BREAKING AWAY FROM THE BEAR

Dianne L. Smith

August 3, 1998
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ii
In just half a decade, Central Asia has gone from b

backwater known only to selected scholars to one of the most 

watched spots on the globe. In the words of The Economist, “

six years after emerging from the rubble of the Soviet Unio

attracted by substantial proven reserves . . . and by the pro

fabulous wealth from the oil and gas fields that have ye

explored fully, the world’s oil bosses are falling over themse

secure a piece of the Caspian action.”1

Central Asia is a region of potential wealth; it is a re

potential turmoil. It is characterized by multi-ethnic societie

product of centuries of transmigration and political exile, sep

by boundaries drawn by central authorities in part to “divi

conquer” the indigenous population and turn them on one a

(rather than Moscow). Central Asia is the last remnant of the 

model: paper constitutions that promise much but assure litt

and block charts for administrative procedure that mask rul

oligarchy of the few supporting the one man in charge; and “m

militaries,” with several agencies possessing armed forces, ea

its own mission, its own military, and its own agenda.

Lieutenant Colonel Dianne L. Smith examines the develo

of post-Soviet Central Asian armed forces, Central Asian ef

guarantee their national security, and the implications 

United States of this struggle. She cautions that the United 

use its influence and its military-to-military contact pr

judiciously. This is a region of great instability, with m

infusions of energy wealth just beyond the horizon. If these 

can create viable methods to ensure domestic and regional se

this wealth may produce prosperity and secure well-being fo

citizens. If these states fail to create institutions to preserv

national sovereignty, the new century could presage long, lin

chaos and waste on a grand scale. One need only look s

Afghanistan for such a model.

LARRY M. WORTZEL

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute

iii
LIEUTENANT COLONEL DIANNE L. SMITH 

analyst on Russia for Allied Forces Central Europe. 

August 1997 until July 1998 she was the Director of 

Intelligence at the Center for Strategic Leadership

served as a Strategic Research Analyst in the Str

Studies Institute from August 1995 to August 1997. P

that she was Team Chief for Central Asia, National M

Intelligence Collection Center, Defense Intelli

Agency. A Military Intelligence officer and Russian F

Area Officer, her previous assignments include U.S. 

Exchange Officer to the United Kingdom De

Intelligence and Security School, Ashford, Kent, U

Kingdom; Chief of Strategic Intelligence Br

Intelligence Division, Allied Forces Central Eu

Brunssum, Netherlands; Counterintelligence O

Combined Field Army (ROK-US), Uijongbu, Korea

Assistant Professor of Russian History at the U.S. M

Academy. Her recent works include “Muscovite Log

1475-1598” and “From Chattanooga to Durham Statio

Influence of Logistics Upon Sherman’s Strategy.” She 

a B.A. in history and international relations fro

University of Nebraska and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Ru

history from the University of California at Davis. S

graduate of the U.S. Army Command and Genera

College and the U.S. Army War College.

iv
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Unio

Central Asian states preferred to ensure their se

through the unified command of the Commonwea

Independent States and collective security. Bu

decision of Ukraine, and then Russia, to create indepe

republican forces compelled the Central Asian sta

create their own armed forces. Depending on their re

success at developing viable military forces, each sta

compensated with other tools of national power. Bud

considerations and assessment of real-world threat

compelled each state to make hard decisions conc

relative investment in conventional armed forces, se

forces, or border guards. To avoid further dependence 

Moscow, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan 

attempted joint security ventures. Tajikistan re

dependent upon Russian troops and Central 

peacekeeping forces. Turkmenistan hopes that a po

nonalignment and neutrality (albeit with active su

from Russia) will prove successful. Although the

willing to let Russia assert some authority within C

Asia, each seeks alternative sources for security.

The United States supports the development of C

Asian armed forces to ensure that collective security 

that—collective. Indeed, America has a strong inter

ensuring that Central Asian militaries develop to re

sufficiency so that they are players in the game and n

tools of Moscow.

v
Shymkent, Kazakstan, Sept. 15—Paratroops from the Un

States joined soldiers from five other nations today in a sce

display of long-range airborne deployment skills, in an exer

meant to shore up the independence of the former So

republics of Central Asia.... Marine Gen. Jack Sheeh

commander of the U.S. Atlantic Command and the first of 

paratroops to jump from the C-17 cargo planes, pronounced 

initial phase of the exercise a success and said it proves “ther

no nation on the face of the earth we cannot get to.”

The Washington Post,

September 15, 19972

INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade a significant body of literatu

redefined “security.”3 With the end of the Cold War, 

scholars criticized the traditional, narrow definit

security and focused on issues other than military a

such as population growth, environmental degrad

ethnic conflict, crime, drugs, and migration. Neverth

the focal point of a nation’s security remains its abi

field a military force capable of defending its terr

integrity, safeguarding its national interests, protecti

lives and property of its citizens, and preservi

sovereignty as an independent state.

Since independence, the five Central Asian sta

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan

Turkmenistan have created armed forces with v

capability to perform these missions. Each has 

pensated for its military’s weakness with alternativ

of national power and collective security program

United States has begun programs in each Central 

state to assist in the development of these f

Washington supports this process to ensure that col

security is just that—collective—and that the Central 

1
regional powers. The ability (or inability) of each 

republic to provide credible military force will 

long-reaching consequences for the Central Asian 

their neighbors, and the United States.

THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY

The Central Asian republics were an accident of h

In order for Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine to break 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), their 

leaders had to avow the legitimacy of each of t

republics making up that union to declare its sover

and assert its independence. Independence, howeve

with mixed reactions. The Baltic States emb

independence. The Central Asian States broke out 

cold sweat at the thought. Their leaders recognize

central among the many challenges facing them was 

providing for national security and pushed for inc

within the Commonwealth of Independent States (C

Several options for providing security in Centra

existed: collective security, reliance on domestic na

armed forces, reliance on a patron (either regio

extra-regional), international guarantee of neutral

regional cooperation on a bilateral or multilateral ba

The first, most obvious solution was to create a col

security arrangement within the CIS, which had re

the USSR. This they did. Yet, 8 years later, as that 

meets, analysts contend “the choice is stark: Shou

members paper over its evident collapse or try to star

from scratch?”4 Why has this organization failed to p

security for its members?

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATE

In December 1991, the CIS was created5 and the 

Commonwealth High Command replaced its Soviet 

Command predecessor. The republics had one-b

2
themselves as entities beyond the collective. 

“national” security was that of the CIS. The two bulwa

that security were to be a unified command and a col

security agreement. The member states saw no nee

did they acknowledge their innate inability) to 

independent armed forces.

Cracks in the System.

Serious problems soon occurred in both the u

command structure and the collective security agree

Indeed, initial debate over the nature of CIS armed 

mirrored core arguments over the nature of the Com

wealth itself and the role of the Russian Federation 

facto leader.6 Article 6 of the agreement to fo

commonwealth envisioned a common strategic- m

space under a unified command, including unitary c

over nuclear weapons, but refrained from specifics

Central Asian states assumed that some type of u

defense structure would replace the Soviet High Com

but manning, mission, and deployment would r

basically the same.

Moscow’s proposed structure for the armed 

unified command immediately put the issues of eq

and sovereignty into question. Two schools emerge

first7 accepted the need to decentralize both control ov

ownership of the new republican armed forces. Repu

forces would be subordinate to their respective d

ministries and heads of state, not the CIS.8 The 

school9 rejected any power sharing and envisioned a 

unified (edinyye) armed forces—reflecting the attitud

the CIS was merely the USSR with new letterhead 

and that “the republics had commitments and obliga

not rights of ownership and control.”10 The final compr

created two CIS commands: one for the Combined Str

Armed Forces such as nuclear weapons, strategic air 

3
Moscow to control the remainder.11

When the CIS Joint Command failed, it wa

unexpected. The Russian Federation (even though 

retracted to Muscovy’s borders of the 1650s) regarded 

as the successor state to the USSR. As such, it as

ownership of strategic assets and expected the other 

to accept its lead. As the reality of independence set 

new republics began to refuse to fall into this subor

relationship. Eight states agreed on a common militar

for CIS strategic forces, but Turkmenistan and Uzbe

refrained.12 Commissions set to consider the fate 

Caspian Sea Flotilla and the Black Sea Fleet ran into 

obstacles as states demanded their part of the pie inst

total return of all assets to Moscow.13 Ukraine beg

question Unified Command (that is, Moscow’s) contro

nuclear weapons on its territory. Azerbaijan, Ukrain

Moldova announced their intent to create their own 

forces and opt out of a Unified Command, regardl

which structure was approved.14 After 18 months th

command was dissolved, and a smaller CIS Joint Sta

reduced responsibilities replaced it.15 The strategic 

commander position was abolished, and the posit

“Chief of the Joint Staff for CIS Military Coordination

created in its place.16

The Tashkent Security Agreement.

Even with a unified command infrastructure, the 

understood that “what was once a single strategic spa

broken up, and today none of the newly formed sta

capable of fully solving the problem of its own se

through its own efforts alone.”17 Collective security w

solution, but early efforts to produce a collective se

pact were unsuccessful. The Tashkent summit of Ma

was a make-or-break meeting for the CIS. The first 

CIS summits of 1992 in Moscow (January 16), 

(February 14), and Kiev (March 20) had failed to cr

4
forces or to reach any agreement on a general CIS m

budget, “the bedrock on which any significant CIS m

structure would have to stand.”18 Then, in a single day 

15, 1992) in Tashkent, the attending heads of states ad

13 documents.19 Most important was the signing 

collective security accord, although it was predomina

political-military rather than a military agreement

also agreed on the joint use of airspace and of the Bai

and Plesetsk space-vehicle launching sites and reaff

their desire to have border troops under a unified com

They agreed to fulfill the USSR’s commitments with r

to international treaties on chemical weapons an

reduction of armed forces. Finally, they laid the groun

for CIS peacekeeping forces, to be used only wit

consent of all sides involved in a given conflict.

From the beginning, however, the agreements d

produce a CIS collective security environment

Tashkent Accord (signed by Armenia, Kazakhstan, R

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan on Ma

more resembled a Central Asian security pact than 

security agreement. For varying reasons, Ukraine, Be

Azerbaijan, and Moldova did not accede to the docum

Without Ukrainian participation, initial Russian in

waned. The treaty did not go into effect for nearly 2 

and even then, bureaucratic, financial, and legis

barriers have blocked implementation of some prov

altogether. The treaty did not fulfill its political g

preventing the process of military disintegratio

restoring mutual trust among the signatories.

The treaty also fell short of its military goals. Artic

the treaty provides for joint repulsion of “aggression

does not set criteria that demand action. As such, Ar

was unsuccessful in gaining signatories’ support rep

alleged transgressions during its struggle with Azer

over Nagorno-Karabakh. Until Karimov of Uzbe

protested and threatened unilateral action, the trea

5
Afghanistan into Tajikistan.21

Even when countries acted, their response was li

Under provisions of the accord, Kazakhstan, Kyrgy

and Uzbekistan did eventually supplement Russian 

in Tajikistan, but troop numbers were small in compa

Central Asian states preferred to let Russian forces be

brunt of the burden of peacekeeping (or peacemaking) 

region; they were also still unable to support deployed 

beyond their own borders.

Acknowledging that the “times when a single view

[could be] foisted on everyone are gone,”22 Boris Y

proclaimed that Russia must look toward the creation 

own national forces and seek to assure Commonw

security through bilateral ties with individual CIS me

as well.23 Such a sentiment was reluctantly endors

turn, by the Central Asian republics.24 The states of C

Asia did not want to form independent armed force

were among the strongest advocates of maintaining 

type of unified command under Moscow.

The reluctance of the Central Asian states to undertake t

creation of their own militaries is not surprising, given th

lack of a significant ethnic officer corps on which to draw, th

interest in dedicating scarce economic resources to m

pressing needs, and their general appreciation that th

cannot effectively ensure their security independently.25

Nevertheless, once the Russian Federation decided 

for a national force, one by one the other CIS state

forced to form their own as well.

Interest remains in greater economic cooperatio

(aside from air defense) the CIS military struct

moribund. As one analyst noted, “the only quest

whether to keep the respirator going.”26

6
ASIAN MILITARIES

Each Central Asian state, therefore, has been for

develop national armed forces from the leftovers 

Soviet Armed Forces. Each has faced serious chal

while attempting to mold armed forces to meet its part

needs, defend its borders, safeguard its citizens, and p

its national security. Creation of armed forces has ha

to do with identification of threats to national sover

and molding an armed forces to meet those threats

“making do” with what was left over from the Soviet 

Let us first examine that Soviet legacy and then tra

challenges confronting each state in the format

indigenous armed forces. While many problems 

common, each state had to confront its own se

demands, perceived threats, geopolitical position, eco

dislocation, cadre resources, ethnic strife, and po

sensitivities. As a result, the ability of the countries t

viable armed forces has been uneven, and states hav

forced to find other means to secure their sovereignt

SOVIET LEGACY

The Soviet heritage of the Central Asian states has 

major impact on each republic’s armed forces. The pr

factor molding Central Asian affairs is that the so

Soviet Socialist Republics making up the Union, alt

given boundaries and state institutions mirroring t

Moscow, were never meant to be self-supporting st

politically, economically, or militarily. Each st

supposedly the homeland of its titular minority 

Kazakhs in Kazakhstan), but in reality, the “nation s

of Central Asia suffer from the dysfunction that occurs 

territorial and ethnic boundaries do not coinc

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan

Turkmenistan did not exist prior to the drawing of 

republican boundaries. Stalin’s “cartographic exer

purposefully cut across nationalities, to “divid

7
internal ethnic tensions, to make each republic a 

Matreshka doll with minorities inside minoritie

dependent on Moscow.28 Central authorities meant 

borders as internal administrative control mechanis

one dreamed the Soviet Socialist Republics would 

become actual states. As a result, boundaries, drawn 

Stalin’s political purposes, did not match key terrain o

nations together.

All ties were vertical to Moscow; there was no hori

integration within Central Asia. Politically, each 

Socialist Republic possessed a legislative and exe

infrastructure and a republican Communist Party 

appointed by Moscow, who became the de facto ruler 

the Soviet Union fell apart. There was no comp

republican-level economic infrastructure to fall back 

Economically, the Central Asian economies were part 

command economy run by the Five Year Plans, driv

decisions from the center in Moscow, fed by a unified 

system, and funded by a common currency.29 Whe

system broke up, it created great dislocation and fin

upheaval.

The republics possessed no independent mi

structures, e.g., similar to the British Territorial 

system, the German Wehrkreis, or an American 

National Guard. Soviet strategic considerations dro

alignment of men, equipment, and materiel to the 

called “Soviet Central Asia.”30 Two military district

Turkestan and Central Asian,31 provided the peac

infrastructure and wartime command and control for 

navy, and air force units stationed in the region. 

missions shaped the disposition, location, and mann

Soviet units, garrisons, and facilities. The broad expa

desert and distant mountain ranges housed the Soviet 

center, nuclear test areas, research facilities for ch

and biological warfare, strategic missile silos, top 

research installations, and huge quantities of ma

moved beyond the “Atlantic to the Urals” (ATTU) 

8
in Europe (CFE) Treaty.32 Yet it was pretty much “l

the draw,” the result of decisions by Moscow’s bureau

where troops, training sites, and installations were lo

Soviet security needs, not republican interests, shape

deployment.

Another prominent factor is what Dr. Jacob Kip

the Soviet Union’s “multiple militaries.” In Soviet 

“armed forces” refers not only to troops subordinate 

Ministry of Defense, but to a variety of other military 

subordinate to other agencies, to include internal se

forces (MVD), committees of state security (KGB), ra

troops, praetorian guards assigned to the Presi

border forces, etc.

Finally, Soviet post-World War II manpower 

affected the development of Central Asian milita

Moscow regarded military service as a tool to so

ethnic minorities, teach them Russian, break 

nationalist loyalties, submit them to political trainin

create the “New Soviet Man.”34 Ethnic Russians ma

barely half of the Soviet population but predomina

high technology services (such as the Strategic R

Forces and Air Forces) and security forces (e.g. the 

Border Guards). Slavs, especially Eastern Ukrai

dominated the career noncommissioned officer ranks

also made up nearly 95 percent of the officer corps, alt

very limited numbers of non-Slavic officers reached g

officer rank. Combat units included all 120-plus 

groups of the Soviet Union, but Central Asians increa

found themselves segregated in noncombat support 

such as construction battalions or internal security fo

The victims of racial bias, Central Asian minorities 

found themselves the victims of dedovshchina (haz

senior conscripts) and barracks-slang ethnic slurs.

