alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT      32.2**

**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO**

**18      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

|   | (1) | the                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,                and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | the                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Partnership. |
|--------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| By:    | /s/                Matthew A. Jones                                    |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Name:  | Matthew                A. Jones                                        |
| Title: | Chief                Financial Officer of the Managing General Partner |
| Date:  | May                11, 2007                                            |
Amendment No. 3, dated as of September 21, 2007, to Warrant Agreement



 Exhibit 4.1 
 Amendment #3 to Chiquita Brands International, Inc. 
 Common Stock Warrant Agreement 

This Amendment #3 to the Chiquita Brands International, Inc. Common Stock Warrant Agreement (the “Amendment”) is made as of
September 21, 2007 by and between Chiquita Brands International, Inc., a New Jersey corporation (the “Company”), and Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, a national banking association (“Wells Fargo”). Any
capitalized terms not defined herein shall have the meaning set forth in the Chiquita Brands International, Inc. Common Stock Warrant Agreement (the “Agreement”) dated as of March 19, 2002 by and between the Company and
American Security Transfer Company Limited Partnership, as amended June 24, 2005, and as further amended March 27, 2006. 
 WHEREAS, the Company and Wells Fargo desire to amend the Agreement to provide that the warrants may be held in un-certificated book-entry form on the books of the transfer agent (the “Transfer Agent”) for the Company’s
outstanding securities. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises and mutual covenants contained in this Amendment, the parties
hereby agree as follows: 
 1. A new Section 1.6 is hereby added to the Agreement, which section shall state the following: 
 Section 1.6 Book-Entry Warrants. Any Warrant Certificate issued pursuant to this Agreement may be issued through the Direct Registration System as a
book-entry on the Company’s records, as maintained by the Transfer Agent. Any such Warrant Certificate issued through the Direct Registration System shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of this Agreement as a Warrant Certificate
registered in any other manner. 
 2. The definition “Warrant Certificates” appearing in Article VII of the Agreement shall be amended in its
entirety to state the following: 
 “Warrant Certificates” shall have the meaning provided in the preamble, and may be evidenced by
book-entry statements, transaction advices or any other evidence of issuance and registration through the Direct Registration System on the Company’s records as maintained by the Transfer Agent. 
 [SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS] 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company and Wells Fargo have caused this Amendment to he signed by their
respective duly authorized officers, and the same to be attested by their respective Secretaries or one of their respective Assistant Secretaries, all as of the day and year first written above. 
  

			
	CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ James E. Thompson

	Name:	 	James E. Thompson
	Title:	 	Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary


  

			
	Attest:
	
	/s/ Barbara M. Howland
	Name:	 	Barbara M. Howland
	Title:	 	Assistant Secretary

  

			
	WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Peggy Sime

	Name:	 	Peggy Sime
	Title:	 	Assistant Vice President


  

			
	Attest:
	
	/s/ Cindy Gesme
	Name:	 	Cindy Gesme
	Title:	 	Assistant Vice President
II 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2417 

To suspend temporarily the duty on certain occupancy sensors. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 26, 2012 

Mr. SCHUMER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on certain occupancy 

sensors. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CERTAIN OCCUPANCY SENSORS. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

7 new heading: 

‘‘ 9902.01.00 Switches designed for lighting 

control, activated by dual 

passive infrared sensors that 

detect the presence of any occupant of the coverage area, 

with lens masking for adjusting the field of view of the 

sensors (provided for in subheading 8536.50.90) ............. Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2015 ’’. 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2417 IS

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
No. 47790.

#### Protest 84628-K/90971 of Julius Wile Sons & Co., Inc. (Chicago).

Opinion by

Keefe, J.

From an examination of the official papers the court was. unable to find anything sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness attaching to the action-of the collector. The protest was therefore overruled.
#### John D. Bush, plaintiff in error, *vs.*Henry Elson and John Elson, defendants in error.

*Error to Dubuque.*

A verdict for less than fifty dollars damages, in an action of replevin, in the District Court, does not determine its jurisdiction of the ease.

The test of jurisdiction, is the amount claimed in the plaintiff’s declaration, and not the amount found to be due, by the verdict of the jury.

The facts of the case are sufficiently stated by defendant’s council, and in the opinion of the court.

Tiiomas, Berry & Rogers, for plaintiff in error.

Hempstead, for defendants in error:—.

The court will observe, that this is an action of replevin, or an action of *tort.*The sum demanded, and not the amount recovered, is the subject which gives the District Court jurisdiction in all actions of tort. Dallas Reports, U. S. S. C., 401 ; 1 Condensed U. S. Reports, 185. In this action, it will be seen, that the amount of property, specified in the declaration, is sixty dollars, and the damages (or the taking of the same arc laid at seventy-five dollars, clearly bringing this suit within *317the jurisdiction of the District Court. And the court having once taken jurisdiction in this case, could not be ousted of that jurisdiction, by the amount of the verdict recovered.

Per Curiam,

Mason, Chief Justice.

The defendants in error, brought an action of replevin against the plaintiff in error, for two yoke ot oxen, and claiming in his declaration, damages to the amount of sixty dollars. The jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff below, of thirty-five dollars. A motion was then made to set aside the verdict, for want of jurisdiction ; the sum recovered being less than fifty dollars. That motion being overruled, the question is brought up for revision here.

The act of 3d February, 1843, gives the District Court jurisdiction where the debt or demand or cause of action shall amount to fifty dollars or upwards, shall the test of jurisdiction be the amount claimed in the declaration or that found due by the verdict ?

We think the question of jurisdiction should be capable of being determined at the beginning, rather than at the termination of the proceedings, and such we presume is the universal practice of courts under similar statutes. We know of no instance where the question of jurisdiction has been made dependent upon the verdict of the jury, but it is always made capable of ascertainment at some preliminary stage of the proceedings. One jury might assess one amount of damages *;*another might agree upon a much larger amount. If this case had been sent out of the District Court on account of the verdict being too small, it might at the next trial be sent out of the justice’s court for an equally good reason, because the verdict was too large. This would be a very inconvenient rule. As well for this reason, as for that of such a course being in opposition to the general course of practice in like cases, we think the decision of the court below should be sustained.

Judgment affirmed accordingly.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2360 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2360

       To suspend temporarily the duty on certain food choppers.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 25, 2012

   Mr. Levin introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
       To suspend temporarily the duty on certain food choppers.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CERTAIN FOOD CHOPPERS.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``     9902.01.00      Food choppers,      Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/  ''.
                        each having a                                                      31/2015.......
                        removable clear
                        plastic lid, such
                        lid containing
                        one control
                        button for
                        chopping and one
                        control button
                        for pureeing, and
                        which interlocks
                        with a clear
                        plastic bowl,
                        with bowl
                        capacity greater
                        than 0.7 liter
                        but not exceeding
                        0.9 liter
                        (provided for in
                        subheading
                        8509.40.00)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
with respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
```
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 152 (Thursday, August 7, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 42551]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-20823]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[FRL-5871-6]

Proposed Prospective Purchaser Agreement Under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency.

ACTION: Notice of a Prospective Purchaser Agreement and Covenant Not to 
Sue Rosey's Pit Cleaning, Camden, New Jersey for a Property Within the 
Welsbach/General Gas Mantle Contamination Site.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is 
proposing to enter into a Prospective Purchaser Agreement to provide 
Rosey's Pit Cleaning, Camden, New Jersey, a covenant not to sue under 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 
of 1980 (CERCLA), as amended, in connection with its proposed purchase 
and development of a property related to general contamination from the 
former Gas Mantle facility. This agreement is intended to resolve a 
potentially responsible party's liability for certain response costs 
incurred and to be incurred by EPA at the Welsbach/General Gas Mantle 
Contamination Superfund Site in Camden, New Jersey. Notice is being 
published to inform the public of the Proposed Prospective Purchaser 
Agreement and of the opportunity to comment.

DATE: Comments must be provided on or before September 8, 1997.

ADDRESS: Comments should be addressed to the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Office of Regional Counsel, 290 Broadway--17th 
Floor, New York, NY 10007 and should refer to: In the Matter of the 
Welsbach/General Gas Mantle Contamination Superfund Site: Rosey's Pit 
Cleaning, Camden, New Jersey, U.S. EPA Index No. II-CERCLA-97-0113.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
Office of Regional Counsel, 290 Broadway--17th Floor, New York, NY 
10007, Attention: Virginia Curry, Esq. (212) 637-3134.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given of a Proposed 
Prospective Purchaser Agreement with Rosey's Pit Cleaning, Camden, New 
Jersey, resolving the company's potential liability for a property 
within the Welsbach/General Gas Mantle Contamination Superfund Site. 
CERCLA authorizes EPA to enter into this agreement. The Department of 
Justice approved this agreement pursuant to the inherent settlement 
authority of the Attorney General to settle claims of the United 
States.
    A copy of the Proposed Prospective Purchaser Agreement may be 
obtained by mail from EPA's Region II Office of Regional Counsel, 290 
Broadway--17th Floor, New York, NY 10007.
    Proposed Prospective Purchaser Agreement under CERCLA--Welsbach/
General Gas Mantle Contamination Superfund Site.

    Dated: June 30, 1997.
Jeanne M. Fox,
Regional Administrator.
[FR Doc. 97-20823 Filed 8-6-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
```
# C_2013377EN.01001001.xml

| 21.12.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 377/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.12.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 377/10

---

Order of the President of the Court of 12 September 2013 — European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria

(Case C-203/13) (1)

1

2013/C 377/22

Language of the case: Bulgarian

The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 164, 8.6.2013.

1

---
#### Edward BREAUX, Jr., and Jessie Guillot v. HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 11332.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

June 13, 1977.

Falterman & Joffrion by Steven Joffrion, Pierre Part, for plaintiff-appellant.

Edward W. Gray, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellee.

Pugh, Lanier & Pugh by Walter I. Lanier, Jr., Thibodaux, for plaintiff-appellant.

Before LANDRY, EDWARDS and COLE, JJ.

EDWARDS, Judge.

This is a tort suit brought by the driver (Breaux) and the guest passenger (Guillot) in a pickup truck against the liability insurer of an automobile. The guest passenger did not sue the host driver or his liability insurer, but only sued the liability insurer of the other vehicle.

*1214After trial on the merits the trial judge dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit at their costs. Both plaintiffs have appealed.

The accident occurred on a two-lane blacktop state highway in Assumption Parish, and the plaintiffs’ version of the accident is that the defendant’s vehicle backed out of a driveway onto the highway in front of them and that in order to avoid striking the automobile broadside, Breaux hit his brakes, swerved to the left, lost control, hit a mail box and a tree.

The defendant’s version of the accident is that its insured backed out of the driveway, carefully looked down the road, straightened out, and had gone approximately 150 to 175 ft., down the highway when a passenger in the automobile noticed that the pickup truck behind them was going off the road.

The two vehicles did not make any contact with each other.

Although the trial judge did not give reasons, his dismissal of the guest passenger’s suit as well as the pickup driver’s suit leads to the obvious conclusion that he found no negligence on the part of the automobile driver (Hartford’s insured).

There is adequate evidence in the record through the testimony of Mr. Bourg, the automobile driver; his wife, Mrs. Atlas Bourg; and another witness, Tammie Ma-bile, to support the trial judge’s conclusions of fact. *Canter v. Koehring Company,*283 So.2d 716 (La.1973). There has been shown no manifest error on the part of the lower court.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed at appellants’ costs.

AFFIRMED.
#### City of Pittsburgh *v.*Meyers, Appellant.

Argued May 2, 1933.

Before Trexler, P. J., Keller, Cunnin-gham, Baldrige, Stadteeld, Parker and James, JJ.

*318
      *C. Elmer Bown,*and with him *Henry A. Jones,*for appellant.

*Benjamin L. Steinberg,*Assistant City Solicitor, and with him *Charles A. Waldschmidt,*City Solicitor, for appellee.

October 2, 1933:

Opinion by

Jambs, J.,

The defendant appeals from an order of the court below making absolute a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense to a scire facias sur municipal lien for the assessment of benefits in the construction of a trunk sanitary sewer in the City of Pittsburgh under a joint agreement between the City of Pittsburgh, Mt. Oliver Borough and the Township of Baldwin. The affidavit of defense averred that neither the acts of assembly providing for the joint construction of said sewer nor the said written agreement between said municipalities authorizing the joint construction thereof provides for the assessment of the cost of said improvement or any part thereof on abutting property owners, and'that the viewers’ proceeding and the assessment made upon the defendant were without authority of law and void.

Defendant in his affidavit of defense raises the same questions as were involved ' in the appeal of the *319Terminal Coal Company et al., 110 Pa. Superior Ct. 310, in which appeal an opinion has been filed this date. In view of our holding that the assessments made by the viewers in said- viewers ’ proceeding were legal, the action of the court in directing, judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense in the present ease was proper.

Judgment affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 32

March 31, 2005

Via EDGAR
Securities and Exchange Commission
Judiciary Plaza
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20549

Re:  Certification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
     Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Ladies and Gentlemen:

     In connection with the Annual Report of LL&E Royalty Trust (the "Trust") on
Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, not in
its individual capacity but solely as the trustee of the Trust, certifies
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to its knowledge:

          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
     or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

          (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Trust at the dates and for the periods presented.

     The above certification is furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350) and is not being filed as part of
the Form 10-K or as a separate disclosure document.

                                          JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
                                          Trustee for LL&E Royalty Trust

                                          By:        /s/ MIKE ULRICH
                                            ------------------------------------
                                                        Mike Ulrich
                                              Vice President and Trust Officer
No. 48872.

#### Protests 99110-K, etc., of Strauss-Eckardt Co., Inc., et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Keefe, J,

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
No. 44331.

#### Protests 936572-G, etc., of E. W. J. Hearty, Inc. (New York).

Opinion by

Keefe, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel and on the authority of *Stokby*v. *United States*(4 Cust. Ct. 343, C. D. 358) it was held that the merchandise is properly dutiable at 3)4 cents per pound under paragraph 703, Tariff Act of 1930, on the basis of the net weight of the contents of the cans less 10 percent allowance for the gelatinous material.
No. 00-6139.

#### Hebert *v.*United States.

C. A. 5th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.
#### Abercrombie & Fitch Co. *v.*United States

No. 7797.

Entry No. 703485.

(Decided February 15, 1950)

*Lane, Young & Fox (William II. Fox*of counsel) for the plaintiff.

*David N. Edelstein,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Rao, Judge:

This appeal for reappraisement has been submitted for decision upon the following stipulation of counsel for the parties hereto:

> IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, subject to the approval of the Court, that the issues in the appeal for reappraisement listed above are the same in all material respects as the issues decided in UNITED STATES *v.*WM. S. PITCAIRN CORP., Suit No. 4513, C. A. D. 334, and that the record in said case may be incorporated herein.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the appraised values of the merchandise involved in the case enumerated above, less the additions made by the importer on entry because of advances by the appraiser in similar cases, are equal to the prices, at the time of exportation of such merchandise to the United States, at which such or similar merchandise is freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of the country from which exported, in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade, for exportation to the United States, and that the foreign value of such or similar merchandise is no higher.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that this case may be submitted on the foregoing stipulation.

*553On the agreed facts I find the export value, as that value is defined in section 402 (d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, to be the proper basis for the determination of the value of the merchandise here involved, and that such values are the appraised values, less the additions made by the importer on entry because of advances by the appraiser in similar cases.

Judgment will be rendered accordingly.