James Goodby, Timothy Coffey, and Cheryl Loeb 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University

July 2007 

Deploying Nuclear Detection

Systems

A Proposed Strategy for Combating

Nuclear Terrorism
ii

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official 

policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the 

U.S. Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from 

unclassified materials. 

James Goodby has been professionally involved with nuclear issues for 50 years. He 

served in ambassadorial assignments in the administrations of Presidents Carter, Reagan, 

and Clinton and was chief negotiator for Nunn-Lugar agreements with Russia, Ukraine, 

Kazakhstan and Belarus in 1993-1994. James Goodby is also a well-known author and 

scholar on nuclear weapons issues. His most recent book, At the Borderline of 

Armageddon: How American Presidents Managed the Atom Bomb, was published in June 

2006. 

Timothy Coffey holds the Edison Chair for Technology in the Center for Technology 

and National Security Policy. He is also a Senior Research Scientist at the University of 

Maryland. He was the Director of Research at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory from 

1982 to 2001. He has published extensively in the scientific literature and has served on 

numerous advisory panels. Dr. Coffey holds a BS (EE) from the Massachusetts Institute 

of Technology and a Ph.D. (Physics) from the University of Michigan. 

Cheryl Loeb is a Research Associate at the Center for Technology and National Security 

Policy at the National Defense University and is also a Ph.D. candidate in the Biodefense 

Program at George Mason University. Ms. Loeb may be contacted via email at 

loebc@ndu.edu or by phone at (202) 685-2397. 

Acknowledgements. The authors would like to acknowledge helpful criticism and 

suggestions from Spike Bowman, Linton Brooks, James Kurfess, Gary Phillips, Sam 

Musa, Kimberly Thachuk, and David York. 
iii

Contents 

Executive Summary.........................................................................................................................v 

Introduction......................................................................................................................................1 

 

Understanding the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism..............................................................................2 

Intelligence and Nuclear Materials Smuggling................................................................................4 

Nuclear Detection Systems and Issues ............................................................................................7 

Current Nuclear Detection Programs.............................................................................................12 

Detection Legislation.....................................................................................................................18 

Implementing an International Infrastructure ................................................................................20 

Summary........................................................................................................................................22 
iv
v

Executive Summary 

The most likely means of delivering a nuclear bomb on a major city is through a 

successful smuggling effort by a terrorist organization. The catastrophic damage it would 

cause demands cooperative action by all responsible governments. Several U.S. 

Government programs are in place to deal with this threat. They focus on: 

• Measures to prevent access by terrorist groups to fissile material, particularly 

enriched uranium and plutonium, the basic fuel for nuclear bombs.

• Measures to strengthen international institutions to enable governments to deal 

more effectively with illicit trade in fissile materials and in equipment that can 

produce such materials.

• Measures to enhance international cooperation in intelligence sharing and law 

enforcement.

• Cooperative international defense activities designed to intercept illegal 

trafficking in fissile materials and equipment to produce these materials. 

• Strengthening the capacity to monitor and detect illicit shipments of fissionable 

materials at entry points into the United States and, in cooperation with other 

countries, at key transportation nodes overseas. 

This report focuses on the last of these programs, and primarily on deployment of sensors 

overseas. Our conclusion is that U.S. plans for deployment of various types of sensors 

overseas needs to be: 

• better integrated with all the activities identified above, 

• prioritized to focus on identified threats,

• configured to permit maximum flexibility and efficiency in the use of resources,

• based on the principle that lack of cooperation on the part of key partners will 

entail disadvantages for them, 

• seen as part of a program designed to become a routine part of international law 

enforcement,

• closely tied to legislation under consideration or recently adopted in the U.S. 

Congress, and

• part of a global approach to nuclear nonproliferation in which international 

institutions assume a leading and sustained leadership role. 

This report provides an overview of the threat from nuclear terrorism; discusses the role 

of intelligence and risk assessments in countering this threat; provides a brief overview of 

nuclear detection technologies and issues; briefly summarizes key U.S Government 

programs involved in nuclear detection; summarizes domestic legislation, which provides 

the impetus for increasing international collaboration; and discusses the need for a global 

approach to nuclear nonproliferation in which international institutions assume a leading 

and sustained leadership role. 
vi
1

Introduction 

Preventing terrorist organizations from acquiring and using nuclear weapons and related 

materials is one of the most important challenges facing the international community 

today. Nuclear materials are still inadequately safeguarded in territories of the former 

Soviet Union and elsewhere around the world, and terrorist organizations have openly 

stated their desire to obtain and use these weapons in attacks against the United States. 

The catastrophic damage a nuclear terrorist attack would cause, and its international 

implications, demands cooperative action by all responsible governments. 

Several U.S. Government programs are in place to deal with this threat, such as the 

Second Line of Defense Core Program, the Megaports Initiative, and the Container 

Security Initiative. In cooperation with other countries, these programs aim to strengthen 

our capacity to monitor and detect illicit shipments of nuclear and radiological materials 

at key transportation nodes overseas. While these programs have had success, the U.S 

response to the threat from nuclear smuggling and terrorism needs to be better 

coordinated, prioritized to focus on identified threats, configured to permit maximum 

flexibility and efficiency in the use of resources, and, most importantly, become part of a 

global approach to nuclear nonproliferation in which existing international institutions 

assume a leading and sustained leadership role. 

We recognize that because different partners bring different priorities and constraints, a 

formal and informal coordinating mechanism with international organizations and other 

partners is important to nuclear detection. To encourage broad international participation, 

we recommend using an established international institution to spearhead and coordinate 

global nuclear detection and interdiction activities. These efforts will complement and 

coordinate existing activities and will not replace them. Such an organization could 

operate under Resolution 1540 of the United Nations Security Council, which encourages 

international cooperation in criminalizing the possession of nuclear materials and 

tightening controls over such materials. This organization would be dedicated to the 

identification, detection, and interdiction of illicit nuclear materials and will work closely 

with the international law enforcement and intelligence communities to ensure that 

nuclear detection becomes routine practice throughout the world. This will provide a 

means for exchanging technology, sharing intelligence, correcting flaws in the operation 

of the system, and encouraging best practices, with the end goal of rapid emplacement of 

sensors at key locations identified through intelligence collection and risk assessments. 

Emplacement would not be based on gross tonnage estimates but rather risk analyses. 

The threat from nuclear terrorism necessitates a coordinated response from the United 

States and its international partners. An international culture of combating nuclear 

smuggling already exists that will facilitate the establishment of a coordinating body 

dedicated to the identification, detection, and interdiction of nuclear threats.
2

Understanding the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism 

Since the terror attacks against the United States in September 2001 and the bombings in 

Bali, Madrid, and London, there has been a growing awareness of the increasing threat of 

nuclear terrorism. The possibility that al Qaeda or another terrorist organization might 

acquire the materials and the technical know-how to steal, buy, or build a crude nuclear 

weapon or radiological dispersal device brings the specter of nuclear terrorism to the 

forefront of U.S. national security policy. 