Each of the Central Asian republics has had to dea

this legacy as it shaped an independent armed forc

republics have met with relative degrees of success.

9
Tajikistan’s armed forces have been the least succ

they failed to defend the regime during the initial succ

crisis and, as a result, the country was wracked by civ

and cross-border incursions for half a decade.

Tajikistan’s early days were similar to those 

neighbors: independence declared following the 

Moscow coup; a new government formed under the f

communist leader, Nabiyev; security advisors t

president identified; and a National Guard cr

(December 24, 1991).36 The most significant decis

shape Tajikistan’s early forces was Dushanbe’s decla

that the main Russian force deployed in Tajikista

201st Motorized Rifle Division (MRD), would n

nationalized to form the basis of the new Tajik A

Forces. A subsequent visit by Russian Defense Mi

Grachev confirmed that the division would not be disb

or withdrawn, although local recruitment would in

the proportion of ethnic Tajiks and all Russians s

would be on contract.37 Instead, the 201st MRD 

remain in Tajikistan until at least 1999 in support 

Tajik Army.38

Without that trained, well-equipped core, Taji

was forced to rely on leftovers to form its conven

forces, and leftovers they were: a mixture of in

security, local militia (police), and KNB (KGB succ

troops. The first five “battalions” were also unconven

formed from paramilitary Popular Front volunteers.

Tajik legislature could not resolve the real issues stym

development of operational forces: a shortage of exper

ethnic Tajik officers and noncommissioned officers, re

on Russian training facilities (of the 201st MRD

inability to enforce conscription, a nonexistent m

doctrine, and (the most crucial issue) lack of funds to p

such forces.40

10
overwhelmed by the political, ethnic, and religious te

that were tearing the country apart: regional eco

disparities, breakaway provinces, fighting be

southern Uzbek and northern Tajik factions, radical I

groups, and cross-border incursions by Afghan muja

arms dealers, and drug smugglers.41 The resu

bloodshed left over 50,000 dead and a half-a-million 

homeless refugees.

Any real efforts to create a genuine armed forces aw

the appointment of (ethnic Russian) Colonel Alex

Shishlyannikov as Defense Minister in January 1

With Russian assistance, he gradually built a small f

around 7,000 men who were organized into two mot

rifle brigades, one mountain brigade, and one Surfa

Air Missile (SAM) Regiment.43 This force, however, w

small and poorly trained to ensure Tajikistan’s secur

Failure to produce viable armed forces has produ

security policy totally dependent upon the willingn

other states to accept responsibility for Tajikistan 

expend men, money, and materiel to prop it up

continued existence of the Rakhmanov regime dep

upon military support from the Russian Federatio

fellow Central Asian CIS members.

The Rakhmonov regime came to rely upon two ex

armed forces: the Group of Russian Border Troo

Tajikistan (GRBTT) and the Joint CIS Peacekeeping 

in Tajikistan.44 Tajikistan lacks resources to ma

forces along its 2,000-kilometer border. During the CI

summit in March 1992, Tajikistan confirmed that R

Border Guards would maintain Dushanbe’s borders. 

August 1992 a reorganization of former-Soviet border 

districts occurred, and jurisdiction for the “southern b

of the CIS” was transferred to the GRBTT. Their mis

challenging, for as one observer has noted,

Those soldiers dispatched to protect Tajikistan from “terror

and Islamic fundamentalists,” also became policemen char

11
dealing with returning refugees—and one person crossing t

border could easily be a terrorist, drug runner, and refugee 

at once. The border guards are poorly paid, serve in territo

better known to their opponents, and are surrounded 

trouble . . .45

After 6 years of local recruitment, however, the 

“Russian” border forces refers more to its chain of com

than its ethnic composition. Of the GRBTT’s approxim

18,000 men, today about 12,000 are Tajik. The rem

are made up of some 4,000 Russians, Ukrainian

Belorussians and some 2,000 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz

Uzbeks.46

Since May 1994, Russian border forces have 

complemented by a small “Border Troops of the Repu

Tajikistan” to support the GRBTT. The three b

brigades then formed (and a fourth in 1995) are 

independently in rear areas and jointly with Russian 

in the mountain regions. Tajik border guard

commanded by a Russian officer. Given the choice, how

over 80 percent of Tajik officers and warrant officers 

duty in the Russian border troops because of the bett

rather than service in their own national forces.47

The second external force to provide secur

Rakhmonov’s regime has been the CIS Collective 

keeping Force in Tajikistan (CCPFT), created und

collective security provisions of the Tashkent accord 

nearly a year of wrangling. The original mission of th

(to be comprised of one reinforced Russian battalio

Uzbek, one Kazakh and one Kyrgyz battalions) w

conduct operations “to allow the new leadersh

Tajikistan to take the situation under control and st

excesses of gangs.”48 It was to separate warring factio

safeguard the newly appointed coalition govern

Indeed, the 201st MRD was not part of the orig

designated force and was tasked to guard key install

and military facilities.

12
signed on September 24, 1993, by Russia and four C

Asian states (Turkmenistan abstained) for

established the Joint Command of the Colle

Peacekeeping Forces and authorized it to impl

decisions taken by the heads of respective states reg

the use of these forces. Appendix 2 specified that R

would provide only 50 percent of the collective 

However, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan 

to provide troops other than limited forces for border d

The 201st MRD was drawn into the CCPFT on

magnitude of the mission and the lack of resources b

apparent. It was not until October 1993 that an actu

Collective Peacekeeping Force was finally dispatch

Tajikistan.50 Russian troops from the 201st MRD 

joined by limited contingents from Uzbeki

Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan; all were commanded 

Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint A

Forces.

Thus Tajikistan has remained totally depende

outside sources for its physical security. However, 

political breakthroughts have altered this situati

April 1996, Tajikistan (along with Kazakh

Kyrgyzstan, and Russia) signed the Shanghai Acc

settle on-going border disputes with China. This re

the need for extensive border forces along the e

border. Second, the Tajik government in Dushanbe si

peace accord (the General Agreement of Na

Reconciliation and Peace Establishment) in Mosc

June 27, 1997, with Sayed Abdullo Nuri, leader 

Islamic opposition.51 If parliamentary elections ar

and the secular opposition is brought into the reconci

process, the need for external forces to provide securi

dwindle. It is likely that Dushanbe would then ask 

reduction in Russian troop strength in country (or at 

decrease in their visibility). It is likely that Moscow, 

has long regarded Tajikistan as a black hole sucking 

will welcome such an initiative.

13
comparable build-up of Tajik armed forces, especial

period when the financial demands of sheltering retu

refugees, reinvigorating a shattered economy

reasserting domestic reins of power will take prece

The Tajik armed forces did not provide security in th

Dushanbe will not pump them up to provide security 

future. Instead, if the reconciliation governm

successful, it will most likely attempt to integrate itse

other Central Asian political, economic, and m

mechanisms, rather than trying to “go it alone” 

Russia’s patronage is diminished.52 For exa

Rakhmonov in January met with the other four C

Asian leaders in Ashgabat during which he worked to 

up grievances with Uzbekistan and discussed co

concerns regarding the inter-Tajik settlement, the sit

on the Afghan-Tajik border, the status of Russian tro

Tajikistan, and regional security.53 Dushanbe w

“behind the power curve” of regional integration bu

benefit from the previous labors of its neighbors.

KYRGYZSTAN—FROM REASONABLE

INSUFFICIENCY TO REGIONAL PARTNER?

Kyrgyzstan has always been a reluctant repub

declared sovereignty on December 12, 1990, the last C

Asian republic to do so; in the all-union referendu

preserving the union (held in March 1991) 95 perc

voters (93 percent turnout) supported the union.54 Th

government in Bishkek originally made little eff

establish a national military force, signing the Tas

Accord, giving strong support to the CIS unified com

movement, and relying on Russia’s 40th Army 

quartered in Almaty) to fund ex-Soviet forc

Kyrgyzstan.55 Bishkek issued a decree establishin

Kyrgyz Armed forces only (according to one official) 

“in May 1992 Akayev received a telegram from [CIS D

Minister] Shaposhnikov telling him to take control 

14
longer pay for them.”56

China was Bishkek’s major perceived threat beca

long-standing border disputes dating back to tsaris

grabs and concerns over the treatment in China’s Xi

province of ethnic Uighers who share an ethni

religious (Muslim) heritage with the Kyrgyz. Terr

concerns waned with the signing of the border agreem

April 1997, which included a number of confidence-bu

measures and troop reductions within a 100-kilomete

border area.57 Transnational threats continued, how

from international drug smugglers, arms trafficker

refugees fleeing Tajikistan. Continued unre

Afghanistan and the specter of politicized Islam (esp

from the newly-emerging Taliban) were also se

threatening.

A small set of issues within Central Asia also e

over which Kyrgyzstan could come to blows wi

neighbors, the most contentious being water rights

Central Asian water flows from Tajikistan and Kyrgy

The two states argue that it is a “strategic product” tha

have the right to control, sell, or trade. It is not their 

they say, that Soviet policies created ecological catastr

“too late to solve” elsewhere in the region. “Uzbek

problems with the Aral Sea are not Kyrgyz

problem.”59 But Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors challeng

assertion that it has the right to decide where and 

water should flow. The water issue may prove to 

powderkeg of 21st century security affairs in the reg

Therefore, immediate attention when forming 

forces focused on border guards, next on Ministry of D

(MOD) forces, and then on internal security troo

independence, the “Kyrgyz Border Guards Comm

(subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and comman

a Kyrgyz general officer) administratively replace

Kirghiz (Kyrgyz) Directorate of the former Central 

Border Troops district of the USSR KGB. But this w

15
defend its borders. Seven years later, the a

responsibility still rests on Russian shoulders. In 

when Almaty took over the ex-Soviet Eastern B

District, Bishkek found the Border Troops on K

territory were without leadership, support, or even m

supplies. Bishkek appealed to Moscow for help and un

October 1992 bilateral treaty, Russia assumed r

sibility for guarding Kyrgyzstan’s borders. A “

Kyrgyz-Russian Border Troops Command was establ

commanded by a Russian,60 to patrol only the borde

China—not along “internal” CIS borders. The Gro

Russian Border Guards in Kyrgyzstan work

Kyrgyzstan (but subordinate to the Russian Federal B

Guard Service), financed 80 percent by Moscow a

percent by Bishkek. Border guards serve under con

set by a 5-year agreement with Moscow, although 

result of recent recruitment, more than 60 percent 

inductees into the “Russian” border forces are 

Kyrgyz.61

Kyrgyzstan announced plans for conventional for

include Ground forces and an Air Force/Air De

Command and a National Guard to provide in

security.62 Kyrgyz Armed Forces were originally 

comprised of one division (one tank, one artillery, an

infantry regiment) headquartered in Bishkek;6

independent brigade for mountain warfare headqua

in Osh; and three aviation training regiments.64 The 

forces have survived, but the aviation training regi

have collapsed as Bishkek failed to maintain the 

Union’s pilot training program for foreign students.

Bishkek’s primary military problem is cadre. On

unified command concept collapsed, Kyrgyzstan s

regulations to create a conscript force of nearly 20,0

target it has not been able to meet. Within a year 

apparent that these plans were overly ambitiou

Kyrgyzstan remained ambivalent about the structu

size of its conventional forces. Today’s conscript fo

16
enough qualified officers to lead even that small numb

4,000 Soviet officers stationed in Kyrgyzstan “a

inception,” about 90 percent were ethnic Russian. N

regimental commander and only one battalion comm

were ethnic Kyrgyz. Bishkek appointed an ethnic Kyr

its first Defense Minister,65 but the Chief of the Main 

was Russian. Additional appointments included e

enced Russian and Ukrainian officers, with many K

officers appointed to deputy positions. Around 1,700 K

officers were serving outside Kyrgyzstan in 1991, m

whom returned to serve in the new Kyrgyz forces

interstate treaty allows Russian soldiers to serve 

Kyrgyz armed forces on a contractual basis through t

of 1999. A 1994 agreement enabled contract Russi

transfer to Russian or Kyrgyz service “withou

obstacles.”67 These provisions, however, have failed t

the hemorrhaging exit of skilled officers followin

collapse of the Kyrgyz economy.

For Kyrgyzstan, financing its own armed forces ha

truly daunting both in planning and execution. A

minister noted, “in the past our job was to gather u

money, send it to Moscow and keep the troops 

Independent Kyrgyzstan has had to support forces 

own territory, including retired officers’ pensions, fr

own budget.68 Financial considerations have been a 

factor in the sharp cut of personnel. Bishkek was wo

dependent upon the defense sector. With the end of th

War, this market collapsed. Russia would not buy 

Kyrgyz suppliers. This comes at a time when Bishke

faces up to $300 million in loans to Russia. Kyrgyzsta

had to “sell” much of its defense sector to Russia to p

the loans—Moscow could well soon own a majority 

industrial base in Kyrgyzstan as a result. Under s

situation, there is little defense budget to pay for m

development—and priority goes to paying for b

forces.69

17
“outsourcing” border defense to the Russians and 

sizing conventional armed forces?70 In a sense Kyrgy

originally went beyond (actually below) “reaso

sufficiency”—the Soviet doctrine which argued that a 

develop sufficient means to defend itself but not ala

neighbors—to “reasonable insufficiency”—insuff

means to defend but so little national power that neig

ignore you altogether for more profitable targets.

Kyrgyzstan is tied economically and militarily to R

It has allowed itself to be drawn into Russia’s fold by j

the Quadripartite Customs Union (with Russia, B

and Kazakhstan) because it is landlocked and is is

from major trade routes. It hopes that the new arrang

will be a practical move to avoid customs taxes and 

access to Russian markets.71 Kyrgyzstan has defer

Moscow in all major security and economic arrange

because it felt it had little choice.

That has recently begun to change. Kyrgyzstan h

built up its armed forces and remains militarily weak

has begun working with its more powerful Central 

neighbors to compensate for that insufficiency and p

national security independent of Russia. Kyrgyzsta

slowly moved beyond dependency to Moscow in an ef

avoid total subordination and because its most 

threat was eliminated by the April 1997 agreemen

China. By the end of the decade, Bishkek has begun t

itself to its two most powerful Central Asian neigh

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan—politically, econom

and militarily on a trilateral and bilateral basis.

At the regional level, Bishkek helped form 

tri-national Central Asian Battalion (CENTRAZ

being offered to the United Nations (U.N.) for peaceke

duties.72 Kyrgyzstan joined Uzbekistan and Kazakhs

a trilateral customs union, signed the treaty on Deep

Integration in Economic and Humanitarian Matters

joined them in the International Asian Investment 

18
heads of state, prime ministers, and defense chiefs.

Bishkek also has signed bilateral accords with 

states. In December 1996, Tashkent and Bishkek con

an eternal friendship accord and signed agreemen

military cooperation, hydroelectricty, natura

deliveries, a highway linking Uzbekistan to China

combating drug trafficking.74 Six months later Alma

Bishkek signed a series of agreements to create a 

energy pool, finish building hydroelectric plan

Kyrgyzstan, join uranium-processing efforts, and s

Kyrgyzstan with oil; the two presidents then signed a 

on military cooperation establishing a common defen

border space and providing for a joint air defense sy

cooperation between border units, and joint exercise

This regional integration is not without diffic

Bishkek does not want to be dependent on Moscow, b

tied to Russia through the CIS and the Quadrip

Customs Union and still acknowledges Moscow to 

“main strategic partner of Kyrgyzstan.”76 Unre

tensions exist within the region. Many Kyrgyz distru

ambitions of emerging power Uzbekistan with 

Kyrgyzstan shares the volatile Fergana valley. Mem

also linger of bloody riots in 1990 in Osh, Kyrgy

involving ethnic Uzbeks, in which hundreds if not 

thousand people may have lost their lives. It was 

before independence to direct disfavor and blame a

the Soviet Union than it is to find common ground onc

target disappears.

KAZAKHSTAN—PROMISE UNFILLED?

Is there a basis for Kazakhstan to form its own army? Is th

sufficient finance, a sufficient material and technical base, 

sufficient personnel for this? What is the level of preparatio

national cadres, and what is their present function in the arm

. . . Under present circumstances, three preconditions mus

met to form a well-prepared, complete army. They are finan

19
incomplete army.77

Baqtier Yerimet,

February 14, 1992

On paper, Kazakhstan had the greatest poten

becoming a military power following independence

largest Central Asian state (2,717,000 square kilom

Almaty inherited nuclear weapons and substantial st

military equipment and hardware from the Soviet 

Major test facilities and the Baikonur space center 

located in Kazakhstan. The country was rich in miner

energy resources, especially oil.78 Its population 

million included 8-10 million ethnic Russians 

predominantly in the industrialized north. Yet, 7 year

Kazakhstan struggles to build its armed forces

economic and political weaknesses have increasingly 

it, too, into Russia’s embrace.79

Although drastically different in size and p

Kazakhstan shares many common problems 

Kyrgyzstan to include transnational threats from 

smuggling, potential spillover from the war in Tajik

and fear of politicized Islam and regional instability 

the Taliban’s struggle in Afghanistan.80 Kazakhs ma

only 40 percent of its population, with another 40 p

Russian (although a declining number), and the 

mishmash of other Slavic, Central Asian, and 

minorities. Russian nationalists (e.g., Solzhenitsyn) 

breaking away northern Kazakhstan and returnin

Mother Russia (where it belonged for centuries 

Stalin’s pen sliced it away). Therefore, Kazakh

security demands resemble a Rubik’s Cube of ever-cha

patterns and combinations in which border de

internal security, and conventional forces’ develo

cannot be prioritized but demand equal, if fluctu

attention.

Almaty’s original assumption was that someon

would be responsible for sorting this all out. Kazakhst

20
Nazarbayev’s call for a summit in Almaty to 

independence was a major element in forcing the lead

Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to include the Central 

republics in the newly formed Commonwealth of Ind

dent States. It is not surprising, therefore, that Kazak

was very reluctant to give up the idea of a CIS u

command and form its own armed forces.81 Soon 

declaring independence on December 6, 1991, Nazar

established a National Security Council to form

legislation and doctrine directly affecting na

security.82 A presidential decree of April 16, 

transferred the bulk of the ex-Soviet 40th Army 

jurisdiction of the Kazakhstani government, 

redesignated it the “All-Arms Army” within the conte

CIS unified command.

Outside events forced Nazarbayev’s hand. On M

1992, one day after Boris Yeltsin announced the crea

the Russian Army (thus ending for all intents and pu

any hope for a unified CIS command system), Nazar

declared himself Commander-in-Chief of the “Armed 

of Kazakhstan” and established a Defense Ministry

State Security Council became the supreme dec

making body for national defense doctrine, security 

and senior military appointments under the chairma

of President Nazarbayev.83 Almaty placed ground forc

forces, air defense forces, and naval units84 und

Ministry of Defense. Initial planning envisioned 

conscript forces should be at least 0.5 percent of the na

population (c. 83,000) but a shortage of funds a

inability to enforce conscription consistently forced A

to halve that amount. Current manning totals a

35,000 (ground forces, 20,000; air forces, 15,000; and 

forces, 100).85

Restructuring of the internal security apparatu

proceeded slowly. Nazarbayev created the Repu

Guard in March 1992, making it directly subordin

himself. The first two (of six) battalions were muste

21
month later he designated a Kazakhstani Minist

Internal Affairs, and Moscow transferred control 

ex-Soviet Internal Troops to him for the miss

maintaining public order and suppressing p

disturbances.88 Internal security forces now number a

20,000.89

Initially Kazakhstan envisioned its own border 

under the National Security Committee (the indig

KGB successor) guarding its 1,718 kilometer-long ex

border. It nationalized the Border Guard Academy (l

in Almaty) and accepted technical training assistanc

Russia. Before long, however, it was evident these 

were inadequate to stem the flow of drugs, weapon

refugees crossing the region, and that Almaty lack

resources to increase the size of its own forces. Kazak

was forced to follow the path of other Central 

neighbors and accept the presence of Russian border 

along its external border. By May 1995, however, K

border forces, now subordinated to a new State Com

of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the Protection of 

Borders90 (and assisted by a small [more administ

than operational] “Group of Russian Border Troo

Kazakhstan”), assumed responsibility for border secu

Kazakhstan’s trump card was its inherited n

weapons and delivery systems. However, any thoug

retaining Soviet nuclear weapons were short-lived. A

lacked the funds and technical expertise to maintai

safeguard the weapons. It could not easily integrate n

weapons with its own military forces. Public revulsion 

disastrous impact of various Soviet nuclear test sites 

environment and health of the Kazakhstani popu

could not be ignored. So instead, Almaty adopted a po

denuclearization and nonproliferation to divest itself 

104 SS-18 missiles (ten warheads each) and 40 Tu-

strategic bombers (with 370 nuclear bombs) inherited 

independence and transferred them to Russia.92

22
confrontation and to seek out collective security par

Almaty’s earliest security doctrine declared that no 

was its enemy, denied territorial claims on any 

neighbors, and promised inviolability of ex

borders.93Doctrine stresses that although there 

specific “threat,” territorial, economic, religious, eth

other tensions could escalate to war. Regional inst

and build-up of military potential by some natio

include weapons of mass destruction) remain sour

potential danger. Kazakhstan must not confront 

threats by itself, but find collective security within th

through joint utilization of strategic forces, a syst

comprehensive logistical and rear support, common 

to train and retain officer cadres, joint researc

development of military armaments, and developme

joint military science and military art.94

Unfortunately, the early hopes for CIS mi

integration and cooperation remain basically unfulf

years later, hampered by a lack of funds and a Russian 

of signing documents without executing them.95 As a 

although Kazakhstan remains in the CIS mi

structure, it has sought alternative security partn

help resolve the serious problems encounter

developing conventional armed forces.

The critical shortage of national cadres remains 

problem and deterrent to progress. At independen

percent of Soviet officers in Kazakhstan were Russia

number of active duty Kazakh officers of all ranks 

entire Soviet Army numbered only about 3,000, “not e

to wash one’s hands with.”96 There was not a single K

general commanding a division, army, or military d

among them; colonels numbered only about 50, mo

support roles.97

Kazakhstan selected a distinguished ethnic Kaz

become the first Defense Minister,98 but his original d

defense ministers were Russian officers. As they dep

23
and promote them to general rank. Elderly Ge

Nurmagambetov was replaced as Defense Minis

October 1995, by 41-year-old Lieutenant General A

Kasymov, a graduate of the Frunze Academy and f

Chief of Staff of the 40th Army, who had served 

November 1992 as Chief of the Main Staff.99 Bu

shortage of experienced, capable officers at all 

remains a serious brake on military development.

Moscow did attempt to assist Almaty in stoppin

exodus; in July 1993 Moscow amended its La

Conscription and Military Service to allow Russian o

and warrant officers serving in other republic’s milita

retain legal rights envisaged under Russian laws and 

them from the obligation to take Kazakh citizens

swear an oath until December 31, 1993; this was 

extended to December 31, 1999.100 The outflow cont

however, in part due to Russian perception that alt

the Russians made up the majority of officers, only 

Kazakhs were being promoted to the rank of gener

Russian resentment at serving under senior K

officers whose “rampant incompetence” resulted 

“promotions based on the factor of ethnicity and cap

for political maneuvering rather than expertise. . . . It 

surprising that more and more ethnic Russian

abandoning military service . . .”leading to cases wher

30-40 percent of the officer slots are filled.101

Military education remains a critical issue, especia

noncommissioned and junior officers. Kazakhstan 

better than some Central Asian states in the tr

facilities it inherited, although the number was still 

three military prep-schools, two military secondary s

(as opposed to 34 in Ukraine), and two ex-Soviet 

military schools—the Almaty Higher All-Arms Com

School (only six Kazakhs among the faculty and 84 Ka

out of 1,000 students) and the Border Guards Acade

Under the September 1992 Russo-Kazakhstani Tre

Friendship, Cooperation, and Assistance, Moscow agr

24
military academies.103 Kazakhstani pilots and navi

are being trained at the Lepitsk Training Cen

Russia.104

Kazakhstan also has to face the question of lan

Few of the 60 percent of non-Kazakh populace 

Kazakh at independence, and the number of those 

Slavs making up the officer corps (even those bo

Kazakhstan) who spoke Kazakh was especially low

desire to push the Kazakh language was hindered no

by the embarrassing number of Russified Ka

intellectuals who did not speak Kazakh, but b

knowledge that, until domestic military educa

institutions could be established, personnel would h

continue to train in Russia—where they needed the Ru

language.105 Additionally, instructional materials, 

training manuals, and so forth, inherited from the 

Army were all in Russian.

Unable to exploit fully its energy resources or 

easily the dysfunctions following the breakup of the 

economic system, Kazakhstan has made hard decisi

allocating limited financial resources, and the armed 

have not come out the winner in budget battles. As a 

Kazakhstan has had to relinquish several val

properties to Russian control that it had hoped to e

and it has signed a series of bilateral and multil

agreements designed to draw Kazakhstan closer to R

In May 1992 they signed an Agreement on Frien

Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance by which 

promised each other military assistance in ca

aggression against either state.106 In March 1994 

signed 22 agreements, to include the lease to Moscow 

Baikonur Cosmodrome (for an initial period of 20 year

an option to extend a further 10 years) for $115 m

annually (to be deducted from Almaty’s debts to Rus

January 1995 agreement gave Russia continued acc

several missile test ranges, proving grounds, and m

communications sites in Kazakhstan.107 In Jan

25
of bilateral agreements,108 including an intent to “be

form unified armed forces.” The states would not f

single armed force, but create a close alliance in which 

would be unified, when necessary, to face a common 

within a “mutual military and strategic space.”109 

same year Kazakhstan joined the CIS integrate

defense system and conducted a joint Russo-K

exercise.110 In January 1996, defense officials disc

joint military cooperation, a draft agreeme

establishing a joint Russian-Kazakh regional se

planning organization, a Treaty on Collective Se

closer cooperation in air defense and naval a

technological cooperation, exchange training program

the creation of joint Russian-Kazakh units, and then 

16 agreements.111

Talk of integrating Kazakhstan’s armed forces 

those of Russia (even if only on paper) reflects a 

political and economic dependence. Kazakhstan pos

untapped mineral and energy wealth, but fu

exploitation will require extensive investment i

transportation infrastructure. Kazakhstan is landl

and in the early days there was no other option but 

Russian pipelines (with Moscow taking a huge cut 

top) to get energy to external markets. Almaty join

Quadripartite Customs Union with Russia, Belaru

Kyrgyzstan to gain access to Moscow’s interna

markets and reestablish trade ties disrupt

independence.112

However, this image of Kazakhstan being draw

Russia’s sphere is less striking in reality. Execut

treaties remains spotty, including (6 years late

Tashkent Accord. Russian Defense Minister Ser

visited Almaty in October 1997 to iron out tension

Russia’s failure to meet payment schedules for fac

lease in Kazakhstan, and Kazakh nationalists’ protes

the presence of Russian forces in country.113 CIS supp

form joint peacekeeping forces under Russian comm

26
provide one battalion to guard a 56-kilometer stretch 

Afghan-Tajik border.114 Kazakhstan has signe

agreements on the concept of military security (O

1993) and collective security (February 1995).115

Nazarbayev has sought to develop alternative se

dialogues within Central Asia, first with his call 

Central Asian “Eurasian Union,” then with Kazakh

leadership role in the economic, political, and m

structures formed with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. 

efforts include the 1994 agreement to form a “

economic space” and an “economic integration progr

the year 2000” signed in 1996. For example, the 

planned to finance and build a gas pipeline linkin

Bukhara gas-bearing region (across Kyrgyzstan) 

Almaty. The program also includes construction of na

segments of the Trans-Asia-Europe fiber-optic com

cations line being developed.116 The success of 

endeavors is due (according to Russian analysts) to th

that all signed documents are scrupulously implem

problems are dealt with cooperatively, and none 

leaders publicly accuses another of nonfulfillm

common complaints about Russian-sponsored acco

That this union might evolve into military coope

cannot be discounted.

Ties with immediate neighbors have also 

developed. As a member of the Economic Coope

Organization (ECO), Kazakhstan (and the other C

Asian republics) seeks to improve ties with Is

neighbors Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and de

economic cooperation and integration. Perhaps one d

least in the eyes of some) ECO may transform itself fr

economic union into a regional security forum (as h

Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN).

Almaty has also expanded its security contact

result of signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation T

(NPT) as a non-nuclear power. Russia, the United S

27
Kazakhstan.118 China has also confirmed th

abstention from the use of nuclear weapons or the th

their use against a non-nuclear state “appl

Kazakhstan.”119

Thus, Kazakhstan’s original aspiration to develop 

armed forces from the equipment and cadres inherite

Moscow remains a promise unfulfilled. However, A

has sought alternate political and economic mea

ensure its national sovereignty. Nazarbayev wa

earliest proponent of regional integration. Kazakhsta

taken a leading role in developing economic, politica

military ties with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

TURKMENISTAN—VICTORIAN GOVERNESS?

Turkmenistan seems to hope that in the short run 

avoid conflict by keeping a low profile—a sort of “Vic

Governess Syndrome.” In countless 19th century 

(pick any Bronte sister), the poor, unmarried govern

female relation keeps quiet in the background, dress

dark colors to avoid attention, placating everyone, a

helpful, avoiding the eldest son of the house, and p

that her very anonymity would ensure her cont

residence. Except, of course, this governess knows th

is secretly the missing heiress, and at some point 

future she will come into a large fortune.

Turkmenistan is the second largest Central Asian 

(488,000 square kilometers), but it has a population s

than tiny Kyrgyzstan. Its porous borders to the sout

Iran and Afghanistan and to the west with the Caspia

present a major security challenge to a country wit

four million people (and an additional two million Tur

residing over the border in war-torn Afghanistan). I

possesses potentially huge energy reserves (espe

natural gas) and better access for pipelines and tra

linkups via the reviving “Silk Route” tying it to Chin

Western Europe. Turkmenistan is unique, however

28
protection in favor of nonalignment and a bil

relationship with Moscow.

Following independence (October 27, 1991

government in Ashgabat was a firm supporter of 

unified force until the pace of nationalization by Azerb

Ukraine, and Moldova forced it to create a Turkmen A

Forces organized into Ground Forces, Air Force

Defense Forces, and a Naval Coastal Defense Force f

with the breakup of the Caspian Sea Flotill

approximately 300 Soviet units stationed in Turkme

in December 1991, Moscow transferred about 2

Turkmen control; these included the former Soviet 

Corps headquartered in Ashgabat (redesignate

Independent All-Arms Army in August 1992) wit

all-arms divisions and an air defense brigade. By 

1993, about 60,000 soldiers were stationed i

Turkmenistan (based on the former Soviet 52d Army

about one-fourth of whom were Russian, but fin

problems and immigration have cut that number n

about 16,000-18,000.120

Manpower shortages are compounded by eth

issues. Few Turkmen officers had reached senior 

within the Soviet Army or attended the senior s

college. President Niyazov’s senior appointees have 

backgrounds in security services rather than m

experience, perhaps less an inability to identif

promote Turkmen field grade officers to general rank 

focus on security threats to his personal rule 

propensity for appointing old personal and Party frie

his immediate circle.

Military education has also been a problem. No m

schools or officer academies existed in Turkmenistan 

independence. In the short term Ashgabat has sent 

cadets abroad for training and educated other junior o

at a new Military Faculty of the Turkmen State Univ

in Ashgabat. In September 1993 the first Turkmen M

29
program to train armor, air force, logistics, and comm

tions lieutenants. The first class of 75 lieute

graduated from the Turkmen Military Academy duri

summer of 1996; 200 graduated in 1997.121 No h

schools yet exist, but Ashgabat currently sends 

officers abroad to Russia, Turkey, the United State

Pakistan for additional training. Navy and Air 

officers attend schools in Ukraine, Pakistan and Turk

Turkmenistan did not hold its first full-scale m

exercise until October 1995.123

Materiel remains a problem, although on pap

Turkmen Army possesses 500 T-72 tanks and the Tur

Air Force has 171 operational fighters, trainers, a

defense aircraft on hand and 218 in storage.124 But, “a

inventories do not reflect the impact of maintenance 

or spare parts availability. In fact, Turkmenista

systematically disposed of excess Soviet equip

deployed or stockpiled on its territory, including some 

the 1,000 aircraft held in storage.125

The president of Turkmenistan, Saparmurad Ni

however, listening to his own “different drummer

followed a unique path within Central Asia. Ashgab

up its own Ministry of Defense Affairs (January 27, 

and created a ceremonial National Guard (October 

following the pattern of its neighbors. But 

Turkmenistan refused to sign the CIS Accord, N

replaced it with a bilateral Russo-Turkmen Agreem

July 1992 by which formations and units on Turkm

would be under Russo-Turkmen “joint jurisdiction

Russian Defense Ministry would retain sole contro

certain air defense and long-range bomber unit

Turkmen Defense Minister126 would coordinat

activities of armed forces deployed on the territ

Turkmenistan, as well as liaison with the mi

departments of other CIS states and the CIS comma

30
command ended in January 1994, although Russia ret

representative on Turkmenistan’s Defense and Na

Security Council at the Turkmen MOD and the Comm

of Russian Border Guard Forces.127 By September 

Ashgabat had signed a bilateral agreement with Mos

bring armed forces in Turkmenistan back under Ashg

control. The approximately 2,000 Russian offic

Turkmenistan could voluntarily continue to serve on 

tract basis, but the majority left when their contracts e

With the failure of joint command, a series of bil

agreements reaffirmed Moscow’s role as partne

quasi-patron.128 A naval agreement extended Russia

of facilities at Krasnovodsk for use by warships o

nations, promised creation of combined naval unit

proposed joint naval exercises. Both countries agreed 

up a training center for pilots and aviation technici

December 1993 agreement establishing the princi

“dual nationality” sought to ease the fears of s

Russian officers.129 Ashgabat also signed a 1993 

providing the legal basis for the dispatch, if necess

Russian troops to defend Turkmenistan’s border wit

and Afghanistan.130

Russia also assumed responsibility for prot

Turkmenistan’s 2,300-kilometer border with Ira

Afghanistan. Ashgabat originally announced creation 

own border forces, but that proved too muc

Turkmenistan’s manpower and financial resources, 

the porous nature of its southern border and civil w

Afghanistan.131 An August 27, 1992, Russo-Tur

agreement on border cooperation placed all Russia

Turkmen border units under a provisional 

Russo-Turkmen Border Command to remain in effec

years, during which Russia would assist in the develo

of indigenous border forces. This force, too, proved un

control the spread of drugs and arms throughout the 

thus, in 1995, an “Operational Group of Russian B

Troops on the Territory of Turkmenistan” was estab

31
border.132 Since January 1, 1994, Ashgabat has been p

the entire cost of Russia’s military expenses 

territory.133

Turkmenistan, however, is not a puppet of Mosco

has asserted its independence on several occa

Turkmenistan signed a bilateral Treaty of Friendsh

Cooperation with Russia in September 1992—but onl

Ashgabat refused to ratify the Tashkent collective se

agreement that May.134 Turkmenistan still has not r

the treaty and is merely a “participant” without full r

Ashgabat refuses to send delegates to CIS meetings 

those concerning drugs and international crime. Since 

not approve the Tashkent Accord, Turkmenistan d

send peacekeeping forces to Tajikistan.

Instead, Turkmenistan identifies itself as a nona

nation, free and able to enter into associations w

states.135 At the Helsinki summit in July 1992, N

announced a policy of “positive neutrality,” noninterf

in the affairs of others, and cooperation.136 Niyazov 

took this doctrine to the U.N. General Assembly, wh

December 1995 approved a resolution on the “Perm

Neutrality of Turkmenistan.137 In his mind this pe

resembles international guarantees for Belg

neutrality in the 19th century. Niyazov appears to en

that Turkmenistan now possesses security guara

through the United Nations. However, U.N. assuranc

notoriously thin bonds upon which to stake na

survival.

Under positive neutrality, Turkmenistan has bee

to enter into a variety of military, political, and eco

relationships. Niyazov has stated that Turkmenista

not join any military bloc—but can continue to 

Russian military assistance without compromisi

sovereignty or independence.138 Turkmenistan becam

first Central Asian state to join Partnership for Pe

May 1994 (although it has been slow to actually parti

32
Iran and signed a series of military cooperation agree

with Teheran, including the “exchange of experience 

construction and development of armed forces” an

exchange of military delegations.139 Turkmenistan ha

explored economic and military ties with its neighb

the Caucasus and Ukraine.

Ashgabat claims its policy is a success. Turkme

has experienced the least drop in its Gross Dom

Product since 1989; of course, it also had the 

standard of living within the USSR in 1989. Neverth

the Turkmen argue that positive neutrality has allow

country to invest “not in an enormous military arsen

in the construction of the civilian infrastructure th

eventually become the foundation of the national econ

and has allowed it to maintain friendly rela

simultaneously with the United States, Iran, Pak

Russia, Turkey, and France even as they disagree wit

other.140

In sum, recognizing that its small forces are incap

protecting its vast expanse, Turkmenistan has s

limited bilateral support from Russia and security th

its proclaimed nonaligned status. It has worked to d

the infrastructure needed to impress serious invest

modern airport, hotels at international standard). M

wields considerable influence, but Ashgabat has atte

to ingratiate itself with all sides.

UZBEKISTAN—MALL ANCHOR STORE?

Uzbekistan has been the most successful of the C

Asian countries in creating viable armed forces a

such, has produced the most independent security po

Central Asia.

Tashkent created a Ministry of Defense Affair

appointed the first Defense Minister in September 19

On January 14, 1992, Uzbekistan assumed jurisdictio

33
with the exception of those strategic forces retained 

the CIS unified command. A National Border Guard 

took over from the ex-Soviet Central Asian Border T

District, and a National Guard142 replaced former 

Interior (internal security) troops.143 By July 1992, w

was apparent that a CIS unified command wou

prevail, the Uzbek legislature approved a series of 

laws that laid the framework for the Uzbek militar

new military oath to the “people” and President 

Republic of Uzbekistan was first administered in 

1992.145

Conventional armed forces, numbering pe

65,000-70,000, under a MOD staff derived from 

headquarters of the Soviet Army’s Turkestan M

District, are the largest in Central Asia. Forces inclu

corps headquarters; two tank divisions; four mech

infantry divisions; motorized, air assault, and air m

brigades; three artillery, and one multiple rocket lau

brigades; and an artillery regiment. Equipment in

370 mostly older model main battle tanks and ove

towed and self-propelled artillery systems. Nearl

combat aircraft and over 40 attack helicopters are in t

Force inventory. Added to this are over 15,000 in

security forces and a National Guard brigade. Thi

formidable force compared to the other Central 

republics.146

The Uzbeks are the lone force in Central Asia to d

a new force structure not based on the old Soviet mo

1992 the Uzbeks began to reconfigure their ground 

into a corps-brigade-battalion structure for gr

flexibility.147 Initial planners envisioned two stages fo

development: the first stage (1991 to 1994) to for

armed forces, install the conscription system, and 

reform of the force structure and personnel. A second 

(1995-2000) would finalize structural changes and bri

armed forces to an end strength of about 70,000.14

number has now been halved. The defense budget ha

34
increased, its actual value has been more than hal

Uzbekistan did not inherit a self-sufficient industrial 

but several major military complexes did survive, to in

the Chkalov aviation factory producing the IL-76 CA

(which Uzbekistan exports to China, Cuba, and A

and passenger variants.150

With the nationalization of Soviet forces, an overw

ingly Slavic officer corps and predominantly Uzbek en

forces characterized the Uzbek army.151 But, tha

shifted as a result of Slavic migration, the Uzbek refu

grant dual citizenship, and a concerted govern

program to put Uzbek officers in command.152 One me

acquire senior Uzbek officers was by rejuvenatin

careers of a group of Uzbek officers whose Soviet 

careers seemingly had dead-ended in the 1980

example, Rustam Akhmedov, a lieutenant colonel w

years of service but shunted aside to Civil Defens

promoted to Uzbek major general and appointed D

Minister. Russians appointed as deputies (includin

Army Chief of Staff) monopolized officer positions 

short term, but within a year, appointments became 

balanced. Ethnic Slavs who remained accepted 

citizenship. The officer corps is now about 60 percent U

and the percentage of enlisted conscripts at 85 percent 

the Uzbek the most ethnically pure in the former 

Union.

Three major Soviet educational institution

Tashkent Higher All-Arms Command School, the Tas

Higher Tank Command School, and the Samarkand H

Military Automobile Command), four military ly

prep-schools, and the Tashkent Special Mi

Gymnasium (Internat) located in Uzbekistan g

helped this drive for self-sufficiency in manpower c

Then, in 1994 Uzbekistan established in Tashkent 

institution, the new Armed Forces Academy, a joint f

to train officers for brigade- and corps-level comman

35
institution capable of providing advanced military tra

Uzbekistan issued its own military doctrine in A

1995, in which Tashkent rejected territorial claims 

neighbors and claimed it would launch military action

to defend itself or countries with whom its has m

military assistance agreements.153 It supports incr

the role of the United Nations, active integratio

international and regional security structures, a uni

prohibition of nuclear war (Central Asia should 

nuclear-free zone), elimination of chemical and bio

weapons, and weapons nonproliferation.154

Uzbekistan’s military policy reflects a more ass

stance than its neighbors. Tashkent’s new military do

argues that intervention in the affairs of neighboring 

may be justified for the sake of regional stability, n

empty statement considering its willingness to use m

power vis-à-vis Tajikistan and Afghanistan and the g

of the armed forces since independence.155 Th

defensive in nature and opposing war as a means to r

international problems, Uzbekistan’s doctrine ca

maintaining sufficient combat power to guarant

territorial integrity, stop encroachments on its sovere

and repel aggression. In war, its armed forces would in

decisive defeat on both the aggressor’s forces and on th

military potential of other states linked by rel

treaties.156 Such assertiveness worries other Central 

states, which question Uzbekistan’s long-term goals 

region and fear Tashkent’s willingness to follo

so-called “Sinatra Doctrine,” and do things its way.

Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state not to h

agreement with Russia on joint protection of its “ex

borders.” The Uzbek Border Guard Force was 

established on March 24, 1992, as “Border Prot

Troops157 to fight smuggling, the drug trade, and the 

transit of emigrants from Asia to Europe, especially 

region where Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Taji

36
Troops Directorate, headed by a Deputy Chief 

Republic’s National Security Service (the former 

Committee on State Security or KGB), and transfer

units of the ex-Soviet Central Asian Border Troops D

to the jurisdiction of the Uzbek National Security Serv

At independence the Border Guards’ officer corp

overwhelmingly Slavic, but Tashkent aggres

produced indigenous forces by organizing special 

officers courses in which ethnic Uzbek priv

noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and warrant o

underwent accelerated training and by creating a s

border cadet group at the Tashkent Higher Combined 

Command School. The Termez border detachment 

border brigade with patrol boats guards the 156-kilo

riverine border with Afghanistan. Of course, the sho

of the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan border makes its d

more manageable and allows Uzbekistan to avoid h

Russian border guards on its soil. Uzbekistan also m

border posts along the border with Tajikistan.160

The border Tashkent most fears is that with Tajik

which Tashkent regards as a dagger aimed at the h

Uzbekistan.161 Tajikistan was originally part of 

Uzbekistan, and when its borders were drawn to cr

separate Tajik state, large enclaves of Tajiks, inc

major cultural centers such as Samarkand and Bok

remained. With Kyrgyzstan, they share the Fergana V

a focus for religious revival and activism. Only 5 perc

Uzbekistan’s population of 24 million is Tajik, w

quarter of Tajikistan’s population of 6 million is ethn

Uzbek. Tashkent is determined to keep Tajikistan’s 

from spreading and has ruthlessly suppressed it

domestic political and religious dissent since Dush

cycle of civil war, economic dislocation, ethnic strif

external intervention began.

Karimov also identifies the Afghan wars as a real 

to peace and security in Central Asia and the world be

they have become “a source of international terr

37
aggravated the already tense situation. . . .” In additio

war there stymied Central Asian states’ projects to 

railroads, pipelines, and roads through Afghanis

reach the Indian Ocean.162

Karimov has not just talked about problems “

South,” he has taken action.163 Uzbekistan ac

supported the ethnic Uzbek warlord Dostum in the A

struggle. It sent a 500-man contingent of peacekeep

serve in Tajikistan. Where Moscow support

Rakhmonov regime in Dushanbe with militar

Karimov long pushed the Tajik government to mee

the opposition to negotiate a political end to the tr

Tension exists because Moscow regards Tajikistan 

problem to be solved, while Uzbekistan regards th

within its own sphere of interest.

Uzbekistan does not border Russia, and tha

influence its ambivalent attitude toward Moscow. 

early days of independence, Tashkent was a s

supporter and ally of Russia. Uzbekistan signed bil

agreements in May 1992 and March 1994 that gr

Russia extensive privileges and promised to con

existing ties in the production and supply of we

equipment, spare parts, and accessories and to cooper

exporting weaponry and military equipment.164

However, Uzbekistan began to distance itself 

Moscow at mid-decade. With Russia no longer a super

and its military reputation tarnished in Chec

Moscow’s influence began to wane. In April 1995 Pre

Karimov identified “imperialistic ambition rearing 

Russia” as one of three security issues that could 

Uzbekistan’s independence.165 Uzbekistan refus

support Moscow’s rejection of NATO expansion and b

strongly involved in Partnership for Peace. It has d

signing recent trade and economic agreements with M

and has worked to develop transportation route

bypass the Russian Federation. In November 

38
Mikhail Kolesnikov to be CIS Chief of Staff for Coordin

Military Cooperation, stating that this “interstate 

should be headed by a representative of a state othe

Russia, a citizen of which has already held this po

Uzbekistan pushed for a negotiated settleme

Tajikistan and bypassed Moscow to begin diplo

initiatives of its own.

This cooling did not go unnoticed. The Ru

nationalist journal Zavtra complained of Tash

“emphatically pro-West orientation in the econom

harsh invective apropos integration treaties in the CI

decisive refusal to join even the Customs Union, 

methodical anti-Russian nationality policy. . . .”167 An

observer commented, “The more heartfelt Moscow’s a

for closer integration within the CIS became, the mor

Tashkent displayed indifference, or at best, a cool in

with many reservations.”168

Nevertheless, in speeches Karimov still sup

participation in the CIS and identifies the “key issu

the “development and strengthening of equal ties 

sovereign Russia and a reliance on its potenti

Uzbekistan knows that it is not a vital interest of the U

States, but it is a vital interest of Russia. Ther

Uzbekistan can remain under the CIS’s collective se

umbrella and still play an increasingly independen

and evade being drawn into Moscow’s sphere.

At the same time Uzbekistan has developed increa

warmer ties with the United States. Originally the U

States was critical of Tashkent’s poor human rights 

and linked financial assistance to Uzbekistan’s progr

forging democratic institutions.170 But as Uzbekistan 

in regional importance, the mood in Washington shi

fear that the United States would loose influence if i

pushing human rights. Following the visit of D

Secretary William Perry in April 1995, a sharp sh

American policy occurred. Uzbekistan allowed a 

39
Partnership for Peace (PfP), and Uzbek contin

participated in PfP exercises (COOPERATIVE NUGG

August 1995 and COOPERATIVE OSPREY in A

1996) in the United States; in September 1996, U.S. 

traveled to Uzbekistan for Exercise BALA

ULTRA-96.171 American and Uzbek forces have cond

multinational exercises together including the air

jump into Chimkent in 1997. Uzbek officers reg

attend courses at the Marshall Center in Garm

Partenkirchen, Germany, and in the United States.

President Karimov’s visit to the United States 

summer of 1996 cemented economic investmen

military cooperation. He signed six contracts worth 

million, and the United States granted credit of $400 m

for the development of an Uzbek oil and gas comple

defense conversion program begun in 1995 is stu

(among other projects) conversion of the Chkalov av

plant. A joint U.S.-Uzbek committee for the convers

Uzbek defense enterprises has been established, an

U.S. Government-sponsored Overseas Private Inves

Corporation has budgeted $500 million to suppor

ventures.173

At the same time, Tashkent has supported econ

political, and military integration within Central 

Uzbekistan ratified bilateral military agreements 

Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. In 1996, Tashkent sig

border-protection agreement with Ashgabat.174 In Ja

1997, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan sig

tripartite treaty declaring “eternal friendship

promising to cooperate militarily within a mutual d

agreement (outside the Tashkent Accord).175 The pres

of the three states meet regularly at sessions 

Interstate Council of the Tripartite Central Asian Un

discuss political problems and economic integration

coordinate joint positions before upcoming CIS summ

Moscow.

40
that the United States needs Uzbekistan as an “isl

stability” between Russia’s regional ambitions fro

north and Islamic fundamentalism from the south

that sense, Uzbekistan is the “anchor store” for the C

Asian mall, acting as a strong stabilizer to prevent a C

Asian political vacuum and a core military force a

which to develop units such as the CENTRAZBA

anchor store, however, is designed to draw in cust

that are then shared by smaller shops in the mal

becomes too overwhelming and monopolizes bus

smaller stores may seek leases elsewhere. A s

balancing act must occur in Central Asia. A s

Uzbekistan stabilizes the region; a too strong Uzbe

threatens its neighbors and drives them into the a

Russia.

WHAT ROLE FOR THE DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSE?

The U.S. armed forces were early players in C

Asia. Military flights carried humanitarian aid and v

dignitaries. Moscow’s attaches, experienced travelers 

region, could easily be dual-accredited. With the 

sizing in Europe following the end of the Cold Wa

Central Asian states were an obvious target for stoc

military supplies such as field hospitals and food stock

military was a tool immediately at hand that Wash

could use to show the flag; its personnel were trai

military assistance and it had the means readily ava

to project into the region.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) will conti

have a role in Central Asia, but it must be careful th

not counterproductive. The DoD can have the gr

impact on the development of Central Asian armed 

through military education, military-to-military co

arms control and treaty verification, cooperative 

reduction, and defense conversion.

41
forces is channeled through International Mi

Education and Training (IMET) Programs which 

exploded over the last 4 years, except in Tajikistan 

none are allotted.177 Under the new “expanded” 

concept, Congress mandated that funds be allocated 

services to develop courses on defense resource ma

ment, military justice, civil-military relations, and 

nationally-recognized human rights. Central Asian o

attend these courses. Courses also exist to prepare th

attendance at various Officer Basic and Advanced Co

Command and General Staff College, and senior s

colleges.178

Military-to-military contact programs for th

Central Asian states have been ministered by the Eur

Command (EUCOM) J-5, headquartered in Stut

Germany.179 EUCOM has used congressionally-man

“CINC Initiative Funds” to pay for its military-to-m

programs and PfP activities. EUCOM also administe

George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, 

presents two 5-month courses a year to teach senior m

officers and civilian officials about defense plan

organization, and management in democratic societie

market economies.180

The DoD also plays a major roll in arms contr

treaty verification. The On-Site Inspection A

(OSIA)181 engages in a number of inspection and 

duties that help stabilize Central Asia and redu

burden on developing militaries.182

OSIA is active in non-nuclear inspections as well. A

Central Asian states are signatories of the V

Document 1994 of the Negotiations on Confidence- a

curity-Building Measures (now known as the Organi

for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE) wh

limits on the numbers of military exercises permitte

establishes methods for cooperation on unusual m

activities, compliance and verification evaluation

42
calendars, as well as information on military bu

defense establishments and military forces; OSIA pr

personnel for OSCE inspections and evalua

Kyrgyzstan is a signatory to the Open Skies Treaty (

24, 1992) which allows reciprocal, unarmed obser

overflights for which OSIA has responsibility. Kazak

and Tajikistan were original signatories in 1993 

Chemical Weapons Agreement; inspections w

conducted with OSIA escorts. OSIA was also given the 

and examination mission for Cooperative Threat Red

Program in May 1994; its inspectors conduct audit

examinations to certify that CTR-related equipm

being used for its intended purpose.

The initial Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 

co-sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard L

was broadened into the Cooperative Threat Red

Program (CTRP) after the breakup of the Soviet Un

provide material assistance to Belarus, Kazakh

Russia, and Ukraine with the goals of denucleariz

demilitarization, and reducing the threat of we

proliferation.183 Recently CTRP has expanded beyo

original mission; CTRP funds are financing a 

Kazakhstani joint venture to convert the Semipal

test site and provide foreign exports from electronic d

and circuit boards.184

The DoD has also provided funds to convert C

Asian defense industries for civilian use. Aside fro

Semipalatinsk project already mentioned, under W

Perry the DoD gave Kazakhstan four grants wort

million; one such project involved reequippin

Stepnogorsk chemical plant for the output of ci

chemical products.185

The programs are coordinated and execut

American Defense Attache Offices (DAOs) in the r

Defense Attaches have operated in the region sin

formation of the republics. Initially personnel fro

43
January 1993 they were augmented by Foreign 

Officers on short-term temporary duty serving as in

attaches. The first permanent attache office open

Almaty, Kazakhstan, in 1994.186 The last Central 

office, in Ashgabat, is slated to formally open in 1998

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES:

REGIONAL REACTION

Beyond the immediate impact of American aid 

armed forces of these republics, the United States mus

caution that its military operations in Central Asia 

alienate or threaten other regional powers. A ne

reaction by China, Iran, or Russia could have a 

greater impact upon regional stability than the m

development of these new states.

China.

Proficient armed forces which support political sta

repress politicized Islam, and safeguard markets wo

welcomed by China. China is developing trade, tra

tation, and energy links with Central Asia, includ

planned pipeline, and is making serious inroads into 

consumer market.187 Thus, in one sense, China s

support American programs to strengthen Central 

armed forces. Strong militaries enhance domestic st

which is in China’s interest, and they likely will 

perceived by China as a threat.

Beijing’s greatest internal security challenge is 

predominantly Muslim Xinjiang-Uigher Autono

Region—comprising one-sixth of China’s territory—

borders Central Asia. Kazakhstan/Kyrgyzstan 

Xinjiang share an ethnic Kazakh/Kyrgyz-Uigher he

Almaty/Bishkek and Beijing share a fear of militant 

Therefore, China appreciates Bishkek’s and Alm

restraint from allowing their states to become a 

border safe haven or breeding ground for the mil

44
Improved security forces and border forces pl

important role in that prohibition.

On the surface, therefore, American supp

developing Central Asian militaries would be seen 

positive force in the region. But, on the other hand

programs could harken back to earlier security groupi

which Washington sought to “contain” China alo

periphery. With the breakup of the USSR, weak C

Asian indigenous forces and a strategic buffer zone re

the forward basing of the Soviet Army and border 

forces antagonistic to China’s interests. America’s m

in creating defense ties with the Central Asian states 

be misinterpreted, especially if overall Sino-Am

relations deteriorate.

Iran.

Teheran has vital interests in maintaining re

peace and stability, but its international isolatio

pariah status prevent direct action in support of its ge

security concerns. Iran shares its ethnicity and Shi’it

with Tajikistan (the other Central Asian state

ethnically Turkic and Sunni), but Iran still shares h

ties and economic interests. Iran has refrained 

spreading politicized Islam and from sponsoring 

missionary efforts; Teheran has worked instead to fo

developing trade ties with the region. Iran wants to e

its geographical location as a transportation route an

corridor to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean; for exa

it constructed a rail link from Turkmenistan that 

Central Asia to bypass Russian rail routes. Ashgaba

will open the first Turkmen pipeline south into 

(Korpedzhe-Kurtkoy) later this year. A joint commiss

economic cooperation between Turkmenistan and 

meets to deal with cooperation in the oil and gas 

power engineering, agriculture, transportation, com

cations, trade, and banking contacts.188 Increased tra

45
offer Teheran an opportunity to reconstruct it

war-ravaged and constricted economy, increase f

trade, and play a leadership role within the Islamic 

organization, ECO, and the Organization of the I

Conference (OIC).

The strengthening of Central Asian militarie

promote regional political stability, which will en

Iran’s long-term economic goals for the region

America’s motives are also suspect in Teheran. Te

may assume that efforts by Washington to stren

Central Asian militaries are targeted at Iran. A re

grouping built around Uzbekistan might provide a m

counterweight to Iran. Central Asian participation 

also increases the role of Iran’s rival and western nei

Turkey, which is the “point-man” for the program; T

and Iran are traditional political and economic riv

influence in the region.189 If Iran feels threatened by 

actions, it may drive it even closer to Russia.

Russia.

Moscow also views with suspicion any efforts to us

position as hegemon in Central Asia. The inability o

Central Asian states to develop viable armed 

provided the context for Russia’s reassertion of its int

in the region. Moscow’s stated goal to boost integ

envisions Russia as the godfather of Central 

militaries—not the United States.

Leadership in the CIS, however, is both a blessing 

burden. Peacekeeping in Tajikistan overstretched 

resources, but Russia’s self-image as a “great p

demanded that it manage the violence. Russia’s “str

denial” precludes involvement by neighbors who w

extend their own influence, but Russia’s conti

economic dislocation makes it very difficult to ma

facilities and implement agreements. The fear by 

Russians that Washington is waiting in the wings to 

46
ability to assume responsibility for Central Asian se

but it still acts as an potential irritant in the framew

U.S.-Russian political affairs. This is especially tr

Russia watches NATO enlargement with resentmen

distrust. Increased American military involveme

Central Asia seems to bracket Russia between a con

U.S. effort to increase its authority in Central and E

Europe, Ukraine, and Central Asia—all at Mo

expense.

The great problem of such an analysis is that it 

result in Moscow searching for new allies to defend 

against such a perceived danger. Several observ

Central Asia have expressed fear that NATO enlar

will prod Russia to continue efforts to improve its tie

China and Iran. Many have voiced the fear that M

might create a new tripartitite alliance bloc among the 

states in the 21st century, and that Central Asia wou

itself sandwiched in the middle.190 This is n

ungrounded fear. Russian journalist Vsevolod Ovchin

argues that shortsighted actions on Washington’s pa

prompting Moscow and Beijing to shift their emphasi

bilateral to geopolitical aspects of cooperation.

Moscow is concerned about efforts to extend NAT

infrastructure to Russia’s present borders. Beijing is alarm

by attempts to lend an anti-Chinese thrust to the Americ

Japanese security system and other bilateral military ties fr

the cold war era.191

A new geopolitical landscape is taking shape, he a

one in which Russia and China are becoming the o

strategic rear and renewing their alliance of the 195

America’s Response.

The United States must be extremely careful to 

degree and at what pace it assists the developm

Central Asian militaries, or the “law of unexp

47
States should focus on quality of life issues, tra

education, senior executive development, de

conversion, and arms control. For example, one r

which could revolutionize these forces is the developm

a professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) 

Stricter control in the barracks would alleviate bullyin

ethnic tension; stricter control in the field would im

operational readiness. Senior executive develop

through attendance at schools such as the Marshall C

supports civilian control of defense instrastructur

trains senior leaders to work under legislative over

Washington should push qualitative instititional re

such as defense transparency and accountable d

budgets.

The United States should not actively seek to sel

to Central Asian militaries to replace Soviet equipme

bring about standardization with NATO. Nor s

Washington support the efforts by these nations t

export currency by becoming arms exporters thems

Retaining Soviet equipment ensures abundant spare 

and interoperability. Central Asian economies c

afford a wasteful arms race to buy the newest and 

expensive military gadgets on the world arms marke

The United States must sponsor both bilatera

multilateral programs. Bilateral pairings, for exa

between various states’ National Guards and indi

Central Asian republics focus military-to-military co

Inclusive multinational programs such as recent 

exercises involving Russia, Central Asian, and N

nations (e.g., Turkey) are a valuable tool; the

nonthreatening to other regional powers (especially 

are included) and promote regional cooperation.

CONCLUSION

When the republics of Central Asia became indepe

they already had in place an administrative infrastr

48
sham, it did make transition easier. The same can

said for the economic and military infrastructures in 

all decisions were disseminated from the center. Indu

and military units were spread across the Central 

landscape based on a master plan in Moscow that d

involve promoting republican self-sufficiency in m

affairs.

It is not surprising, therefore, that most Central 

states initially preferred some form of unified comm

which their deficiencies would be compensated b

greater whole and their external defense could b

someone else’s burden. All were perfectly willing to 

Russia, either bilaterally or multilaterally, to reta

bulk of the responsibility. Chechnya was a shock 

wake-up call for Central Asia as well as Russia. 

external events forced each state to create indepe

armed forces even as they began to discern weaknes

the Russian Army and question its ability to realize a

promises. Although the Central Asian states orig

were willing to let Russia assert some authority with

region and provide trained forces for border duty

began to seek alternative sources for their national sec

It was readily apparent that in most cases thei

militaries could not foot the bill. Lacking trained c

training facilities, equipment, spare parts, an indu

base, and financial resources to support it all, develo

of Central Asian militaries has been slow—with an 

retaining what each inherited from the Soviet Army 

than creating anything new. Finally, leaders pre

apportion scarce resources to address competing 

economic, and environmental crises that threaten th

fabric of society over the development and funding of 

forces in the absense of an overt threat.

America has national interests in Central Asia, 

will not assume responsibility for Central Asia’s se

The United States does not oppose the voluntary form

49
the region, but prefers that the Central Asian states d

military institutions that allow them options other 

reliance upon Moscow in their security policy form

The primary focus of the United States will be d

control—to prevent existing problems from escalatin

crises that might engage Russia, China, or Iran. The U

States does not want Central Asia to become a bre

ground for politicized Islam, ethnic hatred, 

proliferation, drug production, political extremism, 

other transnational threat that would destabiliz

region.193

The United States should continue to suppo

development of Central Asian militaries through m

education, military-to-military contact, arms contr

treaty compliance, cooperative threat reduction

defense conversion. But, we must work to ensure th

efforts do not provoke a negative reaction from re

neighbors and destabilize the balance of interests cur

at play.

There is a wide variance among the Central Asian 

regarding ability to assure their own national se

Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are consumers, rathe

providers, of security. Kyrgyzstan has attempt

transition to a provider of security through its econ

political, and military cooperation with Kazakhsta

Uzbekistan.

Regardless of their methodology, however, each r

military ties with Russia. There is nothing inhe

wrong with the Central Asian states using the CI

collective security tool. There is nothing inherently 

with Russia taking a role in this process. But, we 

ensure that collective security is just that—colle

“Breaking away from the Bear” could actually stren

security in Central Asia if the militaries of the C

Asian states develop to a level that they are players 

game and not just pawns of Moscow.

50
1. “A Caspian Gamble,” The Economist, February 7, 1998, p

2. R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S., Russian Paratroops Join in Centra

Jump,” The Washington Post, September 15, 1997, p. A17.

3. See, for example, Richard H. Ullman, “Redefining Se

International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 1983, pp. 129-153; 

Tuchman Mathews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 

2, Spring 1989, pp. 162-177; Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of 

Security in the 21st Century,” International Affairs, Vol. 67, No

1991, pp. 431-451; Kent Hughes Butts, ed., Environmental Sec

DOD Partnership for Peace, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies In

1995; and Gareth Porter, “Environmental Security as a N

Security Issue,” Current History, Vol. 94, No. 592, May 19

218-222.

4. “Russia, Allies at Odds as Summit Opens,” The Washingt

April 29, 1998, p. A23.

5. The attempt to create a purely Slavic union in Minsk on De

8, 1991, was short-lived; within 2 weeks the five newly-indep

Central Asian republics, plus Armenia, Azerbaijan, and M

agreed to join the CIS “on an equal basis.”

6. Ronald Bonesteel, “The CIS Security System: Stagnat

Transition or on the Way Out?,” unpublished manuscrip

Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), 

1992, pp. 1-7, discusses the Lobov-Shaposhnikov debate prior 

founding of the CIS armed forces.

7. The idea was put forth by Soviet Chief of the Gener

General Vladimir Lobov.

8. The CINC of the Combined Strategic Armed Forces, un

plan, commanded Strategic Deterrent Forces (Strategic Rocket 

Aviation Strategic Nuclear Forces, Naval Strategic Nuclear For

aerospace units) and Strategic Mobile Defense Forces (Air Force

Ground Defense Troops, and Airborne Troops). A CIS Coord

Council (Defense Council) subordinate to the Council of the H

States would oversee issues of defense expenditures, nuclear p

and safety, social protection of servicemen, standardization, an

control.

51
(with a Committee on Questions of Collective Security), 

“oversaw” the Supreme High Commander of the CIS Armed 

(Shaposhnikov, appointed commander for two months on Decem

Subordinate to the High Command (and its Main Staff) w

Commander-in-Chief (CINC), CIS Combined Strategic Forc

Forces, Navy, Ground Defense Troops and Airborne Troops) 

CinC, CIS Combined Armed Forces, to which the armed forces 

territories of states entering into the CIS were subordinate. Rep

defense ministers formed a council which was a “coordinating o

10. Bonesteel, “The CIS Security System,” p. 2. Shaposhniko

“The defense ministers of the sovereign republics are settin

council to meet . . . to solve military problems, the financing of the 

forces and their strength and manning, for instance. But this d

necessarily mean that the defense ministers of republics will con

national armed forces. The Soviet defense minister will do this t

his general staff.” Ibid. [italics-editor]

11. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan supported the 

command structure, but they were in the minority. Kobets’ p

(which permitted each republic to have its own independent 

forces) was approved by the ministers, but they bypassed hard d

on personnel, budgets, weapons procurement, oaths of alle

logistics, etc., in favor of setting up a series of interstate commis

coordinate matters. William E. Odom and Robert Du

Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia and the 

caucasus, Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 1995, p. 17.

12. Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian, January 18, 1

Joint Publications Research Service - Military Affairs (he

JPRS-UMA)-92-004, February 6, 1992, p. 21.

13. Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian, January 18, 1

JPRS-UMA-92-004, February 6, 1992, pp. 12-13. A decision 

Caspian Sea flotilla was not reached until May 1992, when 

divided up among Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kaza

“Caspian Flotilla: A Decision To Divide It Has Been Reached,” 

Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, (henceforth CDPP), Vol. XLIV, 

May 20, 1992, p. 26. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan as a result 

coastal naval forces, predominantly engaged in anti-smuggli

anti-drug operations.

14. Ibid, p. 13.

52
Civil-Military Relations in the Former Soviet Union,” in J

Blaney, ed., The Successor States to the USSR, Washingto

Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995, pp. 73-74.

16. Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian, June 16, 1

JPRS-UMA-93-024, July 14, 1993, p. 1. Shaposhnikov resign

position of secretary in August of that year and was named secr

the Russian Security Council. Stephen Foye, “End of CIS Co

Heralds New Russian Defense Policy?,” Radio Free Europe

Liberty Research Report (hereafter RFE/RL RR), Vol. 2, No. 27

1993, p. 45, regarded this as “a belated but final admission 

Russian political and military leaderships that their efforts to 

CIS as a means of maintaining a common security system 

territory of the former USSR had ended in failure.” Colonel G

Valery Mironov, Deputy Russian Minister of Defense, sharply cr

these early attempts at establishing joint command. The s

agreements in the military sphere, concluded at the initial stag

formation of the CIS, on the creation of the CIS Joint Armed 

(JAF), lacked a precise mechanism of realization of their pro

Because of this, the military cooperation of the new states, alth

did have some legal base, could not in that period of time ha

exercised in full. But this joint military structure ultimately 

nonviable and was subsequently eliminated. Moscow, Segod

Russian, July 20, 1995, in Foreign Broadcast Information S

Military Affairs (hereafterFBIS-UMA)-95-153-S, August 9, 1995

17. Almaty, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, in Russian, Febru

1995, JPRS-UMA-05-012, March 21, 1995, p. 32. The views 

Telugan Zhukeyev, secretary of the Kazakkhstani Security Cou

continued, “. . . collective efforts are preferable, since it is e

achieve parity and equality in mutual relations on the b

multilateral, rather than bilateral, relations (the princ

consensus). Only a collective approach, which presuppo

equalization of conditions and the possibility of making comp

decisions, is capable of strengthening our positions. Whereby 

dominates, no one imposes his will, and even a large state recko

the wishes of its allies.”

18. As Odom and Dujarric note, all 11 states signed only the P

on Military Issues (which merely instructed defense minis

prepare a new block of agreements for the next summit). The S

Forces Agreement was signed by all but Moldova; the General P

Forces Agreement was signed by eight members, but not U

Moldova, and Azerbaijan; the appointment of Marshal Shaposhn

CINC was signed by all but Moldova and Turkmenistan; an Agr

53
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Russia; an Agreem

Safeguards of Servicemen was signed by all but Moldova; a

decision to establish a Defense Ministers Council was signed 

Russia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. U

agreed to a single budget for strategic forces, but would not pay in

budget for unified general purpose forces as it was already estab

its own republican force. Odom and Dujarric, p. 21.

19. The 11 states attending were: Russia, Ukraine, Kaza

Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, A

Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

20. Kyrgyzstan did not immediately sign simply because Pr

Askar Akayev was not present. Kyrgyzstan later signed the doc

Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus joined in 1993. Ukraine obje

the implication that its external borders would be protected 

(Russian) forces on its territory. Turkmenistan later bac

membership, preferring bilateral treaties with Russia and a p

“positive neutrality.” Some argued that the treaty marked a 

Russian policy away from the Slavic orientation of the origin

signatories, but that overstates the case. The treaty did not go in

until April 20, 1994.

21. Moscow, New Times International, in English, N

September 1993, in JPRS-UMA-93-037, October 6, 1993, pp. 1

22. Moscow, Izvestiya, February 24, 1992, in FBIS-SOV-

February 24, 1992, p. 35.

23. Central Asian states, especially Kazakhstan, supp

unified force until Russia changed its position. As Pre

Nazarbayev noted,

We are not renouncing the signed documents on creating Jo

Armed Forces with a unified command. At present we rem

loyal to this principle. But Russia, which has always said th

it would be one of the very last to start creating its own arm

has begun to work out a military doctrine and is starting 

create an army.

President Karimov of Uzbekistan concurred. “I agree wit

Nursultan Nazarbayev said about our not being able to ge

without a so-called mutual security treaty, and we would like th

that today are part of the CIS . . ., especially Russia, to sign such 

CDPP, Vol. XLIV, No. 17, May 27, 1992, p. 20.

54
dismantled; indeed, it is constantly expanding: the Council of D

Ministers (February 1992), the Staff for Coordinating M

Cooperation (December 1993), the Coordinating Committee 

Defense Issues (February 1995), the Military Technical Com

(April 1995), and the Committee of the Chief of Staff (March 1

meet regularly.

25. Susan Clark, “The Central Asian States: Defining S

Priorities and Developing Military Forces,” in Michael Mande

ed., Central Asia and the World, New York: Council on F

Relations Press, 1994, p. 177.

26. This is the opinion of Yuri Shishkov, a Russian analys

government run political research institute, IMEMO. The Was

Post, April 29, 1998, p. A24. Even the air defense network is in 

due to funding problems. The integrated CIS network, comp

Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgy

Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, founded in 1996, is broke. Only Rus

Belarus have actually allocated funds for its development, an

Russia, which originally promised 100 billion rubles, has only a

10 billion rubles. CDPP, Vol. 50, No. 15, May 13, 1998, pp. 18-1

27. This phenomenon is described by Uri Ra’anan

Nation-State Fallacy,” in Joseph Montville, ed., Conflict and 

making in Multiethnic Societies, Lexington, MA: Lexington 

1990, pp. 5-20.

28. Pavel Baev, The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles, L

Sage Publications, 1996, p. 12.

29. Thus, Moscow decreed that Uzbekistan’s agriculture be 

into a cotton monoculture—overfertilized and fed by waters d

from the Aral Sea—for the greater good of the Soviet Union

expense of other agricultural enterprises, such as food stuffs

would have benefitted Uzbekistan itself. In August 1991, only 8 

of Kazakhstan’s industrial sector was under republican contr

the rest administered through Moscow (as part of all-USSR mi

or joint USSR-republican control). Kazakhstan has enormous r

of oil, but under Soviet rule it had no refining facilities of its ow

could only ship oil to Russia. Therefore, that same year Kaza

shipped to Russia the equivalent of $2.7 billion worth of petrole

had to purchase from Russia the equivalent of $1.2 billion w

processed fuel and lubricants. Martha Brill Olcott, “National B

and Ethnicity in the Foreign Policies of the New Central Asian 

in Roman Szporluk, ed., National Identity and Ethnicity in Rus

55
The Unified Power System, a network of power stations (ce

planned and allocated) provided electricity to the entire empir

cash, not central planning, decides who gets electricity. One c

currency, the rouble, was standard; the rouble zone “broke up” i

forcing each republic to develop its own currency.

30. While Western analysts referred to this region as 

Central Asia” and now call it “Central Asia,” when Soviet and R

analysts talk of “Central Asia,” they exclude Kazakhstan.

31. The Central Asian Military District was disbanded Aug

1992. The Turkestan Military District’s offices were occupied 

Uzbek Ministry of Defense on February 20, 1992; it was f

abolished on June 30th of that year.

32. Estimated deployment of military equipment and perso

the time of independence within Central Asia includes:

Tanks 4,000

ACVs 10,000

Artillery 3,200

Helicopters 170

Aircraft 220

Personnel 150,000

Richard Starr, The New Military in Russia; Ten Myths That Sh

Image. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996, p. 54.

33. See, for example, Alexander Alexiev and S. Enders Wi

The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces Historical Exp

Current Practices, and Implications for the Future—An Ex

Summary, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1983; Ide

Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces: Preliminary Findings

Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1980; Idem, Ethnic Minoritie

Red Army—Asset or Liability?, Boulder, CO: Westview Press

Ellen Jones, Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet M

Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985; Susan L. Curran and Dmitry Pono

Managing the Ethnic Factor in the Russian and Soviet Armed Fo

Historical Overview, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation

Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “Nationalities and the Soviet M

in Lybomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, eds., The Nationalities 

in Soviet Politics and Society, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 19

72-94; Idem, “’Brotherhood in Arms’: The Ethnic Factor in the 

Armed Forces,” in Nandor F. Dreisziger, ed., Ethnic Armies Pol

Armed Forces From the Time of the Hapsburgs To the Age 

Superpowers, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University 

1990, pp. 123-157; Herbert Goldhamer, The Soviet Soldier: 

56
1975; Richard Gabriel, The New Red Legions: An Attitudinal Po

the Soviet Soldier, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980; and 

Bathurst and Michael Burger, Controlling the Soviet Soldier

Eyewitness Accounts, College Station, TX: Center for St

Technology, Texas A&M University, 1981.

34. Jones, p. 45.

35. Proponents claimed that troops in construction battali

less strenuous duty, discipline was more lax, and they usually r

an additional wage from the civilian project they were building fa

the token five roubles a month military pay. Central Asians 

dimmer view. After independence, Turkmenistan stated th

would no longer provide men for construction battalions becaus

units were “clearly abnormal.” A Turkmen delegation to M

reported that essentially, “people have been left to their own 

commanders had practically no control over them, and the ar

rule of barracks hooligans reigns in subunits.” Sick soldiers w

untreated. Ashkhabad, Frunzevets, in Russian, April 16, 1992, 

in JPRS-UMA-92-021, June 10, 1992, p. 36. Such segregation 

all due to ethnic prejudice; inability of many Central Asian rec

speak Russian and thus understand verbal orders rendere

ineffective in combat.

36. National Guard recruits were to be competitively sele

serve 17 month terms. One of their initial tasks was to disarm th

paramilitary formations emerging on the wake of the Tajik ci

Richard Woff, The Armed Forces of the Former Soviet Union Ev

Structure, and Personalities, Portsmouth, Great Britain: Carm

and Sweet Limited, 1995 (henceforth Woff, 1995), p. D4-2. They 

That same month Dushanbe announced formation of a N

Defense Affairs Committee to oversee nationalization of Sovie

deployed in Tajikistan and to create indigenous units. In Janua

the President (and Commander-in-Chief) gave the newly-ap

committee head control of the National Guard and appointed hi

Security Advisor to the President.

37. Ibid., p. D4-5. The 201st MRD, formerly part of the 40t

transferred to Tajikistan following the Soviet withdrawa

Afghanistan, was headquartered in Dushanbe with two reg

located in Kurgan Tyube and Kulyab. Richard Starr estimat

about 90 percent of the 201st MRD is comprised of ethnic Taji

enlisted ranks. Starr, p. 145.

38. Starr, p. 145.

57
1993, p. 5, in JPRS-UMA-93-031, August 25, 1993, p. 3. In Jun

Tajikistan announced a conscription system for men aged 18 

serve from 18 to 20 months. Philip Petersen, “Security Po

Post-Soviet Central Asia,” European Security, Vol. 4, No. 1, Sprin

p. 204. Those with higher education but without special m

training would serve 18 months, and those with no special m

training and no higher education would serve 20 months.

40. During the Soviet period, “subsidies from the center 

make up at least 50 percent [of the budget], and in some years th

as high as 80 percent.” Without that support, combined with c

and the exodus of nearly 500,000 skilled Russians, the Tajik e

went into a freefall following independence from which it ha

recover. “Tajikistan: How Dire the Situation?,” CDPP, Vol. XLV

33, September 11, 1996, p. 13.

41. Tajikistan is the lone non-Turkic Central Asian state. Eth

Persian and Shi’ite by faith, it shares religious and ethnic ties w

and political and ethnic ties with Afghanistan. Indeed, more 

reside in Afghanistan than in Tajikistan. See Bruce Pannier

Traffic on the Rise in Central Asia,” Transitions, Vol. 2, 

September 20, 1996, pp. 12-14.

42. Russian assistance helped to create a Tajik Defense M

special purpose troops, internal troops, and a helicopter squa

early 1994. Shishlyannikov hoped to create a “small, highly 

professional and dedicated army,” but without a viable conscript 

he had to rely upon troops of the so-called Popular F

Tajikistan—paramilitary, pro-communist forces raised during t

war. It was a poor foundation upon which to build. Paul Beav

“Tajikistan,” in Jane’s Sentinel Regional Security Asses

Commonwealth of Independent States, London: Jane’s Infor

Group, 1994, p. 10.

43. The Military Balance, 1997/98, London: The Intern

Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997, p. 162.

44. One other external source in the region belongs to the U

December 16, 1994, the United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 968 which established an observer mission (UNM

monitor the April 1995 ceasefire; since then the U.N. has peri

renewed UNMOT as it monitored subsequent ceasefires. Curre

observers from seven countries belong to UNMOT.The Military B

1997/98, p. 162.

58
46. Richard Woff, The Armed Forces of the Former Sovie

Evolution, Structure, and Personalities, Second Ed., London: Br

1996 (henceforth Woff, 1996), p. D4-8.

47. The commander of Tajik border forces earns the equ

salary of a private in the Russian border troops. Tajik border ca

trained in Russian border troops institutes and the St. Pet

Artillery School. Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian, August 

p. 2, in JPRS-UMA-94-035, August 24, 1994, pp. 59-60.

48. Woff, 1996, p. D4-10.

49. Baev, p. 112.

50. Woff, 1995, pp. D4-D8-D9. With a strength of 25,000 m

force comprised the 201st MRD, an Operations Group from the R

Border Troops under Russian command, and contingents of 

forces, border guards and internal troops from Kazak

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Russia provided te

infrastructure, to include air defense, aviation, logistics, en

communications, space satellite, and ELINT (electronic intel

support elements.

51. The Military Balance 1997/98, p. 145. The accord was b

by Russia, the U.N., and the Organization for Security and Coop

in Europe (OSCE).

52. Tajikistan joined Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbek

form the “Central Asian Four” and held a successful meeting in 

1998 when the planned CIS meeting fell through. The Russia

(Izvestiya) noted, “No one is going to wait for anyone else. No 

what considerations Moscow is guided by, the time when other

pin their hopes on the Kremlin star is past. . . . So where does th

Russia? Should it perhaps join this Central Asian Union, since 

has come of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, Kazakst

Kyrgyzstan or the union of Russia and Bealrus except huge amo

ink that have been used up in recent years, even as CIS summ

being postponed.” “Central Asia Won’t Wait for Russia,” CDPP, 

No. 13, April 29, 1998, p. 17.

53. CDPP, Vol. 50, No. 2, February 11, 1998, p. 1.

54. Eugene Huskey, “Kyrgyzstan: The Politics of Demograp

Economic Frustration,” in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, ed

59
Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 678.

55. Bishkek did establish a State Defense Committee in late 

January 1992 a State Committee for Defense Affairs was for

advise President Akayev, which included a “Main Staff.”

56. Petersen, p. 173. This telegram was also apparently sen

Kazakhs because the commander of the 40th Army, who was 

Deputy Defense Minister of Kazakhstan, sent a telegram to B

telling the republic to take control of the forces on its territory b

the 40th Army would no longer be paying for them. Ibid.

57. “Border Pact Signed by Asia Powers,” The Washingto

April 25, 1997, p. A31. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Rus

China signed an agreement on April 25, 1997, to reduce militar

along their shared borders and create a 100-kilometer (62-mil

zone on each side of the border in which limits are placed on arm

and personnel: 3,900 tanks for Russia and the three Centra

states (of which 3,810 would be Russian) and 3,900 for China. A

Russian officials deny that withdrawal of border forces from the 

is forthcoming, some reduction will probably be necessary. As pa

Shanghai Accord it also signed an agreement on confidence-b

measures in the military field. This supplements China’s grow

as a trading partner: between 1992 and 1995 imports expand

$16.6 million to $123.5 million and exports from $18.8 million to 

million. Gudrun Wacker, “China Builds Ties, Trade Across its W

Border,” Transition, Vol. 2, No. 17, August 12, 1996, pp. 31-32.

