GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

NUCLEAR SECURITY

DOE Needs to Address 

Protective Forces’ 

Personnel System 

Issues 

January 2010 

GAO-10-275 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

January 2010

NUCLEAR SECURITY

DOE Needs to Address Protective Forces’ Personnel 

System Issues

Highlights of GAO-10-275, a report to 

congressional committees 

The September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks raised concerns about the 

security of Department of Energy’s 

(DOE) sites with weapons-grade 

nuclear material, known as 

Category I Special Nuclear Material 

(SNM). To better protect these 

sites against attacks, DOE has 

sought to transform its protective 

forces protecting SNM into a 

Tactical Response Force (TRF) 

with training and capabilities 

similar to the U.S. military. DOE 

also has considered whether the 

current system of separate 

contracts for protective forces at 

each site provides sufficiently 

uniform, high-quality performance 

across its sites. 

Section 3124 of PL 110-181, the 

fiscal year 2008 National Defense 

Authorization Act, directed GAO to 

review protective forces at DOE 

sites that possess Category I SNM. 

Among other things, GAO (1) 

analyzed information on the 

management and compensation of 

protective forces, (2) examined the 

implementation of TRF, and (3) 

assessed DOE’s two options to 

more uniformly manage DOE 

protective forces. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Energy develop plans 

to implement the DOE study 

group’s recommendations--and, as 

needed, conduct research--to 

enhance protective forces’ career 

longevity and retirement options. 

DOE generally agreed with the 

report and the recommendations. 

Over 2000 contractor protective forces provide armed security for DOE and 

the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) at six sites that have 

long-term missions to store and process Category I SNM. DOE protective 

forces at each of these sites are covered under separate contracts and 

collective bargaining agreements between contractors and protective force 

unions. As a result, the management and compensation—in terms of pay and 

benefits—of protective forces vary. 

Sites vary in implementing important TRF requirements such as increasing the 

tactical skills of protective forces so that they can better “move, shoot, and 

communicate” as a unit. While one site has focused on implementing TRF 

requirements since 2004, other sites do not plan to complete TRF 

implementation until the end of fiscal year 2011. In addition, broader DOE 

efforts to manage postretirement and pension liabilities for its contractors 

have raised concerns about a negative impact on retirement eligibility and 

benefits for protective forces. Specifically, protective force contractors, 

unions, and DOE security officials are concerned that the implementation of 

TRF’s more rigorous requirements and the current protective forces’ 

personnel systems threaten the ability of protective forces—especially older 

members—to continue their careers until retirement age. 

Efforts to more uniformly manage protective forces have focused on either 

reforming the current contracting approach or creating a federal protective 

force (federalization). Either approach might provide for managing protective 

forces more uniformly and could result in effective security if well-managed. 

Although DOE rejected federalization as an option in 2009 because it believed 

that the transition would be costly and would yield little, if any, increase in 

security effectiveness, the department recognized that the current contracting 

approach could be improved by greater standardization and by addressing 

personnel system issues. As a result, NNSA began a standardization initiative 

to centralize procurement of equipment, uniforms, and weapons to achieve 

cost savings. Under a separate initiative, a DOE study group developed a 

number of recommendations to enhance protective forces’ career longevity 

and retirement options, but DOE has made limited progress to date in 

implementing these recommendations. 

DOE Protective Force Members in Tactical Training

Source: DOE.

View GAO-10-275 or key components.

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-10-275 

Contents 

Letter 1

Scope and Methodology 4 

Background 5 

Protective Forces Are Not Uniformly Managed, Organized, Staffed, 

Trained, Equipped, or Compensated 9 

Tactical Response Force Implementation Varies and Has Raised 

Concerns about the Longevity of Protective Forces Careers 14 

With the Issuance of the Graded Security Protection Policy, Most 

Sites Ceased Efforts to Implement the 2005 Design Basis Threat 18 

Office of Secure Transportation Federal Agents and Protective 

Forces Differ Significantly in Several Respects 19 

Protective Forces and Office of Secure Transportation Federal 

Agents Do Not Routinely Use Their Federal Law Enforcement 

Authority to Make Arrests 22 

Either of the Two Principal Options DOE Has Considered Could 

Result in More Uniform Management of Protective Forces 25 

Conclusion 33 

Recommendation for Executive Action 34 

Agency Comments 35 

Appendix I Recommendations from the Protective Force Career 

Options Initiative Study Group 36 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Energy 40 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 41 

Tables 

Table 1: Characteristics of Sites with Enduring Category I SNM 

Missions 6 

Table 2: Numbers and Categories of Protective Force Members, as 

of September 30, 2008 11 

Table 3: Top Pay by Site, as of September 30, 2008 13 

Table 4: Benefits by Site, as of September 30, 2008 14 

Table 5: Required Qualifications by Protective Force Positions and 

Combatant Standards 16 

 Nuclear Security 
Table 6: Protective Forces and Federal Agents’ Pay Systems 20 

Table 7: Assessment Criteria for Management Options and 

Associated Issues 25 

Figures 

Figure 1: Protective Force Equipment at One DOE Site 12 

Figure 2: Protective Force Constable, SRS 24 

Abbreviations 

DBT Design Basis Threat 

DOE U.S. Department of Energy 

FERS Federal Employee Retirement System 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

GSP Graded Security Protection 

HSS Office of Health, Safety and Security 

INL Idaho National Laboratory 

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory 

M&O Management and Operations 

NE Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 

NTS Nevada Test Site 

OPM Office of Personnel Management 

OST Office of Secure Transportation 

PX Pantex Plant 

SNM special nuclear material 

SO security officer 

SPO security police officer 

SRS Savannah River Site 

TRF Tactical Response Force 

Y-12 Y-12 National Security Complex 

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Page ii GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
Page 1 GAO-10-275 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

January 29, 2010 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Howard McKeon 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Contractor guard forces, or protective forces, are a key component of 

security at Department of Energy (DOE) sites with special nuclear 

material (SNM), which the department considers its highest security risk. 

This material—including plutonium and highly enriched uranium—is 

considered to be Category I when it is weapons grade and in specified 

forms (e.g., nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, metals, and 

oxides) and quantities. The risks associated with Category I SNM include 

theft and the potential for sabotage through the use of a radioactive 

dispersal device, also known as a “dirty bomb.” Currently, DOE and its 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a agency within DOE 

responsible for the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear 

weapons stockpile, has six contractor-operated sites that possess—and 

will possess for the foreseeable future—Category I SNM (sites with 

“enduring” missions). The six sites include the Los Alamos National 

Laboratory, in Los Alamos, New Mexico; the Y-12 National Security 

Complex (Y-12), in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; the Pantex Plant, near Amarillo, 

Texas; the Nevada Test Site, outside of Las Vegas, Nevada; the Savannah 

 Nuclear Security 
River Site, near Aiken, South Carolina; and the Idaho National Laboratory, 

near Idaho Falls, Idaho.1

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOE 

embarked on a multifaceted effort to better secure its sites with Category I 

SNM against a larger and more sophisticated terrorist threat by changing 

policies, such as its Design Basis Threat (DBT)—a classified document 

that specifies the potential size and capabilities of adversary forces that 

the sites must defend against.2

 Protective forces have been an important 

focus of DOE security improvements. Initially, DOE deployed a larger 

number of protective force members at its sites. More recently, DOE has 

sought to improve the effectiveness of its protective forces by deploying 

security technologies, such as sensors capable of detecting adversaries at 

long ranges, and through the use of advanced weaponry, such as belt-fed 

machine guns and grenade launchers. In addition, DOE has sought to 

enhance protective forces’ tactical skills—the ability to move, shoot, and 

communicate in a combat environment—through its Tactical Response 

Force (TRF) initiative.3

 Among other things, this initiative directed the 

development of new training curricula at DOE’s National Training Center, 

revised the application of DOE’s existing protective force categories to 

emphasize tactical skills, and instituted more rigorous weapons and 

physical fitness qualifications for many of DOE’s protective forces. 

However, protective force unions have been concerned that the planned 

implementation of TRF—with its potentially more demanding 

requirements—threatens the ability of protective forces to work until 

 

1

We excluded three other DOE Category I SNM sites from this review because they are 

likely to downsize or downgrade their protective forces in the near future. These sites 

include the Office of Environmental Management’s Hanford Site, near Richland, 

Washington, which recently transferred its highest value Category I SNM off site but will 

maintain lower value Category I SNM for the foreseeable future; NNSA’s Lawrence 

Livermore’s National Laboratory, in Livermore, California, which plans to transfer its 

Category I SNM off site by the end of fiscal year 2012; and the Office of Science’s Oak Ridge 

National Laboratory, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which plans to dispose of its Category I 

SNM by the end of fiscal year 2015. 

2

In 2008, DOE changed the name of its DBT (DOE Order 470.3A) to the Graded Security 

Protection policy (DOE 470.3B). 

3

DOE announced this initiative, originally known as “Elite Force” initiative in 2004, and 

began to formalize it into policy through the issuance of DOE Manual 470.4-3, Protective 

Force, in 2005. DOE revised this policy in 2006 with DOE Manual 470.4-3 Change 1, 

Protective Force. In 2008, DOE further revised this policy, which is now contained in DOE 

Manual 470.4-3A, Contractor Protective Force. 

Page 2 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
retirement age. These concerns contributed to a 44-day protective force 

strike at the Pantex Plant in 2007. The strike raised broader issues in DOE 

and Congress about the continued suitability of DOE’s model for managing 

its protective forces. Unionized protective forces can strike when their 

collective bargaining agreement ends and strikes may create security 

vulnerabilities at DOE’s sites with Category I SNM. In addition, DOE’s 

practice of managing its protective forces through separate contracts at 

each site could create disparities in protective force performance, pay, and 

benefits. A coalition of unions that represent a large number of DOE 

protective forces has supported federalizing contractor-operated 

protective forces to provide a federal personnel system that better 

supports a TRF through standardized pay and retirement benefits. The 

coalition noted that DOE’s Office of Secure Transportation’s (OST) federal 

agents, who are responsible for transporting Category I SNM among DOE 

sites and to military bases and who have a unique federal job 

classification, could serve as a template for federalization. In January 2009, 

DOE rejected federalization of contractor protective forces on the grounds 

that it would be costly and would likely provide little, if any, increase in 

security effectiveness. However, a DOE study group, composed of DOE 

and union representatives, recently made a number of recommendations 

that, while maintaining contractor protective forces, may better balance 

protective forces’ concerns over their careers with the need to provide 

effective security and control costs. 

In this context, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008 directed us to report on the management of DOE’s protective forces 

at its sites with Category I SNM.4

 As agreed with your offices, we (1) 

analyzed information on DOE’s protective forces, including their contract 

and management structures, responsibilities, number and categories, 

training, pay, and benefits; (2) examined the implementation of TRF and 

any resulting issues; (3) assessed compliance with the 2005 DBT; (4) 

compared relevant characteristics of contractor protective forces with 

OST federal agents; (5) reviewed law enforcement duties and capabilities 

of protective forces and OST federal agents; and (6) assessed DOE’s 

options for more uniformly managing protective forces. The act also 

required DOE to submit a report on the management of its protective 

forces 90 days after our report is issued. 

 

4

Pub. L. No. 110-181 § 3124 (2008). 

Page 3 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
To obtain information on DOE’s contractor protective forces, we visited 

three of the sites with enduring Category I SNM missions—Pantex, the 

Savannah River Site, and Los Alamos National Laboratory—and met with 

protective force contractors, federal site office officials, and protective 

force union representatives at these sites. We selected these sites because 

each represented one of the three different types of protective force 

contracts currently in place. In addition, we distributed a data collection 

instrument to protective force contractors and federal site office officials 

at each of these sites and at the other three sites with enduring Category I 

SNM missions—Y-12, the Nevada Test Site, and the Idaho National 

Laboratory. From this instrument, we received site information about the 

protective forces, the status of TRF and DBT implementations, views on 

DOE options for managing the protective forces, and the reliability of site 

data. We conducted interviews and reviewed documents with NNSA and 

DOE’s offices of Environmental Management (EM); Nuclear Energy (NE); 

Science. We also met with several organizations within DOE’s Office of 

Health, Safety and Security (HSS), including the Office of Policy; the Office 

of Independent Oversight, which regularly performs inspections at 

Category I SNM sites; and the National Training Center, in Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, which is responsible for developing protective force training 

curricula and certifying site protective force training instructors and 

programs. To obtain comparative information on OST and its federal 

agents, we reviewed documents and met with officials from OST 

headquarters in Albuquerque, New Mexico. All data collected to describe 

contractor protective forces and OST federal agents were current as of 

September 30, 2008. To identify and assess options for the more uniform 

protective force management through federalization, we met with the 

NNSA Service Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico,5

 and the Office of 

Personnel Management (OPM) on cost and job classification of protective 

forces. We developed criteria for options for more uniform management 

by reviewing past and ongoing DOE protective force and federal agent 

studies that HSS, NNSA, and OST provided. We also reviewed documents 

and met with officials from the National Council of Security Police, which 

is a coalition of unions that represent many of the protective forces at 

DOE’s Category I SNM sites. 

Scope and 

Methodology 

We conducted our work from April 2008 to January 2010 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards, which require us 

 

5

NNSA’s Service Center provides business, technical, financial, legal, human resources, and 

management support to NNSA site organizations. 

Page 4 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
to plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. 

DOE’s HSS, which is the department’s central security organization, is 

responsible for developing the department’s security policies and 

overseeing their implementation. Specifically, HSS’s Office of Policy 

develops and promulgates orders and policies such as the DBT policy, as 

well as manuals such as Manual 470.4-3A, Contractor Protective Forces, 

which details protective force’s duties and requirements. Other DOE 

organizations with diverse program missions—EM, NE, and NNSA—are 

responsible for the six DOE sites in our review with enduring Category I 

SNM missions.6

 In accordance with DOE policy, EM, NE, and NNSA must 

ensure that each of their sites has a safeguards and security program with 

the necessary protections to protect security interests against malevolent 

acts such as theft, diversion, sabotage, modification, compromise, or 

unauthorized access to nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, 

special nuclear material, or classified information. Each of these DOE 

organizations has site offices staffed by federal employees located at or 

near each site to oversee day-to-day operations, including security. 

Background 

The management and operations (M&O) contractors that manage the six 

sites we reviewed must develop effective programs to address DOE 

security requirements. In particular, each site with Category I SNM must 

prepare a Site Safeguards and Security Plan, which is a classified 

document that identifies known vulnerabilities, risks, and protection 

strategies for the site. The site’s protection measures are developed in 

response to site-specific vulnerability assessments and become the basis 

for executing and reviewing protection programs. Table 1 highlights some 

of the site differences in mission, topography, and size that may dictate the 

site-specific protection measures, including the protective forces’ size and 

equipment. 

 

6

NNSA is primarily responsible for ensuring the continued safety and reliability of nuclear 

weapons; EM is responsible for cleaning up former nuclear weapons sites; and NE is 

primarily responsible for nuclear energy research. 

Page 5 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
Table 1: Characteristics of Sites with Enduring Category I SNM Missions 

Pantex Plant 

Y-12 National 

Security 

Complex 

Los Alamos 

National 

Laboratory 

Nevada Test 

Site 

Savannah River 

Site 

Idaho National 

Laboratory 

Primary mission 

(related to SNM) 

Assembles and 

dismantles 

nuclear weapons 

and stores SNM 

in the form of 

weapons and 

surplus plutonium 

pits 

Manufactures 

highly enriched 

uranium 

components for 

nuclear weapons 

Conducts 

research, design, 

and development 

of nuclear 

weapons; 

manufactures 

plutonium pits 

Maintains the 

capability to 

conduct 

underground 

nuclear testing 

and other 

Category I 

missions 

Maintains Cat I/II 

quantities of 

SNM associated 

with DOE 

activities 

Engaged in 

research and 

development of 

nuclear reactor 

technologies and 

nuclear fuels 

Topography Relatively flat 

plateau 

Hilly and heavily 

vegetated terrain 

Sloping plateau 

with canyons 

and mesas 

Dry lake beds 

and mountains 

Gently rolling 

forested hills with 

a swamp and 

many streams 

Rolling arid 

terrain 

Size of site area 

(square miles) 

25 1 36 1350 310 890 

Size of protected 

area where SNM 

is stored (acres) 

389 154 45 17 16 9 

Approximate 

number of site 

employees 

3,800 4,440 15,000 5,500 14,430 6,800 

Source: DOE. 

Protective forces are one of the key elements in DOE sites’ layered 

“defense-in-depth” protective systems. Specific elements vary from site to 

site but almost always include, in addition to protective forces, 

• a variety of integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting intruders; 

• physical barriers, such as fences and antivehicle barriers; 

• numerous access control points, such as turnstiles, badge readers, vehicle 

inspection stations, radiation detectors, and metal detectors; 

• operational security procedures, such as the “two-person” rule—which is 

designed to prevent only one person from having access to SNM ; and 

• hardened facilities and storage vaults to protect SNM from unauthorized 

access. 

Increasing security at DOE sites since the terrorist attacks of September 

11, 2001, has been costly and challenging. The complexwide funding for 

Page 6 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
protective forces and physical security systems rose almost 60 percent (in 

constant dollars) from fiscal years 2001 through 2008, to $862 million. 

Protective forces—the single most costly element of DOE security, as well 

as one of the most important7

 —have been a major focus of DOE security 

efforts. The need to increase security at DOE sites as rapidly as possible 

following the 2001 attacks meant that DOE protective forces worked large 

amounts of overtime for an extended period. DOE’s Inspector General and 

Office of Independent Oversight, as well as GAO, reported on the potential 

for extended overtime to increase fatigue and reduce readiness, and 

training opportunities for protective forces.8

 Since then, DOE has sought 

to control protective force costs by increasing the use of security 

technology and advanced weaponry and by consolidating material into 

fewer and better protected locations. 

Since September 11, 2001, DOE security policies, including the DBT, have 

been under almost constant examination and have undergone 

considerable change. For example, DOE issued new DBTs in 2003, 2004, 

and 2005, and, most recently, in November 2008. In its latest iteration, the 

DBT was renamed the Graded Security Protection (GSP) policy. The GSP 

is conceptually identical to DOE’s previous DBTs. However, compared 

with the 2005 DBT, the GSP identifies a generally smaller and less capable 

terrorist adversary force for DOE sites with Category I SNM. 

DOE has also sought to increase the tactical effectiveness of protective 

force performance. Specifically, according to a 2004 classified DOE 

review, the then-current organization and tactics of DOE protective forces 

needed improvement to deal with possible terrorist threats. The review 

found that, historically, DOE protective forces had been more concerned 

with a broad range of industrial security and order-keeping functions than 

with preparing to conduct a defensive battle against a paramilitary 

attacker, as described in DOE’s previous DBTs and GSP. To address this 

situation, the review recommended shifting to an aggressive militarylike, 

 

7

According to DOE’s fiscal year 2010 budget request, protective forces accounted for 

slightly more than 50 percent of its field-site security funding in fiscal year 2008. 

8

DOE Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: Management of the Department’s 

Protective Forces, DOE/IG-0602, (Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2003); DOE Office of Security 

and Safety Performance Assurance (now known as the Office of Health, Safety and 

Security), Department of Energy Protective Force Management and Capabilities (a 

classified report), (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004); and GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE 

Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat. 

GAO-04-623 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2004). 

Page 7 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
small-unit, tactical defense posture, which included enhanced tactical 

training standards to allow protective forces to move, shoot, and 

communicate effectively as a unit in a combat environment. It also 

recommended more frequent, realistic, and rigorous force-on-force 

performance testing and training for the department’s protective forces. 

On the basis of this review, DOE has sought to transform DOE’s protective 

forces who safeguard special nuclear material into an “elite force”—a 

TRF—with training and capabilities similar to military units. To create 

TRFs at Category I SNM sites, in 2005 DOE’s policy for protective forces 

clarified which positions required more demanding physical fitness and 

firearms qualification standards, increased tactical training, and 

reorganized protective forces into tactically cohesive units. 

Although DOE and NNSA considered federalizing the contractor 

protective forces to better support the TRF, the department’s reviews of 

this issue predate its post September 11, 2001, concerns. Since the early 

1990s, the department has intermittently considered federalization 

because of variety of security challenges, often involving actual or 

potential strikes by contractor protective forces: 

• A 1992 DOE review concluded there was no clear evidence that 

federalization of protective forces would significantly save costs or 

improve security. DOE reviewed the issue of federalization in response to 

a 1990 GAO report that examined a protective force strike at Los Alamos 

National Laboratory in 1989.9

• A 1997 DOE report raised concerns about the potential deterioration of an 

aging protective force’s physical and combat capabilities; the increasing 

difficulties in meeting the sudden demand for additional personnel in the 

event of a strike; and cost pressures, such as more overtime pay after the 

department had downsized the protective forces. The report considered 

federalization as a solution but recommended other options using existing 

contractor protective forces. 

• A 2004 DOE study group, examining ways to strengthen DOE’s security 

posture after September 11, 2001, recommended federalization to better 

support tactical forces and to promote uniform, high-quality security 

across sites, but the department did not implement the recommendation. 

 

9

GAO, Nuclear Safety: Potential Security Weaknesses at Los Alamos and Other DOE 

Facilities, GAO/RCED-9l-12 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 11, l990). 

Page 8 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
• Two 2008 NNSA studies, which followed the 2007 strike at the Pantex 

Plant, compared contractor and federalized options for improving 

protective forces, but these studies did not make any firm 

recommendations. 

• In 2009, partly in response to a union coalition calling for federalization, 

NNSA and DOE’s HSS started protective force initiatives to address some 

of the goals that federalization was meant to accomplish, such as 

improving efficiency and effectiveness. 

Contractor protective forces—including 2,339 unionized officers and their 

376 nonunionized supervisors—are not uniformly managed, organized, 

staffed, trained, equipped, or compensated across the six DOE sites. These 

differences occur because protective forces operate under separate 

contracts and collective bargaining agreements at each site and because of 

DOE’s long-standing contracting approach of defining desired outcomes 

instead of detailed, prescriptive guidance on how to achieve those 

outcomes.10 As we have previously reported, DOE’s contract model may 

allow security to be closely tailored to site- and mission-specific needs.11

Protective Forces Are 

Not Uniformly 

Managed, Organized, 

Staffed, Trained, 

Equipped, or 

Compensated 

Management and 

Organization Vary by 

Contract 

As of September 30, 2008, protective forces at the six sites we reviewed 

operated under the following three separate types of contracts: 

• Direct contract with DOE. At Y-12, Nevada Test Site (NTS), and Savannah 

River Site (SRS), NNSA and DOE contract directly with private firms to 

provide protective forces. These contracts are separate from NNSA’s and 

DOE’s contracts with the site M&O contractors. Protective force managers 

report to officials from federal site offices. To coordinate site operations 

and protective force operations, managers from the M&O contractors meet 

regularly to discuss issues with managers from the protective force and 

site office. 

 

10DOE Order 251.1C, Departmental Directives Program specifies that DOE directives 

should focus on results by specifying the goals and requirements that must be met and to 

the extent possible, refraining from mandating how to fulfill the goals and requirements. 

11Our recent review showed that DOE’s policy for nuclear weapons security provides local 

officials greater flexibility than the Department of Defense’s policy for determining how to 

best meet security standards and has a greater emphasis on cost-benefit analysis as a part 

of the decision-making process. See GAO, Homeland Defense: Greater Focus on Analysis 

of Alternatives and Threats Needed to Improve DOD’s Strategic Nuclear Weapons 

Security, GAO-09-828 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2009). 

Page 9 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
• Within the M&O contract. For two sites, Pantex Plant (PX) and Idaho 

National Laboratory (INL), the M&O contractors provide the protective 

forces. The M&O contractor directly manages the protective forces, and 

DOE’s or NNSA’s site office oversees the protective force operations as 

part of the overall M&O contract. 

• Subcontract to the M&O contractor: At Los Alamos National Laboratory 

(LANL), the M&O contractor subcontracts the protective force operations. 

The protective force manager reports to and is overseen by the M&O 

contractor. Since NNSA has no direct contractual relationship with the 

protective force manager, NNSA site office managers coordinate oversight 

direction through the M&O contractor. 

Protective force contractors at the six DOE sites have a management and 

support structure that includes training and physical fitness, human 

relations, legal and contract services, and procurement. Each protective 

force also has uniformed supervisors who are not part of the protective 

forces’ collective bargaining agreements. The duties, responsibilities, and 

ranks of these supervisors are generally site specific and not detailed in 

DOE’s protective force policies. 

Protective Forces Differ in 

Number and Composition 

According to DOE’s 2008 policy in Manual 470.4-3A, Contractor Protective 

Force, protective forces are composed of unarmed and armed positions. 

Security Officers (SO) are responsible for certain unarmed security duties, 

such as checking for valid security badges at entrances and escorting 

visitors. Security Police Officers (SPO), who are armed, are divided into 

three main categories: 

• SPO-I: Primary responsibility is protecting fixed posts during combat. 

• SPO-II: Primary responsibility is mobile combat to prevent terrorists from 

reaching their target but can also be assigned to fixed posts. 

• SPO-III: Primary responsibilities are mobile combat and special response 

skills, such as those needed to recapture SNM (on site) and recover SNM 

(off site) if terrorists succeed in acquiring it. SPO-IIIs are usually organized 

into special response teams. 

As shown in table 2, the number of personnel and composition of 

protective forces vary considerably across sites. It should be noted that 

three sites—INL, LANL, and NTS—had few or no SPO-Is as of September 

30, 2008. At that time, not all sites had incorporated this position into their 

Page 10 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
collective bargaining agreements. In the interim, some SPO-IIs were 

performing the SPO-I-type duties at these sites.12

Table 2: Numbers and Categories of Protective Force Members, as of September 30, 

2008 

 PX Y-12 LANL NTS SRS INL Total

SO 1 5 45 0 33 26 110

SPO-I 285 301 0 7 209 0 802

SPO-II 180 72 189 177 149 139 906

SPO-III 67 89 92 50 99 50 447

Other protective force positionsa0 42 24 0 0 8 74

Total 533 509 350 234 490 223 2339

Source: DOE. 

a

Protective forces may include additional unionized positions, such as trainers, and alarm operators. 

At some sites, personnel in such positions may be SPO qualified, and their positions are counted in 

the appropriate SPO categories. 

Training and Equipment 

Vary 

DOE policy mandates certain protective force training but allows sites 

some flexibility in its implementation. For example, DOE Manual 470.4-3A 

requires newly hired protective forces to complete the Basic Security 

Police Officer Training course that the sites tailor to meet their specific 

needs. The site-specific courses range in length from 9 to 16 weeks. Other 

required training includes annual refresher training in a wide variety of 

topics; tactical exercises, including force-on-force exercises; physical 

fitness training; and firearms training. The content and frequency of this 

training varies by site and, to some extent, by type of protective forces, 

with SPO-IIIs generally receiving more training than other protective 

forces because of their special response mission. To ensure some degree 

of equivalency, DOE’s National Training Center assesses sites’ training 

plans and, while most sites perform their own training, the National 

Training Center certifies instructors. 

Some training requirements are driven by the type of protective force 

equipment, such as firearms and vehicles, that are used at each site. The 

primary protective force weapon at most sites is the M4 rifle, a weapon 

 

12According to NNSA security officials, by September 30, 2009, LANL had converted all of 

its SPO-II positions to SPO-I positions, and NTS had converted almost half of its SPO-II 

positions to SPO-I positions. 

Page 11 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
that is widely used in the U.S. military. Other weapons, such as belt-fed 

machine guns, are generally versions of the M240 and M249 family, also 

widely used in the U.S. military. However, sites have variously adopted 

other equipment, including the following: 

• three models of handguns with two different calibers of ammunition; 

• four types of grenade launchers, although all use 40mm grenades; 

• several types of precision rifles, capable of accurate long range fire, in 

three different calibers; and 

• several different armored vehicles, but older vehicles are being replaced 

by a single type of vehicle across the six sites. 

Figure 1: Protective Force Equipment at One DOE Site 

Source: DOE.

Page 12 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
Pay and Benefits Vary Pay varies for protective forces, based on the site and the category of 

protective forces. Table 3 shows that top pay, as negotiated in collective 

bargaining agreements at each site, ranged from nearly $19 per hour to 

over $26 per hour. SOs received the lowest hourly pay, and SPO-IIIs 

received the highest. Overtime pay, accrued in different ways at the sites, 

and other premium pay, such as additional pay for night shifts and 

holidays, may significantly increase protective force pay. 

Table 3: Top Pay by Site, as of September 30, 2008 

DOE site PX Y-12 LANL NTS SRS INL

Top hourly paya

SO $22.00 $19.83 $22.74 $22.42 $18.81 $20.64

SPO-I 22.90 23.13 Not availableb 23.41 22.69 Not availableb

SPO-II 23.43 23.65 25.14 24.44 24.84 22.64

SPO-III $24.44 $24.17 $26.11 $25.77 $25.92 $23.64

Typical shift 12 hours 

for 4 days 

12 hours 

for 4 days

8 hours 

for 5 days

12 hours 

for 4 days

12 hours 

for 4 days

12 hours 

for 4 days

Overtime rule for typical shift 

After 8 hours per day Yes No Yes Yes No No

After 40 hours per week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Source: GAO analysis of collective bargaining agreements. 

a

Cited pay is for nonspecialists within a position. Specialists, such as dog handlers, may be eligible for 

different hourly pay. 

b

As of September 30, 2008, pay rates for SPO-Is had not been negotiated into the collective 

bargaining agreement. 

Table 4 shows the types of benefits by site. While all employers 

contributed to active protective force members’ medical, dental, and life 

insurance benefits, they differed in the amount of their contributions and 

in the retirement benefits they offered. In general, new hires were offered 

defined contribution plans, such as a 401(k) plan, that provides eventual 

retirement benefits that depend on the amount of contributions by the 

employer or employee, as appropriate, as well as the earnings and losses 

of the invested funds. At the time of our review, two sites offered new 

hires defined benefit plans that promised retirees a certain monthly 

payment at retirement. Two other sites had defined benefit plans that 

covered protective force members hired before a particular date but were 

not open to new hires. A coalition of unions has expressed its preference 

for defined benefit plans. 

Page 13 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
Table 4: Benefits by Site, as of September 30, 2008 

DOE site PX SRS LANL NTS INL Y-12 

Employer contributes to medical, 

dental, and basic life insurance 

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 

Retirement plan 

Defined contribution 401(k) 401(k) Plan1: Money 

Purchase Plana

Plan 2: 401(k) 

401(k) 401(k) 401(k) 

Employer contributes Yes Yes Plan 1: Yes 

Plan 2: No 

No Yes Yes 

Defined benefit open to new hires 

Defined benefit closed to new hires 

but open to hires before a certain date 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yesb

Nob

No 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Medical insurance for eligible retirees 

Employer contributes to premiums for 

eligible retirees 

Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 

Source: GAO analysis of collective bargaining agreements. 

a

A money purchase pension plan requires the employer to put a fixed annual contribution into an 

employee’s individual account. 

b

The NTS defined benefit plan was open to new hires in 2008 but closed to new hires after the 2009 

collective bargaining negotiations. 

Sites are at different stages in the implementation of TRF requirements. 

However, TRF implementation, coupled with broader DOE efforts to limit 

postretirement and pension liabilities, has raised concerns with DOE 

security officials, protective force contractors, and protective force unions 

about the longevity of protective forces’ careers and the adequacy of their 

personnel systems. 

Tactical Response 

Force Implementation 

Varies and Has Raised 

Concerns about the 

Longevity of 

Protective Forces 

Careers 

TRF Implementation 

Varies 

DOE has identified the following important TRF requirements for 

protective forces: 

• Improved tactical skills, so that protective forces “move, shoot, and 

communicate” as a unit. To better facilitate tactical training to meet a 

sophisticated terrorist attack, TRF calls for the development and 

implementation of TRF training curricula as well as the creation of 

Page 14 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
training relief elements or shifts to allow protective forces to participate in 

unit-level training. 

• Revised application of DOE’s offensive and defensive combatant 

standards for protective forces. DOE’s offensive combatant standard is 

more demanding than its defensive combatant standard.13 Nevertheless, 

prior to TRF, SPO-IIs hired before 2000 were allowed to meet DOE’s less 

demanding defensive combatant standard but could retain their SPO-II 

designation and fill some offensive combatant positions. TRF policy 

eliminated this approach, known as “grandfathering,” and restricted 

protective force members who meet only defensive combatant standards 

to serve as SPO-Is. That is, SPO-IIs that did not meet offensive combatant 

standards would be moved into SPO-I positions. 

• Career longevity plans to assist with the shift to the new application of 

offensive and defensive combatant standards. TRF mandates that all 

newly hired protective forces meet DOE’s more demanding offensive 

combatant standard as SPO-IIs. Protective force members may advance to 

the SPO-III level, which requires qualifying at a higher level of firearms 

proficiency. However, under TRF policy, the forces who cannot maintain 

their current standards—perhaps as their years of service accumulate and 

they age—may “fall back” by applying for open protective force positions 

with less demanding standards. For example, protective forces may move 

from meeting offensive combatant standards to defensive combatant 

standards or unarmed SO positions, although they may lose pay with each 

“fall back.” 

Table 5 summarizes the physical fitness, firearms and medical 

qualifications protective forces must pass for DOE’s combatant standards. 

 

13DOE’s combatant standards are defined by physical fitness, firearms, and medical 

qualifications. 

Page 15 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
Table 5: Required Qualifications by Protective Force Positions and Combatant Standards 

DOE combatant 

standard 

Annual physical fitness 

qualification 

Semiannual firearms 

qualifications Medical qualifications 

SO Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Numerous medical conditions 

may result in disqualification for 

service 

SPO-I Defensive standard Run one-half mile in 4 

minutes, 40 seconds; and 

prone to 40-yard dash in 

8.5 seconds. 

Proficiency on several 

required day and night 

courses for each weapon 

carried on duty. 

SPO-II Offensive standard Run 1 mile in 8 minutes, 

30 seconds; and prone to 

40-yard dash in 8 

seconds. 

SPO-III Offensive standard Must demonstrate higher 

day and night proficiency on 

duty weapons and may have 

to qualify on a wider variety 

of weapons. 

Sources: DOE 473.4-3A and 10 C.F.R. 1046. 

One site we visited had implemented most of TRF’s key elements. Since 

2005, this site has constructed new training facilities, implemented a 

training cadre that allows unit-sized tactical training, increased the amount 

of tactical training its protective forces receive, and integrated protective 

force plans with other security elements and response plans. 

As of September 30, 2008, three sites were still using an older job 

classification of SPO-II (that is, allowing a defensive combat standard, 

rather than the offensive combatant standard), which is not a TRF 

classification. In addition, while some sites have created unarmed security 

officer positions to provide fallback positions for protective forces that 

can no longer meet DOE’s defensive combat standard, there are relatively 

few unarmed positions (110—less than 5 percent—of the protective forces 

at the sites we reviewed), and some of these positions, according to a 

protective force contract official and a union representative, were 

eliminated for budgetary reasons. 

We also found that TRF training was not uniform across the six sites: 

• DOE’s National Training Center piloted a more tactically oriented basic 

training course (Tactical Response Force - 1) at one site in 2008, but 

according to a National Training Center official, this class will not replace 

Page 16 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
its existing multiweek Basic Security Police Officer Training course for 

newly hired SPO-IIs until later in 2010. 

• All sites have increased the amount of tactical training for protective 

forces but have been separately developing courses and training facilities. 

• Some sites had purchased and deployed advanced weapons but had not 

adequately trained their protective forces to use these weapons and had 

not integrated these weapons into their response plans, according to 

DOE’s Inspector General and DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight. In 

2007, DOE’s Inspector General reported that one site’s training program 

for the use of a weapon that was key to the site’s security strategy did not 

provide protective forces with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to 

perform assigned tasks.14 A follow-up inspection in 2008 found similar 

problems at several other sites.15

• According to a NNSA official, NNSA sites did not receive dedicated TRF 

training funds until fiscal year 2009. Also, according to NNSA’s fiscal year 

2010 budget submission, NNSA does not expect its sites to complete TRF 

activities until the end of fiscal year 2011. 

TRF Implementation Has 

Raised Concerns 

Since its inception in 2005, TRF has raised concerns in DOE security 

organizations, among protective force contractors, and in protective force 

unions about the ability of protective forces—especially older individuals 

serving in protective forces—to continue meeting DOE’s weapons, 

physical fitness, and medical qualifications. As we reported in 2005,16 some 

site security officials recognized they will have to carefully craft transition 

plans for currently employed protective force officers who may not be 

able to meet the new standards required for an elite force, which is now 

known as TRF. Adding to these concerns are DOE’s broader efforts to 

manage its long-term postretirement and pension liabilities for its 

contractors, which could have a negative impact on retirement eligibility 

 

14DOE Office of Inspector General, Protective Force MK-19 Grenade Launcher Use at the 

National Nuclear Security Administration’s Pantex Facility, DOE/IG-0770 (Washington, 

D.C., July 2007). 

15DOE Office of Inspector General, 40 MM Grenade Launcher Qualification Requirements 

at Department of Energy Sites, DOE/IG-0806 (Washington, D.C., November 2008). 

16GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE’s Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and 

Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis 

Threat, GAO-05-611 (Washington, D.C., July 15, 2009). 

Page 17 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
and benefits for protective forces. In 2006, DOE issued its Contractor 

Pension and Medical Benefits Policy (Notice 351.1), which was designed 

to limit DOE’s long-term pension and postretirement liabilities.17 A 

coalition of protective force unions stated that this policy moved them in 

the opposite direction from their desire for early and enhanced retirement 

benefits. 

These concerns contributed to the 44-day protective force strike at the 

Pantex Plant in 2007. Initially the site designated all of its protective force 

positions as offensive positions, a move that could have disqualified a 

potentially sizable number of protective forces from duty. Under the 

collective bargaining agreement that was eventually negotiated in 2007, 

some protective forces are allowed to meet the less demanding defensive 

combat standards. DOE has also rescinded its 2006 Contractor Pension 

and Medical Benefits Policy. However, according to protective force union 

officials, tensions over TRF implementation and retirement benefits 

remain driving forces behind protective force unions’ drive to federalize. 

With the issuance of the new GSP policy in August 2008, most sites ceased 

2005 DBT implementation efforts.18 However, unlike its practice with 

previous DBTs, DOE did not establish a deadline for GSP implementation. 

While sites study GSP requirements and develop implementation plans, the 

GSP directs that they continue to meet the requirements of the 2003 DBT. 

Under the 2003 DBT, most DOE sites are required to maintain denial 

protection strategies for Category I SNM. Under these strategies, DOE 

requires that adversaries be denied “hands-on” access to nuclear weapons 

and nuclear test devices at fixed sites, as well as all Category I SNM in 

transit. For other Category I SNM at fixed sites, DOE requires that 

adversaries be prevented from having enough time to complete malevolent 

acts. If adversaries gain access to Category I SNM, DOE requires that 

protective forces engage in recapturing the SNM on site or recovering the 

material if it leaves the site. As required by the Fiscal Year 2006 National 

With the Issuance of 

the Graded Security 

Protection Policy, 

Most Sites Ceased 

Efforts to Implement 

the 2005 Design Basis 

Threat 

 

17GAO, Department of Energy: Information on Its Management of Costs and Liabilities 

for Contractors’ Pension and Postretirement Benefit Plans, GAO-08-642R (Washington, 

D.C.: June 19, 2008). 

18One DOE site completed 2005 DBT implementation efforts on schedule and approved a 

Site Safeguards and Security Plan for the 2005 DBT. 

Page 18 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
Defense Authorization Act,19 DOE reported to Congress in 2007 that all its 

sites could meet the 2003 DBT. 

To verify the information DOE reported, we examined whether the sites 

had approved Site Safeguards and Security Plans and whether they had 

undergone an Office of Independent Oversight Inspection to test those 

plans. We found that all sites (except for the one DOE site that had 

implemented the 2005 DBT) had approved Site Safeguards and Security 

plans for the 2003 DBT, and almost all had undergone inspections by the 

Office of Independent Oversight to test those plans. In most cases, 

protective forces performed effectively in these inspections. However, in a 

2008 inspection, one site’s protective forces received a “needs 

improvement” rating—that is, it only partially met identified protection 

needs or provided questionable assurance that identified protection needs 

were met. 

Although they are both responsible for protecting SNM, OST federal 

agents substantially differ from site protective forces in terms of numbers, 

organization, management, pay, benefits, mission, and training: 

• OST forces totaled 363 as of September 30, 2008, or less than one-seventh 

the total number of protective forces members at DOE sites with enduring 

Category I missions. 