In October 2003, a German cargo ship named BBC China was intercepted en route to 

Libya with the components for building approximately 10,000 P-2 gas centrifuges 

designed for enriching uranium to specifications required for a nuclear weapon.1 This 

illicit shipment of centrifuges was part of an international nuclear materials smuggling 

ring headed up by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. While the interdiction of the 

illegal components contributed to Libya’s renunciation of a nuclear weapons program, 

both Iran and North Korea are known to have had extensive dealings with A.Q. Khan and 

are believed to have received numerous nuclear weapons components from his smuggling 

ring. 

The capture and house arrest of A.Q. Khan have likely slowed down the international 

nuclear smuggling black market, but other unknown smuggling networks evidently exist. 

This type of nuclear proliferation presents a serious threat to international security. 

Among other considerations, North Korea and Iran continue to pursue nuclear weapons 

programs and will likely seek materials, components, and technical expertise from 

outside suppliers. Both countries have intensified their nuclear posturing, most notably in 

the form of an underground nuclear weapons test by North Korea on October 9, 2006. 

North Korean possession of nuclear weapons endangers security and stability in the 

region and increases the risk of nuclear terrorism. North Korea currently lacks an 

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the continental United 

States, so the more immediate threat to the United States stems from the possibility that 

North Korea might transfer nuclear weapons and related materials to terrorist 

organizations or other rogue states. 

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported a number of attempted 

thefts of weapons-useable and fissile material from nuclear sites, sometimes by 

employees of the facilities. A recent analysis of open source information by Sandia 

National Laboratories found roughly 750 incidents of trafficking in nuclear materials.2

On January 25, 2007, for example, Georgian officials announced that they had arrested a 

 

1

 Colonel Charles D. Lutes, “New Players on the Scene: A.Q. Khan and the Nuclear Black Market,” 

EJournal USA. Available online at <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0305/ijpe/lutes.htm>. 2

 David York, National Security Issues in Science, Law, and Technology: Confronting Weapons of 

Terrorism (Taylor & Francis, May 2007). 
3

Russian man in 2006 after he had attempted to sell roughly 100 grams of highly enriched 

uranium (HEU) in Georgia.3

A number of known terrorist organizations have also expressed interest in—and taken 

steps toward—obtaining nuclear weapons and materials. The Japanese terror cult Aum 

Shinriyko reportedly had expressed interest in obtaining nuclear materials, and it is 

believed that al Qaeda has been interested in purchasing nuclear materials for over 10 

years. Raids of al Qaeda safe houses, training camps, and other locations after the fall of 

the Taliban in 2001 resulted in the seizure of documents, training manuals, and computer 

discs with information related to the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons. 

Moreover, in August 2001, al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden met with two officials from 

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program to discuss nuclear, chemical, and biological 

weapons.

4

 

 

3

 Elena Sokova, William Potter, and Cristina Chuen, “Recent Weapons Grade Uranium Smuggling Case: 

Nuclear Materials are Still on the Loose,” CNS Report, January 26, 2007, Center for Nonproliferation 

Studies, Washington, DC. Available online at <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/070126.htm>. 

4

 Kamran Khan and Molly Moore, “2 Nuclear Experts Briefed Bin Laden, Pakistanis Say,” Washington 

Post, December 12, 2001. 
4

Intelligence and Nuclear Materials Smuggling 

There are numerous ways terrorists might smuggle nuclear and fissile materials into the 

United States. One of the most publicized ways involves transporting materials in 

containers. The world’s seaports, for example, move an astounding 270 million TEUs5 of 

containers annually, accounting for 90 percent of the world’s cargo. In the United States, 

almost half of incoming trade (by value) arrives via ship.6 

If smugglers or terrorists do not want to lose chain of custody over their illicit materials, 

it is likely that they would try to escort the material into the United States through an 

airport or remote border crossing, which poses a number of difficulties for Federal 

authorities. For example, many border crossings are not equipped with detection portals. 

While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is working to correct this situation, 

radiation portal monitors will not be placed at all border locations for a number of years. 

There are, however, other opportunities to detect materials entering the United States. 

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is currently working with the U.S. 

Coast Guard to ensure that all boarding teams are equipped with radiation detection 

equipment by the end of this year. DNDO also has several initiatives underway, including 

the Securing the Cities (STC) program and the Southeast Transportation Corridor Pilot 

(SETCP), which seek to provide State and local operators with the ability detect and 

interdict materials within the United States. 

 

5

 When container vessels were introduced in 1968, containers were 20 feet long. Since then, containers 

have doubled in length, giving rise to the term “twenty-foot equivalent unit.” 

6

 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Container Security Initiative, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Response to Terrorism.” Available online at <http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/ 

international_activities/csi/csirev_1002.ctt/standard_current_generic_csi.ppt>. 

U.S. Borders and Ports of Entry: High Traffic Zones 

U.S. borders and ports are extremely high traffic zones. On an average day for U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection in FY2006, for example, officers processed: 

• 1.1 million passengers and pedestrians 

• 70,900 truck, rail and sea containers 

• 240,737 incoming international air passengers 

• 71,151 passengers/crew arriving by ship 

• 327,042 incoming privately owned vehicles 

• 85,300 shipments of goods approved for entry 

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “On a Typical Day...,” January 2007. Available online 

at: <http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/ fact_sheets/typical_day.ctt/typical_day.pdf>. 
5

Still, terrorists might ship their materials into the United States at a remote land or sea 

location that does not have a border post. Hence, we must act to interdict the materials 

before they reach the United States. 

One likely method for terrorists to transport illicit materials internationally is through 

known smuggling routes and shipment lanes. Hundreds of trafficking rings operate 

throughout Europe, engaging in human trafficking, arms smuggling, cigarette smuggling, 

drug trafficking, international vehicle theft rings, hazardous waste dumping, and crossborder fraud schemes. These smuggling rings make a living through knowing which 

borders are easiest to cross, which routes are least patrolled, and which individuals can be 

bribed. Most are well-seasoned, highly sophisticated, criminal networks with good 

connections in and out of government and are less likely to get caught than are amateurs. 