58. See, for example, Gregory Gleason, “The Struggle for 

over Water in Central Asia: Republican Sovereignty and Co

Action,” RFE/RL Research Institute, Report on the USSR, Vol. 3

June 21, 1991, pp. 11-19.

59. Interview by author with Kyrgyz defense officials, Jul

Bishkek.

60. Beaver, “Kyrgyzstan,” p. 14. The Russo-Kyrgyz Agree

October 9, 1992, “On the Status of the Border Troops of the R

Federation in the Kyrgyz Republic” defines the legal status of R

forces in Kyrgyzstan. This was superseded by the Russo-

Agreement of July 15, 1994.

61. Bess Brown, “Central Asian States Seek Russian 

RFE/RL RR, Vol 2, No. 25, June 18, 1993, p. 85. Four yea

Russian troops still guard Kyrgyzstan’s 1100 kilometer bord

60
consists of three border detachments at Osh, Naryn, and 

Strugovets, p. 59. Aside from border forces, a small Russian pre

found. For example, an April 1993 treaty on military coop

permits Russia to operate a communications center on Kyrgyz te

Ibid.

62. The small (800-man) National Guard was formed in 

support the constitutional order, protect the president, 

installations, and provide humanitarian relief.

63. The Military Balance 1997/98 (p. 157) states that the 

currently comprises three infantry, one armor, one artillery, and 

regiment.

64. Petersen, p. 174.

65. Within a year he was replaced by an ethnic Russian; on

first duties was to negotiate with Moscow over defense cooperatio

use of Soviet military installations on Kyrgyz territory, and the s

Russian servicemen serving in Kyrgyzstan. He states, “only w

help of Russia can we hope to solve our military problems.” Woff, 

D3-5.

66. Petersen, p. 174.

67. Woff, 1996, p. D3-13.

68. Petersen, p. 173.

69. Impoverished Kyrgyz recruits have lacked food and c

some even risked starvation. Bullying (dedovshchina) in the b

continues. Is it any wonder that parents do not want their son

the armed forces, and draft dodging and desertion flourish? In

by author with Kyrgyz defense officials, July 1997, Bishkek.

70. It has adopted a military doctrine that, after touting st

phrases about defending territorial integrity and preserv

“constitution, sovereignty, and independence,” prioritizes partic

in a system of collective security in the interests of regional stabi

peace and the assurance of free and equitable cooperation wit

states. Woff, 1995, p. D3-7. In January 1994, the Kyrgyz Par

adopted a national security concept that affirmed the defens

‘non-nuclear’ status of the armed forces, stating that those force

never be used against another state in pursuance of political ob

or territorial aggrandizement that could not otherwise be achi

61
other state or coalition as an enemy. Beaver, “Kyrgyzstan,” p. 9

71. Interview by author with Kyrgyz defense officials, Jul

Bishkek.

72. The 535-man battalion—40 percent Kazakh, 40 percen

and 20 percent Kyrgyz—is stationed in southern Kazakhstan. R

Kangas, “With an Eye on Russia, Central Asian Militaries P

Cooperation,” Transition, Vol. 2, No. 16, August 9, 1996, pp. 17

73. Woff, 1996, p. D3-13.

74. CDPP, Vol. XLVIII, No. 52, January 22, 1997, p. 15.

75. CDPP, Vol. XLIX, No. 15, May 14, 1997, p. 21.

76. Moscow, ITAR-TASS World Service, in Russian, June 2

in FBIS-SOV-96-123, June 25, 1996, p. 59.

77. Alma Ata, Yegemendi Qazaqstan, February 14, 1

JPRS-UMA-92-018, May 20, 1992, pp. 35-36.

78. For a discussion of Central Asian energy assets, see Un

the Assets: Energy and the Future of Central Asia and the Ca

Houston: The Center for International Political Economy and the 

A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, April 1998.

79. Things got so bad in August 1996, that Russia cut 

electricity supply to industrialized northern Kazakhstan for fa

pay its bill of $420 million. Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in Russian, Au

1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-160, August 16, 1996, p. 46.

80. Author’s interview with Kazakhstani defense officials, A

July 1997.

81. Ibid., p. D2-7. Nazarbayev’s limited initial moves inc

presidential decree even before independence to establish 

Committee of Defense of the Kazakhstani Soviet Socialist R

responsible for disciplinary matters and maintaining the 

effectiveness of Soviet units deployed on Kazakhstani territory

82. Ibid., p. D2-6.

83. Woff, 1995, p. D2-10. Kazakhstani sovereignty was comp

August 25, 1992, when a military oath to the Republic of Kaza

was adopted.

62
percent), Azerbaijan (25 percent), Kazakhstan (12.5 percen

Turkmenistan (12.5 percent). A Presidential Decree of April 2

formally established a Kazakhstani Navy under the Naval Depa

within the Main Armed Forces Staff. The Navy was of

inaugurated on August 17, 1996, at Aktau. Naval missions 

smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal immigration. The force itse

closely resembles a Coast Guard than a Navy. It currently po

about a dozen ships, six Coast Guard cutters donated from the 

States and several other ships built at a shipyard at Uralsk. “A

Aweigh,” Transition, Vol. 2, No. 19, September 19, 1996, p. 44. In 

1995 it was agreed to create a Naval Border Patrol headquart

Astrakhan comprising elements from Russia, Azerbaijan, Kaza

and Turkmenistan, formed from regular national naval un

remnants of the Caspian Flotilla. Richard Woff, “Kazakh-R

relations-an update,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 7, N

December 1995, p. 567. Kazakhstan is especially short of former

Naval staff officers and senior commanders.

85. The Military Balance 1997/1998, p. 156.

86. The National Guard has both Russian and ethnic 

personnel, but approximately 68 percent of the officers are Kaz

unusual proportion. Lepingwell, p. 76.

87. Presidential Guard 2,000 and Government Guard 5

Military Balance 1997/1998, p. 157.

88. Woff, 1995, p. D2-8. Internal Affairs is also respons

combating organized crime and government corruption. By m

the third element of the security triad, the Committee on State S

(KGB), had become the Committee of National Security (KNB

Republic of Kazakhstan. The KNB retained close ties with new R

intelligence agencies, as well as bilateral agreements with Ukra

Belarus. The five Central Asian agencies formed a joint regional 

structure for gathering and exchange of intelligence, in partic

terrorism, crime, and drug smuggling. Ibid., p. D2-9.

89. Interview by author with Kazakhstani defense officia

1997, Almaty.

90. Woff, “Kazakh-Russian relations-an update,” p. 56

Eastern Border Troops District for the former-border Troops 

USSR KGB was abolished on August 18, 1992; it was replaced 

State Committee for Protection of the State Border and the N

Border Troops Command. Border forces include six border subun

63
at the Almaty Higher Border Troops Command School. Th

approximately 12,000 Kazakhstani Border Guards. The M

Balance 1997/1998, p. 157.

91. This necessitated legal changes within the January 19

“On the State Borders of the Republic of Kazakhstan” (republi

August 1996) to redefine what constitutes a “state border” and to 

the status and role of Kazakh and Russian border forces. Woff, 

D2-16.

92. Nazarbayev almost immediately stopped nuclear 

Semipalatinsk was closed in 1991, and on May 15, 1992, parts of 

converted into the country’s national nuclear center and atomic 

agency. Nazarbayev also closed the uranium mines at Sha

Tasbulak and reduced the amount of uranium mined on the C

Sea island of Mangyshlak. In September 1992 Kazakhstan decl

and released data on its uranium reserves to the International 

Energy Agency. David Twining, The New Eurasia, Westpo

Praeger, 1993, pp. 148-149. Kazakhstan has no known chem

biological warfare programs. Almaty withdrew its 40-CIS Strat

Forces Tu-95 bombers to Russia in February 1994 and transfer

last warhead remaining on its soil to Russia on April 24, 1995. 

“Kazakhstan,” p. 13. Second, Almaty divested itself of ass

delivery structures. The United States guaranteed payment of 

$70 million to help destroy the silos that housed Kazakhstan’

missiles. By February 1993 U.S. aid pledged to dismantle and 

these weapons had increased to $85 million. Petersen, p. 161. Ec

aid to Kazakhstan increased from $91 million in 1993 to $311 m

1994. The agreements also covered 16 launch sites, two trainin

and 14 test silos. There is a difference between agreed upon Coop

Threat Reduction funds and actual disbursements. For exam

1996, the United States agreed upon $87,560 and actually di

$33,334. Monterey Institute of International Studies/The C

Endowment for International Studies, Nuclear Successor State

Soviet Union Nuclear Weapons and Sensitive Export Status Rep

4, May 1996, p. 54. In the December 1995 START Memoran

Understanding, Kazakhstan declared it still had 24 si

Derzhavinsk) and 22 “intact but non-operational” ICBMs rema

country. Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union, No. 4, Ma

p. 10. Under START rules, ICBMs remain accountable until t

removed from their silos and their bases and silos remain acco

until they are destroyed. As a result of its policy of denuclear

Almaty signed a series of international agreements. Kaza

ratified the Lisbon Protocol and START I in July. In 1994, Kaza

became a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Non-Prolif

64
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This allowed fo

inspection of all Kazakhstani nuclear activities. IAEA inspect

currently conducting an inventory of all nuclear mater

Kazakhstan. Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union, No. 

1996, p. 5.

93. Kazakhstan promised nonintervention in the internal a

any other nation. Now denuclearized, it supports both non-prolif

of conventional and nuclear weapons and an end to the arms race 

extension into space. The stated mission of the Kazakhstani 

forces is to prevent war; it rejects use of military force to resolve d

unless it or its allies are attacked. Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan

Pravda, in Russian, November 24, 1993, p. 3, in JPRS-UMA-

April 7, 1993, pp. 51.

94. Ibid.

95. Since December 1991 more than 800 decisions have been 

on topics ranging from military cooperation to liquor sales, but 

knows how many have been signed by whom and ratified by 

parliament. The 2,000-worker-strong CIS bureaucracy in Mo

launching a study to find out. The Washington Post, April 29, 

A23.

96. JPRS-UMA-92-018, pp. 35-37.

97. Ibid. This shortage reflected not only Soviet manpower 

but local cultural restraints against ethnic Kazakhs joini

military. “One does not hear the words ‘become a commander, 

an officer’ from the mouths of parents in local areas. On the co

what they say is,’If you become an officer, you will become too R

and move away.’”

98. General Sagadat Nurmagambetov, Hero of the Soviet 

during World War II and a former division commander, atten

short course of the General Staff Academy.

99. Woff, “Kazakh-Russian Relations,” p. 586.

100. Moscow, Mayak Radio Network, in Russian, July 1, 1

FBIS-SOV-93-126, p. 16. Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda, in R

September 9, 1993, p. 2, in JPRS-UMA-93-035, September 22, 1

33-34.

101. Andrei Kortunov, Yuri Kulchik, and Andrei Shou

“Military Structures in Kazakhstan: Aims, Parameters, and 

65
July-September 1995, p. 306.

102. Ibid., pp. 35-37. Only about 3 percent of the officers ser

the 40th Army in 1992 were Kazakh. Moscow, Krasnaya Zve

Russian, July 2, 1992, p. 2, in JPRS-UMA-92-026, July 15, 199

Indeed, during the entire Soviet period, just three Kazakh offic

finished the General Staff Academy and only two had defende

dissertations in military science. Almaty, Kazakhstanskaya Pra

Russian, November 24, 1993, p. 92, in JPRS-UMA-93-012, April 

p. 53.

103. Dmitry Vertkin, “Prospects for Stability—The Vie

Kazakhstan,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 6, No. 6, June 1

287.

104. Woff, 1996, p. D2-24.

105. General Nurmagambetov downplayed the import

languages in a September 1994 interview. “We conduct trai

Russian. And we give commands in Russian. Ultimately, the la

is not decisive. If a command is given in Kazakh and tomorrow 

readiness rises, I would order a switch to Kazakh today. This is 

issue.” Almaty, Karavan, in Russian, September 2, 1994, p

JPRS-UMA-94-038, September 14, 1994, p. 17.

106. Oumirserik Kasenov, “Central Asia: National, Regio

Global Aspects of Security,” Himalayan and Central Asian Stud

1, No. 1, April-June 1997, p. 34.

107. Douglas Clarke, “Russia’s Military Presence in th

Abroad,” Transition, Vol. 1, No. 19, October 26, 1995, pp. 8-9.

108. Agreements included Declaration on the Expansi

Deepening of Russian-Kazakh Military Cooperation; Status of R

Military Personnel Temporarily Stationed on Kazakh Te

Contract Military Service and Status of Russian Citizens in the 

Forces of Kazakhstan; Lease and Use of the Emba (Air Defense M

Test Range; Lease and Use of Priozersk; Use of the State Centr

Range of the Russian Defense Ministry; and Organization of M

Inter-state Transportation on Behalf of the Russian Defense M

Woff, “Kazakh-Russian relations—an update,” p. 568.

109. Ibid.

110. Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, October 10, 1

FBIS-SOV-95-196, October 11, 1995, p. 22.

66
Grachev and Kasymov, the main result of the meeting was tha

had worked out general approaches to the defence of national in

of the two countries, defined their common collective security ai

laid firm foundations for further developing of bilateral m

cooperation on principles of mutual understanding, parity, and 

respect, and defined specific measures for their implementation

p. D2-22.

112. This was not necessarily a bad decision, for the “. . . dim

of the Soviet legacy present a powerful argument to the effect t

maintenance or revival of traditional Soviet supply arrangemen

in a number of cases, represent a perfectly rational economic ch

least in the short to medium term. ” David Dyker, “Intern

Economic Integration for Central Asia,” The Royal Insti

International Affairs FSS Briefing, No. 11, January 1997, p. 1.

113. CDPP, Vol. XLIX, No. 44, December 3, 1997, p. 18. M

insisted that the debts it owed on lease payments for proving g

and launch sites be offset against Kazakh enterprises’ debts to R

suppliers, but Almaty refused to be held liable for the debts of 

structures.

114. Almaty, Kazakh Television First Program Network, in R

August 12, 1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-158, August 14, 1996, p. 51. 

supplied the “Kazakh Battalion” with weapons, ammunitio

foodstuffs. Kazakhstan paid the bills. Moscow, Rossiyskaya Ga

Russian, January 6, 1997, p. 6, in FBIS-SOV-97-004, January 

(INTERNET).

115. Kasenov, pp. 30-31.

116. Almaty, Delovaya Nedelya, in Russian, September 6, 

12, in FBIS-SOV-96-117, September 11, 1996, p. 47.

117. CDPP, Vol. XLIX, No. 28, August 13, 1997, p. 21.

118. In December 1994 the memorandum of Security Decr

signed in Budapest; the United States and Great Britain con

their commitment to respect the independence, sovereign

existing borders of Kazakhstan and to avoid the threat of or use 

against the territorial integrity or political independe

Kazakhstan. If Kazakhstan becomes a victim of aggression or a

of the threat to use nuclear weapons, Russia, the United Stat

Great Britain must demand immediate action by the U.N. S

67
member state.

119. Kasenov, pp. 34-35.

120. The Military Balance 1997/1998, p. 162.

121. Interview by author with Turkmen defense officials, Ju

Ashgabat.

122. Ibid.

123. Kangas, “With an Eye,” p. 16.

124. The Military Balance 1997/1998, p. 162.

125. Of the rest, approximately 70 remained under Russian 

and constituted an Air Defense Group and Air Force Group 

Russian Federation. A small number were disbanded or tran

back to Russian territory. Beaver, “Turkmenistan,” p. 9; The M

Balance, 1995/1996, p. 152.

126. The Chief of the Main Staff and First Deputy Min

Defense, a Turkmen, was not appointed until September 1992.

127. Kasenov, p. 40.

128. They included the status of Russian officers serv

contract; training and education of Turkmen cadets and off

Russian military schools and academies; finance and assistanc

activity in the Caspian Sea; and cooperation between Russi

Turkmen intelligence services. Woff, 1995, p. D5-17.

129. Tajikistan also legalized dual citizenship in October 1

130. Woff, 1996, p. D5-17.

131. Ashgabat did provide its own training facility. A Border 

Academy at Nebit-Dag graduated the first class of Turkmen 

troops in September 1992.

132. This group is part of a larger joint Border Patrol Forc

Caspian, made up of forces from Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhst

Turkmenistan and created by the CIS Border Guard Council i

Previously the Soviet Central Asian Border Troops District had 

Turkmenistan’s 600-mile border with Iran and the 450-mile bord

Afghanistan. Now the border would also include the Caspian Sea

68
Troops Command; this was soon overcome by events as U

Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan formed their own border forc

CABTD was abolished on August 11, 1992. Ashgabat sends an o

to routine meetings of the Council of CIS Border Troops Comm

but is still is not a formal member. Woff, 1996, pp. D5-15 - D5-

133. Starr, p. 145.

134. President Niyazov attended the Tashkent summit, 

without signing.

135. Niyazov explained his reasoning for adopting this policy 

a 1995 conference address in Ashgabat. “Having today over 30 pe

the world reserves of natural gas, up to 12 billion tonnes of oi

Caspian shelf alone, owning a huge territory and a population of 

5 million, it is impossible to do without neutrality, it is impossibl

any group of countries for that would lead to the creation of bl

weaken neutrality.” Kasenov, p. 40.

136. Petersen, p. 188.

137. Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, February 17, 

10 in FBIS-SOV-96-035, February 21, 1996, p. 52.

138. Beaver, “Turkmenistan, p. 10. In a similar vein, Turkm

joined PfP in May 1994, the first Central Asian state to do s

Brown, ”Turkmenistan Joins NATO Partnership," RFE/RL 

Report, No. 90, May 11, 1994, p. 2.

139. Kangas, “With an Eye,” p. 19.

140. CDPP, Vol. 50, No. 3, February 18, 1998, p. 18.

141. Woff, 1995, p. D6-8. The Ministry’s jurisdiction initia

limited to the Military Commissariat, Civil Defense Sta

pre-military training. The Turkestan Military District was aboli

June 30, 1992. As a result of the Law on Defense and the disband

cessation of operations of the Turkestan Military District, on 

1992 the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Uzbekistan repla

Ministry for Defense Affairs. Tashkent, Vatan Pavar, in Russia

7, 1992, in JPRS-UMA-92-033, September 2, 1992, p. 30. T

Defense Minister was Lieutenant General Rustam Akhmedov. A 

Uzbek, he served with armored troops and was a graduate of the 

Academy.

69
Defense, but in reality the brigade-size force has always been un

de facto control of the President. It guards important instal

conducts anti-terrorist operations, assists disaster relief, and pro

ceremonial guard.

143. Woff, 1995, p. D6-9. Once the Uzbek Defense Minis

formed on July 2, a presidential decree placed former CIS form

and units (e.g. a fighter bomber regiment and an airborne b

under Uzbek jurisdiction “in accordance with Agreements of t

Heads of State” signed in Tashkent on May 15, 1992, and affirme

July 6 meeting of CIS Defense Ministers. Ibid, p. D6-10. Uzb

recalled its servicemen from non-CIS republics (e.g., Baltic sta

under contract, and declared that the remainder of its recruit

either serve with the Turkestan Military District’s conventiona

republican MVD troops, and National Guard units or p

alternative service. Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian, Ma

1992, in JPRS-UMA-92-011, April 1, 1992, pp. 77-78. This provis

later dropped, and servicemen who continued serving abroad f

their citizenship.

144. “On Defense” outlined the role of the Armed Forces, pro

for declaring a ‘state of war’ and martial law, mobilizatio

territorial defense. “On Universal Military Obligation and M

Service” discussed universal military obligations for all citizens, 

in the reserve, manning, military ranks, uniform regul

pre-military service training, reserve officer training, 

procedures, service age-limits by rank, periods of service, mobi

and demobilization, and pay and allowances. “On Alternate S

defined the religious and moral grounds or family circumsta

which a citizen could opt for alternate service for 18 months in 

military service; conscientious objection to war was not 

sufficient grounds for alternative service.

145. Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian, July 12, 1

JPRS-UMA-92-031, August 20, 1992, pp. 33-34.

146. The Military Balance 1997/98, p. 163.

147. Interview by author with Uzbek defense officials, Jul

Tashkent.

148. Valentin Shishslevskiy, “Armed Forces of Uzbekistan

Defence Review, No. 108/10/94, December 1994, p. 52.

70
to $315 million, then again in 1996 to $304 million.The Military B

1995/96, p. 166. The Military Balance 1996/1997, p. 168. The M

Balance 1997/98 estimated the budget at $113 million. p. 163.

150. Tashkent, Uzbekistan Television, in Russian, May 17, 

FBIS-SOV-96-098, May 20, 1996, p. 66.

151. At independence Russian-speaking personnel compr

percent of the officers corps of the Soviet forces in Uzbekistan.

152. For a Russian point of view, see Moscow, Nezavisimaya 

October 22, 1994, in JPRS-UMA-94-046, November 9, 1994, p. 22

the situation matches many issues described in the Centra

military press, notice the underlying attitude that these proble

intractable unless the ethnic Russians are coerced to remain 

them.

153. Moscow, INTERFAX, in English, August 30, 1

FBIS-SOV-95-169, August 31, 1995, pp. 68-69.

154. Tashkent, Narodnoye Slovo, in Russian, September 1

in FBIS-SOV-95-185, September 25, 1995, pp. 87-92.

155. Roger D. Kangas, “Taking the Lead in Central Asian Se

Transition, Vol. 2, No. 9, May 3, 1996, pp. 53-54.

156. Ibid., pp. 89-90. The document outlined the principles 

construction and strategic use of armed forces; conditions for th

preparation of the republic’s economy; territory and popula

defense; preparation of the economy for mobilization; preparatio

country for defense; military training of the population; an

foundations for the doctrine.

157. Agreements concerning border guards troops were si

the Kiev summit on March 20, 1992.

158. JPRS-UMA-94-035, pp. 58-59.

159. Woff, 1995, p. D6-17.

160. Kangas, “Taking the Lead,” p. 54.

161. According to Karimov, “The Tajik problem is a tim

which could cause another conflict like Karabakh here, but a h

times worse. Especially since the situation is influenced by 

happening in Afghanistan...The border between Tajikist

71
and drugs.” Paris, Liberation, in French, September 8, 1992, p

FBIS-SOV-92-178, September 14, 1992, pp. 35-36.

162. Moscow, INTERFAX, in English, October 23, 1

FBIS-SOV-95-205, October 24, 1995, pp. 63-64.

163. Uzbekistan’s power system is fed from sources wit

republic, which makes it self-sufficient in terms of energy. 

provides energy to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and southern Kaza

thus, when Tashkent felt the Tajik government was being intra

at the negotiating table in December 1995, it shut off po

Tajikistan, citing unpaid bills (only 2 percent of the 1995 bill h

paid). Yet Tashkent supplied electricity as “humanitarian aid

ethnic-Uzbek warlord Dostum in northern Afghanistan in 199

he served as a buffer between fighting further south and Uzbe

Bruce Pannier, “The Gordian Knot of Energy,” Transition, Vol. 3

February 21, 1997, p. 37.

164. Peter Ferdinand, ed., The New States of Central Asia an

Neighbors, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 199

For the text of the agreement, see Tashkent, Narodnoye S

Russian, March 10, 1994, pp. 1-2, in FBIS-SOV-94-050, March 1

pp. 40-42. The agreement allowed “the siting on their terr

military installations for joint use.” It also maintained existing 

the production, supply, and exporting of weapons and m

equipment; use of test sites; training; mutual supplies for re

medical security and for servicing of troop transports; and observ

social rights of servicemen. Servicemen in the armed forces of on

have the right to transfer to the armed forces of the other p

continue their service as defined by the January 22, 1993, trea

treaty was to be valid for 5 years.

165. Tashkent, Tashkent Uzbekistan Television, in Uzbek, 

1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-067, April 7, 1995, pp. 75-76.

166. CDPP, Vol. XLVIII, No. 44, November 27, 1996, p. 22.

167. Moscow, Zaftra, in Russian, June 1996, No. 28, p

FBIS-SOV-96-145, July 26, 1996, p. 50.

168. CDPP, Vol. XLVIII, No. 8, March 20, 1996, p. 20. “Why 

Uzbeks start ignoring Russian diplomats? For one thing, i

obvious to the whole world that Russia is unable to perform the 

of a great power, or even an influential continental one.”

72
FBIS-SOV-96-165, August 23, 1996, p. 40.

170. Kangas, “Taking the Lead,” p. 52.

171. Uzbekistan was the 22d state to joint PfP, in Jul

Uzbekistan began sending officers to NATO schools (s

Oberamergau) as early as 1992. Petersen, p. 147.

172. Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in Russian, July 12, 19

in FBIS-SOV-96-164-S, August 22, 1996, p. 108. Already in 199

than 10 different U.S. missions and organizations were loc

Uzbekistan, and more than 100 joint ventures were in op

Tashkent, Uzbekistan Television, in Uzbek, April 6, 19

FBIS-SOV-95-067, April 7, 1995, p. 76.

173. Tashkent, Business Partner, in Uzbek, July 25, 1996, 

FBIS-SOV-96-146, July 29, 1996, pp. 52-53.

174. Kangas, “Taking the Lead,” p. 54.

175. “Bishkek Summit Produces Treaty on Eternal Frien

OMRI Daily Digest, Part I, No. 8, January 13, 1997.

176. Frederick Starr, “Making Eurasia Stable,” Foreign Affa

75, No. 1, January/February 1996, pp. 80-92.

177. IMET funds are allocated by Congress under the D

Foreign Assistance Act/Foreign Operations Bill. IMET funds are 

fund courses; the IMET office does not itself provide instruction

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Turkmenis

FY94 90k 50k 50k 50k

FY95 97k 60k 95k 118k

FY96 388k 231k 223k* 213k

FY97 400k 250k 250k 250k

k = $1,000.00

* actually expended 293k using end of year funds

178. Courses prepared include: English language; Comma

General Staff College, Advance Courses in infantry, arm

intelligence; Naval Staff College; International Defense Mana

Course; Officer Courses in infantry, judge advocate general, en

military police, adjutant general, and public affairs; and A

College. Not all have yet been utilized. Recently Congress also 

its former policy that required civilian students (e.g., Min

73
attendance is now encouraged.

179. European Command inherited Central Asia when the 

Union broke up. It was redesignated the responsibility of 

Command in 1998.

180. Founded on June 5, 1993, the Marshall Center aids 

defense and foreign ministries to develop national se

organizations and systems that reflect democratic principl

Marshall Center was chartered by the U.S. Secretary of Defen

funded by the U.S. Congress, but also receives support from the G

Government and its Defense Ministry. The College of Strategic 

and Defense Economies which teaches foreign officers is divided 

Department of Democratic Defense Management and the Depa

of European/Eurasian Security Studies. The Institute for E

Studies comprises the Foreign Area Officer Program, the 

Language Training Center (Europe), and the English La

program to enhance language skills of foreign defense and 

ministry officials to assist their integration into Western 

structures.

181. The OSIA predates the fall of the Soviet Union; it was f

in 1988 under the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquis

implement the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 

by conducting on-site inspections to verify destruct

intermediate-range nuclear missiles. President Bush expand

OSIA in May 1990 to support inspections for the Conventional F

Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (S

two nuclear test agreements (the Threshold Test Ban Treaty 

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty), and various chemical w

agreements, to include the Chemical Weapons Convention 

Responsibility for inspections for the Open Skies Treaty was a

1992 and for START II in 1993.

182. Originally the focus of attention was on nuclear weapo

result of the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, Ukrai

Belarus also became implementing parties of the Intermediate

Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. One of the four “points of en

inspectors was established in Almaty. Also, a Nuclear Risk Re

Center (NRRC) and an Arms Control Implementation Unit (ACI

set up in Almaty. Kazakh inspectors now escort U.S. inspe

former Soviet sites; inspections continue until 2001. Insp

continue at Derzhavinsk and Zhangiz-Tobe ICBM faciliti

Leninsk Test Range, and the Heavy Bomber Facility at Semipa

OSIA also has the right to conduct suspect site inspections to 

74
Kazakhstan, is on this list. Under the 1990 Threshold Test Ban 

Semipalatinsk Test site is one of three test sites specified in the 

Protocol for inspection, but this program has slowed following R

and U.S. moratoria on underground nuclear tests. Finally

supports the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CT

sponsoring projects and assisting delegations through the A

Almaty.

183. CTRP funds provide the DoD direct support for ef

destroy weapons of mass destruction; to transport, store, disa

safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; 

establish verifiable safeguards against their proliferation. M

Protection, Control, and Accountability activities have been sh

the Department of Energy. CTRP figures (in thousands of doll

FY 1996 included:

Notified Agreed Other Obligated Di

Strategic Offensive 70,000 70,000 0 33,608 

Arms Elimination

Nuclear Infrastructure 7,000 6,000 1,000 1,530 

Elimination

Emergency Response 5,000 5,000 0 2,573 

Tng/Equipment

Industrial 15,000 15,000 0 14,909 

Partnerships

Defense Enterprise 7,000 0 7,000 7,000 

Fund

Defense and Military 900 0 900 151 

Contacts

Material Control and 8,000 8,000 0 7,618 

Accountability

Science and 9,000 0 9,000 8,950 

Technology Center

Export 7,260 7,260 0 3,085 

Controls

Govt-to-Govt 2,300 2,300 0 856 

Communications

Link

Total 131,460 113,560 17,900 80,280 

Source: Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union, No. 4, May 1996, pp. 53-54.

184. Almaty, KARAVAN-BLITS, in Russian, September 2, 

1, in FBIS-SOV-96-175, September 9, 1996, p. 64.

185. Almaty, Kazakh Television First Program Network, in R

March 11, 1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-049, March 12, 1996, p. 5

programs complement commercial ventures. For example, U.S

defense conversion efforts only began in earnest following D

75
Ahmedov had visited the United States to work out details, 

were submitted to American entrepreneurs, a seminar was 

Tashkent (December 1995), and specific offers to joint ventur

made. These plans were endorsed in May 1996 during the visit b

Carter, U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of Export Administ

Department of Commerce. Tashkent, Business Partner, in Uzbe

25, 1996, p. 5, in FBIS-SOV-96-146, July 29, 1996, pp. 52-53.

186. Defense Attache Offices (DAO) are administered 

Defense Intelligence Agency, but in the post-Cold War er

missions in the Former Soviet Union have swung increasingly 

nation building. The Defense Attache (DATT, the senior 

member) has assumed responsibility for a myriad of DoD pe

stationed in-country outside the DAO chain of command. The 

serves on the Ambassador’s Country Team as the senior m

advisor. Attache staff administer IMET funds; coordinate attend

U.S. service schools, the George C. Marshall Institute in Ga

Partenkirchen, Germany, and specialized courses in the United 

oversee Nunn-Lugar programs; provide the logistical supp

military-to-military contact programs; and administer the Partn

for-Peace program. Occasionally they are involved in highly cla

specialized missions such as Operation SAPPHIRE, during wh

U.S. Air Force secretly extracted roughly 600 kilograms of un

highly-enriched uranium from Ust’ Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan

Ridge, Tennessee. This is in addition to their normal responsibi

liaison with local military officials and to visit garrisons, t

institutes, Ministry of Defense offices, and so forth. What mak

most remarkable is that in many of the Central Asian states

manpower shortages, the DAO consists of a lone attache w

support noncommissioned officer.

187. See Gudrum Wacker, “China Builds Ties, Trade Ac

Western Border,Transition, Vol. 2, No. 17, August 23, 1996, pp. 3

188. CDPP, Vol. XLIX, No. 29, January 7, 1998, pp. 21-22.

189. This distrust of Turkey is shared by another tradition

Russia. Following Prime Minister Yilmaz’ trip to Uzbekist

Kygryzstan in April 1998, the Russian press noted Turkey’s inc

regional influence, the result of supporting the Central Asian s

various fora (ECO, U.N., etc.) and investment of $1.5 bil

Uzbekistan alone over the last 6 years. Turkey’s influence w

growing in the Caucasus, where the Turkish Chief of the Gener

visited Georgia and Azerbaijan that same month and signed m

agreeements. CDPP, Vol. 50, No. 16, May 20, 1998, pp. 22-23.

76
Bishkek, July 1997.

191. CDPP, Vol XLVIII, No. 33, September 11, 1996, p. 24.

192. Ibid.

193. Dianne L. Smith, A New Great Game?, Carlisle Barrac

Strategic Studies Institute, 1996.

77
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Larry M. Wortzel

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Lieutenant Colonel Dianne L. Smith

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Rita E. Burgett

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler