# FILED April 24, 1997 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Cou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMINA L APPEALS OF T ENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE JANUARY SESSION, 1997 STEVE L. BRYANT, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9605- CR-00190 ) Appe llant, ) ) ) DAVIDSON COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. J. RANDAL L WYATT, JR. STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE ) Appellee. ) (Habeas Corpus)

ON APPEA L FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT : FOR THE APPELLEE : PARRIS H B. STANTON CHARLES W. BURSON 209 T enth Av enue S outh Attorney Generaland Reporter Nashvill e, TN 37203 LISA A. NAY LOR Assistant Attorney General 450 James Robertson Parkway Nashvill e, TN 37243 VICTOR S . JOHN SON Distri ct Attor ney General KATRIN N. MI LLER Assistant Distri ct Attor ney General Washington Square, Suite 500 222 Se cond A venue N orth Nashvill e, TN 37209-1649
OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFIRMED DAVID H. WELLES , JUD GE-2- 

# OPINION

This is an appeal pur

suant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rulesof Appe llate Procedure. Th e Def endant fil ed a petit ion seeking habeas corpus reli ef on the grounds that Tennes see’s sentencing law s violate the separa tion of powers c lause of the Tenn essee C onstitution and tha t the sentence s authorized a re indeterm inate in nature an d thus contrary to law. The trialcourt deni ed habeas corpus relief. W e affirm the judgm ent of the tria l court.

The petiti on for wri t of habeas corpus allegesthat the Defe ndan t is in the custodyof the Tennessee Depart ment of Correct ion as a resul t of being convicted of burglar

y and larceny

on Ja nuary 19, 19 89, in the CriminalCourt of Davidson County, Tennessee. The petiti on alleges t hat the Defendant recei ved a sente nce of eig hteen ye ars to be served a t thirty-five perce nt (35% ).

We first note that a p etition fo r writ of hab eas c orpus mus t conta in a copy of the “legal process” u pon which re straint is based, or a satisfactory reason for its absence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-107(b)(2). The petition i n this case containsneither. This omission al one would warrant the trialcourt’s dismissal of the petition. State ex rel. Wood v. Johnson , 393 S.W.2d 135, 136 (T enn. 1965 ). In a habeas corpus p roceeding , the burden of showing the i nvalidi ty of t he judgment of conviction is upon the petitioner, “and in theabsence of a product ion of the judgment, or a copy ther eof, we must presum e it was and is valid in a ll respec ts.” State ex re l. George v. Bomar , 3 90 S.W .2d 232, 234 (Tenn. 196 5). It is the Appel lant’s

ob ligati on to have pre pared a n adeq uate rec ord in ord er to1 Because the D efendant was convicted in 1989 , he was sentenced un der the Sentencing Reform Act of 1982. Therefore, hi s challenge would actually be to the 1982 Act. Thi s disti nction i s not material t

o our analy

sis of the issues. -3- allowmeaningful reviewon appea l. Tenn. R . App. P. 2 4(b); State v. Banes , 874 S.W.2d 73, 82 (Te nn. Crim . App. 19 93). The trialcourt did not err when i t denied habea s corpu s relief.

On appeal, t he Defendantarg ues that ou r statu tor y sc heme of sentenci ng violates t he sep aration o f powers clause o f the State Constitu tion. See Tenn. Cons t. art. II , §§ 1 & 2. In sentencing a defendant, the trialjudge must first determine the appropri ate senten cing ra nge which determines the release eligibility percentage. The Defendant argues t hat this judici al funct ion en croaches upon the power of the executive branch to determine an i nmate’ s parole eligibility. The De fendant therefo re argues that we should str ike down our entire sentencing code. 1 We r ej ect theDefendant ’s argu ment because we conclude that i t ha s nomeri t. Some functio ns of the t hree departm ents of sta te government are nec essarily ove rlapping a nd interd epend ent. We believe this is particu larly true in our criminal just ice system
. See Lavon v. S tate , 586 S.W.2d 1 12, 115 (T enn. 19 79); Unde rwood v . State , 529 S.W .2d 45, 47 (T enn. 1975 ); Woods v. State , 130 Tenn . 100, 169 S.W. 558 (1914). Accordi ngly, we do not believe the judici al function of setti ng sentencing r anges is an unconst ituti onal encroachment on the power s of the excecutive br anch.

The Defendant fur

therargue s that thesentencing r anges along wit h the release eligi bilit

y percentages establ ish in determinate se ntences in v iolati on of Tennessee Code Annotated secti on 40-35-211, whi ch prohibi ts indetermin ate sentences. We also reject t hi s ar gument because we conclude t hat it has no2 This co urt has n ot been r eceptive to similar c hallenge s to our s entenc ing laws. See Frank Bell v. Ricky Bell , Warden , C.C.A. N o. 01-C -01-960 2-CR -00058 , Davidso n Cou nty (Tenn . Crim. A pp., Nash ville, Jan. 30, 19 97); Eric C. P endleton v. State , C.C.A. No. 01-C-01-9604-CR-00158, Davids on Co unty (Ten n. Crim . App., Na shville, Feb . 12, 1997 ); Joe T hom as Bak er, Jr. v. State , C.C.A. No. 01C01-9604- CR-00129, Davidson County (Tenn. Crim. App.,Nashvill e, Feb. 20, 1997); Terry M errell v. State , C.C .A. N o. 01 C01 -960 4-C R-0 014 7, Da vidso n Co unty (T enn . Crim
. App., Nashville, Feb. 20, 1997). -4- merit. The fact that t he Board of Paroles may grant or deny parole does no t convert a determinate sentence into an indetermi nate sentence. Parole does not cause a senten ce to exp ire or term inate but i s a con ditio nal release from more restrictive confinem ent. See Howell v. State ; 569 S.W .2d 428, 433 (Tenn. 197 8); Doyle v. Hampton , 207 Tenn. 399, 403, 340 S.W.2d 891, 893 (1960) . A parolee remains in con structive custo dy until the exp iratio n of the ful l term of hi s or her senten ce. How ell , 569 S.W.2d at 433.

The writ of habeas corpus, codifi ed at Tennessee Code Annotated secti ons 29-21-101 to-130, i s to be issuedonl y in the cas e of a void j udgment or to fr ee a prisoner held after the term of impris onment has expired. Tenn . Code Ann. § 29-21-101; Archer v. State , 851 S.W .2d 157 , 164 (T enn. 19 93); Flowers v. Traughber , 910 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Tenn. Cri m. App. 1995). The sol e relief availabl e under Tennessee’s habeas corpus statute is dischar ge from custody. Taylor v. Morgan , 909 S.W .2d 17, 20 (Tenn . Crim. A pp. 199 5). For the reasons s tated i n this opi nion, we cannot conclude that

the tri al judge er red by denyi ng the Defen dant’s request that he be released. Therefore, we conclude that the petiti on for wri t of habeas corpus was properly dismissed. 2
The judgment of the t rial cour t is af firmed.-5- ____________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES , JUD GE

CONCUR:

___________________________________ JERRY L . SMI TH, J UDGE

___________________________________ JOE G. RILE Y, J UDGE