“The great fear is that because these trafficking rings are not concerned with whom or 

what they are smuggling, but rather how much a client can pay, they may be helping al 

Qaeda and other groups to gain access to many European countries.”7

Indeed, nuclear smuggling is not the disorganized trade of petty offenders that many 

people may imagine. In Russia, for example, “[s]mugglers are believed to collect and 

share information on which Russian customs posts are equipped with radiation monitors 

and to route their shipments accordingly.”8 Not only have smugglers beaten the system 

by testing radiation detection devices by sending decoys across borders, but they also 

have devised ingenious schemes for concealing illicit merchandise. These professional 

smugglers know the terrain and the authorities who are either corrupt or even complicit in 

the smuggling activities. Most smuggling routes have existed for generations and 

smugglers and traffickers will move whatever goods net them the most profit; most are 

unlikely to have moral or ethical qualms about trafficking in nuclear materials.9

 

We can maximize our current detection capabilities through strategically deploying 

appropriate detectors based on intelligence and risk assessments. Two key types of 

deployment of detectors would be: 

Along identified smuggling routes and known shipment lanes. The majority of thefts 

involving trafficking in fissile material have occurred in the former Soviet states and 

Russia. The primary corridors of activity are through Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, 

Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan into the middle-eastern states; and through Ukraine, 

Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria, into Turkey. Multiple seizures of fissile material have 

taken place in Istanbul, Turkey, presumably because of its large seaport. A large majority 

of non-fissile nuclear material has taken this route. Analysis has also shown nuclear 

material trafficking from Krasnoyarsk, Russia, down into the South China Sea, and from 

 

7

 Kimberley Thachuk, “Countering Terrorism Across the Atlantic,” Defense Horizons 53, July 2006, 4–5. 8

 Rensselaer Lee, “The Dark Side of the Nuclear Smuggling Business,” Testimony to Subcommittee on 

Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, House Committee on Homeland Security, September 22, 

2005. 

9

 Interview with Dr. Kimberly Thachuk, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, May 15, 

2007. 
6

former Soviet states into Africa (primarily South Africa) and South America (primarily 

Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina).10 

Most seizures along these identified routes involve amateur smugglers with relatively 

small amounts of material. In some cases, small quantities of high-grade material have 

been seized, which usually indicates a major trafficker providing a small sample of a 

much larger supply to a potential customer for testing. There are very few cases involving 

large shipments of material, as these incidents involve international criminal 

organizations or nation-states, both with the resources to conduct counterintelligence and 

counter-surveillance operations.11

Airports, borders, and ports in countries identified as having nuclear materials where 

theft has occurred or where facilities are least secure. Such locations include Russia and 

former Soviet States, such as Georgia and Uzbekistan. 

Intelligence organizations around the world will have to cooperate to achieve the quickest 

possible sharing of information and resources if we are to interdict nuclear materials 

before they reach their intended destination. Agencies involved in counter-terrorism 

intelligence, as well as those specializing in smuggling and interdiction operations will 

need to freely share information. An international coordinating body, operating under 

UNSCR 1540, would provide the platform for closer collaboration among law 

enforcement and intelligence organizations and the management of international nuclear 

detection activities. 

Fortunately, many police and law enforcement agencies, as well as international 

organizations like Interpol and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, already 

provide a platform for information sharing. One good example of effective multilateral 

cooperation is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Countries participating in PSI 

agreements and exercises help build relationships and operational cooperation and 

provide information aimed at improving targeted interdiction, cooperation, and 

intelligence sharing. Law enforcement agencies around the world generally have 

longstanding working relationships in the area of combating organized criminal activity 

and are able to cooperate closely and quickly on the interdiction and apprehension of 

smugglers and traffickers. “Indeed, [prior to September 11] transatlantic law enforcement 

collaboration already had ironed out any barriers to concluding agreements on evidence 

sharing, cooperation in law enforcement, intelligence gathering, rendition of fugitives, 

joint training, harmonized standards, port security, and financial regulation.”12

 

10 Material provided by David L. York, International Security and Technical Systems Analyst, Sandia 

National Laboratories, February 1, 2007. His work was reported in Science Daily, available online at 

<http://www.sciencedaily.com/upi/index.php?feed=Science&article=UPI-1-20070117-16023600-bc-usmonitor.xml>. 

11 Ibid. 

12 Jonathon M. Winer, “Cops across Borders: The Evolution of Transatlantic Law Enforcement and Judicial 

Co-operation,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 1, 2004. Available online at 

<http://www.cfr.org/publication/7389/cops_across_borders.html>. Cited in Kimberley Thachuk, 

“Countering Terrorism Across the Atlantic,” Defense Horizons 53, July 2006, 4–5. 
7

Nuclear Detection Systems and Issues 

The difficulty of detecting nuclear materials has been known since the beginning of the 

nuclear age. Over the years, considerable effort has been put into defining what nuclear 

materials detection systems should consist of, and long-term research is under way to 

identify and develop new technologies. However, mature detection technologies exist that 

can be deployed in large quantities over the next 10–15 years. Indeed, the technologies 

that are viable for relatively near-term deployment under the ASP program are based on 

this past work. They generally employ passive detection techniques—detection of gamma 

rays and neutrons—and are discussed in many open literature articles.13 

Plastic Scintillation Detectors 

The most likely technologies for gamma ray detection are plastic scintillation detectors, 

sodium iodide scintillation detectors, and cooled, high-purity, germanium, solid-state 

detectors. Other detection technologies that use materials such as lanthanum bromide and 

cadmium-zinc-telluride have made significant progress and have some advantages, and 

procurement of handheld detectors is expected to begin next year. However, it is unlikely 

that they will see wide deployment in the near term. All of these detectors operate by 

providing a gamma radiation count as a function of gamma radiation energy received. 

Most gamma radiation of interest occurs at very precise energies that are determined by 

the energy-level structure of the parent isotope. The more precisely one can measure the 

gamma radiation energy the better one can identify the source of the radiation. This is 

referred to as the energy resolution of the detector.14 The three detection technologies 

mentioned above have different energy resolutions. The cost of the detectors generally 

increases as the energy resolution increases. 

In general, plastic scintillation detectors do not have the energy resolution necessary to 

identify the material that is responsible for the detected radiation. They are, however, 

relatively inexpensive and available with large surface areas. For example, a plastic 

scintillation detector 2 inches thick with a surface area of 9 square feet will cost about 

$3,000. Because one is not seeking fine energy resolution with these detectors, the 

electronics and software that enable the detection process is simplified. Therefore, one 

 

13 An introduction to these detection technologies can be found in Gary W. Philips, David J. Nagel, and 

Timothy Coffey, “A Primer on the Detection of Nuclear and Radiological Weapons,” Defense and 

Technology Paper 13 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, May 2005). 

Available online at <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Def_Tech/ 

DTP%2013%20Primer%20on%20Detection.pdf>. A discussion of nuclear weapons detection can be found 

in “Detecting Nuclear Warheads,” Steve Fetter, et al., “Detecting Nuclear Warheads,” Science and Global 

Security, 1990, Vol. 1, 225–302. Available online at <http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/pdf/ 

1_3-4FetterB.pdf>. A discussion of this topic within the context of terrorism and port and border security 

can be found in “An overview of non-traditional nuclear threats” by Geelhood and Wogman, Journal of 

Radio Analytical and Nuclear Chemistry, Vol. 263, No. 1 (2004) 267–273. 14 A discussion of this matter can be found in “White Paper: Why High-Purity Geranium (HPGe) Radiation 

Detection Technology is Superior to Other Detector Technologies for Isotope Identification.” Available 

online at <http://www.ortec-online.com/papers/sup_hpge.pdf>. 
8

gets significantly more detector area per dollar from plastic scintillation detectors than 

from most other detectors. 

Since detector sensitivity increases approximately as the square root of the surface area, 

plastic detectors are potentially useful in portal applications, where large areas are desired 

and are available. Because of their relatively low cost and large surface area, plastic 

detectors might provide better sensitivity at lower cost than other gamma radiation 

detectors (if increased count rate is all one is looking for). Low cost makes plastic 

scintillation detectors potentially useful as a primary radiation alarm in container 

screening applications. However, since they do not have the energy resolution to allow 

unambiguous identification of the radiating species, they are prone to high false alarm 

rates. This is a serious problem in high-throughput applications. 

Sodium Iodide Detectors 

The matter of radiating species identification is somewhat improved with sodium iodide 

detectors, which have higher spectral resolution. Sodium iodide detectors can be 

manufactured in a wide variety of sizes. Historically, a standard sodium iodide detection 

crystal used for many applications was 3 inches in diameter by 3 inches thick and 

weighed about 3 pounds. The addition of a voltage converter and a photomultiplier tube 

adds about 1 pound. The cost of the basic assembled detector (not including the multichannel analyzer, software, and readout device) is about $1,000–$1,500. A portable 

detector requires a multi-channel analyzer to obtain energy resolution, software to 

analyze the data, memory, and a display. These bring the total price for a single portable 

unit to about $10,000 and the weight to about 8 pounds. For portal monitors and other 

SNM applications, sodium iodide detectors 2 ̋x4 ̋x16 ̋ are also widely utilized, as are 

sodium iodide detectors that are 4 ̋x4 ̋x16 ̋. The larger area provides significantly 

improved sensitivity relative to the 3 ̋x3 ̋ detectors. These detectors have an energy 

resolution of about seven percent at 662 kev and five percent at 1332 kev. This energy 

resolution would have difficulty distinguishing between closely spaced lines. 

Nevertheless, it is adequate to eliminate many radiation sources that are not of concern 

but could lead to high false positive alarm rates if not eliminated. 

A sodium iodide portal detection system would likely involve an array of the basic 

detection units, such as those discussed above. The multi-channel analyzer, software, etc. 

can be common for an array of detectors, so the cost of such a system should scale 

roughly with the number of detection elements in the array, plus the cost of the 

supporting hardware and software. The number of detection elements would be related to 

the required minimum detection level. These detectors can get large very rapidly for the 

detection of weak signals in a noisy environment, which is often the situation in the 

detection of nuclear materials. Therefore, the use of sodium iodide detectors as primary 

screeners in a portal application will be much more expensive than using plastic 

scintillators. The tradeoff to be made here is between increased cost but improved 

identification capability (using sodium iodide) and lower cost and higher sensitivity but 

increased false alarms (using plastic). 
9

Cooled, High-Purity, Germanium Detectors 

The “gold standard” of passive gamma radiation detectors is the cooled, high-purity 

germanium detector, which has an energy resolution of 0.2-0.3 percent at 662 kev. This 

should be compared to seven percent for sodium iodide and no energy resolution for 

plastic detectors. Unlike plastic or sodium iodide detectors, the germanium detectors 

provide precise determination of peak energies, separation of closely spaced peaks, and 

detection of weak peaks in the presence of a strong gamma radiation background. These 

attributes enable the identification of the detected radiation source, given sufficiently 

strong signals and sufficient integration time. The price for this capability is that the 

detector must be cooled to the temperature of liquid nitrogen. Therefore, a dewar of 

liquid nitrogen or a mechanical refrigerator must be incorporated into the germanium 

detector. A complete germanium portable detector (full liquid nitrogen dewar or 

mechanical cooler, 7.5-cm-diameter, 5-cm-thick germanium crystal, multi-channel 

analyzer, software, and laptop) will weigh about 25 pounds and cost in excess of $50,000. 

Arrays of germanium detectors can also be constructed. For example, ORTEC offers 

freight cargo monitoring systems consisting of 8.5 cm diameter by 3 cm thick detectors 

where 2–6 detectors are incorporated into a module and up to 12 modules constitute a 

sensor panel.15 The cost, complexity, and weight of germanium detectors suggest their 

employment as portable devices at the secondary or tertiary inspection levels rather than 

as arrays at the primary detection level. The deployment of large numbers of germanium 

detector arrays at ports and border crossings would likely be prohibitively expensive. 

Their use, therefore, would be restricted to limited numbers for special applications. 

When comparing gamma-ray detectors, it is important to note that the costs of 

maintenance increases substantially when going from the lowest-resolution detector 

(plastic) to the better-resolution detector (sodium iodide) and especially to the highestresolution detector (germanium). Similarly, the education level and training required for 

the operators/users of the equipment increases with the detector capability. Furthermore, 

while the analysis of the spectral data can be automated, it is still advisable to have a 

trained analyst look at the data in case of a secondary or tertiary alarm. The trained 

analyst would not necessarily have to be on site, as the data could be transmitted 

electronically to the analyst’s location 

Neutron Detectors 

The most common neutron detectors are gas-filled, proportional counters. These consist 

of a sealed tube containing boron fluoride gas or a gas of the helium isotope 3

He. They 

detect thermal (low-energy) neutrons. The fission neutrons of interest are in the MeV 

range and must be thermalized (slowed down) for the proportional counters to work. This 

is done by surrounding the gas-filled tubes with a neutron-moderating material, such as 

polyethylene. Tubes filled with 3He gas are the most commonly used thermal neutron 

detector. These tubes are insensitive to the gamma radiation that will likely be present. A 

pressurized 3He filled tube suitable for portal screening might be 2 inches in diameter by 

72 inches long, weigh about 3 pounds, and cost about $3,000. A lower-sensitivity tube 

 

15 ORTEC, “Intelligent, Modular Solutions to Portal Monitoring System Needs for Illicit Nuclear and 

Radiological Material Interdiction.” Available online at <http://www.ortec-online.com/pdf/asp-truck.pdf>. 
10

suitable for portable neutron detectors might be 1 inch in diameter by 3 inches long, 

weigh about 5 ounces, and cost about $400. 

A second type of readily available neutron detector consists of a high neutron capture 

isotope, such as lithium-6 (6Li), doped into scintillating plastic or glass fibers. These are 

solid-state alternatives or complements to the 3He detectors. These detectors can be made 

in any size or shape. A 15 ̋x10 ̋x20 ̋ detector will weigh about 20 pounds and cost about 

$7,000. A 50 ̋x48 ̋x11.5 ̋ detector will weigh about 450 pounds and cost about $20,000. 

These detectors have a sensitivity to gamma radiation that can cause false neutron 

detection in certain, well-known circumstances. An interesting new entry into the neutron 

detection field is the “bubble” detector developed by Bubble Technology Industries. The 

basic detection element consists of a gel containing tiny droplets of superheated liquid. 

When a neutron strikes a droplet, the droplet vaporizes forming a visible bubble. The 

number of bubbles is related to the neutron exposure. This technology is potentially 

cheaper and lighter than the gas-filled proportional counters or the doped fibers. 

The technologies discussed above are mature and well understood, so comparing the 

expected performance and costs for various technology combinations employed in 

various situations is straightforward. Indeed, so much is known about the technologies 

that much of the expected performance and cost comparisons can be done by computer 

simulation. To conduct such simulations, it is necessary to specify the required minimum 

detectable gamma ray spectral flux, the required minimum detectable neutron flux, the 

background radiation, the level of acceptable false positives, the level of acceptable false 

negatives, and the maximum time available for detection. This information should allow 

the design of a gamma radiation and/or neutron detection system for any specified 

situation. Verification of the actual performance would, of course, require an extensive 

data collection program in the environments in which the detectors are to be deployed. 

The outcome of such data collection efforts would be the receiver operation characteristic 

curves (ROC curves) that quantify the effectiveness of the detectors by providing the 

detailed statistics regarding false positive and false negative detections for the specific 

environments in which the detectors will be used. 

Detection Issues 

The detection technologies discussed above are well understood and, within limits, 

detection systems based on them can be (and are) designed and built. However, questions 

remain regarding whether those limits are compatible with realistic threats. A determined 

smuggler probably will be well versed in the limitations of the various detection 

technologies and will act to exploit them. Wrapping HEU with lead, for example, would 

make detection by handheld devices difficult, and embedding the HEU-lead package in a 

shipment of high-Z material would make radiographic identification challenging. The use 

of imaging detectors, such as coded-apertures or Compton imaging, would provide a 

significant advantage for detection of 232U in weapons, as the radiation from the weapon 

will be concentrated in a small portion of the image, while the background will be spread 

over the entire image. However, it should also be noted that the inspection time needed to 

build up a useful image with these systems is considerably greater than for a non-imaging 

detector. 
11

Another avenue a smuggler might take would be to suspend the contraband SNM in the 

center of a liquid transport ship, such as a large oil tanker. An oil tanker might carry 

250,000 cubic meters of oil, which corresponds to a volume 300 meters long, 30 meter 

wide and 28 meters deep. If the SNM were properly placed within such a large volume of 

oil, gamma rays and neutrons would be undetectable. The use of radiography to detect the 

SNM mass also is not promising in this scenario. 

The purpose of these two simple examples is to make the point that there are many 

avenues available to a determined smuggler. It is, therefore, unrealistic to depend solely 

on the current level of routine detection. While some degree of routine detection is 

desirable, there should be in place a system that is targeted against specific threats known 

to be originating in identified parts of the world. Such a system could be provided 

through an international coordinating body operating under UNSCR 1540. It would allow 

those responsible for detection to tailor the approach to the specific threat. The approach 

would take into account known techniques for concealing the presence of the contraband 

being smuggled. This would allow detection means to be utilized that are not routinely 

used because of expense or because of safety issues. An example of the latter is certain 

active interrogation techniques that employ radiation levels that might be too high for 

routine use but would be acceptable in special cases. Another example is the use of coded 

aperture imaging detectors or Compton imaging detectors (to improve the signal-to-noise 

ratio) that would be too expensive to deploy broadly on a routine basis. 
12

Current Nuclear Detection Programs 

Several U.S. Government agencies participate in programs to detect and interdict illicit 

trafficking in nuclear materials. The Departments of State, Homeland Security, Defense, 

and Energy have provided radiation detection equipment to countries around the world 

through detection related programs, including the Second Line of Defense Core Program, 

the Megaports Initiative, and the Container Security Initiative.16 

A recent upswing in funding for these organizations and growing Congressional interest 

in nuclear detection necessitate a more coordinated approach. Using UNSCR 1540 as a 

spearhead to coordinate activities would allow more rapid deployment of devices for 

detecting nuclear materials at domestic and foreign air, land, and sea transit points and 

would mitigate the duplication of resources and materials. 

The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) runs the 

Office of Second Line Defense, which is organized into two key initiatives: the Core 

Program (SLD-Core) and the Megaports Initiative. 

SLD-Core Program 

The SLD-Core Program was initially created to assist Russia in its efforts to safeguard 

against nuclear and fissile materials smuggling and trafficking. The U.S. officially began 

working with the Russian Customs Service in 1998 in an effort to equip Russian border 

crossings, airports, and other strategic feeder ports with handheld and fixed radiation 

detection equipment and the specialized training required to use the detectors. Since it 

began working with the Russian Customs Service in 1998, the SLD-Core program has 

equipped 88 sites with detection related technologies.17 To ramp up nuclear detection 

activities in Russia, DOE recently announced that the United States and Russia have 

agreed to emplace radiation detection monitors at all of Russia’s 350 international border 

crossings by 2011, which is 6 years earlier than originally planned.18 

The NNSA SLD-Core program has expanded its focus since 1998 and has installed 

monitoring equipment in Former Soviet Union (FSU) states and Greece and is currently 

working with countries in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, Baltic, and Mediterranean 

regions. The SLD-Core program is also responsible for the repair and upkeep of radiation 

 

16 There are numerous Government programs engaged in nuclear detection activities. Due to space 

constraints, not all could be discussed in depth. Other key programs include: DOE’s Cooperative 

Radiological Instrument Transfer Project (CRITr), the State Department’s Export Control and Related 

Border Security (EXBS) Assistance Program, DOD’s Weapons of Mass Destruction-Proliferation 

Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI), and DOD’s International Counterproliferation (ICP) Program. 17 NNSA, “NNSA’s Second Line of Defense Program.” Available online at <http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/ 

docs/factsheets/2006/NA-06-FS01.pdf>. 

18 John J. Fialka, “Russia, U.S. Step Up Nuclear-Control Drive,” Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2007. 

