F ILED

Ma rch 16, 2000

C ec il Crow s on, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

RICKY LEE OLDHAM, )

)

Plaintiff/Appellant, ) Davidson Chancery

) No. 98-2036-II

VS. )

)

TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF ) Appeal No.

CORRECTION, ) M1998-00852-COA-R3-CV

)

Defendant/Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY

AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE CAROL L. McCOY, CHANCELLOR

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant: Attorney for Defendant/Appellee:

Ricky Lee Oldham, Pro Se Paul G. Summers

Attorney General and Reporter

Abigail Turner

Assistant Attorney General

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
1Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10(b) provides:

The Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may

affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when

a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by

memorandum opinion, it shall be designated "MEMORANDUM OPINION," shall

not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in a subsequent

unrelated case.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal involves a dispute between an inmate and the Tennessee

Department of Correction (“Department”) regarding deductions from the inmate’s

trust account to pay the court costs stemming from his criminal conviction. After his

inmate grievance proved unsuccessful, the inmate filed a petition for a declaratory

order in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a declaration that the

Department could not deduct funds from his inmate trust account without a court

order. The trial court dismissed the inmate’s petition because it did not state that the

inmate had previously sought a declaratory order from the Department. The inmate

asserts on this appeal that he should be excused from this requirement because he is

undertaking to represent himself and because his grievance was tantamount to a

petition for a declaratory order. We affirm the dismissal of the inmate’s complaint

in accordance with Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10(b).1

Ricky Lee Oldham is currently incarcerated in the Northwest Correctional

Center in Tiptonville, Tennessee. Beginning in April 1996, prison officials began

deducting funds from his inmate trust account to pay for $1,692.50 in costs stemming

from his criminal conviction. When he questioned the basis for these deductions,

prison officials provided him with a document from the circuit court clerk of Madison

County certifying that the total cost in Mr. Oldham’s criminal proceedings amounted

to $1,692.50. Mr. Oldham filed an inmate grievance concerning these deductions

because he believed that prison officials did not have the authority to make them. The

grievance was dismissed on the ground that it was inappropriate because it dealt with

a matter concerning an outside agency.

Thereafter, Mr. Oldham filed a petition for a declaratory judgment in the

Chancery Court for Davidson County. The Department moved to dismiss the petition
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because it did not contain an allegation that Mr. Oldham had petitioned for a

declaratory order and that the Department had refused to issue one. The trial court

dismissed Mr. Oldham’s petition. The trial court also taxed the costs of the

proceeding to Mr. Oldham but permitted him to pay these costs at the rate of $5.00 per

month. Mr. Oldham has appealed.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225(a) (1998) empowers the Chancery Court for

Davidson County to render declaratory judgments regarding the legal validity or

applicability of a statute, rule, or order of an administrative agency to specified

circumstances. However, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225(b) prevents the trial court from

rendering a declaratory judgment if the person seeking it has not petitioned the agency

for a declaratory ruling in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-223, -224 (1998).

Mr. Oldham’s petition does not allege that he has complied with Tenn. Code Ann. §§

4-5-223, -224, and the record contains no evidence permitting us to find that he did.

Accordingly, the trial court correctly decided to dismiss his petition. 

Mr. Oldham asserts that he should be excused from complying with Tenn. Code

Ann. § 4-5-225(b) because he is untrained in the law and is attempting to represent

himself. While the courts should construe the pleadings of pro se litigants liberally,

pro se litigants are not excused from following the same procedural and substantive

rules that represented parties are required to follow. See Kaylor v. Bradley, 912

S.W.2d 728, 733 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); Irvin v. City of Clarksville, 767 S.W.2d

649, 652 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). Compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-223, -224

is a procedural prerequisite to a Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225 petition. Without it, Mr.

Oldham’s petition must be dismissed.

Mr. Oldham also asserts that the inmate grievance proceeding is substantially

the same as a petition for a declaratory order under Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223. We

disagree. The purpose of an inmate grievance is not to question the legal validity of

a state statute, rule, order, or their application to a particular set of facts. Accordingly,

pursuing an inmate grievance does not amount to substantial compliance with Tenn.

Code Ann. § 4-5-225(b).
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We affirm the order dismissing Mr. Oldham’s petition and remand the case to

the trial court for whatever further proceedings may be required. We also tax the

costs of this appeal to Ricky Lee Oldham for which execution, if necessary, may

issue.

______________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

CONCUR:

________________________________

WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE

________________________________

PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE