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REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES ON THE 

OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S FINANCIAL 

REGULATORY REFORM PROPOSALS, PART I 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 22, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services 

Serial No. 111–66 

( 

(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts, Chairman 

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York 

JOE BACA, California 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

MELISSA L. BEAN, Illinois 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

TRAVIS CHILDERS, Mississippi 

WALT MINNICK, Idaho 

JOHN ADLER, New Jersey 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio 

SUZANNE KOSMAS, Florida 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JIM HIMES, Connecticut 

GARY PETERS, Michigan 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

MICHAEL N. CASTLE, Delaware 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

WALTER B. JONES, JR., North Carolina 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

TOM PRICE, Georgia 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

ADAM PUTNAM, Florida 

MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota 

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

KEVIN McCARTHY, California 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

LYNN JENKINS, Kansas 

CHRISTOPHER LEE, New York 

ERIK PAULSEN, Minnesota 

LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey 

JEANNE M. ROSLANOWICK, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

July 22, 2009 ..................................................................................................... 1 

Appendix: 

July 22, 2009 ..................................................................................................... 39 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 22, 2009 

Gensler, Hon. Gary, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Commission 

(CFTC) ................................................................................................................... 10 

Schapiro, Hon. Mary L., Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ............................................................................................................. 8 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Garrett, Hon. Scott ........................................................................................... 40 

McCarthy, Hon. Carolyn .................................................................................. 42 

Gensler, Hon. Gary ........................................................................................... 43 

Schapiro, Hon. Mary L. .................................................................................... 58 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Schapiro, Hon. Mary L.: 

Written responses to questions from Representative Royce ......................... 69 

(1) 

REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES ON THE 

OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S FINANCIAL 

REGULATORY REFORM PROPOSALS, PART I 

Wednesday, July 22, 2009 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 

Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2128, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Barney Frank [chairman of 

the committee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Frank, Kanjorski, Maloney, 

Watt, Sherman, Moore of Kansas, Capuano, Baca, Lynch, Miller of 

North Carolina, Green, Cleaver, Moore of Wisconsin, Klein, Wilson, 

Perlmutter, Foster, Carson, Speier, Minnick, Driehaus, Kosmas, 

Himes; Bachus, Castle, Royce, Lucas, Biggert, Miller of California, 

Capito, Hensarling, Garrett, Neugebauer, McHenry, Posey, Jenkins, Lee, Paulsen, and Lance. 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will begin. We are very happy today 

to have before us two Presidential appointees who head important 

agencies: the Chair of the SEC, Mary Schapiro; and the Chair of 

the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Gary Gensler. I want 

to begin by saying I am very happy that both agency heads are 

here. I strongly believe that if we were starting from scratch, we 

would not have two separate agencies, with the extent to which 

they share a mission. But we do have the two separate agencies. 

There is no point in wasting energy in trying to consolidate them 

when there would be no chance of that happening. I am encouraged 

by the fact that the two Chairs here today have, from the beginning of their appointment, worked closely together to try and avoid 

friction. 

I have to say that in my view, jurisdictional fights—whether between congressional committees or among congressional committees or between or among Federal agencies—represent Washington 

at our worst, because the job getting done well ought to be the 

issue. And people who insist that—people’s egos get too tied up 

with their positions. We are working hard to avoid that. I have also 

been working closely with Chairman Peterson of the Agriculture 

Committee because there is a shared jurisdiction here. And we 

have come to a very good agreement on substance. We had the 

hearing a week ago with the Secretary of the Treasury an unusual 

hearing with two major full committees. We intend to keep doing 

this. There will be some disagreements I believe at the edges—I am 

2 

reluctant to say margins here because it will get too doubly interpreted—but at the edges, there may be some disagreements. 

They clearly are outweighed by the substantial agreement that 

we have. So one of the questions will be on derivatives. Another 

will be in our jurisdiction which, we should be clear, is primarily 

the SEC. I appreciate the fact that Mr. Gensler is here. This committee is not the committee of jurisdiction for him. 

Mr. Peterson, in the spirit of cooperation, understands that. If 

Mr. Peterson would ask Chair Schapiro to appear before Agriculture, I don’t know if you have yet, but we would encourage that 

as well, because we don’t want these jurisdictional issues to be 

there. With regard to derivatives, I will tell you the conceptual approach that Mr. Peterson and I have taken, Mr. Peterson’s committee has the jurisdiction over those for whom hedging is a part 

of their business. That is, the Agriculture Committee are more the 

end users of this who have a product to sell and who hedge because 

they want to deal with price volatility. Our jurisdiction is more 

over the people who do some of the hedging and are in the financial 

area. 

The concept, it seems to me, we ought to be guided by here is 

what we ought to be thinking about with the financial institution 

in general. Their role is to be intermediaries, not to be ends in and 

of themselves. When there is a breakdown in the financial sector, 

we call it disintermediation. Their job is to be a very important, I 

was going to say bridge, but bridge understates the creativity involved. There is nothing passive about their role, but their job is 

to link up essentially people in the end of the economy who are producing goods and services of value and the people with money to 

invest in them. Their job is to help us in this society agglomerate 

investment funds so that they are made available to the end users. 

Obviously, people aren’t going to do that unless they make a 

profit off it. That is a very important and sometimes complex business. People aren’t going to make their money available unless they 

make a profit. But I do think that over the past couple of decades, 

there are some examples in the financial sector of the means becoming the ends. We have had people tell us that we should not 

restrict or regulate this or that because then certain entities would 

not be able to make money. Yes, it is important that they make 

money as a by-product of the intermediation function they perform. 

The fact that a given institution won’t make money is, in itself, no 

reason to be opposed to this. And, in fact, activities whose major 

justification is that they make a profit for some entity unconnected 

to that intermediation function are not going to be well received by 

us. 

I will now add, finally, this is not just about derivatives, we have 

other issues, this committee has been very interested in the whole 

question of mark-to-market. The gentleman from Pennsylvania has 

played a major role there. And there is also continued interest in 

the question of short sale and corporate governance. I will say that 

two of our members, the gentleman from California, Mr. Campbell, 

and the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Peters, in a bipartisan way, 

have a great interest in corporate governance issues. And I expect 

the committee will turn to them this fall after we have done some 

of the major regulatory stuff. But both of those issues are, particuVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:33 Feb 23, 2010 Jkt 053246 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\53246.TXT TERRIE
3 

larly the short sale and the mark-to-market, are going to be before 

us today. The gentleman from New Jersey is recognized for 3 minutes. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, members of the panel. Today’s hearing is on the President’s financial 

regulatory reform proposals. You know, your agencies oversee some 

of the most transparent, efficient, and complex markets in the 

world that are also responsible for ensuring that our capital markets promote price discovery, capital formation, and investor protection. 

Now, the Administration’s reform proposals task the SEC and 

the CFTC with developing a regulatory infrastructure for over-thecounter derivatives and reporting to Congress by September 30th 

on how the agencies will harmonize two very disparate regulatory 

approaches. So I look forward to hearing from you to see how well 

those are coming together and where some of your sticking points 

are going to be, if there are some, I think there will, and whether 

you will be able to meet that deadline. You know, with regard to 

the Administration’s proposals, I agree with some of them. I think 

it is evenhanded and certainly less radical than other ideas that 

have been proposed so far in Congress. 

Still, there are some aspects of the Administration’s proposals 

that trouble me. And I am worried that in the name of systemic 

risk reduction, requirements that would force more OTC transactions into central clearinghouses or onto exchanges, as well as 

strident new margin requirements for both centrally cleared and 

noncentrally cleared transactions will make hedging just too expensive for many end users of derivatives throughout the broader economy. The perverse outcome, therefore, of efforts to reduce systemic 

risk in these markets can actually increase risk for many companies if they are no longer able to cost effectively engage in a comprehensive risk management practice. 

So if you take a step back for a moment, perhaps an even more 

fundamental question should be asked here: Were standardized derivatives significantly related to the recent meltdown of our financial markets, and if not, why are we prescribing cures for a nonexistent ailment? You know, the failed oversight of one large dealer 

directly related to broader regulatory failures in the housing finance markets should not cause us to pursue radical fixes for the 

broader OTC derivative markets and their nondealers participants 

that had little or really nothing to do with the recent crisis. 

What we do need is comprehensive regulatory reform, but it 

needs to be sensible and we need to make sure that we are addressing actual problems in the way that we are doing it and not 

causing more harm than good. The risk of mobile capital migrating 

elsewhere as we overshoot the mark in regulatory reform, I think, 

is a real one and we should take the time to carefully evaluate the 

proposals presented to us before we move ahead with legislation. 

So once again, thank you both for coming to the panel today, 

thanks to the people who have been here numerous times in the 

past as well. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just, to balance, because we have the 

time, I call on the gentleman from Texas for 1 minute, Mr. Neugebauer. 

4 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the 

witnesses providing us with their views on the Administration’s 

regulatory proposals as well as an update on their efforts to find 

more harmonization between futures and securities regulation. 

While there are differences in the products in marketplaces, there 

is quite a bit of overlap in regulation. One concern I have heard 

from those with products that fall under both regulators is the 

length of time it takes to get new products approved in the process 

for determining whether the product falls under the CFTC or the 

SEC. We all want our proper transparency and disclosure but we 

also need the regulatory process to be effective. I am also interested in hearing from Chairman Gensler about the upcoming hearings at the CFTC regarding hedge exemptions and positional limits 

in energy futures. We have had quite a bit of discussion on this 

issue in the Agriculture Committee over the past couple of years 

and added new authorities for the CFTC in the 2008 farm bill. 

As the CFTC weighs options, we must maintain efficient price 

discovery and open market and keep the United States competitive. 

As we continue to work through these issues, we must remember 

that government regulations can’t substitute for the due diligence 

for investors and other market participants. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, the Chair of 

the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Mr. Kanjorski, for 3 minutes. 

Mr. KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Among 

other matters this morning we will address the need for effective 

regulatory oversight of the over-the-counter derivatives market estimated at $500 trillion in notional value. These reforms are long 

overdue. Fifteen years ago, I first advocated for increased regulation of our derivatives market. When I helped to introduce the Derivative Safety and Soundness Supervision Act, we sought to enhance the supervision of derivatives activities of financial institutions. Since then, I have endorsed other legislation aimed at improving transparency in and enhancing the oversight of our derivatives markets. Our witnesses today, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro 

and CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler, have an important task before 

them. They must reposition their agencies to better respond to the 

crises of today and the problems of tomorrow. 

Fortunately, both of these leaders come equipped with extensive 

experience and a commitment to effective regulation. While this 

crisis also seems to me the ideal time to merge these two agencies, 

political judgments have led us down a different path. Thankfully, 

however, the two seem determined to work together constructively 

rather than battle over jurisdictional turf. These two Chairmen are 

working within the Obama Administration which will soon release 

legislative language on derivatives reform and with Congress can 

help to create a more transparent, safer, and less risky over-thecounter derivatives market. To increase investor protection and 

market confidence, we must make this reform effort a top priority. 

Most fair-minded observers have acknowledged that unregulated 

derivatives, such as the credit default swaps, played a significant 

role in contributing to our present financial crisis. AIG’s disastrous 

abuse of these potentially explosive financial instruments represents the most glaring example of the dangers to our system 

5 

posed by derivatives. By moving forward, we should remain sensitive to the highly varied nature of derivatives products. Derivatives that consist of highly accustomed contracts which thousands 

of nonfinancial businesses, both large and small, employed to managed risk simply do not easily fit within the mandatory clearing 

and exchange trading regime. By mandating the collection of certain data on such contracts in a repository even where they cannot 

be cleared, we can achieve transparency and access for regulators 

in the hope that we can detect warning signs of systemically risky 

transactions. And by requiring increased capital reserves for those 

who enter into unique derivatives contracts, we can also provide incentives for markets to standardize these complex financial products going forward. 

In closing, Chairman Schapiro and Chairman Gensler can help 

Congress to sensibly regulate this dark corner of our financial markets. I look forward to their testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Delaware, Mr. Castle— 

Mr. CASTLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. —for 1 minute. 

Mr. CASTLE. I appreciate this opportunity to further explore the 

Administration’s regulatory reform proposal, particularly looking at 

securities and futures related reforms in particular. A lot has been 

said about derivatives; currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives, and the like. And I will be interested to hear what the witnesses have to say about the over-the-counter trades and cleared 

and exchanged trades of derivatives. All of these are issues before 

this committee and the organizations our witnesses represent. Although I believe registering hedge funds and reforming credit ratings are integral pieces of financial reform, I maintain that we 

must fully vet the consequences of the entire proposed regulatory 

reform plan. I hope to hear from the witnesses today about their 

views on the reform proposal and areas that may need some improvement. 

In particular, I am curious to know if you believe that there will 

still be gaps in regulation between agencies, if investors will be 

protected as expected, and whether the SEC and the CFTC will 

have the resources necessary to carry out the requirements proposed under these reforms. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, for 1 

minute. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Why has the SEC in the 

course of the past dozen years experienced catastrophic failures in 

every one of its four core competencies: rule making; filing review; 

enforcement; and examinations? This was the question raised by 

former SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins recently. And I think it is 

a tough question that needs answering prior to giving additional 

authority to the SEC. Mr. Atkins goes on to note that Enron’s corporate filings were not reviewed for years in the late 1990’s, enforcement examinations tips were not pursued on Bernie Madoff, 

and again, potentially in the Allen Stanford fraud case. 

In rule making, the Commission proposed in December of 1997, 

and again in April of 2005, regulations regarding credit rating 

agencies, but never adopted any of those. According to former SEC 

Chairman Harvey Pitt, the enforcement examination failures in the 

6 

Bernie Madoff case may have been the result of the SEC developing a blind spot because it is overlawyered and lacked the necessary traders, managers, and veterans of the market. This is certainly also the view of Harry Markopolos who, for years, tried to 

bring this Ponzi scheme to the attention of the SEC. Before increasing the SEC’s regulatory authority, I hope we can get to the 

bottom of these series of failures. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, 

for 11⁄2 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this series 

of hearings on the Obama Administration’s White Paper. At yesterday’s hearing, I relied on secondary sources to agree with a witness 

that the resolution authority set forth in the White Paper involved 

a permanent unlimited bailout authority. In fact, page 77, paragraph 2, of the White Paper, does support that witness’ conclusion 

in large part because the Treasury has been so bold in interpreting 

whatever statutory authority we give them. Secretary Paulson 

boasted that he went far beyond any authority. 

And of course, the bill has been used to bail out auto companies 

and to recycle funds, both real stretches of the statute. So the onus 

is on us to draft a statute that cannot be stretched or manipulated 

by any Treasury no matter how bold. And it is especially, the onus 

is on us to make sure that any bill we pass does not provide a permanent bailout authority. Whether that is a fair reading of what 

the Obama Administration wants or not, it is certainly not what 

the people of this country expect us to do. So I look forward to revisiting the Chairman’s statements that sometimes duplication is 

better than ambiguity, and in this case, I may argue for 

triplication. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman will yield, we will be glad to do 

that at a hearing at which that is the subject, which is not today. 

The gentlewoman from Illinois is recognized for 2 minutes. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

today’s hearing. And welcome, Chairman Schapiro and Chairman 

Gensler. I am very interested in the Administration’s evolving 

ideas regarding regulatory reform. I am interested in hearing from 

you all today about the discussions with the Administration about 

OTC derivatives clearing and reporting. How will the Administration define standardized and customized OTC derivatives? Will new 

rules include trigger mechanisms that will mandate that OTC 

products be electronically traded, cleared or reported to a central 

database for review. Which firms or trading will fall into these 

three buckets? 

I think I want to hear your views on the recently House-passed 

cap and trade bill, which includes a transaction tax. Taxing transactions to raise Federal revenues for more spending or creating an 

unnecessary burdensome regulatory environment may force U.S. 

businesses and jobs to move overseas. Our economy can’t afford it. 

I also look forward to you addressing concerns about the SECCFTC regulatory harmonization, specifically concerns about the inefficiencies of the SEC’s rule-based approach to regulation. 

My fear, which I think is shared by many in Chicago, is that an 

effort to harmonize regulations between the SEC and the CFTC 

may slow down market innovations and give international competiVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:33 Feb 23, 2010 Jkt 053246 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\53246.TXT TERRIE
7 

tors an unfair advantage. It is crucial that we strike the right balance, not overreact and fashion sound regulation to address the deficiencies in the current regulatory environment. With that, I yield 

back. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Miller, for 1 

minute. 

Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In recent 

months, it has become increasingly clear that accounting policy has 

tremendous impacts on the credit markets which are experiencing 

recovery efforts by the financial stability plan. Specifically, the 

issue of mark-to-market has not been adequately addressed. In 

fact, private market activities, lending and investing, as well as recovery efforts, remain hamstrung by pricing challenges while the 

accounting policymakers have been willing to or are unable to offer 

the necessary guidance. 

The TALF program is an example. Under TALF, assets that investors owned that were placed as collateral are held in non-markto-market accounts to shield the investors from the exposure. To 

me, this indicates the problem with the current pricing regime and 

accounting policymakers’ ability to address the issues in a meaningful manner. More recently, FAS has made changes to the accounting standards that will have a tremendous impact on 

securitization known as FAS 166 and 167. These enormous changes 

are occurring at the same time that the Administration is trying 

to restart the securitized credit markets to facilitate private lending. 

It is our understanding that the Federal Reserve has serious concerns with the policy shift that will derail efforts to stabilize financial institutions and get credit flowing. Why is there a disconnect 

between policymakers who own significant issues at a time when 

we are experiencing extraordinary economic circumstances. There 

is tremendous challenge facing the $6 billion—okay, I guess my 

time is over. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized 

for 11⁄2 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our panelists. I appreciate the frequency of these hearings to try to get a 

sense of the Administration’s White Paper on regulatory reform. I 

would like to hear from the panelists during their testimony about 

the issue of these complex derivatives being traded over-thecounter. I still believe, in spite of the Administration’s position, we 

have a big payday problem with the major banks, so I think a lot 

of money is going to gravitate to the OTC version of these things. 

There is no exchange, so we don’t have a consistent valuing mechanism in place. And I just think that the complexity here is 

incentivized under the President’s proposal. 

I raised these issues with Secretary Geithner in the meetings 

that the chairman has arranged, but I still don’t think the protections are there. So I would like to hear the answer to that in your 

testimony. And I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas for 1 minute. 

Mr. HENSARLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am disappointed 

in the Administration’s regulatory reform plan for a number of reasons, one of which is it doesn’t seem to make sense of our current 

8 

existing regulatory structure as much as simply adding new regulatory structure on top of it. Again, the premise is wrong that we 

suffered from a lack of regulation. It wasn’t lack of regulation, it 

was regulators making a mistake, and frankly, some dumb regulation. I know that one of the members brought up the AIG matter. 

I would have all my colleagues recall that the regulators said, do 

you know what, we had the expertise, we had the regulatory authority, we had the manpower, we just missed it. And so maybe 

there are things we can do to help make regulators smarter. I am 

not sure that necessarily argues for more regulation. I continue to 

be concerned that if you hamper or customize OTC derivative contracts, firms will find it more challenging to hedge their risk, that 

means less credit, which means less job opportunities in an economy that has the highest unemployment in 25 years. We must do 

better. 

The CHAIRMAN. We will now begin with our statements. And we 

will start with Chairman Schapiro. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARY L. SCHAPIRO, CHAIRMAN, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. Thank you very much. Chairman Frank, Ranking 

Member Bachus, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Securities and Exchange 

Commission. I am especially pleased to be here with my colleague 

Gary Gensler. I am committed to a long and successful collaboration. President Obama recently unveiled a plan for a stronger and 

safer financial system. I believe the plan makes real progress in 

filling gaps in our regulatory landscape that became apparent in 

the wake of the financial crisis. In particular, it calls for improved 

regulation, oversight, and transparency for over-the-counter derivatives, more consumer investor focus by financial regulators, and 

improved macroprudential oversight so that regulators can identify 

and minimize risks that flow across the financial system. 

I believe this plan will strengthen the SEC, build on our internal 

efforts and, in the process, improve investor protection and help us 

to begin to restore confidence in our financial system. The most 

critical regulatory gap we must fill involves the enormous over-thecounter derivatives market. Given the breadth of this market and 

the importance and interconnectedness of institutions participating 

in it, the Administration has proposed a comprehensive framework 

for regulating OTC derivatives with four broad objectives: preventing activities that pose risk to the financial system; promoting 

efficiency and transparency; preventing market manipulation and 

other abuses; and ensuring that these products are not marketed 

inappropriately to unsophisticated parties. The SEC, the CFTC, 

and the Treasury Department have been working closely and have 

general agreement on the pressing need for a comprehensive regulatory framework. There is agreement on the need for recordkeeping and reporting requirements, significant transparency, robust margin requirements, clearing systems that monitor and manage risk, comprehensive dealer regulation, business conduct and 

disclosure standards, and vigorous enforcement. 

In fashioning a regulatory framework for OTC derivatives, it is 

crucial to recognize the close relationship between the regulated seVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:33 Feb 23, 2010 Jkt 053246 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\53246.TXT TERRIE
9 

curities markets and the now mostly unregulated markets for OTC 

derivatives. For example, when an OTC derivative references a security, it can be used to establish synthetic long or short positions 

regarding that underlying security. In this way, market participants can replicate the economics of either a purchase or sale of securities without actually purchasing or selling any securities. Because market participants can use unregulated OTC derivatives to 

service synthetic substitutes for securities, these securities-based 

derivatives are closely interconnected with the regulated securities 

markets. This creates significant regulatory arbitrage opportunities, that is, moving products away from traditionally regulated 

transparent markets to customized unregulated and opaque bilateral contracts. In deciding how to fill this regulatory gap, it is important that similar products be regulated similarly so that market 

participants cannot use size and leverage to work around the system. 

Accordingly, we believe securities-based swaps should be subject 

to the Federal securities laws. This approach would incorporate the 

securities related OTC derivatives market into an existing unified 

securities regulatory regime. As such, it would be relatively 

straightforward to implement because these products would be 

placed under the same umbrella of oversight as the underlying securities. This approach also would establish a clear delineation of 

primary regulatory responsibility which would help avoid regulatory gaps. 

And finally, it provides a workable framework for bringing transparency, clearing, and exchange trading to this market in the near 

term without creating undue dislocation. In addition to OTC derivatives, the SEC and the CFTC have been working closely together to identify differences between our two regulatory frameworks that might be harmonized. While the cultures and missions 

of our agencies are, in some ways different, we share many of the 

same public policy objectives. While I focus largely on my remarks 

on derivatives, there are many aspects of the Administration’s plan 

as well as complementary proposals that have a direct bearing on 

the SEC’s oversight capabilities. Very briefly, the plan seeks to require that advisers to hedge funds and other private investment 

pools register with the SEC. Currently, exemptions in the laws 

have placed hedge funds and many of their advisers outside the 

purview of regulation. 

First, through registration and resulting oversight, we can enable 

investors, regulators in the marketplace to have more complete and 

meaningful information about private fund investors, the funds 

they manage and the impact of their activities on the broader markets. Second, the SEC and the Administration also appreciate that 

many investors do not realize that they may be treated differently 

depending on whether they seek investment advice from a brokerdealer or an investment adviser. I fully support the view that financial professionals who provide similar services should be subject 

to the same standard of care, namely, that they act solely in the 

interest of their customers or clients and that they be subject to 

comparable regulatory requirements. 

Third, I support the Administration’s proposals to strengthen 

SEC enforcement by giving it expanded authority to compensate 

10 

whistleblowers who bring significant enforcement information to 

our attention, to pursue expanded sanctions against wrongdoers, 

and to increase the potential grounds for seeking sanctions. 

Fourth, I agree with the need to do more to address conflicts of 

interest in the credit ratings process. To that end, I believe the Administration’s legislative proposals are a valuable step forward and 

will help to better align the interest of credit rating agencies with 

investors who rely on them. Already, the SEC is taking steps to 

heighten regulation of rating agencies, including establishing a 

branch of examiners dedicated specifically to rating agencies. 

Finally, I believe there is a need for a systemic risk regulator as 

well as a strong and robust financial stability oversight council. 

Such a council would help assess emerging systemic risk by setting 

standards for liquidity, capital, and risk management practices. 

There is clearly much to do, but I believe the steps the Administration, the SEC, and the Congress are taking will help restore investor confidence. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Schapiro can be found on 

page 58 of the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Chairman Gensler. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GARY GENSLER, CHAIRMAN, 

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION (CFTC) 

Mr. GENSLER. Good morning, Chairman Frank, Ranking Member 

Bachus, and members of the committee. It is good to be back with 

you again after 8 years since I was last before this committee. 

Thank you for inviting me to discuss the White Paper on Regulatory Reform on behalf of the full CFTC. Financial regulatory reform is critical for the health of our economy. As President Obama 

outlined last month, we must urgently move to enact broad reforms 

in our financial regulatory structure in order to rebuild and restore 

confidence in our financial system. 

I would like to start by discussing reforms most relevant to the 

CFTC. First and foremost, this is with regard to bringing broad 

regulatory reform for the derivatives marketplace. This will require 

two complementary regimes: One regime that oversees the derivative dealers themselves; and another regime that oversees the market functions. I think it is only with those two complementary regimes that we are able to capture the reforms that are necessary. 

For the dealers, we should set capital standards and margin requirements to help lower risk. We should set business conduct 

standards to guard against fraud, manipulation, and other market 

abuses. We should also mandate recordkeeping and reporting with 

an audit trail to promote transparency. The dealer regulation will 

cover all OTC derivatives, standardized as well as customized derivatives. This, I believe, won’t go far enough, though, and we also 

need to try to lower risk further by mandating that standard contracts be on central clearing and that standard contracts also be on 

exchanges whether they be fully regulated exchanges or regulated 

electronic trading systems which promotes transparency. Requiring 

clearing and trading on exchanges or regulated transparent electronic trading systems will further promote transparency, and will 

further lower risk in addition to the dealer regime that I talked 

11 

about. To fully achieve the objectives, we must enact both of these 

complementary regimes. 

President Obama last month also called for recommendations to 

change the statutes and regulations that would harmonize the regulation of the futures and securities markets, and I believe this is 

essential. Specifically, I would just mention three areas where the 

CFTC and SEC harmonization process, I think, would benefit the 

American public. First, as we saw last year, there are gaps in our 

regulatory structure right now. The heart of this hearing today is 

filling one of the major gaps; over-the-counter derivatives. 

Second, I think there are places where we may overlap in regulation. And while in certain circumstances that is appropriate, we 

look to identify those overlaps and seek to work with this committee and Congress where we can help clarify those overlaps for 

the marketplace and for all participants. 

And third, there are places where we regulate similar products 

or similar market events or exchanges where we might have inconsistent rules, and we look forward to working together to identify 

those inconsistencies and try to harmonize them. 

Chairman Schapiro and I are committed to doing this and seeking public comment. And in fact, we are looking to have joint hearings between the SEC and the CFTC in August and September to 

help inform the Commissions on these views as we seek to inform 

the rest of the Administration and you on our views on these matters. As we work with Congress to apply these regulations to overthe-counter derivatives, I think it is a real opportunity actually to 

start with harmonization right here on over-the-counter derivatives. 

And whether the SEC has jurisdiction or the CFTC, we need to 

have similar fraud standards and manipulation standards, that the 

electronic trading systems that we oversee have similar standards 

and that we embed in statute, the over-the-counter derivative statute, that we have strong vigorous standards with this regard. I 

would also like to just briefly touch upon hedge funds where the 

Administration is called to require hedge funds to register and 

other investment funds with the SEC, which I fully endorse. But 

I think as we go forward to do that, we have to ensure that the 

CFTC still can make sure that anyone participating in the futures 

markets and those markets that we oversee that we are able to 

have our full ability to police those markets and get ready access 

to information from the SEC from these hedge funds. 

Lastly, I just want to say how fortunate I believe to have a partner in this effort, SEC Chair Mary Schapiro. She brings invaluable 

expertise which gives me great confidence that we will be able to 

provide Congress with sound recommendations on comprehensive 

oversight of OTC derivatives in the markets as a whole. I look forward to your questions, and I am glad to testify in front of you at 

any time, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Gensler can be found on 

page 43 of the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Schapiro, one of the issues that 

you know people have concern about here that is clearly in your 

jurisdiction is the short sale question. Could you give us the state 

12 

of play now before the Commission, what are you thinking about, 

what is pending, what do you think is going to be happening? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I would be happy to, Mr. Chairman. As I have 

told the committee before, that has been the number one issue on 

which I receive comments and letters from both the public, the industry, and Congress as well. The SEC proposed a rule a couple 

of months ago and the comment period closed on June 19th, multiple approaches to dealing with short selling in the marketplace. 

Those approaches broke down roughly to two categories: a set of 

proposals that would operate as a market-wide mechanism to slow 

the descent of stocks during a declining market; and the other set 

akin to the old uptick rule or a bid test. 

The first set of proposals were triggered off of a circuit breaker 

concept so that if the price of a particular stock declined by more 

than, say, 10 percent in one day, then a circuit breaker would kick 

in and no more short selling of that stock would be possible for 

some period of time. As I said, the comment period closed on June 

19th on the multiple proposals. We received 4,000 comment letters. 

We are working our way through those comment letters. In addition, we held a roundtable to solicit views. 

The CHAIRMAN. What is your timetable for a decision? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I am hopeful that we will do some interim steps 

very quickly with respect to fails to deliver and a number of other 

rules that were also in play. And I am hopeful that over the next 

several weeks or next 2 months we will be able to come to closure 

and, assuming the votes on the Commission, an appropriate response. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I know members may still have some 

further questions about that. On the registration of hedge funds, 

let me ask both of you, I think there is a fairly broad consensus 

among some on our side of the committee that hedge funds should 

register, but the question is how. That is, hedge funds are not mutual funds. And I know when you are a lawyer and you have to 

choose, well, we will take this model or that model, A or B or C, 

but we can make it A-plus or C-minus or ice cream. So we can do 

whatever we want in terms of the form. When we come to the 

drafting on registration of hedge funds, should we pick one of the 

existing models, etc., or would you recommend that we draft a registration for hedge funds that might vary from some of the existing 

forms taking into account their particular nature? Ms. Schapiro? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I think, Mr. Chairman, there are obviously, as 

you suggest, lots of ways to do this. You can register the funds 

themselves as investment companies and then try to exempt them 

from a lot of the requirements. You can register the adviser to the 

hedge fund which is what the SEC has proposed doing which would 

get us I think virtually everything we need to effectively regulate 

hedge funds in terms of registration, inspection ability. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say, because again, we have the 

power to write the law, requiring to register and then exempting 

from some of the requirements of what we register doesn’t make 

a lot of sense, right? We ought to just write it right the first time. 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I don’t disagree with that. And I think the concern would be that trying to stuff a hedge fund into the model of 

an investment company isn’t really the most rational way to go. 

13 

But registering the investment adviser gets us access to really everything we need as a regulator of these instruments with the exception of the ability to impose on the fund itself capital requirements, diversification requirements that nobody is envisioning, at 

this time any event, needing to do. So we think adviser registration 

works. 

The CHAIRMAN. I figured that, and depending on how it works, 

that could conceivably be something that a systemic risk regulator, 

however it is constructed, might be taking a look at. 

Let me ask the last point on derivatives. One of the questions 

that has come up was mentioned today in one of the publications. 

What is your view on—well, let’s put it this way. What is the function that is served, and there may well be one, when someone who 

does not own an asset buys insurance against a drop at its value, 

people buying credit default swaps who don’t have an economic interest, in particular, on the item for which they bought the credit 

default swap. Is that an economically important function? Should 

we, in any way, try to change that? Mr. Gensler? 

Mr. GENSLER. I think that the function of using a derivative to 

hedge a risk, first and foremost, is generally a risk that is in that 

commercial enterprise. But there are some times that you are 

hedging a risk that is similar to a risk you have. So it may be that 

a commercial bank wants to hedge a portfolio of loans and enters 

into a credit default swap which is on a portfolio, again, of listed 

securities that have some correlation or relationship to it. So there 

are— 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, and finish in writing, is there 

a third category, that is, you might decide to buy one because you 

are taking a good guess that something is going to go bad and you 

will make some money if it does, and is that something that is good 

or bad or indifferent? Well, let me get that in writing because we 

don’t have time. We have a lot of members who want to ask questions. The gentleman from New Jersey. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Taking a page out of 

Mr. Royce’s comment, and as I said the last time, we have sort of 

been here before with regard to having a problem and then coming 

back to reform it, and we went through a litany of problems in the 

past of the SEC. Just yesterday, we had a panel, and the idea was 

we were going to give more authority to the Fed. And I went 

through a litany of problems where they missed on capital requirements, they missed on regulation, they missed on monetary policy, 

and yet it is the thought right now in Congress we are going to 

give even more authority there to the Fed. So in a sentence, why 

should the American public be watching the hearing today and be 

sanguine to think that we should be at this point giving more authority to the SEC? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. Congressman, I think it is fair to say that every 

regulator over the last several years has had episodic failures and 

missed many of the issues that gave rise to the financial crisis, the 

SEC included, but certainly not only the SEC. But at the end of 

the day, there is an enormous amount of work that happens at the 

SEC that benefits the American investor and taxpayer on a daily 

basis. Whether it is the review of corporate filings to ensure that 

they are honest and transparent or ensuring that mutual funds are 

14 

actually operating as they have extremely effectively over the last 

several years. 

Mr. GARRETT. I appreciate it. They do some good, but obviously, 

the failures in the past, present company excepted because you 

were not there at the time, is something that just raises that question. I don’t have much time, so let me go on to the next point, because I know you are going to sing the praises of things that have 

been done well. A lot of people could have a disparate opinion as 

to what brought us here. Some people would say it is GSEs and 

their leveraging issues, other people would say it is the credit rating agencies and they have problems; other people would say it was 

the regulators or the OTS and what have you that simply missed 

things and what have you. A lot of people can point out different 

things. We have not come to a conclusion as to what the problem 

ultimately was that brought us here. Can you point to one example 

where it was standardized derivative products that was ultimately 

part of the cause that brought us here? 

Mr. GENSLER. I think that the unregulated derivative dealers, 

the affiliates at Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns and, for that 

matter, even that which was in the back allowed for a great deal 

extra leverage in the system. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. That is the— 

Mr. GENSLER. And even the standardized product. 

Mr. GARRETT. That is the entities. How about the product themselves? What we are talking about here is regulating the product 

and putting constrictions around the product itself, and its a standardized product as opposed to, because there is a whole host of 

other proposals out there as far as regulating the brokers and investment advisers, can we point to where it was— 

Mr. GENSLER. I am of the firm belief that bringing standardized 

products onto central exchanges and onto central clearing will 

lower risk and enhance transparency. Tens of thousands of end 

users will benefit by that. 

Mr. GARRETT. I appreciate we can lower risk, but can we give one 

example so I can go home and say this was part of the problem 

that caused it and here is a specific example. 

Mr. GENSLER. I think that AIG is Exhibit 1—$180 billion of 

American taxpayer money for standardized and maximized products. 

Mr. GARRETT. Excellent point. AIG, would they be products that 

would therefore go through and be considered a standardized product that would go through a clearinghouse? 

Mr. GENSLER. Many of their products would. Some of them were 

so customized they couldn’t. But all of them would be regulated for 

capital and margin. All of them would be regulated as a derivative 

deal. 

Mr. GARRETT. Wasn’t most of the problem with the AIG situation 

with their credit default swaps which were based upon the 

subprime problem and the mortgage problem? They would not be 

standardized product. 

Mr. GENSLER. Also, there was no effective Federal regulation for 

capital or margin. So last September, Congress was put in a terrible position we should never put Congress in to have to think 

about the TARP bill and then the Federal Reserve and the TreasVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:33 Feb 23, 2010 Jkt 053246 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\53246.TXT TERRIE
15 

ury loan, you know, this $180 billion of the Fed specifically. We 

want to avoid that in the future. And that is for standardized products as well as customized products. We need capital and margin 

requirements to do that. 

Mr. GARRETT. Well, I have never heard anyone say that the problems over at AIG were with their standardized product. 

Mr. GENSLER. It was actually both. The customized product get 

a lot more publicity obviously because they are so exotic. But it was 

also the standard. It is the amount of leverage that you can put 

in the system, how much debt you can put on a very small basic 

capital. 

Mr. GARRETT. Very quickly, I have heard a lot of people from the 

business community say even with the nonstandardized products 

which would raise the capital requirements or the marginal requirements that this would basically make it impossible for them 

to use them and hedge their businesses. You only have 30 seconds. 

Mr. GENSLER. I think that it is a very good question, but they 

could absolutely—end users could use the products. We are saying 

there should be customized products. I think that by bringing 

transparency to the standard part it would actually lower costs because they should see where the spreads are and they could price 

off the standard product. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania 

and take 15 seconds to say, Mr. Gensler, when you said that the 

AIG thing put Congress in a terrible position, yes, but only as spectators. I do want to emphasize. We voted on the TARP, but the Administration came to us, the Secretary of the Treasury and the 

Chairman of the Federal Reserve last September, and informed us 

that they decided to advance money to AIG. There was never any 

congressional input into that. A few jaws dropped but no votes 

were taken. The gentleman from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. KANJORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And should we add 

that there was a different President at that time? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. GARRETT. We don’t want to get partisan, do we? 

Mr. KANJORSKI. No, no. Just timeframe. First of all, the relationship between the two of you is something we should compliment, 

and I do. And I anticipate that because of this good relationship we 

are going to have very positive things. I understand because of 

prior meetings and other testimony that you have made that you 

have worked out and harmonized a great deal of the conflict between the two agencies but that you have not resolved all of those 

conflicts. And you are down to what really I would like to ask, 

what are the remaining disagreements between the SEC and the 

CFTC that have not yet been harmonized and are still open in the 

air, and do you have a suggestion where they are going to come 

down and are they resolvable at a given time? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. Let me take the first crack at that and then ask 

Gary obviously to fill in. I think you point out correctly that we 

have tremendous agreement around most issues. There is a very 

narrow area where we are not in full accord, and that is with respect to whether broad-based indices, OTC derivatives or swaps on 

broad-based indices should be regulated by the SEC or the CFTC. 

16 

Our view is that securities-related derivatives ought to be under 

the SEC’s jurisdiction. 

The Commodity Futures Modernization Act, while exempting 

these products broadly from regulation, did retain with the SEC 

antifraud authority over anything securities based. As Gary will 

point out, under the Shad-Johnson Accord reached quite a few 

years ago, there was a drawing line between narrow-based and 

broad-based indices. Broad-based went to the CFTC and narrowbased went to the SEC for the purposes of options and futures. I 

would say that is the one area that we still are trying to work 

through. As we go through our harmonization process, and as Gary 

said, we are going to hold joint hearings to get public input on this, 

we will discover there are lots of areas where our rules approach 

things differently. 

And on those I don’t even know that we will have particular disagreement. Some won’t be able to be harmonized because the nature of the markets and the products is quite different. But that 

is what we are working through right now. 

Mr. GENSLER. I would agree with that. I think that we are in 

agreement. And the products, the interest rate, currency, and commodity products, the CFTC would take the lead on. On the narrowbased, the SEC would take the lead. This is broad-based product 

area. Currently, there are over 150 broad-based futures contracts. 

There are five or six that trade actively that are regulated by the 

CFTC. There are about 60 options on those futures, again, regulated by us. So broad-based implicate those. But there is a second 

category that I should mention. I do think we can go in and harmonize for the trading platforms. And working with Congress and 

working together we can do that, but we haven’t yet, between our 

agencies, been able to get to that level of detail. But I think that 

would be important. 

Mr. KANJORSKI. I did hear, though, in Chairman Schapiro’s testimony, that there is a concession that there will be some areas that 

cannot be harmonized and will take some other action. And that 

is consistent with other things that I have seen in the last week 

or so where regulators have not been able to agree as to where a 

problem should lie in terms of who has the responsibility of solving 

or moving in. I am particularly referring to the CIT. There seemed 

to be three Federal regulating entities that were not quite in agreement as to who had the responsibility to take action if any. 

As a result of that, and the fact that we have a concession, you 

cannot harmonize, have you thought of the possibility of our creating an Uber-regulator so that there is a final resolver of conflict 

of disagreement in the regulatory community of the United States 

if the problem gets—rather than just waiting around for months 

and having the Congress enact some special features because of a 

disaster. Can we close it down as if there is an actual decider and 

a peak and have you given any consideration to that? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I think it is certainly worth exploring. And I do 

think, to the extent Congress might move forward with some sort 

of financial stability oversight council, whether as the systemic risk 

regulator or as a body over the systemic risk regulator as we would 

propose that might be a forum for broader discussion of the difVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:33 Feb 23, 2010 Jkt 053246 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\53246.TXT TERRIE
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ferences with other regulators. It might help us achieve some kind 

of a consensus on how to go forward. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. I noticed that both of you, in your opening statements, said that you were working together as colleagues 

and in partnership and I think that is going to be critical and I was 

glad to hear that. I think the key in doing this, we are going to 

continue to have two separate agencies, that is apparent. We are 

the only country in the world that really has that dual set of securities and futures, and you know they are regulated quite differently. 

So I think there is obviously a need for harmonization. I think 

the key is going to be the leadership of you two. I think that will 

really set the tone and will determine how successful we are. So 

I applaud you for your opening statements. I also want to focus on 

something, and I agree that Chairman Schapiro said, she said I 

want to emphasize to the committee that the SEC and other financial regulatory agencies have been making solid progress using our 

existing authority to address the financial regulatory problems that 

face this country. 

You do have a lot of existing authority, and I think it is important that we as a Congress realize that. And actually, in all this 

regulatory reform, my concern has been that we are telling you 

what to do as opposed to you looking at your authority you have, 

looking at the problems that we now all realize, and they are very 

complex problems, and saying to us this is what we need, you know 

this is how we are going to discharge that authority or we need additional statutory authority. As opposed to, particularly with some 

of the banking regulators, saying we are going to totally change our 

approach to regulation and some good, but maybe not so good 

ways. 

I am going to ask one question and one question only. Having to 

do this by September 30th is to me an overwhelming and unrealistic goal. Now, I know that the problems are there, but you have 

already taken steps. And other regulators have already taken 

steps, I think, to minimize a recurrence of what we saw last year. 

I don’t think in the current climate that businesses are going to 

take that kind of risk, number one, or that regulators are allowing 

that kind of risk. But tell me, I will ask both of you, how realistic 

is that? And will you not hesitate to ask for more time? 

Mr. GENSLER. We certainly will not hesitate to ask for more time, 

but what we are trying to do—and I think why the President and 

Secretary Geithner asked for that time—is to help inform Congress 

as they are embarking upon legislative process. So we are going to 

have joint public hearings to hear from the public. We are doing 

what I will call a ‘‘gap analysis’’ to see where the gaps are right 

now. And then we are going to try to have as many meetings as 

we can fit into our schedule to try to resolve those and make recommendations. But again, we might have an interim step on September 30th, and then have more to report, but to help you in your 

legislative process as well. 

Mr. BACHUS. Chairman? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I would agree with that completely. We are really 

committed to getting as much done as we can by September 30th. 

18 

And if we need more time, we will ask for more time. It is very 

important that we get this right. These are, as many of you have 

pointed out, massively important markets, and we want to be sure 

we are thoughtful about it. 

Mr. BACHUS. And I endorse this idea of trying to get at least an 

interim report, but I would caution you as well as you cautioned, 

I think, in your statements, how complex these matters are and 

that you want to get it right because these have tremendous implications for our economy if they are not done right. 

So I thank you and look forward to what I hope will be an interim report September 30th. 

But I would caution you also, you are going to be asked to speak 

to all sorts of forums and all sorts of public addresses. You need 

to limit some of that. You need to set your priorities because there 

is a lot of hard work back at the agencies. And I hope that the public and the Congress will realize that the agencies are going to 

have to do a lot of hard work, a lot of concentration, and a lot of 

study in a very short period of time. 

Mr. GENSLER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I just would say, I think the gentleman from Alabama has just shared with you the advice he probably gets from 

his scheduler, as we all do: Don’t speak at every forum of your priorities. So you are getting passed on what every one of us hears 

every day. 

The gentlewoman from California. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I thank 

our presenters for being here today. 

As you know, I have introduced H.R. 3145, a bill to ban credit 

default swaps. And that has caused a lot of conversation with many 

saying, well, they should not be banned but we should have the 

central exchange and there should be transparency. But the more 

I learn about them, the more concerned I am. I just want to cite 

this particular situation. 

McClatchy Company provides the most recent example of credit 

default swaps hindering our lending markets. This California-based 

newspaper publisher with large holdings in North Carolina and 

Minnesota recently offered bondholders an above-market price for 

its outstanding debt. The company made this offer in order to offset 

declining advertising revenues with reduced costs. More than 90 

percent of bondholders have turned down this offer. 

According to an industry analyst, the debt offer failed because 

many of the bondholders also had substantial credit default swap 

positions. These bondholders stood to gain more from McClatchy’s 

demise than from its continued operation. 

While the company still exists today, it carries massive amounts 

of debt, thanks to the many empty creditors who stand to profit 

from McClatchy’s bankruptcy. 

Some say we should only be concerned about naked credit default 

swaps. I say we should be concerned with all credit default swaps, 

particularly when they function as an incentive to drive a company 

into bankruptcy. 

Ms. Schapiro, if your agency was given authority over securitybased swap agreements, how would you deal with this very controversial question of credit default swaps? And if you could, comVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:33 Feb 23, 2010 Jkt 053246 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\53246.TXT TERRIE
19 

ment on other types of swaps, such as interest rate and currency 

swaps. 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. Thank you. I will ask Chairman Gensler to talk 

about the latter two since those are CFTC-related products. 

You raise a very important question, and you and I have had a 

little bit of a chance to discuss this previously. There is no question 

but your economic interest, when you are on a credit default swap, 

may dictate that you have less incentive to cooperate with a troubled company entering bankruptcy, because you are going to be 

paid when that credit event happens in any event. And perhaps to 

make things worse, there may also be an incentive to even short 

the stock on top of that. 

I think transparency would help tremendously in this regard. 

And I think attaching some greater costs, frankly, to doing credit 

default swaps via regulatory oversight, which obviously has a cost 

to it, the provision of capital and margin requirements. 

I do think that as we explore this issue—and we are spending 

a lot of time thinking about it, and whether at a minimum there 

ought to be some kind of an insurable interest—we have to think 

about the complexities even of just that piece of it, putting aside 

whether you would ban the product entirely. 

A bondholder has an underlying economic interest. Yet in this instance, they were not incented to cooperate in the bankruptcy. Does 

an equity holder have an economic underlying insurable interest? 

What about a large supplier to the company who would see their 

revenues disappear if the company declares bankruptcy? Might not 

they want to ensure that revenue stream through the purchase of 

a credit default swap? So I think the complexities are very significant and ones we have to work through. 

I would say that if Congress decides to go down the path of banning naked credit default swaps, it would be good to think about 

doing something like that prospectively, given the size of the marketplace that already exists and the potential disruption of 

unwinding those kinds of positions. But again, I think these are 

very difficult questions. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you. I still have time. 

Would you like to comment on that, please, Mr. Gensler? 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, I do think that on the credit default swaps— 

and this is one of the reasons why we agree—the credit default 

swaps on single issuers like McClatchy that you mentioned, are 

very related to their stock, are very related to their bond. And appropriately, all of these interplay on investor protection and should 

be regulated, I think, jointly by the SEC. And just as they are looking very closely at the short sale roles on equity, there is some similarity of the short sale or naked sales in credit default swaps. 

I think as it relates to interest rate swaps and currency swaps, 

what really are far more about broad interest rates or broad—you 

know, where currencies are, that there is a role for both hedgers 

and speculators. And speculators play an important role in the 

marketplace, even if they are naked, so to speak—if that term is 

all right—because they provide the other side, so that hedgers can 

find somebody that may, in essence, provide that insurance to them 

who want to protect themselves in currency and interest rate markets. 

20 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Neugebauer. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Gensler, I understand that the CFTC is going to have 

some public hearings regarding hedge exemptions and position limits in the energy markets. As you are aware, in the 2008 farm bill 

we had quite a bit of discussion about that, and we expanded some 

of the CFTC’s authority in that area. There is a lot of disagreement 

about the role of speculators in the marketplace. And my opinion 

is that they provide liquidity and price discovery by the fact that 

they are in the marketplace. 

But what do you think might be the impact if you move to limit, 

and in some cases prohibit, some institutional investors from actually being in the energy commodities? 

Mr. GENSLER. I thank you, and I thank you for the support in 

last year’s farm bill for the additional authorities. 

The CFTC, under a statute that had been in place for some 70 

years, sets limits in the agricultural space—corn, wheat, soy, and 

so forth—and has the authority, in fact, it says that we shall set 

them in other markets. 

And so what we have raised as a question is, we do it in the agricultural stock, we don’t do it in the energy markets. The philosophy 

really is to protect against the burdens that may come from excess 

speculation. Speculators are good, they provide the other side for 

hedgers to hedge their transactions. But conceptually, it is that we 

have at least a minimum number of participants in a market place. 

If there is a diversity, if you had that 10 percent limit, then you 

would have at least 10 participants in a marketplace and lower the 

risk that there are dislocations. If they have to liquidate those positions, it actually lowers the risk in clearinghouses that we have 

been talking about today. 

So we are going to have hearings starting next week—I see Commissioner Dunn from the CFTC is here also today—and we will be 

looking at this over the next several weeks and then trying, if appropriate, to move on it during the fall. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. One of the issues, though, that I get concerned 

about, when you talk about beneficial interest and whether someone is hedging or they are speculating, I would submit to you that 

in the energy business, everybody in this room has some beneficial 

interest when it comes to energy. So one of the concerns I have is 

if we move in this direction, what impact could that potentially 

have on commercial hedging if we begin to limit the participants 

in that? Because, as you know, it is a fairly large market. 

Mr. GENSLER. And our mission is to make sure that the markets 

are fair and orderly and provide the risk management for those 

hedgers. But through position limits, Congress gave us the authority many years ago to set position limits to protect those markets, 

so that they are fair and orderly and they represent the price discovery that you are so—so I think we are aligned on that, and it 

is whether this promotes market integrity along that front. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. And then there is the question out there that 

there are other places for the investors to go and trade energy. Obviously, the United States doesn’t have a lock on that. What imVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:33 Feb 23, 2010 Jkt 053246 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\53246.TXT TERRIE
21 

pacts, if we get two prescriptive, too overly protective here, could 

that have on U.S. markets down the road? 

Mr. GENSLER. It is a very good point. It is why we have asked 

Congress and this committee to consider in over-the-counter derivatives regulation that we also make sure that the position limit authority for commodities of finite supply, that we also be able to do 

that in the over-the-counter market if it serves a price discovery 

function back into the other regulated markets. 

Because you are right that you could move from the futures to 

the over-the-counter derivatives. And we saw that in a number of 

cases in the last several years. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Quickly, a question to both of you. You know, 

we see in this regulatory proposal that the Administration is putting out, you have the clearinghouses, you have the regulators, and 

you have obviously the investors. There has been a lot of discussion 

about bringing more equity and margin to the marketplace. Do you 

support a more aggressive setting of margin requirements from the 

regulator, or still leaving that decision to be made by the individual 

clearers, and basically with the regulators primarily looking at the 

capital structure of the clearing entities? 

Mr. GENSLER. I think we need to start with having in statute, 

mandatory centralized clearing for the standardized product as contrasted today—it is voluntary—and that there be rigorous risk 

management standards and that clearinghouses have open access 

to members to be part of that. 

Margin could first be set by the clearinghouse, but that the regulators, the SEC and the CFTC overseeing those clearinghouses 

should be able to prescribe through rules those risk management 

standards and, where appropriate, if we find that a clearinghouse—just as we have in the futures clearing and an options 

clearing now, the regulators do have authority to go in and comment on that. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Mr. Chairman, could I ask Ms. Schapiro to 

quickly answer that? Could I ask unanimous consent to have an 

additional 30 seconds? 

The CHAIRMAN. We have members low down who don’t get to ask 

questions. If everybody gets an extra 30 or 45 seconds, then they 

are not permitted. That is why I would object. People can answer 

in writing. 

The gentlewoman from New York. 

Mrs. MALONEY. I first grant 30 seconds to Ms. Schapiro to answer his question. 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. Thank you. 

I very much agree. I think that margin levels can be set in the 

initial instance at clearinghouses. I think it will be very important 

for the regulators to have very robust oversight of those clearinghouses to ensure that they themselves don’t become systemic risk 

concerns over time. And that will involve, obviously, making sure 

they are stress-testing those marginal levels and their capital levels, as well as ensuring they have all the proper systems and 

backup and books and records and transparency. 

Mrs. MALONEY. First, I would like to welcome our witnesses— 

particularly Mary Schapiro, a former constituent, a resident of New 

York; New Yorkers are very proud of your service and your current 

22 

appointment—and to Gary Gensler, the Chairman, who was part 

of the Clinton team that brought us the longest period of economic 

expansion in our country’s history of balanced budgets and surpluses. I am glad that you are back on the economic team. And 

welcome, it is good to see you again. 

First of all, I want to say that I truly believe that reforming the 

financial markets and system is the most important issue before 

our country. And getting it right will determine our economic 

growth and expansion for the next—probably 50 years. 

And I want to go on record in support of the many honest hardworking men and women in the financial services industry. Many 

people have made mistakes, and they feel like they are unjustly 

being attacked when they are trying very, very hard to be part of 

the solution and part of moving our economy forward. 

I also want to state how important financial services are in terms 

of our exports. Along with Boeing, it is one of the largest areas that 

we export goods and services that helps with our trade deficit. So 

moving forward in a correct way is tremendously important. 

I for one would like to wait until the report comes back from the 

Commission that we have put in place that will tell us what was 

really the problem, so that we can make sure we are addressing 

what is the thoughtful process of what caused the crisis. I truly believe the best chapter in government since I have been in Congress 

was the 9/11 Commission report that expertly pointed out what 

caused the problem, with concrete recommendations of what should 

be done. And I would like to see what this Commission has to say. 

But the first road map we saw was AIG. And it clearly showed 

markets were out of control. No one knew what was going on. At 

the beginning of the week, they said they didn’t need help. By the 

end of the week, they needed $50 million. By the end of the weekend, they needed another $30 million, and then it just continued. 

Former Chairman Fuld testified before this committee on the 

Lehman disaster and crisis and said if he had one recommendation, 

it would be that there would be one central clearinghouse so that 

you had control of what your exposure is internationally and nationally so you understood the exposure. I don’t think you are going 

to get that with capital requirements and margin requirements and 

leverage requirements. 

And my question, really to Mr. Gensler is, in these clearinghouses are you proposing one central clearinghouse, which is what 

he suggested, or several clearinghouses? And then what do you determine is going to be over the counter, what is going to be in a 

clearinghouse? But do we have one area where we are going to be 

able to track the exposure of investors and the economy of our 

country? 

Mr. GENSLER. I thank you. And I thank you for that warm welcome. And having met my wife and having my three daughters 

born in New York, I feel some closeness, too. 

I think that we must bring the standard product into clearinghouses, but the reason for the regulation of the full dealers is so 

we can also regulate the customized as well as standard— 

Mrs. MALONEY. Would it be one clearinghouse or many clearinghouses? How many clearinghouses? 

23 

Mr. GENSLER. What we would envision is that we would allow 

the market—right now there are three or four clearinghouses sort 

of, as I say, competing for this. They need not to be voluntary, but 

they need to be mandated, and that the regulators would be able 

to see them and rigorously oversee them. If they meet the standards, they would be able to compete. I believe over time you might 

see a consolidation and a concentration in this, but initially the 

statute would allow for more than one clearinghouse. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Very clearly, my time has almost expired. 

Brooksley Born fought very hard to keep derivatives, particularly 

energy derivatives, on the exchange. I put forward an amendment 

that mirrored her recommendation, which failed primarily because 

the regulators were opposed to it. Where does that stand now? Are 

the energy derivatives back on the exchange? 

The CHAIRMAN. Quick answer. 

Mr. GENSLER. We believe that energy derivatives need to be 

brought onto the exchange if they are standardized. With the exempt commercial markets through the farm bill, we have more authorities than we used to have. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Delaware. And remember, 

our witnesses are encouraged to respond in writing in greater detail, and we will have plenty of time this summer to read it before 

we get to any legislative activity. 

The gentleman from Delaware. 

Mr. CASTLE. Chairman Schapiro, you and others—even us up 

here—expressed some concern with the revolving-door issue of employees at the SEC. Actually, I don’t see employees of the SEC. I 

see you or your predecessors, or whatever. But as you know, the 

concern has always been that people go to work at the SEC, they 

are relatively young, they are relatively inexperienced, and they 

may then be looking for offers from Wall Street, so that may taint 

what they are doing—not to suggest there is anything wrong with 

what they have been doing, but it may taint their thinking on it. 

And the thinking was—and you stated—that we need more experienced people. 

Is that starting to happen with the economy and with your desire 

to change that? Can you give us a brief answer on that subject? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. Yes, very much so, Congressman. We have been 

able to take advantage of some of Wall Street’s woes by bringing 

on board tremendously experienced people with a broad range of 

skill sets. 

I am sorry Congressman Royce isn’t still here, but we aren’t just 

hiring lawyers and accountants, we are actually bringing in financial analysts, forensic accountants, people with expertise in trading 

and derivatives, in a wide range of areas, and we are very much 

the beneficiaries of Wall Street’s woes in that regard right now. 

And that is very much by design that we are bringing in those skill 

sets. 

Mr. CASTLE. Thank you. Let me jump to another subject. When 

you talk about hedge funds—and I think there are other private 

pools of capital you were talking about—you indicated they should 

be registered. And I couldn’t find it in your written testimony, but 

in your oral testimony you suggested that registration would lead 

to other oversight of those particular entities. 

24 

Can you elaborate on that a little bit? I mean, I can understand 

and I am all for the registration—I am probably for the oversight 

as well—but does that automatically lead to other regulatory supervision of these entities? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. Not automatically, but I think there is an expectation on the part of the public that if an entity would be registered 

with us, we would have some regulatory oversight, including reporting to the SEC and, ultimately, if there is a systemic risk regulator, to the systemic risk regulator about trading activity. 

We would expect to have the ability to examine the books and 

records of a hedge fund, potentially to write rules that might require the provision of certain kinds of information to their investors 

or to counterparties. 

But our commitment is also, though, not to try to force hedge 

funds, PE firms, venture capital firms, into a model that doesn’t fit 

for them. We recognize these are different types of investment vehicles, but I think we need to bring them under the umbrella of 

regulation. 

Mr. CASTLE. And if you could share with us what is happening 

with respect to credit-rating agencies, without going through all the 

details of that. We all know that there have been some concerns 

about the ratings of various products that ended up falling flat on 

their faces, etc. And should we be doing more with transparency 

registration of some of the credit-rating agencies? Where does that 

stand right now from the SEC? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. Well, as you know, since the agency got authority 

under the 2006 Act, it has engaged in no less than five 

rulemakings to try to put some structure around the regulatory regime for rating agencies. And many of those rules are new and we 

are seeing how they work. 

But I will say that we are going to go forward later this summer 

with some additional rules that we think will be very useful. One 

would propose to require issuers to disclose preliminary ratings 

they have received as a way to get at this issue, which I find really 

pernicious, of ratings shopping. 

Another would require disclosure of the underlying data in structured products that are being rated to all other rating agencies so 

they can perform an unsolicited rating as a check on the conflicts 

that exist in the issuer-pays business model. 

We are going to look at sources of revenue disclosure, again, to 

get at the conflicts issue. More performance history, how the ratings have performed over 1-, 5-, and 10-year periods of time. And 

we are beginning a road map to explore how the SEC and its own 

rules can lessen reliance on ratings as a way to hopefully get investors to do additional due diligence on their own as well. 

So we have quite a lot in the works. And of course the Administration has a new proposal that came out yesterday to require 

mandatory registration and a number of other things. 

Mr. CASTLE. Well, thank you. I believe there are a lot of legitimate concerns with credit-rating agencies, and we should be trying 

to help with that as well. 

I thank you for your testimony and yield back. 

Mr. KANJORSKI. [presiding] We will now hear from Mr. Watt of 

North Carolina. 

25 

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me go back to a question that was raised earlier by Mr. Kanjorski. A lot of people have said that if we were starting from 

scratch, we would have only one agency. And I understand the political realities of two existing agencies, the history that exists 

there. 

And you addressed the process that the two of you engaged in 

cooperatively to define what turf should be in the SEC and what 

turf should be in the CFTC. You said you have come to fairly good 

understandings about existing products. 

I guess the question I want to ask is, with respect to a new product and the possibility—probability—that at some point in the future the two administrators of these agencies won’t be as nice and 

kind and cooperative with each other as the two of you are, how 

should we be assuring in this legislation that there is not the potential for future conflict and legislating a way to resolve that conflict if in fact it does occur? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I am happy to take the first shot at that. 

I think you have identified a real issue for sure. And we have 

this concern now. We have products that are not clearly on the futures side or the securities side, and it takes the agencies a very 

long time—really in some ways an unacceptably long time—to resolve where these products will trade and under which regulatory 

regime. And we disadvantage commercial entities who are trying to 

propose these new instruments. 

I think we are of good will here. I think we will try and we will 

be more successful in working those issues out. 

Mr. WATT. I have the utmost confidence in the two of you, as I 

said, but I am not sure that I have the utmost confidence in the 

future. And we are trying to draw a process that will last, as this 

process did until the meltdown, for 75 years or more. 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I think short of merging the agencies—which is 

also not in the cards—that one option would be to use something 

like the Financial Stability Oversight Council that has been proposed by the Administration as a mechanism or a forum for the 

resolution of these kinds of issues. 

Mr. WATT. And we can write that into this legislation. 

What is your opinion on it? 

Mr. GENSLER. I think if we limit the differences, if we harmonize 

going in, Congress writes clear, statutory guidelines on the clearinghouses and on the exchanges, it sort of limits a little bit more 

whether a product is under one set of Presidentially appointed people and career staff and another set of Presidentially appointed 

people and career staff—I mean, to the extent that we harmonize 

going in. And so that is, I believe, a challenge for all of us. 

Mr. WATT. But you acknowledge that we need to address that 

probably in this legislation; do both of you agree on that? 

Mr. GENSLER. Yes. 

Mr. WATT. Mr. Gensler, you actually led to the next question I 

want to try and get some further clarification on, because I am not 

clear in my own mind. You have referred to clearinghouses, and I 

think you also referred to electronic platforms. I want to get a 

clearer understanding of the difference between those two as you 

26 

see it. Just give us a little education here so the members of the 

committee, including myself, fully understand. 

Mr. GENSLER. I thank you. Both are very important. They serve 

different functions, though. Both, I think, should be regulated by 

the market regulators. The exchange is where buyers and sellers 

meet, and there is transparency on the transactions themselves. 

And what we are proposing is that after any transaction in a sort 

of real-time basis, just like we have in the corporate bond market 

now and the equity markets and the futures markets, those trades 

are reported, so there is transparency between buyers and sellers, 

and then that the trades are announced. 

Clearinghouses have lower risk because it is where, after the 

trade, after the transaction had happened—and some of these 

transactions will go on for 30 years if it is a 30-year interest rate 

swap—that we can lower risk because the transaction has to do 

with a lot of things like marking it to market, posting collateral, 

to make sure that the transaction can live those 30 years regardless of market events. 

Mr. WATT. My time has expired. If you would just give me some 

more written information about that distinction, because I am still 

a little unclear—electronic platforms, clearinghouses, electronic exchanges. I would like to kind of— 

Mr. GENSLER. And I would also be glad to come and see you in 

your office anytime you want us to come by. 

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. KANJORSKI. The Chair recognizes Mr. Royce of California. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Schapiro, Allen Stanford, who has been accused of being a 

mini-made office, has been in the headlines for the last few weeks 

as people have been trying to get a handle on exactly what happened to $8 billion and the full extent of the damage of his actions. 

And recently an alleged Stanford whistleblower, Layla Wydler, was 

interviewed on the matter. And she detailed her initial concerns 

with the Stanford firm, her termination—which was allegedly tied 

to her unwillingness to sell their offshore certificate of deposits 

coming out of Antigua, which she had had concerns about—and her 

attempts to bring what she believed was a Ponzi scheme to the attention of NESB, now FINRA and the SEC. This was some 5 years 

ago. 

According to a complaint filed by the SEC in February of this 

year, the Stanford bank allegedly touted ‘‘improbable if not impossible returns’’ while selling $8 billion in those very same, apparently cryptic, CDs to investors for more than a decade. 

On going to the SEC in 2004, Ms. Wydler said, ‘‘I had a list of 

everything, all my concerns. I wrote down the document, and I sent 

it to them and told them these are my concerns; this is what happened, look into it. This might save people’s savings in the future 

because we can stop this.’’ And it was just sent to them, and that’s 

it. 

Now, I understand there is a criminal investigation going on. But 

what can you tell us about this allegation? Are you aware of any 

evidence legitimizing Ms. Wydler’s claim that she did, in fact, approach the SEC 5 years ago raising concerns over this Ponzi 

27 

scheme, laying out how they were doing it, with respect to Allen 

Stanford’s firm? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. Congressman, I am happy to address it. 

I don’t know about her specific claim, so let me be clear about 

that. But I will tell you that prior to the SEC opening its formal 

investigation in 2005 into Stanford, the Agency had looked into tips 

that had come its way. But at the time, my understanding is that 

the staff believed that these were largely foreign investors investing in foreign certificates of deposit issued by a foreign bank. 

So those jurisdictional issues presented significant hurdles, offshore CDs issued by a foreign bank. And those jurisdictional issues, 

we now understand, were significantly complicated by the fact that 

the Antiguan securities regulator, who had jurisdiction and authority over Stanford International Bank, was on the payroll of Mr. 

Stanford, and has been sued by the SEC, but was clearly subverting the SEC’s investigation into this matter. 

There is also a period of time of significant coordination with 

other Federal agencies, which also took time—undoubtedly longer 

than it should have. But as soon as it became clear to the SEC that 

there was adequate information for us to go forward and that we 

could overcome those jurisdictional hurdles, the case was brought. 

Nine people and entities have been sued, and, as I said, including 

the CEO of the Antiguan Financial Services Regulatory Commission. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I would like to ask you if you could then address the questions raised by Mr. Atkins, which I raised in my 

opening statements; specifically, why do you think the SEC, in the 

course of the past 12 years, experienced, in his words, ‘‘catastrophic 

failures in every one of its four core competencies.’’ He started with 

rulemaking, filing review, enforcement, and examinations. 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I would be happy to do that. I would also be 

happy to come and talk with you directly about these. Needless to 

say, I don’t agree with Commissioner Atkin’s characterization of 

the SEC’s failures over the last number of years during that period 

he was a Commissioner of the Agency. 

I do think all of the Federal financial regulators missed issues 

related to the economic crisis in the last several years, but I also 

think that an enormous amount of positive work and important 

things have happened also under those same years. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let’s do it this way, then. For the benefit of members, you can do it in writing. 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I would be happy to. 

Mr. ROYCE. And I would add two more questions in writing, if 

you could submit. I think going forward it would help the committee members. What led to failures in financial institutions to 

recognize the inadequacy of their own risk management systems 

and strategy in time to avert a collapse? And second, how did many 

investors get lulled into complacency and not adequately do their 

own due diligence as well? 

You probably will have some perspectives at the SEC on those 

two questions, and I think a better understanding of the failure on 

that front as well. 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I would be very happy to do that. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

28 

Mr. KANJORSKI. The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Chairman Schapiro, I hope I have time to focus 

on the SEC’s—what I would hope would be a policy, it is not your 

policy now—to surf the Internet, pose as an investor, and deal with 

all the unregistered activity. Because too much of the SEC’s attitude seems to be, well, if they don’t register with us, we don’t focus 

on them. And that is especially necessary because we have relied 

on State regulation. But now with the Internet, it is easy to steal 

half a million dollars in each of 50 States; whereas in the past, if 

you were going to steal several million dollars, you had to do it 

pretty much in one area. 

But I want to use my time to focus on derivatives. Derivatives 

offer the potential to make huge fortunes to those who are very 

powerful. And so they are defended because there is the tiniest argument that they do some good some of the time. And I refer here 

to over-the-counter derivatives. 

Secretary Geithner reserved the right to use taxpayer funds to 

the full extent of the law not only to bail out old derivatives but 

to bail out derivatives that are issued tomorrow. So they operate 

with that subsidy, or implied subsidy, that maybe Treasury will figure out a way to bail out counterparties. 

