In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

Filed: August 1, 2022

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

OLIVA GUZMAN, *

parent of Z.G., a minor, * PUBLISHED

*

Petitioner, * No. 16-246V

*

v. * Special Master Nora Beth Dorsey

*

SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Motion for Relief from Judgment; Vaccine 

AND HUMAN SERVICES, * Rule 36; RCFC 60(b).

*

Respondent. *

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Edward Kraus, Kraus Law Group, LLC, Chicago, IL, for petitioner.

Alexis B. Babcock, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. 

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT1

Respondent filed a joint motion for relief from judgment on August 1, 2022, requesting 

that the case be reopened. Joint Motion for Relief from Judgment (“Joint Mot.”), filed Aug. 1, 

2022 (ECF No. 61). For the forgoing reasons, the parties’ joint motion is GRANTED. 

I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 19, 2016, Oliva Guzman (“petitioner”), on behalf of her minor daughter, 

Z.G., filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation 

1 The undersigned intends to post this Order on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ 

website. This means the Order will be available to anyone with access to the Internet. In 

accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioners have 14 days to identify and move to redact 

medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion 

of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits within this 

definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access. Because this 

unpublished order contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the undersigned is 

required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website in accordance with the 

E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion 

of Electronic Government Services). 
2

Program (“Vaccine Act” or “the Program”), 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 et seq. (2012),2 alleging that 

Z.G. developed a benign tumor in her right upper arm after receiving tetanus-diphtheria-acellular 

pertussis (“Tdap”) and Varicella vaccinations on August 22, 2013, and an influenza (“flu”) 

vaccination on November 14, 2013. Amended Petition at 1 (ECF No. 31). On December 19, 

2017, the undersigned issued a decision, finding petitioner entitled to compensation and 

awarding petitioner damages as agreed upon in a stipulation filed December 18, 2017. Decision 

dated Dec. 19, 2017 (ECF No. 52). Judgment entered on January 19, 2018. Judgment dated Jan. 

19, 2018 (ECF No. 56).

Respondent filed a joint motion for relief from judgment on August 1, 2022, requesting 

that the case be reopened. Joint Mot. Specifically, the parties explained “that due to an internal 

error, the [respondent] never purchased the annuity contract as directed.” Id. at 1-2. Given that 

Z.G. is now 18, purchasing an annuity is no longer practicable and “the parties agree that the best 

solution is to re-open the case, and strike the prior Stipulation, Decision, and Judgment.” Id. at 

2. The parties request that once the case caption has been amended to include only Z.G. as the 

petitioner, “the Court issue a Decision directing a lump sum payment to Z.G. as contemplated by 

the parties’ original settlement. Finally, following the submission of a Joint Notice Not to Seek 

Review, the parties request that the Court issue Judgment that is consistent with the revised 

Decision.” Id. 

Relying on RCFC 60(b)(6), which provides relief from judgment for “any other reason 

that justifies relief,” the parties argue the relief sought “is appropriate as a matter of fundamental 

fairness to Z.G., and because it is consistent with the original intent of the parties in informally 

resolving the case.” Joint Mot. at 2. The parties further believe this is an “extremely unusual 

circumstance” warranting relief. Id. Additionally, in accordance with RCFC 60(c)(1), this 

motion was filed “within a reasonable time” after the parties were aware of the issue. Id.

On August 1, 2022, petitioner field a status report stating that “she is in agreement with 

the relief requested in the motion for relief from judgment filed by respondent on August 1, 

2022.” Petitioner’s Status Report, field Aug. 1, 2022 (ECF No. 64).

This matter is now ripe for adjudication.

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

Vaccine Rule 36(a) allows a party to seek relief from judgment pursuant to RCFC 60. In 

determining whether a judgment should be set aside or altered, “the need for finality of 

judgments” must be balanced against “the importance of ensuring that litigants have a full and 

fair opportunity to litigate.” Kennedy v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 99 Fed. Cl. 535, 539 

(2011) (citing United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 276 (2010)); see also

Bridgham ex rel. Libby v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 33 Fed. Cl. 101, 104 (1995) 

(discussing the “tension between the goals of ensuring that the court’s judgment appropriately 

2 The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program is set forth in Part 2 of the National 

Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755, codified as amended, 

42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2012). All citations in this Order to individual sections of the 

Vaccine Act are to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa.
3

reflects the adjudication of the parties’ rights and of providing the parties with certainty as to 

those rights”).

“The court has discretion regarding whether to grant relief under [RCFC] 60(b), ‘and the 

court may weigh equitable considerations in the exercise of its discretion.’” Curtis v. United 

States, 61 Fed. Cl. 511, 512 (2004) (quoting Dynacs Eng’g Co. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 240, 

241-42 (2000)). RCFC 60(b) as a remedial provision is to be “liberally construed for the purpose 

of doing substantial justice.” Patton v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 25 F.3d 1021, 1030 (Fed. 

Cir. 1994). 

Under RCFC 60(b), the court may grant relief from a final judgment on the following 

grounds:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have 

been discovered in time to move for a new trial under RCFC 59(b); 

(3) fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an 

earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is 

no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

RCFC 60(b). 

Motions for relief under RCFC 60(b) “seek . . . to set aside a final decision and it is 

incumbent upon the motion-filer to demonstrate that [s]he . . . is entitled to relief.” Kennedy, 99 

Fed. Cl. at 550. The motion’s statements are “not like a pleading . . . in which the factual 

allegation[s] are presumed true.” Id. 

As a threshold matter, RCFC 60(c)(1) requires that “[a] motion under RCFC 60(b) must 

be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3), no more than a year after the 

entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” RCFC 60(c)(1). 

The catch-all provision of RCFC 60(b)(6) provides for relief from judgment upon “any 

other reason that justifies relief.” RCFC 60(b)(6). “The court is limited in granting relief under 

RCFC 60(b)(6) in two respects: (1) the grounds asserted for relief must not be the same as those 

listed in [RCFC] 60(b)(1)–(5), and (2) there must be a valid reason that justifies affording the 

relief, usually broadly described as extraordinary circumstances.” Q Integrated Cos., LLC v. 

United States, 131 Fed. Cl. 125, 132 (2017); see also Kenzora v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 

No. 10-669V, 2015 WL 6121582, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 25, 2015) (citing Freeman v. 

Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 35 Fed. Cl. 280, 283 (1996); Kennedy, 99 Fed. Cl. at 547; 

Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988)). Clauses (1)-(4) are 

mutually exclusive with clauses (5) and (6), and thus, relief under clause (6) cannot be asserted 

on one of those grounds. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 

380, 393 (1993); Kenzora, 2015 WL 6121582, at *2.
4

In addition, in order to justify relief, a showing of “extraordinary circumstances” is 

required. Kennedy, 99 Fed. Cl. at 548 (citing Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 202 

(1950)). RCFC 60(b)(6) permits the decision maker to grant relief from judgment to a party only 

in circumstances in which a “grave miscarriage of justice” would otherwise result. Id. at 540 

(quoting United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47 (1998)). This narrow use of RCFC 60(b)(6) 

is essential in order to preserve the finality of judgments. Id. at 548 (citing Gonzalez v. Crosby, 

545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005)). The party seeking relief from judgment “must show that the 

extraordinary circumstances prevented [the] party from taking timely action to prevent or correct 

an erroneous judgment.” Q Integrated, 131 Fed. Cl. at 132 (internal citations omitted). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Relief from Judgment Is Available Under RCFC 60(b)(6)

RCFC 60(b)(6) is often referred to as the “catch all” provision. It allows a court to 

reopen a case and vacate a judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief.” RCFC 60(b)(6). 

The rule must be narrowly construed in order to preserve the finality of judgments. Kennedy, 99 

Fed. Cl. at 548 (citing Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535). Relief from judgment under RCFC 60(b)(6) 

must be justified by a showing of “exceptional circumstances,” where a “grave miscarriage of 

justice would result if relief is denied.” Id. at 540, 548. However, “[RCFC] 60 relief is not 

available as a means to relitigate claims that have already been decided; if it were, then no 

decision would ever be final.” Rogero v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 143 Fed. Cl. 21, 27. 

(2019).

Here, petitioner has demonstrated “exceptional circumstances” and that a “grave 

miscarriage of justice” would result if the motion is not granted. Judgment entered in 2018, 

providing an amount sufficient for respondent to purchase an annuity contract for the benefit of 

Z.G. that would pay a lump sum of $19,115.84 on Z.G.’s 18th birthday. Shortly before Z.G.’s 

18th birthday, the parties determined an annuity contract was never purchased. Because Z.G. is 

now 18, an annuity contract is no longer practical. Thus, in order to ensure a grave miscarriage 

of justice does not result, the undersigned grants the parties’ joint motion for relief from 

judgment and reopens this case.

IV. CONCLUSION

The parties’ joint motion for relief from judgment is GRANTED. The parties are 

directed to file a new stipulation by Wednesday, August 31, 2022.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Nora Beth Dorsey

Nora Beth Dorsey 

Special Master