See ee a

27. The Agency was matching the 1,500-man brigade, after
an amphibious landing, against Castro's combined military
forces, which the highest-level U.S. intelligence (USIB reports
entitled "The Military Buildup in Cuba", dated 30 November 1960
and 9 February 1961, respectively) estimated as follows: The
Revolutionary Army - 32,000 men; the militia - 200,000 men;
employing more than 30 to 40 thousand tons of Bloc-furnished
arms and heavy materiel of the value of $30,000,000.

28. It is difficult to uderstand how the decision to
proceed with the invasion could have been justified in the
latter stages of the operation. Under the Trinidad plan
(Annex C), access to the Escambray Mountains for possible
guerrilla existence might have constituted some justification
for the enormous risks involved. This justification did not
apply to the Zapata area which was poor guerrilla terrain and
offered little possibility for the break-out of a surrounded
invasion force. The lack of contingency planning for either
survival or rescue of the brigade has never been satisfactorily
explained.

29. The argument has been made that the Agency's theory of
an uprising to be set off by a successful invasion and the
maintenance of the battalion for a period of a week or so has
not been disproved. It was not put to the test, this argument

goes, because the cancelled D-Day air strikes were essential

- 55 -



a a ae aoe oe al

29. The small staff at Key West not only supported small
boat operations; it also had to take whatever action was
necessary when disabled black flights came in to the local Naval :
air station since DPD had no representative in the area. Each
unsuccessful maritime operation doubled the work. Boats coming
back to a safe haven loaded with arms and explosives, usually
crewed by Cubans and sometimes disabled in various ways, had to
be unloaded again by whoever was available among paramilitary
case officers and security and support people. A few staff
employees worked almost around the clock for a month loading
and unloading cargo without benefit of even a forklift. Many
tons were so handled.

30. It is clear that there was no over-all policy in regard
to the small boats. There was no clear directive as to whether
to acquire short-range, speedy boats or long-range, slower boats;
whether to use fishing craft and crews or special-purpose boats
built specifically for our use. There was no policy on the use
of a mother craft. There was no control over the amount of
money spent on these small boats and their outfitting.

The Maritime Unit

31. WH/} Headquarters had a staff employee whose job was
small boat coordinator. This meant, in effect, checking
proposed operations with the intelligence section, extending

approvals and keeping records. wWo/k also had a separate maritime

- lig -



ry
if

FOP

99. In the first three months of 1961 the problems faced
by the project were many and complex. Although the Army Special
Forces instructors had finally arrived in Guatemala the brigade
trainee quota was still only half fulfilled and 6 call went to
the training camps for special recruiting teams to be sent to
Miami. Meanwhile trainees who had been in the camp for several
months had had no contact with the political front-and were
wondering what sort of a Cuban future they were expected to
fight for. Disturbances broke out, and the project leaders
persuaded three FRD figures to visit the camp and mollify the men.

Training in the U.
60. During this period the Nicaraguan air strip which

had been placed at the project's disposal was being made ready
for use and two new training sites were activated. Although
a definite policy determination on the training of Cubans in
the U.S. had never been made, 25 tank operators were success-
fully trained for the strike force at Fort Knox. Another
eleventh-hour training requirement was fulfilled when the
project acquired the use of Belle Chase Ammmition Depot near
New Orleans. This was used for the training of a company-
sized unit hurriedly recruited for a diversion landing and of
an underwater demolition team.

él. During the period between the U.S. national elections

and the inauguration of President Kennedy the Government's



ee eee ee ae

9. The Agency should take steps to improve its
employees' competence in foreign languages, knowledge
of foreign areas, and capability in dealing with foreign
people, when such skills are necessary.

10. The Agency should devise a more orderly system for
the assignment of employees within the pp/P area than that

currently in use.



ane cme oe one a a

various operations in the project but were drawn up in

response to operational needs as they arose. Consequently,

the scope of the operation itself and of the support
required was constantly shifting.

There were some good things in this project. Much of the
support provided was outstanding (for example, logistics and
communications). A number of individuals did superior jobs.
Many people at all grade levels gave their time and effort
without stint, working almost unlimited hours over long periods,
under difficult and frustrating conditions, without regard to
personal considerations. But this was not enough.

It is assumed that the Agency, because of its experience
in this Cuban operation, will never again engage in an operation
that is essentially an overt military effort. But before it
takes on another major covert political operation it will have
to improve its organization and management drastically. It
must find a way to set up an actual task force, if necessary,
and be able to staff it with the best people. It must govern
its operation with clearly defined policies and carefully
drawn plans, engaging in full coordination with the Departments
of State and Defense as appropriate.

Previous surveys and other papers written by the Inspector
General have called attention to many of these problems and

deficiencies, and have suggested solutions. For example, in



16 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Inspector General Survey of the Cuban Operation
(dated October 1961)

It is my understanding that you have requested information con-
cerning the distribution of the IG Survey of the Cuban Operation and
the DD/P comments on it. At the time the report was written it was
understood that copies.of the report would be sent to the President's
Board and consequently 20 copies were made. However, the only
distribution made of the report is as follows:

Copy 1 - Mr. McCone - 21 November 1961

2 - DCI {then Mr. Dulles) - 24 November
3 - DDCI (then Gen. Cabell) - 24 November
4 -DD/P (then Mr. Bissell) - 24 November

5 - 1G (Mr. Kirkpatrick)

6 - On file in office of Acting IG (Mr. McLean)
7 - C/WH (Col. King) - 24 November

8 - Mr. Esterline (WH Division) via Col. King - 24 November

Re)
‘

On file in my office

10 - President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, via
Mr. Earman at request of DCI, 18 January 1962

11 through 20 - On file in my office

¥
Lymdn B, Kirkpatrick

rem



TODS T

by the "Barbara J", a surplus LCI which the Agency bought in
October 1960. It was intended that this craft would serve as
@ mother ship for small boat operations and also provide a
long-range lift capability.

19. Aftera shakedown voyage in December, featured by a
mutiny, the ship was scheduled for clandestine maritime infil-
tration of three paramilitary teams into Cuba. Initially there
was some confusion as to who was running the operation since
Miami had been handling small boat operations and had made the
rendezvous plans for this one, but Headquarters had responsibility
for the "Barbara J". WH/k then sent the chief of its maritime
section to Miami to coordinate, to brief the captain, and to
dispatch the boat on its mission on 16 January.

20. The "Barbara J" put into Vieques Island on 31 January
1961 after having been’ unsuccessful in putting anybody ashore
in Cuba. The crew's morale continued to deteriorate. Som
refused to take direct orders, attempts to discipline the men
were ineffective, the engineers refused to stand watch, and all
of the crew wanted to return to Miami and resign. Also, nine
of the ten agents did not wish to stay on the ship for another
mission.

A Sit-down Strike
21. On 4 February the "Barbara J" sailed from Vieques for

a rendezvous on the south coast of Cuba, 24 crew members having



a I - ol

4g. The President may never have been clearly advised of
the need for command of the air in an amphibious operation like
this one. The DD/P was aware that at least two of the President's
military advisors, both members of the Joint Chiefs, did not
understand this principle. This might well have served to warn
the DD/P that the President needed to be impressed most strongly
with this principle, by means of a formal written communication,
and also have alerted him to the advisability of accepting the
Secretary's invitation to call the President directly.

50. If the project's paramilitary chief, as leader of the
overt military effort, had accompanied the DDCI and the DD/P to
the meeting with the Secretary he might have brought strong
persuasion to bear on the decision.

5l. This fateful incident, in our opinion, resulted in
part from failure to circulate formal planning papers together
with requests for specific confirmation.

Shifts in Scope

52. The general vagueness of policy and direction permitted
a@ continual shifting of the scope and scale of the project, that
is, the type of operational planning commonly referred to as
“playing it by ear," and this in turn led to various kinds of
difficulties about people, money, supplies and bases.

53- A staffing guide prepared in May 1960 listed a total

of 235 personnel required for the foreseeable future (107 being



Sa fe ee ee

The same survey also discussed the management problem in
the pp/P area at length, and made a number of recommendations
which are on record. Among other things, it pointed out the
confusion as to the relationship and ‘functions of the three
top officers.

The study of the Cuban operation shows that these criticisms
and many others discussed in previous Inspector General surveys
are still valid end worthy of review. But the Cuban operation,
in addition to demonstrating old weaknesses again, also showed
Agency weaknesses not clearly discerned before.

The Inspector General, as a result of his study of the
Cuban operation, makes the following recommendations regarding
future Agency involvement in covert operations which have major
international significance and which may profoundly affect the
course of world events:

1. Such an operation should be carried out by a
earefully selected task force, under the command of a
senior official of stature on a full-time basis, and
organizationally outside the DpD/P structure but drawing
upon all the resources of the Clandestine Services.

2. The Agency should request that such projects
should be transferred to the Department of Defense when
they show signs of becoming overt or beyond Agency

capabilities.



Seana NII <a aoe ca a

H. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

1. The WH/4 Branch had not only the responsibility for the
Cuban project but also the normal area duties of a geographical
unit in the Clandestine Services. Besides being considered a
task force with the mission of overturning the Castro government,
it also had the Headquarters desk responsibility for Cuba, in-
cluding support of Havana Station and Santiago Base until the
break in diplomatic relations.

2. This arrangement required WH/l"s intelligence (FT)

, Section to collect intelligence on Cuba not only for the task

force, with its special requirements, but also for the entire
U.S. intelligence commnity, with its diverse and long-range
needs.

3. , me section was plagued with personnel shortages from
the start, but as long as the U.S. Embassy in Havana remained
open, thus assuring comminications, it received and processed a
good yield of intelligence from Cuba, chiefly on political,
economic, and Commmist Party matters. Late in 1960 the section
was directed to place emphasis on military information, but it
found that its agents in Cuba lacked access to high-level mili-
tary sources.

4, The FI section transmitted copies of all the reports
it processed to the paramilitary section as well as to the rest

of its regular intelligence customers.

-_75 -



PO ST

Uneasy Front

25. Although Cuban leaders had formed a "front" at Agency
urging, it was an uneasy one. They were by no means in agreement,
either among themselves or with Agency case officers, on politics
or on operations.

26. Power struggles developed early in the life of the FRD.
The Cuban leaders wanted something to say about the course of
paramilitary operations. As early as May 1960 one of the more ‘
prominent leaders was urging-an invasion on a fairly lerge scale’

from a third country. ,

27. By June the American press was beginning to nibble at
the operation, principally at Radio Swan, some of the stories
implying that it was not a completely legitimate commercial venture.
Another indication that operational security was less than perfect
was a statement by a defected Cuban naval attache that it was com-
mon knowledge among exiles in Miami that a certain Cuban leader
was backed by the Agency and that “there were entirely too many
Americans running around the area waving money."

28. On 22 June the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
briefed the National Security Council on the project. Ultimate
objective of the training program, according to the paper prepared
for this briefing, was a minimm force of 500 men split into
approximately 25 teams skilled in organizing, training and leading

indigenous dissident groups, each team to be provided with a radio





trained personnel, boats, bases, doctrine, and organization.

The employees who worked in this sadly slighted activity were
well aware of this, and morale was not high. As one of them
said, "The lowest kind of operations officer is a paramilitary
operations officer, and the lowest kind of PM officer is a

maritime operations officer."



De ae a oe ae Ee a ~
and that 80 men (instead of 60) were approved for infiltration
teams. During this month the 80 men were moved to Panama where
they were held until somebody could find out what to do with
them. An offer from DPD to give them jump training was turned
down by the project.

15. By January 1961 the morale of the trainees in Panama
had declined considerably. There was not even an interpreter
available for briefing and debriefing them. Headquarters then
had 2h of them brought to safe houses in Miami to be made ready
for dispatch. Twelve radio operators were moved from Panama
to the Agency's training base in the United States for further
training.

16. By February 1961 the 32 trainees still in Panama were
described as disillusioned. and at the breaking point. They
were then transferred to a base in New Orleans to be given
additional training in sabotage and air-maritime reception.
February was actually a red-letter month. Six of the radio
operators were infiltrated legally. On 14 February the first
resistance team was put into Cuba, and two more teams went in
at the end of the month. However, the two teams which had sat
in a Miami safe house from mid-November to mid-January returned
to Miami in bad humor in mid-February after a month on the

"Barbara J" circumavigating Cuba without being put ashore.

- 130 -



Lots

there is evidence that its morale is low but the government is
able to use very large numbers against small groups of guerrillas
and is able to exercise surveillance of suspicious activities
throughout the island. Short of some shock that will disorganize
or bring about the defection of significant parts of the militia,
it must be anticipated that violent opposition of all kinds will
gradually be suppressed.

c. At the present time the regular Cuban military
establishment, .especially the Navy and Air Force, are of extremely
low effectiveness. Within the next few months, - however, it is
expected that Cuba will Pegin to take delivery of jet aircraft and
will begin to have available trained and well indoctrinated Cuban
pilots. During the same period the effectiveness of ground forces
will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet
weapons will improve. .Therefore, after some date, probably no
more than six months away it will probably become militarily
infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except through the
commitment to combat of a more sizeable organized military force
than can be recruited from among the Cuban exiles.

3. Possible Courses of Action: Four alternative courses of

action involving the commitment of the paramilitary force described
above are discussed in succeeding paragraphs. -They are:
a. Employment of the paramilitary force in a mamer which

would minimize the appearance of an invasion of Cuba from the outside.



—~

20-68

withdrawal of all practical support. In view of the breadth
of the political spectrum involved, this will cause some
difficulties for the future since it is hard to imagine any
acceptable post-Castro leadership that will not include some
of the exiles dealt with during the past year.

9. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Castro's position is daily getting stronger and will
soon be consolidated to the point that his oyerthrow will. only'
be possible by drastic, politically undesirable actions such
as an all-out embargo or an overt use of military force.

b. .A failure to remove Castro by external action will
lead in the near future to the elimination of all internal and
external. Cuban opposition of any effective nature. Moreover,
the continuance of the Castro regime will be a substantial
victory for the Sino-Soviet Bloc which will use Cuba as a base
for increased activity throughout the.Western ‘Hemisphere,
thereby accentuating political instability and weakening U. S.
prestige and influence.

c. The Cuban paramilitary force, if used, has a good
chance of overthrowing Castro or at the very least causing a
damaging civil war without requiring the U..S. to commit
itself to overt action against Cuba. Whatever embarrassment

the alleged (though dentable) U..S. support may cause, it



Se eee mca a ea ed

authority over all project personnel and responsibility for the
supervision of any project activities conducted through the
Miami area from other areas. It authorized him to use personnel,
materiel, facilities and funds for the accomplishment of the
over-all Agency mission. He was made responsible to the chief
of the project.

10. The first intelligence (FI) case officer reported to
the base in September 1960 and proceeded to acquire, train and
direct agents. At the timé of the invasion, the Miami Base had
31 FI agents in Cuba, all of whom were reporting and all of whom
had been recruited by the base.

The CI Section

11. The counterintelligence (cI) section began to function
in mid-July 1960. By the time of the strike, this section had
39 carefully selected, highly educated Cubans trained as case
officers to form a future Cuban Intelligence Services also, 100
selected Cubans trained as future CI officials and civil
government officials; also, a reserve of 100 older non-political
individuals trained as a reserve intelligence corps.

12. The paramilitary (PM) section was opened in late June
1960 with one officer. His job was to conduct liaison with the
Cuban leaders in order to obtain recruits for the Guatemala
camps. A second PM officer reported in August, and at this time

there was a beginning of an attempt to infiltrate arms,

- TO-.



PoP 8-5

to 55 hours and 26 hours, respectively. Fourteen frequencies
were used. By the time of the invasion a total of 12,000,000
pounds of leaflets had been dropped on Cuba.

83. Late on 16 April, the eve of D Day, the air strikes
designed to knock out the rest of Castro's air force on the
following morning were called off. The message reached the
field too late to halt the landing operation, as the decision
to cancel the air strike was made after the landing force had
been committed.

84, The invasion fleet which had assembled off the south
coast of Cuba on the night of 16 April included two LCIs owed
by the Agency, 2 U.S. Navy LSD carrying three LCUs and four LCVPs,
all of them pre-loaded with supplies, and seven chartered commer-
celal freighters. All these craft participated in the assault
phase, except for three freighters which were loaded with follow-up
supplies for ground and air forces. These vessels were armed
with 50-caliber machine gums. In addition, each ICT mounted two
75-mm. recoilless rifles.

85. In addition to the personal weapons of the Cuban exile
soldiers, the armament provided for combat included sufficient
numbers of Browning automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars ,
recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, and flame-throwers. There
were also five M-41 tanks, 12 heavy trucks, an aviation fuel tank
truck, a tractor crane, a bulldozer, two large water trailers,
and numerous small trucks and tractors.

- 28-
CeO ae ae eee ee



la
lo
Irv
IK

1 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Report on the Cuban Operation

1. In our conyersation on Friday morning, the first of
December, you mentioned your concern that the Inspector General's
Report on the Cuban Operation, taken alone, might give an erroneous
impression as to the extent CIA is responsible for the failure of
the operation. In my opinion the failure of the operation should
be charged in order to the following factors.

a. An over-all lack of recognition on the part of the U.S.
Government as to the magnitude of the operation required to oyer-
throw the Fidel Castro regime.

b. The failure on the part of the U.S. Government to plan
for all contingencies at the time of the Cuban operation including
the necessity for using regular U.S. military forces in the event
that the exiled Cubans could not do the job themselves.

c. The failure on the part of the U.S. Government to be
willing to commit to the Cuban operation, as planned and executed,
those necessary resources required for its success.

/s/ Lyman Kirkpatrick
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General



a ee a

layout and the location of the drop zone, and also the amounts
and kinds of materiel desired. wH/4 cabled this requirement to
the air base in Guatemala, where all the flights originated.
However, the Development Projects Division (DPD) then cabled
Guatemala that arms and ammmition would be dropped with food to
make a maximum load, also 200 pounds of leaflets for a drop
elsewhere. This cable was not coordinated with wH/h, which sent
a message to the agent the following day stating that a cargo
drop would take place as requested and that the weight would be
1,500 pounds. .

Rice and Beans

4%. A drop was made on 31 December. The 15~-man reception
team received, not only 1,500 pounds of materiel which was dif-
ferent from the original request because the specific items could
not be packed in waterproof containers in tim, “but also 800
pounds of beans, 800 pounds of rice and 166 pounds of lard.

5. This was the only drop to this Cuban agent. He was so
vexed with the drop that he came out of Cuba specifically to make
a complaint and to cancel a succeeding drop which had been planned.
He stated that he would not accept another drop, no matter what
the cargo was. He pointed aut that the Agency had endangered his
safety by dropping cargo which he had not asked for, did not
need, and could not handle. Furthermore, the aircraft had stayed
in the vicinity too long, had flown with its landing lights on,
had circled around and made numerous U-turns and even dropped

-9- . ne
na ea <n oe



Sa a oe al

serious operational mistakes and omissions, and in lack of
awareness of developing dangers, in failure to take action to
counter them, and in grave mistakes of judgment. There was

failure at high levels to concentrate informed, unwavering
scrutiny on the project and to apply experienced, unbiased

Judgment to the menacing situations that developed.



2

facility might be installed on a U.S. base in the Bahamas or
temporary use might be made of a shipborne station if it is
desired to avoid "gray" broadcasting from Florida.

3. Newspapers are also being supported and further support
is planned for the future. Avance, a leading Cuban daily
(Zayas! paper), has been confiscated as has EL Mundo, another
Cuban daily. Diario de ia Marina, one of the hemisphere's
outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana, is having
difficulty and may have to close soon. Arrangements have al-
ready been made to print Avance weekly in the U.S. for introduc-
tion into Cuba clandestinely and mailing throughout the hemi-
sphere on a regular basis. As other leading newspapers are
expropriated, publication of “exile" editions will be considered.

4. Inside Cuba, a CIA-controlled action group is producing
and distributing anti-Castro and anti-Comminist publications
regularly. CIA is in contact with groups outside Cuba who will
be assisted in producing similar materials for clandestine
introduction into Cuba.

5. Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latin
America. They will be followed by others of equal calibre. The
mission of these men will be to gain hemisphere support for the

opposition to Castro. Controlled Western Hemisphere assets

*



Rein

38. However, cancellation would have averted failure, which
brought even more embarrassment, carried death and misery to
hundreds, destroyed millions of dollars' worth of U.S. property,
and seriously damaged U.S. prestige.

39. The other possible outcome -- the one the project
strove to achieve -- was a successful brigade lodgment, housing
the Revolutionary Council but isolated from the rest of Cuba by
swamps and Castro's forces. Arms were held in readiness for
30,000 Cubans who were expected to make their way unarmed
through the Castro army and wade the swamps to rally to the
liberators. Except for this, we are unaware of any planning
by the Agency or by the U.S. Government for this success.

40. It is beyond the scope of this report to suggest what
U.S. action might have been taken to consolidate victory, but
we can confidently assert that the Agency had no intelligence
evidence that Cubans in significant numbers could or would join
the invaders or that there was any kind of an effective and
cohesive resistance movement under anybody's control, let alone
the Agency's, that could have furnished internal leadership
for an uprising in support of the invasion. The consequences of
a@ successful lodgment, unless overtly supported by U.S. armed

forces, were dubious.



BOP

recognition after a decent interval and thus to prepare the way

for more open and more extensive logistical support if this

should be necessary.

5. Military Advantages:
a. This is a safer military operation than the daylight

landing in force originally proposed. The landing itself
is more likely to be unopposed or very lightly opposed
and the beachhead perimeter could be more easily held.

b. ‘here are no known’ commnications facilities in .the.-
inmediate target area. This circumstance, coupled with the
plen for a night landing, increases the chance of achieving
surprise.

ec. By comparison with any of the known inaccessible
parts of the Oriente Province the objective area is closer
to rear bases for air and sea logistical support.

d. The plan has the disadvantage that the build up of
force can be only gradual since there is virtually no local
population from which to recruit additional troops and
volunteers “from other parts of Cuba will be able to in--
filtrate into the area only gradually.

6. Political Acceptability: The proposal here outlined

fits the three conditions stated in paragraph 1 above for the

political acceptability of a paramilitary operation. The landing

TS #176622



Oe

5. The Agency failed to collect adequate information
on the strengths of the Castro regime and the extent of
the opposition to it; and it failed to evaluate the
available information correctly.

6. The project was badly organized. Command lines
and management controls were ineffective and unclear.
Senior Staffs of the Agency were not utilized; air support
stayed independent of the project; the role of the large
forward base was not clear.

7. The project was not staffed throughout with
top-quality people, and a number of people were not used
to the best advantage.

8. The Agency entered the project without adequate
assets in the way of boats, bases, training facilities,
agent nets, Spanish-speakers, and similar essential
ingredients of a successful operation. Had these been
already in being, much time and effort would have been
saved.

9. Agency policies and operational plans were never
clearly delineated, with the exception of the plan for the
brigade landing; but even this provided no disaster plan,
no unconventional warfare annex, and only extremely vague
plans for action following a successful landing. In

general, Agency plans and policies did not precede the



TOP 5-5-6

93. The air attacks continued throughout the day. The 11
B-26s of the Cuban exile force which were available for close
support and interdiction were no match for the T-33 jets. However,
at least four of Castro's other aircraft were shot down by machine
gon fire from maritime craft, assisted by friendly air support.

94. Whe first ground attacks by Castro's fortes occurred at
Red Beach which was hit by successive waves of militia in the
morning, afternoon and evening of 17 April. While ammmition
lasted these attacks were beaten off with heavy enemy vasvalties,
and several of Castro's tanks were halted or destroyed. by ground
or friendly air action. On the morning of 18 April, the Red
Beach Force, nearly out of ammunition, retired in good order to
Blue Beach without being pressed by the eneny.

- 95. In addition to supporting the ground forces and protect-
ing shipping on 17 April, the’ friendly B-26s also sank a Castro
patrol escort ship and attacked the Cienfuegos airfield. .Four of
the friendly B-26s were shot down, while three returned safely to
Nicaragua, and four landed at other friendly bases.

96. Attempts were made to resupply the brigade with ammmi-
tion by air drops. On the night of 17-18 April one C-54 drop was
made at Red Beach and three at Blue Beach, and on the following
night Blue Beach received two drops. Preparations for resupply

by sea had to be cancelled due to enemy air action.



T0236

comprehension and approval, the culminating incident which
preceded the loss of the Cuban brigade might never have
happened.

47, We are informed that this took place as follows: On
the evening of 16 April the President instructed the Secretary
of State that the D-Day strikes setfor the following morning
should be cancelled, unless there were overriding considera-
tions to advise him of. The Secretary then informed the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Director being
absent from Washington, and the Deputy Director (Plans) of
this decision, offering to let them call the President at
Glen Ora if they wished. They preferred not to do so, and
the Secretary concluded from this that they did not believe
the strikes to be vital to success.

A Civilian Decision

48. Earlier that evening the project chief and his para-
military chief had emphatically warned the DD/P to insist
that cancellation of the strikes would produce disaster. Thus
the DD/P, a civilian without military experience, and the DDCI,
an Air Force general, did not follow the advice of the project's
paramilitary chief, a specialist in amphibious operations. And
the President made this vital, last-minute decision without
direct contact with the military chiefs of the invasion

operation.



TOP SEC RE

b. Commitment of the paramilitary force ina surprise
ianding with tactical air support, the installation under its
protection on Cuban soil of the opposition government and either
the rapid spread of the revolt or the continuation of large scale
guerrilla action in terrain suited for that purpose.

c. Commitment of the paramilitary force in two suc-
cessive operations: \ First, the landing of one company without
air support in a remote area in which it could sustain itself for
some days (hopefully indefinitely), and second, the landing of the
main force forty-eight hours later in a widely different location
in the same manner as in paragraph 3.B. above. .

d. Commitment of the whole force in an inaccessible
region where it would be expected to ‘keep control of a beachhead
for a long period of time to permit installation and recognition
ofa provisional government and a gradual build-up of military
strength.

4. Covert Ianding of the Paramilitary Forces: Careful study

has been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary
forces in a night amphibious landing, using man-portable equipment
and weapons and taking ashore only such supplies as can be carried
by the troops. .The force would move immediately in-land to. the
mountains and commence operations as a powerful guerrilla force

relying entirely upon confinuing air logistical support. Shipping



or cE CrrT

dad. Among the alternative course of action here reviewed,
an assault in force preceded by a diversionary landing offers the

best chance of achieving the desired result.

DD/P:RMB:d ju: bp&gb

1-President & returned - DD/P Chrono 9-DD/P-FMB retained
2-Sec. State & returned - Destroyed 10-Wm. Bundy - retained
3-¥. Pres..& returned - Destroyed li-Gen. Gray - retained
4-Adolph Berle & returned. - Destroyed 12-Mr. Barnes - retained
5-Thomas Mann State & returned - Destroyed 13-DD/P Subj. file - Cuba
6-Sec. Defense & returned - Destroyed 14-Destroyed
{7-Ilemitzer - retained 15-Destroyed
8-McGeorge Bundy - retained - 16-D/DCL - retained

17-Destroyed

(17 .0f 17)
-22-



LORS

propaganda leaflets on his property. He decided the Agency lacked
the professional competence to make clandestine air drops.

6. This operation was recorded as “successful” by the Agency
because cargo was actually delivered to the people it was meant for.
There were four such “successes” in all, out of 30 missions flown
up to 21 April 1961. (The Fiscal Year 1961 budget called for 105
air drops.) The first of these took place on 30 December after
numerous attempts beginning in mid-October. There were 13 unsuc-
cessful attempts during January and February. .The third success
took place on 3 March, when three agents were dropped (previous
attempts to drop them had been made on 7 February and 27 February).
The fourth successful drop was on 29 March.

The Successful Drops

7. “Except for the rice-and-beans drop, the successful drops
were all to an agent who had been trained in air reception pro-
cedures by staff personnel at Headquarters.

8. The three cargo drops known to be successful were all
made in the Pinar del Rio Province. In other words, practically
all the supplies went to one small area of western Cuba. Small
amounts are thought to have been received in Camaguey and Oriente,
but none in Matanzas or Havana. Ten missions were flown into the
Escambray at the request of an agent who had no training in air
reception. Twice the cargo vas not dropped because the drop zone

was not located, and once the plane turned back because of bad





POPSET
realize how much boats cost to run and to keep in repair. The
arrangement whereby officers in Headquarters tried to control
the expenditures being made in Florida to repair and operate
boats which were urgently needed was highly impractical. The
high cost of boats in this project is well illustrated by the
dismal case of the “Sea Gull".

Case of the "Sea Gull"

I
A Tt bed pre-
viously been used to service offshore oil-drilling rigs and was
estimated to have a fair market value of $14, 500. _

38. The request for approve] gD was signed
for the chief of the project by a special assistant in the FI
section (acting for the acting chief!) and approved by the
Deputy Chief of WH Division (acting for His chief). It was
qe, christened the "Sea Gull"-and transported ”
to Miami, where it broke down 500 yards from the pier on its
first trial run. On 6 January 1961 it was estimated that
repairs and modifications would cost $10,000; by 30 January,
the estimate had grown to $32,000; by 22 February, to

$40,000; and on 24 February, the shipyard doing the work _

submitted a bill for $65,000! In all, the "Sea Gull" cost:



a

NY

eee ee oa a al

E. EVALUATION OF STAFFING

1. In April 1960 the Director of Central Intelligence
stated that he would recall from any station in the world
personnel whose abilities were required for the success of
the project. This recognition of the need for high-quality
personnel is nowhere reflected in the history of the project.
The DD/P's Deputy for Covert Action advised his subordinates
that the Director's words did not mean that the project was
to be given carte blanche in personnel procurement but that
officers could be adequately secured through negotiation.

2. In actual fact, personnel for the project were
secured by the customary routine method of negotiation between
the project and the employee's office of current assignment;
no recourse was had to directed assignment by the Director of
Central Intelligence. The traditional independence of the 55
individual division and branch chiefs in the Clandestine
Services remained unaffected by the Director's statement. The
lists prepared by the project for the purpose of negotiation
for personnel naturally reflected the preferences of the chief
of the project and the willingness of the person in question
to accept the assignment. In many cases, the reason for assign-
ing a given person to the project was merely that he had just

returned from abroad and was still without an assignment.



eam ee a ee a

revolution to take an important banking post but found Castro's
Communist tendencies intolerable and went into opposition again.
His group is described as liberal and progressive but rejecting
any accommodation with Commmisn.

The Organizing Committee

9. Carrillo was one of several Cuban figures whom the
Agency induced to defect in late 1959 or the early months of
1960. Others were Manuel Francisco Artime Buesa,. Jose Ignacio
Rasco Bermudez. end Manuel Antonio Varona Loredo. It. was. these
four who, after long negotiations, formed the organizing com-
mittee of the FRD in May 1960.

10. Artime, who is still under 30, joined Castro's moyement
as an anti-Batista student. Under instructions from -the Catholic
Church he organized a group of 4,000 Catholic Action students
to gain the farmers' help against Batista. The view has been
expressed that he was the Jesuits! penetration of the 26 duly
Movement. Castro gave him a high post in National Agrarian
Reform Institute (Ira) from which he resigned after ten
months to form the Movement to Recover the Revolution (MRR) ’
composed in part of his former Catholic Action followers. This
exile opposition group provided a large proportion of the recruits
for the strike force.

il. Rasco, a college and university classmate of Castro's,

is a lawyer and history professor, described as a nice young

_7 83.--



4. This document, providing for the nourishment of a powerful
internal resistance program through clandestine ‘external assistance,
was the basic and indeed the only U.S. Government policy paper
issued throughout the life of the project. The concept was classic.
The Cuban exile council would serve as cover for action which
became publicly known. Agency personnel in contact with Cuban
exiles would be documented as representatives of a group of private
American businessmen. The hand of the U.S. Government would not
appear.

Preparatory Action

5. Some months of preparation had preceded presentation of

this paper to the President. | In August 1959 the Chief of the

Agency's Paramilitary Group attended a meeting fF
ee discuss the creation of a para-

military capability to be used in Latin American crisis situations.
At this time Cuba was only one of a number of possible targets,
all of which appeared equally explosive. The Chief of the Para-
military Group prepared a series of staff studies for the Western
Hemisphere (WH) Division on various aspects of covert limited war-
fare and urged the creation of a division paramilitary staff. He
also set up a small proprietary airline in aa: eventual
support use.

6. In September 1959 the WH Division assigned an officer to

plan potential Agency action for contingencies which might develop





oP

June 1958 a recommendation was made, in a survey of the Far East
Division, that a high-level Agency study be made of the extent
to which the Agency should be engaged in paramilitary operations ’
"if any"; and that it include an evaluation of the capabilities
of other government departments to assume primary responsibility
in this field.

In January 1959 the Inspector General pointed out in a
memorandum to the Deputy Director (Plans) that: "A basic
problem in the PM field is the delineation of responsibility
between the Agency and the military services. In our view, the
Clandestine Services tends to assume responsibilities ‘beyond
its capabilities and does not give sufficient consideration to
the ability of other Departments of the Government to conduct
or participate in these operations."

A 1955 survey of the then Psychological and Paramilitary
Operations Staff warned against the by-passing of this staff
by the operating divisions, who were dealing directly with the
Deputy Director (Plans) and the Director of Central Intelligence
instead. In March 1961 the survey of the Covert Action Staff
again warned against ignoring the staff and failing to utilize
its services.

The July 1959 survey of the Deputy Director (Plans)
organization again stressed the importance of the functional

staffs, particularly in relation to the conduct of complex

~ Ue -



Sa aoe eo oe

6. Three further extraordinary factors must be mentioned:

(1) The Chief of Operations of the Clandestine
Services (COPS), who is the DD/P's chief staff advisor on
clandestine operations, played only a very minor part in the
project. On at least two occasions COPS was given express warn-
ing that the project was being perilously mismanaged, but he
declined to involve himself with the project.

(2) he three Senior Staffs, the Agency's top-level
technical advisors in their respective areas, were not consulted
fully, either at the important formative stages of the’ project
or even after grave operational difficulties had begun to develop;
instead, they allowed themselves to be more or less ignored by
the chief of the project and his principal assistants. This
state of affairs is partly attributable to the inadequate
managerial skill and the lack of experience in clandestine pare
military operations of the WH/4 chiefs; -it was not corrected by
the DD/P or his deputy or by the Chief of WH Division.

(3) There was no review of the project by the Agency's
Project Review Committee, which would at least have allowed the
views of the most senior review body in the Agency to be heard.

Independence of DPD
7- Still another important factor in the diffusion of
direction and control was the insistence of the Agency's air

arm, the Development Projects Division (DPD), on preserving



6

6. Recommendations: That the Central Intelligence Agency
be authorized to undertake the above outlined program and to
withdraw the funds required for this purpose as set forth in

paragraph 5. from the Agency's Reserve for contingencies.



SAE ee ae

complete cooperation of the local FBI, the Border Patrol, Immi-
gration, Coast Guard, FCC, Customs, Navy, and police officials.

7. Except for the Director of Central Intelligence, who
visited the base, top Agency officials concerned with the project
did not have first-hand knowledge of what was being done and
what could be done at Miami. The limitations they placed on
base activities had serious consequences. For example, when
the resistance organizers being trained in Guatemala were ready
to go into Cuba in September, the maritime capability to in-
filtrate them did not yet exist. By the time the base had built
up some capabilities in various lines, valuable months had been
lost.

The Miami View

8. On the other hand, there was a general feeling at the
base that it should be a "station", conducting operations just
as Havana was able to do (up to the date when diplomatic rela-
tions were broken off), with Headquarters providing support,
guidance and policy. This view failed to realize that a station
with several hundred people would have been very difficult to
conceal, that it would have cost a million dollars to move
everyone to Miami, and that Headquarters would have gotten into
the operations anyhow, due to the easy access to Miami from
Washington, especially by telephone.

9. The letter of instructions to the base chief, dated

6 October 1960, was pretty vague. It stated that he would have

- & -



PUP Ss

requested by the DD/P, because neither section would learn of
the requests made of the other. Until the end of 1960 the two
sections were housed in different buildings.

12. The most serious consequence of the third-echelon
position of the G-2 unit was that it concentrated in the hands
of the unit chief the dual function of receiving all the infor-
mation available from Government-wide sources, including that
from the agents of his own paramilitary section, and of inter-
preting all these date for the purpose of supplying intelligence
support to the various. invasion plans.

13. ‘Interpretation of intelligence affecting the strike
force aspect of the operation was thus entrusted to officers
who were so deeply engaged in preparations for the invasion that
their judgments could not have been expected to be altogether
objective. This circumstance undoubtedly had a strong influence
on the process by which WH/4 arrived at the conclusion that the
landing of the strike force could and would trigger an uprising
among the Cuban populace. This conclusion, in turn, became an
essential element in the decision to proceed with the operation,
as it took the place of the original concept, no longer
maintainable, that the invasion was to be undertaken in support
of existing and effective guerrilla forces.

14. Irrespective of the validity of that conclusion, it is

clear that the interpretative analysis should have been made not



CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PRGGRAivi
RELEASE AS SANITZZED
1997

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
of the
CUBAN OPERATION
and

ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS

Part 1 of 2 Parts



Leon ee anak meen i ee a

his staff. But no action was ever taken, and the situation remained
as described for the duration of the project.

19. WH/d and DPD did not even agree on doctrine and tech-
niques. In addition, all flight plans had to be personally reviewed
and approved by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI)
and by the 5412 Special Group. The requests for air drops came
from Cuba by radio, secret writing or telephone to Miami and then
were forwarded to WH/k headquarters, which then put in an opera-
tional request to DPD, which in turn directed the Guatemala air
base to mount the flight after approval had been given by DDCI.

DPD could and did release its own cables, without coordination.

20. This cumbersome system was complicated even more by the
scarcity of agent radio operators inside Cuba. Some of the arrange-
ments had to be made by secret writing, which was not only slow but
contributed to misunderstanding. Necessary last-minute changes of
plan by the reception groups or air crews could not be communicated
to each other.

Example of Confusion

21. The drop finally accomplished on 30 December is an out-
standing example of the confusion that prevailed.

22. WH/4 informed Havana that the drop would be made from
400 feet. DPD told the Guatemala nse that the drop would be at
1,000 feet. Guatemala, on the other hand, felt that 600 feet

would be best. WH/4 informed the agents that the aircraft definitely

- 1Oh -



6. In the Sierra Escambray, which is the only area of
Cuba in which true guerrilla operations are now being conducted,
ill-equipped and wtrained groups of up to 200 to 300 men have
been hard pressed to survive and have been unable to conduct
effective operations. The only worthwhile accomplishment of
these bands has been to serve as a symbol of resistance.
Smaller groups, even though better trained and equipped, could
not be expected to be effective. _

7. There are very few sites on the south coast of the
Sierra Escambray where small boats can be landed. These are
found principally at the mouths of rivers and are all guarded
by militia posts armed with machine guns. A small group
landing at such a point by shuttling from a larger vessel in
small boats would probably receive heavy casualties.

8. Small-scale infiltrations would not produce a
psychological effect sufficient to precipitate general uprisings
and widespread revolt among disaffected elements of Castro's

armed forces. These conditions must be produced before the

Castro Government can be overthrown by any means short of

overt intervention by United States armed forces. As long as

the armed forces respond to Castro's ortlers, he can maintain
himself in power indefinitely. The history of all police-type

states bears out this conclusion.



bane ne oe eo

and equipment; he also had to find sites for a suitable air base,
a@ maritime base, and a prison and contract for these facilities
to be built. He had three assistants: a communications officer
and two contract employees.

8. The initial group of paramilitary trainees was trans-
ferred to the Guatemala Base from Panama after two months of
training. By 23 August there were 78 paramilitary trainees,

34 commmications trainees, and nine staff and contract employees.

9. By. September the training cemp had enovgh facilities
and instructors to begin a four-week basic training course.

The trainees were sorted into seven-man teams according to
their area knowledge and their aptitudes. Sixty were selected
to go into Cuba (either legally or illegally) and to contact
resistance groups; 60 were selected for action teams to go in
illegally and join the resistance groups that had been contacted
by the first teams; the remainder of the trainees would be formed -
into a small conventional strike force. The training base
expected the teams to be ready to go in October and asked Head-
quarters to provide the infiltration plans.

10. The trainers did not realize that Headquarters had
changed the plan. Already in July the FRD, the exile political
front, had been asked to provide 500 individuals for a para-

military action cadre, and the training base was asked if it

could accommodate this number. Obviously, it could not.



k
require a minimm of six months and probably closer to eight.
In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and
for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA
control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the
situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel
this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as
@ commercial operation in another country.

3. Leadership: It is important to avoid distracting
and divisive rivalry among the outstanding Cuban opposition
leaders for the senior role in the opposition. Accordingly,
every effort will be made to have an eminent, non-ambitious,
politically uncontentious chairman selected. The emergence
of a successor to Castro should follow careful assessment of
the various personalities active in the opposition to identify
the one who can attract, control, and lead the several forces.
As the possibility of an overthrow of Castro becomes more
imminent, the senior leader mst be selected, U.S. support
focused upon him, and his build up undertaken.

4. Cover: All actions undertaken by CIA in support and
on behalf of the opposition council will, of course, be ex-
plained as activities of that entity (insofar as the actions

become publicly known at all). The CIA will, however, have to



14.

~ 2 t = “ot

Se ae oe aD

Memorandum to Mr. Kirkpatrick from Messrs. ,
and @@BXIc starr officers), subject: The IG's Survey end
the DD/P's Analysis of the Cuban Operation; 26 January 1962.

Memorandum for Mr. John McCone, DCI, from Allen W. Dulles ’
subject: The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban
Operation; 15 February 1962.

DCI's letter of acknowledgement of Mr. Dulles' 15 February
memorandum; 19 February 1962.



co eS a ee

would retire from the coast before dawn and no tactical air opera-
tions would be conducted. Unfortunately, it is believed that such
an operation would involve unacceptable military risks.
ae. The paramilitary force would run the risk of becoming
completely disorganized and scattered in a night landing. (Such
an operation is very difficult for even highly trained forces
experienced.in amphibious operations.)
pb. The force would not have motor transport, heavy mortar,
75 mm recoiling rifles, heavy machine guns, nor tanks. Initial .
ammunition and ‘food supplies would be limited and it would be wholly
dependent on air logistical support. If the rainy season commences
in April, overcast conditions could prevent effective support.
Casualities could not be evacuated.
ce. Since tactical aircraft would not participate, the
objective area could not be isolated; enemy forces could move “
against the beachhead unimpeded. The Castro Air Force would be
left intact.
5. A Landing in Full Force: This operation would involve an
amphibious/airborne assault with concurrent (but no prior) tactical

air support, to seize a beachhead contiguous to terrain suitable

for guerrilla operations. The provisional government would land

as soon as the beachhead had been secured. If initial military

operations were successful and especially if there were evidence



ee a _ and the GD
ee : and the QF
CID, 2 or pro0e ts being mee to

es. =...

course, in addition many others rumored to be disaffected but

to whom no channel of approach is available. The objective
of these efforts is not to induce immediate défections but to

prepare thé individuals for eppropriate “action in place after

- "6. Internal Resistance Movements: * Qn the latest estimate -~

there are nearly 7,000 insurgents responsive to same degree of
control through agents with whom commmications are currently
active. About 3,000 of these are in Havana itself, over 2,000
e.. in oriente, about, 700 in Las Villas in central Cuba. For the
: most part, the individual groups are small and very inadequately
armed. Air drops are currently suspended because aveilable
aircraft are tied up in the movement of troops from their train-
ing area to the staging base. After D-Day when it is hoped that
the effectiveness of the Castro air force will be greatly reduced,
it is planned to supply these groups by daytime air drops. Every
effort will be made to coordinate their operations with those

of the. landing parties. Efforts will be made also to sabotage or



Co

POPE SEC ET

would make only one pass over the drop zone. But DPD authorized
one 360° turn in order to make the drop good if the drop zone was
not located on the initial run. (Actually, the crew made three
passes.) This drop then failed (on 5 December) because the recep-
tion group understood that the plane would make only one pass, and
turned off the lights when the plane came back for a second try.
There was also confusion over the time of the drop and the number
of bundles. The difficulties in arriving at an understanding among
all parties concerned were so great that this operation, first
planned for 22 October, was re-scheduled for 13 November; run.on

5 December without dropping, then scheduled for 19 December. Then
this had to be changed to 25 December and finally to 30 December.

23. For another operation WH/4 told Guatemala that the cargo
should weigh 6,000 pounds, but DPD told Guatemala it could not be
more than 4,000 or 5,000 pounds. The DPD message was not coordinated
with WH/4, as Guatemala then pointed out.

24. . Some of the techniques used by DPD were highly question-
able. In one instance DPD told Guatemele that in the event the
drop-zone lights were not seen by the crew the pilot should never-
theless drop his cargo on the drop zone as determined by dead reckon-
ing. As it turned out, the reception group had dispersed after an
encounter with a Cuban army patrol and was unable to be at the drop
zone. The Castro forces then picked up at least half of the bundles

dropped.

toda chatta iti A Le ee te



EO Pade aR

76. In late March the (jars,

ostensible owner of the Swan Island radio station, thanked.all
the sponsors of political programs and advised them that no more
tapes would be required; purpose of this action was to clear the
way for a unity program during the action phase of the operation.
A Radio Swan listener survey had received 1,659 replies from 20
countries. .Ships with strike force equipment were arriving in
Nicaragua, and the Guatemala camp was still receiving trainees
as late as the week of 4 April.
Overflights Suspended

TT. Cuban overflights were suspended on 28 March. ‘Two
reasons have been given for this suspension: (a) that the air-
craft were needed to move the strike force from Guatemala to
Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, for embarkation on the invasion ships;
(b) that the Agency wished to avoid any incident, such as a
plane being downed over Cuba, which might upset the course of
events during the critical pre-invasion period.

78. For a White House meeting on 29 March papers were pre-
pared on these subjects: (a) The status of the defection program;
(b) internal Cuban support which could be expected for the landing
operation.

79. On 5 April the B-26 "defection" plan was prepared in an
effort to knock out some of Castro's air force before D Day ina

manner which would satisfy State Department objections. Project

~ 26 -



8. The Political Leadership: As of the present moment ,

the six members of Cardona's Revolutionary Council, notably
including Ray, have reaffirmed their membership. Although no
specific portfolios have been confirmed, the following
possibilities are currently under discussion: Varona, Defense;
Ray, Gobernacion (Interior); Carrillio, Finance; Hevia, State;
Maceo, Public Health. The political leaders have not yet been
briefed on the military plan but they will be informed at each
phase of military operations. Advance consultation with the
‘political leaders is considered unacceptably dangerous on security
grounds and although last minute briefings will be resented, it is
believed that the political leaders will want to take credit for
and assume control as quickly as possible over these major
operations against Castro. The present plan is that one of them
(Artime) will go into Cuba with the main force, others will
follow as soon as possible after D-Day and they will announce
the establishment of a Provisional Government on Cuban soil.

9. Command: Military command will be exercised in the name
of the Revolutionary Council and later of the Provisional Govern-
ment, In fact, however, the CIA staff constitutes the general staff

of the operation and the Agency controls both logistics support and

communications. Accordingly, in the early stages at least, the



ee a a

14. Thus the original group of organizers represented a
fairly broad range of political views. They were joined in
June 1960 by Aureliano Sanchez Arango who claimed leadership
of the AAA group, the initials possibly representing Asociacion
de Amigos de Aureliano. Both Sanchez Arango and Varona claimed
to have considerable following in the Cuban labor field. Sanchez
Arango and his followers appeared to have some general knowledge
of the use of clandestine techniques. ’

15. These five associated themselves in issuing a manifesto
at Mexico City on 22 June 1960. This document called upon Cubans,
other Latin Americans and the world at large to help the FRD over-
throw Castro's dictatorship. The FRD pledged itself to establish
a representative democratic government with full civil liberties
under the 1940 Cuban constitution. It pledged free general
elections within 18 months of establishment of @ provisional
government. It proposed to ban the Communist party and institute
@ program of social and economic progress for all classes of Cubans.

16. Varona's maturity and experience led to his selection
as coordinator, in effect, general manager, of the FRD. This
immediately precipitated the resignation of Sanchez Arango and
in turn led to the beginning of a problem in establishing and

maintaining FRD unity which the project never fully solved.



SOPH rEeT

b. A Base for Tactical Air Operations: It was empha-

sized that ultimate success of the operation will require
tactical air operations leading to the establishment of
the control of the air over Cuba. In order to fit the pattern
of revolution, these operations Should be conducted from an
air base within territory held by opposition forces. Since
it is impracticable to undertake construction of an air
base in the rainy season and before any air support is avail-
able, the territory seized in the original landing mist in-
clude an airstrip that can “support tactical: sserations.

ce. Slower Tempo: The operation should be so designed
that there could be an appreciable period of build up after
the initial landing before major offensive action was under-
taken. This would allow for a minimm decent interval be-
tween the establishment and the recognition by the U.S. of
@ provisional government and would fit more closely the
pattern of a typical revolution.

d. Guerrilla Warfare Alternative: Ideally, the terrain

should not only be protected by geography against prompt or
well-supported attack from land but also suitable for
guerrilla warfare in the event that an organized perimeter
could not be held.

2.. Alternative Areas: Five different areas, three of them

on the mainland of Cuba and two on islands off the coast, were

studied carefully to determine whether they would permit an ¢



TPs

him to receive it. There was substantially no intelligence
support covering the Cuban beach areas or the political
situation inside Cuba. There was no analysis or interpretation
of Special Intelligence, and there was no mechanism to call
critical material to anyone's attention.

18. The result of this highly defective state of affairs
was that individual Miami case officers were forced to rely
upon their own interpretation of the separate intelligence
reports, instead of having this material interpreted for them
by specialists. They were not given a number of other items
of operational intelligence which were in existence in the

G-2 unit of the paramilitary section at Headquarters.



POP 6-5-6

intention of requesting funds to pursue the program, and no
objections were.raised by the group.

15. The project to unseat Castro had thus become a major
Agency activity with the highest policy sanction, engaging the
full-time activity of the personnel of a rapidly expanding operat-
ing branch, requiring a great amount of detailed day-to-day atten-
tion in higher Agency echelons and entailing frequent lidison with
other agencies and departments of the Government.

16. The activities described to the President continued .at
an accelerated rate, but the financial approsch to the project: was
relatively cautious in the early weeks.

Financial Preparations

17. On 24 March 1960 the project was approved by the Director
of Central Intelligence in the initial amount of $900,000 for the
rest of Fiscal Year 1960. However, only two weeks later, on ~*~
7 April, WH/4 Branch reported that 85% of the $900,000 had been
obligated. By 30 June an additional $1,000,000 was obligated.

18. In April the Director of Central Intelligence told a
meeting of WH/} personnel that he would recall people from anywhere
in the world if they were needed on the project. From January 1960,
when it had 4O people, the branch expanded to 588 by 16 April 1961,
becoming one of the largest branches in the Clandestine Services,
larger than some divisions. Its Table of Organization did not

include the large number of air operations persomel who worked



LD Reintingaha

T- Conclusion: The operation here outlined, despite the
revision of concept to meet the political requirements stated
above, will still have a political cost. The study over the
past several months of many possible paramilitary operations
makes perfectly clear, however, that it is impossible to intro-
duce into Cuba and commit to action military resources that
will have a good chance of setting in motion the overthrow of
the regime without paying some price in terms of accusations
by the Commmists and possible criticism by others. It is be-
lieved that the plan here outlined goes as far as possible in
the direction of minimizing the political cost without impair-
ing its soundness and chance of success as a military operation.
The alternative would appear to be the demobilization of the
paramilitary force and the return of its members to the United
States. It is, of course, well understood that this course of

action too involves certain risks.

(Page 8 of 8)



Se ae a ol

project had to do their day-to-day business. This policy
undertainty was, in several respects, never satisfactorily
resolved right up to the very hour of action, and many
problems arose out of the changing limitetions to which
authority to do certain things was subjected in the name
of political necessity.

13. Thus, during the months immediately preceding the
inauguration on 20 January 1961 » the Agency was recruiting
and training Cuban troops and otherwise proceeding with a
changed plan not yet definitely formuleted or reduced to
writing, with no assurance that the invasion, which was now
the essence of the plan, would ultimately be authorized by
the new Administration. The Agency was driving forward without
knowing precisely where it was going.

14. The first formal briefing of President Kennedy and
his advisors took place on 28 January 1961. (He had received
briefings on earlier occasions, even before his election.)
At this meeting there wes a presentation, largely oral, of
the status of preparations, and President Kennedy approved
their continuation. But there was still no authorization,
express or implied, that military action would in fact
eventually be undertaken.

15. In the ensuing weeks, the Director of Central

Intelligence and the Deputy Director (Plans) ,. accompanied in



eT

prestige of the U. S., and foster the inevitable popular support
that Castro's continuance of power will engender. A National
Estimate states: “For the Commmist powers, Cuba represents an
opportunity of incalculable value. More importantly, the advent
of Castro has provided the Commmists with a friendly base for
propaganda and agitation throughout the rest of Latin America and
with a highly exploitable example of revolutionary achievement
and successful defiance of the United States."

4. POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION: For reasons which require

no elaboration the overt use of U. S. military forces to mount an
invasion of Cuba has been excluded as a practical alternative.
Broadly defined the following three possible alternative courses
of action remain for consideration:

a. Intensification of economic and political pressures
coupled with continued covert. support of sabotage and minor
guerrilla actions but excluding substantial commitment of
the Cuban opposition's paramilitary force.

b. Employment of the paramilitary force but in a manner
which would not have the appearance of an invasion of Cuba
from the outside.

Ce Commitment of the paramilitary force in a surprise
landing, the installation under its protection on Cuban soil

of the opposition government and either the rapid spread of



cr

Sn mean <a ooe an meee

34. Under the guidance of Bender he became a strong force
for unity in the FRD during its most difficult period, the virtual
political interregnum before the inauguration of President Kennedy.
Miro was influential in bringing Ray into the Revolutionary. Council
which was formed on 20 March with Miro as chairman.

Visit_to Training Camp

35. Miro, with other Council members, visited the strike
force in-Guatemala on 29 March in a much-needed effort. to spur
troop morale. There had been far too little contact between the .
FRD and the soldiers being trained in its name. Artime, Yarona,
and Antonio Jaime Maceo Mackle had been there in February in an
attempt to calm mutinous spirits. The last previous visit had
been made in the fall of 1960 by Col. Eduardo Martin Flena,
head of the FRD's military staff and a former constitutional
Army officer. Martin Elena antagonized the trainees , and. with
the beginning of straight military training under a U.S. Army
officer, who had no interest in Cuban politics, a ban was placed
on visits to the camp by Cuban politicians.

36. This was probably a mistake and an unreasonable inter-
ference in the Cubans' management of their own affairs. Con-
trolled contact between the FRD and the troops could have done
much to improve the morale and motivation of the troops and make
the training job easier. There was nobody in the Guatemala camp

who could answer the political questions of the trainees, who

-92-



PROPOSED OPERATION AGAINST CUBA

i. Status of Preparatory Action: About a year ago the

Agency was directed to set in motion: the organization of 4
broadly-based opposition to the Castro regime; a major propaganda
campaign; support for both peaceful and violent resistance
activities in Cuba; and the development of trained paramilitary
ground and air forees of Cuban volunteers.
~ A decision should shortly be made as to the future of

these activities and the employment or disposition of assets that
have been created. The status of the more important activities
is as follows:

a. Political: Over a period of nearly a year, the FRD
(Frente Revolucionarto Democratico), which was created in the hope
that it would become the organizational embodiment of a unified
opposition to Castro, has proved to be highly useful as a cover
and administrative mechanism but important political elements
refused to join it.

Accordingly, a major effort was undertaken three weeks ago
to form a more broadly-based revolutionary council which would
include the FRD, and which could lead to the setting up of a

provisional government. Considerable progress has been made in



De a ae

extremely low effectiveness. Within the next few months,
however, it is expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery
of jet aircraft and will begin to have available trained
Cuban pilots of known political reliability. During the same
period the effectiveness of growud forces will be increasing
and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet weapons will
improve. Therefore, after some date probably no more than
six months away it will become militarily infeasible to over-
throw the Castro regime except through. the count! tment to
combat of a sizeable organized military force. .The option
of action by the Cuban opposition will no longer be open,

3. THE NATURE OF THE THREAT: Cuba will, of course, never

present a direct military threat to the United States and it is
unlikely that Cuba would attempt open invasion of any other latin
American country since the U. S. could and almost certainly would
enter the conflict on the side of the invaded country. Neverthe-
less, as Castro further stabilizes his regime, obtains more
sophisticated weapons, and further trains the militia, Cuba will
provide an effective and solidly defended base for Soviet operations
and expansion of influence in the Western Hemisphere. -Arms, money,
organizational and other support can be provided from Cuba to dis-
sident leaders and groups throughout Latin America in order to

create political instability, encourage Commarism, weaken the



bee kr a eo

ammunition and personnel into Cuba clandestinely by boat.

(These were the "PM types" whose duties had mystified the DD/P.)
There were also two maritime "types" who were training the crew
of a borrowed small boat for clandestine trips.

13. By 15 November 39 people had been assigned to the Miami
base in addition to 44 people from the Agency's Office of Com-
munications. In addition to support elements, there were
sections for propaganda, FI, CI, political action, and PM.

14. By 15 April 1961, the base and its sub-base had 160

persons assigned, as follows:

10 FI
5 cL
2 Political Action
7 Propaganda
25 Support
26 PM
14 Security
68 Communications
3 Miscellaneous

15. While the Havana Station was still operating, Miami Base
was in close touch with it by courier and secure communications.
When Havana Station was closed, Miami expected to take over the
stay-behind assets, such as they were. However, Headquarters
took over their control. Miami concentrated on the training and
infiltration of agents.

PM Support Role
16. In PM activities, control was tightly held by Head-

quarters, and the PM section of the base was limited pretty mch





Pew Sr

9T. At Blue Beach the enemy ground attacks, supported by
aircraft, began from three directions on the afternoon of 18 April.
Six friendly B-26s, two of them flown by Americans, inflicted
heavy damage on the Castro colum moving up from the west, using
napalm, bombs, rockets, and machine gum fire to destroy several
tanks and about 20 troop-laden trucks. -Air support to the Blue
Beach troops was continued.on.the morning of 19 April, when three
friendly B-26s, including two piloted by Americans, were shot
down by Castro T-33s. Jet cover from the Navy aircraft carrier
“Essex” had been expected to protect the 19 April sorties, but a
misunderstanding over timing hampered its effectiveness. . ‘

98. In spite of this air action, however, and in spite of a
reported 1,800 casuklties suffered by the Castro forces sy the
brigade's ability to resist depended in the last resort on
resupply of ammmition, which had now become impossible. “On the
night of 18 April, when failure appeared inevitable » the Cuban
brigade commander refused an offer to evacuate his troops. And
on the morning of 19 April, with ammmition rapidly running out,
the brigade was still able to launch a futile counterattack
against the forces relentlessly moving in from the west.

99. In the last hours of resistance the brigade commander
sent a series of terse and desperate messages to the task force
command ship pleading for help:

"We are out of ammo and fighting on the beach. Please

send help. We cannot hold.”



eliminate small groups of insurgents. A landing by 27 men of

the Masferrer Group in Oriente, for example, was pursued and
eliminated by 2,000 militia. A similar group of insurgents
in Western Cuba, was attacked and destroyed by six battalions
of army and militia (about 3,000 men).

4. A build-up of force in a given area by infiltration
of small groups would require a series of night landings in
the same general vicinity. Discovery of the initial landing
by GOC forces would be almost a certainty, since security posts
are located at all possible landing areas. Even if the initial
landing were successful, the GOC could be expected to move
troops and naval patrol craft to the area making further
landings difficult if not impossible. Any small force landed,
experience has shown, will be rapidly engaged by forces vastly
superior in numbers. Therefore, it is considered unlikely that
small groups landing on successive occasions would succeed in
joining forces later. A series of surrounded packets of
resistance would be the result.

5. Repeated approaches to the Cuban coast by vessels
large enough to land ‘up to 50 men would probably provoke attack
by the Cuban Navy and/or Air Force, either of which is capable
of destroying any vessels which could be used by CIA for these

purposes.



persons connected with this operation, we talked initially to three

of the top officers in the operation, commencing with Mr. Esterline
and Colonel Hawkins, and having our initial lengthy discussions
with them within a week of the operation. We interviewed all of
the appropriate supervisors in the DD/P, starting with the DD/P
himself and including the A/DDP/A, Chief, WH, Chief WH-~k, and same
130 other. officers and employees directly involved in the operation.
We kept extensive notes and mterial of all of these discussions
which are decumented in our files.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

ec: DDCI
pp/P



ORE

Scarcity of Linguists

9. Very few project personnel spoke Spanish or had Latin-
American background knowledge. In a number of instances those
senior operating personnel in the field stations that did
speak Spanish had to be interrupted in their regular duties
merely in order to act as interpreters. This lack occurred
in part because of the scarcity of Spanish linguists in the
Agency and in part because WH Division did not transfer to the
project sufficient numbers of its own Spanish speekers.

10. There were many other examples of improper use of
skilled personnel. In many instances, case officers were used
merely as “handholders" for agents and technical specialists
were used as stevedores. Some of the people who served the
project on contract turned out to be incompetent.

ll. Staffing of the project was defective because the
whole Clandestine Services staffing system, with absolute
power being exercised by the division and branch chiefs, is
defective. Each division seeks to guard its own assets; scanty
recognition is given to the respective priorities of the various
projects.

12. In spite of the foregoing, there were a great many
excellent people in the project who worked effectively and who
developed considerably in the course of their work. It should

also be emphasized that, almost without exception, personnel



De ae

success. From September to. the time of the strike about 70,000
pounds were successfully infiltrated. This was about three times
as mich as was put in by air drops. The total amount of supplies
put into Cuba by air and boat operations amounted to about 93,000
pounds (463 tons); this would be about enough to equip 1,250 men.
Iamited Area

12. There was one successful boat operation in September;
two in October; three in November; six in December, none in
January} six in February; thirteen in March; and two.in April.
Up to February only six and a half tons were sent in.

13. One should not get the idea that these supplies were
wiiformly distributed throughout Cuba. Most of them were
placed in one small area, the north coast of Cuba close to
Havana. The small boats did not have the range to go farther.

14. In almost all cases the supplies were transferred to
a Cuban boat or an offshore key rather than deposited on the
shores of Cuba itself. In the fall, boat operations were
restricted by policy to offshore rendezvoug. By January Miami
had begum to plan beach landing operations as a means of
overcoming the wnreliability of Cuban-based boats. At this
time Miami Base did not even have aerial photos of the north
coast of Cuba.

15. Of the 33 missions rated as successful only 27 could

be considered entirely so since the cargo on the other operations



a le

elements from U.S. air bases at the rate of two flights a
week. Only the first authorization was given at that time.

10. In mid-January 1961 various major policy questions
were, at CIA's request, under discussion by the Special Group.
These included: (a) use of American contract pilots for
tactical and logistical air operations over Cuba; (b) use
of a U.S. air base for logistical flights to Cuba; (c)
commencement of air strikes not later than dawn of the day
before the amphibious assault and without curtailment of
the number of aircraft to be employed from those available;
(a) use of Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, as an air-strike base
and maritime staging area.

11. In the end only one of these policy questions was
resolved in the affirmative, that with regard to the use of
Puerto Cabezas. It should be especially noted that the
project's paramilitary chief had strongly recommended that
the operation be abandoned if policy should not allow
adequate tactical air support.

Conflicting Views

12. The raising of these questions and the failure to
resolve many of them demonstrates the dangerous conflict
between the desire for political acceptability and the need
for military effectiveness. It also indicates the fluctuat-

ing policy background against which the officers running the

- 4g -
See aon ee ee



ae ae eee

is unspectacular; no tactical air support will be provided until
an air base of sorts is active within the beachhead areas the
tempo of the operation is as desired; and the terrain is such
as to minimize the risk of defeat and maximize the options open
to the opposition force.

a. It may be objected that the undertaking of tactical
air operations so promptly after the landing is inconsistent
with the pattern of a revolution. But most Latin American
revolutions in recent years have used aircraft and it is
only natural that they would be used in this case as soon
as the opposition had secured control of an air strip.
Wherever in the island a paramilitary operation is attempted
and whatever its tempo, command of the air will sooner or
later have to be established, and aircraft will have to
be flown into a beachhead to enable this to be done. Sooner
or later, then, it is bound to be revealed that the opposi~
tion in Cuba has friends outside who are able and willing
to supply it with obsolescent combat aircraft. This revela-
tion will be neither surprising nor out of keeping with , ‘
traditional practice. :

bd. An alternative way to handle this problem would be
to make a few strafing runs against the Castro Air Force
some days before the landing and apparently as an opposition

act unrelated to any other military moves.

-T- Ts #176622



ee ad

Consequently, what training was done, was done without control,
by individual case officers doing the best they could. How
effective this training was cannot be determined. Much of it
took place in Miami, where personnel from the base were instruct-
ing Cubans in intelligence collection, counterintelligence tech-
niques, psychological warfare activities, or paramilitary subjects,
according to need.

25- The training was necessarily conducted in safe houses,
and required a considerable expenditure of time on the part of
base personnel. Other training was conducted in the Washington
area, usually by case officers. One man was trained in a hotel
room to make a parachute jump (he made one successfully!). Many
-requests were levied on the Office of Training for instructors
and training materials. But these were uncoordinated and wasteful.
Many of the instructors, when made available, were not used in
their specialties, ending up in such jobs as stevedoring instead.

26. A well thought-out project would have had a training
annex which would have laid specific requirements on the Office
of Training, particularly when the training of hundreds of people
was an integral part of the venture. Instead, the requirements
were met in piecemeal and improvised fashion, under difficult

conditions, and with dubious results.

- 134 -



DOP SF

worked extremely long hours for months on end without complaint
and otherwise manifested high motivation, together with great
Perseverance and ingenuity in solving the manifold problems
that the project constantly raised. It should be stated that in
general the support people sent to the project by the support
component were of excellent quality and effective performance.
13. Unfortunately, however, while many persons performed
prodigies of effort, these were often directed towards over-
coming obstacles which better organization and management would
have eliminated. Such efforts were especially necessary (a) in
support, of the chimera of "non-attributability" of the operation;
(bd) in negotiating with the Armed Services for equipment, train
ing personnel, etc., which the Agency should have been able to
request as of right; and (c) in providing the support for an
overt military enterprise that was too large for the Agency's

capabilities.

- 45 -





2. The Time Table of the plan is as follows:

D7: Commence staging main force - staging
completed night of D-5,
. /
D-6: First vessel sails from staging area - last
vessel departs early morning D-}.
D-2: B-26 defection operation - limited air strikes.
D2: Diversionary landing in Oriente (night D-3 to
D-2). -

D-Day: Main landings (night D-l to D) - limited air
- strikes. Two B-26s and liaison plane land .on
Seized air strip. - ’

- Dto D4: Vessels return night of D to Dtl to- complete
discharge of supplies.

Dt: - Diversionary landing in Pinar del Rio.

3. Diversion or Cancellation: It would now be infeasible to

halt the staging and embarkation of the troops. In the event of a
decision to modify the operational plan or to cancel the operation,
ships will be diverted at sea, either to Vieques Island or to ports
in the U.S. If cancellation is directed, the troops and ships’
officers will be told that the reason for the diversion is that all
details of the operation, including time and place of intended
landings, had been blown to the Castro regime and that under these
circumstances the landings would be suidical. This explanation
would be adhered to after the demobilization of the force in the

U.S. The U.S. Government could take the position that this



20 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McCone
SUBJECT 2 Survey of the Cuban Operation

i. Presented herewith is a 150 Rage survey of the Cuban
operation, together with the most important basic documents on
the operation which are included in the five nnexes. In this
report we have not attempted te go into an exhaustive step by
step inspection of every action in the operatim. Nor have we
tried to assess individual performance, although our inspection
left us with yery definite views. Rather, we have tried to find
out what went wrong, and why, and to present the facts and con«
clusions as briefly as possible. This report has been double-
spaced for ease in reading. The ten recommendations for
corrective action start on page 1h8.

2. In conducting this survey we reviewed all of the basic
files and documents, including all of the material prepared by
the Agency for General Maxwell Taylor's Committee, ag well as the
minutes of that Committee which were made available to us. In
addition, we conducted extensive interviews with all of the prin-
cipal officers on the project from the DD/P on down, and made
detailed memoranda for our files on all of these discussions; e.g.,
my meeting with the top three officers of the Branch reviewing the

Te a Ce oe



BOP Re

22. The general situation also led to an extraordinary
number of temporary-duty trips back and forth between Washington
and Miami. These were not only expensive but added a great many
problems in the way of support and security.

23. In December 1960 the base chief pointed out to Head-
quarters that the base needed "clarification and specification
of the requirements it is expected to fulfill and tasks that
it is expected to perform, together with the investment of
sufficient authority and discretion for the operational action
which may be involved." In March 1961 he pointed out that "the
base would welcome more precise requirements for its agents
than had been received up to that time in the interests of
making efficient use of them."

2h. In May 1961 he wrote a memorandum on control of denied-
area operations which pointed out that future operations should
either be controlled from Headquarters or from a forward operating
base, but that the divided control which had existed during the
project had resulted in parallel, sometimes duplicative and
conflicting efforts and in operational relationships which were
competitive, without purpose » and sometimes counter-productive.

25. The inspectors agree that this divided effort
represented an ineffective and uneconomical use of time, money,
and materiel, and less than maximum utilization of Agency employees,
plus unexploited, delayed or poorly coordinated use of Cuban agents

and assets.

eo - Tee ,



BP

intellectual without much talent for action. In the fall of
1959 he became the first president of the Christian Democratic
Movement, (mpc), an anti-Communist Catholic group which Castro
drove underground in April 1960 at which time Rasco fled the
country.

12. Varona's career in government and in opposition
politics goes back to the 1920s. During the regime of
President Prio Socarras he held several important posts, \
including that of prime minister, and was responsible for
anti-Communist policies and measures. He collaborated with -
Castro until the Commnist pattern of the new regime became
evident, coming to the U.S. in April 1960. Before leaying
Havana he had presented-a plan for Castro's overthrow, in-
cluding a unified opposition and U.S. aid for developing
propaganda and military capabilities.

The Political Spectrum

13. Varona was representative of the older opposition
parties (Autentico and Ortodoxo) which had survived both
Batista and Castro and which were roughly in the middle of
the political spectrum. Artime's group also occupied a
centrist position, but its membership was drawn from the
younger generation on Cubans. Carrillo and Rasco appeared

to be a little left and a little right of center, respectively.



TOP 6-

its independence and remaining outside the organizational
structure of the project, in which it had a vital » central
role, including air drops to the underground, training Cuban
Pilots, operation of air bases, the immense logistical problems
of transporting the Cuban volunteers from Florida to Guatemala,
and the procuring and servicing of the military planes. ‘The
project chief had no command authority over air planning and
air operations. The DPD unit established for this purpose was
completely independent.

8. The result was a divided command dependent upon mutual
cooperation. There was no day-to-day continuing staff relation-
ship, which is essential for properly coordinated operations.
Headquarters of the two mits were in different buildings far
away from each other. The chiefs of air operations in Guatemala
and Nicaragua were DPD representatives , independent of the WE/4
chiefs of these bases, and the Headquarters confusion was
compounded in the field.

9. In October 1960, shortly after his assignment to the
project, the paramilitary chief noted coordination difficulties
between WH/4 and DPD. He pointed out that the organizational
structure was contrary to military command principles ‘3 to
accepted management practices, and to the principles enunciated
by the DD/P himself in 1959, and recommended that the DPD unit

be integrated into WH/}, under command of its chief.



Toe

L. CLANDESTINE PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS -- TRAINING UNDERGROUND
LEADERS

1. Early in the project a carefully selected group of
Cubans was trained for infiltration into Cuba to organize
resistance. The loose management of the project is illus-
trated by the confusion between the headquarters elements
and the training elements over what these men were being
trained for, and by the failure to have their missions, means
of entry, and reception ready for them.

2. The trained Cubans put into Cuba were too few and
too late to do very much, and the strike planners ignored
them. The cost of training and holding these men probably
ran well over a million dollars, yet most.of them were never
used for what they were trained to do, and some were not used
at all. .

3. This particular endeavor began in December 1959 when
the WH Division made a decision to pick a small group of Cubans
and train them to train other Cubans for infiltration into Cuba
in small paramilitary teams to organize resistance forces.
Possible training sites in Panama were surveyed at this time,
but no further action was taken. The basic policy paper
approved by the President in March 1960 included the above

proposal.

- 125 -



be ae ae nee ar aad

But the agents had their own problems during this time:

"Unjust to delay operation so much. . .This is not a game."
“How long will I have to wait for the drop. The lives of
peasants and students depend on you."

“Dear Allies: Arms urgent. We made a commitment. We have
complied. You have not. If you have decided to abandon us ,
answer.“

“We are risking hundreds of peasant families. If you cannot
supply us we will have to. . .demobilize. Your responsibility.
We thought you were sincere."

"All groups demoralized. . .They consider themselves deceived

because of failure of shipment of arms and money according

to promise."

Perhaps the situation was best summed up by this agent message:

"Impossible to fight... .Either the drops increase or we
die. . .Men without arms or equipment. God help us."

34. The Inspector General reluctantly concludes that the

agent who was showered with rice and beans was entirely correct

in his finding that the Agency showed no professional competence

in its attempts at clandestine air drops into Cuba. Furthermore,

these attempts in their over-all effect probably hurt the resis-

tance more than they helped.



eT

Service Award -- the highest honorary civilian award within
the authority of the MSTS commander.

26. The branch had never taken action either to clear
him or to convict him of serious charges, and the high
commendation he received casts doubt not only on the validity
of other WH/4 recommendations for merit citations but also
on the quality of personnel management in the project.

Peculiar Organization

27. The organization for controlling clandestine maritime
operations was peculiar. The forward operating base in Miami
bad the responsibility for small boat operations but could not
run any without Headquarters approval. It was seldom that
Headquarters had any query or refused to give approval.

28. But the Miami Base did not have the equipment and
experience that were needed. For a long time the docking
facilities were inadequate. The desirability of having a
base at Key West was recognized as early as November 1960, but
this base was not established until mid-February. It was
insufficiently staffed and had a great many cover, security and
administrative problems on which it received little assistance.
At first it was under the direction of the Miami paramilitary

section; eventually it was placed under the chief of the Miami

Base.



enterprise had been undertaken by the Cubans without U.S,

‘Governmental support, that it had failed because of their ‘poor
security, and that the U.S, .could not refuse to grentesylum
to the Cuban volunteers. If by reason of either new intelli-.
gence .or policy considerations it is necessary to effect a
major change in the operational plan, it will be necessary to
divert to Vieques Island so that officers of the brigade and
‘ships' captains can be assembled and briefed on the new plan.

some days on board ship.)
4. Naval Protection: the ships carrying the main force
will receive unobtrusive Naval protection up to the time they

enter Cuban territorial waters. If they are attacked they. wild

be protected by U.S. Naval vessels but following such an inter-
vention they would be escorted to a U.S. port and the force would
be demobilized.

5. Defections: Every effort is being mde to induce the
defection of individuals of military and political significance,
At the present time contact has been established by and through

Cuban agents and anti-Castro Cuban groups with some thirty-one

specific military and police officers, incluing GY



eee

ee $39, 500
Repairs (eventually reduced from $65,000) 58,000
Communications gear, tools, arms, navigation

aids 14,000

FrI1, 500

39. The "Sea Gull” was not ready to be used until the last
week of March; at this time it was commandeered (along with the
"yasp") by a headquarters unit which was staging a deception
operation in connection with the amphibious strike, over “the
strong protests of Miami Base, which never got to use the boat
on an infiltration operation. ~

ho. The lack of qualified personnel, the confusion of
responsibility, the lack of planning, and the skyrocketing
costs in the maritime activity led to a high-level request for
the assignment of a qualified senior Naval officer to the
project. When @ captain reported, no one seemed to know what
to do with him and, after he briefly visited Miami and Key West
bases, he was assigned to the naval side of the strike planning
at Headquarters. He is reported to have been not entirely
happy with his brief Agency tour. In any event he was another
example of poor handling of people in this project, and he was
not given a chance to solve the problems of maritime operations.

kl. It is apparent that the Agency had very little capability

for maritime operations even of 8 clandestine nature. It lacked



eo

28 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

General Cabell called Mr. Kirkpatrick to state that
the fact of the IG's report on Cuba should be restricted on
& must-need-to-know basis. No copies other than those that
have been distributed to Mr. McCone, Mr. Dulles, General
Cabell, Mr. Bissell, Colonel King, and Mr. Esterline will
be distributed without authority of the DCI or DDCI.

This restriction also specifically applies to distri-
bution to the President's Board of Intelligence Advisors,
and Mr. Kirkpatrick so informed 27 November.

General Cabell has discussed holding this report
tightly with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell, and the latter is
to pass on the guidance to Colonel King and Mr. Esterline.
(Accomplished per report to DDCI 27 November. )

/s/ CPC
C. P. CABELL
General, USAF
Deputy Director



a aoe oe oe ne

Operations, and advocated the use of a task force for covert
operations having major international significance.

"These operations", the survey stated, “may be aimed at
the overthrow of a hostile regime and may require extensive
paramilitary operations, ...... and clandestine logistics and
air support of substantial magnitude. Such operations must
be coordinated with national policy on a continuing basis,
and may require constant high-level liaison with the State
Department and the White House. To be successful, major covert
operations of this nature require the effective mobilization of
all the resources of the Dp/P, and are clearly beyond the
capabilities of any one area division."

The same survey added that the Caribbean task force located
in the WH Division was planning at a great rate, but accomplishing
little because it was too low-level to act decisively or to obtain
effective policy guidance from other departments of the Government;
it did not even inspire confidence among many senior pp/P officers.
Such task forces within a single division "represent a woefully
inadequate response to a problem of major national significance.
Command of such a task force must be a full-time Job, and the task
force commander must be of sufficient stature to deal directly
with the Under Secretary of State or with other senior officials

of the government as the need arises."



i ANNA A |



1a
10
{rd
In

INDEX

NOTE

This document contains the items listed below and should
not be broken up. This is at the directian of Mr. John A. McCone,
Director of Central Intelligence. ‘os

Tab: ~

1. Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operations;
October 1961

2. Memorandum 9: ransmittal of IG Survey of the Cuban Operation
to Mr. John “McCone from Inspector General; 20 November 1961.

‘ransmittal of IG Survey of the Cuban Operation
to DCI from Inspector General; 24 Nowember 1961.

4, DDCI Memorandum for the Record concerning restricted distribution
of IG's Report on Cuba; 28 November 1961.

5. Memorandum for the DCI from IG, subject: Report on the Cuban
Operation; 1 December 1961.

6. Memorandum prepared by DDCI, subject: The Inspector General's
Survey of the Cuban Operation; 15 December 1961.

7. An Analysis of the Cuban Operation by the Deputy Director (Plans),
Central Intelligence Agency; 18 Jenuary 1962.

8. Letter to Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., Chairman, President's
Foreign Intelligence Board, from DCI, transmitting the IG
Survey and the DD/P Analysis of the Cuban Operation;

19 January 1962.

9. Memorandum for Deputy Director (Plans), from C. Tracy Barnes ,
subject: Survey of Cuban Operation; 19 January 1962.

10. Memorandum for Mr. C. Tracy Barnes from Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
referencing Barnes' 19 January memorandum; 22 January 1962.

11. Memorandum for DCI from DD(P) transmitting Mr. Barnes'
19 January memorandum; 27 January 1962.

TS 173160
Copy %



Sa a a oe aoe

4, Through the first day of fighting, 17 April, only Cuban
air crews were used for combat or drop missions. Of 11 Cuban-
manned B-26s which had gone over the beachhead, only three had
returned to base, and four of the others had been shot down.

That night the available Cuban crews were exhausted and dispirited.

5. On 18 April the hard pressed exile brigade was calling
for air support. Two American fliers volunteered to go, and
several Cuban crews followed their example. The result was a
highly successful attack against a colum of Castro's forces
moving on Blue Beach. Four American-manned aircraft were in
combat over the beachhead the following day, and two of them
were shot down by Castro's T-33s. Later the same day two
American crews returned for another sortie. Four American fliers
were either killed in combat or executed by Castro forces after
being shot down.

6. In addition to these actions, an American-manned PBY
patrolled the waters south of Cuba for a total of 57 hours
during five days on air-sea rescue and communications relay
duty.

7. The American pilots lost in combat were aware of United
States Government sponsorship and probably also of Agency interest,
‘put had been instructed not to inform their families of this. In
spite of wide press coverage of the invasion failure, the story of

the American pilots has never gotten into print, although its

> Ul -



iia

In another case the coordinates given for a drop zone were in the
ocean. Reception parties proposed to mark the drop zone with
various bizarre and impractical patterns, such as: two red lights
and one white light about 15 feet apart moving clockwise; an arrow
50 meters long with lights at two-meter intervals; lights in the
form of a straight line with a sign in the middle lit up with
Christmas lights (on this one, the crew at one point mistakenly
identified cars on a road as the drop-zone signal); two crosses
side by side; a triangle of three lights with a fourth light in
the center. In some areas there were so many small lights in the
vicinity that no pattern could be located. For one drop the agents
made four proposals in rapid succession: no lights, a nine-man
cross, & line of five bonfires, a 60-meter line of colored flash-
lights.

12. The standard light patterns taught by paramilitary instruc-
tors and generally accepted as best, were (2) an "L" of lights;
(>) a "D" of 5 lights; and (c) @ cross of 6 lights. All lights
should be 15 to 25 yards apart, with one light different from the
others.

13. The Cuban air crews must share the blame for the failures,
@s must their trainers. Policy did not allow American observers
to go along on the missions to correct the errors. Pilot disci-
pline was lacking and instructions were not followed in numerous

instances.



Se <a a: aoe oe eo oe oe ed

4k. U.S. policy called for a covert operation and assigned
it to the agency chartered to handle such things. When the
project became blown to every newspaper reader the Agency should
have informed higher authority that it was no longer operating
within its charter. Had national policy then called for continu-
ation of the overt effort under a joint national task force,
vastly greater man-power resources would have been available for
the invasion and the Agency could have performed an effective
supporting role. The costly delays experienced by the Agency
in negotiating for support from the armed services would have
been avoided.

Piecemeal Policy

45. In the hectic weeks before the strike, policy was being
formed piecemeal and the imposition of successive restrictions
was contracting the margin of error. The last of these restric-
tive decisions came from the President when the brigade was
already in small boats moving toward the Cuban shore. Had it
come a few hours earlier the invasion might have been averted
and loss of life and prestige avoided.

46. If formal papers outlining the final strike plan in
detail and emphasizing the vital necessity of the D-Day air
strikes had been prepared and left with the President and his
advisors, including the Joint Chiefs, with a request for

written confirmation that the plan had received full



De ee amemen amnan ame al

landing of a team of 650-700 men with extraordinarily heavy
firepower; (c) preliminary air strikes against military
targets. CIA stated that it believed it feasible to seize
and hold a limited area in Cuba and then to draw dissident
elements to the landing force, which would then gradually
achieve enough stature to trigger a general uprising. At
this stage of the planning, clandestine nourishment of
resistance forces was still an important element, though
mow overshadowed by the overt strike force concept.

8. President Eisenhower orally directed the Agency to
go ahead with its preparations with all speed. But this
meeting occurred during the U.S. political interregnum and
the proposed target date was later than 20 January 1961,
so that in effect the President's instructions were merely
to proceed and to keep the preparations going until the
new Administration should take office and should make the
definitive decisions, especially whether and under what
circumstances the landing should take place.

Search for Policy Decisions

9. As an example of the decision-making process, at
the meeting of the Special Group held 8 December 1960 the
Agency requested authorization (a) to make propaganda leaflet
flights over Cuba; (b) to screen non-official U.S. personnel

for use in maritime operations; (c) to resupply Cuban resistance



5 ee ae ae oe a

d. %In any event, it is estimated that the prospects for
effective international action are poor.

6. ‘THE MIDDLE COURSE: Careful study has been given to the
possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary force gradually to an
assembly point in suitable terrain, hopefully avoiding major
encounters.in the process and committing it to extensive guerrilla
action. This course of action would: have the advantage of render-
ing unecessary a single major landing which could be described ae
an invasion. - The infiltration phase would take om the coloration -
of efforts by. small groups of Cubans to join an already existing
resistance movement. Unfortunately, it has been found to be
infeasible on military grounds. Basically the reasons (explained
more fully in the attachment) are:

a. It is considered militarily infeasible to infiltrate
in small units a force of this size to a single area where it
could assemble, receive supplies, and engage in coordinated
military action. Such an operation would have to be done
over a period of time and the loss of the element of surprise
after initiel infiltrations would permit goverment forces to
frustrate further reinforcements to the same area.

b. Military units significantly smaller than the
battalion presently undergoing mit training would fall short
of the "minimm critical mass" required to give any significant

Likelihood of success. . Smaller scale infiltrations would not

ae De wb ene ee ee oe ae oa



Sa we oe el

e@ ignore the contributions and the kmowledge which they can bring
to bear, and generally treat them as incompetent children whom

the Americans are going to rescue for reasons of their own.



Se a soe ea

policymaking machinery had slowed down. A number of piecemeal
policy decisions were vouchsafed, but not all the specific ones
the project chiefs were pressing for, for example, authority for
tactical air strikes and permission to use American contract pilots.

62. President Eisenhower had given a general go-ahead signal
on 29 November and had reaffirmed it on 3 January 1961, but the
impending change in administration was slowing matters down. For
example, a proposed propaganda drop was turned down on 13 January
for this reason. On 19 January, at the Special Group's last
meeting before the inauguration, it was agreed that a high-level
méeting, to include the new Secretaries of State and Defense,
should be set up as soon as possible to reaffirm the basic concepts
of the project.

Preparations Endorsed

63. Such a meeting was held 22 January, and the project and
current preparations were generally endorsed. At a meeting with
the new President on 28 January the Agency was authorized to
continue present activities and was instructed to submit the
tactical paramilitary plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for
analysis. Shortly thereafter, in an attempt to get a high-level
internal review of the plan, it was briefed to Gen. Cabell,
Gen. Bull (consultant) and Adm. Wright (ONE). By 6 February
the Joint Chiefs had returned a favorable evaluation of the

strike plan, together with a number of suggestions.





POPSET

Freedom Fund Campaign

49. There were also financial problems on a smaller scale.
To publicize Radio Swan, and perhaps to enhance its cover, the
Cuban Freedom Fund Campaign was organized in November to solicit
donations through newspaper advertisements. The radio station,
which was budgeted at $900,000 for Fiscal Year 1961, received
$330 in gifts during the next few weeks.

. /

50. Bohemia Libre, a handsome weekly magazine » budgeted
at $300,000 but actually costing about $35,000 an issue, had
bad luck from the start in seeking advertising and once missed
an issue on that account. Additional funds had to be sought
for it several times. Yet it developed an audited circulation
of 126,000, said to be second only to the Reader's Digest in
the Spanish-language field.

51. While the project moved forward, acquiring boats,
planes and bases, training men, negotiating with foreign govern-
ments, seeking policy clarification, training an FRD security
service, publishing magazines and newspapers, putting out radio
broadcasts, and attempting to move arms, men and propaganda
into Cuba by sea or air, the FRD, in whose name most of this
activity was being carried on, was making little progress
toward unity.

52. Members would resign in a huff and have to be wheedled

back. Each faction wanted supplies to be sent only to its own



EP ee

weather. On the seven occasions cargo was dropped, it was either
totally or in large part recovered by the Castro forces. Three
times cargo was dropped blind, three times in the wrong Place,
and once on the drop zone when the reception committee was not
there.

9. In all, about 151,000 pounds of arms, ammmition and
equipment were transported by air. Not more than 69,000 pounds
of this was actually dropped; the rest was returned to base. Of
this 69,000 pounds, at least 46,000 pounds were captured: by
Castro forces, who recovered all or a large part of ten drops,
compared with our agents, who recovered three. In other words,
out of 75 tons which were air-lifted, paramilitary agents
actually got about twelve (about enough to arm 300 men, figuring
7,500 pounds to a hundred-man pack).

10. Except for the one team, there were no clandestine
personnel drops made or even attempted during the entire project.

Lack of Procedure

li. The agents on the ground did not have a standard
procedure for air reception (most of them had not been trained).
The locations of drop zones were variously and insufficiently
described by coordinates, sketches, or azimuths. In two opera-
tions the requesting agents did not even have mapsof their areas.
In one of these WH/ headquarters, DPD and Miami Base euch arrived

at a different set of coordinates from the reference points given.

- 101 -



THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION

1. CIA is already in close touch with three reputable oppo-
sition groups (the Montecristi, Autentico Party and the National
Democratic Front). These all meet the fimdamental criteria
conditional to acceptance, i.e. they are for the revolution as
originally conceived--many being former 26th of July. members--
and are not identified with either Batista or Trujillo. ‘They
are anti-Castro because of his fadiure to live up to the original
26th of July platform and his apparent willingness to sell out
to Communist domination and possible ultimate enslavement. These
groups, therefore, fit perfectly the planned opposition slogan
of "Restore the Revolution".

2. An opposition Council or Junta will be formed within
30 days from representatives of these groups augmented possibly
by representatives of other groups. It is probably premature
to have a fixed platform for the Council but the Caracas Mani~
festo of 20 July 1958 contains a number of exploitable points.
Two of the CIA group leaders were signers of the Manifesto. The
following points are suggested as a few possibilities:

a. The Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cuba

subject to strong Sino-Soviet influence.



ress, radio, television
P. ? ?

will support this mission as wil.

selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin

American travel.



regardless of declining populer support. There is no significant
likelihood that the Castro regime will fall of its own weight.

a. The regime is proceeding methodically to solidify
its control over all the major institutions of the society
and to employ them on the Communist pattern as instruments
of repression. The Government now directly controls all
radio, television, and the Press.” It has placed politically
dependable leadership in labor unions » Btudent groups y end
professional organizations. It has nationalized moat ,
productive and ‘financial enterprises and is using a ,
program of so-called land reform to exercise effective
control over the peasantry. It has destroyed all political
parties except the Communist party. Politically reliable
and increasingly effective internal security and military
forces are being built up.

b. Cuba is in economic difficulties but the Commnist
Bloc will almost certainly take whatever steps are necessary
to forestall any decisive intensification of these troubles.
Economic dislocations will occur but will not lead to the
collapse or the significant weakening of the Castro regime.

c. At the present time the regular Cuban military

establishment, especially the Navy and Air Force, are of



BOP SEL

Beach was at the right flank, with Blue Beach at the center. .The
lodgment to be seized was thus a coastal strip about 40 miles

long, separated from the interior by an impassable swamp penetrated
only by three roads from the north and flanked by a coastal road
from the east.

90. In the early hours of 17 April Cuban underwater demoli-
tion teams, each led by an American contract employee, went ashore
to mark Red and Blue Beaches. Each of these parties engaged in
fire fights with small enemy forces but accomplished their tasks,
and the troops began moving ashore in small aluminum boats and
ICUs. Before daylight small militia forces were encountered at
both beaches. These offered little opposition, and many of the
militiamen were quickly captured.

Ql. Not long after daylight the airborne infantry company
was successfully parachuted from C-46 aircraft to four of the five
scheduled drop zones where its elements were given the mission of
sealing off approach roads.

92. At dawn began the enemy air attacks which the project
chiefs had aimed to prevent by the planned dawn strikes with
Nicaragua-based aircraft against Castro's fields. Action by
Castro's B-26s, Sea Furies, and jet T-33s resulted in the sinking
of a supply ship, the beaching of a transport, and damage to an -
IcI. The plan for a landing at Green Beach was thereupon abandoned,
and these troops, with their tanks and vehicles were put ashore at

Blue Beach. Shipping withdrew to the south under continuous air attack.

Pe a BO



DORSET

of the militia. No definitive conclusions can be advanced
but it must be remembered that the majority of the militia
are not fighters by instinct or background and are not
militiamen by their ow choi¢e. Their training has been
slight and they have never been exposed to actual fire
(particularly any heavy fire power) nor to air attack.
Moreover, the instabilities within Cuba are such that if -
the tide shifts against the regime, the chances are strong
that substantial numbers will desert:or change sides,’ .

b. There is no doubt that the paramilitary force. would
be widely assumed to be U. S. supported. Nevertheless, this ,
conclusion would be difficult to prove and the scale of its
activity would not be inconsistent with the potentialities
for support by private Cuban and American groups rather than
by the U. S. Government. It must be emphasized; moreover; ””
that this enterprise would have nothing in common (as would
the use of U. S. military forces) with the Russian suppression_
of Hungary or the Chinese suppression of the Tibetans. . This
would be a force of dissident Cubans with Cuban political and
military leadership.

ec. There would be adverse political repercussions to a
landing in force but it is not clear how serious these would

be. Most Latin American Governments would at least privately



LPR

SEED 20015

5. In November and December there were six other successful
small boat operations conducted with boats owed by various Cubans.
The arrangements were made by individual case officers at Miant
(there being no maritime section) and mainly in response to
requests by the owners. No memoranda of understanding were made
end the agreements as to supporting, equipping, and funding
these Cuban boats were exceedingly loose, thus causing many
problems later. . , :

6. A Cuban would say, "Give me a tank of gas and a machine
gun, and you can use our boat and we will help run it." After
the operation he was likely to come back and say that the boat
needed all sorts of equipment which had been damaged by the
operation, and many claims vere built up in this way.

{- Although more than twenty of these boats were offered .
to case officers, mast of them were too small and too limited
in range to be of much use. Furthermore, the bad weather
which lasted from December into March made small boat operations —
impossible at a time when they were badly needed. In January
1961 there was not a single successful operation.

Boats .

8. By December the need for some QB boats vas

becoming obvious. The "Sea Gull" (see below) was picked up by

Headquarters about this time. It turned aut to be a complete



Lee

surprise for the main assault force. These advantages would be
counterbalanced by the diversion of troops otherwise supporting
the main unit.

[7. Ianding and Slow Build-up: Under this fourth alternative

the whole paramilitary force could carry out a landing and seize

@ beachhead in the most remote and inaccessible terrain on the
island with intent to hold indefinitely an area thus protected by
geography against prompt or well-supported attacks from the land.
This would permit the installation there of the provisional govern-
ment, its recognition by the U. S. after a decent interval, and (if
needed) a long period of build-up during which additional volunteers
and military supplies would be moved into the beachhead.

a. A major political advantage of this course of action
would be that the initial assault might be conducted in such a way
as to involve less display of relatively advanced weaponry and of
professional military organization than the landing in force dis-
cussed above, especially so as there is every likelihood that the
initial landing would be virtually unopposed by land forces.
Recognition could provide a suitable political and legal basis for
a protracted build-up after the initial assault.

b. Such an operation would, however, require tactical air
support sufficient to destroy or neutralize the Castro Air Force.

If this were not provided concurrently with the landing, it would

-10-



lel



Le Te a ee a

19. The time spent in training is no measure of the quality
of the training, of course, and there was undoubtedly a great

waste of time. One of the Cubans trained for infiltration into

Cuba wrote that after he arrived in Panama in December 1960:"

during almost three weeks, the only thingh I did...was cleaning

@ small dam and the shoting range. after that we just din't do
anythingh, just sleep and ate, thats all.". When he arrived in
Florida on 18 January: "There, the same history, sleep, eat, play
card and watch teleyision. ‘The only training I receveid.during -
that time was on secret writting, wich was very good but nothing
else." The same agent pointed out serious deficiencies in his
weapons training and his final briefing.

20. One of the instructors in Guatemala in the early months
later claimed that only two instructors Imew their business; the
others were chosen from the trainee cadre, who had only a back-
ground of two months' training themselves. _He included -himself
among the unqualified.

Training Omission

21. The remoteness of the training site caused additional
difficulties. When brigade training started on 29 Novenber
there were only two compasses for. 405 troops, and these belonged
to trainees. Compasses had first been requested on 2 October,
but when they were not received the training in their use had

to be omitted from the program.



a Oe aed

the U. S. inability to take decisive action with regard to
Castro. David will again have defeated Goliath. Anti-U. S.
regimes like that of Trujillo would gain strength while pro-
U. S. Betancourt would undoubtedly suffer. Surely Ydigoras,
who has ‘been pn exceedingly strong ally, would also be placed
ina very difficult position for kis support of a disbanded
effort. It mst be remembered in this connection that there
are sectors of Latin. American opinion which eriticize the :
U. 8S..for not dealing sufficiently. forcefully with the Castro
regime. -In fact, one reason why many latin American govern-
ments are holding back in opposing Castro is ‘because they
feel that sooner or later the U. S. will be compelled to take
strong measures. ~

b. The resettlement of the military force will wmavoid-
ably cause practical problems. Its members will be angry,
disillusioned and aggressive with the inevitable result that
they will provide honey for the press bees and the U. S. will
have to face the resulting indignities and embarrassments.
Perhaps more important, however, will be the loss of good
relations with the opposition Cuban leaders. To date almost
all non-Batista, non-Communist political leaders.have been

encouraged or offered help in fighting Castro. . An abandonment

of the military force will be considered by them as a



ad

Se Te ar -e-sad

“insurgents” seems to have been used in the sense of "potential"
insurgents or mere civilian opponents of Castro. A statement
about military and police defectors was similarly vague; the
Agency was in touch with 31 such persons whom it hoped to induce
to defect after D Day.

Arrests of Agents

25. These tacit admissions of the non-existence of effective,
controlled resistance in Cuba correspond to the intelligence
reports which clearly showed the unfavorable situation resulting
from the failure of our air supply operations and the success
of the Castro security forces in arresting our agents, rolling
up the few existing nets, and reducing guerrilla groups to
ineffectiveness.

26. It is clear that the invasion operation was based on
the hope that the brigade would be able to maintain itself in
Cuba long enough to prevail by attracting insurgents and
defectors from the Castro armed services, but without having
in advance any assurance of assistance from identified, known,
controlled, trained, and organized guerrillas. The Agency
hoped the invasion would, like a deus ex machina, produce a
"shock", which would cause these defections. In other words,
under the final plan the invasion was to take the place of an
organized resistance which did not exist and was to generate

organized resistance by providing the focus and acting as a

catalyst.



Ne ee ee oe ae ee

critiques for each mission regarding compliance with instructions,
elimination of blind drops, and better identification of drop zones.
DPD cabled Guatemala on 7 March that an analysis of the mission
results to date would be forwarded shortly to be used as a basis
for refinement of tactics and improvement of coordination with the
reception teams. And at the end of March a check pilot was included
for the first time in a mission crew. He noted discrepancies in
pilot procedure. and crew coordination. :
Tardy Corrective Action

33. These corrective actions came too late. The seeming
inability to support resistance elements augmented_the growing
reliance being placed on the idea of an amphibious strike force
to accomplish the objective; then, as the strike idea took over
more and more, interest in clandestine drops decreased among
officers in charge of the project. On or about 28 March a policy
decision was made that there would be no more clandestine drops
until after the amphibious assault. Inasmuch as the WH/4 case
officers handling these drops were not informed as to the strike
plan or the date, this posed 4 problem for them because 19 drops
to specific drop zones were requested between 22 March and 19 April,
and it was necessary to stall off the requests with such messages as!

"Don't give up hope. We'll drop as‘ soon as we can."

"Regret unable mount BERTA. Definitely planning support your

operation. Beg you understand our problems."



ne SS =a od

to providing support in recruiting soldiers and running small
boat operations. This tight control meant that the PM officers
at the base looked to Headquarters for guidance rather than to
the chief of base. The PM and other sections had their own
channels to Headquarters, and this led to uncontrolled action
and considerable confusion. PM officers in Key West, a sub-
base of Miami, also sometimes communicated directly with Head-
quarters.

17. There are alleged to have been cases in which a Head-
quarters decision was conveyed to the Mami Base by three
persons simltaneously, each over the telephone. The result
of this was that the base had an enormously high phone bill and
the base chief often was not informed of events until after
they were over, if at all.

18. The Miami case officers retained their agents as long
as the agents were reporting by secret writing. Once the
agents reported by radio, they were taken over by Headquarters.
This was resented by the Miami case officers, who felt that
they were in the best position to know the agents, having
recruited and trained them.

19. Case officers in Headquarters, on the other hand,
felt that Miami case officers tried to steal their agents when
they passed through the Miami area. One agent who visited

Headquarters received promises of money and support which went



Sa eee net ee

attempting to nourish the underground. There were six success-
ful boat operations, carrying men and materials, in February
and 13 in March, and two successful air drops in March. Infil-
tration of agents was continuing. As of 15 February Miami Base
reported the following numbers and types of agents in Cuba:
Counterintelligence, 20; positive intelligence, 5; propaganda,
2; paramilitary, 4. As of 15 March the base reported that
these numbers had risen, respectively, to 21, 11, 9, and 6.

69. By the invasion date the personnel strength of Miami
Base had grown to 160. The intensity of activity there during
the latter months of the operation is indicated by the record
of a day picked at random -~ it happened to be 9 February --
when 21 case officers spent 140 man hours in personal contact
with 125 Cubans.

70. Successive changes in the operational plan and post-
ponements of the strike date are discussed later in this
report and are documented in Annexes C, D, and E. Detailed
policy authorization for some specific actions was either never
fully clarified or only resolved at the eleventh hour, and even
the central decision as to whether to employ the strike force
was still somewhat in doubt up to the very moment of embarka-
tion.

Ji. During the weeks preceding the invasion the pace of

events quickened. In early March the State Department asked the



DOPE KE T

28. However, Rubio was too conservative for the FRD's
taste, and the MAR was never incorporated into the FRD.

29. An organization which resisted incorporation in the
FRD until March 1961 and which meanwhile had a stormy relation-

ship with the Bender Group was the Movimiento Revolucionario del

Pueblo (MRP), headed by Manuel Antonio Ray Rivero. Ray had been
Castro's minister of public works until he lost his job toa
Commmist. He arrived in this coumtry in November 1960 and
agreed to accept assistance from the Bender Group but wished

to maintain his freedom of choice. The project's unilateral use
of Ray resulted in some successful maritime operations.

30. Bender's efforts to get Ray to join the FRD produced
strained relations, but in December Ray agreed to accept military
aid through ‘the FRD. Ray's program appeared to be identical with
Castro's but without Communism and without hostility. to the United
States. Ray became less intransigent as time went on and in
February and March 1961 was participating in talks with Bender
and Varona on the formation of the Revolutionary Council which
he ultimately joined. There seems to be no substance to alle-
gations in the press that Ray was ignored. In fact, his unsub-
stantiated claims to wide underground resources are said to have

been received uncritically by some project personnel.

- 90 -



BE

in a number of Latin American countries. There was a lack of
sufficient readily available operational information on potential
target areas, so a requirement, with special emphasis on Cuba,
whose Communist control was now becoming more and more apparent,
was sent throughout the intelligence commmity, and resulted in a
three-volume operational study.

7. By December 1959 these studies had produced a plan for
training a small cadre of Cuban exiles as paramilitary instructors,
these in turn to be used for training other Cuban recruits, ina
Latin American country, for clandestine infiltration into Cuba to
provide leadership for anti-Castro dissidents.

Organization of Branch

8. On 18 January 1960 the WH Division organized Branch 4
(WH/4) as an expandable task force to run the proposed Cuban opera-
tion. The initial Table of Organization totaled 40 persons, with
18 at Headquarters, 20 at Havana Station, and two at Santiago Base.

9. The branch also began negotiations for a Panama training
site. Its officers reconnoitered the area of Miami, Florida, in
search of suitable installations for office space, warehouses,
safe sites, recruiting centers, communications center, and bases
for the movement of persons, materiel, and propaganda into or out
of Cuba.

10. At the same time Headquarters and the Havana Station

were conducting a study of Cuban opposition leaders to prepare



a EE eo el

far beyond what the case officer in Miami had offered. The base
was not informed of these promises until the agent mentioned
them. For the next several months, this particular agent was
unmanageable and would not even meet with the Miami case officer.
This was naturally viewed as Headquarters meddling.

Examples of Confusion

20. Case officers in Miami also felt that they were unduly
handicapped in that Headquarters was not only competing with
them but also reviewing their actions, which was something like
playing a game with the umpire on the other team. It is doubt-
ful that a reviewing component can maintain objectivity when it
is also competing with the component whose activities it is re-
viewing.

21. Numerous examples could be cited to illustrate the
confusion that existed. The divided control over maritime opera-
tions is discussed elsewhere in this paper. There was an ex-
pensive fiasco over some special lubricating oil additive in-
tended for sabotage use in Cuba. The organizational arrangement
made necessary hundreds of telephone calls and cables which
otherwise would not have been sent, and the areas for uncertainty
and misunderstanding were still considerable. For example, a
Miami cable of 15 February referred to an agent message and
asked, "Does Headquarters intend to answer and arrange this

operation?"

-B-



Cee Selita

by the persons who were working day and night to prepare
the invasion but by an objective and disinterested senior

interpretation specialist from the Agency's FI Staff or from

its Office of Current Intelligence.

Intelligence Support Vacuum

15. Another serious error in the field of intelligence
support was that Miami Base received almost no intelligence
support from the Headquarters G-2 section. This may be
attributed to the facts that the paramilitary chief was almost
completely preoccupied with the strike force preparations and
that his subordinate G-2 was not given project-wide responsi-
bilities and to the rigid security restrictions under which
the paramilitery section was expected to operate, as well as
to the general confusion in the organizational position of the
Miami Base.

16. This serious support vacuum at Miami was compounded
because the base, in spite of its large size and the fact
that it was deeply engaged in its own operations in Cuba, had
no intelligence support section. There was no single officer
or unit charged with responsibility for interpreting the
considerable amount of intelligence derived directly from base
sources and from Special Intelligence.

17. Furthermore no photographic intelligence was available

to Miami Base, which had no officer with a clearance entitling

-7179-



=

On the other hand, the report treats the preparations for the
April landings as if these were the only activities directed
against Castro and his influence throughout the hemisphere and the
world. It chooses to ignore all other facets of the Agency's
intelligence collection and covert actions program which preceded,
accompanied, and have followed the landings in April of 1961. Thus,
it does too little.

The report misses objectivity by a wide margin. In unfriendly
hands, it can become a weapon unjustifiably to attack the entire
mission, organization, and functioning of the Agency. It fails to
cite the specific achievements of persons associated with the opera-
tion and presents a picture of unmitigated and almost willful
bumbling and disaster.

In its present form, this is not a useful report for anyone
inside or outside the Agency. If complete analysis beyond that
already accomplished by General Taylor and his group is still
required, then a new kind of report is called for, --a report
with clear terms of reference based on complete testimony. Such
@ report could concentrate on clandestine tradecraft, an asset for
which the Agency remains uniquely responsible.

/s/ C. P. Cabell
Cc. P. Cabell
General, USAF
Deputy Director



e A. INTRODUCTION

1. This is the Inspector General's report on the Central
Intelligence Agency's ill-fated attempt to implement national
policy by overthrowing the Fidel Castro regime in Cuba by means
of a covert paramilitary operation.

2. The purpose of the report is to evaluate selected
aspects of the Agency's performance of this task, to describe
weaknesses and failures disclosed by the study, and to make
recommendations for their correction and avoidance in the future.

3. The report concentrates on the organization, staffing
and planning of the project and on the conduct of the covert

paramilitary phase of the operation, including comments on

C intelligence support, training, and security. It does not
e@ describe or analyze in detail the purely military phase of the
effort.

4, The supporting annexes have been chosen to illus-
trate the evolution of national policy as outlined in Section
F of the body of the report. Annex A is the basic policy paper
approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March 1960. Annex B
is a paper prepared by the project's operating chiefs for the
briefing of President Kennedy in February 1961. Annexes C, D,
and E are the planning papers successively prepared during

March and April 1961 in the last few weeks before the invasion.



29. For a long time the results of the drops, as reported

by the ground elements, were not forwarded to the air crews, who
got no critiques but continued to report successes when in fact
they were missing the drop zone by many kilometers.
Handling an Emergency
30. The handling of an emergency also left something to be
desired. One of the planes had to land in Jamaica. The commander's

Phone call to an emergency. number in Guatemala produced the reply,

Mover Mae of 7" I 2 nae
this landing cron ( . who had assumed (wrongly) that
a =: been advised by Headquarters.

31. In January 1961 Division D of the Agency's FI Staff made
a study which raised pertinent questions about the air drops. The
Project's paramilitary staff made a study in March and concluded
that the Cuban crews did not have sufficient experience or super-
vised training in clandestine paramilitary air operations to meet
the project objectives and that they were too undisciplined to
obey instructions or to make correct reports. This study recom-
mended that contract American aircraft commanders be used, but it
did not receive the approval of the paramilitary chief and went
no further.

32. DPD also made an analysis in March and recommended cer-
tain overdue corrective action such as obtaining agent reports of

drop results for prompt dispatch to the air base in Guatemala,

- 107 -



}

Se an EE Eh ae - al

\

Function of G-2 Unit

8. The paramilitary G-2 unit consisted of four officers
and several secretaries. Its principal function was to prepare
intelligence annexes to the successive invasion plans. Its
sources of information included, in addition to the FI section's
reports, photographic intelligence, cartographic intelligence,
Special Intelligence, armed services reports, and messages
received from the paramilitary section's own agents in Cuba.
Reports from the. armed services were procured rapidly through -
direct informal liaison rather than through the usual slower
channels. , _

9. In various ways the functioning of the regular FI
section, which was directly under the project chief, was ad-
versely affected by the paramilitary G-2 unit.

10. The PM unit absorbed the available personnel. The
chief of the FI section was not invited to attend WH/4 staff
meetings, and for security reasons, he never had access to
WH/4's war room. During the final weeks the FI section was
not permitted to examine the PM section's incoming operational
cables for possible positive intelligence content. The FI
section chief did not have a clearance for photographic intelli-
gence. ;

lack of Liaison
ii. There was no close liaison between the two sections,

and this resulted in some duplication in preparation of reports



—~

a ee a oan aed

action, it will continue to do so regardless of declining popular
support as the machinery of authoritarian control becomes
increasingly effective.

a. The regime is proceeding methodically to solidify its
control over ali the major institutions of the society and to
employ them on the Communist pattern as instruments of repression.
The Government now directly controls all radio, television, and
the press. It has placed politically dependable leadership in
labor unions, student groups, and professional organizations. It
has nationalized most productive and financial enterprises and is
using a program of so-called land reform to exercise effective
control over the peasantry. It has destroyed all political
parties except the Communist party. Politically reliable and
increasingly effective internal security and military forces are
being built up.

b. There is still much active opposition in Cuba. It is
estimated that there are some 1200 active guerrillas and another
thousand individuals engaging in various acts of conspiracy and
sabotage, the tempo of which has been rising in recent weeks.
Nevertheless, the government has shown considerable skill in
espionage and counter-espionage. It is making good use of the
militia against guerrilla activities and the infiltration of

people and hardware. The militia is relatively untrained and



a aoe ont ae a od

14. For example, one air crew, under specific orders to abort
the mission if the drop zone was missed on the initial run and not
to search for it or circle around, made four passes four miles
away, according to the ground report (which added, "Pilots drunk
or crazy.").

15. Another crew commander, under orders not to drop unless
the T pattern was positively identified, elected to drop without
seeing the T because he had a "positive feeling" that he was over
the drop zone. Another aircraft remained in the drop zone area
41 minutes before dropping cargo.

Headquarters Direction

16. The Headquarters direction of these air drops left mich
to be desired. DPD, which controlled the crews and planes, never
had a representative physically assigned to WH/4, and the two
activities were operating in a divided command situation on the
basis of mutual cooperation rather than generally accepted manage-
ment practice and military command principles.

17. Deily consultation proved impossible although there was
@ requirement of it. There was trouble on cover stories, on
funding, on security, and on cables, among other things. It was
difficult to determine where the responsibilities of one
component ended and those of the other began.

18. The WH/4 paramilitary chief recommended that the DPD unit

be assigned to the chief of the task force for integration within

- 103 -



Government had agreed to be hospitable. Housing and office space

were arranged for the executive committee members and their

families and for a project case officer and his secretary. ia

iy: Mexico City was reactivated for support

duties, such oe 0L0ULUUUt—CSYS and the moye was

made. ’

22. Hovever, the Mexican Government appears not to have
kept its word, and the Cubans were gubjected to surveillance
end other herassnent. Within a few weeks it became evident
that .the situation was intolerable, and everybody moved back: i
to Miami » Which is where the Cubans wanted to be in the first

place.
The Bender Group

23. ‘The man responsible for laying the groundwork of the
FRD, arranging a long.series of meetings among the Cubans,
and persuading them to merge their differences and issue a
joint manifesto, was the chief of the project's political
section. He was known to the Cubans and inevitably to the
press as "Frank Bender". The Bender Group, for reasons of
plausible denial, purported to be composed of U.S. business-
men who wanted to help overthrow Castro. The Cubans do not
seem to have cared whether this was true or not, but the guise
irritatea them because they wanted to be in direct touch with

the U.S. Government at the highest level possible.



APPENDIX - A

A. CLANDESTINE INFILTRATION BY SEA OF SMALL GROUPS
(UP TO 50 MEN)

1. The only. areas of Cuba with mountainous terrain of
sufficient extent and ruggedness for guerrilla operations are
the Sierra Escambray of La Villas Province in Central Cuba and
the Sierra Maestra of Oriente Province at the egstern extremity
of the island. The Sferra de les Organos of Western Cuba do
not encompass sufficient area and are not rugged enough to
sustain guerrilla operations against strong opposition. Of the
two areas with adequate terrain » only the Sierra Escambray is
truly suitable for our purposes » Since the mountains in
Eastern Cuba are too distant from air bases in Latin America
available to CIA for air logistical support operations. Primary
reliance would have to be placed on this method of supply for
guerrilla forces.

2. The Government of Cuba (GOC) has concentrated large
forces of army and militia in both Las Villas and Oriente
Provinces. Estimates of troop strength in Las Villas have
varied recently from 17,000 to as high as 60,000 men, while up
to 12,000 men are believed to be stationed in Oriente.

3. While of dubious efficiency and morale, the militia,

by sheer weight of numbers has been able to surround and



9. The CIA Cuban Assault Force, composed entirely of

volunteers, has been trained for action as a compact, heavily
armed, hard-hitting military unit, and the troops are aware
of the combat power which they possess as a wit. They have
been indoctrinated in the military principle of mass and
instructed that dispersion of force leads to defeat in detail.
They will be quick to recognize the disadvantages of the
infiltration concept, and it is unlikely that all would
volunteer for piecemeal commitment to military action in Cuba.
The troops can be used in combat only on a voluntary basis.
The Government of the United States exercises no legal
command or disciplinary authority over them.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. This course of action would result in large scale
loss of life, both through military action against forces
vastly superior in numbers and as a result of drum-head justice
and firing squad execution of those captured.

2. This alternative could achieve no effective military

or psychological results.



a a aoe = el ~
to the invasion's success. Such an argument fails in the face
of Castro's demonstrated power to arrest tens of thousands of
suspected persons immediately after the D-Day-minus-2 air strikes
and the effectiveness of the Castro security forces in arresting
agents, as demonstrated by unimpeachable intelligence received.
Views of Joint Chiefs

30. Agency participants in the Project have sought to
defend the invasion plan by citing the approval given to the
plan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). To this argumut,
members of the JCS have replied, in the course of another
inquiry, (1) that the final plan was presented to them only
orally, which prevented normal staffing; (2) that they regarded
the operation as being solely CIA's, with the military called
on to furnish various types of support and the chief interest
of the JCS being to see to it that every kind of support
requested was furnished; (3) that they went on the assumption
that full air support would be furnished and control of the
air secured and on the Agency's assurances that a great number
of insurgents would immediately join forces with the invasion
forces; and (4) that, in the event the battle went against them,
the brigade would at once "go guerrilla" and take to the hills.

31. The Agency committed at least four extremely serious

mistakes in planning:
a. Failure to subject the project, especially in its

latter frenzied stages, to a cold and objective appraisal

-~ 56-- cos aa
ae ene ae



Se <n — a oe oe a

18. The four characteristics were:

a. an unspectacular night landing;

b. possibility of conducting air operations from a.
base on seized territory;

ce. a build-up period, after the initial landing,
to precede offensive action against Castro's forces, and

d. terrain suitable for guerrilla warfare in the
event the invasion force could not hold a lodgment.

19. The airfield requirement obliged the planners to shift
the invasion site from Trinidad to Zapata. The former area was
close to the Escambray Mountains and therefore offered better
guerrilla possibilities, but only the latter had a suitable
airfield.

20. The third paper also introduced a plan for a guerrilla-
type, diversionary landing in Oriente Province two days before
the strike and provided that supplies should be landed at night
during the initial stages. It also provided for air strikes
on military objectives at dawn of D Day as well as on D Day
minus 2.

Guerrilla Role

21. Close reading of the three papers also discloses that
the invasion was no longer conceived as an effort to assist
Cuban guerrilla forces in a coordinated attack. The papers

make no claim that significant guerrilla forces existed with

~ 52 -



RB

35. The terms "invasion", “strike”, and "assault" were used
e in these documents although the strike force concept does not seem
to have been given any sort of policy sanction until the Special
7 Group meetings which took place toward the end of 1960.
Plan of Operations
36. The Presidential briefing paper of August 1960 outlined
the plan of operations as follows: .

"The initial phase of paramilitary operations envisages
the development, support and guidance of dissident groups in
three areas of Cuba: Pinar del Rio, Escambray and Sierra _
Meestra. These groups will be organized for concertea
guerrilla action against the regime.

“The second phase will be initiated by a combined sea-
air assault by FRD forces on the Isle of Pines coordinated

. with general guerrilla activity on the main islend of Cuba.
This will establish a close-in staging base for future
: operations.

"The last phase will be air assault on the Havana area
with the guerrilla forces in Cuba moving on the ground from
these areas into the Havana area also."

37. Expenditures were rapidly running beyond the original
estimates. The WH Division estimated operating costs for four
weeks starting 1. July at $1,700,000 and for the fiscal year at

approximately $25,000,000. On 19 August an additional $10,000,000



P8868

6. It is apparent from these ratings that the other units
had not detailed their best people to WH/k but had in some
instances given the project their disposal cases.

7. Furthermore, although the project eventually included
the large number of 588 personnel, there were long periods in
which important slots went unfilled, due to difficulty in
procuring suitable officers. For example, the counterintelligence
officer of the Miami Base was never supplied with a case officer
assistant, there was a long period in which the project professed
inability to find a CI officer for the Guatemala Base, and
months were spent in search of an announcer for Radio Swan. Few
Clandestine Services people were found who were capable of serving
as base chiefs; the support services had to supply most of them.
All of the paramilitary officers had to be brought from outside
WH Division, or even from outside the Agency. (Air operations
presented no staffing problem for WH/4, since DPD supplied its
own people.)

8. There were in fact insufficient people to do the dob
during the latter stages of the project. Personnel worked such
long hours and so intensively that their efficiency was affected.
Personnel shortages were one of the reasons why much of the work

of the project was performed on a “crash" basis.

- 43-



a a oe = a

for a period of time (some said a week) sufficient to
administer a "shock" and thereby, it was hoped, to trigger
an uprising.
Discard of Original Plan

5. By November 1960 the original planning paper (Annex A)
had for practical purposes ceased to exist as a charter for
Agency action. By that date the Special Group had come to
be unanimously of the opinion that the changed conditions,
chiefly Castro's increased military strength through Soviet
support and the increased effectiveness of his security
forces, had made the original covert activities plan obsolete.

6. The Special Group had, however, not yet agreed on a
substitute plan and strong doubt was expressed whether any-
thing less than overt U.S. forces would suffice to obtain
Castro's downfall. But there appeared to be agreement that,
whatever the ultimate decision, it would be advantageous
for the United States to have some trained Cuban refugees
available for eventual use, and that CIA should continue to
prepare such a force.

7. At the end of November 1960, the Agency presented
a revised plan to President Eisenhower and his advisors.
This included (a) infiltration into Cuba by air of 80 men
in small paramilitary teams, after reception committees had

been prepared by men infiltrated by sea; (b) an amphibious

-47-
ne oe



LOTT SECRET

The Net in Havana

5. The section devoted considerable effort to supporting
Havana Station in preparing its agents for stay-behind roles in
the event of a break in diplomatic relations. When the embassy
finally closed on 3 January 1961 the station had a single net
for positive intelligence. It comprised some 27 persons, 15 of |
whom were reporting agents and the rest radio operators, cutouts
and couriers. The principal agents and one of the radio oper+
ators were U.S. cdtizens and thus had doubtful status after the
break in relations.

6. In September 1960 as the military invasion concept was
beginning to gain ascendancy in project planning, the ehief of
the project created a G-2 unit. But instead of placing this
unit directly under himself as a project-wide unit. and making
its chief a member of his immediate staff, he put it in the
paramilitary section under the aggressive Marine Corps colonel
who became the paramilitary unit chief at about that tim.

7. As chief of this low-echelon intelligence unit, whose
analyses were to have important influence on an action vitally
affecting national security and prestige, WH/k brought in an
officer of undoubted ability but of limited experience in para-
military and FI operations. It was a grave error to place this
G-2 unit in such a subordinate position in the project, and

this error produced the serious consequences described below.

- 76 -
ee P-L E



POPS rer.

10. For security reasons, the resistance elements inside
Cuba were not advised of the time of the assault, and could
hardly have risen up even if there had been 100,000 of them.
The entire complement of the Miami Base was likewise uninformed
and was unprepared to take action when the strike occurred.
Staff employees at the Miami Base, who could have benefited by
special clearances, did not get them until much too late.

Use of Guatemala ~

11. The use of Guatemala for training bases was, in terms
of security '» unfortunate. It is obvious now that the training
could have been done more securely in the United States (as for
example, the tank crew training, which got no publicity at all).
The Guatemala camps were not easily hidden and not easily
explained. The air base was located on a well-traveled road
and in view of a railroad where trainloads of Guatemalans
frequently halted on a siding.

12. It is strange that the training of the Cubans was under-
taken in a foreign country, where the trainees were necessarily
exposed to the natives and reporters could pick up information.
Presumably this was done on grounds of security and non-attri-
putability; however, the radio operators who were trained in
Guatemala were later brought to the United States for further
training. The force for the abortive diversionary expedition

was trained in New Orleans rather than being sent outside the



ee a eae

17. An effective infiltration mechanism never was developed.
Not one of the paramilitary teams was ever delivered by air. On
29 March the project was able to put four agents into Cuba through
Guantanamo Base. It is not clear why this could not have been
done earlier. No infiltration was ever tried by submarine.
Morale Problems
18. On 10 March 1961 (16 months after.the original decision
to train resistance teams) the 90 men who had been trained for
this were distributed as follows:
32 infiltrated, including 14 radio operators
5 at sea on a sabotage mission
6.in New Orleans as members of a raider team
28 in New Orleans still awaiting infiltration
19 detached to Miami for various impending operations.
The morale of the remaining trainees was low and their anger high.
This caused a great many problems in New Orleans. Some of these

men had been held in five different camps over ‘a ten-month period.

Qn 30 March, about three weeks before the invasion, the remainder
of the group (about 20) were transferred to Miami and turned loose,
being described as a collection of spoiled individuals distinguished
by bad conduct. At least 30 of the agents who were recruited

between May and September 1960 never got into Cuba at all; among

the 30 were eight who came into the project in the original group

in May 1960 and who were in training almost continuously from that |

time up to April 1961.

-131-.



RPS 8-6 T

on the project and who were administered by their own mit, the
Development Projects Division (DPD), nor did it include the many
people engaged in support activities or in services of common
concern, who, though not assigned to the project, nevertheless
devoted many hours to it.

19. In the early months of the project there were intensive
efforts to organize an exile front group, to get a broad and varied
propaganda program under way, to begin a paramilitary program, and
to acquire sites in Florida and elsewhere for training and. recruit-
ing activities and for office space.

20. The so-called "Bender Group", composed of project politi-
cal action officers, was set up as a notional organization of
American businessmen to provide cover for dealing with the Cubans.
After a series of meetings in New York and Miami a nominally

unified Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), composed of several

Cuban factions, was agreed upon on 11 May 1960.
Propaganda Activity

21. Radio broadcasts from Miami into Cuba were continued
under the sponsorship of a Cuban group. Preparations were made
for exile publication of Avance, whose Havana plant had been seized
by Castro. Anti-Castro propaganda operations were intensified
throughout Latin America, and a boat for marine broadcasts was pur-
chased. The Swan Island radio station, on which the President had
been briefed, was completed and on the air with test signals by

1T May.



ORS

22. More serious, there had never been any definition of
training goals, and the base and Headquarters were working at
cross-purposes. The chief of the training base in Guatemala
never received any letter of instruction.

23. The situation at the New Orleans Base in March 1961
was even more chaotic. The instructors found a training erea
which was 90% swamp and filled with poisonous snakes. Demolition
classes had to be conducted along a footpath leading from a
theater to a mess hall, with constant interruptions from
passers-by. Nobody seemed able to define the training that
was required. A demolitions instructor was assured on arrival
that the group he had come to train did not need the instruction;
in any case, there were no explosive training materials, no
adequate range, and.no gear to set one up. Another instructor,
sent to New Orleans to train a small raider group, found himself
expected to train, organize and equip a 90-man guerrilla force.

A week later he found himself training a 160-man assault battalion
instead. The training requirement was never spelled out, and the
training equipment never showed up.

2h. Training activity of various sorts was going on contin-
ually; there were requirements for everything from counterintelli-
gence to small boat handling. But there was no full-time chief

of training in the project to oversee requirements, define

responsibilities, set up facilities and provide support.



a ee ol

some instances by other Agency representatives, attended a number
of meetings with the new President and his advisors. (The paper
prepared for a 17 February meeting is appended as Annex B.) In
the course of these meetings, the Agency presented three informal
planning or "concept" papers, dated 11 March 1961, 16 March 1961
and 12 April 1961, each a revision of its predecessor (Annexes Cc,
D and E, respectively). These papers served chiefly as the bases
for oral discussions at these meetings.
Successive Alterations

16. According to our information, the revised concept, as
exposed by the paper of 12 April 1961, was apparently acceptable
to the President although he indicated he might order a diversion.
Before that he had authorized the Agency to proceed with mounting ,
the operation, but had reserved the right to cancel at any time.
The President was advised that noon on the 16th was the last hour for
a diversion. The DD/P checked with Mr. Bundy shortly after noon on
the 16th, and no diversion being ordered, authorized the landing to
proceed.

17. These three papers disclose that, starting with the World
War II commando-type operation outlined in the 11 March 1961 paper
(Annex C), the plan had been swiftly and successively altered to
incorporate four characteristics which had been deemed essential
in order to ensure that the operation would look like an infiltra-
tion of guerrillas in support of an internal revolution and would

therefore be politically acceptable.

- 51 -
ae ea oer



INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
of the
CUBAN OPERATION

October 1961

TS No. 173040



Lee ate

produce a psychological effect sufficient to precipitate

general uprisings of wide-spread revolt among disaffected

elements of Castro's armed forces.
c. Actually, the least costly and most efficient way

to infiltrate the force into a terrain suitable for protracted

and powerful guerrilla operations would be by a single landing

of the whole force as currently plamed and its retirement
from the landing point into the chosen redoubt.

7. A LANDING IN FORCE: "he Joint Chiefs of Staff have
evaluated the military aspects of the plan for a landing by the
Cuban opposition. They have concluded that “this plan has a fair
chance of ultimate success" (that is of detonating a major and
ultimately successful revolt against Castro) and that, if ultimate
success is not achieved there is every likelihood that the landing
can be the means of establishing in favorable terrain a powerful
guerrilla force which could be sustained almost indefinitely. The
latter outcome would not be (and need not appear as) a serious
defeat. It would be the means of exerting continuing pressure on
the regime and would be a continuing demonstration of inability of
the regime to establish order. It could create an opportunity for
an OAS intervention to impose a cease-fire and hold elections.

a. Any evaluation of the chances of success of the

assault force should be realistic about the fighting qualities



PET COPY

15 March 1961

REVISED CUBAN OPERATION

1. Political Requirements: The plan for a Cuban operation
and the variants thereof presented on 11 March were considered
to be politically objectionable on the ground that the contem-
plated operation would not have the appearance ofan infiltra-
tion of guerrillas in support of an internal revolution but

rather thet of a small-scale World War Ir type. of amphibious

fa

assault. In undertaking to develop alternative Plans and to.

judge their political acceptability, it has been necessary tos.

infer from the comments made on the earlier plan the charac-

teristics which a new plan should possess in order to be

politically acceptable. They would appear to be the ‘following:
a. An Unspectacular Landing: The initial janding

x
should be as unspectacular as possible and should ‘have

neither immediately prior nor concurrent tactical air
support. It should conform as closely as possible to the
typical pattern of the landings of small groups intended :
to establish themselves or to join others in terrain
suited for guerrilla operations. In the absence of air
support and in order to fit the pattern,’ it should Probably

be at night.





Tab B

PROPAGANDA

1. Articulation and transmission of opposition views has
L already begm. Private opposition broadcasts (tee. purchase of :
comercial time by private individuals) have occurred in ‘Miami

(wets wave). and arrangements have been made with Station WRUL

or additional broadcasts from Massachusetts (short wave) and

Pete Conte oe) ET <

; furnishea support to these efforts through encouragement,
negotiating help and providing some broadcast material.

2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed
to establish at least one “gray” U.S.-controlled station. This
will probebly be on Swan Islend and will employ both high
frequency and broadcast band equipment et substantial power.
The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these
will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting.
After some experience and as the operation progresses, it may
be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at
least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts

of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. Such an additional



Sa oe oe oe

instance, I am not quite clear what are the duties of the PM
types there since this component is neither a headquarters nor
a training installation nor even a forward command post." And
in another memo in November, he again urged that WH/+ be
especially careful to avoid any duplication of effort between
Miemi and Headquarters.

Duplication of Effort

5. By this time there was plenty of duplication. Head-
quarters and the Miami Base had become engaged in many parallel
or overlapping operations and were even competing with each
other. Both components were handling all kinds of agents and in
some cases the same ones. The only activity that Miami did not
get into was air operations, but even here it necessarily had a
role in many of the clandestine air drops.

6. There was a general feeling at Headquarters that the
forward base existed solely for support and that Headquarters
was in the best position to handle operatias because it had
ready access to policy guidance and fast radio communications
to and from all elements. This view ignored the fact that much
of the communication with Cuba was only by secret writing and
couriers; that Miami was the main source of information, poli-
ticians, agents, and soldiers for the projects that it was the
logical location for infiltration and exfiltration; that the

base, through the maintenance of effective liaison, had the



aoe ee ee a

64. On 17 February the Agency presented a paper (Annex B)
to the President which outlined three possible courses of action
against Castro.

65. Noting plans for early formation of a government in
exile, the paper described the growing strength of the Castro
regime under Bloc support and observed: “Therefore, after
some date probably no more than six months away it will become
militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except by
the commitment to combat of a sizeable organized military force.
The option of action by the Cuban opposition will no longer be
open.”

66. This paper found the use of small-scale guerrilla
groups not feasible and advocated a surprise landing of a mili-
tary force, concluding that the brigade had a good chance of
overthrowing Castro "or at the very least causing a damaging
civil war without requiring the U.S. ‘to commit itself to overt
action against Cuba."

67. Following presentation of this paper to the President,
the project leaders were given to understand that it would be
at least two weeks before a decision would be made as to use
of the invasion force. They thereupon withheld action to expand
the force up to 1,000 for the time being.

Movement of Agents
68. Although the invasion preparations were absorbing

most of the project's energies and funds WH/l Branch was still

- 23-



TOPS ELE ,

been obligated and an additional $28,200,000 was requested and
authorized. In May 1961, an additional $5,000,000 was requested
to meet obligations incurred. The total amount of money for
this project for Fiscal Years 1960/61, instead of $4,400,000, was
more than $46,000,000.

57. When the project started, it was not realized that bases
would be needed at Useppa Island, Key West, Miami, and Opa-locka,
Florida; New Orleans, Puerto Rico, Panama, Guatemala, and
Nicaragua, as well as innumerable safe houses and other facilities.
Consequently the project suffered, because many of these facili-
ties were not ready when needed. The WH Division launched into
a large paramilitary project without the bases 3 the boats, the
experienced paramilitary Personnel, or a complete and sufficient

plan, and never really caught up.



Le Gane

sensational nature still makes this a possibility. In dealing
with the surviving families it has been necessary to conceal
connection with the United States Government. This effort has
been complicated by the fact that the original cover story was
changed and a second notional company substituted.

8... The resolution in a secure manner of the legal and
moral claims arising from these four deaths has been costly,
complicated and fraught with risk of disclosure of the ,
Government's role. These problems were aggravated by the
inclusion in the employment contracts of certain unnecessarily
complicated insurance clauses and by the project's failure to

prepare in advance an effective plan for dealing with the

eventual legal and security problems.



TOSS

was urging the Agency to take away its Cubans. The rainy season
was hard upon the Caribbean. The reappraisal never happened,
though these very factors which helped prevent it should have
warned the Agency of its necessity.

36. These adverse factors were compounded and exacerbated
by policy restrictions that kept coming one upon another through-
out a period of weeks and right up until the point of no return.
These caused successive planning changes and piled up more
confusion. Rapidly accumulating stresses, in our opinion,
caused the Agency operators to lose sight of the fact that the
margin of error was swiftly narrowing and had even vanished
before the force was committed. At some point in this degenerative
cycle they should have gone to the President and said frankly: -
"Here are the facts. The operation should be halted. We request

further instructions."

Consequences of Cancellation

37- Cancellation would have been embarrassing. The brigade
could not have been held any longer in a ready status, probably
could not have been held at all. Its members would have spread
their disappointment far and wide. Because of multiple security
leaks in this huge operation, the world already knew about the

preparations, and the Government's and the Agency's embarrassment

would have been public.



POPSET TET

41. Late September 1960 saw the almost simultaneous occur-
rence of the first maritime operation and the first air drop over
Cuba. The former was successful. ‘The latter, the first of a
series of failures, resulted in the capture and execution of a
paramilitary agent on whom the project had set great store.

Maritime Operations

42. Several successful maritime operations took place during
make them almost impossible. But the project had only one boat.
regularly available during this period, and the process of supply-
ing and building up a resistance movement through clandestine
means began to seem intolerably slow, especially since during this
same period Castro's army was reported to have been strengthened
with 30 to 40 thousand tons of Bloc arms, and Cuban internal
security was being tightened.

43, .The strike force concept which, as noted, had already
begun to be associated with the project as early as July, began
to play an ever greater role in WH/4 planning. This role became
dominant in September 1960 with the assignment to the project, as
chief of its Paramilitary Staff, of a Marine Corps colonel
experienced in amphibious operations.

M4. In late October the Nicaraguan Government offered the
Agency the use of an air strip and docking facilities at Puerto

Cabezas, some 250 miles closer to Cuba than the facilities in

- 16- : - . .



—

ae nr a —e -e  ae d

"In water. Out of ammo. Enemy closing in. Help must
arrive in next hour."

"When your help will be here and with what?”

“Why your help has not come?"

100. “The last message was as follows: “Am destroying all
equipment and commmications. Tanks are in sight. I have nothing
to fight with. Am taking to woods. I cannot repeat cannot wait
for you."

101. An evacuation convoy was headed for the beach on the
afternoon of 19 April. When it became known that the beachhead
had collapsed the convoy reversed course.

102. During the next few days two Americans and a crew of

Cuban frogmen succeeded in rescuing 26 survivors from the beach

and coastal islands.