• OST forces are geographically dispersed, but unlike protective forces, 

management is centralized. OST operations are organized into three 

commands, which are collocated at two DOE sites and a Department of 

Defense military base. These commands report to a central command in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, which is under a single organization, NNSA. In 

contrast, the protective forces at six sites have decentralized management 

and are overseen by one of three DOE organizations. 

Office of Secure 

Transportation 

Federal Agents and 

Protective Forces 

Differ Significantly in 

Several Respects 

• Federal managers directly operate the OST organization and supervise 

federal agents. 

Unlike protective forces, OST federal agents cannot collectively bargain 

and are covered by a single pay system.20 Effective in March 2008, the 

 

19Pub. L. No. 109-163 § 3113 (2006). 

Page 19 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
NNSA’s Pay Band Demonstration is a pay system for most NNSA federal 

employees—including OST federal agents.21 Table 6 shows the differences 

between the protective forces’ many negotiated pay rates and the 

nonsupervisory federal agents’ single pay band, which is linked to federal 

pay grades that are established governmentwide. 

Table 6: Protective Forces and Federal Agents’ Pay Systems 

Protective forces Nonsupervisory OST federal agents 

Basis for pay 

provisions 

Collective bargaining agreements with various contractors 2008 NNSA pay band demonstration 

Type of pay Hourly rates Salary 

Range of base pay 

rates 

Lowest pay rates Highest pay rates $19.54 to 30.90/houra

SPO-I $15.00-22.90/hour $22.69-23.41/hour 

SPO-II: $15.00-22.90/hour $22.64-25.14/hour 

SPO-III $17.53-25.77/hour $23.64-26.11/hour 

Overtime pay rate Generally 1.5 times base rate 1 times base rate plus 0.5 times regular 

rateb

Sources: Collective bargaining agreements and NNSA. 

a

These hourly rates are derived from the annual salary range (the pay grades of GS-8, step 1 through 

GS-10, step 10) for OST federal agents in NNSA’s Pay Band 1, a range that was at $40,779 to 

$64,482 at the end of fiscal year 2008. 

b

A regular rate is potentially greater than a base rate, because it is calculated on total remuneration 

that reflects the base rate plus applicable premium pays, if any, such as a night shift premium. 

In addition, while OST’s pay system is designed for more flexible pay, 

protective forces’ pay rules generally do not provide for any variation in a 

position’s pay rate after a few years of service. Specifically, OST agents’ 

pay rates can vary more when they are hired and in later years because the 

NNSA pay system is designed to give OST managers more flexibility to 

offer exceptional candidates higher entry salaries and to provide faster or 

slower annual pay progression, depending on individual performance. In 

 

205 U.S.C. § 7103(b). Exec. Order No. 12171, 44 FR 66565, (1979), recently amended by 

Exec. Order No. 13480, 73 Fed. Reg. 73991 (2008), provides that NNSA’s federal workers 

cannot be represented by unions. 

21The NNSA Pay Band Demonstration establishes a pay framework by creating a career 

path and pay bands for OST federal agent positions as well as the rules for pay for 

performance. In addition, the pay system for OST federal agents must conform to other 

relevant legal and regulatory requirements and agency rules and procedures covering, for 

example, premium pay for overtime, holiday worked, Sunday worked and night work. In 

contrast, aspects of such premium pay could be variously negotiated for contractor 

protective forces. 

Page 20 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
contrast, fixed pay rules allow a contracted SPO to start at the top pay rate 

or to reach or closely approximate it after only about 1 to 3 years of 

service. However, as table 6 shows, both protective forces and federal 

agents receive significantly higher pay for overtime hours. 

Concerning benefits, OST federal agents generally receive those that are 

broadly available to other federal employees, such as through the Federal 

Employee Health Benefit program and the Federal Employee Retirement 

System (FERS), which has a defined benefit component and a defined 

contribution component. In contrast, at each site, protective force unions 

negotiate for benefits such as medical insurance and retirement plans, and 

new hires in protective forces generally do not receive defined benefits for 

retirement. In addition, in 1998, Congress made OST federal agents eligible 

to retire earlier (at age 50 after 20 years of service) with a higher monthly 

retirement annuity (defined benefit) than is typical for other federal 

employees.22 This early retirement provision contrasts with the provisions 

for the two defined benefit plans open to new protective force hires as of 

September 2008, which provides for retirement with more years served or 

at older ages. 

OST federal agents’ mobile mission also differs significantly from that of 

protective forces that guard fixed sites. OST agents operate convoys of 

special tractor trailers and special escort vehicles to transport Category I 

SNM. These agents travel on U.S. highways that cross multiple federal, 

state, tribal, and local law enforcement jurisdictions. They also travel as 

many as 15 days each month. Agents may also provide security for 

weapons components that are flown on OST’s small fleet of aircraft. In 

contrast to the public setting of agents’ work, protective forces that guard 

Category I SNM at fixed sites typically have elaborate physical defenses 

and tightly restricted and monitored public access. 

Finally, the training for OST federal agents and protective forces differs. 

Although both OST and protective force contractors must comply with 

DOE orders and regulations when developing and executing training, OST 

agents undergo longer, more frequent, and more diverse training than do 

most protective forces. For example, newly hired OST trainees undergo 

longer basic training, lasting 21 weeks at OST’s academy in Fort Chaffee, 

Arkansas. To operate OST’s fleet of vehicles, federal agents must also 

complete the requirements for a commercial driver’s license. In addition, 

 

22Pub. L. No. 105-261 § 3154 (1998). 

Page 21 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
all agents must meet DOE’s offensive combatant standard throughout their 

careers. Overall, OST officials estimate that OST federal agents spend 

about a third of their time in training, which, according to an NNSA 

official, is much more frequent than most contractor protective forces. 

Much of the training is tactically oriented, and OST convoy elements are 

organized into tactical units. 

In the performance of their official duties, both protective forces and OST 

federal agents have limited arrest authority for a variety of misdemeanors 

and felonies,23 though neither routinely exercises this arrest authority. 

Both protective forces and OST federal agents are also authorized to use 

deadly force to protect SNM and may pursue intruders in order to prevent 

their escape and to arrest those they suspect have committed certain 

misdemeanors or felonies or have obtained unauthorized control of SNM. 

DOE’s Federal Protective Force manual (DOE M 470.4-8) and DOE’s 

Contractor Protective Force manual (DOE 470.4-3A) set guidelines and 

direct DOE sites to develop policies for using deadly force and for fresh 

pursuit, which involves pursuing suspected criminals who flee across 

jurisdictional boundaries, such as leaving the property of a DOE site. 

These actions include developing memorandums of understanding that 

establish, among other things, fresh pursuit guidelines with other law 

enforcement agencies. 

Protective Forces and 

Office of Secure 

Transportation 

Federal Agents Do 

Not Routinely Use 

Their Federal Law 

Enforcement 

Authority to Make 

Arrests 

DOE protective forces and OST federal agents have limited authority to 

make arrests for specific misdemeanors and felonies, such as trespassing 

on, or the theft or destruction of, federal property. Other offenses against 

government property subject to arrest include sabotage, civil disorder, 

conspiracy, and the communication of or tampering with restricted data. 

For the covered misdemeanors and felonies, protective forces and OST 

federal agents have authority to arrest if they observe the offenses while 

they are performing their official duties; for the covered felonies, they may 

also make arrests if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the 

person has committed a felony. If other federal law enforcement agencies, 

such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), are involved in the 

apprehension of suspected criminals, even on DOE property, protective 

forces and OST federal agents must relinquish arresting authority to the 

other federal agencies. While both protective forces and OST federal 

 

23Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 161.k (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2201(k)). Defense Programs: 

Limited Arrest Authority and Use of Force by Protective Force Officers, 10 C.F.R. § 1047. 

Page 22 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
agents receive initial and annual refresher training in law enforcement 

authorities and duties, we found that protective forces at the six sites last 

made an unassisted arrest using their federal authority more than 25 years 

ago. The protective forces at Pantex arrested nine individuals, six in 1981 

and three in 1983, for trespassing on site property. In both instances, the 

offenders were convicted and sentenced to a federal detention facility. 

According to OST officials, federal agents do not routinely make arrests 

because they have not encountered individuals attempting to steal SNM 

from their shipments, which is the focus of their legal concerns. Protective 

forces do not routinely use their federal authority to make arrests for 

several reasons, in addition to limited authority. First, one contractor site 

official told us, federal courts, which have jurisdiction for all arrests made 

by protective forces using their federal authority, are reluctant to pursue 

what may be considered minor cases associated with a DOE site. Instead, 

this official said, the site had more success prosecuting crimes in state and 

local courts. In these cases, arrests are made by local and state law 

enforcement agencies. Second, DOE security officials told us that sites 

may be concerned about the legal liability of using contractor employees 

to make arrests and potential lawsuits that could ensue.24 Finally, both 

DOE and site contractor officials told us that routine law enforcement 

duties may distract protective forces from performing their primary duty 

to protect Category I SNM. 

Rather than make arrests when witnessing possible crimes, protective 

forces may gather basic facts, secure the crime scene, and notify 

management, which decides whether to refer the matter to local law 

enforcement agencies, DOE’s Inspector General, the U.S. Marshall, or the 

FBI for arresting and transporting suspects. However, we could not 

determine how often the forces take these actions because sites do not 

typically document detainments or have facilities in which to hold such 

detainees. 

While protective forces and OST federal agents seldom use their federal 

arrest authority, protective forces have used other legal authorities to 

make arrests. For example, specially designated protective force officers 

at the Savannah River Site (SRS), are authorized under South Carolina law 

 

24A DOE Inspector General report found this to be the case at a DOE site not covered in our 

review. See DOE, Inspection Report: Protective Force Response to a Security Incident at 

Sandia National Laboratory, California, DOE/IG-0658 (August 2004). 

Page 23 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
to make arrests and investigate crimes.25 The SRS protective force 

includes 26 Special State Constables (about 5 percent of SRS’s total 

protective force) who have state law enforcement jurisdiction on the 310-

square-mile SRS complex, which spans three counties and includes public

highways. These officers wear special uniforms and drive specially marked

vehicles. In addition, they must complete and maintain state law 

enforcement qualification requirements, in order to retain their state law 

enforcement authority. This additional authority, according to SRS 

officials, allows the remaining protective force personnel to focus on the 

other aspects of the site’s national security mission. 

Figure 2: Protective Force Constable, SRS 

Source: DOE.

 

25This authority is contained in S. Carolina Code § 23-7-10 through 7-50. 

Page 24 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
Either of the Two 

Principal Options 

DOE Has Considered 

Could Result in More 

Uniform Management 

of Protective Forces 

To manage its protective forces more effectively and uniformly, DOE has 

considered two principal options—improving elements of the existing 

contractor system or creating a federal protective force. We identified five 

major criteria that DOE, protective force contractors, and union officials 

have used to assess the advantages and disadvantages of these options. 

Overall, in comparing these criteria against the two principal options, we 

found that neither contractor nor federal forces seem overwhelmingly 

superior, but each has offsetting advantages and disadvantages. Either 

option could result in effective and more uniform security if well-managed. 

However, we identified transitional problems with converting the current 

protective force to a federalized force. Furthermore, while DOE has 

sought to improve protective force management by reforming protective 

forces, this effort is still at an early stage and budgetary limitations may 

constrain some changes. 

Both a Contractor Force 

and a Federalized Force 

Present Advantages and 

Disadvantages 

Table 7 summarizes the five criteria that DOE, protective force 

contractors, and union officials have used to discuss whether to improve 

the existing contractor system or federalize protective forces, as well as 

associated issues or concerns. 

Table 7: Assessment Criteria for Management Options and Associated Issues 

Criteria 

Issues associated with stakeholders’ views on how the options align with the 

criteria 

A personnel system that supports force 

resizing and ensures high-quality 

protective force members. 

• Several contractors and DOE managers believe the current contractor system provides 

more flexibility than a federal system to hire and fire quickly to meet changing DOE 

personnel needs and to handle poor performers. 

• A union coalition advocates federalization to get early and enhanced retirement 

benefits, which are available for law enforcement officers and some other federal 

positions, to ensure a young and vigorous workforce. 

Greater standardization of protective 

forces across sites to more consistently 

support high performance and ready 

transfer of personnel between sites. 

• Protective forces perform inconsistently across sites, in part because DOE culture and 

policy give each site leeway to manage itself, which can result in differences, such as 

various interpretations of DOE orders. 

• Protective forces are also trained and equipped differently, making it difficult to provide 

reinforcements from other sites for strikes or other emergencies. 

• A 2004 DOE work group concluded federalization might drive standardization across 

the DOE complex, which would benefit from more uniform training and application of 

policies and from more uniform and efficient procurement of, among other things, 

equipment and services. 

Page 25 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
Criteria 

Issues associated with stakeholders’ views on how the options align with the 

criteria 

Better DOE management and oversight to 

ensure effective security. 

• Federalization could enhance DOE’s direct control and awareness of protective force 

operations. 

• Some DOE officials are concerned that more centralized federal control might slow and 

impede protective forces’ support of the site contractors’ operations and federalization 

could confuse the roles, responsibilities, and interfaces between contractor personnel 

in other types of security positions and federal protective force personnel. 

Prevention or better management of 

protective force strikes. 

• Contractor protective forces can legally strike when their collective bargaining 

agreements expire, creating a potential lapse in security. Security operations during a 

strike must be managed through temporary replacement protective forces. 

• According to OPM, a federalized protective force could not legally strike. 

Containment costs within expected 

budgets. 

• Protective forces are the most expensive component of security costs, which have 

increased dramatically since September 11, 2001. 

• DOE officials are concerned that future security budgets will be relatively flat and may 

not support changes that require significant new expenditures, which federalization 

may involve. 

Source: GAO analysis of information from federal, contractor, and union sources. 

Evaluating the two principal options against these criteria, we found that, 

for several reasons, either contractor or federal forces could result in 

effective and more uniform security if the forces are well-managed. First, 

both options—maintaining the current security force structure or 

federalizing the security force—have offsetting advantages and 

disadvantages, with neither option emerging as clearly superior. For 

example, one relative advantage of a contractor force is the perceived 

greater flexibility for hiring, disciplining, or terminating an employee; one 

relative disadvantage of a contractor force is that it can strike. In contrast, 

federalization could better allow protective forces to advance or laterally 

transfer to other DOE sites to meet protective force members’ needs or 

DOE’s need to resize particular forces. 

Second, key disadvantages, such as potential strikes, do not preclude 

effective operations if the security force is well-managed. According to 

one protective force manager, a well-managed protective force is less 

likely to strike. In addition, a 2009 memo signed by the NNSA 

administrator stated that NNSA had demonstrated that it can effectively 

manage strikes through the use of replacement protective forces. With 

respect to federal protective forces, a 2004 department work group on 

protective force issues observed that even federal operations like OST had 

experienced difficult labor-management relations that had to be carefully 

managed in order to ensure effective performance. 

Page 26 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
Third, as can be seen in the following examples, distinctions between the 

two options, each of which could have many permutations, can be 

overstated by comparing worse- and best-case scenarios, when similar 

conditions might be realized under either option. 

• While federalization might improve effectiveness and efficiency by driving 

standardization, NNSA recently announced initiatives to increase 

standardization among contract protective forces to achieve some of the 

same benefits, including cost savings. 

• Federalization could potentially provide early and enhanced retirement 

benefits, which could help to ensure a young and vigorous workforce. 

However, such benefits might also be provided to contractor protective 

forces. 

• Although more centralized federal control might impede both protective 

forces’ support of a site’s operations and the coordination between 

contractors and federal managers, this concern presumes a scenario in 

which the department would choose a highly centralized organization, 

whereas it might delegate responsibility for day-to-day operations to its 

site managers. 

• Either option could be implemented with more or less costly features. For 

example, adding the early and enhanced retirement benefits would 

increase costs for either contractor or federal protective forces. 

Reliably estimating the costs of protective force options proved difficult 

and precluded our detailed reporting on it for two broad reasons. First, 

since contractor and federal forces could each have many possible 

permutations, choosing any particular option to assess would be arbitrary. 

For example, a 2008 NNSA-sponsored study identified wide-ranging 

federalization options, such as federalizing all or some SPO positions at 

some or all facilities or reorganizing them under an existing or a new 

agency. Second, DOE will have to decide on the hypothetical options’ key 

cost factors before it can reasonably compare costs.26 For example, when 

 

26In terms of retirement benefits, for example, the features and costs are not clear for 

hypothetical contractor options, for which any variety of retirement plans could potentially 

apply. In contrast, the likely features and costs are fairly clear for hypothetical federal 

forces because they would likely be placed under existing retirement plans. According to 

OPM estimates for fiscal year 2008, for instance, annuities under the Federal Employee 

Retirement System for regular or early and enhanced retirement cost the government an 

average of 11.2 percent or 24.9 percent of basic pay, respectively. 

Page 27 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
asked about some key cost factors for federalization, an NNSA Service 

Center official said that a detailed workforce analysis would be needed to 

decide whether DOE would either continue to use the same number of 

SPOs with high amounts of scheduled overtime or hire a larger number of 

SPOs who would work fewer overtime hours. Also, the official said that 

until management directs a particular work schedule for federalized 

protective forces, there is no definitive answer to the applicable overtime 

rules, such as whether overtime begins after 8 hours in a day. The amount 

of overtime and the factors affecting it are crucial to a sound cost estimate 

because overtime pay can now account for up to about 50 percent of pay 

for worked hours. 

Transition to a Federalized 

Security Workforce 

Creates Difficult Issues 

Either under Current Laws 

or with Special Provisions 

for Enhanced Retirement 

Benefits 

If protective forces were to be federalized under existing law, the current 

forces might face a loss of pay or even their jobs. OPM told us that 

legislation would be required to provide these federalized protective 

forces with early and enhanced retirement benefits. However, provisions 

associated with these benefits could create hiring and retirement 

difficulties for current older members of the protective forces. 

According to officials at OPM and NNSA’s Service Center, if contractor 

SPOs were federalized under existing law, they would likely be placed into 

the security guard (GS-0085) federal job series. Although a coalition of 

unions has sought federalization to allow members to have early and 

enhanced retirement benefits, which allows employees in certain federal 

jobs to retire at age 50 with 20 years of service, security guards under the 

GS-0085 job series are not eligible for these benefits. Under the applicable 

rules for federal security guards, transitioning protective forces would not 

become eligible to retire with immediate federal annuities until at least age 

55, and only after accruing sufficient years of federal service. For example, 

transitioning protective forces could begin receiving a federal annuity at 

age 62 with 5 years of service or, with reduced benefits, at age 55 to 57 

(depending on birth year) with 10 years of service.27

Federalization under Existing 

Laws May Not be Palatable to 

Current Protective Force 

Members and Their Unions 

 

27Although transitioning members would still be required to work beyond age 50, they 

could also work for even more federal service years, retiring with an immediate annuity at 

age 60 with 20 years of service or at age 55 to 57 (depending on birth year) with 30 years of 

service. These retirement eligibility provisions are for FERS, which is the federal plan open 

to new hires. 

Page 28 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
In addition, transitioning force members may receive lower pay as federal 

employees, according to our analysis of two tentative federal pay levels for 

protective force positions at SPO levels of I, II, and III.28 As of September 

30, 2008, contractors are generally paid higher top rates than the top rates 

for the applicable federal General Schedule (GS) pay grades.29 Only SPOIII positions at three sites and SPO-II positions at one site could have the

top rates potentially matched by 2008 federal rates, but only under certain 

assumptions.

ir 

 

30 Also, to reach federal pay rates that better approximate the 

contractor rates, transitioning contractor protective forces might have to 

wait many years. While most collective bargaining agreements allow 

protective forces to reach a position’s top pay rate after 3 years or fewer, 

federal guards could take much longer because the 10 steps within a GS 

pay grade have progressively longer periods of service between 

incremental increases. This step progression means reaching the top of a 

pay grade (step 10) could take up to 18 years. 

Finally, if protective forces are federalized, OPM officials told us that 

current members would not be guaranteed a federal job. According to 

28We separately asked OPM and the NNSA Service Center to tentatively classify SPOs at 

levels I, II, and III for the applicable federal pay grades using the contractor job 

descriptions for SPOs. The NNSA service center classified SPO levels I, II, and III at GS pay 

grades of 5, 6, and 7, respectively. OPM classified each SPO level at one higher grade level. 

For a more definitive classification of federal pay, more information on the positions at 

each site may be required. 

