No. 247, October 2009 Strategic Forum 1

and its intelligence unit, the Inter-Services 

Intelligence Directorate (ISI), remain the 

most important elements in determining 

Pakistan’s future. The army establishment is 

the glue that holds this large multi-ethnic, 

nuclear-armed Muslim country together. 

Throughout Pakistan’s history, the army has 

served as “kingmaker” with decisive influence on political leadership, as guarantor of 

stability within the state, and as protector of 

the nation against external threats.

Pakistan’s armed forces are the eighth 

largest in the world.1 The ISI is in turn one 

of the largest military intelligence services 

worldwide. Its reputation was enhanced during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 

the 1980s, when it played a critical role in 

mobilizing and supporting the Afghan opposition movement. The ISI is an integral part 

of the armed forces of Pakistan and has been 

instrumental in executing many of the country’s foreign policy objectives. It also has a 

history of active intervention in Pakistan’s 

domestic politics.

Civil-military relations have been a 

major factor in Pakistan’s history since founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s death in 

1948. The army in Pakistan has had the reputation—not fully deserved—of professionalism, incorruptibility, and being the savior of 

the country after partition and the guarantor 

of its independence. The highest ranking military officer, the chief of army staff, found it to 

be his solemn duty to intervene in the political 

The Pakistani army and the Inter-Services 

Intelligence Directorate remain essential for the 

security and stability of Pakistan. Both organizations have deliberately embraced Islamic radicalism as a means to address the conventional 

military gap between Pakistan and India.

Although there are signs of a shift in 

Pakistan’s short-term strategic priorities and 

recognition that the challenge of homegrown 

Taliban is not just a U.S. problem, India will 

remain the focal point of Pakistan’s long-term 

national security. Progress toward reordering 

Pakistan’s strategic priorities and effecting a 

fundamental change in its strategic culture is 

bound to be slow and difficult. Furthermore, it 

cannot be forced by the United States.

The history of relations between Pakistan 

and the United States is complicated and ambiguous, largely due to Pakistani perceptions of 

past U.S. abandonment. Any new U.S. strategy 

for Pakistan has to be considered against realistic expectations, which in turn have to take 

due account of the longstanding, fundamental 

nature of the factors that have shaped Pakistani 

strategic priorities and culture.

Events in Pakistan today resemble a fastmoving kaleidoscope. Although it is impossible to predict the future, Pakistan’s very 

existence as a state undoubtedly is at stake. 

The danger this poses to the region and to 

the United States is of the greatest magnitude. For better or worse, the Pakistani army 

 Strategic Forum No. 247

October 2009

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

Radicalization by Choice: 

ISI and the Pakistani Army

by Robert B. Oakley with Franz-Stefan Gady

process whenever it threatened to run counter 

to national interest and security as defined by 

the army leadership.2

This tradition started with General Ayub 

Khan and the military coup he launched in 

1958. The ISI was instrumental in maintaining Ayub’s military dictatorship. Subsequently, 

the army and civilian political leadership 

took turns running the country, but Zulfikar 

Ali Bhutto was the only civilian to play a 

truly dominant role in the 60-year history of 

Pakistani politics. However, even he was overthrown by Chief of Army Staff Zia al Haq in 

1977 (with the popular support of Islamist 

political parties). Despite their electoral victories, subsequent governments led by Benazir 

Bhutto and the Pakistan People’s Party 

(1988–1990 and 1993–1996) and Nawaz 

Sharif and the Pakistan Muslim League 

(1990–1993 and 1997–1999) were not able to 

exert great influence on the Pakistani army. 

Democracy as a binding institution has not 

taken root despite U.S. efforts to strengthen 

democratic institutions.

The ISI’s involvement with Afghan resistance groups, including radical Islamist elements, continued following Soviet withdrawal 

from Afghanistan in 1989.3 The ISI remained 

involved in Afghan internal strife and actively 

supported the Taliban movement and indirectly al Qaeda. This association raises serious questions in Pakistan and abroad about 

the radicalization of ISI and Pakistani armed 

forces in general.
2 Strategic Forum No. 247, October 2009

Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 

the United States pressured the ISI and 

Pakistani armed forces to sever their ties 

to the Taliban and actively join the war on 

terror. Despite U.S. pressure and appeals, 

Pakistani support has lacked the scope and 

intensity desired by the United States, and 

concerns persist about radicalization of the 

ISI and military, their loyalties in the war on 

terror, and strategic priorities, raising doubts 

about the future of Pakistan. Underlying U.S. 

misgivings about Pakistan’s true intentions 

and strategic priorities have been its longterm rivalry with India and concern that its 

threat perceptions and priorities have not 

changed despite numerous pledges of support 

for the war on terror and vast amounts of U.S. 

assistance intended to cement a partnership.

The United States reportedly sent nearly 

$11 billion in economic and military assistance to Pakistan between 2002 and 2008, 

mostly for military and security related programs, in an effort to strengthen Pakistan’s 

role in the war on terror,4 demonstrate U.S. 

commitment to the country, and encourage it to reevaluate its strategic priorities and 

shift the focus from its rivalry with India to 

the problem of domestic radicalization and 

the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan. 

