UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1118

ANGELA D. MCLEOD,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of SSA,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:13-cv-00550-BO)

Submitted: August 31, 2015 Decided: September 11, 2015

Before WILKINSON, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David F. Black, General Counsel, Cassia W. Parson, SOCIAL 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland; Benjamin C. Mizer, 

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Thomas G. Walker, 

United States Attorney, Caroline D. Lopez, Civil Division, 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellant. Charlotte W. Hall, CHARLES T. HALL LAW FIRM, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

The Acting Commissioner of Social Security appeals the 

district court’s orders: (1) reversing the Commissioner’s 

decision denying the application of Angela D. McLeod for 

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security 

benefits; (2) remanding for an award of benefits; and (3) 

denying the Commissioner’s Fedederal Rule of Civil Procedure

59(e) motion. We hold that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in reversing the Commissioner’s decision instead of 

remanding the matter to the Commissioner for further 

consideration of the administrative record. Accordingly, we 

affirm the district court’s judgment.

I.

Following a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) 

found that McLeod suffered from a number of severe impairments, 

including malignant hypertension and migraine headaches. The 

ALJ found that none of the impairments, singly or in 

combination, met or equaled a listing at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, 

subpt. P., app. 1 (2012). The ALJ also found that McLeod 

retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light 

work, with some restrictions. Consequently, on the basis of the 

evidence in the record, the ALJ found that McLeod was not 

disabled and not entitled to benefits. The Appeals Council 
3

upheld this decision, which became the final decision of the 

Commissioner. 

McLeod then filed a complaint in the district court. 

Following a hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for judgment 

on the pleadings, the district court reversed the Commissioner’s 

decision on the ground that it was not supported by substantial 

evidence. The court focused on the ALJ’s handling of evidence 

related to McLeod’s hypertension and migraine headaches. The 

court found that the record did not support the ALJ’s finding 

that these conditions were managed when McLeod was compliant 

with medication. Specifically, the court found that McLeod’s 

symptoms “continued despite medication compliance.” (J.A. 22). 

Additionally, the district court determined that the ALJ did not 

give “sufficient weight” to the opinion of McLeod’s treating 

physician. (J.A. 22). Because the vocational expert testified 

that there were no jobs that McLeod could perform if her 

migraines and hypertension were not controlled, the court 

remanded for an award of benefits. 

II.

“When examining an SSA disability determination, a 

reviewing court is required to uphold the determination when an 

ALJ has applied the correct legal standards and the ALJ’s 

factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Bird 
4

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 

2012). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)

(internal quotation marks omitted), and “consists of more than a 

mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a 

preponderance,” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir 

1966). “In reviewing for substantial evidence, we do not

undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility 

determinations, or substitute our judgment for that of the 

[Commissioner].” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 

1996). Nor should the reviewing court “engage in these 

exercises in the first instance.” Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 

288, 296 (4th Cir. 2013). 

“If the reviewing court decides that the ALJ’s decision is 

not supported by substantial evidence, it may affirm, modify, or 

reverse the ALJ’s ruling ‘with or without remanding the cause 

for a rehearing.’” Id. at 295 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

(2012)). It is appropriate to reverse without remanding for 

further proceedings if “the record does not contain substantial 

evidence to support a decision denying coverage under the 

correct legal standard and . . . reopening the record for more 

evidence would serve no purpose.” Breeden v. Weinberger, 493 

F.2d 1002, 1012 (4th Cir. 1974). “We review the district 
5

court’s choice of remedy—to affirm, modify, or reverse—for abuse 

of discretion.” Radford, 734 F.3d at 295. 

In its brief, the Commissioner overstates this Court’s 

holding in Radford. In that case, the ALJ’s denial of benefits 

was “devoid of reasoning.” Id. While the ALJ in Radford did 

cite state medical opinions, he did not “indicate why the 

opinions merit[ed]” the weight he afforded them. Id.

Furthermore, the ALJ failed to provide any explanation why he 

rejected the treating physician’s opinions. Id. at 295-96. 

While the district court ruled that remand was futile, we noted 

that there was some conflicting evidence in the record. Id. at 

296. Consequently, the record was “ambivalen[t].” Id. Because 

of this, and because the ALJ failed to explain his reasoning, 

the district court could not meaningfully review the record. 

Id. Thus, remanding for further proceedings was necessary. Id.

Here, however, the ALJ provided reasoning in finding that 

McLeod’s ailments could be managed by medication. Thus, unlike 

in Radford, the district court had the opportunity to consider 

the ALJ’s analysis and determine if it was indeed supported by 

substantial evidence. The district court concluded that the

record did not support the ALJ’s conclusion that McLeod’s

symptoms could be managed by medication. Indeed, the district 

court found that the evidence pointed decidedly in the other 

direction. 
6

We thus conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in reversing the decision of the Commissioner and 

directing the Social Security Administration to award benefits. 

Remanding for further development of evidence or consideration 

of the record is unnecessary.

III.

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED