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S. HRG. 111–331 

THE PROPOSED U.S.–UAE AGREEMENT ON 

CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND 

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 7, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania, opening statement ...................................................................................................................... 1 

McFarlane, Dr. Harold, chairman of the International Nuclear Energy 

Academy, former president of the American Nuclear Society, and Deputy 

Associate Laboratory Director for Nuclear Science and Technology, Idaho 

National Laboratory, Idaho Falls, ID ................................................................. 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator from Idaho, opening statement .................. 4 

Sanderson, Hon. Janet, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, 

Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................... 8 

Prepared joint statement ................................................................................. 10 

Van Diepen, Vann H., Acting Assistant Secretary for International Security 

and Nonproliferation, Department of State, Washington, DC ......................... 9 

Prepared joint statement ................................................................................. 10 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., supplemental prepared statement ............................ 26 

Responses of Assistant Secretary Vann H. Van Diepen to questions submitted 

by Senator John F. Kerry .................................................................................... 26 

Responses of Assistant Secretary Vann H. Van Diepen to questions submitted 

by Senator Russell D. Feingold ........................................................................... 28 

(III)

(1) 

THE PROPOSED U.S.–UAE AGREEMENT ON 

CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2009 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P. Casey, Jr. 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Casey, Feingold, Kaufman, and Risch. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much for being here this morning. The hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations’ Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs 

will now come to order. 

In 2 weeks time, the U.S.–UAE 123 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement could go into effect unless Congress takes action to block its 

inception. Today, the subcommittee meets to assess the ramifications, both positive and negative, that this Nuclear Cooperation 

Agreement may have on future agreements, the international system, and the long-term security of the United States and our allies. 

As many of you know, since 1952, more than 2,000 bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements have been signed and implemented worldwide. Nuclear cooperation agreements inherently 

include certain opportunities and risks—the U.S.–UAE Nuclear 

Cooperation Agreement before us today is no different. However, 

what has changed over the past 50 years are the stipulations and 

standards that those receiving technological and materiel nuclear 

assistance must uphold in the execution of these nuclear cooperation agreements. 

The U.S.–UAE Nuclear Cooperation Agreement has been hailed 

as the strongest bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement that the 

United States has ever concluded. 

The UAE, already a partner to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

Treaty, has voluntarily signed and pledged—signed and pledged— 

to accede to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s—as we 

know, is the IAEA—the UAE has acceded to the IAEA’s Additional 

Protocol, which allows for short-notice inspections of any facility 

and remote monitoring of declared facilities. 

2 

The United States, the IAEA, and the U.N. Security Council all 

agree that the Additional Protocol should be universally adopted; 

and for the first time in a bilateral U.S. agreement, the United 

States and the UAE have agreed that the United States will not 

export nuclear technology until the UAE brings its Additional Protocol into force. 

The UAE is now participating in several U.S.-led initiatives to 

strengthen export controls. More importantly, the UAE has declared that it will forgo all domestic enrichment and reprocessing 

of nuclear material in its territory. This last provision is not merely 

a pledge, but it is explicitly prohibited in Article 7 of the agreement. 

And like other nuclear cooperation agreements, the United 

States may terminate the deal and require the return of all nuclear 

materiel and technology if the UAE fails to adhere to any aspect 

of agreement, especially if it acquires sensitive nuclear technology 

related to enrichment or reprocessing. 

While this may be the strongest nuclear cooperation agreement 

the United States has ever concluded, I also recognize that its inception at this moment in history gives some pause. At issue is the 

UAE’s legal right to obtain nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, as enshrined in the nuclear technology—I’m sorry, as 

enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, versus the risk 

incurred by introducing nuclear technology in the world’s most 

volatile region. 

The ongoing controversy regarding Iran’s nuclear program is also 

relevant here. With the largest oil reserves in the world, there’s no 

doubt that Iran’s neighbors seriously take Tehran’s nuclear ambitions into their nuclear security and energy calculations. Because 

some civilian nuclear technology can be used for a military nuclear 

program, there are concerns—there are also concerns that the 

spread of civilian nuclear programs to the region may spark a 

nuclear arms race. While there is a possibility that a proliferation 

domino effect could occur in the Middle East, this prospect could 

happen even without—even without—U.S. involvement. 

On January 16, 2008, France and the UAE signed a nuclear cooperation agreement. The UAE is also pursuing nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia, Germany, China, the U.K., Japan, 

and South Korea. In light of other nuclear suppliers moving forward with their agreements, the U.S.–UAE Nuclear Cooperation 

Agreement could help reshape the standard by which nuclear 

agreements are conducted in a world going through a nuclear 

energy renaissance. 

This agreement may very well be the model—the model—needed 

to conclude civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with Middle 

Eastern countries and set on obtaining this technology. It could 

also serve as a new standard operating procedure for members of 

the nuclear suppliers group and other export control regimes. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on the regional implications of the UAE 123 Agreement and how the agreement can 

possibly serve as a model for future such agreements. 

The UAE’s willingness to explicitly forswear uranium enrichment 

and spent-fuel reprocessing for plutonium production is a legally 

binding standard—a legally binding standard—that we should seek 

3 

in all nuclear cooperation agreements. On this point, a few of my 

colleagues in the Senate and the House have expressed their concern that the agreement does not do enough to ensure that the 

UAE strengthen its export controls, and we’ll be talking about that 

today. Members of the administration have argued that strengthening one’s export controls must be implemented over time and 

that the UAE has taken significant steps to rectify this problem. 

As we discuss this nuclear agreement today, it will be helpful to 

know what steps the UAE has taken to strengthen its export controls and how the United States will continue to leverage its relationship with the UAE to reduce the illicit trafficking of goods 

through its territory. 

President Obama continues to express his desire for a nuclearweapons-free world. We know that a nuclear-weapons-free world 

does not mean a nuclear-energy-free world. Nonproliferation is not 

about creating rules that prohibit the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but rather nonproliferation is about setting rules based on the 

current threat environment to prevent the irresponsible use—the 

irresponsible use—of nuclear technology. To say we will not support the peaceful use of nuclear energy by the UAE could support 

the false Iranian charges that we seek to prevent access to nuclear 

technology in Muslim nations—or to Muslim nations, I should say. 

This agreement sends a message that the United States is willing to deal with an array of countries on the basis of their commitment to peaceful nuclear energy and compliance with international 

norms and safeguards. Therefore, I believe the United States must 

be a leader, not only on nonproliferation, but on how to use nuclear 

energy responsibly. Energy insecurity and climate change are problems that will continue to drive nuclear energy production. The 

question before us today is whether or not this nuclear cooperation 

agreement provides the United States the opportunity to start reshaping nonproliferation norms in an era when countries are seeking energy diversification and hedging against external security 

threats. 

We are pleased to have an excellent group of witnesses today to 

explain the dimensions of this nuclear cooperation agreement and 

its effect on nonproliferation regimes as more nations explore the 

need for civilian nuclear programs. Each of our witnesses has more 

than 20 years experience in either arms control or Middle East 

policy. 

Our first panel features the Honorable Vann Van Diepen, the 

Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and 

Nonproliferation. He is joined by the Honorable Janet Sanderson, 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, as well 

as, today, the Idaho National Laboratory Deputy Associate Laboratory Director for Nuclear Science and Technology, Harold McFarlane. I’m sure that their testimony will provide insights into this 

nuclear cooperation agreement and how it can serve as a model for 

future agreements. 

I want to welcome all of our witnesses and commend them for 

their work, and thank them for their willingness to appear today. 

And with that, let me turn to our ranking member, Senator 

Risch, for any opening statement that he might have. 

4 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO 

Senator RISCH. Senator Casey, thank you very much. 

First of all, let me say that I had the honor and privilege of traveling in the UAE this spring. I met with the sheikh in Dubai, and 

numerous government officials there, and I can’t tell you how impressed I was with, not only the commitment, but the sincerity of 

the people in the UAE to pursue goals that are shared both by the 

UAE and by this country, as far as the use of nuclear energy for 

peaceful purposes. I was so impressed with their commitment and 

their sincerity to enter into negotiations whereby nuclear power 

would be used and they would forsake the enrichment. 

Having said that, I want to say, Senator Casey, thank you so 

much for holding this very important hearing. And I want to thank 

the State Department witnesses, also, who are here to testify. I 

want to welcome Dr. McFarlane, from the great State of Idaho. I’ve 

had the honor and privilege of working with Dr. McFarlane, both 

when I was Governor of the State of Idaho, now as United States 

Senator, and he is certainly a preeminent expert in these areas 

that we’re going to talk about today. 

As we go forward—and, Senator Casey, as you mentioned—the 

agreement with the UAE could very well be a model used, not only 

in the region, but around the world, for the development of nuclear 

energy, which will be important to us as we strive to put less carbon into the atmosphere, and as many of the other 200 countries 

in the world strive to convert to nuclear energy. And the United 

States is well-poised to help. The United States is well-poised to 

take the economic advantage that’s available to us to export that 

type of technology. And we, in Idaho, are excited about, and doing 

our best to encourage, the establishment and construction of a 

domestic enrichment plant, known as the Eagle Rock facility, in 

Bonneville County, ID. 

So, with that, I look forward to hearing all of you testify. And 

again, thank you, Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Risch. And we’re always 

happy to have more Idaho talent in the Nation’s Capital. I just 

hope the trip here wasn’t too long for the Doctor. 

But, thank you very much, Senator Risch, and thank you for 

your staff’s help, as well, in arranging and working on this hearing. 

I know that we will have other Senators joining us during the 

question period, but I thought what we would do now is go to our 

witnesses’ opening statements. 

Dr. McFarlane, we’ll start with you and move from left to right. 

If you could keep your statements around 7 minutes, I have a 

gavel, but I’m hesitant to use it on witnesses. [Laughter.] 

We’ll have a joint effort on the gavel. But, as best you can. Your 

full statements, if they’re longer than that and you want to highlight or summarize them, will be made part of the record. So, without asking for that, we’re making sure that you know you can have 

that as part of the record. 

So, Dr. McFarlane, why don’t we start with you, and then we’ll 

conclude with our witnesses and get to questions. 

5 

STATEMENT OF DR. HAROLD MCFARLANE, CHAIRMAN OF THE 

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR ENERGY ACADEMY, FORMER 

PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR SOCIETY, AND 

DEPUTY ASSOCIATE LABORATORY DIRECTOR FOR NUCLEAR 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY, IDAHO FALLS, ID 

Dr. MCFARLANE. Well, Chairman Casey and Ranking Member 

Risch, thank you for this opportunity today to testify before the 

subcommittee on this U.S.–UAE agreement for peaceful nuclear 

cooperation. 

I believe that this agreement will set a positive example for the 

more than 30 countries that, for the first time, are considering nuclear energy as a strategic component for meeting their projected 

growing demand for reliable, clean, baseload electricity. It will also 

establish expectations of strong nonproliferation assurance for 

other nations with nuclear energy ambitions in the region. Given 

the ongoing challenges the international community has faced with 

Iran, the UAE’s voluntary agreement to forgo the sensitive technologies of uranium enrichment and reprocessing while applying 

IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities will usher in a landmark 

standard of nonproliferation, safety, and transparency in the Middle East and other parts of the world. 

The UAE has expressed a willingness to make the investment in 

capital, time, and human resources that is necessary to implement 

a responsible nuclear energy program. The UAE has already contributed $10 million toward an international fuel bank that will 

help create a low-enriched uranium reserve as insurance against 

supply disruptions in the global uranium market. Preparation for 

irreplaceable U.S. cooperation and advice in developing a robust 

regulatory safety framework has begun with initial discussions 

about arrangements for technical exchanges. 

For 60 years, aspiring and established nuclear energy states 

have turned to the U.S. education system to train their future leaders in nuclear research, regulation, and commercialization. This is 

a critical role that the United States can serve in nurturing the 

UAE’s development of an educational framework for the nuclear 

workforce that it will need to create and sustain a safe and reliable 

nuclear energy infrastructure. 

Among the countries with existing peaceful nuclear energy programs, I have found a consistently high level of desire for U.S. 

engagement and leadership in international nuclear matters, an 

interest that has been sustained through periods when the U.S. 

nuclear energy policy was less defined. The cooperation agreement 

with the UAE sends a strong signal that the United States is 

engaging with clear policy objectives for nonproliferation, safety, 

and responsible international expansions of the benefits of clean 

nuclear energy. 

This action will have positive impacts beyond this specific agreement. Failure to act would be detrimental to U.S. nonproliferation 

and economic objectives. It has been estimated that the UAE will 

spend some $40 billion over the next few years to create and operate their nuclear energy supply system. Under the umbrella of the 

123 Agreement, U.S. industry will be able to compete for some of 

that business, with a high expectation of success. Although some 

6 

U.S. firms are currently providing evaluation and advisory services 

to the UAE without a nuclear cooperation agreement in place, the 

large supplier contracts will depend upon this agreement. 

Given this agreement’s affirmation of U.S. policy objectives and 

its apparently broad support from all branches of government, the 

resulting creation of thousands of high-quality U.S. jobs will be a 

well-earned outcome. 

The Department of Energy’s national laboratories provide an unparalleled technical resource that can be called upon to assure that 

terms of this agreement are effectively implemented and monitored. The national labs work closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency to develop and implement effective compliance 

monitoring technology. For example, Los Alamos took the lead in 

designing and testing equipment for assuring safeguards compliance in the soon-to-be-commissioned Rokkasho Mura reprocessing 

plant in Japan. Oak Ridge has helped return highly enriched uranium from areas of the world where it is no longer—has a viable 

use. Oregon and Idaho have developed low-enriched research reactor fuel to convert both foreign and domestic research reactors from 

high-enriched uranium without any noticeable loss of capability. 

National laboratory and Department of Energy personnel also 

work with the IAEA to develop resource information on the complex institutional and technical framework needed by nations with 

emerging peaceful nuclear energy ambitions. 

National laboratories work together with their industry, academia, and regulatory counterparts on harmonizing international 

nuclear safety standards with the IAEA and other international 

organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation 

and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency and the Generation-IV 

International Forum. 

National laboratories, universities, and the nuclear industry have 

a large cadre of personnel who actively participate in international 

professional organizations. This type of unofficial engagement provides additional insight into the ambitions of other countries while 

projecting our safety and nonproliferation values in an effective 

and positive venue. 

Last year, a UAE representative with a nuclear engineering 

degree from Perdue University explained their approach to developing nuclear energy to a meeting of the American Nuclear Society. 

In a healthy, compliant nuclear program, we would expect to see 

this type of engagement by the UAE increase and be expanded to 

include active participation in other relevant organizations, such as 

WANO, the World Organization for Nuclear Operators. 

In summary, my 37 years in national and international nuclear 

energy arenas leads me to support the agreement for cooperation 

between the Government of the United Arab Emirates and the 

Government of the United States of America concerning peaceful 

uses of nuclear energy. My international experience has convinced 

me that U.S. engagement and leadership are effective tools for 

positively influencing nuclear programs abroad. In the case of the 

UAE, our assurance of an international nuclear fuel supply in 

exchange for their renunciation of sensitive nuclear technologies 

reinforces that conviction. 

7 

This concludes my statement, and I’d be happy to take any questions that you have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. McFarlane follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. HAROLD MCFARLANE, CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL

NUCLEAR ENERGY ACADEMY; FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR

SOCIETY; AND DEPUTY ASSOCIATE LABORATORY DIRECTOR FOR NUCLEAR SCIENCE

AND TECHNOLOGY, IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY, IDAHO FALLS, ID 

Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for this opportunity to testify today before the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, 

on the U.S.–UAE Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. I believe that this 

agreement will set a positive example for the more than 30 countries that for the 

first time are considering nuclear energy as a strategic component for meeting their 

projected growing demand for reliable, clean baseload electricity. It will also establish expectations of strong nonproliferation assurance for other nations with nuclear 

energy ambitions in the region. Given the ongoing challenges the international community has faced with Iran, the UAE’s voluntary agreement to forgo the sensitive 

technologies of uranium enrichment and reprocessing while applying IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities will usher in a landmark standard of nonproliferation and safety transparency in the Middle East and other parts of the world. 

The UAE has expressed a willingness to make the investment in capital, time, 

and human resources that is necessary to implement a responsible nuclear energy 

program. The UAE has already contributed $10 million toward an international fuel 

bank that will help create a low-enriched uranium reserve as insurance against supply disruptions in the global uranium market. Preparation for irreplaceable U.S. cooperation and advice in developing a robust regulatory safety framework has begun 

with initial discussions about arrangements for technical exchanges. For 60 years 

aspiring and established nuclear energy states have turned to the U.S. education 

system to train their future leaders in nuclear research, regulation, and commercialization. This is a critical role that the United States can serve in nurturing the 

UAE’s development of an educational framework for the nuclear workforce that it 

will need to create and sustain a safe and reliable nuclear energy infrastructure. 

Among the countries with existing peaceful nuclear energy programs, I have 

found a consistently high level of desire for U.S. engagement and leadership in 

international nuclear matters, an interest that has been sustained through periods 

when U.S. nuclear energy policy was less defined. The cooperation agreement with 

the UAE sends a strong signal that the United States is engaging with clear policy 

objectives for nonproliferation, safety and responsible international expansion of the 

benefits of clean nuclear energy. This action will have positive impacts beyond this 

specific agreement. Failure to act would be detrimental to U.S. nonproliferation and 

economic objectives. 

It has been estimated that the UAE will spend some $40 billion over the next few 

decades to create and operate their nuclear energy supply system. Under the umbrella of the 123 Agreement, U.S. industry will be able to compete for some of that 

business, with a high expectation of success. Although some U.S. firms are currently 

providing evaluation and advisory services to the UAE, without a nuclear cooperation agreement in place, the large supplier contracts will depend upon this agreement. Given this agreement’s unprecedented affirmation of U.S. policy objectives 

and its apparently broad support from all branches of government, the resulting creation of thousands of high-quality U.S. jobs will be a well-earned outcome. 

The Department of Energy’s national laboratories provide an unparalleled technical resource that can be called upon to help assure that terms of this agreement 

are effectively implemented and monitored. The national labs work closely with the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to develop and implement effective 

compliance monitoring technology. For example, Los Alamos took the lead role in 

designing and testing equipment for assuring safeguards compliance in the soon-tobe-commissioned Rokkasho Mura reprocessing plant in Japan. Oak Ridge has 

helped return highly enriched uranium from areas of the world when it no longer 

had a viable use. Argonne and Idaho have developed low-enriched research reactor 

fuel to convert both foreign and domestic research reactors from high-enriched uranium without noticeable loss of capability. 

National laboratories and Department of Energy personnel also work with the 

IAEA to develop resource information on the complex institutional and technical 

framework needed by nations with emerging peaceful nuclear energy ambitions. 

National laboratories also work together with their industry, academia, and reguVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:34 Mar 31, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\US-UAE.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
8 

latory counterparts on harmonizing international nuclear safety standards with the 

IAEA and other international organizations such as the Organization for Economic 

Cooperation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency and the Generation-IV International Forum. 

National laboratories, universities, and the nuclear industry have a large cadre 

of nuclear personnel who actively participate in international professional organizations. This type of unofficial engagement provides additional insight into the ambitions of other countries while projecting our safety and nonproliferation values in 

an effective and positive venue. Last year a UAE representative, with a nuclear 

engineering degree from Purdue University, explained the UAE’s approach to developing nuclear energy to a meeting of the American Nuclear Society. In a healthy, 

compliant nuclear program we would expect to see this type of engagement by the 

UAE increase and be expanded to include active participation in other relevant 

organizations such as WANO, the World Organization of Nuclear Operators. 

In summary, my 37 years in national and international nuclear energy arenas 

leads me to support the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the 

United Arab Emirates and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. My international experience has convinced 

me that U.S. engagement and leadership are effective tools for positively influencing 

nuclear programs abroad. In the case of the UAE, our assurance of an international 

nuclear fuel supply in exchange for their renunciation of sensitive nuclear technologies reinforces that conviction. 

Senator CASEY. Doctor, thank you very much. 

Ambassador Sanderson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JANET SANDERSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador SANDERSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you very much for the opportunity to 

testify today. 

Mr. Chairman, the proposed agreement under review today 

should be seen in the context of the close and very important bilateral relationship that has developed between the United States and 

the United Arab Emirates in the past several years. The United 

States and the UAE have established strong partnership, and we 

share a common vision for a secure, stable, and prosperous Middle 

East. 

The UAE is a strong supporter of the Palestinian authority. It 

was the first Arab State to send an ambassador to Baghdad and 

to support Iraq’s engagement and reintegration into the neighborhood. It has also committed to cancel $7 billion of Iraqi debt. 

The United States and the UAE are working closely to bring 

peace and stability to Afghanistan, where the UAE has deployed 

combat troops. The UAE provides the United States and coalition 

forces access to its ports and territories, as well as other critical 

logistical assistance, and it is working vigorously to support Pakistan, pledging $300 million in assistance at the Tokyo Conference 

in April 2009. 

The UAE, we believe, has been a responsible and reliable partner 

of energy to world markets, with the sustained involvement of U.S. 

companies in the UAE oil and gas sector for more than 40 years. 

The UAE has made sizeable investments in the development of 

renewable energy, and, on June 29 of this year, was selected to 

host the headquarters of the International Renewable Energy 

Agency, also known as IRENA. 

9 

The proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear energy further 

strengthens cooperation between our two countries. In addition, as 

Acting Assistant Secretary Van Diepen will note, the agreement is 

a significant nonproliferation achievement. 

Mr. Chairman, in sum, the proposed agreement under review 

today should be seen in the context of our expanding and very close 

bilateral relationship with the United Arab Emirates. By signing 

this agreement, the United States and the UAE will continue to 

strengthen this already vibrant and multifaceted relationship, and 

we believe that the proposed agreement deserves the support of 

Congress. 

Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, thank you very much 

for the opportunity to testify in support of this groundbreaking 

agreement. I look forward to your questions. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Ambassador Sanderson. 

Mr. Van Diepen. 

STATEMENT OF VANN VAN DIEPEN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, 

members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify today in support of the proposed U.S.–UAE agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. And thank you for agreeing 

that our formal testimony will be incorporated into the record. 

This proposed agreement is a significant nonproliferation 

achievement. And, as Ambassador Sanderson noted, it represents 

a further strengthening of cooperation between the United States 

and the UAE. 

For the first time in such an agreement, a U.S. partner has voluntarily agreed to forgo enrichment and reprocessing. The proposed 

agreement also provides, for the first time, that prior to U.S. licensing of exports for nuclear material, equipment, components, or 

technology, the UAE shall bring into force the Additional Protocol 

to its safeguards agreement. It also allows the United States to require the removal of special fissionable material from the UAE and 

its transfer either to the United States or a third country if exceptional circumstances of concern, from a nonproliferation standpoint, 

so require. 

The UAE’s expressed commitment not to pursue enrichment and 

reprocessing capabilities represents a marked contrast to Iran, 

which has failed to comply with its international obligations and 

seeks indigenous nuclear capabilities unnecessary for civil nuclear 

power, but critical for the development of nuclear weapons. 

It is well known that the UAE has been a transshipment hub for 

sensitive items, and was used by the A.Q. Khan network for some 

of its activities. In the past several years, however, the UAE has 

taken critical steps to address this problem. It helped the United 

States expose and shut down the Khan network by taking actions 

against firms and financial activities on its territory. The UAE has 

declared it the high—at the highest levels, that its territory should 

not be a source of proliferation in the future. 

More work remains to be done to implement this decision, but 

the UAE has made considerable progress. Just a few days ago, the 

10 

UAE adopted a civil nuclear energy law that domestically prohibits 

uranium enrichment, creates a Federal authority for nuclear regulation, and develops a nuclear material licensing and control system. It is taking steps to implement U.N. Security Council resolutions against North Korea and Iran. It has taken actions to prevent 

the abuse of its financial system by proliferators. It has worked 

closely with the United States to prevent the diversion of U.S.-origin goods and technology through its territories. It is taking action 

against companies engaged in proliferation-related activities, and it 

has indicated that it has stopped shipments of WMD-related goods 

to countries of concern. 

The United States is committed to working with the UAE on further steps toward establishing a comprehensive export control 

regime and effective export control practices. Earlier this year we 

held our annual bilateral counterproliferation task force, in which 

we discussed additional ways to address proliferation issues. 

We are assisting the UAE through the Department of Statecoordinated Export Control and Related Border Security Program, 

as well as other U.S. Government programs, in establishing a comprehensive export control regime and effective export control practices. While the UAE still has work to do, we believe that it is taking the necessary steps to implement an effective export control 

system. As a result, the UAE has become one of our strongest nonproliferation partners. It genuinely shares our concern over the 

proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials, as well as over WMD financing. 

In closing, I would like to ask the committee and the Congress 

to consider the proposed agreement on its own merits. It is in some 

ways a groundbreaking agreement. It contains all the necessary 

nonproliferation conditions and controls that Congress has written 

into law. It does not commit either party to transfer any nuclear 

commodities, technologies, or services to the other. Those are decisions for the future and will be handled only on a case-by-case 

basis according to the usual stringent U.S. licensing practices. 

As President Obama has formally determined, the agreement 

will promote, and not constitute unreasonable risk to, the common 

defense and security. By signing this agreement, the United States 

and the UAE have taken an important step in building a long and 

mutually beneficial partnership to enhance nonproliferation and 

energy security in the region. The proposed agreement deserves the 

support of the Congress. 

[The joint prepared statement of Acting Assistant Secretary Van 

Diepen and Deputy Assistant Secretary Janet Sanderson follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY VANN H. VAN

DIEPEN AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY JANET SANDERSON, DEPARTMENT OF

STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, thank you for 

this opportunity to testify today before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 

support of the proposed U.S.–UAE Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, 

which President Obama submitted to the Congress on May 21 for review pursuant 

to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. As shown by last 

month’s visit of Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and 

Deputy Supreme Commander of the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces to Washington to see President Obama and other officials, this important agreement reinforces a particularly strong and mutually beneficial political, security, and economic 

11 

bilateral relationship. The UAE is a valued partner, cooperating with us on issues 

related to the Palestinian Authority, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. 

In connection with approving the proposed agreement and authorizing its execution, the President made the determination required by section 123 of the Atomic 

Energy Act that performance of the proposed agreement will promote, and will not 

constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. 

Our purpose today is to discuss with the committee the principal factors that the 

President considered before making his statutory determination, and to urge the 

Senate to give the proposed agreement favorable consideration. 

A GROUNDBREAKING ACHIEVEMENT

Let us say at the outset that the administration recognizes the nonproliferation 

value of this unique agreement. The UAE has made a principled decision that it will 

abide by the highest nonproliferation standards. The U.S.–UAE 123 Agreement recognizes these commitments and achievements of the Government of the United Arab 

Emirates and provides the basis to expand our existing cooperation into areas of 

peaceful nuclear energy. 

Consistent with the UAE’s commitments to the highest nonproliferation standards, the proposed agreement contains some unprecedented features for agreements 

of this type. For the first time in an agreement of this type, the UAE has voluntarily 

agreed to forgo uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel. This will supplement in a legally binding international agreement the UAE’s recent pioneering law 

to prohibit uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel. Additionally, for the 

first time, the proposed agreement provides that prior to U.S. licensing of exports 

of nuclear material, equipment, components, or technology pursuant to the agreement, the UAE shall bring into force the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The agreement also allows for the United States to remove 

special fissionable material subject to the agreement from the UAE either to the 

United States or to a third country if exceptional circumstances of concern from a 

nonproliferation standpoint so require. 

The proposed agreement has a term of 30 years and permits the transfer of 

nuclear material, equipment (including reactors), and components for civil nuclear 

research and civil nuclear power production subject to subsequent individual export 

licensing. It does not permit transfers of Restricted Data, sensitive nuclear technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, or major critical components of such facilities. It 

limits the special fissionable material that may be transferred under the agreement 

to low enriched uranium except for small amounts of special fissionable material for 

use as samples, standards, detectors, targets or other purposes agreed by the Parties. If the agreement is terminated, key nonproliferation conditions and controls 

will continue with respect to material, equipment, and components subject to the 

agreement. 

In sum, the robust nonproliferation features of the UAE 123 Agreement are a significant achievement. The UAE is an example of a country that has concluded that 

indigenous fuel cycle capabilities are not needed to fully enjoy the benefits of civil 

nuclear energy. 

Mr. Chairman, please let us expand on some of the key points I have just made. 

Once the proposed agreement enters into force, it will establish the necessary 

legal framework for the United States and the UAE to engage in subsequent, individually authorized forms of cooperation in the development of nuclear energy for 

peaceful purposes to assist the UAE in meeting its growing energy demand. In addition to being indicative of our strong partnership with the UAE, the proposed agreement is a tangible expression of the United States desire to cooperate with states 

in the Middle East, and elsewhere, that want to develop peaceful nuclear power in 

a manner consistent with the highest nonproliferation, safety and security standards. 

THE UAE’S STRONG NONPROLIFERATION CREDENTIALS

We have spoken of the UAE’s commitment to the highest nonproliferation standards. We shall summarize the UAE’s strong nonproliferation credentials in a checklist form: 

• The UAE acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on September 

26, 1995, and its IAEA Safeguards Agreement entered into force on October 9, 

2003. It has signed the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with 

the IAEA and is committed to bringing it into force. 

• The UAE ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 

on November 15, 2003, and deposited its instrument of acceptance for the 2005 

Amendment strengthening the Convention on July 31, 2009. 

12 

• It acceded to the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of 

Nuclear Terrorism on January 10, 2008. • The UAE is implementing UNSC 1540—a resolution that, among other things, 

requires U.N. Member States to take and enforce effective measures to establish 

domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 

their means of delivery and related materials. • UAE Federal Law 6 issued in 2009 prohibits uranium enrichment and spent 

fuel reprocessing, creates a Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation, and 

develops a nuclear material licensing and control system. • UAE Federal Law 13 issued in 2007 provides a strong basis on which to build 

an effective export control system for commodities that are subject to import 

and export control procedures. 

• The UAE actively participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Container Security Initiative. 

• The UAE is a key counterterrorism partner and actively works to combat money 

laundering and terrorist financing. 

• The UAE has stated it intends to implement export and import control rules 

for nuclear and nuclear-related equipment and technology in strict accordance 

with the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for nuclear transfers. This will 

enhance the UAE’s current basis for an export control system and assist its government in preventing illicit transshipments of sensitive nuclear technologies 

through the UAE. 

In March 2008, the United Arab Emirates published its policy for the development of nuclear energy in a report entitled, ‘‘Policy of the United Arab Emirates on 

the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy.’’ In it, the 

UAE committed itself inter alia to ‘‘pursuing the highest standards of nonproliferation’’ and ‘‘the highest standards of safety and security.’’ In signing this agreement, 

the UAE has demonstrated its commitment to develop civil nuclear energy in a 

responsible way, in full conformity with its nonproliferation commitments and obligations. U.S. cooperation with the UAE will also serve as a distinct counterpoint to 

those countries that have chosen a different path, in particular Iran. 

The UAE’s commitment not to pursue enrichment and reprocessing capabilities is 

in marked contrast to Iran, which has continued to defy its international obligations 

and is continuing to develop technical capabilities that could be applied to nuclear 

weapons development. 

The UAE recognizes the value of international cooperation for establishing a 

nuclear power program as well as the need to develop domestic human resources. 

The UAE is expected to hire a foreign consortium to construct, operate, and perhaps 

partially own its first nuclear powerplants while local expertise is developed. U.S. 

industry is poised to assist with the development of a nuclear power program in the 

UAE, but the Agreement for Cooperation is necessary to allow its full participation. 

U.S. technology in this area is leading-edge, and the United States anticipates that 

the UAE will give it strong consideration as the UAE moves forward in implementing its plans. 

U.S. PRIOR APPROVAL FOR RETRANSFERS

The Agreed Minute to the proposed agreement provides U.S. prior approval for 

retransfers by the UAE of irradiated nuclear material subject to France and the 

United Kingdom, if consistent with their respective policies, laws, and regulations. 

Such retransfers would provide the UAE opportunities for management of its spent 

fuel, subject to specified conditions, including that prior agreement between the 

United States and the UAE is required for the transfer to the UAE of any special 

fissionable material recovered from any such reprocessing. Plutonium recovered 

from reprocessing could not be returned under the agreement (with the exception 

of small quantities for the uses described above, but even then only with the further 

agreement of the Parties). The transferred material would also have to be held within the European Atomic Energy Community subject to the Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy between the United States of America 

and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). 

In view of the fact that this retransfer consent would constitute a subsequent 

arrangement under the Act if agreed to separately from the proposed agreement, 

the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy have ensured that the advance 

approval provisions meet the applicable requirements of Section 131 of the Atomic 

Energy Act. Specifically, they have concluded that U.S. advance approval for retransfer of nuclear material for reprocessing or storage contained in the Agreed 

Minute to the proposed agreement is not inimical to the common defense and secuVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:34 Mar 31, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\US-UAE.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
13 

rity. An analysis of the advance approval given in the Agreed Minute is contained 

in the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) submitted to Congress 

with the agreement. 

CONCLUSION

For all the above reasons we would ask the subcommittee, and the Senate, to consider the proposed agreement on its merits. It is, in some ways, a groundbreaking 

agreement. It contains all the necessary nonproliferation conditions and controls 

that Congress has written into law. It does not commit either Party to transfer any 

nuclear commodities, technology or services to the other. Those are decisions for the 

future and will be handled on a case-by-case basis according to the usual stringent 

U.S. licensing procedures. As President Obama determined, the agreement will promote, and not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. 

By signing this agreement, the United States and the UAE have taken an important 

step in building a long and mutually beneficial partnership to enhance nonproliferation and energy security in the region. The proposed agreement deserves the support of the Congress. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you. We look forward to your 

questions. 

Senator CASEY. Thanks very much. 

Let me start. We’ll do 7-minute rounds, and probably several 

rounds. 

Let me start with both of our State Department witnesses with 

questions from two different areas. First of all, if you’re making a 

determination about something as grave and as serious as this, 

obviously there’s a cost-benefit analysis that has to be undertaken. 

And I know both the Obama administration as well as the Bush 

administration engaged in some level of cost-benefit analysis to 

make determinations about how to proceed here. I’d ask you first 

to make the case for this agreement, in terms of our own national 

security interests, in particular, as well as concerns beyond the 

scope of our own security to delve into the concerns that we have 

about nonproliferation and what that means for the rest of the 

world. Make the case in terms in terms of proliferation and to use 

this agreement to leverage other strategies. 

And then I want to ask you some questions about major concerns 

that I and others have about another aspect of the agreement. 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that it’s a 

pretty straightforward thing, from our standpoint. 

As noted in your opening statement and in my statement, this 

agreement has some very important nonproliferation features—the 

requirement to accede to the Additional Protocol, forgoing enrichment and reprocessing technology—that not only handles well the 

nonproliferation issues involving the UAE, but serves as a positive 

example for the responsible development of civil nuclear power 

throughout the Middle East. And it underscores our objective of 

limiting the spread of proliferation-sensitive enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in favor of promoting reliable international 

nuclear fuel supply arrangements. 

In addition, as Ambassador Sanderson noted, this agreement 

reinforces the already strong relationship between the United 

States and the UAE, including on nonproliferation, and including 

on nonproliferation issues involving not just the UAE, but regionally and globally, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and 

the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. 

And then, finally, as Dr. McFarlane noted, the agreement will 

provide a framework for potential commercial sales of civil nuclear 

14 

commodities to the UAE by U.S. industry under agreed nonproliferation conditions and controls, good both for the United States— 

and again, setting the standard for safe, secure, and safeguarded 

peaceful nuclear cooperation that we hope countries around the 

world will follow. 

Senator CASEY. Ambassador Sanderson, do you want to add to 

that, or—— 

Ambassador SANDERSON. I would just add that this is part and 

parcel of our overall relationship with the UAE, which—as I noted 

and I think that the Senator, during his trip to the UAE, saw firsthand—that the very cooperative and collaborative relationship that 

we have had over the last—I’d say the last 5 to 7 years—it’s a very 

different place, in many ways, the UAE, than it was 25 years ago, 

when I was the desk officer. It’s a—they are taking charge of their 

future. They have very seriously looked at what their energy needs 

will be down the road—the fact that they do not want to be totally 

dependent on their oil and gas resources; the fact that in 20 years 

or so, they’re going to have their energy needs—they’re going to see 

their energy needs almost triple—and they have decided to make 

a safe and secure choice, and do it within a framework which is 

acceptable, they believe, to their own needs as well as to the international community. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. I’ll get into further aspects surrounding making the case, because one of the things we have to do 

here is make the case to the American people; and they’re hearing 

a lot about proliferation issues right now, especially in the context 

of the controversy as it relates to Iran’s nuclear program. 

Let me move, in the few minutes I have left in this round, to 

raise an important concern that I and others have about export 

controls. And I know we’ve addressed it. I know, for example, that, 

in the joint testimony, you have several pages worth of examples 

of how the UAE has engaged—or has, I should say—strong nonproliferation credentials, and I know, on page 7, you refer, at least 

in two parts, two sections, to export controls. 

Here’s the concern. And there are a lot of ways to express it. But, 

the Port of Dubai is a major transshipment point for illicit goods 

bound for Iran. In the past, A.Q. Khan used the UAE to trade 

nuclear black-market goods to Iran. If this agreement goes into 

effect, the United States may—some would argue—may lose some 

of the leverage that it currently has to push the UAE to further 

strengthen export controls. 

Tell us how you deal with that concern. And, in particular, is 

there a risk that entities that will use this cooperation as a cover 

for proliferation shipments through the UAE to other countries? 

Please address that question. And we may have one more before 

my time is up. 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, on the last issue, Mr. Chairman, I don’t 

think there’s any substantial risk of any cooperation that we conduct under this agreement being misused and finding its way outside the UAE. Not only is the U.S. export control licensing system 

very thorough, including the potential for on-site end-use checks, 

and not only do we have very close intelligence coverage of nuclearrelated matters, but the substantial items that we would provide 

to the UAE under this agreement would be under International 

15 

Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. And so, I think the complex of 

those various measures, taken together, would really deal pretty 

effectively with that possibility. 

On the larger question of dealing with illicit activity going 

through places like Dubai, obviously, given the geographic proximity of Iran to the UAE, to a longstanding history of smuggling 

that goes back decades, if not centuries, in that area, it’s always 

going to be difficult to completely control that problem. But, as 

Ambassador Sanderson noted, over the past several years the UAE 

government has taken these issues especially seriously. They’ve 

passed new export control legislation, they’ve been extremely cooperative with us on specific cases of problematic shipments, they’ve 

shut down companies, they’ve monitored problem entities, they’ve 

done a lot of concrete activity, and we are working with them to 

help them go the rest of the way that they need to go. 

Senator CASEY. Well, I’ll push you a little more on that to get 

more detail on those steps, but my time is up. 

Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. Thank you, Senator. 

First of all—Ambassador Sanderson and the administration generally—really, to see that the administration has reached the same 

conclusion, I guess, I did, personally, after my discussions there, 

that indeed these people are dealing with us in good faith. I mean, 

this is not one of these gamesmanships things, or—where they’re 

taking us to the brink, and what have you. I mean, they are, in 

very good faith, wanting to do just what they’re telling us they 

want to do, and that is develop, for the future and to meet their 

energy needs, this nuclear power. 

As far as the proliferation issue, I think that that’s one of the 

things that encourages me about all this, is that in our dealings 

with the UAE, we’ve really gone beyond proliferation. I think all 

of us in America have been rightfully consumed by the proliferation 

issues, because of things that happened in other countries. But, 

this really takes us beyond that. And indeed, the conclusion I 

reached, Senator Casey, in response to your question, was that yes, 

indeed, the trade between Iran and the UAE, long before it was the 

UAE or anything else, goes back, as you pointed out, centuries. 

But, I think that the agreement, indeed the contract, that we’re 

going to enter into, will give us a better insight into what’s happening there, and probably better control as to what’s happening 

there, when it comes to nuclear issues. 

So, that was the conclusion I reached, and I’d be interested to 

hear the response of the people from the State Department for 

that. 

But, I have one minor question. I don’t want this to be a stumbling block or make it appear partisan, but I noted that the negotiations were completed in November, I think, of 2008, and an 

agreement was signed January 15, 2009. But, then the new administration went to renegotiate, and there was a renegotiation, and 

a reexecution, in May 2009. And I never really did understand the 

reason for that, or the niceties of it. Could one of you maybe enlighten me on that? Again, I don’t want to make more—I don’t 

want to make more of this than what it is. I’m glad the agreement 

16 

is here. But, I do have little more than a curiosity as to steps to 

how it got here. 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Yes, Senator. Basically, the reason for the renegotiation was to add into the agreement the provisions under 

which the UAE would forgo enrichment and reprocessing capability, and specifying that there would not be transfers until its 

Additional Protocol had entered into effect. So, the key nonproliferation features that had been noted in the chairman’s statement 

basically were the things that we added in that renegotiation. 

Senator RISCH. So, was it more procedural than substantive? Is 

that what you’re telling me, about the add-on to the contract? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, they were very substantive, but I—you 

know, they weren’t problematic. Maybe that’s a good way to answer 

your question. 

Senator RISCH. All right. As I close out my time here, maybe 

both of you from State could comment on my view that we may be 

better off with the agreement, when it comes to proliferation, than 

we would be without the agreement with the UAE. 

Ambassador SANDERSON. Well, let me, if I may—let me, if I may, 

Senator, tell you that your sentiments, I think, have been replicated, time and time again, in dealing with the UAE. They have 

assured us that they want to go forward in this process in the most 

transparent, safe, and secure manner. And we are hopeful that this 

will open doors for us, in terms of our dealings with the UAE. 

I must tell you that we have a very frank, useful, and collaborative dialogue on proliferation issues, on transshipment issues, on 

the issues that we are talking about today, with the UAE. But, I 

hope that this will give further context to those discussions. 

Senator RISCH. Mr. Van Diepen, could you comment on that? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. And again, just to echo what Ambassador 

Sanderson has said, I think that both the specific nonproliferation 

provisions of the agreement itself, as well as the strengthening of 

the overall bilateral relationship that the agreement represents, 

both of which will help us pursue more effectively this nonproliferation issue that we have with the UAE, and I think it’ll prompt the 

UAE to do more, and it would also make our ability to assist them 

more effective. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Risch. 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. It’s an important issue that needs to be publicly 

debated. 

There is no clear line between a civilian nuclear energy program 

and a nuclear weapons program. So, I think it’s vital that Congress 

exercise its oversight power and hold hearings to carefully consider 

the terms and implications of every nuclear cooperation agreement 

that comes before us. 

The United Arab Emirates and the United States have an important relationship, one that I hope will continue to strengthen. I also 

understand the growing energy needs that all countries face, and 

appreciate the interest of the UAE in seeking alternative and 

diversified sources of energy. 

17 

However, I do have strong concerns about expanding the use of 

nuclear energy, particularly in this volatile region, before we have 

an international regime in place to ensure that countries will not 

export enrichment and reprocessing technologies. And if an effective international agreement prohibiting the transferring of these 

technologies is not forthcoming, I think we do have to have a serious discussion about whether we should continue following the current course of promoting nuclear energy and entering into these 

cooperation agreements. 

I am concerned that an increased reliance on nuclear energy will 

lead a growing number of countries to seek the ability to produce 

nuclear fuel. While we may receive assurances today that this is 

not the intent, the history of nations relying on foreign fuel supplies is not an encouraging one. We need to look no further than 

Iran to find a country which the United States used to provide 

nuclear fuel, that now insists on having its own fuel supply for 

what it claims are civilian purposes. 

Any nation with enrichment or reprocessing capabilities poses 

two threats. First, it can spark what amounts to an arms race as 

regional adversaries seek to have their own capabilities. Second, it 

increases the risk that weapons-grade materials could fall into the 

hands of terrorists. 

In the case of this particular agreement, we must also be certain 

that the UAE is committed to ensuring that its territory is never 

used again as a transit point for illicit nuclear trade. This will 

require ensuring that adequate export controls exist. And I want 

to emphasize that my concerns are obviously not just targeted at 

the UAE. Rather, I have serious reservations about committing to 

any nuclear cooperation agreement until there is an international 

agreement that effectively prohibits the transfer of enrichment and 

reprocessing technologies. 

Mr. Van Diepen, I’m pleased that the UAE has promised to forgo 

developing enrichment or reprocessing capacity pursuant to the 

proposed agreement. But, since the agreement also provides for renegotiation in the event that we sign a more generous agreement 

with a regional neighbor, I’m curious whether we’re having success 

in extracting similar promises from other countries. For example, 

are we likely to get a similar commitment from Jordan, with whom 

we have signed a Memorandum of Understanding? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Thank you, Senator. I think that—excuse me— 

all of these things are works in progress, and they’re countryspecific negotiations. But, if, in fact, this agreement goes into effect 

and we have a legally binding provision such as this with the UAE, 

it will certainly serve as an example that will make it easier for 

us to try and get similar provisions with other countries. 

The critical thing, I think, is—more critical is the idea of coming 

up with whatever practical and appropriate limits we can on the 

spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology, which you’ve 

made a very articulate case for, than the specific form of that 

agreement with any specific country. With Jordan, for example, we 

already have a Memorandum of Understanding that contains that 

provision. 

In terms of the UAE, in addition to the legally binding provision 

in this agreement, the UAE has just passed domestic legislation 

18 

that would—in a domestic legal way, would have them forgo 

enrichment or reprocessing capability. So, that’s another potential 

tool. 

And in terms of your larger question about controlling exports of 

enrichment and reprocessing capability, again, to the extent that 

we have provisions in—we have commitments from countries like 

the UAE not to have enrichment and reprocessing at all, that then 

provides a safeguard in terms of any shortcomings in our ability to 

get controls over exports of E&R, because the UAE has committed 

not to import E&R from anyone, not just from the United States. 

And it’s these very provisions in this UAE agreement that we 

think help establish another example, another method, another 

brick in the wall, of this overall effort of trying to get constraints 

on enrichment and reprocessing technology, both from the supply 

side, if you will, and the demand side. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. When can we expect the Nuclear 

Suppliers Group to vote on a final agreement to limit the transfer 

of enrichment and reprocessing technologies? And are you optimistic that they will approve such an agreement? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. I’m optimistic that one will ultimately be 

approved, but it’s going to take continued time. The couple of countries that have raised objections have raised objections of, kind of, 

broad sovereignty principle at very high levels that it’s going to 

take us some time to work around. But, these same countries are 

very much committed to nonproliferation, and so, I’m optimistic 

that we can work that through. 

In terms of a time prognosis, I’m really not in a position to give 

one at this point. 

Senator FEINGOLD. The criteria-based approach under consideration by the NSG does not appear to significantly limit the number of countries eligible to purchase enrichment and reprocessing 

technologies. How many countries would be eligible under this 

approach, and what is the administration’s position on a criteriabased approach? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, we support a criteria-based approach, in 

part because that’s realistically what’s achievable in the NSG, as 

the history of the past few years has demonstrated. But, we think 

that that is an effective way. 

But, more importantly, beyond the specifics of the criteria, it’s 

important to look at the history, and there basically have been 

very, very, very few authorized exports, by NSG countries, of 

enrichment and reprocessing technology. 

So, we’re already operating in an environment characterized by 

a high degree of constraint and restraint. And so, I think that we 

have to take that into consideration in working this issue. 

Also, it’s important to note that the G8 countries have agreed to 

go ahead and abide by that not-yet-agreed NSG policy, even though 

it is not agreed—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me just follow up. The UAE arguably satisfies the criteria included in past proposals, despite the potential 

presence of a terrorist threat within its borders. Would it trouble 

you if a final agreement permitted the transfer of technologies to 

produce weapons-grade material to countries where al-Qaeda might 

19 

operate? And how can we strengthen the potential NSG agreement 

to better safeguard against the risk posed by al-Qaeda? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Again, Senator, I think we’ve got to make a distinction between whatever the specific words in the agreement ultimately say and the actual behavior of Nuclear Suppliers Group 

countries. And again, there’s a long history of a great deal of constraint and restraint by NSG countries. There’s, you know, clear 

understanding amongst NSG countries of the sensitivity of this 

technology, and the fact that the United States and other countries 

would look askance and engage in counterpressure against any 

interest in selling that technology in an irresponsible way, which 

again, historically, has not been the case. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Feingold. 

Senator Kaufman. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Are there any—currently any plans for peaceful nuclear cooperation with other gulf states? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. We’ve concluded Memoranda of Understanding—not 123 Agreements, Memoranda of Understandings—with a 

number of gulf states. The UAE is really the farthest along, in 

terms of their degree of interest and commitment and preparation 

for peaceful nuclear activity, as Dr. McFarlane noted. We don’t 

have any concrete plans right now to engage in such activities with 

other countries in the gulf. But, I think, frankly, it—their processes 

on this are probably too early along to get to the point where that 

really becomes a realistic consideration. 

Senator KAUFMAN. And I assume that this 123 Agreement with 

UAE is a model for what you’d be thinking for, for other countries? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, the words that we’ve been using are a 

‘‘positive example,’’ again recognizing that, once you start getting 

into specific negotiations with specific countries in specific contexts, 

you may not be able to skin the cat exactly the same way each 

time. But, certainly the idea that we want to have the best possible 

controls on enrichment and reprocessing technology will absolutely 

be part of the mix. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Can you talk a little bit about the—I know 

the UAE signed an agreement with France. How is their agreement different from our agreement? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. I’m not familiar with all the details, but, in 

general, it does not contain a lot of the nonproliferation protections 

that ours do, because many of our provisions were pursuant to 

United States domestic law, for which there’s not a counterpart in 

France. 

But, in terms of French policy, and in terms of the sort of commercial framework, it’s not part of that envisaged commercial 

framework that there would be any transfers of enrichment and 

processing technology by France to the UAE. 

Senator KAUFMAN. And I know Chairman Casey talked about the 

benefits—cost benefits of this, and one of them is—Is there any discussion about talking to the UAE in regard to this, about the promotion of democracy, human rights, women’s rights, freedom of the 

press, all those issues? 

20 

Ambassador SANDERSON. Senator, if I may, I’ll take that question. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Sure. 

Ambassador SANDERSON. Those are discussions that we have 

with the UAE all the time. They’re part and parcel of our broader 

dialogue. We have not done them in specific reference to this agreement. We look at this agreement as standing alone. But as we pursue our diplomatic discussions with the UAE, we discuss a wide 

variety of issues, and they have a very forward-leaning young leadership in the UAE now, very determined to ensure that this country remains a modern stabilizing element in the region. And so, we 

are able to talk about what’s next with regard to opening up the 

political process, what’s next with regard to democratization in the 

region, and in the UAE in particular. It’s a good dialogue, and we 

continue that. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator RISCH [presiding]. Thank you. 

Senator Casey had to step out to cast another vote, but will be 

back rather quickly. 

I wish Senator Feingold had remained, because I was hoping we 

could have a dialogue about some of the remarks that he’s made. 

I think—first of all, let me say that I think everyone shares the 

objectives that Senator Feingold stated, and that is to prevent proliferation. But I think—one of the disagreements I had was, I don’t 

think that you can in any way compare UAE’s view of using 

nuclear material with that of Iran’s. I think that they are—you’re 

talking about the difference between night and day, the attitude of 

the regime, the attitude of the people toward the United States, the 

attitude of using nuclear for peaceful purposes versus nonpeaceful 

purposes. 

And I wonder, Ambassador, if you could comment on that, 

briefly, as far as the attitude of the two nations toward the use of 

nuclear material. 

Ambassador SANDERSON. Senator, I would agree with you wholeheartedly. On one hand you have Iran, which has not lived up to 

its international obligations, has not lived up to requests from the 

international community to give it a sense of where Iran intends 

to go with its nuclear program; in fact, has not given the international community the confidence that it is not going to engage 

in further proliferation and development of nuclear weapons or 

other items. 

You have, on the other hand, the UAE, that is trying to do this 

in a very transparent manner. It has made a conscious political 

decision to go with peaceful nuclear power. But, it wants to do it 

right. And I think that’s something that the UAE leadership 

deserves a great deal of credit for. They are working with us very 

closely. They understand our concerns about proliferation, about 

issues related to transshipment, about issues related to terrorism. 

They are working very much to clean up their own system and to 

put into place regimes necessary to deal with those issues. But, 

they want to do it right. They’ve seen the example of Iran. And 

frankly, as Mr. Van Diepen said, they are offering the international 

community an alternative example of how to move forward on 

peaceful nuclear power. 

21 

Senator KAUFMAN. Senator, can I just follow up? 

Senator RISCH. Yes, please. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes, and I think that’s right, and I think 

that’s clear, and I think it’s a good comment. But, I think—I know 

Senator Risch has raised this before—if Iran gets, and has, a 

nuclear weapon, and everybody in the gulf knows they have a nuclear weapon, then these attitudes about whether a country cannot 

develop nuclear weapons is going to become more and more important, and proliferation is going to be more of a problem. 

So that, right now, I think the UAE is right where we would like 

them to be, but you have—I mean, I think that if Iran has a nuclear weapon, the whole gulf state situation, with all the states in 

the gulf state, changes. Is that a correct analysis? 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, I think, to the extent that becomes a possibility, it’s all the more important that we try and lock countries 

into the proper path now. And so, the kinds of legally binding— 

internationally legally binding constraints that we have in this 

arrangement are exactly the kind of thing we’d want to have in 

place to deal with that potential contingency and help us manage 

it better. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. 

Senator RISCH. Senator Kaufman and I have discussed this at 

length, about the fact that he—it becomes a real game-changer in 

region if indeed Iran does develop a nuclear weapon. 

One—another comment I have about Senator Feingold’s questions or—and statement—and I’m not exactly sure what he meant 

by this, but he said there was no bright line, or no—the line between peaceful domestic use of nuclear material, versus nonpeaceful use, was not very clear. And I’m not exactly sure where he was 

going with that. 

But—maybe, Dr. McFarlane, you could comment on this—but it 

seems to me the step between highly enriched—the step making 

highly enriched uranium, versus simple enrichment of uranium for 

development of power, is indeed a very bright line that inspectors 

can determine quite quickly if a country is stepping over that line. 

Am I right or am I wrong on that, Doctor? 

Dr. MCFARLANE. Senator Risch, I think, given the type of technology that UAE is going to have, which is commercial nuclear 

reactors with low-enriched uranium fuel, I think that’s very easy, 

yes, to monitor and account for, and it is quite far removed from 

having highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium that could 

be used in a nuclear weapons program. So, I think there’s a lot of 

room there. Even if we don’t know exactly where the line is, we do 

know that the technology that they’re going to have available will 

be quite far removed from that line. And the safeguards that 

should be in place, I think, will be completely effective for that. 

Senator RISCH. You would agree, then, that something like that 

is relatively easily monitorable, if, indeed, they allow international 

inspectors into the country to review what’s going on. Am I right 

or am I wrong there? 

Dr. MCFARLANE. Yes, Senator Risch, you are correct. For the 

technology they have, it’s very simple, and monitoring techniques 

for simply counting—it’s just unit accountability—and then, there 

are more sophisticated techniques that are available through the 

22 

IAEA and with inspectors on the ground, so it should be very 

straightforward. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. 

I wonder if maybe I could get each of you to comment on the— 

and again, I think Senator Feingold raised some very legitimate, 

debatable points, and one of those has to do with our participation 

in this. And after going there, it seemed to me—and discussing 

with the people in the UAE, where they want to go—it seems to 

me it would be very, very naive for us to believe that if we just 

walked away from this, the UAE would abandon their efforts to do 

this. It seems to me the French are ready to jump in, and other 

countries are ready to jump in to take advantage of a financial situation. So, it seems to me that our better place is at the table, 

versus being a critic of what’s going on. 

Could you comment on that? Mr. Van Diepen, perhaps starting 

with you. 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. I think that’s right. In particular, given the fact 

that, although the agreement we have with the UAE is bilateral, 

it governs UAE activity across the board. And so, the UAE commitment not to possess enrichment and reprocessing technology 

applies not just to E&R technology it might get from the United 

States, but to any E&R technology from any source. Likewise the 

requirement that it have in force the Additional Protocol, once that 

protocol is in effect it will give the U.N.—give the IAEA inspection 

rights not just on U.S.-provided nuclear equipment, but nuclear 

equipment provided from any source. 

And so, this bilateral agreement actually has a broad global 

applicability, vis-a-vis the UAE, that would be, you know, very useful in terms of dealing with the issue that you’ve raised. 

Senator RISCH. Ambassador. 

Ambassador SANDERSON. I certainly would agree. I would also 

note that this project of the UAE has attracted a great deal of commercial interest around the world; and so, there are countries out 

there that are looking at this as a commercial possibility. And the 

fact that, as they go with the 123 Agreement, there will be a 

regime in place that will help govern where they end up, it’s certainly very useful. But, yes, it’s going to be a competitive market. 

Senator RISCH. Dr. McFarlane. 

Dr. MCFARLANE. I believe that they will go forward, and I think 

if we look at the risk to the United States, we are far better off 

to be engaged and understand what is going on and have some say 

in what they’re doing, versus being disengaged and not having an 

influence on how they go forward. So, it’s a fairly simple equation, 

I think, and it is important, I think, that the United States be a 

player. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. Let me just conclude, Mr. Chairman. 

I think that—after this hearing and after my trip and what have 

you, I think all of us should compliment the UAE, No. 1, for being 

a friend of America in the region, being as open and transparent 

as they are, and including the United States in their efforts to do 

what they are trying to do. So, I think we should embrace that. I 

think certainly we should continue to negotiate and work in good 

faith with them, to help them accomplish what they want to, 

23 

because what they want appears to be in the best interest of the 

United States also. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding the hearing. 

Senator CASEY [presiding]. Thank you Senator Risch. And I 

appreciate your insight, having spent some time in the area, and 

also the insight you bring to this hearing today. 

And I don’t know if Senator Risch asked for this, in my absence, 

that Idaho be represented at every subcommittee hearing henceforth, but we’ll see what we can do about that. 

And thank you for your patience. I had to run down the hallway 

to vote in another committee. 

I wanted to go back to some of the concerns that have been 

raised, just to highlight a few more questions. 

A related concern, in terms of the movement of goods or services 

commerce, really through the region, involves financial institutions 

and financial—for lack of a better phrase, financial flows—to Iranian banks with important ties to the Iranian proliferation efforts 

including Bank Melli, that carries out activities in UAE. I guess I’d 

ask you to restate, or enunciate further, steps that the UAE has 

taken to deal with these concerns about Iran, but also about the 

region. 

And I think Senator Risch made a good point about the fact that 

an agreement like this could provide better opportunities, strengthened opportunities for us to be able to pay even closer attention, 

and get even more intelligence and more information. 

But, I wanted to have you address that again, our State Department witnesses. 

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The UAE has taken a number of concrete steps to implement the 

U.N. Security Council resolutions that impose sanctions on Iran. 

And these are really the international legal basis that they and 

other countries have to try and deal with the problem of Iranian 

banking and proliferation finance. 

For example, the UAE was one of the first gulf states to alert its 

financial institutions this year to the perils of doing business with 

Iran. This is consistent with the statements of the so-called Financial Action Task Force, an international financial body. And it’s our 

understanding that these actions have resulted in increased scrutiny, by the UAE’s financial sector, of transactions with Iran. 

And as I noted before also, the UAE has passed and has started 

implementing new export control legislation, and we see them taking steps to enforce this law, and they’ve actually been prosecuting 

cases under that law. 

And again, as you’ve noted, the improvement in our bilateral 

relationship that’ll be facilitated by this 123 Agreement will, I 

think, give us a better basis to assist them to do even more in trying to deal with this very thorny problem. 

Senator CASEY. Ambassador. 

Ambassador SANDERSON. Senator, if I may? 

I would also note that over the last 5 to 7 years the UAE has 

put into place a series of laws and regulations that are regulating 

the movement of money through and in its territory. That includes 

a money laundering law, that includes adhering to the Middle East 

North Africa Financial Action Task Force that Mr. Van Diepen reVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:34 Mar 31, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\US-UAE.TXT SENFOR1 PsN: BETTY
24 

ferred to. They have implemented a counterterrorism law; they 

have set up a sensitive financial intelligence unit to look at money 

laundering and the passage of money through banks; they have 

worked very closely with the—the government has worked very 

closely with the Central Bank of the UAE to train and to put the 

banking system under increased regulation and scrutiny. 

It’s still a work in progress, but these have been significant 

efforts by the UAE government, and they’re—also been complimented by the fact, in certain instances, they have shut down 

financial entities, as well as companies that are involved in transshipment and the diversion of dual-use items. 

Senator CASEY. So, you’re confident that they’ve taken, to date, 

all the necessary and appropriate steps to deal with the broader 

question of export controls, as well as any other related concern 

that have been raised here. 

Ambassador SANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, it certainly remains a 

work in process, and as we’ve noted earlier, we are helping that 

through training, through exercises, and other endeavors as part 

and parcel of our partnership. But, they are putting into place the 

legal framework, and they are going after individuals and entities 

that they believe are involved in proliferation, transshipment, and 

other money-laundering-related issues. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

Dr. McFarlane, I didn’t have a chance to ask you a question 

before. I wanted to ask you—based upon your significant experience in the national and international nuclear energy arena—can 

you—and you’ve referred to this, I know, but I wanted to have you 

review or amplify—can you give us your sense of the commercial 

opportunities for U.S. companies here, in terms of, not just the opportunity, but the ability to compete as a result of this agreement. 

Dr. MCFARLANE. Well, as I mentioned in my testimony, there are 

some small contracts in place for consulting that currently is to 

help the UAE get into position to be able to start importing nuclear 

reactors for power and to regulate them effectively once they have 

them. 

But, these are fairly minor, compared to the opportunity that the 

U.S. companies will have to compete for both being major suppliers 

of components for the nuclear powerplants, as well as the fuel for 

the plants. And I’m very confident that U.S. technology is highly 

competitive in the world market and that there is a very high probability of success for some significant portion of those contracts. 

Senator CASEY. And what would the component parts that you 

see potential in, in terms of what we could export be? Can you list 

or identify some of those? 

Dr. MCFARLANE. Well, for one thing, we have—as I’m sure you’re 

aware, Senator—we have nuclear reactor vendors, such as Westinghouse from your State—— 

Senator CASEY. Right. 

Dr. MCFARLANE [continuing]. Home State. And we have—in addition to the reactor itself, there are many different, kind of, hardware components, such as steam supply systems and generators 

and things, which can be part of that export—on that export list. 

I mean, there’s quite a lot of hardware, and, in addition, there is 

engineering and construction expertise available from the United 

25 

States that I think is a good opportunity to compete for some of 

that—some of that design work. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

I wanted to highlight one last thing, one last theme that we’ve 

heard before. But, it’s interesting that—every once in a while in 

Washington, it’s good to point to a source outside of the four walls, 

so to speak, of the Senate. 

I was looking at a July Congressional Research Service report 

that was very informative on this agreement, and the background, 

and the process. But, I thought it was interesting, on page 6 of the 

report, it did highlight the two new provisions that are significant. 

And we mentioned these before, but I think it bears repeating, 

because when the American people are asked to review, or to at 

least be aware of, what this agreement means for the country—and 

it’s obviously not in the headlines every day we need additional 

assurances that I think these two provisions provide. 

‘‘First’’—and I’m quoting from the Congressional Research Service Report, on page 6, ‘‘First, the agreement provides that the UAE 

bring into force’’ the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards 

agreement before the United States licenses, ‘‘exports of nuclear 

material, equipment, components, or technology,’’ pursuant to the 

agreement. That’s significant. And we can’t highlight that enough, 

especially for Americans who are just beginning to tune into the 

ramifications of this agreement. So, it’s important that Additional 

Protocol is highlighted on the record. 

Second, as the CRS report notes, the agreement states that the 

UAE—and I’m quoting here from the report—‘‘shall not possess 

sensitive nuclear facilities within its territories or otherwise engage 

in activities within its territory for or relating to the enrichment 

or reprocessing of material, or for the alteration in form or content 

of plutonium, uranium 233, highly enriched uranium, or irradiated 

source or special fissionable material.’’ 

So, those two new provisions are significant. And I know you’ve 

highlighted those, or our witnesses have. But, I think it’s critically 

important that the American people know the lengths to which 

both administrations—the Bush administration and the Obama 

administration—have gone to insist upon as substantial and as airtight an agreement that we could negotiate, because it’s vitally 

important that we do this the right way. 

And I thought it was interesting that both administrations have 

used—in one way or another, have used the word ‘‘model’’ to 

describe this. Because it’s not enough for us to be able to make the 

case against what the Iranian regime has been doing. We have 

taken steps, and we’ll take more steps, to hold them accountable. 

And I think the international community will, as well. It’s also 

important that we can point to another model—not just a theory, 

not just a hope—but another model that other governments can try 

to live up to. 

So, it’s not by way of a question, but it’s by way of an observation, that these new provisions are vitally important. 

And with that, let me ask any and all of our witnesses if you’d 

like to add anything or to make any final remarks before we 

conclude. 

Anyone? 

26 

[No response.] 

Senator CASEY. OK. 

And we will leave the record open for other Senators on the subcommittee, or even beyond our subcommittee, to submit questions, 

and we would ask that our witnesses do your best to reply to those 

in writing. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

We’re adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SUPPLEMENTAL PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today’s hearing on the U.S.–UAE nuclear 

cooperation agreement. It is important to vigorously debate whether this agreement—and our practice of pursuing this type of agreement with other countries— 

is a sensible policy from a nonproliferation perspective. 

Today’s hearing made clear that there are many willing buyers and sellers of the 

technology needed to make nuclear fuel and weapon-grade materials. We should not 

pretend that a bilateral agreement with one government will change that fundamental reality. We must directly address this problem if we want to prevent terrorists from one day gaining the materials they need to acquire a nuclear weapon. 

I would like to address two issues that my colleagues raised at today’s hearing: 

The first issue is whether it is appropriate to compare the risks of nuclear cooperation with the UAE to the danger posed by Iran’s nuclear program. 

I do not believe that the UAE poses an Iran-style proliferation threat right now. 

I am concerned, however, that if we continue to encourage countries to pursue 

nuclear energy, it is only a matter of time before one of them decides to acquire an 

enrichment or reprocessing capacity to guarantee a nuclear fuel supply. It is common sense that any country relying on nuclear energy will want its own fuel supply 

notwithstanding any promises that it is willing to make today. Iran is just one of 

several countries that have illustrated this danger. 

While I applaud the UAE’s promises to forgo an enrichment and reprocessing 

capacity, there is a risk that a future regime could walk back that promise. The Iranian example is particularly relevant here: after all, the United States helped 

launch the Iranian nuclear program under the Atoms for Peace program, only to see 

it turn in a dangerous direction after the Iranian Revolution. 

Finally, I am not convinced that the UAE has taken the necessary steps to 

restrict illicit transfers to Iran. I understand they have passed a national export 

control reform law, but that implementation has been slow. 

The second issue is whether there is a clear line between a civilian nuclear energy 

program and a nuclear weapons program. 

I am not suggesting that the nuclear cooperation that would occur under the proposed agreement would be sufficient to support a nuclear weapons program. I am 

concerned, however, that this agreement—and others like it—may facilitate or 

encourage a nuclear weapons program. Even a civilian nuclear energy program 

involves dual-use technology, which can also be used to support a weapons program. 

Further, countries that depend on nuclear energy may eventually covet a domestic 

enrichment and reprocessing technology to ensure a reliable nuclear fuel supply. 

Lack of progress on an agreement in the Nuclear Suppliers Group that would meaningfully restrict the transfer of these technologies suggests that countries want to 

retain the right to transfer and receive enrichment and reprocessing technology for 

the financial and energy benefits that technology may bring. Given this reality, the 

promises in this bilateral agreement provide little comfort. 

RESPONSES OF ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY VANN H. VAN DIEPEN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. The proposed U.S.–UAE agreement breaks new ground by requiring the 

UAE (a) not to construct uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing facilities 

on its territory; and (b) to bring into force an Additional Protocol to its safeguards 

agreement with the IAEA before the United States will permit exports. But what 

27 

happens if other countries in the region refuse to accept these conditions, and other 

nuclear supplier countries nevertheless agree to engage in cooperation? 

What is the administration doing to keep the United States from being isolated 

and undercut as it tries to establish these standards for cooperation? 

Press reports indicate that Jordan has already signed agreements for nuclear 

cooperation with France, the United Kingdom, China, and Russia. Do any of those 

agreements have conditions similar to the U.S.–UAE agreement? 

Answer. The U.S.–UAE agreement obligates the UAE not to assume enrichment 

or reprocessing facilities from any suppliers, not just the United States. While we 

cannot control the specific conditions in bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements 

that other nuclear supplier states make with other countries, we are working 

actively in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to institute stricter guidelines for the 

transfer of civil nuclear technologies, including that recipient countries have put in 

place an Additional Protocol to their safeguards agreements with the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 

We also have ongoing discussions with bilateral partners regarding appropriate 

supply conditions. For example, we work regularly with France, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, and with all Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) participating governments to ensure that all nations maintain stringent standards for any transfer 

of proliferation-sensitive technologies. And we are focusing our efforts on furthering 

agreement among supplier states about the importance of encouraging customers to 

rely the market rather than developing their own enrichment or reprocessing capabilities. With specific regard to Jordan, we applaud the fact that Jordan has brought 

into force the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. 

Question. What specific actions has the United States taken to get other supplier 

countries—particularly including France and Russia—to ask for the same conditions 

in the bilateral agreements that they sign? 

Doesn’t United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887 require this, when it 

‘‘Calls upon States to adopt stricter national controls for the export of sensitive 

goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle?’’ 

Will this be an issue at the next meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group? 

Answer. As a result of U.S. efforts in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), NSG 

participating governments (including France and Russia) will discuss the adoption 

of stricter export control measures for sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies in November 2009, and will continue to press the NSG to reach consensus 

on appropriate guideline amendments. We also have ongoing discussions with bilateral partners regarding appropriate supply conditions. (If you would like additional 

information regarding these discussions, we would be pleased to brief you and your 

staff in a classified setting.) Additionally, all enrichment and reprocessing technology holders in the NSG already apply stringent export controls to these technologies, and the de facto commercial standard for enrichment transfers requires 

‘‘black box’’ conditions; that is, transfers that do not provide the recipient country 

with access to technology enabling replication of such facilities. 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887 reflects the international community’s agreement about the importance of adopting stricter national export controls on sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies, and Resolution 1887 calls on states 

to increase their efforts in this regard. We are working both bilaterally and multilaterally in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to limit the spread of these technologies. We 

have also worked bilaterally with many states to strengthen their nuclear export 

control regimes. 

Question. Both the United States and, now, the U.N. Security Council have called 

for universal application of the IAEA Additional Protocol. Will the administration 

make this a requirement in all future cooperation agreements, including with countries outside of the Middle East, before U.S. nuclear exports commence? 

Answer. We do support the universal adoption of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/153) and are working actively to 

achieve that objective. The majority of countries that are potential nuclear trading 

partners of the United States have already brought an Additional Protocol to the 

IAEA safeguards agreements into force, and we will consider whether a state has 

an Additional Protocol in force when negotiating any future nuclear cooperation 

agreements. 

Question. What other agreements for nuclear cooperation are currently being 

negotiated, or have been completed and are awaiting submittal to Congress? 

What new Memoranda of Understanding on nuclear cooperation are being negotiated or have been completed in the last few months? 

28 

Answer. A nuclear cooperation agreement with Jordan remains under negotiation, 

and we continue to work to finalize the agreement. A nuclear cooperation agreement 

with Russia was signed in 2008, but former President Bush made a subsequent 

determination that effectively terminated Congressional review of that agreement 

following the Russia-Georgia conflict. President Obama and Russian President 

Medvedev have issued statements indicating that both sides plan to work together 

to bring the agreement into force; however, no decision has been made on its resubmission to Congress. 

No nuclear cooperation Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) have been completed within the last few months. The text of a nuclear cooperation MOU with Vietnam has been agreed upon at the expert-level. It awaits only final approval of senior 

officials within both governments. 

Additionally, the United States proposed a draft civil nuclear cooperation MOU 

with Qatar in June 2008. This MOU is still under review by the Government of 

Qatar. 

RESPONSES OF ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY VANN H. VAN DIEPEN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. If the UAE were to back out of this agreement and seek its own enrichment or reprocessing technology, isn’t it true that other nations are not bound to 

cut off technological assistance or fuel supplies? 

Answer. As a general rule, bilateral international agreements cannot bind third 

parties to take particular actions if one party withdraws from an agreement. However, a UAE withdrawal from this agreement and subsequent pursuit of enrichment 

and reprocessing, despite its numerous public pronouncements to the contrary, 

would potentially have extremely significant economic and political consequences on 

future cooperation between the UAE and other supplier nations. 

Question. What efforts are being made to coordinate with our allies to ensure that 

they place similar restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing capacity in their 

bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, both with the UAE and with other prospective countries? 

Answer. While we cannot control the specific language in bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements made by other nuclear supplier states, we work regularly with bilateral partners and with all Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) participating nations 

to ensure that all nations maintain rigorous standards for any potential transfers 

of enrichment and reprocessing-related technologies. Further, the UAE has committed to follow strictly the NSG Guidelines, the application of which will provide 

it with stronger tools to prevent proliferation and illicit transshipments of sensitive 

nuclear technologies through the UAE. 

Question. What are the security implications if numerous additional countries 

were to acquire enrichment or reprocessing capabilities? Does it increase the danger 

that terrorists will acquire the materials needed to make an improvised nuclear 

device or a dirty bomb? 

Answer. We recognize these potentially significant security implications of numerous additional countries acquiring enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. As a 

consequence, we are seeking to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing 

technologies through strengthening Nuclear Suppliers Group controls over such 

transfers and through bilateral consultations with key technology holders. 

Question. I am concerned about the role that the UAE may play as a hub for the 

illicit transfer of nuclear materials to Iran or as a financial conduit for terrorist 

organizations. I understand that the UAE has passed a national export control reform law, but implementation had been slow. Has the regulatory regime been made 

operational with implementing regulations yet? And has the national control body 

established by the law been fully staffed? 

Answer. The UAE has made significant progress in the area of export controls and 

preventing transshipments of proliferation concern. The national export control law 

is being enforced. The UAE, as part of its enforcement efforts, formed the ‘‘UAE 

Committee on Commodities Subject to Import and Export Control,’’ an interagency 

committee chaired by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs that reports directly 

to the Council of Ministers. This committee has already met and its goal is to facilitate effective implementation of the export control law. The UAE is also adding 

additional staff to the export control office and is working to complete implementing 

regulations; we are actively engaged with the UAE on these issues. 

29 

Question. Mr. Van Diepen, you suggested that our memorandum of understanding 

with Jordan on nuclear cooperation includes a provision requiring Jordan to forgo 

an enrichment or reprocessing capacity. But it is my understanding that the delay 

in proceeding with the 123 Agreement centers on Jordan’s unwillingness to give up 

its right to an enrichment and reprocessing capacity, which it considers to be nonnegotiable. Have there been recent developments in negotiations, or new language 

in the agreement, that suggest otherwise? 

Answer. During the hearing, we attempted to convey that the United StatesJordan Memorandum of Understanding contains language noting Jordan’s intent to 

rely on the international markets for fuel services as an alternative to developing 

sensitive enrichment or reprocessing technologies. We continue to discuss with the 

Government of Jordan the possibility of concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement, 

and we intend to employ those mechanisms that are most appropriate to achieve 

our goal of limiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. 

Æ