IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2013 WY 57

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2013

May 10, 2013

JOHN LESLIE CHAPMAN,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

S-12-0085

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The Honorable Nena James, Judge 

Representing Appellant:

Elisabeth M.W. Trefonas, Assistant Public Defender

Representing Appellee:

Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy 

Attorney General; Theodore R. Racines, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 

Jeffrey Pope, Assistant Attorney General

Before KITE, C.J., and HILL, VOIGT, BURKE, and DAVIS, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building,

Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be

made before final publication in the permanent volume.
1

DAVIS, Justice.

[¶1] Appellant John Chapman was initially charged with attempted first degree murder 

and conspiracy to commit first degree murder after he allegedly shot a man he believed to 

have assaulted his fiancée. He was later charged with aggravated assault with a request 

for habitual criminal enhancement to life in prison based on the same event. 

[¶2] Chapman pled guilty to a reduced charge of attempted second degree murder in an 

oral plea agreement which provided for dismissal of the conspiracy and aggravated 

assault charges. He was sentenced to a term of twenty-five to fifty years in accordance 

with the plea agreement. The district court ordered restitution but waived reimbursement 

of public defender fees.

[¶3] Chapman later moved to withdraw his plea, claiming that his attorney conspired 

with the court, misled him about the term he would serve, and otherwise coerced him into 

pleading guilty. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion. Chapman 

timely appealed the decision denying the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming 

that the court abused its discretion in denying it. He also claimed in this appeal that the 

district court abused its discretion in awarding restitution.

[¶4] We find that the district court reasonably concluded that Chapman failed to 

demonstrate the manifest injustice required to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. We

find that our review of the restitution issue is limited by Chapman’s failure to timely 

appeal the award, and that the district court had authority to make the award it did. We 

therefore affirm. 

ISSUES

[¶5] 1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Chapman’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea?

2. Did the district court have authority to award restitution and waive

reimbursement of public defender fees?

FACTS

[¶6] In October of 2008, the State filed an Information charging Chapman with 

attempted first degree murder. The Information was soon amended to add a charge of 

conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The State later charged aggravated assault and 

battery based on the same facts in a separate Information. It gave notice of its intent to 

seek sentence enhancement as a habitual criminal on the assault and battery charge under 

Wyoming Statute § 6-10-201. Each of the charges exposed Chapman to life
2

imprisonment if he was convicted. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-101(b), 6-10-201(b)(ii) 

(LexisNexis 2009). The two cases were consolidated for trial. 

[¶7] The probable cause affidavit supporting the Information in each case alleged that

Chapman’s fiancée told him that she had been “hurt” by the victim of the shooting. The 

affiant claimed that the fiancée showed Chapman where the victim lived, and that the 

couple then drove to a gun show where the fiancée purchased a Remington .270 rifle with 

which she intended to shoot her alleged abuser. On September 28, 2008, the couple 

drove to the victim’s residence and waited for him to come home. When he did, 

Chapman drove next to the victim’s vehicle and shot him in the face. A bystander who 

witnessed the incident identified Chapman as the shooter. The victim survived, but 

sustained major injuries to the right side of his face, jaw and neck.

[¶8] At his arraignment in district court, the district judge advised Chapman of his 

rights as required by Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b), including his right to 

plead not guilty and to proceed to trial. The court repeatedly asked Chapman if he had 

questions about his rights, and he responded that he did not. He pled not guilty to both 

charges. 

[¶9] Chapman also pled not guilty to the assault charge at a separate arraignment held 

almost a year later. The same district judge again advised him of his rights, including his 

right to a jury trial, and he once again indicated that he understood his rights. 

[¶10] The case proceeded slowly as Chapman expressed repeated dissatisfaction with 

public defenders appointed to represent him. He claimed that one of his public defenders 

pressured him to plead guilty, which he did not wish to do, and new counsel was 

therefore assigned. Chapman was evaluated at the Wyoming State Hospital at the request 

of his second appointed public defender, which resulted in further delay. He was 

assessed competent to stand trial. A third public defender ultimately became involved in 

the case to assist the second appointed public defender.

[¶11] Although he initially expressed satisfaction with the second and third public 

defenders, Chapman eventually became disgruntled and retained a private attorney with 

financial assistance from his mother. Private counsel entered an appearance on January 

6, 2010. At a January 25 hearing on a motion for continuance, Chapman complained that 

his public defenders had done “nothing . . . so far on my behalf. That is why I went to a 

private attorney.” 

[¶12] Replacement counsel promptly moved for a continuance of a trial then set to begin 

on March 2, 2010, arguing that the charges against Chapman were sufficiently complex 

that he could not adequately prepare to effectively try the case on that date. The trial was 

rescheduled to begin on June 28, 2010 by an order entered on January 27, 2010. Waivers 

of speedy trial had already been filed at various times during the pendency of the case.
3

[¶13] After learning that private counsel had been retained, the public defenders still 

assigned to the case moved to withdraw and for an order awarding public defender fees 

on January 19, 2010. The court set a hearing on that motion on January 29, but was 

forced to reschedule it because all of the involved attorneys did not appear at the 

appointed time, evidently due to a misunderstanding as to whether the pending issue had 

been resolved by stipulation. The district judge observed at the aborted hearing that 

Chapman had refused to come out of his jail cell to attend. The hearing was rescheduled 

to February 5, 2010. 

Change of Plea

[¶14] Before the rescheduled hearing on public defender fees began on February 5, the 

court was advised that Chapman wished to change his plea. The district judge noted after 

calling the case that “It is my understanding that we are here today because there is a plea 

agreement, we are anticipating a plea from you on the basis of that plea agreement. Is that 

your understanding?” Chapman replied, “Yes, ma’am.” 

[¶15] As already discussed, the court had previously advised Chapman of his rights on 

two prior occasions because the two cases now before it had originally been filed 

separately. The trial judge referred to the two prior advisements, and asked if Chapman 

understood his rights. He replied that he did. 

[¶16] Despite this assurance, the court advised Chapman of the nature of the original 

charges against him as well as the penalties for attempted first degree murder, conspiracy 

to commit first degree murder, and aggravated assault. The effect of the habitual criminal 

enhancement was also explained–if the State could prove its case on this point, Chapman 

faced the possibility of life imprisonment on that charge as well as on the attempt and 

conspiracy charges. The court also advised Chapman of the consequences of a guilty 

plea, including that he “would be giving up the right to the presumption of innocence, the 

right to remain silent, the right to do a trial, the right to be confronted by witnesses and to 

cross-examine those witnesses, and the State wouldn’t have to prove any allegation 

against you.” 

[¶17] Chapman indicated that he understood the consequences of a guilty plea, that his 

plea was voluntary and that he was satisfied with his current attorney’s representation:

THE COURT: . . . . Do you understand the consequences of

a guilty plea?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Are you ready to plead today?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Will your plea be entered voluntarily?
4

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Ma’am.

THE COURT: Has anyone forced, threatened or promised

you anything outside of a plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Ma’am.

. . .

THE COURT: Have you talked with [your attorney] about

this case in general and the plea that it is anticipated that you

will be entering today?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with his representation of

you so far?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 

[¶18] Defense counsel then described the plea agreement. The State would amend the 

Information charging attempted first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first 

degree murder to one count of attempted second degree murder and recommend a 

sentence of twenty-five to fifty years on the reduced charge. Chapman would consent to 

the amendment, waive any right he might have to a preliminary hearing, and plead guilty 

to the amended charge. The conspiracy and aggravated assault charges on which the 

State sought habitual criminal enhancement would both be dismissed. 

[¶19] Chapman would also stipulate to the amount of public defender fees incurred 

before he retained private counsel, as well as to the amount of restitution required to pay 

the victim’s medical bills. However, his counsel would be free to argue that he was 

financially incapable of paying the public defender fees or restitution, while the State was 

free to argue that he was able to pay both. 

[¶20] After hearing the terms of the plea agreement, the district court addressed 

Chapman again, and established that he understood the agreement, that he consented to 

the amendment of the Information, that he waived any right to a preliminary hearing on 

the amended charge, and that he wanted to proceed to sentencing that day. The 

presentence investigation required by Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a) had 

been completed early in the case, and so it was not necessary to wait for it to be compiled 

to proceed to sentencing if Chapman did in fact plead guilty. 

[¶21] The district judge explained the elements of second degree murder, noting that the 

elements of attempt were the same for the amended charge as for the original charge. 

She also explained the minimum and maximum penalties for attempted second degree 

murder, which were a minimum of twenty years and a maximum of life in prison. After 

hearing the explanation, Chapman asked for further clarification and then expressed his 

understanding of what he had been told. The judge asked him again if he understood his
5

constitutional rights, which she noted were the same as for the original charges, and he

said that he did. When asked if he had any questions, he indicated that he did not.

[¶22] Chapman pled guilty and testified under oath to a factual basis to support the plea. 

He generally corroborated the allegations of the probable cause affidavit described above. 

However, the affidavit indicated that he told a Rock Springs police officer that he was 

holding the rifle at the time of the shooting, but that someone “yelled, causing him to 

‘jerk’ at which time the gun ‘went off.’” This could of course indicate that he did not 

intend to shoot the victim. 

[¶23] In his testimony as to the factual basis for his guilty plea, Chapman stated 

unequivocally that he took the rifle in question from his fiancée and shot the victim on 

purpose–that he “meant to shoot him, yeah.” The record reflects no prompting by or offthe-record conferences with defense counsel during his testimony as to the factual basis, 

suggesting that Chapman’s responses were spontaneous.

[¶24] After taking the factual basis, the court found that Chapman was mentally alert, 

capable of understanding the proceedings, and competent to enter the plea. It also found 

that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made, “and not the result of force or threats 

or promises apart from a plea agreement.” It determined that Chapman had been 

properly advised as required by W.R.Cr.P. 11, that he understood those advisements, and 

that “the plea was made after consultation with competent counsel, with whom the 

Defendant is satisfied, without any improper inducement or conditions, with an 

understanding of the charge and the direct consequences.” After making these findings, 

the court accepted the guilty plea and dismissed the aggravated assault and conspiracy to 

commit first degree murder charges as called for by the plea agreement.

[¶25] The court then proceeded immediately to sentencing, first correcting a minor error 

in the presentence investigation report which Chapman and his attorney agreed was 

otherwise accurate. Neither attorney made an argument concerning the sentence, 

although they argued their respective positions regarding restitution. 

[¶26] As agreed, defense counsel did not dispute that the amounts of restitution or public 

defender fees were reasonable, but asked the court to find that Chapman was unable to 

pay either because he would be incarcerated. The State argued that restitution was 

appropriate given the victim’s significant medical expenses. The prosecuting attorney 

did not specifically address whether Chapman should be ordered to pay public defender 

fees. Before pronouncing sentence, the court asked, “Mr. Chapman, is there anything 

that you would like to say to the Court at this time or do you know of any reason why this 

Court should not proceed to sentence you?” Chapman replied, “No, ma’am.” 

[¶27] The court sentenced Chapman to a term of imprisonment of not less than twentyfive years nor more than fifty years with credit for time served while awaiting trial, as
6

called for by the plea agreement. It waived reimbursement of public defender fees but

awarded $76,589.19 in restitution for the expenses the victim and his health care

providers incurred as a result of the shooting. A written judgment and sentence was

entered four days later on February 9, 2010.

Plea Withdrawal Hearing

[¶28] On February 11, 2010, six days after he changed his plea and was sentenced, 

Chapman filed a handwritten motion to withdraw his guilty plea.1 He alleged that his 

plea was the result of duress imposed by his attorney, and specifically that “all the stress 

at the time & being told if I did not take the plea deal I would be getting life in prison . . . 

take the deal now or do life. I feel I was forced into it.” He claimed that he had lied when 

he provided a factual basis for the plea, and that Lesley Stevenson, his mother, “was in 

the room [when he discussed a plea agreement with his attorney] and feels the same way 

I do.” 

[¶29] After this motion was filed, Chapman’s private attorney withdrew, citing a 

potential conflict of interest based on the likelihood that he would become a witness. An 

evidentiary hearing on the motion was not held until August 25, 2011, well over a year 

later, due to delays in resolving a request by Chapman to represent himself, followed by 

appointment of a public defender (his fifth attorney in the case). The involvement of 

numerous attorneys also made it difficult and time-consuming for replacement counsel to 

locate evidence and transcripts in the hands of prior attorneys. Replacement counsel was 

also permitted to conduct discovery related to the motion. 

[¶30] When the August 25 hearing began, counsel advised the court of a written 

stipulation that the county attorney’s office had notified the victim that plea negotiations 

were taking place about one week before the February 5, 2010 hearing, and that he was 

notified on the morning of February 5 that Chapman would change his plea that day. He 

was present in the courtroom when Chapman entered his plea. 

[¶31] Lieutenant Crystal Valenciano of the Sweetwater County Sheriff’s Office testified 

when called by the defense that she was a supervisor in charge of inmate transports at the 

detention center in Rock Springs on February 5, 2010. She scheduled Chapman to be 

brought to the courthouse in Green River that day at about 9:00 a.m., but she did not find 

out that he needed be brought over until that same morning. This was unusual, because 

she typically learned about transports a week in advance. It is unclear what significance 

this testimony was intended to have, as Chapman was already scheduled for a hearing on 

the public defender’s motion to withdraw and for an award of fees that morning. 

 

1 The motion was dated February 10, 2010, a day earlier.
7

[¶32] The defense then called Chapman’s former private attorney. He testified that there 

was no plea agreement when he entered his appearance. He knew that Chapman was 

upset with his previous lawyers, but testified that he “never became aware that 

[Chapman] was dissatisfied with his other lawyers because they were pursuing plea 

negotiations.” He asked the court for a continuance of the March 2010 trial date on 

January 25, 2010 because he needed to review discovery and prepare for trial. He did not 

recall whether he talked to the prosecutor between January 25 and February 5. 

[¶33] The retained attorney testified that he anticipated an important discussion about 

resolving the case on February 5, the date of the hearing on public defender fees, 

although he was not asked why he believed this would occur. He requested that 

Chapman’s mother Lesley Stevenson be present, and she drove through the night from 

Washington State to be there. He met with Chapman and his mother in the jail in Rock 

Springs for thirty to forty-five minutes that morning. No plea negotiations had taken 

place up to that point in time. 

[¶34] The meeting at the Rock Springs jail was interrupted by staff who advised 

Chapman and his attorney that he had to be taken to the courthouse in Green River with 

other prisoners who had proceedings scheduled in district court that morning. The 

attorney arranged for Ms. Stevenson to follow him to the courthouse in her vehicle, and 

then discussed resolution of the case with the prosecutor. At some point, he notified the 

court that “if we could have some additional time we might be able to make progress 

resolving the case.” 

[¶35] The retained attorney testified that he then met with Chapman and his mother at 

the courthouse to discuss a possible plea agreement. The attorney said that Chapman told 

him, “[L]ook, if you can get me a bottom number of 25 [years] I would do that.” He 

advised Chapman that he could file a motion for sentence reduction late into his first year 

of incarceration, but warned him that the decision as to whether to grant a sentence 

reduction would be entirely in the court’s discretion. He also spoke of Department of 

Corrections/Board of Parole administrative good time, but he did not recall discussing 

whether Chapman would be eligible for placement at an adult community corrections 

facility, as Chapman later claimed they had. He was unsure how much time they spent 

discussing a possible change of plea. He remembered talking with his client about the 

necessary factual basis to support a plea, and how “there would be no other charges” filed 

with regard to the victim in this case. 

[¶36] On cross-examination by the State, the attorney clarified that he does not always 

recommend plea agreements to clients facing potential life sentences, but that he instead 

leaves the decision as to whether to plead or go to trial to them after they have assessed 

the risks of each choice. He testified that the prosecutor was willing to recommend a 

term of twenty-five to fifty years if Chapman would change his plea that day, which was
8

acceptable to Chapman. He believed that a plea bargain was in Chapman’s best interest, 

and he specifically told him that he could either negotiate a plea or go to trial. 

[¶37] He also told Chapman that he would receive good time if he met the 

administrative requirements, although he cautioned him that good time was discretionary 

and that he should view his sentence as one of at least twenty-five years. He did not 

discuss the specific effect of good time on the actual length of the minimum sentence, 

and likewise did not tell Chapman that he would receive a sentence reduction or that he 

would serve only six years if he did, as Chapman claimed.

[¶38] The defense next called Dr. Carlos Garcia-Prieto, an attending adult psychiatrist at 

the Wyoming State Hospital, as an expert witness. His forensic evaluation of Chapman 

yielded the following diagnoses: substance abuse including poor impulsive disorder and 

antisocial personality disorder, and adjustment disorder with disturbances of emotion and 

conduct, which is one of the most common psychiatric disorders. Dr. Prieto explained 

that, in his experience as a psychiatrist, not being forthright and honest with a person like 

Chapman may lead him to be uncooperative, make bad decisions, and even become 

violent. 

[¶39] Chapman also testified. He had been unhappy with his appointed public defenders 

because “[t]hey were more interested here, as they do in Wyoming, they plea bargain 

everything out.” He retained the private attorney because of his reputation as a trial 

lawyer, and also because the attorney told him that he would take the case to trial. He 

specifically told his new lawyer that he wanted to go to trial. He testified that he made it 

“very clear” that there were to be no plea bargains when he met with counsel on January 

25. He denied giving his attorney authority to enter into plea negotiations. Chapman 

testified that the two talked by phone on February 2 to discuss discovery and the request 

for reimbursement of public defender fees, but that they did not discuss plea negotiations 

at that time.

[¶40] Chapman testified that his attorney and his mother showed up at the jail in Rock 

Springs at 7:50 a.m. on February 5. They all met briefly, but did not discuss plea

negotiations at that time. He was transported to Green River at approximately 9:00 a.m.2

 

2 Chapman gave inconsistent testimony as to the length of the meeting:

Q. [New public defender] John, I just want to be clear. You are saying to 

me that it [the meeting] was about ten minutes?

A. Yeah, ten minutes.

Q. But I also heard you say that it was shortly after 8:00. So which is it?

A. No, it was ten minutes, ten minutes to 9:00. Sorry if I wrecked that. 

It was 8:50 when they called me out of my cell to come down to the front 

room.
9

Chapman anticipated a hearing which would only deal with the pending request for

public defender fee reimbursement. He described what happened next as follows:

When I got here to the courthouse I -- I was told I was here --

[my attorney] came in and he said that I had waived my right

to a trial. I told him a speedy trial. He said I -- no, we are not

going to get into all that. The judge is expecting for you to do

a plea. The district attorney is here. The victim is here, the

witnesses. We have your wife on -- at Lusk on the intercom.

The judge is willing to work with her, if you are willing to

work with the judge. Right now she is willing to work with

you, otherwise you are going to be sentenced today. So I

would advise you to take a plea bargain. He said I have

already spoke to the judge and I have spoke to Ms. -- he said I

spoke to [the deputy county attorney]. And [the county

attorney] is on his way over right now to do this. He says, ah

you know, this is what is going on. I told him -- at that time

regarding to the room, it was pretty long and lengthy in the

room. We spent probably two hours of him going in and out.

And I told him at the time just take me back to the jail. I am

done with you, man. I’m done with you. I don’t want a plea 

bargain. I told you that at the beginning. He said it’s not up 

to me, that right had been taken away, and that I was here to 

be sentenced.

Even though Chapman acknowledged that his attorney spent two hours going back and 

forth between the witness room where he waited and the county attorney’s office, he 

claimed not to know why his attorney would be making these mysterious peregrinations. 

[¶41] Chapman testified that the judge indicated that the change of plea caught her off 

guard. He also testified without objection that he believed that the victim had been 

notified at 9:00 that morning that a change of plea would take place, which was 

consistent with the stipulation in the record. He also testified to the following:

Q. Okay. When you got to the courthouse and you went in to

the visiting room there what were your -- how did the

discussion begin with [your attorney]?

A. He came in. He said -- okay. My mom was sitting in the

room. He walked in a little after I sat down. He said, hey, 

give me a minute, I’ll be right back. He came back to the 

room. He said look. He said I just spoke to the judge and to 

the district attorney, they are here. You are going to be
10

sentenced today. I told him at that time, I said no, I said I’m 

going to trial. I’m not doing the sentence. He said no, look, 

there is not going to be a trial. I just spoke with the judge and 

district attorney and they are going to sentence you today. 

Now, the judge has offered you the deal that has been on the 

table. She is willing if you be cooperative right now because 

she is tired of all this. She favors you a little bit so she is all 

right. So if you are willing to take this deal right now I advise 

you to take this deal right now, which is he came in with a 

number of 30 to 50 is the first number he came at me with, 

said that he had on the table that he was going to negotiate 

with.

. . .

His exact words, you are not leaving here today until

you are sentenced, you are here to be sentenced now. The

judge is willing to work with you. Not the DA, the judge. He

said the judge was going to work with me, she was going to

let me have the deal, it was still on the table if I cooperate and

take it right now. That was his -- that was his thing. I told

him no, you go tell the judge I want my trial. He left the

room and came back. He said no, the judge isn’t going to do 

that. I said go tell the judge to take me back to jail because I 

am not doing a plea bargain.

Chapman indicated that he repeatedly asked his attorney for more time to obtain a written

plea agreement and to study it, but his attorney insisted that he would be sentenced that

day. He claimed that his lawyer told him that his options were either to take “the deal” 

(of twenty-five to fifty years) or be sentenced to life that same day. 

[¶42] He also indicated that his attorney told him that he would receive a credit of fifty 

percent good time against his minimum sentence, and that there would be no federal

prosecution as a result of the plea agreement.3 He claimed that he was told that he would

only serve a total of six years in prison:

[A]s a matter of fact, he spoke with the judge, he had done

some other deals with the judge and the judge had -- you

know, it [was] all back to the judge, of course, according to

him. That he had spoke with the judge and . . . the judge said 

 

3 The record is silent as to what federal charges might have been brought. It is clear that Chapman was a

convicted felon, however, and he might therefore have been subject to a federal charge of being a felon in

possession of a firearm at the time of the shooting. See 18 U.S.C. 922(g) (2012).
11

that if we would just settle this since it was so long and it had

been so much and so much confusion. If would just satisfy

the victim right now with this number, she was willing to do a

sentence reduction, take 15 off the top, five off the bottom. 

Now that’s pretty good because I’m only doing 50 percent 

with the credits for my time served. That is ten years for 

credit of time served. I am three years down. That only gives 

you six to six and a half years and you can do that [at a 

community correction facility], yeah. 

In response to questions about the specific language that his attorney had used, Chapman 

claimed that “I have got [sic] a photographic memory. I can repeat just about anything 

over time.” 

[¶43] Chapman testified that although he believed that he would only serve six years 

after entering his plea on February 5, he realized this was incorrect after talking to other 

inmates and doing legal research at the jail’s law library. He felt that his lawyer provided 

false and misleading information, and indicated that at the time he changed his plea he 

believed that he had waived his right to a trial and would be sentenced that day regardless 

of whether he entered into a plea agreement because that is what his lawyer told him. He 

felt pressured, coerced, manipulated, and that he had no control over the situation. 

[¶44] On cross-examination, Chapman testified that he was upset with all of his previous 

attorneys because they wanted him to enter into a plea agreement when he just wanted to 

go to trial. He believed that his retained attorney had “manipulate[ed] the system for two 

hours,” referring to the time period during which plea negotiations were taking place. He 

admitted that he was familiar with the legal system and that he knew he had a choice 

between pleading guilty and going to trial based on past experience. However, he still 

claimed that he was told that he had no choice but to take the plea agreement and plead 

guilty, or go to prison for life without a trial. He testified that he lied to the court about 

understanding his rights, about entering a voluntary plea, and about the factual basis he 

gave. 

[¶45] The defense next called a records manager for the Wyoming Department of 

Corrections. She testified that “good time” typically reduces a well-behaved inmate’s 

minimum term by one-third and his or her maximum term by one-quarter because it only 

applies to time actually served. She also testified that it is common for attorneys and 

inmates alike to believe that good time results in a fifty percent reduction in a minimum 

sentence, but that the system does not in fact work that way. 

[¶46] Chapman called his mother Lesley Stevenson as his final witness. She testified 

that she paid to retain replacement counsel because he was willing to take the case to trial 

as her son wished to do. The attorney contacted her at some point before February 5 and
12

told her it was “imperative that [she] be there” for the February 5 hearing, and she

therefore drove overnight through a blizzard from Idaho to Rock Springs despite the fact

that she was recovering from pneumonia.

[¶47] She met with her son and counsel at the jail that morning, and Chapman did not 

authorize his attorney to negotiate a plea at that meeting. She traveled to the courthouse 

in Green River after the detention center staff took her son there. She was present when 

counsel and her son met at the courthouse. Her son’s attorney told him that the 

prosecutor had offered to recommend a term of thirty to fifty years. She said that 

Chapman “absolutely exploded and said no way.” She testified that Chapman said that

the numbers would need to be “really low” but explained that what he really wanted was 

to go to trial. The attorney left and came back with the offer of twenty-five to fifty years, 

which Chapman refused. 

[¶48] Ms. Stevenson claimed that counsel then told Chapman that he would be 

sentenced that day, and that his only choices were to plea bargain or receive a life 

sentence. Chapman argued with his lawyer, and counsel then told him that he would only 

serve six to eight years at a work camp after receiving a sentence reduction. Chapman 

asked for more time to consider his options, to which the attorney replied, “You can take 

what the prosecutor is offering or you can get sentenced to life. . . . [T]his is a one time 

right now deal.” She testified that the attorney “emphatically said if we didn’t take the 

plea bargain he was going . . . to be sentenced for life,” and she “still didn’t understand 

why we couldn’t have a trial.” 

[¶49] Ms. Stevenson testified that her son’s attorney had provided him false and 

misleading information. She recorded her recollection of the events of that day in a letter 

written after the private attorney was discharged. The letter was received into evidence at 

the hearing, and stated as follows: 

[The attorney] finally was able to talk the prosecutor down to

25 to 50 years, which he explained meant that John would

only be in prison for about 16 years if he made the plea right

now.

[¶50] The State called no witnesses. The court found that Chapman had failed to prove 

that manifest injustice would result if he was not allowed to withdraw his plea for reasons 

discussed below. It therefore orally denied the motion, and subsequently entered a 

written order confirming that decision on September 22, 2011. 

[¶51] On October 19, 2011, Chapman filed a notice of appeal of the written September 

22, 2011 order denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea and to the judgment and 

sentence entered on February 5, 2010. 
13

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶52] We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of

discretion, meaning that “we must determine whether the trial court could reasonably 

conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.” Dobbins

v. State, 2012 WY 110, ¶ 53, 298 P.3d 807, 821–22 (Wyo. 2012) (quoting Kruger v. State, 

2012 WY 2, ¶ 26, 268 P.3d 248, 254 (Wyo. 2012)). See also Jackson v. State, 2012 WY 56, 

¶ 6, 273 P.3d 1105, 1107 (Wyo. 2012) (citation omitted); Follett v. State, 2006 WY 47, ¶ 

19, 132 P.3d 1155, 1162 (Wyo. 2006) (citing Ingersoll v. State, 2004 WY 102, ¶ 19, 96 

P.3d 1046, 1051–52 (Wyo. 2004)). The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed to 

determine whether they are clearly erroneous. Palmer v. State, 2008 WY 7, ¶ 11, 174 

P.3d 1298, 1301 (Wyo. 2008) (citing McCard v. State, 2003 WY 142, ¶ 8, 78 P.3d 1040, 

1043 (Wyo. 2003)). When reviewing a decision to determine whether it is clearly 

erroneous:

[W]e assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below

is true and give that party every reasonable inference that can

fairly and reasonably be drawn from it. We do not substitute

ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we

defer to those findings unless they are unsupported by the

record or erroneous as a matter of law.