29According to a 2008 NNSA-sponsored study, the current contractor pay rates might be 

matched by federal pay under the flexibility allowed by NNSA’s new pay demonstration 

that established pay bands that may cover more than one GS grade. Indeed, our analysis 

confirmed that the likely pay band—spanning the pay range of GS grades 5 through 8 and 

applicable to all SPO levels—will generally accommodate the top contractor pay rates at 

NNSA sites, particularly because it allows higher pay rates for SPO I and II positions than is 

likely through the regular GS pay grades. Nevertheless, transitioning SPOs may still fail to 

match their contractor pay rates for two reasons. First, according to the NNSA service 

center, if DOE hires all forces under the regular General Schedule for pay, no forces will 

then fall under the NNSA pay banding. Alternatively, if the protective forces were organized 

under separate DOE organizations, at most only those protective forces employed by NNSA 

would be paid under its pay banding. Second, to match the contractor rates, new hires 

must be paid at the top end of the pay band. However, according to the NNSA Service 

Center, it would be unusual to hire employees at rates close to the top of a pay band, since 

a pay band is intended to allow for annual pay-for-performance raises. 

30According to NNSA Service Center officials, DOE has flexibility to hire at above step 1 of 

the GS grade when a candidate demonstrates superior qualifications. However, DOE might 

not use this hiring authority to put new hires at the top end of a GS pay grade because its 

use must be consistent with, among other things, merit system principles and budgetary 

considerations. 

Page 29 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
those officials, current members would have to compete for the new 

federal positions, and thus they risk not being hired. Nonveteran members 

are particularly at risk because competition for federal security guard 

positions is restricted to those with veterans’ preference, if they are 

available. According to NNSA Service Center officials, veterans groups 

would likely oppose any waiver to this hiring preference. Thus, if the 

protective forces were to be federalized, the department might lose some 

of the currently trained and experienced personnel. 

According to OPM officials, legislation would be required to provide 

federal protective forces with early and enhanced retirement because their 

positions do not fit the current definition of law enforcement officers that 

would trigger such a benefit.31 For the same reason, DOE had to pursue 

legislation to extend early and enhanced retirement for OST federal agents 

in 1998. OPM had determined that OST federal agents did not meet the 

definition for law enforcement officer that would have made them eligible 

for early and enhanced retirement benefits. Consequently, at DOE urging, 

Congress enacted legislation to give OST federal agents the special 20-year 

retirement provisions.32

Legislation Could Provide 

Federalized Forces with Early 

and Enhanced Retirement 

Benefits, but Providing These 

Benefits Could Pose Problems 

for Current Force Members 

Although a coalition of unions has supported federalization to get early 

and enhanced retirement benefits, provisions associated with these 

benefits could create hiring and retirement difficulties for older force 

members. Older members might not be rehired because agencies are 

typically authorized to set a maximum age, often age 37, for entry into 

federal positions with early retirement. In addition, even if there were a 

waiver from the maximum age of hire, older protective forces members 

could not retire at age 50 because they would have had to work 20 years to 

meet the federal service requirement for “early” retirement benefits. These 

forces could retire earlier if they were granted credit for their prior years 

of service under DOE and NNSA contracts. However, OPM officials told us 

OPM would strongly oppose federal retirement benefits being granted for 

previous years of contractor service (retroactive benefits). According to 

 

31According to a 2004 OPM report, the retirement definition for a law enforcement officer 

has a more restrictive meaning than the common understanding of law enforcement. The 

main element of the definition is that the employee’s duties must be primarily the 

investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals suspected or convicted of offenses 

against the criminal laws of the United States. This definition generally excludes federal 

guards and even uniformed police officers from being eligible for law enforcement officer 

retirement because they prevent or detect violations instead of investigating them. 

32Pub. L. No. 105-261 § 3154 (1998). 

Page 30 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
these officials, these retroactive benefits would be without precedent and 

would violate the basic concept that service credit for retirement benefits 

is only available for eligible employment at the time it was performed. 

Moreover, retroactive benefits would create an unfunded liability for 

federal retirement funds. When the law changed to allow OST federal 

agents early retirement, these agents were already federal employees, and 

they received retroactive enhanced credit for service; DOE paid the extra 

liability (approximately $18 million over 4 years). 

DOE Seeks to Address 

Protective Forces Issues 

by Reforming Contractor 

Forces, but Some Changes 

May Be Constrained by 

Budgetary Limitations, and 

Progress Has Been Limited 

to Date 

In a joint January 2009 memorandum, the NNSA Administrator and DOE’s 

Chief Health Safety and Security (HSS) Officer rejected the federalization 

of protective forces as an option and supported the continued use of 

contracted protective forces—but with improvements. They concluded 

that, among other things, the transition to a federal force would be costly 

and would be likely to provide little, if any, increase in security 

effectiveness. However, these officials recognized that the current 

contractor system could be improved by addressing some of the issues 

that federalization might have resolved. In particular, they announced the 

pursuit of an initiative to better standardize protective forces’ training and 

equipment. According to these officials, more standardization serves to 

increase effectiveness and cost efficiency as well as to better facilitate 

responses to potential work stoppages. In addition, in March 2009, the 

Chief HSS Officer commissioned a study group, which included DOE 

officials and protective force union representatives and had input from 

protective force contractors, to recommend ways to overcome the 

personnel system problems that might prevent protective force members 

from working to a normal retirement age, such as 60 to 65, and building 

reasonable retirement benefits. 

Both of these initiatives might benefit the department and its programs. 

For example, the initiative to standardize protective forces has started 

focusing on the inefficiencies arising from having each contractor 

separately choose and procure security equipment and support services; 

one identified inefficiency is that smaller separate orders hinder 

contractors from negotiating better prices. In NNSA’s fiscal year 2010 

budget request, NNSA predicted that standardizing procurement and 

security equipment, such as vehicles, weapons, and ammunition, could 

save NNSA, cumulatively, 20 percent of its costs for such equipment by 

2013. With respect to the career and retirement initiative, the DOE study 

group reported, among other potential benefits, that improving career 

incentives for individuals to enter a protective force career and then 

remain in the DOE security community for a lifetime of service could help 

Page 31 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
the department minimize the significant costs associated with hiring, 

vetting, and training protective force members. 

NNSA has established a Security Commodity Team—composed of security 

and procurement professionals from NNSA, some DOE sites, and other 

DOE organizations—to focus first on procuring ammunition and 

identifying and testing other security equipment that can be used across 

sites. According to NNSA officials, NNSA established a common 

mechanism in December 2009 for sites to procure ammunition. Another 

effort will seek greater standardization of protective force operations 

across sites, in part by HHS or NNSA clarifying protective force policies 

when sites do not have the same understanding of these policies or 

implement them in different ways. To move toward more standardized 

operations and a more centrally managed protective force program, NNSA 

started a broad security review to identify possible improvements. As one 

result of this security review, according to NNSA officials in January 2010, 

NNSA has developed a draft standard for protective force operations, 

which is intended to clarify both policy expectations and a consistent 

security approach that is both effective and efficient. 

For the personnel system initiative to enhance career longevity and 

retirement options, in June 2009, a DOE-chartered study group made 29 

recommendations that were generally designed to enable members to 

reach a normal retirement age within the protective force, take another 

job within DOE, or transition to a non-DOE career. The study group 

identified 14 of its 29 career and retirement recommendations as involving 

low- or no-cost actions that could conceivably be implemented quickly. 

For example, some recommendations seek to ensure that protective force 

members are prepared for job requirements through expanding fitness and 

wellness programs and reviewing the appropriateness of training. Other 

recommendations call for reviews to find ways to maximize the number of 

armed and unarmed positions that SPOs can fill when they can no longer 

meet their current combatant requirements. Other recommendations focus 

on providing training and planning assistance for retirement and job 

transitions. (All 29 recommendations are described in app. I.) 

The study group recognized that some of its personnel system 

recommendations may be difficult to implement largely because of budget 

constraints. The study group had worked with the assumption that DOE 

security budgets will remain essentially flat for the foreseeable future, and 

may actually decline in real dollars. Nevertheless, it identified 15 of its 29 

career and retirement recommendations as challenging because they 

involve additional program costs, some of which are likely to be 

Page 32 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
substantial, and may require changes to management structures and 

contracts.33 For example, to provide some income security when 

protective officer members must take a lower-paying position because of 

illness, injury, or age, one recommendation would include provisions in 

collective bargaining agreements to at least temporarily prevent or reduce 

drops in pay. Among the more challenging recommendations is a call to 

enhance retirement plans and to make them more equivalent and portable 

across sites—the types of changes that a coalition of unions had hoped 

federalization might provide. 

Progress on the 29 recommendations has been limited to date. When 

senior department officials were briefed on the personnel system 

recommendations in late June 2009, they took them under consideration 

for further action but immediately approved one recommendation—to 

extend the life of the study group by forming a standing committee. They 

directed the standing committee to develop implementation strategies for 

actions that can be done in the near term and, for recommendations 

requiring further analysis, additional funding, or other significant actions, 

to serve as an advisory panel for senior department officials. According to 

a DOE official in early December 2009, NNSA and DOE were in varying 

stages of reviews to advance the other 28 recommendations. Later that 

month, NNSA achieved aspects of one recommendation about 

standardization, in part by formally standardizing protective force 

uniforms, as well as the uniforms’ cloth shields. In the Conference Report 

for the fiscal year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act,34 the conferees 

directed the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National 

Nuclear Security Administration to develop a comprehensive DOE-wide 

plan to identify and implement the recommendations of the study group. 

Protective forces are a key component of DOE’s efforts to secure its Category 

I SNM, particularly after the September 11, 2001, terrorism attacks. Since the 

attacks, DOE has made multiple changes to its security policies, including 

more rigorous requirements for its protective forces. However, in making 

these changes, DOE and its protective force contractors through their 

Conclusion 

 

33According to officials in DOE’s Office of General Counsel, one issue for changing benefits 

is that the department does not set protective forces’ benefits because their members are 

not department employees. Instead, protective forces and their various employing 

contractors would have to negotiate changed benefits into the collective bargaining 

agreements. 

34H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 111-288 (2009). 

