[Cite as State v. Hoy, 2024-Ohio-1555.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, : 

 Nos. 23AP-38, 23AP-39,

Plaintiff-Appellee, : 23AP-40, 23AP-41, 23AP-42,

23AP-43, 23AP-44, 23AP-45, 

v. : 23AP-46, & 23AP-47 

(C.P.C. Nos. 22CR-0832, 22CR-0834

: 22CR-1231, 22CR-2224, 22CR-2235, 

 22CR-2236, 22CR-2237, 22CR-4444,

Jonathan M. Hoy, : 10CR-1348, & 10CR-6800)

 

Defendant-Appellant. : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

 

:

 

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on April 23, 2024

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Sheryl L. 

Prichard for appellee. Argued: Sheryl L. Prichard.

On brief: Todd W. Barstow, for appellant. Argued: Todd W. 

Barstow.

APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

EDELSTEIN, J.

{¶ 1} From 2010 to 2022, defendant-appellant, Jonathan M. Hoy, was indicted 

under ten different case numbers with several offenses, including felonies of the third, 

fourth, and fifth degree. Following several proceedings, including, most recently, a plea 

hearing and combined plea and sentencing hearing, the trial court entered judgments of 

conviction on January 9, 2023, sentencing Mr. Hoy to prison terms ranging from 6 to 24 

months for each count. The court ordered that all of the sentences be served consecutive 

to one another. Mr. Hoy now appeals, asserting the trial court erred in imposing 

consecutive sentences. For the following reasons, we reverse. 
Nos. 23AP-38, 23AP-39, 23AP-40, 23AP-41, 23AP-42, 2

23AP-43, 23AP-44, 23AP-45, 23AP-46, & 23AP-47

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} Following a plea hearing on June 29, 2022, and a combined post-release 

control revocation and plea hearing on January 5, 2023, the trial court proceeded directly 

to sentencing on all of Mr. Hoy’s ten cases.

{¶ 3} At sentencing, both the prosecutor and defense counsel presented arguments

as to an appropriate sentence. The prosecutor asserted a sentence of incarceration would 

be appropriate due to the “breadth of the conduct across these cases” and Mr. Hoy’s 

“flagrant noncompliance with his conditions of community control.” (Jan. 5, 2023 Hearing 

Tr. at 20.) Defense counsel asked the court to sentence Mr. Hoy to community residential 

sanctions including a term at a community based correctional facility. In support of that 

request, counsel asserted that most of Mr. Hoy’s criminal conduct coincided with his 

substance use and “extensive mental health issues.” (Jan. 5, 2023 Hearing Tr. at 20-21.)

Mr. Hoy, too, addressed the court, apologizing for his actions and admitting wrongdoing.

{¶ 4} The trial court then sentenced Mr. Hoy as follows:

Case No. Counts of Conviction Sentence

10 CR 1348 F51 Assault; F5 Harassment by Bodily Substance 12 months

10 CR 6800 F5 Attempted Failure to Appeal 12 months

22 CR 832 F5 Theft 12 months

22 CR 834 F5 Theft 12 months

22 CR 1231 F5 Theft 12 months

22 CR 2224 F3 Money Laundering 24 months

22 CR 2235 F5 Theft 12 months

22 CR 2236 F5 Aggravated Possession of Drugs 6 months

22 CR 2237 F5 Theft 12 months

22 CR 4444 F3 Having Weapons Under Disability 24 months

The trial court ordered that these sentences be served consecutively, for an aggregate prison 

sentence of 138 months. 

{¶ 5} When ordering that Mr. Hoy serve the imposed prison terms consecutively, 

the trial court initially stated:

[P]ursuant to 2929.14(C)(4)([b]), with the number of cases, 

consecutive sentences are appropriate in this case in order to 

protect the public, and one sentence is insufficient to 

adequately punish the defendant. That’s based upon the long 

history of going through this, the spree that he went on at the 

1 We have abbreviated “fifth-degree felony” and “third-degree felony” to “F5” and “F3” for ease of reading.
Nos. 23AP-38, 23AP-39, 23AP-40, 23AP-41, 23AP-42, 3

23AP-43, 23AP-44, 23AP-45, 23AP-46, & 23AP-47

end, and the most -- the fact that upset me the most was him 

having a gun on the last one. Okay? He knew better than to have 

a gun. Bad things happen with guns in those circumstances.

