GAO 

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Defense, Committee on 

Appropriations, House of 

Representatives 

DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Challenges in Aligning 

Space System 

Components 

October 2009 

GAO-10-55 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

October 2009

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Challenges in Aligning Space System Components 

Highlights of GAO-10-55, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, 

Committee on Appropriations, House of 

Representatives 

The Department of Defense (DOD) 

expects to spend more than 

$50 billion to develop and procure 

eight major space systems. 

Typically, the systems have two 

main components: satellites and 

ground control systems. Some also 

have a third component—user 

terminals—that can allow access 

from remote locations. If the 

delivery of these three components 

is not synchronized, there can be 

delays in providing full capabilities 

to the warfighter, and satellites on 

orbit can remain underutilized for 

years. Given preliminary indication 

of uncoordinated deployment, GAO 

was asked to examine (1) the 

extent to which satellite, ground 

control, and user terminal 

deployments are aligned; (2) the 

reasons deployments have not 

always been well coordinated; 

(3) actions being taken to enhance 

coordination; and (4) whether 

enhancements to ground systems 

could optimize the government’s 

investment. To accomplish this, 

GAO analyzed plans for all major 

DOD satellite acquisitions and 

interviewed key officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Defense take a variety 

of actions to help ensure that DOD 

space systems provide more 

capability to the warfighter through 

better alignment and increased 

commonality, and to provide 

increased insight into ground asset 

costs. DOD generally agreed with 

these recommendations. Previous 

GAO recommendations have 

focused on improving acquisition 

problems. 

Satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals in most of DOD’s major 

space system acquisitions are not optimally aligned, leading to underutilized 

satellites and limited capability provided to the warfighter. Of the eight major 

space system acquisitions we studied, three systems anticipated that their 

satellites will be launched well before their associated ground control systems 

are fully capable of operating on-orbit capabilities. Furthermore, for five of 

the eight major space systems GAO reviewed, user terminals were to become 

operational after their associated satellites reach initial capability—in some 

cases, years after. When the deployments of satellites, ground control 

systems, and user terminals are not well synchronized, problems arise that 

can affect both the warfighter and the space systems themselves. When 

capabilities are delayed because of lack of alignment between satellite and 

ground control systems or user terminals, the warfighter may develop shortterm solutions, often at diminished capability and added cost. In addition, 

according to DOD testing officials, when the deployment of space system 

components is not properly timed, components may be ready for system 

testing at different times. This means that the space system may not be tested 

as a whole, connected system. 

DOD has inherent challenges in aligning its satellite and ground control 

systems. However, long-standing acquisition problems, a tendency to shift 

funds from ground control system development to satellite development when 

satellite development problems arise and the underestimation of software 

complexity on several major space systems have exacerbated the problem. 

The primary cause for user terminals not being well synchronized with their 

associated space systems is that user terminal development programs are 

typically managed by different military acquisition organizations than those 

managing the satellites and ground control systems. 

DOD does have several efforts in place to help achieve better synchronization. 

The Air Force has also made some attempts to improve acquisition 

management and increase oversight of contractors by separating the 

acquisition of satellites and their ground control systems. However, the 

outcomes of these efforts are still pending. Moreover, there is a lack of 

guidance needed to help plan for and coordinate the development of satellite 

and ground systems and a lack of transparency into costs for ground control 

systems and user terminals. 

 

DOD representatives in the satellite acquisition community agree that 

opportunities exist for DOD to transition to a more common type of 

architecture for satellite ground control systems in order to achieve additional 

efficiencies, capabilities, and a higher degree of information sharing among 

space systems, ultimately resulting in increased capability to the warfighter. 

All of the officials GAO spoke with agreed that ground control systems can be 

developed to provide data and information to other systems, and expect the 

same in return, to potentially enhance the flow and timeliness of information 

and better exploit satellite capabilities. 

View GAO-10-55 or key components. 

For more information, contact Cristina 

Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or 

chaplainc@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-10-55 

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 3 

Most Major Space Systems Are Not Aligned with Delivery of 

Ground Assets, User Assets, or Both 5 

Acquisition and Other Problems Contribute to a Lack of Space 

System Component Alignment 12 

Efforts Are Being Made to Achieve Better Alignment of Satellite, 

Ground Control System, and User Terminal Deliveries, but They 

Are Limited by Lack of Guidance and Cost Data 18 

Opportunities Exist to Enhance the Capabilities of Satellite Ground 

Systems 22 

Conclusions 24 

Recommendations for Executive Action 25 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 25 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 28 

Appendix II Summary of Synchronization Issues Affecting 

Testing 30 

Appendix III Synchronization Issues between Satellites and User 

Terminals 31 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 34 

Appendix V GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 37 

Tables 

Table 1: Current and Planned DOD Space Systems by Mission and 

Associated Cost 4 

Table 2: Alignment of Space System Acquisitions 5 

 Defense Acquisitions 
Table 3: Space System Program Costs Showing Separate Costs for 

Satellites and Ground Control Systems 21 

Figure 

Figure 1: Notional Representation of Space System Components 

(Satellites, Ground Control Systems, and User Terminals) 

That Are Not Well Synchronized 7 

Abbreviations 

AEHF Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite 

AEP Architecture Evolution Plan 

CENTCOM Central Command 

CNPS Consolidated Network Planning Software 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOT&E Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 

FAB-T Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals 

GEO geosynchronous earth orbit satellite 

GPS Global Positioning System 

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

JTEO Joint Terminal Engineering Office 

JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System 

M-code modernized military signal 

MDA Missile Defense Agency 

MILSATCOM Military Satellite Communications 

MUOS Mobile User Objective System 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NPOESS National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental 

 Satellite System 

NRO National Reconnaissance Office 

NSA National Security Agency 

OSD Office of Secretary of Defense 

SAR Selected Acquisition Reports 

SBIRS Space Based Infrared System High 

SBSS Space-Based Space Surveillance 

SMC United States Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center 

SOCOM Special Operations Command 

STRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

STSS Space Tracking and Surveillance System 

Page ii GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
TT&C Tracking, telemetry, and commanding 

WGS Wideband Global SATCOM 

WIN-T Warfighter Information Network – Tactical 

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Page iii GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
Page 1 GAO-10-55 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

October 29, 2009 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) expects to spend over $50 billion to 

develop and procure eight major space systems. These systems are 

intended to provide military communications, global positioning and 

navigation information, weather monitoring data, and missile warning 

information. Typically, space system acquisitions consist of two main 

components: satellites and ground control systems. Satellites use sensors 

to collect data or provide communications capabilities, while ground 

control systems receive and often process and transmit data from the 

satellites. Space systems often include a third component, user terminals, 

which allow the combatant commands,1

 also known as the warfighters, to 

use the space systems’ capabilities in the field. While the costs associated 

with the ground control systems and user terminals can be much less than 

the costs of the satellites, space systems often require all three 

components—satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals—to 

work together to be fully utilized. 

The majority of major space acquisition programs in DOD’s space 

portfolio, however, have experienced problems during the past two 

decades that have delayed deployment and driven up cost. Many programs 

are experiencing significant schedule delays—as much as 7 years—

resulting in potential capability gaps in areas such as positioning, 

navigation, and timing; missile warning; communications; and weather 

monitoring. We recently estimated that costs for major space acquisition 

programs have increased by about $11.0 billion from initial estimates of 

$11.4 billion for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. This investment risk is 

compounded because the development of satellite ground systems and 

1

 There are 10 unified combatant commands. Six combatant commands have geographic 

responsibilities to plan and execute military operations in their respective regions. Four 

combatant commands have functional responsibilities, for example, providing 

transportation services. 

 Defense Acquisitions 
 

user terminals sometimes lags considerably behind the development of 

satellites, even when the satellite development has faced considerable 

delay. This means that mission-capable satellites may be in orbit for 

months or years, but warfighters and others would be unable to use the 

full complement of the satellites’ capabilities. The extent to which this 

problem is likely to occur is not well known. Satellite development 

problems typically represent a greater risk to the program and may 

therefore receive more attention. Ground system development problems 

may not be as visible as those facing satellite developments partially 

because the oversight and management of these development efforts is 

often intertwined. Moreover, while many DOD, congressional, and GAO 

studies have focused on the causes of satellite development delays and 

cost increases, few have focused on the delivery of ground control systems 

and user terminals, which are just as critical to optimizing the investment 

in space. 

For these reasons, you asked us to determine (1) the extent to which the 

deployment of satellite, ground control systems, and user terminals is 

aligned, or “synchronized,” so that the delivery of these assets optimizes 

investments in space; (2) the reasons satellites, ground control systems, 

and user terminals are not always aligned; (3) actions being taken to 

enhance coordination in the development of these assets; and (4) whether 

opportunities exist to enhance ground systems to better optimize the 

government’s investment in space, given recent trends in information 

technology and networking. 

To assess the coordination of satellite and ground system deployment, we 

analyzed current and future testing and fielding plans for corresponding 

satellite and ground assets (control systems and user terminals) of all 

major DOD space system acquisitions: the Advanced Extremely High 

Frequency Satellite (AEHF), NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS), 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), National Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), Space Based 

Infrared System (SBIRS), Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS), Space 

Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), and Wideband Global SATCOM2

(WGS). In making determinations about whether space system acquisition 

programs had synchronization issues, we compared the fielding dates of 

satellites, ground systems, and user terminals to determine whether there 

were gaps in the delivery of capabilities associated with these three 

 

2

 SATCOM stands for satellite communications. 

Page 2 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

components. We assessed user terminals to be not synchronized if a small 

percentage of terminals were scheduled to be delivered at the time of 

satellite and ground system delivery. Programs without gaps between 

fielding dates of satellites and ground system capabilities, and that had 

higher percentages of user terminals scheduled to be fielded, were 

determined to be synchronized. We also examined four of these programs 

in greater detail to better understand the causes of less-than-optimal 

synchronization. Further, we discussed ground control system and user 

terminal development with combatant commanders (warfighters) to help 

determine the effect(s) that synchronization issues have on the users of 

the space system capabilities. We also interviewed various space officials 

within DOD, including program management officials of the satellite 

programs we reviewed. To determine whether enhancements can be made 

to ground systems to increase utility of satellite capabilities, we 

interviewed high-level DOD representatives of various offices in the 

satellite acquisition community, officials in the intelligence community, 

and staff at ground control system facilities. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2008 to September 

2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. For more information on 

our scope and methodology, see appendix I. 

DOD’s major space system acquisition programs are intended to perform a 

wide variety of functions, including communications, missile warning, 

navigation, tracking space objects, and even providing weather 

information. Communication satellites provide DOD the ability to 

communicate along narrowband, wideband, and secure and protected 

bandwidths. Narrowband communications use lower (slower) rates to 

process data and give the warfighter the ability to communicate better 

while on the move, and also work better in disadvantaged environments, 

such as in forests, where conventional frequencies might be less effective. 

Wideband communications use higher data rates and work better for 

stationary locations in addition to allowing more warfighters to use this 

type of bandwidth. Secure and protected bandwidths allow warfighters to 

communicate when other satellites are disabled because of enemy 

jamming measures and allow a wider use of terminals deployed on 

backpacks, submarines, airborne assets, and other means. Missile 

Background 

Page 3 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

detection satellites allow DOD to identify launches and initially track 

ballistic missiles and provide early warnings to warfighters. Positioning 

and navigation satellites give DOD the ability to pinpoint a location, 

enabling soldiers to call for precise air support and lowering the risk of 

accidents. Satellites that track space objects and debris help keep 

satellites safe in space. Finally, weather satellites allow the warfighter to 

directly receive weather and climate information for more effective 

military operations. The satellites DOD is developing have finite useful 

lives that range from about 5 to15 years. Some space systems under 

development, such as AEHF, are intended to replace older legacy systems 

with upgraded and more robust capabilities—such as increasing the 

volume of data transmitted per second. Table 1 shows the various 

missions of current and planned DOD satellite programs. 

Table 1: Current and Planned DOD Space Systems by Mission and Associated Cost 

Fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions 

Mission 

Total mission costs 

(RDT&E and procurement) Space systems 

Communications $19,012.4 Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite 

Mobile User Objective System 

Wideband Global SATCOM 

Missile warning and tracking 12,554.4 Space Based Infrared System 

Space Tracking and Surveillance System 

Positioning, navigation, and timing 9,423.5 NAVSTAR Global Positioning Systema 

Space object tracking 514.1 Space-Based Space Surveillance 

Terrestrial and near-space weather 11,068.9 National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental 

Satellite System 

Source: GAO presentation of DOD data. 

Legend: RDT&E = research, development, test, and evaluation. 

a

Includes Block IIR/IIR-M, Block IIF, Operational Control Segment, and military user equipment 

Most space systems consist of satellites, ground control systems, and user 

terminals, though some space systems only require ground control 

systems to provide capability to users. Ground control systems are 

generally used to (1) download and process data from satellite sensors and 

disseminate this information to warfighters and other users and (2) 

maintain the health and status of the satellites, including steering the 

satellites and ensuring that they stay in assigned orbits. 

User terminals, typically procured by the military services and managed 

separately from associated satellites and ground control systems, can 

Page 4 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

range from equipment hosted on backpacks to terminals mounted on 

Humvees, airborne assets, or ships. Terminals can be used to help the 

warfighter determine longitude, latitude, and altitude via GPS satellites, or 

securely communicate with others via AEHF satellites. Some user 

terminals are not solely dedicated to delivering capability from a specific 

satellite system. For example, the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is 

the primary user terminal associated with the MUOS program, but the 

system is also designed to be the next generation of tactical radios, 

allowing extensive ground-to-ground communication as well. 

For six of DOD’s eight major space system acquisitions, DOD has not been 

able to align delivery of space assets with ground assets, user assets, or 

both. Of the eight major space system acquisitions, five ground control 

system efforts are optimally aligned to deliver capability with their 

companion satellites, while three are not optimally aligned. For the five 

space systems requiring user terminals, none were aligned. In some cases, 

capability gaps resulting from delays in the fielding of ground control 

systems or user terminals are 4 or more years. When space system 

acquisitions are not aligned, satellite capability is available but 

underutilized, though in some cases, work-around efforts can help 

compensate for the loss or delay of capability. Moreover, when ground 

systems, user terminals, or both are not aligned with satellites, there are 

significant limitations in the extent to which the system as a whole can be 

independently tested and verified. Table 2 provides a summary of 

alignment between space systems and corresponding ground control 

systems or user terminals. 

Most Major Space 

Systems Are Not 

Aligned with Delivery 

of Ground Assets, 

User Assets, or Both 

Table 2: Alignment of Space System Acquisitions 

Space system 

Gap exists between delivery of satellites 

and full ground control capabilities, user 

terminal capabilities, or both 

Gap between delivery of 

satellites and full ground 

control system capabilities 

Gap between delivery of 

satellites and fully fielded 

user terminals 

AEHF Yes NoaYes 

GPS Yes Yes Yes 

MUOS Yes No Yes 

NPOESS Yes No Yes 

SBIRS Yes Yes N/Ab

SBSS No No N/Ab

STSS No No N/Ab

WGS Yes Yes Yes 

Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data. 

Page 5 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

a

According to program officials, recent unplanned delays in the launch dates of AEHF satellites have 

allowed the program to become better synchronized with ground control system capabilities. 

b

This indicates that the space system does not include user terminals; capability is exacted through 

the ground system. 

In making determinations about whether space system acquisitions were 

aligned, we examined whether there were gaps between fielding dates of 

satellite capabilities compared to ground control system capabilities and 

whether lower percentages of user terminal types were planned to be 

fielded by the space system acquisitions’ planned initial capability. We 

generally only considered aspects of a space acquisition unaligned if there 

was a gap of years, rather than months, between the fielding dates of 

significant capabilities. Regarding user terminals, we only considered 

these unaligned compared to satellite capabilities when user terminals did 

not meet DOD’s measure of synchronization for military satellite 

communications space acquisitions. This measure, established by U.S. 

Strategic Command (STRATCOM), a primary user of DOD space systems, 

asserts that 20 percent of any type of user terminal should be fielded by a 

space system acquisition’s initial capability date and 85 percent should be 

fielded by its full capability date.3

Notwithstanding the fact that alignment gaps are undesirable, several 

factors provide insight into the inherent challenges associated with 

managing alignment. First, alignment may be relatively easier to achieve in 

some programs than in others. For example, some space systems may 

require only a ground system or few user terminals and may even manage 

these acquisitions within one organization. By contrast, other programs 

may require literally tens of thousands of terminals that must be installed 

on a wide span of weapon systems, including ships, planes, vehicles, and 

even other space systems—which are owned and controlled by various 

military services. Second, an inherent difficulty in aligning satellite 

launches with ground and user terminal programs is the lead time needed 

to schedule satellite launches—about 2 years—which makes it difficult to 

hold back satellite deployment if a ground or user terminal is experiencing 

a considerable delay. Nevertheless, there is a consensus that investments 

in space are not optimized when satellites are in orbit and user terminals 

or ground systems are many months or years away from being delivered. 

 

3

 It should be noted that while there are criteria for communications satellites, there are no 

criteria available in DOD that determine the optimum alignment or synchronization for the 

broader portfolio of satellite programs. This is principally because of inherent differences 

in satellite missions and their associated ground and user assets, according to officials 

involved in space system development as well as acquisition oversight. 