The Barack Obama administration has 

come up with further packages of military 

and economic assistance for Pakistan and 

Afghanistan. The President has expressed his 

support for the bill cosponsored by Senators 

John Kerry (D–MA) and Richard Lugar (R–

IN) that authorizes $1.5 billion in support 

for Pakistan every year over the next 5 years, 

funds that are intended to build schools, 

roads, and hospitals; create new energy infrastructure; and shore up the foundations of 

a secular democratic state and counter the 

influence of Islamic militants.5

There are signs of a shift in Pakistan’s 

strategic priorities and recognition that the 

challenge of home-grown Taliban is not just 

a U.S. problem. Recent military operations in 

the Swat, Dir, and Buner districts are indicators 

of changing attitudes on the part of Pakistan’s 

army and government. However, progress 

toward reordering of the country’s strategic priorities and effecting a fundamental change in 

its strategic culture is bound to be slow and difficult for several reasons: Pakistan’s strategic 

culture and priorities, which are a product of 

deliberate choices made by the country’s leaders decades ago; a complicated and ambiguous history of relations with the United States 

as Pakistan’s principal external partner; and a 

legacy of war with India that is rooted in the 

origins of the Pakistani state itself. Not only do 

these factors amount to a difficult legacy for 

Pakistan, but also they are likely to define the 

limits of Pakistan’s strategic reorientation, and 

thus represent realistic constraints on, as well 

as guidelines for, U.S. policy.

The powerful political rule of Pakistan’s 

army—and the growth of Islamic radicalism—followed the sudden death in 1948 of 

Pakistan’s founding father, the charismatic, 

secular, politically astute Muhammad Ali 

Jinnah. The absence of strong national political institutions in the new country left the 

army as the only force able to hold together 

the disparate peoples (including the fiercely 

independent Pashtun in the northeast and the 

Baluch in the southwest) and provinces (such 

as poor rural Sindh in the south, largely dominated by feudal landlords, and the relatively 

more prosperous Punjab in the east composed 

of farmers and small businessmen) thrown 

together as a result of the British partition in 

1947. The vast port city of Karachi is a chaotic 

conglomerate of all these ethnic groups. In 

addition, Pakistan is divided along religious 

lines—with a Sunni majority and a sizeable 

Shia minority—and suffers from major socioeconomic disparities.

Influences on 

Strategic Culture

Five issues have decisively shaped 

Pakistan’s strategic culture:

■ the conflict with India, finding its 

most vivid expression in the struggle over 

Kashmir

■ the dictatorship of Zia ul-Haq, who 

altered the face of the army through a program of Islamization

■ the war in Afghanistan during the 

1980s, which increased the power of the ISI 

substantially

■ the perceived U.S. abandonment of 

Pakistan in the 1990s (for example, the sanctions imposed by the Pressler Amendment), 

which undermined U.S. influence in Pakistan 

and reinforced Pakistani fears that their 

country is a “disposable ally” of the United 

States

■ the U.S. war on terror and the decision 

of the Pervez Musharraf regime to side with 

the United States and its allies after 9/11.

Conflict with India. Kashmir—

or the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as it 

is officially known—was ruled by a Hindu 

dynasty at the time of the partition of British 

India into India and Pakistan. The population of the state was predominantly Muslim. 

The ruler of Kashmir, having first declared 

independence and facing a Muslim rebellion 

and infiltration of irregulars from Pakistan, 

reversed course and decided to accede to 

India, allowing Indian troops to enter the 

state. The conflict, which came to be known 

as the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947, ended 

inconclusively with a ceasefire at the end of 

1948, and resulted in the establishment of the 

Line of Control, or the de facto border along 

the line of ceasefire.

In August 1965, the second war over 

Kashmir broke out between India and 

Pakistan. The latter infiltrated forces into 

Kashmir to try to overthrow the state government 

despite U.S. pressure 

and appeals, Pakistani 

support has lacked 

the scope and 

intensity desired by 

the United States

Robert B. Oakley is a Distinguished Senior Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at 

the National Defense University and former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan. Comments may be directed to 

oakleyr@ndu.edu. Franz-Stefan Gady was a Research Assistant in INSS and an Analyst for the Project on 

National Security Reform.
No. 247, October 2009 Strategic Forum 3

and set up a successor regime, which would call 

for accession to Pakistan. India responded forcefully, and a series of attacks and counterattacks 

followed without producing a conclusive victory for either side. Several weeks of fighting were followed by a ceasefire in September 

1965, and the two sides agreed to return to the 

ceasefire line that had existed prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

The third Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 

and the subsequent Pakistani defeat was a 

pivotal event in Pakistan’s history. Tensions 

in East Pakistan rose after the military government refused to accommodate demands 

for autonomy there and did not accept the 

results of national elections won by the leftist 

Awami Party, whose victory in East Pakistan 

was overwhelming. Efforts by the Pakistani 

army to restore control over East Pakistan, 

including use of force against the local resistance movement, resulted in numerous casualties and refugees. India’s active support 

for the resistance movement led to a series 

of Pakistani airstrikes against Indian targets in early December 1971. India counterattacked, and within 2 weeks the Pakistani 

military in East Pakistan was defeated by the 

combined Indian and local resistance forces. 

East Pakistan won its independence and 

became the independent state of Bangladesh. 

This was a traumatic event for Pakistan. It 

lost half its population and territory and left 

90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war in Indian 

hands. The loss of East Pakistan was a bitter pill to swallow for the army in particular and the public in general.6

 It undermined 

the army’s key claim to legitimacy based on 

its reputation as protector of the territorial 

integrity of the Pakistani state and showed 

the army once and for all that it was unable 

to defeat India conventionally. The capability 

and resource gaps were just too big. Despite 

this military setback, however, the army 

remained the most important force in the 

country due to its dominance in all branches 

of the government and the economy.

As a direct result of the defeat in East 

Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was installed as 

president by General Yahya Khan in a peaceful transition of power in December 1971. 

After consolidating his power, Bhutto set his 

own agenda. Most important, he increased 

the influence of Islam in order to keep the 

Pakistani military in check.7 Dismayed at the 

lack of U.S. support in the 1971 war, he sought 

a long-term relationship with China. He also 

initiated a program to develop nuclear weapons. In 1974, Bhutto sent the army to fight 

an insurgency in Baluchistan without proper 

training and equipment for a counterinsurgency—a mistake that was to be repeated 

decades later under President Musharraf. 

Despite being essentially secular, Bhutto also 

gave in to the Islamists and banned alcohol, 

until then a common sight in the officers’ 

messes that still upheld the traditions of the 

British imperial Indian army.

After its defeat in 1971, the army was 

gradually transformed from a postcolonial 

conservative force to a more politicized and 

radical instrument. It strongly supported 

Bhutto’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons as a way to compensate for its shortcomings in conventional warfare. The army also 

pushed for an increase in funding and training for insurgent activity in the Kashmir 

region, which it saw as a useful instrument 

for executing its policy of “strategic diversion” 

against New Delhi.8

Zia ul-Haq and Islamization. 

General Zia’s accession to power in a coup in 

July 1977 left indelible marks on Pakistan.9 

A representative of the new postcolonial officer class, he was deeply religious and from a 

humble middle-class urban background. His 

major legacy was further Islamization of the 

army and society. He changed the motto of 

the army from “Unity, Faith, and Discipline” 

to “Faith, Obedience of God, and struggle in the path of Allah” and tried to rally 

the nation under the state ideology of Islam 

in order to foster a Pakistani identity.10 Zia 

began to change the culture of the Pakistani 

officer corps and introduced mandatory religious learning as a requirement for advancement. He also turned to Saudi Arabia for 

support in building up Islamist political parties at home (for example, Jamaat-e-Islami) 

and in organizing groups in Afghanistan to 

conduct an insurgency against the pro-Soviet 

regime in Kabul. Pakistan had covert assistance from the United States in creating these 

Afghan resistance organizations.

While Zia provided a major push toward 

Islamic radicalism, he did not start the 

movement. Islamic radicalism in Pakistan 

has fluctuated over the decades. It grows 

from the ethnic and socioeconomic weaknesses of the nation that are reflected in its 

institutional failures. Popular discontent has 

found cyclical expression through street protests, terrorist attacks, and military coups. 

Over the last three decades, the people’s frustration with the corruption and failings of 

both civilian- and military-led governments 

has been reinforced by radical teachings. 

As in other Muslim nations, the Islamists’ 

appearance of incorruptibility and their role 

as the “voice of the oppressed” has attracted 

many of the disaffected.

Today, optimists describe Pakistan as a 

transitional democracy; pessimists call it a 

fragmented state. In this dangerous situation, 

the Pakistani army and the military intelligence services have a de facto monopoly over 

nuclear policy as well as tight control over 

weapons and equipment procurement, the 

national budget, and the country’s policies 

toward Afghanistan and Kashmir.

The Afghanistan War and 

Radicalization. The year 1979 brought 

a series of events that fundamentally altered 

the strategic landscape of Southwest Asia. 

In Iran, the shah was overthrown by radical 

Shi’ite leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. 

He was determined to export his version 

of Shia Islam to the entire Muslim world, 

threatening both Saudi security and religious supremacy and the West’s main source 

of oil. The shah for years had very close relations with Pakistan (a majority Sunni state), 

which also felt threatened by revolutionary 

Iran. The same year, Pakistan’s army relied 

on popular discontent in Kashmir to introduce Pakistani-trained Islamist forces. The 

culminating event in 1979 was the Red Army 

invasion of Afghanistan to keep the proSoviet regime in Kabul from being ousted.

optimists describe 

Pakistan as a transitional 

democracy; pessimists 

call it a fragmented state
4 Strategic Forum No. 247, October 2009

ing insurgent groups, which it later applied 

to operations in Kashmir and India.

The Afghanistan war was the pivotal event 

in radicalizing the Pakistani army and the ISI. 

In sum, it illustrated the power of combining 

jihad, nationalism, and guerrilla warfare.

Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Ever since 

Pakistan’s creation, the United States had 

enjoyed a close relationship with that country. Following Jinnah’s death in 1948, Prime 

Minister Liaquat Ali Khan sought to ensure 

that international negotiations on Kashmir 

did not undo whatever gains had been made 

toward making it a part of the new state of 

Pakistan. In doing so, he relied heavily on 

Britain and the United States. The prime 

minister also looked to the Soviet Union, but 

when push came to shove he opted for the 

Western alliance.15

For its part, the United States found 

Pakistan a useful ally in the developing 

Cold War due to its strategic location. India 

chose to seek closer ties with the Soviet 

Union (and the Non-Aligned Movement), 

leaving the United States with little choice 

but to side with Pakistan. In return for its 

support against the Soviet Union, Pakistan 

expected U.S. help in its confrontation 

with India. Pakistan started to receive U.S. 

military aid in 1954 under the Mutual 

Defense Assistance Agreement after Army 

Chief of Staff (later President) Ayub Khan 

convinced Washington of the usefulness of 

Pakistan against the Soviet Union. By the 

1960s, Pakistan was a member of South 

East Asia Treaty Organization and Central 

Treaty Organization, both U.S.-led antiSoviet alliances.

Even with these mutual commitments, 

the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was an uneasy 

one over the next few decades, with the 

United States suspending military and economic aid during the wars of 1965 and 1971. 

And despite its commitments to Pakistan, on 

a number of occasions the United States supplied India with military hardware. The perceived fickleness of the U.S. commitment to 

Pakistan remains a big issue with Pakistanis 

to the present day.

Spearheaded by the ISI, which had set up 

a division for the clandestine procurement of 

military technology from abroad in the 1970s, 

Pakistan was pursuing its nuclear ambitions, 

These events not only changed the strategic landscape, but they also were pivotal 

in radicalizing both the Pakistani army and 

the ISI. With the outbreak of the Afghanistan 

war and the U.S. decision to support the 

mujahideen, the ISI found itself as a major 

element of U.S. global strategy against the 

Soviet Union. Since Pakistan was needed as 

the main base of U.S. operations for support of the mujahideen, the United States 

provided hundreds of millions of dollars in 

military and economic assistance. At the 

same time, the United States covertly provided hundreds of millions of dollars to support the Afghan resistance. As a condition for 

allowing the United States to use Pakistan as 

a base of operations, President Zia insisted 

that all support for the Afghans be channeled via the ISI. Presidents Jimmy Carter 

and Ronald Reagan agreed.11 The ISI took 

on the principal role in the execution of the 

covert war in Afghanistan, pushing the ISI 

from the background into the forefront of 

U.S. strategy.

During this period, the ISI both 

gathered intelligence and handled several billion dollars’ worth of weapons and 

financial assistance, which were subject to 

little control or accountability.12 The majority of aid went to Afghan Sunni fundamentalists—most of them from Pashtun ethnic 

groups.13 The Afghani mujahideen also 

received direct cash infusions from Saudi 

Arabia (which provided the United States 

with annual funds matching its contribution).14 Saudi Arabia established bilateral 

programs in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region and the Afghan refugee camps 

aimed at spreading its Wahhabi version 

of Islam. It built and staffed hundreds of 

mosques and madrassas, working with 

Pakistani political-religious parties and 

the ISI to do so. Saudi Arabia also took the 

lead in recruiting thousands of Muslims 

from countries as far away as Indonesia 

and Morocco to join the jihad against the 

atheist Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The 

United States considered the role of Islam 

to be a powerful global political weapon 

against the Soviets, as well as a mobilizing 

factor for the Afghan resistance. The war 

in Afghanistan also provided the ISI with 

valuable experience in supplying and traindisregarding repeated warnings from the U.S. 

Government. Congress passed a number of 

resolutions intended to deter Pakistan from 

acquiring nuclear weapons by requiring the 

termination of economic assistance and military transfers if Pakistan tested a nuclear 

device. The Pressler Amendment, which initially increased the amount of U.S. assistance, 

also called for termination of government-togovernment military sales and new economic 

assistance unless the President certified annually that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear 

device. While the United States was engaged 

in Afghanistan, the Reagan administration 

was willing to give Pakistan the benefit of the 

doubt when intelligence was uncertain.16

With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union 

from Afghanistan in 1989, the United States 

lost its strategic incentive to remain engaged 

in Afghanistan. In October 1990, the United 

States decided to impose sanctions against 

Pakistan for pursuit of its nuclear enrichment program. A total of $600 million of 

U.S. aid was halted. Notwithstanding the 

administration’s efforts to persuade Congress 

to delay sanctions until after the establishment of Nawaz Sharif’s new government in 

Pakistan, U.S. lawmakers were not prepared 

to compromise.17 Pakistan and Afghanistan 

were left to cope with the immense problems caused by a decade of war, including 4 million to 5 million Afghan refugees 

in Pakistan. This development contributed 

significantly to strong anti-American attitudes within the ISI and Pakistani army. 

The Pakistani public’s and political leaders’ reaction was outrage. They felt that the 

United States had willfully cut off assistance 

once the Soviets had been defeated and that 

the United States 

considered the role 

of Islam to be a 

powerful global political 

weapon against the 

Soviets, as well as a 

mobilizing factor for the 

Afghan resistance
No. 247, October 2009 Strategic Forum 5

the United States no longer needed Pakistan. 

Only a handful of very senior Pakistani government officials had been aware of the 

nuclear problem in U.S.-Pakistani relations. A comment by President Ghulam Ishaq 

Khan in May 1990 (prior to sanctions being 

imposed) to Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA) Deputy Director Robert Gates reveals 

the Pakistani opinion on the matter: “The 

truth is that the U.S. too often used its aid 

as a lever. We did not succumb in the past 

and we will not give up our principles for the 

sake of American aid or fear of war.”18

The Pakistani military felt 

betrayed. There were to be no more military exchanges with the United States. 

Intelligence cooperation between the CIA 

and ISI steadily declined. Important and 

successful U.S. Agency for International 

Development projects were shut down. The 

cancellation of delivery of 58 F–16 fighter 

jets, judged by the Pakistanis as critical 

to deterring India, was a particularly bitter pill to swallow. Inadvertently, this made 

the pursuance of nuclear weapons a more 

pressing imperative for Pakistan because of 

its even greater inferiority in conventional 

forces vis-à-vis India. It also forced Pakistan 

to turn to ballistic missiles and to develop 

new, smaller nuclear warheads to put on 

them. Partly in return for assistance to its 

own nuclear program, North Korea provided the missiles in a program approved 

by Prime Minister Bhutto and managed by 

Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan.

The U.S. “abandonment” in the 1990s 

opened the door to powerful Islamist, antiAmerican Pashtun-based forces in Pakistan. 

The Taliban, springing up largely on their 

own in Afghanistan, soon received substantial support in the 1990s from the ISI 

and Pakistani army under the tutelage of 

the civilian governments of both Benazir 

Bhutto (during her second term) and Nawaz 

Sharif.19 The objective was to reestablish 

traditional Pashtun control of Afghanistan 

and eject the Tajiks and Uzbeks. In 1994, 

Prime Minister Bhutto organized an interagency group on Afghanistan. ISI brigadiers urged her to maintain pressure on 

Ahmad Shah Massoud’s government in 

Afghanistan as it was perceived to be too 

“pro-Indian.”20 Pakistani support for the 

Taliban was driven by the fear of strategic 

encirclement that was omnipresent in both 

the ISI and army. Even today, the army 

fears that it could face both a U.S.-IndianAfghan alliance and an Iranian-Russian 

alliance, aimed at checking Pakistani 

influence or even breaking up the Pakistani 

state.21 As Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid 

stated recently, “Many in Pakistan believe 

that the United States has deceived Pakistan 

into conniving with Washington to bring 

about its own destruction: India and U.S.-

supported Afghanistan will form a pincer 

around Pakistan to dismember the world’s 

only Muslim nuclear power.”22

The War on Terror and 

Musharraf. Following 9/11, President 

Musharraf was forced to either turn away 

from the Taliban and support the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan or face the consequences of being seen as a supporter of 

Islamic terrorism. He opted for the former 

with the objective of both receiving military aid and countering the growing influence of Islamic radicals in Pakistan.23 The 

United States, in turn, reengaged vigorously in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 

Pakistan, it dropped sanctions and rapidly 

reestablished large-scale military and economic assistance programs, while encouraging other governments to provide sizeable 

economic support. For the first time in a 

decade, Pakistani military officers were 

enrolled in U.S. military schools. New weapons and critical spare parts for old weapons systems flowed from the United States 

to Pakistan, increasing the army conventional capabilities. In 2006, U.S. arms sales 

reached $3.5 billion.24

In Afghanistan in 2001, the U.S. campaign resulted in the fall of the Taliban 

regime. The thousands of Taliban who fled 

to Pakistan after the lightning U.S. victory were mostly Pashtun, as were many 

of the personnel working for the ISI (the 

army remains a Punjabi-dominated force). 

A smaller number of al Qaeda fighters 

who fled were mostly from Arab and other 

Islamic nations. Some individuals sent to 

Guantanamo Bay reportedly were arrested 

in Pakistan.25 Most Taliban Pashtun fighters, however, settled along the border in 

the Pakistani Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas (FATA), the Northwest Frontier 

Province, and Baluchistan. With the tacit 

cooperation of the Pakistani army (and 

the ISI), the Taliban quietly reorganized, 

rearmed, and reestablished their old connections. They began preparing for a new 

insurgency against the U.S.-supported 

Hamid Karzai government in Kabul. The 

Taliban also established close ties with 

homegrown Afghan Pashtun resistance 

groups such as those led by Gulbuddin 

Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani. Despite 

the improved U.S.-Pakistan relationship, 

large-scale infiltration from Baluchistan 

Province and the FATA went unchecked for a 

long time.26

Responding to U.S. pressure, President 

Musharraf finally in 2005 moved Pakistani 

army forces into the FATA for the first time 

since the 1970s, where they were stalemated 

by the determined attacks of both Taliban 

and Pashtun tribal warriors. The army experienced a major problem with Pakistani regulars of Pashtun descent who were reluctant 

to kill fellow Pashtuns.27 At the end of 2008, 

over twice as many Pakistani soldiers were 

involved in the fight against the Taliban 

(120,000 in FATA) than the total number of 

U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) forces in Afghanistan (55,000). 

Pakistan suffered more military deaths 

(over 1,800 in FATA) than the International 

Security Assistance Force and United 

States combined in Afghanistan (1,006).28

Furthermore, the attacks on Pakistani military personnel by their fellow countrymen 

have lowered morale, increased desertion 

and suicide rates, and led to growing discontent with the political leadership of President 

Asif Ali Zardari, who replaced Musharraf in 

2008. These operations were seen by most 

Pakistanis as yielding to U.S. pressure rather 

than pursuing Pakistan’s own interests.29

U.S. “abandonment” in 

the 1990s opened the 

door to powerful Islamist, 

anti-American Pashtunbased forces in Pakistan
6 Strategic Forum No. 247, October 2009

extremists in Pakistan, there appears to be no 

alternative to the dual policy of building up the 

capabilities of the Pakistani army and ISI while 

working to shore up popular and political support for this critical effort.

Observations and 

Recommendations

After a period of uncertainty, Pakistan’s 

military forces appear to be confronting 

the major security threats. They have surprised most observers by their combined arms 

operations using F–16s, helicopters, artillery, tanks, and infantry to great effect, demonstrating the value of U.S. training and 

material assistance. The hard work of the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral 

Michael Mullen, in developing a close relationship with Pakistani army leadership is 

also paying off.

This is most decidedly not the time to 

place restrictions upon U.S. assistance to the 

Pakistani armed forces. U.S. policymakers 

must make this very clear to Congress, leaving no doubt of the disastrous consequences 

that would ensue.

When talking about the radicalization of both the ISI and the army, it is 

important to understand one crucial fact: 

the army has embraced that radicalism by 

choice. Over the last 25 years, Pakistanis 

believe that it has been their most effective weapon in defending the nation against 

Indian power. Radicalism, therefore, is a 

rational means to achieve a particular end: 

the survival of the Pakistan state.

The new Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, 

General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, has ousted a 

number of corrupt and incompetent senior 

officers and has removed some 200 activeduty and retired officers from top-level positions in the civilian administration. He has 

replaced the top commanders at the ISI in an 

attempt to cut ties with the Taliban and other 

Islamic radical groups—particularly after 

the Indian embassy bombing in Kabul in 

2008, which was directly linked to the ISI.37

But disentangling the ISI from its liaison with 

radical Islamic groups will prove difficult 

if not impossible. Despite General Kayani’s 

efforts, he only was able to purge the top 

leadership of the ISI. In most cases, it is hard 

Zardari’s Election 

and Beyond

The election of Asif Ali Zardari first 

as Pakistan’s prime minister and subsequently as president in 2008 was to a 

large degree made possible by the decision of the new Chief of Army Staff General 

Ashfaq Parvez Kayani to keep the army 

and ISI out of electoral politics and support the electoral process. Zardari’s prospects were also helped by a wave of sympathy 

following the assassination of his wife, 

Benazir Bhutto.30 Furthermore, the United 

States applied strong pressure to hold free 

and fair elections. After a decade of essentially authoritarian rule, something resembling democracy has returned to Pakistan. 

The Islamist political parties lost almost 

all their seats in the National Assembly, as 

well as their majorities in regional legislatures in the key provinces of Baluchistan 

and the Northwest Frontier, which border 

Afghanistan. However, since the election, 

the Zardari government has been plagued 

by allegations of corruption and charges of 

incompetence and overall poor governance. 

His government has low popularity ratings.31

This situation underscores the military’s critical role in Pakistan. It remains 

essential to the country’s domestic stability, efforts to combat homegrown Taliban, 

and to safeguarding the nuclear arsenal. 

Thanks to technical assistance from the 

United States and a complete overhaul of the 

nuclear command and control system, the 

U.S. Government reportedly finds the present safeguards adequate.32 This is particularly 

important because a number of simulations 

reportedly conducted by the U.S. military and 

Intelligence Community have repeatedly cast 

doubt upon the ability of the United States to 

recover a weapon if the Pakistani army loses 

control of it. However, with Pakistan’s future 

domestic stability not to be taken for granted 

and the obvious risk of further radicalization 

of the army and ISI, the prospect of radical 

elements gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear 

arsenal cannot be ruled out.33

The Pakistani army, largely a conventional force designed for traditional warfare, 

has experienced difficulties in adapting to 

the requirements of irregular warfare.34 The 

recent offensive in the Swat Valley, using elements of the Frontier Corps, heavy artillery, 

tanks, and helicopter gunships, has shown 

signs of progress and inflicted heavy casualties on the Taliban. However, given the likelihood of the Taliban’s return as soon as the 

army pulls back, the sustainability of this 

offensive and the degree to which the army 

is reorienting itself toward irregular warfare 

remains an open question.

The army and the Zardari government must also confront a renewed insurgency by ethnic Baluch tribesmen. For 

decades, the Baluch have seen the revenues 

for their province’s oil and gas deposits go 

to the central government. Little has been 

done to provide education and health care. 

Jobs created by new construction projects 

(for example, ports and roads) went to persons from other provinces. Former President 

Musharraf’s attempt to crush the insurgency 

by brute force made matters worse, and the 

Zardari government has done nothing to 

follow up on its promises for reform. The 

Pakistani army also mounted a new offensive in South Waziristan, the main base of 

the allegedly killed Taliban leader Baitullah 

Meshud reportedly responsible for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

A national poll conducted in mid-2008 

found that 74 percent of Pakistanis oppose 

direct U.S. military action against Taliban and 

al Qaeda militants.35 The same poll shows that 

most Pakistanis oppose the entire Pakistan-U.S. 

security relationship. A separate March 2009 

poll found that while 69 percent of Pakistanis 

agreed that having the Taliban and al Qaeda 

operating in Pakistan was a serious problem, only 24 percent said that they would support American military incursions in the tribal 

areas.36 Given such attitudes and the continuing critical role of the Pakistani military, when 

it comes to the task of confronting Islamic 

this is most decidedly 

not the time to place 

restrictions upon 

U.S. assistance to the 

Pakistani armed forces
No. 247, October 2009 Strategic Forum 7

to distinguish between contacts by juniorlevel ISI operatives acting on their own and 

their contacts made at the direction of highlevel authorities. The longstanding Pakistani 

policy of maintaining contacts with militant 

groups and providing them with some assistance—with no precise purpose—is a form 

of insurance against the possibility of the 

United States again withdrawing its support 

and tensions with India increasing.

President Obama presented his new 

Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy on March 21, 

2009. It was the result of three independent 

reviews conducted by the National Security 

Council, U.S. Central Command, and Joint 

Staff, synthesized by another team, and personally approved by President Obama. First, 

the Obama plan calls for a comprehensive, 

long-term approach, combining security with 

political and social development. Given the 

extreme sensitivity of Pakistan-U.S. relations, 

the U.S. policy should avoid being perceived 

as advocating specific changes in Pakistan’s 

political institutions or leadership.

Second, over the long term, the FATA 

need to be brought into the political mainstream. The present system is one of indirect 

rule based upon tribal structures with their 

own separate authorities, most of which were 

installed by the British. This is a structural 

weakness that has been exploited by various 

extremist groups, a source of constant danger for the Pakistani army and the Frontier 

Corps. Closer integration between the army 

and the Frontier Corps would be desirable and 

would help the overall unity of effort.

Third, there is an obvious need for 

regional diplomacy, starting with an international conference on assistance for 

Afghanistan and the creation of a permanent “contact group” covering both 

Afghanistan and Pakistan (which presumably includes Russia, China, India, 

Iran, and Saudi Arabia), as well as the 

United States and NATO members. China 

is making huge public and private investments in Pakistan—developing its mineral resources, roads, and ports—as well 

as in Afghanistan. It has a major longterm interest in stabilizing both countries 

in order to establish a reliable corridor to 

the Indian Ocean for imports and exports. 

Saudi Arabia is another country with the 

capability to assist Pakistan economically, 

as well as having the potential to bring 

Islamic extremists under control and assist 

in the reform of the Islamic schools.

Fourth, in addition to greater nearterm support, the United States ought to consider collaborating with Turkey, which has a 

long history of close relations with Pakistan, 

in training the Pakistani army. It is also 

essential that the United States, preferably 

in cooperation with other countries (such 

as Turkey), help Pakistan develop a longterm program for training and equipping 

its police forces. Such programs have been 

a major part of U.S. strategy for both Iraq 

and Afghanistan. There has only been minimal assistance to Pakistan in this respect. 

The Pakistani army has neither the training nor the equipment to deal with the significant criminal threat in major cities (such 

as Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad) and is 

already badly overstretched.

Fifth, there needs to be PakistanIndia rapprochement. Ever since partition, 

Pakistan’s fears about its larger neighbor—

and anger over what it sees as the unjust 

occupation of Kashmir—have been the chief 

motivator for Pakistani support of jihadist 

movements and the dominant political role of 

its army, as well as the cause of several wars. 

Even an interim agreement would make it 

much easier for Pakistan to make the necessary political reforms. More significantly, it 

would open the way for Pakistan to drop its 

restrictions on trade with India. The latter 

would then become a locomotive that is badly 

needed to help revitalize Pakistan’s economy.

Sixth, there also needs to be continued 

progress in U.S.-sponsored efforts to improve 

relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan 

and relieve the deep distrust between them. 

The recent meetings in Washington between 

Presidents Obama, Zardari, and Karzai were 

helpful, yet progress is going to be slow. In 

addition to what can be accomplished on the 

political side, there is a great deal to be done 

on the economic front, including regional 

economic cooperation. Pakistan was already 

in deep economic crisis before the global 

meltdown. Its situation now is truly desperate. The United States has taken the first step 

in organizing an international conference 

of major partners (including China, Saudi 

Arabia, Japan, Europe, International Bank 

for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD], 

Asian Development Bank, and International 

Monetary Fund) and developing both shortand long-term plans to revive and reform the 

economy. The United Nations and the IBRD 

could play the leading role. However, these 

plans should include Central Asia, which 

could play an important role as a potential 

source of oil, natural gas, and electric power 

for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

The perils of the present situation in 

Pakistan are enormous not only for that 

country and Afghanistan but also for the 

entire region, including India. The danger of 

another military confrontation between India 

and Pakistan is very much alive, with the risk 

that it could develop into a nuclear exchange. 

Amid all the current discussion on counterinsurgency operations, this issue has received 

little coverage in recent months.

Despite its scope and scale, the new U.S. 

strategy for Pakistan has to be considered 

against realistic expectations, which in turn 

have to take into account the longstanding 

fundamental nature of the factors that have 

shaped Pakistani strategic priorities and culture. Thus, expectations for U.S. policy and 

assistance will have to be set accordingly. 

Hopes for near-term significant changes in 

Pakistan’s strategic culture or U.S. ability to 

dictate Pakistan’s national interests are likely 

to prove exceedingly optimistic. Previous 

attempts to do so have been futile, and there 

are few reasons to expect it to be otherwise in 

the future.

Whatever their faults, the Pakistani 

army and ISI remain absolutely essential 

forces for security and stability in Pakistan.

given the extreme 

sensitivity of PakistanU.S. relations, the U.S. 

policy should avoid being 

perceived as advocating 

specific changes in 

Pakistan’s political 

institutions or leadership
8 Strategic Forum No. 247, October 2009

Notes

1

 U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: 

Pakistan,” March 2009, available at <www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/

bgn/3453.htm>.

2

 For a detailed analysis of civil-military relations in 

Pakistan. see Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: 

The Parallel State (New York: Routledge, 2007), 47–76.

3

 For a detailed description, see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: 

The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, 

from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: 

Penguin Press, 2004), chapters 10, 11.

4

 Center for American Progress, “U.S. Aid to Pakistan 

by the Numbers,” August 21, 2008, available at <www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/08/pakistan_aid_numbers.

html>.

5

 The White House, remarks by the President on a New 

Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 27, 2009, and 

State Department, press release: “U.S. Pledge at the Tokyo 

Donors’ Conference,” April 17, 2009.

6

 For a detailed description of the background of the 

military defeat, see Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, 

Its Army and the Wars Within (New York: Oxford Free Press, 

2008), chapter 11.

7

 Ibid., 320–350. Bhutto introduced his own brand of 

Islamic socialism, banned alcohol, and bowed to Islamic radicals to counterbalance the still influential army leadership 

by amending the constitution, which officially made Pakistan 

an “Islamic State.” 

8

 Ashley J. Tellis, Pakistan and the War on Terror: 

Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance (Washington, 

DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 12.

9

 “Background Note: Pakistan.” 

10 Nawaz, 359–360.

11 Kanishkan Sathasivam, Uneasy Neighbors: India, 

Pakistan, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Ashgate 

Publishing, 2005), 133–134.

12 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque 

and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, 2005), 188–189.

13 Sathasivam, 136; Coll, 180–182.

14 Sathasivam, 134. 

15 Nawaz, 76.

16 Thahir-Kheli Shirin, India, Pakistan and the 

United States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 

1997), 74–89.

17 Nawaz, 437.

18 Ibid., 431.

19 Coll, 287–297.

20 Ibid., 290.

21 Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, “From Great 

Game to Grand Bargaining,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 6 

(November/December 2008), available at <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64604/barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashid/

from-great-game-to-grand-bargain>.

22 Ibid.

23 Nawaz, 539–542.

24 “U.S. Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers.”

25 For example, the BBC reported that Mohamed elGharani was arrested in Pakistan in October 2001. See 

BBC News, “Chad man released from Guantanamo,” 

June 12, 2009, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

africa/8096402.stm>.

26 For a detailed account of the Taliban’s influence on Pakistan, see Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s 

Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the 

Rise of the Taliban (Seattle: University of Washington 

Press, 2001), chapter 5; and Rizwan Hussein, Pakistan and 

the Emergence of Islamic Militancy (Aldershot: Ashgate 

Publishing, 2005), chapter 6.

27 Tellis, 26–27.

28 Ibid.,10.

29 Ibid., 30.

30 Pakistani former Chief of the Army Staff Jehangir 

Karamat referred to the new civil-military relationship as the 

“Kayani model” in Jehangir Karamant, “The Kayani Model,” 

Pakistan Ka Khuda Hafiz, March 21 2009, available at 

<http://pakistankakhudahafiz.wordpress.com/2009/03/21/

the-kayani-model/>. 

31 Gallup Poll, “Pakistanis Give New Civilian 

Leadership Low Marks So Far,” January 13, 2009, available at 

<www.gallup.com/poll/113737/pakistanis-give-new-civilianleadership-low-marks-far.aspx>. 

32 General David Petraeus, commander of U.S. Central 

Command, said in an interview with Fox News on May 10, 

2009: “With respect to—the nuclear weapons and—and sites 

that are controlled by Pakistan, as President Obama mentioned the other day, we have confidence in their security procedures and elements and believe that the security of those 

sites is adequate.” Transcript available at <www.foxnews.

com/story/0,2933,519696,00.html>.

33 David E. Sanger, “Obama’s Worst Nightmare,” 

The New York Times, January 8, 2009, available at 

<www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/magazine/11pakistan-t.

html?pagewanted=all>. 

34 Tellis, 43.

35 Ibid., 30.

36 International Republican Institute, “IRI Pakistan 

Index,: May 2009, available at <www.iri.org/newsreleases/

pdfs/2009%20May%2011%20IRI%20Pakistan%20Index,%20

March%207-30,%202009.pdf>.

37 Robert D. Kaplan, “Behind the Indian Embassy 

Bombing.” The Atlantic Monthly (August 2008), available at 

<www.theatlantic.com/doc/200808u/kaplan-pakistan>.

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I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

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