GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

WARFIGHTER 

SUPPORT 

Actions Needed to 

Improve Visibility and 

Coordination of 

DOD’s CounterImprovised Explosive 

Device Efforts 

October 2009 

GAO-10-95 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

October 29, 2009

WARFIGHTER SUPPORT

Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and 

Coordination of DOD's Counter-Improvised Explosive 

Highlights of GAO-10-95, a report to Device Efforts congressional committees 

Prior to the Joint Improvised 

Explosive Device Defeat 

Organization’s (JIEDDO) 

establishment in 2006, no single 

entity was responsible for 

coordinating the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) counter 

improvised explosive device (IED) 

efforts. JIEDDO was established to 

coordinate and focus all counterIED efforts, including ongoing 

research and development, 

throughout DOD. This report, 

which is one in a series of 

congressionally mandated GAO 

reports related to JIEDDO’s 

management and operations, 

assesses the extent to which 

1) capability gaps were initially 

identified in DOD’s effort to defeat 

IEDs and how these gaps and other 

factors led to the development of 

JIEDDO, 2) JIEDDO has 

maintained visibility over all 

counter-IED efforts, 3) JIEDDO has 

coordinated the transition of 

JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the 

military services, and 4) JIEDDO 

has developed criteria for the 

counter-IED training initiatives it 

will fund. To address these 

objectives, GAO reviewed and 

analyzed relevant documents and 

met with DOD and service officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that JIEDDO 

(1) improve its visibility of all 

counter-IED efforts, (2) work with 

the services to develop a complete 

transition plan for initiatives, and 

(3) define criteria for funding 

training initiatives. DOD generally 

concurred with our 

recommendations and noted 

actions to be taken. 

With the escalation of the IED threat in Iraq, DOD identified several counterIED capability gaps that included shortcomings in the areas of counter-IED 

technologies, qualified personnel with expertise in counter-IED tactics, 

training, dedicated funding, and expedited acquisition processes. For 

example, prior to JIEDDO’s establishment, many different DOD entities 

focused on counter-IED issues, but coordination among these various efforts 

was informal and ad hoc. DOD’s efforts to focus on addressing these gaps 

culminated in the creation of JIEDDO, but its creation was done in the 

absence of DOD having formal guidance for establishing joint organizations. 

Further, DOD did not systematically evaluate all preexisting counter-IED 

resources to determine whether other entities were engaged in similar efforts.

JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility over counter-IED initiatives 

throughout DOD. First, JIEDDO and the services lack a comprehensive 

database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, limiting their visibility over 

counter-IED efforts across DOD. Although JIEDDO is currently developing a 

management system that will track initiatives as they move through JIEDDO’s 

acquisition process, the system will only track JIEDDO-funded initiatives—

not those being independently developed and procured by the services and 

other DOD components. Second, the services lack full visibility over those 

JIEDDO-funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO’s acquisition process. With 

limited visibility, both JIEDDO and the services are at risk of duplicating 

efforts. 

JIEDDO faces difficulties with transitioning Joint IED defeat initiatives to the 

military services, in part because JIEDDO and the services have difficulty 

resolving the gap between JIEDDO’s transition timeline and DOD’s base 

budget cycle. As a result, the services are mainly funding initiatives with 

funding for overseas contingency operations rather than their base budgets. 

Continuing to fund transferred initiatives with overseas contingency 

operations appropriations does not ensure funding availability for those 

initiatives in future years since these appropriations are not necessarily 

renewed from one year to the next. This transition is also hindered when 

service requirements are not fully considered during the development of jointfunded counter-IED initiatives, as evidenced by two counter-IED jamming 

systems. As a result, JIEDDO may be investing in counter-IED solutions that 

do not fully meet existing service requirements. 

JIEDDO’s lack of clear criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will 

fund has affected its counter-IED training investment decisions. As a result, 

JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may have primary uses other than 

defeating IEDs. In March 2009, JIEDDO attempted to update its criteria for 

joint training initiatives by listing new requirements; however, these 

guidelines also could be broadly interpreted. Without specific criteria for 

counter-IED training initiatives, DOD may find that it lacks funding for future 

initiatives more directly related to the counter-IED mission. 

View GAO-10-95 or key components.

For more information, contact William M. 

Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-10-95 

Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 8 

DOD’s Efforts to Address Counter-IED Capability Gaps Culminated 

in the Creation of JIEDDO 9 

JIEDDO and the Services Lack Full Visibility Over Counter-IED 

Initiatives throughout DOD 16 

JIEDDO Faces Difficulties with Transitioning Joint IED Defeat 

Initiatives to the Military Services 20 

JIEDDO Lacks Clear Criteria for Defining What Counter-IED 

Training Initiative It Will Fund 24 

Conclusions 25 

Recommendations for Executive Action 26 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 26 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 31 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 34 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 39 

Figure 

Figure 1: Evolution of JIEDDO as IED Incidents Escalated in Iraq 12 

 Warfighter Support 
Abbreviations 

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command 

CREW Counter Remote Control Improvised Explosive Device 

 Electronic Warfare 

CVRJ Counter Remote Control Improvised Explosive Device 

 Electronic Warfare Vehicle Receiver/Jammer 

DOD Department of Defense 

IED Improvised Explosive Device 

JCAAMP Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Capability 

 Approval and Acquisition Management Process 

JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

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Page ii GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
Page 1 GAO-10-95 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

October 29, 2009 

Congressional Committees 

Improvised explosive devices (IED) continue to be the number one threat 

to U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. During 2008, IEDs accounted for 

almost 40 percent of the attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. In 2009, 

insurgents’ use of IEDs against U.S. forces in Iraq began to decline for the 

second straight year since 2003, while in Afghanistan the number of 

monthly IED incidents increased to more than 800 in July 2009. Through 

fiscal year 2009, Congress has appropriated over $16 billion to the Joint 

IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to address the IED threat. In addition, 

other Department of Defense (DOD) components, including the military 

services, have devoted at least $1.49 billion to the counter-IED effort. 

Along with the escalation in Afghanistan, the IED threat is expanding 

throughout the globe with over 300 IED events per month worldwide 

outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, according to JIEDDO. There is 

widespread consensus that this threat will not go away and that IEDs will 

continue to be a weapon of strategic influence in future conflicts. 

Prior to JIEDDO’s establishment in 2006, no single entity was responsible 

for coordinating DOD’s counter-IED efforts. DOD established JIEDDO and 

directed it to focus (lead, advocate, and coordinate) all DOD actions in 

support of the combatant commanders’ and their respective joint task 

forces’ efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. 1

 DOD’s 

directive mandates that JIEDDO’s director serve as the DOD point of 

coordination for initiatives across the full range of efforts necessary to 

defeat the IED threat, integrate all counter-IED solutions throughout DOD, 

and coordinate with other DOD components for ongoing midterm research 

and development initiatives and long-term science and technology efforts. 

In a series of reviews in response to direction in Senate Report 109-292, we 

first reported in March 2007 on several issues related to JIEDDO’s 

management and operations, including JIEDDO’s lack of a strategic plan 

and the resulting effects on the development of its financial and human 

1 Department of Defense Directive 2000.19E, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 

Organization (JIEDDO) para. 4 (Feb. 14, 2006). (Hereinafter cited as DODD 2000.19E, (Feb. 

14, 2006)). DODD 2000.19E superseded DODD 2000.19 (June 27, 2005) and transformed the 

IED Defeat entity from a joint task force, established under DODD 2000.19, into a joint 

organization. 

 Warfighter Support 
 

capital management programs. We made several recommendations to the 

Secretary of Defense to improve the management of JIEDDO operations, 

stressing the development of JIEDDO’s detailed strategic plan. 

Subsequently, we also reported on JIEDDO’s financial management 

processes and internal controls and JIEDDO’s coordination of intelligence 

support efforts. Due to concerns over JIEDDO’s performance and its 

ability to effectively coordinate DOD’s response to IEDs, Congress, in the 

Conference Report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense 

Authorization Act,2

 mandated that we review JIEDDO’s efforts in this 

regard. In response, this review assesses the coordination of DOD’s 

counter-IED efforts, specifically focusing on the extent to which (1) 

capability gaps were initially identified in DOD’s effort to defeat IEDs and 

how these gaps and other factors led to the development of JIEDDO, (2) 

JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all counter-IED efforts, (3) JIEDDO 

has coordinated the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military 

services, and (4) JIEDDO has developed criteria for the counter-IED 

training initiatives it will fund. In another ongoing engagement, we also are 

examining what progress JIEDDO has made to improve its management of 

internal processes. 

To assess the extent to which capability gaps were initially identified in 

DOD’s effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led to 

the development of JIEDDO, we met with officials from JIEDDO, the Army 

Asymmetric Warfare Office, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other current and former DOD 

officials involved in the establishment of JIEDDO. We also examined 

documentation including DOD Directive 2000.19E, which established 

JIEDDO, and documentation and briefings relating to JIEDDO’s evolution. 

To assess the extent to which JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all 

counter-IED efforts, coordinated the transition3

 of JIEDDO-funded 

initiatives to the military services, and defined what constitutes a counterIED training initiative, we met with officials from organizations including 

the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office, Army Training and Doctrine 

Command, Army National Training Center, Marine Corps Warfighting 

Laboratory, Marine Corps Training and Education Command, Training 

Counter-IED Operations Integration Center, Joint Forces Command, 

JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence, U.S. Central Command, Technical 

 

2

 H. Rep. No. 110-477 (2008) 

3

 A service assumes sustainment costs for an initiative by placing it into a program of 

record as an enduring capability in a transition. 

Page 2 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

Support Working Group, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and JIEDDO. 

We also examined documentation including DOD Directive 2000.19E4

 and 

JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01, 5

 which established JIEDDO’s rapid 

acquisition process, as well as other documents and briefings from 

JIEDDO, the services, and other DOD entities. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 through August 2009 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides additional 

details on our scope and methodology. 

With the escalation of the IED threat in Iraq, DOD identified several 

counter-IED capability gaps and began focusing on addressing counterIED issues. These counter-IED gaps included shortcomings in the areas of 

counter-IED technologies, qualified personnel with expertise in counterIED tactics, training, dedicated funding, and expedited acquisition 

processes. DOD’s efforts to address these gaps culminated in the creation 

of JIEDDO in 2006. Prior to JIEDDO’s establishment, many different DOD 

entities at the service and joint levels began focusing on counter-IED 

issues, but communication and cooperation among these various efforts 

was informal and ad hoc. In an attempt to coordinate and focus counterIED efforts, the Army established an IED Task Force in 2003, but the Task 

Force lacked both the funding and authority to undertake a large-scale, 

departmentwide effort. DOD responded by elevating the Army IED Task 

Force to the joint level in 2004, placing it directly under the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense in 2005, and increasing the organization’s budget 

from $20 million in 2004 to over $1.3 billion in 2005. In 2006, the Joint Task 

Force was turned into a permanent joint entity and jointly manned activity 

of DOD—JIEDDO—with an initial budget of over $3.7 billion and with the 

Results in Brief 

 

4

 DOD Directive 2000.19E, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

(JIEDDO) (Feb. 14, 2006). 

5 Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Instruction 5000.01, Joint 

Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability Approval and Acquisition 

Management Process (JCAAMP) (Nov. 9, 2007). (Hereinafter cited as JIEDDOI 5000.01, 

(Nov. 9, 2007)). 

Page 3 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

intention to provide the institutional stability necessary to attract and 

retain qualified personnel. These various actions that led to the 

development of JIEDDO were done in the absence of DOD having formal 

guidance for establishing joint organizations, and JIEDDO was developed 

largely through informal communication among key individuals in various 

services and agencies. Furthermore, DOD did not systematically evaluate 

all preexisting counter-IED resources in order to determine whether other 

DOD entities were engaged in similar efforts. In recognition of the 

increasing number of joint activities and the lack of official guidance for 

planning them, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review called for the 

development of a formal process for establishing joint organizations.6

 In 

response, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is currently developing a 

Joint Task Assignment Process to provide formal guidance for planning 

joint activities, which it expects to implement in late 2009. Despite the 

creation of JIEDDO, many of the organizations engaged in the IED defeat 

effort prior to JIEDDO continued to develop, maintain, and expand their 

own IED defeat capabilities. 

JIEDDO and the services have limited visibility over counter-IED 

initiatives throughout DOD. Although JIEDDO and various service 

organizations compile some information on the wide range of IED defeat 

initiatives existing throughout DOD, JIEDDO and the services lack a 

comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, limiting 

their visibility over counter-IED efforts across DOD. JIEDDO is required to 

lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions to defeat IEDs, and 

maintain the current status of program execution, operational fielding, and 

performance of approved joint IED defeat initiatives. However, JIEDDO 

does not maintain a comprehensive database of all IED defeat initiatives 

across DOD. JIEDDO is currently focusing on developing a management 

system that will track its initiatives as they move through its own 

acquisition process. Though this system will help JIEDDO manage its 

counter-IED initiatives, it will only track JIEDDO-funded initiatives, not 

those being independently developed and procured by the services and 

other DOD components. Without incorporating service and other DOD 

components’ counter-IED initiatives, JIEDDO’s efforts to develop a 

counter-IED initiative database will not capture all initiatives throughout 

DOD. Additionally, the services do not have a central source of 

 

6

 The Quadrennial Defense Review is a comprehensive examination of the national defense 

strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other 

elements of the national defense program. It is conducted every 4 years. 

Page 4 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

information for their own counter-IED efforts because there is currently 

no requirement that each service develop its own comprehensive database 

of all of its counter-IED initiatives. Accordingly, the services are limited in 

their ability to provide JIEDDO with a timely and comprehensive summary 

of all of their existing initiatives. Furthermore, although JIEDDO involves 

the services in its process to select initiatives, the services lack full 

visibility over those JIEDDO-funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO’s 

acquisition process. In its process to select counter-IED initiatives, 

JIEDDO has approved some counter-IED initiatives without vetting them 

through the appropriate service counter-IED focal points, because the 

process allows JIEDDO to make exceptions if they are deemed necessary 

and appropriate. For example, at least three counter-IED training 

initiatives sponsored by JIEDDO’s counter-IED joint training center were 

not vetted through the Army counter-IED focal point—the Army 

Asymmetric Warfare Office’s Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions 

Branch—before being approved for JIEDDO funding. Service officials 

have said that not incorporating their views on initiatives limits their 

visibility of JIEDDO actions and could result in approved initiatives that 

are inconsistent with service needs. JIEDDO officials acknowledged that 

while it may be beneficial for some JIEDDO-funded initiatives to bypass its 

acquisition process in cases where an urgent requirement with limited 

time to field is identified, these cases do limit service visibility over all 

JIEDDO-funded initiatives. We are therefore recommending that the 

military services create their own comprehensive IED defeat initiative 

databases and work with JIEDDO to develop a DOD-wide database for all 

counter-IED initiatives. We are also recommending that, in cases where 

initiatives bypass JIEDDO’s rapid acquisition process, JIEDDO develop a 

mechanism to notify the appropriate service counter-IED focal points of 

each initiative prior to its funding. 

JIEDDO’s initiative transitions to the services are hindered by funding 

gaps between JIEDDO’s transition timeline and DOD’s base budget cycle 

as well as by instances when service requirements are not fully considered 

during the development and integration of joint-funded counter-IED 

initiatives. According to DOD’s Directive, JIEDDO is required to develop 

plans for transitioning joint IED defeat initiatives into DOD programs of 

record, to be included in DOD’s base budget, for sustainment and further 

integration into existing service programs.7

 In a transition, one of the 

 

7

 For purposes of this report, we use the term “base budget program” to refer to “programs 

of record” as described in DODD 2000.19E, para. 6.2.8, and JIEDDOI 5000.01. 

Page 5 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

services is expected to pick up sustainment costs for an initiative by 

placing it into a base budget program as an enduring capability. In a 

transfer, one of the services may sustain the initiative through funding for 

current contingency operations. However, JIEDDO and the services still 

have difficulty resolving the gap between JIEDDO’s transition timeline and 

DOD’s base budget cycle, causing DOD to rely on service overseas 

contingency operations funding to sustain jointly-funded counter-IED 

initiatives following JIEDDO’s 2-year transition timeline. According to 

JIEDDO’s latest transition brief for fiscal year 2010, the organization 

recommended the transfer of 19 initiatives totaling $233 million to the 

services for funding through overseas contingency operations 

appropriations and the transition of only 3 into service base budget 

programs totaling $4.5 million. Furthermore, JIEDDO’s initiative 

transitions are also hindered when service requirements are not fully 

considered during the development of joint-funded counter-IED initiatives, 

as evidenced during the acquisition of two counter-IED radio jamming 

systems. In the first example, JIEDDO funded a man-portable counter-IED 

jamming system to fill a U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) operational 

need, even though the Army and Marine Corps did not have a formal 

requirement for the system. Nevertheless, DOD plans to field the system to 

each of the services in response to the operational need, which was 

revalidated in September 2009. It remains unclear, however, which DOD 

organizations will be required to pay for procurement and sustainment 

costs for the system, since DOD has yet to identify the source of final 

procurement funding. In the second example, Army officials stated that 

they were not involved to the fullest extent possible in the evaluation and 

improvement process for a JIEDDO-funded, vehicle-mounted jamming 

system, even though the Army was DOD’s primary user in terms of total 

number of systems fielded. The system, called the Counter Remote 

Control IED Electronic Warfare Vehicle Receiver/Jammer, ultimately 

required at least 20 proposals for configuration changes to correct flaws 

found in its design after the contract was awarded. Without ensuring that 

service requirements are fully taken into account when evaluating and 

developing counter-IED systems, this creates the potential for fielding 

equipment that is inconsistent with service requirements. This could later 

delay the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the services following 

JIEDDO’s 2-year transition timeline. To facilitate the transition of JIEDDOfunded initiatives, we are recommending that JIEDDO coordinate with the 

services prior to funding an initiative to ensure that service requirements 

are fully taken into account when making counter-IED investment 

decisions. We are also recommending that the military services work with 

JIEDDO to develop a comprehensive plan to guide the transition of each 

JIEDDO-funded initiative, including expected costs, identified funding 

Page 6 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

sources, and a timeline with milestones for inclusion into the DOD base 

budget cycle. 

JIEDDO’s lack of clear criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it 

will fund has affected its counter-IED training investment decisions. 

DOD’s directive defines a counter-IED initiative as a materiel or 

nonmateriel solution that addresses joint IED defeat capability gaps, but 

does not specifically lay out funding criteria for training initiatives. Though 

JIEDDO has published criteria for determining what joint counter-IED 

urgent requirements to fund, it has not developed similar criteria for the 

funding of joint training initiatives not based on urgent requirements. As a 

result, JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may have primary uses 

other than defeating IEDs, such as role players and simulated villages to 

replicate Iraqi conditions at various service combat training centers. 

Without criteria specifying which counter-IED training initiatives it will 

fund, JIEDDO may diminish its ability to fund future initiatives more 

directly related to the counter-IED mission. DOD also could hinder 

coordination in managing its resources, as decision makers at both the 

joint and service levels operate under unclear selection guidelines for 

which types of training initiatives should be funded and by whom. We are 

therefore recommending that JIEDDO evaluate counter-IED training 

initiatives using the same criteria it uses to evaluate theater-based joint 

counter-IED urgent requirements, and incorporate this new guidance into 

an instruction. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully agreed with three 

of our recommendations and partially agreed with two other 

recommendations. However, DOD expressed concerns that our report 

focused on counter-IED initiative challenges from a service perspective 

rather than a combatant command urgency of need. While we recognize 

JIEDDO’s mission and contribution in supporting urgent warfighter needs, 

as DOD’s focal point for coordinating counter-IED efforts throughout 

DOD, JIEDDO is tasked with the integration of all IED defeat solutions, 

which includes the integration of service requirements during the 

development of counter-IED initiatives. DOD also stated that our report 

focused on a handful of initiatives or efforts that encountered friction 

during either the development phase or the coordination process to 

transfer, transition, or terminate the program. While we recognize 

JIEDDO’s progress to successfully transition some initiatives to the 

services, the examples used in the report highlight the challenges noted in 

our work and identify areas for improvement. Furthermore, DOD generally 

agreed with our recommendations to address these challenges. DOD’s 

written comments are reprinted in appendix II. 

Page 7 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

Although the IED was not a new threat when first encountered during 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to DOD officials, U.S. forces 

were not initially concerned with the IED as a “weapon of choice” until 

IED attacks began to increase in Iraq at the end of major combat 

operations. Terrorist and insurgent groups facing overwhelming 

conventional forces had previously used IEDs in a variety of scenarios, 

including the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, the ship-borne 

attack against the USS Cole in 1999, and the airborne attacks of September 

11th, 2001. In a 2006 report examining the requirements for truck armor, 

we stated that the Army had previously identified the IED as a threat to 

U.S. forces prior to the beginning of operations in Iraq.8

Background 

Following the end of major combat in 2003 in Iraq, insurgents began to 

rapidly adjust their tactics due to the overwhelming firepower and 

accuracy of U.S. and coalition military forces in conventional warfare. As 

U.S. forces began to respond to this asymmetric threat, a new tactic 

emerged as the preferred enemy form of fire, the IED. Beginning in June 

2003, IED incidents targeting coalition forces began to escalate from 22 

per month to over 600 per month in June 2004. In June 2006, these 

incidents reached more than 2,000 per month. At one point in 2006, 

coalition forces in Iraq were experiencing almost 100 IEDs per day. The 

initial IED attacks in Iraq used nonconventional tactics, techniques, and 

procedures with a magnitude U.S. forces had not seen before. This threat 

involved an enemy that takes advantage of and adapts to the environment 

and is not restricted by conventional rules of engagement. For example, 

insurgents began using tactics such as buried or camouflaged roadside 

bombs, vehicle-borne IEDs (car bombs), and suicide bombers to attack 

coalition forces. Not only was the enemy flexible, but these insurgents also 

had the ability to rapidly respond to countermeasures. 

Due to the magnitude and previously mentioned changes made by the 

enemy in its tactics, techniques, and procedures, several counter-IED gaps 

related to the IED threat were identified by DOD: 

• technology gaps—shortage of jammers, robots, and other technology, 

almost none of which were geared towards homemade roadside bombs, 

 

8

 GAO, Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Production and Installation of 

Army Truck Armor during Current Wartime Operations, GAO-06-160 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 22, 2006). 

Page 8 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

• personnel gaps—lack of qualified personnel to analyze the threat and 

collect and distribute information on intelligence, forensic evidence, latest 

tactics, techniques, procedures, and other data, 

• training gaps—training on latest tactics, techniques, and procedures not 

available, equipment often supplied without training or instructions, and 

jammers interfered with communications equipment, 

• funding gaps—little to no dedicated funding for counter-IED efforts, and 

• DOD acquisition process gaps—no process for rapidly developing and 

fielding new equipment. 

DOD’s efforts to address counter-IED gaps culminated in the creation of 

JIEDDO. Initially, many different DOD entities began focusing on counterIED issues in an effort to address capability gaps. JIEDDO emerged 

through a series of attempts to focus counter-IED efforts, but its 

development did not follow a formal process. In recognition of the lack of 

official guidance for planning joint activities, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) is developing a formal process for establishing future joint 

organizations. Despite steps taken to focus DOD’s counter-IED efforts, 

most of the organizations engaged in the IED defeat effort prior to JIEDDO 

continue to develop, maintain, and in many cases expand their own IED 

defeat capabilities. 

DOD’s Efforts to 

Address Counter-IED 

Capability Gaps 

Culminated in the 

Creation of JIEDDO 

Many Different DOD 

Entities Began Focusing 

on Counter-IED Issues in 

an Effort to Address 

Capability Gaps 

As IED attacks in Iraq reached nearly 300 per month by October 2003 and 

over 400 per month by May 2004, many different DOD entities at the 

service and joint levels began focusing on addressing capability gaps in the 

areas of counter-IED technologies, qualified personnel with expertise in 

counter-IED tactics, training, dedicated funding, and expedited acquisition 

processes. Many of these efforts were carried out by the Army and Marine 

Corps, in addition to a number of joint and interagency efforts. 

Army officials stated that within the Army, individual units throughout Iraq 

began to focus on counter-IED efforts as IED incidents increased in Iraq. 

Army units developed their own counter-IED tactics, techniques, and 

procedures as insurgent tactics evolved, and soldiers began using an 

increasingly wide range of electronic jammers in varying configurations to 

counter remote-detonated IEDs. According to Army officials, the Army 

also employed Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians to disable and 

dispose of suspected IEDs. Army officials stated that these personnel 

began relying on remote-controlled robots as the number of IED incidents 

and the level of complexity of the devices increased, and Explosive 

Ordnance Disposal technicians were initially among the few personnel 

with counterexplosives training in-theater. To support these initial efforts, 

Page 9 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

according to Army officials, the Army relied on the Rapid Equipping Force 

to quickly acquire counter-IED technology such as jammers and robots. 

This organization was established in 2002 to identify and pursue off-theshelf or near-term materiel solutions that could be acquired and fielded 

quickly without having to rely on the Army’s normally lengthy acquisition 

processes, Army officials stated. The Operational Needs Statement, a 

process that enables commanders to request a materiel solution for an 

urgent need, was another method of rapidly acquiring technology 

solutions. 

Marine Corps officials stated that initial Marine Corps counter-IED efforts 

were centered on the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 

which was responsible for managing materiel requests, known as 

Universal Needs Statements, from deployed personnel. This organization 

began to receive a larger number of counter-IED-related requests as the 

IED threat escalated, according to Marine Corps officials, increasing from 

2 in 2002 to 8 in 2003, and 26 in 2004. Overall, 13 percent of all requests 

during this 3-year period were counter-IED-related. According to Marine 

Corps officials, in response, the organization established a counter-IED 

cell in 2004 to focus exclusively on counter-IED-related requests. The cell 

was later transferred to the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, and 

expanded to include personnel with more specialized technical expertise. 

Marine Corps officials stated that the Urgent Universal Needs Statement 

was developed during this period as a means of providing commanders 

with an expedited process for requesting critically needed capabilities, 

including counter-IED solutions. Through this process, Marine Corps 

officials stated that they have been able to develop and field equipment in 

a significantly shorter time frame than the normal acquisition processes, 

sometimes within several weeks. 

At the joint and interagency level, a variety of organizations were engaged 

in intelligence support and counter-IED technology acquisition. Early joint 

efforts included the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell, which was 

established by the Army in 2003 to perform physical, biometric, and 

tactical exploitation of evidence from IED attack scenes. Staffed by a 

combination of Army, law enforcement, and intelligence personnel, the 

organization provided Army, Marines, and Special Forces units with intheater analyses of IED construction techniques and enemy tactics, 

techniques, and procedures, and also collected biometric data, such as 

fingerprints, in an effort to identify specific bomb makers. While the 

organization often collected evidence from IED attack scenes itself, it also 

collaborated with Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and drew on data 

provided by these teams in their analyses. Since 2004, the Naval Explosive 

Page 10 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

Ordnance Disposal Technology Division has served as the administrative 

sponsor and primary source of technical and engineering support for the 

organization. According to an Army official, the Technical Support 

Working Group was involved in developing counter-IED technology 

solutions as part of the Combating Terrorism Directorate of the Joint Staff 

Operations Center, which in turn was responsible for counter-terrorism 

force protection efforts, including counter-IED efforts. The Terrorist 

Explosive Device Analytical Center was established in 2003 to leverage 

law enforcement, the intelligence community, and military capabilities to 

perform technical and forensic analyses on recovered IED components in 

the United States and provide actionable intelligence to field personnel. 

Army officials told us that, in contrast to the Combined Explosives 

Exploitation Cell, it focused on higher-level strategic issues rather than 

tactical ones, and included personnel from the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, DOD, and the 

intelligence community. 

Army and Marine Corps officials stated that communication and 

cooperation among these various efforts lacked overall coordination, with 

multiple entities independently engaged in attempts to address various 

facets of the larger IED problem. Although the Army had direct experience 

with IEDs due to its presence in Iraq, according to an Army official, it had 

no single coordinator for even its own IED defeat efforts. For example, 

Army officials stated that coordination of counter-IED efforts between 

Army units occurred in-theater at the working level as personnel facing 

similar enemy tactics exchanged successful tactics, techniques, and 

procedures, but little synchronization of Army-wide efforts was occurring. 

Army and Marine Corps officials stated that some coordination between 

the Army and the Marine Corps took place, for example, on the use of the 

different electronic jamming systems used by each service, but 

communication was carried out on an ad hoc basis and generally occurred 

only in Iraq as commanders from both services attempted to overcome 

IED-related threats. At the interagency level, counterterrorism force 

protection efforts, including the Technical Support Working Group, were 

coordinated by the Combating Terrorism Directorate of the Joint Staff 

Operations Center. However, an Army official stated that this organization 

was left with limited capabilities by 2003 as many of its resources had 

been reallocated to the Department of Homeland Security after the attacks 

of September 11, 2001. 

Page 11 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

JIEDDO Evolved through a 

Series of Attempts to 

Focus Counter-IED Efforts 

As IED attacks increased following the invasion of Iraq, JIEDDO evolved 

through a series of attempts to focus counter-IED efforts. Figure 1 

illustrates JIEDDO’s evolution as the IED threat increased from 2003 to 

2007. 

Figure 1: Evolution of JIEDDO as IED Incidents Escalated in Iraq 

Year

2004 2005 2006 2007

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

July 2004

Deputy Secretary of 

Defense creates Joint 

Integrated Process

Team for Defeating 

IEDs, transforms Army 

Task Force into the 

Joint IED Defeat 

Task Force

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

IED Incidents

Funding levels for JIEDDO and preceding organizations

Number of IED Incidents in Iraq

June 2005 

Directive 2000.19 

elevates Joint IED 

Defeat Task Force to 

report directly to 

Deputy Secretary

$100 million

$20 million

$1.3 billion

October 2003

Army IED Task Force formed

February 2006

Directive 2000.19E 

transforms the Joint IED Defeat 

Task Force into JIEDDO

$3.7 billion

All of the actions, noted in the above timeline, were attempts to coordinate 

counter-IED efforts and provide funding commensurate with the increased 

scale of the effort. For example, in late 2003, recognizing the need for 

closer coordination and greater focus on its counter-IED efforts, the Army 

took the initial steps toward what would later become a joint-level 

organization with the establishment of the Army IED Task Force. 

Page 12 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

According to an Army official, the IED Task Force consisted of a 

coordinating cell in Washington and two field teams in Iraq, and was 

largely focused on operational and training efforts in an attempt to address 

both the lack of personnel in-theater with counter-IED training and the 

need for better training on effective tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

The field teams, including former Special Forces personnel, developed 

effective tactics, techniques, and procedures, which they then relayed to 

the Center for Army Lessons Learned. An IED cell was established at the 

center to analyze these practices and incorporate lessons learned in the 

training of outgoing troops to Iraq, while an Army official stated that the 

coordinating cell in Washington provided leadership and facilitated 

communication between the field teams, field commanders, and the 

center. Army officials also stated that the IED Task Force fielded a limited 

amount of counter-IED-related technology in cooperation with the Rapid 

Equipping Force, including more sophisticated jamming equipment, 

vehicle armor, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal robots. However, an 

Army official stated that with an initial budget of $20 million and no formal 

authority to coordinate counter-IED efforts outside of the Army, the IED 

Task Force lacked both the funding and authority to undertake a largescale, departmentwide effort. 

In 2004, senior leaders began to believe that greater emphasis should be 

placed on developing a technology solution rather than focusing on 

training as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures, according to Army 

officials. In June 2004, the commander of the CENTCOM wrote a 

memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense requesting a Manhattan 

Project-like effort to find a technical solution to the IED problem. In 

response to the CENTCOM memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense created a Joint Integrated Process Team in July 2004. This team 

was intended to identify, prioritize, and resource materiel and nonmateriel 

solutions, and the Army IED Task Force was elevated to the joint level and 

renamed the Joint IED Defeat Task Force, with a budget of $100 million. 

In an attempt to enhance visibility over all DOD initiatives and to further 

focus the counter-IED effort, in June 2005, DOD Directive 2000.19 elevated 

the Joint IED Defeat Task Force to report directly to the Deputy Secretary, 

gave it a budget of over $1.3 billion, and clarified its role as the focal point 

for all efforts in DOD to defeat IEDs. The Joint Integrated Process Team 

was transformed into an advisory group to the Joint IED Defeat Task 

Force’s director, and a retired four-star general was recruited to head the 

Task Force in an effort to raise its profile among other senior DOD 

leaders, according to a former senior DOD official. However, a DOD 

official stated that by 2006, the Joint IED Defeat Task Force had begun to 

Page 13 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

encounter difficulties attracting and retaining qualified personnel due to 

its temporary status. 

In late 2005, the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense began working 

with the Joint Staff and the Director of Administration and Management9

to give the task force more permanence and to provide more manpower 

continuity. Several solutions were proposed by the Director of 

Administration and Management, including placing the task force within 

the Joint Forces Command, making it a Staff Element within OSD, or 

creating a Jointly Manned Entity under OSD. Consequently in February 

2006, DOD Directive 2000.19E turned the joint task force into a permanent 

joint entity and jointly manned activity of DOD—JIEDDO—with a budget 

of nearly $3.7 billion, with the intention to provide the institutional 

stability necessary to attract and retain qualified personnel, according to a 

DOD official. 

These various actions that led to the development of JIEDDO were done in 

the absence of DOD having formal guidance for establishing joint 

organizations. According to a former DOD official, JIEDDO developed 

largely through informal communication among key individuals in various 

services and agencies. For example, a former DOD official stated that after 

the establishment of the Army IED Task Force, the Secretary of the Navy 

became aware of its work and began meeting regularly with its director, 

and these meetings eventually led to the idea of elevating the IED Task 

Force to the joint level. Furthermore, DOD did not systematically evaluate 

all preexisting counter-IED resources in order to determine whether other 

entities were engaged in similar efforts within DOD, according to DOD 

officials. Although the Technical Support Working Group, for example, 

was already in existence at the time of the establishment of the Army IED 

Task Force in 2003, an Army official stated that Army officials were under 

pressure to find an immediate solution and that creating a new working 

group or task force would be the most efficient approach to overcoming 

the IED problem. In addition, an Army official stated that existing 

organizations, such as the Technical Support Working Group, were too 

focused on technology solutions, but even after the CENTCOM’s 2004 

memorandum requesting a technology solution, as noted above, a DOD 

official stated that the possibility of using preexisting counter-IED 

 

9

 The Director of Administration and Management advises the Secretary and Deputy 

Secretary of Defense on DOD-wide organizational and management planning matters. 

Among other activities, the director develops and maintains organizational charters for 

DOD activities. 

Page 14 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

resources rather than creating a new organization was not considered 

when the decision to establish JIEDDO was made. Furthermore, according 

to a DOD official, the Director of Administration and Management was not 

tasked to evaluate potential organizational solutions until after the 

decision to establish a permanent organization had already been made. 

OSD Is Developing a 

Formal Process for 

Establishing Future Joint 

Organizations 

In recognition of the increasing number of joint activities and the lack of 

official guidance for planning them, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 

called for the development of a formal process for establishing joint 

organizations in the future. In response, the Director of Administration 

and Management is currently developing a Joint Task Assignment Process 

with the goal of ensuring that future joint activities have the appropriate 

authorities, responsibilities, resources, and performance expectations to 

carry out their missions. This process will consist of four stages, during 

which preexisting resources and capabilities will be fully evaluated, the 

optimal organizational solution will be determined, and all stakeholders 

will be identified and included in the process. OSD officials stated that 

although the ultimate solution may range from a Memorandum of 

Agreement between two existing organizations to a new defense agency, 

creation of a new organization will be considered if no existing 

organizations are determined to be capable of fulfilling the mission’s goals. 

According to OSD officials, the process will be implemented through a 

formal DOD directive and instruction, and all new joint activities will be 

required to go through the process before being established. Although 

development of the process is still ongoing, DOD officials stated that 

implementation will likely take place in late 2009. 

Many Efforts to Address 

the IED Threat Have 

Continued after the 

Creation of JIEDDO 

Despite these steps taken to focus DOD’s counter-IED efforts, many of the 

organizations engaged in the IED defeat effort prior to JIEDDO continue 

to develop, maintain, and expand their own IED defeat capabilities. For 

example, the Army continues to address the IED threat through such 

organizations as the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office, established in 2006, 

which coordinates Army responses to asymmetric threats such as IEDs. 

The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command provides training support 

and doctrinal formation for counter-IED activities, and the Research, 

Development & Engineering Command conducts counter-IED technology 

assessments and studies for Army leadership. Furthermore, an Army 

official stated that the Center for Army Lessons Learned continues to 

maintain an IED cell to collect and analyze counter-IED information. 

Similarly, the Marine Corps continues to address the IED threat through 

the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, whose Global War on Terror 

Page 15 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

Operations Division is the focal point for all Marine Corps IED 

countermeasures. DOD officials also stated that the Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command, the Training and Education Command, and the 

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned have all continued counter-IED 

efforts beyond the creation of JIEDDO. According to DOD officials, at the 

joint level, CENTCOM maintains its own counter-IED task force as part of 

the Interagency Action Group, while Joint Forces Command continues to 

support counter-IED training and maintain involvement with counter-IED 

doctrine development. At the interagency level, the Technical Support 

Working Group continues its research and development of counter-IED 

technologies. 

JIEDDO has taken steps to improve visibility over its counter-IED efforts 

by, for example, involving the services in the joint counter-IED acquisition 

process and hosting DOD counter-IED conferences. However, JIEDDO 

and the services have limited visibility over all counter-IED initiatives 

throughout DOD in that there is no comprehensive database of all existing 

counter-IED initiatives. In addition, the services lack visibility over some 

JIEDDO-funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO’s acquisition process. 

JIEDDO and the 

Services Lack Full 

Visibility over 

Counter-IED 

Initiatives throughout 

DOD 

JIEDDO and the Services 

Have Taken Steps to 

Improve Visibility over 

Their Counter-IED Efforts 

Since JIEDDO’s establishment, JIEDDO and the services have taken steps 

to improve visibility over their counter-IED efforts. For example, JIEDDO, 

the services, and several other DOD organizations compile some 

information on the wide range of IED defeat initiatives existing throughout 

DOD. JIEDDO also promotes visibility by giving representatives from the 

Army Asymmetric Warfare Office’s Adaptive Networks, Threats and 

Solutions Division, and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, the opportunity 

to assist in the evaluation of IED defeat initiative proposals. Additionally, 

JIEDDO maintains a network of liaison officers to facilitate counter-IED 

information sharing throughout DOD. It also hosts a semiannual 

conference covering counter-IED topics such as agency roles and 

responsibilities, key issues, and current challenges. JIEDDO also hosts a 

technology outreach conference with industry, academia, and other DOD 

components to discuss the latest requirements and trends in the counterIED effort. Lastly, the services provide some visibility over their own 

counter-IED initiatives by submitting information to JIEDDO for its 

quarterly reports to Congress. 

Page 16 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

JIEDDO and the services have limited visibility over all counter-IED 

initiatives throughout DOD in that there is no comprehensive database of 

all existing counter-IED initiatives. Tasked with leading, advocating, and 

coordinating all DOD actions to defeat IEDs, JIEDDO is also required by 

its directive to (1) integrate all IED defeat solutions throughout DOD and 

(2) maintain the current status of program execution, operational fielding, 

and performance of approved joint IED defeat initiatives. Another 

document, JIEDDO’s internal standard operating procedure, requires it to 

maintain visibility and awareness of all counter-IED initiatives. Despite 

these requirements, JIEDDO does not maintain a comprehensive database 

of all IED defeat initiatives existing throughout DOD, which has spent at 

least $1.49 billion in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 on counter-IED activities 

outside of JIEDDO. In a previous report, we recommended that JIEDDO 

develop a database to capture all DOD counter-IED initiatives.10 In its 

response to our report, JIEDDO acknowledged the need for such a 

database and cited ongoing work in partnership with the Director, Defense 

Research and Engineering, to develop one. JIEDDO is currently 

developing a management system that will track its initiatives as they 

move through JIEDDO’s acquisition process. However, this system will 

only track JIEDDO-funded initiatives—not those being independently 

developed and procured by the services and other DOD components. 

Without incorporating service and other DOD components’ counter-IED 

initiatives, JIEDDO’s efforts to develop a counter-IED initiative database 

will not capture all initiatives throughout DOD. 

No Comprehensive IED 

Defeat Initiative Database 

Exists throughout DOD 

Though they are required by DOD directive11 to ensure that JIEDDO 

maintains visibility over their IED defeat initiatives, the services do not 

have a central source of information for their own counter-IED efforts. 

DOD officials stated that there is currently no requirement for each service 

to develop a comprehensive database of all of its counter-IED initiatives. 

Without centralized counter-IED initiative databases, the services are 

limited in their ability to provide JIEDDO with a timely and comprehensive 

summary of all their existing initiatives. For example, the U.S. Army 

Research and Development and Engineering Command’s Counter-IED 

Task Force and the service counter-IED focal points—the Army 

Asymmetric Warfare Office’s Adaptive Networks, Threats and Solutions 

 

10 GAO, Defense Management: A Strategic Plan is Needed to Guide the Joint Improvised 

Explosive Device Defeat Organization’s Efforts to Effectively Accomplish Its Mission, 

GAO 07-377C (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2007) 

11 DOD Directive 2000.19E (Feb. 14, 2006). 

Page 17 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

Division, and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab—maintain databases of 

counter-IED initiatives, but, according to Army and Marine Corps officials, 

these databases are not comprehensive of all efforts within their 

respective service.12 Additionally, of these three databases, only the U. S. 

Army Research and Development and Engineering Command’s database is 

available for external use. Since the services are able to act independently 

to develop and procure their own counter-IED solutions, several service 

and joint officials told us that a centralized counter-IED database would be 

of great benefit in coordinating and managing DOD’s counter-IED 

programs. 

Two other DOD components maintain counter-IED initiative information 

repositories, but they also are not comprehensive of all counter-IED 

efforts within DOD. At the combatant command level, CENTCOM 

maintains a Web-based information management system to track incoming 

requirements from its area of responsibility, but the system does not 

capture nor list all available counter-IED technologies. Additionally, 

DOD’s Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office’s Technical 

Support Working Group maintains an information management system 

that tracks counter-IED technologies resulting from industry responses to 

broad agency announcements. However, this system is neither searchable 

by other agencies nor comprehensive of all initiatives being pursued 

across DOD. 

The Services Lack 

Visibility over Some 

JIEDDO-Funded Initiatives 

The services lack full visibility over those JIEDDO-funded initiatives that 

bypass JIEDDO’s acquisition process. In this process, JIEDDO brings in 

representatives from the service counter-IED focal points to participate on 

several boards to evaluate counter-IED initiatives, such as the JIEDD 

Requirements, Resources, and Acquisition Board, and the Joint IED Defeat 

Integrated Process Team. However, even with these boards, JIEDDO has 

approved some counter-IED initiatives without vetting them through the 

appropriate service counter-IED focal points because the process allows 

JIEDDO to make exceptions if deemed necessary and appropriate. 13

 

12 The U.S. Army Research and Development and Engineering Command’s Counter-IED 

Task Force maintains an online counter-IED technology interface that provides a search 

and organization tool of counter-IED technologies, studies, signatures, and requirements. 

The Army Asymmetric Warfare Office’s Adaptive Networks, Threats and Solutions Division 

maintains a list of all initiatives that have gone through JIEDDO’s acquisition process. The 

Marine Corps Warfighting Lab maintains a list of all counter-IED solutions the Marine 

Corps uses in-theater. 

13 JIEDDOI 5000.1 (Nov. 9, 2007). 

Page 18 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

Specifically, the process allows the Director of JIEDDO’s counter-IED 

training center to make exceptions when training requirements and 

training support activities need to be accelerated to meet predeployment 

training requirements. For example, at least three counter-IED training 

initiatives sponsored by JIEDDO’s counter-IED joint training center were 

not vetted through the Army counter-IED focal point before being 

approved for JIEDDO funding. These initiatives included a $9.5 million 

upgrade to counter-IED training areas, a $19.1 million search rehearsal site 

to replicate conditions in Iraq, and a $1.5 million initiative to augment the 

number of personnel trained on IED signal jamming at an Army training 

center. In addition to not having visibility over these initiatives, Army 

officials later rejected the transition or transfer from JIEDDO of each of 

these initiatives for fiscal year 2011. In particular, Army officials rejected 

the search rehearsal site and signal jamming personnel augmentation 

initiatives because the Army had already been pursuing similar efforts. 

JIEDDO officials acknowledged that while it may be beneficial for some 

JIEDDO-funded initiatives to bypass its acquisition process in cases where 

an urgent requirement with limited time to field is identified, these cases 

do limit service visibility over all JIEDDO-funded initiatives. 

Army officials also cited examples where JIEDDO allowed certain science 

and technology initiatives with high-technology readiness levels to bypass 

the first stages of JIEDDO’s process to select initiatives. Officials from the 

Army’s Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions Division stated that this 

step limits the Army’s visibility over JIEDDO’s funding decisions. They 

cited six initiatives that bypassed JIEDDO’s acquisition process, including 

one designed to predetonate IEDs. While this method may shorten the 

time required for procurement, it denies the service counter-IED 

representatives at JIEDDO’s initiative vetting boards the opportunity to 

review the initiatives. 

JIEDDO also has bypassed its acquisition process by working directly with 

individual service units and organizations to address specific counter-IED 

capability gaps. For example, JIEDDO worked directly with the Army’s 

Training and Doctrine Command to establish the Joint Training CounterIED Operations and Integration Center without input from the Army’s 

Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions Division. As a result, the Army 

counter-IED focal point was initially unaware of the initiative and 

expressed confusion about how the initiative would be integrated into the 

Army’s overall counter-IED effort. Additionally, this training center was 

not based on a theater-based urgent need. Furthermore, Army officials 

voiced concerns about the implications of assigning a service 

responsibility for what is essentially a joint training function. Additionally, 

Page 19 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

officials with the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab described the 

coordination and accountability challenges involved when JIEDDO’s 

counter-IED training center works directly with a Marine unit to deliver 

counter-IED equipment, making it difficult for the Marine counter-IED 

focal point to monitor counter-IED activity and quantify the amount of 

funding it receives from JIEDDO. Overall, service officials have said that 

not incorporating their views on initiatives limits their visibility of JIEDDO 

actions and could result in approved initiatives that are inconsistent with 

service needs. This lack of visibility also creates the potential for 

duplication of effort across the services and other DOD organizations. 

Since its creation, JIEDDO has taken steps to support the services’ and 

defense agencies’ ability to program and fund counter-IED initiatives 

approved for transition following JIEDDO’s 2- year transition timeline. 

According to DOD’s Directive, JIEDDO is required to develop plans for 

transitioning joint IED defeat initiatives into DOD base budget programs 

for sustainment and further integration. However, JIEDDO’s initiative 

transitions to the services are hindered by funding gaps between JIEDDO’s 

transition timeline and DOD’s base budget cycle as well as by instances 

when service requirements are not fully considered during the 

development and integration of jointly-funded counter-IED initiatives. 

JIEDDO Faces 

Difficulties with 

Transitioning Joint 

IED Defeat Initiatives 

to the Military 

Services 

JIEDDO Has Taken Steps 

to Guide the Transition of 

Joint IED Defeat Initiatives 

to the Military Services 

JIEDDO has taken steps to support the services’ and defense agencies’ 

ability to program and fund counter-IED initiatives approved for transition 

following JIEDDO’s 2-year transition timeline. For example, in November 

2007, JIEDDO developed an instruction with detailed guidance to formally 

document, clarify, and improve procedures for transitioning JIEDDOfunded initiatives. JIEDDO has also taken steps to keep the services 

informed of the status of upcoming initiative transitions. For example, it 

holds a transition working group to provide the services and other 

agencies with notification of upcoming initiative transitions. JIEDDO also 

gives transition briefings to several boards and councils throughout DOD 

to facilitate the transition of joint-IED defeat initiatives. It gives a quarterly 

briefing to the Joint Staff’s Protection Functional Capabilities Board, a 

permanently established body responsible for the organization, analysis, 

and prioritization of joint warfighting capabilities within the protection 

functional area. To ensure coordination of transition recommendations, 

JIEDDO also provides annual briefings to the Joint Capabilities Board and 

the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. JIEDDO also annually updates 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s Senior Resource Steering Group on the 

transition of initiatives valued greater than $25 million. 

Page 20 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

JIEDDO and the services still have difficulty resolving the gap between 

JIEDDO’s transition timeline and DOD’s base budget cycle, causing DOD 

to rely on service overseas contingency operations funding to sustain 

jointly-funded counter-IED initiatives. In our 2008 report, we 

recommended that DOD develop a more effective process to ensure funds 

designated for sustainment costs are included in its budget cycle.14

However, DOD still lacks a comprehensive plan to ensure that the services 

have the proper funding to sustain an initiative following a transition. 

JIEDDO’s Initiative 

Transitions Are Hindered 

by Funding Gaps within 

the Services’ Budgets 

According to DOD’s Directive, JIEDDO is required to develop plans for 

transitioning joint IED defeat initiatives into DOD base budget programs 

for sustainment. As described in its instruction, JIEDDO plans to fund 

initiatives for 2 fiscal years of sustainment. After that, the initiative is 

supposed to be either disposed of or passed to one of the services for its 

continued sustainment through a transition or transfer. In a transition, one 

of the services is expected to pick up sustainment costs for an initiative by 

placing it into a base budget program as an enduring capability. In a 

transfer, one of the services may sustain the initiative through funding for 

current contingency operations. In comments on our prior report, JIEDDO 

stated that it would work with DOD to develop a more effective process to 

ensure that funds designated for sustainment costs are included in its base 

budget cycle. However, since that report, service officials have stated that 

JIEDDO’s process has not yet been improved and that JIEDDO’s transition 

timeline may not allow the services enough time to request and receive 

funding through DOD’s base budgeting process. As a result, DOD 

continues to transfer most initiatives to the services for funding as 

permanent programs, with service overseas contingency operations 

appropriations, rather than with service base budget funding. According to 

JIEDDO’s latest transition brief for fiscal year 2010, JIEDDO 

recommended the transfer of 19 initiatives totaling $233 million to the 

services for funding through overseas contingency operations 

appropriations and the transition of only 3 initiatives totaling $4.5 million 

into service base budget programs.15 Continuing to fund transferred 

initiatives with overseas contingency operations appropriations does not 

 

14 GAO, Defense Management: The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 

Organization Provides Valuable Intelligence Support but Actions Are Needed to Clarify 

Roles and Improve Coordination, GAO-09-172C (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 2008) 

15 The three initiatives include a bomb-sniffing dog initiative for both the Army and Air 

Force and a homemade explosives detection initiative for the Navy. As of May 29, 2009, due 

to additional transfers, JIEDDO estimated that the services would be responsible for $410 

million in transferred initiatives for fiscal year 2010. 

Page 21 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

ensure funding availability for those initiatives in future years, since these 

appropriations are not necessarily renewed from one year to the next. 

In addition to the small number of transitions and transfers within DOD, 

the services often decide to defer indefinitely their assumption of funding 

responsibility for JIEDDO initiatives following JIEDDO’s intended 2-year 

transition or transfer point. According to the fiscal year 2011 JIEDDO 

transition list, the Army and Navy deferred or rejected the acceptance of 

16 initiatives that JIEDDO had recommended for transition or transfer, 

totaling at least $16 million.16 Deferred or rejected initiatives are either 

sustained by JIEDDO indefinitely, transitioned or transferred during a 

future year, or terminated. When the services defer or reject the transition 

of initiatives, JIEDDO remains responsible for them beyond the intended 

2-year transition or transfer point, a delay that could diminish its ability to 

fund new initiatives. 

Lastly, JIEDDO has delivered training aids to the Army without ensuring 

that it had the appropriate funds to sustain the equipment. As a result, 

Army officials have stated that they are unable to quickly reallocate 

funding from current programs to pay for these sustainment costs. For 

example, JIEDDO provided counter-IED training aids, such as surrogates 

for mine-resistant vehicles to support training at the Army’s combat 

training centers, without first coordinating with the Army’s Combat 

Training Center Directorate to plan for their future sustainment. 

Consequently, this directorate had not planned for the $12.7 million 

requirement to sustain the vehicle surrogates and other training 

equipment. As a result of unplanned sustainment costs such as these, the 

services could face unexpected, long-term sustainment requirements in 

the future. 

 

16 According to the Army’s Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions Division, nine of 

these initiatives were training initiatives or medical initiatives later rejected by the Army 

for transition or transfer in fiscal year 2011. The training initiatives were not included in the 

$16 million figure cited above. 

Page 22 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

JIEDDO’s initiative transitions are also hindered when service 

requirements are not fully considered during the development and 

integration of jointly-funded counter-IED initiatives. According to DOD’s 

Directive,17 JIEDDO is required to integrate joint-funded counter-IED 

initiatives throughout DOD. However, service officials stated that 

transitioning JIEDDO-funded initiatives, such as counter-IED radio 

jamming systems, is made more difficult when service requirements are 

not fully considered throughout the systems’ evaluation process. In 2006, 

DOD established the Navy as single manager and executive agent for 

ground-based jamming systems for DOD. Under this arrangement, the 

Navy oversees several boards to review and evaluate jamming system 

proposals, including a program board at the general officer level and a 

technical acceptance board at the field officer level. Though the services 

participate on each of these boards, the counter-IED jamming program 

board approved, with JIEDDO funding, two ground-based, counter-IED 

jamming systems that did not fully meet the services’ needs. In the first 

example, CENTCOM, in response to an urgent operational needs 

statement originating from its area of operations, published a requirement 

in 2006 for a portable IED jamming system for use in theater. In 2007, 

JIEDDO funded and delivered to theater a near-term solution to meet this 

capability gap. However, Army officials stated that the fielded system was 

underutilized by troops in Iraq, who thought the system was too heavy to 

carry, especially given the weight of their body armor. Since then, the joint 

counter-IED radio jamming program board has devised a plan to field a 

newer portable jamming system called Counter Remote Control IED 

Electronic Warfare (CREW) 3.1. According to JIEDDO, CREW 3.1 systems 

were developed by a joint technical requirements board that aimed to 

balance specific service requirements for portable systems. While 

CENTCOM maintains that CREW 3.1 is a requirement in-theater, and 

revalidated the need in September 2009, officials from the Army and 

Marines Corps have both stated that they do not have a formal 

requirement for the system. Nevertheless, DOD plans to field the 

equipment to each of the services in response to CENTCOM’s stated 

operational need. It remains unclear, however, which DOD organizations 

will be required to pay for procurement and sustainment costs for the 

CREW 3.1, since DOD has yet to identify the source of final procurement 

funding. In a second example, Army officials stated that they were not 

involved to the fullest extent possible in the evaluation and improvement 

process for a JIEDDO-funded, vehicle-mounted jamming system, even 

JIEDDO’s Initiative 

Transitions Are Hindered 

When Service 

Requirements Are Not 

Fully Considered 

 

17 DOD Directive 2000.19E (Feb. 14, 2006). 

Page 23 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

though the Army was DOD’s primary user in terms of total number of 

systems fielded. The system, called the CREW Vehicle Receiver/Jammer 

(CVRJ), ultimately required at least 20 proposals for configuration changes 

to correct flaws found in its design after the contract was awarded. Two of 

the changes involved modifying the jammer so it could function properly 

at high temperatures. Another change was needed to prevent the jammer 

from interfering with vehicle global positioning systems. Army officials 

stated that had they had a more direct role on the Navy-led control board 

that managed configuration changes to the CVRJ, the system may have 

been more quickly integrated into the Army’s operations. As this 

transpired, the Army continued to use another jamming system, DUKE, as 

its principal counter-IED electronic warfare system. Not ensuring that 

service requirements are fully taken into account when evaluating and 

developing counter-IED systems creates the potential for fielding 

equipment that is inconsistent with service requirements. This could also 

delay the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the services following 

JIEDDO’s 2-year transition timeline. 

JIEDDO devoted $454 million in fiscal year 2008 to support service 

counter-IED training requirements through such activities as constructing 

a network of realistic counter-IED training courses at 57 locations 

throughout the United States, Europe, and Korea. Although JIEDDO has 

supported service counter-IED training, its lack of clear criteria for the 

counter-IED training initiatives it will fund has affected its counter-IED 

training investment decisions. According to its directive, JIEDDO defines a 

counter-IED initiative as a materiel or nonmateriel solution that addresses 

joint IED defeat capability gaps, but the directive does not specifically lay 

out funding criteria for training initiatives. Since our last report, JIEDDO 

has attempted to clarify what types of counter-IED training it will fund in 

support of in-theater, urgent counter-IED requirements. In its comments to 

our previous report, JIEDDO stated that it will fund an urgent in-theater 

counter-IED requirement if it “enables training support, including training 

aids and exercises.”18 JIEDDO also stated in its comments that it will fund 

an urgent in-theater counter-IED requirement only if it has a primary 

counter-IED application.19 Beyond JIEDDO, CENTCOM officials have 

JIEDDO Lacks Clear 

Criteria for Defining 

What Counter-IED 

Training Initiative It 

Will Fund 

 

18 GAO, Defense Management: A Strategic Plan is Needed to Guide the Joint Improvised 

Explosive Device Defeat Organization’s Efforts to Effectively Accomplish Its Mission, 

GAO 07-377C (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2007) 

19 GAO 07-377C. 

Page 24 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

stated that they will process counter-IED capabilities only if they are 

primarily related to countering IEDs. 

Though JIEDDO has since published criteria for determining what joint, 

counter-IED, urgent requirements to fund, it has not developed similar 

criteria for the funding of joint training initiatives not based on urgent 

requirements. As a result, JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may 

have primary uses other than defeating IEDs. For example, since fiscal 

year 2007, JIEDDO has spent $70.7 million on role players in an effort to 

simulate Iraqi social, political, and religious groups at DOD’s training 

centers. JIEDDO also spent $24.1 million on simulated villages at DOD’s 

training centers in an effort to make steel shipping containers resemble 

Iraqi buildings. According to Army officials, these role players and 

simulated villages funded by JIEDDO to support counter-IED training are 

also used in training not related to countering IEDs. Lastly, according to 

its 2008 annual report, JIEDDO used counter-IED funding to purchase 

authentic Iraqi furniture and other items to create a realistic environment 

for counter-IED search rehearsals. In March 2009, JIEDDO attempted to 

clarify its criteria for training initiatives not based on urgent requirements 

by requiring counter-IED training initiatives to be (1) counter-IED related, 

(2) joint in nature, (3) derived from an immediate need, and (4) unable to 

be funded by a service. As with JIEDDO’s urgent needs criteria for 

training, these guidelines could also be broadly interpreted, as 

demonstrated by the above examples. Without criteria specifying which 

counter-IED training initiatives it will fund, JIEDDO may diminish its 

ability to fund future initiatives that are more directly related to the 

counter-IED mission. DOD also could hinder coordination in managing its 

resources, as decision makers at both the joint and service level operate 

under unclear selection guidelines for which types of training initiatives 

should be funded and by whom. 

JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility and coordination of the wide 

range of counter-IED measures throughout DOD, which presents 

difficulties for DOD in efficiently using its resources to defeat IEDs. While 

JIEDDO and the services have taken important steps to focus counter-IED 

efforts, DOD remains challenged in its effort to harness the full potential 

of its components towards an integrated effort to defeat IEDs. In addition, 

difficulties remain in maintaining visibility over all counter-IED activities 

throughout DOD, coordinating the transition of JIEDDO initiatives, and 

clearly defining the types of training initiatives it will fund. If these issues 

are not resolved, DOD’s various efforts to counter IEDs face the potential 

for duplication of effort, unaddressed capability gaps, integration issues, 

Conclusions 

Page 25 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

and inefficient use of resources in an already fiscally challenged 

environment. As a result, DOD may not be assured that it has retained the 

necessary capabilities to address the IED threat for the long term. 

We are making five recommendations to address the issues raised in this 

report: 

• To improve JIEDDO’s visibility over all counter-IED efforts, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the military services to 

create their own comprehensive IED defeat initiative databases and work 

with JIEDDO to develop a DOD-wide database for all counter-IED 

initiatives. 

• To further provide DOD visibility over all counter-IED efforts in cases 

where initiatives bypass JIEDDO’s rapid acquisition process, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct JIEDDO to develop a 

mechanism to notify the appropriate service counter-IED focal points of 

each initiative prior to its funding. 

• To facilitate the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives, we recommend 

that the Secretary of Defense direct the military services to work with 

JIEDDO to develop a comprehensive plan to guide the transition of each 

JIEDDO-funded initiative, including expected costs, identified funding 

sources, and a timeline including milestones for inclusion into the DOD 

base budget cycle. 

• To facilitate the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives, we recommend 

that the Secretary of Defense direct JIEDDO to coordinate with the 

services prior to funding an initiative to ensure that service requirements 

are fully taken into account when making counter-IED investment 

decisions. 

• To better clarify what counter-IED training initiatives JIEDDO will fund, 

we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct JIEDDO to evaluate 

counter-IED training initiatives using the same criteria it uses to evaluate 

theater-based joint counter-IED urgent requirements, and incorporate this 

direction into existing guidance. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully agreed with three 

of our recommendations and partially agreed with two other 

recommendations. However, DOD expressed concerns that our report 

focuses on counter-IED initiative challenges from a service perspective 

rather than a combatant command urgency of need. While we recognize 

JIEDDO’s mission and contribution in supporting urgent warfighter needs, 

as DOD’s focal point for coordinating counter-IED efforts throughout the 

department, JIEDDO is tasked with the integration of all IED defeat 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 26 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

solutions throughout DOD, which includes the integration of service 

requirements during the development of counter-IED initiatives. DOD also 

stated that our report focused on a handful of initiatives or efforts that 

encountered friction during either the development phase or the 

coordination process to transfer, transition, or terminate the program. 

While we recognize JIEDDO’s progress to successfully transition some 

initiatives to the services, the examples used in the report highlight the 

challenges noted in our work and identify areas for improvement. 

Furthermore, DOD generally agreed with our recommendations to address 

these challenges. 

In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO and the services to 

develop a DOD-wide database for all counter-IED initiatives, DOD 

concurred and noted that JIEDDO is supporting the Army Research 

Development and Engineering Command’s effort to establish a JIEDDOhosted network solution that establishes a common collaboration tool to 

link these databases and provide comprehensive visibility across DOD for 

all counter-IED efforts. However, this initiative does not describe how the 

services will develop a comprehensive database for each of their own 

counter-IED efforts. While we recognize that this ongoing effort is a step in 

the right direction, until all of the services and other DOD components 

gain full awareness of their own individual counter-IED efforts and 

provide this input into a central database, any effort to establish a DODwide database of all counter-IED initiatives will be incomplete. 

In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO to develop a 

mechanism to notify the appropriate service counter-IED focal points of 

initiatives that bypass JIEDDO’s acquisition process prior to its funding, 

DOD concurred and stated that JIEDDO will take action to notify 

stakeholders of all JIEDDO efforts or initiatives, whether or not initiatives 

are required to go through the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 

Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP). 

JIEDDO will also inform stakeholders and elicit their opinions on JIEDDO 

developmental efforts in order to decrease duplication of efforts and allow 

services greater lead time to review these efforts. DOD noted that this 

process will be incorporated in the pending update of JCAAMP. We agree 

that if implemented, these actions would satisfy our recommendation. 

In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO to develop a 

comprehensive plan to guide the transition of each JIEDDO-funded 

initiative, including expected costs, identified funding sources, and a 

timeline including milestones for inclusion into the DOD base budget 

cycle, DOD concurred and noted that the Navy and Marine Corps are 

Page 27 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

working on efforts to improve the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives. 

DOD also stated that it has developed recommended changes for DOD 

Directive 2000.19E that will address coordinating the transition of counterIED solutions. DOD noted that these changes will be staffed to DOD and 

the services during the periodic update of DOD Directive 2000.19E. We 

agree that if implemented, these actions would satisfy our 

recommendation. 

In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO to coordinate with 

the services prior to funding an initiative to ensure that service 

requirements are fully taken into account when making counter-IED 

investment decisions, DOD partially concurred. DOD noted that JIEDDO 

responds to in-theater requirements that have joint applications but may 

not have service specific applications. DOD also stated that fully vetted 

coordination with the services prior to funding an effort or initiative could 

delay the fielding of material that would save lives. DOD therefore 

suggested that this recommendation be incorporated with our second 

recommendation to notify the services of all JIEDDO-funded initiatives or 

the language to this recommendation be changed to reflect DOD’s 

position. While we recognize the need to respond rapidly to support 

warfighter needs and that our previous recommendations will help gain 

awareness of JIEDDO-funded initiatives as they are being developed, we 

continue to support our recommendation and reiterate the need for the 

integration of service requirements and full coordination prior to funding 

an initiative to ensure that these efforts are fully vetted throughout DOD 

before significant resources are committed. 

In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO to evaluate counterIED training initiatives using the same criteria it uses to evaluate intheater-based joint counter-IED urgent requirements, and incorporate this 

direction into existing guidance, DOD concurred with the intent but not 

the language of this recommendation. DOD noted that the JCAAMP 

provides the mechanism to identify, validate, and provide solutions for 

combatant commanders and service training counter-IED capability gaps. 

DOD also noted that it is currently developing a new DOD instruction on 

counter-IED training guidance. According to DOD’s comments, the 

instruction directs DOD components to implement counter-IED, missionessential tasks across all levels of war into their training regiments at the 

individual, collective, unit, and staff levels, and sustain relevancy through 

interface with JIEDDO. While we recognize these actions may be a 

positive step towards improving coordination of training initiatives 

between JIEDDO and the services, neither the JCAAMP nor the instruction 

cited in DOD’s response to this report contain the criteria by which 

Page 28 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

JIEDDO will fund counter-IED training initiatives. We, therefore, continue 

to support our recommendation and reiterate the need for establishing 

criteria specifying which counter-IED training initiatives JIEDDO will 

fund. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or 

your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 

512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

William M. Solis 

listed in appendix III. 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 29 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
 

List of Committees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Howard McKeon 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Chairman 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 30 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the extent to which capability gaps were initially identified in 

DOD’s effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led to 

the development of JIEDDO, we spoke with current and former senior 

officials involved in the evolution of JIEDDO and examined existing 

documentation. To assess initial DOD efforts to defeat IEDs and the early 

evolution of JIEDDO, we met with officials from JIEDDO, the Army 

Asymmetric Warfare Office, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other current and former DOD 

officials involved in the establishment of JIEDDO. We also examined 

documentation including DOD Directive 2000.19E, which established 

JIEDDO, and documentation and briefings relating to JIEDDO’s evolution. 

To assess DOD’s efforts to implement a process for establishing new joint 

organizations, we met with officials from the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Office of the Director of Administration and Management, to 

examine documentation and conduct interviews on the implementation of 

the Joint Task Assignment Process and its relevance to JIEDDO. 

To assess the extent to which JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all 

counter-IED efforts, we met with officials from JIEDDO, the Army 

Asymmetric Warfare Office, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the 

Army’s Research Development and Engineering Command, and 

CENTCOM to discuss current efforts to gain visibility over all of DOD’s 

counter-IED efforts. We also examined documentation including DOD 

Directive 2000.19E and JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01, which established 

JIEDDO’s rapid acquisition process, as well as analyzed JIEDDO, service, 

and other DOD counter-IED databases. 

To assess the extent to which JIEDDO has coordinated the transition of 

JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military services, we met with officials 

from JIEDDO, the Army’s Combined Arms Center, the Army Asymmetric 

Warfare Office, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, and the Navy’s 

CREW Office. We also examined documentation including JIEDDO 

Instruction 5000.01, JIEDDO’s annual reports, and DOD Directive 5101.14, 

which designated the Secretary of the Navy as the Executive Agent for 

CREW and authorized the Secretary of the Navy to designate a Single 

Manager for CREW. 

To assess the extent to which JIEDDO has developed criteria for the 

counter-IED training initiatives it will fund, we met with officials from 

organizations including JIEDDO, the JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence, 

and CENTCOM. We also examined documentation including DOD 

Directive 2000.19E and other relevant documents and briefings, such as 

Page 31 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

published criteria for accepting counter-IED Joint Operational Urgent 

Needs from JIEDDO, the services, and other DOD entities. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 through August 2009 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review: 

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

• Operations and Training Division 

• Training Counter-IED Operational Integration Center 

• Joint Center of Excellence 

• J-5 (Interagency) Division 

• Technology and Requirements Integration Division 

• Congressional Affairs 

Department of Defense 

• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness 

• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller 

• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Director of Program 

Analysis and Evaluation 

• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Director of 

Administration and Management 

• U.S. Central Command 

• Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 

• Office of the Inspector General 

Department of the Army 

• Army National Training Center 

• Army Center of Excellence 

• Army Asymmetric Warfare Office 

• Army Research Development and Engineering Command 

• Training and Doctrine Command 

Department of the Navy 

• Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory 

Page 32 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

• Marine Corps Training and Education Command 

• CREW Program Office 

Joint Forces Command 

• Joint Warfighting Center 

Executive Office of the President 

• Office of Science and Technology Policy 

Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office 

• Technical Support Working Group 

Page 33 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 34 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 35 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 37 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 38 GAO-10-95 Warfighter Support
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 39 GAO-10-95 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made 

contributions to this report: Cary Russell, Assistant Director; Grace 

Coleman; Kevin Craw; Will Horton; Ronald La Due Lake; James Lloyd; 

Gregory Marchand; Lonnie McAllister; Jason Pogacnik; Michael 

Shaughnessy; and Yong Song. 

 Warfighter Support 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(351231) 
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