(Jan. 5, 2023 Hearing Tr. at 25-26.) When defense counsel objected to the imposition of 

prison sentences and to the court’s decision to run the sentences consecutively, the trial 

court responded as follows:

I gave you an opportunity to show me something, but then that 

gun comes out, and it just wrecked everything you had.

And I’ve been with Mr. Hoy two decades. Okay? It’s not like 

we’re just new with each other. I have gone to bat for him I can’t 

count you how many times, and he’s kicked me in the teeth 

every one of them. And I’m not doing this as a retribution for 

that, but he’s got to learn something. Okay?

And I didn’t max them all out. There are some that less (sic). 

All the F3s are 24 months. Okay?

But, you know, there comes a time he’s got to take care of 

business.

(Jan. 5, 2023 Hearing Tr. at 27-28.)

{¶ 6} After defense counsel renewed her objection to consecutive sentencing, the 

trial court stated:

Well, what part of the presumption should I maintain? I mean, 

he’s not been -- totally noncompliant on probation. He has 

continued to commit crimes. And then the final of them was he 

was possessing a weapon at the -- or near the casino. Okay? 

And that’s just -- that’s not behavior that the presumption’s 

meant to protect. Okay? 

It warrants the consecutive sentences. It warrants the danger 

to the public and that one sentence is inadequate to do.

* * * 

But this is one of those long histories, and I think I reiterated it 

earlier. This isn’t our first rodeo. We’ve been through this 

numerous times. I’ve taken chance and chance and chance with 

him. I’ve let him out when he’s been an absconder, okay, on the 

promise that he was going to go take care of his problem, and it 

never happened. Okay?
Nos. 23AP-38, 23AP-39, 23AP-40, 23AP-41, 23AP-42, 4

23AP-43, 23AP-44, 23AP-45, 23AP-46, & 23AP-47

(Jan. 5, 2023 Hearing Tr. at 30-31.) The trial court then overruled the objection. (Jan. 5, 

2023 Hearing Tr. at 31.)

{¶ 7} The trial court’s sentencing entries for case Nos. 22CR-0832, 22CR-0834, 

22CR-1231, 22CR-2224, 22CR-2235, 22CR-2236, 22CR-2237, and 22CR-4444 include the 

following language:

Considering the facts of this case, the purposes and princip[les] 

of sentencing and the requirements set forth in R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4) the Court finds that a consecutive sentence is 

both necessary and appropriate. The Court further finds that 

(a) a consecutive sentence is necessary to punish the Defendant 

given the seriousness of the offenses committed; (b) a 

consecutive sentence is not disproportionate to the seriousness 

of the Defendant’s conduct; and (c) at least two of the multiple 

offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of 

conduct and that the harm caused by the Defendant’s (sic) was 

so great that no single prison term adequately reflects the 

seriousness of the Defendant’s conduct.

(Emphasis deleted.) (Jan. 9, 2023 Jgmt. Entries at 1-2.) The entry for case No. 10CR-1348 

states:

The Court has considered the purposes and principles of 

sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the factors set forth in 

R.C. 2929.12. In addition, the Court has weighed the factors as 

set forth in the applicable provisions of R.C. 2929.13 and R.C. 

2929.14. The Court further finds that a prison term is/is not

mandatory pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F). 

* * * 

Sentence to run consecutively with case numbers 22CR4444, 

22CR2237, 22CR2236, 22CR2235, 22CR2224, 22CR1231, 

22CR834, 22CR832, and 10CR6800. 

(Emphasis sic.) (Jan. 9, 2023 Revocation Entry, case No. 10CR-1348 at 1-2.) And the entry 

in case No. 10CR-6800 is nearly identical:

The Court has considered the purposes and principles of 

sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the factors set forth in 

R.C. 2929.12. In addition, the Court has weighed the factors as 

set forth in the applicable provisions of R.C. 2929.13 and R.C. 
Nos. 23AP-38, 23AP-39, 23AP-40, 23AP-41, 23AP-42, 5

23AP-43, 23AP-44, 23AP-45, 23AP-46, & 23AP-47

2929.14. The Court further finds that a prison term is not 

mandatory pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F). 

* * * 

Sentence to run consecutively with case numbers 22CR4444, 

22CR2237, 22CR2236, 22CR2235, 22CR2224, 22CR1231, 

22CR834, 22CR832, and 10CR1348.

(Emphasis sic.) (Jan. 9, 2023 Revocation Hearing, case No. 10CR-6800 at 1-2.)

{¶ 8} Mr. Hoy timely appealed from the trial court’s January 9, 2023 judgment 

entries. He raises the following sole assignment of error for our review:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF 

APPELLANT BY IMPROPERLY SENTENCING HIM TO 

CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF INCARCERATION IN 

CONTRAVENTION OF OHIO’S SENTENCING STATUTES.

II. ANALYSIS

{¶ 9} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Hoy contends the trial court imposed 

consecutive sentences without making the requisite findings during his sentencing hearing 

and in the court’s sentencing entries.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

{¶ 10} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), we “may increase, reduce, or otherwise 

modify a sentence * * * or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the [trial]

court for resentencing” if we clearly and convincingly find either “[t]hat the record does not 

support the sentencing court’s findings under * * * [division] (C)(4) of section 2929.14” or 

“[t]hat the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” 

{¶ 11} We generally presume prison sentences “ ‘shall be served concurrently with 

any other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this 

state, another state, or the United States.’ ” State v. Byrd, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-342, 2020-

Ohio-507, ¶ 8. However, a sentencing court may overcome that presumption and impose 

consecutive sentences by making three specific findings set forth in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). 

See, e.g., State v. Greene, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-667, 2018-Ohio-3135, ¶ 15, quoting State v. 

Jones, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-80, 2014-Ohio-3740, ¶ 18. 
Nos. 23AP-38, 23AP-39, 23AP-40, 23AP-41, 23AP-42, 6

23AP-43, 23AP-44, 23AP-45, 23AP-46, & 23AP-47

{¶ 12} To impose consecutive sentences, the court must find “consecutive service is 

necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender” and 

“consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s 

conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public.” R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). 

Additionally, the court must make at least one of the following findings: 

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple 

offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, 

was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 

2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under postrelease control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part 

of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by 

two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so 

great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the 

offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct 

adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s 

conduct.

(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates 

that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the 

public from future crime by the offender.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). “[A] word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute is not 

required.” State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 29. And while the trial 

court must make each of these findings “at the sentencing hearing and incorporate [them] 

into its sentencing entry, * * * it has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings.” 

Id. at ¶ 37. “[A]s long as [we] can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct 

analysis,” we must uphold the imposition of consecutive sentences. Id. at ¶ 29. However, 

when a trial court fails to make the required findings, consecutive sentences are contrary to 

law and must be reversed. State v. Ayers, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-371, 2014-Ohio-276, ¶ 15, 

quoting State v. Wilson, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-551, 2013-Ohio-1520, ¶ 18. 

B. The trial court failed to make the requisite findings.

{¶ 13} We begin our analysis by noting the trial court did not use language identical 

to that set forth in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). While that would be preferable, the failure to “give 

a talismanic incantation of the words of the statute” is not, itself, error. Bonnell at ¶ 37. 

Therefore, we must sift through the sentencing transcript to determine whether the words 
Nos. 23AP-38, 23AP-39, 23AP-40, 23AP-41, 23AP-42, 7

23AP-43, 23AP-44, 23AP-45, 23AP-46, & 23AP-47

the trial court did use during the hearing satisfy R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)’s dictates. See, e.g., 

State v. Hairston, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-416, 2017-Ohio-8719, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Hargrove, 

10th Dist. No. 15AP-102, 2015-Ohio-3125, ¶ 19-21 (“[A]ppellate courts have been ‘fairly 

deferential to the trial court’ in reviewing R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) challenges and will determine 

the trial court made requisite findings if reasonably able to ‘glean’ such findings from the 

record.”).

{¶ 14} Because it is dispositive of this appeal, we first address whether the trial court 

made the second required finding that “consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to 

the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the 

public.” R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). With respect to this finding, the trial court failed to use 

language of proportionality or seriousness, and failed to engage in any analysis that would 

suggest consideration of the seriousness of Mr. Hoy’s conduct in these ten cases when it 

ordered Mr. Hoy to serve the prison terms consecutively at the sentencing hearing. 

{¶ 15} The state asserts that when viewed together, the court’s findings that 

“ ‘consecutive sentences are appropriate in this case in order to protect the public, and one 

sentence is insufficient to adequately punish the defendant * * * based upon the long history 

* * * and having a gun’ ” and the court’s mention of “ ‘danger to the public and that one 

sentence is inadequate’ ” are sufficient to satisfy the “proportionality/danger to the public 

analysis.” (Brief of Appellee at 6, quoting Jan. 5, 2023 Hearing Tr. at 26, 30.) Ultimately, 

the state asks us to assume from the trial court’s mention of the two other required 

consecutive sentence findings, the trial court’s reference to the escalation in number and

frequency of incidents, and the presence of a gun during the last incident, that the court 

properly considered and made a finding that consecutive sentences across all of Mr. Hoy’s 

ten cases are not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct in each of those cases. 

{¶ 16} In support of its argument, the state relies on our decision in State v. Dixon, 

10th Dist. No. 17AP-884, 2018-Ohio-3759, where we found similar language at sentencing 

was sufficient to satisfy R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)’s dictates. In Dixon, the trial court stated:

Pursuant to Revised Code Section 2929.14 Subsection (C)(4), 

because these offenses clearly constitute an ongoing course of 

conduct and because the court believes that no single sentence 

can satisfy the course of conduct, the danger that conduct poses 

to the community, and in order to ensure the safety of the 

community, because, again, Mr. Dixon has demonstrated a 
Nos. 23AP-38, 23AP-39, 23AP-40, 23AP-41, 23AP-42, 8

23AP-43, 23AP-44, 23AP-45, 23AP-46, & 23AP-47

clear pattern of repeated behavior, he is assaultive to the 

mothers of his children, those sentences are going to run 

consecutively with each other for a total of 11 years of 

incarceration.

Id. at ¶ 8. Because the trial court in that case did not use the statutory language, we 

undertook a thorough review of the transcript to determine whether the trial court made

the required proportionality finding. Id. at ¶ 9. We relied on State v. White, 7th Dist. No. 

16 MA 0143, 2017-Ohio-7797 and State v. Fields, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-417, 2017-Ohio-661,

to conclude it did. In so holding, we noted, “Courts have held that even though the trial 

court employed the language of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b), rather than the specific language of 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), the statement equated to a proportionality/danger to the public 

finding.” Dixon at ¶ 10. Applying that principle, we concluded that “by stating ‘no single 

sentence can satisfy that course of conduct,’ the trial court weighed the severity of 

consecutive sentences against the seriousness of the conduct.” Id.

{¶ 17} However, our decision in Dixon was flawed. This is because we failed to 

grapple with meaningful differences between the trial courts’ consecutive sentencing 

pronouncements in Fields and White on the one hand, and the deficiencies of those 

pronouncements in Dixon on the other. Before imposing consecutive sentences, the trial 

court in Fields stated, “I do not think that a single prison sentence could adequately reflect 

the seriousness of the conduct, and [appellant’s] history of criminal conduct demonstrates 

that consecutive sentences are necessary.” (Emphasis sic and deleted.) Fields at ¶ 12.

Similarly, in White, the trial court stated, “[C]onsecutive terms are necessary because this 

type of a crime committed repeatedly renders the harm so great and so unusual that a single 

term does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the conduct.” (Emphasis added.) White 

at ¶ 9. Although the trial courts in both cases failed to make the explicit proportionality 

finding required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), both our court and the Seventh District upheld the 

consecutive sentences based on the overlap between findings and the trial courts’ 

references to the seriousness of the offenders’ conduct. See White at ¶ 14-15; Fields at ¶ 20-

21.

{¶ 18} In Dixon, we gave only cursory consideration to the underlying facts in Fields

and White. We noted that appellate courts had previously upheld consecutive sentences 

when trial courts employ language from R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) in lieu of the proportionality 
Nos. 23AP-38, 23AP-39, 23AP-40, 23AP-41, 23AP-42, 9

23AP-43, 23AP-44, 23AP-45, 23AP-46, & 23AP-47

finding, without considering why or how. But, while the lower courts in Fields and White 

expressed concern about the seriousness of the offenders’ conduct, the court in Dixon, like 

the court here, made no such mention. In Dixon, the trial court stated only that “no single 

sentence can satisfy that course of conduct, the danger that conduct poses to the 

community.” Id. at ¶ 8. While some of these words appear in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b), they 

are not the words that matter for purposes of this specific analysis. The sentencing court in 

Dixon made no mention of the harm caused by the offender or the seriousness of his 

conduct. As a result, we cannot “discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis.” 

Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177 at ¶ 29. Therefore, we believe our court erroneously concluded in 

Dixon that any overlap between the trial court’s language and R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) is 

sufficient to demonstrate a trial court engaged in a proportionality analysis. To the extent 

Dixon and other decisions from this court stand for the proposition that any such overlap 

is sufficient regardless of which language actually overlaps, they are overruled.

{¶ 19} And, so, for purposes of this case, we return to the actual language employed 

by the trial court. Following a careful review of the sentencing hearing transcript, we are 

unable to conclude that the trial court made the requisite findings to support consecutive 

sentences. During Mr. Hoy’s sentencing hearing, the trial court noted: 

(1) Consecutive sentences are appropriate to protect the 

public;

(2) One sentence is insufficient to adequately punish Mr. 

Hoy;

(3) Mr. Hoy had a long criminal history and committed 

criminal offenses while under supervision;

(4) Mr. Hoy seems to have gone on a crime spree in the 

months leading up to the charges; and

(5) Mr. Hoy possessed a gun during the last of the incidents.

(See Jan. 5, 2023 Hearing Tr. at 25-28, 30-31.) Absent from these statements is any 

indication that the trial court found consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the 

seriousness of Mr. Hoy’s conduct. Any minimal overlap with the language of R.C. 
Nos. 23AP-38, 23AP-39, 23AP-40, 23AP-41, 23AP-42, 10

23AP-43, 23AP-44, 23AP-45, 23AP-46, & 23AP-47

2929.14(C)(4)(b)—under the facts and circumstances of this case—does not save the 

sentences from reversal. 

{¶ 20} Accordingly, we sustain Mr. Hoy’s assignment of error, vacate his consecutive 

sentences, and remand for resentencing.2

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 21} Having sustained Mr. Hoy’s sole assignment of error, we reverse the

January 9, 2023 judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, and remand 

this matter for resentencing consistent with this decision. 

Judgments reversed;

cause remanded.

BEATTY BLUNT and BOGGS, JJ., concur.

2 We note two of the trial court’s sentencing entries failed to incorporate the necessary findings. On remand, 

the trial court must ensure its entries, too, reflect each of the required findings. (See Brief of Appellee at 12 

(conceding two of the trial court’s entries failed to include the necessary findings).)