S UPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc
STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. ) HEARTLAND TITLE SERVICES, INC., ) f/k/a HEARTLAND TITLE COMPANY, INC., ) AND JAMES C. DAY, ) ) Relators, ) ) v. ) No. SC 95377 ) THE HONORABLE KEVIN D. HARRELL, ) ) Respondent. )
ORIGINA L PROCEEDING IN MANDAMUS
This actio n involves an original proceeding for a writ of prohibition or, alternatively, a writ of mandamus filed by Heartland Title Services, Inc. , and James C. Day (collectivel y, "Heartland") requesting this C ourt prohibit Respondent from dismissing one of Heartland's claims in the circuit court for lack of venue. This Court issued a preliminary writ. Because this Court holds that venue was proper in any county in Missouri, including Jackson County, the preliminary writ is made permanent. Factual Background In March 2015, Heartland filed a two

- count petition in the circuit court of Jackson County alleging professional malpractice claims against Paul P. Hasty, Jr. , and Hasty an d
Associates , LLC (collectively, "Hasty"). Count II of the petition alleges a claim of professional malpractice based on Hasty's provision of legal services in a case in which Opinion issued October 18, 20162 Heartland sought to become creditors in a former employee' s personal bankruptcy case filed in the United States Bankru ptcy Court for the District of Kansas. Hasty filed a
motion to dismiss C ount II for lack of venue , arguing that the tort injury alleged in Count
II occurred outside Missouri

. Hasty asserted the applicable venue stat ute , § 508.010 .5 , 1
limit ed venue to either the county in Missouri where a corporate defendant' s registered agent is located or the county in Missouri where an individual defendant's principal place
of residence i s located. Hasty further asserted that bec ause the individual defendant did
not have his princip al place of residence in Missouri and because the corporate defendant
did not have a registered agent in Missouri , no county in Missouri constitute s a proper

venue , including Jackson County

. The circui t court agreed and dismissed C ount II for
lack of venue

. 2 Heartland seeks relief in this Court. Analysis This Court has the authority to " issue and determine original remedial writ s. " Mo. Const. art. V, § 4.1. " It is well

- established that this Court ac cepts the use of an extraordinary writ to correct improper venue decisions of the circuit cou rt before trial and judgment. " State ex rel. Kan

. City S

. Ry. Co. v. Nixon , 282 S.W.3d 363, 365 (Mo. banc 2009)

. This Court has determined a writ of mandamus is the " appropriate remedy to

1 All statutory references are to RSMo NonCum. Supp. 2014, unless otherwise noted. 2 Hasty's motion to dismiss only raised the affirmative defense of lack of venue. When . . . the circuit court does not specify reason for dismissing a petition, an appellate court presumes that the circuit court's judg ment is based on t he reason stated in the motion to dismiss. Avery Contracting v. Niehaus , 492 S.W.3d 159, 162 (Mo. banc 2016).3 reinstate a petition erroneously dismissed for improper venue. " State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher , 816 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Mo. banc 1991)

. Heartland contends that venue is proper in Jackson County for Count II and that
the circ uit court e rred in its interpretation of § 508.010 .5

. Before addressing the text of § 508.010 .5 , a brief discussion of the distinction between jurisdiction and venue is in
order. Jurisdiction refers to " the powe r of a court to try a case[.] " Nixon , 28 2 S.W.3d at
365. J urisdiction " is based upon constitutional principles. " Id.
Missouri c ourts recognize two kinds of jurisdiction: subject matter and personal

. J.C.W

. ex rel. Webb v. Wy ciskalla , 275 S.W. 3d 249, 252 (Mo. b anc. 2009). Subject matter jurisd iction refers to a court's authority to render judgment in a particular category
of case s
. Id . at 253. The Missouri constitution provides circuit courts with subject matter jurisdiction over all civil and crimin al cases. Mo. Const. art. V, § 14. Person al jurisdiction, on the other hand, refers to the power of a court to require a p arty to respond to a legal proceeding affecting the p arty's rights or interests

. Id . at 2 53. The requirement
that a court ha ve personal jurisdiction flows mostly from the Du e Process Clause, either
in the Fifth or the Fourteenth a mendments to the United States Constitution

. Ins

. Corp. of
Ireland v . Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
While subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived, personal ju risdiction is an individual right to which a party can consent

. Id

. at 703. It is not alleged that the circuit4 court of Jackson County lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Count II , and the motion to dismiss does not allege lack of personal jurisdictio n over either defendant

. 3 Venue, on the other hand, assumes jurisdiction and only " relates to the locale

w here the trial is to be held. " Nixon , 282 S.W.3d at 365. Unlike jurisdiction, venue is not determined by constitutional principles but by the applic able rule or statute that

" determines, among many courts with jurisdiction, the ap propriate forum for the trial. "
Id.
In the event a party is injured outside Missouri by allegedly tortious conduct, § 508.010.5 provides , in relevant part : (1) If the defendant is a corporation, then venue shall be in any count y where a defendant corporation' s registered agent is located or, if the plaintiff' s principal place of residence was in the state of Missouri on the date the plaintiff was first injured, then venue may be in the county of the plaintiff' s principal place of residence on the date the plaintiff was first injured; (2) If the defendant is an individual, then venue shall be in any cou nty of the individual defendant' s principal place of residence in the state of Miss ouri or, if the plaintiff' s principal place of residence was in the state of Missouri on the date the plaintiff was first injured, then venue may be in the county containing the plaintiff ' s principal place of residence on the date the plaintiff was first i njured[.]
The parties agree , and the pleadings confirm , that § 508.010 .5 does not prescribe a particular venue for the facts alleged in Count II

. Heartland argues that , without an express provision in § 508.010 .5 prescribing a specific venue, venue is pr oper in any

3 At oral argument, counsel for Hasty conceded that Jackson County had personal jurisdiction over both defendants.5 Missouri county. Hasty argues the lack of an express provision in § 508.010 .5 prescribing a specific venue for these parties means that no county in Missouri is a proper
venue and , th erefore , C ount II was properly dismissed. 4
This is an issue of first impression for this Court. The court of appeals, however,
addressed a similar issue in State ex rel. Neville v. Grate , 443 S.W.3d 688 (Mo. App.
201 4). In Neville , a plaintiff filed an action in Jackson County for a tort claim related to an inju ry that occurred in Kansas

. Id. at 690

– 91

. The corporate defendant owned property and transacted business in Bates County, Missouri, and plaintiffs alleged that some of the tortious actions that caused the injury in Kansas occurred on defendant' s
Missour i property. Id. As in the present case, the individual defendant did not have his principal place of residence in Missouri and the corporate defendant had no registered agent in Missouri. Id. a t 691. The d efendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of venue or, in the alternative, to transfer the case from J ackson County to Bates County.
Id. The circuit court transfe rred the case to Bates County. Id. T he court of appeals held that venue was p roper in Jackson County. Id. at 695. The court explaine d that the language of § 508.010.5 " does not reflect an intent to deny Missouri venue in all situations not provided for by the statute " and without an express prescription of a particular venue, venue was " proper in any Missou ri county, including Jackson. " Id. at 693, 695.

4 Each c ount must pa ss venue muster. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Jinkerson v. Koehr , 826 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Mo. banc 1992)

.6 Hasty argue s that Neville is distinguishable because it is " limited to its facts, which involved negligent conduct in Missouri ; " " [t]herefore, in the absence of any nexus to Missouri, the rule in

. . . Neville has no application " to th is case. Hasty' s argument, in essence, is that § 508.010 .5 requires a " nexus " to Missouri that would be akin to a minimum contacts requirement for personal jurisdiction

. This argument confuse s the requirements for venue with the requirements of jurisdict ion. See, e.g. , Andra v. Left Gate Prop. Holding , 453 S.W.3d 2 16, 225 (Mo. banc 2015) ; Nixon , 282 S.W.3d at 365

. As explained by the court in Neville , such a construction of § 508.010.5(1) and (2)
is not in accord with the purpose of the venue statutes , w hich is to " provide a convenient, logical and orderly forum for the resolution of disputes, not to limit or control the types of parties and actions that can a ppear before Missouri courts. " 443 S.W.3d at 693 (internal citation omitted) ; s ee also State ex rel. McDonald' s Corp. v. Midkiff , 226
S .W.3d 119, 123 (Mo. banc 2007). Moreover, this Court has held that whe n venue is improper, the circuit court has a " ministerial duty " to transfer the case to a county where venue is proper. See Nixon , 282 S.W.3d at 365 ; § 476.410, RSMo 2000

. Th e requirement to transfer a case to the proper venue when it is filed in an improper venue supports the interpretation that § 508.010.5 is not intended to bar litigation whe n a circuit
court in Missouri has jurisdiction. 5 To interpret § 508.010' s silence as barring venue in any Missouri county in which the circuit court 's jurisdiction is not contested would lead

5 Similarly , the fed eral analog for venue provides, in relevant part, that " if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, [a civil action may be brought in] any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. " 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3) (emphasis added).7 to the absurd result of precluding a forum to a party in which a Missouri court has subject

matter jurisdiction of t he case and personal jurisdiction over the defendant

. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan , 398 S.W.3d 472, 479 (Mo. banc 2013); 801 Skinker
B oule v ard Corp. v. Dir

. of Revenue , 395 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. banc 2013). Hasty argues that interpr eting § 508.010 .5 to allow venue in any Missouri county where the circuit court has jurisdicti on will encourage forum shopping , which could
inundate the circuit courts , particularly those located in larger metropolitan areas, with
cases from outside Missouri

. First, t hi s argument neglects the reality that both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction are prerequisite s to proceeding in Missouri courts. Second, this argument neglects that the General Assembly requires both limited liability companies and corp orations, whether foreign or domestic, to register an agent in Missouri if conducting business in the state, see § 347.030.1(2) (Missouri limited liability companies); § 347.0153 (foreign limited liability companies); § 351.370.1(2) (Missouri corporations) ; § 351.586(2) (foreign corporations), and provides venue for those entities

. S ee § 347.069.2 (Missouri limited liability companies); § 347.167 (foreign limited liability companies); § 508.010 (Missouri and foreign corporations). It is unreasonable to
in terpret the venue statute in a manner that would encourage limited liability companies and corporations to not follow the law and appoint a registered agen t

. Third, the General Assembly is presumed to know this Court has not abolished the doctrine of inte rstate 6 forum non conveniens, State ex rel. Howard Elec. Co

- op. v. Riney , 490 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Mo.

6 Missouri does not recogni ze intrastate forum non conveniens, which would permit a circuit court to transfer venue from one proper county under the venue statute to another proper county under the venue statute. State ex rel. Sharp v. Romines , 984 S.W.2d 500, 500 (Mo. banc 1999).8 1973) (noting that the General Assembly is presumed to know the law, including this Court's prior decisions, in enacting statutes), which would permit a circuit court to
dismiss the rare case in which jurisdicti on and venue are present but defending in the
forum would be such a hardship on the defendant that it warrants dismissal and refiling
the case in another jurisdi ction. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Wyeth v. Gra dy , 262 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Mo. banc 2008) ; State ex rel. K

- Mart Corp. v. Holliger , 986 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo.
banc 1999)

. Conclusion In conclusion, if personal and subject matter jurisdiction are established, venue is proper in any county in Missouri in the absence of an express provision by the General Assembly restricting venue
. 7 The preliminary writ of mandamus is made permanent.

___________________________ Zel M. Fischer , Judge
All concur.

7 Because venue was proper in Jackson County, this Court need not reach Heartland' s constitutional challenge to § 508.010.5. See, e.g. , Lang v. Goldsworthy , 470 S.W.3d 748, 751 (Mo. banc 2015).