Page 6 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

Third, it is difficult to measure the extent to which warfighters and other 

users are being affected by delayed capability or even the extent to which 

capability is delayed. As figure 1 depicts, satellites themselves only offer 

initial capabilities until enough satellites have been launched to provide 

the coverage needed to achieve full capability. This process alone can take 

years and will vary system to system as the number of satellites required 

to achieve full operational capability depends on mission requirements 

and coverage offered by satellites, among other factors. At the same time, 

ground control systems can be delivered in phases, the first of which may 

focus solely on controlling and maintaining the health of the satellite, with 

subsequent phases delivering software that can collect and process sensor 

data. User terminals can take years to install as they can span a broad 

spectrum of weapon systems and their installation is usually done along 

side other upgrades. 

Figure 1: Notional Representation of Space System Components (Satellites, Ground 

Control Systems, and User Terminals) That Are Not Well Synchronized 

Source: GAO analysis and Art Explosion (clip art).

 Lesser capability

On-line first

Moderate capability Full capability

Degree of system 

capabaility:

Satellite

capability

Years

Ground

control

systems

User 

terminals

Period where system is

not fully utilized

Denotes period when the first satellite is launched and ground control and user terminals

first fielded.

Initial capability

Full capability

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5

Page 7 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

Ground systems deployment for three of DOD’s major space system 

acquisitions is lagging behind delivery of satellites. This means that 

satellites either already are in space or will be in space, but are or will be 

unable to deliver all of their planned capabilities. In one case, the 

development of the ground system was completed in time, but the system 

has not worked properly. In contrast, five major space system acquisitions 

have largely aligned their satellites and associated ground control systems 

acquisitions so that capabilities on satellites are fielded at approximately 

the same time as on the ground. In some of these instances, schedule slips 

in satellite development allowed more time for ground control system 

development. Had the satellites been delivered on their original schedules, 

the ground control systems might not have aligned with satellite delivery. 

The three instances where we identified gaps are described below. 

Alignment of Ground 

Control Systems and 

Satellites 

• GPS achieved full operational capability in 1995 and currently is a 

constellation of 31 active satellites of various generations used extensively 

by the military for multiple applications worldwide. The current GPS 

ground control system consists of the Operational Control Segment and an 

upgrade under way called the Architecture Evolution Plan. However, the 

plan and the capabilities it is being designed to provide have been delayed 

and are significantly over budget. As a result, some new capabilities are 

not now available to the warfighter because the ground control system 

features needed to command and operate the capabilities have not been 

completely delivered. For example, updated user equipment possessing a 

capability to prevent spoofing4

 of navigation information started being 

delivered to the warfighter in 2004. However, the Architecture Evolution 

Plan, representing the current ground control system, is not capable of 

providing two important aspects of this capability and is not expected to 

do so until early fiscal year 2010. 

• The first SBIRS satellite5 will carry scanning and staring sensors designed 

to provide early missile warning capabilities. However, DOD will not be 

able to fully utilize the data collected from the staring sensor when this 

first satellite launches, currently planned for September 2010, because the 

ground control software that is to process the sensor’s data is not planned 

to be fully functional until at least 2014. This means that complete, usable 

 

4

 Spoofing is a process where an entity gains unauthorized access to a system to disrupt the 

normal flow of information. 

5

 That is, the first geosynchronous earth orbiting satellite to be delivered by the SBIRS 

program, rather than a previously deployed missile warning sensor that is now in orbit on 

two highly elliptical orbiting satellites. 

Page 8 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

data from the staring sensor will not be available until about 4 years after 

the satellite is on orbit. 

• The first WGS satellite launched in October 2007, but its associated ground 

mission planning software—the Consolidated Network Planning 

Software—does not work properly. This planning software was designed 

to compute required bandwidth for all users simultaneously accessing 

WGS satellites. It would then disseminate that information to various 

satellite operation and support stations located globally so that all stations 

had a real-time view of the availability of WGS satellite capabilities. 

However, because the development of the mission planning software has 

had problems and is not well coordinated with WGS satellite capability, 

the dissemination of information does not occur as designed, and the 

information has to go through a time-consuming and labor-intensive workaround through a single ground station before it reaches the warfighter. 

Alignment of User 

Terminals 

Five of the eight major space systems we reviewed had user terminals 

scheduled to be delivered and become operational after, and in some 

cases long after, their associated space systems achieved initial capability. 

The other three space systems did not require user terminals. It should be 

noted that in some cases—for example, AEHF, GPS, and NPOESS—there 

is more than one type of terminal that will serve a similar purpose. 

However, when we examined these programs we also identified gaps 

across the programs. For AEHF specifically, the most prominent gap 

existed in the terminal that will have the widest use—Family of Advanced 

Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T). Three instances where we 

identified gaps are described below. Appendix III contains more details. 

• FAB-T. The Air Force’s FAB-T program is designed to provide antijam and 

protected communications for nuclear and conventional forces as well as 

many airborne assets and ground command posts. As one of the primary 

user terminal programs associated with AEHF, FAB-T has recently 

experienced numerous problems and is not currently aligned with the 

AEHF satellite program. Specifically, contractor performance problems, 

which caused design teams to be restructured to improve performance 

and efficiency, caused a delay in the start of initial production from fiscal 

year 2007 to fiscal year 2010. In addition, design changes and contract cost 

growth have more than tripled development costs since the contract was 

first awarded. While AEHF will be able to provide capability through other 

user terminals, current estimates show that FAB-T will only have 2 percent 

of its terminals fielded when AEHF is scheduled to reach its initial 

operating capability in 2011. Further, estimates are that FAB-T will not 

have all of its terminals fielded until fiscal year 2019. 

Page 9 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

• JTRS. JTRS is a family of interoperable, digital, modular, and softwaredefined radios that is planned to provide the capability to receive, 

transmit, and relay voice, data, and video. In the past, tactical military 

radios could not work well with each other. The JTRS radio is also being 

designed as the primary user terminal for the new MUOS satellite 

capability to help the warfighter achieve information superiority. Although 

MUOS will be able to provide capability through other, legacy user 

terminals, DOD estimates that less than 20 percent of JTRS terminals will 

be available to access the MUOS satellite when it achieves operational onorbit capability in December 2011. In 2014, when MUOS is expected to 

reach full operational capability, 32 percent of JTRS terminals are 

expected to be available to the warfighter. DOD expects to field all the 

needed JTRS terminals by 2021—about 7 years after MUOS is expected to 

be fully operational. In the past, we have expressed concerns about the 

JTRS program because of problems with requirements, technology 

development, and program management.6

 A recent DOD independent 

program assessment concluded that the interface between MUOS and the 

JTRS radios and satellite contained unwarranted risk.7

• Military GPS user equipment. DOD also plans to field extensive—both in 

quantity and type—GPS user equipment and terminals to assist with 

positioning and navigation on a variety of air, ground, and sea platforms to 

utilize a modernized military signal (M-code), designed to be secure and 

jam resistant. This signal is planned to reach its initial operating capability 

on the GPS satellites and ground control system by 2014. While user 

terminals will start to receive and process the signal in 2014 as they are 

being fielded leading up to 2025, the user equipment and terminals are not 

expected to be fully fielded and operational until 2025. As a result, the 

military services’ ability to achieve a joint navigation capability, an 

essential element of conducting future military operations, may not be 

fully realized until 2025. In a 2007 memo from United States Strategic 

Command (STRATCOM)8

 to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

the combatant command expressed concern that new GPS capabilities will 

 

6

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Department of Defense Needs Framework for Balancing 

Investments in Tactical Radios, GAO-08-877 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 2008). 

7

 Mobile User Objective System Independent Program Assessment Build Approval, 

February 2008. 

8

 STRATCOM is a combatant command with the functional responsibility for space and 

information operations; missile defense; global command and control, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance; strategic deterrence; and integration and synchronization 

of DOD’s departmentwide efforts in combating weapons of mass destruction. 

Page 10 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

not be realized in a timely manner because of the lack of alignment 

between the major GPS components. 

Implications on 

Warfighters and the 

Testing Community 

When space capabilities are not delivered in a coordinated manner or are 

partially delivered, the warfighter will either not have certain capabilities 

available when expected or may have to develop short-term solutions 

while waiting for the expected capability. Officials from one warfighting 

command (users of the capability) told us that because of the 2-year gap 

between when all MUOS satellites reach on-orbit capability and when the 

MUOS-capable user terminals (JTRS) first become available, the MUOS 

satellites will have spent a portion of their expected lifespan less than fully 

utilized. This issue concerns the combatant command because MUOS is 

replacing the aging Ultra High Frequency Follow-On space system, which 

currently serves more military customers than it was originally designed to 

handle. While waiting for the JTRS capability, the command will likely 

have to lease commercial satellite capability and user terminals to increase 

bandwidth capacity and improve the speed and effectiveness of 

information and communication transfers. 

The testing community is also significantly affected when satellite delivery 

is not aligned with ground control systems and user terminals, according 

to officials from the Office of the Director of Operational Test and 

Evaluation (DOT&E).9

 If all three space system components—satellites, 

ground control systems, and user terminals—are not working together, 

they essentially do not represent actual system capability, thus requiring 

nonrepresentative equipment to be used in testing and possibly yielding 

results that are not characteristic of the actual system. Overall, DOT&E 

officials identified alignment issues as the most significant obstacle to 

their obtaining credible and useful test results. However, these officials 

also noted that there have been recent efforts by some space system 

programs to better synchronize satellite capabilities with their ground 

systems. For example, MUOS will have production-representative satellite 

and ground control systems available for testing, which will facilitate 

optimal operational testing. 

 

9

 DOT&E is DOD’s primary office responsible for the testing of weapons, equipment, or 

munitions under operational, or realistic, conditions for the purpose of determining their 

effectiveness and suitability for use. 

Page 11 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

DOT&E officials identified GPS as a specific example of where delays in 

delivery of ground assets have hampered testing. The GPS program office 

has not yet fully developed the ground control software designed to 

prevent spoofing of navigation information. The unavailability of this 

software has delayed both the testing and the use of the antispoofing 

capability by the warfighter. Had the needed ground system component 

been fielded as scheduled, this capability could have been tested shortly 

after user equipment started being delivered to the warfighter in 2004. As it 

stands now, by the time testing of these functionalities is conducted, the 

entire constellation of satellites will have been launched. DOT&E officials 

told us that recently the GPS program has undertaken efforts to align 

schedules to achieve a higher degree of overall synchronization, which 

should facilitate more effective testing. 

Another example involved JTRS user terminals, which are 2 years behind 

MUOS. While the MUOS satellite and ground control systems are ready for 

testing with production-representative equipment, representative user 

terminals are not. Because operational testing relies on productionrepresentative components, DOT&E officials will not be able to test the 

overall system. For more examples of how less-than-optimal 

synchronization issues can affect testing, see appendix II. 

Though there are inherent difficulties in aligning delivery of satellites, 

ground control systems, and user terminals, the lack of synchronization 

between segments of space acquisition programs is largely the result of 

the same core issues that hamper acquisition in general—requirements 

instability, funding instability, insufficient technology maturity, 

underestimation of complexity, and poor contractor oversight, among 

other issues. Previous GAO reports on DOD acquisitions have consistently 

linked such problems to significant cost increases and schedule delays. In 

addition, user terminals are not optimally aligned because of a lack of 

coordination and effective oversight over the many military organizations 

that either develop user terminals or have some hand in development. 

Acquisition and Other 

Problems Contribute 

to a Lack of Space 

System Component 

Alignment 

Page 12 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

Acquisition Problems The satellite, ground system, and user terminal programs we studied have 

had execution problems that have caused substantial delays in schedule 

that in turn have made it more difficult to align delivery of all three space 

system components. Most prominent are requirements changes, technical 

problems resulting from underestimation of complexity, and poor 

contractor oversight. The first satellite delivery of SBIRS, for instance, has 

been delayed at least 7 years in part because of poor oversight, technical 

complexities, and rework. The first satellite delivery for NPOESS is over 4 

years late. AEHF has experienced delays of about 3 years for these 

reasons along with requirements changes that occurred earlier in the 

program and difficulties meeting information assurance requirements for 

its satellite. The GPS IIF system has also had about a 3-year delay because 

of technical and workmanship problems and requirements changes. 

Ground systems and user terminals have experienced similar problems. 

JTRS, for example, has experienced significant delays because of 

problems in maturing critical technologies, and as noted earlier, FAB-T 

delays have occurred because of contractor performance problems. Also, 

as noted earlier, the WGS ground system has experienced technical 

problems that have prevented it from working properly with WGS 

satellites now in orbit. 

We have previously reported that space acquisition problems are leading 

to potential gaps in the delivery of critical capabilities, and that with too 

many programs in its portfolio, DOD is forced to continually shift funds to 

and from programs. Additionally, DOD has preferred to make fewer but 

more complex satellites, which has stretched technology challenges 

beyond current capabilities in some cases, and vastly increased the 

complexities related to software. Also, there is no way to accurately 

estimate how long the design, development, and construction of a satellite 

system will take when critical technologies planned for that system are 

still in relatively early stages of discovery and invention. These factors and 

more can contribute to the inherent challenges in aligning delivery of 

space system components. 

Underestimating software complexity has also been a problem. The 

complexity of software on any system, including space systems, is often 

denoted by the amount of software, or number of lines of software code. 

Generally, the greater the number of lines of code, the more complicated 

the software system development, and ground control systems typically 

require significantly more software than the satellites. This means that 

software development for ground control systems is oftentimes the higher 

risk. In some cases, unanticipated software complexity can lead to lack of 

synchronization between the satellite and ground systems of space system 

Page 13 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

acquisitions. For example, on the AEHF space system, the prime 

contractor has experienced quality control problems with the software for 

the mission planning element of the ground control system. In testing so 

far, the government has identified numerous significant software 

deficiencies and continues to find deficiencies as testing continues. 

Ground control system fielding will be delayed until the deficiencies are 

corrected. Also, our past work has shown that the MUOS ground control 

software represented one of the greatest risks to the program because of 

the size and complexity of the design. On SBIRS, the total estimated lines 

of code on the ground control system software grew from approximately 

1.55 million in August 2004 to approximately 1.88 million in December 

2008. 

In at least one case, delays being experienced as a result of program 

execution development difficulties in satellite programs may actually offer 

a ground control or user terminal program some schedule relief. For 

example, when the AEHF space system was forced to delay the launch of 

its first two satellites because of issues that arose during vacuum testing, 

the unplanned delay allowed time for ground control system and user 

terminal capabilities to catch up to the revised satellite launch dates so 

that they are now planned to be fielded closer together. At the same time, 

however, these difficulties may ultimately require changes in requirements 

or designs that can create disruptive changes to ground control and user 

terminal programs. 

We have made numerous recommendations over the past decade aimed at 

reducing execution problems experienced in weapon system and space 

system programs, many of which inherently make it more difficult to align 

delivery of space system components and achieve better synchronization. 

Generally, we have recommended that DOD separate technology 

discovery from acquisition, follow an incremental path toward meeting 

user needs, match resources and requirements at program start, and use 

quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move 

to next phases. We have also identified practices related to cost 

estimating, program manager tenure, quality assurance, technology 

transition, and an array of other aspects of acquisition program 

management that space systems could benefit from. 

Funding Shifts Space system acquisition programs sometimes shift funds from the 

development of ground control systems to their associated satellite 

development efforts to meet unexpected obstacles—an action that can 

create new problems. For example, when the GPS IIF satellite program 

Page 14 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

encountered development problems, the program shifted funds set aside 

for the GPS ground control system to address the satellite problems, 

causing a delay in the delivery of some ground control capabilities. 

Similarly, SBIRS officials reallocated funding from the ground control 

system to address satellite software issues, which may have contributed to 

the system’s initial inability to utilize the staring sensor data from the first 

geosynchronous earth orbit satellite. Program officials told us that they 

like the flexibility of being able to move funds from ground control 

systems to the satellites if priorities warrant. However, as we indicated 

above, this can put the development of ground control systems at a 

disadvantage compared to development of the satellites for space systems, 

for example, GPS and SBIRS. 

Lack of Coordinated 

Planning among 

Organizations Involved in 

Development 

DOD program office officials told us the primary reason that user 

terminals are not optimally synchronized is a lack of coordination and 

effective oversight over the many military organizations that either 

develop user terminals or have some hand in the development. For some 

systems, user terminal development could involve several different 

organizations and a complex sequencing of events. For example, in the 

case of GPS, the Air Force must first develop prototype electronic 

modules and production-ready receiver hardware for selected platforms 

within the space, air, ground, and maritime environments—a process that 

can take several years. After this is done, each of the military services will 

still need to procure the new user equipment and install it on a range of 

other platforms. Given the breadth of equipment that the terminals must 

be installed on and the need to coordinate installations with existing 

maintenance schedules, the process of realizing capability could take 10 or 

more years. Thus, user terminal programs need to have timely funding and 

be well-coordinated. 

In the case of GPS, this advance planning did not take place, and it is likely 

that the installation of user equipment that can take advantage of the 

satellites’ modernized military signal (M-code), designed to be secure and 

jam resistant, will not be completed until 2025. We reported10 earlier this 

year that there was a lack of coordination with GPS and that no single 

authority was responsible for synchronizing GPS satellites and ground 

 

10 GAO, Global Positioning System: Significant Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading 

Widely Used Capabilities, GAO-09-325 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2009). 

Page 15 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

systems and user terminals. Both the Defense Science Board11 and the U.S. 

Space Commission identified the same problem in earlier reports. A 

January 2001 study by DOD’s U.S. Space Commission12 noted that when 

satellites and ground control systems are funded in one budget and user 

terminals in another, the result can be a lack of synchronization in the 

acquisition of satellites and their associated user terminals because of this 

decentralized arrangement. 

In another example, the responsibility for developing and acquiring the 

MUOS satellite and associated ground control systems falls under the 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, but responsibility for 

developing and acquiring JTRS user equipment and terminals associated 

with MUOS falls under a joint program office with multiple services 

involved. Under this structure, there is no single office or group 

responsible for the coordination of these two interdependent program 

offices to help achieve better synchronization. However, MUOS program 

officials told us that in 2004 they began to recognize that their program’s 

success was tied to the JTRS program and there was a need to coordinate 

and address synchronization and other issues. As a result, a formal group 

was established to address systems engineering coordination issues under 

both programs. While this group does not constitute a single authority 

responsible for synchronizing MUOS and JTRS, program officials stated 

that it has helped resolve coordination issues. 

Officials from a third program, AEHF, agreed that space system 

synchronization challenges often result from the way the military services 

are organized to manage the various space system components. Officials 

told us that satellites and associated user terminals are often not well 

synchronized because they are frequently managed by different military 

services with different development contracts and funding accounts. They 

said that they would like for all of the terminals to be fielded at the same 

time, but because of the independent nature of these programs and their 

complexity, they are unable to synchronize them to a greater extent. These 

officials acknowledged that it would help if there was one person or 

organization that could oversee all the components of a satellite system, 

both within a service and among services, to help ensure that satellites and 

 

11 Defense Science Board Task Force, The Future of the Global Positioning System, 

(Washington, D.C., Oct. 28, 2005). 

12 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management 

and Organization, January 2001. 

Page 16 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

their user terminals are better synchronized. We recently reported13 that 

DOD’s acquisition process is not well designed to manage across programs 

in part because the military services have traditionally focused on 

developing and acquiring systems to meet their own specific missions and 

have placed relatively less emphasis on developing and acquiring the types 

of interoperable systems needed to meet the demands of joint operations. 

Finally, another factor contributing to user terminal delays is the 

difficulties some programs have in anticipating security requirements and 

gaining approval from the National Security Agency (NSA), which is 

responsible for certifying a satellite system’s information security. In the 

past, we have reported on delays in obtaining NSA’s certification 

associated with the AEHF and MUOS space systems. In addition, the risk 

of this potential delay is not always fully known at program inception. For 

example, in the AEHF program, the changing nature of security 

requirements placed stress on an already tight schedule by adding a high 

level of complexity to the program’s user terminal efforts. In the case of 

MUOS, which is associated with the JTRS user terminal, NSA determined 

that the user terminal’s existing security architecture was not adequate, 

and as a result, NSA declined to certify the system until changes were 

made to its architecture. 

 

13 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Management Approach and Processes Not Well-Suited 

to Support Development of Global Information Grid, GAO-06-211 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 

30, 2006). 

Page 17 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

There are efforts in place focused specifically at better aligning delivery of 

satellite, ground system, and user terminals as well as reducing the kinds 

of acquisition problems that contribute to delays that make alignment 

difficult. However, it remains to be seen how effective these will be. 

Moreover, improvements are likely to be hampered by a lack of guidance 

to help plan for and coordinate the development of satellite and ground 

systems and a lack of transparency into the costs of ground control 

systems and user terminals. 

In 2005, DOD’s Joint Terminal Engineering Office (JTEO) began 

monitoring the alignment of military satellite communication space 

systems, including satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals.14

JTEO analyzes program plans, schedules, and budgets; identifies 

interdependent systems that are not aligned; and analyzes the impact of 

systems that are not aligned and shares the results of its analysis with a 

wide variety of organizations involved with military communications 

satellites. JTEO uses guidance established by STRATCOM to define basic 

and optimal synchronization to assess the level of synchronization of 

military satellite communications space systems. However, officials from 

both JTEO and STRATCOM acknowledged that these definitions are 

somewhat arbitrary and do not really measure what is most important—

capability provided to the warfighter via a certain level of synchronization 

related to a space system’s components. Further, JTEO only tracks 

synchronization of military satellite communications space systems, not 

the space systems involved with other space missions. 

Efforts Are Being 

Made to Achieve 

Better Alignment of 

Satellite, Ground 

Control System, and 

User Terminal 

Deliveries, but They 

Are Limited by Lack 

of Guidance and Cost 

Data 

Also, the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics, has recently been utilizing an advisory body called the 

Narrowband SATCOM Systems Engineering Group to focus specifically on 

the alignment of MUOS and JTRS given the extent of schedule gaps and 

the importance of JTRS to MUOS. The advisory body seeks to anticipate 

and identify the technical challenges between MUOS and JTRS and any 

other interdependent systems. 

In addition, the Air Force is attempting to mitigate some of the 

contributing factors that create synchronization issues by separating the 

acquisition of satellites and their ground control systems, intending to 

ensure that ground systems receive increased oversight. Specifically, the 

 

14 JTEO is an Air Force office that provides a DOD-wide view of MILSATCOM 

synchronization. 

Page 18 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

GPS program recently split the acquisition and funding of the GPS IIIA 

satellites from its ground control system. While both acquisitions remain 

under the same GPS program management, GPS officials told us that they 

expect the funding separation to yield greater government oversight of the 

contractor and increased control over programmatic decisions. For 

example, if a satellite encounters a problem during development, a 

contractor may be tempted to make changes to the satellite’s operating 

software. Such changes, which could add time and rework to the ground 

control system’s software development effort, might not receive attention 

from the government. By acquiring the satellites and ground system 

separately, GPS program officials believe that acquisition changes will 

have to be approved through program management, and that more 

generally, the ground programs would receive more focused oversight 

than they receive now. Officials also indicated that when programs use the 

same contractor to develop both the satellite and ground control systems, 

the government can be beholden to the single contractor to deliver some 

capability, even if contractor performance falls below expectations. 

Other actions have been taken to improve program execution within space 

and other weapon programs that have the potential to improve DOD’s 

ability to align delivery of satellites with ground and user terminals. For 

example, the Air Force is planning to conduct a review in November 2009 

with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to enable better management 

of GPS as an enterprise instead of as many individual programs. Further, 

within the space community, the Air Force has been emphasizing the use 

of an incremental development approach where it will gradually meet the 

needs of its users, and it is requiring space programs to make independent 

technology readiness assessments at particular points in the acquisition 

process. For some newer space programs, such as GPS III, the Air Force 

has taken actions to ensure that requirements remain stable and to hold 

contractors more accountable for their performance. The Office of 

Networks Information and Integration within the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense has also developed tools to enable better coordination among 

interdependent programs, such as the Net-Centric15 Integrated Master 

Schedule, an online software program designed to provide insight to 

program schedules, key events, and most importantly cross-program 

dependencies, to more effectively synchronize aspects of the net-centric 

 

15 Net-centric refers to the capability to discover, access, trust and use information within a 

complex community of people, devices, information and services interconnected by a 

communications network to achieve optimal benefit of resources. 

Page 19 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

portfolio, including space system acquisitions. Moreover, recently passed 

acquisition reform legislation also sets requirements for space and other 

programs to increase emphasis on systems engineering and developmental 

testing, preliminary design reviews, and technology readiness 

assessments.16 We recently testified that actions that the Air Force and the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense have been taking to address problems 

related to technology development are good steps. However, there are still 

more significant changes to processes, policies, and support needed to 

ensure that reforms can take hold, including addressing the diffused 

leadership for space programs, which hampers the ability of DOD to 

synchronize delivery of space, ground, and user assets for space programs. 

Limited Insight into Costs 

of Ground Systems and 

User Terminals Can 

Hamper Oversight 

DOD’s efforts to improve coordination of satellite, ground control system, 

and user terminal efforts may be hampered by a lack of transparency in 

the costs associated with ground control systems and user terminals. To 

identify the costs associated with the poor synchronization of space 

system components, we attempted to determine development and 

procurement costs associated with ground control systems. However, 

several of DOD’s space system acquisitions do not break out these costs 

through their standard reporting measures,17 reporting instead combined 

satellite and ground system costs. We asked the program offices to provide 

separate costs for their ground control systems, and while most programs 

were able to provide some information, officials with two programs—

AEHF and GPS—told us that they did not officially track cost information 

in this manner. The next-generation GPS ground control system is being 

acquired under a separate contract than the satellites which could allow 

the program to separate cost information. Without better cost information 

on ground control systems, congressional decision makers and 

appropriators have limited insight into costs, and the possibility of cost 

overruns, for ground control systems of major space systems. 

Table 3 shows the six space systems that were able to provide cost 

information that distinguished the development and procurement costs of 

their satellites from the development and procurement costs of their 

 

16 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, Public Law 111-23, May 22, 2009. 

17 Selected Acquisition Reports, primary sources for cost information on all major DOD 

acquisition programs (including space systems), for example, do not show costs associated 

with the ground control systems, but instead show the combined total costs of satellites 

and ground control systems. 

Page 20 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

ground control systems. It also shows the two space systems, AEHF and 

GPS, that were not able to officially break out and distinguish 

development and procurement costs between satellites and their ground 

control systems. 

Table 3: Space System Program Costs Showing Separate Costs for Satellites and Ground Control Systems 

Fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions 

RDT&E Procurement 

Program Satellite Ground Total Satellite Ground Total

Total RDT&E and 

procurement

AEHFa,b Not 

availablea

Not 

availablea

$7,267.3 Not 

availablea

Not 

availablea

$3,150.1 $10,417.4

NAVSTAR GPSa,b Not 

availablea

Not 

availablea

$4,485.9 Not 

availablea

Not 

availablea

$4,937.6 $9,423.5

MUOSb$2,065.8 $1,741.9 $3,807.7 $2,536.3 $135.1 $2,671.4 $6,479.1

NPOESSb6,661.3 1,464.2 $8,125.5 2,943.4 0.0 $2,943.4 $11,068.9

SBIRSc 5,615.1 2,109.6 $7,724.7 2,522.7 133.0 $2,655.7 $10,380.4

SBSSc 469.1 45.0 $514.1 N/Ae N/Ae N/Ae $514.1

STSSd 1,886.1 287.9 $2,174.0 N/Ad N/Ad N/Ad $2,174.0

WGSc 377.9 N/A $377.9 1,706.7 31.3 $1,738.0 $2,115.9

Total $17,075.3 $5,648.6 $34,477.1 $9,709.1 $299.4 $18,096.2 $52,573.3

Source: GAO presentation of DOD and Missile Defense Agency data. 

Legend: RDT&E = research, development, test, and evaluation; N/A = not applicable. 

a

The program office was not able to officially provide separate satellite and ground control system 

costs. 

b

The program office provided cost data for the RDT&E and procurement phases. 

c

The program office provided cost data through fiscal year 2013 or 2014. 

d

This program is a demonstration effort and DOD does not currently have plans for a procurement 

phase. 

e

The original SBSS selected acquisition report did not include procurement funding. 

Although six programs were able to provide some information that 

distinguished costs between satellites and ground control systems, the 

programs did not report this information separately in their Selected 

Acquisition Reports (SAR).18 DOD officials at one program office told us 

that they do not break out these costs because they have a combined 

contract for development of the satellites and ground control systems. 

 

18 These comprehensive, summary status reports on major defense acquisition programs 

are required for periodic submission to the Congress. 

Page 21 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

Officials at another program explained that when a program uses one 

contractor for satellite and ground control system development, it has 

flexibility to move funds between satellite and ground control system 

development, as necessary. As a result, it can be difficult to identify, track, 

and report separate cost information for satellites and ground control 

systems. However, the Air Force initiative to separate the acquisition of 

satellites and their ground control systems might make it easier to track 

and report separate cost information. In addition, the overall acquisition 

costs associated with user terminal programs are also difficult to 

determine because different DOD organizations often manage these 

acquisitions. Even though user terminals are what allow for the day-to-day 

use of a typical space system’s capabilities by military services in the field, 

the costs of user terminal programs are not usually reported along with, or 

as part of, the total space system. This can result in a lack of transparency 

regarding the total costs of all components of a space system. 

DOD has typically developed and operated its ground systems in a 

stovepiped manner. Specifically, each ground system’s development is 

dedicated to a particular satellite system for a specific mission area, such 

as communications, missile warning, navigation, space object tracking, or 

weather monitoring. As a result, ground systems generally only receive 

and process data from the satellites for which they were developed. They 

generally do not control and operate more than one type of satellite and 

they generally do not share their data with other ground systems. More 

important, there are few ground systems that are capable of fusing data 

from multiple space systems to enhance military and intelligence planning 

and operations. 

Opportunities Exist to 

Enhance the 

Capabilities of 

Satellite Ground 

Systems 

In recent years, however, information technology has migrated toward 

common architectures and systems that enabled systems that were 

traditionally stovepiped to share or even fuse data to maximize their value. 

There is a consensus among officials we spoke with—including individuals 

from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics; the Joint Requirements Oversight Council; 

National Reconnaissance Office; Office of the Secretary of the Air Force; 

Air Force Space Command; and Lincoln Laboratory (a federally funded 

research and development center)—that investments in ground systems 

can be optimized in two ways. First, common ground systems can be built 

to operate and control multiple satellite systems rather than just one. 

Second, ground systems or other types of information technology can be 

used to combine or fuse data from multiple space assets to optimize 

planning and execution of military operations. Several of the officials we 

spoke with in fact believe that including air-, land-, and sea-based sensor 

Page 22 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

data in addition to satellite data in such systems or architectures could 

ultimately reduce the current level of capability needed in space. We have 

also reported in the past that designing systems with common subsystems 

and components and using an open systems19 design approach can reduce 

production and life cycle costs.20 

Several of these officials, however, also identified obstacles to such 

commonality. These obstacles include getting agreement on a common 

design, meaning whether it will be based primarily on the warfighter’s 

needs or cost savings, and overcoming the resistance of different DOD 

organizations to sharing their data and trusting that the data will not be 

misused. 

Moreover, progress on building common ground systems or technology 

that can fuse data from a variety of sensors in the military has been 

limited. One satellite control facility operated by the Navy, known as 

Blossom Point,21 does operate a ground system that can control a variety 

of national security satellites. The facility uses a common approach 

(architecture) to command and control the satellites as well as receive and 

analyze data and information transmitted from the satellites. The common 

approach allows the facility to reuse a large percentage of the existing 

software across multiple satellites. Typically, 80 percent of the software 

required on the ground to operate the satellites can be reused and only 

about 20 percent is unique and has to be created for that new system. 

However, the facility primarily operates nonmilitary space systems and 

according to Blossom Point officials, no major Navy or Air Force space 

system uses the facility even though the capacity and capability exists. The 

Air Force has no similar facility, opting instead to primarily develop 

unique ground control systems for each satellite system.22 In addition, 

there are efforts currently being planned at the Air Force’s Space and 

Missile Systems Center that will fuse early missile warning information 

from SBIRS and information from the next generation of infrared missile 

 

19 Open systems allow the use of commercially available products from multiple vendors, 

rather than developing unique components. 

20 GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: More Common Systems and Components Could Result 

in Cost Savings, GAO/NSIAD-99-101 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999). 

21 The Blossom Point Tracking Facility is located in Maryland near Washington, D.C. 

22 The Air Force does have a similar capability specifically for communications satellite 

constellations, but no capability to allow for control of multiple space systems with 

different missions. 

Page 23 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

detection satellites. These efforts are aimed at eliminating the need for the 

Air Force to develop separate dedicated ground control systems. 

However, these efforts are in the planning stages. 

In 2004, DOD established policy23 directing that data collected by various 

means, including space systems, be made visible and accessible to any 

potential user in DOD by making them available in shared spaces, but 

again, according to the individuals we interviewed, this has not made 

progress because of resistance to sharing data as well as system design, 

development, and operation. Confirming these views, in 2009, DOD’s 

Defense Science Board24 reported that while DOD has initiated some 

efforts to achieve interoperability, it is a long way from achieving the 

desired level of interoperability in several areas, including satellite 

communication.25

DOD’s space systems continue to offer opportunities to enhance and 

transform how the military conducts its operations. But such 

opportunities are being limited or delayed because of problems in 

synchronizing the delivery of space, ground, and user assets. While 

synchronization is inherently difficult for space systems and complete 

synchronization is practically unattainable, there are relatively 

straightforward actions that can be taken to allow for better 

synchronization. These include better coordination among the many 

players involved with development and more transparency into and 

awareness of program complexity, costs, consequences of delays, and 

criteria to help planning and oversight. DOD has appropriately started 

taking some of these actions, but expanding this effort could increase cost 

transparency. Moreover, in response to previous recommendations, DOD 

has taken actions to address long-standing acquisition problems and 

ensure that development of the three space system components is 

knowledge based. Without doing so, synchronization will not be achieved 

even if coordination and guidance are strengthened. Because acquisition 

improvements are still relatively recent, the success of these efforts will 

Conclusions 

 

23 DOD Directive 8320.02, December 2, 2004. 

24 The Defense Science Board is an advisory board within DOD that provides independent 

advice to the Secretary of Defense. 

