Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 07A01-1610-CR-2425 | June 29, 2017 Page 1 of 9

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kurt A. Young

Nashville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Daniel E. Messel,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

June 29, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

07A01-1610-CR-2425

Appeal from the Brown Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Judith A. Stewart, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

07C01-1504-MR-113

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 07A01-1610-CR-2425 | June 29, 2017 Page 2 of 9

[1] Daniel Messel appeals following his conviction for Murder1 and adjudication 

for being an Habitual Offender.2 Messel argues that the trial court erred by 

admitting certain evidence. He also appeals the sentence imposed by the trial 

court, contending that it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and 

his character. Finding no error and that the sentence is not inappropriate, we 

affirm.

Facts

[2] On April 23, 2015, Hannah Wilson, a 22-year-old senior at Indiana University, 

finished her last exam for her undergraduate degree and began celebrating with 

friends that afternoon. Later that evening, Hannah and some of her friends 

decided to go to a bar in Bloomington. While they were waiting in line to enter 

the bar, however, Hannah’s friends decided that she was too intoxicated to 

continue with the evening, so they put her in a taxi and told the driver to take 

her home. Surveillance videos later obtained by police showed a car similar to 

Messel’s following the taxi that was transporting Hannah. The taxi driver 

followed the instructions of Hannah’s friends, dropping her off at the corner of 

8th Street and Dunn, which was near her apartment.

[3] On the morning of April 24, 2015, Carol Bridges was driving from her Brown 

County home to Bloomington when she saw something along Plum Creek 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.

2

Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(b).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 07A01-1610-CR-2425 | June 29, 2017 Page 3 of 9

Road near Indiana 45 that caught her attention, so she stopped to investigate. 

When she exited her car and walked closer, she realized there was a body, later 

identified as Hannah, lying in a vacant lot with a cell phone at its feet. Bridges 

then called the police. The Brown County Sheriff and his deputies, as well as 

the Indiana State Police, responded to the scene.

[4] As law enforcement began investigating, they learned that the cell phone near 

Hannah’s body belonged to Messel. State Police detectives arrived at Messel’s 

home early on the morning of April 24, 2015. He was not home, as he 

normally would have been, nor did he show up for work that day—a pay day—

or call in to report his absence. He also did not respond to texts from a friend. 

Messel emptied his bank account and filled up his car with gas.

[5] Later that day, a neighbor called police when Messel returned home. State 

Police quickly drove to Messel’s home and saw that he was carrying a plastic 

garbage bag out to his car. State Police arrested him at that time and seized the 

bag. Further investigation revealed that the bag contained clothing that had 

blood on it, some of which contained Hannah’s DNA. Hannah’s blood, hair, 

and DNA were found in the interior and exterior of Messel’s car. Surveillance 

videos showed a vehicle similar to Messel’s on the road that led to the crime 

scene early on the morning of April 24. Cell phone location evidence linked 

Messel to the location where Hannah was in Bloomington before her 

disappearance and to the area near the crime scene on April 24.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 07A01-1610-CR-2425 | June 29, 2017 Page 4 of 9

[6] An autopsy on Hannah’s body was conducted on April 25, 2015. The autopsy 

revealed that she had sustained various injuries and that she had died after 

being struck multiple times with a blunt object on the left side of her head, 

crushing her skull.

[7] On April 27, 2015, the State charged Messel with murder. On December 3, 

2015, the State added a count alleging Messel to be an habitual offender. 

Messel’s jury trial began on August 2, 2016. At trial, the State introduced 

testimony that Messel once possessed a mag flashlight. Messel’s attorney 

objected to this testimony, but the trial court overruled the objection and 

admitted the evidence.

[8] The jury found Messel guilty of murder on August 10, 2016. The jury then 

heard evidence regarding the habitual offender allegation and found that Messel 

is an habitual offender. On September 22, 2016, the trial court sentenced 

Messel to sixty years imprisonment for murder and enhanced that term by 

twenty years for the habitual offender finding. Messel now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

[9] Messel first argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence that he once 

possessed a mag flashlight, which the State posited may have been the murder 

weapon. The admission and exclusion of evidence falls within the trial court’s 

sound discretion, and we will reverse only if the decision is clearly against the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Johnson v. State, 6 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 07A01-1610-CR-2425 | June 29, 2017 Page 5 of 9

N.E.3d 491, 498 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Messel argues that this evidence was 

overly speculative, as a murder weapon was never identified, and that its 

prejudicial effect far outweighed its limited probative value. See Ind. Evidence 

Rule 403 (evidence may be excluded if probative value is substantially 

outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice).

[10] We will assume solely for argument’s sake that the admission of this evidence 

was erroneous. The erroneous admission of evidence is harmless where “the 

conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt so as to 

satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood the questioned 

evidence contributed to the conviction.” Duncan v. State, 23 N.E.3d 805, 811 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[11] In this case, the independent evidence of Messel’s guilt in the record includes 

the following:

 Surveillance video places a vehicle similar to Messel’s following 

Hannah’s taxi home and also at the crime scene the next morning.