Available online at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118066679818221102.html?mod= 

todays_europe_page_one>. 
13

detection equipment installed by other U.S. Government agencies at the end of the Cold 

War.19 

Megaports Initiative 

The Department of Energy’s NNSA initiated its Megaports Initiative in 2003 with the 

aim of working with designated partner countries to equip large international seaports 

with radiation detection equipment to detect, deter, and interdict nuclear materials. The 

three main goals of the Megaports Initiative are to deter terrorists from using the world’s 

seaports to ship illicit materials, detect nuclear or radioactive materials if they are shipped 

via sea cargo, and interdict harmful material before it is used against the United States 

and its allies.20 

Under the Megaports Initiative, which is coordinated closely with the Container Security 

Initiative (led by DHS), foreign customs and other officials are provided with radiation 

detection equipment and training to screen shipping containers entering and departing 

their ports. Key to the success of the Initiative is that Megaports systems are specifically 

designed to have minimal impact on port operations. The Megaports Initiative is 

currently operational in Greece, the Bahamas, Sri Lanka, the Netherlands, Singapore, and 

Spain, and NNSA personnel are at various stages of implementing the Megaports 

program in 13 other countries: Belgium, China, Dubai, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica, Israel, 

Oman, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Thailand, and Taiwan. NNSA is 

engaged in negotiations with approximately 20 additional countries.21 

Container Security Initiative 

In response to the terror attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, and the 

increasing awareness of the potential threat from nuclear and radiological terrorism, the 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) initiated the Container Security Initiative 

(CSI) on January 17, 2002. The three strategic goals of the CSI are to: 

• Secure U.S. borders against terrorists and weapons by evaluating all containers 

bound for the United States for terrorist risk before lading at CSI ports. 

• Build a robust CSI cargo system that will withstand a terrorist incident and ensure 

a continuous flow of trade or prompt resumption of trade through CSI ports in the 

event of a terrorist incident. 

• Protect and facilitate legitimate trade by maintaining effectively operating CSI 

ports, working with host nations to inspect all containers identified as a possible 

 

19 NNSA, “SLD Implementation Strategy: Revision B,” April 2006. Available online at 

<http://www.doeal.gov/dicce/ImplementationDocs/SLDImplentationStrategy.pdf#search=%22SLDCore%20program%22>. 

20 NNSA, “Megaports Initiative.” Available online at 

<http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/megaports_initiative.htm>. 

21 NNSA, “Second Line of Defense Program.” Available online at <http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na20/sld.shtml>. 
14

terrorist risk, and providing benefits and incentives to international governments 

and organizations, as well as U.S. trading partners.22 

As of August 2006, 44 foreign ports were actively participating in the CSI; by the end of 

FY2007, CBP plans to cover 85 percent of containers destined for the United States from 

CSI monitored ports and to maintain a 100 percent manifest review rate of those ports.23

Along with its activities in the CSI, CBP also uses nuclear detectors at U.S. ports-of-entry 

to monitor and interdict nuclear and radiological materials. 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

DHS participates in nuclear detection programs through its Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office (DNDO). Established in April 2005, DNDO is the only Federal organization 

dedicated to nuclear detection and the development of a nuclear detection architecture 

aimed at improving our capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, 

possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the 

United States.24 DNDO, which is staffed by representatives from Federal departments 

and agencies, conducts both near-term and long-term research and development of 

detection architecture. The architecture, as developed, consists of three high-level 

geographic layers: domestic, border, and international. 

In 2006, DNDO announced the award of contracts totaling up to $1.15 billion for the 

Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program to enhance the detection of radiological 

and nuclear materials at the nation’s ports of entry. The program focuses on developing 

detectors that will be able to discriminate between naturally occurring radioactive 

materials and true threat materials. 

ASP models were deployed to the Nevada Test Site, where they will be tested using 

nuclear threat material. Portals have also been delivered to the New York Container 

Terminal for data collection, and DNDO plans to deploy radiation portal monitors at the 

Port of Tacoma for testing.25 Further, in the FY2008 Homeland Security spending bill 

(HR 2638), the President has requested $9.8 million from the House and $9.6 million 

from the Senate for “red teaming” programs in DNDO.26

Some experts have questioned the expense of the portal technology adopted by DNDO, 

raising concerns about the efficacy of using such portals internationally. Recently, 

 

22 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Container Security Initiative: 2006-2011 Strategic Plan.” 

Available online at 

<http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/csi_strategic_plan.ctt/csi

_strategic_plan.pdf>. 

23 Ibid. 

24 Department of Homeland Security, “Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.” Available online at 

<http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0766.shtm >. 25 Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: Select Homeland Security Accomplishments for 2006,” 

December 29, 2006. Available online at <http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1167404984182.shtm>. 26 Eileen Sullivan, “Appropriators Show Support for DHS’ ‘Red Team’ Scenarios,” CQ Homeland 

Security, June 13, 2007. Available online at <http://public.cq.com/docs/hs/hsnews110-

000002531281.html>. 
15

concerns also have been raised by the Government Accountability Office as to the 

detection rates of the machines. The authors of this report acknowledge the concerns 

about the detectors and recommend a thorough evaluation of the existing technologies. 

The red team effort should be helpful in this regard. DNDO has stated that it will 

continue performance testing of the machines. 

Another significant effort that DNDO has underway is in the area of nuclear forensics. 

The DNDO’s National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) has two core 

missions—to develop and advance capabilities to perform nuclear forensics on predetonation nuclear and radiological materials, and to implement national-level 

integration, centralized planning, exercising and assessment across the full spectrum of 

Government nuclear forensics capabilities, from pre- to post-detonation. The nuclear 

forensics mission underpins the attribution process, contributing to deterrence of an initial 

attack, preventing a follow-on attack, and supporting prosecution and national response 

deliberations. 

Secure Freight Initiative 

On December 7, 2006, the Departments of Homeland Security and Energy announced a 

new initiative called the Secure Freight Initiative, a collaborative program aimed at 

deploying a globally integrated network of radiation detection and container imaging 

equipment to seaports worldwide.27 The initial phase of the new program involves 

deploying nuclear detection technologies to participating ports in Honduras, South Korea, 

Pakistan, Oman, the United Kingdom, and Singapore. Beginning in early 2007, 

containers at the participating ports will be scanned for radiation and evaluated on risk 

factors before they are cleared for shipment to the United States and other international 

locations. If radiation is detected, an alarm will sound, simultaneously alerting homeland 

security officials and security personnel in the participating country. Data gathered on the 

containers will be combined with other intelligence and risk assessment data and shared 

among partnering countries to improve analysis of high-risk containers.28

The recent collaboration between the Departments of Homeland Security and Energy and 

the combination of intelligence and risk assessment in government-to-government 

information sharing are key components in the defense against nuclear terrorism. 

However, while progress is being made through the joint program, the legislatively 

mandated but unrealistic goal of one-hundred-percent coverage, coupled with little 

coordination among other U.S. programs, likely will diminish their effectiveness. 

Current U.S. programs to combat international illicit trafficking of nuclear material have 

focused on installing portal monitors or conducting checkpoints along seaports and major 

highways, usually selecting locations based on gross tonnage of cargo. While this has led 

to several seizures of nuclear and radiological materials, deployments of nuclear 

detection technologies in this fashion focus primarily on areas subject to extensive 

commercial and industrial activity. It has been shown that in seaports having advanced 

 

27 Department of Homeland Security, “Secure Freight Initiative: Vision and Operations Overview,” 

December 7, 2006. Available online at <http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1165943729650.shtm>. 28 Ibid. 
16

portal monitoring equipment, only 10–20 percent of the cargo is scanned for nuclear or 

radiological material due to the massive amounts of shipments traveling through these 

major ports.29

Our detection capabilities can be improved, however, by coordinating international 

activity through an established institution to spearhead and coordinate global nuclear 

detection and interdiction activities. Such an organization could operate under UNSCR 

1540, which would provide a means for exchanging technology, sharing intelligence, 

correcting flaws in the operation of the system, and encouraging best practices, with the 

end goal of rapid emplacement of sensors at key locations identified through intelligence 

collection and risk assessment. Emplacement would be based not on gross tonnage 

estimates but on threat analyses. Such locations would include, for example, land, air, and 

sea ports and other locations along known smuggling routes and shipment lanes. A recent 

State Department initiative can provide lessons on how to collaborate internationally. 

Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative 

One of the programs the State Department has developed to address the issue of nuclear 

smuggling is the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, which is aimed at identifying 

and addressing shortcomings and gaps in nuclear smuggling security capabilities of states 

at risk.30 The Initiative conducts outreach both to countries with source material and those 

at risk from nuclear smuggling activity. 

After selecting at-risk countries based on assessments of their capabilities to prevent, 

detect, and prosecute illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological material, an 

interagency team engages with host-government officials to develop a list of priority 

projects designed to close the capability gaps. Once they reach agreement on a list of 

projects, they work with potential donors in the international community, such as 

members of the G-8 Global Partnership, to arrange funding for them.31 Despite limited 

funding, the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative has had strong interagency 

participation and support from international donor countries and can provide key lessons 

on how to collaborate in the international arena in nuclear detection. 

International Counterproliferation Initiatives 

The United States is an active participant in a number of international 

counterproliferation initiatives, including the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, the Global 

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G-8 

Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the IAEA Additional 

 

29 Material provided by David L. York, International Security and Technical Systems Analyst, Sandia 

National Laboratories, February 1, 2007. His work was reported in Science Daily, available online at 

<http://www.sciencedaily.com/upi/index.php?feed=Science&article=UPI-1-20070117-16023600-bc-usmonitor.xml>. 

30 U.S. Department of State, “Enlisting Foreign Cooperation in U.S. Efforts to Prevent Nuclear 

Smuggling,” May 25, 2006, Statement of Francis C. Record, Acting Assistant Secretary, International 

Security and Nonproliferation, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 

Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attacks. Available online at <http://www.state.gov/ 

t/isn/rls/rm/69307.htm>.

31 Ibid. 
17

Protocol, and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. In particular, the Proliferation 

Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism play a 

significant role in U.S. international cooperation related to nuclear detection and 

interdiction. The PSI is a broad international partnership of over 80 countries that 

coordinate their actions to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

and their delivery systems and related technologies and materials.32 PSI participants have 

engaged in numerous air, land, and sea interdiction training exercises. 

On July 15, 2006, U.S. President Bush and Russian President Putin, recognizing that 

nuclear terrorism is one of the most dangerous international security challenges that the 

international community faces, announced the creation of the Global Initiative to Combat 

Nuclear Terrorism. President Bush stated that the Initiative reflected his intention to take 

the steps necessary to prevent the acquisition, transport, or use by terrorists of nuclear 

materials and radioactive substances. Among the key objectives of the Initiative is the 

establishment of a robust international detection architecture. Currently, over 50 countries 

have joined the Initiative. 

These international efforts reflect a sense of urgency in dealing with the threat of nuclear 

terrorism and provide impetus for international collaboration in nuclear detection and 

interdiction. Further, the PSI and other multilateral initiatives could provide important 

contributions to improving targeted interdiction, cooperation, and intelligence sharing.

 

32 The White House, “Statement on Proliferation Security Initiative,” September 4, 2003. Available online 

at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030904-10.html>. 
18

Detection Legislation 

The case for a more strategic deployment of detectors to monitor goods bound for U.S. 

destinations and for close international collaboration is strong. This has been recognized 

in two important bills recently passed into law that demonstrate the interest of Congress 

and its recognition of the urgency of combating the threat. As of the time of writing, a 

third bill that addresses nuclear smuggling had emerged from conference. 

The first bill, sponsored by Senators Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Barrack Obama (D-IL), 

was introduced November 1, 2005, as the “Cooperative Proliferation Detection and 

Interdiction Assistance and Conventional Threat Reduction Act.” The Bill was 

reintroduced as S. 2566 in February 2006 and was signed into law January 11, 2007. The 

Lugar-Obama bill will launch a new nonproliferation initiative by focusing on two key 

issue areas: the threat from unsecured conventional weapons and the interdiction of 

weapons of mass destruction. 

The Lugar-Obama legislation is aimed at providing incentives for other countries to 

cooperate with the United States in improving the monitoring of shipments to the United 

States. Specifically, the bill would increase statutory oversight on U.S. assistance to 

friendly foreign countries for proliferation detection and interdiction activities. The bill 

includes the provision that no less than one quarter of Chapter 9 funds (Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1961) be used for providing assistance to partner nations for the 

purpose of enhancing their capabilities to detect and interdict proliferation-related 

shipments by land, air, and sea.33 The provision of funding to assist partners in nuclear 

detection and interdiction programs will be a key component of the implementation of 

UNSCR 1540 and an international coordinating body for nuclear detection. 

The second bill, enacted as Public Law 109-347 on October 13, 2006, is also known as 

the “Security and Accountability For Every Port Act” and was sponsored by Rep. Daniel 

Lundgren (R-CA) and Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA). The bill sets standards for monitoring 

at domestic and foreign ports for nuclear and radiological materials. Some of the key 

provisions of the bill are risk-based funding through a dedicated Port Security Grant 

Program for U.S. ports and the authorization of the Secretary of Homeland Security to 

loan detection equipment and provide training in the operation of the detection portals to 

participating foreign nations.34 The legislation also authorizes $2 billion over 5 years to 

increase security at U.S. ports, requires tightened access at ports, and requires the largest 

22 ports to install radiation detection equipment by the end of 2007. 

While the bill is focused almost wholly on domestic port security, it does require the 

Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct a study on the security and trade of U.S. land 

 

33 United States Senate, “S. 2566, To Provide for Coordination of Proliferation Interdiction Activities and 

Conventional Arms Disarmament, and for Other Purposes.” Available online at 

<http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:s2566rs.txt.pdf>. 34 House Committee on Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: The SAFE Port Act of 2006.” Available online at 

<http://homelandsecurity.house.gov/SAFE_Port_Act_FactSheet_031206.pdf>. 
19

ports and devise a strategic plan to enhance the security of the international supply chain. 

