Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A17D0402. KELLY J. CROISSANT v. MONA N. CROISSANT.

This discretionary application stems from an order entered in an ongoing

divorce action, which order denied a motion to recuse, disqualified the lawyer who

filed the recusal motion, and ordered that lawyer to pay certain legal expenses incurred

by the other side. For reasons explained below, this application is dismissed for lack

of jurisdiction.

Mona N. Croissant filed a complaint for divorce against Kelly J. Croissant. In

February 2017, Attorney Catherine Sanderson filed an entry of appearance as cocounsel for Kelly J. Croissant and a motion to recuse the judge. Counsel for Mona

N. Croissant opposed the motion to recuse and filed a motion asking the court to

disqualify Sanderson as co-counsel for Kelly J. Croissant and to award her attorney

fees and litigation expenses incurred in connection with the pleadings filed by

Sanderson.

The motions were assigned to another judge, and an evidentiary hearing was

conducted. Thereafter, on March 23, 2017, the court entered the order contested here,

denying the motion to recuse and granting the motion to disqualify Sanderson.

Additionally, the court found that the motion to recuse lacked substantial justification,

and ordered Sanderson to pay a specified amount as legal expenses incurred by the

other side.

Sanderson filed this application for discretionary appeal. The order Sanderson

seeks to appeal, however, is interlocutory. See OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) (providing for

a direct appeal from a “final judgment[ ], that is to say, where the case is no longer

May 16, 2017
pending in the court below”); Cherry v. Coast House, Ltd., 257 Ga. 403, 404 (2) (359

SE2d 904) (1987) (an order disqualifying counsel is an interlocutory order);

Settendown Public Utility, LLC v. Waterscape Utility, LLC, 324 Ga. App. 652 (751

SE2d 463) (2013). See also Eidson v. Croutch, 337 Ga. App. 542, 544 (788 SE2d

129) (2016) (because the transfer order was a continuation of the same proceeding and

not final, the attorney fees order was not immediately appealable); Ellis v. Stanford,

256 Ga. App. 294, 295 (2) (568 SE2d 157) (2002) (an order denying a motion to

recuse is an interlocutory order).

Therefore, in order to obtain appellate review, Sanderson was required to follow

the interlocutory appeal procedure set forth in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). See Bailey v.

Bailey, 266 Ga. 832, 833 (471 SE2d 213) (1996) (where contested order is

interlocutory, discretionary appeal statute does not excuse failure to comply with

OCGA § 5-6-34 (b)); Eidson, supra at 545 (“Although . . . an order granting attorney

fees may involve a distinct and separate offshoot of the underlying pending action, that

is not the test for determining whether this Court has jurisdiction.”). Sanderson’s

failure to do so deprives this Court of jurisdiction of this application, which is hereby

DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

C l e r k ’ s O f f i c e ,

Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

05/16/2017