E PLURIBUS UNUM

NATIONAL TRA S PORTAT

OI N

BOARD

SAFE T Y

N

National Transportation Safety Board 

Washington, D.C. 20594 

Railroad Accident Brief

Accident No: DCA-99-MR-004 

Location: Momence, Illinois 

Date of Accident: March 23, 1999 

Time: 7:02 a.m. central standard time 

Railroad: Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) 

Injured: 4 minor 

Property Damage: $1,791,000 

Type of Accident: Collision 

The Accident 

On March 23, 1999, about 7:02 a.m., central standard time, eastbound 

Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) train KAEL-3 struck the side of the lead 

locomotive unit of southbound Union Pacific Railroad (UP) train ZYCMX-23 at a 

crossing of Conrail and UP tracks in Momence, Illinois. 

As a result of the collision, the lead locomotive unit of the Conrail train and both 

locomotives and the first 16 cars of the UP train derailed. Diesel fuel from the second UP 

locomotive was released and caught fire, damaging the locomotive and containers on the 

freight cars in the immediate area. The UP estimated its damage to be $1,654,000. 

Conrail estimated its damage to be $137,000. 

Both conductors and engineers were hurt. The Conrail conductor refused 

treatment on scene, and the Conrail engineer and both UP crewmembers were treated and 

released from a local hospital. 

An hour before the accident, the Conrail train departed Kankakee, Illinois. As it 

approached the distant signal for Control Point Momence Junction, it was traveling 

approximately 44 mph. The engineer observed in a timely manner that the distant signal 

was displaying an approach-restricting indication, and he made an automatic brake 

application, slowing the train to 27 mph. About a minute later, he released the brakes. He 

knew, he later said, that an approach-restricting indication meant that the next signal (the 

home signal at Control Point Momence Junction) could display a red aspect (stop) if 

another train was occupying the UP tracks near the crossing. He knew that after passing 

the approach-restricting indication, he was responsible for slowing the train to less than 

30 mph and for being prepared to stop short of the next signal. 

NTSB/RAB-02/02
 NTSB/RAB-02/02

2 

Neither the engineer nor the conductor was able to see the home signal while 

transiting the curve because tall trees lined the track. As the train headed out of the curve 

and moved onto the straight track, the signal was still too far away for its aspect to be 

distinguished by the naked eye. The engineer and the conductor realized that the position 

of the sun made the aspect even harder to read. Nevertheless, the engineer took no 

additional action to slow the train. 

The conductor became concerned about not being able to see the home signal but 

did not mention his concern to the engineer. The conductor retrieved a pair of binoculars 

from his bag to help him identify the signal aspect. He told the engineer the aspect was 

red, and moments later he told the engineer to place the brakes in emergency. The 

engineer immediately and progressively applied more brakes; then, no more than 474 feet 

before the crossing, he placed the train into emergency, but he did not activate the twoway end-of-train device. The train slowed down, but it did not stop in time to avoid 

entering the crossing and striking the passing UP train. Train performance simulation 

indicated that had the end-of-train device been activated at the time the engineer initiated 

emergency braking, it would have increased the braking performance of the train and 

may have prevented the accident. 

Tests and inspections found no indication the train’s brakes or the signal system 

had malfunctioned. The crossing did not have any automatic enforcement of the signal 

indications. Collision protection depended entirely on the ability of the crew to handle the 

train properly. 

PROBABLE CAUSE 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of 

the collision was the failure of the Conrail engineer, despite the crew’s difficulty in 

seeing the home signal, to slow the train enough to be able to stop it before it entered the 

crossing. Contributing to the accident was the conductor’s delayed action in warning the 

engineer to slow the train even though the conductor realized that the train might be 

traveling too fast to stop at the crossing. Also contributing to the accident was the lack of 

any safety redundancy system capable of preventing a collision in the event of human 

failure. 

Approved: March 14, 2002