These new bills reflect a sense of urgency in Congress about dealing with the threat of 

nuclear smuggling and provide the domestic impetus for developing and implementing a 

global strategy. Action undertaken by the U.S. Government must reflect this urgency and 

use the momentum provided by these bills and current domestic and international nuclear 

nonproliferation activities to implement a program that is prioritized to focus on 

identified threats, configured to permit maximum flexibility and efficiency in the use of 

resources, and undertaken as part of a global approach to nuclear nonproliferation in 

which international institutions assume a leading and sustained leadership role. 

The third bill is based on the work of The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States, more commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. In 2004, the 

9/11 Commission submitted 41 recommendations to the Administration and Congress on 

improving homeland security, preventing terrorists from acquiring WMD, and 

developing strategies for preventing the spread of Islamic terrorism. In response to the 

Commission’s recommendations, Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS) sponsored H.R.1, the 

“Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007.” Among other 

provisions, the legislation requires that within the next 5 years all container ships be 

scanned for nuclear devices before they leave a foreign port. In late July 2007, it was 

announced that differences had been resolved in Conference and H.R.1 would be sent to 

President Bush for signature. 
20

Implementing an International Infrastructure 

Nuclear smuggling and nuclear terrorism are not a temporary threat but one that will 

confront the world indefinitely, just as do other forms of smuggling and terrorism. The ad 

hoc approaches that have characterized efforts to cope with this threat are no longer 

adequate. Nuclear science, technology, and materials are no longer the province of a few 

select states. At least 60 nations host nuclear research and technology centers, and 144 

nations are members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Access to 

nuclear materials—and technical competence with respect to those materials—is 

worldwide. While this situation is the source of the threat, it also provides means to deal 

with the threat. 

Recognizing the need for international cooperation, the United Nations Security Council, 

in UNSCR 1540, noted that the Security Council is “Gravely concerned by the threat of 

illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, 

and related materials, which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such 

weapons and also poses a threat to international peace and security.” UNSCR 1540, 

among other things, “Decides also that all states shall . . . Develop and maintain 

appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent 

and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit 

trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities 

and legislation and consistent with international law.” UNSCR 1540 also “Recognizes 

that some states may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution 

within their territories and invites states in a position to do so to offer assistance as 

appropriate in response to specific requests to the states lacking the legal and regulatory 

infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above 

provisions.”35 

To encourage broad international participation, we recommend using an established 

international institution to spearhead and coordinate global nuclear detection and 

interdiction activities. Such an organization could operate under UNSCR 1540. It would 

provide a means for exchanging technology, sharing intelligence, correcting flaws in the 

operation of the system, and encouraging best practices, sharing of resources, and expert 

training, with the end goal of rapid emplacement of sensors at key locations identified 

through intelligence collection and risk assessment. This effort would complement and 

coordinate existing nuclear detection activities, not replace them. 

Nuclear smuggling and terrorism, like other forms of contraband smuggling and 

terrorism, are first and foremost law enforcement problems. The national and 

international infrastructures of law enforcement must be systematically brought to bear 

on this problem. Some progress has been made in mobilizing the international law 

enforcement community. For example, Interpol now issues Interpol International Notices 

 

35 United Nations, “Resolution 1540 (2004),” April 28, 2004. Available online at 

<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/73519.htm>. 
21

to warn police, public entities, and other international organizations about potential 

threats from disguised weapons, parcel bombs, and other dangerous materials. Also, at 

the request of the UNSC, an Interpol-United Nations Special Notice was created to 

support the UNSC in the fight against terrorism. These suggest the beginnings of the 

needed international program. However, special action is required with respect to the 

problem of nuclear smuggling and terrorism. This is not only because of the great 

destructive power of nuclear weapons, but also because of the special technologies and 

expertise needed to address the problem. 

Traditional law enforcement agencies are unable to deal with the nuclear smuggling and 

the terrorism problem. They must have available to them capabilities to do routine 

monitoring to detect nuclear smuggling and rapid access to special expertise and 

equipment to respond to identified special threats. They also need, on a regional basis, the 

ability to quickly bring to bear teams with special expertise and equipment to respond to 

special threats. For example, the United States has Nuclear Emergency Support Teams 

(NESTs). The technical members of these teams are typically associated with the DOE 

National Laboratories so as to maintain the required special expertise. The nuclear 

weapons laboratories also develop and maintain the needed equipment. Many countries 

have special expertise similar to the NESTs that would be helpful in implementing their 

own nuclear detection architectures. 

At the law enforcement level, Interpol should be a key player in international 

cooperation. At the level of technical cooperation, the IAEA would seem to be well 

positioned to be a key player. The IAEA has instituted the Regional Co-operative 

Agreement (RCA), which is an intergovernmental agreement for East Asia and the 

Pacific region in which the parties undertake, in cooperation with each other and the 

IAEA, to promote and coordinate cooperative research, development, and training 

projects in nuclear science and technology through their appropriate national institutions. 

Some appropriate variation on this approach could be the means to provide/maintain the 

regional technical expertise and equipment needed to assist regional law enforcement in 

exercising its responsibilities regarding nuclear smuggling and terrorism. 

What is ultimately needed is to treat nuclear smuggling and terrorism as the law 

enforcement issue that it is. All of the means of national and international law 

enforcement should be brought to bear. Due to special aspects of nuclear smuggling and 

terrorism, law enforcement will, on occasion, need rapid access to specialized expertise 

and equipment. 

Management of the U.S. role in international nuclear detection should include leadership 

by the White House, with implementation by several departments in clearly delineated 

roles. Close collaboration with the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism (S/CT) and implementation of the State Department’s Nuclear 

Smuggling Outreach Initiative will assist negotiators in forging partnerships with foreign 

governments participating in a coordinated approach to global nuclear detection and will 

permit maximum flexibility and efficiency in the use of resources. 
22

Summary 

Preventing terrorist organizations from acquiring and using nuclear weapons and related 

materials is one of the most important challenges facing the international community 

today. There is a real risk that clandestine networks of criminals with access to nuclear 

materials and smugglers with long experience in illicit trade can team up to provide wellfinanced terrorist organizations with nuclear materials. 

The seriousness of the threat requires that U.S. Government efforts to deter nuclear 

terrorism be given the highest national security priority and the necessary funding to do 

the job expeditiously. While a number of U.S. Government departments and agencies 

operate programs aimed at combating this threat, a more targeted approach is needed. 

To encourage broad international participation, we recommend using UNSCR 1540 as a 

spearhead to integrate international activities. This effort would be dedicated to the 

identification, detection, and interdiction of illicit nuclear and radiological materials and 

would work closely with the international law enforcement and intelligence communities 

to ensure that nuclear detection becomes routine practice, not only in the United States 

but also throughout the world. The seriousness of the threat necessitates that the United 

States and its international partners work closely together to deter, detect, and interdict 

nuclear terrorism.