The defense of derivatives is that on rare occasions they are actually purchased by someone who has a risk they are trying to hedge; 

and that on even rarer occasions, they can’t hedge that risk efficiently on an exchange-traded derivative, so they need the over-thecounter derivative. 

I don’t know if either of you have done any studies. But what 

percent of the over-the-counter derivatives are purchased by those 

who really are hedging a risk rather than the more common case 

of somebody just placing a casino bet? I mean, I could wake up 

today and think pork bellies are going up and place a bet, and I 

would love—those who like gambling would think that is a wonderful idea, but I don’t own any pigs. I will ask either of you. 

Do either of you know what percentage of this multitrillion-dollar 

industry, conducted in part at the risk of the U.S. taxpayer, is serving its alleged legitimate, societal purposes? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I think because this has been such an opaque 

market and it is such a broadly unregulated market, that it is very 

hard for regulators to actually— 

Mr. SHERMAN. What if we simply said a derivative was illegal 

unless you were really hedging a risk, and we basically said you 

can’t use over-the-counter derivatives as a casino? 

Mr. GENSLER. We actually need—and this has been a concept in 

our financial markets for many decades, if not over 100 years—for 

those that want to hedge a risk, you need speculators on the other 

side— 

Mr. SHERMAN. One of the two parties has to have a real risk. 

Mr. GENSLER. And so the vast majority of end users—and there 

are tens of thousands of end users—whether it is a small municipality, a small hospital, or a large consumer products— 

Mr. SHERMAN. Although the vast majority of those end users can 

and do use the exchange-traded derivatives. 

Mr. GENSLER. And we believe and we share your view that we 

have to bring the over-the-counter derivatives market onto exVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:33 Feb 23, 2010 Jkt 053246 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\53246.TXT TERRIE
29 

changes. And in that regard, I have heard various estimates. The 

low estimate is about half, and the high estimate is about 80 percent of the over-the-counter derivatives marketplace could be considered standardized and on to exchanges. That would accommodate all end users. They would be able to see in real-time the pricing of these transactions and to be able to then decide to use 

those— 

Mr. SHERMAN. So we could ban over-the-counter derivatives without major harm to the legitimate users of derivatives? 

Mr. GENSLER. No, no. I would have to say I think that the tens 

of thousands of end users are able to hedge risk in their day-to-day 

business—it could be interest rate risk, it could be risk related to 

a certain energy product—but we want to bring transparency and 

lower the risk by the reforms we are calling for. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, under these reforms, Wall Street will continue to have trillions of dollars of societally useless betting, using 

over-the-counter derivatives, and the taxpayer may very well be 

called upon to bail out these derivatives and their counterparties. 

What I am asking is, given the risk to taxpayers, are there enormous benefits to our economy to have these over-the-counter derivatives where neither party has an insurable interest? 

Chairman Schapiro? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I think it is a very good question. And it is very 

hard to answer when you are trying to balance societal risk with 

trading, where neither party has an insurable interest. 

I guess I would go back to what I said to Congresswoman 

Waters, that defining insurable risk is a very difficult question and 

one we need to think about very carefully. 

I do think it is important where a party does have an insurable 

risk, that there is some flexibility to have a customized over-thecounter product, that they not absolutely be forced onto the exchange. 

But I think where there is no insurable risk and it is merely a 

matter of two parties speculating, if we don’t ban them—and that 

is a question for the Congress, obviously—I think the answer is 

that there has to be sufficient capital and dealer regulation and 

protections in place to ensure that we don’t end up walking down 

this same path again. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I would think we might ban them, and then we 

could open the door later. 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. Exemptive authority actually might be a possible 

thing for Congress to consider. 

Mr. KANJORSKI. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Now I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

FASB has made changes to accounting standards that will have 

tremendous impacts on securitizations known as FAS 166 and 167, 

as I said in my opening statement. These changes are occurring at 

the same time that the Administration is trying to restart the 

securitized credit markets through programs like TAF to private 

lending. On the other hand, it is our understanding that the Federal Reserve has serious concerns with this policy shift that could 

30 

derail efforts to stabilize financial institutions and get credit flowing. 

And, I guess, is that accurate; and what are their concerns? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. Thank you, Congressman. I guess I have a couple 

of comments on this. 

I would say that FASB walked down the path of reviewing off 

balance sheet accounting, really as a result of a concern expressed 

by the Fed and the Treasury and the President’s Working Group, 

that more transparency and improvement to all balance sheet accounting was absolutely essential; that it had been the lack of 

transparency; the ability to push all these products off balance 

sheet had, in fact, been a contributor and perhaps a significant one 

to the financial crisis. 

So I am surprised to learn that the Fed is not comfortable with 

where FASB landed with the guidance that it issued in June. I 

guess I would also say that these new standards were actually— 

the assumptions underlying these new standards were actually 

even incorporated into the stress-testing that was done of the 

banks. So the Fed has been quite involved and quite aware of what 

FASB was doing here and had quite a lot of input throughout this 

process. 

With respect to what the Fed might do regarding capital rules, 

I think that is a question, obviously, best perhaps directed to 

Chairman Bernanke. 

Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. That is applying stress tests to basically the banks with that slice of the market. How do you plan to 

apply it to the rest? Basically applying the stress test to banks is 

only a slice of the market. 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. Yes. I brought that up only to indicate that the 

Fed has had active involvement in these discussions. 

Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Okay. We discussed in Chairman Bernanke’s hearing yesterday about the challenges facing the $6 

trillion commercial marketplace that we see coming in the future. 

Many of these accounting regulation changes—aimed most at the 

residential market—hit the commercial real estate capital market 

especially hard, which in turn impacts business and provides jobs. 

Are the accounting policymakers communicating with the financial regulators who oversee the economy and recovery efforts? And 

I guess that would be Chairman Schapiro. 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. Very much so. There is very great sensitivity at 

FASB—and I will say on the international level, the International 

Accounting Standards Board—that while financial statements are 

prepared for investors so that they can make rational decisions 

about the allocation of capital and where and how to invest, that 

there are other constituents that have interests. And so they have 

been very open to receiving input from bank regulators, from the 

SEC, as well as from investor groups and others. 

Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. My concern is, if you look at the situation the banks were in at the beginning of the situation with the 

subprime and the residential marketplace, the reserves were much 

healthier than they are today and I think they were in a healthier 

than they are today. 

And if you look at the commercial-backed mortgage securities, 

they are starting to hit about the fourth quarter this year; about 

31 

$5 billion worth of loans are maturing and coming due. And then 

about January, the default rate on the commercial sector was about 

one-quarter of 1 percent. It is about 2 percent today. In the coming 

days, it is expected to rise dramatically. The loans due by about 2012 are about $1 trillion. The growing 

expectation is that default rates will be between 12 and 15 percent. 

How do we realistically handle that when most of these loans are 

30-year loans, 5-year calls and you have gone from a 7 percent cap 

rate in 2006 to a 10 percent cap rate today. Whereby a lender is 

stuck in a situation where they might have a $14 million loan on 

a piece of property that based on a declining marketplace, as we 

see in a 10 percent cap rate, might value at $8 million when they 

should only get 5 on it, how are you going to deal with them trying 

to extend that loan when you have to apply mark-to-market to it, 

which would require a $9 million set-aside? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I guess I am not exactly the right person to answer that question. But if I could take a step back and say that 

the SEC staff conducted a pretty extensive review of fair value and 

mark-to-market accounting last year and published their report before I arrived at the agency in early January. And what they found 

through their efforts is that investors value greatly fair-value accounting. It is what allows them to make decisions to invest at all. 

Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. I understand that. But the situation 

we are facing is you are hitting a second round of residential foreclosures that is occurring right now. And that is the people who 

have good loans, but have lost their jobs. Or they are business people who are no longer able to make their payments who are losing 

their homes today. 

You have about 70 percent of the lending marketplace is commercial; you have lenders that are not in a situation they were in 

4 years ago as far as liquidity and reserves. I am not talking about 

a new loan that somebody wants to make for a piece of commercial 

investor property. I am talking about a current situation that the 

banking and lending industry is going be in today when these 5- 

year calls come due. And based on accounting standards, you have 

to apply mark-to-market—I mean, that is the rule today. And 

based on that rule alone, the banking industry is going to be absolutely upside down. I don’t know how they weather this, or the 

economy weathers this next round of commercial foreclosures. 

And my question is—I am not saying new loans—I am saying for 

existing loans that are coming due, how are we going to deal with 

them? We can’t just say, ‘‘well, mark-to-market requires.’’ We are 

faced with a financial situation that could be devastating. 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I guess I don’t have a quick answer to your question. I would be more than happy to come up and maybe bring our 

chief accountant with me and spend some time to talk with you 

about that. 

Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. I would love to, because this is a serious situation for the economy that is going to occur very rapidly, 

and I don’t think banks can handle it. 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I would be very happy to do that. 

Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. I would love to meet with you. 

Thank you. 

Mr. KANJORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Miller. 

32 

We will now hear from Mr. Moore of Kansas. 

Mr. MOORE OF KANSAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In light of the Madoff scandal and other Ponzi schemes, what can 

and should we do to improve the return of funds for defrauded investors? Chairman Schapiro, are the SEC’s fair funds fulfilling this 

mission and should Congress consider additional steps for helping 

out defrauded investors? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I think, Congressman, the fair funds program has 

been largely successful. It has returned billions and billions of dollars to investors. I think it was actually a brilliant idea on the part 

of this committee and the Congress to enable the SEC to get money 

back to investors through that mechanism. 

That said, I think it takes us sometimes a little bit too long to 

get that done. We have a new Director of Enforcement who has responsibility for fair funds administration, and he is looking at how 

we can try to speed that process up to get the money back as quickly as we possibly can. 

Mr. MOORE OF KANSAS. Thank you. 

Chairman Gensler, do you have any comments, sir? 

Mr. GENSLER. Not specifically on the fair funds proposal. But I 

do think that in working to harmonize our roles, that we should 

look very closely at whether our fraud standard between the CFTC 

and the SEC should be the same. We bring about a third of our 

fraud cases with the SEC, we do a lot jointly, and I think it would 

be helpful. 

Mr. MOORE OF KANSAS. Thank you. 

Some people have suggested we should require the largest financial firms to undergo an annual stress test that would have aggregate information publicly released even in good times, not just bad 

times. Is this something Congress should require, Chairman 

Gensler? And what about leverage? Any thoughts on how best to 

create incentives for firms to maintain reasonable leverage ratios? 

Mr. GENSLER. Well, I think that one of the ways with regard to 

over-the-counter derivatives is that we be explicit. In the past, I 

think this is one of the assumptions that was sorely tested. We assumed that our overall capital standards would take into consideration these derivatives. And I think that we should be explicit in— 

whether it be the bank regulators or the SEC overseeing the broker 

dealers where most of the derivatives take place, there should be 

explicit capital standards for these derivatives. And then beyond 

that, we lower risk, of course, with centralized clearing. 

Mr. MOORE OF KANSAS. Chairman Schapiro, do you have any 

comments? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I guess I would add that I think stress-testing is 

critically important. And one of the failures was perhaps to include 

enough low-probability, high-impact events in stress tests historically. And that would be important for the regulators to insist upon 

with respect to clearinghouses, as well as with respect to dealers 

and other participants in the financial markets. 

Mr. MOORE OF KANSAS. Thanks to our witnesses, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Mr. KANJORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Moore. 

We will now hear from the gentleman from Florida Mr. Posey. 