2

outside of Cuba. It is hoped that within one month a political
entity can be formed in the shape of a council or junta, through
the merger of three acceptable opposition groups with which the
Central Intelligence Agency is already in contact. The council
will be encouraged to adopt as its slogan "Restore the Revolu-
tion", to develop a political position consistent with that
slogan, and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attrac-
tive political alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition
will: serve as a magnet for the loyalties of the Cubanss in
actuality conduct and direct various opposition activities; and
provide cover for other compartmented CIA controlled operations.
(eb A)

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's
basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop
the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a
powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of
the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used
for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting
facility, probably to be located on Swan Island. The target
date for its completion is two months. This will be supplemented
by broadcasting from U.S. commercial facilities paid for by
private Cuban groups and by the clandestine distribution of

written material inside the country. (Tab B)



m os

Ral Gelin elie

whom -- after evaluative reports from our own trained agents,
confirming their strength, sufficiency of arms and ammunition,
and their readiness -- we had worked out plans for a coordinated,
combined insurrection and attack against Castro. As the 12 April
1961 paper expressly states, the concept was that the operation
should have the appearance of an internal resistance.

22. With reference to the strength of the resistance in
Cuba, the 11 March 1961 paper refers to an estimated 1,200
guerrillas and 1,000 other individuals engaging in acts of
conspiracy and sabotage, but it makes no claim of any control
exercised by the Agency or even that coordinated plans had been
made and firm radio communications established.

23. The 12 April 1961 paper states the estimate at "nearly
7,000 insurgents" (without specifying the number of guerrillas
included therein), who were "responsible to some degree of
control through agents with whom communications are currently
active." It locates these in three widely separate regions of
the island and states that the individual groups are small and
very inadequately armed and that it was planned to supply them
by air drops after D Day, with the objective of creating a
revolutionary situation.

2h. The foregoing language suggests existence of 7,000
insurgents but refrains from claiming any prospect of immediate

help from trained guerrilla forces in being. The term

- 53 -



Sn a

followers in Cuba, while groups inside were reluctant to receive
infiltrees sent in the name of the FRD. The FRD coordinator had
his own redio boat which made unauthorized broadcasts until
halted by the Federal Commmnications Commission and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.

Provisional Government Plans

53. Tentative “plans for a provisional government were first
discussed with FRD leaders in December, and this set off a flurry
of intrigue and bickering which delayed the recruiting process
and did nothing to advance the cause of unity. In mid-January
Miami Base reported that "the over-all problem is simply to main-
tain the Frente (FRD) as an operational facade until military
action intervenes and a provisional government can be established."
Until the question of how and by whom such a government was to
be selected could be answered, the base reported, "we are at
political dead center."

54. This dead center remained until very near the target
date and was only resolved by an ultimatum to the FRD Executive
Committee directing its members to agree on the chairman for a
Revolutionary Council or risk the loss of all further support.

55. However, in selective ways the FRD proved to be a
responsive and useful instrument. An example of this was the
counterintelligence and security service which, under close

project control, developed into an efficient and valuable unit
in support of the FRD, Miami Base, and the project program.

- 19 -



enon eae imam aie ams and

N. AMERICANS IN COMBAT

1. During the invasion landing two Agency contract
employees, assigned as operations officers aboard the two
LCIs, went ashore to mark two of the beaches and exchanged
gunfire with Cuban militia. One of these employees had taken
part in a sabotage raid on a Cuban oil refinery a month
earlier. Both of them engaged in rescue operations along
the Cuban shore after the brigade collapsed.

2. In late 1960 the project leaders were becoming doubtful
of the motivation of the Cuban pilots they were training and of
their ability to perform tactical missions successfully. In
January 1961 the Agency requested the Special Group to authorize
the use of American contract pilots. The authorization given
was limited to the hiring of the pilots and reserved for later
decision the question of their actual use. The Special Group
also granted authority to recruit and hire American seamen to
serve in the invasion fleet.

3. Three American contract pilots with long Agency
experience were made available from another project. A number
of other pilots and air-crew technicians, members or ex-members
of several Air National Guard units, were recruited especially
for the project in early 1961 under cover of a notional commercial

company.

- lho -



@ Change in Policy
17. The FRD had originally been conceived as the channel

through which all of the project's aid to the Cuban cause would
flow. However, Sanchez Arango's walkout ‘threatened a loss of
assets and capabilities which the project wanted. to preserve.
The result was expressed.as follows in a briefing prepared by
WH/4 for CINCLANT in November 1960:

"In October we made a change in operational policy.
Heretofore we ,had kept our efforts centéred om: the. FRD; -
However, we will now consider. requests for paramilitary
aid from any anti-Castro (ana non-Batista) group, inside
or outside Cuba, which can show it has a capability. for

C paramilitary action against the Castro regime. We feel
@ that the combination of our controlled paramilitary
action under the FRD aegis and the lesser-controlled
operations of other Cuban revolutionaries will bring
about a considerable acceleration of active anti-Castro
expressions within Cuba. We will, in-any event, have
the lever of support as a mechanism for influencing
the ultimate emergence of one individual or group as
the primary figure in the anti-Castro commnity."
18. Because of the gregariousness of Cuban exiles, the
project was uneble to prevent this change in policy from

becoming known to the FRD executive committee. When the



Sn a ee oe

@ the revolt or the continuation of large scale guerrilla action
in terrain suited for that purpose.
These alternatives are discussed in the following praragraphs.

5. DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE: There is little that

can be done to impose real political and economic pressure on the
Castro regime and no such course of action now under serious conk
sideration seems likely to bring about its overthrow.

a. A true blockade of Cuba enforced by the United States
would involve technical acts of war-and has now ‘been dismissed
as infeasible.

b. Action to halt arms shipments from Cuba into any
other part of the hemisphere would be cumbersome and easily

C evaded if air transport were employed. . While undoubtedly of
e some value it is difficult to see that the institution of such
measures would either impose severe pressure on the Castro
regime or effectively insulate the rest of the hemisphere from
it. Castro's principal tools of subversion are people,
ideology, the force of example andimoney. The flow of these
items cannot be dammed up.

ce. Further economic sanctions are theoretically possible

but can quite readily be offset by an increase of trade with

the Bloc.



PR

Failure of Integration Effort

10. The DD/P rejected this recommendation as not being the
most efficient solution for technical reasons. The insufficiently
effective relationship between the project and the DPD unit was
one of the gravest purely organizational failures of the opera-
tion. The DD/P has subsequently confirmed this conclusion and
has ascribed this lack of effectiveness to personality frictions
and to the "classic service rivalry." (We would note that this
does not exist in present-day combined commands. )

il. The organizational confusion was augmented by the
existence of a large forward operating base in the Miami area,
which in turn had loose control over several sub-bases. ‘The
mission of this base was vaguely defined and not well understood.
In theory the base had a supporting role; actually it was con-
ducting operations which for the most part paralleled similar
operations being conducted by WH/4 from Headquarters. This
divided effort was expensive, cumbersome, and difficult to
coordinate. In some cases the efforts of the two elements
were duplicating or conflicting or even competing with each other.

12. The upshot of this complex and bizarre organizational

situation was that in this tremendously difficult task the _

Agency failed to marshal its forces properly and to apply them

effectively. .



a ae eee oe

I. THE POLITICAL FRONT AND THE RELATION OF CUBANS TO THE PROJECT
1. The Cuban opposition front, as conceived by the Agency
in consultation with the State Department, was to have the
following characteristics:
a. Full restoration of the 1940 Cuban constitution.
b. Return to the basic principles of the revolution,
as enunciated in the 1958 Caracas Declaration.
ce. Pro-Western and strongly anti-Communist orientation.
d. Political complexion ranging from a little to the
right of center to somewhat left of center.
e. Ability to muster the broadest possible support
from the Cuban population.
2. The functions of such a front organization were conceived
to be:
a. A cover for covert action against the Castro
regime.
b. A catalyst and a rallying point for anti-Castro
groups variously reported to number 178, 184, or 211.
ce. A possible nucleus for a provisional government of
Cuba following Castro's downfall.
3. The terms of reference thus excluded followers of the
former dictator, Fulgencio Batista. They also excluded extreme

leftists.



LOPS ET

r ) approve of unobtrusive U. S. support for such an opposition
move, especially if the political coloration of the opposition
were left-of-center. The reaction of the rest of the free
world, it is estimated, would be minimal in the case of
unobtrusive U..S. support for such an attempt. It might
produce a good deal of cynicism throughout the world about
the U..S..role but if quickly successful little lasting
reaction. Generally speaking it is believed that the political
cost would be low in the event of a fairly quick ‘success. .The .
political dangers flowing from long continued large aeale .
guerrilla warfare would be greater but there are diplomatic
preparations that could be made to forestall extreme adverse

reactions in this contingency.

@. 8. DISSOLUTION OF THE MILITARY FORCE: A decision not.to use
the paramilitary force must consider the problem of dissolution,
since its dissolution will surely be the only alternative if it. is
not used within. the next four to six weeks. It is hoped that at
least one hundred volunteers could be retained for infiltration in
small teams but it is doubtful whether more than this number would
be available or useful for this type of activity.

a. There is no doubt that dissolution in and of itself
will be a blow to U. S. prestige as it will be interpreted in

many Latin American countries and elsewhere as evidence of



destroy by air attack the microwave links on which Castro's
commumication system depends. ‘The objective 1s of course to
create a revolutionary situation, initially perhaps in Oriente
and Las Villas. Provinces, and then spreading to all parts of
the. island.

{. Propaganda and Communications: Currently medium and

short wave broadcasting in épposition to Castro is being carried :
on from seven stations in addition to Radio Swan. Antennae —
modifications of the latter have increased its effective power

in Cuba and it is believed that there is now good medium wave
reception of Swan everywhere except in Havana itself where it

can still be effectively jammed. The number of hours of broad
casting per day will be increased beginning immediately from
ahout 25 to almost 75 soon after D-Day. The combination of
multiple long and short wave stations which will then be in use,
supplemented by three boats which carry broadcasting equipment
(two short wave and one medium wave) will assure heavy coverage

of all parts of the island virtually at all times. Radio programs
will avoid any reference to an invasion but will call for up-rising
and will of course announce defections and carry news of all
revolutionary action. Soon after D-Day a small radio transmitter

will be put in operation on Cuban soil.



SOP T

attacks against the beachhead will be undertaken within
2k to 48 hours of the landing but the perimeter can
easily be held against attacks along the most direct ap-
proach routes. The terrain may well prevent any sizeable
attacks (providing the enemy air- force has been rendered:
ineffective) until the opposition force is ready to
attempt to break out of the beachhead. ,

d. The timing and direction of such offensive action
will depend upon the course of events in the island,’ At
least three directions of break out are possible. Because
of the canalization of the approaches to the beachhead from
the interior, a break out will require close support by
tactical air to be successful unless enemy forces are
thoroughly disorganized. The opposition force will have
the option, however, of undertaking an amphibious assault
with tactical air support against a different objective
area if it should seem desirable.
4k. Political Action: ‘The beachhead area proposed to be

occupied is both large enough and safe enough so that it should
be entirely feasible to install the provisional government there
as soon as aircraft can lend safely. Once installed, the tempo

of the operation will permit the U.S. Government to extend

-5- . TS #176622



aE 6-5

33. It would also have raised the question of why the United
States should contemplate pitting 1,500 soldiers » however well ,
trained and armed, against an enemy vastly superior in number and
armament on a terrain which offered nothing but vague hope of
significant local support. It might also have suggested that the
Agency's responsibility in the operation should be drastically
revised and would certainly have revealed that there was no real
plan for the post-invasion period, whether for success or
failure.

Existence of Warnings

34. The latest United States Intelligence Board, Office of
National Estimates, and Office of Current Intelligence studies
on Cubaavailable at that time provided clear warning that a
calm reappraisal was necessary.

35. But the atmosphere was not conducive to it. The chief
of the project and his subordinates had been subjected to such
gruelling pressures of haste and overwork for so long that their
impetus and drive would have been difficult to curb for such a
purpose. The strike preparations, under the powerful influence
of the project's paramilitary chief, to which there was no
effective counterbalance, had gained such momentum that the
operation had surged far ahead of policy. The Cuban volunteers
were getting seriously restive and threatening to get out of

hand before they could be committed. The Guatemalan Government



Sn ee eae oe

4, Exclusion of the Batistianos and other ultra-conservatives
caused one kind of problem. Many of the exiles had been Batista
followers. Many of them were rich and had assets, such as boats
and followers, which could be used. Some had military experience.
Some of them had American friends who were influential enough to
urge their claims to consideration upon the White House.

, The Leftist Fringe

5. Exclusion of the far-left fringe caused another kind
of problem. It was hard to tell how far ‘left ‘some persons were, 2 >
And some of those whose political acceptability was questionable
nevertheless claimed such substantial following inside Cuba that
it was difficult to ignore them.

6.. In forming the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD)

the Agency focussed its attention principally on personalities
end groups who had either participated in Castro's government
or supported his revolution but had become disillusioned and
gone into opposition. , '

J. %In early 1959 the Havana Station was already assessing
a wide variety of anti-Castro personalities with whom it was
in contact. In mid-1959 a station agent was exploring the
possibility of covert support to the Montecristi Movement of
Justo Asencio Carrillo Hernandez.

8. In the mid-1950s the Montecristi group had been active

against Batista, who exiled Carrillo. He returned after the



Le ae ee oe a

"Barbara J". Upon landing in Key West the ten paramilitary

agents, having been on this trip for a month after spending

two months in a safe house, were ready to resign and it took

a considerable amount of persuasion to get them to stay with

the program. They were then sent to New Orleans for holding.
Earning a Citation

2h. Several officers who were associated with the captain
of the "Barbara J", a contract employee acquired from Military
Sea Transportation Service (MSTS), have testified to his
drinking on duty, his bullying of Cubans, and his disregard
for security. Drew Pearson wrote about the drunken American
LCI skipper who scared away Cuban underground leaders with his
ship's floodlights, and who threatened to abandon a sabotage
team. On 21 March the project's paramilitary chief relieved
the captain of his command and requested that he be terminated.
However, the captain was retained on duty and eventually
received full pay and a bonus for a six-month contract period
in the amount of $14,698.

25. WH/% Branch initiated action to get the captain
commended by his parent service for outstanding performance. ,
In July 1961 he was cited "for completing an assignment involving
extreme hazards in an outstanding manner, and displaying excep-

tional skill and courage" and given the Navy Superior Civilian

-u7- a

ne te i Le eee ee - ee



0 Ron SER

be needed soon thereafter in order to permit ships to operate into
the beachhead and the planned build-up to go forward. If the
initial landing could include seizure of an air strip, the necessary
air support could fairly soon be provided from within the territory
controlled by friendly forces. -There is, however, no location
which both contains a useable airstrip and is so difficult of
access by land as to permit protection of a slow build-up.

c. This type of operation by the very fact of being
clandestine in nature and remote geographically would have far less
initial impact politically and militarily than courses two or
three.

8. Conclusions:

a. The Castro regime will. not fall of its own weight.

In the absence of external action against it » the gradual weakening
of internal Cuban opposition must be expected.

b. Within a matter of months the capabilities of Castro's
military forces will probably increase to such a degree that the
overthrow of his regime, from within or without the country, .by
the Cuban opposition will be most unlikely.

c. The Cuban paramilitary force if effectively used has
@ good chance of overthrowing Castro, or of causing 28 damaging
civil war, without ‘the necessity for the United States to commit

itself to overt action against Cuba.



Ba a

unit which handled the technical side of the small boats,
approved funds for them, and arranged for personnel for them,
but had nothing to do with their operations.

32. This maritime unit also had the responsibility for
acquiring and fitting out the larger ships such as the
"Barbara J", the "Blagar", the three LCUs and the ships used
in the strike. This unit also had the responsibility for
training underwater demolition teams » directing raiding
operations, and overseeing the Vieques Base.

33. The. lack of equipment, the shortage of experienced
personnel, the press of time and the problems of coordination
are shown by the experience which the maritime unit had with
the acquisition and outfitting of the ICIs and the LCUs. The
press of time hardly allowed for advertising for specific
types of craft or soliciting competitive bids. The two ICIs
(the "Barbara J" and the "Blagar") were purchased from a
private corporation in Miami for $70,000. About $253,000 was
then spent in modifying, repairing and outfitting them.

34. This work, which extended over a period of several
months, was directed by officers from Headquarters during
short temporary duty tours in the Miami area. The day-to-day
supervision of the work was under several Navy chief petty :

officers (borrowed from the Agency's Office of Training) who

had no contact with Miami Base, no authority to spend money or



Pe

chiefs agreed that in event of a policy decision to call off the
invasion they would move the troops to sea, tell them that new
intelligence made the invasion inadvisable, and divert the force
to Vieques Island for demobilization.

80. On 12 April at a meeting with the President it was
decided that Mr. Berle would tell Miro Cardona there would be no
overt U.S. support of the invasion. The President publicly
announced there would be no U.S. support. On 13 April all WH/&4
headquarters sections went on 24-hour duty. The Revolutionary
Council was assembled in New York and advised that it would be
briefed in stages on the military aspects of the project. On
14 April the Council agreed to go into "Ssolation" during the
landing phase of the military operation.

81. The raids on three Cuban airfields were carried out by
eight B-26s on 15 April, and destruction of half of Castro's air
force was estimated on the basis of good post-strike photography.
Afterward, according to plan, one of the pilots landed in Florida
and announced that the raids had been carried out by defectors
from Castro's own air force. The Council was briefed on the air
strike. The diversionary expedition by the force which had been
trained in New Orleans failed to make a landing on two successive
nights preceding the strike.

82. ‘Immediately before D Day, Radio Swan and other outlets
were broadcasting 18 hours a day on medium-wave and 16 hours on

short-wave. Immediately after D Day, these totals were increased

~27-

a oe ao ae a



Ees-orrr cOPY

16 March 1960

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein
is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one
more devoted to the true interests of the Duban people and more
acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any
appearance of U,S. intervention. Essentially the method of
accomplishing this end will be to induce, support; and so far
as possible direct action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by
selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might’ be expected
to and could undertake on their own initiative. Since a crisis
inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be

provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U,S. before

the covert action program has accomplished its “Objective; “re
every effort will be made to carry it owt in such a’ way as pro-
gressively to improve the capability of the U.S. to act ina
crisis.

2. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major
courses of action:

a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsi-

ble, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime,

publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located



PaO Reina

may well be considerably less than that resulting from the
continuation of the Castro regime or from the more drastic
and more attributable actions necessary to accomplish the
result at a later date.

d. Even though the best estimate of likely Soviet
reaction to a successful movement against Castro indicates
problems to the U. S. arising from the removal or substantial
weakening of the Castro regime, Soviet propaganda and
political moves will still be mich less prejudicial to the
long-range interests of the U..S..than would the results of

a failure to remove Castro.



B06

@ B. HISTORY OF THE PROJECT
1. The history of the Cuban project begins in 1959 and for
the purposes of the survey ends with the invasion of Cuba by the
Agency-supported Cuban brigade on 17 April 1961 and its defeat and
capture by Castro's forces in the next two days.
2. Formal U.S. Government adoption of the project occurred
on 17 March 1960, when, after preliminary preparations by the
Agency, President Eisenhower approved an Agency paper titled
"A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime" (Annex ‘A)
and thereby authorized the Agency to undertake this program:
a. Formation of a Cuban exile organization to attract
Cuban loyalties, to direct opposition activities, and to
C provide cover for Agency operations.
e@ b. A propaganda offensive in the name of the opposition.
ce. Creation inside Cuba of a clandestine intelligence
collection and action apparatus to be responsive to the
direction of the exile organization.

a. Development outside Cuba of a small paramilitary force
to be introduced into Cuba to organize, train and lead
resistance groups.

3. The budget for this activity was estimated at $4,400,000.
The breakdown was: Political action, $950,000; propaganda,
$1,700,000; paramilitary, $1, 500,000; intelligence collection,

$250,000.

|



james ey



M. SECURITY

1. The assault on Cuba is generally acknowledged to have
been a poorly kept secret. It could hardly have been other-
wise, considering the complexity of the operation and the number
of people involved, both Cuban and American. The inspection
team did not make a detailed study of the security aspects of
the operation but came across many weaknesses in the protection
of information and activities from those who did not “need to -
know.” . ,

2. In general the Cubans who were in the operation do
not seem to have had any real understanding of the need to
keep quiet about their activities. Many of them knew mich
more than they needed to kmow, and they were not compartmented
from each other and from Americans to the extent that was neces-
sary. For example, one wealthy Cuban who was close to the
operation was being contacted by at least six different staff
employees.

3. Some agents were being handled by two or three
different case officers at the same time, with confusing results
and lack of control. Many of the agents who were sent into
Cuba had known each other during training; for example, a dozen
radio operators had been trained as a group. If one was arrested,
he would know who the other ones were. One radio operator inside

Cuba was aware of almost every paramilitary operation in Cuba

from the beginning of the project.

= 135 ves



See nn aa

oO. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Certain basic conclusions have been drawn from this survey
of the Cuban operation:

1. The Central Intelligence Agency, after starting to
build up the resistance and guerrilla forces inside Cuba,
drastically converted the project into what rapidly became
an overt military operation. The Agency failed to recognize
that when the project advanced beyond the stage of plausible
denial it was going beyond the area of Agency responsibility
as well as Agency capability.

2. The Agency became so wrapped up in the military
operation that it failed to appraise the chances of success
realistically. Furthermore, it failed to keep the national
policy-makers adequately and realistically informed of the
conditions considered essential for success, and it did not
press sufficiently for prompt policy decisions in a fast
moving situation.

3. As the project grew, the Agency reduced the exiled
leaders to the status of puppets, thereby losing the
advantages of their active participation.

4. The Agency failed to build up and supply a resistance
organization under rather favorable conditions. Air and boat

operations showed up poorly.

- 13 -



Dae ee ee eae

3. The Agency should establish a procedure under which
the Board of National Estimates or other body similarly
divorced from clandestine operations would be required to
evaluate all plans for such major covert operations, drawing
on all available intelligence and estimating the chances of
success from an intelligence point of view.

4, The Agency should establish a high-level board of
senior officers from its operational and support components,
plus officers detailed from the Pentagon and the Department
of State, to make cold, hard appraisals at recurring intervals
of the chances of success of major covert projects from an
operational point of view.

5. A mechanism should be established for communicating
these intelligence and operational appraisals to the makers
of national policy.

6. In return, a mechanism should be established to
communicate to the Agency the national policy bearing on
such projects, and the Agency should not undertake action
until clearly defined policy has been received.

7. The Agency should improve its system for the guided
collection of information essential to the planning and
earrying out of such projects.

8. The Agency should take immediate steps to eliminate

the deficiencies in its clandestine air and maritime operations.

- 149 -



a I oe el

3. The basic mistake was made of filling the key spots
early, without realizing how much the project vould grow and
that it should be staffed for a major effort. In some cases ’
officers originally selected to supervise five persons ultimately
had to supervise 15 or 20 times as many. Of the three GS-16
officers assigned to the project, none was given top-level
managerial responsibilities. The result of all these factors
was that none of the most experienced, senior operating officers
of the Agency participated full time in the project.

An Indication of Quality

4, An interesting insight into the quality of the personnel
of WH/4 is afforded by the initial "Relative Retention Lists"
prepared in April 1961 by the divisions and senior staffs of the
Clandestine Services and other Agency units pursuant to the
requirements of Regulation 20-701 (Separation of Surplus Personnel).
Each such unit was required to group its officers in each grade
into ten groups, on the basis of the performance and qualifica-
tions of each one. (Under the prescribed procedure, these lists
are to be reviewed at several levels before becoming definitive.)

5. Of the 42 officers holding the principal operational jobs
in WH/4 in grade GS-12 through GS-15, 17 officers were placed in
the lowest third of their respective grade, and 9, or 21% in the
lowest tenth. The ratings of 23 of these 2 were made by WH

Division, which placed seven in the lowest third, and 19 were rated
by other units, which together placed ten in the lowest third.

- 42 - . S



OPS

on D-Day itself instead of placing reliance on a larger
strike coordinated with the landings on D-Day.

ce. Shortly after the first air strikes on D-2.a B-26
with Cuban pilot will land at Miami airport seeking asylum.
He will state that he defected with two other B-26 pilots
and aircraft and that they strafed aircraft on the ground
before departing. ; -

da. A preliminary diversionary lgnding of true guerrilla
type will be made in Oriente Province on D-2. “the main D-Day*-
landings will be made by three groups at locations spaced
some distance apart on the coast. These will be followed
about one week later by a further guerrilla type landing in
Pinar del Rio (at the western end of the island).

e. Ships carrying the main forces leave the staging
pase at staggered times. (‘he first one sailed on Tuesday
morning.) They will follow independent courses to a
rendezvous for the final run-in. Until nearly dusk on D-1
they would appear to air observation to be pursuing unrelated
courses so there will be no appearance of a convoy.

f. All the landings will be at night. At least in the
first 2) hours, supply activity over the beaches will be at
night. There will be no obtrusive "beachhead" to be seen by air-

craft. Most troops will be deployed promptly to positions inland.



15 December 1961

SUBJECT: The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban
Operation

To comment on the subject report in detail would result in a
paper approaching in length, that of the survey itself. Sucha
commentary would have to deal in depth with the aim of the survey,
its scope, and the method used in compiling it. Such a commentary
would, at a large number of pages, be required to note inaccuracies,
omissions, distortions, unsupported allegations, and many erroneous
conclusions.

A detailed inquiry on the Cuban operation on elements other
than clandestine tradecraft, has already been completed by the
group headed by General Taylor. General Taylor's report was based
on testimony by all the principal officers involved in the Cuban
operation. The Inspector General's report is not based on complete
testimony; some of its conclusions are in conflict with General
Taylor's conclusions. .

It is not clear what purpose the Inspector General's report
is intended to serve. If it is intended primarily as an evaluation
of the Agency's role, it is deficient. Neither Mr. Dulles nor I
was consulted in the preparation of the Inspector General's report.
As a result, there are many unnecessary inaccuracies.

The report tries to do both too much and too little.

On the one hand, it attempts to describe the processes of
national security policy-making as though this were a process in
logical deduction like working a problem in geometry. According
to the Inspector General's account, firm propositions should be
laid down in writing and in advance from which correct conclusions
as to proper actions must inevitably be drawn. In this respect
the report goes far beyond an analysis of the Agency's role, and
it is not accurate. It tries to do too much.



a ae oe ee

5. The report includes references to the roles played by
Agency officials in Presidential conferences and interdepart-
mental meetings at which policy decisions affecting the course
of the operation were taken, but it contains no evaluation of
or judgment on any decision or action taken by any official
not employed by the Agency.

6. In preparing the survey the Inspector General and his
representatives interviewed about 125 Agency employees of all

levels and studied a large quantity of documentary material.



De eee eee ae ae a a

D. EVALUATION OF ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE

1. The project was organized at the level of an operating
branch, the fourth echelon in the organization of the Agency, in
the Western Hemisphere Division. Its chief, a GS-15, was not
given the independence and the broad, extensive powers of a task
force commander. Instead, he had to apply constantly for the
decision of policy questions and important operational problems
to the Deputy Director (Plans) (DD/P), who was in fact directing
the project, although this was only one of his many responsibilities.
The DD/P delegated much of his responsibility to his Deputy for
Covert Action, especially the handling of policy matters involving
contact with non-Agency officials. The office of the DD/P and the
offices of the project were in different buildings. Consideration
was given by the DD/P in late 1960 to raising the project out of

; WH Division and placing it directly under his Deputy for Covert
Action, but this was not done.

2. The Chief of WH Division was in the chain of command
between the chief of the project and the DD/P but only in a partial
sense. He exercised his right to sign the project's outgoing cables
until the week of the invasion even though the project's own signal
center was activated at the end of December 1960. He supervised the
staffing activities and attended some of the meetings of the Special
Group. But the DD/P and his deputy dealt directly with the project
chief, and gradually the Chief of WH Division began to play only 4

diminished role.

- 36-



BBP SEE

been left on a Vieques beach, where they staged a sit-down and
@ hunger strike. On 9 February the "Barbara J" reported that
the contact had not shown up at the rendezvous point.

22. After trying again on 10 February, the captain of the
“Barbara J" cabled: "Take a message to Garcia: The reluctant
heroes in fishing boat again conspicuous by their absence."
On 11 February he sent another odd cable: "Last message to
Garcia: Your fishing boat still manifesting extreme shyness.
Suggest next operation send in varsity." On 13 February he
sent: "Cruised without making contact. Picked up small target
on radar, tracked it down, and scared hell out of some fisher-
men who wanted no part of us."

23. The case officer and the team leaders had a different
story. They stated that when the "Barbara J". arrived at the
rendezvous point it was approached by a émall boat that came
at the right time and gave the correct signals, but that ag
the boat came alongside the captain of the “Barbara J" ordered
two floodlights turned on the boat which apparently scared it
away. On 18 February the reception party sent a message that
their boat had been at the right place at the right time and
that a patrol boat had showed up. The “Barbara J" arrived at
QE, oo. 1: February without having received arrival
instructions. On 15 February Miami sent a message saying that

it was setting up facilities at Key West to receive the

- 116 -



e functions of a general headquarters will be exercised from the

Agency with the Cuban brigade commander exercising field command
over the units that land on D-Day.



Sn ee ~ a

was requested and obtained. About half of this figure was the
estimated cost of paramilitary activities, with about another
$2,000,000 estimated for propaganda.

. Anti-Castro Broadcasts

38. Propaganda activity had gotten off to an early start
and had developed rapidly. After an initial shakedown period
Radio Swan had gone on the air first with anti-Trujillo, then
with anti-Castro broadcasts. Radio programs were also originating
in Miami and ap: The newspaper Avance in Exile was being
published by the end of the sumer, and a second paper and a
weekly magazine were planned. There had also been some successful
black operations. Most such operations had thus far been conducted
without participation by the FRD.

39. By the end of August the FRD had a lawyer team set for a
letin American propaganda tour and was ready with its first broad-
cast on Radio Swan, which was reported to be getting world-wide
reception with many listeners in Cuba. An anti-Castro comic book
was being reprinted, and a Spanish-language television program was
being preparéd in Miami.

4O. At the end of August WH/4 Branch was reporting that a
machine run search had failed to find any bilingual Agency employee
suitable as a Radio Swan announcer. (This search went on for some
time. On 28 December the branch reported finding a candidate, but

on 18 January 1961 that he had backed out.)



Se ee oe ae oe a a

22. The action-cadre instruction training program was being
prepared, and $25,000 worth of sterile arms were being sent to the
Panama training base, which was activated 11 May. At the same time
Useppa Island, Florida, was acquired as a site for assessment and
holding of Cuban paramilitary candidates and for training radio
operators. Screening of paramilitary recruits had begun in Miami
in April, and.the training in Panama began in June.

23. The Miami Base was opened on 25 May in the Coral Gables
business district under cover of a New York career development and
placement firm, backstopped by a Department of Defense contract,
and on 15 June a communications site, with Amy cover, was opened
at the former Richmond. Naval Air Station, which was held under
lease by the University of Miami. .Safe houses were also acquired
in the Miami area for various operational uses. The use of other
sites for project activities, in the United States and other
countries, was acquired for varying periods as time went on.

2k. Project officers were engaged in liaison on numerous
matters. In April they reached an agreement with the Immigration
and Naturalization. Service on special entry procedure for Cubans
of interest to the operation. They consulted with Voice of America
and the United States Information Agency on propaganda operations.
There were many discussions with the Federal Commmications Com-
mission on the licensing of Radio Swan and with the Defense Depart-
ment concerning its cover. The State Department was regularly

consulted on political matters.

toy beukg eo Saye dO =



H
;

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
of the

‘CUBAN OPERATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Introductions cssessceseceeneneeenenenereneees enone Sa
History of the Projects cevccscececscctcrrceccescees “3
Sumiary of Evalustion...++++++reees - Zh.
Evaluation of Organization and Command Structure... : 36
Evaluation of Staffing....scssceersecceeereerrerens an
Evaluation of Plannings..sececssescetereccecsccrees UG
The Miami Operating Base..sseveeescacsrescreceeeees 67
Intelligence Supports sesesseeceeceeeeeeueeeeeeuees 15
The Political Front and the Relation of Cubans

to the Projectsrcccrccvcsecvevereccsverssseseeres 81
Clandestine Paramilitary Operations -- Air..s.seees 98

Clandestine Paramilitary Operations -- Maritime.... | 110

Clandestine Paramilitary Operations -- Training

Underground LeaderSsescsseecevecesercescecneeeere 125
SECULAtY ese receererescvssescecsnceseversreereresres 135
Americans in Combat..cseccccccceccceceseevecsceeees ho

Conclusions and Recommendations......+seees

143



DRT

Conditions actually got worse. In September the training camp
was plagued by torrential tropical rains, shortages of food
and supplies, plus trouble with agitators and hoodlums among

their recently arrived trainees, who were not being screened

‘and assessed as the first ones had been. The training base

chief got into disfavor with Headquarters apparently because
of his blunt cables asking for assistance. ("My men are going -
hungry and barefoot.")
Request for Missions

ll. In October the infiltration teams that had been
selected from among the trainees worked out detailed opera-
tional plans for themselves, complete with maps, propaganda
handouts, and resistance operations. When the base announced
that about a hundred men were ready to go, Headquarters replied
that it was proposing the illegal infiltration of the teams in
November by boat. (Actually, the only boat the project had at
this time was the 54-foot "Metusa Time".) Headquarters further
cabled that it was engaged in preparing a general plan for the
employment of the infiltration teams but that the details were
not yet ready. The base chief was recalled in October, and
thereafter the training base had a new chief each week for five
weeks. One trainee was put into Cuba legally at the end of

October.

- 128 -



Se ae 2 a

Supplies for Castro

25. In another case 1,600 pounds of food and materiel were
dropped blind (in the dark of the moon) on each of four hilltops
to a group which was known to be in such a precarious position
thet it was not able to stay in place long enough to lay out a
drop zone. Again, the Castro‘forces got most of the load.

26. In still another, DPD told Guatemala that turns were
ellowed if the plane was not lined up on the initial rum over the
drop zone. .The agents reported that the plane passed over twice
without dropping and that this alerted the Castro army to attack
the resistance group and to disperse it.

27. Once two planes were sent over the drop zone half an
hour apart and allowed to mke two passes each. Not surprisingly,
200 militia searched the area the next day and seized the cargo.
The drop altitude for another operation was set at 4,000 feet. . The
pilot reported he had hit the drop zone from 3,500 feet, even though
unable to recognize the marker, but there is evidence that the enemy
got at least half the drop.

28. One aircraft received heavy fire and was damaged. Its
crew thus learned the hard way that dropping leaflets first had
helped to alert the area and recommended that in the future the
cargo be dropped first. Miami Base pointed out to Headquarters
that it was a mistake to drop heavy weapons before a group had a

known capability of using them or had specifically requested then.



OPEC KET

on board). By September, the strength had been built up to
228. In October another staffing guide listed a total of 363
positions. By the end of the project, 588 people were work-
ing in WH/k. There were 160 people in the Miami area alone.

54. The original plan contemplated 200 to 300 Cubans as
a contingency force. By mid-July, a force of 500 was being
considered. In early November, the plan was to use 1,500 men,
and there was talk .of as many as 3,000. In early December, a
brigade of 750 was agreed upon. Its strength was built up to
664 by the end of January. By 17 March the ground forces in
training numbered 973. By 28 March equipment for 1,600 men
had been ordered, and the actual brigade strength on 6 April
was 1,390. Such changes made it very difficult for the
supporting components, particularly the Office of Logistics
and Development Projects Division, who were not given much
lead time.

55. The original estimate for the project anticipated
expenditures to the total of $4,400,000 during the two fiscal
years, 1960 and 1961. On 24 March 1960, $900,000 was released
for the balance of Fiscal Year 1960. This amount was expended
within a month and an additional million dollars released to
carry the project to the end of June.

56. In August, a budget was presented for Fiscal Year 1961

which amounted to $13,000,000. By December, $11,300,000 had

-6-.



BORGER T copy
12 April 1961
CUBAN OPERATION

1. Orientation and Concept: The present concept of the
operation being mounted to overthrow Castro is that it should
have the appearance of & growing and increasingly effective

: internal resistance, helped by the activities of defected Cuban
aircraft and by the infiltration (over a period of time and at ~
several places) of weapons and small groups of men. External
support should appear to be organized and controlled by the
Revolutionary Council under Miro Cardona as the successor toa
number of separate groups. To support this picture and to
minimize emphasis on invasion, the following steps have been
taken:

a. The public statements of Cardona have emphasized
that the overthrow of Castro was the responsibility of the
Cubans, that it must be performed mainly by the Cubans in
Cuba rather than from outside, and that he and his colleagues
are organizing this external support free of control by or
official help from the U.S. Government.

b. The plans for air operations have been modified to

provide for operations on 4 limited scale on D-2 and again



56. By mid-March 1961 this security organization comprised

86 employees of whom 37. were trained case officers, the service
having graduated four classes from its own training center,

whose chief instructor vas a QP rotice officer.

Security Activities

57. The FRD's service ran operations into Cubs, -many of
them successful. It built up a voluminous set of card files
on Cuban personalities. -.One of its most helpful services was
reporting on. meetings of FRD committees and other anti-Castro
groups and on political maneuvering within the:FRD hierarchy.
It also helped in recruiting for the strike force at a time
when the political leaders were sabotaging this effort. Security
and counterintelligence teams were also trained for integration
with the strike force. . These had the primary mission of securing
vital records and documents during the invasion and a secondary
mission of assisting in establishing and maintaining martial lew.
58. The service also carried on radio monitoring and con-
ducted interrogations and debriefings. An indication of its
alertness and efficiency is the fact that it supplied Miami Base
with its first information on the location of a C-5k plane which
was forced down in Jamaica after a mission over Cuba. The chief
of the service was largely responsible for personally persuading

the crew. of the downed plane to return to the training camp.



eo eam ammncas.cimoan a ant I

country. Other Cubans were trained in both paramilitary and
espionage subjects in the outskirts of Miami and Washington,
and still others were trained on American soil at Vieques
Island. Of all these training locations, only the ones in
Guatemala became known to the world.

13. It is acknowledged that many Cubans and Americans
observed strict security discipline, that the security officers
of the project made an outstanding contribution, and that many
arrangements and activities are not open to criticism regarding
their security. Unfortumately, this was not good enough for a
project of this size and importance » conducted by professional
intelligence officers.

1k. Because of the operation's magnitude, the errors
committed resulted in the exposure of Agency personnel and
modus operandi to many uncontrolled individuals, both foreign

and American.

ele: Cea



lettin

for the formation of a unified political front to serve as the
cover instrument for clandestine operations and as a rallying
point for anti-Castro Cubans. They were also making a map
reconnaissance of the Caribbean, seeking a site for a powerful
medium-wave and short-wave radio station.

Pre. Progress

li. As a result of this intensive activity over a relatively
brief period the Agency was able to report considerable preliminary
progress and to predict early performance in a number of respects,
when it carried its request for policy approval to the President
in mid-March of 1960.

12. Among the facts so reported (Annex A) were: That the
Agency was in close touch with leaders of three major and reputable
anti-Castro groups of Cubans whose representatives, possibly
together with others, would form a umified opposition council
within 30 days; that the Agency was already supporting opposition
broadcasts from Miami, had arranged for additional radio outlets
in Massachusetts, QD anc ay. and that a powerful
“gray” station, probably on Swan Island, could be made ready in
two months; that publication of an exile edition of a confiscated
Cuban newspaper had been arranged; that a controlled action group
was distributing propaganda inside Cuba, and that anti-Castro

lecturers were being sent on Iatin American tours.



—E-0-b 5

Training for a few weeks, the Agency was unable to provide a
counterintelligence officer to the camps. This lack was serious
because, in order to obtain a great many recruits for the strike
force in a hurry, there was very little screening of the
volunteers, and some who were sent to camp had been inadequately
checked.

Poor Backstopping

8. Instances were noted of poor backstopping of the cover
stories of Agency employees, sketchy briefings on cover, weak
cover stories, and faulty documentation. Much of this can be
ascribed to lack of attention to detail due to the press of
time. Many of the early difficulties in Guatemala stemmed
from the inadvisability of providing supplies and support to
instructors who were posing as "tourists" and "soldiers of
fortune". This pretense eventually had to be dropped because
of its impracticality. A serious weakness showed up in the
poor arrangements for backstopping overflights (for example,
the plane that landed in Jamaica).

9. Somewhat curiously, a strict compartmentation was
applied in certain areas of the project which actually denied
information to people who needed it. Those who were engaged
in running agents into Cuba were never allowed into the War

Room or given the plan for the strike.

- 137 -





BOP

Agency not to announce formation of the Revolutionary Courltil
or to commit any untoward act until after the 5-9 March Mexico
City Peace Conference. The Cubans conferring in New York dis-
agreed on various aspects of a post-Castro platform. The Guatemala
camp was having counterintelligence problems.

Sabotage Action,

72. On 12 March the ICI “Barbara J" successfully launched
and recovered a sabotage team in an action against the Texaco
refinery in Santiago.

73. During 13-15 March project chiefs were working inten-
sively to prepare a revised plan which would meet policy objec-
tions cited by the State Department. On the 15th the new plan
was presented to the President.

7%. %In mid-March ten members were added to the FRD Execu-
tive Committee, the politicians continued their platform talks,
and 23 March wag set as deadline for choice of a chairman. An
intensive defection project was started from Miami Base. A
survey was started yitn the object of determining the trainges'
knowledgeability of U.S. involvement in the strike preparations.
Trainees at Guatemala were impatient, and a number had gone
AWOL.

75. Jose Miro Cardona was unanimously elected Chairman

of the Revolutionary Council.



Il.

III.

Iv.

tion will not occur until FY-1961.

FINANCIAL ANNEX

Political Action FY-1960

Support of Opposition Elements

and other Group Activities 150,000
Propaganda

Radio Operations and Pro-

gramming (including establish- -

ment of transmitters) 400,000

Press and Publications 100,000
Paramilitary

In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air

Support Material and Training 200,000
Intelligence Collection 50,000

Totals *900 000

Tab C

FY-1961

800,000

700,000
500,000

1, 300,000
200,000

3,500,000

*These figures are based on the assumption that major ac-

If by reason of policy

decisions or other contingencies over which the Agency cannot

exercise control, the action program should be accelerated,

additional funds will be required.



negotiations with the principal Cuban leaders in which great

efforts have been made to permit the Cubans to chart their own

course. It is expected that the desired result. will be accomplished

.shortly. What .is emerging from these negotiations ig a provisional

government with a center to left-of-center political orientation,
and @ political platform embodying most of the originally. stated
goals of the 26 July movement. It is believed.that this will com
mand the support of a very large majority of anti-Castro Cubans

‘although. it will not be altogether acceptable ‘to the. wore conserya—

tive groups. , :

b. Military: The following paramilitary forces have been
recruited and trained and will shortly be in an advanced state of
readiness.

(1). A reinforced battalion with a present strength
of 850 which will be brought up to*a strength of

_ approximately 1,000 through the addition of one more
infantry company to be used primarily for logistic
purposes and as a reserve.

(2) A briefly trained paramilitary force of
approximately 160 intended to be used for a diversionary
night landing to be. undertaken in advance of coum tment

~ of the battalion.



Ta

charted five different lists of proposed assignments for any future
provisional government of Cuba and are compiling biographic data
on those Cubans who might be utilized by us in forming a future
Cuban government." . : :

4O. The crowning incident which publicly demonstrated the
insignificant. role of the Cuban leaders and the contempt in‘which
they were held occurred. at the time of the invasion. Isolated
in a Miami safe house, “voluntarily” but under ‘strong persuasion,
the Revolutionary Council members awaited the outcome -of a military
operation which they had not planned and znew little about while
Agency-written bulletins were issued to the world in thei? name.

41. They. had not been puppets in the early days of the
project. Some of the Cubans had drawn up detailed operational
plans for resistance in areas of Cuba that. they knew intimately;
others provided coyer and support. .OQnue wealthy exile -eyen vol~
untarily went through the assessment routine at Useppa Island
along with the young trainees. They had reason to feel that the
project was in the nature of a joint venture, at least.

The Military Emphasis

42. But when the project began to shift from a clandestine
operation to a military operation, Cuban advice and participa-
tion no longer seemed necessary. Cubans who up to about
November 1960 had been close to some of the plans and opera-

tions were cut out. To the military officers on loan to the

- 9h -



Baa

4, Agents who were supposedly well trained disregarded
elementary rules of personal security and were arrested because
they needlessly gave away their true identities by visiting
relatives who were under surveillance or by carrying identifying
documents in their pockets.

Hazard in Miami

5. The Miami area represented a particular hazard because
stories and rumors spread rapidly through the large Cuban
community, which included Castro agents. Movements of boats
and people soon became known. One agent, who had been infiltrated
into Cuba by boat, reported later that within three days his
family in Miami knew when and how he had landed, because one of
the crew members of the boat had told many people in Miami about
it. Letters from the training camp, although censored, managed
nevertheless to convey information to the Miami Cubans.

6. The Americans on the project in many cases also failed
to observe strict security discipline. One senior case officer
holding an operational meeting with Cubans in a Miami motel was
overheard by a citizen, who reported to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.

7. %It has been testified that the security measures at the
training camps in Guatemala and at New Orleans were inadequate.
Furthermore, the training camps had no adequate counterintelligence

capability. Except for an instructor borrowed from the Office of,

~ 136 -

7 PB



Dae

e@ Bender Group, now generally understood by Cubans and many
others to represent the CIA, began responding to requests
from and giving support to defectors from the FRD and to
groups which the FRD considered politically unacceptable,
the organization which was supposed to be a world-wide
symbol of Cuban freedom and which wes being groomed as the
nucleus of the next government of Cuba naturally felt that
its prestige had been undermined.

Diffusion of Effort
19. This complicated relations between project case
officers and the FRD leaders. It also appears to have
resulted in some diffusion of effort in the attempts at

. clandestine infiltration of arms and paramilitary leaders

@ into Cuba. It seriously hampered progress toward FRD unity,

sharpened internal FRD antagonisms, and contributed to the
decline in strike force recruiting efforts.

20. The composite political complexion of the FRD
shifted a little to the right in August 1960 with the Jjoin-
ing of Ricardo Rafael Sardinia, who headed an organization

called the Movimiento Institucional Democratico (MID).

21. A source of friction between the FRD and its project
sponsors was the effort to induce it to set up its headquarters
outside the U.S. The Cuban leaders were finally persuaded by

financial leverage to move to Mexico City where the Mexican

. ; - 8 - oe
e De a nee ee a aac el a



Ts # 1730h0/Ada.

2h. Rovember 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director af Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Repart on the Cuban Operation

i.. The report .on the Cuban Operation, as tax tue of all
Inspector General reports, was Prepared ynder my personal direction
and werked.on by myself and ny demty, Mr. David Melean, ga yell as
the three officers wha did the Principal callecting of informitign
and preparation of the text: Mesars. | A aD a.

The final editing was done by myself personally and the report
represents the Views of the Inspecter General.

2. In preparing the report’ we had access to all of the material
Brepared by this agency and submitted ta the Taylor Committee, az
well as the mimtes of the Taylor Committee meetings, and chance to
Bee their final conclusions and recommendations. ‘In addition to thin
we had all ef the documentary mterial available in the WH Division,
WH-l., and other staffs and divisions of the agency who bad cggnizance
of or prepared material for WH-4. These particularly included ONE,
OCI and Staff D of the DD/P. :

RR. :
3. As is noted particularly in our repart, we did not ge outside

of the agency in any respect and tried to confine gur inspection to
snly internal agency mtters y except where reference had to be made

to outside actions that affected the operation. In interviewing



POP BESET

guerrilla action could be continued on a sizeable scale in favors.
able terrain. -This would be a means of exerting continuing pres-
sure on the regime.

6. A Diversionary Tending: As a variant of the above Plan,
-1t would be feasible to conduct a diversionary landing with a
force of about 160 mew in an inaccessible area as a prelude to a
landing of the main assault force. ‘The initial operation would
be conducted at. night without tactical air support. -At least a
part of the provisional goverment would go in with the diver-
sionary landing sand presumably the establishment ef the provisional
government on Cuban soil would thereupon be amounced. ‘The sub-
sequent landing of the main assault force would be carried out as
outlined in paragraph 5 preceding.

a. This course of action might have certain political
advantages in that the initial action in the campaign would be of
@ character that could plausibly have been carried out by the
Cubans with little outside help.

b. There would be a military advantage in that the
diversionary landing would. distract attention and possibly divide
some enemy forces from the objective area for the main assault.
If reports had. reached the Castro government that troops trained
in Guatemala were on the move » the diversionary landing might well

be taken to be the main attack thus enhancing the element of



Se ean AE Wha oe - an: a

13. The President was further informed that an effective
intelligence and action organization inside Cuba, responsive to
direction by the exile opposition, could probably be created within
60 days and that preparations for the development of an adequate
paramilitary force would require “a minimm of six months and
probably closer to eight."

Policy Discussions

U4. Discussion at high pblicy levels of the Government had
preceded submission of this program to the President. In the last
months ‘of 1959 the Special Group, composed of representatives of
several departments and agencies and charged by NSC 5h12 with
responsibility for policy approval of major covert action opera-
tions, considered several Agency proposals for exile broadcasts
to Cuba. During January and February of 1960 the Director of
Central Intelligence informed the Special Group of Agency planning
with regard to Cuba, and on 14 March an entire meeting was devoted
to discussion of the Agency's program. Concern was expressed over
the length of time required to get trained Cuban exiles into
action, and there was discussion of U.S. capabilities for immediate
overt action if required. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff is reported to have said that forces totaling 50,000. men
were ready if needed and that the first of them could be airborne
within four hours after receipt of orders. Members of the group

urged early formation of an exile junta. The Agency announced its



aa o-oo al

were all volunteers and deserved to know what kind of a future
they were preparing to fight for. Furthermore, the FRD needed

a@ chance to develop the loyalty of the troops who were presumably
to install and protect its leaders on Cuban soil as members of

a@ provisional government.

37.. This was one example of a high-handed attitude toward
Cubans that became more and more evident as the project progressed.
Cubans were the basic ingredient for ‘a successful operation and,
although the aim of having the exiles direct activities was
probably idealistic and unattainable, nevertheless the Agency
should have been able to organize them for maximm participation
and to handle them properly to get the job done.

An American Operation

38. But with the Americans running the military effort,
running Radio Swan, and.doing unilateral recruiting, the operation
became purely an American one in the exile Cuban mind, and in the
public mind as well. In by-passing the Cubans the Agency was
weakening its own cover.

39. The official attitude which produced this situation
is reflected in the project's progress reports. In November a
report noted that the Agency had "plenty of flexibility to choose
the Cuban group we would eventually sanction as a provisional
government." A January report indicated that the Agency, rather

than the Cubans, was making the plans and decisions: "We have



OPS

- (3) An air force of 16 B-26 light bombers, 10 C¢54s
and 5 C-46s. ,
(4) -Shipping including 2 100-ton ships, 5 1500-tom
ships, 2 LCIs, 3 LCUs and k ICVPs.
A JCS team recently inspected the battalion and the air force at
their bases in Guatemala. Their findings led them to conclude
that these forces could be combat-ready by 1 April. Certain
deficiencies were indicated that are in progress of correction
partly by further training and partly by the recruitment of the
additional infantry company referred to above.
ce. Timing: It will be infeasible to hold all these
forces together beyond early April. They are in large part
volunteers, some of whom have been in hard training, quartered in
austere facilities for as much as six months. -Their motivation
for action is high but their morale cannot be maintained if their
commitment to action is long delayed. The onset of the rainy
season in Guatemala in April would greatly accentuate this problem
and the Guatemalan Government is in any event unwilling to have
them remain in the country beyond early April. -The rainy season
in Cuba would also make their landing on the island more difficult.

2. The Situation in Cuba: We es

ate that time is against
us. The Castro regime is steadily consolidating its control over

Cuba. In the absense of greatly increased external pressure or



SP Se

Je CLANDESTINE PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS -- AIR

1. The first attempt at a clandestine air drop over Cuba
took place on 28 September, 1960. (By coincidence this was the
same night as the first maritine operation.) A 100-man arms
pack was dropped for an agent rated as having considerable: poten-
tial as a resistance leader. The crew missed the drop zone by

seven miles and dropped the weapons on a dam. Castro forces

- scooped them up, ringed the area, caught the agent and later

shot him. The airplane got lost on the way back to Guatemla
and landed in Mexico. It is still there.

2. This operation might have indidated an unpromising future
for air drops. In fact, its failure was influential in persuading
the chiefs of the project of the futility of trying to build up an
internal resistance organization by clandestine means, and within
the next few weeks the operational emphasis was beginning its
fateful swing toward the overt strike-force concept. To this
extent the portent of failure was heeded, but it did not suffice
either to halt the air drops or to ensure arrangements for their
success. The attempts went on and on with results that were
mostly ludicrous or tragic or both.

3. On 26 December 1960, Headquarters received word that a
Cuban agent, who had been given Agency training in this country,
wanted an air drop of not more than 1,500 pounds of demolition

and sabotage materiel and weapons. He clearly specified the

- 98 -





a a el

combat. As many supplies as possible will be unloaded over
the beaches but the ships: will put to sea in time to be
well offshore by dawn. The whole beachhead area includ-
ing the air strips will be immediately occupied and
approach routes defended. No tanks will be brought ashore
in the initial landing. It is believed that this operation
can be accomplished quite unobtrusively and that the Castro
regime will have little idea of the size of the force in-
volved. ae .

b. The second phase, preferably commencing at dawn
following the landing, will involve the movement into the
beachhead of tactical aircraft and their prompt commitment
for strikes against the Castro Air Force. Concurrently
C-l6's will move in with gas in drums, minimal maintenance
equipment, and maintenance personnel. As rapidly as
possible, the whole tactical air operation will be based
in the beachhead but initially only enough aircraft will
be based there plausibly to account for all observable ac-
tivity over the island.

c. In the third phase, as soon as there is adequate
protection for shipping from enemy air attack, ships will
move back into the beach to discharge supplies and equip-

ment (including tanks). It mst be presumed that counter

ee Ts #176622



DOT

of spreading disaffection against the Castro regime » the provisional
government could be recognized and a legal basis provided for at
least non-governmental logistic. support.

a. The military plan contemplates the holding of a
perimeter around the beachhead area. It is believed that initial
attacks by the Castro militia, even if conducted in considerable
force, could be repulsed with substantial loss to the attacking
forces. -The scale of the operation and the display of professional
competence and of determination on the part of the assault force
would, it is hoped, demoralize the militia and induce defections
therefrom, impair the mogzle of the Castro regime, and induce
widespread rebellion. If the initial actions proved to be unsuc-
cessful in thus detonating a major revolt, the assault force
would retreat to the contiguous mountain area and continue opera-
tions as a powerful guerrilla force.

b. This course of action has a better chance than any
other of leading to the prompt overthrow of the Castro regime
because it holds the possibility of administering a demoralizing
shock.

ec. If this operation were not successful in setting off
widespread revolt, freedom of action of the U. S. would be pre-
served because there is an alternative outcome which would neither

require U. S. intervention nor constitute a serious defeat; i.e.,



Se no ee ee oe a

was later recovered by the Castro government or the success
was only partial. The reception committees did not seem to
have had much training in maritime reception procedures.

16. In sum, a small amount of materiel was put into the
Havana area in the period September-December by some ill-suited
small boats, Then by using the "Wasp" and the "Tejana" a
substantially larger amount of supplies was put in during .
February and March as well as some people, but to a limited
area only. At this point the "Barbara J" and the "Blagar"
(former LCIs) were used because of their longer range and
larger size; however, for various reasons they were also
unsuccessful in placing anything on the south coast except
at the westernmost part,

Lack of a Plan

17. Officers who worked on these operations reported
that there was no effective project plan for using small boats
to deliver men and equipment tocforces inside Cuba who were
best suited to use them to build up a powerful underground
movement against Castro. According to these officers, WH/4
did not plan small boat operations; the case officers simply
responded to requests by individual Cubans and groups. One
officer remarked that the Cubans were running the operations.

18. Of all the attempts mde to land men and supplies in

Cuba clandestinely by water some of the most notable were made

- be MeL a mnie oe



OT

The Choice

4. The choice was between retreat without honor and a
gamble between ignominious defeat and dubious victory. The
Agency chose to gamble, at rapidly decreasing odds.

42. The project had lost its covert nature by November
1960. As it continued to grow, operational security became
more and more diluted. For more than three months before
the invasion the American press was reporting, often with
some accuracy, on the recruiting and training of Cubans.

Such massive preparations could only be laid te the U.s,
The Agency's name was freely linked with these activities.
Plausible denial was a pathetic illusion.

43. Insistence on adhering to the formalities imposed by
a non-attributability which no longer existed produced absurd-
ities and created obstacles and delays. For example, the use
of obsolete and inadequate B-26 aircraft » instead of the more
efficient A-5s originally requested, was a concession to non-
attributability which hampered the operation severely. A
certain type of surgical tent requested for the landing beach
was not supplied because it could be traced to the U.S. A
certain modern rifle was not supplied, for the same reason,
although several thousand of them had recently been declared
surplus. In the end, as could have been foreseen, everything

was traced to the U.S.



LO 6-

G. THE MIAMI OPERATING BASE

1. ‘The confused relationships between WH/4 headquarters
and the forward operating base in the Miami area were & signifi-
cant factor in the over-all performance ofthe project mission.
The base was activated in late April 1960 and was put in Miami
mainly because it was the chief center of Cuban refugees in the

United States.

2. From the beginning, the DD/P and his associates took

-a firm stand against allowing this base to become more than a

small support organization, and witil September 1960 the base
did little except carry on liaison with the Cuban exile organi-
zations and U.S. law enforcement agencies. For example, there
was only one paramilitary officer at the base during this period.
3. The pp/P's Chief of Operations wrote in June 1960:
"T recognize your need for some operational personnel in the Miami
area to service and conduct certain actiyities there. I am firmly
opposed, however, to the growth of an organization which would
represent a second headquarters or intermediate echelon there."
At this same time, the DD/P's Assistant for Covert Action empha-
sized that the function of the forward operating base should be
one of coordination, with command remaining in Headquarters.
4, In August the DD/P wrote that he was worried about
Miami and wanted to be sure that "we are not duplicating there

any functions that are being performed in Headquarters. For



ROP

operation fitting the above conditions. One of the areas appears
to be eminently suited for the operation. All the others had
to be rejected either because of unfavorable geography (notably
the absence of a suitable air strip) or heavy concentrations of
enemy forces, or both. The area selected is located at the head
of a well protected deep water estuary on the south const of
Cuba. It is almost surrounded by swamps impenetrable to in-
fantry in any numbers and entirely. impenetrable to vehicles,
except along two narrow and easily defended approaches. * Although
strategically isolated by these terrain features, the area is
near the center of the island and the presence of an opposition
force there will soon become known to the entire population of
Cuba and constitute a serious threat to the regime. The beach-
head area contains one and possibly two air strips adequate to
handle B-26's. There are several good landing beaches. It is
of interest that this area has been the scene of resistance
activities and of outright guerrilla warfare for over a hundred
years.

3. Phases of the Operation:

a. The operation will begin with a night landing.
There are no known enemy forces (even police) in the objec-
tive area and it is anticipated that the landing can be

carried out with few if any casualties and with no serious

-3- Ts..$176622



operator.

POOP SBC

Preparations were under way for creating an exile Cuban

air force, and attempts were being made to develop maritime

capabilities for support of paramilitary groups.

29.

This briefing contained an expression of doubt that a

purely clandestine effort would be able to cope with Castro's

increasing military capability, pointing out that implementation

of the paramilitary phase of operations would be contingent upon

the existence of dissident forces who were willing to resist and

that such groups had not as yet emerged in strength.

Training in Panama

30. The air training program began to get under way in July

1960 with the screening of Cuban pilot recruits and negotiations

with Defense for 12 AD-5s and the Navy being asked to supply 75

instructi
31.
training
32.
move its
with the
order to

involved

on and maintenance personnel.

In mid-June 29 Cubans had arrived in Panama to begin

in small-unit infiltration.

The FRD was resisting Agency attempts to persuade it to

headquarters to Mexico and was demanding direct contact

State Department or with some high government official in

argue its case. It also showed reluctance to become

in the recruiting of Cuban pilots.

It presented a budget

for $500,000 a month, excluding paramilitary costs, but was told

it would have to get along on $131 ,000 and would get this only if

it agreed to move to Mexico.

It did agree to furnish 500



@ 5
have direct contacts with a certain number of Cubans and, to
protect these, will make use of a carefully screened group of
U.S. businessmen with a stated interest in Cuban affairs and
desire to support the opposition. ‘They will act as a >
NUM 2nd channel for guidance and support to thé directo-
rate of the opposition under controlled conditions. CIA
personnel will be documented as representatives of ‘this group.
In order to strengthen the cover it is hoped that substantial -
funds can be raised from private sources to support the opposi-~
tion. $100,000 has already been pledged from U.S. sources.
At an appropriate time a bond issue will be floated by the

C council (as an.obligation on a future Cuban government) to va...

@ s an additional $2,000,000.

5. Budget: It 4s anticipated that approximately’ $4,400,000 -
of, CIA funds will be required for the above program.- On the
assumption that it will not reach its culmination earlier then
6 to 8 months from now, the estimated requirements for FY-1960
funds is $900,000 with the balance of $3,500,000 required in
FY-1961. The distribution of costs between fiscal years could,
of course, be greatly altered by policy deciaions or unforeseen

contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary opera-

tions. (Tab C)



SRO

project, the problem was a military one, and their attitude
was "to hell with the Revolutionary Council and the political
side."

43. The paramilitary and the political action sections of
wa/4 were not in effective touch with each other; in effect,
they. treated their tasks as unrelated, and this was reflected
in the field. The diminished relationships with the Cuban
leaders were a measure of the extent to which people in the
project became carried away. by a military operation. ;

4h, The effective utilization of Cubans and. cooperation
with them ‘was also hampered to some extent. because many of the
project officers had never been to Cuba, did not speak Spanish,
and made judgments of the Cubans on very. slim knowledge. (A
notable exception was the propaganda section, which was well
qualified in this respect.) They considered.the Cubans un-
trustworthy and difficult to work with. Members of the Revo-
lutionary Council haye been described to the inspectors as
"idiots" and members of the brigade as "yellow-bellied."

45. However, many staff employees in the project realized
that the Cubans would have to be dealt with realistically and
allowances made for their differences and weaknesses. In some
instances, case officers achieved quite remarkable rapport

with the Cubans they were handling. These officers were ones

-95-



Ce a a eee rd

Guatemala. At about the same time, the Agency requested the Army
to supply 38 Special Forces personnel as instructors. Due to
prolonged policy negotiations, these trainers did not arrive in
Guatemala until 12 January 1961.
Switch in Concept

45. On 4 November 1960 WH/4 took formal action to change the
course of the project by greatly expanding the size of the Cuban
paramilitary unit and redirecting its training along more conven-
tional military lines. Appropriate orders were sent to the
Guatemala Base, which had 475 air and ground trainees on 10 November,
and to Miami where recruiting efforts were increased. :

46. By this time Miami Base, through liaison with the FRD
military staff, had already recruited and dispatched to Guatemala
101 air and 370 paramilitary trainees, plus six specialists (doctors,
dentists, and chaplains). ‘The base had also recruited 124 maritime
personnel for manning the invasion fleet that was being acquired.

47. By 28 January 1961 the strike force strength was 644, on
3 February it was 685, by 10 March it had risen to 826, by 22 March
to 973. On 6 April 1961 brigade strength was reported at 1,390.

48. On 3 November 1960 WH/4 reported it had only $2,250,000
left for the rest of Fiscal Year 1961, and by 16 December this was
almost gone. A supplementary budget estimate was prepared, and an

additional $28,200,000 was obtained from the Bureau of the Budget.

-17-



Oe

TRG

F. EVALUATION OF PLANNING

1. Before proceeding to an evaluation of the Agency's
planning, the over-all policy decisions of the United States
Government with reference to the Cuban operation will first
be stated in summary form. These decisions not only consti-
tuted the background against which Agency planning was
conducted but also presented numerous important factors that
limited or otherwise determined its Scope.

2. We will next endeavor to point out the yarious
occasions on which we believe that the Agency officials
responsible for the project made serious planning errors,
both of commission and of omission » Which affected the project
in vital respects. ,

3. Between the plan approved by President EiSenhower
on 17 March 1960 (Annex A) and the invasion plan actually
carried out on 17 April 1961 (Annex E) there was a radical
change in concept. Originally the heart of the plan was a
long, slow, clandestine build-up of guerrilla forces » to be
trained and developed in Cuba by a cadre of Cubans whom the
Agency would recruit, train and infiltrate into Cuba.

4. But thirteen months later the Agency sponsored an
overt assault-type amphibious landing of 1,500 combat-trained
and heavily armed soldiers. Most of them were unversed in

guerrilla warfare. They were expected to maintain themselves



aad mae ae AE ool

Contact with Batistianos

31. Another allegation which gained some currency was that
the project was supporting and otherwise using former associates
and supporters of Batista. At one point wa/ % did have contact
with one ex-Batista leader, Sanchez Mosquerra, and gave some
support to his group, but this effort was soon called off. There
were also attempts by Batistianos to penetrate the project's
military effort, but these were resisted. The FRD's own intelli-
gence section was active in attempting to screen out Ratistianos.
The strike force contained some members of the former Cuban
Constitutional Army, which existed under Batista, but these were
recruited as soldiers not as politicians.

32. The brigade officers seem to have been clean of the
Batista taint. However, the FRD, for whom they were supposedly
fighting, justly complained that it. had had no hand in their
selection.

33. Jose Miro Cardona, a distinguished lawyer who turned
to politics late in his career, was the first Cuban prime minister
after the Castro revolution, was later ambassador to Spain, and
was ambassador-designate to the United States when he broke with
Castro, took asylum in the Argentine Embassy, and was eventually
granted safe conduct to this country (in October 1960) where he

became the FRD's secretary-general for public relations.

~9l-,



Te UAE oon an-ak im an ee

86. The invasion brigade comprised 1,511 men, all of them on
the invasion ships excepting one airborne infantry company of 177

men. The brigade included five infantry companies, a heavy weapons

company, an intelligence-reconnaissance company, and a tank platoon.

87. These troops had been moved by air on three successive
nights from the Guatemala training camp to the staging area in
Nicaragua where they embarked on the ships which had been pre-loaded
at New Orleans. The ships had moved on separate courses from
Nicaragua, under unobtrusive Navy escort, to the rendezvous 40 miles
offshore in order to avoid the appearante of a convoy. From there
they had moved in column under cover of darkness to a point 5,000
yards from the landing area, where they met the Navy LSD. These
complicated movements were apparently accomplished in a secure
manner and without alerting the enemy.

88. Of the three follow-up ships, one was due to arrive from
Nicaragua on the morning of D Day plus 2 and two others were on
call at sea south of Cuba. Additional supplies were available for
air landing or parachute delivery at airfields in Guatemala,
Nicaragua, and Florida. At a Defense base in Anniston, Alabama,
there were also supplies ready for 15,000 men. Altogether there
were arms and equipment available to furnish 30,000 dissidents
expected to rally to the invasion force.

89. The landing was to be carried out at three beaches about
18 miles from each other on the Zapata Peninsula. The left flank

of the beachhead was Red Beach at the head of Cochinos Bay; Green



oo ee an COPY

17 February 1961

CUBA

1. BACKGROUND: About a year ago the Agency was directed
to set in motion the organization of a broadly based opposition
to the Castro regime and the development of propaganda channels,
clandestine agent nets within Cuba, and trained paramilitary
ground and air forces wherewith that opposition could overthrow
the Cuban regime. The concept was that this should be. so far as

possible a Cuban operation, though it was well understood that

support in many forms would have to come ‘from the United States.
Great progress has been made in this undertaking. A Government-
in-Exile will soon be formed embracing most reputable opposition
elements. It will have a left-of-center political orientation
and should command the support of liberals both within Cuba and
throughout the hemisphere. It will sponsor and increasingly
control trained and combat-ready military forces based in Central
America. A decision mst soon be made as to the support (if any)
the United States will render the opposition henceforth.

2. PROSPECTS FOR THE CASTRO REGIME: The Castro regime

is steadily consolidating its control over Cuba. Assuming that
the United States applies political and economic pressures at

roughly present levels of severity, it will continue to do so



ae oe a ee

12. In November 1960 (12 months after the original decision
had been made to train Cuban teams for resistance organization)
ten teams were reported ready to go. But they were still awaiting
Headquarters plans for infiltration. In all 178 men (including
23 radio operators) had been trained in security, basic clandestine
tradecraft, intelligence collection and reporting, propaganda and
agitation, subversive activities, resistance organization, recep-
tion operations, explosives and demolitions, guerrilla action,
and similar matters.

13. Headquarters approved the use of 60.of these men for
the resistance teams; all others were scheduled to begin formal,
conventional combat training on 15 November as an element of a
strike force of 1,500 men. This drastic change in over-all
Plan was announced to the training base by a cable on 4 November
and led the base to plead for closer coordination in the future
between Headquarters planning and the field training. During
this month six trainees were moved to a Miami safe house where
they stayed for two months, awaiting transportation into Cuba.

Move to Panama

14, In December 1960 Headquarters adyised the training
base that it was expecting approval of its operational concept ?
which included internal resistance stimulated by teams as well
as the use of a ground and air assault force. It advised the

base that a 750-man brigade (instead of 1,500) was being planned



bn a eee oo rl

paramilitary candidates and finally gave in on the issue of moving
@ to Mexico. It remained there only a few weeks because of harassment
by the Mexican Government, in spite of prior agreements to the

contrary. It appears that one reason why the FRD leaders were 80

reluctant to be based ina third country is that they desired to
establish a direct, official channel to the U.S. Government.
: Emphasis on Resistance
33. In August WH/4 Branch prepared papers for use in briefing
the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, respectively. By
about 1 November it was expected to have 500 paramilitary trainees
and 37 radio operators ready for action. It was stated that this
group would be available for use as infiltration teams or as an
C invasion force. The briefing paper for the Joint Chiefs made the
point that “obviously the successful implementation of any large-
scale paramilitary operations is dependent upon widespread
guerrilla resistance throughout the area."
34. The paper prepared for the President's briefing identified
11 groups or individuals with whom the Agency had some sort of
contact and who claimed to have assets in Cuba. The paper for the
Joint Chiefs spoke of the problems of obtaining support bases and
trained man power and warned that an exile invasion force might
have to be backed up by a contingency force, augmented by U.S.

Army Special Forces personnel.



Se

by the best operating talent available, particularly by
those not involved in the operation, such as the Chief of
Operations and the chiefs of the Senior Staffs. Had this
been done, the two following mistakes (b and ¢, below)
might have been avoided.

b. Failure to advise the President » at an appropriate
time, that success had become dubious and to recommend that
the operation be therefore cancelled and that the problem
of unseating Castro be’ restudied.

c. Failure to recognize that the project had become
overt and that the military effort had become too large to
be handled by the Agency alone.

d. Failure to reduce successive project plans to
formal papers and to leave copies of them with the
President and his advisors and to request specific written
approval and confirmation thereof.

32. Timely and objective scrutiny of the operation in the
months before the invasion, including study of all available
intelligence, would have demonstrated to Agency officials that
the clandestine paramilitary operations had almost totally
failed, that there was no controlled and responsive underground
movement ready to rally to the invasion force, and that Castro's
ability both to fight back and to roll up the internal opposition

must be very considerably upgraded.



Penile

operation the week after tHe landing tailea is reported in some
70 pages. Thus, while the analysis and conclusions presented
herewith regarding the operation are those of the Inspector
General, the bases for these conclusions are extensively
documented in the files.

3. This, in my opinion, is a fair report even though highly
critical. Unfortunately, there has been a tendency in the Agency
to gloss over CIA's inadequacies and to attempt to fix all of the
blame for the failure of the invasion upon other elements of the
Government, rather than to recognize the Agency's weaknesses
reflected in this report. Consequently, I will mike no additional
distribution of this report until you indicate whom you wish to
have copies. In this comectian, the President's Foreign Intelli-
gence Advisory Board has requested a copy in time for Mr. Coyne to
give a brief repart on it at their December 9 meting. I will await

your wishes in this regard.

/s/ lymen Kirkpatrick
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

Attachment



®

EOP eR

4, In April 1960, the Cuban leader Manuel Artime, who was
in Miami, offered a number of his followers as recruits for
this program. Useppa Island was acquired as an assessment
and holding site, anda preliminary screening of the candidates
for the training program began.

9+ During May and June 1960 complete polygraphs, psycho-
logical and psychiatric tests, and evaluations were obtained
on 66 individuals. Basic Morse code training was begun at
the island. In June 29 trainees. were sent from Useppa Island
to Panama for basic paramilitary. training. In July 32 trainees
were sent to Guatemala to be trained as radio operators y and :
Useppa Island was then closed down.

The Training Site

6. A worse training site could hardly have been chosen ~
than the one in Guatemala, it being almost inaccessible, with
no training facilities and.almost no living facilities. The
trainees were put to work building the camp, working during
the day and studying at night. This went on for several months.

7. The number of Americans at the camp was held to a bare
minimum for security reasons. They were represented to be
either tourists or adventurers. The camp commander was also
the chief of training and the project officer for Guatemala.
When he arrived, he had to set up the temporary ‘camp, find an

area for a permanent camp, contract for buildings, supplies,



aa ammens am aea

K. CLANDESTINE PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS -- MARTTIME

1. WH/4 Branch had two separate maritime problems. It
needed to transport men and supplies clandestinely to the coast
of Cuba by small boats, and it needed ships to transport and
Support an amphibious landing of a military force » more or less
overtly. This section of the report will be mostly concerned
with small boat operations.

2. The WH Division had no assets in beings there was no i
Agency element comparable to DPD to call om; and for obscure
reasons the Navy was not asked to provide the help it might
have. .WH/4 had to start with nothings there seemed to be very
little maritime know-how within the Agency.

3. The original Operational plan called for building up
@ substantial resistance organization, which could be done
only if supplies and people were delivered to the right places.
During the critical period March-December 1960, WH/# had one
boat, the "Metusa Time", a 5h-foot pleasure cruiser which was
lent to the Agency by a friend. Two maritime operations
officers, more or less under deep cover, labored from March to
October to outfit this boat and train its crew.

4, The boat went on its first mission on 28 September,
offloading 300 pounds of cargo and picking up two exfiltrees.
By January it had made five additional trips and transported
about five tons, but only one infiltree. It had another

successful operation in March 1961 and another in April.

220.,-



Se no ar Oe ae ve a

"lemon"; one of the most experienced employees in small boats
spent most of his time from December to June trying to get it
to run, and it never did participate in an infiltration or
exfiltration operation. Also, about December a 75-foot yacht,
the "Wasp", MD. It had a 17-knot speed and a 600-mile
range and ran its first successful mission on 15 February.

9. About February the "Tejana" also became operational.
This was a 110-foot yacht which became available through a
Cuban contact of a case officer. The arrangements made by
the case officer with the Cuban owner were so vague that
payment of bills incurred was a continuing ‘problem. However,
the "Tejana", in four operations in March, infiltrated 19,000
pounds, as compared with 12,700 pounds which had been infil-
trated from September up to February by all available boats.

10. The statistics compiled by WH/h and by Miami Base
on the small boat operations are somewhat confused and
inconsistent. However, the general picture is clear. The
small boat operations succeeded in getting about 76 people
into Cuba clendestinely. Most of these were taken in during
March. Up to the middle of February only ten had been
successfully infiltrated by this means, the first being in
mid-November.

ll. In the matter of arms, ammunition and other supplies

to the resistance, the boat operations were not an outstanding



ANNEXES

Basic Policy Plan of 17 March 1960
Briefing Paper of 17 February 1961
Operational Plan of 11 March 1961
Operational Plan of 16 March 1961.

Operational Plan of 12 April 1961



Se a a ae oe ad

2k, Bender's linguistic accomplishments did not include
Spanish and this may have diluted his effectiveness in dealing
with Cubans.

25. After the FRD was launched the handling of purely
FRD affairs in Mexico City and later in Miami was turned over
to a case officer with fluent Spanish and long experience ‘in
Latin American affairs.

26. However, Bender continued to be identified with the
project. .The FRD leaders' antagonism toward the Bender Group
was sharpened when, at the time of the change in operational
policy noted above, Wa/k assigned Bender the responsibility
of dealing with Cuban individuals and groups outside of the
FRD framework.

The Rubio Padilla Group

27. One of the outside groups the project continued to
work, with was the Action Movement for Recovery. (MAR), headed
by Juan Rubio Padilla. Use of this conservative group of rich
lendlords was strongly advocated by William D. Pawley, an influ-
ential Miami businessman. A paper prepared by WH/4 for the
Director of Central Intelligence's use in briefing Senator
Kennedy in July 1960 stated MAR's claims to a widespread
resistance organization needing only arms and ammunition and
orders to go into action and called the MAR relationship a

most encouraging development.

a



ee ee oe od

C. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION

1. In evaluating the Agency's performance it is essential
to avoid grasping immediately, as many persons have done, at the
explanation that the President's order cancelling the D-Day air
strikes was the chief cause of failure.

2. Discussion of that one decision would merely raise this
underlying question: If the project had been better conceived,
better organized, better staffed and better managed, would that
precise issue ever have had to be presented for Presidential
decision at all? And would it have been presented under the “
same ill-prepared, inadequately briefed circumstances?

3. Furthermore, it is essential to keep in mind the
possibility that the invasion was doomed in advance, that an
initially successful landing by 1,500 men would eventually
have been crushed by Castro's combined military resources
strengthened by Soviet Bloc-supplied military materiel.

4. The fundanental cause of the disaster was the Agency's
failure to give the project, notwithstanding its importance
and its immense potentiality for damage to the United States,
the top-flight handling which it required -- appropriate
organization, staffing throughout by highly qualified personnel,
and full-time direction and control of the highest quality.

5. Insufficiencies in these vital areas resulted in

pressures and distortions, which in turn produced numerous

73h



3

e. Work is already in progress in the creation of a
covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which
will be responsive to the orders and directions of the "exile"
opposition. Such a network mst have effective commmication:
and be selectively manned to minimize the risk of penetration.
An effective organization can probably be created within 60
days. Its role will be to provide hard intelligence, to arrange
for the illegal infiltration and exfiltration of individuals,
to assist in the internal distribution of illegal propaganda,
and to plan and organize for the defection of key individuals
and groups as directed.

d. Preparations have already been made for the develop-
ment of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together
with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert
military operations on the Island. Initially a cadre of leaders
will be recruited after careful screening and trained as para-
military instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary
cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U.S.
so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to
organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there
both before and after the establishment of one or more active

centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will



DOP SEE

give orders, and no channel to procure parts and equipment.
The technical and training abilities of these Navy chiefs were
grossly misused by the project; much of their time was spent

at stevedore or deckhand labor.

Training on LCUs

35
res 10

were bought directly from the Navy in September 1960 at
$125,000 each. . Supposedly in operating condition, these
craft had been stripped and were in such bad shape that they
could hardly be moved from the dock. The dozen or so Agency
employees who went to Little Creek to get them into operational
condition were so busy with repairs that there was little time
left for learning how to operate the craft, even though some
members of the group were not familiar with LCUs, the engineers
did not all know engineering and the skippers did not all know
navigation. This group got the LCUs to Vieques Island somehow
and proceeded to train the Cuban crews, which, however, were
given no training in night landing and very little in navigation.
36. In all, about $1, 400,000 was spent on boats and ships,
and the total cost of the maritime phases of the project was
about $2,679,000. Wages were a considerable item. For example,
ship's masters on contract were budgeted at $2,500 a month, cooks

at $1,000. There seemed to be a general failure at the top to



Sar eae eee eae

who had had considerable experience in dealing with foreign
nationals in various parts of the world, and ‘the results showed
it.

Dealing with Cubans

46. Some military officers on loan to the project were less
successful in dealing with Cubans. They simply gave military
orders to these foreign nationals and expected to be obeyed.

47. Some of the contract employees, such as ships! officers,
treated the Cubans like dirt. This led to revolts, mutinies,
and other troubles. Some very able Cubans withdrew from the
project because of the way they were treated.

48. The inspecting team has received a definite impression
that this operation took on a life of its own, that a number of
the people inyolved became so wrapped up in the operation as
such that they lost sight of ultimate goals.

49, There is a substantial question whether any operation
can be truly successful when the attitudes toward the other
people are so unfavorable. There does not seem to be much
excuse for not being able to work with Cubans. If this
nationality is so difficult, how can the Agency possibly succeed
with the natives of Black Africa or Southeast Asia?

50. The Agency, and for that matter, the American nation
is not likely to win many people away from Commmism if the

Americans treat other nationals with condescension or contempt,

7% -



BOP 8-H

3. The pD/P, in turn, reported to the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) and the Deputy Director of Central Intelli-
gence (DDCI) who usually represented the Agency at the meetings
of the 5412 Special Group.

4. The Director delegated his responsibility for major
project decisions to a considerable extent. He relied on the
DDCI, an Air Force general, for policy matters involving air
operations. For military advice he relied on the military
officers detailed to the project. This reliance deprived the
Director of completely objective counsel, since the project's
military personnel were deeply involved in building up the
strike force and the DDCI was taking an active role in the
conduct of air operations.

Fragmentation of Authority

5. Thus, the project lacked a single, high-level full-
time commander possessing stated broad powers and abilities
sufficient for the carrying out of this large, enormously
difficult mission. In fact, authority was fragmented among
the project chief, the military chief of the project's Para-
military Staff, and several high-level officials, whose wide
responsibilities elsewhere in the Agency prevented them from
giving the project the attention it required. There were too
many echelons; the top level had to be briefed by briefers who

themselves were not doing the day-to-day work.