NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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Nos. 15-3984 & 16-1871

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BERISH BERGER; KILBRIDE INVESTMENTS LIMITED; 

BUSYSTORE LIMITED; TOWERSTATES LIMITED; 

BERGFELD CO. LIMITED; ARDENLINK LIMITED 

v.

RICHARD ZEGHIBE; PATRIOT PARKING, INC.; JAMES RAPPOPORT; 

DDI ARCHITECTS, P.C.; DAROFF DESIGN, INC.; DAROFF DESIGN INC, DDI 

ARCHITECTS, P.C.; JATINDER CHAWLA; ELI WEINSTEIN; RAVINDER

CHAWLA; MARK SAHAYA; 2040 MARKET ASSOCIATES, LP; JFK BLVD 

ACQUISITION PARTNERS, L.P.; PINE PROJECTS LLC, C/O ELI WEINSTEIN;

WORLD ACQUISITION PARTNERS CORPORATION

Jatinder Chawla,

 Appellant

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CONSOLIDATED APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. No. 2-08-cv-05861)

District Judge: Hon. Berle M. Schiller

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 6, 2016

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Before: SHWARTZ, COWEN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: October 17, 2016)
2

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OPINION*

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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.

Jatinder Chawla (“Jatinder”)

1

appeals the District Court’s order granting a 

preliminary injunction to Berish Berger, Kilbride Investments Limited, Busystore 

Limited in Liquidation, Towerstates Limited, Bergfeld Co. Limited, and Ardenlink 

Limited (“Judgment Creditors”), enjoining Philadelphia Chancellor, LP (“Philadelphia 

Chancellor”) from making any payments to her and directing that the payments be placed 

in escrow. Jatinder claims that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over her and abused 

its discretion by granting the preliminary injunction. We disagree and will affirm.

I

Five years ago, a federal jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania awarded

Judgment Creditors and others a $33 million judgment against Jatinder’s husband, 

Ravinder Chawla (“Ravinder”), and others for fraud related to two real estate projects.2 

Collection has been unsuccessful because, on paper, Ravinder appears to have few 

assets,

3

even though he plays a leadership role in his family’s real estate development 

business. Although he is not directly compensated for his services, the family business 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 

does not constitute binding precedent.

1 For ease of reference, we are referring to the Chawlas by their first names.

2

Jatinder was a party in the lawsuit but no judgment was entered against her. 

3 Ravinder apparently holds no interest in any real estate investment trusts, 

savings, money market, checking, or retirement accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, 

securities, or negotiable instruments. With respect to personal property valued over 

$500, Ravinder claims to only own five business suits, a watch, and a gold chain. 
3

pays for his luxury cars, private school education for his children, home repairs, meals, 

insurance, attorneys’ fees, and some daily expenses. 

Jatinder has an ownership interest in a number of companies that make up the 

family’s real estate business, including Goldencents, Inc., from which she receives a 

$20,000 monthly stipend. Jatinder also has an ownership interest in an entity called 

Philadelphia Chancellor, which made a $200,000 distribution to her in 2014. 

Philadelphia Chancellor has a contract to sell a property (the “Chancellor Street 

Property”) for $25 million, which could result in the Chawla family receiving between $8 

million and $10 million.

In light of the impending sale of the Chancellor Street Property, Judgment 

Creditors filed a motion seeking a declaration that all of Jatinder’s interests are the assets 

of Ravinder. They also sought an injunction prohibiting Ravinder and Jatinder from 

disguising, concealing, transferring, assigning, and/or otherwise disposing of Ravinder’s 

assets held in Jatinder’s name. In the alternative, Judgment Creditors asked that all 

distributions be placed in escrow. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court 

entered an order preliminarily enjoining Philadelphia Chancellor from making any 

payments to Jatinder, and directing that any payments be placed in escrow until there is a 

decision regarding whether Ravinder has a partnership interest in Jatinder’s assets. 

Jatinder appeals. 

II4

 

4 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review legal issues de 

novo, factual findings for clear error, and the District Court’s order granting a 
4

Jatinder argues that the District Court: (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 

enter the preliminary injunction; (2) lacked jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 69 to issue 

an injunction against a nonparty; and (3) abused its discretion by issuing the preliminary 

injunction. We will address each argument in turn.

5

 

A

A district court that enters a judgment has subject matter jurisdiction over actions 

related to its enforcement. IFC Interconsult, AG v. Safeguard Int’l Partners, LLC., 438 

F.3d 298, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A] federal court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction 

(1) to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and 

degrees, factually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to . . . vindicate its authority, 

and effectuate its decrees.” (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 

379–80 (1994))).

6

 The injunction sought here—to prevent Jatinder from receiving, 

transferring, or disposing of assets in a manner that would prevent Judgment Creditors 

from collecting on their judgment—is precisely the type of post-judgment action that falls 

within a district court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Thus, the District Court had subject 

matter jurisdiction over this motion. 

 

preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 

183 (3d Cir. 1998).

5 Contrary to Jatinder’s argument, the relief sought here is not barred by res 

judicata based on Judgment Creditors’ previously unsuccessful fraudulent transfer action 

arising from different real estate development projects. Cf. Purter v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 

682, 690 (3d Cir. 1985) (“In order to raise successfully the defense of res judicata, the 

party asserting the defense must demonstrate[, among other things,] that . . . there had 

been a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit . . . [of] the same causes of action.”).

6 Our Court uses the terms ancillary jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction 

interchangeably. IFC Interconsult, 438 F.3d at 309.
5

B

Having determined that the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction, we next 

examine whether it had the power to issue an order resolving the motion against a 

nonparty. Judgment Creditors’ post-judgment motion is governed by Rule 69, which sets 

forth the following guidelines for proceedings in aid of executing a judgment:

A money judgment is enforced by a writ of execution, unless the court 

directs otherwise. The procedure on execution—and in proceedings 

supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution—must accord with 

the procedure of the state where the court is located, but a federal statute 

governs to the extent it applies.

Accordingly, under Rule 69, the District Court was bound to follow the procedures set 

forth by Pennsylvania state law and any applicable federal statute in deciding whether it 

had the authority to enter an injunction impacting Jatinder. The operative statutes in this 

case were Pa.R.C.P. No. 3118 and 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (the “All Writs Act”).

7

 Rule 3118 

 

7 Rule 3118 sets forth the following directives for obtaining summary relief in aid 

of execution:

(a) On petition of the plaintiff, after notice and hearing, the court in which a 

judgment has been entered may, before or after the issuance of a writ of 

execution, enter an order against any party or person

(1) enjoining the negotiation, transfer, assignment or other 

disposition of any security, document of title, pawn ticket, 

instrument, mortgage, or document representing any property 

interest of the defendant subject to execution;

(2) enjoining the transfer, removal, conveyance, assignment or other 

disposition of property of the defendant subject to execution;

(3) directing the defendant or any other party or person to take such 

action as the court may direct to preserve collateral security for 

property of the defendant levied upon or attached, or any security 

interest levied upon or attached;

(4) directing the disclosure to the sheriff of the whereabouts of 

property of the defendant;
6

permits summary proceedings in aid of executing a judgment to maintain the status quo 

as to property that is owned by the judgment debtor or in which he has an interest. 

Greater Valley Terminal Corp. v. Goodman, 202 A.2d 89, 92, 94 (Pa. 1964). The All 

Writs Act has been interpreted to empower a federal court “to issue such commands . . . 

as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders it 

has previously issued in its exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained.” United States v. 

N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977). This power “extends, under appropriate 

circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to the original action or engaged in 

wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the 

proper administration of justice, and encompasses even those who have not taken any 

affirmative action to hinder justice.” Id. at 174; see also Catalytic, Inc. v. Monmouth & 

Ocean Cty. Bldg. Trades Council, 829 F.2d 430, 434 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the All 

Writs Act empowers federal courts to enjoin nonparties to enforce orders in civil cases).

8

 

These two statutes collectively empower the District Court to grant a preliminary 

 

(5) directing that property of the defendant which has been removed 

from the county or concealed for the purpose of avoiding execution 

shall be delivered to the sheriff or made available for execution; and

(6) granting such other relief as may be deemed necessary and 

appropriate.

The All Writs Act provides that “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by 

Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 

jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

8 Courts should only exercise their authority under the All Writs Act “where there 

is no other adequate remedy.” Bd. of Comm’rs of Knox Cnty. v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S. 376, 

377 (1860); Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996). 
7

injunction against a nonparty to maintain the status quo as to property that might have 

been placed beyond the reach of a judgment creditor to avoid satisfying a judgment. 

Here, the District Court properly recognized a need to maintain the status quo as to 

Jatinder’s assets until such time as it adjudicates whether a partnership exists in which 

Ravinder has an interest. The All Writs Act authorized the District Court to enjoin 

Jatinder, a nonparty, because, as demonstrated at the preliminary injunction hearing, she 

is in a position to frustrate Judgment Creditors’ attempts to collect on their judgment by 

receiving income from Chawla family businesses in which Ravinder may have an 

interest. Thus, by acting within the scope of Rule 3118 and the All Writs Act, the District 

Court had the authority under Rule 69 to entertain a motion enjoining the distribution of 

assets to Jatinder.

C

We next examine whether the District Court acted within its discretion in granting 

the preliminary injunction. “To determine whether to grant a preliminary injunction, a 

district court must consider whether: “(1) . . . the movant has shown a reasonable 

probability of success on the merits; (2) . . . the movant will be irreparably injured by 

denial of the relief; (3) . . . granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to 

the nonmoving party; and (4) . . . granting the preliminary relief will be in the public 

interest.” Iles v. de Jongh, 638 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2011). Here, the District Court did 

not abuse its discretion by granting injunctive relief.
8

First, Judgment Creditors demonstrated a reasonable probability that a business

partnership exists in which Ravinder has an interest.

9 The record demonstrates that: (1) 

Jatinder has an interest in numerous real estate holding entities that are connected to 

Chawla family real estate development ventures and that she receives income from those 

entities; (2) Jatinder has no knowledge of her interest in these real estate entities and 

plays little or no role in them; (3) Ravinder plays a leadership role in these entities; and 

(4) although Ravinder receives no formal compensation for his work on his family’s real 

estate development ventures, the ventures subsidize many of Ravinder’s expenses and 

provide him with cash for daily expenses, and give Jatinder a $20,000 monthly “stipend.”

These facts demonstrate a reasonable probability that a Chawla partnership exists,

Ravinder has an interest in that partnership, and Judgment Creditors can execute upon the 

proceeds of that partnership. 

Second, Judgment Creditors demonstrated that they would be irreparably harmed 

by the denial of relief and that a balance of the equities favors an injunction because 

Ravinder has made no effort to pay the judgment against him and, absent judicial action, 

will likely continue to evade his creditors and the judgment itself by structuring his 

finances to appear insolvent. Third, nothing in the record suggests that Jatinder will be 

injured by an order preliminarily enjoining her from receiving payments from the 

Chancellor Street Property sale because it appears she has many other assets to sustain 

 

9 The District Court noted that Judgment Creditors satisfied the first prong of the 

preliminary injunction standard because they have a judgment against Ravinder. The 

correct inquiry here, however, is whether Judgment Creditors have demonstrated a 

reasonable probability that a partnership exists in which Ravinder has an interest. 
9

her. Finally, granting the injunction is in the public interest because it promotes respect 

for judgments. 

For these reasons, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by finding that 

Judgment Creditors met the factors necessary to grant preliminary injunctive relief.10 

III

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.

 

10 Jatinder’s appeal of the order denying her emergency motion to require 

Judgment Creditors to post a bond was mooted by the subsequent order requiring 

Judgment Creditors to post a $1,000,000.00 bond.