400, 

TAD-RHA. 27 Ibid.; Memo, Lt Col Edward L. Waddell Jr., 12 May 62, sub: Post Completion Report on MAP 

Sites—Pakistan, box 51-83-8376, Farrell Papers; Data for Wilson, pp. 3–6. 28 Data for Wilson, pp. 3–6; Waddell, “Military Construction Aid in Iran,” p. 43; “Hamadan, Iran, 

Site Adapt Design,” Sep 62, p. 3; USACE, “Gulf District, Khaneh Area, Iran,” foreword by Lt Col 

Ellis E. Pickering, 1 Nov 58, p. 2, box 23, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC.
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 201

work at the U.S. Air Force’s communications facility near Peshawar. These contracts 

were relatively small: Two exceeded $1 million; two fell between $200,000 and 

$900,000; and one was less than $10,000.29

However large or small, administering construction contracts in Pakistan from 

Tehran challenged the Corps. The Gulf District had to wrestle with the cumbersome 

Pakistani system of tax-exemption certificates and contractor claims to recover 

taxes paid on construction materials that by government-to-government agreement 

qualified as tax free. District records speak of files “bulging with correspondence 

on contractor’s claims for tax refunds on contracts which were completed several 

years ago.”30 Travel between Tehran and construction sites in Pakistan was nearly 

as cumbersome as the tax situation. The air distance from Tehran to Karachi is 

one thousand two hundred miles; but the sites of most of the projects after 1961, 

Peshawar and Lahore, were seven hundred miles from Karachi. Navigating the 

customs and other entry procedures added hours to the trip. District personnel could 

make only one leg of the trip to Peshawar in a single day; they always had to stay 

the first night in Karachi. Thus, every trip between Peshawar and Tehran involved 

at least four days of travel.31

Tax laws and lengthy travel schedules were routine problems, but the outbreak 

of armed conflict was not routine. When war broke out between Pakistan and 

India in September 1965, Peshawar came under attack by Indian aircraft. The Gulf 

District evacuated dependents of Corps employees to Karamursel, Turkey, where 

the U.S. Air Force provided lodging and support. The Mediterranean Division sent 

an employee to Karamursel to provide assistance. As the fighting continued, making 

the return to Pakistan unsafe, dependents were given the option of returning to the 

States. In June 1966, the Air Force withdrew $2.3 million in construction projects 

at Peshawar, effectively ending Mediterranean Division work in Pakistan.32

Burma

The Gulf District also inherited the activities involving Burma where, in 

1959–1960, the State Department had sought help from the Mediterranean Division. 

Encouraged by the chief of engineers to give potential work in Burma the highest 

degree of attention, the Mediterranean Division had opened an area office in 

Rangoon in 1959. When progress toward a construction project for a highway 

between Rangoon and Mandalay languished, the division closed the area office in 

August 1960.

Still, the State Department continued to promote the idea of work by the Corps of 

Engineers in Burma. The Burmese government rejected the initial report on a possible 

29 Memo, Cameron, 29 Jan 61, pp. 5–7, Mil Files XXI-2-6, OH, HQ USACE; “History of the 

[Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 56–67. 30 Ibid., pp. 63–64.

31 Ltr, Col (Ret) Peter Grosz Jr. to authors, 18 Aug 64, attachment “USAF Communication Unit, 

Peshawar, West Pakistan,” to “Comments, Peshawar Area,” unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 32 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 27 Sep 65, 8 Nov 65, 27 Jun 66, Som-29, TAD-RHA.
202 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

highway from Rangoon to Mandalay as too expensive. The U.S. International 

Cooperation Administration then requested that the design company, Louis Berger & 

Associates, study more economical alternatives; Berger conducted this phase of the 

study between February and May 1961. On 10 April 1961, the Corps of Engineers 

signed an agreement with the International Cooperation Administration to continue 

to provide technical support for cooperative programs in Burma. Late in 1961, 

the ICA reorganized to become the U.S. Agency for International Development. 

The organization of the new agency slowed work, but the Office of the Chief of 

Engineers alerted the division engineer in Livorno to the possibility of assignments 

in Burma for 1962.33

The Gulf District already provided limited technical and managerial assistance 

to the Burmese government on construction at an intermediate college and for work 

at Rangoon Hospital. Throughout the spring of 1962, district personnel worked 

with Berger on a more economical highway plan. A coup d’état in March and the 

formation of a revolutionary council composed of military leaders who ruled Burma 

by decree delayed the program; but by December, Berger had delivered its revised 

engineering and feasibility studies for a highway.34

In March 1963, the Burmese government signed agreements authorizing design 

of a stretch of highway between Rangoon and Pegu that could be seen as an initial 

segment of the complete road to Mandalay. In April, the Mediterranean Division 

awarded a $337,000 contract to Berger and Associates for the detailed design of the 

42-mile segment of highway. Berger completed this design, and AID prepared a 

project agreement in late December 1963 for the Burmese to authorize construction 

of the road from Rangoon to Pegu.35

All of the conditions seemed to be in place for the issuance of a final contract; 

the Mediterranean Division issued a request for proposals and received bids. Then, 

on 26 May 1964, the division notified all contractors that “the Rangoon-Mandalay 

33 Maj Gen Keith R. Barney to Nauman, 23 Jan 62, Mil Files XXI-3-2, OH, HQ USACE. “Historical Report, U.S. Army Engineer District, Trans-East, 21 November 1955–30 June 1960,” Aug 60, p. 

133, box 51-83-8379 (hereafter cited as Hist Rpt–Trans-East), and Addendum for Period 1 Jul 60–31 

Dec 60, May 61, p. 10, box 51-83-8370; Project Implementation Order, Technical Services, Agency 

for International Development (AID), “Burma: Technical Support,” 16 Nov 62, box 51-83-8376; all 

in Farrell Papers. 34 Memo, Col Harry F. Cameron Jr., 21 Mar 62, sub: Periodic Letter Report to Chief of Engineers, 

Mil Files XXI-3-2; Memo, Col W. G. Trainer, 19 Dec 62, Mil Files XXI-3-2; Final Rpt, Rangoon-Pegu 

Highway Project, Union of Burma, [1964], pp. 1–2, Mil Files XII-49-7; all in OH, HQ USACE. 35 Col W. G. Trainer to Nauman, 9 Mar 63, box 51-83-8378, Farrell Papers; Louis Berger Inc., “Engineering Report—Phase IA to Agency for International Development: Rangoon-Mandalay Highway 

Project, Union of Burma,” vol. 1, Dec 62, pp. 5–6, box 51-83-8376, Farrell Papers; Office of the Chief 

of Engineers (OCE), “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1962–30 June 1963,” n.d., pp. 5, 35, Gen 

Files 5-1; Mediterranean Div, “Rangoon-Pegu Highway Project, Union of Burma, Final Rpt,” [1964], 

pp. 3–6, Mil Files XII-49-7; “Project Agreement Between the Agency for International Development 

(AID) . . . and the Ministry of National Planning . . . Burma: Rangoon-Mandalay Highway (Design—

Rangoon-Pegu),” 31 Dec 63, [to be] signed by U. Ohn Khin, Sec, Ministry of National Planning, and 

Donald P. Barces, Administrator, AID, box 51-83-8378, Farrell Papers; all in OH, HQ USACE.
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 203

Highway Project has been terminated.” The bids were never opened.36 The road 

construction had fallen victim to a deteriorating domestic situation in Burma and 

worsening relations between the U.S. and Burmese governments. Although the 

Mediterranean Division headquarters continued to provide technical assistance to 

the Burmese government concerning design and construction at Rangoon University, 

the canceled highway project was the Gulf District’s last effort in Burma.37

The Gulf District and Saudi Arabia, 1961–1963

The Gulf District had no role in Saudi Arabia until the Trans-East District 

closed. Beginning in January 1961, the Gulf District assumed responsibility for 

those projects begun after King Saud and President Eisenhower signed an agreement 

in April 1957. Construction of the most dramatic of those projects, the civil air 

terminal at Dhahran, was behind schedule but still well advanced when the Gulf 

District inherited it. The ceremony for the transfer of the terminal to the Saudi 

government took place on 20 September 1961 with all but a small amount of work 

completed. By contrast, a good deal of work remained on the less-visible projects 

to support the U.S. Military Training Mission in its development of the Royal Saudi 

Air Force (RSAF).

Training for the Royal Saudi Air Force

The $9 million program of construction for the U.S. Military Training Mission 

involved a training school complex at Riyadh and support facilities at Jiddah and 

Taif. (See Map 16.) Oman-Farnsworth-Wright won the contract in June 1960 for the 

training school in Riyadh and began developing the new installation. In addition to an 

access road and utilities, the school had sixteen buildings, including a headquarters 

for operations, airmen’s dormitories, maintenance and shop facilities, a mess hall, 

an academic building, bachelor officers quarters, and warehouse space. Although 

construction began in September 1960, very little work had been completed when the 

Gulf District took over the Riyadh resident office that supervised the project.38

36 Memo, L. W. McBride, 19 Feb 64, sub: Request for Technical Advice and Assistance, Burma, 

Mil Files XII-49-7; Memo, F. Heywood Marsh, Louis Berger, Inc., to H. P. Winn, OCE, 4 Mar 64, 

sub: Rangoon-Mandalay Highway Project, Burma, Pegu-Pyu Study, unmarked box; unlabeled doc 

dtd 24 Mar 64, unmarked box; Memo, Col John W. Burfening, 26 May 64, unmarked box; all in OH, 

HQ USACE. 37 Interviews with Lieutenant General Frederick J. Clarke (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief 

of Engineers, 1980), p. 129. Memo, Louis A. Cohen, AID, Ofc of the Rep to Burma, 3 Jun 64, Mil 

Files XII-49-7; OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1963–30 June 1964,” n.d., p. 32, and similar 

Rpt for FY 1966, p. 40, both in Gen Files 5-4; all in OH, HQ USACE. The division awarded a design 

contract for Rangoon University on 15 December 1964 in the amount of $195,800. Mediterranean 

Div Staff Mtg Min, 4 Jan 65, Som-29, TAD-RHA. 38 Ralph M. Parsons Co., “Design Analysis for Royal Saudi Air Force Training School,” 11 Jul 

58, p. I-1, box 40, access. no. 77-84-2400, TAD-RHA; Hist Rpt–Trans-East; Nauman to Itschner, 9 

Dec 60, p. 9; “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 73–75.
204 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

By September 1961, the contractor was nearly back on schedule and had 

completed two-thirds of the project in Riyadh. On 1 September, similar construction 

began at Jiddah for RSAF support facilities consisting of a headquarters building; 

an operations building; a hangar with supporting shops; concrete extensions of 

existing parking aprons; a paved, open storage area; ammunition-storage facilities; 

and other improvements.39 On 1 October, construction for the RSAF began at a third 

location—Taif. With construction progressing satisfactorily and nearing completion 

in Riyadh, the Gulf District closed its Riyadh resident office and moved its personnel 

39 “Summary of Construction Contracts in Saudi Arabia,” 15 Nov 61, p. 15, box 24, access. no. 

77-92-0001, WNRC; Architect Engineer Consultants Inc., “Design Analysis, Operations Building & 

Headquarters Building (Jiddah),” Jun 61, p. 2, and “Design Analysis, Link Trainer Building, Jiddah 

Airfield,” Jul 61, pp. 1–3, both in box 40, access. no. 77-84-2400, TAD-RHA.

RIYADH

AŢ ŢĀ’IF

JIDDAH

DHAHRAN

Medina

R E D S E A

G U L F O F O M A N

G U L F O F A D E N

S OCOT RA

E G Y P T E G Y P T

S U D A N

YEME N

ADEN PRO T E C T O R A T E

I R A Q IRAN

IRAN

OMAN

Q A T A R

BAHRAIN

KUWAIT

ISRAEL

E T HIOPIA

J O R D A N

O

M

A N

T R U C I A L O M A N

FRENCH TERRITO R Y

OF AFARS AND ISSA

SAUDI ARABIA

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND AID PROGRAM

GULF DISTRICT

1957–1964

Royal Saudi Air Force Site, 1958–1961

Civil Air Terminal, 1957–1964

AID Project, 1963–1964

0

0 300 Miles

300 Kilometers

Map 16
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 205

to Jiddah, where they could also supervise the work in Taif. In September 1962, the 

Army engineers delivered the completed facilities in Riyadh to the U.S. Military 

Training Mission for turnover to the Saudi government. With work complete at 

Jiddah and Taif as well, the Corps of Engineers closed all offices in Saudi Arabia 

on 14 December 1962; headquarters staff in the Gulf District in Tehran assumed 

responsibility for supervising work on the remaining project in Saudi Arabia: repair 

of the Dhahran Air Terminal.40

Repairing the Dhahran Air Terminal

Although the Saudi Arabian government took possession of the civil air terminal 

in Dhahran in September 1961, a major structural problem kept the Gulf District 

involved at the terminal for several more years. Even before completion, leaks 

appeared in the roof of the terminal’s main building. In November 1961, Corps 

personnel raised the problem with the design firm, Ralph M. Parsons Company. 

Parsons responded that engineers had observed deviations from the specifications in 

the construction contractor’s installation of the roof, had brought these to the attention 

of the area engineer, and had sent a copy of the correspondence to the division. 

Parsons suggested dismantling the roof and reinstalling it according to the original 

design. The company also suggested what it described as “a more expeditious and 

probably less satisfactory ‘fix’”: repair and modification of the existing installation. 

In the early spring of 1962, it became apparent that the roof was inadequate to handle 

the rapid runoff of water from heavy downpours. Both the construction contractor, 

OFW, and the area engineer in Saudi Arabia identified the problem as a fault of the 

original design, which had not taken into account the intensity of the seasonal rains. 

In late April, an inspection team from the Gulf District confirmed the judgment 

of the area engineer. The Gulf District’s construction and engineering personnel 

therefore sought to devise a flexible and efficient method to drain the flat areas of 

the roof where water accumulated and created the leaks.41

While the Gulf District sought a solution, the Corps again brought the matter 

to the Parsons Company. In mid-June 1962, Parsons reasserted that its design was 

correct and that any fault must derive from improper installation. With the prospect 

of a lengthy battle to establish legal responsibility, the U.S. embassy in Saudi 

Arabia stepped in, deciding that the political importance of rapid satisfaction for 

40 DF, Patrick E. Tulley, 3 Dec 62, sub: Change of Headquarters, Saudi Arabia Area, box 51-

84-5389, Farrell Papers; Memo, Col W. G. Trainer, 19 Dec 62, sub: Periodic Letter Report to Chief 

of Engineers, Mil Files XXI-3-2, OH, HQ USACE; “Summary of Construction Contracts in Saudi 

Arabia,” 15 Nov 61, pp. 4–6; Waddell, Continuing Memo to Trainer, 10–12 Sep 62. 41 Memo, C. W. Brandt, Ralph M. Parsons Co., to Cameron, 18 Dec 61, sub: Roof Deficiencies, 

Dhahran Civil Air Terminal, box 24, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; “Final Construction Narrative 

Report, Roof Modification–Dhahran Civil Air Terminal, Saudi Arabia,” n.d., p. 1, box 51-83-8376, 

Farrell Papers. 
206 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

the Saudi Arabians was more significant than recovering money from either of the 

contractors.42

Accordingly, the Office of the Chief of Engineers arranged with the Agency 

for International Development to make money available for a contract to design a 

modification of the roof. The firm selected, Commonwealth Service International 

Inc., submitted designs in January 1963 to promote more effective runoff of heavy 

rains. The Gulf District reviewed the new design in March and suggested only 

minor changes. In June 1963, the district negotiated a construction contract with 

the same company for a lump sum of $32,000 (the redesign had cost $3,000). By 

June 1964, all of the work was done. As Parsons had predicted, the repair did not 

entirely solve the problem of leaks. Expansion and contraction of the structural 

system caused deterioration of flashing and seals. There was no way to identify 

where that deterioration would cause leaks until after a rain, so the roof remained 

a problem.43

On 1 May 1964, as completion of the repair to the civil air terminal approached, 

the Gulf District transferred its responsibilities for all construction in Saudi Arabia 

to the Mediterranean Division headquarters.44

Highways in Afghanistan

The largest new program that the Gulf District undertook in the 1960s was 

highway construction in Afghanistan. A kingdom in the 1950s, Afghanistan shared 

borders with the Soviet Union in the north and Iran in the west. In the east, a narrow 

corridor of Afghanistan’s territory situated between the Soviet Union and Pakistan 

touched the People’s Republic of China. (Map 17) To the south and west of that 

eastern corridor, Afghanistan shared a long border with Pakistan, with whom 

relations were strained during the 1950s and 1960s and where fighting broke out 

periodically. The Himalayan Mountains, with peaks rising to twenty-one thousand 

feet, covered much of Afghanistan. The average elevation throughout the country 

was four thousand feet. The population in 1950, around 12 million, was divided about 

equally between inhabitants of villages scattered around the country and nomadic, 

pastoral tribes who lived in tents and traveled annually between the mountains and 

the plains. Ninety percent of the nation’s income came from agriculture, with grapes, 

raisins, and mulberries as the principal products. The land was arid, and irrigation 

42 “Final Construction Narrative Report, Roof Modification–Dhahran Civil Air Terminal,” n.d., 

pp. 2–3. 43 “Final Construction Narrative Report, Roof Modification–Dhahran Civil Air Terminal,” n.d.; 

“History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 73–74; Emil L. Blondell and Col John 

E. Walker, Trip Rpt of MDD Part to Saudi Arabia, 21 Aug–1 Sep 65, 7 Sep 65, p. 9, box 51-84-5389, 

Farrell Papers; Interv, Moorhus with Grosz, 19 Mar 96, p. 43. Grosz reports that the roof leaked in 

1978 when he went through the terminal. 44 OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1963–30 June 1964,” p. 92.
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 207

was maintained through an ancient system of underground tunnels and ditches. The 

strongest unifying element for the country’s population is the Islamic religion.45

Given Afghanistan’s strategic location, the U.S. State Department began a 

program in the late 1950s to promote stronger and more positive relations between 

the two countries, in part to counter Soviet influence. American policymakers 

focused on improving the country’s poor system of roads to encourage internal trade 

and political cohesion. Afghanistan’s rudimentary highway system consisted of a 

1,700-mile circular road with dirt and rock roadbeds linking principal towns and 

cities. From Kandahar in the south, the roads ran northeast to Kabul and northwest to 

Herat. The main road then looped across the northern tier of the country to connect 

Herat and Kabul. Spurs from this great elliptical route extended toward Iran to the 

west and Pakistan to the southeast.46

45 H. A. Swanson, “High Roads of Afghanistan,” Military Engineer (November-December 1959): 

462–63. 46 An excellent discussion of the Kabul-Kandahar highway program may be found in Frank N. 

Schubert, “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Afghanistan’s Highways, 1960–1967,” Journal of 

Construction Engineering and Management (September 1991): 445–59; Swanson, “High Roads of 

Afghanistan,” p. 463.

Indus River

AREA

UNDER

DISPUTE

U NION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

PAKISTAN

PAKISTAN

C H I N A

INDIA

IRAN

Herāt

Meymaneh

Mazār-e Sharīf

Feyzābāb

Doshi

Chārīkār

KABUL

Ghaznī

Qalāt

Mukur

Spīn Baldak Chaman

Jalālābād

Quetta

Kandahār

Farāh

Shīndand

Islām Qala

Dilārām Girishk

0 200

0 200 Kilometers

Miles

AFGHANISTAN

HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS

GULF DISTRICT

1960–1967

FY 1960

FY 1961

FY 1962

Map 17
208 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

In 1957, the International Cooperation Administration sponsored a study of 

Afghanistan’s transportation system; the next year, the ICA assisted the Afghan 

government in organizing a program of road maintenance. In February 1959, the 

ICA selected the firm of Kenneth R. White Consulting Engineers Inc. of Denver, 

Colorado, to draft a design to convert the road from Kabul to Kandahar into a 

modern, two-lane, bituminous-surface highway.47

Although the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had expressed interest in the ICA’s 

highway construction project in Afghanistan during the winter of 1958–1959, the 

Corps’ ultimate involvement resulted from a fortuitous coincidence. The U.S. 

ambassador to Afghanistan, Henry A. Byroade, was a former Army engineer officer. 

A 1937 graduate of West Point, Byroade had served in World War II. In 1949, he 

resigned as a colonel and joined the State Department as a Foreign Service officer. 

As ambassador to Afghanistan in 1959, Byroade became impatient with the lack 

of progress under the ICA, especially since the Soviet Union had an active aid 

47 Swanson, “High Roads of Afghanistan,” p. 463; “Technical Assistance Project History and 

Analysis Report of the Construction of the Kabul-Kandahar Highway, Afghanistan Regional Transit 

Project, Afghanistan, for AID, Washington, D.C.,” Nov 67, pp. 3, 8, box 51-83-8378, Farrell Papers 

(hereafter cited as Technical Assistance Hist: Kabul-Kandahar Hwy, Nov 67); Intervs, Lynn Alperin 

and Niels Nilson with Brig Gen (Ret) Philip T. Boerger, 19–20 Jul 82, 9–10 May 83, p. 126.

Construction of the Afghan highway, ca. 1966
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 209

program in the country yielding results visible to the Afghanis. In a January 1960 

cable, Byroade urged the ICA to engage a team from OCE to study the construction 

components of the program in Afghanistan and to make recommendations. At 

a 2 February meeting involving representatives from the State Department, the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, ICA, and OCE, the Corps agreed to evaluate 

the projects.48

A team of three men from the Corps of Engineers traveled to Afghanistan in 

early March and reported their findings on 30 March 1960. In forwarding the report, 

the chief of engineers, General Itschner, expressed his willingness to assist the State 

Department, provided that the Corps was given an effective degree of control over 

the design and construction. Ambassador Byroade continued to press for Corps 

involvement, believing that “the ICA cannot do construction projects overseas as 

now constituted and cannot get themselves constituted.”49 In July 1960, the Corps 

and the ICA reached a tentative agreement; in August, a second Corps team visited 

Afghanistan to review the White engineering firm’s design for the road between 

Kabul and Kandahar. The Corps team decided that Byroade’s negative assessment 

of the ICA was right: The ICA had based its plans on faulty assumptions and had 

as a consequence written bad contracts.50

Over the summer, the Corps began to put in place the organizational structure that 

would allow the Mediterranean Division to supervise road building in Afghanistan. 

The division engineer, Brig. Gen. William R. Shuler, urged his Trans-East District 

engineer to “exert your persuasive influence” on one of the district employees, 

Thurston B. Wheeler, to accept the assignment of overseeing the Afghanistan project. 

Shuler described Wheeler, who had been assistant area engineer in the short-lived 

Burma field office, as eminently qualified for the job because of his initiative, 

personality, and field experience. Shuler called the assignment “the ‘hottest’ project 

we have in the Division at the present time, and it must go!”51

On 10 October 1960, Wheeler officially became the area engineer for the 

newly established Afghanistan Area Office at Kabul. On 1 November, the Corps of 

Engineers signed an agreement with the ICA that confirmed the Corps’ responsibility 

over the operational, technical, and administrative aspects of the design and 

construction of the highway from Kabul to Kandahar. On 23 December, the ICA 

also turned over authority to the Corps to supervise the remaining design under the 

agreement with the White company.52 With the Trans-East District on the eve of 

its deactivation, the Gulf District took over administration of the construction in 

Afghanistan. 

48 Technical Assistance Hist: Kabul-Kandahar Hwy, Nov 67, pp. 3–4; Schubert, “U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers and Afghanistan’s Highways,” p. 448. 49 Itschner to Shuler, 25 Apr 60, Mil Files XXI-3-1, OH, HQ USACE.

50 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” p. 68; Schubert, “U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers and Afghanistan’s Highways,” p. 450. 51 Shuler to Northington, 12 Jul 60, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE.

52 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” p. 71. 
210 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Initially, General Itschner wanted to minimize the visible participation of the 

military in Afghanistan. He instructed the Mediterranean Division engineer to limit 

the involvement of uniformed officers and to avoid sending any military personnel 

into the country “except in case a serious problem develops” or upon the request 

of the ambassador.53 This restriction complicated staffing the Corps offices in 

Afghanistan, as did the host government’s restrictions on privileges extended to 

third-country nationals.54 The concern about a visible American military presence 

passed, and four of Wheeler’s five successors as area engineer were Corps of 

Engineer officers.55

To supervise the construction, the division officially activated the Kandahar 

Resident Office on 1 January 1961. The Americans in the office included Charlie 

Hyman as resident engineer, a secretary, and a contract equipment specialist. To 

fill out his staff, Hyman handpicked several third-country nationals, including two 

Englishmen, one of whom, Art Chapman, became Hyman’s deputy. Two Germans, 

Wilhelm Voelker and Manfred Mertin, remained in Afghanistan for the duration 

of the initial highway construction project. A third German worked as a surveyor 

on the project for a brief time with a Greek surveyor, John Vrettos. Another Greek 

and several Filipinos completed the staff.56 Hyman, Chapman, Voelker, Mertin, and 

several other area office staff came from positions in the Gulf District. The Afghan 

government initially denied visas to many of the third-country nationals, thereby 

delaying the opening of the office in Kandahar until February 1961. Even after the 

initial contingent received visas, the government of Afghanistan held up approval 

of later arrivals.57

Kandahar–Spin Baldak Highway

Once the Kandahar Resident Office’s staff arrived, they immediately began to 

oversee the construction of one part of the highway system, a 96-mile spur from 

Kandahar southeast to the border with Pakistan at Spin Baldak. (See Map 17.) 

The ICA had awarded a $3 million construction contract on this project to A. L. 

53 Memo, Brig Gen Clarence Renshaw, 29 Aug 60, sub: Afghanistan Project, Mil Files XXI-3-1, 

OH, HQ USACE. 54 Nauman to Itschner, 9 Dec 60, p. 7.

55 Technical Assistance Hist: Kabul-Kandahar Hwy, Nov 67, pp. 4–5; “History of the [Gulf] District, 

March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 73–74; Schubert, “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Afghanistan’s 

Highways,” p. 456. 56 Interv, Frank N. Schubert with Wilhelm Voelker, 25–26 May 88, pp. 6–7, 11.

57 “Final Construction Narrative Report, Kandahar–Spin Baldak Highway,” n.d., p. 2, box 35–Afghan, TAD-RHA; Memos, Cameron, 29 Jan 61, p. 3, and 30 Mar 61, p. 5, sub: Bi-Monthly Letter 

to the Chief of Engineers, both in Mil Files XXI-2-6, OH, HQ USACE; Technical Assistance Hist: 

Kabul-Kandahar Hwy, Nov 67, pp. 4–5; “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 

73–74; Memo, Waddell to Cameron, sub: Continuing Memorandum, 9 Apr thru 14 Apr 62, p. 6, box 

51-83-8376, Farrell Papers.
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 211

Dougherty Overseas Inc.; on 31 December 1960, the Gulf District engineer issued 

the notice to proceed.58

The existing gravel road along the route had been constructed in 1948–1949 

by Morrison-Knudsen. In general, the Dougherty crew followed the same track. 

Paving began in early August 1961. In mid-November, light rains that fell in the 

Kandahar area caused the rise of gypsum salts through the asphalt on about a 

twelve-mile stretch of the highway that over several days weakened the surface. 

The project supervisors began testing the pavement; on 16 December, the district 

issued a stop order on construction for the entire road because of the weakening of 

the road on that twelve-mile segment. Later heavy rains did not increase the length 

of the segment affected by the gypsum salts, and investigations completed by early 

March 1962 revealed that no similar problem existed with the remaining fifty-one 

miles of road. On 10 March, the district lifted the stop order for all but the affected 

twelve miles. In the area that had showed the salts, Dougherty solved the problem 

by adding a crushed aggregate base and improving drainage.59

The stop order and the repairs delayed completion of this highway beyond the 

original date of July 1962; but the contractor finished the work and the Corps turned 

the road over to the ICA on 25 October. By the end of October, the local workforce 

of almost two hundred fifty had disbanded and the Dougherty personnel had all left 

Afghanistan. On 1 December, Ambassador Byroade formally transferred the road 

to the government of Afghanistan. The project cost $3.86 million.60

Kabul-Kandahar Highway

Whereas the Kandahar–Spin Baldak highway had been ready for construction 

when the Gulf District took on management of the project late in 1960, the major 

portion of the Afghanistan highway, the 300-mile road from Kabul to Kandahar, was 

still in the design stage. On 20 February 1961, the district advertised its intentions 

to solicit proposals for construction on the road. A few days later, Mediterranean 

Division and district personnel decided to divide construction into six segments 

because lack of money made it impossible to fund the entire road in one contract. 

The solicitation asked for bids on all six segments but reserved the right to award 

contracts for segments at different times.61

58 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 69–70. 

59 “Final Construction Narrative Report, Kandahar–Spin Baldak Highway,” p. 3; Memo, Cameron, 

21 Mar 62, p. 4; “Kandahar–Spin Baldak Highway, Afghanistan: Special Investigation,” Feb–Mar 62, p. 

2, box 35–Afghan, TAD-RHA; “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 69–70. 60 Memo, Trainer, 19 Dec 62; “Final Construction Narrative Report, Kandahar–Spin Baldak Highway,” pp. 1, 4–5; “Afghan Regional Transit Project,” 31 Oct 63, p. 1, box 27, access. no. 77-92-0001, 

WNRC; “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 69–70. 61 Technical Assistance Hist: Kabul-Kandahar Hwy, Nov 67, pp. 8, 12; Schubert, “U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers and Afghanistan’s Highways,” p. 452. Technical Assistance Hist: Kabul-Kandahar Hwy, 

“Afghan Regional Transit Project” and “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 

69–74, provide the basic facts concerning the Afghanistan highway project. The information in this 

entire section draws on these sources, supplemented by the other documents cited individually.
212 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Three bidders submitted proposals, the low bid coming from a joint venture 

operating under the name Afghanistan Highway Constructors (AHC). Six firms 

comprised the joint venture: Oman Construction Company, R. P. Farnsworth and 

Company, Wright Contracting Company, J. A. Jones Construction Company, 

Morrison-Knudsen Overseas Inc., and Peter Kiewit Sons Company. After negotiations, the Corps awarded a $17.7 million construction contract to AHC for the first 

two segments; the contract allowed the government to award the remaining segments 

within a year. AHC signed the formal contract at a ceremony held 21 June 1961 in 

the office of the Royal Government of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Works in 

Kabul. Ambassador Byroade participated in the ceremony and the reception, which 

the deputy minister of public works, the director of the ICA mission, and the Gulf 

District and Afghanistan Area Office engineers attended.

The contractor planned to transport construction equipment and materials from 

the Pakistani port of Karachi to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and over the new 

road from Spin Baldak to Kandahar. AHC set up a base camp, storage and repair 

facilities at Kandahar, and a second construction camp at Kabul. A groundbreaking 

ceremony on 17 August 1961 launched work on the first segment, a high-visibility 

section from the capital Kabul to the southwest. This segment of forty-one miles 

was the high end of the road, climbing from six thousand feet at Kabul to eight 

thousand three hundred feet near Ghazni; it was the portion most susceptible to 

seasonal suspension of construction because of bad weather. Work also began on 

the second segment, a portion rising gently from Kandahar (at three thousand four 

hundred feet) to the higher elevations in the northeast.62

Before the contractor had fully mobilized, a new episode in the periodic clash 

of arms between Afghanistan and Pakistan broke out, provoking the Afghan 

government to close the border between the two countries on 6 September 1961. 

This cut off the transportation route from Karachi to Kandahar over which supplies 

for the construction would normally travel. With the exception of a brief opening 

in the winter of 1962, the border remained closed until July 1963, when the two 

countries restored diplomatic relations and reopened their common border. Even 

then, local conditions prevented any shipment of asphalt until September 1963. 

By curtailing the shipment of goods from Pakistan, the border closing restricted 

construction operations for two years.

By late September 1961, AHC had run out of fuel, supplies, and spare parts 

and could not proceed. With the support of the U.S. government, the contractor 

sought to procure materials within Afghanistan and over alternate routes. On 20 

November, with no prospect for a quick resolution to the conflict, the Corps ordered 

the contractor to suspend all shipments bound for the Pakistani port of Karachi. 

Materials already en route at the moment of suspension were stored in Karachi upon 

arrival. On 24 December, the district learned that the Afghan government would 

62 Memo, Cameron, 20 Dec 61, p. 3; Interv, William C. Baldwin with Col (Ret) Harry F. Cameron 

Jr., 27–29 Mar 89, p. 301; C. M. Messall, “Modern Highways for Afghanistan,” Military Engineer

(November-December 1963): 424; Schubert, “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Afghanistan’s 

Highways,” p. 452. 
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 213

open the border for a limited period in late January 1962. The contractor moved 

the supplies that had arrived in Karachi to the Pakistani border town of Chaman. 

On 29 January, the border opened for eight weeks and AHC moved many needed 

supplies into Afghanistan. The contractor still had to develop alternate routes for 

transporting equipment and supplies, principally through Iran to Mashhad, across 

a primitive road to Herat, Afghanistan, and on to Kandahar.63

By May 1962, AHC had completed grading on ten miles of roadway south of 

Kabul although lack of materials and spare parts had sharply reduced their ability to 

continue. At the south end of the road, the contractor had graded about fifteen miles, 

established a construction camp, and was poised to continue with “great dispatch” 

as soon as the stop orders on procurement were lifted.64

With progress stalled on the two segments of the highway already under contract, 

the Corps of Engineers decided to exercise its option to award contracts for the 

remaining segments. Corps administrators reasoned that finding new bidders would 

be difficult given the closure of the easiest supply route from Pakistan. Delaying 

award until the border opened would probably involve much higher prices. In 

addition, the Mediterranean Division personnel judged the AHC quote of $22.8 

million for the remaining sections to be fair. The State Department also wanted 

to reassure the government of Afghanistan that the United States would honor its 

commitment to build the entire highway from Kabul to Kandahar. On 6 June 1962, 

the Agency for International Development, which had succeeded the International 

Cooperative Administration, announced award of the remaining work to Afghanistan 

Highway Constructors.

Within days of closing the contract for the middle sections of the road, the 

Gulf District directed Afghanistan Highway Constructors to suspend work on the 

first segment out of Kabul. Because of the lack of supplies, AHC could not sustain 

effective work at two locations; thus, the district chose to concentrate all work on 

the second segment from Kandahar. The slowdown of construction meant that 

Thurston Wheeler had to notify his staff in the Afghanistan Area Office of possible 

reductions in force. Wheeler protested the reductions, arguing that “the mission 

accepted by the Corps of Engineers in Afghanistan can[not] be accomplished with 

the proposed staff.”65

Although the limit on supplies obtainable through Iran delayed progress, AID 

asked the Gulf District to issue to AHC a limited notice to proceed on another 

segment at the southwest end of the road. The same directive, dated 24 October 

1962, authorized AHC to purchase equipment and supplies for all remaining 

segments of the construction and to store them in Karachi until the border opened. 

63 Interv, Moorhus with Grosz, 19 Mar 96, pp. 28–30.

64 Memo, J. F. Chandler, 28 May 62, sub: Post-Completion Inspection Mil. Construction, Pakistan 

and General Inspection of Construction Underway in Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia, 

p. 4, box 51-83-8378, Farrell Papers. 65 Memo, T. B. Wheeler, 23 Jul 62, sub: Reduction in Force Afghanistan Area, box 51-83-8376, 

Farrell Papers.
214 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

The contractor also received instructions to obtain six thousand tons of asphalt and 

to store it at the Pakistani border.66

AID decided in early February 1963 to modify specifications from asphalt to 

gravel surface for the remaining segments. Without the change, funds would not 

have covered the costs of completing the full length of the highway. By the spring, 

the quantity of supplies arriving through Iran had increased to the point that the 

division engineer, Colonel Nauman, could report that AHC’s work was progressing 

“extremely well.”67 The segment beginning at Kandahar was turned over to the 

Afghan government on 29 October 1963. The contractor completed its neighboring 

segments ten months later. In November 1964, AHC completed the first segment 

in the north, which it had begun over three years earlier.

As the work progressed, the contractor and the Gulf District personnel were able 

to make more accurate evaluations of site conditions. Based on new information, they 

agreed to strengthen beyond the original design specification the foundation of road 

sections at the highest elevations in the middle segments. These negotiations were 

part of settling the contractor’s claim for the increased costs imposed by the border 

closing. The negotiators reduced the $5 million claim to $3 million and conceded 

AHC a 355-day extension of the deadline for completing the first two segments. 

66 Wilson to Nauman, 25 Oct 62, Mil Files XXI-3-2, OH, HQ USACE; Technical Assistance Hist: 

Kabul-Kandahar Hwy, p. 19. 67 Nauman to Maj Gen J. B. Lampert, 14 May 63, p. 2, Mil Files XXI-3-3, OH, HQ USACE.

Laying asphalt during construction of the Afghan highway
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 215

Lt. Col. Peter Grosz Jr., the deputy district engineer, served as chief negotiator to 

resolve the AHC claim for “delays in transportation.” This unusual provision in the 

contract entitled the contractor to compensation for the “ripple effect” of delays in 

work incurred because the closing of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border hindered the 

transport of equipment and materials. In the negotiations, AHC determined that, 

although AID had modified specifications from asphalt to gravel, they had funds 

available to spray the gravel road with a double bituminous surface treatment.68

Because the middle stretch of the highway was farthest from the contractor’s 

base camps and at the highest elevations, these segments were the last completed. 

Before the work was finished, the port of Karachi closed again in September 1965, 

this time because of the outbreak of fighting between Pakistan and India. Fortunately, 

AHC already had the supplies needed to finish the project. On 16 July 1966, the 

contractor turned over the final portion of the highway. 

In addition to the roadbed, paving, and bituminous treatment, AHC constructed 

forty-eight bridges and widened one existing bridge. The construction involved 

another thirty-two concrete sections where seasonal waters could overflow the 

road without washing it out. The construction contractor also had to respect ancient 

irrigation practices observed by the local population. To facilitate the customary 

distribution of water carried in troughs that cut across the line of the highway, the 

contractor installed about one hundred miles of corrugated sheet-metal drainage 

culverts and irrigation ditches and another fifty miles of furrow ditches.69

Over the duration of the highway’s construction, AHC had averaged forty-nine 

American and thirty third-country national supervisors to manage a local labor 

force that reached three thousand at its maximum and averaged about one thousand 

six hundred. The Afghan workers proved diligent and quick to learn, and many 

took advantage of the training programs AHC offered.70 They also maintained an 

exemplary record for safety, which the U.S. National Safety Council recognized 

by giving Afghanistan Highway Constructors honor awards in 1962, 1963, and 

1964. In the two succeeding years, the National Safety Council presented AHC 

with awards for “The Best Record in the Highway Construction Industry” when 

laborers on the highway worked over 2.1 million man-hours between October 1964 

and March 1965 and 2.57 million man-hours between August 1965 and February 

1966 without a lost-time accident.

The Afghanistan Area Office supervised the highway projects for the Gulf 

District through resident offices at Kabul and Kandahar. In November 1961, the 

Kandahar office became the Southern Resident Office and the office at Kabul 

became the Northern Resident Office, each supervising a portion of the Kabul68 Interv, Moorhus with Grosz, 19 Mar 96, pp. 30–31.

69 Statistics from Technical Assistance Hist: Kabul-Kandahar Hwy, p. 23. The explanation of 

why these ditches were necessary comes from Interv, Schubert with Voelker, 25–26 May 88, pp. 

52–53, 96–98. 70 Memo, Cameron, 7 Feb 67, sub: Certificate of Appreciation for Patriotic Civilian Service Under 

Contract DA-92-144-ENG-73 for Construction of the Kabul to Kandahar Highway, box 27, access. no. 

77-92-0001, WNRC; Intervs, Alperin and Nilson with Boerger, 19–20 Jul 82, 9–10 May 83, p. 122.
216 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Kandahar highway. When the Kandahar–Spin Baldak construction project ended 

in December 1962, many of the staff who had worked on that project continued on 

the Kandahar-Kabul highway. During 1963, the Afghanistan Area Office reached 

its maximum strength of fifty-seven.

In August 1965, division headquarters in Livorno took over contracting officer 

authority for the work in Afghanistan; in September, the Afghanistan Area Office 

moved from Kabul south to Ghazni. By the spring of 1966, with only one segment 

left to turn over to the Agency for International Development, the area office staff 

had dwindled to six Americans (including two military officers) and six third-country 

nationals.71

On 13 July 1966, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman represented 

President Lyndon B. Johnson at the ceremony near Ghazni marking the turnover of 

the Kabul-Kandahar highway to the Afghan government. Col. Harry F. Cameron, 

who had been the Gulf District engineer between 1960 and 1962 at the outset of 

the project, represented the Corps of Engineers at the turnover ceremony. He had 

returned to the Mediterranean Division in March 1966 as division engineer. The 

highway cost a total of $42.9 million, of which $39.3 million came from the U.S. 

government. The Afghan government paid the balance in Afghani currency, a portion 

71 Chaffin to Cassidy, 28 Sep 65, p. 3, Mil Files XXI-3-4, OH, HQ USACE; Technical Assistance 

Hist: Kabul-Kandahar Hwy, pp. 22–23, 30, for this and the following two paragraphs. See also Memo, 

Chaffin, 19 Jan 66, sub: Organization to Accomplish Construction in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, 

p. 2, box 682798, Record Group (RG) 77, access. no. 77-004, Federal Records Center, Bayonne, N.J. 

(hereafter cited as Bayonne FRC).

Multiplex of culverts constructed for the Afghan highway, July 1967
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 217

of which came from the sale of surplus American wheat under the provisions of 

PL 480. The Corps of Engineers collected $4.45 million in fees for engineering, 

design, supervision, and administration. The compensation paid to the Corps for 

its supervisory work amounted to less than the Mediterranean Division had saved 

on the project by negotiating the construction contract for $6 million less than the 

original bid.

Very early in the construction, in March 1962, a Corps engineer made a trip 

by land rover from Kandahar to Kabul. With over 90 percent of the bridges on the 

existing road washed out by floodwaters, the trip took twenty-two punishing hours 

at an average of fifteen miles per hour, a speed that was “definitely abusive to the 

vehicle over most of the road.” After completion of the road, the Kabul Times

reported that the trip between the two cities took six hours. The same newspaper, 

using statistical data provided by the United Nations, calculated that the KabulKandahar highway would save shippers $60 every time ten tons of goods passed 

between the two cities.

Herat–Islam Qala Highway

The Mediterranean Division oversaw construction of a third highway in 

Afghanistan—the road running seventy-five miles west from Herat to the city 

of Islam Qala on the Iranian frontier. (See Map 17.) When the clash between 

Afghanistan and Pakistan closed their common border in September 1961 and made 

trade along established routes to the east impossible, Afghanistan became acutely 

aware that the camel track from Herat to Iran, the only road that led to the west 

from Herat, was totally inadequate. With advice from AID, the Afghan government 

included improvement of this road in its five-year plan of 1962. The Mediterranean 

Division began discussing a feasibility study concerning this segment of highway 

during the summer of 1962 and formally initiated the study in April 1963. Division 

personnel, supported by the Gulf District staff, delivered a preliminary design of 

the proposed road from Herat to Islam Qala to AID in December.72

In late September 1964, Louis Berger Inc. won the contract for the final design 

and preparation of specifications for construction of the new highway; but another 

year elapsed before the AID office in Afghanistan received the plans and specifications. In an agreement signed in April 1966, the Afghan government designated the 

Corps of Engineers as its agent in the process of selecting a construction contractor. 

Later that month, the Gulf District issued a request for proposals with a due date 

in June. Only one company bid on the contract: the joint venture of Afghanistan 

Highway Constructors that had built the highway from Kabul to Kandahar. It took 

nearly two months to negotiate a satisfactory contract with AHC for the 75-mile 

72 Waddell, Continuing Memo to Trainer, 10–12 Sep 62, p. 3; Schubert, “U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers and Afghanistan’s Highways,” p. 456; Waddell to Cameron, Continuing Memo, 9–14 Apr 

62, p. 3; Nauman to Wilson, 8 Jul 63, Mil Files XXI-3-3, OH, HQ USACE; OCE, “Annual Historical 

Summary, 1 July 1963–30 June 1964,” n.d.
218 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

segment of highway from Herat west to the Iranian border. The agreed price came 

to $8 million, paid with funds from AID loans.73

Work on the Herat–Islam Qala highway began on 27 August 1966. By the 

end of November, the contractor had completed construction of a base camp near 

the Iranian border. AHC had also completed drainage structures and earthwork 

emplacement for about twenty-eight miles of the road and poured footings for a 

bridge about sixty miles west of Herat over the Hari River, which the road parallels 

for much of its length. When inclement winter weather halted work on the road in 

mid-December, the contractor continued to crush and stockpile rock.74

Construction resumed in March 1967 and progressed rapidly and ahead of 

schedule. All but the final surfacing was in place on the first thirty miles of the road 

west of Herat when, on 17 April, a series of violent thunderstorms occurred. Over 

a span of ten days, the road suffered extensive damage from four separate flash 

floods. Work stopped; designers went to work to modify the drainage system; and 

negotiators for the contractor, the Corps of Engineers, the Afghan government, and 

the Agency for International Development worked on a new price for the contract 

to take into account the additional work.75

In early May 1967, redesign and repair work began; but AHC soon received a 

stop order on the repairs until an agreement could be reached on the renegotiated 

costs. Construction continued on the new parts of the road until, on 24 July, AHC 

received an order to stop work. Available funds were nearly exhausted, and no agreement on the costs of repair had been reached. Designers adjusted the requirements for 

paving, drainage, and other elements of the specifications to cut costs. Paul Wheeler, 

a civilian engineer with the Mediterranean Division, recalls that negotiations with 

AHC took place in the field. It “was like what they do in the States when there’s 

hurricane damage to be repaired. . . . It was a real fast negotiation.”76

With costs trimmed as drastically as possible, the division issued a notice to 

resume work on 11 August 1967. To avoid the costs of delays due to late shipment 

of materials, the Afghan government arranged to have the Afghan Air Authority loan 

asphalt and other materials to AHC. The contractor put his crews on eleven-hour 

days and seven-day weeks to finish the job as rapidly as possible and to reduce 

overhead. 

On 9 October 1967, AHC crews laid the final crushed-stone layer to the Iranian 

border; by 12 October, all major construction was completed—ten months ahead 

of schedule. The Royal Government of Afghanistan accepted the Herat–Islam Qala 

highway in a formal ceremony on March 1968. Over the period of the contract, 

73 Maj Gen R. G. MacDonnell to Chaffin, 27 Dec 65, p. 2, Mil Files XXI-3-4; Cameron to Cassidy, 

8 Jun, 6 Sep 66, both in Mil Files XXI-3-5; Chaffin to Cassidy, 9 Mar 66, p. 2, Mil Files XXI-3-5; 

OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1965–30 June 1966,” n.d., p. 43, Gen Files 5-4; all in OH, 

HQ USACE. 74 “Final Narrative Report of Herat–Islam Qala Highway,” 16 Dec 67, box 51-83-8378, Farrell 

Papers. Unless otherwise indicated, information on the Herat–Islam Qala highway construction comes 

from this document. 75 Cameron to Cassidy, 7 Jun 67.

76 Interv, Moorhus with Paul S. Wheeler, 31 May 95, p. 4. 
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 219

the contractor’s payroll averaged 16 Americans, 20 third-country nationals, and 

about 930 local nationals. The Afghanistan Area Office employed a maximum of 5 

Americans, 6 third-country nationals, and 24 Afghanis. The total cost of constructing 

the road had risen to $9.5 million with the repair and additional design necessitated 

by the floods.77

At its eastern end, the highway between Herat and Islam Qala intersected 

with the Russian-built highway across northern Afghanistan. The Herat–Islam 

Qala, Kabul-Kandahar, and Kandahar–Spin Baldak highways, linked with the 

Russian-built highways, gave Afghanistan a modern highway system. The American 

contribution to this highway system cost over $55 million for construction and 

another $25 million in related costs.78

Declining Workload

The year 1961 marked the apogee of the construction program in Iran. For 

a very short time, the Gulf District and the Mediterranean Division hoped that 

work outside of Iran might sustain the district; but at the same time, they began 

to plan for its probable closing. In November 1962, an organizational study cited 

the decrease in both actual and projected construction to support suggestions for 

restructuring the district’s operational elements.79 A month later, Colonel Nauman 

reported to the chief of engineers, Brig. Gen. Walter K. Wilson Jr., that the district 

had “phased the organization down in consonance with our new 18-month forecast 

of work placement.” Indeed, the cuts had been dramatic. The number of staff fell 

from 797 at its high point in 1961 to 421 by the time of Nauman’s letter, a reduction 

of 47 percent.80

Some of the decline in staff occurred by attrition, but some involved formal 

reductions in force that the district implemented as a part of its long-term plan to 

trim its overhead costs. In late 1961, the Mediterranean Division’s headquarters 

took over the major engineering and design responsibilities and the Gulf District 

abolished its Engineering Division. An Engineering Branch in the Construction 

Division performed change-order design, provided as-built drawings, and executed 

other tasks. In July 1963, the district transferred these remaining functions to the 

Supervision and Inspection Branch of the Construction Division and abolished the 

Engineering Branch.81

77 OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1967–30 June 1968,” n.d., p. 42, Gen Files 5-8, OH, 

HQ USACE; Schubert, “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Afghanistan’s Highways,” p. 457. 78 Schubert, “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Afghanistan’s Highways,” p. 457.

79 L. A. Webber, “GED Organization Study,” 10 Nov 62, p. 2, access. no. 77-92-0002, box 25, 

WNRC. 80 Quotation from Nauman to Wilson, 31 Dec 62, p. 2, Mil Files XXI-3-2, OH, HQ USACE. The 

figure for 1961 comes from “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” p. 7. Figure for 

December 1962 from Data for Wilson, p. 1. 81 “Feasibility Study: Deactivation of Gulf District,” 19 Apr 63, p. 1, box 25, access. no. 77-92-

0002, WNRC; Data for Wilson, p. 16.
220 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Other measures to reduce costs eliminated some of the amenities that the district 

had extended to staff as inducements to serve in Iran. In the early years of the district, 

adequate housing in Tehran had been scarce and expensive. Studies showed that 

having the district lease houses would be less expensive than providing housing 

allowances and would relieve new employees of the demands of finding lodging 

on their own. By July 1962, the district’s Office of the Headquarters Commandant, 

the office responsible for handling housing, managed thirty-four leases that secured 

sixty-five housing units for district personnel.82

Cost consciousness at the district and division levels, coupled with the arrival of 

Robert E. Hall, a new civilian executive officer with a background in management, 

led to a reexamination of the leasing arrangement.83 Hall urged the district engineer, 

Col. Wyatt G. “Gristy” Trainer, to eliminate district-leased housing and to provide 

employees with a housing allowance. By the summer of 1964, the district had 

terminated all but two leases and the Office of the Headquarters Commandant, 

renamed the Headquarters Service Office, fell from forty-seven to fifteen positions. 

The Headquarters Service Office continued to help employees locate appropriate 

housing and to administer leases for other military elements in Tehran, including 

fifteen for personnel attached to ARMISH-MAAG.84

The district also provided very modest—some said “shabby”—wrought-iron 

furniture and household appliances for employees and set a relatively low weight 

limit for household goods shipped from the United States at government expense. 

The district did, however, pay the costs of storing the household goods left behind. 

Early in 1962, Colonel Nauman discontinued the practice of paying storage fees 

on behalf of new appointees. The change struck some as unfair, in part because 

American civilians employed by other American governmental agencies in Iran had 

even more privileges than the civilians working for the Corps of Engineers.85

Despite the declining workload, reductions in staff, and cutbacks in benefits, 

many Americans enjoyed living in Tehran and working in the Gulf District. In 

1962 and 1963, the Castle Club built a large swimming pool, a children’s wading 

pool, two tennis courts, and a baseball park. The district welcomed all Corps 

personnel in Tehran to their social activities, including, for example, Lt. Col. Roy 

Kackley, the Army engineer assigned to GENMISH (Iranian Gendarmerie), and 

members of the Topographical Battalion. (Later in his career, Kackley would serve 

as division engineer for the Mediterranean Division.) Even the Iranian contractors 

could participate as associate members of the Castle Club, giving them the chance 

82 Ibid.

83 Interv, Moorhus with Robert E. Hall, 24 Mar 95, pp. 3, 9–10, 12. Hall arrived in Tehran in the 

summer of 1962. 84 Data for Wilson, p. 18; Intervs, Moorhus with Hall, 24 Mar 95, pp. 9–10, 12, and with Grosz, 

19 Mar 96, pp. 8–10. 85 MFR, Lt Col John A. Hughes Jr., 3 Mar 62, sub: Discussions with Division Engineer, p. 1, 

Household Goods, box 51-83-8376, Farrell Papers; Interv, Moorhus with Hall, 24 Mar 95, p. 11; 

“History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 14–15.
The Gulf District, 1961–1967 221

to enjoy potluck suppers, bingo games, community theater productions, and theme 

parties.86

The district continued to implement cost-cutting measures, but a study of the 

Gulf District that Colonel Nauman commissioned in the spring of 1963 concluded 

that the division could supervise all construction in the district’s area of operations 

from Livorno at a considerable savings. On 30 June 1964, the Mediterranean Division 

took over most of the Gulf District’s accounting functions. By 31 July, the district’s 

workforce dropped to 278, less than 35 percent of what it had been in 1961. In 

keeping with “directives from higher authority” to use American personnel “to the 

widest extent possible,” most of the reductions were in the ranks of the Iranians and 

the third-country nationals. Some personnel transferred to the division, including 

the executive assistant, Robert Hall, who moved to Livorno in October 1964.87

The value of construction placement in the district continued to drop, from 

$47.5 million in 1961, to $25 million in 1963, to $18.98 million in 1964. For 1965, 

the Gulf District anticipated a second year of construction placement below $20 

million. When the Army Audit Agency examined the district’s operations in June 

1965 and identified $2 million in operating costs for the coming year, it renewed 

an earlier recommendation to deactivate the district.88

In August 1965, the division assumed contracting authority from the Gulf District 

engineer, Col. John M. Frassrand, who then moved to Livorno as assistant division 

engineer. A new district engineer, Lt. Col. Philip T. Boerger, arrived that month in 

Tehran. In November, the Mediterranean Division took over the remaining finance 

and accounting operations, leaving the Gulf District to operate more as an area 

office. Still, as the division had done in Morocco and in Libya in earlier years, it 

maintained the district title for its office in Tehran to preserve continuity in relations 

with the host government and with other U.S. government agencies there. As of 1 

April 1966, the division redesignated its offices in Pakistan and in Afghanistan as 

area offices reporting directly to the division.89

In its final years, the office in Tehran continued to supervise a modest amount of 

work in Iran. Most of the work involved small projects or continuation of contracts 

awarded in earlier years. Project Spellout, a classified project for the U.S. Air Force 

86 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” pp. 14–15; Intervs, Moorhus with 

Grosz, 19 Mar 96, pp. 12–16, and Alperin and Nilson with Boerger, 19–20 Jul 82, 9–10 May 83, p. 

119; “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” p. 14. 87 “Feasibility Study: Deactivation of Gulf District,” 19 Apr 63, passim; Memo, Stuart E. Wagman, 

5 Jun 64, sub: Consolidation of Comptroller and Related Functions, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE; 

Data for Wilson, pp. 18–19; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 20 Oct 64, Som-29, TAD-RHA. 88 Mediterranean Div, Army Audit Rpt, EU-65-43, 30 Jun 65, box 23, access. no. 77-92-0002, 

WNRC. 89 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 1, 18 Jun 65, Som-29, TAD-RHA; Chaffin to Wilson, 12 

Jan 65, Mil Files XXI-3-4, OH, HQ USACE; Chaffin to Lt Col Peter T. Boerger, 28 Jan 66, box 

682798, RG 77, access. no. 77-004, Bayonne FRC; Memo, Chaffin, 19 Jan 66, sub: Organization to 

Accomplish Construction in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, pp. 1–3, box 682798, RG 77, access. no. 

77-004, Bayonne FRC; Chaffin to Cassidy, 28 Sep 65; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 3 Nov, 20 

Dec 65, Som-29, TAD-RHA.
222 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

at several sites in Iran, called for the Corps of Engineers to furnish field inspection 

of construction activity in 1966; the work was completed in the spring of 1967.

Between February 1966 and August 1967, the district oversaw construction of 

twenty-seven so-called “civic action schools” for the Iranian armed forces. Located 

at or near military garrisons and close to villages with inadequate school facilities, 

these schools used the same design in all but one case. The total project, with a 

value of $1.5 million, was funded with Iranian rials.90

The district saw an unusual new project to completion between July 1966 and 

May 1967: the drilling of a 10,000-foot-deep “well” for the U.S. Air Force in the 

shah of Iran’s private game preserve, a location that ensured extremely limited 

access to the site. The contractor, Southeastern Drilling Company of Texas, had 

trouble keeping the bore hole within the strict specifications of the contract. The 

contract value was $1.2 million, and veterans of the Gulf District remember the 

project as distinctive. When completed, the well contained seismic equipment for 

the detection of nuclear testing in the Soviet Union.91

Neither the drilling project nor the remaining construction work altered the 

reduction of the Gulf District’s role. The district staff had 246 employees on 30 June 

1965; by the following June, it had just 71; by June 1967, only 27 persons remained 

on staff. On 30 September 1968, the district closed officially, but it had played only 

a minor role in the division’s operations for many months before that.92

During the Gulf District’s years of service, it placed approximately $170 million 

of construction in Iran, including four large airfield projects, at scores of sites. Most 

of the work came under the Military Assistance Program. In addition, the district 

had taken over work in Pakistan, Burma, and Saudi Arabia and had initiated the 

construction in Afghanistan.93 The Gulf District had remained active for over thirteen 

years, longer than any other district in the history of the Mediterranean Division.

90 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 1 Jun, 20 Oct 65, unmarked box, and 7 Mar 67, 10 Jul 67, 

box 51-83-8379, Farrell Papers, all in OH, HQ USACE; “History of the [Gulf] District, Supplement 

History Covering Period July 1965 to September 1968,” 6 Nov 68, p. 4, Paul Wheeler Papers, R&D 

File 2475, Transatlantic Programs Center, Winchester, Va. (hereafter cited as Gulf Dist Supplement 

Hist, 1965–1968); Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 8 Feb, 1 Mar 66, Som-29, TAD-RHA; Chaffin 

to Cassidy, 9 Mar 66. 91 Gulf Dist Supplement Hist, 1965–1968, p. 4. Intervs, Moorhus with Wheeler, 31 May 95, pp. 

14–15; Baldwin with Cameron, 27–29 Mar 89, pp. 455–56; Grathwol with Jack Baylor, 22 Jun 95, 

pp. 30–31; Alperin and Nilson with Boerger, 19–20 Jul 82, 9–10 May 83, p. 118. 92 Gulf Dist Supplement Hist, 1965–1968, p. 1; “Visit of Chief of Engineers to Gulf District,” Apr 

67, p. 3, box 22, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 93 Gulf Dist Supplement Hist, 1965–1968, p. 7.
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 223

7

The Mediterranean Division

1961–1966

Reorganization of the Mediterranean Division headquarters in Livorno accompanied the closing of the two districts in 1960: the Southern District in August and 

the Trans-East District at the end of December. The Mediterranean Division became 

once again an operating division that simultaneously managed projects directly in 

the Southern District’s area of responsibility as well as the activities of the Gulf 

District. From headquarters, the division continued projects in the NATO countries 

of southern Europe and northeastern Africa. In addition, as the decade progressed, 

the division became increasingly involved in Saudi Arabia.

Initially, the district closings meant retrenchment for the division. The consolidation 

of staffs of the Southern District and division headquarters eliminated forty-three 

positions held by Department of the Army civilians and twelve filled by local national 

employees. The division retained office space in the Palazzo Grande and the Corallo 

Hotel in downtown Livorno, although division leaders released one floor of the hotel 

to reduce rent. The consolidation involved the expected tensions of merging staffs. For 

the most part, division personnel outranked their district counterparts and retained the 

best positions. The perception persisted that those from the Southern District, especially 

the holdovers from the years of the Joint Construction Agency, did not fully understand 

Corps of Engineers procedures and had to “learn our ways.” The decision to maintain 

staff in two locations hampered the development of a harmonious, cohesive staff.1

Three commanders served the Mediterranean Division between 1961 and 1966. 

Colonel Nauman, who replaced General Shuler in September 1960, served until the 

summer of 1963, when Col. Andrew D. “Dave” Chaffin arrived in Livorno. Chaffin 

had commanded the Middle East District in Tripoli between 1953 and 1955 and at 

the end of that tour had become district engineer for the newly formed Trans-East 

District. Col. Harry F. Cameron Jr., who arrived in March 1966 to succeed Chaffin, 

had commanded the Gulf District from August 1960 to June 1962.

To cover work taken over from the Southern District, the division created a new 

element, the Mediterranean Division Operating Area, as a subdivision of its technical 

staff. A colonel with the new title of assistant division engineer headed Mediterranean 

Operations, as this quasi-district became known. The creation of the Office of the 

1 Brig Gen William R. Shuler to Lt Gen Emerson C. Itschner, 20 Aug 60, Mil Files XXI-3-1, Office of History (OH), HQ United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Alexandria, Va.; Interv, 

Moorhus with W. Justin Long, 14 Mar 95, pp. 11, 14–15.
224 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Assistant Division Engineer separated responsibility for operations from supervision and 

allowed the division engineer to focus on the full range of the division’s activities. The 

assistant division engineer exercised contracting authority, supported by the construction 

and supply staffs formerly attached to the Southern District. Working out of the Corallo 

Hotel as the Southern District had, Mediterranean Operations opened and supervised 

area, resident, and project offices in Italy, Greece, Turkey, Malta, Libya, Eritrea, 

Ethiopia, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia. Many of the projects supervised by the assistant 

division engineer had lower dollar values but were important because they involved the 

introduction of new technologies and the installation of new weapon systems.2

In 1962, the division shifted the Office of the Assistant Division Engineer 

and Mediterranean Operations to the staff of the Executive Office and merged 

all construction and engineering functions into its Engineering Division, thereby 

eliminating a separate Construction Division. This reorganization reflected the 

Mediterranean Division’s concern over its declining workload. In April 1962, the 

division calculated that during the subsequent eighteen months it would have design 

work for construction projects valued at an estimated $80 million. By October, few 

new projects had materialized and several projects had been postponed; thus, the 

division reduced its estimate to $45 million. Bringing the assistant division engineer 

into the Executive Office and reorganizing construction and engineering functions 

allowed the division to eliminate thirty-four positions held by Department of the 

Army civilians and thirteen held by local nationals.3

Programs Under Mediterranean Division Management

The Mediterranean Division directly managed two major programs, a 

communications network called Troposcatter and a housing program for American 

military families called USAHOME. Both programs had construction sites in several 

countries, and both evinced a growing concern among government leaders over 

the outflow of American gold reserves as a result of the overall deficit in the U.S. 

balance of payments.

That imbalance in international payments came about because of the unique 

status of the United States after World War II, when it was the only nation with the 

financial strength to underwrite international trade and exchange. As a result, the 

dollar became the dominant currency in the world economy. Between 1945 and 

1960, the United States had spent freely abroad to develop commerce and mutual 

defense. By 1960, the nation’s leaders became concerned because foreign holders 

of these expatriated dollars were redeeming them for gold from the U.S. Treasury, 

reducing American gold reserves and threatening the stability of the dollar. To 

2 Interv, Moorhus with Long, 14 Mar 95, p. 14; Nauman to Itschner, 7 Oct 60, p. 2, and 9 Dec 60, 

pp. 3, 9, both in Mil Files XXI-3-1, OH, HQ USACE; Mediterranean Div, “Informational Brochure for 

OCE Command Inspection,” 20 Nov 70, p. 1, box 18, access. no. 77-92-0001, Washington National 

Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md. 3 For this and the preceding paragraph, see Nauman to Wilson, 2 Apr 62, 10 Oct 62, 31 Dec 62, 

all in Mil Files XXI-3-2, OH, HQ USACE.
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 225

limit the exodus of dollars, the Eisenhower administration and Congress imposed 

regulations on military spending overseas and encouraged the Department of Defense 

to use American products wherever possible. Both Troposcatter and USAHOME 

reflect these new regulations. 

Troposcatter

Troposcatter is a shorthand description of the scientific basis for the communications systems that were developed, designed, and funded under several names. All 

of the systems (EUR-MED, Ace-High, Big Rally, STARCOM, MEDCOM, 486L, 

and STRATCOM) used a layer of the earth’s atmosphere to reflect communications 

signals to a point beyond the horizon. Creating a system comprised of several 

transmitting and receiving sites allowed signals to relay from point to point, thus 

extending communication over long distances. The high-frequency Troposcatter 

system, which provided more than 90 percent reliability, was developed to ensure 

the integrity of communications between U.S. military commands and American 

and NATO bases armed with nuclear weapons from Norway to Turkey.4

4 The description of the Troposcatter system is distilled from “History of TUSEG, 1958–1965,” 

[ca. 31 Dec 65], R&D file 1134, Transatlantic Programs Center (TAC), Winchester, Va.; Intervs, 

Moorhus with Richard Wiles, 21 Oct 93, 7 Feb, 5 May 94, pp. 49–50; with Adrian Hromiak, 6 Feb 

Malta resident office, ca. 1968
226 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

To serve the Mediterranean, a transmitter site in Spain passed signals to the 

islands of Mallorca; to Sardinia; to a site at Coltano, Italy; to two sites down the 

axis of Italy (Avelino and Martina Franca); and on to Greece and Turkey. From the 

principal sites along this trunk (also called the backbone), which included about a 

dozen installations, the signal could be distributed to substations at military installations in each country. In all, the Troposcatter program’s design called for over 

sixty sites throughout the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Division supervised 

the construction at all sites except those in Spain.5

Elevation above sea level helped the transmission of the communications signals, 

so the site selectors looked for mountaintops. The isolated nature of the remote 

mountain locations usually meant constructing an access road over difficult terrain. 

Structures at each site consisted of two or four large parabolic billboard antennas 

of sixty to one hundred twenty square feet, a power plant, an operations building 

with the electronic equipment to receive and retransmit the signals, housing and 

administrative accommodations for the personnel staffing the site, and supporting 

utilities.6

In the summer of 1960, the division received directives to design the Troposcatter 

facilities as semipermanent installations and assigned Richard Wiles as project 

manager for design.7

 Appropriate sites proved difficult to locate and land difficult 

to obtain in both Italy and Greece, so site surveys did not begin until late summer 

1961.8

 Additional delays arose because the U.S. Air Forces in Europe, the agency 

providing design criteria for many sites, repeatedly failed to meet deadlines for 

furnishing the information to the Mediterranean Division. The division awarded the 

first construction contracts during the summer of 1963, but the Air Force continued 

to submit design changes throughout that year.9

To conform to the directives from Washington relating to gold outflow, designs 

for the Troposcatter facilities incorporated prefabricated structures built in the 

95, pp. 2, 4, 6; with Paul Friesch, 22 Aug 89, pp. 14–15; with Arthur Textor, 1 Feb 90, pp. 2–4. See 

also Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE), “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1962–30 June 

1963,” p. 32; “1 July 1963–30 June 1964,” p. 28; “1 July 1965–30 June 1966,” p. 36; all in Gen Files 

5-4, OH, HQ USACE. 5 For a detailed list of proposed sites, see Federal Electric Corporation, “EUR-MED Tropo System: Initial Plan for Implementation,” 1 Jul 61, box 51-83-8376, Richard T. Farrell Papers, OH, HQ 

USACE; Directorate of Wideband Communications, Ofc of the Dep for Communications Systems, 

HQ, Electronic Systems Div, Air Force Systems Command, U.S. Air Force, Program Status Rpt, 

486L–MEDCOM System, 1 Dec 63, p. iii, passim, box 51-83-8376, Farrell Papers (hereafter cited as 

Program Status Rpt–MEDCOM). 6 OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1965–30 June 1966,” p. 36; Intervs, Moorhus with 

Hromiak, 6 Feb 95, p. 4, and with Wiles, 21 Oct 93, 7 Feb, 5 May 94, pp. 49–50. 7 DF, Renshaw, 4 Nov 60, sub: ACAN [Scatter] Facilities, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE. 

8 Federal Electric Corporation, “EUR-MED Tropo System: Initial Plan for Implementation,” 1 Jul 

61, p. 4; OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1962–30 June 1963,” p. 32. 9 Nauman to Wilson, 3 Jan, 2 Apr 62; Wilson to Nauman, 17 Apr 62; Nauman to Wilson, 6 Jul 

62; Wilson to Nauman, 18 Jul 62; all in Mil Files XXI-3-2, OH, HQ USACE. Nauman to Wilson, 3 

Apr 63; Chaffin to Wilson, 27 Sep 63. MacDonnell, Comments on Chaffin Letter, 27 Sep, 18 Oct 63, 

both in Mil Files XXI-3-3, OH, HQ USACE.
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 227

United States and shipped to the overseas sites. Plans also specified American 

generators and switching gear for the communications system rather than similar 

equipment available in foreign markets. Unfortunately, the American generators 

purchased initially were not sufficiently reliable to meet the rigorous criteria for 

the communications system; correcting the deficiencies created further delays in 

completing the sites.10

By the summer of 1964, the Mediterranean Division had completed construction 

on 3 sites, begun construction on 6 sites, completed design on 5 sites, and started 

design on 42 sites but lacked sufficient information to begin design on 12 sites. 

Over the next year, the Troposcatter program advanced markedly; only two sites 

still lacked design criteria. Although problems with the generators and a dock strike 

in the United States contributed to the overall slippage in construction, the division 

expected to complete ten sites in Greece and Turkey by October 1965. By June 

1966, the division had substantially completed all sites in Italy and Greece and had 

only minor corrections to make on most of the eleven sites in Turkey. Between 1968 

and 1970, the division extended the Troposcatter system to Wheelus Air Base in 

Libya via Malta. As the 1960s ended, the entire system was being overtaken by new 

technology and construction on the communications network ceased.11

Because of the many sites involved, figures for the cost of the Troposcatter 

construction are fragmentary; but through the end of FY 1966, the system in 

the Mediterranean region alone had cost $14.8 million. Roughly a third of that 

had been spent in the United States on prefabricated buildings and diesel-fueled 

generators.12

As part of another communications program in the early 1960s, the Mediterranean 

Division constructed facilities at Matratin, Libya; Catanzaro, Italy; and Targabarun, 

Turkey, for the U.S. Coast Guard. The installations formed part of a long-range 

navigation (LORAN) system that used transmission stations situated at precise 

geographic coordinates to broadcast very-low-frequency radio signals. Aircraft or 

ships with receiving units could pick up the signal and calculate their position in 

relation to the source station as an exact reference point. Construction for the LORAN 

stations consisted of the power and signal buildings, barracks for the troops manning 

the station, recreation buildings, and high towers for the antennae.13

10 Nauman to Wilson, 31 Dec 62; Program Status Rpt–MEDCOM, p. 2.

11 Chaffin to Clarke, 30 Jun 64; Chaffin to Wilson, 8 Jul, 2 Oct 64; all in box 36, access. no. 77-

92-0001, WNRC. Chaffin to Lt Gen W. F. Cassidy, 15 Jul, 28 Sep 65, Mil Files XII-3-4; Chaffin 

to Cassidy, 9 Mar, 8 Jun 66, Mil Files XII-3-5; all in OH, HQ USACE. TUSEG Hist, 1958–1965; 

“Chronological Construction History by Country: Malta,” n.d., box 24, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; 

Interv, Moorhus with Hromiak, 6 Feb 95, p. 6. 12 OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1965–30 June 1966,” p. 36, and “1 July 1962–30 

June 1963,” p. 32. 13 Excerpt from “Engineer Division Mediterranean: Information Booklet,” 15 Aug 59, unmarked 

box, Farrell Papers; “Part V—Middle East Area Office,” p. 19, access. no. 77-92-0001, box 35, 

WNRC; “Chronological Construction History by Country,” n.d. [list runs to June 1970], box 35, 

access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Interv, Moorhus with Wiles, 21 Oct 93, 7 Feb, 5 May 94, p. 58; 
228 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

USAHOME

The attention in Washington to limiting the United States’ depletion of its 

gold reserves influenced the purchase of American generators for the Troposcatter 

program. The same concern virtually created the USAHOME program. Housing to 

accommodate military families overseas had been a significant part of the Corps of 

Engineers’ construction program during World War II; but in the 1960s, the funding 

basis for housing changed. 

A USAHOME was a factory-made, prefinished, packaged house designed for 

use by American military families overseas. The program originated in July 1962 

based on a recommendation from a study by the secretary of defense’s Family 

Housing Office on how to reduce gold outflow while still providing good housing 

to American military personnel serving outside the United States. The housing 

office recommended a two-story structure designed so that several units could be 

linked together where land was scarce. The Department of Defense initially assigned 

design of the prefabricated housing units to the Air Force, which had experience 

TUSEG Hist, 1958–1965. See also A. Binion Amerson Jr., “The Coral Carrier,” Military Engineer

(January-February 1972): 33–35.

Part of the construction of the Troposcatter system on Malta, slabs upon which power 

equipment will be installed, May 1968
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 229

with relocatable housing. By mandate, all construction of the modular elements 

took place in the United States. Local contractors in the host nations prepared the 

housing site, poured the concrete slab, and fitted the modules together to complete 

the building.14

From the beginning, the USAHOME program encountered problems. In field 

tests at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, the prototype of the initial design failed to 

fit together properly. In the spring of 1963, the Army Corps of Engineers received 

the assignment to take over the program from the Air Force and to procure and 

ship five hundred ten prefabricated homes for installation abroad as a part of the 

housing program for FY 1963. In September, the Corps awarded a contract for 

design and manufacture of FY 1963 USAHOME units; but the new contractor, 

Home Manufacturing Corporation of Sedalia, Missouri, also failed to produce a 

satisfactory prototype. Faced with cancellation of the contract, Home Manufacturing 

found a subcontractor in Tucson, Arizona, Lusk Corporation, which presented an 

acceptable prototype in March 1964. Lusk began producing the buildings in May, 

14 For the historical sketch of the program contained in this and subsequent paragraphs, see “USAHOME [Bfg for Vice Chief of Staff of the Army],” [Jul 65], Mil Files XXI-2-4, OH, HQ USACE. 

For the date, see Cassidy to Chaffin, 29 Jul 65, Mil Files, XXI-3-4, OH, HQ USACE. See also E. P. 

Yates, “USAHOME,” Military Engineer (November-December 1965): 415–16; J. Robert Newman, 

“Overseas Housing Strategies,” Military Engineer (September 1984): 392–93.

Troposcatter Site 20-A, Brindisi, Italy, 26 March 1965
230 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

but the company badly underestimated the plant capacity needed to build thirty 

housing units a week as the contract stipulated. Even after leasing another building 

and doubling production, Lusk could not produce more than eighteen units a week. 

It was May 1965 before the contractor completed all units stipulated in the contract 

for FY 1963. 

The USAHOME program for FY 1964 fared little better. The contract, awarded 

to Knox Homes of Georgia, called for one thousand three hundred fifty units; but 

the goal per week was reduced. The first prototype of the Knox design, erected in 

November 1964, proved unacceptable. Knox got help from its parent company, 

National Homes of Lafayette, Indiana, to refine its design and expand its plant 

capacity. The contractor produced a satisfactory prototype the following February, 

but orderly production began only in May—twenty-two weeks behind the schedule 

set in the contract. 

The design and production problems encountered in the United States tell only 

half the story: the USAHOME program faced as many problems in the field. In 

October 1962, the Mediterranean Division began developing its plan to install 282 

units at locations in Italy, Eritrea, Turkey, and Pakistan. The American construction 

agreement with the Italian government, however, required “local,” i.e., Italian, 

procurement. In February 1963, the division obtained a waiver for one installation 

where USAHOME houses represented only 12 percent of the total cost of construction; but the waiver admonished the division to observe in the future the restriction in 

Monitor station for long-range navigation at Cagliari, Italy, February 1962
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 231

the bilateral agreement “which does not sanction the use of prefabricated buildings 

made in America.” Nine months later, the Italian Foreign Office approved the use 

of prefabricated housing units provided that only Italian firms bid on contracts to 

prepare the sites and to erect the units.15

In November 1964, the Mediterranean Division finally awarded a contract to 

assemble a prototype of a USAHOME on site in San Vito, Italy. The division issued 

several cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts to build eight USAHOME models with the 

different floor plans. The Italian workmen’s lack of experience with prefabricated 

structures slowed both the preparation of the site and actual assembly of the unit. 

As subsequent prototypes went up and actual costs could be determined, division 

personnel realized they had insufficient funds for the installation. In June 1965, 

money finally became available to award the contract to erect the ninety-two 

additional homes at San Vito.16

The division experienced similar problems in implementing the USAHOME 

program in Asmara, Eritrea, and at two sites in Turkey. In Asmara, the division 

began assembling eight prototypes under cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts late in June 

1965. The contractor preparing the foundations had trouble finding cement and steel, 

which led to delays; but in the autumn of 1965, the division awarded a contract for 

the fifty-two units remaining from the FY 1963 program.17

In July 1965, the incoming chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. William F. Cassidy, 

briefed the vice chief of staff of the Army on USAHOME and found him “not 

particularly impressed by the magnitude of our problems.” General Cassidy let his 

Mediterranean Division commander know that the Corps of Engineers faced sharp 

criticism “at the highest level, within the Army and by the Air Force, and in OSD 

[the Office of the Secretary of Defense] on the basis of simple facts: The program 

was assigned to us in April 1963 and we have yet to produce a unit which we can 

turn over to a military family for its use.”18

By June 1966, all of the FY 1963 units at San Vito had been completed and 

transferred, as had fifty-four of the units at Asmara. In Karamursel, Turkey, only 

twenty-two out of two hundred units had been completed because of indecision by 

the Air Force regarding the layout of the housing complex and the late arrival of 

the prefabricated panels. A contract for another eighty-four units at Golbasi (near 

Ankara) had just been awarded. Nine months later, in March 1967, the division 

began design on the layout of one hundred eighty housing units at Iraklion, Crete. 

15 Nauman to Wilson, 31 Dec 62, p. 4, Mil Files XXI-3-2; Nauman to Wilson, 14, 29 Jan 63, Mil 

Files XXI-3-3; all in OH, HQ USACE. “Site I-5 [Italy] Housing, USAHOME, Chronological Table 

of Events,” 11 Aug 65, box 24, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC (hereafter cited as Italy USAHOME 

Chronology). Quotation from Memo, Lt Col G. Santone, 23 Feb 63, sub: Construction Work at San 

Vito dei Romanni, Mil Files XXI-3-3, OH, HQ USACE. 16 Maj Gen R. G. MacDonnell to Chaffin, 20 Oct 64, box 36, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

Chaffin to Wilson, 12 Jan 65; Chaffin to Wilson, 14 Apr 65, Mil Files XXI-2-4, OH, HQ USACE; 

Chaffin to Cassidy, 15 Jul 65, Mil Files XXI-3-4, OH, HQ USACE; Italy USAHOME Chronology, 

pp. 6–8. 17 Chaffin to Cassidy, 15 Jul, 28 Sep 65, Mil Files XXI-3-4, OH, HQ USACE.

18 Cassidy to Chaffin, 29 Jul 65.
232 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

From this point on, work on the USAHOME units in the Mediterranean region 

progressed satisfactorily.19

The idea of a prefabricated housing unit that could be installed and assembled 

anywhere in the world was always better than its realization. The failed prototypes 

in 1963 and 1964, the inability to meet DoD-mandated production schedules, the 

barriers presented by bilateral construction agreements, and the difficulties in finding 

workers skilled enough to prepare the foundations for the prefabricated structures 

all illustrate the practical problems that limited the program’s effectiveness. 

Complications arose when schedules slipped on both sides of the Atlantic. By the 

time construction began in some areas, modules for the prefabricated homes had been 

in open storage for nearly a year. Since crating was insufficient to protect the pieces 

from damage by the elements, the new homes needed repairs immediately.20

The Department of Defense installed homes under the same program in Japan, 

Ireland, Scotland, Alaska, Labrador, Spain, and the Philippines. The single standard 

model failed to stand up to local conditions in such disparate locations.21 In addition, 

19 Cameron to Cassidy, 8 Jun 66, to Brig Gen J. C. Dalrymple, OCE, 26 Jul 66, to Cassidy, 6 

Sep 66, all in Mil Files XXI-3-5; Cameron to Cassidy, 3 Mar 67, Mil Files XXI-3-6; all in OH, HQ 

USACE. 20 Mediterranean Div Response to Army Audit Rpt, EU-65-43, 30 Jun 65, box 23, access. no. 

77-92-0002, WNRC. 21 MFR, Clarke, 29 May 67, sub: Visit to Mediterranean Division, 16–28 May 1967, Mil Files 

XII-37-1, OH, HQ USACE.

USAHOMEs constructed in Asmara, 1967
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 233

from the outset, the Department of Defense had projected that the USAHOME 

program would increase overall production costs from 10 to 15 percent when 

compared to on-site construction of conventional masonry-and-frame housing. The 

program did meet its major objective—to retain expenditures for design and major 

construction in the United States—but the Department of Defense abandoned the 

USAHOME program in 1965 and authorized conventional on-site construction for 

subsequent housing at overseas bases.22

Support for NATO’s Southern Flank

In addition to administering multinational construction programs, the 

Mediterranean Division supported the U.S. military presence on Europe’s southern 

tier. Some construction programs expanded the technical capabilities of the American 

armed forces and their NATO allies, while others provided for the welfare of the 

dependent communities in Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The assistant division engineer 

for Mediterranean operations carried responsibility for field offices in both southern 

Europe and North Africa.

Day-to-day construction for the Mediterranean Division in Italy involved airfields, 

communications sites, and troop and family housing. Occasionally, the division had 

an opportunity to set aside considerations of military effectiveness and to focus on 

22 Newman, “Overseas Housing Strategies,” pp. 392–93.

USAHOME apartment construction in Brindisi, March 1965
234 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

elements of community morale and aesthetics. This was the case in northern Italy 

near Venice, where the division supervised construction of a chapel for the military 

community at Aviano Air Base. Using local materials, the Army engineers built an 

interdenominational house of worship at less cost—but greater beauty—than if the 

builders had used the standard plans for a military chapel. The architectural firm, 

Pedersen and Tilney, used the Air Force chapel specifications as general guidelines 

but extensively incorporated local brick, terrazzo tile, and marble.23

The contractor used a milk-white Carrara marble for the entrance area to the 

chapel. The terrazzo tile of the chapel nave, with marble chips of a type called 

Carrara Flower of Peach, created a violet-white tone on the chapel floor. Designers 

gave particular attention to the altar in the sanctuary, using a marble called “Rosa 

Aurora” ground to a high polish. Chaplains of several denominations participated 

with the resident engineer, the contractor, and the marble vendor to select a piece of 

marble with a symmetrical pattern of veining that rose diagonally to an imaginary 

apex at the center of the altar, focusing visual attention on sacred symbols, texts, 

and the presiding minister. The vertical faces of the altar steps were adorned with 

black Carrara marble lightly veined with gold and white. A bronze Bari marble with 

red veins covered the floor surfaces of the steps around the altar. 

Italian stained glass, the end product of centuries of craftsmanship, filtered the 

light through cathedral windows designed in geometric patterns that took advantage 

of all five colors available: light amber, dark amber, purple, green, and light blue. 

After studying the natural light, designers determined that the altar would receive 

stronger light from the east side, so they used the two tones of amber glass, darker 

on the bright side, lighter on the opposite side. The choice balanced the play and 

intensity of light falling on the altar.

Through careful use of readily available local materials, the Army engineers 

and the Italian contractor, Geometer Luigi Salvi, created a striking place of worship 

for the Air Force community’s multiple denominations. Features that would be 

considered extravagant in another location in fact saved 35 percent per square foot 

over the cost of using standard materials for a chapel in the United States.

In Greece, construction for U.S. forces constituted a part of the Mediterranean 

Division’s work; but the division also designed and constructed for the Greek Army 

a modern training center, airfield facilities, and maintenance and repair shops. 

In September 1964, as the real estate for Troposcatter sites and housing became 

available and the pace of construction quickened, the division changed the status 

of its offices in Iraklion, Levkas, and Pateras from project offices to resident offices 

assigned to the Greece Area Office. The contracts were small, and the area office 

numbered just thirteen people in August 1965.By the summer of 1966, the work was 

again declining. Problems in acquiring real estate delayed construction of housing 

at Iraklion until late in the decade.24

23 Jay P. Dawley, “Aviano Chapel,” Military Engineer (March-April 1965): 105–07. Dawley was 

the assistant division engineer for Mediterranean operations in 1962–1963. 24 “Chronological History of the Mediterranean Division,” n.d., pp. 10, 18; Mediterranean Div, 

General Orders (GO) no. 13, 25 Sep 64; both in box 24, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. “Greece 
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 235

In Turkey, between 1960 and 1966, the Mediterranean Division managed over 

eighty contracts on a variety of projects, many of them classified. Less than 20 

percent of the contracts involved construction of more than $1 million; 43 percent 

of the contracts were under $100,000 each.25

The Izmir field office of The U.S. Engineer Group supervised four large projects 

priced between $1.3 million and $12.1 million each. All four contracts awarded 

in the early 1960s involved work at Cigli Air Base, used by NATO and U.S. Air 

Force units. Installing Jupiter missiles accounted for much of the construction; but 

the expansion of Cigli to accommodate the Jupiter missiles ceased when the U.S. 

government, as part of the settlement of the Cuban Missile Crisis, stopped the missile 

program in Turkey in April 1963.26

From the TUSEG Area Office in Ankara, the division continued throughout 

the 1960s to supervise construction through resident offices on the Black Sea, at 

Area USAHOME MDD [Mediterranean Division] Visit,” 22 Aug 65, box 24, access. no. 77-92-0002, 

WNRC. Cameron to Cassidy, 6 Sep 66, Mil Files XXI-3-5, and 3 Mar 67, Mil Files XXI-3-6; MFR, 

Clarke, sub: Visit to Mediterranean Division, 16–28 May 1967, Mil Files XII-37-1; all in OH, HQ 

USACE. 25 TUSEG Hist, 1958–1965, is a basic document for the next five paragraphs. 

26 Nauman to Wilson, 6 Jul 62, Mil Files XXI-3-2, OH, HQ USACE. Intervs, John T. Greenwood 

with Richard Wiles, 7 Nov 85, p. 2; Moorhus with Hromiak, 6 Feb 94, pp. 4–6; authors with Maj Gen 

(Ret) Louis W. Prentiss, 14 Sep 90, p. 34.

Airmen’s dormitory under construction at Cigli Air Base, December 1961
236 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Karamursel, and at Incirlik, as well as at Izmir. TUSEG followed the internship 

program for Turkish engineering students of the late 1950s with an additional 

training program for Turkish graduate engineers between 1962 and 1964 funded by 

the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Turkish government. The 

program began with twenty English-speaking graduates from Turkish engineering 

programs who received ten months of training in Corps field offices. Colonel Nauman 

attributed the realization of the program to “the enthusiastic and persistent efforts 

of my TUSEG Area Engineer, Lt. Colonel Jerry G. Capka.”27

Like many of the Mediterranean Division’s field offices, TUSEG remained 

a challenging environment for Corps personnel, whether American civilian 

engineers, third-country civilian professionals, or young Army officers. Colonel 

Capka’s deputy in the area office between 1960 and 1963, Capt. Norman 

Delbridge, remembered the experience as exhilarating. Delbridge, his wife, and 

their two-year-old son lived in rented quarters in Ankara. In the winter, the rooms 

on the upper story of the house stayed at 38 ̊F. To keep warm, Delbridge “always 

wore a wool hat” and the family moved space heaters from room to room. Mrs. 

Delbridge learned Turkish, visited with neighbors, and shopped locally. The 

family babysitter, who studied civil engineering at a local technical university, 

was excited to find that Delbridge had a book on reinforced concrete written in 

English. When Delbridge learned the babysitter’s textbook was in German, he gave 

her his book. Delbridge remembered the mentoring attitude of the senior civilians 

in the area office, and he relished the wide range of practical field experience he 

gained in the assignment.28

Civilian personnel of the Corps of Engineers assigned to the provincial 

offices worked in isolation; but for a young, venturesome man such as Adrian 

Hromiak, it was exciting. Hromiak, a Polish-born American of Ukrainian 

extraction, came to the Incirlik Resident Office in November 1964 from the Corps 

of Engineers’ two-year training program in the Chicago District. Recruited to 

supervise construction at three Troposcatter sites around Adana, he also worked 

on runway extensions, ammunition-storage facilities, and barracks. Hromiak 

found the responsibility far greater than he would have faced in any position in 

the United States. At the end of his eighteen-month tour, with work in Turkey 

declining, he accepted a position in Livorno. With the exception of a few years 

in the private sector, he spent thirty years with the Mediterranean Division and 

its successor organizations.29

Third-country nationals working in Turkey for the Mediterranean Division 

also found the environment challenging. Giovanni Trapanese, an Italian citizen 

born in Spain of an Italian father and a French-English-Australian mother, 

learned Spanish, English, and French at home and Italian in a Christian Brothers 

school in Tripoli. He came to work with the Army engineers in December 1951 

when the United States Forces Austria (USFA) began to build Camp Darby 

27 Nauman to Wilson, 8 Jul 63, Mil Files XXI-3-3, OH, HQ USACE; TUSEG Hist, 1958–1965.

28 Interv, authors with Maj Gen (Ret) Norman G. Delbridge, 14 Feb 91, pp. 1–4, 25–30, 76–77.

29 Interv, Moorhus with Hromiak, 6 Feb 94, pp. 1–6, passim.
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 237

near the port of Livorno. Trapanese worked successively with USFA, the Joint 

Construction Agency, and the Mediterranean Division. His first assignment 

in Turkey was two-month’s temporary duty in 1961 at Cigli Air Base on the 

construction program for the Jupiter missiles. The local engineer commander, 

Lt. Col. Walter Gelini, asked Trapanese to accept a permanent assignment to 

the area. Beginning in October 1961, he, his wife, and their growing family 

spent seven years in Turkey, living and working at Samsun, Trabzon, Sinop, 

and Karamursel. Colonel Capka made sure that the division plane took baby 

supplies from the commissary in Ankara to the Trapanese family in remote areas 

on its normal monthly flight.30

Continuing Work in Northern Africa

The Mediterranean Division continued work in Morocco and Libya throughout 

the 1960s, but the region became increasingly volatile as the politics of Arab 

nationalism began to impinge on the U.S. military presence. In Morocco, the U.S. 

Air Force withdrew from Nouasser, its last base, in December 1963 under terms of 

an agreement signed several years earlier by President Eisenhower.31

In Libya, the division’s Middle East Area Office in Tripoli supervised relatively 

minor construction during the early 1960s, including some at Matratin and Marble 

Arch; but Wheelus Air Base remained the focus of most of the activity. The contract 

to build the Al Mellaha Road between Tripoli and Wheelus was awarded in June 

1960, and work progressed through 1961 with a familiar array of delays: protests 

from property owners, late submission of cement samples by the contractor, 

breakdowns of equipment, and difficulties with compaction of the roadbed. In May 

1962, the road was close enough to completion that it could be presented as a gift 

from the American people to the Libyan government. The following September, 

with no new work in sight, the division closed the Middle East Area Office. The 

division’s Mediterranean Operations Branch supervised the remaining work in 

Libya directly from headquarters in Livorno.32

By the time the United States presented the Al Mellaha Road to the Libyan 

government, the tenor of American relations in North Africa was changing. In 

February 1963, just months after the presentation ceremony, Egypt’s president, 

Gamal Abdel Nasser, launched a propaganda attack against the British and American 

military installations in Libya. As leader of the secular Arab nationalist movement, 

Nasser denounced the Western presence as a carryover from colonial domination and 

as an infringement of Arab sovereignty and independence. Nasser’s rhetoric struck 

30 Interv, authors with Giovanni Trapanese, 9 Jun 94, pp. 6–7. 

31 “Chronological History of the Mediterranean Division,” n.d., p. 6.

32 “MDD Internal Organizational Changes” [handwritten chronology, Aug 58–Jan 71, with GO 

numbers], n.d., p. 2, GO no. 6, 16 Sep 62, box 24, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; “Chronological 

Construction History by Country: Libya,” n.d. [list runs to June 1970], p. 3, box 35, access. no. 77-

92-0001, WNRC; “Mediterranean Division, Corps of Engineers, United States Army,” [1967], p. 25, 

unmarked box, Farrell Papers; Ltr, Baylor to authors, 1 Dec 95, p. 13, TAC.
238 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

a responsive chord in the Arab world, and the Libyan government reacted to the 

pressure by publicly demanding that the Western powers remove their bases. To quell 

the crisis, Libya’s pro-Western King Idris threatened to abdicate if the government 

persisted in its demands. As a compromise, the British and the Americans agreed 

to review their presence at the bases, even though the agreements with the Libyan 

government granting them base rights had not expired. The crisis subsided, but it 

signaled a change in the situation of the United States in Libya.33

The discovery of oil in Libya liberated the country’s government from 

dependence on the rents paid for the Western military bases. The growing new 

wealth also provoked an increasing split between the Libyan elite and the common 

people. Nasser’s revolutionary program of Arab socialism appealed to the disaffected 

populace in Libya and in other Arab countries. This political agitation came as the 

role of the bases in U.S. strategy was also changing. The development of longer-range 

bombers and missiles decreased the importance of Wheelus and other North African 

air bases. Wheelus itself became a staging facility and a training station rather than 

an essential point on the front line of U.S. defense against the Soviet Union.34

Nonetheless, limited work continued throughout the decade in Libya. One project 

illustrates some of the unusual conditions faced by Mediterranean Division personnel 

in their day-to-day work. In 1964, the division dispatched Jack Baylor, chief of 

the Geology, Soils, and Materials Branch, to Libya to conduct a comprehensive 

investigation for a proposed airfield at Banghazi. Baylor took a team of four from 

Livorno to Tripoli, where they secured a truck and a jeep to transport their equipment 

to the site. Before they could begin their tests of the Banghazi soil’s load-bearing 

properties, they had to call in a crew from the U.S. Air Forces in Europe to conduct a 

sweep for mines over the area of the proposed access road and a swath three hundred 

by eleven thousand five hundred feet corresponding to the runway. Even after the 

team had cleared the area in which Baylor and his crew worked, a “local” bomb 

squad continued to investigate the surrounding desert. Daily, this team brought in 

truckloads of mines and bombs, lined them up in rows, and exploded them within 

sight of the Mediterranean Division’s crew. The ordnance represented one of the 

legacies of the World War II campaigns in the region.35

The Mediterranean Division’s presence and work in Asmara, Eritrea, continued 

into the 1960s. In 1962, Ethiopia incorporated Eritrea as a federated province against 

the will of Eritrea’s parliament, which favored independence. In the short term, this 

dispute had little direct bearing on the mission of the U.S. Army engineers.

In addition to the Mediterranean Division’s work in Eritrea for the Troposcatter 

system and USAHOME, it also managed construction on a major naval communications facility at Gura, southwest of Asmara. The project for the U.S. Navy started 

from scratch, so the office in Asmara supervised construction of all facilities: drilling 

wells for water, installing sewage-disposal and power systems, building residences 

33 John S. Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab World (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 

p. 117. 34 Ibid.

35 Ltr, Baylor to authors, 1 Dec 95, p. 13. 
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 239

for the Navy personnel, installing transmitters and antenna fields, and erecting a 

rock wall that delineated the property. Discussions with the Navy and completion 

of design lasted until mid-May 1964, when the Mediterranean Division awarded a 

construction contract for the work at Gura for $3.5 million.36

In mid-1965, the Navy wanted facilities added at Gura on a high-priority basis. 

Mediterranean Division personnel informed the Navy that their rush schedule could 

be met only if the division were authorized to negotiate a sole-source contract with 

36 OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1963–30 June 1964,” p. 38; Chaffin to Wilson, 8 

Jul 64, p. 1, box 36, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. The two documents give different totals for the 

construction contract: $3.7 million and $3.3 million, respectively. On the design phase and discussions 

with the Navy, see Nauman to Wilson, 3 Apr 63, to Clarke, 27 Dec 63, both in Mil Files XXI-3-3, 

OH, HQ USACE.

Workmen laying floor tiles in barracks at Asmara
240 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Reynolds Construction Company, which was working on the initial contract just two 

miles from the new site chosen by the Navy. The Mediterranean Division pointed out 

that such an arrangement would cost about 25 percent more than a competitively bid 

contract. The Navy chose the fast process, and the Corps and Reynolds negotiated 

a series of change orders to the company’s existing contract to cover the additional 

work.37 Reynolds also installed a telephone system at Gura between 1965 and 1967. 

By late summer 1968, construction at the Gura naval communications facility was 

complete.38

To manage the division’s work along Africa’s Red Sea Coast, the division created 

the Southern Area Office in Asmara in September 1962. The area engineer, Maj. 

Charles I. McGinnis, reported to the assistant division engineer for Mediterranean 

operations and supervised resident offices in Asmara and in Somalia.39

Given its responsibilities, the Southern Area Office had to take into account the 

political tensions of the region. Somalia claimed the territory of Ogaden, which had 

been assigned to Ethiopia during the period of British colonial rule over Somaliland. 

The territory had a large nomadic Somali population that moved back and forth 

across the common border between the two countries. Armed hostilities broke out 

in the spring of 1964, subsided temporarily under a cease-fire negotiated in April, 

but continued sporadically for the several years thereafter.

The Mediterranean Division continued operating in both countries throughout 

the tensions, but travel between the two countries had to be scheduled carefully to 

avoid offending political sensitivities. Major McGinnis, for instance, never traveled 

in uniform and always routed his trips between Asmara and Somalia through Aden, 

across the Red Sea, or through Nairobi, Kenya. On forms for entry into either Somalia 

or Ethiopia, he listed his occupation as “engineer” so that his military status never 

appeared on any official document. Such complications became routine. In July 

1966, as the construction projects begun in the early 1960s neared completion, the 

division closed the resident office in Asmara and renamed the Southern Area Office 

the Ethiopia Area Office.40

Somalia

In contrast to a long-standing presence in southern Europe and North Africa, the 

Mediterranean Division first entered Somalia in the 1960s. The Somali program grew 

37 Memos, William O. Tatum III, 23 Jun 65, sub: SATCOM Ground Station, Loc 04, Asmara, 

Ethiopia, and C. B. Rosseau Jr., 23 Jun 65, sub: SATCOM Ground Station, Loc 04, Asmara, Ethiopia, 

both in box 30, access. no. 77-84-2400, Transatlantic Division–Records Holding Area (TAD-RHA). 

See also the series of letters concerning change orders addressed to Reynolds between 15 July and 23 

August 1965, box 126A of 357, TAD-RHA. 38 Memos and correspondence between the Mediterranean Division and Reynolds Construction 

Company of Haifa and New York, dtd between Jun 67 and Jan 68, ETH-5, TAD-RHA. “Annual 

Historical Summary, 1 July 1967–30 June 1968,” p. 44, Gen Files 5-8, OH, HQ USACE. 39 “MDD Internal Organizational Changes,” n.d., p. 2, GO no. 6, 16 Sep 62.

40 Interv, Martin Reuss with Maj Gen Charles I. McGinnis, 5 Nov 79, p. 35; “MDD Internal Organizational Changes,” p. 5, MDD GO no. 3, 3 Jul 66, box 24, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC.
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 241

out of efforts by the State Department’s International Cooperation Administration 

(or ICA, renamed in 1961 the Agency for International Development) to strengthen 

the economy of Somalia by creating a modern port and supporting facilities at 

Chisimayu.41

Somalia lies on the eastern Horn of Africa, which also includes Eritrea and 

Djibouti (formerly French Somaliland), across the Gulf of Aden from the oil-rich 

Arabian Peninsula. (See Map 18.) The Italians controlled a substantial portion of 

the territory before World War II but lost it to the British in combat and in the 

postwar settlement. In 1950, Italian Somaliland became a UN trust territory under 

Italian control; in 1960, Somalia achieved its independence. At the same time, 

Great Britain relinquished control of its territory, which joined with the formerly 

Italian provinces to create the United Republic of Somalia. The drawing of artificial 

boundaries during the colonial period had left the newly independent Somalia with 

a legacy of border disputes involving Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. Moreover, by 

virtue of the Horn of Africa’s strategic situation astride the oil routes through the 

Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the region became another proxy battleground for 

the Soviet Union and the United States in the Cold War.

As Somalia approached independence in 1959, the United States extended to its 

government the possibility of economic aid to enhance the new nation’s ability to 

export one of its main crops—bananas. None of Somalia’s ports was deep enough 

to permit direct loading or unloading of ocean transport ships, and the transfer of 

goods to shallow-water craft increased the costs of trade. To overcome the limits of 

nature, the United States proposed and the Somali government accepted a plan to 

deepen the harbor at Chisimayu. Somalia’s second largest city in 1960 (about sixteen 

thousand inhabitants) lies 234 miles south of the Somali capital of Mogadiscio 

(Mogadishu) and twenty-eight miles south of the equator. 

In late October 1959, the ICA asked the Corps of Engineers to investigate the 

feasibility of improving the Chisimayu harbor, a task that fell to the Mediterranean 

Division. In December, the division delivered its initial report and suggested that 

the division could carry out the design “without expensive stateside assistance.” 

The formal written report submitted in January 1960 confirmed that the construction 

of port facilities at Chisimayu was both technically and economically feasible. 

The division’s suggestion that it could accomplish the design of the port without 

outside help was the first of many mistakes in the Somalia program; the design of 

the breakwater, seawalls, and causeways proved much more complicated than the 

division anticipated.42

41 The documents generally follow Italian spelling conventions in giving place names. Anglicized 

spellings are frequently quite different, so both are given here. 42 The basic document on this project is “Final Narrative Report, Phase I Port Facilities, Chisimaio, 

Somali Democratic Republic,” Feb 71, Mil Files XII-49-1, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited as Final 

Rpt, Phase I, Chisimaio); Arthur C. Nauman and James L. McCall Jr., “Kisimaio Port,” Military 

Engineer (March-April 1963): 114–17; “Chronological History of the Mediterranean Division,” n.d., 

pp. 4–5. For the quoted passage expressing the International Cooperation Administration’s (ICA’s) 

positive response to the report, see Itschner to Shuler, 23 Dec 59, Mil Files XXI-2-7, OH, HQ USACE. 
242 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

During 1960, Somali officials remained preoccupied with independence 

and the unification of the former British and Italian Somalilands into a single 

country. In April 1961, the ICA and the Corps of Engineers signed an agreement 

for the construction in Somalia; in May, the Mediterranean Division engineers 

began the design. The division planned the project in two phases. The initial 

phase included design of the dock and wharf structure to accommodate four 

ships simultaneously; design of the dredged approach channel and the turnaround 

basin; and design of an access way and causeway (partly protected by armor 

stone) from the city to the port on Serpenti Island in the harbor. The construction 

of these facilities would take place between 1962 and 1965. Phase II, planned 

for the second half of the decade, included design and construction of the port’s 

water and power systems, storage structures, transit sheds, shops, and office 

space with facilities for the port administrative staff.43

Several interviewees attest to the difficulties of design, the shortcomings of the contractor, and the 

troubled progress of the Somali project. 43 ICA, “Chisimaio Port Development,” 15 Mar 61, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE; Final Rpt, 

Phase I, Chisimaio, pp. 1–2; “Chronological History of the Mediterranean Division,” n.d., pp. 5–6; 

Memo, Walter F. von Neudegg, [1975], box 51-84-5389, Farrell Papers.

Administration and supply buildings at Kagnew Station, August 1968
CHISIMAYU

Webi Jubba

Webi Shabeelle

INDIA N

OCEA N

GULF OF ADEN

Berbera

Hargeysa

Bender Cassim

Garoowe

Galcaio

MOGADISHU

Beledweyne

Baardheere

Ionte

PROVISIONAL ADMI N ISTR A TIVE LINE 

FRENCH TERRITO R Y

O F

A FARS AND ISSA

ADEN PROTEC T OR AT E

E T H IOPIA

K E N Y A

YEME N

PORT WORK

MEDITERRANEAN DIVISION 

1960s

SOMALIA

Port

0

0 200 Miles

200 Kilometers

Map 18
244 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Corps engineers, working under informally drawn posters that proclaimed 

“THINK BANANAS,” completed their designs for Phase I by December 1961; the 

division issued requests for proposals to nineteen construction contractors. Twelve 

firms submitted bids, which the division opened in Livorno on 5 March 1962. 

The division entered into negotiations with the two lowest bidders, but even their 

bids exceeded the available funds. On 4 May, the division awarded a construction 

contract for $6.8 million to Paul Smith Construction Company of Tampa, Florida. 

The company had worked on Cape Canaveral but had no experience with marine 

construction and no overseas construction experience.44

On 23 August, the Mediterranean Division established a resident office in 

Chisimayu. On the same day, the Paul Smith Company loaded men and equipment 

onto two light barges, a crane barge, and two tugboats and set sail from Mombasa, 

Kenya, to begin operations in Chisimayu. The tow began with the first of many 

ill-advised decisions—the contractor chose not to hire a local pilot familiar with the 

region.45 The tow reached the waters off Chisimayu in darkness in the early morning 

hours of 29 August, but the pilot failed to recognize the harbor and sailed by it. Only 

the next morning, when the tow was more than twenty miles too far north, did the 

party discover its error. The crew turned the tow about; but the prevailing currents 

now ran against them, and they progressed very slowly. By nightfall, they were still 

five miles north of the mouth of the Giuba (Juba) River, with Chisimayu slightly 

farther to the south. The party anchored for the night. Overnight, wave and wind 

action broke the anchor cables and all the barges washed aground on the beach. 

The crew left the barges stranded and the cargo at the mercy of scavengers.46 This 

initial scenario typified the fate of the entire project. 

The contractor began on 1 October to build a causeway from the shore of the 

harbor to Serpenti Island. By 20 November, work had progressed to the point that 

vehicles could drive to the island; the construction crew relocated its camp there. 

Because of the beaching of the barges in August, the contractor lacked the heavy 

equipment necessary to keep the construction of the breakwater on schedule. 

Replacement barges and a crane finally arrived in February 1963. The rock quarry 

from which Paul Smith expected to extract armor stone and fill for the breakwater 

lay at a distance of about twelve miles by land from the worksite but only about 

four miles by water. The contractor’s plans called for water transport because it 

was more efficient and less expensive. The delays in replacing the barges meant 

that the stone had to be moved during one of the region’s semiannual monsoons, 

when strong winds and currents ran against the direction of the haul. The contractor 

44 Interv, Moorhus with Robert E. Hall, 24 Mar 95, p. 7; Nauman to Wilson, 3 Jan 62, Mil Files 

XXI-3-2, OH, HQ USACE; Final Rpt, Phase I, Chisimaio, pp. 18–19; Edmond C. Hutchinson to L. 

W. McBride, 30 Apr 62, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE; “Chronological History of the Mediterranean Division,” n.d., p. 6. 45 Memo, McGinnis to Col Sidney T. Martin, 21 Jun 65, sub: Informal Observations, Som-28, 

TAD-RHA. McGinnis wrote his six-page review of the “highlights and/or achievements” of his two 

years in the “Paul Smith School of Hard Knocks.” 46 Final Rpt, Phase I, Chisimaio, pp. 20–22; Interv, Richard T. Farrell with Wilbur Sheehan, Aug 

75, p. 5.
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 245

invested substantial money in building a small wharf near the quarry for loading 

stone, but he never made the water transport system work effectively and had to 

shift to land transportation. He even lost an additional barge when it sank under the 

weight of improperly loaded stone. The investment in water transport coupled with 

the increased costs of land transport translated to a substantial financial setback. 

Moreover, inefficient management and operation of the quarry threatened to exhaust 

the available armor stone before enough had been gathered to complete the job.47

Difficulties in getting adequate equipment and materials to the construction 

site continued to complicate the work at Chisimayu. The design called for steel-rod 

reinforcements for pilings to support the pier. The contractor shipped steel bar on 

an American flag carrier to Durban, South Africa, for transshipment to Mombasa. It 

took the contractor three weeks to locate the steel. Then, to load the steel rods onto 

the next ship, port workers in Durban used a crane and clamshell scoop. When the 

steel reached the beach in Chisimayu, it “bore the appearance of a dish of cooked 

spaghetti after having been mixed with sauce.”48

Such mishaps and delays put the contractor seriously behind schedule by the 

spring of 1963. Over a quarter of the work had been scheduled for completion by 

that time, but actual construction amounted to less than 10 percent. Throughout the 

summer, Corps personnel pressed the contractor to expand his supervisory staff, to 

improve his management and organization of the work, and to increase productivity. 

Breakwater construction, the key element in the initial phase of the construction, 

did not start until 17 June, and, after the initial dump of stone, had to be suspended 

until December. In late December, the lifting boom on a barge-mounted crane 

buckled under an overload and the crane fell into the sea. Overnight, the barge 

itself, which had been taking on water for several days prior to the collapse of the 

crane, sank.49

In January 1964, a visiting inspector from the Agency for International 

Development, which financed the construction, reported that “this project is in 

an extremely sad condition” (emphasis in the original) and that the operation of 

the quarry and the construction of the breakwater were both in a state “of almost 

utter chaos.” The inspector saw “obvious” signs that the Paul Smith Company was 

“making advance preparations for a large changed condition claim” on the project. 

The Mediterranean Division’s resident personnel estimated the contractor’s losses 

at $1 million, potentially increasing to as much as $3 million or $4 million.50 The 

AID inspection added pressure, and the contractor increased operations to twenty 

hours a day. In March 1964, the Mediterranean Division replaced the civilian 

47 Final Rpt, Phase I, Chisimaio, pp. 22–24; Intervs, Farrell with Sheehan, Aug 75, p. 5, and Moorhus 

with Wiles, 21 Oct 93, 7 Feb, 5 May 94, p. 56; Dawley to Kenneth P. Peel, Paul Smith Const. Co., 7 

Jun 63, box 51-83-8378, Farrell Papers. 48 Nauman to Lampert, 29 Mar 63, Mil Files XXI-3-3, OH, HQ USACE.

49 Final Rpt, Phase I, Chisimaio, pp. 22–23; Nauman to Wilson, 8 Jul 63, p. 3; MFR, Marshall J. 

Spencer, 6 Jan 64, sub: Crane Barge Sinking, Som-19, TAD-RHA. 50 Memo, F. R. Worthen to John W. Robinson, 11 Jan 64, sub: Chisimaio Port Phase I, pp. 1–4, 

box 20, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC.
246 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

resident engineer, who had maintained an optimistic view of the project’s prospects 

throughout all its travails, with an engineer officer, Capt. Charles A. Debelius.51

Captain Debelius (promoted to major before the end of the year) took up his 

post on 30 March and almost immediately had his introduction to the bungling that 

continued to dog the project. On 13 April, a Smith Company employee used the 

contractor’s only welding truck to try to rescue a private automobile stuck in the 

sand on a beach north of Chisimayu, only to strand the truck there as well and have 

it engulfed by the incoming tide. The company fired the employee, and the truck 

had to be replaced.52 Ten days later, a tugboat sank when it made too sharp a turn in 

windy conditions while attached to a barge loaded with stone. The combination of the 

turn, the wind, and the swells pulled the tow hawser so tight that the strain caused the 

barge to capsize. An investigation board noted that, apart from the other conditions 

that had contributed to the accident, the captain did not have a valid tugboat license. 

Other vexations included trucks that stood idle because their replacement batteries 

were the wrong size, equipment that broke down with alarming regularity, local 

labor officials who harassed the contractor to fire Italians in order to give more jobs 

to Somalis, and local government representatives who demanded the company pay 

taxes that had been waived by the agreements governing the construction.53

By the summer of 1964, the contractor had completed only a quarter of the work 

that the original contract had scheduled for completion by April 1963.54 Over the 

summer and autumn of 1964, the division engineer, Colonel Chaffin, reported to 

the Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) that the project continued to fall behind 

schedule and that the port would not likely be ready before 1966—two years behind 

schedule. Chaffin attributed the delays to the Smith Company’s poor management 

and to the failure to mobilize properly; now the company faced “deep financial 

trouble.” In late 1964, rumors circulated that the contractor would not be able to 

meet payrolls or commitments to pay American employees’ return transportation. 

When the company implemented an austerity program at the job site in Chisimayu, 

it heightened unrest among its workers.55

Debelius bore down harder on the contractor, but contractor personnel worked 

in the most dilatory manner. Debelius’ construction log shows his exasperation. For 

51 Nauman to Lampert, 23 Apr 63, Mil Files XXI-3-3, OH, HQ USACE.

52 Somali Residency Contract DA 91-211-ENG-260 Rcd, 9 Nov 63–5 Oct 64, entry for 13 Apr 

64, Som-18, TAD-RHA (hereafter cited as Somali Residency Master Diary); Interv, Moorhus with 

Wiles, 21 Oct 93, 7 Feb, 5 May 94, p. 56. 53 Documents related to the sinking of the tug George Bonnie on 23 April 1964, including “Report 

on the Findings of a Board of Investigation,” 23 Apr 64, are in Som-5, TAD-RHA. Debelius records 

the incident in his logbook, Somali Residency Master Diary, entry for 23 Apr 64; see also diary entries 

between April and December 1964. 54 OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1963–30 June 1964,” p. 35; Final Rpt, Phase I, 

Chisimaio, p. 71. Memo, Worthen to Robinson, 11 Jan 64, sub: Chisimaio Port Phase I, pp. 3–4, box 

20; Chaffin to Wilson, 2 Oct 64, box 36; both in access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 55 Chaffin to Wilson, 8 Jul 64, to Clarke, 22 Aug 64, both in box 36, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 

Quotation from 22 Aug 64 Ltr, p. 1. See also Intervs, Reuss with McGinnis, 5 Nov 79, p. 37, and 

Moorhus with Wiles, 21 Oct 93, 7 Feb, 5 May 94, pp. 52–58; McGinnis, “Trip to Somali Residency, 

3–12 December 1964,” p. 2, Som-28, TAD-RHA. 
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 247

example, in late autumn 1964, he wrote that two men—a mason and a helper—could 

have handled the work on a small section of masonry wall:

Instead there were 10 men, including an American supervisor. The breakdown 

of duties appeared to be:

1. One man mixes mortar

2. One man shovels sand and cement onto board for mixing mortar

3. One man carries cement 10 yards to mason

4. One man carries rocks 6 yards to mason

5. One man slowly builds wall

6. One truck driver sleeps in the cab of his truck until time to bring the men in 

at the shift’s end

7. One man watches the mason

8. One man watches the man carrying the rocks

9. One man watches the man carrying the mortar

10. One American supervisor watches the whole operation.56

Troubles continued to hound the project. Somali strikers dynamited a contractorowned truck in late December 1964, and a dock strike in the United States in the 

spring of 1965 delayed materials. A crane barge under repair sank in the harbor 

when the repair crew tried to tip it to work on the bottom. Major Debelius departed 

the resident office in March 1965, leaving to his successor a situation that Debelius 

described as “reminiscent of the Keystone Cops.”57 The experiences encountered 

by the new resident engineer, Capt. Gene Boyer Fee, reinforced the impression that 

the project seemed to operate under Murphy’s Law. Dredging of the harbor began 

6 May; but on 1 June, after just three weeks of work, the dredge collided with a 

sunken wreck in the harbor, tearing a hole in the dredge’s hull below the waterline. 

The dredge had to be sent to Mombasa for repairs, which delayed progress by 

another two months. As the AID inspector had predicted in January 1964, Paul 

Smith Company filed a claim of $6.3 million in April 1965, contending that changed 

conditions had increased the costs of construction. The company argued that the 

change from hauling quarry stone by sea to hauling by land, made necessary by the 

inaccuracy of government specifications, accounted for over $6 million of those 

claims. In 1974, the division finally negotiated a settlement with the Smith Company 

for a final payment of $1.5 million.58

56 Somali Residency Master Diary, 9 Nov 63–5 Oct 64, entry for 16 Nov 64.

57 Ibid., entry for Dec 64, pp. 68–69; quotation from Debelius to Martin, 30 May 64, Som-28, 

TAD-RHA. 58 Chaffin to Wilson, 12 Jan, 14 Apr, 15 Jul 65, Mil Files XXI-3-4, XXI-2-4, and XXI-3-4, respectively, OH, HQ USACE; Memo, Martin to McBride, 6 May 65, sub: Status of Claims Presented 

by Paul Smith Construction Co., 6 May 65, Som-28, TAD-RHA; OCE, “Annual Report of Major 

Activities, 1 July 1973–30 June 1974,” p. 58, copy in R&D File 2270, TAC.
248 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Despite all the mishaps, the project did progress. On 3 September 1965, the 

first oceangoing transport ship docked at one of the two completed sections of the 

wharf at Chisimayu, an event officials marked with a ribbon-cutting ceremony. 

Work to complete the two additional berths continued to June 1966, and dredging 

stretched to February 1967.59

Unfortunately, inadequate design coupled with compromises and mismanagement during construction resulted in a breakwater and mole (extended causeway) 

unable to withstand the incessant pounding of the waves. The causeway and mole 

had been designed too low, and waves washed over regularly. Within a year of the 

first docking, the armor stone holding the fill that supported the mole was breaking 

up, serious voids were developing in the fill under the mole, and waves washing 

over the mole flooded the first floors of buildings and threw “rocks of considerable 

size” against doors and windows. The resident engineer warned that remedial 

action, although very expensive, ought to be taken if, in competition with the Soviet 

59 Chaffin to Cassidy, 3 Sep 65, unmarked box, and 28 Sep 65, Mil Files XXI-3-4; Cameron to 

Cassidy, 3 Mar 67, p. 4, Mil Files XXI-3-6; all in OH, HQ USACE. OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1965–30 June 1966,” p. 43; “Chronological History of the Mediterranean Division,” 

n.d., p. 8.

Chisimayu Port construction using a clamshell on a crane barge to remove underwater 

high spots, September 1966
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 249

Union for the good will of “an emerging new nation,” the United States hoped to 

save face.60

Before Phase I was finished, planning for the second phase—support facilities 

such as the water and power systems and the storage and office space at the port 

of Chisimayu—had begun. During the winter months of 1965, the Mediterranean 

Division conducted talks with AID representatives and with officials of the Somali 

government concerning the division’s role for Phase II. By early March 1965, the 

parties had worked out a schedule to issue a request for proposals late in the year. 

On 10 November 1965, a formal agreement with the Somali Republic assigned 

the division responsibility for construction management and engineering services 

on the AID-sponsored project to build the additional port facilities and supporting 

municipal utilities at Chisimayu.61

New Work in Saudi Arabia

Whereas Somalia was a new venue for the Mediterranean Division in the early 

1960s, the division already had a decade of experience in Saudi Arabia. After 

managing improvements at the Dhahran airfield in the early 1950s, the division had 

closed its operations in the country in 1956. In 1958–1959, the Corps had returned 

to Saudi Arabia for the construction of the civil air terminal at Dhahran and for 

projects to support the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM). The 

Mediterranean Division again closed all offices in Saudi Arabia as that work came 

to an end in 1962; what work remained the division handled from its offices in 

Livorno, Italy. Then, in 1963–1964, the Saudi government requested help from the 

United States, specifically asking for assistance from the Army Corps of Engineers 

on a series of projects that bound the Mediterranean Division to the Arab kingdom 

in a relationship more enduring than any preceding involvement. Understanding 

the far-reaching nature of the relationship that arose from these Saudi requests for 

engineering assistance requires a review of the situation in the Arabian Peninsula 

from 1958 to 1964. 

The year 1958 had brought crisis to Saudi Arabia. King Saud, who succeeded 

to the throne of the absolutist Saudi Arabian monarchy in 1953 and signed the 

agreement with President Eisenhower in 1957, proved a poor administrator. Even 

with steadily rising oil revenues, Saud provoked near bankruptcy for his country 

through financial mismanagement and lavish personal spending. In addition, Saud, 

who had been an early supporter of Nasser in his seizure of power in Egypt, now 

opposed the leader of secular pan-Arab nationalism. The growing hostility between 

Nasser and Saud strained relations with the United Arab Republic, a confederation 

that joined Egypt and Syria in a front to promote revolutionary change in the Arab 

60 DF, Capt Guy H. Payne, 13 Sep 66, sub: Sea Action Damage to Breakwater & Mole, Som-28, 

TAD-RHA. 61 Chaffin to Wilson, 12 Jan, 14 Apr 65, Mil Files XXI-3-4 and XXI-2-4, respectively, OH, HQ 

USACE.
250 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Middle East. Nasser supported factions in Saudi Arabia that sought to overthrow 

the monarchy.62

The combination of political and economic tensions forced Saud to cede some 

of his powers to his brother, Crown Prince Faisal ibn Abdulaziz, who took over 

management of the government as prime minister and foreign minister. Faisal initiated a careful fiscal program, and by 1960 he had stabilized the country’s currency 

at 4.5 rials to the dollar, had replenished the country’s monetary reserves, and had 

placed the external and internal debt on a path to complete liquidation. 

In December 1960, King Saud reasserted his absolutist prerogatives by refusing 

to approve Faisal’s budget proposal, which led to Faisal’s resignation from the 

government. Saud’s repudiation of Faisal’s budget undermined the country’s 

financial stability. In addition, political stability on the Arabian Peninsula broke down 

in 1962 with the outbreak of civil war in Yemen on Saudi Arabia’s southwestern 

border. Pro-Nasser military officers overthrew the Muslim ruler and declared a 

secular republic in North Yemen. Egypt openly supported the military junta and 

quickly had thirty-six thousand well-equipped troops and supporting air force 

elements in Yemen. Although Saudi Arabia and Jordan aided the deposed royalist 

faction, they could not match Egypt’s military presence. The entire Saudi Army 

numbered only about eighteen thousand troops, with another eighteen thousand 

men serving part- or full-time in the country’s national guard.63

By October 1962, the overlapping crises of the government’s finances, the civil 

war in Yemen, and an intimidating Egyptian military presence on the southern 

Saudi border had led Saudi leaders and princes to insist that King Saud recall 

Prince Faisal and turn practical control of the government over to him. Moving 

quickly, Faisal reshuffled the cabinet to increase his own authority and the stability 

of the monarchy. He put three half-brothers, all a half-generation younger, in key 

positions: Prince Sultan in charge of the Ministry of Defense, Prince Fahd in charge 

of the Ministry of the Interior, and Prince Abdullah in command of the military 

unit that became the Saudi Arabian National Guard in 1963. Within weeks, Faisal 

completed his reorganization of the cabinet and launched a ten-point governmental 

reform program. Having vested new elements of the princely family with a share in 

governmental authority and power, Faisal created a cadre of leadership that continued 

to govern Saudi Arabia over the next thirty years, providing an exceptional degree 

of continuity and consistency in policy.64 In March 1964, after months of internal 

but bloodless struggle among factions of the royal family, Saud was forced to 

renounce his powers in favor of Faisal; in November 1964, the country’s leaders 

proclaimed Faisal king. 

62 For a fuller discussion of the intricacies of internal and external politics in the region during this 

period, see Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, 

the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder, Colo.: 

Westview Press, 1984), pp. 96–114. 63 Ibid., p. 112.

64 Ibid., pp. 109–14.
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 251

The turbulent internal and external conditions in 1962–1964 provoked feelings 

of insecurity in Saudi Arabia. Nasser provided overt military aid to the military 

junta in Yemen and conducted air strikes between November 1962 and January 

1963 on Saudi villages harboring Yemeni royalists. In addition, Nasser’s ideology 

of secular pan-Arab nationalism, with its hostility to Islamic monarchies, appealed 

to many in Saudi Arabia, where a wide gap existed between the very rich and the 

very poor. As insecurity mounted, the leadership of Saudi Arabia decided to ask 

the United States for assistance. In response, the United States sent a squadron of 

F–100 fighter-bombers to the region to make clear to Nasser that Saudi Arabia had 

American support.65

To address the longer-term military threat represented by Egypt, the Saudis wanted 

help in modernizing their own armed forces. To combat Nasser’s propaganda, the 

kingdom wanted to be able to communicate more effectively with its own people. 

In the spring of 1963, the Saudis requested help in developing a government owned 

and operated nationwide television system. In January 1964, the Saudis asked for six 

American engineers, preferably military officers, to help them review their construction 

plans and to assist in modernizing the Saudi military forces. These overtures touched 

off three U.S.-Saudi programs that carried into the 1970s and 1980s.

Television Program

The Saudi request for American assistance in establishing a nationwide television 

system came in March 1963, less than six months after Prince Faisal had been 

restored to full governmental powers in the recurring struggle with his brother, King 

Saud. The request came directly from Faisal, but Saudi Minister of Information 

Jamil Hujaylan had responsibility for executing the program.66

The main function of the Ministry of Information (MOI) was to control the 

flow of public information through official supervision of mass media such as 

radio, television, film, and press. The Saudis understood the potential of television 

in a society that was largely preliterate. A nationwide television system could 

serve as a major source of information, cover both local and international events, 

and broadcast programs on domestic subjects and cultural issues important to the 

conservative Islamic monarchy. Instructional programs could counteract what the 

Saudis saw as “devastating and misleading propaganda.” In a country as large as 

the United States east of the Mississippi River, television could help bind people 

into a national whole.67

65 George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 4th ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 

Press, 1980), p. 608; “The Secret Files,” p. 11, transcript of WETA-TV broadcast, created by the 

Washington Post, 17 Feb 92, on U.S.-Saudi relations. 66 Memo, Grant, 21 Aug 63, sub: Circular 175: Contracting for Television Installation in Saudi 

Arabia, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE. 67 The quoted passage and the more general description are taken from Abdulrahman S. Shobaili, 

“Saudi Arabian Television: A History and Descriptive Study,” pp. 12–13, Jul 69, M.S. thesis, University 

of Kansas. As television director of the broadcast station at Riyadh, Shobaili worked as a telecaster 

and program director for the first television broadcasts. 
252 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Prince Faisal made the request for assistance during conversations with members 

of an American mission trying to negotiate a cease-fire in the Yemen civil war. In 

response, the State Department dispatched the chief of the Federal Communications 

Commission, Edward W. Allen, to Saudi Arabia; Allen’s report, submitted on 30 

April, recommended that the Saudi government contract with private companies. 

In subsequent discussions, the Saudis expressed a sense of their own limitations, 

arguing that their government lacked the skills to manage the cumbersome and 

time-consuming contracting procedures. Reiterating the request that the American 

government act as agent in developing the television program with Saudi funds, 

the Saudis indicated that, based on prior experience, they would be pleased to have 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers involved.68

The U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Parker T. Hart, vigorously urged 

his government to take on the role that Prince Faisal had so strongly requested; 

the State Department found the appropriate legal mechanism in a clause of the 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Although Section 601 of that act encouraged the 

maximum use of private-sector resources, as Allen had recommended in his report, 

Section 607 authorized U.S. government agencies, with the president’s approval, 

to provide services and commodities to foreign countries on a reimbursable basis. 

The State Department asked the Corps of Engineers to undertake the contracting 

responsibilities associated with the Saudi television broadcasting network, and the 

chief of engineers assigned the task to the Mediterranean Division.69

Between May and August 1963, negotiators worked out the specific terms of 

American assistance. The Saudi Arabian government wanted the Corps of Engineers 

to construct the television stations, to operate them initially, and to train Saudi 

personnel to operate them at a later date. The Saudis acknowledged that they lacked 

even the capacity to define their requirements for the program. The Corps agreed to 

help design and build a nationwide television system, beginning with two stations 

at Jiddah and Riyadh. (Map 19) The government of Saudi Arabia agreed to pay for 

all costs associated with the creation of the system. To transfer funds, the Saudis 

would establish an irrevocable letter of credit with the Chase Manhattan Bank in 

New York from which the Corps would withdraw money as needed.70

The two governments exchanged notes constituting the formal government-togovernment agreement on 9 December 1963 and 6 January 1964. The Mediterranean 

Division agreed to supervise operations and maintenance contracts, to monitor 

68 Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, p. 111; Memo, Grant, 21 Aug 63; 

Mediterranean Div, “Saudi Arabian Television System: Completion Report to the Minister of Information (MOI),” Jun 71, p. 28, box 16, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC (hereafter cited as Saudi Arabian 

TV Sys Completion Rpt, Jun 71). 69 Memo, Grant, 21 Aug 63; Memo of Law, Andreas F. Lowenfeld, [late 1963], sub: Circular 175: 

Proposed Agreement with Saudi Arabia Covering Television Installation Services, unmarked box, 

Barry Sude Papers, OH, HQ USACE (copy in R&D File 2657, TAC); Frank N. Schubert, “A Helping 

Hand: Three Decades of Corps of Engineers Involvement in Foreign Assistance Programs,” n.d., p. 

8, OH, HQ USACE, copy in R&D File 2214, TAC. 70 Phillips Talbot to Wilson, 10 Feb 64, R&D Folders 2219–2223, Adrian Hromiak Papers, TAC; 

MFR, Brig Gen T. J. Hayes, 13 Oct 64, p. 1, box 24, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC.
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 253

student training in the United States, and to serve as consultant to the Ministry of 

Information on the television system and other related matters. The division would 

also provide a television network adviser to the ministry and an electronics engineer 

to supervise network engineering. These two positions would be located in Riyadh. 

In addition, the Corps promised a qualified employee stationed in the United States 

as a full-time coordinator and adviser to the Saudi students sent to the United States 

to train in television programming and station operations and maintenance.71

71 [U.S. Embassy, Jiddah to] Omar Sakkaf [sic], 9 Dec 63, Hromiak Papers; Shobaili, “Saudi 

Arabian Television,” pp. 16–18; Note, Umar Saqqaf [sic] to Hon Parker T. Hart, U.S. Ambassador, 

Jiddah, 6 Jan 64, Hromiak Papers; “Mediterranean Division, Corps of Engineers,” [1967], p. 8; Saudi 

Arabian TV Sys Completion Rpt, Jun 71, p. 1. 

RIYADH

AD DAMMĀN BURAYDAH

MEDINA

MECCA

AŢ ŢĀ’IF

JIDDAH

E G Y P T E G Y P T

S U D A N

PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN YEMEN AR A B

REPUBLI C

I R A Q

IRAN

OMAN

UNITED ARAB

EMIRA TES

Q A T A R

BAHRAIN

K U WAI T

SYRIA

ISRAEL

E T HIOPIA

J O R D A N

WORK FOR MINISTRY OF INFORMATION

SAUDI ARABIA AREA OFFICE 

1963–1975

Television Network, 1963–1969

Radio Broadcast Studio, 1967–1975

0

0 300 Miles

300 Kilometers

Map 19
254 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

On 2 March 1964, the division engineer, Colonel Chaffin, and others met with 

Saudi officials in Jiddah to discuss the development of interim stations at Jiddah and 

Riyadh. The Mediterranean Division’s engineers looked for existing facilities in each 

city to house the new stations but concluded that new buildings would be necessary. 

Over the next half year, the Mediterranean Division awarded a series of letter contracts 

totaling about $2.2 million. In May, the contract for design of the interim stations 

went to Frank E. Basil Inc. On 9 July, the Paul Hardeman Construction Company 

of Nevada won the construction contract. Six days later, the Radio Corporation of 

America (RCA) won the contract to procure and install the television equipment 

for the two stations. In July, the National Broadcasting Corporation International 

(NBCI), a British subsidiary of the National Broadcasting Company, received a 

contract to operate and maintain the two stations; in September, NBCI received a 

second contract to train Saudis in English and in television operations. Also in July, 

a second contract went to the design contractor, Basil Inc., for a feasibility study of 

a network of five additional television stations that would span the entire country. 

In mid-June 1964, to supervise all this activity, the Mediterranean Division opened 

the Saudi Arabia Area Office at Jiddah and a resident office in Riyadh. In Livorno, 

the assistant chief of the Engineering Division, James F. Vanek, worked up budget 

proposals for the coming Saudi fiscal year, which began in November.72

The Basil design for the first two stations called for American-made prefabricated 

structures for the broadcast studios. In addition to the commercial power for normal 

conditions, designers provided for a utility building with a heavy-duty diesel 

generator as a backup power supply for the television broadcast facilities. Basil 

personnel completed the design in ninety-nine days. During the same period, the 

staff of the Mediterranean Division designed workshops and storage space for the 

station in Riyadh.73

The first operational plan assumed that both stations would have identical staffs 

and equipment and that their broadcast schedules would be identical: 2 hours a day 

for the first 6 months, 4 hours a day for the second 6 months, and 6 hours a day for 

the next year. NBCI agreed to supply eleven people since there would be no Saudi 

personnel with the technical qualifications to operate the stations initially and to 

begin broadcasts using filmed programming to fill the daily schedule.74

By mid-October 1964, the Hardeman Company had completed nearly a third 

of the construction at Jiddah and was about to begin at Riyadh. Over the summer, 

as construction got underway, the NBCI team screened Saudi students and selected 

72 MFR, J. F. Vanek Jr., 23 Mar 64, sub: Television Project—Saudi Arabia, box 13, access. no. 

77-92-0002, WNRC; MFR, Hayes, 13 Oct 64, p. 1; MFR, Vanek, 23 Nov 64, sub: Narrative Summary 

TV Project, Saudi Arabia (Draft), box 5, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; “Chronological History of 

the Mediterranean Division,” n.d., p. 7; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 28 Jul, 24 Aug 64, Som29, TAD-RHA. 73 Shobaili, “Saudi Arabian Television,” pp. 23–25; Saudi Arabian TV Sys Completion Rpt, Jun 

71, pp. 5–8; Harold E. Anderson, NBC International Ltd., to Vanek, 28 Aug 64, box 5, access. no. 

77-92-0002, WNRC. 74 Shobaili, “Saudi Arabian Television,” pp. 23–25; M. Klein, NBC International, to Col Sidney 

T. Martin, 5 May 64, box 5, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC.
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 255

fifty-six for professional development. The company began intensive English 

training in September 1964 for fifty-eight employees of the Ministry of Information 

assigned to television operations. By November, when the installation of broadcast 

equipment had reached the halfway point, Saudi trainees began working directly 

with the equipment. The thirty-six students who progressed most rapidly in English 

were selected to study at the RCA Institute in New York City. Two of those students 

enrolled for advanced degrees at Syracuse University early in 1965. Of the students 

remaining in Saudi Arabia, about twenty continued to work in each of the two 

cities, Jiddah and Riyadh, where they pursued both their formal class work and their 

on-the-job training with the NBCI operations and maintenance crews.75

The Hardeman Company completed construction of the stations at Jiddah and 

Riyadh in May 1965; and the first broadcasts, fifteen-minute test transmissions 

from each station, took place on 17 July. Two days later, both stations began daily 

broadcast schedules lasting two hours. By the end of the year, telecasts lasted four 

to six hours daily.76

Assisting the Saudis to develop the capacity to create their own programming 

presented a situation that both the U.S. State Department and the Saudi Ministry 

of the Interior considered “quite delicate.” NBCI’s contract required it to provide 

technical management and support; but program content had to come from the Saudis 

and NBCI could broadcast only what the Saudis furnished. Neither government 

wanted any suspicion that the United States might be using the television broadcasts 

to promulgate its own propaganda.77

In the spring of 1965, the Mediterranean Division presented the Basil plan for 

the expansion of the television system to five additional stations. The expansion was 

just beginning when the initial television agreement of December 1963 approached 

its expiration date of 30 July 1966. The governments extended the agreement for 

construction of additional television broadcast stations at Medina, Buraydah, Taif, 

and Mecca and continued station operation.78

Engineer Assistance Agreement

When the collaboration between the Mediterranean Division and the Saudi 

Arabian Ministry of Information began on the television program, the work seemed 

discrete and limited. In late 1963, the Saudis began to explore the possibility of 

collaboration on matters of military preparedness. This process led, after months 

of talks, to the Engineer Assistance Agreement.

75 MFR, Hayes, 13 Oct 64, pp. 2–3; Saudi Arabian TV Sys Completion Rpt, Jun 71, pp. 20–22; 

Shobaili, “Saudi Arabian Television,” pp. 87–88. 76 Saudi Arabian TV Sys Completion Rpt, Jun 71, p. 9. 

77 MFR, Hayes, 13 Oct 64, pp. 3–4.

78 MFR, Chaffin, 14 Jan 66, sub: Briefing of Ambassador Eilts on MDD Saudi Arabian Activities, 

p. D4, box 5, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; “Draft History of Saudi Arabia District,” [1970], p. 9, 

box 16, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Transatlantic Div, “A Short History of the Corps of Engineers 

in Saudi Arabia,” 1993, p. 1, Current Files, TAD-RHA.
256 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

After Faisal returned to power in October 1962, he dramatically increased 

spending for defense and the Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) launched 

a series of military construction efforts to strengthen Saudi national security. By the 

end of 1963, the Saudis had more than fifty projects underway but were dissatisfied 

with the progress. They wanted help with planning, design, supervision, and inspection of construction—functions they had seen the Corps of Engineers perform on 

military construction projects.79

In the first week of January 1964, Colonel Chaffin reported to the chief of 

engineers, Brig. Gen. Walter K. Wilson Jr., that the Saudis had informally approached 

division staff members concerning Corps assistance on military construction projects. 

Within weeks of Chaffin’s report, the U.S. Military Training Mission alerted its 

higher command that MODA planned to ask the United States through diplomatic 

channels to assign five professional engineers and one ordnance motor vehicle 

planning and procurement specialist, preferably military officers, for one year to 

aid MODA in its review of its currently active military construction and logistics 

projects. When the Saudis asked what the six officers would cost, USMTM estimated 

$55,000 for one year, assuming that officers would be assigned to the mission as 

advisers to MODA.80

The Gulf District engineer, Col. Wyatt G. Trainer, visited the U.S. Military 

Training Mission in mid-February and learned that the Saudi military had suspended 

construction on all military projects pending MODA’s exploration of ways to 

improve results. USMTM officers told Trainer that the Saudi military would like to 

have the Corps “supervise future military work using American prime contractors.” 

USMTM personnel indicated that the Saudis had in mind several new army camps 

and additions at other facilities, a program of about $100 million.81

On 8 March 1964, the Saudi deputy foreign minister submitted a formal request 

to the U.S. embassy in Jiddah for the services of six officers from the Corps of 

Engineers to work with MODA as advisers on military construction and military 

vehicles. The request indicated the Saudi Arabian government’s willingness to 

pay the estimated cost of these services, to a total of $55,000 a year. On 10 March, 

Ambassador Hart forwarded the request to the State Department, which provided 

a copy for the chief of engineers. The U.S. embassy judged the willingness of the 

Mediterranean Division to take on the television project, as well as its ability to 

deliver what the Saudis wanted, to be determining factors in MODA’s decision to 

seek American help in strengthening the nation’s armed forces.82

The chief of engineers asked the Mediterranean Division for its comments on 

the Saudi request. The division observed that the Saudis seemed quite specifically 

79 MFR, Hayes, 13 Oct 64, p. 1; Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, p. 

112. 80 Chaffin to Wilson, 10 Feb 64, sub: Potential Saudi Arabian Mil. Construction Program, box 36, 

access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; MFR, Hayes, 13 Oct 64, p. 1; Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search 

for Strategic Stability, p. 112. 81 Chaffin to Wilson, 20 Feb 64, box 36, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC.

82 MFR, Hayes, 13 Oct 64, p. 1.
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 257

to want one specialist in procurement and logistical support for military vehicles. 

Noting this comment, the Office of the Secretary of Defense passed the request to 

the Army’s deputy chief of staff for logistics, expecting the U.S. Army Materiel 

Command (AMC) to furnish a Transportation Corps officer. This part of the Saudi 

request languished until it reemerged in a different form a year later.

In fact, the Saudis had both less and more in mind than the American military 

planners attributed to them. In making their request, they thought specifically of 

the last several Corps of Engineers officers who had served in Saudi Arabia—they 

requested the officers by name. The Army contacted each officer and asked if 

he wanted to return to Saudi Arabia. All declined, but the incident illustrates the 

Saudi desire for continuity and emphasis on the personal nature of the relationships 

established by governmental agreement.83

After assessing the Saudi request, the Office of the Chief of Engineers suggested 

to the Department of Defense that the Corps undertake the advisory work on a 

“mission basis” as it had in other countries of the region, provided that an appropriate 

agreement could be worked out. Under such a plan, the Corps would assume 

complete responsibility for the design and construction of facilities to strengthen 

and modernize the Saudi armed forces. This approach would take advantage of 

both the military and civilian capabilities of the Corps. By giving Saudi officers 

on-the-job training to plan and execute future construction programs, the Corps 

would help the Saudi Arabian military develop its own contracting and management 

capabilities. Two days after the Corps submitted its alternate plan, the State and 

Defense Departments endorsed and forwarded it to Ambassador Hart, who greeted 

it enthusiastically. After discussions between the embassy and the U.S. Military 

Training Mission, Hart sent a favorable reply to the State Department urging that 

one or two Corps representatives be sent immediately to Saudi Arabia to help draft 

the agreement and gather data for a cost estimate.84

The Mediterranean Division assigned the deputy division engineer, Col. John 

W. Burfening; the Gulf District engineer, Colonel Trainer; and the chief of the 

Programming and Reports Branch, Engineering Division, William O. Tatum III, 

to travel to Saudi Arabia. The division delegation met with the ambassador and 

USMTM personnel on 29 April 1964 and with MODA officials on 2 and 4 May. 

During these meetings, the Saudi minister of Defense and Aviation, Prince Sultan, 

responded positively to the idea of a more extensive involvement by the Corps of 

Engineers. Indeed, he wanted to broaden Corps involvement to include the entire 

MODA five-year program; but he also wanted the engineer officers he requested 

originally to provide immediate help with projects already underway.85

83 Interv, Moorhus with Col (Ret) Claude D. Boyd III, 9 Nov 95, pp. 24–25. Boyd, a captain at the 

time, was among the officers the Saudis requested. 84 MFR, Hayes, 13 Oct 64, p. 2.

85 MFR, Col John W. Burfening, 5 May 64, sub: Meeting with Prince Sultan, Minister of Defense 

and Aviation, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Memo, Burfening, 7 May 64, sub: Meeting with Staff of 

Ministry of Defense and Aviation, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; MFR, Tatum and Burfening, 15 May 
258 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

When the delegation returned to Livorno, the Mediterranean Division prepared 

a draft of a government-to-government agreement similar to the agreement of 

December 1963 concerning the television program but addressing the concerns 

derived from prior experiences in Saudi Arabia. The division sent the draft to 

Ambassador Hart and to the Office of the Chief of Engineers in late May; the embassy 

forwarded a revised version to the State Department in early July.86

Because confusion existed between the Corps and the Military Training Mission 

in Saudi Arabia over which agency would take the lead on the Saudi request, no 

action occurred between early May and mid-June 1964. When the chief of engineers, 

General Wilson, discovered the inaction, he directed that the Mediterranean Division 

immediately provide a colonel to MODA. The division dispatched Colonel Burfening 

again, and he arrived on 16 June. On 31 August, Col. John E. Walker arrived in 

Saudi Arabia as the assigned Corps of Engineers representative to MODA.87

Colonel Burfening initiated a study of the elements necessary for design and 

construction of the project that MODA designated as its top priority—an army 

cantonment at Khamis Mushayt, three hundred twenty miles southeast of Jiddah 

near the border with Yemen. The Saudis wanted a brigade post but had not devised 

a table of organization and equipment, that is, the organizational structure and list 

of necessary equipment for such a military unit. Burfening worked closely with 

the Army section of the U.S. Military Training Mission to develop his projections 

for brigade strength of six thousand six hundred men. He outlined the structures 

that such a force would need, and, in discussions with MODA, determined that 

the Saudis found unsatisfactory the criteria that the Corps had applied to building 

similar facilities in Iran.

Burfening and his staff arrived at an estimate of around $50 million and 

a timetable of four years for the design and construction of the cantonment at 

Khamis Mushayt. Prince Sultan seemed startled by the price; but in August 1964, 

he sought approval from the Saudi government. Endorsing the project in principle, 

the government directed the Army engineers to reexamine all the elements to reduce 

costs, to study the adaptability of the planning to the actual site, and to develop 

budget details.

The division staff reworked the estimate, and Division Engineer Colonel 

Chaffin traveled to Jiddah to meet with Prince Sultan on 20 September for a lengthy 

discussion of the role of the Corps of Engineers in assisting the Ministry of Defense 

and Aviation. During this meeting, the two sides finally addressed the role of the six 

officers the Saudis had originally requested. Colonel Chaffin explained that, while a 

few officers could help MODA map out a broad construction program, this limited 

number could never manage or supervise an annual construction effort of $10 or $15 

million. Overseeing the design and construction of the program the Saudis had in 

64, sub: Trip to Saudi Arabia re Corps of Engineers Assistance to Saudi Ministry of Defense and 

Aviation; all in box 51-84-5389, Farrell Papers. 86 MFR, Hayes, 13 Oct 64, p. 2; “Saudi Arabia Engineer Assistance Program Chronology—Program 

Conception to First A-E Contract Award,” n.d., box 28, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 87 For this and the two succeeding paragraphs, see MFR, Hayes, 13 Oct 64, pp. 3–4.
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 259

mind would involve many more people and cost a percentage of each contract. With 

great care, Colonel Chaffin explained the concept of a supervision and inspection rate 

to cover personnel checking design, monitoring construction, conducting tests, and 

training Saudi personnel. Colonel Chaffin’s very thorough explanation of how the 

Corps of Engineers administers a construction project seemed to end the confusion, 

and subsequent discussions focused on the broad program rather than on the tasks 

of the six officers originally requested.88

As the meeting continued, Prince Sultan committed the Saudi government to 

the Khamis Mushayt construction and proposed two additional cantonments: one 

at Qaysumah, about two hundred sixty miles north of Riyadh near the borders 

with Iraq and Kuwait, and one at Tabuk in northwestern Saudi Arabia near the 

border with Jordan. He also mentioned the possibility of a road construction 

program. Sultan emphasized the need for speed in getting these projects 

underway, and Chaffin promised to provide him with new figures before the 

mid-October meeting of the Saudi royal council. Corps representatives also 

explained that proper design took time, that shortening the design time would 

increase costs, and that the prince should anticipate at least another eleven months 

for design preparation.89 On 12 October 1964, Colonel Walker informed Prince 

Sultan that the rough estimate for all three sites had risen to about $120 million 

projected over five years. Prince Sultan approved the general framework of the 

projections but suggested stretching construction out over six years.90

Although the cost estimates changed, the basic framework for the construction 

of three cantonments was set by mid-October 1964. The Mediterranean Division 

began to recruit the personnel needed to manage design and construction. Indeed, 

the division anticipated difficulties in recruiting enough qualified professionals for 

its engineering staff and in finding architect-engineer firms with enough staff to 

meet the projected design schedule.91

The two governments still lacked a diplomatic agreement to govern the work. 

Over the summer and autumn of 1964, the Mediterranean Division, OCE, and 

USMTM had worked out the details concerning the engineer officers assigned to 

assist MODA with its current short-term projects. On 3 November 1964, OCE issued 

a directive authorizing expenditure of $55,000, the amount USMTM estimated for 

88 MFR, Walker, 22 Sep 64, sub: Meeting with HRH Prince Sultan on Cantonment Construction 

in Saudi Arabia, 20 Sep 64, box 51-84-5389, Farrell Papers. 89 MFRs, Chaffin, 30 Sep 64, sub: Proposed Military Construction for Saudi Arabia, box 51-84-

5389, and Hayes, 19 Oct 64, sub: Support of the Saudi Army Construction Program by the Corps of 

Engineers, box 51-84-9384, both in Farrell Papers. 90 MFR, Walker, 22 Sep 64; MFR, Brig Gen Thomas J. Hayes, 13 Oct 64, sub: Construction of 

Army Bases, Saudi Arabia (SA), pp. 6–8, box 24, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Mediterranean 

Div Staff Mtg Min, 24 Aug, 21 Sep, 5 Oct, 20 Oct 64, Som-29, TAD-RHA. 91 Memo, Z. L. Zabban, 15 Oct 64, sub: Additional Personnel for Design Branch, Saudi Arabia 

Military Assistance Program; “Saudi Arabia Engineer Assistance, Comments by Engineer Division,” 

[Mediterranean Div], [23 Oct 64], both in Som-29, TAD-RHA.
260 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

several officers to develop plans, scopes of work, and estimates for the existing 

Saudi military construction projects.92

The draft agreement remained stalled between Washington and Jiddah while 

Ambassador Hart concentrated on a new agreement covering the USMTM role 

in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government’s final crisis between Saud and Faisal 

also slowed action; but with broad support among the royal family and notables, 

Faisal formally deposed Saud in early November 1964 and was declared king. In 

mid-November, the U.S. embassy forwarded the draft construction agreement to 

the Saudi government.93

Even without a signed country-to-country agreement, the division continued 

its preparatory work for the three cantonments. On Colonel Chaffin’s instructions, 

Colonel Walker made arrangements in November with Prince Sultan for several 

dozen engineers and architects to conduct preliminary surveys at Khamis Mushayt, 

Tabuk, and Qaysumah. The division staff then revised the budget and funding 

estimates for a six-year construction program at the three sites and arrived at a 

total of $101,919,000. The division planned about three hundred buildings for a 

troop contingent of six thousand six hundred at Khamis Mushayt; with families, 

the population would total about ten thousand. They estimated a comparable size 

for Qaysumah and double that size for Tabuk.94

Colonel Walker communicated these new figures to Prince Sultan in midFebruary 1965 and then waited for an agreement. In March, the Saudi government 

and the U.S. embassy renewed discussions; on 24 May, the Saudis signed the draft 

accord sent to MODA. On 15 June, the American ambassador signed the same 

document creating the Engineer Assistance Agreement (EAA). 

The EAA defined the manner in which the United States would assist Saudi 

Arabia in the construction of military facilities and outlined the responsibilities of the 

two governments in implementing the program. The agreement designated the Corps 

of Engineers as the agent for the U.S. government and the Saudi Arabian Ministry 

of Defense and Aviation as counterpart to the Corps of Engineers; it specifically 

named the Mediterranean Division engineer or his authorized representative to 

act for the Corps. Using standard Corps procedures, the Mediterranean Division 

would manage design and construction for MODA; the Saudi government would 

pay all costs.95

Most of the EAA provisions described the standard tasks that the Mediterranean 

Division performed in its work with host nations; but some clauses reflected the 

92 MFRs, Hayes, 13 Oct 64, and Chaffin, 14 Jan 66; “Saudi Arabia Engineer Assistance Program 

Chronology,” n.d. 93 Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, p. 114; MFR, Hayes, 13 Oct 64; 

Chaffin to Wilson, 12 Jan 65, p. 2. 94 Walker to Prince Sultan, 23 Nov 64, Gen Corresp, 1964, no. 2, OH, HQ USACE; “Saudi Arabia 

Military Construction Program Budget Estimates and Schedules, Six-Year Program,” 15 Feb 65, box 

51-84-5389, Farrell Papers; MFR, Chaffin, 14 Jan 66. 95 The Ministry of Defense and Aviation retained responsibility for defining the projects. For a 

more extensive discussion, see Barry Sude, “A History of the Engineer Assistance Agreement with 

Saudi Arabia, 1965–1985,” Draft Ms, 31 Jan 94, unmarked box, Sude Papers.
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 261

division’s memory of the Saudi threat in 1956 to Maj. William Bailey in a dispute 

over taxes imposed on the contracting firm that had worked at the Dhahran air base. 

The agreement assigned to the “senior representative of the Corps element in Saudi 

Arabia” responsibility for assuring that Corps employees and their dependents 

“respect the laws of Saudi Arabia.” If “any member of the Corps or dependent” 

were accused of violating Saudi law or arrested, the authorities of Saudi Arabia were 

to “promptly notify the senior representative of the Corps” and “transfer custody 

of the accused” to him. Further, the agreement granted Corps personnel and their 

dependents immunity from civil process for any actions taken in pursuit of their 

official duties. The agreement exempted all property, materials, equipment, services, 

and supplies imported to carry out the functions of the agreement from inspections 

other than for purposes of identification and from “import and export duties, taxes, 

licenses, excises, imposts, bonds, deposits and any other charges.” It also exempted 

Corps personnel from “all kinds of taxes or charges imposed within Saudi Arabia.” 

The EAA provisions conferred upon the Mediterranean Division personnel a status 

in Saudi Arabia not enjoyed by other U.S. military personnel. The division worked 

directly with the MODA, not through the USMTM as it had in constructing the 

training facilities for the Royal Saudi Air Force in the early 1960s.

Shortly after both countries had signed the exchange of notes defining the Engineer 

Assistance Agreement, Prince Sultan, the minister of Defense and Aviation, sent a 

letter to Colonel Walker authorizing the division to begin the design of the facilities 

at Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk. In reporting to the division, Walker commented, 

“Historical note: After 10 months of advisory negotiations this is the first paper received 

from and signed by Sultan.”96 A month later, the division received notice that the Saudi 

government had established a letter of credit with the Chase Manhattan Bank in New 

York in the amount of $6.25 million, the first increment for the construction program. 

The schedule mapped out by the division’s planners had anticipated having money 

available on 1 March; the release of the funds several months later in mid-summer 

1965 required a new timetable.97

With the funds in place, design development proceeded. On 9 August 1965, the 

division’s architect-engineer selection board submitted to MODA the names of three 

companies that it endorsed as qualified and in keeping with the Engineer Assistance 

Agreement. Over the next four months, division personnel and the Saudis monitored 

the development of design elements. The Mediterranean Division, in addition to its 

normal role, explicitly focused on helping the Saudis learn to handle such contract 

management tasks. On 24 November, the division awarded the first design contract 

to a joint venture called BATMED: Frank E. Basil Inc. of Delaware; the Architects 

Collaborative International Ltd. Inc. of Massachusetts; and Metcalf & Eddy Inc. 

also of Massachusetts. Delays in receiving visas for the survey teams held up its 

commencement of work at the sites until January 1966; but by mid-February, the 

96 Telex, USACE Rep Riyadh to Div Engr, USAMED [Mediterranean Division]–Leghorn, 3 Jul 

65, sub: Weekly Progress Report, unmarked box, Sude Papers. 97 Chaffin to Wilson, 14 Apr 65, Mil Files XXI-2-4, OH, HQ USACE; Mediterranean Div Staff 

Mtg Min, 19 Jul 65, Som-29, TAD-RHA.
262 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

contractor had thirty-two people in the field in Saudi Arabia and another ninety working 

on the project in its offices in Athens.98

An intangible but important element of the negotiations between the Mediterranean 

Division and the Saudi Arabian government for the Engineer Assistance Agreement 

was the participation of Mahmoud Nassief. From the start of the negotiations in May 

1964, then Lieutenant Nassief served as translator/interpreter for Prince Sultan in the 

meetings with the Americans. Nassief had studied engineering at the University of 

Southern California, spoke English well, and came from a family prominent in Saudi 

society because of its intellectual tradition. His grandfather, Sheikh Muhammad 

Nassief, was reputed to be the most renowned living Arabic scholar in Saudi Arabia 

and the only person for whom the king would rise as he entered the room.99

During the next decade, the younger Nassief became a key figure in the cooperation 

between MODA and the Mediterranean Division. In February 1966, Sultan appointed 

him the MODA liaison officer with the Corps, and the division began addressing 

all official correspondence to him rather than to the minister.100 Nassief established 

close personal relations with many of the Corps employees who worked on the Saudi 

program. When he traveled to Livorno, he stayed in the home of Zeno Zabban, chief of 

the Design Branch in the Engineering Division. Rising to colonel in the Saudi Army, 

Nassief remained an important player in all of the Corps’ dealings with MODA until 

he retired in the mid-1970s. He also retained the friendship and respect of many of 

the Americans who worked with him.101

Ordnance and Vehicle Support Program

In late 1963, when the Saudis first opened discussions about engaging U.S. 

Army engineer officers to help modernize their military establishment, they 

specifically requested one additional officer experienced in procurement and support 

for ordnance and motor vehicles. The resultant Mediterranean Division logistical 

and supply program, in its early years called the Saudi Arabia Mobility Program 

(SAMP), was out of the normal range of Corps of Engineer activities. Nonetheless, 

it became the longest-running engagement by U.S. Army engineers in Saudi Arabia 

and remained active into the late 1990s under a different name. SAMP was never a 

98 On the division’s role as mentor, see Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 20 Oct 65; in addition, 

see minutes for staff meetings on 20 Oct, 8 Nov, 22 Nov, 6 Dec 65, and 24 Jan 66, in Som-29, TADRHA; Telex, [unclear] to Div Engr USAENGR Div MED Leghorn, 29 Nov 65, sub: Weekly Progress 

Report, box FB107, OH, HQ USACE. 99 Telex, Ch MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group] Rome from USACE Rep Riyadh, 11 

Jul 65, sub: Visit of Saudi Engineer Officers to Rome, unmarked box, Sude Papers; Memo, Blondell 

and Walker, 7 Sep 65, sub: Trip Report of MDD Party to Saudi Arabia, 21 Aug–1 Sep 65, box 51-

84-5389, Farrell Papers. 100 Walker to Col Francis G. McBride, 11 Feb 66, p. 2, box 51-84-5389, Farrell Papers. 101 The authors’ interviews with Wiles, Reisacher, Hight, Oliva, and Dykes (see Bibliography) 

attest to Nassief’s importance and to the friendships that he developed with members of the Mediterranean Division.
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 263

part of the Engineer Assistance Agreement, but the origins of the program paralleled 

the negotiations that yielded that agreement.

During the several months of negotiations leading to the EAA in May 1965, the 

Saudi request for ordnance support received little attention. The Saudis reiterated 

this request once the agreement was signed, specifically asking the U.S. Army to 

survey the Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance Corps (SAAOC). The U.S. Army TankAutomotive Command’s review, conducted without Corps participation, revealed 

that the Saudi Arabian Army had essentially no mobility and could not deploy its 

troops anywhere within the kingdom if a crisis developed. To rectify the situation, the 

Army Materiel Command recommended that the Saudis acquire all-new, compatible 

equipment; update their facilities; develop a modern maintenance and supply system; 

and create a technical training school to teach ordnance skills.102 The Saudis then 

requested help to devise a program for planning, procurement, maintenance, and 

logistical support for military vehicles. The Army Materiel Command, the appropriate agency to support the Saudi need, had no overseas capability or responsibility. 

Involved in its own reorganization, it declined to take on the responsibility. The 

USMTM had a presence in Saudi Arabia but no contracting authority, a necessary 

element in any program to develop a training and supply system. Only the Corps 

of Engineers, already deeply engaged through the Mediterranean Division in work 

for Saudi Arabia, had both a presence in the country and the contracting authority 

to sustain the operation. With approval from Washington, the division assumed 

the advisory role in support of the vehicle and ordnance program in March 1966. 

The division counted on the support of the Army Materiel Command to furnish the 

logistical expertise that the program demanded.103

In late March 1966, the division appointed its assistant chief of engineering, 

James Vanek, as project officer to explore the prospects of establishing a program 

to manage the Saudi fleet of military vehicles. Vanek led a team from the division, 

augmented by officers from the U.S. Military Training Mission and the U.S. Army 

Ordnance Corps, to assess the condition of the Saudi Arabian Army’s vehicles 

and the logistical and maintenance systems that supported them. The study team 

observed a wide range of problems. The Saudi Army had equipment from several 

countries. It could neither identify the spare parts it had on hand nor distribute them 

to the sites where they were needed for maintenance and repair. Moreover, Saudi 

personnel lacked the training and skills necessary to operate, maintain, or supply 

the vehicles in their possession. Nearly new trucks, including an immaculatelooking Mercedes truck with only 2,500 kilometers (1,550 miles) on its odometer, 

sat abandoned in virtual junkyards apparently because the Saudis did not know how 

102 Thomas Bortner, “A Look Back: OPD Lineage Date Back to 1966 Signing of SAMP Agreement,” Transatlantic News, October-November 1994, copy in R&D File 2363, TAC; Richard Wiles, 

“SAMP,” Mar 98, provided by Wiles, authors’ files. 103 Wiles, “SAMP,” p. 2. Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 21 Mar 66, pp. 2–3, Som-29, TADRHA, copy in R&D File 2759, TAC; Mediterranean Div, “History: Saudi Arabia Mobility Program 

(SAMP),” 30 Jun 70, p. 8, box 16, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC (hereafter cited as SAMP Hist, 

30 Jun 70).
264 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

to service or maintain them. At a maintenance shop in Taif, the supply of small 

replacement parts for various military vehicles was in a jumbled pile about four 

feet high. The visiting Americans observed as three workmen pawed through the 

pile, each one trying to locate a part to match the one he held in his other hand. 

When team members asked the commanders of the Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance 

Corps how many vehicles the army had, the commanders had no answer.104 The 

visit confirmed what the Saudis already knew—they needed help. 

Upon returning to Livorno, Vanek’s team prepared a report to define the scope of 

the problems and to set out recommendations to guide the Mediterranean Division’s 

assistance. The Saudis needed an intensive training program in maintenance and 

supply. They needed procedures to supply and maintain the vehicles currently in 

the inventory. They needed an automated system to track the location, movement, 

and replacement of existing and new equipment. They needed a procurement system 

with maximum interchangeability of parts, components, tools, and equipment. The 

division did not command all this expertise, so it decided from the outset to engage 

a contractor to marshal the services the Saudi Army needed.105

By May 1966, the division had completed its initial feasibility study and 

assembled data on budget and cost for the program that Vanek had proposed. 

The division sent its report to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Affairs, and the summer passed as the proposal made its 

way through the establishment in Washington. On 7 September 1966, Secretary of 

Defense Robert S. McNamara and Saudi Minister of Defense and Aviation Prince 

Sultan signed an agreement to create the Mobility Management Organization in 

Saudi Arabia. The United States agreed to sell modern equipment to the Saudi 

Arabian Army and to provide assistance in modernizing the Army’s systems for 

procurement, maintenance, and supply for its vehicles. The endeavor was called 

the Saudi Arabia Mobility Program.106

Between the signing and the end of 1966, the Mediterranean Division, the Office 

of the Chief of Engineers, and the Saudi government developed arrangements for 

financing and managing the engineer support to SAMP. The agreement specified that 

the Corps would “appoint a Program Manager in coordination with USMTM.” The 

division engineer, Colonel Cameron, favored retaining the management authority 

in division headquarters and designating the division engineer as program manager, 

with a deputy program manager on site in Saudi Arabia. He reasoned that, because 

104 Bortner, “A Look Back”; Interv, Moorhus with Wiles, 21 Oct 93, 7 Feb, 5 May 94, pp. 63–64, 

and Wiles’ comments on the draft manuscript. 105 “Mobility Modernization and Armaments Program for the Saudi Arabian Army,” 28 May 66, 

box 11, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. Wiles, “SAMP,” pp. 2–3. 106 SAMP Hist, 30 Jun 70, p. 8; DF, Barber, Actg Cost to Dir MC, 29 Apr 66, sub: Restatement 

of ASD (ISA) Responsibility for International Logistics Negotiations, Mil Files XXI-3-5, OH, HQ 

USACE; Cameron to Cassidy, 8 Jun 66, OH, HQ USACE; Memo, Col W. G. Trainer, 27 Oct 66, 

sub: Special Instructions for Saudi Arabia Mobility Arrangements, box 27, access. no. 77-92-0001, 

WNRC; Bortner, “A Look Back”; Maj James F. Rosebery, “Ordnance Program Division (OPD), 

Historical Summary, 1986,” 10 Feb 87, introduction, Current Files, TAD-PAO (hereafter cited as 

Rosebery, OPD Hist Sum: 1986).
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 265

of Saudi sensitivity to issues of prestige, the division engineer in Livorno should 

be in charge, just as he had been in presenting all other programs directly to King 

Faisal and to his ministers. Cameron felt that the program would enjoy greater 

continuity of personnel, an element favored by the Saudis, if it were managed from 

Livorno with support in Saudi Arabia. Cameron anticipated problems in recruiting 

personnel to serve in Riyadh. The U.S. Army designated military tours in Riyadh 

as unaccompanied because the city lacked the modern facilities available in Jiddah, 

the diplomatic capital and location of all the embassies.107 By late 1966, the division 

began its search for a contractor who could furnish the services and personnel needed 

to make the Saudi Arabia Mobility Program successful.

Relocation to Camp Darby

In 1965 and 1966, as the division leaders worked to develop the new construction programs for the Saudi government, they also grappled with pressure from 

Washington to reduce overhead. In the spring of 1965, a DoD committee studying 

ways to reduce the United States’ deficit in international balance of payments asked 

the division to consider relocating to Camp Darby, home of the U.S. Army 8th 

107 Cameron to Seedlock, 5 Nov 66, Mil Files XXI-3-5, OH, HQ USACE.

Col. H. F. Cameron Jr. (far right) and Col. Dennis Grace (second from right) review the 

contract for the Saudi Arabia Mobility Program, February 1967.
266 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Logistics Command, about ten miles north of Livorno. The 8th Logistics Command 

provided support to U.S. Army elements in the Southern European Task Force 

(SETAF) in Italy and to other elements under the United States Army, Europe 

(USAREUR). The Mediterranean Division itself already relied on the command 

for some support. A further consolidation would reduce the outflow of dollars and 

gold from the American economy into the Italian economy.108

Division staff reviewed the possibility of the move and concluded that some local 

procurement could be combined with the 8th Logistics Command; it also appeared 

feasible to merge the civilian personnel functions of the two organizations. Other 

division functions had to remain separate. As a result of the study, the division 

engineer, Colonel Chaffin, informed the chief of engineers in June 1965 that he had 

no objection to relocating the division to Camp Darby into two barracks buildings 

converted for administrative use.109

The order from Washington to relocate first put the date at 1 October 1965. The 

division objected that the buildings designated for it at Camp Darby were neither 

vacant nor immediately usable as office space. When the staff, citing the disruption 

108 Msg, Corps of Engrs to Div Engr, Mediterranean, 19 Mar 65, in file labeled Management Study 

of January 1966, MDD Move to Camp Darby, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 109 “Merger of Selected Functions of 8th Log Cmd and U.S. Army Engineer Division, Mediterranean,” 7 May 65, in file labeled Management Study of January 1966, MDD Move to Camp Darby, 

unmarked box; Memo, Burfening, 9 Jun 65, unmarked box; both in TAD-RHA. 

New location of the Mediterranean Division at Camp Darby, ca. 1967
The Mediterranean Division, 1961–1966 267

of work, resisted the suggestion to move first and have the renovation done “in the 

spring,” Washington relented. In December, funds arrived for the redesign and 

modest renovation of the barracks buildings at Camp Darby. Contractors completed 

the minor construction in the spring of 1966. In the meantime, the division terminated 

the lease on the Palazzo Grande in Livorno effective 15 June 1966. Between 18 May 

and 10 June, the move was completed with a minimum of confusion. In 1967, an 

additional building of permanent masonry construction was erected at Camp Darby 

to accommodate the division’s reproduction equipment.110

The Mediterranean Division in 1966

As 1966 ended, Colonel Cameron assessed the division’s status. Administratively, 

the situation was stable, with the division physically relocated to renovated buildings 

at Camp Darby. After much delay, Cameron had a nearly full complement of civilian 

pilots: two in Italy and one each in Turkey and in the Gulf, with an aviator due to 

arrive in February for Saudi Arabia.111

In Turkey and Iran, the division’s workload continued to drop. In September, 

Cameron had alerted the Office of the Chief of Engineers that, with the work in 

Iran due for completion by June 1967, he expected to recommend closing the Gulf 

District that year.112 The forecast for construction in Turkey, $3.5 million in projects 

at Incirlik, Karamursel, Sinop, Samsun, Golbasi, and Izmir, meant the probability 

of phasing out the TUSEG Area Office as well. In Somalia, only the dredging and 

final cleanup remained at the Chisimayu Port to complete Phase I. Bids for Phase II 

construction, scheduled to be opened in early October, had been delayed indefinitely 

by the Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C. 

Throughout the region, the late receipt and shortages of USAF design funds 

continued to be a problem. Although the division had completed design for 

thirty-five Air Force projects, lack of construction authorization, of funds, or of 

host-government approval kept the projects from going into construction.113

The prospective workload for the division using U.S. military construction 

funds looked bleak, and the division had only the Phase II Chisimayu Port project 

on the horizon for AID. The projects funded by the government in Saudi Arabia, 

however, seemed to multiply almost monthly. In late August, the division signed a 

contract with the Bin Ladin Organization to build Access Road A, the initial item 

of work for the cantonment at Khamis Mushayt.114

110 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 6 Dec 65, 10 Jan, 7 Feb, 13 Jun 66, Som-29, TAD-RHA; 

Memo for Secretary of Defense, MEDIV [sic] Engineers (U[nclassified]), 15 Jun 71, sub: MEDDIV 

Engineers, box 6, access. no. 77-86-0008, WNRC. 111 Ltr, Cameron to Cassidy, 2 Dec 66, Mil Files XXI-3-5, OH, HQ USACE; Mediterranean Div 

Staff Mtg Min, 4 Jan 67, box 51-83-8379, Farrell Papers. 112 Cameron to Cassidy, 6 Sep 66. 113 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 4 Jan 67, box 51-83-8379, Farrell Papers. 114 Cameron to Cassidy, 6 Sep 66, p. 2. 
268 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

With the design on the Khamis Mushayt cantonment progressing well, the 

division expected to issue a request for proposals for construction early in January 

1967. Field investigations and surveys for Tabuk were substantially complete; for 

Qaysumah, the third cantonment, negotiations were underway with the architectengineer for surveys, field investigations, and a master plan.115

Expansion of the Saudi Arabian television system continued. Construction 

had started on the television station at Medina, and the contractor was ready to 

begin at Buraydah. In December, NBCI signed an option contract to operate the 

completed stations. The division had drafted and presented a five-year budget plan 

for expansion of the television network. The Saudi minister of information had then 

enthusiastically asked for a ten-year plan and indicated that he was considering the 

future addition of a 600-seat movie theater, a UN-type congress hall with seating 

for representatives from fifteen nations, a TV studio, and a film center. This would 

be a “sizable possible addition to our Saudi program,” Cameron noted.116

By the end of 1966, the Mediterranean Division, the Office of the Chief of 

Engineers, and the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation developed financial and 

managerial arrangements to initiate the SAMP. In January and February 1967, the 

Corps signed with the U.S. Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia two letter 

agreements that defined the relationship between the two concerning the Saudi Arabia 

Mobility Program. Prince Sultan continued to want arms included in this program, 

offering another possibility for additional work for the division.117

Although the Mediterranean Division maintained its enormous area of 

responsibility, its attention was focused on Saudi Arabia. The division continued 

to construct facilities for the American military forces and, with State Department 

financing, for American allies. By contrast, the programs in Saudi Arabia were paid 

for entirely by the Saudis. To oversee the new and rapidly growing program, the 

division prepared to open a district in Saudi Arabia, the first newly created district 

in the division since the activation of the Gulf District in March 1956. As the year 

ended, the Mediterranean Division was poised to solicit bids from private American 

contractors to implement a support program for Saudi Arabia that would grow 

beyond anyone’s expectations.118

115 Ltr, Cameron to Cassidy, 2 Dec 66. 116 Med Div Staff Mtg Min, 4 Jan 67, box 51-83-8379, Farrell Papers; quotation from Ltr, Cameron 

to Cassidy, 2 Dec 66. 117 SAMP Hist, 30 Jun 70, p. 9; Ltr, Cameron to Cassidy, 2 Dec 66. 118 Ltr, Cameron to Cassidy, 2 Dec 66, p. 3; Cameron to Cassidy, 3 Mar 67, p. 3.
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 269

8

Developing the Saudi Arabian 

Programs, 1967–1972

In the years immediately following the signing of the Engineer Assistance 

Agreement in 1965, the volume of construction that the Mediterranean Division 

supervised for the Saudi Arabian government began to increase. By contrast, in 

the areas where the division had invested most of its energy in the 1950s and early 

1960s (North Africa, the NATO countries of southern Europe, and the buffer states 

between the Soviet Union and the oil-rich states of the Arabian Peninsula), the 

volume of construction waned steadily throughout the 1960s. Despite this decline, 

the Mediterranean Division provided construction management services outside 

Saudi Arabia for the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard, and Agency for 

International Development even while the main focus of the division’s activity 

shifted progressively between 1967 and 1972. 

As the 1960s ended and a new decade began, the anticolonial nationalism 

that had propelled Egypt’s Nasser to world prominence provoked similar revolutions in Libya and Somalia. This made North Africa a political environment 

inhospitable to military construction by the United States. At the same time, the 

need for new facilities for the NATO countries of southern Europe would not 

sustain an overseas division of the Corps of Engineers. By the end of the decade, 

the war in Vietnam dominated the allocation of American resources for military 

construction and personnel. Of the Middle Eastern states, only Saudi Arabia 

evinced a very strong desire to have U.S. Army engineers heavily involved in 

building the country’s military infrastructure. Moreover, the Saudi royal family 

had the money to pay for the engineers’ services. This chapter explores the 

changing patterns of work as Saudi Arabia became the Mediterranean Division’s 

principal customer. 

Waning Operations in the Mediterranean

The division managed only a smattering of projects in Greece and Turkey in 

the late 1960s. In December 1968, the Mediterranean Division closed its materials 

testing laboratory in Athens, a sign of the division’s declining activity in the region. 

Division personnel supervised for the Air Force construction of one hundred eighty 

family-housing units at Iraklion on the island of Crete and another two hundred 

units at Karamursel in Turkey. In 1969, the division received notification that the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense finally approved additional construction for the 
270 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Air Force in Turkey at Incirlik and at Ankara. These construction projects in Greece 

and Turkey all dated from programs authorized in fiscal years 1965 and 1966.1

NATO Countries

The Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 sparked one of the Mediterranean Division’s 

rare new construction programs outside Saudi Arabia. The program, Theater Air 

Base Vulnerability Evaluation Exercise (TAB VEE), addressed the vulnerability of 

aircraft on the ground. Army engineers designed and constructed aircraft shelters 

that used reinforced concrete poured over liners made of corrugated-steel arches. 

In early 1969, the Mediterranean Division received authorization to design and 

build maintenance and parking hangars for the Air Force at Aviano in Italy and at 

Incirlik in Turkey. The number of structures and the criteria fluctuated as the Air 

Force repeatedly revised its requirements and specifications. Construction finally 

1 Cameron to Cassidy, 3 Mar 67, p. 2, Mil Files XXI-3-6; MFR, Clarke, 29 May 67, sub: Visit to 

Mediterranean Division, 16–28 May 1967, Mil Files XII-37-1; Waddell to Cassidy, 6 Jun 69, pp. 1–2, 

and 31 Dec 69, p. 1, Mil Files XXI-3-8; Waddell to Clarke, 3 Dec 69, p. 2, Mil Files XXI-3-8; all in 

Office of History (OH), HQ United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Alexandria, Va. MDD 

Internal Organizational Changes, Chronology with GO nos., Aug 58–Jan 71, n.d., p. 9, box 24, access. 

no. 77-92-0002, Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md.; Mediterranean Div, 

“Informational Brochure,” 1 Feb 69, p. 5, box 24, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC.

Resident office in Karamursel, 1969
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 271

began very late in 1970 at Aviano; by early 1972, the division had completed sixteen 

aircraft shelters and two maintenance shelters at a cost of about $1 million. At 

Incirlik, the division supervised construction of eighteen TAB VEE aircraft shelters 

in 1971 worth $2 million. In 1973, the TAB VEE program at Aviano became a part 

of NATO’s construction activities and responsibility for completing additional work 

passed to the Italian government.2

Work in North Africa

The work in Asmara, Ethiopia, typified the Mediterranean Division’s activities 

in North Africa during the late 1960s. Here, the division administered half a dozen 

modest contracts to construct such facilities as a grade school for military dependents 

at Kagnew Station, a building to house a communications receiver for the U.S. 

Army Security Agency, an expanded system of water wells to alleviate the serious 

water shortage provoked by drought between 1968 and 1971, the rehabilitation 

of a heating plant, and relocation of power lines for the satellite-tracking station 

2 Waddell to Cassidy, 12 Nov 69, p. 1, box 26, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Waddell to Clarke, 

17 Dec 70, p. 3, Mil Files XXI-3-9, OH, HQ USACE; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 12 Nov 69, 

box 26, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 Jan 72, pp. 12–13, box 

51-84-9384, Richard T. Farrell Papers, OH, HQ USACE; Williams to Gribble, 14 Dec 73, p. 2, box 

26, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC.

Asphalt paving during road construction in the family housing area at Karamursel, June 1970
272 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

at Asmara run by the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command, Europe. 

When the Army terminated its activities at Kagnew Station in June 1973, the 

Mediterranean Division’s responsibilities in Asmara ended. Thereafter, the Navy 

operated a communications center from the post and provided engineering support 

for the remaining U.S. installations in Asmara.3

The division’s final months in Asmara provide an example of the sort of pesky 

administrative problems that characterized management of construction operations in foreign countries. By terms of the construction agreement, the Corps of 

Engineers and its contractors used tax-exempt gasoline purchased from commercial 

sources and gave the dealer the forms to request tax waivers from the government. 

In January 1970, the Ethiopian government imposed a new regulation that all 

tax-exempt gasoline be dyed red to prevent it from entering the black market.4

 In 

Eritrea, enforcement came only in May 1971 when Ethiopian customs officials 

began to refuse to honor the tax-exempt certificates submitted by the commercial 

outlets. Corps contractors bought gas directly from the U.S. military; it was tax 

exempt but not dyed red. If stopped, the contractors faced fines if they could not 

prove the gas was tax exempt. When the division’s area engineer, Arthur Chapman, 

interceded with local customs officials on behalf of the contractors, the officials 

referred him to the government in Addis Ababa. Chapman sought help from the 

U.S. embassy, but months of efforts proved fruitless. Finally, American officials at 

Kagnew Station instructed contractors to buy gasoline on the commercial market 

and request compensation from the Army for the tax liabilities. This procedure was 

less expensive than establishing a distribution and accounting system that complied 

with the new regulations.5

The Corps of Engineers had worked at Wheelus Air Base in Tripoli, Libya, 

since 1951 when the Middle East District had been activated to manage construction 

there. In 1952, the Mediterranean Division incorporated the district; by 1958, the 

3 Memo, Bertram W. Hoare, 13 Jul 67, sub: Starting and Completion Dates, Contract DACA75-

67-C-0046, and other docs; Reginald Wong, “Time Extensions Due to Suez Canal Closure, Contract 

DACA75-67-C-0046, Dependent Grade School and Administration and Supply Additions, Asmara, 

Ethiopia,” n.d.; Col Denis B. Grace to Geometra Gabriele Pollera, 27 Feb 69; all in ETH-9, Transatlantic 

Division–Records Holding Area (TAD-RHA). Melvin G. Green, Trip Rpt, 29 May 68, sub: Asmara 

and Saudi Arabia, 28 April–21 May 1968, box 29, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; Mediterranean 

Div, Fact Sheets for Ch of Engrs, 16 Apr 70, box 51-83-8379, Farrell Papers; MFR, Green, 29 Jun 70, 

sub: Ground Water Production, Asmara, Ethiopia, box 21, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; Memo, 

Philip M. Butler, Trip Rpt, 18 Aug 72, sub: Asmara, Ethiopia, 7–10 August 1972, box 12 of 357, 

TAD-RHA; Telephone/Verbal Conversation Rcd, Boer (STRATCOM, Heidelberg) to Holle, 11 Feb 

71, sub: Relocation of Satellite Tracking Station, Asmara, Ethiopia, box 21, access. no. 77-92-0002, 

WNRC; Ltr from Maj Richard Chandler Jr., 21 Sep 72, box 12 of 357, TAD-RHA. 4 Maj Frederick E. Moss to Arthur Chapman, 15 Mar 72; DF, Chapman, 30 Nov 71, sub: Exemption of Duty Free Fuel Contracts DACA75-72-C-0005 and DACA75-71-C-0017; both in box 12 of 

357, TAD-RHA. 5 DF, Chapman, 30 Nov 71; Moss to Chapman, 15 Mar 72. Memo of Conversation, Daniel H. 

Clare, 2 Sep 71, sub: Difficulties in Arranging for Duty-Free Gasoline for Kagnew Station Contractors; Edward W. M. Bryant, U.S. Embassy, to American Consul General, Asmara, 14 Sep 71; both 

in box 12 of 357, TAD-RHA.
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 273

division had completed all major construction for the U.S. Air Force at Wheelus. 

The division’s activities in Libya thereafter were limited to small contracts to support 

and improve Air Force operations at Wheelus or to assist the Coast Guard at the 

LORAN navigation station at Matratin. Late in 1966, the division undertook projects 

to rehabilitate and expand the runways at Marble Arch Airfield adjacent to Matratin 

Station. The June 1967 war between Israel and the Arab states disrupted and delayed 

that work, and U.S. support of Israel in the war heightened anti-American feeling 

among Libyan nationalists. Despite the changing atmosphere, work continued. 

Between April and September 1968, contractors repaired the antenna towers that 

served Matratin Station; the following June, the division awarded a contract to 

improve several buildings at the installation.6

In addition to these projects, the Mediterranean Division supported Peace

Desert, a program to construct facilities at Wheelus Air Base for the nucleus of a 

modern Libyan Air Force equipped with F–105 aircraft. In December 1967, the U.S. 

Air Force authorized design to begin; in June 1968, Morrison-Knudsen International 

(MKI) won a $1.4 million construction contract for Wheelus.7

On 1 September 1969, a military coup led by a young Libyan nationalist, Col. 

Muammar Gadhafi, overthrew the Libyan monarchy. In mid-December, the newly 

installed revolutionary government asked the United States to end all construction in 

the country. At the time of the revolution, the Mediterranean Division had six active 

contracts in Libya, five related to Peace Desert and one for the LORAN station at 

Matratin. The division terminated two of the contracts, completed the remaining 

four, and turned all facilities over to the new Libyan government. On 10 March 

1970, after nearly two decades in the country, the Corps of Engineers closed its 

area office at Wheelus Air Base and ended its operations in Libya.8

 Within months, 

the Libyan government insisted that the United States and Great Britain withdraw 

from the military bases they had operated for a generation or more.

The largest volume of the division’s work outside Saudi Arabia in the late 1960s 

was in Somalia. The completion of the Phase I construction at the port of Chisimayu 

(the construction of the breakwater and mole to control and reduce wave action, 

the wharf and ship berths, and the access road to Serpenti Island) overlapped the 

initiation of Phase II. The second phase involved construction of a water treatment 

and distribution system for the city, cargo sheds, warehouses, port administrative 

6 “Chronological Construction History by Country: Libya,” n.d. [list runs to June 1970], p. 3, box 

35, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; E. Tweedale, Taylor Woodrow International Ltd., to Corps of 

Engineers, USCG Loran Station, Matratin, Libya, 8 Jun 67, and other docs in LIB-6, TAD-RHA. 7 Cameron to Cassidy, 6 Dec 67, Mil Files XXI-3-6, and 29 May 68, Mil Files XXI-3-7, both in 

OH, HQ USACE; Cameron to Cassidy, 14 Mar 68, box 18, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; “Chronological Construction History by Country: Libya,” n.d.; OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 

1967–30 June 1968,” p. 48, Gen Files 5-8, OH, HQ USACE; Memo, Rosseau, 16 Oct 68, sub: Trip 

Report—Malta, Wheelus—9/12 October 1968, box 35, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 8 Memo, Col Victor O. Wilson, 16 Mar 70, sub: Corps of Engineers Contracts in Libya, box 15 of 

357, TAD-RHA; Waddell to Clarke, 5 Mar 70, p. 5, Mil Files XXI-3-9, OH, HQ USACE; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 5 Mar 70, p. 7, box 18, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC.
274 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

buildings, and an electrical system adequate to support the facilities planned for 

the expanding port.9

In October 1965, the division engineer, Colonel Chaffin, traveled to Mogadiscio 

to complete negotiations with the Somali government for Phase II of the work 

at Chisimayu. The Somali government had signed directly with the Agency for 

International Development the agreement for funding Phase I, but AID preferred to 

have the Corps of Engineers negotiate an agreement for Phase II. In early November, 

the Somali government and the Mediterranean Division signed an agreement under 

Section 607 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The provision, which allowed 

a U.S. government agency to furnish services to a friendly state on a reimbursable 

basis, had covered the Mediterranean Division’s management of the Saudi Arabian 

television program beginning in 1963. Like the work of Phase I, financing for 

the second phase of the Chisimayu work came from an AID loan to the Somali 

government.10

It took over a year before the Agency for International Development, the 

Mediterranean Division, and the Somali government reached agreement on design 

specifications and other criteria for a construction contract. AID then set an upper 

limit of $5.5 million on all bids, which the Mediterranean Division opposed as 

too restrictive. In December 1966, the division invited construction proposals and 

received four bids, three of which exceeded the price ceiling. Morrison-Knudsen 

International, which priced the work at just over $5.7 million, pointed out that the 

contract ceiling did not take into account either a trade embargo between Somalia and 

Kenya or the inflationary impact of the Vietnam War. MKI expressed a willingness 

to negotiate the price and specifically noted that if the contract’s “Buy American” 

provisions were waived, the company could buy Italian pipe at considerable savings 

and reduce its bid. Because the MKI bid did not meet the terms of the solicitation, 

the division rejected it and the other two submissions as nonresponsive.11

This left only the submission from Reynolds Construction Company. The 

Somali minister of public works refused to open the Reynolds bid, ostensibly 

because Reynolds had not been included on the list of nine contractors the Somali 

government had preapproved. More likely, the Somali government rejected the 

bid because Reynolds had an active contract with the Mediterranean Division for 

construction in Ethiopia, a country with which Somalia had fought in 1964 over 

9 “Mediterranean Division, Corps of Engineers, United States Army,” [1967], p. 26, unmarked 

box, Farrell Papers. 10 “Work for Other Nations,” in The History of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1986), p. 112; Chaffin to Cassidy, 28 Sep 65, Mil Files XII-3-

4, OH, HQ USACE; “Agreement Between the Government of the Somali Republic and the Corps of 

Engineers, Department of the Army of the United States of America, Relating to the Construction of 

Municipal and Port Facilities at Chisimaio,” 10 Nov 65, box 20, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 11 Cassidy to Cameron, 29 Jun 66, and Cameron to Cassidy, 2 Dec 66, both in Mil Files XXI-3-5, 

OH, HQ USACE; MFR, Rosseau and Frassrand, 2 Feb 67, sub: Trip Report to Mogadiscio, Somalia, 

for Bid Opening of Phase II, Chisimaio Project, box 102 of 357, TAD-RHA; Ltrs, John S. Withers, 

Grove, Shepherd, Wilson, and Kruge Inc., 25 Jan 67, and W. R. Conrow, MKI Inc., 26 Jan 67, both 

to Minister of Public Works, Republic of Somalia, both in box 102 of 357, TAD-RHA.
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 275

disputed territory along their common border. The contracting officer at the review 

of proposals, the assistant division engineer, Col. John M. Frassrand, said that 

the terms of the solicitation bound the Somali government to honor the bid from 

Reynolds, a bona fide American contractor. The AID representative at the meeting 

concurred, noting that AID had added Reynolds as a legitimate bidder in a letter to 

the Somali government. The Somali minister resisted these entreaties and left the 

Reynolds proposal unopened on the table. The review party moved its discussion 

to the office of the U.S. ambassador to Somalia, and he also urged to no avail that 

the bid be opened. That afternoon, the ambassador raised the matter with the Somali 

foreign minister, who agreed to discuss the issue with the prime minister.12

By late February 1967, the negotiations on the Reynolds bid had not advanced; 

but the last element of the work under the Phase I contract, the dredging of the harbor 

channel at Chisimayu, finally came to an end. Given the impasse over the Reynolds 

bid, and with Phase I completed, the division reduced its staff in Somalia to one 

officer and suspended all action on the Phase II contract. The Reynolds Company 

kept one representative in Somalia to monitor the situation.13

On 29 April 1967, after extensive correspondence with the Agency for 

International Development, the Somali government agreed to open the Reynolds 

bid. The $5,329,636 bid fell under the ceiling and was judged responsive in all 

respects. After final negotiations, on 31 May, Reynolds signed a contract that 

contained two special conditions. First, Reynolds agreed to form a subsidiary to 

which it assigned the construction at Chisimayu. Second, the parties added a clause 

to require 100 percent employment of either American or Somali citizens. Citizens 

of other countries could be hired only after they had lived in Somalia for more than 

three years. Reynolds assigned the contract to its newly formed, wholly owned 

subsidiary, Overseas African Construction Corporation (OACC). On 7 August, 

AID finally cleared the contract so that the Mediterranean Division could issue a 

notice for OACC to proceed. Both the contractor and the division opened offices 

in Somalia.14

The contractor’s mobilization proceeded slowly. OACC had planned to use four 

third-country nationals in its management team, but these appointments contradicted 

the contract provision governing citizenship of personnel. The area engineer, Maj. 

William S. Norris Jr., pointed out the violation; and OACC took some time adjusting 

its hiring practices.15 OACC had assurances that it could use Serpenti Island, but 

12 MFR, Rosseau and Frassrand, 2 Feb 67; MFR, Frassrand, 3 May 67, sub: FONCON Mr. Paul 

N. Shulman [Reynolds Exec] and Undersigned, box 102 of 357, TAD-RHA. 13 Cameron to Cassidy, 3 Mar 67, p. 4.

14 Ltr, Ahmed Jama Abdilleh, Dir Gen, Ministry of Public Works, Republic of Somalia, to Div 

Engr, Mediterranean Div, 18 May 67, box 102 of 357, TAD-RHA; Ltr, Cameron to Cassidy, 7 Jun 

67, p. 3, and 5 Sep 67, both in Mil Files XXI-3-6, OH, HQ USACE; “Final Narrative Report, Phase II 

Port Facilities, Chisimaio, Somali Democratic Republic,” Feb 71, p. 12, Mil Files XII-49-1, OH, HQ 

USACE (hereafter cited as Final Narr Rpt, Phase II, Chisimaio); OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 

1 July 1967–30 June 1968,” p. 42. 15 MFR, John F. Elder, OACC [Overseas African Construction Corporation], and Maj William S. 

Norris Jr., 14 Sep 67, sub: Conference, Contract DACA75-67-C-0044, box 25 of 357, TAD-RHA; 
276 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

a local contractor held a lease for the island from the Somali government. Despite 

repeated appeals, the local contractor did not clear the island for use by OACC until 

late January 1968, nearly five months after the anticipated date.16

Logistics created another delay. By contract, OACC had to provide housing 

and support facilities for the division’s staff as well as its own personnel. The first 

shipment of prefabricated buildings and the furniture for those accommodations 

took three weeks to travel from Mogadiscio to Chisimayu, a distance of about 

two hundred fifty miles. Only part of the road between the two cities was paved: 

when the trucks carrying the materials ran into heavy rain, they became hopelessly 

mired in mud about ninety-five miles north of Chisimayu. For over a week, no one 

in Chisimayu knew the whereabouts of the truck convoy. Then one of the drivers 

reached Chisimayu and OACC officials dispatched a tractor to pull the trucks out 

of the mud.17

When the division’s resident engineer, Walter F. von Neudegg, arrived in 

Chisimayu in September 1967 with his wife and ten-year-old son, he found no 

suitable accommodations for rent. For several months, the von Neudegg family 

shared a home that AID had leased for the last remaining Corps employee from 

Phase I. Von Neudegg described the accommodations as crowded and the sanitary 

facilities as “rudimentary.” Meals consisted of canned goods and the prizes from 

the host’s occasional hunting expeditions, including warthog and, on one occasion, 

a young crocodile. In very late December, the von Neudegg family moved into a 

housing unit rented by the contractor.18

Through the autumn and winter of 1967–1968, Major Norris worked in 

Mogadiscio to speed decisions by officials from AID and the Somali government 

and to assure that OACC’s imported materials remained free of Somali taxes, 

tariffs, duties, and other levies. OACC needed about one hundred fifty workers to 

begin construction; but the news of major construction activity brought more than 

ten thousand job-seeking Somalis to Chisimayu, creating near chaos in the city of 

twenty thousand. When OACC was ready to begin construction in December, the 

Somali government had not yet acquired the land required at the water-treatment 

plant at Ionte, about ten miles upstream on the Giuba River north of Chisimayu.19

MFR, von Neudegg, 28 Sep 67, sub: Meeting with the Director of Public Works, GSR, Regarding 

Contract DACA75-67-C-0044 Problems, SOM-28, TAD-RHA. 16 MFR, Norris, 13 Oct 67, sub: Conference with Ambassador Thurston; Norris to Abdilleh, 

20 Oct 67; Norris to Grace, 16 Dec 67, Mixed Files; all in SOM-28, TAD-RHA. MFR, Norris, 18 

Dec 67, sub: Meeting with Director General of Public Works, box 25 of 357, TAD-RHA; Norris to 

Abdilleh, 29 Dec 67, SOM-28, TAD-RHA; MFR Prepared by Reginald Wong, Civil Engr CAB, 

Concurred by Douglas B. Ruddle, Asst Div Counsel, and Capt Robert G. Tames, Area Engr, 8 Jul 

70, sub: Discussions of OACC Claim Relative to Non-availability of Serpenti Island under Contract 

DACA75-67-C-0004—Construction of Port and Municipal Facilities, Chisimaio, Somalia, Mixed 

Files, SOM-28, TAD-RHA. 17 “Mr. von Neudegg’s Comments,” typescript dating from late 1975–early 1976, p. 2, box 51-84-

5389, Farrell Papers (hereafter cited as von Neudegg Comments). 18 Ibid., pp. 1–2.

19 Norris to G. A. Froemming, USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], 9 Oct 67, 

sub: USAID Engineering Function as Project Coordinator, Chisimio [sic], Phase Two Construction, 
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 277

By mid-January 1968, OACC had assembled a professional staff of fifteen 

at Chisimayu but continued to make management decisions that led to delays. 

OACC had operations at three separate construction sites—at the port, in the city 

of Chisimayu, and at the water intake at Ionte—but only one concrete batch plant 

at Ionte. The contract required concrete at locations more than twenty miles away, 

making timely delivery of fresh concrete mixes difficult when work proceeded at 

all locations simultaneously. By similarly dubious logic, the contractor used an 

excavator that cut a 24-inch trench although the contract called for minimum 28-inch 

trenches for water pipes. OACC had to subcontract to an Italian firm that used its 

backhoes to widen the trenches from the intake point on the Giuba to the storage 

reservoir on the outskirts of town.20

The area office’s location in Mogadiscio helped early in the project, when 

key decisions had to be reached in negotiations with Somali officials and with 

the diplomatic support of the U.S. embassy. New radio communications linking 

Chisimayu, Mogadiscio, and Asmara enabled the division to relocate the area office 

in March 1968; thereafter, the area office and the resident office shared office space 

in Chisimayu.21

In addition to supervising construction, the division sought to prepare a trained 

and efficient Somali organization to take over the facilities that supported the new 

seaport. AID provided funds for five Somali trainees who worked under the resident 

engineer, von Neudegg, in Chisimayu. The office also engaged a Somali laboratory 

technician who had worked in the Corps’ laboratory during Phase I.22

OACC overcame many of its difficulties; by summer 1968, its workforce of 

283 local laborers had construction ahead of schedule.23 In March 1969, the Somali 

government even agreed to allow OACC to hire skilled third-country artisans because 

the contractor could not meet his needs with local craftsmen. A revised construction 

schedule anticipated completion of the work by December 1969. A military coup 

following the assassination of the president of Somalia on 15 October delayed 

OACC’s completion of work; but on 31 March 1970, the Mediterranean Division 

transferred the Phase II construction to the Somali government.24

SOM-28, TAD-RHA; Norris to Grace, 16 Dec 67, pp. 1–3; Norris to Abdilleh, 27 Nov 67, sub: Customs Duties Exemptions, SOM-28, TAD-RHA; MFR, Norris, 18 Dec 67; von Neudegg Comments, 

pp. 2–3; Waddell to Cassidy, 10 Mar 69, p. 3, Mil Files XXI-3-8, OH, HQ USACE. 20 Ibid.; MFR, von Neudegg, 13 Dec 67, sub: Meeting with Contractor Project Manager, Contract 

DACA75-67-C-0044, 12 December 1967, p. 5, box 25 of 357, TAD-RHA. 21 MFR, Norris, 26 Feb 68, sub: Conference with Contractor, box 25 of 357, TAD-RHA; Cameron 

to Cassidy, 14 Mar 68; Final Narr Rpt, Phase II, Chisimaio, p. 15. 22 Norris, “Operations and Maintenance of Facilities, Chisimaio, Phase II,” 10 Jan 68, SOM-28, 

TAD-RHA; von Neudegg Comments, pp. 4–5; Final Narr Rpt, Phase II, Chisimaio, p. 35. 23 Final Narr Rpt, Phase II, Chisimaio, p. 35; Waddell to Cassidy, 7 Sep 68, Mil Files XXI-3-7, 

OH, HQ USACE. 24 Final Narr Rpt, Phase II, Chisimaio, pp. 20, 24; MFR, Col Denis B. Grace, Daly C. Lavergne, 

and Dan F. Miller Jr., 10 Jul 69, sub: Corps of Engineers and AID Discussions on Chisimaio Projects, 

SOM-28, TAD-RHA.
278 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

For another eight months, the division’s area office remained open to supervise 

remedial repair work on the breakwater and mole (extended causeway) constructed 

during Phase I. Since 1966, wave action during monsoons had overtopped the port’s 

breakwater and washed over the mole area, causing erosion of the fill under the 

mole and inside the armor stone of the breakwater. The division’s own engineers 

had designed the facilities, and they argued that the worsening erosion could have 

been prevented by adequate maintenance or by early remedial measures but that 

field inspectors had failed to show appropriate “adaptability to field conditions.”25

In 1967, the Agency for International Development awarded the first contract 

to correct the deficiencies; but the measures proved inadequate. After an inspection 

in January 1968, engineers in the division formulated a new plan. They proposed 

adding 500-pound stones to the breakwater to reduce surge from the wave action and 

placing additional armor stones to raise the breakwater by approximately nine feet 

along most of the mole area. The increased height would, they argued, “meet Somali 

Government objections to overtopping at certain times during the monsoons.”26

In June 1968, the Somali government signed an agreement with AID to complete 

the repairs. The Mediterranean Division wanted OACC to add the remedial repair 

of the wharf, breakwater, and mole area to its existing contract for Phase II; but 

the company declined. OACC doubted that it could find skilled local personnel or 

dependable subcontractors and sources of supply, and the Somali government’s 

restrictions on the work already under contract discouraged any new commitment. 

The company also complained of the “unreliability of regular direct shipping services 

from the United States.” In sum, the company declared, its overall “unsatisfactory” 

experience in Somalia and the “considerable loss” that it anticipated on the work 

already contracted for Phase II made it unwilling to remain active in Somalia.27

With the on-site construction firm unwilling to bid, the division decided in 

late 1968 to contract with a local Somali firm to undertake most of the repair; in 

June 1969, the local contractor began work. The company’s initial efforts received 

positive reviews from the division’s engineers, but progress slowed in late summer 

because of poor and unreliable equipment.28

In addition to all the other problems, the wharf area’s concrete surface had 

developed cracks. To repair these, the Corps of Engineers proposed a relatively 

new technique, the application of epoxy mortar. During the mid-1960s, engineers 

had experimented using epoxy mortar to repair concrete exposed to water erosion 

25 Quotation from Cameron, “Inspection Trip with OCE Team,” 15 Apr 66, p. 1, box 5, access. 

no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; Cameron to Cassidy, 3 Mar 67; OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 

1962–30 June 1963,” p. 42, Gen Files 5-4, OH, HQ USACE. 26 Cameron to Cassidy, 5 Sep 67. Quote from OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1967–30 

June 1968,” p. 43; Norris to His Excellency Mohamud Abdi Bur, Minister of Public Works, Mogadiscio, Somali Republic, 4 Jan 67, SOM-28, TAD-RHA. 27 Vanderschaaf to Issah Ali Dereh, Port Captain, Chisimaio, 31 Jul 68, sub: Maintenance of Wharf 

Area, SOM-28, TAD-RHA; Waddell to Cassidy, 7 Sep 68. Quotations from Paul N. Shulman, Overseas 

African Construction Corp., to Grace, 13 Nov 68, box 102 of 357, TAD-RHA. 28 Memo, G. A. Froemming [AID/Somalia] to U. L. James [AID/Washington], 16 Nov 68, sub: 

USAID Mogadiscio—Engineers Report, SOM-28, TAD-RHA; Waddell to Cassidy, 6 Jun 69, p. 3.
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 279

at civil works projects in the United States. The division sent Paul Wheeler, a civil 

engineer with experience in contract administration, to work with the contractor in 

determining the extent of the repairs. In February 1970, AID approved the use of 

epoxy to repair the wharves and reaffirmed its approval of the previously authorized 

deck and pile repairs. Over the spring and summer, the repairs progressed slowly, 

in part because essential materials did not arrive as planned. When the highly 

combustible chemicals needed to mix and thin the epoxy binder reached Italy from 

the United States, the division had difficulty finding ships that would transport them 

to Somalia.29

The area office in Somalia remained open while the remedial work continued. 

Simultaneously, the division held negotiations in Livorno with the Overseas African 

Construction Corporation to settle all pending change orders and claims. During 

July and August 1970, the division reached a settlement with OACC by conceding 

the company an adjustment that brought the contract price for Phase II to a total of 

$5,963,912. On 12 November, with the repair work completed, the Mediterranean 

Division closed its area office in Chisimayu and ended its decade of work in 

Somalia.30 It left behind a functional modern port, an adequate municipal electrical 

system able to support the harbor’s operations, and a system for the distribution of 

potable and sanitary water—the first in Chisimayu’s history. It also left behind a 

small cadre of Somali citizens trained to operate the facilities. 

Lt. Gen. Frederick J. Clarke, who oversaw the work in Somalia from Washington, 

D.C., as director of military construction before becoming chief of engineers in 

August 1969, reflected on Somalia as a microcosm of Cold War competition. “The 

Italians were in there with a banana subsidy; the West Germans were in on a road 

building program; the Red Chinese were in on agricultural assistance; and the 

Russians were in there building a cannery [while] the Americans were putting in a 

water system and the wharf facilities.”31

Operations in Saudi Arabia

When the Mediterranean Division closed its office in Somalia, it had fewer than 

thirty people in field offices outside of Saudi Arabia.32 A modest contract ($131,000) 

29 Donald R. Pope, “Epoxy Protection at Milford Dam,” Military Engineer (March-April 1965): 

119–20; Interv, Moorhus with Paul S. Wheeler, 31 May 95, pp. 23–24; MFR, Grace, Lavergne, and 

Miller, 10 Jul 69; Waddell to Cassidy, 10 Mar 69, p. 3; Waddell to Clarke, 5 Sep 69, Mil Files XXI3-8, OH, HQ USACE; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 5 Mar 70, pp. 1–2, and 28 Jul 70, pp. 4, 6, 

both in box 18, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Waddell to Clarke, 5 Mar 70, p. 4, and 6 Mar 70, p. 

1, both in Mil Files XXI-3-9, OH, HQ USACE. 30 Final Narr Rpt, Phase II, Chisimaio, p. 24; Mediterranean Div, Fact Sheets for Ch of Engrs, 16 

Apr 70, box 51-83-8379, Farrell Papers; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 28 Jul 70, p. 6; Waddell 

to Clarke, 17 Dec 70, Mil Files XXI-3-9, OH, HQ USACE. 31 Interviews with Lieutenant General Frederick J. Clarke (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief 

of Engineers, 1980), pp. 174–75. 32 See Table 10, “Mediterranean Division Personnel, End of Fiscal Year Strength,” derived from fourthquarter reports in Program Rev and Analysis Covering FYs 1967–1975, box 3 of 3, C-7-10, TAD-RHA.
280 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

covered drilling of water wells near Kagnew Station in Ethiopia. Two contracts 

totaling less than $500,000 remained active in Greece; in Turkey, five contracts were 

active with a total value of $1.8 million. By contrast, the division had contracts in 

Saudi Arabia worth hundreds of millions of dollars. As of 30 October 1971, estimates 

for programs sponsored by the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) 

alone reached $143.1 million. Activities in Saudi Arabia accounted for 80 percent 

of the division’s workload at the end of 1968 and over 95 percent by 1971.33

The division traced the expansion of its operations in Saudi Arabia back to 

1963, when division personnel began work for the Saudi Ministry of Information 

(MOI) on a modern television system. The Engineer Assistance Agreement with the 

Ministry of Defense and Aviation in 1965 further committed the division, initially 

to design and construct three brigade-size military cantonments to house elements 

of the Saudi Arabian Army. The division had also laid the basic groundwork for 

the Saudi Arabia Mobility Program (SAMP) to procure, maintain, and support a 

fleet of modern military vehicles. More generally, the division provided technical 

services as requested by Saudi governmental ministries, primarily in engineering 

and construction. These three large programs grew in the late 1960s to supplant the 

Mediterranean Division’s work in other geographic areas.34

As the geographic balance of the division’s activities shifted, concerns arose 

about the division’s continuing viability in Italy. As early as December 1965, the 

division’s own projections suggested that it might not be practical to maintain a 

Corps of Engineers division in the Mediterranean region beyond the late 1960s. In 

June and September 1968, the division had received inquiries from the Office of the 

Chief of Engineers in Washington concerning possible reorganization. Proposals 

suggested consolidating the division headquarters with the newly activated Saudi 

Arabia District or relocating to the United States. Mediterranean Division personnel 

argued that any relocation would involve substantial one-time costs and increase 

the division’s annual operating budget by well over a million dollars. They also 

contended that the move would adversely affect relations with the Italian government 

and thereby compromise the division’s ability to serve the U.S. military installations 

there.35

In the summer of 1969, Senator Stuart Symington (D-Missouri) questioned 

the chief of engineers about the proportion of the division’s present and future 

33 Mediterranean Div, “Information Brochure for the Honorable Nicholas Thacher, United States 

Ambassador to Saudi Arabia,” 14 Sep 70, p. 4, box 51-84-7361, Farrell Papers (hereafter cited as Info 

Brochure for Thacher); Program Rev and Analysis Rpts for FYs 1967–1975, box 3 of 3, C-7-10, TADRHA; Waddell, Farewell Address, 9 Jul 71, box 18, access no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Mediterranean 

Div, “Informational Brochure for OCE Command Inspection,” 20 Nov 70, unmarked box (SA-725), 

TAD-RHA (hereafter cited as Info Brochure: OCE Cmd Inspection, 20 Nov 70); Mediterranean Div, 

“Data Book,” 15 Mar 72, p. 9, Walker Box 15, OH, HQ USACE. 34 “Handbook, Saudi Arabia District,” Oct 69, p. 13, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE.

35 Memo, Chaffin, 30 Dec 65, sub: Division Long Range Organization Plan, p. 7, box 682798, 

Record Group 77, access. no. 77-0004, Federal Records Center, Bayonne, N.J.; Robert E. Hall, 

“Organization and Workload of the Mediterranean Engineer Division,” 6 Dec 68, box 6, access. no. 

77-86-0008, WNRC.
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 281

workload devoted to Saudi Arabia. Symington’s inquiry signaled the continuing, 

perhaps growing, opinion in Washington that the division headquarters might be 

more appropriately located in the United States. For the time being, the division 

retained its headquarters in Livorno. Colonel Cameron, the division engineer who had 

negotiated the Engineer Assistance Agreement, understood that the Mediterranean 

Division’s increasing involvement in Saudi Arabia represented a commitment to 

give Saudi Arabia the basic management support and physical infrastructure needed 

to transform its existing army into a modern military force. He predicted that the 

division’s support of Saudi Arabia would “last a minimum of ten years despite 

estimates for a shorter time.”36

In 1967, the Saudi Arabian Army, excluding the national guard, nominally 

numbered twenty-five thousand and was organized in five brigades. (Its real strength 

may have been fewer than eighteen thousand.) The forces lacked training facilities 

and had no modern combat equipment, communications equipment, or logistical 

transport. Given a hostile and well-armed Egypt that espoused a secular Arab 

nationalism, civil war in the Yemens, and unrest in the other states of the Arabian 

Peninsula, modernization of the military represented a pressing need for the Saudi 

monarchy.37

Saudi Arabia District

When the Mediterranean Division’s work for Saudi Arabia began to increase, 

the division activated field offices to put its managers close to the projects. In June 

1964, the division opened a Saudi Arabia Area Office in the port city of Jiddah 

on the Red Sea to supervise the Saudi television program. As the division’s work 

for the Saudi government expanded, the area engineer opened a small office in 

the capital, Riyadh, to maintain liaison with MODA and with the United States 

Military Training Mission (USMTM). In November 1965, the area engineer took 

over the duties of the Corps representative and assumed responsibility for liaison 

with MODA. On 1 January 1967, the division converted the office in Jiddah to the 

Saudi Arabia District. Jiddah, where diplomatic missions to Saudi Arabia had their 

offices, was a comfortable and cosmopolitan place to live; but Colonel Cameron 

was convinced that the new district would have to move to Riyadh, the location of 

MODA and the future site of a new administrative complex planned for the Ministry 

of Information.38

36 Reisacher to Harris, 22 Jul 69, p. 5; Stuart Symington, Chairman, Subcommittee [of the Foreign 

Affairs Committee] on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, to Maj Gen F. J. Clarke, 

7 Jul 69; both in box 6, access. no. 77-86-0008, WNRC. Cameron to Seedlock, 5 Nov 66, pp. 1–3 

(quotation from p. 1), Mil Files XXI-3-5, OH, HQ USACE. 37 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder, Colo.: Westview 

Press, 1984), p. 136, more generally pp. 122–47. 38 Telex, American Embassy, Jiddah, to Div Engr, USAENGR Div Med–Leghorn, 5 Nov 65, sub: 

Weekly Progress Rpt, box FB107, File 4-EAA, OH, HQ USACE; MFR, Chaffin, 14 Jan 66, p. A-1; 

GO no. 28, Dec 68, box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers; quotation from Memo, Cameron, 19 Dec 66, sub: 
282 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

In May 1967, a group of district personnel moved to Riyadh and set up offices 

in a leased villa in the city. Col. Joseph A. Bacci, who had served as area engineer 

before becoming district engineer, resisted moving the entire district to Riyadh. He 

argued that Jiddah was closer to the district’s most active work at the cantonments 

of Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk, that work for the Saudi Arabia Mobility Program 

involved the Jiddah port, and that the embassy provided the new district with an 

excellent communications network. The MODA liaison officer, Maj. Mahmoud 

Nassief, also favored retaining a cadre in Jiddah, where he lived. When Colonel 

Bacci’s tour ended in August 1967, his successor, Col. Albert G. Dancy, moved 

to Riyadh where the district leased forty-five villas, most housing staff members 

and their families. Because only one villa in Riyadh was suitable for office space 

and could not accommodate his entire operation, Dancy left part of his staff in 

Jiddah.39

Establishment of Saudi Arabia District, Mil Files XXI-3-5, OH, HQ USACE; “Draft History of the 

Saudi Arabia District,” [1970], pp. 8, 11, box 16, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; MFR, Rosseau, 

29 Dec 66, sub: Trip Report—Visit to Saudi Arabia, 12–21 December 1966, p. 3, box FB107, OH, 

HQ USACE. 39 MFR, Rosseau, 29 Dec 66; Joseph A. Bacci to Richard T. Farrell, 26 Mar 76, box 17, access. no. 

77-92-0001, WNRC; “Draft History of the Saudi Arabia District,” [1970], pp. 11–12; MFR, George 

Saudi Arabia District Office, Jiddah, 1968
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 283

Communications from Riyadh were so limited that Dancy’s successor, Col. Peter 

Grosz Jr., found that district headquarters had only one telephone when he arrived to 

take over the district in June 1968. To make a call, district personnel had to ring the 

Arab telephone operator at Riyadh’s central switchboard, so “it helped a great deal 

to be able to ask for the number in Arabic.” Within the American community, only a 

few of the leased houses had telephones, and the city’s limited system made adding 

new phones difficult. This meant that families, isolated by Saudi prohibitions against 

women driving, had no way to get in touch with a spouse at the office. To alleviate 

this isolation, the district won permission to establish a short-range CB radio system 

that linked district headquarters, SAMP offices, and at least one accommodation 

in each cluster of leased houses. The district abolished the CB radio network after 

1969 when improvements to the Riyadh telephone system permitted telephones in 

most of the homes leased for Corps employees.40

Communications between Riyadh and other cities were also severely limited. 

The district could send written communications to the embassy in Jiddah by means 

of the USMTM teletype or by pouch on either a USMTM or a district plane. 

Colonel Grosz found that the quickest way to converse with anyone in Jiddah was 

to fly the five hundred thirty miles there in one of the district’s three light aircraft 

maintained by the Mediterranean Division’s aviation detachment. To communicate 

with the division in Livorno, the district often used hand-carried pouches because 

international telephone calls were, in Grosz’s words, “impossible in 1968 [and] 

still unreliable in mid-1970.” Teletype to the division went first to the USMTM 

office at Dhahran and was retransmitted over the military communications system. 

The quickest turnaround was two days, and a message normally took at least three 

days.41

The Saudi Arabia District enjoyed an unusual place in the chain of command 

governing the U.S. military in Saudi Arabia. In Iran, all of the Gulf District’s contacts 

with the government had passed through the USMTM office. In Saudi Arabia, the 

district engineer had direct, often face-to-face contact with the Saudi ministers. When 

Colonel Grosz wanted to establish the CB radio network to serve the district, Minister 

of Information Jamil Hujaylan helped arrange it. District engineers met frequently 

with Minister of Defense and Aviation Prince Sultan. In routine meetings, only 

one other person participated: the MODA liaison officer to the Corps of Engineers, 

Major Nassief, who acted as interpreter for both parties. In addition to direct access 

to the Saudi government, the district engineer and his staff had greater freedom of 

movement within the country than did the members of USMTM. When one district 

engineer wanted to give the commander of USMTM a tour of the cantonment under 

Bogorad, 21 Mar 67, sub: Meeting of Coordinating Committee for Establishment of Saudi Arabia 

District, box 15, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 40 Interv, Moorhus with Col (Ret) Peter Grosz Jr., 19 Mar 96, p. 33; Ltr, Grosz to authors, 18 May 

96, R&D File 2814, Transatlantic Programs Center (TAC), Winchester, Va. 41 Ibid.; “Saudi Arabia District Historical Report,” [1969], p. 13, SA-725, TAD-RHA. On the 

division’s aviation detachment, see Waddell to Cassidy, 4 Dec 68, p. 7, Mil Files XXI-3-7, OH, HQ 

USACE.
284 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

construction at Khamis Mushayt, the Saudis informed him that the USMTM officer 

could visit the site only upon invitation of Prince Sultan.42

In June 1968, the district’s offices had no single room to accommodate a meeting 

of the entire senior staff. Colonel Grosz’s predecessor had already chosen a more 

suitable office building; in September, Grosz moved the district headquarters to 

a new three-story building designed for offices and apartments. The district then 

converted the former office villa into a social center and meeting place. Renamed 

the Desert Inn, the villa had a small outdoor swimming pool, making the site a 

center for family activities.43

When the Gulf District in Iran closed in September 1968, Grosz, who had served 

there as deputy district engineer, arranged to have certain nonperishable provisions 

from the district’s Castle Club shipped in a sealed container to Riyadh. The Desert 

Inn thereby acquired a selection of beverages for the district’s social functions. 

The Desert Inn never sold the beverages but was able to maintain its supply by 

42 Interv, Moorhus with Grosz, 19 Mar 96, pp. 29–30; Peter Grosz Jr., “Saudi Arabia District, 

1968–1970,” p. 11, draft of a speech to Soc of Amer Mil Engrs, Winchester, Va., 16 Feb 95, OH, 

HQ USACE. 43 DF, Col Albert G. Dancy, 15 Apr 68, sub: District Operations, pp. 1, 3, unmarked box, TADRHA; Interv, Moorhus with Grosz, 19 Mar 96, pp. 26–27; Grosz, “Saudi Arabia District, 1968–1970,” 

pp. 10–11.

Aircraft belonging to the Mediterranean Division, 1968
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 285

accepting contributions in kind from members, many of whom developed the means 

to produce their own.44

Col. Edward L. Waddell Jr., the division engineer, had specifically asked that 

Colonel Grosz bring his wife to Saudi Arabia; Grosz thus became the first district 

engineer to have an accompanied tour. Both Waddell and Grosz put a premium on 

the morale of the organization and its families. They saw the social activities, which 

the Desert Inn held about once a month, as a means of knitting the staff together; 

and Grosz’s wife took an active role. To help recruit new employees for the district, 

Grosz prepared an orientation handbook and recruiting brochure. With Waddell’s 

approval, the district provided direct help for district staff in finding and leasing 

accommodations. Grosz particularly tried to incorporate into the district’s social 

activities the people serving the Saudi Arabia Mobility Program, who were often 

assigned to more isolated locations in the country.45

By October 1969, the district held fifty-six leases including rented space for the 

area office in Jiddah in a building that offered eight transient billets. In Riyadh, the 

district provided thirty-three bachelor officers quarters divided among three buildings 

for men and one for women; one building in Jiddah had four units. For families, the 

district rented 39 villas in Riyadh, 5 in Jiddah, and 1 in Taif. It also maintained an 

apartment in Dammam. Recreational facilities included the Desert Inn in Riyadh 

and beach cabins in Jiddah. Housing for district personnel was dispersed among the 

local Saudi residences rather than concentrated in an American compound.46

Recruiting remained difficult. Early in 1968, the division engineer arranged to 

have a representative of the Corps’ personnel office in Washington spend a week in 

the Saudi Arabia District to acquaint him with local conditions and to encourage his 

recruiting for the district. Despite this effort, and to the detriment of work schedules, 

the district waited an average of nine months before a new civilian reported for duty; 

the wait was seven months for military personnel.47

The district grew, albeit slowly. In May 1968, its staff included 6 Army officers, 

3 noncommissioned officers, and 51 civilians accompanied by 60 dependents. By the 

end of the year, the district’s staff included 34 military, 100 American civilians, and 

25 foreign nationals. About a third of the district’s staff occupied field offices around 

the country: an area office in Khamis Mushayt; resident offices in Dammam and 

Riyadh; a project office in Taif; SAMP project offices at Al Kharj, Jiddah, Khamis 

Mushayt, Riyadh, Tabuk, and Taif; and a SAMP training unit in Taif. In the next 

year, the staff barely held even. By late October 1969, the district’s personnel had 

declined to 148 people while it waited for a score of new recruits to arrive. Fifteen 

of the thirty-one military personnel were from the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps 

44 Intervs, Moorhus with Grosz, 19 Mar 96, pp. 26–27; with Paul S. Wheeler, 31 May 95, pp. 7–8; 

Moorhus and Grathwol with John Cummings, 18 Nov 93, pp. 52–53. 45 Interv, Moorhus with Grosz, 19 Mar 96, pp. 25–26, 28; Waddell to Cassidy, 4 Dec 68, p. 6.

46 “Saudi Arabia District Historical Report,” [1969]; Peter Grosz Jr., “Saudi Arabia in the Late 

1960s,” Speech to the Soc of Amer Mil Engrs, 16 Feb 95, p. 6, OH, HQ USACE. 47 Interv, Moorhus with Grosz, 19 Mar 96, pp. 31–33; Cameron to Cassidy, 14 Mar 68; Clarke to 

Waddell, 3 Jul 68, Mil Files XXI-3-7, OH, HQ USACE; Waddell to Cassidy, 7 Sep 68.
286 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

assigned to the SAMP. Four of the military and fifty-two of the civilian employees 

had their families in the country.48

The district also employed local personnel. In most other countries, the 

Mediterranean Division hired citizens of the host country; but very few Saudis 

worked for the division or the district. Saudis did occasionally drive vehicles, 

operate equipment, and serve as technicians; but the majority of the positions in 

construction, maintenance, and menial labor went to former slaves (their servitude 

was abolished in 1962) and to recent Islamic immigrants: Yemenis, Sudanese, 

Ethiopians, Pakistanis, Lebanese, and Indonesians.49

With a staff of about one hundred fifty full-time personnel and the active 

support and involvement of division personnel based in Livorno, the Saudi Arabia 

District supervised the development of the installations and staff for a nationwide 

television and radio broadcast system; the cantonment construction program; and 

the logistical, maintenance, and mobility program known as the Saudi Arabia 

Mobility Program. 

Completing the Saudi Television Network

The construction of the initial temporary television stations at Riyadh and Jiddah 

began in 1964; the two stations made their inaugural broadcasts in July 1965 with 

American equipment procured and installed by RCA Great Britain Ltd. Late in 

the year, the Saudi Arabian government approved the addition of four television 

transmitting stations. In January 1966, the Mediterranean Division awarded a 

contract to McGaughy, McMillan, Marshal, and Lucas of Norfolk, Virginia, and 

Rome, Italy, to design transmitting stations at Buraydah (also called Qassim Station) 

and Medina (one of Islam’s two holiest cities), as well as microwave links to Taif 

and Mecca. (See Map 19.) Mecca and Taif, the king’s summer capital, would receive 

broadcasts from the station in Jiddah transmitted by a microwave relay. Medina and 

Buraydah would have facilities for replaying filmed or taped broadcasts and only 

very limited local production capabilities.50

In July 1966, U.S. Ambassador Hermann F. Eilts and Saudi Minister of 

Information Hujaylan agreed to extend the arrangement originally expressed through 

the exchange of notes in December 1963 and January 1964. As work progressed, the 

48 “Draft History of the Saudi Arabia District,” [1970], p. 12; organizational charts provided by 

Grosz; “Saudi Arabia District Historical Report,” [1969], p. 7; Waddell to Cassidy, 6 Jun 69, p. 5; 

Cassidy to Waddell, 2 Jul 69, Mil Files XXI-3-8, OH, HQ USACE; “Saudi Arabia District Historical 

Report,” [1969], p. 10. 49 MFR, Bogorad, 21 Mar 67, p. 1; Grosz, “Saudi Arabia District, 1968–1970,” p. 5. 

50 MFR, Chaffin, 14 Jan 66; Amb Eilts, Semi-Monthly Progress Rpt for MDDGM, 31 Jan 66, 

unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE; Chaffin to Cassidy, 9 Mar 66; Mediterranean Div, “Saudi Arabian 

Television System: Completion Report to the Minister of Information (MOI),” Jun 71, pp. 5–11, box 

16, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC (hereafter cited as Saudi Arabian TV Sys Completion Rpt, Jun 

71); OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1967–30 June 1968,” p. 46.
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 287

two countries renewed the agreement several more times.51 In September 1966, the 

division awarded contracts for construction of the stations at Medina and Buraydah 

to an American company, Briscoe-Cat International.

In the autumn of 1966, at the request of Hujaylan, the division developed a 

five-year budget plan to expand the Saudi television network. The plan incorporated 

voice-telephone-telegraph communications through the microwave system used to 

relay the television signals to create a link between Taif, Riyadh, and Dammam 

and to add links between Jiddah and Khamis Mushayt, between Jiddah and Medina, 

and between Riyadh and Buraydah. The plan also encompassed a permanent station 

at Riyadh and a new station at Dammam, conversion of all systems to make color 

transmission possible, and a 240-line telephone and telegraph capacity from Jiddah 

to Dammam.52

The Ministry of Information encountered problems acquiring real estate for the 

television stations at Medina and Buraydah; by March 1967, additional delays in 

procuring materials and equipment had put construction for the stations two months 

behind schedule. The Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 extended those delays. The final 

design for Medina, adapted for Buraydah as well, stipulated masonry construction 

for a studio with office space and for a power plant. The construction contractor 

laid foundations for antenna towers, installed air conditioning and all other utilities, 

and provided paved parking and an access road. Because non-Muslims could not 

enter Medina, the television station had to be located outside the city boundaries. 

The project also involved construction of housing at the site to accommodate the 

Americans who staffed the station in its early years.53

In March 1967, the contract for the last of the television stations, at Dammam, 

went to the Frank E. Basil Company. Because of Dammam’s location in a highly 

populated region, the Saudis wanted this station to be equipped with a high antenna 

for maximum transmission over a wide area. The Saudis also hoped to reach the 

populations of the neighboring states of Kuwait and Bahrain with their television 

broadcasts. A powerful station would allow Saudi broadcasts to compete with the 

private Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) television station at Dhahran, 

just ten miles away.54

Basil designed two parallel transmitters into the station’s operating system so 

that if one failed the other would continue to broadcast with no loss of air time. The 

51 OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1967–30 June 1968,” p. 46; “Mediterranean Division, 

Corps of Engineers, United States Army,” [1967], p. 8. 52 Abdulrahman S. Shobaili, “Saudi Arabian Television: A History and Descriptive Study,” p. 

1, Jul 69, M.S. thesis, University of Kansas; Memo, Area Engr Jiddah to Div Engr, 28 Sep 66, sub: 

Expansion of TV System, R&D File 2220, Adrian Hromiak Papers, TAC; Memo, Vanek, 1 Oct 66, 

sub: Expansion to TV System, Hromiak Papers; Cameron to Cassidy, 2 Dec 66. 53 Cameron to Cassidy, 3 Mar 66, Mil Files XXI-3-6, OH, HQ USACE; Saudi Arabian TV Sys 

Completion Rpt, Jun 71, pp. 13–16; Memo, Rosseau and Grace, 30 Jul 68, sub: Trip Report, Saudi 

Arabia, 10–21 June 1968, p. 15, box 29, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; Shobaili, “Saudi Arabian 

Television,” p. 50. 54 Cameron to Cassidy, 3 Mar 66; Saudi Arabian TV Sys Completion Rpt, Jun 71, pp. 14–16; 

Shobaili, “Saudi Arabian Television,” pp. 54–55, 175. 
288 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

design also incorporated an antenna tower of one thousand three hundred feet, four 

times higher than any other antenna in the system. In October 1967, the division 

awarded the construction contract for the station to the Saudi firm of Tamimi and 

Fouad.55

The microwave system linking Jiddah, Mecca, and Taif began operating in 

December 1967. The transmitter at the holy city of Mecca, as with the facilities 

at Medina, had to be located outside the city limits. Medina went on the air in 

January 1968, followed by Buraydah in July. The station at Dammam made its 

first test broadcast in April 1969 and began regular telecasts in November. With 

its completion, the second phase in the construction of a Saudi television system 

came to an end.56

While the physical construction of their television network proceeded, the 

Saudis also had to develop the personnel to staff the system. Late in 1964, the 

Mediterranean Division awarded a two-year contract to cover the interim operations 

55 Cameron to Cassidy, 3 Mar 67, p. 2, and 6 Dec 67, p. 3, both in Mil Files XXI-3-6, OH, HQ 

USACE; Memo, Frassrand, 11 May 67, sub: Authorization—Design and Construction of Facilities—

Saudi Arabia MOI, box 2, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; Shobaili, “Saudi Arabian Television,” 

pp. 41, 54–55. 56 Shobaili, “Saudi Arabian Television,” pp. 40–41; Sum Rpt/Dammam Television/Saudi Arabian 

Television System/Ministry of Information, 30 Dec 69, p. 2, box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers; Saudi 

Arabian TV Sys Completion Rpt, Jun 71, pp. 11, 16.

Television studio building in Dammam, ca. 1968
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 289

and maintenance of the television system and for training Saudi personnel to take 

over operations in the future. The contract went to the National Broadcasting 

Corporation International (NBCI), which provided twenty-one American engineers, 

program and production personnel, and managers for the stations at Jiddah and 

Riyadh. Under the general direction of a project manager, this staff screened and 

hired personnel, ran the day-to-day operations, and controlled the budget of the 

two stations.57

The NBCI team also launched an on-the-job training program for Saudis and 

helped the Ministry of Information select trainees for special programs of study in 

the United States. Most of the candidates were young, were not proficient in English, 

and had less than a high school education. Moreover, they had to jump from the 

conservative social milieu of Saudi Arabia to New York City where they attended 

English-language and technical courses at the RCA Institute. Keeping track of the 

students and keeping them focused on their training proved challenging.58

The Saudi government provided a letter of credit to cover a stipend for each 

student, but many of the young men could not stay within their allowance. The 

57 MFR, Vanek, 23 Nov 64, sub: Narrative Summary TV Project, Saudi Arabia (Draft), pp. 3–4, 

box 5, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; Shobaili, “Saudi Arabian Television,” p. 22. 58 MFR, Vanek, 23 Mar 64, box 13, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; Saudi Arabian TV Sys Completion Rpt, Jun 71, pp. 20, 29; Interv, John T. Greenwood with Richard Wiles, 7 Nov 85, pp. 46–47.

Saudi Arabian Minister of Information Jamil Hujaylan at the opening of the Dammam 

television station, 1968
290 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

division’s New York liaison office hired the Arabic-speaking wife of an Egyptian 

diplomat in New York to serve as an adviser to the students, but problems persisted. 

The Saudi government did not select new students for this study program in the 

United States in 1967. In early 1968, division representatives and Minister Hujaylan 

discussed the students’ difficulties. Colonel Cameron and Hujaylan each agreed to 

dispatch a representative to the United States. The two subordinates would interview 

the students, inspect the facilities, and review the teaching methods and course 

work. Hujaylan also requested that the division review the feasibility of having the 

students train in Britain.59

The American Institute of Foreign Trade at Thunderbird, near Tempe, Arizona, 

agreed to provide the Saudis with preliminary education and English-language 

courses. In mid-1968, the division arranged with Arizona State University for 

technical training. Even away from the temptations of New York City, the cultural 

adjustments remained difficult. Some students, however, went on from Arizona to 

graduate work at Ohio State and Kansas State Universities; others studied at the 

University of Kansas and at Syracuse University. Two-thirds of the 108 young men 

who participated finished their courses with certificates of completion from technical 

schools; three earned bachelor’s degrees, and two earned master’s degrees. When 

they returned to Saudi Arabia, the television system had a nucleus of seventy-eight 

trained Saudis. The system also had about three hundred other employees who had 

trained on the job with the Americans who operated the Saudi television studios 

during the 1960s.60

When the contract for operations and maintenance of the television system came 

up for renewal in 1966, only NBCI submitted a bid. In the autumn of 1968, when 

NBCI submitted a proposal for a second renewal, the division found it unreasonably 

expensive and suggested that the Saudi Ministry of Information authorize a competitive bidding process. Although nervous about losing air time if a new contractor 

won the contract, the Saudis agreed. AVCO Electronic Division of Cincinnati, Ohio, 

submitted the low bid and received the new contract on 10 October 1968.61

The division assigned Adrian Hromiak from the Livorno headquarters to work 

with NBCI and AVCO to prepare for the transfer of responsibilities. For weeks, 

Hromiak shuttled between Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the United States to monitor the 

transition. The Saudis had the personnel to take over management and production; 

59 MFRs, Vanek, 26 Feb 68, sub: Trip Report, Saudi Arabia, 13–21 Feb 68, p. 4, and 5 Mar 68, sub: 

Trip Report, Saudi Arabia, 28 Feb–4 Mar 68, p. 2, both in box 29, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 60 Intervs, Greenwood with Wiles, 7 Nov 85, pp. 46–47, and authors with Hromiak, 6 Feb 95, pp. 

17–18. Hromiak accompanied a group of Saudi students to Arizona. Saudi Arabian TV Sys Completion Rpt, Jun 71, pp. 20, 24, 29, 87, 93. This report mentions Ohio State and Kansas State as hosting 

Saudi graduate students, but Abdulrahman Shobaili wrote his thesis at the University of Kansas. Two 

students also went directly from New York City to Syracuse University for master’s degrees in radio and 

television. See Shobaili, “Saudi Arabian Television,” p. 89; Info Brochure for Thacher, p. III-26. 61 MFR, Harold C. West and Vanek, 17 Oct 66, sub: Position Paper on Rejection of TV Operations 

Proposal by Thomson TV International, pp. 1–4, box 29, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; Interv, 

authors with Adrian Hromiak, 6 Feb 94, p. 18; Saudi Arabian TV Sys Completion Rpt, Jun 71, p. 18; 

Shobaili, “Saudi Arabian Television,” p. 21. 
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 291

but AVCO provided about thirty American television technicians, including several 

who had worked for NBCI, to monitor the operations and utilities. On 1 January 

1969, AVCO assumed operational responsibilities for the Saudi television system. 

The transition occurred without incident and with no loss of broadcast time.62

By 1970, the Saudi Arabian government had seven television broadcast stations 

in operation: major studio-transmitter facilities at Jiddah, Riyadh, and Dammam; 

smaller television stations at Medina and Qassim (Buraydah) that had rebroadcast 

facilities; and satellite stations at Mecca and Taif linked with Jiddah by microwave 

repeaters. A microwave system fed two transmitter locations that propagated the 

television signals around the entire country. The microwave system also supported 

voice telephone and telegraph communication throughout the kingdom. In addition, 

mobile television vans made on-site television reporting possible.63

Because RCA had acquired and installed U.S. equipment, each station resembled 

a small American television studio. Housed in pre-engineered buildings and equipped 

with emergency generators, stations could use both European and American tapes. 

Between 1964 and 1970, American management skills and technology had combined 

with Saudi Arabian money to create a complete, functioning monochromatic television system at a total cost of about $28.5 million. During the same period, Saudi 

Arabia imported between fifty-two thousand and sixty-seven thousand television 

sets, giving the country a growing audience for its new broadcast system.64

In October 1969, Hujaylan informed the Mediterranean Division that his ministry 

would assume full responsibility for the television system in 1970. The division 

drafted a transition plan proposing that the Saudis assume responsibility on 31 

December 1970, the end date of the AVCO contract for operations and maintenance 

of the system. A team consisting of members from the division, the Ministry of 

Information, the Ministry of Finance, and AVCO conducted detailed inspections and 

performance tests in the closing months of 1970; on 1 January 1971, the Ministry 

of Information assumed responsibility for the Saudi Arabian television system.65

Radio Broadcast Facilities

Beginning in 1966, the Mediterranean Division worked simultaneously on 

the television system and on a radio-broadcast complex for the Saudi Ministry of 

Information. Minister Hujaylan had turned to the Corps of Engineers for help because 

he was unhappy with earlier construction of radio facilities in Jiddah. That project 

dated from the mid-1950s, had stretched over more than eight years, and had involved 

62 Interv, authors with Hromiak, 6 Feb 94, p. 18; Memo, Hromiak, 18 Dec 68, sub: Trip Report—

Saudi Arabia, 4–12 Dec 68, Hromiak Papers; Saudi Arabian TV Sys Completion Rpt, Jun 71, p. 18; 

Shobaili, “Saudi Arabian Television,” p. 21; Info Brochure for Thacher, p. III-26. 63 Saudi Arabian TV Sys Completion Rpt, Jun 71, pp. 2, 25–26.

64 For an overview of costs, see Saudi Arabian TV Sys Completion Rpt, Jun 71, p. 31; Grosz, 

“Saudi Arabia District, 1968–1970,” pp. 10–11; Hermann F. Eilts, “Social Revolution in Saudi Arabia, 

Part II,” Parameters (Fall 1971): 27. 65 Saudi Arabian TV Sys Completion Rpt, Jun 71, pp. 2, 25–26.
292 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

four different construction contractors, three of whom had gone bankrupt. The Corps 

had played no role in construction of the Jiddah radio facilities, but Hujaylan wanted 

Corps help in pursuing his plans. In September 1966, he authorized the division 

to issue a contract for redesign to the American architect-engineer firm of Ralph 

M. Parsons.66 The following May, the United States and Saudi Arabia amended 

the agreement that governed the television project to include construction of the 

Ministry of Information’s new administrative complex, including the headquarters 

and a studio building for radio broadcasting.67

For six months, design engineers, members of the division’s engineering team, 

and MOI representatives discussed specifications as Parsons prepared designs for 

three separate structures: a fourteen-story administration building, a three-story 

radio broadcast studio building, and a power plant to serve both. The request for 

construction proposals in April 1967 enticed only two firms to bid, and both bids 

substantially exceeded the government estimate for the project. The division then 

expanded the bidders list, designated some items to be awarded on an incremental 

basis depending on funding, and rebid the project in September. Again, only two 

bids came in: they showed no significant change in price.68

Division staff and Minister Hujaylan next discussed scaling down the requirements of the construction. In November 1967, one of the key figures in the division, 

James F. Vanek, traveled to Saudi Arabia to present the results of the bidding. At a 

followup meeting on 18 November, Hujaylan accepted the division’s recommendations to reduce the size of the project, generating a burst of labor-intensive work 

for the division. In this case, Hujaylan asked for twenty Arabic-language copies of 

the revised report; he wanted the translated report in a matter of days to present the 

request for funds quickly to the minister of finance.69

Parsons received the charge to modify the design for certain features of the 

project; in January 1967, Vanek brought the new package back to Saudi Arabia 

with the new cost estimate of $16.9 million. With Hujaylan’s approval, the division 

sent the revised specifications to the two companies that had bid earlier. Both 

submitted proposals, and both were below the revised estimate. The low bid priced 

the construction for the buildings at $15.6 million and set a total cost for the project 

of $20.2 million.70

66 Memo, Filippo Borrello, 26 Oct 66, sub: Investigation of MOI Radio Building in Jeddah, box 13; 

MFR, Vanek, 21 Jan 67, sub: Trip Report—Radio-Studio Complex, Riyadh and SA TV Microwave 

Link, pp. 1, 7, box 13; “Saudi Arabia MOI Programs,” 10 May 68, pp. 2–3, box 28; all in access. no. 

77-92-0002, WNRC. 67 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 27 Jun 66, Som-29, TAD-RHA; Cameron to Cassidy, 6 Sep 

66, Mil Files XXI-3-5, OH, HQ USACE; Saudi Arabian TV Sys Completion Rpt, Jun 71, p. 1. 68 Cameron to Cassidy, 7 Jun 67; MFR, Vanek, 29 May 67, sub: Inspection, Saudi Arabia TV Program, box 5, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; “Saudi Arabia MOI Programs,” 10 May 68, pp. 2–3. 69 MFRs, Vanek, 11 Nov 67, sub: Trip Report, Saudi Arabia, 31 Oct thru 8 Nov 67, pp. 1–3, and 

24 Nov 67, sub: Trip Report, Saudi Arabia, 14–21 November 1967, pp. 1–5, both in box 29, access. 

no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 70 Cameron to Cassidy, 6 Dec 67; MFR, C. J. Egan, 16 Jan 68, sub: Discussion on Revised Final 

Design of Radio/Studio Complex–Riyadh, box 13; MFR, Vanek, 25 Jan 68, sub: Trip Report, Saudi 
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 293

Although the winning bid was below the Mediterranean Division’s estimate 

for the work, the Saudi Arabian council of ministers would not approve the price. 

Over the spring and summer, Vanek shuttled between Livorno, Los Angeles, New 

York, and Riyadh to adjust the specifications, to repackage the design, and to lower 

costs. The division reduced the administrative building to four stories and trimmed 

other features. It then separated the administration building from the solicitation. 

The construction package now included a redesigned radio studio and auditorium 

building, the power plant, surrounding landscaping, and supporting facilities at an 

estimated cost of $12.5 million. The design called for utilities capable of supporting 

the administration building, leaving later expansion of the complex open.71

Aware of the Saudi government’s previous rejection of bids, contractors balked 

at expending additional resources to prepare proposals unless the division could offer 

some assurance that an award would take place. Unable to give such assurances, the 

Mediterranean Division sought new contractors and found two willing companies, 

one French and one American. The French firm bid “slightly in excess” of the 

Saudi government’s limit of $12.5 million, while the American company’s bid 

was $13.4 million. The division rejected both bids and then contacted one British 

and two Italian contractors already working in Saudi Arabia. Judging that they 

could submit lower bids because they already had a presence in the country, the 

division set the maximum price at $9 million for the radio studio/auditorium and 

power-plant buildings.72

On 3 December 1968, Compagnia Generale Costruzioni Sp.A. (COGECO) of 

Rome, one of the three firms already working in Saudi Arabia, submitted a bid of just 

over $9 million. Late in the month, a representative traveled to Riyadh to join Colonel 

Grosz in discussing the proposal with Minister Hujaylan. On 16 January 1969, the 

Mediterranean Division finally awarded COGECO a $9.197 million contract to 

construct the studio complex. Total project costs, including nonconstruction items, 

were not to exceed $12.5 million.73

COGECO began work almost immediately and quickly discovered that the 

subsoil at the site was not the limestone fragments and sandstone described in the 

specifications but very hard limestone bedrock. Initial efforts to break it up with a 

jackhammer produced negligible results. Removing the bedrock would be a much 

longer and more expensive endeavor than anticipated at the time of the bid. Strikes in 

Arabia, 9–24 January 1968, passim, box 29; MFR, Egan, 29 Jan 68, sub: Radio Complex, Riyadh, box 

13; Memo, Vanek, 26 Feb 68, sub: Trip Report, Saudi Arabia, 13–21 Feb 68, pp. 1–2, box 29; all in 

access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. Cameron to Hujaylan, 27 Feb 68, box 272 of 357, TAD-RHA. 71 See Vanek’s trip reports dated 5 Mar, 22 Apr, 25 Jun, 26 Jul, and 12 Aug 68; Dancy to Hujaylan, 14 Apr 68; all in box 29, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. Cameron to Cassidy, 14 Mar 68, p. 

3; Waddell to Hujaylan, 8 Jul, 2 Aug 68, and Grosz to Hujaylan, 28 Oct 68, all in box 272 of 357, 

TAD-RHA; OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1967–30 June 1968,” p. 46; Grace to Grosz, 

24 Jul 68, box 29, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 72 Waddell to Hujaylan, 2 Aug 68, and Grosz to Hujaylan, 28 Oct 68; Grace to Grosz, 24 Jul 68.

73 Memo, Lt Col James C. Hartup and Grosz to Waddell, 1 Feb 69, sub: Semi-Monthly Narrative 

Status Report, RCS MDDVC-4, box 31, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; Waddell to Hujaylan, 3 Feb 

69, and attached notes, box 272 of 357, TAD-RHA.
294 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Italy, border closings in Lebanon-Syria-Jordan, a cholera epidemic, and difficulties 

in delivering structural steel all contributed to further delays. COGECO finally 

completed work on the radio studio building, the power-plant building, landscaping, 

and supporting facilities on 31 May 1972. A few months later, Nippon Electric 

Company Ltd. of Japan won a contract to install the radio equipment, a step left 

out of the original contract to keep costs at a minimum. It took Nippon until May 

1975 to complete the procurement and installation.74

During 1969 and 1970, while COGECO worked on the radio studio complex, 

the Mediterranean Division continued to discuss with Minister Hujaylan the redesign 

of the administrative building. Despite design revisions, the Council of Ministers 

did not provide funds; when Ibrahim Angary succeeded Hujaylan as minister of 

information in the second half of 1970, the project disappeared.75

With the completion of the studio complex in May 1972, the Mediterranean 

Division had accomplished all of its tasks for the Saudi Arabian Ministry of 

Information. Division staff then concentrated on work for the Ministry of Defense 

and Aviation. The planning for cantonment construction and the development of a 

comprehensive program for the Saudi Army’s ordnance corps, begun in the mid1960s, became the dominant element in the Mediterranean Division’s activities.

Building Cantonments for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation

Developing a nationwide television system for the Saudi Arabian government 

marked a new departure for the Mediterranean Division. The cantonments for the 

Saudi Arabian Army involved the division in a more customary role—military 

construction similar to the work it had accomplished in Iran and Pakistan. 

From the earliest discussions in 1964, the Saudis saw these cantonments as 

the cornerstone of the modernization of their armed forces. The Saudi minister of 

Defense and Aviation, Prince Sultan, anticipated three cantonments: in the southwest 

near Yemen; in the northwest near Jordan; and in the north near Iraq. Given the 

unrest throughout the entire region and the menacing foreign policy of Nasser’s 

Egypt, he wanted construction to start on two of the cantonments within a year after 

serious discussions began. The Mediterranean Division’s engineers found Prince 

Sultan’s timetable unrealistic; during the negotiations for the Engineer Assistance 

74 Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 15 Oct 72, p. 23, box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers; Memo, 

West and Reisacher, 23 Oct 69, sub: Trip Report—Saudi Arabia—13 Sep–15 Oct 1969, p. 8, box 7 

of 357, TAD-RHA; Waddell to Clarke, 3 Dec 69; Memo, Hromiak, 22 Nov 70, sub: Inspection of 

Studio Building by His Excellency Ibrahim Angary, Minister of Information, box 7 of 357, TADRHA; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 15 Mar 74, p. 21, box 5, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

OCE, “Annual Report on Major Activities, Jul. 1, 1974–Jun. 30, 1975,” p. 48, OH, HQ USACE, copy 

in R&D File 2207, TAC. 75 Waddell to Clarke, 5 Sep 69; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 9 Jun 69, pp. 1, 8, and 28 Jul 

69, p. 5, box 26, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 295

Agreement, the division staff had tried to educate the Saudis about the planning 

time needed to develop a sound construction program.76

After the EAA signing in May–June 1965, the division’s efforts on the cantonment program moved forward. In late November, the division had awarded a $3.28 

million design contract to the joint venture Basil, the Architect Collaborative, and 

Metcalf & Eddy. In addition to field investigations, concept designs and criteria, 

and a master plan for the cantonments at Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk, BATMED’s 

contract included preparation of the final design for Khamis Mushayt.77

Khamis Mushayt

The town of Khamis Mushayt is situated less than eighty miles from the border 

with Yemen and about sixty miles east of the Red Sea’s coast in southwestern Saudi 

Arabia in the rugged highlands of the province of Asir. The town lies at six thousand 

two hundred feet above sea level. Spring rains bring most of the annual rainfall 

that averages only about eight inches a year. A twelve-year record of temperatures 

showed a maximum of 81 ̊F and a minimum of 41 ̊F.78

The inaccessibility of the site presented the first challenge in developing the 

cantonment. No road led from the town to the location of the construction, about 

ten miles away. The airport, about seven miles away, had a 10,000-foot runway and 

provided the only convenient arrival point for visitors. Air travel from Jiddah took 

one hour, from Riyadh an hour and a half. Overland travel took a minimum of four 

days and traversed country that remained virtually unmapped; not even a rail line 

ran there. The first construction contract therefore went to a Saudi contractor, Bin 

Ladin, to construct a road between the local airfield and the construction site. Work 

began on Access Road A in August 1966 and lasted until March 1967.79

A scarcity of water created the second problem. No one had identified an 

adequate source of water to supply the cantonment. Finding a sufficient water 

supply and transporting it to the site involved several million dollars of additional 

expense.80

76 Memos, Hayes, 15 Oct 64, sub: Construction of the Army Bases, Saudi Arabia (SA), p. 11, and 

19 Oct 64, sub: Support of Saudi Army Construction Program by the Corps of Engineers, p. 9, both 

in box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers. “Saudi Arabia Engineer Assistance, Comments by Eng Div,” [23 

Oct 64], p. 1, Gen Corresp 1964, no. 2, OH, HQ USACE; Memo, Walker to Chaffin, 18 Nov 65, sub: 

MODA Crisis Concerning MDD’s Inability to Expend Appropriated Funds—$6.250 Million for Saudi 

FY 1385 and $13.963 for Saudi FY 1386, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE. 77 Telg, [author unclear] to Div Engr USAENGR Div Med–Leghorn, 29 Nov 65, sub: Weekly 

Progress Report, box FB107, and Semi-Monthly Narr Rpt for MDDGM, 15 Jan 66, EAA Corresp, 

both in OH, HQ USACE; Basil, [The Architects Collaborative], Metcalf & Eddy, “Saudi Arabian 

Engineer Assistance Program: Khamis Mushayt, Engineering Feasibility Reports: Master Planning 

Analytical Report,” 3 May 66, box 65 of 104, access. no. 77-84-2400, TAD-RHA (hereafter cited as 

BATMED Rpt). 78 MFR, Chaffin, 30 Sep 64, sub: Proposed Military Construction for Saudi Arabia, box 51-84-

5389, OH, HQ USACE. 79 “Building the King Faisal Military Cantonment, 1967–1971,” Aug 71, p. 3, Mil Files XII-49-2, 

OH, HQ USACE; BATMED Rpt, p. 9; Cameron to Cassidy, 6 Sep 66, p. 2. 80 MFR, Clarke, 29 May 67, p. 2; Interv, Paul Walker with John Coony, 9 Feb 85, pp. 24–25. 
296 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Just as the designers had to compensate for inaccessibility and a lack of water, 

they had to adjust to unfamiliar cultural factors in the design of the cantonment. 

Although two-story construction was less expensive, MODA preferred single-story 

structures because of earthquakes. After much vacillation, they chose one-story 

construction except for the enlisted men’s barracks. The Saudi practice of building 

high walls around living quarters added to the expense of construction. Initial design 

had failed to take this into account in the cost estimates.81

The architect-engineers preparing the designs incorporated the traditional Saudi 

architectural practice of orienting buildings on an east-west axis to mitigate the most 

severe effects of solar heating. Surrounding walls protected buildings from direct 

radiant heat when the sun was at low angles. Roof insulation and large overhangs 

to shade the sides of buildings provided protection from the sun at higher angles. 

Ventilation openings high in walls promoted and enhanced the natural flow of air 

for cooling. Designers included courtyards, trees, water pools, and fountains to 

minimize the heat and dust. The architect-engineers anticipated that these design 

features would apply to all three cantonments, with appropriate adaptations.82 Even 

for Khamis Mushayt, where extremes of heat or cold were uncommon, designers 

followed these design guidelines, using the east-west orientation and locating the 

latrines on the west end of buildings to reduce heat transfer to the interior. Family 

quarters had no windows on the east or west sides.83

As initially designed, the Khamis Mushayt cantonment covered approximately 

three thousand acres and included over three hundred buildings to accommodate 

one army combat brigade with a projected size of 6,484 officers and enlisted men. 

Conscious of Saudi family mores, the engineers designed each house with segregated 

quarters for men and women. Schools were likewise segregated, with one for one 

hundred eighty females and a second for three hundred sixty males. Designers 

envisioned the space as a pedestrian community, so they avoided making walkways 

cross major traffic arteries and placed housing a maximum of eight hundred meters 

from the community center along the main entrance road.84

In May 1966, the BATMED designers presented the proposal to Prince Sultan, 

organizing the prospective work in six broad categories of construction: troop 

housing, officers family housing, bachelor officers quarters (BOQ), community 

facilities, a hospital group, and a maintenance and storage area. Support facilities 

encompassed utilities (electricity, water, sewage, roads, and a POL storage and 

distribution system), a 100-bed hospital, a community center, two schools, and 

81 Memo, Col John E. Walker to Vanek, 25 Apr 65, sub: Draft Criteria for Army Camps, box 

FB107, OH, HQ USACE. 82 Four documents, each entitled “Basis of Definitive Design,” with subtitles, “Company Barracks,” “Bachelor Officers Quarters,” “Family Quarters,” and “Civil Works,” all dtd 5 Mar 66, box 

10, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 83 BATMED Rpt.

84 Ibid.
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 297

two mosques. The cantonment had facilities to serve a total population of about ten 

thousand soldiers and supporting personnel.85

Models and displays helped convince Prince Sultan to approve construction. 

In reviewing the design for Khamis Mushayt, Prince Sultan asked for changes that 

illustrate the attention to detail that recurred throughout the Saudi relationship with 

the Corps of Engineers. He asked that one of the duplex senior officers houses be 

redesigned as a single-family home for visiting dignitaries and that one BOQ building 

be furnished and reserved for visiting high-rank officers. In addition to approving 

the start of construction at Khamis Mushayt, Sultan also endorsed completion of 

the designs for Tabuk and Qaysumah.86

The estimated costs for construction at Khamis Mushayt were higher than 

the division’s earlier estimates, so the plan proposed two phases of construction: 

facilities that could be built with available funds and those that could be added 

later when more funds became available. To reduce costs, revised plans restricted 

hot water to mess halls, the laundry, the bakery, the brigade commander’s house, 

and the hospital. Designers reprogrammed air conditioning only for the bakery, 

the commander’s house, VIP housing, and the hospital; and only the commander’s 

house and the hospital got central heating. Prince Sultan considered heating, air 

conditioning, and hot water elective amenities that officers could choose to add to 

their own quarters. The revisions reduced construction cost estimates. Successive 

reviews and approvals took from June to December 1966. On 1 October, the division 

opened a resident office at Khamis Mushayt.87

On 5 January 1967, the division issued to eighteen companies a construction 

bidding package for the Khamis Mushayt cantonment. The three bids submitted 

and opened on 14 April were all higher than the Saudis had expected. Costs had 

risen steadily through the 1960s because of the inflationary pressure of the Vietnam 

War and the growth in construction activity worldwide. Within Saudi Arabia itself, 

the rapid pace of development had drawn down the available labor pool. When 

the Saudis raised questions about the discrepancy between estimates and bids, the 

division engineer, Colonel Cameron, pointed out that they had added twenty major 

items to the construction project and significantly expanded another twenty-six 

elements.88 The willingness to make numerous changes in the scope of a project and 

the attention to minutiae of furnishings and design that complicated the development 

of the Khamis Mushayt cantonment recurred in virtually all of the Saudi projects. 

85 MFR, Emil L. Blondell, 3 Jun 66, sub: Presentation of Design-Planning Criteria for Cantonment 

at Khamis Mushayt to HRH Prince Sultan MODA, SAG on 21 and 25 May 1966, box 29, access. no. 

77-92-0002, WNRC; Cameron to Cassidy, 8 Jun 66, and Cameron to Col Paul R. Sheffield, 1 Jun 66, 

both in Mil Files XXI-3-5, OH, HQ USACE; MFR, Chaffin, 14 Jan 66, pp. B-2–B-3. 86 MFR, Blondell, 3 Jun 66; Cameron to Sheffield, 1 Jun 66, Mil Files XXI-3-5, OH, HQ 

USACE. 87 Mediterranean Div, GO no. 19, 23 Sep 66, box 29, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. For Prince 

Sultan’s attitude, see Memo, Hayes, 19 Oct 64, sub: Support of the Saudi Arabia Construction Program 

by the Corps of Engineers, box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers. 88 Cameron to Prince Sultan, 30 Jun 67, box 139 of 357, TAD-RHA.
298 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Between April and August 1967, the division negotiated with the two lowest 

bidders to try to reduce costs by changing the length of the contract period, 

removing some facilities, modifying specifications on others, and adjusting bonding 

requirements.89 The conversations to trim costs led to revised specifications for 

construction; in mid-August, the division sent these new specifications to the two low 

bidders from the first round. The solicitation listed each of the facilities to be built, 

set out time schedules for completion of each stage, and stipulated that the contractor 

provide such things as transportation, electricity, housing, messing, medical, and 

other services for contractor and Corps personnel. Bids from the two joint ventures 

came to within $5,000 of one another, but a chance happening disrupted the award of 

a contract. Just weeks after the submissions, the Saudi Arabian principal participant 

in one of the joint ventures, Bin Ladin, died in a plane crash. The final consultations 

proceeded only with the other joint venture.90

On 19 December, the Mediterranean Division awarded a fixed-price contract for 

construction of the cantonment at Khamis Mushayt to Joint Venture Khamis Mushayt 

(JVKM), led by the West German Hochtief A.G. and including Compagnie Française 

d’Entreprises of Paris and Costruzioni Generali Farsura S.p.A. (COGEFAR) and 

Imprese Italiane all’Estero S.p.A. (Impresit), both of Milan. Most often, the group 

was simply called Hochtief. The total value of the contract came to $58.98 million, 

more than double the estimate of six months earlier.91

Given Khamis Mushayt’s isolation, Hochtief chose to develop a barge port at 

Shuqayq, about sixty miles southwest of Khamis Mushayt on the Red Sea, as the most 

efficient avenue for transporting materials to the construction site. The contractor 

also greatly improved the one hundred miles of road between Shuqayq and Khamis 

Mushayt. Maps of the day showed a good road from Taif, two hundred fifty miles 

northwest of Khamis Mushayt; but Hochtief concluded that the heavy loads that 

they had to ship would render the road impassable. Hochtief shipped materials to 

Shuqayq, where they were off-loaded to light boats and then hauled overland and 

seven thousand feet up to the construction site.92

The contractor’s first shipment of building materials cleared Saudi customs on 

20 March 1968; by July, the contractor had set up a rock-crushing and screening 

plant on site to produce aggregate. On 20 July, the Mediterranean Division held an 

89 See numerous memos and correspondence, Apr–Aug 67, in box 44 of 357, TAD-RHA; Cameron 

to Prince Sultan, 30 Jun 67. 90 “Specifications for Construction of Mil. Cantonment at Khamis Mushayt, Saudi Arabia,” Specs 

no. 67/1, Aug 67, box 17 of 104, access. no. 77-84-2400, TAD-RHA; “Information Folder: Saudi 

Arabian Engineer Assistance Program,” 10 May 68, p. 5, box 28, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; 

“Khamis Mushayt Cantonment, Final Proposals Received 22 August,” n.d., box 44 of 357, TAD-RHA; 

Cameron to Cassidy, 5 Sep 67, Mil Files XXI-3-6, OH, HQ USACE. 91 The companies participating in the joint venture at the time of the award are named in Cameron 

to Cassidy, 6 Dec 67, p. 3. By 1972, the contractor was using a letterhead that listed an American 

participant, Grove International of New York. See Joint Venture Khamis Mushayt to Mediterranean 

Div, 29 Aug 72, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 92 Cameron to Cassidy, 14 Mar 68, p. 3; Grosz, “Saudi Arabia District, 1968–1970,” p. 3; “Building the King Faisal Military Cantonment,” pp. 1–2. 
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 299

official dedication and groundbreaking ceremony that was attended by Prince Sultan 

and the deputy chief of engineers, Maj. Gen. Frederick J. Clarke. The ceremony 

drew thousands of local Saudis.93

The original design had called for a combination of cast-in-place structural 

support elements with concrete-block filler. Hochtief received permission to precast 

the concrete elements of the structural framework using a precast plant built on site 

at Khamis Mushayt. The choice to use precast concrete provoked some concern 

because it delayed the visible signs of construction that the Saudis awaited, that is, 

buildings rising visibly out of the ground. The plant began producing the structural 

elements in December 1968, but buildings appeared much later. During the sixteen 

months of the plant’s operation, it manufactured more than seventeen thousand six 

hundred concrete pieces for beams, columns, roof slabs, curbs, and sun shades. Once 

the elements were cast, the buildings rose rapidly. In April 1969, the contractor 

opened a plant to produce terrazzo and concrete floor tiles. By June, the cantonment 

had become a small town populated by the employees of Hochtief and of the Corps 

93 “Building the King Faisal Military Cantonment,” pp. 1–2; “Report of Progress for Month of 

July 1968 for the Saudi Arabia Engineer Assistance Program,” 31 Jul 68, box 5, access. no. 77-92-

0002, WNRC.

Mosque under construction at the Khamis Mushayt cantonment, December 1969
300 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

of Engineers and their families. In October, the contractor opened its last on-site 

production facility, an asphalt plant.94

While construction of the essential cantonment facilities proceeded at Khamis 

Mushayt, the division negotiated with MODA concerning such ancillary facilities as 

training ranges and access roads. By March 1969, the working estimate for Khamis 

Mushayt had risen to $73.5 million and estimates for all three cantonments had 

increased from $102 million (in 1965) to $209.5 million.95 The Saudi minister of 

finance expressed concern. Prince Sultan, facing pressure from his fellow minister, 

his uncle, began to look for ways to spread the costs over a longer period. He also 

decided to reduce the cantonment at Tabuk to a facility for only one brigade.96

The discussion of how to handle the increasing construction costs coincided 

with a crisis in cash available to the division through the letter of credit in New 

York. As of 1 April 1969, all of the funds assigned to the letter of credit were 

obligated. The division engineer, Colonel Waddell, went to Riyadh, accompanied 

by the MODA liaison officer, Major Nassief, to persuade the minister of finance 

as well as the minister of defense, Prince Sultan, to add to the letter of credit. After 

several hours of consultation, Waddell obtained a promise that the Saudi government 

would immediately release $7.1 million to cover work at Khamis Mushayt to 30 

June and another $6 million shortly thereafter to cover construction costs for the 

following quarter. Upon returning to Livorno, Waddell stopped in Jiddah to brief 

the ambassador, who interpreted the entire exchange as indicating a slowdown in 

Saudi defense spending.97

While the division’s administrative staff wrestled with the problem of available 

funds, its technical staff reviewed and adapted the water supply system designed 

by BATMED. The plan proposed developing a number of wells at Wadi Bishah 

North, where the division’s geologists expected to find water close to the surface. 

In June 1969, the division awarded a contract for $1.9 million to Joint Venture 

Khamis Mushayt to construct the water system at Bishah North, northwest of Khamis 

Mushayt and about sixteen miles from the cantonment. When completed, the system 

included twelve encased wells approximately ten feet deep, pumps, a collection 

line, booster pump houses, and a water conduit sixteen miles long that raised the 

water about four hundred feet above its ground location. Even with the enhanced 

94 “Building the King Faisal Military Cantonment,” pp. 5–6; Waddell to Cassidy, 7 Sep 68; Intervs, 

authors with Col (Ret) Robert W. Reisacher, 25 Oct 94, pp. 17–18, and Paul K. Walker with Col (Ret) 

Robert W. Reisacher, 7 Feb 85, pp. 22, 39. 95 Waddell to Cassidy, 10 Mar 69, p. 2; “Engineer Assistance Program: Saudi Arabia,” 10 Mar 69, 

box 28, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 96 Rough trans of Ltr, Minister of Finance to Minister of Defense, 30 Mar 69, sub: Tabuk and 

Qaysumah Cantonments, attached to MFR, Waddell, 4 Apr 69, box 51-84-9377; Waddell to Prince 

Sultan, 31 Mar 69, box 51-84-9384; all in Farrell Papers, OH, HQ USACE. 97 MFR, Waddell, 4 Apr 69, sub: Funds for MODA Cantonment Construction Program, box 51-

84-9377, Farrell Papers; Waddell to Prince Sultan, 31 Mar 69. 
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 301

supply, division engineers expected the area’s limited water to circumscribe the 

cantonment’s growth.98

Despite the difficulties with money and water, construction at Khamis Mushayt 

advanced on schedule throughout 1970. In January 1971, the Saudi Arabian Army 

Ordnance Corps (SAAOC) moved onto the base at Khamis Mushayt as the first 

official occupant. The division provided support to the Saudi officer charged with 

developing the staff and procedures to operate and maintain the base. In April, Saudi 

Arabian Army personnel began operating the water system that supplied the base. In 

May, after a month-long training period, they assumed responsibility for the power 

plant. By June, they operated the entire power system for the cantonment.99

In August 1971, JVKM completed construction of the cantonment and MODA 

scheduled an official dedication of the new facility, to be called the King Faisal 

Military Cantonment. King Faisal attended the dedication ceremony and the four 

days of festivities. As part of the celebration, the emir of the provincial capital of 

Abha, Faisal’s son Prince Khalid, hosted a banquet that the district engineer, Col. 

Robert W. Reisacher, described as “right out of the Arabian Nights.” Reisacher 

characterized the ceremony and festivities surrounding it as “the most exciting and 

grandiose affair I have ever witnessed.”100

At the dedication, the King Faisal Military Cantonment at Khamis Mushayt 

contained 243 buildings in a two-square-mile area with almost five-and-a-half miles 

of boundary fence. Although scaled down from the original design, it accommodated 

over five thousand troops and the families of commissioned and noncommissioned 

officers. The cantonment cost $67.8 million for construction alone; the Saudis spent 

an additional $14.5 million on equipment and furnishings.101

In October 1971, the Saudi Arabia District closed the Khamis Mushayt Area 

Office and the last Corps civilian employee left the region. This transfer did not 

mean, however, that the division had ended its work on the cantonment. Since 1969, 

the division had been helping the Saudis organize an operations and maintenance 

staff to support a post engineer for the cantonment. Even after the Saudis assumed 

responsibility for all systems in 1971, the division continued to assist the post 

engineer by procuring supplies, equipment, and repair parts.102

98 Cameron to Cassidy, 14 Mar 68; “Building the King Faisal Military Cantonment,” p. 5; Chaffin 

to Cassidy, 9 Mar 66; “Saudi Arabia District Historical Report,” [1969], p. 4; Interv, Walker with 

Reisacher, 7 Feb 85, p. 41. 99 Reisacher to Nassief, 4 Feb 71, box 214 of 357, TAD-RHA; “Building the King Faisal Military 

Cantonment,” p. 8. 100 Reisacher to Waddell, 21 Sep 71, box 51-84-9384, and Col Roy L. Kackley to Clarke, 7 Sep 71, 

p. 3, box 51-84-7361, both in Farrell Papers; Interv, Walker with Reisacher, 7 Feb 85, pp. 68–69. 101 “EIG [Engineer Inspector General] Inspection: Annual General Inspection, Saudi Arabia 

District, 29 May–1 June 1972,” 16 May 72, pp. 4–4A, box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers (hereafter 

cited as EIG Inspection: 1972); Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, p. 14, box 1, access. no. 

77-92-0001, WNRC. 102 Memo, Lt Col John R. Witt, 8 Mar 72, p. 2, box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers; MFR, Waddell, 

4 Oct 69, sub: Meeting with HRH Turki, Deputy MODA, box 51-84-9377, Farrell Papers; Memo of 

Conversation, 6 Nov 69, sub: Major General Dunn’s Visit to Saudi Arabia, box 18, access. no. 77-

92-0001, WNRC; Waddell to Clarke, 5 Mar 70, p. 3; Sultan bin Abd Al-Aziz to His Excellency the 
302 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Tabuk

The proposed site for the second cantonment, about three miles south of the 

town of Tabuk, lay in the northwest corner of the country on a sandy plateau about 

three thousand feet above sea level. The terrain was open and the atmosphere 

generally clear so that heat dissipated during the night, producing an average 

variation in temperature of 34 ̊F between day and night. With the winter average just 

above freezing and a summer average of 103 ̊F and highs up to 118 ̊F, the region 

experienced a much wider range of temperatures than Khamis Mushayt. The wind 

was almost constant at about fifteen miles an hour.103

BATMED prepared the basic design for the cantonment at Tabuk in 1966, at 

the same time that it drafted the design for Khamis Mushayt. It included almost 

identical facilities and was different only because it was originally designed to house 

two brigades and because the site already had thirty-two military warehouses and 

other shops and buildings. Designers incorporated the existing facilities into the 

new master plan by segregating them in an industrial area remote from the troop 

and family housing. On 31 January 1967, the division and BATMED briefed Prince 

Sultan on the design. MODA approved the design, and the division planned to make 

only minor changes to adapt it to the specific conditions at Tabuk. Months later, 

after Prince Sultan decided that Tabuk would contain only one brigade, BATMED 

prepared a redesign that nevertheless preserved sitings and utilities sufficient to 

support a second brigade.104

Given the experience gained at Khamis Mushayt, the bidding process for Tabuk 

went more smoothly, but not without its own delays. In late October 1968, MODA 

approved a bidders list with the reservation that all other Saudi governmental 

ministries and agencies also approve all of the bidders. In mid-November, the 

division issued a request for construction proposals. It then learned that the Saudi 

Council of Ministers had not included funds in the coming year’s budget for the 

construction at Tabuk; money would become available only in September 1969. The 

division extended the cutoff date for proposals and opened bids on 23 April. It took 

another six months before the division arrived at a satisfactory $56 million contract 

with Philipp Holzmann A.G. of West Germany. On 23 October, Holzmann signed 

American Ambassador, 3/2/92 [the Saudi date in year 1392], box 1, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

“Proposed Plan for Assistance to Saudi Arabian Army Facility Engineer and CE [Chief of Engineers] 

Constructed Cantonments, Draft—Version II,” Jul 75, box 31, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 103 Basil, The Architects Collaborative, and Metcalf and Eddy, “Tabuk, Engineering Feasibility 

Reports,” vols. 1 and 2, 30 May 67, box 65 of 104, access. no. 77-84-2400; Leo L. Anderson et al., 

“Exploratory Report of Wind Abatement and Dust Stabilization Near Tabuk, Saudi Arabia,” 31 Mar 

75, SA-725; both in TAD-RHA. 104 “Study of Maintenance and Storage Facilities, Tabuk Cantonment,” Mar 71, box 276 of 357, 

TAD-RHA; Cameron to Cassidy, 3 Mar 67; Cameron to Prince Sultan, 31 Jul 67, box 11, access. no. 

77-92-0002, WNRC; Memo, John P. Coony, 6 Sep 67, sub: Tabuk Cantonment, box 11, access. no. 77-

92-0002, WNRC; EIG Inspection: 1972; “Draft History of the Saudi Arabia District,” [1970], p. 1. 
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 303

the contract; on 30 October, the district held a groundbreaking ceremony in which 

Prince Sultan and the chief of the U.S. Military Training Mission participated.105

Holzmann’s difficulty obtaining entry visas for its management team and 

customs clearance for construction materials slowed mobilization. When Holzmann 

appealed for help, the area engineer designate, Lt. Col. Adolph Hight, learned that 

Holzmann would have to apply for each visa separately because the Saudis would 

no longer approve multiple applications in a single action. Made nervous perhaps 

by the assassination of King Idris of Libya on 1 September 1969, the Saudis insisted 

that Holzmann submit a personal data sheet with the visa application for each

individual seeking admission. Holzmann also encountered obstacles when it sought 

permission to open a communications link between Jiddah and Tabuk. Finally, 

Hight interceded with the MODA liaison officer, Nassief, asking him to persuade 

the Saudi Ministry of Commerce to clear the communications system and to list 

Tabuk among its customs-exempt contracts.106

Mediterranean Division personnel began to arrive at the Tabuk Area Office in 

early January 1970, and Holzmann’s first personnel arrived two weeks later. Colonel 

105 Waddell to Cassidy, 10 Mar 69; Dunn to Waddell, 21 Mar 69, box 16, access. no. 77-92-0001, 

WNRC; “Information Folder: Saudi Arabian Engineer Assistance Program,” 10 May 68; Telgs, Amb 

Hermann F. Eilts to Div Engr, 24 Oct, 10 Nov 68, box 276 of 357, TAD-RHA; Memo, Grace, 4 Apr 

69, sub: Tabuk Cantonment, RFP 69-R-0014, box 276 of 357, TAD-RHA; “Draft History of the Saudi 

Arabia District,” [1970], pp. 1, 9; Memo, 9 Mar 70, sub: Installation Historical Progress Report, p. 3, 

box 16, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 106 Waddell to Clarke, 3 Dec 69; MOU, Nassief and Hight, 9 Dec 69, sub: Tabuk Mil. Cantonment, box 276 of 375, TAD-RHA; “Chronological Summary of Significant Events—1970, Tabuk 

Area Office,” SA-725, TAD-RHA.

Site plan for VIP complex at the Tabuk cantonment, ca. 1969
304 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Hight moved to Tabuk in February. Holzmann’s problems with customs and visa 

permits persisted throughout the winter and into the spring, and the contractor had 

trouble gaining approval from the Saudi Ministry of Civil Aviation to operate an 

aircraft in the country. During the same months, the Saudis began to increase pressure 

on the contractor to hire Saudi nationals and to subcontract with Saudi businesses 

where they were technically qualified.107

One incident illustrates the aggravation that rigid application of such bureaucratic 

rules could produce. A Holzmann employee arrived at the Jiddah airport carrying two 

rolls of drawings for the Tabuk cantonment, but he was prevented from continuing 

until he had obtained a certificate from MODA allowing passage of each drawing. 

Hand-carrying drawings was the most efficient way to get them to the construction 

site, but only if they could pass Customs. Holzmann asked the area office staff to 

contact Nassief again about streamlining the process, perhaps by issuing multiple 

certificates for drawings to the contractor’s office in Frankfurt.108

The volatile situation in Jordan, where the Palestinian problem erupted in 

open civil war in 1970 between supporters of the Palestine Liberation Front and 

the government of Jordan, further delayed the progress of construction because 

the normal routes of commerce between the eastern Mediterranean and Saudi 

Arabia were cut off by the extended closure of the Syrian border. By July 1970, the 

contractor at Tabuk had constructed a field laboratory and had completed family 

quarters for contractor personnel. He had also received permission to operate the 

company’s Cessna 402–A, a nine-passenger aircraft that transported both Corps 

and contractor personnel.109

The Saudis continued to express dissatisfaction with the very low percentage 

of Saudi contractors or workers involved at Tabuk. The failure to hire Saudi 

subcontractors irritated Prince Sultan, Major Nassief, and the Saudi minister of 

labor. Colonel Reisacher, who moved in mid-June 1970 from his position as assistant 

division engineer in Livorno to become district engineer in Riyadh, expressed their 

frustration to division headquarters and suggested that using a Saudi subcontractor 

for “lightweight roofing” might help alleviate the pressure.110

Holzmann did make progress. By April 1971, a project engineer visiting the site 

from Livorno reported that “concrete seems to be coming out of the ground all over 

the cantonment”; by late that year, the contractor had completed about half of the 

cantonment. In early 1972, military officers from the U.S. and Saudi Armies built 

a geodesic dome at the Tabuk construction site. They constructed a wood frame 

with plastic sheets stapled in place as a cover to demonstrate to local farmers the 

107 MFR, Hight, 16 Mar 70, sub: Trip Report (7–11 March 1970); Memo, Philipp Holzmann A.G., 

8 May 70, sub: Custom Clearance of Our Goods; G. W. Probasco to Nassief, 9 May 70; Nassief to 

Maj. R. Brickley, 25 Aug 70; all in box 276 of 357, TAD-RHA. Waddell to Clarke, 5 Mar 70; Memo, 

Hight, 16 Mar 70; “Draft History of the Saudi Arabia District,” [1970], p. 2. 108 Maj R. A. Roberts to Nassief, 19 Jul 70, box 276 of 357, TAD-RHA. 109 Waddell to Clarke, 17 Dec 70, p. 4, Mil Files XXI-3-9, OH, HQ USACE; “Draft History of the 

Saudi Arabia District,” [1970], p. 3. 110 Reisacher to Col V. O. Wilson, 30 Aug 70, p. 3, D-8-11, TAD-RHA. 
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 305

structure’s potential as a greenhouse. At the same time, the commanding general of 

the Saudi military region began a beautification program using as fertilizer effluent 

from the sewage treatment plant at the construction camp. He also sponsored a 

nursery where local personnel, under guidance of a Saudi officer, rooted trees and 

shrubs for later use in the cantonment. On 30 August 1972, the Corps turned over 

Prince Sultan participated in a groundbreaking ceremony at the Tabuk cantonment, ca. 1969.
306 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

the first building, the post engineer maintenance shop, to the Saudi government. 

Pakistani engineers began arriving to staff the facilities engineering organization 

headed by a Saudi captain.111

By the end of 1972, several Saudi subcontractors had become involved in the 

construction and four of five new projects had been set aside for Saudi firms. Early 

in 1973, the area office turned over substantial portions of the cantonment to the 

Saudi government. On 2 April, a command inspection team from the Office of the 

Chief of Engineers visited Tabuk. By mid-July, Holzmann had virtually completed 

the construction. The remaining work involved repairing cracks in family housing 

and completing additional work contracted through change orders.112

The Saudi government scheduled the dedication of the cantonment, known since 

early in the year as the King Abdulaziz Military Cantonment, for 22 September 

1973. King Faisal presided at the ceremony, to which the chief of engineers sent 

Maj. Gen. George Rebh, director of military construction, as his representative. 

Rebh brought with him as a gift for Faisal a pair of ornately engraved six-shooter 

pistols. Over four days of festivities, the American engineers and their Saudi hosts 

celebrated the completion of a $75 million military city capable of accommodating 

a 7,500-man brigade complete with hospital, schools, family quarters, maintenance 

shops, community facilities, and utilities.113

Saudi Arabia Mobility Program, 1967–1973

Throughout 1966, Mediterranean Division personnel had worked to define the 

program that MODA had requested to support its fleet of military vehicles. These 

efforts led to the agreements between the division and MODA in September and the 

elaboration of the Saudi Arabia Mobility Program. Further discussions established 

the program’s primary objective, that is, to help modernize the Saudi Arabian 

Army’s maintenance and supply systems to support its vehicles. As a concurrent 

objective, the division would arrange training to develop a staff within the Saudi 

Arabian Army capable of managing and operating the logistical, maintenance, and 

supply systems set up for the vehicle fleet. The maintenance and supply systems 

111 Quotation from Memo, John T. Ortino, 14 May 71, sub: Trip Report—Saudi Arabia—13–26 

April 1971, p. 3, box 7 of 35, TAD-RHA; Memo, Lt Col P. D. Weinert, 28 Feb 72, sub: Highlights 

of Historical Events for 1971, Tabuk Area Ofc, SA-725, TAD-RHA; various Public Information Ofc 

releases from Tabuk Area Ofc to Mediterranean Div, 1972 and 1973, SA-725, TAD-RHA. 112 Memo, Maj Daniel G. Barney, 27 Dec 72, sub: Additional Construction at Tabuk, box 276 of 

357; various 1973 news releases from Public Information Ofc, Tabuk Area, SA‐725; Capt Russell 

E. Milnes, “Chronological Summary of Significant Events—Tabuk Residency, 1973,” 17 Mar 74, 

SA‐725; all in TAD-RHA.

113 Intervs, Thomas Tulenko with Col (Ret) Charles T. Williams, 20–21 Feb 85, p. 105; Milnes, 

“Chronological Summary of Significant Events—Tabuk Residency, 1973”; “Ceremony for the 

Dedication of the King Abdul Aziz Military Cantonment, Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, 21–24 Sep 73,” SA725, TAD-RHA; Williams, Notes from the Div Engr, Mediterranean Div Info Bull no. 9, 4 Oct 73, 

SA-725, TAD-RHA. 
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 307

also needed a construction program for depots, warehouses, and repair shops around 

the kingdom.114

To implement the program, the division planned to engage a private contractor. 

Finding the appropriate contract instrument presented a challenge because standard 

Corps procedures did not cover the situation. A lump-sum, fixed-price contract 

worked well for a construction project based on detailed designs that allowed the 

contractor to estimate costs and craft a proposal. The mobility and supply program 

that the Mediterranean Division had agreed to manage had no such circumscribed 

scope. Indeed, the division expected the contractor to define the scope of the program 

as it progressed. A cost-reimbursable contract would require extensive staffing by 

the Corps in order to monitor its progress, and the division had no staff available 

for the task. 

The Mediterranean Division eventually proposed a hybrid contract format that 

combined various pricing mechanisms. The contractor would provide management 

functions for services in supply, maintenance, and training on a fixed-price or 

lump-sum basis. The contractor would also hire mechanics, supply clerks, and other 

personnel to staff technical trades and be compensated for man-months of work as 

needed. The costs of procuring the large variety of supplies, equipment, and materials 

would be reimbursable. The division further identified the major facilities needed to 

support the program and contracted for their construction separate from the services 

portion of the program. The facilities to be constructed included a central inventory 

control point to be built in Riyadh near MODA headquarters and an ordnance school 

and training center in Taif. Other smaller facilities came under the original services 

contract or were added by supplemental agreement. The Letterkenny Army Supply 

Depot in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, provided major assistance in defining the 

requirements of the supply operation. The U.S. Military Training Mission detailed 

its ordnance adviser to the Mediterranean Division to help define the maintenance 

operations and to develop the contract documents.115

On 26 May 1967, the Corps of Engineers awarded the first SAMP contract to 

Commonwealth-Tumpane Company Ltd., an American joint venture. The terms of 

the two-year, $32.4 million services contract with options for extension set May 

1972, five years after the official initiation of the program, as the target date by which 

Saudi staff would assume responsibility for operating the systems independently. 

Within days of the contract’s signing, the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, also called 

the Six-Day War, broke out. This conflict disrupted the entire region, complicating 

114 Mediterranean Div, “History: Saudi Arabia Mobility Program (SAMP),” 30 Jun 70, p. 3, box 

16, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC (hereafter cited as SAMP Hist, 30 Jun 70); Maj James F. Rosebery, “Ordnance Program Division (OPD), Historical Summary, 1986,” 10 Feb 87, introduction, 

Current Files, Transatlantic Division–Public Affairs Office (hereafter cited as Rosebery, OPD Hist 

Sum: 1986). 115 For this and the preceding paragraph, Richard Wiles, “SAMP,” Mar 98, pp. 3–4, provided by 

Wiles, authors’ files.
308 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

the approval of visas for contractor personnel, slowing the shipment of contractor 

supplies, and delaying implementation of the new contract.116

Even before the conflict, the Saudi Arabian and U.S. governments had begun 

discussions to broaden the SAMP agreement to include a program of maintenance 

and support for armaments and weapons. These talks culminated on 17 October 

1967, when the two governments signed a supplemental accord, “The Weapons 

Maintenance Arrangements.” Ten months elapsed while MODA secured approval 

for funding. In August 1968, the Mediterranean Division and CommonwealthTumpane modified the existing contract by incorporating support for Saudi 

armaments. Under the name Royal Armament Maintenance Program (RAMP), 

Commonwealth-Tumpane extended its development of procedures for procurement 

and supply to include weapons; ammunition; combat vehicles; and all maintenance 

equipment, systems, and supplies for the Saudi Arabian Army. The armaments 

program dealt only with artillery, tank turrets, and other large-caliber weapons, 

excluding small arms; but thereafter, SAMP applied to both the original and the 

expanded program.117

First Years

Officially, SAMP began with award of the contract to Commonwealth-Tumpane 

in May 1967. The initial two-year contract, the first of three planned contract 

increments, included the contractor’s mobilization of personnel and resources, an 

inventory, receipt of new vehicles, establishment of sites, and training of Saudi 

Arabian Army personnel. A quick preliminary inventory indicated that the Saudis 

used nearly two hundred fifty different makes and models of automotive equipment. 

This multiplicity of models defied efficient maintenance, repair, and supply. A large 

percentage of the fleet was inoperable, with many vehicles beyond economical repair. 

The Saudis had no records indicating what problems had put vehicles out of service. 

No manuals existed to guide repair, and no records identified the location of vehicles 

or their status. According to MODA’s own estimates, it had 3,666 vehicles—tanks, 

mobile armaments, and commercial and service vehicles—of which 769 (21 percent) 

were categorized as unserviceable.118

A more thorough inventory conducted during the first year of the Saudi Arabia 

Mobility Program revealed that MODA had 8,213 vehicles, more than twice as 

many as its records indicated. The revised inventory divided the vehicles into five 

categories based on their condition. Vehicles in the top three categories could be 

repaired and returned to service quickly, provided parts were available, without 

disassembly of power trains or other major systems. Vehicles in Category 4 (8 

percent of the total) required disassembly and overhaul or replacement of major 

116 SAMP Hist, 30 Jun 70, p. 9; “Saudi Arabia District Historical Report,” [1969], p. 5. 117 Wiles, “SAMP,” p. 8; Rosebery, OPD Hist Sum: 1986, p. 1; SAMP Hist, 30 Jun 70, pp. 2, 

9–10. 118 SAMP Hist, 30 Jun 70, pp. 9, 14, 16–17. 
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 309

systems. The 1,657 vehicles in Category 5 (20 percent) were beyond repair and 

could be used only for parts and salvage.119

Maintenance

The initial contract called for Commonwealth-Tumpane to return to service any 

and all vehicles that could be repaired with existing resources. During the first year, 

the contractor quickly managed to service several thousand vehicles and to repair 

374 of the 1,300 vehicles in need of major overhauls. As the program extended into 

the second year, the contractor renovated and modernized existing shops at Al Kharj 

to establish a central facility for repair, overhaul, and rebuilding of vehicles.120

The contractor concentrated facilities for routine maintenance at a central 

maintenance point in Riyadh, where he also kept cost data and records on all vehicles 

serviced. Statistical analysis of the data highlighted trends and identified problem 

areas. The company organized mobile maintenance teams, initially working from Taif, 

Khamis Mushayt, and Riyadh and expanding these operations as needed. (See Map 20.) 

The contractor also established a semipermanent operation in Najran, south of Khamis 

Mushayt. By the end of the first year, a team began to operate from Jiddah as well. Other 

maintenance centers existed at Al Kharj, Khamis Mushayt, Tabuk, Taif, Riyadh, and 

Jiddah. By the end of the second year, the contractor had eleven active teams.121

Supply

During the first year of the SAMP contract, Commonwealth-Tumpane received 

and processed 1,517 new vehicles for the Saudi Arabian Army. Through the 

same months, to control stock and to determine what was on hand or on order, 

Commonwealth-Tumpane established a major supply depot at Al Kharj and satellite 

depots at Taif and at Tabuk. By the end of the first year, the contractor had identified 

a total of sixty-two thousand supply items in the country.122

To maintain inventory and to manage supply, the contractor depended on a 

central inventory control point (CICP). Commonwealth-Tumpane created and 

staffed the CICP during the first year of the contract. The contractor established 

basic recordkeeping procedures and replaced the pen-and-ledger system with an 

automated data-processing center. Electronic accounting machines and other dataprocessing equipment arrived in November 1967. Because an existing building had 

to be modified to accommodate the new equipment, the contractor did not install it 

until mid-April 1968. The electronic system became completely operational in late 

1968 and by the end of the second year included two of the field sites as well.123

119 Ibid., pp. 17–20. 120 Ibid., pp. 19, 26; Grosz, “Saudi Arabia District, 1968–1970,” p. 3. 121 SAMP Hist, 30 Jun 70, pp. 3–5, 20–21, 23. 122 Ibid., pp. 32–33. 123 Ibid., pp. 3–5, 28–32, 34. 
310 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

The multiple pieces of computer equipment installed in the data-processing 

center in Riyadh attest to how early this was in the development of computers as 

management tools. By the end of the second year, the central inventory control point 

had an IBM 360 Model 20 computer that included a central processing unit, two 

dual-tape drives, a disk drive, a card reader, a card punch, and a printer. The center 

also had an IBM 407 accounting machine with three keypunch machines and other 

supporting equipment. IBM 407 models also served supply points at Al Kharj, Taif, 

Tabuk, and Khamis Mushayt.124

Commonwealth-Tumpane needed manuals and publications to establish basic 

systems for maintenance and repair. During the first year, through arrangements made 

by the Mediterranean Division’s liaison office in New York City, the contractor’s 

headquarters in Marietta, Georgia, ordered over six hundred U.S. Army manuals. The 

contractor established a radio communications network that provided high-quality 

voice contact with all maintenance and supply sites in Saudi Arabia. The company 

also provided a leased airplane for traveling around the kingdom and ran a shuttle 

service, the “Green Ball Trucking Line,” that supported all program and contractor 

requirements for shipping.125

By June 1970, the Saudi Arabian Army’s fleet of vehicles totaled 13,148, 

including over five hundred vehicles in field units that did not appear in the SAMP 

inventory. Commonwealth-Tumpane had identified over one thousand vehicles that 

were difficult to support and gathered them at Taif, Al Kharj, Tabuk, and Najran 

for elimination from the fleet.126

Training

The contractor established three categories of training, on-the-job, counterpart, 

and classroom, for Saudi personnel. The training programs concentrated on operating 

the supply system, operating the maintenance system, and training techniques for 

the Saudis to use as they extended the programs.127

The Saudi Arabians who came to these programs had very little formal education, 

negligible technological experience, and few skills. Given the small demographic base 

and the absence of obligatory military service, meeting recruitment goals was difficult and 

selectivity impossible. Moreover, commanders of Saudi Arabian Army units frequently 

had little acquaintance with principles of logistics, maintenance, and supply. The Saudi 

command structure in the 1960s further complicated the effort to make a training 

program effective, because it largely ignored the experience and training of individuals 

in making military assignments. These drawbacks notwithstanding, the Saudi Arabian 

Army selected 698 students for on-the-job training in SAMP’s first two years. After 

putting them through the instructional program, the contractor certified 542 soldiers as 

having passed the training, a success rate of 78 percent. In another dimension of the 

124 Ibid., pp. 28–32, 34, 38. 125 Ibid., p. 35; Wiles, “SAMP,” p. 5. 126 SAMP Hist, 30 Jun 70, pp. 36–37. 127 Ibid., pp. 3–5; Wiles, “SAMP,” p. 5. 
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 311

training, the contractor identified 210 of its 1,322 defined staff positions as appropriate 

for counterpart training, where Saudi Arabians worked with contract employees to learn 

the duties, functions, and management principles of the positions. As of January 1970, 

only ninety-four Saudis held counterpart training positions.128

The Ordnance Corps Center and School

The most far-reaching training program involved reform of the Saudi Arabian 

Ordnance Corps Center and School at Taif. Through the school, the contractor trained 

128 SAMP Hist, 30 Jun 70, pp. 40, 54–55. 

RIYADH

AL KHARJ

JĪZĀN

NAJRĀN

KHAMĪS MUSHAYT

TABŪK

AŢ ŢĀ’IF

JIDDAH

Medina Yanbu’ 

Wādī Bīshah

Qal’at Bīshah

Shuqayq

Mecca

Ad Dammām

E G Y P T E G Y P T

S U D A N

I R A Q

IRAN

OMAN

UNITED ARAB

EMIRA TES

Q A T A R

BAHRAIN

K U WAI T

SYRIA

ISRAEL

E T HIOPIA

PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

YEMEN AR A B

REPUBLI C

J O R D A N

SAUDI ARABIA MOBILITY PROGRAM (SAMP)

SAUDI ARABIA DISTRICT 

1960s–1970s

District Headquarters

District Headquarters, Temporary

SAMP Site

0

0 300 Miles

300 Kilometers

Map 20
312 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

the personnel for the administrative and technical responsibilities of managing the 

ordnance system and handling the equipment used by the Saudi Army. The Saudis 

had established a precursor to the school in 1953, which they moved to Taif in 1963. 

In 1967, the SAAOC integrated it into the training program established under SAMP 

to create the new center and school. Conforming to Saudi expectations, the center 

handled basic military training for recruits and trained them in technical fields. 

The school trained ordnance personnel to be technically proficient in supply and 

maintenance. The program also trained army instructors, administrators, and other 

personnel in the theory and practice of supply and maintenance activities.129

Instruction under SAMP began with an interim program at the same time that 

construction for the improved school facility got underway. The program had startup 

problems and limitations such as shortages of training aids, materials, equipment, and 

instructors. By May 1968, when the first group of students graduated, the contractor 

had overcome most of these problems, in part by using materials and programs of 

instruction developed by the U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC). The 

contractor established several levels of training, implemented testing procedures for 

selection and advancement of students, and proceeded to train Saudi officers and 

noncommissioned personnel in a variety of military occupational specialties. In the 

first two years, The Ordnance Center and School (TOCS) trained 767 students as 

mechanics, metal-body workers, machinists, drivers of different classes of vehicles, 

arms and artillery repairmen, and several varieties of maintenance-supply clerks and 

typists. By January 1970, the contractor had screened 1,489 members of the Saudi 

Arabian Army for schooling at TOCS. The average age of the candidate was 29.5 

years, and 78 percent of the students were married. Of those screened, 38 percent 

were illiterate even in Arabic.130

Construction of the new facilities at TOCS, begun in 1968, paralleled the development of the new curriculum. On 16 September 1970, Minister of Defense and Aviation 

Prince Sultan and the Prince of Holy Mecca Province, HRH Fauroy bin Abdulaziz, 

dedicated the facilities for the new Ordnance Center and School. By 1986, the center 

and school occupied a land area of one hundred fifty acres and encompassed forty 

modern buildings. The school conducted about ninety courses a year and annually 

graduated about six hundred students qualified to perform and manage the maintenance 

and related supply operations at all levels of the Saudi Arabian Army.131

Construction

Because maintenance, repair, and storage facilities in the kingdom were 

inadequate, construction of a variety of structures began in the first year of the 

SAMP contract. During the year, one training and two maintenance buildings 

129 Ibid., pp. 44–46; Rosebery, OPD Hist Sum: 1986, p. 2, tab N. 130 SAMP Hist, 30 Jun 70, pp. 44–52. 131 Rosebery, OPD Hist Sum: 1986. 
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 313

were rehabilitated or constructed at Khamis Mushayt, Tabuk, and Al Kharj. A 

deprocessing center went up at Jiddah, and school facilities were built at Taif.132

Building the central inventory control point at Riyadh, the Ordnance Center and 

School, and other similar facilities cost $4.7 million, nearly 50 percent more than 

the amount budgeted for construction at the outset of the program. Costs increased 

because the activities pursued under SAMP had expanded beyond the original scope. 

The school at Taif needed 83 percent more classroom space than planned, and the 

projections for housing and messing facilities for the soldier-students who attended 

the new school had not accounted for the high percentage of married students.133

Costs also rose because not all of the equipment for training shops had been 

included in the original budget due to the misapprehension that the Saudi Arabian 

Army already had the necessary items. Moreover, to accommodate the data-processing 

equipment that the final design for the CICP building demanded a quality of construction that exceeded the original estimates. Finally, neither the costs of relocating from 

the interim to the permanent school nor the cost of providing electrical power to the 

new school site had been included in the original estimates.134

Other lapses in the early planning contributed to rising construction costs at the 

Ordnance Corps Center and School. When planning began in the late 1960s, no one 

included the commandant of the school in reviewing the designs, although he was 

the ultimate user of the facilities. When construction did not meet his expectations, 

he asked for additions not included in the original scope of work: drains, shower 

curtains, coldwater taps in the bathrooms, parade grounds, a mosque, a recreation 

room for the soldiers, a storage room for weapons, and a fence around the grassed 

area. In addition, maintenance, which Commonwealth-Tumpane provided, came 

as an addition to the cost of construction.135

The school was one of several construction projects for which, beginning in 

1967, Commonwealth-Tumpane developed design specifications. The Saudi Arabian 

Army had some facilities for maintenance and repair as a result of earlier work by 

Egyptian military advisers, but they were in dilapidated condition. Construction 

under SAMP involved rehabilitation of these facilities and construction of new ones 

at sites all around the kingdom. The contractor built or modified office facilities, 

maintenance shops, warehouses, and supply and training facilities at Al Kharj, 

Jizan, Jiddah, Najran, Riyadh, Taif, Tabuk, and Khamis Mushayt. Much of the early 

construction was completed by the end of 1969.136

Other construction included shelters for vehicles at Taif and Khamis Mushayt 

and mess facilities at all of the SAMP sites throughout the kingdom. The Saudi 

132 SAMP Hist, 30 Jun 70, p. 59; MFR, Hromiak, 16 Jan 69, and Memo, Ch, S&I [Supervision 

and Inspection] Br, 29 Nov 70, both in box 213 of 357, TAD-RHA. 133 SAMP Hist, 30 Jun 70, pp. 50, 60–62. 134 Ibid., pp. 50, 61–62. 135 Memo, Jimmie E. Kazaleh, 21 May 68, sub: Staff Visit Report—Khamis-Mushayt, Jizan, Jeddah [sic] and Tabuk, box 213 of 357, TAD-RHA. 136 Interv, Moorhus with Grosz, 19 Mar 96, pp. 34–35; DF, Earl Dyer, 18 Jan 69, sub: Construction 

Review of SAMP Facilities, Contracts DACA75-68-C-0040 and -0033, box 213 of 357, TAD-RHA; 

Construction Rpts, Oct, Nov 69, unmarked box, TAD-RHA.
314 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Arabian Army did not originally include food service for its personnel working in 

SAMP. As the program progressed and as the typical workday increased from six 

to eight hours, MODA realized that such facilities were necessary.137

After April 1970, by directive of the Saudi Arabian government, all contracts for 

rehabilitation of facilities went to Saudi construction firms. Many of the subsequent 

projects were under $100,000 in placement value; but during FYs 1970 and 1971, 

these small projects amounted to a total of nearly half a million dollars.138

The contractor for the Saudi Arabia Mobility Program provided valuable support 

to the Mediterranean Division’s personnel serving in the Saudi Arabia District. 

At both Riyadh and Taif, Commonwealth-Tumpane put the dining, lodging, and 

recreational facilities maintained for its employees at the disposition of all district 

personnel. At Riyadh, the company also provided potable water, cooking and heating 

fuels, and a substantial portion of the district’s transportation.139

137 SAMP Hist, 30 Jun 70, p. 662; “Saudi Arabia District Historical Report,” [1969], p. 5. 138 Memo, Lt Col Jack R. Mullis to Div Engr, 24 Feb 71, sub: Installation Historical Program Report, 

with Encl, sub: Chronological List of SAD [Saudi Arabia District] Historical Activities, 1970, p. 1, 

box 20, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Memo, Hromiak, 23 Oct 71, sub: Construction Contractor 

Performance Evaluation Report, Shore Corporation, OMC and RAMP Rehabilitation, Taif, Saudi 

Arabia, box 111 of 357, TAD-RHA; Msg, Grosz to Waddell, 7 Mar 70, D-8-11, TAD-RHA. EIG 

Inspection: 1972, table “SAMP Construction,” lists contracts awarded in FYs 1970 and 1971. 139 Grosz, “Saudi Arabia District, 1968–1970,” p. 3.

Saudi Arabia Mobility Program training complex, 1968
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 315

Personnel and Funding

The Saudi Arabia District began its management of SAMP with only three people. 

Between 1967 and 1970, the SAMP division within the district grew to a staff of thirty, 

two-thirds U.S. Army officers and about one-third civilian employees. A larger contingent 

of contractor employees executed most of the day-to-day work of the program. By June 

1970, Commonwealth-Tumpane employed around one thousand people from numerous 

countries. In Khamis Mushayt and the surrounding region, for example, one-third of the 

136 people were American. The third-country nationals serving at Khamis Mushayt, 

Jizan, and Najran came from Germany, Turkey, Jordan, Pakistan, France, Sudan, Spain, 

Lebanon, and Greece. Only one employee was Saudi.140

SAMP operations were funded through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procedures 

authorized by the Arms Export Control Act, which provided for the DoD-controlled sale 

of goods and services to strategically important foreign governments. Both the Corps of 

Engineers and the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) carried numerous FMS cases 

in support of the Saudi military. The Corps cases funded the service and construction 

contracts, whereas the AMC cases funded the purchase of military vehicles as well as 

the parts and supplies to support them. In addition, in a highly unusual arrangement, the 

Department of Defense granted the Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance Corps the privilege 

of requisitioning repair parts directly from the U.S. Army supply system.141

Extending the Program, 1969–1973

In May 1969, when the initial phase of the contract came up for extension, 

Commonwealth-Tumpane had 684 employees working on the Saudi Arabia 

Mobility Program at half a dozen sites around the kingdom. Another 647 military 

and civilian employees of the Saudi Arabian Army also held positions in SAMP. 

Headquarters operations for SAMP, the central inventory control point, and the 

central maintenance point were all located in Riyadh. Al Kharj housed the main 

army depot for supply as well as maintenance and rebuild activities. General supply 

support and maintenance operations took place at Tabuk, Taif, Khamis Mushayt, 

Jiddah, Jizan, and Najran. In addition, Riyadh supported Dammam and Jiddah 

supported Yanbu, Medina, and Mecca. A vehicle-deprocessing facility at Jiddah 

received about four thousand new U.S. Army vehicles. Finally, mobile maintenance 

teams provided support for organizational maintenance and supply to individual 

army units throughout the kingdom. Satisfied with Commonwealth-Tumpane’s 

performance, the Mediterranean Division extended the contract for another two 

years for $25.9 million with an option for a fifth year.142

140 SAMP Hist, 30 Jun 70, pp. 5–7; Info Brochure for Thacher, p. III-17; Memos, Ward Hoover, 

26 Oct 68, sub: Personnel in the Khamis Mushayt Area, and A. C. Nerdahl, CTCL [CommonwealthTumpane Company Ltd.], 29 Oct 68, sub: Contractor Personnel Khamis Mushayt Area, both in box 

195 of 357, TAD-RHA. 141 Wiles, “SAMP,” pp. 6–7. 142 Ibid.; SAMP Hist, 30 Jun 70, pp. 5–7, 62, 65.
316 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Between the spring of 1969 and the autumn of 1970, the contractor’s total workforce 

fluctuated between six hundred fifty and one thousand fifty. With the Saudis providing 

the funds through FMS administered by the Mediterranean Division, the contractor 

commanded the manpower and know-how to dominate the logistical and supply systems 

that supported the Saudi Arabian Army. Contractor personnel were privy to sensitive 

information concerning the repair status and readiness of the Saudi Arabian Army’s 

fleet of military vehicles and heavy armaments. The contractor’s staff, not personnel of 

the Saudi Ordnance Corps, actually ran the systems. In effect, the contractor’s general 

manager in Saudi Arabia had become the chief of ordnance for the Saudi Arabian Army. 

The circumstances created an uncomfortable situation in which the Saudi military 

commanders had become a diminished element in the three-party arrangement that 

linked them to the Mediterranean Division and to Commonwealth-Tumpane.143

Control of the program became an issue of great concern; as a result, the character 

of the Saudi Arabia Mobility Program changed between 1970 and 1973. The extension 

of the SAMP contract in May 1969 called for the systematic transfer of responsibility 

to personnel of the Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance Corps and the planned reduction 

of contractor participation. That goal remained unreachable because in 1970 and 

1971 the SAAOC had too few people to fill the positions in the program. By the 

summer of 1970, the Saudis had about six hundred fifty people actually assigned to 

the program, less than half the number called for in the transition schedule. Moreover, 

Commonwealth-Tumpane supervisors judged only a fifth of those actually engaged 

as truly qualified to handle the responsibilities of their positions.144

Because the pace at which the Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance Corps filled 

SAMP positions was so slow, Commonwealth-Tumpane had to delay withdrawing 

its personnel from the program. In 1971, the Mediterranean Division exercised the 

option for the fifth year of the contract with the company while it tried to negotiate 

SAMP’s future.145 The U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia wanted the Corps to continue 

supporting MODA for several years beyond the end of the current contract. Prince 

Sultan wanted continued support from the Corps but not a long-term commitment 

to Commonwealth-Tumpane. By contrast, the Mediterranean Division engineer, 

Colonel Waddell, had instructions from the chief of engineers to extricate the division 

from the program by shifting increasingly more responsibilities to the contractor 

and to the Saudis. In 1970, Waddell still anticipated closing the Saudi Arabia 

143 Wiles, “SAMP,” p. 6, and Wiles commentary on manuscript during in-progress review, 10 

Mar 98, Winchester, Va. 144 Memos, Reisacher to Prince Sultan, 1 Oct 70, sub: Phasedown of Contractor Personnel, and 

Griffin C. Stuart, CTCL, 11 Aug 70, sub: November Phase-Out, both in D-8-11, TAD-RHA. 145 MFR, Waddell, 2 Mar 70, sub: Meetings in Saudi Arabia, pp. 1, 6, box 51-84-9377, Farrell 

Papers; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 28 Jul 70, p. 8, box 18, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

Memo, Reisacher to Sultan, 1 Oct 70; Memo, Wiles, 13 Nov 70, sub: Status of Agenda Items for 

Discussion with Mr. Economou, D-8-11, TAD-RHA; Info Brochure: OCE Cmd Inspection, 20 Nov 

70, p. 14; EIG Inspection: 1972, p. 2 entitled “PROGRAMS” (this page dtd 29 Apr 72).
Developing the Saudi Arabian Programs, 1967–1972 317

District shortly after completing the work under the SAMP contract in May 1972. 

Accordingly, the Saudi Arabia District began to reduce its staff in June 1971.146

By May 1972, the end of the fifth year of Commonwealth-Tumpane’s contract, the 

parties had still not resolved the balance of influence and personnel. As a temporary 

measure, the Mediterranean Division arranged an extension of the existing contract for 

six months, to 26 November 1972. No arrangements existed for Corps support to the 

SAAOC beyond that date. In a March 1972 report to the chief of engineers, Waddell’s 

successor as division engineer, Col. Roy L. Kackley, described the fate of SAMP beyond 

November as “a puzzle.”147 The extension in May proved to be the last SAMP contract 

for Commonwealth-Tumpane. The fifth year had garnered the company $9.2 million and 

the extension of an additional $4.4 million. The value of Commonwealth-Tumpane’s 

five-and-a-half years of contract work totaled $71,762,180.148

Under SAMP, the Saudi Arabian Army had acquired regulations and written 

procedures that it had tested in operation in all areas of maintenance and supply. The 

146 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 3 Nov 70, pp. 7–8, box 18, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

Info Brochure: OCE Cmd Inspection, 20 Nov 70, p. 14; Info Brochure for Thacher, p. 6; Memo, Witt, 

8 Mar 72. 147 Kackley to Clarke, 15 Mar 72, box 51-84-7361, Farrell Papers. 148 EIG Inspection: 1972, table “SAMP Construction,” lists contracts awarded in FYs 1970 and 

1971.

Table 9—Mediterranean Division Actual Construction Progress by Location

Fiscal Years 1967–1972 ($000)

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972

Italy 1,593 2,847 2,174 490 864 1,364

Greece 599 49 407 476 119 297

Turkey 5,411 1,700 1,483 2,257 1,383 3,610

Iran 3,388 316 96 78 0 0

Afghanistan 5,139 3,913 0 0 0 0

Ethiopia 1,231 509 400 457 136 358

Somalia 324 2,091 2,680 1,382 525 1

Saudi Arabia 3,896 5,245 14,685 39,833 36,756 46,451

Totals 21,581 16,670 21,925 44,973 39,783 52,081

Saudi Arabia 

Percentage 18 31 67 89 92 89

Source: Derived from 4th Qtr Program Review and Analysis Rpts for FYs 1967–1975, box 3 of 

3, C-7-10, Transatlantic Division–Records Holding Area.
318 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

program had implemented procedures to provide an adequate supply of repair parts, 

which came through the Army Materiel Command under a support agreement for 

supply. The Ordnance Center and School at Taif provided a steady flow of trained 

personnel. A new transportation system satisfied most of the Saudi Army’s needs; 

and a system of base maintenance points around the kingdom, operated by specially 

trained directors, supported the entire system of logistics and supply.149 Still, the issue 

of control remained to resolve in the next phase of the program’s development.

The Mediterranean Division in 1972

Between 1967 and 1972, the workload in the Mediterranean Division shifted 

dramatically. Reflective of the change, the dispersion of division personnel shifted 

as well. (See Tables 9 and 10.)

In both 1968 and 1969, the Mediterranean Division weathered suggestions that it 

relocate to the United States as well as questions about the growing volume of work for 

the Saudi Arabian government. In the late 1960s, there was some speculation that the 

division would complete the work in Saudi Arabia by 1972 and close the Saudi Arabia 

District. At the end of calendar year 1971, it became clear that, rather than ceasing, the 

work in Saudi Arabia would expand in the next decade. At the same time, no substantial 

new construction programs emerged for the division in the NATO countries or in North 

Africa. How the Corps of Engineers and the Mediterranean Division responded to the 

growing disparity in workload is the subject of the following chapters.

149 Saudi Arabia Dist, “Review and Analysis of SOCP [Saudi Ordnance Corps Program],” Aug 

73, pp. 1–2, box 51-84-5389, Farrell Papers.

Table 10—Mediterranean Division Personnel

End of Fiscal Year Strength

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972

Division HQ 243 219 213 214 182 187

Division field offices 129 169 175 187 140 114

Other 0 4 3 0 0 4

Totals 372 392 391 401 322 305

Saudi Arabia 25 105 132 165 140 114

Percentage of total 7 27 34 41 43 38

Note: Figures for Saudi Arabia are included in total for the division.

Source: Derived from 4th Qtr Program Review and Analysis Rpts for FYs 1967–1975, box 3 of 

3, C-7-10, Transatlantic Division–Records Holding Area.
Army Engineers in Saudi Arabia, 1972–1988 319

The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union had drawn the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers into the Mediterranean in the late 1940s and early 

1950s. Beginning in the late 1960s, a series of events destabilized the Middle East 

and turned it into a new and critical theater of conflict in the Cold War.1

 As that 

happened, the Mediterranean Division responded to the new imperatives of U.S. 

foreign policy by becoming increasingly involved in the Arabian Peninsula. The 

territory progressively became a major focal point of the struggle for influence 

between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 constituted the first major crisis that began 

to redefine the region’s place in international politics and, as a consequence, the role 

that the U.S. Army engineers would play in the area. With a preemptive strike, the 

Israelis soundly defeated the Arab states in only six days. The humiliating defeat 

intensified pan-Arab nationalism and fueled Arab resentment and mistrust of the 

Western nations that had supported Israel. The war correspondingly enhanced 

the position of the Soviet Union and expanded its political and military influence 

in the region. It provoked civil war in Jordan between the Palestinian Liberation 

Organization and the Jordanian government. It laid bare the fissure in Lebanon 

between the Christian and Muslim populations, a situation that Israel exacerbated 

by its raids on Palestinian bases in Lebanon beginning in January 1969. Many in 

the Arab world denounced the United States—because of its support for Israel—for 

the subsequent collapse of Lebanon into civil war over the next six years.

The total eclipse of British influence in the region, manifested in the postwar 

dissolution of the British overseas empire and the kingdom’s economic exhaustion 

in the decade after 1945, led to further destabilization. The Suez Crisis of 1956 

had shown the new limits to Britain’s power. In spite of that setback, Britain tried 

for another decade to maintain its traditional role as counterweight to the Russian 

state in the contest for influence in the region. Only tardily did Britain recognize 

the complete exhaustion of its wealth and power that World War II had exposed. 

In January 1968, the British government announced that it would remove all of its 

military forces and its political presence from the areas “east of Suez.” With that, 

1 Analysis below based on Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance

(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 54–62, 136–75, passim.

PART III

Army Engineers in Saudi Arabia

1972–1988
320 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

the British abandoned client states and positions of influence they had cultivated 

since the mid-1800s. The decline and withdrawal of the power that had imposed a 

degree of stability threw the region into a prolonged crisis. The tremendous riches 

of oil and the dependence of Western Europe and the United States on access to 

that oil made the stakes of the contest very high.

The states of the Gulf region took advantage of the waning British power to 

pursue their individual territorial ambitions to the further detriment of stability. Iran 

tried to seize several islands in the Straits of Hormuz that controlled access between 

the Persian (Arabian) Gulf and the Arabian Sea. In addition, it sought to exploit its 

status as a Shi’ite state to win influence over Bahrain, exacerbating tensions between 

Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims in the region. Iraq and Kuwait clashed as Iraq tried to 

secure its access to the Gulf at the mouth of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. The 

British withdrawal allowed tensions to build between conservative Islam and radical 

secular Arab nationalism throughout the southern Gulf area. Internal ferment and 

external pressures threatened the smaller states that lined the Arabian Peninsula’s 

littoral: the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and North and South Yemen. 

In the absence of Britain, the United States became the protagonist in the 

regional contest with the Soviet Union. To counter the growing Soviet influence, 

the administration of President Richard M. Nixon formulated a new approach to the 

regional balance of power. The United States selected Iran and Saudi Arabia as the 

“two pillars” of stability in the Gulf area. Iran had the military potential to hinder 

a Soviet expansion of power. Saudi Arabia had influence with the conservative 

Islamic regimes of the region. It also had tremendous reserves of oil that the Western 

powers needed both for their economies and for their military arsenals. In pursuing 

the two-pillar policy, the United States abandoned its prior policy of restraining 

arms sales in the area. It gave Iran in particular extensive access to the American 

market in armaments, aircraft, and equipment.

The Yom Kippur War of October 1973 further increased the region’s volatility 

and instability. Egypt’s surprise attack on Israel temporarily reversed the pattern 

of the 1967 war, but Israel recovered quickly and triumphed once more on the 

battlefield. This new Arab defeat again inflamed Arab nationalism, intensified 

Palestinian consciousness of their displacement, and won converts for the revolutionary radicalism that rejected all compromise with Israel. Iran provoked the enmity 

of the region’s Arab states tacitly by supplying Israel with oil and disregarding the 

interests of fellow Muslims. 

The defeat also gave the Arab states the cohesion to shape a successful policy of 

embargoing oil shipments to Western Europe and the United States to punish them 

for their continued support of Israel. The successful manipulation of oil supplies 

by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) ran up the price of 

a barrel of oil from $3.39 in 1973 to $12.93 in 1978.2

 Given the rising price of oil 

and the power of the Arab states in the new market, international financiers began 

to speak of “petrodollars” that accumulated in the oil-producing countries of the 

2 Oil prices from ibid., p. 12.
Army Engineers in Saudi Arabia, 1972–1988 321

Middle East. The influx of wealth to the states of the region gave them a buying 

power in the arms market that they had never had before.

The British withdrawal from the Arabian Peninsula had left the small states of 

the region feeling abandoned and betrayed. The United States’ failure to prevail 

in Vietnam and in Angola in the mid-1970s did nothing to allay the sense of 

vulnerability that these small states felt. The presence of over forty thousand Cuban 

soldiers in a dozen African countries in the late 1970s enhanced the influence of the 

Communist bloc in the region. When the Soviets increased their potential leverage 

over Arabia by gaining naval staging areas on Africa’s eastern coast in Mozambique, 

uneasiness in the peninsula increased. The Soviet Navy could, from its new vantage 

point, threaten the oil routes out of the Gulf region. The Soviets strengthened their 

influence further when a substantial Soviet, East German, and Cuban presence 

helped Ethiopia prevail in its border clash with Somalia in early 1978. The Soviet 

presence in Ethiopia, linked with its support of radical forces in the Yemens, gave 

the Soviet Union the strategic positioning to menace the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, 

and Israel’s sea lanes to the outside world. 

In September 1978, the United States sponsored the Camp David accords that 

led to a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. The U.S. policy of promoting 

this peace provoked a mixed response in the Arab world. Many Arab states and 

factions opposed the agreements as a betrayal of the goal of a Palestinian state. This 

fierce rejectionism inflamed Arab feeling and led to the assassination of the Egyptian 

proponent of the accords, President Anwar el-Sadat, on 6 October 1981. On the 

other hand, the realization of a peace accord between Egypt and Israel tempered 

one of the most dangerous destabilizing elements in the region. 

Developments in Iran a few months later were more clearly detrimental to 

the U.S. position in the region. In January 1979, the regime of Mohammed Reza 

Shah Pahlevi collapsed and a fundamentalist Muslim movement, led by Ayatollah 

Ruhollah Khomeini, seized power in Iran. With the Iranian revolution, the only 

substantial military “pillar” of the Nixon policy in the area disappeared. Under the 

new regime, Iran became a hostile power rather than an ally in the United States’ 

attempts to stabilize the region; Saudi Arabia remained aligned with the United 

States. Oil production in the region declined, and the price of crude oil rose from 

$18.67 a barrel in January 1979 ($10.64 in 1974 prices) to $30.41 in May 1980 

(over $18.00 in 1974 prices).3

At the end of 1979, the Soviet Union took a bold step to extend its immediate 

military sphere of action by invading Afghanistan. The intervention became in the 

long run a quagmire akin to the American experience in Vietnam. The immediate 

impact, however, was to place eighty- to one hundred thousand Soviet Army troops 

closer to the petroleum resources of the Arabian Peninsula. In September 1980, Iraq 

further destabilized the region by launching an attack on Iran, hoping to topple the 

new regime. When Iraq failed to win a quick victory, the war became a vicious 

seesaw that lasted eight years with neither side achieving any strategic advantage. 

3 Ibid., p. 60.
322 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

This array of factors conditioned and shaped the activities of the Mediterranean 

Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and its successor, the Middle East Division, 

during the 1970s and 1980s. In the late 1960s, while events remained locked in an 

unknown future, the Mediterranean Division activated the Saudi Arabia District to 

manage the growing construction program there. Elsewhere in the division’s area 

of responsibility, work had declined to a very low volume. The chief of engineers, 

Lt. Gen. William Cassidy, seriously contemplated closing the overseas division 

serving the Mediterranean and the Middle East, reckoning that the Corps could 

support design and construction for U.S. military forces in the region from offices 

in the continental United States. His successor, Lt. Gen. Frederick J. Clarke, took 

a similar position.

In 1968, the Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) in Washington, D.C., urged 

the Mediterranean Division to avoid becoming overextended in Saudi Arabia. The 

division engineer, Col. Harry F. Cameron, assured General Cassidy that the division 

would commit to “new SAG [Saudi Arabian government] projects . . . [only] on the 

basis of country-to-country agreements negotiated at the highest level.” During a 

visit to Saudi Arabia in late 1969, the deputy chief of engineers, Maj. Gen. Carroll 

Dunn, expressed “Washington’s desire to wrap up the Corps’ operation in Saudi 

Arabia.”4

Col. Edward L. Waddell, Cameron’s successor as division commander, received 

a similar message from General Cassidy. Colonel Waddell admitted at the end 

of this tour (June 1971) that General Cassidy had sent him to Italy to close the 

division. After a year on the job, Colonel Waddell concluded that he could not do 

so because the work in Saudi Arabia kept increasing. Colonel Waddell reported to 

Cassidy’s successor, General Clarke, that in Saudi Arabia “we keep getting pushed 

into doing more and more in the turnkey concept; everything that was left out . . . 

is now wanted.”5

The expectation in Washington in 1970 that the Mediterranean Division would 

soon withdraw from Saudi Arabia proved to be an illusion. On the contrary, the 

volume of construction supervised by the Corps of Engineers for the Saudi Arabian 

government expanded colossally over the next decade. Once again, the Corps had 

to adjust to a changing geographic locus. Indeed, between April and June 1976, a 

new entity, the Middle East Division, supplanted the Mediterranean Division and 

located its headquarters in Saudi Arabia. During the months of transition, the two 

divisions coexisted, with the Middle East Division assuming an ever-increasing 

share of the work and responsibility, as well as much of the staff.

The next five chapters present the construction programs administered by the 

Army engineers in Saudi Arabia between 1972 and 1986. The historical narrative, 

4 Cameron to Cassidy, 14 Mar 68; Memo of Conversation, 4 Nov 69, sub: Major General Dunn’s 

Visit to Saudi Arabia; both in box 18, access. no. 77-92-0001, Washington National Records Center, 

Suitland, Md. 5 Interv, Moorhus with Richard Wiles, 21 Oct 93, 7 Feb, 5 May 94, p. 78; quote from Waddell 

to Clarke, 9 Jun 70, Mil Files XXI-3-9, Office of History, HQ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alexandria, Va.
Army Engineers in Saudi Arabia, 1972–1988 323

which has proceeded chronologically to this point, will continue in a topical 

organization with chronological overlap from one chapter to another.

Chapter 9 covers the rapid expansion of construction in Saudi Arabia, the 

participation of the Mediterranean Division, and the division’s cession in 1976 to 

the Middle East Division headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The chapter will 

also look briefly at the origins and scope of the many Saudi programs initiated during 

the 1970s. Chapter 10 begins the treatment of the construction programs in greater 

detail by examining work undertaken in the 1970s for the Saudi Arabian Ministry of 

Defense and Aviation (MODA) under the Engineer Assistance Agreement of 1965. 

The programs encompassed work already begun for the Saudi Arabian Army and for 

MODA itself, such as improvements at Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk, headquarters 

complexes, officers clubs, special military schools, and the expansion of military 

medical facilities. The chapter also includes the modernization of the Royal Saudi 

Air Force (RSAF). Chapter 11 covers major construction programs for two Saudi 

military services that made decisions independently of MODA—the Royal Saudi 

Naval Forces (RSNF) and the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). Chapters 12 

and 13 describe the two largest construction programs undertaken for MODA under 

the Engineer Assistance Agreement: the creation of the King Abdulaziz Military 

Academy (KAMA) and the King Khalid Military City (KKMC). 

By virtue of their size, KAMA and KKMC merit special treatment; in addition, 

they started and ended later than the other programs. On those programs discussed 

in Chapters 9 through 11, construction began quickly and reached the highest 

point of activity around 1978. Two of the programs—the Saudi Naval Expansion 

Program (SNEP) and the SANG modernization program—appeared at the outset to 

entail construction amounting to several billions of dollars each. It is clear only in 

retrospect that the grand expectations held for these programs in the 1970s would 

not materialize in the 1980s. SNEP and SANG were in rapid decline in the early 

1980s as construction at KAMA and at KKMC expanded. Although the topical 

chapters are aligned according to a rough chronological tempo, each chapter covers 

substantially the same span of time as the stories of individual programs and projects 

parallel one another between 1972 and 1986.

New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 325

The idea of closing the Mediterranean Division corresponded to a general 

decline in the division’s work in the late 1960s. Even in Saudi Arabia, an end seemed 

in sight. Late in 1970, with the construction at Khamis Mushayt approaching its 

completion, with work just beginning at Tabuk, and with all efforts concerning the 

third cantonment suspended, the division projected that it would close the Saudi 

Arabia District in the spring of 1972. The value of construction in the division’s 

traditional area of operation, the Mediterranean basin, declined from $7.2 million 

in 1969, to $5.1 million in 1970, to $3.03 million in 1971.1

As the work dropped off, the division could not retain the same number of 

positions and could promise nothing to those whose jobs were about to end. Engineer 

Adrian Hromiak’s situation was typical. He had been with the division since 1964; 

but in the spring of 1972, he had few options. Although he had reemployment rights 

in the Chicago District, that district offered him a pay grade below the GS–13 he had 

attained overseas. He made several inquiries at division headquarters in Livorno; 

nothing materialized, and he decided that he had better prospects in private industry. 

Hromiak was just one of nearly one hundred employees who lost positions between 

July 1968 and October 1972 as the division’s staff strength declined from 392 to 

298.2

The Burgeoning Workload

The seeming lack of new work that characterized the years 1968 to 1972 was 

misleading. Between 1972 and 1975, the Corps of Engineers’ role in Saudi Arabia 

expanded dramatically as the Saudi Arabian government sought to modernize its 

1 Mediterranean Div, “Information Brochure for the Honorable Nicholas Thacher, United States 

Ambassador to Saudi Arabia,” 14 Sep 70, p. 6, box 51-84-7361, Richard T. Farrell Papers, Office of 

History (OH), HQ United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Alexandria, Va. (hereafter cited 

as Info Brochure for Thacher). Figures on the value of construction are derived from 4th Qtr Prog Rev 

and Analysis Rpts, FYs 1969–1971, C-7-10, box 3 of 3, Transatlantic Division–Records Holding Area 

(TAD-RHA), R&D Files 3014 and 3015, Transatlantic Programs Center (TAC), Winchester, Va. 2 Interv, authors with Adrian Hromiak, 6 Feb 94, p. 25; Reisacher to Col C. E. Harris, 29 Jul 69, 

attachment giving actual strength at end of FY 1968, box 6, access. no. 77-86-0008, Washington 

National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md.; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 15 Oct 72, p. 5, 

box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers.

9

New Programs and 

Organizational Changes, 1972–1977
326 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

military forces. The decision to modernize coincided with a rapid increase in Saudi 

wealth as a result of the rise in oil revenues, which gave the government of Saudi 

Arabia the cash to support its building programs. 

Projects such as expanding the facilities at the new cantonments at Khamis 

Mushayt and Tabuk for the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense and Aviation 

(MODA) continued. Simultaneously, the division developed new construction 

programs for the Royal Saudi Navy, the Royal Saudi Air Force, and the Saudi 

Arabian National Guard (SANG).3

 In the space of three years, the Mediterranean 

Division quickly had commitments for programs that added up to a staggering 

volume of design and construction with a total value estimated in excess of $20 

billion. The contrast with the volume of work executed in the late 1960s, when 

contracts for a few million dollars seemed large, was dramatic. 

On 16 January 1972, the U.S. and Saudi Arabian governments signed a 

memorandum of understanding that initiated the Saudi Naval Expansion Program 

(SNEP). Subsequently, the October 1973 war between Egypt and Israel, the resulting 

oil embargo, the quadrupling of oil prices, and the growing threat of Soviet power 

in the waters around the Arabian Peninsula intensified the Saudi desire to expand 

its own naval facilities. The kingdom’s entire navy had only about a thousand men 

in 1972, and it had very limited equipment: one 100-ton coastal patrol boat; two 

170-ton torpedo boats; and an assortment of about a dozen other small patrol boats, 

hovercraft, landing craft, and speed boats. The Saudis wanted to develop a fleet to 

patrol the country’s two coasts and to defend the shipping and supply lines in the 

region.4

To fulfill the 1972 agreement, the Mediterranean Division undertook to design 

and construct deepwater naval ports at Jiddah on the Red Sea and at Jubayl on the 

Arabian Gulf. The program included all the off-shore and on-shore facilities at both 

locations to support naval operations. Early estimates of the program’s costs ranged 

around $350 million. Even though the Saudis anticipated a limited, coastal fleet, 

the scope of work expanded rapidly: By October 1974, the division’s new estimate 

for SNEP surpassed $1 billion.5

Within six weeks of the agreement on the Saudi naval program, the Mediterranean 

Division received another new project. Through the Peace Hawk program, the Royal 

Saudi Air Force received F–5 aircraft and the facilities to support them. The U.S. 

Air Force, not the Corps of Engineers, managed the program from design through 

construction, with the Corps providing only limited service by reviewing budgetary 

issues, technical criteria, and engineering design and specifications and by inspecting 

3 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder, Colo.: Westview 

Press, 1984), pp. 136–48. 4 Ibid., p. 174.

5 Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE), “Annual Report of Major Activities, 1 Jul. 1972–30 Jun. 

1973,” p. 49, box 7a, Gen Files, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited as OCE, Major Activities, FY 1973); 

Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 15 Oct 72, p. 22; Williams to Clarke, 15 Mar 73, box 18, access. 

no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; G. Wayne Dykes to Lt Cdr Rashad A. Abu Al-Samh, 28 Oct 74, sub: Saudi 

Naval Expansion Program Status Report, p. 1, box 5, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 327

and supervising construction of facilities at Dhahran and Taif. At only $12.9 million, 

the estimated value of the division’s involvement was small by comparison to its 

other work in Saudi Arabia; but it was still more than double the division’s entire 

workload outside of Saudi Arabia.6

King Faisal wanted the Saudi Arabian National Guard, commanded by his half 

brother, Prince Abdullah, included in the overall modernization of Saudi Arabian 

armed forces. The National Guard had a numerical strength of about thirty-five 

thousand, but many of its soldiers were paramilitary irregulars who operated from 

regional centers throughout the country to keep order. SANG recruited heavily 

from Bedouin tribes traditionally loyal to the house of Saud. In September 1971, 

the king asked for assistance from the United States. The resulting study formulated 

a plan to improve the National Guard’s equipment and training. In early 1972, 

Prince Abdullah began talks with the Mediterranean Division about implementing 

a modernization program. A year later, on 19 March 1973, the United States and 

Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding that included the sale of 

equipment; design and construction of facilities; development and initial operation 

of a training program; and design and implementation of communications, logistical, 

and maintenance systems.7

The Department of the Army assigned overall management responsibility for 

the SANG modernization program to the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC). 

The Corps of Engineers managed the planning, design, and construction of facilities. 

Mediterranean Division staff and National Guard leaders defined a construction 

program including a new headquarters complex at Riyadh and new training, 

maintenance, and support facilities at Khashm al An, northwest of Riyadh. In 1973, 

the division estimated that the construction program would exceed $100 million. 

By the summer of 1975, that estimate had risen to $250 million with intimations 

that construction might expand to several billion dollars more.8

Continuing Work, 1972–1975

In addition to the new work from the Royal Saudi Navy, the Saudi Arabian 

National Guard, and the Royal Saudi Air Force, the Mediterranean Division 

continued to serve the Saudi agencies with which it had been working since the 

6 Kackley to Clarke, 15 Mar 72, p. 1, box 51-84-7361, Farrell Papers; Mediterranean Div, “Data 

Book,” 15 Oct 72, pp. 10, 23; OCE, Major Activities, FY 1973, p. 50; OCE, “Annual Report of Major 

Activities, FY 74,” p. 64, copy in R&D File 2270, TAC (hereafter cited as OCE, Major Activities, 

FY 1974). 7 Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, pp. 136–48, 173; Memo, Durham, 

15 Apr 72, sub: Saudi Arabian National Guard Program, box 20, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

Maj Gen Verne L. Bowers, “Saudi Arabia National Guard Modernization Program,” 27 Apr 73, box 

51-84-9384, Farrell Papers. 8 OCE, Major Activities, FY 1974, p. 64; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, p. 23, box 

1, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; “Saudi Arabia Programs,” 28 Feb 78, p. 9 (map), unmarked box, 

TAD-RHA. 
328 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

mid-1960s: the Ministry of Defense and Aviation and the Saudi Arabian Army 

Ordnance Corps (SAAOC). 

The Saudi Ordnance Corps Program

In 1971–1972, the Saudi Arabia Mobility Program (SAMP) remained an 

active part of the Mediterranean Division’s mission in the kingdom. In 1971, the 

Saudi Arabia District engineer set a goal of completing by the end of the year all 

of the rehabilitation and construction facilities needed to support the procedures in 

procurement, logistics, and training developed under SAMP for the Saudi Arabian 

Army’s military vehicles. Total construction for SAMP to that point came to just 

under $100 million.9

Over the same period, while division personnel continued their SAMP work, 

representatives of the American contractor, Commonwealth-Tumpane Company 

Ltd.; the division; and the Saudi Army held a long series of discussions concerning 

shifting control of the program’s activities from contractor personnel to the personnel 

of the Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance Corps. In the spring of 1972, in order to 

maintain continuity while the discussions of who controlled the program continued, 

the division extended Commonwealth-Tumpane’s contract six months beyond its 

five-year limit.10

In early June 1972, the Mediterranean Division distilled from the discussions 

new terms of administrative and logistical support that satisfied the minister of 

defense, Prince Sultan. In November, the SAAOC assumed full responsibility for the 

operation and management of all of the systems established during the five years of 

Commonwealth-Tumpane’s activities. The Saudi commander became self-sufficient, 

at least in authority. His ascendancy was enhanced by the support of U.S. Army 

Ordnance Corps officers serving with the Mediterranean Division. Prince Sultan 

also emphatically insisted that the U.S. government, through the Corps of Engineers, 

continue its advisory support—training in contract administration, budgeting, and 

fiscal management—for at least another two years. The Mediterranean Division 

continued to train SAAOC personnel so as to develop the capability for contract 

management within the Saudi Arabian Army.11

To emphasize the break with past arrangements and the diminished role of 

the contractor in managing the program, the Mediterranean Division advertised a 

new competitive contract proposal. On 1 November 1972, on behalf of SAAOC, 

9 Reisacher to Prince Sultan, 1 Oct 70, sub: Phasedown of Contractor Personnel, D-8-11, TADRHA; Reisacher to Commonwealth-Tumpane, 27 Dec 70, D-8-11, TAD-RHA; “Activities of the 

Corps of Engineers in Saudi Arabia,” [1974], box 51-84-5389, Farrell Papers; Mediterranean Div, 

“Data Book,” 15 Oct 72, p. 17. 10 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 13 Apr 71, p. 9, box 20, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

Kackley to Clarke, 23 Jun 72, pp. 1–2, box 51-84-7384, Farrell Papers. 11 Kackley to Clarke, 23 Jun 72, pp. 1–2; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 15 Oct 72, p. 19, and 1 

May 76, pp. 19–20; Mediterranean Div, “Appendix I-L: Planning,” 28 Feb 74, p. 12, box 19, access. 

no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; “USACE Activities in Saudi Arabia,” 12 Jul 76, p. 3, Walker box 6, OH, 

HQ USACE. Richard Wiles, “SAMP,” Mar 98, pp. 8–9, provided by Wiles, author’s files.
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 329

the Corps signed a personal-services contract with a joint venture made up of the 

America-based Bendix Corporation and the Saudi Maintenance Company Ltd. 

(SIYANCO). Bendix-SIYANCO agreed to supply about four hundred fifty skilled 

personnel—fewer than half the number Commonwealth-Tumpane had furnished—to 

execute the program under SAAOC direction. The new contract, with a value of 

$14.55 million, took effect on 26 November. The overall objective of the program 

remained the modernization of the Saudi Arabian Army’s fleet of military vehicles, 

limited maintenance of nonelectronic weapons, and continuing development of a 

modern logistics system.12

The newly modified SAMP restored to the SAAOC commander the appropriate 

authority and responsibility for operations and management of the support systems. 

Many of the employees of the new contractor continued in positions that they had 

held under Commonwealth-Tumpane, but Bendix-SIYANCO was more clearly 

subordinate to the SAAOC commander. The Corps of Engineers provided advisers 

to work with and to assist SAAOC officers. The Corps also continued to execute the 

contracts that supported the systems. In the months after signing the contract with 

Bendix-SIYANCO, the Mediterranean Division realigned its activities to transfer all 

direct authority from division headquarters in Livorno to the Saudi Arabia District 

12 Ibid.; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 15 Oct 72, p. 19, and 1 May 76, pp. 19–20; Mediterranean Div, “Appendix I-L: Planning,” 28 Feb 74, p. 12; “USACE Activities in Saudi Arabia,” 12 

Jul 76, p. 3.

Saudi Arabia District Office, Riyadh, 1969
330 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

in Riyadh. Planning and programming became a joint effort involving the Saudi 

Arabian Army and the district staff. The district engineer disbursed all funds for the 

program, while the division retained only cost accounting and overall monitoring of 

the Corps activities associated with the program. Financing grew to $132.9 million 

for the period 1972–1976, an 85 percent increase over 1967–1973.13

In 1971, a series of changes in organizational structure and nomenclature began 

that paralleled the negotiations leading to the new contract. On 8 February 1971, 

the Mediterranean Division discontinued the SAMP Construction Project Office at 

division headquarters in Livorno and assigned the office’s responsibilities to the 

Saudi Arabia District. On 16 August 1972, the district element supervising SAMP 

became the Ordnance Program Management Assistance Division (OPMAD) with 

no change in functions or mission. The agreement that led to the contract with 

Bendix-SIYANCO in November 1972 declared that the Saudi Arabia Mobility 

Program and Royal Armament Maintenance Program (RAMP) had been completed 

to the satisfaction of all parties. On 12 January 1973, the designation of the management unit, OPMAD, was shortened to Ordnance Program Management Division 

13 Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, p. 20.

Quarters built in Riyadh for the district engineer, late 1970s
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 331

(OPMD). Simultaneously, the new program—as distinguished from the management 

unit—received the designation Saudi Ordnance Corps Program (SOCP).14

On 1 September, the division activated a project office that was located at The 

Ordnance Center and School (TOCS) in Taif and reported to OPMD at the district. 

On 4 October 1976, the Saudi Arabia District’s management organization, headed 

by an officer of the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps, received its final name change to 

become the Ordnance Program Division (OPD), the name that it retained through 

the next two decades.15

In August 1973, the Mediterranean Division and the Saudi Arabia District 

conducted a thorough review and analysis of the SOCP. The study concluded that 

the Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance Corps would not have the proficiency to become 

independent in November 1974 when the Bendix-SIYANCO contract ended. The 

study group recommended continuing support by the U.S. government but that the 

Corps pass to the SAAOC the responsibility for awarding the personal-services 

contract. In May, Prince Sultan accepted the recommendations. He also asked the 

Corps to continue its role in SOCP and to help negotiate a two-year continuation, 

to November 1976, of the contract with Bendix-SIYANCO. In November 1974, 

despite the recommendation that SAAOC take over contracting, it was the Saudi 

14 Ibid.; Wiles, “SAMP,” pp. 9–10.

15 Maj James F. Rosebery, “Ordnance Program Division (OPD), Historical Summary, 1986,” 10 

Feb 87, Current Files, Transatlantic Division–Public Affairs Office; Durham to Col G. B. Gray, 4 Feb 

74, box 19, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC.

U-shaped bachelor officers quarters, Taif, 1969
332 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Arabia District that signed the new two-year contract with Bendix-SIYANCO. The 

extension was priced at $26 million.16

The Saudis were willing to see the contract with Bendix-SIYANCO renewed, 

but they were reluctant to fund additional staff positions in the face of the Saudi 

Ordnance Corps’ persistent inability to provide the SOCP with sufficient qualified 

personnel. As a result, the passage of responsibilities to the Saudis remained more 

nominal than real. The situation led, in the judgment of the chief of the Saudi 

Arabia District’s Ordnance Program Division, to a degradation of the contractor’s 

ability to train the Saudis. Contractor personnel had to spend too much time and 

attention keeping the maintenance, supply, and logistical system in operation, all 

to the detriment of their role as teachers and trainers.17

In 1975–1976, having already invested a total of $156.39 million in sales cases 

supporting the Ordnance Corps Program over the preceding four years, the Saudi 

government decided to extend to other elements of the Army the logistics system 

that had developed under SAMP and SOCP. The decision created additional tasks 

for the Corps advisers engaged in the program at just the time that the transition to 

the Middle East Division stretched the command’s resources. As of July 1976—the 

month in which the Middle East Division officially supplanted the Mediterranean 

Division, which nonetheless remained active for several months as it closed out 

operations—the programmed amount for SOCP stood at $379.6 million. This 

included the option year 1977 contained in the Bendix-SIYANCO contract. The 

Corps expected to obligate directly about 30 percent of that amount. The Saudi 

Arabian Army obligated the balance, but the Corps continued to disburse all funds 

obligated under the program.18

Questions Concerning the Role of the Corps

Throughout the involvement in the supply programs, doubts circulated in 

Washington about participation by the Mediterranean and Middle East Divisions. 

The tasks of the mobility program and its successor, the Ordnance Corps Program, 

involved first creating and then overseeing a logistics system. The Corps specialized 

in construction management, not logistics. The Mediterranean Division, already 

active in Saudi Arabia, took on the program somewhat by default only when the 

16 Saudi Arabia Dist, “Review and Analysis of SOCP [Saudi Ordnance Control Program],” Aug 73, 

pp. 149–51, box 51-84-5389, Farrell Papers; Durham to Williams, 13 Oct 73, p. 2, box 51-84-9384, 

Farrell Papers; OCE, Major Activities, FY 1974, p. 62; Mediterranean Div, “Appendix I-L: Planning,” 

28 Feb 74, pp. 12–13; “Annual Historical Summary Report, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Saudi 

Arabia District, 1 January 1974 to 31 December 1974,” [31 Dec 74], pp. 2, A3, B3, box 15, access. 

no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 17 Col Robert A. Meese to Brig Gen Yahya Fadil Daftardar, 14 Jul 74, pp. 1–3, box 19; Williams 

to Gribble, 14 Jun 74, p. 2, box 26; both in access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 18 OCE, “Annual Historical Review, 1 July 1975–30 September 1976,” p. 34, box 9, Gen Files, 

OH HQ USACE (hereafter cited as OCE, AHR, FY 1976); Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 

76, p. 28.
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 333

Army Materiel Command, which did have logistical expertise, declined in the 

mid-1960s to undertake the program that the Saudis wanted. 

The Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE), particularly under Generals Cassidy 

and Clarke, showed considerable skepticism about the appropriateness of Corps 

involvement. In 1969, the deputy chief of engineers, Maj. Gen. Carroll H. Dunn, 

visited Saudi Arabia to attend the opening of the Dammam television station. He 

presented these reservations clearly, emphasizing that the Corps role in SAMP ought 

to pass to the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia.19

The issue resurfaced in 1973 when a new USMTM commander, Brig. Gen. John 

Hill, arrived in Saudi Arabia. Hill pursued the goal of uniting under his command 

all advisory programs sponsored by the U.S. military, including Corps programs 

with the Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance Corps and with the Saudi Arabian National 

Guard.20 General Hill’s efforts continued over the next two years and seemed to 

prevail. In June 1975, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the deputy secretary of 

defense directed that responsibility for the SOCP be transferred from the Corps to the 

USMTM. Although the Office of the Chief of Engineers supported the realignment, 

Prince Sultan vetoed it. As a result, Corps advisers to the SOCP continued to operate 

after 1976 under the supervision of the Mediterranean Division’s successor, the 

Middle East Division.21

Even after Prince Sultan intervened to override the proposed reorganization in 

mid-1975, the Corps expected the transfer to the USMTM to occur eventually.22

The U.S. deputy secretary of defense even asked the new Middle East Division 

commander, Brig. Gen. Richard M. Wells, to speak to Prince Sultan about having 

USMTM take over the program. Wells recalled Sultan’s answer: “Either the Corps 

of Engineers keeps the ordnance program or I’ll give it to another nation.” The 

transfer never occurred, and the Corps continued as the advising agency to the Saudi 

Arabian Ordnance Corps. In addition, the Corps continued its role in disbursing 

funds. The Saudis placed all orders to vendors and suppliers, but the Corps paid 

the invoices. The arrangement, intended to be temporary when the SOCP began, 

became a permanent part of the Corps’ relationship with Saudi Arabia.23

19 Memo of Conversation, 6 Nov 69, sub: Major General Dunn’s Visit to Saudi Arabia, p. 1, box 

18, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 20 Durham to Williams, 13 Oct 73, p. 4, 28 Nov 73, p. 1, and Attached Draft Msg, Brig Gen Hill, 

28 Dec 73, p. 2, all in box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers; Williams to Gribble, 14 Dec 73, p. 3, box 26, 

access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 21 On Hill’s persistent efforts, see Durham to Williams, 22 Apr 74, box 20, access. no. 77-92-0001, 

WNRC; Telex, Hill to Williams, 25 Nov 74, sub: Saudi Ordnance Corps Program, box 51-84-9384, 

Farrell Papers. On Prince Sultan’s veto despite Corps support, see Brig Gen Richard M. Wells to Lt 

Gen John W. Morris, 26 Sep 76, p. 2, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. See also “Report to Congress by 

the Comptroller General of the United States: Perspectives on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia,” 26 Oct 

77, p. 38, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE. 22 Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, p. 21.

23 Wiles, “SAMP,” p. 11; Interv, John T. Greenwood with Maj Gen Richard M. Wells, 29–30 Jun 

91, p. 163; Memo, 2 May 82, sub: Middle East Division Position “Stovepiping” in European Command 

(EUCOM) Area Security Assistance Agreements (SAO), pp. 1–2, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE.
334 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Cantonments at Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk

The Saudi Ordnance Corps Program, successor to the Saudi Arabia Mobility 

Program, remained something of an anomaly for an engineer division. The 

Mediterranean Division pursued a more typical role through its continuing work 

on the cantonments at Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk. Although Khamis Mushayt 

was officially turned over and dedicated in August 1971 and Tabuk in September 

1973, the division’s activities continued at both locations beyond those dates. Part 

of the ongoing work involved hospitals at both cantonments that were not activated 

upon completion of construction. By 1974, with the country’s wealth in petrodollars 

burgeoning, the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation decided to staff both 

medical facilities, as well as a third hospital at the Royal Saudi Air Force’s Peace 

Hawk site at Jiddah. MODA negotiated a contract to open and staff the hospitals; 

in late 1974, the Mediterranean Division arranged for design and construction of 

housing, administrative buildings, and related services. The working estimate for 

these facilities at all three sites exceeded $65 million.24

At Tabuk, the division had to oversee correction of the cracking that occurred 

in a number of buildings. The structural design had not paid sufficient attention 

to the thermal stresses imposed by the variations in temperature. As buildings 

expanded in the heat of the scorching daytime sun and contracted during the cool 

desert nights, the structural materials cracked. An alteration during construction of 

the joint between roofs and walls exacerbated the stresses.25

MODA added other facilities at both Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk. By the spring 

of 1976, the Mediterranean Division had instructions to develop a master plan for 

Khamis Mushayt that would expand facilities by an estimated $431 million. In 

March 1976, construction began at Tabuk on an additional three hundred twenty 

units of family housing, adding about $120 million to the cost of construction for 

the cantonment.26

Third Cantonment

Beginning in 1964, the Saudis had talked of three cantonments; but by the 

early 1970s, the third cantonment, planned for Qaysumah in north-central Saudi 

Arabia near the border with Iraq, had hardly advanced at all. Initially, the Saudis 

had thought that the cantonment at Qaysumah would be built after the facility at 

Khamis Mushayt; its predesign actually began before work on Tabuk. In December 

1966, the Mediterranean Division contracted with BATMED, a joint venture of 

three architect-engineer firms, for field work and master planning at Qaysumah. 

Over time, priorities changed. BATMED also had the contract for a master plan 

24 “Annual Historical Summary Report, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Saudi Arabia District, 1 

January 1974 to 31 December 1974,” an. B, p. 3. 25 Ibid., p. 1; Interv, Paul K. Walker and William C. Baldwin with John Blake, 24 Jun 88.

26 Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, pp. 14–15; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 15 

Dec 75, p. 3, box 18, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC.
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 335

at Tabuk, and the work on Tabuk took precedence. Still, the design for Qaysumah 

proceeded; in late September 1968, BATMED presented the master plan to Prince 

Sultan. The Mediterranean Division expected final design, primarily site adaptation, 

in another year.27

The expectation turned out to be overly optimistic. Between 1968 and 1970, the 

work at Khamis Mushayt and at Tabuk took much longer than initially anticipated, 

slowing completion of the final plan for Qaysumah. In February 1970, facing 

financial constraints and with only about 60 percent of the cantonment’s design 

completed, the Saudi government instructed the Mediterranean Division to suspend 

all effort at Qaysumah.28

Signs of Saudi interest in Qaysumah surfaced again in late 1971 and early 1972, 

but only in September 1972 did the Saudi government inform the division that 

money was available to complete the design. When work resumed in February 1973, 

a technical team from the division conducted field examinations and engineering 

evaluations at Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk to identify ways to improve the design 

for Qaysumah. The team’s assessment indicated that the cost of adapting the earlier 

designs approached the cost of a complete redesign and creation of a new master 

plan. In April, given the team’s assessment, Prince Sultan approved a preparation 

of a completely new master plan.29

In May 1973, the division conducted an aerial survey of the area and concluded 

that the site near Qaysumah was inadequate. The division recommended placing 

the cantonment at an alternate site, Hafar al Batin, southwest of the original site. 

Before proceeding further, the division chose to confirm Prince Sultan’s commitment 

to a complete redesign. The MODA liaison officer, Lt. Col. Mahmoud Nassief, 

affirmed Prince Sultan’s decision and instructed the division to continue with the 

new design.30

27 On the early priority of Qaysumah, see Memos, Charles J. Arado, Design Br, 25 Sep 64, sub: 

Saudi Arabia Mil. Assistance Program, Revised Cost Estimate—Khamus-Mushait [sic], and 25 Sep 64, 

sub: Saudi Arabia Mil. Assistance Program, Revised Cost Estimate—Qaysumah, both in box 5, access. 

no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; MFR, Hayes, 15 Oct 64, sub: Construction of Army Bases, Saudi Arabia 

(SA), box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers; Memo, Hayes, 19 Oct 64, sub: Support of Saudi Construction 

Program by the Corps of Engineers, box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers. Information on contracts with 

BATMED for Qaysumah and Tabuk in “Informational Folder: Saudi Arabian Engineer Assistance 

Program,” 10 May 68, box 28, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; Waddell to Cassidy, 4 Dec 68, Mil 

Files XXI-3-7, OH, HQ USACE. 28 Waddell to Clarke, 5 Mar 70, Mil Files XXI-3-9, OH, HQ USACE; Mediterranean Div, “Data 

Book,” 15 Oct 72, p. 21. 29 Kackley to Clarke, 7 Sep 71 and 15 Mar 72, both in box 51-84-7361, Farrell Papers; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 15 Oct 72, p. 21. Memo, Lt Cdr P. W. Drennon, 21 Feb 73, sub: Trip Report 

SNEP [Saudi Naval Expansion Program] and Qaysumah Design, pp. 3–5; Drennon, Trip Rpt, 21 Feb 

73, SNEP (Athens, Greece) and Qaysumah Design (Saudi Arabia), 28 Jan–14 Feb 73; Williams to 

Nassief, 8 Jan 74; all in Walker box 8, OH, HQ USACE. 30 Memo, W. H. Voelker, A. E. Charmot, and Z. I. Zabban, 16 May 73, sub: Trip Report—Greece, 

Turkey, Saudi Arabia—23 Apr–7 May 1973, p. 3, Walker box 8, OH, HQ USACE; OCE, Major Activities, FY 1973, p. 48. Williams to Nassief, 8 Jan 74; Telex, Nassief to Williams, 28 Jan 74; Williams 

to Maj Gen George Rebh, 1 Feb 74; all in Walker box 8, OH, HQ USACE.
336 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Between spring 1973 and early 1974, MODA increased the scope of the facilities 

at the new cantonment to include an airfield, a fighter squadron, and a firing range. 

In early 1974, the Mediterranean Division engineer, Col. C. Torrey Williams, 

exchanged notes with Nassief. The latter once again confirmed Prince Sultan’s 

steadfast commitment to a total redesign of the final cantonment, incorporating 

the lessons learned from the construction of Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk. MODA 

also approved the division’s recommendation to change the site from Qaysumah 

to Hafar al Batin.31

In March 1974, the Mediterranean Division issued contracts to conduct 

topographic surveys, to explore for water, and to begin a new master plan and 

concept design for the cantonment. The division anticipated that the contractors 

would complete the survey work at the new site by December, after which full-scale 

design could begin. The commitment by the Saudi government to this new series 

of contracts bespoke an enormous construction program for this one cantonment 

alone. Mediterranean Division personnel estimated total costs for the Hafar al Batin 

project in the range of $8 billion to $15 billion. The contemplated scope dwarfed 

any previous project undertaken by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers anywhere 

in the world.32

New Medical Center and General Hospital for the Ministry of Defense 

and Aviation

MODA’s ambitions did not stop with facilities to garrison its prospective troops. 

The leadership also sought to provide the troops with the best possible health and 

medical facilities. In addition to activating the hospitals at Khamis Mushayt, Tabuk, 

and Jiddah in the early 1970s, MODA instructed the Mediterranean Division to 

begin planning entirely new medical facilities, specifically a highly specialized 

patient-care and medical-training center near Al Kharj, about fifty miles southeast 

of Riyadh, and a general hospital at Taif. 

To design the facilities, the division engaged the architect-engineer company 

Ellerbe Architects Inc. of Minneapolis, Minnesota, which formed a joint venture 

with Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall (DMJM) of Los Angeles. As the 

planning concepts evolved, the medical center came to include a 600-bed hospital; 

a training and research institute; and facilities to support the medical staff and their 

families. This amounted to creating a small city to accommodate a population of 

about eight thousand five hundred. The general hospital at Taif would have three 

hundred thirty beds and facilities for a population of about five thousand, including 

31 Williams to Nassief, 8 Jan 74; Nassief to Williams, 28 Jan 74; Williams to Rebh, 1 Feb 74; 

Memo, Williams, 12 Apr 74, sub: Assignment of Responsibilities for Al Batin, box 5, access. no. 

77-92-0001, WNRC. 32 Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 15 Mar 72, p. 16; Memo, Williams, 12 Apr 74; “Annual Historical Summary Report, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Saudi Arabia District, 1 January 1974 to 31 

December 1974,” p. 1, an. A, p. 2; Interv, Moorhus with Gordon W. Dykes, 24 Oct 95, p. 42.
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 337

a 112-room motel and a vocational rehabilitation center. Within a year of the award 

of the design contract, the estimated cost of the facilities had risen to $5 billion.33

Other Projects for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation

The Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation recognized that facilities alone 

do not make a military force, so the ministry planned to provide its military with 

the best training that money could buy. To develop the training program, MODA 

commissioned the Mediterranean Division to contract for the construction of a 

new academy for military cadets as well as four specialized schools and training 

centers. 

Advanced planning for King Abdulaziz Military Academy began in 1973. In 

April 1974, MODA approved a contract to prepare a master plan for an installation 

about thirty miles northwest of Riyadh. Saudi planners envisioned an academy 

comparable to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point: a self-contained military 

community of one thousand five hundred cadets, faculty and their families, and 

supporting staff—a total population of about ten thousand. Preliminary estimates put 

the cost at $125 million. As with many Saudi projects, the scope of work expanded 

and the cost rose. By 1976, the Saudis had approved $600 million for the academy 

and projections of the total cost of the program exceeded $1 billion.34

In the spring of 1974, MODA also authorized the Mediterranean Division 

to design and construct four new centers for training soldiers and leaders for the 

specialized branches of the Saudi Arabian Army.35 MODA located the artillery 

and infantry schools at the Khamis Mushayt cantonment, the airborne school at 

Tabuk, and the engineer school at the cantonment planned for Hafar al Batin. When 

the division’s chief of planning, Dick Wiles, asked for clarification concerning 

the scope of the authorization, Colonel Nassief responded that the Saudis wanted 

the four military centers to be “the most modern and comprehensive instructional 

institutions for their respective military specialties in the Middle East and for their 

size unsurpassed in the world.” He pointedly called Wiles’ attention to his use of 

the word “centers” rather than “schools.”

The Centers must be capable not only of instructing all grades in the various 

aspects of Modern Warfare, but be also able to develop Doctrine and advanced 

training methods. The Corps, and all who assist them in this project, should let their 

33 “Saudi Arabia Programs,” 28 Feb 78, pp. 88, 90; Trip Rpt, Maj J. Fero, 16 Sep 75, sub: MDD 

for LNO Conference, 10–11 Sep 75, box 5, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Interv, authors with 

David Dobberman, 31 Oct 96. 34 MFR, John Blake, 30 Apr 74, sub: Meeting with Mr. Nassief, Major Barney, and Mr. Peterson, 

28 April 1974, Walker box 8, OH, HQ USACE; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 15 Mar 74, isolated 

pages, box 5, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; “Saudi Arabia Programs,” 28 Feb 78, p. 72; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, p. 9. 35 “Annual Historical Summary Report, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Saudi Arabia District, 1 

January 1974 to 31 December 1974,” p. 1; Mahmoud H. Nassief to Richard R. Wiles, sub: Military 

Schools, 6 May 74, R&D File 2282, TAC.
338 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

imagination soar. The product should be so outstanding as to attract the attention of 

the whole world.36

Nassief’s guidance rippled throughout the Mediterranean Division. People quoted 

his admonition to “let their imagination soar” often and applied it to all projects—not 

just to the training centers. His words captured the vision that moved the Saudis to 

spend money lavishly on project after project.37

In addition to the work associated with SNEP, SAMP, SANG, the cantonments, 

the medical facilities, and the schools, MODA had other, smaller projects. In August 

1973, Phillip Holzmann A.G. of West Germany began a three-story marble-faced 

executive office building in Riyadh for the ministry. In May 1974, the Corps awarded 

J. A. Jones a $10.3 million contract for construction of an officers club complex, 

also in Riyadh. Four years earlier, the working estimate of the club’s cost had been 

just $3 million.38

In the summer of 1973, to coordinate the growing construction program, the 

Ministry of Defense and Aviation established the Military Works Department. 

Colonel Nassief assumed command of the new department, assisted by a young 

Saudi Army lieutenant, Naser F. Al Faisal. The Saudi Arabia District’s chief of 

construction, John Blake, tells an instructive story about Al Faisal. In 1973, shortly 

after Blake arrived in Riyadh, he had to pick up some documents; Al Faisal, who 

had been a Corps trainee at Tabuk between 1970 and 1973, drove Blake to the 

MODA headquarters. 

[We] walked in a room that was full of Saudi Arabian military officers, ranging 

all the way from captains to major generals. When we walked in the room everyone 

stood up. Now, since they didn’t know who I was from Adam, and I obviously was not 

one of them and I was not in any uniform, I knew they weren’t standing up because 

of me. And when major generals stand up at the entrance of lieutenants, you have got 

to know that there is something [unusual] about that lieutenant.39

Blake’s insight was correct: Al Faisal was a member of the royal family. In January 

1976, Al Faisal, by then a captain, succeeded Nassief as the director of military 

works and became the person in MODA with whom the Corps staff had the most 

contact. Americans who worked with Al Faisal described him as “very intelligent,” 

as having “very high business acumen,” and as both tough and reasonable in 

36 Nassief to Wiles, 6 May 74.

37 Nassief’s words are cited in Intervs, authors with Frank Oliva, 13 Jan 95, pp. 10, 27, and with 

Wiles, 21 Oct 93, p. 101; Ltr, Col Williams to Ch of Engrs, 14 Jun 74, box 26, access. no. 77-92-0001, 

WNRC. See also Interv, Paul K. Walker with Gus Woodall, 5 Feb 85, p. 4. Woodall applies the words 

directly to King Khalid Military City (KKMC) and attributes them to Prince Sultan. 38 Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, p. 15; “Annual Historical Summary Report, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, Saudi Arabia District, 1 January 1974 to 31 December 1974,” p. 1; Memo, 

Dist Engr USAMED Riyadh to RUEADWD/Ch of Engr ENGMC Dept Army, 24 Jan 70, sub: Riyadh 

Officers Club Med Lb, box 6, access. no. 77-86-0008, WNRC. 39 Interv, Paul Walker and William Baldwin with John Blake, 24 Jun 88, p. 239.
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 339

negotiations. For all the positive tone, the characterizations of Al Faisal lacked 

the warmth, admiration, and sense of friendship that Corps personnel expressed in 

describing Nassief.40

Funding the Projects

The Saudi government paid for all of the management and construction services 

that the Mediterranean Division provided. The initial mechanism had been the 

irrevocable letter of credit at Chase Manhattan Bank through which the Saudi government made funds available to the Corps of Engineers, which then paid contractors. 

Another mechanism, Foreign Military Sales (FMS), became available when the U.S. 

Congress passed the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968. If the defense ministry of 

a foreign government initiated a request for support and the host government made 

a formal request for assistance to the U.S. embassy that was approved by the U.S. 

government, the Corps of Engineers cooperated with the host government to specify 

terms for the project in a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA).41

The LOA, also frequently called the sales case, was a single-page document 

that described in very broad terms the needed services. The LOA included an initial 

estimate of the total cost, allowing for a more precise definition of scope as the 

project took shape. It was neither an open-ended nor a rigidly defined, inflexible 

contract. By signing an LOA, a foreign government made a commitment to pay 

for the services it sought. Payment could take the form of a cash deposit at the 

time that the government accepted the sales case, or it could be a “dependable 

undertaking” subject to the approval of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). 

Dependable undertakings could involve three forms. The host government could 

establish an irreversible commercial letter of credit from which funds could be 

drawn as required. It could give a formal promise to make payments as the project 

progressed. It could make a cash advance, normally 10 percent of the total sales 

case, combining this with the two methods previously described to cover the total 

cost of the project. The balance of money available in a sales case always had to 

cover contractual commitments and obligations, a minimum of three months of 

40 On Al Faisal as successor to Nassief, see [Prince] Sultan ibn Abdul Aziz to U.S. Amb, 15 Jan 

76, E-7-6, TAD-RHA. On Al Faisal’s status as a member of the royal family, see Col George W. 

Page, “Mediterranean Division [sic] Command Briefing,” 21 Jun 77, p. 1, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 

For Blake’s observations, see Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Blake, 24 Jun 88, p. 239. Other commentaries on Al Faisal appear in Intervs, John Greenwood with Brig Gen George R. Robertson, 1 

Oct 83, pp. 9, 37–38; with Elmer Parkin, 4 Oct 83, pp. 109–10; with Col Gurnie C. Gunter, 8 Jul 86, 

pp. 3, 10; with Earl Kramer, 14 Mar 83, pp. 28–29; with Tom Connor, 21 Nov 82, pp. 9–10; Paul 

Walker with Col Maurice Leiser, 27 Feb 85, p. 92; Thomas Tulenko with Col (Ret) Charles T. Williams, 20–21 Feb 85, p. 104. 41 OCE, “Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1967–30 June 1968,” p. 48, Gen Files, box 5, OH, 

HQ USACE; USACE, “Technical Assistance Operating Procedures,” Apr 82, pp. 14–15, unmarked 

box, TAD-RHA.
340 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

anticipated disbursements, and a reserve that corresponded to the estimated liability 

that accrued in case of termination of the contract.42

Because the processes used in FMS cases could make money immediately 

available to begin project planning, such cases became the method of choice for 

financing the work in Saudi Arabia. Projects begun under the bilateral Engineer 

Assistance Agreement of 1965 continued to use letters of credit until the U.S. 

Department of Defense insisted in the mid-1970s that they be incorporated into the 

FMS reporting system. To comply, the Mediterranean Division established a series 

of “dummy” sales-case designators. These accounting entries allowed the division 

to track funds using the FMS reporting system, even though no FMS money was 

involved.43

The use of FMS cases became prevalent about the same time that MODA 

requested the Corps’ help for its new directorate—referred to as both the Military 

Works Directorate and the General Directorate of Military Works (GDMW). The 

Saudis wanted to develop GDMW’s capacity to take over construction management from the Corps of Engineers. In March 1974, the division engineer, Colonel 

Williams, assigned the task of coordinating with the new directorate to the division’s 

Saudi Arabia District.44

Creation of the new directorate in MODA confirmed the growing scope of 

the building program, and leaders of the Saudi Arabia District understood that 

1974 was a pivotal year.45 In that year, in Saudi Arabia alone, the Mediterranean 

Division awarded a sufficient array of contracts to sustain a U.S. Army engineer 

division in the region for years to come. Less clear was where that division should 

be headquartered.

Emergency Water System Repair in Jiddah

The early months of 1975 brought two totally unpredictable disasters in Saudi 

Arabia that affected the work of the Corps of Engineers. On 25 March, a disaffected 

and possibly unstable prince of the royal family shot and killed his uncle, King 

Faisal. Crown Prince Khalid quickly assumed the throne, but the reorganization of 

the government and the redistribution of influence continued for another six months. 

During this period, many issues of Saudi national security underwent special scrutiny 

and action slowed on the modernization programs.46

The second disaster, natural rather than regicidal, impinged on the work of 

the Mediterranean Division more directly. In early April, torrential thunderstorms 

42 USACE, “Technical Assistance Operating Procedures,” Apr 82, pp. 14–16; Maj Jules S. Kincaid 

to Ahmed T. Sedairy, 9 May 83, sub: Letter of Credit Procedures, SA 1176, TAD-RHA. 43 Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, pp. 27–29.

44 Quotation from Williams to Gribble, 18 Mar 74, p. 2, box 26, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 

On the creation of the office, see Durham to Gray, 4 Feb 74, pp. 4–5, box 19, access. no. 77-92-0001, 

WNRC. 45 “Annual Historical Summary Report, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Saudi Arabia District, 1 

January 1974 to 31 December 1974,” p. 1. 46 Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, pp. 181–86.
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 341

caused flash floods in the Jiddah area that inundated water wells, destroyed pumps 

and pumping plants, and washed out the pipelines in the system that supplied the 

city with water. The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Agriculture and Water estimated 

that repairs would take three to six months—longer than the city’s population could 

safely endure. Faced with a severe shortage of safe water in one of its major cities, 

the Saudi Arabian government appealed to the U.S. ambassador for emergency 

assistance. Within days of the floods, the Saudi Arabia District engineer, Col. George 

Gray, led a team of Army engineers to assess the damage in the area. On 19 April, 

the district set up an emergency project office under Lt. Col. William Badger to 

supervise the reconstruction of the water system.47

The reconnaissance team quickly determined that twenty-three of the thirty-two 

wells that formed the basis of the city’s water supply had been damaged and fouled. 

Over the following week, the team mobilized fourteen contractors, both American 

and Saudi Arabian, to make emergency repairs to the system. Working twenty-four 

hours a day under the supervision of district personnel, the contractors managed to 

clear the wells and to restore the pipelines to the city by 2 May. By 9 May, crews 

had cleaned and repaired the system sufficiently to deliver 6.5 million gallons of 

usable water a day, approximately 80 percent of the system’s preflood production. 

The initial repairs addressed less than 25 percent of the damage done to the region’s 

water system; but over the following eight months, the Saudi Arabia District worked 

with contractors to modernize the water system and to make it more resistant to 

damage by flash flooding. By 1 January 1976, the new system had an increased 

capacity to distribute 110 percent of the system’s water flow prior to the flood.48

The responsiveness of the Saudi Arabia District to the emergency in Jiddah 

enhanced the standing of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at a moment when the 

assassination of King Faisal had engendered an atmosphere of uneasiness and stress. 

It confirmed the Corps’ managerial capabilities and contributed to a confidence that 

the Saudi Arabian government could count on the Corps. 

Transition to the Middle East Division

By the second half of 1974, the volume of design either underway or approved 

for construction in Saudi Arabia made an expansion of the Mediterranean Division’s 

staff imperative. Colonel Williams launched a recruiting campaign for the Saudi 

Arabia District that added about a dozen people to the district’s staff by December.49

47 Cristobal S. Berry-Caban, “To Give People Water: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Flood 

Emergency Relief Project in Saudi Arabia,” abstract, p. 31, Walker box 8, OH, HQ USACE, R&D File 

2713, TAC; Interv, Cristobal S. Berry-Caban with Col George Gray, [12 Jun 85], pp. 5–13, Walker 

box 8, OH, HQ USACE; Interv, Tulenko with Williams, 12 Jun–5 Jul 85, pp. 123–26. 48 Fact Sheet, Jiddah Water Proj, n.d., box 5, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Interv, Paul K. Walker 

with Robert Meehan, 6 Feb 85, pp. 75–76; Memo, Gray, 16 Sep 75, sub: General Order to Establish 

the Jiddah Water Project Resident Office, box 5, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Berry-Caban, “To 

Give People Water,” abstract, pp. 31–55. 49 Intervs, Moorhus with Ron Friestad, 7 Feb 94, pp. 3–4, 7–8; with Patricia Hill, 24 Nov 93, pp. 

1–3, 24–25; authors with Oliva, 13 Jan 95, pp. 20–21.
342 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

The district activated area offices in Jiddah and in Al Khobar to manage construction 

for the Saudi Navy in Jiddah and Jubayl, respectively. It also established a planning 

and liaison office in Riyadh to facilitate communications on engineering issues 

between the division headquarters, the district, and MODA.50

The assassination of King Faisal only temporarily dampened the Saudi government’s appetite for military modernization. The construction activity both reflected 

and stimulated a rapidly expanding national economy in which petrodollars fueled 

expansion. The unstable political and military situation in the Middle East generally, 

and in the Arabian Gulf region specifically, motivated the Saudi government to invest 

even more money in modernizing its military forces. At the same time, the influx 

of money and the intense economic demand contributed to inflationary pressures, 

which reached 30 percent in Saudi Arabia in the middle 1970s and remained in 

double digits into the 1980s.51 The combination of a volatile political climate and 

such inflation made the award of contracts and the movement of construction 

materials more difficult. 

Handling the Growing Volume of Materials

The growing demand for construction created a need to import vast quantities 

of construction materials and labor. The region had only limited capabilities for 

dealing with the inflow of goods and workers. When construction began at Khamis 

Mushayt in 1966, strained Saudi port facilities had barely coped. To compensate, 

the contractor had chosen to build its own small port on the Red Sea; but at the 

end of that project, the joint venture closed and dismantled the port. Nothing had 

improved by the mid-1970s. Mediterranean Division personnel became increasingly 

concerned about the limited ability of Saudi Arabia’s ports to handle the volume of 

shipping needed to sustain the large construction projects under design. As serious 

discussions began concerning construction of the cantonment at Hafar al Batin, the 

military academy, and the medical research and treatment center at Al Kharj, the 

division’s engineers again voiced their concern about port capacity. In late 1974, 

the division commissioned a study of the port conditions and the transportation 

facilities needed to support the planned programs.52

In mid-November 1975, Mediterranean Division personnel presented to Prince 

Sultan the idea of constructing a port on the Saudi east coast at Ras al Mishab near 

the border with Kuwait. The port would handle only materials imported for the 

50 “Annual Historical Summary Report, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Saudi Arabia District, 1 

January 1974 to 31 December 1974,” pp. 2–3. 51 Abdul Kasim Mansur, “The American Threat to Saudi Arabia,” Armed Forces Journal (September 1980): 47–60. 52 MFR, Blondell, 3 Jun 66, sub: Presentation of Design Criteria for Khamis Mushayt, box 29, access. 

no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; “EIG [Engineer Inspector General] Inspection: Annual General Inspection, 

Saudi Arabia District, 29 May–1 June 1972,” 16 May 72, pp. 4–4A, box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers; 

“Building the King Faisal Military Cantonment,” Aug 71, box 23, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

Interv, Walker with Woodall, 5 Feb 85, pp. 9–10; Williams to Gribble, 14 Jun 74, p. 2, box 26, and 

12 Sep 75, p. 3, box 6, both in access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC.
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 343

MODA project at Hafar al Batin. The division quickly furnished a cost analysis 

of eight-berth seaports at two locations—one in the east at Ras al Mishab and the 

other in the west on the Red Sea at Sharm Yanbu (never built). MODA approved the 

concept; in late July 1976, the recently established Middle East Division awarded 

a $161 million contract to Santa Fe Overseas Inc. of Orange, California, to build at 

Ras al Mishab. Over the next five years, the Saudis added facilities and extended 

construction in two phases. When completed in 1981, the port had seven general 

Silos at Ras al Mishab, a new seaport built in Saudi Arabia between 1976 and 1981
344 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

cargo berths, a bulk cement berth, on-shore storage, and related port facilities and 

housing. The total program cost $218.2 million.53

Staffing for the Expanding Workload

Given the steady increase in the projected volume of work through the early 

1970s, the Mediterranean Division had thirty-three recruitment actions pending 

at the Office of the Chief of Engineers in mid-December 1974 and an additional 

sixty-two requests ready to forward. Colonel Williams planned recruitment visits 

to districts and divisions in the United States during the spring and, if necessary, 

similar recruitment drives in Europe. Over the next year, these efforts garnered an 

influx of new staff members both for the Saudi Arabia District and for division 

headquarters in Livorno.54

The Mediterranean Division’s expanding construction program also made necessary a review of the division’s organization and operations. Williams commissioned 

an internal study to make sure that the division was organized effectively to meet 

the requirements of its growing and shifting workload. Williams’ first alternative 

involved enhancing the authority of the Saudi Arabia District over work in the 

kingdom while retaining the engineering and design functions at the division level. 

Headquarters in Italy would continue to act as an operating division in relation 

to work in countries other than Saudi Arabia. The second organizational scheme 

included adding a second district to the division to execute the programs outside 

Saudi Arabia, with the division office functioning as a supervisory element for both 

districts.55

Completed on 1 February 1975, the Williams study examined eight scenarios 

for reorganizing and eleven possible cities in the Mediterranean–Middle East area 

for division headquarters. The top two candidates for relocation were Athens and 

Beirut. The clash in Cyprus between Greeks and Turks and the resulting Greek 

hostility toward the United States persuaded the U.S. embassy in Athens that a Corps 

presence there was untenable. When Richard Wiles visited Beirut on behalf of the 

division, U.S. diplomats suggested that the political situation between Lebanese and 

Palestinians in the country was too unstable to make establishing the Corps there 

53 Fact Sheet, Saudi Arabian Govt Mil Ports in Saudi Arabia, 1 Dec 75, box 5, access. no. 77-92-

0001, WNRC; Gray to Lt Gen Othamn Al-Humaid, 8 Nov 75, sub: Request for Authorization for Access to Various Sites on the Arabian Gulf and Red Sea Coasts, box 5, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

Bennett to Al Faisal, 25 Jan 77, sub: MODA [Ministry of Defense and Aviation] Ports—Sharm Yanbu 

and Ras al Mishab, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Memo, Thomas L. Carnes, 19 Jul 82, sub: Contract 

DACA86-78-C-0017, Additional Facilities, RAM II Contract Closeout Meeting, K-8-4, TAD-RHA; 

“Saudi Arabian Programs,” [1981], p. 6, box SH-6-93-0006, TAD-RHA. 54 Williams to Gribble, 16 Dec 74, p. 3, box 26, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. Intervs, Moorhus 

with Friestad, 7 Feb 94, pp. 3–4, 7–8, and with Hill, 24 Nov 93, pp. 1–3, 24–25; authors with Oliva, 

13 Jan 95, pp. 20–21. 55 Williams to Gribble, 16 Dec 74, pp. 3–4.
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 345

advisable. Within months of Wiles’ visit, Beirut and Lebanon had descended into 

chaos and civil war.56

The study also gave serious consideration to relocating the division’s headquarters to either Jiddah or Riyadh in Saudi Arabia but rejected such a move. It 

anticipated that recruitment to Saudi Arabia would prove very difficult. Whereas 

Livorno, Italy, had worked positively, Saudi Arabia might become an impediment 

to attracting both the numbers and the quality of staff that the division needed. The 

mismatch of workdays (the Saudi weekend falls on Thursday–Friday) and office 

hours between Saudi Arabia and the Western world presented more problems. Study 

leaders worried about the restrictions on movement around the country, the limited 

facilities for communications, the difficulties in getting items through customs, 

and the general impediments to conducting business. In addition, they feared that 

placing the headquarters in Saudi Arabia would inhibit work that was developing 

for the governments in Jordan, Iran, and Kuwait.57

The Williams study recommended increasing the authority and autonomy of the 

Saudi Arabia District and retaining the role of division headquarters as an operating 

division to supervise all other work in areas outside Saudi Arabia. The study also 

proposed that the division’s role in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

countries be retained as long as its headquarters remained in Italy. This would 

avoid compromising the status of forces arrangements under which the division’s 

personnel functioned.58

Williams had launched his study in mid-December 1974, just after personnel 

from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Audit Office, Europe, visited 

the division to gather information on a possible consolidation of construction 

activities in Europe. The OSD auditors reached conclusions quite different from 

those of the division. The auditors’ report, presented in draft form on 23 January 

1975, concluded that the Department of Defense would save money by merging the 

two Army engineer divisions in Europe under the Europe Division (EUD) that had 

been activated in Frankfurt, West Germany, in the summer of 1974. The auditors 

argued that the limited work in southern Europe managed by the Mediterranean 

Division could easily be handled by EUD and that the Saudi Arabia District could 

report to the Europe Division.59

The OCE staff marshaled a variety of arguments against the consolidation of 

the two divisions. They disputed the OSD auditors’ estimate of savings in personnel 

and challenged the feasibility of consolidation on both operational and political 

grounds. The volume of work administered by the Europe Division demanded 

56 Exec Sum, 1 Feb 75, sub: A Study of the Organizational Structure of the U.S. Army Engineer 

Division, Mediterranean, pp. i–iii, box 6, access. no. 77-86-0008, WNRC; authors’ conversation with 

Wiles, 6 May 97; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Blake, 24 Jun 88, p. 232. 57 “Study,” 1 Feb 75, box 6, access. no. 77-86-0008, WNRC.

58 Ibid.

59 Memo, Williams to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), 16 Dec 74; Col Guy F. 

Cardinalli, “OSD Audit of Support Functions in the European Theater (D75-103),” 28 Feb 75; both 

in box 6, access. no. 77-86-0008, WNRC.
346 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

its full attention. It was a new organization that needed time to work out standard 

procedures (OCE projected two years at a minimum). Its span of control could 

not be extended without compromising its ability to fulfill its mission. A merger 

would create strains on EUD’s capabilities that it could not overcome by increasing 

its staff size. Moreover, the programs and the orientation of the Europe Division 

and the Mediterranean Division were largely incompatible. The Europe Division 

served the United States Army, Europe (USAREUR); the U.S. Air Forces in 

Europe; and U.S. military units assigned to the Atlantic alliance. Its funding came 

from congressional appropriations and through NATO. Funding for Mediterranean 

Division projects came almost exclusively from foreign governments. Given the 

3,000-mile distance between the two primary locations of work—West Germany 

and Saudi Arabia—management would require an inordinate amount of effort and 

the costs in time, talent, and travel would be disproportionately large. OCE also 

saw no reason to believe that the Saudi Arabian government, which was paying 

for all of its construction projects and 90 percent of the Mediterranean Division’s 

operating costs, would accept a relocation that moved the division’s headquarters 

even farther from the kingdom.60

Throughout the spring of 1975, discussions of the OSD auditors’ draft report 

continued among USAREUR, OSD, and OCE. The discussion formed one small 

part of DoD efforts to increase the ratio of “tooth to tail” in the alignment of U.S. 

military forces overseas. For the most part, the Mediterranean Division remained 

uninvolved in the discussions. Colonel Williams pursued his plans to increase the 

authority of the Saudi Arabia District. He also sought cooperation and support from 

OCE to recruit additional personnel for the district.61

On 30 June 1975, the auditors from the OSD Audit Office, Europe, issued their 

final report with the recommendation to merge the Mediterranean Division into the 

Europe Division in Frankfurt unchanged. A week later, OCE’s chief of military 

construction, Maj. Gen. George A. Rebh, and several civilians from the OCE staff 

met in Livorno with the EUD commander, Brig. Gen. Louis Prentiss; Colonel 

Williams from the Mediterranean Division; and Colonel Gray from the Saudi Arabia 

District. During the meeting, the participants reached three decisions that reshaped 

the organization of engineering responsibilities in Europe.62

First, the participants concluded that the Europe Division could take over 

responsibility for U.S. military construction in the NATO countries of southern 

Europe: Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The USAREUR commander favored this reorganization because it consolidated all construction work for NATO countries under 

60 “OCE Comments on OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] ‘Draft Report on Review of 

Consolidation of Army Engineer Divisions in Europe,’” 24 Feb 75; Talking Paper, 15 May 75, sub: 

OSD Draft Audit Report on Consolidation of EUD and MDD Headquarters; both in box 6, access. 

no. 77-86-0008, WNRC. 61 Williams to Gribble, 14 Mar 75, p. 4, and 19 May 75, p. 4, both in box 6, access. no. 77-92-

0001, WNRC. 62 Clement E. Roy, OSD, “Report on Review of Consolidation of Army Engineer Divisions in 

Europe,” 30 Jun 75, box 6, access. no. 77-86-0008, WNRC; Interv, Tulenko with Williams, 20–21 

Feb 85, pp. 130–33.
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 347

one engineer organization. That change left the Mediterranean Division focused 

almost exclusively on projects in Saudi Arabia. The division depended heavily 

on contracts with American architect-engineer firms to develop concept designs, 

master plans, and detailed design for construction in Saudi Arabia because the 

firms had sufficient capacity to deal with very large projects. This led to the second 

major decision. The division’s engineering functions, that is, all of the planning 

and design to the point of awarding a construction contract, would relocate to the 

continental United States, enabling division personnel to work in easy proximity 

with American firms.63

If just the Mediterranean Division’s construction management personnel needed 

to remain on site in Saudi Arabia, the third decision seemed foreordained. That 

portion of the division’s work involving construction and construction management 

would move forward to Saudi Arabia.64

Reorganizing Engineering Responsibilities

Before the end of July 1975, OCE approved these decisions; by mid-September, 

the two divisions and OCE had a draft plan to transfer military construction in Italy, 

Greece, and Turkey to the Europe Division. Simultaneously, Colonel Williams 

instructed Colonel Gray to begin looking for family housing for the personnel 

who would be moving to Jiddah. (Williams chose Jiddah, where the division had a 

liaison office, over Riyadh as the appropriate site for the division’s forward element 

because of its better amenities and its experience accommodating Westerners.) 

Several locations emerged as candidates for the division’s rear echelon in the United 

States: Huntsville, Alabama, site of the Corps of Engineers’ Huntsville Division, 

which had provided many of the Mediterranean Division’s staff members in recent 

years; the area between Baltimore and Washington; and the rural areas of Virginia 

west of Washington. Considering the need for easy access to international travel, 

Williams himself preferred locating to Northern Virginia for proximity to Dulles 

International Airport.65

By mid-October 1975, information about the planned move had begun to 

circulate as rumor, so Williams met with his entire headquarters staff to lay out the 

plan, emphasizing that its details might still change. About one-third of the division’s 

personnel would move to Jiddah to oversee the construction programmed for Saudi 

Arabia. About two-thirds of the staff, augmented by a significant number of new 

personnel, would establish the division rear element in the vicinity of Washington, 

63 Memo, Cardinalli, 28 Feb 75, sub: OSD Audit of Support Functions in the European Theater, 

D75-103, Encl 1, box 6, access. no. 77-86-0008, WNRC. Intervs, Tulenko with Williams, 20–21 Feb 

85, pp. 130–33; Walker with Woodall, 5 Feb 85, pp. 69–70; John T. Greenwood with Ralph Wheeler, 

6 Nov 85, p. 16. 64 Interv, Tulenko with Williams, 20–21 Feb 85, pp. 130–33. The decisions reached at the meeting in early July are confirmed by Prentiss to Gribble, 14 Jul 75, sub: Quarterly Report, file 11B, box 

M-1-12, Europe Division–Records Holding Area (EUD-RHA). 65 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 28 Jul 75, box 6, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Gribble to 

Prentiss, 11 Sep 75, file 11B, box M-1-9, EUD-RHA; Williams to Gribble, 12 Sep 75, pp. 1–2.
348 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

D.C. Division personnel involved with the military construction contracts underway 

in Italy, Greece, or Turkey could continue their work as members of the Europe 

Division at the headquarters in Frankfurt or in field offices in the southern NATO 

countries.66

Two weeks after Colonel Williams’ address to the division staff, Maj. Gen. John 

W. Morris, acting for the chief of engineers, asked the chief of staff of the Army 

to approve and forward to OSD the plan to relocate the Mediterranean Division’s 

headquarters to Jiddah, Saudi Arabia; to activate a rear element in Virginia; and 

to transfer the Mediterranean Division’s work in NATO countries to the Europe 

Division. In addition to arguments concerning the size and changing focus of the 

Mediterranean Division’s workload, General Morris added a new justification: The 

transfer of personnel to a division rear echelon in the United States and the relocation 

of the division’s headquarters from Italy to Saudi Arabia helped meet the ceiling, 

imposed by the U.S. Senate to take effect 30 June 1976, on the number of civilian 

employees in Europe.67

General Morris’ 28 October 1975 memorandum projected that by 1978 the 

new division headquarters in Saudi Arabia would have a construction placement 

of more than $500 million, giving it the largest construction program of any Corps 

of Engineers division. For that reason, and to improve comprehensive planning, 

policy development, and liaison with the government of Saudi Arabia, the chief 

of engineers intended to appoint a general officer to head the division. The new 

division would add two districts in addition to the district based in Riyadh. A district 

in Jiddah would become active in the summer of 1977 as the work for the Saudi 

Naval Expansion Program grew; and a district would open at Hafar al Batin, where 

the third cantonment would be built for the Saudi Arabian Army.68

Approval came quickly; in early November 1975, OCE authorized the transfer of 

NATO work to the Europe Division. In December, General Prentiss sent his special 

assistant, William Camblor, to Livorno to familiarize himself with procedures used 

in handling work in southern Europe. On 1 February 1976, the Europe Division 

assumed full responsibility for the construction in Italy, Greece, and Turkey. 

EUD retained numerous Mediterranean Division staff members and set up a small 

design section at Camp Darby comprised of Italian nationals. In April, the Europe 

Division also assumed responsibility for work in Iran that had developed for the 

Mediterranean Division, easing the concerns prompted by the delicate relationship 

between Saudi Arabia and Iran.69

66 Williams Address to Mediterranean Div Personnel, 16 Oct 75, Misc Files, EUD-RHA; Castle 

Comments, 29 November 1975, box 6, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 67 Decision Memo, Maj Gen John W. Morris, 28 Oct 75, sub: Realignment Plan—Relocation of 

U.S. Army Engineer Division, Mediterranean, Mil Files XII-36-9, OH, HQ USACE. 68 Ibid., encl. A, pp. 7–9; Castle Comments, 29 November 1975. 69 OCE, General Orders (GO) no. 44, 7 Nov 75, sub: Change of Military Construction Boundaries, 

box 51-84-7361, Farrell Papers. On the visits by Camblor and other EUD staff, see Mediterranean Div 

Staff Mtg Min, 15 Dec 75, pp. 1–2, 4, and 29 Dec 75, p. 5, both in box 18, access. no. 77-92-0001, 

WNRC; Memo, Camblor, 29 Dec 75, Misc Files, EUD-RHA; Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. 

Moorhus, Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 349

Implementing the Move to Saudi Arabia

Even before the formal approvals, Colonel Williams traveled to Saudi Arabia 

to brief his two most influential customers: the commander of the National Guard, 

Prince Abdullah, and the minister of Defense and Aviation, Prince Sultan. Prince 

Abdullah seemed pleased by the division’s proposed move to Jiddah. Williams’ 

personal meeting with Prince Sultan ended abruptly before Williams had laid out the 

plan to move to Jiddah, when the minister had to attend to other pressing business. 

As a result, Williams presented the proposal to Prince Sultan in a letter from Italy.70

In exchanges over the following six weeks, the Saudis made clear that Prince Sultan 

wanted the division headquarters in Riyadh, closer to the Military Works Directorate, 

to MODA headquarters, and to other government ministries.71

Williams remained convinced that Jiddah offered numerous advantages over 

Riyadh, including what he called “space-time insulation” from the pressures and 

influence that MODA and SANG might exert. Although he disliked having the 

Saudis tell the Corps of Engineers “how to run its business,” he understood that 

opposing Prince Sultan’s wishes would be costly and self-defeating. In January 1976, 

Williams traveled to Saudi Arabia with instructions from Washington to move the 

division’s forward headquarters to Riyadh.72

Locating the Division Rear in Virginia

On 24 February 1976, the secretary of the Army announced plans to reorganize 

the Corps of Engineers activities in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The next 

day, the Office of the Chief of Engineers issued a general order to establish a rear 

echelon of the Mediterranean Division near Berryville, Virginia, about thirty-five 

miles west of Dulles Airport, and to activate the U.S. Army Construction Activity, 

Mideast, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The public announcement intensified efforts in 

Italy to complete a plan for moving personnel to the two new locations in Saudi 

Arabia and Northern Virginia. By early March, the division had established an ad 

hoc staff section to handle planning and coordination of the moves and to close out 

activities at division headquarters at Camp Darby. Within weeks, the division had 

established organizational structures for the two locations and had begun to issue 

transfer-of-function letters. The division scheduled the first contingent of personnel 

Army Center of Military History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2005), p. 356. On the work in Iran, 

see Williams to Gribble, 14 Dec 73, p. 3; OCE, “Annual Report of Major Activities, Jul. 1, 1974–Jun. 

30, 1975,” pp. 54–56, box 8, Gen Files, OH, HQ USACE. On EUD’s takeover of the work in Iran, 

see OCE, AHR, FY 1976, pp. 37–38. 70 Williams to Maj Gen Bates C. Burnell, 14 Nov 75, and Williams to Prince Sultan, 13 Nov 75, 

both in box 4, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 71 Williams to Burnell, 31 Dec 75, sub: Move of MDD HQ to Riyadh or Jiddah; Al Humaid to 

Williams, 27 Dec 75, sub: The Move of the Engineer Division to the Kingdom; both in box 14, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 72 Williams to Hon William J. Porter, U.S. Amb to Saudi Arabia, 22 Jan 76, box 14, access. no. 

77-92-0001, WNRC; Interv, Tulenko with Williams, 20–21 Feb 85, pp. 130–33.
350 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

to move to Virginia beginning in April, with others following throughout the spring 

and summer. Relocation to Saudi Arabia began at the same time and continued 

throughout the rest of 1976.73

The designation of the engineer unit in Saudi Arabia as a “construction activity” 

lasted less than two months. On 20 April 1976, the engineer entity working in Saudi 

Arabia became the U.S. Army Engineer Division, Middle East, or simply the Middle 

East Division. Concurrent with the new designation, the chief of engineers announced 

the appointment of General Wells as division engineer. The Mediterranean Division 

continued to exist, overlapping with the Middle East Division as it transferred all 

of its functions and personnel to Saudi Arabia and Virginia. Earlier, in February 

1976, the entity organized in Northern Virginia had been formally placed under the 

command of the Mediterranean Division’s deputy engineer, Col. George W. Page, as 

the Rear Echelon, Mediterranean Division. In late June, orders transferred the Rear 

Echelon and other elements, such as the Saudi Arabia District, the liaison office in 

New York that had existed since the 1950s, and the liaison office in Jiddah from the 

Mediterranean to the Middle East Division. The Mediterranean Division closed out 

its remaining responsibilities in late 1976 and quietly passed out of existence.74

Physical preparations at the site in Northern Virginia paralleled the administrative efforts at Camp Darby. Five buildings at the Federal Preparedness Agency’s 

special facility on Mt. Weather near Berryville were designated to become the home 

of the Rear Echelon—initially an element of the Mediterranean Division that passed, 

by the end of 1976, to the Middle East Division. Four of the buildings had to be 

renovated and the fifth moved and renovated. Because time constraints did not permit 

careful delineation of construction specifications, the Corps sought and received 

permission to bypass the normal competitive bidding process and to negotiate a 

single contract for the renovation and new construction with modifications as criteria 

became more clearly defined. Early in 1976, the Baltimore District, acting on behalf 

of the Mediterranean Division, awarded a $2.3 million contract and supplemental 

agreements for the work at Mt. Weather.75

73 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 28 Feb, 8 Mar, 22 Mar 76, box 17, access. no. 77-92-0001, 

WNRC; OCE, GO no. 19, 25 Feb 76, sub: Rear Echelon, U.S. Army Engineer Division Mediterranean . . . near Berryville, Va., and U.S. Army Engineer Construction Activity, Mideast, Riyadh, 

Saudi Arabia, in unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Mediterranean Div, Info Bull no. 17, 15 Mar 76, sub: 

Relocation of MDD, box 19, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 74 On the change of names, see Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 28 Apr 76, p. 1, box 19, access. 

no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; OCE, GO Seq for MDD to MED, 6 Apr 76, box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers; 

OCE, GO no. 31, 20 Apr 76; OCE, AHR, FY 1976, pp. 32–33; Mediterranean Div, GO no. 16, 15 Jun 

76, sub: U.S. Army Engineer Division, Middle East . . . Activation of Division Organizational Elements, box 3, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. On the transfers and final closeout of the Mediterranean 

Division, see OCE, GO no. 45, 15 Jun 76, and OCE, AHR, FY 1976, p. 65. On the final activities in 

Livorno, see Wells to Morris, 28 Sep 76, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 75 Memo, Williams to HQDA, 3 Feb 76, sub: Request for Approval to Procure by Negotiation the 

Rehabilitation and Modernization of Facilities at Berryville, Va., E-5-3, TAD-RHA; Memo to Div 

Engr, North Atlantic, Burnell, 24 Feb 76, sub: Approval to Procure by Negotiation the Rehabilitation 

and Modernization of Facilities at Berryville, Va., E-5-3, TAD-RHA; Mediterranean Div, Staff Mtg 

Min, 2 Feb 76, box 17, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Decision Memo, Morris, 28 Oct 75.
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 351

New Staff in Berryville

The Mediterranean Division had a staff of 418 in September 1975, before 

the relocation to Saudi Arabia and to Northern Virginia. A small number of staff 

positions passed to the Europe Division in February 1976. Most of the division’s 

staff moved to Riyadh; only forty-nine employees relocated to Berryville to form 

the nucleus of the division’s rear headquarters. By late September, most of the 

staff had left Livorno, although the Finance and Accounting Branch remained at 

Camp Darby awaiting the completion of the automated data-processing center in 

Riyadh.76 Several longtime employees of the division, such as the comptroller, 

Stuart Wagman, and the chief of design, Zeno Zabban, exercised a third option: 

They retired to retain the pleasant life they had established and enjoyed in the Italian 

coastal region of Livorno. 

The moves caused economic hardship for some of “the 49ers” who relocated to 

Virginia from Italy, especially those who had been recruited into the Engineering 

Division in early 1975 and had expected to serve three years in Italy. Some division 

employees had to terminate long-term leases in Italy and then find temporary quarters 

76 Williams to Gribble, 30 May 75, p. 4, box 6, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Decision Memo 

48F, Wells, 21 Dec 76, sub: MED Stovepipe Summary, p. 2, Encl 3, box 36, access. no. 77-92-0001, 

WNRC; Wells to Morris, 28 Sep 76, p. 2.

Mt. Weather, Virginia, was the location of Mediterranean Division and then the Middle East 

Division rear echelons.
352 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

until the move took place. All this occurred at the height of the Italian tourist season 

when rents were high and availability low. Temporary living allowances were well 

below the real rental costs. Some of the repatriates had leased their homes in the 

United States for three years and could not readily sell them without breaking the 

lease. Unable to sell these homes, they had difficulty finding money to buy in the 

Berryville-Winchester area. In all cases, because regulations did not cover moving 

between continents while retaining the same bureaucratic functions, they did not 

qualify for all of the benefits normally associated with a required relocation.77

As chief of the Engineering Division, Gordon W. “Wayne” Dykes relayed these 

issues to the Mediterranean Division’s personnel officer early in the discussions 

of the move. One of the concerns, the retention of reemployment rights in their 

“home” offices of the Corps in the United States, surfaced as an issue during the 

spring of 1976: the division’s personnel retained their rights for a year after their 

assignment to Virginia. In August, Dykes reiterated the grievances of the 49ers, 

who had relocated, as he pointed out, “for the convenience of the government.” He 

objected to inadequate living allowances and disqualification from reimbursement 

on real estate sales and acquisitions fees. Dykes estimated that uncompensated real 

estate costs averaged about $5,000 per employee. The uncovered costs represented 

a particular burden because there was only a small rental market in the BerryvilleWinchester area and the real estate market had been inflated by the sudden arrival of 

both transferring and new Corps of Engineers employees. Interest rates had reached 

historic highs in the mid-1970s and continued to climb into the 1980s, leaving many 

of the Corps employees, who held short-term, adjustable-rate mortgages, faced with 

a credit squeeze as those mortgage rates adjusted upward.78

General Wells tried to gain monetary relief for those who had moved from 

Italy to Virginia. In arguing their case with the chief of engineers, Wells pointed 

out that had the civilians moved from Italy to their district of origin and then to 

Virginia, they would have qualified for financial support. Because they had moved 

directly from Italy—for the convenience of the government—they were excluded 

from compensation. Despite Wells’ and Dykes’ efforts, the employees received no 

redress, which fueled resentment for many. In their minds, bureaucratic rigidity 

triumphed over logic, economy, and fairness.79

77 Intervs with Dykes, Friestad, Wood, Oliva, et al. Although the group that moved from Livorno 

to Berryville referred to themselves as “the 49ers,” there is a list of fifty names attached to Memo, 

Dykes to All Personnel Relocating from Overseas, 30 Aug 76, sub: MDD Relocation Allowance, in 

Interv, authors with Oliva, 13 Jan 95. 78 Memo, Dykes, 10 Dec 75, sub: Relocation of MDD Personnel to CONUS, and attachment, 

“Pending Move to CONUS, Items of Concern Requiring Clarification or Resolution,” prepared by 

staff members and their spouses who had recently arrived in Italy. See also Memo, William L. DeLong 

to Oliva, 22 Mar 76, sub: Transfer of Functions; Intervs, authors with A. O. Werner, 20 Oct 93, p. 

3, and with Roger Thomas, 27 Aug 96, pp. 22–23; Memo, Dykes to All Personnel Relocating from 

Overseas, 30 Aug 76, with attachments. 79 Wells to Morris, 12 Dec 76, p. 8, box 3, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; “Summary of Division 

(Fwd) Staff Meeting—8 February 1977,” unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Interv, Moorhus with Dykes, 

24 Oct 95, p. 32.
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 353

An unintended consequence of the financial problems of the relocation to 

Virginia occurred in the early 1980s. When it came time for those who had bought 

houses to refinance their short-term mortgages, interest rates were even higher than 

they had been in 1976–1977. As a result, the division lost the services of several 

well-seasoned veterans. Unable to afford to refinance their homes at the higher 

rates, they accepted other positions in the Corps of Engineers and qualified for 

compensation of the costs of the real estate transactions.80

Three third-country nationals represented a unique situation. These men had a 

wealth of experience with the Mediterranean Division and with the Saudi program, 

and the division wanted to retain them when it relocated to Virginia. Because they 

were not American citizens, they were not eligible for employment with the Corps 

in the United States under normal civil service rules. To keep them employed, the 

division needed to obtain a special immigration visa and approval by the Civil 

Service Commission.81

Orhan Ahmet Cankardes had begun work for the Corps of Engineers in his 

home country, Turkey, in 1950. In addition to his native Turkish, Cankardes spoke 

French, Italian, German, English, and Arabic. Albert Charmot had worked on the 

Moroccan airfields and had moved with the division to Italy in 1957. French by 

parentage, Charmot had grown up in Cairo; like Cankardes, he was fluent in several 

languages, including Arabic. The division had recruited the third employee, Wilhelm 

“Willi” Voelker, from Germany in the late 1950s when it needed personnel to staff 

the Gulf District in Tehran. In the 1960s, the district sent Voelker to Afghanistan; 

when work there ended, he moved to Livorno. He was multilingual because he 

learned the language of each locale in which he worked. Over time, all three had 

won a reputation for technical excellence.82

In February 1976, Colonel Williams petitioned the State Department for special 

immigrant status for the three men and their families, arguing that each man was an 

essential employee. A few days later, the Office of the Chief of Engineers requested 

that the Civil Service Commission grant them civil service status so they could 

continue to work for the division. The commission first responded that regulations 

did not permit them to approve the appointments except in the absence of qualified 

American citizens for the positions that they held. The division advertised the positions, including in its list of qualifications basic knowledge of Arabic and extensive 

experience in Saudi Arabia. In May, OCE reported to the Civil Service Commission 

that, of forty-five applicants and another 155 possible candidates who had applied for 

other engineering positions with the division, no one else met these qualifications. 

After a second appeal by OCE, the commission issued its approval on 17 June for 

80 Interv, Moorhus with Thomas, 27 Aug 96, pp. 22–23.

81 Interv, Tulenko with Williams, 20–21 Feb 85, p. 141.

82 On Cankardes, see Memo, Williams to Hon Henry M. Kissinger, 26 Feb 76, sub: Visas: Advisory Opinions, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Interv, Frank Schubert with Wilhelm Voelker, 25–26 May 

88, passim. The information on Charmot is from Intervs, authors with Blake, Boyd, Carozza, Dykes, 

Wheeler, and Wiles and Tulenko with Williams.
354 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

the division to employ Cankardes, Charmot, and Voelker in Berryville.83 The three 

continued their work as integral members of the division staff. 

By the beginning of 1977, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had completed 

reorganizing its operations in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. At its forward 

headquarters in Riyadh, the new Middle East Division had a minimum staff 

composed of construction personnel, a small Engineering Division Liaison Office, 

program planning staff, and support staff. On a day-to-day basis, this group worked 

with the Saudis to ensure they had the information they needed to incorporate the 

construction program into the government’s budget process. The forward staff 

tracked the Saudi budget cycle and reviewed funding levels. They maintained the 

contacts with Saudi government and military officials that allowed them to develop 

criteria to complete definitive design on new projects. The forward headquarters 

maintained a personnel office with a suboffice located in Virginia.84

The Rear Echelon’s largest branch was its Engineering Division, with a staff 

of nearly 200 authorized positions, although only 135 were filled by January 1977. 

The rear headquarters, commanded by the deputy division engineer, also included a 

modest construction element of fewer than forty spaces, a very small executive office 

and an office of counsel, an automated data-processing center, an office administration staff, a procurement and supply staff, and a resource management office. These 

elements negotiated with companies to encourage international ventures among 

contractors, to prequalify potential contractors, and to issue requests for proposals 

and solicit bids. The Construction Division personnel stationed in Berryville then 

conducted discussions with the firms whose bids were in the competitive range to 

ensure they had full understanding of the scope of work and to arrive at best and final 

offers. The division rear office awarded the contracts. The resource management 

staff quickly put the division on the Corps of Engineers Management Information 

System (COEMIS) to track costs.85

Over the summer of 1976, with personnel in transition from Italy to Virginia, 

the Middle East Division (Rear) awarded five new contracts with a total value of 

$767 million. Two of these contracts set new highs for the Corps of Engineers—a 

construction contract worth $208 million for the SANG headquarters complex and 

a contract valued at $361 million to construct on-shore facilities at Jubayl for the 

SNEP.86

83 Memo, Williams to Kissinger, 26 Feb 76; Ralph Loschialpo to U.S. Civil Service Commission 

(CSC), 4 Mar 76; Joseph A. McMaster, CSC, to Loschialpo, 31 Mar 76; “Transfer of CWS [Continental 

Wage Scale] Employees,” 28 May 76; Loschialpo to CSC, 21 May, 14 Jun 76; Charles O. Leins, CSC, 

“Authority to Appoint Non-citizens,” 18 Jun 76; all in unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 84 Page, “Mediterranean Division [sic] Command Briefing,” 21 Jun 77, pp. 33–34. 85 On the authorized strength and organization of the division rear, see Decision Memo 48F, Wells, 

21 Dec 76, p. 2, encl. 3. For Engineering Division strength, see “U.S. Army Engineer Division, Middle 

East (Rear), Saudi Arabia Government Funded Projects,” n.d. [after Jun 78], provided by Dykes. Concerning tasks, see Page, “Mediterranean Division [sic] Command Briefing,” 21 Jun 77, pp. 33–34. 86 Wells to Morris, 28 Sep 76, p. 2.
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 355

The Middle East Division’s Initial Years

In the spring of 1976, as commander designate of the Middle East Division, 

General Wells faced a situation totally different from that of his Mediterranean 

Division predecessors. The year before, the United States had ended its long engagement in South Vietnam, and the American construction capacity and energy that 

had been committed there needed new focus. Three years earlier, the Yom Kippur 

War had provoked the Arab oil embargo; the price per barrel of oil had quadrupled 

between 1973 and 1978.87 As a result, a large quantity of petrodollars flowed to 

Saudi Arabia and became available to fund the monarchy’s plans to modernize the 

country’s military establishment. 

The dramatic increase of military construction programs since 1974 represented 

one aspect of this new situation. The scale of construction facing the new Middle 

East Division in 1976 exceeded anything the Mediterranean Division had undertaken. 

Only the Moroccan air base program came close in size and complexity, and even 

it was small by comparison. After only a few months on the job, Wells became 

concerned that the division’s “organizational posture” might be inadequate and 

cumbersome. The complete division staff totaled 742 persons, about two-thirds of 

87 Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, p. 12.

Chief of Engineers Lt. Gen. John Morris (third from left) joined Corps employees and 

spouses in a traditional Middle Eastern dinner while visiting in October 1976.
356 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

the staff strength of 1,100 that he felt he needed to handle the work. The total staff 

allocation for the rear headquarters amounted to just over 300 positions.88

As a result of these concerns, during the first year of his tenure, General Wells 

established several new organizational elements. He set up a procurement system 

to allow the division to supply contractors with government-furnished materials. He 

established a unit to manage the logistics of getting those materials from the United 

States to Saudi Arabia and then to the specific construction sites. He activated new 

88 Wells, “Establishment of a Planning and Control Capability in Middle East Division,” 24 Aug 

76, box 12, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Wells to Morris, 28 Sep 76, p. 2, unmarked box, TADRHA. On the authorized strength and organization of the division rear, see Decision Memo 48F, 

Wells, 21 Dec 76, p. 2, encl. 3.

RIYADH

H ̧ AFAR AL BĀŢIN

JIDDAH

Medina

Mecca

Ad Dammām

E G Y P T E G Y P T

S U D A N

IRAN

OMAN

UNITED ARAB

EMIRA TES

Q A T A R

BAHRAIN

K U WAI T

SYRIA

E T HIOPIA

PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

YEMEN AR A B

REPUBLI C

ISRAEL

J O R D A N

I R A Q

MIDDLE EAST DISTRICT

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION 

1977

Division Headquarters

District Oce

0

0 300 Miles

300 Kilometers

Map 21
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 357

districts within Saudi Arabia to divide the area of responsibility formerly handled by 

the Saudi Arabia District into more manageable proportions. These three initiatives 

created the framework in which the new division operated. 

New Districts

General Wells’ predecessor, Colonel Williams, and the commander of the Saudi 

Arabia District, Colonel Gray, both recognized that the division needed more than 

one district in Saudi Arabia to monitor construction in a land mass as large as the 

United States east of the Mississippi River. Since 1975, the Mediterranean Division 

had planned to activate a new district in Jiddah, but the transition to the new Middle 

East Division postponed those plans.89

During 1975 and 1976, the need for a district based in Jiddah increased. MODA 

developed programs for additional construction at the cantonments in Khamis 

Mushayt and Tabuk at the same time that the Saudi Navy planned a port at Jiddah. In 

late 1976, General Wells began to identify positions and personnel to move to Jiddah 

from the existing district in Riyadh. The division projected a staff of one hundred 

seventy for the Jiddah District, but recruiting remained behind schedule. In February 

1977, Wells dispatched a recruiting team to visit Washington, Berryville, Chicago, 

Omaha, Portland, San Francisco, Vicksburg, and Mobile, hoping to attract qualified 

applicants for the new district and for the division’s forward headquarters.90

On 1 April 1977, the Middle East Division activated the Jiddah District with 

Col. Phillip D. “Dave” Engle as district engineer. At the same time, the division 

reduced the Saudi Arabia District’s area of responsibility to eastern Saudi Arabia 

and renamed it the Riyadh District, staffing it with about two hundred sixty people. 

(Map 21) Reporting on the change, the Middle East Division’s news circular Castle 

Comments referred to the Saudi Arabia District established in January 1967 as the 

“expeditionary force of the Middle East Division.”91

Because the division expected to open a third district the following year to 

manage work on the cantonment at Hafar al Batin, Wells charged the Riyadh 

District with the task of developing a second district staff parallel to its own. On 

1 September, five months after the Riyadh District came into being, the division 

activated the Al Batin District exclusively to supervise work at the third cantonment, 

King Khalid Military City.92

89 Wells, “Establishment of a Planning and Control Capability”; Castle Comments 7, 29 November 

1975, box 6, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 90 Wells to Morris, 12 Dec 76, p. 4; Wells to Morris, 16 Mar 77, p. 5, box 6, access. no. 77-92-

0001, WNRC; Decision Memo 48F, Wells, 21 Dec 76. 91 See U.S. Army Engr Dist, Jiddah, Permanent Order 12–1, 3 Apr 77, on Authority of OCE 

Permanent Order 4–1, 11 Mar 77, SA 725, TAD-RHA; Wells to Morris, 16 Mar 77, p. 5. Quotation 

from Castle Comments, MED, Saudi, Spring/Summer 1977, p. 1, box 31, access. no. 77-92-0001, 

WNRC. 92 Interv, Moorhus with Col (Ret) Rayburn L. Williamson, 28 Sep 95, p. 5; OCE, “Annual Historical Review, Oct. 1, 1976–Sept. 30, 1977,” p. 9, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited as OCE, AHR, 

FY 1977).
358 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Engineer Logistics Command

In addition to realigning the districts, General Wells wanted to be sure that the 

Middle East Division had the capacity to provide logistical planning and support 

for contractors and Corps personnel in Saudi Arabia. With the dramatic expansion 

of the construction program between 1973 and 1976, the Mediterranean Division 

had decided that it had to procure and supply materials for the construction contractors. Otherwise, the competing demands of numerous contractors would lead to 

inefficiency, confusion, and inflation of costs for goods and machinery bought for 

construction. To promote uniformity in procurement and to lower costs, the division 

proposed to act as sole agent to buy the materials and equipment. Wells remained 

uncertain that the existing division organization satisfied the need. In mid-August 

1976, he commissioned an internal study and committed staff to examining alternative organizational structures.93

The series of study papers prepared by division staff examined governmentfurnished property (GFP), government-furnished materials (GFM), the planning 

necessary to manage both of these, and which entities ought to do that planning. 

The division vested these responsibilities in several elements within the command: 

the Logistics and Operations Division, the Engineering Planning and Liaison Office 

(EPLO), and the Engineer Support Group. Wells wanted a single organizational unit 

responsible for managing cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contracts with companies 

that would in turn act as buyers and suppliers for the major construction projects 

in Saudi Arabia.94

93 Wells, “Establishment of a Planning and Control Capability.” Decision Memo, George F. Miller, 

18 Aug 76; Memo, Miller, 21 Aug 76, sub: Establishment of a Planning and Control Capability in 

MED, and similar docs, Aug 76–Aug 77; all in box 12, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 94 Decision Memo, Miller, 18 Aug 76; Memo, Miller, 21 Aug 76; Page, “Summary of Division 

Staff Meeting—28 September 1976,” 28 Sep 76, p. 5, box 3, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. Wells’ 

New headquarters for the Riyadh District, 1979
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 359

The Engineer Logistics Command (ELC) came the closest to what Wells had 

in mind. Planning for this group’s formation went back at least to the activation in 

March 1976 of the Riyadh Base Support Division within the Saudi Arabia District. 

This support division exercised administrative responsibility for directing and 

coordinating all logistical activities in Saudi Arabia, including maintenance of 

materials and equipment, movement of materials and personnel, and management 

of housing and housing assignments. The Base Support Division had as one of its 

basic responsibilities the award and administration of a CPAF contract for service 

support throughout all of Saudi Arabia. The Middle East Division intended that the 

Engineer Support Group take over these responsibilities; but because Wells proposed 

to give the group the same authority vested in a Corps of Engineers district, he 

needed special permission before taking action.95

remarks in the meeting on 28 September apply particularly to KKMC, but the tenor of the studies of 

18 and 21 August 1976 indicates the same intent for the division’s operations as a whole. See Ltr, 

Wells to Morris, 29 Sep 76, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 95 On the Riyadh Base Support Division, see Mediterranean Div, GO no. 8, 5 Apr 76, and Memo, 

James R. Sides, 21 May 76, sub: Riyadh Base Support Division, both in box 31, access. no. 77-92-0001, 

WNRC. On the Engineer Support Group, see MFR, Vandenberg, 28 May 76, sub: Establishment of 

Engineer Support Group (ESG), and Vandenberg to HQDA, 10 Jun 76, sub: Organization of Saudi 

Arabia Engineer Support Group (ESG), both in box 31, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC.

Col. and Mrs. Ray Williamson at the dedication of new headquarters for the Riyadh 

District, August 1979
360 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

The Office of the Chief of Engineers approved the unit as equivalent to a district, 

as the Middle East Division requested, but objected to the name. OCE’s chief of 

construction, Fred McNeely, urged the division to give “serious consideration” 

to restricting the support group’s function of procuring construction materials for 

projects to materials purchased in Saudi Arabia and proposed that the commander of 

the new unit in the Middle East Division limit his role to oversight and coordination 

of procurement actions. He suggested that the division’s procurement actions be 

handled by procurement and supply branches that already existed in the United 

States. He seems to have had in mind the Huntsville Division, which had lost its 

primary mission when Congress eliminated funding for the Sentinel and Safeguard 

Ballistic Missile Systems in 1969 and 1975.96

The Mediterranean Division and the Huntsville Division already had a number of 

cooperative agreements. The Huntsville Division had worked with the Mediterranean 

Division on projects in Iran and Jordan earlier in the decade; in March 1976, the 

two divisions reached an agreement that put Huntsville in charge of procurement 

of furniture and household items for 129 leased villas in Riyadh, Jiddah, and 

Dhahran.97 Beginning in September 1976, Middle East Division personnel met 

with staff from the Huntsville Division to work out cooperative arrangements for 

Saudi Arabia. Huntsville formed a team of instructors to visit Riyadh late in the 

year to coach Middle East Division personnel in administering CPAF contracts. 

The Huntsville Division also agreed to review the Middle East Division’s draft of 

a request for proposals for a logistics management contractor to handle transport 

of goods and materials from the United States to the construction sites in Saudi 

Arabia. By mid-November, the Huntsville Division had become the procurement 

agent for purchases of nonconstruction materials in the United States for the Saudi 

Arabian modernization programs.98

During the intervening weeks, the Middle East Division accepted a suggestion 

from the chief of engineers, General Morris, that the new element be named the 

Engineer Logistics Command. The division also signed the first CPAF contract 

that the ELC would administer with Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE). This 

American company, which had held a combination of fixed-price and CPAF contracts 

in Vietnam dating back to the early 1960s, became the division’s countrywide service 

contractor, supplying life-support services throughout Saudi Arabia to Corps and 

contractor personnel except those working on the cantonment at Hafar al Batin.99

96 Memo, F. B. McNeely, 2 Aug 76, sub: Organization of Saudi Arabia Engineer Support Group 

(ESG), box 3, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 97 Louise S. Heidish, A History of the Huntsville Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1977–1981 

Update (Huntsville, Ala.: U.S. Army Engineer Division, Huntsville, ca. 1986), pp. 22–26; James A. 

Kitchens III, A History of the Huntsville Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1967–1976 (Huntsville, Ala.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1978), p. 162. 98 MFR, Lt Col Joseph J. Arcari, 3 Oct 76, sub: Logistic Meeting, 30 September 1976; John A. 

Hildenbrand, “Presentation of ESG Organization,” 17 Nov 76; both in box 31, access. no. 77-92-

0001, WNRC. 99 “Summary of Division Staff Meeting—6 November,” 11 Nov 76, pp. 3, 5; Wells to Morris, 12 

Dec 76, p. 4; both in box 3, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. See the definition of life support in MOU, 
New Programs and Organizational Changes, 1972–1977 361

Life support included housing, transportation, medical services, recreational services, 

furnishings and equipment, utilities, and maintenance of equipment and facilities. 

By March 1977, PAE had completed its mobilization, and the division served notice 

to local contractors that by June the company would provide all management and 

operations for life-support functions.100

On 17 January 1977, the Middle East Division formally established the Engineer 

Logistics Command with Col. John Hatch as its commander having authority 

similar to a district engineer. The Engineer Logistics Command contracted, initially 

with PAE, for life support on a countrywide basis to serve all personnel, families, 

and others associated with the Middle East Division’s work in Saudi Arabia. 

Progressively, the ELC took over management of leases. The ELC also provided 

the logistical management for all government-furnished procurement and materials. 

This included tracking of procurement requests from their origin to their delivery 

Brig Gen Richard M. Wells, Div Engr, and Capt Nasser F. Faisal, Dir General, Directorate of Military 

Works, 1 Nov 76, sub: Construction Operations, Support Activities and Contracting for KKMC, app. G, 

Walker box 8, OH, HQ USACE; “Project Plan Update, King Khalid Military City, revision 4 August 

1979,” vol. 1, p. 4, vol. 2, app. 7, an. B, pp. 1–8, Walker box 13, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited as 

Project Plan Update: KKMC). On PAE in Vietnam, see Lt Gen Carroll H. Dunn, Base Development 

in South Vietnam, 1965–70 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1991), pp. 92–94. 100 Bennett, “Command, Staff and Customer Relationships—Engineer Logistics Command,” 2 Jun 

77, box 31; Wells to Morris, 16 Mar 77, box 3; both in access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. Project Plan 

Update: KKMC, revision 4 Aug 79, vol. 1, p. III-2.

Housing built in Riyadh for lieutenants, ca. 1979
362 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

to the construction contractor and involved transportation of the materials to Saudi 

Arabia and their reception, storage, and transshipment from the port of entry.101

The ELC used two additional CPAF contracts to address its second responsibility. 

On 1 September 1977, the division signed a contract with an American company, 

Global Associates, to provide operations and maintenance services for the newly 

constructed port of Ras al Mishab. In late 1978, the ELC assumed management 

of a contract with Todd Warehouse and Distributors Inc. of Bayonne, New Jersey 

(also referred to as Todd Logistics International), to manage the division’s logistical 

operations.102

With the establishment of the Engineer Logistics Command in January 1977, the 

new districts in Jiddah and Riyadh in April, and the Al Batin District in September, 

the Middle East Division had completed its creation of a new organizational structure 

to manage military construction on behalf of the Saudi Arabian government. Despite 

the disruption caused by the dissolution of the Mediterranean Division, the relocation 

of personnel to the United States and to Saudi Arabia, and the organization of the 

Middle East Division, the construction program in Saudi Arabia had never stopped. 

Indeed, throughout the period of transition, Corps personnel launched some of the 

largest construction programs in the history of the Corps of Engineers. The story 

of those individual programs over the next decade constitutes the history of the 

Middle East Division.

101 The date for the ELC’s activation comes from OCE Regulation no. 10–1–28, Organization 

and Functions, U.S. Army Engineer Division, Middle East, 29 Sep 78, C-7-10, TAD-RHA, and 

Memo, Bennett, 2 Jun 77, sub: Command, Staff and Customer Relationships—Engineer Logistics 

Command, 1977, box 31, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. See also Castle Comments, MED Saudi, 

Spring/Summer 1977, p. 2, which gives a date ten days later. On the transfer of leases, see Memo, 

Gray to Col John Hatch, 28 Mar 77, sub: Transfer of Lease Files from MEC to MEL, box 30, access. 

no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 102 Memo, R. Phillip Benson [and] Earl J. Kramer to Div Engr, 28 Sep 77, sub: Project Narrative Report, Aug. 16–Sept. 15, 1977, p. 4, E-7-3, TAD-RHA. For early comments on the logistics 

management role and delays related to work at KKMC, see Wells to Morris, 28 Sep 76, p. 5, and 12 

Dec 76, p. 4; Project Plan Update: KKMC, revision 4 Aug 79, vol. 1, sec. 2, p. 4. For a wide-ranging 

discussion of the role of the Engineer Logistics Command, see Interv, Moorhus with Maj Gen (Ret) 

James N. Ellis, 27–29 Sep 95, pp. 312–27.
Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation 363

Between 1972 and 1976, the Saudi Arabian government asked the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers to undertake a broad range of construction programs 

for the Saudi Army, Air Force, Navy, and National Guard—a total armed force 

of only forty- to fifty thousand men.1

 This chapter focuses on projects executed 

for the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA), most of which came 

under the Engineer Assistance Agreement (EAA) of 1965. The EAA projects 

included expanded facilities for the Saudi Arabian Army at Khamis Mushayt 

and Tabuk, specialized military branch schools and developmental centers, new 

headquarters complexes for MODA and the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), a 

new all-service officers club in Riyadh, and several military medical centers. 

(See Map 22.) The two governments had other agreements that regulated the 

construction MODA ordered to support U.S. aircraft bought by the Saudi Air 

Force. The large construction programs commissioned by the Royal Saudi 

Naval Forces (RSNF) and the Saudi Arabian National Guard will be treated in 

the next chapter.

The EAA covered several new specialized schools built to train Saudi soldiers.2

The Artillery Center and School, the Infantry Center and School, and the Airborne 

and Physical Training School were all part of the general expansion of facilities at 

Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk. The Corps also managed the design and construction 

of the most ambitious of the school projects, the King Abdulaziz Military Academy, 

discussed in Chapter 12. A fourth center, the Engineer School, was included in the 

development of the third cantonment, King Khalid Military City, which will be 

covered in Chapter 13.

1 Numbers on the size of the Saudi armed forces vary. The best discussion of their growth from 

the 1950s through the 1970s is in Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic 

Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military 

Balance (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984). See also Walter Pincus, “The Saudi Connection,” 

Washington Post, 1 May 1975, and “Foreign Entanglements: Now Saudi Arabia,” New Republic (29 

March 1975): 9. 2 For a slightly different but general overview of the programs under the Engineer Assistance 

Agreement, see “Saudi Arabian Programs,” [1981], passim, box SH-6-93-0006, Transatlantic Division–

Records Holding Area (TAD-RHA).

10

Programs for the Ministry of

Defense and Aviation in the

1970s and 1980s
364 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Upgrading Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk

From 1964 to 1974, the Saudi Arabian government spent over $160 million to 

construct the King Faisal Military Cantonment at Khamis Mushayt and the King 

Abdulaziz Military Cantonment at Tabuk. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, 

the Ministry of Defense and Aviation spent an additional billion dollars to expand 

the facilities at both cantonments.

The millions spent to build Khamis Mushayt were far greater than the estimates 

for the project as outlined in 1964. In cost projections that year, the Mediterranean 

Division reduced the initial calculation of $47 million to $31 million, but the scope 

of the cantonment expanded during construction. Costs, including all equipment and 

the establishment of facilities-engineering operations, rose to about $82.3 million by 

RIYADH

AL JUBAYL

KHASHM AL ‘ĀN

R’AS AL MISH’ĀB

DHAHRAN

AL HASA

JIDDAH

AŢ ŢĀ’IF

TABŪK

KHAMĪS MUSHAYT

H ̧ AFAR AL BĀŢIN

Medina

Mecca

Ad Dammām Al Khubar

Yanbu’ 

E G Y P T E G Y P T

S U D A N

IRAN

OMAN

UNITED ARAB

EMIRA TES

Q A T A R

BAHRAIN

SYRIA

ISRAEL

E T HIOPIA

PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

YEMEN AR A B

REPUBLI C

J O R D A N

I R A Q

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

MIDDLE EAST DIVISION 

1970s

SAUDI ARABIA

Division Headquarters

Ministry of Defense and Aviation Cantonment

Port

Peace Hawk and Peace Sun

Saudi Naval Expansion Program

Saudi Arabian National Guard Program

0

0 300 Miles

300 Kilometers

Map 22
Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation 365

1972 when Saudi Army units began to occupy the cantonment. Construction of the 

cantonment at Tabuk took place between 1969 and 1974. Because early planning 

for Tabuk designated it as a two-brigade installation, cost estimates, around $64.6 

million, ran higher than for Khamis Mushayt. The scope of work was adjusted 

to make the installation a one-brigade facility; but before the end of the initial 

construction in March 1974, costs reached $80 million.3

The Saudis hardly paused in their modernization program when they moved 

into the two cantonments. They immediately asked the Mediterranean Division 

to develop proposals for additional facilities at both Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk: 

medical support facilities, VIP complexes, specialized training centers, headquarters 

facilities for the area commander, and water and sewage treatment systems to support 

the growing population.

3 For the early cost estimate and revisions, see “Saudi Arabia Military Assistance Program, Revised 

Design Cost Estimate—Khamis Mushait [sic],” [Sep 64], box 5, access. no. 77-92-0002, Washington 

National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md. For the cost of construction by 1971, see Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, p. 7, box 1, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; “EIG [Engineer 

Inspector General] Inspection: Annual General Inspection, Saudi Arabia District, 29 May–1 June 

1972,” 16 May 72, p. 4A, box 51-84-9384, Richard T. Farrell Papers, Office of History (OH), HQ 

United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Alexandria, Va.; “Saudi Arabia Military Construction Program Budget Estimates and Schedules, Six-Year Program,” 14 Feb 65, p. 1, box 51-84-5389, 

Farrell Papers; “Annual Historical Summary Report, CY 74,” [31 Dec 74], p. 1, box 15, access. no. 

77-92-0001, WNRC (hereafter cited as Annual Hist Sum, CY 1974).

Concrete batch plant at Khamis Mushayt
366 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Medical Support Facilities

When the Saudi government initially commissioned the construction of the cantonments, its leaders had envisioned small post hospitals at each location staffed by a Saudi 

medical corps; but they did not have the pool of military or professional personnel 

to staff the hospitals. In late 1973, MODA contracted directly with the Whittaker 

Corporation to staff and operate the three medical facilities; accommodating the influx 

of Whittaker personnel required construction for housing and other support.4

The U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Nicholas G. Thacher, recommended 

engaging the Corps of Engineers to develop the medical communities. In June 1974, the 

Mediterranean Division negotiated a letter contract with the J. A. Jones Construction 

Company to design and build community-support facilities and housing in all three 

locations. The contract required Jones to provide some facilities as an “urgent project” 

to be completed within a year at an estimated cost of $175 million. The package called 

for two hundred twenty family-housing duplexes to house doctors, one thousand 

three hundred twenty apartments for nurses and other medical personnel, recreational 

facilities, dining halls, and medical and basic support buildings. The second phase of the 

4 Interv, Thomas Tulenko with Col (Ret) Charles T. Williams, 20–21 Feb 85, p. 118; Memoirs 

by George Zeiler [1980], unmarked box, TAD-RHA (hereafter cited as Zeiler Memoirs; Annual Hist 

Sum, CY 1974, pp. A2, B3; Pincus, “The Saudi Connection,” and “Foreign Entanglements,” pp. 

8–10; MFR, Blake, 15 Dec 74, sub: Trip Report—Tabuk, Jiddah, and Khamis Mushayt—8 thru 11 

December 1974, p. 2, box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers.

Sand mining at Wadi Tindaha for construction at Khamis Mushayt
Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation 367

construction, estimated at $35 million, encompassed space for training, administration 

buildings, outpatient clinics, vehicle-maintenance facilities, and water storage. In a 

third phase, principally at Khamis Mushayt, the Jones Company contracted to build 

a boys school, a girls school, additional training facilities, and guardhouses.5

In late 1975, during Jones’ work at Khamis Mushayt, MODA requested the 

Mediterranean Division’s help for new, unrelated facilities at the cantonment: firing 

ranges, roads, parade grounds, and bleachers. Because MODA wanted the parade 

grounds and bleachers to be ready in six months, the division proposed negotiating 

a modification of the Jones contract to include these items. The division proposed 

to follow the normal process of solicitation for the other work. The 1975 working 

estimate for these additional facilities, including expansion of the power supply, 

was $33 million. The firing ranges alone, on which work continued into the early 

1980s, cost a total of $16.7 million.6

5 Durham to Williams, 8 Aug 73, p. 3, box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers; OCE, “Annual Report of Major 

Activities, FY 74,” p. 66, copy in R&D File 2270, Transatlantic Programs Center (TAC), Winchester, 

Va. (hereafter cited as OCE, Major Activities, FY 1974); Chart, “Engineer Assistance Agreement,” attached to Brazier, “Various Aspects of the Army’s Construction Effort,” 6 Jun 75, unmarked box, OH, 

HQ USACE; Annual Hist Sum, CY 1974, p. A2; “Saudi Arabia Programs,” 28 Feb 78, p. 26, unmarked 

box, TAD-RHA; J. A. Jones Construction Company, Jones Journal (Fall 1978): 8–9. 6 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 8 Jan 76, pp. 2, 5–6, box 17, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

Chart, “Engineer Assistance Agreement”; Robertson to Al Faisal, 13 Dec 82, sub: Closeout Documents 

for Firing Ranges, Khamis Mushayt (Index 016), box 9, K-8-4, TAD-RHA. 

Outpatient clinic at Khamis Mushayt, March 1978
368 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Schools

MODA planned to place two of its specialized training centers—the Infantry Center 

and School and the Field Artillery Center and School—at Khamis Mushayt as satellite 

installations. In October 1975, the American architect-engineer firm of Perkins and 

Will received the contract to develop a master plan for each school. The infantry center, 

estimated to cost $75 million, would accommodate about one thousand seven hundred 

students, staff, and cadre. The plan included a headquarters building, an academic 

complex, dining facilities, a housing complex, a mosque, sports and recreational facilities, 

and a maintenance and warehouse complex. The company designed the Field Artillery 

Center and School, estimated to cost about $50 million, with similar facilities for a 

population of about one thousand two hundred students, staff, and cadre. J. A. Jones 

completed construction on the infantry center in early 1977 and on the artillery center 

in early 1978.7

In May 1975, another American architect-engineer firm, Sverdrup and Parcel 

from St. Louis, Missouri, began work on the master plan for the Airborne and Physical 

Training School to be built at Tabuk. Sverdrup and Parcel engineers used as a starting 

point a preliminary plan approved by the Saudi military liaison officer. In June, MODA 

added a ranger headquarters facility, a company administration and supply building, 

7 “SAA Infantry Center, Preliminary Plan,” May 75, box 31, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; 

Chart, “Engineer Assistance Agreement”; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, pp. 17–18; 

“Saudi Arabia Programs,” 28 Feb 78, pp. 82, 84.

Swimming pool at Khamis Mushayt
Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation 369

a cargo-rigging building, and an obstacle course. The Saudis increased the scope of 

the other facilities and changed the concept of the school to include ranger training, 

jumpmaster training, and heavy cargo rigger training instead of just basic parachute 

training as originally envisioned. In October, they requested an enclosed gymnasium for 

basketball, a swimming pool with locker rooms and offices, a fencing gymnasium, and 

an additional volleyball court. Since the Corps had already scheduled the presentation 

of the master plan for early November, Sverdrup and Parcel did not include these items 

in their plan.8

On 2 November, Sverdrup and Parcel made their presentation to the minister of 

Defense and Aviation, Prince Sultan. A week later, MODA approved the plan pending 

incorporation of a number of modifications requested by the prince—a shaded training 

area, a mosque to accommodate seven hundred people instead of five hundred, an indoor 

swimming pool for the physical-training program, and a second confidence-building 

course for ranger training. The Saudi Arabian Army area commander also insisted that the 

designers add a running track and a soccer field exclusively for the school. In December, 

after Sverdrup had begun revisions, the Saudis added a requirement to include quarters 

for eight guards adjacent to the Airborne School gatehouse. The final plan located the 

school adjacent to the Tabuk cantonment and provided for a completely self-contained 

living and training complex, including ninety-six family-housing units.9

The interventions and changes of scope at the Airborne and Physical Training School 

typified the design process for many of the projects that the Saudis commissioned. 

The changes often led to delays in completing the designs, and the costs of a project 

increased as the scope expanded. Even after the Corps issued the request for proposals for 

construction, the Saudis introduced changes—such as relocating stairwells and moving 

instructor offices farther away from classroom space—involving major architectural, 

structural, mechanical, and electrical redesign. Middle East Division personnel repeatedly 

sought to convey to Capt. Naser F. Al Faisal—a Corps trainee as a young engineer and 

director general of military works since 1 January 1976—and to others in MODA that 

their requests for changes substantially increased costs.10

In the spring of 1977, the You One Construction Company of Seoul, Korea, 

won the construction contract with a bid of $83.5 million for the Airborne Physical 

Training School, which included the largest concentration of solar energy collectors 

in the world. The collector system provided 40 percent of the heat and all of the 

hot water for the installation’s main complex, which held fourteen of the school’s 

8 Fact Sheet, Abn Sch—Increase in Project Scope, 1 Nov 76, E-7-2, TAD-RHA.

9 Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, p. 16; Fact Sheet, Abn Sch—Increase in Project 

Scope, 1 Nov 76; Bennett to Al Faisal, 17 Nov 76, sub: MODA Budget Item 240/2/15 Airborne School, 

Tabuk, E-7-2, TAD-RHA; “Saudi Arabia Programs,” 28 Feb 78, p. 62; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg 

Min, 15 Dec 75, p. 3, box 18, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 10 Quotes from DF, Wiles, 18 Feb 77, sub: MLO Final Design Review Comments for the Airborne 

and Physical Training School at Tabuk, E-7-2, TAD-RHA. See also “Responses to MLO Final Design 

Review Comments of Airborne & Physical Training School Design,” n.d., attached to Bennett to Al 

Faisal, 1 Mar 77, sub: MODA Budget Item 240/2/15 Airborne School, Tabuk, E-7-2, TAD-RHA.
370 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

twenty-two buildings. The You One Company completed construction in May 1980 

at a total cost of $107 million.11

As part of the expansion of services at Tabuk, MODA asked the Corps to add a 

$1.4 million air-conditioning system to the Armor School and to link the school to 

the cantonment’s sewage system. Other Corps activities at the cantonment included 

renovations of the Tabuk officers club and construction of underground storage for 

petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL).12

11 Col George W. Page, “Mediterranean Division [sic] Command Briefing,” 21 Jun 77, p. 18, 

unmarked box, TAD-RHA; “Saudi Arabia Programs,” 28 Feb 78, p. 62; Brig Gen James N. Ellis, 

“Formal Testimony, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, Europe and the Middle East,” 25 Jun 79, 

p. 10 of typescript, PAO [Public Affairs Office], TAD-RHA; U.S. Congress, House, Activities of 

the United States Army Corps of Engineers in Saudi Arabia. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 

Europe and The Middle East (Lee H. Hamilton [Indiana], Chairman), of the Committee on Foreign 

Relations, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, p. 11 (hereafter cited as Hamilton Comm Hearings); “Airborne 

School Uses Solar Power,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, September-October 1980; Fact Sheet, MED Projects 

in Saudi Arabia, 29 Mar 85, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 12 “MODA Fund Recapitulation,” app., MDD Directive no. 71, 4 Feb 76, E-7-6, TAD-RHA; 

Lively to Al Faisal, 9 Jul 77, sub: Sewage Treatment Plant, Tabuk, E-7-2, TAD-RHA; Memo, 

Drennon, 21 Feb 73, sub: Trip Report, SNEP (Athens, Greece) and Qaysumah Design (Saudi 

Arabia), 28 January–14 February 1973, p. 4, Walker box 8, OH, HQ USACE; Memo, Maj D. G. 

Barney, 27 Aug 73, sub: Tabuk Dedication, box 276 of 357, TAD-RHA; Albro to Al Faisal, 15 

Dec 80, sub: Closeout Documents for Air Conditioning, Armor School, Tabuk, L-8-5, TAD-RHA; 

Mosque at the Airborne and Physical Training School, Tabuk
Solar panels, Tabuk, late 1970s
372 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Area Commander’s Headquarters

In February 1976, the Saudi Arabian government formally requested Corps 

support to design and build, adjacent to the existing brigade headquarters at Khamis 

Mushayt, a headquarters complex for the Saudi Arabian Army’s area commander. 

MODA wanted a facility with modular flexibility able to accommodate a staff of sixty 

initially and adaptable up to one hundred eighty as staff needs increased. MODA set 

a budget for the project of $1.4 million. Corps personnel worked on the design in 

house during the 1976 transition from the Mediterranean to the Middle East Division. 

In 1977, when the Middle East Division awarded a contract for construction to the 

low bidder, Najeeb Establishment of Riyadh, division staff advised Al Faisal that 

“additional funds in the amount of $3,577,811 are required.” When finally completed 

in the early 1980s, the new headquarters’ costs of had exceeded $5.77 million.13

In early 1977, MODA asked the Corps to undertake the construction of an area 

commander’s headquarters building at Tabuk as well, using the same approach as 

at Khamis Mushayt. Within weeks, however, MODA suspended action on that 

building as the ministry contemplated the prospect of reductions by as much as 50 

percent in programs submitted for budget consideration within the Saudi Arabian 

government.14

VIP Complexes and Family Housing

All of the facilities that the Saudis built in the modernization of their armed 

forces included special housing for dignitaries and for the king and his entourage. At 

Khamis Mushayt, the VIP complex consisted of a 50-unit guest house, an 8-bedroom 

guest house, and a 4-bedroom executive villa. In August 1977, the Middle East 

Division signed a $14.5 million contract for the construction of this complex with 

Hanil Development Company Ltd. of Seoul, Korea. The division closed accounts 

on the project in early 1984 at a total cost of $18.4 million, including furniture, 

furnishings, and equipment.15

USACE, “This Is Saudi Arabia,” 7 Feb 76, p. 4, box 2, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Page, 

“Mediterranean Division [sic] Command Briefing,” 21 Jun 77, p. 19. 13 Memo, Bennett to Al Faisal, 9 Apr 77, sub: Area Commander Headquarters Tabuk and Khamis 

Mushayt, E-7-4; Fact Sheet, Area Commanders’ [sic] HQ, Khamis Mushayt, 10 Nov 77, E-7-4; Al 

Faisal to Lively, 24 Sep 77, sub: Area Commander’s Headquarters Building, Khamis Mushate [sic], 

E-7-4; Bennett to Al Faisal, 13 Mar 79, sub: Request for Authority to Award Construction Contract—

Area Commander’s Headquarters, Khamis Mushayt, E-7-5; Robertson to Lt Col Abdulaziz Otaishan, 

10 Mar 84, sub: Closeout Documents for Area Commanders’ [sic] Headquarters, Khamis Mushayt, 

K-8-3; all in TAD-RHA. 14 Memo, Bennett to Al Faisal, 9 Apr 77; Memo, Al Faisal to Bennett, 27 Apr 77, sub: Area Commander Headquarters, Tabuk and Khamis Mushayt, E-7-4, TAD-RHA; Wells to Morris, 16 Mar 77, 

box 3, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 15 MFR, Emil L. Blondell, Project Engr, 3 Jun 66, sub: Presentation of Design-Planning Criteria 

for Cantonment at Khamis Mushayt, box 44 of 357, TAD-RHA; MFR, Blake, 15 Dec 74, sub: Trip 

Report—Tabuk, Jiddah, and Khamis Mushayt—8 thru 11 December 1974, p. 2, box 51-84-9384, 

Farrell Papers; Trip Rpt, 9 Dec 78, sub: Khamis Mushayt, Saudi Arabia, 13–14 Nov 78, p. 2, E-5-6, 
Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation 373

In late 1975, Sverdrup and Parcel, the same company that prepared the master 

plan for the Airborne and Physical Training School at Tabuk, received the contract to 

design the VIP complex at that cantonment. In July 1977, the Middle East Division 

awarded a contract to the You One Company with $21.6 million to build the main 

VIP complex and another $6.32 million for a special villa. The division included in 

the same construction contract two smaller projects—renovation of the officers club 

estimated at $1 million and construction of an underground POL storage facility at 

just under $2.2 million. Construction began on the VIP villas in late 1977 with a 

completion date of June 1979.16

Family housing for servicemen constituted the largest single category of facilities 

in the Corps of Engineers’ support for the Saudi Arabian military, accounting for over 

25 percent of the total spending. The Corps estimated the cost of housing additions 

at Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk at $250 million for each location. In June 1976, J. A. 

Jones received a notice to proceed with construction of forty-eight housing units for 

army officers at Khamis Mushayt. A much larger, and over time more troublesome, 

contract went in March 1976 to the Blount Brothers Corporation for construction of 

over three hundred family-housing units at Tabuk. Blount fell behind schedule very 

early, and it appeared unlikely that the company would recover enough to complete 

the work on time. The work was only marginally satisfactory and progress very slow. 

By July 1977, Al Faisal concluded that Blount should receive no additional work 

in the kingdom. The chief of the Middle East Division’s Engineering Planning and 

Liaison Office in Riyadh, Earl J. Kramer, reached the same conclusion and observed: 

“Given Blount’s difficulties and apparent lack of progress with the family housing 

project,” the company “should not be considered for any work outside their current 

contract.” By the date set for completion of the contract, January 1978, Blount had 

only a few facilities ready to turn over. Turnover continued in stages until the builder 

completed the work on 13 June 1979.17

TAD-RHA; Bennett to Al Faisal, 25 Jun 77, sub: VIP Complex, Khamis Mushayt, RFP DACA 78-

77-R-0012, E-7-2, TAD-RHA; Construction Contract, DACA 92-77-C-0005, Hanil Development 

Co. Ltd., 6 Aug 77, box 231 of 357, TAD-RHA; Robertson to Otaishan, 26 Feb 84, sub: Closeout 

Documents for VIP Complex, Khamis Mushayt, I-5-2, TAD-RHA. 16 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 12 Nov 75, p. 3, box 18, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

Bennett to Al Faisal, 9 Nov 77, sub: VIP Complex, Special VIP Villa, Tabuk, DACA 78-77-C-0063, 

E-7-4, TAD-RHA; Bennett to Al Faisal, 20 Jul 77, sub: Request for Authority to Award Four Projects 

at Tabuk, E-7-2, TAD-RHA; Bennett to Al Faisal, 1 May 77, sub: Renovation of MODA Officers’ 

Club, Tabuk, E-7-2, TAD-RHA; John R. Lewis, “VIP Complex and Special VIP Villa, Tabuk,” 30 

Oct 77, E-7-4, TAD-RHA; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 12 Nov 75, p. 3, box 18, access. no. 

77-92-0001, WNRC; Earl J. Kramer, “VIP Complex, Tabuk,” 13 Nov 77, E-7-4, TAD-RHA. 17 “Distribution of MED Program by Type Facility,” in Hamilton Comm Hearings, p. 6; Chart, 

“Engineer Assistance Agreement”; Memo, Kramer, 13 Jul 77, sub: Sliding Partitions for Officer’s 

Housing Khamis Mushayt & Tabuk, E-7-2, TAD-RHA; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, 

p. 15; [Saudi Arabia District?], Qtrly Hist Narrative Rpt (1 Jan 77–31 Mar 77), E-1-2, TAD-RHA; 

Contract DACA 75-76-C-0044, Family Housing Cantonment, Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, Completion Date, 

2 Aug 82, K-8-4, TAD-RHA; quotation from Kramer, “Additional Work at Tabuk; Accomplishment 

of,” 9 Jul 77, E-7-2, TAD-RHA.
374 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Providing the Infrastructure

Throughout Saudi Arabia, both the scarcity and the mineral content of groundwater created vexing problems. The amount of water available at any location was 

always a concern in planning construction. The water system developed for Khamis 

Mushayt, which drew from the Wadi Bishah North, was adequate to support only 

the population of the cantonment itself, not the 100 percent increase in population 

that occurred in the area as construction on the cantonment advanced. Aware of 

the strain on the water supply, the division designed an interim solution—a station 

and a booster pump to the Wadi Bishah waterline. The division projected that the 

needs of the cantonment and the air base at Khamis Mushayt would again exceed 

the water supply by early 1978. So short was water in the area that, as MODA 

developed new wells, local farmers shut them down because they believed that the 

wells interfered with their own irrigation.18

In January 1976, the Mediterranean Division negotiated a contract with the 

architect-engineer firm of James E. Montgomery Inc. to design a longer-term solution 

to the water shortage. One solution involved “massive engineering efforts,” such as 

pumping water from sea level up the 7,000-foot escarpment to Khamis Mushayt. 

18 Memo, Melvin Green, 29 Jan 71, sub: Trip Report—Khamis Mushayt, Saudi Arabia, and Asmara, Ethiopia, 5–26 Jan 71, p. 3, box 21, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; Bennett to Al Faisal, 27 

Dec 76, E-7-2, TAD-RHA; Maj Richard J. Vedell to Al Faisal, 1 Oct 79, sub: Saudi Arabian Armed 

Forces Signal Center and School, Taif, Saudi Arabia, p. 2, E-7-5, TAD-RHA.

VIP villa at Khamis Mushayt
Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation 375

Preliminary calculations suggested that such an operation would cost in excess of 

$200 million and would demand a competent contractor to operate and maintain 

the system. Although water was never drawn from the bottom of the escarpment, 

concern over the water shortage did prompt development of a second water source. 

In mid-July 1979, the division awarded a contract to Al Harbi Establishment for 

construction of a system to draw water from the Wadi Itwed to the cantonment. The 

line was completed in the early 1980s.19

Even when water was available, there were problems. The high concentration 

of chemicals in the water on the Arabian Peninsula fouled the circulation systems 

the Corps installed. Studies commissioned by the Corps determined that the water 

contained dissolved gasses and minerals in a highly unstable state. Any change in 

the concentration of hydrogen ions (pH), in temperature, or in pressure and velocity 

during pumping or water circulation provoked precipitation of chemical salts, 

principally calcium and magnesium carbonates. Encrusted salts corroded pipes, 

metal fixtures, and boiler and cooler parts, leading to performance degradation, 

bursting pipes, and equipment failure.20

The division’s Engineering Planning and Liaison Office proposed hiring an 

engineering firm, Black and Veatch of Kansas City, to study the problem of chemical 

salts. The company concluded that the Corps had to design a system that would 

process the water to remove the troublesome chemicals. In early November 1976, 

MODA’s General Directorate of Military Works approved the study. In late 1979, 

the division added a water-treatment project to the contract for the VIP complex at 

Tabuk. The resulting construction created the facilities to neutralize the scaling and 

corrosive properties of the water systems at military installations around the country. 

The project, implemented over the next several years, cost $3.768 million.21

Like the water system, the sewage system planned for the original installation 

at Khamis Mushayt became inadequate as the population in and around the cantonment increased. During the 1970s, the Corps managed the construction of two 

supplementary sewage-treatment plants at the cantonment. One was an expansion 

of the existing system to accommodate the cantonment and the infantry and artillery 

schools. The second was a new system to serve new family housing. In March 1976, 

the Frank E. Basil Company completed design for the expanded system as part of the 

support facilities for the medical center staff. Problems with funding delayed award 

19 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 29 Dec 75, p. 2, and 8 Jan 76, p. 2, box 17, access. no. 77-92-

0001, WNRC; Bennett to Al Faisal, 27 Dec 76; Kramer, “Development of Wadis Itwed and Tindahah,” 

27 Sep 77, E-7-2, TAD-RHA; Col James B. Hall to Al Faisal, 5 Aug 79, sub: Reprogramming Funds, 

K-8-5, TAD-RHA; Ellis to Morris, 11 Jan 80, pp. 5–6, and 24 May 80, p. 7, Walker box 6, OH, HQ 

USACE; Albro to Morris, 21 Sep 80, p. 6, box 1, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 20 “Field Lessons-Learned Comments,” 11 Aug 76, E-5-3, TAD-RHA; Kramer to Al Faisal, 12 

Oct 76, 3-7-2, TAD-RHA; DF, Blake, 17 Nov 76, sub: Cooling Water Problems at Tabuk (Similar 

Problems Exist at Jeddah and K-M), E-5-3, TAD-RHA; MFR, Blake, 15 Dec 74. 21 Kramer to Al Faisal, 12 Oct 76; “Water Corrosion Study, Tabuk,” [6] Nov 76, 3-7-2, TADRHA; Ellis to Morris, 19 Sep 79, p. 5, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; Robertson to Al Faisal, 30 

Nov 82, sub: Closeout Documents for Water Corrosion and Scaling Protection, Tabuk (Index 039), 

K-8-4, TAD-RHA.
376 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

of a construction contract for over a year. In September 1976, Perkins and Will, the 

architect-engineer company designing additional family housing at Khamis Mushayt, 

completed a design for the new sewage-treatment plant that served the housing units. 

Construction began in late 1977; in December 1979, the division turned the new 

plant over to the Saudi Arabian Army. The project cost $11.7 million.22

The expansion of facilities at Tabuk also created a need to increase the capacity 

of the sewage-treatment system there. Frank E. Basil delivered the cantonment’s new 

master plan to the Middle East Division at the end of 1976, and the division designed 

the sewage-treatment plant in house in conformance with the Basil master plan. Early 

in 1977, the Saudis asked the division to modify design of the sewage-treatment 

plant to include the armor school and to increase capacity from a population base 

of twenty-six thousand to one of forty thousand. They also requested that the plans 

include a similar increase in the system that used sewage wastewater to irrigate 

landscaping. The division estimated that the additional costs would amount to $8.2 

million in construction. Contractors completed work on the irrigation system in late 

1979 and the sewage plant in early 1980.23

As other facilities expanded, the power plants at Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk 

had to be improved and augmented; in 1973, the Saudis requested assistance from 

the Corps. Poor maintenance and the hard water caused serious corrosion in the 

cooling system for the diesel generators that provided the electricity. The engines 

needed overhaul to allow them to generate to capacity. Between 1975 and early 

1977, the J. A. Jones Company at Khamis Mushayt and Sverdrup and Parcel at 

Tabuk worked to overhaul and redesign the power plants.24

Closing Out the Projects

Taken together, the various additions and improvements constructed at the 

Khamis Mushayt cantonment between 1974 and 1979 totaled $310 million. During 

the 1980s, the Corps supervised another $5 million in construction. In September 

1981, the Corps of Engineers left Khamis Mushayt and turned over the compound 

to a U.S.-Saudi agency active in the country since 1974 and alternately called the 

Joint Commission of Economic Cooperation or the Joint Economic Commission 

22 Kramer, “Sewage Treatment Plants, Khamis Mushayt,” 26 May 77, E‐7‐2, TAD-RHA; Ellis to 

Morris, 11 Jan 80, pp. 5–6; Robertson to Otaishan, 29 Mar 84, sub: Closeout Documents for Sewage 

Treatment Plant, Khamis Mushayt, K-8-3, TAD-RHA. 23 Memo, Jarel P. Starling, 29 Oct 76, sub: Trip Report, Firm Frank E. Basil, Athens, Greece, 25 

through 28 October 1976, E-7-2, TAD-RHA; Lively to Al Faisal, 2 Mar 77, sub: Sewage Treatment 

Plant, Tabuk, E-7-2, TAD-RHA; Lively to Al Faisal, 9 Jul 77; Ellis to Morris, 11 Jan 80, pp. 5–6, and 

24 May 80, p. 7, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE. 24 Memo, Maj John F. Sobke, 24 Jun 72, sub: Visit to the King Faisal Military Cantonment, box 

107 of 357, TAD-RHA; MFR, Blake, 15 Dec 74; Durham to Williams, 13 Oct 73, p. 3, box 51-84-

9384, Farrell Papers; [Saudi Arabia District?] Qtrly Hist Narr Rpt (1 Jan 77–31 Mar 77). Bennett to 

Al Faisal, 9 Jun 77, sub: Power Plant Expansion, Phase II, Tabuk, E-7-2, TAD-RHA; Memo, Lewis 

to Dept of the Army, 3 Oct 78, sub: Construction Progress Report, attachment Qtrly Status Rpt for 

Facilities Construction . . . Saudi Arabia [30 Sep 78], E-5-6, TAD-RHA.
Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation 377

Representative Group (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia)—with the acronym JECOR used for 

both titles. The transfer included trailers, furniture, generators, and other capital 

assets worth over $430,000. Subsequent construction work at Khamis Mushayt 

came under supervision of the Western Area Office of the Riyadh District.25

At Tabuk, the supplemental work had begun in 1974; by the autumn of 1978, the 

Middle East Division had contracts for all the work outlined in plans for expansion 

except for one project, a water-treatment facility completed in 1980. On 30 August 

1980, with the supplemental work substantially completed, King Khalid dedicated 

the Airborne School at the cantonment.26

Although the work was done, Tabuk remained an active concern for the division 

because of the Blount contract. In June 1979, upon completion of the new family 

housing, Blount Brothers initiated a claim against the Corps. In late November 1979, 

the company submitted a formal justification that ran to seven volumes of printed 

material. Blount contended that delays and cost overruns attributable to government 

failures to meet the terms of the contract had cost the company $65.1 million.27

Following usual procedures, the division conducted an audit of the contract to 

determine what portions of the claim were legitimate. To assist with the closeout 

negotiations, the division called a contract analyst and negotiator, Calvin S. Martin, 

out of retirement. Early in 1980, the two sides entered into preliminary talks led by 

Col. Gurnie C. Gunter, who as the district engineer at Jiddah since 1979 had been 

the contracting officer on the project. In an agreement reached on 22 April 1980, 

the Corps acknowledged $21.49 million of Blount’s claims as valid: $18.9 million 

on the family housing and $2.59 million on other facilities.28

With an agreement in hand, Gunter requested permission from Al Faisal to 

make the payment to Blount. Al Faisal balked and refused to authorize the payment, 

pointedly noting that any attempt by the division to transfer funds unilaterally would 

constitute “stealing” Saudi government monies. Al Faisal was adamant that the 

EAA prohibited the Corps of Engineers from transferring funds between projects 

without MODA’s explicit approval. Indeed, the practice of the Mediterranean and 

Middle East Divisions, to which the division could find no exception in its records, 

had been to request such approval. The Corps was equally adamant that the EAA 

25 Fact Sheet, MED Projects in Saudi Arabia, 29 Mar 85, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; “A Short 

History of the Corps of Engineers in Saudi Arabia,” 1993, p. 2, Current Files, PAO, TAD-RHA; 

Memo, Lt Col George R. Leonard, 30 Sep 81, sub: Turnover of Compound in Khamis Mushayt 

from MED to JECOR, box 30, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Ellis to Morris, 24 May 80, p. 4. On 

JECOR, see Middle East Div, “Information Booklet,” [hand-dtd Dec 81], p. II-3, box 3, access. no. 

77-92-0002, WNRC. On the creation, composition, and objectives of JECOR, see Pincus, “Foreign 

Entanglements,” pp. 8–10. 26 Ellis to Morris, 26 Sep 78, 11 Jan 80, p. 6, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; Albro to Morris, 

21 Sep 80, p. 6. 27 DF, Charles T. Frew, 6 Feb 80, sub: Claim on Contract DACA 75-76-C-0044, Additional Family 

Housing, Tabuk, K-8-5, TAD-RHA. 28 Ellis to Mayor, Goldendale, Wash., 18 Nov 79, box 14, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; DF, 

Frew, 6 Feb 80; Frew to Calvin S. Martin, 23 Apr 80, box 14, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Memo, 

Col Gurnie C. Gunter to Al Faisal, 5 May 80, sub: Request for Reprogramming Authority, unmarked 

box, OH, HQ USACE.
378 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

acknowledged the authority of the contracting officer to settle claims and fixed the 

responsibility on the Saudi Arabian government to pay for claim settlements.29

The Corps found itself caught between Al Faisal’s anger over the settlement 

with Blount and the practices and obligations under U.S. law. The division could 

not repudiate the settlement that Gunter had reached with Blount. Moreover, in 

estimating the potential liability faced by the government, the Defense Contracting 

Audit Agency had concluded that, if the claim went to adjudication, Blount might 

win substantially more than the proposed settlement. The division therefore 

considered Gunter’s compromise about as advantageous as possible under the 

circumstances.30

The matter stalled for months. At the behest of the installation facilities engineer, 

the division sent an inspection team to Tabuk to examine structural failures in the 

houses that Blount had built. The team identified contractor error as a substantial 

element in the structural failures. The contractor had used improper materials to 

backfill the area—a former landfill—on which it built the housing units. The team 

tested only a sample of twenty-eight houses but concluded that the situation required 

further geotechnical investigation of all structures in the landfill area to determine 

the extent of risk of future problems.31

In early May 1981, the Middle East Division commander, Brig. Gen. Ames 

S. Albro Jr., met with Prince Sultan. General Albro reviewed the Corps’ methods 

and procedures for supervising construction contracts. He emphasized that the 

contracting officer had the authority to negotiate and settle claims with the contractor 

on behalf of the Saudi government. Albro then reviewed the Blount Brothers 

contract for the Tabuk housing project. Blount had claimed over $65 million in 

compensation. The project’s contracting officer had through negotiations reduced 

this claim to $18.9 million. The division did not have the money in the project’s 

budget to pay this amount, so Albro requested the prince’s authorization to allocate 

funds to pay the contractor.32

Prince Sultan responded that in his judgment the contractor had no right to 

any such compensation. MODA refused to pay a contractor who had “delayed the 

project for one year and whose quality of work was poor.” If the contractor wished 

to seek compensation from the Saudi Arabian government, he would have to take 

his claim to the Saudi Grievance Council. Albro then indicated that, if MODA 

refused to pay, the Corps had only one alternative—to take the money to pay the 

contractor out of its supervision and administration (S&A) funds. Prince Sultan 

repeated that he did not want MODA “involved.” When Albro explained that the 

29 Fact Sheet, Status of Blount Brothers Claim, 29 Jul 80, pp. 1–2; Memo, Maj Jules S. Kincaid, 

21 Jul 80, sub: Meeting with MAJ Faisal on Impact at Al Batin without MKSAC Extension, 19 July 

1980; both in unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE. 30 Fact Sheet, Status of Blount Brothers Claim, 29 Jul 80, p. 1.

31 Gunter to Al Faisal, 19 Jan 81, sub: Cracks in Concrete Masonry Unit Walls, Family Housing 

Units Constructed by Blount Brothers, Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, and attached Rpt dtd Dec 80, K-8-5, 

TAD-RHA. 32 M. A. Faraj, “Record of BG Albro’s Meeting with HRH Prince Sultan,” 6 May 81, K-8-4, 

TAD-RHA.
Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation 379

8 percent charge for S&A was not sufficient to meet operating costs and that the 

deficit would be compounded by having to pay $18.9 million to Blount Brothers, 

Prince Sultan responded that he “wishes that the U.S. Government would absorb 

part of the loss in the same way that Saudi Arabia absorbs some loss by supplying 

the U.S. with oil below the market price.”33

Albro charged the cost of the claim to the division’s S&A budget over the next 

two fiscal years and increased the S&A costs to 8.5 percent. The Saudis understood 

the cost “pass through”; nonetheless, they had made their dissatisfaction very 

clear. The incident was symptomatic of a growing assertiveness on the part of the 

Saudis. In the 1980s, poor performance by contractors, contractor claims, and the 

cost of Corps’ supervision and administration all became knottier problems in the 

construction program that the Corps managed in Saudi Arabia. 

The payment of the Blount claim removed the last obstacle to closing out the 

work at the King Abdulaziz Cantonment at Tabuk. Over a decade and a half, the 

Corps of Engineers administered construction with a total value of $356 million. In 

October 1984, the Middle East Division closed its resident office at Tabuk.34

Peace Hawk and Peace Sun

The Royal Saudi Air Force was the Corps of Engineers’ oldest customer among 

the Saudi Arabian military services. In 1960 and 1961, the Mediterranean Division’s 

Gulf District, headquartered in Tehran, Iran, had supervised a $3.7 million project 

to construct a sixteen-building training school complex in Riyadh and another 

$3 million in construction at airfields in Jiddah and Taif.35 The five thousand five 

hundred men of the Royal Saudi Air Force came in for additional attention in the 

1970s as RSAF modernization paralleled the expansion of the army cantonments. 

The two programs that carried the modernization forward were Peace Hawk 

(1972–1984) and Peace Sun (1978–1985).

The RSAF attracted to its ranks young officers who had been educated in the 

West and favored modernization. Their outlook made them critical of the practice, 

prevalent since the 1950s, of promotion to the highest ranks of military service on the 

basis of nepotism and corruption. These attitudes overlapped with ideas propounded 

by radical and secular Arab nationalists in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria who opposed the 

Saudi monarchy. In the late 1960s, small dissident groups formed within the Air 

Force, largely focused on discontent over the pace of modernization, the poor quality 

of middle management, and the corruption and nepotism that they encountered. In 

May 1969, the Saudi government cracked down on dissent throughout the kingdom. 

33 Ibid.

34 Ellis to Morris, 11 Jan 80, p. 6; Albro to Morris, 21 Sep 80, p. 6; “A Short History of the Corps of 

Engineers in Saudi Arabia,” 1993, p. 2; Mid East Div, Bfg for Ch of Engrs, 5 Jan 85, re Phaseout from 

Saudi Arabia and Future of MED, p. 2, Uncatalogued Hist Files, TAD-RHA, R&D File 2455, TAC. 35 “History of the [Gulf] District, March 1956–June 1965,” Jun 65, p. 74, box 21, access. no. 77-

92-0002, WNRC.
380 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

By September, the government had arrested more than one hundred thirty members 

of the Saudi military.36

From late November to mid-December 1969, just as the arrests slackened, Saudi 

Arabia experienced one of its periodic border clashes with the People’s Democratic 

Republic of Yemen. South Yemeni forces crossed the border and quickly captured 

a small post defended by a few Bedouins. The Saudi Air Force counterattacked, 

supported by British military advisers, and helped drive the invading forces out 

of the country. The loyal and effective performance by the RSAF helped restore 

its relationship with the Saudi ruling elite, leading the monarchy to coopt rather 

than persecute the dissident elements. The royal family accelerated the pace of 

the Air Force’s modernization, shifted promotion to merit rather than ethnic or 

tribal background, committed to reducing corruption and nepotism, and expanded 

improvements in living conditions for members of the military.37

In the 1960s, Saudi Arabia had purchased British aircraft and equipment; in the 

1970s, it chose to buy American planes. In June 1971, using Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS) procedures, the Saudi government bought one hundred F–5 fighter aircraft, 

to be delivered over several years, at a cost of $130 million. In late February 1972, 

the U.S. Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC), acting as project manager, signed 

a memorandum of understanding with the Corps of Engineers to provide budgetary 

and technical reviews of the criteria, schedules, spending, and engineering and design 

specifications for the program called Peace Hawk. In May, the AFLC awarded a 

letter contract with the manufacturer of the F–5, Northrop Corporation, to build 

facilities, train Saudi Air Force personnel, and maintain the aircraft.38

The construction took place initially at Taif and Dhahran and was later extended 

to Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk. Between mid-1972 and early 1974, Mediterranean 

Division staff provided about $13 million worth of supervision and inspection 

services to the Peace Hawk program. By February 1974, with the facilities defined 

in the early phases (I through IV) of the program completed, the division closed its 

resident office at Taif.39

Starting in 1974, the U.S. Air Force undertook several studies of the threat 

of a hostile attack by air, as well as Saudi Arabia’s ability to defend against such 

attacks. These studies led the Saudis to acquire later-model F–5s and more advanced 

aircraft—acquisitions that created the need to expand support facilities. In January 

1975, the Air Force signed a memorandum of understanding that gave the Corps of 

Engineers a larger role in the Peace Hawk program—more responsibility for design 

and construction, including furnishings and equipment for all facilities required in 

36 Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, pp. 137–38. 37 Ibid., pp. 138–40.

38 Barry Miller, “USAF to Deliver F–5Es to Saudi Arabia,” Aviation Week and Space Technology

(12 November 1973): 14–15; Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, p. 143; 

Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 15 Oct 72, pp. 23–24, box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers; Kackley to 

Clarke, 15 Mar 72; OCE, Major Activities, FY 1974, p. 64. 39 Ibid.; Kackley to Clarke, 15 Mar 72, p. 1; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 15 Oct 72, p. 10; 

“Sequence of Chronological Events, Taif—January 1974 to Completion,” n.d., box 5, access. no. 

77-92-0001, WNRC; Annual Hist Sum, CY 1974, p. A1. 
Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation 381

the phase of the program designated Peace Hawk V. The estimated cost of these 

facilities, funded by the RSAF through FMS, was $480 million.40

Because the construction for Peace Hawk V involved seventy-eight diversified 

and complex technical facilities located in three widely separated parts of Saudi 

Arabia—Dhahran, Taif, and Khamis Mushayt—the Mediterranean Division 

proposed to manage the work through a Peace Hawk Area Office located in Dhahran 

with resident offices at each of the three sites. Construction included depot supply 

buildings, power plants, aircraft hangars, avionics shops, headquarters buildings, 

armament shops, training buildings, aircraft maintenance buildings, firing ranges 

for the aircraft, and the full complement of infrastructure and utilities (electric, 

water, sewer, communications, streets, and roads) needed to support the RSAF 

communities.41

The U.S. Air Force had set a tight, two-year construction schedule, and the 

Corps of Engineers warned of difficulties in meeting the deadlines. The Peace Hawk 

40 Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, p. 165; OCE, “Annual Report of 

Major Activities, Jul. 1, 1974–Jun. 30, 1975,” p. 53, box 8, Gen Files, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter 

cited as OCE, Major Activities, FY 1975); MOU, HQ, U.S. Air Force, and USACE, [23 Jan 75], sub: 

Saudi Arabian F–5 Program, box 5, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 41 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 12 Nov 75, pp. 1–2, box 18, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

DF, Lt Col Thomas R. Braun, 26 Nov 75, sub: Proposed Organization for Peace Hawk Area Office, 

pp. 1–2, unmarked box, TAD-RHA.

Construction for Peace Hawk, February 1978
382 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

programming data contained no master plan or site layout for the facilities. The 

construction industry in Saudi Arabia was overextended because of the volume of 

building, making it difficult to acquire basic materials and compounding the normal 

logistical problems of getting materials to the construction sites.42 Corps personnel 

also remained uncomfortable that their roles in review, supervision, and inspection 

gave them only limited authority over design and construction.43

In 1978, with only about a third of the F–5s delivered, the Saudi Arabian 

government reduced the number of F–5s on order, having succeeded, in spite of 

sharp opposition in the U.S. Congress, in purchasing the more-advanced F–15. Work 

on the facilities for the F–5s continued into another phase, Peace Hawk VII. At the 

same time, the Corps entered into a new agreement with the Air Force to supervise 

construction of facilities for the F–15s, a project called Peace Sun. For Peace Sun, 

the Corps took on total responsibility for construction management.44

42 Durham, “Construction Estimate for Peace Hawk V,” 23 Jun 75, pp. 1–2, box 5, access. no. 

77-92-0001, WNRC. See also Memo, Clements to Secretary of the Army, 25 Jun 75, sub: Contractor 

Services and Construction (Peace Hawk V), pp. 1–2, box 5, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 43 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 12 Nov 75, p. 1, box 18; Wells to Morris, 16 Mar 77, p. 9, 

box 3; both in access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 44 Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, pp. 165–67; “Saudi Arabian Projects,” [mid-1981], p. 2, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE.

Construction of a potable-water tank for the Royal Saudi Air Force headquarters, Riyadh
Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation 383

The first Peace Sun contract came in December 1979, and the work continued 

over the next five years. The program involved construction at Khamis Mushayt 

and Taif of aircraft shelters, avionics maintenance buildings, hangars, engine-repair 

facilities, flight-simulator buildings, squadron operations buildings, taxiways and 

parking aprons, roads, fencing, and staff housing. By mid-June 1981, the division 

had awarded thirteen Peace Sun contracts and four new Peace Hawk contracts. The 

construction to support RSAF aircraft reached its peak in FY 1982. At the end of the 

first quarter, December 1981, the division had about $314 million in construction 

underway for Peace Sun and another $9 million for Peace Hawk.45

The division engineer, General Albro, hoped in 1980 that the Peace Sun program 

would prove “a fresh start and a chance to do a professional job all the way through.” 

But the division quickly ran into problems with several contractors. The most serious 

situation arose with a Korean firm, Pacific Construction Company Ltd. (PCC), the 

lead partner in a joint venture responsible for one package of construction at Dhahran. 

The contractor fell thirty-seven days behind schedule in the first five months of work, 

prompting an interim unsatisfactory performance rating from the contracting officer 

in mid-October 1980. Two other Korean contractors had also received unsatisfactory 

ratings on other parts of Peace Sun construction. When the director general of the 

Korean Overseas Corporation Bureau visited Saudi Arabia in December 1980, the 

division informed him that the three firms would not be considered on any future 

work until they had corrected their unsatisfactory ratings.46

Although late in 1980 the Middle East Division considered terminating PCC’s 

contract for the work at Dhahran, eighteen months later, General Albro recounted 

that the division had turned “an early ‘loser’ . . . into a very successful contract.” 

By October 1981, PCC had won removal of the unsatisfactory interim performance 

rating and had all critical aircraft-support facilities ready prior to the arrival of 

the F–15s at Dhahran in January 1982. Albro credited the “continuous pressure 

by Colonel Bob Whitley and his dedicated area office staff at Dhahran” for the 

successful turnaround. At Taif, the division delivered support facilities for the 

F–15s in July 1982.47

The Peace Sun program continued at a slow pace over the next two years. The 

Middle East Division awarded all major contracts by January 1983, and the Royal 

Saudi Air Force had taken delivery of sixty F–15s and over one hundred F–5s. 

45 Ellis to Morris, 11 Jan 80, pp. 1, 6; “Saudi Arabian Projects,” [mid-1981], p. 2; Fact Sheet for 

Lt Gen Joseph K. Bratton’s Visit to Middle East Div, 1 to 7 Jan 81, prepared 31 Dec 80, Walker box 

6, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited as Fact Sheet for Bratton Visit, Jan 81); “Project Management 

Assignments—Riyadh,” 15 Jul 81, SA 719, TAD-RHA; Albro to Morris, 21 Sep 80, p. 6; Middle 

East Div, “Information Booklet,” [Dec 81], p. II-6. 46 Quotation from Albro to Morris, 13 Jul 80, p. 2, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; Fact Sheet 

for Bratton’s Visit, Jan 81. 47 Quotation from Albro, Cdr’s Periodic Ltr, 5 Jun 82, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; Middle 

East Div, “Information Booklet,” [Dec 81], p. II-6; Albro, Cdr’s Periodic Ltr, 5 Jun 82; DF, Col James 

P. Oppenheim, 1 Feb 84, sub: Division Commander’s Periodic Letter, p. 14, E-1-1, TAD-RHA.
384 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

By the summer of 1984, contractors had completed about 85 percent of the work 

associated with Peace Hawk and Peace Sun.48

The Peace Hawk and Peace Sun programs were relatively modest. At their 

peak in the early 1980s, these programs never exceeded 4 percent of the Saudi 

construction program conducted by the Middle East Division. Still, they accounted 

for forty-one contracts, cost $790 million divided among four locations, and 

demanded significant management attention. They also contributed to the creation 

of the modern technological base and gave the Royal Saudi Air Force the tools to 

become a proficient, well-equipped, and well-trained air combat force.49

Headquarters Complexes

The modernization program for the Saudi Arabian armed forces included the 

command elements as well as combat units. The Saudi Arabian government commissioned the Corps of Engineers to design and construct headquarters complexes for 

the Ministry of Defense and Aviation, the Royal Saudi Air Force, the Royal Saudi 

Naval Forces, and the Saudi Arabian National Guard. The latter two projects are 

discussed in Chapter 11. 

During the development of plans for the various headquarters complexes, the 

military leadership in Saudi Arabia decided that it wanted to include underground 

command centers. The Corps cooperated with the U.S. Army officers assigned to 

the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia to develop 

design and construction. The design of the operations centers was linked to a larger 

debate concerning the strategic justification for them. The Saudis wanted multiple 

underground centers—one each at the headquarters buildings being planned for 

MODA, the Air Force, and the Navy, and at headquarters buildings planned for 

the area commanders in Khamis Mushayt, Tabuk, and King Khalid Military City 

(Hafar al Batin).50

USMTM advisers saw the six centers as “a tremendous drain on manpower” for 

the Saudi military. They strongly recommended one national center with subordinate 

satellite centers as a more strategically effective plan. A combined national command 

center in Riyadh would promote sharing of common facilities and communications 

systems by MODA, RSNF, RSAF, and Saudi Arabian Land Forces, while permitting 

the independent operation of each service. American advisers acknowledged that 

48 “Col. Schroder Briefing to SAD [South Atlantic Division],” 23 Dec 85, p. 6, unmarked box, 

TAD-RHA; Fact Sheet, MED Projects in Saudi Arabia, 29 Mar 85; Cordesman, The Gulf and the 

Search for Strategic Stability, p. 165; “Briefing for HRH Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz, 2nd Dep Premier 

and Minister of Defense and Aviation,” Aug 84, SA 719, TAD-RHA. 49 “Briefing Middle East/Africa Projects Office,” [30 Jun 87], unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, p. 165. 50 DF, Dykes, 28 Sep 77, sub: PPR for UG Shelters & Operations Centers, Various Locations, S.A., 

E-7-6; MFR, Melvin G. Dailey, 25 Jun 77, sub: Trip Report to United States—Meeting re Underground 

Shelter, Command Posts, Various Locations Saudi Arabia and Meeting in Division (Rear), E-7-3; 

Brig Gen Carl H. Cathey Jr. to Kramer [Nov 77], sub: Preliminary Planning Report for Underground 

Shelters and Operations Centers, Saudi Arabia, E-7-4; all in TAD-RHA.
Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation 385

their strategic argument for consolidating command in one location was only one 

of several factors that the Saudi service commanders weighed as they considered 

separate command centers.51

Between the autumn of 1977 and the summer of 1978, USMTM and Corps 

planners and MODA representatives discussed the first three underground shelters: 

two in Riyadh for MODA and the RSAF and one in Khamis Mushayt.52 The Middle 

East Division’s advisers lent their weight to the argument that the Saudis needed 

fewer command centers and that the individual services did not require specially 

reinforced, or “hardened” shelters.53 The Saudis remained unpersuaded.

The entire consideration of underground command centers developed after 

work had begun on several of the headquarters complexes. As a result, plans for 

the command centers often had to be grafted onto existing headquarters designs. 

Construction already underway had to be modified to accommodate the addition of 

an underground facility. The exercise added to the cost and to confusion of work 

in progress.

Royal Saudi Air Force Headquarters Complex

The RSAF planned a headquarters complex in Riyadh. Preliminary criteria 

and design work for the complex, undertaken by the architect-engineer firm of 

Smith, Henchman, and Grill, began in 1973, with cost estimated at $30 million. 

By September 1976, the Corps had a final design; but the cost estimate for the 

project, including an underground command center, had risen to $160.6 million. 

The following February, the Middle East Division issued a request for proposals for 

the construction and in May awarded a contract to a joint venture of Saudi Tarmac 

and Tarmac Overseas Ltd.54

The design set out a building with strong horizontal lines faced with Travertine 

and Riyadh stone. The main portion of the building was seventy feet tall. Set back 

from the facade by almost thirty feet and extending the building’s height by another 

fifteen feet was a penthouse for mechanical equipment. The ground floor opened 

onto a courtyard and a VIP parking area. The building occupied an area of about 

180 by 656 feet and provided almost 323,000 square feet of office space, excluding 

an offset area that created extra floor space for a mosque.55

51 Col R. R. Battreall to Kramer, 2 Oct 77, E-7-6, TAD-RHA; Cathey to Kramer [Nov 77], pp. 

1–3.52 Lively to Al Faisal, 25 Apr 78, sub: Underground Shelters and Operations Centers, Various 

Locations, E-7-4, TAD-RHA. 53 Memo, Col Donald J. Palladino, 14 Feb 78, sub: Summary of Division (Rear) Staff Meeting, 

pp. 17–18, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 54 Brazier, “Various Aspects of the Army’s Construction Effort,” 6 Jun 75; Page, “Mediterranean 

Division [sic] Command Briefing,” 21 Jun 77, p. 12; Bennett to Al Faisal, 24 Sep 76, sub: RSAF 

Headquarters, Riyadh, and 22 May 77, E-7-2, TAD-RHA. 55 Lively to Al Faisal, 8 Aug 77, sub: RSAF Headquarters: Information for Building Permit, and 

attachment, “Riyadh Headquarters Building,” 26 Jul 77, E-7-2, TAD-RHA.
386 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

As the construction contractor prepared to begin work, he encountered a number 

of design errors involving reinforcing steel in the concrete, surface and subsurface 

drainage, and architectural details. Changes to the site of the underground command 

center came at the same time. To address and correct all these problems, the division 

established weekly meetings among staff from the Engineering and Construction 

Divisions and the project manager for the headquarters complex. The meetings 

continued from early September to early November, until the team had resolved 

most of the problems.56

Competition for working space added to the construction contractor’s problems. 

Adjacent to the site of the RSAF headquarters, other builders worked under contract 

with MODA independent of the Corps on construction projects for the Saudi Air 

Defense Command. When these contractors began to erect an air-traffic control 

building on the northwest corner of the headquarters site, Middle East Division 

personnel asked MODA’s General Directorate of Military Works to help coordinate 

the activities of the two groups.57

By the spring of 1979, the various changes that the contractor had had to make in 

the scope of work since the summer of 1977 amounted to $9.3 million. In requesting 

additional funds from the GDMW, the division explained that nearly $5.6 million 

of those changes stemmed from requests made by the Saudi Air Force. The balance 

was attributed to changed site conditions. The contract set the original completion 

date for the RSAF headquarters as 15 May 1980; but at that point, the contractor 

still had one thousand six hundred workers on site. In addition to structural changes 

56 DF, Kramer, n.d., sub: RSAF Headquarters: Design Errors Noted by Contractor, E-7-2, TADRHA; MFRs, Robert M. Stone Jr., Sep, Oct, and Nov 77 in E-7-2, TAD-RHA. 57 Lively to Al Faisal, 23 Jul 78, E-7-4, TAD-RHA.

Model of the Royal Saudi Air Force headquarters, Riyadh, October 1979
Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation 387

to the headquarters building, the contractor had to modify work already completed 

in a barracks building and a utility building when construction in the adjacent area 

created subsurface water and drainage problems. The contractor also constructed 

a separate and unplanned facility to accommodate the Riyadh Electric Company’s 

transformers and switching gear.58

By the autumn of 1980, contractors were able to set a firm date for turnover 

at 1 April 1981. During the winter and early spring of 1981, the division worked 

with MODA and RSAF officials to plan the dedication ceremony with about one 

hundred guests for 22 April. In May, the division awarded the sixth contract for the 

project for construction of the underground command center. When the division 

finally closed out the project, design and construction of the RSAF headquarters 

complex had cost $187 million.59

Ministry of Defense and Aviation Headquarters Complex

As the bureaucratic force behind modernization, the Ministry of Defense 

and Aviation wanted a new headquarters facility for itself. MODA’s existing 

headquarters building in Riyadh, constructed nearly two decades earlier under 

Egyptian supervision, began to seem inadequate as newer construction sprang up. 

To provide fitting surroundings for himself and his staff, Prince Sultan decided to 

rebuild MODA’s offices.

Executive Office Building

The construction of the new facilities for the MODA headquarters staff took 

place in stages. In August 1973, the Mediterranean Division awarded a $4.8 million 

construction contract to Holzmann to build a three-story executive office building 

designed by Brown, Daltas & Associates of Rome. The Holzmann contract included 

landscaping, an irrigation system, exterior lighting, paving, and all supporting 

utilities in addition to the building’s construction. The contract also provided for 

58 Memos, Hall to Al Faisal, 18 Mar, 27 May 79, sub: Additional Funding Requirements—RSAF 

Hqs Building, both in E-7-5, box 5, TAD-RHA; Albro to Al Faisal, 13 Dec 80, sub: Contract DACA 

78-77-C-0047, RSAF Headquarters Building Completion Date, K-8-5, box 13, TAD-RHA; Ellis, 

“House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,” Informal Bfg on 11 Mar 80, 

Current Files, Transatlantic Division–Public Affairs Office (TAD-PAO). Another document makes 

it clear that this was an “informal” briefing that Representative Hamilton had requested as an update 

on Ellis’ published testimony from the previous June. See Memo, Ellis to Ludwig, 7 Feb 80, sub: 

Briefing for Subcommittee on Europe & Middle East, House Committee on International Relations, 

box 14, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Albro to Al Faisal, 13 Dec 80. 59 Albro to Morris, 21 Sep 80, p. 5; Memos, Lt Col John F. Donahue, 24 Mar 81, sub: Meeting 

with MODA and RSAF Officials on Transfer of RSAF HQ Building, and 25 Mar 81, sub: Meeting 

with Maj. Nafisah on Details of RSAF Dedication Ceremony, both in K-8-4, box 10, TAD-RHA; 

Albro to Bratton, 12 Aug 81, p. 2, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; Memo, Col Frank D. Miller Jr., 

24 Jun 91, sub: Authorization: Design and Construction of Facilities Under Engineering Assistance 

Agreement (EAA), Royal Saudi Air Force Headquarters (RSAF HQ), Current Files, Transatlantic 

Division–Resource Management (TAD-RM); “Riyadh District Command Briefing for Brig Gen James 

W. Ray, Commander, Middle East Division,” n.d. [first half of 1985], unmarked box, TAD-RHA.
388 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

complete furnishing of the offices and conference spaces. Project costs rose to $7.8 

million by the time the executive office building was completed in June 1975.60

As the new executive office building progressed, it highlighted the deteriorated 

condition of the old headquarters building that sat immediately behind it. Prince 

Sultan therefore asked for proposals to improve the appearance of the existing 

building. The Mediterranean Division engaged McGaughy, Marshall & McMillan 

(MMM), who proposed a solution to preserve the older building but to disguise it 

by constructing anodized metal architectural screens to cover its entire facade and 

to shade the exterior walls.61

The Saudis rejected this concept in favor of a plan that would involve two 

separate office buildings—a headquarters building and an operations building, 

the latter to be designed by Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas (PBQ&D). 

In a subsequent meeting in Livorno in early 1976, the director general of military 

works, Captain Al Faisal, decided to place the operations center in a wing of the 

headquarters building, eliminating the need for a separate building. The division 

relayed this decision to MMM and instructed PBQ&D (later Parsons, Brinckerhoff 

International) to develop a preliminary report defining requirements for the 

underground command center.62

In May 1976, the division reviewed the MMM concept design. Although 

earlier designs had called for the rehabilitation of the existing headquarters building 

constructed by the Egyptians, the new plan called for its demolition. The designers 

now proposed a new headquarters building on the same site, just behind the executive 

office building completed in June 1975. They also placed a multistoried, 1,000-car 

parking structure at the back of the site. McGaughy, Marshall & McMillan proposed 

that contractors erect a three-story prefabricated temporary office building to 

accommodate the MODA staff during the construction. The construction site would 

also include a 1,000-worker mobilization camp.63

Design and Construction of the Headquarters Complex

In February 1977, as MODA leaders weighed the general issues of the 

underground command centers, the Middle East Division submitted a list of architectengineer firms qualified to prepare the final design of the MODA headquarters 

building. By the end of the year, the division selected Hotchkiss, Thompson, and 

Ball Inc. (HTB), of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. At meetings in April and May 

1978 with representatives of HTB, Major Al Faisal “adjusted” the design plans. 

60 Annual Hist Sum, CY 1974, pp. 1, A2; Zeiler Memoirs; Memo, Lt Col James W. Neal, 31 Jan 

76, sub: Annual Historical Summary Report, pp. B1, B2, SA-725, TAD-RHA; “Saudi Arabia Programs,” 28 Feb 78, pp. 15, 20, 80. 61 Hamilton Comm Hearings, p. 10; Ltr, Wiles to authors, commenting on manuscript, 5 Oct 97, 

TAD-RHA, with Interv, and R&D File 3158, TAC. 62 Memo, Kramer, 17 Nov 76, sub: Combined Operation Building, MODA, Riyadh, E-7-3, TADRHA. 63 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 7 May 76, p. 3, box 17, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; “Saudi 

Arabia Programs,” 28 Feb 78, pp. 20, 78. In Interv, John T. Greenwood with Elmer Parkin, 4 Oct 83, 

pp. 63–64, Parkin mentions the switch from rehabilitation to demolition of the Egyptian building. 
Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation 389

He specified the shape of the new seven-story headquarters building and the site 

of the data-processing building, added parking space around certain buildings, and 

insisted on a larger bedroom for the chief of staff.64

In late October 1978, design engineers presented the concept design for the 

underground command center with the expectation that they would complete final 

design in March 1979. The Corps projected awarding the construction contract for 

the entire complex in the late summer of 1979, allowing MODA to take occupancy 

by mid-1982. Despite the extensive early consultations on the design, the Saudis 

made changes in late 1979 that necessitated a major redesign of the headquarters. 

One of the changes eliminated the building for automated data processing and made 

room for the ADP functions in the main headquarters building by adding an extra 

story.65

While HTB worked on the design, planning also went forward for the temporary 

office building. In January 1978, MODA authorized the Middle East Division to 

advertise the construction contract for the temporary office building and the mobilization camp. Lack of funds delayed the request for proposals so that the division 

awarded a contract only in April to Hyundai Construction Company of Korea to erect 

the temporary office building at a cost of $3.5 million. In May 1980, rather than in 

August 1979 as planned, the division awarded the contract for construction of the 

new MODA headquarters complex in Riyadh. Miryung Construction Company Ltd. 

of Korea won the $168 million contract for the main office building, the underground 

command center, the parking garage, and supporting facilities.66

Miryung began construction in August 1980. In May 1981, the division modified 

Miryung’s contract to include construction of the underground command center 

at the headquarters. Demolition of the old headquarters building and ancillary 

structures took place in May 1981 with an expectation that the new building would 

be completed early in 1984. In midsummer 1981, Al Faisal directed the division 

to redesign the underground command center, the executive office space, and the 

facade of the headquarters building, thereby interrupting construction. Severe 

technical problems compounded the delays and increased costs. In excavating for 

the foundations, Miryung found cavities and loose materials where the company 

64 Lively to Al Faisal, 7 Feb 77, sub: Approval of A/E Slate for Design of MODA HQ Complex 

Rehabilitation, E-7-3; Lively to Al Faisal, 11 Dec 77, sub: MODA Headquarters Complex: ArchitectEngineer Site Visit and Pre-design Conference, E-7-4; MFR, Anwar Badwan, 2 Apr 78, sub: MODA 

HQ Briefing, E-8-6; Lively to Al Faisal, 2 May 78, sub: MODA Headquarters Complex: Resolution of 

Questions of Architect-Engineer, and attachment, E-8-6; Lively to Al Faisal, 30 May 78, sub: MODA 

Headquarters Building: Design Information, E-8-6; all in TAD-RHA. 65 Maj Louis J. Martinez to Al Faisal, 12[?] Sep 78, E-7-4; Lively to Al Faisal, [1 Oct 78], sub: 

MODA HQ Complex: Survey of Existing Facilities, E-7-5; A. L. Maier to Ellis, 24 Dec 78, sub: 

MODA Command Center, E-7-5; all in TAD-RHA. Ellis to Morris, 19 Sep 79, p. 2. 66 DF, Dykes, 16 Jan 78, sub: Significant Activities Report—Dec 77/Jan 78, p. 7, E-5-6, TAD-RHA; 

Bennett to Al Faisal, 3 Apr 78, sub: Request for Authority to Award Temporary Office Building–MODA 

Headquarters Complex, Riyadh, E-8-6, TAD-RHA; Albro to Morris, 21 Sep 80, p. 6.
390 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

had expected to find solid rock. To assure stable footings for the foundation, the 

contractor had to excavate to greater depth in these areas.67

Additional delays occurred because the division had to comply with a recently 

implemented Department of the Army regulation requiring approval by the assistant 

secretary of the Army prior to issuing a notice to proceed for any contract changes 

that exceeded $3 million. The changes involved totally gutting the executive office 

building completed in 1975 and physically connecting it with the new headquarters 

building. The costs of the redesign qualified the project for review, and the procedures 

slowed construction.68

By the end of 1984, with construction over 80 percent complete, the Middle 

East Division had issued a total of 116 change orders for the MODA headquarters 

complex. Saudi requests triggered about 96 percent of the change orders and 

escalated the cost of construction. The original contract called for 1,260 calendar 

days of work for $168 million. As of 31 December 1984, 427 days beyond the 

original allotment, the contract had cost $248 million and the projections of final 

costs exceeded $300 million. The division commander, Brig. Gen. James W. Ray, 

recommended to Al Faisal’s successor as director general of military works, Lt. 

Col. Abdulaziz Al-Otaishan, “that no additional changes be made to the Miryung 

contract.”69

General Ray’s advice went unheeded. In July 1985, in an effort to arrive at a 

“more structured way of addressing changes,” the Riyadh District engineer created 

a Modification Review Board and invited Al-Otaishan and his staff to participate 

in the board’s deliberations. The Saudis continued to issue change orders, and only 

the completion of construction ended their requests for changes. Final inspection 

of the new facilities took place in December 1985. On 4 May 1986, MODA finally 

held the dedication. The total cost of the headquarters complex, including the 

underground command center and renovations to the executive office building, 

came to $425.6 million.70

67 Albro to Bratton, 12 Aug 81, pp. 2–3. Ellis, “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe 

and the Middle East,” 11 Mar 80, p. 5, mentions “tearing down an existing structure before erecting 

a new office building.” Albro, “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle 

East,” typescript of testimony, 22 Jul 81, p. 8, Current Files, TAD-PAO; Albro to Bratton, 22 Jul 81, 

p. 8, Current Files, TAD-PAO; Memo, Donahue, 11 Jul 81, sub: Record of Meeting with MWGD 

[Military Works General Directorate] Concerning MODA Headquarters Facade Executive Suite 

and UGCC [Underground Command Center], K-8-4, TAD-RHA; Albro to Al Faisal, Contract no. 

DACA 86-80-G00013, MODA Headquarters Excavation [Jul 81], unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Zeiler 

Memoirs, pp. 3–6. 68 Intervs, John T. Greenwood with Brig Gen George R. Robertson, 22 Nov 83, pp. 44–46, and 

with Wayne Henry, Nov 85, pp. 14–15; DF, Oppenheim, 1 Feb 84, page marked “MODA Headquarters Complex.” 69 Brig Gen James W. Ray to Otaishan, 8 Apr 85, K-8-3, TAD-RHA. Ray exempted changes demanded to maintain structural integrity. The work is described as 85 percent completed in Fact Sheet, 

Middle East Div Reorg, 24 Mar 84, E-1-1, TAD-RHA. 70 Ray to Otaishan, 8, 10, 21 Apr 85, and Otaishan to Ray, 30 Apr, 14 May 85, all in K-8-3, TADRHA; Col J. E. Gross to Otaishan, 20 Jul 85, sub: MODA Headquarters, K-8-3, TAD-RHA; Maj 

Robert A. Ross, “Annual Historical Summary Report,” 1986, p. 2, OH, HQ USACE; Memo, Lt Col 
Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation 391

Officers Club in Riyadh

Concurrently with the construction of the headquarters complex, Prince Sultan 

sought to improve amenities for the officer corps serving in Riyadh. Discussions 

of a new officers club began within MODA in the mid-1960s; early in 1970, the 

liaison officer asked the Mediterranean Division to provide a master plan for such a 

facility. Brown, Daltas completed a design in March 1972. In August 1973, Prince 

Sultan formally requested that the U.S. ambassador “kindly instruct the U.S. Corps 

of Engineers to supervise the construction of the Officers’ Club in Riyadh.” In May 

1974, the Saudi Arabia District awarded J. A. Jones a $10.3 million contract due 

for completion in 1976.71

Daniel R. Wells, 6 Oct 89, sub: Authorization—Design and Construction of Facilities under Engineering Assistance Agreement, Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) Headquarters Complex, p. 1, 

Current Files, TAD-RM; Bfg Outline, marked in longhand “Heiberg Briefing,” 14 Jul 86, Transition, 

unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 71 “Officers’ Military Club in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: MDD Review Comments Relative to Design 

Prepared by MODA,” Jan 67, box 5, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; Memo, DIST ENGR USAMED 

RIYADH to RUEADWD/CHIEF OF ENGR ENGMC DEPT ARMY], 24 Jan 70, sub: Riyadh Officers 

Club Med Lb, box 6, access. no. 77-86-0008, WNRC; DF, Charles J. Arado, 9 Dec 70, sub: Concept 

Design, Officers’ Club Complex, Riyadh, Contract DACA 75-71-C-0001, box 8 of 357, TAD-RHA; 

Doc marked in longhand “MDD Data Book,” 15 Mar 74, p. 22, box 5, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

Headquarters, Ministry of Defense and Aviation, Riyadh, June 1986
392 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

The complex included a recreation and dining facility and living facilities for 

Saudi Arabian military officers. It featured a 450-seat lecture hall; executive quarters; 

a swimming pool; athletic fields; and decorative pools, fountains, and gardens. The 

architectural materials, the furnishings, and the appointments of many of the club 

facilities had the sumptuous quality characteristic of much of the Saudi building 

program. Persian carpets covered floors of white Italian Carrara marble. Fabric and 

teak paneling decorated walls, and curtains draped the many arched glass windows. 

Heavy bronze grillwork on windows facing the atrium provided protection from the 

intense sunlight. Thirteen exterior pools and fountains were constructed of green 

and white Italian marble, while red marble and granite graced building interiors. 

Hand-painted Italian tiles decorated kitchens, baths, and toilet areas.72

The facilities included light fixtures specially designed and exclusively 

manufactured for the project. The main reception hall had a spectacular 7,000-pound 

stainless steel and blown-glass chandelier fabricated in northern Italy. The fixture was 

shipped in pieces to the construction site, where skilled artisans from the fabricator’s 

shop assembled and installed it. The Saudis specially commissioned two wall-size 

mosaics from a French ceramicist.

The arched windows and parapets on the exteriors of buildings featured 

native limestone, a traditional material widely used in Saudi Arabian monumental 

architecture. Middle Eastern masons cut the stone into individual pieces with a 

tolerance of plus or minus one millimeter. Modern concrete, used in a series of 

thin-shelled domes, complemented the traditional materials used in walls and 

facades. Over one hundred small domes eighteen feet in diameter created cover 

for spaces within the complex, and six 36-foot domes adorned special rooms. The 

lecture and reception halls were centered beneath domes that spanned fifty-four 

feet. Two inches of foamed-in-place urethane provided insulation, and application 

of acrylic coatings created a waterproof membrane resistant to ultraviolet light. The 

basic chemicals for the urethane foam were shipped to the construction site under 

refrigeration because the freon foaming agent would boil at the temperatures—up 

to 120 ̊F—that prevailed during construction.

Construction proved more difficult than anticipated and took much longer than 

the initial estimate. The elaborate character of the Brown, Daltas design, which 

included fine detail work and design elements that were not always clear, contributed 

to the problems. Unskilled labor made the construction contractor’s quality control 

difficult and time-consuming. A severe groundwater problem, the result of the 

prevalent use of septic systems in the area, also hindered progress.73

The contractor completed the club early in 1978, but it remained vacant for 

several months. The J. A. Jones Company took care of the facility under a contract 

with the Middle East Division, while MODA grappled with the issues of its operations 

Sultan bin Abd Al-Aziz to U.S. Amb, 27 Aug 73, sub: Implementation of Project, box 276 of 357, 

TAD-RHA. Annual Hist Sum, CY 1974, p. 1. 72 The descriptions in this and the next two paragraphs are taken from “The Officers’ Club Complex: 

An Elaborate Display of the World’s Designs and Technologies,” Jones Journal (Fall 1978): 2–3. 73 Zeiler Memoirs, p. 10.
Ministry of Defense and Aviation officers club, Riyadh, April 1978
394 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

and maintenance. The club officially opened on 15 December 1978; but for some 

time thereafter, Saudi officials used it exclusively to entertain foreign dignitaries, 

much to the chagrin of MODA officers. In February 1979, the club won the Honor 

Award for Architecture in the 1978 Chief of Engineers Design and Environmental 

Awards Program. By the time of its completion, the total cost for the officers club 

complex rose from a projected $15.7 million to $21 million.74

Designing Medical Centers

The Ministry of Defense and Aviation’s willingness to build facilities to 

modernize every aspect of the Saudi Arabian military structure seemed nearly 

limitless in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and the concomitant increase in 

oil revenues. In reality, some programs that the Saudi military leaders proposed 

did not reach fruition. One of the most ambitious programs, the development of 

major military medical facilities, went through several years of development before 

evaporating with unexpected rapidity.

In 1971, at the request of MODA, two representatives of the U.S. Army Office 

of the Surgeon General and one member of the Mediterranean Division staff 

conducted a study of the Saudi Arabian Army’s medical facilities. The study formed 

the background for a decision in early 1974 by the Saudi Council of Ministers to 

approve a new 400-bed military hospital for Riyadh and the rehabilitation and 

enlargement of the hospital at Taif. The council’s order also directed construction 

of an administrative building for the medical corps in Riyadh.75

The Corps of Engineers then began discussions with American architectengineer firms. A joint venture of Ellerbe Architects and Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and 

Mendenhall (DMJM) became the leading candidate. Ellerbe had designed a number 

of medical facilities in the United States, while DMJM had extensive international 

experience. In late August 1974, the Ellerbe/DMJM team delivered a presentation 

in Livorno on its design concepts for the medical construction program. By the 

following February, MODA had approved the concept and the division issued a 

design contract to Ellerbe/DMJM to develop a master plan for medical facilities at 

Riyadh and Taif. By the summer of 1975, discussions had broadened to the creation 

of medical centers—hospitals plus teaching and research facilities. The estimated 

cost was $526 million for Riyadh and $400 million for Taif.76

74 Ellis to Morris, 26 Sep 78, p. 3, and 30 Jan 79, p. 4, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; “A Short 

History of the Corps of Engineers in Saudi Arabia,” 1993, p. 20; “MED Tops in Architecture,” Mideast 

Engineer (February 1979): 1–3. Estimated project cost was $15.7 million in MDD Directive no. 71, 

app. A, “MODA Fund Recapitulation,” 4 Feb 76, p. A4; final costs in Fact Sheet, MED Projects in 

Saudi Arabia, 29 Mar 85, p. 1. 75 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 18 Mar 71, p. 3; MFR, Blake, 28 Apr 74, sub: Meeting with 

Mr. Nassief, Major Barney and Mr. Peterson, p. 3; all in box 20, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 76 Interv, Moorhus with David Dobberman, 31 Oct 96, pp. 1–3. Dobberman was technical director 

of the Ellerbe/DMJM team. Telex to Ellerbe, 9 Aug 74, setting the date of presentation for 26 August, 

provided by Dobberman, in Interv, Moorhus with Dobberman, 31 Oct 96. Visa stamps in Dobberman’s 
Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation 395

In mid-June, representatives of the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces Medical Service 

Department traveled to Minneapolis to discuss the program with the Ellerbe/DMJM 

team and, after the meeting, to tour medical facilities in the United States.77 These 

visits stimulated an expanded wish list from the Saudis, and the design team put 

together a new array of medical facilities that substantially increased the estimated 

cost of the program. 

The design team discovered that the Saudis had no precise scope of work in 

mind and no understanding of how the wish list defined the design. For instance, the 

Saudis wanted the facility at Riyadh to be an acute-care hospital. The experienced 

designers translated this into criteria for four hundred fifty to six hundred beds—the 

critical number needed to sustain such a hospital and to attract specialists to practice 

there. The Saudis also wanted the facility at Riyadh to be a teaching and research 

hospital with emphasis on military medicine. This new criteria also defined—and 

added—facilities. The Saudis’ need to train nurses and paramedics to support the 

hospital staff again added to the requirements for the medical center. Finally, all 

these people had to have support facilities. By degrees, the designers came to realize 

that they were planning not just hospitals but small medical cities with populations 

of ten- to fifteen thousand people. About this time, it became evident that MODA 

did not have enough land available in Riyadh for the size of the medical center 

they wanted. Land was readily available at Al Kharj, only thirty miles southeast of 

Riyadh and easily accessible from the capital city. Planning for the major facility 

therefore shifted from Riyadh to the area around Al Kharj.78

By September 1975, given the expanded scope of work resulting from the 

Saudis’ visit to the United States, the Corps’ project manager indicated that the 

current working estimate for the MODA medical centers and hospitals “could go as 

high as $5 billion.” In November, the division staff outlined this revised plan to the 

deputy minister of Defense and Aviation, Prince Turki bin Abdulaziz, Prince Sultan’s 

younger brother. In December, three division staff members, including the chief of 

engineering, Gordon W. Dykes, visited the Ellerbe offices in Minneapolis to review 

concept sketches and data for the two hospital complexes. Division representatives 

worked with the Ellerbe/DMJM designers to try to reduce the scope of the project as 

it had been presented to Prince Turki in November, cutting the number of personnel 

residing at each site (by 56 percent at Taif and by 48 percent at Al Kharj).79

Despite the trimming, the master plan for the MODA medical program included 

design for the two complete small cities. Al Kharj had a 600-bed hospital providing 

highly specialized patient care, a training and research institute to develop Saudi 

healthcare professionals, troop and family housing, and an urban site plan to 

support a population of about eight thousand five hundred. At Taif, the plan called 

passport confirm the date. OCE, Major Activities, FY 1975, p. 53; Brazier, “Various Aspects of the 

Army’s Construction Effort,” 6 Jun 75, attached table of projects. 77 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 7 Jul 75, box 6, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC.

78 Interv, Moorhus with Dobberman, 31 Oct 96, pp. 9–15.

79 Trip Rpt, Maj James P. Fero to MDD, 16 Sep 75, sub: LNO Conference 10–11 Sept, p. 1, box 5; 

Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 2 Feb 76, p. 1, box 17; both in access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC.
396 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

for a 330-bed general hospital, family housing, troop housing, a 112-room hotel, a 

vocational rehabilitation center, dependent schools, recreation clubs, warehousing, 

and community and support facilities for a population of about five thousand. The 

designers took their master plan to the division offices in Italy on 20 January 1976, 

and they returned a few months later to make a presentation at the 50 percent stage 

of the master plan. By the time of this review, cost estimates had risen to $4.1 billion 

for the facilities at Al Kharj and $1.5 billion for Taif.80

The Ellerbe/DMJM design team continued working; and in December 1976 in 

Minneapolis, they gave a major presentation of the master plan to staff from Corps 

headquarters, the U.S. Military Training Mission, and the Middle East Division. The 

director general of military works, Captain Al Faisal, and the head of the Medical 

Services Department, Lt. Col. Hammeed Al Fareedi M.D., represented MODA. The 

meeting lasted from morning to late afternoon, with the final three hours devoted to 

general discussion of the plan with extensive commentary and “guidance” from Al 

Faisal concerning specific facilities and the priorities to follow in future work.81

Taif had superseded Al Kharj in MODA’s priorities, so Al Faisal instructed the 

designers to proceed immediately to final design of those facilities. In the case of 

Al Kharj, he asked for a construction schedule in three phases with each increment 

providing a fully operational medical facility. He indicated that funding might 

delay completion of the later phases, and he suggested “as a likely possibility” a 

twenty-year period for funding of the fully developed medical center at Al Kharj. 

He wanted the entire 600-bed hospital included in the first phase of construction. 

On 12 February 1977, division representatives and the Ellerbe/DMJM designers 

presented the completed master plan to Prince Turki in Riyadh. Turki “appeared 

extremely pleased with the presentation,” and division personnel were “optimistic” 

that the medical program would receive approval.82

The February 1977 presentation was the last optimistic occasion for the military 

hospital program. By July, Corps personnel had heard informally that the Saudi 

Arabian government had “disapproved or deferred” all funding for it. The deputy 

division engineer informed MODA staff that slightly less than half of the $30.22 

million designated for design remained on hand and that it might be used to complete 

design/construction packages for the 600-bed hospital at Al Kharj and the 330-bed 

hospital at Taif. The Ellerbe/DMJM team, which numbered nearly one hundred 

people, spent the next several months putting its design work into deliverable 

form for the closeout of the contract. In January 1978, the Middle East Division’s 

80 “Saudi Arabia Programs,” 28 Feb 78, pp. 88–91 (including photographs of the design models); 

Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 22 Mar 76, p. 2, box 17, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Dobberman’s passport stamps and calendar-diary entries; “Status of Corps Projects in Saudi Arabia,” 1 

May 76, p. 7, box 1, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 81 MFR, T. Rex Kell, 2 Dec 76, sub: MODA Medical Center and Taif General Hospital, Saudi 

Arabia, box 18, E-7-2, TAD-RHA; Wells to Morris, 12 Dec 76, p. 7, box 3, access. no. 77-92-0001, 

WNRC. 82 MFR, Kell, 2 Dec 76; quotations and report in Telex, Kramer, n.d., sub: Master Planning Presentations of MODA Hospitals and Admin [sic] School, box 18, E-7-2, TAD-RHA; Wells to Morris, 

16 Mar 77.
Programs for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation 397

hospital section reported that the lack of directions and inadequate design funds 

had “brought all A–E selection and design effort on MODA Medical Center and 

Taif General Hospital to a halt.”83

The MODA medical program never went any further. Between 1974 and 1976, 

it grew to a multibillion-dollar undertaking, just as the Corps of Engineers, in 

anticipation of multiple programs worth billions of dollars, reorganized its overseas 

operations in the region to locate a division headquarters in Saudi Arabia. When it 

became clear in 1978 that the medical program would fail to fulfill earlier expectations, the division still had abundant work to keep its staff occupied. When, in a 

similar manner, other programs failed in 1980–1981 to live up to multibillion-dollar 

projections for them, the decline in future work forced a reassessment of the Corps’ 

overseas operations.

83 Bennett to Al Faisal, 23 Jul 77, sub: MODA Hospital Program, Al Kharj & Taif, box 18, E-7-2, 

TAD-RHA; DF, Dykes, 16 Jan 78, p. 2; Interv, Moorhus with Dobberman, 31 Oct 96, p. 21.

Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 399

In supervising the programs described in the previous chapter—the Khamis 

Mushayt and Tabuk cantonments, Peace Hawk and Peace Sun, and headquarters 

facilities—the Corps of Engineers worked in cooperation with the Saudi Arabian 

Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) through its engineering management 

service, the General Directorate of Military Works (GDMW). For two other major 

programs, the Corps took its instructions directly from the military services that 

commissioned the work: the Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF) and the Saudi 

Arabian National Guard (SANG). Although the Corps acted as if the terms of the 

Engineer Assistance Agreement (EAA) of 15 June 1965 governed these programs, 

they were quite different because funding and authorization came directly from the 

services through several separate Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases.

Saudi Naval Expansion Program

Like the MODA medical program, the RSNF modernization offered the 

prospect of a series of major design and construction projects totaling several 

billions of dollars. The Saudi Navy was even smaller than the Air Force, with only 

about one thousand men and a dozen vessels in the early 1970s. Despite the size 

of the Saudi Navy, the Saudi Naval Expansion Program (SNEP) developed into 

the second largest construction program the Corps managed in Saudi Arabia, even 

though the expenditures fell far short of the levels of spending imagined for it in 

the mid-1970s. 

The naval expansion program formally began in January 1972, when Saudi 

Arabia and the United States signed a general memorandum of understanding 

establishing the concepts that guided the development of effective naval operations to protect Saudi Arabia’s coastlines.1

 In May, the U.S. secretary of defense 

designated the U.S. Department of the Navy as the SNEP program manager. The 

1 “Naval Supply Systems Command Involvement in the Saudi Naval Expansion Program (SNEP) 

Shore Facilities Supply Support Program, January 1972–September 1983,” 20 Dec 83, unmarked 

box, Transatlantic Division–Records Holding Area (TAD-RHA); Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf 

and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends 

in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 173–78, including 

table, pp. 176–77.

11

Modernization of the Saudi 

Arabian Navy and National Guard
400 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Navy would advise the Saudis concerning weaponry and equipment, while the 

Corps of Engineers would provide construction management and other procurement 

support and would design and build new deepwater ports on the Arabian Gulf at 

Jubayl and on the Red Sea at Jiddah. These ports would include facilities for ship 

docking, drydocking and repair, fuel storage, and maintenance, as well as training, 

living, and recreation for naval personnel. The construction program also included 

a headquarters complex for the Saudi Navy in Riyadh.2

 The Corps was to provide 

fully equipped and operable facilities, including stocks, equipment, spare parts, 

furniture, fixtures, and operational equipment.3

Although the Royal Saudi Naval Forces were subordinate to the Ministry of 

Defense and Aviation, during the 1970s the Saudi Arabian government provided 

funding directly to the RSNF. Payments for the Saudi Naval Expansion Program 

came through the FMS program.4

Initiating the Program

The Corps began work on SNEP in September 1972 through the Mediterranean 

Division in Italy and the Saudi Arabia District in Riyadh. For the next two years, a 

joint study team from the U.S. Navy and the RSNF designed a modernization plan 

through which the navy would acquire a score of American vessels—ranging from 

guided-missile patrol boats to coastal minesweepers and smaller craft—and the 

ordnance to make them an effective military force for coastal defense. In the same 

period, the division worked with Parsons, Basil Inc. of Athens, Greece, to prepare 

a master plan for the first phase of the SNEP construction program. In November 

1973, RSNF leaders approved the master plan the designers had prepared.5

In April 1974, after delays caused by the Yom Kippur War of the previous 

October, the American and Saudi governments signed a detailed protocol that 

specified training of key Saudi personnel, design and construction of two major 

naval bases at Jubayl and Jiddah, creation of a naval academy, and expansion of 

smaller facilities. The protocol also called upon the Corps of Engineers to build 

and equip an RSNF headquarters in Riyadh. Early estimates set the cost for the 

2 Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 15 Oct 72, p. 22, box 51-84-9384, Richard T. Farrell Papers, 

Office of History (OH), HQ United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Alexandria, Va. 3 “Naval Supply Systems Command Involvement,” 20 Dec 83. 

4 MOU, Gov’ts of United States and Saudi Arabia, 18 Jan 72, sub: Technical and Advisory Assistance to be Furnished by the United States Government in Connection with the Saudi Arabian Naval 

Expansion Program, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 5 U.S. Congress, House, Activities of the United States Army Corps of Engineers in Saudi Arabia. 

Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East (Lee H. Hamilton [Indiana], 

Chairman), of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, p. 63 (hereafter 

cited as Hamilton Comm Hearings); Memo, Drennon, 21 Feb 73, sub: Trip Report, SNEP (Athens, 

Greece) and Qaysumah Design (Saudi Arabia), 28 January–14 February 1973, p. 1, Walker box 8, 

OH, USACE; “Annual Historical Summary Report, CY 74,” [31 Dec 74], p. A2, box 15, access. no. 

77-92-0001, WNRC (hereafter cited as Annual Hist Sum, CY 1974).
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 401

two ports and the headquarters complex at approximately $350 million over three 

to four years.6

The scope of the construction expanded rapidly and dramatically; the Saudi 

naval command directed the Corps to initiate designs that would extend construction 

through the 1980s. By October 1974, only thirteen months after receiving approval 

of the initial master plan, the Corps estimated SNEP construction costs at $1 billion. 

Changes in scope, inflation of 25–30 percent, and the intense competition for 

resources engendered by the construction boom in Saudi Arabia accounted for the 

increased costs. Costs continued to escalate; by the time the construction program 

had run its course, in the mid-1980s, SNEP had absorbed $3.7 billion.7

Ports at Jiddah and Jubayl

In February and March 1974, the Mediterranean Division awarded the design 

contracts for ports at Jiddah, to be called King Faisal Naval Base, and at Jubayl, 

the King Abdulaziz Naval Base. Each naval base was essentially a small city with 

the appropriate family housing, schools, shopping, and recreational facilities in 

addition to the training, maintenance, and support facilities for the naval personnel 

and vessels stationed there. The design contract for the off-shore facilities at both 

sites was $1.5 million and for the on-shore facilities $4.7 million. Most of the 

design work went to the same firm that had prepared the master plan—Parsons, 

Basil. With few exceptions, the two naval bases had similar capabilities and similar 

construction plans. In general, the designs were created for Jubayl and then site 

adapted for Jiddah.8

The first construction contracts for the ports, awarded between March and April 

1974, involved preparation of the sites. The division awarded a $2.6 million contract 

for cleanup and fencing at Jiddah to a Saudi firm, Al Hamidi Contractors of Riyadh, 

and a $7.1 million contract for the landfill at the same site to another Saudi firm, Al 

Torki of Al Khobar. Al Hamidi completed its work at Jiddah in March 1975, and Al 

Torki finished in December 1976. At Jubayl, Khodari-Intergreen, a Saudi-American 

joint venture, won contracts for fencing and landfill in April 1975. The company 

6 Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE), “Annual Report of Major Activities, 1 Jul. 1972–30 

Jun. 1973,” p. 49, box 7a, Gen Files, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited as OCE, Major Activities, FY 

1973); Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, pp. 173–75. 7 Memo, Dykes to Lt Cdr Rashad A. Abu Al-Samh, 28 Oct 74, sub: Saudi Naval Expansion Program 

Status Report, p. 1, box 5; Williams to Gribble, 16 Dec 74, box 26; both in access. no. 77-92-0001, 

Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md. Interv, Moorhus with Ben Wood, 27 

Jun 96, pp. 12–13. 8 OCE, “Annual Report of Major Activities, FY 74,” pp. 62–63, copy in R&D File 2270, Transatlantic Programs Center (TAC), Winchester, Va. (hereafter cited as OCE, Major Activities, FY 1974). 

Annual Hist Sum, CY 1974, p. A2; “Saudi Arabian Programs,” [1981], p. 8, box SH-6-93-0006, 

TAD-RHA; Memoirs by George Zeiler [1980], p. 8, unmarked box, TAD-RHA (hereafter cited as 

Zeiler Memoirs); Interv, Moorhus with Wood, 27 Jun 96, p. 46.
402 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

completed its work before the end of February 1976, ten months before similar 

work ended at Jiddah.9

The area selected for development at Jiddah had long been the municipal 

garbage dump. Approachable in 1974 only by a narrow road, the site lay south of 

the city across a stretch of tidal flats and just beyond an ancient slaughterhouse that, 

although still active, had declined over the years. The Saudi Arabia District chief of 

construction, John Blake, visited the site with George Zeiler prior to the cleanup. 

The experience left an indelible imprint on Blake’s memory and imagination:

About three-fourths of the buildings associated with the slaughterhouse were in 

some sort of decay, falling in. . . . Everything about it looked rotten. Once you pass the 

slaughterhouse you are in the dump. They kept the dump burning all the time. . . . And 

there were kind of windrows where the trucks would pull up and dump, and of course 

the new stuff was burning in the background.

At the slaughterhouse, when they butchered the meat, they just threw the waste 

over the wall. They kept the meat and the hides, but whatever the offal was, they 

threw it over the wall. What this had done was generate a pack of dogs that probably 

9 Zeiler Memoirs, p. 7; Annual Hist Sum, CY 1974, pp. A1–A3; List, “Construction Placement, 

Riyadh District, Red Sea Area Office,” in Bfg for OCE Inspection Team, 1 Oct 83, unmarked box, 

TAD-RHA; “King Abdulaziz Naval Base” [Bfg], 16 May 79, box 3, K-8-4, TAD-RHA.

Placing a beam for the wharf at Jiddah, December 1977
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 403

numbered a hundred or more. Try to get the mental image here. The first time I drove 

up there, driving over this narrow road to these tidal flats, the tide was out, these 

dogs had these pieces of flesh, and they had gathered and were laying around, bellies 

in the cool sand. Of course, they are looking at you over their eyebrows, and in the 

background are these square miles of burning refuse. And try to imagine the stench. 

The slaughterhouse has been there for centuries. I told Zeiler, “I guess that is as close 

to my Judeo-Christian image of hell as hopefully I will ever see.10

Cleaning up the Jiddah site enough to permit construction cost about two-and-a half 

times the $10 million spent for site preparation at Jubayl.11

In July 1975, construction passed to the next phase when the Korean firm 

Sam Whan Corporation won a $22.2 million contract to build the workers camp 

at Jiddah. In October, a similar contract at Jubayl—for $45.2 million—went to 

another Korean firm, Miryung Construction Company Ltd. About the same time, 

the division awarded a construction contract for the off-shore facilities at Jiddah to 

a Greek firm, the J. S. Latsis Group, and a similar contract for Jubayl to Hyundai 

Construction Company Ltd. The award of three early contracts under SNEP to 

South Korean firms—Sam Whan, Miryung, and Hyundai—marked the beginning 

10 Interv, Paul K. Walker and William C. Baldwin with John Blake, 24 Jun 88, pp. 199–201.

11 Zeiler Memoirs, p. 7.

Cutterhead dredge at Jiddah, February 1978
404 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

of the long-term affiliation of mammoth Korean construction companies with 

Saudi Arabian projects.12

Parsons, Basil Inc. completed the designs for on-shore facilities at both sites 

in early 1976. The designs thus became available for review just as the Corps 

reorganized its operations, establishing the Middle East Division in Riyadh and 

moving the engineering and design staff from Italy to Virginia. Because of the 

transition, the division did not have sufficient personnel available for design review. 

To compensate, the chief of engineering, Wayne Dykes, received permission to 

recruit temporary-duty personnel from Corps districts around the United States. 

The reviewers settled into a hotel just outside Athens to work with the designs 

produced by Parsons, Basil.13

In October 1976, Hyundai, which already held the contract for off-shore 

construction at Jubayl, won what was at the time the largest construction award 

ever made by the Corps: a $361 million contract for the on-shore facilities at Jubayl. 

At that point, money became a serious concern for the Saudi Naval Expansion 

Program. In March 1976, the Corps had estimated the total cost for planning, 

design, and construction at $1.2 billion. To match the limited funds that RSNF had 

available, the Middle East Division repackaged the on-shore facilities at Jiddah 

into two phases. In the summer of 1977, the Miryung Construction Company 

won a $137 million contract for Phase I construction. It took another year and a 

half before Miryung received the contract for construction of the second phase 

of Jiddah’s on-shore facilities.14

Between the summer of 1976 and the following spring, the division conducted 

a thorough review of the escalating costs of the program. The move from Italy to 

Virginia had broken up the SNEP project team, so the division put together a new 

team consisting of Ken Griggs, Marion Davidson, Charles Taylor, and Ben Wood. 

Wood, hired by the Corps in the summer of 1976, had five years’ experience as 

an engineer and project manager with the U.S. Navy, a background that he found 

valuable in working with the Saudis and in dealing with the contractors. The new 

Corps team worked with personnel from Parsons, Basil to identify the factors in the 

increasing costs. By the end of 1976, SNEP project costs reached approximately 

$2 billion, although the approved program authority was only $1.307 billion. Cost 

12 “Construction Placement, Riyadh District,” 1 Oct 83; “King Abdulaziz Naval Base,” 16 May 

79, table: “Contract Summary—Eastern Area Office,” E-1-1, TAD-RHA; Mediterranean Div, “Data 

Book,” 1 May 76, p. 22, box 1, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Interv, Moorhus with Phil Dinello, 

19 Sep 96, p. 6. 13 Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, p. 22; Interv, Moorhus with Gordon W. Dykes, 

24 Oct 95, pp. 25–26. 14 Wells to Morris, 28 Sep 76, p. 2, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; “King Abdulaziz Naval Base,” 16 

May 79, Table “Contract Summary—Eastern Area Office,” E-1-1, TAD-RHA; Mediterranean Div, 

“Data Book,” 1 May 76, p. 22; Memo, Col G. W. Page, 23 Nov 76, sub: Summary of Division (Rear) 

Staff Meeting, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE; Col George W. Page, “Mediterranean Division [sic] 

Command Briefing,” 21 Jun 77, p. 17, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; “Construction Placement, Riyadh 

District,” 1 Oct 83.
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 405

increases worth $240 million were directly attributable to new work added by the 

Royal Saudi Naval Forces.15

Early in 1977, division representatives traveled from Virginia and Riyadh to 

Dammam to detail the increased costs for the RSNF commander, Capt. Ibrahim 

Al Saja; his deputy, Col. Othman Al Khweet; and other leaders of the Saudi 

Navy. After extensive questioning of the team, Al Saja and his staff accepted the 

explanations concerning the costs of their program and why these had risen so 

dramatically; they then requested and received a $2.12 billion appropriation from 

the Saudi Arabian government.16

The construction contracts for off-shore facilities at both Jiddah and Jubayl called 

for ship-repair facilities featuring the Syncrolift system. Early in the program (June 

1974), the Mediterranean Division contracted with Pearlson Engineering Company 

of Miami, Florida, to provide both ports with Syncrolift at a cost of $3.4 million. 

The Syncrolift system featured two closely spaced piers between which a ship would 

float over a lifting mechanism that operated on synchronous electric motors. The 

motors lifted the ship out of the water on a carrier resembling a railroad car, and the 

ship was then pulled into a dry slip for maintenance and repair. Each port received 

a ship-repair facility with four slips, thus allowing several ships, depending on the 

length of each, to receive attention simultaneously.17

Although the construction plans for the two ports were similar, as construction 

progressed, the work at Jiddah fell behind schedule. Site cleanup, which involved 

razing the old slaughterhouse and filling in the dump, took longer than planned. The 

Jiddah harbor was not as deep as the master plan anticipated, so more dredging was 

necessary, which also led to delays and increased costs. Dredging was further slowed 

by a grounded freighter.18 Finally, at the Jiddah site, three different contractors from 

three different nations competed for space, one building off-shore facilities and two 

others working on shore. At Jubayl, one contractor, Hyundai, handled both off- and 

on-shore construction, making coordination easier.

The local government also hindered progress at Jiddah. The access roads to the 

Jiddah site were severely inadequate. In the late spring of 1978, the Saudi Navy 

persuaded the local authorities to provide emergency funding to build temporary 

roads. Other problems with municipal officials involved inadequate telephone lines, 

15 Interv, Moorhus with Wood, 27 Jun 96, pp. 1–6, 13–20; Ltr, Wells to Morris, 16 Mar 77, pp. 

2–3, box 3, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 16 Ltr, Wells to Morris, 16 Mar 77, pp. 2–3; Interv, Moorhus with Wood, 27 Jun 96, pp. 13–19. 

Wood recalls that the briefings took place in Dhahran (p. 15), but Wells’ letter indicates Dammam. 

Wood also mentions an additional “joint Saudi Navy-Corps briefing” for Prince Turki in Jubayl (p. 

3). Wells to Morris, 21 Jan 78, p. 2, A-9-9, TAD-RHA. 17 OCE, Major Activities, FY 1974, pp. 62–63; Annual Hist Sum, CY 1974, p. A2; Charles N. 

Dunnam, Min of Mtg with Royal Saudi Naval Force, 10 Feb 75, pp. 1–2, access. no. 77-92-0001, box 

5, WNRC; Interv, Moorhus with James Edinger, 9 Mar 95, p. 3. 18 Memo, B. F. Jordan, 30 Nov 76, sub: Deepening of SNEP Harbors, p. 6, E-7-6, TAD-RHA; 

Interv, Moorhus with Wood, 27 Jun 96, pp. 41–42; Memo, Earl Kramer, 7 May 78, sub: Interference 

from Off-site Landfill, p. 1, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Wells to Al Saja, 21 Dec 77, sub: Removal 

of the Freighter M/V Arolos, unmarked box, TAD-RHA.
This page and right, Syncrolift in operation: When a ship is in position, the Syncrolift 

motors raise the platform, pulling the ship out of the water, where repairs can be made.
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 407

lack of electrical power, and a nearby landfill that threatened to cause flooding at 

the construction site. The RSNF was not always able to act as a successful liaison 

between the Corps and its contractors and Jiddah authorities. An encampment of 

Bedouins living on the grounds of the naval base in early 1978 further delayed 

construction. The Saudi Navy had to seek MODA’s help to move the Bedouins 

from the site.19

At Jubayl, foundation work for the on-shore facilities began early in 1977; 

but not everything proceeded smoothly. In March, just as work on the on-shore 

facilities began, Hyundai workers rioted because of poor living conditions and 

harsh treatment by their supervisors. The rioting workers destroyed structures, beat 

several people, and burned vehicles. Although the incidents took place after dark, 

Col. George Gray, commander of the Saudi Arabia District, decided to fly to Jubayl 

immediately. Before leaving Riyadh, Gray instructed the area engineer to clear the 

runway of the debris left by rioters and to burn oil in barrels to light the strip for 

the night landing. He then boarded one of the Corps planes and sent a second Corps 

plane to Jiddah to pick up the Korean ambassador to Saudi Arabia and fly him to 

Jubayl. When Gray landed, Captain Al Saja had already arrived from Dhahran with 

a small contingent of Saudi troops.20

19 MFR, Joseph Wu, 5 Jun 78, sub: Meeting with Lt. J. B. Abdulaziz Al Namla, 4 June 1978; 

Memo, Col Phillip D. Engle, 25 Jan 78, sub: Bedouins Living on the King Faisal Naval Base (KFNB), 

Jiddah, pp. 1–2, unmarked box; both in TAD-RHA. 20 The account is drawn from Intervs, Thomas Tulenko with Col George Gray, 12 Jun–5 Jul 85, 

pp. 367–81; Moorhus with Wood, 27 Jun 96, pp. 43–44; Walker with Meehan, 6 Feb 85, pp. 73–74. 
408 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Rumors circulated that “armed Koreans” had commandeered “30 Euclid dump 

trucks” to link up with other rioters. Al Saja deployed his troops and local police. The 

Saudi force successfully cut off the rioters who arrived a few hundred strong—not 

the rumored thousands—in fewer than a dozen trucks. Isolated, and having spent 

their anger in their initial rampage in the mobilization camp and a nearby quarry, the 

rioters calmed down. There was no repetition of the rioting when Gray and Al Saja 

toured the streets in a jeep convoy. The Saudis asked the Korean ambassador and 

Hyundai executives to address the issues that had provoked the rioters. The Korean 

government then appointed to the ambassador a number of construction aides who 

functioned as overseers and inspectors of conditions and treatment of the workers. 

Over the next several months, the facilities at workers camps were cleaned up and 

expanded. Despite the disturbance, Hyundai managed to maintain work on both 

on- and off-shore facilities ahead of schedule.21

At Jiddah, construction proceeded in 1977 without incident. In the summer, with 

the mobilization camp completed, Miryung began construction of Phase I on-shore 

facilities. In December, Miryung won a $47.1 million contract to build housing and 

community facilities for operations and maintenance (O&M) workers.22

Over the summer of 1977, Al Saja visited the division offices in Virginia to 

discuss schools at the naval bases and to select furniture and furnishings for the 

new facilities. In fiscal year 1978, the Corps awarded contracts for construction of 

schools for both boys and girls of the Saudi families stationed at Jubayl and Jiddah 

and contracts for housing for the O&M staff at Jiddah. In mid-January 1978, the 

division awarded a second contract, valued at $167.7 million, for the on-shore 

facilities at Jiddah to a Taiwanese firm, Ret-Ser Engineering Agency.23

In the spring of 1978, after discussions with the U.S. Navy and the Corps of 

Engineers, Al Saja expanded the scope of work for SNEP. In a letter to the U.S. 

ambassador, he conveyed a number of “new scope items that he wished included 

in the Saudi Naval Expansion Program.” The list included 4 items for Riyadh, 

21 for Jubayl, and 16 for Jiddah. The projects encompassed a “SNEP Film,” a 

computer center for each of the three sites, additions and revisions to the VIP 

complex, construction of ladies lounges at both Jiddah and Jubayl, a stadium and 

a Harpoon-missile repair workshop at Jubayl, and O&M contractors for each site. 

Al Saja acknowledged that the new work added another $272.5 million to the cost 

of SNEP.24

Wells to Morris, 16 Mar 77, p. 8. 21 Interv, Tulenko with Gray, 12 Jun–5 Jul 85, pp. 375–81; Wells to Morris, 21 Jan 78, p. 4; “King 

Abdulaziz Naval Base,” 16 May 79, p. 1. 22 Wells to Morris, 21 Jan 78, p. 4; “Construction Placement, Riyadh District,” 1 Oct 83.

23 Wells to Prince Sultan, 1 Jun 77, E-7-6, TAD-RHA; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 

76, p. 22; Wells to Morris, 21 Jan 78, p. 4; “Project Manager [PM] Assignment—Riyadh Dist, Active 

Projects,” 15 Jul 81, unmarked box, TAD-RHA (hereafter cited as PM Assignment—Riyadh Dist); 

Wells to Morris, 20 May 78, p. 2, A-9-9, TAD-RHA. 24 Al Saja to Hon John C. West, n.d., attached to Wells to West, 24 Apr 78, box 8, E-7-4, TADRHA; Wells to Morris, 20 May 78, p. 5.
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 409

In FY 1979, the Middle East Division awarded a series of construction contracts 

at Jiddah. The first was a $12.2 million award on 3 May to Miryung for Phase II 

community facilities for O&M workers to include a community center, pools, 

tennis courts, and parking areas. On 12 July, the Corps also awarded Miryung a 

$6.9 million contract for a prayer shelter, a bowling facility, and a ladies lounge. At 

Jubayl, the division contracted for a range of facilities including a hospital, airstrip 

improvements, a desalinization plant, and landscaping.25

By the spring of 1979, all of the construction activity began to produce visible 

results. In May, the Middle East Division commander, Brig. Gen. James N. Ellis, 

described the naval base at Jubayl as “taking shape.” Hyundai had completed the 

off-shore facilities and approached completion of the first phase of the on-shore 

facilities. Delays in connecting with the commercial power company made it impossible to test utilities such as the chiller plant and electrical switching gear, but they 

were ready. The U.S. Navy had awarded a contract for operations and maintenance 

of the base to Hughes, Bendix, Holmes, and Narver (HBH). Hyundai prepared to 

turn over its mobilization and workers camps to the HBH personnel, even though 

the company had work to complete on Phase II of the on-shore construction.26

The first U.S. naval vessel, the USS Elmer Montgomery, berthed at the King 

Abdulaziz Naval Base at Jubayl in July 1979. RSNF ships arrived at Jiddah for the 

first time in September, when four RSNF minesweepers and a U.S. Navy escort ship 

stopped there en route on their 63-day voyage from Virginia to Jubayl. Offshore 

facilities were incomplete; but, as Ellis reported the event, the channel configuration 

and the other piers “proved outstanding.” In December, the Corps’ Red Sea Area 

Office awarded contracts for ornamental planting and for a cable television system 

at the Jiddah base. Over the winter of 1979–1980, contractors completed work on 

the rest of the on-shore facilities, community-support facilities, an airstrip, and a 

patrol road. Between May and October 1980, Hyundai finished work at Jubayl on 

community-support facilities, warehouse space, and a building for the ship-repair 

facility. When King Khalid officially dedicated the base in late November, work 

was not yet complete.27

Although work advanced satisfactorily, the construction at the naval bases 

included a major misunderstanding indicative of the issues that troubled the 

relationship between the Corps and the Saudis. The conflict occurred over the seating 

capacity of the mess hall at Jubayl. When division personnel explained the designs 

to Al Saja, they described the mess hall at King Abdulaziz Naval Base as capable of 

serving one thousand seven hundred people. In considering the ceremony at which 

King Khalid would dedicate the base, Al Saja anticipated using the hall for a royal 

25 Dykes, Significant Activities Rpt–Dec 77/Jan 78, 16 Jan 78, p. 5, E-5-6, TAD-RHA; PM 

Assignment—Riyadh Dist, 15 Jul 81; “King Abdulaziz Naval Base,” 16 May 79, p. 1; “Construction 

Placement, Riyadh District,” 1 Oct 83. 26 Ellis to Morris, 22 May 79, p. 5, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE.

27 “U.S. Naval Vessel Berths at Jubail,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, July 1979; Ellis to Morris, 19 Sep 

79, p. 4, and 11 Jan 80, p. 5, both in Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; PM Assignment—Riyadh Dist, 

15 Jul 81.
410 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

banquet. As the mess hall neared completion, RSNF officials could see that it had 

less than half the seating capacity they had expected. Faced with the embarrassment 

of having to reduce the scale of the dedication banquet, Al Saja wrote a scathing 

letter to Ellis expressing anger at having been misled. Either the Corps had a serious 

problem with its architect-engineer firms, he wrote, or it had failed to provide him 

with correct information.28

The acting division engineer, Col. James B. Hall, replied to Al Saja in a letter 

asserting that the information provided by the Corps had been accurate but that the 

Saudis had failed to understand it. The Corps had described not a seating capacity but 

a “serving capacity of 1700.” “The mess hall can serve 1700 enlisted personnel over 

an operating time of less than one hour and 15 minutes, if the mess hall operator can 

serve at a rate of 30 personnel per minute and the EM personnel can complete their 

meals on the average of 15 minutes.” Hall quoted for Al Saja the exact information 

that the division had provided in explaining the design: “Enlisted Men—2 Serving 

Lines with 320 seats. Students—1 Serving Line with 160 Seats.”29 The arithmetic 

of Hall’s explanation is not self-evident, and the assumptions concerning the tempo 

of the serving lines and the meals are certainly American, not Saudi.

At Jiddah, construction advanced less quickly than at Jubayl, delayed in part 

by the transition from the Mediterranean Division to the Middle East Division 

28 Al Saja to Ellis, 30 Jul 79, sub: KANB Mess Hall Capacity, unmarked box, TAD-RHA.

29 Hall to Al Saja, 14 Aug 79, sub: Mess Hall at KANB, Jubail, p. 1, Encl, p. B-94, E-7-6, TADRHA.

Pier piles at King Abdulaziz Naval Base, Jubayl, June 1978
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 411

throughout 1976 and in part by the slow cleanup of the slaughter facilities and 

landscape that John Blake so vividly described. In late 1979, activity on the contract 

for Phase I of the on-shore facilities, begun a year earlier, slowed because Miryung 

had an insufficient number of laborers and because of delays in receiving government- and contractor-furnished equipment. In January 1980, when not all the housing 

under construction was ready for occupancy, personnel from the Royal Saudi Navy 

and from the contractors providing operations and maintenance—Hughes, Bendix, 

Holmes, and Narver—began jointly to use the available housing.30

Because of the foreseeable end to the work in the western area at the King Faisal 

Naval Base and other installations, such as Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk, the division 

began planning in early 1980 to draw down the Jiddah District and to place the staff 

in other positions. The district closed 1 April 1980; the Riyadh District assumed 

responsibility for the mission, personnel, equipment, and facilities. In September 

1980, the contractor completed the off-shore facilities at Jiddah; the Corps anticipated 

the turnover of on-shore facilities the following month.31

By the end of 1980, the naval bases at Jubayl and Jiddah each consisted of three 

main groups of completed facilities: off-shore harbor and ship facilities, on-shore 

facilities to support the naval mission directly, and facilities to support the RSNF 

personnel.32

Headquarters of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces

Over the same years that the two naval bases took shape, the Corps supervised 

the design and construction in Riyadh of a headquarters complex for the RSNF. Early 

estimates put the cost of the headquarters complex at $27 million. In the spring of 

1976, using Parsons, Basil designs, the Mediterranean Division advertised a request 

for proposals; in June, the division awarded a construction contract to a German 

company, Weimar and Trachte. In mid-March 1977, the preliminary site work for 

headquarters began. The project managed to stay on schedule despite a strike by 

U.S. dockworkers in late 1977–1978. Weimar and Trachte completed work on the 

RSNF headquarters on 11 March 1980, a few months before the completion of the 

facilities at Jiddah and Jubayl.33

By early 1980, the approved amount of construction for the headquarters 

complex had risen to $94.98 million. Saudi base commanders and project officers 

had requested numerous changes in scope and design as well as numerous additional 

30 Ellis to Morris, 11 Jan 80, p. 5.

31 Ibid., p. 4; Permanent Orders no. 4–1, 13 Mar 80, Gen Files 54-2, OH, HQ USACE; Albro to 

Morris, 21 Sep 80, p. 4, box 1, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 32 Fact Sheet, Saudi Naval Expansion Program (SNEP) Jubail, Jiddah, Riyadh, Dammam, Saudi 

Arabia, 31 Dec 80, p. 1, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 33 Wells to Morris, 16 Mar 77; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 28 Apr 76, p. 3, box 17, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, listing “Under RFP for 

Construction,” p. 8; Page, “Mediterranean Division [sic] Command Briefing,” 21 Jun 77, p. 12; PM 

Assignment—Riyadh Dist, 15 Jul 81; Wells to Morris, 21 Jan 78, p. 4; Ellis to Morris, 24 May 80, p. 5, 

unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE.
412 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

services without authorization from the RSNF command. As a result, Captain Al 

Saja issued instructions that contractors should follow the specifications of the 

contract only unless a change had his explicit approval. The Middle East Division 

commander, General Ellis, issued his own instructions to clarify guidelines for 

determining whether a change was minor or major and to ensure in the latter case 

that it had RSNF command approval.34

In addition to the construction costs, SNEP spent a great deal of money acquiring 

furnishings for the facilities. The memorandum of 1972 called for the Corps of 

Engineers to provide the RSNF with “fully furnished and operable facilities.” 

In addition to equipment such as the Syncrolifts, that included offices and living 

quarters. The Saudis interpreted fully operational to mean ready to use, “down to 

the paper clips in the drawers.” Procurement even extended to fish for the aquariums 

at the naval bases.35

Government-furnished property and equipment came to comprise a significant 

dimension of the Saudi Naval Expansion Program.36 Some of the spending went to 

purchase fine china and silver, a practice that engendered public derision in the United 

States in a March 1980 article in the Washington Post. Headlined “His Majesty’s 

Silver Service, The Royal Saudi Arabian Navy’s $4.5 Million Dinnerware Deal,” 

the article dwelt on the extravagance of Saudi spending on Steuben glass, Limoges 

china, Christofle silver, and Baccarat crystal—“the stemware Czar Nicholas II of 

Russia used to drink from, then smash.” With American hostages in the hands of 

radical Muslim revolutionaries in Iran, the reference to the czar whose ineptitude had 

ushered in the Russian Revolution of 1917 was particularly pointed. In disdainful 

tones, the article set out a series of comparisons. The Ceralene-Raynaud custommade china bought for the king’s use at $530 per three-piece place setting contrasted 

with “the china used by the U.S. chief of naval operations . . . called ‘GSA-issue, 

standard hotel/motel grade’” available at $20.03 per six-piece place setting. Each 

four-piece place setting of Reed & Barton silverware for senior Saudi officers cost 

$911, while the commercial-grade silver plate used for the U.S. Navy’s top brass 

cost $8.66 for a seven-piece place setting.37

The Saudi Navy, of course, was doing nothing markedly different from the 

other Saudi services in furnishing its VIP quarters and officers homes. Many of the 

luxurious furnishings that the Navy bought were destined for celebratory occasions, 

such as the king’s dedication of the naval bases or a visit by Queen Elizabeth II of 

Great Britain. There is also no doubt that the level of luxury that the Saudis provided 

for their military was far beyond that the United States provided to American service 

personnel. Because the Saudi Navy was so small, the spending per sailor came under 

34 Bfg for Lt Gen Morris, 20 Jan 80, p. 15, E-6-4; Memo for Div Engr, 26 Feb 78, sub: Meeting with 

RSNF, box 17 of 20, K-8-5; Decision Memo, Ellis, 28 Aug 78, pp. 1, 2–4, E-7-6; all in TAD-RHA. 35 Quotation from Interv, Moorhus with Wood, 27 Jun 96, p. 29; Carlson to Wible and Griggs, 18 

Jul 79, E-7-6, TAD-RHA. 36 Wells to Prince Sultan, 24 Sep 77, E-7-6, TAD-RHA.

37 Elisabeth Bumiller, “His Majesty’s Silver Service, The Royal Saudi Arabian Navy’s $4.5 Million Dinnerware Deal,” Washington Post, 4 March 1980.
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 413

heavy criticism in hearings before the House of Representatives, even though no 

U.S. funds were being spent.38

Naval Program Constrained

Cost increases characterized all of the Saudi programs, but they particularly 

troubled the long-range development of the Saudi Navy. In 1980, the RSNF still had 

only one thousand five hundred servicemen. This small service had a construction 

program exceeding $2 billion and projects worth another several hundred million 

dollars in various stages of design. A program of that size demanded a cadre of 

managers capable of overseeing it, but the Saudi Navy never created its own 

effective staff structure, such as MODA’s General Directorate of Military Works, 

for managing its multibillion-dollar expansion.39

One setback to the development of the bureaucracy necessary to support the 

RSNF came in the spring of 1978, when one of Al Saja’s most effective staff officers, 

Colonel Al Khweet, died in an automobile accident in Italy. A Saudi engineer with 

an Italian wife, Al Khweet was fluent in English, which Al Saja did not command, 

and was comfortable in technical discussions with the American engineers and 

38 Interv, Moorhus with Wood, 27 Jun 96, pp. 57–62; Hamilton Comm Hearings, pp. 27–30.

39 Interv, Moorhus with Wood, 27 Jun 96, p. 73; Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic 

Stability, p. 175.

Residence for the commander of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces, ca. 1980
414 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

designers.40 The Saudi Navy had too shallow a manpower pool of technically trained 

managers to be able to afford the loss of someone like Al Khweet. 

The RSNF’s political position within Saudi Arabia also appears to have been 

weaker than that of the other services. The Navy had no direct connection to the 

royal family as did the National Guard through Prince Abdullah or MODA through 

Prince Sultan. In the competition for the nation’s limited manpower pool, the 

Saudi government gave its Army and Air Force priority in selecting high-quality 

recruits. The Saudi Naval Expansion Program also suffered from the relative 

inattention given it by the U.S. Navy. The experience of the first half-dozen years 

of the program, as assessed by one knowledgeable observer, suggested that the 

Navy “lacked the advisory experience of the other U.S. services [and] continued 

to provide low-quality or mediocre personnel” to support SNEP. Further, much 

of the equipment that the U.S. Navy advised the Saudis to buy developed serious 

reliability problems.41 All these factors rendered the Saudi Navy’s expansion program 

particularly vulnerable.

In retrospect, the momentum behind the Saudi Naval Expansion Program 

depended too heavily on the vision of one person, Captain Al Saja. He wanted to 

bring the RSNF to a high degree of self-sufficiency so that, after the Corps and 

the U.S. Navy turned over facilities and equipment, it would be able to sustain 

its operations independently. To achieve that goal, Al Saja ordered the largest 

changes in the program’s scope in areas that improved O&M facilities, training, and 

spare-parts warehousing. Al Saja also thought of the Saudi Navy and its facilities 

as the nucleus of a larger Arab naval force. He envisioned cooperation with the 

other Gulf states.42

The timing of the Washington Post article, “His Majesty’s Silver Service,” on 

4 March 1980—when the Saudi government was reviewing all spending—was 

particularly unfortunate. The article cannot have registered well with a government 

that shunned publicity. In the internal political struggles that developed in 1979 and 

1980 over allocations within the defense budget, Captain Al Saja lost.43

Whatever the reasons, the results of a SNEP reorientation became evident during 

1980 and 1981. The perceived inadequacies of American equipment and advice 

led to a shift in emphasis by the Saudi Arabian government, which concluded that 

several European countries could provide naval vessels, equipment, and training 

services better suited to Saudi needs. At the turn of the decade, the Saudis entered 

into serious negotiations with both the Italian and French governments. In October 

40 Interv, Moorhus with Wood, 27 Jun 96, pp. 8–9. Captain Al Saja mentioned Al Khweet’s death 

in a briefing in June 1978. See MFR, Anwar Badwan, 11 Jun 78, sub: SNEP Briefing, box 17, K-8-5, 

TAD-RHA. 41 Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, pp. 174–75, quotations from p. 175. 

See also Interv, Moorhus with Wood, 27 Jun 96, pp. 33–34. 42 Interv, Moorhus with Wood, 27 Jun 96, pp. 20–21, 36.

43 Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, p. 175.
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 415

1980, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with France to supply $35 billion in naval 

equipment and advice.44

In early 1980, at the same time that negotiations advanced with the French, a 

new “acting” naval commander, Capt. Mohammad Own Sharaf Al Barakati, emerged 

as the RSNF head. Between spring and autumn, “acting” disappeared from Al 

Barakati’s title; the Middle East Division commander addressed his correspondence 

to Captain, then Commodore Al Barakati. Al Saja’s name disappeared altogether 

from the documents passing between the Corps and the Saudi Navy. The dedication 

ceremony for the King Abdulaziz Naval Base at Jubayl, which Al Saja had been 

planning since 1978, was postponed from 1979 to March 1980, then to September, 

then again to late November. With Al Saja’s removal, the energy behind SNEP 

dissipated. The situation is reminiscent of what occurred after the minister of 

information, Jamil Hujaylan, was replaced in 1970 and the Corps of Engineers’ 

construction for the television and radio broadcast programs declined.45

Although the SNEP construction program continued beyond 1980, and the 

change was not immediately evident, events during 1980 and 1981 would show 

that SNEP had ceased to expand. In February 1980, Ellis described the prospects 

of the naval academy as “iffy” because of cost. By May, as a result of consultations during the spring, he felt that he had “firm commitments” for the academy’s 

final design, as well as for the expansion of the RSNF headquarters complex just 

completed in Riyadh. To prepare plans for the naval academy, the division engaged 

the Washington, D.C., firm of Warnecke, Ewing, Desmond, and Lord, which had 

been involved for two decades in master-planning and design at the U.S. Naval 

Academy.46 Within days of Ellis’ report on the academy and the expansion of RSNF 

headquarters, the Saudis requested a conference with the U.S. Navy’s SNEP project 

manager and with the Middle East Division.

The discussions in late May 1980 began a series of meetings to develop a new 

memorandum of understanding for the program. The Saudis wanted assurances 

that the Corps of Engineers could complete the SNEP construction within the 

Saudi Arabian government’s current five-year plan. The Saudis wanted to review 

the projects that would be included in future construction, to establish completion 

dates, and to generate new estimated annual expenditures for the program. Finally, 

they wanted to have the new memorandum as a tool for coordinating three agencies 

involved in SNEP: the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Royal 

Saudi Naval Forces. Over the summer, the parties met, compiled lists of all projects 

not yet under construction, established milestone dates, and agreed on the text of a 

44 Ibid., pp. 175, 220–23.

45 MFR, Capt Dennis J. Garbis, 24 Mar 80, sub: Visit with Capt Sharif [Sharaf] (Acting Cdr, 

RSNF), box 17, K-8-5, TAD-RHA; Interv, Moorhus with Roger Thomas, 27 Aug 96, p. 37, and with 

Wood, 27 Jun 96, pp. 12–13, 26–28, 38–40. 46 Ellis to Morris, 7 Feb, 24 May 80, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE. “King Khalid Dedicates 

Jubail Base,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, January-February 1981, pp. 6–7.
416 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

memorandum, signed on 2 August 1980. These discussions also led the three parties 

to begin quarterly meetings, the first of which took place in November 1980.47

In December, the Middle East Division took stock of those SNEP projects that 

had not been included in the memorandum of understanding of August or added to 

the list at the November meeting. The omitted projects included the Royal Saudi 

Naval Academy; music centers for the Navy’s marching band at Jiddah and Jubayl; 

additional housing and warehouse space at Riyadh, Jiddah, and Jubayl; a training 

center referred to as The Institute of Naval Studies (TINS); and a special-forces 

training center planned for Jiddah. The total value of the projects put on hold 

exceeded $1 billion.48

By mid-1981, there were other changes. On 30 May, the RSNF’s participant 

in the quarterly review meetings informed division staff that they would need to 

cut $2 billion from the current estimates of projects. In early July, SNEP, which 

had always been funded directly by the Saudi Arabian government, came under the 

authority of MODA’s director general of military works, Col. Naser F. Al Faisal. 

Noting that of the seventeen projects scheduled for construction under the August 

1980 memorandum of understanding only thirteen had actually been awarded, 

the Middle East Division moved $685 million in future projects out of the “firm” 

category. The division still anticipated $5.2 billion in construction for the RSNF—a 

third of the division’s anticipated work.49

The fate of the naval academy was symptomatic of the dilatory progress that 

the SNEP projects were making. The architect-engineer firm completed concept 

designs in June 1981. For six months, the Saudis discussed relocating the academy; 

but by the end of 1981, the GDMW had placed the project on hold. In 1982, Saudi 

officials terminated the project.50

Projects already under construction continued. Contractors completed a 

significant expansion of the RSNF headquarters complex in Riyadh in late January 

1986 at a cost of $181 million. The headquarters building itself consisted of a ninelevel facility that included subbasement and basement floors and renovations to the 

floors above ground and to the penthouse. The headquarters building was the last 

facility completed in the expansion project for the complex that also encompassed 

47 Fact Sheet for Lt Gen Joseph K. Bratton’s Visit to Middle East Div, 1 to 7 Jan 81, prepared 31 

Dec 80 (hereafter cited as Fact Sheet for Bratton Visit, Jan 81); MOU, Royal Saudi Navy, U.S. Navy 

PM, and Middle East Div, 31 Dec 80, sub: Scheduling of Design and Construction for the Royal Saudi 

Naval Expansion Program; both in Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE. 48 Fact Sheets for Bratton Visit, Jan 81, Fact Sheet 20, “SNEP Projects Not Attached to MOU 

During the 4 and 5 November 1980 Update,” 31 Dec 80. 49 Memo, Donahue, 1 Jun 81, sub: SNEP Budget, box 11, K-8-4, TAD-RHA; Albro to Bratton, 12 

Aug 81, p. 1; Fact Sheet: SNEP MOU Performance Evaluation, 19 Jul 81, K-8-4, TAD-RHA; Albro, 

“House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East” (typescript), 22 Jul 81, p. 5, 

Current Files, Transatlantic Division–Public Affairs Office (TAD-PAO). 50 R. L. Rousseau, “Middle East Division (Rear) 1981 Historical Summary Report,” 26 Mar 82, p. 

5, Current Files, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited as Rousseau, Mid East Div [Rear] Hist Sum, 1981); 

R. L. Rousseau, “Middle East Division (Rear) 1982 Historical Summary Report,” 28 Mar 83, p. 1, 

unmarked box, TAD-RHA (hereafter cited as Rousseau, Mid East Div [Rear] Hist Sum, 1982).
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 417

an underground command center, a seven-level parking garage with over five 

hundred parking spaces, bachelor enlisted quarters, gatehouses, a central mechanical 

and electrical building, a 500,000-gallon water tank, and other work on utilities to 

support these expanded facilities. MODA dedicated the multistory office building 

and parking garage on 4 May 1986. About the same time, contractors completed 

a housing complex at Al Kharj with 520 houses, 320 of which were designated 

for Navy officers and enlisted men and 200 of which went to MODA personnel. 

July 1988 saw completion of the last SNEP project, a multipurpose stadium at 

King Abdulaziz Naval Base in Jubayl; but the $23.5 million stadium stood unused 

and unmaintained for several years. When Corps of Engineers personnel who had 

worked on the project revisited it in the early 1990s, it showed extensive disrepair 

and erosion of the concrete. Nonetheless, during the Gulf War of 1990–1991, the 

stadium, which accommodated U.S. Marine Corps forces, served both the Kingdom 

of Saudi Arabia and the United States well, as did the facilities at the Jiddah and 

Jubayl naval bases.51

51 “RSNF Headquarters Expansion Project Review for Maj Gen Richard M. Wells, Deputy Chief 

of Engineers,” 13 Jul 84, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Col R. M. Danielson to Otaishan, 31 May 86, 

sub: Royal Saudi Naval Forces Headquarters Expansion, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Final Completion 

of Work/Warranty of Construction, box 1, K-8-3, TAD-RHA; “Three Major Saudi Projects Wrap 

Up,” Middle East Division News, Summer 1986, pp. 1ff; Brig Gen James W. Ray, “Completion and 

Turnover of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces Headquarters Project,” 18 Mar 86, unmarked box, TADRHA; Interv, Moorhus with Wood, 27 Jun 96, pp. 70–73, and with Ron Breen, 30 Jan 95, pp. 16–19; 

Wayne Henry, Comments on Draft Ms, 1 Oct 97, TAD-RHA.

Geodesic dome at the Saudi Naval Expansion Program headquarters, Riyadh, May 1979
418 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

In December 1990, the Middle East Division’s successor organization, the 

Middle East/Africa Projects Office (MEAPO), closed the accounts of the Saudi 

Naval Expansion Program. The program had a total cost of $3.7 billion, making it 

the second largest construction program measured by dollar value in the history of 

the relationship between the Saudi military and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

When measured by the sixty-eight contracts awarded for SNEP work, it surpassed 

the largest dollar program, King Khalid Military City, which had about fifty 

contracts.52

The program never fulfilled the vision of the Royal Saudi Naval Force’s leader, 

Captain Al Saja. Competing agendas within the Saudi Arabian government brought 

piecemeal reductions to SNEP projects. For all its limitations, SNEP did provide the 

Saudi Arabian government with two modern naval ports, a naval command center, 

and a stronger, more modern navy than it had a decade earlier. 

Modernizing the Saudi Arabian National Guard

In contrast to the Royal Saudi Naval Forces, which had always been nominally 

subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and Aviation even when it operated 

independently in the 1970s, the Saudi Arabian National Guard existed completely 

independent of MODA. Its commander, Prince (King since August 2005) Abdullah 

bin Abdulaziz, was one of the most powerful men in the kingdom. He took command 

of the SANG in the early 1960s as an ally of his half brother, Prime Minister Faisal 

(who became king in November 1964), in the struggle to wrest control of the 

government from King Saud. The limitations on the involvement by the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers in the modernization of the National Guard came not from the 

loss of influence of its commander but from Abdullah’s sense that the program, and 

possibly the Corps of Engineers, had failed to meet his expectations.

In the early 1970s, at the insistence of King Faisal, Abdullah acquiesced to 

modernize the Guard and began talks to secure assistance from the U.S. government. 

SANG had twenty-thousand regular troops dispersed throughout the kingdom and 

approximately thirty thousand irregular soldiers who supplemented the regular force 

by serving part time. These military and paramilitary forces came from the Bedouin 

tribes of the Arabian Peninsula. Some of the guardsmen were organized into effective 

infantry units; but overall, the force was poorly armed and ill trained for modern 

warfare or for the control of internal security in an era of growing terrorism.53

52 The dollar total is from Memo, David Brown to Wiles, 14 Dec 90, sub: Authorization—Design 

and Construction of Facilities, Saudi Arabian Naval Expansion Program (SNEP), FMCS Case HAQ, 

Current Files, Transatlantic Division–Resource Management (TAD-RM). The number of contracts 

is given in “Briefing, Middle East/Africa Projects Office,” n.d. [1987], one-page summary, “Saudi 

Program,” unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 53 Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, p. 178. Mark Heller, ed., The Middle 

East Military Balance, 1984 (Tel Aviv, Israel: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1984), p. 181, gives 

statistics on the strength of the various branches of the Saudi military force. Hermann F. Eilts, “Social 

Revolution in Saudi Arabia” (Part II), Parameters (Fall 1971): 31.
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 419

By personal background and culture, Prince Abdullah had a far greater affinity 

to the Bedouin world than to the modern world of American technology. As 

talks progressed in early 1972, Abdullah repeatedly requested explanations from 

Mediterranean Division personnel of the processes involved in Foreign Military 

Sales. The Saudi Arabia District engineer, Col. William L. Durham, concluded that 

the Corps had a substantial amount of work to do “in developing working relationships and procedures . . . [with] HRH Abdullah and National Guard Staff.” Drawing 

on a long-standing relationship between the British military and the Saudi Arabian 

National Guard, one of the experienced British advisers warned Durham that SANG 

leaders had no real knowledge even of their own government’s administrative procedures for approving projects or for arranging payments. Durham acknowledged that 

the division would need to help the SANG staff to develop internal decision-making 

procedures and methods of coordination with other agencies of the Saudi Arabian 

government in order to support the construction program.54 The Guard had neither 

an institutional bureaucracy comparable to MODA’s growing General Directorate 

of Military Works nor a decade of experience working with the Americans.

On 19 March 1973, after more than a year of talks, the governments of the United 

States and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding establishing the 

U.S. role in the SANG modernization program. This document was very similar to 

the memorandum signed in 1972 establishing the Saudi Naval Expansion Program. 

It specified five areas of “technical and supervisory assistance” that the U.S. 

Department of Defense would provide: 

1. Preparation of a National Guard Modernization Plan to cover such functions 

as organization, training, procurement, construction, maintenance, supply, 

and administrative support;

2. Development and administration of training programs;

3. Procurement of facilities, materials, equipment, and services necessary to 

implement the plan;

4. Supervision of the design and construction of training, maintenance, supply, 

and communications facilities and other facilities related thereto, as necessary 

to implement the plan;

5. Management of the establishment and operation of training, administrative, 

and logistic support elements.55

In late April 1973, the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) received orders 

to appoint a program manager and to establish a program management office for 

the SANG modernization program. AMC established the Office of the Program 

Manager for the Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG). For its part, the 

Corps of Engineers pursued the construction management objectives set forth in the 

54 Memo, Durham, 14 Apr 72, sub: Saudi Arabian National Guard Program, p. 1, box 20, access. 

no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 55 MOU, Govts of United States and Saudi Arabia, 19 Mar 73, sub: Saudi Arabian National Guard 

Modernization Program, p. 1, unmarked box, TAD-RHA.
420 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

memorandum: planning, designing, and building the facilities necessary to realize 

the modernization program.56

Design Phase

Preliminary discussions of the SANG program addressed first a headquarters 

complex in Riyadh and a troop-training area near the capital. Later, when the design 

for the headquarters project was well advanced, the Guard began to explore creation 

of military cities to station troops throughout the kingdom. 

Headquarters Complex

When SANG first began discussions with the Corps in early 1972, it had a 

design for a new headquarters building in Riyadh that had been prepared by the 

Saudi Ministry of Public Works.57 Abdullah gave these design drawings to Colonel 

Durham, who sent them, and subsequent additions developed during the next year 

as the specifications grew, to the Mediterranean Division headquarters in Italy for 

review. In June 1973, three division representatives, after completing their review 

of the Saudi designs, traveled to Riyadh to confer with the SANG staff and, in a 

separate meeting, with Abdullah. The chief of engineering, William McCormick, 

suggested that the size of the headquarters building and complex might exceed SANG 

needs; but Saudi officials replied that they had studied the Guard’s needs carefully 

and that the building met those needs appropriately. When McCormick presented 

a preliminary budget estimate of $22 million for the headquarters, SANG officials 

reacted to the amount with surprise. Still, they indicated that they preferred to seek 

a budget increase rather than to reduce the scope of the building.58

Abdullah also reacted negatively to the high estimate, but he was prepared to 

have his staff again review the criteria and scope of the construction for possible 

economies. McCormick estimated that it would take approximately nine months to 

convert the Saudi designs to Corps standards. Abdullah pressed to have the designs 

completed in five months. He displayed impatience that the building could not be 

designed and built within a year. When division engineers explained to him how 

long it had taken to build at Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk, he acquiesced; but he 

remained uncomfortable and annoyed with every delay throughout the project.59

The conferees also discussed the criteria for the underground command center 

Abdullah had decided to add to the headquarters. The specifications located the 

facility apart from the headquarters building but connected the two buildings by a 

tunnel. The command center, designed to withstand a direct strike with conventional 

56 Memo, Maj Gen V. L. Bowers, 27 Apr 73, sub: Saudi Arabia National Guard Modernization 

Program, p. 5, box 51-84-9384, OH, HQ USACE; OCE, Major Activities, FY 1973, p. 50. 57 Interv, John T. Greenwood with Elmer Parkin, 4 Oct 83, pp. 5, 11–17.

58 MFR, William N. McCormick Jr., R. R. Wiles, and J. K. Soper, 28 Jun 73, sub: Meetings in 

Riyadh and Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, 17 thru 20 June 1973, pp. 2–3, box 51-84-9384, Farrell Papers. 59 Ibid.; Interv, Greenwood with Parkin, 4 Oct 83, p. 8.
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 421

weapons, would be provisioned to maintain a contingency staff for fourteen days. 

The SANG staff directed the Mediterranean Division to proceed with a concept 

design and a budget estimate for the underground command center but not to let its 

development delay construction of the headquarters building.60

After the discussions with the SANG staff, two division staff members left 

Riyadh; but the third, Dick Wiles, remained to meet with Brig. A. Donaldson, 

the British military adviser to SANG, at Donaldson’s request. The British officer 

sketched for Wiles the expansiveness of the thinking within SANG concerning the 

modernization program. Abdullah had recently visited the Saudi Arabian Army’s 

new cantonment at Khamis Mushayt. Impressed by the quality of the facilities, he 

had begun to discuss building similar complete cantonments for the regular troops 

of the National Guard. Donaldson noted that SANG had more men than the Saudi 

Army, which meant that such an undertaking would involve possibly six to eight 

cantonments throughout the country. Donaldson confirmed that the Guard would 

build a central training installation, and he asserted that discussions also included 

regional headquarters complexes. He concluded by observing that the SANG 

modernization program was very large in scope and would last ten to fifteen years. 

In reporting the conversation, Wiles raised at least the possibility that the SANG 

modernization program would grow to rival the MODA construction program in 

scope.61

In September 1973, the Saudi government approved three architect-engineer 

firms as potential designers for the SANG headquarters complex. In mid-December 

1973, five months after McCormick’s June briefings, the division presented Abdullah 

with revised time and cost estimates. Abdullah expressed impatience with the 

projected schedule that allowed four years for construction, and he pressed the division’s personnel both directly and through Donaldson to move more quickly.62

The following February, a month after the government established the FMS 

case for the project, the Saudi Arabia District awarded a $1.4 million contract to 

Leo A. Daly Company of Omaha, Nebraska, for design of the SANG headquarters 

complex. In March, the district received authority to conduct studies and prepare 

drawings for training facilities for a SANG vehicle-management program. This 

prompted initiation of another FMS case in August for the planning, programming, 

and development of the criteria for the program. The district commissioned Daly 

to conduct the study, which the company delivered in mid-1975. The Corps had 

no further involvement in the vehicle management program, which SANG pursued 

through a contract with Chrysler International Corporation.63

60 Interv, Greenwood with Parkin, 4 Oct 83, p. 19; MFR, McCormick, Wiles, and Soper, 28 Jun 

73, p. 2. 61 Ibid.

62 Durham to Williams, 3 Sep 73, p. 1; 18 Dec 73, pp. 1–2; 22 Dec 73, p. 1; all in box 51-84-9384, 

Farrell Papers. 63 Fact Sheet, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Cases Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG), 22 Oct 

74, p. 1, box 20, access. no. 77-92-001, WNRC (hereafter cited as Fact Sheet, FMS SANG, 22 Oct 

74); Annual Hist Sum, CY 1974, p. A1; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, p. 24.
422 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

When the Saudi Arabian National Guard signed the FMS case covering the 

headquarters complex in January 1974, the Corps programmed completion in 

three years at an estimated cost of $52 million, more than double the first estimate 

of $22 million. By the time the Mediterranean Division staff prepared to brief 

the SANG staff again the following April, the cost estimate had risen to $62 

million and the projected date of completion had slipped to late 1977. McCormick 

anticipated an angry reaction from Abdullah; but during the briefing, Abdullah’s 

staff accepted the cost increases with no visible protest. The discussion concerning 

the slippage in the completion date for the headquarters, on the other hand, took 

“a very interesting twist” when SANG staff asserted that King Faisal had not yet 

authorized the headquarters facility and that “His Majesty hasn’t decided that the 

Corps of Engineers is going to do this work.” McCormick concluded that “the 

SANG program is in real trouble right now from an authorization standpoint, at a 

level above the people that we have been working with. . . . The problem seems to 

be with the Ministry of Finance.”64

If Prince Abdullah showed no visible concern over the rising cost estimates 

for the headquarters complex, it may have been because he had launched his own 

plans for dealing with the costs of construction. In an 8 April 1974 letter to U.S. 

Ambassador James E. Akins, Abdullah conveyed his desire to proceed. However, 

he wanted three additional stipulations—to apply to all final contracts—incorporated 

in the document governing the SANG modernization. First, Abdullah wanted a 

clause stipulating that contract prices be final, with no opportunity for price review 

as work progressed. Second, he wanted all costs related to contractor personnel and 

workers, including lodging and other facilities, assumed by the contractors as part of 

the salaries they paid their employees, rather than having the costs paid by the Saudi 

government. Third, Abdullah wanted a clause specifying that all contract prices be in 

U.S. dollars with no obligation to adjust or compensate for devaluation of currency 

due to inflation and with no obligation to adjust to fluctuating currency rates.65

If accepted, these clauses would fundamentally change the character of the 

agreements under which the Corps had operated in Saudi Arabia since the 1960s. 

When the Americans involved in the negotiations asked what had prompted the 

addition of these conditions, Abdullah replied that “the Ministry of Finance had 

recommended them in a letter to His Majesty, King Faisal . . . and that His Majesty 

had directed they be carried out in his letter to Prince Abdulla [sic].”66

The Saudi Arabia District engineer, Colonel Durham, and the ambassador both 

recognized that Prince Abdullah’s clauses had to be rejected—without offending him. 

Therefore, in carefully crafted letters with similar lines of argument, Durham wrote 

to the prince and Ambassador Akins wrote to the minister of finance and national 

64 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 22 Apr 74, pp. 1–3, box 20, access. no. 77-92-0001, 

WNRC. 65 Durham to Prince Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz, [23 Apr 74], box 20, access. no. 77-92-0001, 

WNRC. 66 James E. Akins, U.S. Amb, to HRH Prince Musa’id ibn Abdul Rahman, 29 Apr 74, box 20, 

access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC.
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 423

economy, Musa’id ibn Abdul Rahman—also a royal prince. Each indicated that the 

U.S. government and the Corps of Engineers had as their objective to provide the 

best possible service and support to the Saudi Arabian government in its program to 

modernize the National Guard. Including the three clauses in the letter of offer and 

agreement that established the FMS case would contradict that basic objective. In 

addition, it would put the agreement at odds with contract law in the United States, 

which the U.S. government and the Corps were both obliged to observe. 

The ambassador appealed to “Your Royal Highness’s known astuteness and 

discernment . . . to grasp the problem which has prompted this letter.”67 Durham 

used slightly different language:

To enable the Corps of Engineers to protect the interests of the Saudi Arabian 

Government, the Corps must be able to study the conditions of each contract 

situation and prescribe in each contract at the time of award those provisions which 

will insure the highest quality construction at the lowest cost to the Saudi Arabian 

Government.68

The two men conveyed the same message—Abdullah’s clauses were unacceptable. In discussions over the following weeks, Corps representatives advanced 

the additional argument that the three clauses, by transferring all risk to the 

contractors, would mean that contractors would add money to their bids to cover 

unforeseen contingencies and thus increase the costs of construction. It took 

several months to resolve this contretemps; but in late August 1974, SANG 

effectively abandoned its position by approving the preliminary designs for its 

headquarters complex. This cleared the way for final design with no reference to 

the problematic provisions.69

In late October, SANG staff informed the Corps of Engineers that they had 

resolved problems with the Ministry of Finance and that an additional $3 million 

would be provided. Ten days later, the division awarded a $3 million contract for 

the final design of the headquarters complex now projected to cost $85 million. In 

mid-May 1975, the Mediterranean Division and the Daly team presented to Prince 

Abdullah the final design of the headquarters complex.70

Military Cities at Al Qasim and Al Hasa

In September 1975, the SANG staff began informal discussions with the Corps 

about fulfilling Prince Abdullah’s desire to have installations comparable to the 

67 Ibid.

68 Durham to Abdullah, [23 Apr 74].

69 Memo, Maj Howard Brown, Jun 74, sub: Talking Paper [on Modernization Program], box 51-

84-9384, Farrell Papers; Fact Sheet, FMS SANG, 22 Oct 74, pp. 1–2. 70 Fact Sheet, FMS SANG, 22 Oct 74, pp. 1–2; OCE, “Annual Report of Major Activities, Jul. 1, 

1974–Jun. 30, 1975,” p. 53, box 8, Gen Files, OH, HQ USACE; Williams to Gribble, 13 Jun 75, p. 

1, box 6, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC.
424 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

army cantonment at Khamis Mushayt. The discussions addressed preparation of 

master plans for two military cities to be located at Al Qasim, about ninety miles 

west-southwest of Buraydah, and at Al Hasa, south-southwest of Dhahran and 

six miles northwest of Hufuf. The Mediterranean Division commissioned the Leo 

A. Daly Company to undertake preliminary work on the military cities, using the 

specifications that SANG outlined. Each city would have facilities to support a 

population of seven thousand five hundred, including areas for a cantonment, 

specialized training, firing ranges and maneuvers, recreation, a main post, family 

housing (nine hundred houses), and contractor housing. After the division turned 

over its preliminary work to the Guard, nothing happened until late October 1976, 

when the Saudi Ministry of Finance gave SANG’s deputy commander, Sheikh 

Abdul Aziz Al Towaijri, approval for the study and design of the military cities. 

The Corps estimated facilities would cost roughly $1.33 billion.71

The Middle East Division staff encouraged SANG to send a letter to the U.S. 

government to initiate an FMS case for the military cities; but again, no action 

occurred for months. Then, on 31 August 1977, the Guard formally requested that 

the Middle East Division submit an FMS case. The next day, the division engineer, 

Brig. Gen. Richard M. Wells, sent a letter to Prince Abdullah forwarding the FMS 

case for his approval and signature. Within days, the division informed the U.S. 

ambassador that the Guard had verbally requested cost estimates and a construction 

schedule for one military city. SANG wanted the work delivered by April 1978 so 

construction of the military city could be programmed into the government’s budget 

for the next fiscal year. Abdullah sent a letter requesting “timely completion of the 

study and design.”72

After a series of exchanges, the Saudi Arabian government accepted the FMS 

case on 2 October 1977. On the same day, the Middle East Division engaged the 

Daly Company to prepare the concept design and cost estimate. Over the following 

fourteen weeks, designers, engineers, and planners met periodically with division 

personnel and with SANG officials to develop preliminary designs and sketches of 

the cityscapes of the two military cities. At one point, in mid-November, Deputy 

Commander Al Towaijri instructed Daly to suspend all work while he consulted 

with the minister of agriculture and water concerning a new site at Al Qasim that 

would offer sources of water better than the one on which the company had been 

working. The delay lasted about two weeks. At a meeting in mid-January, Al Towaijri 

requested that the division have its budget data ready to submit in mid-March, a 

month earlier than his original instructions.73

71 Locations given in Fact Sheet, New SANG Construction Projects in Saudi Arabia, 29 Jan 78, 

E-7-4, TAD-RHA; Fact Sheet, National Guard Military Cities Projects, 31 Dec 80, and attachments, 

Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; MFR, Maj Martin C. Fisher, 1 Nov 76, sub: Meetings with HE 

Sheikh Towaijri, SANG Deputy Assistant Commander, p. 4, E-7-3, TAD-RHA; Wells to Morris, 12 

Dec 76, p. 6, box 3, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 72 Rpt, Lawrence F. S. Wu [after 6 Jan and before Apr 79], sub: Chronological Events, SANG 

Military Cities, box 20, K-8-6, TAD-RHA. 73 Ibid.
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 425

By February 1978, estimates for construction of the two cities had reached $2 

billion, nearly twice the original rough estimate. Wells became concerned that, 

“if we go that high we can forget about construction.” On 14 March, the division/

contractor team presented the concept design and budget data for the military cities 

to Prince Abdullah and four days later presented a more technical briefing to the 

SANG staff. Between April 1978 and January 1979, work on the design of the 

military cities slowed because of a disagreement between the division and SANG 

over which architect-engineer firms would participate in preparing final designs. 

The division wanted to divide the final designs into nine packages—family housing, 

hospital, cantonment, post support, centrum, schools, power plant, water-treatment 

plant, and site and utilities—and assign one package to each of nine American 

architect-engineer companies. The list did not include Daly, which had prepared 

the preliminary designs, because Daly had neither responded to the solicitation 

nor expressed any interest in submitting a proposal for final design of the project. 

Informally, SANG officials made clear that they preferred a list of three or four 

firms and that they wanted Daly on the list.74

While the two sides engaged in the debate over architect-engineer firms, the costs 

of design and the estimated costs for construction dictated a change in approach. 

Until early 1978, the designs for the two cities, which had similar facilities, had 

proceeded in tandem because the early construction packages for the two were the 

same. Over time, the design for the military cities had grown to roughly twice the 

size of the 1975 specifications. By March 1978, instead of a population of 7,500 per 

city, the projection was for 14,000. Instead of 900 houses, it was now 2,250. Instead 

of a small dispensary, the criteria now called for a 100-bed hospital expandable 

to 200 beds. Although the original concept included no airfield, a field capable of 

handling C–130 aircraft became part of the design. The Guard had also added a VIP 

complex, a 4,000-seat stadium, and sixty-one bomb shelters each with a 400-person 

capacity—all features absent in the original scope.75

When the Middle East Division presented the concept design in March 1978, it 

had added water-well fields with a pipeline and had extended topographical surveying 

and mapping to adjust to a changed boundary line—all to accommodate the cities’ 

increased sizes. In June, the division informed the Guard that more funds would be 

needed to continue work on the design. In response, the SANG staff verbally directed 

the Corps to concentrate design funds on Al Qasim; thus, the division stopped all 

further design effort on the military city at Al Hasa. In mid-September, General 

Wells’ successor as division engineer, General Ellis, formally notified the SANG 

staff that the $24 million originally estimated as adequate for the design of both 

74 Memo, Col Donald J. Palladino, 14 Feb 78, sub: Summary of Division (Rear) Staff Meeting, p. 

16, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Fact Sheets for Bratton Visit, Jan 81, att. E, Chronology of Events; 

Rpt, Wu, [after 6 Jan and before Apr 79]; Ellis to Abu Haimid, 7 Oct 78, sub: AE Selection for Final 

Design of Military City, Al Qasim, FMS Case HCE, box 5s, E-7-5, TAD-RHA. 75 Memo, Palladino, 14 Feb 78, p. 16; “National Guard Military Cities Projects,” 31 Dec 80, att. 

D, “Matrix Illustrating Variations in Project Scope With Time,” Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE.
426 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

cities would no longer suffice. The division now projected the cost for designing 

both Al Qasim and Al Hasa to be $36.9 million.76

In early August 1978, the division submitted the list of nine firms, not including 

Daly, buttressed by an explanation of the advantage to the Saudi Arabian government 

of having multiple firms preparing the designs.77 In late September, the SANG 

deputy for technical affairs, Sheikh Abdul Rahman Abu Haimid, “approved” the 

list—with several changes. Abu Haimid added Daly to the list as the first choice 

for the design package for cantonment facilities, explaining that he had talked with 

Al Towaijri and “his excellency wanted Leo A. Daly to be No. 1 for cantonment. 

. . . Leo A. Daly must be given a chance on the cantonment because they are our 

friends and we like their work.”78 Abu Haimid also rearranged some of the other 

design packages among the companies on the list. 

The Corps faced a dilemma. Since Daly had not submitted a proposal, including 

the company on the list of architect-engineers would be anomalous and subject 

to challenge by competitors under American contracting procedures. The Corps 

reconvened its architect-engineer selection board specifically to reevaluate Daly’s 

qualifications and again denied Daly a place on the list. The evaluation constituted 

a professional assessment that the firm “was not as qualified as other firms for the 

final designs in question.” Ellis informed Abu Haimid in a letter that emphasized 

that to award the cantonment design package to this company would place the Corps 

in a tenuous legal position.79

In late October 1978, in an effort to resolve the impasse, Ellis met with Abu 

Haimid and proposed that Daly be retained as the “executive” architect-engineer firm 

to advise the other firms concerning the basic elements of the design. In addition, 

Daly could be assigned to design early construction items such as the workers 

camp, the VIP villa, access roads, and perimeter fencing, as well as the mosques, 

mess halls, slaughterhouse, and communications complex. Abu Haimid accepted 

the proposal and approved the selection list on 3 December, nearly eight months 

after the approval of the concept design.80

In early January 1979, the deputy division engineer, Col. Joseph Bennett, met 

with the SANG staff to submit a construction schedule and startup program. The 

division was poised to pursue negotiations with the architect-engineer firms and 

anticipated that contracts for final design could be awarded by spring 1979. In 

April, representatives of the division and the Daly Company conducted a series of 

detailed briefings for the SANG staff, during which the staff requested a wide range 

76 Ellis to Abdullah, 30 May 79, sub: Military Cities at Al Qasim and Al Hasa, box 16, K-8-5; 

Ellis to Abu Haimid, 13 Sep 78, sub: National Guard Military Cities’ Design Budget, box 20, K-8-6; 

TAD-RHA. 77 Rpt, Wu, [after 6 Jan and before Apr 79].

78 MFR, Vedell, 8 Oct 78, sub: Selection of A/E Firms for SANG Military Cities, box 20, K-8-6, 

TAD-RHA. 79 Ibid.; Rpt, Wu, [after 6 Jan and before Apr 79]. Quote from MFR, Vedell, 10 Oct 78, sub: Meeting with SH Abu Haimid ref: A/E Selection for Military Cities, box 20, E-8-6, TAD-RHA. 80 Ibid.; Ellis to Al Towaijri, 28 Aug 78, sub: National Guard Military City—Al Qasim, box 8, 

E-7-4, TAD-RHA; Rpt, Wu [after 6 Jan and before Apr 79].
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 427

of changes in the design. Division personnel pointed out that some changes—such 

as increasing the capacity of the airport, doubling the size of the hospital, shifting 

from central air conditioning to window units (more expensive but simple to replace, 

thereby avoiding the headaches of maintaining a central system), and redesigning 

the mosques—dramatically increased the costs of redesign, of construction, and of 

maintenance. The SANG staff consistently replied that “the cost of the additional 

facilities did not concern them” and that “it must be done regardless of cost.”81

On 27 May 1979, the Saudi Arabian government approved its budget for 

the coming fiscal year. It contained no money for starting new projects in any 

ministry and no money for SANG military cities. The budget realities that had also 

curtailed the naval program during the same review stood in stark contrast to the 

expansiveness that prevailed in the design-review meetings held with the SANG staff 

a month earlier. Three days after the budget announcement, Al Towaijri instructed 

the division not to incorporate any of the review comments developed during the 

recent meetings.82

81 Rpt, Wu [after 6 Jan and before Apr 79]. MFR, Vedell, 12 May 79, sub: Record of Meetings 

About SANG Military Cities, box 16, K-8-5, TAD-RHA, covers about a dozen meetings between 13 

and 30 April 1978 (cited passages are from pp. 2 and 15 of the 22-page memo). 82 Ellis to Morris, 19 Sep 79, p. 1; Ellis to Abdullah, 30 May 79, p. 1.

Construction of the Saudi Arabian National Guard headquarters using precast concrete, 

August 1978
428 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

SANG officials appeared exceedingly distressed at having received no funding 

and at the realization that the funds set aside for the design of the two military 

cities would now barely cover the design of Al Qasim. They directed their anger 

and disappointment at the Corps. Ellis sought to mollify SANG’s most important 

leaders, Prince Abdullah and Sheikh Al Towaijri, with letters identifying the factors 

(changes, modifications, and increases in scope of work) that had increased costs. 

Assuring them that the division stood ready to “cooperate to our utmost,” he said 

the division would execute the instructions it had received from Al Towaijri to 

complete the designs for Al Qasim as soon as possible. Any additional effort to 

complete the designs for Al Hasa would, however, require supplemental funding 

of $12 million.83

Over the summer, division staff met frequently with SANG personnel to try to 

find ways to complete the design of Al Qasim sufficiently for the Guard to present 

it to the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Finance. The hardest problem to overcome, and 

the key to maintaining any dialogue with the Guard, seemed to be bringing them 

to understand that “FMS cases are not firm-fixed-price contracts.” The division 

had awarded ten contracts for design packages between January and early May 

1979—before the Saudi Arabian budget for the coming fiscal year appeared. The 

division awarded an eleventh design contract, for special project design, to Daly on 

the last day of May and awarded a final contract, for design of the water-treatment 

plant, on 21 August 1979. Taken together, these twelve contracts exhausted the $24 

million originally budgeted for design. The division did not award a contract for 

“Executive A-E Support,” because no funds remained to cover it.84

With all design packages under contract by September 1979, the designs for 

Al Qasim could move forward. In late December, Ellis informed Al Towaijri and 

then Prince Abdullah that design of Al Qasim would be complete on 15 January 

1980. The division report on the meetings noted that “HRH seemed to be pleased.” 

Between January and August 1980, the designers completed work on Al Qasim and 

the division turned the designs over to the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Despite the 

perception in the December meeting that the prince was pleased, relations between 

the Corps and SANG remained delicate and somewhat tense. The Corps received 

no request for assistance to construct the military cities.85

Saudi officials provided little information about the results of the governmental 

budget cycle in May 1980. Neither MODA nor SANG offered any guidance to the 

Middle East Division concerning their share of the budget or the implications for 

the Corps. Ellis did hear informally that “SANG received funds for the military 

83 Ellis to Abdullah, 30 May 79, p. 1; Ellis to Al Towaijri, 10 Jun 79, sub: Military Cities at Al 

Qasim and Al Hasa, box 5, E-7-5, TAD-RHA. 84 “National Guard Military Cities Architect-Engineer Design Contracts,” 11 Sep 79, attached to 

Status Sheet, NG Military City—Al Qasim, 11 Sep 79, box 5, E-7-5, TAD-RHA. 85 See, for example, “Resiting Alternatives of the Hospital/Hospital Complex for the NG Military 

City at Al Qasim,” [15 Sep 79], box 5, E-7-5, TAD-RHA; MFR, Vedell, 29 Dec 79, sub: Meeting 

with NG officials on 23 December 79, p. 1, K-8-5, box 16, TAD-RHA. Middle East Div, “Information 

Booklet,” [hand-dtd Dec 81], pp. IV-17-18; Fact Sheet, National Guard Military Cities, 16 Dec 81; 

both in box 3, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC.
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 429

cities.” In August, the staff from the division began working with an engineer and 

architect, Abdullah Al Swailem, newly appointed as the SANG director general of 

housing and military cities and as the project manager for the military cities. Al 

Swailem indicated that the Guard wanted a major redesign to update the existing 

plans for Al Qasim and Al Hasa and to incorporate the changes identified in April 

1979. Over the next several months, the division pursued a carefully paced dialogue 

with Al Swailem to explore establishing a new FMS case with funding for the 

additional design.86

In December 1980, the Guard informed the Corps that it planned to provide 

housing and other facilities for its units at various locations around the kingdom. 

Part of this program might include construction of the military cities at Al Hasa 

and Al Qasim, reversing the previous order of priority. SANG anticipated that 

funding for this construction would come in the following fiscal year’s budget. The 

division suggested that the Guard use the $3 million that remained from the original 

FMS case for design of the military cities to prepare the information and criteria 

necessary to award a new design contract for Al Hasa. SANG staff accepted this 

recommendation and asked in addition that the division’s personnel provide a list 

of all the construction packages for the two military cities that could be ready for 

advertising in five months, along with a recommended construction schedule.87

On 22 December 1980, the Middle East Division formally proposed four 

steps—outlined in the earlier discussions—to prepare a complete redesign of Al 

Hasa using the remaining $3 million in FMS money: (1) a soils investigation; (2) 

surveys at the site and development of a land-use plan; (3) criteria for the city; 

and (4) a memorandum of understanding to include a schedule for accomplishing 

anticipated tasks and designation of responsibilities. Despite special measures by Al 

Swailem and the division to “prod their system into action,” the SANG leaders took 

no initiative to renew activity on the military cities. On the contrary, in a meeting 

that took place in mid-February, Al Swailem asked if it was true that SANG still 

owed $12 million to the Corps under the existing sales case. When that debt was 

confirmed, Al Swailem commented that SANG might refuse to authorize payment 

of this debt “until the terms of the Sales Case have been carried out, i.e., two military 

cities have been designed to the requirements of the National Guard.” At issue was 

“whether the CE proceeded with the design of Al Qasim, thereby spending NG 

funds, after becoming aware that the city being designed did not meet the needs 

and desires of the NG.”88

86 Ellis to Morris, 24 May 80, p. 1. For the series of contacts between August and December, see 

Maj R. J. Winkel Jr. and Col Gurnie C. Gunter, “NG Military Cities,” 15 Aug 80; Donahue, “NG 

Military Cities,” 12 Oct 80; Albro to Al Swailem, 8 Nov 80, sub: National Guard Military Cities; 

Donahue, “Visit to NG Dept. of Technical Affairs,” 8 Nov 80; Donahue, “NG Military Cities,” 3 Dec 

80; all in box 14, K-8-5, TAD-RHA. 87 The decisions are recorded in Donahue, “National Guard Military Cities,” 16 Dec 80, box 14, 

K-8-5, TAD-RHA. 88 Gunter to Al Swailem, 22 Dec 80, sub: Redesign of Military Cities, box 14, K-8-5; MFR, Robert 

T. Beach, on copy of Ltr, Albro to Abu Haimid, 15 Feb 81, sub: National Guard Military Cities, box 

11, K-8-4; MFR, Winkel, 23 Feb 81, sub: NG Military Cities, box 11, K-8-4; all in TAD-RHA.
430 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Over the next several days, while Al Swailem was out of town, the division 

prepared a chronology, with supporting documents, of the points at which SANG 

had approved the division’s use of funds and the decision to focus spending on 

the design of Al Qasim. The chief of the SANG branch in the division’s Riyadh 

Liaison Office, Maj. R. J. Winkel, presented the documentation to Al Swailem on 

22 February. Al Swailem “revised his opinion,” but urged that the Corps postpone 

discussing the $12 million in arrears until he, Al Swailem, had an opportunity to 

brief Al Towaijri on the history of the matter.89

The Saudi Arabian National Guard never asked the Corps for any additional 

work on the military cities and indeed remained in arrears on payment of the FMS 

case that had funded design. The Middle East Division, in spite of repeated efforts, 

never succeeded in conveying to SANG leaders the cumulative impact of the design 

changes that the Guard’s staff had requested. Some division employees felt that 

it had created problems in the relationship in 1978 by strongly recommending a 

multitude of firms to design the cities when the Guard’s leadership clearly preferred 

maintaining long-term relationships with the Daly Company.90 In addition, the 

impact of inflation and worldwide economic trends around 1980 strained the Saudi 

national budgets, dictating a cutback in defense spending and hurting the SANG 

modernization program. Ultimately, the British adviser to SANG had been prescient 

in warning that the National Guard’s lack of a cadre of administrators would cause 

the Corps trouble. The cultural gap between Bedouin traditions and the technical 

and administrative inclinations of the Corps may have been too great to bridge 

effectively in a mere decade.

Construction Phase

The Corps did construct three projects for the Saudi Arabian National Guard. 

The first, training facilities at Khashm al An, moved very quickly from design to 

construction, with most of the work carried out under a design-build contract. The 

second, a camel racetrack, was a small project with major implications. The third 

was the largest construction project carried out for the National Guard by the Corps 

in the 1970s and 1980s: the SANG headquarters complex in Riyadh.

Training Facilities at Khashm al An

The frustration that overtook the development of the military cities was not 

evident in 1974–1975, when work on the SANG training area at Khashm al An, 

twelve miles east of Riyadh, moved from design to construction. In February 1974, 

the Corps selected the Sam Whan Corporation of Seoul, South Korea, to survey the 

site in preparation for design and construction of training facilities, a maintenance 

support area, and a cantonment area for three battalion-size units of one thousand 

men each. The division had completed in-house design of the training area and firing 

89 Ibid.

90 Interv, Greenwood with Parkin, 4 Oct 83, pp. 28–29. Interv, Moorhus with Dykes, 24 Oct 95, 

pp. 28–29, mentions the association’s “lobbying” to have more American firms involved.
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 431

ranges, and Sam Whan designed the rest of the facilities. In April, the U.S. State 

Department announced that the U.S. and Saudi Arabian governments had signed 

a $335 million contract to provide military hardware and training to the Guard. 

In July, approval came for the FMS case to finance the work by Sam Whan. On 

20 October, SANG approved the final design for the facilities, with construction 

scheduled to begin in February 1975 at the Khashm al An site where a training 

center already existed.91

Throughout 1975 and 1976, Sam Whan worked on construction of training 

facilities and firing ranges. By November 1976, the contractor had completed 

construction valued at about $11 million—the first training facilities and Phase I of 

the firing ranges. When SANG took over these facilities, it pronounced itself “very 

pleased” with Sam Whan’s work. Construction continued on Phases II and III of 

the firing ranges as well as on maintenance and other facilities. By the beginning 

of 1978, completed work amounted to $18.3 million and another $36.7 million of 

construction work was still in progress.92

Request for a Camel Racetrack

The area around Khashm al An became the site of one of the more positive 

moments in the Corps/SANG relationship. On a Thursday evening in early March 

1978, Maj. Martin C. Fisher of the division’s Riyadh Liaison Office (RLO) received 

a summons to visit Prince Badr ibn Abdulaziz, the SANG deputy commander, in 

his palace. Accompanied by the Guard’s director of military operations, Brig. Gen. 

Maashi Al Duqan, and another member of the RLO staff, Fisher appeared at the 

appointed hour of 8:00 p.m. Prince Badr asked what progress the Corps had made 

on the new camel racetrack that the Guard wanted built. Fisher replied that the Corps 

had just learned of the request and that General Wells, who was inspecting projects 

in the western province, had not yet been informed of the request.93

Prince Badr explained that the course laid out the previous year for the king’s 

annual Invitational Camel Race was unacceptable. The Guard, in charge of staging 

the race, wanted the Corps to design and construct the 22-kilometer course in the 

Khashm al An area for use this year. Fisher asked when the race would take place. 

Badr replied that although the king had not selected a date, it would most likely be 

in six or seven weeks and that Prince Abdullah wanted to see the site and a design 

as soon as possible—as early as the following Monday or Tuesday. Fisher stalled, 

observing that if the race was not for six weeks, the design ought not to be rushed; 

one had to consider wind direction, location of the sun, and other critical factors to 

91 “Probe Urged of Contract to Train Saudi Oil Guards,” Rome Daily American, 11 February 1975; 

Fact Sheet, FMS SANG, 22 Oct 74, p. 1; Wells to Morris, 12 Dec 76, p. 8; Memo, Lt Col L. R. Nunn, 11 

Nov 76, sub: Summary of Division Staff Meeting, 6 November, p. 3, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 92 Wells to Morris, 12 Dec 76, p. 8, box 3, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Memo, Nunn, 11 

Nov 76, p. 3; “SANG Modernization Program, Status of Funds (U.S. $), FMS Case HBB,” 31 Jan 

78, E-7-4, TAD-RHA. 93 The account in this and the next two paragraphs from MFR, Fisher, 11 Mar 78, sub: Meeting 

with HRH Prince Badr ibn Abdul Aziz, Deputy Commander, SANG, box 20, K-8-6, TAD-RHA.
432 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

design the best possible course. Badr thereupon turned over the project to General 

Al Duqan, instructing him to inform the Corps about timing the preparation of the 

design to allow review and approval by King Khalid. 

Asked by the prince for an estimate of the cost, Fisher tried to temporize, pointing 

out that no criteria existed; but his deflection proved ineffective. Badr explained 

that the track would be similar to last year’s, with graded natural earth and ditches 

defining both sides. Pressed, Fisher guessed that such a track could be built for 20,000 

Saudi riyals (SR) per kilometer. Badr said that the money for the project would 

come from the Equestrian Club, of which Prince Abdullah was president. General 

Al Duqan declared that he and Fisher would inspect the area of the camel race on 

Saturday, 11 March, with Corps technical personnel. Badr concluded that “he was 

confident that the Corps would provide the National Guard a good race track.”

When apprised of the request for the camel track, General Wells recognized 

immediately that construction of a track for a camel race was well outside the 

mission of the Corps but that this was neither “just a camel race” nor “just a request 

to build a track.” The king’s camel race, an annual event that drew competitors and 

dignitaries from the entire Arab world, was more important to the royal family and 

to Saudi society than any single race or sporting event was to U.S. spectators. 

General Wells took the request as an opportunity to perform a service for Prince 

Abdullah, one of the three or four most powerful men in Saudi Arabia and a difficult 

customer for the Corps. Wells asked his designers at the division headquarters to 

create a plan and specifications for construction of the race course, and he asked 

the Riyadh District engineer, Col. Rayburn L. Williamson, to act as an adviser to 

Sheikh Al Towaijri, who was in charge of the preparation of the race for the National 

Guard. While the designers worked, Williamson contacted the contractors already 

active in Saudi Arabia and alerted them to the coming solicitation.94

Division engineers prepared a one-page specification sheet for the project with a 

blueprint of a jellybean-shaped track, narrower between the straightaways than across 

the looping curves at each end. To this they added a VIP reception and seating area 

and access roads. After receiving modifications from General Al Duqan, division 

personnel hand-carried the design and specifications to Colonel Williamson, who 

prepared a solicitation. By 21 March, the Riyadha Equestrian Club had a contract 

with Hyundai Construction Company Ltd. to build the track with access roads, to 

grade and compact parking lots, and to prepare the earthwork for the king’s reviewing 

area on a mound adjacent to the track. The contract was for SR 575,310, roughly 

SR 26,000 per kilometer, with a like amount set aside to pay for field changes, 

modifications, or additional work that might arise during construction.95

The design placed the start and finish lines directly in front of the king’s seat 

in the viewing stand. The track was one thousand three hundred yards wide at the 

start line to accommodate the hundreds of camels that would begin the race. Over 

94 Interv, Moorhus with Col (Ret) Rayburn Williamson, 28 Sep 95, pp. 11–16.

95 DF, Kramer, 22 Mar 78, sub: Camel Race Track, and Attached Copy of Contract; Bennett to Al 

Towaijri, 19 Apr 78, sub: Final Report on the Construction of the Camel Race Track at Al-Janadriah, 

both in box 18, K-8-5, TAD-RHA.
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 433

the first three miles, the track narrowed to fifty-five yards wide in the middle of the 

first turn and remained that width to the finish line. On 29 March, with construction 

underway, General Al Duqan asked the division to inform Hyundai that the National 

Guard wanted the area for the royal family improved. The instruction directed the 

contractor to add a facing of desert stone to the earth embankments, to lay concrete 

slabs instead of compacting gravel for the reviewing area, and to modify sidewalks 

so the king would not have to negotiate stairs. In early April, the Corps received 

notice of other modifications. Taken together, the changes to the contract brought 

the total final cost to SR 2,209,310.96

Although funding for the camel racetrack came nominally from Prince 

Abdullah’s Riyadha Equestrian Club, King Khalid actually paid for it. As with 

so many other Saudi projects, the cost increases became an issue. Based on the 

contract price, Al Towaijri had informed the king that the track would cost SR 

1.15 million and the king had provided that amount to SANG. As the contractor 

accommodated the requests for additions and changes, the cost of the construction 

rose. In mid-April, Al Towaijri requested that Williamson meet with him to discuss 

the cost overrun. Williamson went, accompanied by Al Duqan, who had authorized 

all of the cost increases.97

Al Towaijri began the meeting by acknowledging that the National Guard had 

“caused the Corps a lot of trouble” by requesting help on this project that was beyond 

the scope of the Corps’ mission. He expressed his gratitude and then presented the 

situation to Williamson as a problem for which he wanted help in finding a solution. 

He explained his correspondence with the king concerning costs and the dilemma 

he found himself in because of the increases in cost.98

Colonel Williamson chose not to address the cost increases specifically nor 

to place responsibility for them on General Al Duqan, who had requested and 

authorized them. He responded rather by expressing the Corps’ sense of honor at 

having been asked to help the Guard prepare the new camel track. He reminded 

Al Towaijri that the bid price had been for an “austere facility.” When the sheikh 

acknowledged that improvements had been added, Colonel Williamson agreed, 

praising the improvements as “many and outstanding” and noting that the contractor 

had continued to show his good disposition by bringing in additional workers and 

working 24-hour days to have the track ready on time. Al Towaijri finally requested 

that the Corps send him a letter stating the reasons for the increase. When asked 

whether the SR 2,209,310 was the final amount, Williamson replied that “if there 

are no more changes, it is the total cost.”99

96 Bennett to Al Towaijri, 19 Apr 78; Riyadha Equestrian Club, Riyadh, “Request for Proposal 

78-R-076-0001 for Construction of a Camel Race Track at Khashm al An, Saudi Arabia,” n.d., with 

blueprints of the proposed track, box 18, K-8-5, TAD-RHA; Interv, Moorhus with Williamson, 28 

Sep 95, pp. 13–15. 97 MFR, Fisher, 18 Apr 78, sub: Meeting with HE Sheikh Abdul Aziz Towaijri, SANG Deputy 

Commander, on 16 Apr 78, box 20, K-8-6, TAD-RHA. 98 Ibid.

99 Ibid.
434 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Al Duqan sat through the hour-plus exchange feeling as much on the spot as 

the American officer. The memo recording the meeting notes laconically that “after 

the meeting, BG Maashi [Al Duqan] expressed his gratitude to COL Williamson.” 

Williamson remembers Al Duqan’s response more vividly: “We walked out and 

General Maashi [Al Duqan] gave me a big hug. And he said, ‘Not only are you a 

superb engineer, and a great friend, you are an outstanding negotiator.’”100

The story of the camel racetrack takes more space to recount than its official 

dimensions merit. Officially, the Corps sought to avoid any overt connection with 

the construction. A first draft of the request for proposals issued by the Equestrian 

Club mentioned the Corps as the appointed agent for construction, but that sentence 

was removed from the version that circulated. In fact, the Corps’s contribution of 

the design and management time was modest. In its final accounting, the Middle 

East Division posted a modest line-item charge labeled “camel track” to the FMS 

Case HBB, Khashm al An, of $3,266.24.101

The incident illustrates several important elements in the Saudi-U.S. relationship. Prince Abdullah looked upon the Corps as an extension of his own staff. The 

Corps did construction, he needed a camel track built, and the Corps could build 

it. General Wells recognized that this was a relatively inexpensive way to foster 

good relations with the commander of the Guard and the second deputy premier 

of the kingdom. Colonel Williamson understood that haggling over price was as 

much a part of the Saudi culture as camels and horses. He dealt with Al Towaijri 

not by making excuses, shifting responsibility, or rationalizing, but by emphasizing 

how the changes, which the Saudis had initiated, contributed to a much improved 

facility and how honored he and the Corps felt to be asked to help. As a result, he 

cemented his personal relations with both Al Towaijri and Al Duqan, with whom 

he worked on other SANG projects.

Building the Headquarters

Whereas building the camel track appeared peripheral, building a headquarters 

for the National Guard was clearly central to the Corps’ mission in Saudi Arabia. 

The Leo A. Daly Company presented the final design for the headquarters complex 

to the SANG commander, Prince Abdullah, in May 1975. Over the following year, 

the Mediterranean Division and then the Middle East Division worked with the 

designers to prepare a request for proposals for the construction. At the same time, 

the Engineering Division under Wayne Dykes, encouraged by the Association of 

General Contractors in the United States, sought willing U.S. construction firms. 

Several firms expressed interest; but as the time approached to submit bids, three 

of the five firms that had inquired about the contract backed out, citing the price 

volatility of the Saudi construction market as too risky for fixed-price contracts. 

One firm, Leon D. DeMatteis & Sons Inc. of Elmont, New York, joined with Sam 

100 First quotation from MFR, Fisher, 18 Apr 78; second quotation from Interv, Moorhus with 

Williamson, 28 Sep 95, p. 16. 101 Memo, Verne Brandt, 27 Nov 89, sub: Overpayment of Funds on Saudi Arabian National Guard 

(SANG) Sales Case HBB, attached form DD 1513-2, [12 Aug 85], Current Files, TAD-RM. 
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 435

Whan Enterprises of Seoul, South Korea, to bid on the contract. On 31 July 1976, 

the Corps awarded a $208 million construction contract for the SANG headquarters 

complex in Riyadh to the joint venture, DeMatteis–Sam Whan.102

By the time of the award, the scope of work had grown to include a multistory 

headquarters building, an executive office building (which came to include the 

underground command center), a police barracks, a stockade, a police headquarters 

building, a signal building, an auditorium, a mosque, a utility plant and utilities, a 

vehicle maintenance building, a wastewater-treatment plant, ancillary structures, and 

complete site development. The complex was located on a fifty-acre site in Riyadh 

and when completed would accommodate three thousand five hundred people.103

Over the year between final design and award of the construction contract, Prince 

Abdullah grew increasingly impatient to see progress on his headquarters building. 

To expedite the start of construction, the division pulled the site preparation and 

fencing out of the construction package and awarded those tasks to a local contractor 

who could make the start on the construction visible. Al Badr Establishment was on 

site early in the morning on 17 July 1976 to begin work, but the workers could not 

start because an official from the Ministry of Finance instructed the contractor that 

the land had not yet been officially turned over to the National Guard. The Al Badr 

crew chief and a Saudi trainee with the Corps, Nabil Musallam, drove to SANG 

headquarters to seek help. They returned with an official letter authorizing work 

to begin and with instructions that “any interference from the Ministry of Finance 

should be referred to SANG by the CE.”104

The prime contractor for the headquarters project, DeMatteis–Sam Whan, got 

off to a slow start after receiving the notice to proceed in mid-September 1976. 

Problems of financing and procurement and the lack of a cohesive working relationship between the two partner firms compounded the problems of mobilization. 

The Saudi Arabia District engineer, Colonel Gray, sent a series of letters warning 

the contractor that he viewed the “delays in the initial phases of the construction 

to be the responsibility of the Joint Venture” and insisting that the company make 

up the lost time. He upbraided the contractor for poor preparation and for lack of 

“orderly plans for staffing a capable and adequate construction organization, with 

clearly defined functions.”105 Between November 1976 and February 1977, Gray 

met with executives of the firms, cajoling, setting out benchmarks for progress, 

102 Williams to Gribble, 13 Jun 75, p. 1; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 29 Mar 76, p. 2, box 17, 

access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Interv, Moorhus with Dykes, 24 Oct 95, pp. 28–29; Vandenberg to 

Al Towaijri, 12 Mar 76, sub: Sales Case HBA, Saudi Arabia National Guard Headquarters Complex, 

p. 1, box 250 of 357, TAD-RHA; Wells to Morris, 28 Sep 76, p. 2. 103 Saudi Arabia National Guard, Riyadh, Contract DACA 78-76-C-0002, SANG HQ Complex, 

hand-dtd 1 Sep 78, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; “Saudi Arabia Programs,” 28 Feb 78. 104 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 1 Jun 76, p. 2, box 17, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

Interv, Moorhus with Dykes, 24 Oct 95, p. 29; MFR, Nabil Musallam, 19 Jul 76, sub: Inspection of 

SANG HQ Complex Site, box 250 of 357, TAD-RHA. 105 Gray to Leon DeMatteis & Sons Inc. and Sam Whan Enterprises Co. Ltd. (J-V), 18 Sep 76, 

sub: Start of Construction for Contracts . . . SANG HQ Complex and SANG Maint. Facilities, p. 1, 

unmarked box, TAD-RHA. On the pressure from Prince Abdullah, see Decision Memo no. 8R, Wells, 
436 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

and occasionally raising the threat of contract termination. By mid-March 1977, 

construction on the headquarters complex had reached only 5 percent. Even the 

mobilization camp for workers was not yet complete.106

While Colonel Gray worked on DeMatteis–Sam Whan, both he and the division 

commander, General Wells, sought to promote good relations with the Saudi Arabian 

National Guard. They held weekly meetings with Al Towaijri to review the progress 

of the headquarters complex. Wells initiated two audits to address questions Abdullah 

raised concerning spending by the Corps. He also tried to involve Saudi firms in the 

SANG program, although the leadership of the Guard remained unconvinced by 

the Corps’ efforts. Relations did improve somewhat when the Guard appointed as 

its liaison officer a young Saudi engineer, Ibrahim Madani, who had the technical 

education to discuss engineering-related problems.107

26 Oct 76, sub: Prince Abdullah’s and Secretary Clements’ Concern about Corps Work on SANG 

Projects, box 9, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 106 MFR, Capt Phillip R. Anderson, 6 Dec 76, sub: 30 November 1976 Meeting with Sam Whan 

Representatives, p. 1, unmarked box; Gray to Leon D. DeMatteis & Sons Inc. and Sam Whan Enterprises 

Co. Ltd. (J-V), 7 Feb 77, sub: SANG Headquarters Complex, p. 1, unmarked box; MFR, Anderson, 

27 Feb 77, sub: Unsatisfactory Contract Performance of the DeMatteis–Sam Whan Joint Venture, 

unmarked box; all in TAD-RHA. Wells to Morris, 16 Mar 77, p. 8; David L. Fulton, Semi-monthly 

Narr Rpt for Period Ending 15 Mar 77, 20 Mar 77, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 107 Quotation from Wells to Morris, 12 Dec 76, p. 1; Memo, Nunn, 11 Nov 76, p. 3; Wells to 

Morris, 16 Mar 77, p. 3; MFRs, Fisher, 1 Nov 76, p. 3, and 2 Feb 77, p. 2, both in box 18, E-7-2, 

TAD-RHA.

General Wells (right) observes a briefing for Prince Abdullah (second from left), October 1976.
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 437

Construction gained momentum in late 1977 and early 1978; by early July, 

DeMatteis–Sam Whan had completed roughly half of the construction at the 

headquarters complex. Prince Abdullah remained impatient. During a visit to the 

site, Abu Haimid informed the Riyadh District engineer, Colonel Williamson, that 

Abdullah wanted the Corps to put pressure on the contractor to speed up work. 

Corps staff pointed out that access to water for the construction had become a 

significant impediment because it had to be hauled to the construction site at very 

high cost. Construction could be accelerated, they noted, if the Guard could assist 

in connecting the construction site to the municipal water system, use its influence 

to have the local electrical power company install transformers, or approve the use 

of Italian marble, which was more plentiful than Saudi marble.108

Abu Haimid also expressed his concern about the water supply. He asked for a 

report on the daily rate of consumption and cost of water for construction purposes. 

Ten days later, he raised the possibility that DeMatteis–Sam Whan, which had 

108 MFR, Faraj, 10 Jul 78, sub: HE Sheikh Abu Haimid’s Visit to SANG’s New HQ Complex, 

pp. 1–2, box 20, K-8-6, TAD-RHA. See also Memo, John R. Lewis to Dept of the Army, 3 Oct 78, 

sub: Construction Progress Report, attached Qtrly Status Rpt for Facilities Construction as of 30 Sep 

78, E-5-6, and MFR, Wu, 14 Dec 77, sub: Briefing to BG Wells on HBA Funds, p. 1, E-7-3, both in 

TAD-RHA; MFR, Faraj, 10 Jul 78, p. 2. On the lack of Saudi marble, see MFR, Beach, 28 Mar 78, 

sub: SANG Headquarters Complex, to Discuss Various Project Topics, Especially Construction Stone 

(Marble), E-7-3, TAD-RHA.

Prince Abdullah touring the construction site of the Saudi Arabian National Guard 

headquarters complex, 1977
438 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

another contract in Riyadh, might have workers from that project living at the 

mobilization camp and using water paid for by SANG. The sheikh “did not want 

any of the workers, working on other projects, to live in the National Guard MOB 

Camp [nor] to pay for water used at another project.”109

The antagonism over the cost of water for workers is indicative of the uneasiness 

that some SANG leaders felt in dealing with the large construction program they had 

launched. In a later discussion, Abu Haimid accepted the contract that the division 

had worked out to supply water to the mobilization camp but voiced his fundamental 

objection to what he described as the Corps’ “method of telling a contractor to do 

something and discussing the price later.”110

In February 1979, division personnel reviewed with the SANG staff the status of 

the headquarters construction and the likely delay of the completion date given the 

changes to the scope of work. Al Towaijri asked that the division analyze in detail 

the alternatives for adjusting to the effects of the changes on time and cost. In late 

April, the deputy division engineer, Col. James B. Hall, delivered that report listing 

seven changes that had altered both cost and time. The contractor had been asked 

to waterproof the underground command center and to create a subsurface drainage 

system. The company had also added interfaces for a British communications system 

to be installed later. The National Guard had ordered an access for private vehicles 

to the executive office building. In an effort to accommodate the Riyadh electric 

company’s requirements, the contractor had redesigned and relocated an electrical 

substation, a task for which he was allowed only two months. Still, the change had 

come at a time of severe labor shortage and had impeded progress on the rest of the 

project. The contractor had to find new sand for his architectural concrete because 

the sand provided by the National Guard failed to meet specifications. Finally, at 

SANG request, the contractor had redesigned the space requirements and layouts 

and modified toilets in both the headquarters building and the executive office 

building.111

The division offered four alternatives to address the cumulative effects of 

these and lesser changes. First, implement none of the modifications still pending. 

Second, seek to complete the contract as originally scheduled by paying a premium 

to expedite the work. Third, select one portion of the work to expedite. Finally, 

make equitable adjustments to cost and time with the contractor. The division had 

raised but not analyzed a fifth possibility: reduce the scope of work to offset the 

other increases. It had rejected this alternative as likely to yield a facility that the 

National Guard would find unsatisfactory.112

The division advised that alternative four—equitable adjustment with the 

contractor of schedule and costs—provided the most cost-effective approach to the 

109 MFR, Vedell, 8 Aug 78, sub: Meeting with HE SH Abu Haimid, Deputy Assistant for Technical 

Affairs, on Funds Analysis of Foreign Military Sales Case HBA, p. 2, E-7-3, TAD-RHA. 110 MFR, Vedell, 11 Sep 78, sub: Meeting at SANG Headquarters, E-7-3, TAD-RHA. 111 Hall to Al Towaijri, 22 Apr 79, sub: National Guard Headquarters Construction Completion 

Date, attachment Changes Impacting Contract Completion, box 16, K-8-5, TAD-RHA. 112 Ibid., p. 1.
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 439

problem and gave the greatest likelihood of long-term satisfaction. The analysis 

offered a perfectly rational assessment, but it did little to resolve—or perhaps even 

to address—the inherent conflict among the National Guard’s own contradictory 

desires: sophisticated facilities, cost consciousness, and early occupancy of the new 

and exceedingly impressive headquarters complex. The tensions between SANG 

and the Middle East Division persisted.113

The reaction of SANG leadership to the division’s recommendation reflects 

what Colonel Bennett described as a consistent disposition to “ignore administrative 

requirements until the last moment, then become irritated when ‘instant buildings’ 

cannot be produced.”114 To Corps personnel, it was clear that, given the changes in 

scope, some adjustments in the deadline for completion and in the contract price were 

necessary. On 23 December 1979, Wells informed Al Towaijri that the headquarters 

complex would be completed in mid-1980. The actual completion and turnover of 

the headquarters complex occurred on 31 July 1980.115

Ground Settlement Problems

Even before the completion of the complex, problems reflecting poor or hurried 

workmanship began to appear. The area immediately around the SANG headquarters 

building contained fill to a depth of thirty feet in some places.116 An extensive 

system of esplanades and sidewalks rested on this fill. Beginning in February 1980, 

significant settlement started to show. A number of buried asbestos-cement and PVC 

pipes, used in the irrigation system to water the landscaping and for domestic water 

distribution, broke at scattered locations around the project site.

In August 1980, the division hired an architect-engineer firm to study the 

situation and to make recommendations. The firm completed the study in November 

and determined that the breaks resulted from “deficient compaction and improper 

bedding.” The study also concluded that the major ground settlement, and therefore 

the strain on pipes, had already taken place. Unfortunately, breaks continued to 

occur. The division held the contractor responsible under warranty and latent-defect 

provisions of the contract, and DeMatteis–Sam Whan responded in a timely way 

to repair the breaks.117

As problems developed, the Middle East Division took steps to address them 

in cooperation with the Saudi Arabian National Guard. On 22 September 1980, 

five division representatives toured the headquarters complex with members of 

SANG’s recently formed O&M team to review deficiencies the maintenance staff 

had discovered. In early December, the Riyadh District engineer, Col. Edward K. 

113 MFR, Faraj, 3 Apr 79, sub: Colonel Hall’s Courtesy Call on SANG Officials, p. 1, box 16, 

K-8-5, TAD-RHA. 114 Bennett to Hon John C. West, U.S. Amb, 27 Feb 79, p. 1, box 16, K-8-5, TAD-RHA. 115 MFR, Vedell, 29 Dec 79, p. 1; Albro to Morris, 21 Sep 80. 116 MFR, A. E. Wanket, 31 Jan 83, sub: Blue Ribbon Panel on Construction Quality—MED & 

EUD Visits, pp. 7–8, M-1-6, Europe Division–Records Holding Area. 117 For this and the preceding paragraph, see Fact Sheet, Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) 

Headquarters Complex, 30 Nov 81, in Middle East Div, “Information Booklet,” [Dec 81]; Fact Sheets 

for Bratton’s Visit, Jan 81, “SANG Headquarters Complex.”
440 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Wintz, and the new division engineer, Brig. Gen. Ames S. Albro Jr., initiated weekly 

meetings with SANG officials to provide updates on the progress of corrections and 

to keep both sides informed of any new problems.118

Although the weekly meetings offered a forum for discussion, the Saudis were far 

from satisfied. In January 1981, on the occasion of a visit by the chief of engineers, 

Lt. Gen. Joseph K. Bratton, the Saudi government appointed a committee consisting 

of four high-ranking officials—an ambassador from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs; the director general of military works for MODA, Colonel Al Faisal; the 

director general for the National Guard Maintenance and Operations Department, 

Abdul Rahman Abdullah Al Abdan; and the director general of Housing and Military 

Cities for the National Guard, Abdullah Al Swailem. The committee met with Bratton 

and Albro and presented a list of criticisms of Corps practices in dealing with projects 

paid for by the Saudi Arabian government. Giving vent to their frustration, the Saudis 

offered scathing observations that can be summarized in five propositions:

1. The Corps’ estimates were inflated.

2. The Corps concentrated on procurement from the United States at additional 

cost to the Saudi Arabian government.

118 Donahue, “Tour of National Guard Headquarters Complex,” 22 Sep 80; Albro to Abdul Rahman Al-Abdan, 17 Dec 80, sub: Major Problems Remaining at the National Guard HQ Complex,” 

both in box 14, K-8-5, TAD-RHA.

Model of the Saudi Arabian National Guard headquarters
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 441

3. The Corps did not use Saudi suppliers of manufactured goods.

4. The Corps should require competition among architect-engineer firms for 

award of design projects.

5. The Corps did not effectively deal with change orders. Often, when the Saudi 

Arabian government requested a change, it was not informed of its cost in 

time or money.119

Albro addressed each point in turn, offering plausible explanations and refutations and proposing new procedures to accommodate the Saudis’ concerns:

1. Figures showed that Corps estimates were lower than the average bids on 

projects and certainly lower than the high bids. 

2. Design specifications were expressed in terms of U.S. standards, but products 

from any country that met those specifications were acceptable. The safest 

assumption was that contractors made their decisions on the basis of cost.

3. Construction contractors would buy Saudi goods if they were truly cheaper 

because they would earn higher profits; if they chose not to buy Saudi goods, 

it was because those goods were more expensive. If the Saudi government 

so wished, the Corps would certainly add clauses to contracts mandating 

purchases in Saudi Arabia.

4. Congressional legislation governed the Corps’ contracting procedures with 

architect-engineer firms and expressly forbade competition among them. The 

Corps process of negotiating with the firms ensured the interests of the Saudi 

Arabian government while guaranteeing high-quality designs. 

5. Contract changes came in three types: field changes, changes dictated by 

differing site conditions, and customer-directed changes. The Corps attempted 

to issue no change order until after it had negotiated a price with the contractor. 

In situations where the change or its delay affected the “critical path” or the 

final completion date, the Corps ordered immediate implementation of the 

change.120

Although the answers were all well formulated and rational, the Saudis were not 

persuaded.

The Saudi delegation mentioned several other points. They accused the Corps of 

violating Saudi law by allowing women to work and by allowing family members to 

work without permits. They charged that the Corps did not protect the rights of the Saudi 

government on deficiencies in design and construction and made the Saudi government 

pay for errors committed by others. They complained that the Corps protected contractors 

by allowing them to perform their own quality control. The Saudis wanted these points 

addressed in a renegotiation of the Engineer Assistance Agreement.121

119 MFR, Winkel, 10 Jan 81, sub: LTG Bratton’s Meetings at the National Guard Headquarters, 

box 11, K-8-4, TAD-RHA. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid.
442 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

While the SANG committee and the Corps of Engineers debated, extensive 

settlement of the ground around buildings at the headquarters complex continued, 

creating a highly unsightly exterior condition at what was otherwise an exceptionally 

attractive building. During the late spring of 1981, the contractor corrected several 

areas; but the basic problem persisted. In May, the division began an extensive soil 

investigation that indicated poor compaction. The contractor had improperly filled 

around several buildings, especially around the underground command center. When 

water infiltrated the soil, either from a break in a pipe or from the system installed to 

irrigate the landscaping, the poor fill settled, causing the failure of sidewalks, curbs, 

and streets. The division redesigned the curb-sidewalk and irrigation system in an 

effort to avoid saturating the soil adjacent to and under sidewalks and curbs. The 

modifications raised questions about the appropriateness of the original design and 

thereby opened the issue of liability on the part of the architect-engineer.122

Despite the visible problems, the buildings faced no risk to their structural 

integrity because their foundations rested solidly on the rock substratum under the 

headquarters site. Albro assured the Guard that the buildings were not at risk, but 

this assurance may have been difficult to accept when the most visible features of the 

office complex (sidewalks, flowerbeds, even a sun-shade portico designed to cover 

the walk around a building) began to settle and break. The problem was pervasive, 

122 On the general character of the problem, see Intervs, Moorhus with Thomas, 27 Aug 96, pp. 

14–16; John T. Greenwood with Paul S. Wheeler, 31 May 85, pp. 42–43; John T. Greenwood with 

Col. Gurnie Gunter, 24 Mar 84, pp. 67–68; Paul K. Walker with Gus Woodall, 5 Feb 85, pp. 110–13. 

Fact Sheet, 30 Nov 81, in Middle East Div, “Information Booklet,” [Dec 81].

Sunshades at a Saudi Arabian National Guard facility, late 1970s
Modernization of the Saudi Arabian Navy and National Guard 443

affecting the grounds, sidewalks, and streets around half a dozen buildings at the 

complex.123

The settlement of soils was devastating to the aesthetics of the headquarters site 

and to the precarious element of trust that the Saudi Arabian National Guard felt 

regarding the work of the Corps. SANG leaders took the position that the architectengineer, the construction contractor, or the division had to pay the costs of correcting 

the situation. The division countered that it held the construction contractor and the 

architect-engineer firm responsible for errors that were demonstrably attributable to 

them. Beyond that, funding for correcting deficiencies had to come from contingency 

funds built into the working estimate for the project. That meant that the Saudi 

government paid.124

It took time; but by 1982, the Corps and SANG had come to terms on most issues. 

In a January meeting, Al Towaijri expressed to the new Riyadh District engineer, Col. 

James R. Whitley, his judgment that a project as large as the headquarters complex 

“could not have gone without some mistakes.” He simply wanted the Corps to study 

the mistakes, describe them, decide which were minor and which were major, and 

determine the cost involved in correcting them. The sheikh considered the Corps and 

the Guard “as one team,” and he wanted the Corps’ “honest and professional opinion 

in the evaluation.” The meeting left the division representatives feeling that they had 

reestablished effective communications and that the requested study would allay the 

Guard’s doubts.125

The question of contractor liability remained. In the spring of 1982, General 

Albro telegraphed an urgent request to the commander of the Corps’ Waterways 

Experiment Station in Vicksburg, Mississippi, asking him to expedite test results on 

soil samples related to the problems at the headquarters complex. Albro expected 

that the claims arising from the corrective work would find their settlement only 

“in a court of law.” Over the remaining months of 1982, the division continued to 

negotiate with the joint venture DeMatteis–Sam Whan. By the end of the year, the 

contractor had decided to demobilize and to perform no further work on deficiencies. 

The Middle East Division’s position, supported by SANG, was to let that occur, 

to hire another contractor to correct deficiencies, and to pay that contractor out of 

project funds that might otherwise have gone to DeMatteis–Sam Whan.126

The context of the period 1979–1982 is crucial to assessing the crisis of 

confidence of the Saudi Arabian National Guard toward the Corps of Engineers. The 

123 Albro to Abu Haimid, 25 Feb 81, sub: National Guard Construction Problems, p. 1; Rpt, [Sep 

81], sub: “D” Building Repairs, and Status of M&O Reported Civil Deficiencies; both in box 1, K-8-

41, TAD-RHA. 124 Fact Sheet, 30 Nov 81, in Middle East Div, “Information Booklet,” [Dec 81]. 125 MFR, Faraj, 6 Jan 82, sub: Meeting with HE Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Al Towaijri, National 

Guard Deputy, box 9, K-8-4, TAD-RHA. 126 Telex, Albro to Cdr WES Vicksburg, 21 Apr 82, sub: Saudi Arabian National Guard HQ 

Complex, Riyadh SA, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; Memos, Thomas L. Carnes, 4 Dec 82, sub: 

Meeting with HE SH Abdul Rahman Abu Haimid, National Guard Deputy for Technical Affairs, and 

19 Dec 82, sub: Meeting with SH Abu Haimid, SANG Deputy for Technical Affairs, Concerning the 

Remaining Repair Work at SANG HQ Complex, both in box 9, K-8-4, TAD-RHA.
444 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Guard’s grievances had factual bases in the construction that the Corps delivered. At 

the same time, the grievances may also have been an expression of the uneasiness that 

Saudis in general felt about the Americans and in particular about their relationship 

with the U.S. military establishment. The concerns of the SANG, in many ways 

the most traditional and conservative element of the Saudi military forces, came 

at a time when the position of the United States was in crisis throughout the Arab 

world. The Camp David agreements of 1978, the collapse of the government of 

the shah of Iran in 1979 and the hostage crisis that continued throughout 1980, the 

Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, the fundamentalist Muslim seizure of the Grand 

Mosque in Mecca, and the abortive attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran 

in April 1980 all undermined the prestige of the United States in the eyes of the 

Saudi Arabian leadership.127

The misunderstandings between SANG and the Corps of Engineers eventually 

diminished in intensity, and both sides could look with satisfaction on what had been 

accomplished while not overlooking what had remained undone or poorly done. 

The office space was large enough to accommodate three thousand five hundred 

people in a building that, as several observers commented, turned out to be one of 

the most beautiful the Corps constructed in Saudi Arabia. The entire complex, with 

all the modifications and changes, cost $286 million. Sheikh Al Towaijri was right: 

In so large a project, problems were inevitable. On balance, the problems were small 

compared to the accomplishment. A comment made by the last commander of the 

Middle East Division in Saudi Arabia, Brig. Gen. James W. Ray, puts the problems 

relating to construction for SANG in perspective. In describing the total program in 

Saudi Arabia in 1985, Ray pointed out that problems had arisen with less than 0.5 

percent of the construction measured by value. “That,” he concluded, “converts to 

a success rate of 99.5 percent.”128

127 Foreign Affairs Chronology of World Events, 2d ed., 1978–1991 (New York: Council on 

Foreign Relations Press, 1992). 128 Fact Sheet, MED Projs in Saudi Arabia, 29 Mar 85; “Authorization—Design and Construction of Facilities, Saudi Arabia National Guard Program (SANG), FMS Case HBA,” 9 Apr 86, app. 

A, Current Files, TAD-RM; “Saudi Arabian Programs,” [1981], p. 10. On the building’s beauty, see 

MFR, Wanket, 31 Jan 83, p. 8; Interv, John T. Greenwood with Wayne Henry, Nov 85, p. 26; “Saudi 

Arabia: Still a Healthy Program,” Middle East Division News, March-April 1985, p. 5.
King Abdulaziz Military Academy 445

The volume of contractor activity in Saudi Arabia in the late 1970s was truly 

staggering. The Saudi government’s ambitious five-year development plan for 

1976–1980 devoted to construction over half of its $142 billion budget. In characterizing the rapidity of modernization taking place, one commentator noted that as 

recently as the early twentieth century the wheel had been virtually unused in Saudi 

Arabia. This made the pace of construction to establish roads, ports, communications 

facilities, and all the accouterments of the modern age all the more astounding. The 

Saudis referred to the efforts to modernize their entire economy as “The Battle of 

the Infrastructure.”1

Modernization of the Saudi Arabian military constituted only one small part of 

the Saudi five-year plan. Among the many projects for which the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers had preliminary plans that exceeded a billion dollars, two large building 

programs stood out: the new King Abdulaziz Military Academy (KAMA) and King 

Khalid Military City (KKMC), the third cantonment near Hafar al Batin. This and 

the following chapter cover the general issues that relate to the two mega-programs 

and discuss each in detail.

When the leadership of the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense and Aviation 

(MODA) embarked on modernization of its military forces, the country had an 

academy to train military officers. In its early years, the school was in Makkah 

and then Taif; it was relocated to Riyadh in 1955. MODA envisioned a permanent 

facility and an expansion to make the existing two-year program comparable to the 

training at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. To realize these plans, MODA 

approached the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the early 1970s to supervise design 

and construction of a new academy.2

In July 1973, the Mediterranean Division received authorization from the Office 

of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) to undertake advanced study for the design and 

1 Peter A. Iseman, “The Arabian Ethos,” Harper’s (February 1978): 37–56. 2 Williams, “Notes from the Division Engineer,” 4 Oct 73, unmarked box, Transatlantic Division–

Records Holding Area (TAD-RHA), mentions the first graduating class from the King Abdulaziz 

Military Academy. Interv, Grathwol with Col (Ret) Dr. Terrence Ryan, 21 May 97, Alexandria, Va., 

p. 4d, and Albro, “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East” (typescript), 

22 Jul 81, Current Files, Transatlantic Division–Public Affairs Office (TAD-PAO), both mention the 

two-year cadet program in Riyadh.

12

King Abdulaziz Military Academy
446 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

construction of King Abdulaziz Military Academy. The initial estimates for the 

project put construction costs at $125 million. The division assigned a new employee 

in the Engineering Division, Frank Oliva, as project manager.3

In September 1973, Oliva traveled to Riyadh to meet with Saudi officials. 

Because Saudi Arabia had a limited population from which to recruit cadets, the 

division instructed Oliva to inquire whether MODA intended to build an all-service 

academy or one designed to train only army officers.4

 Just after Oliva arrived, the 

Yom Kippur War broke out and oil prices quickly tripled, generating vast revenues 

and reserves of “petrodollars” for the Saudi Arabian government. With their wealth 

increasing, the Saudis chose to build the academy exclusively for army officers.

In March–April 1974, the Saudis approved the joint venture of Caudill, Rowlett, 

and Scott (CRS) of Houston, Texas, and McGaughy, Marshall and McMillan 

(MMM) of Norfolk, Virginia, to develop a master plan for the military academy. By 

late 1975, the joint venture had drawn up a design for the designated site fifty-five 

kilometers northwest of Riyadh in a previously undeveloped area. The plan called 

for a self-contained complex of facilities, including seventy buildings, distributed 

in three zones: the academic campus, the general maneuver and training area, and 

a complex of training ranges. In addition to facilities for instruction and physical 

education, a library building, cadet quarters, and a mess hall, the academic campus 

included bachelor quarters, family housing for the faculty and support staff, space 

for community worship, market areas, and family recreational areas. The housing 

area, which featured a series of plazas, also had elementary and high schools. A 

separate area for support services contained plant-maintenance facilities, the central 

utilities, warehouses, POL facilities, maintenance and facilities engineering shops, 

and the energy plant.5

To present the master plan to Prince Sultan, the minister of Defense and Aviation, 

in November 1975 the CRS lead architect assembled slides, sketches, display panels, 

and about a dozen models of different facilities. CRS then created a video simulating 

a walk through the academy that began by ascending along a steep road from the 

plateau to the front gates set high on the bluff above. The display panels and models 

supplemented the video. Saudi Arabia’s military liaison officer, Lt. Col. Mahmoud 

Nassief, presented the master plan to Prince Sultan and the MODA staff using the 

3 Joan Kibler, “Saudis Host Close-out Ceremony,” Engineer Update, May 1988; Durham to Williams, 3 Sep 73, p. 3, box 51-84-9383, Richard T. Farrell Papers, Office of History (OH), HQ United 

States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Alexandria, Va.; Interv, authors with Frank Oliva, 13 

Jan 95, pp. 7–8. 4 Durham to Williams, 3 Sep 73, p. 3; Interv, authors with Oliva, 13 Jan 95, pp. 10–11; U.S. 

Congress, House, Activities of the United States Army Corps of Engineers in Saudi Arabia. Hearings 

Before the Subcommittee on Europe and The Middle East (Lee H. Hamilton [Indiana], Chairman), of 

the Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, p. 77 (hereafter cited as Hamilton 

Comm Hearings). 5 “King Abdul Aziz [sic] Military Academy Project Plan,” Apr 78, p. 1, E-1-1, TAD-RHA; MFR, 

Blake, 30 Apr 74, sub: Meeting with Mr. Nassief, Major Barney, and Mr. Peterson, 28 Apr 74, p. 

1, Walker box 8, OH, HQ USACE; “King Abdulaziz Military Academy Master Plan,” Dec 81, OH, 

HQ USACE.
King Abdulaziz Military Academy 447

slides and artists’ sketches of the academy mounted on eight large panels stretched 

across the room. Oliva placed his project team of engineers behind the panels armed 

with documentation on all aspects of the project in case any questions arose. Nassief 

made his presentation in Arabic and handled all the questions himself.6

Prince Sultan approved the KAMA concept; on 15 December 1975, an MMM 

representative hand-delivered the joint venture’s design proposal for the next phase to 

the Corps offices in Italy. As the architects, engineers, and the division’s project team 

worked to prepare the contract for final design, the division engineer, Col. Torrey 

Williams, and his deputy, Col. William E. Vandenberg, scrutinized the master plan. 

From their perspective as graduates of West Point, they insisted that the distances 

between locations on the campus made it impossible for cadets to get from one 

class to another on time. To address this concern, designers moved the large parade 

grounds from the center of the academic campus to the side next to the physical 

education facilities and moved the academic buildings closer together. Colonel 

Williams was pleased that, although “it took us at least four tries . . . CRS finally 

came up with a layout . . . [that was] acceptable and practical” for the cadets.7

Beginning Construction

In July 1976, CRS-MMM received a notice to proceed with final design. By 

October, the design team had completed the final designs for three early construction 

packages involving the development of water wells and stockpiles of aggregate. Not 

until January 1978, eighteen months after approving initiation of detailed design, did 

MODA program the funds needed to begin construction of the military academy. 

The Corps convened a task force to plan the contracting schedule. When MODA 

urged the Middle East Division to reserve some work for Saudi contractors, the task 

force rearranged the construction packages to match the technical capabilities of 

Saudi construction firms. Of the thirty-two contract packages the task force defined 

for the project (later consolidated to twenty-nine), the division set aside nine for 

Saudi firms. By March, the team from CRS-MMM had completed 70 percent of the 

design for the entire academy complex. At this point, mid-March 1978, the Corps 

had $346 million available for construction contracts, nearly a threefold increase 

over the original $125-million estimate for the entire KAMA project. The estimated 

costs for the whole project had grown to $2.56 billion, but this turned out to be 

nearly $1 billion higher than the actual final costs.8

6 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 12 Nov 75, p. 3, box 18, access. no. 77-92-0001, Washington 

National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md.; MFR, Wanket, 31 Jan 83, sub: Blue Ribbon Panel 

on Construction Quality—MED & EUD Visits, p. 7, M-1-6, Europe Division–Records Holding Area. 

For a description of Nassief’s presentation, see Interv, authors with Oliva, 13 Jan 95, pp. 15–17. 7 Med Div Staff Mtg Min, 15 Dec 75, p. 3, box 18, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Interv, Thomas 

Tulenko with Col (Ret) Charles T. Williams, 20–21 Feb 85, p. 117. On Lawrence’s solution, see Interv, 

authors with Oliva, 13 Jan 95, pp. 16–17. 8 Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, p. 17, box 1, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Bennett to Al Faisal, [20] Oct 76, sub: MODA Budget Item 4/8/15, King Abdul Aziz [sic] Mil Academy, 

E-7-3, TAD-RHA; DF, West, 13 Jan 78, sub: Significant Activities Report, 16 Dec–15 Jan, Construc-
448 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

The project team identified six contract packages as critical to the sequencing 

of construction: development of a water source, creation of the mobilization camp 

for five thousand to seven thousand five hundred workers, development of a system 

for delivering concrete, construction of the academic campus, excavation into the 

limestone rock that lay beneath the surface soil on the site, and installation of central 

utilities. The first five construction contracts, awarded between July and November 

1978, included the water source and the mobilization camp but not the other critical 

packages. Early in 1979, the division awarded contracts for the development of a 

zone as a contractor area and for support services. The value of the contracts for 

this preparatory work made KAMA the second largest project in the Saudi program 

at that time.9

Designating the concrete-delivery system as a critical contract established an 

element in common between the projects to build KAMA and KKMC. The design 

concept for both projects called for a single cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contractor 

to provide ready-mix concrete, concrete block, and precast concrete elements for all 

other construction contractors working on the project. The plan also called for the 

contractor that won the award for the concrete-delivery system to provide life-support 

services for the contractors working on other construction packages.10

The Middle East Division developed the specifications for the concrete-delivery 

system contract at KAMA in early 1978, but various delays postponed solicitation 

of bids. In the early stages of planning for KAMA and KKMC, the division’s 

managers anticipated using similar contracting approaches. When the delays put 

the KAMA project nearly two years behind the contract negotiations for the prime 

contractor at Hafar al Batin, division planners decided on different contracting 

arrangements. Initially, division managers assumed that they would have to offer a 

contract with a price redetermination clause allowing renegotiation after three years. 

In 1953–1954, the Mediterranean Division had used such a clause in converting the 

Atlas Constructors’ cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract in Morocco to a fixed-price 

contract.

tion Programs Branch, p. 4, E-5-6, TAD-RHA; Kramer, “King Abdulaziz Military Academy: Site and 

Other Information,” 19 Feb 78, E-7-4, TAD-RHA; “King Abdul Aziz [sic] Military Academy Project 

Plan,” Apr 78, pp. 1–3, 8–9, E-1-1, TAD-RHA; Telex, Ghani and Lt Col Daly to Reichel, 29 Sep 79, 

sub: KAMA Briefing, K-8-5, TAD-RHA; Memo, Palladino, 14 Feb 78, sub: Summary of Division 

(Rear) Staff Meeting, Historical Files, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Memo, Bennett to HQDA, 7 Mar 

78, sub: Request by MODA for Source Selection, E-7-4, TAD-RHA. The increase to the estimated 

total cost is in Bennett to Al Faisal, 5 Jun 78, sub: Increase in Design Requirement—King Abdulaziz 

Military Academy, Riyadh, I-5-1, TAD-RHA. Final cost is given in Memo, Lt Col Charles S. Cox, 

9 Apr 91, sub: Authorization—Design and Construction of Facilities Under Engineering Assistance 

Agreement, King Abdulaziz Military Academy, HAY, Current Files, Transatlantic Division–Resource 

Management. 9 “King Abdul Aziz [sic] Mil Academy Project Plan,” Apr 78, pp. iv, 9–17; Interv, authors with John 

Cummings, 18 Nov 93, p. 5; KAMA Contract Status Rpt, 27 Feb 85, attached to Riyadh Dist Serial 

Ltr 85/3/96, sub: Construction Status Report, King Abdulaziz Military Academy (KAMA), Oyeyneh, 

Saudi Arabia, K-8-3, TAD-RHA; Ellis to Morris, 26 Sep 78, p. 2, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE. 10 “King Abdul Aziz [sic] Military Academy Project Plan,” Apr 78, p. iv.
King Abdulaziz Military Academy 449

By the spring of 1979, the economic conditions in Saudi Arabia had stabilized 

substantially; the staff in Riyadh concluded that contractors would accept a 

fixed-price contract, even for a five-year period of performance. In early April, the 

division recommended that MODA authorize award of a fixed-price contract for 

just under $112 million to Hyundai Construction Company. Ten weeks later, on 26 

June, the division awarded Hyundai the contract. A month after that, the division 

awarded a contract for $178.44 million—the largest of the KAMA contracts—to 

another Korean contractor, Chin Hung International Inc., to build the academic 

campus and buildings.11

Effective 19 December 1979, the office overseeing the academy’s construction 

became the KAMA Area Office. Its staff of about one hundred administered fourteen 

current construction contracts with a total value of $492 million. When the KAMA 

Area Office took charge, Hyundai had its concrete plant well underway. Until the 

plant was fully operational, Hyundai supplied ready-mix concrete to other contractors 

by using a temporary batch plant. By May 1980, the team from CRS-MMM had the 

design for KAMA essentially complete and Hyundai had its batch plant producing 

concrete for other contractors. The contractor also had nearly completed the precast 

plant. In just six months, the value of construction managed by the KAMA Area 

Office had increased to $750 million.12

Notwithstanding the progress, delays put the KAMA project far behind the 

schedule planners had set in 1976. Although the division had awarded twenty 

of the twenty-nine construction contracts by the autumn of 1980, it was evident 

that KAMA would not open, even for partial occupancy, by the projected date of 

October 1982. The division engineer, Brig. Gen. Ames S. Albro Jr., attributed the 

failure to meet the deadline at least in part to “over-optimistic scheduling” in the 

early planning for the academy.13

Procuring Equipment, Furniture, and Furnishings

As contractors signed on progressively during 1978 and 1979, construction 

moved ahead on the academic campus. By mid-September 1979, twelve construction 

contracts, about half the number anticipated, were underway. With work progressing, 

the Middle East Division began planning to have its Rear Echelon in northwestern 

Virginia arrange procurement for KAMA of equipment, furniture, and furnishings 

for the academy.14

11 Hall to Al Faisal, 8 Apr 79, sub: King Abdulaziz Military Academy, Concrete Delivery System, 

2I, Request for Authority to Award, E-7-5, TAD-RHA; KAMA Contract Status Rpt, 27 Feb 85, attached 

to Riyadh Dist Serial Ltr 85/3/96; Ellis to Morris, 19 Sep 79, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE. 12 Ellis to Morris, 11 Jan 80, p. 13, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; Ellis, “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,” Informal Bfg on 11 Mar 80, p. 5, Current Files, 

TAD-PAO; Ellis to Morris, 24 May 80, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE. 13 Ellis, “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,” 11 Mar 80, p. 5; 

Albro to Morris, 21 Sep 80, p. 4, box 1, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 14 Ellis to Morris, 19 Sep 79. For this and the following paragraph, see also Interv, Moorhus with 

Roger Thomas, 27 Aug 96, pp. 28–31.
450 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

In setting out the scope of design contracts, division planners insisted that the 

architect-engineers working on KAMA hire interior decorators and designers to 

define the needed equipment and furnishings. The firms prepared sample books 

for carpets and drapes and photographs of furniture and equipment. The division 

also sent staff to visit the manufacturers and suppliers of items such as desks, desk 

chairs, filing cabinets, laboratory tables, and lecture hall desk-seats.

The sample books and photographs of the merchandise did not always satisfy the 

Saudis. In May 1981, Maj. Mohammad Nafisah, a MODA officer who had been an 

engineer-trainee with the Corps in Livorno in the early 1970s, dismissed the catalogs. 

He wanted furniture displays set up, preferably in Saudi Arabia, for representatives 

of the General Directorate of Military Works (GDMW) and the academy staff to 

examine. Staff from the division in Virginia arranged to have manufacturers create 

seven mockup rooms at Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Stadium in Washington, D.C. 

Col. Naser F. Al Faisal and other GDMW officers looked at the configurations and 

selected pieces to create office ensembles for the executive conference room and 

the superintendent, the chief of staff, and other academy staff.15 This attention to 

detail, even to selecting specific pieces of furniture for individual offices, typified 

Saudi involvement in the massive construction program. At KAMA, as in other 

projects, it lengthened the process of procurement and construction.

The program to build and furnish the academy created more than the usual 

range of problems for the division’s procurement team. Procurement personnel had 

to know the curriculum to configure space for teaching and research and to buy 

equipment. Science courses that included laboratory work dictated a certain type of 

classroom and specific equipment. Curriculum development for the academy often 

lagged, slowing the procurement efforts.16

The scope of the program—creating a whole new academy—translated into 

buying the furnishings for an entire small college. Few manufacturers of desks, 

filing cabinets, and laboratory equipment had the production capacity to supply large 

quantities of goods in a very short span of time. Some companies declined the offer 

to bid, explaining that the volume and the short deadlines imposed by this one-time 

order threatened their ability to maintain production for regular customers. One 

company, Steelcase of Michigan, solved the problem by rearranging its production 

schedule. Crews worked overtime for several months to build up an inventory 

surplus of the items most frequently ordered and then devoted full production to 

the Saudi order for ninety days.

The procurement team ran into unanticipated complications in furnishing the 

one thousand three hundred fifty family-housing units for students and faculty. 

When the furniture arrived in Saudi Arabia, some pieces did not fit. Modifications 

15 MFR, Donahue, 3 May 81, sub: Record of Meeting with MDW Personnel on KAMA & RSAF 

HQ, p. 1, K-8-4, TAD-RHA. On Nafisah’s service as a trainee in Italy, see MFR, Oliva, 18 Jan 78, 

sub: King Abdulaziz Military Academy, E-7-4, TAD-RHA; MFR, Roger Holloway, 2 Jul 81, sub: 

Col. Faisal’s Comments on Furniture for KAMA, K-8-4, TAD-RHA; Albro to Bratton, 7 Mar 81, p. 

1, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE. 16 Interv, Moorhus with Thomas, 27 Aug 96, p. 28.
King Abdulaziz Military Academy 451

made during construction had changed the dimensions of the living rooms, but no 

one had informed the procurement team.17

Getting the Program on Track, 1981–1983

By the summer of 1981, 80 percent of the KAMA construction packages 

were under contract. The academy occupied a tract of land with a total area of just 

over one hundred square miles. Most of the construction activity took place in the 

academic zone, which, at slightly more than half a square mile, represented less 

than 1 percent of the total area. In that limited space, the workers from a score of 

individual contracting companies, drawn from almost as many nationalities, operated 

two dozen tower cranes and other machinery in an effort to build seventy buildings 

and the utilities to support them. Activity was intense; despite the best efforts of the 

KAMA Area Office staff, construction continued to fall further behind the scheduled 

pace for completion.18

17 Ibid., pp. 31–33, for this and preceding paragraph.

18 “King Abdulaziz Military Academy Master Plan,” Dec 81, maps on pp. 2–3; MFR, Wanket, 31 

Jan 83, p. 7; Intervs, Moorhus with Thomas, 27 Aug 96, pp. 28–29, and authors with Ryan, 21 May 

97, pp. 4–5, 13.

Construction of bachelor officers quarters and club at King Abdulaziz Military Academy, 

April 1982
Utility trench excavation at King Abdulaziz Military Academy, early 1980s
King Abdulaziz Military Academy 453

The Middle East Division revised the construction plan for KAMA almost yearly 

after the original formulation in early 1978. The arrival of a new area engineer, Lt. 

Col. Terrence Ryan, in August 1981 became the occasion for another update. Ryan 

had studied construction management and had several years of experience teaching 

at West Point. Concerned that construction was not proceeding according to plan, he 

decided to compare the actual progress of construction with the scheduled progress 

using his own Apple II+ computer and an early spreadsheet application (Visicalc). 

The KAMA area office had just begun to acquire its own computer capability and 

to apply it to management analysis.19

Ryan and the staff devised computer models to track the pace of construction 

needed to get the project on track. They programmed the models to compare that 

pace with the amount of the crucial materials and utilities—concrete, power, and 

water—necessary to sustain construction. They found that by FY 1982, when 

construction placement increased to the level of $1 million a day, the supply of 

critical materials would fall below the level the construction contractors needed.20

Armed with this information, area office personnel began looking for ways to balance 

the supply of construction materials with demand.

In the case of the concrete-delivery system, the solution was conceptually 

simple but contractually more complicated. Hyundai had planned and constructed 

the concrete-delivery system using projections of contractor demand from the 

construction schedules in the solicitations. Delays in awarding construction contracts 

reduced the early demand for concrete, but that shortfall would have to be “made 

up” in 1982. Hyundai’s plants did not have the production capacity to meet the 

projected demand. The Saudi Arabian government approved the recommendation 

of the planning task force to modify Hyundai’s contract, giving the company nearly 

$50 million to build increased capacity. The decision to spend the additional money 

saved money in the long run by avoiding claims from the construction contractors 

for delays imposed by the lack of deliverable concrete.21

In reworking the master schedule, the area office staff formulated solutions 

to overcome the shortages predicted in other critical materials. They proposed 

to expand the electrical power plant by adding thirteen gas-powered generators 

from KKMC. They outlined contingency strategies to compensate for projected 

shortages of water and sewage capacity and to address anticipated problems with 

the heating and air-conditioning systems. In the summer of 1982, General Albro 

reported to the chief of engineers that the division had made “significant management 

improvements” at the KAMA Area Office. He observed that “the key element . . . 

[was the] automated master network which is being used to predict, and hopefully 

19 “King Abdulaziz Military Academy Master Plan,” Dec 81, p. 7; Interv, authors with Ryan, 21 

May 97, pp. 2, 21–22. 20 “King Abdulaziz Military Academy Master Plan,” Dec 81, pp. 4–8; Interv, authors with Ryan, 

21 May 97, pp. 27–28. See also Albro to Bratton, 16 Dec 81, p. 5, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE, 

on Ryan’s role in the “comprehensive review” of the KAMA program. 21 “King Abdulaziz Military Academy Master Plan,” Dec 81, pp. 23–24; Interv, authors with Ryan, 

21 May 97, pp. 27–28d.
454 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

overcome” the delays brought on by changes made in the contracted work. He 

concluded that “predictions are optimistic that all necessary facilities will be ready 

by 1 May 1983 for the scheduled activation of the Military Academy at the 500-cadet 

occupancy level.”22

Colonel Ryan, who left Saudi Arabia in August 1982, was the last military 

commander of the KAMA Area Office. His successor, George J. Zeiler, had served 

as chief of the Riyadh District’s Construction Division. Supervising a staff of 

nearly one hundred fifty, Zeiler used the contingency plans to circumvent delays 

and the computer programs to chart progress. As a result, he was able to maintain 

the schedules for placement laid out in the revised project plan of 1981. Albro’s 

prediction of completion by May 1983 came close; the facility received the first 

five hundred cadets in September 1983. In 1984, the Society of American Military 

Engineers awarded Zeiler the George W. Goethals Medal in recognition of his 

achievement.23

While the procurement team shopped for equipment and furnishings and the 

area office moved construction forward, the Riyadh District prepared the Saudis 

to take over the facilities. Beginning in October 1980, the district helped MODA 

develop capabilities for the operations and maintenance (O&M) of King Abdulaziz 

Military Academy. In January 1982, the district’s Facilities Engineering Branch 

helped MODA draft an interim O&M contract; nine months later, the district 

issued a request for proposals. The Corps began turning over the KAMA facilities 

to the Saudis in May 1983. As turnover progressed, district staff continued to assist 

MODA with planning, organizing, and transferring the functions associated with 

operations and maintenance of the facilities. By October 1983, MODA assumed 

all O&M functions at KAMA.24

Completing the Academy

The key to steady progress at KAMA was full operation of Hyundai’s 

concrete-delivery system. The Hyundai precast plant had eight production bays, 

each measuring 230 by 394 feet. They produced at a rate of one hundred to three 

hundred thirty elements per day, depending on the type of element. The precast pieces 

varied from small products about 1 foot by 3 feet by 6 inches to pieces measuring 

30 feet by 22 feet by 6 inches that weighed as much as 34 tons each.25 One of the 

22 “King Abdulaziz Military Academy Master Plan,” Dec 81, pp. 32–67, 118–21; quotation from 

Albro, Cdr’s Periodic Ltr, 5 Jun 82, p. 2, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; Memo, Albro to Hal West, 

31 Mar 82, p. 1, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; Interv, authors with Ryan, 21 May 97, p. 26. The 

generators have a brand name, Solar, that leads to confusion when the documents are examined. 23 Interv, authors with Ryan, 21 May 97, p. 25; “Zeiler, Topp Win Society Awards,” Mt. Weather 

Bulletin, March-April 1984. 24 See DF, Col James P. Oppenheim, 1 Feb 84, sub: Division Commander’s Periodic Letter, p. 14, 

E-1-1, and Fact Sheet, Facilities Engineering Br, Riyadh Dist, unmarked box, both in TAD-RHA. 25 The source for this and following paragraphs uses English rather than metric measurements. 

See “Concrete Is in Full Command at Saudi Arabia’s West Point,” Concrete Products, March 1984, 

pp. 34–35.
King Abdulaziz Military Academy 455

more innovative elements was the tri-beam, a triangle-shaped beam designed to 

fulfill three functions: structural, architectural, and mechanical. Structurally, the 

beam was a load-bearing element. At its center, it had a four-inch hole that ran its 

entire length and was designed to hold air-conditioning ducts and, in some instances, 

drainage pipes. Hyundai produced more than four thousand five hundred tri-beams, 

typically measuring 9 inches wide, 10 inches deep, and 32 feet long.

To supply the precast plant, as well as to provide concrete for cast-in-place 

elements, Hyundai constructed two central mix plants and used seventeen mixer 

trucks to deliver the ready-mixed concrete to the pour sites. The company produced 

concrete block on two machines, each of which could turn out three hundred eighty 

units an hour. The company also used three paver machines. Hyundai made all the 

precast elements in flat steel molds. Once the concrete set, pieces were steam-cured 

for nine hours. Pieces that would be externally exposed were sandblasted to produce 

an architectural finish. Getting a satisfactory finish on the precast and cast-in-place 

pieces proved to be an enormous challenge.26 So did the pattern of production. 

When Colonel Ryan arrived in August 1981, Hyundai was producing pieces 

by size, giving preference to the small pieces that could be handled easily. Ryan 

insisted that production be shifted to turn out the structural pieces needed early in 

the construction so that the contractors would have them to erect the buildings.27

The large site area had ample space for storage locations, so the contractor could 

stockpile as many as twenty-six thousand pieces. Forty-eight A-frame trailers and 

ten flatbed trailers transported pieces from the production plant to storage and to 

the construction sites.

The area office had to sequence construction carefully to allow orderly progression of the work of the twenty-four multinational contractors and their twelve 

thousand workers. Staff also identified critical meeting points between segments 

of utility systems put in place by different contractors. These interfaces had to be 

monitored so that physical hookups—conduits for wiring, pipes for water—would 

meet and match. The staff catalogued five hundred such interface points between 

contract packages and used computer-generated management reports to coordinate 

placement at these critical points.28

In August 1982, with construction proceeding rapidly, the division invited the 

cadets attending the military academy in Riyadh to visit the facilities they would 

occupy the following year. The assistant area engineer gave a slideshow on the 

facilities for the cadets while a member of the faculty provided an Arabic translation. 

The cadets then boarded buses for the tour of the facilities.29

The instructors for military tactics, most of whom were Pakistani, showed special 

interest in the ten ranges where cadets trained in everything from small-arms fire to 

26 MFR, Wanket, 31 Jan 83, p. 8; Interv, authors with Ryan, 21 May 97, pp. 13–18.

27 Interv, authors with Ryan, 21 May 97, pp. 13–18, 22–24.

28 Ibid., pp. 33–34; “Duke Wins Tudor Medal for KAMA Work,” Middle East Division News, 

March-April 1985. 29 MFR, Maj Wesley J. McMillan, 21 Aug 82, sub: Visit of Existing King Abdulaziz Military 

Academy (KAMA) Cadets, K-8-4, TAD-RHA.
This page and top right, precast concrete panels were used extensively in 

construction at King Abdulaziz Military Academy. 
Below, because of the volume of construction, it was commonly said that “the crane is the 

national bird of Saudi Arabia.”
Main entry to the library/administration building under construction at King Abdulaziz 

Military Academy, early 1980s
King Abdulaziz Military Academy 459

mortar and antitank firing. All of the ranges had state-of-the-art electronic equipment, 

including pop-up and swing-out targets. Among the ranges was an infiltration course 

where trainees would traverse terrain while a machine gun fired over their heads. 

To convey a sense of combat conditions, the course incorporated numerous shell 

holes, trenches, and firing devices that simulated exploding shell bursts. Here, too, 

the Saudis had state-of-the-art technology, with running-man targets, swing-out 

targets, pop-up targets in windows, battle-sound devices, and shell-burst simulators. 

The instructors particularly appreciated the mock village, where the touring group 

observed a training demonstration of urban combat. The cadets found the size of 

the academy’s built spaces imposing. Inside, they liked the size of the rooms they 

would occupy as quarters, but they wanted more storage space for clothing. Cadets 

also questioned the size of beds and raised concerns about living so far from Riyadh, 

where many had second jobs.30

The cadets who arrived in the autumn of 1983 for their initial term at King 

Abdulaziz Military Academy found a fully functional institution with quarters and 

classrooms ready for about one thousand students. Contractors had completed the 

mess hall, the administration building and library, the utility systems, roughly half 

of the housing units, and eight VIP villas. By February 1984, all of the principal 

facilities required to support the academy were complete. On 15 May 1984, the 

Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation held a formal dedication ceremony in 

the academy’s new stadium. In all, the academy—the cantonment and academic 

complex, a general maneuver and training area, and the training ranges—cost $1.5 

billion.31

The cantonment area contained most of the seventy buildings and both the 

campus and a service-support zone. The academic campus included administrative 

and instructional buildings, along with lodging and dining facilities that would 

eventually accommodate one thousand five hundred cadets. The campus also had 

the main mosque with space for two thousand worshippers; a medical clinic with 

twenty beds; a thousand-seat auditorium; a parade field with a grandstand for four 

thousand people; a stadium with fourteen thousand six hundred seats; 5 soccer, 

6 basketball, 6 volleyball, and 20 tennis courts; horse stables; and an equestrian 

performance arena.

A family-housing area contained the VIP villas and sufficient houses, with two to five 

bedrooms, to accommodate 1,348 families. The housing area contained schools for the 

children of the community, six mosques, and four shopping centers and markets. In the 

service-support zone, an office building supported the O&M contractor. The chiller plant 

30 “Welcome to the King Abdulaziz Military Academy Area Office,” [14 Jul 84], TAD-RHA. For 

a similar description of the training facilities, see Gen Robertson’s Bfg to Col Faisal on SALFAAP, 

18 Jan 83, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; MFR, McMillan, 21 Aug 82. 31 DF, Oppenheim, 1 Feb 84; Fact Sheets, Facilities Engineering Br, Riyadh Dist, and Activation 

Status—KAMA, both in unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Brig Gen James W. Ray to Otaishan, 27 Nov 

84, sub: Contract DACA 86-80-C-0012, Stadium, Stables and Horse Arena, King Abdulaziz Military 

Academy, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Security/Maintenance Services at the Stadium, K-8-3, TAD-RHA. 

Unless otherwise noted, the description in the following paragraphs is taken from “Welcome to the 

King Abdulaziz Military Academy Area Office,” [14 Jul 84].
460 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

was the starting point of a utility tunnel that looped around the area with radial tunnels to 

individual buildings throughout the academy. The service-support zone also contained 

gas and fire stations, a communications center, office space, shops, a landscape nursery, 

a sewage-treatment plant, a slaughterhouse, a stockade, and other structures.32

The academy faced several problems and deficiencies. In April 1984, even before 

the official dedication, a heavy rainfall caused the ground to settle nearly six-and-ahalf feet in some public areas and roadways. The settling of soil in streets collapsed 

manholes and damaged water pipes, problems comparable to those experienced at 

the headquarters complex of the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Occupants of the 

new houses reported odors, cracking stairs and walls, roof-tile shifting, roof leaks, 

and other problems.33 The contractor corrected numerous deficiencies. 

Saudi social practices that the designers had not anticipated led to certain problems. 

For instance, most of the family houses had flat roofs, each with a membrane to make the 

roof watertight. The Saudi residents used the roofs as patios, and serious leakage resulted 

when foot traffic and furniture caused the sealing membranes to break. The bakery 

illustrated an even more striking lack of understanding by designers. As the installation 

of the equipment in the bakery neared completion, General Albro wryly described the 

32 MFR, Wanket, 31 Jan 83, p. 7.

33 Brig Gen A. Aldugheim, “Detailed Report on Settling That Occurred at Some Areas, KAMA,” 

16 Apr 84 [Trans], and attached Rpt, K-8-3, TAD-RHA.

Parade ground at King Abdulaziz Military Academy, mid-1980s
King Abdulaziz Military Academy 461

situation: “We appear to have a gross overkill in the ability to make American loaf bread 

and Parker House rolls. The ability to make pita bread appears marginal.”34

Maintenance, or the lack of it, became a major issue at KAMA. In April 1984, 

the division turned over the stadium to the Saudis. In the months after the May 

dedication ceremony, the stadium received no regular maintenance. Unregulated 

pedestrian traffic made the situation worse, degrading the grounds and turning the 

neglected facility into a potential safety and security hazard. The division engineer, 

Brig. Gen. James W. Ray, recommended that GDMW work out a contract with 

the construction company to perform interim operations and maintenance until the 

Saudis made more permanent arrangements.35

The stadium had one serious deficiency directly attributable to design. The 

CRS-MMM design used cantilevered spiraling ramps for access. In 1982, well before 

the stadium’s completion, cracks appeared in the spiral ramps. An investigation by 

division staff revealed that the cantilevered portion of the ramp was much longer 

than the physical structure could support. One of the division’s chief structural 

engineers, A. O. “Ollie” Werner, commented that the CRS engineers simply “blew 

34 Intervs, Moorhus with Thomas, 27 Aug 96, pp. 34–36; with George Rouse, 10 Jan 95, p. 9; with 

Ron Breen, 30 Jan 95, p. 18. Quotation from Memo, Albro to West, 31 Mar 82. 35 Otaishan to Col R. E. Schroder, 8 Oct 84, sub: Deficiencies COE [Corps of Engineers], and attached Rpt, Settlement of Parade Field Bleachers; Ray to Otaishan, 27 Nov 84, sub: Contract DACA 

86-80-C-0012, Stadium, Stables and Horse Arena, King Abdulaziz Military Academy, Riyadh, Saudi 

Arabia, Security and Maintenance Services at the Stadium; all in K-8-3, TAD-RHA.

Mosque at King Abdulaziz Military Academy, mid-1980s
Settlement problems at King Abdulaziz Military Academy, shown here in 1990, led to 

some tension between the Corps of Engineers and Saudi officials.
King Abdulaziz Military Academy 463

the design” of the stadium ramp. Werner, who participated in the negotiations for a 

solution, convinced the company that they were lucky that the error was discovered 

early, before the ramp had collapsed under the weight of a crowd. In a settlement 

of the claim to compensate for the error, CRS-Sirrine, the successor company to 

the designer, paid $75,000.36

Sometimes the division succeeded in satisfying the Saudis by arranging remediation of problems. In late 1984, the east reviewing stands at the parade field cracked 

seriously because of ground settlement. The division determined that the cause was 

traceable to low density in the backfill and to a significant quantity of fill that did not 

meet the requirements specified in the contract. The contractor was still on site, and the 

Corps held him responsible for demolition of the existing construction, for correction 

of the basic problem of ground fill, and for reconstruction of the structure.37

At other times, the Corps could not provide satisfaction. In January 1986, for 

instance, the Saudis reported ground settlement at the sewage-treatment plant. Staff 

from the Riyadh District investigated and determined that the settlement apparently 

occurred because of a broken or leaky pipe near one of the water clarifiers. This 

suggested that the problem had arisen from common breakage, a normal development 

in a sewage-treatment plant that had been in operation for four years. The district 

engineer, Col. J. E. Gross, pointed out that the contract had closed in 1983. The 

contractor had repaired, at his own expense, the ground settlement in the plant’s 

pump room; as a part of the agreement, he had received assurances that he would 

face no further liability. Gross suggested that GDMW have its own O&M department 

correct the problem at the sewage plant.38

The ground settlement and other visible failures created tensions between the 

Saudis and the Army engineers. By the time Gross had to turn away the Saudi 

complaint concerning the sewage plant, the Corps of Engineers had sharply reduced 

its operations at KAMA and in Riyadh. The Corps had no contractors on site to turn 

to for remedial work. In July 1986, the Corps closed its KAMA Area Office.39

36 R. L. Rousseau, “Annual Historical Summary Report,” 28 Mar 83, and attachment, “Middle 

East Division (Rear) 1982 Historical Summary Report,” p. 2, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Ray to 

Otaishan, 24 Jun 84, sub: Architect-Engineer Liability, K-8-3, TAD-RHA; Interv, authors with A. 

O. Werner, 20 Oct 93, p. 23. 37 Schroder to Otaishan, 19 Nov 84, sub: Contract DACA 86-79-C-0023, Academic Campus, 

King Abdulaziz Military Academy (KAMA), Oyeyneh, Saudi Arabia, Settlement in Parade Field 

East Reviewing Stands, K-8-3, TAD-RHA. 38 Gross to Otaishan, 27 Jan 86, sub: Sewage Treatment Plant, King Abdulaziz Military Academy, 

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, K-8-3, TAD-RHA. 39 Interv, authors with Werner, 20 Oct 93, p. 22; Maj Charles D. Whaley to Nafisah, 27 Jul 86, sub: 

Communication Equipment at King Abdulaziz Military Academy (KAMA), K-8-3, TAD-RHA.

King Khalid Military City 465

By any standard, the scope of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ largest 

project for the Saudi Arabian government, the creation of King Khalid Military 

City (KKMC), was colossal. The Mediterranean Division’s early estimates ran to 

$15 billion, although later estimates were considerably less.1

 Building King Khalid 

Military City was by far the largest of the Saudi projects and indeed constituted the 

largest single construction effort in the history of the Corps. The management challenges presented by the program were intensified by the simultaneous construction 

of the King Abdulaziz Military Academy (KAMA), the Saudi Naval Expansion 

Program (SNEP), and all of the other construction efforts that Army engineers 

managed over the same years.

Planning for what became KKMC began in the 1960s when the Mediterranean 

Division built new cantonments for the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense 

and Aviation (MODA) at Khamis Mushayt and Tabuk. The third cantonment, 

constructed on a site near Hafar al Batin, which became KKMC, dwarfed the two 

of them combined. MODA asked the Corps of Engineers to manage the creation of 

an entire city for seventy thousand inhabitants at a desert location forty miles from 

the nearest highway where no settlement of any kind existed. The area had no local 

labor force and no readily available construction materials other than aggregate.2

The coordination and sequencing of work in building the military city, from the 

earliest concept designs through completion of all construction, engaged the Army 

engineers for fifteen years.

New Master Plan

In the spring of 1973, MODA approved changing the site of the third cantonment 

from Qaysumah to Hafar al Batin and the Mediterranean Division initiated the 

design for the new military city. In March 1974, the division awarded a $1.5 million 

contract to a joint venture consisting of the architect-engineer firms of Brown, 

Daltas & Associates with offices in Rome and Sippican Consultants International 

of Cambridge, Massachusetts, to produce a completely new master plan for the 

1 Interv, Moorhus with Gordon W. Dykes, 24 Oct 95, pp. 41–43.

2 E. R. Heiberg III, “The Future of Macro-Projects: A Global Perspective,” speech to the American 

Society for Macro-Engineering, Washington, D.C., 13–14 Mar 86.

13

King Khalid Military City
466 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Hafar al Batin site. Over the next thirteen months, the joint venture’s personnel 

surveyed the location and prepared a concept design. The lack of a reliable estimate 

for the total military and dependent population of the proposed city made the task 

more challenging. Nonetheless, the designers identified the necessary structures, 

infrastructure, and utilities and set the architectural themes for the buildings, 

neighborhoods, and facilities. In May 1975, Brown, Daltas presented to MODA a 

concept design and master plan for a one-brigade cantonment at Hafar al Batin.3

Prince Sultan, the Saudi minister of Defense and Aviation, approved the outlines 

of the concept design during the presentation, but he also said that he wanted to add 

two additional brigades to the military city. The Mediterranean Division estimated 

that redesigning for three brigades would expand total project costs dramatically—to 

over $3 billion—and would delay work on the preliminary construction packages 

for water supply, fencing, premobilization facilities, and a temporary airstrip. These 

contracts would have to be modified before they could be awarded.4

By June 1975, the division had tentative Saudi approval to negotiate a new 

contract, at $9 million, for a more complete design of a military city capable of 

supporting three brigades, each with troop strength of about five thousand five 

hundred men. MODA also authorized the division to begin preparing advanced 

procurement packages as soon as additional funds became available. On 3 December, 

the division completed negotiations with Brown, Daltas–Sippican for the revised 

master plan and for definitive drawings. Division personnel generally referred to 

the third cantonment as the Hafar al Batin project until the first week of January 

1976 when the Saudi Arabian military liaison officer instructed them to refer in all 

official dealings to King Khalid Military City.5

The project was too large for one design firm to execute all of the design 

drawings. In the concept design, Brown, Daltas included identical precast concrete 

structural pieces that fit in buildings intended for quite different activities. Studies 

indicated that having one firm design all these repeated elements would realize great 

economy of effort, so the division commissioned Brown, Daltas to complete the 

design. The division assigned other facilities—secondary schools, commissaries, the 

airfield, and an administrative telecommunications system—to different architect3 Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE), “Annual Report of Major Activities, Jul. 1, 1974–Jun. 

30, 1975,” p. 49, Office of History (OH), HQ United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), 

Alexandria, Va. (hereafter cited as OCE, Major Activities, FY 1975); “Annual Historical Summary 

Report, CY 74,” [31 Dec 74], p. 2, box 15, access. no. 77-92-0001, Washington National Records 

Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md.; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, p. 16, box 1, access. no. 

77-92-0001, WNRC; Williams to Nassief, 20 Jun 74, sub: Al Batin Master Plan, Walker box 7, OH, 

USACE. For a useful description of the scope of the master plan, see Interv, Moorhus with George 

Rouse, 10 Jan 95, p. 6. 4 OCE, Major Activities, FY 1975, p. 49.

5 “KKMC Facts & Figures,” n.d., original provided by A. T. Carozza, R&D File 2531, Transatlantic 

Programs Center (TAC), Winchester, Va.; Williams to Lt Gen William C. Gribble Jr., 13 Jun 75, box 

6, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; John J. Fialka, “Huge Plan to Modernize a Desert,” Washington 

Star, 18 February 1980. Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 15 Dec 75, p. 3, box 18; 8 Jan 76, p. 3, 

box 17; both in access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC.
King Khalid Military City 467

engineer firms for final design. Still other firms worked up the detailed plans for 

an engineer center and school, a hospital, a nursery, and a workers community. All 

these designs and drawings had to follow the general guidelines set out in the master 

plan and had to be integrated into the final plan.6

Brown, Daltas’ concept design for KKMC featured an inventive octagonal 

layout 1.7 miles in diameter with a dual-level plaza, the centrum, in the middle of 

the octagon. The design confined all vehicular traffic in the centrum to the lower 

level except that a ramp would lead to the main, ceremonial entrance to the military 

headquarters building. Common facilities and administrative office buildings 

encircled a central pool and fountain, providing an “oasis” to which residents could 

walk from either the residential or the office sectors. The main focus of the centrum 

was the Friday mosque designed to accommodate two thousand people. Other 

facilities located in the centrum around the oasis included a bank, the officers and 

enlisted clubs, a post office, the main theater, commissary facilities, and a motel to 

accommodate visitors.7

6 “Project Plan Update, King Khalid Military City,” rev. 4 Aug 79, vol. 2, app. 1, pp. 1–2, Walker 

box 13, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited as Project Plan Update: KKMC); Interv, Moorhus with 

Dykes, 24 Oct 95, pp. 41–43. 7 The description of facilities in this and the following paragraph comes from Morrison-Knudsen 

Saudi Arabia Consortium (MKSAC), “A New City Is Born,” 1978, p. 12, box 78 of 84, A-10-5, TransModel of King Khalid Military City
468 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

The southern half of the octagon contained the facilities for three brigades 

arranged in three contiguous segments with troop housing, dining, recreational 

space, and administrative facilities in each segment. Maintenance facilities and 

vehicle parking filled the southern perimeter. Across the centrum on the north side, 

the designers located housing units and supporting facilities for about six thousand 

five hundred families. The plan called for small neighborhood mosques throughout 

the city. An oasis-like plaza provided a focal point for each neighborhood, with 

other facilities such as schools and shops placed around it. 

In separate compounds outside the octagon, the designers placed supporting 

facilities. These included a 300-bed hospital and attendant facilities; various base 

maintenance facilities, utility plants, and warehouses; quarters for workers to be 

used during the construction phases; an airfield about six miles to the south; the 

engineer center and school just west of the city; and VIP quarters consisting of a 

sumptuous royal pavilion to accommodate the king and five villas for other Saudi 

royalty or distinguished guests.8

Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contracting

With construction contractors swarming over Saudi Arabia by 1975, Corps 

of Engineers personnel became concerned about the complicated and dizzying 

multiplicity of activities, contracts, and subcontracts for which they were responsible. 

All of the workforces for the various construction programs would simultaneously 

need support in a country where much of the infrastructure of utilities and services 

existed at the most minimal level, if at all. KKMC, planned as a community of 

seventy thousand, would be considerably larger than KAMA, projected to accommodate ten- to fifteen thousand. The undertakings for the Saudi Naval Expansion 

Program and for the Saudi Arabian National Guard involved construction at several 

sites. At KKMC, as at KAMA, everything, from the underground utilities to the 

overhead power lines and all the structures in between, had to be in place before 

construction could begin.9

An inflation rate of up to 30 percent added to the Corps’ concerns about building 

KKMC. The political situation in the region was also volatile. Goods to supply the 

construction boom clogged Saudi ports. These factors intensified the difficulties faced 

by contractors and combined to inhibit true competition. The number of American 

contracting companies willing to accept projects in Saudi Arabia was always small; 

but in the mid-1970s, it got smaller. Contracts required high guarantees and bonds, 

and the risks appeared out of proportion to the possible return. In solicitations for 

fixed-price contracts, the division received on average only two to four bids from 

atlantic Division–Records Holding Area (TAD-RHA), also in R&D Files 387 and 3002, TAC, and Mil 

Files XIV-2-61, OH, HQ USACE; “Saudi Arabia Programs,” 28 Feb 78, p. 46, unmarked box, TADRHA; Interv, John T. Greenwood with Maj Gen (Ret) Richard M. Wells, 29–30 Jun [91], pp. 172–73; 

“Saudi Arabia Programs,” 28 Feb 78, p. 46; Interv, Moorhus with Rouse, 10 Jan 95, pp. 4–6. 8 “Saudi Arabia Programs,” 28 Feb 78, p. 46; Fialka, “Huge Plan to Modernize a Desert.” 9 MKSAC, “A New City Is Born,” p. 12.
King Khalid Military City 469

international contractors; these bids often exceeded the division’s estimates.10 The 

division concluded that, on contracts as big as those planned for the Hafar al Batin 

cantonment and the military academy, solicitations might attract no bidders at all. 

Alternately, bids might be so inflated to cover the imponderable risks as to make 

them unacceptable.11

Given the myriad problems associated with the volatile market conditions and the 

concentration of so much construction in a confined area of Hafar al Batin, planners 

considered special management measures. In February–March 1976, the leadership 

of the Mediterranean Division proposed to reduce both the time of construction 

and the risk to contractors by using cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contracts for the 

largest projects in Saudi Arabia. The proposal was an adaptation of an old idea, the 

use of cost-reimbursable contracting, that is, contracts that paid the contractor for 

the actual costs incurred in performing the work.12

The Mediterranean Division’s experience with Atlas Constructors in Morocco 

in the 1950s under such a cost-plus contract had not been entirely positive. Intensely 

negative criticism from the U.S. Congress, combined with changing economic 

conditions, induced a renegotiation with Atlas to a fixed-price contract. The cost-plus 

contract had had one major virtue: It had enticed the contractor to start work on a 

project of otherwise prohibitive immensity and had thereby made the successful 

completion of the Moroccan air-base program possible. In more recent years, 

cost-plus contracting had become more sophisticated; in 1966, the U.S. military 

had introduced CPAF contracts in Vietnam. Award-fee contracts offered the award 

fee in addition to a guaranteed base fee calculated as a percentage of the estimated 

cost of construction. The government invoked CPAF contracts for work involving 

efforts and activities not susceptible to finite measurement or estimation.13

In a CPAF contract, the rate of the guaranteed base fee and the rate of the 

possible award fee, to be determined by the contractor’s performance evaluation, 

are negotiated at the outset of the project. Decisions on the award fee are based on 

subjective criteria identified in the contract such as progress, quality control, cost 

containment, and responsiveness. The award fee that the contractor receives varies 

according to the government’s assessment of his performance in terms of these 

criteria. The government alone determines the award fee, and its decision is not 

subject to the disputes clause in the contract. An outstanding performance earns the 

maximum award fee, but the fee decreases if the contractor’s performance ratings 

on the specified criteria fall.

10 Mediterranean Div, “The Use of Cost Reimbursable Construction Contracts in Saudi Arabia,” 

12 Mar 76, pp. 1–2, box 51-84-7361, Richard T. Farrell Papers, OH, HQ USACE. 11 Ibid.; Interv, Thomas Tulenko with Col. George Gray, 12 Jun–5 Jul 85, p. 292.

12 Richard M. Wells, “Corps Experts and Saudi Arabians Are Growing Modern Cities in the Desert,” Engineer Update, October 1977; Mediterranean Div, “Use of Cost Reimbursable Construction 

Contracts,” 12 Mar 76, passim. 13 Mediterranean Div, “Use of Cost Reimbursable Construction Contracts,” 12 Mar 76, passim, pp. 

3–4. Unless otherwise noted, the arguments for CPAF contracting come from this document. 
470 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Negotiators for the Mediterranean and Middle East Divisions viewed CPAF 

contracts as offering multiple advantages. By paying for actual rather than estimated 

costs, the Saudi Arabian government could remove unpredictable costs as a risk 

factor for contractors. Removing unpredictability would encourage contractors to 

bid on projects they might otherwise avoid altogether. Furthermore, compensation 

for real costs protected the contractor against bankruptcy brought on by having costs 

escalate far beyond estimates.14

A CPAF contract also offered flexibility. Work could begin quickly on those 

parts of the project already defined while design continued on other facilities. Work 

orders for changes could follow immediately and easily for anything less than a 

change in the total scope of the project. Finally, the cost-plus-award-fee contract 

created a strong incentive for the contractor to perform well in order to earn the 

maximum award fee and thus increase his profits.

In February 1976, the Mediterranean Division commander, Col. Torrey 

Williams, and his chief of planning, Dick Wiles, marshaled all these arguments 

and presented to the Saudis the possibility of using cost-plus contracting. MODA’s 

chief of procurement raised no objections, leading the two division representatives 

to conclude that Williams should write a letter to Prince Sultan explaining the 

cost-plus contracting mechanism and requesting approval to use it.15

In March, the Mediterranean Division sent the prince a thirteen-page memorandum with a cover letter recommending that MODA use CPAF contracts for the 

work on three major programs: KKMC, KAMA, and the medical research center and 

hospitals at Al Kharj and Taif. Colonel Williams urged that such contracts be awarded 

to consortia of “the largest and most capable US contractors . . . [with] inclusion 

of international sub-contractors to the extent necessary to be cost-effective.” The 

Corps would require the prime U.S. contractors to have extensive experience and 

to maintain their internal cost records in a form that allowed the U.S. government 

to audit them over the life of the contract. In conclusion, Williams asserted that cost 

contracting was not one of several acceptable choices but rather “the only method 

that will allow us to construct your major projects within a reasonable cost and 

period of time.”16

Preparing a Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contract

The Saudi reply to Colonel Williams’ March 1976 letter to Prince Sultan came 

indirectly. MODA’s liaison officer, Capt. Naser Al Faisal, informed Williams that 

Prince Sultan was considering the matter and that an in-person presentation of the 

pros and cons of cost-reimbursable contracting would be helpful. In early May 1976, 

Williams dispatched his deputy division engineer, Col. William E. Vandenberg, 

and the division’s chief of engineering, Gordon Dykes, to meet with Prince Sultan. 

The prince agreed to a CPAF contract for KKMC as long as it contained two 

14 Ibid., p. 5.

15 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 28 Feb 76, p. 2, box 17, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 

16 Williams to Prince Sultan, 12 Mar 76, pp. 2–3, box 51-84-7361, Farrell Papers.
King Khalid Military City 471

stipulations. First, he wanted international firms and consortia, not just U.S. firms, 

to bid on the major construction in Saudi Arabia. Second, he wanted the Corps to 

hold a groundbreaking ceremony no later than the coming November to lay the 

cornerstone for the main mosque at KKMC.17

Williams had named KKMC as one of the three projects for which only CPAF 

contracting would attract acceptable bidders. As events developed, the division 

used CPAF contracts only sparingly in managing other Saudi Arabian programs. 

The MODA medical centers, which Williams mentioned as appropriate for such 

a contract, never went beyond the early planning stages, so the issue never arose. 

Contracts for KAMA, which Williams also mentioned, came several years later 

under totally different economic conditions that allowed the division to use fixedprice contracts. Major service contractors—Pacific Architects and Engineers, the 

countrywide service contractor; Global Associates, which operated the port of Ras 

al Mishab; and Todd Logistics Inc., the logistics management contractor—operated 

under CPAF contracts. KKMC thus became the only construction project on which 

a CPAF contract came into play.18

The CPAF contract seemed appropriate for KKMC not only because of the size 

of the project but also because of the undeveloped and isolated location. Hafar al 

Batin lay four hundred miles inland from the nearest existing port and one hundred 

fifty miles from the new port of Ras al Mishab, on which construction began only 

late in the summer of 1976. Before any permanent construction could begin at 

KKMC, the CPAF contractor had to create an infrastructure capable of supporting 

the construction effort itself. Under a CPAF contract, a single contractor could begin 

preliminary construction of workers camps, temporary housing for management 

staff, concrete batch plants, warehouses, offices, and the production facilities for 

precast concrete. These facilities would then serve all of the subsequent construction 

contractors working on the city. Nearly every material needed for the construction 

had to be imported to Saudi Arabia and transported to the site.19 Only a CPAF 

contract would induce a contractor to take on such a prodigious effort. Even with 

the guarantees built into the CPAF contract, finding a willing contractor presented 

a challenge.

The construction plan scheduled the work for KKMC in phases, in part because 

the Saudis wanted to occupy the military city progressively. Also, the sheer volume 

of construction demanded a logical progression to ensure availability of the facilities 

needed at each step along the way. As a CPAF contractor developed the infrastructure 

to support additional operations, other construction contractors could begin work. 

Officials within the Corps remained convinced that this progressive development 

would reduce the cost of later bids for fixed-price construction packages. The Saudis, 

17 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 29 Mar 76, p. 1; 20 Apr 76, p. 1; 7 May 76, p. 2; all in box 

17, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 18 Williams to Sultan, 12 Mar 76, pp. 2–3; Mediterranean Div, “Use of Cost Reimbursable Construction Contracts,” 12 Mar 76, passim. 19 MKSAC, “A New City Is Born,” p. 12.
472 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

however, remained uncomfortable. They were not convinced of the need for CPAF 

contracting and made clear that they preferred fixed-price contracts.20

In early June 1976, staff from the Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) and the 

Mediterranean/Middle East Division met in Italy and in Washington to make final 

arrangements to solicit proposals on the contract for KKMC. On 17 June, division 

personnel met in Washington with U.S. construction firms judged capable of taking 

the lead in forming a consortium to bid on the project. A few days later, the division 

notified twelve established and experienced American companies that the Corps 

planned to issue a call for proposals on a CPAF contract, worth over $700 million, 

for life support and construction of KKMC. The notice went out just as the division 

was redistributing its personnel from Italy to Virginia and Riyadh.21

The June 1976 notice identified eight major tasks associated with the creation 

of the King Khalid Military City:

1. Build a workers community and operate it during the life of the contract; 

2. Develop and operate a concrete-delivery system with a plant and appropriate 

equipment, including a capability to receive equipment and materials purchased 

by others; 

3. Procure, ship, erect, and operate on site a precast concrete plant; 

4. Construct and maintain support facilities as the first element of the permanent 

facilities; 

5. Build an airfield;

6. Provide permanent city facilities, to include the grading and drainage necessary 

for construction of utility mains, utility plants, urgently needed housing, and 

other operational facilities;

7. Receive, store, distribute, and/or install all government-furnished materials;

8. Give general construction advice and other services to support the management 

role of the Corps of Engineers.22

The announcement further indicated that American companies wishing to 

participate had to form an international consortium that included non-U.S. firms. 

The notification invited the companies to an “amplification briefing” in Reston, 

Virginia, in early July.

20 “Saudi Arabia Programs,” 28 Feb 78, p. 46; Project Plan Update: KKMC, rev. 4 Aug 79, vol. 2, 

app. 4, p. 2; Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 26 Apr 76, box 17, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

“A Study of Contracting Arrangements for Construction of King Khalid Military City,” 4 Jan 79, p. 

4, R&D File 2527, TAC. 21 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 7, 14 May, 7 Jun 76, box 17, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

Telex, Page to Selected Companies, 22 Jun 76, box 30, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Memo, 5 

Dec 76, sub: CPAF Contractor Selection for KKMC, Selection Board Report, p. 2, file 28, Walker 

box 8, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited as CPAF Contractor for KKMC, 5 Dec 76); Vandenberg to 

HQDA, 10 Jun 76, sub: Organization of Saudi Arabia Engineer Support Group (ESG), pp. 1–2, box 

3, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 22 Telex, Page to Selected Companies, 22 Jun 76.
King Khalid Military City 473

Of the twelve companies notified, only five joint ventures expressed the intention to submit proposals; but on 19 July, the division notified them to suspend all 

preparatory effort because of “the regrettable change in position by the Saudi Arabian 

Government concerning our intended use of Cost Plus Award Fee procedures.” 

Over the summer and early autumn, the Middle East Division worked with the 

Saudis to overcome their reservations about CPAF contracting and to elaborate a 

more detailed construction plan for KKMC. On 23 October, the Saudi government 

approved a revised plan and reaffirmed its acceptance of CPAF contracting. On 1 

November, the military liaison officer, Captain Al Faisal, and the commander of 

the Middle East Division, Brig. Gen. Richard M. Wells, signed a memorandum of 

understanding approving the construction plan and the use of CPAF contracting 

for KKMC.23

Finding the Right Contractor

The Corps moved quickly to negotiate with the five joint ventures that had 

indicated a willingness to bid on the project. On 4 November 1976, the Middle 

East Division issued a revised scope of work and invited detailed proposals. On 29 

November, a review panel of half a dozen experienced senior civilian personnel 

from the Corps began a weeklong review of the proposals submitted. On successive 

days, each firm made a three- to four-hour oral presentation. In addition to the oral 

presentations, the firms gave the review committee thousands of pages of printed 

material to support their proposals.24

Evaluation of each proposal lasted a full day. The oral presentations occupied the 

mornings, while Corps technical staff assessed the written materials in the afternoons. 

During the evening hours, the senior review board deliberated and prepared written 

judgments. After meeting on 3 and 4 December to review their findings, the board 

compiled a list of five firms in rank order and submitted it to General Wells.25

The joint venture Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia Consortium (MKSAC) 

emerged in the first position on the final list. The consortium included MorrisonKnudsen of Arabia Inc. with offices in Boise, Idaho, and Riyadh; Fischbach and 

Moore International Corporation of Dallas, Texas; and Interbeton Construction N.V. 

of Netherlands Antilles, an operating company of Hollandsche Beton Groep N.V. 

of the Netherlands with offices and production factories in Delft.26

23 Quote from Page to C. A. Shirk, President and CEO, Austin Co Intl, 16 Aug 76, E-7-3, TADRHA. On the course of the negotiations with the companies, see CPAF Contractor for KKMC, 5 

Dec 76, p. 3; Wells to Morris, 12 Dec 76, p. 6, box 3, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; “Study of 

Contracting Arrangements,” 4 Jan 79, pp. 3–4; Project Plan Update: KKMC, rev. 4 Aug 79, vol. 2, 

app. 4, pp. 2–3. 24 CPAF Contractor for KKMC, 5 Dec 76, p. 5; Interv, authors with A. Thomas Carozza, 26 Jan 

95, pp. 4–17. 25 CPAF Contractor for KKMC, 5 Dec 76; Interv, authors with Carozza, 26 Jan 95, pp. 4–17. 

26 MKSAC, “A New City Is Born,” p. 59; MKSAC, “Project Historical Report, King Khalid Military 

City,” 22 Feb 82, p. 6, A-10-5, TAD-RHA (hereafter cited as MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82).
474 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

The Middle East Division anticipated that negotiations with MKSAC would 

move quickly. On 5 December 1976, General Wells set out a schedule for negotiations that projected signing the contract with MKSAC by late January. In fact, the 

Corps waited until 27 January 1977 to obtain MODA approval to negotiate a contract 

with MKSAC and the discussions stretched out over the next several months. The 

Saudi government had already deferred the initial funding of the KKMC project, 

forcing the division to modify the logistics management contract that it was also 

negotiating. After receiving MODA approval, another month passed before division 

and OCE representatives had a preliminary meeting with MKSAC negotiators.27

By 1976–1977, the Corps estimated the cost of building KKMC at $8 billion, 

of which about $1.5 billion could reasonably go into the three-year CPAF contract, 

including the base fee and the award fee. MKSAC’s initial cost proposal was $2.7 

billion. By dropping facilities programmed for Riyadh and the Dhahran area and by 

reducing the scope of work at KKMC itself, the Corps brought the total estimated 

value of the contract down to $1.199 billion. The parties agreed on a guaranteed 

base fee of 3 percent and an additional maximum award fee of 3 percent. On 26 

July 1977, days after Prince Sultan gave his final approval to the CPAF contract, 

the division signed with MKSAC.28

Progress at Ras al Mishab

During the period of negotiation with MKSAC, the Middle East Division kept 

abreast of construction of the port at Ras al Mishab. In July 1976, the division had 

awarded a design-build contract for the port to Santa Fe Overseas Inc. Progress of 

the KKMC construction depended on the rapid completion of Santa Fe’s work, and 

the Saudi government set July 1977 as the target date for completion of a usable 

portion of the port. To minimize costs, the contract called for a port with only four 

berths. The division estimated that the costs for supporting onshore facilities would 

bring the total cost of the port to $205.6 million.29

Between late 1976 and the spring of 1977, while construction at Ras al Mishab 

proceeded, the Middle East Division and the Saudi liaison officer, Captain Al 

Faisal, continued to discuss building a second port at Sharm Yanbu on the Red 

Sea. The division examined the shipping traffic arriving through the Red Sea and 

concluded that the volume could not sustain this port. Division representatives 

27 Wells to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), n.d. [before 8 Dec 76], sub: CPAF 

Contractor Selection for King Khalid Military City, Al Batin, Saudi Arabia, and Wells to Morris, 12 

Dec 76, p. 6, both in box 3, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; “Pre-Award Activities, CPAF Contract 

KKMC,” 2 Feb 77, A-10-5, TAD-RHA; MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, p. 6. 28 For discussions of the division’s negotiations with MKSAC, see Intervs, authors with Carozza, 

26 Jan 95, pp. 13–18; with Adrian Hromiak, 6 Feb 94, p. 36; Tulenko with Gray, 12 Jun–5 Jul 85, 

pp. 387–404. See also MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 3, 6; “Study of Contracting Arrangements,” 

4 Jan 79, p. 4; OCE, “Annual Historical Review, Oct. 1, 1976–Sept. 30, 1977,” p. 9 (hereafter cited 

as OCE, AHR, FY 1977). 29 Bennett to Al Faisal, 25 Jan 77, sub: MODA Ports—Sharm Yanbu and Ras Al Mishab, p. 2, 

unmarked box, TAD-RHA.
King Khalid Military City 475

therefore recommended reprogramming funds earmarked for the construction of 

the second port to buy operations and maintenance (O&M) services for the port at 

Ras al Mishab, services not included in the contract with Santa Fe. In addition to 

minimal traffic, opposition from the emir of Yanbu worked against a second port. 

In late February 1977, the emir told a Corps of Engineers officer that he feared the 

construction would spoil the natural beauty of the cove, which the local population 

used for recreational purposes. In April, MODA postponed construction at Sharm 

Yanbu indefinitely; thereafter, the Red Sea port disappeared from the MODA 

construction program.30

To encourage rapid development of the port at Ras al Mishab, the Corps had 

included an incentive clause in the Santa Fe contract that paid a premium if the 

company completed two berths in less than a year. The payment was $100,000 for 

each day short of a year, with a limit of $3 million (thirty days). Santa Fe collected 

the entire premium because the port opened for limited operation early in the summer 

of 1977. On 1 September, the Middle East Division awarded to Global Associates 

a contract worth $13.1 million for the operations and maintenance of the new port. 

An advance party of Global personnel arrived at the port in mid-September with 

plans to open the port for full operation on 10 October.31

In early 1978, Santa Fe completed additional construction at the Ras al Mishab 

port, including a facility for unloading bulk cement. Tons of cargo began to arrive 

at the new port. Seven ships unloaded more than 4,200 metric tons between January 

and May. Another eleven ships brought 11,411 metric tons between 1 July and 13 

September.32 All this cargo was destined for KKMC; and, because MODA controlled 

port operations, the goods were not subject to what one Corps employee called “the 

whims and fancies of the [Saudi] customs inspectors.” As a result, construction 

materials reached their destination much more quickly.33

Although the port functioned during 1978, facilities were not complete. The 

cargo staging area needed strengthening and resurfacing. It needed modification 

to accommodate side-loading and stern-loading roll-on/roll-off ships and to permit 

expansion to speed unloading. Containers and trailers needed a larger hardstand on 

the causeway for loading and discharging materials and to facilitate movement to 

and from the sea islands used for docking. To increase efficiency and safety, the port 

needed a ramp for loading heavy equipment directly onto trailers. Shippers needed 

30 Maj Dan McDonald, “Sharm Yanbu,” 19 Oct 76, E-7-3; Bennett to Faisal, 18 Nov 76, sub: 

MODA Ports—Sharm Yanbu and Ras al Mishab, unmarked box; MFR, Capt John E. Wright, 2 Mar 

77, sub: Conversation with the Emir of Yanbu Regarding the Location of MODA Unloading Facility 

at Sharm Yanbu, E-7-3; Kramer, “Funding Ras al Mishab Port Operations and Logistics Management 

Contract,” 27 Apr 77, E-7-3; all in TAD-RHA. 31 Col George W. Page, “Mediterranean Division [sic] Command Briefing,” 21 Jun 77, p. 29, Oral 

History Collection, OH, HQ USACE; Memo, R. Phillip Benson [and] Earl J. Kramer to Div Engr, 28 

Sep 77, sub: Project Narrative Report, Aug. 16–Sept. 15, 1977, p. 4, E-7-3, TAD-RHA; OCE, AHR, 

FY 1977, p. 11. 32 Wells to Morris, 21 Jan 78, p. 6, and 20 May 78, p. 4, both in A-9-9, TAD-RHA; Ellis to Morris, 

28 Sep 78, p. 5, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE. 33 Interv, John T. Greenwood with Calvin Curtis, 16 Nov 82, p. 19.
476 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

general-purpose, covered warehouse space; stevedores who worked the ships and 

docks needed accommodations.34

At the behest of the Saudi government, the Middle East Division continued to 

arrange expansion of the port. The division opened negotiations with Santa Fe to 

add four berths to the original construction package, but the parties could not reach 

a satisfactory agreement. The division therefore issued a request for competitive 

proposals and in the summer of 1978 awarded a contract to Hyundai to build the 

additional berths. By the spring of 1979, Hyundai had its labor force working 

simultaneously on a new sea island, an airstrip, and onshore facilities expansion. The 

latter included water storage, duplex housing, a VIP villa, roads, and utilities.35

Organizing for the Construction

The Middle East Division organized to manage the KKMC construction well 

before the final award of the CPAF contract. In April 1977, the Riyadh District, the 

successor to the Saudi Arabia District in the Middle East Division’s rearrangement 

of regional responsibilities, became the supervisory center for the developing 

project at Hafar al Batin. The division also created a management analysis team to 

formulate plans, functional statements, and operating procedures for managing the 

construction of the King Khalid Military City.36

In late June, the division offices in Virginia developed plans for a new Corps 

district at Hafar al Batin. In August, the division established the KKMC Project 

Office, Continental United States (CONUS); in November, they changed its name to 

the Al Batin Project Office. The division activated a KKMC Area Office and a CPAF 

Contract Management Office (originally named the KKMC Support Office) at Hafar 

Al Batin. The three offices—the Al Batin Project Office, CONUS; the KKMC Area 

Office; and the CPAF Contract Management Office—were distinct but coequal. On 

1 September 1977, the Middle East Division activated the Al Batin District, which 

oversaw the work of all three subordinate units. The district operated out of Riyadh 

until facilities existed at Hafar al Batin to allow its staff to move there.37

In August 1977, the Corps made Col. Maurice Leiser the designated Al Batin 

District engineer. In November, General Wells took the unusual step of naming Leiser 

program manager for all activities relating to KKMC. In theory, this appointment 

brought into the hands of one person the responsibilities for planning, budgeting, 

34 DF, Col John F. Hatch, 22 Nov 78, sub: Request for Additional Construction at Ras al Mish’ab, 

E-7-6, TAD-RHA. 35 Wells to Morris, 21 Jan 78, p. 6; Ellis to Morris, 22 May 79, p. 4, Walker box 6, OH, HQ 

USACE. 36 Charles R. Wells et al., Mgmt Eval Team Rev Rpt, 3 Oct 78, p. 1, C-7-10, TAD-RHA; OCE, 

AHR, FY 1977, p. 9; OCE, Engineer Regulation (ER), 10-1-28, 29 Sep 78, “Organization and Functions, U.S. Army Engineer Division, Middle East,” C-7-10, TAD-RHA. 37 Project Plan Update: KKMC, 4 Aug 79, vol. 1, pp. 1–2; C. Wells et al., Mgmt Eval Team Rev 

Rpt, 3 Oct 78, p. 1; OCE, AHR, FY 1977, p. 9; OCE, ER 10-1-28, 29 Sep 78; “KKMC: Then and 

Now,” Middle East Division News, May-June 1985, pp. 6–7.
King Khalid Military City 477

engineering, procurement, logistics, and construction.38 Leiser and his successors 

as Al Batin District engineer also exercised authority as contracting officer for all 

fixed-price construction contracts and contracts for support services associated 

with the KKMC project. The consolidation of authority created the opportunity for 

regular, timely review of priorities and very rapid reprogramming to accommodate 

changes requested by MODA. Leiser spent the first year dividing time between the 

district and area offices in Riyadh and Hafar al Batin and division and district offices 

in Virginia and Maryland. Alternating between the United States and Saudi Arabia, 

Leiser met monthly with the staff supervising the huge project.39

Maj. Daniel M. Wilson, who served in Saudi Arabia between early 1976 and 

April 1977 as area engineer at Hafar al Batin, became Leiser’s deputy district 

engineer and the administrative contracting officer. As area engineer, Wilson had 

monitored early construction contracts at the KKMC site, including a drilling 

contract for water wells awarded in May 1976. A second contract had gone to a 

Saudi company to complete a small airstrip, supporting facilities, and fencing of 

the entire area destined for construction. At the end of his tour in Saudi Arabia, 

Wilson, by then a lieutenant colonel, had worked in Virginia defining the terms of 

the CPAF contract.40

Mobilization of the Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia Consortium

Upon signing the contract for KKMC in July 1977, the Morrison-Knudsen 

Saudi Arabia Consortium began to organize and assemble its personnel. The day 

after signing the contract, MKSAC rented space in Columbia, Maryland. On 19 

August, it formally activated the KKMC Project Office as the consortium’s base of 

operations in the United States.41 MKSAC provided space for Major Wilson, the Al 

Batin District deputy, and his staff, and for representatives of the Defense Contract 

Audit Agency. The office in Maryland existed for nearly five years to provide 

stateside coordination and support for construction at KKMC.42

Initially, MKSAC authorized the office in Columbia, Maryland, to hire one 

hundred fifty employees; but the number grew to over five hundred as the work 

expanded. At the outset, the office served as the center of administration, planning, 

and operations for the activities of the contract. As the MKSAC presence in Saudi 

Arabia grew, the offices at the KKMC site in Saudi Arabia assumed primary 

38 Authors’ conversation with Richard Wiles concerning comments on draft manuscript, 6 May 

97. 39 Project Plan Update: KKMC, 4 Aug 79, vol. 1, pp. 3, II-3; Interv, Paul K. Walker with Col 

Maurice Leiser, 27 Feb 85, p. 31; Min, Al Batin Prog Mgrs Mtg, 3 Dec 77, A-10-4, TAD-RHA; Wells 

to Morris, 21 Jan 78, p. 3. 40 “Active Construction Contracts—Al Batin District,” 1 Dec 80, box 13, K-8-5, TAD-RHA; 

Intervs, Paul K. Walker with Col Daniel Wilson, 13 May 85, pp. 1–2, 10–11, 33–42, and with Leiser, 

27 Feb 85, pp. 27–28. 41 Memo, Benson and Kramer to Div Engr, 28 Sep 77, p. 2.

42 “MKSAC Contract Nearly Closed,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, March-April 1982, p. 18; MKSAC 

Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, p. 26.
478 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

responsibility for the activities in country. The Columbia office provided assistance 

in administration, engineering, and management. It played an important role in 

mobilizing the MKSAC workforce and remained the administrative center primarily 

responsible for finance and accounting, procurement, personnel, data processing, 

and similar general services.43

In October 1977, MKSAC opened offices at Delft, the Netherlands. As 

operations grew there, the space became too limited; a year later, the joint venture 

rented additional office facilities at the Hague. At the high point of activity on the 

construction site, MKSAC had three hundred twenty people in the Netherlands. The 

Netherlands staff engineered and designed the structural elements, the molds to form 

them, and the precast plant with its several production lines that would fabricate them 

at King Khalid Military City. The offices also provided support for procurement, 

data processing, project/cost control, communications, and administration.44

MKSAC’s first permanent offices in Saudi Arabia opened in Riyadh in January 

1978. MKSAC personnel lived in a hotel for several weeks until the company found 

more permanent lodging. The office in Riyadh, housed in a villa and then in the 

Intercontinental Hotel, established the first in-country administrative, accounting, 

banking, and purchasing operations for the KKMC project.

In mid-January 1978, the consortium leased from the Middle East Division a 

building formerly used for work on the Peace Hawk program. The building was 

in Al Khobar, about five miles east southeast of Dhahran and close to the port at 

Dammam on the Arabian Gulf. MKSAC used the space in Al Khobar to open its 

administrative and purchasing offices and to provide transient quarters. Al Khobar 

had unique advantages, such as an international airport and a military air cargo 

facility that eased quick transit of both equipment and personnel to the construction 

site at Hafar al Batin. Late in January, the consortium leased a guest house, enabling 

it to extend lodging and limited meal service to permanent employees. By the spring 

of 1978, MKSAC had 185 employees at its several offices in Saudi Arabia and Al 

Khobar had become the principal administrative center.45

MKSAC entered a second and intense phase of recruitment between February 

1978 and the spring of 1979. The consortium recruited and hired workers primarily 

in Turkey, Thailand, and El Salvador, with the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 

and the United States targeted to fill certain positions. Between the spring of 1979 

and the summer of 1980, MKSAC maintained a fairly steady level of manpower, 

ranging from about six thousand four hundred to seven thousand three hundred 

employees. In the final phase of the CPAF contract, beginning in June 1980, the joint 

venture reduced its manpower until, by May 1981, it maintained only a caretaker 

staff to liquidate the office’s final business. To train its workforce, the consortium 

conducted an orientation program in Saudi Arabia in several languages, including 

Thai, Turkish, and Spanish, and translated various written materials from these 

43 MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 25–26.

44 Ibid., p. 27.

45 “Consolidation of PA&E and MKSAC Life Support Functions,” 15 Oct 78, C-7-10, TAD-RHA; 

MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 28–29, 33, 36.
King Khalid Military City 479

languages, as well as from English, into Arabic to provide documentation of its 

personnel to the Saudi Arabian government.46

The first major public undertaking for MKSAC in Saudi Arabia was the ceremony 

to dedicate the site and to break ground. Although Prince Sultan had wanted the 

ceremony to take place in November 1977, delays in reaching agreement on the 

CPAF contract pushed the dedication into early 1978. To prepare for the ceremony, 

MKSAC lengthened the runway at the local airfield from four- to seven thousand feet; 

paved about four miles of road from the airfield to the dedication site; and prepared 

an area in the city’s future centrum suitable to receive King Khalid, members of the 

royal family, Saudi Arabian dignitaries, and high government officials.47

On 1 February 1978, the deputy prime minister, Crown Prince Fahd bin 

Abdulaziz, welcomed King Khalid to the celebration. To dedicate the site, the 

king ceremonially removed a green satin veil from the cornerstone, a 4,000-pound 

stone of Yanbu granite adorned with a bronze relief of the planned layout of the 

city. Each member of the royal family received a leather-bound commemorative 

book containing photographs and a narrative description of the project. Bilingual 

paperback versions of the same book went to other dignitaries. The ceremony 

included a film, narrated by Maj. Naser Al Faisal, which used models and artists’ 

drawings to depict the future city. After the unveiling, MKSAC provided a banquet 

for one thousand persons.48

Less than two months later, in late March 1978, the new Al Batin District moved 

from Riyadh to office space provided by MKSAC at the construction site, although 

the district’s work continued at multiple locations—Hafar al Batin, Riyadh, Al 

Khobar, Delft, and the United States. In Columbia, Maryland, the district’s office 

managed activities throughout the United States and in Delft. The area office on 

site monitored MKSAC’s operations in Saudi Arabia. The district headquarters 

coordinated and supervised the work at all locations.49

Responsibilities of the Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia Consortium

Concurrently with preparing for the dedication ceremony, MKSAC began 

to grapple with the wide range of its responsibilities. These included life support 

for personnel at KKMC, construction and construction support, and management 

assistance to the Corps of Engineers.50

Life Support

All of the activities and deployment of resources to support the total force of 

laborers and managers fell into the category of life support. This included building, 

46 MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 28, 33, 145–52.

47 Ibid., p. 3; After-Action Report (AAR), 1 Feb 78, sub: Dedication of King Khalid Military City, 

attached to Memo, Col Maurice H. Leiser, 18 May 78, A-10-4, TAD-RHA. 48 MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, p. 3; AAR, 1 Feb 78.

49 OCE, AHR, FY 1977, p. 9; Wells to Morris, 20 May 78, p. 3.

50 MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, p. 17.
480 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

managing, and maintaining housing for the work crews, as well as food service in 

mess halls, healthcare, recreational activities, programs to promote welfare and 

morale, mail services, banking, commissaries, and other concessions. The CPAF 

contract also covered site security, coordination of on-site logistics activities, and 

operation of all temporary utilities.51

The Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia Consortium had to provide housing 

not only for its own employees in Saudi Arabia but also for Corps of Engineers 

personnel and the workers on other contracts. A workers camp for one thousand 

two hundred men had been started before the MKSAC contract; in February 1978, 

the consortium took over the camp’s construction. In March, MKSAC began work 

on a new installation, called the workers community, designed to provide better and 

more permanent facilities for more than fifteen thousand workers. At the same time, 

to provide additional beds temporarily, MKSAC began construction of a camp for 

one thousand five hundred workers. The two workers camps lay just over a mile 

51 MOU, Brig Gen Richard M. Wells, Div Engr, and Capt Nasser F. Faisal, Dir General, Directorate of Military Works, 1 Nov 76, sub: Construction Operations, Support Activities and Contracting 

for KKMC, app. G, Walker box 8, OH, HQ USACE; Project Plan Update: KKMC, 4 Aug 79, vol. 1, 

p. 4, vol. 2, app. 7, an. B, pp. 1–8.

Children of Corps employees attended schools operated by the Department of Defense 

Dependent Schools, which followed the American school curriculum, June 1980.
King Khalid Military City 481

east of the edge of the military city, the workers community about one-half mile 

northeast of the city.52

The two workers camps provided basic shelter and services. The 1,200-man 

camp had a complex of forty-two prefabricated buildings with two- and threebedroom family housing units, bachelors quarters, dormitories, mess halls, and 

recreational and administrative facilities. MKSAC completed the utilities systems 

that the previous contractor had begun; converted some of the living space to office 

space; and either constructed or moved a laundry, a post exchange, additional mess 

halls, an ice-making facility, and a post office. 

The 1,500-man camp had 14 bachelors quarters that housed 16 men each, 32 

dormitories each with a 40-man capacity, 5 dining facilities, 2 recreation halls, a 

laundry, and a water system with a 378,000-liter storage tank. The buildings were 

prefabricated Porta-Kamps. When housing became critical in late 1978, MKSAC 

resorted to double bunking and the two camps held about five hundred people more 

than their designed capacity.53

The third living area, the more permanent residential area known as the workers 

community, covered one-and-a-half square miles and contained housing, dining, 

recreation, religious, medical, shopping, and other facilities. The first buildings 

52 Interv, Walker with Leiser, 27 Feb 85, pp. 27–29; MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 48–50.

53 MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, p. 50; Project Plan Update: KKMC, 4 Aug 79, vol. 2, app. 1, p. 2.

Mobilization housing at King Khalid Military City
482 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

in the community of more than five hundred structures were ready for occupancy 

in early November 1978. The compound included barracks buildings, two-man 

bachelor quarters, and 209 family units known as J1 models. Work proceeded in 

two phases to allow progressive occupancy and continued throughout the three 

years of MKSAC’s contract.54

The consortium also constructed and maintained housing in a compound for 

MODA. Although another contractor had constructed royal villas, MKSAC built the 

permanent power plant and water system for the royal compound and repaired the 

interior and exterior of the structures as needed. For the Al Batin District compound’s 

two hundred villas, built by another contractor for Corps of Engineers personnel 

and MKSAC senior staff, MKSAC provided complete water, sewer, power, and 

road systems, as well as landscaping.55

Construction Support

The CPAF contract required MKSAC to develop and maintain an array of 

facilities to support the essential activities of construction itself. From facilities for 

storage and processing plants for concrete, asphalt, and aggregate, MKSAC had to 

provide construction materials at no cost to the contractors working under fixed-price 

54 MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 48–50.

55 Ibid., p. 51.

Mobilization camp at King Khalid Military City
King’s villa and compound at King Khalid Military City, October 1978

VIP villa at King Khalid Military City, August 1979
484 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

contracts. MKSAC also had to create electrical, water, fuel, and sewage-treatment 

systems. In effect, MKSAC had to construct the utilities systems necessary to sustain 

both the construction activity and the working population that would increase in the 

military city as the project progressed.56

MKSAC began work on a concrete batch plant in early February 1978 and had 

it in production by 25 July, one year after signing the contract. In May 1978, the 

consortium began developing a quarry about thirteen miles southwest of KKMC’s 

perimeter and plants for producing sand and crushed aggregate to support construction. A second concrete batch plant began producing in May 1979. Between July 

1979 and June 1980, MKSAC constructed three cement storage silos with a capacity 

of 4,535 metric tons each and a fourth silo that held 1,905 metric tons. MKSAC 

completed the first asphalt concrete plant in September 1979 and delivered the first 

asphalt for construction operations fourteen weeks later.57

The consortium provided maintenance and repair for all vehicles. It received, 

stored, and dispersed government-furnished materials and equipment. It provided 

utility services such as power, sewage, and water for domestic and industrial use 

and for use during construction. It installed underground utilities for over 25 percent 

of the permanent city, which the follow-on contractors used while constructing the 

56 Project Plan Update: KKMC, 4 Aug 79, vol. 1, p. III-13, vol. 2, app. 7, an. C, p. 1.

57 MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 47–48.

Rock crusher at Hafar al Batin, site of King Khalid Military City
King Khalid Military City 485

rest of the city. MKSAC also provided other contractor-support services such as 

blasting assistance.58

The operation of the precast concrete plants constituted a particularly critical 

service that MKSAC provided to other construction contractors. Completion of the 

plants on a timely schedule was key to the progress of the project. In mid-November 

1977, MKSAC received a verbal notification to proceed with design of the precast 

concrete plants and with the molds of the structural elements used in various 

buildings. The following January and February, MKSAC and Al Batin District 

personnel agreed on plans for five precast concrete “plants,” that is, five separate 

production lines scheduled for sequential construction as adjacent structures at the 

KKMC site. At a February meeting, MKSAC received the directive to “proceed 

with design, procurement and construction of Plants 2 and 4.” Simultaneously, 

the consortium was told to postpone work on production lines 1, 3, and 5 until the 

Saudi Arabian government had made funding for FY 1979 available.59 The dual 

instructions—to proceed and to postpone—epitomized the problems and delays 

that dogged MKSAC’s efforts.

In February 1978, because the Corps and the Saudis wanted to see the results 

that the precast design would yield, the district instructed MKSAC to construct 

58 Ibid., p. 53; Project Plan Update: KKMC, 4 Aug 79, vol. 1, p. 4.

59 Project Plan Update: KKMC, 4 Aug 79, vol. 1, p. 1; MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 17, 44, 

74.

Generator turbines at Hafar al Batin
486 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

a test house at the project site using precast structural elements. In subsequent 

weeks, the criteria for the test house went through several conceptual changes. By 

midsummer, MKSAC had sufficiently precise specifications and instructions to 

produce two identical sets of panels in the Netherlands. MKSAC shipped one set 

to Saudi Arabia, where the contractor erected the test house at KKMC during the 

week ending 21 September. The contractor roughed in the interior electrical and 

mechanical work and finished one room with painted walls and a tiled floor. The 

Saudis made substantial modifications in the design. Engineers incorporated the 

changes in the structural elements before full production began, thereby saving 

substantial sums of money; but MKSAC also had to modify the precast concrete 

production lines. These revisions, though unavoidable, slowed completion of the 

entire precast system.60

By September 1978, when MKSAC built the test house, work on Precast Plant 

4 had progressed to the pouring of its concrete footings. Work continued on Plants 

4 and 2 throughout the autumn of 1978 and spring of 1979. Plant 4 produced its 

first precast building element in mid-April 1979 and began regular production in 

early June, two months behind the construction schedule established in the previous 

summer. Ground leveling for Plant 2 began in October 1978; one year later, the 

60 MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 44, 75; Interv, Paul K. Walker with Gus Woodall, 5 Feb 85, 

pp. 89, 165–66; MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, p. 44.

Precast concrete stacked for storage at Hafar al Batin
Massive lifts were used to move precast concrete panels from the storage area to trucks, 

which took them to the construction sites.
488 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

plant produced its first structural element. Work on Plants 1 and 3 began only in 

mid-1979. Just as ground was being leveled for Plant 3, MKSAC received an order 

to halt all work on it pending a review of the entire production sequence. A major 

fire in late September 1979 set the operation back further. MKSAC completed work 

on Plant 2 in January 1980, but the plant failed to reach full production because of 

shortages of molds, other materials, and manpower.61

After reassessing the production sequence for precast structural elements, 

designers decided that they could eliminate Plant 3 by reprogramming certain 

elements for production in Plant 1. The redesign thus pushed back the target date for 

completion of Plant 1. Delays mounted when the Saudi government limited funding 

and imposed ceilings on MKSAC’s recruitment of needed personnel. Plant 1 began 

producing two months late, in May 1980. Therefore, by May 1980, MKSAC had 

eliminated Plant 3 and completed Plants 4, 2, and 1. A rapid increase in the rate of 

production of precast elements followed over the next five months. In November, 

MKSAC completed the final plant, Plant 5, which produced specialized paving tiles. 

Plants 4, 2, and 1 all produced vertical building elements.62

61 Memo, Palladino, 19 Jun 78, sub: Summary of Division Staff Meeting—13 June 1978, p. 11, 

box 9, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 41–45. 62 Ellis to Morris, 11 Jan 80, p. 2, E-6-4, TAD-RHA; MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 35, 41–45, 

74.

Test house built at Hafar al Batin using precast concrete panels, April 1979
King Khalid Military City 489

Management Assistance and Support

The memorandum of understanding governing work at KKMC stipulated 

that the CPAF contractor provide assistance to the Corps of Engineers in certain 

management areas. With the prospect of thirty or more fixed-price construction 

contracts at KKMC, the division anticipated needing additional staff to review 

designs, to coordinate contractors on site, to schedule and deliver materials, to 

monitor progress, and to maintain records for cost control and budgeting. Once 

in place, MKSAC’s personnel also provided constructability reviews and quality 

assurance; reviewed shop drawings, as-built drawings, and materials and equipment; 

developed procedures, catalogues of data, manuals, and training programs to cover 

the operations and maintenance of many of the facilities constructed; and assisted 

the contracting officer with procedures for acceptance and inspection of completed 

facilities. MKSAC’s employees undertook all these operations in coordination with 

Corps personnel.63

The contract for logistical support, signed with Todd Warehouse and Distributors 

Inc. of Bayonne, New Jersey, in late 1978, involved managing the logistics of moving 

construction materials and supplies from Ras al Mishab to the construction site near 

Hafar al Batin, a distance of about one hundred eighty miles. The O&M contractor 

for the port, Global Associates, offloaded the cargo, cleared it through customs, and 

loaded it onto transport equipment for overland shipment by Todd. The process freed 

the fixed-price contractors from the concerns and costs of port operations and delivery 

of materials. Both Todd and Global worked under CPAF contracts administered by 

the Middle East Division’s Engineer Logistics Command.64

Supervising the Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia Consortium

The dedication and groundbreaking for KKMC in February 1978 showcased a 

successful project; but behind the scenes, the project was not proceeding smoothly. 

MKSAC’s effective provision of life support, construction and construction support, 

and management assistance all depended on careful planning and coordination. The 

CPAF contract specified that, in the first sixty to ninety days after award, MKSAC 

would submit for approval a number of plans, systems, and procedures outlining 

its organization; its functional positions; its proposed staffing; and its arrangements 

for quality control, financial management, and procurement.

Although a substantial amount of work had been completed on the KKMC design, 

the Corps had engaged in little systematic planning for construction of the facilities 

that MKSAC needed in order to provide the broader services. Moreover, not much 

63 Project Plan Update: KKMC, 4 Aug 79, vol. 1, p. III-14, vol. 2, app. 7, an. A, p. 1; MOU, Wells 

and Faisal, 1 Nov 76, app. G; MFR, Carozza, 3 Mar 78, sub: Management Assistance Concept—

KKMC CPAF Contract, Walker box 8, OH, HQ USACE. 64 Memo, Benson and Kramer to Div Engr, 28 Sep 77, p. 4; Project Plan Update: KKMC, vol. 1, 

p. 4; MOU, Wells and Faisal, 1 Nov 76, p. 6. Ellis to Morris, 26 Sep 78, p. 5; 30 Jan 79, p. 7; 11 Jan 

80, p. 9; 24 May 80, p. 7; all in Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE.
490 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

thought had gone into a comprehensive administrative plan to allow progress to be 

monitored on the CPAF contract.65 In reality, it became MKSAC’s responsibility to 

devise and execute a plan of construction for the facilities required to support the work 

of other contractors. Simultaneously, the consortium had to integrate its construction 

timetable into a management plan for the entire undertaking.

Within days of signing the contract in July 1977, MKSAC management met 

with Middle East Division personnel to draw up a new working schedule to replace 

the outdated timeline of November 1976. The revised plan, “KKMC Current Plan 

and Alternatives,” signed on 19 August, became the new baseline for MKSAC’s 

activities. It called for an eight-year construction period dating from 1 August 

1977, rather than the earlier six-year period beginning July 1976.66 This was not a 

comprehensive management plan but only an initial step toward establishing one. 

By September 1977, MKSAC had about seventy-five employees in its office 

in Maryland. Corps personnel judged this number insufficient to handle all of the 

firm’s myriad assignments, and the shortage of staff persisted through the end of 

the year.67 The staff shortage and MKSAC’s seeming inability to supply the plans, 

systems, and procedures called for in the contract became a major issue of contention 

between the officers who led the Al Batin District—Colonel Leiser and his deputy, 

Colonel Wilson—and the MKSAC management group.

Controversy Over Management

Leiser and Wilson considered the integrated management plan that the contract 

required MKSAC to create as the key to controlling the entire KKMC effort. They 

saw the plans, systems, and procedures generated by such a plan as essential elements, 

and they repeatedly directed MKSAC to produce a plan and procedures—to no 

avail. At first, Leiser ascribed the failure to incompetence. In November 1977, he 

complained directly to the president of Morrison-Knudsen that three of MKSAC’s 

top personnel—the chief of procurement, the chief of administration, and the chief 

engineer—had insufficient qualifications to manage such a large project. Over the 

following months, the consortium continued to resist or to submit materials that the 

engineer officers found totally inadequate. MKSAC’s top managers, for their part, saw 

the insistence on the multiplicity of submissions as over-management by the Corps. 

Although the consortium did change personnel in several management positions, 

tensions persisted between MKSAC and leaders of the Al Batin District.68

CS-Squared

One of the principal issues was a management tool named the Cost/Schedule 

Control System, commonly called CS-Squared and written CS2

. The system origi65 Interv, Walker with Wilson, 13 May 85, sess. 3, p. 13.

66 Project Plan Update: KKMC, 4 Aug 79, vol. 1, pp. 1–3; Wells to Morris, 12 Dec 76, pp. 4–5.

67 Project Plan Update: KKMC, 4 Aug 79, vol. 2, pp. 1–2, and app. 2, encl. 1.

68 Interv, Walker with Leiser, 27 Feb 85, pp. 34–35.
King Khalid Military City 491

nated as a set of criteria for tracking the relationship between progress in production 

and prorated spending on Department of Defense (DoD) projects. It had been used 

in the development and manufacture of the F–14 aircraft and a few other projects, 

but it was still very new. Wilson and Leiser understood CS2

 as a set of criteria to 

define accountability. The criteria represented a management device that required 

the contractor to set a schedule that they as supervisors could use to measure costs; 

progress of mobilization; and implementation of life support, construction, and 

construction support. They readily conceded that changing circumstances might 

force adjustments to the schedule but insisted that certain facilities and equipment 

had to be in place to permit the timely award of fixed-price construction contracts. 

Scheduling, they argued, was essential because it determined what was purchased, 

how much of the total was paid for, when funds were needed, and what needed to 

be staffed at any point. Without a construction schedule, the Al Batin District could 

not measure progress.69

MKSAC’s managers viewed CS2 as an attempt to impose a management system. 

They contended that it required them to reveal proprietary information about their 

operations. They found the criteria confusing and complicated. In this judgment, 

they were not alone. Many managers in the headquarters in Washington also found 

the criteria complicated, a circumstance that repeatedly required Leiser and Wilson 

to try to explain the system.70

In October and November 1977, the tension between Al Batin District and 

consortium managers reached an uncomfortable level. Colonel Leiser judged the 

consortium’s performance unsatisfactory during the first months of operation. He 

believed the company had not put the best managers in the consortium, and he 

faulted the consortium for not delivering the management plans stipulated in the 

contract. Overall, the Middle East Division rated the company’s performance for the 

first quarter as “marginal.” Given the clash over CS2

 and the negative evaluations, 

MKSAC management quickly concluded that the consortium could never win the 

3 percent maximum in its award fee.71

Morrison-Knudsen’s top executives raised the issue of Leiser and Wilson’s 

management with personnel they knew in Corps headquarters, which prompted 

civilian Corps leaders to intervene with Leiser and Wilson to urge improved relations. 

The district engineer and his deputy resented this intervention as an intrusion. The 

incident, which Leiser labeled the “inquisition of the [Washington] chiefs,” also 

made Leiser and Wilson feel that Morrison-Knudsen had more influence with Corps 

69 C. Wells et al., Mgmt Eval Team Rev Rpt, 3 Oct 78, p. 2. The study visits took place between 

14 and 23 August 1978. See also Interv, Walker with Wilson, 13 May 85, pp. 67–90, and sess. 3, pp. 

1–20, on the tensions between the Corps and MKSAC. 70 Interv, Walker with Wilson, 13 May 85, pp. 67–90; C. Wells et al., Mgmt Eval Team Rev Rpt, 

3 Oct 78, passim. 71 Interv, Walker with Leiser, 27 Feb 85, pp. 34–35. “Marginal” comes from Wells to Morris, 

21 Jan 78, p. 3, A-9-9, TAD-RHA. See also Interv, Paul K. Walker with Cecilia Lane, 6 Oct 83, p. 

10. Lane contrasted the situation in Saudi Arabia with her experience with Morrison-Knudsen in 

Vietnam. Interv, Paul K. Walker with Jerry J. Cavens, 11 Feb 85, p. 22, and with Wilson, 13 May 

85, sess. 3, p. 6.
492 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

leaders than they did. Their determination to hold MKSAC to the criteria very quickly 

became a source of acrimony, defensiveness, and resentment. In this atmosphere, 

mutual trust, confidence, and teamwork broke down in a way detrimental to the 

completion of the mission.72

Tensions Over Management Decisions

The tensions provoked by the issue of CS2 made other issues more difficult to 

resolve. Leiser and Wilson thought that MKSAC should concentrate its staff in the 

United States, while MKSAC wanted to concentrate staff in Saudi Arabia. In spite of 

concerns about insufficient staff strength at the outset, the Corps supervisors thought 

that MKSAC increased staff too quickly for the amount of money available. The two 

parties clashed over data-processing needs as well. MKSAC claimed that it needed 

expensive computing equipment to track the data that the Corps supervisors were 

demanding, while Corps personnel were convinced that the equipment MKSAC 

wanted was more powerful and more expensive than needed.73

Locating the offices for developing precast concrete operations and for producing 

prototypes in the Netherlands complicated the consortium’s project management 

because Dutch tax and labor laws increased costs. The country imposed a value-added 

tax on all manufactured products. In addition, by law, the minimum labor contract 

in the Netherlands was for five years so the company could not economically hire 

workers to accelerate production. Moreover, Dutch law forbade overtime. Finally, 

because the Dutch partner in the consortium was not accustomed to American 

procedures, tensions arose between Morrison-Knudsen and its partner that created 

additional problems for the Corps.74

Furthermore, Corps personnel disagreed with MKSAC’s Dutch corporate 

partner, Interbeton, over the design and construction of the precast concrete facilities. The Al Batin District commanders wanted to have interim production so that 

construction could proceed in stages with the support of the precast plants already 

on line. The Middle East Division had hired three architect-engineer firms to prepare 

preliminary designs for the precast concrete plants that reflected this approach. By 

contrast, Interbeton wanted to build one huge plant and start production only when 

that was fully completed. When Interbeton rejected the designs prepared by others, 

Colonel Leiser concluded that the firm was “redesigning the wheel.”75

Seven years after the fact, Colonel Wilson could see that designing the precast 

molds and the precast production system on the huge scale imposed by a project the 

size of KKMC was far more complicated than anyone appreciated at the time. He 

further acknowledged that the gap between starting and getting to full productivity 

72 Intervs, Walker with Leiser, 27 Feb 85, pp. 64, 72, 77 (quotation from p. 95), and with Wilson, 

13 May 85, pp. 62, 70, 71, 73, 81–82. 73 Interv, Walker with Wilson, 13 May 85, sess. 3, pp. 20–22, 27–28.

74 Interv, Walker with Leiser, 27 Feb 85, pp. 22–26, 29–30.

75 Interv, Walker with Woodall, 5 Feb 85, pp. 46–47, 95–96. Quotation from Interv, Walker with 

Leiser, 27 Feb 85, p. 30.
King Khalid Military City 493

on the KKMC project “was a lot bigger than we had ever anticipated. . . . I’m not 

sure that that would have been any different with any other contractor.” With the 

passage of time, he also concluded that, however good the CS2

 system may have 

been, trying to implement it on the contract for KKMC proved counterproductive.76

In the midst of the operation, however, the wrangling over all these issues threatened 

to paralyze the project entirely.

The tensions between the Al Batin District personnel and MKSAC raised the 

concern of the chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. John W. Morris. In May 1978, he ordered 

a management evaluation team formed to review and analyze the KKMC project. 

Working in late August, the review team observed that, one full year after the 

contract award, MKSAC still had no coherent organizational structure or staffing 

plan, although Colonel Wilson had tried repeatedly to get the consortium to submit 

organizational information. The team concluded that “this is a major [emphasis 

in the original] cause of confusion; poor interfaces; lack of operating procedures; 

vague product flows; and general frustration of personnel at all levels, including 

top management officials in MKSAC.”77

In defense of MKSAC, the team observed that incremental funding, rather than 

full funding at the outset as envisioned in November 1976, “precludes orderly and 

realistic scheduling and budgeting for the full scope of work . . . over the original 

time frame” of three years from the date of the award. Given the pattern of funding, 

MKSAC could not achieve “a smooth and aggressive momentum” but became 

victim of “a ‘start-stop’ mode . . . which disrupts planned actions, logistic pipelines 

and financial controls.”78

The management review team reached the overall conclusion that the parties 

could achieve a working operation but that it would take willingness on both 

sides to cooperate and compromise. MKSAC had to organize more effectively, 

the district engineer and deputy had to intervene less often and less forcefully, 

and both sides had to engage in more oral discussion and consultation to improve 

communications. No progress would occur, however, unless “all parties promptly 

recognize the unacceptable consequences [of the existing situation] and start 

working together toward the same objective (i.e., get the job done well, on time, 

at acceptable cost).”79

MKSAC never fully overcame its shortcomings. In the spring of 1979, it again 

received low evaluation scores. As late as January 1980, the Middle East Division 

commander pointedly noted that “MKSAC, after 30 months, has yet to produce 

reliable scheduling, budgeting, or production data.”80

76 Interv, Walker with Wilson, 13 May 85, p. 74, sess. 3, pp. 27–28, 31–33; C. Wells et al., Mgmt 

Eval Team Rev Rpt, 3 Oct 78, pp. 1–2. 77 C. Wells et al., Mgmt Eval Team Rev Rpt, 3 Oct 78, pp. 1–2.

78 Ibid., pp. 4–5.

79 Ibid., pp. 7–8.

80 Rcd of Mtg with [Saudi] MWD [Military Works Directorate], 22 May 79, p. 2, K-8-5, TADRHA; Ellis to Morris, 11 Jan 80, p. 4.
494 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Implications for Progress

The accumulation of problems and delays slowed the award of construction 

contracts for KKMC. The November 1976 memorandum of understanding on its 

construction had laid out a schedule for sequencing work under fixed-price contractors that specified twenty-four construction contracts during the first two-and-a-half 

years of the MKSAC contract. In reality, the division awarded only two such 

contracts in that time, one on 31 December 1977 and a second in January 1979. No 

awards at all occurred in 1978.81 (Table 11)

Although the Al Batin District awarded no construction contracts in 1978, the 

project did move forward. The MKSAC consortium worked on two precast plants, 

developed a quarry and a sand borrow, and began constructing concrete batch 

plants. It erected prefabricated warehouses, a workers school, and other buildings 

in the contractor-support area. MKSAC also completed the two camps for workers 

and rushed to open the first units in the workers community. Still, all this activity 

amounted to construction placement of only $182.6 million, 31 percent below the 

level projected for FY 1978. Of course, this represented nearly fifteen times the 

Mediterranean Division’s construction placement for 1974.82

In 1979, the Al Batin District began to award fixed-price contracts for specific 

construction projects, including family housing and troop facilities in areas to be 

81 MOU, Wells and Faisal, 1 Nov 76, app. F; Wells to Morris, 21 Jan 78, p. 3, and 20 May 78, p. 

4; MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, p. 51. 82 Prog Rev and Analysis, 4th Qtr FY 1978, p. 8-8, and 4th Qtr FY 1977, pp. 11–13, both in C-7-

10, TAD-RHA; MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 48–51. For placement in FY 1979, see Rev and 

Analysis, Oct 79, n.p. For the level of placement in FY 1974, see Bfg, Middle East/Africa Proj Ofc 

[second half of CY 1987], unmarked box, TAD-RHA.

Table 11—Al Batin District Active Construction Contracts

1 December 1980

Calendar Year No. Contracts Let Value ($ millions)

1976 2 39.20†

1977 1* 28.10

1978 0 —

1979 9 514.94†

*Does not include MKSAC contract valued at $1.343 billion.

†In the original contracts, the monetary values are denominated in Saudi riyals.

Source: Adapted from “Active Construction Contracts—Al Batin District,” 1 Dec 80, box 13, 

K-8-5, Transatlantic Division–Records Holding Area.
King Khalid Military City 495

occupied by the Saudi First Brigade. However, MKSAC’s inability to keep pace 

with the planned progress of construction at KKMC had serious reverberations. 

Because the precast plants remained behind schedule, the Middle East Division 

had to delay award of several contracts. These delays continued into 1980, when 

the Al Batin District had to delay erection of family housing units and troop 

facilities because the precast elements needed for their construction were not 

ready on time.83

Network Analysis System

Except for the initial work on infrastructure and support undertaken by MKSAC, 

the plan for building KKMC provided that fixed-price contractors would complete 

all permanent construction for the city. The contracts had to be managed in a way 

that integrated the contractors’ efforts into a coordinated sequence of activity. 

Responsibility for managing the project as a whole involved the integration 

and coordination of life support, construction support, design, and construction 

placement. By late 1979, the Al Batin District personnel had finally developed an 

automated master network analysis system (NAS) that included all of the design 

packages associated with the project, including design for the precast elements, the 

molds, and their procurement and delivery. This NAS assumed only a 10 percent 

increase in available funds from year to year.84

The NAS was one of the principal elements of the master plan that Colonel Leiser 

had hoped MKSAC would produce. The system developed by the district had to be 

adjusted constantly to account for new constraints and unanticipated contingencies. 

Still, Corps personnel felt that for the first time in the project they had a tool that 

allowed them to deal effectively with slippage, unanticipated problems, or proposed 

changes because it allowed them to assess the “ripple effect” of such adjustments 

on all aspects of the total KKMC construction program.85

The constraints on funding, the frequent design changes, and the disputes 

between district personnel and MKSAC’s leadership all converged to put KKMC 

construction well behind schedule. The Project Plan Update of August 1979 

programmed production of two precast concrete plants for over eleven thousand 

molded elements by the end of December. In fact, Plants 2 and 4, the only ones 

operating, produced fewer than five thousand elements. Calculations in the August 

1979 plan indicated for the eight-year projection that precast plants would have 

to produce ten thousand elements a month and for the ten-year projection seven 

83 Ellis to Morris, 30 Jan 79, p. 6; 19 Sep 79, p. 2; 11 Jan 80, pp. 2–3; 24 May 80, p. 3; all in 

Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE. For the contracts and their award dates, see “Active Construction 

Contracts—Al Batin District,” 1 Dec 80, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 84 Project Plan Update: KKMC, vol. 1, pp. II-5–9.

85 Ibid., esp. p. II-8.
496 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

thousand a month. Even in its best month, June 1980, MKSAC achieved a production 

total of fewer than six thousand precast elements.86

The pace of construction improved through the second year of the CPAF 

contract. By the end of FY 1979 (30 September 1979), construction placement had 

risen to $479.3 million, 33 percent above the projections for the year and more 

than two-and-a-half times the placement for FY 1978. By July 1980, the end of the 

three-year contract period, MKSAC had completed over 99 percent of the tasks 

assigned to it in the revised plan of August 1979.87

However laudable the achievement, the impression remained that throughout 

its three years of work MKSAC produced too little and too late. Even delays that 

were not entirely the consortium’s fault became its responsibility. 

Shortcomings of the Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia Consortium

Explanations for MKSAC’s failure to meet the targets of the contract are not 

hard to find. The consortium had to prepare specific job descriptions before it could 

hire staff, and the Saudi government delayed granting visas to incoming MKSAC 

personnel. It also took time to master the logistics involved in large-scale transfers 

of men and materials to the remote location. A longshoreman’s strike at the docks 

in the United States in December 1977 and January 1978 also slowed progress. 

Many of the delays MKSAC encountered in building the precast concrete plants 

derive from proceeding simultaneously rather than sequentially with both design and 

construction. Without definitive designs for the structural elements that the plants 

were to produce, construction of the precast plants had to be delayed. As late as 

January 1980, KKMC’s designs remained only 90 percent complete.88

In addition, Saudi funding for the KKMC project consistently failed to match 

the amounts programmed. The Saudis also made available only about 15 percent 

of the money needed for FY 1978, whereas the Middle East Division and MKSAC 

had expected the entire amount at the start of the year in October 1977. The Saudis 

provided the balance of funding for the year only in mid-March, after the dedication 

ceremony. In FY 1978, the Saudi government programmed $1.7 billion but actually 

made only $290 million accessible. For FY 1979, the comparable figures were $1.52 

billion programmed versus $715 million accessible and for FY 1980 $1.18 billion 

programmed versus $742 million accessible.89

86 MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 35, 73; Ellis to Morris, 11 Jan 80, p. 2; “KKMC Planning 

Update—Briefing for Major Faisal,” 6 Aug 79, p. 2, K-8-5, TAD-RHA. 87 For the amount of placement in FY 1978, see Prog Rev and Analysis, 4th Qtr, FY 1978. For the 

projects, see 4th Qtr, FY 1977, pp. 11–13. For placement in FY 1979, see Rev and Analysis, Oct 79, 

n.p.; MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, p. 17. 88 MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 33–34, 41–44; Ellis to Morris, 11 Jan 80, p. 13.

89 Wells to Morris, 21 Jan 78, p. 3, and 20 May 78, p. 1; DF, West, 13 Jan 78, sub: Significant 

Activities Report, 16 Dec–15 Jan, Construction Programs Branch, p. 4, E-5-6, TAD-RHA; Project 

Plan Update: KKMC, vol. 2; figures in MOU, Wells and Faisal, 1 Nov 76, amend. no. 1, 1 Aug 79, 

attached to Draft Ltr, Ellis to Faisal, Walker box 13, OH, HQ USACE.
King Khalid Military City 497

In June 1978, MKSAC and Al Batin District leaders negotiated revisions to the 

schedule of work that had been fixed in August 1977. The parties revised the schedule 

again in August 1978 as a direct result of the “substantially reduced funding” from the 

Saudis for FY 1979. In the spring of 1979, the division planners began a new review 

of the project’s construction schedule. The Project Plan Update of 4 August 1979 

was the fourth formal revision since November 1976 and became the new baseline 

for MKSAC. The new plan proposed two possible construction schedules, one of 

them based on “optimum support,” the other based on “constrained funding.” This 

new distinction recognized for the first time the reality that the Saudi government 

had funded MKSAC’s work more slowly than earlier plans had programmed. In 

addition, the August 1979 update restored several projects that were eliminated from 

the memorandum of November 1976 and the revisions of August 1977 to reduce 

costs—including the hospital, the airfield expansion, and the Engineer School.90

Allegations of Corruption

In August 1979, charges surfaced publicly that several MKSAC employees had 

engaged in a scheme to inflate prices for materials bought to support the KKMC 

construction and that they had accepted payments for their cooperation. The 

allegations touched off a number of newspaper articles around the United States 

and raised questions about kickbacks or illegal payments in business dealings in 

Saudi Arabia.91

The problem had come to light in mid-June during a routine audit of MKSAC’s 

procurement records by Al Batin District personnel. The initial examination 

uncovered irregularities that prompted the Middle East Division commander, Brig. 

Gen. James N. Ellis, to order an in-depth audit, to request an investigation by the 

U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (CIC), and to alert U.S. Ambassador 

John C. West.92 With the full cooperation of MKSAC executives, fourteen members 

of the Defense Contract Audit Agency examined eighteen thousand records covering 

procurement valued at $35 million. The audit revealed questions concerning $1.4 

million in purchases. Because the transactions had taken place in Saudi Arabia 

and involved Saudi materials, the Corps took the issue to the Saudi government to 

seek its cooperation. The Saudi government then presented MKSAC with a list of 

thirty-one employees, including nineteen U.S. citizens, whom it wanted held in the 

country as potential material witnesses.93

90 Project Plan Update: KKMC, 4 Aug 79, vol. 1, pp. 1–3, quotations from pp. 2, 3, III-12; MKSAC 

Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 17, 45, A-10-5, TAD-RHA. 91 “MKSAC Audit and Detainment of Employees in Saudi Arabia,” 8 Aug 79, and News Query 

Form, 6 Aug 79, query from Bill Currie, Chicago Tribune, Current Files, Transatlantic Division–Public 

Affairs Office (TAD-PAO). 92 Ellis to Maj Gen William Wray, 27 Jul 79, sub: CID [Criminal Investigation Division] Report 

Initial SSI [Serious or Sensitive Incident] 007-79-0139, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 93 Ibid.
498 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Once the Saudi government confiscated the passports of U.S. citizens, the 

incident became a public issue. The public relations offices at Corps headquarters 

and at the division offices in Virginia began receiving inquiries from newspaper 

reporters, frantic relatives, and congressional offices. The Idaho Statesman from 

Boise, the headquarters of Morrison-Knudsen, published an article that concentrated 

on an Idaho resident among the thirty-one detainees and his assertion that “we have 

been taken advantage of [and] our rights have been taken away from us.”94

The likelihood of any serious charges emerging from the investigations 

lessened when a key figure in the probe, the Lebanese sales representative of the 

local vendor, managed to leave Saudi Arabia surreptitiously. The charges never 

involved Morrison-Knudsen or MKSAC as entities. The individual employees 

detained were all middle-ranking functionaries at the highest, and the investigations 

never developed significant evidence against more than two U.S. citizens. By early 

September, all passports had been returned, the auditors and agents of the U.S. 

Army Criminal Investigation Command had submitted their reports, and the incident 

disappeared from the headlines. Division records do not show whether any legal 

action ever occurred.95

No evidence suggests that the incident involved more than individual corruption. 

No one from the Corps of Engineers was implicated, and MKSAC had no corporate 

culpability. The company agreed to repay the project for those procurement items 

that the audit had identified as irregular. The entire affair represents a relatively 

small and uncharacteristic incident in the history of the Corps of Engineers in Saudi 

Arabia.

Ending the Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contract

In 1976, the leadership of the Corps of Engineers had convinced a reluctant 

military staff at MODA to accept a CPAF contract to build King Khalid Military 

City. The first full year of the MKSAC contract did little to reduce the skepticism of 

the Saudis regarding CPAF contracting. The consortium’s performance during 1977 

and 1978 fell far short of the level of productivity that the Middle East Division’s 

managers had expected.96

It came as no surprise that, shortly after the end of MKSAC’s first year, leaders 

in the Al Batin District and in the Middle East Division began to reexamine the 

CPAF contract. The memorandum of understanding of November 1976—the 

document defining the role of the CPAF contractor in building King Khalid Military 

City—specified the use of fixed-price contracts in conjunction with and eventually as 

a replacement for the CPAF contract. The memorandum even provided for periodic 

94 Steve Ahrens, “Saudis Detain 31 M-K Workers,” Idaho Statesman, 1 August 1979. 95 Action based on the CID report remained pending at the Department of Justice when division 

records ceased to report the incident. See Col Daniel D. Ludwig to Sen Dale Bumpers [D-Ark.], 23 

Oct 79, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. Documentation ends in the spring of 1980 with no mention of 

action by the Justice Department. 96 Project Plan Update: KKMC, vol. 1, p. VIII-1.
King Khalid Military City 499

review of circumstances to decide when it might “become desirable to convert the 

CPAF contract.” By late 1978, that time seemed to be at hand. The Saudis strongly 

favored terminating the contract with MKSAC at the end of its three-year term and 

proceeding with competitive bidding. A study group within the Middle East Division 

considered a variety of approaches and arrived at a set of recommendations.97

The CPAF contract set out separate categories of work, each of which was subject 

to termination, modification, or extension. The study group proposed to negotiate 

exclusively with MKSAC to continue two of the categories—construction support 

and management assistance—under a fixed-price contract. For other functions, such 

as life support and additional technical support, the division proposed to advertise 

fixed-price contracts and to make awards after competitive bidding. By combining 

negotiations with MKSAC for certain services and open bidding for others, the 

division could take advantage of MKSAC’s experience. The consortium would 

have an opportunity to continue as the on-site contractor if it could negotiate a fair 

and reasonable price for its services and if MODA approved. In the absence of an 

agreement with MKSAC, all the services would pass to new contractors.98

In mid-December 1978, the Al Batin District deputy, Colonel Wilson, briefed 

the chief of engineers, General Morris, on the alternatives and won his approval to 

proceed; although Morris expressed concern over ending MKSAC’s involvement in 

the project. On 15 January 1979, the Middle East Division engineer, General Ellis, 

met with his staff and the study group in Virginia to review the alternatives. After 

weighing the recommendations, Ellis approved discontinuing the consortium’s CPAF 

contract for support services. In its place the division would pursue competitively 

bid fixed-price contracts. Although MKSAC’s performance ratings remained barely 

satisfactory, with some activities still marginal, the division leaders proposed to 

seek a fixed-price contract with that consortium to continue its involvement in 

construction support and management assistance.99

On 2 February 1979, personnel from the division and the Al Batin District 

briefed General Morris and key members of his staff again. The chief of engineering 

in headquarters, Lee Garrett, expressed concern about “changing horses” and said 

he did not want to “let the client dictate our way to do the job,” believing that a 

CPAF contract represented a better tool to get the job done. The director of military 

construction, Maj. Gen. Bates Burnell, echoed Garrett’s concerns, but General 

Morris approved the division’s decision to end the CPAF contract and to replace 

it with a number of fixed-price contracts. One week later, the Al Batin District 

formally presented the plan for converting the CPAF contract with MKSAC to 

fixed-price contracts and Major Al Faisal at MODA gave his approval. During the 

97 Quoted passage from memo as cited by Project Plan Update: KKMC, vol. 1, p. VIII-1. MOU, 

Wells and Faisal, 1 Nov 76, pp. 5–6; MFR, Wilson, 5 Jan 79, sub: Briefing for LTG J. W. Morris on 

18 December 1978 . . . in MED (REAR), p. 2, A-9-3, TAD-RHA. 98 “Study of Contracting Arrangements,” 4 Jan 79, p. 11; Project Plan Update: KKMC, vol. 1, p. 

VIII-1–2; Ellis to Morris, 30 Jan 79, p. 6. 99 MFR, Wilson, 5 Jan 79, p. 2; MFR, Ab al Kassim, 15 Jan 79, sub: Al Batin District Briefing to 

Division Engineer in Berryville, A-9-3, TAD-RHA.
500 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

next several months, district personnel repeatedly briefed Al Faisal on the progress 

of the negotiations.100

Throughout the spring and summer of 1979, division staff, working mostly 

from the district office in Maryland, developed scopes of work for various contract 

packages. In April, MKSAC indicated an interest in negotiating a contract to 

continue its role in construction support and management assistance. By contrast, 

the consortium expressed no interest in continuing to offer life support. Corps staff 

pursued two functions simultaneously: first, monitoring the day-to-day activities of 

MKSAC and other contractors as they executed construction at KKMC and second, 

planning the closeout of the CPAF contract while developing contracts in life-support 

services. They also prepared to negotiate with MKSAC for a construction support 

contract. As a measure of prudence, the division developed a request for proposal 

and a bidders list of prequalified companies capable of executing the construction 

support and management assistance services.101

By late October 1979, when Major Al Faisal visited the office in Maryland, 

Corps personnel had a scope of work ready for the life-support contract and had 

passed the list of prequalified bidders to the Saudi military liaison office. Al Faisal 

approved a schedule that would allow award of the contract in mid-April 1980. In 

November 1979 in Riyadh, he reaffirmed his approval of the division’s intention 

to negotiate a contract with MKSAC to continue construction support at KKMC. 

He thought that “the negotiations would be fruitless,” however, and had no plans 

to participate or to send a MODA representative. He urged the division negotiators 

not to be too accommodating to MKSAC and to hasten preparations of the materials 

necessary to solicit bids from other firms when, as he expected, the discussions with 

MKSAC ended.102

In December 1979, the division opened formal negotiations with the consortium 

that led in late January 1980 to a final series of meetings in St. Louis. On 2 February, 

MKSAC submitted its revised proposal to the Middle East Division for an additional 

eighteen months of construction support services. After several days, the division’s 

negotiators concluded that the gap between MKSAC’s final offer and the government 

estimate of the cost of work was too great to reconcile. On 8 February, the Corps team 

ended the negotiations; the next day, the division issued a request for competitive 

proposals on construction support.103

100 MFR, West, 5 Feb 79, sub: KKMC Briefing for LTG Morris on 2 February 1979, A-9-3; MFR, 

Maj Louis J. Martinez, 11 Feb 79, sub: MLO Attendance at MKSAC Award Fee Evaluation, K-8-5; 

MFR, James L. McFaul [after 20 May 79], sub: MODA Approval to Convert CPAF Contract DACA 

86-77-C-0091, Support Services, KKMC, to Firm Fixed Price (FFP), K-8-5; MFR, Chester A. Taylor, 25 Oct 79, sub: Maj Faisal Visit to CONUS Office, K-8-5; Addendum by Maj Richard J. Vedell, 

Riyadh Liaison Ofc, to MEDRL’s MFR, dtd 27 Nov 79, 28 Nov 79, K-8-5; Memo, Vedell, 17 Dec 

79, sub: Meeting with MODA Officials on 16 Dec 79, K-8-5; all in TAD-RHA. 101 MFR, Martinez, 11 Feb 79. Ellis to Morris, 19 Sep 79, p. 2; 11 Jan 80, p. 4; 24 May 80, p. 2. 

Project Plan Update: KKMC, vol. 1, sec. 8, pp. 14, III-2. 102 Vedell, Addendum to MFR dtd 27 Nov 79, 28 Nov 79; Memo, Vedell, 17 Dec 79, pp. 2–3. 103 Ellis to Morris, 19 Sep 79, p. 2; 11 Jan 80, p. 4; 24 May 80, pp. 2–3.
King Khalid Military City 501

When discussions with MKSAC ended, the division had the documents and 

bidders lists for the life-support contract ready. Within days, the division convened 

a series of pre-proposal conferences with seven firms that had expressed an interest 

in bidding on site management and life support. In early April, five companies 

submitted bids that ranged from a high of $279.9 million to a low of $136.3 million. 

The Al Batin District negotiating team met with the bidders to clarify issues in 

the proposals and then solicited best and final offers for submission. On 13 May 

1979, the Al Batin District engineer signed a $128.8 million, three-year contract 

with the low bidder, Saudi Maintenance Company Ltd. (SIYANCO). This contract 

with SIYANCO was more limited than the MKSAC contract because experience 

established that many construction contractors preferred to provide their own 

life-support services, especially ethnic foods.104

In March 1980, the Al Batin District hosted a preliminary meeting with nine 

firms interested in taking over construction support functions. District personnel 

also arranged site visits to Hafar al Batin for companies interested in bidding on 

the automated data processing (ADP) services that MKSAC had provided as part 

of its management assistance. On 2 June, the district awarded a contract valued at 

$9.17 million to a joint venture of Saudi Computer Services Ltd. and Statskonsult 

International A.B. for data processing. The district covered other management 

assistance functions under contracts with other firms. Seven days after signing the 

ADP contract, the district let a construction support contract to the Korean firm, Sam 

Whan Corporation, for $265.99 million. The three fixed-price contracts—SIYANCO 

for life support, Sam Whan for construction support, and Saudi Computer Services/

Statskonsult for data processing—replaced MKSAC’s functions.105

When the Middle East Division broke off negotiations with MKSAC in 

February 1980, less than six months remained to the end of the CPAF contract. The 

contractors who followed MKSAC could not take up the work effectively before 

the autumn of 1980, making it necessary to extend the MKSAC contract beyond 

the expiration date, 26 July, to allow for a smooth transition. The division formed 

scores of three- and four-person teams to inventory and to prepare documentation to 

facilitate the transition. MKSAC’s extension period ultimately lasted two hundred 

ten days.106

104 Ellis to Morris, 24 May 80, pp. 2–3; MFR, Phillip L. Dinello, 18 Apr 80, sub: RFP DACA 

78-80-R-0051, Site Management/Life Support Services, KKMC Negotiations with SIYANCO, A-9-

3, TAD-RHA; “Active Construction Contracts—Al Batin District,” 1 Dec 80; Project Plan Update: 

KKMC, vol. 1, p. III-2. 105 Ellis to Morris, 24 May 80, pp. 2–3; MFR, C. A. Donaldson, 8 Apr 80, sub: Review of Offers on DACA 78-80-R-0051, A-9-3, TAD-RHA; MFR, Dinello, 18 Apr 80; “Active Construction 

Contracts—Al Batin District,” 1 Dec 80. 106 Ellis to Morris, 24 May 80, p. 2; Memo, Maj Jules S. Kincaid, 21 Jul 80, sub: Meeting with 

MAJ Faisal on Impact at Al Batin without MKSAC Extension, 19 July 1980, p. 1, unmarked box, 

OH, HQ USACE; Bfg Slide, “CPAF/KKMC, Background,” attached to Memo, Thomas L. Carnes, 

28 Dec 82, sub: MKSAC Close-out Briefing, 15 December 1982, K-8-5, TAD-RHA; Albro to Morris, 21 Sep 80, pp. 1–3. On the division’s transition teams, see Interv, Moorhus with Allen R. Lane, 
502 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

SIYANCO formally began to assume its responsibilities on 11 August 1980; 

the contract for data processing took effect on 4 September; and Sam Whan began 

its work on 7 September. Throughout the autumn of 1980, MKSAC transferred its 

responsibilities, functions, property, and equipment by phases. In September and 

October, it turned over to Sam Whan the precast concrete plants that had already 

begun production and in December completed construction on Plant 5 and turned it 

over. In all, by the end of the transition period in February 1981, MKSAC transferred 

$175 million in inventory to Sam Whan Corporation and another $62 million in 

warehoused materials to fourteen other contractors working at KKMC.107

At the peak of its operations in May 1980, MKSAC had over seven thousand five 

hundred employees in Saudi Arabia. By the end of February 1981, the consortium 

had fewer than ten employees at KKMC. The company retained a presence in Saudi 

Arabia, including a few people in its Riyadh office and at Al Khobar, through 31 

December 1981. In December 1980, the Middle East Division established a suboffice 

in Baltimore to deal with the closeout of the MKSAC contract; that office closed 

in December 1982. When MKSAC and the Corps of Engineers settled all claims 

in 1989 and closed out the contract, the consortium’s total compensation came to 

just over $1 billion.108

Completing King Khalid Military City

As MKSAC approached the end of its three-year contract, Brig. Gen. Ames 

S. Albro Jr. assumed command of the Middle East Division. Albro indicated in 

his initial public comments in the summer of 1980 that the division’s program of 

military construction in Saudi Arabia had reached its apogee. He expected it to end 

about 1987 with the completion of King Khalid Military City.109

When General Albro made his remarks, KKMC appeared nowhere close 

to completion. Little evidence of a city existed above ground at Hafar al Batin, 

reflecting the construction plan that called for MKSAC to concentrate first on 

developing the infrastructure. Much of what the consortium had constructed was 

either underground or stood outside the perimeter of the octagon city: the two 

workers camps and the workers community to the east, the temporary airport and 

the 200-villa compound to the southeast, and four precast-concrete production plants 

in the contractor-support area to the southwest. In addition, MKSAC had laid out 

the Engineer Center and School, the military hospital, the permanent airport, and 

9 Mar 95, pp. 12–13; Lt Col Guy H. Payne, “Summary of Negotiations [with MKSAC],” [Jul 80], 

unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 107 Albro to Bratton, 7 Mar 81, p. 2; MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 33, 35, 73, 78–79, 96, 113, 

152.108 Taylor, “Info Briefing for Mr. Zamel Fahad I., GDMW Status of Close Out of MKSAC Cost 

Plus Award Fee Contract KKMC,” Dec 82, K-8-4, TAD-RHA; MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 

33, 35, 73, 78–79, 96, 113, 152; “MKSAC Contract Nearly Closed” and “KKMC Final Closeout,” 

Middle East/Africa News, May 1989. 109 Sherrie L. Moran, “Customer Gets Top Priority,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, September-October 

1980.
King Khalid Military City 503

other support facilities. MKSAC had set the geometry of the city, but little of the 

city itself had taken shape.110

MKSAC’s failure to meet production deadlines for delivery of precast elements had a 

ripple effect and accounted for some delays in construction. In late 1979, the Middle East 

Division awarded a contract for the first cluster of enlisted men’s housing and a similar 

contract for the first troop area. When production of precast elements lagged, the division 

had to revise both contracts. As a result, little vertical construction arose within the city’s 

central octagon. In March 1980, MKSAC delivered the first vertical precast elements 

produced on site, for an electrical power substation. In June, the first precast concrete 

panel erected in the city proper went into place. When General Albro assumed command 

of the Middle East Division in the summer of 1980, the follow-on fixed-price contractors, 

who had the task of building the visible elements of the city, had hardly begun.111

Packaging Construction Tasks

The Al Batin District put together ten packages of specific construction 

assignments. Each package included projects for a particular area of KKMC and a 

110 Al Batin Dist, Bfg Slides, “The City Builders,” [Jan 83], with layout plan of KKMC, color 

coded to show the facilities supporting each of the three brigades, box 6 of 6, SH-6-93-0006, TADRHA. For the CPAF contractor’s role in laying out the “geometry of the site,” see KKMC Master 

Plan Bfg, Mar 84, copy in R&D File 2530, TAC. For photographs of this work, see MKSAC Hist 

Rpt, 22 Feb 82, p. 238. 111 MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, pp. 198, 238, 234; Ellis to Morris, 11 Jan 80, p. 3; Interv, Paul 

Walker with Col Gene Schneebeck, 6–7 Oct 83, pp. 13–14.

New bachelor enlisted quarters at King Khalid Military City, August 1981
504 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

particular stage of the overall construction. As design was completed, the division 

issued bidding documents on each package in the order defined by the master 

network analysis system.112

First, the division awarded the contract to the Saudi company Al Huseini for 

construction of over one thousand seven hundred fifty family-housing units for 

enlisted men and junior officers assigned to the First Brigade.113 Another package 

included family housing, troop facilities, and industrial facilities. Sam Whan, the 

Korean contractor that succeeded MKSAC in providing general construction support, 

participated in a joint venture that won this fixed-price construction contract. A third 

package involved such general-support components as the sewage-treatment plant, the 

well-water control system, the water plant, the chilled-water plant, and the fuel facility, 

all located around the perimeter of the octagon. MKSAC had already installed utilities 

in these areas. By the end of 1980, the Middle East Division had awarded construction 

contracts for all First Brigade facilities. At that point, the division had twenty-three 

contracts active at KKMC and another thirty-two waiting to be awarded.114

Packaging and sequencing construction for the city’s centrum presented special 

problems. The area was small and very congested, given the number of contractors 

working in it simultaneously. Completion of any structure restricted movement of 

equipment and materials, especially large precast concrete elements, within the 

limited ground space. Over the summer of 1980, the resident engineer at Hafar 

al Batin, Jim McFaul, took the precaution of having a scale model of the centrum 

made that could be assembled and disassembled. He wanted to use the model as a 

tool for project management, to study the problems of sequenced construction in 

the model and to test what could be done, before work proceeded on the ground. 

The model had to include all of the equipment, such as construction cranes with 

their booms, scheduled to work in the segments under construction. Brown, Daltas 

developed the detailed model and, in conjunction with it, a network analysis system 

for the centrum.115

Pace of Construction, 1981–1983

Construction delays at KKMC recurred throughout the early 1980s. In December 

1980, MODA asked General Albro to postpone further work on construction for 

the Third Brigade. Albro and his staff advised MODA that discrete segments of 

this construction could be delayed without disrupting progress on other segments 

112 Project Plan Update: KKMC, vol. 1, pp. III-3–7; MOU, Wells and Faisal, 1 Nov 76, app. B. 113 Information derived from Al Batin Dist, Active Contracts Status Rpt, 1 Sep 81, 1 Oct 81, K-8-

5, TAD-RHA; Al Batin Dist, “City Builders,” [Jan 83], with layout plan of KKMC. See also “First 

Units for Saudi City Draw Nine Bids, $206 Million Low,” Engineer News-Record, 30 August 1979, 

p. 24. 114 Al Batin Dist, “City Builders,” [Jan 83]; MKSAC Hist Rpt, 22 Feb 82, p. 54; Fact Sheets for 

Lt Gen Joseph K. Bratton’s Visit to Middle East Div, 1 to 7 Jan 81, prepared 31 Dec 80, Walker box 

6, OH, HQ USACE (hereafter cited as Fact Sheets for Bratton Visit, Jan 81). 115 Carozza, Fact Sheet, Centrum Model Study and NAS, 20 Jan 81, copy in R&D Files 2527–2533, 

TAC; Interv, authors with Carozza, 26 Jan 95, pp. 39–42.
King Khalid Military City 505

but that work in the centrum, even on some elements exclusively identified with 

the Third Brigade, needed to continue. Returning to construct them later in a highly 

congested area would make the construction vastly more difficult and more costly. 

In addition, later construction would disrupt the functions and operations of the two 

brigades already using the centrum.116

In the early months of 1981, the division consulted with MODA about what 

facilities ought to be postponed in conjunction with the delay of work for the Third 

Brigade and what facilities had to remain part of the construction sequence. The 

model of the centrum, completed in early spring, became one of the tools that the 

Al Batin District used to ensure that construction tasks could in fact be executed 

on the ground.117

Other construction delays arose because the Saudis introduced changes that 

required modifications in the sequence and placing of facilities. MODA wanted 

mosques, for instance, at intervals around KKMC to minimize the walking distance 

for worshipers. In January 1981, Maj. Ali A. Kahtany from MODA proposed adding 

116 Albro to Al Faisal, 16 Dec 80, sub: Delay of Construction of Facilities for the Third Brigade 

at King Khalid Military City, K-8-5, TAD-RHA. 117 Carozza, Fact Sheet, 20 Jan 81; Interv, authors with Carozza, 26 Jan 95, pp. 39–42; MFR, 

Carozza, 13 Jan 81, sub: Engineering Division Meeting with Major Kahtany, copy in R&D Files 

2527–2533, TAC; Memo, Col J. E. Gross to Otaishan, 15 Sep 85, sub: King Khalid Military City 

Third Brigade Facilities, K-8-3, TAD-RHA.

Centrum at King Khalid Military City under construction
506 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

two mosques to areas where construction plans called for other facilities. The request 

involved redesign of several spaces and structures and required particular attention 

to changes in vehicle and pedestrian traffic patterns.118

Still other delays occurred as a result of interventions by MODA in the 

procurement process. In early 1980, Lt. Col. Naser Al Faisal directed that all 

requests for proposals and contract awards pass through his office before being 

published. This review added about four weeks to the process of bids and awards. 

In November, Al Faisal ordered that contractors use Saudi Arabian cement mills 

to the maximum extent possible in the construction of KKMC. At his direction, 

the Al Batin District awarded a contract to a Saudi firm in November for seventyfive thousand metric tons of cement. The contractor was unable to produce the 

quantities needed to sustain construction at the site, and the lack of other qualified 

Saudi bidders for the bulk-cement contracts meant that emergency procurement 

requests became frequent. The failure to maintain the required supply of cement 

for KKMC construction forced the Middle East Division into what one participant 

called “crisis management,” with the attendant delays and increased likelihood 

of claims by the contractors.119

Even with imported cement, the contractors could not count on its timely 

arrival at the construction site. The transportation system for moving goods 

between the port of Ras al Mishab and Hafar al Batin broke down in the spring of 

1981 because of a shortage of trucks. As cement piled up in the onshore facilities 

at the port, the Al Batin District staff sought a solution to the problem. One 

construction contractor proposed that he provide his own inland transportation 

from the port to the KKMC site at a charge of SR 3,000 per truckload. The 

district recommended that MODA accept the proposal as a less costly solution 

than the 80,000-riyal-a-day charge that the contractor could ask in a claim to 

recover the costs of a work stoppage for lack of materials. MODA officials 

rejected the offer.120

Moving materials from the port to KKMC remained a problem throughout the 

summer of 1981. Representatives of the district and MODA met repeatedly before 

finally establishing monthly meetings to try to resolve the problems. In spite of the 

effort, cement shortages put construction behind schedule over the summer and led 

to $5 million in claims from the contractors.121

Another problem created safety hazards as well as construction delays. During 

the development of the sewage-treatment plant, an increasing number of Saudi 

Arabian citizens used the site as a convenient place to collect water for their personal 

118 MFR, Carozza, 13 Jan 81. 119 Fact Sheets for Bratton’s Visit, Jan 81. 120 Memo, Lt Col David O. Lindsay to Mr. Fahad Zamel, 11 May 81, sub: Request for Video Tape 

Pictures at KKMC; “Areas 8 & 12, Phase I, Non-Delivery of Materials from RAM,” 13 May 81; 

“KKMC Construction Program,” 24 May 81; all in Walker box 8, OH, HQ USACE. 121 Schneebeck to Albro, 14 Dec 81, p. 3, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; Albro to Bratton, 16 Dec 

81, p. 1; Donahue, “MED–MWD Meeting 1300 Hours 9 June 1981,” 20 Jun 81, and Memo, unsigned, 

15 Jun 81, sub: MED–MWD Meeting 1300 Hours 9 June 1981, K-8-4, TAD-RHA.
Completed centrum at King Khalid Military City, mid-1980s
508 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

use. In May 1981, the deputy district engineer described the traffic as “four to six 

pickups per day” and noted that “while one person fills the canvas bags in the bed 

of the pickup with water, two or three other persons (including children) tend to 

wander around the construction site watching the work.” Raising the matter with 

the MODA military liaison officer, the deputy pointed out that, in addition to the 

danger of accidents, the construction water was nonpotable and presented a potential 

health threat.122

The various delays slowed but did not stop progress at KKMC. By August 1981, 

General Albro reported to the chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. Joseph K. Bratton, that 

KKMC “is really beginning to look like a city.” Indeed, the division awarded the 

highest one-year total of fourteen contracts for KKMC in 1981. Despite Albro’s 

positive tone, the Al Batin District engineer, Col. Gene A. Schneebeck, continued 

to describe the construction of facilities for the First Brigade as “laced with 

problems.”123

By December 1981, the Al Batin District staff had increased to 297 people, 

21 percent of the division’s total of 1,422. In anticipation of greater activity, the 

district projected just over 400 people by October 1982 and had begun vigorous 

122 Lindsay to Zamel, 5 May 81, sub: Contract No. DACA 93-79-C-0006, Sewage Treatment 

Plant, Area 20, Safety of Unauthorized Personnel at the Sewage Treatment Plant, Walker box 8, OH, 

HQ USACE. 123 Albro to Bratton, 7 Mar 81, p. 6, and 12 Aug 81, p. 3; Al Batin Dist, Active Contracts Status 

Rpt, 1 Sep 82, K-8-5, TAD-RHA; Schneebeck to Albro, 14 Dec 81.

Mosque in Area 3, King Khalid Military City, December 1983
King Khalid Military City 509

recruiting to reach that authorized strength. Throughout most of 1982, KKMC 

construction made good progress. The contractors prepared to activate the 

utility systems, and precast elements and other government-furnished materials 

arrived on site in timely fashion. The division awarded a $93 million contract 

for the Engineer Center and School to a Saudi Arabian firm, Obaid and Al Mulla 

Construction Company; its construction began just west of the cantonment. In 

midyear, General Albro projected that the facilities for the First Brigade would 

be ready for occupancy by early 1983.124

Facing Crises in Funding

In the autumn of 1982, the Middle East Division encountered a problem that 

would persist for over a year and become progressively more serious—a shortage 

of funds to pay for work already under contract. In early autumn, the new division 

commander, Brig. Gen. George R. Robertson, notified Al Faisal that the “funding 

situation at KKMC is becoming critical.” Without an increase in the letter of credit 

by 15 November, Robertson would be compelled “to begin notifying contractors that 

funds will soon be exhausted, and [that] work should stop.”125 The Saudis overcame 

the funding crisis in late 1982; but in early 1983, the crisis recurred and remained 

chronic for much of the year.

By early 1983, contractors had a prodigious volume of work underway at 

KKMC with one hundred fifty separate funding lines in use for projects. The Al 

Batin District had a staff of 365, and construction workers for the thirty-four active 

contracts numbered around sixteen thousand. By March, the Middle East Division 

had spent $3.58 billion on the design and construction of King Khalid Military City. 

Talk arose that work might even resume on facilities for the Third Brigade, and 

division planners drew up documents to define the impact resumption would have 

on existing construction. Still, the total effort had brought the project only about 

one-third of the way to completion.126

In fact, construction work in the Saudi economy as a whole had begun to 

decline in mid-1982 and continued that trend through 1983. During the first four 

months of 1983, the number of new construction contracts awarded in the Saudi 

Arabian market fell by 21 percent over the previous year. The building boom of 

124 Schneebeck to Albro, 14 Dec 81; Albro to Bratton, 16 Dec 81. Albro to Bratton, 5 Jun 82, 

Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; “Engineer Center Contract Awarded,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, MayJune 1982. 125 Robertson to Al Faisal, n.d., sub: King Khalid Military City (KKMC) Funding, K-8-5, TADRHA; “Robertson New Commander,” and “Engineer Center Contract Awarded,” both in Mt. Weather 

Bulletin, May-June 1982. 126 Robertson to Faisal, 11 May 83, sub: KKMC Funding, Walker box 7, OH, HQ USACE; MFR, 

Wanket, 31 Jan 83, sub: Blue Ribbon Panel on Construction Quality—MED & EUD Visits, p. 3, M-1-

6, Europe Division–Records Holding Area; Fact Sheet, COPs [Change Order Proposals] for Areas 

Impacted by Third Brigade Resumption, 15 Apr 82, and accompanying Memo, n.d., sub: Resumption of Third Brigade, copy in R&D File 2533, possibly also docs on Mid East Div—KKMC—Third 

Brigade Facilities, Early 1980s, R&D File 3005, TAC.
510 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

past years seemed to be turning into a serious recession. In April, as a response 

to a drop in oil prices brought on by recession in the Western industrialized 

economies, the Saudi government proposed a budget for the pending fiscal year 

that cut the funds allocated for the completion of KKMC from $1,112 million to 

$580 million, a reduction of 48 percent. General Robertson told Al Faisal that 

such a cutback would drastically affect KKMC’s progress. Such a steep decline 

of funds would remove money already programmed to cover current contractual 

obligations, and U.S. contract law would require Robertson to send letters 

instructing contractors to halt work on existing contracts. This would immediately 

impinge on contracts for the engineer school, the hospital, and the centrum, as 

well as contracts involving seven other construction areas. Moreover, because the 

funds to pay for the work were not accessible, Robertson would have to cancel 

all requests for proposal.127

The Saudis had not anticipated such a radical curtailment of activities at KKMC. 

After discussions with Robertson, MODA’s leadership agreed to send funds in June 

to supplement the existing letter of credit for the Engineer Assistance Agreement 

projects. Division staff examined funding and progress for other MODA contracts 

to see what funds might be temporarily transferred to cover the budgetary shortfalls 

for work at KKMC. The division managed to use standby funds through May to 

avoid sending out stop letters while awaiting transfer of funds in early June; but the 

basic problem remained unresolved.128

On 6 June 1983, General Robertson, accompanied by his predecessor, General 

Albro—who by this time had become director of military construction at Corps 

headquarters in Washington—met with the Saudis in Riyadh. The Saudis indicated 

that their budget cutbacks had been a necessary response to the declining price of oil 

and the resulting general economic squeeze but that they did not want any KKMC 

contracts terminated or suspended. General Albro reinforced General Robertson’s 

earlier insistence that U.S. law required the Middle East Division to have funds 

available in advance of incurring obligations. Robertson added that, even with all 

transfers to KKMC of funds available under other project budget lines, the division 

would still come up short by almost $200 million given the contracts currently 

ready for award.129

127 “Saudi Arabia—The Construction Bubble Bursts,” Middle East Economic Digest (17 June 

1983): 8. MFR, Robertson, 26 Apr 83, sub: Meeting with LTC Naser Al Faisal, Walker box 6; Memo, 

Thomas L. Carnes, Meeting [5 Jun] with HE Sheikh Al-Hemaid, Deputy Minister of Defence and 

Aviation for Military Affairs, 6 Jun 83, Walker box 7; Robertson to Al Faisal, 7 May 83, sub: KKMC 

Funding, and 7 May 83, sub: Suspension of New Contract Awards . . . , both in Walker box 7; all in 

OH, HQ USACE. 128 Robertson to Al Faisal, 11 May 83, sub: KKMC Funding, and 25 May 83, sub: KKMC Funding 

Problem; Memo, Carnes, 1 Jun 83, sub: Meeting with Mr. Zamel, KKMC Funding Requirements, 

and attached Info Paper, KKMC Funding, [Saudi FY] 1403/04; Carnes, “Meeting [Jun. 5] with HE 

Sheikh Al-Hemaid, Deputy Minister of Defence and Aviation for Military Affairs,” 6 Jun 83; all in 

Walker box 7, OH, HQ USACE. 129 Memo, Carnes, 19 Jul 83, sub: Meeting with GDMW, KKMC Funding, pp. 1–2, Walker box 

7, OH, HQ USACE.
King Khalid Military City 511

The division leadership met several more times with the Saudis to work 

through the funding crisis. After extensive discussions, the parties reached an 

agreement that all funds from other MODA projects not currently committed would 

be used for KKMC. MODA approved an immediate reprogramming of $141.9 

million. The remaining $198.3 million needed to cover the costs of continuing 

work at KKMC would be reprogrammed only after MODA had explored with 

the Ministry of Finance a method to replace the funds for KAMA and MODA 

headquarters and only if the money were required to keep KKMC funding ahead 

of obligations.130

In the course of the meetings, Major Abdulaziz Al-Otaishan, who succeeded Al 

Faisal as the Corps’ principal contact on engineering issues, advised the division that 

all of its funding decisions should be made on the assumption that the First Brigade 

would not occupy its facilities at KKMC in 1983. In fact, the contractor had the 

basic facilities for the First Brigade ready for turnover by July but the Saudis had 

not yet arranged an operations and maintenance contract to service the facilities. 

The Saudis also had no military command to which the Corps could deliver the 

facilities.131

In late 1983, the funding shortfall again became acute. The Saudi Arabian 

government failed to transfer funds to the Chase Manhattan Bank to increase the 

letter of credit in time to avoid a crisis. As a result, the division had insufficient funds 

as of October to continue paying contractors beyond the work already committed. 

General Robertson ordered Colonel Schneebeck to prepare a letter to all contractors, 

to be sent 1 October 1983, suspending all work at the end of thirty days. Again 

by reprogramming funds and through unscheduled infusions of Saudi money, the 

crisis passed without a complete breakdown of activities. Construction continued. 

Despite the problems with funding, contractors managed to complete more than 80 

percent of the work at KKMC by early 1984.132

Completing First Brigade Facilities, 1984

By June 1984, contractors completed the family-housing units for the First 

Brigade and the Middle East Division prepared to turn over the facilities. Because 

the brigade would arrive with about four thousand five hundred troops and with 

one thousand seven hundred to one thousand eight hundred families accompanying 

the troops, contractors working in the city on other facilities had to take special 

precautions. They separated areas of occupancy from areas of active construction 

by erecting temporary construction fences and temporary sidewalks. They also 

arranged the construction schedule to give highest priority to completion of those 

130 Ibid., encl. 1. 131 Ibid., p. 1; Intervs, John T. Greenwood with Brig Gen George R. Robertson, 1 Oct 83, p. 31; 

authors with Edgar L. Tohill, 23 Jan 95, pp. 18–19; Paul K. Walker with Col Gene Schneebeck, 6–7 

Oct 83, p. 17. 132 Interv, Greenwood with Robertson, 1 Oct 83, pp. 27–30; Fact Sheet, Middle East Div Reorg, 

24 Mar 84, Table, “Major Projects,” E-1-1, TAD-RHA.
512 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

elements that the First Brigade needed to function and to minimize the delay of 

progress on the rest of the construction. The brigade actually took up residence in 

November 1984.133

With the First Brigade in place and with 90 percent of the total construction 

completed, Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd dedicated King Khalid Military City. The 

ceremony, hosted by Prince Sultan, second deputy premier as well as minister 

of Defense and Aviation, took place on 6 April 1985. By May, contractors had 

completed all of the troop facilities and housing for the Second Brigade. On 26 

June, the official presence of the Middle East Division in Hafar al Batin changed 

its status from a district to an area office. At that time, only fifteen of the forty-nine 

contractors who had worked actively in the city remained on site, with less than $250 

million of the $6 billion construction project left to complete (about 4 percent). By 

December, contractors had completed another $100 million of construction. In late 

1985, the Middle East Division awarded one of the last contracts, a renewal (Phase 

IV) of the construction support contract to Sam Whan, with the expectation that all 

construction would be completed by 1987.134

Late in 1986, contractors completed construction begun in 1982 on the Engineer 

Center and School. The U.S. architect-engineer firm of Reynolds, Smith & Hills 

of Jacksonville, Florida, had undertaken master planning for the center in March 

1976. The school, which cost a total of $106 million to build, provided the facilities 

for four hundred soldiers to train with six hundred staff and support personnel as 

combat and construction engineers for service in the Saudi Arabian Army.135

In March 1976, just as Reynolds, Smith & Hills had begun work on the master 

plan for the Engineer Center, a young U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officer, Maj. 

Dan Wilson, had made his first visit to Hafar al Batin. Only an isolated drilling rig 

marked the site in the middle of the desert. A decade and $6 billion later, the site 

supported a bustling city with a population of twenty-six thousand.136

133 Middle East Div, “Briefing Book . . . MG Ames S. Albro Jr., Director of Engineering & Construction, OCE, Visit to King Khalid Military City, Al Batin, Saudi Arabia,” 3 May 84, box 31, access. 

no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Chronology at End of Bfg Book Prepared for the Occasion of Maj Gen N. 

G. Delbridge, Dep Ch of Engrs, Visit to King Khalid Military City, Al Batin, Saudi Arabia. 134 Chronology and Bfg List, KKMC Contract Status as of 1 Apr 85, box 31, access. no. 77-92-

0001, WNRC; “King Fahd Inaugurates KKMC,” March-April 1985, and “KKMC: Then and Now,” 

May-June 1985, both in Middle East Division News; “Col. Schroder Briefing to SAD [South Atlantic 

Division],” 23 Dec 85, p. 6, unmarked box, TAD-RHA (hereafter cited as Schroder Bfg, 23 Dec 85); 

Gross, KKMC Construction Support Contract, 18 Sep 85, K-8-3, TAD-RHA. 135 Mediterranean Div Staff Mtg Min, 28 Apr 76, box 17, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Schroder 

Bfg, 23 Dec 85, p. 7; Fact Sheet, MED Projs in Saudi Arabia, 29 Mar 85, p. 2, unmarked box, TADRHA. The figures on the number of students and staff come from U.S. Congress, House, Activities of 

the United States Army Corps of Engineers in Saudi Arabia. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 

Europe and The Middle East (Lee H. Hamilton [Indiana], Chairman), of the Committee on Foreign 

Relations, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, p. 78. 136 “KKMC: Then and Now”; “Military City Costs SR18 Billion,” Arab News, 6 April 1985; Schroder Bfg, 23 Dec 85; Bfg Outline, Heiberg Bfg, “14 July 86 Transition,” unmarked box, TAD-RHA.
Changing Geopolitics in the Middle East 513

The Camp David accords of September 1978 provoked negative reactions from 

many Arab countries. The collapse of the shah’s regime and the Islamic revolution in 

Iran, the seizure of American hostages in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 

1979, and the abortive attempt to rescue them in April 1980 all undercut America’s 

prestige and the credibility of the country’s political influence and military power. 

By contrast, Soviet influence in eastern Africa and South Yemen seemed to be 

increasing and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 added to the 

restiveness felt by the United States’ Arab allies. These geopolitical factors and the 

reactions they engendered impinged on the atmosphere in which the Middle East 

Division conducted its operations. 

Just months after the signing of the Camp David accords, the commander of the 

Middle East Division, Brig. Gen. James N. Ellis, reported to the chief of engineers 

that “events of last summer and fall in the two Yemens, Somalia and, more recently, 

in Iran have greatly alarmed the SAG [Saudi Arabian government] and have 

influenced in various ways the relationship between SAG and USG [United States 

government].” Several months later, Ellis commented that he and his counterparts 

in the U.S. embassy and in the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM), 

with whom he met regularly for routine discussions, all agreed that the “special 

relationship” between the Americans and the Saudis “is not as special as it once 

was.” In another year, after the United States failed in its attempt to rescue the 

hostages in Iran, Ellis noted that members of the Saudi Arabian government were 

voicing “a low-keyed disapproval of the US action.”1

New U.S. Policy

The United States and Saudi Arabia remained close partners, but the series of 

destabilizing developments forced the U.S. government to formulate a new policy for 

the defense of its interests. The new strategy envisioned a network of air bases and 

1 Quotations from Ltrs, Ellis to Morris, 30 Jan 79, p. 2; 22 May 79, p. 1; 24 May 80, pp. 8–9; all 

in Walker box 6, Office of History (OH), HQ United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), 

Alexandria, Va.

PART IV

Changing Geopolitics in the 

Middle East
514 BrickS, Sand, and Marble

ports that would support the rapid deployment of U.S. military power.2 In October 

1979, the United States created a rapid deployment force, renamed a few months 

later the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). This task force, composed 

of U.S. military units from the four services, was at the outset essentially a planning 

staff. It organized potential deployment to forward bases from which U.S. military 

forces could move quickly to crisis points throughout the Middle East. The U.S. 

government approached pro-West states in the region to obtain a network of such 

bases. As those bases became a reality, the Middle East Division served as agent 

within its area of responsibility for the engineering and management necessary to 

prepare the facilities needed to make the force effective.3

Adjusting the Work in Saudi Arabia

The U.S. government’s relationship with Saudi Arabia, and by extension the 

Corps’ relationship, depended in a general way on the reputation of the United States 

within the region and more specifically on the credibility of the security guarantee 

that the United States could offer. The interconnectedness between geopolitics and 

the Middle East Division’s work can be seen in the Saudi Arabian reaction to the 

United States’ sponsorship of the settlement between Egypt and Israel that grew 

out of the Camp David accords and to the progressive loss of American influence 

in Iran throughout 1979. 

The Middle East Division commander, General Ellis, characterized the reactions 

of the governments in his region to U.S. policies as ranging from “mildly critical 

to outright negative.” He noted that the government of Oman was reconsidering 

whether to allow construction of U.S. facilities on its territory because South Yemen 

had linked better bilateral relations to Oman’s denying the U.S. request. Ellis also 

reported that Somalia, while indicating that it would permit U.S. facilities on its 

territory, would do so at “substantially increased costs.”4

The shifting strategic balance hastened the natural tendency among Saudi 

Arabian leaders to assert their own autonomy and to lessen their dependence on 

the United States. Having gained professional experience through their cooperation 

with the Corps, the Saudis could now handle designs and construction contracts for 

themselves. By 1981, the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) 

managed, without assistance from the Middle East Division, about three-quarters 

of the construction for the Saudi Arabian land forces. The Saudis had gained 

not just experience and proficiency in engineering and management but also the 

confidence to handle their own engineering programs. MODA’s General Directorate 

of Military Works (GDMW) played an increasingly assertive role in relations with 

the Middle East Division. In 1981, GDMW took over management of the Saudi 

Naval Expansion Program (SNEP). This assumption of responsibility for SNEP 

2 Lawrence R. Benson, “USAF Aircraft Basing in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, 

1945–1980,” 23 Apr 81, pp. 93–94, HQ U.S. Air Forces in Europe. 3 Ibid.

4 Ltr, Ellis to Morris, 24 May 80, pp. 8–9.
Changing Geopolitics in the Middle East 515

ended the independence that the Royal Saudi Navy had enjoyed in financing its own 

construction since SNEP’s inception in 1972.5

The normal progression of the major programs begun in the 1970s to modernize 

the Saudi Arabian military establishment meant that construction projects were 

approaching completion in the 1980s. This translated to a declining volume of work 

for the Middle East Division. Work for the Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF), 

which represented 33 percent of the division’s effort in 1981, was by then in its 

waning stages. Construction for King Khalid Military City (KKMC)—which 

in mid-1981 represented 61 percent of the total value of the division’s work in 

Saudi Arabia—would reach completion after mid-decade.6

 Declining oil prices in 

the early 1980s also placed the Saudi Arabian government in a tighter economic 

situation and curtailed more ambitious plans for expansion of the country’s military 

establishment.

The change in U.S. security policy in the region, the growing assertiveness of 

the Saudi leaders responsible for military engineering, tighter Saudi budgets, and the 

culmination of the construction program in Saudi Arabia all combined to reshape the 

Middle East Division’s plans for the 1980s. The division had to staff the growing 

demands of newer programs in countries neighboring Saudi Arabia, balancing 

this effort against the need to reduce over the coming years the dimensions of its 

activities within Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the division had to preserve the 

good working relationship with the Saudi Arabian government that had developed 

under the Engineer Assistance Agreement (EAA).

Iran-Iraq War

The Islamic revolution in Iran created an opportunity for its neighbor, Iraq, to 

press old claims to disputed territory that controlled Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf. 

The revolution appeared to have weakened Iran militarily; and Saddam Hussein, 

who ascended to the presidency of Iraq in 1979, reopened claims to the territory. 

After a series of skirmishes along the border, Iraq launched an attack on Iran in late 

1980. The resulting conflict continued for eight years.7

The administration of Ronald Reagan, who succeeded Jimmy Carter as president 

in January 1981, extended the U.S. policy more ambitiously in an effort to check 

the apparent destabilization of the region exemplified by Soviet fighting against 

rebel forces in Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War. The administration gave public 

guarantees to protect Saudi Arabia and put more money and muscle into the rapid 

5 Albro, “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,” Informal Bfg on 

22 Jul 81, p. 3, Current Files, Transatlantic Division–Public Affairs Office; Interv, Frank N. Schubert 

with Maj Gen Ames S. Albro Jr., 5 Jun 84, pp. 131–32; Ltr, Albro to Bratton, 12 Aug 81, p. 1, Walker 

box 6, OH, HQ USACE. 6 Albro, “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,” pp. 4–5.

7 The discussion of regional geopolitics in this section is indebted to Frank N. Schubert and Theresa 

L. Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War: The United States Army Operations in Desert Shield and Desert

Storm (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1995). 
516 BrickS, Sand, and Marble

deployment initiative, including building support facilities in Morocco, the Azores, 

and on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, as well as bases on the Arabian 

Peninsula for which the Corps of Engineers was responsible. The Department of 

Defense heightened the profile of the rapid deployment force itself and assigned 

troops to fill it out. On 1 January 1983, the force became the U.S. Central Command 

responsible for operations in Southwest Asia and northern Africa and one of six U.S. 

multiservice commands. One of the cornerstones of the command’s approach to the 

politics of the region was emphasis on supporting friendly nations and strengthening 

their military establishments through training, arms sales, and close military contact 

including joint maneuvers. The assertion of strength had a reassuring effect.

Collapse of Bipolar Geopolitics

The Iran-Iraq War ended in August 1988 with both countries exhausted, a situation that brought no improvement in the stability of the region. The last months of 

the war had been concurrent with portentous changes in Europe that had far-reaching 

implications for the Cold War. In December 1987, the United States and the Soviet 

Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Six months later, the 

two superpowers began to withdraw missiles from Europe.8

 In December 1988, 

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced his plan to reduce Soviet forces 

in Eastern Europe by five hundred thousand. The following April, he stated that 

the Soviet Union would pull its tanks out of Hungary. The removal of the Soviet 

military presence emboldened the Hungarian government to remove the barbed-wire 

fencing along its border with Austria. This opened an avenue of migration for East 

Germans. Whereas they could readily receive visas to travel to other Eastern bloc 

countries but not to the West, they could now move through Czechoslovakia and 

Hungary to Austria. From there they could migrate into West Germany, where they 

had rights of citizenship and social support under West German law. Through the 

summer of 1989, a trickle—and then a torrent—of East Germans followed this path 

to West Germany.

In early October 1989, East Germans began demonstrating internally in East 

Berlin, Dresden, and Leipzig to demand greater freedom. A month later, on 9 

November, the East German government admitted that it could no longer contain 

its people and opened all border points with West Germany, including the Berlin 

Wall. The Communist parties rapidly lost control in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, 

Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Rumania. In the face of the rapid disintegration 

of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, the four powers that had remained in Berlin 

since the end of World War II agreed to withdraw their forces from the city. This 

collapse of the bipolar rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States in 

Central Europe allowed East and West Germany to reunite on 3 October 1990. 

While the monumental change in the balance of power in Germany reduced 

the threat of a superpower confrontation, it did little to stabilize the politics of the 

8 Jim Hoagland, “Europe’s Destiny,” Foreign Affairs (1990): 40.
Changing Geopolitics in the Middle East 517

Middle East. One of the precipitating factors in the collapse of the Soviet Union’s 

control over Eastern Europe was its long and costly engagement in the civil war in 

Afghanistan—the Soviet Union’s Vietnam. After a decade of trying to shore up a 

friendly satellite government, the Soviet Union abandoned the effort. Between April 

1988 and January 1989, all Soviet troops withdrew. In spite of this, the Middle East 

remained as volatile as ever.

Iraq’s Attack on Kuwait

Although Iraq’s economy was in a shambles after its long war with Iran, 

Saddam Hussein had a formidable military force that had sustained combat for 

nearly a decade. Both the United States and Kuwait had supported Iraq in its war 

against Iran, and both continued their support after the cessation of hostilities. To 

Iraq, the dependence was a source of bitterness and resentment that tended to focus 

on Kuwait, a wealthy but smaller and vulnerable neighbor. Iraq had disputes with 

Kuwait, just as it had with Iran, over territory at the headwaters of the Persian Gulf. 

In the months after the end of fighting with Iran, Iraq applied increasing pressure 

on Kuwait. In October 1989, the United States warned that it would defend its vital 

interest in the region by force if necessary; but Iraq continued to pressure Kuwait by 

massing troops at the common border. On 2 August 1990, Iraq launched an attack 

across Kuwait that carried its forces to the border with Saudi Arabia and declared 

that Kuwait no longer existed. The invasion galvanized the United States to form 

a worldwide coalition of powers that began military preparations for the liberation 

of Kuwait.9

These events formed the framework in which the Corps of Engineers pursued 

its mission in Saudi Arabia and in neighboring countries during the 1980s. The 

Middle East Division opened the decade with a substantial construction program 

to complete in Saudi Arabia but with growing interests in other countries (Chapter 

14). By mid-decade, the Middle East Division ceded place to a smaller, district-level 

entity called the Middle East/Africa Projects Office (Chapter 15). The 1990s, which 

opened with the Iraqi attack on Kuwait and the resultant Gulf War, saw still another 

organizational adjustment of the Corps presence in the region.

9 Schubert and Kraus, Whirlwind War, and Peter Hayes, ed., Foreign AffairsChronology, 1978–1989

(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Inc., 1990), provide the basis for this account.

Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 519

When the United States’ relationship with Iran deteriorated in 1979, the nation 

launched new diplomatic initiatives in and around the Arabian Peninsula. The strategy 

aimed to establish a network of support bases for U.S. military forces to use in the 

event of any crisis that threatened American interests or allies in the region. Through 

diplomatic efforts, the United States persuaded several countries to grant wartime use of 

bases: Berbera in Somalia, Mombasa in Kenya, and Ras Banas in Egypt.1

 On the Arabian 

Peninsula itself, the United States continued its enormous construction effort in Saudi 

Arabia; but it also strengthened and expanded its ties to Saudi Arabia’s neighboring 

states of Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan. (See Map 23.) A part of this overall 

strategy involved the Corps of Engineers and its ability to translate diplomatic bonds 

into operational military installations, either to strengthen the military establishments of 

friendly nations or to support directly the military forces of the United States.

The efforts of the Middle East Division reflected this shift in U.S. diplomatic 

and military strategy. The work in Saudi Arabia continued to dominate the division’s 

efforts, but the growing importance of developing relations with other states in the 

region occupied an increasing share of the division’s attention. Indeed, since the work 

in Saudi Arabia would peak in 1983–1984 and decline thereafter, work outside of 

Saudi Arabia held more promise for the division’s longer-range involvement in the 

region. The dominant motif in the story of the Army engineers in the Middle East 

during the 1980s is one of adjustment to the changing balance of these interests.

The Middle East Division in the Region

The division’s work had never been confined exclusively to Saudi Arabia; and as 

work in that country reached and passed its apogee, the division continued to manage 

projects elsewhere. Some of that work had passed from the Mediterranean Division to 

the Middle East Division in 1976. Other parts of the division’s work arose from the 

changing balance of forces and interests in the area. In Jordan and Kuwait, the Corps 

undertook construction programs in the early 1970s paid for by the host governments 

with funds handled through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case procedures.

1 Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War: The United States Army 

in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 1995), p. 15.

14

Reorienting the Engineer Effort 

1981–1986
520 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Jordan

The Corps of Engineers’ role in Jordan originated in 1972 when U.S. military 

advisers identified a need for an armor-rebuild center located somewhere in the 

Middle East region. Jordan’s position between Israel on its west, Syria to the 

north, and Saudi Arabia to the east and south made it strategically important in the 

P

E

R

S I A

N

G

U L F

G U L F O F O M A N

THAMARĪT

AS SĪB

KHAŞAB

SHAIKH ISA AIR BASE

AL MANĀMAH

MAŞĪRAH

ALI AL SALEM

AIR BASE

AL MUBARAK AIR BASE

AHMED AL JABER AIR BASE

MUSCAT

RIYADH

I R A Q

IRAN

OMAN

Q A T A R

BAHRAIN

KUWAIT

O

M

A

N

UNITED ARAB

EMIRA TES

PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN YEMEN AR A B

R EPUBLIC

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

PERSIAN GULF AREA

MIDDLE EAST DIVISION 

1980s

Air Force Facility

Naval Facility

0

0 200 Miles

200 Kilometers

Map 23
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 521

politics of the region. The exact origins of the idea of the armor-rebuild center, the 

evolution, and the anticipated uses of the facility remain obscure; but studies by the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff seem to have prompted plans for a center capable of servicing 

the major types of American and British armored vehicles in use by several Arab 

states. Existing facilities permitted only routine field-level maintenance at best. For 

complete overhaul or other depot-level maintenance, vehicles had to be returned to 

the suppliers in Europe and the United States.2

The principal function of the proposed armor-rebuild center would be to convert 

American-made M48A1 tanks owned and operated by the Jordanian Armed Forces 

(JAF) to the later model, M48A5. The work involved complete disassembly, modification, and reassembly of several hundred tanks, tasks that no existing facility in the 

area could perform. In addition to the conversion, a depot-level rebuild facility could 

undertake the routine maintenance for tanks, armored personnel carriers, armored 

cars, artillery, and light vehicles impossible with only field-level maintenance.3

Consultation with U.S. military advisers led the Jordanian government to dispatch 

a team of JAF representatives on a six-month inspection tour of the U.S. Army’s M48 

tank depot at Anniston, Alabama. Before definitive plans developed, the Yom Kippur 

War of October 1973 broke out, disrupting all such ventures. The parties returned to 

the idea in 1974, when the Jordanian government asked for assistance in planning 

construction to support its armored units. Conversations began between the Military 

Assistance Program (MAP) office in Amman, Jordan, and the U.S. Army Materiel 

Command (AMC). When AMC indicated in January 1975 that it could not staff the 

project that Jordanian officials had outlined, the Department of the Army assigned 

responsibility for most of the project to the Corps of Engineers. Discussions in March 

and April among members of the Jordanian Armed Forces, the U.S. State and Defense 

Departments, and the Corps of Engineers led to an agreement that the Corps would 

be responsible for design and management of a construction contract awarded by the 

Jordanian government. The Jordanian Armed Forces would bear all costs.4

On 24 April 1975, the Jordanian Armed Forces signed the initial FMS case of 

$500,000 for planning and design of the facility. Almost simultaneously, the U.S. 

and Jordanian governments signed a technical agreement regarding assistance from 

the Corps of Engineers in design and construction of the armor-rebuild facility. The 

Corps’ Mediterranean Division assumed responsibility for the entire project. The 

division sent a study team to Jordan that came away convinced that the Jordanians 

had a clear idea of what they wanted but concerned that their $15 million estimate 

of the cost diverged substantially from the team’s own estimate of $80 million to 

$100 million. Nonetheless, the project continued to develop.5

2 James A. Kitchens III, A History of the Huntsville Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

1967–1976 (Huntsville, Ala.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1978), p. 157. 3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE), “Annual Report of Major Activities, Jul. 1, 1974–Jun. 

30, 1975,” pp. 56–58, Office of History (OH), HQ United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), 

Alexandria, Va. (hereafter cited as OCE, Major Activities, FY 1975).
522 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Design of the facility involved frequent interaction with American 

architect-engineer firms and vendors over a period of several years. Therefore, the 

Mediterranean Division, with its headquarters in Livorno, Italy, requested assistance 

from the Corps’ Huntsville Division in Alabama in procuring equipment. In early 

November 1975, Huntsville awarded a design contract to Giffels Associates Inc. 

of Detroit, Michigan, for a preliminary design, which the company completed the 

following June.6

 A year later, in July 1977, Jordan signed a $3 million sales case 

for final design of the facility and development of equipment lists. Huntsville then 

arranged with Giffels to add the final design as a modification of the existing contract. 

In June 1978, personnel from the Jordanian Armed Forces met with representatives 

from Giffels and the Huntsville Division to review the design, which was 90 percent 

complete.7

While Giffels worked on the final design in late 1977, the recently activated 

Middle East Division began planning for a field office in Jordan to manage construction. The parties subsequently revised the 1975 agreement to clarify the role of the 

U.S. contracting officer as an agent of the Jordanian Armed Forces, to allow the 

use of Jordanian contracting procedures, and to name the Middle East (rather than 

the Mediterranean) Division as the responsible agency.8

In April 1978, representatives of the Middle East Division, the Military 

Assistance Program Jordan, and the Jordanian Armed Forces met in the U.S. embassy 

in Amman to discuss the armor-rebuild facility. With design nearly completed, the 

Corps wanted to gather data for planning the next phase, construction management. 

The participants in the meeting discussed options for the Corps’ involvement in 

the construction and briefly discussed costs involved in maintaining a field office. 

The Jordanians urged that the Corps staff the organization with a nucleus of its 

personnel supported by JAF technicians. Because Jordan did not appear to have 

sufficient funding for construction, the participants also considered other nations 

to provide the money. Corps personnel then met with the U.S. embassy to discuss 

possible support arrangements.9

Seven years after discussions of the project began, in May 1979 Middle East 

Division representatives met with Jordanian officials to prepare terms for an FMS 

6 Ibid., pp. 157–58; OCE, Major Activities, FY 1975, pp. 37, 56; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 

1 May 76, p. 28, box 1, access. no. 77-92-0001, Washington National Records Center (WNRC), 

Suitland, Md.; “Technical Agreement Concerning Assistance by USACE in Designing and Constructing an Armor Rebuild Facility for the Government of Jordan,” Apr 75, J-10-4, Jordan, Transatlantic 

Division–Records Holding Area (TAD-RHA); Williams to Gribble, 18 Mar 74, p. 3, and 16 Dec 74, 

p. 2, box 26, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Memo, Wiles, 22 Mar 74, sub: Trip Report—Visit to 

Jordan 12–15 Mar 74, pp. 1–3, box 19, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC. 7 OCE, “Annual Historical Review, Oct. 1, 1976–Sept. 30, 1977,” OH, HQ USACE (hereafter 

cited as OCE, AHR, FY 1977); “Armor Rebuild Depot Underway in Jordan,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, 

November-December 1981. 8 Memo, Wells, 19 Dec 77, sub: Proposed Changes to Jordanian Technical Agreement for the 

Armor Rebuild Facility, J-10-4, TAD-RHA. 9 MFR, Bennett, 8 May 78, sub: Coordination Trip, Armor Rebuild Facility, Amman, Jordan—23–25 

Apr 78, E-7-4, TAD-RHA.
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 523

case to cover the Corps’ limited construction management role in building the 

armor-rebuild facility. Based on those meetings, Brig. Gen. James N. Ellis, the 

division commander, delivered a $2.75 million sales case to the Jordanian Army 

on 22 July. The next day, when Ellis met with JAF officials to discuss the case, the 

Jordanians asked for more time to study the proposal. The issue of cost, identified by 

the Corps team in 1974, reemerged. The Jordanians found the price too high, so Ellis 

explained the cost factors and promised to provide a more detailed account later. He 

also assured the Jordanians that the Middle East Division personnel in Jordan would 

work for the contracting officer, who would be a JAF official. Months of delicate 

and extended negotiations ensued. On 20 October, only ten days before the sales 

case expired, the Jordanian Armed Forces signed the FMS case for construction 

management with few changes.10

In September 1979, the Middle East Division activated an area office in 

Amman. Although under the supervision of division headquarters in Riyadh, the 

small contingent of Middle East Division employees, with a proposed staff of two 

10 Ellis to Maj Gen Abdul-Hadi Al Majali, 22 Jul 79, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE; Msg, Ellis, 

22 Aug 79, sub: Jordan Armor Rebuild Facility, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE; U.S. Department of 

Defense, “Offer and Acceptance to the Govt of Jordan,” 1 Jul 79, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; MFR, 

Ellis, 23 Jul 79, sub: Meeting with MG Majali, Chief of Staff, JAF [Jordan Armed Forces], on FMS 

[Foreign Military Sales] Case JO-B-HAD (Corps Construction Management Services), unmarked box, 

OH, HQ USACE; Ellis to Col Alfred B. Prados, 30 Oct 79, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE.

Building no. 1 of the armor-rebuild facility in Jordan, October 1982
524 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

military officers and twelve civilians, received life-support services from the U.S. 

embassy in Jordan. The Huntsville Division remained involved, signing a separate 

sales case with Jordan in December 1979 to cover procurement of equipment and, 

commencing the following February, procuring over one thousand seven hundred 

items of industrial equipment and machinery to be furnished for the rebuild plant 

by the U.S. government. An additional two thousand four hundred items brought 

the total procurement program to about $10 million. Huntsville awarded an $80,000 

contract to William H. Muller Shipping Corporation to transport the governmentfurnished materials to Jordan. In June 1981, Huntsville engaged another contractor, 

Dynetics Inc., to supply the Jordanian Armed Forces with a management plan for 

initial startup and operation of the facility.11

In the spring of 1980, the Jordanian Armed Forces awarded a construction 

contract worth nearly $40 million to John Laing International of London. The 

contract, with an estimated completion date of October 1982, included installation 

of government-furnished equipment procured in the United States and involved the 

construction of facilities capable of rebuilding tracked vehicles and armored equipment with an output of about eighty tanks per year. The contract called for a complex 

of eleven major buildings and four warehouses in Zarqa, northeast of Amman, 

to include an industrial workshop, two large warehouses, several administrative 

office buildings, utilities, roads, and other support facilities. The complex had the 

capability to rebuild both U.S. and third-country tracked equipment then in use in 

the Jordanian Army. The project was patterned after the Anniston Army Depot, 

where Jordanian personnel received training.12

Although construction of the facility fell slightly behind schedule in 1981 and 

1982, by the end of 1983, the Corps’ support for what became a $43 million facility 

was essentially complete. In August 1984, the Middle East Division closed its area 

office in Jordan. In 1985, the Jordanian Armed Forces again requested that the 

Middle East Division provide assistance in obtaining post-construction warranty 

services. Because sufficient funds remained on the sales case, the division was able 

to provide this assistance.13

11 “Middle East Division Reorganization Ceremony: Leaders in Customer Care,” 30 Sep 86, 

unmarked box, TAD-RHA (hereafter cited as Middle East Div Reorg Ceremony); Memorandum of 

Agreement (MOA), Ofc of the Area Engr and U.S. Mil Assistance Program Ofc, 10 Dec 81, signed 

by Col Alfred B. Prados and Richard A. Carr, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; “Armor Rebuild Depot 

Underway in Jordan”; Louise S. Heidish, History of the Huntsville Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1977–1981 Update (Huntsville, Ala.: U.S. Army Engineer Division, Huntsville, ca. 1986), 

pp. 26–27; “Armor Rebuild Depot Underway in Jordan.” 12 “JARF,” n.d., handwritten notes, J-10-4, Jordan, TAD-RHA; Ellis to Morris, 24 May 80, Walker 

box 6, OH HQ USACE; “Armor Rebuild Depot Underway in Jordan”; Albro, “House Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,” Informal Bfg on 22 Jul 81, p. 3, Current Files, Transatlantic Division–Public Affairs Office. The preceding sources conflict on the actual date of award, 

ranging from March to April 1980. Heidish, History of the Huntsville Division. 13 Albro to Bratton, 12 Aug 81; Cristobal S. Berry-Caban, Kathryn C. Bruce, and Ralph Dezell, 

“Annual Historical Review,” OCE, FY 1983, box 9A, Gen Files, OH, HQ USACE; “Col. Schroder 

Briefing to SAD [Saudi Arabia District],” 23 Dec 85, unmarked box, TAD-RHA (hereafter cited as 
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 525

Oman

The sultanate of Oman became one of the keys to the new military strategy 

the United States pursued in the Middle East after the collapse of the U.S.-Iran 

relationship. In 1980, the United States secured an agreement with Oman that made 

it the only state in the Arabian Peninsula to permit an effective American combat 

presence on its territory during peacetime.14 The agreement involved building and 

improving military facilities for the sultanate as well as for the United States. The 

Middle East Division became the executor of a $300 million construction program 

at four sites in Oman: Khasab, Seeb, Thamarit, and Masirah Island. Oman would 

own and use the facilities; but they would be available, with approval from the 

sultan, for use during emergencies by U.S. troops operating as part of the Rapid 

Deployment Joint Task Force.15

On the southeastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, Oman borders Saudi Arabia 

and the United Arab Emirates to the west and Yemen to the south. The Arabian 

Sea washes Oman’s eastern coast, and a narrow passage of the Strait of Hormuz to 

the north separates Oman from Iran. Oman’s one hundred fifteen thousand eight 

hundred square miles (slightly larger than Arizona) contain a variety of terrain, 

including stony plains, sand dunes, a central plateau, jagged mountains rising to 

almost ten thousand feet in height, and nearly one thousand two hundred fifty miles 

of coastline. The country had a population of about 2 million in 1980. Sultan Qaboos 

bin Said, who ascended the throne in July 1970, began to modernize his country 

by seeking to improve infrastructure, healthcare, and education. Qaboos expanded 

Oman’s diplomatic relations and joined the United Nations, the Arab League, and 

many other international organizations. The expanded relationship with the United 

States and the military construction program in Oman was part of Qaboos’ efforts 

to improve and strengthen the country’s international position.16

On 30 April 1980, the U.S. and Omani governments signed a country-to-country 

agreement in preparation for the construction program. In June, an engineering 

inspection team made an initial visit to Oman. At the same time, Middle East 

Division representatives joined personnel from an Oman Construction Advisory 

Team (OCAT) organized by the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) to 

establish contacts with Omani officials in the country’s capital city, Muscat. The 

division’s rear headquarters then began planning a new area office to manage the 

construction. Both the U.S. State Department and the United States Air Force 

(USAF) wanted to begin construction in Oman quickly to demonstrate the United 

Schroder Bfg, 23 Dec 85); Middle East Div Reorg Ceremony; Memo, Larry C. Graham, 18 Dec 85, 

sub: Additional MED Support on FMS Case JO-HAD, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 14 Schubert and Kraus, Whirlwind War, p. 15. 15 “Briefing for Major General Richard Wells, Deputy Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, and Party, 

13–15 Jul 84,” p. 4, box SA 1176, TAD-RHA (hereafter cited as Wells Bfg, 13–15 Jul 84); Lawrence 

R. Benson, “USAF Aircraft Basing in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, 1945–1980,” 23 

Apr 81, pp. 93–94, HQ U.S. Air Forces in Europe. 16 Oman ’91 (Sultanate of Oman: Ministry of Information, 1991).
526 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

States’ commitment to the program. The Air Force chose to upgrade an airstrip at 

Khasab first and then to develop facilities on Masirah Island.17

In November 1980, the Air Force officially designated USAFE the host command 

for the bases in Egypt and Oman. USAFE also acted as the program manager in 

Oman for planning and programming of military construction, while the Middle 

East Division served as the agent for design and construction. The Department of 

Defense established the Military Construction and Program Management Office in 

Muscat to provide overall management of the program under general guidance from 

the U.S. embassy. The Construction and Program Management Office consisted of 

one representative each from USAFE and the Middle East Division and acted as a 

liaison to the Omani Ministry of Defense and to U.S. Department of Defense.18

The construction program in Oman was complex because of the variety of 

facilities needed, the compressed schedule, and the remote location. To expedite the 

work, the Corps of Engineers’ headquarters asked the Middle East Division (Rear) 

in Winchester, Virginia, to develop alternatives to standard contracting procedures. 

The alternative recommended by the rear headquarters was partial design followed 

by a fixed-price design/construct contract for the Masirah Air Base.Corps and Air 

Force personnel spent the end of 1980 engaged in intensive discussions with Omani 

officials about the construction program. In December, Corps of Engineers Capt. 

Paul T. Gard traveled to Oman to establish an area office. To house the initial staff 

of four, he leased a four-bedroom villa near Muscat for $4,000 a month.19

About the time that the Corps appointed Gard as area engineer for Oman, the 

Department of Defense issued the “Preliminary Plan of Proposed Construction 

for the Sultanate of Oman,” with a current working estimate of $209.6 million. 

On 16 December 1980, the advisory team made a formal presentation of the 

program to the Omani government. All sides agreed in principle on the facilities 

and their locations at the four sites. The construction at Khasab was limited 

primarily to improving the runway. The facilities at the other sites fell into four 

general categories: (1) operational facilities, such as runways, taxiways, aprons, 

aircraft shelters, fuel hydrant systems, and maintenance buildings; (2) utility 

improvements for water and power; (3) storage facilities for fuel, liquid oxygen, 

17 Wells Bfg, 13–15 Jul 84, p. 5; “Middle East Division (Rear) 1980 Historical Summary Report,” 

attached to Memo, Rousseau, 1 Apr 81, E-6-4, TAD-RHA; Draft Memo, 4 Nov 80, sub: Oman Construction Program, W-4-9, TAD-RHA; MFR, Albro, 1 Nov 80, sub: Record of Several Discussions 

with Col. Hall and Mr. Lee Garrett on 30 & 31 October, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE. 18 Fact Sheet, CENTCOM Prog, Sultanate of Oman, 6 Apr 84, in Fact Sheets, Brig Gen George 

R. Robertson, Middle East Division (Rear) Bfgs, 9–12 Apr 84, E-1-1, TAD-RHA, copy in R&D File 

3151, TAC (hereafter cited as Robertson Bfgs); Telex, SECDEF, 12 Sep 81, sub: Establishment of 

MILCON Management Office, W-4-9, TAD-RHA; Fact Sheet, RDF Prog, Sultanate of Oman, 19 Jan 

84, p. 1, with attachments, box SA-1176, TAD-RHA. 19 Memo, G. A. Yager, 9 Dec 80, sub: Prequalification of Proposers for Projects in Egypt and 

Oman, W-4-9, TAD-RHA; Draft Ltr, Hall, 24 Dec 80, sub: Expediting Construction in Oman, W-4-9, 

TAD-RHA; Fact Sheet, Discussion of Work in Oman, 31 Dec 80, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; 

Middle East Div Reorg Ceremony.
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 527

ammunition, and general supplies; and (4) personnel support such as dormitories, 

dining halls, and latrines.20

The Omanis requested that the Corps integrate all new facilities with those 

already at the bases and that separate U.S. facilities be “downplayed.” In negotiating 

the financial arrangements, the Omanis pointed out that U.S. requirements imposed 

the need for new utilities systems at the sites. To share the overall costs, the Omanis 

agreed to help finance the lengthening of the runway at Khasab. The Department of 

Defense, bound by congressional mandate, initiated an American Preference Policy 

which essentially restricted to U.S. firms competition for prime construction contracts 

in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas. Design work was to be completely 

American, and construction contracts over $5 million were to be awarded to U.S. 

firms or to joint ventures between U.S. and Omani companies. U.S. companies had 

to furnish all supplies except cement products and aggregate, and American-flagged 

vessels had to carry all materials. Because only two American transport companies 

shipped directly to Oman, this requirement caused problems for the construction 

contractors. The limited number of shippers, Oman’s monsoon season, severe winter 

storms on America’s east coast, and the relatively small size of the cargo destined 

20 Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Defense [MOD], “Preliminary Plan of Proposed Construction,” 

Dec 80, box 5; Rcd of Discussions with USAF and Corps of Engrs at HQ SOAF [Sultan of Oman Air 

Force] on 16 and 17 Dec 80, [Dec 80], box 4; Draft Exec Sum, Oman Construction Advisory Team 

(OCAT), Jan 81, box 5; all in W-4-9, TAD-RHA. See also Schroder Bfg, 23 Dec 85.

Corps of Engineers villa, Muscat, October 1982
528 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

for Oman all combined to produce scheduling problems, increased costs, and 

construction delays. The construction contractors purchased most of their cement, 

exempt from the “Buy American” policy, from neighboring United Arab Emirates 

and later from new Omani cement plants.21

By February 1981, officials from the Omani Ministry of Defense, USAFE, and 

the Corps of Engineers endorsed an addendum to the formal governmental agreement 

that incorporated the Omani requirements. These “Processes and Procedures” 

stipulated that contractors bidding on the projects had to register to work in Oman, 

that the evaluation of bidders would consider the firms’ degree of compliance with 

Omani laws and regulations, and that Omani officials would participate in opening 

and evaluating bids.22

The supplemental agreement also specified several contracting procedures. 

The document reiterated the Corps’ decision to prequalify construction contractors, 

subject to approval by the Omani government. It incorporated the U.S. insistence that 

firms be limited to U.S. or joint U.S./Omani concerns. This insistence was tempered 

by a provision that the Corps agreed to encourage the use of Omani subcontractors 

as much as possible. The Omani government provided land, easements, and rights 

of way for construction and support facilities. Except for the small portion of the 

Khasab runway, the United States agreed to bear all construction costs.

On 17 September 1981, the Corps and the Air Force signed a memorandum of 

understanding explaining that statutes and regulations used for military construction 

programs would govern the design and construction of the Omani facilities. Under 

terms of the agreement, USAFE would establish design criteria and standards, the 

Corps would manage the design and construction, and the Middle East Division 

would establish a resident office at each construction site to give instructions to the 

contractors. The division also provided housing, office space, and other support to 

the USAFE officer serving in Oman as the Air Force regional civil engineer.23

Design for the Oman Program

In mid-December 1980, division personnel briefed contractors interested in 

prequalifying for the mobilization camp at Masirah Island and for work on the 

21 Memo, Robert A. Stone, 23 Sep 82, sub: American Preference Policy, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; 

“MED Receives Oman Mission,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, January-February 1981; “Part B—Discussions 

with the SOAF on the Construction Plan,” 16 Dec 80 [handwritten], box 1, W-4-9, TAD-RHA; MFR, 

Wiles, 14 Jan 81, sub: Discussions with the SOAF on the Construction Plan, box 5, W-4-9, TAD-RHA; 

Intervs, Frank N. Schubert with Lt Col James Andrews, 21 Jun 82, pp. 1–3b, and John T. Greenwood 

with Col Pat Stevens IV, 13 Aug 85, p. 36. 22 For this and the following paragraph, see MFR, Hall, 16 Dec 80, sub: Meeting with Omani 

Officials, Al Gubra Guest House, 16 December 1980, box 5, W-4-9, TAD-RHA; “Processes and Procedures Concerning the Design and Construction of Improved Facilities in the Sultanate of Oman for 

the Joint Use of the United States Department of Defense and the Ministry of Defense of the Sultanate 

of Oman,” signed by Col Salim Abdullah Al-Ghazali on 21 Dec 80, by Brig Gen Ames S. Albro Jr. 

on 1 Feb 81, and by Brig Gen Sheldon J. Lustig on 20 Jan 81, box 4, W-4-9, TAD-RHA. 23 MOU, HQ USAFE and Middle East Div, Corps of Engrs [Sep 81], sub: Providing for Technical 

Services for Upgrade/Construction of Various Facilities in Oman, box 1, W-4-9, TAD-RHA.
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 529

airstrip at Khasab. The division’s team then issued a request for proposals for 

the mobilization camp. In early January, division personnel approached Stanley 

Consultants of Muscatine, Iowa, to expedite the design for the program in Oman. 

Roger Thomas, who had just completed procurement work for the King Abdulaziz 

Military Academy project in Saudi Arabia; Anthony DiSalvo, another engineer 

from the division office in Virginia; and several Air Force representatives traveled 

to Muscatine for a predesign conference. They discussed the design requirements, 

the scope, and the criteria for all facilities except for Khasab, which the division 

planned to design in house. USAFE wanted the design to conform to the NATO 

criteria of austerity to enhance possible future NATO involvement in the Rapid 

Deployment Joint Task Force being organized by the United States.24

On 10 January 1981, the Corps awarded to Stanley Consultants a letter contract 

authorizing the firm to proceed with up to $400,000 of design work for the Masirah 

Island facilities. Stanley agreed to deliver complete design for facilities programmed 

for FYs 1981 and 1982 by 15 April. Stanley prepared four categories of design for 

the facilities: complete design, turnkey, design/build, and site adaptable. Following 

negotiations in February, the division awarded Stanley a design contract for $2 

million, a figure below the government estimate. Ultimately, Stanley Consultants 

would perform the design for nearly all of the projects built in Oman except the 

improvements at the Khasab airstrip.25

Masirah Island Construction

Moved by the U.S. government’s concerns over the international situation, the 

Corps pushed to award a contract to build the mobilization camp for the construction 

contractor’s staff on Masirah Island before the monsoon of 1981 began. The first 

package designed and built in Oman was the workers camp on Masirah Island, 

situated ten to fifteen miles off the eastern coast of Oman in the Arabian Sea. The 

island has low-lying, sandy topography and is about forty miles long and ten miles 

wide. In 1981, the relatively treeless island boasted a “pristine” environment and 

abundant wildlife, including gazelles, donkeys, birds, and turtles. Because of its 

lack of development, contractors had to use barges to transport materials to the 

construction site.26

24 MFR, Henry, 18 Dec 80, sub: Prequalification of Proposers for Mobilization Facilities, Masirah 

and Airstrip, Khasab, box 5, W-4-9, TAD-RHA; “Middle East Division (Rear) 1980 Historical 

Summary Report”; Draft Exec Sum, Jan 81; MFR, Anthony W. DiSalvo, 7 Jan 81, sub: Predesign 

Conference Meeting Between the COE, Air Force, and Stanley Consultants Inc. on Design Criteria, 

Requirements, and Siting for Facilities to be Constructed in Oman, box 1, W-4-9, TAD-RHA; Memo, 

Wiles, 21 Nov 80, sub: A-E Selection, Oman RDF, box 1, W-4-9, TAD-RHA; Interv, Moorhus with 

Roger Thomas, 27 Aug 96, pp. 25–26. 25 DiSalvo, Fact Sheet, Indian Ocean Prog—Oman, Masirah Air Base, Masirah Island, 14 Jan 

81, box 1, W-4-9, TAD-RHA; Fact Sheet, Middle East Div Oman Proj, 22 Sep 82, unmarked box, 

W-4-9, TAD-RHA; Msg, Kramer/Thomas to Albro, 2 Feb 81, sub: Status Report—Masirah Island, 

unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE. 26 MFR, Albro, 1 Nov 80; Interv, Schubert with Andrews, 21 Jun 82, p. 8; Interv, Moorhus with 

Col (Ret) Claude D. Boyd III, 9 Nov 95, p. 25. Boyd notes the abundance of whales and turtles sur-
530 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

On 28 February, the Middle East Division awarded a $3.5 million contract 

for a 75-person mobilization camp to Taylor Woodrow–Towell, a British-Omani 

joint venture. During 1981, this venture placed eighty-five housing units purchased 

from International Shelters Systems and Cliff Industries, Inc. The camp consisted 

of prefabricated, assembled, and furnished units that were selected for reasons of 

economy and speed and ease of construction. The contract company completed the 

camp in early December, only slightly behind schedule. On 10 December, 15 Corps 

field personnel, 20 staff members from the follow-on construction contractor, and 

40 transient or contract laborers took up residence. In addition to housing, the camp 

included office space, dining facilities, and a laundry.27

Well before work started on the mobilization camp, the Corps began planning 

for the permanent facilities on Masirah Island. In mid-January 1981, the Middle 

East Division announced its interest in prequalifying firms for a fixed-price contract 

for the Masirah Island construction. The construction site was at a former British 

airfield on the northern end of the island. Construction included improvements to 

utilities such as water, power, and sewage treatment plants; extension and paving 

of runways and taxiways; and installation of lighting. The construction plan called 

for an instrument landing system and a new parking apron with a hydrant refueling 

system, new aircraft shelters, maintenance buildings, an administrative headquarters, 

a 150-person dormitory, and a dining hall. The air base needed new storage facilities 

for fuel, ammunition, water, and general use, as well as a system of connecting access 

roads.28 As with the other Omani projects, the pattern of congressional funding 

compelled the Corps to organize contracting for the facilities at Masirah Air Base 

into several packages to be awarded over a number of fiscal years.

On 15 April, Stanley Consultants completed the basic design for the construction 

slated for FYs 1981 and 1982. In September, the division awarded a $67 million 

construction contract to Dillingham Construction International Corporation, which 

later joined forces with an Omani partner, Towell. The following February, the division 

exercised the option for FY 1982 and added a $30 million modification to the existing 

contract, bringing the combined program total to nearly $100 million. To provide a 

quick start on substantial construction, Stanley had produced only rudimentary designs 

for the Masirah Island facilities. To complete the designs as construction progressed, 

rounding Masirah Island. “Masirah, Copied from an Original Written by an Unknown Member of the 

Royal Air Force in 1977,” 2 Apr 83, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 27 Msg no. 270, 2 Dec 81, sub: Weekly Status Report—Oman Area Office, box 1 of 8, W-4-9, 

TAD-RHA; Wells Bfg, 13–15 Jul 84; Fact Sheet, RDF Prog, Sultanate of Oman, 19 Jan 84, pp. 6–7, 

with attachments, box 1 of 8, W-4-9, TAD-RHA; Memo, Jack D. Stewart, 30 Jun 81, sub: Plant Inspections of Mobilization Living Units, Contract DACA 78-81-C-0098, Misirah [sic] Island, Oman, box 

5/8, W-4-9, TAD-RHA; Interv, Schubert with Andrews, 21 Jun 82, pp. 7–8; Draft Bfg, Albro, 16 Jun 

81, sub: House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, pp. 10–11, unmarked 

box, TAD-RHA; Handwritten Notes, “Execution of Design and Construction for Facilities To Be 

Constructed in the Sultanate of Oman,” 4 Dec 80, box 1, W-4-9, TAD-RHA. 28 Press Release no. 80–68, 15 Jan 81, sub: Construction and Rehabilitation of Facilities at Masirah 

Island, Sultanate of Oman, PAO, MED, box 1, W-4-9, TAD-RHA; Wells Bfg, 13–15 Jul 84, pp. 9–12; 

Oman, MOD, “Preliminary Plan of Proposed Construction,” Dec 80.
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 531

Dillingham-Towell contracted with another firm, Keller-Gannon. With the aid of 

nearly one thousand Indian, Pakistani, and Sri Lankan laborers and over forty British 

supervisors on site, Dillingham-Towell completed the FY 1981–1982 packages in July 

1984. The design program for FY 1983 was completed on 24 September 1982; the 

following February, Dillingham-Towell received the FY 1983 construction contract 

for $14 million. They completed construction in February 1985.29

On 10 May 1984, the division issued a request for proposal for the FY 1984 

program estimated at over $10 million. Although several U.S. firms expressed 

interest, only Dillingham submitted a formal bid—at a price significantly higher than 

the government estimate. After a series of unsuccessful negotiations with Dillingham, 

the division decided to resolicit proposals, this time allowing international firms to 

bid. On 13 February 1985, the Corps awarded the FY 1984 Masirah Island program 

to the low bidder, the British firm Pauling (Oman) L.L.C., for $11.2 million, for 

completion in May 1986.30

29 Interv, Greenwood with Stevens, 13 Aug 85, pp. 14–15; Wells Bfg, 13–15 Jul 84, p. 14; Fact 

Sheet, RDF Prog, Sultanate of Oman, 19 Jan 84, pp. 6–7, with attachments; Fact Sheet, Middle East 

Div’s Oman Proj, 29 Mar 85, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 30 Wells Bfg, 13–15 Jul 84, p. 14; Fact Sheet, RDF Prog, Sultanate of Oman, 19 Jan 84, pp. 6–7, 

with attachments; Fact Sheet, Middle East Div’s Oman Proj, 29 Mar 85, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; 

Interv, Greenwood with Stevens, 13 Aug 85, pp. 37–38. 

Site plan for Masirah Air Base, July 1984
532 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Khasab

Whereas the work at Masirah Island was the largest project in the Oman 

program, the project to improve and lengthen the Khasab airstrip was the smallest. 

Like Masirah Island, it was one of the early projects that the Corps undertook in 

Oman. The construction site was located south of the town of Al Khasab on the 

Musandam peninsula. This rugged piece of land juts north into the Strait of Hormuz, 

narrowing to about twenty miles the water passage that separates Oman from 

Iran. The northernmost portion of Oman, the Musandam peninsula is physically 

separated from the rest of the country by a 200-mile-wide corridor of the United 

Arab Emirates. At the time of construction, travel to and from Khasab was by air 

or sea only. The Khasab site originally consisted of only a few facilities and a 

2,000-foot gravel airstrip.

The division completed in-house design for the new runway on 6 April 1981. On 

15 June, the Omanis signed a $1.3 million FMS case to finance a further lengthening 

of the runway. On 16 July, the Corps awarded a $4.5 million fixed-price contract to 

Mothercat Ltd. of Lebanon to construct a new 6,500-foot paved asphalt runway, concrete 

turnaround, and parking apron capable of accommodating C–130 aircraft and Jaguar 

fighters. The project also included a sophisticated drainage structure in one of the local 

wadis (dry riverbeds). Mothercat began construction in mid-September 1981 using one 

hundred ten Pakistani and Lebanese laborers. Labor problems arose during construction 

when the Omani government began to prevent operators of heavy equipment, drivers of 

Truck with equipment and supplies arriving on Masirah Island by boat, October 1981
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 533

heavy trucks, and workers under twenty-five or over fifty-five years old from entering 

Oman. Despite these problems, Mothercat successfully completed the jointly funded 

project on 5 May 1982, ahead of schedule, and the Corps’ involvement at Khasab came to 

a close. In June, the Omani government took full control of the completed airfield.31

Seeb

The Seeb International Airport, slightly more than twenty miles from Muscat 

on Oman’s northern coastal plain, was the third site in Oman at which the Corps 

managed construction. The project provided a temporary power generator and 

additional storage and distribution for both fuel and water. Construction included 

new aprons, taxiways, a liquid oxygen plant, six aircraft shelters, maintenance 

buildings, and several storage buildings with access roads.32

On 1 February 1982, Stanley Consultants completed the design for the FY 1982 

program. The company finished the design for the FY 1983 program in January 

1983 and for the FY 1984 program eleven months later. On 15 September 1982, the 

31 Wells Bfg, 13–15 Jul 84, pp. 7–8; Fact Sheet, RDF Prog, Sultanate of Oman, 19 Jan 84, p. 5, 

with attachments; Msg no. 134, Oman Area Engr, 15 Sep 81, sub: Weekly Status Report—Oman 

Area Office, box 1, W-4-9, TAD-RHA; Msg no. 162, Oman Area Engr, 29 Sep 81, sub: Change in 

Labor Regulations—Oman, box 1, W-4-9, TAD-RHA; Interv, Schubert with Andrews, 21 Jun 82, 

pp. 10–12, 32. 32 Wells Bfg, 13–15 Jul 84, pp. 15–17.

Aircraft shelters at Masirah, mid-1980s
534 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Corps awarded a $35.6 million construction contract for the FY 1982 package to the 

joint venture of Oman Construction Company Inc./Fischbach & Moore International 

Corporation/Abdulla Moosa Contracting & Trading Company (AMCAT). Later 

modifications brought the contract amount to $41.8 million. Oman-Fischbach, 

employing over four hundred personnel, including over three hundred Indian 

laborers, completed the project in December 1984. On 11 September 1983, Laing 

Oman L.L.C. received a $700,000 contract for construction of four portable, modular, 

covered storage units that comprised the FY 1983 package. The contractor completed 

the work in April 1984. On 1 June 1984, the FY 1984 program was awarded to MWK 

International Ltd. Inc. for $7.7 million. The program was completed in December 

1985. The FY 1985 program went to Wimpey Alawi L.L.C., with a $1.3 million 

contract awarded on 28 June 1985. This contract, for an air-conditioned warehouse, 

a liquid-oxygen maintenance building, and a small access road, was scheduled for 

completion in September 1986.33

33 Ibid.; “FY-82 Program and FY-84 Program, Seeb, Sultanate of Oman,” [ca. Jul 84], box SA 

1176, TAD-RHA; Fact Sheet, RDF Prog, Sultanate of Oman, 19 Jan 84, p. 7, with attachments; Fact 

Sheet, Middle East Div Oman Proj, 29 Mar 85; Thomas, Project Stakes Sheet, MCAF MILCON Prog, 

Sultanate of Oman, 30 Jun 87, Current Files, Transatlantic Division–Public Affairs Office (TAD-PAO). 

“Liberia Housing Contracts Awarded,” Middle East Division News, July-August 1985, also reports 

on the contract at Seeb.

Mobilization camp at Khasab, October 1981
Plan for Khasab Airfield, ca. 1980
536 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Thamarit

The Middle East Division also developed a project at Thamarit, a remote town built 

on the salt flats south of the “Empty Quarter” in Oman, about six hundred miles from 

Muscat across open desert. Thamarit is separated from coastal plains by hills approaching 

five thousand feet. An installation that included a paved airstrip, a taxiway, and some 

support facilities had been built there in the early 1970s to outflank the Soviet-backed 

People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. The Corps’ construction program improved 

utilities, such as water, sewage, and a power plant. The program also included a new 

apron for the airstrip, a munitions maintenance building, general-purpose warehouses, 

and facilities for storage of fuel, ammunition, and liquid oxygen. New housing to 

accommodate up to fifty people would augment existing billets.34

Stanley Consultants completed the designs for the FY 1982 program in March 1982, 

for the FY 1983 program in September 1982, and for the FY 1984 program in December 

1983. On 1 December 1982, AMCAT received a construction contract for $978,000 to 

build the FY 1982 package and completed that project in August 1983. The Corps awarded 

to Perini Corporation of Framingham, Massachusetts, a $32 million construction contract 

for FY 1983 in February 1983 and a $6.6 million contract for FY 1984 in May 1984. 

Perini completed the 1983 program in March 1985 with the 1984 program anticipated for 

completion by November 1985. On 4 December 1985, the division awarded the $150,000 

34 Wells Bfg, 13–15 Jul 84, pp. 20–21; Benson, “USAF Aircraft Basing,” 23 Apr 81.

Khasab Airfield
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 537

FY 1985 contract for a liquid-oxygen storage facility to AZD-Hochtief Construction 

L.L.C., with a scheduled completion date of August 1986.35

At Thamarit, Perini, its Omani subcontractor Hamdan, and the Thai and 

Lebanese laborers found the most unpleasant construction site in Oman. The 

contractor brought about half of his needed supplies to the hot and dusty location 

through a small southern port and up the steep, 5,000-foot hills to the plateau town. 

The alternate route was overland across the desert from Muscat. The only paved 

road through the desert was completely desolate, and drivers had to carry with them 

sufficient water and gasoline to last for the entire 600-mile trip.36

At both Seeb and Thamarit, contractors encountered difficulties finding adequate 

rock for aggregate. Further difficulties with the borrow areas at both locations led to 

one of the biggest single change orders in the Oman program. The Omani government 

had designated areas where the contractors could gather rock for crushing and use 

in the base course during construction. Certain elements of the Omani government, 

unaware of the contractors’ rights, blocked both Oman/Fischbach/Abdulla Moosa at 

Seeb and Perini at Thamarit from gathering the rock as planned. The bureaucratic snare 

led to delays and higher overhead costs. The area engineer, Lt. Col. Pat M. Stevens IV, 

35 Interv, Schubert with Andrews, 21 Jun 82, pp. 18–19; Wells Bfg, 13–15 Jul 84, p. 23; Fact 

Sheet, RDF Prog, Sultanate of Oman, 19 Jan 84, p. 8, with attachments; “VOA Design Award Tops 

Contracts List,” Middle East Division News, January-February 1986. 36 Interv, Schubert with Andrews, 21 Jun 82, pp. 18–19.

Aircraft shelter in Thamarit, January 1981
538 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

drew two lessons from the experience. First, early intervention by the U.S. embassy 

in any bureaucratic confusion within the host government was imperative. Second, 

future contracts ought to include no guarantee of borrow sources to the construction 

contractors.37

Program Status in Oman by the Mid-1980s

Initially, the division experienced difficulty in recruiting qualified personnel 

to Oman because the relative isolation made the assignment unattractive. Except 

for two (later four) supervisory positions in the area office, all positions were 

classified as unaccompanied, meaning that personnel could not bring their families 

to Oman. Housing and food were difficult to obtain, particularly in the early days 

of the project. Air conditioning, an important consideration in the oppressively hot 

climate, was a rare luxury. The military could not provide services such as medical 

help, postal services, commissaries, and recreational facilities, although Corps 

personnel had permission to make purchases from U.S. Navy ships that docked in 

Muscat every three months. Unfortunately, the Navy goods came in bulk packages 

that were too big for a single individual. To offset the high prices in Oman, the 

Corps paid its personnel a cost-of-living allowance; civilian employees received 

a 25 percent supplement because the location qualified as a hardship assignment. 

37 Ibid., pp. 33–34.

Ammo storage igloos at Thamarit
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 539

For most Americans, Saudi Arabia remained a much more attractive venue, where 

Corps employees received substantially more benefits.38

Nonetheless, the division managed to recruit sufficient personnel to increase the 

staffing level over time. To accommodate the growth, personnel moved into larger 

leased office space in August 1981 and again in April 1983. The Corps’ strength 

in Oman, which peaked at just over forty people, was limited by the desire of the 

U.S. State Department, the ambassador, and the Omani government to maintain 

only a minimal presence in the country. The area office in Muscat had the main 

contingent of Middle East Division personnel; but the division also had staff at 

resident offices in Khasab, Thamarit, Masirah Island, and Seeb. Area office personnel 

supported the resident offices by making frequent trips to the construction sites using 

complimentary air service provided by the Omani government. By the summer of 

1987, because Congress had declined to approve funds for programs beyond FY 

1986, the Oman program had devolved to caretaker support for personnel facilities 

at Seeb, Thamarit, and Masirah Island.39

Kuwait

Although the Mediterranean Division had worked in Kuwait in the early 

1970s, the Corps’ involvement in the country grew in the 1980s when the 

United States was eagerly cultivating new bonds in the region. In May 1973, 

the division forwarded to the U.S. ambassador in Kuwait a letter of offer for 

design and construction of three alert airstrips, a complete air base, and a joint 

operations center. In 1974, the role of the division expanded. New tasks included 

development of an air-defense system using the improved Hawk (I-HAWK) 

missile, study of the feasibility of establishing a military technical training center, 

estimation of the cost, and preparation of an FMS case for such a facility. The 

Kuwaiti government suspended the training school project but placed an order 

for the Hawk missiles, the air-defense system, and ancillary equipment.40

The tempo of the Middle East Division’s activity in Kuwait increased in 

the early 1980s, initially at the behest of the U.S. Navy. The Naval Supply 

System Command and its contractor, TGS International Ltd., began a program 

in 1981 to help the Kuwait Air Force develop its supply system. Early in 1982, 

Kuwait requested that the U.S. Navy extend additional aid by issuing a contract 

38 Ibid., p. 28; Interv, Moorhus with James J. Edinger, 9 Mar 95, p. 14.

39 Maj John D. MacInnes, Trip Rpt—Oman, 14 Feb 81, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE; Memo, 

West, 26 Mar 83, sub: Trip Report—Muscat, Oman, 19–24 March 1983, unmarked box, OH, HQ 

USACE. Intervs, Schubert with Andrews, 21 Jun 82, p. 4; Greenwood with Stevens, 13 Aug 85, p. 

28; Moorhus with Edinger, 9 Mar 95, p. 14. Thomas, Proj Stakes Sheet, MCAF MILCON Prog, 

Sultanate of Oman, 30 Jun 87. 40 OCE, “Annual Report of Major Activities, 1 July 1972–30 June 1973,” p. 51, box 7a, Gen Files, 

OH, HQ USACE; Williams to Gribble, 14 Dec 73, p. 4, box 26, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; 

Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 15 Mar 74, p. 25, box 5, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; OCE, 

Major Activities, FY 1975, pp. 58–61; Williams to Gribble, 16 Dec 74, p. 2, box 26, access. no. 77-

92-0001, WNRC; Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 1 May 76, p. 26.
540 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

to TGS for rehabilitation of warehouses for DC–9 and C–130 aircraft at the 

Kuwait Air Force International Base. In December, the Navy’s Supply System 

Command sought technical assistance from the Middle East Division. Shortly 

thereafter, the division signed a memorandum of understanding with the Navy 

that permitted the latter to use funds from an FMS case to award a contract to 

TGS for rehabilitation and installation of a warehouse shelving system. Signed on 

5 January 1983, the TGS contract was valued at $1.3 million. The next month, a 

Middle East Division representative arrived on site; seven months later, in July, 

despite delays and problems with the designs, TGS and its three subcontractors 

completed the warehouse rehabilitation.41

In early 1983, the Kuwaiti government requested an amendment to the 

Navy sales case to provide for a larger, $5 million warehouse project at the Ali 

al Salem Air Base where French-built F–1 Mirage aircraft were stationed. The 

Corps managed the contract for design and construction awarded to TGS on 

a sole-source basis and at a fixed price. In April, a team from the Middle East 

Division made a site visit to the air base in preparation for the new project; in 

August, the division established a resident office in Kuwait.42

The Corps also cooperated with the U.S. Navy to expand a computer center 

for the Air Defense Base by adding more computer room, classrooms, and an 

auditorium. Reprogrammed Navy sales case funds supported the project under 

the management of the Navy Fleet Material Support Office. In November 1984, 

the Middle East Division awarded a $904,000 construction contract to the 

U.S.-Kuwaiti joint venture of Fischbach and Moore International Corporation/

Al Hamra Kuwait Company W.L.L. The $1 million contract provided for 

construction of a 50x150-foot pre-engineered metal addition to the computer 

center and some modifications to the existing building. On 2 March 1986, the 

contractor completed the computer center.43

Concurrently, the division became engaged in a U.S. Navy project to build 

a flight-training center for the Kuwaiti Air Force at the Al Jabar Air Base. 

When disagreements arose between the Navy and the Corps over construction 

management, the Department of Defense reaffirmed the Middle East Division’s 

41 MFR, Simon Mouer, 24 May 83, sub: Lessons Learned on Contract N00600-83-C-0538 C9/C-130, Warehouse Improvement; Fact Sheet, Kuwait Warehouse Rehabilitation, 1 Mar 83; both in 

unmarked box, 94-2-7-3, TAD-RHA. 42 Fact Sheet, Future Work in Kuwait, 18 May 93, unmarked box, 94-2-7-3; MFR, Thomas R. 

Conner, 26 Apr 83, sub: Trip Report for Site Investigation and Coordination for Potential Kuwaiti 

Projects, unmarked box, 94-2-7-3; “Warehouse Rehabilitation and Ordnance Storage Projects, Kuwait 

Air Force,” 8 Jun 83, unmarked box, 94-2-7-3; Middle East Div (Rear), “Annual Historical Summary 

Report, 1983,” p. 5, E-1-1 (hereafter cited as Middle East Div [Rear], Hist Sum Rpt, 1983); all in 

TAD-RHA. Middle East Div Reorg Ceremony, hist chronology. 43 Fact Sheet, Computer Bldg (K-4) Expansion, Kuwait, 6 Apr 84, “Briefing Book for Brigadier 

General George R. Robertson . . . Briefings 9–12 April 1984,” E-1-1, TAD-RHA; Bfg, “Kuwait 

Resident Office,” attached to DF, Schroder, 18 Aug 86, sub: AE/RE Conference, unmarked box, 94-

1-31-2, TAD-RHA; “Kuwait Computer Center Expansion Awarded,” Middle East Division News, 

December 1984.
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 541

responsibility for design and construction of projects in the area of operations: 

The Corps and the Navy had signed a joint operating agreement in March 1984. 

Fully funded by the Kuwaiti government through an FMS case, the project 

involved an operational trainer building with a flight simulator, an academic/

administrative building, and an auditorium.44

Because the Kuwaiti Air Force wanted a single competitive contractor for 

the whole training-center project, including its post-construction operation, the 

Middle East Division prepared the proposal for design and construction and the 

Navy prepared the proposal for provisioning, curriculum design, and operations. 

The proposals were then combined and issued by the Navy as two awards to 

one contractor. On 13 July, the Middle East Division awarded a package for 

the training center’s concept design to Aeck Associates/Tippett & Associates/

Newcomb & Boyd, a joint venture based in Atlanta, Georgia. The design, 

completed in September 1985, was used as the basis for the design-construct 

package. On 4 April 1986, the division awarded a $9.6 million contract to 

Musaad Al Saleh & Sons Ltd. of Kuwait to build the flight-training center, with 

completion expected in two years.45

During the summer of 1984, Kuwait’s Air Force requested additional 

Corps assistance in making improvements at several of its Hawk missile sites. 

Design for the project was completed in September 1984, and the Middle East 

Division awarded a $1.1 million contract for one site to Neuero Industrieanlagen 

of West Germany in early October. The scope of the contract expanded to 

include procurement of prefabricated steel buildings for Hawk missile shelters 

at four—and then six—sites. On 25 April 1986, the Hawk shelter project was 

completed at all six sites for a total cost of $4.3 million.46

Bahrain

The Middle East Division increased its involvement in the Persian Gulf in 

the early 1980s. When in May 1982 the government of Bahrain, a small island 

country in the Persian Gulf east of Saudi Arabia and close to Qatar, issued a 

request for general assistance, the division responded by sending a fact-finding 

team. During the conversations, the division engineer explained FMS case 

44 Fact Sheet, Kuwait Flight Training Sch, 9 Apr 84, in Robertson Bfgs; Memo, Wiles, 17 Feb 

84, sub: Trip Report on Kuwait Visit, 9–16 February, Flight Training Ctr, box SA 1176, TAD-RHA; 

“MED Gets Go-Ahead on Ras Banas,” Middle East Division News, August 1984; Interv, Frank N. 

Schubert with Maj Gen Ames S. Albro Jr., 5 Jun 84, p. 32. 45 Fact Sheet, Kuwait Flight Training Sch, 9 Apr 84; Msg, SECDEF, 3 Mar 84, sub: Kuwait Air 

Force Flight Training School, box 1176, TAD-RHA; Schroder Bfg, 23 Dec 85; “MED Gets Go-Ahead 

on Ras Banas”; Bfg, “Kuwait Resident Office”; “MED Completes Logistics Facilities, Prepares for 

New Contract in Sudan,” Middle East Division News, Summer 1986; Bfg, Col Butler, Ofcrs Call 

Presentation, 25–26 Apr 88, p. 7, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 46 Msg, U.S. Embassy, 21 Aug 84, sub: Hawk Site Improvement, Kuwait, box SA 1176, TADRHA; Schroder Bfg, 23 Dec 85; “VOA, Bahrain Work Brightens Future,” Middle East Division News, 

October 1984; Bfg, “Kuwait Resident Office”; Comments on Draft Ms, 10 Mar 98.
542 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

procedures to members of Bahrain’s government. This led military officials of 

the Bahrain Defense Forces (BDF) to request assistance in building additional 

military facilities at the Bahrain International Airport. As a consequence, a 

second team, consisting of employees from the Corps of Engineers and the U.S. 

Air Force, traveled to Bahrain. During this visit, the Bahraini officials unveiled 

more ambitious plans for an entirely new military air base elsewhere in the 

country that they wanted the Corps to design and construct. The Middle East 

Division team members recommended that Bahrain make an official request for 

Corps assistance through the U.S. embassy.47

On 13 November 1983, the government of Bahrain formally requested 

through the embassy that the Middle East Division design a new air base to 

accommodate two fighter squadrons and one helicopter squadron. A Corps 

team visited Bahrain in early December to discuss the project, at which point 

the Bahraini government signed an initial FMS case of $237,000 for planning, 

programming, and site investigation. A followup team of personnel from the 

Middle East Division and the U.S. Air Force returned in mid-January 1984 to 

visit potential sites and to hold more discussions. The BDF leadership selected a 

site on the southern end of the island and provided the division with a preliminary 

list of desired facilities. In April 1984, after division personnel completed final 

planning and programming, they presented the results to the BDF and embassy 

staffs.48

Plans for the air base included a 12,500-foot runway, a taxiway, aircraft 

shelters, aprons, warehouses, maintenance facilities, administration buildings, 

housing, and support facilities. The division estimated that construction would 

cost approximately $250 million and be divided into several construction phases. 

Phase I, estimated at $115 million, included sufficient facilities to make the base 

operational and to allow the Bahrain Defense Forces to respond to hostilities. 

The parties amended the original sales case to cover concept and final design. 

In the autumn of 1984, Bahrain signed the $5.3 million sales case amendment 

for master planning and surveys for the entire base and the final design for 

Phase I. 

The architect-engineer company, Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall 

(DMJM) of Los Angeles, received the design contract and completed design 

during 1985. At that point, the government of Bahrain decided to defer 

construction. In 1986, Bahraini leaders reopened discussions with the Corps 

on a revised scope of work for the base; on 22 July, the government signed a 

47 “Corps of Engineers Assistance, Initial Briefing,” [3–5 May 1982], box 1176, TAD-RHA; 

Msg, Wiles, 16 Sep 83, sub: CE Assistance to Bahrain, Aircraft Support Facilities, unmarked box, 

94-3-29/11, TAD-RHA; Msg, Wiles, 29 Sep 83, sub: Future Construction Projects for BDF [Bahrain 

Defense Forces] in Bahrain, unmarked box, 94-3-29/11, TAD-RHA. 48 For this and the following paragraph, see Middle East Div (Rear), “Historical Summary Report, 

1983,” p. 5; Fact Sheet, Bahrain Southern Air Base, 9 Apr 84, in Robertson Bfgs; Fact Sheet, Bahrain 

Southern Air Base, 6 Sep 84, W-4-9, TAD-RHA; “New Work in Bahrain, Sudan,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, January-February 1984; “VOA, Bahrain Work Brightens Future”; Interv, Schubert with Albro, 

5 Jun 84, p. 32.
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 543

new sales case to cover the Middle East Division’s construction management 

services for Phase I of the project. For this project, the division served only to 

administer the contract, whereas the Bahraini government awarded the contract 

and made the progress payments under the rules of the Fédération Internationale 

des Ingenieurs-Conseils (FIDIC), which were modified to include standard Corps 

of Engineers’ contract language.49

The construction contract for what became known as the Shaikh Isa Air Base 

went to the Taiwan-based international construction firm Ret-Ser Engineering 

Agency in May 1987 for $89.15 million. The contractor substantially completed 

work on all facilities in August 1990 with increased costs raising the total to 

$130.88 million. Contractor claims carried over through the mid-1990s.50

As the division developed plans for the air base, it garnered two other small 

projects at the request of the U.S. Navy. The commander of Middle East Forces 

turned to the division to construct warehouse facilities in Bahrain. The project 

entailed designing two hundred fifty thousand square feet of open-bay warehouse 

buildings and another five hundred thousand square feet of open-area storage 

space outside the warehouses. The internal space also included administrative 

offices, a maintenance bay, and twelve thousand five hundred square feet of 

cold storage. The facilities were programmed but never built. In addition, the 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command asked the Corps to act as the design and 

construction agent for an indoor recreation facility at the Navy’s administrative 

support unit in Manama, Bahrain. The unit supported naval troops who had 

limited opportunities for shore recreation on ships in the Persian Gulf and the 

Arabian Sea. The facility was a 15,000-square-foot pre-engineered metal building 

housing a gymnasium with weight room, bowling alley, and snack bar with patio 

area. In April 1984, a joint team of Navy and division personnel made a visit 

to the site and held discussions on funds and schedules. Since funding for the 

design and construction, estimated at $3.1 million, came from FY 1987 military 

construction appropriations, the project remained in abeyance.51

Egypt

For the United States, Egypt held a key position strategically, as the most 

populous Islamic state in the Middle East, and geographically, because of its location across the Red Sea and the Sinai from the Arabian Peninsula. (See Map 24.) 

As a consequence, the Corps’ work grew continuously in the country throughout 

49 “Planning & Programming Report of the Bahrain Southern Airbase, Volume I of II, Narrative,” 

Dec 84, unmarked box (1980–1992), TAD-RHA; “Bahrain Requests Assistance on New Cantonment,” May-June 1985, and “A Firm Base for MED’s Future,” Summer 1986, both in Middle East 

Division News. 50 Memo, [Hutchinson], [May–Aug 95], sub: Shaikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain, Current Files, TADPAO. 51 Fact Sheet, Warehouse Facilities, Bahrain, 6 Apr 84, in Robertson Bfgs; Comments on Draft 

Ms, 10 Mar 98; Fact Sheet, Indoor Rec Facility, Bahrain, 6 Apr 84, in Robertson Bfgs; Fact Sheet, 

Indoor Rec Facility, Bahrain, 17 Oct 84, W-4-9, TAD-RHA.
544 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

the 1970s and 1980s. The Middle East Division executed work in Egypt on behalf 

of U.S. military commands, using funds appropriated by Congress, and on behalf 

of the Egyptian government under FMS case procedures. By 1990, with Corps 

offices in Saudi Arabia closed, Egypt enjoyed the largest commitment of Corps 

resources in the Middle East.

The Corps of Engineers began an association with the professional community 

of Egyptian design and construction engineers in the early 1970s through the 

Mediterranean Division’s support of the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit 

(NAMRU). Located in Cairo since World War II, NAMRU’s medical staff pursued 

research in cooperation with the Egyptians on diseases prevalent in the Middle East 

and northern Africa. The program also included a training component for Egyptian 

doctors. In November 1971, personnel from the Mediterranean Division performed 

soils investigations for a project at NAMRU’s request.52

Late in the decade, NAMRU again requested assistance from the Corps. The 

Middle East Division responded in the spring of 1979 by awarding a design contract 

to the architect-engineer firm of Haines, Lundberg, Waehler of New York for a new 

laboratory facility in Cairo. Eighteen months later, the division awarded a construction contract to a joint venture, Dongsan Construction and Engineering Company, 

which combined Korean and Egyptian firms. The $7.8 million contract specified 

a six-story facility that provided thirty-nine thousand square feet of space for 

departments of virology, bacteriology, parasitology, biochemistry, and immunology. 

The Middle East Division’s chief of construction, Earl Kramer, participated in the 

groundbreaking ceremony on 30 October 1980.53

The Middle East Division undertook another project in Egypt more in the category 

of civil works. In May 1980, the Suez Canal Authority and the government of Egypt 

requested that the Corps explore possible technical improvements to the Suez Canal. 

To provide the expertise needed for various aspects of the project, the division formed 

a team that included members from the Corps’ Waterways Experiment Station in 

Vicksburg, Mississippi; from the South Atlantic Division in Atlanta, Georgia; and from 

the Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory in Hanover, New Hampshire. 

The team submitted the study to the Suez Canal Authority early in 1981.54

In the late 1970s, U.S. and Egyptian military forces expanded their cooperation 

in conjunction with the Camp David accords. Throughout the 1980s, the division 

worked on the basis of dollar credits made available to Egypt as part of the reconciliation with Israel. The money came with the requirement that Egypt buy U.S. goods 

and services. Each U.S. military service engaged in the bilateral programs concluded 

52 Mediterranean Div, “Data Book,” 15 Oct 72, p. 15; Memo, G. Greig, 16 Mar 73, sub: Miscellaneous Maintenance, Repairs, Alterations and Improvements, NAMRU-3, Cairo, Egypt, unmarked 

box, TAD-RHA; “New Lab Studies Cures,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, November-December 1980. 53 Ibid.

54 “MED Completes Suez Canal Study,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, January-February 1981; “Suez 

Canal Improvement Study,” Apr 81, unmarked box, TAD-RHA.
M E D I T E R R A N E A N

S E A

R E D

S

E

A

Nile R

CAIRO HELIOPOLIS

SAKARA AIR BASE

CAIRO EAST AIR BASE CAIRO WEST AIR BASE

EL NASR CITY

BENI SUEF AIR BASE

R’AS EL TĪN NAVAL BASE

ĪKINJ MARYŪŢ NAVAL BASE

RĀS BANĀS AIR BASE

SUD A N

ISRAEL

LEBANON

CYPRUS

NORTHERN CYPRUS

SYRIA

S A UDI

ARABIA

L I B Y A

J O R D

A

N

Suez

Al Minyā

Qinā

Aswan High Dam

Aswān

Luxor

Alexandria Port Said

EGYPT

MIDDLE EAST DIVISION

1980–1990s

CENTCOM

Egypt Area Headquarters

Housing

Peace Vector Program

Peace Pharaoh Program

Hawkeye Program

Egyptian Naval Site

Other Work

0

0 200 Miles

200 Kilometers

Map 24
Biomedical research lab in Cairo for the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit, ca. 1980s
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 547

an FMS case with the Egyptian government and then assigned responsibilities for 

design, construction, or both to the Corps of Engineers.55

The division’s new responsibilities in Egypt began in November 1980 with 

Peace Vector I and Peace Pharaoh, projects to support multiple sales of Americanmanufactured F–16 and F–4 aircraft to the Egyptian government. The foreign aid, 

amounting to $1 billion to $1.5 billion annually, that the U.S. government granted 

Egypt paid for the aircraft and the services to support them. The FMS cases funded 

weapons systems, equipment, and facilities for use by the Egyptian armed services. 

The U.S. Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) acted as the designated program 

manager for USAF systems adapted for use by the Egyptian Air Force (EAF).56

When the EAF asked for assistance in upgrading its facilities at An Shas Air Base to 

support F–16 aircraft (a USAF weapons system), the U.S. government named the AFLC as 

the program manager for the project, called Peace Vector I. The EAF planned to perform 

the architectural, civil, and structural design as well as all the necessary construction and 

installation of equipment. The AFLC assumed responsibility to execute mechanical and 

electrical design and to procure equipment and materials not available in Egypt.57

In September 1980, the USAF requested that the Corps take over these design 

responsibilities along with design and procurement of a power-plant system for the 

An Shas Air Base. The following January, the two U.S. agencies signed a memorandum of agreement regarding the work for Peace Vector I. Subsequently, with 

revision of the memorandum, the Air Force asked the Corps to procure mechanical 

and electrical equipment and construction materials. In March, the USAF added 

more responsibilities, including complete design of a flight simulator facility and 

procurement of its equipment and spare parts. In pursuing these programs, the Middle 

East Division worked closely with General Dynamics Corporation, the manufacturer 

of the F–16s. The company acted as contractor for technical consultation to ensure 

that the systems installed were appropriate for an F–16 air base.

In November and December 1980, the division engaged Burns and McDonnell 

Engineering Company and Black and Veatch, both of Kansas City, Missouri, as 

primary architect-engineer firms for the Peace Vector projects. Corps representatives 

accompanied personnel from Burns and McDonnell on a site visit to An Shas, 

where the company’s engineers worked on the electrical and mechanical designs 

to upgrade facilities at the base. Because of time pressures, the Corps awarded the 

project as a supplemental agreement to the contract that Burns and McDonnell 

held for the airfield at King Khalid Military City. Concurrently, the division began 

fulfilling its procurement mission. On 9 January 1981, the Corps awarded a $1.4 

million contract for the power-plant equipment to Melley Energy Systems Inc. and 

55 “MED’s Expanding Role in Egypt,” Middle East Division News, January-February 1986. 56 “Egyptian Program Management Review Held,” Transatlantic News, June-July 1991; Intervs, 

Moorhus with Edinger, 9 Mar 95, p. 24, and with Richard Wiles, 21 Oct 93, p. 121. 57 For this and the following paragraph, see Fact Sheets, Proj Peace Vector, 11 May 81, unmarked 

box (SNEP, RSNF, PVI), and Proj Peace Vector I, 6 Apr 84, Robertson Bfgs; “Division’s Expanding 

Missions in Egypt,” and “Mission in Egypt Expands with Peace Vector II Work,” both in Mt. Weather 

Bulletin, September-October 1982.
548 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

on 3 February awarded a procurement contract for the prefabricated power plant 

building to National Steel Products Company.58

Burns and McDonnell began the electrical and mechanical design for the air-base 

facilities in January 1981 and design of a flight simulator building in March. Black 

and Veatch completed designs for the electrical, mechanical, and foundation installations for the power-plant building and delivered them to the overall coordinator 

for Peace Vector I, the Air Force Logistics Command, on 8 May. That same month, 

Egypt took delivery of the prefabricated power-plant building. In March 1981, while 

the architect-engineer firms pursued their work, the AFLC decided to expand the 

Middle East Division’s role by adding responsibility for procuring the equipment 

for the flight-simulator building under design by Burns and McDonnell. By early 

June, company designers submitted the final electrical and mechanical designs to 

the AFLC. Over time, these designs underwent many revisions as criteria for the 

project changed. Between late June and August 1981, the division awarded the 

procurement contracts for the flight simulator building’s mechanical and electrical 

equipment. On 30 September, the AFLC asked the division to purchase a two-year 

supply of spare parts for the equipment. In October, the AFLC allocated an additional 

$1.5 million for purchase of simulator equipment.59 Burns and McDonnell finished 

designs for the flight simulator in January 1982.

The first delivery of F–16s arrived at An Shas Air Base in March 1982. By 

November, the Middle East Division’s $8 million portion of the Peace Vector I 

program was nearly complete. Division personnel had overseen preparation of 

design for the air-base facilities, the simulator building, and the power plant. They 

had also completed procurement of the power plant and its equipment, construction 

materials and equipment for the simulator building, and spare parts. The small work 

that remained for Peace Vector I included design of an upgrade to an existing storage 

facility and procurement of the related equipment and materials.60

Whereas Peace Vector I covered air-base facilities and systems to support 

aircraft, Peace Pharaoh involved installing microwave towers at various sites in 

Egypt to provide a communications network for logistical support between the Peace 

Vector facilities and the headquarters of the Egyptian Air Force. In early February 

1981, the AFLC asked the Middle East Division to conduct soils investigations 

and to recommend appropriate foundation designs for seven microwave towers 

ranging in height from fifty to two hundred fifty feet. In October 1981, the Middle 

East Division activated the Egypt Area Office in Cairo. The Peace Pharaoh program 

58 Fact Sheets, Rouse, Proj Peace Vector, Egypt, 13 Jan 81, and 19 Mar 81, both in unmarked box 

(SNEP, RSNF, PVI), TAD-RHA. 59 Fact Sheet, Proj Peace Vector, Background, 16 Dec 81; Fact Sheet, Peace Vector I (PV I)—MED 

Performance, 17 Feb 84, box SA 1176, TAD-RHA; “Division’s Expanding Missions in Egypt”; Fact 

Sheet, Proj Peace Vector I, 22 Feb 83, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Memo, Lt Cdr James E. Ealy, 23 

Mar 81, sub: Trip Report, Procurement and F–16 Simulator Building Design Criteria Meeting and 

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio—Project Peace Vector, 16 and 17 March 1981, unmarked 

box (SNEP, RSNF, PVI), TAD-RHA; Fact Sheet, Proj Peace Vector, 16 Dec 81, box 3, access. no. 

77-92-0002, WNRC. 60 Fact Sheet, Middle East Div Projs in Egypt, 12 Nov 82, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 549

expanded with the addition of a power plant and procurement of three generators for 

the Cairo West Air Base, the home of the F–4 fighters purchased from the American 

manufacturer. A year later, by November 1982, the Corps finished the design and 

procurement of the power plant and completed procurement of the generators and 

other equipment by April 1983. Costs for Peace Pharaoh in these first two years 

amounted to nearly $3 million.61

Throughout 1983, work continued at An Shas Air Base and Peace Pharaoh 

approached completion. This work overlapped with the Peace Vector II program, 

which began in May 1982 when the governments of the United States and Egypt 

concluded a second sale of F–16 aircraft, with the initial delivery scheduled for 

January 1986. All of the principal participants maintained most of their Peace 

Vector I responsibilities. The project included upgrading seventeen existing facilities 

and building nine new ones at Beni Suef Air Base, south of Cairo. The facilities 

included housing, shops, water and sewer system, hangars, maintenance facilities, 

warehouses, a power plant, and aircraft shelters. The Middle East Division was 

again responsible for mechanical and electrical design of the facilities, as well as 

the architectural, civil, and structural design previously performed by the Egyptian 

Air Force. In addition, the Corps would manage the total design of a new utility 

system and procure all items except concrete, steel, masonry, and some electrical 

equipment. The estimated cost for Peace Vector II was $20 million. Burns and 

McDonnell designed all the Peace Vector II facilities, completing this phase of the 

work in December 1983. The contractor continued to provide additional designs 

for Peace Vector II through 1987.62

Still other construction tasks in Egypt accrued to the Middle East Division as 

the result of the division’s role as agent for the engineering and construction needs 

of the rapid deployment force. Shortly after its establishment by President Jimmy 

Carter in October 1979, the Rapid Deployment Force was renamed the Rapid 

Deployment Joint Task Force, superseded on 1 January 1983 by the U.S. Central 

Command. With Egyptian cooperation, CENTCOM decided to expand facilities 

at Ras Banas, an air base originally built for the Egyptians by the Soviet Union. 

CENTCOM wanted immediate construction of a power plant; a desalinization 

plant; storage for petroleum, oil, and lubricants; and a utility system to support its 

contingency forces. Over the summer of 1984, Congress authorized $49 million 

in Military Construction, Army (MCA), funds, to be matched by the Egyptian 

61 Fact Sheet, Proj Peace Pharaoh, 16 Dec 81, p. VI-5 of Middle East Div, “Information Booklet,” Dec 81, box 3, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; Middle East Div Reorg Ceremony, 30 Sep 86; 

Berry-Caban et al., “Annual Historical Review, Fiscal Year 1982” (hereafter cited as Berry-Caban 

et al., AHR, FY 1982); Fact Sheet, Middle East Div Projs in Egypt, 12 Nov 82; Fact Sheet, Indian 

Ocean Projs–Proj Peace Pharaoh, 12 May 81, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; “Division’s Expanding 

Missions in Egypt.” 62 Rousseau, “Middle East Division (Rear) 1983 Historical Summary Report,” 7 Mar 84, unmarked 

box, TAD-RHA. Fact Sheets, Proj Peace Vector II, 22 Feb 83, unmarked box, and Peace Vector II, 6 

Apr 84, in Robertson Bfgs; Performance Eval (Architect-Engr), Contract no. DACA 78-83-C-0040, 

Design of Peace Vector II Aircraft Support Facilities at Beni Suef Air Base, Egypt, 26 Jan 88, X-1-10, 

Egypt; all in TAD-RHA. “Mission in Egypt Expands with Peace Vector II Work.”
550 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

government, for “bare-bones construction” of the CENTCOM base at Ras Banas. 

The facilities, maintained by the U.S. Air Force, would become a rear staging area 

for U.S. forces if an emergency arose in the Persian Gulf region. By late 1984, the 

program grew to six active contracts with architect-engineer firms.63

The division also began preparing for the Hawkeye program, which supported 

the Egyptian purchase of U.S. Navy aircraft. In 1983, using funds from an FMS 

case made possible by the Camp David accords, the Egyptian Armament Authority 

purchased for the Egyptian Air Force four Grumman Aerospace E–2C Hawkeye 

airborne early-warning planes and four F–4 aircraft. Scheduled for delivery in 

January 1987, the planes were to be based at Cairo West Air Base, where thirty-five 

F–4s were already stationed.64

As in the Peace Vector programs, the Middle East Division oversaw design of 

mechanical, electrical, and general utility systems for existing and new facilities 

at Cairo West Air Base. It also managed procurement of mechanical and electrical 

materials. For the Hawkeye program, the division worked with the U.S. Navy; but 

the Egyptian Air Force played its accustomed role, providing civil, architectural, 

and structural design and managing the construction and installation of equipment. 

63 Schubert and Kraus, Whirlwind War, pp. 15–17; Benson, “USAF Aircraft Basing in Europe,” 

pp. 93–94; Interv, Grathwol with Col (Ret) John M. Dorr, 11 Aug, 12 Sep, 26 Sep, 31 Oct 94, p. 115; 

“MED Gets Go-Ahead on Ras Banas”; “U.S. Army Engineer Division Middle East (Rear) Active 

Ongoing A-E Contracts by Location,” Nov 84, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 64 “MED Mission May Expand in Egypt,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, May-June 1983.

Egypt Area Office, May 1987
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 551

Planners estimated that the $20 million construction program would be completed 

by July 1986, well ahead of the January 1987 delivery of the aircraft. The division 

expected its portion of the program at Cairo West to cost approximately $10 million: 

$3 million for the design, $6 million for the procurement, and $1 million for optional 

construction management assistance. The division was responsible for mechanical 

and electrical design for four maintenance shops and two aircraft shelters, as well 

as minor rehabilitation for the E–2C aircraft and for the rehabilitation of a hangar 

and maintenance shops for the F–4s.65

In early 1984, after the division started preliminary design, the project at Cairo 

West Air Base was placed on hold. The U.S. Navy had not received a decision 

from the Egyptian Air Force concerning the Navy’s proposal to use the Corps for 

construction management assistance on the Hawkeye program. When the Egyptian 

approval came, it allowed the division and the Navy to conclude an interagency 

agreement on 8 June 1984 authorizing work for the E–2C and F–4E facilities at Cairo 

West. In November 1984, the Corps shipped to Egypt final design documents for 

the E–2C facilities and the power-distribution system. By early 1986, the division 

was monitoring about three thousand line items of equipment and materials for the 

Hawkeye program.66

The Hawkeye program also included a computer center and software lab 

at the Nasr City military installation near Cairo. In 1986, the division assumed 

responsibility for the design and construction of the computer center for the Egyptian 

Armament Authority. Division personnel designed the single-story metal-frame 

building and, in July 1986, awarded a $1.5 million construction contract to the joint 

venture of Fischer Engineering & Maintenance Company of Portland, Oregon, and 

Egyptian Building Systems.Construction began in August.67

The work associated with the Egyptian programs increased the number of 

Americans in Egypt, leading the U.S. and Egyptian Air Forces to request that the 

Middle East Division manage the design and construction of a housing complex at 

Beni Suef. The Egyptians needed the compound to accommodate the people attached 

to U.S. Air Force technical assistance field teams (TAFTs) and the support personnel 

hired to train EAF cadre to fly and maintain the F–16s. The USAF field team monitored 

the contract with General Dynamics for operational maintenance and hands-on training 

and the contract with Pratt & Whitney for training to maintain the aircraft engines.68

65 Ibid.; “New Projects in Egypt, Sudan,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, Fall 1983. 66 Fact Sheet, Egyptian Hawkeye Prog, 6 Apr 84, in Robertson Bfgs; Msg, Ralph N. Wheeler, 3 

Dec 84, sub: Egyptian Hawkeye/F–4E Program Status Report, Cairo West AB, MED Facilities Design, 

unmarked box, mixed-1, TAD-RHA; “MED’s Expanding Role in Egypt”; “P&S Supports U.S. Air 

Force, Navy in Egypt Procurement Missions,” unmarked box, mixed-1, TAD-RHA. 67 Fact Sheet, Egyptian Hawkeye Prog, 6 Apr 84; “MED Mission May Expand in Egypt”; Bfg, Col 

Butler, Ofcrs Call Presentation, 25–26 Apr 88, p. 5; “MED’s Expanding Role in Egypt”; “MED Completes Logistics Facilities, Prepares for New Contract in Sudan,” Middle East Division News, Summer 

1986; “Computer Center Dedicated in Cairo,” Middle East/Africa News, March-April 1988. 68 Fact Sheet, Proj Peace Vector II, 22 Feb 83; Col Schroder, AGC Presentation, 6 Mar 87, R&D 

File 2470, TAC; “MED’s Expanding Role in Egypt”; “Peace Vector II Procurement Nears End,” 

Middle East/Africa News, July-August 1987.
552 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

The Beni Suef housing project involved one hundred twenty prefabricated 

two-bedroom units and the facilities to support them. The first phase included 

fifty houses, an administration building, a dispensary, a commissary and post 

office, a vehicle maintenance shop, and roads—all funded under an FMS case 

with an initial value of $8 million. The second phase included seventy houses, 

recreational facilities, a dining building, a gatehouse, a swimming pool, utilities, 

and landscaping. The project’s design was completed in December 1983, and in 

March 1984 the Middle East Division awarded a sole-source letter contract to 

General Dynamics Services Company for construction of the first phase of the 

housing project. Within weeks, the division terminated the contract because the 

parties could not reach agreement on the cost of work. In August, the division 

then awarded a $12 million construction contract for the same project to Turner 

International Industries/MAK, a U.S.-Egyptian joint venture, for the second phase.

The one hundred twenty housing units and related facilities at Beni Suef Air Base 

were intended to accommodate the contract support/technical assistance field team 

(CS/TAFT) of U.S. personnel.69

In the mid-1980s, still another project, an EAF conference center, emerged as 

an FMS case adjunct to the Peace Vector II program. The U.S. Air Force and the 

Middle East Division were responsible for the project’s total design, construction, 

and furnishings. The four-story, 5,143-square-yard building in downtown Cairo 

provided conference space for sixty participants and office space for seventy to eighty 

staff members attached to USAF or EAF agencies, as well as support personnel 

hired by General Dynamics. The center included an auditorium, conference rooms, 

underground parking, and a standby power plant. In September 1984, Sverdrup 

and Parcel of St. Louis won the contract to design the conference center. On 27 

December 1985, the division awarded a $10.4 million construction contract to Turner 

International Industries of New York, which completed the construction three years 

later, in November 1988.70

The Corps of Engineers carried out work involving the United States Army 

Security Assistance Command (USASAC) and the Egyptian Army engineers. In 

1983, the Middle East Division contracted with Giffels Associates to design a $21 

million rebuild facility for tanks and other tracked vehicles outside of Cairo. In 

the autumn of 1983, Giffels finished the design, which the Egyptian Engineering 

Authority modified. On 26 June 1984, the Egyptian Armament Authority awarded 

a construction contract to El Abd Contracting Company with the Corps providing 

construction management assistance. The primary facilities were scheduled for 

completion in June 1986, with the remainder completed by June 1987. The division 

69 Fact Sheet, Peace Vector II—ICS/TAFT Housing, 6 Apr 84, in Robertson Bfgs; “VOA, Bahrain 

Work Brightens Future,” Middle East Division News, October 1984; Fact Sheet, Peace Vector II—ICS/

TAFT Housing, 17 Feb 84, box SA 1176, TAD-RHA; Comments on Draft Ms, 10 Mar 98; Schroder 

Bfg, 23 Dec 85, pp. 9–10, slides 40, 45. 70 Fact Sheet, Egyptian Air Force Conf Ctr, 6 Apr 84, in Robertson Bfgs; “MED’s Expanding 

Role in Egypt”; “EAF Conference Center Complete,” Middle East/Africa News, November-December 

1988; Schroder Bfg, 23 Dec 85, pp. 9–10, slides 40, 45.
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 553

also supervised work on a hangar and other support facilities to accommodate C–130 

aircraft and the acquisition of new computer equipment for the Egyptian Armament 

Authority. The several projects meant that the division had approximately $76.7 

million in construction programmed for Egypt at the end of 1985.71

Sudan

The Middle East Division became active in Sudan in 1980 when, at the request of 

the U.S. embassy, a division team visited the country to conduct a study of navigation 

on the White Nile River. Trade Development Programs (formerly the Agency for 

International Development) funded the study to improve transportation between 

Khartoum and Port Sudan. (See Map 25.) A second Corps project in Sudan arose 

at the suggestion of the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation, in Sudan since 1979 

to manage the U.S. military aid program that delivered U.S. military equipment to 

the Sudanese armed forces. The office indicated that the Sudanese military needed 

to establish a supply, logistics, and maintenance system. The Military Assistance 

Program funded the project, under USASAC direction, to design and construct 

maintenance and logistics facilities through rehabilitation of existing facilities.72

Saudi Arabia purchased and donated to the Sudanese government several 

lightweight, pre-engineered steel buildings. The government erected ten of them 

around Khartoum and two in Port Sudan and then asked the United States to complete 

the interiors under an FMS case to pay for construction of partitions, lighting, 

power, and utilities. The Corps of Engineers assigned the Middle East Division 

to cooperate with the U.S. Navy to execute the work. The rehabilitation included 

upgrading administrative areas, classrooms, cafeterias, lounges, machine shops, and 

warehouses by installing concrete floors, internal walls, and a power-distribution 

system. Funding totaling $6 million came from the Military Assistance Program 

for FY 1983.73

In the autumn of 1983, Middle East Division representatives traveled to Sudan to 

gather data on the proposed work. About the same time, the division began a second 

project to assist the Sudanese Air Force by designing and building maintenance 

facilities for C–130 transport planes at Khartoum and for F–5E aircraft at the Wadi 

Saidna air base near Khartoum. In January 1984, the Corps issued a request for 

proposal to Reading & Bates Construction Company of Houston, which was already 

firmly established in Sudan. The request was issued on a sole-source negotiated basis, 

as suggested by the Sudanese government and the Office of Military Cooperation 

and provided for in the sales case. Division personnel then made another trip to 

71 “New Projects in Egypt, Sudan”; “Egypt Program Booming,” Middle East/Africa News, May 

1989; Zone Workshop #101, Cairo, Egypt, 18 Nov 84, unmarked box, 94-1-31-14, TAD-RHA; 

Schroder Bfg, 23 Dec 85, pp. 10–11, slide 46. 72 “Study Takes Rouse to Africa’s White Nile,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, September-October 1980; 

“U.S. Office of Military Cooperation, Khartoum, Sudan,” [Jan 83], unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Fact 

Sheet, Maintenance-Log Facilities, Sudan, 6 Apr 84, in Robertson Bfgs. 73 Ibid.; Fact Sheet, Sudan, n.d., in Robertson Bfgs; “New Projects in Egypt, Sudan.”
PORT SUDAN

WĀDĪ SAYYIDNĀ

KHARTOUM

R

E

D

S

E

A

Nile R

White Nile R

Blue Nile R

Nile R

Khartoum North

Omdurman

Juba

Al Fāshir

EGYPT

E THIOPIA

KEN Y A

UGAND A

ZAIRE

CENTRAL

AFRICAN

REPUBLIC

LIB Y A

CHAD

S A UDI

ARABIA

SUDAN

MIDDLE EAST DIVISION

1980s

Military Assistance Program

Sudanese Air Force

0

0 300 Miles

300 Kilometers

Map 25
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 555

establish priorities and to make a final review of the design/construct documents 

prepared in house. On 13 June 1984, the Corps awarded to Reading & Bates a 

design/construction contract for seven of the facilities for $4.4 million, with a $3.3 

million optional add-on for the remaining five buildings.74

In September 1984, the division established a resident office to manage the 

construction in Sudan. The acting resident engineer, Caesar Santucci, went to Sudan 

to lease office space in a Khartoum villa for the resident engineer and a secretary, to 

establish relations with the Sudanese minister of defense and the U.S. ambassador, 

and to help get Reading & Bates started on its contract.75

During the course of construction, Reading & Bates encountered problems 

with procurement, customs, and logistics, as well as civil unrest in Sudan. The 

original completion date was pushed back from November 1985 to January 1986, 

but even this estimate proved optimistic. By February, some facilities were nearing 

completion and most were at least 80 percent finished; but construction dragged on 

through the spring.76

Other Occasional Work

The Middle East Division also undertook occasional work for other countries 

of the region. In 1978, it carried out an engineering study on dredging in Qatar that 

it delivered to the U.S. embassy there. Similarly, the division prepared a study of 

Omani water resources for the U.S. Agency for International Development.77

In February–March 1983, the division conducted a three-week survey of one 

thousand miles of roads planned by the government of Gabon to promote development 

and to enhance security within the country. The resulting study and report, submitted 

in French to the Gabonese government, examined the engineering, logistical, and 

financial issues related to construction of the roads. In October, the Middle East 

74 Middle East Div (Rear), Hist Sum Rpt, 1983, p. 5; “New Work in Bahrain, Sudan”; Fact Sheet, 

Maintenance-Log Facilities, Sudan, 6 Apr 84, in Robertson Bfgs; Fact Sheet, Improvements to 

Maintenance-Log Facilities, Khartoum and Port Sudan, 20 Jan 84, box SA 1176, TAD-RHA; Fact 

Sheet, Maintenance-Log Facilities–Sudan, 18 Jul 84, box SA 1176, TAD-RHA; Memo, Boyd, 20 Dec 

83, sub: Request for Authorization to Enter into a Negotiated Sole-Source Contract, W-4-10, TADRHA; Rcd of Contract Negotiations, 17 May 84, W-4-10, TAD-RHA; Memo, Koterwas to Reading & 

Bates, 14 Jun 84, sub: Contract DACA 78-84-C-0023, Design and Construct Maintenance-Logistics 

Facilities, Sudan, W-4-10, TAD-RHA; “MED Gets Go-Ahead on Ras Banas.” Note: In 1986, the 

name of Reading & Bates was changed to Associated Pipe Line Contractors Inc. For clarity, this 

book refers to the contractor as Reading & Bates, the name in use at the time of contract award. See 

Amendment of Solicitation/Modification of Contract, 17 Sep 86, W-4-10, TAD-RHA; Schroder Bfg, 

23 Dec 85, p. 11, slide 49. 75 Middle East Div Reorg Ceremony, 30 Sep 86; Memo, Caesar Santucci, 2 Oct 84, sub: Request 

for Recruitment Action for an Administrative Secretary, W-4-10, TAD-RHA; “Santucci Sets in Motion Maintenance Logistic Contract,” Middle East Division News, January 1985. 76 DF, Schroder, 30 Jun 86, sub: AE/RE Conference, with attachments, unmarked box; Memo, 

Michael F. Iarosis to Brig Gen Tag El Sir, 15 Feb 86, sub: Progress to 15 February 1986, W-4-10; 

both in TAD-RHA. 77 Ellis to Morris, 30 Jan 79, p. 2.
556 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Division also participated in a U.S. Army Military Training Requirements Survey 

conducted for the government of Nigeria.78 Near mid-decade, the division began a 

cooperative program with the Voice of America that expanded throughout the rest 

of the decade.

In addition to these projects, the Middle East Division sought to support 

the Agency for International Development (and the State Department’s Trade 

Development Program) by providing it with the benefits of the division’s experience 

in the region. The division set up a computer-aided cost-estimating system and 

established a set of unit-price books for African countries, much as it had done 

in Saudi Arabia. In 1984, the division sent estimators to Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, 

Cameroon, and Senegal to gather raw data to construct the cost-estimating system. 

The system provided current and reliable cost information for estimating work in 

these countries.79

Inside Saudi Arabia, the Middle East Division managed a small construction 

project in support of a civilian governmental organization. The United States 

Geological Survey (USGS), a component of the Department of the Interior, had 

maintained a delegation in Jiddah since 1963. Its staff assisted the Saudi Arabian 

government’s Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources with geological 

investigations in the kingdom. Early in 1980, the USGS asked the Middle East 

Division to act as its agent in construction of administrative facilities and housing 

for its personnel in Jiddah. In the spring, the division awarded a design contract 

to the joint venture STV/Lyon Associates. Two years later, on 23 March 1982, 

the division awarded a $31.9 million contract to Development International Trade 

Company Ltd. (DITCO) for the first-phase construction of the USGS facilities.80

The division’s project for the USGS was unique—the only civil works construction undertaken in Saudi Arabia. All other projects involved military construction. 

Other aspects of the project were all too typical. Construction was delayed for a full 

year after the award of the contract in March 1982 because local Saudi authorities 

required that the contractor obtain a building permit before construction began. The 

authorities insisted on reviewing all plans and specifications, surveying the property, 

and stamping all design drawings. Even after the contractor obtained the permit, local 

authorities changed the boundary limits to decrease the amount of land available 

for the complex. That introduced further delays because several facilities had to be 

redesigned to accommodate the changed dimensions and locations of buildings.81

The construction contractor, DITCO, eventually subcontracted the project 

to Hanil Development of Korea, which successfully completed the work over 

78 Middle East Div (Rear), Hist Sum Rpt, 1983; “Study Takes MED Engineers to Gabon,” Mt. 

Weather Bulletin, March-April 1983. 79 “MED Estimators on the Road to Africa,” Middle East Division News, October 1984. 80 Ellis to Morris, 24 May 80, p. 2; “USGS Work Underway in Jeddah,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, 

March-April 1982; Albro to Edward J. Grant, United States Geological Survey (USGS), 9 May 82, 

p. 1, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE. “USGS Complex Turned Over to Client,” Middle East/Africa 

News, Fall 1986. 81 “USGS Complex Turned Over to Client,” Middle East/Africa News, Fall 1986.
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 557

the summer of 1986 at a final cost of $33 million. The completed compound for 

USGS personnel consisted of an office building with a laboratory for geological 

science, a power plant, water and sewage treatment plants, and a warehouse and 

shop building. In addition, construction included ten villas, a mosque, a recreational 

facility, and a building with units to house as many as twenty-three persons on 

temporary duty.82

Refocusing the Organization, 1981–1986

The Middle East Division had originated in 1976 to manage the prodigious 

construction program developing in Saudi Arabia. Construction in Saudi Arabia 

remained the largest part of the Middle East Division’s operations through the first 

half of the 1980s. By mid-1981, the division had completed construction worth $4.3 

billion in the kingdom but estimated that it still had $15.6 billion programmed for 

the coming years. The division had already awarded contracts for $5.6 billion of the 

remaining construction, with another $5.7 billion under design and an additional 

$3 billion in proposed programs.83 As Brig. Gen. Ames S. Albro Jr. assumed his 

position as division commander in the summer of 1980, he faced the immediate task 

of renewing with the Saudi government the agreement that governed construction 

in the kingdom.

Extending the Engineer Assistance Agreement

The Engineer Assistance Agreement, originally signed through an exchange of 

notes in May–June 1965, came up for renewal in May 1981. The two governments 

had extended the EAA for five years in 1973 and again at the end of that term for an 

additional three years. In both instances, the extension took place with no changes in 

the terms of the agreement. Indeed, during discussions in 1977, the general director 

of military works, Maj. Naser F. Al Faisal, indicated a reluctance to reassess the 

terms of the agreement. Such discussions, he observed, might provoke pressures 

within Saudi Arabia sufficient to erode the privileged position of the Corps of 

Engineers in the country.84

When General Albro took command of the division, such negative pressures 

were certainly stronger as the deadline for the EAA renewal approached. In 

December 1980, Albro opened a formal exchange of letters with Al Faisal to 

address an extension. Subsequent exchanges revealed that both parties wanted 

modest modifications in the agreement but found the relationship’s general terms 

satisfactory. On 21 April 1981, with the existing agreement set to expire on 24 

82 Ibid.

83 Albro, “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,” 22 Jul 81, pp. 

1–3.84 “Saudi Arabian Programs,” [1981], p. 8, SH-6-93-0006, TAD-RHA; Morris to Lt Gen H. M. 

Fish, 17 Jun 77, box 6, access. no. 77-86-0008, WNRC.
558 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

May, Al Faisal recommended a one-year extension to provide additional time for 

discussions. Albro concurred.85

Discussions continued into the autumn of 1981. By then, both Albro and Al 

Faisal had reached the same conclusion: A simple extension with no changes offered 

the solution least likely to raise questions about the agreements. Any changes might 

lead to challenges that would disrupt the satisfactory working arrangements that 

had evolved since 1965. The two parties settled on an extension of three years to 

carry construction through 1983–1984, when Albro expected the Saudi Arabian 

construction to peak and then decline through the rest of the decade. Albro anticipated 

that all construction would end in FY 1987 and that the division would then need 

another year and a half to complete all activities in Saudi Arabia. As the division’s 

work waned, modifications of the EAA might prove superfluous.86

Adjusting Staff Size

While General Albro could contemplate how declining demands in the future 

for the division’s services might affect EAA revisions, the division had to cope 

with the still-increasing pace of construction placement in 1980–1981. The division 

therefore still had to recruit aggressively to ensure it had sufficient staff to manage 

existing tasks. In 1981, the division added an average of thirty-one people a month. 

By early December 1981, staff strength had risen to 1,565, with about 25 percent 

in the rear headquarters in Virginia. Most overseas personnel still served in Saudi 

Arabia, with a very small number in other Middle Eastern countries. Over the first 

nine months of 1982, the division added another one hundred fifty positions.87

85 Albro to Al Faisal, 14 Jan 81; Al Faisal to Albro, 14 Feb 81; Albro to Al Faisal, 14 Mar 81; 

Telex, Clark J. Hulce and Albro, [21?] Apr 81, sub: Extension of Engineer Assistance Agreement 

(EAA), and related docs; Fact Sheet, EAA, Purpose: To Respond to an Inquiry by the House Foreign 

Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East Regarding Renegotiation of the EAA, 30 Jul 

81; all in box 28, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC. 86 Fact Sheet, The Engineer Assistance Agreement (EAA), 27 Aug 81, unmarked box, OH, HQ 

USACE; Memo, Donahue, 22 Sep 81, sub: Customs Exemption Status, p. 1, K-8-4, TAD-RHA; 

Middle East Div, “Information Booklet,” Dec 81, pp. v–3ff; Fact Sheet, Corps Procurement and 

Contracting Procedures in Saudi Arabia, 30 Nov 81, box 3, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; DF, A. 

L. Maier, 31 Oct 78, sub: Special Provisions Review, New Required/Standard Clause, SP-44, Use of 

Saudi Arabian Firms and Products, E-5-2, TAD-RHA; Memo, Albro to Al Faisal, 6 Apr 82, sub: RFP 

for Chilled Water Treatment Plant at King Khalid Military City, and Future RFPs, Kingdom of Saudi 

Arabia, K-8-5, TAD-RHA; Albro, “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle 

East,” 22 Jul 81, p. 3; Albro to Richard W. Murphy, U.S. Amb, 1 Nov 81, unmarked box, OH, HQ 

USACE; Middle East Div, “Information Booklet,” Dec 81, p. II-3; “Engineer Assistance Agreement 

(EAA),” box 3, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC; Albro to Bratton, 12 Aug 81, p. 5, Walker box 6, 

OH, HQ USACE. 87 Memo to Ch, USMTM, 2 May 82, sub: Middle East Division Position “Stovepiping” in European 

Command (EUCOM) Area Security Assistance Organization (SAO), Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE, 

gives the division’s total staff strength as 1,774. “Personnel Summaries for Civilians and Military, 

Review and Analysis,” Oct 82, box 11, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC, give a figure lower by about 

100. The figures on average recruitment per month for 1981 and 1982 come from Middle East Div, 
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 559

Despite Saudi Arabia’s preeminence in dollar terms, the division had already 

begun in 1980 to plan for the end of this work. In January 1980, The division’s 

commander, General Ellis, noted that design for two of the largest projects, King 

Khalid Military City and King Abdulaziz Military Academy, had reached 90 percent. 

This meant that the division would need fewer and smaller architect-engineer firms 

in the future, selected for their expertise in design of a particular type of facility. Just 

two months later, Ellis closed the Jiddah District. He also commissioned a study, 

completed in June 1981, that clearly depicted a downward trend in the division’s 

volume of work after 1983–1984. In June 1982, Ellis’ successor as commander of 

the Middle East Division, General Albro, began to prepare an orderly reduction of 

the Engineering Division in Virginia in the face of the declining volume of design 

work.Upon arriving in Riyadh as division commander in August 1982, Brig. Gen. 

George R. Robertson quickly initiated his own study to explore the implications 

of the changing workload and to offer recommendations for reorganization.While 

his staff examined the situation, Robertson informed Al Faisal that, in the absence 

of an “appropriate sustaining workload,” the division would soon present a plan to 

reduce the number of staff positions.88

In the spring of 1983, the Middle East Division developed plans to consolidate 

the Engineer Logistics Command (ELC) with the division’s forward headquarters 

in Riyadh; to augment the Riyadh District to support the division’s work in Saudi 

Arabia; and to begin moving headquarters functions from Saudi Arabia to Virginia, 

deferring transfer of the commander’s flag until June 1984. Robertson explained 

through the division’s newsletter that staff salaries and other operating expenses 

came out of a supervision and administration fee paid by the Saudis as a percentage 

of the cost of construction. As the dollar value of the programs declined in the years 

after 1983 so too did the division’s income. In the absence of additional work, the 

division had a responsibility to plan for reductions in staff and expenses.89

The dissolution of the Engineer Logistics Command took place on schedule. 

In the summer of 1983, it appeared that transfer of the headquarters command to 

Virginia might proceed more rapidly than initially proposed. Construction of an 

airfield at Hafar al Batin and of facilities for the third brigade at King Khalid Military 

City had been deferred. In August, the Middle East Division issued to division 

employees in Virginia the first notices of a reduction in force as a step toward the 

proposed elimination of eight hundred positions over the next two years.Predictably, 

“Organizational and Workload Study for International Projects” [draft], May 85, p. 15, unmarked box, 

TAD-RHA; Albro to Bratton, 16 Dec 81, p. 2, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE. 88 Ellis to Morris, 11 Jan 80, p. 13, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; Permanent Order no. 4-1, 13 

Mar 80, sub: Jiddah District Discontinued, Gen Files 54-2, OH, HQ USACE; Cain, Fact Sheet, Middle 

East Div Construction Trends, 1976–1980, 30 Jun 81, box 11, K-8-4, TAD-RHA; Albro, Cdr’s Periodic Ltr, 5 Jun 82, p. 4, and Robertson to Bratton, 15 Feb 83, pp. 2–3, both in Walker box 6, OH, HQ 

USACE; Middle East Div Cdrs Conf Bfg Book, “Status of Phase Down and Consolidation Planning 

(Division Forward), 15 October 1983,” unmarked box, R&D File 3161, TAC. 89 Middle East Div Cdrs Conf Bfg Book, 15 Oct 83; “Robertson Answers Questions on MED’s 

Future,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, March-April 1983.
560 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

the action generated pessimism and produced an exodus of people seeking positions 

with a more secure future.90

Managing Work from Forward and Rear

In early 1981, the division had to balance its management of resources between 

the predictable decline of work in Saudi Arabia and the growing volume of work 

elsewhere in the region. Two years before the reduction in force imposed in 1983, 

General Albro had placed his deputy in Virginia, Col. James B. Hall, in charge of 

managing the programs in Egypt and Oman, where work for the Rapid Deployment 

Joint Task Force was developing into a major new responsibility for the division. 

Administratively, the reorganization made sense. The two active districts in Saudi 

Arabia, at Riyadh and Hafar al Batin, had their hands full with over $700 million 

in construction placement annually, all funded by the Saudi government.91 The 

projects in Egypt and Oman, by contrast, represented a part of the congressionally 

appropriated funds. 

Meeting all of the governmental regulations associated with congressional 

funding made careful tracking of the money imperative. Additionally, the other agencies involved in the construction program were located in Washington. Politically, 

the reorganization addressed Saudi sensitivities to the division’s involvement in work 

in other countries. Fixing responsibility for the U.S.-funded programs in the office in 

Virginia separated management of them from the Saudi-funded work and provided 

a clear distinction on overhead costs. As the prospect of work outside Saudi Arabia 

increased for the division, that separation became increasingly important.92

Shortly after Col. Claude D. “Buck” Boyd III arrived in mid-December 1981 

to replace Colonel Hall in Virginia, General Albro placed him in charge of all work 

outside Saudi Arabia. Albro retained direct control of the work in Saudi Arabia. 

Only one non-Saudi area, the field office in Jordan (which closed in August 1984) 

reported directly to division headquarters in Riyadh. This arrangement gave Boyd 

what he wanted, a separate, identifiable organizational element as the headquarters 

unit supporting the division’s non-Saudi work. Although created in 1982, the 

new management element officially became the Southwest Asia Construction 

90 Robertson to James C. Shirey, Pres., Russell & Axon, 15 Jun 83, p. 2, Walker box 6; Robertson 

to Bratton, 9 Aug 83, p. 3, Walker box 6; Schroder to Otaishan, 24 Sep 83, sub: Middle East Division S&A Costs, Walker box 7; all in OH, HQ USACE. “Reduction in Force: How It Affected MED 

Employees” and “Wheeler Readies Engineering for New Overseas Work,” both in Mt. Weather 

Bulletin, Fall 1983. 91 Memo, Albro to HQDA, 18 Apr 81, sub: Management of Construction Programs in Oman & 

Egypt, unmarked box, OH, HQ USACE. Intervs, Moorhus with Edinger, 9 Mar 95, p. 18; authors with 

Adrian Hromiak, 6 Feb 94, pp. 41–42; and Moorhus with Boyd, 9 Nov 95, pp. 24–25. 92 For this and the following paragraph, see Fact Sheet, Discussion of Work in Oman, 31 Dec 80, 

Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; Robertson to Bratton, 15 Feb 83. Intervs, Moorhus with Edinger, 9 

Mar 95, p. 18; authors with Adrian Hromiak, 6 Feb 94, pp. 41–42; and Moorhus with Boyd, 9 Nov 

95, pp. 24–25.
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 561

Management Office (SACMO) only in 1983.93 Wayne Henry, the chief of the 

Construction Programs Branch at the rear office, directed SACMO’s work. A 

contracting officer and staff located in Virginia, not the staff at the division headquarters in Riyadh, supported area office personnel. The rear office staff performed 

construction, comptroller, and personnel activities. Only if the work in Oman or 

Egypt were to grow substantially would the Corps consider establishing a “mini” 

district in Cairo to supervise work in both countries.94

In mid-1983, the Middle East Division’s rear headquarters in Virginia began 

searching for office space to replace quarters on Mt. Weather leased from the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency. In the autumn, the division announced that it 

would relocate its staff to a building in Winchester, twenty-five miles southwest of 

its current location. The move, in April 1984, contributed significantly to savings 

in operating costs.95

In the autumn of 1983, the Middle East Division hired Ralph Wheeler as chief 

of engineering in Winchester. During the selection process, Wheeler had expressed 

concerns about the division’s long-range prospects. In conversations with the deputy 

chief of engineering, Dick Wiles, Wheeler became convinced that the division 

could find work if it pursued leads with potential customers in its area of operations. 

Wheeler and Colonel Boyd supported Wiles’ recommendation to expand the Middle 

East Division’s list of customers. To realize this objective, Wiles promoted the 

division’s capabilities to both foreign and U.S. governmental agencies who had 

interests in the region. “Whenever we had an inkling of a project, I would write or 

send messages to the office of the military cooperation or the embassy or others 

and throw our hat in the ring.”96

In July 1984, Col. John M. “Jack” Dorr replaced Boyd as deputy and commander 

of division rear headquarters in Winchester. Dorr also supported Wiles’ effort to 

generate additional work. He described Wiles as the division’s “vice president 

for marketing,” with responsibilities comparable to a position vital to growth in 

any private-sector company. Over the next several years, the effort led by Wiles 

contributed substantially to the division’s new work in Bahrain, in Africa, for the 

Voice of America, and for other work in the region.97

93 Memo, Graham, 17 May 82, sub: After Action Report—General Albro’s Visit, unmarked box, 

1980–1992, TAD-RHA; Interv, Moorhus with Boyd, 9 Nov 95, pp. 24–25; Memo, Henry, 10 Jan 83, 

sub: Reorganization of Construction Programs Branch, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. For SACMO’s 

growing share of the work, see Middle East Div, “Organization Study, 1983,” n.d., p. 4, E-1-1, TADRHA; Middle East Div Cdrs Conf, 15–17 Oct 83, “Southwest Asia Construction Management Office, 

Middle East Division (Rear),” Bfg charts, maps, and tables, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 94 Fact Sheet, Discussion of Work in Oman, 31 Dec 80, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE; Robertson 

to Bratton, 15 Feb 83. Intervs, Moorhus with Edinger, 9 Mar 95, p. 18; authors with Hromiak, 6 Feb 

94, pp. 41–42; Moorhus with Boyd, 9 Nov 95, pp. 24–25. 95 “MED to Move to Winchester,” Mt. Weather Bulletin, Fall 1983; “MED’s Relocation Saves 

$1.6 Million,” Middle East Division News, May-June 1985. 96 “Wheeler Readies Engineering for New Overseas Work”; Intervs, Moorhus with Wiles, 21 Oct 

93, pp. 132–34, and with Joan Kibler, 11 Jan 95, p. 17. 97 Quote from Interv, Grathwol with Dorr, 11 Aug, 12 Sep, 26 Sep, 31 Oct 94, pp. 114–20. Intervs, 

Moorhus with Wiles, 21 Oct 93, pp. 132–34, and with Kibler, 11 Jan 95, p. 17.
562 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Dorr and Wheeler shared concerns about the division’s high overhead costs. 

In Dorr’s judgment, the Winchester staff was living beyond the revenues it would 

generate in the near future. To be attractive to potential customers, the division had 

to cut expenses, a task that Dorr approached “with a big cleaver.” A self-described 

“nitpicker” on issues of cost, Dorr marked up each month’s budget report with 

numerous questions and demands for explanation. He reduced staff by attrition, 

expanded the responsibilities of some full-time positions to cut down on part-time 

staff, and reduced other positions from full to part time.98

A projection from early in 1984 put the total value of all of the Middle East 

Division’s non-Saudi projects at over $385 million. This was small when compared 

with the estimated total costs for the Saudi program in the billions of dollars; but in 

contrast to the Saudi program, the non-Saudi work retained at least the possibility of 

growing. By August 1984, construction at both King Abdulaziz Military Academy 

and at King Khalid Military City was over 90 percent complete while the MODA 

and RSNF headquarters complexes both exceeded 80 percent completion. Of the 

projects, new housing for the Royal Saudi Naval Forces alone stood at less than 50 

percent completion.99

In mid-1984, the division began to track and to analyze the prospects outside 

Saudi Arabia, categorizing the pending work as “firm,” “high potential,” or “possible 

future projects.” Analysts estimated that to remain viable the division needed design 

assignments worth $12.2 million a year. By December, authorized and funded work 

for FY 1985 had reached $12.4 million, with another $3 million in authorized work 

for which funding was pending. The total, $15.4 million, made up the division’s firm 

workload. For FYs 1986 and 1987, including the totals for pending “high potential” 

work, the division’s analysts concluded that the division had sufficient work to 

sustain its engineering operations and its staff at division-level strength.100

By October 1983, General Robertson knew that opinion in Washington favored 

delaying the transfer of command back to Virginia for a year beyond June 1984. 

In December, Chief of Engineers Lt. Gen. Joseph K. Bratton confirmed that he 

wanted the division’s headquarters and commander to remain in Riyadh until the 

summer of 1985. He also announced that he would appoint another general officer to 

command the division from Riyadh when Robertson completed his tour. Throughout 

the transition, the division would maintain a headquarters forward office distinct 

from the Riyadh District office. Despite Bratton’s decision, Robertson remained 

committed to the early and progressive transfer of the headquarters support staff 

to Virginia.101

98 “Wheeler Readies Engineering for New Overseas Work”; Interv, Grathwol with Dorr, 11 Aug, 

12 Sep, 26 Sep, 31 Oct 94, pp. 114, 116–19. 99 Cost estimates taken from Fact Sheet, Potential Future Projs, 6 Apr 84, in Robertson Bfgs; 

“Briefing for HRH Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz, 2d Deputy Premier and Minister of Defense and 

Aviation,” Aug 84, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 100 “Maintaining Engineering Capability,” Dec 84, pp. 1 (quotes), 4–5, unmarked box, TADRHA. 101 Middle East Div Cdrs Conf Bfg Book, 15 Oct 83; Memo, Bratton, 6 Dec 83, sub: Request for 

MED Reorganization, unmarked box, TAD-RHA.
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 563

With headquarters functions incrementally moving from Riyadh to Virginia, 

and with construction projects active in Saudi Arabia and in other countries around 

the region, the Construction Division had to operate at two levels of authority. For 

programs continuing in Saudi Arabia, the Construction Division at headquarters 

functioned as a division-level element, providing supervisory oversight and support 

for the Riyadh and Al Batin Districts, which remained directly involved in the 

projects. For the missions outside Saudi Arabia, the Construction Division functioned 

as a district-level element and provided direct support. Throughout 1984 and into 

1985, the Construction Division had a suboffice in Virginia but remained in Riyadh 

as part of the forward headquarters.102

The division also adjusted its management of design contracts. The Saudi 

Ministry of Defense and Aviation had long urged that Saudi firms play a larger 

role in construction projects financed by the Saudi government. Between 1981 and 

1984, the division awarded two open-ended (indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity) 

contracts to Saudi Arabian architect-engineer firms for design work on numerous 

small projects. In the spring of 1984, the general director of military works, Lt. 

Col. Abdulaziz Otaishan, approved a plan advanced by the Middle East Division to 

negotiate and award an indefinite delivery contract for any future design requirements 

in Saudi Arabia.103

Relocating Command Authority

In the summer of 1984, General Bratton named Brig. Gen. James W. Ray to 

succeed Robertson as commander of the Middle East Division. Ray took command 

in mid-October 1984, but the retention of a general officer billet did not slow the 

measured transfer of the command’s focal point from Saudi Arabia to Virginia. In 

January 1985, Ray reassigned Col. Romayne E. “Rom” Schroder, deputy commander 

in Riyadh during the previous nineteen months, to Winchester “as part of the 

division’s overall reorganization plan.”104

Under Ray’s overall authority, Schroder supervised matters pertaining to 

programs in Saudi Arabia and general administrative or policy issues. Colonel 

Dorr, deputy commander in Virginia since the previous July, continued to exercise 

responsibility for all non-Saudi programs and for all contractual matters administered 

from that office. Schroder explained his relocation to division staff as an effort “to 

make the transition smoother as the division readies to pull out of Saudi.” It was 

“another visible symbol that the rest of the division headquarters really is moving 

102 Henry to Comptroller, 15 Feb 84, sub: Request for Reorganization of Construction Division 

(Rear), unmarked box, TAD-RHA; “News Briefs: Office Names Change,” Middle East Division 

News, August 1984. 103 Robertson to Otaishan, 4 Jun 84, sub: Saudi Arabian Architect-Engineer (A-E) Selection for 

an Open-Ended Contract, K-8-3, TAD-RHA. 104 “Ray Leads Middle East Division,” October 1984, and “Schroder Transfers to Winchester,” 

January 1985, both in Middle East Division News.
564 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

[to Virginia].” Shortly after Schroder’s transfer, the Construction Division also 

relocated from Riyadh.105

Despite the downtrend of work in Saudi Arabia, the Middle East Division 

still administered about eighty construction contracts worth approximately $700 

million in construction placement in 1985. The division began the year with a total 

work force of 1,173, down from more than 1,300 in 1984. In May, the division still 

maintained a staff of 823, plus dependents, in the kingdom but planned to reduce 

those numbers to under 500 by the end of the year.106

Throughout 1985, the division pursued work outside Saudi Arabia as opportunities arose. When the New York District of the Corps’ North Atlantic Division 

needed help with a new Army installation at Fort Drum in Upstate New York, the 

Middle East Division provided design support. Specifically, the division undertook 

to negotiate and award architect-engineer contracts for the industrial and aviation 

packages programmed for FY 1987. The Fort Drum project had a budget estimate of 

$1.2 billion, making it comparable in scope to some of the projects that the Middle 

East Division had supervised in Saudi Arabia.107

The division’s involvement in the Fort Drum project entailed conducting 

two studies. The first examined precast construction’s applicability to family 

housing in the project. The second sought lessons learned in the Saudi Arabian 

experience that might have relevance for the work at Fort Drum. Middle East 

Division personnel also designed an addition to a health clinic and a new child 

development center.

Consolidation and change occurred rapidly for the division in mid-1985. On 

1 May, Corps of Engineers headquarters issued the order, effective 1 July, to 

discontinue the Al Batin District, which had supervised construction at King Khalid 

Military City since 1977. Supervision of the remaining KKMC work passed to the 

Riyadh District, the only district left in Saudi Arabia. On 1 July, the Middle East 

Division officially relocated its headquarters from Riyadh to Winchester, Virginia. 

Because the division still had substantial work in Saudi Arabia, the chiefs of several 

headquarters elements—including construction and personnel—remained temporarily in Riyadh even though they had divisionwide responsibilities. Other elements 

that had more parochial responsibilities—safety, provost marshal, liaison—remained 

because their functions were closely linked to the Riyadh District.108

105 Quotation from “Schroder Transfers to Winchester”; “News Briefs: Construction Reorganizes,” 

Middle East Division News, March-April 1985. 106 Ray to Otaishan, 27 Mar 85, 22 May 85, sub: Extension of the Engineering Assistance Agreement, both in K-8-3, TAD-RHA; Schroder, “Annual Historical Summary Report [for 1985],” 1 Apr 

86, Current Files, OH, HQ USACE; Bfg, Middle East/Africa Projects Office [Oct 86], unmarked box, 

TAD-RHA (hereafter cited as MEAPO Bfg [Oct 86]). 107 For this and the following paragraph, see “MED Assists New York District on Fort Drum,” 

January 1985, and “MED Provides More Fort Drum Design,” March-April 1985, both in Middle East 

Division News. 108 Permanent Order no. 12–1, 1 May 85, sub: U.S. Army Engineer District, Al Batin . . ., Gen 

Files 32-1, and no. 8–1, 20 Mar 85, sub: U.S. Army Engineer Division, Middle East . . ., Current 
Reorienting the Engineer Effort, 1981–1986 565

Most important, General Ray remained in Riyadh and continued to command 

the division. Construction placement in Saudi Arabia for the fiscal year, just entering 

its final quarter when the headquarters relocated, approached $893 million. For the 

succeeding fiscal year, 1986, the division projected a sharp drop to $290 million 

in construction placement. The Riyadh District supervised the work through its 

thirteen field offices.109

In conjunction with all these changes, the division went through another round 

of personnel cuts. Plans called for the elimination of twenty-three existing spaces, 

only two of which were occupied. Reduction-in-force letters were scheduled to go 

out by 1 October. Even with the limited number of people being formally discharged, 

the specter of job loss hurt morale in the organization. The end of the year found 

the division’s strength under eight hundred with fewer than two hundred remaining 

in Saudi Arabia.110

Within a few weeks of the official transfer of division headquarters to Virginia, 

General Bratton’s successor as chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. E. R. Heiberg III, 

appointed General Ray as the new commander of the Corps of Engineers’ Europe 

Division (EUD), headquartered in Frankfurt, West Germany, a position that had 

opened unexpectedly. The appointment took effect on 1 October; for ten days, 

General Ray commanded both the Middle East Division and the Europe Division. 

On 10 October, Heiberg placed Colonel Schroder in command of the Middle East 

Division but retained Ray as “Principal Assistant Responsible for Saudi Arabian 

Programs” to the chief of engineers.111

The transfer of division headquarters out of Saudi Arabia marked an end to a 

very long chapter in the history of the Army engineers in the region. Although the 

engineer presence continued, for the first time since February 1952, the Corps of 

Engineers had no division headquarters located in the Mediterranean and Middle 

East area of operations. Although the chief of engineers retained General Ray as a 

principal adviser on Saudi affairs, command of the division had again reverted from 

a general officer to a colonel. Outside Saudi Arabia, the division anticipated $46 

million in construction placement for FY 1985 and $56 million for the following 

Files, both in OH, HQ USACE; “Headquarters Moves to Winchester,” Middle East Division News, 

May-June 1985. 109 Col Terence. J. Connell, “Change in Organizational Structure of Middle East Division,” 12 

Jul 85, box 54-2, Gen Files, OH, HQ USACE; Ray to Sheikh Abdul Rhaman Abu Haimid, 10 Jul 85, 

sub: Meeting with Sheikh Abu Haimid, 25 February 1985, K-8-3, TAD-RHA; Permanent Order no. 

12–1, 1 May 85; “Saudi Arabia: Still a Healthy Program” and “Headquarters Moves to Winchester,” 

both in Middle East Division News, March-April 1985. 110 “This Summer’s RIF: Its Effect on the Work Force,” May-June 1985, and “Managing Finances 

in Fiscal 1986,” July-August 1985, both in Middle East Division News; Interv, Moorhus with Ronald 

Friestad, 7 Feb 94, pp. 18–19; Ray to Otaishan, 22 May 85; Schroder, “Annual Historical Summary 

Report [for 1985]”; MEAPO Bfg [Oct 86]. 111 “Ray to Command Europe Division,” “MED to Remain in Winchester,” and “A Year of Change 

at MED,” all in Middle East Division News, July-August 1985.
566 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

year.112 Still, the work in Saudi Arabia was declining faster than the work in other 

countries was growing and the future of the organization was under scrutiny.

112 “Saudi Arabia: Still a Healthy Program.”
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 567

Months before the chief of engineers appointed Col. Romayne E. Schroder to 

succeed Brig. Gen. James W. Ray in mid-October 1985 as commander of the Middle 

East Division, the leadership of the Corps of Engineers began questioning the need 

to maintain a full-fledged division in the Middle East. As the debate developed 

throughout 1985, Middle East Division personnel argued forcefully that, despite 

the decline in work in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. military and the Corps of Engineers 

would be best served by preserving the organization as a full-fledged division. By 

the division’s own projections, work in the region seemed adequate to support a 

small division. Nonetheless, the Middle East Division passed out of existence, 

succeeded by a district-level operation which came to bear the name Middle East/

Africa Projects Office (MEAPO), with headquarters in Winchester, Virginia.1

In providing engineer services in the region, the Middle East/Africa Projects 

Office completed the work in Saudi Arabia; continued the expansion of its responsibilities into other areas; and, late in the decade, addressed a series of administrative 

changes initiated by the Office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington. By 1991, 

circumstances in the Middle East had changed so dramatically that the chief of 

engineers decided to re-create a division-level organization to manage military 

construction for the United States and its allies in the area.

Transition to the Middle East/Africa Projects Office

In early 1985, Corps headquarters in Washington began the debate over the future 

role of the Corps of Engineers in the Middle East by undertaking an assessment of 

its mission in the region. In February, David A. Spivey, chief of the Policy Planning 

Branch in the headquarters’ Engineering and Construction Division, and E. Scott 

Chronister, chief of the Organization and Studies Branch in Resource Management, 

submitted a proposal for a confidential study, “The Future of the Corps of Engineers 

1 For this and the next three paragraphs, see E. Scott Chronister and David A. Spivey, “Study 

Proposal: The Future of the Corps of Engineers in the Middle East,” 21 Feb 85; Memo, Chronister and 

Spivey to Maj Gen Hatch, Maj Gen Wall, Brig Gen Ray, Col Connell, Mr. Loschialpo, 13 May 85, 

sub: Draft Report on the Study of the Future of the Corps of Engineers in the Middle East; Chronister 

and Spivey, “The Future of the Corps of Engineers in the Middle East, Draft,” May 85, introduction; 

all in Current Files, Transatlantic Division–Resource Management (TAD-RM).

15

From Division to Middle East/

Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991
568 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

in the Middle East.” Maj. Gen. Mark J. Sisinyak, director of engineering and 

construction, approved the study on 13 March, with a schedule that would give him 

the results to present to the chief of engineers in late May.2

The Chronister-Spivey study addressed four major questions: What was the 

near (two-year) and midterm (five-year) need for a Corps of Engineers presence or 

capability in the Middle East? What military, political, and other factors influenced 

the need for Corps involvement in the Middle East? What organizational options 

existed for the Corps that would allow it to respond to the needs in the region? 

Finally, what were the staffing and funding implications of the organizational 

options identified? Chronister and Spivey surveyed written materials and interviewed 

thirty-six people, including the deputy commander at the time, Colonel Schroder; 

the division’s current commander, General Ray; and a former commander, Brig. 

Gen. Ames S. Albro Jr. The lone civilian interviewee from the Middle East Division 

was its chief of construction, William E. Crouthers.3

In a draft report prepared in May, Chronister and Spivey concluded that the 

work available to the Middle East Division outside Saudi Arabia would be limited 

in volume and would consist of a collection of projects spread out over a wide 

geographic area. The overhead costs associated with the dispersion of projects in 

widely separated, relatively underdeveloped countries would be high. They projected 

that the dollar value of the work over the next five years would be insufficient to 

sustain a full-service division such as the existing Middle East Division, which had 

just over one thousand employees at the time.4

Having concluded that the division was not sustainable in its existing form, 

Chronister and Spivey proposed that the remaining work in Saudi Arabia continue 

under the existing organization in Virginia until the work generated too little income 

to support its overhead staff. All work in the region outside Saudi Arabia “can and 

should be dealt with separately.” Reasoning that the volatility of the workload in 

the region dictated that only an organization with a large, stable existing workload 

could handle the fluctuations, the two analysts proposed that the Corps of Engineers’ 

South Atlantic Division or its Europe Division take over the Middle East Division’s 

work.5

Corps headquarters circulated the study to a very limited number of people, 

including the Middle East Division commander, General Ray. As Ray’s copy of the 

2 Chronister and Spivey, “Study Proposal,” 21 Feb 85; Memo, Chronister and Spivey to Hatch 

et al., 13 May 85; Chronister and Spivey, “The Future of the Corps of Engineers in the Middle East, 

Draft,” May 85, introduction. 3 Chronister and Spivey, “The Future of the Corps of Engineers in the Middle East, Draft,” May 

85, introduction, app. C. 4 Memo, Chronister and Spivey to Hatch et al., 13 May 85; Fact Sheet, Realignment, Middle East 

Div, USACE [United States Army Corps of Engineers], Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and Winchester, Virginia, attached to DF, Maj Gen Mark J. Sisinyak, 26 Jun 85, sub: Memorandum for Transmission to 

Secretary of the Army—HQ USACE Study on Future of the Corps of Engineers in the Middle East 

and Africa, Current Files, TAD-RM. 5 Chronister and Spivey, “The Future of the Corps of Engineers in the Middle East, Draft,” May 

85, introduction.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 569

draft report passed to the staff members with whom he shared it, it accumulated an 

array of marginal comments that sharply challenged the assumptions and conclusions 

therein.6

Arguments for Division Status

In responding to the Chronister and Spivey study, Middle East Division 

personnel argued that the demand for engineer services in the Middle East region 

would continue, an assertion based on “30 years of the Corps of Engineers [experience] in the Middle East, Africa, the Mediterranean area and Southwest Asia.” The 

division’s defenders cited the 1984 edition of World Military Expenditures and Arms 

Transfers, which indicated that military spending, even adjusted for inflation, was 

growing at 3.1 percent annually and would exceed $1 trillion in 1985. Moreover, 

the countries with the highest per capita spending on defense in the early 1980s 

were, in descending order, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Israel, 

Kuwait, and Libya. Advocates for the division asserted that “short term economic 

downturns,” such as the drop in oil prices cited by Chronister and Spivey, might 

slow but “will not stop these trends.”7

The division’s analysts also took a very different view of the volume of work 

currently available. Whereas the headquarters report found an estimated value of 

$7.593 million in “known firm” design for FY 1986, the division assessed the “firm/

funded” design workload at $13.209 million. The two studies were even farther apart 

in evaluating work that was less definite. The Chronister-Spivey study used $5.316 

million as an estimate of the “pending” design work. The division calculated “high 

potential” design—with a list of nine projects, including Voice of America, Egypt, 

Kuwait, Bahrain, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and Oman—as totaling 

$31.193 million, nearly six times the value of work anticipated by the headquarters 

analysts.8

 The two parties differed on anticipated construction placement for future 

years as well.

The division also argued that its staff offered unique capabilities that the Corps 

of Engineers should retain. The staff had extensive experience designing facilities 

appropriate for the region’s harsh environments. They had developed rare expertise 

in the design standards and criteria of the region and had the skills needed to manage 

construction in remote, underdeveloped areas with little logistical support. Staff 

members were familiar with regional customs, materials, products, and standards. 

They were practiced at dealing with local officials, and several were fluent in local 

languages. These assets meant that “the Division has been able to put engineers on 

6 Ibid.

7 Middle East Div, “Organizational and Workload Study for International Projects” [draft], May 

85, pp. 2, 13, unmarked box, Transatlantic Division–Records Holding Area (TAD-RHA), Winchester, 

Va.8 The comparisons are based on figures given in Chronister and Spivey, “The Future of the Corps 

of Engineers in the Middle East, Draft,” May 85, “Engineering Workload” section, and Middle East 

Div, “Organizational and Workload Study for International Projects” [draft], May 85, p. 7.
570 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

the ground, fully operational, within 48 hours notice.” Not surprisingly, the staff 

who prepared the reply to the Chronister-Spivey study concluded that “the Middle 

East Division is a valuable Corps resource which should be continued in the best 

interests of the Corps of Engineers to manage a major portion of international 

construction.”9

When General Sisinyak briefed the chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. E. R. Heiberg III, 

on 31 May, Heiberg asked for “a formal study on the Corps organization appropriate 

to respond to future projects in the Middle East and Africa.”10 To the study team of 

Chronister and Spivey, Heiberg added a former commander of the Riyadh District 

(1981–1983), Col. James R. “Bob” Whitley, who was serving as executive director 

of the Engineering and Construction Division at Corps headquarters. Heiberg asked 

that the team examine the option of retaining a division to manage future projects in 

the Middle East and Africa. Other options involved reassigning that responsibility 

to one of three other Corps divisions. On 8 and 9 August, representatives from 

each of the four divisions—Europe Division, Huntsville Division, South Atlantic 

Division, and Middle East Division—met in Winchester with Chronister, Spivey, 

and Whitley to review and discuss the practical questions involved in realigning 

engineer services in the Middle East.11

Following that meeting, General Ray marshaled all of the Middle East Division’s 

arguments into a seven-page letter with attachments. Ray challenged the scenarios 

Spivey and Chronister advanced. He described as “meaningless” any formula for 

predicting the division’s viability based exclusively on an analysis of “firm nonSaudi” workload. “Because the visibility of the ‘firm’ non-Saudi workload is only 

months in advance,” it would never appear in time to weigh the predictions. Only 

by including possible work and by taking into account the “steady rise in workload 

and proliferation of customers” that the division had recently experienced could 

analysis, in Ray’s judgment, offer a sound basis for future planning.12

Ray further argued that, in addition to “cost and staffing factors alone,” analysts 

should consider the need for the Corps to maintain “an organization that can be 

responsive to future projects in the region while maximizing the economic use 

of USACE [United States Army Corps of Engineers] resources.” Measured by 

this consideration, the Middle East Division “clearly has a technical advantage 

over other Corps organizations. . . . If disrupted, it would be several years before 

another organization could rebuild a cohesive work force that would understand 

and be compatible with operations in the area.” Dissipating the talent assembled by 

the Middle East Division “would lead to inefficiency, and any manpower savings 

9 Ibid.

10 Quotes from Memo, Col John H. Sullivan, [23 Jul 85], sub: Study of USACE Middle East/Africa 

Program Realignment Options, Current Files, TAD-RM. 11 Ibid.; “Managing Finances in Fiscal 1986,” Middle East Division News, July-August 1985; Fax, 

Chronister to Schroder, 5 Aug 85, with attachments, Current Files, TAD-RM. 12 Ltr, Ray, 26 Aug 85, sub: Study of USACE Middle East/Africa Program Realignment Options, 

endorsed by Schroder, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. Ray’s arguments are outlined in the five paragraphs 

that follow, and the quotes are from this document.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 571

that others might forecast . . . pale in comparison to the potential for disruption in 

technical capability.”

The sensitive political dynamics that characterized the Middle East, Ray 

observed, meant that “any radical change in the present customer-Corps” relationship 

might frustrate, prejudice, or preclude future Corps involvement in the region. Even 

more significantly, any “disruption in the continuity of Corps activities” could 

provoke concern in Saudi Arabia and its neighboring states that the United States 

was altering its position concerning security assistance in the region. 

The policies set by the Corps of Engineers should take into account the risks 

that were inherent in the politics of the area rather than assess them as impediments 

to operating there. Workloads in the region had always been hard to predict and had 

seldom been accurate beyond a single year. Citing planned construction activities 

funded by agencies of the U.S. government—the State Department’s program to 

upgrade security at embassies and the Agency for International Development’s 

plans for multimillion-dollar construction ventures in Africa—as well as the existing 

market in the region for facilities to support weapon systems, Ray asserted that the 

Corps of Engineers had an opportunity to develop new customers. The challenge 

for the Corps was “to convince these Agencies that the Corps is the best alternative 

to provide the full-service project management expertise they require; that we can 

accomplish it at a competitive price; and that we will deliver a quality product.”

Continuing his defense of the division, Ray noted that Winchester, Virginia, 

had the advantage of being located near many foreign embassies, which facilitated 

his staff’s contacts in making arrangements for their frequent travel in the region 

near all the foreign embassies. The division had succeeded in obtaining “passport 

and visa applications [in] an average processing time of seven days; one day service 

is not uncommon.” The extensive travel was no luxury. The staff accepted as part 

of their job the hardships of travel on short notice, the lack of a U.S. sponsor at 

the destination, frustrating customs procedures, language barriers, starkly different 

social customs, exposure to abnormal health risks, and family separations. Having 

the embassies close by eased at least some of the burden.

General Ray concluded that “a viable future workload exists in the Middle 

East/Africa and that this Division is both uniquely qualified and ideally located to 

extend to that work, and the broad range of customers involved, the special focus 

required for success.” Ray invoked five criteria that the Corps applied in evaluating 

architect-engineer firms: “professional qualifications necessary to perform the 

mission, specialized experience and technical competence in the type of work 

required, capacity to accomplish the work in the required time, past performance, 

experience in the geographic area.” Judging by these standards, the Middle East 

Division “clearly exceeds all other options” and deserved to be retained.

Despite General Ray’s arguments, General Heiberg chose not to preserve the 

division but did preserve the cohesive organization that the division had built. 

On 5 December 1985, Corps headquarters announced that a new Corps element, 

replacing the Middle East Division, would operate as a district-level entity under 

the South Atlantic Division beginning as early as 1 October 1986. The majority of 

the Middle East Division’s employees would remain in Winchester as part of the 
572 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

new organization.13 For another nine months, the organization remained without a 

new name and continued to operate as the Middle East Division.

Status of Projects in December 1985

In late December 1985, General Ray’s successor as commander for the reduced 

Middle East Division, Colonel Schroder, traveled to Atlanta to brief his new superior, 

the commander of the South Atlantic Division. Schroder briefly sketched the 35-year 

history of the Army engineers in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and named 

the countries and clients for whom the division performed work at that moment. 

He then offered details concerning three topics: the division’s closeout efforts in 

Saudi Arabia, the extent of current work in countries outside Saudi Arabia, and the 

staffing levels the division would have to maintain to accomplish the range of its 

activity.14

In describing the status of the division’s work in Saudi Arabia, Schroder 

mentioned the major construction projects either completed or “virtually completed.” 

By the end of the month, contractors would complete work on the multistory addition 

to the Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF) headquarters complex in Riyadh. The last 

remaining project at King Abdulaziz Military Academy, the water-treatment plant, 

was scheduled for completion in February 1986. At the naval bases, only the stadium 

at Jubayl was left unfinished. Contractors had work at the Ministry of Defense and 

Aviation (MODA) headquarters in Riyadh that would continue to the end of the 

summer of 1986. Work on the housing community for the Royal Saudi Naval Forces 

would last about as long. Work still remained at four locations for Peace Hawk/

Peace Sun construction to support the Saudi purchase of American F–5 and F–15 

aircraft. King Khalid Military City (KKMC) had the largest amount of unfinished 

work—$150 million of a total anticipated placement for 1986 of approximately $250 

million remaining—including the centrum, a hospital, housing in two sectors, and the 

Engineer Center and School. The division administered a $15 million construction 

support contract for KKMC. The Ordnance Program Division (OPD), the successor 

to the Saudi Arabia Mobility Program (SAMP) and the Saudi Ordnance Corps 

Program (SOCP), continued to support the Saudi Arabian Ordnance Corps.

Between December 1984 and Schroder’s December 1985 briefing, the division 

had resolved 153 of the 331 contractor claims. It had concentrated effort on arriving 

at settlements with the seven contractors that had 54 percent of the dollar value of 

the claims. Resolving the remaining 178 claims would constitute a major part of 

the division’s administrative task in closing out the Saudi program.

In addition to the programs remaining in Saudi Arabia, Schroder described for 

South Atlantic Division personnel the Middle East Division’s programs in other 

13 Schroder, “Annual Historical Summary Report [1985],” 1 Apr 86, p. 1, Current Files, Office of 

History (OH), HQ USACE, Alexandria, Va.; “MED to Remain in Winchester,” Middle East Division 

News, July-August 1985. 14 For this and the following four paragraphs, see “Col. Schroder Briefing to SAD [Saudi Arabia 

District],” 23 Dec 85, unmarked box, TAD-RHA (hereafter cited as Schroder Bfg, 23 Dec 85). 
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 573

countries in its area of operation. Those projects had advanced, and the division had 

new offices about to open in Liberia and Morocco. Schroder named the division’s 

clients and sketched the geographic expanse as shown in Table 12.

Schroder then outlined the Middle East Division’s involvement in each of the 

non-Saudi programs. In Oman, the division had active work at four sites: Al Khasab, 

Seeb, Masirah Island, and Thamarit. The projects had an estimated value of $271.8 

million, with Masirah Island representing 56 percent of the total. All work in Oman 

was covered by congressionally appropriated funds for U.S. military construction 

to support CENTCOM’s combat forces.15

In Kuwait, the division’s projects included managing design and construction 

for an expansion of a computer facility and for a flight training school. The division 

had also agreed to arrange procurement, design, and construction management for 

15 Ibid., p. 8, slide 38.

Table 12—Middle East Division Customers

December 1985

Saudi Arabia

Minister of Defense and Aviation

National Guard

U.S. Geological Survey

Egypt Egyptian Air Force/U.S. Air Force

Egyptian Army

Egypt/Saudi Arabia U.S. Navy

Sudan Sudanese Air Force

Bahrain Bahrain Defense Force

Kuwait Kuwait Air Force

Oman U.S. Air Force

Various, Middle East U.S. Central Command

Various, Africa

Agency for International Development/Trade Development 

Program

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 

Security Affairs

Various Voice of America

Source: “Col. Schroder Briefing to SAD [Saudi Arabia District],” 23 Dec 85, unmarked box, 

Transatlantic Division–Records Holding Area.
574 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

prefabricated steel shelters at four Hawk air-defense missile sites. The estimated 

value of work in Kuwait totaled $27.1 million. Work in Bahrain included an air 

base for fighter aircraft and, under separate Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, 

programs for an underground command center ($22 million) and a cantonment to 

house a new armored battalion ($100 million).16

The Middle East Division also had projects in Africa. In addition to the 

expanding programs in Egypt, the division became active in new programs in 

Liberia and more broadly through the Africa Civic Action program. In Liberia, the 

division acquired a new mission in early 1985—a five-year construction program 

involving military housing for the Liberian Army under an FMS case. About $14 

million worth of work remained of the original $40 million project, and the division 

expected to complete the work in a year. The division opened a resident office to 

supervise the work and awarded several construction contracts over the summer 

of 1985. One of the engineers involved in the project, Phil Dinello, observed that, 

when the housing was turned over to Liberian soldiers, they were visibly moved 

with gratitude. “It was touching and probably the only time in my career that I was 

involved in a project where the user was so elated to receive it.”17

The broader involvement in Africa grew out of the Africa Civic Action program 

devised by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 

Affairs (OASD/ISA) to encourage African military agencies to undertake construction to benefit their civilian populations. Schroder reported that as of December 1985 

the division had Africa Civic Action projects pending for an airfield and primary 

schools in Niger, medical centers in Sierra Leone and Malawi, and other work on 

the Ivory Coast.18

In addition to work for foreign countries, the division also served the Voice 

of America, an element of the U.S. Information Agency. In 1984, VOA asked the 

Middle East Division to embark on a $1.2 billion modernization program to upgrade 

its overseas transmitter installations and to construct several new broadcast stations. 

VOA programmed the construction over a five-year period as an effort to make 

high-quality, easily heard shortwave radio broadcasts available around the world. 

During FY 1985, the Corps managed $2 million of design placement and $3.4 million 

of construction placement for VOA projects.At the time of Schroder’s briefing, the 

division had projects pending for the VOA valued at $22.1 million.19

16 Ibid., pp. 12, 15, slides 54, 56, 57, 66. Fact Sheets, Kuwait Flight Training Sch, 9 Apr 84; Computer Bldg (K-4) Expansion, Kuwait, 6 Apr 84; Miscellaneous Aircraft Support Facilities, Kuwait, 

6 Apr 84; all in Brig Gen George R. Robertson, Middle East Division (Rear) Bfgs, 9–12 Apr 84, 

E-1-1, TAD-RHA, copy in R&D File 3151, Transatlantic Programs Center (TAC), Winchester, Va. 

(hereafter cited as Robertson Bfgs). 17 Schroder Bfg, 23 Dec 85, p. 15, slide 66; “MED Gains New Work in Liberia,” Middle East 

Division News, March-April 1985; “Liberia Housing Contracts Awarded,” Middle East Division News, 

July-August 1985. Quotation from Interv, Moorhus with Phil DiNello, 19 Sep 96, p. 26. 18 Schroder Bfg, 23 Dec 85, pp. 15–16, slide 67. 

19 Ibid.; “VOA, Bahrain Work Brightens Future,” Middle East Division News, October 1984; 

MFR, Paul D. Robinson, 20 Feb 85, sub: VOA, USGS [United States Geological Survey] FY 1985 

Construction and Design Placement, SA-1176, TAD-RHA.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 575

Adjusting to a New Entity

The announcement in late 1985 by the chief of engineers, Heiberg, that the 

Middle East Division would become a district-level element of the South Atlantic 

Division left the division’s staff in limbo. Despite the wide-ranging responsibilities 

and work in hand that Schroder described in his briefing to the South Atlantic 

Division commander, the new status required additional staff reductions. Key staff 

members sought assignments in late 1985 and early 1986 that promised greater job 

security, and the outplacement programs operated by the Corps began to work too 

well. General Ray, who began as commander of the Europe Division in October 

1985, worked hard and with considerable success to help place staff members from 

Saudi Arabia in positions opening in the Europe Division. The departures threatened 

the Middle East Division’s effectiveness because many of the departing personnel 

had important roles in wrapping up the work in Saudi Arabia.20

On 28 April 1986, another organizational adjustment emphasized the Middle 

East Division’s changing role. Corps headquarters redesignated the Riyadh District, 

activated in January 1967, as the Riyadh Area Office effective 30 April. The area 

office continued to monitor the remaining work in Saudi Arabia. For FY 1987, its 

20 “New Requirements for Outplacement Registration,” Middle East Division News, JanuaryFebruary 1986; Intervs, authors with Patricia Hill, 2 Nov 93, pp. 18–19, and with Phil Butler, 19 

Nov 93, p. 18.

Housing built in Liberia, 1986
576 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

staff allowance of fourteen persons was sufficient to manage warranty inspections 

and adjustments after the Saudis took possession of facilities.21

The staff in Riyadh continued its work throughout 1986 and oversaw the 

completion of three significant Saudi Arabian projects. In February, contractors 

completed the seven-story addition to the RSNF headquarters in Riyadh, nearly 

six years after the division had turned over the original headquarters structure. On 

4 May, the district participated in the dedication ceremony for the headquarters of 

the Ministry of Defense and Aviation, a $320 million complex equivalent to the 

Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Finally, in late summer, contractors completed the 

family-housing complex and related support facilities for RSNF officers and enlisted 

men. The complex, constructed in Al Kharj, near Riyadh, at a cost of $356 million, 

contained five hundred twenty houses. Two hundred units were intended for use by 

MODA personnel, while the remainder housed naval personnel.22

In mid-August 1986, Heiberg announced that the new Corps element would bear 

the name Middle East/Africa Projects Office and retain the location in Winchester 

that the Middle East Division had established. Although not named as such, MEAPO 

would have the “full stature, rights, responsibilities, and authorities of a district” 

under the South Atlantic Division. The new “projects office” had constructionmanagement responsibility for the Middle East (except Israel), the entire continent 

of Africa, and countries of Southwest and South Asia as far east as Burma.23

Heiberg issued special instructions to govern the alignment of the new entity 

for one year. For the program in Saudi Arabia, MEAPO would continue to have 

division-level authority and the MEAPO commander would work with Heiberg’s 

“Principal Assistant and Representative for Saudi Arabian Programs [General 

Ray] for all guidance and assistance.” All contracting authority would flow from 

Corps headquarters in Washington to MEAPO rather than through the South 

Atlantic Division, including contracting authority for non-Saudi work. Heiberg 

also instructed the South Atlantic Division commander and staff to refrain from 

“any TDY [temporary duty] trips to Saudi Arabia during the transition year.” In 

October 1987, at the end of the transition year, the special provisions would lapse 

and MEAPO would become fully subordinate to the South Atlantic Division.24

MEAPO’s designation as a projects office had a curious ring for employees of 

the former Middle East Division. No one understood what the title meant. It did not 

have the connotation of a district, and yet people felt that their responsibilities made 

them “more than a district.” The initialism MEAPO, they commented mordantly, 

21 Permanent Orders no. 15–1, 28 Apr 86, Gen Files, OH, HQ USACE; Info Paper, 1 Feb 86, sub: 

USAED-ME Organization Required for Riyadh, FY 1988, p. 3, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; “A Little 

of Yesterday,” Middle East Division News, Summer 1986. 22 “Three Major Saudi Projects Wrap Up,” Middle East Division News, Summer 1986; “Information 

Booklet, COE Customers in MED,” 30 Nov 81, p. IV-9, box 3, access. no. 77-92-0002, Washington 

National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md.; Bfg Outline, marked in longhand “Heiberg Briefing, 14 July 86, Transition,” unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 23 Memo, Heiberg, 19 Aug 86, sub: Approval of MED/South Atlantic Division Realignment, box 

54-2, Gen Files, OH, HQ USACE. 24 Ibid.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 577

sounded like a dog food. The reductions in personnel continued. Employees feared 

that the name change was just another step toward eliminating the entire staff and 

dissolving the organization altogether.25

Some voices argued against this discouraging view. The deputy commander, 

Col. John M. Dorr, insisted to staff that the reorganization had preserved virtually 

intact the talent and experience that the Middle East Division had assembled over 

time. The chief of engineers had not scattered personnel among several other 

Corps offices as might have happened. Moreover, Heiberg’s special provisions 

had preserved for MEAPO some of the characteristics of a division, at least for a 

time. In a visit to Winchester, the South Atlantic Division commander, Brig. Gen. 

C. E. Edgar III, ensured the MEAPO staff that he saw no indication of a decline 

in the volume of work that would warrant moving the program out of Winchester.

Nonetheless, rumors persisted that MEAPO was a “short-term organization” and 

that the headquarters office would ultimately move to Atlanta. Because of such 

perceptions, Horry T. Johns, who replaced Ralph Wheeler as chief of engineering 

in December 1986, faced difficulties recruiting engineers, even though he could 

point to what he called “a stabilizing, sustaining workload.”26

The relationship with the South Atlantic Division preserved for MEAPO a great 

deal of autonomy of action. Col. D. Fred Butler succeeded Schroder, who retired in 

June 1987, as MEAPO commander. Staff continued efforts to develop projects in 

the region. Whereas the Mediterranean Division had had work placement in 1974 

of $12.6 million, MEAPO anticipated placement in FY 1987 of $99.7 million.27

Ordnance Program Division

In December 1985, Colonel Schroder had conducted a rapid survey of the Middle 

East Division’s activities for the South Atlantic Division engineer who was about to 

assume command of the Middle East Division. In that briefing, Schroder mentioned 

only in passing the Ordnance Program Division, the successor to the Saudi Arabia 

Mobility Program. In fact, by the time the Middle East Division became the Middle 

East/Africa Projects Office in 1986, the program of support to the Saudi Arabian 

Army Ordnance Corps (SAAOC) had become the most enduring Corps of Engineers 

program in the kingdom. 

Since the program’s origins in 1967, it had also become larger in dollar 

value than nearly all of the construction programs that the Corps of Engineers 

had managed in Saudi Arabia. Between 1967 and 1972, the value of the Corps’ 

portion of the ordnance program amounted to $97.8 million. By 1977, after a full 

25 Intervs, Moorhus with Richard Wiles, 21 Oct 93, p. 136; with Joan Kibler, 11 Jan 95, p. 17; with 

Ronald Friestad, 7 Feb 94, pp. 18–19. 26 Interv, Grathwol with Col (Ret) John M. Dorr, 11 Aug, 12 Sep, 26 Sep, 31 Oct 94, p. 131; “A 

New Charter as Projects Office,” Fall 1986, and “Recruitment Poses Biggest Challenge,” JanuaryFebruary 1987, both in Middle East/Africa News. 27 “A New Charter as Projects Office”; “A Firm Base for MED’s Future,” Middle East Division 

News, Summer 1986. The figures are not adjusted for inflation.
578 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

decade of operation, the estimated total value of activities under the Saudi Arabia 

Mobility Program and its successor, the Saudi Arabian Ordnance Corps Program 

administered by the Ordnance Program Division, approached three-quarters of a 

billion dollars.28 That year, the Saudi Council of Ministers approved a continuation 

of services by both the Corps of Engineers and by the contractor for the program, 

Bendix-SIYANCO. Funding for the FMS case through which the Saudi Arabian 

government paid for the services was increased by $604.6 million in 1977 to cover 

the extension of the program.29

In reporting on the SOCP to a congressional subcommittee in 1979, the Middle 

East Division engineer, General Ellis, described the program as an “anomaly among 

our programs because it includes very little construction.” It consisted rather of 

advising and training SAAOC personnel in logistics management through an 

arrangement with a contractor. The Corps further assisted the SAAOC by contracting 

for equipment to modernize the Saudi fleet of nonarmored vehicles, by providing 

limited maintenance support, and by disbursing funds for the contracts awarded 

by SAAOC.30

Although an acknowledged anomaly, the ordnance program continued into the 

1980s because, as Prince Sultan, the minister of Defense and Aviation, told Ellis 

personally, he was “well satisfied” with the support that the division provided to the 

Saudi Ordnance Corps. By September 1979, the existing FMS case stood at over $1 

billion. At that point, the ordnance program had thousands of line items to track in 

its maintenance, supply, and repair operations. The IBM equipment that supported 

the logistical system was by then ten years old; and the Middle East Division urged 

the SAAOC to update its equipment and software, using the FMS case for financing. 

The division also assisted the SAAOC with new construction to provide additional 

warehouses, vehicle storage sheds, maintenance shops, and housing complexes for 

Ordnance Corps personnel throughout the kingdom.31

In late March 1980, the Corps redefined the mission of the Ordnance Program 

Division. The redefinition included “assisting the Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance 

Corps (SAAOC) in operating and managing the Ordnance Corps Logistics system at 

the Headquarters, directorate and field site levels (to include the Ordnance School),” 

working with and helping the SAAOC headquarters staff to execute and administer 

contracts on behalf of the Saudi Arabian government. These contracts secured 

28 “Report to Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States: Perspectives on Military 

Sales to Saudi Arabia,” 26 Oct 77, p. 38, Walker box 6, OH, HQ USACE. 29 Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE), “Annual Historical Review, 1 October 1976–30 September 1977,” p. 11 (hereafter cited as OCE, AHR, FY 1977). 30 U.S. Congress, House, Activities of the United States Army Corps of Engineers in Saudi Arabia. 

Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe and The Middle East (Lee H. Hamilton [Indiana], 

Chairman), of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, p. 3 (hereafter cited 

as Hamilton Comm Hearings). 31 Ellis to Morris, 19 Sep 79, pp. 9–10, and 11 Jan 80, pp. 10–11, both in Walker box 6, OH, HQ 

USACE. 
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 579

personal services and supplies required for operation and support of the “logistics 

system and for SAAOC construction projects throughout the Kingdom.”32

In September 1980, the U.S. Congress approved a new three-year sales case 

with a two-year option. Several months before, in July 1980, the Saudi Maintenance 

Company Ltd. (SIYANCO) replaced the joint venture of Bendix-SIYANCO as 

provider of the technical-services personnel needed to support the SOCP. In many 

cases, the same people stayed on under the new contract; but the managing company 

was now more clearly Saudi Arabian. The contract carried a fixed price of $110 

million and a term of three years. In a short span of months, SIYANCO also won 

the life-support services contract for King Khalid Military City and the operations 

contract for the port at Ras al Mishab. At KKMC, it succeeded the MorrisonKnudsen Saudi Arabia Consortium (MKSAC). At Ras al Mishab, it succeeded 

Pacific Architects and Engineers. SIYANCO remained the SOCP technical-services 

contractor throughout the 1980s.33

The Ordnance Program Division remained active in Saudi Arabia as a forward 

element of the Middle East Division after division headquarters relocated to 

Virginia and continued operations under its successor organization, the Middle 

East/Africa Projects Office. In late 1981, a total of thirty-five persons—thirteen 

military and twenty-two civilians (reversing the ratio of military to civilians of the 

late 1960s)—staffed OPD at six locations around Saudi Arabia. They provided 

support and advice concerning maintenance, supply, automated data processing, 

contract administration, financial management, training, and construction. OPD 

continued to advise the Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance Corps. The SAAOC now 

managed an increasingly sophisticated system of maintenance and supply, servicing a 

growing range of Saudi Arabian Army equipment: tanks, armored personnel carriers, 

artillery, trucks, generators, engineer equipment, forklifts, ground missile systems, 

air-defense guns, electronic instruments and testing equipment, and a wide range 

of commercial vehicles. The SAAOC ran programs through the Ordnance Corps 

Center and School at Taif to train its own personnel. It also supervised construction 

of its maintenance and supply facilities, barracks, bachelor officers quarters, mess 

halls, and base support facilities.34

OPD supported these activities directly and through the contract for technical 

services for which the OPD chief served as contracting officer. Under the contract, 

SIYANCO deployed about one thousand two hundred employees who worked 

directly for SAAOC officers and noncommissioned officers at sites throughout the 

kingdom. OPD also served as the contact point between the SAAOC and the U.S. 

32 Maj James F. Rosebery, “Ordnance Program Division (OPD), Historical Summary, 1986,” 10 

Feb 87, p. 4, Current Files, Transatlantic Division–Public Affairs Office (TAD-PAO) (hereafter cited 

as Rosebery, OPD Hist Sum: 1986). 33 Ibid.; Ellis, “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,” Informal 

Bfg, 11 Mar 80, p. 7, Current Files, TAD-PAO; Ellis to Morris, 24 May 80, p. 8, Walker box 6, OH, 

HQ USACE; Albro to Morris, 21 Sep 80, pp. 2–3, 8, box 1, access. no. 77-92-0001, WNRC; Albro 

to Bratton, 7 Mar 81, p. 4, unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 34 Fact Sheet, Ordnance Prog Div, 30 Nov 81, in Middle East Div, “Information Booklet,” Dec 

81, box 3, access. no. 77-92-0002, WNRC.
580 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

government on all FMS-related activities. The sales cases funded the technical 

services contract with SIYANCO; the cost of operations for OPD/Middle East 

Division; construction and rehabilitation; procurement of commercial and tactical 

military vehicles; support for military equipment; and supplies, training, and repair, 

all purchased from American companies.35

During the 1980s, the program changed little, although the manner of its 

execution evolved continuously. On 12 July 1983, OPD opened a new field site at 

Hafar al Batin to coordinate work for the SAAOC at King Khalid Military City. 

A month later, it closed its site at Jiddah. The SAAOC exercised the options in its 

contract with SIYANCO to extend it to the full five years and renewed it in 1986. 

The sales cases through which the Saudi Arabian government paid the costs of 

support by the Corps of Engineers continued in uninterrupted succession. Between 

1972 and 1986, the three major sales cases amounted to $3.72 billion. A multiplicity 

of smaller sales cases accounted for another $1.4 billion. In addition to the $5.12 

billion spent since 1972, the program continued with the ninety-two FMS cases that 

remained active in 1986.36

When the division moved its headquarters from Saudi Arabia to Virginia, in the 

summer of 1985, a question arose about the appropriate location of the Ordnance 

Program Division. In the summer of 1986, the division commissioned a study 

team that recommended three options. OPD could be transferred to the U.S. Army 

Security Assistance Command under the Army Materiel Command. It could remain 

an element equivalent to a district under MEAPO. It could be transferred to the U.S. 

Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia under CENTCOM. The leadership in the 

Office of the Chief of Engineers consistently expressed a willingness to relinquish 

the program provided that those in favor of a change could persuade Prince Sultan 

to accept it.37

Ultimately, the Saudi Arabian government refused to endorse a transfer of 

the support program for its Ordnance Corps to any other agency and insisted on 

continued involvement by the Corps of Engineers. The Ordnance Program Division 

continued to function under MEAPO; by the end of the decade, the program 

distributed about $10 million each month for commercial repair parts, supplies, and 

services in support of the SAAOC.38

What began as the Saudi Arabia Mobility Program in 1967 and became the 

Saudi Ordnance Corps Program in 1973 continued to operate in much the same way 

into the 1990s under the Ordnance Program Division. In August 1990, Iraq attacked 

its neighbor state Kuwait and thereby threatened Saudi Arabia. An international 

coalition led by the United States took quick action to send military units to defend 

Saudi Arabia. When the first of these units attached to Operation Desert Shield

35 Ibid.

36 Rosebery, OPD Hist Sum: 1986.

37 Interv, Moorhus with Brig Gen Eugene S. Witherspoon, 23 Feb 95, pp. 15–16.

38 Col David F. Matthews, “The Ordnance Program Division: For More Than 20 Years, Helping 

the Saudis Become Self-Sufficient,” Middle East/Africa News, July 1989.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 581

arrived in the Arabian Peninsula, the personnel of the Ordnance Program Division 

were there to meet and to support them.39

Closing Out the Saudi Program Under the Middle East/Africa 

Projects Office

The Middle East/Africa Projects Office inherited the Ordnance Program Division 

and all the other programs that the Middle East Division had administered in and 

outside of Saudi Arabia. During five years of operations, MEAPO oversaw the 

end of the construction program in Saudi Arabia and the continued evolution of its 

responsibilities throughout the Gulf region and in Africa. 

Very little military construction remained in Saudi Arabia by the time of 

MEAPO’s official activation in October 1986. In one of its early public functions 

as the successor to the Middle East Division, MEAPO turned over to the U.S. 

Geological Survey the $33 million complex for which the construction contract 

had been awarded in March 1982. Of the remaining $70 million in outstanding 

construction in the kingdom, King Khalid Military City accounted for the largest 

portion. Ten contracts remained active at KKMC, but most of them involved small 

projects. On 30 September 1986, the Al Batin Resident Office still had sixty-six 

staff members but closed before the end of September 1987.During 1987, the Saudi 

Arabia Area Office, successor to the Riyadh District since April 1986, reduced its 

staff from ninety-nine to thirty-three employees.40

On 12 April 1988, the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation hosted a quiet 

ceremony and luncheon marking the formal end of the role that the Corps had played 

in the kingdom since the signing of the Engineer Assistance Agreement in 1965. 

The list of honored guests included thirty Corps of Engineer officers, some retired, 

and civilian employees including the MEAPO public affairs officer, Joan Kibler, 

the only woman invited. On that occasion, the chief of engineers, General Heiberg, 

observed: “The Saudis asked us to bring in our standards for construction and to 

set up a training program for Saudi engineers. In providing this huge amount of 

construction and in training the cadets to assume this mission, we have helped Saudi 

Arabia ensure peace through strength.” Heiberg acknowledged the clear benefits to 

the United States: “We have learned more about engineering and construction as a 

result of being here, and we have learned more about you as a people.” In a tangible 

way, the Saudi Arabian program had also benefited the American economy. Most of 

the $355 million spent on the 133 design contracts had gone to American architect39 Maj James Hayes, “OPD, SOMC Employees Support Desert Storm,” April 1991, and “OPD 

Supports Saudi Land Forces During Desert Storm,” August-September 1991, both in Transatlantic 

News. 40 “USGS Complex Turned Over to Client,” Fall 1986, p. 21, and “Area Office Manages Saudi 

Work,” Summer 1986, both in Middle East/Africa News; “Staffing Data—FY 86–95,” 27 Sep 94, 

Current Files, TAD-RM; Contract Closeout Schedule [Jan or Feb 87], unmarked box, TAD-RHA; 

“Saudi Closeout on Schedule,” Middle East/Africa News, November-December 1987.
582 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

engineer firms, and U.S. specifications in the designs had led to procurement of $1 

billion worth of materials and equipment from the United States.41

In a special part of the ceremony, Heiberg and one of his predecessors, Lt. 

Gen. (Ret.) Fred Clarke, paid tribute to the long-standing relationship between the 

two engineering establishments. They installed the director of the Saudi General 

Directorate of Military Works, Col. Abdulaziz Al-Otaishan, as an honorary member 

of the Corps of Engineers regiment. This was the first time such a distinction had 

been extended to anyone outside the United States.42

Within a month of the ceremony, only thirteen employees remained in the Saudi 

Arabia Area Office to oversee the remaining work of closing out contracts. The 

office finished September 1988 with a staff of three. By then, the only significant 

Corps presence in Saudi Arabia was the Ordnance Program Division, with a staff of 

thirty civilians and military who continued to advise and support the Saudi Arabian 

Ordnance Corps.43

In 1951, and again in 1963, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers went to Saudi 

Arabia at the invitation of that nation’s government. The Corps, upon completing 

its work in the 1980s, scaled down its operations and withdrew as it had in the early 

1960s. The concluding ceremony that the Saudis hosted in April 1988 took place in 

an atmosphere of celebration, satisfaction, and mutual respect. No engineer officers 

remained in the kingdom. Nonetheless, the ties between the U.S. Army engineers 

and their Saudi counterparts remained vital and strong.

Projects Throughout the Region

While the Middle East/Africa Projects Office presided over the conclusion of the 

Corps of Engineers’ construction program in Saudi Arabia, it continued to pursue 

projects elsewhere in the region. MEAPO successfully expanded its list of customers 

to new countries and continued to serve U.S. governmental agencies such as Voice 

of America, the United States Information Agency (USIA), and OASD/ISA. The 

Projects Office also found new customers among the military commands, including 

U.S. Army, Europe; European Command; and Pacific Command.44

Oman

When the Middle East Division initially undertook the program in Oman in 

1980, the Department of Defense paid for the first year of work with contingency 

funds because the international situation dictated a quick start. Construction costs 

in following years depended on congressional appropriations. To conform to the 

41 “Ceremony Marks End of Saudi Program,” Middle East/Africa News, March-April 1988 (includes quote from Heiberg); “Corps Ends Saudi Mission,” Engineer News Record, 21 April 1988; 

Comments on Draft Ms, 10 Mar 98. 42 Joan Kibler, “Saudis Host Close-Out Ceremony,” Engineer Update, May 1988. 43 Ibid.; “Staffing Data—FY 86–95.”

44 Bfg for Mr. Allen Carton and Lt Col James Behan, 1 Jun 90, unmarked box, TAD-RHA.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 583

procedures necessary to secure congressional funding, construction at Masirah 

Island, Seeb, and Thamarit was divided into projects that relied on yearly funding 

from Congress. Funding limitations and unexpectedly high costs caused slippage 

that stretched the program beyond the original three-year schedule. Work at Masirah 

Island, Seeb, and Thamarit developed more in sequence than simultaneously as 

originally planned. Furthermore, the Omani government enlarged the program with 

“constant request[s] for additional facilities.”45

Early in the program, with the fall of the shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of 

Afghanistan fresh in memory, the U.S. Congress willingly provided funds for the 

construction in Oman. As these events receded from immediate concern, Congress 

showed less inclination to fund overseas bases owned by a foreign government. 

Funding dropped considerably in 1984 and 1985, although Congress appropriated 

limited amounts in later years for small construction packages, especially housing 

and offices for the U.S. Air Force contractor responsible for caretaker support.46

As a result of the congressional unwillingness to appropriate funds, construction 

activity in Oman ceased in early 1987. By this time, MEAPO had finished the majority 

of its construction there and had signed over all completed projects to the U.S. Air 

Force. MEAPO placed the military construction program on standby status until the 

Air Force could reprogram funds for the FY 1987 program. Effective 1 June 1987, 

the Corps downgraded Oman’s area office to a resident office.47

The construction program remained on hold for nearly a year and a half. After 

the reprogramming of funds by the U.S. Air Force, small programs for FYs 1987 

and 1988 recommenced in the autumn of 1988. In August, the Corps awarded an 

$18.3 million contract for the combined FY 1987–1988 program to a joint venture, 

H. B. Zachary Company of San Antonio and Consolidated Contractors Company of 

Oman.The construction package included an administrative building, a building for 

communications and maintenance management, a supply building, warehouses, and 

a foam deluge system at Seeb. Similar buildings were constructed at Thamarit and 

Masirah Island. MEAPO also supervised construction of living compounds at the 

sites and the renovation of a mess hall at Masirah Island. In June 1990, contractors 

essentially completed the FY 1987–1988 military construction program in Oman, 

with only the navigational aids awaiting testing in September. Construction for the 

two fiscal years came to a total of $19.1 million.48

45 Draft Memo, 4 Nov 80; Interv, Moorhus with Roger Thomas, 27 Aug 96, pp. 25, 39–41; Memo, 

Andrews, [Jun 82], sub: After Action Report, Oman Area Office, June 1981–June 1982,” unmarked 

box, TAD-RHA. Quote from Interv, Frank N. Schubert with Lt Col James Andrews, 21 Jun 82, pp. 

9b, 15. 46 Interv, John T. Greenwood with Col Pat Stevens IV, 13 Aug 85, pp. 9–11.

47 Bfg, Col Butler, Ofcrs Call Presentation, 25–26 Apr 88, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; “Oman 

Program Placed on Stand-by Status,” Middle East/Africa News, May-June 1987. 48 Interv, John T. Greenwood with Capt Wes Reynolds, 17 Jun 87, p. 7. “Focus on Oman: After 

Long Delay, FY 87–88 Program Underway,” June 1989; “MEAPO Awards $60 Million in Contracts,” 

July-August 1988; “FY 87–88 Oman Program Complete,” May 1990; all in Middle East/Africa News. 

Bfg for Carton and Behan, 1 Jun 90.
584 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

In September 1989, the Corps awarded a $7.6 million contract to the Zachary 

joint venture for the FY 1989 program, which included petroleum, oil, and lubricants 

(POL) storage and distribution at Seeb and runway lighting at Masirah Island. Small 

projects undertaken as part of the FY 1990 program included additional warehouses 

at Seeb and Thamarit and airfield improvements at Thamarit. Contractors finished 

these projects quickly. On 4 March 1991, the Air Force accepted the completed 

construction; the Oman Resident Office closed on 7 March.49

In all, the Corps had managed the construction of over $300 million worth of 

facilities in Oman. The Corps of Engineers and its contractors, supervised by the 

Middle East Division and then the Middle East/Africa Projects Office, produced 

four quality air bases in Oman and received high praise from U.S. Air Forces in 

Europe for their work. The construction and expenditures served both American 

and Omani forces effectively during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 

Despite some of the difficulties associated with the location and lack of amenities, 

many Corps personnel enjoyed their assignments in Oman and working with the 

Omani people.50

Kuwait

MEAPO’s work in Kuwait consisted of completing projects that the Middle 

East Division had begun early in the decade. Only late in the decade did new work 

come to the Projects Office. In August 1989, the Kuwait Defense Ministry asked 

MEAPO to design and construct three high-priority facilities for the Kuwait Air 

Force’s purchase of F–18s scheduled to arrive in January 1992. The estimated 

$35 million project included a training facility, a missile maintenance and storage 

building, and an addition to a technical institute at Al Jaber Air Base southeast of 

Kuwait City. Because of the pressure of deadlines, MEAPO insisted on having its 

own sales case with Kuwait and using U.S. firms or joint ventures between U.S. 

and Kuwaiti firms for the construction. MEAPO proposed to design the facilities 

in house, using U.S. Navy facilities in California as a basis for adaptation. MEAPO 

also planned to use expedited construction contracting, that is, issuing a request for 

proposal based on the current design and awarding a fixed-price contract that would 

49 Robert G. Dow, Serial Ltr no. SOAF-89-048, 30 Sep 89, sub: Contract no. DACA 78-89-C0028, FY 89 MILCON Program, Sultanate of Oman, Award of FY 89 Program, box 1, box Z-4-6 

(Zachary), TAD-RHA; “FY 87–88 Oman Program Complete”; “Transfer and Acceptance of Military 

Real Property, MEAPO to TAC, DEE (AFRCE), Job no. FY 1989 Seeb, Contract no. DACA 78-

89-C-0028,” 4 Mar 91; Bfg for Carton and Behan, 1 Jun 90; “Oman Office Closes,” Transatlantic 

News, March 1991. 50 “Oman Office Closes”; Intervs, Moorhus with James J. Edinger, 9 Mar 95, pp. 13, 16, 27, and 

John T. Greenwood with Ralph Wheeler, 6 Nov 85, pp. 22–23. Edinger, chief of construction and 

deputy area engineer, recalled that the Omani people were probably the best he ever worked with. 

Wheeler noted that Oman is “one of the best places that we’ve worked in.”
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 585

be modified during construction. However, the F–18 facilities project was cut short 

by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.51

The destruction caused by that invasion led to the Corps of Engineers’ continued 

involvement in Kuwait. In anticipation of liberation, Kuwaiti officials began 

contingency planning to restore civil services and turned to the United States for 

help. On 15 December 1990, the Defense and State Departments, which had joint 

responsibility for the effort, signed agreements with the government of Kuwait 

on emergency assistance and reconstruction. In January 1991, the Corps received 

the first formal request from Kuwait for emergency management assistance and 

accepted a $46.3 million sum to begin the first ninety-day emergency phase. The 

Corps was designated to make damage assessments and manage contracts to restore 

infrastructure and systems controlled by the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry 

of Electricity and Water, and the National Guard. To manage the effort, MEAPO 

established the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office (KERO) under Col. Ralph V. 

Locurcio of the Savannah District.52

At 3:00 a.m. on 17 January 1991 (the evening of 16 January in the United 

States), a coalition of UN forces launched airstrikes on Iraqi military positions. 

On 28 January 1991, a KERO advance party traveled to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, to 

begin contracting actions and logistical purchases to support the reconstruction of 

Kuwait. On 3 March, just a week after the allied attack on 24 February that liberated 

Kuwait in one hundred hours, the KERO team awarded eight contracts. The next 

day, about forty Corps employees moved to Kuwait City to help rebuild a country 

shrouded in the acrid smoke of hundreds of fires set at the country’s oil wells by the 

retreating Iraqis.53 The Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office continued its mission 

in Kuwait to early 1992.

Bahrain

In Bahrain, MEAPO maintained work on the indoor recreation facility for the 

U.S. Navy carried over from the Middle East Division. Starting in July 1987, the 

contractor, J&P (Bahrain) W.L.L., constructed the $1.5 million facility at the Navy’s 

administrative support unit in Manama in only fifteen months. The Corps supervised 

the construction through a project office and in the final stages through the resident 

office in Oman. On 15 October 1988, MEAPO delivered the completed facility to 

51 “MEAPO to Build F–18 Facilities in Kuwait,” Middle East/Africa News, October 1989; Engr 

Strategic Studies Ctr, “United States Army Corps of Engineers International Activities: Preliminary 

Assessment,” Dec 91, p. A-29, U.S. Army Engineer Strategic Studies Center, Fort Belvoir, Va. 52 Memo, Graham, 9 Jan 95, sub: Support Agreements, Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), 

Memorandums of Agreement (MOA), and Foreign Affairs Administration Support (FAAS) Agreements, Current Files, TAD-RM; “USACE Plan for Emergency Response Assistance to the Government 

of Kuwait,” 7 Jan 91, unmarked box (1980–1992), TAD-RHA; Info Paper, 6 May 91, sub: Kuwait 

Emergency Recovery Office, unmarked box (1980–1992), TAD-RHA; “New Role in Kuwait: MEAPO 

to Assist in Emergency Phase of Recovery Effort,” Middle East/Africa News, January 1991. 53 “August 1990–August 1991: A Look at the Past Year,” Transatlantic News, August-September 

1991.
586 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

the U.S. Navy one month ahead of schedule.54 That same year, the Naval Facilities 

Engineering Command made tentative plans to design and have MEAPO manage 

the construction of a 12,000-square-foot command and communications facility for 

the Navy’s administrative support unit in Manama. 

To manage the construction of the Bahraini fighter air base, MEAPO used 

the same people who had supervised the project through 1986 under the Middle 

East Division. Phase I construction began in May 1987 when the Bahrain Defense 

Forces awarded a construction contract for approximately $100 million to Ret-Ser 

Engineering Agency of Taiwan. At that point, MEAPO staffed a resident office in 

Bahrain with nine Americans and six local employees. Plans called for completion 

of the base, now named Shaikh Isa Air Base, in May 1989.55 In October 1988, 

Ret-Ser had approximately one thousand five hundred workers at the site. Even 

though this number had reached two thousand two hundred by February 1989, the 

contractor had completed only 48 percent of the construction at that time instead 

of the planned 75 percent. Problems with procurement of equipment, earthwork, 

and the POL system had contributed to the delays. To help recover the lost time, 

Ret-Ser subcontracted with the Korean firm AK Group to perform plastering and 

54 “Rec Center in Bahrain Complete,” Middle East/Africa News, November-December 1988. 55 “MEAPO Being Considered for Embassy Work,” Middle East/Africa News, March-April 1988; 

Fax, George Hollowell, 20 Oct 93, sub: History Project, copy in R&D File 2393, TAC; “Bahrain Office Being Staffed,” Middle East/Africa News, May-June 1987.

George Holloway and Allen Dale at the Bahrain Resident Office, 1991
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 587

to finish the buildings. Another subcontractor, United Gulf Asphalt, encountered 

problems with its paving operation when it was prohibited from removing sand 

from the beach, denied blasting permits, and encountered other problems that led 

to substantial contractor claims.56

In conjunction with the air base, the Bahrain Defense Forces had signed two 

additional sales cases for MEAPO assistance in May 1987. MEAPO’s Engineering 

Division designed about $60 million worth of facilities and systems at the air base, 

including an operations center, aircraft shelters, a recreation area, warehouses, 

and an air-traffic control system. The sales cases also paid for MEAPO to assist 

in managing procurement of furniture, rolling stock, air-traffic equipment, and 

communications systems.57

By May 1990, Ret-Ser had nearly completed construction of the first phase of 

the air base. Design of Phases II and III of the project—additional maintenance, 

administrative, and recreational facilities and an air operations center—was also 

nearly complete. Design for a fourth phase of the Bahrain defense system, helicopter 

facilities and an armor cantonment, had only begun when funding restraints prompted 

56 Memo, Col D. Fred Butler, 27 Feb 89, sub: Trip Report—Bahrain—10–12 February 1989, 

unmarked box, 94-3-29/11, TAD-RHA; Comments on Draft Ms, 10 Mar 98. 57 Fax, Hollowell, 20 Oct 93; “Bahrain Office Being Staffed.”

Shaikh Isa Air Base
588 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Bahrain to discontinue contracts for the subsequent phases of the work and the 

Corps closed its resident office.58

Egypt

In the decade from 1980 to 1990, the Corps of Engineers became increasingly 

involved in design and construction projects in Egypt that by November 1990 totaled 

nearly $1 billion. When MEAPO assumed management, some of the work was well 

advanced. MEAPO assumed responsibility for completing the armor-rebuild facility 

begun under the Middle East Division in 1983. The work for Peace Vector II at 

Beni Suef approached an end by the summer of 1987 as MEAPO completed orders 

for approximately $10 million worth of materials. Simultaneously, construction of 

the housing complex at Beni Suef neared completion. Already, twenty-five people 

from the U.S. Air Force technical assistance field team had taken up residence 

in the compound. In March 1988, a year and a half after construction began on 

the computer center and software lab at Nasr City near Cairo under the Hawkeye 

program, the Corps held a dedication ceremony and transferred the completed 

building to the Egyptians.59

The Hawkeye project, like the Peace Vector programs, expanded from its 

original scope. On 22 September 1989, MEAPO awarded a $4.5 million contract 

to Wallace O’Connor Inc. of Carrollton, Texas, for Phase II of the support facilities 

for the E–2C and F–4E aircraft. This phase, involving rehabilitation of twenty-two 

aircraft facilities, was scheduled for completion in March 1991.60

Other work had barely begun when MEAPO succeeded the Middle East Division 

in October 1986. Earlier that year, the Air Force Logistics Command identified a 

five-year military master facility program for the Egyptian Air Force. The AFLC 

established an initial sales case, dubbed Pacer Forge, for design, construction, and 

operations and maintenance support for five air bases. Several subsequent Egyptian 

Air Force programs fell under Pacer Forge, a program to support renovation or 

construction of facilities at any Egyptian base that had a U.S. weapon system present. 

Various small projects, such as a water and sewer upgrade at Cairo East Air Base, 

came within the master plan.61

58 “Bahrain Resident Office to Close This Summer,” December 1989, and “Offices List Year’s Top 

Events,” January 1991, both in Middle East/Africa News; Jim Knight, “Shaikh Isa Air Base Bahrain,” 

31 May 90, in Bfg for Carton and Behan, 1 Jun 90. 59 Prog Rev for Lt Col Kenneth Ashhurst, Dep Cdr, Military Progs, South Atlantic Div, 30 Nov 

90, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; “Peace Vector II Procurement Nears End”; Schroder, AGC Presentation, 6 Mar 87, R&D File 2470, TAC; Butler, Ofcrs Call Presentation, 25–26 Apr 88, p. 5; “MED’s 

Expanding Role in Egypt,” Middle East/Africa News, July-August 1987; “MED Completes Logistics 

Facilities, Prepares for New Contract in Sudan,” Middle East Division News, Summer 1986; “Computer 

Center Dedicated in Cairo,” Middle East/Africa News, March-April 1988. 60 “Pacer Chariot, VOA Station Among Contracts Awarded,” Middle East/Africa News, October 

1989. 61 “A Firm Base for MED’s Future”; “82nd Engineer Company Aids MEAPO in Egypt,” Middle 

East/Africa News, May-June 1987.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 589

In addition, the Egyptian Air Force requested a Peace Vector III program. 

Estimated at $190 million, Peace Vector III represented another major upgrade of 

an existing air base for F–16 aircraft scheduled to arrive in December 1991. For 

this project, the AFLC authorized MEAPO to perform full design and construction 

of facilities at Amoun Air Base. The project included upgrades to pavement and 

lighting, maintenance shops, storage facilities, utilities, base security, communications, fuel storage and distribution, and administrative facilities. On 20 August 1987, 

representatives of the Corps of Engineers and Burns and McDonnell went to Egypt 

for a site survey and to prepare to start design in January 1988.62

In late 1987, the Egyptian Air Force took over construction under Peace Vector III 

and accelerated the schedule, although the Corps still provided advice and assistance 

during construction. The Corps remained responsible for procuring construction 

materials not available in Egypt, including about $25 million of materials from 

the United States. The size of the program at Amoun required the Corps to create 

a special project management team comprised of personnel in Winchester and the 

Peace Vector III resident office. The resident office also became part of the new 

Joint Management Engineering Team in Egypt alongside the U.S. and Egyptian Air 

Forces. The team became the direct contact between the U.S. government and the 

Egyptian contractor. By the end of the decade, Peace Vector III had become the 

largest project ever undertaken by Egyptian Army engineers.63

On 15 January 1988, MEAPO awarded an $8.26 million contract to Burns and 

McDonnell for full design of the upgrade of facilities under Peace Vector III. The 

award modified a contract from 25 August 1986 originally awarded for $108,000 

to prepare a project-development brochure. The company completed the design in 

several phases between March and July 1989.64

In 1988, the Corps awarded a $2.8 million cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for 

procurement of mostly Egyptian-made construction materials to Willbros Butler 

Engineers Inc. of Tulsa, Oklahoma. Through its subcontractor, Perini International 

of Framingham, Massachusetts, Willbros also provided warehousing and in-country 

support such as housing, office space, and transportation to the engineering team. 

After the Egyptian Army had the first stage of construction underway with materials 

procured in Egypt, MEAPO awarded another contract for procurement of materials 

made in the United States. In March 1989, MEAPO awarded a $40.3 million costreimbursement contract for construction materials and services to Willbros Butler.65

62 “A Firm Base for MED’s Future”; “MEAPO Gets Green Light for PV III,” Middle East/Africa 

News, July-August 1987; Memo, Graham, 9 Jan 95; Memo, Paul H. Baker, 14 Aug 86, sub: Trip 

Report, August 1986, PVI, PVII and Pacer Forge PMR [Program Management Review], unmarked 

box, 94-1-31-2, TAD-RHA. 63 Capt Larry (Haleem) Washer, “Peace Vector III: A View From the Field,” July 1990; “PV III 

Phase II Award Caps Team Effort,” March 1989; “PVIII, Phase II: Construction’s Role in Managing 

the Contract,” April 1989; all in Middle East/Africa News. 64 “Contracts Awarded,” Middle East/Africa News, January-February 1988; Memo, Butler, 9 Jun 

89, sub: Trip Report—Egypt—31 May thru 4 June 1989, with attachments, unmarked box, 94-3-29-

11, TAD-RHA. 65 “PV III Phase II Award Caps Team Effort.”
590 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

In October 1991, the first shipment of F–16 planes arrived from the United States 

when the Peace Vector III project at the Amoun Air Base was about 75 percent 

complete. In the interim, the contract held by Willbros Butler had increased from 

$40 million to $63 million.66

In 1990, the Peace Vector participants began planning for a potential fourth 

sale of F–16 aircraft to Egypt. This project, at Sakara Air Base, included airfields, 

maintenance shops, utility plants, roads, personnel support, and administrative 

facilities. MEAPO received $1 million for planning and $3 million of the estimated 

$8.5 million for design under the Pacer Forge sales case. The air base design required 

rehabilitation, site adaptation from Peace Vector III designs, and new designs. 

MEAPO began the site adaptation designs as an in-house effort. On 25 October 1990, 

MEAPO awarded a $7.8 million contract to Burns and McDonnell for new design 

of the Peace Vector IV facilities scheduled for completion in November 1992.67

MEAPO also assumed responsibility for a number of smaller projects when it 

replaced the Middle East Division as construction agent in Egypt. In January 1986, 

the Middle East Division began the design of a hangar to house two C–130 aircraft 

and supporting shops at Cairo East Air Base for which the Corps had full design and 

66 “First F–16s Arrive at Egyptian Air Base,” Transatlantic News, November 1991. 67 “MEAPO Begins Design of PV IV Facilities,” July 1990, and “PV IV Contract Awarded,” 

October 1990, both in Middle East/Africa News.

Karlene Morgan of the Corps of Engineers and members of the Egyptian military at the site of 

the Peace Vector III project
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 591

construction responsibility. In November 1987, MEAPO awarded an $11 million 

construction contract to the joint venture of EBASCO Overseas Corporation and 

Taylor Woodrow Inc. of New York for the C–130 hangar and a utility upgrade at 

the base. This contract also included work on other projects, including a welding 

shop, warehouse, and fire alarm at An Shas Air Base and a fire alarm and utility 

building at Beni Suef Air Base. As of May 1989, EBASCO had completed about 

50 percent of the hangar construction at Cairo East.68

In 1986, the Middle East Division extended its responsibilities by taking on 

an Egyptian Navy program to design and build a Syncrolift system at Alexandria 

Harbor, another project that passed to MEAPO. The system, which cost $2 million 

to design, was almost identical to the one used by the Corps at the Jiddah and Jubayl 

naval bases in Saudi Arabia. The division established a resident office in Alexandria 

to supervise the work. The project involved two phases: dredging followed by 

installation of the lift and construction of supporting facilities. On 21 December 

1987, MEAPO awarded a $9 million contract to Philipp Holzmann A.G./Jan De Nul 

N.V., a German-Belgian joint venture, for dredging and filling in preparation for the 

Syncrolift and dry-docking facilities. Planning called for completion of Phase I by 

April 1989.69 By the autumn of 1989, the dredging phase of the Syncrolift project 

was almost complete but at an increased cost of $14 million. The contractor had 

moved seven hundred thousand cubic meters of clay and 1 million cubic meters of 

other material from the turning basin and had built a 550-meter quay wall. As work 

progressed, MEAPO began to prepare planning and programming reports for $30 

million to $40 million of new work for the Egyptian Navy. Most of the additional 

work was associated with the Syncrolift and included new shops and equipment for 

ship support and some renovations to existing repair facilities.70

On 24 August 1988, MEAPO awarded a $20 million contract to George A. 

Fuller of New York (later known as American International Contractors Inc.) for 

construction of the marine lift and dry-docking facilities, supporting buildings, and 

a new electric substation. Although the 12,000-square-meter (14,350-square-yard) 

facility was scheduled for completion in December 1990, it was turned over to the 

Egyptian Air Force in June 1991.71 MEAPO awarded a second contract in August 

1988, worth $17.2 million, to J. A. Jones Construction Company of Charlotte, North 

Carolina, for construction of an aeromedical facility in Cairo (Heliopolis) for pilot 

training and medical research.72

68 “MED’s Expanding Role in Egypt”; “Construction, Design Contracts Awarded,” Middle East/

Africa News, November-December 1987; “Egypt Program Booming,” Middle East/Africa News, 

May 1989. 69 Prog Rev for Ashhurst, 30 Nov 90; “A Firm Base for MED’s Future.” “Living in Egypt: Area 

Office Teeming with Activity,” July-August 1987; “Phase I of Syncrolift Project Nearly Complete,” 

August 1989; “Contracts Awarded,” January-February 1988; all in Middle East/Africa News. 70 “Phase I of Syncrolift Project Nearly Complete”; Prog Rev for Ashhurst, 30 Nov 90; “New 

Work for Egyptian Navy Planned,” Middle East/Africa News, September 1989. 71 “Egypt Program Booming”; “Aeromedical Center Completed in Egypt,” Transatlantic News, 

January 1992. 72 “MEAPO Awards $60 Million in Contracts.”
592 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

In mid-1988, MEAPO awarded to Sadelmi New York Inc. a $4 million contract 

(later increased to $7 million) for a Harpoon missile weapons station at King Maryut 

with February 1990 as the scheduled date of completion. In November 1990, the 

Egyptian Navy signed an FMS case to fund additional projects. The expanded 

program managed by the Corps included facilities for ship support and ship repair 

($20 million), a torpedo-repair facility ($6 million), and Syncrolift auxiliary equipment ($14 million). The Syncrolift facility experienced delays and cost increases 

to $25 million; but in September and October 1991, the system passed tests at 

Alexandria when it moved a 5,000-metric-ton load and a submarine from Alexandria 

Harbor overland to the dry-dock berth at nearby Ras El-Tin navy base.73

MEAPO also became involved with the Egyptian land forces in design and 

construction of maintenance facilities for the Hawk and Chaparral missiles. On 

29 September 1987, MEAPO awarded a $394,000 contract to Metcalf & Eddy 

International Inc./Frank E. Basil Inc. to design a Hawk ground-support depot and 

Chaparral maintenance facilities in Cairo. The project included a maintenance area, 

shops, and repair facilities. On 20 April 1989, MEAPO awarded a $4.7 million 

contract to Wallace O’Connor Inc. to build the facilities, with completion expected 

in February 1991.74

Given the growth in work, the Egyptian Area Office received authorization in 

August 1988 to add thirty-nine new positions for FY 1989. About half of those were 

programmed to support Peace Vector III, whereas the balance was divided among 

the Cairo East, Cairo West, and Cairo Central Resident Offices and the resident 

office at Alexandria.75

In December 1989, the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command asked MEAPO 

for assistance with an estimated $20 million Apache helicopter project in Egypt. 

In 1990, MEAPO began preparing a scope of work to build and improve facilities 

to house two Apache helicopter squadrons at an air base northeast of Cairo. New 

facilities included a control tower, a refueling station, water supply, and a combat 

mission simulator and training center, with rehabilitation of shelters, hangars, 

and battery shops. On 7 February 1991, the Corps awarded a $930,000 contract 

to Allen and Hoshall of Memphis, Tennessee, to design the facilities. Design and 

construction of the project, later supplemented with construction of housing for 

a technical-assistance field team, continued into the 1990s under the Cairo East 

resident office.76

73 Prog Rev for Ashhurst, 30 Nov 90; “Egypt Program Booming”; “MEAPO Awards $60 Million 

in Contracts”; Clancy Wahl, “Syncrolift Successfully Tested in Egypt,” Transatlantic News, October 

1991. 74 “Construction, Design Contracts Awarded”; “Contracts Awarded,” Middle East/Africa News, 

May 1989. 75 “RRAC [Resource Review and Allocation Committee] Approves 8.5 Positions for Winchester,” 

Middle East/Africa News, July-August 1988. 76 “Apache Helicopter Facilities Get Green Light,” Middle East/Africa News, September 1990; 

“Contract Awarded,” February 1991, and Julie K. Shoemaker, “‘Dalton Gang’ Finds Success at Cairo 

East,” September 1993, both in Transatlantic News.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 593

Sudan

When the Middle East/Africa Projects Office assumed responsibility for the 

Corps work in Sudan, it faced an exceedingly tense atmosphere. The Middle East 

Division had begun work on a logistical system for the Sudanese Army in the 

early 1980s. In mid-April 1986, anti-American feelings erupted, inflamed by the 

air raid ordered by the U.S. government on Libya in retaliation for a terrorist attack 

in Berlin. Sudanese citizens demonstrated in Khartoum against the attack, and the 

demonstrations led to the shooting of an American citizen. The U.S. ambassador 

warned Americans to stay in their homes. He subsequently directed the evacuation 

of dependents and contract personnel to Nairobi, Kenya. The contractor for the 

division’s project, Reading & Bates, sent its project manager to Kenya; on 19 April, 

two division representatives were also evacuated from Sudan.77

The contractor briefly halted work on the construction project; but because the 

company had British staff members who remained in Sudan, it resumed activities 

on 27 April and continued to work during the Corps’ absence from the country. 

Corps representatives returned in July to conduct final inspections of the project, 

now valued at $7.9 million. During the last week of July 1986, the Corps transferred 

the remaining eight completed buildings to the Sudanese government.Following the 

inspections and turnover, Corps employees left Sudan again, expecting to return that 

autumn to supervise another contract, this time for the Sudanese Air Force.78

The Middle East Division also had work dating from December 1983 when 

the U.S. Air Force had asked the division to design and build aircraft-maintenance 

facilities for the Sudanese Air Force. Like the logistical system, this project was 

funded by the Military Assistance Program. The scope of work included rehabilitation of an existing hangar; installation of utilities and partitions; construction of 

parking aprons for a new F–5 maintenance hangar at Wadi Saidna Air Base; and 

building a pre-engineered metal shop facility, utilities, and roads for a new C–130 

maintenance shop at Khartoum International Air Base. The division had provided 

final design sketches to the Sudanese Air Force in January 1984.79

In March 1986, the division awarded a contract worth nearly $6 million to Arkel 

International Inc. of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for construction of the facilities for 

the Sudanese Air Force. Because of political demonstrations and the danger posed 

to American employees, the Office of Military Cooperation requested on 17 April 

77 MFR, Michael F. Iarosis, 18 Apr 86, sub: Stoppage of Work Due to Civil Unrest; MFR, Iarosis, 18 Apr 86, sub: Evacuation Status of Sudan Resident Office; Telex, 19 Apr 86, sub: MEDCD-S 

Evacuation [sic] from Sudan; Telex, 24 Apr 86, sub: Reading and Bates Operations; all in W-4-10, 

1 of 3, TAD-RHA. 78 MFRs, Iarosis, 18 Apr 86, sub: Stoppage of Work Due to Civil Unrest, and 18 Apr 86, sub: 

Evacuation Status of Sudan Resident Office; Telex, 19 Apr 86; Telex, 24 Apr 86; DF, Iarosis, 6 Aug 

86, sub: DACA 78-84-C-0023, Design/Contract [sic] of Maintenance-Logistics Facilities, Sudan, 

Transmittal of DD Forms 1354—Physical Completion, with attached Forms 1354, W-4-10, TADRHA. “MED Completes Logistics Facilities, Prepares for New Contract in Sudan.” 79 Fact Sheet, Sudanese Air Force Aircraft Maintenance Facilities, 6 Apr 84, in Robertson Bfgs, 

9–12 Apr 84, E-1-1, copy in R&D File 3151, TAC.
594 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

that the Corps postpone the notice to proceed and the possibility arose of canceling 

the contract. On 15 July, however, the Corps told Arkel to proceed.80

In addition to the delays caused by the Corps’ absence from Sudan for nearly 

three months, Arkel encountered other difficulties. The Sudanese government 

remained unstable; the economy was in trouble; and a civil war was ongoing in the 

south. The contractor’s primary problem was getting materials to the site. Completion 

dates were pushed back as the construction project fell behind schedule.81

The arrest and detention in Sudan of American employees as Arkel was finishing 

its work created major difficulties. Arkel became involved in a legal dispute with 

its Sudanese subcontractor, Hydra Engineering Ltd., which sued Arkel in Sudanese 

courts. Two of Arkel’s representatives were arrested, a familiar practice in Sudan 

during legal disputes. When these two employees were released, no Arkel representatives remained in country to arrest. The Sudanese arrested the only remaining 

American associated with the project, Richard Bassett, an electrical and mechanical 

subcontractor of Arkel. The Corps, although concerned with Bassett’s situation, had 

no legal authority to intervene in the dispute between Arkel and its subcontractor. 

80 Msg, Iarosis to Amb Horan, 14 May 86, sub: Corps of Engineers Construction Contracts in Sudan, 

W-4-10, TAD-RHA; DF, Schroder, 30 Jun 86, sub: AE/RE Conference, with attachments, unmarked 

box, TAD-RHA; “MED Completes Logistics Facilities, Prepares for New Contract in Sudan.” 81 Butler, Ofcrs Call Presentation, 25–26 Apr 88, p. 7; “Armstrong Challenged by Sudan Work,” 

September-October 1987, and “Life in Sudan Marked by War, Famine,” November-December 1988, 

both in Middle East/Africa News.

Maintenance facility near completion in Sudan, 1988
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 595

Bassett was confined to his hotel room in Khartoum for over four months before 

he was allowed to leave the country in October 1989.82

In June 1989, the Corps closed its resident office in Sudan upon completion of 

the upgrade of an F–5 hangar at Wadi Saidna and of C–130 facilities at Khartoum. 

Arkel had a few items of work remaining on the project. Because of the recent antiAmerican incidents, Arkel hired an Indian subcontractor to complete the work.83

Voice of America

The Voice of America’s program of modernization, in which the Middle East 

Division became involved, began in the early 1980s. President Ronald Reagan and 

the National Security Council directed the VOA, a division of the U.S. Information 

Agency, to expand and improve its worldwide broadcasting system. Pursuing the 

president’s directive, the VOA initiated a five-year, $1.2 billion modernization 

program to construct new stations and to upgrade existing overseas transmitter 

installations to provide the capability to broadcast high-quality shortwave radio 

signals.84

At the time, the VOA was broadcasting from twenty-two locations in forty-two 

languages to an estimated 100 million listeners. But the VOA had not updated 

its equipment or operations in decades and had fallen behind other international 

broadcasters in hours, languages, transmitters, and equipment. The broadcast agency 

turned to the Middle East Division to provide planning, programming, and design 

assistance for all locations worldwide. In addition, the division would provide 

direct construction management for those facilities within the division’s area of 

operations. The Corps of Engineers responded through the Support for Others 

program, which provided Corps services on a reimbursable basis to federal, state, 

and local agencies. The program allowed agencies without engineering capabilities 

to obtain quality services in design and construction management without building 

up their own staffs.The Corps’ headquarters designated the Middle East Division as 

the program manager for all planning, program development, and preconstruction 

design activities for the worldwide VOA program.85

A new station in Morocco was the Voice of America’s top priority; in 1983, 

the Middle East Division’s first assignment was to provide a realistic and firm cost 

82 George A. Robinson, Arkel International Inc., to Wayne E. Henry, 24 Apr 89, sub: Contract 

DACA 78-86-C-0019, Aircraft Maintenance Facilities, Khartoum and Wadi Seidna, Sudan; Memo, 

Lt Col Daniel R. Wells, 30 Jun 89, sub: Potential Congressional Inquiry Reference Incarceration and 

Pending Court Action Against Mr. Richard Bassett in the Sudan, with encl; both in TAD-PAO. 83 “Sudan Resident Office Closes,” Middle East/Africa News, June 1989; Robinson to Henry, 10 

Nov 89, sub: Your Serial Letter Number 89-28, TAD-PAO. 84 Memo, F. B. McNeely, 9 Aug 84, sub: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Assistance 

to the Voice of America, SA-1176, TAD-RHA; Dorr, “VOA Brief,” 10 Jun 87, Civic Presentations 

(contains many public lectures), Uncatalogued Historical Files, R&D File 2470, TAC. 85 Dorr, “VOA Brief,” 10 Jun 87; “VOA, Bahrain Work Brightens Future”; Memo, Lloyd A. 

Duscha, 24 Jul 84, sub: Voice of America (VOA) Program, SA-1176, TAD-RHA; Schroder Bfg, 23 

Dec 85, p. 14, slides 61–62.
596 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

and time estimate for the construction. The initial memorandum of understanding 

between the division and the VOA identified the terms of the Morocco project. The 

division provided site preparation (earthmoving) at the location near Tangier and 

agreed to prepare a manual of design criteria for all VOA facilities and to design 

test facilities for transmitters at the VOA relay station at Greenville, North Carolina. 

In a second phase, the project would move to design and construction at Tangier, 

with terms specified in a separate support agreement.86

Under the Support for Others agreement with VOA, the Middle East Division 

began work in Morocco in October 1984 when it established a resident office in 

Tangier to supervise work on a new transmitter station. Eight division employees 

traveled to Morocco on temporary duty in late October and November to prepare 

for the division’s new mission there. This brought the Corps of Engineers back to 

the country where the Mediterranean Division got its start more than thirty years 

earlier. The team identified an area for excavating fill near the fifteen hundred acres 

of land twenty-two miles southwest of Tangier that the Moroccan government had 

donated for the new station. Phase I of the project, site preparation, involved moving 

2 million cubic meters of soil from the borrow pit to the valley. The contractor 

built embankments to keep water from flooding the valley during the rainy season, 

constructed the main entrance, built roads, and landscaped the site. The station at 

Tangier needed a high-power, shortwave broadcast facility with maintenance and 

administrative facilities and a power plant. The budget for the station, including 

equipment, was estimated at $175 million. The station and related facilities would sit 

on a hub, and eleven antennae would rise from three bases extending from the hub. 

While in Morocco, Corps representatives placed prequalification announcements 

for the Phase I construction in local papers. They arranged for housing and office 

space for the resident engineer’s office. The Corps planned to prequalify firms by 

December 1984, issue the request for proposals in January 1985, award Phase I in 

February, and open the resident office in March.87

On 14 December 1984, an umbrella agreement for worldwide support to the 

VOA was enacted. The agreement, signed by the U.S. Information Agency and the 

assistant secretary of the Army for civil works, obviated the need for individual 

memorandums of understanding for each new country where work was planned.88

In late 1984, the Corps signed two more memorandums, one for work in Puerto 

Rico and one for the project in Thailand. In Puerto Rico, the agreement for Phase 

I differed from the others. Land near Cabo Rojo was identified for purchase, but 

86 MFR, Wiles, 13 Aug 84, sub: MG Wall Debrief on VOA/USIA [United States Information 

Agency] Meeting of 1 August 1984, SA-1176, TAD-RHA; “VOA, Bahrain Work Brightens Future”; 

“VOA Program Gets Into Swing with First Trip to Morocco,” Middle East Division News, October 

1984. 87 “VOA Program Gets Into Swing with First Trip to Morocco”; “VOA, Bahrain Work Brightens 

Future”; “Middle East Division Reorganization Ceremony: Leaders in Customer Care,” 30 Sep 86, 

hist chronology, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Statement of Work for Contract DACW 78-86-C-0001, 

Modification P00006, Facilities Design for the Morocco Relay Station, 13 May 87, unmarked box, 

TAD-RHA. 88 Memo, Graham, 9 Jan 95; Corps-Govt Agreements [1991], R&D File 2227, TAC.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 597

work could not immediately proceed. Puerto Rico was a U.S. territory, and the 

National Environmental Protection Act mandated an environmental assessment 

report. The Middle East Division scheduled an engineering investigation report, and 

the Jacksonville District of the South Atlantic Division then assumed responsibility 

for the environmental report and the remaining work.89

In the meantime, the division discovered that the land identified in Morocco 

as a borrow area was owned by over one hundred people. Instead of trying to deal 

with many landowners, in January 1985 the Corps returned to Morocco for another 

survey and selected a new borrow area north of the site. On 24 April, the division 

awarded a $7.8 million contract to Cherifienne de Travaux Africains (Morocco) 

for a site development package for the Tangier station. The contractor completed 

construction, which included stonework and building embankments and culverts, 

on 19 September 1986.90

The support agreement for VOA work in Thailand closely paralleled that for 

the Morocco work. Phase I again involved site preparation, including clearing the 

land, building access roads on the 1,280-acre site, and fencing for a new station 

to be built near Udorn at the northern border and Mekong River. The Middle 

89 “VOA, Bahrain Work Brightens Future”; “VOA Work Begins in Thailand, Puerto Rico,” Middle 

East Division News, January 1985. 90 “VOA Work Begins in Thailand, Puerto Rico”; “Tangier Resident Office” [1986], unmarked 

box, TAD-RHA; “First VOA Award,” Middle East Division News, March-April 1985.

Voice of America site in Morocco, ca. 1990
598 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

East Division sent a team to the Udorn site in January and February 1985. They 

interviewed Thai contractors, manufacturers, suppliers, and shipping companies 

to collect information concerning the cost of construction. They also performed 

geotechnical investigations. The Corps of Engineers Pacific Ocean Division managed 

construction of the broadcast facilities.91

During the year of transition between the Middle East Division and the Middle 

East/Africa Projects Office, staff in Winchester continued to develop the design 

and construction program for the Voice of America. On 14 February 1986, the 

division awarded a $2.7 million contract, to be completed by December, to Holmes 

and Narver Inc. of Orange, California, for design of a prototype radio relay station 

adaptable to site conditions at all major VOA sites. After months of negotiations 

and revisions, on 12 June 1987 the Corps awarded a $1.05 million modification 

to the Holmes and Narver contract to include adapting the prototype transmitter 

relay station to the site at Tangier. Design was expected by December 1987, with 

construction to start in the spring of 1988.92

MEAPO’s role in the VOA program continued to expand during the Projects 

Office’s early months. In December 1986, the VOA requested that the Corps prepare 

support agreements for design contracts for the stations in Morocco, Thailand, and 

Botswana. The agreements provided authority, funding, and guidance, allowing the 

Corps to manage contracts to design transmitter relay stations using the Holmes 

and Narver prototype. The VOA requested a fourth support agreement to cover the 

Corps’ technical review of designs for a station in Sri Lanka, a design contract that 

the VOA let directly.93

Earlier, over the summer of 1986, the Middle East Division had begun site 

investigation for work on a transmitter radio relay station in Botswana. On 27 August 

1987, MEAPO awarded a $1.8 million contract to Lockwood Greene Engineers Inc. 

of Atlanta, Georgia, to adapt the prototype station to the Botswana site.In February 

1987, Thai Huat Engineering Company completed site preparation for a facility at 

Udorn under a $700,000 contract let by the Corps’ Honolulu District. In June 1987, 

the contract to design the adaptation of the prototype for the radio relay station in 

Thailand went to Hennington, Durham, and Richardson of Alexandria, Virginia. 

With site preparation completed and design under contract, the Honolulu District 

then took responsibility to manage the $14.5 million construction contract, awarded 

on 29 December 1989, to Brown and Root USA Inc. of Houston, Texas.94

Delays occasioned by congressional cuts in modernization funding disrupted 

construction schedules for the stations in Morocco, Thailand, and Botswana. On 

91 “VOA Work Begins in Thailand”; “Work Begins on Udorn VOA Station,” Middle East Division News, January 1985. 92 “VOA Design Award Tops Contract List,” Middle East Division News, January-February 1986; 

Résumé of Negotiations, VOA Facilities Design for the Morocco Relay Station, Contract DACW 

78-86-C-0001, MOD P00006, Holmes and Narver Inc., Orange, Calif., 13 May 87, unmarked box, 

TAD-RHA; “JOC, VOA Contracts Awarded,” Middle East/Africa News, May-June 1987. 93 Robert E. Kamosa to Dorr, 4 Dec 86, box 3 of 4, T-6-7, TAD-RHA.

94 “A Firm Base for MED’s Future”; “Contract Awarded,” September-October 1987, and “MEAPO, 

POD, Team Up for VOA Project,” February 1990, both in Middle East/Africa News.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 599

21 September 1988, MEAPO awarded a $22.9 million contract to J. A. Jones 

Construction Company for the relay station in Tangier. The contract called for 

construction of a transmitter and administration building, maintenance and storage 

buildings, guard quarters, a gatehouse, storage facilities, wastewater treatment, an 

electrical substation, and a water tank. The contractor began construction in Morocco 

in 1989. The field office staff of eleven Corps employees and a team of five VOA 

construction managers initially found office space in the old consulate building in 

downtown Tangier. In 1989, they moved to a new office at the construction site. 

Completion was expected in November 1990.95

Work for the Voice of America had also developed in Liberia in western Africa, 

where MEAPO sent three representatives to inspect a 25-year-old VOA relay station 

near the capital of Monrovia. The planned work called for installing two diesel 

generators, a metal shed, and other small facilities. On 25 September 1989, MEAPO 

awarded an $8.24 million contract to ENCORP AMCA International of Cincinnati, 

Ohio, for an upgrade of the Liberian station. The contract called for ENCORP to 

design, engineer, furnish, install, and test an upgraded electrical power plant with 

completion scheduled for July 1991. In March 1990, the Corps opened a resident 

office in Liberia to oversee the VOA project but closed the office the following 

month when the U.S. State Department urged nonessential personnel to leave the 

country because of increased fighting between government and rebel forces.96

The next year, the Corps had a similar experience in Morocco. In early January 

1991, the U.S. embassy ordered four MEAPO employees and their dependents 

to leave Morocco. The embassy felt that labor disturbances and tensions that 

broke out in the country posed a danger to Americans. Three MEAPO employees 

remained in Morocco along with three local hires and contract personnel. The 

Moroccan government provided military personnel and gendarmes as security for 

the Americans who remained.97

In early 1990, the VOA asked MEAPO to adapt designs in house for facilities in 

Sri Lanka and for the revived Botswana project and to act as the VOA’s procurement 

agent for communications and control-room equipment. Because of sensitivities 

concerning a visible U.S. military presence, MEAPO’s support for Sri Lanka had 

been limited to technical review of the designs of the architect-engineer under direct 

contract with the VOA.Although the VOA eventually canceled the final design of 

the Sri Lankan facilities and awarded its own design/construct contract, the Corps 

continued its procurement activities into the 1990s. The Botswana project involved 

construction of a medium-wave relay station to replace an old station.98

95 Butler, Ofcrs Call Presentation, 25–26 Apr 88, p. 11; “VOA, SWAPDOP Contracts Awarded,” 

September-October 1988, and “Facilities Construction Starts in Tangier,” July 1989, both in Middle 

East/Africa News. 96 “Team Inspects VOA Site in Liberia,” April 1989; “Pacer Chariot, VOA Station Among Contracts Awarded,” October 1989; “Liberia Resident Office Closes Temporarily,” April 1990; “1990: 

A Retrospect,” January 1991; all in Middle East/Africa News. 97 “Employees Evacuated in Morocco,” Middle East/Africa News, January 1991. 98 “MEAPO Gets New Work From VOA,” Middle East/Africa News, April 1990; Kamosa to Dorr, 

4 Dec 86; Butler, Ofcrs Call Presentation, 25–26 Apr 88, p. 11; TAD, International Activities Rpt, 1 
600 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

By the end of 1990, MEAPO had a steady construction program for the Voice 

of America. The construction of facilities in Morocco had reached over 60 percent 

completion. Installation of equipment, including an audio, communications, and 

control-room subsystem, took place in 1991. Continuing civil strife in Liberia led 

to termination of the Monrovian power plant rehabilitation, which was just over 50 

percent finished. The Corps settled with the contractor in January 1992. The work 

for the VOA in Botswana had not begun by the end of 1990.99

Africa Civic Action

The idea for the program called Africa Civic Action took form in 1983 

but reached implementation only in 1985 under the direction of various U.S. 

governmental agencies. The undertaking aimed to establish ties between the U.S. 

military and the military establishments of selected African countries through 

support of projects and activities that each country’s military would undertake to 

benefit the local civilian population. The State Department designated the recipient 

countries and allocated funds; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Apr 92, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; “Botswana Office to Open This Fall,” April 1991, and “RRAC 

Approves 70 New Spaces for Division,” March 1991, both in Transatlantic News. 99 Bfg for Carton and Behan, 1 Jun 90; Prog Rev for Ashhurst, 30 Nov 90; TAD, International 

Activities Rpt, 1 Apr 92; “Botswana Office to Open This Fall.”

Old pier at Bonjul, Gambia, mid-1980s
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 601

International Security Affairs exercised program management and project approval; 

and the Defense Security Assistance Agency handled direction, authorization, and 

funding. Various unified commands and U.S. embassies provided management and 

coordination, and troops from the military forces of the host government executed 

the construction projects. Although the Department of Defense implemented the 

program, the activities fell under the State Department’s foreign assistance program. 

Congress funded Africa Civic Action annually through the budget line for the 

Military Assistance Program, a part of the Foreign Assistance Act. Funds came to 

Africa Civic Action projects through FMS case procedures.100

Under Africa Civic Action, the host government’s military establishment 

constructed facilities for civilian benefit or at least dual use by the military and 

civilian sectors. The United States furnished construction materials and technical 

assistance to the local project managers and laborers. The program aimed to improve 

the construction expertise of each host nation’s military engineers, to improve 

the host nation’s economic and political situations by providing infrastructure for 

social and economic development, and to promote regional stability. The benefits 

100 Engr Strategic Studies Ctr, “Corps of Engineers International Activities,” Dec 91, p. 31; “Africa 

Civic Action: Planning and Implementation Guide,” 17 Mar 88, R&D File 2437, TAC; Bfg to Maj 

Gen Kem on Middle East & Africa Projects Office and African Civic Action Program, 11 Jun 87, 

R&D File 2433, TAC.

Construction workers at Camp du Kassai Bridge, Central African Republic
602 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

provided to the civilian population constituted an important criterion in judging 

each proposed project.101

Africa Civic Action was subdivided into three categories: Military Civic Action, 

African Coastal Security, and Military Health Affairs.102 The primary purpose of 

the Military Civic Action component was to include African armed forces in nation 

building by providing them the necessary training and materials. Projects under this 

heading had to have a primary benefit to the civilian population in the categories 

of education, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, or health 

and sanitation. 

The African Coastal Security program, developed by the Department of Defense, 

focused on helping coastal states control their waters and maritime resources. Under 

this program, the United States did not generally provide combat vessels. Instead 

it provided training, technical assistance, advice, and some equipment to improve 

the host nation’s abilities to conduct maritime reconnaissance and law enforcement, 

smuggling deterrence, search and rescue, pollution control, and fishing resource 

protection. 

The Military Health Affairs program provided medical assistance to African 

nations, such as construction or rehabilitation of clinics, improvements to military 

hospitals, or provision of medical supplies and equipment. This component differed 

from the others in that Military Health Affairs projects were not required to benefit 

the civilian population directly.

The Corps provided project planning and cost estimates for the Civic Action 

Program, performed site surveys and technical evaluations, prepared and monitored 

FMS cases, and furnished technical assistance and procurement services to the 

various African military establishments, leaving construction to the host nation’s 

military elements. When the program began, the Corps assigned responsibility for 

it to the Middle East Division; that responsibility transferred to the Middle East/

Africa Projects Office.103

The first Civic Action Program undertaken by the Corps was to rehabilitate a 

remote airfield built in 1956 near the town of Dirkou in the former French colony 

of Niger. Dirkou is in the northern reaches of Niger, eight hundred miles from the 

country’s capital Niamey and about two hundred fifty miles south-southwest of 

Niger’s northern border with Libya. 

In December 1984, the president of Niger requested assistance from the United 

States with the project, intended to provide a logistical lifeline for the local citizens. 

In March 1985, a survey team traveled to Niger to assess the project’s feasibility 

and to determine design and construction standards. In October, the government of 

Niger signed the original FMS case for $1.23 million. Starting the following month 

and continuing through May 1986, Corps employees in Virginia coordinated the 

101 Engr Strategic Studies Ctr, “Corps of Engineers International Activities,” Dec 91, p. 31; Bfg 

for Carton and Behan, 1 Jun 90. 102 The three subdivisions are described in “Africa Civic Action,” 17 Mar 88. 103 “A Firm Base for MED’s Future”; Engr Strategic Studies Ctr, “Corps of Engineers International 

Activities,” Dec 91, p. 31; Bfg to Kem, 11 Jun 87.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 603

procurement of machinery and materials for the construction project. Local troops 

mobilized for the work in June 1986. A Mobile Training Team from United States 

Army, Europe (USAREUR), arrived in July to train the Nigerian soldiers to use 

the equipment and to advise them on construction and maintenance. Construction 

started in August 1986. Almost immediately, problems arose with the equipment 

operated by the Nigerian troops—particularly the poorly maintained crusher—and 

because of the lack of usable rock.104

Beginning in July 1986, the sales case underwent several amendments to 

increase the money available. In September, Niger requested technical assistance 

from the Corps; in response, MEAPO sent Dr. Robert S. Barneyback in November. 

At this time, MEAPO also took over responsibility for the ever-increasing 

requests for spare parts and the sales case was again increased, to $1.73 million. 

Although by early 1987 Niger’s engineer troops had laid much of the runway’s 

base course and asphalt, problems were discovered with both. Throughout the 

spring, construction slowed as equipment failed and as MEAPO negotiated with 

the Mobil Corporation to replace the poor-quality asphalt that the company 

104 Lt Col Terry L. Rice, “Dirkou Airfield Rehabilitation Project, Comments by the Final Liaison 

Officer,” 14 Dec 87, Mil Files XIV-3-2, OH, HQ USACE; Bfg to Kem, 11 Jun 87; “Barneyback, 

Voelker Cited for Work in Dirkou,” Middle East/Africa News, July-August 1987.

Project site in Kenya, November 1989
Foundation wall for medical center at Chilumba, Malawi, October 1990
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 605

had originally supplied. In February and again in May 1987, the sales case was 

increased, reaching over $2.5 million.105

The overall project suffered from poor initial planning as well as from lack 

of unity of command and clearly defined roles. The harsh conditions in Niger and 

lack of suitable base course material came as a surprise to those on site and caused 

difficulties and delays. The lack of a central responsible agency led to difficulties 

in making decisions and getting the project on track. With so many agencies 

involved—the embassy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, MEAPO, the 

European Command, USAREUR, and the 18th Engineer Brigade—the hierarchical 

structure and responsibilities were never clearly defined. 

Originally expected to take two months, the rehabilitation project at Dirkou 

dragged out for sixteen months. However, on 1 December 1987, a local engineering 

company successfully completed a 5,250-foot runway, turnarounds, and parking 

aprons capable of handling C–130 aircraft. Despite the difficulties, the liaison officer 

assigned to the Office of Defense Attaché in the capital noted that the “mutual 

respect that the Americans and Nigerians [sic] gained is a benefit at least equal in 

importance to the completion of the airfield.”106

The somewhat inauspicious beginnings to the Africa Civic Action Program did 

not discourage the U.S. government from continuing. Despite the problems in Niger, 

officials involved felt the program was an excellent vehicle to promote American 

interests.107 The difficulty with the Dirkou airfield proved to be an anomaly, and 

later projects were completed with far fewer problems. Over the next several years 

and into the 1990s, the Corps continued to lend its assistance to the armed forces of 

several African nations. The Middle East/Africa Projects Office provided technical 

and logistical assistance to other U.S. agencies and foreign governments involved 

in the construction of roads, bridges, schools, medical facilities, and housing. A list 

of some of MEAPO’s projects under the Africa Civic Action Program follows in 

Table 13. Funding for the program is indicated in Table 14.

Department of Defense Dependent Schools

In addition to its regional responsibilities, the Middle East/Africa Projects 

Office also handled work for Department of Defense Dependent Schools (DODDS) 

worldwide. In 1986, the U.S. Congress passed the Asbestos Hazard Emergency 

Response Act, which mandated removal from all DoD schools of asbestos previously used in a variety of building materials. DODDS contracted with MEAPO to 

design a program to inspect 269 schools worldwide for the presence of asbestos and 

105 “Barneyback, Voelker Cited for Work in Dirkou”; Rice, “Dirkou Airfield Rehabilitation Project,” 

14 Dec 87; Bfg to Kem, 11 Jun 87. 106 Rice, “Dirkou Airfield Rehabilitation Project,” 14 Dec 87. 107 Ibid. 
Table 13—Sample of Projects Under the Africa Civic Action Program

Botswana Provision of ambulances

Central African 

Republic Camp Du Kassai Bridge

Djibouti

Site preparation for refugee and low-income housing

Earthen dam to catch rainwater

Repair of earth road linking Djibouti city to Hol Hol

Gambia

Yundum Medical Clinic

Pier upgrade at Bonjul

Ghana Water improvement project at military hospital in Accra

Guinea Permanent floating dry dock in Conakry Harbor

Ivory Coast Bouake Medical Clinic

Kenya Tiwi-Mtonge Water Project, Mtonge Naval Base

Madagascar Road and irrigation projects 

Over twenty duplexes in Antananarivo

Malawi Chilumba Medical Clinic

Mali Medical facilities

Mauritania Selibaby Bridge 

Community center in Nouakchott

Niger

Airfield rehabilitation at Dirkou 

Medical facilities

Rwanda

Kanombe Pediatric Clinic

Engineering spare parts and equipment

Senegal Naval facility at Elinkine in Casamance region

Hospital/clinic rehabilitation in Dakar

Sierra Leone

Murraytown Primary School complex at Freetown for 800 students

Engineering spare parts and equipment

Provision of a patrol boat

Togo Engineering spare parts and equipment

Source: “Africa Civic Action: Planning and Implementation Guide,” 17 Mar 88, R&D File 2437, 

Transatlantic Programs Center, Winchester, Va.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 607

then to structure a program to remove it. MEAPO’s plan called for a three-phase 

approach.108

In Phase I, a contractor surveyed the schools and developed a plan for interim 

operations, containment, and abatement. Because of the concerns for the health of 

children, the program had an urgent status that recommended a sole-source contract, 

awarded to Dynamac Corporation, a Maryland company, in 1987. Dynamac took 

seventy samples in each school, a total of over seventeen thousand samples by 

mid-1988 when the survey was completed. Dynamac’s tests showed that no schools 

were in an emergency state.

Phase II of the program involved destructive testing and design of an abatement 

program, and Phase III scheduled the actual removal. For this work, MEAPO was 

responsible for about 175 schools. In September 1988, it awarded an indefinite 

delivery order contract for Phase II to Baker/TSA of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 

MEAPO used computer-aided design and drafting (CADD) to create a general 

design adaptable to particular schools. In September 1990, Baker/TSA received a 

$4.37 million contract for Phase III hygienic and engineering services to oversee 

and conduct removal of asbestos, to train workers, and to conduct further surveys 

and assessments at several of the schools.109

Eventually, the DODDS program involved 269 schools and about one thousand 

five hundred buildings in nineteen countries in which a total of seven different 

languages were spoken. MEAPO engaged one prime contractor for architectengineer services and twelve subcontractors and consultants to work with eight Corps 

of Engineers field offices and five regional DODDS offices to correct the situation 

in schools operated for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Phase I cost $3.8 million. 

At the halfway point in late 1990, the work for Phase II had a total estimated value 

of $24 million. Phase III, for which only 10 percent of the work was completed, had 

108 For this and the following paragraph, see Memo, Graham, 9 Jan 95; “MEAPO Tapped for 

Asbestos Program,” Middle East/Africa News, January-February 1988; “VOA, SWAPDOP Contracts 

Awarded.” 109 Memo, Graham, 9 Jan 95; “MEAPO Tapped for Asbestos Program”; “VOA, SWAPDOP 

Contracts Awarded”; “DODDS: Asbestos Abatement Program in Full Swing,” December 1989, and 

“PV IV Contract Awarded,” October 1990, both in Middle East/Africa News.

Table 14—Annual Funding for Africa Civic Action Program

Fiscal Years 1985–1990

($ millions)

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

2.80 3.90 2.0 1.0 0.43 0.94

Source: Bfg for Mr. Allen Carton and Lt Col James Behan, 1 Jun 90, unmarked box, Transatlantic 

Division–Records Holding Area.
608 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

a total estimated value of $100 million. Planners anticipated two additional phases 

to encompass periodic reinspection of the schools.110

Status at the End of the Decade

In FY 1990, the Middle East/Africa Projects Office expected to place $149 

million in construction. Egypt accounted for 68 percent of all placements, much of 

that dedicated to Peace Vector III and the Amoun Air Base. Bahrain accounted for 

another large portion of the placement because of construction at the Shaikh Isa 

Air Base. The DODDS work accounted for 32 percent of MEAPO’s design work 

between 1987 and 1990. Other work scheduled for future years brought MEAPO’s 

total estimated program in mid-1990 to $1.2583 billion (Table 15).111

In June 1989, MEAPO’s commander, Colonel Butler, issued a memorandum 

that carried one of the organization’s most painful announcements: “By now, most 

of you have read or heard that Willie Voelker pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court 

for the Eastern District of Virginia to accepting a bribe and filing a false tax return. 

110 Bfg for Carton and Behan, 1 Jun 90; Prog Rev for Ashhurst, 30 Nov 90. 111 “Miller Briefs Chief of Engineers on MEAPO Programs,” Middle East/Africa News, April 1990; 

Charles Hendricks, Handwritten Notes on Staff Mtgs at HQ USACE, 16 Nov 87 and 9 May 88, OH, 

HQ USACE, copies in R&D File 2387, TAC; Bfg for Carton and Behan, 1 Jun 90. 

Table 15—MEAPO Program Project Cost Estimates

June 1990

($ millions)

Military construction (Oman) 108.7

U.S. Central Command support 12.0

DoD Dependent Schools 125.0

Egypt 580.5

Kuwait 23.0

Bahrain 248.0

Voice of America 150.1

Africa Civic Action 11.0

Total 1,258.3

Source: Bfg for Mr. Allen Carton and Lt Col James Behan, 1 Jun 90, unmarked box, Transatlantic 

Division–Records Holding Area.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 609

Mr. Voelker had been chief of the Geotechnical Branch, from which he retired last 

Fall. He has been a respected Corps employee.”112

Voelker’s plea bargain had come after a three-year investigation by the 

Department of Justice and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command of 

accusations initially raised in 1986 that he had issued restrictive specifications for 

the preparation of concrete and had accepted money from the company that the 

specifications favored. The case involved contracts for projects at King Khalid 

Military City between 1982 and 1985. The specifications mandated the use of a 

plasticized liquid additive to concrete called Rheobuild manufactured by a single 

company, Modern Advance Concrete (MAC), with offices in Boca Raton, Florida, 

and production facilities in Italy. The product made concrete softer, more workable, and more effective for filling molds. The special agent who conducted the 

investigation reported that “Rheobuild was tested thoroughly, and it was the best 

product on the market at the time. There’s no doubt about that.” The impropriety 

concerned Voelker’s accepting a MAC senior vice president’s offer of a special 

commission for each liter of Rheobuild used in the Saudi contracts. Over several 

years, the MAC vice president, who also pleaded guilty in the court hearing, arranged 

to have the commissions paid into overseas accounts. Over the three years of the 

contract, he transferred nearly $107,000 to Voelker and retained nearly $200,000 

for himself. Neither man reported the income to the Internal Revenue Service and 

thus faced not only bribery but tax-evasion charges as well. When sentenced in 

August, Voelker received three years in prison on the bribery charge, with all but six 

months suspended; one year on the tax evasion charge, which was also suspended; 

and a fine of $25,000.113

Colonel Butler characterized the reaction of the MEAPO community as 

“shocked and saddened” over the news of Voelker’s conviction. A native German, 

Voelker had thirty years of service with the Corps of Engineers, beginning when 

the Mediterranean Division had hired him to join the staff of its newly opened Gulf 

District. In 1976, at the time of the move from Italy to Virginia, he was one of three 

“indispensable” non-U.S. citizens for whom the Middle East Division petitioned 

the Civil Service Commission for permission to employ in positions in the United 

States. He had a superb reputation as a materials engineer and as an eminent expert 

in concrete. Throughout the investigation, many of his colleagues had defended his 

ethics as impeccable; they were shaken by his admission of guilt.114

112 Memo, Butler, 12 Jun 89, sub: DoD Inspector General Investigation of Mr. Voelker, unmarked 

box, TAD-RHA. 113 The quote from the investigating agent appears in “Former Employee Pleads Guilty to Bribery,” 

Middle East/Africa News, June 1989. See also “2 Plead Guilty to Contract Bribery,” Washington Post, 

10 June 1989, and other press reports, including “Voelker Sentenced to Six Months in Jail,” Middle 

East/Africa News, August 1989. 114 Loschialpo to U.S. Civil Service Commission, 4 Mar 76, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Memo, 

Butler, 12 Jun 89, sub: DoD Inspector General Investigation of Mr. Voelker,” unmarked box, TADRHA; Interv, Grathwol with Dorr, 11 Aug, 12 Sep, 26 Sep, 31 Oct 94, pp. 150–52, quotation from 

p. 151.
610 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

The Voelker conviction was a sad but, seen in proportion, minor incident in 

the long history of the Corps of Engineers’ relations with Saudi Arabia. The illegal 

action involved $300,000 out of a construction program that totaled more than $14 

billion, and it in no way compromised the quality of the construction accomplished 

nor implicated anyone else in the Corps. It was one of the rare breaches of integrity 

in a relationship between the Corps and the Saudis that spanned four decades.

Major Administrative Actions, 1986–1991

While the Middle East/Africa Projects Office managed design and construction 

in the Middle East and Africa, Corps initiatives and geopolitical events again 

produced organizational changes in the late 1980s. Pressured by strong civilian 

leaders in the Army secretariat, landmark legislation, and declining budgets for both 

civil works and military construction projects, leaders at Corps headquarters took 

several actions near the end of the decade to change the day-to-day procedures for 

managing projects. Not all of these initiatives affected MEAPO, but the adoption 

of the process called project management—sometimes called lifecycle project 

management (LCPM)—required MEAPO to manage projects differently and to 

reorganize its staff. 

Lifecycle Project Management

The assistant secretary of the Army for civil works (ASA[CW]), Robert W. Page 

Sr., an engineer who came to government service in 1987 from private industry, 

pressed the Corps to adopt project management. Although enthusiastic about the 

capabilities of the Corps, Page nevertheless thought that outmoded operating and 

management systems burdened the organization. In early January 1988, Page told 

the chief of engineers, General Heiberg, that the Corps had to make basic changes in 

how it developed projects. He specifically suggested that districts adopt the project 

manager concept.115

At each administrative level, the Corps organized its staff by function: planning, 

engineering, construction, and operations. A project passed from one functional area 

to the next as it progressed from concept through delivery. The handoff from one 

function to another was often awkward, and the break in continuity confused and 

irritated customers.116 In contrast, project management as it operated in the private 

sector required that one person, a project manager, manage the costs and schedules 

for the project through all phases. The authority of the project manager extended 

115 Interv, Martin Reuss with Robert Page, 3, 25 Jan 91, pp. 7–9, quotation from p. 9; Page to 

Heiberg, 4 Jan 88, Maj Gen Henry Hatch Papers, OH, HQ USACE. 116 “The Report of the Corps of Engineers Panel on Project Development in Partnership,” Mar 88, 

p. 20. Intervs, Donald Fitzgerald with Donald Cluff, 2 Dec 94, pp. 2–3; with William Augustine, 5 

Apr 95, pp. 5, 16; with John Elmore, 1 Dec 94, pp. 6–8; with Allen M. Carton, 6 Dec 94, pp. 19–25; 

Paul Walker with Lt Gen Henry J. Hatch, 12 Feb 91, pp. 12–13.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 611

to selection and evaluation of staff, and the system emphasized teamwork above 

loyalty to a technical specialty or supervisor. 

The director of civil works at Corps headquarters, Maj. Gen. Henry Hatch, had 

personal experience with project management and endorsed Page’s initiative for 

civil works projects. In June 1988, Hatch was promoted and succeeded Heiberg 

as chief of engineers; on 1 July, the Corps formally adopted project management 

for civil works projects.117 Over the next year, Corps headquarters, divisions, and 

districts struggled to implement the new management system.

Initial guidance regarding project management specified that, within the current 

allocation of staff positions, each district would designate a civilian as the deputy 

district engineer for project management (DDE[PM]). Districts were also to assign 

independent project managers for large projects and a team of project managers to 

oversee the projects too small to be managed individually. A project review board 

chaired by the district DDE(PM) would meet monthly to review and evaluate the 

status of all projects. A program management office at the district level would provide 

technical advice to the DDE(PM). The chiefs of the functional areas (planning, 

engineering, and construction) retained responsibility for developing the schedules, 

budgets, and manpower requirements for their respective functions and for providing 

traditional products. The first “notional” district organization chart showed project 

managers reporting directly to the DDE(PM); it did not show a relationship between 

the project managers and the functional staff.118

The principal lines of authority—and loyalty—in the Corps were “stovepipes,” 

or vertical functional chains. Confronted with resistance, questions, and a variety 

of district organizational plans, Hatch issued memos establishing the position of 

DDE(PM) equal to the rank of the chiefs of engineering and construction. The directives announced that assigning a functional chief from Engineering or Construction 

to serve simultaneously in the DDE(PM) position, so-called dual-hatting, was not 

acceptable because it violated “the principles” behind the establishment of the 

position.119

Although MEAPO staff knew about the turmoil in other districts and divisions, 

the project management initiative had no impact on them prior to September 1989. 

At that time, Hatch announced that all Corps programs, including military projects, 

117 Interv, Walker with Hatch, 12 Feb 91, pp. 4–5, 7; “Western Resources Wrap-Up,” 15 Sep 88, 

pp. 1–2; “Special: I-88,” PAR [Public Affairs Report], Sacramento Dist, Dec 88; “Managers, Projects 

Marry for Life,” Engineer Update, July 1988; “Implementation of Project Management,” 30 Jun 88, 

all in Hatch Papers. 118 “Implementation of Project Management,” 30 Jun 88, Hatch Papers. 119 Intervs, Fitzgerald with Augustine, 5 Apr 95, pp. 26–27; Gregory Graves with G. Edward Dickey, 

6 Sep 96, pp. 25, 44–45, Hatch Papers; “Temporary Shift of Key Personnel,” Daily Staff Journal, 3 

November 1988, Gen Files 23L-5, OH, HQ USACE. Memos, Hatch, 24 Oct 88, sub: Implementing 

Life Cycle Project Management; Loschialpo, 27 Oct 88, sub: Grading of Positions as Deputy District 

Engineer (Project Management); Hatch, 11 Jan 89, sub: Implementing Life Cycle Project Management; all in Hatch Papers.
612 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

would also be managed under the project management model.120 Because the military 

customer—the Army or the Air Force—obtained funds from Congress and then

turned to the Corps for design and construction, only two functional areas—design 

and construction—handled the project.

In early December 1989, MEAPO held a two-day workshop to determine the 

most effective organization to carry out LCPM and to establish a timetable for 

implementation. In his opening remarks, the commander, Colonel Butler, noted that 

the organization had some systems in place that would make implementation of 

the new project management system easier: “knowing our costs of doing business, 

using the team approach to managing projects, and being aware of the importance 

of customer care to meet the customer’s needs.” In discussions at the workshop, 

participants decided that MEAPO would combine the Engineering and Construction 

Divisions to form a new, single element. The new entity would include technical and 

management functions, as well as some functions of contracting. Butler designated 

Richard Wiles as the deputy district engineer for project management and appointed 

a “tiger team” to refine the proposed organization. The team, headed by Larry 

Graham in Resource Management, included Wiles, A. O. “Ollie” Werner, Wayne 

Henry, and management analyst Merle Moody.121

On 1 February 1990, the acting director of military programs at Corps headquarters, Allen M. Carton, sent out initial guidance and procedures for implementing 

project management for military projects.122 Initially, only one to three Military 

Construction, Army (MCA), projects in each district would be managed in the new 

LCPM system. Since MEAPO had no MCA projects at all, the organization had 

several additional months to complete its plan for reorganization. 

Corps headquarters issued other memos in February clarifying the guidance on 

project management. On 5 February, Hatch instructed division engineers to organize 

a new Programs and Project Management Directorate (PPMD) and district engineers 

to organize a similarly titled division.123 This guidance gave the project management 

function a stovepipe, and the staff responsible for project and program management 

gained some parity with the chiefs of engineering and construction.

On 15 February, the MEAPO commander and key staff members briefed the 

South Atlantic Division commander, Maj. Gen. Robert Bunker, and his staff about 

the MEAPO proposal and received their approval. The MEAPO plan called for two 

120 Memos, Hatch, 29 Sep 89, sub: Project Management (PM) for Corps Programs, and Page, 1 

Aug 89, sub: Reporting Scheme for Military Projects, both in Hatch Papers. 121 Memo, 1 Dec 89, sub: Life Cycle Project Management Workshop, Hatch Papers; “MEAPO to 

Reorganize under LCPM,” Middle East/Africa News, December 1989; Min, [MEAPO] Life Cycle 

Project Management Workshop, 4–5 Dec 89, unmarked box, TAD-RHA; Memos, 11, 22 Jan 90, 20 

Feb 90, sub: MEAPO Reorganization; Memo, Merle Moody, 25 Feb 90, sub: MEAPO Reorganization 

Briefing to South Atlantic Division, both in unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 122 Memo, Carton, 1 Feb 90, sub: Project Management Guidance for Military and Support for 

Other Programs, Hatch Papers. 123 Memo, 5 Feb 90, sub: Division and District Programs and Project Management (PPM) Organizations, Hatch Papers; Interv, Fitzgerald with Augustine, 5 Apr 95, pp. 21–22, 26–27. See also “Programs 

Chosen for Life Cycle Project Management,” Middle East/Africa News 5, no. 2 (February 1990): 8.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 613

deputy commanders, one for support and one for programs and project management. 

The Office of the Deputy Commander for Programs and Project Management 

would oversee the Engineering and Construction (E&C) Technical Division and 

the E&C PPMD. On 12 March, MEAPO formally requested headquarters approval 

to reorganize.124

Expecting “complete consensus by HQUSACE staff” and formal approval in 

early May 1990, MEAPO staff briefed the Military Programs Directorate staff at 

headquarters in mid-April. The headquarters response was negative.125 In recommending rejection of the plan, Carton criticized the loss of “constructive tension” 

between design and construction managers and cited Hatch’s explicit prohibition 

against combining engineering and construction. Carton also questioned the very 

existence of MEAPO “in its present form” and offered several alternative organizations, including the transfer of MEAPO to the Huntsville Division or to the Europe 

Division. The leaders in Winchester had not expected this challenge to the very 

existence of their organization.

Key MEAPO leaders rebutted the points in Carton’s memo. Wayne Henry 

emphasized the effective working relationship between engineering and construction 

at MEAPO. He saw this as a contrast to the headquarters’ “very low confidence 

in the professionalism and integrity of the work force.” Henry defended the plan, 

asserting, “We [MEAPO] have gone beyond life cycle project management to life 

cycle project execution.” In mid-June 1990, the MEAPO commander, Col. William 

A. Miller, submitted a formal point-by-point rejoinder to the South Atlantic Division 

commander. He included a compromise proposal and a revised organization plan 

calling for two distinct divisions—E&C Technical Division and E&C Programs and 

Project Management Division—both reporting to the commander and the deputy 

commander for programs and project management.126 Miller deemed the attempt 

to link the reorganization plan with rethinking MEAPO’s future roles and missions 

“inappropriate.” Nevertheless, the MEAPO plan to reorganize became tied up in the 

concerns at headquarters about the Corps’ overseas missions and workload, as well 

as in the Corps-wide difficulties of implementing project management. 

Recognizing the resistance in numerous districts to implementing project 

management, in late June 1990 senior leaders from headquarters and various 

Corps field offices met at St. Michaels, Maryland, to thrash out several issues. 

124 Memos, Col William A. Miller, 20 Feb 90, sub: MEAPO Reorganization, unmarked box, TADRHA; Moody, 25 Feb 90, sub: Reorganization Briefing to SAD; 12 Mar 90, sub: Request for Change 

in Organization, with attachments; all in unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 125 Memos, 23 Mar 90, sub: Reorganization, and 6 Apr 90, sub: LCPM Reorganization; Reorganization Bfg, MEAPO, 12 Apr 90. Memos, Dan Mauldin, 23 Apr 90, sub: Request for Approval of 

MEAPO Reorganization; Carton, 11 May 90, sub: Comments on MEAPO’s Proposed Reorganization; 

Miller, 4 Jun 90, sub: Status of MEAPO Reorganization; all in unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 126 Memos, Miller, n.d., sub: Comments Keyed to CEMP-CP MEMO Dated 11 May 90, and Henry, 

5 Jun 90, sub: Comments on OCE Nonconcurrence with MEAPO’s Proposed Reorganization; A. O. 

Werner, “Comments on OCE Nonconcurrence with MEAPO’s Proposed Reorganization and Subsequent Comments by Col Miller and Wayne Henry,” 6 Jun 90; Memo, Miller, 11 Jun 90, sub: Response 

to CEMP-CP Comments on MEAPO’s Reorganization Request; all in unmarked box, TAD-RHA.
614 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

They defined and differentiated the roles and responsibilities of the Program and 

Project Management (PPM) staff and the technical staff. The project manager, 

working under the DDE(PPM), would have responsibility for project schedule and 

cost and would provide overall leadership in project implementation. The technical 

managers, working under the functional chiefs, would provide the technical 

products such as studies, plans, and designs.127 Even with this clarification, the 

MEAPO proposal to combine the two major technical divisions under a single 

manager was an anomaly. 

Rethinking the Future of the Middle East/Africa Projects Office

While MEAPO and other Corps field offices in the continental United States were 

struggling with the mandate to implement project management, several significant 

international events and geopolitical changes took place. For decades the two 

superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—had faced each other across 

fortified borders that divided Europe. The most visible and symbolic expression of 

the divide between West and East was the Berlin Wall. Between 1989 and 1991, 

the Berlin Wall fell, the Cold War ended, and the Soviet Union disintegrated into 

its constituent states. In another quarter of the world, a broad coalition of nations 

participated in a short but intense war in the Middle East involving the oil resources 

of the Arabian/Persian Gulf region. The monumental changes in the world order 

suddenly and dramatically affected U.S. national security policy, defense budgets, 

and the Corps’ military construction program.

The sudden “outbreak of peace” in Europe and the concomitant reassessment of 

U.S. foreign policy had a particularly severe impact on the U.S. military construction 

program, particularly the Corps of Engineers’ Europe Division.128 With headquarters 

in Frankfurt, Germany, the division’s principal customers for design and construction 

services were U.S. Army, Europe, and U.S. Air Forces in Europe. 

In January 1990, barely two months after the Berlin Wall fell, Secretary of 

Defense Richard Cheney imposed a hiring freeze throughout the Department of 

Defense and a three-month moratorium on new military construction. When Cheney 

extended the moratorium in April and again in June, the financial problems of the 

Europe Division, already under orders to reduce the staff, worsened. Although EUD 

cut the number of employees from 1,011 in September 1989 to 710 in September 

1990, the projection of affordable staff for FY 1990 was only 535. The discrepancy 

created a deficit for the division of $7.4 million. The acting director of Military 

127 Min of Mtg, HQ USACE Senior Leaders on Progs and Project Mgmt, 27–28 Jun 90, St. Michaels, Md., an. A, in Engr Strategic Studies Ctr, “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Program and Project 

Management (PPM) Study,” 1991; Memo, Maj Gen Patrick Kelly and General Ray, 8 Mar 91, sub: 

Project Management Regulation ER 5–7–1; both in Hatch Papers. 128 Robert P. Grathwol and Donita Moorhus, Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 

1945–1991 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

2005), pp. 372–88.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 615

Programs, Carton, injected his concern about “the EUD problem” into considerations 

of MEAPO’s request for reorganization to implement project management.129

By mid-1900, Corps headquarters had initiated another process that impinged 

on issues of organization and structure. In response to a congressional mandate, the 

Corps undertook a study of the field structure—divisions and districts—that had 

existed virtually unchanged since the 1930s. MEAPO, which operated overseas using 

money from foreign governments and U.S. funds other than Military Construction, 

Army, and Military Construction, Air Force, was not directly affected by the 

possibility of reorganization explored in that study. Nevertheless, MEAPO stood 

out as an unusual field element. EUD was not directly affected by the reorganization 

study either; but as the mission in Europe declined, the rationale and support for 

retaining an operating division in Germany dissipated. 

Like Carton, Brig. Gen. Ernest J. Harrell, EUD’s commander, saw similarities 

between the EUD and MEAPO missions. Administering both construction programs 

seemed an attractive option. On 1 June 1990, Harrell wrote a letter to Hatch proposing 

the transfer of the Corps’ Middle East and Africa responsibilities and operations to 

EUD in Frankfurt.Hatch assigned to the Resources Management Office (RMO) in 

headquarters responsibility for recommending a response. Colonel Miller informed 

the MEAPO staff of these developments and reported that Hatch would meet with 

Harrell; General Bunker, the commander of South Atlantic Division; and Miller in 

July. With this meeting pending, Miller decided to put “in abeyance” requests for 

approval of the MEAPO proposal to reorganize for project management and the 

proposal for a new headquarters building.130

The first staff paper from the RMO at Corps headquarters endorsed Harrell’s 

proposal, but both the South Atlantic Division and the Middle East/Africa Projects 

Office found it unacceptable. Bunker indicated support for an EUD/MEAPO merger 

if it resulted in a new division-level organization with the division flag in the United 

States. Miller and the MEAPO director of resource management, Larry Graham, 

met with the headquarters chief of resource management, John Wallace. With his 

permission, they drafted a decision document recommending establishment of a joint 

EUD and South Atlantic Division/MEAPO task force to prepare a plan to locate a 

division-level organization in Winchester, Virginia. Hatch received the draft memo 

in mid-July but took no immediate action.131

On 30 July, Hatch met with Bunker, Harrell, Wallace, Carton, and Miller in 

Washington. The chief of engineers approved in concept a consolidation of EUD and 

MEAPO into a new operating division with principal headquarters in Winchester. He 

129 Memo, Brig Gen Ernest J. Harrell to Staff, 17 Jan 90, OH, HQ USACE; Msgs, Harrell, 7 Feb 

90, Current Files, EUD-RMO; “Commander’s Comments” and “Reduction in Force Procedures Show 

Employees Their Standing,” both in Corps’ Line, June 1990; Bfg dtd 13 Jul 90, Current Files, EUDRMO. See also Intervs, authors with Allen M. Carton, 22 Apr 97, pp. 338–44, and with John Wallace, 

19 Dec 96, pp. 6–28, Europe Division, Records Management Office. 130 Memo, Miller, 25 Jun 90, sub: Important Information Regarding MEAPO’s Future, R&D File 

2370, TAC. 131 Memos, Miller, 28 Jun 90, sub: Update on Merger of MEAPO and EUD, and 17 Jul 90, sub: 

Update #3 on Merger of MEAPO and EUD, both in R&D File 2370, TAD-RHA.
616 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

also directed a task force of EUD and South Atlantic Division/MEAPO employees 

to develop a study plan that would recommend the best organizational structure of 

a merged EUD and MEAPO.132 Leaders from USACE, MEAPO, and EUD agreed 

that there would be no public disclosure of the discussions and that neither EUD 

nor MEAPO would be subordinate to the other during the transition period.

International Events Intervene

Before Corps staff could begin the organizational study, international events 

intervened in a way that directly and immediately involved MEAPO. On 2 August 

1990, more than one hundred thousand Iraqi soldiers launched an attack on Iraq’s 

neighboring state of Kuwait. Four days later, after conferring with Secretary of 

Defense Cheney and top U.S. military officials, the Saudi Arabian government 

formally invited the United States to send troops to defend Saudi Arabia, to enforce 

UN sanctions imposed on Iraq, and to prepare an offensive attack to liberate Kuwait. 

On 8 August, President George H. W. Bush ordered U.S. forces deployed to the 

region in an operation called Desert Shield. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Saudi 

request for assistance, and Operation Desert Shield created a number of pressures 

on MEAPO, which had civilian employees in field offices in Egypt, Oman, Bahrain, 

Morocco, and Kuwait, as well as in Saudi Arabia.133

The harrowing experiences of two civilians in Kuwait since 1987 illustrate 

the perils that MEAPO employees working in the region and their families faced. 

Following instructions from the U.S. embassy, Bobby Higgins and his wife Odessa 

remained in their apartment from 1 to 5 August 1990, after which they fled to the 

embassy with their car, food, and three pieces of luggage. Among the first Americans 

to take sanctuary in the embassy, the Higgins couple stayed there until they were 

told they could leave—under Iraqi military escort—in an auto caravan to Baghdad. 

During the trip, their car was rammed and Mrs. Higgins broke her hip. The couple 

returned to Kuwait City to find medical treatment. Embassy officials and wellmeaning Kuwaitis took them to three different hospitals before they were accepted 

for treatment in apparent safety. Finally, on 1 September, the Iraqis evacuated the 

couple on a small plane to Baghdad. The next day, they flew to Paris, then on to 

London and Washington, D.C.134

Because MEAPO was the DoD agent for contract construction in the Middle 

East, virtually all of its offices became intensely involved in the war. Numerous 

employees went to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on temporary duty. The Corps sent 

both the commander, Colonel Miller, and the deputy commander, Lt. Col. Charles 

132 Miller, Rpt to MEAPO Staff, n.d., sub: Results of General Officers Meeting 30 July 1990; 

Bfg, EUD/MEAPO Merger IPR [In-Progress Review], 12 Sep 90; both in Documents on Merger of 

MEAPO and EUD, 1990–1991, R&D File 2370, TAC. 133 For coverage of the activities of the Corps of Engineers in the Gulf War, see Janet A. McDonnell, Supporting the Troops: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Persian Gulf War (Alexandria, 

Va.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1996). 134 “Trapped in Kuwait,” Middle East/Africa News, January 1991.
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 617

“Stoney” Cox, to the area. On 15 August 1991, Cox arrived in Dhahran to set up 

the MEAPO (Southwest Asia) forward office. Later in the month, Hatch dispatched 

Miller to CENTCOM headquarters in Riyadh. The South Atlantic Division assigned 

the deputy district engineer from Jacksonville, Lt. Col. William D. Brown, to 

Winchester as acting commander of MEAPO.

In mid-August 1990, just days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the task force 

considering the future of EUD and MEAPO had its first meeting. Jude Breitwieser 

from RMO in headquarters chaired the meeting. Ollie Werner, Larry Graham, and 

Merle Moody represented MEAPO; EUD sent two representatives; and the South 

Atlantic Division sent one. The task force recommended creating an operating 

division in Winchester and downsizing EUD to “appropriately-sized area office(s) 

in Europe.” The proposed timetable called for autumn meetings in Frankfurt and 

Winchester, with a new organizational chart and allocation of manpower completed 

by 1 March 1991 and the new division formally activated seven months later, on 

1 October 1991. By September 1990, a timeline for establishing the new division 

had been advanced by six months, to 2 April 1991.135

Despite the task force’s recommendations, both Harrell and the new South 

Atlantic Division commander, Maj. Gen. John Sobke, offered counterproposals, 

citing the additional work developing in the Middle East. MEAPO informally asked 

EUD about sending temporary-duty personnel to Winchester. Harrell responded by 

suggesting that his division take on the new work, noting that it had a number of 

people with experience in the Saudi program. Sobke proposed maintaining MEAPO 

as a district and downsizing the Europe Division to a district, both under the South 

Atlantic Division. In mid-October 1990, activities at Corps headquarters geared 

toward reorganizing the entire field structure became more prominent. Concerned 

that any action regarding MEAPO or EUD might “adversely affect” the flexibility 

he wanted for restructuring the entire Corps field structure, Hatch “decided to 

hold in abeyance” the decision on the Corps’ operations in Europe and the Middle 

East.136

Transatlantic Division

On 20 December 1990, Hatch announced that EUD would be a “tailored district 

subordinate to a renamed ‘MEAPO’” and that the new organization would be 

subordinate to the South Atlantic Division. This announcement came after meetings 

in Frankfurt in mid-December to develop an action plan for implementing the new 

organization. Ken Griggs of the South Atlantic Division, Ollie Werner of MEAPO, 

and Louis Brettschneider of EUD met with EUD leaders. Because Harrell would be 

leaving Europe to command the North Pacific Division in Portland, Oregon, Sobke 

135 Memo, n.d., sub: Consolidation of EUD-MEAPO Information to all Employees, 27 Aug 90; Bfg, 

EUD/MEAPO Merger IPR [In-Progress Review], 12 Sep 90; both in unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 136 Harrell to Hatch, 14 Aug 90, sub: Work in Saudi Arabia; Sobke to Edgar, 14 Sep 90; Memo, 

Hatch, 11 Oct 90, sub: Organization Structure and EUD Future; all in unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 
618 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

was “solely in charge” of the transition planning.137 The team developed milestones 

that set 28 February 1991 as the transition date. 

Selecting names for the new entities posed a problem. Werner’s memo to the 

MEAPO commander reported that the team proposed “the European District” 

reporting to the “Atlantic Ocean Division answering to the South Atlantic Division.” 

Staff in MEAPO, military and civilian alike, welcomed the opportunity to get a 

new name; but being a division that reported to another division would continue 

the confusion over the organization’s independence and authority. What to call 

the revamped Europe Division also created some controversy. Some staff in 

Europe did not want to be “reduced” to a district; but the EUD deputy, Col. John 

Moravec, thought the organization should become an area office because of its 

small workload.138 “Atlantic Division” drew at least one expression of concern 

that it “may cause some confusion to an outsider because of the perceived sense 

that a subdivision of the whole (South Atlantic Division) should answer to the 

whole (Atlantic Division), and not the reverse.”139 In the end, the Corps settled on 

Transatlantic Division (TAD) and Europe District (EUD). The chief of engineers 

selected Brig. Gen. Eugene S. Witherspoon as TAD commander and named Col. 

Daniel Waldo, former deputy of the Europe Division, as EUD commander. 

Tying Up Loose Ends

For several months, the staff team led by Griggs, Werner, and Brettschneider 

continued working to develop the parameters of authority and procedures for the 

new operating division and its district. One challenge for both organizations was the 

implementation of a new organizational structure and new procedures to implement 

lifecycle project management. Although Sobke urged Hatch in late October to 

approve the MEAPO reorganization, the chief of engineers did not act on MEAPO’s 

11 June 1990 memo until 28 January 1991, less than a month before MEAPO was 

redesignated as the Transatlantic Division. Witherspoon named Richard Wiles the 

deputy commander for programs and project management, Wayne Henry as head 

of the E&C Programs and Project Management Division, and Ollie Werner as chief 

of the E&C Technical Division.140

137 Memo, Hatch, 20 Dec 90, sub: Futures of Europe Division (EUD) and the Middle East/Africa 

Projects Office (MEAPO), unmarked box; “Roles Shift as Europe Division Reorganizes,” HQ USACE 

Internal News Briefs, 7 Jan 91, unmarked box; Interv, authors with Col Daniel Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 

6–7, Oral History Collection; Memo, Werner to Miller, 20 Dec 90, sub: MEAPO/EUD Transition, 

unmarked box; all in TAD-RHA. 138 Memo, Werner to Miller, 20 Dec 90; MFR, Griggs, 20 Dec 90, sub: EUD Merger, unmarked 

box, TAD-RHA. 139 Memo, Gary Lloyd, 8 Jan 91, sub: Name Change for Middle East/Africa Projects Office 

(MEAPO), unmarked box, TAD-RHA. 140 Memos, Werner, 1 Apr 91, sub: Authorities and Procedures for the Transatlantic Division and 

Europe District; Sobke to Hatch, 23 Oct 90, sub: MEAPO’s Implementation of Life Cycle Project 

Management (LCPM); Hatch, 28 Jan 91, sub: MEAPO’s Reorganization Request; Witherspoon, 1 
From Division to Middle East/Africa Projects Office, 1985–1991 619

On 17 January 1991, coalition forces commenced Operation Desert Storm, 

an air campaign to destroy critical Iraqi targets. The coalition launched a ground 

campaign on 24 February; within one hundred hours, coalition forces had routed the 

Iraqi Army.141 After the fighting ceased, U.S. forces helped to protect Iraqi Kurds 

in northern Iraq and to rebuild Kuwait. The new Transatlantic Division played an 

active role in both operations.

Coming Full Circle

The civilian personnel who had staffed the Middle East Division in 1986 had 

found the demotion of their organization to district status uncomfortable. On their 

behalf, their commander, General Ray, had made a strong argument that the talents 

existing among the division’s staff represented a resource that allowed the Corps of 

Engineers to “be responsive to future projects in the region while maximizing the 

economic use of USACE resources.”142 Ray had insisted that no other organization 

within or outside the Corps could respond with a “cohesive work force that would 

understand and be compatible with operations in the area.” The events of 1990–1991 

justified every confidence that General Ray showed in his personnel and in their 

abilities to respond to an emergency situation with alacrity and aplomb. Fortuitously 

and perhaps significantly for the successful integration of MEAPO personnel into 

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Ray had advanced to major general and 

director of military programs for the Corps of Engineers by the time Iraq invaded 

Kuwait.

MEAPO personnel performed well during the crisis, and the volume of business 

handled by the Projects Office increased as a result of the Gulf War and the postwar 

reconstruction. As a result, the chief of engineers, General Hatch, decided to return 

the organization to division status, even in the midst of downsizing within the 

Department of Defense. The Transatlantic Division, created in early 1991, inherited 

an illustrious tradition built by Corps of Engineers personnel in the Mediterranean 

and the Middle East over forty years.

Feb 91, sub: LCPM Reorganization; all in unmarked box, TAD-RHA. “Engineering and Construction 

Reorganization Approved,” Middle East/Africa News, January 1991. 141 “Department of the Army Historical Summary, 1990–1991” (Draft), pp. 12–13, copy in archives, 

U.S. Army Center of Military History. 142 All quotations in this paragraph from Ltr, Ray, 26 Aug 85.

Army Engineers Overseas 621

The activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Mediterranean and 

the Middle East after World War II were closely tied to U.S. security interests 

and foreign-policy objectives during the Cold War. In 1947, when the Truman 

administration announced its decision to protect Greece and Turkey from Soviet 

and Communist pressures, the engineers became agents of economic recovery in 

Greece and advisers for military modernization in Turkey. When the United States 

needed air bases in proximity to the Soviet Union to make credible the policies of 

containment and nuclear deterrence, the engineers built bases in Morocco, Libya, 

and Turkey. Advances in technology extended the range of U.S. military aircraft, but 

the contest with the Soviet Union for worldwide influence continued. Particularly in 

the Middle East, U.S. foreign policy shifted to emphasize the cultivation of friendly 

nations through military and economic assistance. Army engineers progressively 

expanded the geographic extent of the Corps’ activity by setting up operations in 

Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and East Africa. To monitor work in the Mediterranean 

and Middle East, the Corps of Engineers maintained a division headquartered in the 

area—in Morocco, in Italy, and then in Saudi Arabia—from 1952 to 1985. Even 

after the Corps returned the division headquarters to the continental United States, 

a cadre of personnel remained at work throughout the region. 

With U.S. funds, the engineers built airfields, warehouses, schools, hospitals, chapels, 

communications sites, and dormitories for use by the U.S. military services: the Army, the 

Air Force, and occasionally the Navy. They built cantonments, air bases, runways, mess 

halls, maintenance shops, and storage facilities in an effort to modernize and improve 

readiness and living conditions for military forces in countries generally supportive of 

the West and of anti-Communist alliances. In several countries, the engineers undertook 

projects designed to improve the local infrastructure, such as roads, air terminals, 

wharves, and piers. Elsewhere, particularly in Saudi Arabia, the engineers oversaw the 

design and construction of projects paid for by the host country. 

In all of the countries in which the engineers operated, they worked in accordance 

with U.S. government regulations on contracting and the procedures of American 

professional engineers. American architect-engineer firms executed the majority 

of design; American contractors handled the construction, particularly in the 

early decades. Nevertheless, the engineers working overseas encountered special 

challenges and unusual problems. The programs that were sponsored by other U.S. 

CONCLUSION

Army Engineers Overseas

Challenges, Opportunities, and 

Changing Times
622 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

agencies, such as the Agency for International Development, required the engineers 

to develop effective interagency partnerships. Maintaining a close working relationship with the U.S. embassy in each country was mandatory. As a representative of 

the United States, each employee of the Corps had to be adept in diplomacy as well 

as a specialist in design, construction, or management. Collectively, Corps actions, 

activities, and efforts came under scrutiny from the U.S. Congress, the Department 

of Defense, and the ultimate users of the facilities.

For all of the billions of dollars (and riyals) spent, for all of the tons of aggregate, 

sand, cement, and steel used to construct facilities in the Mediterranean basin, the 

accomplishments of the Corps of Engineers redound to people—literally thousands 

of individuals who worked for and with the organization. People formulated the 

plans, created the designs, let the contracts, ordered and managed the flow of equipment and materials, assembled the workforces, inspected the construction, operated 

the machinery, and paid the bills. The stories of the few people who appear in this 

historical narrative as actors in particular events capture little of the rich tapestry of 

individuals that comprised the day-to-day history of over forty years. Although the 

organization changed successively from the Mediterranean Division to the Middle 

East Division to the Middle East/Africa Projects Office and then to the Transatlantic 

Division, the significance of the people remained constant and central. 

In the first three decades of this history, the preponderance of men and women 

engaged in the mission of the Corps overseas lived and worked overseas. Those 

serving in the military usually did not have the option of accepting or declining the 

overseas assignment, and often their families did not have a choice either. Civilian 

employees of the Corps of Engineers chose the overseas assignments. Numerous 

service members, civilians, and their dependents found the work and the living 

situation satisfying as well as challenging. 

In the 1950s, Americans rarely had opportunities to live and work abroad. Even in 

1960s and 1970s, an assignment to the region generally meant a location that qualified 

as exotic: Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Libya, Eritrea, and the Arabian 

Peninsula. The people who chose these locations were willing to live and work in 

circumstances vastly different from the comfortable life and conventional career paths 

that employment with the Corps offered in the continental United States. 

The work itself offered challenges as well as a range of experience, responsibility, and freedom that was simply not available in the United States. The pace was 

often intense—the pressure to complete the Moroccan air bases, for example—but 

the engineers keenly felt the importance of their mission. Unlike some projects in 

the United States, overseas projects could not drag out for decades. The intensity 

of activity continued in the Saudi program in the 1970s and early 1980s, in part 

because of the sheer volume of the program. George Kingsley, who joined the 

counsel’s office of the Middle East Division in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in February 

1982, said that he developed “a completely different work ethic [because] you just 

had to work constantly.”1

1 Interv, authors with George Kingsley, 10 Mar 95, p. 7.
Army Engineers Overseas 623

The leaders overseas, civilian as well as military, became intensely involved with 

their employees because they had responsibility for the whole life of the staff—from 

housing, to education of dependents, to medical care, to recreation. The behavior 

of the employee, or any family member, had potential diplomatic implications that 

could impinge on the relations between the United States and the host country. For 

example, Col. Peter Grosz established guidelines for what women could wear in 

public in Saudi Arabia—dresses that reached at least down to the knee, sleeves to 

at least mid-arm, and no slacks or shorts.2

 With Italy as the exception, social outlets 

in the overseas locations were circumscribed and family members had limited 

opportunities for work. The life-support issues were of vital concern to the leaders 

who had to attract and retain personnel.

Life in Morocco, Libya, and Turkey had a certain allure. Italy, even with all its 

postwar problems, was enchanting, what several employees called “the best-kept 

secret” in the Corps of Engineers. Along with Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Egypt, it 

offered architectural and archaeological remains of great civilizations of the past, 

many accessible for a weekend visit. In the 1950s and 1960s, the cost of living and 

touring in these countries was still a bargain for Americans who ventured there.

Conditions of life for Corps personnel working in the Mediterranean and 

Middle East fostered a spirit of community. When housing at remote construction 

sites was scarce, expensive, and/or inadequate, the contractor supplied housing 

for Corps personnel. In Morocco in the mid-1950s, contractor personnel, military 

personnel, and civilian employees of the Corps lived and worked together in the 

same communities, “intermixed to the point where you would not have been able 

to tell one from another . . . in civilian attire.” A similar cohesion developed among 

employees in the Mediterranean Division in Italy, even though employees lived in 

housing dispersed along the coast and near Livorno. Some division staff enjoyed 

the Scuderia Aurelia Sports and Touring Car Club, a group of sports-car enthusiasts 

who held rallies once a month on a Sunday afternoon followed by a communal meal 

in a local restaurant. Another group of division employees—American civilians, 

U.S. military, Italian coworkers, and new-found Italian friends—took a chartered 

rail coach to Monaco each May for three or four days to watch the Grand Prix of 

Monte Carlo auto race. The division offered folk-dancing classes and had a theater 

group that produced plays and musicals.3

The cohesiveness was harder to maintain in remote and less-developed areas, 

but the district offices tried nonetheless. The Castle Club in the Gulf District from 

the late 1950s to 1967 and the Desert Inn in the Saudi Arabia District after 1967 

served as popular gathering places. District headquarters in Tehran also maintained 

sports facilities such as squash and racquetball courts, tennis courts, soccer fields, 

and swimming pools.

2 Peter Grosz, “Saudi Arabia District, 1968–70,” n.d., pp. 5–6, provided by Colonel Grosz, copy 

at Transatlantic Programs Center, Winchester, Va. 3 Intervs, Moorhus with W. Justin Long, 14 Mar 95, p. 15, and authors with Wolfram Wolz, 19, 

24 Nov 93, pp. 27–28; quotation from Interv, Nanse Grady and Charles Hendricks with Col (Ret) 

Philip W. Regar, 20 Dec 89, 26 Feb 90, pp. 133–34, 138–39.
624 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Conditions for Corps employees working in Saudi Arabia changed markedly 

from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, in part because conditions in the country 

changed so dramatically. In the early years, Corps employees lived in leased villas 

scattered around Riyadh; into the early 1970s, Saudis and Americans mixed socially 

as well as officially. Although the country was Islamic and activities for women 

were severely restricted, Colonel Reisacher entertained frequently in his home and 

developed close relations with several Saudis. As one gesture of friendship, the 

former liaison to the Corps from the Ministry of Defense and Aviation, Mahmoud 

Nassief, gave Reisacher two ornately carved wooden doors that had graced the 

entrance to Nassief’s grandfather’s library, reputedly one of the finest literary 

collections in all of Arabia.4

In the years after the Corps activated the Middle East Division and large 

numbers of Americans arrived in Saudi Arabia, the atmosphere changed. As Saudi 

Arabia moved increasingly into international prominence and the cities took on 

modern characteristics, the Saudi bureaucracies became more structured and 

relations between Saudis and Americans became more formal. Given the good 

employment market in the United States in the late 1970s, the new division’s first 

commander faced an old problem—recruitment. His response was similar to that of 

Corps leaders in Morocco, Karachi, and Tehran: consolidate the living quarters and 

sponsor construction of two major housing complexes, one designated for families 

and one for single and unaccompanied personnel. Through the remaining years of 

the Middle East Division in Saudi Arabia, division employees in Riyadh lived in 

large, self-contained compounds. Because women could not drive in the country, 

the division provided buses and drivers for the unaccompanied female employees. 

What employees gained in comfort and security they lost in contact with the local 

people and culture.5

One of the characteristics of Corps offices outside the United States is the 

presence of both local nationals as coworkers and employees who are neither 

Americans nor nationals of the host country. Citizens of the host country worked 

for the Corps in virtually every division and field office, frequently in clerical 

or manual-labor positions, occasionally in more technical positions. The local 

nationals generally worked under their own country’s employment rules rather 

than under U.S. labor law. The Italians in the Design Section of the Mediterranean 

Division, for example, received all of the benefits of Italy’s civil service, as well as 

all official Italian holidays. When the division left Italy, the Italian employees still 

on its roster could not by Italian law be terminated, so they were transferred to the 

Europe Division’s payroll.

Although Saudi military officers and engineer trainees worked in Corps offices, 

few Saudi civilians worked for the Corps. One, however, became well known to 

virtually all Corps employees who worked in or traveled to the country during the 

4 Intervs, authors with Adrian Hromiak, 6 Feb 94, pp. 22–23, and with Col (Ret) Robert Reisacher, 

25 Oct 94, p. 26; Conversation, Reisacher with authors. 5 Intervs, authors with Patricia Hill, 24 Nov 93, p. 12, and Moorhus with Betty Jo Naylor, 31 Jan 

95, pp. 10–13.
Army Engineers Overseas 625

1970s and 1980s. The Corps engaged Bakheet M. Al Malik through a personalservices contract. Dubbed Superman, he earned his nickname because he proved 

extraordinarily adept in bringing newly arriving personnel through customs, in 

wending his way through the Saudi governmental bureaucracy, and in a variety of 

very practical services. 

Foreign nationals played an important role in the successful execution of the 

programs and projects. The Corps recruited foreign nationals on site in all the 

countries in which it operated and from countries in northern Europe as well. 

Germany proved a fertile recruiting ground in the 1950s; but division employees also 

came from France, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Greece, and other countries around the 

region. The occasional appearance of names such as Orhan Cankardes from Turkey, 

Albert Charmot from France, Wilhelm Voelker from Germany, Arthur Chapman 

from England, and Giovanni “John” Trapanese from Italy barely suggests the range 

and the importance of the contributions made by third-country or local nationals. 

Not least of their contributions was a facility with the language and culture of their 

respective regions. 

One incident illustrates the sort of inventiveness demanded of Corps employees 

in the overseas environment. After the Gulf District had closed its offices in Tehran, 

the Mediterranean Division headquarters in Italy received a letter in Farsi from the 

Iranian Planning Commission. Paul Wheeler, a former Gulf District employee, read 

some Farsi but not enough to decipher the letter. A second American employee, 

Robert Imagire, spoke Farsi with his Iranian wife but did not read it. A third 

employee, Egyptian-born Victor Saikali, knew Arabic, not Farsi, but he could sound 

out the words in the letter because the two languages use the same alphabet and 

phonetic marks. Saikali read the letter aloud; Imagire translated what he heard to 

English; and Wheeler, who knew the work that the division had accomplished in 

Iran, extrapolated from Imagire’s translation to make sense of the letter.6

When the Corps operations in the Mediterranean/Middle East split into a 

forward headquarters in Riyadh and a rear headquarters in Winchester, Virginia, 

the nature of the workforce engaged in the Corps’ overseas mission changed. 

Although the division needed a large number of people to work in Saudi Arabia 

and these positions offered challenges, opportunities, and promotions for a wide 

range of job classifications, the work assigned to the rear also offered an unusual 

range of opportunities. The workforce in Virginia included old-timers like Dick 

Wiles, a Corps employee since 1957, well-known both for his willingness to travel 

overseas “at the drop of a hat” and for never taking more than a single carry-on bag, 

whether the trip was three days or three weeks. The new recruits into the overseas 

work included Roger Thomas, who transferred from the Baltimore District. After 

working on the Saudi Arabian National Guard and King Abdulaziz Military Academy 

programs, he was given responsibility for the Oman program at age twenty-nine. 

Once, when asked by Corps employees from other divisions what he was working 

on, he answered, “a couple of housing packages.” His answer to the followup 

6 The incident is described in Interv, Moorhus with Paul S. Wheeler, 31 May 95, pp. 10–11. 
626 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

question about the estimated construction cost startled his colleagues: “A billion 

dollars.” “You mean a million, right?” “No,” he answered, “No, I mean a billion.” 

The scope of the projects seemed unbelievable. Although he never had an overseas 

assignment, Thomas traveled to Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain, frequently for 

stays of thirty to sixty days.7

As Thomas’ career illustrates, advances in communications and in airline travel, 

as well as willing employees, made it possible to manage overseas construction 

efficiently from within the continental United States. Construction managers still 

had to work at the project sites, which were often remote; but enhanced communications (improved telephone service, the fax machine, and e-mail) helped these 

employees feel less isolated. Improved travel opportunities made frequent home 

visits possible. 

In spite of changes made possible by technology, the challenge remains for the 

Corps: how to manage the overseas construction mission. However much money, 

whatever the projects, people are the essential ingredient. For almost forty years, in 

almost every instance at the initiation of a major program, Corps offices began their 

work with insufficient and inexperienced staff. What was true in Morocco, Libya, 

Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in the early 1950s; in Iran and Pakistan in the late 1950s; 

and in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia in the 1960s remained true for new 

programs in the 1970s and 1980s. Recruiting remained a problem throughout the 

Corps’ involvement in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Col. Paul D. Troxler, who faced this situation, drew lessons from his experiences 

as deputy district engineer in Greece in 1947–1948 and as district engineer in Libya 

in the early 1950s. Having seen the effects of understaffing in the early stages of the 

programs, Troxler suggested that the chief of engineers maintain a permanent group 

of overseas specialists directly under his command. Troxler envisioned that seasoned 

overseas hands—construction workers, auditors, supply personnel, administrators, 

legal personnel, and all the rest—would have permanent assignments within the 

Corps but would be organized and on call for deployment overseas. They would 

command all of the talent, experience, and skill necessary to launch a district-level 

office and to integrate its operations into a foreign theater. If the Department of 

Defense wanted to initiate a construction program abroad, the chief of engineers 

could call on the talent and experience of these trained and experienced civilian 

specialists and military personnel to get the project or program started. Troxler’s 

proposal never received formal endorsement or implementation, perhaps not even an 

acknowledgment.8

 The technological advances of the intervening years, especially 

the facsimile of the 1980s and the e-mail of the 1990s, have made management of 

overseas work easier. Still, electronic communications devices are only tools; they 

do not replace people.

7 Interv, Moorhus with Roger Thomas, 27 Aug 96, pp. 4, 37–40.

8 “Historical Summary, Mid. East Dist., June 1950–September 1951,” p. 19, in Office of the Chief 

of Engineers, “Historical Summary, 1950–1951,” Gen Files 2-1, Office of History, HQ U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, Alexandria, Va.
Army Engineers Overseas 627

Fortunately for the United States, the Middle East/Africa Projects Office 

(MEAPO) retained the services of the experienced engineers and managers that 

Troxler had counted on to staff his proposed teams. These people were still organized 

to act quickly in an overseas setting. Thus, when Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait in 

August 1990 and the U.S. military needed to provide for a rapid buildup to support 

a strike force in Saudi Arabia, MEAPO filled the role. Drawing on the experience 

of forty years of service in the region and twenty-five years of contract work in 

Saudi Arabia, MEAPO personnel rushed into action to organize the construction 

and contracting necessary to support half a million coalition soldiers preparing to 

engage the enemy. The performance delivered by the men and women of the Middle 

East/Africa Projects Office confirmed the value of the overseas mission and of the 

experience reaped by the Corps of Engineers in its half century of service in the 

Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Bibliography 629

Primary Documents

The source material for this study is drawn primary from documents generated 

by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Mediterranean and Middle East. These 

documents are located in three principal repositories—the Records Holding Area 

maintained at the headquarters of the successor organization, the Transatlantic 

Programs Center (TAC), in Winchester, Virginia; the Research Collections, Office 

of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Alexandria, 

Virginia; and the Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, 

Maryland. This bibliography contains brief descriptions of the records in each 

repository. A few documents from the Federal Records Center in Bayonne, New 

Jersey, also proved relevant.

Records Collections, Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Alexandria, Virginia

The Records Collections are located on the ground level of the Kingman 

Building at the Humphreys Engineer Center in Alexandria. Records include an 

extensive oral history collection of both tapes and transcripts; sorted documents in 

Military Files and General Files; the papers of former chiefs of engineers, Lt. Gens. 

Samuel D. Sturgis, Walter K. Wilson Jr., and Frederick J. Clarke; documents from 

the Mediterranean Division collected by Richard T. Farrell; documents from the 

Middle East Division collected by Dr. Paul Walker, identified in this manuscript as 

“Walker box” with a number. Dr. Farrell collected ten boxes of documents, a total of 

about fifteen linear feet, in the mid-1970s to write the history of the Mediterranean 

Division. He died before completing the project.

Copies of documents collected by the authors for a history of military 

construction in Europe, many of them relevant to the Mediterranean and Middle 

East Divisions, are also located at the Office of History in Virginia and designated 

as the Europe Division (EUD) Collection.

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, and Federal 

Records Center, Bayonne, New Jersey

The WNRC is a branch of the National Archives and Records Administration. 

It contains all of the Standard Form 135 sheets that the Corps of Engineers uses 

to retire materials. The documents held in the records center are still owned and 

controlled by the retiring governmental agency. 

Bibliography
630 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Two accessions deposited by the Corps of Engineers are located within Record 

Group (RG) 77: accession number 77–92–0001 (thirty-eight large boxes) and 

77–92–0002 (thirty-five large boxes). The one relevant holding in Bayonne is RG 

77, accession number 77–004, box 682799.

Records Holding Area, Transatlantic Programs Center, Winchester, 

Virginia

The successor organization of the Mediterranean and Middle East Divisions and of 

the Middle East/Africa Projects Office is the Transatlantic Programs Center. The large, 

warehouse-like section of the TAC headquarters building holds about ten thousand large 

boxes, and more than five hundred contain documents with material of interest and value 

to this study. Some date from the 1960s and cover the programs in Ethiopia, Pakistan, 

Iran, and Libya. A larger number date from the 1970s and 1980s and relate to the work 

in Saudi Arabia. A smaller number of records relating to more recent projects in Oman, 

Egypt, Jordan, and Kuwait have also been retired to the TAC records holding area. 

The Corps of Engineers has prepared several finding aids for the documents at 

all three repositories. Unfortunately, the finding aids are confusing and difficult to 

use because documents have been reboxed, shuffled, and divided in ways that the 

finding aids do not reflect. As an example, the finding aid publicly available at the 

Office of History, HQ, USACE, for the boxes that are deposited at the Washington 

National Records Center in accession numbers 77–92–0001 and –0002 does not 

reflect the redistribution of document folders in new boxes that took place at the 

records center. The computerized inventories maintained for the records held in 

Winchester do not always contain information useful to the historian in determining 

the relative value of the contents of individual boxes.

Secondary Literature

Books Cited in the Text

Adams, Gerald M. A History of U.S. Strategic Air Bases in Morocco, 1951–1963. 

Omaha, Neb.: Moroccan Reunion Association, 1992.

Badeau, John S. The American Approach to the Arab World. New York: Harper 

& Row, 1968.

Blaker, James R. United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma. 

New York: Praeger, 1990.

Campbell, John C. Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy, 2d 

ed. New York: Harper, 1960. 

Chambers, John W., II. The North Atlantic Engineers. New York: North Atlantic 

Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1980.

Condit, Kenneth W. History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 6, The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff and National Policy, 1955–1956. Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, 

Joint Staff, 1992.
Bibliography 631

Cordesman, Anthony H. The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi 

Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military 

Balance. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984.

Donnelly, Charles H. United States Defense Policies Since World War II. 

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957.

Dunn, Lt. Gen. Carroll H. Base Development in South Vietnam, 1965–70. 

Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1991.

Feis, Herbert. From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950. New 

York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1970.

Fontaine, André. History of the Cold War from Korea to the Present. New York: 

Random House, 1969.

Grathwol, Robert P., and Donita M. Moorhus, Building for Peace: U.S. Army 

Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of 

Military History, 2005.

Haddad, George M. Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab 

States, Part II: Egypt, The Sudan, Yemen and Libya. New York: Robert Speller 

& Sons Publishers Inc., 1973.

Heidish, Louise S. History of the Huntsville Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

1977–1981 Update. Huntsville, Ala.: U.S. Army Engineer Division, Huntsville, 

1986.

Heller, Mark, ed. The Middle East Military Balance, 1984. Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center 

for Strategic Studies, 1984.

Interviews with Lieutenant General Frederick J. Clarke, Engineer Memoirs. 

Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1980.

Jones, Howard. A New Kind of War: America’s Global Strategy and the Truman 

Doctrine in Greece. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Keylor, William R. The Twentieth-Century World, An International History. New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Kitchens, James A., III. A History of the Huntsville Division, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, 1967–1976. Huntsville, Ala.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

1978.

Kuniholm, Bruce R. The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power 

Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece. Princeton: Princeton 

University Press, 1980.

LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1980, 4th ed. New 

York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980.

Lenczowski, George, The Middle East in World Affairs, 4th ed. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 

University Press, 1980.

McDonnell, Janet A. Supporting the Troops: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 

the Persian Gulf War. Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1996.

A New City is Born. Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia Consortium, 1978.

Oman ’91. Sultanate of Oman, Ministry of Information, 1991.

Report to Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States: Perspectives 

on Military Sales to Saudi Arabia, 1997.
632 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Schubert, Frank N., and Theresa L. Kraus, ed. The Whirlwind War: United States 

Army Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Army Center of Military History, 1995.

Snyder, Thomas S., and Shelia A. Shaw. United States Air Forces in Europe, 

Historical Highlights, 1942–1992. Ramstein, Germany: U.S. Air Forces Europe, 

1993.

Swetzer, R. L. Wheelus Field: The Story of the U.S. Air Force in Libya, The 

Early Days, 1944–1952. Ramstein, Germany: Historical Division, Office of 

Information, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, 1965.

Tumpane, John D. Scotch and Holy Water. Lafayette, Calif.: St. Giles Press, 1987.

Walker, Paul K. Interviews with Lieutenant General Walter K. Wilson, Jr., Engineer 

Memoirs. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1984.

Periodical Literature, Pamphlets, and Chapters in Books Cited in the Text

The Military Engineer, 1948–1996

The following newsletters published by the Mediterranean Division, the Middle 

East Division, and the Middle East/Africa Projects Office cover 1976–1991:

Mideast Engineer

Mt. Weather Bulletin

Middle East Division News

Middle East/Africa News

The following articles are cited in the text:

Ahrens, Steve. “Saudis Detain 31 M-K Workers.” Idaho Statesman, 1 August 1979.

Bowman, Waldo G. “Aftermath in Morocco—Good Bases.” Engineering News 

Record, 27 August 1953, pp. 30–36, 39–41.

Bumiller, Elisabeth. “His Majesty’s Silver Service, The Royal Saudi Arabian Navy’s 

$4.5 Million Dinnerware Deal.” Washington Post, 4 March 1980.

“Castle Comments.” Saudi Arabia Information Bulletin, 29 November 1975.

“Concrete Is in Full Command at Saudi Arabia’s West Point.” Concrete Products, 

March 1984, pp. 34–35.

Eilts, Hermann F. “Social Revolution in Saudi Arabia” (Part II). Parameters 1, no. 

2 (Fall 1971): 31.

Fialka, John J. “Huge Plan To Modernize a Desert.” Washington Star, 18 February 

1980.

“First Units for Saudi City Draw Nine Bids, $206 Million Low.” Engineer NewsRecord, 30 August 1979, p. 24.

Griffiths, D. W. “Reconstruction in Greece.” Military Engineer (July-August 1949): 

252.

Iseman, Peter A. “The Arabian Ethos.” Harper’s (February 1978): 37–56.

Kibler, Joan. “Saudis Host Close-out Ceremony.” Engineer Update, May 1988.
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Leffler, Melvyn P. “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, 

Turkey, and NATO, 1945–1952.” Journal of American History (March 1985): 

807–25.

Lincoln, L. J. “Construction in a Cold War Theater of Operations.” Army Information 

Digest (July 1958): 18–21.

Lohr, Lenox R. “Engineer Shortage and National Security.” Military Engineer

(September-October 1954): 343–46.

Mentzelopoulos, Christ. “The Work Performed in Greece under the Direction of the 

Corps of Engineers.” Reprinted from Technika Chronika (April 1949).

“Military City Costs SR18 billion.” Arab News, 6 April 1985.

Miller, Barry. “USAF to Deliver F–5Es to Saudi Arabia.” Aviation Week and Space 

Technology (12 November 1973): 14–15.

“The Officers’ Club Complex: An Elaborate Display of the World’s Designs and 

Technologies.” Jones Journal (Fall 1978): 2–3.

Pincus, Walter. “Foreign Entanglements: Now Saudi Arabia.” New Republic (29 

March 1975): 8–10.

———. “The Saudi Connection.” Washington Post, 1 May 1975.

“Probe Urged of Contract To Train Saudi Oil Guards.” Rome Daily American, 11 

February 1975.

“Saudi Arabia—The Construction Bubble Bursts.” Middle East Economic Digest

(17 June 1983): 8.

“Saudi Arabia: Information Pamphlet,” USAFE, Office of Information Services, 

Headquarters, 2d Air Division, 1 August 1959.

Shuler, William R. “Safety in the Middle East Construction Program.” Military 

Engineer (September-October 1959): 368.

Snetzer, Robert E. “Pakistan: Newest Construction Area.” Military Engineer

(September-October 1958): 335–39.

Tulley, David H. “The Military Construction Program.” Military Engineer

(November-December 1954): 403–08.

Turhollow, Anthony. “Airfields for Heavy Bombers.” Builders and Fighters: U.S. 

Army Engineers in World War II, ed. Barry W. Fowle. Fort Belvoir, Va.: Office 

of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1992.

“Who Is Doing the Work?” Moroccan Courier, 3 July 1953.

“Work for Other Nations.” In The History of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986.

Unpublished Manuscripts and Studies Commissioned by the Government

Arrigona, James S., and W. R. Karsteter. “USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, 

Historical Report, 15 January 1953–31 July 1957.” U.S. European Command, 

1958.

Dod, Karl C. “Airfield Construction in North Africa: Morocco.” Office of History, 

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634 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

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Schubert, Frank N. “A Helping Hand: Three Decades of Corps of Engineers 

Involvement in Foreign Assistance Programs.” Office of History, Headquarters, 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, n.d. 

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Congressional Documents

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Moroccan Air Base 

Construction: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Military Public Works, pt. 

4 of Investigation of Military Public Works, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 1952.

———, Committee on Foreign Relations, Activities of the United States Army Corps 

of Engineers in Saudi Arabia. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe 

and The Middle East (Lee H. Hamilton [Indiana], Chairman), of the Committee 

on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Second Report on Moroccan 

Air Base Construction [19 Feb 1953], 44th Report of the Preparedness 

Investigating Subcommittee [Lyndon B. Johnson, Chairman] of the Committee 

on Armed Services, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 1953.

———, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed 

Services (Lyndon B. Johnson, Chairman), Investigation of the Preparedness 

Program: Interim Report on Moroccan Air Base Construction, 82d Cong., 2d 

sess., 1952.

———, Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, Mutual 

Defense Assistance Program, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950.

Oral History Interviews

The authors conducted the following interviews specifically for this project. 

Unless otherwise noted, Donita M. Moorhus conducted the interview. The military 

officers served with the U.S. Army. Tapes and copies of the transcripts are located 

in the Oral History Collection, Records Collections, Office of History, HQ, USACE. 

Copies of the transcripts are also located in the Public Affairs Office, TAC, USACE, 

Winchester, Virginia.

Anderson, Thor S., 26 Feb 96, telephone interview.

Baylor, Jack, 22 Jun 95, telephone interview by Robert P. Grathwol.

Bodner, Karleen M., 8 Mar 94, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, by Moorhus and Grathwol.

Boyd, Col. (Ret.) Claude D., III, 9 Nov 95, Arlington, Va.

Breen, Ron, 30 Jan 95, Winchester, Va.

Buehler, Col. (Ret.) John P., n.d., telephone interview by Grathwol.

Butler, Phil, 19 Nov 93, Frankfurt, Germany, by Moorhus and Grathwol.
Bibliography 635

Carozza, A. Thomas, 26 Jan 95, White Hall, Md., by Moorhus and Grathwol.

Connell, Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Richard M., 26 Sep 95, Oakland, Calif.

Cummings, John, 18 Nov 93, Frankfurt, Germany, by Moorhus and Grathwol.

DiNello, Phil, 19 Sep 96, Winchester, Va. 

Dobberman, David R., 31 Oct 96, Alexandria, Va., by Moorhus and Grathwol.

Dorr, Col. (Ret.) John M., 11 Aug, 12 Sep, 26 Sep, 31 Oct 94, Winchester, Va., 

by Grathwol.

Dykes, Gordon W., 24 Oct 95, Alexandria, Va.

Edinger, James J., 9 Mar 95, Winchester, Va.

Ellis, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) James N., 27, 28, 29 Sep 95, Oakland, Calif.

Friestad, Ronald, 7 Feb 94, Winchester, Va.

Gay, Capt. Steven, 2 Jun 94, Winchester, Va., by Moorhus and Grathwol.

Graham, Larry, 26 Sep 94, Winchester, Va.

Grosz, Col. (Ret.) Peter, Jr., 19 Mar 96, Winchester, Va. 

Groves, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Richard H., 28 Jun 95, Alexandria, Va., by Moorhus and 

Grathwol.

Hall, Robert E., 24 Mar 95, Alexandria, Va.

Hight, Col. (Ret.) Adolph A., 23 Aug, 30 Aug, 6 Sep, 27 Sep 94, Olney, Md., by 

Moorhus and Grathwol.

Hill, Patricia, 24 Nov 93, Frankfurt, Germany, by Moorhus and Grathwol.

Hromiak, Adrian, 6 Feb 94, Winchester, Va., by Moorhus and Grathwol. 

Kibler, Joan, 11 Jan 95, Winchester, Va.

Kingsley, George M., 10 Mar 95, Winchester, Va.

Lane, Allen R., 9 Mar 95, Winchester, Va.

Long, W. Justin, 14 Mar 95, Alexandria, Va.

McGiverin, Terry J., 2 Jun 94, Winchester, Va.

Naylor, Betty Jo, 31 Jan 95, Winchester, Va.

Oliva, Frank, 13 Jan 95, Washington, D.C., by Moorhus and Grathwol.

Reisacher, Col. (Ret.) Robert, 25 Oct 94, Santa Fe, N.M., by Moorhus and 

Grathwol. 

Rouse, George, 10 Jan 95, Winchester, Va.

Sibony, Henry, 26 Jan 95, Ellicott City, Md., by Moorhus and Grathwol. 

Thomas, Roger, 27 Aug 96, Winchester, Va.

Tohill, Edgar, 23 Jan 95, Arlington, Va., by Moorhus and Grathwol.

Trapanese, Giovanni, 9 Jun 94, Winchester, Va., by Moorhus and Grathwol. 

Wagman, Stuart, 11 Jan 94, Alexandria, Va., by Moorhus and Grathwol. 

Wells, Lt. Col. (Ret.) Daniel R., 29 Aug, 8 Sep, 15 Sep, 20 Oct, 17 Nov 94, 

Alexandria, Va., by Moorhus and Grathwol.

Werner, A. O., 20 Oct 93, Winchester, Va., by Moorhus and Grathwol.

Wheeler, Paul S., 31 May 95, Leesburg, Va.

Wiles, Richard, 21 Oct 93; 7 Feb, 5 May 94, Winchester, Va.

Williamson, Col. (Ret.) Rayburn, 28 Sep 95, Oakland, Calif.

Witherspoon, Brig. Gen. Eugene S., 23 Feb 95, Washington, D.C.

Wolz, Wolfram, 19, 24 Nov 93, Frankfurt, Germany, by Moorhus and Grathwol.

Wood, Bennie, 27 Jun 96, Winchester, Va.
636 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Other Oral History Interviews from the Research Collections, Office 

of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alexandria, 

Virginia.

Albro, Maj. Gen. Ames S., Jr., 5 Jun 84, Washington, D.C., by Frank N. 

Schubert.

Bailey, Col. (Ret.) William, Aug 75, San Antonio, Tex., by Richard T. Farrell.

Blake, John, 24 Jun 88, Frankfurt, Germany, by Paul K. Walker and William C. 

Baldwin.

Boerger, Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Philip T., 19–20 Jul 82, Beaumont, Tex.; 9–10 May 83, 

Cabin John, Md., by Lynn Alperin and Niels Nilson.

Cameron, Col. (Ret.) Harry F., Jr., 27–29 Mar 89, Stone Mountain, Ga., by 

Baldwin.

Carton, Allen M., 22 Apr 97, Potomac, Md., by Moorhus.

Cavens, Jerry J., 11 Feb 85, Washington, D.C., by Walker.

Chapman, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Curtis W., Jr., 28–30 Sep 81, Mt. Sunapee, N.H., by 

Walker.

Connor, Tom, 21 Nov 82, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, by John T. Greenwood.

Coony, John, 9 Feb 85, Albuquerque, N.M., by Walker. 

Curtis, Calvin, 16 Nov 82, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, by Greenwood.

Delbridge, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Norman G., 14 Feb 91, Washington, D.C., by Moorhus 

and Grathwol.

Derby, Col. (Ret.) George T., 19, 20 Dec 84, Naples, Fla., by Herbert M. Hart.

Friesch, Paul, 22 Aug 89, Brussels, Belgium, by Moorhus and Grathwol.

Gray, Col. George, 12 Jun–5 Jul 85, Alexandria, Va., by Thomas Tulenko. 

Gunter, Col. Gurnie, 24 Mar 84, Kansas City, Mo., by Greenwood.

Henry, Wayne, Nov 85 (no place given), by Greenwood.

Kramer, Earl, 14 Mar 83, Berryville, Va., by Greenwood.

Lane, Cecilia, 6 Oct 83, Al Batin, Saudi Arabia, by Walker. 

Leiser, Col. Maurice, 27 Feb 85, Cambridge, Mass., by Walker.

Lincoln, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Lawrence J., Dec 79–Jan 80, Alexandria, Va., by Lawrence 

Suid.

———, 4 Aug 75, Alexandria, Va., by Farrell.

Lipscomb, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Thomas H., 12 Nov 83, Moorestown, N.J., by Hart.

McGinnis, Maj. Gen. Charles I., 5 Nov 79, Annandale, Va., by Martin Reuss.

Meehan, Robert, 6 Feb 85, Washington, D.C., by Walker.

Parkin, Elmer, 4 Oct 83, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, by Greenwood.

Prentiss, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Louis W., 14 Sep 90, Indian Beach, Del., by Moorhus 

and Grathwol.

Raymond, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Daniel A., and Barbara L. Raymond, 9, 11 Jan 80, 

Alexandria, Va., by Stuart Rochester. 

Regar, Col. (Ret.) Philip W., 20 Dec 89, 26 Feb 90, Washington, D.C., by Nanse 

Grady and Charles Hendricks.

Reisacher, Col. (Ret.) Robert, 7 Feb 85, Santa Fe, N.M., by Walker.
Bibliography 637

Robertson, Brig. Gen. George R., 1 Oct, 22 Nov 83, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, by 

Greenwood.

Schneebeck, Col. Gene, 6–7 Oct 83, Al Batin, Saudi Arabia, by Walker.

Seedlock, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Robert F., 25–26 Oct 79, Atlanta, Ga., by Alfred 

Beck.

Sheehan, Wilbur, Aug 75, San Antonio, Tex., by Farrell.

Textor, Arthur, 1 Feb 90, Frankfurt, Germany, by Moorhus and Grathwol.

Voelker, Wilhelm, 25–26 May 88, Winchester, Va., by Schubert.

Waldo, Col. Daniel, 4 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany, by Moorhus and Grathwol.

Wallace, John, 19 Dec 96, Washington, D.C., by Moorhus.

Wells, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Richard M., 29–30 Jun 91, Paradise Valley, Ariz., by 

Greenwood.

Wheeler, Paul S., 31 May 85, Leesburg, Va., by Greenwood.

Wheeler, Ralph, 6 Nov 85, Winchester, Va., by Greenwood.

Williams, Col. (Ret.) Charles T., 20–21 Feb 85, by Tulenko.

Wilson, Col. Daniel, 13 May 85, by Walker.

Wilson, Robbie, Oct 75, Camp Darby, Italy, by Farrell.

Woodall, Gus, 5 Feb 85, Albuquerque, N.M., by Walker.

Abbreviations 639

AACS Airways and Air Communications Service

AC&W aircraft control and warning

ADP Atkinson-Drake-Park

ADP automated data processing

AFLC U.S. Air Force Logistics Command

AHC Afghanistan Highway Constructors

AID U.S. Agency for International Development

AMC U.S. Army Materiel Command

AMCAT Abdulla Moosa Contracting & Trading Company

ARAMCO Arabian-American Oil Company

ARMISH-MAAG Army Mission and Military Assistance Advisory Group to Iran

ASA(CW) assistant secretary of the Army for civil works

ATC Air Transport Command

BATMED Frank E. Basil Inc., the Architects Collaborative 

International Ltd. Inc., and Metcalf & Eddy Inc.

BDF Bahrain Defense Forces

BOD Beneficial Occupancy Date

BOQ bachelor officers quarters

CADD computer-aided design and drafting

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CENTO Central Treaty Organization

CIC U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command

CICP central inventory control point

COEMIS Corps of Engineers Management Information System

COGECO Compagnia Generale Costruzioni Sp.A.

CoGeFar Costruzioni Generali Farsura S.p.A.

CONARC U.S. Continental Army Command

CONUS Continental United States

CPAF cost-plus-award-fee

CPFF cost-plus-fixed-fee

CRS Caudill, Rowlett, and Scott

CS contract support

CSS Crow-Steers-Shepherd

CWE current working estimate

CWS continental wage scale

Abbreviations
640 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

DAC Department of the Army civilian

DCS deputy chief of staff

DDE(PM) deputy district engineer for project management

DFS Direct Forces Support

DITCO Development International Trade Company Ltd.

DLF Development Loan Funds

DMJM Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall

DoD Department of Defense

DODDS Department of Defense Dependent Schools

E&C Engineering and Construction

EAA Engineer Assistance Agreement

EAF Egyptian Air Force

ELC Engineer Logistics Command

EPLO Engineering Planning and Liaison Office

EUD Europe Division

FIDIC Fédération Internationale des Ingenieurs-Conseils

FMS Foreign Military Sales

FY fiscal year

GDMW General Directorate of Military Works

GED Gulf Engineer District

GFM government-furnished materials

GFP government-furnished property

Globecom global communications

GO general orders

GPM gallons per minute

HTB Hotchkiss, Thompson, and Ball Inc.

ICA International Cooperation Administration

IG inspector general

Impresit Imprese Italiane all’Estero S.p.A.

JAF Jordanian Armed Forces

JAMMAT Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey

JCA Joint Construction Agency

JUSMAGG Joint United States Military Aid Group Greece

JUSMMAT Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey

JVKM Joint Venture Khamis Mushayt

KAMA King Abdulaziz Military Academy

KERO Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office

KKMC King Khalid Military City
Abbreviations 641

KTA Knappen-Tippetts-Abbett

LCPM lifecycle project management

LOA letter of offer and acceptance

LOI letter of instruction

LORAN long-range navigation

MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group

MAC Modern Advance Concrete

MAP Military Assistance Program

MATS Military Air Transport Service

MCA Military Construction, Army

MEAPO Middle East/Africa Projects Office

MKI Morrison-Knudsen International

MKO Morrison-Kaiser-Oman

MKSAC Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia Consortium

MMM McGaughy, Marshall & McMillan

MODA Ministry of Defense and Aviation

MOI Ministry of Information

NAF U.S. Naval Air Facility

NAMRU U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit

NAS network analysis system

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBCI National Broadcasting Corporation International

O&M operations and maintenance

OACC Overseas African Construction Corporation

OASD/ISA Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Affairs

OCAT Oman Construction Advisory Team

OCE Office of the Chief of Engineers

OFW Oman-Farnsworth-Wright

OH Office of History

OPD Ordnance Program Division

OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OPMAD Ordnance Program Management Assistance Division

OPMD Ordnance Program Management Division

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PA Pakistani Army

PAE Pacific Architects and Engineers

PBQ&D Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas

PCC Pacific Construction Company Ltd.

PL Public Law
642 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

PN Pakistani Navy

POL petroleum, oil, and lubricants

PPM Program and Project Management

PPMD Programs and Project Management Directorate

RAMP Royal Armament Maintenance Program

RCA Radio Corporation of America

RCT regimental combat team

RDJTF Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

RHA Records Holding Area

RLO Riyadh Liaison Office

RMO Resources Management Office

RSAF Royal Saudi Air Force

RSNF Royal Saudi Naval Forces

S&A supervision and administration

SAAOC Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance Corps

SAC U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command

SACMO Southwest Asia Construction Management Office

SAD Saudi Arabia District

SAMP Saudi Arabia Mobility Program

SANG Saudi Arabian National Guard

SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

SETAF Southern European Task Force

SIYANCO Saudi Maintenance Company Ltd.

SNEP Saudi Naval Expansion Program

SOCP Saudi Ordnance Corps Program

SR Saudi riyals

TAB VEE Theater Air Base Vulnerability Evaluation Exercise

TAD Transatlantic Division

TAFT technical assistance field team

TINS The Institute of Naval Studies

TOCS The Ordnance Center and School

TUSAFG The United States Air Force Group

TUSAG The United States Army Group

TUSEG The U.S. Engineer Group

TUSNG The United States Navy Group

UN United Nations

USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers

USAF United States Air Force

USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe

USAREUR United States Army, Europe

USASAC United States Army Security Assistance Command
Abbreviations 643

USEA United States Employees Association

USFA United States Forces Austria

USGS United States Geological Survey

USIA United States Information Agency

USMTM United States Military Training Mission

VOA Voice of America

WNRC Washington National Records Center

Index 645

2d Bomb Wing, 61

5th Air Division, 57, 59

6th Division, Iranian Army, 198

8th Engineer Brigade, 605

8th Logistics Command, 265–66

30th Engineer Battalion Topographic Section, 

107

36th Fighter Bomber Wing, 61

7206th Support Group, U.S. Air Force, 111

A. L. Dougherty Overseas Inc., 210–11

AACS. See Airways and Air Communications 

Services.

Abadan Institute of Technology, 187

Abdan, Abdul Rahman Abdullah Al, 440

Abdulaziz, Prince Badr ibn, 431, 432

Abdullah, King of Saudi Arabia, 414, 421, 

435, 437

camel racetrack request, 431, 432, 434

and SANG, 327, 349, 418, 434

SANG project, 420, 422, 424, 425, 428, 

435

Abdullah, Prince. See Abdullah, King of Saudi 

Arabia.

Abdulla Moosa Contracting & Trading 

Company (AMCAT), 534, 536, 537

Active engagement, 96

AC&W. See Aircraft control and warning.

Adana, Turkey, 24–25, 27, 130, 142, 236

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 272

Aden, 240

ADP. See Atkinson-Drake-Park; Automated 

data processing.

Aeck Associates/Tippett & Associates/

Newcomb & Boyd, 541

Afghan Air Authority, 218

Afghanistan, 98, 99, 129, 621, 622, 626

DFL projects in, 116

highways in, 206–19

irrigation in, 206–07

Soviet invasion of, 321, 444, 513, 515, 517, 

553

See also Herat–Islam Qala highway; KabulKandahar highway; Kandahar–Spin 

Baldak highway.

Afghanistan Area Office, Gulf District, 209, 

212, 213, 215, 216, 219

Afghanistan Highway Constructors 

(AHC), 212, 213, 214, 215. See also

Herat–Islam Qala highway; KabulKandahar highway.

AFLC. See U.S. Air Force Logistics 

Command.

Africa Civic Action, 574, 600–605

Afyonkarahisar, Turkey, 19, 25, 27

Agency for International Development (AID), 

183, 216, 269, 553, 555, 571, 622

and Afghan highways, 213, 214, 215

and Dhahran Civil Air Terminal, 206

and Herat–Islam Qala highway, 217, 218

in Somalia, 241, 245, 247, 249, 267, 274, 

275, 277, 278, 279

training program for Turkish engineers, 

236

See also International Cooperation 

Administration; Trade Development 

Programs.

Agricultural Trade Development and 

Assistance Act. See Public Law (PL) 

480.

AHC. See Afghanistan Highway Constructors.

AID. See Agency for International 

Development.

Air Force, U.S. See United States Air Force.

Airborne and Physical Training School, Saudi 

Arabia, 363, 368–69

King Khalid dedicates, 377

master plan for, 373

solar collectors, 369–70

Aircraft control and warning (AC&W) 

stations, 88, 94, 132

Airis, Col. T. F., 30

Airways and Air Communications Services 

(AACS), 39

Ajab Shir, Iran, 175, 183

AK Group, 586

Akins, James E., 422

Al Torki, 401

Al Bard Establishment, 435

Al Batin District, Middle East Division, 357, 

362, 479, 490, 492, 505, 564

cement and concrete for, 485, 506

construction assignment packages, 503–04

and contracts, 494–95, 498, 501

Index
646 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Al Batin District, Middle East 

Division—Continued

corruption at, 497

delays at, 495

and MKSAC personnel, 493

network analysis system, 495–96, 504

staff of, 509

villas at, 482

work schedule at, 497

See also Hafar al Batin; King Khalid Military 

City.

Al Batin Project Office, 476

Al Batin Resident Office, 581

Al Hamidi Contractors of Riyadh, 401

Al Harbi Establishment, 375

Al Hasa Military City, Saudi Arabia, 423–30

cost of, 425, 426

design for, 425, 429

master plan for, 424, 425

See also Al Qasim Military City; King Khalid 

Military City.

Al Huseini, 504

Al Jabar Air Base, Kuwait, 540, 584

Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia, 285, 309, 310, 313, 315

housing complex, 417, 576

medical center, 336, 342, 395, 396, 470

Al Khobar, 342, 401, 478, 479, 502

Al Mellaha Road, Libya, 136, 237

Al Qasim Military City, Saudi Arabia, 423–30. 

See also Al Hasa Military City; King 

Khalid Military City.

Albro, Brig. Gen. Ames S., Jr., 443, 449, 453, 

460, 503, 559, 560, 568

and Blount contract, 378, 379

and Engineer Assistance Agreement, 557–58

on KAMA projects, 449, 453

on KKMC projects, 502, 504, 508, 509, 510

on Peace Sun project, 383

and SANG projects, 440, 441

Alexandria, Egypt, 591, 592

Algeria, 9, 94

Ali al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, 540

Allen, Edward W., 252

Allen and Hoshall, 592

AMC. See U.S. Army Materiel Command.

AMCAT. See Abdullah Moosa Contracting & 

Trading Company.

“American Club,” 174

American Institute of Architects, 166

American Institute of Foreign Trade, 290

American International Contractors Inc., 591

American Preference Policy, 527

Amman, Jordan, 521, 522, 523–24

Ammann and Whitney, 108, 184

Ammann and Whitney–Husted, 108, 179, 199

Amoun Air Base, Egypt, 589–90, 608

An Shas Air Base, Egypt, 547–48, 591

Angary, Ibrahim, 294

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 94, 95. See 

also Arabian-American Oil Company; 

National Iranian Oil Company; Oil.

Angola, 321

Ankara, Turkey, 21, 237, 270

living conditions, 26–27, 236

TUSEG in, 19, 20, 235

Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, 521, 524

Arab League, 525

Arab nationalism, 94–95, 115, 237, 249, 251, 

269, 281, 319, 320

Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO), 

29, 31–32, 37, 287. See also AngloIranian Oil Company; National Iranian Oil 

Company; Oil.

Arabian Sea, 320, 525, 529, 543

Arab-Israeli War of 1967, 270, 273, 287, 307, 319

ARAMCO. See Arabian-American Oil 

Company.

Architects Collaborative International Ltd. Inc., 

261, 295

Arizona State University, 290

Arkel International Inc., 593, 594, 595

ARMISH-MAAG. See U.S. Army Mission and 

Military Assistance Advisory Group to Iran.

Arms Export Control Act, 315

Army, U.S. See U.S. Department of the Army.

ASA(CW). See Assistant Secretary of the Army 

for Civil Works.

Asmara, Ethiopia, 88–92, 145, 231, 238, 271, 

277. See also Kagnew Station.

Asmara Area Office, Middle East District, 91, 

240

Asphalt, 51, 59, 60, 63, 74, 214

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works 

(ASA[CW]), 610

Association of General Contractors, 434

ATC. See U.S. Air Transport Command.

Athenia Airfield, Athens, 140

Athens, Greece, 86, 111, 119, 140, 197, 262, 

269, 344

Athens Area Office, Southern District, 140, 143

Atkinson-Drake-Park (ADP), 10, 14, 15

Atlas Constructors, 50, 52, 54, 55, 74, 77, 79, 

469

Army Audit Agency report on, 69

asphalt plant of, 59, 63

at Benguérir, 59, 62

contracts of, 83, 84, 85, 448

funding of projects, 68, 70
Index 647

Nouasser construction, 51, 57, 58, 60, 63

and overtime, 79, 85

recordkeeping by, 79

shipping operations of, 53

Sidi Slimane construction, 60

Attica, Greece, 13

Austria, 133, 136, 516

Automated data processing (ADP), 309, 310, 501

AVCO Electronic Division, 290, 291

Avelino, Italy, 226

Aviano Air Base, Italy, 136, 234, 270–71

AZD-Hochtief Construction L.L.C., 537

Azores, 72, 516

B–50 bombers, 61

Bacci, Col. Joseph A., 282

Badger, Lt. Col. William, 341

Baghdad Pact, 96, 105, 115

Bahrain, 161, 287, 320, 519, 561, 569, 626

airbase construction in, 541–43, 574, 586

and MEAPO, 88, 585

U.S. civilian employees in, 616

Bahrain Defense Force (BDF), 542, 586, 587

Bahrain International Airport, 542

Bailey, Maj. William, 161, 167, 261

Baker/TSA, 607

Balikesir, Turkey, 19, 21–22, 24, 25, 27, 63

Baltimore District, Corps of Engineers, 350, 625

Bandirma, Turkey, 19, 25, 27

Banghazi, Libya, 88, 238

Bangladesh, 96, 129

Barakati, Capt. Mohammad Own Sharaf Al, 415

Barneyback, Dr. Robert S., 603

Bassett, Richard, 594–95

Bates & Rogers Construction Corporation, 50

Batman, Turkey, 25, 27

BATMED. See Frank E. Basil Inc., the 

Architects Collaborative International Ltd. 

Inc., and Metcalf & Eddy Inc.

Bay of Sidra, 88

Baylor, Jack, 98, 119, 238

BDF. See Bahrain Defense Force.

Bedouins, 327, 380, 407, 419, 430

Beirut, Lebanon, 111, 172, 344, 345

Bendix Corporation, 329

Bendix-SIYANCO, 330, 331–32, 578, 579

Benguérir, Morocco, 55, 56, 57–58, 59, 61, 62, 

85, 93, 132, 133

Beni Suef Air Base, Egypt, 549, 551–52, 588, 

591

Bennett, Col. Joseph, 426, 439

Berbera, Somalia, 519

Berger, Dr. Louis, 160

Berger and Associates, 160, 202

Berlin, Germany, 6, 7, 46, 51, 516, 614

Bin Laden Organization, 267, 295, 298

Bisdouni, Greece, 15

Black Sea, 1, 4, 17, 19, 94, 127, 142, 235

Black and Veatch, 375, 547, 548

Blake, John, 338, 402, 411

Blount Brothers Corporation, 373, 377–79

Blythe Bros. Company, 50

Boerger, Lt. Col. Philip T., 221

Bonny, Jack, 85

Bosco Mantico airstrip, Italy, 136, 139

Botswana, 598, 599

Boulhaut, Morocco, 62, 87, 93, 132

Boyd, Col. Claude D. (“Buck”), III, 192, 560–61

Bratton, Lt. Gen. Joseph K., 440, 508, 562, 563, 

565

Breitwieser, Jude, 617

Brettschneider, Louis, 617

Bricks, brick construction, 105, 148, 149–50, 

191, 234. See also Cement; Concrete.

Brindisi, Italy, 136, 143

Briscoe-Cat International, 287

British Foreign Office, 30

British Somaliland. See Somalia.

Brown, Lt. Col. William D., 617

Brown, Daltas & Associates, 387, 391–92, 465–66. 

See also King Khalid Military City.

Brown, Daltas–Sippican, 465–66

Brown and Root USA Inc., 598

Brown Engineering International, 184–85

Bulgaria, 5, 17, 516

Bunker, Maj. Gen. Robert, 612, 615

Buraydah, Saudi Arabia, 255, 268, 286, 287, 

288, 291, 424 

Burfening, Col. John W., 257–58

Burma, 116, 129, 157–60, 183, 202, 209, 576

Burnell, Maj. Gen. Bates, 499

Burns and McDonnell Engineering Company, 

547, 548, 549, 589, 590

Bush, George H. W., 616

Bushire, Iran, 183

Butler, Col. D. Fred, 577, 608–09, 612

Byroade, Henry A., 208–09, 211, 212

C–47 aircraft, 30

C–54 aircraft, 30

C–130 transport plane, 196, 425, 532, 553, 

590–91, 593, 595, 605

Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico, 596

CADD. See Computer-Aided Design and 

Drafting.

Cairo, Egypt, 29, 111, 591

Cairo Central Resident Offices, 592

Cairo East Air Base, 588, 590–91, 592
648 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Cairo West Air Base, 548–49, 550–51, 592

California bearing ratio test, 49

Camblor, William, 348

Cameron, Col. Harry F., Jr., 195, 216, 223, 

264–65, 266, 267–68, 281, 290, 297, 322

Cameroon, 556

Camp Darby, Italy, 136, 236, 265–67, 348, 349, 

351

Camp David accords/agreements, 321, 444, 513, 

514, 544, 550

Camp Ederle, Italy, 136

Campbell, Col. Jack P., 73, 80, 87

Cankardes, Orhan Ahmet, 86, 353, 354

Cape Canaveral, Florida, 244

Capka, Lt. Col. Jerry G., 236

Capodichino Naval Air Station, Italy, 137

Carlson, Col. Gunnard W., 87

Carter, James E., 515, 549

Carton, Allen M., 612–13, 615

Casablanca, Morocco, 45, 60, 62

air terminal for, 54

Mediterranean Division at, 72, 73, 80, 83, 87

Cassidy, Lt. Gen. William F., 231, 322, 333

Castle Club, Tehran, 174–75, 220, 284, 623

Castle Comments, 357

Catania, Italy, 137, 143

Catanzaro, Italy, 137, 227

Caudill, Rowlett and Scott (CRS), 446

Caudill, Rowlett and Scott–McGaughy, Marshall 

& McMillan (CRS-MMM), 449, 461, 477

CB radios, 283

Cement, 103, 231, 528

Iranian production of, 105, 197

for KKMC, 475, 484, 506

See also Bricks, brick construction; Concrete.

CENTCOM. See U.S. Central Command.

Central inventory control point (CICP), 307, 

309–10, 313, 315

Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 115

Chaffin, Col. Andrew D., Jr., 98, 223, 246, 254, 

256, 258–60, 266, 274

Chaman, Pakistan, 213

Chaparral missiles, 592

Chapman, Arthur, 210, 272, 625

Chapman, Lt. Col. Curtis W., Jr., 80, 83, 84

Charmot, Albert, 353, 354

Chase Manhattan Bank, 252, 261, 339, 511. See 

also Letters of Credit.

Chehel Dokhtar, Iran, 175

Cheney, Richard, 614, 616

Cherifienne de Travaux, Morocco, 597

Chief of Engineers Design and Environmental 

Awards Program, 394

Chin Hung International Inc., 449

China. See People’s Republic of China.

Chisimayu, Somalia, 244–48, 267, 275

OACC work at, 275, 276–79

Phase I, 244, 249, 267, 273, 277

Phase II, 267, 273–74, 279

water treatment and distribution system, 273, 

279

See also Concrete.

Chronister, E. Scott, 567, 570. See also

Chronister-Spivey Study.

Chronister-Spivey Study, 567–71

Chrysler International Corporation, 421

CIC. See U.S. Army Criminal Investigation 

Command.

CICP. See Central inventory control point.

Cigli, Turkey, 142, 145, 235, 237

CINTIA site, Asmara, 91

Clarke, Lt. Gen. Frederick J., 152, 153, 156, 165, 

279, 299, 333

on construction standards, 148, 149

and Dhahran Civil Air Terminal, 163, 203

and turnkey concept, 322

Clema, Col. Joe A., 127, 128, 145

Cliff Industries, 530

COEMIS. See Corps of Engineers Management 

Information System.

COGECO. See Compagnia Generale Costruzioni 

Sp.A.

COGEFAR. See Costruzioni Generali Farsura 

S.p.A.

Cold Regions Research and Engineering 

Laboratory, 544

Collective security, 115

Coltano, Italy, 226

Columbia, Maryland, 477–78, 479

Commodity Credit Corporation, 133

Commonwealth Service International Inc., 206

Commonwealth-Tumpane Company Ltd., 

307–10, 313–17

and central inventory control point, 309

manuals and publications for, 310

personnel, 316, 328, 329

supply responsibilities, 309–10

Compagnia Generale Costruzioni Sp.A. 

(COGECO), 293–94

Compagnie Française d’Enterprises, 298

Competitive bidding, 79, 85, 141, 153, 290, 350, 

499. See also Contractors; Contracts.

Computer-Aided Design and Drafting (CADD), 

607

CONARC. See U.S. Continental Army 

Command.

Concrete, 82, 125, 277, 448

additives for, 609
Index 649

asphaltic, 39, 51

cast-in-place, 455

concrete block, 448, 455

at King Khalid Military City, 448, 466, 478, 

484, 485, 486, 488, 492

molds for, 455, 478, 485, 492

precast, 299, 448, 455, 466, 478, 485–86, 

488, 492, 495–96, 502

See also Bricks, brick construction; Cement.

Congress. See U.S. Congress.

Consolidated Contractors Company of Oman, 583

Consular Court (Morocco), 77

Containment policy, 1, 6, 7, 17, 105, 621

Continental Wage Scale (CWS), 174

Contract law (U.S.), 423, 510

Contractors, 38, 39, 125, 443, 621

in Iran, 175, 179, 189

and SAMP, 307

Saudi, 304, 447

Turkish, 127

and women, 441

See also Competitive bidding; Contracts; 

individual firms or projects.

Contracts, 50, 377, 389, 390, 524, 538

Bendix-SIYANCO, 330, 332, 579

competitive bidding, 79

fixed-price, 83, 99, 307, 449, 468, 477, 

494–95, 498–99, 503

hybrid, 307

for KAMA, 448–49, 468, 470, 471

for KKMC, 468–76, 494, 498, 500, 501, 609

lump-sum, 141, 307

OCE procedures, 153

and Pacific Construction Company, 383

for Peace Hawk and Peace Sun, 383

redetermination clauses, 85

for SAMP, 307, 308, 317

for SANG projects, 354, 421, 422, 431

for SNEP, 403, 404, 409

sole-source, 239

Title II, 157, 179

See also Competitive bidding; Contractors; 

Cost-Plus-Award-Fee; Cost-PlusFixed-Fee.

Corinth, Greece, 13

Corinth Canal, 10, 13

Corps of Engineers Management Information 

System (COEMIS), 354 

Cost accounting, 68

Cost/Schedule Control System (CS-Squared), 

490–92, 493

Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF), 358, 360, 362, 

448, 468–76

ended, 498–502

for KKMC, 476, 479–80, 482, 489, 496, 

498–502

replacements for, 498–99

See also Contracts; Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee.

Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF), 11, 12, 41, 99, 448

Asmara projects, 91

contract conversion, 83–85

Crow-Steers-Shepherd ends, 135

for Nouasser, 47, 49

and Saudi Arabia, 34, 47

in Turkey, 18, 47, 86, 141

and USAHOME program, 231

See also Contracts; Cost-Plus-Award-Fee.

Costruzioni Generali Farsura S.p.A. 

(COGEFAR), 298

Cox, Lt. Col. Charles (“Stoney”) 616–17

CPAF. See Cost-Plus-Award-Fee.

CPAF Contract Management Office, 476

CPFF. See Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee.

Crete, Greece, 140

Crouthers, William E., 568

Crow-Steers-Shepherd (CSS), 40, 134–35, 143

Asmara project, 91, 92, 136

contract, 33, 34, 135

Wheelus Air Base construction, 34, 81, 

87–88, 91, 134

CRS. See Caudill, Rowlett and Scott.

CRS-MMM. See Caudill, Rowlett and 

Scott–McGaughy, Marshall & McMillan.

CRS-Sirrine, 463

CSS. See Crow-Steers-Shepherd.

CS-Squared. See Cost/Schedule Control System.

Cuban Missile Crisis, 235

Cumaovasi, Turkey, 20

CWS. See Continental Wage Scale.

Cyprus, 344

Czechoslovakia, 516

Dacca, East Pakistan, 169

Dallas hut, 61, 62

Dammam, Saudi Arabia, 161, 164, 285, 287, 

291, 333, 405

Dancy, Col. Albert G., 282–83

Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall 

(DMJM), 336, 394–96, 542

Davidson, Marion, 404

Davis, Col. William A., 98, 99, 111

DC–9 aircraft, 540

DDE(PM). See Deputy district engineer for 

project management.

Debelius, Capt. Charles A., 245–47

Defense Contract Audit Agency, 477, 497

Defense Department. See U.S. Department of 

Defense.
650 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Defense Security Assistance Agency, 601

Delbridge, Capt. Norman, 236

Delft, The Netherlands, 473, 478, 479

DeMatteis–Sam Whan, 435–38, 439–44

Department of Defense Dependent Schools 

(DODDS), 605–08

Deputy district engineer for project management 

(DDE[PM]), 611

Derby, Col. George T., 46, 60, 63, 68, 69, 71, 

72, 73

and asphalt testing, 65

charges against, 77

and competitive bidding, 79

funding for construction, 57, 66

and Moroccan projects, 47, 54, 55, 61, 75

Nouasser construction, 49, 50, 51

on Porter-Urquhart, 56

schedules and, 60

and Sidi Slimane, 64

Desert Inn, 284–85, 623

Desert Shield. See Operation Desert Shield.

Desert Storm. See Operation Desert Storm.

Deterrence policy, 1, 7, 28, 621

Development International Trade Company Ltd. 

(DITCO), 556

Development Loan Funds (DLF), 115–16, 153, 

154

Dezful Airfield, Iran, 109, 175, 177–78

DFS. See Direct Forces Support.

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 36, 37, 283, 287, 424, 

585

PCC work at, 383

Peace Hawk Area Office at, 381

and Peace Hawk, 380–81

and Peace Sun, 383

Dhahran Air Transport Station, 36

Dhahran airfield, 30, 32, 36, 37, 89, 249, 327

administrative issues, 38–43

Air Force specifications for, 83

concrete issues, 82

construction, 33, 43, 82, 93

Egyptian laborers at, 164

facilities, 33

Fluor at, 83, 88, 160

inspection of, 80

materials, 81, 92

Dhahran Airfield Agreement, 163, 167

Dhahran Civil Air Terminal, 162–64, 205–06, 

249

Dhahran International Air Terminal, 166

Di Salvo, Anthony, 529

Diego Garcia, 516

Dillingham Construction International 

Corporation, 530

Dillingham-Towell, 531

Direct Forces Support (DFS), 97, 104, 105, 115, 

119, 148, 172

Dirkou, Niger, 602, 605

DITCO. See Development International Trade 

Company Ltd.

Diyarbakir, Turkey, 20, 21–22, 24, 27, 63, 130, 

142

Djibouti, 89, 241

DLF. See Development Loan Funds.

DMJM. See Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and 

Mendenhall.

DoD. See U.S. Department of Defense.

DODDS. See Department of Defense Dependent 

Schools.

Donaldson, Brig. A., 421

Dongsan Construction and Engineering 

Company, 544

Dorr, Col. John M. (“Jack”), 561–62, 563, 577

Drigh Road, Pakistan, 99, 102, 157

Dulles, John Foster, 95, 96

Dunn, Maj. Gen. Carroll, 322, 333

Duqan, Brig. Gen. Maashi Al, 431–34

Durban, South Africa, 245

Durham, Col. William L., 419, 420, 422–23

Dykes, Gordon W. (“Wayne”), 352, 395, 404, 

434, 470

Dynamac Corporation, 607

Dynetics Inc., 524

E–2C Hawkeyes, 550, 551, 588

EAA. See Engineer Assistance Agreement.

East Africa, 621

East Atlantic District, Corps of Engineers, 50, 

51–52, 55, 60, 61, 80, 83

Benguérir office, 62

Casablanca office, 59

closed, 87

and East Ocean Division, 69

and Mediterranean Division, 72, 79, 117

offices at Nouasser, 72, 73, 87

East Germany, 516

East Ocean Division, 69, 72, 79, 87, 119

East Pakistan, 96, 129, 148, 169. See also

Bangladesh.

EBASCO Overseas Corporation, 590

Edgar, Brig. Gen. C. E., III, 577

Edwards, Lt. Gen. Idwal H., 57

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, 229

Egypt, 94, 281, 543–53, 560, 569, 574, 588–92

Air Force of, 547, 550, 551–52, 588, 589, 591

Army of, 589

nationalism, 95, 115

Navy of, 591, 592
Index 651

U.S. employees in, 616

USAFE bases in, 526

in Yom Kippur War, 320, 326

See also Camp David accords/agreements; 

Peace Pharaoh; Peace Vector I; Suez 

Crisis.

Egyptian Area Office, Middle East/Africa 

Projects Office, 548, 592

Egyptian Armament Authority, 550, 551, 552

Egyptian Engineering Authority, 552

Eilts, Hermann F., 286

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 95, 131, 157, 162, 203, 

237, 249

Eisenhower Doctrine, 115

El Abd Contracting Company, 552

El Djema Sahim, Morocco, 55, 62

Elburz Mountains, 105

Ellerbe Architects Inc., 336, 394–97

Ellery Husten, 108

Ellis, Brig. Gen. James N., 415, 497, 513, 514, 

559, 578

on change orders, 412

Jordanian projects, 523

on Jubayl, 409, 410

on SANG projects, 425, 426, 428

Engineer Assistance Agreement (EAA), 255–62, 

269, 281, 323, 363, 399, 515, 581

cantonment program for Saudi Army, 294–95

extended, 557–58

funding issues, 377–78

letters of credit used by, 340, 510

negotiations and renegotiation of, 262, 441

and SAMP, 263, 280

Engle, Col. Phillip D. (“Dave”), 357

Epoxy mortar, 278, 279

Eritrea, 11, 88, 112, 116, 129, 145, 241, 622

Erzincan, Turkey, 19, 25, 27

Eskisehir, Turkey, 20, 24, 27

Ethiopia, 8, 89, 91, 118, 238, 240, 272, 274

Ethiopia Area Office, Mediterranean Division, 

240. See also Southern Area Office.

Eti Yapi Ltd., 127, 128, 141

Europe Division, Corps of Engineers, 345, 346, 

351, 565, 575, 614

areas of work, 347, 348

reorganization, 568, 570, 613, 617

European Command, 28

European District, Transatlantic Division, 618

F–1 Mirage, 540

F–4 fighter, 549, 550, 551

F–4E aircraft, 588

F–5 fighter, 196, 326, 380, 382, 572, 593, 595

F–5E aircraft, 553

F–14 aircraft, 491

F–15 aircraft, 382, 383, 572

F–16 aircraft, 547–49, 589, 590

F–18 aircraft, 584, 585

F84E fighter, 61

F–100 fighter-bomber, 251

F–105 aircraft, 273

Fahd bin Abdulaziz, King of Saudi Arabia, 250, 

479, 512

Fairbank, Col. Leigh C., Jr., 107

Faisal, Col. Naser F. Al, 339, 373, 396, 470, 473, 

511

and the EAA, 557, 558

and KAMA, 450

and KKMC, 479, 499, 500, 506, 509, 510

and MODA executive office complex, 388, 

389

on Ras al Mishab, 474

and Tabuk contract, 377

on underground command centers, 389

Faisal ibn Abdulaziz, King of Saudi Arabia, 

250–52, 256, 260, 265, 306, 418

assassinated, 340, 341, 342

on National Guard, 327, 422

Family Housing Office, 228

Fareedi, Lt. Col. Hammeed Al, M.D., 396

Farouk I of Egypt, 95

Fauroy bin Abdulaziz, Prince of Holy Mecca, 312

Fay, Spofford & Thorndike, 50

Federal Communications Commission, 252

Federal Emergency Management Agency, 561

Federal Preparedness Agency, 350

Fédération Internationale des IngenieursConseils (FIDIC), 543

Fee, Capt. Gene Boyer, 247

FIDIC. See Fédération Internationale des 

Ingenieurs-Conseils.

Finletter, Thomas K., 47

Fischbach and Moore International Corporation, 

473, 534

Fischbach and Moore International Corporation/

Al Hamra Kuwait Company W.L.L., 540

Fischer Engineering & Maintenance Company, 

551

Fisher, Maj. Martin C., 431

Fluor Corporation Ltd., 31, 37, 287

Dhahran projects, 83, 88, 160

tax issues in Saudi Arabia, 160, 161, 163

FMS. See Foreign Military Sales.

Foggia, Italy, 137

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 252, 274, 601

Foreign Military Sales (FMS), 315, 316, 519, 

532, 553, 580

Africa Civic Action funding, 601, 602
652 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Foreign Military Sales (FMS)—Continued

and Bahrain, 541–42, 574, 587

for camel racetrack, 434

in Egypt, 547, 552, 592

and Jordan, 521, 522–23

for Kuwait, 540, 541

and SAMP, 578

for SANG, 422, 424, 428–31

for Saudi Arabia, 339, 340, 399

for SNEP, 400

Foreign Military Sales Act of 1969, 339

Fort Drum, New York, 564

France, 1, 9, 45, 47, 55, 95, 96, 100, 111, 133

Franco-American construction agreements, 50

Frank E. Basil Inc., 254, 255, 261, 287–88, 295, 

375, 376

Frank E. Basil Inc., the Architects Collaborative 

International Ltd. Inc., and Metcalf & 

Eddy Inc. (BATMED), 261, 295, 296, 

300, 302, 334, 335

Frassrand, Col. John M., 221, 275

Frech, Col. Frederick, 24, 75

Frederic R. Harris, 184

Freeman, Orville L., 216

French Morocco. See Morocco.

French Somaliland. See Djibouti.

Frye, Lt. Col. Arthur H., Jr., 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 

27

Fürstenfeldbrück, West Germany, 61

“Future of the Corps of Engineers in the Middle 

East, The,” 567–68

Gabon, 555–56

Gadhafi, Muammar, 273

Gard, Capt. Paul T., 526

Garlock, Lyle S., 67

Garrett, Lee, 499

GDMW. See General Directorate of Military 

Works.

Gelini, Lt. Col. Walter, 237

General Directorate of Military Works 

(GDMW), 340, 386, 399, 413, 419, 450, 

461, 463, 514

General Dynamics Corporation, 547, 551

General Dynamics Services Company, 552

GENMISH (Iranian Gendarmerie), 220. See also

Iran.

Geometer, Luigi Salvi, 234

George A. Fuller, 591

George W. Goethals Medal, 454

Geotechnical Branch, Middle East/Africa 

Projects Office, 609

Ghanats, 199

Ghazni, Afghanistan, 212, 216

Giffels Associates Inc., 522, 552

Giuba (Juba) River, 244, 276

Global Associates, 362, 471, 475, 489

Global Communications (Globecom), 88, 132

Globecom. See Global Communications.

Golbasi, Turkey, 231, 267

Gold (monetary reserves of), 224, 226, 228, 266

Gordon Hamilton Contracting Company Inc., 18

Grad, Urbahn and Seelye, 98

Grady, Henry F., 16

Graham, Larry, 612, 615, 617

Grand Mosque, Mecca, 444

Gray, Col. George, 341, 346, 347, 357, 407, 408, 

435, 436

Great Britain, 9, 29, 30, 39, 95, 100, 319–21

as Baghdad Pact member, 96, 115

and Saudi National Guard, 419, 421

Grecian District, Corps of Engineers, 12, 13, 15, 

16, 140

Greece, 269, 280, 346, 347–48, 621, 626

Air Ministry of, 15

civil war, 4, 5, 15

Ministry of Public Works, 15

in NATO, 86, 116, 233

railroads, 13–14

reconstruction of transportation and harbor 

system, 10

road construction, 15

and Troposcatter, 226, 227, 234

See also Truman Doctrine.

Greece Area Office, Mediterranean Division, 234

“Green Ball Trucking Line,” 310

Greenland, 1, 72

Greenville, North Carolina, 596

Griffiths, Col. D. W., 12

Griggs, Ken, 404, 617

Gross, Col. J. E., 463

Grosz, Col. Peter R., Jr., 215, 283–85, 293, 623

Grove, Shepherd, Wilson, and Kruge Inc., 10, 18

Gulf District, Mediterranean Division, 109, 117, 

124, 168, 223, 609, 623

activated, 107, 119, 145, 147, 265

Afghanistan projects, 206, 209, 211, 213, 217

austerity criteria, 199

and Burma, 201–03

civilian employees of, 108, 109

Construction Division, 175, 196, 219

cost reductions, 220, 221

deactivation of, 221, 267, 284, 625

and Dhahran Civil Air Terminal, 205

Engineering Branch, 198, 219

housing, 220

in Iran, 104–10, 171–82, 183, 186–87, 

191–95, 219
Index 653

living conditions in, 173–75

and Military Assistance Program, 195, 198

Materials Operations Branch, 198

offices of, 175, 178, 197, 198, 220

Pakistani projects, 200–201

RCT installations, 189

recruiting, 175

and Saudi Arabia, 203–06, 379

standards of, 198–200

Supervision and Inspection Branch, 219

Transportation Branch, 172–73

water supplies, 198–99

workload, 175–77

Gulf of Aden, 89, 94, 241

Gulf War, 417, 517, 619. See also Operation

Desert Shield; Operation Desert Storm; 

Persian Gulf.

Gunter, Col. Gurnie C., 377

Gura, Eritrea, 238, 239

Guy F. Atkinson Company, 10

H. B. Zachary Company, 583, 584

H. B. Zachary Company–Consolidated 

Contractors Company of Oman, 583

Hafar al Batin, 335, 343, 469, 471, 478, 502, 560

airfield at, 559

as area office, 512

and automated data processing, 501

cantonment, 342, 348, 357, 365, 465

engineering school, 337

master plan for construction, 465–66

negotiations for, 448

water wells, 477

See also Al Batin District; King Khalid 

Military City.

Hague, The Netherlands, The, 478

Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, 89

Haimid, Sheihk Abdul Rahman Abu, 426, 437, 

438

Haines, Lundberg, Waehler, 544

Hall, Col. James B., 410, 438, 560

Hall, Robert, 221

Hamadan, Iran, 175, 180–82, 183, 185–89. See 

also Shahrokhi Air Base.

Hamdan (subcontractor), 537

Hamilton, Brig. Gen. Pierpont M., 55–56, 57, 67

Hanil Development Company Ltd., 372, 556

Hardy, Col. Wilfrid H., 57, 58, 62

Harpoon missile system, 408, 592 

Harrell, Brig. Gen. Ernest J., 615, 617

Hart, Parker T., 252, 256, 257, 258, 260

Haseman, Lt. Col. Leonard L., 53–54, 56, 57, 59, 

72, 73, 77

Hatch, Maj. Gen. Henry, 611–13, 615–17, 619

Hatch, Col. John, 361

Hawk missiles, 539, 541, 574, 592

Hawkeye Program, 550, 551, 588

HBH. See Hughes, Bendix, Holmes, and Narver.

Hehrabad, Iran, 175

Heiberg, Lt. Gen. E. R., III, 565, 570, 571, 

575–77, 581, 582

Hennington, Durham, and Richardson, 598

Henry, Wayne, 561, 612, 613, 618

Henry J. Kaiser Company, 109

Herat, Afghanistan, 207, 213, 217. See also

Herat–Islam Qala highway.

Herat–Islam Qala highway, 217–19. See 

also Kabul-Kandahar highway; 

Kandahar–Spin Baldak highway.

Higgins, Bobby, 616

Higgins, Odessa, 616

Hight, Lt. Col. Adolph, 303, 304

Hill, Brig. Gen. John, 333

Himalayan Mountains, 206

Hochtief A.G., 298, 299

Hochtief Construction L.L.C., 537

Hollandsche Beton Groep N.V., 473

Holmes and Narver Inc., 598

Home Manufacturing Corporation, 229

Honolulu District, Corps of Engineers, 598

Honor Award for Architecture, 166, 394

Horn of Africa, 94, 241

Hotchkiss, Thompson, and Ball Inc. (HTB), 388, 

389

Hromiak, Adrian, 236, 290, 325

HTB. See Hotchkiss, Thompson, and Ball Inc.

Hughes, Bendix, Holmes, and Narver (HBH), 

409, 411

Hujaylan, Jamil, 251, 283, 286, 290, 415

and radio broadcast complex, 291–94

and Saudi television network, 287, 291

Huntington, West Virginia, 78

Huntsville Division, Corps of Engineers, 347, 

360, 522, 570, 613

Hussein, Saddam, 515, 517, 627

Hydra Engineering Ltd., 594

Hyman, Charlie, 210

Hyundai Construction Company Ltd., 389, 432, 

433, 449, 455

concrete, 449, 453, 454–55

Jubayl project, 403–05, 407, 409, 455

IBM 360 Model 20 computer, 310

IBM 407 accounting machine, 310

ICA. See International Cooperation 

Administration.

Idris, King of Libya, 238, 303

I-Hawk, 539
654 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Imagire, Robert, 625

Imhoff tanks, 200

Imprese Italiane all’Estero S.p.A. (Impresit), 298

Impresit. See Imprese Italiane all’Estero S.p.A.

Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, 24, 142, 236, 267, 

270, 271

India, 96, 117, 147, 154, 201, 215

Indian Ocean, 1, 516, 527

Interbeton Construction N.V., 473, 492

“Interim Report on the Moroccan Air Base 

Construction” (U.S. Senate), 73

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 516

International Cooperation Administration (ICA), 

97, 119, 143, 169, 180

Afghan infrastructure, 208, 209

Burma projects, 157, 202

Dhahran Civil Air Terminal sponsored by, 

162

Hamadan airfield construction, 182

and Karachi civilian airport, 153, 162

Mehrabad project, 162

in Somalia, 241, 242, 274

See also Agency for International 

Development.

International Shelters Systems, 530

Invitational Camel Race, Saudi Arabia, 431

Ionte, Somalia, 276

Inventory control, 79

Iraklion, Crete, 140, 231, 234, 269

Iran, 105, 115, 206, 207, 267, 345, 622

Air Force of, 108, 109, 172, 183, 192

Army of, 107, 108, 172, 177

cement production, 105

Cold War, 4, 5, 17, 29, 621

communications in, 283

construction agreement with, 108

DFS programs in, 97, 105

Gendarmerie of, 108, 172, 183, 191–95, 198

infrastructure, 105

Islamic revolution, 321, 513

nationalism, 94, 95

Navy, 183–85

nonmilitary projects, 116

RCT installations, 189–91

war with Iraq, 321, 515–16

water issues in, 199

See also GENMISH; Oil; U.S. Army Mission 

and Military Assistance Advisory Group 

to Iran.

Iran-Iraq War, 515–16

Iranian Military Assistance Program, 195

Iraq, 1, 29, 96, 115, 172, 294, 379

Iran-Iraq War, 321, 515–16

invasion of Kuwait, 320, 517, 585, 616

Islam Qala, Afghanistan, 217. See also

Herat–Islam Qala highway.

Israel, 39, 94, 95, 99, 520, 569

Istanbul, Turkey, 1, 20, 142

Isthmus of Corinth, 13

Italian Somaliland. See Somalia.

Italy, 9, 29, 36, 113, 346, 347, 348, 621

Air Force of, 122

civil service of, 624

construction agreement with, 230

construction programs, 136–37

housing projects, 230, 231

in NATO, 136, 233, 346

and Southern District, 112, 129

Italian Foreign Office, 231

Itschner, Maj. Gen. Emerson, 128, 141, 145, 149, 

156, 165

and Afghanistan, 209, 210

on Burma, 159, 160

and Royal Saudi Air Force Training School, 

167

Izmir, Turkey, 20, 235, 236, 267

J. A. Jones Company, 212

in Iran, 174, 188, 189

in Saudi Arabia, 338, 366, 367, 368, 373, 

376, 391, 392

J&P (Bahrain) W.L.L., 585

J. Rich Steers Company, 10, 33

J. S. Latsis Group, 403

Jacksonville District, South Atlantic Division, 

597, 617

JAF. See Jordan Armed Forces.

Jakaitis, Col. Bruno L., 27

James E. Montgomery Inc., 374

JAMMAT. See Joint American Military Mission 

for Aid to Turkey.

Jan De Nul N.V., 591

Japan, 1, 29, 53, 61, 232

JCA. See Joint Construction Agency.

JECOR. See Joint Economic Commission 

Representation Group.

Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, 203, 205, 256, 265, 282, 

303, 417

communication facilities, 288, 291, 292, 405

computer facilities, 408

construction, 313, 405

district office in, 357, 362, 411, 559

hospital, 336

housing, 285, 347

liaison office, 350

Peace Hawk project at, 334

port construction, 400, 401–18

SAMP offices in, 285, 309, 315
Index 655

Saudi Arabia Area Office in, 254, 281, 342

Saudi naval facilities in, 342, 411, 416, 591

slaughterhouse at, 405, 411

Syncrolift system, 405

television system, 252, 254, 255, 281, 286, 

287, 291

VIP complex, 408

water system repair, 340–41

See also King Faisal Naval Base.

Jizan, Saudi Arabia, 313, 315

John Laing International of London, 524

Johns, Horry T., 577

Johnson, Lyndon B., 71–73, 76, 216

Johnson Committee, 71–72, 74, 75, 76–77

Johnson-Drake and Piper, 10

Joint American Military Mission for Aid to 

Turkey (JAMMAT), 17–18, 19, 20, 142

Joint Chiefs of Staff. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of 

Staff.

Joint Commission of Economic Cooperation, 

376

Joint Construction Agency (JCA), 27, 28, 80, 86, 

118, 129–30, 136, 140, 145, 223, 237

Joint Economic Commission Representation 

Group (JECOR), 376–77

Joint Management Engineering Team, 589

Joint United States Military Aid Group Greece 

(JUSMAGG), 111, 141

Joint United States Military Assistance Advisory 

Group (JUSMAAG), 141

Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to 

Turkey (JUSMMAT), 122, 142

Joint Venture Khamis Mushayt (JVKM), 298, 

300, 301

Jordan, 115, 250, 345, 519, 561

area office in, 523

construction in, 520–24

and Palestinian issue, 304, 319

Jordan Armed Forces (JAF), 521, 522, 523, 524

Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, 326, 342, 354, 408, 409, 

417

computer facilities, 408

Harpoon missile repair shop, 408

Hyundai workers riot, 407, 408

port construction, 400, 591

Syncrolift system, 405

See also King Abdulaziz Naval Base.

Jupiter missiles, 136, 142, 235, 237

JUSMAAG. See Joint United States Military 

Assistance Advisory Group.

JUSMAGG. See Joint United States Military Aid 

Group Greece.

JUSMAT. See Joint United States Military 

Mission for Aid to Turkey.

JVKM. See Joint Venture Khamis Mushayt.

Kabul, Afghanistan, 207. See also KabulKandahar highway; Kabul Resident 

Office.

Kabul Resident Office, 215. See also Northern 

Resident Office.

Kabul Times, 217

Kabul-Kandahar highway, 208, 209, 211–17, 

219

Kackley, Col. Roy L., 220, 317

Kagnew Station, Asmara, 90, 91, 130, 136, 

271–72, 280

Kahtany, Maj. Ali A., 505

KAMA. See King Abdulaziz Military Academy.

KAMA Area Office, Middle East Division, 449, 

463

Kandahar, Afghanistan, 207, 213. See also

Kabul-Kandahar highway; Kandahar 

Resident Office; Kandahar–Spin Baldak 

highway.

Kandahar Resident Office, 210, 215. See also

Southern Resident Office.

Kandahar–Spin Baldak highway, 210–11, 212, 

216, 219. See also Herat–Islam Qala 

highway; Kabul-Kandahar highway.

Kansas State University, 290, 290n60

Karachi, Pakistan, 29, 97, 98, 111, 152, 157, 624

ammunition-storage facility, 99, 102, 147

area office in, 168

residency office in, 169

and supplies for Afghanistan, 212, 213, 215

Karachi Civil Air Terminal, 154, 157, 169

Karamursel, Turkey, 142, 201, 231, 236, 237, 

267, 269

Kayseri, Turkey, 19, 25, 27

KB–29 tankers, 61

Keller-Gannon, 511, 531

Kenitra. See Port Lyautey.

Kenneth R. White Consulting Engineers Inc., 

208, 209

Kenya, 241, 274, 556

Kerman, Iran, 189, 190

KERO. See Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office.

Khalid, King of Saudi Arabia, 340, 432, 433, 479

Khamis Mushayt, Saudi Arabia, 260, 300, 315, 

335, 363, 365–79, 420

Access Road A, 267, 295

artillery and infantry schools, 337, 363

cantonment, 258, 282, 284, 295–301, 326, 

334, 357, 424, 465

closeout of projects, 376–79, 411

computers, 310

construction, 259, 296, 301, 313, 325, 342
656 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Khamis Mushayt, Saudi Arabia—Continued

dedicated, 299

designs for, 261, 268, 296, 302

facilities, 367

headquarters, 323, 365, 372, 384

housing, 373, 376

King Abdullah visits, 421

medical facilities, 334, 336, 365, 366–67

Peace Hawk, 380, 381

Peace Sun, 383

power plant, 376

precast concrete, 299

roads, 367

SAMP office in, 285, 309, 315

sewage systems, 375

television network, 287

training facilities, 365, 367

underground command center, 385

upgrading, 364–79

VIP complexes, 365, 372–73

water, 295, 296, 374–76

See also King Faisal Military Cantonment; 

Wadi Bishah North.

Khamis Mushayt Area Office, Saudi Arabia 

District, 285, 301

Khaneh, Iran, 109, 175, 177, 183

Kharg Island, Iran, 183–85

Kharian, Pakistan, 103, 148, 149

army cantonment, 102, 147, 150, 168

inspection services, 157

water supply, 103

Khartoum, Sudan, 553, 593, 595

Khartoum International Air Base, 593

Khasab, Oman, 525, 526–27, 529, 532, 539, 

573

Khashm al An, Saudi Arabia, 327, 430–34. See 

also Saudi Arabia National Guard.

Khodari-Intergreen, 401

Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 321

Khouribga, Morocco, 47

Khweet, Col. Othman Al, 405, 413, 414

Kibler, Joan, 581

King Abdulaziz Naval Base, 401, 409–10, 415, 

417

King Abdulaziz Military Academy (KAMA), 

363, 445–63, 465, 529, 559, 562, 625

automated master network, 453

concrete for, 448, 449, 453, 454

creation of, 323

dedication of, 459

facilities, 455, 459–61

funding issues, 511

ground settlement issues, 460, 463

housing area, 459

master plan for, 337, 446

operations and maintenance of, 454, 461, 463

Saudi contractors for, 447

water-treatment plant, 572

See also Contracts.

King Abdulaziz Military Cantonment, 306, 364, 

379

King Faisal Military Cantonment, 301, 364

King Faisal Naval Base, 401, 411

King Khalid Military City (KKMC), Saudi 

Arabia, 357, 363, 445, 465–512, 559, 562, 

564, 572

airport, 502, 547, 559

construction support, 482, 484–89, 500

contractor for, 473–74

costs of, 418, 474, 509–11

creation of, 323

Engineer Center and School, 497, 502, 509, 

512, 572

First Brigade facilities, 495, 504, 508, 509, 

511–12

headquarters, 384

infrastructure, 471, 484, 495

“KKMC Current Plan and Alternatives,” 490

life-support services, 479–82, 500, 501, 579

memorandum of understanding for, 473, 489, 

494, 498

precast concrete, 466, 486, 488, 495

Project Plan Update of August 1979, 495–96, 

497

Second Brigade facilities, 512

workers communities, 480–81, 482, 504

See also Al Batin District; Brown, 

Daltas–Sippican; Concrete; Contracts, 

Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia 

Consortium.

King Maryut, Egypt, 592

King Paul Airfield, Greece, 15

Kingsley, George, 622

KKMC. See King Khalid Military City.

KKMC Area Office, Middle East Division, 476

Knappen-Tippetts-Abbett Engineering Company 

(KTA), 30–34, 40, 87

Knox Homes, 230

Korean Overseas Corporation Bureau, 383

Korean War, 8, 26, 28, 41, 47, 65

Kramer, Earl J., 373, 544

KTA. See Knappen-Tippetts-Abbett Engineering 

Company.

Kushi, Iran, 175, 183

Kuwait, 320, 539–41, 573–74, 584–85

Air Force of, 539–41, 584

Iraq invasion of, 517, 580, 585, 616, 627

Ministry of Electricity and Water, 585
Index 657

Ministry of Public Works, 585

National Guard, 585

and Saudi television, 287

Kuwait Air Force International Base, 540

Kuwait City, Kuwait, 585, 616

Kuwait Defense Ministry, 584

Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office (KERO), 

585

Kyber Pass, 99

L23D aircraft, 122

Lahore, Pakistan, 150, 201

Laing Oman L.L.C., 534

Lamia, Greece, 13

Larisa, Greece, 13

LCPM. See Lifecycle Project Management.

Lebanon, 115, 294, 315, 319, 345

Leiser, Col. Maurice, 476, 477, 490–93, 495

Lemay, General Curtis, 68, 69, 78, 93

Leo A. Daly Company, 421, 423, 424–25, 

426–27, 428, 430, 434

Leon D. DeMatteis & Sons Inc., 434

Letter of offer and acceptance (LOA), 339

Letterkenny Army Supply Depot, Pennsylvania, 

307

Letters of credit, 252, 261, 289, 306, 339, 340, 

509, 510, 511. See also Chase Manhattan 

Bank.

Levkas, Greece, 234

Liberia, 573, 574, 599, 600 

Libya, 30, 105, 116, 117, 237, 569, 621, 622, 623

AC&W stations in, 94

air-base construction, 34–36, 45, 84, 113, 

116, 135

Air Force of, 273

Arab nationalism, 237, 238

ghanat technique in, 199

housing, 130

land acquisition, 39

oil in, 238

revolution, 269, 273

sovereignty of, 9, 29, 36, 81, 82

surplus property, 143

Troposcatter in, 227

U.S. personnel evacuated from, 593

See also Wheelus Air Base.

Lifecycle Project Management (LCPM), 610, 

612

Life-support services, 360, 448, 500, 501, 524, 

579, 623. See also King Khalid Military 

City.

Lincoln, Brig. Gen. Lawrence J., Jr., 94, 117, 

124, 161

and construction standards, 149

and relocation of Mediterranean Division, 

111–14

on Turkish projects, 128

Line of Communications Agreement, 45

Lipscomb, Col. Thomas H., 18

Livorno, Italy, 236, 254, 262, 345

and Afghanistan projects, 216

and Burma projects, 202

facilities, 130

relocation of Mediterranean Division to, 

111–13, 116

and SAMP, 330

and SETAF, 136

staff of, 344, 351

See also Mediterranean Division.

LOA. See Letter of Offer and Acceptance.

Lockwood Greene Engineers Inc., 598

Locurcio, Col. Ralph V., 585

Long-range navigation system (LORAN), 227, 

273

LORAN. See Long-range navigation system.

Louis Berger & Associates, 202, 217

Lovett, Brig. Gen. Robert G., 69

Lusk Corporation, 229–30

M48A1 tanks, 521

MAAG. See Military Assistance Advisory 

Group.

MAC. See Modern Advance Concrete.

MacArthur, General Douglas, 47

Madani, Ibrahim, 436

Makkah, Saudi Arabia, 445

Malawi, 574

Malik, Bakheet M. Al, 625

Mallorca, 226

Malta, 36, 227

Maltauro-Marini, 137

Manama, Bahrain, 543, 585

Mandalay, Burma, 157, 201, 202

Manjil, Iran, 175

MAPs. See Military Assistance Programs.

Marble Arch Airfield, Libya, 237, 273

Marrakech, Morocco, 47, 56

Marshall, George C., 6

Marshall Plan, 6

Martin, Calvin S., 377

Martina Franca, Italy, 226

Mashhad, Iran, 105, 175, 183, 195–98, 213

Mashhad Area Office, Gulf District, 197, 198

Mashhad Civil Airfield, 198

Masirah Air Base, 526, 530, 531

Masirah Island, Oman, 525, 526, 528, 529–30, 

532, 539, 573, 583, 584

Materials-testing laboratory, 119, 197, 269
658 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Matratin, Libya, 227, 237, 273

MATS. See Military Air Transport Service.

Mauripur, Pakistan, 97–99, 102, 103, 147

Maxon, Glen W., 74

MCA. See Military Construction, Army.

McBride, Lewis W., 18, 86, 119

McCormick, William, 420–21, 422

McFaul, Jim, 504

McGaughy, Marshall & McMillan (MMM), 388, 

446, 447

McGaughy, McMillan, Marshal, and Lucas, 286

McGinnis, Maj. Charles I., 240

McNamara, Robert S., 264

McNeely, Fred, 360

MEAPO. See Middle East/Africa Projects Office.

Mecca, Saudi Arabia, 255, 286, 288, 291, 315, 

444

Mechra bel Ksiri, Morocco, 55, 56, 57, 58, 

59–62

Medina, Saudi Arabia, 255, 268, 286–88, 291

Mediterranean Division, Corps of Engineers, 

87–110, 114, 182, 267–68, 318, 434, 519, 

622

Afghanistan highway projects, 209–19

area directed by, 117–18

Asmara construction project, 90, 272

aviation detachment, 283

and Burma Area Office, 159, 160, 201, 202

and civil aviation projects, 181

communications within, 122

Construction Division, 124, 130, 224

construction standards in, 149

contracts, 240, 469

deactivation, 325, 362

Design Branch, 262, 624

East Atlantic Division absorbed by, 117

and Engineer Assistance Agreement, 260

Engineering Division, 98, 124, 224, 257, 262, 

351

established, 72, 79

and Europe Division, 346

Executive Office, 224

FMS administration, 316

funding of projects, 339, 364

Geology, Soils, and Materials Branch, 119, 

238

Hafar al Batin, 336, 466

headquarters, 219, 223

housing, 230, 231

and Huntsville Division, 360

India-Pakistan War, 201

and Iran, 109, 188, 198

JCA work assumed by, 111, 112

and Jordan, 521, 522

legal support for districts, 129

Materials Branch, 98

MODA buildings, 387, 388

Nassief’s influence in, 338

New York office of, 99

and Nouasser, 113

OCE liaison, 119

Office of the Assistant Division Engineer, 

224

officers club in Riyadh, 391

Operating and Supervising Division, 93

Operations Branch, 237

overhead of, 156

Peace Hawk program supervised by, 380

personnel, 286

port construction, 342, 362, 410

Programming and Reports Branch, 257

Qaysumah cantonment, 334–36

radio facilities for Saudi Arabia, 291–94

redetermination clause, 85

relocation, 111–14, 348, 349–50

responsibilities of, 94, 113, 124

and Royal Saudi Air Force Training School, 

167, 261

and Saudi Arabia, 160–61, 164, 249–65, 269, 

279–306, 322, 323, 334, 337, 347

Saudi Arabia Area Office, 254

in Somalia, 240–49, 274, 275, 278, 279

staff, 123–24

television system in Saudi Arabia, 252, 254, 

255, 258, 288, 291

Tabuk Area Office, 303

and water issues, 374

See also King Abdulaziz Military Academy; 

King Khalid Military City; Middle East/

Africa Projects Office; Middle East 

Division; Saudi Arabia Mobility Program; 

Saudi Arabia National Guard; Saudi 

Naval Expansion Program; Transatlantic 

Division; Troposcatter.

Mediterranean Sea, 1, 4, 17, 45, 81

Mehrabad Airport, Tehran, 109, 162, 173, 

180–82, 183

Meknès, Morocco, 47

Melley Energy Systems Inc., 547

Mertin, Manfred, 210

Merzifon, Turkey, 19, 25, 27

Metcalf & Eddy Inc., 261, 295

Metcalf & Eddy International Inc./Frank E. Basil 

Inc., 592

Metcalf Construction Company, 18

Metcalf-Hamilton-Grove, 18, 19–20, 21, 22, 25, 

141

Meyer, Armin H., 189
Index 659

Middle East/Africa Projects Office (MEAPO), 

517, 576, 583, 610, 614–16, 622, 627

and Africa Civic Action, 602

Construction Division, 612

and Department of Defense Dependent 

Schools, 605, 607

in Egypt, 589, 591, 592, 608

Engineering and Construction Technical 

Division, 613

Engineering Division, 612, 613

headquarters of, 567

and Kuwait, 585

in Niger, 603, 605

Office of the Deputy Commander for 

Programs and Project Management, 613, 

614

Programs and Project Management 

Directorate, 612, 614

project management used by, 610–14

reorganization of, 615

and Sakara Air Base, 590

Saudi projects, 418, 581

Sudanese projects, 593–95

technical managers, 614

and VOA projects, 598–600

See also Lifecycle Project Management; 

Mediterranean Division; Middle East 

Division; Transatlantic Division.

Middle East District, Corps of Engineers, 39, 40, 

41, 51, 98, 108, 570

activated, 29, 30, 272

Asmara projects, 88, 90, 91, 118

civilian employees, 80

and Dhahran, 36, 38, 43

housing and living conditions, 130, 624

in Libya, 72, 79, 81, 87, 118

in Morocco, 93

at Wheelus Air Base, 38, 43

Middle East Division, Corps of Engineers, 322, 

332, 350, 355–62, 434, 519, 622

and Africa Civic Action, 602

African work by, 574

and AID, 556

and Bahrain, 541–43

and camel racetrack, 434

Construction Division, 354, 386

contracts, 358, 498

and design changes, 369

districts of, 357

and Egypt, 544–53

Engineering Division, 386

Engineering Division Liaison Office, 354

Engineering Logistics Command, 359, 360, 

361–62, 559

Engineering Planning and Liaison Office, 

358, 373, 375

Engineering Support Group, 358, 359

funding issues, 509–11

in Jordan, 522, 523–24

and Kuwait, 539, 540–41

Liberian projects, 573, 574

medical facilities master plan, 396–97

and MKSAC, 490, 491, 493, 496

Moroccan projects of, 573

in Oman, 525–39

and Pacific Construction Company contract, 

383

and Peace Sun, 383

Rear Echelon, 354

recruitment, 357

in Saudi Arabia, 323, 333, 354, 360, 385, 

388, 390, 392, 404, 410, 474, 475, 512

staff of, 558–60

in Sudan, 553–55, 593

transition to MEAPO, 567–81, 598

and Voice of America, 595–98

workloads, 514–15

See also Cost-Plus-Award-Fee; King 

Abdulaziz Military Academy; King 

Khalid Military City; Mediterranean 

Division; Middle East/Africa Projects 

Office; Saudi Arabian National Guard; 

Saudi Naval Expansion Program; Support 

for Others Agreement; Transatlantic 

Division.

Middle East Division (Rear), 354, 526

Military Air Transport Service (MATS), 30, 32, 

33, 39

Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), 

97, 98, 109, 117, 129, 148, 153, 162, 180. 

See also Direct Forces Support; United 

States Military Training Mission. 

Military Assistance Program Jordan, 522

Military Assistance Programs (MAPs), 117, 180, 

183, 222, 521, 553, 593, 601

Military Construction, Air Force, 615

Military Construction, Army (MCA), 549, 612, 

615

Military Construction and Program Management 

Office, 526

Military Programs Directorate, 613

Military Works Directorate, 340, 349

Miller, Col. William A., 613, 615, 616

Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA), 258, 

268, 281, 316, 445, 563, 581

cantonments for, 294–306, 326, 357

and communications networks, 283

construction efforts, 256, 280, 294, 514
660 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Ministry of Defense and Aviation 

(MODA)—Continued

and contract administration, 378

executive office building construction, 

387–88

funding issues, 511

GDMW, 386, 399

Hafar al Batin site, 336, 343, 466

headquarters complex for, 363, 384, 387–90, 

511, 562, 572, 576

medical facilities, 336–37, 338, 394–97, 471

Military Works Department, 338

officers club in Riyadh, 391, 392, 394

petrodollar use, 334

Tabuk project, 302, 375

and underground headquarters, 384, 385, 

389–90

USMTM works with, 257, 260

and water issues, 375

See also King Abdulaziz Military Academy; 

King Khalid Military City; Saudi Arabia 

Mobility Program.

Ministry of Information (MOI), 251, 253, 255, 

281, 294

and NBCI, 289

radio broadcast complex for, 291, 292

and television system, 280, 287, 290

Miryung Construction Company Ltd., 389–90, 

403, 404, 408, 409, 411

Misratah, Libya, 88

MKI. See Morrison-Knudsen International.

MKO. See Morrison-Kaiser-Oman.

MKSAC. See Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia 

Consortium.

MMM. See McGaughy, Marshall & McMillan.

Mobil Corporation, 603

Mobility Management Organization, 264

MODA. See Ministry of Defense and Aviation.

Modern Advance Concrete (MAC), 609

Modification Review Board, 390

Mogadiscio (Mogadishu), Somalia, 241, 274, 

276, 277

Mohammed V, King of Morocco, 132

MOI. See Ministry of Information.

Mombasa, Kenya, 244, 245, 247, 519

Monrovia, Liberia, 599, 600

Montechiari, Italy, 137

Moody, Merle, 612, 617

Moravec, Col. John, 618

Moroccan Area Office, Southern District, 

133–34

Morocco, 77, 83, 116, 117, 129, 237, 623, 626

air base program, 46, 47, 49–50, 355, 469, 622

and Cold War, 1, 8, 45, 516

funding for projects, 65, 66–71

ghanat technique in, 199

housing, 133, 624

independence granted to, 94, 111

investigations of projects in, 71–78

labor, 56

nationalism, 94

negotiations with, 55, 56

U.S. personnel in, 130, 616

VOA station, 595–96, 598–600

See also individual projects.

Morris, Maj. Gen. John W., 348, 360, 493, 499

Morrison-Kaiser-Oman (MKO), 109, 174, 177

at Hamadan airfield, 185–88

and Mehrabad airport expansion, 181

Morrison-Knudsen Company Inc., 70, 79, 109, 

211

Morrison-Knudsen International (MKI), 273, 274

Morrison-Knudsen Saudi Arabia Consortium 

(MKSAC), 473, 474, 477–89, 493, 502, 

579

automated data processing, 492, 501

corruption allegations, 497–98

foreign workers for, 478–79, 480, 481

management plan, 490

and master plan, 495

offices of, 477, 478

precast structural elements, 486, 488, 503

progress of, 495, 496, 497

recruitment for, 478, 488

supervision of, 489–98

See also Concrete; CS-Squared.

Mossadegh, Mohammed, 94, 95, 105

Mothercat Ltd., 532, 533

Mt. Weather, Virginia, 350, 561

Multan, Pakistan, 150, 157, 168, 169, 200

Musaad Al Saleh & Sons Ltd., 541

Muscat, Oman, 525, 526, 533

Mutual Defense Assistance Act, 45

Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 18

Mutual Security Act of 1954, 129

MWK International Ltd. Inc., 534

Myers, Brig. Gen. Colby M., 70

Nabil, Musallam, 435

NAF. See U.S. Naval Air Facility.

Nafisah, Maj. Mohammad, 450

Naguib, Mohammed, 95

Nairobi, Kenya, 240, 593

NAMRU. See U.S. Naval Medical Research 

Unit.

Najeeb Establishment, 372

Najran, Saudi Arabia, 309, 310, 313, 315

Naples, Italy, 137
Index 661

Naqadeh, Iran, 109, 175, 177

Nasr City, Egypt, 551, 588

Nasser, Gamel Abdel, 95, 99, 249

and Arab nationalism, 115, 237, 269

relationship with Saudi Arabia, 250, 251, 294

Nassief, Col. Mahmoud, 262, 282, 283, 300, 304, 

339, 446

and Hafar al Batin site, 335, 336

commands Military Works Department, 338

issues at Tabuk, 303

on training centers, 337, 338

Nassief, Sheik Muhammad, 262

National Broadcasting Corporation International 

(NBCI), 254–55, 268, 289–91

National Environmental Protection Act, 597

National Homes, 230

National Iranian Oil Company, 95. See also

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; ArabianAmerican Oil Company; Oil.

National Security Act of 1947, 5

National Security Council, 5, 7, 96, 595. See also

NSC–68.

National Steel Products Company, 548

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Nauman, Col. Arthur C., 117, 129, 169, 214, 

219, 220, 221, 223, 236

Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 543, 

586

Naval Supply System Command, 539, 540

Navy, U.S. See U.S. Navy.

Navy Fleet Material Support Office, 540

Naziabad, Iran, 195

NBCI. See National Broadcasting Corporation 

International.

Nello L. Teer Company, 50

Netherlands, The, 478, 486, 492

Neudegg, Walter F. von, 276

Neuero Industrieanlagen, 541

New York District, Corps of Engineers, 19, 20, 

564

Newcomen Society, 165

Newfoundland, 19, 26

Niamey, Niger, 602

Niger, 574, 602–03, 605

Nigeria, 556

Nixon, Richard M., 320

Norfolk District, Corps of Engineers, 46, 49

Norris, Maj. William S., Jr., 275, 276

Norstad, Lt. Gen. Lauris, 58, 60

North Atlantic Alliance, 45

North Atlantic Division, Corps of Engineers, 12, 

19, 24, 34, 75, 119

in Middle East, 33, 42

New York District of, 19, 20, 564

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 7, 

28, 96, 117, 269, 345, 346

and Cigli Air Base, 235

construction in member nations, 111, 223, 

233–37, 270–71

criteria for austerity, 529

expansion of, 54, 86

formation of, 6, 45

Greece joins, 27

Turkey joins, 27

North Korea, 7, 20, 46, 47

North Pacific Division, 617

North Yemen, 250, 320, 321, 513

Northern Resident Office (Kabul), 215

Northington, Col. Hartsell H., 153, 159, 160, 

165, 168, 169, 171

Northrop Corporation, 380

Nouasser, Morocco, 56, 58, 92, 111, 118, 130, 

132

Air Force operates from, 93

changes, 63

contract for, 47, 50, 51, 85

facilities, 54, 61, 62, 67, 70

master plan for construction, 59

pavement, 64, 74

repair work, 65, 77

schedule for, 49, 51

U.S. withdraws from, 237

NSC–68, 7, 8. See also National Security 

Council.

OACC. See Overseas African Construction 

Corporation.

OASD/ISA. See Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for International Security 

Affairs.

Obaid and Al Mulla Construction Company, 509

OCAT. See Oman Construction Advisory Team.

OCE. See Office of the Chief of Engineers.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Affairs (OASD/

ISA), 264, 574, 600–601

Office of Military Cooperation, 553, 593

Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE), 202, 

267, 322, 346, 360, 580

and Afghanistan, 209

and Chisimayu breakwater, 246

and Civil Service Commission, 353

contracting procedures, 153

inspection teams, 124

and Iran, 107, 109

and MEAPO, 567

and Mediterranean Division, 119

Nouasser project, 67
662 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Office of the Chief of Engineers 

(OCE)—Continued

recruiting, 344

reorganizing engineering responsibilities, 

347–48

in Saudi Arabia, 162, 167, 206, 233, 257, 

258, 264, 268, 280, 306, 445–46, 472

Saudi Arabian District, 280

See also U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Office of the Program Manager for the Saudi 

Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG), 

18, 333, 419

Office of the Secretary of Defense Audit Office, 

Europe, 345, 346

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 68, 

69, 209, 231, 257, 269, 605

OFW. See Oman-Farnsworth-Wright.

Ogaden, Somalia, 240

Ohio State University, 290, 290n60

Oil, 4, 17, 45, 66, 175, 241, 614

embargo, 320, 326, 355

prices, 379, 446, 510, 515, 569

production, 94, 95, 321

revenues, 249, 326, 394

wells, 585

See also Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; 

Arabian-American Oil Company; 

National Iranian Oil Company; 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting 

Countries.

Old, Brig. Gen. Archie J., Jr., 57, 59, 68, 69

and funding for work in Morocco, 66, 70

on Mechra bel Ksiri site, 60, 62

Oliva, Frank, 446, 447

Oman, 320, 519, 525–39, 560, 569, 582–84, 

584n50, 625, 626

country-to-country agreement with United 

States, 525–26, 528

“Empty Quarter,” 536

Ministry of Defense, 526, 528

subcontractors, 528

U.S. civilian employees in, 616

and Yemen, 514

Oman Construction Advisory Team (OCAT), 525

Oman Construction Company Inc., 99, 109, 

212, 534

Oman Construction Company Inc./Fischbach & 

Moore International Corporation/Abdulla 

Moosa Contracting & Trading Company, 

534, 536

Oman-Farnsworth-Wright (OFW), 99, 147, 

164, 203

and Dhahran Civil Air Terminal, 163, 164, 

205

and Sandbag Operation, 152, 168

Oman Resident Office, 584

OPD. See Ordnance Program Division.

OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum 

Exporting Countries.

Operation Desert Shield, 580, 584, 616, 619

Operation Desert Storm, 584, 619

OPM-SANG. See Office of the Program 

Manager for the Saudi Arabian National 

Guard.

OPMAD. See Ordnance Program Management 

Assistance Division.

OPMD. See Ordnance Program Management 

Division.

Ordnance Program Division (OPD), 331, 572, 

577–81, 582

Ordnance Program Management Assistance 

Division (OPMAD), 330. See also

Ordnance Program Management 

Division (OPMD).

Ordnance Program Management Division 

(OPMD), 331

Organization of Petroleum Exporting 

Countries (OPEC), 320. See also Oil; 

Petrodollars.

OSD. See Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Oshnaviyeh, Iran, 109, 175, 177

Otaishan, Col. Abdulaziz Al, 390, 511, 563, 582

Overseas African Construction Corporation 

(OACC), 275–79

Pace, Frank, Jr., 72, 73, 75, 76

Pacer Forge, 588, 590

Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), 360, 

361, 471, 579. See also Society of 

American Military Engineers.

Pacific Construction Company Ltd. (PCC), 383

Pacific Ocean Division, Corps of Engineers, 

598

PAE. See Pacific Architects and Engineers.

Page, Col. George W., 350

Page, Robert W., Sr., 610, 611

Pahlevi, Mohammed Reza Shah, 94, 95, 105, 

321, 444, 513, 583

Pakistan, 1, 94, 102, 115, 183, 621, 622

Air Force of, 102, 147

Army of, 147

as Baghdad Pact member, 96

cement shortage, 103

construction agreement, 104

contracts for work in, 99, 103, 168

and Direct Forces Support, 97, 119

independence of, 96

living conditions in, 154–55
Index 663

Military Assistance Advisory Group, 97–98, 

102, 122

Ministry of Defense, 104, 153

Navy of, 147

projects in, 116, 230

technical agreement, 103

surplus property used, 143

tax-exemption certificates, 201

and USAF communications, 152

war with India, 201

Pakistan Area Office, Mediterranean Division, 

169

Pakistani International Airlines, 154 

Palestine Liberation Front, 304

Palestinian Liberation Organization, 319

Palestinians, 230, 321, 344

Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas 

(PBQ&D), 388

Parsons, Basil Inc., 400, 401, 404, 411

Pateras, Greece, 234

Patras, Greece, 13

Paul Hardeman Construction Company, 254

Paul Smith Construction Company, 244–47

Pauling (Oman) L.L.C., 531

PBQ&D. See Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & 

Douglas.

PCC. See Pacific Construction Company Ltd.

Peace Desert, 273

Peace Hawk Area Office, Mediterranean 

Division, 381

Peace Hawk program, 383, 384, 399, 478, 

572

master plan lacking, 382

Peace Hawk V, 381

Peace Hawk VII, 382

and Royal Saudi Air Force, 326, 334, 379, 

380

Peace Pharaoh, 547–49

Peace Sun, 379, 382–84, 399, 572

Peace Vector I, 547–49

Peace Vector II, 549, 552, 588

Peace Vector III, 589, 590, 592, 608

Peace Vector IV, 590

Pearlson Engineering Company, 405

Pedersen and Tilney, 234

Pegu, Burma, 202

Peloponnese Peninsula, 13

People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. See

South Yemen.

People’s Republic of China, 47, 115, 206

Perini Corporation, 536, 537, 589

Perkins and Will, 368, 376

Persian Gulf, 9, 105, 183, 515, 517, 527, 541, 

543, 550, 614. See also Gulf War.

Peshawar, Pakistan, 99, 102, 147, 152, 157, 

168, 169, 171, 201

Peter Kiewit Sons Company, 212

Petrodollars, 320, 334, 342, 355, 446. See 

also Oil; Organization of Petroleum 

Exporting Countries.

Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), 59, 74, 

87, 88, 189, 370, 373, 584, 586

Phillip Holzmann A.G., 302–03, 306, 338, 387, 

591

Phillip Holzmann A.G./Jan DeNul N.V., 591

Pick, Maj. Gen. Lewis A., 18, 19, 24, 46, 57, 

70, 71

at congressional investigation, 72, 73

East Ocean Division, 69

Mediterranean Division, 79

and Middle East District, 30

Moroccan project administration, 75

Piraeus, Greece, 10, 13

POL. See Petroleum, oil, and lubricants.

Port Lyautey, Morocco, 45, 56, 58

Port Sudan, Sudan, 553

Porta Benito, Libya, 34

Porta-Kamps, 481

Porter, O. James, 49, 70, 74

Porter-Urquhart Associates, 49, 50, 54, 55, 56, 

60

Porter-Urquhart, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill 

(PUSOM), 56, 70, 72, 80

Pratt & Whitney, 551

Prefabricated housing. See USAHOME.

“Preliminary Plan of Proposed Construction for 

the Sultanate of Oman,” 526

Prentiss, Brig. Gen. Louis, 346, 348

Project Ebony Forest, 136

Project management, 492, 504, 571, 589, 

610–14, 615, 618. See also Deputy 

district engineer for project management 

(DDE[PM]).

Project Spellout, 221–22

Public Law (PL) 480, Agricultural Trade 

Development and Assistance Act, 133, 

192

Puerto Rico, 596, 597

PUSOM. See Porter-Urquhart, Skidmore, 

Owings and Merrill.

Qaboos bin Said, Sultan of Oman, 525

Qassim Station, 286. See also Buraydah.

Qatar, 541, 555, 569

Qaysumah, Saudi Arabia, 259, 260, 268, 297, 

334–36, 465. See also Hafar al Batin.

Quchan, Iran, 189, 190, 196

Quonset huts, 24, 25, 37, 62
664 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

R. P. Farnsworth and Company Inc., 99, 109, 

212

Rabat, Morocco, 45, 52, 53, 56, 57

Radio broadcast complex (Saudi Arabia), 

291–94

Radio Corporation of America (RCA), 254, 291

Rahman, Musa’id ibn Abdul, 423

Ralph E. Mills Company Inc., 50

Ralph M. Parsons Company, 163, 205, 292

RAMP. See Royal Armament Maintenance 

Program.

Rangoon, Burma, 121, 157, 159, 160, 201, 202

Rangoon Hospital, 202

Rangoon-Mandalay highway, 202–03

Rangoon University, 157, 159, 203

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), 

514, 525, 529, 549, 560

Ras al Mishab, Saudi Arabia, 471, 475, 506, 579

and cargo for KKMC, 475, 489

port construction, 342, 343, 362, 474–76

Ras Banas, Egypt, 519, 549, 550

Ras El-Tin Naval Base, Egypt, 592

Rawalpindi, Pakistan, 99

Ray, Brig. Gen. James W., 390, 444, 461, 563, 

565, 567, 568, 570–72, 575, 619

RCA. See Radio Corporation of America.

RCA Great Britain Ltd., 286

RCA Institute, New York City, 255, 289

RDJTF. See Rapid Deployment Joint Task 

Force.

Reading & Bates Construction Company, 553, 

555, 593

Reagan, Ronald, 515, 595

Rebh, Maj. Gen. George, 306, 346

Red Sea, 1, 89, 240, 241, 298, 400, 474, 543

Red Sea Area Office, Riyadh District, 409

Reisacher, Col. Robert W., 304, 624

Resources Management Office (RMO), 615, 617

Ret-Ser Engineering Agency, 408, 543, 586, 587

Reynolds, Smith & Hills, 512

Reynolds Construction Company, 240, 274, 275

Rheneh, Iran, 199

Rheobuild, 609

Richmond, Virginia, 47, 69, 87

Riley, John J., 73

Riley Committee, 74, 75

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 167, 203, 345, 347, 405, 

446

all-services officers club, 363, 391–94

automated data-processing center, 351

central inventory control point, 313, 315

communication system, 438

construction, 313

electric company, 438

housing, 285

labor shortage, 438

medical facilities, 394, 395

military academy, 445

personnel, 265, 282

radio program and, 293

resident office, 204, 254, 285

RSAF complex, 379, 385

SAMP office in, 285, 309

SANG headquarters at, 420, 430, 435–39

Saudi Arabia District Office, 400

Saudi naval headquarters, 400, 411, 415, 

416–17, 576

television system, 252, 253, 286, 287, 291

telephone system, 283

underground command centers, 385, 416, 438

water issues, 314, 417, 438

Riyadh District, Middle East Division, 377, 463, 

559, 570, 585

Construction Division and, 454

Facilities Engineering Branch, 454

Hafar al Batin, 476

and KKMC, 564

Riyadh District Office, 357, 362, 411

Riyadh Electric Company, 387

Riyadh Liaison Office (RLO), 431

Riyadha Equestrian Club, 431, 434

RLO. See Riyadh Liaison Office.

RMO. See Resources Management Office.

Robert College, 142

Robertson, Brig. Gen. George R., 509, 510–11, 

559, 562, 563

Robinson, Maj. Gen. Bernard L., 111

Rome, Italy, 111

Royal Armament Maintenance Program 

(RAMP), 308, 330

Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), 203, 204, 323, 

326, 327, 379

F–5 purchase, 383

F–15 purchase, 383

headquarters complex, 363, 384, 385–87

in Jiddah, 204, 379

modernization program, 380

underground command center, 385, 387

See also Peace Hawk; Peace Sun.

Royal Saudi Air Force Training School, 163, 167

Royal Saudi Naval Academy, 400, 415, 416

Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF), 326, 327, 

342, 363, 399, 415, 515

cost concerns, 413–18

headquarters complex for, 384, 411–13, 562, 

572, 576

Jiddah and, 357, 407

minesweepers, 400, 409
Index 665

quarterly meetings on construction, 416

Syncrolifts for, 412

See also Saudi Naval Expansion Program.

RSAF. See Royal Saudi Air Force.

RSNF. See Royal Saudi Naval Forces.

Ryan, Lt. Col. Terrence, 453, 454, 455

SAAOC. See Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance 

Corps.

SAC. See U.S. Air Force Strategic Air 

Command.

SACMO. See Southwest Asia Construction 

Management Office.

Sadat, Anwar el-, 321

Sadelmi New York Inc., 592

Safeguard Ballistic Missile System, 360

Sahneh, Iran, 200

Saikali, Victor, 625

Saja, Capt. Ibrahim Al, 405, 407–08, 409–12, 

413, 414–15, 418

Sakara Air Base, Egypt, 590

Salé, Morocco, 47

SAMP. See Saudi Arabia Mobility Program.

SAMP Construction Project Office, 330

Sam Whan Corporation, 403, 430, 431, 434–45, 

501, 502, 504, 512

Samsun, Turkey, 19, 130, 142, 237, 267

San Vito dei Romanni, Italy, 137, 231

Sanandaj, Iran, 175, 178, 179, 199

Sandbag Operation, 152, 168

SANG. See Saudi Arabian National Guard.

Santa Fe Overseas Inc., 343, 474–76

Santucci, Caesar, 555

Sarab, Iran, 189, 190

Sardinia, 226

Sargodha, Pakistan, 99, 102, 147

Saud, Abdul Aziz Al, King of Saudi Arabia, 29, 

161, 162, 280, 418

on design of Dhahran Civil Aviation 

Terminal, 166, 203

and Faisal, 251, 260

Saudi Air Defense Command, 386

Saudi Arabia, 30, 32, 105, 116, 183, 249–65, 

267, 569

air base expansion, 45

budgets, 515

and Chase Manhattan Bank, 252, 511

and Cold War, 8, 17, 29, 115, 621

communications, 283, 288, 291–94

construction, 36–38

foreign workers in, 315

ghanat technique in, 199

land acquisition, 39

Ministry of Information, 251, 253, 255

Ministry of the Interior, 255

nonmilitary projects in, 116

ports of, 342

Sharie Courts, 38, 161

student training program, 253

and tax issues, 161

television system, 251–55, 268

Saudi Arabia District, Mediterranean Division, 

281–86, 301, 314, 330, 338, 340, 350, 

357

activated, 280, 322

authority of, 344

deactivated, 316–17, 325

local labor employed, 286

Riyadh Base Support Division, 359

and SAMP, 315, 328

and SANG expansion, 421

television system development, 286

See also Ordnance Program Division; Riyadh 

District.

Saudi Arabia Field Artillery School and Center, 

363, 368. See also Khamis Mushayt.

Saudi Arabia Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral 

Resources, 556

Saudi Arabia Mobility Program (SAMP), 262–65, 

282, 306–18, 328–32, 338, 572, 580

and central inventory control point, 309

and communications, 283

contractors, 307

contracts for, 307, 317

construction, 312–14

extending program, 315–18

and food services, 314

funding, 315

initiated, 268

project offices of, 285

and Saudi Ordnance Corps, 315, 316, 333

Saudi Arabian District manages, 315

See also Ordnance Program Division; SAMP 

Construction Project Office; Saudi 

Arabian Ordnance Center and School; 

Saudi Ordnance Corps Program.

Saudi Arabian Armed Forces Medical Service 

Department, 395

Saudi Arabian Army, 264, 281, 315, 316, 330, 

348

construction programs for, 363

and Egyptian advisers, 313

medical facilities, 394

modernization, 294, 306

training installations, 337–38

vehicles for, 308, 309

and water systems, 301

See also Saudi Arabia Mobility Program.
666 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance Corps (SAAOC), 

301, 315, 333, 577, 578, 583

construction projects, 294, 579

housing complex for, 578

IBM equipment for, 578

logistics systems of, 332

Ordnance Corps Logistics system, 578

responsibilities of, 316, 328

survey of, 262, 264

training projects, 312

See also Bendix Corporation; 

Commonwealth-Tumpane Company Ltd.; 

Saudi Maintenance Company Ltd.

Saudi Arabian Infantry School and Center, 363, 

368. See also Khamis Mushayt.

Saudi Arabian Ministry of Agriculture and 

Water, 341

Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), 323, 

326, 333, 338, 349, 399, 439, 468

composition of, 327

contract for, 354

and Corps of Engineers, 444

cost of expansion, 425, 427

designs for, 428

headquarters, 384, 434–39

ground settlement, 439–44

modernization, 327, 363, 418–44

O&M team, 439, 440

schedule for construction, 426

training installation, 421

underground command center, 420, 421

and vehicle management programs, 421

See also Al Hasa Military City; Al Qasim 

Military City; Khashm al An.

Saudi Arabian Ordnance Center and School, 579

Saudi Computer Services Ltd., 501

Saudi Council of Ministers, 394, 578

Saudi Enterprises, 164, 167

Saudi Grievance Council, 378

Saudi Maintenance Company Ltd. (SIYANCO), 

329, 501, 502, 579

Saudi Ministry of Civil Aviation, 304

Saudi Ministry of Commerce, 303

Saudi Ministry of Finance, 422–23, 424, 428, 

435, 511

Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 440

Saudi Ministry of Public Works, 420

Saudi Naval Expansion Program (SNEP), 323, 

336, 338, 404, 412, 415, 418

concluded, 418

construction, 348, 417, 468

funding for, 400, 401, 404, 405, 412, 515

management for, 399, 400, 465, 514

reorientation of, 414–15

and U.S. Navy, 414

work added to, 405, 408

See also Royal Saudi Naval Forces.

Saudi Ordnance Corps Program (SOCP), 331, 

332–34, 419, 572, 578

Saudi Television Network, 286–91

Schneebeck, Col. Gene A., 508, 511

Schroder, Col. Romayne E. (“Rom”), 563–64, 

567, 568, 572, 574, 575, 577

Sea of Marmara, 1, 19, 25, 142

SEATO. See South East Asia Treaty 

Organization.

Seeb, Oman, 525, 533–37, 538, 539, 573, 583, 584

Seeb International Airport, 533

Seedlock, Col. Robert F., 111

Senegal, 556

Sentinel Ballistic Missile System, 360

Septic systems, 200, 392

Serpenti Island, Somalia, 242, 244, 273, 275

SETAF. See Southern European Task Force.

Shah of Iran. See Pahlevi, Mohammed Reza 

Shah.

Shahabad, Iran, 175

Shahrokhi Air Base, Iran, 188

Shaikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain, 543, 586, 608

Sharm Yanbu, Saudi Arabia, 343

Shepherd Construction Company Inc., 33

Sherkat Tazamoni Neamatollah Jahan-Bin and 

Company, 191

Shobaili, Abdulrahman, 290n60

Shuler, Brig. Gen. William R., 117, 122, 127, 

129, 159, 160, 223

Afghanistan highway projects, 209

on Burma, 160

and construction standards, 149

on Royal Saudi Air Force Training School, 

167

Southern District reorganized under, 143–45

and Trans-East District, 156

on Turkish projects, 128, 141

Shuqayq, Saudi Arabia, 298

Sicily, 9, 137

Sidi Slimane, Morocco, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 71, 

93, 132

Atlas Construction at, 59, 60

communication equipment, 58

and congressional investigation, 72

construction, 58, 61

contracts for, 85

housing, 133, 134

master plan for construction, 59

pavement tested, 74

repair work, 65, 77

runway base course, 60, 64–66
Index 667

schedule for, 64

Sierra Leone, 574

Sigonella Residency, Southern District, 143

Sigonella, Italy, 137, 139. See also U.S. Naval 

Air Facility.

Simmons, Harold M., 60, 71

Sinai Peninsula, 100, 543

Sinop, Turkey, 127, 130, 237, 267

Sippican Consultants International, 465

Sisinyak, Maj. Gen. Mark J., 568, 570

Six-Day War. See Arab-Israeli War of 1967.

SIYANCO. See Saudi Maintenance Company 

Ltd.

Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill, 56

Skyblazers aerial demonstration team, 61

Smith, Henchman, and Grill, 385

SNEP. See Saudi Naval Expansion Program.

Sobke, Maj. Gen. John, 617

Society of American Military Engineers, 454. 

See also Pacific Architects and Engineers.

SOCP. See Saudi Ordnance Corps Program.

Somalia, 129, 274, 278, 321, 514, 556, 622, 626

modernization, 116, 240–49

revolution in, 269, 277, 513

See also Chisimayu.

South Atlantic Division, Corps of Engineers, 

544, 570, 571, 618

and MEAPO, 517

Middle East Division assumed by, 568, 575

personnel, 572

South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 

96, 97

South Korea, 1, 7, 8, 20, 46

South Yemen, 320, 321, 380, 513, 514, 536

Southeastern Drilling Company, 222

Southern Area Office, Mediterranean Division, 

240

Southern District, Mediterranean Division, 117, 

118, 127, 129–45, 224

branches abolished, 144

closed, 143–45, 223

SETAF projects and, 136

surplus material disposed of, 142–43

Southern European Task Force (SETAF), 112, 

136, 137, 266

Southern Resident Office, 215

Southwest Asia Construction Management 

Office (SACMO), 560–61

Spain, 1, 9, 75, 86, 131, 226, 232

Spin Baldak, Afghanistan, 210. See also

Kandahar–Spin Baldak highway.

Spivey, David A., 567, 569, 570

Sri Lanka, 598

Stanley Consultants, 529, 530, 533, 536

Starr-Park and Freeman, 10

State Department. See U.S. State Department.

Statskonsult International A.B., 501

Steelcase, 450

Steers-Grove, 10, 13

Stevens, Lt. Col. Pat M., IV, 537–38

Strait of Hormuz, 320, 525, 532

Straits of Gibraltar, 1

Sturgis, Maj. Gen. Samuel D., Jr., 86, 99, 104, 

105, 161

contracts, 85

and Moroccan projects, 83

and relocation of Mediterranean Division, 87, 

111

personnel recruiting, 108

STV/Lyon Associates, 556

Sudan, 89, 94, 286, 315, 553–55, 556

Air Force of, 553, 593

Army of, 593

civil unrest in, 555, 593–95

construction, 594

resident office in, 555

Suez Canal, 1, 29, 94, 161, 321

Suez Canal Authority, 544

Suez Crisis, 99–100, 102, 103, 108, 115, 319

Sultan, Prince, 250, 262, 264, 284, 349, 369, 578

on cantonment, 260, 261

on costs, 258, 259, 300, 470

on Hafar al Batin cantonment, 466

and KAMA master plan, 446, 447

at Khamis Mushayt opening, 299

and KKMC, 466, 474, 479, 512

and MODA, 257, 387, 388, 414

and modernization of Saudi Army, 294, 296, 

297

and officers club in Riyadh, 391

on ordnance program, 331, 333

and port construction, 342

and Qaysumah cantonment, 335

and SAMP, 268, 316, 328

lack of Saudi subcontractors, 304

and supervision of construction contracts, 

378, 379

Tabuk project, 302, 303

Support for Others agreement, 595, 596

Surplus commodity housing, 133, 136, 137, 139, 

142

Surplus materials, 15, 142–43

Sverdrup and Parcel, 368, 369, 373, 376, 552

Swailem, Abdullah Al, 429, 430, 440

Symington, Stuart, 280, 281

Syncrolift system, 405, 412, 591, 592

Syracuse University, 254, 255, 290, 290n60

Syria, 115, 172, 249, 294, 304, 379, 520
668 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

TAB VEE. See Theater Air Base Vulnerability 

Evaluation Exercise.

Tabriz, Iran, 105, 189

Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, 260, 261, 268, 282, 323, 

325, 399, 411

Armor School at, 370

BATMED and, 302, 335

beautification program, 304–05

bidding for, 302

cantonment, 259, 295, 297, 300, 302–06, 334, 

357, 465

communications issues, 303

computers at, 310

construction, 313

expansion of, 326, 363, 366–67, 376

field laboratory at, 304

geodesic dome, 304

headquarters facilities, 365, 372, 384

housing, 373

master plan for construction, 376

medical facilities, 334, 336, 365, 366–67

Peace Hawk program, 380

power plant, 376

and SAMP, 285, 309, 315

Saudi contractors at, 304

schools, 368–71

supply depot, 309

training center, 365

VIP complexes, 365, 372–73

water treatment facility, 377

See also King Abdulaziz Military 

Cantonment.

TAD. See Transatlantic Division.

TAFTs. See Technical assistance field teams.

Taif, Saudi Arabia, 203, 205, 255, 285, 298, 309, 

383

computers at, 310

construction, 313, 327

maintenance shop, 264

medical facilities, 336–37, 394, 395–96, 397

microwave system, 288

military academy, 445

Peace Hawk, 380, 381

Peace Sun, 383

and RSAF, 204

SAMP, 309, 315

satellite station, 291

Saudi Arabian Ordnance Center and School 

at, 307, 311–12, 313, 579

and Saudi television network, 287

Taif General Hospital, 397

Talley, Brig. Gen. Benjamin B., 94, 96, 97–98, 

105, 107, 108, 111, 122, 161

Tamimi and Fouad, 288

Tangier, Morocco, 596, 597, 598–99

Targabarun, Turkey, 227

Tarmac Overseas Ltd., 385

Tatum, William O., III, 257

Taylor, Charles, 404

Taylor Woodrow Inc., 591

Taylor Woodrow–Towell, 530

Technical assistance field teams (TAFTs), 551, 

552

Tehran, Iran, 175, 182, 201, 623, 624

Gulf District based in, 104, 168, 379

MKO office at, 109

Television system (Saudi Arabia), 251–55

TGS International Ltd., 539, 540

Thacher, Nicholas G., 366

Thai Huat Engineering Company, 598

Thailand, 1, 478, 596, 597–99

Thamarit, Oman, 439, 525, 534, 536, 537, 573, 

583

The Institute of Naval Studies (TINS), 416

The Ordnance Center and School (TOCS), 

311–12, 318, 331, 579

The United States Air Force Group (TUSAFG), 

17–18, 19, 21, 23–24, 25

The United States Army Group (TUSAG), 17

The United States Engineer Group (TUSEG), 18, 

23, 26, 27, 80, 86, 236

area offices, 142, 235, 267

Audit Branch, 86

Engineering-Construction Division, 18, 21, 

86

internship program, 142

Joint Construction Agency and, 27, 86, 141

Turkey and projects, 19–25, 26, 141

The United States Navy Group (TUSNG), 17

Theater Air Base Vulnerability Evaluation 

Exercise (TAB VEE), 270, 271

Thessalonika, Greece, 10, 13

Thomas, Roger, 529, 625, 626

Timberlake, Maj. Gen. Patrick W., 70

TINS. See The Institute of Naval Studies.

TOCS. See The Ordnance Center and School.

Todd Logistics Inc., 471

Todd Warehouse and Distributors Inc., 362, 489

Tombolo, Italy, 137

Topographical Battalion, 220

Towaijri, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al, 424, 426, 430, 

436, 438, 439, 443

and budgets, 427, 428

and race course, 432–34

Towell, 530

Trabzon, Turkey, 130, 142, 237

Trade Development Programs, 553

Tragakes, C. N., 119
Index 669

Trainer, Col. Wyatt G. (“Gristy”), 220, 256

Trans World Airlines, 29

Transatlantic Division (TAD), Corps of 

Engineers, 618, 619, 622. See also

Mediterranean Division; Middle East 

Division, Middle East/Africa Projects 

Office.

Trans-East District, Mediterranean Division, 

104, 105, 117, 145, 147–71, 169, 182

activated, 98, 111

and Afghanistan, 209

Burma projects, 157–60, 168

cement shortage and, 10

and contracts, 124, 157, 169

deactivating, 168–71, 200, 203, 223

and Dhahran Civil Air Terminal, 164, 165

and Direct Forces Support, 119

Engineering Division, 155

and International Cooperation Agreement, 

119

and Karachi Civilian Airport, 153, 154

Karachi headquarters for, 119, 154

at Kharian, 102

and MAAG construction standards, 148

Management Branch, 155

overhead costs, 155–57

recruitment for, 108, 155

and Royal Saudi Air Force Training School, 

167

Saudi Arabia Area Office, 164

Saudi Arabian projects, 112, 160–67

staff of, 154–55, 157

See also individual projects.

Transportation Consultants Inc., 169

Trapanese, Giovanni (“John”), 236, 237, 625

Treviso, Italy, 137

Tripoli, Libya, 29, 72, 87, 89, 111, 272

AC&W stations near, 88

area office in, 237

road work at, 134, 136, 145

See also Wheelus Air Base.

Tripolis, Greece, 15

Troposcatter, 225–28, 238

Troxler, Col. Paul D., 34, 35, 37, 40, 626, 627

and budget issues, 41, 43

on district engineers, 42

on labor force, 36

establishes Middle East Division, 30

and Wheelus Air Base, 31, 33

Truman, Harry S., 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 17, 45, 521

Truman Doctrine, 5–6, 8, 12, 140

Tudor Engineering Company, 162

Tunisia, 9, 94

Turkey, 18, 19, 63, 86, 267, 269, 280, 621, 622

air base expansion, 45, 115

Air Force of, 17, 20, 21, 25, 27

Army of, 17, 21

as Baghdad Pact member, 96

and Cold War, 1, 4, 5, 8, 621

Coordinating Bureau no. 2, 21

construction companies, 141

and customs issues, 142

dependent community in, 233, 623

funding, 128

housing projects, 230, 231

inspections, 84

Ministry of Public Works, 20

in NATO, 86, 116, 346, 348

ports, 20

staffing of projects, 41

and Troposcatter, 226, 227

See also Joint Construction Agency; Joint 

American Military Mission for Aid to 

Turkey; The United States Air Force 

Group; The United States Army Group; 

The United States Engineer Group; The 

United States Navy Group.

Turki bin Abdulaziz, Prince, 395, 396

Turkish Scrap Company, 143

Turner International Industries/MAK, 552

TUSAFG. See The United States Air Force 

Group.

TUSAG. See The United States Army Group.

TUSEG. See The United States Engineer Group.

TUSNG. See The United States Navy Group.

U.S. Air Force headquarters, 39, 46, 57

U.S. Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC), 

380, 547, 588, 589

U.S. Air Force Materiel Command, 47, 57, 58

U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command (SAC), 

30, 45, 47, 55, 57–58, 60–61, 115, 131

U.S. Air Transport Command (ATC), 29, 30

U.S. Army. See U.S. Department of the Army.

U.S. Army Air Forces, 10, 29

U.S. Army Audit Agency, 42, 69, 221

U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command, 592

U.S. Army Construction Activity, Mideast, 349

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), 71, 

115, 228, 498, 516, 570, 578

civilian personnel, 37, 50, 55, 173, 174, 220, 

236, 301

charges against, 71, 75, 77

Cold Regions Research and Engineering 

Laboratory, 544 

and Cold War, 319

FMS cases, 315, 339

funding, 68
670 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE)—Continued

housing, 228, 229, 231

and MKSAC, 492

organization of, 610

personnel, 41, 42, 122, 128, 129, 174

project management used by, 610

reorganization, 354

and Voice of America, 595

Waterways Experiment Station, 544

See also individual districts, divisions, or 

projects; Office of the Chief of Engineers.

U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command 

(CIC), 497, 498, 609

U.S. Army Engineer Division, Middle East. See

Middle East Division. 

U.S. Army Hospital, Tehran, 174

U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC), 257, 

263, 315, 318, 333, 419, 521, 580

U.S. Army Military Training Requirements 

Survey, 556

U.S. Army Mission and Military Assistance 

Advisory Group to Iran (ARMISHMAAG), 107, 109, 171–73, 189, 198, 220

U.S. Army Office of the Surgeon General, 394

U.S. Army Ordnance Corps, 263, 285, 328

U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps, 10

U.S. Army Security Agency, 90, 136, 271

U.S. Army Security Assistance Command 

(USASAC), 552, 553, 580

U.S. Army Signal Corps, 90

U.S. Army Signal Training Team, 198

U.S. Army Strategic Communications 

Command, Europe, 272

U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command, 263

U.S. Army Transportation Corps, 35, 54, 257

U.S. Bureau of the Budget, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), 516, 549, 

550, 569, 573, 580, 617

U.S. Civil Service Commission, 353, 609

U.S. Coast Guard, 137, 227, 269, 273

U.S. Congress, 18, 225, 544, 605, 622

Africa Civic Action funding, 601

appropriations for Morocco construction, 46, 

66

investigations by, 71–75

VOA funding, 598–99

U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC), 

312

U.S. Department of the Army, 123, 372, 521

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), 96, 111, 

129, 232, 257, 526, 622

and CS-Squared, 491

and Direct Forces Support, 104, 177

and Foreign Military Sales, 340

and Jordan, 521

and Kuwait, 540

and LOAs, 339

costs of Moroccan projects, 66

See also Military Assistance Program.

U.S. Department of Justice, 609

U.S. Department of the Interior, 556

U.S. Department of the Navy, 399. See also U.S. 

Navy.

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 

Virginia, 608

U.S. European Command, 133

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 

Appropriations, 73

U.S. Information Agency, 574, 595, 596

U.S. Internal Revenue Service, 609

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 96, 97, 333, 521

U.S. Marine Corps, 417

U.S. Military Academy at West Point, 53, 208, 

337, 445

U.S. Mission for Aid to Greece, 10

U.S. National Safety Council, 215

U.S. Naval Academy, 415

U.S. Naval Air Facility (NAF), 139, 140

U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit (NAMRU), 

544

U.S. Naval Supply System Command, 540

U.S. Navy, 117, 118, 142, 143, 269, 541, 584

in Asmara, 272

and Bahrain, 161, 543

and DODDS, 607

Egypt, 550

and Gura installation, 239

in Kuwait, 539

and SNEP, 404, 409, 415

Spanish bases, 86

in Sudan, 553

U.S. Office of Military Cooperation, 553

U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 16

U.S. State Department, 10, 36, 96, 208, 252, 255, 

431, 599

and Afghanistan, 207, 213

and Africa Civic Action, 600

and Burma, 201

contract issues, 164

DLF funds administered by, 115–16

and DFS programs, 97, 104

embassy security programs, 571

aid to Iran, 172

and Jordan, 521

and Oman, 525

and Royal Saudi Air Force Training School, 

167
Index 671

Saudi request for engineering assistance, 256, 

258

See also International Cooperation 

Administration.

U.S. Treasury, 224

U.S.S. Elmer Montgomery, 409

Udorn, Thailand, 597

United Arab Emirates, 320, 525, 528, 532, 

569

United Arab Republic, 249

United Gulf Asphalt, 587

United Nations, 9, 29, 217, 525

and British trusteeship of Libya, 36, 39, 81

General Assembly, 88

imposes sanctions on Iraq, 616

United Republic of Somalia, 241

United States Air Force (USAF), 28, 118, 134, 

183, 269, 583, 589

AC&W stations in Libya, 33, 88

in Bahrain, 542

and Cigli Air Base, 235

DODDS, 607

in Egypt, 550

in Europe, 346

funding of projects, 40

housing units for, 228–29

inspections, 84

Iraklion facility, 140

in Iran, 198, 222

in Morocco, 47, 48, 50, 56, 58, 62, 66–67

in Oman, 525, 526

and Peace Hawk, 326, 380, 381

in Saudi Arabia, 37, 162

in Sudan projects, 593

in Turkey, 17, 22, 26, 27, 235

technical assistance teams, 588

and Troposcatter, 226

See also Nouasser; Wheelus Air Base.

United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), 

30, 46, 47, 58, 525, 526, 528

United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), 86, 

266, 346, 603, 605, 614

United States Employees Association (USEA), 

174

United States Forces Austria (USFA), 236, 237

United States Geological Survey (USGS), 556, 

557, 581

United States Military Training Mission 

(USMTM), 162, 249, 263, 281, 513, 580

and communications, 283

in Niger, 603

and Royal Saudi Air Force Training 

School, 166–67, 203, 205

and SAMP, 268, 307, 333

and Saudi construction projects, 256–58, 

259–60, 384, 385, 396

and Tabuk project, 303

University of Abadan, 198

University of Southern California, 262

University of Kansas, 290

USACE. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

USAF. See United States Air Force.

USAFE. See United States Air Forces in Europe.

USAREUR. See United States Army, Europe.

USAHOME, 224, 225, 228–33, 238

USEA. See United States Employees Association.

USFA. See United States Forces Austria.

USGS. See United States Geological Survey.

USMTM. See United States Military Training 

Mission.

Vandenberg, General Hoyt, 66

Vandenberg, Col. William E., 447, 470

Vanek, James F., 254, 263, 264, 292, 293

Verona, Italy, 136, 137, 139, 143

Vicenza, Italy, 136, 137, 139, 143

Vinnell Corporation, 142, 153, 154

VOA. See Voice of America.

Voelker, Wilhelm (“Willi”), 210, 353, 354, 

608–10, 625

Voice of America (VOA), 556, 561, 569, 574, 

582, 595–600. See also Support for Others 

agreement.

Volos, Greece, 10

Vrettos, John, 210

Waddell, Col. Edward L., Jr., 188, 285, 300, 

316–17, 322

Wadi Bishah North, 300, 374

Wadi Itwed, 375

Wadi Saidna Air Base, Sudan, 553, 593, 595

Wadsworth, George, 160–61, 162, 163

Wagman, Stuart, 86, 351

Walker, Col. John E., 258–61

Wallace, John, 615

Wallace O’Connor Inc., 588, 592

Walsh, Brig. Gen. Orville E., 72, 73, 79, 86

Warnecke, Ewing, Desmond, and Lord, 415

Washington Post, 412, 414

Waterways Experiment Station, 443

“Weapons Maintenance Agreements, The,” 308

Weimar and Trachte, 411

Wells, Brig. Gen. Richard M., 333, 352, 424, 425, 

436

and camel racetrack, 432, 434

and KKMC, 473, 474, 476

and Middle East Division organization, 355, 

356, 358, 359
672 Bricks, Sand, and Marble

Werner, A. O. (“Ollie”), 461, 463, 612, 617, 618

West Berlin, 6, 7

West Germany, 346, 516

West Pakistan, 96, 97, 122, 125

Western Punjab, 102, 149

Wheeler, Paul, 218, 279, 625

Wheeler, Ralph, 561, 562, 577

Wheeler, Lt. Gen. Raymond A., 161

Wheeler, Thurston B., 209, 210, 213

Wheelus Air Base, Libya, 29, 30, 91, 135, 237, 

238, 272

administrative issues, 38–43

construction, 33, 34–36, 81, 88, 273

contract for, 31

contractors and subcontractors at, 38, 88

funding for, 41, 81

labor force issues, 36

master plan for, 40

road work, 134, 136, 145

supplies for, 35, 87

and Troposcatter, 227

Wheelus, Lt. Richard, 29

Whitley, Col. James R. (“Bob”), 383, 443, 570

Whittaker Corporation, 366

Willbros Butler Engineers Inc., 589, 590

Wilbur, Lyman D., 70, 79

Wiles, Richard (“Dick”), 136, 226, 337, 344, 

421, 470, 561, 612, 625

William H. Muller Shipping Corporation, 524

William L. Crow Construction Company, 33

Williams, Col. C. Torrey, 336, 340, 345, 346, 

347–49, 353

and KAMA, 407, 447

and KKMC, 470, 471

recruiting efforts of, 341, 344

Williams Brothers, 189, 190–91

Williamson, Col. Rayburn L., 432, 433–34, 437

Wilson, Col. Daniel M., 477, 490–93, 512

Wilson, Brig. Gen. Walter K., Jr., 83–84, 85, 

86–87, 88, 94, 256

Wimpey Alawi L.L.C., 534

Winchester, Virginia, 570, 577, 589, 598, 613, 

615, 625

and contracting procedures, 526

MEAPO headquarters at, 567, 571–72, 576

Middle East Division relocates to, 564

Winkel, Maj. R. J., 430

Wintz, Col. Edward K., 439–40

Women, 441, 622, 623, 624

Wood, Ben, 404

World Military Expenditures and Arms 

Transfers, 569

Wray, Col. Stanley T., 46

Wright Contracting Company, 99, 109, 211

Yamasaki, Minoru, 166

Yanbu, Saudi Arabia, 315, 475

Yemen, 89, 250, 251, 252, 258, 281, 294, 295, 

311

Yom Kippur War, 320, 355, 394, 400, 446, 521

You One Construction Company, 369, 370, 373

Zabban, Zeno, 262, 351

Zagros Mountains, Iran, 105, 177–78

Zahedan, Iran, 192

Zarqa, Jordan, 524

Zeiler, George J., 402–03, 454

PIN : 085143–000