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THE PRESIDENT’S DECISION ON MISSILE DEFENSE 

IN EUROPE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 24, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

PAUL G. KIRK, JR., Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

THE PRESIDENT’S DECISION ON MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE

SEPTEMBER 24, 2009

Page 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le A., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy ..................... 11 

O’Reilly, LTG Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency ...................... 17 

Cartwright, Gen. James E., USMC, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ......... 22 

(III) 

(1) 

THE PRESIDENT’S DECISION ON MISSILE 

DEFENSE IN EUROPE 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m. in room 

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, 

Sessions, Chambliss, Thune, Wicker, Burr, Collins, and LeMieux. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and Gerald J. Leeling, counsel. 

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican 

staff director; and Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Christine G. Lang 

and Brian F. Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator 

Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick 

Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to 

Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; 

Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Tressa Steffen Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay 

Young, assistant to Senator Begich; Nathan Davern, assistant to 

Senator Burris; Anthony J. Lazarski and Rob Soofer, assistants to 

Senator Inhofe, Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to 

Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator 

Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Kevin 

Kane, assistant to Senator Burr; Rob Epplin and Chip Kennett, assistants to Senator Collins; and Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator 

LeMieux. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the President’s recent decision concerning missile defense 

in Europe. We’re joined today by Miche`le Flournoy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; General James Cartwright, the Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). 

2 

We’re delighted to have you with us. We thank you for your service 

to the Nation. 

I see that Senator Lemieux is also with us today. We’re delighted 

that you are here. We give you a very warm welcome to a committee which works on a very bipartisan basis. I think you’ll enjoy 

your service on this committee and we very warmly welcome you. 

We also, if we have a quorum here, are going to take up military 

nominations when we have that quorum. 

Last Thursday, President Obama announced that he had accepted the unanimous recommendations of Defense Secretary Gates 

and Joint Chiefs of Staff to restructure the plan for missile defense 

in Europe. President Obama put it this way: ‘‘Our new missile defense architecture in Europe will provide stronger, smarter, and 

swifter defenses of American forces and American allies.’’ 

Secretary Gates called the new approach ‘‘vastly more suitable 

and a far more effective defense’’ than the previous plan to deploy 

10 long-range interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. 

I believe this decision will enhance our national security and the 

security of our allies and partners in the region. It will deploy demonstrated technology sooner to defend against the number one existing threat in the Middle East, the threat of Iranian short- and 

medium-range missiles that can reach our forward-deployed forces 

and allies in Europe and Israel. Secretary Gates has said the existing Iranian threat ‘‘was not addressed by the previous plan.’’ 

The new European missile defense architecture will evolve an increasing capability as Iran’s missile capabilities evolve. It is flexible 

and adaptable to circumstances. It will counter future Iranian missile threats, including long-range missiles that could reach the 

United States if Iran develops them. So it will offer supplemental 

protection of the United States to augment the missile defense security we now have deployed in Alaska and California. 

Instead of abandoning missile defense in Europe, as some have 

suggested, the new approach expands and enhances our missile defense capabilities in Europe compared to the previous plan. Secretary Gates summarized the issue well by saying: ‘‘We are 

strengthening, not scrapping, missile defense in Europe.’’ 

The new architecture will be deployed sooner than the previously 

proposed third site would have been. Secretary Gates has said that 

the new system will be deployed starting in 2011, whereas the previously planned system would not have been deployed until at least 

2017, assuming then that it met all the conditions required in our 

law, such as ratification by the Czech Republic and Poland and 

demonstrating that the system would be operationally effective. 

As to the suggestion that the administration is abandoning some 

of our European allies, the administration’s plan would involve 

more allies than the previous plan and would defend all of the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Europe rather than 

only a portion of Europe. Poland and the Czech Republic are being 

offered the first opportunity to participate in the new architecture. 

The NATO view is positive. Last Thursday NATO Secretary General Rasmussen said: ‘‘I welcome that the United States today has 

discussed at NATO how we can develop a missile defense which 

can include all allies and protect all allies. I welcome in fact that 

3 

NATO will play a more prominent role in the U.S. plans for missile 

defense in Europe. That is a positive step.’’ 

Now, the reason that he reacts that way is that the new plan 

would defend all of our NATO allies and our forward-deployed 

forces against that existing threat, rather than defending only a 

portion of NATO Europe that is not within the range of Iran’s existing missiles, as was the case with the previous plan. This is a 

substantial improvement for NATO. 

Now, while some early statements from some Polish and Czech 

leaders were critical, later statements were supportive. For instance, last Friday Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski said: ‘‘Poland 

will be an element of a new missile defense security. There is no 

question of the United States abandoning our region. If the scenario outlined yesterday by the U.S. President, State Department 

officials, and the Secretary of State is implemented, it will be a significant reinforcement of Poland’s defense potential,’’ he said. On 

Polish TV he said: ‘‘We will have what we wanted.’’ This is the Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski. ‘‘We will have what we wanted. The 

presence of American troops and Patriot missiles is guaranteed.’’ 

Czech President Vaclav Klaus earlier this week says he ‘‘fully accepts the decision.’’ 

To those who say the new approach stems from Russian pressure, Secretary Gates wrote in The New York Times: ‘‘Russia’s attitude and possible reaction played no part in my recommendation 

to the President on this issue.’’ Secretary Gates added that ‘‘if Russia’s leaders embrace this plan, that will be an unexpected and welcome change of policy on their part.’’ 

Now, it would be an additional benefit if the new plan opens the 

door to cooperation with Russia on missile defense. If Russia were 

to cooperate with the United States and NATO, it would send a 

powerful signal to Iran. It could also, if Russia were to share the 

data from its Armavir radar, improve the capability of our defenses 

against Iran. 

NATO has repeatedly supported missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia. In April I traveled to Warsaw, 

Prague, and Moscow with Senator Bill Nelson and Senator Collins. 

We had frank discussions with government officials in each country. We came back I think with the view that there appeared to be 

a possibility for a new approach to missile defense that might be 

acceptable to all and which might show Iran that its pursuit of 

missiles and nuclear weapons will bring countries, including Russia, together in opposition. This plan creates the possibility for missile defense to be a uniting issue, rather than continuing as a dividing issue. 

I would add that it was clear from that trip that the Polish Government was focused, as Foreign Minister Sikorski said, on the deployment of a U.S. Patriot battery and in U.S. personnel in Poland, 

rather than on deployment of the previously proposed long-range 

interceptors in Poland. It appears that now both nations are moving steadily toward such a deployment and I hope Secretary 

Flournoy will discuss the status of the Patriot issue. 

The new plan is also consistent with the direction that was provided by Congress over each of the last 3 years under both Democratic and Republican leadership. Congress in our legislation told 

4 

the Defense Department to buy more Standard Missile–3 (SM–3) 

and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors to 

defend against the existing short- and medium-range missile 

threat. Congress established a policy to develop, test, and deploy effective missile defenses to defend our forward-based forces, our allies, and our Homeland against the threat of Iran’s existing and 

possible future ballistic missiles, and Congress directed that the 

Defense Department place a priority on developing, testing, and 

fielding near-term effective missile defense securities, including the 

Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) with its SM–3 interceptor, 

THAAD and Patriot (PAC–3). 

In summary, I believe this new approach is a three-fer. It addresses more directly and effectively Iran’s missile threat, it maintains and expands our security commitment to Europe, including 

Poland and the Czech Republic, it opens the door to working cooperatively with Russia on a missile defense security system that 

could not only provide greater protection to Europe, but also make 

a strong statement to Iran that Europe, including Russia, will take 

unified action against Iran’s threat. 

The balance of my statement will be placed in the record, and before calling on our witnesses let me recognize Senator McCain. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

The committee meets today to receive testimony on the President’s recent decision 

concerning missile defense in Europe. 

We are joined today by the Honorable Miche`le Flournoy, the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy; General James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff; and Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly, the Director of the Missile 

Defense Agency. We are glad to have you with us, and we thank you for your service 

to the Nation. 

Last Thursday, President Obama announced that he had accepted the unanimous 

recommendations of Defense Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to restructure the plan for missile defense in Europe. 

President Obama put it this way: ‘‘our new missile defense architecture in Europe 

will provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and American allies.’’ Secretary Gates called the new approach ‘‘vastly more suitable’’ and ‘‘a 

far more effective defense’’ than the previous plan to deploy 10 long-range interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. 

I believe this decision will enhance our national security and the security of our 

allies and partners in the region. It will deploy demonstrated technology sooner to 

defend against the number 1 existing threat in the Middle East, the threat 

ofIranian short- and medium-range missiles. They can reach our forward-deployed 

forces and allies in Europe and Israel. Secretary Gates has said that the existing 

Iranian threat ‘‘was not addressed by the previous plan.’’ 

The new European missile defense architecture will evolve and increase in capability as Iran’s missile capabilities evolve. It is flexible and adaptable to circumstances. It will counter future Iranian missile threats, including long-range missiles that could reach the United States, if Iran develops them. So it will offer supplemental protection of the United States, to augment the missile defense system 

we now have deployed in Alaska and California. 

Instead of abandoning missile defense in Europe, as some have suggested, the 

new approach dramatically expands and enhances our missile defense capabilities 

in Europe compared to the previous plan. Secretary Gates summarized the issue 

well by saying that ‘‘we are strengthening—not scrapping—missile defense in Europe.’’ 

The new architecture will be deployed sooner than the previously proposed ‘‘third 

site’’ would have been. As Secretary Gates has said, the new system will be deployed 

starting in 2011, whereas the previously planned system would not have been deployed until at least 2017–assuming that it met all the conditions required in our 

law, such as ratification by the Czech Republic and Poland, and demonstrating that 

the system would be operationally effective. 

5 

As to the suggestion that the administration is abandoning some of our European 

allies, the administration’s plan would involve more allies than the previous plan, 

and would defend all of NATO Europe, rather than only a portion of Europe. We 

are offering both Poland and the Czech Republic the first opportunity to participate 

in the new architecture. 

The NATO view is also positive. Last Thursday, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen said: ‘‘I welcome that the United States today has discussed at NATO how 

we can develop missile defense which can include all allies and protect all allies. . . . I welcome in fact that NATO will play a more prominent role in the U.S. 

plans for missile defense in Europe. That is a positive step.’’ 

The new plan would defend all of our NATO allies and our forward-deployed 

forces against that existing threat, rather than defending only the portion of NATO 

Europe that is not within range of Iran’s existing missiles—as was the case with 

the previous plan. This is a substantial improvement for NATO. 

While some early statements from some Polish and Czech leaders were critical, 

later statements were supportive. 

For instance, last Friday, Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski said: ‘‘Poland will be 

an element of a new [Missile Defense] system.’’ . . . ‘‘There is no question of the 

United States abandoning our region. If the scenario outlined yesterday by the U.S. 

President, State Department officials, and Secretary of State is implemented, it will 

be a significant reinforcement of Poland’s defense potential.’’ On Polish TV, he said: 

‘‘We will have what we wanted: the presence of American troops and Patriot missiles is guaranteed.’’ 

Czech President Vaclav Klaus earlier this week said: he ‘‘fully accepts’’ the decision. 

As to those who say the new approach stems from Russian pressure, Secretary 

Gates wrote in the New York Times, ‘‘Russia’s attitude and possible reaction played 

no part in my recommendation to the President on this issue.’’ He added that ‘‘if 

Russia’s leaders embrace this plan, then that will be an unexpected—and welcome— 

change of policy on their part.’’ 

It will be an additional benefit if the new plan opens the door to cooperation with 

Russia on missile defense. If Russia were to cooperate with the United States and 

NATO, it would send a powerful signal to Iran. It could also, if Russia were to share 

the data from its Armavir radar, improve the capability of our defenses against 

Iran. NATOhas repeatedly supported missile defense cooperation between the 

United States and Russia. 

In April, I traveled to Warsaw, Prague, and Moscow with Senator Bill Nelson and 

Senator Collins. We had frank and constructive discussions with government officials in each country. We came back with the view that there appeared to be a possibility for a new approach to missile defense which could be acceptable to all sides, 

and which might show Iran that its pursuit of missiles and nuclear weapons will 

bring countries—including Russia—together in opposition. This plan creates the 

possibility for missile defense to be a uniting issue, rather than continuing as a dividing issue. 

I would add that it was clear from that trip that the Polish Government was focused, as Foreign Minister Sikorski said, on the deployment of a U.S. Patriot battery and U.S. personnel in Poland, rather than on deployment of the previously proposed long-range interceptors in Poland. It appears that both nations are moving 

steadily toward such a deployment, and I hope Secretary Flournoy will discuss the 

status of the Patriot issue. 

It was also clear that the Czech Government was not moving toward ratifying the 

missile defense agreements before its national elections, now scheduled for next 

year, and appeared likely not to do so after those elections, either. 

The new plan is consistent with the direction provided by Congress over each of 

the last 3 years, under both Democratic and Republican leadership: 

• Congress told the Defense Department to buy more Standard Missile-3 and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors to defend against the 

existing short- and medium-range missile threat; 

• Congress established a policy to develop, test, and deploy effective missile defenses to defend our forward-based forces, our allies, and our Homeland against 

the threat of Iran’s existing and possible future ballistic missiles; and 

• Congress directed the Defense Department to place a priority on developing, 

testing, and fielding near-term effective missile defense systems, including 

Aegis BMD with its Standard Missile-3 interceptor, THAAD, and Patriot PAC– 

3. 

In its report to accompany the National Defense Authorization Act last year, this 

committee told the Defense Department that its highest missile defense priority 

6 

should be to buy significantly more Standard Missile-3 and THAAD interceptors in 

order to defend against the existing threat of short- and medium-range missiles 

from nations such as Iran and North Korea. That is the essence of the new plan. 

Two years ago, in section 229 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181), Congress established the policy of the United 

States to develop, test, and deploy, as soon as technologically feasible, in conjunction 

with allies and other friendly nations whenever possible, an effective defense 

against the ballistic missile threat from Iran, to protect the forward-based forces of 

the United States and allies in Europe and the surrounding region, as well as to 

protect against possible future long-range Iranian missiles that could eventually 

threaten the United States. That, in a nutshell, is what the President and Secretary 

Gates announced last Thursday. 

Three years ago, this committee initiated, and Congress adopted, legislation making it the policy of the United States to place a priority in its missile defense programs on developing, testing, deploying, and improving near-term, effective missile 

defense systems, including the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system with its 

Standard Missile-3 interceptor, the THAAD system, and the Patriot PAC–3 system, 

and their sensors. Those are, of course, the three systems that form the core of the 

administration’s new missile defense plan for Europe. 

In summary, this new approach is a ‘‘three-fer:’’ It addresses more directly and 

effectively Iran’s missile threat. It maintains and expands our security commitment 

to Europe, including Poland and the Czech Republic. It opens the door to working 

cooperatively with Russia on a missile defense system that could not only provide 

greater protection to Europe, but also make a strong statement to Iran that Europe, 

including Russia, will take unified action against Iran’s threat. 

Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and General O’Reilly, thank you for joining us today. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d also like to acknowledge Senator George LeMieux of Florida and welcome him to 

the committee. Despite the fact that he is an attorney, I look forward to working with him on the many issues we face today. This 

committee does work in a bipartisan fashion, but I also might say 

a very spirited fashion from time to time. So welcome, George. 

I welcome the witnesses today. Since the end of the Cold War, 

we’ve prided ourselves on the strong and enduring relationships 

we’ve forged with our European allies, particularly in Eastern Europe. At a time when Eastern European nations are increasingly 

wary of renewed Russian aggression in the region—Georgia, attempts to intimidate Ukraine, other actions that have been taken— 

the administration is adopting a new European missile defense 

strategy that has clearly bruised some of our staunchest allies in 

Europe while encouraging hard-liners in my view. 

The decision by the administration to back away from its missile 

defense commitment to the Czech Republic and Poland can only 

demonstrate to the rest of Europe that the United States is not 

prepared to stand behind its friends, that the United States views 

resetting its relations with Russia more important than commitments made to close friends and allies, and that the administration 

is willing to let Russia have veto power over the disposition of our 

missile defense architecture. 

Missile defense in Europe is not and should not be viewed in 

Moscow as some new form of post-Cold War aggression. It’s rather 

a reasonable and prudent response to the very belligerent threats 

the Iranian regime continues to pose to the United States and the 

world. 

One of the troubling rationales for this new approach is based on 

the assumption that the long-range Iranian ballistic missile threat 

7 

is not materializing as quickly as previously assessed and that the 

real threat is in the short- and medium-range missiles. I agree the 

short- and medium-range missile threats are a significant and 

growing threat, but I question the notion that we don’t have to be 

as vigilant in developing our defenses against long-range Iranian 

ballistic missiles. Eric Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy under Secretary Gates during the Bush administration, recently said that intelligence reports on the Iranian threat as recently as January of this year were more troubling than what is 

being portrayed by the current administration. He said: ‘‘Maybe 

something really dramatic changed between January 16 and now 

in what the Iranians are doing with their missile securities, but I 

don’t think so.’’ 

We all know the threat’s real of Iranian ballistic missiles, real 

and growing. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on both 

exactly what has changed threat-wise and why the new and old 

strategies are mutually exclusive, why we can wait until 2020, at 

least 3 to 5 years later than originally planned, to field a longrange security capable of defending both the United States and Europe. 

Interesting about this whole decisionmaking scenario, which in 

my view was incredibly amateurish and ham-fisted: Months of negotiations were dedicated towards reaching an agreement with the 

Poles and Czechs in 2008, but a late night phone call was all it 

took to tell our friends to take a hike. According to news reports, 

the Polish Prime Minister was called at midnight, only hours before the administration formally announced its new strategy. I suppose that Prime Minister Tusk shouldn’t be all too upset because 

he, unlike Members of Congress, didn’t have to wait to read about 

it in the morning papers. 

I must say the timing was exquisite, while the Poles were commemorating the 75th anniversary of the Russian invasion of Poland—exquisite timing. Poland headlines read: ‘‘Betrayal. The U.S. 

sold us to Russia and stabbed us in the back.’’ In the Czech Republic: ‘‘No radar. Russia won.’’ 

I urge the administration to take every step necessary above and 

beyond proceeding forward with the planned European missile defense strategy to not downplay the long-range Iranian threat and 

reassure our allies. 

Also, I think it’s worth noting the Czech Republic currently have 

NATO forces deployed, as well as 100 personnel deployed in 

Kandahar. The Polish currently have 2,000 troops in Afghanistan. 

I’ll be very interested in the future to see how firmly the Poles and 

the Czechs stand behind those commitments. 

There is very little doubt that in most of the world that this is 

viewed as an attempt to gain Russian concessions on the Iranian 

nuclear issue. That’s the interpretation. It was Machiavelli who 

said it’s not what you do, it’s what you appear to do. I am sure that 

the witnesses today will make a strong technical case for abandonment of the long-range missiles to short- and medium-range missile 

defenses. I have to tell you that there’s more to this, far more to 

this, than a change in policy. This is a signal to our East European 

friends, who are very nervous about aggressive Russian behavior in 

8 

the region, and they have a rich history which to base their concerns on that we have sent the wrong message at the wrong time. 

As far as this decision having significant beneficial effect on Russian attitudes towards Iranian nuclear buildup, we’ll see. History 

shows us that unilateral concessions very rarely gain anything except increased demands from our adversaries. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I’d like to take a moment to acknowledge Senator 

George S. LeMieux of Florida and welcome him to the committee. Despite the fact 

that he is an attorney, I look forward to working with him on the many issues that 

we face today, and I thank him and his family for their willingness to serve. 

Since the end of the Cold War we have prided ourselves on the strong and enduring relationships we have forged with our Eastern European allies. At a time when 

Eastern European nations are increasingly wary of renewed Russian aggression in 

the region, the administration in adopting a new European missile defense strategy 

has clearly bruised some of our staunchest U.S. allies in Europe while encouraging 

Russian hardliners. 

The decision by the administration to back away from its missile defense commitment to the Czech Republic and Poland can only demonstrate to the rest of Europe 

that the United States is not prepared to stand behind its friends; that the United 

States views re-setting its relations with Russia more important than commitments 

made to close friends and allies; and that the administration is willing to let Russia 

have veto power over the disposition of our missile defense architecture. 

Missile defense in Europe is not, and should not, be viewed in Moscow as some 

new form of post-Cold War aggression. It is, rather, a reasonable and prudent response to the very real belligerent threats the Iranian regime continues to pose to 

the United States, Europe, and the world. 

One of the troubling rationales for this new approach is based on the assumption 

that the long-range Iranian ballistic missile threat is not materializing as quickly 

as previously assessed and that the real threat is in short- and medium-range missiles. I agree that short- and medium-range ballistic missiles are a significant and 

growing threat but question the notion that we don’t have to be as vigilant in developing our defenses against long-range Iranian ballistic missiles. Eric Edelman, the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under Secretary Gates during the Bush administration, recently said that intelligence reports on the Iranian threat as recent 

as January of this year were more troubling than what is being portrayed by the 

current administration. Mr. Edelman maintains that ‘‘maybe something really dramatic changed between January 16 and now in terms of what the Iranians are 

doing with their missile systems, but I don’t think so.’’ 

We all know that the Iranian ballistic missile threat is real and growing and I 

look forward to hearing from our witnesses on both exactly what has changed 

threat-wise and why the new and old strategies are mutually exclusive. Why we can 

wait until 2020, at least 3 to 5 years later than originally planned to field a longrange system capable of defending both the United States and Europe? 

Months of negotiations were dedicated towards reaching agreement with the Poles 

and Czechs in 2008, but a late night phone call was all it took to tell our friends 

to ‘‘take a hike.’’ According to news reports, the Polish Prime Minister, was called 

at midnight, only hours before the administration formally announced its new strategy. But, I supposed Prime Minister Tusk shouldn’t be all too upset. He, unlike 

Members of Congress, didn’t have to read about it first in the morning newspaper. 

In Poland, headlines read ‘‘Betrayal! The U.S. sold us to Russia and stabbed us 

in the back’’ and in the Czech Republic, ‘‘No Radar. Russia won.’’ I urge the administration to take every step necessary above and beyond proceeding forward with the 

planned European missile defense strategy to not downplay the long-range Iranian 

threat and reassure our allies and the rest of the world that the U.S. stands behind 

its commitments. Given the global threats we face today, we cannot afford to lose 

friends or real estate in the region. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

There is a quorum now present so I would ask the committee to 

consider a list of 2,559 pending military officer nominations. InVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\55138.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
9 

cluded in this list is Admiral Mullen for reappointment to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. 

Of these nominations, 25 do not meet the committee’s 7-day requirement by only 1 day. No objection has been raised to these 

nominations. I recommend the committee waive the 7-day rule in 

order to permit the confirmation of the nominations of these 25 officers. 

Senator MCCAIN. So moved. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Second 

Chairman LEVIN. All those in favor say aye. 

[A chorus of ayes.] 

Opposed, nay. 

[No response.] 

The ayes have it. 

[The list of nominations considered and approved by the committee follows:] 

MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE’S CONSIDERATION ON SEPTEMBER 24, 

2009. 

1. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of rear admiral (list begins with Michael H. Mittelman) (Reference No. 77). 

2. ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN, to be admiral and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff (Reference No. 489). 

3. BG Joseph B. DiBartolomeo, ARNG, to be major general (Reference No. 725). 

4. In the Air Force, there are 40 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(list begins with Lance L. Annicelli) (Reference No. 771). 

5. In the Army there is one appointment to the grade of major (Robert J. Schultz) 

(Reference No. 825). 

6. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Andrea J. Fuller) 

(Reference No. 826). 

7. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of colonel and below (list 

begins with Peter H. Guevara) (Reference No. 827). 

8. In the Army, there are eight appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

and below (list begins with James Bane) (Reference No. 828). 

9. Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC, to be general and Commander, U.S. Joint Forces 

Command (Reference No. 830). 

10. In the Army Reserve, there are 46 appointments to be colonel (list begins with 

John A. Blankenbaker) (Reference No. 853). 

11. In the Army Reserve, there are 307 appointments to be colonel (list begins 

with William L. Abernathy, Jr.) (Reference No. 854). 

12. In the Army Reserve, there are 237 appointments to be colonel (list begins 

with Gregory T. Adams) (Reference No. 855). 

13. In the Navy, there is one appointment to be lieutenant commander (Erik J. 

Modlo) (Reference No. 856). 

14. In the Navy, there are two appointments to be lieutenant commander (list begins with Josh A. Cassada) (Reference No. 857). 

15. In the Navy, there are 72 appointments to be lieutenant commander (list begins with Matthew J. Acanfora) (Reference No. 858). 

16. In the Navy, there are 49 appointments to be lieutenant commander (list begins with Ron J. Arellano) (Reference No. 859). 

17. In the Navy, there are 41 appointments to be lieutenant commander (list begins with Benjamin I. Abney) (Reference No. 860). 

18. In the Navy, there are 38 appointments to be lieutenant commander (list begins with Christopher D. Addington) (Reference No. 861). 

19. In the Navy, there are 22 appointments to be lieutenant commander (list begins with Kelly W. Bowman, Jr.) (Reference No. 862). 

20. In the Navy, there are 32 appointments to be lieutenant commander (list begins with Hasan Abdulmutakallim) (Reference No. 863). 

21. In the Navy, there are 12 appointments to be lieutenant commander (list begins with Denise G. Barham) (Reference No. 864). 

10 

22. In the Navy, there are 17 appointments to be lieutenant commander (list begins with Guillermo R. Amezaga) (Reference No. 865). 

23. In the Navy, there are 157 appointments to be lieutenant commander (list begins with Christopher W. Anderson) (Reference No. 866). 

24. In the Navy, there are 907 appointments to be lieutenant commander (list begins with Matthew L. Abbot) (Reference No. 867). 

25. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Cameron D. Wright) (Reference No. 893). 

26. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Andre L. Brown) 

(Reference No. 894). 

27. In the Army Reserve, there are six appointments to the grade of colonel (list 

begins with Kathleen E. Coffey) (Reference No. 895). 

28. In the Navy, there are six appointments to the grade of commander and below 

(list begins with Paul C. Kerr) (Reference No. 896). 

29. In the Navy, there are four appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Scott A. Anderson) (Reference No. 897). 

30. In the Navy, there are 38 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins 

with Keith R. Barkey) (Reference No. 898). 

31. In the Navy, there are 30 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins 

with Paul S. Anderson) (Reference No. 899). 

32. In the Navy, there are 51 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins 

with Robin M. Allen) (Reference No. 900). 

33. In the Navy, there are 50 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins 

with James D. Abbott) (Reference No. 901). 

34. In the Navy, there are 28 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins 

with Jason T. Baltimore) (Reference No. 902). 

35. In the Navy, there are 61 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins 

with Joel R. Bealer) (Reference No. 903). 

36. In the Navy, there are 21 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins 

with Martin J. Anerino) (Reference No. 904). 

37. In the Navy, there are 144 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Roger S. Akins) (Reference No. 905). 

38. MG Ralph J. Jodice II, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Commander, Allied 

Air Component Command Headquarters, Izmir and Commander, 16th Air Expeditionary Task Force, U.S. Air Forces in Europe (Reference No. 912). 

39. MG William J. Rew, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Vice Commander, 

Air Combat Command (Reference No. 913). 

40. MG Christopher D. Miller, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Deputy Chief 

of Staff, Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force (Reference No. 

914). 

41. LTG Benjamin C. Freakley, USA, to be lieutenant general and Commanding 

General, U.S. Army Accessions Command (Reference No. 915). 

42. LTG John D. Gardner, USA, to be lieutenant general and Deputy Commander, 

US European Command (Reference No. 916). 

43. LTG Frank G. Helmick, USA, to be lieutenant general and Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg (Reference No. 917). 

44. MG Mark P. Hertling, USA, to be lieutenant general and Deputy Commanding 

General, Initial Military Training, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Reference No. 918). 

45. In the Army, there are 38 appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list 

begins with Robin B. Akin) (Reference No. 919). 

46. MG Frank A. Panter, Jr., USMC, to be lieutenant general and Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics (Reference No. 920). 

47. MG Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC, to be lieutenant general and Deputy 

Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps 

(Reference No. 921). 

48. Capt. Charles A. Rainey, USNR, to be rear admiral (lower half) (Reference No. 

922). 

49. Capt. Jonathan W. White, USN, to be rear admiral (lower half) (Reference No. 

923). 

50. RADM(lh) David W. Titley, USN, to be rear admiral (lower half) (Reference 

No. 924). 

51. Col. David J. Conboy, USAR, to be brigadier general (Reference No. 938). 

52. Col. James V. Young, Jr., USAR, to be brigadier general (Reference No. 939). 

53. Col. Ivan N. Black, USAR, to be brigadier general (Reference No. 940). 

54. MG John F. Kelly, USMC, to be lieutenant general and Commander, Marine 

Forces Reserve and Commander, Marine Forces North (Reference No. 941). 

55. RDAM(lh) Gregory J. Smith, USN, to be rear admiral (Reference No. 942). 

11 

56. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(Thomas M. Anderson) (Reference No. 943). 

57. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Ricky B. 

Reaves) (Reference No. 944). 

58. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Jose R. 

Pereztorres) (Reference No. 945). 

59. In the Air Force, there are seven appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Loyd A. Graham) (Reference No. 946). 

60. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

(Sonnie D. Deyampert) (Reference No. 947). 

61. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Douglas 

Lougee) (Reference No. 948). 

62. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (James Peak) 

(Reference No. 949). 

63. In the Army, there are 12 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel and 

below (list begins with Joyvetta Lewis) (Reference No. 950). 

64. In the Navy, there are four appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Brian J. Ellis) (Reference No. 951). 

65. In the Navy, there are 12 appointments to the grade of captain and below (list 

begins with Anthony T. Cowden) (Reference No. 952). 

66. VADM Bruce W. Clingan, USN, to be vice admiral and Deputy Chief of Naval 

Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy, N3/N5, Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations (Reference No. 965). 

67. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major (Derek D. Brown) 

(Reference No. 966). 

68. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Stephanie Latimer) (Reference No. 967). 

69. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of major (list begins 

with Michelle H. Martin) (Reference No. 968). 

70. In the Army, there are nine appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel 

and below (list begins with Robert E. Powers) (Reference No. 969). 

71. In the Navy Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of captain (list 

begins with Neri B. Barnea) (Reference No. 970). 

72. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Anita Aminoshariae) (Reference No. 971). 

73. In the Navy, there are six appointments to the grade of commander and below 

(list begins with Tracy D. Emerson) (Reference No. 972). 

Total: 2,559. 

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Flournoy. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHE` LE A. FLOURNOY, UNDER 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, 

and other distinguished members of the committee. We very much 

appreciate the opportunity to discuss the administration’s new approach to missile defense in Europe with you today. 

We are confident that our new approach represents a dramatic 

improvement over the program of record. Under the old plan, we 

were not going to be able to deploy a European missile defense system capable of protecting against Iranian missiles until at least 

2017. Under our new plan, we’ll be able to protect vulnerable parts 

of Europe and the tens of thousands of U.S. troops stationed there 

by the end of 2011. We’ll be creating a far more flexible and adaptive missile defense system, one that can adapt to provide better 

protection against emerging threats. 

The previous administration had planned to deploy 10 groundbased interceptors (GBIs) in Poland, a European midcourse radar 

in the Czech Republic, and a TPY–2 radar elsewhere in the region. 

The decision to move forward with that particular configuration 

was made several years ago and it was based on threat information 

12 

and technologies available at that time. But circumstances have 

changed significantly since then. 

First, we now have a rather different intelligence picture; and 

second, we have made major strides in missile defense technologies 

in just the last few years. We are now in a position to put a far 

more effective missile defense system in place more rapidly than 

just a few years ago. 

So let me start by discussing the current threat assessments. The 

Intelligence Community now assesses that the threat from Iran’s 

short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly than previously projected, while the threat of potential Iranian 

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) has been somewhat 

slower to develop than previously estimated. 

In the near term what this means is that the greatest missile 

threats from Iran will be to our allies and our partners and U.S. 

deployed personnel and their families in the Middle East and in 

Europe. Needless to say, this concern is all the more urgent in light 

of Iran’s continuing uranium enrichment program. 

But as Secretary Gates has noted, we understand that intelligence projections can be wrong and can change over time. Iran’s 

priorities and capabilities may indeed change in ways that we can’t 

predict. So our new approach also hedges against the possibility 

that threats from Iranian long-range missiles will evolve more rapidly than we currently predict. We would still have 30 GBIs deployed in the United States by the end of 2010, which will provide 

the United States with a sufficient capability to deal with any Iranian ICBM threat for many years to come. What’s more, the information from the European forward-based TPY–2 radar that does 

remain part of our new plan will significantly enhance the performance of our existing U.S.-based GBIs. We will also continue to develop the two-stage GBI. 

Let me now turn to highlight some of the technological changes 

that have allowed us to develop an improved approach to missile 

defense. As General O’Reilly and General Cartwright will describe 

in much more detail, improved interceptor capabilities developed in 

the last 5 years now offer us a more flexible and capable missile 

defense architecture. We’ve also significantly improved our sensor 

technologies. That means we have a variety of better options to detect and track enemy missiles and guide interceptors in flight to 

enable successful engagements. As a result, we now have missile 

defense options that were not previously available. 

Our new approach, which the President has adopted on the 

unanimous recommendation of both the Secretary of Defense and 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will rely on a distributed network of sensors and proven SM–3 interceptors, which can be fired from both 

Aegis ships and from land. This means greater geographic flexibility, greater survivability, and greater scalability in response to 

an evolving threat. That’s exactly what we mean by a phased, 

adaptive approach. 

But before I turn it over to my colleagues to describe the system 

in more detail, I want to say a few words about how our new approach has been received by our allies. For us, one of the many advantages of this new architecture is that it greatly increases our 

ability to work with our European allies and our partners to 

13 

strengthen extended deterrence and our mutual defenses. The new 

architecture we are creating provides many more opportunities for 

alliance-building and burden-sharing between the United States 

and our NATO partners. 

Indeed, the reactions we have received from our allies have ultimately been quite supportive. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen 

has hailed the decision as a positive step and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has described it as a real chance to strengthen 

Europe’s security. 

We began general discussions earlier this spring and now we’re 

in quite specific consultations—with both Poland and the Czech Republic about their potential roles in a new missile defense architecture. Our Polish allies understand that they have the option of replacing the GBIs from the previous plan with land-based SM–3 

interceptors in the new plan, and we will continue to seek Polish 

ratification of the missile defense basing agreement and the supplemental Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). We are also on track 

once the SOFA is agreed to begin the regular rotations of Patriot 

batteries to Poland, as agreed by the previous administration. 

We are also in discussions with the Czech Republic to ensure 

that they continue to play a critical and leadership role on missile 

defense within the alliance. We have several joint projects already 

under way with our Czech partners and those will continue. We are 

already discussing several more, including the possibility of having 

the Czech Republic host some of the new system’s elements, such 

as the command and control. 

In short, we are standing by our allies in Central and Eastern 

Europe and we are in fact increasing our commitment to their defense in very real terms. 

While we certainly welcome Russian interest in the new approach, as well as potential Russian cooperation in sharing data 

from their radars, this is not about Russia. It’s never been about 

Russia. Regardless of Russian reaction, we will continue to do 

whatever it takes to ensure the security and defense of our European allies. 

Let me end here by underscoring this point. Our new approach 

to missile defense in Europe allows us to provide coverage to vulnerable parts of Europe much faster than the old approach, and 

when fully deployed in phase four it will be even more capable than 

the program of record against the full range of threats, including 

longer range systems. Our new approach will also allow us to augment our current homeland defense against ICBMs that may 

evolve in the future. In sum, we are strengthening, not scrapping, 

missile defense in Europe. We look forward to working with members of this committee to make this new architecture a reality. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and we look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Flournoy and General Cartwright follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. MICHE`LE A. FLOURNOY AND GEN. JAMES E. 

CARTWRIGHT, USMC 

Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee. We 

appreciate the opportunity to discuss the administration’s new approach to missile 

defense in Europe, and to set the record straight that the Obama administration 

14 

is committed to deploying timely, cost-effective, and responsive missile defenses to 

protect the United States, our deployed forces, as well as our allies and friends 

against ballistic missiles of all ranges. 

We are confident that our new approach represents a dramatic improvement over 

the program of record. Under the old plan, we were not going to be able to deploy 

a European missile defense system capable of protecting against Iranian missiles 

until at least 2017. Under our new plan, we’ll be able to protect vulnerable parts 

of Europe and the tens of thousands of U.S. troops stationed there by the end of 

2011. We’ll also be creating a far more flexible missile defense system, one that can 

be adapted to provide better protection against emerging threats. 

Before going into details, I would like to place this decision about European missile defense in context. We are in the midst of several major defense reviews, one 

of which is a congressionally-mandated review of our approach to ballistic missile 

defense. The Department of Defense is leading that review, with active participation 

from the Intelligence Community and a number of other agencies. That review is 

comprehensive and ongoing; it examines our strategic and operational approach to 

missile defense not just in Europe but around the world. 

The review is moving forward based on four key principles: 

(1) We must ensure that U.S. missile defenses are responsive to the 

threats we face today and are likely to face in the future, that the technologies we use are proven and effective, and that our defenses are cost effective; 

(2) We must maintain and improve defenses for the United States and our 

allies against potential missile attacks from countries such as Iran and 

North Korea; 

(3) We must renew our emphasis on protecting U.S. deployed forces and 

their dependents in theater, as well as U.S. allies and friends against regional threats; and 

(4) We must continue to make missile defense an important feature of our 

international cooperation efforts. 

The results of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review are not due back to Congress 

until January, but as we began our in-depth analysis, it became clear very early 

that circumstances had changed fundamentally with regard to missile defense in 

Europe, so that we would need to make some significant adjustments to the previous administration’s plan. 

In early 2007, the previous administration decided to seek deployment of groundbased interceptors (GBIs) in Poland, a European Mid-Course Radar (EMR) in the 

Czech Republic, and an AN/TPY–2 radar elsewhere in the region. The decision to 

move forward with that particular configuration was made nearly 3 years ago, and 

had been considered for several years prior to that, based on the threat information 

and the technologies available at that time. 

Circumstances have changed significantly since early 2007. First, we now have a 

rather different intelligence picture than we had 3 years ago, particularly with regard to Iranian capabilities. Second, we have made major strides in missile defense 

technologies and capabilities in just the last few years. We are now in a position 

to put an effective missile defense system in place far more rapidly than we were 

a few years ago, one that will be far more flexible, adaptable, and capable. 

The intelligence community now assesses that the threat from Iran’s short- and 

medium-range ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly than previously projected, while the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 

capabilities has been slower to develop than previously estimated. In the near-term, 

the greatest missile threats from Iran will be to U.S. allies and partners, as well 

as to U.S. deployed personnel—military and civilian—and their accompanying families in the Middle East and in Europe. 

Iran already possesses hundreds of ballistic missiles capable of reaching neighbors 

in the Middle East, Turkey and the Caucasus, and is actively developing and testing 

missiles that can reach further into Europe. Our intelligence assessments indicate 

that the continued production and deployment of these more capable medium-range 

missiles has become one of Iran’s highest missile priorities. 

In the near-to mid-term, this means that the primary threat posed by Iranian 

missiles will be to U.S. allies, our 80,000 deployed forces in Europe, our civilian personnel and their families. Needless to say, this concern is all the more urgent in 

light of Iran’s continued uranium enrichment program. Iran continues to defy international obligations, and there continues to be reason to fear that Iran is seeking 

a nuclear weapons option. We hope that won’t come to pass. But obviously it increases the urgency of developing a truly effective missile defense system in Europe 

15 

for the protection of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) territory and 

populations and the U.S. Homeland. 

As the Secretary of Defense has noted, we understand that the intelligence projections can be wrong, which makes it all the more important for us to have a flexible 

and adaptable missile defense system that can evolve with the threat. So we remain 

very concerned about Iran’s potential to develop ICBMs, and part of our new approach in the later phases is to provide a more effective addition to our already existing GBIs based in Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air Force Base, which we will address in detail in a minute. 

Let us turn now to the opportunities for improved capabilities. 

Technological developments over the past several years have led to new capabilities, demonstrated in multiple tests. Improved interceptor capabilities now offer us 

more flexible and capable missile defense architecture, and we have also significantly improved our sensor technologies. That means we now have a variety of better options to detect and track enemy missiles and guide the interceptor in-flight 

to enable a successful engagement. As a result, we now have new and proven missile defense options that were not previously available. 

The previous plan, approved in early 2007, relied on 2 large, fixed missile-defense 

sites, with 10 GBIs in Poland and the EMR in the Czech Republic. It was designed 

to identify and destroy up to about 5 to 10 long-range missiles, and as noted, the 

radar and interceptors called for under the old plan would not have been in place 

until at least 2017. 

Our new approach, which the President adopted on the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will rely on a distributed network of sensors and SM–3 interceptors. The SM–3 IA is a proven capability 

with eight successful tests since 2007, and it is more than capable of dealing with 

current threats from even multiple short- and medium-range missiles. It and future 

variants also have many advantages over a GBI. The SM–3 is much smaller, weighing only about 1 ton compared to the GBI’s 25 tons. Because it is smaller and fits 

inside a vertical launch canister, it can be fired from Aegis capable ships. Starting 

with the SM–3 Block IB, it will also be able to be fired from land. 

The capability of having a missile defense system that can integrate interceptor 

sites located both at sea and on land offers us geographic flexibility that was unavailable under the previous plan. Furthermore, the resulting distributed network 

is more survivable in the case of an attack than the single large radar and single 

missile field of the previous plan. The SM–3 IA and IB, at around $10 million per 

interceptor, are also much cheaper than a GBI, which costs around $70 million per 

interceptor. This means that we can deploy scores of SM–3 interceptors, again enhancing our defensive capabilities. Since Iran already possesses hundreds of shortand medium-range ballistic missiles, this is critical. 

The SM–3 will be upgraded over time. Each upgrade will provide more capability 

for countering Iranian threats, meaning each upgrade will be able to defend an increasingly larger area. 

Our planned European missile defense architecture includes both sea- and landbased missile defense systems, encompassing both interceptors and a range of sensors. As our capabilities and technologies continue to improve, the architecture will 

evolve and become ever more capable. 

Now to describe our phased adaptive approach. Phase 1 is essentially underway; 

the SM–3 Block IA is already deployed in the fleet. In the first phase of our plan, 

we can provide SM–3 Block IA capable warships when necessary for the protection 

of parts of southern Europe. To enhance protection in Phase 1, we will need a forward based sensor, probably a TPY–2 radar. 

By including the forward based sensor, we are retaining one of the most significant contributions to the defense of the United States from the previously proposed 

architecture. The forward based sensor contributes to the defense of the United 

States by providing early and precise track data to our GBIs in Alaska and California. We expect that full Phase I missile defense capability will be possible in 

2011. 

In Phase 2, to be completed by 2015, we intend to use a more advanced version 

of the SM–3 interceptor, the SM–3 Block IB, which is already under development. 

We will deploy this at sea and on land. By adding the land-based sites, we will significantly increase coverage of NATO against ballistic missiles from Iran without 

having to increase the number of Aegis BMD ships—a much more cost-effective approach. 

In Phase 3, we will introduce a new, more capable version of the SM–3, the Block 

IIA. This interceptor is currently under development. The SM–3 Block IIA will provide full coverage of NATO against short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic 

missiles. We expect to deploy the SM–3 Block IIA by 2018. 

16 

In the final phase, Phase 4, we expect to field an even more-improved SM–3 missile that has anti-ICBM capabilities. This ascent-phase intercept capability will further augment the defense of the U.S. Homeland from potential Iranian ICBM 

threats. This phase is planned for 2020. 

It is important to note that the SM–3 based defense against any Iranian ICBMs 

will be additive to the GBI-based defense we already have deployed in the United 

States, at Fort Greely and Vandenberg AFB. As noted previously, these U.S.-based 

defenses will be made more effective by the forward-basing of a TPY–2 radar— 

which we plan by 2011. We currently have the ability to defend the United States, 

including the east coast, against any Iranian ICBM, and with the TPY–2 deployment planned in Phase 1 and continued improvement of the GBIs, this defense will 

grow even stronger in the next several years. While we expect the SM–3 based approach to ICBM defense to work, we also will continue to improve our existing GBIbased system here in the United States and conduct tests of the 2-stage GBI in the 

near-term. 

The SM–3’s ascent-phased intercept capability in Phase 4 would mean that, unlike the previous administration’s GBI-based system, Iranian missiles would have 

to defeat not one, but two very different kinds of missile defenses. 

Over time, we plan on one land-based site in southern Europe and one somewhere 

in northern Europe. Given the flexibility of the architecture, there are a number of 

options for land-based sites that would provide the same capability, including in Poland. The mix of sea-and land-based systems makes our new approach far more capable and adaptable; we can move sensors and interceptors from region to region 

as needed. This approach allows us to scale up our defenses, if necessary, by deploying additional SM–3 interceptors much faster and at lower costs than adding the 

much heavier GBIs, and their associated silos. In times of crisis, the system can 

‘‘flex’’ by surging Aegis capable ships to the area for more protection and to serve 

as a visible deterrent. This approach also allows us to deal with a wider range of 

potential missile tactics, such as salvo launches. The previous GBI architecture 

could intercept about five to ten missiles at most; the new plan’s distributed network will be able to cope far more effectively should an adversary fire many missiles 

simultaneously. 

Similarly, replacing the fixed radar site with a mix of sensors that are airborne, 

seaborne and ground-based will allow us to gather much more accurate data, and 

will offer better early warning and tracking options combined with a stronger networking capacity. Finally, because it relies on a distributed network of sensors and 

interceptors, the new approach is more survivable—less vulnerable to destruction or 

disruption—than the previous plan, which relied on a single large radar and a single interceptor field. 

It should be crystal clear that those who say we are ‘‘scrapping’’ missile defense 

in Europe are, as Secretary Gates has said, ‘‘either misinformed or misrepresenting 

the reality of what we are doing.’’ In fact, we are replacing the previous plan with 

a phased approach that delivers more effective and more robust capability sooner. 

To sum up: the Phased Adaptive Approach offers many advantages over the previous plan for European missile defense. We will now be able to defend the most 

vulnerable parts of Europe 6–7 years earlier than the previous plan. Our new approach will be also able to cover all NATO territory and populations, rather than 

leaving some allies exposed to short- and medium-range threats. We will move toward a new additive approach to defending the United States against any future 

Iranian ICBM—while continuing to enhance our existing GBI-based defenses. Overall, our new approach allows us to better respond to existing threats now—and to 

better prepare for future threats as they emerge. 

Those who assert that the new plan doesn’t uphold U.S. security commitments to 

friends and allies, particularly Poland and the Czech Republic, are far off the mark. 

This is a better defense for Europe as well as for the United States. All of our missile defense efforts will be complementary of and interoperable with those being developed by NATO, and the new architecture we are creating provides many opportunities for alliance-building and burden-sharing between the United States and our 

NATO partners. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has hailed our decision as ‘‘a 

positive step’’; Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said it offers a real ‘‘chance to 

strengthen Europe’s security.’’ 

We remain firmly committed to strong bilateral relationships with both Poland 

and the Czech Republic and have already begun discussions with both nations about 

their potential roles in the new missile defense architecture. In the coming weeks, 

we will have numerous strategic discussions with the Poles on missile defense and 

our security arrangements. It is prudent that we continue to seek Polish ratification 

of the missile defense basing agreement and supplemental Status of Forces Agreement. 

17 

We are also in discussions with the Czech Republic to ensure that they continue 

to play a leadership role on missile defense within the Alliance. We have several 

joint projects already underway with our Czech partners, and are discussing several 

more. 

Last week, in addition to visiting Warsaw and Prague to discuss the Phased, 

Adaptive Approach, Under Secretary Flournoy briefed the North Atlantic Council on 

our new approach and emphasized that we will pursue missile defense in a NATO 

context. The response was very positive, as evidenced by the NATO Secretary General’s comments last week that ‘‘It is my clear impression that the American plan 

on missile defense will involve NATO . . . . to a higher degree in the future. . . . 

This is a positive step in the direction of an inclusive and transparent process, 

which I also think is in the interest of . . . the NATO alliance.’’ 

This phased adaptive approach better meets our security needs, and our security 

commitments to our European allies and partners. Russia’s positive response to date 

is a useful collateral benefit, though we are not sure whether and how it will affect 

their perspective on missile defenses. We welcome Russian interest in our new approach as well as potential cooperation in sharing data from their radars. But Russian reactions notwithstanding, we will continue to do whatever it takes to ensure 

our security and that of our European partners and allies. 

In closing, it is important to note that the strategic thinking behind our new approach to European missile defense will also be valuable as we continue to address 

missile defense issues in other regions. 

Because the type of system we are planning in Europe can be easily adapted to 

different geographic constraints, it can be applied in various regions around the 

globe, if necessary. In fact, a scaled-down version of this approach is already being 

used for the defense of Japan against North Korean missile threats, and for the defense of Israel against an Iranian missile attack. Because the assets of this system 

are either mobile or transportable, the new approach provides future flexibility to 

reposition interceptors and sensors if the geopolitical environment changes. Because 

the systems will be upgraded over time, the new approach provides a natural evolution to match the threat. 

As the President said, ‘‘our new missile defense architecture in Europe will provide a stronger, smarter, and swifter defense of American forces, and America’s allies. It is more comprehensive than our previous program. It deploys capabilities 

that are proven and cost-effective. It sustains and builds upon our commitment to 

protect the U.S. Homeland against long-range ballistic missile threats. It ensures 

and enhances the protection of all of our NATO allies.’’ 

Thank you for your time. We will continue to work with you as we move forward 

on the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and we look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Secretary Flournoy. 

General Cartwright. 

General CARTWRIGHT. Sir, we’d ask if General O’Reilly could go 

second. 

Chairman LEVIN. Sure, of course. General O’Reilly. 

STATEMENT OF LTG PATRICK J. O’REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, 

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 

General O’REILLY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

McCain, and distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate 

the opportunity to testify before you today on the technical aspects 

of the President’s decision to use a phased, adaptive approach to 

provide missile defense in Europe. This new proposal is a more 

powerful missile defense of NATO, enhances U.S. Homeland defense, is deployable to theaters around the world, and is more 

adaptable to respond to threat uncertainties. 

The previous proposed missile defense of Europe consisted of four 

components: a command and control system, 10 GBIs, in Poland; 

an X-band discrimination radar in the Czech Republic; and an Xband precision tracking forward-based radar in southeastern Europe. Assuming a shot doctrine of two interceptors against each 

threat missile, this previous missile defense architecture had a 

18 

maximum capability to engage five intermediate-range ballistic 

missiles or medium-range ballistic missiles aimed at Europe, or 

five ICBMs aimed at the United States from the Middle East. 

The most valuable component of the previous architecture to the 

defense of the U.S. Homeland was the forward-based X-band radar 

in southeastern Europe, which would provide early and precise 

tracks of threat missiles from the Middle East heading towards the 

United States, thus increasing the accuracy of the fire control instructions to our GBIs based at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg 

Air Force Base, CA. 

We remain concerned about the future Iranian ICBM threat. 

Therefore we are retaining the forward-based sensor component in 

our new phased adaptive approach proposal. Moreover, we will also 

continue to develop the GMD, ground-based midcourse defense system, and begin testing against ICBM targets using representative 

Iranian trajectories. 

A significant limitation of the previous European architecture 

was that the GBIs were being used in ICBM, Intermediate Range 

Ballistic Missile (IRBM), and Medium Range Ballistic Missile 

(MRBM) defense roles. Although we have only tested the GBIs 

against IRBMs, that is in ranges less than 5,500 kilometers, it is 

currently our only interceptor designed against intercontinental 

ballistic missiles. The earliest operational date of the previous architecture is now 2017. 

Given the current threat estimate, by 2017 the European-based 

GBIs could be rapidly consumed by an attack of five IRBMs or 

MRBMs aimed at NATO countries, leaving no GBIs to contribute 

to U.S. ICBM defense. 

Therefore, the previously proposed European defense architecture was insufficient to counter the quantity of ballistic missile 

threat faced by NATO and our forward-deployed forces and still 

provide redundant coverage of the U.S. Homeland. 

The area of greatest opportunity for increased missile defense capability is our achievements in developing faster and more accurate 

command and control, battle management, and communications 

systems which combine data from a network of different sensors, 

especially sensors that track missiles in the early phases of their 

flight, rather than using a large radar in a region. For example, 

our successful intercept of the ailing satellite in February 2008 was 

based on our ability to combine data from sensors around the world 

and provide a highly accurate track of the satellite to an Aegis 

BMD ship and launch the modified SM–3 IA prior to the ship’s 

radar even seeing the satellite. Although this is a very limited capability against an inoperable satellite, it demonstrated the great 

increase in capability of networking sensors to a missile defense architecture. 

Fortunately, we have made significant advances over the last 

several years in missile defense technologies that enable the 

phased adaptive approach. The Aegis Standard Missile Block IA, or 

SM–3 IA interceptor, is a very capable weapon due to its high acceleration, velocity, and its proven track record, and our ability to 

rapidly increase to over 80 interceptors at any one launch site. 

Since we began testing the operationally configured SM–3 Block 

IA missile in June 2006, we have successfully intercepted a target 

19 

eight out of nine times in which we had launched an interceptor. 

We also are developing the next generation kill vehicle for the SM– 

3 interceptor, the SM–3 IB, which uses the same rocket motor as 

the SM–3 IA, but has a more advanced seeker and fire control system that uses external sensors as well as the Aegis shipborne 

radar. 

We have already demonstrated the higher risk components of the 

new kill vehicle and are planning the first intercept test in the winter of 2011. We have had many demonstrations of using networks 

of sensors, including the most recent intercept by the ground-based 

midcourse defense system last December, when we combined the 

tracks of satellites, early warning radars, sea-based X-band radars, 

and forward-based radars on land and at sea to provide the GBIs 

with a very accurate track. 

Additionally, we have demonstrated unmanned aerial vehicles as 

highly accurate forward-based defense sensors in intercept tests 

last spring. 

Tomorrow morning we are scheduled to launch a pair of demonstration Space Tracking and Surveillance System Satellites from 

the Kennedy Space Center that will detect and track ballistic missiles over their entire flight. 

Finally, at our External Sensors Laboratory at Schriever Air 

Force Base, CO, we continue to develop new algorithms and demonstrate combining their sensor data to achieve even more accurate 

tracks than any individual sensor could produce. A more advanced 

variant of the SM–3, the SM–3 IIA, has been under development 

since 2005. This interceptor will have more than twice the range 

of an SM–3 Block IB. SM–3s are also more affordable than GBIs 

since you can procure four to seven production variants of an SM– 

3 for the cost of one GBI. 

But the key attribute is that we can launch SM–3s from sea or 

land, which gives us great flexibility in locating the interceptor 

launch point between the origin of the threat launch and the area 

that you are trying to protect. This is a key enabler in intercepting 

threat missiles early in their flight. 

We propose defending NATO in phases. Phase one would consist 

of Aegis ships with SM–3 Block IA missiles deployed in the eastern 

Mediterranean and a forward-based sensor in southeastern Europe. 

We propose by 2015 deployment of the SM–3 Block IB missile, 

which will have greater capacity to use the network of sensors and 

greater ability to discriminate threat objects. Scores of SM–3 IBs 

would be deployed at land and sea-based locations. 

By 2018, the deployment of the SM–3 IIA missile, which could 

defend all of NATO from two land-based locations and one seabased location. By 2020, our goal is to leverage the lightweight kill 

vehicle technology to develop a higher velocity SM–3 Block IIB missile to destroy MRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs early in flight from 

launch locations within the theater of the threat launch location. 

Two land-based SM–3 Block IIB sites would protect all of NATO. 

The timetable which I have presented allows for these missile defense technologies to be tested and proven prior to deployment decisions. An additional advantage to a phased adaptive approach is 

the applicability to missile defenses outside of Europe. As an examVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\55138.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
20 

ple, if the land-based SM–3 site were in Hawaii, it would provide 

significant protection of those islands. 

We are committed to fully funding this program as we prepare 

for the next budget submission to Congress. However, it is important that we have relief from rescissions and flexibility to spend 

the unused fiscal year 2009 Research, Development, Test, and 

Evaluation and some Military Construction dollars associated with 

the previous European site proposal. I note that both the House 

and Senate authorizing committees have very presciently included 

provisions in this year’s National Defense Authorization bill that 

permit the Department to use fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 

funding for an alternative architecture once the Secretary of Defense certifies that this architecture is as cost-effective, technically 

reliable, and operationally available as the previous program. With 

this relief and some redirection of fiscal year 2010 funds, we can 

pursue this architecture within our fiscal year 2010 budget request. 

Finally, I was very gratified last Thursday when I was given the 

opportunity to personally meet with the members of the delegations of Poland and the Czech Republic that I have been working 

closely with for the past 3 years and explain that we were not 

backing out of our commitments, we would still honor our ballistic 

missile agreements for them to host our components of a missile 

defense architecture and other allies would also have that opportunity. Likewise, in addition to the radars in Armavir, Russia, or 

Gabala, Azerbaijan, the cooperative development of missile defense 

technologies by Russia and other countries are not necessary, but 

they would be welcome. 

My assessment is that executing this approach is challenging, 

but no more challenging than the development of our other missile 

defense technologies. Technically challenging endeavors endure setbacks, but the engineering is executable and the development risks 

are manageable. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General O’Reilly follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LTG PATRICK J. O’REILLY, USA 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the 

committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on the technical 

and programmatic details of the President’s decision to use a Phased Adaptive Approach to enhance missile defense protection for the United States and Europe for 

our friends, allies, our forward-deployed forces, civilian personnel, and their families 

there. This new proposal would provide a more powerful missile defense capability 

for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), enhance U.S. Homeland defense, and would be applicable in other theaters around the world to counter a growing ballistic missile threat, and would more adaptable to respond to threat uncertainties and developments. With the Phased Adaptive Approach, we are not scrapping or diminishing missile defense—rather we are strengthening it and delivering 

more capability sooner. 

In 2006 the Defense Department proposed a long-range missile defense of Europe 

that consisted of four components: a command and control system; 10 ground-based 

interceptors (GBIs) in Poland; an X-band discrimination radar in the Czech Republic; and an X-band precision doctrine of two interceptors against each threat missile, 

the 2006 proposed missile defense architecture provided an upper-tier missile defense to intercept five Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) aimed at Europe, or it could intercept five Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) aimed at 

the Continental United States from the Middle East. The most important component of the 2006 proposed architecture to the defense of the U.S. Homeland was the 

forward based X-band radar in Southeastern Europe, which was to provide early 

and precise tracks of threat missiles from the Middle East, increasing the accuracy 

21 

of the fire control instructions to our GBIs based at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. We remain concerned about a future Iranian ICBM threat; 

therefore, we are retaining the forward-based X-band radar of the 2006 proposed 

European missile defense architecture in our new Phased Adaptive Approach proposal. We will also continue to improve our domestic GBI-based system and conduct 

research and development for the two-stage GBI in the near term. 

Under the Phased, Adaptive Approach, we propose defending Europe in phases 

starting with the area most vulnerable to today’s Iranian missile threat: southern 

Europe. Phase 1 would consist of Aegis ships with sea and a forward-based sensor 

in southern Europe. This will provide protection across much of the southern tier 

of Europe against Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles. 

We propose by 2015 the deployment of the SM–3 Block IB missile, which will 

have a greater capacity to use a network of sensors and greater ability to discriminate threat objects. Once this technology is proven in our test program these interceptors would be deployed at land- and sea-based locations and extend protection 

against medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East. 

By 2018, the deployment of the SM–3 Block IIA missile, an interceptor with greater range currently being developed, could defend all of Europe from land- and seabased locations. By 2020, our goal is to leverage the lightweight kill vehicle technology developed in the now terminated Multiple Kill Vehicle program to develop 

a higher velocity SM–3 Block IIB missile that would destroy ballistic missiles early 

in flight, during the ascent phase, from many hundreds of kilometers from the 

threat launch location. This missile would still fit on today’s Aegis launch system. 

With that capability, two land-based SM–3 Block IIB sites could protect all of Europe. The tested and proven prior to deployment decisions. 

A significant limitation of the previous European architecture was that the GBIs 

were used in both ICBM and IRBM defense roles. Although we have only tested the 

GBIs against IRBMs (ranges less than 5,000 km), it is currently our only interceptor 

designed against ICBMs. The earliest operational date of the 2006 proposed architecture is 2017 and more likely 2018 considering the host nation approvals that 

would have been required to construct the facilities. When deployed in 2017 the European based GBIs could be consumed by an attack of 5 IRBMs aimed at NATO 

countries, leaving no two-stage GBIs to contribute to U.S. ICBM defense. Therefore, 

the previously proposed European Defense architecture is insufficient to counter 

large raid sizes. Under the Phased, Adaptive Approach, the SM–3 Block IIB would 

be able to accommodate a large IRBM and ICBM missile threat and diversify the 

technology that we are using to counter Iranian ICBMs, providing a layered defense. 

We have made significant advances in missile defense technologies that enable 

the Phased Adaptive Approach. First, the interceptors we are developing are smaller, faster and have greater on-board discrimination capability. The sea-based Aegis 

BMD SM–3 interceptor would provide a burn out velocity, proven track record (for 

the SM–3 IA), and our ability to rapidly increase the number of interceptors at any 

launch site. Since we began testing the operationally configured SM–3 Block IA missile in June 2006, we successfully intercepted the target in eight out of the nine 

times we have launched the interceptor. We are also taking a deliberate approach 

to the development and testing of the next generation kill vehicle for the SM–3 interceptor, the SM–3 IB, which has a more advanced seeker and a fire control system 

that uses external sensors as well as its ship’s radar. We have already demonstrated 

the higher risk components of the new kill vehicle: the solid propellant Divert and 

Attitude Control System, new seeker, and fire control system with good results. The 

first test of the SM–3 IB is scheduled for the winter of 2011. 

The area of greatest opportunity for increased missile defense capability involves 

our achievements in developing faster and more accurate Command Control, Battle 

Management, and Communication capabilities, which combines data from a network 

of many different sensors (especially sensors that track missiles in the early phases 

of their flight), rather than using single large radars in a region. Key to our successful intercept of the ailing satellite in February 2008 was our ability to combine the 

satellite to an Aegis ballistic missile defense ship and launch the modified SM–3 IA 

prior to the ship’s radar seeing the satellite. We have had many other demonstrations of these capabilities to date, to include the most recent intercept test of the 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense system last December, when we combined the 

tracks of satellites, early warning radars, Sea Based X-band radar and forwardbased radars on land and at sea to provide the GBIs with a very accurate track. 

Additionally, we have also demonstrated the capability of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles as highly accurate forward-based missile defense sensors in the Navy’s ‘‘Stellar 

Daggers’’ series of intercept tests last spring. Tomorrow we are scheduled to launch 

a pair of demonstration Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites 

that will detect and track ballistic missiles over their entire flight. Over the next 

22 

few years we will conduct several tests using the tracking capabilities of these STSS 

demonstration satellites, including the launching of an interceptor from an Aegis 

ship, to intercept ballistic missile targets. Finally, at our External Sensors Laboratory at Shriever Air Force Base, CO, we continue to develop new algorithms and 

combine new sensor data to achieve even more accurate tracks than any individual 

sensor could produce. 

A more advanced variant of the SM–3, the SM–3 IIA has been under development 

with our Japanese partners since fiscal year 2006. This interceptor will have the 

range to defend all of NATO from only a few small sites. SM–3s are also more affordable than GBIs (you can buy four to seven production variants of the SM–3s, 

IA or IB, for the cost of one GBI). But the key attribute is that we can launch SM– 

3s from sea or sites on land, which gives us great flexibility in locating the interceptor launch point between the origin of the threat launch and the area we are 

trying to protect a key enabler to intercepting threat missiles early in flight. One 

advantage of land-based SM–3s over the previous GBI missile field proposal is that 

they can be relocated if the direction of the threat changes rather than waiting the 

more than 5 years needed to construct a new GBI missile field. 

I would note that the new Phased Adaptive Approach offers greater opportunities 

for our close allies, including Poland and the Czech Republic, to collaborate on the 

missile defense architecture—by hosting sites or providing funding or capabilities 

that could be linked to provide a network of missile defenses. Likewise, the radars 

at Armavir and Gabala could augment the proposed sensor network and that type 

of collaboration could perhaps be a catalyst for Russia to join countries participating 

in our cooperative development of missile defense technologies. 

An additional advantage of the Phased Adaptive Approach is that efforts over the 

next several years to develop, test, and procure the sensor, command and control, 

and interceptor upgrades for deployment of this architecture have application in the 

United States and theaters other than Europe. As an example, if the land-based 

SM–3 is tested in Hawaii, it would also provide continuous protection of those Islands. 

We are committed to fully funding this program as we prepare for the next budget 

submission to Congress. However, it is important that we have relief from rescissions and the flexibility to spend the unused fiscal year 2009 RDT&E and some 

MILCON dollars associated with the previous European Site proposal. With relief 

from some of the constraints placed on our fiscal year 2009 budget and support for 

redirection of some fiscal year 2010 funds, we believe we can start work on components of this new architecture within our fiscal year 2010 budget request. 

I would note that both House and Senate authorizing committees very presciently 

included provisions in this year’s National Defense Authorization bill that permit 

the Department to use fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 funding for an alternative architecture once the Secretary of Defense certifies that this architecture is 

expected to be consistent with the direction from the North Atlantic Council, operationally effective and cost-effective, and interoperable with other missile defense 

components. I believe the President’s new plan meets these criteria and would 

strongly reinforce NATO’s overall approach to missile defense. 

My assessment is that executing this approach is challenging, but no more challenging than the development of other missile defense technologies. It is more 

adaptable, survivable, affordable, and responsive than the previous proposal, while 

enhancing the defense of the U.S. Homeland and our European allies. There will 

be setbacks, but the engineering is executable and development risks are manageable. 

I look forward to discussing the specifics of the Phased, Adaptive Approach with 

Members and staff in this and other forums. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General O’Reilly. 

General Cartwright. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General CARTWRIGHT. Chairman Levin and Senator McCain, 

thank you for this opportunity. I’ve had the privilege of working in 

the missile defense architecture and warfighting requirements for 

over 10 years now, both on the Joint Staff as a combatant commander and now as the Vice Chairman. 

23 

The congressionally-directed BMD review has provided the opportunity to review our objectives, the threat, the combatant commander’s needs, and the technologies available to fulfill their 

needs. Our recommendations are not a departure from the objectives. The needs of the combatant commanders, however, reflect an 

adjustment in the balance of our capabilities in response to the 

threats they face today and the threats that are clearly visible on 

the horizon. 

My colleagues have laid that case before you. You asked me to 

address the architecture and the broader implications of our recommendations across all of our combatant commanders. First in 

the objectives, we remain solid in defense of the homeland, deployed forces, friends and allies. The architecture remains associated with the phases of flight of a ballistic missile: boost, midcourse, and terminal. Integration of the midcourse and the terminal is probably our most recent demonstrated capability. Midcourse is associated with the GBIs that are currently based in Alaska and California and usually associated with ICBMs. The terminal phase, that phase in which the missile comes back down into 

the atmosphere towards its target, was demonstrated in our deployment of the Theater High Altitude Area Defense ( THAAD) capabilities in the SM–3 to Hawaii last July when we were defending 

against a potential launch of a TD–2 from North Korea. This was 

the initial integration and, rudimentary as it was, started to demonstrate the value of being able to integrate across the architecture 

the phases of flight, the weapons, and the sensors. 

We still remain committed to addressing all of the range of ballistic missiles from short to ICBMs, and all of the various launch 

venues, from pads to silos to mobile launchers. These are critical 

to our combatant commanders in their addressal. 

We also remain committed to what has been referred to as rudimentary threats, the two, three to five missiles potentially coming 

out of a rogue nation. But in addition to that, the combatant commanders need the ability to defend our forces deployed in the field 

and our allies against raids. We have seen in the video clips over 

the last couple of years the raid-type demonstration, salvo launches 

out of Iran. These are troubling. 

Current systems developed for point defense can handle two or 

three inbound missiles. We need to move forward to be able to handle these raids. They are critical to the defense and they are critical to our combatant commanders. 

On the other side of the coin here, as a friendly, we remain committed to the defense of the homeland, a theater capability, which 

is emerging with the SM–3 and the THAAD systems, and our point 

defense capabilities, which are handled by our Patriot PAC–3 systems. The point defense systems that we have deployed today are 

capable of handling large population areas, seaports, airports, 

bases where our forces are deployed. Theater systems are for the 

general area associated with a combatant commander’s area of operations and they are necessary and they are emerging as the 

greatest need that we have today, that we face out there against 

these short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. 

Adaptive and responsive are two attributes that we find critical. 

As General O’Reilly said, the first leverage point that we have in 

24 

our technologies is the common command and control system. This 

is a global system. This is not a regional system. This is not a platform system. This is a global system that integrates sensors, weapons, puts them together in a way that optimizes their use in the 

theater and across the globe. 

Fixed, relocatable, and mobile systems are also critical to us. The 

fixed systems are the easiest to operate. They are the most permanent. They give you an enduring capability. The relocatable systems accept the fact that the threat may change, that the enemy 

may change their approach to the problem, and in days or weeks 

we are able to move these relocatable, mostly sensors, some weapons, to places that are more advantageous based on the threat that 

emerges. Our mobile systems are the most adaptable. They are 

available to reinforce. They are available to fill in which threats 

change quickly, and they are globally deployable, most notably on 

the Aegis platform. 

Any weapon, any sensor, is where we’re headed. Our ability to 

net together any weapon and any sensor and create the opportunity for a fire control solution is critical to the architecture as we 

build it. 

We are in the process here, as we demonstrate in the European 

architecture and the phases, moving to a construct that General 

O’Reilly alluded to when we shot down the errant satellite, which 

is to understand that, particularly with our SM–3 and our Patriot, 

the weapons are far more capable than their organic sensors. They 

have greater kinematic ranges, they have better ability to intercept 

if they’re put with a more capable sensor. 

So what you see in the early phases, phases one and two of this 

Europe capability and moving to phase three, is really the acknowledgment that we are pairing longer range sensors with weapons 

that are capable of flying longer ranges, but are currently paired 

with sensors that can’t see far enough to get them out there. That’s 

probably the biggest advantage and the biggest differentiation between phases one, two, and three. 

There are hardware differences, but the reality is what we’re 

doing here is taking advantage of systems that we already have, 

pairing them up with sensors that can reach out further and address the threats. They also, these new sensors, are able to address 

raid-sized threats. Organic sensors can handle a very limited number of inbound targets. These newer, larger sensors that are 

relocatable, that we are putting out, are capable of handling raids 

and capable of seeing much further out, and therefore give us a 

much greater defended space. 

Another attribute that we’re very interested in with this new architecture is the idea of a collective defense. This is not a U.S.-only 

approach. In other words, first and foremost many nations have 

bought the Patriot system. Many nations have bought the Aegis 

system. They can be integrated and are being integrated into this 

architecture and this command and control system. Probably the 

most visible example are the Japanese and their integration of 

their Aegis systems. The South Koreans are following very quickly 

behind that. 

The many Patriot systems that are deployed, particularly 

throughout Europe and the rest of the world, are easily integrated 

25 

into this system. That to us is a very high leverage issue. In other 

words, we don’t have to buy all of these weapons, nor do we have 

to buy all of these sensors. 

In the case of indigenous systems, for instance the Arrow associated with the Israelis, we are integrating that weapons system into 

this architecture. That opportunity gives us a great amount of flexibility as we move to the future. We’re also integrating other nations’ sensors into this system. So this opportunity has a much 

broader leverage point in its collective nature and its ability to integrate both U.S. systems that have been sold abroad and indigenous systems from other countries into the architecture. 

That allows us also to adapt to the threat as it emerges and 

where it emerges, and we are not locked to any one single location 

to address the threat that evolves over the next few years. 

The last attribute that I’d like to talk to in this architecture is 

the multi-mission attribute. Today we are focused on ballistic missiles. The reality is that we have challenges with cruise missiles. 

This command and control system, these weapons systems, can be 

adapted, can handle cruise missile type capabilities. They also are 

capable of handling air threats, and we can adapt this into our 

warning system and we can also bring this system—and are about 

to demonstrate over the next couple of months—online to be able 

to handle space situation awareness, something that is the number 

one issue associated with U.S. Strategic Command’s (STRATCOM) 

space mission, our ability to do space situation awareness. These 

sensors, based on software programming, can handle that mission 

as well. 

So we get several bangs for the buck, as the chairman said, more 

than a three-fer really here, sir, I believe, out of this system. It is 

adaptable, it is resilient. It has the ability and the flexibility to go 

after the threats as they emerge, to lead turn the threats when 

necessary, and to reinforce in areas where we did not plan to be. 

I thank you for this opportunity and I stand ready for your questions, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. General, thank you. 

Why don’t we try a 7-minute first round for questioning. We have 

a number of Senators here. 

General Cartwright, is it correct that the new approach that was 

approved by the President has the unanimous support of the Joint 

Chiefs? 

General CARTWRIGHT. It does, sir, and also the combatant commanders. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you say that this is a strong support 

from the Chiefs? 

General CARTWRIGHT. It is unwavering. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did the Chiefs have a role in developing this 

recommendation? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. We did this under the aegis of the 

BMD review that was directed by Congress. We had started this 

review actually 3 years ago when we adjusted many of our buy 

rates towards the SM–3 and the development of the THAAD. That 

was an input from the combatant commanders that came in during 

one of our defense senior leader conferences. We have worked that 

26 

hard with the combatant commanders, and the Chiefs and the commanders believe this is the right way to go. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, there’s been a suggestion that this new 

approach represents a reduction in our security commitment to our 

allies, particularly to Poland and the Czech Republic. My question 

is this, General. Would you and the Chiefs make a recommendation 

that diminishes our commitment to our NATO allies? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I can’t forecast what we wouldn’t do, but 

I’ve never seen that trend. 

Chairman LEVIN. It’s also been suggested and stated that this is 

a better, faster way to deal with the Iranian threat. Is it? 

General CARTWRIGHT. It is, and also the North Korean threat. 

Chairman LEVIN. You’ve described as to why it is, so I’m not 

going to ask you to go through that again. But do the Chiefs agree 

that this is a better, faster way to deal with the Iranian missile 

threat? 

General CARTWRIGHT. They do. There is particularly solid support both from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Chief of 

Naval Operations as they move forward. The Chief of Naval Operations has a very large play in this as we move to the SM–3. His 

support, both at sea and now on land, of that system is solid. He 

is a strong advocate for that approach. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, it’s also been suggested that this recommendation and decision was aimed at placating Russia. Is that 

at all a factor in the Chiefs’ recommendation? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Not in the Chiefs’ recommendation, no, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, Secretary Flournoy, you quoted Prime 

Minister Tusk of Poland, and there were some early comments 

from some Polish leaders which were very critical. It seems that 

the later comments, as I quote in my opening comments, are much 

more supportive. But nonetheless, you’ve quoted Tusk as saying 

that this represents a real chance to strengthen European security. 

Is that the Polish position or is the earlier position the Polish position? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I believe that what I quoted from the Polish 

prime minister is the Polish position. I think that some of the early 

reactions, frankly, were based on erroneous and speculative press 

reporting. It was before they had actually been briefed by us on the 

full degree of the plan. It was before they had a chance to talk with 

President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and others. I think once they 

understood what it was we were actually proposing, they’re quite 

pleased with the proposal. 

Chairman LEVIN. Why was there not an earlier briefing or conversation with them? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. There were earlier briefings on missile defense in 

general and some of the ideas we were thinking about, going back 

to the spring. I think as we got closer to a decision one of the challenges we faced was that we started to have a number of leaks 

from various discussions, and again that led to speculative reporting. So I think that accelerated the timeline for actually making 

the decision public. We wanted to set the record straight. 

Chairman LEVIN. You say that you met with the Poles and the 

Czechs recently? 

27 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Last week. A team of us went out last week, yes, 

before the President announced his decision. 

Chairman LEVIN. That was before? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is that the same meeting, General O’Reilly, 

that you made reference to? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. What was the reaction or the response at that 

meeting to what you told them? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think at those meetings they were taking in a 

lot of information. It was somewhat contrary to what they had read 

in the press and therefore expected. But literally over the course 

of the day, I think the reaction became quite positive. Particularly 

by the time we got to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), and were 

able to brief all of the NATO permanent representatives there, we 

got a uniformly positive response. 

Chairman LEVIN. Were the Poles and the Czechs part of the NAC 

meeting? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. They were at that NAC meeting? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes, they were. 

Chairman LEVIN. That was a uniform response? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. They were all very supportive and then, by 

then, looking to discuss, well, how do we actually solidify our continued participation in the new architecture. 

Chairman LEVIN. Were you at that meeting at the NAC also? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. No, no. I’m asking General O’Reilly. 

General O’REILLY. Yes. Secretary Flournoy and I briefed the 

NAC that afternoon. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you describe the reaction at the NAC, 

including the representatives from the Czech Republic and Poland, 

as she did? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, very positive. 

Chairman LEVIN. In terms of the Russia issue, General O’Reilly, 

about the possibility of U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperation. Is 

there any advantage in that technically to us if there were such cooperation? If we can work out something with the Russian radar, 

for instance, is that of value to us? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir, it would be. Again, as I stated before, 

it’s not necessary. However, both the geographic locations of 

Gabala and Armavir provide different views of the Iranian missile 

space and that would enhance our accuracy of our early tracks. Not 

only that; those are very large radars and they have significant 

power to not only observe Iran, but the entire region way beyond 

what our smaller forward-based radars would. So there would be 

a technical enhancement of that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, in terms of that radar, have you had discussions with the Russians? Have you had technical discussions 

with the Russians? Have you met with them? 

General O’REILLY. Over the past several years, yes, sir. The last 

was May of this year. 

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Flournoy, if we were able to involve 

the Russians somehow in a missile defense system and gain the 

28 

benefit of their radar information, for instance, in addition to being 

useful technically, not necessary but advantageous, as General 

O’Reilly has just told us, would there be a positive powerful political signal to Iran if we could involve Russia in a joint missile defense? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. I think anything we can do to show Iran a 

united front would be very helpful. I also think it would help to get 

the Russians over the hump of not viewing any of our missile defense activities as threatening to them. It’s never been the case and 

it shouldn’t be viewed as such. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did we cave to the Russians in doing this in 

any sense? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. No. I was part of many of the decisionmaking 

meetings. That was not the driving factor. This has never been 

about Russia. 

Chairman LEVIN. General Cartwright, do you agree with that? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I do. I’ve been in most all of those decisionmaking processes with the Secretary. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank the witnesses, and I won’t take too long 

because the issue has been decided in really remarkable fashion, 

in the category you can’t make it up. 

For Czech Prime Minister Jan Fischer, the news came in a call 

hastily placed by President Barack Obama shortly after midnight 

on Thursday in Prague. In Warsaw, his Polish counterpart Donald 

Tusk initially declined to answer the phone from the White House 

as he guessed the purpose from the unusual timing and wanted to 

prepare a response. 

I’m so pleased to hear that our allies now are pleased and happy, 

but I guess the report of yesterday that says ‘‘President Kaczynski 

has said that if he meets President Obama at today’s U.N. General 

Assembly he will not try to hide his disappointment over the antimissile shield decision.’’ Kaczynski, presently in New York, is 

quoted on TV in 24 News as saying ‘‘I do not intend to say that 

we are satisfied.’’ It goes on. 

The Foreign Minister of Poland said: ‘‘I hope this will prove a 

salutary shock, especially for the right end of Poland’s political 

spectrum,’’ Sikorski told TOK–FM Radio, adding ‘‘It could lead 

some to rethink the dream of basing everything on a bilateral alliance with the United States. We are a European country and here 

first and foremost we must seek our security guarantees.’’ I think 

that message is very clear, so I’ll ask to have included in the record 

these many comments. 

Chairman LEVIN. They will be made part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

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Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, I have over a long life had 

many, many contacts and relationships with individuals and leaders and former leaders of both Poland and the Czech Republic and 

I can tell you their comments to me are not that they are satisfied. 

In fact, they were surprised—midnight phone calls—and very much 

disturbed by what is perceived to be by them and in the world a 

unilateral concession to the Russians in order to hope that we can 

get cooperation from the Russians in trying to address the Iranian 

nuclear issue. 

So I guess I should have to comment also that, as short a time 

ago before this committee on March 10, 2009, Lieutenant General 

Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified: 

‘‘Iran’s 2 February 2009 launch of the Sofir space launch vehicle 

shows progress in mastering the technology needed to produce 

ICBMs. Iran has boosted the lethality and effectiveness of existing 

missile systems with accuracy improvements and new sub-munition payloads.’’ 

In 2009, NDA stated: ‘‘Iran continues to develop ballistic missiles 

capable of striking Israel and Central Europe and could have an 

ICBM capability of reaching the United States’’—this was just last 

May—‘‘the United States before 2015.’’ 

General Cartwright, you stated back in February that the technologies for boosting satellites into space ‘‘are compatible with an 

ICBM-type capability.’’ You did clarify that this was not a longrange missile, but it was the path towards that, and that we should 

be concerned with it. 

I don’t have access to intelligence information, but I think perhaps one would interpret your remarks today as a significant shift 

from testimony a short time ago, this past May. Is that an accurate 

assumption, General Cartwright? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I think from the standpoint of the space 

launch that the Iranians conducted and their demonstration of the 

ability to stage, that they are getting at the early phases of an 

ICBM capability. I still believe that to be the case. But they have 

several phases that they must go through yet that will take them 

measured in years rather than months to accomplish. 

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hicles, any time you start to move in that direction, that is very 

visible activity and generally takes a nation several years to accomplish. That doesn’t include mating it to a weapon. 

So we are concerned about the progress and the technologies that 

the Iranians are demonstrating them. The pace at which they’re 

demonstrating them has been stretched out more than we originally believed was going to be the case. 

Senator MCCAIN. Then I guess, General Cartwright, isn’t it true 

that the North Koreans were not anticipated by the Intelligence 

Communities? I think I can provide a factual record to substantiate 

that. 

General CARTWRIGHT. I think the twist in the North Korean case 

in the Taepodong 2 systems has been the movement toward the 

space capability, which demonstrates again probably the same or 

similar—— 

Senator MCCAIN. The question, General Cartwright, is did we 

miss? Did we have wrong intelligence information about the 

progress that the North Koreans had made, both in their nuclear 

capability and their missile capability? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I think that the intelligence, as you say, 

sir, has been wrong on that. 

Senator MCCAIN. I have one more question. I understand that 

now it will be sea-based, part of our missile defense shield will be 

in sea-based missile defense weaponry; is that correct? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Does that mean that we could anticipate a 

budget request for more ships? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I’d have to go back and look. Right now we 

are modifying existing ships and existing classes of ships. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Full analysis of the long-term programmatic impact of the Phased Adaptive Approach on shipbuilding requirements is ongoing, but it is unlikely to require additional ships be built to support Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). With 80 Aegis ships 

in the fleet today, we have outfitted 19 with a BMD capability and have programmed funding to convert up to 27 total. Should the need for additional Aegis 

BMD assets be determined, some additional existing ships could be upgraded with 

BMD capabilities. 

Senator MCCAIN. We’re certainly giving them additional missions. 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, General 

O’Reilly. Based on previous conversations that I’ve been privileged 

to have with the three of you and based on a sense of the Senate 

amendment that Senator Sessions and I presented to the Senate 

that was adopted on our defense authorization bill just 2 months 

ago in July, I would guess that you will not be surprised to hear 

that I am disappointed by the administration’s decision to scrap 

the Polish-Czech ground-based midcourse defense and go to this 

new system. 

39 

I am disappointed and frankly troubled because I believe that it 

opens a much greater risk of a period of time during which we, the 

United States, will not have an adequate defense against an ICBM, 

long-range missile, fired, launched, from Iran against the United 

States. That’s serious stuff. 

I understand every strategy that one adopts has risks, but to me 

in making this judgment to change direction based on the intelligence, which I’ll get to in a minute, to give a somewhat greater 

protection than the Polish-Czech system to our allies in Europe and 

the Middle East, we are giving less protection to the continental 

United States if we are targeted by an Iranian long-range ballistic 

missile. 

Let me come back and just explain why I get to this point. 

What’s the Iranian threat? I understand the intelligence that 

you’ve described. I was going to quote General Maples and General 

Craddock earlier this year talking about their concerns about an 

ICBM program development by the Iranians. I want to take a look 

at some of the intelligence that you base this on. I’m going to ask 

for a briefing on it. 

But here’s my concern. If we now have reached, based on an updated threat assessment, the conclusion that the short- and medium-range missile programs, ballistic missile programs of Iran, 

are further developed than we thought, to me that suggests even 

more likelihood that their ICBM program may break out sooner 

than we currently estimate, which is 2015, and face the U.S. with 

a threat. 

There was a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report which I 

know I’ve discussed with you before, which had a big effect on me. 

It just came out in February of this year, and it had two maps. I 

have it too small here, but one basically shows the protection that 

the silo-based GBIs in Poland would give to the United States. It 

covers the entire United States. What’s the significance of this? 

Some people call it redundant. ‘‘Redundant’’ is a word that may to 

some people mean unnecessary. We properly build redundancy into 

our planes, our helicopters, our ships, our tanks. Why? Because if 

one system fails we want to make sure that there’s a backup system to protect us. 

We’re talking here about the potential of a ballistic missile attack 

on the United States of America. Fortunately, we have the two 

sites in California and Alaska. But the GBI in Poland gave us what 

I believe is our desired, our best strategy here, which is the socalled shoot, look, and shoot option. A missile is launched from 

Iran, we have a first shot from Poland as it’s ascending. If we miss 

it, we have a second shot from California and Alaska. 

With the alternative that you’re proposing here, most of the 

United States west of the Mississippi only has protection from 

those two sites in California and Alaska. They don’t have that first 

shot at that incoming missile from the Polish site. Now, I know 

you’ve said in the proposal you’ve made that the SM–3 Block IIA 

variant will be expected to be ready in 2018 and it will increase 

the defensive capability to include long-range missile threats to the 

United States. SM–3 Block IIB hopefully will be ready by 2020, 

will provide a significant defense against the ICBM threat. 

40 

But here’s my concern. The GBI is built, the ones that we’re 

going to put in Poland. It’s ready to be tested. Something we may 

want to deal with on the floor when the defense appropriations bill 

comes up, they’ve taken a lot of the money out for the testing of 

those GBIs. 

Incidentally, they were supposed to be ready in 2015. 

I think they still can be ready in 2015 at the Polish-Czech sites 

if we give it adequate money. What’s holding it up is not the technology developments; it’s Congress holding back on money. 

So the GBI we’re going to put in Poland is done. It just is ready 

to be tested. Those two other systems that are part of the new proposal, which would give us the redundant protection of the United 

States against an ICBM from Iran, the SM–3 Block IIA and Block 

IIB—I may be overstating it by saying they’re paper missiles, but 

they’re in an early development stage. They’re nowhere near where 

the GBI is. So that’s why I am so concerned about the impact of 

this decision on the protection of the United States from an Iranian 

ICBM. 

I suppose one question I’d ask, and I think if folks were here 

from the previous administration they might say, although maybe 

you’d quibble, or maybe even I would quibble a little bit, that their 

program was to do both of these things, their program was to develop systems to protect Europe and the Middle East from the 

short- and medium-range missiles, but also with the Polish-Czech 

system to protect the continental United States from a long-range 

missile shorter. 

So I guess I had a lot to say, so I used most of my question time. 

But why not do both? Why not accept your proposal for the improved defense of Europe and the Middle East from the short- and 

medium-range missiles from Iran and continue the Polish-Czech 

system, which provides the redundant, but I think all of us would 

like to feel that we have two shots at a missile coming toward the 

United States from Iran, rather than putting all our hopes in one. 

General Cartwright? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. Much of what you say was in the 

calculus of at least my perspective and the Chiefs as we worked 

our way through this. I’ll defer to General O’Reilly, but the addition of the ten GBIs in Poland from a mathematical standpoint— 

everybody worries about the ambiguity of that, but the difference 

in probability of success was somewhere between a .92 as it stands 

and using the interceptors from the United States. Adding the 

interceptors from Poland got us up maybe as high as .96, but probably in the .95, .94 area. That’s a major investment. 

What it did not do was twofold, what worries us the most. The 

first is—— 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m not sure what you mean. You say it added 

very little, is that the point? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. In probability of success of the engagement, it added very little. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Very little to the defense of the United 

States against a long-range missile? 

General CARTWRIGHT. To the defense of the United States 

against an ICBM threat from Iran. 

41 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I’m surprised to hear that. That’s not what 

the CBO stated. 

General CARTWRIGHT. I’ll defer to General O’Reilly to go through 

the data. 

The two things that were most troubling for us was the potential 

for building more than three to five of these missiles, ICBMs, by 

Iran, that we would need to have scale and be able to address at 

an affordable price a large number of missiles. Now, maybe that’s 

ten. I don’t know what they’re going to do. 

You referred to the last administration, and the second piece that 

was very compelling to us was that in the discussion of a boost, 

midcourse, and terminal. We now have a terminal. The GBIs give 

us a midcourse. We have no boost, no credible boost capability. 

What this development program does—and I agree with you, it is 

more than paper, but in that class—it gives us the potential to get 

at the boost phase, which is by all accounts and all analysis the 

most effective way to take on the threat. The threat is most vulnerable as it is ascending. It can’t defend itself, it can’t maneuver. It 

is very ballistic at that stage. If we can get it at that stage, we can 

thin out the threat substantially, if not eliminate it. 

That was the most compelling discussion about the technology to 

be that weighed in our decision process, sir. So I don’t disagree 

with you and redundancy is something that we’re looking for. We 

went with the redundancy of getting all three phases of flight as 

a balancing activity that was available to us now, rather than putting all of our eggs into the midcourse, very expensive, very sophisticated intercepts. 

I take your criticism. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate what you’ve said. 

My time is up. I just want to say that my hope would have been, 

of course I’d like to see us develop a boost phase capability to knock 

down a missile, but the consequences of an Iranian long-range ballistic missile attack on the United States are catastrophic. We’re 

just a day after Ahmadinejad speaks to the United Nations with 

the most poisonous, primitive attacks on the United States and 

Israel. The United States is what we’re talking about and really 

the west. I would have preferred to see us go with parts of the new 

system, with the whole new system, and continue the Polish-Czech 

development, because that would have given us the midcourse, 

shoot-look-shoot, and an investment in a capacity we’d like, we 

really need to have, which is the boost phase as well. 

We’ll continue the discussion. My time is up. Thank you. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. May I add a response? Is that okay, sir? 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. I think you’re entitled. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Thank you. 

I just wanted to say that our boss, Secretary Gates, as a former 

Director of Central Intelligence is very aware of how we can be 

wrong in our intelligence estimates. He’s also the Secretary that 

signed the program of record. So as I watched him go through this 

decision—— 

Chairman LEVIN. What does that mean, ‘‘program of record’’? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Meaning he is the person who put forward the 

previous plan in the previous administration. 

42 

So as I watched him go through this decisionmaking process, he 

asked a lot of the same questions that you’ve raised. In order to 

support the new system, he had to be convinced of a couple things: 

first, that we could still defend the U.S. Homeland should an Iranian ballistic ICBM threat develop earlier than what was being 

predicted; second, that we would have options, technical options, 

should the development of the later blocks, Block II of SM–3 missile, either fail or be delayed. 

He raised those specific issues. I think in designing the new architecture, by putting in the TPY–2 radar early that closes the 

notch in our coverage for the homeland and gives you that extra 

ability to see what’s coming at you and makes the GBIs in the 

United States more effective. Second, we are going to continue the 

development of the two-stage GBI as a technological hedge. 

So he asked exactly the questions that you’re asking, Senator. 

But he, working through the details, became convinced that this 

system could and would adequately protect, fully protect, the U.S. 

Homeland even as we move towards a more cost-effective way to 

protect Europe over time as well. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I have the greatest respect for Secretary 

Gates. I’m reassured that he asked the same questions. But I’m not 

reassured by the answers, as he apparently was. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Lieberman’s comment about the poisonous rhetoric of Ahmadinejad I think would be shared by probably every member of this committee. Poisonous indeed they were, 

and I think we all recognize what the Iranian threat is and want 

to deal with it. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess I would agree with the last two questioners, particularly 

when Senator McCain said this thing’s done anyway. You guys 

have made up your mind. We’ll do all we can through our process 

to change that. 

I just want to get in the record a couple of things that I observe. 

I coincidentally happened to be in Poland when President 

Kaczynski made the statement, when he said that he believes the 

United States will honor the agreement to build the missile defense 

in this country. ‘‘A deal was signed’’—I’m quoting now—‘‘and I 

think that, regardless of which administration is in power in the 

United States, agreements are going to be honored.’’ 

He asked me the question, are these agreements going to be honored? I said yes, these agreements are going to be honored; America doesn’t do this. 

In addition to the statements that were entered into the record 

by Senator McCain, the betrayal, no radar, Russia won, one of 

them he overlooked was in the second largest newspapers: ‘‘An ally 

we rely on has betrayed us in exchange for its own better relations 

with Russia.’’ 

Just one comment. We were talking about the significance of the 

boost phase and yet this budget virtually kills one of the things we 

were working on, the kinetic energy interceptor, and then the second test of the Airborne Laser. 

What I want to do is, when we talk about the fact that we’re 

somehow going to do a better job for Western Europe and Eastern 

43 

Europe by accelerating our activity and becoming more aggressive 

with the SM–3 and the THAAD, it’s interesting because this budget calls for the termination or at least no more THAADs and cuts 

the SM–3s down from 24 to 18. 

Just real quickly, for a yes or no question: Are you going to make 

an amended request in terms of the THAAD and the SM–3 in light 

of this new development that apparently happened since the budget request? 

General O’REILLY. No, sir, we’re not, and the reason—— 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Well, could he explain it? 

General O’REILLY. The reason is the policy, the funding policy up 

until now, sir, was we would buy missiles in pieces. That’s an exception to the rule for the Department of Defense and MDA was 

allowed to do that. Starting this year, we no longer have that option, and when we fund we’re actually funding $400 million more 

for SM–3 and THAAD missiles this year than before, because we’re 

buying those missiles in their totality. 

So we are spending $400 million more than previously on those 

interceptors and we’re buying them in full-up, full production price 

that we pay for. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, that’s fine. I heard that before and I don’t 

agree with that. 

Of the people at this table up here, the one I think should be 

most concerned would be the Senator from Maine, because as I look 

at the overlay map that Senator Lieberman was using, but mine’s 

a little bit larger, as to what our capability, what our protection is 

right now with what we have in Alaska and California, it even cuts 

Maine in half up there. I want you to know that, I say to Senator 

Collins. You should be concerned. 

But it shows that the capability is from the western United 

States. So obviously something coming from the west, that gives us 

a good capability. Something from the east, obviously it does not 

give us the capability that makes us comfortable. During the Bush 

administration—and all of you were around at that time—they emphasized, this is not just for Europe; this is for a potential ICBM 

that comes to the United States. 

Now, with that in mind, I want to get a couple of things in the 

record just to show what is happening over there. I’ve said this several times up here and there’s not time to give the whole story, but 

when we were talking about the Taepodong 1 capability that we 

thought was developing in North Korea, our intelligence estimate 

said on August 24, 1998, that it would be another couple or 3 

years, and they fired one 7 days later, on August 31. 

On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a three-stage Taepodong 

2. The current range of North Korea’s missiles is five times further 

than it was in 1990. North Korea has sold ballistic missiles to several countries, and technology. I don’t think there’s anyone in this 

room on either side of this table who doesn’t believe that anything 

that North Korea has can very easily end up in Iran. 

This is very significant—a satellite, three-stage liquid-fueled 

rocket demonstration, the same propulsion that it takes to send up 

a satellite could be used, as you have said and I think someone 

else, I think Senator McCain, already quoted you, General CartVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\55138.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
44 

wright, when you stated on February 10 that that same technology 

could be used. So we all understand that. 

Now, this is what I’m getting around to. The Department of Defense in the 2009 MDA, they said: ‘‘Iran continues to develop ballistic missile capability of striking Israel and Central Europe and 

could have the ICBM capability of reaching the United States in 

2015.’’ I think several of us have said that now, so let’s assume 

that that’s a fact. 

Let’s assume also that the SM–3 IIB would have the same capability as a GBI would have had as originally designed. I don’t think 

anyone’s going to disagree with those two things. So the question 

to me is very similar to the question, but I’m asking it a little different way, of Senator Lieberman. That is, if we were to have 

stayed with the GBI—it was going to be 2013, we all understand 

that. Well this is what the estimates say. This was put together 

and I’m always gone on that assumption. 

Then they said, well, maybe, since we slipped a year, it could be 

2015. So let’s just say 2015, or if you want to go all the way to 

2017. 

Now, shift over to the SM–3 IIB. I think we discussed and I 

think it was in the written testimony of one of the three of you because I saw it, that that would be 2020, and that was repeated by 

Senator Lieberman. So regardless, if you put those three things together, if they have that capability by 2015 and we could have had 

the capability of knocking it down by that time or even a year 

later, no matter how you match these up it’s another 3 years of exposure that we would have as a result of shifting from the GBI to 

potentially the SM–3 IIB. 

Where am I wrong? 

General O’REILLY. First of all, sir, it’s always been that once we 

start construction it’s 5 years to build the missile field. That’s been 

consistent for the last several years. It’s when that start point will 

occur has always been what has moved those dates 41⁄2 years for 

the European midcourse radar. 

For the IIB, it is not a brand-new development. I was responsible 

for the development of the GBI and the THAAD and the Patriot 

and now I’m responsible for the SM–3. Looking at that, the SM– 

3 is more of an evolutionary technical growth, built on existing 

components and built on more mature models than what we’ve had 

before. We also, as we testified earlier this year, have a much more 

extensive test program in order to validate this. Our decision process previously was we were deploying the GBIs, but, as we stated 

earlier, most of the testing, including all of the testing against 

ICBMs, remains to occur. 

In this approach, those timelines were extended because we were 

laying out a program that tests first. Then decisions are made 

based on those tests, including operational assessments: Should we 

go forward? Yes, sir, that does extend time, and that’s when we arrived at the 2020 timeframe. 

Could it occur earlier? Yes, it could, but we have laid in that significant amount of testing. 

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired, 

but, as Senator Lieberman said, when we’re looking at the GBI capability, it’s ready to test, ready to go. I still believe that as a reVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\55138.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
45 

sult of this that we are exposing ourselves in the eastern part for 

probably 3 years. Any way you line up these numbers, I think it 

comes to that conclusion. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Cartwright, in countering potential threats like the potential threat from Iran, do we solely rely on our anti-missile defense? 

General CARTWRIGHT. No, sir. There is a robust program by Central Command (CENTCOM) to address them across a myriad of different capabilities. So missile defense is but one element. There is 

an offensive force element, obviously, and a credible one, that is 

represented by CENTCOM. There are also activities associated 

with counter-proliferation, nonproliferation, consequence management, both here in the United States and overseas, to protect our 

forces and to protect populations. 

So we try to go at this as holistically as possible. This is but one 

element of that deterrent strategy. 

Senator REED. It’s your professional judgment that this approach 

strengthens that holistic approach to the defense of the Nation and 

also our forces in the field against missiles? 

General CARTWRIGHT. It does from a technical standpoint. I believe that it also does from a standpoint of what most warfighters 

would talk to, which is in the eyes of your enemy have you presented a credible case that would potentially influence their decision process. When you bring all your allies in line and you’re able 

to speak with one voice and they can see that that is mounting 

against them, that has to have an influence on their decision calculus. 

Senator REED. Let me follow up with another question. Unfortunately, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as has been suggested 

in some of the questions, is a current problem. If for example a 

threat would either shift away from Iran or another threat would 

arise, this system has I think inherently more flexibility because of 

its sea-based and its mobile sensors to be shifted onto that threat; 

is that correct? 

General CARTWRIGHT. That is correct, sir. That is why we retain 

the mobile. It is probably the most expensive, but it gives us the 

greatest opportunity to hedge against an enemy who obviously has 

a vote in how they represent the threat. We’re not exactly consistent on always being able to predict who we’re going to fight 

with next. 

Senator REED. Right. It’s been raised here and it’s a very, very 

sobering and legitimate point—through proliferation of a 

Taepodong to a country that now is not on our list, that site in Poland might be of absolutely no use to us. 

General CARTWRIGHT. That’s true, sir. 

Senator REED. General O’Reilly, can you just give us an idea of 

the tactical risks associated with bringing on the SM–3 Block IIA? 

You described it’s building on a proven product, not a completely 

new system, but what are the technical risks you will have to look 

for? 

46 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we are applying the same type of seeker 

technology that we are developing for the IIB, and we’ve actually 

tested it on aircraft. We’ve observed missile launches. We have a 

very well characterized design for that, for the IB. That is also, 

that design is going to be carried forward for the IIA. We might 

say, it’s a very good design and it also has applicability, if not exact 

use, for a IIB. 

The second is the booster itself. It’s a 21-inch booster. The GBI 

for reference is a 25-ton missile. The SM–3 IA is a 1-ton missile, 

25 times smaller. The IIB is 2 tons, twice as big. But that technology, the way we steer it, the way we operate it, gives it aerodynamic control, is a direct scale from what we are doing with the 

current missile. 

We understand the flight environments. So we’re able to qualify 

the components on the ground before we fly them. 

Senator REED. Are you reasonably confident that you can overcome any technical issues and come in on time, as well as on target, we hope? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, absolutely, because the timelines we have 

laid out take into account having problems and having failed flight 

tests and recovering from those problems. So this is not a very aggressive timeline, given where we are in the development of this. 

Senator REED. Let me ask another question. If intelligence developed that would suggest the threat period is moving forward, you 

have the opportunity to accelerate the program? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. In fact, just to give an idea of the maturity of these technologies, our first time we fly the IB next year 

we will actually intercept. Typically, you have four or five flights, 

but we understand this technology to the point we don’t see the 

benefit there. We could always go back to a contingency deployment, where the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary 

of Defense will tell me to deploy a capability that hasn’t been fully 

characterized. We do that today in Japan and Israel and we could 

do that here. 

Senator REED. Just a final question, General Cartwright. It goes 

to the number of ships that the Navy will need to carry out this 

strategy. You’ve indicated you’re in the process of converting Aegis 

destroyers or destroyers—— 

General CARTWRIGHT. The Spruance class. There are cruisers 

and destroyers there that are capable of this. 

Senator REED. You’re doing it. Part of that also would involve 

forward basing, I presume? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. What we’re working on right now 

is the early stages, what we were calling phase one, is mostly associated with ship-based capability. Then we move to land-based because that’s infinitely cheaper and doesn’t tie down a multi-purpose 

ship to one function. But we always retain the capability to surge. 

What we’re thinking right now—and this is early stage concept 

of operations—is that we would like to see the ability to have two 

ships per station for three stations, so a total of six. That’s generally the way we operate in Japan versus North Korea. That allows one off station, one on station. A magazine on any one of these 

ships is 100, plus or minus, the capability of 100, plus or minus, 

missiles. 

47 

Senator REED. I know, I think, that Spain and Norway, as well 

as South Korea, Australia, and Japan, have Aegis systems, and 

you’re actively talking to them to augment our efforts? 

General CARTWRIGHT. That’ll be part of the way forward over the 

next year, is to sit down and talk. The burden-sharing opportunities here are significant. Many countries have Patriot, as I said. I 

would ask General O’Reilly also—the financial contributions of 

countries like Japan towards our R&D have been significant. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. In the case of the Block IIA, they have invested $1 billion. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

your warm welcome to the committee here today, and I will strive 

to work in a bipartisan way, but also, as Senator McCain said, be 

spirited when appropriate. 

I also want to thank Senator McConnell and my Republican colleagues for the opportunity to serve on this committee, and say 

good morning to Secretary Flournoy and General Cartwright and 

General O’Reilly. I haven’t had a chance to meet you yet, but I look 

forward to working with you. 

The first thing that I’d like to discuss this morning—and I’m 

very impressed with your testimony—is to talk about when the 

change of intelligence occurred and when the new technology became available that would dictate a change in policy. In preparing 

for today’s hearing, I saw the comments from Secretary Gates originally recommending this ground-based missile defense system to 

the prior administration back in December 2006, and I have comments that are here before me which I’d like to read to you from 

Secretary Gates when he appeared before this committee in January 2009. He was asked by Senator Wicker: ‘‘Is it your view that 

in any event it’s essential that the United States continue its current plan for missile defense deployment in Eastern Europe?’’ The 

Secretary said: Well, as I said earlier, we have not had the opportunity to pursue this in the new administration and discuss the administration’s policy on it. I will say this: All of the NATO heads 

of government unanimously last April in Bucharest endorsed the 

importance of a NATO-wide European missile defense capability. 

So this is a commitment that has been made by the alliance and 

so I think we at least need to take it very seriously.’’ 

There was also discussion in that same meeting from the Senator 

from Alaska, Senator Begich, concerning the ground-based missile 

defense system that’s placed in Alaska. Secretary Gates, in responding specifically to Alaska, added that ‘‘I think having a layered defense such as we are building, that includes the GBIs, is 

very important.’’ 

So my first question to you goes to, when did this new intelligence occur? Secretary Flournoy, you said in your opening statement that the Intelligence Community now assesses that the threat 

from Iran’s short- and medium-based ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly and that the longer range has been slower to 

develop than previously estimated. So if you could answer my quesVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\55138.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
48 

tions on when did we have this change in intelligence, and then 

also we can maybe speak to when did the technology improve so 

much that you would have this change in policy? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, thank you for the question. I want to be 

careful since we’re in open session, but there have been three national intelligence estimates to my knowledge on this issue. There 

was one in 2001, one in 2006 that informed the development of the 

program of record, the old approach, and then one that was done, 

that was completed in the spring, after Secretary Gates testified, 

of this year, in 2009. 

It’s drawing from that most recent estimate, that’s where we’re 

basing our judgment. I am sure that our colleagues from the Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence would be happy to come 

brief members on that in detail in a closed session. 

But I would just say that, on Secretary Gates’s comments about 

NATO’s endorsement of a BMD system and the importance of 

GBIs, I think he would not have agreed—since he is the one who 

signed the program of record, who presented it to our NATO allies, 

he would not have agreed to this new architecture and in fact 

championed it if he were not convinced that we are not breaking, 

we are strengthening, our commitment to the defense of our allies, 

and that the new system offers both the coverage that we need for 

homeland defense and better and faster coverage that we need of 

our forces and allies in Europe. 

Senator LEMIEUX. In terms of technology, the two parts of your 

assessment of why to have the policy change is: one, this change 

of intelligence, which I understand I guess from your comment is 

this year, spring 2009; and then also there seems to be this convergence of a technology change that happens. When does that occur, 

that we now believe that this sea-based system is better than the 

ground-based system? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, first of all, we are proposing both ground 

and sea-based in this capability. 

But in 2006, and before, when this design was developed, we had 

only flown one GBI, not in a test. We had very few actual flight 

tests. Since then we’ve had I believe it’s 19 flights, 17 have been 

successful intercepts. We had not deployed our most powerful radars and our sensors. We did not demonstrate until a few months 

ago, until April of this year, the great capability, far greater than 

was estimated, for unattended aerial vehicles. 

So we have in fact executed the program, the technology program. But we learned from it, and as we learned from it, number 

one, it became evident we did not have to rely on the assumptions 

that we were making in 2006 that you had to have very large missiles, they had to be at a fixed site, and you had to have large radars in order to track, precisely track, complex clusters that are associated with a missile in flight. 

So based on what we have learned, a tremendous amount over 

the last 4 years, when you relook at what is a more survivable network of missile defense capability, it became evident to us that this 

was in fact not only more survivable, gave you greater capability, 

but what really surprised us back then, because I was part of that, 

was looking at the number of threats we’d have to handle simultaneously. 

49 

So what we have observed is the fact that very large numbers 

of missiles can be simultaneously launched. As I said in my earlier 

testimony this year, it is my primary concern. So by intercepting 

early, we’re going after the countermeasures, which we have always been worried about. But the amount of raid size was what 

drove us to a different type of architecture to handle and grow and 

respond to those raid sizes. 

Senator LEMIEUX. When did you come to that conclusion, General? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, I’ve been continuously working this since 

the early part of this decade. It became evident as we completed 

each test, this became more evident to us, our post-flight reconstructions of what’s occurred. So I don’t believe that it’s a well 

characterized representation that there was some sudden decision. 

I would say that we executed the technical program that was laid 

out over the last 5 years and we were continually updating our assessments as we went through that. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I’m just looking for a timeframe, General. 

My time has expired. I just wanted to make the point and understand that when the intelligence change happened and when the 

technology change happened and when you had come to those decisions that would lead to this policy shift and when Congress was 

notified based upon those decisions. So I don’t have any further 

time to ask those questions, but I think the point that I’m trying 

to make is that I believe, in echoing Senator McCain, that there 

was a need for this body to know that there was a significant 

change in policy. It looks like you made those decisions some time 

earlier this year without this body knowing. 

But I appreciate your comments today and thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator LeMieux. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCaskill has a commitment, so I would switch places with her here. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. It’s coming at a price. Just kidding. 

I think the way this was rolled out is problematic. I think it’s a 

problem that this appears to have appeared to come out of whole 

cloth all of a sudden. The fact that I think that Czech and Poland 

were notified, what, at midnight, and we were not notified at all 

that this was coming—I think you get everyone agitated by the 

way this was rolled out. I would just say that as an opening comment. I think it was not done as well as it should have been done 

for this kind of major shift in our missile defense policy in this 

country. 

I noticed in the 2010 budget you have asked for a cut of $1.2 billion in missile defense. But yet clearly by scrapping this I know 

you’re talking about—I know Secretary Gates talked about this 

being more economical. Obviously, General O’Reilly, you know the 

kind of record we’ve had on bloated costs as it’s related to the missile defense program. 

I think the SM–3 costs around $65 million apiece. I’m trying to 

understand and reconcile, if you were working this over the last 

few months, how do you reconcile the request for cuts to the missile 

50 

defense program if we are going to be adding SM–3s? How is the 

money going to work out here? 

General O’REILLY. Ma’am, first of all, our cost estimate is around 

$10 million and is what we’re paying today for SM–3s, versus $65 

million. Now, a GBI is, the latest estimate, is $70 million, which 

is closer to the cost you have. But the SM–3 is a much smaller missile. That class of missile, it’s very reasonable that that’s the right 

cost. That’s very similar to a THAAD cost. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What were you envisioning cutting with the 

$1.2 billion? When that figure was submitted, where was that 

money supposed to be coming from? The GBIs or the SM–3s? 

General O’REILLY. No. The reduction in the cost consists of three 

major parts. First of all was the termination of the Kinetic Energy 

Interceptor program. Second was the termination of the Multiple 

Kill Vehicle program. Third, the largest, was funding which we 

were not able to propose that we had previously envisioned for the 

European site, due to the congressional restrictions on using that 

money. That covered actually more than the $1.2 billion. 

There was additional funding added by Secretary Gates again to 

address, to procure more SM–3s and more THAADs. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. Let me turn to Russia for just a 

minute. This I think, whether it is intended or unintended, clearly 

pleases Russia. As usual, we have no assurances that they’re going 

to cooperate any more or do anything in addition in terms of our 

policies towards Iran, Afghanistan, or NATO. 

I never really understood Russia’s concerns as to what we were 

doing there, and obviously we now have projection as to Russia 

conducting operations and missions off the east coast. We get no 

substantive offers from Russia in terms of dealing with the Iranian 

threat and the ballistic missile threat from Iran. They have a dominant foothold in Central Asia and in many ways we have to rely 

on their approval to get the stuff for our troops coming through the 

northern distribution network into Afghanistan. 

Have we gotten anything from Russia for this? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. We did not seek anything from Russia for this. 

This was not about Russia. Our going through the BMD review, 

this was about how do we ensure that we can deal with Iranian 

missile threats to our forces and allies in Europe and also to our 

Homeland. So this has never been about that. In fact, we’ve been 

very clear, for example in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty negotiations, that our negotiations on offensive forces are not connected to anything we’re doing on missile defense. 

We haven’t made that linkage and so we have not sought that. 

I think there is a broader question about how reset in the relationship is going, whether that’s possible, whether we’re seeing reciprocity on the other side. But that’s a different conversation. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What have the Israelis expressed to you 

about the policy change? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I have not had any specific conversations with 

the Israelis about this. But I would say that—and I would just underscore General Cartwright’s point—that the kind of BMDs that 

they’re building will be able to be very integrated with the architecture that we’re envisioning as well. 

51 

Senator MCCASKILL. Were they informed of this policy change 

contemporaneously with Congress or with Czech and Poland? 

When were they informed of the policy change? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I know that it was discussed last week when 

Minister Barak was here to meet with Secretary Gates. I do not 

know if they had any prior consultation before that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Are we reassuring the emerging democracies in the Ukraines and the Georgias and the Polands of the 

world that we’re really committed? I just worry about their perceptions of this move. Do you have any comments about the emerging 

democracies and what this says to them about our commitments? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Again, I think when we went to the North Atlantic Council one of the things that became clear as the permanent 

representatives got beyond the erroneous press reports and started 

digesting what we were actually presenting to them, the reason we 

got such a positive reaction is they saw this as a strengthening of 

U.S. Article 5 commitment to the defense of Europe and to extended deterrence. 

So I think that that has been the intention. That is in fact the 

reality of what’s in this program. I would hope that the others on 

the periphery of Europe would see that same signal. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

I believe Senator Collins is next. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Cartwright and General O’Reilly, two of my colleagues 

have brought up what I believe to be the key issue for us. That is, 

does this new strategy provide less protection to the continental 

United States? Now, I will tell you that it was never clear to me 

that the third site was primarily intended to strengthen the protection of the United States. I was under the impression that the two 

sites in California and Alaska were adequate to provide protection 

to the entire continental United States from an ICBM attack 

launched by either the Iranians or the Koreans. 

But I must say that the map given to me this morning by Senator Inhofe does cause me to question the assumption under which 

I was operating and the lens through which I was viewing this new 

strategy, because, as he has pointed out, it just barely covers most 

of my State of Maine. So could you address this issue, which is, 

after all, a very important issue to this committee, of whether or 

not the two sites that we have now in California and Alaska provide sufficient coverage to the continental United States? General 

O’Reilly? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, ma’am. Our analysis indicates we do 

have coverage. I’ve testified and my predecessors have testified to 

that. I will have to look at and understand the details of this new 

analysis that I’m hearing about today that we don’t. 

Senator COLLINS. General Cartwright? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I’ll let us go back through the analysis, because we haven’t seen the chart. But I would also say that as we 

move forward on the SM–3 Block II development, those ships certainly can protect our deployed forces and friends and allies overseas. They can also come home. They live here, and they can be 

moved to areas that we think have some sort of increased vulnerVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\55138.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
52 

ability in the future, for which we don’t know why today, but could 

emerge. So part of what we’re trying to understand here as we 

move forward is how do we accommodate something that, either 

through an analytic process, through a test process, or through a 

new threat, somehow disadvantages any part of the United States, 

and how can we ensure that that’s taken care of? 

We talked a little earlier about defending Hawaii and the challenges of Hawaii. The same applies as we look at the rest of the 

United States, whether it be Alaska or Maine or down in the southern end of Texas and Florida. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I would ask that you get back to 

the committee with an analysis of the CBO study since the maps 

do give me pause. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Our analysis indicate that Maine is fully protected against both liquid- and solidfueled Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles originating in Iran. 

Senator COLLINS. Madam Secretary, you’ve said three times this 

morning: This is not about Russia. You’ve literally said that three 

times. Are you saying then that you do not expect that this new 

approach will enhance Russia’s willingness to cooperate to deter 

Iran? I had thought that would be an advantage of this new approach, but you’ve said very emphatically three times this morning: 

This is not about Russia; this has nothing to do with Russia; we 

haven’t asked anything of Russia. I find that very troubling. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, we would certainly welcome both Russia’s new view of our missile defense efforts. We would welcome 

their willingness to cooperate in things like the radars and sharing 

radar data and so forth. We would welcome strengthened cooperation on things like on Iran and proliferation writ large. 

What I was trying to communicate is that those things that we 

would welcome did not drive the substance of this decision. That’s 

what I was trying to say. 

Senator COLLINS. But do you in fact expect that this new approach will encourage the Russians to be more cooperative with us 

in deterring the Iranians? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. We have never believed that our missile defenses 

posed a threat to the Russians. 

Senator COLLINS. No one who has looked at it believes that. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. No, I know. But for whatever reason, they did. 

So if they now look at this, this architecture, new architecture, and 

finally understand this doesn’t pose a threat to you, and that opens 

the door for further cooperation, we would welcome that. 

Senator COLLINS. Finally, as a Senator who participated in the 

trip with the chairman this spring, I have to tell you that, while 

I think there is merit in the decision the administration has 

reached, assuming we can clear up this map, I am appalled at the 

poor communication and consultation with our allies. That clearly 

could have been done in a far better way. 

When I look at the public comments by the Polish officials, it 

seems evident to me that what they did is first give their real impression of alarm and shock and then, when they realized that this 

was the decision and they were going to have to live with it, they 

then modified their public comments to try to accept the reality. 

53 

I’m just at a loss why there wouldn’t have been better consultation 

with two allies whom we value so greatly. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, if I could, we had begun consultations 

in the spring. We certainly would have liked to have had more time 

for consultations and for the rollout. One of the things that happened is as we got more detailed in our consultations, things started to leak. There started to be a lot of erroneous discussion in the 

press. I think the decisionmaking was proceeding on an analytic 

basis, that we were getting ready for a decision. But in terms of 

the rollout, it made us try to get the decision and the facts out 

sooner rather than later, so that we could correct the record on 

what this decision actually involved and what it was about and 

why it was being made. 

So we too would have preferred a longer period for consultation 

and rollout. But leaks and speculation in the press sort of forced 

us to go sooner to set the record straight. 

Senator COLLINS. General, did you want to add to that? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I think the Secretary has it about right. I 

would love to have had a lot more time. We believed that we were 

on a path both analytically and politically to explain alternatives, 

and we looked through a very broad range of alternatives as we’ve 

worked through this missile defense review. Some of that was 

taken away by just the fact that the information leaked early and 

then was developed into a position that was erroneous from a factual standpoint. 

I think that we have gone back to our allies and we continue to 

go back to our allies, which I would say is another positive opportunity where we’re dealing with preparing the fiscal year 2011 

budget. One of the things we wanted to do was to give Congress 

a full year of review of this activity. So in other words, this is a 

budget that the Services are just now submitting to the Department, and we will bring up and have opportunity with the Hill for 

a full year of debate about this way forward. 

We lost some of that in this rushed, accelerated release. But we 

still are on a path to have a full year of debate about the fiscal year 

2011 budget and its support of this concept. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As one of five Senators who voted against the original proposal 

to put the systems into Poland and the Czech Republic, I think this 

is just a very important step forward in terms of how we approach 

our National defense and also our international relations. The reason that I was opposed to the original proposal was due to the cost 

and the static nature of the technology, at the same time that it 

was widely being viewed as provocative of Russia, at a time when 

the Russians actually, as I recall, were offering to cooperate on alternate sites such as the site in Azerbaijan; and also that it was 

not really as proposed doing the job that we were expecting it to 

do in terms of the threat from Iran. 

What I’m seeing in this particular proposal is really the way 

things need to be done, and I congratulate all three of you. We’re 

54 

putting mobility into a system. We’re putting maneuverability into 

a system, so that it can address not simply multiple operational 

threats, but multiple strategic threats, at a time when we are really bogged down resources-wise because of our commitments in 

places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Importantly, it allows the adaptation and the innovation of new technologies as these concepts move 

forward. 

I quite frankly would hope we can start thinking in this way 

when it comes to the disposition of troops in places like Afghanistan, which worry me very much, that we’re going to be bogged 

down, local defense, when we are facing an enemy that is highly 

mobile and loves to take advantage of the fact that we get in these 

static positions. 

So conceptually, and strategically, I think this is a very strong 

step forward. I think it’s very important for us as we consider this 

to consider also the letter that General Jones sent. Mr. Chairman, 

I had to step out of this hearing. I’m not sure if it was mentioned 

in terms of the hearing, but General Jones, the National Security 

Adviser, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, former Commander of NATO, under his own signature wrote a very strong letter in support of this, talking about how this new architecture will 

protect Europe sooner, will have greater capability, greater survivability, flexibility, be cost effective, and will provide an added layer 

of defense to augment the United States. I think that’s a pretty 

strong statement. 

General Cartwright, your testimony I think was very powerful 

today in terms of the background that you’ve had in this and the 

conceptual observations you brought to the table. 

I think this is something that we’ve been needing. The major 

comment that I would have, Secretary Flournoy, goes to the point 

that you’ve now heard four or five times, about the need to do a 

better job explaining the linkage, quite frankly, to our larger relations with Russia. You’ve just made the point, I think quite well, 

in terms of the response you gave to Senator Collins. I think the 

message needs to be very clear as we’re moving forward here that 

this clearly was not done in response to any demand from Russia, 

but at the same time, in the context of overall relations, it’s not 

necessarily a bad thing as long as we’re acting clearly and solely 

in the National interest of the United States. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Senator, I would agree completely. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, and that letter will be made part 

of the record that you made reference to. It has not been referred 

to before and I’m glad you raised it. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

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Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, you said the GBI would take 5 years to deploy, which 

I think makes Senator Inhofe’s point. The same year that we predict Iran will have an ICBM capability that could reach the United 


924ful14.eps
60 

States is 2015. The SM–3 IIB won’t be fielded until 2020. Doesn’t 

that expose us for that 5-year period between 2015 and 2020? 

General O’REILLY. Senator, once we’re given the approvals to 

begin the construction, yes, sir, it’s 5 years. The issue we’ve had 

is the current restrictions I have require us to go through testing 

that will take us to 2013 before the Secretary of Defense is in a 

position, with the Director of the Operational Test and Evaluation 

Agency, to then certify that the ground-based midcourse defense 

system will work in a European scenario. 

So 2013 would be the earliest we can see programmatically 

where we could begin, and that actually takes you to 2018. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is that for the previous system? It’s unclear. 

What are you referring to? 

General O’REILLY. The current program, the GBI’s in Europe. 

Chairman LEVIN. Before the change? 

General O’REILLY. Before the change, yes, sir. I’d clarify. 

Also what is clear is that’s pure construction time. We do need 

the approval of the countries, and there are extensive implementing agreements also required before you can begin that. So we 

saw the 2017–2018 timeframe as optimistic based on the approvals 

necessary in order to begin. 

Senator THUNE. I don’t know how much this has been covered already. But Secretary Flournoy and General O’Reilly, the new approach to European missile defense calls for sea-based defenses to 

be deployed to theater in the 2011 timeframe. But the CBO in their 

report from February of this year found that deploying sea-based 

defenses is the most expensive option. In fact, the CBO wrote: 

‘‘That system would cost almost twice as much as the original European missile defense proposal, a total of about $18 billion to $26 

billion over 20 years.’’ 

The CBO study assumed the Department would need to buy additional ships to permanently station three Aegis cruisers in the region. So how does the new proposal for European missile defense 

meet President Obama’s stated goal of having a system that’s cost 

effective? You said earlier in your remarks that this is the cost effective approach, when CBO says that a system like that would 

cost twice as much compared to the system that you’re intending 

to scrap. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, what they were referring to as I recall, 

but I’ll go back and verify, was protection of all of Europe at one 

time. In the phased approach, what we’re looking at is pacing technology and pacing our current capabilities with the threat that we 

know exists today, which is a focus in phase one on the southeastern part of Europe that we know is threatened today by Iran. 

Their study was looking at today’s technology, if you had to proliferate it over all of Europe, and that caused a significant higher 

number of ship stations that would be required. Also, we are in fact 

combining the greater range of the SM–3 IIA and the IIB with 

land-basing, which optimizes the coverage that you can have of Europe. So as the threat grows we would deploy in phases, as we said, 

and that would significantly reduce the costs and extend the coverage that we would have from much fewer bases than what they 

were assuming in their study. 

61 

Senator THUNE. Do you have that analysis? Does that include 

cost estimates of this proposal relative to the third site? Because 

CBO is the only number that I’ve seen. I assume in your analysis— 

you say it’s more cost effective to do it this way. Is that something 

that’s available? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir, we do have that. As we were going 

through the BMD review, cost analysis is part of that review for 

these different options. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Again, if I could just underscore, the CBO and 

the Institute for Defense Analysis studies both costed out a seabased only architecture, which would be very expensive. Once you 

move the majority of the interceptors onto land, which is what we 

envision doing, the cost effectiveness goes way up. It’s much less 

expensive. So the sea-based piece of the architecture really plays 

a role in the initial phases while we’re developing the land-based 

sites, and that’s just to cover the southern part of Europe that’s 

currently under threat. 

Then, as a surge sort of flexibility element, should, under a particular contingency, a part of Europe is under threat, or a part of 

the United States is under threat, we can surge sea-based assets 

to complement the land-based systems. 

But they really costed out a totally different concept, which is 

different than what we’re proposing. 

Senator THUNE. The 2010 defense budget request, there was a 

request for funds that would be included to convert six Aegis ships 

to provide missile defense capability. I guess my question is what 

other funds were going to be required to field sea-based defenses 

in accordance with the new European missile defense approach? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, as I said in my statement, we are asking 

for the opportunity to utilize fiscal year 2009 funding for European 

defense which has not been released to us because of the criteria 

of the BMD agreements being ratified in both Poland and in the 

Czech Republic and the constraint on testing. 

So if we had access to that funding in fiscal year 2009, then we’d 

have sufficient funding in which to meet the timelines, especially 

the earlier timelines, of developing the unmanned aerial vehicles, 

all the research and development that we’ve referred to, the longterm development, and get it started now, as well as the short-term 

deployments focused on 2011 and the testing which we are proposing that goes with this. 

Senator THUNE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would just echo what 

some of my colleagues previously have said. That is, I think this 

is a real abrupt change which sort of kind of got dropped on everybody. Probably the most notable example of that are some of our 

allies in Europe. I think it’s interpreted, at least there, as the U.S. 

sort of betraying their interests after we’d made commitments, that 

we’re not following through and honoring those commitments. 

So I have questions about these cost issues. I have questions 

about coverage issues, some of which were raised earlier in Senator 

Lieberman’s discussion and questions. But I also have a lot of questions about the perception that this creates among people who have 

been very friendly to us and very reliable, and also the issue that’s 

been broached about whether or not this was designed to curry 

some favor with the Russians in dealing with the Iranians. 

62 

All that I guess is sort of conjecture. But I certainly hope that 

at the end of the day that these decisions weren’t predicated on 

those, that we have good sound criteria that will enable us to protect the United States and protect our allies and do it in a cost effective way. But many of the concerns that have been voiced today 

are concerns that I share. 

So thank you all very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

When you made reference, General, to constraint on testing, you 

were referring, I believe, to the requirement in the laws that there 

be operational effectiveness shown by testing before deployment; is 

that correct? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir, that’s exactly right. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s what you were referring to? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just wanted to ask a question talking about defending against 

the Iranian short- and medium-range missiles. I agree with the Department’s renewed emphasis on countering the short- and medium-range missiles. I understand that Iran’s short and mediumrange missile capability not only poses a threat to our strategic assets and allies in Europe, but also our allies’ strategic assets and 

forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility; and the Iranians’ 

short- and medium-range ballistic missiles can have drastic effects 

to our soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as our forward operating bases in theater that are critical to our logistical supply 

lines. Our partners in the Arabian Gulf I think are very concerned 

about these ballistic missile capabilities, particularly as it pertains 

to defending their critical infrastructure, obviously, the oil facilities. This has numerous implications for our efforts to provide our 

forces with the fuel that they need to consider and carry out their 

missions in theater. 

I applaud Secretary Gates’s initiative to use the annual Manama 

Dialogue in Bahrain as a multilateral forum to discuss the development of a shared early warning and air and missile defense framework amongst his counterparts in the Gulf area. 

But can you provide the progress the Department’s made in utilizing our Arab Gulf partners to build this strategic framework for 

a BMD shield that would protect our forces and strategic assets 

against the Iranian ballistic missile threat? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, ma’am. Manama was but one dialogue. CENTCOM is currently running a center of excellence to ensure that the countries have the opportunity to see in detail what 

the opportunities of an architecture similar to what we’re proposing 

here could offer to them. We put in Israel one of these new X-band 

radars for just that reason. 

One of the most difficult activities associated with the Gulf is 

that everything is on a bilateral basis. The reality is no one single 

country can mount either the defense or the offense alone to protect against this kind of threat. So much of what CENTCOM is 

working on in the Gulf is the understanding amongst them of how 

they can leverage off of each other. Whether they buy Patriot sysVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\55138.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
63 

tems, indigenous systems that are built, other countries’ systems, 

netting them together will get them a much more effective defense 

than working on a pure bilateral basis. 

General Petraeus is having significant progress, making significant progress, in that dialogue. As we start to introduce these new 

systems, I think most of those countries are very interested in buying additional Patriots, and we are moving our Patriots around, 

demonstrating to them what the capabilities are, not only in the 

modeling and simulation, but in the actual physical presence of 

those weapon systems, and moving them quite a bit so that multiple countries see it, but also so that Iran watches those movements. Quite frankly, these are very powerful steps as we move forward. The more we can layer that further out to the Israelis, the 

Jordanians, other countries out beyond the Gulf in the Middle 

East, to start to demonstrate a collective approach to this problem, 

the more valuable the deterrent aspects of this capability are. 

Senator HAGAN. Let me ask one other question. I understand 

that the Department of Defense plans to field the land-based SM– 

3s by 2015 and is in the process of consulting with our allies, once 

again particularly Poland and the Czech Republic, about hosting a 

land-based version of the SM–3. But given the problems that we’ve 

experienced with Poland and the Czech Republic in the ratification 

process with regards to stationing radars and GBIs, and in addition 

the extra communication problems just recently, what lessons can 

we utilize to expedite this process? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think we have begun discussions with Poland 

about hosting, being a potential site to host SM–3s. What we’ve 

made clear to them is that we are not falling off the agreement 

that the previous administration signed with them, which covered 

a very broad range of security cooperation, to include the Patriots, 

to include a U.S. garrison in Poland, and so forth. So that is all 

still under way. 

In fact, we could go ahead with the ballistic missile agreement 

that we signed with a minor modification to the annex that simply 

substituted SM–3 for GBI as a referred-to system if they choose to 

proceed with us along this path. 

So I think with Poland the path is very clear should they decide 

to continue on down that path with us. In the Czech Republic, the 

discussion is not about hosting land-based missiles, but it is—because of this networked system, there are many other kinds of data 

fusion, command and control, ops center. There are all kinds of 

ways to participate in this system, and we are actively in discussions about that with the Czech Republic, who have already expressed to us that they very much want to remain a leading partner with us in the new architecture. We’re just in the process of 

figuring out the details of what that will look like. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan. 

Just one question. I guess we can take one question each on a 

second round if it’s needed. 

General O’Reilly, you gave a speech in Boston on Monday and 

you said that the new European missile defense plan is a ‘‘much 

more powerful missile defense proposal than the previous one.’’ 

Can you just succinctly tell us why in your judgment? You’ve given 

64 

us I think the essence in your earlier testimony this morning, but 

kind of just sum up: Why do you believe that this approach presents a much more powerful missile defense proposal than the previous one? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, in that discussion, which was to an international audience, the point I was making was that, as I’ve testified before, my greatest concern as the Director of the MDA is to 

be able to counter the proliferation of missiles that we see and the 

large, specifically the large raid sizes. That is becoming more evident around the world as more launchers, more missiles, and more 

exercises show that many countries are demonstrating and practicing that capability. 

In the previous defense architecture we had, we had a limited 

number of missiles that we could intercept at any one time. So this 

proposal allows you to put significantly more and rapidly expand 

the firepower of a missile defense system. That’s a term that hasn’t 

been used often, ‘‘firepower’’ in this case. But it is; it’s firepower 

against missiles that have been launched against you. 

The firepower of this system is significantly higher. As General 

Cartwright and others have said—and we are all concerned about 

the threat predictions—we would like to move from a more rigid 

missile defense to one that’s more adaptable and quickly flexible, 

so that if the threat changes we can very quickly increase that firepower and increase the orientation of it. 

Chairman LEVIN. We will also insert in the record your remarks 

of September 21. 

We will also insert in the record Secretary Gates’ September 20 

op-ed in The New York Times. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

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Chairman LEVIN. If there are no other questions, with our great 

thanks for your testimony this morning and all your work on this, 

we will stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 


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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

NATO ALLIES

1. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Flournoy, what is the status of U.S.-Polish discussions on deployment of a U.S. Army Patriot air and missile defense battery in Poland? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The United States and Poland will discuss the upcoming rotations 

of a Patriot battery to Poland at the High Level Defense Group (HLDG) consultations in Warsaw on October 15–16. The United States will begin these rotations 

upon entry into force of the U.S.-Poland Supplemental Agreement to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Status of Forces Agreement, which is currently 

being negotiated. 

2. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Flournoy, specifically, does the United States plan to 

deploy such a battery in Poland in accordance with the U.S.-Polish Declaration of 

Strategic Cooperation and, if so, is there a schedule for such a deployment? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The United States will begin the Patriot battery rotations upon 

entry into force of the U.S.-Poland Supplemental Agreement to the NATO Status 

of Forces Agreement. 

3. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Flournoy, there have been suggestions that our 

NATO allies are not supportive of the new missile defense plan announced by President Obama on September 17. Can you explain whether our NATO allies support 

the new plan? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The response of almost all of our NATO allies to the Phased 

Adaptive Approach has been positive. When we briefed the North Atlantic Council 

in Brussels on September 16, there were expressions of support for the new approach and a general appreciation that this is a change in the way we plan to address the threat, but not a change in America’s commitment to Europe. It is understandable that our decision to use a different approach to missile defense would 

cause some concern in Warsaw and Prague, but both Poland and the Czech Republic 

have already communicated their interest in participating in the Phased Adaptive 

Approach. 

4. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Flournoy, there has been confusion over the reaction 

of the Czech and Polish Governments to the new missile defense plan. Can you explain the position of the Czech and Polish Governments on the new plan? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. It appears that both governments are becoming increasingly receptive to the new plan as they understand the rationale behind the changes and 

know that they can be part of the new architecture should their governments desire. 

5. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Flournoy, can you explain what steps the United 

States is taking with Poland and the Czech Republic to give them an opportunity 

to participate in the new missile defense architecture? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. We are reaching out to both countries via new HLDG dialogues. 

The HLDG with Poland will take place on October 15–16 in Warsaw and the one 

with the Czech Republic will occur on November 5–6 in Prague. During these and 

future discussions we will provide necessary details to allow these allies to determine how they want to continue to partner with the United States in the European 

Missile Defense plan. 

CAPABILITIES OF NEW SYSTEM

6. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, there were suggestions at the hearing that the 

United States currently has no ballistic missile defense (BMD) against a long-range 

Iranian ballistic missile. Can you describe the degree of coverage provided by the 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system currently deployed in Alaska and 

California against long-range missiles that Iran might have in the future? 

General O’REILLY. [Deleted.] 

7. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, can you describe how the recently announced 

European missile defense architecture will enhance the capability of the currently 

deployed GMD system, particularly with the planned deployment of an AN/TPY–2 

X-band radar in the Caucasus region? 

General O’REILLY. [Deleted.] 

81 

8. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, the new missile defense plan for Europe includes, in Phase 4, a land-based Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) Block IIB system using 

enhanced sensor capabilities. Can you compare the planned capabilities of this 

Phase 4 system to those of the previously planned two-stage Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) proposed for deployment in Poland? For example: would the Phase 4 

SM–3 IIB system be able to defend against as many (or more) potential future Iranian long-range missiles as the European Interceptor Site; would it cover a similar 

defended area; and what are the advantages of the planned SM–3 Block IIB in providing defense against long-range missiles? 

General O’REILLY. [Deleted.] 

9. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, please describe how Phase 4 of the newly announced missile defense plan will augment or supplement the existing GMD system 

deployed in Alaska and California. 

General O’REILLY. [Deleted.] 

10. Senator LEVIN. General Cartwright, at the hearing it was mentioned that one 

of the benefits of the new missile defense plan is that it will be able to defend 

against Iranian missile attacks employing large raid sizes. Why is this important, 

and how does it relate to the existing threat of Iranian short- and medium-range 

ballistic missiles? 

General CARTWRIGHT. The Iranians are developing and testing more short- and 

medium-range ballistic missiles, as demonstrated again recently by multiple test 

launches in September. These systems exist now. Based on the potential for larger 

raid sizes, the Phased Adaptive Approach is better suited to counter that threat by 

providing the ability to launch more interceptors. 

11. Senator LEVIN. General Cartwright, of what value is this benefit to our regional combatant commanders? 

General CARTWRIGHT. The value of this benefit is that it provides more comprehensive protection sooner for our forward-based and deployed forces from known, 

existing, and emerging ballistic missile threats. 

12. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, Iran recently launched a series of short- and 

medium-range ballistic missiles, reportedly including the Shahab-3 and the Sejil 

medium-range missiles that could reach as far as Israel and Turkey. Would the new 

missile defense architecture be able to defend against these missiles? 

General O’REILLY. [Deleted.] 

13. Senator LEVIN. General Cartwright, there has been a suggestion that the new 

European missile defense architecture somehow represents a worse capability than 

the previous plan. Secretary Gates has said the new architecture is ‘‘vastly more 

suitable’’ and would be a ‘‘far more effective defense’’ than the previous plan. Do you 

agree with Secretary Gates? If so, what is your view of how the new architecture 

will provide a better capability to defend our forward-based forces and allies in Europe than the previously planned system? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, I do agree with Secretary Gates. The Phased Adaptive 

Approach is better suited than the previously planned system to meet the current 

and projected threat. The previous GBI plan was designed to meet an ICBM threat 

that has not developed as expected and contained a limited number of interceptors 

from a fixed location. The Phased Adaptive Approach will allow us to pace the 

threat, engage more inbound threats, and provide flexibility to surge additional capabilities as required. This allows us to better protect our forces oversees, as well 

as contribute to NATO’s overall defense. 

IMPACT OF NEW ARCHITECTURE ON ISRAEL’S SECURITY

14. Senator LEVIN. General Cartwright and General O’Reilly, the United States 

has already deployed a forward-based radar in Israel, and we have cooperative missile defense programs with Israel. The main missile threat to Israel comes from 

Iran’s growing number of medium-range missiles. The new architecture is intended 

to defend against these same Iranian missiles. Overall, how would you describe the 

impact of the new architecture on Israel’s security? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Although the architecture proposed for Europe does not 

provide any specific coverage to Israel, the missile defense capability that we deploy 

to Europe can potentially improve security for all of our allies as we leverage technological advances and lessons learned. 

82 

General O’REILLY. The recent additions and cooperative improvements to the 

Israeli missile defense architecture have provided improved early warning for the 

Israeli systems, and have added an additional layer of defense. The AN/TPY–2 Xband radar provides earlier detection and discrimination of ballistic missile attack 

than was previously available to the Israeli Arrow Weapon System. In addition, 

when Aegis BMD ships are operating in the theater, they can use the AN/TPY–2 

information to conduct exo-atmospheric ‘‘upper tier’’ intercepts against ballistic missiles targeting Israel. These improvements give Israel better defensive capabilities 

against Iranian ballistic missiles, as well as the ability to defend against attacks 

with greater raid size. 

15. Senator LEVIN. General Cartwright and General O’Reilly will the new architecture help improve the ability to defend Israel against an Iranian ballistic missile 

attack? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Although the architecture proposed for Europe does not 

provide any specific coverage to Israel, the missile defense capability that we deploy 

to Europe can potentially improve security for all of our allies as we leverage technological advances and lessons learned. 

General O’REILLY. [Deleted.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

REVIEW PROCESS

16. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Flournoy and General Cartwright, you were 

both involved in the process by which the administration conducted its review of options for missile defense in Europe. 

Can you describe that process? For example, when did the review start, how was 

it conducted, who was involved, who was consulted, and so on? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. As part of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) required 

in part by section 234 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2009 (Pub. L. 110–417), the Department of Defense (DOD) is reviewing the U.S. strategy and policy for BMD. Among other topics, the BMDR includes 

an in-depth consideration of our strategic and operational approach to Europeanbased BMD. 

The review began in early April and includes representatives from multiple BMD 

stakeholders, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Secretaries 

of the Military Departments; Combatant Commanders; the Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA); the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with responsibilities for national and 

international BMD policy; the intelligence community; the Department of State and 

the National Security Council staff. The review has included opportunities for allies 

and partners abroad to comment on and shape the BMDR. Although the review is 

still ongoing, the analysis conducted and conclusions reached to date informed the 

joint recommendation by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff to pursue a revised approach for missile defense in Europe. The 

President accepted their recommendation and announced the decision on September 

17, 2009. 

Consistent with congressional direction, the BMDR will be finalized and provided 

to Congress in January 2010. 

General CARTWRIGHT. As part of the BMDR required in part by section 234 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (S. 3001), DOD is reviewing the United States’ strategy and policy for BMD. Among other topics, the BMDR 

includes an in-depth consideration of our strategic and operational approach to European-based BMD. 

The review began in early April and includes representatives from multiple BMD 

stakeholders, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders, as the 

end-user of the BMDS; the MDA, as the developer of the missile defense system; 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense responsible for national and international 

BMD policy; the Intelligence Community; the Department of State; and NATO. 

While the review is still ongoing, the analysis conducted and conclusions reached 

to date informed the joint recommendation by the Secretary of Defense and the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a revised approach for missile defense in Europe. The 

President accepted their recommendation and announced the decision on September 

17, 2009. 

Consistent with congressional direction, the BMDR will be finalized and provided 

to Congress in January 2010. 

83 

ADDITIONAL CAPABILITY TO DEFEND THE UNITED STATES

17. Senator BILL NELSON. General O’Reilly, Secretary Gates has said that the new 

architecture will have the ability to provide additional defense of the United States 

against a possible future Iranian long-range missile, using a land-based version of 

the SM–3, in Phase 4 of the new system. Can you describe how this capability will 

work, and how it will augment the existing capability we already have deployed in 

Alaska and California to defend the Homeland against long-range missile attacks 

from nations like North Korea and Iran? 

General O’REILLY. [Deleted.] 

FUNDING IMPACT OF NEW APPROACH

18. Senator BILL NELSON. General O’Reilly, given the President’s decision on the 

new missile defense architecture for Europe, do you see any funding impacts for fiscal years 2009 or 2010 funds to implement the new architecture? If so, what are 

they? 

General O’REILLY. MDA is committed to fully funding this program as the Agency 

prepares for the next budget submission to Congress. However, it is important that 

MDA have relief from rescissions and the flexibility to spend the unused fiscal year 

2009 Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and some Military 

Construction (MILCON) dollars associated with the previous European Site proposal. With relief from some of the constraints placed on the Agency’s fiscal year 

2009 budget and some redirection of fiscal year 2010 funds, MDA believes it can 

pursue this new architecture within its fiscal year 2010 budget request. 

MDA also would note that both the House and Senate authorizing committees 

very presciently included provisions in this year’s National Defense Authorization 

bill that permit the Department to use fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 funding 

for an alternative architecture once the Secretary of Defense certified that this architecture is as cost-effective, technically reliable, and operationally available as the 

previous program. 

OVERARCHING MISSILE DEFENSE APPROACH

19. Senator BILL NELSON. General Cartwright, you have described the need for 

the United States to have flexible and agile military capabilities that can adapt to 

rapidly evolving security challenges and threats. How does this new approach to 

missile defense in Europe fit into that construct? 

General CARTWRIGHT. The phased adaptive approach utilizes systems, such as 

AEGIS, that are already available and have the ability to deploy and provide limited 

protection much sooner than the previous program of record (EMR/EIS). With additional radar assets and land based SM–3s we will have the capability to meet that 

need as the threat evolves. 

20. Senator BILL NELSON. General Cartwright, do you agree that this new architecture can be used in other regions, besides Europe, as well? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes. Although the elements may vary from region to region, 

the concept of a flexible, adaptable architecture can be applied to other regions of 

concern. 

CZECH VIEW OF X-BAND RADAR

21. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Flournoy, on a trip in April with Chairman 

Levin and Senator Collins, I had the distinct impression that the Czech Government 

was not moving toward ratification of its agreements on deploying the previously 

proposed European Midcourse Radar, and that a new Czech Government might not 

ratify the agreements. Do you share that view? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The BMD Agreement and the Supplemental Status of Forces 

Agreement were approved by the Czech Senate in November 2008. Approval of the 

two agreements in the lower chamber was suspended after the collapse of the governing coalition in March 2009. We do not expect any further consideration of the 

agreements until after elections, probably in the first half of 2010. 

22. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Flournoy, do you believe the Czech Government is interested in participating in the new missile defense architecture? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The Czech Government has communicated its interest in discussing possible opportunities for participation in the newly announced missile deVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\55138.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
84 

fense architecture. We look forward to examining proposals for their potential participation during the HLDG in November. 

CAPABILITIES OF THE STANDARD MISSILE-3

23. Senator BILL NELSON. General O’Reilly, much of the new missile defense architecture approved by the President would rely on the SM–3, both on Aegis ships 

and on land. 

Can you describe your level of confidence in the ability of the SM–3 to evolve to 

have increased capability to accomplish its intended missions? 

General O’REILLY. Operational since late 2004, the Aegis BMD SM–3 system is 

MDA’s only Element that has been assessed to be operationally suitable and effective by an independent test agent. This assessment was earned as a result of rigorous system engineering, a knowledgeable U.S. Government/industry team, and a 

stressing, realistic test program. It is upon this foundation that we place our confidence that the SM–3 system will evolve and meet future BMD challenges. Through 

the first half of fiscal year 2009 the SM–3 Block IA has a stellar record of performance in its flight test program, successfully engaging 8 of 11 ballistic missile targets. 

The SM–3 has consistently delivered capabilities that meet, and many times exceed, 

requirements, e.g., the 20 February 2008 satellite intercept demonstrated interceptor capability far beyond that required by design specifications. SM–3 Block IA 

missiles deployed in Phase One of the European Phased Adaptive Architecture on 

Aegis BMD-capable ships will provide flight test proven near-term defense of Europe and our Deployed Forces against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. 

The successful SM–3 Block IA flight test program will be followed by the initial 

flight test of the follow-on interceptor, the SM–3 Block IB, in calendar year 2011. 

The Aegis BMD Project Office follows a disciplined system engineering process to 

test and verify weapon capabilities through risk management activities and extensive ground testing and simulations. The design process is planned to build confidence through flight test demonstrations of intercept capability. The SM–3 Block 

IB will be subjected to the same rigorous verification program that the successful 

SM–3 Block IA missile was. Since the SM–3 Block IB uses the same rocket motors 

and other kill vehicle components that have already been demonstrated, MDA is 

confident that technical risks are mitigated. When certified for fielding, the SM–3 

Block IB will be the basis for upgrading the European defense in Phase Two with 

deployment both at sea on Aegis BMD-capable ships and at a land-based Aegis 

Ashore site. The SM–3 Block IB will provide extended capability against short- and 

medium-range ballistic missiles. 

While still in its early design phase of development with our international partner 

Japan, the SM–3 Block IIA will be deployed to provide broader coverage of Europe 

against intermediate range ballistic missiles as well as short- and medium-range 

ballistic missiles in Phase Three of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Currently seven flight tests are planned for the SM–3 Block IIA to demonstrate its ability to meet five joint United States/Japan knowledge points leading to verification 

of its intercept performance. Following the joint flight test demonstrations there will 

be additional tests to verify integration with Aegis Weapon System upgrades and 

the rest of the BMDS. 

Finally, to further extend our coverage of Europe against all ranges of ballistic 

missiles and provide additional defense from long range ballistic missiles threatening the U.S. mainland in Phase Four, MDA is exploring design concepts for an 

SM–3 Block IIB missile to be based at Aegis Ashore sites. As plans mature for this 

new developing capability, the same disciplined, success-oriented process will be followed to deliver or exceed requirements. 

REVISED IRANIAN MISSILE THREAT ASSESSMENT

24. Senator BILL NELSON. General Cartwright, one of the issues highlighted by 

both President Obama and Secretary Gates in explaining the new missile defense 

architecture is a revised assessment of the Iranian ballistic missile threat. The conclusion of this assessment is apparently that Iran is putting more effort into its 

short- and medium-range missile program—and increasing the number of those missiles—and is not proceeding as quickly with the development of long-range ballistic 

missiles as previously predicted. Can you explain the new threat assessment and 

describe the impact of this revised threat assessment on the development of the new 

architecture? 

General CARTWRIGHT. [Deleted.] 

85 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK BEGICH

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW

25. Senator BEGICH. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and General 

O’Reilly, since March 2009, the MDA has discussed conducting a BMDR. Reference 

a presentation given to our office in May 2009 by MDA, the BMDR was going to 

be conducted from August through December 2009 and provided to Congress in January 2010. During the hearing, the BMDR was referenced several times as justification for recent decisions concerning missile defense. At one point, it was said that 

the BMDR has been going on for 3 years. However, both Secretary Flournoy and 

General Cartwright’s joint testimony states the BMDR will not be completed until 

January 2010. 

There seems to be several inconsistencies with the timing and execution of the 

BMDR and the decisions being made based on interim findings. DOD and the administration have made significant changes to the missile defense program of record 

based on findings from what they say are results of the BMDR. These changes include reduction from 44 GBIs based in the United States to 30 GBIs. Most recently, 

the decision to cancel the deployment of the 10 GBIs deployed in Europe while proposing an entirely new means of intercept through the ascent phase using SM–3 

missiles. When will Congress receive the BMDR? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Consistent with section 234 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the BMDR will be finalized and provided to Congress no later than January 31, 2010. 

General CARTWRIGHT. The analysis required to support the President’s decision on 

European missile defense was front-loaded in the review. There is more work to be 

done in other areas of the review. Consistent with congressional direction from section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the BMDR 

will be finalized and provided to Congress in January 2010. 

General O’REILLY. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for conducting the BMDR, which is still ongoing. MDA has participated by providing critical technical and engineering data needed to inform the discussion. The results of 

the BMDR will be submitted to Congress not later than January 31, 2010 as required by Sec. 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. 

But regarding your concerns about the number of GBIs, 30 highly ready operational 

GBIs will provide the United States with adequate operational interceptors considering the limited number of ICBM capable launch complexes in North Korea and 

Iran. The fiscal year 2010 budget reflects our commitment to procure the complete 

buy of 44 GBIs on contract, of which some will go to the replacement and refurbishment of the 14 oldest interceptors to improve the operational readiness of the fleet 

and extend the U.S. GBI production capacity. 

26. Senator BEGICH. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and General 

O’Reilly, were conclusions from this review used in the administration’s change of 

direction in the European site? If so, why has the BMDR and supporting documentation not been provided to Congress? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Although the BMDR is not due to Congress until January 2010, 

we already have reached some important conclusions. We have decided to move forward now on selected conclusions from the review so we do not delay the process 

of improving defenses for ourselves, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners, 

many of whom are facing an immediate, near-term threat from large inventories of 

short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. This is an important issue to some of 

our allies and partners, and we wanted to inform them as soon as possible. 

Consistent with congressional direction as outlined in Section 234 of the Duncan 

Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the BMDR will be 

finalized and provided to Congress no later than in January 31, 2010. 

General CARTWRIGHT. Although the BMDR is not due to Congress until January, 

we already have reached some important conclusions. We have decided to move forward now on selected conclusions from our review so we don’t delay the process of 

improving defenses for ourselves, our deployed forces, and our allies, many of who 

are facing an immediate, near-term threat from large inventories of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. This is an important issue to some of our allies and 

we wanted to inform them as soon as possible. 

Consistent with congressional direction as outlined in section 234 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the BMDR will be finalized and provided to Congress in January 2010. 

General O’REILLY. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for conducting the BMDR, which is still ongoing. MDA has participated by providing critVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\55138.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
86 

ical technical and engineering data needed to inform the discussion. The results of 

the BMDR will be submitted to Congress not later than January 31, 2010, as required by section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2009. 

27. Senator BEGICH. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and General 

O’Reilly, the administration and DOD have consistently agreed to work in conjunction with Congress. Was it the intent of DOD to submit the BMDR to Congress for 

review before decisions were made on changing the policies and programs of record 

for missile defense in the United States and around the world? If so, what prompted 

accelerated decisions? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. It was not our intent, nor were we required, to submit the BMDR 

report to Congress for review before decisions were made. The BMDR is one of several reviews, including the Space Policy Review and the Nuclear Policy Review, 

being conducted in conjunction with the Quadrennial Defense Review. These reviews will form the basis for DOD policy and strategy over the next 10–15 years, 

and will inform the preparation of the fiscal year 2011 budget. 

Section 234 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2009 directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a review of the BMD policy 

and strategy of the United States and, upon completion, provide that report to Congress. Consistent with those requirements, the Secretary of Defense will submit to 

Congress the final results of the review no later than January 31, 2010. 

We have decided to move forward now on selected conclusions from the review so 

we do not delay the process of improving defenses for ourselves, our deployed forces, 

and our allies and partners, many of whom are facing an immediate, near-term 

threat from large inventories of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. This 

was an important issue to some of our allies and partners, and we wanted to inform 

them as soon as possible. 

General CARTWRIGHT. It was not our intent, nor were we required, to submit the 

BMDR report to Congress for review before decisions were made. The BMDR is one 

of several reviews, including the Space Policy Review and the Nuclear Policy Review, being conducted in conjunction with the Quadrennial Defense Review. These 

reviews will form the basis for DOD policy and strategy over the next 10–15 years, 

and will inform the preparation of the fiscal year 2011 budget. 

Section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 directs 

the Secretary of Defense to conduct a review of the BMD policy and strategy of the 

United States and, upon completion, provide that report to Congress. Consistent 

with those requirements, the Secretary of Defense will submit to Congress the final 

results of our review in January 2010. 

We have decided to move forward now on selected conclusions from our review 

so we don’t delay the process of improving defenses for ourselves, our deployed 

forces, and our allies, many of who are facing an immediate, near-term threat from 

large inventories of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. This was an important issue to some of our allies and we wanted to inform them as soon as possible. 

General O’REILLY. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for technical aspects of 

the new architecture including the development, testing, and fielding of the architecture’s components. I defer to my colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

the Department of State who are in a better position to respond to questions that 

have policy or diplomatic implications. 

28. Senator BEGICH. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and General 

O’Reilly, were the decisions to reduce the number of interceptors deployed in the 

United States (Alaska and California) from 44 to 30 based on having 10 GBIs deployed in Europe as indicated by the 2010 President’s budget submission? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The decision to reduce the number of operational interceptors emplaced at Fort Greely, Alaska, was driven by the current assessment of the longrange ballistic missile threat from countries like Iran and North Korea. The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

the MDA, determined that the current force of 30 operational GBIs provides the 

warfighter a sufficient defense against possible long-range ballistic missile threats 

to the homeland from rogue nations like Iran and North Korea. This determination 

was not dependent on having 10 additional GBIs deployed in Europe. 

General CARTWRIGHT. The recent decision on European-based BMD was independent of force-structure considerations concerning GBIs in Alaska and California. 

The decision to reduce the number of operational interceptors emplaced at Fort 

Greely, AK, was driven by the current assessment of the long-range ballistic missile 

threat from countries like Iran and North Korea. The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the MDA, determined that the current 

87 

force of 30 operational GBIs provides the warfighter a sufficient defense against possible long-range ballistic missile threats to the homeland from rogue nations like 

Iran and North Korea. 

It should also be noted that the decision to cap the emplacement of operational 

interceptors at 30 will allow the Department to provide a more reliable and effective 

capability for the defense of the homeland by decommissioning the older ‘‘test-bed’’ 

Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely, and instead begin fielding GBIs in the new Missile 

Field 2. 

General O’REILLY. [Deleted.] 

GBI SILOS AND SILO INTERFACE VAULTS

29. Senator BEGICH. General Cartwright and General O’Reilly, in the September 

17 joint press conference between Secretary Gates and General Cartwright, General 

Cartwright, you stated: ‘‘We’re continuing the effort that we have ongoing today on 

the ground-based interceptor, which is to build a two-stage capability . . . those steps 

are funded and will continue.’’ We have already constructed and paid for the last 

seven silos and silo-interface vaults to be fielded in Alaska at a cost of approximately $62 million. It had been discussed that since the decision to not field the 

final seven interceptors in Alaska, these systems would be used in Europe. Since 

deploying a silo-based GBI system in Europe is no longer planned, will DOD reevaluate the decision about fielding the final seven silos in MF 2 at Fort Greely? 

Why or why not? 

General CARTWRIGHT. MDA plans to field the final 7 silos to complete Missile 

Field-2 in a 14-silo configuration. While this will not affect the number of GBIs emplaced at Fort Greely, it will allow for the decommissioning of Missile Field-1 and 

provide future flexibility for an increase in the number of interceptors, if the threat 

evolves. 

General O’REILLY. MDA plans to complete Missile Field-2 in a 14 silo configuration. This will allow for the decommissioning of Missile Field-1 and provide future 

flexibility for an increase in the number of interceptors, if the threat evolves. 