25 Defense Science Board Task Force, Creating an Assured Joint DOD and Interagency 

Interoperable Net-Centric Enterprise, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (Washington, D.C., March 2009). 

Page 24 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

not be known for some time. Lastly, there are opportunities to increase the 

quality and usefulness of data collected from satellites that DOD has been 

slow to take advantage of. In this case, technical obstacles seem to be 

easier to overcome than cultural obstacles. DOD has already issued 

policies to adopt approaches that would facilitate data sharing and senior 

leaders have been encouraging such approaches, but they have not been 

implemented. Resistance and lack of coordination among the individual 

organizations that develop and use space systems are seen by some as key 

factors. As such, it may be in DOD’s best interest to support small-scale 

demonstrations of new architectures and technologies, such as DOD 

planned efforts to fuse missile warning information, and find ways to 

incentivize programs to participate in these demonstrations. 

To help DOD space systems provide more capability to the warfighter 

through better synchronization and increased commonality, and to provide 

increased insight into the costs associated with ground assets, we are 

making five recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. 

• Define a basic level of expected synchronization during the development 

of each space system acquisition based on delivering a capability to the 

warfighter. 

• Assess the value of designating an office with responsibility for overseeing 

the relative progress of satellite, ground, and user terminal programs with 

the aim of ensuring that problems that could affect the ability to 

synchronize a space system are known and addressed. 

• Formulate guidance to better align space system components so that all 

components are available to facilitate optimal operational testing. 

• Develop DOD-wide guidance, specific to space systems, to allow for the 

integration and consolidation, to the extent feasible, of DOD’s current and 

future satellite ground control systems via common ground architecture or 

by other similar means. 

• Provide annual documentation to Congress (in SARs or in other 

documents) that specifically delineates the cost, and cost performance, 

associated with (1) the satellites, (2) the ground control systems, and (3) 

associated user terminals, and as a result, provides the total cost of all 

planned components of each space system acquisition. 

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. DOD 

concurred with four of our recommendations and partially concurred with 

a fifth recommendation and identified actions it has taken or plans to take 

to address them. The comments are reprinted in appendix IV. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 25 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

In partially concurring with our recommendation to formulate guidance to 

align space system components to better facilitate optimal operational 

testing, the department noted that it had taken some steps to better align 

space system oversight and noted that it did not want to significantly delay 

providing the warfighter with needed space system capabilities to optimize 

operational testing. We agree that any efforts to optimize space system 

operational testing should not result in significant delays in providing the 

warfighter with needed capabilities. However, the purpose of operational 

testing is to ensure a system’s effectiveness and suitability for use by the 

warfighter. Not being able to conduct operational testing with productionrepresentative equipment can yield results that are not characteristic of 

the actual system. This can also negatively affect the warfighter. Our 

recommendation seeks to achieve a more pragmatic balance. It seems 

reasonable and even beneficial to the warfighter to have guidance that 

endorses operational testing that includes all of a space system’s 

components, or at least as many components as can be feasibly tested 

before delivery to the warfighter. 

In concurring with our other recommendations, DOD identified actions it 

has already taken that it believes will address our concerns. However, we 

considered these actions in formulating our recommendations and found 

that they did not go far enough to address the problems we identified. For 

example, DOD cited a newly created Space and Intelligence Office within 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics as a means of enhancing oversight for space programs. 

However, the office does not have oversight authority over all user 

terminals. DOD also stated that total cost information on each space 

system is provided to the Congress in SARs. However, these reports do not 

currently capture satellite, ground system, and related user terminal costs 

in a single document, which we found was needed to provide more 

accessible and transparent data on total costs for space programs. To 

improve synchronization and commonality of space systems, we believe 

that DOD needs to go beyond what it is already doing. This is the intent of 

our recommendations. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, and other interested parties. The 

report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 26 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
 

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-

4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Key contributors to this report are provided in appendix V. 

Sincerely yours, 

Cristina T. Chaplain 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 27 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) 

manages the synchronization of capabilities between satellite and ground 

components of satellite programs, we assessed eight DOD satellite 

programs: the Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite (AEHF), 

NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS), Mobile User Objective 

System (MUOS), National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental 

Satellite System (NPOESS), Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), SpaceBased Space Surveillance (SBSS), Space Tracking and Surveillance System 

(STSS), and Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS). We developed and sent 

data requests to the respective program offices, and examined planned 

deployment dates for satellites, ground systems, and user terminals to 

determine if capabilities will be synchronized. In making determinations 

about whether space system acquisitions had synchronization issues, we 

examined whether there were gaps between fielding dates of satellite 

capabilities compared to ground system capabilities and whether lower 

percentages of user terminal types were planned to be fielded by the space 

system acquisitions’ planned initial capability. Programs without gaps 

between fielding dates of satellite capabilities and ground system 

capabilities and that had plans for higher percentages of user terminal 

types to be fielded by their associated space system’s initial capability, 

were determined to be synchronized. While there is no DOD standard by 

which to measure lack of synchronization between satellite capabilities 

and ground system capabilities, we generally only considered aspects of a 

space acquisition unsynchronized if there was a gap of years, rather than 

months, between the fielding dates of significant capabilities. Regarding 

user terminals, we only considered these unsynchronized compared to 

satellite capabilities when user terminals did not meet DOD’s measure of 

synchronization for military satellite communications space acquisitions.1

This DOD measure of basic synchronization, established by U.S. Strategic 

Command (STRATCOM) says that 20 percent of any type of user terminal 

should be fielded by a space system acquisition’s initial capability date and 

85 percent should be fielded by its full capability date.2

 Although DOD 

officials acknowledged that these definitions are somewhat arbitrary and 

do not really measure what is most important—capability provided to the 

 

1

 DOD does not have a measure of synchronization for space acquisitions with missions 

other than military satellite communications. 

2

 U.S. Strategic Command, SATCOM Mission Area Initial Capabilities Document, August 

2004. DOD also has a definition for optimal military satellite communications user terminal 

synchronization of 50 percent of a type of user terminal fielded by a space acquisition’s 

initial capability date and 95 percent by its’ full capability date. 

Page 28 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

warfighter via a certain level of synchronization—this is the only DOD 

measure of space system synchronization. 

We analyzed four programs (AEHF, GPS, MUOS, and SBIRS) in greater 

detail to better understand the causes of less-than-optimal 

synchronization. We also reviewed various reports and analyses that 

identified factors contributing to a lack of synchronization. To determine 

the effect(s) of space systems that are not synchronized, we interviewed 

combatant commanders (in STRATCOM, Omaha, Nebraska; U.S. Special 

Operations Command, Tampa, Florida; and U.S. Central Command, 

Tampa, Florida) and testing personnel from the Office of the Director of 

Operational Testing and Evaluation, Washington, D.C., to determine if 

programs are optimally synchronized for testing and the consequences if 

they are not. We also analyzed cost data for the various programs to 

determine how much money was allocated to the satellites versus the 

ground control systems. 

To determine whether enhancements could be made to ground control 

systems and what challenges must be overcome to better utilize space 

systems, we interviewed DOD and government personnel at the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council, Washington, D.C.; Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, 

D.C.; National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia; Office of the 

Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.; United States Air Force 

Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles, California; the Navy’s 

Blossom Point Tracking Facility, Maryland; and RAND Corporation, Los 

Angeles, California. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2008 to September 

2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 29 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Summary of Synchronization Appendix II: Summary of Synchronization Issues Affecting Testing 

Issues Affecting Testing 

Satellite system and description Synchronization issues and how testing is affected 

AEHF. A communications satellite intended to 

provide global, secure, jam-resistant 

communications capability for strategic and 

tactical warfighters. 

• The prime contractor has experienced significant software development problems 

(issuing numerous deficiency reports) with an aspect of the ground control system 

that controls mission planning. Ground control system fielding will be delayed until 

the deficiencies are corrected and verified by the government testers. 

• The Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) command post 

terminal for command and control (ability to “fly”) of AEHF will be delayed. As a 

result, an interim, non-production-representative command and control terminal 

will have to be relied upon for testing and initial support of AEHF. In order to 

determine that a space system is operationally effective and suitable, productionrepresentative equipment for all components must be in place for operational 

testing. 

MOUS. A communications satellite designed 

to provide a worldwide, multiservice 

population of mobile and fixed terminal users 

with narrow-band line of sight satellite 

communications capability. MUOS will be 

capable of operating in adverse weather 

conditions. 

• Delays in the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) terminals mean that these are 

not well synchronized with MUOS. As a result, there may be no productionrepresentative JTRS available for MUOS operational testing scheduled for fiscal 

year 2010, which will affect the ability to test several aspects of MUOS. 

• Because of development delays, the majority of MUOS testing will be conducted 

in a laboratory instead of an operational platform environment. This will limit the 

capability to assess operational effectiveness and suitability issues associated 

with satellites’ payload performance in their intended environment. 

GPS. A navigation satellite with a spacebased radio-positioning system providing 

navigation and timing data to military and 

civilian users worldwide. 

• The development delays of a ground control system capable of commanding 

several significant satellite capabilities, which are designed to ensure that military 

GPS signals are secure, has delayed both testing and operational use of the 

capabilities. These capabilities could have been tested in 2005 if there had been 

no delays, but now they most likely will not be tested until 2010. As a result, by 

the time operational testing can be conducted for these significant capabilities, the 

entire GPS constellation (Block IIR-M and IIF satellites) will have already been 

launched, eliminating the opportunity for operational testing to influence the 

development of those satellites before they launch. Therefore, the overall lack of 

GPS program synchronization limits the utility of operational testing. 

SBIRS. A missile warning satellite designed 

to meet requirements in the missile warning, 

missile defense, technical intelligence, and 

battlespace characterization missions. 

• The hardware for an important sensor capability was placed on the first increment 

of SBIRS satellites, but because of problems, the associated software to enable 

full utilization of the sensor data will not be available. As a result, this sensor’s 

data will be available years before it can be fully utilized. From a testing 

standpoint, this means that initial satellite capabilities cannot be tested in time to 

affect the subsequent increment of satellites. 

• There has also been instability in the plan for the ground control system 

architecture because system requirements have continued to change. These 

requirements changes have led to ground software development delays and, from 

a test perspective, difficulties in developing an efficient test strategy. 

WGS. A communications satellite designed to 

provide essential communications services to 

U.S. warfighters, allies, and coalition partners 

during almost all levels of conflict. 

• The mission planning system does not work as intended. It was acquired 

separately from the satellite, and its shortcomings affect the ability of the 

Wideband Satellite Operations Center to perform its missions. This affects the 

ability of testers to validate user operations. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Page 30 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions 
Appendix III: Synchronization Issues between 

Satellites and User Terminals 

DOD program User terminal synchronization issues 

Advanced Extremely High 

Frequency Satellite System 

AEHF 

-Initial operational 

capability (IOC) 2011a

 (two 

satellites fielded) 

-Full operational capability 

(FOC) date not specified 

by programa

Air Force terminals: 

FAB-T Increment 1 

Function: Provide voice and data military satellite communications for 

nuclear and conventional forces as well as airborne and ground command 

posts. Synchronization issue: Two percent fielded by AEHF IOC (2011). 

Ground Element Minimum Essential Emergency Communication 

Network 

Function: Fixed and deployable communication for alerting aircrew of 

emergencies on bombers, tankers, and reconnaissance aircraft. 

Synchronization issue: Sixty-four percent fielded by AEHF IOC (2011). 

Minuteman Minimum Essential Emergency Communication Network 

Program –-Upgrade 

Function: Provides 24/7 survivable, redundant communication links for the 

reception of emergency action messages and command and control of 

ICBM force. Synchronization issue: Fifty-two percent fielded by AEHF IOC 

(2011). 

Secure Mobile Anti-Jam Reliable Tactical Terminal 

Function: Provide worldwide, low probability of intercept/detection, jamresistant, survivable multichannel communications and robust operations. 

Synchronization issue: Fifty-eight percent fielded by AEHF IOC (2011). 

Navy terminal: 

Navy Multiband Terminal 

Function: Next generation of maritime satellite communication designed to 

enhance protected and survivable satellite communications to naval forces. 

Synchronization issue: Only 14 percent fielded by AEHF IOC (2011) 

NAVSTAR Global 

Positioning System 

NAVSTAR GPS Military GPS user equipment: 

DOD plans to field extensive GPS user equipment and terminals to assist 

with positioning and navigation on a variety of air, ground, and sea 

platforms. While we did not evaluate plans to field the many types of GPS 

user equipment, we did examine when user equipment would be able to 

utilize a modernized military signal (M-code), designed to be secure and 

jam resistant. 

Synchronization issue: The M-code signal is planned to reach its IOC on 

the GPS satellites and ground control system by 2014. While user 

terminals will start to receive and process the signal as they begin to be 

fielded leading up to 2025, the user equipment and terminals are not 

expected to be fully fielded and operational until that year. 

Appendix III: Synchronization Issues 

between Satellites and User Terminals 

Page 31 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: Synchronization Issues between 

Satellites and User Terminals 

DOD program User terminal synchronization issues 

National Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental 

Satellite System 

NPOESS 

- IOC 2014 (one satellite 

fielded) 

- FOC 2017 (number of 

satellites not specified by 

program) 

Navy terminals: 

AN-SMQ-11 – Navy Field Terminal 

Function: Fielded primarily shipboard, with some shore, depot, and training 

assets. It ingests, processes, stores, and displays environmental data 

records (EDR) from meteorology and oceanographic (METOC) satellite 

families. Synchronization issue: System is currently fielded, but program 

estimates that only 50 percent of population will be upgraded for NPOESS 

compatibility by NPOESS IOC (2014). 

AN-FMQ-17 - Navy Field Terminal 

Function: Fielded on shore only. It ingests, processes, stores, and displays 

EDRs from METOC satellite families. Synchronization issue: System is 

currently fielded, but program estimates that only 67 percent of population 

will be upgraded for NPOESS compatibility by NPOESS IOC (2014). 

Marine terminal: 

Field Terminal Segment (FTS) Mobile 

Function: Signal Processing Element (SPE), Data Processing Element 

(DPE), and Mission Applications Element (MAE). SPE receives, decrypts, 

and conducts basic RF processing. DPE provides the data analysis 

algorithms that transform the raw data into usable images and METOC 

data. MAE provides the graphical user interface for the system, conducts 

postprocessing analysis, and displays finished products. This capability is 

highly desired in the FTS for size and weight considerations. 

Synchronization issue: Twelve planned, but only 1 estimated to be 

available by NPOESS IOC. 

Air Force terminals: 

MARK IVB and RSS terminals 

Function: Both types of terminals designed to receive geostationary 

information. Synchronization issue: Systems are currently fielded and work 

with legacy systems. Plans and funding are in place to achieve NPOESS 

compatibility. 

Mobile User Objective 

System 

MUOS 

- IOC 2011 (one satellite 

fielded) 

- FOC 2014 (when all five 

satellites are fielded) 

Joint terminal: 

JTRS 

Function: Software-defined radios that will interoperate and increase 

communication and networking capabilities. Synchronization issue: Less 

than 20 percent of MUOS-capable JTRS terminals available by MUOS IOC 

(on orbit capability) in late 2011. 

Wideband Global SATCOM WGS 

- IOC 2009 (one satellite 

fielded) 

- FOC 2013 (when all five 

satellites are fielded) 

Army, Navy, and Air Force - several airborne intelligence surveillance 

reconnaissance terminals 

Synchronization issue: SADT for Predator/Reaper UAV, FAB-T Increment 

2, and the Aerial Common Sensor—all zero percent fielded as of WGS IOC 

(2009). 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Legend: IOC = Initial Operational Capability; FOC = Full Operational Capability. 

Page 32 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: Synchronization Issues between 

Satellites and User Terminals 

a

AEHF IOC (defined as two satellites fielded) is currently scheduled for 2011 and there is no specified 

FOC date. However, there is a new acquisition program baseline pending approval. If it is approved, 

IOC will be delayed until 2013, and FOC is projected for 2019 (defined as four satellites fielded) 

because of satellite development issues. If the IOC date becomes 2013, this will alleviate several of 

the terminal synchronization issues listed above. AEHF program management told us that the 

satellite delays have been fortuitous in that they have allowed the program to be more synchronized. 

Regardless, before this unplanned delay in IOC, the program was being managed with significantly 

less-than-optimal synchronization (as evidenced by the information above). 

Page 33 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department Appendix IV: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 34 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 35 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-10-55 Defense Acquisitions
A

A

ppendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff

cknowledgments 

Page 37 GAO-10-55 

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Cristina T. Chaplain (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report 

were Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; Michael Aiken; Greg Campbell; John 

Crawford; Claire Cyrnak; John Krump; and Don Springman. 

 Defense Acquisitions 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(120787) 
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