Mr. POSEY. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

33 

Madam Chairwoman, I know we have the IG report that we 

should be receiving to give us more information. But I am curious 

as to whether or not we can know if anyone has been fired or even 

reprimanded over the way the Madoff fiasco was mishandled? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. Congressman, we are waiting, obviously, for the 

release of the Inspector General Report, which has been quite comprehensive and quite extensive and is due to be released at the end 

of the summer. And based upon whatever is in that report, we will 

have to make decisions about whether any kind of personnel actions are appropriate. We do not want to interfere in any way with 

the independent review of the Inspector General. 

I will say, though, that I have not wanted to wait for the Inspector General’s Report to make really extensive changes in the Securities and Exchange Commission, both in how we are organized— 

Mr. POSEY. I know we are going to make changes in the future, 

hopefully, but I think there should be some accountability for the 

people who did not do their jobs. And I think that we made the illustration before: If you report a bank robbery to the local police 

department and the bank robbery has gone on for 10 years and 

they never walk over to the bank to investigate the robbery, somebody ought to lose their job, somebody ought to be reprimanded. 

And it is just incredible that hasn’t happened yet and that we 

have to wait for a report to take any action against the negligence 

that cost people, arguably, $70 billion in losses. Because your agency would not take any action, even after Barron’s Magazine writes 

a feature story about this guy. I mean, it was worldwide news. 

The smart hedge fund managers and the money managers know 

to stay away from him, but gullible members of the public were 

still lured in by this because he was allowed to continue doing business. 

I just would think that there should be some discipline taken for 

the employees who allowed that to happen. 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. Congressman, I think it is really critical that we 

have the full story of exactly what happened, and that is what the 

Inspector General has been charged with doing. There has not been 

a separate inquiry down to the level of employee conduct because 

that investigation is going on. And no one has wanted, and myself 

included, to interfere in any way with that. 

But we are not just making changes in the future, we are making changes right now and have, over the last 6 months, made extensive changes at the SEC. We have a new Enforcement Director, 

a new Deputy, a new head of the New York office. We have new 

technology, we have new rules— 

Mr. POSEY. But the question is, when employees don’t do their 

job to protect the public, do we have to have an Inspector General 

come in there and tell us if it is okay to fire people? I mean, 

wouldn’t that be a normal management routine if you have an employee who is incompetent or lazy, or for whatever other reason 

doesn’t do his job to protect the public clearly like he should be 

doing, that we just don’t fire those people? I mean, isn’t there a policy in place to do that? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I believe deeply in holding employees accountable 

for their work, but I can’t do that until I have the facts and the 

details about how they conducted their work and what the issues 

34 

were. And that is what needs to wait for the Inspector General Report. 

Mr. POSEY. But don’t they have supervisors? Isn’t there somebody in the organization that already—I mean, I know in any business—and I know government doesn’t have competition like a business, but in any business where someone made a business blunder 

that big, the whole department would be gone, the senior manager 

would be gone. Doesn’t that happen anywhere in government? I 

mean, doesn’t anybody have the authority to get rid of incompetent 

employees, people who refuse or for whatever reason don’t do their 

jobs? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. We do certainly have the ability to get rid of incompetent employees, but I have to have the evidence that shows 

me that employees were incompetent. I can’t fire hundreds of people or tens of people without having a basis for doing that, and I 

don’t have that basis at this point. That is the purpose, in part, of 

the Inspector General’s Report, to understand—as was by my predecessor, Chairman Cox—to understand what went wrong; what did 

the SEC do; what did it fail to do; and where does the responsibility lie? And that is a necessary precondition, from my perspective, to taking any kind of personnel action. 

Mr. POSEY. And with all due respect—and I am not aiming this 

at you—but I think the failure to know what went wrong and who 

is responsible for things that go wrong is culpable negligence on 

the part of management. 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I understand that concern. And there are things 

that we do know went wrong. We know that, for example, the 

agency receives 1.5 million tips a year and has no capability to 

really manage them or manage that process, so we have attacked 

that. We know we have gaps. 

Mr. POSEY. We know twice they blew off Mr. Markopolos, even 

after Barrons Magazine did a big feature cover story on this fraud. 

I mean, anybody with half a brain in the agency, that should have 

been plenty to know right there. I mean, this is not one of a million 

tips that got ignored. This guy took a big file down there, he was 

a qualified, experienced investigator—I am talking about Mr. 

Markopolos—he took it down there and laid it in their hands, and 

they did nothing. He went back, and they did nothing. It was exposed in Barrons; they did nothing. 

I mean, I can’t imagine any excuse. It is just a matter of finding 

out who all had a fingerprint on this thing and getting rid of them. 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. There is no question but that the agency did not 

appropriately follow up on the information that he gave them; I am 

not defending that at all. And that is why we are in this process. 

And that is why we have devoted extraordinary resources both to 

the Inspector General’s investigation, but also to filling all the gaps 

that we can, putting in place all the processes and procedures, and 

bringing in many senior new people to the agency to try to ensure 

that we can protect against this ever happening again. 

This is a tragedy of epic proportions, I fully appreciate that. And 

we are doing everything we can do— 

Mr. POSEY. When do we expect the IG’s report? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. The Inspector General has said that he would 

hope to release his report by the end of the summer. 

35 

Mr. KANJORSKI. By September 30th, Mr. Posey. And as soon as 

he does, we anticipate having a special session. 

We have five votes on the Floor, and we have another committee 

hearing starting at 2 p.m., so I am going to pose the question to 

the members, do they wish to return and poll the panel for an additional hour and then start up, which would only give us about 40 

minutes? Or should we have one more individual on questions and 

then recess the hearing until a further date or some other time? 

Are there any preferences? 

Mr. BACA. Continue, and have the hearing some other time. 

Mr. KANJORSKI. You are next. 

Mr. BACA. That is why I want to continue. 

Mr. KANJORSKI. I am not suggesting we do not have you. The 

question is, after you have had your opportunity, should we come 

back in an hour from now after votes? Is there anyone terribly in 

favor of that? Mr. McHenry says no. 

Mr. MCHENRY. I am in favor of Mr. Baca getting his time, 

though. He is a good pitcher. 

Mr. KANJORSKI. We follow seniority, so Mr. Baca gets the next 

question. 

Ms. MOORE OF WISCONSIN. I guess I will write my questions to 

them, Mr. Chairman. Whatever you decide, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KANJORSKI. And return in an hour? That is what we will do. 

We will hear Mr. Baca, and then take a recess for an hour and 

then return. And we will give the opportunity for the witnesses to 

have lunch or something in the meantime. 

Mr. Baca. 

Mr. BACA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you 

for holding this meeting, along with the ranking member. And 

thank you, Chairwoman Schapiro and also Chairman Gensler. 

My question is to either one of you two, or both of you can answer this. I have a question regarding both of your agencies’ roles 

in the Consumer Financial Protection Agency. The bill states that 

CFPA will be required to coordinate with both of your agencies in 

an effort to promote consistent regulatory treatment of consumers’ 

investment product and services. 

Can you comment on your role in coordinating with CFPA? That 

is one question. And how do you envision this taking place? And 

what level of interaction would you like to see? 

And finally, would you like to see the interactions be limited solely to derivatives, regulations; or does it expand beyond that? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I am happy to start with that. 

I think it is going to be critically important for the SEC to coordinate pretty closely with the CFPA. We both have investor or consumer protection missions at our core, and there is a possibility for 

there to be products or issues that arise where we will both have 

an interest. So I think a high level of pretty continuous coordination will be important. 

The President’s plan actually calls for, I think, a quarterly meeting, at a minimum, between the leadership of those agencies and 

the FTC and others, to make sure we are sharing information and 

that no gaps are able to arise between our authorities to protect 

investors. 

36 

Mr. GENSLER. I would concur with that. And while the CFTC 

principle focuses on markets and risk management, there is a clear 

consumer piece in protecting against fraud and manipulation 

where we would envision coordination. 

The second part of your question was about derivatives, and I am 

sorry— 

Mr. BACA. Would you like to see interaction be limited solely to 

derivatives regulation or does it expand beyond that? 

Mr. GENSLER. I think it really does expand beyond that probably 

for both of our agencies because derivatives are a new product. But 

whether it be futures, options, or securities, there is some interplay. 

I can even think of it in terms of how foreign currency transactions that are marketed to the retail public, which is very much 

something that we look at and try to protect the public on. But this 

consumer agency, as a bank product, might possibly get involved. 

So I think we need coordination as well on other product areas. 

Mr. BACA. And the other question I have, I was wondering if you 

could speak to the concerns that a quick transaction to either a 

mandatory clearing process or a mandatory exchange process for 

all derivatives may cause a disruption in the market? Do you share 

this concern? And what can be done to counter this potential problem? 

Mr. GENSLER. I think that bringing derivatives onto centralized 

clearing and exchanges will actually be an enormous benefit to the 

market. I think it will promote transparency and efficiency, and 

end users will get the benefit of seeing those prices, where right 

now they can’t. And I think it will lower risk. 

So, though I might not have understood the question, but I don’t 

see it as a disruption, I see it as an enormous benefit to markets. 

Mr. BACA. Chairman Schapiro? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I agree. 

Mr. BACA. Thank you. 

Mr. Gensler, I want to follow up for a question that was asked 

by one of my colleagues earlier about the clearinghouses. Chairman 

Gensler, you said that you were in favor of having several different 

clearinghouses compete. Wouldn’t this create the same problem as 

credit-rating agencies’ experience with conflict of interest, and how 

do you safeguard against this? 

Mr. GENSLER. I think that your analogy is a very apt one. And 

how we safeguard against it is it should be mandatory regulation. 

Not only do they have to register—which right now there is voluntary registration of the rating agencies—but we have to have 

regulation to manage the risk management. Rating agencies have 

very real conflicts of interest. 

And I will defer to Chair Schapiro on whether she has the right 

authorities. But if she needs more, I would certainly support that. 

But in this case, we should make sure that these clearinghouses 

have open access, that any member who can meet the rigorous risk 

management standards be able to be there and we not allow them 

to be sort of too clubby or controlled by the dealer community, but 

that they have to meet the rigorous risk management standards 

that we would lay out. 

Mr. BACA. Ms. Schapiro, how would you answer that? 

37 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. I agree with that. 

Mr. BACA. What do you agree with? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. That we have to have rigorous oversight of the 

clearing agencies in order to assure that, to the extent any conflicts 

of interest arise, that they are fully disclosed and, to the greatest 

extent possible, eliminated. 

Mr. BACA. How will we monitor the oversight? You said that we 

need oversight. How will we monitor that we actually do have the 

oversight and that oversight is really occurring right now and the 

accountability that needs to be done? 

Ms. SCHAPIRO. Both the SEC and the CFTC currently oversee 

clearinghouses for other products, for securities at the SEC, for futures at the CFTC, for options at the SEC. So we have pretty extensive programs in place to review the governance models of clearinghouses, the risk management systems, the technology, because 

if they have a major technology failure it can hugely disrupt markets. And so those programs exist. And my view would be we would 

expand them to cover any new clearing platforms or agencies that 

are created. 

Mr. BACA. Thank you very much. I know that my time has expired. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. KANJORSKI. The Chair notes that some members may have 

additional questions for this panel which they may wish to submit 

in writing. Without objection, the hearing record will remain open 

for 30 days for members to submit written questions to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record. Quite different 

from what we had originally decided, we decided not only to give 

you a lunch break but to give you the afternoon off to enjoy yourselves on the golf course. 

Since we have votes, we are going to recess the meeting at this 

point and ask you to return in the future, probably in September, 

for the SEC as soon as the Inspector General’s report is out, Ms. 

Schapiro. And we will annoy you, Gary. We won’t let you feel abandoned. But with no further questions before the committee, the 

committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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