40388 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 144 / Monday, July 28, 1997 / Notices

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–317 and 50–318]

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company;

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant,

(Unit Nos. 1 and 2)

Exemption

I

The Baltimore Gas and Electric

Company (BGE) is the holder of Facility

Operating License Nos. DPR–53 and

DPR–69 for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear

Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (Calvert

Cliffs). The licenses provide, among

other things, that the licensee is subject

to all rules, regulations, and orders of

the Commission now or hereafter in

effect.

II

Subsection (a) of 10 CFR 70.24,

‘‘Criticality Accident Requirements,’’

requires that each licensee authorized to

possess special nuclear material shall

maintain in each area where such

material is handled, used, or stored, an

appropriate criticality monitoring

system. In accordance with Subsection

(a)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24, coverage of all

such areas at Calvert Cliffs shall be

provided by two criticality detectors.

However, exemptions may be requested

pursuant to 10 CFR 70.24(d), provided

that the licensee believes that good

cause exists for the exemption.

By letter dated August 19, 1996, as

supplemented February 14, 1997, the

licensee requested an exemption from

the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a). A

previous exemption from the provisions

of 10 CFR 70.24 for the storage of

special nuclear material, including

reactor fuel assemblies [maximum

amount of 2,440 kg of U–235 in uranium

enriched to no more than 3.00 weight

percent (w/o)] for Unit 1 and maximum

amount of 2450 Kg of U–235 in uranium

enriched to no more than 3.05% was

granted to Baltimore Gas and Electric

Company for Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 in

NRC Materials License No. SNM–1364

and for Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 in NRC

Materials License No. SNM–1624. The

materials licenses were issued on

August 23, 1973, for Unit 1 and May 18,

1976, for Unit 2.

The materials licenses expired upon

conversion of the construction permits

to operating licenses, which was July

31, 1974, for Unit 1 and November 30,

1976, for Unit 2, respectively. The basis

for the current exemption request is the

same as for the original request. The

licensee proposes to handle and store

unirradiated fuel without having a

criticality monitoring system as required

by 10 CFR 70.24.

The basis for the exemption is that

inadvertent or accidental criticality will

be precluded, in accordance with

General Design Critrion 62 through

compliance with the Calvert Cliffs

Technical Specifications, the geometric

spacing of fuel assemblies in the new

fuel storage racks and spent fuel storage

pool, and administrative controls

imposed on fuel handling procedures.

Special nuclear material, as nuclear

fuel, is stored in the spent fuel pool, the

new fuel storage racks, and the

Independent Spent Fuel Storage

Installation. The spent fuel pool is used

to store irradiated fuel under water after

its discharge from the reactor, and new

fuel prior to loading into the reactor.

The Independent Spent Fuel Storage

Installation utilizes dry canisters to

store spent fuel.

Special nuclear material is also

present in the form of excore fission

chamber detectors and startup neutron

sources. The small quantity of special

nuclear material present in these latter

items precludes an inadvertent

criticality.

The spent fuel pool is designed to

store the fuel in a geometric array using

a solid neutron absorber that precludes

criticality. The effective neutron

multiplication factor, Keff, is maintained

less than or equal to 0.95 by the solid

neutron absorber. Although soluble

boron is maintained in the spent fuel

pool, no credit is taken for it in

determining Keff.

The new fuel storage racks may be

used to receive and store new fuel in a

dry condition upon arrival on site and

prior to loading in the reactor or spent

fuel pool. The spacing between new fuel

assemblies in the storage racks is

sufficient to maintain the array in a

subcritical condition even under

accident conditions assuming the

presence of moderator. The maximum

enrichment of 5.0 wt% U–235 for the

new fuel assemblies results in a

maximum Keff of 0.89 at a water density

of 1.0 gm/cc (fully flooded), and a Keff

of less than 0.89 for aqueous foam at

optimum moderation conditions.

Nuclear fuel is moved between the

new fuel storage racks, the reactor

vessel, the refueling pool, and the spent

fuel pool to accommodate refueling

operations. In addition, fuel is moved

into the facility and within the reactor

vessel, or within the spent fuel pool. In

all cases, fuel movements are

procedurally controlled and designed to

preclude conditions involving criticality

concerns. These procedural controls

include:

1. Plastic bags or other dust covers

placed around new core components are

removed or rendered incapable of

holding water prior to inserting the

assemblies into the new fuel storage

racks.

2. Only the auxiliary hook of the

spent fuel cask handling crane may be

used to move new fuel. Therefore, only

one fuel assembly can be moved at a

time.

3. A maximum of two fuel assemblies

are permitted outside of the approved

shipping container or new fuel storage

rack location at one time, one of which

must be located in the new fuel

inspection platform. Although two

highly enriched assemblies may achieve

criticality under close proximity, fully

flooded conditions, it is highly

improbable that the required water level

for neutron moderation could be

attained. The spent fuel pool area and

new fuel handling areas would have to

be flooded to an elevation

approximately 17 feet above the floor.

Based on the possible sources of water,

achieving this fully flooded condition

would require blockage of floor drains,

sealing of access doors, and numerous

procedure violations. In addition, the

spent fuel pool high level alarm would

alert operators of flooding from any of

these sources. Since no fire protection

sprinkler system exists in the new fuel

handling area, there is no source of lowdensity aqueous foam moderation.

Technical Specifications also

preclude certain movements over the

spent fuel pool to prevent an

inadvertent criticality. Previous

accident analyses have demonstrated

that a fuel handling accident (i.e., a

dropped fuel assembly) will not create

conditions which could result in

inadvertent criticality. Additionally, the

Emergency Response Plan contains

provisions for coping with unusual

events such as a dropped fuel assembly.

In order to meet the requirements of

General Design Criterion 63, three area

radiation monitors are provided for

detecting high radiation levels in the

spent fuel pool area, the spent fuel

handling machine, and the new fuel

storage area. At the alarm setpoint of

these monitors, audible and visual

alarms annunciate locally and in the

control room. The output of each

monitor is also recorded in the control

room.

Based upon the information provided,

there is reasonable assurance that

irradiated and unirradiated fuel will

remain subcritical during handling and

storage. The circumstances for granting

an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24 are met

because criticality is precluded with the

present design configuration, Technical
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 144 / Monday, July 28, 1997 / Notices 40389

Specifications requirements,

administrative controls, and the fuel

handling equipment and procedures.

Therefore, the staff has determined that

the Licensee has demonstrated good

cause for the granting of the exemption,

thus the exemption should be granted.

III

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR

70.14, this exemption is authorized by

law, will not endanger life or property

or the common defense and security,

and is otherwise in the public interest.

Therefore, the Commission hereby

grants Baltimore Gas and Electric

Company an exemption as described in

Section II above from 10 CFR 70.24,

‘‘Criticality Accident Requirements’’ for

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit

Nos. 1 and 2.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will have no

significant impact on the quality of the

human environment (61 FR 52959).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day

of July 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97–19802 Filed 7–25–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–U

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–244]

Rochester Gas and Electric

Corporation, R. E. Ginna Nuclear

Power Plant

Exemption

I

The Rochester Gas and Electric

Corporation (the licensee) is the holder

of Facility Operating License No. DPR–

18, which authorizes operation of the R.

E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. The

license provides that the licensee is

subject to all rules, regulations, and

orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC or the Commission)

now or hereafter in effect.

The facility consists of a pressurizedwater reactor at the licensee’s site

located in Wayne County, New York.

II

The Code of Federal Regulations at 10

CFR 70.24, ‘‘Criticality Accident

Requirements,’’ requires that each

licensee authorized to possess special

nuclear material shall maintain a

criticality accident monitoring system in

each area in which such material is

handled, used, or stored. Sections 70.24

a(1) and a(2) specify detection and

sensitivity requirements that these

monitors must meet. Section 70.24 a(1)

also specifies that all areas subject to

criticality accident monitoring must be

covered by two detectors. Section

70.24(a)(3) requires licensees to

maintain emergency procedures for each

area in which this licensed special

nuclear material is handled, used, or

stored and provides (1) that the

procedures ensure that all personnel

withdraw to an area of safety upon the

sounding of a criticality accident

monitor alarm, (2) that the procedures

must include drills to familiarize

personnel with the evacuation plan, and

(3) that the procedures designate

responsible individuals for determining

the cause of the alarm and placement of

radiation survey instruments in

accessible locations for use in such an

emergency. Section 70.24(b)(1) requires

licensees to have a means by which to

quickly identify personnel who have

received a dose of 10 rads or more.

Section 70.24(b)(2) requires licensees to

maintain personnel decontamination

facilities, to maintain arrangements for a

physician and other medical personnel

qualified to handle radiation

emergencies, and to maintain

arrangements for the transportation of

contaminated individuals to treatment

facilities outside the site boundary.

Section 70.24(c) exempts Part 50

licensees from the requirements of 10

CFR 70.24(b) for special nuclear

material used or to be used in the

reactor. Subsection 70.24(d) states that

any licensee who believes that there is

good cause why he should be granted an

exemption from all or part of 10 CFR

70.24 may apply to the Commission for

such an exemption and shall specify the

reasons for the relief requested.

III

The special nuclear material that

could be assembled into a critical mass

at the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

is in the form of nuclear fuel; the

quantity of special nuclear material

other than fuel that is stored on site is

small enough to preclude achieving a

critical mass. The Commission’s

technical staff has evaluated the

possibility of an inadvertent criticality

of the nuclear fuel at the R. E. Ginna

Nuclear Power Plant and has

determined that such an accident is

unlikely to occur if the licensee meets

the following eight criteria:

1. Plant procedures do not permit

more than one PWR fuel assembly or

three BWR fuel assemblies to be in

storage or transit between their

associated shipping cask or storage rack

at one time.

2. The requirement is met that keffective not exceed 0.95, at a 95%

probability, 95% confidence level with

the fresh fuel storage racks filled with

fuel of maximum permissible U–235

enrichment and flooded with pure

water.

3. The requirement is met that keffective not exceed 0.98, at a 95%

probability, 95% confidence level with

the fresh fuel storage racks filled with

fuel at the maximum permissible U–235

enrichment and flooded with moderator

at the (low) density corresponding to

optimum moderation.

4. The requirement is met that keffective not exceed 0.95, at a 95%

probability, 95% confidence level with

the spent fuel storage racks filled with

fuel of the maximum permissible U–235

enrichment and flooded with pure

water.

5. The quantity of forms of special

nuclear material, other than nuclear

fuel, such as sources or detectors, that

are stored onsite in one area, is less than

that necessary for a critical mass.

6. Radiation monitors, as required by

GDC 63, are provided in fuel storage and

handling areas to detect excessive

radiation levels and to initiate

appropriate safety actions.

7. The maximum nominal U–235

enrichment is 5 wt%.

8. Training is provided to the

appropriate personnel for safely

handling fresh fuel.

By letter dated June 5, 1997,

Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation

requested an exemption from 10 CFR

70.24. In this exemption request, the

licensee addressed the eight criteria

given above. The NRC staff has

reviewed the licensee’s submittal and

has determined that the R. E. Ginna

Nuclear Power Plant meets the criteria

for prevention of inadvertent criticality;

therefore, the staff has determined that

an inadvertent criticality is highly

unlikely in special nuclear material

handling or storage areas at the R. E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.

The purpose of the criticality

monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is to

ensure that if a criticality were to occur

during the handling of special nuclear

material, personnel would be alerted to

that fact and would take appropriate

action. Although the staff has

determined that it is highly unlikely

that such an accident could occur, the

licensee has radiation monitors, as

required by General Design Criterion 63

(GDC), in fuel storage and handling

areas. These monitors will alert