Page 33 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
collective bargaining agreements have not successfully aligned protective 

force personnel systems—which affect career longevity, job transitions, and 

retirement—with the increased physical and other demands of a more 

paramilitary operation. Without better alignment, in our opinion, there is 

greater potential for a strike at a site, and potential risk to site security, when 

protective forces’ collective bargaining agreements expire. In the event of a 

strike at one site, the differences in protective forces’ training and equipment 

make it difficult to readily provide reinforcements from other sites. Even if 

strikes are avoided, the effectiveness of protective forces may be reduced if 

tensions exist between labor and management. The potential for a strike and 

for declines in protective forces’ performance have elevated the importance 

of finding the most effective approach to maintaining protective force 

readiness, including an approach that better aligns personnel systems and 

protective force requirements. At the same time, DOE must consider its 

options for managing protective forces in a period of budgetary constraints. 

With these considerations in mind, DOE and NNSA, to their credit, have 

recognized that the decentralized management of protective forces creates 

some inefficiencies and that some systemic career and longevity issues are 

not being resolved through actions at individual sites. NNSA’s recent 

standardization initiatives and the 29 recommendations made by a DOE 

study group in June 2009 offer a step forward. The responsibility lies with 

DOE, working with protective force unions and contractors, to further 

develop and implement these initiatives and recommendations. However, 

if DOE decides not to take meaningful actions or if its actions will not 

achieve the intended goals, an examination of other options, including the 

federalization of protective forces, may be merited. 

To better align protective force personnel policies and systems with DOE’s 

security requirements for Category I SNM sites, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Energy promptly develop implementation plans and, where 

needed, undertake additional research for the DOE study group’s 2009 

recommendations to improve career longevity and retirement options for 

protective force personnel. Specifically, we recommend the Secretary take 

the following two actions: 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 

• For actions such as reviewing the appropriateness of training that the 

study group identified as low or no cost, unless DOE can state compelling 

reasons for reconsideration, it should develop and execute 

implementation plans. 

Page 34 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
• For actions that may involve substantial costs or contractual and 

organizational changes, such as enhancing the uniformity and portability 

of retirement benefits, DOE should plan and perform research to identify 

the most beneficial and financially feasible options. 

We provided DOE with a draft of this report for its review and comment. 

In its written comments for the department, NNSA generally agreed with 

the report and the recommendations. However, NNSA stated that the 

report does not sufficiently credit the department for its significant efforts 

taken to address protective force issues. We added some information to 

the report about the status of the department’s efforts that NNSA provided 

separately from its comment letter. Nevertheless, we continue to view 

DOE’s progress on its study group’s 29 recommendations as generally 

limited to date. The complete text of NNSA’s comments are presented in 

appendix II. NNSA also provided technical clarifications, which we 

incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

Agency Comments 

OPM also received a draft of this report for review and comment. It chose 

not to provide formal comments because it said our report fairly and 

accurately represented the facts and policy issues that OPM provided to us. 

We are sending copies of this report to congressional committees with 

responsibilities for energy issues; the Secretary of Energy; and the 

Director, Office of Management and Budget. This report is also available at 

no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have any questions regarding this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix III. 

Gene Aloise 

Director, Natural Resources and Environment 

Page 35 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
13BA the 

Protective Force Career

Study Group 

ppendix I: Recommendations from

 Options Initiative

Page 36 GAO-10-275 

Appendix I: Recommendations from the 

Protective Force Career Options Initiative 

Study Group 

In March 2009, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Chief Health, Safety and 

Security (HSS) Officer commissioned a study to examine “realistic and 

reasonable options for improving the career opportunities and retirement 

prospects of protective force (PF) members while maintaining, within 

current and anticipated budgetary constraints, a robust and effective 

security posture.” Under the leadership of HSS and with input from 

protective force contractors, a study group was formed consisting of 

senior leaders of the National Council of Security Police and senior 

technical staff from the National Nuclear Security Administration, the 

Office of Environmental Management, the Office of Nuclear Energy, and 

the Office of Fossil Energy. 

The study group’s report, Enhanced Career Longevity and Retirement 

Options for DOE Protective Force Personnel, released on June 30, 2009, 

included 29 recommendations to overcome the problems that prevent 

protective force members from working to a normal retirement age and 

building reasonable retirement benefits. Summaries of these 

recommendations follow. 

The study group thought the following 14 recommendations were 

achievable mostly within existing management structures and anticipated 

budgetary constraints. 

Study Groups 

Recommendations 

1. PF deployment strategies should be re-examined to ensure that 

appropriate Security Police Officers’ (SPO) skill sets and response 

capabilities (e.g., offensive or defensive capabilities) are matched to 

current response plan requirements in a manner that maximizes 

reliance on defensive combatants. The intent is to maximize the 

number of defensive positions that could be filled by personnel who 

can no longer meet the higher offensive combatant requirements. 

2. Anticipated requirements for security escorts and other securityrelated unarmed positions (including current outsourcing practices) 

should be reviewed and procedures implemented to maximize work 

opportunities for unarmed PF members (Security Officers). The intent 

of this recommendation and the next is to provide positions to be filled 

by PF members who can no longer meet either the offensive or the 

defensive combatant standards. 

3. Unarmed PF-related work should be identified as part of the career 

path for PF members. 

 Nuclear Security 
13BAppendix I: Recommendations from the 

Protective Force Career Options Initiative 

Study Group 

4. Measures should be adopted to minimize the impact of current 

physical fitness standards upon career longevity, and these standards 

should be reviewed against current job requirements. 

5. Revisions to current medical requirements should be developed to 

ensure that existing medical conditions do not represent (given the 

current state of the medical arts) unreasonable barriers to career 

longevity. 

6. So long as the department expects PF personnel to meet explicit 

medical and fitness standards, it should provide reasonable means to 

prepare for testing and evaluation. 

7. Existing “fitness/wellness” programs should be expanded to help SPOs 

maintain and prolong their ability to meet physical fitness 

requirements and to achieve medical cost savings that result from 

maintaining a well-managed program. According to the study group, 

this recommendation is not cost-neutral. 

8. Retirement/transition planning should be integrated into PF training. 

9. The capabilities of the National Training Center should be used to 

facilitate career progression and job transition training. 

10. PF organizations should be encouraged to appoint “Career 

Development/Transition” officers to assist personnel in career path 

and transition planning. 

11. The Human Reliability Program (HRP) monitors employees to ensure 

they have no emotional, mental, or physical conditions that impede 

them from reliably conducting their work. Under this program, if a 

reasonable belief or credible evidence indicates that employees are not 

reliable, they should be immediately removed from their duties as an 

interim precautionary measure. The study group recommended taking 

strong actions to correct HRP administrative errors and to rigorously 

enforce existing prohibitions against using HRP in a punitive manner. 

This recommendation and the next arise from a concern that some 

protective force members may be punished without the opportunity 

for timely recourse. 

12. Contractor policies and actions that lead to placing PF members in 

nonpaid status without appropriate review or recourse should be 

closely monitored (and, where necessary, corrected). 

Page 37 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
13BAppendix I: Recommendations from the 

Protective Force Career Options Initiative 

Study Group 

13. DOE M 470.4-3A, Contractor Protective Force, should be reviewed to 

ensure that requirements are supportable by appropriate training. 

14. To encourage future communication on the issues considered in this 

study, the life of the present study group should be extended as a 

standing committee, and union participation in the DOE HSS 

Protective Force Policy Panel should be ensured. 

The study group thought the following 15 recommendations would require 

currently unbudgeted resources or changes to existing contracts. 

15. Existing defined contribution plans should be reviewed in order to 

identify methods to improve benefits, to ensure greater comparability 

of benefits from one site to the next, and to develop methods to 

improve portability of benefits. This recommendation, and those 

through number 19, involve changes to retirement plans that could 

enhance benefits and allow protective force personnel to transfer 

benefits more easily when moving to other sites. 

16. Consistency in retirement criteria should be established across the 

DOE complex (e.g., a point system incorporating age and years of 

service or something similar). 

17. The potential for incorporating a uniform cost-of-living allowance into 

defined benefit retirement programs based on government indexes 

should be examined. 

18. Portability of service credit between PF and other DOE contractors 

should be explored. This could be directed in requests for proposals 

for new PF contracts. 

19. Potential actions should be explored to create a reasonable disability 

retirement bridge for PF personnel when alternate job placement is 

unsuccessful. 

20. Job performance requirements (such as firearms proficiency) should 

be supported by training sufficient to enable PF members to have 

confidence in meeting those requirements. 

21. A retraining fund should be created to assist personnel with job 

transitions and second careers. 

22. A centralized job registry should be established to facilitate 

identification of job opportunities across the complex. 

Page 38 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
13BAppendix I: Recommendations from the 

Protective Force Career Options Initiative 

Study Group 

23. Consideration should be given to sponsoring a student loan program to 

assist PF members in developing second careers. 

24. The department, as a matter of policy and line management procedure, 

should establish the position that SPOs be considered for job 

placement within each respective site’s organizational structure before 

a contractor considers hiring personnel from outside of the site. 

25. “Save pay” provisions should be included in collective bargaining 

agreements to cover specified periods when a PF member must be 

classified to a lower-paying position because of illness, injury, or aging. 

26. DOE should explore the potential for facilitating partnerships among 

the various contractor organizations in order to broaden employment 

opportunities for aging or injured personnel and to encourage PF 

personnel seeking alternative career paths to actively compete for 

those opportunities. 

27. Where possible, the department should review its separate PF prime 

contracts and convert them to “total” security and emergency 

management contracts. The intent of this recommendation is to permit 

protective force personnel to better compete for emergency 

management positions when they lack the ability or desire to continue 

with their security positions. 

28. PF arming and arrest authority should be reviewed with the objective 

of enhancing the capabilities of SPOs. The intent of this 

recommendation is to, among other things, ease SPOs’ postretirement 

path into law enforcement positions. 

29. Where possible, equipment, including uniforms, weapons, and badges, 

should be standardized throughout the department. According to the 

study group, more standardized uniforms might improve protective 

forces’ morale and could offer some offsetting cost savings for the 

department. 

Page 39 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
14BAppendix II: Comments from the Appendix II: Comments from the Department Department of Energy 

of Energy 

Page 40 GAO-10-275 Nuclear Security
15BAppendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 41 GAO-10-275 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Jonathan Gill, Assistant Director; 

John Cooney; Don Cowan; Cindy Gilbert; Terry Hanford; Mehrzad Nadji; 

Cheryl Peterson; and Carol Herrnstadt Shulman made key contributions to 

this report. Other contributors include Carol Kolarik, Peter Ruedel, and 

Robert Sanchez. 

Nuclear Security

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(360953) 
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Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information. 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, DC 20548 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548 

Public Affairs 

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