J-S79018-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.R.N.L., JR., 

A MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.L., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2333 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered July 14, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000945-2016

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JANUARY 04, 2018

D.L. (“Father”) appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County, terminating his parental rights to his minor child, 

D.R.N.L, Jr. (“Child”) (born 9/14), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2) 

and (b). After our review, we affirm.1

The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history as follows:

On September 18, 2014, the Department of Human Services 

(“DHS”) received a General Protective Services (“GPS”) report 

alleged that Child’s mother (“Mother”) tested positive for 

marijuana at Child’s birth. The GPS report stated that mother 

admitted that she ate three “weed brownies” for nausea and lack 

of appetite and that she received limited prenatal care. Thereafter, 

DHS determined that Father and Mother did not co[habitate] and 

that Father resided with his roommate in a supervised 

independent living apartment through Valley Youth House. On 

September 19, 2014, DHS inspected Father’s apartment and 

determined that the apartment had operable utilities and 

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1 Mother’s parental rights were previously terminated. See N.T. Termination 

Hearing, 7/14/17, at 55-56. She is not a party to this appeal. 
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appropriate sleeping arrangements but that there were rodent 

droppings on the kitchen counter and the kitchen sink was clogged 

and filled with dirty dishes. Additionally, DHS was unable to 

approve Father’s apartment because Father’s roommate was 

determined to be the perpetrator in a Child Protective Services 

(“CPS”) report for the sexual abuse of a three year old child. . . . 

On September 20, 2017, DHS determined that the home where 

Mother intended to stay with Child was not appropriate due to 

limited space. On September 22, 2014, Child was discharged 

from the hospital to DHS’ care. DHS obtained an Order for 

Protective Custody (“OPC”) to ensure Child’s safety and place him 

in foster care through Asociacion Puertoriquenos en Marcha 

(“APM”). At the shelter care hearing held on September 24, 2014, 

the OPC was lifted and the temporary commitment to the DHS 

was ordered to stand. At the adjudicatory hearing on October 3, 

2014, before the Honorable Jonathan Irvine, the [c]ourt 

discharged the temporary commitment and adjudicated the Child 

dependent and referred Father and Mother to the Achieving 

Reunification Center (“ARC”) program. DHS held routine Family 

Service Plan (“FSP”) meetings for Father and Mother throughout

this case. The FSP objectives for the parents were for them to[:]

(1) maintain sobriety and to successfully complete drug and 

alcohol treatment; (2) to provide consistent negative random drug 

screens; (3) to successfully complete mental health treatment; 

(4) to successfully complete a parenting program; (5) to obtain 

housing and (6) to visit the Child. On December 15, 2015, Father 

tested positive for benzodiazepine at very high levels at Family 

Court. On March 15, 2016, Father tested positive for 

benzodiazepine at Family Court. On May 24, 2016, Father tested 

positive for benzodiazepine and marijuana at Family Court. Father 

was scheduled for an intake appointment at Net-West on June 6, 

2016. Father did not attend. Father was never able to secure 

housing.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/6/17, at 2-4.

On October 11, 2016, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Father’s parental rights to Child. The court held a hearing on July 14, 2017

and heard testimony from several witnesses, including Bill Henning, DHS 
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social worker and case manager, Maureen Pie’, Guardian ad litem (“GAL”),2

Andre Briggs, CUA case manager, and Father. 

At the hearing, it was established that Child had been in placement with, 

maternal cousin and her husband, a pre-adoptive home in Atlanta, Georgia, 

for 33 months; all of Child’s physical, emotional and developmental needs

were being met by the foster parents. N.T. Termination Hearing, 7/14/17, at 

21, 50-52. Additionally, DHS established that Father failed to meet his FSP 

objectives; drugs and alcohol have been a concern for 33 months and Father 

failed to establish that he has successfully completed the required drug and 

alcohol and mental health treatment. Id. at 15-17, 52. Father completed 

only one of five drug and alcohol screens, and admitted to prior relapses. Id.

at 15-16, 28, 46. Further, Father was unable to provide verification as to the 

condition of his housing and could provide no proof of adequate housing. Id. 

at 17. 

The court also heard from the GAL, who testified that “it’s just taking 

too long for dad to get it together.” Id. at 54. The GAL did note that Father 

and Child have a good relationship when they are together, however Child “is 

three years old, and he needs a permanent home immediately.” Id. She 

also stated that she was “heartened” by the fact that Child’s “current caregiver 

is open and willing to allow [Father] to continue to visit.” Id. 

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2 We note the GAL did not file a brief in this matter. 
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Father testified that he was currently working as a home health 

caregiver for his grandmother. Id. at 38. He stated that he had been 

prescribed Xanax, which explained his positive test for benzodiazepines. Id. 

at 38-39. However, Father was unable to produce documentation indicating 

that he was attending or had completed mental health treatment and/or drug 

and alcohol treatment. Id. at 39-40. Father also testified to his version of 

the events that led to his arrest following an assault on Mother that left her 

with two black eyes, stating that it was in fact his ex-girlfriend that had 

punched Mother, but that Mother said he did it. Id. at 44. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court noted on the record that Child 

had been in placement since birth, for over two and one-half years, that it did 

not find Father’s testimony credible, and that Father has failed, despite being 

given every chance, “to rectify the situation and meet his goals.” Id. at 55-

56. The court also noted that Father failed to establish that he had secured 

adequate housing, finances or child care arrangements. Id. at 57. The court, 
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therefore, terminated Father’s parental rights under sections 2511(a)(1),

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(a)(2)4 and (b).

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On appeal, Father raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error, when it 

involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights where such 

determination was not supported by clear and convincing 

evidence under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

2511(a)(1) and (2)?

2. Whether the trial court erred because the evidence was 

overwhelming and undisputed that Father demonstrated a 

genuine interest and sincere, persistent, and unrelenting 

effort to maintain a parent-child relationship with Child?

3. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights without 

giving primary consideration to the effect that the 

termination would have on the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs of Child as required by the Adoption Act, 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). 

Appellant’s Brief, at 8.

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3 “The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months 

immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled 

purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to 

perform parental duties.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1).

4 “The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the 

parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions 

and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).

5 “The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis 

of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, 

clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.” 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)
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In cases involving termination of parental rights, our standard of review 

is limited to determining “whether the order of the trial court is supported by 

competent evidence, and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration 

to the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child.” In re Z.P., 994 

A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 8 (Pa. 

Super. 2009)). 

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient 

evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must 

stand. . . . We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of 

the record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision 

is supported by competent evidence. 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). 

Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder of fact, is 

the sole determiner of the credibility of witnesses and all conflicts 

in testimony are to be resolved by [the] finder of fact. The burden 

of proof is on the party seeking termination to establish by clear 

and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for doing so. 

The standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony 

that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the 

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of 

the truth of the precise facts in issue. We may uphold a 

termination decision if any proper basis exists for the result 

reached. If the court’s findings are supported by competent 

evidence, we must affirm the court’s decision, even if the record 

could support an opposite result. 

In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (internal quotations and citations omitted). If 

the court finds grounds for termination under the statute have been 

established by clear and convincing evidence, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a), the court 

must then consider the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child and determine whether severing the parent-child 
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relationship is in the child’s best interests. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). See

also In re: Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

Parental rights may be involuntarily terminated where any one 

subsection of section 2511(a) is satisfied, along with consideration of the 

provisions in subsection 2511(b). In re Z.P., supra at 1117. Initially, the 

focus is on the parent’s conduct. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 

2007). The party seeking termination has the burden of proving by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in section 2511(a). “Only if the court determines 

that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his [or her] parental rights 

does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section

2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 

Further, the statute “outlines certain irreducible minimum requirements of 

care that parents must provide for their children, and a parent who cannot or 

will not meet the requirements within a reasonable time following intervention 

by the state, may properly be considered unfit and have his parental rights 

terminated.” In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2001).

After our review of the record, we conclude that there is clear and 

convincing evidence to support the court’s determination that Father has failed 

to perform parental duties for 33 months, that he is incapable of parenting 

Child, that Child had been left without proper parental care and control for 33 

months, and that Father cannot, or will not, remedy his parental incapacity. 
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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1). Further, DHS presented clear and convincing 

evidence that Father has failed to demonstrate sufficient progress in 

remedying the circumstances which led to Child’s placement, nor is there any 

indication that he could remedy such circumstances in the foreseeable future, 

even with continued services in place. The evidence shows that Father was 

unwilling to actively and meaningfully participate in the services offered by 

DHS. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). We discern no abuse of discretion. In re 

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. 

Next, we consider whether the court abused its discretion by terminating 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of 

C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). This Court has 

stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under section 2511(a) is 

on the parent, but under section 2511(b), our focus is on the child. Id. at 

1008. In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section 

2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have 

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, 

comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 

(Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 

1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs

and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds

between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be 

paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing 

the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. 
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In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). Our Supreme Court has 

explained that “the mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a 

parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition.” Id.

at 267. “Common sense dictates that courts considering termination 

must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home 

and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” Id. at 268

(emphasis added). Moreover, in weighing the bond considerations pursuant 

to section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in 

mind. Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an 

obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . .

the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id. at 269. 

Here, there was evidence of a developing bond between Father and 

Child. However, with respect to Child’s placement, Henning, the social worker

and case manager, testified that foster mother has a “loving, nurturing, 

maternal bond” with Child, and she provides Child with love, safety, security 

and support. N.T. 7/14/17, at 6-7. Additionally, Child’s foster parents, who 

are a pre-adoptive resource, have cared for Child all of his life and they provide 

Child with all of his medical, physical and developmental needs. Id. Henning 

also testified that he saw no harm to Child as a result of termination of Father’s 

parental rights, noting that at the time of the hearing, Father had not seen 

Child for two months. Id. at 22. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. 

Super. 2010) (in conducting bonding analysis, court is not required to use 

expert testimony, but may rely on testimony of social workers and 
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caseworkers). As we stated in Z.P., a child’s life “simply cannot be put on 

hold in the hope that [Father] will summon the ability to handle the 

responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125 (citation omitted). Rather, “a 

parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is 

converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s 

right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a 

permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 

(Pa. Super. 2004). The record supports the court’s finding that termination 

would not cause Child irreparable harm and that termination was in Child’s 

best interests. We agree with the trial court’s determination that permanency 

will best serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of Child, and that it is in Child’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental 

rights. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/4/2018