 Cell phone evidence places Messel at the location in Bloomington where 

Hannah was before she disappeared and also at the crime scene the next 

morning.

 Messel’s cell phone was found next to Hannah’s dead body.

 Messel was found with a garbage bag full of clothes covered in blood that 

contained Hannah’s DNA.

 The interior and exterior of Messel’s vehicle contained Hannah’s blood, 

hair, and DNA.

Given this overwhelming independent evidence of Messel’s guilt, we find that 

there is no substantial likelihood that the evidence related to his past ownership
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 07A01-1610-CR-2425 | June 29, 2017 Page 6 of 9

of a mag light contributed to the conviction. In other words, any error was 

harmless. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ind. 2002) (where there 

was no murder weapon introduced at trial, erroneous admission of photograph 

of the defendant with a gun was harmless where there was overwhelming 

evidence of his guilt).

[12] Messel argues that the harmless error standard requires us to conduct an 

impermissible reweighing of the evidence. Essentially, he asks us to ignore and 

abrogate the harmless error standard—an invitation we decline. Even if the 

admission of this evidence was erroneous, it was harmless, and we will not 

reverse on this basis.

II. Appropriateness

[13] Messel also contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that this Court may revise a sentence if it is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender. We must “conduct [this] review with substantial deference and give 

‘due consideration’ to the trial court’s decision—since the ‘principal role of 

[our] review is to attempt to leaven the outliers,’ and not to achieve a perceived 

‘correct’ sentence . . . .” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014) 

(quoting Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2013)) (internal 

citations omitted).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 07A01-1610-CR-2425 | June 29, 2017 Page 7 of 9

[14] Messel was convicted of one count of murder, for which he faced a sentence of 

forty-five to sixty-five years imprisonment, with an advisory term of fifty-five 

years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3. He received a sixty-year sentence for this 

conviction. He was also found to be an habitual offender, for which he faced a 

sentence enhancement of six to twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i). He 

received a twenty-year enhancement, for an aggregate term of eighty years 

imprisonment.

[15] With respect to the nature of the offense, Messel preyed upon an intoxicated 

young woman at night, following behind her taxi until she was dropped off and 

alone. He brutally bludgeoned her to death, inflicting multiple injuries to her 

body, and then dumped her body as if it were a piece of trash in a vacant lot 

alongside a road in rural Brown County. The next day, he emptied his bank 

account, filled his car with gas, and was attempting to dispose of evidence when 

he was arrested. Nothing about the appalling nature of this offense renders his 

sentence inappropriate.

[16] With respect to Messel’s character, he has a lengthy criminal history. Among 

other things, he has convictions for criminal mischief, public intoxication, 

disorderly conduct, leaving the scene of an accident on two occasions, Class A 

misdemeanor battery on four occasions, Class A misdemeanor resisting law 

enforcement on three occasions, Class A misdemeanor operating while 

intoxicated endangering a person, Class C felony forgery, and Class C felony 

battery on three occasions. He has violated probation multiple times and has 

faced many additional charges to the ones that ended in conviction. His many 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 07A01-1610-CR-2425 | June 29, 2017 Page 8 of 9

contacts with the criminal justice system have not caused him to reform his 

behavior, and his crimes have only become more serious with time. We do not 

find that Messel’s character aids his appropriateness argument. In sum, we find 

that the sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his 

character.

[17] Messel devotes much of his argument to a claim that the trial court overlooked 

several mitigating circumstances, but we do not review this argument under 

Appellate Rule 7(B). Consequently, he has waived it. Waiver notwithstanding, 

he argues that the trial court should have found his physical and mental health 

to be a mitigator, but fails to explain how this alleged state of affairs relates to 

his murder of Hannah or is relevant to sentencing. He also argues that his close 

relationship with his father and nephew should have been a mitigator, but fails 

to explain why this is relevant to sentencing. Third, he contends that the fact 

that his criminal history is remote should have been a mitigator, but the trial 

court observed that the remoteness of his criminal history somewhat mitigated 

his criminal history. Fourth, he argues that the fact that he expressed sorrow 

for the loss suffered by the victim’s family should have been a mitigator, but 

fails to explain why this is relevant to sentencing. Finally, he notes that he was 

willing to waive a jury trial for the habitual offender phase of his trial, but this 

waiver would have saved the State and the jurors little time and effort because 

they had already handled a multiple-day jury trial, were already present, and 

the State had already prepared for the hearing. Consequently, we find no error 

for any of these reasons.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 07A01-1610-CR-2425 | June 29, 2017 Page 9 of 9

[18] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Barnes, J., and Crone, J., concur.