Harber v. Jensen, 2004 WY 104, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, 60 (Wyo. 2004). A finding is clearly 

erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed after examining all of the 

evidence. BJ Hough, LLC v. City of Cheyenne, 2012 WY 140, ¶ 8, 287 P.3d 761, 764

(Wyo. 2012) (citation omitted).

[¶53] Wyoming Rule of Appellate Procedure 2.01 provides as follows:

An appeal from a trial court to an appellate court shall

be taken by filing the notice of appeal with the clerk of the

trial court within 30 days from entry of the appealable

order . . . .

W.R.A.P. 2.01(a). This requirement is both mandatory and jurisdictional, meaning that 

“[t]he failure to timely file a notice of appeal deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear 

the appeal.” Yeager v. Forbes, 2003 WY 134, ¶ 14, 78 P.3d 241, 247 (Wyo. 2003)

(citation omitted); see also W.R.A.P. 1.03. Moreover, “when a party fails to timely 

appeal an appealable order [as defined by W.R.A.P. 1.05], he cannot raise the issues 

decided in the order in a subsequent appeal.” Cook v. Swires, 2009 WY 21, ¶ 10, 202 

P.3d 397, 400 (Wyo. 2009) (citation omitted). The existence of subject matter jurisdiction 

is a question of law that may be raised sua sponte at any time. Id.; Thunder Basin Coal
14

Co. v. Campbell Cnty., 2006 WY 44, ¶ 36, 132 P.3d 801, 813 (Wyo. 2006) (citing 

Scherer v. Schuler Custom Homes Const., Inc., 2004 WY 109, ¶ 10, 98 P.3d 159, 162 

(Wyo. 2004)).

DISCUSSION

Plea Withdrawal

[¶54] Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d) provides as follows:

(d) Plea withdrawal. -- If a motion for withdrawal of a plea of

guilty or nolo contendere is made before sentence is imposed,

the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing

by the defendant of any fair and just reason. At any later

time, a plea may be set aside only to correct manifest

injustice.

W.R.Cr.P. 32(d). Rule 32(d) does not impose a time limit for the filing of a postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. However, we have held that a motion to

withdraw a guilty plea must be filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal. Nixon v.

State, 2002 WY 118, ¶¶ 13–14, 51 P.3d 851, 854 (Wyo. 2002). Chapman filed a motion 

to withdraw his guilty plea just two days after a judgment and sentence was entered, well 

within the thirty days allowed by Wyoming Rule of Appellate Procedure 2.01. Although 

his motion was not decided for approximately twenty months, the Rules of Criminal 

Procedure do not impose a time limitation as they do for certain types of post-trial 

motions, and we are therefore able to reach the merits of this issue.

[¶55] Chapman argues that his plea was involuntary because his attorney made 

misrepresentations or gave bad advice on which he relied. He claims that three separate 

misrepresentations induced him to plead guilty: (1) that he would serve substantially less 

time than he actually would before being eligible for parole due to good time allowances 

and a sentence reduction; (2) that he must accept a plea agreement and enter a guilty plea 

to a lesser charge or receive a life sentence without a trial; and (3) that federal charges

would not be filed because there would be a notice of nolle prosequi4from federal

authorities. He contends that he would have gone to trial if he had not been misled.

[¶56] The State responds that the district court properly exercised its discretion and 

reasonably concluded that Chapman’s claims were not credible. It contends that the calm 

and relaxed demeanor of Chapman observed by the district judge at the change of plea 

hearing was inconsistent with his subsequent claim that he was pressured and coerced to 

 

4 A legal notice that a prosecutor has abandoned an action. Black’s Law Dictionary 1147 (9th ed. 2009).

Chapman seemed to be more familiar with this term than anyone else involved in the case.
15

enter a guilty plea. The State also points to Chapman’s statements that he understood his 

rights, which would be inconsistent with his claim that he was convinced that he no 

longer had a right to a trial. 

[¶57] Rule 32(d) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the trial 

court may allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing only upon a 

showing that manifest injustice would result if he is not allowed to do so. “Manifest 

injustice contemplates a situation that is unmistakable or indisputable, was not 

foreseeable, and affects the substantial rights of a party. [The rule] is, in part, intended to 

address a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice 

or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” Follett, ¶ 

19, 132 P.3d at 1161 (quoting Ingersoll, ¶ 19, 96 P.3d at 1051). The district court 

concluded that Chapman did not make the required showing. As noted above, we review 

the trial court’s findings of fact to determine whether they are clearly erroneous, and its 

decision for an abuse of discretion. See Palmer, ¶ 11, 174 P.3d at 1301 (citing Ingersoll, 

¶ 12, 96 P.3d at 1050; McCard, ¶ 8, 78 P.3d at 1043). 

[¶58] The court indicated that it was not convinced that coercion took place, or that 

representations were made without authority. The judge did not find the circumstances 

surrounding the plea agreement to be as suspicious as Chapman claimed they were. She 

noted that “just because [the private attorney] conveyed an offer that was made by the 

State, doesn’t mean that he represented that he had authority to settle the case.” The 

court likewise found nothing coercive about the fact that defense counsel explained the 

factual basis required to support a plea to attempted second degree murder, pointing out 

that sometimes defendants want to plead guilty but balk at actually admitting guilt, and 

therefore fail to provide the required factual basis. The court also observed that many 

hearings get changed from one purpose to another at the last minute, and that “[t]he fact 

that this deal was made quickly is not per se evidence that it was done in an improper 

way.” 

[¶59] The court also found that Chapman had “some serious credibility issues,” noting 

that his testimony “speaks for itself today. I just kind of sat and let him go on and on. It 

got more incredible as it went along. . . . I got to hear about his photographic memory. I 

find his testimony to have been less than credible, especially in view of the self-interest 

that he has in the outcome of this hearing.” The court declined to comment on the 

credibility of counsel, explaining that he was an officer of the court, and that it was 

“incredible to really believe that he said that you are getting sentenced no matter what, 

the judge has already agreed, the judge owes me some favors.” The court further 

observed that Ms. Stevenson seemed credible, but that she presented conflicting 

testimony about both the discussion of a minimum term of years and the length of her 

drive to Rock Springs. 
16

[¶60] Finally, the district judge observed that she had firsthand knowledge of the change

of plea hearing. She indicated that she was not manipulated by defense counsel as

Chapman alleged. She did not find out about the change of plea until 11:00 a.m. on

February 5, when her judicial assistant told her that Chapman had decided to change his

plea, and she had no contact with any of the attorneys before then. The judge indicated

that she was vigilant and observant during the change of plea hearing. She intentionally

engaged Chapman in dialogue, and she asked him several times if he understood his

rights or had any questions. At one point, Chapman asked her a question that “indicated 

clearly that he understood what was going on.” 

[¶61] She observed that Chapman remained relaxed and calm throughout the change of 

plea proceeding. There was no visible indication of any conflict between client and 

counsel, and Chapman’s demeanor never suggested that he did not want to plead guilty. 

His body language was different than it had been in previous hearings when he was 

agitated because he was not getting along with his attorneys. The trial judge concluded 

that Chapman asked her to disregard her own observations, and that she could not do so.

She found no credible evidence of deception, coercion, or intimidation perpetrated by 

Chapman’s attorney.

[¶62] Turning to the record itself, Chapman’s statements were patently incredible. He 

admitted that his lawyer spent two hours going back and forth between the room where 

he and his mother were located and the prosecuting attorney’s office. This activity would 

be typical of a defense attorney attempting to negotiate a plea agreement. After this 

extended period of what would be aimless behavior on counsel’s part if plea negotiations 

were not being conducted, Chapman entered the courtroom and calmly pled guilty to 

attempted second degree murder. He provided a spontaneous and credible factual basis 

to support the plea. He had not previously been reticent about expressing his 

disenchantment with his public defenders, and it is no wonder that the district judge 

found his claim to have been coerced incredible based on her observations of his 

behavior. The record is consistent with the district court’s observations.

[¶63] Chapman and his mother claim that he was terribly upset with his lawyer and that 

he refused to even consider a plea agreement. This claim cannot be reconciled with his 

contention that he was misled into agreeing to one because he thought he would serve a 

little more than six years time in community corrections for shooting a man in the face at 

close range with a high-powered hunting rifle with the obvious intent to kill him. 

[¶64] Chapman was on parole on felony charges in two other states at the time of the 

shooting, and the criminal history reflected in his presentence investigation report shows 

that these were not his first experiences with felony prosecution. It is simply 

unbelievable that any competent adult, much less one who has been previously 

prosecuted for and convicted of felonies, and who has been fully advised of his rights as 

Chapman had been, could believe that a trial judge could or would sentence a defendant
17

to life in prison without a guilty plea or a trial. This is a scenario too far-fetched even for

Franz Kafka.5 

[¶65] This claim is even more incredible in light of the fact that Chapman was present at 

a hearing on replacement counsel’s motion to continue the trial on January 25, 2010, just 

eleven days before he changed his plea. He heard the court continue the trial date to 

allow counsel enough time to prepare. The transcript of that hearing clearly reflects that 

the trial judge was concerned about delay, and wanted Chapman to have his trial as soon 

as reasonably possible. 

[¶66] Ms. Stevenson’s testimony was itself incredible in some respects, but in others 

credibly undercut Chapman’s claims. For example, she originally wrote in her narrative 

of the conversations between Chapman and his lawyer that he was told he could serve as 

little as sixteen years before being paroled, which would be about two-thirds of his 

minimum sentence. This was approximately the good time credit which the Department 

of Corrections records manager testified well-behaved inmates might expect to receive. 

Ms. Stevenson also corroborated defense counsel’s claim that he spent two hours 

working on a plea agreement before one was reached. 

[¶67] Finally, she testified that Chapman said that the numbers would need to be “really 

low” after his attorney conveyed the State’s offer to recommend a sentence of thirty to 

fifty years. Although she was quick to explain that he meant that he really wanted to go 

to trial, the explanation makes no sense. All her son had to do to go to trial was to 

maintain his not guilty plea. He already had a trial date.

[¶68] The district judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Chapman’s motion to 

withdraw his plea, and her findings of fact were certainly not clearly erroneous. She 

assessed the credibility of the witnesses, weighed conflicting testimony, and made 

necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions based on what she had seen and heard. 

See Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Wyo. 1997). She correctly ruled that Chapman 

failed to prove that manifest injustice would result from a refusal to allow him to 

withdraw his guilty plea.

Restitution Order

[¶69] We must determine whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider Chapman’s 

appeal of the district court’s order of restitution. As noted above, the judgment and 

sentence was entered on February 9, 2010. No notice of appeal was filed until October 

19, 2011, well over a year and a half later. Wyoming Rule of Appellate Procedure 

2.01(a) allows an appellant only thirty days to file a notice of appeal. 