30. Senator BEGICH. General Cartwright and General O’Reilly, could the final 

seven silos and silo interface vaults be installed in Alaska and accept the two-phase 

interceptors? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes. The launch silo and handling equipment are the same 

for two-stage and three-stage interceptors, as these interceptors share the same external dimensions as well as the same structural and mechanical interfaces with the 

silo. Emplacement of two-stage interceptor would require development of changes to 

GMD Fire Control and Command Launch Equipment software, with requisite testing. However, MDA currently has no plans to emplace more than 26 GBIs at Fort 

Greely. Additional silos at Fort Greely by themselves would not be cause to increase 

the number of GBIs without a change in the threat assessment leading to a decision 

to emplace additional interceptors. 

General O’REILLY. Yes. The launch silo and handling equipment are the same for 

two-stage and three-stage interceptors, as these interceptors share the same external dimensions as well as the same structural and mechanical interfaces with the 

silo. Emplacement of two-stage interceptor would require development of changes to 

GMD Fire Control and Command Launch Equipment software, with requisite testing. However, MDA currently has no plans to emplace more than 26 GBIs at Fort 

Greely. 

THREAT

31. Senator BEGICH. General Cartwright, in your joint prepared testimony with 

Secretary Flournoy, you state that Iran has increased production of short-medium 

range missiles and is slower to develop ICBMs. However, you caveat this statement 

with the fact that our intelligence projections can be wrong. I understand that a report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) believes Iran is much 

closer today to marrying their ballistic missile arsenal and its nuclear program to 

fashion a system capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. It has been stated construction of a missile field takes 5 years and as a result of the fiscal year 2010 shortfalls, 

production base capabilities will most likely be lost or otherwise negatively impacted. What is your assessment in how close Iran is to materializing a system capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to attack Europe and the United States? 

General CARTWRIGHT. [Deleted.] 

88 

32. Senator BEGICH. General Cartwright, has the construction and production aspect necessary for deploying additional GMD capabilities to meet the materializing 

threat been considered? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Construction and production aspects for deploying additional GMD capabilities have been considered. Should future changes to the assessed threat so warrant, the Combatant Commands, in collaboration with the Services and the Joint Staff, will document the requirement for additional GMD capabilities. 

33. Senator BEGICH. General Cartwright, what level of strategic risk has been accepted by decisions not to deploy a European site or field 44 interceptors in 

CONUS? 

General CARTWRIGHT. First, there was no decision to ‘‘not deploy a European 

Site’’. Rather, the new Phased Adaptive Approach reaffirms the strategic value of 

European-based missile defense. The new approach revises the previous plan in 

order to better leverage recent advancements in technologies and capabilities, and 

to better respond to the threat that our forward-deployed forces face now. The new 

approach will still field shooter, sensor and command and control elements in Europe. 

The decision to field 30 operational GBIs in Alaska and California, rather than 

the previously planned 44, was the result of a careful and deliberative process by 

which the Department determined the best way to provide missile defense capabilities. This year’s budget request, including the decision to field 30 GBIs, places a 

greater emphasis on defending against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles 

(SRBM/MRBM), which comprise the most significant ballistic missile threat to our 

forces and allies today. The sheer inventory of SRBM’s and MRBM’s that exist today 

in countries like Iran require us to focus on deploying regional and theater capabilities now, while also developing defenses against long-range missiles should such a 

threat materialize in the future. 

The decisions reflected in the administration’s fiscal year 2011 budget request and 

the recent decision on European BMD substantially decreases the risk to our forward-deployed forces, including their families, and our friends and allies. 

34. Senator BEGICH. General Cartwright, how does the Department justify that 

risk? 

General CARTWRIGHT. As noted above, the decisions reflected in the administration’s fiscal year 2011 budget request and the recent decision on European BMD 

substantially decreases the risk to our forward-deployed forces, including their families, and our friends and allies. 

FUNDING

35. Senator BEGICH. General O’Reilly, we have seen several cost estimates for the 

various options for a missile defense system in Europe. The two main systems discussed were a silo-based plan, recently cancelled by the administration, and a seabased plan. According to a February 2009 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report, the silo-based plan would cost between $9 billion to $14 billion over 20 years. 

The CBO report says the sea-based plan in which the United States would deploy 

SM–3 interceptors on Navy ships and station them permanently at three locations 

in European waters would cost almost twice as much as MDA’s original proposal— 

a total of about $18 billion to $26 billion over 20 years—largely because CBO assumed that the Navy would need to buy additional ships to operate it. However, testimony today indicated the Department has not yet fleshed out the details of requirements necessary to execute this plan. Is there proper funding in fiscal year 

2010 and planned in fiscal year 2011 to begin to implement the administration’s 

new plan? Please describe in detail. 

General O’REILLY. MDA is committed to fully funding this program as the Agency 

prepares for the next budget submission to Congress. However, it is important that 

MDA have relief from rescissions and the flexibility to spend the unused fiscal year 

2009 RDT&E and some MILCON dollars associated with the previous European 

Site proposal. With relief from some of the constraints placed on the Agency’s fiscal 

year 2009 budget and some redirection of fiscal year 2010 funds, MDA believes it 

can pursue this new architecture within its fiscal year 2010 budget request. We are 

currently building the fiscal years 2011–2015 Future Years Defense Plan and outyear funding profiles to reflect the new architecture, and they will be available with 

the PB11 release. 

89 

MDA also would note that both the House and Senate authorizing committees 

very presciently included provisions in this year’s National Defense Authorization 

bill that permit the Department to use fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 funding 

for an alternative architecture once the Secretary of Defense certified that this architecture is as cost-effective, technically reliable, and operationally available as the 

previous program. 

ASCENT PHASE INTERCEPT TECHNOLOGY

36. Senator BEGICH. General O’Reilly, following the April 6, 2009, administration 

announcement to cut certain missile defense systems and increase funding in other 

areas, MDA briefed a new layer to the Integrated BMD plan, Ascent Phase Intercept. When should Congress expect a detailed brief on this technology and plan for 

how this will be integrated into the BMD architecture? 

General O’REILLY. The House Armed Services Committee directed the Secretary 

of Defense to submit a Report to Congress on Ascent Phase Missile Defense Strategy 

(‘‘Early Intercept’’). The Report to Congress is due 180 days after enactment of National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2010 (est April 2010). 

SM–3 MISSILES IN EUROPE

37. Senator BEGICH. Secretary Flournoy and General O’Reilly, Secretary Gates 

has said that we will deploy ‘‘scores’’ of SM–3 missiles in Europe to defend against 

a growing Iranian threat of short-to medium-range missiles. Can you better define 

‘‘scores’’ of missiles? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The ability to augment future land-based sites with Aegis-capable 

ships will allow the United States to rapidly increase defensive capabilities when 

needed. The Phased Adaptive Approach will field a significantly larger number of 

interceptors and sensors by leveraging proven, mobile, and more cost-effective platforms like AN/TPY–2 radars, airborne infrared sensors, and SM–3s. 

General O’REILLY. [Deleted.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

ALLIED REACTIONS

38. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Flournoy, when were our allies notified of the 

President’s decision on missile defense in Europe? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The President phoned the Czech Prime Minister on the evening 

of September 16 to inform him of the decision, and he reached his Polish counterpart on the morning of September 17. I led an interagency team to Warsaw, Prague, 

and NATO Headquarters in Brussels on September 17 to provide details on the 

basis for the decision and our new proposed BMD architecture. 

39. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Flournoy, were they consulted in advance of the 

notification, and if so, on what date(s)? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. Consultations with allies and friends on the BMDR began 

in May in various bilateral and multilateral settings. We consulted with NATO as 

well as a number of European countries. During these consultations we listened and 

offered allies the opportunity to share their ideas and suggestions for consideration 

during our review. 

40. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Flournoy, Secretary Gates said during his press 

conference: ‘‘We would prefer to put the SM–3s in Poland, in place of the GBIs.’’ 

Does this mean that we have not yet gained Poland’s support to field land-based 

SM–3 missiles in exchange for the GBIs? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. We have offered Poland the ‘‘first right of refusal’’ to host a landbased SM–3 site in Poland in large part due to Poland’s willingness to be part of 

our previous European Missile Defense plans. We expect that Poland will make its 

intentions known later this fall. 

41. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Flournoy, what is the likelihood that Poland and 

the Czech Republic as well as other NATO countries will agree to host land-based 

SM–3s and associated sensors? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. We are confident that NATO countries will support our efforts as 

they begin to realize that the intent of the system is to protect not only U.S. forces, 

90 

dependents, and military facilities in Europe, but all NATO member countries as 

well. 

NATO’s initial response to our briefing on September 17 was very positive. Since 

then, several allies have contacted us to express their interest in hosting elements 

of the new architecture. 

42. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Flournoy, under the Bush concept, our NATO allies were encouraged to contribute to Europe’s defense against short- and mediumrange threats. Your plan suggests the United States will assume this mission. How 

do we now ensure our allies contributions to their own defense? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Under the Phased Adaptive Approach, there will be more opportunities for allies to participate in their own defense. For example, the Phased Adaptive Approach will be interoperable with NATO systems and with the lower-tier 

BMD systems that are already being acquired by some allies. Also, several allies 

already have Aegis and Patriot capabilities that could contribute to the Phased 

Adaptive Approach. 

RUSSIAN REACTIONS

43. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and General 

O’Reilly, when were the Russians notified of the President’s decision on missile defense in Europe? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Ambassador Kislyak of the Russian Federation was notified of the 

President’s decision on the morning of September 17, EST. 

General CARTWRIGHT. My understanding is that the Russian Government was notified of the President’s decision on September 17. I cannot offer additional clarity 

on the meeting as neither I nor any Joint Staff representatives were present. 

General O’REILLY. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for technical aspects of 

the new architecture including the development, testing, and fielding of the architecture’s components. I defer to my colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

the Department of State who are in a better position to respond to questions that 

have policy or diplomatic implications. 

44. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and General 

O’Reilly, were they told before or after we spoke with our allies and if so, what has 

been their reaction? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The Russians were told after the Czechs and Poles were notified. 

The Russian reaction has been cautious, but generally positive. Prime Minister 

Vladimir Putin called the decision ‘‘correct and brave.’’ President Dmitri A. 

Medvedev hinted that Russia would respond favorably to the decision to replace the 

program of record with a missile shield that is seen as less threatening to Moscow. 

Foreign Minister Lavrov has also made positive comments on the decision, stating 

it ‘‘creates good conditions for dialogue.’’ 

Other Russian officials such as Dmitriy Rogozin and the Chief of the General 

Staff, General Nikolai Makarov, have been less than enthusiastic since the announcement was made, indicating that they want guarantees that the system in no 

way threatens Russia. 

General CARTWRIGHT. We notified our Czech and Polish allies prior to the U.S. 

Government’s notification to the Russian Government. The Russian President and 

Prime Minister made public statements that were generally supportive of the decision. Of course, the Russians remain interested in learning the details associated 

with our plans for missile defense in Europe, and we are committed to meeting with 

them to determine their willingness to play a constructive and cooperative role in 

the process. 

General O’REILLY. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for technical aspects of 

the new architecture including the development, testing, and fielding of the architecture’s components. I defer to my colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

the Department of State who are in a better position to respond to questions that 

have policy or diplomatic implications. 

45. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and General 

O’Reilly, what has been their reaction? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Russian reaction has been cautious, but generally positive. Prime 

Minister Vladimir Putin called the decision ‘‘correct and brave.’’ President Dmitri 

A. Medvedev hinted that Russia would respond favorably to the decision to replace 

the program of record with a missile shield that is seen as less threatening to MosVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:32 Mar 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\55138.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
91 

cow. Foreign Minister Lavrov has also made positive comments on the decision, stating it ‘‘creates good conditions for dialogue.’’ 

Other Russian officials such as Dmitriy Rogozin and the Chief of the General 

Staff, General Nikolai Makarov, have been less than enthusiastic since the announcement was made, indicating that they want guarantees that the system in no 

way threatens Russia. 

General CARTWRIGHT. Following the President’s announcement on the new 

‘‘phased adaptive approach’’ to missile defense in Europe, Russian official statements by the President and Prime Minister were cautiously optimistic that the new 

approach would address Russian security concerns. The Russian President indicated 

that ISKANDER missiles would no longer need to be deployed to Kaliningrad. In 

addition, following the presidents’ meeting on the margins of the U.N. General Assembly meeting, President Medvedev announced a greater willingness to consider 

sanctions as part of the diplomatic process with respect to Iran. I anticipate that 

a more in-depth substantive dialogue between U.S. and Russian experts will occur 

in the near-term with a view toward exploring areas of cooperation in this area. 

General O’REILLY. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for technical aspects of 

the new architecture including the development, testing, and fielding of the architecture’s components. I defer to my colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

the Department of State who are in a better position to respond to questions that 

have policy or diplomatic implications. 

46. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and General 

O’Reilly, has the administration received assurances that the future deployment of 

different missiles with the same intended capability as the GBI to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles will not be met with future resistance and objection? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. No, the Russians have not provided such assurances, nor did we 

expect them to do so. An important aspect of the new Phased Adaptive Approach 

is its adaptability in the face of uncertainty over the development of the Iranian ballistic missile threat. That uncertainty may require future deployment of different 

systems, and we hope Russia would cooperate with the United States in the face 

of a common threat. Russia seems to be reviewing the new approach, and its position could evolve. We are hoping that our efforts to be transparent with the Russians and to encourage Russian participation and cooperation on missile defense will 

result in a greater amount of trust and Russian cooperation with us. 

General CARTWRIGHT. No assurances have been received. We have yet to have a 

detailed experts-level exchange with the Russians on this aspect of our missile defense plans. However, the reaction from the Russian political leadership has been 

very positive and we anticipate that response to factor into a constructive dialogue 

with our Russian colleagues at the expert level. 

General O’REILLY. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for technical aspects of 

the new architecture including the development, testing, and fielding of the architecture’s components. I defer to my colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

the Department of State who are in a better position to respond to questions that 

have policy or diplomatic implications. 

47. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and General 

O’Reilly, what will we do if they change their minds and object? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The decision on missile defense was not based on any expectations 

about the Russian reaction. The United States changed its European BMD plans because of an updated threat assessment and the availability of new capabilities. Although the new Phased Adaptive Approach approved by the President does not pose 

a threat to Russia, there will likely be elements of the system in Central Europe 

to which the Russians may object. Although we sincerely desire Russian participation and cooperation in addressing this common threat, Russia cannot and will not 

be able to divert the United States from the strategic goal of protecting Europe and 

the United States from Iranian ballistic missile attacks. 

General CARTWRIGHT. We will closely consult with Russia on our missile defense 

plans in Europe with a view toward enhancing their understanding of the approach 

and soliciting their inputs on potential areas of cooperation. At this point in time, 

it would be premature to engage in speculation on the Russian reaction or the prospective U.S. response to that reaction. We will seek to address on a case-by-case 

basis on any objections the Russians might raise. 

General O’REILLY. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for technical aspects of 

the new architecture including the development, testing, and fielding of the architecture’s components. I defer to my colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

the Department of State who are in a better position to respond to questions that 

have policy or diplomatic implications. 

92 

48. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and General 

O’Reilly, how do you expect this decision to impact U.S.-Russian relations? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Although the decision to change our approach to missile defense 

was not made to placate the Russians, if removing an irritant to the relationship 

can result in better cooperation on the wide range of issues on which we would like 

to cooperate with Russia, then I would view this as an added benefit. We see missile 

defense as an opportunity for multilateral cooperation against a common threat. 

General CARTWRIGHT. I would anticipate that resolving this issue in a way that 

addresses both our countries’ security concerns will provide tangible momentum to 

the broader relationship. Our presidents have committed to working together on security issues of mutual concern. Cooperation on missile defense in Europe is fully 

aligned with these principles. 

General O’REILLY. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for technical aspects of 

the new architecture including the development, testing, and fielding of the architecture’s components. I defer to my colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

the Department of State who are in a better position to respond to questions that 

have policy or diplomatic implications. 

49. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Flournoy, General Cartwright, and General 

O’Reilly, do you agree that this decision creates in the minds of many that the 

United States has offered a concession to the Russians? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. As Secretary Gates wrote: ‘‘Those who say we are scrapping missile defense in Europe are either misinformed or misinterpreting what we are 

doing.’’ Although the Russian media may have put a positive spin on the decision 

initially, the Russian professional elite understand that the decision was taken after 

careful study and consideration, and that we decided upon the best system to meet 

our needs. 

General CARTWRIGHT. It would not be accurate to characterize this decision as a 

‘‘concession’’ to the Russian Government. Our decisionmaking with respect to European deployments has been based on an extensive technical assessment and projection of the threat as it has evolved over the past several years. Detailed Russian 

security concerns were expressed to U.S. representatives during various consultations we had over the past several years. While these inputs certainly informed the 

process, they were by no means a determining factor in our internal decision-making. 

General O’REILLY. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for technical aspects of 

the new architecture including the development, testing, and fielding of the architecture’s components. I defer to my colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

the Department of State who are in a better position to respond to questions that 

have policy or diplomatic implications. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

REACTION IN EUROPE

50. Senator VITTER. Secretary Flournoy, I have deep reservations about the administration’s recent decision to cancel the planned BMD installations in Eastern 

Europe. This decision is particularly troubling in light of the continuing threat 

posed by the Iranian regime’s development of ballistic missile systems. In what 

ways does the cancellation of the European BMD program increase the security of 

the United States or her allies from the threat posed by long-range ballistic missiles 

from Iran or other hostile regimes? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The revised European-based BMD program does not ‘‘cancel’’ the 

fielding of BMD capabilities in Europe. Rather, it revises the planned system to provide a significantly better and more adaptive defense of the United States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies and partners. 

This phased approach starts by protecting those most at risk from current Iranian 

missile threats and grows in later phases to protect all of our European allies and 

U.S. forces, civilians and their families stationed in NATO countries, and the U.S. 

Homeland. As planned, the approach will leverage proven capabilities with SM–3 

interceptors and forward-based X-band radars, while still providing our military 

commanders the ability to adapt quickly to new and emerging threats. There are 

also greater opportunities for our allies and other partners to participate—sensors 

and interceptors of international allies and partners can be interoperable with this 

approach. 

The Phased Adaptive Approach significantly improves our ability to meet nearterm requirements for our warfighters. Today our forward deployed forces face a 

93 

range of potential missile threats, including increasing numbers and types of shortand medium-range ballistic missiles, ongoing Iranian development programs to field 

more capable missiles, and the ability of the enemy to conduct salvo launches in an 

attempt to overwhelm the system. This phased approach deliberately addresses the 

threats we see today, while also augmenting the defense of Europe and the U.S. 

Homeland against threats we may face in the future. 

51. Senator VITTER. Secretary Flournoy, are you concerned that this decision in 

any way increases the vulnerability of U.S. forces stationed in Europe or our allies 

in the region? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. On the contrary, the Phased Adaptive Approach will provide U.S. 

forces in Europe and our allies in the region protection sooner against the missile 

threats they face now. The new approach is also flexible in that it augments existing 

defenses of the U.S. Homeland should a long-range ballistic missile threat from a 

country like Iran suddenly surface, and creates another layer of long-range defenses 

that will be deployed in future phases. 

52. Senator VITTER. Secretary Flournoy, Russian leaders have indicated that they 

view the decision to cancel the European BMD program favorably. Do you believe 

that the United States and Russia share the same long-term objectives regarding 

deterrence of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. It is important for the Russians and others to understand that 

we did not cancel the European BMD program. We redesigned it to be more immediately responsive to the projected threat and more adaptive to the future threat. 

The Russians share our concern over the possibility of a potential Iranian nuclear 

weapon capability, and they have made it clear that they prefer a diplomatic solution to this issue. However, President Medvedev stated in New York that sanctions 

may be inevitable in certain situations. We appreciate his comments and hope that 

the new positive atmosphere in our relations will be reflected in how we deal with 

the issue of Iran. 

53. Senator VITTER. Secretary Flournoy, do you believe that the cancellation of the 

European BMD program in any way affords Russia a strategic advantage in the region, particularly in regard to former Soviet bloc states including the Czech Republic 

and Poland? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The President did not cancel European missile defense. The President opted for a Phased Adaptive Approach that takes advantage of new technology 

to addresses the short- to medium-range threats sooner than the GBIs and European Mid-course Radar (EMR) would have been emplaced in Poland and the Czech 

Republic. Poland has first right of refusal on hosting land-based SM–3s in a later 

phase. We are exploring potential roles for the Czech Republic in the new architecture. I believe this new architecture, which can better protect Europe from the current and future Iranian missile threats, improves stability and is a win-win for all 

of Europe including Russia. 

54. Senator VITTER. Secretary Flournoy, was the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

follow-on negotiation ever mentioned in the context of this decision by you or anyone 

by the administration that you are aware of? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. We are moving to a Phased, Adaptive Approach because it will 

be more effective against current and emerging missile threats to Europe and the 

United States. From the beginning of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Followon Treaty negotiations, we have made it clear to the Russians that the treaty should 

not include any limitations on missile defenses and that discussions on missile defense should be conducted through other bilateral contacts. 

STRATEGIC SHIFT

55. Senator VITTER. General O’Reilly, I am frankly very concerned about this shift 

in our approach to missile defense, particularly the sudden reversal of our plans to 

cooperate with our Polish and Czech allies in establishing BMD installations. Broadly speaking, what is your opinion of the role of permanent, theater-based BMD installations in our overall missile defense strategy? 

General O’REILLY. There is a high degree of flexibility in where elements of the 

revised Phased, Adaptive Approach can be based—sea- and land-based at locations 

in northern and southern Europe. By mixing sea- and land-based missile defense, 

the war fighter will be able to leverage both ‘‘theater-based BMD installations,’’ such 

as the land-based SM–3 sites, and sea-based assets, that are mobile and can be 

94 

surged to the region as the threat develops, to provide a more powerful and responsive missile defense capability. 

56. Senator VITTER. General O’Reilly, you recently expressed support for a shift 

toward sea-based mobile BMD systems over the fixed land-based systems in Eastern 

Europe. In as much detail as possible, can you describe how the sea-based system 

represents an improvement over the land-based system? 

General O’REILLY. [Deleted.] 

57. Senator VITTER. General O’Reilly, are you at all concerned that the cancellation of the European BMD installations will serve the strategic interests of Russia 

at the expense of the long-term interests of the United States? 

General O’REILLY. As head of the MDA, I am responsible for technical aspects of 

the new architecture including the development, testing, and fielding of the architecture’s components. I defer to my colleagues in Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

the Department of State who are in a better position to respond to questions that 

have policy or diplomatic implications. 

[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

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