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ONE YEAR LATER: HAVE TSA AIRPORT SECURITY

CHECKPOINTS IMPROVED?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 15, 2007

Serial No. 110–92

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman

TOM LANTOS, California

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland

PETER WELCH, Vermont

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

BILL SALI, Idaho

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PHIL SCHILIRO, Chief of Staff

PHIL BARNETT, Staff Director

EARLEY GREEN, Chief Clerk

DAVID MARIN, Minority Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on November 15, 2007 ...................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Kutz, Gregory D., Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, Government Accountability Office, accompanied by John

Cooney, Assistant Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations,

Government Accountability Office; and Edmund ‘‘Kip’’ Hawley, Administrator, Transportation Security Administration ...................................... 11

Hawley, Edmund ‘‘Kip’’ ............................................................................. 27

Kutz, Gregory D. ....................................................................................... 11

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Davis, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, prepared statement of ........................................................................ 7

Hawley, Edmund ‘‘Kip’’, Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, prepared statement of ..................................................................... 31

Kutz, Gregory D., Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of ....... 14

Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the State of

Florida, letter dated March 28, 2006 .......................................................... 41

Sali, Hon. Bill, a Representative in Congress from the State of Idaho,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 66

Watson, Hon. Diane E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California, prepared statement of ........................................................... 62

Waxman, Chairman Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the

State of California, prepared statement of ................................................. 3

(1)

ONE YEAR LATER: HAVE TSA AIRPORT

SECURITY CHECKPOINTS IMPROVED?

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2154,

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry A. Waxman (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Waxman, Cummings, Tierney, Watson,

Higgins, Yarmuth, Braley, Sarbanes, Davis of Virginia, Shays,

Mica, Issa, Westmoreland, and Sali.

Staff present: Phil Schiliro, chief of staff; Phil Barnett, staff director and chief counsel; Kristin Amerling, general counsel; Karen

Lightfoot, communications director and senior policy advisor; David

Rapallo, chief investigative counsel; John Williams, deputy chief investigative counsel; Steve Glickman and Susanne Sachsman, counsels; Earley Green, chief clerk; Teresa Coufal, deputy clerk; Caren

Auchman and Ella Hoffman, press assistants; Leneal Scott, information systems manager; Kerry Gutknecht and William Ragland,

staff assistants; Sam Buffone, special assistant; David Marin, minority staff director; Jennifer Safavian, minority chief counsel for

oversight and investigations; Keith Ausbrook, minority general

counsel; Janice Spector and Christopher Bright, minority professional staff members; John Cuaderes, minority senior investigator

and policy advisor; Patrick Lyden, minority parliamentarian and

member services coordinator; Benjamin Chance, minority clerk;

Meredith Liberty, minority staff assistant and correspondence coordinator; and Todd Greenwood, minority research assistant.

Chairman WAXMAN. The meeting of the committee will please

come to order.

Today we are holding a hearing on airport security. Last year,

the Government Accountability Office tested the effectiveness of

airport security checkpoints by conducting undercover missions to

bring explosives through airport screening security checkpoints at

21 locations. The Transportation Security Administration failed all

21 of those tests. The purpose of today’s hearing is to determine

whether TSA has improved over the last year. GAO is here again

to tell us about the results of its most recent investigation.

This committee comes to this issue in a bipartisan manner. This

investigation was jointly requested by our ranking member, Tom

Davis, Benny Thompson, the Chair of the Homeland Security Committee and myself. A bipartisan approach is critical, because explosives on airplanes are a dangerous threat.

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In August 2006, terrorists plotted to bring liquid explosives onto

eight flights bound for the United States. The British thwarted

that threat, but there are new ones on the horizon. The terrorist

threat to our airlines is constantly evolving. The question is, is the

Transportation Security Administration keeping up?

To help answer this question, we asked GAO to do another round

of covert tests. Congress and the traveling public we represent

have the right to know whether TSA is effectively addressing this

threat. Unfortunately, the news is not good. GAO’s undercover

agents once again succeeded in getting dangerous materials

through airport security checkpoints.

Last year, the co-chairman of the 9/11 Commission spoke publicly

about the fact that TSA failed GAO’s tests. Thomas Kane said he

was dismayed because ‘‘I thought the Department of Homeland Security was making some progress on this, and evidently they are

not.’’ And Lee Hamilton stated that ‘‘The fact that so many airports

failed this test is a hugely important story which the American

traveler is entitled to know.’’

The Homeland Security Department promised to plug these

holes. But what we will hear from GAO today is that the Department is not succeeding. The Transportation Security Administration has had 6 years and has spent billions of taxpayers’ dollars,

yet our airlines remain vulnerable. That is an embarrassing and

dangerous record. I hope today’s hearing will begin to point the

way toward reforms that are urgently needed. We have to fix this

problem.

I want to now recognize Ranking Member Tom Davis.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Henry A. Waxman follows:]

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Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you

very much for holding this hearing. It is indeed bipartisan; this is

not about red or blue, it is about red, white and blue, and defending the homeland.

In several days, families in record numbers will begin their travels to celebrate Thanksgiving. For many who travel by plane, their

journey will start with long lines to reach the airport and then to

park. These will be followed by even longer, more agonizing lines

to get boarding passes and check luggage. These will be followed

by the most torturous line of all, the one that leads to the Transportation Security Agency checkpoint.

Since 9/11, people have become accustomed to the added security

procedures associated with air travel. Although it takes longer to

board an aircraft and there are more restrictions on what can be

carried onto a plane, the public generally has been willing to endure these inconveniences for the benefit of safety. It is safe to say,

though, that the flying public would not be so understanding if people came to believe these inconveniences do not assure security.

In August 2006, British authorities discovered a plot to blow up

trans-Atlantic aircraft using explosives made from common liquids.

In response to this new threat, TSA implemented what is known

as the 3–1–1 or the 3–1–1 policy, which permits passengers to

carry 3 ounces of liquids or gels aboard a plane in 1 quart-sized

plastic bag. In theory, strict limits on the amount of liquids that

passengers can carry will prevent a bomb from being constructed.

Today, we will hear testimony from the Government Accountability Office on how its agents successfully got past TSA checkpoints

at several airports with common liquids that, when combined,

could have constituted an explosive device large enough to bring

down a commercial aircraft. That is obviously not what Congress

or the public want to hear.

A little more than 2 years ago, I chaired a similar hearing on the

adequacy of TSA’s security at airports. Then TSA leaders testified

the solution was more time, more resources and better technology.

They have had all three. Unfortunately, as this latest GAO report

shows, TSA still cannot consistently detect or prevent prohibited

items from being carried onto aircraft. We have to do better.

I understand the threat evolves, as our enemies learn more about

our improved security and take steps to react. TSA has to do the

same. In fact, TSA just can’t react, the agency has to be proactive

and stay on offense.

I am pleased to see Administrator Hawley in his opening statement acknowledge what GAO was able to do and the need for TSA

to do better. But his words need to trigger strong actions and tangible results.

Mr. Chairman, as we approach the beginning of the 2007 holiday

season and the flying public begins to travel, it is important to remember the American people rely on TSA to do everything possible

to ensure their safety. It is not enough to identify gaps. These gaps

have to be addressed aggressively and consistently.

Flying these days is stressful enough. The commercial air travel

industry is straining under serious cost and performance pressures.

But no one can afford to let security challenges get lost in the shuffle. We need to understand how TSA proposes to strengthen the

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system, increase vigilance and deter those who seek to exploit the

vulnerabilities of so fragile a network. The next baggie of prohibited liquids may not be a test.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Tom Davis follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Davis.

Ordinarily it would be just the two of us making opening statements. But we have had a request from Mr. Mica, who is the ranking member of the legislative committee on transportation issues,

so I know he wants to give a statement. Let me invite any Member

who wishes to make a statement to do so at this time.

Let me recognize Mr. Mica first.

Mr. MICA. First of all, Mr. Waxman, you are going to probably

fall out of your chair, but I want to take this opportunity to publicly thank you. I think what you are doing today is probably one

of the best hearings that we will do for the American public this

entire year. Henry Waxman, I really appreciate your following up

on one of the most important threats we face as a Nation. You have

also done something that I was unable to do, make the public

aware of the failure of our security screening system. I think that

is very important.

In fact, I thought of even breaching security or classified information when I first asked GAO, when I was chairman. And your

staff did an excellent job of detailing what has taken place in previous tests and previous failures. If this was just this failure, it

would still be a problem. But this is unfortunately a record of failure, which you have detailed and you also have made public. This

is an open society, and the public has a right to know.

Mr. Hawley is going to tell you about a layered security system

with 19 levels of security. I read his testimony. The last one is the

public. I am telling you, this is one of the most serious threats that

we face as a Nation. Because these people are out to get us. This

has been a cat and mouse game since before September 11, 2001.

No one should let down their guard on this. If you just look at the

history of what they have tried to do, they scoped the system in

2001, they found our vulnerabilities. We didn’t have standards for

screeners, we didn’t ban box cutters, we didn’t have rules in place

to deal with a hijacking of a plane, the failure of government.

If you look at the sophistication of what they have done just of

late, the Richard Reid shoe bomb was a very sophisticated effort to

take down multiple aircraft. If you look at the liquid bombs in the

London case, the same thing, an evolving sophistication to take

down multiple aircraft. If you think 9/11 was something, folks,

using non-traditional explosives like Mr. Cooney and GAO has used

is the next step in this process. We have tried to put in place layers

of security to deal with that.

I have some very specific questions, because I didn’t feel that the

hand-off to the Democrat side was well done. And I am going to

go into the details of the meeting that took place when we really

handed this off to the other team, who has the same interests that

I had. I don’t think that they got the full story, and today we are

going to hear the full story due to what Mr. Waxman has been able

to make public.

So finally, the good thing about what this is going to do is make

the public aware that they are the last link in this. We have put

other links in, and Mr. Hawley will describe them, not as fast and

not as well with technology or training of personnel or placement

of personnel to deal with this situation. But we do have a failure

of a system. It needs to be publicly known, and the public can help

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us, because they can be alert. Probably the best thing that they are

going to deal with today is congested aircraft, which will mean that

those planes are full. But they are full of Americans and people

who can help us in an effort to detect this threat. You are going

to hear more about it.

So Mr. Waxman, I thank you on behalf of the American people

for what you are doing today and making them aware. They are

going to have to be partners with us to make certain that we don’t

repeat a national catastrophe. Thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Mica.

Let me call on any other Member—Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I too thank you for holding this

hearing. I am glad that it is truly a bipartisan hearing. I, like Mr.

Mica, am a senior member of the Transportation Committee. I am

chairman of the Coast Guard Subcommittee. We spend a phenomenal amount of time and resources trying to guard our ports. It

seems that we had taken for granted, while we were trying to

make sure our ports were safe, that our airports were very safe.

And the fact is that so many people, when I think about GAO

testing 21 airports last year and getting through every single one

of them, I didn’t say 20 of them, I said every single one of them,

it makes you wonder. The fact is that my constituents are paying

more for airline tickets, and part of the increase in price is to cover

the TSA. Then they of course stand in the long lines and they are

very patient, everybody from the little children to senior citizens

going through all kinds of procedures, only to find out that we

could do better.

Mr. Chairman, a few years ago, many years ago when I visited

Israel, I will never forget a statement that they said to me, and it

is something that I have thought about a lot. What they said was,

if we are not better, we will not be. If we are not better, we will

not be. I think we have to be better. And I think we can do better.

Americans across the country will be traveling next week for the

Thanksgiving holiday. They are going to go through a lot. But they

will be under the assumption that they are safe because they see

what they go through.

So I am hoping that this hearing will shed some light, but most

importantly, I am hoping that it will let us discover what the true

problems may be. Are we mired in an atmosphere of mediocrity?

Are we in need of better detection equipment? Are there human

error issues here? I don’t know. We need to find out all of these

things, so that we can be the very best we can be. We must, by

the way, have very, very high expectations.

It is in the DNA of every cell of my brain and probably every

American’s brain, seeing those planes on 9/11 fly into the World

Trade Centers. We never want that to happen again. So Mr. Chairman, I think this hearing will go a long way toward making sure

that we are better. Because if we are not better, we will not be.

With that, I yield back.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cummings.

Does any other Member wish to be recognized? Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A 30 second intervention

to thank you, Mr. Chairman, as well, in working with Mr. Davis

and Mr. Thompson. The issue for me was heightened in the early

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1980’s when a plane was blown out of the sky because of drug terrorists who were involved. We were shown back in the early 1990’s

that just a bottle of gin with basically liquid explosives next to a

radio next to a carton of cigarettes, and the radio was the detonator. And another one was just a mat on the bottom of a suitcase

that was an explosive, non-detectable.

I will just end by saying what is extraordinarily alarming to me

is this isn’t 21 break-ins, in a sense, out of 100. This is 21 out of

21 and that to me is extraordinarily unsettling and makes me

question whether we are going to see any success in the near future. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Shays. Do any other Members wish to be recognized? If not, I want to welcome our witnesses

here today. We have with us Mr. Gregory D. Kutz, the Managing

Director of Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, from the

Government Accountability Office. He is accompanied by Mr. John

Cooney, Assistant Director of Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, Government Accountability Office. And the Honorable

Edmund ‘‘Kip’’ Hawley, the Administrator of the Transportation

Security Administration.

We are grateful to you for being here today. It is the practice of

this committee that all testimony is taken under oath, so I would

like to ask you if you would please stand and raise your right

hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman WAXMAN. Let the record indicate that each of the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

Mr. Kutz, I want you to start off. Your prepared statements, all

of you, will be in the record, and we would like to ask you to try

to limit the oral presentation. We won’t be strict about this, but we

will have a clock that will indicate when the 5-minutes is up.

Thank you.

STATEMENTS OF GREGORY D. KUTZ, MANAGING DIRECTOR,

FORENSIC AUDITS AND SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN

COONEY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, FORENSIC AUDITS AND

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE; AND EDMUND ‘‘KIP’’ HAWLEY, ADMINISTRATOR,

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

STATEMENT OF GREGORY D. KUTZ

Mr. KUTZ. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank

you for the opportunity to discuss airport security. In March 2006,

we reported that investigators boarded commercial aircraft with explosive devices in their carry-on luggage. At the request of this

committee, we performed additional covert testing of airport security in 2007. Today’s testimony highlights the results of our testing.

It is important to note that we worked closely with TSA to make

sure that my testimony does not have any classified or sensitive security information.

My testimony today has two parts. First, I will discuss what we

did; and second, I will discuss the results of our covert tests. First,

using information available on the Internet, we were able to idenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:36 Nov 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\45241.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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tify devices that could severely damage an aircraft and jeopardize

the safety of its passengers. The first device was an improvised explosive device [IED], containing two parts. The first part, a liquid

explosive; the second part, a low-yield detonator.

Our 2006 work showed that the detonator itself could function as

an IED. However, using this detonator to ignite the liquid explosive

results in a more powerful device.

The second device was an improvised incendiary device, or IID.

These types of devices do not explode, but instead create intense

fire, heat and noxious fumes. Our incendiary device was created by

combining products prohibited by TSA from carry-on luggage. The

components for both our devices were purchased at local stores and

on the Internet for less than $150.

We tested the effectiveness of our devices in partnership with a

local law enforcement agency and at a national laboratory. As you

requested, I will show a short video at the end of my presentation

that shows the results of these tests. As the video will show, our

devices could cause severe damage to an aircraft and threaten the

safety of its passengers.

Using only publicly available information which we do for all of

our covert testing, we devised methods to conceal the components

for these devices in our carry-on luggage and on our persons. As

with all FSI testing, this was a covert, or Red Team test. In other

words, very few people at GAO knew what we were doing and nobody at TSA was aware in advance of our testing.

Moving on to our results, we successfully passed through TSA

checkpoints with components for several explosive devices and an

incendiary device. These prohibited items were concealed in our

carry-on luggage and on our persons. Our testing was done at 19

airports across the country, including those that employ private

screeners. We found no difference in the results for TSA employees

and the privately contracted screening employees.

In most cases, security officers appeared to follow TSA procedures. However, we did identify several vulnerabilities. For example, most travelers are aware of the 3–1–1 rule, prohibiting certain

liquids and gels aboard the aircraft. We were able to bring a liquid

component of the incendiary device through checkpoints undetected

by studying policies related to this process.

Also in two instances, our investigators were selected for a secondary inspection. However, in both cases, the security officer did

not detect the prohibited items that our investigators carried on

board the aircraft. One of our suggestions for TSA is to consider

improved search techniques, including enhanced pat-downs.

In conclusion, our testing shows that a terrorist group using publicly available information could bring explosive and incendiary devices on board an aircraft undetected. TSA faces the monumental

challenge of balancing security with the efficient movement of passengers. Our work clearly shows the increased security risk of the

current policy of allowing substantial carry-on luggage aboard aircraft. Absent changes in the carry-on policy, we believe that risks

can be reduced through improvements in human capital, process

and technology.

As you requested, we will now show a short video. I want to just

briefly discuss what the video will show. The first part of the video

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is the IED detonator I described, which you will see used on an

automobile. The second part of the video is the liquid explosive,

which is ignited by the IED detonator. The third part will be the

incendiary device that I mentioned.

So if we could show the video.

[Video shown.]

Mr. KUTZ. Mr. Chairman, this ends our statement. Special Agent

Cooney and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kutz follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Cooney, did you have a statement?

Mr. COONEY. No, I don’t, Mr. Chairman, but I will be able to answer your questions at the appropriate time.

Chairman WAXMAN. Very good. Thank you.

Mr. Hawley.

STATEMENT OF EDMUND ‘‘KIP’’ HAWLEY

Mr. HAWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Davis,

members of the committee. I also thank you for having this hearing

and drawing attention to these issues. I particularly appreciate the

work of the chairman and the ranking member and their staffs,

along with my colleagues from the GAO, to protect sensitive information. I think this is, as Mr. Mica mentioned, an extraordinarily

important issue that we deal with openly and transparently.

The videos that we saw a minute ago and the play on the television are noteworthy and certainly get your attention. I think the

key point to it is, there are vulnerabilities in every system of security. What we are engaged in is risk management. As we look at

risk management, it looks at an IED that would have the capacity

of taking an airplane down. There are many, many, many steps, including making the bomb, getting components through, perhaps assembling them, all those various steps. And we look at the whole

system.

And the 19 layers of security that Mr. Mica mentioned and I put

in my opening statement are like numbers in a combination lock.

If you find one number to a 19 number combination, you have one

number. What we have done is identify and understand the

vulnerabilities in our system, and there are vulnerabilities, and

then put in place other layers to compensate for them.

I would like to just give a quick summary. In August 2005, we

identified, I came on the job in July 2005. We looked at what are

the vulnerabilities. We looked at the technology vulnerabilities, we

looked at the people vulnerabilities and we looked at our strategy

vulnerabilities. We identified that we had work to do in all three

areas. We needed to dramatically upgrade the technology that we

have at checkpoints for the point of eliminating the possibility of

bringing on IED components, not the assembled bomb, but the

components, a much, much more difficult task.

So we re-trained the entire TSA work force with professional

bomb techs directed at that, and changed our protocols to require

us to train and test to the standard of IED components. And to put

these tests in context, and I appreciate the work, they are done for

a good purpose, they yield valuable information, but it is important

to stay focused, not get panicked by looking at one particular number in that combination lock and worrying about the whole system.

There are issues that need to be addressed and I welcome discussing them.

But to put it in context, if the number of tests that the GAO did

for this were measured in miles, there were 38 tests, that would

be roughly from here to Baltimore. The Office of Inspector General

has done roughly 300 tests, this is in a 3-month period of this year.

That is approximately from here to Philadelphia. And in a 3-month

period at TSA, we do 225,000 tests. These are physical tests with

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actual bomb components going through, with real people smuggling

through the checkpoint. That is the equivalent of going around the

world eight times.

So I think the trip to Baltimore, one can learn interesting things.

But what we do every day and the 225,000 over 3 months or over

a million a year gives us very focused information on what we

know terrorists work on. We know their capability. We focus our

efforts on what will actually take down a plane as opposed to what

might severely damage. My pen can do severe damage.

We look at what can take a plane down and work backward from

there each one layer. So yes, there are vulnerabilities in technology. I will address what we are doing about those. So we have

put aside a significant amount of money to buy new AT machines,

new checkpoint carry-on machines. We have announced a purchase

of 250 already in October. We expect to double that, using fiscal

year 2008 funds, should the Congress appropriate that money and

the bill be signed.

But 2008, we expect to move that number up to 500. To give you

an idea, there are about 2,500 lanes in the United States, 500 and

some checkpoints. So this is a very, very significant technology upgrade that we will be deploying in 2008 that will be the first significant technology upgrade since the 1970’s on carry-on luggage.

That is in progress. We identified it earlier, and now fortunately

it is being deployed.

On the strategy we identified in 2005, we are too check-list oriented. If our TSOs are looking to find a certain number of prohibited items and pull them out of bags, they are not thinking ahead.

I think as Mr. Davis mentioned, we have to go on offense. We can’t

sit back at the checkpoint looking through a prohibited items list

and fishing out peoples’ objects. We have to be aware that they

change their technique. When we move one direction, they will find

a way around it. We have to play offense, we have to be nimble.

That is why we do so many of these other IED component tests at

our checkpoints every day, every shift, every airport. It is the crux

of what we do.

Then we said, in addition to being more flexible, better technology, we need to change up what we do. We can’t be a sitting

duck at the checkpoint with the same process. We have added layers. We have added the behavior observation layer, which is for

people to identify suspicious behavior, such as you would find with

surveillance or pre-attack planning. They are not bringing prohibited items. They are not breaking any laws. They are doing their

surveillance feeling they are protected because we can’t get them

because they are not carrying prohibited items. Not true any more.

Step into a U.S. airport, we have 600 behavior detection officers

out there and they will pick you off in the public area.

Then on top of that, we have added the ticket document checker,

with the support of the Congress, and I appreciate that, to take

over the critical point at which somebody shows up and shows

identification. Now we have Federal officers there checking identity

who have much better briefing who can then tie in with the behavior piece. On top of that, we have added our VIPR teams, which

bring our Federal air marshals who are not flying on aircraft, they

are now able to move undercover and overtly to do unexpected paVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:36 Nov 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\45241.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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trols everywhere in the airport environment. We also work, I

should say, with our transit partners to help there, too.

On top of that, we have added a program in the back of airports,

where we have the equivalent of 1,000 headcount now, that we

have developed to spend their time in the backside of airports. We

are not just sitting at the checkpoint. We are looking at what are

employees doing in the back, what is happening at the fuel dump,

we are looking at what is happening in the parking garage, we are

looking at who is driving into the airport. All of those things are

now added. Those are additional layers that have been added since

2005.

So we addressed, we identified the vulnerabilities in 2005. I told

you on the technology we are after that with AT and the millimeter

wave, I should say, and backscatter, whole body imaging, that gets

us out of this pat-down issue. The GAO mentioned enhanced patdowns. We know what that means. The TSA officers can do very

enhanced pat-downs. It has not been acceptable to the public. If

that is something that we have to do, we will do that. The better

answer is millimeter wave or backscatter, which allow people to

have privacy protections to go through and eliminate that possibility. So technology would fix that.

Now the most important, the people. Our TSOs, we have trained

them, I mentioned that. We have career progression now where our

employees can move up and enhance their skills. We have a pay

for performance program. Our attrition is dramatically down. Our

attendance is up. The people who flew on August 10th know that

our TSOs stood up that day and changed the entire security process overnight. That is not an easy thing to do. It is nimble, it is

fast, it shows a commitment by our security officers.

So we know our vulnerabilities, and we are addressing them, and

we need one more thing. That is the support of the public. Mr.

Mica mentioned this, and I think it is absolutely critical. We need

the passengers back in the game. We are on the same side and we

need your help. Our officers come to work at 4 a.m. They came to

TSA, they are coming to the airport to protect you. We need your

help. This is not something to be gamed. We need you to separate

out when you pack your bag, be very clear. Here are the components of what I am bringing on and let the officer quickly assess

that is not a problem. The more we give clean bags to our TSOs,

the less places there are to hide if you are a terrorist.

So we ask for help on participating, we ask for help on the respect and appreciation of our officers who are doing a great job. I

have to say, working with my international partners, that I believe

the transportation security officers that we have are the best in the

world. The layers of security that we have added are more than

other countries. I have had many discussions with a lot of these

countries. We work closely to align our security measures.

The last point on 3–1–1, it not only works for us, but it was

adopted by 170 countries around the world. The EU announced it

and followed our lead. We are working together with our partners.

So we need to partner with our public, we need to partner with our

international colleagues and we need to be very direct in saying

yes, there are vulnerabilities. We can’t be squeamish and say, oh,

my goodness, they brought some firecrackers through and put it in

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the trunk of a car. Well, you know what? That is something you

have to face up to and say, we need to stop all things but we have

to focus on what truly does us harm.

So I appreciate the committee’s time and look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hawley follows:]

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Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you very much for the testimony, Mr.

Hawley. We want you to be successful. The American people are

willing to do whatever is necessary. You can see that every day at

an airport where people wait patiently. When the change was made

about liquids, people became attuned to it and wanted to cooperate.

I appreciate your appeal to people to even cooperate further.

But while that all sounds very good, we still have this report,

which is extremely troubling. And it follows another report a year

ago where we found that in 21 out of 21 incidents where GAO sent

people to get on the planes, they were able to get through. Mr.

Kutz and Mr. Cooney, you heard Mr. Hawley’s testimony. He said

he has additional layers now. It is not just bringing in something

that is not appropriate. They are looking for the most serious, the

most serious thing that could be brought in that might lead to taking down an airplane.

Did you and your people that did this study, did they take something that was serious enough to take down an airplane?

Mr. KUTZ. Again, the only way to determine that is actually to

have an airplane. But you saw the video, you saw some of the explosion. Certainly it would cause severe damage to an aircraft and

potentially harm some of the passengers. Whether it would bring

an aircraft down, we don’t have an aircraft to actually prove that.

But certainly people we have consulted with that there is a possibility, what is going to happen at that many feet in the air I don’t

really know. But I think it is serious enough and I think that they

would agree that this is a serious threat. Mr. Hawley did mention

that in his opening statement. So I think we are in agreement with

that.

Chairman WAXMAN. Serious threat. Now, the airports, were they

just at one airport or how many different airports were used for the

GAO investigation?

Mr. KUTZ. Well, as you mentioned, last year we did 21, and this

year we did 19. In each of the airports, two of our investigators

went through and as we always have, we have cover teams. So

there are follow investigators in case our investigators run into any

trouble. So we did, I guess, double the number of airports, 80 tests

over 2 years.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, you did this first test last year in

2006. And it was requested by Congressman Mica. And in that investigation, GAO conducted undercover tests in 21 airports. After

you delivered your report, it was leaked to the media and the results were broadcast on national television. I want to play a clip

from NBC Nightly News, this was on March 16, 2006.

[Video shown.]

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, when that report came out, Mr.

Hawley, you testified, and your response to last year’s investigation

was that TSA was implementing new training members that had

not yet ‘‘burned in’’ to your transportation security officers. You

promised that things were going to get better. Do our airports continue to have security vulnerabilities? I am pretty disturbed by the

GAO report. Should the American people feel that you are going to

be able to control this and protect the American public?

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes. Yes. The American public can be confident

traveling with the security system in place. You mentioned my tesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:36 Nov 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\45241.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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timony previously saying we were moving in that direction. We

have accomplished that. Those were distributing the extra

bombmaking kits, basically, the training devices to every airport,

all the checkpoints. That is in place, that is operating today, and

it is part of the training improvement effort. It works both ways,

because you get the guy who is doing the test to figure out, how

could I beat my own system, then they get somebody, another Federal agent unknown to bring it through, and then the TSO identifies it, in which case they congratulate them, or they don’t, in

which case they train them.

Chairman WAXMAN. Let me ask, since my time is up, Mr. Kutz

and Mr. Cooney, should, based on your investigation, the public

think that our airports are secure?

Mr. KUTZ. I think Mr. Hawley is correct, there is a broader picture to this, including the intelligence. The best prevention here is

to keep the terrorists from getting to the airport in the first place.

I firmly believe, I don’t know if he necessarily agrees with that, but

I think that is the solution to this. Once you are at the airport,

there are a lot of other layers here.

But I would point out with respect to the 2006 and 2007 tests

that the components that we brought through, and I am not allowed to say how often we got through, but the components we

brought through both times were the same. Plus in 2007, as I mentioned in my opening statement, we had the liquid explosive in addition to those. So again, I don’t know what processes were put in

place between 2006 and 2007. But I don’t think they were necessarily effective totally in looking at what we are talking about.

Chairman WAXMAN. Still, a discouraging result.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Yes.

Mr. MICA. I would like to ask a unanimous consent request that

a letter that I sent to then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez,

March 28, 2006, in regard to the leaks, which took place, which you

just showed there, and I have a partial response in September from

the Department of Justice.

Chairman WAXMAN. Without objection, the document you wish to

put into the record will be made part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I am not trying to put in something

to cover the administration. They never properly responded or investigated the leaks, which revealed national security information.

Thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you. Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you.

Mr. Kutz and Mr. Cooney, let me just ask, a lot of the material

we are talking about that came through, this was gels and liquids,

is that correct?

Mr. KUTZ. Some.

Mr. COONEY. Some, yes, sir. Some. No gels.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. OK. And right now, if you go through

metal detectors, there is no way really to detect liquids, is that fair

to say?

Mr. COONEY. I can’t go into the methods we used, but they

were——

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I am not saying everything. I am just

saying, if I were to walk through a metal detector today that you

have at the airport, that doesn’t necessarily get liquids, is that correct?

Mr. COONEY. No, it does not pick up liquids.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. So if I have a vial in my pocket with 4

ounces or 5 ounces of liquid it wouldn’t be detected going through

the detector, is that fair to say?

Mr. COONEY. It is fair to say depending on what material the

vials are made up of.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. But in some cases, some of the things

that could be used to assemble a bomb or an IED would not be detectable?

Mr. COONEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KUTZ. Mr. Davis, as I mentioned in my opening statement,

some of the things we brought through the checkpoints were carried on our persons.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Right.

Mr. KUTZ. So I think that addresses your point.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. So Mr. Hawley, that is a hole right now,

correct?

Mr. HAWLEY. Absolutely. An object on a person is something that

needs mitigation.

But the question is overall, if there is a vulnerability one place,

such as a magnetometer, what are you doing elsewhere to make up

for it.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I understand. And some people you do

pull aside and pat down.

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I understand you have intelligence and

you have everything combined. But it didn’t work with the GAO,

I guess that is my question.

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, there are two ways to improve what we do

in the walk-through. One is the millimeter wave answer, or the

backscatter, which is a technology answer. It has some privacy

issues. Highly effective but very good. The other is the enhanced

pat-down, as the GAO has suggested, which has had some very significant concerns in the American public. Our officers are capable

43

of doing it, but those would be the two directions to go for closing

any vulnerability that specifically you mentioned. Obviously there

are other ones in front and behind.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I just want to focus on that, because I

think that is understandable to, at least I understand it. Do we

have any technology that can discern banned liquids and gels from

those that are OK?

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. And are we working on equipment and

machinery that may be able to detect that?

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes. We have purchased 200 already and we are

purchasing an additional 400 in fiscal year 2008 should the appropriations bill go through.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Mr. Kutz, if that were to be in operation,

that would really cut down on the vulnerability, would it not?

Mr. KUTZ. I don’t know enough about those machines to tell you

for sure. I would defer to Mr. Hawley, because he knows what we

brought through, so he would be able to answer that question.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. OK. Do you feel that would significantly

cut down on some of the——

Mr. HAWLEY. Very, very significantly add to the risk management.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. If the technology does not exist today,

are we taking a chance by allowing liquids and gels even in limited

amounts aboard a plane at this point, as we look at it today?

Mr. HAWLEY. It is a risk management process. And we did originally ban everything. That was before we understood in detail all

aspects of what the terrorists were planning. We have shared that

with our international partners and have come to the agreement of

all of us, based on intelligence and science and security issues, that

the 3–1–1 is effective. Because if you ban all liquids, then you are

putting a lot more pressure on the checked baggage system. That

can create its own problems in terms of just even the volume of

checked bags.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Getting at Diet Coke or something, if it

is labeled and you buy it inside, it shouldn’t be a problem. Since

the limitations on gels and liquids came out of the U.K. threat last

year, what does the U.K. do to address the threat in terms of

screening passengers for liquids and gels?

Mr. HAWLEY. One of the things is allow one carry-on bag, not one

plus one as we do in the United States. So that was one thing.

I should say we are in constant communication with the U.K. on

all of these matters. We are of common mind and common strategy.

In fact, we are both buying these advanced x-ray machines for

checkpoint, both working on the millimeter wave and both developed the 3–1–1.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. In Israel, how do they handle this

threat?

Mr. HAWLEY. They have a different security process, in that they

have one major international airport. So they have a very aggressive, I think as you know, the questioning on the up-front, and if

they are doing a pat-down, it is significantly different from what

you get in the United States.

44

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Let me just ask finally, if mandatory patdowns were in place, let me ask Mr. Kutz, if mandatory pat-downs

were in place, would you have likely been caught, at least during

the banned substances that were hidden on the bodies?

Mr. KUTZ. I think it depends on the person doing the pat-down,

it depends on the aggressiveness and what parts of the body are

patted down.

Mr. COONEY. With the pat-downs that they have in place right

now, that TSA implements, I believe we would not have been

caught. That has to be changed.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I appreciate it. Thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Davis.

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. This testimony is very troubling. I am wondering

whether we have some low expectations here. Mr. Kutz, you are,

I guess for you all to conduct these tests, you know what procedures are in place?

Mr. KUTZ. We use only publicly available information. So to the

extent that it is something we have either observed going through

an airport or see on the Internet, we try not to do our tests with

any insider information.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK, so you are just like Joe Citizen?

Mr. KUTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. CUMMINGS. That might be even worse. What I am saying is,

you were able to—what were your expectations? I guess that is

what I am wondering. Because I hear Mr. Hawley talk about, and

I still don’t fully understand it, the combination lock and the 19

layers. But the bottom line is, this stuff still got on the plane. Duh.

It got on the plane.

Mr. HAWLEY. It actually did not get on the plane.

Mr. CUMMINGS. It didn’t?

Mr. HAWLEY. In theory, it might have. But in theory, I can dunk

a basketball.

Mr. KUTZ. No, it got on the plane. I would disagree with that.

It got on the plane——

Mr. HAWLEY. Not what you saw on the video.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Excuse me, excuse me, gentlemen. I will come

back to you, Mr. Hawley, because I want to be fair. Did the items

get on the plane that you, when you conducted some tests and you

showed the results of the devices, the kinds of things that you were

able to get on the plane, did those things get on the plane?

Mr. KUTZ. Yes.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. And Mr. Hawley, as I listen to your testimony, you talk about all of these layers. Can you explain that combination lock thing again to me, because I missed that one.

Mr. HAWLEY. You bet. What does it take to do a catastrophic terrorist act? You have to plan it, you have to procure the materials

necessary to do it, you might communicate with other conspirators.

All of those represent opportunities to stop the attack if you are

tightly lined up with intelligence and law enforcement.

Then you might have to travel to go to a training camp or to

come to the United States or travel in the United States. That is

an opportunity. Then there is the surveillance. They are going to

have to see what it is they want to do. That is an opportunity.

45

Mr. CUMMINGS. I got you. Now, let’s fast forward to the checkpoints.

Mr. HAWLEY. You bet.

Mr. CUMMINGS. How important are the checkpoints?

Mr. HAWLEY. Very important.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And would you say that they are the most important?

Mr. HAWLEY. No.

Mr. CUMMINGS. OK. So if the security checkpoints, they are critical, though, is that right?

Mr. HAWLEY. No, I think that is one of the problems, is that

Americans focus that the whole thing is the checkpoint. And the security system is a layered security system. Because if they say the

checkpoint is all buttoned down, then the attack comes through the

perimeter, the attack comes in front of the airport. There is a

ManPad attack.

There are thousands of ways to attack. If you put all your resources at the checkpoint to make that bulletproof, they say thank

you very much and go someplace else to get in. So you have to secure the entire environment at a basic level and then you have to

upgrade in an unexpected, unpredictable way.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me ask you this. All these people are standing in these long lines, everybody in this room. They are standing

in long lines, thinking that the checkpoints are critical. Are you

telling me that they are not?

Mr. HAWLEY. I am telling you they are a piece of the puzzle. And

the lines are not extraordinarily long. I would expect next week we

are going to be tested by the largest load of passengers. I am looking forward to the challenge and our officers are looking forward

to the challenge.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, the other layers of security you refer to

deal mostly with intelligence gathering. And certain individuals

making sure that certain individuals don’t get to security checkpoints in the first place. Are you talking about racial profiling?

Mr. HAWLEY. No, no, no, no. No, because terrorists use people

who specifically don’t ‘‘look like’’ terrorists. If you rely on what you

think a terrorist looks like, you are going to miss them.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, I can tell you, Mr. Hawley, it seems like

at the rate we are going, and I really didn’t expect the testimony

that you provided us, because it sounds like we are almost, you are

saying that, I think, that you know we can, you think we can do

better, but we are just going to have to tread water until we get

there.

Mr. HAWLEY. No, no, no. We have to do better every day. That

is why we do all these tests. That is why every test every day, to

improve. But we have to stay ahead of the threat, because if we

just focus on what we saw in the video, yes, we can guarantee that

won’t happen.

Mr. CUMMINGS. But doesn’t that upset you, that 19 of 19 or

whatever it was could get through and get on the plane?

Mr. HAWLEY. No. I think that it is instructive and helpful and

is a data point. But as I said, we do 2,500 a day every day. And

we target it to our vulnerabilities. We know what they are. Those

tests allow us then to close the gap. Frankly, some of the stuff we

46

saw here is not a concern, honestly. There is some of it that is a

concern.

So we focus on the piece that could do serious, catastrophic damage, take an airplane down. That is what we go after. We know

that if somebody goes up and puts on a flash in the plane, that is

not a good thing, they will be arrested and other passengers will

certainly take it out on them. But we are not going to put our resources against things that are scientific demonstrations. We are

looking for the terrorists.

The terrorists are very smart. They know what takes a plane

down. That is the enemy we have to stop. We like the coaching and

the information we get from the GAO. Very helpful, good partner.

But it doesn’t get to the point of what the terrorists are doing.

Chairman WAXMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank

you, Mr. Cummings.

Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. At the end of 2005, I asked GAO to conduct studies and tests of performance at TSA. There are three

types of testing that have gone on. One is the Inspector General

of Homeland Security, TSA test itself and then independent GAO.

I asked GAO because I was made aware, and again, we are in a

deadly, a very deadly game. But you don’t have to be a rocket scientist to figure out that terrorists or folks who want to take us out

are looking for the next level of vulnerability. We are always putting something in place that deals with the last incident.

What disturbed me about this 2006 leak, and I don’t know who

leaked this, but after you concluded your tests and before I even

got a copy of the test, information was leaked. Mr. Waxman

showed it here. Do you know anyone who leaked this, Mr. Cooney

or Mr. Kutz?

Mr. KUTZ. No. No one is aware, and FBI did not do an investigation based upon yours and the Comptroller General’s request.

Mr. MICA. OK. What disturbed me in that is because this information was given to me, was to be given to me and I did learn of

the failure. This failure is not new that you just released in your

report, is that correct? This failure is not new. It mirrors what took

place in your last test a year ago, is that right?

Mr. KUTZ. It mirrors it plus the liquid explosive we mentioned.

Mr. MICA. OK. And one of the reasons I asked you to conduct a

test is because TSA had not conducted those kinds of tests, is that

correct, Mr. Hawley?

Mr. HAWLEY. We started doing liquid tests in 2006, before the

liquid plot in the U.K.

Mr. MICA. When we met in April of this year, I asked you if you

had done similar tests to what GAO had done. And you had said,

yes. Then you came back and you told me you had to correct, with

the meeting when we had the hand-off to Mr. Costello and the others, then you came back and you told me no. You corrected yourself. Which is the case?

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, the GAO has done a number of different

types of testing. So it gets into the technical——

Mr. MICA. Well, again, the specific type of test that we saw displayed here. You had done that or you had not done that?

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Mr. HAWLEY. If we are talking about chemicals, yes. If we are

talking about the exact same chemicals, no.

Mr. MICA. You had not?

Mr. HAWLEY. No.

Mr. MICA. Sort of non-traditional explosives, which I consider our

biggest threat at this time. You were at that meeting. The other

thing that was at the meeting is that they sort of pooh-poohed,

TSA sort of pooh-poohed the results of that explosion with that material. Is that correct?

Mr. COONEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MICA. OK. Have you had that material tested to see if it

would do catastrophic damage?

Mr. COONEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MICA. And what were the results?

Mr. COONEY. We have had two independent opinions on that,

and the results are that placed in the appropriate place on an aircraft, and I can’t say where that is at this hearing, that it could

possibly do catastrophic damage.

Mr. MICA. OK. See, I am not out to, Mr. Hawley, I just was disturbed by again not giving the other side as they took over all the

information. I wish I could talk more about that.

OK, we failed. Now, of course, when I learned this, I would have

been negligent, too, if we didn’t do something or Mr. Hawley didn’t

do something. And he learned about this back a year ago. We know

what can make up for problems at the checkpoint. One, we started

putting behavior analysis people in place. We still don’t have that

done, do we, Mr. Hawley?

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, we do, 2,000.

Mr. MICA. At every checkpoint?

Mr. HAWLEY. The President signed a budget amendment last

week, so we will be able to——

Mr. MICA. But it is not done yet? I am not giving you a hard

time. I just want to say that we learned that.

Mr. HAWLEY. 600 in place.

Mr. MICA. When you did your tests most recently at the 21 airports, Mr. Hawley, do you know how many of those had our new

protocol?

Mr. HAWLEY. I do not. In terms of the BDOs? Are you talking

about the BDOs or the 3–1–1?

Mr. MICA. The behavior analysis trained personnel that we started putting in place after we learned that the technology in place

would not handle this.

Mr. HAWLEY. We do not know.

Mr. MICA. I want to know. I want to know how many of those

people, that should have been the first thing we did is find out if

what we put in place failed. That is just—I can’t accept that. That

is beyond belief that we would not know what we put in place.

Now, the technology is there also to deal with some of these nontraditional explosives, is that correct?

Mr. HAWLEY. That is correct.

Mr. MICA. OK. Could I have an additional minute by unanimous

consent?

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Chairman WAXMAN. Well, if you want to make one last question,

do it. You said nice things about me, so I am going to give you 1

more minute. [Laughter.]

Mr. MICA. One of the last things, my last question, you test, Mr.

Hawley, your personnel on performance. USA reported in October

statistics that have been publicly made available, maybe they were

classified but they are here. What concerns me even more, and I

have the past performance levels, this seems to indicate that there

is not improvement, in fact, it looks like we have lost ground in

passenger screening.

Mr. HAWLEY. No. And let’s be clear. If you want good scores, I

will deliver you good scores. What we are saying is——

Mr. MICA. No, I know we——

Mr. HAWLEY [continuing]. We are going to take on the toughest

assignment, which is they are bringing improvised explosive devices in component parts, and we are going to train and test

against that. That is really, really hard. I would suggest there

might be any number of facilities within 10 miles of here that

would have a very difficult time to detect all these things. We are

focused on the toughest, toughest part of it, we train and test on

it. That article was something about training. There was not data

in there about test results.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Mica.

I am confused about one point, just to clarify for the record. Mr.

Cummings asked whether the materials got on the plane, and as

I understand it, Mr. Kutz you said yes and then Mr. Hawley, you

said no. What would be the basis for your saying that on GAO

tests, it didn’t get onto the plane?

Mr. HAWLEY. My understanding is that what was in the video

was not what was brought through the checkpoint. The reason that

is significant is that you would have had to assemble the bomb

past the checkpoint. And there are measures in place between the

checkpoint and the aircraft that would make it more difficult for

somebody to therefore get there. So as I said, you can get through

a piece of it, you can get a piece through the checkpoint, perhaps.

But there are other barriers on the way. And I just wanted to make

clear it was not a completed IED that went through and got on the

aircraft.

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, we are talking about GAO’s—what

was the situation?

Mr. COONEY. Mr. Chairman, we did not, after we got through the

checkpoint, we did not construct the device. We brought all the

components onto the aircraft. That is to say that we could have

constructed it on the aircraft. We could have simply gone into the

lavatory on the aircraft once the plane was airborne and constructed the device there. So we did bring all the components onto

the aircraft.

Chairman WAXMAN. It did get onto the plane.

Mr. Higgins.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a couple of

observations. Mr. Hawley, you had indicated at the beginning that

TSA officers have the best interests of the flying public in mind

and that the flying public should be more, presumably tolerant of

the work that TSA does to protect them. The thing that kind of

49

concerns me about this panel is that there seems to be an adversarial relationship TSA and the Government Accountability Office,

where in fact my sense is you have the same primary objective, and

that is to protect the public, and the flying public in this particular

circumstance.

I understand that there are layers of security and that risk management is not a perfect science, that you have to not only take

into consideration possibility, but also probability. So when I look

over the testimony and this seemingly adversarial history that exists between TSA and GAO, that fundamentally raises some questions and concerns, because my sense is that GAO is not conducting this to embarrass anybody, but knowing that a security system

in its many layers is an evolving process that takes into consideration information that may not have been presumed when originally security systems were put in place, that it has to be flexible,

it has to be elastic, it has to be evolving.

Your thoughts?

Mr. HAWLEY. I would just like to say, although we definitely are

sparring a little bit today, we have a surprisingly good relationship

in that, the reason I have said certain things was to have the

record be clear. Because I think it is a key point, the difference between catastrophic failure and something unsafe on the aircraft. I

think we are absolutely in lockstep in terms where we end up. I

think we agree strongly with GAO’s suggestions as to what goes

forward. The value they bring is in some other areas other than the

ones that I am disputing.

So I take it as an indication of our respect and sort of professional relationship. But it actually is a very good relationship.

Mr. HIGGINS. On behalf of the flying public, we want to encourage you to work together and to continually improve the security

system.

Mr. KUTZ. Yes, we do often spar over the facts. But I think the

important part is, as you said, the suggestions we have, if they consider those seriously and where appropriate, implement them, that

is the most important part at the end of the day and hopefully that

is what they will walk away with from this.

Mr. HIGGINS. Great. Just a final question, Mr. Chairman. Mr.

Kutz, you had said that one of the recommendations to TSA was

increased pat-downs. I am just curious, is it a more comprehensive

pat-down per incident, or is it more incidents of pat-downs that you

are recommending?

Mr. KUTZ. No, it is actually the pat-down being, if I could say a

little bit more thorough.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thorough, OK.

Mr. KUTZ. Yes.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you very much. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.

We are being called to the House floor for a series of three votes,

which ought to bring us back here in a half hour. So we are going

to recess then reconvene to complete the hearing. So we stand in

recess.

[Recess.]

Chairman WAXMAN. I want to call the hearing back to order. We

will start with Mr. Yarmuth.

50

Mr. YARMUTH. Let me start by saying I am a little bit uncomfortable with conversations like these, as I am sure you are, recognizing on the one hand our obligation to provide oversight on airport

security and also the security of striking that very delicate balance

between trying to make the public confident that we are doing

what we need to be doing, and also not scaring them to the point

where they are afraid to fly.

I remember back in my journalist days, back right after the 9/

11 crashes, and I was doing an interview with the director of the

airport in Louisville, and asked him, going through a number of

the measures they were taking, whether these measures in fact

were designed to provide real security or the illusion, the perception of security. He was quite candid and said, this is basically to

create the perception of security, because there is a limit to what

we can do to provide real security. I probably won’t get any serious

disagreement out of you on that.

But with that premise, whether you accept it or not, I would like

to ask a couple of questions, because we all go through security on

a weekly basis. And by the way, I will say the TSA people in my

airport in Louisville are terrific, they work hard, they are very considerate. I have no complaints about them. But it seems like a lot

of the measures that are taken don’t focus on what you talked

about, focusing on the priorities of not bringing a plane down, but

to again create some kind of an illusion which, when you get behind them, don’t make any sense. This is going to sound a little

trivial, but it is parochial and important to me.

We make Louisville Sluggers at Hillerich and Bradsby in Louisville. You can go on a tour of the museum there. They sell souvenir

baseball bats. Souvenir baseball bats are about 15 inches long and

probably not much bigger around than this pencil, and you can’t

take them on a plane.

Now, I will guarantee you, and there is a big display when you

go through the TSA line that you can’t bring these little bats on

the plane. Now, I guarantee you, I am carrying, every time I am

on the plane, things that I could do more damage with than those

baseball bats. It seems to me that is one of those instances in

which we focus on things that don’t make any sense, don’t provide

any security and may in fact, if we are relying on people who are

stressed and have to cover a lot of people and so forth, we are making them deal with things that don’t make any difference in the

final analysis. Would you care to comment on that, Mr. Hawley?

Mr. HAWLEY. I think you have raised a number of good points.

Specifically on that one, we are looking right now at the prohibited

items list, and we are doing it in conjunction with our partners in

Canada and the European Union and other places, so that we can

have a common framework. As you know, we made the decision on

scissors and small tools, and recently the lighters, based on risk

management.

So we specifically are looking at the baseball bats as well as the

rest of the prohibited items list, because we have to stay flexible.

Again, I want to get away from the checklist mentality, where we

are just looking to take things away. We need to look for the person who is bringing a novel threat.

51

Mr. YARMUTH. And I guess the other question I would have is,

you may have alluded to this earlier, but it seems to me that in

most cases, the greatest protection you would have in terms of

things that go on in the passenger cabin are the other passengers.

And not necessarily things that you would do going in. Richard

Reid was ultimately stopped because it was a passenger who pointed out that it was unusual that somebody would try to light his

foot on the plane.

Mr. HAWLEY. I would like to address the charade issue, because

I hear it a lot, I see it on the blogs. We directly address that in

the IED component piece. We can get high scores on testing, etc.

But our officers know in reality what is real and what is charade.

In order to get them prepared and motivated and switched on to

look for the difficult threat, they have to believe that what we are

really doing is security.

So we have really worked hard in the last couple of years to

openly communicate with our work force about the threats. What

we do we do because we believe it is a security matter. And we do

need the support of the Congress and the public when we do

change a security measure, because you can always come up with

a scenario that says I can use X to do Y. And all of it is risk management. It is very difficult. Any one issue you can fight over. But

you have to fit the whole thing together. I think it is a pretty complex equation. It is important that we address these vulnerabilities

publicly, so the public knows that is involved.

Mr. YARMUTH. Along those lines, I am not sure I have ever heard

an announcement from a flight attendant inside a cabin about, and

I know you don’t want to make people so hypersensitive that they

will report things that are just normal behavior, but when you get

paranoid people, but that you need to be alert to what people are

doing in the cabin and if you see any suspicious activity to report

it. Has there ever been any thought to utilizing the crew to actually

enlist the passengers in those precautions?

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, certainly the crews are enlisted. We don’t

make any announcements. Actually you would be surprised, we

probably get two or three a day of disruptive passengers subdued

by other passengers. So I think we all travel at a heightened state

of alert. I am very confident, given the track record we have, that

people doing suspicious activities are in fact reported.

Mr. YARMUTH. Good. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Westmoreland, I think you are next.

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hawley, I just want to go back to a couple of things. One was

the point about whether this material that we saw on the video actually got on the plane or didn’t get on the plane. I think it was

Mr. Cooney that said it did get on the plane. And you said that it

may have, but not in a form that could have caused the damage.

You mentioned that there were some other points, I guess, between the screening location and where it would have actually got

on the plane. So are we to be under the assumption that these people would prepare this thing prior to boarding the plane or once

they boarded the plane?

Mr. HAWLEY. Of course, they could attempt either. From the

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curity that is not seen. As you know, we have a significant number

of Federal air marshals flying every day. They are undercover, they

are in airport boarding gates. Part of their job is when they are not

actually on the aircraft to be patrolling in those areas, on the lookout for this. We know exactly what can bring a plane down, we

know the characteristics of that chemistry and what you have to

do to mix it properly. So there are some tell-tales that you can pick

up on that would make it very, very difficult for someone to get

away with it.

I think the point Mr. Cooney raised, on the aircraft, in the restroom, is something that we pay attention to, and certainly flying

air marshals and flying flight crews pay attention to it. But we look

at, we really look across the board.

Mr. WESTMORELAND. OK. Let me ask you this. I think that you

mentioned that there has been too much attention, or TSA agents

are having to pay too much attention to carry-on baggage. Just

from experience, in doing quite a bit of flying, there are some people that carry on everything but the kitchen sink. Supposedly, it

is a one bag carry-on, one carry-on and one personal item. Would

it help if we start enforcing that to where you could spend more

time on the person, on the physical person, rather than having to

go through all these bag checks? Some people get in line, they have

five of the gray trays and then some other stuff going through.

When can we have some enforcement of that, where you are kind

of given a little more flexibility in looking at that individual?

Mr. HAWLEY. It is a shared responsibility with the airlines. We

looked at this during the liquid plot with the U.K. They went to

one bag, we did not. Our concern and my concern was, you get a

duffel bag and toss your two or however many it is in there and

zip it up and say, voila, here is my one bag. Then that gets, that

is too congested for us really to give an easy look. So you have to

do a bag check and then that is a nightmare.

So it really is, that is why I say partnering with the public, that

we have to fight through 10 million images a day, and the extent

to which the public can make them less cluttered, it gives terrorists

less room to hide and it speeds the process.

Mr. WESTMORELAND. So you don’t think that would be an alternative in trying to get the airlines to more enforce what they are

doing?

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, I would focus on the weight. I think the

weight is a bigger problem than the number. Because we injure our

folks sometimes when picking up a bag and it is way too heavy.

But we have to operate in the world that exists and not unduly do

commerce. Our challenge is it is our job to find the bomb part, no

matter what is thrown at us. And that is what we hold our officers

to.

Mr. WESTMORELAND. And I know that you are probably going

through all the training and trying to get everybody through the

training. I know that Mr. Mica had mentioned the behavioral interviewing or whatever. I am sure that is a much more difficult process or more training that you have to send somebody through, and

they probably have to have a certain tendency to be able to do that.

But it does concern me that these tests were run in several airports, and you, or the TSA doesn’t seem to know if this behavioral

53

part was there, and if it did any good or whatever. I don’t know

how much information you have shared back and forth about the

test and the airports and who it was. But I would like for you to

comment on that if you would.

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, it is a key point. Part of the protocol, and I

respect the protocol, is they don’t give us advance notice. So we

don’t know when they are coming, and whether they know it, the

BDOs or not. We in fact are working on tests of what we call the

behavior detection officers. It is, we are finding it is difficult to simulate the actual stress of somebody with hostile intent. So we are

working with other countries who have capability there, as well as

with our research arm at the Department, to get the scientific data

that will say how good our officers are, just on the behavior.

Mr. WESTMORELAND. Mr. Hawley, I want to thank you for the job

that you are trying to do with TSA. I know it is a big, big undertaking. I appreciate your coming here today. I know it was probably similar to having a root canal. But I do want to thank you for

that.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Westmoreland.

Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for holding this

hearing.

Mr. Hawley, I wouldn’t want your job. I want to say that up

front. I think it is one of the most difficult jobs. I think it is a nowin job. But I was uncomfortable with the morning part of this

hearing, because I felt like we were making, giving us the sense

that we have 19 points, so they got through 1, and that is not good,

but don’t lose sleep over it. And I am losing sleep over it, and I

don’t have your job.

Mr. Kutz, my understanding is you attempted 21 times to bring

in explosive devices. Is that correct?

Mr. KUTZ. It was 21 times in 2006 and 19 in 2007.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, of the 21 times, how many got through?

Mr. KUTZ. I can’t discuss that specifically. That is considered sensitive security information.

Mr. SHAYS. Did a majority get in?

Mr. KUTZ. I am not supposed to—I can say we got through.

Chairman WAXMAN. If Mr. Shays would yield to me, Mr. Davis

and I have had a briefing with the intel people and we didn’t think

it was productive to get into any kind of numbers.

Mr. HAWLEY. I could offer that the numbers are not necessary to

get the learning from it. And I think we derive a significant

amount of learning. So we would stipulate that there are learnings

to be had regardless of the numbers.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. I am going to go under the assumption, then, because I don’t know, that a majority got through. And given that,

I would like to ask this question. Mr. Kutz, if you had attempted

19 times, 21 times and 19 times to get through and none of them

got through, would you have still written the report and would we

have been able to say to Mr. Hawley, this is pretty fantastic. Or

if you had had a total failure, would there have been no report?

Mr. KUTZ. We always write the results of our work. That is part

of our protocols. We always go through the same briefings. We gave

54

them all the details of where we went, what we did, several detailed briefings. We always report externally the results.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Hawley, I was troubled by your comment that

none of the weapons grade material, or the bombs got in because

they weren’t assembled. It seems to me like that is a lawyer talking instead of the fact that GAO was able to get this weapon grade

material through, they were able to get the detonation through.

And is that not correct, they were able to get it through and get

it on the plane, is that not correct, Mr. Hawley?

Mr. HAWLEY. You have to ask them as to what they actually did.

Mr. SHAYS. What got on the plane? Did you stop——

Mr. KUTZ. The devices we described, the detonator, the liquid explosive and the incendiary device components.

Mr. SHAYS. And everything you showed us on the film was what

you got on? There is not two different examples? You didn’t have

a bigger explosive on the TV screen. What you got through was

what you detonated or similar?

Mr. KUTZ. Similar, correct.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. What would have been involved with assembling

the weapon, the bomb?

Mr. COONEY. We practiced assembling the weapon. It took approximately 12 to 15 minutes to put it together once.

Mr. SHAYS. So that is a pretty long time. If you were to take

that, if someone was sitting next to you, that would be a pretty difficult thing to assemble in front of someone, correct?

Mr. COONEY. If we were on a plane, we wouldn’t assemble it in

our seats. We would assemble it in another area of the plane.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Let’s just say you went to the restroom. Would

you have had to carry a case into the restroom?

Mr. COONEY. I can’t go into that, Congressman, based on the confidentiality and the classification of the report. I will be happy to

discuss that with you in a closed session.

Mr. SHAYS. I guess what I want to know is, would it have been

noticeable to a flight attendant or someone else that someone was

having to carry on something that was noticeable, or would it have

been able to have been disguised?

Mr. COONEY. It would have been disguised.

Mr. SHAYS. So Mr. Hawley, why should I take any solace in the

fact that you say, well, they weren’t taken on the plane because

they weren’t assembled? Why is that meaningful?

Mr. HAWLEY. Thank you for asking the question. This is not an

exact analogy, but it is like bringing the watch parts through and

then saying, I am going to assemble it——

Mr. SHAYS. Bringing the what part through?

Mr. HAWLEY. A watch, you know, I have my watch and I bring

watch parts through. It is very sophisticated chemistry to get the

right everything, as well as certain matters of assembly. There are

some telltale indicators when one is doing that, and it is not trivial

to assemble one of these things so that they work. You have to ask

yourself that, given the Richard Reid issue, there is a certain bar

of effectiveness that they would want to do before they would expose themselves to discovery. And that bar is reasonably high.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Well, I will just end by saying, it is unsettling

to think that so much explosive device could get through. And I

55

make an assumption that a good amount did get through. I would

like to have thought that maybe 1 out of 19 or 1 out of 21 would

have been the number. So I wish you well and I hope that we are

doing everything that we can to help you succeed, Mr. Hawley.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Shays.

Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for holding

this bipartisan hearing. I think it is doing us a lot of good to at

least make sure the American public understands the need for ongoing improvement.

I think maybe, Administrator, the kindest way to start this off

is with something that will be good for the public. I had this shown

to you earlier, and it is entitled deluxe 16-piece carry-on kit. For

the record, if someone goes and buys one of these kits where they

can get little teeny amounts of what they need to travel that may

not otherwise be available or may cost a lot of money to buy, are

they allowed to use that?

Mr. HAWLEY. Pretty much yes, assuming it has a zip top bag

under there, which I believe it does.

Mr. ISSA. Right, but the individual bottles themselves?

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes.

Mr. ISSA. And I would hope that after today’s hearing, universally, TSA people who don’t get it, who routinely I have seen, because I travel every single week, twice a week, I have seen them

turn people away with, oh, there is no marking on that. They do

not seem to understand that, while these are being sold, and while

in many cases the only way, and I don’t want to sound sexist, but

for a woman to have a multitude of different, small items, makeup needs, and carry it on, they need to have that, particularly if

you look at what is often in a purse. I see a lot of grinning by the

men and women behind you. But I think it is important that when

we say we care about commerce and we care about the traveler,

that there be a uniform understanding that this doesn’t have to be

the answer, which is everything I took from the last hotel I stayed

in. [Laughter.]

It was 2 days worth, I didn’t take any more than my share.

But I think it is important, because my line of questioning will

not be on security. And it won’t be on security because one, I spent

time in the military, in EOD, and I am going to predict that 20

years from now you are still going to be playing cat and mouse. We

were playing cat and mouse with the STFs in the 1970’s. I don’t

think it is going to change.

Having said that, I am going to ask you a question, which is,

given that we continue to fund you at the levels you request and

that you continue to ask for bucks for Buck Rogers type innovation,

do you believe that you will reasonably be able to stay ahead of

these ever-moving and improving target characteristics?

Mr. HAWLEY. I do, but it won’t be through Buck Rogers technology. I think we have to have technology that is reliable, that is

sophisticated, that is affordable. But getting on the cutting edge of

technology I think is expensive, not reliable, and can usually be engineered around. So we will always have the human factor, and I

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term thing. When we do something, they are going to react to get

around it.

Therefore, for our technology purchases, you will see fewer purchases of those big trace portals and more purchases of portable

liquid explosive detectors, portable explosive detectors that we are

in fact using even with some of our foreign partners. So the flexible

mix of technology and the business process where our officers and

all of our folks, including Federal air marshals, can continue to

adapt and not give the enemy a stationary target, I think that is

the critical thing and I don’t think, we are not going to have a silver bullet.

Mr. ISSA. Because you kind of led into this, you are going to be

a labor-intensive industry for a while, for the foreseeable future,

that technology per se is not going to eliminate the need for the

men and women in uniform who handle the luggage, look through

it, or who, out of uniform, plain clothes, who observe after you go

through the primary checkpoint. Then can I ask for something very

straightforward in this hearing? Because this is the Oversight and

Government Reform Committee. I travel throughout Europe and

the Middle East, but usually go through Europe commercially on

my way to the Middle East.

For some reason, the Europeans have figured out that to have a

TSA-equivalent person shuttling little gray trays back and forth is

a huge waste of a trained individual. I travel through Dulles, I

travel through San Diego, Sacramento, a number of other airports.

They all vary, but none of them reached level of moving the trays

from where they get left off back to the other without human intervention, meaning that in every one of your airports, you have

somebody like the uniformed person behind you who is doing a

task that requires absolutely no training, absolutely no expertise,

for which we are paying for training and expertise. I would hope

that you would commit to us to make the dollars available to automate the trays or the equivalent, so that we not waste valuable

Government employees on something that, quite frankly, anybody

can do and no one should have to do in this automated day and

age.

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, that is the perfect use of technology to make

it more efficient. I totally agree.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you . I will end on that high note, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Issa.

Mr. Kutz, last year, GAO conducted a similar undercover operation and managed to get liquid explosives past security checkpoints in all 21 airports you tested. In February 2006, when GAO

completed its investigation, there wasn’t a public hearing such as

we are having today. Instead, GAO privately briefed TSA officials,

including Mr. Hawley, on its results.

Mr. Kutz, in your February 2006 briefing with Mr. Hawley, did

you warn him about the vulnerabilities your test had exposed?

Mr. KUTZ. The February 2006 briefing, we did not have liquid explosives on the 2006 testing. It was the other two devices, the incendiary and the IED detonator we showed today. The liquid explosives were on the work we did for your committee as part of the

2007. So we did not do that. They were certainly aware, as Mr.

57

Hawley said, that liquid explosives are a significant risk here. And

that was one of the reasons, I think, that we attempted to do that

as part of our second test for your committee.

Chairman WAXMAN. But you did brief him on what you had

found in your investigation?

Mr. KUTZ. In 2006, that is correct. Yes.

Chairman WAXMAN. And following your briefing to TSA, did TSA

change its policies or procedures to fix the gap in security that your

tests highlighted?

Mr. KUTZ. I don’t think any procedures were changed. What they

represented to us, that people were alerted to what we did and

there was additional training. That is what we understood happened after the last report.

Chairman WAXMAN. Instead, Homeland Security Department officials made statements to the press criticizing the GAO investigation, stating that they were a bit far-fetched. Mr. Hawley, you were

quoted in an NBC story as saying, TSA wasn’t interested in materials that would set off an interesting firework display in an aircraft but can’t bring the plane down.

Mr. Kutz, do you think the substances that GAO smuggled in

were nothing more than fireworks, as Mr. Hawley had suggested?

Mr. KUTZ. I would go back to the video that we showed, the first

video of the automobile trunk and the floor of the automobile being

blown out, that was the item we brought on in 2006. And the incendiary device that was the intense heat burning was the other

device we brought on. Whether they would bring down an aircraft

or not, I don’t know. But they would certainly threaten the passengers and could cause serious damage.

Chairman WAXMAN. Do you think that they were minimizing the

true dangers with that statement?

Mr. KUTZ. To call it a science experiment or something, I think

that trivializes it, yes.

Chairman WAXMAN. Mr. Hawley, you appear to think that these

GAO tests are insignificant. You say that you are only focused on

the serious threats. We all just saw the video of the explosions and

that is a serious threat.

In this morning’s Washington Post, this is what TSA says:

‘‘There is nothing in the report that is news to us.’’ Last year, you

failed to prevent explosives from getting onto airplanes, you promised to improve your performance. But now we learn that GAO was

again able to bring explosive materials onto planes.

The problem is that the news is the same, it is not getting better.

And that is unacceptable, you are failing. Here is what else TSA

said: ‘‘We don’t change security procedures in knee-jerk fashion.’’

GAO’s first report was issued in February 2006. That was 19

months ago. I want to know what you are going to change now, so

that we are not here next year facing exactly the same situation.

Mr. HAWLEY. I appreciate the question. The answer is that all

this training I was talking about in terms of the checkpoint drills

that we now do throughout the system every day, that is added.

I believe that is probably the best thing that we can do at this

point, is actually from our own covert testing, which drills down

into the specifics of the vulnerability, that was identified and they

58

recommended this. We followed the recommendations of our covert

testers.

I think the technical issues about what the GAO tested are a

separate debate, and we probably don’t completely agree on it.

However, the results of it I take. I think it is a valuable lesson to

learn, and the issue of explosives or homemade chemicals, whether

they work or don’t work. We have to be alert to it. I should also

say, as I said in my opening, that I identified and TSA identified

those vulnerabilities in 2005. So we know what the vulnerabilities

are. As I laid out, we have put in place quite a few measures, and

I think I have provided the committee with that, that are directed

at improvement.

And have we closed the vulnerability? No. But we do 2 million

passengers a day and 38 tests over 3 months is probably not statistically significant. It is directionally significant and I think we have

to take it as valuable input. But it is not something on which the

public should panic or should be concerned about the overall system. These are known vulnerabilities. The GAO is helping us in

terms of addressing them and that is really what the story is.

Chairman WAXMAN. Last year, you said you were going to do

more training of personnel as well. I guess the point I want to

drive home is that we are going to ask for this GAO report again

next year, and you are on notice. We don’t want to have to hold

a hearing where we get a report that GAO came in and gave us

a very discouraging picture. We don’t want TSA to minimize it, we

don’t want to scare people but I don’t want you to minimize it. I

think you should take this one seriously, and I didn’t feel that you

took the first one as seriously as you should.

So I hope that we can continue to talk about all the efforts that

are going to be made to assure the public in reality that as many

of the vulnerabilities as we face are going to be reduced and that

we are going to get safer and safer in our transportation.

Mr. HAWLEY. I can assure you that everybody at TSA has no

question about the seriousness of which I take IED penetration

drills and the significance of this. So yes, sir.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Davis, any further comments?

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I just have a couple. I want to clarify a

point that was talked about earlier. Mr. Hawley, as you understand

it, and then I will ask Mr. Cooney and Mr. Kutz to comment, was

what the GAO got past security the same elements that were in

the video played earlier? What is your understanding?

Mr. HAWLEY. My understanding was that they were in fact different.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. OK. Mr. Cooney, Mr. Kutz.

Mr. COONEY. They were the same as in the video.

Mr. KUTZ. Yes, Mr. Cooney is one of the ones that actually did

the testing. So he has first-hand knowledge of what was brought

onto the plane, because he is one of he ones that had it in his bags

and on his person.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. OK.

Mr. HAWLEY. I think the issue, it is not a trivial issue that in

the sense as we evaluate the layers of security, if in fact what you

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brought to the checkpoint was able to blow up a plane, that is one

thing. And if you have to——

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Well, they never said it was able to blow

the plane up. They could obviously cause damage, right? But there

is no allegation here that it would blow the plane up?

Mr. COONEY. That is correct, sir.

Mr. HAWLEY. So I think I would just stand with——

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. You could open up the door, the emergency door of the plane and do damage as well. I think they were

very careful not to make the allegation it would blow it up.

Mr. HAWLEY. The key point for the public is that we are in agreement on the need to continue to close down vulnerabilities everywhere in the system. I think the differentiation is, because of the

distinctive nature of the video, people say, oh, my goodness, this

could happen to my plane. And the situation, that is not what is

actually portrayed in this data. The data points out and recognizes

vulnerabilities that we recognize exist, they discover they exist.

And we all agree they need to be closed.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. TSA has recognized the threat of explosive bomb components being brought on board in carry-on bags

some time ago. You spent millions of dollars funding the development of a high quality auto explosive detection system to meet the

threat, a technology that is successfully used to screen checked

baggage, is that correct?

Mr. HAWLEY. And now recently carry-on baggage.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. OK. What has your agency done to advance this technology at a passenger screening checkpoint?

Mr. HAWLEY. The science and technology division of DHS does

the R&D for the Department. My understanding is they put something close to $1 billion of investment into the IED research and

development area. The key point for us is the R&D discoveries in

the next short period of time aren’t immediately deployable. Our

job is to use what is available today to limit the gaps until future

technology is developed.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. So you are using AT machines today as

opposed to the EDS? Or could you use both?

Mr. HAWLEY. We use both. There is the old-fashioned x-ray,

which is a single source——

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Right, AT machines, as I understand it,

don’t provide a 360 degree view.

Mr. HAWLEY. No, but they can get pretty close.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. And they don’t provide a 3-D image for

the screeners to view the baggage?

Mr. HAWLEY. That is correct as far as I know.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. But they do provide a cheaper price?

Mr. HAWLEY. Exactly. And we can deploy them extraordinarily

widely. And they have very low maintenance. So that is a factor.

I think a mix is important. The auto EDS, as they call it, very

excellent technology. We are buying 20 more, I hope, in 2008. But

if we can get 500 of the ATs out, that covers a lot of ground and

is upgradable over time with better software. So I think that is a

good business decision.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. For 2007, the President initially requested $80.52 million for emerging technologies, is my underVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:36 Nov 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\45241.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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standing. In addition, he requested $25 million for checkpoint explosives detection equipment and pilot screening technologies in

the emergency supplemental, for a total of $105 million for emerging technologies in 2007. Congress provided the requested funds,

but the agency still only spent $50 million on the emerging technology, checkpoint technologies.

Mr. HAWLEY. Those numbers don’t match what I have in my

head. I clearly can go back and reconcile those.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. I guess the question is, we have provided close to $105 million, my understanding is it has not all been

spent. I guess what we would like to know from a committee perspective is, what hasn’t been spent, why not, what is in the pipeline, just so——

Mr. HAWLEY. I will have to get back to you on what has been

spent. We have asked for $136 million in checkpoint technologies.

It is perhaps a different category than what you are talking about.

But we have significantly spent in that area. We used up to buy

the 250 AT machines, I believe what we had in 2007. I will have

to confirm those numbers. But we have continued to request significant additional funds in 2008.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. The last thing I would ask you is, how

are we in coordination with other nations at this point? Some of

them have, many of them are not as strict as we are. But they are

subject to the same kind of vulnerabilities that we are.

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. How is that coordination?

Mr. HAWLEY. I think that is absolutely critical. Because if we get

our U.S. domestic secure and somebody is able to board a flight

overseas and hijack it or blow it up, that is the same result. So we

depend on our international partners. We have created a new

group at TSA that does this global strategy. We moved our head

of intel, intelligence, to the head of that, so that he would have the

credibility with other nations in discussing security matters, for instance, on shoes. We feel very strongly about shoe screening and

working with our partners to do shoe screening is something that

is not popular, but we think is effective from a security point of

view.

So I think over the next 5 years and beyond, the degree to which

U.S. security measures tie in with our international partners is a

big opportunity and important.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Well, no question. But I guess my question is, how is that partnership?

Mr. HAWLEY. That is it.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Are they all responding? Are we having

some that are balking a little bit at it?

Mr. HAWLEY. We have extraordinary cooperation with our neighbors to the north and south, Canada and Mexico. The European

Union, clearly the U.K. we are very close with. I have just returned

from working with some of our Asian partners. I expect that closes

the loop.

The big opportunities are in Africa and South America. There are

a lot of governments there that want to do first-rate security. Our

job is to give them the training in something that is accessible. We

can’t give them million dollar pieces of equipment and say we want

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you to deploy this. We have to find things that are less expensive

but do provide security value that can in fact be deployed around

the world.

Mr. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you.

Chairman WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Davis.

I want to thank the three of you for your presentations to us, and

the GAO for your excellent work. We hope that next year, when we

look at a GAO report we are going to see a lot of improvement and

we will have better news. Because at this time of year, people want

the good news and their anxieties eased. There are too many

vulnerabilities. And we want those vulnerabilities fixed.

Thank you very much. The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statements of Hon. Diane E. Watson and Hon. Bill

Sali follow:]

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