 

5

Franz Kafka, The Trial (1915).
18

[¶70] Rule 2.03 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the running

of time to file a notice of appeal is terminated by the timely filing of “a motion for 

judgment of acquittal made pursuant to Rule 29(c), Wyo. R. Cr. P.; a motion for a new 

trial made pursuant to Rule 33, Wyo. R. Cr. P.; or a motion in arrest of judgment made 

pursuant to Rule 34, Wyo. R. Cr. P.” W.R.A.P. 2.03. Motions to withdraw a guilty plea 

are not included on the above list, and therefore do not toll the time for filing a notice of 

appeal. Chapman’s time to appeal the restitution provisions of the judgment and sentence 

was not therefore extended by the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and the notice of 

appeal filed in 2011 was therefore untimely. “The failure to file a timely notice of appeal 

from a final, appealable order deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” 

Cook, ¶ 10, 202 P.3d at 400 (citing Yeager, ¶ 14, 78 P.3d at 247).

[¶71] Chapman filed motions to correct an illegal sentence on December 27, 2011 and 

February 22, 2012, long after a judgment and sentence had been entered, after the hearing 

on Chapman’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and after a notice of appeal concerning 

the denial of that motion had been filed. In each motion he claimed that he was unable to 

pay restitution and that the judgment and sentence ordering it was therefore illegal. The 

court made a minute entry indicating that it would not act upon the motion due to the 

pendency of this appeal. 

[¶72] An award of restitution may be reviewed on a motion to correct an illegal sentence 

if it is claimed that the sentencing court exceeded its authority when it made the award, 

but not if the claim is that the decision to award restitution was factually erroneous. Hite 

v. State, 2007 WY 199, ¶ 10, 172 P.3d 737, 739–40 (Wyo. 2007). “A challenge to the 

legal authority of a sentencing court to impose restitution . . . is essentially an allegation

that an illegal sentence has been imposed.” Id. We have previously reviewed claims of

an illegal sentence to promote judicial economy even when the issue has not been 

resolved by the trial court:

Our rules of criminal procedure authorize a trial court

to correct an illegal sentence at any time. W.R.Cr.P.

35(a). A motion to correct an illegal sentence is

properly addressed to the trial court in the first

instance. Kahlsdorf v. State, 823 P.2d 1184, 1189

(Wyo. 1991). For reasons of judicial economy,

however, we have considered illegal sentence claims

when the issue was raised for the first time on appeal,

Price v. State, 716 P.2d 324, 328 (Wyo. 1986), and

when the issue, although mentioned in the trial court,

was not pursued until appeal. Kahlsdorf, 823 P.2d at

1189.
19

Sarr v. State, 2007 WY 140, ¶ 12, 166 P.3d 891, 895 (Wyo. 

2007). We are not precluded from considering the legality of 

Mr. Endris’s sentence for the first time on appeal.

Endris v. State, 2010 WY 73, ¶ 21, 233 P.3d 578, 583 (Wyo. 2010).

[¶73] Chapman’s claim that the restitution award was an illegal sentence is flawed by 

the failure to file a timely appeal, as well as by the absence of any final order disposing of 

his motion to correct an illegal sentence or an appeal from such an order. We would be 

justified and probably well-advised to decline to consider the issue at all. However, 

because any decision the district court might later make could only be reviewed to 

determine whether the court had authority to order restitution as it did, we will reach the 

merits of that question in an effort to promote judicial economy.

[¶74] Chapman argues that the district court lacked authority to award restitution while 

waiving public defender fees because restitution is lower on the list of priorities set forth 

in Rule 32.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure than public defender fees.

This is clearly incorrect. Rule 32.1 provides as follows:

The clerk of court shall use the following prioritized

order when distributing offender payments and restitution:

1. Crime Victims Compensation Surcharge (Wyo.

Stat. Ann. § 1-40-119)

2. Judicial Systems Automation Fee (Wyo. Stat. Ann. 

§ 5-2-120)

3. Indigent Civil Legal Services Fee (Wyo. Stat. Ann. 

§ 5-2-121)

4. Restitution as follows:

. . .

5. Court costs

6. Fines

7. Fees (in the following order, including but not

limited to: public defender fee, prosecution fee,

addicted offender fee, probation fee, jail costs,

extradition fee, and other fees)

8. Contempt.

W.R.Cr.P. 32.1 (emphasis added). By its plain language, Rule 32.1 does not prioritize

distribution of public defender fees over an order of restitution. Chapman has 

mischaracterized the “Indigent Civil Legal Services Fee,” referring to it as “a.k.a. Public 

Defender fees.” 
20

[¶75] After July 1, 2012, a fee currently set at $10.00 is to be collected in all civil and 

criminal cases to fund a program to provide civil legal services for the indigent. Wyo. 

Stat. Ann. §§ 5-2-121; 5-2-122; 6-10-102 (LexisNexis 2011). This assessment has 

nothing whatsoever to do with public defender fees, which are specifically listed lower 

than restitution on the list of priorities in a portion of Rule 32.1 which was not quoted in 

Chapman’s brief. We therefore conclude that the district court had authority to prioritize 

restitution over public defender fees as it did.

[¶76] It might be argued that the district court should have ordered Chapman to pay 

public defender fees as well as restitution. Even if this were true, Chapman benefitted

from that claimed error. Rule 9.04 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure directs 

a reviewing court to disregard harmless error, which is defined as “[a]ny error, defect, 

irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights . . . .” W.R.A.P. 9.04; see 

also Condra v. State, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 29, 100 P.3d 386, 394 (Wyo. 2004) (“An error 

must be ‘injurious or prejudicial’ to warrant reversal . . . .”) (citing Spilman v. State, 633 

P.2d 183, 185 (Wyo. 1981)). Chapman cannot obtain a reversal for an error in his favor. 

See id.

CONCLUSION

[¶77] The district court acted reasonably and within its discretion in denying Chapman’s 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Chapman did not timely appeal the restitution 

provisions of his judgment and sentence, and he thereby waived his right to challenge 

anything other than the district court’s authority to make the award. The court had 

authority to award restitution and waive public defender fees as it did under W.R.Cr.P. 

32.1. Affirmed.