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41–453 PDF 2010

S. Hrg. 110–1016 

AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP: U.S. RELIANCE 

ON PRIVATE SECURITY FIRMS IN 

OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 27, 2008 

Available via http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

TROY H. CRIBB, Counsel 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

RICHARD A. BEUTEL, Minority Professional Staff Member 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Tester .................................................................................................. 23 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 25 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 27 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2008 

Hon. Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management, Bureau of Management, U.S. Department of State .................................................................... 5 

Hon. P. Jackson Bell, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness, U.S. Department of Defense ............................................. 9 

James D. Schmitt, Senior Vice President, ArmorGroup North America, Inc. .... 12 

Laura A. Dickinson, Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law .......... 16 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Bell, P. Jackson: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45 

Dickinson, Laura A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 16 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 60 

Kennedy, Patrick F.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 39 

Schmitt, James D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 52 

APPENDIX 

Questions and Responses for the Record from: 

Mr. Kennedy ..................................................................................................... 76 

Mr. Bell ............................................................................................................. 122 

Mr. Schmitt ....................................................................................................... 149 

Ms. Dickinson ................................................................................................... 158 

(1) 

AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP: U.S. RELIANCE 

ON PRIVATE SECURITY FIRMS IN 

OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2008 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, McCaskill, Tester, 

Collins, and Sununu. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. Thank 

you all for being here. 

Throughout our history, the American military has relied on the 

private sector in what has been called a ‘‘great arsenal of democracy’’ to provide weapons and supplies for our fighting forces. But 

once the private sector delivered the goods, generally speaking its 

responsibility ended. 

Over the past 15 years, we have seen a significant expansion of 

the role of private firms in overseas operations from being the manufacturers of military supplies and equipment to becoming suppliers of crucial military services, like the logistical support of our 

troops, the training of foreign police and armies, the conduct of interrogations, and the provision of armed security details. 

It is the latter—the use of private security contractors (PSCs)— 

that is the subject of today’s hearing because of questions that have 

been raised about the use of private security contractors in the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Traditionally, bearing arms and employing force in arenas of 

military conflict have been the sole province of the armed services. 

But our present military is just not large enough to fulfill the need 

for the protection of American personnel, convoys, key facilities, 

and reconstruction projects. 

So the use of PSCs has become necessary in Iraq and Afghanistan. PSC employees have, in fact, performed effectively, honorably, 

and in many instances, heroically. Many of the PSC employees are 

ex-service members. They are patriots who are deeply dedicated to 

the U.S. mission and ready every day to risk their lives—and someVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:41 Mar 09, 2010 Jkt 041453 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41453.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
2 

times lose them—protecting American personnel and America’s 

cause. 

We all remember in this regard the horrific sight of the bodies 

of those four Blackwater contractors, private security contractors, 

being dragged through the streets of Fallujah in 2004. 

But there have also, of course, been problems with the private 

security contractors. The rapid growth in their use has been ad hoc 

and without a comprehensive framework for the hiring, training, 

vetting, or even use of their services. 

Insufficient oversight of PSCs has drawn strong criticism from 

within our government and our military itself, including Defense 

Secretary Robert Gates, who said in October that the mission of 

many contractors was ‘‘at cross purposes to our larger mission in 

Iraq.’’ 

A special panel convened by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 

to look at PSCs—directed by Under Secretary Patrick Kennedy, 

who is one of our witnesses today—concluded that PSCs ‘‘operate 

in an overall environment that is chaotic, unsupervised, deficient 

in oversight and accountability, and poorly coordinated.’’ Those are 

tough words that need to be taken seriously by us. 

These concerns are reinforced, of course, by incidents like the 

September 16, 2007, shooting incident in Baghdad involving Blackwater security agents in which 17 Iraqis died. Incidents like that 

one have exposed gaps in our own laws that leave our government 

with limited ability to prosecute employees of Federal contractors 

who may have committed criminal acts abroad. 

The House of Representatives, in fact, has passed legislation to 

address these gaps, and I understand that Senators Leahy, Obama, 

and others are currently working to bring a similar bill to the Senate floor. 

But beyond changing the laws so we can punish criminal behavior when it occurs—which, again, I stress, are a minority of cases— 

we also need to have a discussion about our rapidly growing reliance on PSCs with the goal of developing a better framework 

across our government for deciding how and where we are going to 

use them. 

Our Committee staff has conducted an extensive investigation 

into the use of PSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan that leads to the following findings: 

First, there are no government-wide standards for the hiring, 

vetting, and training of PSCs. 

Second, oversight of PSCs has been hobbled by jurisdictional 

squabbles between the State Department and the Department of 

Defense (DOD), as well as insufficient numbers of personnel from 

both departments in theater to supervise the contractors. 

Third, reconstruction companies, non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs), and other kinds of non-governmental entities also employ 

armed security contractors—many of them third-party nationals— 

further complicating the creation of a uniform framework for security services. 

And, fourth, Federal agencies are doing very little to assess our 

future needs for PSCs or entering into a process to decide by some 

rational standards which functions must remain governmental and 

which can be contracted out. 

3 

That has led our staff to make some recommendations to us for 

consideration, for instance: To give consideration to creating a licensing authority for security companies and their employees; to 

set training standards on everything from the proper use of weapons to the application of international human rights laws; better 

coordination among agencies to oversee PSCs; and to create a clear 

chain of command when multiple agencies are involved in an operation. And, again, the fundamental question that has to be answered—and it seems to us is not now answered—is what kind of 

missions private security contractors should be hired for in the first 

place. 

In December 2007, the Department of Defense and the Department of State took a first step by signing a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to commit to the development of common standards 

for management of PSCs in Iraq and to clarify their respective 

roles. 

But this only applies to Iraq and only applies to the Departments 

of State and Defense, not to other potential fields of battle or to 

other agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Justice, which also are involved in the retention of private security contractors. 

The need for standards and regulations on the use of PSCs goes 

far beyond today’s missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. For instance, 

peacekeeping and stabilization, I believe, will be a major focus of 

the new Africa Command (AFRICOM) at the Department of Defense. The State Department is currently bidding a private contract 

worth approximately $1 billion to train peacekeepers and provide 

logistics for use in Africa. 

So, we have to assume that in the normal course the need for 

PSCs in the Federal Government is only going to grow, and I think 

we have to determine together, Congress and the Executive 

Branch, where that growth is necessary and where it is reasonable. 

And we have to put in place clear rules for their hiring of PSCs, 

and then, I hope, comprehensive systems to ensure proper training, 

vetting, and accountability of their employees. 

I thank our staff for the good work they have done preparing for 

this hearing. I thank our witnesses for being here. And now I 

would call on the Ranking Member of the Committee, Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very interesting and important subject, and I appreciate your decision to 

focus the Committee’s efforts on it. 

Over the past two decades, the end strength of the U.S. military 

has declined by a third, from 3.3 million in 1987 to 2.2 million 

today. 

That dramatic post-Cold War decline has imposed enormous 

strains on our troops and caused some unintended consequences as 

America undertook large-scale military operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. 

As the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently concluded, the decline in force strength, coupled with the demands of 

4 

overseas deployments, has greatly increased the demand for private contractors, including private security firms. 

When thousands of contract security employees are involved in 

guarding facilities and escorting convoys in a hostile zone and face 

a high risk of violent incidents, we confront a fundamental question: Should private contractors be responsible for jobs in a combat 

zone that have traditionally been performed by military personnel? 

Where should the line be drawn between inherently governmental 

military operations and contract services? 

There are, of course, many valid reasons to employ contractors 

to carry out or augment overseas tasks. But as the Congressional 

Research Service has pointed out, never before have private sector 

employees played such an extensive role in a combat zone. 

Furthermore, the heavy reliance on contractors without effective 

acquisition policies and contract oversight has led in some cases to 

wasteful spending, unsatisfactory performance, and failure to 

achieve mission objectives. When the Departments of State and Defense, USAID, or other agencies hire firms that place armed civilians in foreign countries, their actions can also have a significant 

impact on America’s foreign policy objectives. 

It is also true that private security firms are providing valuable 

services in hostile settings overseas, especially at a time when our 

military forces are stretched so thin. They guard vital infrastructure, protect American and foreign officials, and escort convoys. 

Their employees, as the Chairman pointed out, are often highly 

skilled, disciplined, and honorable professionals, typically with extensive military experience. 

Nevertheless, the actions of some contract employees, combined 

with legally tenuous or ambiguous accountability mechanisms, 

have tarnished the industry. 

A team of Justice Department prosecutors and the FBI are currently in Baghdad on a 2-week mission to interview local witnesses 

to the September 2007 incident in which Blackwater private security guards under contract to the State Department opened fire in 

a public square. Seventeen Iraqi civilians died, and others were 

wounded. 

Now, the facts of this incident remain to be determined, but they 

raise a broader issue about the lingering uncertainty about whether these security guards are subject to any legal accountability. 

And that degree of uncertainty should not be acceptable at this 

stage in the war. And the degree of accountability should not 

hinge, as it appears to do today, upon whether the contractor was 

supporting a Defense Department mission or acting on behalf of 

the State Department. 

The problem is not new. In recent years, several contractors implicated in violence have simply left the area to avoid any legal 

consequences. 

These examples underscore a stark truth: The United States cannot expect trust and respect from other peoples if we cannot impose 

clear constraints and enforce serious legal consequences for illegal 

conduct by private security contractors. 

Improving private security performance and protecting Federal 

interests demand explicit expectations, precise contract requireVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:41 Mar 09, 2010 Jkt 041453 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41453.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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1The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy appears in the Appendix on page 39. 

ments, sharp oversight, clear standards for the use of force, and a 

framework for ensuring legal accountability. 

Our hearing today will raise many difficult questions, and it is 

evident that we need better answers than we seem to have today. 

Devising an effective set of answers must also include improving 

our Nation’s ability to recruit, train, and retain a skilled Federal 

acquisition workforce. 

Our acquisition workforce must not only be strengthened, but be 

able to apply its skills in a war zone. And that is why the Chairman and I have worked very hard to include provisions in our contracting reform bill that will strengthen our Federal acquisition 

workforce and create a Contingency Contracting Corps that could 

be marshalled to deploy experienced acquisition professionals in 

hostile settings such as Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The rule of law, our obligations to other governments and to noncombatants, our responsibilities to taxpayers, and our interest in 

the success of our foreign policy all suggest that we need to ask 

fundamental questions about the role of private security firms in 

a war zone. We need to improve the regulation and oversight of 

these firms when they are used, and most of all, we need to ensure 

accountability. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins, for an excellent opening statement, and you raise some very important questions. 

I welcome Senator Tester and Senator Sununu to the hearing 

this morning. 

We will proceed now with the witnesses. I believe we are going 

to give each of you 10 minutes. I appreciate that you are here. I 

think you are exactly the people we wanted to be here to help us 

with our deliberations. 

We will begin with Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary of Management for the Department of State. Mr. Kennedy was asked by 

Secretary Rice last fall to serve as executive director of a special 

panel convened to examine the State Department’s contracting for 

security, so I welcome you and look forward to your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. PATRICK F. KENNEDY,1 UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, BUREAU OF MANAGEMENT, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. KENNEDY. Good morning. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Collins, distinguished Members of the Committee. I am honored to appear before you today with my distinguished colleagues. I would like to thank you and the Committee 

Members for your continued support and interest in the Department of State’s programs and foreign policy objectives. 

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the law enforcement and security bureau of the Department, has the primary responsibility for 

ensuring the safety and security of State Department and other 

U.S. Government personnel operating under Chief-of-Mission authority overseas. The Diplomatic Security’s nearly 1,500 special 

agents serve in the United States and around the world, in embassy and consulate Regional Security Offices, and manage secuVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:41 Mar 09, 2010 Jkt 041453 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41453.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
6 

rity programs designed to protect U.S. Government personnel, facilities, and classified information at 285 posts worldwide. 

Even with this presence, the employment of security contractors 

has become a critical Department tool since the 1980s for providing 

services necessary to protect U.S. personnel, buildings, and information. After the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1983, 

private companies were afforded the opportunity to compete for security contracts at U.S. overseas missions under the Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. Over the years, security contractors have been employed in diverse hot spots around the world, 

and as these contracts have evolved, the Department has sought to 

standardize the way posts contracted and paid for guard force services to enhance uniform fiscal reporting responsibilities and to 

streamline security management. 

Over the past decade, conflicts, wars, political unrest, and terrorist activities have increasingly required the deployment of diplomats to areas that are inherently dangerous places to live and 

work. As the U.S. Government continues its diplomatic efforts in 

these critical areas, the assets and resources required to ensure the 

safety and security of U.S. diplomats and other governmental representatives have also increased. 

The use of security contractors in these dangerous places has allowed the Department the flexibility to rapidly expand its capabilities to meet these increased security requirements and to support 

national security initiatives without the delays inherent in recruiting, hiring, and training full-time personnel. The employment of security contractors remains an essential cost-effective tool utilized 

by the Department to provide security services necessary to support U.S. personnel and facilities. 

The government’s Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) enables 

the Department to procure, sometimes with little notice, the services of a skilled cadre of security professionals for emergency needs 

as world events unfold. The Department’s security contractors perform a narrow range of defensive duties abroad, including the protection of certain foreign heads of State, high-level U.S. Government officials—including Members of Congress—and U.S. diplomats under Chief-of-Mission authority. These functions are not 

inherently governmental, as Department security contractors are 

engaged in protecting our diplomats and other officials and are not 

authorized to engage in law enforcement or combat activities. The 

use of contract personnel allows the Department the flexibility to 

rapidly expand or contract the level of security personnel deployed 

based upon changing requirements. Most importantly, it is through 

the contracting mechanism that the Department requires security 

contractors to adhere to stringent standards of recruiting and 

training. 

The establishment of interagency standards for contractors would 

ensure that all U.S. Government security contractors or subcontractors meet core standards regarding their qualifications, 

training, and operations. Over the past several months, the Department of State has been working closely with the Department of Defense to accomplish this goal. Agencies should be allowed the flexibility to augment core standards, as needed, with additional training and operational requirements. 

7 

Contract provisions requiring contractors to comply with local 

laws and regulations are additional measures that ensure appropriate security contractor activity. Such provisions are currently included in Department of State contracts; for example, existing contracts require contractors to comply with all licensing requirements 

that are established by the host government. In general, such provisions require contractors to secure a business license, firearms 

permits, and firearms storage licenses, etc. 

Contract requirements and government-wide standards are only 

as effective as the management and oversight controls implemented, as the Chairman noted in his opening remarks. The Secretary of State’s Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq, on 

which I served, carried out a comprehensive review of the embassy’s security practices in Iraq and provided recommendations, all of 

which have been adopted by the Secretary to strengthen these procedures. 

The panel also encouraged enhanced coordination and communication with the U.S. military. To that end, the Secretaries of 

State and Defense signed on December 7, 2007, a memorandum to 

jointly develop, implement, and follow core standards in these 

areas. 

Over the past several months, the Department has undertaken 

to quickly institute new policies and procedures governing security 

contractors. Diplomatic Security agents are now ‘‘embedded’’ with 

every embassy movement of personnel in Iraq. Procedures have 

been established to ensure that the Multi-National Force in Iraq 

(MNF-I) and the embassy are aware of and coordinate all movements by each other’s details. This maximizes the Department of 

State protective support and provides visibility to battle-space commanders. Respective liaison officers now serve in operations centers, and both entities have established procedures to respond to 

and investigate incidents. 

The State Department has developed new investigative procedures on the use of force which will also facilitate the referral of 

cases to the Department of Justice where there is evidence of potentially criminal misconduct. 

A Joint Embassy Review Board, which also includes U.S. force 

representatives, periodically reviews incident investigations to develop lessons learned, determine trends, and make recommendations for improvements in private security contractor operations. 

Embassy Baghdad’s Mission Firearms Policy has been revised 

and reissued to reflect the common principles on ‘‘Rules for the Use 

of Force’’ that govern private security contractors, as agreed in the 

State and Defense Department MOA. And the Regional Security 

Officer in Baghdad has established direct channels of communication and working arrangements on coordination and liaison with 

senior Iraqi officials at the National Police, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Defense. 

Moreover, the Department of State strongly supports efforts to 

provide greater legal accountability for unlawful acts its security 

contractors may commit abroad. The Administration is currently 

working with the Congress on legislation concerning extraterritorial coverage of U.S. criminal laws. We would very much like 

to see this critical legislation enacted as soon as possible. 

8 

In addition to private security contractors that contract directly 

with the Department of State, there are also those with contractual 

arrangements with other contractors, subcontractors, or grantees of 

the Department or other civilian agencies. In accordance with the 

State and Defense Department MOA, the State Department has 

also taken strides to strengthen oversight and accountability of 

these security contractors. The State Department has been actively 

engaged with the Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development in developing core policies for vetting, background investigations, training, weapons authorizations, movement 

coordination, and incident response procedures and investigations 

for these subcontractors, arrangements we already have in place 

for our direct contractors. 

In that vein, on January 30, 2008, the Departments of State and 

Defense co-hosted a meeting at the Pentagon with company executives to discuss further efforts to strengthen security contractor operations, oversight, management, and accountability. 

With the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, the Departments of State and Defense are now actively engaged in the development of formal regulations governing private security contractors operating in combat 

zones, as well as the development of a Memorandum of Understanding that will address all contractors operating in Iraq and Afghanistan and establish a common database of information, as required by Sections 861 and 862 of the Act. Our joint efforts in developing and implementing the December 2007 MOA have already 

established a strong foundation for these regulations. Moreover, the 

State Department is prepared to participate in the Defense Department’s Synchronized Pre-deployment Operational Tracking (SPOT) 

database of these contractors, anticipated for a DOD rollout in 

March. 

This enhanced coordination with the Defense Department and 

our own increased oversight of our private security contractors has 

necessitated additional staffing in Iraq by State Department personnel. In response, the State Department has initiated temporary 

deployments of additional Diplomatic Security special agents to 

Iraq and authorized a permanent increase in Baghdad staffing consistent with the recommendation of the Secretary of State’s Panel. 

With these staffing requirements straining personnel resources and 

the need to meet continual and emerging worldwide security demands, the State Department will be hiring additional special 

agents. The additional requirements are being requested, and with 

them the Department will be able to meet these requirements and 

continue to provide a safe and secure environment for the conduct 

of U.S. foreign policy. 

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, I thank you very 

much, and other Members of the Committee, for the opportunity to 

appear here today, and at the end of the testimony, I would be glad 

to receive any questions that you might have. Thank you very 

much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Kennedy. A good beginning. 

I am impressed that you completed your statement exactly as the 

10 minutes expired. We do not see that too often. 

9 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Bell appears in the Appendix on page 45. 

Mr. Bell, thanks for being here. Jack Bell, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, has been a 

leader in the Department of Defense efforts to strengthen the integration, oversight, and management of the large contractor force 

working alongside military personnel in Iraq. So you are right in 

the middle of exactly the questions we have on our minds, and we 

look forward to your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. P. JACKSON BELL,1 DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. BELL. Thank you. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member 

Collins, other Members of the Committee, thanks for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss DOD’s initiatives to improve 

the management and oversight of personal security contractors— 

operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

As Chairman Lieberman pointed out, contractors supporting our 

military forces in contingency operations, both at home and deployed, are performing critical support functions that are integral 

to the success of our military operations. DOD military forces—civilian forces also—have been downsized significantly over the last 

25 years, as Ranking Member Collins has pointed out, and our dependence on contractors has, accordingly, increased. 

In addition, the increasing technical complexity of DOD weapons 

systems and equipment requires a level of specialized technical expertise that DOD does not believe can be cost-effectively supported 

by a military force capability. 

The current scale and duration of DOD military force deployments in support of the global war on terrorism (GWOT) are the 

first major contingency operations to reflect the full impact of the 

shift of the reliance on contractor personnel to support critical functions of the military deployed in the field. This has required a substantial commitment by DOD contractors to deploy with our military forces in forward areas. As of the first quarter of fiscal year 

2008, which ended December 31, 2007, for example, Central Command (CENTCOM) reported in January about 163,590 DOD contractor personnel working in Iraq and 36,520 personnel for DOD 

working in Afghanistan. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Give us those numbers again, because 

those are quite significant—some might say stunning. 

Mr. BELL. Glad to do that. As of December 31, 2007, CENTCOM 

reported in January about 163,590 DOD contractor personnel 

working in Iraq and 36,520 DOD contractor personnel working in 

Afghanistan. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So, in Iraq, that is about as high, or 

maybe a little higher than uniform personnel that we have had 

there. 

Mr. BELL. That is correct. The ratio in both theaters is about 1:1, 

roughly. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. That is very important for us to understand. Please go ahead. 

10 

Mr. BELL. Thank you. This unprecedented scale of dependence on 

contractors has led us at DOD to recognize the situation that deployed contractors are a significant and continuing part of our total 

force, and DOD must manage our contractors on an integrated 

basis with our military forces. 

Since 2005, we have launched several major initiatives that are 

already strengthening the management of all DOD contractors and 

contractor personnel. I will briefly outline those for you. 

First of all, we have been working since 2005 on establishing a 

strategic policy and operational framework for managing contractors and contractor personnel in future operations on a systematic 

basis. 

Second, we have focused on strengthening the management of 

current DOD contractor operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Third, we are responding to the recommendations in the Gansler 

Report on Contracting in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. 

Fourth, as Mr. Kennedy has pointed out, we are implementing 

State Department-DOD Memorandum of Agreement governing PSC 

operations, specifically in Iraq. 

And, fifth, we are both working with the State Department again 

and with USAID on implementing Sections 861 and 862 of the 

2008 National Defense Authorization Act. 

However, in my testimony today, I would like to focus on what 

DOD is doing with the State Department to strengthen the management of PSC operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as we have all recognized, have required PSCs to fulfill a variety of important security 

missions, operating in non-permissive environments in support of 

both the DOD military mission and State Department diplomatic 

mission. These include both mobile physical protection for individuals and delegations, such as congressional delegation trips 

(CODELs), and facility protection for bases, buildings, and supplies. 

Again, referring to the first quarter 2008 CENTCOM census for 

the period ending December 31, 2007, there were approximately 

6,467 armed DOD personal security contractor personnel in Iraq 

and 2,745 DOD personal security contractors in Afghanistan performing security functions. 

Both DOD and the State Department have recognized the need 

for more effective coordination of PSC operations in Iraq. On December 5, DOD and the State Department signed a Memorandum 

of Agreement—I will be referring to it as a ‘‘MOA’’—defining a 

framework for improving both the accountability over PSC operations and strengthening the actual operational procedures. This 

MOA covers a broad range of management policies and operational 

procedures to achieve more effective management coordination in 

Iraq. The specific provisions of the MOA are detailed in my written 

testimony, and also a copy is available on the DOD website. 

The purposes of the MOA, briefly, are to: Establish core standards for vetting, training, and certifying PSC personnel; to specifically avoid situations where there is a high risk of incidents occurring; to integrate incident management and investigations; to integrate follow-ups with the government of Iraq’s Ministry of Interior 

and our own Tactical Operations Centers; and to coordinate followVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:41 Mar 09, 2010 Jkt 041453 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41453.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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ups with any persons affected by an incident and any witnesses 

thereto. 

MNF-I has already executed and implemented what we call a 

Fragmentary Order (FRAGO)—titled 07–428. It establishes authorities, responsibilities, and requirements for oversight of all 

DOD civilians and DOD contractors. The State Department, as Mr. 

Kennedy points out, is developing a counterpart document to reflect 

U.S. Embassy Baghdad’s policies for U.S. Government agencies 

working under Chief-of-Mission authority. 

Many aspects of the MOA have already been implemented. In 

fact, we have adopted interim procedures in cases where permanent solutions require additional work. At the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), we are closely monitoring the implementation status of these elements as they are being put together incountry. 

On January 30, again, as Mr. Kennedy pointed out, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England and Deputy Secretary of State 

John Negroponte co-hosted a meeting of PSC company executives. 

In this meeting, we discussed the new initiatives covered by the 

MOA. We particularly emphasized contractor responsibilities for 

the elimination of sexual harassment, ethnic discrimination, employee misconduct, and criminal activity. We also covered the implementation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which is applicable to DOD contractor personnel deployed with our military 

forces. And again, most importantly, we emphasized the need to 

support U.S. strategic goals in the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as performing contract missions. 

We also discussed the efforts of both the State Department and 

DOD to obtain legislation to strengthen the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act—MEJA, as we call it—because we feel 

it is important to clarify the legal accountability of non-DOD U.S. 

Government contractors overseas. 

In response to the requirements of Sections 861 and 862 of the 

2008 NDAA, DOD and the State Department are jointly developing 

a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), covering matters relating to the State Department, DOD, and USAID contractor operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that covers all contractors, not 

just PSCs. Once this memorandum is signed, the MOU will be implemented through DOD, the State Department, and USAID policies and regulations. 

We are also moving ahead at the State Department with efforts 

to comply with the provisions of Section 862 of the 2008 NDAA, 

and that specifically focuses on the management of PSC operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

We have already placed a high priority at DOD and the State 

Department on registering contracts and contractor personnel in 

the theater of operations in something called the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker System. SPOT provides a system to: Track contractor personnel movements within Iraq, Afghanistan, and CENTCOM AOR; verify specifically the authority of the 

individual to have authorization and access to specific facilities; 

and establish their eligibility for specific support services. 

We are approaching at DOD 100 percent registration and accountability of all DOD PSCs and contractor personnel involved in 

12 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Schmitt appears in the Appendix on page 52. 

translation and interpretation activities. We anticipate that SPOT 

will be a system used also in compliance with Section 861. The 

State Department is already participating in getting their contractors in and is on schedule to basically get their personal security 

contractors under prime contracts into the system by March 2008. 

USAID is also evaluating how best to implement the system. 

Taken together, these initiatives substantially strengthen DOD’s, 

the State’s Department, and USAID’s capabilities in managing its 

contractors and in particular its PSC contractors and contractor 

personnel compliant with Sections 861 and 862. 

We thank you for your interest and support in this effort, and 

at this time I look forward to your questions whenever the other 

people have finished testifying. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Bell. 

Mr. Schmitt, you are next. As Senior Vice President of the 

ArmorGroup of North America, you served last year as the Chair 

of the private security industry’s association, the International 

Peace Operations Association. The ArmorGroup itself has 9,000 

employees in 38 countries, including 1,600 in Iraq. Thank you for 

being here, and I look forward to your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES D. SCHMITT,1 SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, 

ARMORGROUP NORTH AMERICA, INC 

Mr. SCHMITT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Collins, Members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for 

having me appear in front of you today with such distinguished 

leadership from the Department of Defense, the Department of 

State, and from academia. 

It is an honor to assist the Committee in its review of the use 

of the private security industry. And as noted this morning, the 

private security industry, my industry, has been under a great deal 

of scrutiny due to the recent events and significant incidents in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. These events, especially tragic incidents involving the deaths of private security employees and local civilians 

alike, have brought questions concerning the practices of private 

security providers, their oversight, and their accountability to the 

front pages of newspapers and morning discussions across kitchen 

tables throughout America. 

At best, we are viewed as a necessary evil and, at worst, as trigger-happy thugs who sacrifice America’s reputation at home and 

abroad and damage its strategic operations by operating as if we 

are above the law in the pursuit of a quick, opportunistic buck. 

From our perspective, this view is a gross caricature of an industry 

in which ArmorGroup, my company, has been operating for more 

than 26 years, providing a wide range of defensive protective services, risk avoidance training, humanitarian and mine action, and 

reconstruction and stabilization efforts. 

As private security contractors, it is our actions—good or bad— 

and the image we project that influence and shape how the local 

civilian populations view our Nation. Perceptions matter. The conduct and disposition of private security contractors paint a striking 

canvas from which we, as a Nation, are viewed by local inhabVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:41 Mar 09, 2010 Jkt 041453 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41453.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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itants. As an American, I know how I would feel about large numbers of foreign security contractors driving down our streets. Would 

we really expect the Iraqi people or the population of any other nation to feel so differently when they witness an expatriate-laden security convoy careen through their neighborhood? 

While the development of a coordinated and comprehensive U.S. 

Government framework for using PSCs has been under discussion 

and long in the making, it seems to me that the question is not 

when we will use private security providers but, rather, which 

firms are best qualified to provide the optimal support commensurate with our national interests. 

Of course, the specific decision on whether to use a PSC will always depend on the U.S.’s requirements at that time and on given 

needs and circumstances. However, experience has shown that contingency requirements normally develop with little warning. Hurricane Katrina, the deteriorating security situation of Iraq in 2003 

and 2004, the need to train and mentor a large number of local security sector personnel in Iraq, Afghanistan, West Africa, and elsewhere all indicate that the U.S.’s interests could be best served by 

identifying, validating, and competing suitable firms for contingency response contracts in advance of a crisis or need. 

Likewise, U.S. Government demand for private security contractors seems poised for continued growth with the establishment of 

National Security Presidential Directive 44 and Department of Defense Directive 3000.5 for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction, both of which demonstrate the U.S. Government’s intent to include the private sector in future reconstruction and stabilization efforts in high-risk areas around the world. 

For this reason, I believe the U.S. Government’s coordinated 

framework for determining when to use private security companies 

should be less about deciding the when and more about setting the 

common standards, the validation, and oversight procedures necessary that have been addressed so far this morning. My company, 

along with many other committed firms, would prefer to do everything we can in terms of proving our standards and procedures before a contingency operation even gets underway so that we are 

able to respond and deliver immediately when called upon to do so. 

As to the question on whether there is a need to establish government-wide standards, licensing requirements, or contract provisions for security providers, the answer can only be ‘‘absolutely, 

yes.’’ 

The development of industry standards, best practices, and accountability provisions was first addressed by the private security 

industry well before the ramp-up of PSCs in Iraq in 2003. In the 

case of my company, we have long-established formal corporate 

programs to ensure that company employees act at all times within 

the relevant international and local legal and humanitarian frameworks including an employee Code of Conduct, a stringent ethics 

policy, and an ethics review board. We implement deliberate leave 

rotation, provide personal insurance and welfare policies, and we 

teach cultural training to ensure our employees—whom we refer to 

as our ‘‘quiet professionals’’—are prepared to provide our protective 

services in an ethically sensitive fashion in the most complex of environments. 

14 

In 2004, in keeping with our commitment to transparency, we 

published the PSC industry’s first white paper, calling on the U.K. 

Government to regulate the industry, and we became a publicly 

traded company. 

Unfortunately, a number of newer PSCs working in support of 

U.S. Government programs in Iraq and elsewhere, but without this 

rigorous approach to ethics, have found themselves embroiled in 

difficult incidents which have resulted in controversy surrounding 

the U.S. Government’s use of PSCs. The U.S. Government regulations are clearly beginning to take shape, including the key oversight provisions for PSCs, as discussed this morning by the Hon. 

Patrick Kennedy and the Hon. Jack Bell. In fact, with regulation 

now established, the industry stands ready to assist in its implementation. 

PSCs will gladly follow the U.S. Government’s regulatory requirements provided to them. And with the establishment of the 

MOA between the Department of State and the Department of Defense for PSC operations in Iraq, and the provisions of the 2008 

National Defense Authorization Act, the industry is hopeful that 

this will be a blueprint of interagency policies and operating practices that can be applied to other future areas of operations as required. 

We stand ready to assist and will do so more efficiently when the 

implementation procedures are developed in an inclusive manner 

with the U.S. Government taking into account companies’ experiences and management practices. Companies that comply with prescribed regulatory and performance standards should be rewarded 

with more opportunities to support the U.S. Government stabilization objectives; companies that do not should be held accountable 

through the loss of contracts and the ineligibility to bid on new 

ones. 

We also suggest implementation of the following mechanisms: 

First, involve PSCs and other stakeholders in ongoing standardsetting dialogues and implementation processes; 

Second, a codification of standards and best practices in company 

policies and daily operating procedures; 

Third, training of U.S. Government personnel interacting with 

PSCs within the Combatant Command (COCOM)/Chief-of-Mission 

AOR; 

And, last, education for impacted local populations on the means 

to identify PSCs and how to register a complaint through appropriate authorities concerning PSC operations. Additionally, we also 

see a more proactive role for trade associations. 

While many industry best practices are codified in the existing 

codes of conduct and ethics policies of individual firms and internationally recognized trade associations, not all U.S. Government 

private security contractors are members of these trade associations or have adopted codes of conduct. 

An alternative method of regulation could be that the U.S. Government mandates that its PSCs require some type of third-party 

accreditation, potentially through trade associations, to validate 

their attainment of industry standards. Strict enforcement of these 

standards ultimately depends upon the will and consensus of the 

association’s members to prove an effective self-enforcement mechaVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:41 Mar 09, 2010 Jkt 041453 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41453.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
15 

nism exists, and upon the U.S. Government to demonstrate that it 

takes these standards seriously by committing to only work with 

those companies who have obtained accreditation. 

Oversight for private security contractors begins with a corporate 

commitment to the ethical delivery of services that we believe at 

a minimum should contain the following provisions: Knowledge of, 

and respect for, indigenous populations; a defined corporate ‘‘operating envelope’’ which limits a company’s role to purely protective, 

defensive security support; a formal declaration that the company 

will not plan or participate in offensive operations; full adherence 

in mandatory induction and continuation training on U.S. and host 

Nation local laws, international human rights and humanitarian 

law, and country-specific rules for the use of force; a commitment 

to cooperate with local and all law enforcement agencies and submit records of all notifiable incidents to those agencies; a commitment to transparency by registering host Nation subsidiary companies; a formal declaration that the company will not plan or participate in any operations that seek to destabilize governments or alter 

the political or military balance in a host nation; a commitment 

that the company will not supply lethal equipment nor permit employees to bear arms, except for those carried for personal protection or for the defense of clients, without possessing a license from 

the host government or mandated authority; and, finally, the establishment of an executive-level ethics committee to review and approve all significant new client contracts. 

Additionally, and in closing, we believe that U.S. Government resources in areas of operation would help provide improved oversight to private security providers. 

While reputable PSCs can and have established policies and 

codes to ensure the ethical delivery of their services, ultimately 

only the U.S. Government can establish formal industry-wide regulatory and ethical standards though the introduction of more stringent contractual obligations and a commitment to the enforcement 

of these obligations 

The regulatory provisions described above and discussed earlier 

are an important step in establishing standards, but will only be 

effective if sufficient resources are committed to ensure that they 

are upheld and a more rigorous approach is taken towards those 

who do not uphold them. 

Working under the direction and guidance of Congress and the 

U.S. Government agencies we support, the private security industry is capable of providing meaningful contributions to U.S. Government stabilization and reconstruction efforts in high-risk areas 

around the world. This work, we know, must be delivered with full 

adherence to U.S. and host Nation local law and with full commitment to the provisions of international human rights and humanitarian law. 

I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak to you this 

morning, Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins, and 

to the Members of the Committee, and I look forward to taking any 

questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Schmitt, for that constructive testimony. I appreciate it. 

16 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Dickinson appears in the Appendix on page 60. 

Our last witness this morning is Professor Laura Dickinson of 

the University of Connecticut Law School. I will express parochial 

pride in the fact that you are here from UConn Law, and I will say 

with additional parochial pride that is not why you are here. But 

the staff of the Committee, in asking people who in academia 

would have the most to contribute, kept receiving your name in answer to that question, and I was very pleased to hear that. 

Professor Dickinson has written extensively on U.S. Government 

privatization of foreign affairs functions. She served during the 

Clinton Administration in the Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 

Thank you very much for being here. 

TESTIMONY OF LAURA A. DICKINSON,1 PROFESSOR, 

UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT SCHOOL OF LAW 

Ms. DICKINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Collins, and other Members of the Committee. It is a great privilege to be here with such a distinguished panel. 

While most contractors have performed admirably and have filled 

vital roles—and, indeed, more than 1,100 have died in Iraq—many 

have committed serious abuses without being held accountable. 

The use of private security contractors and interrogators poses special risks and potentially threatens core values embodied in our 

legal system, including respect for human dignity and limits on the 

use of force, as well as a commitment to transparency and accountability. 

How should Congress respond to the problems posed by private 

security contractors? One possibility is to define certain functions 

as inherently governmental, such as security, and ban outsourcing 

of these functions entirely. However, the drive to use contractors 

will likely persist and may even expand, particularly once the inevitable drawdown of troops in Iraq begins. Therefore, it may be difficult, and perhaps even unwise, to limit significantly the use of 

such contractors. 

Another approach might be for Congress to define such functions 

as core functions rather than inherently governmental, which 

would permit outsourcing, but at the same time impose limits on 

the percentage of positions that may be turned over to contractors 

while mandating higher standards of oversight for these positions. 

Regardless, Congress will need to institute more effective measures to punish contractors who commit abuses. The MEJA Expansion Act of 2007, which has already passed in the House and which 

is pending in the Senate, would close important loopholes in the 

Federal courts’ jurisdiction over contractors who commit crimes 

overseas. I suspect, however, that these types of back-end enforcement measures, while critical, will be insufficient. I, therefore, propose five steps that Congress can take to improve contracting practices, oversight, and monitoring so as to better prevent abuses before they occur. 

First, Congress should establish minimum standards for contractual terms. As my co-panelists Mr. Bell and Mr. Kennedy have testified, the Department of State and the Department of Defense 

17 

have made significant progress in this area. However, I recommend 

that we do more. I think Congress should go further and establish 

a set of minimum standards to guide the drafting of private sector 

contracts. These minimum standards would explicitly make contractors subject to clear, consistent rules regarding the use of force 

and establish specific requirements for training and recruitment. 

With respect to the use of force in particular, these rules should 

be both specific and consistent across governmental departments. 

Indeed, the Department of Defense and the Department of State 

rules have sometimes differed from each other. For example, as Mr. 

Kennedy’s report concluded in the wake of the September 16, 2007, 

Blackwater incident, the Department of Defense at the time required its security contractors to fire aimed shots when responding 

to a threat, while the Department of State did not. 

Similarly, Congress could mandate that contracts with private 

security companies do more to explicitly require that contractor 

employees receive training in the applicable limits on the use of 

force, including very specific training in international human rights 

and humanitarian law. Experts have concluded that training thus 

far has in some cases been insufficient. DOD’s recently proposed 

rule that certain security contractors should receive training by 

military lawyers is a very strong measure that would be a significant improvement. I would argue, however, that Congress should 

legislatively require such training rather than leaving it up to 

agency discretion, as the agencies have differed in their practices 

on this question. 

Congressionally mandated standard contractual terms should 

also include consistent recruiting and vetting requirements for security contractor employees. Vetting becomes even more critical 

and more difficult as the number of non-citizen contract employees 

rises. Finally, in the increasingly global market for labor, recruiting 

practices are particularly important, and Congress could impose 

minimum standards here as well. 

Second, Congress should encourage better interagency coordination. Government officials from the multiple agencies that have 

hired security contractors have not in the past communicated well 

with each other in the field or in Washington, contributing to a climate of confusion that can create abuse. For example, in some 

cases, military commanders have not known when security contractors hired by other agencies passed through their areas because 

there was no clear system in place to communicate that information to them. And the agencies have not had a working, unified system for counting, let alone keeping track of what contractors are 

doing. 

As mentioned above, agencies have applied different rules regarding the use of force, and when there are investigations, multiple agencies have been on the scene. Moreover, the precise jurisdiction of each agency has been unclear, leading to further confusion. 

For this reason, we must improve interagency coordination of 

contractors both on the ground and in Washington. The Memorandum of Understanding between the State and Defense Departments is an important step, but we can do much more. I would 

argue that Congress should require the establishment of an interVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:41 Mar 09, 2010 Jkt 041453 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41453.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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agency working group to set common standards for security contractors and design uniform systems for keeping track of them, improving communication, and clarifying lines of authority. 

Third, Congress should expand the contract monitoring regime. 

An effective contractual regime must include sufficient numbers of 

trained and experienced governmental contract monitors. We have 

recently cut back on the acquisitions workforce, and the personnel 

who are on the payroll do not have adequate incentives to serve in 

Iraq and other conflict zones. The problems caused by the sheer 

low number of personnel are exacerbated by a lack of expertise in 

the particular issues raised by security contractors. Many of the 

contract personnel were trained in another era. They did not learn 

how to manage service contracts, let alone service contracts that 

raised the specific problems regarding security. 

Congress should mandate that agencies increase the number of 

monitoring and oversight personnel, ensure that they specialize in 

the types of tasks they are overseeing, and require that they receive specific training in rules regarding the use of force. 

Fourth, Congress should require regular reporting. One of the 

factors that is creating the oversight challenge is a lack of information, combined with the piecemeal way that much information 

about contractors comes to Congress and to the public at large. Recent legislation and bills in the pipeline would improve the situation but do not go far enough. Congress should require each agency 

to report to Congress quarterly or every 6 months. If Congress establishes an interagency working group, it could be the task of this 

group to coordinate and provide the report. Moreover, this report 

should not only identify the number of contractors and oversight 

personnel, but it should provide information about the tasks the 

contractors are performing, the number of incidents in which security contractors fire their weapons and injure third parties, and 

qualitative assessments about whether these incidents raised concerns. 

Furthermore, the reports should provide information about follow-up: Whether there was an investigation, what the conclusion 

was, and what happened subsequent to the investigation. If the 

State Department can report annually on the human rights conditions in all of the countries around the world, the agencies should 

be able to provide Congress with minimal information about their 

own security contractors. Of course, any mandate should be funded 

so that the agencies have the resources to do this work. 

Finally, Congress should foster accreditation and licensing. Congress should encourage the creation of third-party monitoring, accreditation, and certification entities and then consider requiring 

such third-party approval as part of the contract. At least one industry organization, the International Peace Operations Association, has launched this sort of a system, and its work has been very 

important. Accreditation by an independent organization, I would 

argue, would be an even better approach, but no organization yet 

exists. The National Committee on Quality Assurance, which rates 

and monitors health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the 

health care area, might serve as a model. Congress could encourage 

the creation of such an entity by providing seed funding or, as it 

has done in the health care area, by giving agencies the authority 

19 

to deem ratings by such an independent entity as sufficient to satisfy congressionally mandated standards. 

In conclusion, it is extremely important that Congress move forward with this Committee’s efforts to impose greater contractual 

standards and monitoring requirements on private security contractors. To that end, in addition to any legislation arising from 

this Committee, the work of the new Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan will provide an important forum 

for further consideration of these issues. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to address this Committee. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Professor Dickinson. Thanks for the suggestions, and I promise you that we will 

consider those as we consider whether and how to legislate, as we 

will the suggestions that Mr. Schmitt made. We are going to do a 

6-minute round of questioning to move the discussion around to the 

Members here. 

I appreciate what has been done to provide for better management of private security contractors, as both Mr. Kennedy and Mr. 

Bell have testified to. Let me try to focus on the question on which 

I am interested in, which is, are we using private security contractors too much? In other words, are we for various reasons using 

private security contractors in what might be called inherently governmental functions that would better be carried out by full-time 

government personnel? 

I know you could talk for hours on that. I want to ask Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Bell just to give me a quick response to that overall 

question. Too many PSCs? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I do not think so, for two reasons. 

The way the State Department uses PSCs, we ensure that they do 

not engage in any law enforcement activities and they do not engage in any what I will call ‘‘aggressive combat activities.’’ They 

simply engage in defensive activities. 

The second point I would make, Mr. Chairman, is that, at least 

for the State Department, the ebb and flow of the activities in Iraq 

today, Xanadu tomorrow, or Shangri-La next year create a curve 

that I do not believe that the State Department has the resources 

to meet. We only have 1,500 special agents. To deploy them all to 

Iraq and Afghanistan would mean we would have no defensive advisory capability at any other post in the world, as well as no one 

in Washington to pursue important activities such as combating 

passport and visa fraud. So I believe that private security contractors, with appropriate oversight, with the full panoply of restrictions and injunctions placed into the contracts, constitute an important tool for the State Department to carry out its mission. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So I understand the second part of what 

you said. Obviously, there is a benefit to a private security contractor because it is not a full-time governmental employee and you 

can retain their services in the arena where you need them. But 

I wonder, if I can phrase this question differently, whether we are 

at a point where we ought to be able to foresee not only the need 

for private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan but, to 

carry on your wonderful fantasy names, Shangri-La and Xanadu 

20 

and, therefore, increase the total number of full-time Diplomatic 

Security beyond the 1,500 that it is at now. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, we employ in Iraq alone 1,518 contractors, just in the security arena, which is almost exactly the 

same number as the Diplomatic Security special agents we have. 

We also employ other contractors, for example, assisting our personnel who go into the Gaza Strip or the West Bank. 

I do not feel confident to say that requirement would continue in 

perpetuity. I wish to have a robust Diplomatic Security Service. I 

think that is essential to permit us to carry out our activities 

abroad. But a doubling or a tripling of the Diplomatic Security 

Service, I am not sure about, Mr. Chairman. We are seeking a few 

additional resources so that we can have, as the Secretary has 

mandated from the report, a Diplomatic Security special agent 

move as the agent in charge in every one of these convoys. I think 

that pairing of a Federal agent as the agent in charge, backed up 

by contractors, is the appropriate way to go, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Bell, what is your quick answer on 

the DOD side? Too many PSCs? 

Mr. BELL. Sir, we do not believe so, and I think it is important 

to insert in the record here very briefly that we are operating within a well-defined U.S. Government policy regarding what is an inherently governmental function and what is not. As you know, Policy Letter 92–1 from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

defines what is an inherently governmental function and what is 

not. And I would just like to emphasize that Appendix B, Paragraph 19 of that Public Policy Letter specifically exempts personal 

security contractor functions as not being inherently governmental. 

That policy has been in place since 1992. We have built our DOD 

force structure around the assumption that they would not be inherently governmental. 

So, for example, if you looked at the approximately 9,200 personal security contractors that we have in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

using the Congressional Budget Office analytical construct from 

their work in 2005 on DOD staffing, it would indicate we would 

probably have to have somewhere on the order of magnitude of 

nine brigades of military forces to support the rotation of troops in 

and out for a fielded force of 9,200 private security contractors. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I hear you on that. The fact is that there 

have been numerous incidents that have drawn private security 

contractors in Iraq into hostilities, when they have been deployed 

to protect personnel, convoys, or facilities in hot zones. I understand, for instance, that Forward Operating Base Shield, which is 

a quarter mile from Sadr City, is guarded by a contractor. 

So I wonder whether there has been any shift in the Department’s policies about when security contractors should be used and 

when they should not, and whether, in fact, they are not inherently 

in some of these cases in hot zones performing governmental functions. 

Mr. BELL. The line of distinction, as Mr. Kennedy has pointed 

out, is whether they are used for defensive purposes or need to be 

involved in offensive combat operations. Static base security is considered to be defense. The private security contractor personnel 

that we have engaged in that static security defense are clearly 

21 

trained on the fact they are not to engage in offensive operations. 

But as for any base that is threatened by a hostile force, the role 

of that security force is to protect that base. 

So that is the distinction that we have been using within the Executive Branch, certainly at DOD, regarding what is an appropriate role for a private security contractor. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. My time is up, but I want to come 

back to this in the second round. Thanks very much. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Actually, Mr. Chairman, you have 

set up perfectly the questions that I want to ask, because I, too, 

believe that the fundamental question here is what functions are 

appropriate to contract out and what functions should be retained 

and are, in the bureaucratic term that we use, inherently governmental. 

This is a section of the Army Field Manual, and as you can see, 

it is a very thick section. And it is entitled ‘‘Contractors on the Battlefield.’’ It sets forth the standards for when you would use a contractor. It is very detailed. It was written by a contractor. In other 

words, a private security contractor wrote the guidance in the 

Army Field Manual for using contractors on the battlefield. And I 

want to ask each of you whether you think that is appropriate. 

It seems to me that this is inherently governmental, but even if 

it is not inherently governmental, it seems to me that there is at 

least an inherent conflict of interest to have a contractor writing 

the section of the manual on the use of contractors. But I am going 

to start with you, Mr. Bell, since it is a DOD document. 

Mr. BELL. With all due respect, Senator Collins, I am sure that 

that document was not issued without detailed review by both military and civilian employees of the Department of Defense. We do, 

as you know, use contractors for different drafting purposes. I have 

not actually seen the manual in detail. I know specifically what it 

is. But I would suggest that the document has been thoroughly vetted by both DOD military personnel as well as civilian personnel 

in its issuance. 

Obviously, there is the appearance, as you are pointing out, of an 

apparent conflict of interest in that, but I would suggest that that 

probably had very detailed screening. 

Senator COLLINS. Well, our understanding is that the contractor 

received some basic guidance, but essentially did the job. It obviously was reviewed—— 

Mr. BELL. Right. 

Senator COLLINS [continuing]. As you have said. I want to ask 

the professor her opinion on this. 

Ms. DICKINSON. Well, I do think it raises concerns, a broader concern, which is that when you outsource certain functions, there is 

a risk that you lose the capability in-house. Now I am not suggesting that the military has lost the capability of doing that particular job, but with respect to security, I think there is a risk, and 

that is why I think we ought to think about limiting the percentage 

of positions that can be outsourced. And, of course, anytime you 

have risk to human life, then there is a greater concern, and so 

there should be greater oversight. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

22 

Mr. Bell, another specific issue that is raised by this Army Field 

Manual is the role of contractors in the interrogation of prisoners. 

Now, I am told that an earlier version of this manual in 2000 had 

a specific prohibition against intelligence work being performed by 

private contractors. But in 2003, when the manual was revised— 

this version—that policy was omitted. And, subsequently, we had 

the abuse at Abu Ghraib. And according to the Fay Report, private 

contractors allegedly were involved in 10 of the incidents of abuse 

of Iraqi prisoners. 

Do you believe that the interrogation of prisoners is an inherently governmental function that should not be contracted out? 

Mr. BELL. I can say, irrespective of my personal beliefs on this, 

that it has been defined that interrogation, translation, and prisoner/detainee operations are not considered inherently governmental functions. I think to the extent that we wanted to get into 

personal discussions, there would be a lot of different opinions on 

that. What we operate on is what is provided for specifically in the 

U.S. Government guidance. 

Senator COLLINS. Are you aware of a dispute within the Army 

on whether the earlier policy should have been reinserted into the 

2003 version of this manual? 

Mr. BELL. Senator Collins, I actually am not. 

Senator COLLINS. OK. Mr. Kennedy, I also want to get your 

views on the timeline for finalizing a Memorandum of Understanding for Afghanistan. I understand it is finished for Iraq, but 

where are we as far as coming up with the same sort of guidance 

for Afghanistan? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, the requirement in the Defense Authorization Act for 2008 requires this to be done within 6 months of the 

date of enactment. And Mr. Bell and I are under specific orders 

from Deputy Secretary England and Deputy Secretary Negroponte 

that we are not to fail to meet that deadline. So it will be done 

within 6 months, and it will incorporate Afghanistan and Iraq as 

the Defense Authorization Act requires. 

There is already a first draft of it circulating among our agencies, 

and we have every intention of making it. It is a complicated issue 

because of the volume of individuals to be registered and conforming practices. But there is a clear congressional mandate, and 

we will meet it, ma’am. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. BELL. Let me clarify Mr. Kennedy’s comment. With specific 

regard to PSC operations for Iraq and Afghanistan, we have 120 

days after the enactment of the legislation to comply with Section 

862. Mr. Kennedy was referring to the larger issue, and Section 

861 is where we have to put in place the database, the tracking 

mechanisms, and the policies regarding all DOD, State Department, and USAID contractors. But the deadline for PSC compliance 

is 120 days after enactment, so that is in April. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. Senator Tester. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER 

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all 

the witnesses today for being here. This is a very important hearVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:41 Mar 09, 2010 Jkt 041453 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\41453.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
23 

ing. It has been very valuable to me. I think there are a couple reasons why we have such a hearing, and other people may have different opinions: to make sure that taxpayer dollars are spent to the 

best effect and that they are not being wasted. Regrettably, I do 

not see an urgency there, and I have heard a lot of information 

about what has been going on with contractors, particularly in 

Iraq. And it is of great concern to me. 

I am very proud of the nine freshmen in this Senate, led by Senator Webb, Senator McCaskill, and others, who are setting up a 

contracting commission to find out what is going on and get to the 

bottom of how these dollars are being spent. Unfortunately, I think 

the President put a signing statement on that DOD authorization 

bill that I hope does not block this important work. 

It is important we spend the dollars correctly for obvious reasons. 

When you are at war, the money has to go to what is important— 

armor protection, bullets, equipment, those kind of things. And 

then we also need to understand how contracting would affect our 

troops, and there is a lot of information out there about what the 

contractors are getting paid versus what the troops are getting 

paid—6 or 7 times as much is what I have heard. And I think that 

could have a tremendously negative effect on morale. So I really 

appreciate your being here. I do have some questions. 

Mr. Kennedy, you talked about local laws and regulations being 

adhered to by the contractors. When did this start occurring? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, it is a requirement in the State Department worldwide security contract that we issue that governs all the 

contractors we employ. It is a prima facie requirement. 

Senator TESTER. OK. Has that been put in all the contracts from 

the beginning? Because there are plenty of examples where contractors have, well, to be blunt, killed Iraqis and have been escorted out of the country before any law enforcement could take 

place in Iraq. 

Mr. KENNEDY. It has been in the contract. We have referred the 

case, I believe, that you are referring to, Senator, to the Department of Justice. And, unfortunately, I cannot comment on it any 

more because I do not have any information from DOJ. 

Senator TESTER. That is fine. 

Mr. KENNEDY. But we are pursuing that case at DOJ, and if it 

is appropriate, the individual would be brought to justice. 

Senator TESTER. How many contractors are Americans and how 

many are foreign? 

Mr. BELL. It varies, depending on whether they are personal security contractors or not. 

Senator TESTER. Well, of the total 163,000—well, over 200,000, 

approximately, ballpark figure? 

Mr. BELL. The figure, I believe, is about 17 percent Americans. 

Senator TESTER. Seventeen percent American, 83 percent foreign 

born? 

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. Most of those are third-country nationals, but 

we have some host-country nationals as well. 

Senator TESTER. Is that about the same ratio in the Department 

of State? 

Mr. KENNEDY. No, sir. All of our direct personal security contractors are Americans. 

24 

Senator TESTER. OK, so of that 9,200 that you talked about? 

Mr. KENNEDY. It was 1,500, sir, we have 1,500 personal security 

contractors in Iraq; 792 are personal security professionals. They 

are all Americans. 

Senator TESTER. OK. 

Mr. KENNEDY. We have 431 static guards. Almost all of those are 

third-country nationals with American supervisors. And then there 

is some support personnel, technical personnel, cooks, etc., who 

are—— 

Senator TESTER. OK. You actually used two terms. You used 

1,500 special agents, and then during testimony somewhere—and 

I think this was attributed to you—you said there are 9,200 PSCs. 

Is that incorrect? 

Mr. BELL. That is actually my quote, Senator. That is 9,200 in 

Iraq and Afghanistan for the Department of Defense. 

Senator TESTER. Help me out. You have 163,590. 

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. 

Senator TESTER. Where is the 9,200? 

Mr. BELL. The 9,200 are a subset of that. Those are the personal 

security contractors that are a subset of the total number of contractors. 

Mr. KENNEDY. And, Senator, if I might, it just happens to be that 

our number of contractors in Iraq is 1,518, and the total number 

of our special agents worldwide is 1,500 

Senator TESTER. So you are saying that 1,518 is 100 percent 

American. 

Mr. KENNEDY. No, sir. Half of—792 of the 1,518—— 

Senator TESTER. So half American. 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. Are Americans. Half of them, and 

then of the other half, about 10 percent or so have American supervisors, but those are static guards or support personnel. 

Senator TESTER. Good enough. One thing that came to me—and 

this goes back to the questions of the Chairman and Senator Collins. Mr. Bell, you talked about weapons systems were pretty much 

being manned by contractor personnel. That is somewhat concerning to me. We are talking about weapons systems that are 

being operated by contract personnel that, quite frankly, could go 

to the highest bidder anywhere in the country. 

Mr. BELL. The way it works, Senator, is we have about 12,500 

contract—— 

Senator TESTER. Numbers aside, just that philosophy, can you 

tell me what the justification of it is? 

Mr. BELL. The justification is usually the original equipment 

manufacturer (OEM) of a system—it is not usually the entire 

weapons system. It is a specific component of the weapons system. 

It is involving technology that has to be maintained. 

Senator TESTER. OK. 

Mr. BELL. And so most of the contractors that we have doing 

that are representatives of the OEM. 

Senator TESTER. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Tester. Senator McCaskill. 

25 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

to the panel this morning. I have sent a letter to President Bush 

about the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). What I am really 

concerned about here is this notion that we are negotiating potential immunity from Iraqi law for contractors before it is very clear 

that every single contractor involved in a contingency operation or 

in a war zone is accountable to someone. 

As you all know, there are various, different types of laws that 

contractors are potentially accountable under. There is the Military 

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, obviously. There is the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice. There are laws in the United States of 

America. And depending on what kind of contractor you are, it is 

not clear where you fall under these various accountability regulations. 

What I would particularly like to hear from Mr. Kennedy and 

Mr. Bell is a commitment on the part of the Departments of State 

and Defense that you would support the notion that we should 

enter into no agreement until it is laid out under the letter of the 

law, the accountability for acts performed by contractors that are 

in direct violation of our standards of conduct in the United States 

of America. 

Mr. BELL. Senator, we are already on the record, both the State 

Department and DOD, as strongly encouraging Congress to pass 

the amendment for the MEJA provision here. We think there is 

ambiguity in the current law that needs some attention, and until 

that is done, obviously, there are some questions about it. 

I think certainly we would feel it would be ill-advised to issue an 

additional task order in support of our troops and our combat operations until that law passes because it is obviously something outside our control. But we very strongly endorse the recommendation 

that the MEJA law be passed as quickly as possible. 

Mr. KENNEDY. If I could second that, one of the recommendations 

of the panel for which I was executive director is specifically to 

seek clarity, and in turn, the Secretary of State and Secretary of 

Defense have talked about this, along with the Department of Justice. And we fully agree with you, this must be clarified. 

There are statutes that are available to the Diplomatic Security 

Service if the event takes place on U.S. Government owned or 

leased property abroad. But there are obviously gray areas, and we 

want absolute clarity. We fully support, believe, and endorse that 

if a contractor employee commits a violation, it would be a violation 

in the United States, that individual should be brought to justice. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Do you agree that the President should not 

negotiate any Status of Forces Agreement and execute any agreement unless and until that law is clarified? 

Mr. BELL. Our great hope, Senator McCaskill, is that the law 

will be passed well in advance of the conclusion of SOFA negotiations, which are not scheduled to be concluded until some months 

from now. It is our view that this law needs to be passed as quickly 

as possible. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Negotiating something as complex as the SOFA 

agreement or an agreement based upon the Vienna Convention is 

26 

a very complex and time-consuming activity. And I believe that it 

is important that the negotiations proceed sequentially. 

Senator MCCASKILL. On another topic, I want to make sure I get 

both Defense and State Departments on the record today about the 

new auditing authority given to the Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and to the Special Inspector General 

for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in last year’s defense authorization bill that was signed into law by the President. I sponsored an amendment that expanded the authority of the SIGIR and 

for the new SIGAR to be able to do audit work in the area of these 

security contracts. 

The tricky part is getting the Inspectors General at the State Department and at DOD to cooperate and work effectively in order to 

make sure that the horizon is covered with the appropriate audit 

work. I know that Mr. Krongard had testified in front of Congress 

that he did not have sufficient resources to do the kind of audit 

work that, frankly, would have exposed some of the problems that 

have been exposed in the press. It is bad when we learn about bad 

stuff by someone other than the Inspectors General because that 

means the Inspectors General are not adequately doing their jobs 

or do not have the resources to do their jobs. And many times it 

is the latter, not a lack of will. 

I know that Mr. Krongard is now gone from the State Department, but it is my understanding there have been meetings, regarding where we have jurisdiction here, and we are not sure, so 

we are anxious for you to do these audits. This amendment was 

passed to make sure that no one had the excuse that someone did 

not have the responsibility for doing the audit work in this important area. 

Mr. Bell. 

Mr. BELL. Having spent 7 months in Afghanistan in 2003 and 

2004, Senator McCaskill, I strongly welcome the approval of the 

SIGAR authority, to establish the same authority there we have in 

Iraq with SIGIR. So I welcome that. 

I personally have not seen any evidence of any territorial disputes between DOD and SIGIR. I do not know the personnel who 

may eventually be nominated to take the responsibility for SIGAR. 

I know some qualified candidates. Knowing General Kicklighter, 

who is our Inspector General, I would assume that he has no sense 

of turf or stovepiping desire in his duties and would welcome that 

opportunity. 

I believe that SIGIR has done a good job as much in preventive 

oversight as in retroactive oversight, and I think that is an important thing to establish. We have recognized in some work the Secretary asked me to do last September that we needed to strengthen 

the oversight in the field. We have given authority to the Joint 

Contracting Command in Iraq and Afghanistan so that they must 

pre-clear all contracts. We are adding up to 300 Defense Contract 

Management Agency (DCMA) personnel going into Iraq and Afghanistan before the end of March; a hundred of them are already 

deployed—all with the point of view I think the direction you are 

leading, which is we need much stronger integrated oversight of all 

post-award contract administration. 

27 

Senator MCCASKILL. And I am more worried about the State Department than I am the Defense Department in this regard. 

Mr. KENNEDY. As you know, Senator, the Inspector General is an 

independent entity within the State Department and not under the 

jurisdiction of the Under Secretary for Management, as it should 

be. 

I have been briefed that the Inspector General of the State Department’s team and SIGIR have already engaged in some joint reviews. I know that the Inspector General of the State Department 

is in the process of staffing a regional office in Amman, Jordan, so 

that the new Inspector General or the current Acting Inspector 

General will have resources in the field, because I fully agree that 

oversight by an independent entity such as an Inspector General 

is a critical element. I welcome that. I welcome the information 

that the Inspectors General can provide to me as the management 

adviser to the Secretary so I can make course corrections when I 

see that. 

If I could also second something that Mr. Bell has said, we are 

just in the process of changing over our entire contracting support 

operation in Iraq to what we call a working capital fund so that 

we assess a small fee on every contract and that fee goes to the 

contracting office that guarantees, as work rises and falls, they 

have sufficient resources to give every contract the sufficient frontend work, signing work, and post-award work. 

So these are activities that I personally am very committed to, 

and I know that our Inspector General is working with SIGIR and 

is working to push personnel into the field so they are closer to the 

scene in Iraq and can do a better job. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator Akaka, welcome. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me 

apologize for being here late as I was chairing another hearing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood. Thank you. Glad you came. 

Senator AKAKA. And I welcome our witnesses here. Mr. Bell, 

many reports indicate that Department of Defense private security 

contractors utilize non-American personnel. Specifically, a January 

L.A. Times article pointed out a firm called Triple Canopy that relied on Peruvian citizens to work security in Iraq. 

How can the Department adequately ensure the suitability of 

non-U.S. citizens for work as security contractors? And what additional challenges do they pose for the Department? 

Mr. BELL. Thank you, Senator Akaka. It is good to see you again, 

sir. Obviously, every private security contractor has to be vetted 

from a security perspective in their home country, just as they 

would for an interpreter, a translator, or an intelligence operative. 

And so the vetting process is conducted against the same standards 

we would use for any other function where we recruit foreign nationals to do that. 

Out of the 6,467 armed security contractors we have in Iraq 

working for DOD, about 5,300 of them are third-country nationals. 

Many of them come from countries where that vetting process is 

28 

relatively easy, such as the U.K. and South Africa. There are a 

number of others where it is more difficult, but we have the procedures and the capability to do that vetting, and that has not been, 

to our knowledge, a problem. 

Senator AKAKA. I understand some of these have experience as 

ex-military personnel and ex-policemen in their countries. Let me 

ask, are there background checks made on each one of these individuals? 

Mr. BELL. There are, sir, and in fairness, when we recruit people, 

for example, there are a substantial number of former British 

Army Gurkhas, who have obviously been vetted by the British Government themselves, who are working as private security contractors. We do additional vetting over and above their credentials for 

having served in a government. So that is done on an individual 

basis. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Schmitt, in your testimony you alluded to 

security contracts being awarded based more on claimed versus 

demonstrated capabilities. Can you please explain that? 

Mr. SCHMITT. Certainly, Senator, and good morning. 

Senator AKAKA. Good morning. 

Mr. SCHMITT. That basis really comes from some of the observations that I personally had when I had the opportunity to serve at 

the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003 and 2004 in 

Iraq. And more publicly, from some of the instances we have seen 

that are really a matter of public record—and I guess probably the 

most striking example would be the Custer Battles Company, 

which, as I recall, had really no background or past performance 

as a security provider whatsoever, but was awarded a security contract to provide the security for the Baghdad International Airport. 

So for an established firm, not just mine but many others, to see 

something like that and then to see that contract really disintegrate, we took great concern with that. And certainly the FAR exists for a reason, both at the Federal level and at the agency level, 

but we also are sympathetic that there was such great need at that 

time and such great demand that the services need to be rendered 

quickly. 

Our view is that, as I mentioned this morning, Senator, if we can 

identify the processes in advance, much like the indefinite delivery/ 

indefinite quality (IDIQ) contracts that are more greatly being used 

by the agencies, the agencies then can identify suitable providers 

before the need occurs. And when that need occurs, the providers 

are ready to respond. The American taxpayer has the assurance 

that the provider is, in fact, qualified and is, in fact, prepared to 

do what they have demonstrated they can do through the evaluation process. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Mr. Bell, one concern raised in a joint Subcommittee hearing I 

co-chaired on January 24, 2008, regarding contingency contracting 

in Iraq and Afghanistan was that contractors are not under the 

same obligations as U.S. servicemen and servicewomen. For example, a contractor could refuse to travel to dangerous areas of Iraq. 

Does the Department feel comfortable that there is a strong 

chain of command with private security contractors? 

29 

Mr. BELL. Yes, Senator Akaka, we did discuss that at the last 

hearing. We are comfortable that we are being fully supported by 

the contractor companies. If they have an internal problem with an 

individual contractor personnel refusing the mission, they also 

have the obligation to supply somebody according to the timetable 

we have to perform that mission. I have actually had personal conversations with the heads of several of the private security contractors who provide those kinds of services, such as KBR, Inc., which 

has the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract, 

to query whether this has at any time been a problem or looks like 

it could be a problem. We are getting strong, consistent assurances 

that with our reliance on the individual company to provide the 

personnel required, they do not anticipate any problem in that regard. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you very much. Thank you for your 

responses. 

Mr. Chairman, I have a statement that I would like to be included in the record in the proper place. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. 

I have made it a point over the past year to take a close look at government contracting for goods and services. At several hearings with both in this Committee, 

and in the Armed Services Committee, a pattern of insufficient contract oversight 

and poor execution has emerged. In too many cases, contracts are awarded hastily 

with not enough Federal employees overseeing them, putting the government at risk 

of waste, fraud, or abuse. 

In particular, I have been concerned about hiring contract workers to fill gaps in 

the Federal workforce. Agencies across the Federal Government rely on contractors 

to fulfill critical government functions. Alarmingly, many agencies don’t even know 

how many contractors are working for them, side by side with Federal employees, 

at any one time. 

The Federal Government has all too often passed off the job of managing contractors to the contracting firms themselves. There are currently no consistent standards across agencies that say who can be a private security contractor or how they 

should be managed. Different contract security firms conduct different levels of 

background checks and have different hiring standards. 

The legal status of many contractors operating outside of the United States needs 

to be clarified. The law is ambiguous at best as to how private security contractors 

are treated when they break the law in foreign countries. 

For the foreseeable future, private security contractors will need to be used 

abroad. Our dependence on them can not be ended quickly, but we can do more to 

ensure better oversight and management. Reforms are needed to make sure that the 

Federal Government is using private security contractors appropriately and that 

they are well suited to work for the Federal Government. 

I am a cosponsor of the Security Contractor Accountability Act which would clarify the legal status of security contractors overseas to ensure that they are accountable for their actions. However, the legal status of contractors is only part of the 

problem. Perhaps even more importantly we must institute standards for private security contractors to ensure that they behave appropriately in the field. 

This Committee has an important role in reforming contracting rules conducting 

oversight. Contractors should be held to the same high standards as our outstanding 

Federal workforce. Even though contractors overseas are not government employees, 

it is essential that their actions reflect well on the United States. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka. 

I would like to return to a few of the questions that I raised at 

the outset, regarding the kind of functions that private security 

contractors are performing now. They have been involved in so 

many shooting incidents, and I am assuming, for the record, that 

30 

those are justified incidents of shooting. But I wonder if the distinctions that we are making that we discussed earlier, Mr. Bell, between defensive and offensive operations really are relevant in that 

sense. I will start with Ambassador Kennedy because I did not 

have a chance to ask him about this. The security contractors from 

the Department obviously are often assigned tasks or sent into 

areas that put them at high risk of being engaged in the use of 

force. And I know you spoke to this issue somewhat in earlier comments, but I want to ask you if you would address the validity of 

the distinction between defensive and offensive security. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Clearly, Senator, we ask our security contracting 

professional colleagues to engage in dangerous activities. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. KENNEDY. During calendar year 2007, in Iraq—this is in 

both Baghdad and other locations where the State Department 

uses personal security contractors—we asked them to run over 

5,648 missions. There was a very small percentage of those missions—I will calculate that and get it to you—where there was escalation of force and actual shooting. So the numbers are relatively 

small, but they have been deadly over the years. During the course 

of the existence of the American Embassy in Iraq after it was 

turned over to the State Department from the CPA, two State Department Foreign Service security officers, government employees, 

have been killed, and 28 colleagues from the contract security 

forces have been killed as well. So this is inherently dangerous. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. KENNEDY. However, their actions that they take are entirely 

defensive. They do not fire unless they are approached and encroached into the zone, and then they go through a very specific 

and laid-out rubric, flashing lights, hand signals, large placards on 

the back of the trailing vehicle. So we have very specific rules of 

engagement that say you do not fire. And then as the next to the 

last resort, you fire shots into the engine body of the vehicle that 

is encroaching on you to attempt to disable the vehicle, and only 

then as a last resort do you fire into the cabin or the body of the 

vehicle. 

So it is a dangerous environment, but the percentages are relatively small, where escalation of force and actual shooting occurred but the number of missions, as you can see, is very large, 

over 5,600 in 1 year. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Schmitt, let me ask you to get into 

this from the contractor’s point of view. Is the distinction between 

offensive and defensive actions is a meaningful one? And, parenthetically—I know the parent company of ArmorGroup is British—I’d like to know whether, from your own experience whether 

the British Government system, both for hiring contractors and for 

describing responsibility once hired, is different from our own. 

Mr. SCHMITT. Certainly, Senator. Clearly, the British Government took an early lead on this, even, I would say, earlier than we 

did, in really about 2004. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Meaning the use of the contractors or in 

rules to govern the use? 

Mr. SCHMITT. The use and the rules themselves for the employment of the contractors. It is an essential question on the rules of 

31 

force, which are different than rules of engagement, actually, and 

as the Under Secretary described, there is a whole series of procedures and actions that do occur. 

We believe that the most essential thing is that you train individuals prior to employing them on these tasks so that there is no 

question of how to de-escalate when you have a situation. Much 

can be determined on how a contractor is perceived by the local 

population. 

I will give you an example from my own experiences in Hurricane Katrina. I was deployed immediately upon landfall of Hurricane Katrina to set up our support for the de-watering of the city, 

and the thing that I felt was most important was the type of weaponry that we would use. We chose to use—and it was very dangerous, very lawless at the time—only shotguns, not rifles. 

Now, you may ask, it is still a firearm, but the distinction in how 

it looks and how it is perceived by the local population makes all 

the difference. And the same is true in Iraq, and we believe that 

if you train individuals appropriately before placing them in the 

situation, you can do much to avoid the incident to begin with— 

not always. Sometimes you have to actually escalate very quickly 

to the rules of force where you may have to engage to protect life 

or limb. Many times you can avoid it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So do you think the existing defensive/offensive security distinction that our government is following is a 

meaningful one? 

Mr. SCHMITT. I do, Senator, and I think it is essentially important that we clearly state as a government and as a country that 

we only allow private security providers to provide defensive work. 

Private security providers are not agents of the U.S. Government. 

They are contractors. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Thank you. My time is up. Senator 

Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Bell, I want to refer to a December 2006 

GAO report that is entitled ‘‘High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with the Management and Oversight 

of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces.’’ There were a number 

of recommendations in the report. One is that DOD had such limited visibility over contractors because information was not aggregated, and as a result, senior leaders and military commanders 

could not develop a complete picture of the extent to which they 

could rely or did rely on contractors to support their operations. 

And the GAO went on to give an example of a base consolidation 

plan that DOD officials were unable to determine how many contractors were even deployed to bases in Iraq. 

What is the current status in terms of DOD’s visibility over contractors? This report is about 14 months old now. 

Mr. BELL. Thank you, Senator Collins. The report itself, even 

when it was issued, was somewhat dated, and I have had a series 

of conversations with Bill Solis about this. Let me give you the current status of those arrangements. 

First, as I mentioned earlier, we are in the process of implementing now a system we call SPOT, which actually will identify 

every DOD contractor who comes on a military base, and we will 

know where they are on the base—if they come to a dining facility, 

32 

medical care facility, or when they leave the base. So we can actually identify and aggregate the statistics regarding the individual 

contractor personnel. 

Equally important, we have put into place in October of this last 

year the authority that all contracts and task orders that are going 

to be implemented in Iraq or Afghanistan must be pre-cleared by 

the Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and Afghanistan, so that 

not only do we know about the individuals who are transiting and 

moving around our AOR, we actually know what contracts are 

being implemented. This was not the case prior to that effort of 

putting the Joint Contracting Command Authority in place and as 

we implement the actual SPOT system, as we call it, for tracking 

the personnel. So we have about 75,000 contractor personnel and 

contracts in the system already that is being fielded today. The 

State Department is pilot testing that for their own personnel for 

contractors. So we believe by this summer that the combination of 

having the Joint Contracting Command oversight of any contract 

to be implemented there as well as the actual ability to track individual contractor personnel and their movements will give us that 

kind of information. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Another concern that GAO raised about the oversight of contractors is that DOD did not have sufficient contracting officers incountry. I know from my many briefings with the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction that he believes this is still a problem. Similarly, Ambassador, with the State Department, the October 2007 report found that there was not sufficient State Department contracting officers in-country. There is a very startling statistic that my staff found that in 2003, USAID had only four employees to oversee its Iraq contract work. 

What is the status of your efforts to ensure that there is sufficient DOD acquisition personnel? I will start with you, Mr. Bell, 

and then the same question to you, Ambassador. 

Mr. BELL. Thank you again, Senator Collins. The Secretary of 

Defense asked me to do an assessment for him in September about 

how effectively we were managing contractors, addressing the 

whole range of operational and contract management activities. At 

that time, I recommended to him exactly what you have indicated 

here, that we need to substantially strengthen both the staffing 

and contracting authority of the Joint Contracting Command as 

well as significantly increase the amount of DCMA post-award contract administration. 

Subsequent to that, he has approved all those recommendations. 

We are in the process of adding 48 people just to the Joint Contracting Command as contracting officers. We have already put 100 

additional DCMA personnel in. We have another 150 that are going 

in before the end of March. That meets the short-term need. 

The long-term need is one we have to address, which is the need 

to enlarge the civilian and military contracting capability and personnel force that we have available to deploy to support post-award 

contracting activity. That is a long-term problem. The Gansler 

Commission has some important recommendations regarding the 

need to strengthen that, particularly not only to train the people 

but to career-path them so we have appropriate levels of experiVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:41 Mar 09, 2010 Jkt 041453 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\41453.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
33 

ence, both in contracting in general, but particularly in contingency 

contracting. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Ambassador Kennedy. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, the State Department approaches the 

problem slightly differently. We do not do major contracts in Iraq. 

In order to reduce the number of people at risk and make sure that 

we have the most robust contract oversight, all of our major contracts are written, negotiated, and executed in Washington by our 

contracting professionals here. So that is why we do not have as 

many contract executors there. What we do, though, in parallel to 

Defense, is we have contracting officer’s representatives. For example, every Diplomatic Security special agent who is being assigned 

to Iraq now receives a 40-hour course on how to ensure that they 

enforce the provisions of the contract. We have contracts for telecommunications and so our information management supervisors 

there provide the oversight of the contract and refer any questions 

back to Washington. The same with our facilities and the same 

with our logistics. 

So we have the contract officer’s representatives there who are 

professionals in the field that they are overseeing and they then 

refer questions or doubts about it to our central headquarters in 

Washington where the contract was negotiated and where there is 

the solid expertise on that. And that reduces the number of personnel at risk while at the same time maintains a robust oversight 

of the execution of the contract. 

Senator COLLINS. I will tell you, Ambassador, based on the discussions that I have had with Stuart Bowen, if you do not have the 

contracting officials in-country, you have a lessening of accountability and oversight. I realize the negotiation can be done in the 

safety of Washington, but look at all the terminations for convenience of the government that we have seen in Iraq when they really 

should have been terminations for default. And it is because you 

do not have the people on the ground. I think nothing substitutes 

for that on-site oversight. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, I have read Mr. Bowen’s reports. I fully 

agree with you for those kind of contracts, but those are not the 

kind of contracts that are within my jurisdiction. Developmental 

contracts are the purview of the Agency for International Development. The one division that we have out there, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement that does various kinds 

of training, they do have a robust staff. I believe they are up to 11 

contracting people overseeing that. 

I will be glad to get that data, but I fully agree with you, but 

it is the distinction of the type of contract that we use versus the 

kind DOD uses or the kind the Agency for International Development or some other body that is doing developmental work as opposed to internal operations contracting. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank, Senator Collins. Senator Tester. 

Senator TESTER. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

As I alluded to earlier, I think that any time taxpayer dollars 

end up unnecessarily in the contractor’s pockets instead of going to 

support the troops in terms of body armor, vehicles, bullets, or just 

general overall support, I think it is a travesty. And I think it is 

34 

our job to make sure that any fraud or abuse that happens does 

not happen. 

Along that line, Mr. Kennedy, in 2004, there was a Worldwide 

Personnel Protective Services (WPPS) contract awarded, which you 

alluded to earlier, for $332 million to Blackwater. Two years later, 

Blackwater received for that contract $488 million, over $150 million more than what the contract said. 

Was that contract competitively bid in the beginning? Explain to 

me why Blackwater would underbid a contract by that much. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, the original Blackwater contract to provide protective security operations in Iraq was awarded by the Department of Defense in 2003. When the U.S. Embassy was stood 

up on relatively short notice in 2004, there was a brief, sole-source 

award to Blackwater by the State Department. 

Senator TESTER. And that was this contract? 

Mr. KENNEDY. The original one. However, the State Department 

was then in the process of awarding what we call the Worldwide 

Personnel Protective Security contract. That pre-qualified companies, and there were three companies that won as being certified: 

Triple Canopy, Blackwater, and DynCorp. Then we post task orders to that contract that say we want you to bid now among the 

qualified firms for this particular task order. And then the three 

companies bid on that. 

Senator TESTER. It was competitively bid? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir. And then the task orders are competitively bid. However, if during the period of the contract running for 

the year, if circumstances greatly change on the ground and we 

need additional PSCs, because of increased danger or expanded 

presence. 

Senator TESTER. And that is the case? 

Mr. KENNEDY. We then amend the task order, but they are paid 

the same rate that they won the bid on. 

Senator TESTER. So Blackwater billed the State Department 

$1,222 a day for their employees, which was about $445,000 a year, 

which is well above the poverty line and well above what you pay 

our soldiers in the field. Is that typical? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I hate to say it, Senator, but that is the competitively bid going rate, yes, sir. We competitively bid the contract, 

and we take the best price and best value. And it is what it costs 

these days—— 

Senator TESTER. And this is cost-effective rather than going with 

our active military to provide the support we want, to have control 

over, and as Senator McCaskill said, to be able to work our forces 

so everybody knows where they are at and integrate what is happening. That is cost-effective? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Two things on that, Senator. When I was a member of the Secretary’s special panel, I interviewed every senior U.S. 

military officer in and around Iraq from four stars to one star. 

Senator TESTER. Yes. 

Mr. KENNEDY. And I said if the State Department stopped using 

contractors to provide the protective security operations—— 

Senator TESTER. Yes. 

35 

1See Mr. Bell’s response to question for the record, which appears in the Appendix on page 

147. 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. For diplomatic activities there, do 

you, DOD, have the resources and the troops to take on the mission? And the answer was 100 percent uniformly, ‘‘No.’’ 

Senator TESTER. I do not doubt that a bit, but shouldn’t we step 

up our efforts to make the active military more suitable because we 

are at war? 

Mr. KENNEDY. That, Senator, is a question that I do not feel 

qualified to answer. 

Senator TESTER. OK. 

Mr. KENNEDY. But if I might, one other thing. 

Senator TESTER. Yes. 

Mr. KENNEDY. We have vetting procedures. We run through a 

complete schedule to make sure that we are getting everything that 

the taxpayer has paid for under the terms of those contracts. 

Senator TESTER. I understand, but if the bar is set at $1,200 a 

day, that is pretty incredible from my perspective. I mean, it is 

truly incredible. 

Mr. KENNEDY. That is, of course, Senator, you realize, a fully 

loaded cost where they are providing the housing, the meals, the 

transportation. 

Senator TESTER. Are you sure about that? When I went to Iraq, 

the folks who guarded me—they did a very fine job, I might say— 

were contractors and ate in the same barracks everybody else ate 

in. 

Mr. KENNEDY. No, sir. If you went to Baghdad, you were protected by the Regional Security Office which uses Blackwater. 

Senator TESTER. Right. 

Mr. KENNEDY. There is a Blackwater camp where they sleep. 

There is a Blackwater dining hall where they eat. And their ID 

card does not entitle them—— 

Senator TESTER. That is amazing. 

Mr. KENNEDY [continuing]. To services in the Defense mess hall, 

which the State Department pays for independently. 

Senator TESTER. All right. 

Mr. BELL. If I could, Senator Tester? 

Senator TESTER. Yes. 

Mr. BELL. What you may have observed is they were on duty 

providing protection to you, which requires them to be in proximity 

to you when you have your meals. 

Senator TESTER. OK. All right. Could you give me any kind of 

ballpark figure—and I know I am running out of time rapidly here. 

But of the $70 billion we just appropriated for Iraq and Afghanistan, what percentage of those dollars that you get will be used for 

contracts across the board, not just PSC but all contracts? Just give 

me an idea. And if you cannot, you can get back to me with what 

that amount might be.1

Mr. BELL. I would like to take that as a question for the record 

because I think you deserve a good, specific answer on that. 

Senator TESTER. That would be fine, yes. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I have a ballpark figure. I would say in Iraq it is 

about $400 million a year. But let me provide you with an exact 

36 

1See Mr. Kennedy’s response to question for the record, which appears in the Appendix on 

page 120. 

figure for the record, Senator, because that would allow me to 

make sure I encompass all the costs, including the Northern portion and the Southern portion.1

Senator TESTER. That would be good. I know the contractors do 

a good job because I saw them. The ones I dealt with did a good 

job. But one of the things, I think, that the American public does 

not understand and why red flags go up on a contractor is because 

we think we have 150,000 or 170,000 troops in Iraq. Well, we are 

paying for twice that many. And as you said earlier, Mr. Bell, only 

17 percent are Americans, but we are supporting twice that many 

troops in Iraq. I know the militaries went down from 3.3 million 

to 2.2 million, and I do not doubt that. But this policy decision was 

made, and I just do not know if I quite agree with it, to be honest 

with you, from my perspective. And we can debate that some other 

time. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Tester. 

Thanks for your participation in the hearing. 

I would note the presence of the distinguished Senator from 

Delaware, Senator Carper. 

With apologies to the witnesses, I am going to turn the gavel 

over to Senator Akaka because I have to go to the Senate floor. So 

he will decide who winds this up. I want to thank the witnesses. 

You have been very constructive, and I appreciate it a lot. 

The hearing record will remain open if you want to submit additional testimony for at least 15 days, and we may want to submit 

questions. Some of you have made suggestions here that I would 

like to invite the others to comment on, particularly Professor Dickinson’s suggestions. 

The Committee thinks there is a need to legislate here, but obviously we want to do it thoughtfully and only as necessary. So your 

input will remain very important to us. 

I want to say finally that Senator Levin wanted to be here, but 

has been unable to get away from a very important hearing of the 

Senate Armed Services Committee. He asked me to thank the witnesses on his behalf and to indicate that he will have questions to 

ask you for the record, so you have something to look forward to 

when you leave the hearing. 

With that, I thank you and turn the gavel over to the Senator 

from Hawaii. 

Senator AKAKA [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bell, subcontracting has been an area where there have been 

questions. In a letter to Chairman Henry Waxman of the House 

Oversight Committee, the Department of Defense found that prime 

contractor KBR, Inc., had subcontracted for private security under 

a dining and facilities contract. At the time, the Department had 

no idea such a subcontract had been put into place by KBR, Inc. 

Does the Federal Government have authority over these subcontractors? Or must we rely on prime contractors to oversee them? 

37 

Mr. BELL. We have the authority to specify the deliverables 

under a performance contract, and IDIQ contract, which KBR, Inc. 

has under LOGCAP. They were specifically prohibited from providing security services under that contract, but were authorized to 

subcontract that out to qualified security companies should the 

need be determined to do that. So in this particular case, I am not 

sure of the specifics it was responding to. I am sure that what happened is that they found a need, given a deteriorating security situation, to get security contract protection for that facility and did 

that through a subcontract. 

Senator AKAKA. I see. So my question was whether the Federal 

Government has authority over those subcontractors? 

Mr. BELL. We do have authority over all subcontractors. We even 

have authority over contracts where the services and the goods 

have not yet been turned over to the U.S. Government, and we are 

exercising, for example, jurisdiction over private security contractors on deliveries that have not yet changed ownership to the U.S. 

Government. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Mr. Bell. 

Mr. Kennedy, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 

(HSPD-12) requires that all Federal employees and contractors 

have a common proven identity card (PIV), which requires a background check. According to the Department of State website, due 

to difficulty in conducting background checks for many overseas 

employees, you do not expect to implement PIV cards for everyone 

until 2011 because of your many overseas employees and contractors. 

How many private security contractors working for the Department of State have obtained PIV cards and undergone the mandatory background check? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Senator, every single direct personal services contractor protective agent is an American, we only employ Americans 

for those jobs. When the contractor proposes the individual to us, 

we vet that individual. We check their credentials. In the beginning, they already must be an honorably discharged U.S. military 

veteran or someone with Federal, State, or local law enforcement 

experience. Then we run a security check on them under all the 

relevant U.S. Executive Orders and bring them up to the Secret security clearance level. So every one of our American employees is 

fully cleared and has a Secret security clearance among the contractors. 

For our contractors who are non-Americans—and we only use 

those individuals as static guards—not any of the movement security professionals that you may have seen if you have been in any 

one of the State Department threatened posts, as I know you have. 

For static guards, support personnel, cooks, cleaners, maintenance 

personnel, and others, we run every single local check that is possible under the State Department’s rubric and the State Department’s liaison with the intelligence community and other law enforcement. 

The problem that HSPD-12 causes for the State Department is 

that you can run all the checks that they want on Americans, but 

you cannot run them all to the same degree on local employees, 

38 

which is why we do not give third-country nationals or locally engaged staff security clearances, and HSPD-12 drives that. 

So there is an important distinction there, but in terms of the security professionals we hire for convoy and movement security, 

they all, sir, have a full U.S. Government Secret security clearance 

and the appropriate suitability checks that go with it. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, thanks for the distinction. Let me ask Mr. 

Bell the same question. 

Mr. BELL. As you know, Senator Akaka, we use both U.S., thirdcountry nationals, and foreign nationals for our private security 

contractors. Our requirements under the rules we have at DOD 

and certainly the rules we have with the multi-national force over 

in Iraq and Afghanistan require that background checks must be 

completed and security clearances must be provided. We use, obviously, Interpol and the FBI; we use U.S. embassy facilities if they 

are third-country nationals. And any investigation of local records 

from their city or province of origin are also checked to make sure 

they have no criminal records. 

To the extent they have been in the United States, obviously, we 

check to make sure that they have not been convicted of any crime 

that would prohibit them from being armed and, in fact, that they 

have no other criminal investigation against them. So we do conduct, particularly on private security contractors, very thorough 

background investigations. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you. I really appreciate your responses. You have been helpful to the Committee. What we have 

put into the record now will certainly clarify and explain some of 

the questions surrounding this important issue. 

So, with that, I want to thank Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Bell, Mr. 

Schmitt, and Ms. Dickinson for being here today and being part of 

this hearing. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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