U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

41–189 PDF 2008

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY LAW 

ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, 

AND HOMELAND SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 11, 2008 

Serial No. 110–135 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

PERRY APELBAUM, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia, Chairman 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

BOBBY VASSAR, Chief Counsel 

CAROLINE LYNCH, Minority Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

MARCH 11, 2008 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENT 

The Honorable Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 

and Homeland Security ....................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Louie Gohmert, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 

Homeland Security ............................................................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Dana A. Brown, Director, Federal Air Marshall Service, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland 

Security, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 5 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 13 

Mr. Jeffrey D. Self, Chief, Southwest Border Division, Office of Border Patrol, 

Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 6 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 13 

Mr. Raymond R. Parmer, Deputy Director for Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 8 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 13 

Mr. Michael Stenger, Assistant Director, Office of Investigations, United 

States Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 10 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 13 

Rear Admiral Wayne Justice, Assistant Commandant for Capability and Director of Response Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland 

Security, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 11 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 13 

APPENDIX 

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 39 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY LAW 

ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 

TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in 

room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Robert 

C. (Bobby) Scott (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Scott, Delahunt, Nadler, Jackson Lee, 

Gohmert, Sensenbrenner, Coble, and Chabot. 

Staff present: Bobby Vassar, Subcommittee Chief Counsel; Mario 

Dispenza (Fellow), ATF Detailee; Ameer Gopalani, Majority Counsel; Veronica Eligan, Majority Professional Staff Member; Kimani 

Little, Minority Counsel; and Kelsey Whitlock, Minority Staff Assistant. 

Mr. SCOTT. The Committee will come to order. I am pleased to 

welcome you today for the hearing before the Subcommittee on 

Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security on the Department of 

Homeland Security law enforcement operations. 

In 2002 the Department of Homeland Security was created in the 

wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001. The concept was to 

transform and realign multiple agencies of various functions into 

one department, to streamline intelligence and law enforcement, 

and better protect the United States from terrorist attacks. 

One of the shortcomings that we had was we were trying to get 

all the agencies together, because the FBI wasn’t talking to the Department of Defense who wasn’t talking to the CIA. And when the 

dust settled, we looked up and we had a new department and none 

of those agencies were in the Department of Homeland Security. So 

instead of three people not talking to each other—— 

Anyway, the concept is the concept, but as part of the creation 

of the department, the following law enforcement agencies were either transferred to DHS or created by consolidation: the Transportation Security Administration, Customs and Border Protection, 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secret Service, and the 

Coast Guard. These agencies, their functions, their accomplishments, and their challenges are the subject of this hearing. 

The TSA’s main law enforcement functions are the Federal Air 

Marshals and the National Explosives Detection Canine Team programs. Air marshals are deployed on flights around the world and 

2 

the United States to ensure the security of the plane and the passengers during flight. During this hearing, the Subcommittee will 

follow up on issues from the 2005 hearing and inquire about the 

effectiveness of air travel security. 

The TSA’s National Explosives Detection Canine Team program 

prepares dogs and analysts to locate and identify dangerous materials that may present a threat to transportation systems. Explosives detections canines can be a valuable tool in foiling terrorists’ 

plots, which is why a number of agencies outside the DHS conduct 

explosive detections services with canines. 

However, the training standards and methods differ among agencies, which has caused controversy among the experts in the field. 

The Subcommittee will inquire about whether multiple efforts 

among agencies using different methods and standards are the 

most effective use of Federal resources, or whether a national 

standard should be established by one agency. 

The United States Customs and Border Protection is responsible 

for protecting our Nation’s borders from terrorism, human and 

drug smuggling, and illegal immigration, while simultaneously facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade. This agency must 

work a fine line of balancing the urgency of securing the borders 

while being the least intrusive on commerce and the liberty rights 

of Americans as possible. 

Some privacy and civil rights groups have voiced concerns about 

the techniques that might violate the first amendment. They have 

demanded that CBP disclose its policies when questioning travelers 

on first amendment protected activities, photocopying individuals’ 

personal papers, searching laptop computers and other electronic 

devices, and we may discuss these policies today. 

The Committee will also inquire about the Operation Streamline 

initiative, which targets for prosecution those who enter the United 

States through high-traffic areas near the United States’ southwest 

border in violation of criminal law. Concerns have been raised 

about Operation Streamline being too aggressive, and allegations 

that have been raised by some U.S. citizens about being improperly 

subject to deportation. 

The Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE, is the largest investigative branch of DHS and focuses on targeting unauthorized aliens, people, money, and materials that support terrorism 

and other criminal activities in meeting its mission objectives. 

Today the Subcommittee will explore issues related to ICE policies 

and practices related to investigation and detention and removal of 

unauthorized aliens. 

In 2007, the Government Accountability Office report about ICE 

practices identified problem areas, recommended that ICE update 

its policies for alien apprehension and removal, streamline and improve its dissemination of legal updates, and develop a system of 

determining comprehensive best practices to uniform supervisory 

reviews of officer discretion. The Subcommittee will inquire about 

how ICE is responding to the GAO’s recommendations. 

In addition to its protection responsibilities, the United States 

Secret Service also investigates financial crime violations. The Subcommittee will want to know about the investigation of financial 

3 

crimes, which pose a tremendous threat to our national security 

and the personal finances of all Americans. 

According to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, more than 150 

million records containing sensitive information—personal information—have been involved in data security breaches since 2005. 

Since November 2005, there have been at least 436 data security 

breaches in the United States affecting millions of American consumers. The Subcommittee will inquire as to how the Secret Service is responding to combat these threats. 

The United States Coast Guard law enforcement mission is maritime security, which is to protect America’s maritime borders from 

all intrusions hosting the flow of illegal drugs, aliens, and contraband into the United States through maritime routes, preventing 

illegal fishing, and suppressing violations of Federal law in maritime areas. The Subcommittee will inquire the Coast Guard’s success in these areas, and will also explore the Coast Guard’s plan 

for updating its technology. For example, the Coast Guard is developing an important homeland security program called the Automatic Identification System, which will enable the Coast Guard to 

employ a nationwide system for identifying, tracking, and communicating with vessels in U.S. harbors. 

With that said, it is my pleasure to recognize the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas—from the 1st 

Congressional District of Texas—former judge Louie Gohmert. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Chairman Scott. I couldn’t tell, are 

these microphones working? 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, I believe it is. 

Mr. GOHMERT. You would be better off, probably, if mine wasn’t. 

But I appreciate Chairman Scott’s comments. 

I wasn’t in Congress when Homeland Security was created; as I 

recall it was a fairly bipartisan effort, because the 9/11 Commission 

recommended it. But in my layman state of ignorance, I sure didn’t 

think it was a good idea to add another level of bureaucracy. Gee, 

if they are not communicating, let us add another level of bureaucracy that everybody will have to communicate through. And it 

seems that when I had that opinion in my state of ignorance, that 

maybe I wasn’t as ignorant as one might have thought. 

But I want to thank you for scheduling this hearing. This is the 

first hearing the Subcommittee will have on law enforcement agencies in the Department of Homeland Security. This represents an 

opportunity to learn more about the vast law enforcement mission 

given to DHS. 

Last week our full Committee held an oversight hearing on the 

entire department. At that hearing, Secretary Chertoff focused his 

comments on answering questions on immigration issues. Today we 

look forward to hearing from the representatives of the five law enforcement agencies. 

We want to hear about your missions, your capabilities, and 

what challenges you expect to face in the near future. That also 

will tell us what we need to do to help you. 

The Department of Homeland Security has wide Federal law enforcement authority to achieve its mission to secure the homeland. 

That law enforcement authority is divided among five agencies—of 

course, you know this well: the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Secret 

4 

Service, the Federal Air Marshal Service, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 

The United States Coast Guard patrols international waters and 

America’s coasts and waterways. With over 43,000 employees, 

Coast Guard Service is the lead Federal agency to combat maritime 

illegal immigration and for maritime drug interdiction. Each year, 

Coast Guard drug interdiction accounts for nearly 52 percent of all 

U.S. government seizures of cocaine. 

U.S. Secret Service is best known for its mission to protect the 

President and other national and foreign leaders; however, the 

Service combats the counterfeiting of U.S. currency, and guards 

against cyber-attacks on our financial and telecommunications infrastructure. In 2007, the Service seized an estimated $147 million 

in counterfeit dollars. 

Federal Air Marshal Service is the primary law enforcement 

agency within the Transportation Security Administration. Each 

year the Air Marshals deploy on thousands of flights, domestically 

and internationally, to protect passengers and crew from criminal 

and terrorist attacks in the air. 

United States Custom and Border Protection is responsible for 

securing the U.S. borders and ports, works to prevent terrorists 

and terrorist weapons from entering the U.S., and combats drug 

trafficking and human smuggling along the border. In 2007, CBP 

seized more than 87,000 pounds of cocaine, and more than 307,000 

pounds of marijuana in its law enforcement operations. 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is the largest investigative arm of DHS. With the second-largest cadre of special 

agents in the U.S., ICE targets the people, money, and materials 

that support terrorists and criminals. Since 2003, ICE has seized 

more than $600 million in cash and monetary instruments, and 

more than $850 million worth of real property, vessels, aircrafts, 

artwork, vehicles, and jewels. 

DHS has had an impact in law enforcement, but there is still 

more to do, of course. I look forward to working with Chairman 

Scott on ensuring effective oversight of DHS law enforcement agencies—and that is why I am pleased you called this hearing—and 

look forward to this hearing and learning more about the problems 

you face, the challenges you have ahead, and how we can work together to solve them. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

I will ask other Members to have their statements in the record. 

If there is no objection, we will continue by introducing our panelists. 

Our first witness will be Mr. Dana Brown, assistant administrator for law enforcement for the TSA, and director of the Air 

Marshal Service. He served with the U.S. Secret Service for 25 

years, and is retired as assistant director for the Office of Administration before bringing his expertise and experience to the Federal 

Air Marshal Service in 2003. He has a bachelor’s degree from the 

College of William and Mary in Virginia. 

Our next witness will be Mr. Jeffrey Self, Southwest Border Division chief, Office of Border Patrol. He is a 19-year veteran of the 

Border Patrol, having served in numerous patrol areas in leaderVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:49 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\031108\41189.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41189
5 

ship positions. As Southwest Border Division chief, he is responsible for the activities of nine Southwest Border sectors and over 

11,000 Border Patrol agents. 

Our next witness will be Raymond Parmer, deputy director of the 

Office of Investigations to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. As deputy director, Mr. Parmer oversees the largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for the policy planning, management, and operations conducted under the five major investigative program divisions within 

the Office of Investigations. He has a Bachelor of Arts degree in 

criminal justice administration from the University of South Alabama, and a Master of Science degree in criminal justice management from the University of Southern Mississippi. 

Our next witness is Michael Stenger, the assistant director, Office of Investigations, United States Secret Service. He is a 31-year 

veteran of the Secret Service, and has served in numerous protective, investigative, and staff assignments. For his current assignment, he serves as the senior official overseeing the agency’s investigations. In this capacity, he develops and implements policies as 

it pertains to the cyber and fraud related crimes that the agency 

investigates. He has a Bachelor of Arts degree from Fairleigh Dickinson University in New Jersey. 

Our final witness is Rear Admiral Wayne Justice, who serves 

currently as the assistant commandant for Capability, and as the 

director of Response Policy for the United States Coast Guard. As 

the assistant commandant for Capability, he is responsible for the 

allocation, distribution, management, and recapitalization of all 

Coast Guard operation forces. As the director of Response Policy, 

he is responsible for the development of doctrine and policy guidance for all Coast Guard forces to accomplish operational maritime 

missions in the areas of search and rescue, law enforcement, defense operations, and incident management. He is a 30-year veteran of the Coast Guard, and has a Bachelor of Science in management from the Coast Guard Academy, 1977, a master’s in human 

resource management with honors from Nova University, and a 

master’s in strategic studies from the Naval War College—College 

of Naval Warfare—in 1996. 

Each of our witnesses’ written statements will be entered in the 

record in its entirety, and I ask each witness to summarize his testimony in 5 minutes or less. And to help you stay within that time, 

there is a lighted device in front of us, which will switch from 

green to yellow when you have 1 minute left, and we would ask 

you to conclude your testimony—finish your thought—but conclude 

your testimony when 5 minutes have expired. 

We will begin with Mr. Brown. 

TESTIMONY OF DANA A. BROWN, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL AIR 

MARSHALL SERVICE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BROWN. Good morning, Chairman Scott, Representative 

Gohmert, distinguished Members of the Committee. I am privileged 

to appear before you today to discuss the authority of the Federal 

6 

Air Marshal Service and the Transportation Security Administration of the Department of Homeland Security. 

September the 11, 2001, forever transformed our Nation. In one 

moment we came face to face with a known enemy on American 

soil, on a chance condition threatening to our way of life. However, 

on that day something far greater than fear, something much 

stronger than despair took root: an unshakeable faith in our fellow 

citizens and our ideals in our Nation, and an unwavering determination to protect and preserve what we stand for as a country 

on virtue of the destruction, to guide our efforts in the fight against 

terrorism and the quest to preserve liberty; and I have my place 

of work at the Federal Air Marshal Service due to that set of beliefs. 

Over the past 4 years, Air Marshal capability has expanded and 

contracted in reaction to hijack activity. Until 9/11, the Air Marshals consisted of less than 50 personnel who operated under the 

direction of the Federal Aviation Administration and flew mainly 

international missions. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Department of 

Homeland Security was envisioned, formed, and is now in operation—Federal Air Marshal Service has been a challenging and rewarding undertaking. 

While we have come a long way since then, we still have some 

distance to go. I was fortunate to be named as the director of the 

Federal Air Marshal Service a little over 2 years ago. Since that 

time, one of my goals has been to build on the accomplishments of 

the former director who did an outstanding job in creating a fullfledged law enforcement organization consisting of thousands of 

personnel in less than 1 year—is complete and the old condition 

stabilizes, my goal to building success—blueprint for the future. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. Self? 

TESTIMONY OF JEFFREY D. SELF, CHIEF, SOUTHWEST BORDER DIVISION, OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chief SELF. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, and distinguished Subcommittee Members, it is an honor to have the opportunity to appear before you today. My testimony this morning 

focuses on law enforcement operations of CBP as well as partnership with other Federal agencies to guard our Nation’s borders 

against terrorists and their instruments of terror. 

Established in 2003, CBP is a consolidated agency brought together to protect America’s front line from terrorism while facilitating legitimate trade and travel along our Nation’s border. The 

agency unites in inspectional work forces and broad border authorities of the U.S. customs, Key West immigration, animal and plant 

health and inspections services and the entire U.S. Border Patrol. 

The agency manages 326 ports of entry and 144 border patrol 

stations within 20 sectors to secure almost 6,000 miles of border 

with Canada and Mexico, and 95,000 miles of shoreline. On a typical day in fiscal year 2007, the law enforcement jurisdiction of the 

agency executed 70 arrests of criminals at ports of entry, 2,400 illegal aliens between the ports, intercepted 84 fraudulent documents 

7 

and seized over 7,300 pounds of narcotics at and between ports of 

entry. 

CBP has authority to enforce Federal criminal law, codified in 

title 18 and elsewhere in the U.S. Code. CBP works in coordination 

with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Coast 

Guard, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and other 

Federal agencies to enforce Federal criminal law at the border. 

CBP officers and border patrol agents may arrest without a warrant for any Federal offense, including violations of title 18 and 

title 19, if the offense is committed in the officer or agent’s presence. The officer and agent may also arrest without a warrant for 

any Federal felony that occurs outside the officer or agent’s presence if the officer or agent has reasonable grounds to believe the 

person committed the felony. 

Common immigration-specific violations of title 18 at the border 

include false claim to U.S. citizenship, fraud involving identity documents reproduction and fraud involving citizenship documents 

forgery or false use of a passport and false statements to a Federal 

officer. Other common violations of title 18 that lead to arrest by 

CBP are: for an assault on a Federal officer, and—possession of a 

firearm. 

CBP has primary responsibility for enforcing the immigration 

laws of title 8 and the custom laws of title 19 at the border. The 

Immigration and Nationality Act within title 8 has its own criminal 

provisions. In addition, violations of title 8 may also form the basis 

of a title 18 prosecution. Common prosecution based on violations 

of the INA discovered by CBP at the border are: alien smuggling, 

illegal entry into the U.S., and illegal reentry into the U.S. 

Many prosecutions result from the identification of arrested subjects through the IAPS system. The IAPS system resulted in over 

144,000 hits this past fiscal year for crimes ranging from homicide, 

sexual assault, robbery, dangerous drugs, and other misdemeanor 

crimes. 

In order to ensure these laws, CBP—in order to enforce these 

laws, CBP utilizes partnership with other Federal agencies. A key 

example of these partnerships are Integrated Border Enforcement 

Teams and Operation Uniforce. 

From January 13, 2008 to January 26, 2008 border patrol agents 

from the New Orleans sector conducted Operation Uniforce to 

interdict alien and narcotic smugglers. These multi-agency operations were conducted utilizing traffic observation units on Interstate 20, operating between the Mississippi River and the city of 

Jackson, Mississippi. 

Forty border patrol agents and two canine handlers from the 

New Orleans Sector conducted operations with the Office of Field 

Operations Special Response Team members, agents from the ICE 

Detention and Removal Office, CBP Air and Marine, the Mississippi Highway Patrol, the Rankin, Madison, and Hines County 

Sheriff’s Departments, along with the Pearl and Clinton Police Department. 

The intelligence data that was gathered during Operation 

Uniforce provided valuable insight into identifying the criminal organizations that use the I-20 corridor for human and narcotic trafVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:49 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\031108\41189.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41189
8 

ficking. Through law enforcement operations and partnerships with 

other local, State, and Federal foreign and international agencies, 

CBP front line officers and agents will continue to protect America 

from the terrorist threat while also accomplishing our traditional 

missions in immigration, customs, and agriculture. 

I would like to thank the Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to present this testimony today and 

for your continued support of DHS and CBP. We will be happy to 

respond to any questions that you may have. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Self. 

Mr. Parmer? 

TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND R. PARMER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

FOR INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. PARMER. Good morning, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member 

Gohmert, and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is my 

privilege to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement’s criminal law enforcement responsibilities. 

ICE has broad responsibilities and we are leveraging them by 

aligning our authorities with the risks that face the Nation today. 

In this regard, ICE enacted a multi-year strategy of improving immigration enforcement through efficient management, focused enforcement efforts to target the most dangerous illegal aliens, and 

worksite enforcement initiatives that target employers who defy 

immigration law, thus reducing the pull of jobs magnets that draw 

illegal workers across the border in search of employment. 

At the same time, ICE stepped up the battle against financial 

crime and the exploitation of legitimate financial networks by 

criminal organizations using methods to earn, move, and store illicit funding needed to support their criminal enterprises. Our riskbased approach extends from interior immigration enforcement, in 

which we are prioritizing criminal aliens and fugitives, to the application of our customs fraud authorities to prevent the importation 

of tainted commodities and counterfeit pharmaceuticals. 

This approach shapes our methods to target drug and other contraband smuggling with financial authorities and international 

partnerships, and it means we continue to thwart the illegal export 

of weapons and sensitive technology. 

To target some of the most dangerous criminals and sophisticated criminal organizations, ICE has developed robust initiatives 

to enforce our immigration laws in the interior, including programs 

that specifically target child predators and gang members, ensure 

compliance on the part of those who visit the U.S. for school or simply to tour, target alien absconders, who are fugitives who have 

failed to comply with a lawful judicial order to leave the country, 

and dismantle the infrastructure that supports illicit immigration 

such as illegal employment and the fraudulent document trade. 

We are also working particularly close with State and local law 

enforcement partners. Recognizing that there are more than 

775,000 State and local law enforcement officers in the country, 

ICE is leveraging our authorities to develop partnerships under the 

9 

ICE ACCESS program, including cross-designation programs such 

as 287(g) and customs title 9 authority. 

While the immigration authorities—I am sorry, while the Immigration Enforcement initiatives I have described most often relate 

to people wanting to come into our country, another key risk we 

guard against is efforts to take sensitive technology and arms out. 

In fiscal year 2007, arms and strategic technology investigations resulted in 188 arrests, 178 indictments, and 127 convictions for export-related violations—more than any other U.S. Federal law enforcement agency. 

Other dangers are less obvious. Traditional customs fraud, in 

many cases, constitutes serious and unrecognized public health 

risks. Take, for example, Operation Guardian, an ongoing ICE-led 

operation with CBP, the FDA, and Consumer Product Safety Commission, to investigate imports of substandard, tainted, and dangerous products from China. 

The operation to date has resulted in the seizure of more than 

59,000 tubes of diethylene glycol and bacteria-laden toothpaste 

bound for U.S. markets and the initiation of joint U.S.-People’s Republic of China investigations. Diethylene glycol, by the way, is a 

toxic chemical used to make antifreeze. And this is one of many 

similar cases involving tainted goods which would otherwise be on 

store shelves just waiting for purchase by American families. 

As I mentioned, the risk-based approach also shapes our methods 

to target drug and other contraband smuggling. With only 25 percent of our special agents authorized to conduct drug smuggling investigations, ICE conducted investigations resulting in the seizure 

of 232,000 pounds of cocaine, 1.3 million pounds of marijuana, as 

well as 5,900 narcotics-related convictions. 

Using our financial tools and international partnerships, we are 

pushing out beyond our borders. Our Trade Transparency Units 

represent unique relationships with foreign nations that allow us 

to share import and export data to identify trade anomalies that 

suggest money laundering. Our agents, thanks to these partnerships, are effectively identifying schemes designed to hide the illicit 

proceeds from the drug trade and sale of dangerous consumer 

goods, foreign tax fraud, and other transnational criminal activity. 

This kind of approach—focusing on risk and going after the 

money—yields real results. Since 2003, ICE has seized more than 

$600 million in cash and monetary instruments, and more than 

$580 million worth of real property, vessels, aircraft, artwork, vehicles, and jewels. 

ICE’s Federal Protective Service, responsible for policing, securing, and ensuring a safe environment in which Federal agencies 

can conduct their business, seized more than 760,000 prohibited 

items last year. They investigated hundreds of threats posed 

against the more than 8,800 Federal facilities and millions of visitors to Federal buildings nationwide. 

Our work can be dangerous and difficult, but we tackle our responsibilities each day with pride and professionalism. I appreciate 

the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of ICE, and 

look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Stenger? 

10 

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL STENGER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, 

OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Mr. STENGER. Yes. Good morning, Chairman Scott, Ranking 

Member Gohmert, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today on the investigative responsibilities of the Secret Service. 

While the Service is perhaps best known for our protective responsibilities, we have a dual mission. 

The Secret Service was established in 1865 to suppress the 

rampant counterfeiting of U.S. currency. Throughout our 142-year 

history, the Service has evolved and adapted to thwart attempts by 

both individuals and criminal organizations to exploit the Nation’s 

financial infrastructure. 

Today we investigate criminal violations relating to the counterfeiting of obligations and securities of the United States; financial 

crimes such as access device fraud, financial institution fraud, identity theft, and computer-based attacks on the Nation’s financial 

payment systems and critical infrastructure. 

To accomplish our mission, we have 139 domestic offices and 21 

foreign offices located in 16 countries. We work closely with our 

Federal, State, and local law enforcement partners as well as other 

U.S. government agencies and foreign counterparts to maximize 

our efforts. 

The Secret Service is proud of its role and success in protecting 

U.S. currency. Last year, more than 2,200 suspects were arrested 

for counterfeiting offenses, and over $147 million in counterfeit currency was seized. The agency continues to adapt to the trends in 

counterfeiting, which have been influenced in recent years by computer-based technologies. 

Widespread use of personal computers and advancements in digital printing technologies have provided more individuals the opportunity to manufacture counterfeit money. Approximately 58 percent of the counterfeit currency passed domestically in 2007 was 

produced using digital printing. 

In our role of safeguarding the Nation’s critical financial infrastructure, we have a long history of protecting American consumers 

and the financial industry from fraud. With the passage of legislation in 1984, we were provided authority for the investigation of access device fraud and concurrent authority with other law enforcement agencies in identity theft crimes. 

In recent years, the combination of the information revolution 

and the effects of globalization have caused the investigative mission of the Secret Service to evolve. Through our work in the areas 

of financial and electronic crime, we have developed particular expertise in the investigation of financial crimes, cyber crimes and 

computer intrusions. 

In fiscal year 2007, agents arrested over 4,300 suspects for finan- cial crimes, who were responsible for over $690 million in actual 

fraud loss. The most recent trend is the use of computers and the 

Internet to launch cyber attacks targeting citizens and financial institutions. Cyber criminals have become adept at stealing victims’ 

personal information through the use of phishing emails, account 

11 

takeovers, malicious software, hacking attacks, and network intrusions resulting in data breaches. 

This stolen information is often sold in bulk quantities through 

illicit Internet Websites known as carding portals. We have established a national network of 29 financial crimes task forces and 24 

electronic crimes task forces in cities throughout the United States. 

These task forces leverage the combined resources of law enforcement as well as technical experts from academia and the private 

industry. 

Further, the Secret Service will have a key role in the implementation of the Administration’s cyber-security activities, as outlined 

in the recent presidential directive addressing cyber-security policy. 

As I have highlighted in my statement, the Secret Service has 

adapted to the constantly evolving criminal environment. We continue to aggressively investigate all offenses within our purview, 

and are committed to our mission of protecting the integrity of U.S. 

currency and safeguarding the Nation’s critical financial infrastructure and financial payment systems. 

This concludes my prepared statement. Thank you again for the 

opportunity to testify on behalf of the Secret Service. I am pleased 

to answer any questions. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much. 

Admiral Justice? 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WAYNE JUSTICE, ASSISTANT 

COMMANDANT FOR CAPABILITY AND DIRECTOR OF RESPONSE POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Admiral JUSTICE. Good morning, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. It 

is a privilege for me to testify before you today about the maritime 

law enforcement mission of the United States Coast Guard. I feel 

passionately about this mission, having spent nearly 30 years deeply involved in it. 

While the written testimony covers the full spectrum of Coast 

Guard’s global law enforcement activities, for my oral testimony 

today I would like to share with you some highlights of how drug 

and alien smugglers continuously adapt their technologies and tactics, and then ask your help in adapting our criminal law to better 

counter two of the most dangerous activities facing maritime law 

enforcement officers in our Nation: self-propelled semi-submersible 

smuggling vessels and maritime alien smuggling. 

The influx of illegal drugs remains one of America’s greatest 

maritime security threats. One of the emerging and most significant threats we face in transit zones today are manned and unmanned self-propelled semi-submersible, SPSS, vessels that transport multi-ton loads of cocaine and other illicit cargo bound for the 

United States. 

SPSS vessels are watercraft of unorthodox construction, capable 

of putting much of their bulk under the surface of the water, making them difficult to detect. You can see images of recently interdicted SPSS vessels on the posters here, and we have provided the 

Committee staff compelling video from a case just 2 weeks ago that 

I urge you to watch. 

12 

SPSSs typically carry up to five crew and four to six tons of illegal cargo at speeds up to eight knots. SPSS vessels encountered by 

the Coast Guard are stateless vessels built in the jungles of South 

America with no legitimate use. Their crews typically abandon and 

sink the vessels and contraband when detected by law enforcement 

in order to evade U.S. prosecution for drug trafficking. 

Although U.S. interdiction forces nearly always capture imagery 

of detected SPSS and the crews abandoning them before they sink, 

attempting to access and recover contraband before a SPSS scuttles 

is very dangerous and almost impossible. The SPSS vessel is an attempt to avoid both detection and consequences—if territorial operation of and embarkation in stateless SPSS vessels was a criminal 

offense in title 18 of the United States Code, then U.S. interdiction 

forces and U.S. attorneys would have the necessary tools to combat 

the SPSS threat even in the absence of recovered drugs or other 

contraband. The Coast Guard has closely coordinated with the Department of Justice to draft an amendment to title 18 to address 

this concern. 

We have briefed Committee staff on this amendment, which is 

attached to my written statement, and urge Committee action on, 

and House passage of, the amendment as soon as possible. The 

Coast Guard projects the possibility of 85 SPSS events, carrying 

possibly 340 metric tons of cocaine, during fiscal year 2008. We 

need your help now to counter this dangerous emerging threat. 

As the lead Federal agency in maritime law enforcement, the 

Coast Guard is also responsible for enforcing immigration laws at 

sea. Thousands of people try to enter our country illegally every 

year using maritime routes in dangerously overloaded, 

unseaworthy, or otherwise unsafe vessels. This is why the Coast 

Guard migrant-interdiction operations are as much humanitarian 

efforts as they are law-enforcement missions. 

Although Coast Guard has interdicted migrants of various nationalities through the Western Hemisphere, the primary illegal 

immigration threat comes from Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. In the Mona Pass between Puerto Rico and the Dominican 

Republic, deployment of mobile biometrics capability on 110-foot 

patrol boats and robust interagency support have contributed significantly to a reduction in the flow of illegal migration by nearly 

50 percent. 

The referral of 120 cases of criminal aliens identified at sea 

through mobile biometrics, including 33 aggravated felons, 77 

aliens illegally attempting reentry after deportation, seems to have 

stemmed the flow in what was the single largest migrant smuggling vector before biometrics-based prosecutions. This project 

would not have been possible without the full partnership of USVISIT, CBP, ICE, Border Patrol, plus the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 

San Juan, Department of State, and the Dominican Navy. 

Like drug traffickers, migrant smugglers profit by adapting their 

tactics and acquired technical innovations—particularly high-speed 

multi-engine go-fast vessels. The enterprise brings thousands of 

undocumented aliens to the United States for the price of up to 

$10,000 a head. Despite a 35 percent increase in the number of cutter and resource hours targeted against migration in the Florida 

Straits, migration continues to increase in that vector. The effecVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:49 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\031108\41189.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41189
13 

tiveness of any interdiction model is dependant on our ability to deliver consequences to smugglers through prosecution and other action. 

I would like to thank the House Judiciary Committee for hearing 

and acting on our request in 2007 for enhanced offenses involving 

maritime alien smuggling. The statutory amendment to 18 U.S.C. 

2237, developed by the Committee last fall and now appearing in 

title VI of our Auth Act, will be vital to Coast Guard mission accomplishment. 

That amendment would be strengthened further by making it 

unlawful to smuggle any person or contraband into the United 

States and permitting both civil and criminal forfeiture of property. 

We would also like the provision to ensure that any sentence under 

2237 runs consecutively, not concurrently. 

With these additions, title VI, if enacted this year, would also assist us and U.S. attorneys to achieve these operational requirements. With your help, sirs, we can reduce the flow of illegal aliens 

and illicit goods into our country by ensuring that the risks and 

consequences far outweigh the possible benefits. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I am pleased to answer questions at this time. 

[The joint prepared statement of the United States Department 

of Homeland Security follows:] 

f 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Good morning, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee. We would like to thank you for the opportunity to 

testify today on the law enforcement and investigative responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—specifically the responsibilities of the United 

States Secret Service, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the United 

States Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the United States Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the United States Coast Guard. As you will see, 

DHS has utilized its authorities to protect our nation from dangerous people, protect 

our critical infrastructure, and protect our nation from dangerous goods. 

U.S. SECRET SERVICE

While the Secret Service is perhaps best known for protecting the president, vice 

president, and other high-ranking public officials, the Secret Service originated as 

an investigative law enforcement agency. The Secret Service was established in 

1865 to suppress the rampant counterfeiting of U.S. currency. Since then, the Secret 

Service’s investigative mission has evolved and the agency has adapted to thwart 

attempts by both individuals and criminal organizations to exploit the nation’s financial infrastructure through varied financial crimes. Currently, the Secret Service 

investigates criminal violations relating to the counterfeiting of obligations and securities of the United States (18 U.S.C. §§ 470–474); financial crimes such as access 

device fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1029), financial institution fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344), and 

identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028); cyber crime such as network intrusions, malware, 

and online organized crime (18 U.S.C. § 1030; and computer-based attacks on the 

nation’s financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure (18 U.S.C. 

§ 1030). 

To accomplish its investigative mission, the Secret Service operates 139 domestic 

offices (including domicile offices) and 21 foreign offices in 16 countries. The agency 

works closely with federal, state, and local law enforcement entities, as well as other 

U.S. government agencies and foreign police counterparts to maximize its efforts. 

Counterfeiting: 

The Secret Service is proud of its role and success in protecting the worldwide 

integrity of U.S. currency. Last year, the Secret Service arrested more than 2,200 

14 

suspects for counterfeiting offenses and helped to remove over $147 million in counterfeit U.S. currency from circulation. The agency continues to adapt to the trends 

in counterfeiting, which have been influenced in recent years by computer-based 

technologies. The widespread use of personal computers and advancements in digital printing technology has provided more individuals the opportunity to manufacture a passable counterfeit note with relative ease. Approximately 58% of the counterfeit currency passed domestically in FY 2007 was produced using digital printing 

means, compared with less than 1% in FY 1995. 

Financial Fraud and Electronic Crimes: 

In our role of safeguarding the nation’s critical financial infrastructure, the Secret 

Service has a long history of protecting American consumers and the financial industry from fraud. With the passage of legislation in 1984, the Secret Service was 

provided authority for the investigation of access device fraud, including credit card 

and debit card fraud, and parallel authority with other law enforcement agencies 

in identity theft cases. In recent years, the combination of the information revolution and the effects of globalization have caused the investigative mission of the Secret Service to evolve. 

Through our work in the areas of financial and electronic crime, the Secret Service has developed particular expertise in the investigation of identity theft, false 

identification fraud, credit card fraud, debit card fraud, check fraud, bank fraud, online back account and investment portfolio takeovers, cyber crime, malware, and 

computer network intrusions. In Fiscal Year 2007, Secret Service agents arrested 

over 4,300 suspects for financial crimes violations. These suspects were responsible 

for approximately $690 million in actual fraud loss to individuals and financial institutions. 

In fact, the Secret Service has observed a marked increase in the quantity and 

complexity of financial crimes in recent years—particularly offenses involving identity theft and access device fraud. The recent trend observed by law enforcement 

is the use of computers and the Internet to launch cyber attacks targeting citizens 

and financial institutions. Cyber criminals have become adept at stealing victims’ 

personal information through the use of phishing emails, account takeovers, malicious software, hacking attacks, and network intrusions resulting in data breaches. 

This stolen information is often sold in bulk quantities through illicit Internet portals. These portals, or ‘‘carding websites,’’ can be likened to online bazaars where 

the criminal element converges to conduct their business. The websites vary in size, 

from just a few dozen members to more popular sites which boast memberships of 

approximately 8,000 users. These websites are often composed of separate forums 

which are moderated by notorious members of the cyber crime community. Within 

these websites, cyber criminals can buy, sell, and trade malicious software; 

spamming services; hacking services; credit, debit, and ATM card data; and personal 

identification and bank account information. The Secret Service is currently conducting approximately 15 online undercover investigations targeting domestic and 

international groups that are using malicious web-based forums to trade stolen information. 

The Internet has enabled criminal groups involved in financial crimes to routinely 

operate in a multi-jurisdictional environment. By working closely with other federal, 

state, and local law enforcement representatives, as well as international police 

agencies, the Secret Service is able to provide a comprehensive network of information sharing, resource sharing, and technical expertise that bridges jurisdictional 

boundaries. This partnership approach to law enforcement is vital to our criminal 

investigative mission. 

Financial Crimes/Electronic Crimes Task Forces: 

The Secret Service has established a national network of 29 Financial Crimes 

Task Forces and 24 Electronic Crimes Task Forces in major metropolitan areas 

across the United States. These task forces leverage the combined resources of our 

federal, state, and local law enforcement partners, as well as technical experts from 

academia and private industry, in an organized effort to combat threats and effectively investigate crimes directed at our critical infrastructure. Collaboration between law enforcement and the private sector is critical to our preventative approach to financial and electronic crimes. We also build partnerships with academia 

to ensure that law enforcement is on the cutting edge of technology by leveraging 

the research and development capabilities of teaching institutions and technical colleges. 

To provide our special agents with the advanced skills needed to identify and address cyber vulnerabilities, the Secret Service established the Electronic Crimes 

Special Agent Program (ECSAP) in 1987. Agents trained through ECSAP are comVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:49 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CRIME\031108\41189.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41189
15 

puter specialists, qualified to conduct network intrusion investigations and forensic 

examinations of various types of electronic evidence, including computers, personal 

data assistants (PDAs), telecommunications devices, electronic organizers, and other 

electronic media. Currently, the Secret Service has approximately 770 ECSAPtrained agents assigned to more than 85 offices worldwide. We are continuing to expand this program and, by the end of FY 2008, the Secret Service expects to have 

over 1,000 ECSAP-trained agents. 

Further, the Secret Service will have a key role in the implementation of the Administration’s cybersecurity activities, as out lined in the recent Presidential directive addressing cybersecurity policy. 

The Secret Service has adapted to the constantly evolving criminal environment. 

We will continue to aggressively investigate all offenses within our jurisdiction to 

protect consumers and financial institutions. The Secret Service is committed to our 

mission of protecting the worldwide integrity of U.S. currency and safeguarding the 

nation’s critical financial infrastructure. 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Prior to 9/11, the air marshal program consisted of less than 50 personnel who 

were classified as civil aviation security specialists rather than law enforcement officers. These personnel operated under the direction of the Federal Aviation Administration and primarily flew international missions. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Administration and Congress agreed that a stronger federal air marshal program was 

required. First under the Department of Transportation within TSA, and now within DHS, the Federal Air Marshal program is the largest such program in the world 

and has evolved into a critical layer of aviation security. The Federal Air Marshal 

Service (FAMS) today has not only expanded in size, but has been enhanced in quality by requiring all air marshals to meet the high standards associated with an 1801 

law enforcement series. Today, Federal Air Marshals fly on thousands of domestic 

and international missions, conduct valuable surveillance within airport perimeters, 

and participate in joint law enforcement efforts with other agencies. 

TSA’s office of Law Enforcement/FAMS enhanced this operation and promotes 

confidence in our Nation’s civil transportation systems through the effective riskbased strategic deployment of Federal Air Marshals and other law enforcement resources in both air and land-based mission assignments. The organization’s primary 

focus is to detect, deter, and defeat terrorist or other criminal hostile acts targeting 

U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers, crew, and, when necessary, other transportation modes within the Nation’s general transportation systems. 

The authority for the Federal Air Marshals is found in Title 49 USC section 

114(q)—Law Enforcement; section 44917(a)—Deployment of Federal Air Marshals; 

section 44903(d)—Authorizing Individuals To Carry Firearms and Make Arrests, 

and, most recently, PL 110–53, section 1303, which authorizes Federal Air Marshals 

to participate in Visible Intermodal Prevention And Response (VIPR) Teams. 

In addition to the FAMs, the Office of Law Enforcement’s resources conduct Joint 

Vulnerability Assessments (JVA) and Man Portable Air Defense Systems 

(MANPADS) assessments. The JVA is a joint effort undertaken by TSA and FBI 

with the purpose of assessing current and potential threats to commercial air transportation facilities within the United States. TSA has committed to conducting 

MANPADS vulnerability assessments—evaluations of close-range threats such as 

shoulder-fired missiles—at all of the largest airports on an annual basis. Also, the 

FAMS are full partners with the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). FAMs 

are assigned to every FBI field office JTTF (56) and the National JTTF as well. 

The OLE/FAMS also operate a robust explosives detection canine program. TSA 

has met projections for FY07 with the deployment of a total of 422 canine teams 

in the aviation domain. Additionally, there are currently 56 teams deployed in the 

mass transit environment for a current total of 478 teams. 

FAMs have participated in hundreds of TSA-led VIPR operations, where FAMs, 

TSA inspectors, transportation security officers, and any TSA assets assist federal 

agencies and local law enforcement responding to specific threats or high-risk situations aimed at the nation’s transportation network. FAMs also began partnering 

with other DHS agencies towards forming and deploying task-organized VIPR teams 

utilizing the combined skill sets, resources, and expertise of DHS’s seven major operating agencies. The FAMs have participated in all Departmental VIPR teams to 

date. 

One of FAMS unique deployments includes our response following the unprecedented events surrounding Hurricane Katrina and the relief we provided to thousands of travelers who were trapped at the Louis Armstrong International Airport 

in New Orleans, while other residents inundated the airport in the aftermath of the 

16 

storm. With virtually no state or local law enforcement presence on the airport 

grounds, the few federal officials and employees of the TSA there were quickly overwhelmed. 

The FAMS responded to this dire situation by activating a 24-hour crisis center 

during the evening hours of Thursday, September 1. Approximately 500 FAMs were 

then activated from 15 Field Offices. These FAMs traveled to New Orleans, restored 

and maintained security at Louis Armstrong International Airport for over three 

weeks, and ensured the safety of TSA personnel as well as the displaced residents 

on hundreds of humanitarian flights out of the stricken city. 

The FAMS’s unique capabilities were also exhibited in the early morning hours 

of August 10, 2006, when the FAMS strategically redeployed significant assets in 

reaction to the unfolding terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives to be carried 

onto airplanes traveling to the United States from the United Kingdom. The FAMS 

were able to deploy quickly and efficiently to the United Kingdom to provide an additional layer of security onboard airplanes destined for the United States. The 

rapid deployment insured that international travelers were protected against any 

terrorist act that might be perpetrated in connection with the plot. Over a 30-day 

period, the FAMS’s surge capacity enabled coverage of over 1500 flights between 

major airports in the United States and United Kingdom, utilizing more than 1,000 

FAMs. 

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) protects our nation’s borders from terrorism, human and drug smuggling, illegal migration, and agricultural pests while 

simultaneously facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade. 

As the nation’s single unified border agency, CBP’s mission is vitally important 

for the protection of the American people and the national economy. Nearly 44,000 

CBP employees and law enforcement officers work in a variety of ways to secure 

the nation’s borders both at and between the official ports of entry and also to extend our zone of security. CBP secures America’s borders through three major law 

enforcement entities: Field Operations, Border Patrol, and Air and Marine. 

CBP officers are responsible for enforcing over 400 laws for 40 agencies at the border, which govern both imports and exports of goods and entry and exit of persons 

and conveyances. To that end, CBP officers have the authority to enforce federal 

civil and criminal laws, carry firearms, and make arrests for offenses committed in 

their presence or for felony offenses where the officer has probable cause to believe 

the person committed the crime. CBP’s enforcement of border-related laws is wide 

ranging, and CBP works closely with various other agencies or departments to enforce these laws, including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. 

Coast Guard, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), and other 

federal agencies. CBP works most closely with ICE, which acts, in most respects, 

as CBP’s investigatory arm. 

For example, under Title 18 of the U.S. Code, CBP often enforces non-immigration 

offenses such as smuggling, money laundering, child pornography, and criminal 

trademark infringement. Common immigration-specific violations of Title 18 at the 

border include false claims to U.S. citizenship, fraud involving identity documents, 

reproduction or fraud involving citizenship documents, forgery or false use of passports, and false statements to a federal officer. CBP is also often involved in arresting individuals for assault on a federal officer and felon in possession of a firearm. 

CBP has primary responsibility for enforcing the immigration laws of Title 8 and 

the customs laws of Title 19 at the border. The Immigration and Nationality Act 

(INA), within Title 8, has its own criminal provisions. For example, under INA section 274, the acts of illegally bringing in, transporting, harboring, or encouraging 

someone to enter the United States at someplace other than a port of entry can result in serious felonies. In addition, violations of Title 8 may also form the basis 

of a Title 18 prosecution. Common prosecutions based on violations of the INA discovered by CBP at the border include alien smuggling, illegal entry into the U.S., 

illegal re-entry into the U.S., and importation of aliens for immoral purposes. CBP 

also enforces criminal provisions under Title 31; administers the currency and monetary instrument reporting requirement of Title 31; interdicts bulk cash smuggling; 

and enforces laws relating to imitation firearms in Title 15, Title 17 copyright infringement, exportations contrary to law in Title 22, including Trading with the 

Enemy Act violations of Title 50, and Arms Export Control Act violations in Title 

22. 

In order to enforce these laws, CBP utilizes partnerships with other federal agencies. A few examples of these partnerships are Operations Uniforce, the Public 

17 

Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (BTA), 

and operations within the CBP Air and Marine (A&M). 

From January 13, 2008 to January 26, 2008, Border Patrol Agents from the New 

Orleans Sector conducted Operation Uniforce to interdict alien and narcotic smugglers. This multi-agency operation was conducted utilizing traffic observation units 

on I–20 operating between the Mississippi River and the city of Jackson, Mississippi. Forty Border Patrol Agents and two canine handlers from the New Orleans 

Sector conducted the operation with Office of Field Operations (OFO) Special Response Team Members, agents from ICE’s Detention and Removal Officers, CBP Air 

and Marine, the Mississippi Highway Patrol, the Rankin, Madison, and Hines County Sheriff’s Departments, along with the Pearl and Clinton Police Departments. The 

intelligence data that was gathered during Operation Uniforce provided valuable insight into identifying the criminal organizations that use the I–20 corridor for 

human and narcotic trafficking. 

The BTA authorized the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to receive information regarding imports, enabling the agency to target shipments of food for 

human or animal consumption prior to arrival at U.S. ports of entry. The BTA provides CBP the opportunity to assist FDA with the prior notice requirements. CBP 

works jointly with FDA to augment an existing automated interface to institute a 

prior-notice reporting requirement with minimal disruption to the trade. 

Under provisions of Title 18, CBP A&M operates in direct support of the Coast 

Guard, Secret Service, DEA, FBI, ATF, and other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. CBP A&M operates in support of DHS operations for CBP, 

ICE’s Office of Investigation, and Federal Protective Service and Detention and Removal Operations. CBP A&M also provides critical air and marine support to other 

federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, including the U.S. Secret Service, 

DEA, FBI, ATF, and the Coast Guard. 

CBP A&M operates in support of multi-agency and international partnerships to 

deter and combat the threat of illegal activity. CBP A&M has developed skills in 

air and marine operations by providing training and vessel to vessel operations and 

the integration of air and marine assets under the establishment of a joint DEA/ 

Columbian/CBP command center in Cartagena, Colombia, enabling the interdiction 

of maritime targets leaving northern Colombia. 

Overall, CBP is responsible for guarding 7,000 miles of land border the United 

States shares with Canada and Mexico and 2,000 miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida peninsula and off the coast of Southern California. The agency 

also protects 95,000 miles of maritime border in partnership with the United States 

Coast Guard. 

To secure this vast terrain, more than 15,500 CBP Border Patrol agents and CBP 

Air and Marine agents, and approximately 20,000 CBP officers and agriculture specialists, together with the nation’s largest law enforcement canine program, stand 

guard along America’s front line. 

• CBP officers protect America’s borders at official ports of entry, while CBP’s 

Border Patrol agents prevent illegal entry into the United States of people 

and contraband between the ports of entry. 

• CBP Air and Marine, which manages the largest law enforcement air force 

in the world, patrols the nation’s land and sea borders to stop terrorists and 

drug smugglers before they enter the United States. 

• CBP agriculture specialists prevent the entry of exotic plant and animal 

pests, and confront emerging threats in agro- and bioterrorism. 

While carrying out its priority anti-terrorism mission, CBP must also work to facilitate the movement of legitimate trade and travelers, as the agency processes all 

people, vehicles and cargo entering the United States. On a typical day in fiscal year 

2007, CBP processed approximately 1.1 million passengers and pedestrians; 70,000 

containers; 304,000 privately owned vehicles; and 83,000 shipments of goods approved for entry. Through law enforcement operations and partnerships with other 

federal, state, and local agencies, CBP’s frontline officers and agents will continue 

to protect America from the terrorist threat while also accomplishing our traditional 

missions in immigration, customs, and agriculture. 

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the lead investigative federal agency for enforcing that nation’s immigration laws under Title 8 of the United 

States Code, in addition to specific law enforcement authority found under Titles 18 

and 19, among others. Some of the areas included in the enforcement of these laws 

are National Security, Public Safety, Commercial and Identity Fraud, Illegal SmugVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:49 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CRIME\031108\41189.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41189
18 

gling of Contraband, and Money Laundering. The merger of the legacy federal authorities now makes ICE the second most diverse law enforcement agency within 

the federal government. In 2003, the Office of Investigations started with a total of 

5,190 agents. As of today, there are a total of 5,516 agents, although ICE plans to 

hire an additional 296 agents in 2008 and the President has asked for an additional 

87 in 2009. 

Given that ICE has such broad law enforcement and investigatory responsibilities, 

we leverage these responsibilities by aligning our authorities with the risks that 

face the nation today. ICE protects national security and upholds public safety by 

targeting terrorist organizations and other criminal networks that seek to exploit 

vulnerabilities in our immigration system, in international trade, in our financial 

networks, along our borders, at federal facilities, and elsewhere in order to do harm 

to the United States. The end result is a safer, more secure America. 

In this regard, ICE enacted a multi-year strategy of improving immigration enforcement through more efficient management, focused enforcement efforts that target the most dangerous illegal aliens, worksite enforcement initiatives that target 

employers who defy immigration law, and reducing the pull of the ‘‘jobs magnet’’ 

that draws illegal workers across the border in search of employment. At the same 

time, ICE stepped up the battle against financial crime and the exploitation of legitimate financial networks by criminal organizations using methods to earn, move, 

and store illicit funding needed to support their criminal enterprises. 

ICE’s risk-based approach shapes interior immigration enforcement, in which we 

are prioritizing everything from criminal aliens and fugitives to the application of 

our customs fraud authorities to prevent the importation of tainted commodities and 

counterfeit pharmaceuticals. This approach shapes our methods to target drug and 

other contraband smuggling with financial authorities and international partnerships—and it means that we continue to work to thwart the illegal export of weapons and sensitive technology. 

To target some of the most dangerous criminals and sophisticated criminal organizations, ICE has developed robust initiatives to enforce our immigration laws in the 

interior, including programs that specifically target child predators and gang members, ensure compliance on the part of those who visit the U.S., target alien absconders—fugitives who’ve failed to comply with a lawful judicial order to leave the 

country—and dismantle the infrastructure that supports illicit immigration such as 

illegal employment and the fraudulent document trade. 

For example, ICE created its Detention Enforcement and Processing Offenders by 

Remote Technology (DEPORT) Center in FY06, and it has been integral to DHS’s 

effort to halt criminal activity by aliens. The DEPORT Center conducts interviews 

of inmates in remote prisons from a centralized location. Through the combined effort of the DEPORT Center and local ICE resources, coverage is provided to all 114 

federal detention facilities. This ensures that criminal aliens are taken into ICE custody upon the completion of their federal sentences rather than being released into 

U.S. communities. 

While ICE’s immigration enforcement initiatives most often relate to people wanting to come in to our country, another key risk we guard against is efforts to take 

sensitive technology and arms out. In FY 2007, arms and strategic technology investigations resulted in 188 arrests, 178 indictments, and 127 convictions for exportrelated violations—more than any other U.S federal law enforcement agency. 

ICE’s 287(g) program, authorized under the 1996 Immigration and Nationality 

Act, has emerged as a key partnership tool in allowing ICE to train state and local 

officers in immigration enforcement. Once in place, the 287(g) agreement allows ICE 

to delegate enforcement powers to state and local agencies, who serve as force multipliers in immigration enforcement in their communities. In August 2007, ICE announced the launch of the ICE ACCESS (Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and Security) program to expand the opportunities for law 

enforcement partnerships. Under the ACCESS program, ICE works with local officials to determine specific enforcement challenges and develop partnership plans 

that help fight document fraud, illegal immigration, gang activity or other critical 

law enforcement challenges. 

Recognizing that there are more than 775,000 state and local law enforcement officers in the country, ICE is leveraging our authorities to develop partnerships 

under the ACCESS program and the cross designation programs such as 287(g) and 

customs. 

ICE’s risk-based approach also shapes our methods to target drug and other contraband smuggling. ICE has developed a full cadre of investigative expertise—including undercover operations, use of confidential informants, wire intercepts, controlled deliveries, consensual monitoring, and electronic surveillance—to combat 

smuggling organizations. These smuggling organizations use every imaginable 

19 

method to smuggle contraband into this country, including the use of aircraft, automobiles, trucks, maritime vessels, backpacks, tunnels, and railways. Additionally, 

smuggling organizations infiltrate and use legitimate businesses and industries as 

mechanisms for smuggling illicit goods and narcotics into the United States. 

In FY07, ICE conducted investigations resulting in the seizure of 232,000 pounds 

of cocaine and 1.3 million pounds of marijuana, as well as obtained 5,900 narcoticsrelated convictions. Using our financial tools and international partnerships, we are 

pushing out beyond our borders. Our Trade Transparency Units represent unique 

relationships with foreign nations that allow us to share import and export data to 

identify trade anomalies that suggest money laundering. Our agents, thanks to 

these partnerships, are effectively identifying schemes designed to hide the illicit 

proceeds from the drug trade and sale of dangerous consumer goods, foreign tax 

fraud, and other transnational criminal activity. 

Other dangers from which ICE protects this nation are less obvious: Traditional 

customs fraud, in many cases, constitutes serious and unrecognized public health 

risks. Take, for example, Operation Guardian, an ongoing ICE-led operation with 

CBP, the FDA, and Consumer Product Safety Commission, to investigate imports 

of substandard, tainted, and dangerous products from the People’s Republic of 

China. The operation to date has resulted in the seizure of more than 59,000 tubes 

of diethylene glycol- and bacteria-laden toothpaste bound for U.S. markets and the 

initiation of joint US/PRC investigations. Diethylene glycol is a toxic chemical used 

to make antifreeze. And this is one of many similar cases involving tainted goods 

which would otherwise be on store shelves just waiting for purchase by American 

families. 

The Federal Protective Service, responsible for policing, securing, and ensuring a 

safe environment in which federal agencies can conduct their business, seized more 

than 760,000 prohibited items last year. They investigated hundreds of threats 

posed against the more than 8,800 federal facilities and millions of visitors to federal buildings nationwide. 

ICE’s approach—focusing on risk and going after the money—yields real results: 

since 2003, ICE has seized more than $600 million in cash and monetary instruments, and more than $580 million worth of real property, vessels, aircraft, artwork, 

vehicles, and jewels. ICE’s law enforcement and investigatory work can be dangerous and difficult, but we tackle our responsibilities each day with pride and professionalism. 

U.S. COAST GUARD

The Coast Guard has served as our nation’s primary federal maritime law enforcement agency since the first Congress of the United States created the Revenue 

Cutter Service in 1790 to enforce maritime laws, interdict smugglers, and protect 

American shipping. The Coast Guard is one of the oldest organizations of the federal 

government and, until the Navy Department was established in 1798, we served as 

the nation’s only Armed Force afloat. Today, the Coast Guard is the only Armed 

Service with statutory responsibility and authority for direct law enforcement action. 

Since the beginning of the Republic, Congress has granted our Service expansive 

authority to board and inspect vessels at sea without particular suspicion. After the 

Civil War, Congress removed geographic limitations on our boarding authority and 

directed the Service to enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable Federal 

laws on, under, and over the high seas, in addition to waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. This worldwide boarding authority, now codified in 14 

U.S.C. §§ 2 and 89, is the foundation of the Coast Guard’s maritime law enforcement 

mission. Coast Guard boarding activity is as critical to the national security and 

economy of the United States today as it was in 1790. Not unlike the boarding officers of the Revenue Cutter Service over 200 years ago, today’s boarding officers lead 

teams, usually embarked in boats and sometimes delivered from helicopters, to 

‘‘make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures and arrests upon the 

high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection and suppression of violations of laws of the United States.’’ 

The Coast Guard conducts an average of 190 boardings each day around the 

world. The daily fare of Coast Guard assets and boarding teams includes drug 

smuggling, alien smuggling, illegal incursions into the U.S. Exclusive Economic 

Zone, breaches of fisheries and living marine resources laws, violations of boating 

safety and navigation regulations, substance abuse while operating vessels, and environmental crimes. 

The influx of illegal drugs is one of America’s greatest maritime security threats. 

The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime drug interdiction in the 

20 

transit zone—a six million square mile area roughly the size of the continental 

United States including the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and Eastern Pacific—and 

shares lead responsibility for maritime threats within U.S. territorial waters with 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The Coast Guard’s mission is to reduce the 

supply of drugs from the transit zone, originating in South America, by denying 

smugglers the use of maritime, as well as air routes and conveyances. In order to 

overcome the ‘‘tyranny of distance,’’ the Coast Guard depends on technological innovation, partnerships with other federal agencies, and countries and actionable intelligence. 

One example of technological innovation is the broad expansion of armed 

counterdrug helicopter capabilities used to disable fleeing vessels or to compel them 

to stop (airborne use of force (AUF)). The Coast Guard operates a special armed helicopter squadron of HH–65C helicopters, which has been tremendously effective at 

interdicting elusive, high speed go-fast vessels. United Kingdom (U.K.) Royal Navy 

ships are also deploying to the Caribbean Sea with U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement detachments who support the U.K.’s armed helicopters, and U.S. Navy helicopters operate with Coast Guard gunners on board Navy warships in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. The overwhelming success of AUF has caused drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) to shift tactics, using smaller go-fasts with contraband 

concealed within the construction and avoiding the most direct deep water routes 

between departure point and destination. DTOs have also been driven to the 

littorals along Central America where they are more susceptible to coastal State 

interdiction forces. 

The Coast Guard relies on international and interagency partnership to complete 

its missions. One example of this is the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) 

South, which is responsible for directing interagency detection, monitoring and sorting of air and maritime drug smuggling events; fusing intelligence activities; and 

planning and conducting flexible operations within their respective joint operating 

area. This enables the Coast Guard to interdict and disrupt drug smuggling events 

in the transit zone. Every department and agency with a drug interdiction responsibility and role participates in making JIATF-South an extremely effective and efficient operation. JIATF South also utilizes foreign liaison officers from 11 different 

countries to facilitate transnational cooperative counterdrug efforts. 

One of the emerging and most significant threats we face in maritime law enforcement today is manned and unmanned self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS) vessels that transport multi-ton loads of cocaine and other illicit cargo bound for the 

United States. SPSS vessels are watercraft of unorthodox construction capable of 

putting much of their bulk under the surface of the water, making them difficult 

to detect. SPSS are typically less than 100 feet in length and carry up to five crew 

and 12 metric tons of illicit cargo (4–6 tons typically) at speeds of up to eight knots. 

SPSS vessels can travel from the north coast of South America to the southeastern 

U.S. without refueling. According to the Consolidated Counter Drug Database 

(CCDB), 23 SPSS drug smuggling events occurred between January 2001 and September 2007. Between October 1, 2007 and February 1, 2008, the CCDB reported 

an unprecedented 27 SPSS events that successfully delivered an estimated 111 metric tons of cocaine. 

The SPSS vessels encountered by the Coast Guard are stateless vessels built in 

the jungles of South America with no legitimate use. They are built for stealth and 

the capability to rapidly scuttle. Their crews typically abandon and sink the vessels 

and contraband when detected by law enforcement in order to evade U.S. prosecution for drug trafficking. Although U.S. interdiction forces nearly always capture imagery of detected SPSS and the crews abandoning them before they sink, attempting 

to access and recover contraband before a scuttled SPSS sinks is very dangerous 

and often impossible. 

If operation and embarkation in an SPSS were illegal, U.S. interdiction forces and 

U.S. Attorneys would have the necessary legal tools to combat the SPSS threat even 

in the absence of recovered drugs or other contraband. Criminalizing the operation 

of SPSS vessels on international voyages would improve officer safety, deter the use 

of these inherently dangerous vessels, and facilitate effective prosecution of criminals involved in this treacherous and emerging trend. 

The Coast Guard has closely coordinated with the Department of Justice to draft 

an amendment to Title 18, United States Code, to address this concern. We have 

already briefed committee staff on this amendment, and urge Committee action on, 

and House passage of, the amendment as soon as possible. The Coast Guard 

projects 85 SPSS events carrying 340 metric tons of cocaine during FY 2008, so we 

need your help now to counter this dangerous emerging threat. 

Drug trafficking innovation is, of course, not limited to SPSS vessels. In 2007, the 

Coast Guard interdicted five separate vessels carrying a combined 21.5 MT of coVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:49 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CRIME\031108\41189.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41189
21 

caine concealed in liquid form. ‘‘Liquid cocaine’’ consists of cocaine paste and base 

dissolved, usually in fuel oil, and concealed within tanks or holds onboard smuggling 

vessels. This smuggling tactic allows smugglers to quickly jettison the illicit cargo 

into the sea when encountered by law enforcement assets. To combat this threat, 

the Coast Guard, with our partners at ICE, the Drug Enforcement Administration 

(DEA), JIATF South, and PANEX, has developed procedures for the detection, identification, and preservation as evidence of liquid cocaine. Additionally, the Coast 

Guard has used advanced interdiction tactics to board and secure smuggling vessels 

to prevent the crews from destroying evidence or scuttling vessels. 

As we turn to the Coast Guard’s alien maritime interdiction operations, we would 

like to thank the House Judiciary Committee for hearing and acting on our request 

in 2007 for enhanced offenses involving maritime alien smuggling. Once enacted, 

the statutory amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2237, developed by the Committee last fall 

and now appearing in Title VI of the Coast Guard Authorization Act, H.R. 2830, 

will be vital to Coast Guard mission accomplishment. 

As the lead federal agency for maritime law enforcement, the Coast Guard is responsible for enforcing immigration laws at sea. Thousands of people try to enter 

this country illegally every year using maritime routes, many via dangerous smuggling operations in dangerously overloaded, unseaworthy, or otherwise unsafe vessels. The flood of undocumented migrants in boats onto America’s shores is both a 

threat to human life and a violation of U.S. and international laws. Coast Guard 

migrant-interdiction operations are as much humanitarian efforts as they are lawenforcement missions. In fact, the majority of Coast Guard migrant interdiction 

cases begin as search and rescue missions. 

The primary illegal migration threat comes from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, 

and Cuba; however, the Coast Guard has interdicted migrants of various nationalities throughout the Western Hemisphere. Successful illegal immigration potentially 

costs U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars each year in social services. The Coast 

Guard’s mission is to interdict undocumented aliens as far from U.S. shores as possible and return them to their countries of nationality or origin. Swift repatriation 

deters many potential migrants and minimizes costly processes arising from illegal 

entry into the United States. In addition to relieving our citizens of this financial 

burden, the Coast Guard’s efforts help to support legal immigration systems. Protection from political persecution and torture are also important concerns for the U.S. 

During the course of migrant interdictions, Coast Guard crews may encounter migrants requesting protection from persecution or torture. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and the Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees and 

Migration establish policies in this area and handle all potential protection cases 

arising from interdiction at sea. 

The Coast Guard relies on technological innovation and partnerships with other 

federal agencies and countries to counter illegal alien smuggling. In the Mona Pass 

between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, the deployment of mobile biometrics capability on 110-foot patrol boats and robust interagency support have resulted in a reduction in the flow of illegal migration by nearly 50 percent. The referral of 118 cases of criminal aliens identified at sea through mobile biometrics, including 33 aggravated felons and 77 aliens attempting to illegally re-enter the U.S. 

after deportation, seems to have stemmed the flow in what was the single largest 

migrant smuggling vector before biometrics-based prosecutions. This project would 

not have been possible without the full partnership of the DHS US-VISIT program, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

the U.S. Attorney’s Office in San Juan, the Department of State, and the Dominican 

Navy. 

Similar to drug traffickers, migrant smugglers also profit from technological innovations—particularly high-speed, multi-engine go-fast boats. Go-fast smuggling vessels are replacing rafts and rusticas as the preferred mode of transportation due to 

the increased chance of success. We estimate that the rate of success for a raft or 

rustica is generally less than 25 percent, and never better than 50 percent. By comparison, the rate of success for a go-fast is estimated at 70 percent. The multimillion 

dollar human smuggling enterprise brings thousands of undocumented aliens to the 

U.S. at a price of up to $10,000 a head. Despite a 35 percent increase in the number 

of cutter and aircraft resource hours targeted against illegal migration in the Florida Straits, migrant flow continues to increase in that vector. The transition to gofasts constitutes a significant challenge for interdiction assets. 

The effectiveness of any alien interdiction model is dependant upon the ability to 

deliver consequences to smugglers through prosecution or other action. It is imperative that we secure more effective prosecution tools, including the closure of loopholes that currently impede investigation and consequence delivery, longer sentences, special seizure, and forfeiture provisions for vessels outfitted for smuggling. 

22 

We must also enhance sentences for vessels that fail to stop while engaged in alien 

smuggling. 

The President’s Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan provides for 

coordinated U.S. Government response to threats against the U.S. and its interests 

in the maritime domain by establishing roles and responsibilities enabling rapid and 

decisive response. The Coast Guard, as the Nation’s leading maritime law enforcement agency, fulfills DHS’s role as one of the principal MOTR agencies in the maritime domain. The Coast Guard brings broad law enforcement and military authorities, planning, and execution skills to operations requiring interagency coordination 

through the MOTR process in support of both maritime law enforcement and homeland security missions. The operations can include the deployment of integrated and 

adaptive capabilities (including use of force) required to locate, identify, intercept, 

apprehend, exploit, and, when necessary, defeat maritime threats. We use the 

MOTR process daily to engage and coordinate with our domestic interagency partners and with our foreign maritime law enforcement partners on drug, migrant, piracy, and fisheries cases. 

The links between place, crime, control measures, and national identity are becoming more complicated—especially at the border. To a greater extent than ever 

before, crime and control measures are not always linked to a common national territory. Instead, criminals often exploit international borders, turning the seams between sovereigns into operational barriers for law enforcement. The Coast Guard’s 

unique authorities, capabilities, competencies, and partnerships, foreign and domestic, enable the Coast Guard along with our fellow Department of Homeland Security 

agencies, to consistently and effectively enforce maritime laws, interdict smugglers 

and drug traffickers, and protect American resources. 

CONCLUSION

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department of 

Homeland Security’s law enforcement and investigatory responsibilities. Due to the 

breadth of the hearing, this written statement necessarily only outlines some of the 

important responsibilities that DHS fulfills in protecting this great nation. We will 

be pleased to answer any questions at this time. 

f 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Admiral Justice. We will now have questions from the members, and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Brown, you had mentioned the standard for canines. Are you 

working with experts to ascertain whether or not a national standard for training canines would be appropriate? 

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir, we are. We have an ongoing program with 

the FBI and the National Institute of Justice called the Scientific 

Working Group Dog and Orthogonal Detector Guidelines. It is to 

establish the best practices to do this. 

Mr. SCOTT. You also have a no-fly list. If you believe you are 

wrongly on the no-fly list, is there a way to get your name off the 

list? 

Mr. BROWN. There is a redress process that TSA has, yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Is that very complicated? 

Mr. BROWN. Sir, I am not that familiar with it, to be honest with 

you. I can give you a little bit of information about it. I know that 

you have to apply to it and it takes a little—but I am not sure how 

complicated the process really is. I can find out for you, though, 

and get back to you. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. Self, you issued the ID cards for port workers? 

Chief SELF. No, sir—U.S. 

Mr. SCOTT. Who does? 

Chief SELF. I believe that would be the Office of Field Operations. 

Mr. SCOTT. Office of Field Operations of what? 

23 

Chief SELF. Under CBP, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Are you involved in port operations at all? 

Chief SELF. U.S. Border Patrol, sir, typically are not. We will 

help the OFO officers in the field doing certain operations at times. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Parmer, if someone is detained at a port of entry 

and has dependent children, and they are the only person available, what happens to the children? 

Mr. PARMER. We have protocols in place for humanitary concerns. If it is a sole care provider then the totality of the circumstances is taken into consideration, and ordinarily if it is a sole 

care provider situation the individual is released with a notice to 

appear later in order to take care of the children. 

Mr. SCOTT. If you have death of persons in the custody of ICE, 

are those deaths reported under the Deaths in Custody Act? Do you 

know? 

Mr. PARMER. I do not know, sir. I am sorry. 

Mr. SCOTT. If you could—— 

Mr. PARMER. We do keep track of the individuals who, within our 

custody, who are obviously—die—but I don’t know if it is reported 

under that particular act. 

Mr. SCOTT. You are coordinating your activities with local law 

enforcement? 

Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. If local law enforcement begins enforcing immigration 

law, is there any potential for problems with community relations 

between the local police and the community that may have many 

immigrant citizens? 

Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir. As we have learned, there are—with the 

merger of the agencies within DHS, there are—for those of us who 

were unacclimated to the immigration arena before March 1, 2003, 

it has been a learning process for all of us. And there are actually 

many social and political concerns that relate to the immigration 

concerns. But if the State or local authorities implement immigration statutes on their own, as we have learned in the Federal 

arena, there are all these implications for relations with the community. 

Mr. SCOTT. What training is done to make sure that local police 

do not engage in illegal profiling? 

Mr. PARMER. Well, in terms of what we do within ICE, we have— 

as part of title 8–287, section 287G, we provide training for the 

State and local authorities to look for immigration violations; but 

profiling is not a part of that—that is a no-no within our scope of 

order. We don’t profile, so—— 

Mr. SCOTT. That is because your agents have been trained. Local 

law enforcement may not have the same training. 

My time is expired, and I may come back for a second round. 

Mr. PARMER. Sure. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Gohmert? 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. And I appreciate you all’s statements. 

First of all, let me ask Mr. Parmer: After your agency, ICE, is 

notified that an illegal alien is in local custody, does ICE have the 

authority to say, ‘‘Go ahead and detain them,’’ and from that point 

forward the Federal Government will reimburse local law enforcement for holding them? 

24 

Mr. PARMER. We have the authority to advise the local authorities to detain them, but I am not sure what the reimbursement 

protocols are. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Because of course if you advise local law enforcement to detain somebody—and this is a complaint I have heard 

from local law enforcement—they can be told to detain somebody 

and then hold them for 30 days, and then ICE will come back and 

say, ‘‘Well, we decided not to pursue it,’’ and so they are out all 

that money for an individual they have held which, around my jurisdiction is around $50 a day. And that is an awful lot of money 

for the Federal Government to ask a local government to be out, 

and then not reimburse. If you are not familiar with the answer 

to that question, who do you think would be? 

Mr. PARMER. Well, sir, we are divided up within ICE into the Office of Investigations, which is the component I am representing 

here today, although I am speaking on behalf of all of ICE, but we 

also have Detention and Removal Operations, the Federal Protective Service, the Office of International Affairs—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. But my question, who would—— 

Mr. PARMER. The more appropriate entity to answer that question would be Detention and Removal Operations. 

Mr. GOHMERT. But you don’t know who is in charge of that? 

Mr. PARMER. Mr. Gary Mead is the director. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. Since you are representing part of the agency, we 

may have good questions that you could have the appropriate person—that would be helpful. 

Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir. He is not here today, but—— 

Mr. SCOTT. That is why we include the submitted questions. 

Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Mr. Stenger, when personal identification information is stolen from the Internet, how does and when does the Secret Service become involved in that? 

Mr. STENGER. Mr. Congressman, we don’t have any specialists 

for investigations. If a case is brought to our attention we evaluate 

each one on the merits of the case—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Somebody has to bring it to your attention? See, 

you brought that up in your opening statement and I wasn’t aware 

that you got involved in that, other than the FBI did, but did I understand right? That is something you get involved in if it is 

brought to your attention? 

Mr. STENGER. That is correct, sir. There are a number of agencies that have cross-cutting jurisdiction, including the FBI, Postal 

Inspectors, as well as Secret Service, but if these types of cases— 

if it is access device or computer fraud—one of the violations that 

we investigate—if brought to our attention, we will take the case 

in—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. But someone has to bring it—my time is so limited. I hate to be rude and keep cutting you off, but to go to my 

question, at what point—what threshold—do you get involved? 

That is when somebody brings it to your attention, is that right? 

Mr. STENGER. That is correct. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. 

25 

Let me ask about the no-fly list, Mr. Brown. After TSA takes 

somebody off that list—like I have got a general,—general, served 

29 years in the military, and he was on the terrorist watch list. It 

took a while to get his name removed by TSA, and yet the airlines 

still have trouble recognizing he is not on the list because he is not 

off their list yet. 

And so it seems kind of absurd to treat a real hero like this, and 

I understood from Secretary Chertoff when he testified last week, 

you remove them but it doesn’t seem like there is any follow-up to 

make sure the airlines remove them off. And so it seems almost 

like a Seinfeld episode: You remove them off, but nobody gets them 

out there in the field off the list, which means what good does it 

do? 

And so, is there follow up that you do with the airlines to make 

sure they take them off the list? 

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir, there is. I am not familiar with the process, 

but there is some follow up. I do know that. 

Mr. GOHMERT. There is some follow up, but you don’t know what 

it is? 

Mr. BROWN. No, sir, I don’t. I am not familiar with that. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Think you could find out what it is? 

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir. Certainly. 

Mr. GOHMERT. So we can follow up on the follow up. 

And then as far as Chief Self, we had a Border Patrol agent from 

my district in Henderson, Clint Thrasher, that was—his family was 

told he was following illegal aliens when his—I believe it was a 

Cessna—went down. Of course there was some concern, you know, 

was he being fired on? Was there anything like that? I just wondered, did NTSB or any other Federal agency find a reason for that 

crash and give a specific reason? 

Chief SELF. Yes, sir. NTSB, FBI, OPR, and FAA all investigated 

that crash. The finding was pilot error, and he was, of course, 

killed in 2007 while in the line of duty. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay. So they all attributed it to pilot error. Was 

there any evidence at all that his plane was ever fired upon? 

Chief SELF. No evidence whatsoever, sir. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, I might encourage you to pass that on to 

Secretary Chertoff. He wasn’t aware we lost anybody like that. 

So, thank you. I see my time has expired. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. Delahunt was next, and I understand you want to defer to 

the gentleman from New York. 

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler? 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. And I appreciate the gentleman deferring; I have a meeting to go to shortly. 

Mr. Parmer—that the ICE has invaded people’s homes—ICE 

agents banging on people’s doors—agents have entered people’s 

bedrooms. Assistant Secretary Myers stated, ICE agents only enter 

with the—consent. Do you agree with that? 

Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. NADLER. And when the police—your home brandishing—who 

may not be able to understand, how do you get consent? 

26 

Mr. PARMER. Well, we have bilingual agents and officers who are 

out on these, and that is—the early morning hours are often the 

best time to catch individuals at home, but we always have—— 

Mr. NADLER [continuing]. Many of these people that I have 

known, I—the people banging on my door demanding entrance, 

what did I do? Is that informed consent? 

Mr. PARMER. I can’t speak to anecdotal stories, but I know that 

we have a professional and—— 

Mr. NADLER [continuing]. Lawsuits are pending, they are not anecdotal stories. 

Mr. PARMER. They are lawsuits pending, and they are still in litigation, so—— 

Mr. NADLER. What standards? 

Mr. PARMER. If an individual is asked to allow agents to enter 

their residence, then they enter. We have had instances where— 

in the lawsuit in which you are referring to—a great many of the 

requested entries were—the agents wound up standing by the residence for hours on end waiting for someone either to come in or 

out of the residence so they could conduct their interviews; but 

they did not forcibly enter any residence. That is just against the 

law. 

Mr. NADLER. Let me go further. ICE has stated—there have been 

a lot of reports—U.S. citizens are being arrested. What is ICE’s policy regarding collateral corrections? What compensation do you give 

to people who are illegally arrested? 

Mr. PARMER. No one is arrested until their alienage is determined. If someone is—— 

Mr. NADLER. Excuse me, I don’t think that is true. U.S. citizens 

have been arrested. 

Mr. PARMER. If we can determine alienage on the spot then they 

are immediately released. As soon as we can reasonably determine 

the citizenship of an individual in our custody while we are detaining—— 

Mr. NADLER [continuing]. Five o’clock in the morning. How can 

you determine alienage? Five o’clock in the morning, on the spot? 

Mr. PARMER. Any combination of things: documentation, a combination—any reasonable responses to questions, documentation—— 

Mr. NADLER. So you think it is reasonable that anybody, as an 

American citizen, should produce his passport or other documentation, on demand, at 5 o’clock in the morning? 

Mr. PARMER. I do. 

Mr. NADLER. You do? 

Mr. PARMER. I do think that is reasonable. I mean, if someone 

awakened me at 5 o’clock in the morning, I would be able to 

produce my driver’s license or any other document to show that I 

was a legitimate citizen. I do. 

Mr. NADLER. And what if you didn’t drive? 

Mr. PARMER. Then most States have identification cards. 

Mr. NADLER. How do you know when people don’t have these— 

identification cards—— 

Mr. PARMER. And our agents are not bound by just that particular documentation. 

27 

Mr. NADLER. Are there any guidelines that have been published 

to help to show what you would look for? 

Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir. We have published guidelines to the field; 

we have a checklist that we go down. We take great precaution in 

ensuring that no U.S. citizens—— 

Mr. NADLER. Yet, ICE has admitted—U.S. citizens have been arrested. 

Mr. PARMER. No, sir. I don’t acknowledge that—— 

Mr. NADLER. You don’t. Then why—as collateral? 

Mr. PARMER. Collateral arrest could be individuals who were not 

targeted, but who happened to be illegal aliens who were present 

at the time of the individual who was targeted—— 

Mr. NADLER. My time has expired, but I would request that you 

supply the Committee, please, with all the written guidelines that 

are supplied in training, that are supplied to agents so that when 

you go to somebody’s house at 5 o’clock in the morning, what their 

instructions are to obtain consent, and what the guidelines are to 

determine alienage under those circumstances. 

Mr. PARMER. I would be happy to do that—— 

Mr. NADLER [continuing]. Figures for the—how many U.S. citizens have been arrested in the last year—— 

Mr. PARMER. I would be happy to provide that, sir. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble? 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is good to have you all with us, gentlemen. 

Admiral, last year, I am told, the Coast Guard confiscated more 

than 350,000 pounds of cocaine on the high seas, surpassing all 

previous records. How has the interagency efforts between the 

United States and our international colleagues contributed to the 

Coast Guard’s interdiction success in transit zones? 

Admiral JUSTICE. Sir, we have established, over the past few 

years, 27 separate bilateral agreements with foreign nations—various foreign nations: Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, et cetera—and we use those bilateral agreements to have 

the ability to do law enforcement with the flag-state vessels. And 

we exercise those authorities on a daily basis. 

Our ability to work with those foreign nations—which we do, as 

I said, daily—has the ability for us to deliver consequences to those 

foreign nations, the peoples. 

Mr. COBLE. Are my figures correct: 350,000 pounds? 

Admiral JUSTICE. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. COBLE. Mr. Stenger, the USA PATRIOT Act mandates Secret 

Service to establish a nationwide network of electronic crimes. 

Have these task forces been helpful in combating cyber attacks on 

the Nation’s financial and banking infrastructure? 

Mr. STENGER. Yes, sir, I believe they have. We have a national 

network of 24 of these electronic crimes task forces in conjunction 

with 29 financial crimes task forces, and I think the sharing of information and the relationships that have developed there—with 

academia, with the private sector—especially the private sector, because they are, in fact, in most of these incursions and hackings, 

are the victims. 

28 

So we are dependent upon them to inform us of this information, 

and the electronic crimes task forces really strengthen those relationships, as well as strengthen the relationships with our local 

and State partners to develop that sharing of information, that 

when they receive information on something like this, we can share 

that information and bring all of the appropriate resources to bear. 

Mr. COBLE [continuing]. Thank you. 

Mr. Self, describe, if you will, ICE’s efforts to identify, arrest, and 

remove alien gang members. 

Chief SELF. Border Patrol really has no interaction with ICE as 

it pertains to alien gang members, other than when we apprehend 

an alien gang member, at that point in time we will turn it over 

to ICE for prosecution. Sir, if you are speaking operationally, as to 

what they do in areas such as San Antonio or L.A., we don’t take 

part in those operations with them. 

Mr. COBLE. Anybody? Anybody want to respond to that question? 

Mr. PARMER. Yes. We, through Operation Community Shield, we 

do target illegal alien gang members. Since inception, we have arrested well over 8,000 illegal gang members—illegal alien gang 

members—within the last fiscal year, over 3,300. I am not sure, 

other than—specifically what your question is, how we—— 

Mr. COBLE. Yes—— 

Mr. PARMER. Very often, it is referrals from the local constabularies—the State and local department—that they are having a 

gang problem in their area, and we respond and try to develop as 

much law enforcement intelligence as we can based upon the referral, and then go out and do a sweep of the area in question. 

Mr. COBLE. Admiral, before my time expires, let me come back 

to—Alien Smuggling Act. The amendments were part of the 2008 

Coast Guard authorization, generally, tell the Subcommittee, if you 

will, why amending the Maritime Alien Smuggling Act is essential 

to the Coast Guard anti-smuggling effort. 

Admiral JUSTICE. Yes, sir. Right now, when illegal aliens on the 

high seas are smuggled, when we catch the boat we have got the 

crime in front of us. The current laws, the penalties are misdemeanor-level offenses, they don’t have any teeth, and they are 

not an inhibitor to the smugglers. In this—that the 2237 will put 

some teeth into our ability to enforce these laws. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you. 

My time has expired. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Admiral Justice, were you describing one that is on the books, or 

the one that you want on the books? 

Admiral JUSTICE. The one that is on the books now is the one 

that is not—it is weak; it is not strong enough. I am describing the 

one that we have worked to get on the books, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt? 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Admiral, for the outstanding work 

that the Coast Guard is doing on behalf of the country. You indicated that we have an agreement with Venezuela. How is that 

working? What kind of a grade—as far as that particular agreement? 

29 

Admiral JUSTICE. Surprisingly enough, sir, when it comes to 

counter-drug operations and counter-drug interactions, there is a 

facet of the Venezuelan government that will interact with us and 

we will have communications with them. So that is ongoing, sir. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. They get a good report card? 

Admiral JUSTICE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Parmer, are you familiar with the case of 

Mahir Arar? How long have you been with the—department? 

Mr. PARMER. March 1, 2003. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. March 1, 2003. Are you familiar—— 

Mr. PARMER. Since it’s inception. 

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. Of Mahir Arar, a dual national Canadian-Syrian? 

Mr. PARMER. The name doesn’t ring a bell, sir, but the circumstances—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. Facts—because I am interested if 

there is a policy within ICE or its predecessor, INS. On September 

26, 2002 this individual, Mr. Arar, was flying from Zurich to Montreal, and he was transiting through JFK Airport in New York, and 

there he was detained for hours by FBI, presumably by ICE or its 

predecessor—— 

Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. And the NYPD. And the next day he 

was sent to a detention facility in Brooklyn where he was further 

interrogated, and INS officials informed him that they would like 

him to—return to Syria. 

This is an individual who was born in Syria; he is around, I 

think, around 35 years old. He had spent the last 20 years of his 

life in Canada—was a Canadian national. He said no, he didn’t 

want to return to Syria. He was on the watch list; it was alleged 

that he was an Al Qaida associate. 

Subsequently that was proven to be correct, but on September 

28, he was given a document saying that he was inadmissible 

under section 235C of the Immigration and Nationality Act because 

he was a—of al Qaida. On October 2 he was permitted a 2-minute 

phone call; he called his mother-in-law up in Ottawa, and he expressed his concern to her that he would be sent to Syria. 

On October 4 he had a visit from the Canadian Counsel who told 

him, ‘‘Don’t worry about it; it won’t happen.’’ October 6 he was 

asked by American officials why he did not want to go to Syria, and 

he informed them that he was concerned about being tortured because he hadn’t met his military obligation prior to his leaving at 

around, I think, 17 or 18 years old. In addition, he was a Sunni, 

he indicated. 

On October 8 he read a document saying that they decided, 

based on classified information, that he was Al Qaida and that the 

INS director had decided to send him to Syria. Protestors say that 

he would be tortured, but that didn’t seem to cause any consternation. And they are saying that if he was taken in change to a private jet, flown to Jordan and then on to Syria, we—is there a policy 

in terms—you are not familiar with that case, now that I am—— 

Mr. PARMER. Mr. Delahunt, no. I apologize—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Don’t apologize. 

30 

Mr. PARMER [continuing]. But I am not familiar with it. But my 

colleague, Ms. Acom, just passed me a note saying that she is familiar with it, but as you alluded, there is a DHS-OIG report dealing with that particular issue that is classified. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right. I mean, well, just about everything is classified. But I guess what I am looking for is an unclassified to what 

the policy is when they are a dual citizen of another country, and 

in this case specifically, why Syria rather than Canada? 

Mr. PARMER. That is a very good question, sir, and I don’t 

know—obviously he was not a U.S. citizen, so he should have—it 

would stand to reason that he should have gone back to Canada 

before any decision was made, but I—because of the nature of the 

issue, I can’t—and my unfamiliarity with it—I can’t respond to 

your question. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. But somebody has got to respond at some point 

in time. 

Mr. PARMER. Perhaps our OIG could meet with you in a different 

setting and—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. But you know, the American people are very concerned about how we are viewed across the world; and it is incidents like this that erode respect for the United States, because if 

one had an opportunity to examine the Department of State reports, it was inevitable—at least if you can rely on those reports— 

that he was going to be tortured in Syria, and he was. That doesn’t 

bespeak well of what occurred, and hopefully there has been a review of that decision, and the American people deserve to know 

why he was sent to Syria rather than to Canada. 

Mr. PARMER. Yes. Yes, sir. I can’t speak to that; it predates the 

Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement. But I can assure you, in my tenure with this organization, nothing like that has occurred. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. 

Mr. PARMER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Last week—and I will address this to anyone who wants to handle it—last week the Washington Post published an article highlighting the very real possibility of a cyber attack on our Nation’s 

infrastructure by cyber terrorists. This article, together with the reports that botnets have invaded more than 5 million computers 

across the Nation and are ‘‘the weapon of choice for criminals,’’ according to FBI director Robert Mueller, illustrate the seriousness 

of this issue. 

What is the Department of Homeland Security doing to ensure 

that our cyberspace is secure, and does law enforcement have the 

tool it needs to effectively investigate and prosecute these types of 

crimes to keep our Nation safe? 

Mr. STENGER. Speaking for the Secret Service, sir, we work very 

aggressively on cyber security issues and the various aspects of 

cyber security; and some concerns the overall system security. Our 

role in the Department of Homeland Security, as an investigative 

agency, is to investigate the criminal areas. 

31 

And I think one of the issues that we have found a lot of times 

is complementary: terrorism, law enforcement and crime are not 

things that don’t go well together. Many times we find—and I 

think the old adage that not every criminal is a terrorist, but every 

terrorist is a criminal—and we find more and more, the methods 

of the criminals that are out there using cyberspace and electronic 

crimes actually enable the funding of some of their activities. 

So the lessons we learn and the information that we are receiving, both from our law enforcement partners here, from the private 

sector, as well as many of our law enforcement and private sector 

partners overseas, is really giving us some information, I think, 

that is very important to move into the overall cyber security strategy. 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes, sir. 

Admiral JUSTICE. Sir, I will add—I know, even this morning listening to the Coast Guard CIO, you know, briefing our commandant about what he is doing today, DHS is focused and aggressively attending to this issue—DHS at large. There is a meeting 

today; I think there is a tabletop sort of exercise at that level 

where they are talking about these issues. 

They are looking at having some sort of a national PFO, similar 

to how DHS is attending to the pandemic challenge. You know, 

cross-cutting, obviously is, as you know, an interagency, intergovernmental issue. But it is absolutely on the front plate of the DHS. 

Mr. CHABOT. Anybody else care to comment? Let me just bring 

to your attention a bill that has been introduced called the Cyber 

Security Enhancement Act of 2007. It was introduced by Congressman Adam Schiff, who is a Democrat from California, and myself— 

I happen to be a Republican from Ohio—so it is a bipartisan bill; 

we have 20 co-sponsors so far. In short, the bill would amend the 

Federal Criminal Code to do a number of things. 

I will list those just briefly here: Number one, prohibit accessing 

a protected computer to obtain unique identification number, address, a routing code, or access device; two, revise the definition of 

protected computer to include computers affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communications; three, expand the definition of 

racketeering to include computer fraud; four, redefine the crime of 

computer-related extortion to include threats to access without authorization or to exceed authorized access of a protected computer; 

five—and there are only seven—impose criminal penalties for conspiracy to commit computer fraud; six, require forfeiture of property used to commit computer fraud; and seven, impose criminal 

penalties for damaging ten or more protected computers during any 

1-year period. 

And it also directs the U.S. Sentencing Commission to review 

and amend its guidelines and policy statements to reflect congressional intent to increase criminal penalties for computer fraud. 

Without going into great detail, does that seem like something that 

might make it—might be a better tool for law enforcement? 

Mr. STENGER. Yes, Congressman, I am familiar with that. We do 

support that because I think in today’s environment with cyber 

crimes, the evolving nature of these types of crimes need to be addressed in evolving legislative initiatives in order to be able to address those appropriately. 

32 

And whether it is new laws or enhancing the existing laws, I 

think it is very opportune to be able to do that as these crime types 

have developed. So we are very supportive of the Committee looking at new ways to address the evolving criminal nature of what 

is taking place. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

I see my time has expired, so I will yield back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much, 

and—— 

Admiral JUSTICE. I would say it is a DHS issue, that TSA should 

technically be overseeing the TWIC issue. We are supporting it in 

the ports, and we feel at this time—it is a phased implementation, 

and we feel we are on track to move forward. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Even though—— 

Admiral JUSTICE. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. And the question is, do you have 

enough personnel to—— 

Admiral JUSTICE. Yes we do, ma’am. The 2009 budget request 

that we have, that is the right amount. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me just ask—— 

Admiral JUSTICE. Okay. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. I don’t ask questions. Let me go 

straight to the question? 

Mr. BROWN. Well, we work off of a protocol that is dictated by 

threat—on our ability, and we have assessed all the flights that 

we—by a risk-based strategic deployment policy. That is how we 

identify the flights that we are wanting to address. I am not quite 

sure what you mean, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, let me stop you—— 

Mr. BROWN. Sure. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. What I would like to know is—— 

Mr. BROWN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. That we are having difficulty 

with the children at the border—, and I would like to know what 

we are doing—children being held—what are you doing to ensure 

that that is not happening. 

Chief SELF. Yes, ma’am. Border Patrol is presently working with 

the Office of Refugee Resettlement. What happens is, when we apprehend an unaccompanied minor, we will take him in and we will 

go through the processing with the minor. At that point, we start 

engaging with ORR and trying to find them bed space. 

There are times when we can’t find bed space; we just revamped 

a hold room policy that ensures that that minor is taken care of. 

Within the hold policy, it outlines that that minor will have two to 

three hot meals a day, and any request for—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. For 72 hours, that absolutely, 

without a doubt. 

Chief SELF. I cannot tell you that. But I can tell you that we are 

doing everything we can to work with ORR, civil rights, civil liberties, to ensure that they are moved out of our detention space as 

quickly as we can. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me pursue that with you. 

33 

Chief SELF. I understand, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And I thank you. 

Mr. PARMER. Yes, ma’am. I think we will all agree that was a 

very unfortunate incident. I did not personally attend the function, 

which was intended to be a fundraiser, but I think it is our overall 

regret and embarrassment, and this organization is well on the 

record. And we have very proactive measures in terms of sensitivities to ethnicity and EEO matters that have been reinvigorated as 

a result of that incident. And I—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. More detail. 

Mr. PARMER. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. It affects, if you will—— 

Mr. PARMER. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. I appreciate—a more detailed response. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

We are going to have a couple more questions, and I would recognize myself. 

First, Mr. Parmer, the GAO has a report on ICE practices that 

identified some problem areas. Could you provide us with the list 

of problem areas that were identified and what you have done since 

October 2007 to address them? 

Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir. I think the crux of the report had to do 

with officers’ discretion in the field about detention—ability to release from detention and humanitarian concerns. And as an organization, we have taken on—— 

Mr. SCOTT. If you could provide us with the report in which you 

have got in writing, we would appreciate it. 

Mr. PARMER. Yes, sir. I will—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Does ICE have a policy against torture? 

Mr. PARMER. We do not torture, no, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. And to follow up on the gentleman from Massachusetts, do you coordinate with other nations to have people tortured? 

Mr. PARMER. No, sir. We do not in any form or fashion condone 

torture. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. Stenger, there have been reports that some of the government computers were hacked, possibly by people from China. What 

is the status—can you give us any update in open session as to 

what the status of that is? 

Mr. STENGER. Mr. Chairman, because of, I think, the sensitivity 

of it, it is going to be very difficult to comment on it, but I do believe that there are steps being taken to secure the systems—not 

only government systems, but military systems and private sector 

systems—from malicious malware that is out there to prevent 

losses like that could take place. 

Mr. SCOTT. In the ID theft, one of the problems with consumer 

ID theft is, what usually happens is when someone gets their identification compromised and someone runs up charges on their credit card, what usually happens is the bank writes it off. There, at 

that point, are no complaining witnesses and the thief pretty much 

gets away. What would it take to set up an operation where routine 

ID theft could be actually investigated and prosecuted? 

34 

Mr. STENGER. Mr. Chairman, because of the fact that it really 

cross-cuts many jurisdictions, I think the task force model that we 

have—we are a very strong proponent of both the electronic crime 

and the financial crime task forces—is really, ultimately, the answer to this situation; because we don’t have thresholds for investigations—I know there was some discussion about thresholds for 

prosecution—but for us, as an investigative agency, we take everything individually on its merit. So if someone brings forth a case 

to us on identity theft, we will take a look at it and try and work 

it in the proper context. 

Mr. SCOTT. So most of these can be solved, but they are laborintesive? 

Mr. STENGER. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. My question is, how much would we need to appropriate? We appropriated a few million dollars when we passed the 

last bill—that was about 2 years ago. We had in there some funding for ID theft investigations. I assumed it was woefully insufficient. My question is, what would we need to do to have an operation that could routinely track these things down? 

Mr. STENGER. I think because of the nature—the evolving nature 

of this type of crime in cyberspace, it would be difficult to quantify 

an exact amount of money, but I do think that we must maintain 

recognition of the evolving nature of these crimes as well as legislation I think that is the right path to take, especially for identity 

theft, because it is not only a problem here, it is a problem overseas. And that—— 

Mr. SCOTT. You made a request for funding? 

Mr. STENGER. Have we made a request? I would have to go back 

specifically to track that, as far as—— 

Mr. SCOTT. We would be looking for that, because we would like 

to fund sufficient operation to deter people from committing identity theft. 

Admiral Justice, you mentioned the legislation that you wanted. 

Could you describe the—exactly what conduct you want proscribed 

in the new legislation? 

Admiral JUSTICE. Yes, sir. We specifically are looking to make it 

illegal to just operate one of these vessels in international waters. 

A stateless vessel in international waters, if you are operating it, 

that is a crime. There is no good—— 

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. Crime in the United States? 

Admiral JUSTICE. It would be a crime punishable in the United 

States, yes, sir. There is no reason to have that out there, other 

than illicit activity. 

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. Any criminal activity—without proving 

any criminal activity, just the mere operation in international waters—— 

Admiral JUSTICE. That is correct. Yes, sir. What happens is—— 

Mr. SCOTT. A crime prosecutable in the United States? 

Admiral JUSTICE. That is correct. Yes, sir. What happens, sir, is 

you can see they are going along, and the minute they counter-detect us, they throw one switch, the thing floods, and it goes to the 

bottom. And we can’t get the cocaine off of it, and they are homefree. 

Mr. SCOTT. If there is legitimate use of these—— 

35 

Admiral JUSTICE. If there is a legitimate use, there would be a 

state; there would be a country that owned it, an owner. And if 

they could produce some ownership, it is not a crime. I am talking 

about a stateless vessel, there is no proof of where they came from 

or whose nationality it is. That is the key piece here. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Chairman. If you want to do something on that, I would be glad to join in with you. It does sound 

like if it is a stateless vessel that it is, you know, basically—speaks 

for itself—that it is a violation, and that is why they are wanting 

to remain anonymous. 

Let me ask Admiral Justice, under the 1995 change to the Cuban 

Adjustment Act, Cubans who attempt to enter the United States 

over water are given parole status for 1 year and allowed to seek 

U.S. citizenship if they make it to dry land. If they don’t make it 

to dry land, they are interdicted by the Coast Guard, detained, and 

sent back to Cuba. 

As a result of that policy, smugglers engage in dangerous practices—place migrants in a dangerous situation. I am just wondering, have you ever questioned the wisdom of this wet-feet, dryfeet policy, and have you ever considered whether that policy ought 

to be changed? I am just curious to your thoughts on it. 

Admiral JUSTICE. It does create an extraordinary challenge to us, 

and an incentive for lawlessness and for people to take great risks 

as they try to get to our sand—to our beach. And that—law, and 

that constitutes a definite challenge in the Florida Straits; it requires us to have extraordinary amounts of resources dedicated to 

the challenge, and it—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, without leaving our country completely unprotected, do you have a policy that would cause less challenge? Of 

course, less challenge would be where you don’t ever protect us 

from anybody coming in, but—policy like that—— 

Admiral JUSTICE. What we are asking, sir—and you supported it 

and we ask you just aim at some more definitive support—the 

Interauthorization Act, the law we would like to see as I mentioned 

to Congressman Coble, has stiffer penalties for the people we do 

catch out there; and we catch people, again, daily running highspeed, overloaded boats. We get them to stop, and we don’t have 

enough teeth in the law to really make it not worth their time to 

do that. We want to make it not worth their time to try to smuggle 

people at high speeds, you know, into our Nation. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Chief Self, my office was told that I could have 

access to the remains of the plane that Clint Thrasher was flying. 

Do you know who has possession of those remains? 

Admiral JUSTICE. I believe it is going to be Air and Marine under 

CBP, sir. The plane is presently located at the El Paso International Airport. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Stenger, who has primary jurisdiction to investigate things 

like Congress’ computer systems being hacked into? Is that you or 

FBI—who has primary jurisdiction? 

Mr. STENGER. Depending on what kind of crime it is—we share 

jurisdiction in many of these things. If it is a criminal attempt, obviously we share jurisdiction with the FBI; so either one of us or 

36 

both of us could work together depending on what the case looked 

like when it was initially brought forward. Certainly if it was terrorism, the Bureau would have primary jurisdiction. 

Mr. GOHMERT. If it is terrorism; but if it is not for sure that it 

is terrorism, then we don’t have a delineation as to who takes priority in investigating that? 

Mr. STENGER. Unless it is set by MOU, Congressman, it could be 

co-worked together. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Is there an MOU, or is it just MOUSE? 

Mr. STENGER. I am not sure there is an MOU specifically on that 

concerning the Capitol, but I do believe that we do have an excellent working relationship with the FBI on this—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, I understand that, but it sometimes—I 

know how it works: If two entities have the same jurisdiction, 

sometimes there is a battle and things get falling in the cracks. 

And we do have a problem, and I have been advised that—our 

members’ financial information, some of it has been put online and 

made available to anybody out there on the Internet; and that 

wasn’t even a crime, it was our own people getting it out there. 

I am also told that the home address of all of you, all of us, all 

of that information is obtainable on the Internet, and I am just 

wondering if we don’t need more protective laws to allow people to 

have greater privacy, because there is so much out there on everybody. I was at a briefing back when I was a judge where we were 

shown how people in prison, who may have been mad at us for 

sending them there, could get on the Internet, not only find out 

where exactly we live, floor plans for many of our homes, get a map 

printed out of how to get there and where to go in the home to go 

after whoever you want to go—it is amazing what is out there. 

Do you feel like there ought to be more extensive laws protecting 

private information online? 

Mr. STENGER. Congressman, I think that the globalization of information is a major problem—it is a major issue—and it is instantaneous. It is not like it used to be in just being delivered by the 

mail; it is instantaneous sharing of information. Specifically for 

this location and the Capitol, I believe the Capitol police would 

probably have the primary jurisdiction, and depending on their resources and availability, they would work together with us or the 

FBI. 

But specifically—as mentioned by the congressman concerning 

the new legislation, that is an issue. I think existing laws need to 

be looked at, resources need to be looked at on a regular basis—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. That is why we are asking you not just, ‘‘Do we 

need to look at it?’’ but, ‘‘What do you recommend?’’ That is what 

I am getting to. You all are supposed to be the experts. 

Mr. STENGER. Well, I think the recommendation would be, as 

crime evolves we do need to look at enhancing the existing laws. 

First off, the—globalization—international aspect of it needs to be 

addressed because it is continuing—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, I know it needs to be addressed, and we 

thought we were doing that by inviting you up here. So we are trying to do that; we just need recommendations on exactly what to 

do. So I would ask if you would submit information in writing to 

us after the hearing that would give specific recommendations as 

37 

to what we could do to better protect ourselves and everybody out 

there, including you—you know if all your private information online—have you ever checked? 

Mr. STENGER. It probably is, and I am, too, concerned; I think 

it has got to be everyone’s concern. But we will be happy to provide 

that to you. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay, thank you. 

Thank you, Chairman, for your indulgence. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

This concludes the hearing. I would ask the witnesses to—if 

there are other questions from the panel, they will be submitted in 

writing—would ask the witnesses to respond to those as quickly as 

possible so that they can be made part of the record. Without objection, the record will remain open for 1 additional week for additional comments and anything else people want to introduce. 

With that, the hearing is now adjourned. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(39) 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN CONYERS, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE

JUDICIARY

In 2002, we brought a number of agencies together because of their expertise and 

capabilities so that we could create our best domestic defense against terrorism. Although no system is perfect, I think that we’ve had some success and I think that 

we’re making progress. And, I thank Chairman Bobby Scott for holding this hearing 

an exchange of information and feedback such as this hearing is crucial for ensuring 

that we remain on the cutting edge against terrorism because sadly in today’s 

world, we cannot afford to let our defenses down. 

In today’s hearing, I would like to emphasize that in keeping those defenses up, 

we also have to be sure that we are working just as hard to safeguard our civil liberties. After all, we could ensure our safety easily enough by clamping down on 

rights and liberties but that’s not what America is about. If we were to do that, we 

would be safe but in effect, it would be a victory for the terrorists because they 

would change our way of life. So, we must strike that balance in which we’re physically safe and safe within our liberties as well. 

Today, we will hear from the Transportation Security Administration main law 

enforcement function, the Federal Air Marshals, the Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Secret Service, and the 

Coast Guard. Each has important functions and enormous challenges but mainly I 

would like to discuss ICE CPB and their operations. 

I have three main concerns that I would like to address and the first is humanitarian. Reports of poor conditions for detainees particularly along the Southwest 

border raises some disturbing allegations. ICE and CBP have adopted a ‘‘zero tolerance’’ policy has pushed detention facilities past their capacities. Food, medicine, 

even blankets are apparently hard to come by and people are sleeping on nothing 

but concrete slabs. This concerns me because if the allegations are true, we are depriving people of basic necessities and it must be corrected. 

The second is the delegation of ICE authority through the section 287(g) of the 

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA). We need 

to be sure that state and local law enforcement officers who enforce ICE responsibilities receive the proper training. They must be trained in the laws pertaining to unauthorized aliens, what constitutes being an unauthorized alien and we also must 

ensure and that their detention facilities meet the standards to ensure proper care. 

The third concern is whether Due Process rights are being properly protected for 

detainees. The zero tolerance approach along the Southwest border is not only causing poor conditions in the holding facilities but apparently, access to adequate counsel is also in doubt. There are so many detainees that one lawyer must handle up 

to six or eight clients per day and there is little or no room to meet with clients 

confidentially. This raises serious concerns about whether detainees are receiving 

adequate counsel and if not, Due Process is not properly awarded in these cases, 

which would be unconstitutional. 

In addressing these issues, I would like to hear from these witnesses about how 

their agencies are addressing the concerns. I should think that if ICE and CBP continue to pursue zero tolerance we would see requests for more and better detention 

facilities that would include upgraded health care. We should also see continuous 

improvement to their training of state and local officers to whom they delegate authority and requirements for those officers to have continuing education in order to 

keep their authority. Finally, I would like to see recommendations for increases to 

the federal public defenders’ offices so that detainees can be adequately represented 

in our courts. 

40 

I am looking forward to discussing these issues today because they are a great 

concern to me. Again, I thank Chairman Bobby Scott for holding this important 

hearing and I yield back. 

f 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, 

TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership in convening today’s very important 

hearing on the oversight of the Department of Homeland Security. I would also like 

to thank the ranking member the Honorable Louie Gohmert. Welcome to our distinguished panelists. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established six years ago. The 

National Strategy for Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 

served to mobilize and organize our nation to secure the homeland from terrorist 

attacks. As part of the creation of DHS, the following law enforcement agencies 

were either transformed to DHS or created via consolidation of two or more agencies: the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the United States Secret Service, 

and the U.S. Coast Guard. 

The primary reason for the establishment of DHS was to provide the unifying core 

for the vast network of organizations and institutions involved in the efforts to secure our nation. In order to better do this and to provide guidance to the 180,000 

DHS men and women who work every day on this important task, the Department 

developed its own high-level strategic plan. The vision, mission statements, strategic 

goals and objectives provide the framework guiding the actions that make up the 

daily operations of the Department. 

DHS’s vision is simple: to preserve our freedoms, protect America, and secure our 

homeland. Its mission is to lead the unified national effort to secure America; prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation; and ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants 

and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce. 

DHS has seven strategic goals and objectives. These include, awareness, prevention, protection, response, recovery, service, and organizational excellence. 

DHS has engaged in much good work over the past six years, but more needs to 

be done. The five agencies that comprise DHS, their functions, their accomplishments, and their challenges are the subject of this hearing. 

I. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA)

The TSA’s main law enforcement functions are carried out through the Federal 

Air Marshals and the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Programs. The 

Federal Air Marshals are the primary law enforcement entity within the TSA. They 

are deployed on flights around the world and in the United States to ensure security 

of the plane and the passengers during flight. The Federal Air Marshals staff several positions at different organizations such as the National Couterterrorism Center, the National Targeting Center, and on the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Forces. The Federal Marshals also work among other 

law enforcement and homeland security liaison assignments during times of heightened alert or special national events. 

In its 2005 oversight hearing, the Subcommittee questioned administrators about 

several issues including undercover appearance, aircraft boarding procedures, lodging policies and standards of conduct. On March 5, 2008, during a full Committee 

hearing, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff stated that the biggest air threat posed 

to the U.S. is by private jets entering U.S. airspace. During this hearing, we plan 

to follow-up on these issues and inquire about other aspects of air travel security. 

II. UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP)

CBP is responsible for protecting our nation’s borders from terrorism, human and 

drug smuggling, illegal immigration, and agricultural pests while simultaneously facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade. CBP is responsible for guarding 

7 thousand miles of land border of the United States with Canada and Mexico and 

2 thousand miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida peninsula and off the 

coast of Southern California. The agency also protects 95,000 miles of maritime border in partnership with the United States Coast Guard. CBP is also responsible for 

enforcing trade and tariff laws to ensure that industry operates in a fair and comVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:49 Nov 20, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CRIME\031108\41189.000 HJUD1 PsN: 41189
41 

petitive trade environment. This hearing will examine CBP standards for questioning individuals at the borders, human trafficking and what CBP does to combat 

this problem, and various problems associated with detention and removal. 

III. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT

Immigration and Customs Enforcement is the largest investigative branch of 

DHS. This agency was created after the tragic events of 9/11, by combining the law 

enforcement arms of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service and the 

former U.S. Customs Service, to more effectively enforce immigration and customs 

laws and to protect the United States from terrorist attacks. 

Since its creation, ICE’s workload has continuously increased. ICE has increased 

its worksite enforcement arrests from 510 in fiscal year 2002, to 4,383 in fiscal year 

2006. ICE’s Office of Detention and Removal Operations more than doubled its fugitive arrests from 7,958 in fiscal year 2005 to 15,467 in fiscal year 2006. In fiscal 

year 2006 alone, ICE removed about 182,000 aliens from the United States through 

its combined enforcement efforts. Nevertheless, at the end of fiscal year 2006, there 

were still an estimated 12 million unauthorized aliens in the United States. 

In a report to Representative Lofgren and myself, the Government Accountability 

Office recommended several changes for ICE to improve its operations. GAO recognized that given the sheer number of unauthorized aliens, ICE would need to 

prioritize workloads and exercise officer discretion. For example, an alien who poses 

a threat via terrorism or other crime must be detained. On the other hand, humanitarian situations such as when an alien who poses no immediate threat and is a 

primary care giver, may call for the ICE officer issue a notice to appear rather than 

detention. Questions have been raised as to whether ICE’s policies and training 

have been sufficient to impart the necessary expertise to the ICE officer to equip 

them to make the proper determination as to whether an alien should be detained 

or issued a notice. In addition to needing increased officer discretion, detention 

space may also factor into whether to detain an alien. The Subcommittee will request information about alternatives to detention and the acquisition of additional 

detention space. 

IV. UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

The United States Secret Service protects the president and the vice-president, 

their families, heads of state, and other designated individuals; investigates threats 

against these protectees; protects the White House, vice-president’s residence, foreign missions, and other buildings within Washington, D.C.; and plans and implements security for designated National Special Security Events. 

The Secret Service also investigates violations of laws relating to counterfeiting 

of United States currency and other financial crimes including: access device fraud, 

financial institution fraud, identity theft, computer fraud and other computer-based 

attacks on our nation’s banking and telecommunications infrastructure. 

The Subcommittee plans to inquire about when the Secret Service gets involved 

in state or local identity theft and the resources the Service needs to adequately 

combat identity theft and other cybercrimes in the United States and abroad. 

V. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

The United States Coast Guard’s law enforcement mission is maritime security. 

The goal of maritime security is to protect America’s maritime borders from all intrusions by: (a) halting the flow of illegal drugs, aliens, and contraband into the 

United States through maritime routes; (b) preventing illegal fishing; and (c) suppressing violations of federal law in the maritime arena. This Subcommittee is concerned about the Coast Guard updating its technology and increasing personnel to 

meet its increasingly challenging mission. The Subcommittee will explore whether 

the Coast Guard has sufficient resources to carry out its goals. 

I am eager to hear testimony from, and question, all of the agencies represented 

today. I welcome each of our distinguished panelists to provide insight into the various agencies that comprise DHS. The Department has achieved much over the past 

six years in ensuring that America is a safer place; however, much work needs to 

be done. I am hopeful that DHS will become more effective and diverse and that 

this hearing will help start us along the way. Again, I welcome the testimony from 

our distinguished panelists. 

Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time. 

f 

42 


A-1.eps
43 

f 


A-2.eps
44 


B-1.eps
45 


B-2.eps
46 


B-3.eps
47 


B-4.eps
48 


B-5.eps
49 


B-6.eps
50 


B-7.eps
51 

f 


B-8.eps
52 


C-1.eps
53 


C-2.eps
54 


C-3.eps
55 


C-4.eps
56 


C-5.eps
57 


C-6.eps
58 


C-7.eps
59 


C-8.eps
60 


C-9.eps
61 


C-10.eps
62 


C-11.eps
63 


C-12.eps
64 


C-13.eps
65 


C-14.eps
66 

f 


C-15.eps
67 


D-1.eps
68 


D-2.eps
69 


D-3.eps
70 


D-4.eps
71 


D-5.eps
72 


D-6.eps
73 


D-7.eps
74 


D-8.eps
75 


D-9.eps
76 

Æ 


D-10.eps