Vol. 81 Tuesday, 

No. 124 June 28, 2016 

Part II 

Department of Transportation 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Parts 21, 43, 61, et al. 

Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems; Final 

Rule 


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42064 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 28, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Parts 21, 43, 61, 91, 101, 107, 

119, 133, and 183 

[Docket No.: FAA–2015–0150; Amdt. Nos. 

21–99, 43–48, 61–137, 91–343, 101–9, 107– 

1, 119–18, 133–15, and 183–16] 

RIN 2120–AJ60 

Operation and Certification of Small 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) and Office of the 

Secretary of Transportation (OST), 

Department of Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is amending its 

regulations to allow the operation of 

small unmanned aircraft systems in the 

National Airspace System. These 

changes address the operation of 

unmanned aircraft systems and 

certification of their remote pilots. This 

rule will also prohibit model aircraft 

from endangering the safety of the 

National Airspace System. 

DATES: This final rule is effective August 

29, 2016. 

ADDRESSES: For information on where to 

obtain copies of rulemaking documents 

and other information related to this 

final rule, see ‘‘How To Obtain 

Additional Information’’ in the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

small UAS technical questions 

concerning this final rule, contact Lance 

Nuckolls, Flight Technologies and 

Procedures Division, AFS–400, 470 

L’Enfant Plaza SW., Suite 4102, 

Washington, DC 20024; telephone 1– 

844–FLY–MYUAS; email UAShelp@

faa.gov. 

For FAA small UAS policy questions 

concerning this final rule, contact 

Everette Rochon, Manager, Commercial 

Operations Branch, AFS–820, Flight 

Standards Service, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 55 M Street SE., 8th 

Floor, Washington, DC 20003; telephone 

1–844–FLY–MYUAS; email UAShelp@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents 

I. Executive Summary 

A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action 

B. Summary of the Major Provisions of the 

Regulatory Action 

C. Costs and Benefits 

II. Background 

A. Authority for This Rulemaking 

B. Analysis of Public Risk Posed by Small 

UAS Operations 

C. Current Statutory and Regulatory 

Structure Governing Small UAS 

D. Integrating Small UAS Operations Into 

the NAS Through Rulemaking 

E. Related UAS Integration Initiatives 

III. Discussion of the Final Rule 

A. Incremental Approach and Waiver 

B. Discussion of the Applicable Statutory 

Framework 

C. Applicability 

1. Transporting Property for Compensation 

(Air Carrier Operations) 

2. International Operations and ForeignOwned Aircraft 

3. Public Aircraft Operations 

4. Model Aircraft 

5. Moored Balloons, Kites, Amateur 

Rockets, and Unmanned Free Balloons 

6. Current Treatment of UAS and 

Grandfathering of Section 333 

Exemption Holders 

D. Definitions 

1. Control Station 

2. Corrective Lenses 

3. Unmanned Aircraft 

4. Small Unmanned Aircraft 

5. Small Unmanned Aircraft System (Small 

UAS) 

6. Other Definitions 

E. Operating Rules 

1. Remote Pilot in Command 

a. Terminology 

b. Remote Pilot in Command 

c. Airman Certification Requirement 

d. Emergency Powers of a Remote Pilot in 

Command 

2. See-and-Avoid and Visibility 

Requirements 

a. Visual Line of Sight 

b. Visual Observer 

i. Definition of Visual Observer 

ii. Operational Requirements When Using 

Visual Observer 

iii. Optional Use of a Visual Observer 

iv. No Airman Certification or Required 

Training of Visual Observer 

c. Additional Visibility Requirements 

i. Daytime Operations 

ii. Weather/Visibility Minimums 

iii. Yielding Right of Way 

d. Additional Technology/Conspicuity 

Requirements 

i. ADS–B, Transponders, and TCAS 

ii. Radio Equipment 

iii. Lighting 

iv. Conspicuity 

3. Containment and Loss of Positive 

Control 

a. Confined Area of Operation Boundaries 

i. Horizontal Boundary and Moving 

Vehicles 

ii. Vertical Boundary (Maximum Altitude) 

b. Mitigating Loss of Positive Control Risk 

i. Maximum Speed 

ii. Operating Multiple Unmanned Aircraft 

iii. Micro UAS 

iv. Flight Over People 

v. Preflight Briefing 

vi. Preflight Assessment of the Operating 

Area and Ensuring That the Aircraft 

Poses No Undue Hazard 

1. Preflight Assessment of the Operating 

Environment 

2. Undue Hazard if There Is a Loss of 

Control 

vii. Automation 

viii. Other Equipage 

1. Geo-Fencing 

2. Flight Termination System 

3. Other Technological Equipage 

4. External Load and Dropping Objects 

a. External Load and Towing 

b. Dropping Objects 

5. Limitations on Operations in Certain 

Airspace 

a. Operations in Class B, C, D, and Lateral 

Boundaries of the Surface Area of Class 

E Airspace Designated for an Airport 

b. Operations in Class A Airspace 

c. Prohibited or Restricted Areas 

d. Areas Designated by Notice to Airmen 

e. Operations in Class G Airspace 

6. Inspection, Maintenance, and 

Airworthiness Directives 

a. Inspections and Maintenance 

i. Preflight Check and Maintenance 

Requirements 

ii. Discontinuing Flight 

iii. Control Link Check 

b. Airworthiness Directives 

7. Additional Operating Provisions 

a. Careless or Reckless Operation 

b. Drug and Alcohol Prohibition 

c. Sufficient Power for the Small UAS 

F. Remote Pilot Certificate 

1. Use of UAS Experience To Apply for 

Part 61 Pilot Certificate 

2. Remote Pilot Certificate Eligibility and 

Issuance 

a. Minimum Age 

b. English Language Proficiency 

c. No Airman Medical Certificate Required 

d. Flight Proficiency and Aeronautical 

Experience 

e. Formal Training 

f. General Requirement for Initial 

Aeronautical Knowledge Test 

g. General Requirement for Recurrent 

Aeronautical Knowledge Test 

h. Pilots With Military Experience 

i. Credit to Holders of Part 61 Pilot 

Certificates 

j. Areas of Knowledge on the Aeronautical 

Knowledge Tests and Training Courses 

for Part 61 Pilot Certificate Holders 

i. Regulations Applicable to Small UAS 

ii. Airspace Classifications and Operating 

Requirements, and Flight Restrictions 

Affecting Small Unmanned Aircraft 

Operation 

iii. Obstacle Clearance Requirements 

iv. Aviation Weather Sources and Effects of 

Weather on Small Unmanned Aircraft 

Performance 

v. Small UAS Loading and Performance 

vi. Emergency Procedures 

vii. Crew Resource Management 

viii. Determining the Performance of the 

Small Unmanned Aircraft 

ix. Physiological Effects of Drugs and 

Alcohol 

x. Aeronautical Decision-Making and 

Judgment 

xi. Airport Operations 

xii. Radio Communication Procedures 

xiii. Other Areas of Knowledge Suggested 

by the Commenters 

k. Administration of the Knowledge Tests 

and Training Courses 

i. Location of the Knowledge Test and 

Online Option for Training Course 

ii. Cheating or Engaging in Unauthorized 

Conduct 


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1 80 FR 9544, Feb. 23, 2015. 

2As used here, ‘‘non-hobby and non-recreational 

purposes’’ refers to small UAS that are not operated 

in accordance with section 336 of Public Law 112– 

95. A discussion of section 336 can be found below 

in section III.C.4 of this preamble. 

3Public Law 112–95, sec. 331(6). 

iii. Identification of the Test-Taker 

iv. Retesting After Failure 

l. Transportation Security Administration 

Vetting and Process for Issuance 

i. TSA Vetting and Temporary Remote 

Pilot Certificates 

ii. Issuance and Positive Identification 

3. Remote Pilot Certificate Denial, 

Revocation, Suspension, Amendment, 

and Surrender 

a. Drugs and Alcohol Violations 

b. Change of Name 

c. Change of Address 

d. Voluntary Surrender of Certificate 

e. Additional Comments on Remote Pilot 

Certificate 

G. Registration and Marking 

H. Fraud and False Statements 

I. Oversight 

1. Inspection, Testing, and Demonstration 

of Compliance 

2. Accident Reporting 

J. Statutory Findings 

1. Hazard to Users of the NAS or the Public 

2. National Security 

3. Airworthiness Certification 

K. Miscellaneous Provisions 

1. Mandatory Insurance 

2. Test Sites 

3. Noise and Environmental 

a. The National Environmental Policy Act 

b. Noise 

c. Other Environmental Comments 

4. Privacy 

5. First Amendment 

a. First Amendment Law in the United 

States 

b. Restrictions on Speech in a Non-Public 

Forum 

c. Incidental Restrictions on Speech 

d. Time, Place, Manner Restrictions on 

Speech 

6. Preemption 

7. Agricultural Operations 

8. Miscellaneous Comments 

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses 

A. Regulatory Evaluation 

B. Final Regulatory Flexibility 

Determination 

1. A Statement of the Need for and 

Objectives of the Rule 

2. A Statement of the Significant Issues 

Raised by the Public Comments in 

Response to the Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis, a Statement of the 

Assessment of the Agency of Such 

Issues, and a Statement of Any Changes 

Made in the Proposed Rule as a Result 

of Such Comments 

3. The Response of the Agency to Any 

Comments Filed by the Chief Counsel for 

Advocacy of the Small Business 

Administration (SBA) in Response to the 

Proposed Rule, and a Detailed Statement 

of Any Change Made to the Proposed 

Rule in the Final Rule as a Result of the 

Comments 

4. A Description and an Estimate of the 

Number of Small Entities to Which the 

Rule Will Apply, or an Explanation of 

Why No Such Estimate Is Available 

5. A Description of the Projected Reporting, 

Recordkeeping and Other Compliance 

Requirements of the Rule, Including an 

Estimate of the Classes of Small Entities 

Which Will Be Subject to the 

Requirement and the Type of 

Professional Skills Necessary for 

Preparation of the Report or Record 

6. A Description of the Steps the Agency 

Has Taken To Minimize the Significant 

Economic Impact on Small Entities 

Consistent With the Stated Objectives of 

Applicable Statutes, Including a 

Statement of the Factual, Policy, and 

Legal Reasons for Selecting the 

Alternative Adopted in the Final Rule 

and Why Each One of the Other 

Significant Alternatives to the Rule 

Considered by the Agency Which Affect 

the Impact on Small Entities Was 

Rejected 

6. Describe Alternatives Considered 

C. International Trade Impact Assessment 

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

E. Paperwork Reduction Act 

1. Obtaining a Remote Pilot Certificate 

With a Small UAS Rating 

Summary 

2. Accident Reporting. 

Summary 

3. Emergency Powers 

4. Certificate of Waiver 

5. Total Annual Burden Estimate 

F. International Compatibility and 

Cooperation 

G. Environmental Analysis 

H. Regulations Affecting Intrastate 

Aviation in Alaska 

V. Executive Order Determinations 

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations 

That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use 

C. Executive Order 13609, Promoting 

International Regulatory Cooperation 

VI. Additional Information 

A. Availability of Rulemaking Documents 

B. Comments Submitted to the Docket 

C. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 

Fairness Act 

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 

Frequently Used in This Document 

AC—Advisory Circular 

AGL—Above Ground Level 

ACR—Airman Certification Representative 

ADS–B—Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast 

ARC—Aviation Rulemaking Committee 

ATC—Air Traffic Control 

CAFTA-DR—Dominican Republic-Central 

America-United States Free Trade 

Agreement 

CAR—Civil Air Regulation 

CFI—Certificated Flight Instructor 

CFR—Code of Federal Regulations 

COA—Certificate of Waiver or Authorization 

DPE—Designated Pilot Examiner 

FR—Federal Register 

FSDO—Flight Standards District Office 

ICAO—International Civil Aviation 

Organization 

NAFTA—North American Free Trade 

Agreement 

NAS—National Airspace System 

NOTAM—Notice to Airmen 

NPRM—Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

NTSB—National Transportation Safety Board 

PIC—Pilot in Command 

Pub. L.—Public Law 

PMA—Parts Manufacturer Approval 

TCAS—Traffic Collision Avoidance System 

TFR—Temporary Flight Restriction 

TSA—Transportation Security 

Administration 

TSO—Technical Standard Order 

UAS—Unmanned Aircraft System 

U.S.C.—United States Code 

I. Executive Summary 

A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action 

This rule finalizes the notice of 

proposed rulemaking entitled Operation 

and Certification of Small Unmanned 

Aircraft Systems 1 (the NPRM). The 

NPRM proposed operating and 

certification requirements to allow small 

unmanned aircraft systems (small UAS) 

to operate for non-hobby and nonrecreational purposes.2 A small UAS 

consists of a small unmanned aircraft 

(which, as defined by statute, is an 

unmanned aircraft weighing less than 

55 pounds 3) and equipment necessary 

for the safe and efficient operation of 

that aircraft. The FAA has 

accommodated non-recreational small 

UAS use through various mechanisms, 

such as special airworthiness 

certificates, exemptions, and certificates 

of waiver or authorization (COAs). This 

rule is the next phase of integrating 

small UAS into the NAS. 

The following are examples of 

possible small UAS operations that can 

be conducted under the framework in 

this rule: 

• Crop monitoring/inspection; 

• Research and development; 

• Educational/academic uses; 

• Power-line/pipeline inspection in hilly 

or mountainous terrain; 

• Antenna inspections; 

• Aiding certain rescue operations; 

• Bridge inspections; 

• Aerial photography; and 

• Wildlife nesting area evaluations. 

Because of the potential societally 

beneficial applications of small UAS, 

the FAA has been seeking to incorporate 

the operation of these systems into the 

national airspace system (NAS) since 

2008. In 2012, Congress passed the FAA 

Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 

(Pub. L. 112–95). Section 333 of Public 

Law 112–95 directed the Secretary to 

determine whether UAS operations 

posing the least amount of public risk 

and no threat to national security could 

safely be operated in the NAS and, if so, 

to establish requirements for the safe 

operation of these systems in the NAS, 

prior to completion of the UAS 


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comprehensive plan and rulemakings 

required by section 332 of Public Law 

112–95. 

On February 23, 2015, as part of its 

ongoing efforts to integrate UAS 

operations in the NAS and in 

accordance with section 333 of Public 

Law 112–95, the FAA issued the NPRM 

proposing to amend its regulations to 

adopt specific rules for the operation of 

small UAS in the NAS. Over 4,600 

public comments were submitted in 

response to the NPRM. The FAA has 

considered the comments, and now 

issues this final rule to integrate small 

UAS into the NAS. 

Based on its consideration of the 

comments submitted in response to the 

NPRM, and its experience with the 

certification, exemption, and COA 

process, the FAA has developed the 

framework in this rule to enable certain 

small UAS operations to commence 

upon adoption of this rule and 

accommodate technologies as they 

evolve and mature. This framework 

allows small UAS operations for many 

different non-recreational purposes, 

such as the ones discussed previously, 

without requiring airworthiness 

certification, exemption, or a COA. 

B. Summary of the Major Provisions of 

the Regulatory Action 

This rule will add a new part 107 to 

Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 

CFR) to allow for routine civil operation 

of small UAS in the NAS and to provide 

safety rules for those operations. 

Consistent with the statutory definition, 

this rule will define small UAS as UAS 

that use unmanned aircraft weighing 

less than 55 pounds. To mitigate risk, 

the rule will limit small UAS to daylight 

and civil twilight operations with 

appropriate collision lighting, confined 

areas of operation, and visual-line-ofsight operations. This rule will also 

address airspace restrictions, remote 

pilot certification, visual observer 

requirements, and operational limits in 

order to maintain the safety of the NAS 

and ensure that small UAS do not pose 

a threat to national security. Because 

UAS constitute a quickly changing 

technology, a key provision of this rule 

is a waiver mechanism to allow 

individual operations to deviate from 

many of the operational restrictions of 

this rule if the Administrator finds that 

the proposed operation can safely be 

conducted under the terms of a 

certificate of waiver. 

Below is a summary of the major 

provisions of the rule. 

TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF PART 107 

Operational Limitations .................................. • Unmanned aircraft must weigh less than 55 lbs. (25 kg). 

• Visual line-of-sight (VLOS) only; the unmanned aircraft must remain within VLOS of the remote 

pilot in command and the person manipulating the flight controls of the small UAS. Alternatively, 

the unmanned aircraft must remain within VLOS of the visual observer. 

• At all times the small unmanned aircraft must remain close enough to the remote pilot in command and the person manipulating the flight controls of the small UAS for those people to be 

capable of seeing the aircraft with vision unaided by any device other than corrective lenses. 

• Small unmanned aircraft may not operate over any persons not directly participating in the operation, not under a covered structure, and not inside a covered stationary vehicle. 

• Daylight-only operations, or civil twilight (30 minutes before official sunrise to 30 minutes after 

official sunset, local time) with appropriate anti-collision lighting. 

• Must yield right of way to other aircraft. 

• May use visual observer (VO) but not required. 

• First-person view camera cannot satisfy ‘‘see-and-avoid’’ requirement but can be used as long 

as requirement is satisfied in other ways. 

• Maximum groundspeed of 100 mph (87 knots). 

• Maximum altitude of 400 feet above ground level (AGL) or, if higher than 400 feet AGL, remain 

within 400 feet of a structure. 

• Minimum weather visibility of 3 miles from control station. 

• Operations in Class B, C, D and E airspace are allowed with the required ATC permission. 

• Operations in Class G airspace are allowed without ATC permission. 

• No person may act as a remote pilot in command or VO for more than one unmanned aircraft 

operation at one time. 

• No operations from a moving aircraft. 

• No operations from a moving vehicle unless the operation is over a sparsely populated area. 

• No careless or reckless operations. 

• No carriage of hazardous materials. 

• Requires preflight inspection by the remote pilot in command. 

• A person may not operate a small unmanned aircraft if he or she knows or has reason to know 

of any physical or mental condition that would interfere with the safe operation of a small UAS. 

• Foreign-registered small unmanned aircraft are allowed to operate under part 107 if they satisfy 

the requirements of part 375. 

• External load operations are allowed if the object being carried by the unmanned aircraft is securely attached and does not adversely affect the flight characteristics or controllability of the 

aircraft. 

• Transportation of property for compensation or hire allowed provided that— 

Æ The aircraft, including its attached systems, payload and cargo weigh less than 55 pounds 

total; 

Æ The flight is conducted within visual line of sight and not from a moving vehicle or aircraft; and 

Æ The flight occurs wholly within the bounds of a State and does not involve transport between 

(1) Hawaii and another place in Hawaii through airspace outside Hawaii; (2) the District of Columbia and another place in the District of Columbia; or (3) a territory or possession of the 

United States and another place in the same territory or possession. 

• Most of the restrictions discussed above are waivable if the applicant demonstrates that his or 

her operation can safely be conducted under the terms of a certificate of waiver. 

Remote Pilot in Command Certification and 

Responsibilities.


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4To become certificated as remote pilot with a 

small UAS rating, an individual is only required to 

pass a knowledge test. The certification does not 

require an individual to attend ground school or to 

pass a practical skills exam, both of which are 

required to receive an airman’s certificate for sport 

pilot and above. 

5See the full regulatory evaluation for a detailed 

description on the two small UAS forecasts the 

FAA used to estimate benefits and costs. 

6The primary authority for this rulemaking is 

based on section 333 of Public Law 112–95 (Feb. 

14, 2012). In addition, this rulemaking also relies 

on FAA statutory authorities. Thus, for the 

purposes of this rulemaking, the terms ‘‘FAA,’’ ‘‘the 

agency,’’ ‘‘DOT,’’ ‘‘the Department,’’ and ‘‘the 

Secretary’’ are used synonymously throughout this 

document. 

TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF PART 107—Continued 

• Establishes a remote pilot in command position. 

• A person operating a small UAS must either hold a remote pilot airman certificate with a small 

UAS rating or be under the direct supervision of a person who does hold a remote pilot certificate (remote pilot in command). 

• To qualify for a remote pilot certificate, a person must: 

Æ Demonstrate aeronautical knowledge by either: 

D Passing an initial aeronautical knowledge test at an FAA-approved knowledge testing center; or 

D Hold a part 61 pilot certificate other than student pilot, complete a flight review within the previous 24 months, and complete a small UAS online training course provided by the FAA. 

Æ Be vetted by the Transportation Security Administration. 

Æ Be at least 16 years old. 

• Part 61 pilot certificate holders may obtain a temporary remote pilot certificate immediately 

upon submission of their application for a permanent certificate. Other applicants will obtain a 

temporary remote pilot certificate upon successful completion of TSA security vetting. The FAA 

anticipates that it will be able to issue a temporary remote pilot certificate within 10 business 

days after receiving a completed remote pilot certificate application. 

• Until international standards are developed, foreign-certificated UAS pilots will be required to 

obtain an FAA-issued remote pilot certificate with a small UAS rating. 

A remote pilot in command must: 

• Make available to the FAA, upon request, the small UAS for inspection or testing, and any associated documents/records required to be kept under the rule. 

• Report to the FAA within 10 days of any operation that results in at least serious injury, loss of 

consciousness, or property damage of at least $500. 

• Conduct a preflight inspection, to include specific aircraft and control station systems checks, to 

ensure the small UAS is in a condition for safe operation. 

• Ensure that the small unmanned aircraft complies with the existing registration requirements 

specified in § 91.203(a)(2). 

A remote pilot in command may deviate from the requirements of this rule in response to an inflight emergency. 

Aircraft Requirements .................................... • FAA airworthiness certification is not required. However, the remote pilot in command must 

conduct a preflight check of the small UAS to ensure that it is in a condition for safe operation. 

Model Aircraft ................................................ • Part 107 does not apply to model aircraft that satisfy all of the criteria specified in section 336 

of Public Law 112–95. 

• The rule codifies the FAA’s enforcement authority in part 101 by prohibiting model aircraft operators from endangering the safety of the NAS. 

C. Costs and Benefits 

Technological advances in small UAS 

have led to a potential commercial 

market for their uses by providing a safe 

operating environment for them and for 

other aircraft in the NAS. In addition to 

enabling this industry to develop, the 

FAA anticipates that this final rule will 

provide an opportunity to substitute 

small UAS operations for some risky 

manned flights, such as inspection of 

houses, towers, bridges, or parks, 

thereby averting potential fatalities and 

injuries. 

The FAA has analyzed the benefits 

and the costs associated with this final 

rule. The estimated out-of-pocket cost 

for an individual to become FAA 

certificated as a remote pilot with a 

small UAS rating is $150, which is less 

than the cost of any other airman 

certification that allows nonrecreational operations in the NAS.4

The final rule will enable a new 

industry to unfold while imposing 

relatively low individual costs. The 

private sector expected benefits exceed 

private sector expected costs because 

each entity voluntarily chooses to incur 

the compliance cost of this rule in 

anticipation that their benefits exceed 

the costs. The sum of these entities’ 

actions results in societal benefits which 

exceed societal costs when government 

costs are also taken into account. The 

FAA has quantified these benefits by 

estimating consumer surplus resulting 

from future commercial operations. 

Benefits to society equal the consumer 

surplus minus certain additional costs 

discussed. 

The regulatory analysis for this final 

rule presents two scenarios in order to 

present a range for costs—a high case 

and a low case. The scenarios are based 

on two fleet forecasts that were prepared 

independently at separate times. As a 

result, the high case and low case 

projections for small UAS sales, fleet, 

and pilots differ significantly. 

Depending on which small UAS 

forecast is used, the FAA expects this 

rule will result in a net social benefit 

ranging from about $733 million in the 

low case to about $9.0 billion in the 

high case over five years.5

II. Background 

This final rule addresses the operation 

and airman certification of civil small 

UAS. The following sections discuss: (1) 

The public risk associated with small 

UAS operations; (2) the current legal 

framework governing small UAS 

operations; and (3) the FAA’s ongoing 

efforts to incorporate small UAS 

operations into the NAS. 

A. Authority for This Rulemaking 

This rulemaking is promulgated 

under the authority described in the 

FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 

2012 (Pub. L. 112–95). Section 333 of 

Public Law 112–95 directs the Secretary 

of Transportation 6 to determine 

whether ‘‘certain unmanned aircraft 

systems may operate safely in the 


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7Public Law 112–95, sec. 333(c). 8 14 CFR 91.113(b). 

9Pilot Vigilance, 33 FR 10505 (July 24, 1968). 

10Administrator v. Pirker, NTSB Order No. EA– 

5730 (Nov. 17, 2014). A copy of the Pirker opinion 

may be found at: http://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/

Documents/5730.pdf. 

national airspace system.’’ If the 

Secretary determines, pursuant to 

section 333, that certain unmanned 

aircraft systems may operate safely in 

the national airspace system, then the 

Secretary must ‘‘establish requirements 

for the safe operation of such aircraft 

systems in the national airspace 

system.’’ 7

This rulemaking is also promulgated 

pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(1) and 

(2), which charge the FAA with issuing 

regulations: (1) To ensure the safety of 

aircraft and the efficient use of airspace; 

and (2) to govern the flight of aircraft for 

purposes of navigating, protecting and 

identifying aircraft, and protecting 

individuals and property on the ground. 

In addition, 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5) 

charges the FAA with prescribing 

regulations that the FAA finds necessary 

for safety in air commerce and national 

security. This rulemaking also 

establishes a new class of airman 

certificate tailored to remote pilots, 

consistent with the statutory obligation 

set forth in 49 U.S.C. 44703. 

The model-aircraft component of this 

rulemaking incorporates the statutory 

mandate in section 336(b) that preserves 

the FAA’s authority, under 49 U.S.C. 

40103(b) and 44701(a)(5), to pursue 

enforcement ‘‘against persons operating 

model aircraft who endanger the safety 

of the national airspace system.’’ 

B. Analysis of Public Risk Posed by 

Small UAS Operations 

Small UAS operations pose risk 

considerations that are different from 

the risk considerations typically 

associated with manned-aircraft 

operations. On one hand, certain 

operations of a small unmanned aircraft, 

discussed more fully in section III.E of 

this preamble, have the potential to pose 

significantly less risk to persons and 

property than comparable operations of 

a manned aircraft due to differences in 

the weight of the aircraft. The typical 

total takeoff weight of a general aviation 

aircraft is between 1,300 and 6,000 

pounds as compared to a total takeoff 

weight of a small unmanned aircraft of 

less than 55 pounds. Consequently, 

because of the reduced weight, the small 

unmanned aircraft would pose 

significantly less risk to persons and 

property on the ground in the event of 

a mishap or pilot error. As such, a small 

UAS operation whose parameters are 

well defined to mitigate risk to other 

aircraft would also pose a smaller 

overall public risk or threat to national 

security than the operation of a manned 

aircraft. 

On the other hand, even though small 

UAS operations have the potential to 

pose a lower level of public risk in 

certain types of operations, the 

unmanned nature of the small UAS 

operations raises two unique safety 

concerns that are not present in 

manned-aircraft operations. The first 

safety concern is whether the person 

operating the small unmanned aircraft, 

who is physically separated from that 

aircraft during flight, would have the 

ability to see manned aircraft in the air 

in time to prevent a mid-air collision 

with that manned aircraft. As discussed 

in more detail below, the FAA’s 

regulations currently require each 

person operating an aircraft to maintain 

vigilance ‘‘so as to see and avoid other 

aircraft.’’ 8 This is one of the 

fundamental principles for collision 

avoidance in the NAS. 

For manned-aircraft operations, ‘‘see 

and avoid’’ is the responsibility of pilots 

on board an aircraft. Because the remote 

pilot in an unmanned aircraft operation 

is not physically on the unmanned 

aircraft, that remote pilot does not have 

the same visual perspective and ability 

to see other aircraft as a manned-aircraft 

pilot. Thus, the challenge for small 

unmanned aircraft operations is to 

ensure that the person operating the 

small unmanned aircraft is able to see 

and avoid other aircraft. 

The second safety concern with small 

UAS operations is the possibility that, 

during flight, the person piloting the 

small unmanned aircraft may lose 

control of the aircraft due to a failure of 

the control link between the aircraft and 

the remote pilot’s control station. This 

is known as a loss of positive control 

and may result from a system failure or 

because the aircraft has been flown 

beyond the signal range or in an area 

where control link communication 

between the aircraft and the control 

station is interrupted. A small 

unmanned aircraft whose flight is 

unable to be directly controlled could 

pose a significant risk to persons, 

property, or other aircraft. 

C. Current Statutory and Regulatory 

Structure Governing Small UAS 

Due to the lack of an onboard pilot, 

small UAS operations cannot be 

conducted in accordance with many of 

the FAA’s current operating regulations, 

codified in 14 CFR part 91, that apply 

to general aviation. The primary 

example of this conflict is § 91.113(b), 

which requires each person operating an 

aircraft to maintain vigilance ‘‘so as to 

see and avoid other aircraft.’’ The FAA 

created this requirement in a 1968 

rulemaking,9 which combined two 

previous aviation regulatory provisions 

(Civil Air Regulations (CAR) §§ 60.13(c) 

and 60.30) into the ‘‘see and avoid’’ 

requirement now found in § 91.113(b). 

These CAR provisions were intended to 

address aircraft collision-awareness 

problems by requiring a pilot on board 

the aircraft to look out of the aircraft 

during flight to observe whether other 

aircraft are on a collision path with his 

or her aircraft. Those provisions did not 

contemplate the use of technology to 

substitute for the human vision of a 

pilot on board the aircraft nor did they 

contemplate the manipulation of the 

aircraft from outside of the aircraft. To 

the contrary, CAR § 60.13(c) stated that 

one of the problems it intended to 

address was ‘‘preoccupation by the pilot 

with cockpit duties,’’ which indicates 

that the regulation contemplated the 

presence of a pilot on board the aircraft. 

Based on this intent, § 91.113(b) 

requires an aircraft pilot to have the 

perspective of being inside the aircraft 

as that aircraft is moving in order to see 

and avoid other aircraft. Since the 

remote pilot of a small UAS does not 

have this perspective, operation of a 

small UAS cannot meet the see and 

avoid requirement of § 91.113(b). 

In addition to regulatory 

considerations, there are statutory 

considerations that apply to small UAS 

operations. For example, even though a 

small UAS is different from a manned 

aircraft, the operation of a small UAS 

still involves the operation of an aircraft 

under the FAA’s statute, which defines 

an ‘‘aircraft’’ as ‘‘any contrivance 

invented, used, or designed to navigate 

or fly in the air.’’ 49 U.S.C. 40102(a)(6). 

Congress reaffirmed that an unmanned 

aircraft is an aircraft in the FAA 

Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, 

by defining unmanned aircraft as ‘‘an 

aircraft that is operated without the 

possibility of direct human intervention 

from within or on the aircraft.’’ Sec. 

331(8), Public Law 112–95. In 

Administrator v. Pirker, the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 

unanimously affirmed this 

understanding, finding that an 

unmanned aircraft is an aircraft for 

purposes of the FAA’s statutes and 

regulations.10

Because a small UAS involves the 

operation of an ‘‘aircraft,’’ this triggers 

the FAA’s registration and certification 

statutory requirements. Specifically, 

subject to certain exceptions, a person 


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11The statutes also impose other requirements 

that are beyond the scope of this rulemaking. For 

example, 49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(4) prohibits a person 

from operating as an air carrier without an aircarrier operating certificate. 

12Administrator v. Barrows, 7 N.T.S.B. 5, 8–9 

(1990). 

13See, e.g., United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 

84 (1964) (holding that the statutory definition of 

‘‘air commerce’’ in the Federal Aviation Act is not 

limited to commercial airplanes); Hill v. NTSB, 886 

F.2d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir. 1989) (‘‘[t]he statutory 

definition of ‘air commerce’ is therefore clearly not 

restricted to interstate flights occurring in 

controlled or navigable airspace’’); United States v. 

Drumm, 55 F. Supp. 151, 155 (D. Nev. 1944) 

(upholding amendments of Civil Air Regulations, 

which among other things prohibited any person 

from piloting a civil aircraft unless the person held 

a valid pilot certificate and the aircraft possessed an 

airworthiness certificate, on the grounds that the 

regulatory action was within the scope of powers 

conferred by Congress). 14See 14 CFR 61.113, 61.133 and 61.167(a). 

15The FAA chartered the small UAS Aviation 

Rulemaking Committee (ARC), which provided it 

with recommendations on how small UAS could be 

safely integrated into the NAS. A copy of the ARC 

Report and Recommendations can be found in the 

docket for this rulemaking. 

16As discussed in more detail further in the 

preamble, the FAA Modernization and Reform Act 

of 2012 also contained a provision prohibiting the 

FAA from issuing rules and regulations for model 

aircraft meeting certain criteria specified in section 

336 of the Act. 

may not operate a civil aircraft that is 

not registered. 49 U.S.C. 44101(a). In 

addition, a person may not operate a 

civil aircraft in air commerce without an 

airworthiness certificate. 49 U.S.C. 

44711(a)(1). Finally, a person may not 

serve in any capacity as an airman on 

a civil aircraft being operated in air 

commerce without an airman certificate. 

49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(2)(A).11

The term ‘‘air commerce,’’ as used in 

the FAA’s statutes, is defined broadly to 

include ‘‘the operation of aircraft within 

the limits of a Federal airway, or the 

operation of aircraft that directly affects, 

or may endanger safety in foreign or 

interstate air commerce.’’ 49 U.S.C. 

40102(a)(3). Because of this broad 

definition, the NTSB has held that ‘‘any 

use of an aircraft, for purpose of flight, 

constitutes air commerce.’’ 12 Courts 

that have considered this issue have 

reached similar conclusions that ‘‘air 

commerce,’’ as defined in the FAA’s 

statute, encompasses a broad range of 

commercial and non-commercial 

aircraft operations.13

Accordingly, because ‘‘air commerce’’ 

encompasses such a broad range of 

aircraft operations, a civil small 

unmanned aircraft cannot currently be 

operated, for purposes of flight, if it 

does not comply with the above 

statutes. However, the FAA’s current 

processes for issuing airworthiness and 

airman certificates were designed to be 

used for manned aircraft and do not take 

into account the considerations 

associated with civil small UAS. 

Because the pertinent existing 

regulations do not differentiate between 

manned and unmanned aircraft, a small 

UAS is currently subject to the same 

airworthiness certification process as a 

manned aircraft. These existing 

regulations do not contemplate small 

UAS operations that could, as a result 

of their operational parameters, safely 

be conducted without any airworthiness 

certification. This framework imposes 

an undue burden on such operations. 

Additionally, under current pilot 

certification regulations, depending on 

the type of operation, the remote pilot 

in command of the small UAS currently 

must obtain a sport, recreation, private, 

commercial, or airline transport pilot 

certificate. While a private pilot and 

commercial pilot may both operate an 

aircraft for the furtherance of a business, 

a private pilot may only do so if the 

flight is incidental to the pilot’s 

business or employment and not for 

compensation or hire. Only a 

commercial or airline transport pilot 

certificate may be used to operate an 

aircraft for compensation or hire.14

Typically, to obtain a sport, private, 

recreational, commercial, or airline 

transport pilot certificate, the small UAS 

pilot currently has to: (1) Receive 

training in specific aeronautical 

knowledge areas; (2) receive training 

from an authorized instructor on 

specific areas of aircraft operation; and 

(3) pass an aeronautical knowledge test 

and a practical (skills) test. A certificate 

applicant also has to obtain minimum 

hours of flight time prior to applying for 

the certificate: (1) 20 hours for a sport 

pilot certificate; (2) 30 hours for a 

recreational pilot certificate; (3) 40 

hours for a private pilot certificate; (4) 

250 hours for a commercial pilot 

certificate; and (5) 1,500 hours for an 

airline transport pilot certificate. 

Finally, the certificate applicant has to 

establish his or her physical capability 

by: (1) Holding a valid and effective 

driver’s license (for a sport pilot 

certificate); (2) obtaining a third-class 

airman medical certificate (for a 

recreational or private pilot certificate); 

(3) obtaining a second-class airman 

medical certificate (for a commercial 

pilot certificate or to exercise second-incommand privileges of an airline 

transport pilot certificate); or (4) 

obtaining a first-class airman medical 

certificate (to exercise pilot-in-command 

privileges of an airline transport pilot 

certificate). 

While these airman certification 

requirements are necessary for manned 

aircraft operations, they impose an 

unnecessary burden for many small 

UAS pilots because a person obtains a 

pilot certificate under part 61 by 

learning how to operate a manned 

aircraft. Much of that aeronautical 

experience/flight training is not 

applicable to small UAS operations 

because a small UAS is operated 

differently than a manned aircraft. In 

addition, the aeronautical/flight 

experience currently necessary to obtain 

a pilot certificate under part 61 does not 

equip the certificate holder with all of 

the tools necessary to safely pilot a 

small UAS. Specifically, applicants for 

a pilot certificate under part 61 

currently are not trained in how to deal 

with those aspects of ‘‘see-and-avoid’’ 

and loss-of-positive-control safety issues 

that are unique to small unmanned 

aircraft. Thus, requiring persons 

wishing to operate a small UAS to 

obtain a pilot certificate under part 61 

imposes the cost of airman certification 

on those persons, but does not result in 

a significant safety benefit because the 

process of obtaining the certificate does 

not equip those persons with all of the 

tools necessary to mitigate the public 

risk posed by small UAS operations. 

D. Integrating Small UAS Operations 

into the NAS through Rulemaking 

To address the issues discussed 

above, the Department has been engaged 

in a rulemaking to integrate small UAS 

into the NAS.15

In 2012, Congress passed the FAA 

Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 

(Pub. L. 112–95). In section 332(b) of 

Public Law 112–95, Congress directed 

the Secretary to issue a final rule on 

small unmanned aircraft systems that 

will allow for civil operations of such 

systems in the NAS.16 In section 333 of 

Public Law 112–95, Congress also 

directed the Secretary to determine 

whether ‘‘certain unmanned aircraft 

systems may operate safely in the 

national airspace system.’’ To make a 

determination under section 333, the 

Secretary of Transportation must assess 

‘‘which types of unmanned aircraft 

systems, if any, as a result of their size, 

weight, speed, operational capability, 

proximity to airports and populated 

areas, and operation within visual line 

of sight do not create a hazard to users 

of the national airspace system or the 

public or pose a threat to national 

security.’’ Public Law 112–95, Sec. 

333(b)(1). The Secretary must also 

determine whether a certificate of 

waiver or authorization, or 

airworthiness certification is necessary 

to mitigate the public risk posed by the 

unmanned aircraft systems that are 

under consideration. Public Law 112– 

95, Sec. 333(b)(2). If the Secretary 


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17 49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(1). 18Public Law 112–95, sec. 333(b)(1). 19http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/uas_roadmap_

2013.pdf. 

20As discussed in section III.C.4 below, 14 CFR 

part 107 will not apply to model aircraft that satisfy 

all of the statutory criteria specified in section 336 

of Public Law 112–95. The FAA has recently 

published an interpretive rule for public comment 

explaining the statutory criteria of § 336. See 

Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model 

Aircraft, 79 FR 36172, 36175 (June 25, 2014). 

21http://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/

section_333/. 

22http://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/

coe/. 

23http://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/

pathfinders/. 

24https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/

Advisory_Circular/AC_91-57A.pdf. 

determines that certain unmanned 

aircraft systems may operate safely in 

the NAS, then the Secretary must 

‘‘establish requirements for the safe 

operation of such aircraft systems in the 

national airspace system.’’ Public Law 

112–95, Sec. 333(c). The flexibility 

provided for in section 333 did not 

extend to airman certification and 

security vetting, aircraft marking, or 

registration requirements. 

As discussed previously, the FAA’s 

statute normally requires an aircraft 

being flown outdoors to possess an 

airworthiness certificate.17 However, 

subsection 333(b)(2) allows for the 

determination that airworthiness 

certification is not necessary for certain 

small UAS. The key determinations that 

must be made in order for UAS to 

operate under the authority of section 

333 are: (1) The operation must not 

create a hazard to users of the national 

airspace system or the public; and (2) 

the operation must not pose a threat to 

national security.18 In making these 

determinations, the Secretary of 

Transportation must consider the 

following factors: size, weight, speed, 

operational capability, proximity to 

airports and populated areas, and 

operation within visual line of sight. 

In 2013, the Department issued a 

comprehensive plan and subsequently 

the FAA issued a roadmap of its efforts 

to achieve safe integration of UAS 

operations into the NAS.19 As a result 

of its ongoing integration efforts, the 

FAA seeks to change its regulations to 

take the first step in the process of 

integrating small UAS operations into 

the NAS. The NPRM proposed to utilize 

the airworthiness-certification flexibility 

provided by Congress in section 333 of 

Public Law 112–95, and allow some 

small UAS operations to commence in 

the NAS.20 As noted earlier in this 

executive summary, the FAA published 

the NPRM on February 23, 2015, and 

received over 4,600 comments. The 

NPRM proposed to issue small UAS 

airman certificates to applicants who 

passed a knowledge test, and proposed 

to allow line-of-sight operations of small 

unmanned aircraft below 500 feet AGL 

at speeds of less than 100 miles per 

hour. Airworthiness certification would 

not be required under the proposed rule. 

The FAA has considered the public 

comments filed in response to the 

NPRM, and now issues this final rule. 

E. Related UAS Integration Initiatives 

While this rulemaking was pending, 

the FAA recognized that there already 

exists a population of small UAS 

operators and remote pilots who are 

ready and able to operate safely. To 

address the needs of these operators and 

remote pilots while these regulations 

were being finalized, the Department 

issued thousands of exemptions under 

its section 333 authority to permit civil 

visual-line-of-sight small UAS 

operations in the NAS.21 The operations 

permitted under those exemptions are 

similar to those that will be enabled by 

part 107. 

In addition, to further facilitate the 

integration of UAS into the NAS, the 

FAA has chosen six UAS research and 

test site operators across the country. In 

selecting the six test site operators, the 

FAA considered geography, climate, 

location of ground infrastructure, 

research needs, airspace use, safety, 

aviation experience, and risk. In totality, 

these six test site applications achieve 

cross-country geographic and climatic 

diversity and help the FAA meet its 

UAS research needs. As of December 

2015, all of the UAS test sites are 

operational and are gathering 

operational data to foster further 

integration, as well as evaluating new 

technologies. The FAA has also 

selected, after a rigorous competition, a 

Mississippi State University team as the 

FAA’s Center of Excellence for 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems. The Center 

of Excellence will focus on research, 

education, and training in areas critical 

to safe and successful integration of 

UAS into the NAS.22

In May 2015, the FAA announced the 

UAS Focus Area Pathfinders 

initiative,23 a partnership with industry 

to explore the next steps in unmanned 

aircraft operations beyond the type of 

operations the agency proposed in the 

small UAS NPRM. Three companies 

reached out to the FAA to work on 

research to continue expanding use of 

UAS in the nation’s airspace in three 

focus areas: Visual line-of-sight 

operations in urban areas; extended 

visual-line-of-sight operations in rural 

areas; and beyond visual line-of-sight in 

rural/isolated areas. In October 2015 a 

fourth Pathfinder initiative was added, 

testing technology to identify small UAS 

operating around airports. 

In September 2015, the FAA issued 

Advisory Circular 91–57A,24 Model 

Aircraft Operating Standards, replacing 

and superseding the guidance provided 

in the now-cancelled Advisory Circular 

91–57, issued in 1981. The updated 

document provides guidance to persons 

operating unmanned aircraft for hobby 

or recreation purposes meeting the 

statutory definition of ‘‘model aircraft’’ 

contained in Section 336 of the FAA 

Modernization and Reform Act (Public 

Law 112–95), and describes means by 

which model aircraft may be operated 

safely in the NAS. 

In February 2016, the FAA convened 

an aviation rulemaking committee 

(ARC) to provide recommendations for 

a performance-based standard that 

would allow certain UAS to be operated 

over people. Previously characterized as 

micro UAS in the NPRM for this final 

rule, this category of operations will 

now be considered in a separate 

rulemaking. The ARC submitted its 

recommendations to the FAA on April 

2, 2016, and the FAA is currently 

evaluating the recommendations. A 

copy of the ARC’s report is available in 

docket for this rulemaking, and more 

information regarding the status of this 

new rulemaking may be found in the 

Department’s significant rulemakings 

report, available at 

www.transportation.gov/regulations. 

III. Discussion of the Final Rule 

As discussed in the previous section, 

in order to determine whether certain 

UAS may operate safely in the NAS 

pursuant to section 333, the Secretary 

must find that the operation of the UAS 

will not: (1) Create a hazard to users of 

the NAS or the public; or (2) pose a 

threat to national security. The 

Secretary must also determine whether 

small UAS operations subject to this 

rule pose a safety risk sufficient to 

require airworthiness certification. The 

following preamble sections discuss the 

specific components of this rule, and 

section III.J explains how these 

components work together and allow 

the Secretary to make the statutory 

findings required by section 333. 

A. Incremental Approach and Waiver 

In the NPRM, the FAA noted that this 

rulemaking is one step of a broader 

process to fully integrate UAS into the 

NAS. ‘‘Once the entire integration 

process is complete, the FAA envisions 

the NAS populated with UAS that 

operate well beyond the operational 


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25 80 FR at 9552. 

26 80 FR at 9552. Section 332(a) of Public Law 

112–95 requires the Secretary of Transportation to 

develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate 

the integration of civil UAS into the NAS. This plan 

must be developed in consultation with 

representatives of the aviation industry, Federal 

agencies that employ UAS technology in the NAS, 

and the UAS industry. Section 332(a) also requires 

the Secretary of Transportation to develop a 5-year 

roadmap for the introduction of civil UAS into the 

NAS. Both the comprehensive plan and the 

roadmap were published in November 2013. 

27Some of these commenters include the 

Michigan Farm Bureau, the Indiana Farm Bureau, 

the Louisiana Farm Bureau Federation, and the 

South Dakota Farm Bureau Federation. 

28EEI, NRECA, and APPA submitted a joint 

comment to the docket. For ease of reference, this 

preamble will refer to the joint submission simply 

by the name of the first organization on the 

letterhead, which is EEI. 

limits proposed in [the NPRM].’’ 25

However, because higher-risk UAS 

operations pose additional safety issues 

that require more time to resolve, the 

FAA proposed to limit this rulemaking 

to small UAS operations posing the least 

amount of risk so that the agency could 

move to quickly issue a final rule 

integrating those operations into the 

NAS. ‘‘In the meantime, the FAA will 

continue working on integrating UAS 

operations that pose greater amounts of 

risk, and will issue notices of proposed 

rulemaking for those operations once 

the pertinent issues have been 

addressed, consistent with the approach 

set forth in the UAS Comprehensive 

Plan for Integration and FAA roadmap 

for integration.26

The FAA also acknowledged that new 

technologies could come into existence 

after this rule is issued that could 

alleviate some of the risk concerns 

underlying the provisions of this 

rulemaking. As such, the FAA invited 

comment as to whether the final rule 

should include some type of waiver 

authority (such as a letter of deviation 

or a waiver) to better accommodate 

these new technologies. For the reasons 

discussed below, the FAA has decided 

to proceed with an incremental 

approach in this final rule but has 

added waiver authority to the regulatory 

text in order to accommodate new 

technologies and unique operational 

circumstances. 

A number of commenters, including 

NTSB, Airlines for America (A4A), and 

the Small UAV Coalition, supported the 

FAA’s proposed incremental approach 

to issue a final rule immediately 

integrating low-risk UAS operations into 

the NAS while continuing to work on 

integrating UAS posing a higher risk in 

separate regulatory actions. Qualcomm 

Incorporated, Google, Inc., the Oregon 

Department of Aviation, and the North 

Dakota Department of Agriculture urged 

the FAA to move quickly to issue a final 

rule integrating small UAS operations 

into the NAS. Google emphasized that 

‘‘[a]s the [small UAS] industry evolves, 

any lengthy delay in the issuance of a 

final [small UAS] rule would 

substantially reduce the benefits of the 

final rule. It will be difficult, if not 

impossible, for the FAA to adequately 

consider the many likely technological 

developments during a protracted 

rulemaking.’’ The National Association 

of Flight Instructors added that because 

UAS are a relatively new technology 

whose risks are still being studied, the 

FAA should use ‘‘a phased in set of 

regulations that ease into basic use of 

[small UAS] in the NAS with close 

attention to the degree of responsible 

use and compliance with regulations 

before considering relaxation of rules to 

allow increasing capability of the 

aircraft.’’ 

The Coalition of Airline Pilots 

Associations (CAPA) commented that 

‘‘creating a set of regulations and 

standards that have a lower level of 

safety in the name of expedience is 

problematic.’’ CAPA asserted that this 

rulemaking ‘‘is an opportunity to 

develop a regulatory schema, using the 

hard lessons learned over the past one 

hundred years that has the long-range 

vision to be capable and integrated to 

handle the full spectrum of anticipated 

operations.’’ CAPA also claimed that 

there may ultimately be remotely 

piloted vehicles that are the size of 

commercial transport category aircraft, 

and that any system put in place to 

govern UAS must account for this 

eventuality and provide the appropriate 

level of regulation. The Flight School 

Association of North America 

recommended a 12 to 18-month 

extension to the rulemaking timeline, 

‘‘so that more review can be 

accomplished.’’ 

Other commenters, including 

Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon), the 

American Farm Bureau Federation, and 

several state farm bureaus,27 raised 

concerns about the proposed 

incremental approach. These and other 

commenters, such as the U.S. Small 

Business Administration (SBA) Office of 

Advocacy and the George Washington 

University Regulatory Studies Center, 

argued that more flexibility is necessary 

in the final rule to keep pace with new 

and emerging technologies. In addition, 

the commenters asserted that by 

delaying the integration of certain 

operations, such as beyond-visual-lineof-sight operations, until a future 

rulemaking, the FAA would also delay 

the benefits associated with those 

operations until the pertinent future 

rulemaking is complete. The George 

Washington University Regulatory 

Studies Center suggested that the FAA 

set regular deadlines for issuing future 

final rules to further integrate UAS into 

the NAS. 

To address these concerns, a number 

of commenters including the SBA Office 

of Advocacy, the National Business 

Aviation Association (NBAA), and 

Google, urged the FAA to include 

deviation authority in the final rule. 

Google suggested that the FAA should 

grant a deviation from the provisions of 

part 107 if an applicant can establish 

that his or her small UAS operation 

would provide a level of safety 

equivalent to the one provided by the 

operating parameters of part 107. 

Several commenters including the 

National Ski Areas Association, EEI,28

and the American Farm Bureau 

Federation (AFBF) asserted that there 

exist industries (such as agriculture, 

electrical utilities, and ski resorts) 

whose unique operating environments 

may allow them to mitigate some of the 

safety concerns underlying the 

operational parameters of the NPRM 

proposal. The Small UAV Coalition 

emphasized that the key to including 

deviation authority in the final rule 

would be for the FAA to establish a 

process by which it may authorize 

certain operations to exceed the other 

provisions of part 107 based on casespecific characteristics such as the 

operational circumstances of the 

mission, technological capabilities of 

the small UAS, and the training and 

experience of the operator. 

After considering the comments, the 

FAA has decided to proceed 

incrementally and issue a final rule that 

immediately integrates the lowest-risk 

small UAS operations into the NAS. As 

Qualcomm, Google, the Oregon 

Department of Aviation, and other 

commenters pointed out, delaying the 

integration of the lowest-risk small UAS 

operations until issues associated with 

higher-risk operations have been 

addressed would needlessly delay the 

realization of societal benefits 

associated with integrating UAS 

operations for which the pertinent 

safety issues have been addressed. In 

addition, the immediate integration of 

the lowest-risk small UAS operations 

into the NAS would provide the FAA 

with additional operational experience 

and data that could be used to assist 

with the integration of higher-risk 

operations. 

However, the FAA also agrees with 

the SBA Office of Advocacy and other 

commenters who pointed out that: (1) 

The rulemaking process for higher-risk 


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29See 14 CFR 91.903(a) (allowing a certificate of 

waiver from part 91 requirements ‘‘if the 

Administrator finds that the proposed operation can 

be safely conducted under the terms of that 

certificate of waiver’’). 

30See 5 U.S.C. 553(b) and (c). 

31Part 107 does require the remote pilot to 

conduct a preflight check to ensure that the small 

UAS is in a condition for safe operation, but the 

manufacturer would be unable to self-certify for 

that requirement because a small UAS may become 

damaged after it leaves the manufacturer’s 

possession. 

UAS operations may lag behind new 

and emerging technologies; and (2) 

certain individual operating 

environments may provide unique 

mitigations for some of the safety 

concerns underlying this rule. To 

resolve these issues, this rule will, in 

§ 107.200, include the option to apply 

for a certificate of waiver. This 

certificate of waiver will allow a small 

UAS operation to deviate from certain 

provisions of part 107 if the 

Administrator finds that the proposed 

operation can safely be conducted under 

the terms of that certificate of waiver. 

This is similar to the standard that the 

FAA utilizes to consider waivers to the 

requirements of 14 CFR part 91.29 A 

discussion as to whether a provision of 

part 107 is waivable can be found in the 

preamble section discussing that 

provision. 

To obtain a certificate of waiver, an 

applicant will have to submit a request 

containing a complete description of the 

proposed operation and a justification, 

including supporting data and 

documentation as necessary, that 

establishes that the proposed operation 

can safely be conducted under the terms 

of the requested certificate of waiver. 

The FAA expects that the amount of 

data and analysis required as part of the 

application will be proportional to the 

specific relief that is requested. 

Similarly, the FAA anticipates that the 

time required for it to make a 

determination regarding waiver requests 

will vary based on the complexity of the 

request. For example, a request for a 

major deviation from part 107 for an 

operation that takes place in a congested 

metropolitan area with heavy air traffic 

will likely require significantly more 

data and analysis than a request for a 

minor deviation for an operation that 

takes place in a sparsely populated area 

with minimal air traffic. If a certificate 

of waiver is granted, that certificate may 

include additional conditions and 

limitations designed to ensure that the 

small UAS operation can be conducted 

safely. 

The certificate-of-waiver process will 

allow the FAA to assess case-specific 

information concerning a small UAS 

operation that takes place in a unique 

operating environment and consider 

allowing additional operating flexibility 

that recognizes safety mitigations 

provided by the specific operating 

environment. The FAA anticipates that 

this process will also serve as a bridging 

mechanism for new and emerging 

technologies; allowing the FAA to 

permit testing and use of those 

technologies, as appropriate, before the 

pertinent future rulemaking is complete. 

Like information collected from § 333 

exemptions, the FAA plans to collect 

useful data derived from waiver 

application and issuance such as what 

part 107 provisions have the greatest 

number of waiver requests, what 

technology is being utilized to enhance 

safety, and what safe operating practices 

are most effective. To evaluate the 

effectiveness of operating practices, the 

FAA plans to compare the mitigations 

imposed by waiver grants against 

accident and incident reports and 

observations made as part of the FAA’s 

oversight. For example, an FAA 

inspector conducting an inspection of a 

small UAS that is operating under a 

waiver will be able to observe potential 

safety issues that may arise during the 

operation. This information will used to 

assess risk and be shared with various 

organizations in the FAA to inform 

policy decisions and rulemaking efforts. 

Some commenters requested 

authorization to deviate for specific 

activities. For example, the National 

Rural Electric Cooperative Association 

(NRECA) requested deviation authority 

for utility maintenance and operations 

of UAS in electric cooperative power 

line right-of-way corridors. The 

American Petroleum Institute (API) 

requested deviation authority in 

circumstances in which environmental 

protection and health and human safety 

issues are implicated. Princeton 

University recommended that the rule 

include an option for universities to 

certify that the aircraft is to be used for 

educational purposes and poses no 

unreasonable danger to the public. Vail 

Resorts requested that the FAA provide 

a vehicle for deviation authority through 

agency practices that will enable ski 

areas to obtain authorization or 

exemption from certain final rules. 

The FAA notes that the safety of a 

small UAS operation is a result of that 

operation’s operating parameters and 

not the purpose for which the operation 

is conducted. For example, if a small 

UAS operation is conducted at a remote 

ski resort, the safety-pertinent factor is 

not that the operation is conducted for 

ski-area purposes, but that the operation 

is conducted in a remote area. However, 

at this time, the FAA does not have 

sufficient data to determine what (if 

any) operational mitigations are 

included when a small UAS operation 

is conducted in a given industry and 

how widespread those mitigations are 

within the industry. To take the earlier 

example of ski areas, the FAA does not 

have sufficient data to determine 

whether all ski areas are remotely 

located and the density of mannedaircraft traffic near each ski area. 

Accordingly, the FAA will evaluate 

operations seeking to go beyond the 

baseline part 107 requirements on a 

case-by-case basis as part of its 

evaluation of the waiver applications. 

Modovolate Aviation and Colorado 

Ski Country USA encouraged the FAA 

to make available class exemptions 

under section 333 of Public Law 112–95 

if specific classes of small UAS cannot 

reasonably be accommodated within the 

final rule. Similarly, DJI recommended 

that, where technology or operating 

practice is widely available or known, 

the FAA could issue guidance allowing 

its inspectors to routinely grant 

deviation authority to all operators 

meeting certain standards rather than 

evaluating individual requests for 

deviation. Another commenter 

encouraged the FAA to consider issuing 

equipment-specific authorizations or 

waivers based on specific technologies 

rather than granting authorizations or 

waivers to specific operators flying 

specific aircraft. An individual urged 

the FAA to set up a program to let 

manufacturers self-certify that their 

aircraft models qualify for exemption 

from applicable rules. 

The FAA notes that the 

Administrative Procedure Act imposes 

certain requirements on agency 

rulemaking. When conducting a 

rulemaking, an agency must, among 

other things, issue a notice of proposed 

rulemaking, allow time for public 

comment, consider public comments, 

and issue a final rule after consideration 

of public comments.30 As part of its 

process to integrate UAS into the NAS, 

the FAA may, in the future, consider 

categories of UAS and UAS operations, 

but absent changes to the statute, the 

method by which the agency will 

integrate those categories into the NAS 

will have to comply with the 

Administrative Procedure Act. With 

regard to manufacturer self-certification, 

the FAA notes that part 107 will not 

contain airworthiness certification 

requirements and thus, there will be no 

part 107 requirement to which a 

manufacturer could self-certify.31

NetMoby encouraged the FAA to 

circumscribe very specific rules 

establishing standards for UAS 

deviation authority at the outset of the 


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32http://www.faa.gov/uas/publications/. 

UAS regulatory environment to avoid 

being immediately overwhelmed with 

waiver requests and other requests for 

deviation authority. Google proposed a 

specific process for the deviation 

authority. Google explained that the 

FAA would be able to tailor different 

operational restrictions, as appropriate, 

if a petitioner can demonstrate that: (i) 

The small UAS has enhanced safety 

technology; (ii) the small UAS meets a 

higher level of airworthiness or 

complies with a more detailed 

maintenance and inspection protocol; or 

(iii) the small UAS operator (pilot) has 

a higher level of pilot and small UAS 

operator qualification, training, and/or 

certification than the proposed part 107 

would require. 

As discussed earlier, the standard that 

an applicant seeking a waiver will be 

required to meet is to demonstrate that 

his or her proposed small UAS 

operation can safely be conducted under 

the terms of a certificate of waiver. This 

waiver process is intended to allow for 

case-specific mitigations that could take 

many different forms or combinations. 

These mitigations could even be based 

on technology that does not exist at this 

time. Because prescriptive requirements 

imposed on the waiver process as part 

of this rulemaking may limit the FAA’s 

flexibility to consider new or unique 

operational circumstances and safety 

mitigations, the FAA declines to add 

more prescriptive requirements to this 

process. 

The International Air Transport 

Association urged the FAA to adopt a 

final rule that allows for regular and 

systemic review to ensure the 

appropriate level of regulation or 

oversight. The Agricultural Retailers 

Association similarly recommended 

timely reauthorization of the rules ‘‘to 

mirror technological advances and risk 

mitigation.’’ The Virginia Department of 

Aviation asserted that the rules ‘‘should 

be reviewed as quickly as the safety data 

permits,’’ which the commenter 

estimated to be every 24 months ‘‘until 

we achieve full integration of the 

technology into the NAS.’’ 

Several commenters urged the FAA to 

specifically address the timeline for 

implementation, so that the industry 

can prepare appropriately. One 

individual questioned whether the FAA 

intends to create a forecast for UAS 

‘‘rule evolution.’’ Specifically, the 

commenter questioned when the FAA 

expects to develop rules for UAS greater 

than 55 pounds and what constraints 

the agency expects to put on operations 

for these larger vehicles. Another 

individual recommended the FAA set 

regular deadlines for issuing final rules 

to update UAS integration standards, 

and commit to removing some of the 

requirements (e.g., size, visual line of 

sight) by a date certain, unless 

experience justified maintaining them. 

The FAA notes that it has issued a 

comprehensive plan and roadmap 

laying out its long-term vision for UAS 

integration into the NAS. The FAA is 

currently updating these documents 

with an FAA strategic plan for UAS 

integration into the NAS.32

With regard to review of the rules 

once they are in place, the FAA notes 

that Executive Order 13610 requires the 

FAA to review its regulations to 

examine whether they remain justified 

and whether they should be modified or 

streamlined in light of changed 

circumstances, including the advent of 

new technologies. The FAA regularly 

conducts a retrospective review of its 

regulations, and the regulations of this 

rule will be no exception. 

B. Discussion of the Applicable 

Statutory Framework 

The Mercatus Center at George Mason 

University and the Competitive 

Enterprise Institute questioned the 

Department’s reliance on Public Law 

112–95, section 333 as the authority for 

the proposed rule. Both commenters 

stated that Public Law 112–95, § 332 

includes Congress’ mandate to the FAA 

to promulgate rules for small UAS 

integration into the NAS. The 

Competitive Enterprise Institute urged 

the Department to clearly articulate why 

it is invoking section 333 authority, as 

opposed to § 332(b) authority, as the 

basis for this rulemaking. 

Section 332(b)(1) requires the 

Secretary to publish a final rule 

allowing for the civil operation of small 

UAS in the NAS ‘‘to the extent the 

systems do not meet the requirements 

for expedited authorization under 

section 333.’’ Conversely, section 333(a) 

requires the Secretary to determine 

whether certain UAS may operate safely 

in the NAS ‘‘before completion of the 

plan and rulemaking required by section 

332. . . .’’ As part of the consideration 

under section 333, section 333(b)(2) 

directs the Secretary to determine 

whether ‘‘. . . airworthiness 

certification under section 44704 of title 

49, United States Code is required for 

the operation of unmanned aircraft 

systems.’’ If the Secretary determines 

that certain UAS may operate safely in 

the NAS, then section 333(c) requires 

the Secretary to ‘‘establish requirements 

for the safe operation’’ of those UAS in 

the NAS. 

Because the statutory text of section 

332(b)(1) applies only to those UAS that 

do not meet the requirements of section 

333, sections 332 and 333 cannot both 

apply to the same UAS. The Department 

is pursuing this rulemaking under 

section 333 because section 333(b)(2) 

allows it to find that airworthiness 

certification is not necessary for small 

UAS that will be subject to this rule. As 

discussed in section III.J.3 of this 

preamble, the Department has indeed 

found that mandatory airworthiness 

certification is unnecessary to ensure 

the safety or security of these types of 

small UAS operations. However, unlike 

section 333(b)(2), section 332 does not 

contain a provision that would allow 

the Department to find that 

airworthiness certification should not be 

required for a small UAS. Because 

airworthiness certification is normally a 

statutory requirement imposed by 49 

U.S.C. 44704 and 44711(a)(1), the FAA 

would have to include an airworthiness 

certification requirement in this rule if 

it were to conduct this rulemaking 

under section 332 rather than section 

333. This would impose an additional 

requirement on small UAS whose 

operational parameters do not pose a 

hazard to users of the NAS or a threat 

to national security. 

Matternet, Inc. argued that Public Law 

112–95 compels the FAA to develop a 

regulatory framework for unmanned 

aircraft systems, but does not bind or 

limit the Agency to existing statutes 

concerning aviation, or to decades-long 

aviation regulatory doctrines that, 

Matternet asserted, do not apply to these 

new technologies. Furthermore, 

Matternet argued that because Public 

Law 112–95, section 333 expressly 

contemplates that ‘‘certain unmanned 

aircraft systems [would] operate safely 

in the NAS before completion of the 

plan and rulemaking required by section 

332,’’ Congress gave the FAA a ‘‘blank 

slate’’ to create small UAS regulations 

‘‘without any suggestion that existing 

statutes or regulations would act as 

impediments to the rulemaking 

process.’’ Matternet also stated that it 

‘‘is concerned that the FAA’s proposal 

is impeded by an apparent notion that 

statutes, regulations or doctrines that 

were created decades ago to address 

manned aircraft operations are 

mandated to apply to unmanned 

aircraft, without any safety or economic 

rationale.’’ 

Matternet’s argument that existing 

statutes and regulatory doctrines are 

limited to manned aircraft operations is 

foreclosed by precedent. In 


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33A copy of the Pirker decision can be found at: 

http://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/OnODocuments/

Aviation/5730.pdf. 

34 14 CFR 91.1(a). 

35Pirker at 4–5. 

36Pirker at 8–12. 

37Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662 (2007) (internal citations 

and punctuation marks omitted). 

38 Id. 

39Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 618 

(1980) (noting ‘‘the axiom that repeals by 

implication of longstanding statutory provisions are 

not favored’’). 

40Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Public Law 85– 

726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958). 

41Pilot Vigilance, 33 FR 10505, July 24, 1968. 

42Public Law 112–95, sec. 333(a) and (c). 

43See, e.g., Public Law 112–95, section 333(a) 

(directing the Secretary of Transportation to 

determine whether certain UAS may operate safely 

in the ‘‘national airspace system’’) (emphasis 

added). 

Administrator v. Pirker,33 the NTSB 

considered the issue of whether an 

unmanned aircraft is an ‘‘aircraft’’ 

within the meaning of FAA statutes and 

regulations and whether it is subject to 

the existing FAA regulations of part 91, 

which ‘‘prescribes rules governing the 

operation of aircraft.’’ 34 The NTSB 

found that the statutory and regulatory 

definitions of aircraft are ‘‘clear on their 

face’’ and ‘‘draw no distinction between 

whether a device is manned or 

unmanned.’’ 35 Thus, the NTSB 

concluded that the existing regulatory 

provision of § 91.13 (which prohibits 

careless or reckless operation of an 

aircraft) apply to the unmanned aircraft 

operation that was at issue in Pirker.36

The FAA is also unpersuaded by 

Matternet’s other argument that Public 

Law 112–95 overturned all existing 

aviation statutes and regulations, 

leaving the FAA with a ‘‘blank slate’’ for 

this rulemaking. The Supreme Court has 

held that ‘‘[w]hile a later enacted statute 

. . . can sometimes operate to amend or 

even repeal an earlier statutory 

provision . . . repeals by implication 

are not favored and will not be 

presumed unless the intention of the 

legislature to repeal [is] clear and 

manifest.’’ 37 The Court added that 

‘‘[w]e will not infer a statutory repeal 

‘‘unless the later statute expressly 

contradict[s] the original act or unless 

such a construction is absolutely 

necessary in order that the words of the 

later statute shall have any meaning at 

all.’’ 38 Implied repeals of a longstanding 

statutory provision are particularly 

disfavored.39

The aviation statutes at issue here 

were enacted in 1958 as part of the 

Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (which 

created the Federal Aviation Agency).40

Because these statutory provisions have 

been in place for 58 years, they are 

longstanding statutory provisions whose 

implied repeal would be particularly 

disfavored. Many of the pertinent 

regulatory provisions at issue in this 

rulemaking are similarly longstanding. 

For example, the ‘‘see and avoid’’ 

requirement of § 91.113(b) was created 

in 1968.41 Thus, for the reasons 

discussed below, the FAA finds that, 

with the exception of 49 U.S.C. 44704 

and 44711(a)(1), Public Law 112–95 did 

not repeal these existing statutes and 

regulations. 

Section 333 of Public Law 112–95 

directs the Secretary of Transportation 

to determine whether certain UAS may 

operate safely in the NAS and if so, to 

establish requirements for the safe 

operation of such UAS in the NAS.42

With the exception of section 333(b)(2), 

which allows the Secretary to determine 

whether the airworthiness-certification 

requirements of 49 U.S.C. 44704 and 

44711(a)(1) should be imposed on 

certain UAS, section 333 does not 

expressly contradict any existing statute 

or regulation. Furthermore, interpreting 

section 333 as repealing all prior 

aviation statutes and regulations is 

unnecessary in order to give meaning to 

section 333, which simply directs the 

Secretary to determine whether existing 

aircraft regulations prohibit or otherwise 

burden certain UAS operations that 

could operate safely in the NAS. If the 

Secretary determines that this is the 

case, then section 333(c) directs the 

Secretary to make the appropriate 

changes to the pertinent regulations. 

Because, with the exception of section 

333(b)(2), section 333 can be given 

meaning without repealing other 

existing aviation statutes or regulations, 

we decline Matternet’s suggestion that 

section 333 impliedly repeals those 

statutes or regulations. 

We also note that section 333(b)(2) 

provides further evidence that Congress 

intended section 333 to work in 

conjunction with the existing aviation 

statutes. This subsection provides the 

Secretary with discretion to determine 

whether airworthiness certification is 

necessary for UAS subject to this rule. 

The FAA normally does not possess this 

discretion because 49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(1) 

requires airworthiness certification for 

any civil aircraft that is operated in air 

commerce. Subsection 333(b)(2) also 

expressly cross-references 49 U.S.C. 

44704, which specifies the process by 

which the FAA may issue an 

airworthiness certificate. If Congress 

had intended section 333 to repeal all 

other aviation statutes and regulations, 

there would be no need to crossreference § 44704 or explicitly give the 

Secretary the power to determine 

whether airworthiness certification 

should be required because a repeal of 

§ 44711(a)(1) and § 44704 would 

automatically remove the statutory 

constraints on FAA’s airworthiness 

certification discretion. Thus, 

interpreting section 333 as repealing all 

other aviation statutes would also 

render meaningless the Congressional 

directive in section 333(b)(2) for the 

Secretary to determine whether the 

airworthiness certification requirements 

of §§ 44711(a)(1) and 44704 should be 

applied to UAS subject to this rule. 

The North Dakota Department of 

Agriculture noted that the FAA has 

authority over the NAS and requested 

clarification on how UAS operations 

will operate in an interstate manner. In 

response, the FAA notes that, as the 

North Dakota Department of Agriculture 

pointed out, the FAA’s authority 

extends over the entire national airspace 

system.43 Thus, with the exception of 

operations discussed in section III.C of 

this preamble, the provisions of part 107 

will apply to small UAS operations 

operating in any State or manner in the 

United States. 

C. Applicability 

To integrate small UAS operations 

into the NAS, this rule will create a new 

part in title 14 of the CFR: Part 107. The 

regulations of part 107, which are 

tailored to address the risks associated 

with small UAS operations, will apply 

to small UAS operations in place of 

certain existing FAA regulations that 

impede civil small UAS operations. 

Specifically, for small UAS operations, 

the requirements of part 107 will 

generally replace the airworthiness 

provisions of part 21, the airman 

certification provisions of part 61, the 

operating limitations of part 91, and the 

external load provisions of part 133. 

However, part 107 will not apply to 

all small UAS operations. For the 

reasons discussed below, part 107 will 

not apply to: (1) Air carrier operations; 

(2) international operations; (3) public 

aircraft operations; (4) certain model 

aircraft; and (5) moored balloons, kites, 

amateur rockets, and unmanned free 

balloons. Additionally, part 107 will 

allow current holders of an exemption 

issued under section 333 of Public Law 

112–95 to continue operating under the 

terms of their exemption rather than 

under part 107. 

1. Transporting Property for 

Compensation (Air Carrier Operations) 

The NPRM proposed to allow 

transportation of property provided it is 

not done for compensation. The 

reasoning for the limitation on accepting 

payment or compensation for such 


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44See 49 U.S.C. 41101 (noting that an air carrier 

may provide air transportation only if the air carrier 

holds a certificate issued under this chapter 

[chapter 411—Economic Regulation of Air Carrier 

Certificates] authorizing the air transportation), 49 

U.S.C. 44705 (requiring the FAA Administrator to 

‘‘issue an air carrier operating certificate to a person 

desiring to operate as an air carrier when the 

Administrator finds, after investigation, that the 

person properly and adequately is equipped and 

able to operate safely under this part and the 

regulations and standards prescribed under this 

part’’), and 49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(4) (prohibiting a 

person from operating as an air carrier without an 

air carrier operating certificate). Air transportation 

is defined in 49 U.S.C. 40102(a)(5) as ‘‘foreign air 

transportation, interstate air transportation, or the 

transportation of mail by aircraft.’’ 

transport is that, in general, when 

someone is transporting persons or 

property by air for compensation, that 

person may be considered an ‘‘air 

carrier’’ by statute and would then be 

required to obtain OST economic 

authority and additional FAA safety 

authority.44 Because the traveling and 

shipping public have certain 

expectations of safety and consumer 

protection when payment is exchanged 

for carriage, air carriers are subject to 

both economic and safety regulations to 

mitigate the risks to persons or nonoperator-owned property on the aircraft, 

including statutory requirements for 

liability insurance coverage. 

The Department sought comment on 

whether the rule should go further—that 

is, whether UAS should be permitted to 

transport property for payment within 

the other proposed constraints of the 

rule, e.g., the ban on flights over 

uninvolved persons, the requirements 

for line of sight, and the intent to limit 

operations to a confined area. The 

Department also sought comment on 

whether a special class or classes of air 

carrier certification should be developed 

for UAS operations. 

Commenters including NAAA, 

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 

and ALPA supported the proposed 

prohibition on carrying property for 

compensation. These commenters 

generally asserted that allowing air 

carrier operations at this time would be 

premature. NAAA stated that a more 

stringent regulatory regime, including 

certification of the safety of a small UAS 

for air carrier operations, should be 

developed before air carrier operations 

are permitted. The International 

Brotherhood of Teamsters stated that 

weakening the regulations before 

‘‘package delivery technologies’’ are 

proven safe and reliable could endanger 

not only the public but also the 

warehouse and operational staff 

involved in the loading and 

maintenance of small UAS. ALPA stated 

that until there is a demonstrated safety 

record for UAS air carrier operations, 

the Department should not authorize 

such operations. 

Other commenters, including FAST 

Robotics, NBAA, and Small UAV 

Coalition argued that the FAA should 

permit such operations. Life Drone 

argued that the final rule should allow 

small UAS to deliver ‘‘medical AED 

units’’ to emergency and remote 

locations where there is little or no risk 

of interference with the NAS. MAPPS 

requested a ‘‘geospatial exemption’’ to 

allow companies to obtain air carrier 

services for various geospatial sensors 

owned by those other than the small 

UAS operator. 

The Small UAV Coalition, Matternet, 

and the Information Technology and 

Innovation Foundation opposed the 

prohibition on the basis that allowing a 

company to use a small UAS to 

transport property in furtherance of the 

company’s own business, but not for 

compensation, is an arbitrary 

distinction. Matternet and the Small 

UAV Coalition argued that there is no 

safety or economic rationale to justify 

allowing property transport for business 

purposes but not for compensation. The 

Information Technology and Innovation 

Foundation asserted that the safety of 

goods transported by UAS does not 

depend on whether the UAS operator 

receives payment. This commenter 

further stated that ‘‘[the] goal should be 

to optimize both safety and commercial 

value when it comes to the integration 

of UAS into the NAS,’’ but the 

prohibition on air carrier operations 

places ‘‘unnecessary restrictions on 

commercial activity.’’ 

Matternet noted that UAS analysis 

shows that over 80% of goods intended 

for delivery by UAS will be in the range 

of two kilograms or less, and that the 

total weight of the small UAS, including 

payload, will therefore be 6 kilograms or 

less. Thus, Matternet argued, the safety 

risks associated with manned air carrier 

operations—where the aircraft weighs 

considerably more and has significant 

fuel capacity, and where the operation 

could impact people both on the aircraft 

and on the ground—do not exist for 

unmanned air carrier operations. Google 

and the Consumer Electronics 

Association also pointed out that most 

UAS cargo delivery will consist of 

relatively low-weight items that create 

minimal safety concerns. 

Google argued that UAS cargo 

operations are very similar to operations 

that require external payloads, such as 

sensors or cameras, and then noted that 

FAA has already authorized several 

small UAS operators to carry such 

external payloads. Amazon and 

American Farm Bureau Federation 

similarly noted that there are 

circumstances in which FAA already 

permits certain commercial operations 

(e.g., aerial work operations, crop 

dusting, banner towing, ferry or training 

flights, and some transport of persons or 

property for compensation) without 

requiring an air carrier certificate, and a 

similar carve-out should be established 

for low-risk transport using small UAS. 

Pointing to the low risks associated 

with the transport of property by small 

UAS under the operating limitations of 

the proposed rule, Amazon, Matternet, 

American Farm Bureau Federation, and 

Michigan Farm Bureau stated that an air 

carrier certification is not necessary for 

small UAS air carrier operations. If, 

however, the Department determines 

that some type of air carrier certification 

is required by statute, those four 

commenters, the Small UAV Coalition, 

and Continental Mapping suggested that 

the Department develop an alternative 

certification process that is tailored to 

small UAS operations. 

NBAA and UPS stated that FAA can 

ensure safe operations by defining 

performance-based standards to enable 

transport of property for compensation. 

For example, UPS suggested weight 

limitations for small UAS involved in 

transporting property. AUVSI said risks 

could be mitigated by compliance with 

industry standards for design and build 

that would normally occur through the 

aircraft certification process. Aviation 

Management noted that small UAS 

should be permitted to transport 

property if they have received approval 

to do so—i.e., through compliance with 

an advisory circular or with an industry 

standard for design and build, such as 

one developed by ASTM. The Consumer 

Electronics Association and Small UAV 

Coalition pointed out that companies 

that want to transport property by UAS 

for compensation have powerful 

business incentives to ensure safe, 

efficient, and complete operations. 

Other commenters, including 

NetMoby, FAST Robotics, and 

Planehook Aviation Services, LLC 

(Planehook Aviation), said that a special 

class of air carrier certification should 

be required for UAS to transport 

property for payment. Planehook 

Aviation stated that, at a minimum, 

FAA should create a ‘‘common carriage 

certification’’ that mirrors the care and 

safety requirements for manned aviation 

under 14 CFR part 119. 

The Department has reviewed the 

comments and legal authorities that 

govern the transport of property for 

compensation and has determined that 

it is appropriate to allow some limited 

operations involving the transport of 

property for compensation to be done 


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45See 14 CFR 119.1(e)(1–10). 

46See 49 U.S.C. 40102(a)(2) (defining ‘‘air 

carrier’’) and (a)(5) (defining ‘‘air transportation’’). 

47See 49 U.S.C. 41101; 14 CFR 298.2. 

under the other provisions of part 107, 

as analyzed below. 

As noted earlier, in general when 

someone is transporting persons or 

property by air for compensation, that 

person may be considered an ‘‘air 

carrier’’ by statute and would then be 

required to obtain economic authority 

from the Office of the Secretary and 

additional FAA safety authority. 

Historically, the FAA has also required, 

through regulation, that certain 

commercial operators who may be 

transporting people or property for 

compensation wholly within a State, 

and thus not triggering the statutory 

requirements for air carriers, be 

certificated and comply with heightened 

safety requirements, based on the 

Administrator’s authority in 

§ 44701(a)(5) to prescribe regulations 

that are necessary for safety in air 

commerce. The rationale for this is that 

even aircraft operating wholly within a 

State could be operated in such a 

manner that directly affects, or may 

endanger safety in foreign or interstate 

air commerce. 

In contrast, the FAA has also 

recognized that some commercial 

operations should not be subject to 

these heightened operator certification 

requirements and should be allowed to 

operate under the general operating 

rules of 14 CFR part 91. Some examples 

of this include student instruction, 

sightseeing flights conducted in hot air 

balloons, and non-stop flights 

conducted within a 25-statute mile 

radius of the airport of takeoff for the 

purpose of conducting parachute 

operations, as well as certain helicopter 

flights conducted within a 25-mile 

radius of the airport of takeoff.45 These 

exceptions are narrow and well-defined, 

and must be conducted in accordance 

with operating limitations set forth in 

§ 119.1(e) and 14 CFR part 91. 

In light of our experience with 

certification of other commercial 

operations, and with particular attention 

to the safe integration of new 

technologies, applications that are 

emerging, and limited nature of the 

transportation that could occur given 

the operating limits of the final rule, the 

Department has determined that a 

similar exception from air carrier 

operations for unmanned aircraft 

involving limited transport of property 

for compensation is appropriate. As 

adopted, the final rule provides 

immediate flexibility for remote pilots 

to engage in the limited carriage of 

property by small UAS, provided that 

the operations are conducted within a 

confined area and in compliance with 

the operating restrictions of 14 CFR part 

107. It does not, however, allow 

individuals or corporations, acting as 

‘‘air carriers,’’ to engage in ‘‘air 

transportation’’ as those terms are 

defined in 49 U.S.C. 40102.46 As 

technology develops in the future, the 

Department will evaluate the integration 

of more expansive UAS air carrier 

operations into the NAS and will 

propose further economic and safety 

regulations if warranted. 

In order to not be considered ‘‘air 

transportation,’’ first, the transport must 

occur wholly within the bounds of a 

state. It may not involve transport 

between (1) Hawaii and another place in 

Hawaii through airspace outside 

Hawaii; (2) the District of Columbia and 

another place in the District of 

Columbia; or (3) a territory or 

possession of the United States and 

another place in the same territory or 

possession, as this is defined by statute 

as interstate air transportation and 

would otherwise trigger the 

Department’s statutory requirements for 

air carrier operations. Thus, remote 

pilots may not offer or conduct ‘‘air 

transportation,’’ in which goods move 

across State or national borders. By 

statute and regulation, individuals 

seeking to carry more than a de minimis 

volume of property moving as part of a 

continuous journey over state, 

territorial, or international boundaries 

are considered by the Department of 

Transportation to be ‘‘air carriers’’ 

engaging in ‘‘air transportation.’’ 47 The 

assessment of whether an operator is 

engaging in ‘‘air transportation’’ is 

specific to the facts and circumstances 

of each case. Generally, the Department 

looks to how the transportation is being 

marketed and offered to customers, 

whether the transporting entity has 

existing aviation economic authority, 

and the extent to which the people or 

goods are being transported as part of an 

inter- or multi-State network. 

Second, as with other operations in 

part 107, small UAS operations 

involving the transport of property must 

be conducted within visual line of sight 

of the remote pilot. While the visualline-of-sight limitation can be waived 

for some operations under the rule, the 

restriction is a critical component of the 

Department’s finding that these part 107 

operations do not warrant further safety 

or economic authority at this time. The 

visual-line-of-sight restriction limits the 

area of operation to a circle with only 

about a 1-mile radius around the remote 

pilot in command, depending on the 

visibility conditions at the time of the 

operation. This limited area of operation 

mitigates the safety concerns that 

underlie the additional requirements 

that the FAA normally imposes on 

commercial operators under part 119. 

Operating within visual line of sight of 

the remote pilot is also critical to the 

Department’s finding that these 

operations are so limited such that at 

this time, they could not be considered 

air transportation, or part of a broader 

network of interstate commerce 

warranting economic authority to 

ensure adequate protection of 

consumers’ interests at this time. 

Accordingly, any waivers that the FAA 

may grant to the visual-line-of-sight 

provisions of part 107 will not allow the 

operation to transport property for 

compensation or hire beyond visual line 

of sight. 

For these reasons, this rule will also 

not allow the operation of a small UAS 

from a moving vehicle if the small 

unmanned aircraft is being used to 

transport property for compensation or 

hire. Allowing operation from a moving 

vehicle could allow the remote pilot in 

command to significantly expand the 

area of operation, raising the same safety 

and economic concerns as operations 

conducted beyond visual line of sight. 

Third, the provisions of part 107 limit 

the maximum total weight of the small 

unmanned aircraft (including any 

property being transported) to under 55 

pounds. This limits the size and weight 

of any property transported by the 

unmanned aircraft. Additionally, other 

provisions of the final rule require the 

remote pilot to know the unmanned 

aircraft’s location; to determine the 

unmanned aircraft’s attitude, altitude 

and direction; to yield the right of way 

to other aircraft; and to maintain the 

ability to see-and-avoid other aircraft. In 

the aggregate, the provisions of the final 

rule are designed to create an integrated 

framework and strike a balance that, on 

the one hand, allows limited 

transportation of property for 

compensation, but, on the other hand, 

ensures safety in the NAS and the 

opportunity to evaluate more expansive 

carriage of property that would require 

both OST economic authority and 

additional FAA safety authority. 

Fourth, the FAA notes that the 

carriage of hazardous materials poses a 

higher level of risk than the carriage of 

other types of property. For example, in 

the context of external load operations 

conducted under 14 CFR part 133, the 

FAA has found, that ‘‘the transport of 

hazardous materials, especially 

forbidden [by PHMSA] hazardous 

materials, in external load operations 

creates a hazard to persons or property 


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48Memorandum to Christopher Bonanti from 

Rebecca MacPherson, Assistant Chief Counsel, AGC 

200 (Aug. 17, 2009). PHMSA is the abbreviation for 

‘‘Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration.’’ 

49 In addition to granting authorization through 

section 333 exemptions, the FAA may authorize 

UAS operations under sections 334 and 336 of 

Public Law 112–95, as well as through 

Experimental Airworthiness Certification of UAS 

and OPA (FAA Order 8130.34). 

in the surface.’’ 48 Because the carriage 

of hazardous materials poses a higher 

level of risk, part 107 will not allow the 

carriage of hazardous materials. 

Based on these operational limits, the 

Department at this time does not view 

the limited transport of property for 

compensation that could occur via a 

small UAS that is operated within 

visual line of sight of the remote pilot 

to constitute ‘‘interstate air 

transportation.’’ The final rule, 

therefore, creates a new exception under 

14 CFR part 119 for these operations 

authorized by part 107. This approach 

will encompass the vast majority of 

transportation by small UAS that could 

be conducted under part 107, including 

many of the specific scenarios suggested 

by commenters, without requiring the 

Department to design and develop a 

new infrastructure for issuance and 

administration of a new air carrier 

economic and safety licensing regime. 

We note that while the operations 

permitted by this rule do not rise to the 

level of air transportation, they are still 

considered to be commercial operations. 

Thus as discussed in the next section, 

if a person does not satisfy U.S. 

citizenship requirements, he or she 

must seek authority under 14 CFR part 

375 before conducting these operations. 

2. International Operations and ForeignOwned Aircraft 

The International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) has recognized that 

UAS are aircraft, and as such, existing 

standards and recommended practices 

(SARPs) that apply to aircraft apply to 

UAS. ICAO currently is reviewing the 

existing SARPs to determine what 

modifications, if any, need to be made 

to accommodate UAS. In the U.S., 

however, UAS may operate with DOT 

authorization, under the authority of 

section 333 49 of Public Law 112–95, in 

a much less restrictive manner than 

current ICAO SARPs require. Thus, the 

FAA proposed to limit the applicability 

of part 107 to small UAS operations that 

are conducted entirely within the 

United States. Persons who wish to 

conduct operations outside of the 

United States would be able to do so, 

provided they seek and obtain the 

proper authorization from the requisite 

foreign civil aviation authority. 

In addition, based on the ICAO 

framework and the current review that 

ICAO is conducting, the FAA proposed 

to limit the rule to operations of U.S.- 

registered UAS. Under 49 U.S.C. 44103 

and 14 CFR 47.3, an aircraft can be 

registered in the United States only if it 

is not registered under the laws of a 

foreign country and meets one of the 

following ownership criteria: 

• The aircraft is owned by a citizen of 

the United States; 

• The aircraft is owned by a 

permanent resident of the United States; 

• The aircraft is owned by a 

corporation that is not a citizen of the 

United States, but that is organized and 

doing business under U.S. Federal or 

State law and the aircraft is based and 

primarily used in the United States; or 

• The aircraft is owned by the United 

States government or a State or local 

governmental entity. 

In proposing this requirement, the 

FAA noted that existing U.S. 

international trade obligations, 

including the North American Free 

Trade Agreement (NAFTA), cover 

certain kinds of operations known as 

specialty air services. Specialty air 

services are generally defined as any 

specialized commercial operation using 

an aircraft whose primary purpose is not 

the transportation of goods or 

passengers, including but not limited to 

aerial mapping, aerial surveying, aerial 

photography, forest fire management, 

firefighting, aerial advertising, glider 

towing, parachute jumping, aerial 

construction, helilogging, aerial 

sightseeing, flight training, aerial 

inspection and surveillance, and aerial 

spraying services. The FAA invited 

comments on whether foreign-registered 

small unmanned aircraft should be 

permitted to operate under part 107, or 

recognized as specialty air services 

under international trade obligations. 

With respect to limiting UAS 

operations under part 107 to operations 

within the United States, the National 

Agricultural Aviation Association 

(NAAA), DJI, and another commenter 

supported the limitation, but sought 

clarification and additional guidance 

material on what steps individuals may 

need to complete to obtain the proper 

authorization from foreign civil aviation 

authorities and the FAA to operate 

outside the United States. 

Article 8 of the Chicago Convention 

specifies that no unmanned aircraft 

‘‘shall be flown without a pilot over the 

territory of a contracting State without 

special authorization by that State and 

in accordance with the terms of such 

authorization.’’ Article 8 also calls on 

States to undertake ‘‘to insure that the 

flight of such aircraft without a pilot in 

regions open to civil aircraft shall be so 

controlled as to obviate danger to civil 

aircraft.’’ In accordance with this 

obligation, the provisions of part 107 set 

forth the necessary authorizations for 

operations conducted by U.S. citizens 

only within the United States. For those 

seeking to operate outside the United 

States, special authorization from the 

foreign civil aviation authority will be 

required. Thus, remote pilots wishing to 

conduct operations over another 

country’s airspace should review that 

country’s statutes, regulations, and 

guidance for clarification about how to 

operate in its airspace. 

The Small UAV Coalition sought 

clarification regarding whether UAS 

operations over water and beyond 12 

nautical miles from the U.S. coast could 

be conducted under part 107, provided 

the operations are within U.S. flight 

information regions and not over the 

territory of a contracting member state. 

Until such time as agreements are 

reached with other countries, the FAA 

has determined that operations will be 

restricted to the land areas, internal 

waters, and territorial sea of the United 

States. U.S. flight information regions 

that are more than 12 nautical miles 

from the coast of the United States do 

not satisfy these criteria, and as such, 

part 107 will not apply to operations in 

those areas. 

Planehook Aviation argued that the 

rule should be consistent with 

applicable articles of the Chicago 

Convention, which, as noted previously, 

deal with unmanned aircraft operations 

and the safe separation from manned 

civil aircraft operations. 

As discussed earlier, ICAO has 

recognized that existing SARPs that 

apply to aircraft apply to UAS. ICAO 

currently is reviewing the existing 

SARPs to determine what modifications, 

if any, need to be made to accommodate 

UAS and in fact, recently amended the 

standard contained in paragraph 3.1.9 of 

Annex 2 (Rules of the Air). This 

standard requires that ‘‘[a] remotely 

piloted aircraft shall be operated in such 

a manner as to minimize hazards to 

persons, property or other aircraft and 

in accordance with the conditions 

specified in Appendix 4.’’ That 

appendix sets forth detailed conditions 

ICAO Member States must require of 

civil UAS operations for the ICAO 

Member State to comply with the Annex 

2, paragraph 3.1.9 standard. 

Consistent with the recent 

amendment to 3.1.9 of Annex 2, the 

provisions of part 107 are designed to 

minimize hazards to persons, property 

or other aircraft operating within the 


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50 80 FR 78594, Dec. 16, 2015. 

51See also 14 CFR part 375, Navigation of Foreign 

Civil Aircraft in the United States. 

United States. Given the on-going 

evaluation of the SARPs by ICAO, this 

rule will, for the time being, limit the 

applicability of part 107 to small UAS 

operations that are conducted entirely 

within the United States. The FAA 

envisions that operations in 

international and foreign airspace will 

be dealt with in a future FAA 

rulemaking as ICAO continues to revise 

and more fully develop its framework 

for UAS operations to better reflect the 

diversity of UAS operations and types of 

UAS and to distinguish the appropriate 

levels of regulation in light of those 

differences. 

Transport Canada stated that there is 

a discrepancy between the proposed 

rule’s description of U.S. territorial 

waters extending to 12 nautical miles 

from the U.S. coast, and text in 14 CFR 

91.1 that makes reference to ‘‘waters 

within 3 nautical miles of the U.S. 

Coast.’’ 

Under Presidential Proclamation 

5928, the territorial sea of the United 

States, and consequently its territorial 

airspace, extends to 12 nautical miles 

from the baselines of the United States 

determined in accordance with 

international law. Thus, UAS operations 

that occur within 12 nautical miles from 

the baselines of the United States will 

be considered as operations occurring 

within the United States consistent with 

the applicability of part 107. 

The FAA notes that this approach is 

consistent with part 91. While, as 

Transport Canada pointed out, § 91.1(a) 

refers to waters within 3 nautical miles 

of the U.S. Coast, the applicability of 

part 91 is not limited to the 3-nauticalmile area. Specifically, § 91.1(b) clarifies 

that certain part 91 regulations also 

apply to aircraft operations taking place 

between 3 and 12 nautical miles from 

the coast of the United States. Thus, the 

12-nautical-mile metric used in this rule 

is consistent with the FAA’s agency 

practice (as codified in § 91.1(b)) and 

reflects the directive of Presidential 

Proclamation 5928. 

With respect to operation of foreignregistered aircraft for non-recreational 

and non-hobby purposes, NBAA, 

NetMoby, and Planehook Aviation 

supported the Department’s decision 

not to include foreign-registered UAS in 

this rulemaking. DJI, however, 

recognized that the current statutory 

restrictions in 49 U.S.C. 44102(a)(1) 

impose constraints on who can register 

an aircraft in the United States. DJI 

urged the FAA to consider asking 

Congress either to drop the aircraft 

registration requirement for all small 

UAS altogether or to withdraw the 

citizenship requirement (including its 

limited exceptions) as part of the 

agency’s upcoming reauthorization. 

Additionally, to the extent some of 

these operations could be conducted by 

foreign citizens using foreign-registered 

small UAS, DJI suggested that DOT 

evaluate whether existing agreements 

allow the use of small UAS and, to the 

extent they cannot be reasonably 

construed as including these aircraft, 

explore a diplomatic solution that 

would allow their use in U.S. airspace. 

Similarly, Textron Systems, Predesa, 

LLC, and the Aerospace Industries 

Association (AIA) suggested that FAA 

evaluate existing bilateral agreements 

and consider new bilateral agreements 

as the mechanism to permit foreignregistered UAS to operate in the United 

States. The Small UAV Coalition 

endorsed this approach as well and 

urged the Department to authorize the 

operation of specialty air services by 

foreign-owned small UAS in the United 

States. 

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to 

exclude foreign-registered aircraft from 

part 107 because the proposed rule 

included a registration component and 

foreign-registered aircraft may not be 

registered by the FAA. The FAA has 

since promulgated a separate interim 

final rule, titled Registration and 

Marking Requirements for Small 

Unmanned Aircraft 50 (Registration 

Rule), to address the registration and 

marking of all small unmanned aircraft, 

including unmanned aircraft that will 

be subject to part 107. In the 

Registration Rule, the Department 

acknowledged that under 49 U.S.C. 

41703, the Secretary may authorize 

certain foreign civil aircraft to be 

navigated in the United States only if: 

(1) The country of registry grants a 

similar privilege to aircraft of the United 

States; (2) the aircraft is piloted by an 

airman holding a certificate or license 

issued or made valid by the U.S. 

government or the country of registry; 

(3) the Secretary authorizes the 

navigation; and (4) the navigation is 

consistent with the terms the Secretary 

may prescribe.51

A foreign civil aircraft is defined in 14 

CFR 375.1 as (a) an aircraft of foreign 

registry that is not part of the armed 

forces of a foreign nation, or (b) a U.S.- 

registered aircraft owned, controlled or 

operated by persons who are not 

citizens or permanent residents of the 

United States. For those that fall within 

this definition and wish to operate 

under the provisions of part 107, they 

must first apply with the Office of the 

Secretary’s Foreign Air Carrier 

Licensing Division for permission to 

operate in the United States. 

The Department only will authorize 

operations of foreign-registered UAS in 

the United States if it determines that 

such operations are recognized under 

international agreements or via findings 

of reciprocity, consistent with the 

statutory obligations under section 

41703, and via the process as described 

below. The notion of reciprocity has a 

long-standing tradition in international 

relations and has been used in the realm 

of specialty air services for years. While 

there are many types of specialty air 

operations authorized under free trade 

agreements, it has been the longstanding policy of DOT to require a 

finding of reciprocity before allowing 

foreign-owned specialty air services to 

operate in the United States, even when 

the United States has no obligation 

under a trade agreement. The 

Department also will continue to review 

whether existing international 

agreements address the operation of 

UAS, and if not, what negotiations will 

need to occur to address these 

operations in the future. 

With respect to the supply of 

specialty air services in the United 

States by foreign-owned or controlled 

entities, DOT may allow these 

operations to occur provided that the 

UAS are registered and the owners have 

provided proof of reciprocity by their 

homeland of the ability for U.S. 

investment in UAS operations. 

Additional conditions may be imposed 

as necessary to satisfy the statutory 

requirements of section 41703. 

The FAA notes that, initially, all 

airmen operating under part 107 will be 

required to obtain a remote pilot 

certificate. Currently, ICAO has not 

adopted standards for the certification 

of pilots of unmanned aircraft that the 

FAA could rely on in determining 

whether it is obligated under 

international law to recognize a foreignissued UAS-specific airman certificate. 

However, once an ICAO standard has 

been developed, this rule will allow the 

FAA to determine whether a foreignissued UAS-specific airman certificate 

was issued under standards that meet or 

exceed the international standards, and 

therefore must be recognized by the 

FAA for purposes of operating a foreignregistered aircraft within the United 

States. 

The FAA also notes that remote pilots 

of foreign-registered aircraft will need to 

comply with any applicable 

requirements imposed by their country 

of registration that do not conflict with 

part 107. For example, while part 107 

will not require airworthiness 


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52NPRM, 80 FR at 9554. 

53NPRM, 80 FR at 9554–9555. 

certification, the small unmanned 

aircraft will need to obtain 

airworthiness certification if required to 

do so by its country of registration. 

3. Public Aircraft Operations 

The FAA is not making any changes 

to the final rule regarding public aircraft 

operations because this rule applies to 

civil aircraft operations only. In the 

NPRM, the FAA explained that this 

rulemaking would not apply to ‘‘public 

aircraft operations with small UAS that 

are not operated as civil aircraft. This is 

because public aircraft operations, such 

as those conducted by the Department 

of Defense, the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration (NASA), 

Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) and NOAA, are not required to 

comply with civil airworthiness or 

airman certification requirements to 

conduct operations. However, these 

operations are subject to the airspace 

and air-traffic rules of part 91, which 

include the ‘see and avoid’ requirement 

of § 91.113(b).’’ 52 The proposed rule did 

point out, however, that it ‘‘would 

provide public aircraft operations with 

greater flexibility by giving them the 

option to declare an operation to be a 

civil operation and comply with the 

provisions of proposed part 107 instead 

of seeking a COA from the FAA.’’ 53

DJI generally supported the FAA’s 

approach to small UAS public aircraft 

operations. The Nez Perce Tribe—which 

also supported the proposal to give 

public aircraft operations the option to 

declare an operation to be a civil 

operation and comply with the 

provisions to proposed part 107— 

asserted that the proper statutory 

interpretation of ‘‘public aircraft’’ 

includes federally recognized Indian 

tribes. Conversely, NAAA stated that 

public aircraft operations should 

continue to be conducted under the 

COA process. 

One individual said proposed 

§ 107.11 should be amended to indicate 

that public agencies may choose to 

voluntarily operate under part 107. The 

City of Arlington, Texas requested the 

ability to follow the small UAS rules, 

not the COA process. Aerial Services, 

Inc. also said that public entities should 

be allowed to operate like commercial 

operators, but only for research and 

instructional purposes. 

Under this rule, a public aircraft 

operation can continue to operate under 

a COA or can voluntarily operate as a 

civil aircraft in compliance with part 

107. As stated in the NPRM, this rule 

will not apply to public aircraft 

operations of small UAS that are not 

operated as civil aircraft. These 

operations must continue to comply 

with the FAA’s existing requirement to 

obtain a COA providing the public 

aircraft operation with a waiver from 

certain part 91 requirements such as the 

‘‘see and avoid’’ requirement of 

§ 91.113(b). 

However, this rule will provide 

greater flexibility to public aircraft 

operations because it allows small UAS 

public aircraft operations to voluntarily 

opt into the part 107 framework. In 

other words, a remote pilot may elect to 

operate his or her small UAS as a civil 

rather than a public aircraft and comply 

with part 107 requirements instead of 

obtaining a COA. With regard to Nez 

Perce’s assertion that aircraft operated 

by federally recognized Indian tribes are 

public aircraft, that issue is beyond the 

scope of this rule. 

The FAA also disagrees with NAAA’s 

comment that public aircraft operations 

should all be required to obtain a COA. 

As discussed in III.J.1 of this preamble, 

the FAA has found that small UAS 

operations conducted within the 

parameters of part 107 will not create a 

hazard to users of the NAS or pose a 

threat to national security. 

Consequently, there will be no adverse 

safety or security impact by the FAA 

providing public entities with an option 

to conduct their small UAS operations 

under part 107. 

NASA stated that the proposed rule 

should be written to specifically 

authorize NASA small UAS use without 

a COA because ‘‘it is incorrect to infer 

that NASA’s high aviation certification 

standards do not meet the rigors of civil 

standards.’’ NASA asserted that the 

proposed rule conflicts with statutory 

authority and does not align with the 

current FAA/NASA memorandum of 

agreement for the operation of small 

UAS. 

The Department of Defense Policy 

Board on Federal Aviation (DOD) also 

supported operations without a COA, 

‘‘commensurate with civil provisions.’’ 

DOD suggested several changes to 

language in the preamble regarding the 

option for government entities to 

conduct a civil UAS operation under 

part 107. DOD argued that ‘‘public 

operator statutory authorities’’ need to 

be preserved and the regulation needs to 

‘‘enable operations without a COA 

commensurate with civil provisions.’’ 

To that end, DOD stated that the FAA 

should clarify that public agencies 

currently operating under memoranda 

of agreement or understanding will be 

authorized to continue operating in that 

manner even where provisions of part 

107 are more restrictive in nature. DOD 

also asked that the FAA explicitly 

exclude aircraft operating under a COA 

from the applicability of part 107. 

Finally, DOD recommended that the 

FAA further amend § 107.1 to clarify 

that part 107 does not apply to aircraft 

operated by or for the National Defense 

Forces of the United States, but could be 

used as an alternative means of 

compliance. 

These comments are largely beyond 

the scope of the proposed rulemaking. 

The proposed rule addressed only civil 

small UAS operations. As stated above, 

the NPRM would enable remote pilots 

of public aircraft to opt into the civil 

framework for small UAS operations, 

but does not address public aircraft 

operations beyond that. In response to 

NASA, the FAA points out that under 

this rule, NASA may operate small UAS 

without a COA as long as it complies 

with part 107. With regard to DOD’s 

suggestions, there is no need to amend 

part 107 because § 107.1 expressly 

limits the applicability of part 107 to 

civil small UAS. After the effective date 

of this rule, the FAA does not anticipate 

issuing a public aircraft operations COA 

that is less flexible than the regulations 

promulgated in this rule, provided that 

all the circumstances are identical to 

that available to a civil operator. 

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates 

Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) 

requires each Federal agency to prepare 

a written statement assessing the effects 

of any Federal mandate in a proposed or 

final agency rule that may result in an 

expenditure of $100 million or more (in 

1995 dollars) in any one year by State, 

local, and Tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector; such 

a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action.’’ The FAA currently 

uses an inflation-adjusted value of 

$155.0 million in lieu of $100 million. 

One commenter suggested that the FAA 

should designate a special status for 

public UAS operating in a civil capacity 

that exempts them from visual-line-ofsight and daylight-only operation 

limitations. However, this is 

unnecessary because public aircraft 

operations are not required to be 

conducted as civil aircraft subject to 

part 107. Thus, a public aircraft 

operation that does not wish to comply 

with part 107 can operate under the 

existing public-aircraft framework rather 

than under part 107. 

Agreeing that the proposed rules 

should not apply to small UAS 

operations by DOD, NASA, NOAA, DHS 

or FAA, one individual stated that the 

proposed rule should apply to ‘‘second 

and third tier public agencies not 

directly tied to constant aeronautical 

activities, testing and research.’’ Two 


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54http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/

headquarters_offices/agc/pol_adjudication/agc200/

Interpretations/. 

other individuals stated that any 

commercial rules for small UAS should 

apply to both private and public sectors. 

This rule will allow any public 

agency, regardless of the ‘‘tier’’ of 

operations, to choose to operate a small 

UAS as a civil aircraft under part 107. 

The Association for Unmanned 

Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) 

recommended that the FAA modify the 

current limitation in § 107.11 

concerning ‘‘civil’’ aircraft to include 

‘‘public aircraft’’ as well. This is 

necessary, AUVSI asserted, because 

some current operation rules for 

manned aircraft (such as those found in 

part 91) apply to both ‘‘public aircraft’’ 

and ‘‘civil aircraft.’’ 

The FAA disagrees. This rulemaking 

applies to civil aircraft only. Expanding 

its application to public aircraft is 

beyond the scope of the proposed rule. 

The Next Gen Air Transportation 

Program at North Carolina State 

University indicated that proposed 

§ 107.3 needs a definition of ‘‘civil 

operation.’’ The commenter asked how 

a public agency declares a civil 

operation. The commenter also implied 

that part 107 does not make clear that 

there would be no adverse safety effects 

from allowing public aircraft operations 

under part 107. 

Twelve members of the Wisconsin 

Legislature signed a joint letter stating 

that ‘‘[t]he NPRM states public entities 

must get a Certificate of Waiver or 

Authorization because they are not 

‘exempt’ from restrictions in the 

proposed rules. However, the proposed 

rules allow public entities to ‘declare an 

operation to be a civil operation’ and 

therefore operate commercially and be 

exempted from flight restrictions.’’ The 

members also stated that the FAA has 

not ‘‘promulgated, clarified or made 

public its rules, policies, and legal 

opinions on public versus commercial 

UAS.’’ 

The Wisconsin Society of Land 

Surveyors stated that ‘‘government 

agencies have been getting a head start 

on the market, at the expense of the 

private sector, by obtaining certificates 

to perform UAS services that are 

commercial in nature,’’ and ‘‘[a]s a 

result, government and universities are 

conducting operational missions, 

developing markets and cultivating 

clients.’’ This commenter concluded 

that there ‘‘should not be unfair 

competitive advantages granted to 

government or university UAS vis-a`-vis 

the private sector.’’ 

These comments reflect some 

misunderstanding of public aircraft 

operations in general and the FAA’s role 

in such operations. The authority to 

conduct a public aircraft operation is 

determined by statute (49 U.S.C. 

40102(a)(41) and 40125). The FAA has 

no authority to prohibit a qualified 

government entity from conducting 

public aircraft operations, manned or 

unmanned. Consequently, many of the 

FAA’s regulations, such as aircraft 

certification and pilot requirements, do 

not apply to public aircraft operations. 

Some of the general operating rules 

apply to all aircraft operations, public 

aircraft and civil, and that is where the 

need for COAs affects public aircraft 

operations of UAS. For example, all 

aircraft must comply with 14 CFR 

91.113, and UAS require a conditional 

waiver of that regulation in order to 

operate in the NAS; the conditions are 

specified in the COA. 

Qualified governmental entities may 

choose to operate a public aircraft 

operation as long as they do so within 

the limits of the public aircraft statute. 

Under this rule, they may choose to 

operate their UAS as a civil aircraft 

instead, and operate under the civil 

regulations. Government entities have 

always had the option to do this with 

their manned aircraft; in some cases, 

government entities may be required to 

operate under civil regulations if their 

operations do not comply with the 

public aircraft statute. The new UAS 

regulations do not change this option or 

the requirements of the public aircraft 

statute. 

‘‘Civil aircraft’’ is already a defined 

term in 14 CFR 1.1, which defines a 

civil aircraft as an aircraft that is not a 

public aircraft. The definition of public 

aircraft in part 1 is a restatement of the 

requirements in the public aircraft 

statute sections cited above. 

Government entities that qualify to 

conduct public aircraft operations but 

choose to operate instead under civil 

rules must comply with the same 

requirements as civil entities; no special 

notice is required. If an operation is 

commercial, it is civil by definition, but 

not all civil operations are commercial. 

Operations for a commercial purpose 

are prohibited by the public aircraft 

statute. The public aircraft statute 

requires that public aircraft operations 

have a governmental function and not 

have a commercial purpose. In short, a 

government entity may choose to 

conduct a public aircraft operation 

within the restrictions of the public 

aircraft statute (and certain civil 

regulations applicable to all aircraft 

operating in the NAS), or it may choose 

to conduct a civil operation and comply 

with the requirements of the applicable 

regulations in 14 CFR. 

Under the definitions in 49 U.S.C. 

40102(a)(41), a university may qualify to 

conduct a public aircraft operation if it 

meets the statutory criteria as a part of 

the government of the State or a 

political subdivision of the state. A 

determination of whether a public 

university meets these criteria is made 

by individual states. Operations of 

aircraft by these universities are subject 

to the same requirements as other public 

aircraft operations. The ability to 

conduct a public aircraft operation is 

determined by statute and cannot be 

changed by the FAA. The FAA has not 

given an ‘‘unfair competitive advantage’’ 

or showed favoritism to any entity by 

declaring their operations public aircraft 

operations because it has no authority to 

do otherwise under the statute. The 

FAA does review the operations 

submitted by UAS proponents to ensure 

that, as described, they meet the 

requirements of the public aircraft 

statute. 

The FAA has made public its policies 

and opinions on all public aircraft 

matters, manned and unmanned. The 

FAA has also published Advisory 

Circular 00–1.1A, Public Aircraft 

Operations, dated February 12, 2014. 

That document is available on the FAA 

Web site. Matters of legal interpretation 

that have been presented to the FAA for 

its opinion are available as part of the 

FAA Office of the Chief Counsel’s 

interpretation database.54

4. Model Aircraft 

The NPRM proposed that part 107 

would not apply to model aircraft that 

satisfy all of the criteria specified in 

section 336 of Public Law 112–95. 

Section 336(c) defines a model aircraft 

as an ‘‘unmanned aircraft that is—(1) 

capable of sustained flight in the 

atmosphere; (2) flown within visual line 

of sight of the person operating the 

aircraft; and (3) flown for hobby or 

recreational purposes.’’ Subsection 

336(a) specifically prohibits the FAA 

from promulgating rules regarding 

model aircraft that meet all of the 

following statutory criteria: 

• The aircraft is flown strictly for 

hobby or recreational use; 

• The aircraft is operated in 

accordance with a community-based set 

of safety guidelines and within the 

programming of a nationwide 

community-based organization; 

• The aircraft is limited to not more 

than 55 pounds unless otherwise 

certificated through a design, 

construction, inspection, flight test, and 

operational safety program administered 

by a community-based organization; 


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55Public Law 112–95, sec. 336(a). 

56Public Law 112–95, sec. 336(a)(2). 

• The aircraft is operated in a manner 

that does not interfere with and gives 

way to any manned aircraft; and 

• When flown within 5 miles of an 

airport, the operator of the aircraft 

provides the airport operator and the 

airport air traffic control tower (when an 

air traffic facility is located at the 

airport) with prior notice of the 

operation. 

Because of the statutory prohibition 

on FAA rulemaking regarding model 

aircraft that meet the above criteria, the 

NPRM proposed that model aircraft 

meeting these criteria would not be 

subject to the provisions of part 107. 

However, although section 336(a) 

exempts certain model aircraft from 

FAA rulemaking, section 336(b) 

explicitly states that the exemption in 

section 336(a) does not limit the FAA’s 

authority to pursue enforcement action 

against those model aircraft that 

‘‘endanger the safety of the national 

airspace system.’’ The FAA proposed to 

codify this authority in part 101 by 

prohibiting a person operating a model 

aircraft from endangering the safety of 

the NAS. 

The FAA received approximately 

2,850 comments on the model-aircraft 

aspect of the NPRM. Many of these 

commenters, including NAMIC, Horizon 

Hobby, LLC (Horizon Hobby), Skyview 

Strategies, Inc. (Skyview Strategies), the 

Academy of Model Aeronautics (AMA) 

and many individuals, supported 

excluding model aircraft operations 

from the provisions of part 107. DJI, 

Aviation Management, and UAS 

America Fund, LLC (UAS America 

Fund) recommended that the FAA 

expand the model-aircraft exception 

from the requirements of part 107 and 

adopt more lenient regulatory standards 

for recreational uses of small UAS that 

do not comply with all of the criteria 

specified in section 336. UAS America 

Fund suggested that the final rule make 

a special allowance for small UAS 

operations that do not meet all of the 

criteria of section 336(a) but are 

conducted for educational or other 

salutary purposes. 

Conversely, NAAA, the 

Transportation Trades Department 

AFL–CIO (TTD), A4A, the American 

Chemistry Council, the Information 

Technology and Innovation Foundation, 

the Southwest Airlines Pilots’ 

Association (SWAPA) and a number of 

individual commenters advocated for 

greater regulation and oversight of all 

model aircraft operations. Many of these 

commenters felt that the risks associated 

with recreational and non-recreational 

UAS operations are the same, and thus, 

there should be no difference in how 

these operations are regulated. A 

number of commenters also expressed 

concern that recreational and hobby use 

of UAS could pose a significant safety 

hazard and that additional regulations 

should be imposed to mitigate this 

hazard. For example, NAAA asserted 

that ‘‘[t]he majority of UAS incidents 

that occurred in recent years have been 

by UAS operated as model aircraft . . . 

including two in 2014 where 

[agricultural] operators were harassed 

by model aircraft in Idaho and Illinois.’’ 

Green Vegans argued that failure to 

regulate model aircraft operations may 

have an adverse impact on the 

environment. 

Section 336 of Public Law 112–95 

specifically prohibits the FAA from 

issuing any new rules with regard to 

model aircraft that satisfy the statutory 

criteria specified in that section. 

Accordingly, the FAA cannot impose 

additional regulations on model aircraft 

that meet the criteria of section 336 nor 

can the FAA make those aircraft subject 

to the provisions of part 107. 

However, with regard to the request 

that the FAA apply the terms of section 

336 to other operations, the FAA agrees 

with NAAA, TTD, A4A and other 

commenters who pointed out that, from 

a safety point of view, there is no 

difference between the risk posed by 

recreational operations, operations used 

for salutary purposes, and nonrecreational/non-salutary operations. 

There is no data indicating that a small 

UAS operation whose operational 

parameters raise the safety risks 

addressed by part 107 would become 

safer simply as a result of being 

conducted for recreational or salutary 

purposes rather than commercial 

purposes. As such, the FAA declines the 

request to apply the terms of section 336 

beyond the statutory criteria specified in 

that section. 

The Air Line Pilots Association, 

International (ALPA) and the Kansas 

State University Unmanned Aircraft 

Systems Program (Kansas State 

University UAS Program) stated that if 

model aircraft operations are being 

added to part 101, then the title of part 

101 should be changed to reflect that 

part 101 now encompasses those 

operations. AMA, Horizon Hobby, 

Skyview Strategies, and numerous 

individuals noted that the statutory text 

of section 336 also applies to ‘‘aircraft 

being developed as model aircraft,’’ and 

these commenters asked the FAA to add 

the pertinent statutory text to the modelaircraft provisions of part 101. 

As the commenters pointed out, the 

statutory language of section 336 applies 

not just to aircraft that are operated as 

model aircraft but also to ‘‘aircraft being 

developed as a model aircraft.’’ 55

Accordingly, the FAA has added this 

statutory language to the regulatory text 

of § 101.41. The FAA also agrees with 

ALPA and the Kansas State University 

UAS Program and has updated the title 

of part 101 to indicate that this part will 

now include model aircraft operations 

that are operated under section 336. 

AMA and a number of individual 

commenters supported the proposed 

inclusion of the section 336 criterion 

concerning nationwide communitybased organizations into the regulatory 

text of part 101. A number of other 

commenters raised concerns about 

having to comply with safety guidelines 

issued by a community-based 

organization and having to operate 

within the programming of such an 

organization. The Permanent Editorial 

Board of the Aviators Model Code of 

Conduct Initiative stated that the FAA 

should demonstrate the efficacy of using 

community-based safety guidelines to 

regulate model aircraft operations prior 

to using such an approach. DJI and the 

Stadium Managers Association, Inc. 

stated that it is unclear what makes an 

organization a nationwide communitybased organization within the meaning 

of section 336. DJI went on to ask the 

FAA to provide guidance as to what 

criteria the agency will look for in 

recognizing a nationwide communitybased organization. The Washington 

Aviation Group and Green Vegans 

suggested that the FAA identify, or seek 

comments to identify, a single set of 

community-based safety guidelines and 

incorporate those guidelines by 

reference into proposed part 101 and 

make them available on the FAA’s Web 

site. 

Section 336 of Public Law 112–95 

includes a specific list of criteria that 

must be satisfied in order for the section 

336 exception to apply. One of these 

criteria is that ‘‘the [model] aircraft is 

operated in accordance with a 

community-based set of safety 

guidelines and within the programming 

of a nationwide community-based 

organization.’’ 56 Because compliance 

with a community-based set of safety 

guidelines and operating within the 

programming of a nationwide 

community-based organization is one of 

the statutory criteria that must be 

satisfied in order for section 336 to 

apply, the FAA has retained this 

provision. 

The FAA notes, however, that those 

model aircraft operations that do not 

wish to comply with a communitybased set of safety guidelines and 


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57 79 FR 36172, June 25, 2014. 58See, e.g., 79 FR at 36175–76. 

operate within the programming of a 

nationwide community-based 

organization will be able to simply 

conduct their operations under part 107. 

Part 107 was designed to impose the 

minimal burden necessary to ensure the 

safety and security of a small UAS 

operation. As discussed in the 

Regulatory Impact Assessment that 

accompanies this rule, the out-of-pocket 

cost for someone who wishes to operate 

under part 107 will be less than $200. 

With regard to comments asking for 

additional clarity as to what makes an 

organization a nationwide communitybased organization under section 336, 

the FAA notes that this issue is beyond 

the scope of this rule. The FAA is 

currently engaged in a separate 

regulatory action titled Interpretation of 

the Special Rule for Model Aircraft,57

(Interpretive Rule) in which the FAA is 

interpreting the statutory provisions of 

section 336 and explaining how those 

provisions apply to model aircraft 

operations. The FAA published this 

interpretation for public comment in 

June 2014 and has since received over 

33,000 public comments. The FAA is 

currently considering the issues raised 

by these commenters and will issue a 

final Interpretive Rule that reflects its 

consideration of the comments. 

Because the FAA is considering the 

specific meaning of section 336 

provisions in a separate regulatory 

action, in order to avoid duplication, the 

FAA limited the scope of the modelaircraft component of this rulemaking 

simply to codifying the FAA’s 

enforcement authority over modelaircraft operations that endanger the 

safety of the NAS. As such, issues 

concerning the specific meaning of 

section 336 (such as what makes an 

organization a nationwide communitybased organization) are beyond the 

scope of this rule. 

With regard to Washington Aviation 

Group and Green Vegans’ suggestions 

that the FAA codify a single set of 

community-based safety guidelines and 

incorporate those guidelines by 

reference into part 101, the FAA notes 

that this suggestion is also beyond the 

scope of this rule. However, even if the 

scope of this rule was broad enough to 

reach this issue, the language of section 

336(a)(2) is not limited to a single set of 

community-based safety guidelines, nor 

is it limited to community-based safety 

guidelines that exist today. Accordingly, 

the FAA cannot incorporate a single 

definitive set of safety guidelines into 

the regulatory text of part 101. 

The NextGen Air Transportation 

Program at NC State University stated 

that § 101.41 should be amended to 

include a requirement to operate at 

locations approved by a nationwide 

community-based organization. Another 

commenter suggested that the FAA 

clarify that the programming of 

nationwide community-based 

organizations is interpreted to include 

location. Colorado Ski Country USA 

said the FAA should add a provision 

that prohibits recreational UAS 

operations within the airspace above 

‘‘Places of Public Accommodation’’ 

without prior approval from the Place of 

Public Accommodation. 

As discussed previously, the scope of 

the model-aircraft component of this 

rulemaking is limited simply to 

codifying the FAA’s enforcement 

authority over model-aircraft operations 

that endanger the safety of the NAS. 

Accordingly, these suggestions are 

beyond the scope of this rule. 

A number of commenters, including 

ALPA, NAAA, and the International Air 

Transport Association, supported the 

FAA’s proposal to codify a prohibition 

on model aircraft operations 

endangering the safety of the NAS. 

NAAA emphasized that the FAA should 

‘‘continue to utilize every tool possible 

to ensure model aircraft are operating 

safely in the NAS.’’ 

The Small UAV Coalition, the 

Airports Council International—North 

America, and the American Association 

of Airport Executives asked the FAA to 

clarify what actions would endanger the 

safety of the NAS. AMA argued that 

enforcement of the ‘‘endangering the 

safety of the NAS’’ provision should not 

affect other airman certificates that may 

be held by a model aircraft operator. 

AMA and several other commenters also 

argued that the FAA is not permitted to 

oversee general safety issues involving 

model aircraft. These commenters 

suggested narrowing the ‘‘endangering 

the safety of the NAS’’ provision to 

make it analogous to 14 CFR 91.11, 

which prohibits interference with a 

crewmember. 

Subsection 336(b) explicitly states 

that the FAA has authority to pursue 

enforcement action ‘‘against persons 

operating model aircraft who endanger 

the safety of the national airspace 

system.’’ Because the scope of the FAA’s 

enforcement authority is explicitly 

specified in section 336(b), the FAA has 

decided to finalize the proposed 

prohibition on model aircraft operators 

endangering the safety of the NAS. To 

do otherwise and artificially narrow the 

FAA’s statutory enforcement authority 

over section 336 operations would be 

contrary to Congressional intent because 

Congress has explicitly specified, in 

section 336(b), the scope of the FAA’s 

enforcement authority over model 

aircraft operations. 

With regard to examples of actions 

that may endanger the safety of the 

NAS, the FAA notes that this is an issue 

that is being addressed by the 

Interpretive Rule.58 Because the issues 

addressed by the Interpretive Rule have 

been subject to extensive public input 

(33,000 plus comments) and because 

addressing those issues here would be 

duplicative, the FAA will defer 

discussion of what qualifies as 

endangering the safety of the NAS to the 

Interpretive Rule. Finally, with regard to 

AMA’s suggestion that enforcement of 

the ‘‘endangering the safety of the NAS’’ 

provision should not affect other airman 

certificates that may be held by a model 

aircraft pilot, the FAA notes that 

determination of the remedy that it may 

seek in specific enforcement cases is 

beyond the scope of this rulemaking. 

Many commenters, including 

Skyview Strategies, AMA, the 

Experimental Aircraft Association, and 

numerous individuals, reiterated 

arguments that were raised in the 

comments filed on the Interpretive Rule. 

These commenters restated arguments 

such as: (1) Considering model aircraft 

to be ‘‘aircraft’’ would effectively make 

those aircraft subject to manned-aircraft 

regulations; (2) the Interpretive Rule 

interprets the phrase ‘‘hobby or 

recreational use’’ too narrowly; (3) the 

Interpretive Rule does not properly 

interpret Congressional intent; (4) model 

aircraft operations should not be subject 

to any airspace restrictions; (5) requiring 

notification when operating within 5 

miles of an airport is too burdensome; 

and (6) the interpretation of ‘‘visual line 

of sight’’ within the Interpretive Rule 

would prohibit the use of first-personview devices. AMA and the Small UAV 

Coalition argued that the FAA must 

address and adjudicate the 33,000 plus 

comments that were made on the 

Interpretive Rule and resolve the issues 

and concerns presented before moving 

forward in finalizing the small UAS 

Rule. 

Because these are all issues that have 

been commented on (in much greater 

detail) and are currently being 

considered as part of the Interpretive 

Rule, considering these issues in this 

rule would be duplicative. Accordingly, 

the FAA declines to address these issues 

here as they are currently the subject of 

a separate regulatory action. 

The FAA also declines the suggestion 

that it issue the final Interpretive Rule 

prior to finalizing this rule. The FAA is 

currently working as quickly as possible 

to issue the final Interpretive Rule. 


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59http://knowbeforeyoufly.org/. 

60 14 CFR 1.1 (definition of ‘‘balloon’’). 

61 Id. (definition of ‘‘kite’’). 

62Additional information can be found in FAA 

Order 7210.3, Chapter 18, Section 5, Moored 

Balloons, Kites, Unmanned Rockets, and 

Unmanned Free Balloons/Objects, http://

www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/

7210.3Z.pdf; and FAA Order 7110.65, Chapter 9, 

Section 6, Unmanned Free Balloons, http://

www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/

ATC.pdf. 

63 14 CFR 1.1 (definition of ‘‘airship’’). 

Because the model-aircraft component 

of this rulemaking simply codifies the 

FAA’s statutory authority over section 

336 operations and because delaying 

this rulemaking would prejudice nonmodel small UAS operations, the FAA 

declines to withhold this rule until 

issuance of the final Interpretive Rule. 

AMA and Horizon Hobby asked the 

FAA to add regulatory text that would 

exempt model aircraft operations and 

aircraft being developed as model 

aircraft from the regulatory provisions of 

parts 21, 43, 45, 47, 61, and 91. These 

commenters also noted the revision that 

the NPRM proposed to make in § 91.1(e) 

and expressed concern that this revision 

may make model aircraft subject to the 

provisions of part 91. Skyview 

Strategies asked the FAA to rewrite the 

guidance that it recently issued to law 

enforcement agencies concerning model 

aircraft that may be operated unsafely. 

As discussed previously, the 

proposed rule was limited simply to 

codifying the FAA’s statutory 

enforcement authority over model 

aircraft operations. Because the FAA did 

not propose making any changes to its 

existing regulations with regard to 

section 336 operations, those changes 

are beyond the scope of this rulemaking. 

Similarly, the FAA did not propose to 

make any changes to its existing 

enforcement guidance as part of this 

rulemaking, and those changes are also 

beyond the scope of this rule. 

With regard to the revision that the 

NPRM proposed in § 91.1(e), this 

revision does not expand the scope of 

part 91. Specifically, the NPRM 

proposed to move the regulatory text 

concerning existing exceptions to part 

91 applicability for moored balloons, 

kites, unmanned rockets, and 

unmanned free balloons into a newly 

created subsection (§ 91.1(e)). The 

NPRM then proposed to add an extra 

exception (also in § 91.1(e)) to part 91 

applicability for small UAS operations 

governed by part 107, because the 

purpose of this rulemaking is, in part, 

for the regulations of part 107 to replace 

the regulations of part 91 as the 

governing regulations for small UAS 

operations. Because this additional 

exception for part 107 operations is the 

only substantive change that the NPRM 

proposed to the applicability of part 91, 

finalizing this exception would not 

expand the scope of part 91. 

Accordingly, this rule will finalize 

§ 91.1(e) as proposed in the NPRM. 

Two commenters disagreed with one 

aspect of the proposed definition of 

model aircraft, namely that the aircraft 

must be capable of sustained flight in 

the atmosphere. These commenters 

argued that the proposed requirement 

was more burdensome than 

requirements imposed on some manned 

aircraft operations. However, section 

336(c)(1) specifically defines a ‘‘model 

aircraft’’ in pertinent part as an aircraft 

that is ‘‘capable of sustained flight in the 

atmosphere.’’ Because the definition of 

‘‘model aircraft’’ is specified in statute, 

this rule will finalize the statutory 

definition in the regulatory text of part 

101. 

The Aircraft Owners and Pilots 

Association (AOPA) and The Permanent 

Editorial Board of the Aviators Model 

Code of Conduct Initiative suggested 

that the FAA take additional steps to 

issue clear and definitive guidance for 

recreational operators and to encourage 

manufacturers to include information 

on this FAA guidance in their packaging 

materials. AOPA further stated that the 

FAA should work with AOPA and 

remote control aircraft groups ‘‘to 

conduct education outreach, and 

publish guidance to help pilots file 

timely reports of reckless UAS 

operations.’’ 

The FAA agrees with AOPA and The 

Permanent Editorial Board of the 

Aviators Model Code of Conduct 

Initiative that guidance and education 

would greatly assist model aircraft 

operators. To that end, the FAA has 

partnered with AMA, AUVSI, AOPA 

and the Small UAV Coalition on an 

education campaign titled ‘‘Know 

Before You Fly,’’ which is designed to 

educate prospective users about the safe 

and responsible operation of model 

aircraft.59 As pointed out by the 

commenters, education and outreach 

efforts will enhance the safety of the 

model aircraft community and, just like 

it did with the ‘‘Know Before You Fly’’ 

campaign, the FAA will consider 

partnering with interested stakeholders 

in future education and outreach efforts. 

The FAA is also currently taking the 

steps suggested by AOPA and The 

Permanent Editorial Board of the 

Aviators Model Code of Conduct 

Initiative to issue clear and definitive 

guidance for recreational operators. 

Specifically, the FAA is working on 

drafting and issuing a final Interpretive 

Rule that addresses the issues raised by 

commenters. The agency has also issued 

an updated AC 91–57A, which is the 

main advisory circular for model aircraft 

operations. 

5. Moored Balloons, Kites, Amateur 

Rockets, and Unmanned Free Balloons 

Moored balloons, kites, amateur 

rockets, and unmanned free balloons are 

currently regulated by the provisions of 

14 CFR part 101. Because they are 

already incorporated into the NAS 

through part 101, the NPRM proposed to 

exclude them from the provisions of 

part 107. The FAA did not receive any 

comments objecting to this aspect of the 

NPRM and, as such, this rule will, as 

proposed, exclude part 101 operations 

from the applicability of part 107. 

The FAA did, however, receive 

several comments asking for 

clarification as to which types of 

operation are subject to part 101. The 

NextGen Air Transportation Program at 

NC State University and three 

individuals asked whether tethered 

powered unmanned aircraft meet the 

definition of unmanned free balloons 

and kites, which are subject to part 101. 

FAA regulations define a balloon as 

‘‘a lighter-than-air aircraft that is not 

engine driven, and that sustains flight 

through the use of either gas buoyancy 

or an airborne heater.’’ 60 A kite is 

defined as ‘‘a framework, covered with 

paper, cloth, metal, or other material, 

intended to be flown at the end of a rope 

or cable, and having as its only support 

the force of the wind moving past its 

surfaces.’’ 61 Based on these definitions, 

a small unmanned aircraft that uses 

powered systems for actions such as 

propulsion or steering is not a balloon 

or kite subject to part 101.62

A commenter asked whether 

unmanned moored airships and blimps 

are subject to part 101. In response, the 

FAA notes that an airship is defined as 

‘‘an engine-driven lighter-than-air 

aircraft that can be steered.’’ 63

Conversely, as discussed previously, the 

definition of ‘‘balloon’’ excludes aircraft 

that are engine-driven. Because an 

airship is not a balloon or kite, a moored 

unmanned airship is not encompassed 

by part 101. With regard to blimps, an 

engine-driven blimp would be 

considered an airship, which is not 

subject to part 101. 

6. Current Treatment of UAS and 

Grandfathering of Section 333 

Exemption Holders 

The FAA currently accommodates 

non-recreational small UAS use through 

various mechanisms, such as special 

airworthiness certificates, exemptions, 

and COAs. However, the FAA 

recognizes that many holders of 


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64The FAA also proposed to create two new 

crewmember positions: (1) Operator; and (2) visual 

observer. Those positions are discussed in sections 

III.E.1 and III.E.2.b of this preamble. 

exemptions issued under section 333 of 

Public Law 112–95 (section 333 

exemptions) may wish to take advantage 

of part 107 when it goes into effect. On 

the other hand, some section 333 

exemption holders may prefer to 

continue operating under the terms and 

conditions of their exemptions. 

Therefore, the FAA will allow any 

section 333 exemption holder to either 

continue operating under the terms and 

conditions of the exemption until its 

expiration, or conduct operations under 

part 107 as long as the operation falls 

under part 107. 

Approximately 40 commenters 

criticized the framework currently 

regulating small UAS operations as 

slow, cumbersome, and inefficient. 

These commenters expressed concern 

that the current framework is having an 

adverse effect on UAS development in 

the United States. 

The FAA anticipates that this 

rulemaking will alleviate many of the 

concerns commenters raised with the 

existing UAS framework. Under this 

rule, many operations that would 

previously require exemptions and 

COAs will now fall under the purview 

of part 107, which generally does not 

require an exemption or a COA prior to 

operation. 

Some commenters, including the 

American Petroleum Institute and the 

Consumer Electronics Association 

(CEA), encouraged the FAA to 

acknowledge that existing permitted 

commercial uses of small UAS are 

unaffected by the rule. The American 

Petroleum Institute stated that such 

acknowledgement is necessary to avoid 

unintended consequences and preserve 

the expectation and business interests of 

current authorization holders. 

CEA stated that the FAA should either 

grandfather-in existing exemptions or 

afford existing exemptions a 3-year 

transition period in recognition of the 

hard work and expense each exemption 

represents. The commenter further 

recommended that, if the FAA chose a 

3-year transition period, and if no 

renewal was sought, then the exemption 

would terminate 3 years after the new 

rules became effective. However, if a 

petitioner sought renewal of the 

exemption, the commenter 

recommended that the exemption 

remain valid until final action by the 

FAA on the renewal application. CEA 

noted that, to the extent that the new 

rules are more permissive than existing 

exemptions, operators should be 

permitted to rescind their exemption 

and operate under the new rules. 

The FAA clarifies that current section 

333 exemptions that apply to small UAS 

are excluded from part 107. The FAA 

has already considered each of these 

individual operations when it 

considered their section 333 exemption 

requests and concluded that these 

operations do not pose a safety or 

national security risk. 

The FAA recognizes, however, that 

there may be certain instances where 

part 107 is less restrictive than a section 

333 exemption. Therefore, under this 

rule, a section 333 exemption holder 

may choose to operate in accordance 

with part 107 instead of operating under 

the section 333 exemption. This 

approach will provide section 333 

exemption holders time to obtain a 

remote pilot certificate and transition to 

part 107. Operations that would not 

otherwise fall under part 107 may not 

take advantage of this option. For 

example, an operation with a section 

333 exemption that does not fall under 

part 107, such as an operation of a UAS 

weighing more than 55 pounds, would 

not have the option of operating in 

accordance with part 107 rather than 

with its section 333 exemption. 

Additionally, when section 333 

exemptions come up for renewal, the 

FAA will consider whether renewal is 

necessary for those exemptions whose 

operations are within the operational 

scope of part 107, which also includes 

those operations that qualify for a 

waiver under part 107. The purpose of 

part 107 is to continue the FAA’s 

process of integrating UAS into the 

NAS. If a section 333 exemption is 

within the operational scope of part 107, 

there may be no need for the agency to 

renew an exemption under section 333. 

Because the FAA’s renewal 

considerations will be tied to the 

outstanding section 333 exemptions’ 

expiration dates, a 3-year transition 

period is not necessary. This will not 

affect those section 333 exemptions that 

are outside of the operational scope of 

part 107 or where a part 107 waiver 

would not be considered. 

Future exemptions may be issued to 

provisions of part 107 that do not allow 

for a waiver. These exemptions may also 

be issued pursuant to section 333. Small 

UAS remote pilots holding an 

exemption for a provision contained in 

part 107 will not be excluded from the 

other part 107 requirements if the 

exemption specifies that part 107 

provisions that are not waived or 

exempted still apply. 

A commenter asked whether there 

will be a grace period for individuals 

already operating small UAS to comply 

with the requirements of part 107, or 

whether those individuals will be 

required to stop operating until they can 

complete those requirements. 

As stated above, a person currently 

operating under a section 333 

exemption will not need to immediately 

comply with part 107. Additionally, a 

person currently operating on the basis 

of a part 61 pilot certificate other than 

student pilot would, as discussed 

below, be eligible to obtain a temporary 

remote pilot certificate upon satisfying 

the prerequisites specified in this rule. 

The temporary remote pilot certificate 

will authorize its holder to operate 

under part 107. 

D. Definitions 

The NPRM proposed to define several 

terms in part 107 including: (1) Control 

station; (2) corrective lenses; (3) 

unmanned aircraft; (4) small unmanned 

aircraft; and (5) small unmanned aircraft 

system (small UAS).64

1. Control Station 

The NPRM proposed to define a 

control station as ‘‘an interface used by 

the operator to control the flight path of 

the small unmanned aircraft.’’ The 

NPRM explained that, unlike a manned 

aircraft, the interface that is used to 

control the flight path of a small 

unmanned aircraft remains outside of 

the aircraft. The proposed definition 

was intended to clarify the interface that 

is considered part of a small UAS under 

part 107. 

NAAA and another commenter agreed 

with the proposed definition. Transport 

Canada asked the FAA to consider 

refining this definition by adding a 

definition of ‘‘control link’’ to 

distinguish between command and 

control functions and communication 

functions. One commenter asserted that 

the proposed definition does not 

encompass instances in which a small 

UAS’s flight path is preprogrammed via 

waypoints, and the interface used by the 

remote pilot is intended simply to 

commence execution of the program. 

The link between the ground control 

station and the small unmanned aircraft 

is commonly referred to as the 

‘‘command and control link’’ or ‘‘C2.’’ 

When a communication link between 

the remote pilot and another person, 

such as a visual observer or an air traffic 

controller, is added to C2, it is referred 

to as ‘‘command, control and 

communications’’ or ‘‘C3.’’ C2 is an 

inherent requirement for safe 

operations, even if the small unmanned 

aircraft flight is completely autonomous 

(i.e., preprogrammed flight operations 

without further input from the remote 

pilot) because the remote pilot must be 


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able to take direct command of the flight 

in order to exercise his/her 

responsibility for collision avoidance, 

yielding right of way to other aircraft, 

etc. C3, on the other hand, is only 

needed if the remote pilot is using the 

ground control station to communicate 

with another person directly involved in 

the operation, such as a visual observer. 

Because this rule does not require multiperson operations, the definition of a 

ground control station will not include 

the requirement for a communications 

link. 

Furthermore, as technology advances, 

the concept and use of C2 and C3 could 

change significantly. Omitting a rigid 

regulatory definition of these terms in 

this rule will allow them to evolve as 

technology changes. 

2. Corrective Lenses 

In connection with the visual-line-ofsight requirements in the NPRM, the 

FAA proposed to define the term 

‘‘corrective lenses’’ as ‘‘spectacles or 

contact lenses.’’ The FAA explained 

that, unlike other vision-enhancing 

devices, spectacles and contact lenses 

do not restrict a user’s peripheral vision, 

and thus could be used to satisfy the 

visual-line-of-sight requirements 

proposed in the NPRM. The FAA did 

not receive any adverse comments on 

this proposed definition, and thus 

finalizes the proposed definition of 

‘‘corrective lenses’’ in this rule without 

change. 

3. Unmanned Aircraft 

The NPRM proposed to define 

‘‘unmanned aircraft’’ as ‘‘an aircraft 

operated without the possibility of 

direct human intervention from within 

or on the aircraft.’’ This proposed 

definition would codify the statutory 

definition of ‘‘unmanned aircraft’’ 

specified in Public Law 112–95, section 

331(8). 

MAPPS stated that the definition of 

‘‘unmanned aircraft’’ needs to be 

clarified because the current definition 

leaves open the possibility that paper 

airplanes, model airplanes, model 

rockets, and toys could be considered 

unmanned aircraft. The Permanent 

Editorial Board of the Aviators Model 

Code of Conduct Initiative stated that 

this definition and the definition of 

small unmanned aircraft may permit 

infant passengers and asked the FAA to 

amend the definition to categorically 

prohibit the carriage of passengers on an 

unmanned aircraft. 

The definition of unmanned aircraft 

as ‘‘an aircraft operated without the 

possibility of direct human intervention 

from within or on the aircraft’’ is a 

statutory definition and, as such, this 

rule will finalize that definition as 

proposed. In response to MAPPS’ 

comment, as discussed in section III.C.5 

of this preamble, part 107 will not apply 

to operations governed by part 101. 

Those operations include model aircraft, 

moored balloons, kites, amateur rockets, 

and unmanned free balloons. With 

regard to carriage of infants on small 

unmanned aircraft, this concern is 

addressed by other provisions in this 

rule that prohibit careless or reckless 

operations that endanger the life of 

another person. 

4. Small Unmanned Aircraft 

The NPRM proposed to define ‘‘small 

unmanned aircraft’’ as ‘‘an unmanned 

aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds 

including everything that is on board 

the aircraft.’’ The NPRM noted that 

Public Law 112–95, section 331(6) 

defines a small unmanned aircraft as 

‘‘an unmanned aircraft weighing less 

than 55 pounds.’’ However, the NPRM 

pointed out that this statutory definition 

does not specify whether the 55-pound 

weight limit refers to the total weight of 

the aircraft at the time of takeoff (which 

would encompass the weight of the 

aircraft and any payload on board) or 

simply the weight of an empty aircraft. 

The NPRM proposed to define small 

unmanned aircraft using total takeoff 

weight because: (1) Heavier aircraft 

generally pose greater amounts of public 

risk in the event of an accident, because 

they can do more damage to people and 

property on the ground; and (2) this 

approach would be similar to the 

approach that the FAA has taken with 

other aircraft, such as large aircraft, 

light-sport aircraft, and small aircraft. 

Commenters including AOPA, ALPA, 

and the Helicopter Association 

International, supported the proposed 

definition. The New England Chapter of 

the Association of Unmanned Vehicles 

International and Devens IOP, 

commenting jointly, pointed out that 

there are commercial applications being 

developed that will need to exceed 55 

pounds. Event 38 Unmanned Systems 

stated that rather than segregate small 

unmanned aircraft by total weight, the 

FAA should use a ‘‘kinetic energy split’’ 

that combines weight and speed. 

Several commenters asked that the 55- 

pound weight limit be lowered. Event 

38 Unmanned Systems recommended 

an initial weight restriction of 10 

pounds, with adjustments based on 

subsequent research. Prioria Robotics, 

Inc. stated that the weight limitation for 

small unmanned aircraft should be less 

than 25 pounds, and that the definition 

should include a requirement that the 

aircraft be ‘‘hand-launchable.’’ Another 

commenter asked for the weight limit to 

be reduced to 33 pounds. 

Green Vegans stated that FAA must 

provide test data on the collision impact 

of a 55-pound UAS, traveling at various 

speeds, on both humans and birds. The 

advocacy group argued that the public 

cannot make informed comments on the 

proposed weight limitation without 

such data. The advocacy group also 

noted that such data would be provided 

by a National Environmental Policy Act 

(NEPA) Environmental Impact 

Statement, which the group stated the 

FAA must do. Crew Systems similarly 

opposed the maximum weight 

limitation, arguing that FAA provided 

no justification for it. The company 

asserted that a 55-pound UAS is large 

enough to be hazardous when operated 

in an urban environment, even if care is 

taken. Although it did not expressly 

object to the weight limitation, the 

United States Ultralight Association also 

expressed concern about the significant 

damage that a 50-plus-pound unmanned 

aircraft could do to light, open-cockpit 

aircraft. 

Other commenters asked the FAA to 

increase the 55-pound weight limit. 

Consumers Energy Company objected to 

the definition’s proposed weight 

limitation as too light, arguing that a 55- 

pound weight restriction will negatively 

impact small UAS flight times and the 

usage of alternative fuel sources. 

Consumers Energy urged the FAA to 

consider fuel loads and to increase the 

weight restriction to 120 pounds. The 

commenter also suggested that, if the 

FAA has concerns about safety, it could 

create subcategories under which 

maximum weight restriction is imposed 

on the fuel load, rather than adopt a 

blanket weight restriction. Several 

commenters also suggested higher 

weight limits, including: 80 pounds; a 

range of 30–100 pounds; and 150 

pounds. Another commenter called the 

weight restriction ‘‘arbitrary,’’ and noted 

that other States have defined small 

UAS to include unmanned aircraft 

weighing up to 150 kilograms. 

One commenter suggested that the 

FAA amend the definition of small 

unmanned aircraft to include aircraft 

weighing exactly 55 pounds. Another 

commenter stated that the definition of 

‘‘small unmanned aircraft’’ must be 

clarified to account for different types of 

UAS (e.g., fixed-wing, rotor-wing, small, 

medium, large). 

The definition of ‘‘small unmanned 

aircraft’’ is a statutory definition. 

Specifically, Public Law 112–95, section 

331(6) defines a small unmanned 

aircraft as ‘‘an unmanned aircraft 

weighing less than 55 pounds.’’ 

Accordingly, this rule will retain the 


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65See 14 CFR 1.1 (referring to ‘‘takeoff weight’’ 

for large, light-sport, and small aircraft in the 

definitions for those aircraft). 

statutory definition, which includes 55 

pounds as the weight limit for a small 

unmanned aircraft. However, the FAA 

emphasizes that, as discussed in section 

III.A of this preamble, this rule is merely 

one step of UAS integration into the 

NAS. As such, the FAA anticipates that 

future rulemakings will integrate larger 

UAS into the NAS and thus enable 

additional commercial opportunities. 

Several commenters discussed the 

ambiguity in the statutory definition 

with regard to how the 55-pound weight 

limit should be calculated. The Small 

UAV Coalition and Federal Airways & 

Airspace supported the inclusion of 

payload in the weight calculation. 

Conversely, DJI, the Associated General 

Contractors of America, and another 

commenter questioned whether the 55- 

pound weight limitation should include 

payload that is carried by the small 

unmanned aircraft. DJI argued that the 

FAA does not consider the weight of 

payload in its regulations governing the 

operation of ultralights. Kapture Digital 

Media stated that the 55-pound weight 

limit should not include the weight of 

the battery. 

As noted in the NPRM, the FAA uses 

total takeoff weight for multiple 

different types of aircraft, including 

large aircraft, light-sport aircraft, and 

small aircraft.65 One of the reasons that 

the FAA uses total takeoff weight in all 

of these regulations is because in the 

event of a crash, a heavier aircraft can 

do more damage to people and property 

on the ground than a lighter aircraft. In 

evaluating this type of risk for a small 

UAS, it is the total mass of the small 

unmanned aircraft that is important; the 

manner in which that mass is achieved 

is irrelevant. In other words, a 50-pound 

unmanned aircraft carrying 30 pounds 

of payload does not pose a smaller risk 

than an 80-pound unmanned aircraft 

that is not carrying any payload. As 

such, this rule will retain the proposed 

inclusion of everything onboard the 

aircraft in the 55-pound weight limit of 

a small unmanned aircraft. 

The General Aviation Manufacturers 

Association (GAMA) pointed out that, 

although the FAA typically points to 

maximum takeoff weight when 

identifying an aircraft’s weight and 

associated mass, the proposed definition 

of small unmanned aircraft does not 

include the term ‘‘takeoff.’’ As such, 

GAMA recommended that the FAA 

modify the definition to reference the 

point of takeoff as follows: ‘‘Small 

unmanned aircraft means an unmanned 

aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds 

including everything that is on board 

the aircraft on takeoff.’’ Another 

commenter stated that the choice of ‘‘on 

board’’ in the definition of ‘‘small 

unmanned aircraft’’ will create 

confusion, because these aircraft 

routinely have ‘‘attached’’ external 

payloads because there is little room for 

internal ‘‘on board’’ payloads. 

The FAA agrees with these comments 

and has modified the proposed 

definition to refer to the total aircraft 

weight at takeoff and to include possible 

external attachments to the aircraft in 

the calculation of small unmanned 

aircraft weight. 

5. Small Unmanned Aircraft System 

(Small UAS) 

Finally, the NPRM proposed a 

definition of ‘‘small unmanned aircraft 

system’’ as ‘‘a small unmanned aircraft 

and its associated elements (including 

communication links and the 

components that control the small 

unmanned aircraft) that are required for 

the safe and efficient operation of the 

small unmanned aircraft in the national 

airspace system.’’ The NPRM explained 

that this proposed definition would be 

similar to the statutory definition of 

UAS specified in Public Law 112–95, 

section 331(9), except that it does not 

include a ‘‘pilot in command’’ reference 

that appears in the statute. The FAA did 

not include the ‘‘pilot in command’’ 

reference in the proposed definition of 

small UAS because that position did not 

exist under the NPRM. Even though the 

FAA is creating a remote pilot in 

command position in this final rule, the 

FAA considers adding a reference to 

that position in the small UAS 

definition as unnecessary. 

AirShip Technologies Group, Inc. 

(AirShip Technologies) supported the 

proposed definition. Conversely, 

Transport Canada asked the FAA to 

consider whether it would be better to 

use the ICAO terminology of remotely 

piloted aircraft system (RPAS) instead of 

small UAS. Foxtrot Consulting, LLC 

stated that the inclusion of the phrase 

‘‘associated elements (including 

communications links and the 

components that control the small 

unmanned aircraft)’’ in the definition of 

small UAS creates a ‘‘regulatory 

nightmare,’’ because it means cellular 

network providers and their 

infrastructure are considered part of a 

small UAS. The commenter pointed out 

that small UAS can be controlled via 

Wi-Fi and cellular networks, which 

opens enormous capabilities to small 

UAS operations. The commenter went 

on, however, to question whether, as a 

result of the proposed definition, a 

cellular provider is liable if a UAS being 

controlled through their network causes 

damage to property, serious injury, or 

death. 

The proposed definition of small UAS 

is derived from the statutory definition 

of ‘‘unmanned aircraft system’’ in Public 

Law 112–95, § 331(9). As such, this final 

rule will codify the proposed definition. 

Because Congress has selected the term 

‘‘unmanned aircraft system’’ to describe 

this type of a system, the FAA may not 

use a different term, such as RPAS, in 

this rule. 

With regard to cellular providers, the 

requirements of this rule apply only to 

the remote pilot, the owner of the small 

UAS, and people who may be involved 

in the operation of the small UAS. As 

such, a cellular provider whose 

involvement in the small UAS operation 

is limited to a remote pilot simply using 

the provider’s infrastructure would not 

be in violation of part 107 if something 

were to go wrong. The FAA does not 

opine on liability issues that are beyond 

the scope of this rule, such as whether 

the provider may be liable to the remote 

pilot or third parties under tort or 

contract law. 

The NextGen Air Transportation 

Program at NC State University and 

another commenter recommended 

specifically stating that tethered 

powered small UAS are considered 

small UAS under proposed part 107. In 

response to these comments, the FAA 

notes that the definition of small UAS 

in this rule includes tethered powered 

small UAS. 

6. Other Definitions 

One commenter asked the FAA to 

define the term ‘‘aerial photography’’ in 

the regulatory text. However, with the 

exception of operations involving the 

transportation of property, part 107 does 

not contain any requirements specific to 

the use to which a small UAS is put. For 

example, a small UAS used for aerial 

photography will be subject to the same 

operating restrictions as a small UAS 

used for bridge inspection, precision 

agriculture, or utility inspection. 

Because this rule does not contain any 

requirements specific to aerial 

photography, no definition of the term 

is necessary. 

E. Operating Rules 

As discussed earlier in this preamble 

(section III.A), instead of a single 

omnibus rulemaking that applies to all 

small UAS operations, the FAA has 

decided to proceed incrementally and 

issue a rule governing small UAS 

operations that pose the least amount of 

risk. Subpart B of part 107 will specify 

the operating constraints of these 

operations. The FAA emphasizes that it 


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66 14 CFR 1.1 (definition of ‘‘commercial 

operator’’). 

67See 14 CFR 119.5(b). 

68 ICAO Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft 

(draft) Chapter 7 Personnel Competence. 

69Unmanned Aircraft System Operations in UK 

Airspace—Guidance CAP 722. 70See 14 CFR 91.3. 

intends to conduct future rulemaking(s) 

to incorporate into the NAS small UAS 

operations that pose a greater level of 

risk than the operations that will be 

permitted by this rule. 

1. Remote Pilot in Command 

The NPRM proposed to create a new 

crewmember position (called 

‘‘operator’’) for small UAS operations 

conducted under part 107. The 

proposed rule would define an operator 

as a person who manipulates the flight 

controls of a small UAS. The NPRM also 

proposed prohibiting a person from 

serving as an operator if he or she does 

not have an unmanned aircraft operator 

certificate with a small UAS rating, 

which would be a new airman 

certificate created by the proposed rule. 

Finally, the NPRM invited comments as 

to whether this rule should create a 

pilot in command (PIC) position and 

whether the PIC should be given the 

power to deviate from FAA regulations 

in response to an in-flight emergency. 

For the reasons discussed below, this 

rule will remove the proposed 

crewmember position of ‘‘operator’’ and 

will instead create a new position of 

‘‘remote pilot in command.’’ The remote 

pilot in command will have the final 

authority and responsibility for the 

operation and safety of a small UAS 

operation conducted under part 107. 

Additionally, the remote pilot in 

command will be required to obtain a 

remote pilot certificate with a small 

UAS rating. However, an uncertificated 

person will be permitted to manipulate 

the flight controls of a small UAS as 

long as he or she is directly supervised 

by a remote pilot in command and the 

remote pilot in command has the ability 

to immediately take direct control of the 

small unmanned aircraft. Finally, in 

case of an in-flight emergency, the 

remote pilot in command will be 

permitted to deviate from any rule of 

part 107 to the extent necessary to meet 

that emergency. A remote pilot in 

command who exercises this emergency 

power to deviate from the rules of part 

107 will be required, upon FAA request, 

to send a written report to the FAA 

explaining the deviation. 

a. Terminology 

The NPRM proposed to create a new 

crewmember position called ‘‘operator,’’ 

which would be defined as a person 

who manipulates the flight controls of a 

small UAS. The NPRM also proposed to 

create a new airman certificate for the 

operator, which would be called an 

‘‘unmanned aircraft operator certificate 

with a small UAS rating.’’ The NPRM 

noted, however, that the term 

‘‘operator’’ is already used in mannedaircraft operations, and invited 

comments as to whether this term 

would cause confusion if used in part 

107. 

Several commenters noted that using 

the term ‘‘operator’’ in part 107 could 

result in confusion. NTSB, ALPA, and 

TTD pointed out that ‘‘operator’’ is 

currently used to refer to a business 

entity and that use of that term to refer 

to a small UAS pilot would be 

inconsistent with existing usage. 

Transport Canada and several other 

commenters stated that ICAO defines 

the person manipulating the flight 

controls of a small UAS as a ‘‘remote 

pilot’’ and asked the FAA to use this 

terminology in order to harmonize with 

ICAO. Transport Canada also noted that: 

(1) Canada uses the same terminology as 

ICAO; and (2) calling an airman 

certificate issued under part 107 an 

‘‘operator certificate’’ may lead to 

confusion with FAA regulations in part 

119, which allow a business entity to 

obtain an operating certificate to 

transport people and property. ALPA 

and TTD suggested that the person 

manipulating the controls of the small 

UAS should be referred to as a pilot, 

asserting that this would be consistent 

with how the word pilot has 

traditionally been used. 

As pointed out by the commenters, 

FAA regulations currently use the term 

‘‘commercial operator’’ to refer to a 

person, other than an air carrier, who 

engages in the transportation of persons 

or property for compensation or hire.66

Commercial operators are issued an 

‘‘operating certificate’’ under 14 CFR 

part 119.67 Because other FAA 

regulations already use the term 

‘‘operator’’ to refer to someone other 

than a small UAS pilot under part 107, 

the FAA agrees with commenters that 

use of the term ‘‘operator’’ in this rule 

could be confusing. 

In considering alternative terminology 

to replace the term ‘‘operator,’’ the FAA 

noted that ICAO 68 and the United 

Kingdom 69 both use the term ‘‘remote 

pilot’’ to refer to the person 

manipulating the flight controls of a 

small UAS. Additionally, as pointed out 

by Transport Canada, Canada also uses 

the term ‘‘remote pilot.’’ Accordingly, 

this rule will use the term ‘‘remote 

pilot’’ instead of ‘‘operator’’ in order to 

harmonize with international 

terminology. Consequently, the FAA has 

changed the name of the airman 

certificate issued under part 107 to a 

‘‘remote pilot certificate with a small 

UAS rating.’’ 

In addition, as discussed below, this 

rule will create a new crewmember 

position of ‘‘remote pilot in command.’’ 

The remote pilot in command will be a 

certificated airman and will have the 

final authority and responsibility for the 

operation and safety of a small UAS 

operation. Because the FAA anticipates 

that the remote pilot in command will 

often also be the person manipulating 

the flight controls of a small UAS, there 

is no need to have a separately defined 

crewmember position for the person 

manipulating the flight controls. 

Accordingly, the proposed definition of 

‘‘operator’’ has been removed from this 

rule. 

b. Remote Pilot in Command 

The current regulations of part 91 

create a separate PIC crewmember 

position that has ultimate authority and 

responsibility for the safety of the 

operation to: (1) Ensure that a single 

person on board the aircraft is 

accountable for the operation; and (2) 

provide that person with the authority 

to address issues affecting operational 

safety.70 The NPRM proposed to forego 

this type of position in part 107, but 

invited comments as to whether a 

separate ‘‘operator in command’’ 

position should be created for small 

UAS operations. 

Commenters including Aerius Flight, 

NetMoby, Predesa, and NRECA, 

generally agreed that a separate operator 

in command designation is not 

necessary for small UAS operations. 

NBAA commented that since small UAS 

operations will largely be excluded from 

airspace covered by traditional 

definitions of ‘‘operator’’ and ‘‘pilot,’’ 

there is no need to create a separate 

operator in command position for part 

107 operations. 

Other commenters requested that the 

FAA include a separate ‘‘operator in 

command’’ position in the final rule 

similar to the PIC position used in 

manned-aircraft operations. The 

University of North Dakota’s John D. 

Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences 

pointed out that due to a wide variety 

of system configurations available for 

small UAS, it is possible that one or 

more flight crew members or sensor 

stations may affect the flight path of the 

unmanned aircraft. Accordingly, the 

commenter recommended that the term 

operator-in-command be added and 

defined in the rule to reflect the final 

authority and responsibility for the 

operation and safety of the flight. 


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ArgenTech Solutions, Inc. also 

recommended the rule address the title 

of operator-in-command and specify the 

requirements for operator hand-off of 

small UAS. Similarly, the Kansas State 

University UAS Program recommended 

clarification of responsibility in regard 

to operations with multiple operators 

and noted that creation of an operatorin-command designation would be an 

appropriate clarification. 

As discussed below, this rule will 

allow small UAS to be operated by more 

than one person for purposes such as 

instruction or crew augmentation. As 

such, the FAA agrees that there needs to 

be a designated crewmember who is 

responsible for the safe operation of a 

small UAS and has final authority over 

that operation. Thus, this rule will 

create a new crewmember position of 

remote pilot in command. 

Just as with manned-aircraft PICs, the 

remote pilot in command: (1) Must be 

designated as remote pilot in command 

before or during the flight; and (2) will 

have the final authority and 

responsibility for the operation. In light 

of this change, the FAA has amended 

the regulatory text of part 107 to transfer 

the duties that the NPRM proposed to 

impose on the operator to the remote 

pilot in command and, where 

appropriate, to the person manipulating 

the flight controls of the small UAS. The 

remote pilot in command will also be 

generally responsible for ensuring that 

the small UAS operation complies with 

all applicable FAA regulations. 

Turning to the comments about 

operator hand-off, a person 

manipulating the flight controls of a 

small UAS may be augmented by 

another person during operation. 

Specifically, the person manipulating 

the flight controls may safely transfer 

the controls to another person during 

flight as long as the transfer does not 

violate the operational provisions of 

part 107 and a remote pilot in command 

is designated. For example, the flight 

controls of a small UAS may not be 

transferred if the process of transferring 

the controls would cause the unmanned 

aircraft to enter Class B airspace without 

ATC permission. 

The FAA emphasizes that, as 

discussed in section III.E.2.a of this 

preamble, at any point throughout the 

entire flight of the small unmanned 

aircraft, the remote pilot in command 

and the person manipulating the flight 

controls of the small UAS must both 

have the ability to see the small 

unmanned aircraft unaided by any 

device other than corrective lenses. 

Therefore, the person manipulating the 

flight controls must be able to see the 

small unmanned aircraft at the time of 

the handoff sufficiently well to satisfy 

the visual-line-of-sight requirements of 

this rule. The FAA also emphasizes that 

§ 107.19(c) requires the remote pilot in 

command to ensure that the small 

unmanned aircraft will not pose an 

undue hazard to other aircraft, people, 

or property on the ground if positive 

control is lost. Thus, the remote pilot in 

command must ensure that the 

technology and method used for 

conducting the handoff does not unduly 

increase the risk associated with a 

possible loss of positive control. 

c. Airman Certification Requirement 

The NPRM proposed to require that 

each person manipulating the flight 

controls of a small UAS obtain a part 

107 airman certificate. The FAA’s 

statute requires a person serving as an 

airman to obtain an airman certificate. 

Because the person manipulating the 

flight controls of a small UAS would be 

an airman under the crewmember 

framework proposed in the NPRM, that 

person would statutorily be required to 

obtain an airman certificate. The NPRM 

also proposed to create a new airman 

certificate to be issued for small UAS 

operations in place of the existing part 

61 pilot certificates that focus on 

manned-aircraft operations. 

Many commenters, including Air 

Tractor, Inc., Ag Info Tech, LLC, and the 

American Fuel & Petrochemicals 

Manufacturers, supported the proposal 

to require the person manipulating the 

flight controls of a small UAS to obtain 

a part 107 airman certificate. 

Commenters generally supported this 

provision because it was viewed as an 

economical means to achieve the rule’s 

safety objective. Commenters including 

Modovolate and the National 

Association of Broadcasters stated the 

proposed approach of adding a new 

category of airmen provides a good 

balance with the need to verify operator 

qualifications without unduly 

burdening the operators. 

Several commenters disagreed with 

the proposed airman certification 

requirement. Airship Technologies 

argued that an airman certificate is 

unnecessary to operate a small UAS and 

asserted that the proposed regulatory 

framework is too complex, costly, and 

burdensome for both the public and the 

FAA. Airship Technologies suggested 

that the operator should instead depend 

upon the product manufacturer’s 

training in the form of classes and 

documented materials. Another 

commenter asserted that processing 

certificate applications will create a 

backlog for the FAA. Yet another 

commenter suggested a self-certification 

procedure in lieu of a required airman 

certificate asserting that the proposed 

certificate would offer little benefit to 

the operators or the NAS. 

Commenters from the educational and 

academic community, including 

Princeton University and the Council on 

Government Relations, suggested that a 

remote-pilot-in-command position 

should allow a faculty member acting as 

a remote pilot in command to oversee 

student operators utilizing small UAS as 

part of a course or research activity. 

Princeton University expressed concern 

over requiring the person manipulating 

the flight controls of a small UAS to 

hold an airman certificate, citing 

complications in the academic 

environment. Princeton provided 

scenarios where students would use a 

small UAS in projects as part of their 

academic courses and the challenges 

involved in obtaining an operator 

certificate prior to testing their project. 

To resolve these concerns, Princeton 

recommended that universities be able 

to obtain an ‘‘Educational UAS 

License,’’ which would give them the 

authority to designate an ‘‘Operator-inCommand’’ and administer the 

knowledge test to appropriate faculty 

and staff. 

The FAA agrees with the majority of 

comments that an airman certificate to 

operate a small UAS should be required 

unless directly supervised by a remote 

pilot in command. This is in fact a 

statutory requirement, as 49 U.S.C. 

44711(a)(2)(A) prohibits a person from 

serving in any capacity as an airman 

with respect to a civil aircraft used or 

intended to be used in air commerce 

‘‘without an airman certificate 

authorizing the airman to serve in the 

capacity for which the certificate was 

issued.’’ The FAA’s statute defines an 

airman to include an individual ‘‘in 

command, or as pilot, mechanic, or 

member of the crew, who navigates 

aircraft when under way.’’ 49 U.S.C. 

40102(a)(8)(A). Because the remote pilot 

in command and the person 

manipulating the flight controls of a 

small UAS without supervision are both 

pilots and members of the crew who 

navigate the small unmanned aircraft 

when it is under way, these 

crewmembers are statutorily required to 

have an airman certificate. The FAA 

therefore maintains the requirement that 

a person manipulating the flight 

controls of a small UAS without 

supervision must obtain a remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating and 

this rule will also extend this 

requirement to the remote pilot in 

command. 

However, the FAA acknowledges the 

educational concerns that have been 

raised by the academic commenters and 


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notes that in the manned-aircraft 

context, an uncertificated person can 

manipulate the flight controls of an 

aircraft in flight as long as he or she is 

directly supervised. An individual 

whose manipulation of the flight 

controls is closely supervised by a 

certificated airman is not in command 

and is not a pilot or member of the crew 

because his or her presence is not 

necessary to fly the aircraft. Instead, the 

certificated airman who is providing the 

supervision is exercising the judgment 

that is normally expected of a pilot and 

that airman could simply fly the aircraft 

by him or herself instead. Thus, an 

individual who is directly supervised by 

a certificated airman is not an ‘‘airman’’ 

within the meaning of section 

40102(a)(8)(A) and is therefore not 

statutorily required to obtain an airman 

certificate. 

To further enable the educational 

opportunities identified by the 

commenters, this rule will allow the 

remote pilot in command (who will be 

a certificated airman) to supervise 

another person’s manipulation of a 

small UAS’s flight controls. A person 

who receives this type of supervision 

from the remote pilot in command will 

not be required to obtain a remote pilot 

certificate to manipulate the controls of 

a small UAS as long as the remote pilot 

in command possesses the ability to 

immediately take direct control of the 

small unmanned aircraft. This ability is 

necessary to ensure that the remote pilot 

in command can quickly address any 

mistakes that are made by an 

uncertificated person operating the 

flight controls before those mistakes 

create a safety hazard. 

The ability for the remote pilot in 

command to immediately take over the 

flight controls could be achieved by 

using a number of different methods. 

For example, the operation could 

involve a ‘‘buddy box’’ type system that 

uses two control stations: One for the 

person manipulating the flight controls 

and one for the remote pilot in 

command that allows the remote pilot 

in command to override the other 

control station and immediately take 

direct control of the small unmanned 

aircraft. Another method could involve 

the remote pilot in command standing 

close enough to the person 

manipulating the flight controls so as to 

be able to physically take over the 

control station from the other person. A 

third method could employ the use of 

an automation system whereby the 

remote pilot in command could 

immediately engage that system to put 

the small unmanned aircraft in a preprogrammed ‘‘safe’’ mode (such as in a 

hover, in a holding pattern, or ‘‘return 

home’’). 

The FAA also emphasizes that, as 

discussed in section III.E.3.b.ii of this 

preamble, part 107 will not allow a 

person to act as a remote pilot in 

command in the operation of more than 

one small unmanned aircraft at the same 

time. In the educational context, this 

means that a faculty member who is 

acting as a remote pilot in command 

could not directly supervise the 

simultaneous operation of more than 

one small unmanned aircraft. The 

faculty member could, however, instruct 

a class of students in a manner that does 

not involve the simultaneous operation 

of multiple small unmanned aircraft. 

For example, a class of students could 

operate a single small unmanned 

aircraft with students passing control of 

the aircraft to each other under the 

supervision of a faculty member who is 

a remote pilot in command. An 

academic institution could also require 

a certain number of students to obtain 

a remote pilot certificate prior to 

beginning a class involving small UAS 

use in order to increase the number of 

people who would be available to act as 

a remote pilot in command. 

Several commenters, including the 

Utah Governor’s Office of Economic 

Development and Textron Systems, 

expressed the view that there should be 

different small UAS certifications for 

different altitudes, locations, aircraft 

sizes, and applications. 

The FAA recognizes there are 

differences between the various small 

UAS operations as articulated by the 

commenters. However, the key 

knowledge areas that will be tested on 

the initial and recurrent knowledge tests 

will be applicable to all small UAS 

operations that could be conducted 

under part 107 regardless of the altitude, 

location, size, or application of the 

small UAS. Requiring only a single 

remote pilot certificate with a small 

UAS rating will give the remote pilot in 

command the flexibility to operate 

various small UAS within the 

parameters permitted by part 107 

without any additional FAA-required 

training or testing. 

Many commenters, including ALPA, 

NAAA, and TTD, argued that small UAS 

operators should be required to have a 

part 61 pilot certificate to operate in the 

NAS. These commenters remarked that 

operating in the NAS is a great 

responsibility, and that all persons 

operating in the NAS should be aware 

of these responsibilities. 

ALPA, TTD, Schertz Aerial Services, 

Inc., and many other commenters 

recommended that the FAA require a 

part 61 commercial pilot certificate. 

TTD stated that the standards put in 

place must ensure one level of safety for 

all who operate in the NAS, and if small 

UAS operators are operating for 

compensation or hire in shared airspace 

with manned aircraft, then they too 

should hold a commercial pilot 

certificate. Schertz Aerial Services 

added that small UAS pose a risk of 

collision or interference with manned 

aircraft and that UAS operators are not 

putting their own life at risk when 

flying. Schertz Aerial Services argued 

that the FAA should not carve out 

exceptions to the well-established 

requirement of commercial airman 

certificates for commercial operations. 

NAAA and several other commenters 

suggested that, in place of a part 61 

commercial pilot certificate, the FAA 

should require small UAS pilots to hold 

a part 61 private pilot certificate. NAAA 

stated that this position is a change from 

its section 333 exemption comments. 

After further analysis NAAA 

determined that requiring a commercial 

pilot certificate is not necessary and a 

private pilot certificate with a UAS 

knowledge and skills test rating would 

be sufficient to operate a UAS safely. 

Another commenter asserted that a UAS 

pilot should be required to have a part 

61 student pilot certificate. 

Many other commenters, including 

AIA, AOPA, and the National 

Association of Realtors, supported 

having a separate part 107 airman 

certificate. Commenters including the 

National Association of Wheat Growers, 

and the American Fuel & 

Petrochemicals Association stated that 

requiring a part 61 pilot certificate 

would be overly burdensome and 

pointed out that many of the knowledge 

areas and skills required for manned 

aircraft do not apply to the operation of 

unmanned aircraft. 

The FAA agrees with the commenters 

who pointed out that the skills 

necessary to obtain a part 61 pilot 

certificate would not equip the remote 

pilot in command with all of the 

aeronautical skills necessary to safely 

operate a small UAS and would instead 

impose a significant cost burden 

without a corresponding safety benefit. 

Specifically, manned-aircraft training 

may not prepare a pilot to deal with 

UAS-specific issues such as how to 

maintain visual line of sight of the 

unmanned aircraft or how to respond 

when signal to the unmanned aircraft is 

lost. 

Required training for a part 61 pilot 

certificate would, however, impose the 

burden of training on areas of 

knowledge that are inapplicable to small 

UAS operations. For example, unlike a 

manned-aircraft pilot, a remote pilot in 


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42090 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 28, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

71Administrator v. Pirker, at 4–5, 8–12. A copy 

of the Pirker decision can be found at: http://

www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/OnODocuments/Aviation/

5730.pdf. 

72Administrator v. Barrows, 7 NTSB 5, 8–9 

(1990). 

73http://www.faa.gov/licenses_certificates/

airmen_certification/change_releasability/. 

command does not need to know how 

to operate the flight controls of a 

manned aircraft. Similarly, the remote 

pilot in command does not need to be 

able to takeoff, land, or maneuver a 

manned aircraft. While these skills are 

critical to the safe operation of manned 

aircraft and are thus required for a part 

61 pilot certificate, they are not 

typically necessary for the safe 

operation of a small UAS. Because 

requiring a part 61 pilot certificate 

would not ensure that certificate 

applicants learn all areas of knowledge 

specific to small UAS operations while 

at the same time requiring those 

applicants to learn areas of knowledge 

that are not necessary to safely operate 

a small UAS, this rule will not require 

a remote pilot in command to obtain a 

part 61 pilot certificate. 

Several commenters stated that 

despite the language of 49 U.S.C. 

44711(a)(2)(A), the FAA should not 

require an airman certificate for small 

UAS operations conducted in rural 

areas on private property, and at low 

altitudes. One commenter stated that 

there is no statutory or regulatory 

requirement that a small UAS operator 

must be an airman given that part 103 

operators need not have an airman 

certificate yet they fly in the NAS. 

Another commenter stated that the FAA 

was overly broad in its definitions of 

aircraft and air commerce. The 

commenter claimed the proposal 

ignored the flexibility FAA exercised in 

creating the regulations of 14 CFR part 

101 regulating amateur rockets, kites, 

and unmanned free balloons. The 

commenter added that current part 101 

regulations for these devices are safetybased and they appropriately make no 

artificial distinction between 

commercial and non-commercial use. 

Several other commenters disagreed 

with the proposed certificate 

requirements, claiming they should not 

be applicable to hobbyists. 

In response to the comment arguing 

that the FAA was overly broad in its 

definitions of aircraft and air commerce, 

the FAA notes that both terms are 

defined by statute. As discussed earlier, 

the NTSB has held that the statutory 

definition of ‘‘aircraft’’ is ‘‘clear on [its] 

face’’ and that definition encompasses 

UAS.71 The NTSB has also held that, 

based on the statutory definition of air 

commerce, ‘‘any use of an aircraft for 

purpose of flight constitutes air 

commerce.’’ 72

Turning to the comments arguing that 

certain UAS operations should be 

exempt from airman certification, as 

discussed earlier, it is a statutory 

requirement, under 49 U.S.C. 

44711(a)(2)(A), that a person may not 

serve as an airman with respect to a 

civil aircraft used or intended to be used 

in air commerce without an airman 

certificate. The statute does not 

distinguish between different types of 

operations, such as those suggested by 

the commenters. Accordingly, 

regardless of where and how a small 

UAS operation is conducted, this rule 

will require the person manipulating the 

flight controls of a small UAS to hold 

a remote pilot certificate unless he or 

she is directly supervised by a 

certificated remote pilot in command 

who has the ability to immediately take 

direct control of the small unmanned 

aircraft. However, as discussed in 

section III.C.4 of this preamble, 

operations of model aircraft as a hobby 

or for recreational use under the 

provisions of section 336 will not be 

subject to part 107. With regard to parts 

101 and 103, those regulations are 

beyond the scope of this rule. 

The Flight School Association of 

North America and Event 38 Unmanned 

Systems suggested that the airman 

certificate should include the operator’s 

information and a color photo. Under 

this rule, the FAA will issue the same 

type of pilot certificate for the remote 

pilot in command as it does for all other 

airmen. The airman’s specific 

information will be listed along with the 

date of issuance. At this time, the FAA 

does not issue airman certificates with 

a photo; however the FAA is addressing 

that issue through a separate rulemaking 

effort. 

Event 38 Unmanned Systems 

suggested that the FAA create a database 

of registered airmen, but limit 

accessibility to FAA and law 

enforcement. NetMoby suggested 

allowing the public to access the 

database so they may confirm a person 

flying a small UAS in their vicinity is 

authorized to do so and assist in 

enforcement. Additionally, NetMoby 

suggested that the FAA use the current 

airman certificate database as the 

template for its suggested database. 

The FAA currently maintains an 

airman certification database that 

permits the public to search or 

download through its public Web site. 

This information includes name, 

address, and certificates and ratings 

held by the certificate holder. The 

agency will issue remote pilot 

certificates in accordance with its 

existing processes for issuing airman 

certificates and the public will be able 

to search the airman certification 

database for those who hold a remote 

pilot certificate. The certificate holder 

may opt to request their address not be 

published on the public Web site.73

The University of North Dakota John 

D. Odegard School of Aerospace 

Sciences recommended that the FAA 

remove the ‘‘small UAS rating’’ from a 

part 107 airman certificate. The 

commenter stated that an additional 

small UAS rating is redundant because 

part 107 will apply only to small UAS 

operations. 

As discussed in section III.A of this 

preamble, this rule is only one step of 

the FAA’s broader effort to fully 

integrate all UAS operations into the 

NAS. Future agency actions are 

anticipated to integrate larger and more 

complex UAS operations into the NAS 

and integrating those operations may 

require the creation of additional UASspecific airman certificate ratings. To 

accommodate these future actions, the 

FAA will retain the small UAS rating. 

Textron Systems recommended 

establishing a small UAS certificate 

with appropriate category ratings (e.g., 

rotorcraft or airplane) which would 

require documentation of aeronautical 

experience and a practical test prior to 

issuance. Textron stated the skills and 

knowledge required to operate 

unmanned rotorcraft and unmanned 

airplanes are substantially different 

during launch, semi-autonomous 

missions, and recovery, and therefore 

there should be a difference indicated 

on the certificate. 

The category and class designations 

used for part 61 pilot certificates stem 

from the airworthiness certification 

designations given on the type 

certificate data sheet (TCDS) when an 

aircraft type becomes certificated. The 

TCDS identifies the airworthiness 

standards that a specific aircraft has met 

as those standards differ for different 

types of aircraft. However, as discussed 

in section III.J.3 of this preamble, small 

UAS operating under part 107 will not 

be required to obtain an airworthiness 

certificate. As such, there will be no 

airworthiness standards or a TCDS that 

will be issued for every small UAS 

design, and a category designation 

would not be workable under part 107. 

One commenter recommended that 

the FAA require that the remote pilot 

certificate be displayed on a name 

badge, lanyard, or armband during a 

small UAS operation in case the remote 

pilot in command is approached or 

questioned about authorization for the 

activity. 


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74 14 CFR 91.3(b). 

75 Id. § 91.3(b). 

76Letter to George K. Shaefer from Donald Byrne, 

Assistant Chief Counsel, Regulations Division 

(April 16, 1993). 

The FAA emphasizes that 

§ 107.7(a)(1) will require the remote 

pilot certificate holder to, upon request, 

make his or her remote pilot certificate 

available to the Administrator. This rule 

will not specify the method by which 

the certificate holder stores and displays 

his or her certificate, but whatever 

method is used, the certificate holder 

must provide the certificate to the FAA 

upon request. 

d. Emergency Powers of a Remote Pilot 

in Command 

In case of an in-flight emergency, the 

existing regulations in 14 CFR 91.3 give 

a PIC the power to deviate from the 

applicable FAA regulations to the extent 

necessary to respond to that 

emergency.74 A PIC who exercises this 

power must provide a written report of 

the deviation to the FAA if requested to 

do so by the agency.75 The NPRM 

proposed to not provide emergency 

powers to a small UAS operator because 

a small unmanned aircraft is highly 

maneuverable and much easier to land 

than a manned aircraft. Thus, the NPRM 

posited that in an emergency situation, 

an operator should be able to promptly 

land the small unmanned aircraft 

without needing to deviate from any 

part 107 regulations. The NPRM invited 

comments as to whether a small UAS 

remote pilot in command should be 

permitted to exercise emergency powers 

similar to those available to a PIC under 

§ 91.3. 

Several commenters including 

AUVSI, AIA, and Trimble Navigation, 

supported allowing small UAS 

operators to exercise emergency powers 

in certain circumstances. Prioria 

provided examples where a small UAS 

may need to violate the proposed 500- 

foot altitude limit and the visual-line-ofsight requirement in order to avoid a 

collision with a manned aircraft or 

remove an uncontrollable small 

unmanned aircraft from the NAS. 

Another commenter provided an 

example of a situation where the only 

viable option to prevent a mid-air 

collision would violate the prohibition 

on operations over people (as a result of 

any lateral movement by the UAS) or 

the various operational restrictions in 

§ 107.51 (as a result of any vertical 

movement by the UAS). The Permanent 

Editorial Board of the Aviators Model 

Code of Conduct Initiative noted that 

there are scenarios where unauthorized 

small UAS penetration of controlled 

airspace may be required to avoid an 

accident, and proposed that the FAA 

authorize small UAS operators to 

penetrate controlled airspace to the 

extent necessary to avoid (at least) 

personal injury or death. 

One commenter said small UAS 

operators should be permitted to 

exercise emergency powers, but only to 

prevent serious injury, death, or a midair collision. Southern Company and 

Trimble recommended permitting UAS 

operators to deviate from FAA 

regulations in emergencies to mitigate 

injury, damage, or risk. Southern 

Company argued that by not extending 

emergency deviation authority to UAS 

operators, the FAA could be forcing a 

UAS operator to choose between 

deviating from FAA regulations and 

ensuring safety. 

Several commenters, including 

Skycatch, Clayco, and AUVSI, 

specifically recommended revising 

proposed § 107.19 to be consistent with 

14 CFR 91.3—i.e., allow an operator to 

deviate from any rule of part 107 to the 

extent required in an emergency 

requiring immediate action, and require, 

upon the request of the Administrator, 

the operator to submit a written report 

of that deviation. Textron Systems said 

that 14 CFR 91.3 should apply to UAS, 

because an unmanned aircraft is 

considered an aircraft according to 49 

U.S.C. 40102(a)(6). AIA said the 

provisions and intent of § 91.3 should 

apply to UAS. 

Conversely, NBAA, Predesa, 

Planehook, and another commenter 

supported the FAA’s proposal not to 

provide a remote pilot with the 

emergency powers available to a PIC 

under § 91.3(b). NBAA and Predesa 

concurred with the FAA’s proposal but 

did not provide any additional 

justification. Planehook cited Articles 

28 and 8 of the Convention on 

International Civil Aviation, which the 

commenter said creates the basis for 

nations to grant emergency powers to 

the PIC of an aircraft in distress, and 

Article 8, which the commenter said 

states that each contracting State 

undertakes to ensure that the flight of 

such aircraft without a pilot in regions 

open to civil aircraft shall be controlled 

so as to obviate danger to civil aircraft. 

Planehook contended that the granting 

of emergency powers to operators of 

unmanned aircraft would violate this 

existing international agreement. One 

commenter argued that until UAS are 

able to communicate, operate accurately 

in controlled airspace, follow in-flight 

restrictions and spacing requirements, 

and fly specific altitudes and routes, 

emergency powers are unnecessary. 

The FAA agrees with the commenters 

who pointed out that there are 

emergency scenarios in which a remote 

pilot may need to deviate from certain 

provisions of part 107, such as altitude 

and visual line of sight, to avoid an 

unexpected and unforeseen collision 

with a manned aircraft or a person on 

the ground. The FAA also agrees that in 

certain emergency situations it may be 

safer to deviate from one or more 

operational requirements of part 107 

(e.g., regarding altitude or controlled 

airspace) than attempt to land the small 

unmanned aircraft immediately. For 

example, if a manned aircraft 

approaches the small unmanned aircraft 

from below, the small unmanned 

aircraft may be unable to immediately 

descend and land without risking a 

collision. 

Accordingly, during an in-flight 

emergency, this rule will allow the 

remote pilot in command to deviate 

from the provisions of part 107 to the 

extent necessary to respond to that 

emergency. As the FAA previously 

pointed out with regard to its emergency 

regulations, ‘‘the plain-meaning 

dictionary definition of an emergency is 

an unexpected and unforeseen serious 

occurrence or situation that requires 

urgent, prompt action.’’ 76 Just as it does 

with other FAA regulations, this plain 

meaning will govern the agency’s 

understanding of what constitutes an 

emergency for part 107 purposes. 

Additionally, because part 107 will 

allow a deviation only during an inflight emergency, this deviation cannot 

be taken for situations that were 

expected or foreseen prior to the takeoff 

of the small unmanned aircraft. If a 

remote pilot in command expects or 

foresees an emergency situation prior to 

aircraft takeoff, then the remote pilot in 

command must delay or cancel takeoff 

or otherwise alter the parameters of the 

operation to the extent necessary to 

ensure full compliance with part 107. 

The FAA also emphasizes that the 

remote pilot in command must always 

prioritize the safety of human life above 

all other considerations. As such, the 

remote pilot in command may not 

endanger human life in order to save the 

small unmanned aircraft. To the 

contrary, the remote pilot in command 

is expected to sacrifice the small 

unmanned aircraft if it begins to pose a 

danger to human life. 

The FAA further agrees with (and has 

included in this rule) the 

recommendation that, just like § 91.3, 

the remote pilot in command must, 

upon FAA request, submit a report to 

the FAA if he or she has exercised his 

or her emergency powers. This report 

must provide a detailed explanation of 


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77For the purposes of this rule, references to 

‘‘part 61 pilot certificate holders’’ specifically refer 

to holders of pilot certificates other than student 

pilot certificates, which include sport pilot, 

recreational pilot, private pilot, commercial pilot 

and air transport pilot certificates. 

78See, e.g., 14 CFR 91.3, 121.557, 121.559, 

135.19. 

what happened. This requirement will 

enable FAA oversight over the exercise 

of emergency powers by giving the 

agency a method to better understand 

the circumstances and reasons that an 

individual remote pilot in command 

had for deviating from part 107. 

The FAA disagrees with the comment 

arguing that granting emergency powers 

to a remote pilot in command would 

violate U.S. international obligations. 

The FAA notes that Article 28 of the 

Convention of International Civil 

Aviation, which was the provision cited 

by the commenter, does not address the 

granting of emergency powers to remote 

pilots of unmanned aircraft. Article 8 of 

that Convention, which governs 

‘‘Pilotless aircraft,’’ states that: 

‘‘No aircraft capable of being flown 

without a pilot shall be flown without 

a pilot over the territory of a contracting 

State without special authorization by 

that State and in accordance with the 

terms of such authorization. Each 

contracting State undertakes to insure 

that the flight of such aircraft without a 

pilot in regions open to civil aircraft 

shall be so controlled as to obviate 

danger to civil aircraft.’’ 

The plain language of Article 8 does 

not prohibit a contracting State from 

giving emergency powers to a remote 

pilot in command operating within that 

State. Because neither Article 8 nor any 

other provision of the Convention of 

International Civil Aviation prohibits 

the granting of emergency powers to a 

remote pilot in command, this approach 

will not violate U.S. international 

obligations. 

Several commenters addressed the 

issue of proper emergency training for 

small UAS operators. One commenter 

said that if small UAS operators have 

passed a reasonable operator license 

exam, they can indeed be trusted to 

behave well in an emergency situation. 

The NJIT Working Group said that 

remote pilots need to be properly 

trained so they will better understand 

what constitutes an emergency. Pointing 

to the NPRM’s discussion of training 

small UAS pilots on emergency 

procedures, ALPA concurred with the 

need for training and recommended it 

include considerations in the exercise of 

emergency authority, however remote 

the likelihood of emergency may be. 

The FAA concurs with commenters’ 

points that small UAS pilots must be 

proficient in emergency procedures and 

the proper exercise of emergency 

authority. That is why, as discussed in 

section III.F.2.j of this preamble, 

emergency procedures and emergency 

authority will be tested on the initial 

and recurrent knowledge tests. Thus, in 

order to pass an initial knowledge test 

and obtain a remote pilot certificate, 

applicants for a remote pilot certificate 

will need to acquire proficiency in these 

areas of knowledge. UAS-specific 

exercises of emergency procedures and 

authority will also be included in the 

training course that part 61 pilot 

certificate 77 holders will be able to take 

instead of the initial and recurrent 

knowledge tests. 

One commenter recommended that 

the FAA conduct further analysis before 

providing a small UAS pilot with 

emergency powers in the final rule. The 

FAA disagrees. Emergency powers have 

been a longstanding feature in FAA 

regulations without an adverse effect on 

safety because they allow the PIC to 

respond to an emergency situation in a 

context-specific manner.78 As discussed 

earlier in this section, deviating from 

certain operational requirements may, at 

times, be unavoidable in order to 

minimize risk to other people. 

Two commenters suggested that the 

FAA prescribe specific methods to 

respond to an emergency situation. One 

commenter stated that lost link is an 

emergency and should be declared to 

ATC or on Unicom to notify other air 

traffic. Another commenter similarly 

said small UAS operators should be 

required to send out a distress signal to 

aircraft within the vicinity if there is 

signal loss or other operational failures. 

The FAA does not mandate a specific 

response to an emergency, as the safest 

response to an emergency situation may 

vary based on the surrounding context. 

For example, the safest response to an 

emergency situation in a rural area may 

differ from the safest response to the 

same situation in an urban area. As 

such, the FAA will not limit the remote 

pilot in command’s ability to respond to 

an emergency situation in a contextappropriate manner. Rather, a remote 

pilot in command is permitted to 

respond as necessary to resolve the 

urgent situation. There is neither a 

requirement nor a prohibition from 

declaring an emergency, either by radio 

communication or by other means, if 

doing so is appropriate under the 

circumstances. For example, in a lostlink scenario, the remote pilot in 

command may declare an emergency if 

it appears that the small unmanned 

aircraft may hit a person on the ground. 

Conversely, lost link may not be an 

emergency if there are no people or 

manned aircraft near the area of 

operation. 

The FAA also disagrees with the 

commenter who suggested that the 

remote pilot in command must be 

required to send out a distress signal if 

there is signal loss or other operational 

failures. Due to the limited operational 

capabilities of small UAS, an operation 

failure or signal loss may not necessarily 

constitute a hazard to persons or 

property. 

2. See-and-Avoid and Visibility 

Requirements 

To ensure that the person piloting the 

small UAS can safely see and avoid 

other aircraft and people and property 

on the ground, the NPRM proposed that 

small unmanned aircraft: (1) May only 

be operated within visual line of sight; 

(2) must yield right of way to all other 

aircraft; (3) may only be operated 

between the hours of sunrise and 

sunset; and (4) must meet minimum 

weather and visibility requirements. 

a. Visual Line of Sight 

Currently, 14 CFR 91.113(b) imposes 

a generally applicable requirement that, 

during flight, ‘‘vigilance shall be 

maintained by each person operating an 

aircraft so as to see and avoid other 

aircraft.’’ This see-and-avoid 

requirement is at the heart of the FAA’s 

regulatory structure, mitigating the risk 

of aircraft colliding in midair. This 

requirement is currently satisfied in 

manned-aircraft operations by a pilot on 

board the manned aircraft looking out 

from inside the aircraft to see whether 

other aircraft are on a collision course 

with the pilot’s aircraft. However, the 

person controlling the small UAS 

cannot see other aircraft in the same 

manner because he or she is not inside 

the aircraft. That is why Public Law 

112–95, section 333(b)(1) requires the 

FAA to consider, as a critical factor in 

this rulemaking, whether a small UAS 

operation is conducted ‘‘within visual 

line of sight.’’ 

To address this issue, the NPRM 

proposed that the operator of the small 

UAS must always be capable of 

maintaining visual line of sight of the 

small unmanned aircraft unaided by any 

technology other than glasses or contact 

lenses. The NPRM also proposed 

creating a new position of visual 

observer to assist the operator in 

maintaining visual line of sight. Under 

that proposal, if a visual observer is 

used in the operation, then the visual 

observer could watch the small 

unmanned aircraft instead of the 

operator. However, if a visual observer 

was not used in the operation, then the 

operator would have to exercise his or 


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her visual-line-of-sight capability to 

watch the small unmanned aircraft. 

As proposed in the NPRM, the 

operator or visual observer would have 

to be able to see the small unmanned 

aircraft throughout the entire flight in 

order to: (1) Know the unmanned 

aircraft’s location; (2) determine the 

unmanned aircraft’s attitude, altitude, 

and direction; (3) observe the airspace 

for other air traffic or hazards; and (4) 

determine that the unmanned aircraft 

does not endanger the life or property of 

another. The NPRM also proposed that 

even if a visual observer is used, at all 

times during flight, the small unmanned 

aircraft must remain close enough to the 

operator for the operator to be capable 

of seeing the aircraft with vision 

unaided by any device other than 

corrective lenses. 

For the reasons discussed below, this 

rule will make three changes to the 

NPRM visual-line-of-sight framework 

but will otherwise finalize it as 

proposed. First, because of the change 

in the small UAS crewmember 

framework (discussed in the previous 

section of this preamble), this rule will 

replace the operator with the person 

manipulating the flight controls of the 

small UAS and the remote pilot in 

command, who in many instances will 

be the same person. Second, this rule 

will make clarifying amendments to the 

regulatory text. Third, this rule will 

make the visual-line-of-sight 

requirement waivable. 

A number of commenters expressed 

concern about whether the visual-lineof-sight framework proposed in the 

NPRM would sufficiently mitigate risk. 

Foxtrot Consulting, the Air Medical 

Operators Association, the Professional 

Helicopter Pilots Association, and 

several individuals asserted that the 

unaided human eye is not adequate to 

see and avoid other aircraft. 

Additionally, these commenters argued 

that the small unmanned aircraft will be 

too small to be seen by a mannedaircraft pilot, and, with no lighting 

requirement, the unmanned aircraft may 

be all but invisible, particularly in 

minimum visual-flight-rules (VFR) 

conditions. 

Similarly, commenters, including 

A4A and several individuals, 

questioned whether small UAS remote 

pilots would be capable of perceiving 

potential conflicts and responsibly 

complying with the principle of ‘‘see 

and avoid.’’ These commenters asserted 

that since small UAS are unmanned, 

they are inherently unable to comply 

with current ‘‘see and avoid’’ 

requirements of 14 CFR 91.113(b) in 

visual flight conditions. The 

commenters argued that a remote pilot 

may not have sufficient perceptual 

accuracy to determine whether or not a 

small unmanned aircraft is on a 

collision course with another aircraft. 

The Human Factors and Ergonomics 

Society suggested that the FAA conduct 

a systematic, scientific study of factors 

that affect an observer’s ability to 

estimate altitude and airspeed. A joint 

comment from Skycatch, Clayco, 

AECOM, and DPR Construction 

suggested that rather than relying 

merely on an operator’s eyesight, the 

FAA should employ a risk-based 

approach to allowing operations. 

The FAA recognizes that one of the 

issues with small UAS is that a person 

on the ground cannot see and avoid 

other aircraft in the same manner as a 

pilot who is inside a manned aircraft. 

The FAA also agrees that due to relative 

size of aircraft, a remote pilot will most 

likely be able to see and avoid a manned 

aircraft before the manned-aircraft pilot 

will see the small UAS. This issue is not 

unique to small UAS; manned vehicles 

currently in the NAS range from a few 

hundred pounds to 1.4 million pounds 

and pilots have similar challenges 

regarding see-and-avoid. The FAA has 

mitigated the risk in this rule through 

operational parameters that reduce the 

risk of a midair collision. Because of the 

limits on their access to airspace that is 

controlled or at higher altitudes, small 

unmanned aircraft will avoid busy flight 

paths and are unlikely to encounter 

high-speed aircraft that would be 

difficult for the remote pilot to see-andavoid. Additionally, as discussed below, 

this rule will also specify minimum 

requirements for weather and visibility 

to maximize the remote pilot’s ability to 

see incoming manned aircraft and avoid 

a collision with those aircraft. 

The FAA disagrees with the notion 

that remote pilots operating under the 

visual-line-of-sight framework of this 

rule will be incapable of perceiving 

potential conflicts with other aircraft. In 

many cases, the remote pilot’s 

perspective from the ground may be 

better than the perspective of a pilot 

onboard an aircraft because the remote 

pilot is not confined to a cockpit with 

vision obscured by the fuselage or flight 

control surfaces. The remote pilot is 

thus able to observe airspace 360° 

around the unmanned aircraft, 

including airspace above and below. 

Thus, the person maintaining visual line 

of sight will be able to see potential 

conflicts with manned aircraft. 

Furthermore, as discussed below, this 

rule will require the small unmanned 

aircraft to always yield the right of way 

to other users of the NAS. 

Several commenters, including the 

News Media Coalition, NAMIC, and 

Drone Labs, LLC objected to the 

proposed limitation that visual line of 

sight must be maintained unaided by 

any technology other than corrective 

lenses. These commenters suggested 

that the rule allow the use of firstperson-view (FPV) technology, arguing 

that available technologies have 

advanced to the point that operators can 

use FPV to meet or exceed the visualline-of-sight requirements proposed in 

the NPRM. United Parcel Service (UPS) 

asserted that FPV technology has been 

safely and effectively used in the UAS 

hobbyist community for many years. 

The Drone User Group Network stated 

that FPV operations should be permitted 

with mandatory use of a spotter. Predesa 

said that a wearable heads-up display 

that combines the FPV from the small 

UAS and a wider-angle view from a 

ground camera located near the operator 

may provide the same risk mitigation as 

that afforded by the visual observer. The 

University of Washington and a joint 

submission by the State of Nevada 

Governor’s Office of Economic 

Development, the Nevada Institute for 

Autonomous Systems, and the Nevada 

FAA-designated UAS Test Site said that 

current FPV technologies offer a wider 

field of vision than the human eye. DJI 

stated that existing technology already 

provides superior orienting abilities 

over visual observers. One individual 

referenced a 2004 test conducted by 

NASA that indicated that FPV cameras 

mounted on pan-tilt gimbals can be 

used to scan virtually the entire 

airspace. This commenter also 

acknowledged FPV limitations ‘‘. . . 

such as the field-of-view of the camera 

(too wide provides less detail, too 

narrow limits situational awareness), 

total field-of-regard, clarity, and range of 

the transmitted video.’’ 

Some commenters, including the 

University of California, the National 

Roofing Contractors Association, and, 

AIA, stated that use of a FPV device 

should be allowed to meet the visualline-of-sight requirements of this rule 

under certain circumstances, such as 

when other navigation and control 

technologies are available in the vehicle 

(e.g., autonomous flight, onboard geofencing, sense-and-avoid technology) 

and mitigating measures are required 

(e.g. altitude, weight, location, and 

speed limitations, location or the use of 

visual observers). Exelon and Skyview 

Strategies said that FAA should include 

specific criteria or standards under 

which the technology would be allowed 

to be used, either alone or in 

conjunction with other technologies and 

procedures. 

Other commenters supported the 

NPRM’s proposed limitation on the use 


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of technology to maintain visual line of 

sight. Commenters, including NAAA, 

ALPA, SkySpecs, and the U.S. Hang 

Gliding & Paragliding Association, 

pointed out that FPV technology 

remains unproven and unreliable and 

the FPV field of view is limited. ALPA 

specifically stated that ‘‘[t]he use of an 

on-board camera cannot replace the 

awareness provided by direct 

observation by the operator/pilot or 

designated visual observer.’’ 

FPV technology works by transmitting 

video feed from a camera carried by the 

small unmanned aircraft to the control 

station. The problem with relying on 

FPV technology for the ability to see and 

avoid other aircraft in the NAS is that 

an FPV camera’s field-of-view is 

currently either very limited (narrowfield-of-view lens ≤30 degrees 

horizontal and 10 degrees vertical) or 

distorted (usually fish-eyed if using a 

wide-field-of-view lens). A narrow fieldof-view lens poses a safety issue because 

it restricts the user’s peripheral vision, 

which is used to detect incoming 

aircraft or other objects that may pose a 

safety hazard. A wide-field-of-view lens 

poses a safety issue because it reduces 

the angular resolution available to the 

user, making it necessary for an object 

in the monitor to be closer to the camera 

before it covers enough pixels for the 

remote pilot to be able to detect it. In 

addition, FPV relies on a video 

transmitter to broadcast the image to the 

remote pilot. These transmitter/receiver 

units are commonly available in several 

frequency bands from 900 MHz to 5.8 

GHz, each frequency band having 

distinct advantages and disadvantages 

as to range, susceptibility to 

interference, and ability to penetrate 

foliage. 

As of this writing, the FAA does not 

have validated data to indicate whether 

FPV can be used to safely conduct 

operations beyond visual line of sight 

and if so, what FPV performance 

specifications are required to support 

those operations. The FAA 

acknowledges that FPV cameras have 

been used by hobbyists for many years 

and that the technology is advancing 

rapidly within the growing industry. 

However, as discussed previously, FPV 

cameras have technical limitations and 

the FAA does not possess the data 

necessary to support a regulatory 

standard at this time. 

The FAA also acknowledges the 

comments concerning technological or 

operational mitigations that could be 

used in conjunction with FPV. 

However, those mitigations have 

significant potential shortcomings that 

need to be explored prior to allowing 

them to be used in the NAS. For 

example, one of the commenters 

suggested the use of pan-tilt camera 

systems to mitigate for the shortcomings 

in FPV technology. While a pan-tilt 

system can allow a narrow-angle camera 

to scan a wider field of view, the system 

is still significantly inferior to the 

peripheral vision of the human eye, 

which can discern movement across the 

entire field of view, approaching 180 

degrees in normal vision. Another 

commenter suggested the use of a 

wearable heads-up display. However, 

while a wearable heads-up display 

could possibly address some concerns 

about low-quality resolution present in 

wide-angle cameras, sharing the screen 

area with a second ground-based camera 

feed could further compound the 

resolution issue. Additionally, the 

ability for a camera to provide a wider 

field of view also generally carries with 

it the significant downside of needing 

increased radio bandwidth for the 

higher resolution video. This could 

make the video feed more susceptible to 

increased noise interference or it could 

reduce the angular resolution, affecting 

target discernibility. 

While data on FPV technology and 

potential associated mitigations is 

currently limited, the FAA recognizes 

the potential for this technology to 

provide a means of operating a small 

UAS beyond visual line of sight. For 

this reason, the FAA is currently 

conducting a pathfinder initiative with 

BNSF Railroad to gather safety data on 

operating beyond the visual line of sight 

of the remote pilot in rural/isolated 

areas. The FAA is also conducting a 

second pathfinder initiative with 

PrecisionHawk to gather data on UAS 

flights in rural areas outside the remote 

pilot’s direct vision. The FAA 

anticipates that data from these 

initiatives could help inform its 

approach to extend visual line of sight 

operations in future agency actions. 

Further, to reflect the changing state 

of UAS technology and the limited data 

available at this time, the FAA has made 

the visual-line-of-sight requirements of 

this rule waivable. An applicant will be 

able to obtain a waiver for an operation 

conducted differently than what is 

required by the visual-line-of-sight 

requirements of part 107 if the applicant 

demonstrates that his or her operation 

can safely be conducted under the terms 

of a certificate of waiver. The FAA also 

emphasizes that this rule does not 

prohibit the use of FPV devices as long 

as the device is not used to meet the 

visual-line-of-sight requirements of part 

107. 

Several commenters argued that small 

UAS operations should be permitted to 

go beyond visual line of sight when 

certain other technologies are used. 

Predesa argued that visual pattern 

recognition technology to detect terrain 

and aircraft hazards could be used to 

mitigate the risk associated with 

beyond-visual-line-of-sight operations. 

The Oregon Department of Aviation, the 

Agricultural Technology Alliance, and 

the New Hampshire Department of 

Transportation Bureau of Aeronautics 

(New Hampshire Department of 

Transportation), among others, asserted 

that utilizing geo-fencing to constrain 

unmanned aircraft flight should safely 

permit beyond-visual-line-of-sight 

operations. In addition to these, other 

technologies suggested by the 

commenters included light detection 

and ranging (LIDAR), Traffic Collision 

Avoidance System (TCAS), automatic 

dependent surveillance-broadcast 

(ADS–B), and automated navigation. 

The National Ski Areas Association 

noted that ‘‘collision detection and 

avoidance systems are in development,’’ 

and said that the final rule needs to 

‘‘recognize and accommodate’’ these 

and other technological innovations. 

Many of the technologies suggested by 

the commenters only partially mitigate 

possible hazards. For instance, 

automated navigation and geo-fencing 

could protect against terrain and ground 

obstructions but would not reveal 

manned aircraft transiting the flight 

area. Conversely, TCAS could reveal 

transponder-equipped aircraft but 

would be ignorant of terrain or nontransponder-equipped aircraft. Some of 

the mentioned technologies, such as 

LIDAR and visual pattern recognition, 

have potential to detect both ground and 

airborne obstacles, but no commenters 

provided data to support a particular 

standard or a testing means to validate 

the ability and reliability of that 

technology. As of this writing, the FAA 

does not have sufficient data to find that 

a technology can safely satisfy the seeand-avoid requirement of part 107. 

Consequently, the FAA will consider 

these situations on a case-by-case basis 

through the waiver process. The FAA 

will also use the waiver process as one 

means by which to evaluate new 

technologies as they become more 

developed. 

Commenters, including Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes (Boeing), News 

Media Coalition, the Newspaper 

Association of America, NAMIC, 

Amazon, and Google, argued that a 

visual-line-of-sight requirement is 

unnecessary over certain areas such as 

those that are unpopulated, private 

property, controlled-access facilities, or 

where activities would be unduly 

restricted by a visual-line-of-sight 

requirement, and that operational 


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safeguards could be employed to ensure 

safe beyond-visual-line-of-sight 

operations. The types of unduly 

restricted activities could include 

newsgathering events where people 

must remain at a distance from the 

event, agriculture operations, 

underwriting or adjusting claims in 

dangerous locations, responses to 

natural disasters, firefighting, search 

and rescue, and law enforcement 

operations. The types of operational 

safeguards proposed could include 

operating under FAA-imposed 

restrictions on weight, range, location, 

and altitude; and operating along preprogrammed and pre-approved paths 

through the use of mapping, navigation, 

and contingency management software. 

The FAA recognizes that the location 

of a small UAS flight could affect the 

inherent risk of the operation. However, 

as discussed previously, there is 

currently limited data concerning 

operations conducted beyond visual 

line of sight. The FAA is working to 

acquire additional safety data as part of 

its pathfinder initiatives, but that data 

will not be available within the 

timeframe envisioned by this rule. 

Because there are a significant number 

of variables involved in each individual 

operating environment and because the 

FAA has limited data on beyond-line-ofsight operations, this rule will not 

include a standard of general 

applicability for these types of 

operations. Instead, the FAA will 

consider each individual operating 

environment (as well as any mitigations) 

on a case-by-case basis as part of its 

consideration of a waiver application. 

Several commenters, including the 

American Farm Bureau and the 

American Petroleum Institute, suggested 

that beyond-line-of-sight operations 

should be permitted over privately 

owned land where the operator would 

be able to close access to nonparticipants. These commenters 

provided examples of pipelines and 

utility lines. 

The FAA recognizes that controlling 

the ground in the vicinity of the flight 

could mitigate hazards to persons and 

property on the ground. However, the 

primary concern underlying the visualline-of-sight restriction in this rule is 

risk to other aircraft in the air. Because 

a property owner is generally limited in 

how much he or she can restrict other 

aircraft from operating near the 

property, the fact that a property is 

privately owned is not, by itself, 

sufficient to allow beyond-visual-lineof-sight operations. As discussed earlier, 

individuals wishing to operate beyond 

visual line of sight will be able to apply 

for a waiver, and the FAA will examine 

individual operating environments on a 

case-by-case basis as part of its 

evaluation of a waiver application. 

AIA and JAM Aviation suggested that 

the first sentence of § 107.31 should be 

amended to read: ‘‘With vision that is 

unaided by any device other than 

corrective lenses, the operator and 

visual observer must be able to see the 

unmanned aircraft throughout the entire 

flight.’’ One individual stated 

§ 107.31(b) should be amended to read: 

‘‘Determine the unmanned aircraft’s 

attitude, altitude, and direction of 

flight.’’ The commenter said the change 

is needed because for multi-rotor UAS, 

the direction of flight could be quite 

different from the nominal ‘‘front’’ of 

the aircraft. According to this 

commenter, the proposed wording 

could lead to confusion on what 

‘‘direction’’ meant, whether it was the 

UAS’s path or the direction (bearing) 

from the remote pilot’s position. 

As an initial matter, the FAA notes 

that, as discussed in section III.E.1 of 

this preamble, the NPRM-proposed 

position of operator has been replaced 

by the remote pilot in command. 

Additionally, the remote pilot in 

command is not required to be the 

person who manipulates the flight 

controls of the small UAS. Accordingly, 

this rule will require both the remote 

pilot in command and the person 

manipulating the flight controls of the 

small UAS to possess the ability to 

maintain visual line of sight of the small 

unmanned aircraft. 

In response to the concerns raised by 

the commenters, the FAA has also 

clarified the regulatory text of § 107.31. 

As amended, § 107.31 states that the 

remote pilot in command, the visual 

observer (if one is used), and the person 

manipulating the flight control of the 

small UAS must be able to see the 

unmanned aircraft throughout the entire 

flight in order to: (1) Know the 

unmanned aircraft’s location; (2) 

determine the unmanned aircraft’s 

attitude, altitude, and direction of flight; 

(3) observe the airspace for other air 

traffic or hazards; and (4) determine that 

the unmanned aircraft does not 

endanger the life or property of another. 

This visual-line-of-sight ability must be 

exercised throughout the entire flight of 

the small unmanned aircraft by either: 

(1) The visual observer; or (2) the remote 

pilot in command and person 

manipulating the flight controls of the 

small UAS (if that person is not the 

remote pilot in command). 

Several commenters, including 

Modovolate, Small UAV Coalition, and 

Southern Company, asked the FAA to 

make clear that brief interruptions to 

visual line of sight should be permitted. 

One commenter asked that a 

quantitative limit on what qualifies as a 

momentary interruption should be 

established. Another individual asked 

the FAA to make clear that the remote 

pilot’s primary mission is to scan the 

area for other aircraft and not to keep 

‘‘eyes on’’ the small unmanned aircraft. 

The FAA understands and accepts 

that the person maintaining visual line 

of sight may lose sight of the unmanned 

aircraft for brief moments of the 

operation. This may be necessary either 

because the small unmanned aircraft 

momentarily travels behind an 

obstruction or to allow the person 

maintaining visual line of sight to 

perform actions such as scanning the 

airspace or briefly looking down at the 

small UAS control station. For example, 

a remote pilot in command stationed on 

the ground utilizing a small unmanned 

aircraft to inspect a rooftop may lose 

sight of the aircraft for brief periods 

while inspecting the farthest point of 

the roof. As another example, a remote 

pilot in command conducting a search 

operation around a fire scene with a 

small unmanned aircraft may briefly 

lose sight of the aircraft while it is 

temporarily behind a dense column of 

smoke. 

However, the FAA emphasizes that 

even though the remote pilot in 

command may briefly lose sight of the 

small unmanned aircraft, he or she 

always has the see-and-avoid 

responsibilities set out in §§ 107.31 and 

107.37. The circumstances of what 

would prevent a remote pilot from 

fulfilling those responsibilities will vary 

depending on factors such as the type of 

UAS, the operational environment, and 

distance between the remote pilot and 

the unmanned aircraft. For this reason, 

the FAA declines to specify a 

quantitative value to an interruption of 

visual contact as it would have the 

effect of potentially allowing a 

hazardous interruption or prohibiting a 

reasonable one. 

With regard to the comment 

concerning keeping ‘‘eyes on’’ the small 

unmanned aircraft, the FAA notes that 

the principles of scanning, long taught 

to manned aircraft pilots, include the 

dangers of ‘‘tunnel vision’’ and that an 

effective scan must encompass all areas 

of the environment a hazard could come 

from. The FAA agrees that to comply 

with § 107.31, the person maintaining 

visual line of sight must effectively scan 

the area and not necessarily be focused 

on constant visual contact with the 

small unmanned aircraft. 

Several commenters suggested that 

the FAA impose a numerical limit on 

how far away a small unmanned aircraft 

may travel from the person maintaining 


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79This commenter submitted comments on behalf 

of its Department of Aviation, owner and operator 

of Denver International Airport. 

visual line of sight. ALPA, NBAA, 

NAAA, and the State of Nevada, Nevada 

Institute for Autonomous Systems and 

Nevada FAA-designated UAS Test Site, 

commenting jointly, argued that an 

appropriate specific numerical distance 

should be imposed and be based on 

study or test data. Predesa stated that a 

numerical limit can be determined by 

the performance of the UAS, taking into 

account a margin that allows for winds 

and wind gusts, and power 

characteristics of the UAS battery. FLIR 

Systems, Inc., Aviation Management, 

the City and County of Denver, 

Colorado,79 and two individuals 

proposed specific numerical limits the 

FAA should impose on the area of 

operation. The numerical 

recommendations of these commenters 

varied widely from 1000 feet to 3 miles. 

An individual commenter suggested 

that some form of reliable and verifiable 

documenting of distance should be 

required. 

The FAA declines to impose a 

numerical limit on how far away a small 

unmanned aircraft can travel from the 

person maintaining visual line of sight. 

A prescriptive numerical limit would 

not take into account situationaldependent operating factors and may 

preclude operations that could 

otherwise be conducted safely. 

Additionally, no commenter provided 

data to substantiate the belief that a 

numerical standard would provide a 

higher level of safety than the visualline-of-sight standard proposed in the 

NPRM. 

This rule will also not include a 

documentation requirement regarding 

the distance of a small unmanned 

aircraft. A distance documentation 

requirement would impose an 

unjustified cost on the public because 

the permissible distance of the small 

unmanned aircraft from the remote pilot 

in command will be situation-specific. 

For example, a remote pilot in 

command operating in excellent 

visibility conditions will be able to fly 

the small unmanned aircraft farther 

away from him or herself and still 

maintain visual line of sight. 

Conversely, a remote pilot in command 

operating in poorer visibility conditions 

will have a more limited area where he 

or she can fly the small unmanned 

aircraft and still maintain the required 

visual line of sight. 

PlaneSense, Inc. and Cobalt Air, LLC, 

in a joint submission, stated that the 

rule should also require that the 

operator or a visual observer have line 

of sight to the ground over which the 

small unmanned aircraft is flying. 

However, requiring a remote pilot or 

visual observer to have line of sight to 

the ground will not enhance the safety 

of this rule, and may prohibit certain 

operations that could otherwise be 

conducted safely under part 107. For 

instance, a small UAS operation over a 

disaster area containing no persons or 

property on the ground would not need 

to have line of sight to the ground to 

ensure the safe operation of the small 

UAS. 

Airports Council International—North 

America suggested that the first 

sentence of § 107.31 should be amended 

to read: ‘‘With vision that is unaided by 

any device other than corrective lenses, 

the operator or visual observer must be 

able to see the unmanned aircraft and 

other aircraft to which the unmanned 

aircraft could pose a collision risk 

throughout the entire flight in order to 

. . . .’’ 

The FAA declines this suggestion 

because the requirement to be aware of 

other aircraft is already encompassed by 

the pertinent regulatory text of part 107. 

Specifically, § 107.31(a)(3) will require 

the remote pilot in command, the visual 

observer (if one is used), and the person 

manipulating the flight controls of the 

small UAS (if that person is not the 

remote pilot in command) to be able to 

see the unmanned aircraft throughout 

the entire flight in order to observe the 

airspace for other air traffic or hazards. 

Other aircraft are considered air traffic 

and are thus covered by the regulatory 

text of § 107.31(a)(3). 

The Washington State Department of 

Transportation, Aviation Division 

concurred ‘‘with the line-of-sight and 

reduced visibility parameters as 

described, with the exception that 

certain verified research and 

development operations . . . be allowed 

on a case-by-case basis, and for unique 

situations such as aerial observation to 

support firefighting where redundant 

systems may alleviate line-of-sight and 

visibility limitations.’’ 

As an initial matter, the FAA notes 

that operations, such as those in support 

of firefighting, will not be subject to the 

provisions of part 107 if conducted as 

public aircraft operations. With regard 

to case-by-case determinations, the 

visual-line-of-sight restrictions of this 

rule will be subject to waiver. This 

means that a person will be able to 

apply for and obtain a certificate of 

waiver from the provisions of § 107.31 

if the person establishes that the 

proposed operation can safely be 

conducted under the terms of a 

certificate of waiver. The FAA will 

evaluate waiver requests on a case-bycase basis. 

Commenters including several state 

farm bureau federations and FLIR 

Systems argued that a visual-line-ofsight requirement could potentially 

negate the cost and time savings 

associated with small UAS operations 

conducted over large swaths of land 

because the requirement would 

necessitate multiple flights to complete 

the operations. According to these 

commenters, the potential safety risks 

associated with operations would also 

increase because more frequent takeoffs 

and landings would be required. 

The commenters did not provide any 

data showing that there is increased risk 

or costs associated with the takeoff or 

landing of a small unmanned aircraft. 

As such, the FAA declines to change 

this rule on the basis suggested by the 

commenters. However, as discussed in 

sections III.E.1 and III.E.3.a.i of this 

preamble, this rule has been changed 

from the NPRM to allow: (1) The flight 

of a small unmanned aircraft over a 

sparsely populated area from a moving 

vehicle; and (2) a remote pilot in 

command to extend the area of 

operation by handing off control midflight to another remote pilot in 

command. Both of these changes, as 

well as the ability to apply for a waiver, 

will allow for additional operational 

flexibility under this rule. 

A large number of commenters, 

including the Airborne Law 

Enforcement Association, Embry-Riddle 

Aeronautical University, and the 

Associated General Contractors of 

America, argued that visual line of sight 

should not apply to certain specific 

operations. Those operations included: 

• Public safety/emergency. 

• Conservation-focused operations. 

• Operations by electric utilities for line 

inspection or for storm-damage restoration. 

• Oil industry inspections. 

• Property inspections. 

• Agriculture. 

• Newsgathering. 

• Operations within a structure. 

As an initial matter, the FAA does not 

regulate UAS operations conducted 

inside an enclosed structure. Similarly, 

as discussed earlier in this preamble, 

part 107 will not apply to public aircraft 

operations unless they voluntarily 

choose to operate as civil aircraft. Most 

public safety operations are conducted 

as public aircraft operations and will 

continue to be authorized by COA. 

Therefore, these types of operations, 

when conducted in accordance with a 

COA, will be unaffected by the 

requirements of part 107. 

With regard to the other operations 

suggested by the commenters, there is 

currently no data indicating that the 


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nature of the small UAS operation 

mitigates the risk associated with 

operations conducted beyond visual 

line of sight. The FAA recognizes that 

there are a variety of uses for UAS that 

this rulemaking will not enable. 

However, there are also a number of 

small UAS uses that will be enabled by 

this rule. If the FAA were to delay 

issuance of this rule until it had 

sufficient data to generally allow 

beyond-visual-line-of-sight operations, 

the societal benefits that could be 

realized by immediately allowing 

operations within visual line of sight 

would be delayed as well. Thus, the 

FAA will utilize the incremental 

approach discussed earlier in this 

preamble, under which the FAA will 

issue a rule for the lowest risk UAS 

activities while pursuing future 

rulemaking to expand their use. 

Additionally, as discussed previously, 

the waiver authority in this rule will 

enable the FAA to examine, on a caseby-case basis, any mitigation provided 

by the operating environment in the 

specific operations discussed by the 

commenters. 

A number of commenters, including 

the National Roofing Contractors 

Association, Vail Resorts, Rocky 

Mountain Farmers Union, and MAPPS, 

suggested that small UAS operators 

should be permitted to extend their 

visual line of sight through the use of 

one or more visual observers who 

maintain visual line of sight while in 

constant communication with the 

operator. Continental Mapping 

Consultants, Inc. (Continental Mapping) 

similarly advocated for the use of one 

‘‘or many’’ remote visual observers 

‘‘daisy chained’’ throughout the 

operational area, while in constant 

contact with each other and the 

operator. The National Association of 

Broadcasters, the National Cable & 

Telecommunications Association, and 

Radio Television Digital News 

Association also asked the FAA to 

reconsider its proposed prohibition on a 

relay or ‘‘daisy chain’’ of visual 

observers. Specifically, the commenters 

said that the FAA should revise 

§ 107.33(b) to require that either the 

operator or a visual observer be able to 

see the small UAS at all points during 

the flight. 

The Colorado Cattlemen’s Association 

asserted that ‘‘adequate operational and 

public safety can be ensured’’ if operator 

visual line of sight is augmented by an 

additional visual observer who 

maintains visual line of sight while in 

communication with the operator. The 

association did not advocate for an 

‘‘extensive or unlimited number’’ of 

observers to extend the range of UAS 

operations, but said a reasonable 

balance can be reached to allow more 

practical uses of UAS (such as 

operations on cattle ranches). 

Allowing remote pilots to extend their 

visual line of sight through the use of 

one or more visual observers may 

introduce new hazards into the 

operation. As discussed in the next 

section of this preamble, the visual 

observer’s role in the operation is 

limited to simply maintaining visual 

line of sight and communicating what 

he or she sees to the remote pilot. 

Allowing ‘‘daisy chaining’’ of visual 

observers to fly the unmanned aircraft 

beyond line of sight of the remote pilot 

in command would result in a delay in 

the remote pilot’s reaction time because 

the visual observer would have to 

verbalize any hazard and the remote 

pilot would be unable to look up and 

directly see the situation. Instead, the 

remote pilot would have to respond to 

the hazard by formulating and executing 

a maneuver based on his or her 

understanding of the information 

received from the visual observer rather 

than a direct visual perception of the 

hazard. 

Because a delay in reaction time may 

introduce new hazards into the 

operation, this rule will retain the 

requirement that the remote pilot in 

command and the person manipulating 

the flight controls of the small UAS (if 

that person is not the remote pilot in 

command) must be able to see the small 

unmanned aircraft throughout the entire 

flight. However, as discussed earlier, the 

visual-line-of-sight requirements of this 

rule will be waivable. Additionally, the 

FAA notes that it is currently engaged 

in research and testing on how a 

communication error could affect the 

ability of the remote pilot to correctly 

apply avoidance maneuvers, and this 

data will help inform future agency 

actions. 

Textron Systems, the National 

Association of Realtors, Trimble 

Navigation, and ArgenTech Solutions 

recommended that this rule provide an 

operator with the ability to hand off 

control and responsibility for flight 

during the course of an operation. 

Textron Systems recommended that the 

rule ‘‘allow passing of ‘operator in 

command’ during flight operations as 

long as the system and the operational 

construct meet other requirements of the 

rule.’’ Trimble proposed that the FAA 

should explicitly permit multiple 

operators using networked radios and 

control stations to operate a single UAS. 

Under Trimble’s proposal, operators 

would transition control of the UAS 

from one operator to another while 

ensuring see-and-avoid concerns are 

met. Trimble also asserted that the 

technology needed to network radios 

and control stations is utilized in other 

countries for small UAS operations and 

has been found to be effective. The 

National Association of Realtors added 

that ‘‘daisy chaining’’ operators does not 

pose a safety concern because ‘‘[t]he 

real-time corrections necessary to 

perfect an UAS flight could be made 

instantaneously, rather than the 

observer communicating with the 

operator and there being a lag in the 

time the correction is orally given and 

then made within the operation.’’ 

NetMoby, on the other hand, 

recommended prohibiting hand-off 

ability because it could create an 

‘‘endless daisy chain of operators.’’ 

The FAA agrees with the commenters 

who stated that transfer of control of a 

small UAS should be allowed between 

certificated remote pilots. This can be 

accomplished while maintaining visual 

line of sight of the UAS and without 

loss of control. Multiple certificated 

remote pilots handing off operational 

control does not raise the same safety 

concerns as a daisy chain of visual 

observers because, unlike a visual 

observer, the remote pilot in command 

will have the ability to directly control 

the small unmanned aircraft. Thus, two 

or more certificated pilots transferring 

operational control (i.e. the remote pilot 

in command designation) to each other 

does not raise the delayed-reaction-time 

issue that arises with visual observers 

having to communicate what they see to 

another person who actually 

manipulates the small UAS flight 

controls. 

Accordingly, as discussed in section 

III.E.1 of this preamble, multiple 

certificated remote pilots may choose to 

transfer control and responsibility while 

operating a small UAS. For example, 

one remote pilot may be designated the 

remote pilot in command at the 

beginning of the operation, and then at 

some point in the operation another 

remote pilot may take over as remote 

pilot in command by orally stating that 

he or she is doing so. The FAA 

emphasizes that as the person 

responsible for the safe operation of the 

UAS, any remote pilot who will assume 

remote-pilot-in-command duties should 

be aware of factors that could affect the 

flight. 

b. Visual Observer 

For the reasons discussed below, this 

rule will finalize the position of visual 

observer as follows. First, this rule will 

define a visual observer as a person who 

assists the remote pilot in command and 

the person manipulating the flight 

controls of the small UAS (if that person 


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is not the remote pilot in command) to 

see and avoid other air traffic or objects 

aloft or on the ground. Second, the 

visual observer will remain an optional 

crewmember who will not be required 

to obtain an airman certificate. Third, 

the remote pilot in command will have 

to ensure that the visual observer is 

positioned in a location that allows him 

or her to see the unmanned aircraft in 

the manner specified in § 107.31. 

Fourth, the visual observer, the remote 

pilot in command, and the person 

manipulating the flight controls of the 

small UAS (if that person is not the 

remote pilot in command) will be 

required to coordinate in order to: (1) 

Scan the airspace where the small 

unmanned aircraft is operating for any 

potential collision hazard; and (2) 

maintain awareness of the position of 

the small unmanned aircraft through 

direct visual observation. Finally, this 

rule will require the visual observer, the 

remote pilot in command, and the 

person manipulating the flight controls 

of the small UAS (if that person is not 

the remote pilot in command) to 

maintain effective communication, and 

it will allow the use of technology, such 

as radios, to assist with the 

communication. 

i. Definition of Visual Observer 

The NPRM proposed to define a 

visual observer as a person who assists 

the operator to see and avoid other air 

traffic or objects aloft or on the ground. 

Skycatch suggested that the definition of 

visual observer should be revised to say 

‘‘sense and avoid’’ rather than ‘‘see and 

avoid’’ because the term ‘‘sense and 

avoid’’ is the term required by Congress. 

According to Skycatch, the term ‘‘see 

and avoid’’ does not appear in Public 

Law 112–95, whereas the term ‘‘sense 

and avoid’’ appears in three locations in 

the enabling legislation. 

As discussed earlier, this rulemaking 

is being conducted under section 333 of 

Public Law 112–95. Subsection 

333(b)(1) requires the FAA to determine, 

in pertinent part, what type of UAS 

operations do not ‘‘create a hazard to 

users of the national airspace system.’’ 

A critical component of that 

determination is whether the operation 

is conducted ‘‘within visual line of 

sight.’’ Id. Section 333 does not use the 

term ‘‘sense and avoid.’’ 

As discussed in the previous section, 

the FAA does not currently have data 

indicating that small UAS technology 

has matured to the point that would 

safely allow small UAS to be operated 

beyond visual line of sight. To reflect 

this fact, as well as the fact that section 

333 explicitly focuses on operations 

within visual line of sight as a critical 

consideration, this rule will retain the 

proposed ‘‘see and avoid’’ terminology 

in the definition of visual observer. 

Accordingly, this rule will define visual 

observer as a person who assists the 

remote pilot in command and the 

person manipulating the flight controls 

of the small UAS (if that person is not 

the remote pilot in command) to see and 

avoid other air traffic or objects aloft or 

on the ground. 

ii. Operational Requirements When 

Using Visual Observer 

The NPRM also proposed a set of 

operational requirements for operations 

that use a visual observer. First, the 

operator and visual observer would be 

required to maintain effective 

communication with each other at all 

times. Under the NPRM, the operator 

and visual observer would not have to 

stand close enough to hear each other 

without technological assistance; 

instead, they could use a 

communication-assisting device, such 

as a radio, to communicate while 

standing farther apart from each other. 

Second, the operator would be required 

to ensure that the visual observer be 

positioned in a manner that would 

allow him or her to maintain visual line 

of sight of the small unmanned aircraft. 

Third, the operator and visual observer 

would be required to coordinate to: (1) 

Scan the airspace where the small 

unmanned aircraft is operating for any 

potential collision hazard; and (2) 

maintain awareness of the position of 

the small unmanned aircraft through 

direct visual observation. This rule will 

finalize the above provisions as 

proposed, but, due to the change in the 

crewmember framework, this rule will 

refer to the remote pilot in command 

and the person manipulating the flight 

controls of the small UAS instead of 

‘‘operator.’’ 

Approximately 20 organizations and 8 

individual commenters, including 

NRECA, AIA, and the Association of 

American Universities and the 

Association of Public Land-grant 

Universities, commenting jointly, agreed 

with the NPRM proposal that the visual 

observer should not be required to stand 

close enough to the operator to allow for 

unassisted verbal communication. 

These commenters generally agreed that 

the operator and visual observers should 

maintain effective communication with 

one another and added that effective 

communication can be achieved with 

the use of technology, such as a twoway radio or cell phone. NRECA stated 

that there is no additional safety benefit 

from requiring the visual observer to 

stand close enough to the operator to 

allow for unassisted verbal 

communication. In fact, NRECA 

continued, such a requirement might 

negatively impact safety by prohibiting 

a visual observer from adopting a 

vantage point that affords a different 

field of view from the operator (i.e., a 

field of view that complements and is 

not merely duplicative of the operator’s 

field of view). 

Aviation Management, NBAA, and 

NRECA further stated that the method of 

effective communication should be 

decided by the operator and visual 

observer. Planehook and an individual 

added the operator and visual observer 

should have a contingency plan if 

electronic communications fail. 

ALPA supported the use of 

communication-assisting devices, but 

asked the FAA to State (in the preamble 

and in advisory material) that the ability 

to maintain communication using any 

device is necessarily complicated by the 

fact that the pilot/operator typically 

uses both hands to control the small 

UAS. ALPA asserted that this 

complication limits the possibilities of 

using assisting devices considerably, 

essentially to two-way radiotelephony 

with a constant (i.e., ‘‘hot’’) transmitreceive capability. 

In contrast to the above commenters, 

the Colorado Agricultural Aviation 

Association and NAAA said that the 

visual observer should be able to 

communicate with the UAS operator 

‘‘from the most minimal distance 

possible.’’ 

This rule will require the remote pilot 

in command, the person manipulating 

the flight controls of the small UAS (if 

that person is not the remote pilot in 

command), and the visual observer to 

maintain effective communication, but 

it will also allow the remote pilot in 

command to determine how that 

communication will take place. The 

FAA agrees that effective 

communication is essential, but there 

are circumstances where this can be 

accomplished at a distance through 

technological assistance. As the 

commenters pointed out, effective 

communication at a distance can easily 

be achieved using existing technology, 

such as a two-way radio or a cell phone. 

In response to ALPA’s concern that 

the person manipulating the small UAS 

flight controls may be unable to 

simultaneously manipulate the controls 

of a communication device, the FAA 

notes that existing technology provides 

a number of options for hands-free 

communication, such as an earpiece, a 

headset, or the ‘‘speaker’’ mode on a cell 

phone. The remote pilot in command 

may choose any communicationassisting technology as long as that 

technology: (1) Allows for effective 


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communication; and (2) does not 

interfere with the safe operation of the 

small UAS. The FAA also agrees that 

the choice of effective communication 

should be agreed upon by the remote 

pilot in command and the visual 

observer, and that it is a good safety 

practice to have a contingency plan. 

The National Association of 

Broadcasters, the National Cable & 

Telecommunications Association, Radio 

Television Digital News Association, 

and MPAA asserted that proposed 

§ 107.33(b) conflicts with the visualline-of-sight requirements of § 107.31. 

These commenters asserted that 

proposed § 107.31 stated that either ‘‘the 

operator or visual observer must be able 

to see the unmanned aircraft throughout 

the entire flight’’ (emphasis added). 

However, proposed § 107.33(b) stated 

that when a visual observer is used, 

‘‘[t]he operator must ensure that the 

visual observer is able to see the 

unmanned aircraft.’’ 

As explained earlier, the visual-lineof-sight framework requires the remote 

pilot in command, the person 

manipulating the flight controls of the 

small UAS, and the visual observer to 

always have visual-line-of-sight 

capability. The visual observer can 

exercise this capability instead of the 

remote pilot in command and person 

manipulating the flight controls of the 

small UAS (if that person is not the 

remote pilot in command), but under 

this rule, everyone must have the visualline-of-sight capability, even if they are 

not exercising it. As noted earlier, the 

visual observer cannot maneuver the 

small unmanned aircraft, so there is a 

potential delay in response time if the 

person manipulating the flight controls 

and the remote pilot in command are 

unable to see what is happening and 

must rely solely on the description 

provided by the visual observer. The 

FAA agrees with commenters that, as 

proposed, the regulatory text of § 107.31 

was unclear because it implied that 

either the operator or visual observer 

(but not both) had to be positioned in 

a manner that allowed for visual line of 

sight. Accordingly, the FAA has 

amended the regulatory text of § 107.31 

to clarify that all crewmembers must 

have the ability to maintain visual line 

of sight. 

One commenter suggested that the 

visual observer should be required to 

stand close enough to the operator that 

the line of sight of the visual observer 

will not deviate from the operator’s line 

of sight when the operator is using an 

FPV device. Another commenter 

objected to the proposed requirement 

that a visual observer must be 

positioned in a way that allows them to 

always maintain visual line of sight. The 

commenter asserted that this 

requirement would significantly limit 

the operational area for operations that 

use multiple visual observers because 

the small unmanned aircraft could only 

be flown in an area where the visual 

observers’ individual lines of sight 

overlap so that each observer could 

satisfy the proposed line-of-sight 

requirement. 

The FAA declines to add a 

requirement that the visual observer 

must stand close enough to the remote 

pilot in command to have the same 

visual line of sight. The remote pilot in 

command, the person manipulating the 

flight controls of the small UAS (if that 

person is not the remote pilot in 

command), and the visual observer will 

be able to satisfy their see-and-avoid 

responsibilities if they are each 

positioned in a manner where they have 

sufficient visual line of sight of the 

unmanned aircraft and surrounding 

airspace (as specified in § 107.31). This 

can be accomplished without each 

person having the same exact line of 

sight as the other people involved in the 

operation. The FAA also emphasizes 

that even though part 107 will not 

prohibit the use of an FPV device by the 

remote pilot in command, FPV may not 

be used to meet the visual-line-of-sight 

requirements of this rule. 

With regard to the use of multiple 

visual observers, the FAA acknowledges 

the concern raised by the commenter. 

As noted by the commenter, § 107.33(b) 

requires that when a person is acting as 

a visual observer, he or she must be 

positioned in a location where he or she 

can perform the visual-line-of-sight 

duties of the visual observer. However, 

this rule does not require that a person 

remain in the role of a visual observer 

for the entire duration of the small UAS 

operation. When a person is not acting 

as a visual observer, he or she is not 

required to perform the duties of a 

visual observer and need not be placed 

in a location where he or she can 

maintain visual line of sight of the small 

unmanned aircraft. This provides 

significant operational flexibility 

because the remote pilot in command 

can activate and deactivate prepositioned visual observers to assist 

with maintaining visual line of sight. 

The FAA emphasizes, however, that the 

remote pilot in command is responsible 

for the small UAS operation and must 

ensure that any hand-off of visual 

observer responsibility is done safely 

and in compliance with §§ 107.31 and 

107.33. 

TTD asked the FAA to clarify the 

proposed requirement that the operator 

and visual observer must coordinate so 

that they ‘‘maintain awareness of the 

position of the small unmanned aircraft 

through direct visual observation.’’ 

(Emphasis added.) TTD pointed to an 

NPRM statement that it would be 

permissible for one’s line of sight to be 

temporarily obstructed by an object and 

asked the FAA to clarify when and to 

what degree obstruction of one’s visual 

observation is permitted under 

§ 107.33(d)(2). 

As discussed in the previous section 

of the preamble, this rule allows for the 

possibility that the person maintaining 

visual line of sight may briefly lose sight 

of the small unmanned aircraft. As 

noted in that section, the FAA declines 

to impose quantitative limits on visualline-of-sight interruptions. Instead, an 

interruption to line-of-sight of the small 

unmanned aircraft is permissible if: (1) 

It is brief; and (2) the person 

maintaining visual line of sight is still 

capable of complying with the see-andavoid responsibilities of §§ 107.31, 

107.33 (if applicable), and 107.37. 

iii. Optional Use of a Visual Observer 

Under the proposed rule, a visual 

observer would be an optional 

crewmember who could be used to 

augment the small UAS operation. For 

the reasons discussed below, this rule 

will finalize this NPRM provision as 

proposed. 

Several commenters argued that a 

visual observer should always be 

required in order to satisfy the visualline-of-sight requirements of part 107. 

ALPA and TTD asserted that small 

unmanned aircraft are difficult to 

observe given their size and speed 

capabilities, and that this difficulty, 

combined with the remote pilot’s need 

to look down at the controls 

periodically, makes a visual observer a 

critical crewmember for the safe 

operation of a small unmanned aircraft. 

Similarly, NAAA stated that the FAA’s 

proposal not to require a visual observer 

is at odds with the fundamental seeand-avoid and visual-line-of-sight 

principles of the rule. NAAA argued 

that the NAS would be endangered by 

the absence of a visual observer in those 

situations in which the remote pilot 

temporarily lacks the ability to see and 

avoid other aircraft. 

Several commenters stated that in the 

absence of a visual observer, a remote 

pilot would not be able to maintain 

situational awareness of activities in the 

air and on the ground. JAM Aviation 

stated that a remote pilot cannot easily 

monitor conditions in the air and on the 

ground simultaneously, and that a 

visual observer is needed to assist the 

remote pilot in doing so. Texas A&M 

University-Corpus Christi Lone Star 


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80 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5) gives FAA the power to 

prescribe regulations that it finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce and national security. 

UAS Center of Excellence & Innovation 

(Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi/ 

LSUASC) stated that a visual observer 

should be required until technology 

comes into existence, such as firstperson view, that would provide 

‘‘situational awareness and [a] level of 

risk-mitigation comparable to that of a 

pilot in the cockpit of a commercial 

aircraft.’’ Similarly, another commenter 

argued that a visual observer should be 

required ‘‘unless some form of 

situational awareness aid is available 

which would allow the operator to 

simultaneously determine [small UAS] 

status and health as well as scan the 

surrounding airspace[.]’’ 

It is not necessary to require a visual 

observer for all small UAS operations. 

Under the visual-line-of-sight 

framework of this rule, a visual observer 

can act as a limited substitute for the 

remote pilot in command and the 

person manipulating the flight controls 

with regard to maintaining visual line of 

sight of the small unmanned aircraft. 

The visual observer position will allow 

the person manipulating the small UAS 

flight controls and the remote pilot in 

command to perform tasks that require 

looking away from the small unmanned 

aircraft for a significant period of time 

or use observational technology (such as 

FPV) that limits their peripheral vision; 

which they can do if a visual observer 

is present because the visual observer 

will observe the small unmanned 

aircraft with the naked eye. 

However, there are some small UAS 

operations in which the person 

manipulating the UAS flight controls (if 

that person is not the remote pilot in 

command) and the remote pilot in 

command will simply observe the small 

unmanned aircraft themselves 

throughout the entire operation. In those 

types of operations, there is no need for 

a visual observer to be present to 

maintain visual line of sight of the 

unmanned aircraft. In response to 

concerns about the ability of the remote 

pilot to maintain see and avoid if there 

is no visual observer present, the FAA 

notes that, as discussed previously, the 

person maintaining visual line of sight 

will have the same (if not better) ability 

to see and avoid other aircraft as a 

manned-aircraft pilot looking out the 

windshield of the manned aircraft. The 

fact that the person maintaining visual 

line of sight may briefly look away from 

the small unmanned aircraft to conduct 

other tasks such as scanning the 

surrounding airspace does not affect this 

conclusion because the ‘‘look away’’ 

will be brief. This situation is similar to 

manned-aircraft operations where a 

pilot can look away from the windshield 

to conduct another task such as 

scanning or manipulating the 

instrument panel. 

As such, this rule will not require that 

a visual observer be present in all small 

UAS operations conducted under part 

107. The FAA emphasizes, however, 

that if a visual observer is not present, 

then the remote pilot in command and 

the person manipulating the flight 

controls of the small UAS (if that person 

is not the remote pilot in command) 

must be the ones to exercise the visualline-of-sight capability required by 

§ 107.31. The FAA also emphasizes that 

the remote pilot in command will 

ultimately be responsible for the safe 

conduct of the small UAS operation. If 

the remote pilot in command 

determines, as part of the preflight 

assessment of the operating area 

required by § 107.49, that his or her 

particular small UAS operation cannot 

be conducted in a safe manner without 

a visual observer, then the remote pilot 

will be obligated to conduct the flight 

with a visual observer. 

One commenter stated that the 

operation of a small unmanned aircraft 

is too complex to be conducted by just 

one person, and that a visual observer 

is needed to share the duties. According 

to this commenter, a visual observer 

should be used to ‘‘assist the operator 

focusing on monitoring aviation air 

band radio transmissions, flight heights, 

distances, see-avoid aircraft 

requirements, spotting, etc.’’ 

The FAA disagrees with the 

suggestion that the operation of a small 

UAS is too complex to be conducted by 

one person. Many small UAS operating 

under this rule are simple to control and 

will be limited to a confined area of 

operation. The remote pilot in command 

is responsible for the safe operation of 

the flight and can make a determination 

as to whether a visual observer or 

another certificated remote pilot is 

necessary based on the nature of the 

operation. For example, a remote pilot 

operating a small unmanned aircraft in 

a sparsely populated area at an altitude 

lower than nearby trees and buildings 

could safety conduct the operation 

without any other crewmembers. 

iv. No Airman Certification or Required 

Training of Visual Observer 

The NPRM proposed to not require 

airman certification or other mandatory 

testing or training for a visual observer. 

The FAA explained that because a 

visual observer would not be permitted 

to exercise independent judgment or 

operational control and because the 

visual observer’s role in the operation 

would be limited simply to 

communicating what he or she is seeing 

to another person, the visual observer 

would not be an airman as defined by 

statute and would therefore not be 

statutorily required to obtain an airman 

certificate. The NPRM also explained 

that because of the limited role of the 

visual observer, there would be no need 

to exercise the FAA’s regulatory 

authority to require the visual observer 

to obtain an airman certificate.80 For the 

reasons discussed below, this rule will 

not require visual observers to be 

certificated or to satisfy any other 

qualification requirements. 

Several commenters expressed 

support for the FAA’s proposal to not 

require airman certification for visual 

observers on the basis that certification 

is unnecessary. Many submissions, 

including those from NRECA, the Nez 

Perce Tribe, and the National 

Association of Realtors, supported the 

FAA’s proposal because a visual 

observer is optional for part 107 

operations and is not responsible for 

operating the device. The Property 

Drone Consortium, NetMoby, Predesa, 

the National Association of Wheat 

Growers, and the American Petroleum 

Institute generally commented that a 

visual observer should not have to 

satisfy airman requirements. The 

Professional Society of Drone Journalists 

added that the only requirement for 

visual observers should be that they are 

capable of visually observing the small 

UAS and communicating with the 

remote pilot. 

Other commenters suggested that 

airman certification should not be 

required for visual observers because 

the limited safety benefits of requiring 

certification would not justify the 

burden. Commenters including the 

University of Arkansas, Division of 

Agriculture and State Farm asserted that 

the costs of requiring visual observer 

airman certification would outweigh the 

benefits. 

The Oklahoma Governor’s Unmanned 

Aerial Systems Council said that 

imposing additional regulatory 

requirements on visual observers could 

increase safety risks since organizations 

would then be incentivized to minimize 

the number of visual observers due to 

cost and logistical issues. Similarly, 

NRECA suggested that the imposition of 

certification requirements could 

discourage the use of visual observers. 

Multiple commenters expressed the 

opposite view and asserted that visual 

observers should be certificated by the 

FAA. NAAA stated that the visual 

observer should be certificated and 

should clearly understand his or her 


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81See 49 U.S.C. 40102(a)(8). This statute defines 

an airman as an individual: ‘‘(A) in command, or 

as pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew, who 

navigates aircraft when under way; (B) except to the 

extent the Administrator of the Federal Aviation 

Administration may provide otherwise for 

individuals employed outside the United States, 

who is directly in charge of inspecting, maintaining, 

overhauling, or repairing aircraft, aircraft engines, 

propellers, or appliances; or (C) who serves as an 

aircraft dispatcher or air traffic control-tower 

operator.’’ The visual observer’s limited role in the 

operation of a small UAS does not meet any of these 

criteria. 

role. CAPA recommended that only 

UAS remote pilots, licensed as such, be 

able to participate as visual observers. 

CAPA also raised the question of who 

would be held responsible if an accident 

were to occur due to an uncertificated 

visual observer’s negligence. Textron 

Systems suggested that visual observers 

with safety-of-flight responsibilities may 

be considered to be flight crewmembers 

and should be certificated as such. 

A few individuals generally argued 

that the same testing requirements 

should apply to all participants in small 

UAS operations, including the remote 

pilot and visual observer. One 

individual commented that a 

certificated visual observer could act as 

a safety redundancy backup for the 

operator. Another commenter suggested 

that UAS operator teams should follow 

a process similar to the traditional 

airman certification process. A third 

individual suggested that a visual 

observer should be required to hold a 

certificate similar to the ones held by air 

traffic controllers. 

Under this rule, a visual observer will 

act only in a flight-support role to the 

remote pilot in command who will 

exercise operational control over the 

small UAS and will have final authority 

for the flight. Part 107 will not place any 

responsibility on the visual observer for 

the safety of the flight operation, as that 

responsibility falls on the remote pilot 

in command. Rather, the intended 

function of the visual observer under 

this rule will be to assist the remote 

pilot in command and the person 

manipulating the flight controls of the 

small UAS (if that person is not the 

remote pilot in command) with 

situational awareness during the flight 

as needed by observing, among other 

things, the small unmanned aircraft’s 

location, other air traffic, obstacle 

clearance, and people on the ground, 

and effectively communicating those 

observations to the remote pilot in 

command. 

The FAA emphasizes that this rule 

will not give a visual observer the power 

to act on his or her observations because 

the visual observer will not share in the 

operational control of the aircraft. 

Rather, the visual observer’s role will be 

simply to convey his or her observations 

to the person who has operational 

authority and/or control of the small 

UAS and can act on those observations. 

Because the visual observer’s role is 

limited to simply conveying his or her 

observations to other people, the visual 

observer does not need special 

mandatory training, testing, or 

certification in order to safely carry out 

that role. The FAA also finds that, due 

to the very limited role that the visual 

observer has in the small UAS 

operation, the visual observer is not an 

airman, within the meaning of the 

FAA’s statute, and is thus not statutorily 

required to obtain an airman 

certificate.81

In response to CAPA’s comment 

concerning liability due to a visual 

observer’s negligence, the person who 

violates the pertinent regulations would 

be the one held liable. The FAA also 

notes that, depending on the 

circumstances, the remote pilot in 

command may be held responsible as he 

or she has final authority over the small 

UAS operation. 

Several commenters suggested that 

visual observers should be required to 

complete mandatory training. The 

University of North Georgia stated that 

visual observers must be trained on 

basic FAA rules and proximity 

awareness. Similarly, Federal Airways & 

Airspace remarked that visual observers 

should have a training course, such as 

a see-and-avoid course. The University 

of North Dakota’s John D. Odegard 

School of Aerospace Sciences 

recommended that visual observers 

complete a training syllabus and be 

tested in the same areas of knowledge as 

the remote pilot. AIA commented that 

visual observer training should be 

required prior to assuming duty. 

Another commenter suggested that 

visual observers should be trained on 

the applicable sections of part 91. 

ALPA recommended development of 

guidance material outlining appropriate 

background and training for the visual 

observer, defining appropriate subjects 

for the operator/pilot to discuss with the 

visual observer prior to flight, and 

clarifying what constitutes visual 

observation in the context of safe UAS 

operation. Similarly, TTD requested that 

the FAA issue guidance indicating the 

training that visual observers should 

complete, and asserted that, without any 

requirement to display skill proficiency 

or determine vision quality, neither the 

visual observer, pilot, nor FAA can be 

sure that the visual observer is reliable. 

NAAA stated that having a set of 

untrained eyes does little to enhance 

safety if the visual observer sees a safety 

threat that the remote pilot does not see. 

As discussed previously, the role of a 

visual observer is limited to simply 

communicating what he or she is seeing 

to the person manipulating the flight 

controls (if that person is not the remote 

pilot in command) and the remote pilot 

in command. Special training and 

testing is not necessary for a person to 

be able to communicate what he or she 

is seeing to another person. Thus, this 

rule will not require visual observers to 

complete special training courses or 

pass a test prior to serving as a visual 

observer. While the FAA has not 

included provisions in the rule to 

require visual observer airman 

certification or training, the FAA may, 

in the future, issue guidance to assist 

remote pilots who choose to utilize the 

visual observer function. 

The FAA also emphasizes that under 

the other requirements of this rule, the 

remote pilot in command must, prior to 

flight, provide important information to 

the visual observer. This information 

will include an understanding of the 

operating conditions, emergency 

procedures, contingency procedures, 

roles and responsibilities, and potential 

hazards. The remote pilot in command 

must also ensure that the visual 

observer understands and can properly 

utilize the method by which he or she 

will be maintaining effective 

communication with the remote pilot in 

command and the person manipulating 

the flight controls of the small UAS (if 

that person is not the remote pilot in 

command). 

Many commenters generally 

emphasized the remote pilot’s 

responsibility to ensure that the visual 

observer is competent and appropriately 

trained. SWAPA supported the use of 

visual observers but emphasized that 

under the FAA’s proposal, the onus 

would be on the remote pilot to ensure 

any visual observers used in the 

operation were familiar with all aspects 

of the operation. Similarly, Aerius 

Flight encouraged the FAA to require 

the remote pilot to ensure that the visual 

observer has become familiar with the 

critical aspects of the operation prior to 

assuming duties. NBAA stated that the 

remote pilot should ensure that a visual 

observer, if used, understands the limits 

of small UAS operations. 

Planehook stated that training and 

certification of visual observers should 

be an internal function unique to 

companies and organizations that 

regularly require the use of visual 

observers for their commercial 

operations. Another commenter 

emphasized that the UAS remote pilot 

is responsible for all aspects of each 


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82See https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/

policyinformation/pubs/hf/pl11028/chapter4.cfm 

(stating that 87% of the population aged 16 or older 

holds a driver’s license). 

flight and must be in charge of selecting 

and training visual observers. 

Additionally, several commenters, 

including Aviation Management and the 

Colorado Cattlemen’s Association, 

mentioned that remote pilots should be 

responsible for briefing visual observers. 

Aviation Management emphasized the 

requirement for the remote pilot to 

ensure that all persons involved in the 

small UAS operation receive a briefing 

that includes operating conditions, 

emergency procedures, contingency 

procedures, roles and responsibilities, 

and potential hazards. 

The FAA agrees that the remote pilot 

in command, in his or her role as the 

final authority over the small UAS 

operation, has ultimate responsibility 

for the safety of the operation and 

therefore should be responsible for 

selecting, training, and informing the 

visual observer (if one is used). The 

FAA also agrees with the commenters 

that a visual observer should be 

informed and understand all critical 

aspects of the small UAS operation prior 

to flight. That is why this rule will 

require the remote pilot in command to 

ensure that all persons directly 

participating in the small UAS 

operation, including the visual observer, 

are informed about the operating 

conditions, emergency procedures, 

contingency procedures, roles and 

responsibilities, and potential hazards. 

A joint submission from the State of 

Nevada, the Nevada Institute for 

Autonomous Systems, and the Nevada 

FAA-designated UAS Test Site said that 

the visual observer should be required 

to self-certify that he or she has the 

aeronautical knowledge and visual 

acuity necessary to safely perform the 

small UAS operation. AUVSI, Prioria 

Robotics, the Professional Society of 

Drone Journalists, and several other 

commenters said that the visual 

observer should be required to hold a 

valid U.S.-issued driver’s license or an 

FAA-issued medical certificate, which 

would ensure a visual test but not be 

overly burdensome. Planehook stated 

that the remote pilot should determine 

the medical suitability of any visual 

observer to perform pre-briefed duties. 

The FAA disagrees that a driver’s 

license should be a prerequisite to 

serving as a visual observer. As 

discussed in section III.F.2.a of this 

preamble, according to the DOT Office 

of Highway Policy Information, 13 

percent of the population aged 16 or 

older does not hold a State-issued 

driver’s license.82 Thus, requiring a U.S. 

driver’s license would create an undue 

burden for many visual observers 

without a significant increase in safety 

because the skills necessary to obtain a 

driver’s license are not the same skills 

needed to serve as a visual observer in 

a small UAS operation. 

The FAA also disagrees that selfcertification concerning aeronautical 

knowledge and visual acuity by a 

person acting as a visual observer 

should be required by this rule because, 

as discussed elsewhere in this preamble, 

this rule does not impose any 

aeronautical knowledge or visual acuity 

requirements on visual observers. A 

visual observer cannot self-certify that 

he or she meets requirements that do 

not exist in this rule. 

Finally, the FAA declines the 

suggestion to impose a specific duty on 

the remote pilot in command to 

determine the medical suitability of a 

visual observer. This rule does not 

require the remote pilot in command to 

be a doctor or have any medical 

training. As such, evaluating the 

potentially complex medical condition 

of another human being could be 

beyond the remote pilot in command’s 

expertise. The FAA notes, however, that 

it expects the remote pilot in command 

to exercise his or her authority when a 

potential visual observer is clearly 

incapable of carrying out his or her 

assigned duties. For example, the 

remote pilot in command would not be 

ensuring a safe small UAS operation if 

he or she designates a visual observer 

who clearly is incapacitated or is under 

the influence of alcohol or drugs at the 

time of the operation. 

c. Additional Visibility Requirements 

To further ensure that the person 

maintaining visual line of sight in a 

small UAS operation can see and avoid 

other aircraft, this rule will: (1) Limit 

small UAS operations conducted 

outside of daylight hours; and (2) 

impose weather-minimum and visibility 

requirements. 

i. Daytime Operations 

Due to the reduced visibility 

associated with nighttime operations, 

the NPRM proposed to prohibit the 

operation of a small UAS outside the 

hours of official sunrise and sunset. For 

the reasons discussed below, this rule 

will maintain the prohibition on 

nighttime operations but will allow 

small UAS operations to be conducted 

during civil twilight if the small 

unmanned aircraft has lighted anticollision lighting visible for at least 3 

statute miles. The nighttime-operations 

prohibition in this rule will also be 

waivable. 

Approximately 25 commenters 

generally supported the proposed 

prohibition on operations outside the 

hours of official sunrise and sunset. 

ALPA noted that the prohibition is 

consistent with the ARC 

recommendations. The MinneapolisSaint Paul Metropolitan Airports 

Commission (Metropolitan Airports 

Commission) asserted that nighttime 

operations introduce a number of visual 

illusions, and unlike manned-aircraft 

pilots, small UAS operators will not be 

required to complete comprehensive 

training programs that teach pilots how 

to deal with these illusions. The City 

and County of Denver, Colorado noted 

that allowing operations only in the 

lightest of conditions will increase the 

probability of avoidance in the event of 

a conflict. 

Federal Airways provided some 

conditions and limitations under which 

they would support nighttime 

operations of UAS, but ultimately noted 

that if the goal is to be as least 

burdensome as possible, limiting 

operating hours to daylight hours only 

would eliminate the need for further 

specification in lighting requirements. 

The American Association of Airport 

Executives and Barrick Gold of North 

America, Inc. concurred with the 

nighttime operation prohibition, but 

added that in the future, technological 

advances may provide the opportunity 

to allow nighttime operations. 

Other commenters objected to the 

proposed prohibition on nighttime 

operations. Skycatch, Clayco, AECOM 

and DPR Construction, commenting 

jointly, and several individuals, 

suggested that the proposed prohibition 

on nighttime operations be entirely 

eliminated from the final rule. Cherokee 

Nation Technologies and The 

Information Technology and Innovation 

Foundation asserted that nighttime 

operations can be safer than daytime 

operations because there is less air 

traffic and there are fewer people on the 

ground. EEI and AUVSI suggested that 

nighttime UAS operations are safer and 

less disruptive than nighttime mannedaircraft operations such as helicopters 

circling overhead. Virginia 

Commonwealth University Honors 

Students said the proposed ban on 

nighttime operations ignores the use of 

other senses, particularly sound, to 

detect and avoid other aircraft. DJI 

stated that because manned aircraft 

operating at night are required to be 

equipped with lighting, UAS operators 

would be able to satisfy their see-andVerDate Sep<11>2014 18:09 Jun 27, 2016 Jkt 238001 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\28JNR2.SGM 28JNR2

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83The comment provided a link to a news article 

containing a short summary of the Kansas State 

University UAS Program’s preliminary analysis of 

its research but did not provide the actual research. 

The linked article also did not include all of the 

assumptions and methodology used in the research 

or the data collected during testing. Finally, the 

article concluded by noting that ‘‘more analysis is 

needed.’’ As a result, the FAA does not currently 

have sufficient information to evaluate the research 

cited in the comment. 

84Civil twilight in Alaska is discussed later in 

this section of the preamble. 

avoid requirements, even when 

operating at night. 

A large number of commenters who 

opposed the daytime-only restriction of 

small UAS operations proposed several 

methods of mitigating hazards. The 

mitigation strategies were generally 

related to improving visibility to 

support see-and-avoid, augmenting seeand-avoid with technology, 

implementing additional restrictions for 

operations at night, and requiring 

additional certification or training. For 

example, the Airborne Law Enforcement 

Association, NBAA, and the National 

Ski Areas Association said nighttime 

operations of small UAS could be 

conducted safely if the aircraft is 

equipped with proper lighting. The 

National Association of Broadcasters, 

National Cable & Telecommunications 

Association and Radio Television 

Digital News Corporation, commenting 

jointly, and the Associated General 

Contractors of America supported 

nighttime operations in well-lit areas, 

such as closed sets or sites of sporting 

events. The Kansas State University 

UAS Program cited preliminary research 

that, it argued, indicates that UAS 

equipped with navigation lights are 

often easier to see at night than during 

the day.83

Nighttime operations pose a higher 

safety risk because the reduced visibility 

makes it more difficult for the person 

maintaining visual line of sight to see 

the location of other aircraft. While the 

existence of other lighted manned 

aircraft may be apparent due to their 

lighting, the distance and movement of 

small unmanned aircraft relative to the 

distance and movement of those aircraft 

is often difficult to judge due to the 

relative size of the aircraft. In addition, 

visual autokinesis (the apparent 

movement of a lighted object) may occur 

when the person maintaining visual line 

of sight stares at a single light source for 

several seconds on a dark night. For this 

reason, darkness makes it more difficult 

for that person to perceive reference 

points that could be used to help 

understand the position and movement 

of the lighted manned aircraft, the small 

unmanned aircraft, or other lighted 

object. 

The lack of reference points at night 

is problematic for small UAS subject to 

part 107 because they are not required 

to have any equipage that would help 

identify the precise location of the small 

unmanned aircraft. As such, a remote 

pilot in command operating under this 

rule will generally rely on unaided 

human vision to learn details about the 

position, attitude, airspeed, and heading 

of the unmanned aircraft. This ability 

may become impaired at night due to a 

lack of reference points because all a 

remote pilot may see of his or her 

aircraft (if it is lighted) is a point of light 

moving somewhere in the air. For 

example, a lighted small unmanned 

aircraft flying at night may appear to be 

close by, but due to a lack of reference 

points, that aircraft may actually be 

significantly farther away than the 

remote pilot perceives. An impairment 

to the remote pilot’s ability to know the 

precise position, attitude, and altitude 

of the small unmanned aircraft would 

significantly increase the risk that the 

small unmanned aircraft will collide 

with another aircraft. 

In addition to avoiding collision with 

other aircraft, remote pilots in command 

must also avoid collision with people 

on the ground, as well as collision with 

ground-based structures and obstacles. 

This is a particular concern for small 

UAS because they operate at low 

altitudes. When operating at night, a 

remote pilot may have difficulty 

avoiding collision with people or 

obstacles on the ground which may not 

be lighted and as a result, may not be 

visible to the pilot or the visual 

observer. As such, this rule will not 

allow small UAS subject to part 107 to 

operate at night (outside of civil 

twilight) without a waiver. 

The Motion Picture Association of 

America (MPAA) and several 

individuals recommended that small 

UAS operations be permitted between 

civil dawn and civil dusk. The 

commenters stated that there is 

sufficient light during civil twilight to 

see and avoid ground-based obstacles. 

One commenter compared UAS to 

ultralight vehicles, citing precedent in 

§ 103.11(b), which allows ultralight 

vehicles to be operated during civil 

twilight, provided the vehicle is 

equipped with an operating anticollision light visible for at least 3 

statute miles. The Drone User Group 

Network suggested that with 

appropriate lighting, a small UAS would 

in fact be more visible in low light than 

during the day, thus enabling the remote 

pilot to exercise his or her visual-lineof-sight responsibility. Many of the 

comments cited photography as a type 

of operation that could be conducted 

during twilight hours. 

Civil twilight is a period of time that, 

with the exception of Alaska,84

generally takes place 30 minutes before 

official sunrise and 30 minutes after 

official sunset. The FAA agrees with 

commenters that operations during civil 

twilight could be conducted safely 

under part 107 with additional risk 

mitigation because the illumination 

provided during civil twilight is 

sufficient for terrestrial objects to be 

clearly distinguished during clear 

weather conditions. As a result, many of 

the safety concerns associated with 

nighttime operations are mitigated by 

the lighting that is present during civil 

twilight. That is why current section 

333 exemptions permit twilight UAS 

operations. Accordingly, this rule will 

allow a small UAS to be operated during 

civil twilight. 

However, while civil twilight 

provides more illumination than 

nighttime, the level of illumination that 

is provided during civil twilight is less 

than the illumination provided between 

sunrise and sunset. To minimize the 

increased risk of collision associated 

with reduced lighting and visibility 

during twilight operations, this rule will 

require small unmanned aircraft 

operated during civil twilight to be 

equipped with anti-collision lights that 

are visible for at least 3 statute miles. 

A remote pilot in command may 

reduce the intensity of the anti-collision 

lights if, because of operating 

conditions, it would be in the interest of 

safety to do so. For example, the remote 

pilot in command may reduce the 

intensity of anti-collision lights to 

minimize the effects of loss of night 

vision adaptation. The FAA emphasizes 

that anti-collision lighting will be 

required under this rule only for civil 

twilight operations; a small unmanned 

aircraft that is flown between sunrise 

and sunset need not be equipped with 

anti-collision lights. 

The FAA acknowledges that current 

exemptions issued under Public Law 

112–95, section 333 allow civil twilight 

operations without a requirement for 

anti-collision lighting. However, the 

section 333 exemptions do not exempt 

small UAS operations from complying 

with § 91.209(a), which requires lighted 

position lights when an aircraft is 

operated during a period from sunset to 

sunrise (or, in Alaska, during the period 

a prominent unlighted object cannot be 

seen from a distance of 3 statute miles 

or the sun is more than 6 degrees below 

the horizon). As such, UAS currently 

operating under a section 333 


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exemption have lighting requirements 

when operating during civil twilight. 

However, while current section 333 

exemptions rely on position lighting, it 

would be impractical for this rule to 

prescribe specifications for position 

lighting for civil twilight operations 

because a wider range of small 

unmanned aircraft will likely operate 

under part 107. Position lighting may 

not be appropriate for some of these 

aircraft. Thus, instead of position 

lighting, small unmanned aircraft 

operating under part 107 will be 

required to have anti-collision lights 

when operating during civil twilight. 

The FAA also notes that 

meteorological conditions, such as haze, 

may sometimes reduce visibility during 

civil twilight operations. Accordingly, 

the FAA emphasizes that, as discussed 

in the following section of this 

preamble, this rule also requires that the 

minimum flight visibility, as observed 

from the location of the ground control 

station, must be no less than 3 statute 

miles. 

Several commenters, including the 

Nature Conservancy, MPAA, 

Commonwealth Edison Company, the 

American Fuel & Petrochemical 

Manufacturers, and the Newspaper 

Association of America, suggested that 

certain types of operations should be 

exempt from the proposed nighttime 

prohibition. These operations include: 

Emergency operations, public service 

operations, hazardous material 

response, railroad incident 

management, public utility inspection 

and repair, pipeline monitoring, thermal 

roof inspections using infrared 

technology, conservation-related 

operations in sparsely populated areas, 

ski area operations where people and 

property can be easily avoided, newsreporting, and filming in controlled, 

well-lit areas. The American Farm 

Bureau and several other commenters 

claimed that certain UAS operations are 

best conducted at night. These 

operations include research and 

humanitarian operations, crop 

treatments, wildfire fighting, nocturnal 

wildlife monitoring, infrastructure 

monitoring, and operations using 

infrared and thermal imaging cameras. 

The Property Drone Consortium stated 

that a daylight-only requirement would 

restrict the ability of its members to 

conduct thermal imaging using small 

UAS. 

Commonwealth Edison stated that the 

proposed restriction to daylight-only 

operations would constrain the ability 

to use small UAS to respond to 

emergencies that occur outside of 

daylight hours. Similarly, NRECA stated 

that the restriction to daylight 

operations would severely impede its 

members’ ability to respond to electrical 

grid emergencies caused by weather. 

Both Commonwealth Edison and 

NRECA suggested that the final rule 

include deviation authority to allow 

nighttime operations if it can be shown 

that such operations can be conducted 

safely. Similarly, Boeing, the University 

of North Dakota’s John D. Odegard 

School of Aerospace Sciences, and DJI 

recommended that the proposed 

nighttime-operation prohibition be 

amended to allow waivers to be 

authorized by the Administrator to 

accommodate time-critical and 

emergency operations that may need to 

be conducted at night if those 

operations can be conducted safely. 

The FAA agrees with commenters that 

there could be benefits to allowing 

certain small UAS operations at night, 

such as search and rescue or firefighting 

operations when those operations are 

conducted as civil operations. As such, 

the nighttime-operation prohibition in 

this rule will be waivable. The FAA will 

consider granting a certificate of waiver 

allowing a nighttime small UAS 

operation if an applicant can 

demonstrate sufficient mitigation such 

that operating at night would not reduce 

the level of safety of the operation. 

The American Petroleum Institute 

recommended an exception for Alaska’s 

North Slope, an area of significant 

operations for the oil and gas industry. 

The commenter noted that there are no 

daylight hours for approximately 3 

months of the year in that area. 

The same safety concerns exist in 

northern Alaska as they do anywhere in 

the United States during periods of 

darkness. However, as discussed 

previously, this rule will allow small 

UAS operations to be conducted during 

civil twilight. This will add significantly 

greater flexibility to Alaska operations 

because for the northernmost portions of 

Alaska, the sun never rises for as many 

as 64 days a year. By allowing 

operations to take place during civil 

twilight, this rule will allow small UAS 

operations year round, even in Alaska’s 

North Slope. In addition, as discussed 

previously, the FAA will consider 

granting a certificate of waiver for 

specific nighttime operations if the 

applicant can demonstrate that 

operating at night will not reduce the 

safety of the operation. 

Qualcomm, FLIR Systems, the Drone 

User Group Network, and several 

individuals supported operations at 

night utilizing technology such as nightvision cameras to allow the aircraft to be 

safety piloted. The Association of 

American Railroads contended that 

risks associated with nighttime 

operations could be mitigated by 

requiring small unmanned aircraft to be 

equipped with sense-and-avoid 

technology approved by the FAA. 

Kapture Digital Media and another 

commenter asserted that night-visionenabled FPV cameras are available that 

would aid in seeing-and-avoiding other 

aircraft and hazards at night. The South 

Dakota Department of Agriculture 

suggested that the FAA prescribe a 

performance-based standard in lieu of 

daylight-only restrictions, thus allowing 

for the integration of new risk-mitigating 

technologies as they are developed and 

refined. The Colorado Cattlemen’s 

Association suggested that risks related 

to low-light and nighttime operations 

could be mitigated through 

technological equipage. 

For the reasons discussed earlier in 

this preamble, existing vision-enhancing 

devices, such as FPV, do not currently 

provide a field of vision sufficient for 

the user to safely see and avoid other 

aircraft. Current sense-and-avoid 

technology would also insufficiently 

mitigate the risk associated with flying 

at night because this technology is still 

in its early stages of development. As of 

this writing, there is no sense-and-avoid 

technology that has been issued an 

airworthiness certificate. The FAA will 

keep monitoring this technology as it 

develops and may incorporate it, as 

appropriate, into certificates of waiver, 

future UAS rules, or possible future 

revisions to part 107. 

Several commenters suggested 

permitting nighttime operations by 

further segmenting the small UAS 

category of aircraft by lesser weights or 

lower operational altitudes. However, 

even a relatively light small unmanned 

aircraft could cause a hazard by 

colliding with another aircraft in the 

NAS or an object on the ground. As 

discussed previously, these safety risks 

are more prevalent at night due to 

reduced visibility. While low weight 

could be one mitigation measure that a 

person could use to support a waiver 

application, this factor, by itself, would 

be unlikely to mitigate the additional 

risk associated with a nighttime small 

UAS operation. 

Embry-Riddle and the Florida 

Department of Agriculture, Consumer 

Services’ UAS Working Group (Florida 

Department of Agriculture) proposed 

allowing operators possessing 

additional certification to fly at night. 

Textron Systems and several 

individuals recommended additional 

training for night operations. 

As discussed previously, this initial 

small UAS rulemaking effort is intended 

to immediately integrate the lowest risk 

small UAS operations into the NAS. The 


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FAA plans to address higher risk 

operations and the mitigations 

necessary to safely conduct those 

operations, such as the mitigations 

suggested by the commenters, in future 

agency actions. The FAA will consider 

the commenters’ recommendations as 

part of future rulemaking efforts to 

integrate higher-risk UAS operations, 

such as nighttime operations, into the 

NAS. 

AUVSI, Prioria Robotics, and a joint 

submission from Skycatch, Clayco, 

AECOM, and DPR Construction pointed 

to Australia and New Zealand as 

examples of countries where nighttime 

operations have been safely conducted 

in areas with established UAS 

regulations. In keeping with U.S. 

obligations under the Convention on 

International Civil Aviation, it is FAA 

policy to conform to ICAO SARPs to the 

maximum extent practicable. However, 

there are currently no ICAO SARPs that 

correspond to the nighttime-operation 

provisions of these regulations. Because 

the integration of UAS into the NAS is 

an incremental process, the FAA will 

continue expanding UAS operations to 

include those that pose greater amounts 

of risk, utilizing data gleaned from 

industry research, the UAS test sites, 

and international UAS operations. 

Matternet and the Mercatus Center at 

George Mason University cited § 101.17, 

stating that kites and moored balloons 

operate safely at night, with specific 

lighting requirements, even though they 

are not equipped with the kinds of 

sense-and-avoid technologies likely 

included in small UAS systems. 

As discussed previously, sense-andavoid technology does not currently 

provide sufficient mitigation to enable 

nighttime operations. In addition, while 

kites and moored balloons operated 

under part 101 are permitted to operate 

at night, § 101.15 requires the kite or 

moored balloon operator to notify the 

nearest ATC facility of the details of the 

operation at least 24 hours prior to each 

operation. Because kites and moored 

balloons governed by part 101 operate 

in a fixed location, this ATC notification 

allows ATC to disseminate details of the 

operation to other aircraft in the area. 

Conversely, with some exceptions, 

small UAS operating under part 107 in 

Class G airspace will not be required to 

communicate with ATC prior to or 

during the operation. 

One commenter suggested that small 

UAS operations be limited to the period 

between one half hour after official 

sunrise and one half hour before official 

sunset, arguing that it is not uncommon 

for small unmanned aircraft to have 

low-visibility color schemes. However, 

it is not necessary to further reduce 

operations conducted near sunset or 

sunrise to mitigate the risk of small UAS 

operations in low light conditions. As 

discussed previously, low-light 

conditions provide sufficient lighting to 

mitigate many of the safety concerns 

underlying the prohibition on nighttime 

operations. 

ii. Weather/Visibility Minimums 

The NPRM also proposed additional 

visibility and cloud-clearance 

requirements to ensure that the person 

maintaining visual line of sight has 

sufficient visibility to see and avoid 

other aircraft. Specifically, the NPRM 

proposed a minimum flight visibility of 

at least 3 statute miles from the location 

of the ground control station. The 

NPRM also proposed that the small 

unmanned aircraft must maintain a 

minimum distance from clouds of no 

less than: (1) 500 feet below the cloud; 

and (2) 2,000 feet horizontally away 

from the cloud. This rule will finalize 

these minimum-flight-visibility and 

cloud-clearance requirements as 

proposed in the NPRM but will make 

those requirements waivable. 

Commenters including NAAA, ALPA, 

and Commonwealth Edison Company 

supported the proposed minimum flight 

visibility and distance-from-clouds 

requirements. Commonwealth Edison 

asserted that the proposed visibility 

requirements, in combination with the 

other proposed operational 

requirements, would ‘‘safeguard safety 

while recognizing reasonable 

commercial interests in such a rapidly 

evolving technological environment.’’ 

NAAA stated that the proposed 

requirements are consistent with the 

VFR visibility requirements under 14 

CFR 91.155 and 91.115. The 

Professional Helicopter Pilots 

Association strongly agreed that 

‘‘weather minimums be at least basic 

VFR.’’ ALPA also agreed that all 

operations must take place in visual 

meteorological conditions (VMC) with 

the identified cloud clearances. ALPA 

further recommended that it be made 

clear that the 3-mile visibility 

requirement for VMC does not mean 

that the visual-line-of-sight required 

elsewhere in the proposed regulation 

can necessarily be maintained at 3 

miles. 

Modovolate Aviation, NAMIC, the 

Property Drone Consortium, and a few 

individuals generally opposed the 

imposition of minimum flight visibility 

and distance-from-cloud requirements. 

The commenters asserted that such 

requirements are unnecessary, given the 

visual-line-of sight requirement of 

§ 107.31. Modovolate stated that it is 

unlikely that an operator can keep a 

small UAS in sight at a distance of 3 

miles, so a separate weather-visibility 

requirement is redundant. Modovolate 

also stated that a small UAS operator 

cannot maintain visual contact with his 

small UAS if it is flown in a cloud, but 

he would be able to fly his small UAS 

closer than 500 or 1,000 feet to a welldefined cloud without risk. 

The Professional Society of Drone 

Journalists (PSDJ), and Edison Electric 

Institute, individually and jointly with 

NRECA and APPA, recommended the 

removal of the cloud distance 

requirements altogether. PSDJ asserted 

that the proposed cloud distance 

requirements would render many types 

of weather coverage and research 

projects impossible and would also 

make it impossible for small UAS to 

replace high-risk manned flights, ‘‘such 

as inspecting tower, bridges, or other 

structures,’’ as contemplated by the 

NPRM. The Travelers Companies, Inc. 

recommended the removal of the 

requirement that small UAS maintain a 

distance of no less than 2,000 feet 

horizontally from a cloud, claiming it is 

not relevant or workable for pilots flying 

small UAS from the ground. Aerial 

Services added that the safety concerns 

associated with cloud clearance will be 

alleviated with automation, the 

maximum altitude restriction, and the 

restriction on the use of small UAS in 

the vicinity of airports. 

Several other commenters generally 

supported the imposition of minimum 

flight visibility and cloud clearance 

requirements, but said the proposed 

minimum requirements should be 

reduced. Commenters including State 

Farm, AUVSI, the Unmanned Safety 

Institute, and DJI, argued that the 

minimum flight visibility and cloud 

distance should be reduced to 1 statute 

mile and changed to ‘‘remain clear of 

clouds.’’ AUVSI asserted that this 

reduced requirement will reflect the 

small size, low speeds, and additional 

operating limitations of small UAS. 

EEI said the proposed regulation is 

too restrictive, especially in areas prone 

to low cloud cover. The commenter 

argued that, as long as the operator 

maintains visual line of sight with the 

small UAS, the aircraft should be 

permitted to navigate up to 500 feet, 

regardless of the elevation of the clouds 

above 500 feet. In a joint comment, EEI, 

NRECA, and APPA noted that under the 

proposed visibility rules, for every foot 

cloud cover dips below 1,000 feet, the 

small UAS dips a foot below 500 feet, 

so that cloud cover at 500 feet would 

ground all small UAS operations. The 

commenters suggested that operations 

in Class G airspace should be allowed 

up to 500 feet AGL, or the height of 


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85The specific parameters suggested by the 

commenter consisted of flight at or below 200 feet 

AGL and at least (a) 5 nautical miles from an airport 

having an operational control tower; (b) 3 nautical 

miles from an airport with a published instrument 

flight procedure, but not an operational tower; (c) 

2 nautical miles from an airport without a 

published instrument flight procedure or an 

operational tower; or (d) 2 nautical miles from a 

heliport with a published instrument flight 

procedure. 

86 14 CFR 91.117. 

cloud cover, whichever is lower. Exelon 

Corporation further suggested the rule 

include permission to operate on the 

transmission and distribution rights-ofway at altitudes not to exceed the tops 

of the structures plus 50 feet without 

weather visibility restrictions. The News 

Media Coalition suggested eliminating 

the flight-visibility and cloud-clearance 

requirements for UAS operated within 

the parameters in the blanket COA for 

section 333 exemptions.85

As discussed earlier, under this rule, 

the remote pilot in command will be 

responsible for observing the operating 

environment for other aircraft and, if 

necessary, maneuvering the small 

unmanned aircraft to avoid a collision 

with other aircraft. However, there is a 

significant speed difference between a 

manned aircraft and a small unmanned 

aircraft. Under part 91, a manned 

aircraft flying at low altitude could 

travel at speeds up to 230 to 288 miles 

per hour (mph).86 On the other hand, a 

small unmanned aircraft operating 

under this rule will have a maximum 

speed of 100 mph and many small 

unmanned aircraft will likely have a far 

lower maximum speed. 

Because of this difference in 

maximum speed, the remote pilot in 

command will need time to respond to 

an approaching manned aircraft. A 

minimum flight visibility requirement 

of 3 statute miles is necessary to ensure 

that the remote pilot in command can 

see far enough away to detect a manned 

aircraft near the area of operation in 

time to avoid a collision with that 

aircraft. Additionally, cloud clearance 

provisions that require the small 

unmanned aircraft to maintain a 

distance of at least 500 feet below the 

cloud and 2,000 feet horizontally away 

from cloud are necessary to reduce the 

possibility of having a manned aircraft 

exit the clouds on an unalterable 

collision course with the significantly 

slower small unmanned aircraft. 

Accordingly, this rule will retain the 

proposed minimum-flight-visibility 

requirement of 3 statute miles and 

minimum cloud-distance requirements 

of 500 feet below the cloud and 2,000 

feet horizontally away from the cloud. 

In response to ALPA’s concern, the 

FAA clarifies that the minimum-flightvisibility and visual-line-of-sight 

requirements of this rule are separate 

requirements that must both be 

satisfied. The visual-line-of-sight 

requirement of § 107.31 is intended to 

ensure that the person maintaining 

visual line of sight can see the small 

unmanned aircraft and the immediately 

surrounding airspace. It is unlikely that 

a person will be able to maintain visual 

line of sight of a small unmanned 

aircraft in compliance with § 107.31 if 

that aircraft is 3 miles away from him 

or her. Conversely, the 3-mile visibility 

requirement of § 107.51 is intended 

simply to ensure that the person at the 

control station is able to see relatively 

larger manned aircraft that may rapidly 

be approaching the area of operation. 

Southern Company suggested that 

small UAS operations should mirror the 

VFR weather minimums for mannedhelicopter flight and that the Special 

VFR minimums under 14 CFR 91.157 

should also apply to small UAS 

operations to the extent available for 

helicopters. The commenter suggested 

that small UAS operations would satisfy 

the requirements for Special VFR flight, 

because only ATC authorization is 

necessary before Special VFR flight and 

all small UAS must receive an ATC 

clearance when operating in controlled 

airspace. The commenter also asserted 

that the use of helicopter minimums is 

appropriate in this rule because, like 

helicopters, a small UAS is highly 

maneuverable and easier to land than 

fixed-wing aircraft. The Small UAV 

Coalition similarly suggested that the 

FAA adopt the helicopter cloudclearance test for small UAS. 

The FAA acknowledges that the part 

107 visibility requirements for small 

UAS operations in Class G airspace will 

be more stringent than the requirements 

of part 91. Part 91 allows aircraft 

operating in Class G airspace to operate 

with 1 statute mile visibility and simply 

requires the aircraft to keep clear of 

clouds. However, as numerous 

commenters pointed out, small UAS 

operating under this rule may, as a 

result of their size, be difficult to see for 

manned-aircraft pilots. Additionally, 

unlike manned aircraft, small 

unmanned aircraft will not be required 

to carry equipage, such as TCAS and 

ADS–B, that aids in collision avoidance. 

Because of the additional challenges 

with collision avoidance raised by small 

UAS operating under part 107, a more 

stringent visibility requirement is 

necessary than the one imposed by part 

91 on manned-aircraft operations in 

Class G airspace. 

Vail Resorts asked the FAA to reduce 

or eliminate cloud clearance 

requirements in certain terrain, or with 

certain mitigation in place (e.g., a 

lighting system on the small UAS). The 

commenter stated that the minimumflight-visibility and distance-from-cloud 

requirements are unnecessarily 

restrictive in a high alpine environment 

where the potential for interaction with 

manned aircraft is incredibly remote, 

and can be mitigated by other 

limitations. Venture Partners asserted 

that its products will contain onboard 

technology and capabilities that will 

allow UAS to operate in adverse 

weather conditions. 

The FAA agrees that there could be 

operations in areas where the likelihood 

of interaction with manned aircraft is 

reduced or in which the risk of collision 

with a manned aircraft is mitigated by 

other means (such as technological 

equipage). Accordingly, the FAA has 

made the visibility and cloud-clearance 

requirements of part 107 waivable and 

will consider individual operating 

environments and other mitigations as 

part of its review of a waiver request. 

The FAA plans to use data acquired as 

part of the waiver process to inform 

future agency actions that will further 

integrate UAS into the NAS. 

The Airborne Law Enforcement 

Association requested an exception 

from the 3-mile minimum flight 

visibility requirement for public safety 

operations, saying that, with the visualline-of-sight restriction, ‘‘there are many 

opportunities to safely utilize UAS 

technology to the benefit of public 

safety operations.’’ The Organization of 

Fish and Wildlife Information Managers 

recommended a disaster-response 

exemption from the 3-mile flight 

visibility requirement, asserting that 

UAS flights in conditions with less than 

3 miles of visibility could be integral in 

protecting human life and natural 

research welfare in the event of a manmade or natural disaster. 

As discussed earlier, this rule will not 

apply to public aircraft operations 

unless the operator chooses to conduct 

the operation as a civil aircraft. Thus, 

public aircraft operations, such as 

public safety operations conducted by 

law enforcement agencies, will not be 

subject to part 107. With regard to the 

other specific types of operations 

mentioned in the comments, as 

discussed previously, the minimumflight-visibility and cloud-clearance 

requirements of this rule will be 

waivable. Thus, operations conducted 

for salutary purposes, such as the ones 

mentioned by the commenters, could be 

authorized through the waiver process if 

the remote pilot establishes that the 

operation can safely be conducted under 

the terms of a certificate of waiver. 


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The Metropolitan Airports 

Commission, Airports Council 

International-North America, the 

American Association of Airport 

Executives, and Exelon Corporation 

recommended that the requirement for 3 

miles of visibility be from the location 

of the small unmanned aircraft and not 

from the location of the ground control 

station. The Metropolitan Airports 

Commission stated that the 3-mile 

visibility requirement is based on a 

manned aircraft pilot’s vantage point 

positioned inside the aircraft, which 

provides a 3-mile observation radius 

around the aircraft to see and avoid 

potential hazards. Airports Council 

International-North America claimed 

that a 3-mile visibility requirement from 

the unmanned aircraft instead of the 

ground control station will prevent 

cases where the UAS operator operates 

an aircraft at the limit of the operator’s 

line of sight. Lloyd’s Market Association 

and the International Underwriting 

Association said the 3-mile minimum 

flight visibility requirement may be 

difficult to administer and police, and 

wondered if maximum wind speeds 

have been taken into account. 

This rule will retain the requirement 

that the minimum visibility must be 

measured from the control station. The 

reason for this requirement is to allow 

the person manipulating the flight 

controls of the small UAS to see other 

aircraft that could be entering the area 

of operation. The person manipulating 

the small UAS flight controls will be 

located at the control station (since the 

control station is the interface used to 

control the flight), and thus the 

minimum-visibility requirement must 

be measured from the control station. 

With regard to the comment arguing that 

the 3-mile minimum flight visibility 

requirement may be difficult to 

administer and police, the remote pilot 

in command must, among other things, 

ensure that the small UAS operation 

complies with part 107. 

This rule will not impose prescriptive 

requirements on maximum permissible 

wind speed because there is a wide 

range of small UAS that could be 

operated under part 107. These UAS 

will have varying ability to respond to 

wind and a prescriptive regulatory 

requirement would be more stringent 

than necessary on certain small UAS 

while being less stringent than 

necessary on other UAS. Instead, 

§ 107.49(a)(1) will require the remote 

pilot in command to assess local 

weather conditions as part of the 

preflight assessment required by 

§ 107.49. If the remote pilot in command 

determines that the wind speed is too 

high to safely conduct the small UAS 

operation, then he or she will have to 

either reschedule the operation or 

implement mitigations to ensure the 

safety of the operation. 

One commenter asked the FAA to 

clarify whether the 3-mile flight 

visibility requirement is horizontal 

visibility or slant angle visibility. The 

commenter asserted that there are many 

situations where radiation or advection 

fog might obscure horizontal visibility 

yet bright blue sky is visible above the 

fog. 

The 3-mile flight visibility 

requirement is based on a slant angle 

from the control station. In other words, 

a person standing at the control station 

of the small UAS must be able to see at 

a diagonal distance of 3 miles into the 

sky in order to detect other aircraft that 

may be approaching the area of 

operation. This requirement ensures 

that the remote pilot in command can 

effectively observe the airspace for 

presence of other aircraft, and reduces 

the possibility of the remote pilot or 

visual observer losing sight of the 

unmanned aircraft. To further clarify 

this concept, the FAA has amended 

§ 107.51(c) to explain that flight 

visibility refers to the average slant 

distance from the control station at 

which prominent unlighted objects may 

be seen and identified by day and 

prominent lighted objects may be seen 

and identified by night. 

The University of North Dakota’s John 

D. Odegard School of Aerospace 

Sciences suggested that the rule prohibit 

small UAS operations above clouds 

because those operations could 

endanger manned aircraft flying under 

instrument flight rules (IFR). In 

response, the FAA notes that a person 

is unlikely to be able to maintain visual 

line of sight of a small unmanned 

aircraft that is flying above the clouds. 

Schertz Aerial Services, the 

Permanent Editorial Board of the 

Aviators Model Code of Conduct 

Initiative, and the City and County of 

Denver, Colorado suggested that the 

proposed flight-visibility and minimumcloud-distance requirements be 

increased. Schertz Aerial Services said 

that because UAS are so much smaller 

than manned aircraft, the proposed 3- 

mile flight visibility requirement, which 

was developed for manned aircraft, is 

not adequate for UAS and should be 

increased to 5 statute miles. Denver also 

recommended increasing the minimum 

flight visibility requirement to 5 statute 

miles, but only in controlled airspace. 

The commenter additionally 

recommended the imposition of a 2,000- 

foot ceiling for operations in controlled 

airspace. ‘‘Those visibility 

enhancements,’’ Denver continued, 

‘‘will maximize opportunities for both 

the operator and other aircraft pilots to 

successfully employ the see-and-avoid 

technique.’’ 

One commenter said the minimum 

flight visibility requirement should be 

increased to 10 to 12 miles and the 

distance-from-cloud requirements 

should both be increased by 1,000 feet. 

Another commenter said the FAA 

should set a specific percentage or range 

for cloud coverage to be allowed during 

flight, in addition to the distance-fromcloud requirements. 

The FAA recognizes the fact that 

increased flight visibility would provide 

more time for the remote pilot in 

command to maneuver away from other 

aircraft. However, the likelihood of the 

remote pilot seeing other small UAS, 

other smaller aircraft, or other hazards 

such as power lines or antennas from a 

distance of five or more miles is not 

probable, so such a requirement would 

not create an additional safety buffer. A 

5-mile visibility requirement above 

10,000 feet mean sea level (not 

including the surface to 2,500 feet above 

ground level) is imposed by part 91 

because manned-aircraft pilots have a 

need for increased visibility at that 

higher altitude due to permitted 

airspeeds above 288 mph. A remote 

pilot in command, on the other hand, 

will remain on the ground and will have 

to deal with ground obstacles that 

impede vision. The remote pilot in 

command will also be looking into the 

sky at a slant angle from the ground 

rather than horizontally in the manner 

of a manned-aircraft pilot. This means 

that a remote pilot will generally be 

challenged to perceive useful 

information from his or her vision 

beyond three miles. An increase in the 

cloud distance requirements poses the 

same dilemma, unless the object is large 

enough or distinct enough it will not 

likely be visible early enough to provide 

the opportunity to avoid or change 

course sooner. 

PlaneSense and Cobalt Air, 

commenting jointly, recommended 

prohibiting a remote pilot from 

operating a small UAS if the ceiling is 

lower than 1000 feet MSL. The 

commenters contended that for manned 

aircraft, the pilot is in the aircraft and 

is therefore better able to make a 

determination about the distance to a 

cloud from the aircraft than an operator 

on the ground positioned 1/4 mile away 

from the unmanned aircraft. 

The FAA declines to prohibit small 

UAS operations when cloud ceilings are 


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87The commenters referred to 1,000 feet MSL, but 

the FAA assumes the commenter intended to 

recommend a prohibition of operations with a 

ceiling less than 1,000 feet AGL. 

lower than 1,000 feet AGL.87

Specifically, the FAA disagrees that the 

remote pilot in command will not be in 

a position to determine whether the 

unmanned aircraft is positioned 

sufficiently far enough from a cloud to 

meet the requirements of § 107.51(d). 

While this rule does not require specific 

technological equipage to determine 

altitude of the unmanned aircraft, 

nothing in this rule precludes the 

remote pilot in command from doing so 

as a means to mitigate the risk of cloud 

clearance requirements. A remote pilot 

in command may also opt to operate the 

unmanned aircraft at a sufficiently low 

altitude that he or she can easily 

determine the aircraft’s altitude. 

Further, cloud ceilings can be 

determined through nearby AWOS/

ASOS/ATIS reports, visual cloud 

observations, or observation of 

obscuration of nearby prominent 

landmarks of a known elevation. If a 

remote pilot in command cannot ensure 

that the unmanned aircraft will 

maintain sufficient cloud clearance in 

accordance with § 107.51(d), that person 

may not conduct operations until 

weather conditions improve. As such, 

no minimum ceiling requirement is 

necessary in this rule. 

Noting that the NPRM would not 

require a qualified weather observer, 

one commenter questioned who is 

responsible for determining visibility at 

the time of the operation. The 

commenter further questioned if the 

regulation has a requirement for the 

airman trained and certificated for small 

UAS to receive training and 

demonstrate competence in making 

accurate visibility determinations. 

Another commenter also questioned 

who determines visibility, and 

recommended that FAA require as a 

minimum that VMC exist and that the 

closest Official Weather Reporting 

Station be used. 

Under this rule, the remote pilot in 

command is ultimately responsible for 

determining whether a flight can be 

conducted safely. As part of the 

preflight assessment required by 

§ 107.49, the remote pilot in command 

must evaluate local weather conditions, 

which includes an evaluation of 

whether those conditions are sufficient 

to meet the requirements of § 107.51(c) 

and (d). With regard to competence, as 

discussed in section III.F.2.j of this 

preamble, knowledge of aviation 

weather sources that can be used to 

inform the small UAS operation will be 

tested on both the initial and recurrent 

aeronautical knowledge test. The initial 

aeronautical knowledge test will also 

test the airman certificate applicant’s 

knowledge of effects of weather on 

small unmanned aircraft performance. 

For the reasons discussed in section 

III.F.2.e of this preamble, formal training 

and practical testing requirements are 

not a necessary component of this rule. 

iii. Yielding Right of Way 

For the reasons discussed below, this 

rule will finalize the NPRM-proposed 

requirement that small unmanned 

aircraft must yield the right of way to all 

other users of the NAS but will make 

that requirement waivable. As discussed 

in the NPRM, the smaller visual profile 

of the small unmanned aircraft, the lack 

of collision-avoidance technology on the 

aircraft, and the difference in speed 

between the unmanned and manned 

aircraft increases the difficulty for 

manned-aircraft pilots to see and avoid 

the small unmanned aircraft. As such, 

this rule will require that the small 

unmanned aircraft always be the one to 

initiate an avoidance maneuver to avoid 

collision with any other user of the 

NAS. This rule will also include the 

NPRM-proposed requirement 

prohibiting the operation of a small 

unmanned aircraft so close to another 

aircraft as to create a collision hazard. 

Approximately 20 commenters agreed 

with the proposal that small unmanned 

aircraft must always yield the right of 

way to all other users of the NAS. 

Several commenters stated that the 

requirement is sensible because small 

unmanned aircraft are more difficult to 

see than manned aircraft. Numerous 

other commenters, including NAAA, 

stated that small unmanned aircraft are 

more maneuverable than manned 

aircraft and therefore would have less 

difficulty taking evasive action to avoid 

a collision with a manned aircraft. 

On the other hand, the Small UAV 

Coalition suggested that in certain 

circumstances it may be preferable to 

have a manned-helicopter yield to a 

small unmanned aircraft. The Small 

UAV Coalition presented a scenario 

where a small UAS is being operated to 

film a newsworthy event. If a manned 

helicopter were to arrive later to also 

film the event, under the proposed rule, 

the small UAS would be required to 

yield right of way to the helicopter. The 

commenter suggested that safety would 

be better served if both the manned and 

unmanned aircraft maintained 

awareness so as to see and avoid each 

other and proposed that part 107 adopt 

the right-of-way rules currently used in 

part 91. Another commenter suggested 

that the FAA should consider creating 

different right-of-way rules for different 

classes of NAS users. 

Requiring small unmanned aircraft to 

always yield the right of way to all other 

users of the NAS is a critical component 

of the see-and-avoid framework of part 

107. As discussed in the NPRM, the 

small size associated with small 

unmanned aircraft will make those 

aircraft more difficult to detect for 

manned-aircraft pilots. Additionally, 

small UAS operating under this rule 

will not be required to be equipped with 

collision avoidance technology, such as 

transponders or TCAS, that would make 

it easier for manned-aircraft pilots to 

detect a small unmanned aircraft 

operating in their vicinity. Conversely, 

because of the far larger size and higher 

noise profile of manned aircraft, the 

person maintaining visual line of sight 

as part of a small UAS operation will be 

in a far better position to detect other 

users of the NAS and initiate maneuvers 

to avoid a collision. 

As such, this rule will retain the 

proposed requirement that the small 

unmanned aircraft must always be the 

one to initiate an avoidance maneuver 

to avoid collision with any other user of 

the NAS. This rule will make this 

requirement waivable for individual 

small UAS operations (if the proposed 

operation can safely be conducted under 

the terms of a certificate of waiver), but 

will otherwise retain the right-of-way 

requirement as proposed in the NPRM. 

When yielding the right of way, the 

small unmanned aircraft should 

optimally yield to manned aircraft in 

such a manner that the manned aircraft 

is never presented with a see-and-avoid 

decision or the impression that it must 

maneuver to avoid the small unmanned 

aircraft. The FAA also emphasizes that 

in extreme situations where collision is 

imminent, the remote pilot in command 

must always consider the safety of 

people first and foremost over the value 

of any equipment, even if it means the 

loss of the small unmanned aircraft. 

An individual suggested that the FAA 

clarify that it is the remote pilot’s 

responsibility, more so than that of a 

manned aircraft pilot, to exercise due 

diligence to prevent other aircraft from 

having to take evasive action to avoid 

the small unmanned aircraft. 

The FAA emphasizes that it is the 

responsibility of all users of the NAS to 

avoid a collision. However, this rule 

places a duty on the small unmanned 

aircraft to always yield the right of way 

to other users of the NAS because the 

remote pilot in command will have a 

better ability to detect those users. 

Specifically, due to size, noise, and 

equipage considerations that apply to 

manned aircraft, it will be easier for a 


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remote pilot to detect a manned aircraft 

operating in his or her vicinity than for 

a manned aircraft pilot to detect a small 

unmanned aircraft. 

The Small UAV Coalition sought 

clarification on what it means to ‘‘give 

way to the other aircraft or vehicle and 

may not pass over, under, or ahead of 

it unless well clear.’’ The Air Medical 

Operators Association, HAI, and an 

individual noted that the NPRM does 

not define the term ‘‘well clear.’’ The 

Small UAV Coalition asserted that ‘‘this 

explanation would permit a sUAS 

operator to take precedence over a 

manned helicopter provided the UAV 

remain ‘well clear’ of the manned 

helicopter.’’ 

Under this rule, yielding the right of 

way means that the small unmanned 

aircraft must give way to the other 

aircraft or vehicle and may not pass 

over, under, or ahead of the other 

aircraft/vehicle unless well clear. The 

term ‘‘well clear’’ means that the small 

unmanned aircraft is far enough away 

from the other aircraft or vehicle that it 

no longer presents a hazard to that 

aircraft or vehicle. Thus, if a manned 

aircraft enters the area of operation, the 

small unmanned aircraft must initiate 

maneuvers to ensure that it maintains a 

distance from the manned aircraft such 

that there is no risk of collision with 

that aircraft. In response to the Small 

UAV Coalition, the FAA notes that there 

is no right-of-way issue if two aircraft 

are far enough apart that they do not 

present a hazard to each other. 

One commenter suggested that this 

rule allow the remote pilot in command 

to determine the specifics of how to 

yield the right of way to another aircraft. 

The FAA declines to allow a remote 

pilot in command to pass over, under, 

or ahead of a manned aircraft if the 

small unmanned aircraft is not well 

clear of the manned aircraft. Compared 

to a pilot onboard a manned aircraft, it 

may be more difficult for a remote pilot 

in command to judge the relative 

altitude of another aircraft in flight. 

Further, the remote pilot will generally 

be limited to a maximum operating 

ceiling of 400 feet AGL, as specified in 

§ 107.51(b), and the manned aircraft will 

likely be moving significantly faster 

than the small unmanned aircraft. As 

such, it is critical that the remote pilot 

in command not attempt to maneuver 

the unmanned aircraft to pass over, 

under, or ahead of a manned aircraft 

unless well clear, as doing so may 

present a hazard to the manned aircraft. 

Several commenters, including the 

Property Drone Consortium, Southern 

Company, and several individuals 

generally focused on right-of-way 

situations involving two or more small 

unmanned aircraft. The Property Drone 

Consortium and two individuals 

questioned how two unmanned aircraft 

could yield the right of way to each 

other. Southern Company proposed that 

the FAA treat ‘‘conflicts between small 

UAS as conflicts between aircraft of the 

same category.’’ 

This rule will not treat conflicts 

between two small unmanned aircraft 

the same manner that the FAA has 

traditionally treated conflicts between 

two aircraft of the same category 

because the rules that apply to aircraft 

of the same category (§ 91.113(d) and 

(e)) are not easily applied to small UAS. 

For example, under § 91.113(d), when 

two aircraft of the same category are 

converging, the aircraft to the other’s 

right has the right of way. For manned 

aircraft, it is easy for a pilot to 

distinguish whether an aircraft is to the 

pilot’s right or left. For unmanned 

aircraft, however, a remote pilot’s 

perspective depends on where the 

remote pilot is located on the ground 

relative to his or her small unmanned 

aircraft. Therefore, applying the 

traditional manned-aircraft right-of-way 

rules to small UAS may cause 

confusion. 

Instead of imposing a specific right-ofway requirement on conflicts between 

two small unmanned aircraft, this rule 

will require the remote pilot in 

command to use his or her best 

judgment to avoid other small 

unmanned aircraft in the NAS. 

Specifically, under § 107.37(b), each 

remote pilot in command will have to 

take whatever maneuvers are necessary 

to ensure that his or her small 

unmanned aircraft is not flying so close 

to other unmanned aircraft as to create 

a collision hazard. 

NAAA, Raebe Spraying Service, 

Boeing, the Property Drone Consortium, 

the Colorado Agricultural Aviation 

Association, and an individual 

expressed concern regarding the 

proximity of unmanned aircraft to 

manned-aircraft operations. Each 

commenter proposed resolving the 

conflicts with a specified range 

requirement. NAAA suggested that UAS 

operations be prohibited within a 2-mile 

vicinity of ongoing aerial application 

operations due to the seemingly 

unpredictable flight patterns and 

‘‘unique nature of ag operations.’’ 

This rule will not impose a 

prescriptive numerical range 

requirement on small unmanned aircraft 

because the distance needed to remain 

well clear of another user of the NAS 

will vary depending on the specific 

small UAS and manned aircraft 

involved, as well as the operating 

environment. The FAA understands that 

agricultural operations may present 

seemingly unpredictable flight patterns 

to an observer. However, the visual-lineof-sight requirements of this rule ensure 

that the remote pilot in command will 

be able to visually observe the small 

unmanned aircraft at all times during 

the operation. This direct observation 

will allow the remote pilot to react 

appropriately to any other users in the 

NAS that may approach his or her small 

unmanned aircraft. The right-of-way 

requirements ensure that the remote 

pilot yields to any other users of the 

NAS and prioritizes the safety of people 

above preventing any damage to the 

small unmanned aircraft. 

Aviation Management, State Farm, 

Prioria Robotics, and an individual 

commented on aspects of technology 

that would affect right-of-way rules. 

Aviation Management, State Farm, and 

another commenter suggested that the 

FAA modify the language of the rule to 

take into account prospective use of 

technology to aid in the deconfliction of 

manned and unmanned aircraft. 

The FAA agrees that there is much 

promise for technology to aid in the 

deconfliction of manned and unmanned 

aircraft, but that technology (referred to 

as ‘‘sense and avoid’’ technology) is still 

in its infancy. As of this writing, the 

FAA does not have data indicating that 

sense and avoid technology has matured 

to the point needed to allow a small 

unmanned aircraft to reliably avoid a 

collision with a manned aircraft. The 

FAA notes that the visual-line-of-sight 

and see-and-avoid requirements of part 

107 are both waivable and that the 

waiver process will allow the FAA to 

allow the use of sense-and-avoid 

technology on a case-by-case basis. The 

FAA intends to use the data acquired 

from the waiver process to inform future 

agency actions to further integrate small 

UAS into the NAS. 

One commenter asked the FAA to 

amend proposed § 107.37(a)(2) to 

require the small unmanned aircraft to 

also avoid a collision with ground-based 

obstacles. The FAA declines to 

categorically limit how close a small 

unmanned aircraft may get to a groundbased obstacle. Some small UAS 

operations, such as bridge and tower 

inspections, may need to fly closely to 

a ground-based obstacle in order to 

successfully conduct the operation. 

Unlike collision with a manned aircraft, 

there could be instances where collision 

with a ground-based obstacle does not 

endanger human life. However, the FAA 

emphasizes the requirement of 

§ 107.23(a), which prohibits a person 

from operating a small UAS in a careless 

or reckless manner so as to endanger the 

life or property of another. 


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d. Additional Technology/Conspicuity 

Requirements 

While the NPRM did not propose to 

require any technological equipage for 

small UAS operating under part 107, 

several commenters suggested either 

adding these requirements to part 107 or 

otherwise recognizing small UAS that 

may be equipped with technology that 

mitigates the safety concerns underlying 

the provisions of part 107. Commenters 

also suggested imposing conspicuity 

requirements on small unmanned 

aircraft. For the reasons discussed 

below, this rule will not impose 

additional conspicuity requirements on 

small UAS operating under part 107 nor 

will it require those UAS to have any 

technological equipage. The FAA will 

consider any technologically based 

mitigations equipped on a small UAS as 

part of the waiver process. 

i. ADS–B, Transponders, and TCAS 

Some commenters, including Daniel 

Webster College, NAAA, CAPA, and the 

Air Medical Operators Association, 

stated that there should be a 

requirement for small UAS to be 

equipped with ADS–B. Daniel Webster 

College, NAAA, the California Aviation 

Agricultural Association, and the 

Colorado Aviation Agricultural 

Association (CoAAA) recommended an 

ADS–B Out equipment requirement to 

increase small UAS visibility. NAAA 

and CoAAA said ADS–B Out 

technology, or the like, should be 

required pending its effectiveness and 

usability to track UAS. 

Several of the commenters who 

supported an ADS–B requirement 

addressed the availability of ADS–B 

systems for small UAS. NAAA and 

CoAAA stated that ADS–B Out 

equipment is currently available on the 

market for use in UAS. NAAA asserted 

that these units weigh as little as 300 

grams and cost as little as $1,200. 

Airware also asserted that ADS–B Out 

transponders currently exist that are 

small and cost effective enough for 

small UAS. The company noted, 

however, that this technology is only 

suitable for uncontrolled airspace 

because transponders are not currently 

certificated by the FAA. One commenter 

said that a technologically and 

economically feasible option would be 

to use ‘‘the more inexpensive, heavy, 

and power-hungry ADS–B 

transponder[s]’’ by placing them on the 

ground near the operator. This would 

work, the commenter said, because most 

missions include a reliable command 

and control data link between a UAS 

and its ground operator. 

Modovolate recommended ADS–B 

Out and In requirements for small UAS 

weighing between 20 and 55 pounds. 

The company noted that the purpose of 

ADS–B In (i.e., equipment to receive 

and present ADS–B information to the 

small UAS operator) is to alert the 

operator to manned aircraft in the 

general vicinity, so that the operator can 

take precautionary action to avoid the 

manned aircraft once it is within the 

operator’s line of sight. An individual 

similarly recommended that all small 

UAS over 1.5 kilograms should have a 

capability for ADS–B In for operators to 

be able to sense and avoid other aircraft. 

Several commenters discussed an 

ADS–B requirement for small UAS in 

the context of the FAA’s 2020 deadline 

for equipping manned aircraft with the 

same technology. The Air Medical 

Operators Association and Schertz 

Aerial Services recommended the same 

deadline be imposed for small UAS. 

Schertz Aerial Services said that five 

years ‘‘will provide an adequate amount 

of time for ADS–B Out to miniaturize 

and lower in cost, so that ADS–B Out 

can be more practically incorporated 

into UAS.’’ The Metropolitan Airports 

Commission pointed out specifically 

that the 2020 deadline would apply to 

manned aircraft operating in Class B 

airspace, and recommended that FAA 

‘‘strongly consider’’ an ADS–B Out 

requirement for small UAS operating in 

Class B airspace. The Commission noted 

that, because ADS–B equipment is 

developed in larger quantities, the cost 

to equip small UAS may become 

reasonable. 

AMA and the Experimental Aircraft 

Association (EAA) also noted the 2020 

deadline for manned aircraft to be 

equipped with ADS–B Out equipment, 

and said any requirement for ADS–B 

Out in small UAS should not ‘‘justify 

further equipment requirements for GA 

aircraft.’’ The commenters stressed ‘‘the 

importance of maintaining the current 

timeline and requirements for ADS–B.’’ 

Several commenters recommended 

ADS–B requirements in certain 

circumstances. CAPA stated that ADS– 

B (along with TCAS with a mode S 

transponder) should be the minimum 

standard for UAS operations above 400 

feet and within airport airspace. 

Another commenter said small UAS 

should have ADS–B Out to operate 

‘‘within the Class B mode-C veil and/or 

inside Class D airspace.’’ A few 

individuals said ADS–B should be 

required for all operations above a 

certain number of feet AGL—i.e., 100 

feet, 200 feet, and 400 feet AGL. 

Another individual proposed that ADS– 

B be ‘‘encouraged’’ for ‘‘small’’ UAS 

(i.e., rotary craft less than 2 kg, fixed 

wing less than 6 kg), be required for 

‘‘medium’’ UAS (i.e., rotary craft, less 

than 4 kg, fixed wing 6–12 kg), and be 

required for ‘‘large’’ UAS (rotary craft 

less than 20 kg, fixed wing 12–24 kg). 

The FAA acknowledges the concerns 

raised by the commenters, but notes that 

the risk associated with the operation of 

an aircraft need not always be mitigated 

through technological equipage. While 

there are benefits associated with 

technological equipage, there can also 

be significant costs in the form of 

installation, airworthiness certification 

(to ensure that the equipage is 

functional, reliable, and properly 

installed), maintenance, and, ultimately, 

replacement of the equipage. The FAA 

considered imposing equipage 

requirements in this rule, but ultimately 

decided against this because the risk 

associated with certain small UAS 

operations (i.e. the operations subject to 

part 107) can be mitigated through 

operational restrictions without any 

equipage requirements. 

As discussed earlier, this rule 

mitigates the see-and-avoid risk 

associated with small UAS use by 

requiring that: (1) The small unmanned 

aircraft remain within visual line of 

sight; (2) the small unmanned aircraft 

yield right of way to all other users of 

the NAS; (3) the minimum flight 

visibility must be at least 3 statute 

miles; and (4) the small unmanned 

aircraft maintain a minimum distance 

away from clouds. The FAA recognizes 

that there are many small UAS 

operations that will seek to go beyond 

these operational parameters, and 

equipage requirements may be one 

measure that the FAA uses to mitigate 

the risk associated with those operations 

when it integrates them into the NAS. 

However, as discussed earlier in this 

preamble, there are numerous small 

UAS operations that can be conducted 

within the operational parameters of 

part 107. By mitigating the risk 

associated with those operations 

through operational restrictions, this 

rule will realize the societal benefits of 

integrating the lowest-risk small UAS 

operations without imposing the costs 

associated with equipage requirements. 

The FAA also notes that many of the 

operational restrictions in this rule are 

waivable. Technology such as ADS–B 

may be a mitigation that a person uses 

to support his or her waiver application 

by showing that the operation could 

safely be conducted under the terms of 

a certificate of waiver. 

Commenters including CAPA, the 

Professional Helicopter Pilots 

Association, the American Association 

for Justice, and the Center for 

Democracy and Technology, 


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88See 14 CFR 91.215(b)(1). 

89 14 CFR 91.225(d)(1). 

90See 14 CFR 91.215(b) and 91.225(d). 

recommended the inclusion of a 

transponder requirement for small UAS. 

The American Association for Justice 

asserted that ‘‘[a]mple evidence exists to 

suggest that small UAS should be 

required to have transponders or other 

position tracking equipment to ensure 

our airspace remains safe.’’ The 

association noted that in the last year, 

there have been at least 25 reports of 

near misses between commercial, 

passenger-carrying planes and UAS. 

According to the association, these 

reports indicated that, because the UAS 

do not have transponders and are too 

small to show up on radar or anticollision warning systems, they 

appeared suddenly and only became 

visible when it is too late for the pilot 

of the manned aircraft to change course. 

Another commenter said it was ‘‘not 

prudent’’ to only rely on ‘‘visual line of 

sight separation by a UAS team’’ to 

conduct operations in the NAS. 

‘‘Inclusion of mini transponders created 

for UAS only,’’ as well as the use of 

beacon lights and high visibility 

markings, the commenter continued, 

‘‘should be a good start toward 

increasing the safety in the NAS.’’ 

Another individual noted that 

operations in controlled airspace 

‘‘would be enhanced by UAS specific 

transponders and TCAS equipment.’’ 

Even with this technology, however, the 

commenter noted that operations in 

some locations within Class B, C, D and 

E airspace ‘‘might not be appropriate or 

allowed.’’ The Professional Helicopter 

Pilots Association said operations in 

Class B airspace should only be 

permitted if the UAS is equipped with 

a ‘‘certified transponder or other 

certified multi-dimensional positionlocating device’’ that is operational at 

least above 200 feet AGL. The 

association also said this requirement 

should eventually be applied to all UAS 

being flown in all U.S. airspace. Noting 

the absence of a transponder 

requirement for small UAS, the Human 

Factors and Ergonomics Society 

expressed concern about UAS 

inadvertently entering Class B airspace 

(particularly in places where Class G 

airspace underlies Class B airspace), 

although it did not go so far as to say 

a transponder should be required. 

Several supporters of a transponder 

requirement addressed the availability 

of transponders for small UAS, which 

the NPRM stated are currently too large 

and too heavy to be used in small UAS. 

An individual commenter said 

transponder technology does not yet 

exist to be put on UAS. Several other 

individuals and Airware, on the other 

hand, said such technology does exist. 

One individual said there are 

manufacturers of miniature 

transponders on the market today and 

that all UAS should have such 

transponders, ‘‘so that ATC can track 

the operations to ensure safety of the 

NAS.’’ Another individual said the 

‘‘technical ability to provide a[] unique 

transponder signal for each aircraft 

exists at this time.’’ The commenter said 

a transponder requirement will ‘‘lead to 

accountability,’’ making it more difficult 

‘‘for a headless operator to create a 

violation . . . without being identified.’’ 

Another commenter said there are 

transponder/ADS–B units that are 

designed for small UAS and weigh 100 

grams. 

As of this writing, no small scale 

transponders have received FAA or FCC 

certification for use on small UAS. 

Additionally, as discussed earlier, the 

person maintaining visual line of sight 

of the small unmanned aircraft will 

have the same (if not better) ability to 

see incoming aircraft as a pilot onboard 

a manned aircraft. With regard to the 

near-misses (better known as near midair collisions) cited by the American 

Association for Justice, this rule will 

require the small unmanned aircraft to 

be the one to initiate a maneuver to 

avoid collision with a manned aircraft. 

Thus, there would be little safety benefit 

to requiring a small unmanned aircraft 

operating under part 107 to carry 

equipage to notify manned-aircraft 

pilots of its presence, as the manned 

aircraft pilots will not be required to 

yield right of way to the small 

unmanned aircraft. 

Turning to concerns about operations 

in controlled airspace, this rule will 

prohibit small UAS operations in Class 

B, Class C, Class D, and within the 

lateral boundaries of the surface area of 

Class E airspace designated for an 

airport without prior authorization from 

the ATC facility having jurisdiction over 

the airspace. The FAA factors 

information such as traffic density, the 

nature of operations, and the level of 

safety required when determining 

whether to designate controlled 

airspace. The requirement for small 

UAS to receive approval from the ATC 

facility with jurisdiction over the 

airspace in which the remote pilot in 

command would like to conduct 

operations allows local ATC approval to 

provide a safer and more efficient 

operating environment. 

Because these other provisions of part 

107 provide a sufficient safety margin, 

a transponder equipage requirement is 

not necessary in this rule. In the 

aggregate, this regulatory framework 

equally accommodates all types of small 

UAS with the least complexity and 

burden, while ensuring the safety of the 

NAS. 

Several commenters addressed 

applying certain provisions of part 91 

stipulating that an aircraft cannot 

operate in controlled airspace unless it 

is equipped with an operable 

transponder and ADS–B equipment. 

WaDOT pointed out that, with some 

exceptions, § 91.215 requires registered 

aircraft to have an operational 

transponder when operating in 

controlled airspace. Transport Canada 

questioned whether the FAA would 

require UAS to carry transponders when 

operating in transponder-required 

airspace, or, alternatively, whether the 

FAA was considering either a relief to 

the requirement or a prohibition on 

small UAS operations in transponderrequired airspace. GAMA stated that the 

transponder rules in § 91.215 and the 

ADS–B Out rules in §§ 91.225 and 

91.227 apply to small UAS because they 

are aircraft according to 49 U.S.C. 

40102(a)(6). GAMA expressed the view 

that small UAS must therefore meet the 

future transponder and ADS–B equipage 

requirements to operate in specified 

airspace despite the statements in the 

proposed rule that the FAA is not 

establishing equipment requirements for 

small UAS. 

As the commenters pointed out, part 

91 currently prohibits aircraft from 

entering certain airspace, such as Class 

B or C airspace, without a 

transponder.88 Additionally, after 

January 1, 2020, a person will also need 

ADS–B equipment to enter certain 

airspace, such as Class B or C airspace.89

However, part 91 gives ATC the ability 

to authorize aircraft to enter the 

pertinent airspace without the normally 

required transponder or ADS–B 

equipment.90 Similarly, by requiring the 

remote pilot in command to obtain ATC 

authorization prior to flying the small 

unmanned aircraft into Class B, C, or D 

airspace, or within the lateral 

boundaries of the surface area of Class 

E airspace designated for an airport, this 

rule will provide ATC with the same 

authority that it has under part 91 to 

determine whether an aircraft operation 

lacking a transponder or ADS–B can 

safely be conducted in controlled 

airspace. 

The City of Phoenix Aviation 

Department and CAPA stated that small 

UAS should also have or support some 

type of collision prevention equipment 

to assist the small UAS operator in 

maintaining a safe distance from 

manned aircraft in airspace adjacent to 


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airports. Specifically, the City of 

Phoenix Aviation Department noted that 

small UAS wanting to operate adjacent 

to airports should support awareness 

enhancing equipment (collision 

prevention equipment). CAPA stated 

that a small UAS operating above 400 

feet above ground level and within 

airport airspace should have TCAS with 

a Mode S transponder (in addition to 

anti-collision lighting and an ADS–B 

system). 

Several individuals also supported a 

TCAS requirement for UAS. One 

commenter, for example, said ‘‘larger 

UVA [sic] aircraft’’ should be required 

to be equipped with transponders and 

TCAS, and that ‘‘the UAV should be 

programmed to automatically turn away 

from conflicting TCAS targets to avoid 

collision.’’ 

As discussed earlier, this rule will 

mitigate the risk associated with small 

UAS operations primarily through 

operational restrictions rather than more 

costly technological equipage 

requirements. Additionally, transponder 

equipment on small UAS to support 

TCAS on other aircraft may have 

adverse consequences to the NAS. The 

transponder spectrum is already 

significantly strained during peak traffic 

times in high density areas such as the 

Northeast corridor. Adding a potentially 

large number of small vehicles into this 

environment on transponder 

frequencies would potentially make 

these frequencies unusable for ATC and 

other users. The FAA needs to study the 

effects such operations will have on our 

existing ATC surveillance using ADS–B 

and secondary surveillance radar, and 

airborne surveillance operations using 

ADS–B, TIS–B and TCAS to determine 

whether the potential benefits of adding 

small UAS to this transponder spectrum 

would justify the potential costs to the 

NAS and its users. 

ii. Radio Equipment 

Southern Company supported the fact 

that the proposed rule did not establish 

a requirement for radio communications 

for small UAS operating in controlled 

airspace. The company stated that 

receiving local ATC approval and 

working closely with FAA could result 

in a safer and more efficient operating 

environment at minimal cost to the 

operator. 

Conversely, Transport Canada 

questioned whether the statement in the 

NPRM that the proposed rule would not 

establish equipment requirements 

included radio equipment when 

operating in areas where ATC 

coordination/communication is a 

requirement. The commenter asserted 

that radio communication is a large 

contributor to the situational awareness 

of all pilots, and asked whether the FAA 

is considering mandating radio 

equipment, either on the aircraft or at 

the ground station, for operations in 

these areas. 

The Professional Helicopter Pilots 

Association and NAAA went one step 

further, recommending that small UAS 

operations in controlled airspace be 

required to meet part 91 requirements, 

which include a requirement for twoway radio communication with ATC. 

The Professional Helicopter Pilots 

Association stated that, at a minimum, 

the operator of a small UAS flying in 

controlled airspace should be required 

to monitor ATC frequency in the area in 

order to maintain situational awareness. 

The County of Los Angeles 

Department of Public Works 

recommended that FAA require small 

UAS operations to maintain two-way 

radio contact with ATC while operating 

in close proximity to an airport (airport 

influence area) or within Class B, C, or 

D airspace. PlaneSense and Cobalt Air 

similarly recommended that operators 

of small UAS operating in the airspace 

of an airport be required to have a radio 

to monitor air traffic at the airport and 

communicate with ATC. 

The Port of Los Angeles encouraged 

the FAA to consider requiring operators 

of small UAS to have two-way radio 

capability during all operations, not just 

those occurring in controlled airspace. 

The commenter noted the importance of 

radio communication between pilots, 

saying that the ability of small UAS 

operators to communicate with pilots of 

manned aircraft is particularly critical 

due to the relatively small size of the 

small unmanned aircraft and the 

difficulty pilots of manned aircraft may 

have in seeing and tracking small 

unmanned aircraft while airborne. The 

Colorado Agricultural Aviation 

Association also recommended a more 

general requirement for all UAS 

operators to be trained and equipped 

with an aviation radio. 

An individual said UAS weighing 

more than 10 pounds should be 

equipped with an FCC-approved VHF 

radio transmitter for the purposes of 

aiding identification from the ground or 

air, for manned-aircraft awareness of 

drone proximity, and to aid search and 

rescue operations. The commenter also 

recommended detailed specifications 

for the radio transmitter. Another 

commenter asked FAA to consider 

requiring that all small UAS transmit 

their GPS location, speed, and direction 

of flight on a shared radio channel. The 

commenter noted that the FLARM 

system used by glider pilots is capable 

of transmitting this, and other, 

information. 

NAAA, PlaneSense, and Cobalt Air 

asserted that cost of radio equipment for 

small UAS is low. NAAA noted that 

UAS operators could obtain relatively 

low-cost ground-based radio equipment, 

as opposed to more costly aircraftmounted systems. PlaneSense and 

Cobalt Air similarly asserted that the 

cost of a hand-held radio is not so 

expensive as to override the safety 

benefits of requiring its use in airport 

airspace. 

As discussed in section III.E.5 of this 

preamble, this rule mitigates the risk 

between small UAS and manned aircraft 

in controlled airspace by requiring the 

remote pilot in command to obtain 

permission from ATC before entering 

Class B, C, or D airspace or the lateral 

boundaries of the surface area of Class 

E airspace designated for an airport. In 

considering whether to grant permission 

to a small UAS to fly in controlled 

airspace, ATC will consider the specific 

nature of the small UAS operation and 

risk the operation poses to other air 

traffic in that controlled airspace. ATC 

facilities have the authority to approve 

or deny aircraft operations based on 

traffic density, controller workload, 

communications issues, or any other 

type of operation that would potentially 

impact the safe and expeditious flow of 

air traffic. Additionally, as discussed in 

section III.F.2.f of this preamble, an 

applicant for a remote pilot certificate 

who does not possess a part 61 pilot 

certificate or has not completed a flight 

review within the previous 24 calendar 

months will be required to pass an 

initial aeronautical knowledge test that 

will include knowledge of radio 

communication procedures. 

With regard to operations near an 

airport, as discussed in section III.E.5.e 

of this preamble, this rule will prohibit 

the small unmanned aircraft from 

interfering with air traffic at an airport. 

The FAA also notes that almost all 

airports in Class G airspace lack ATC 

facilities for the remote pilot in 

command to communicate with via 

radio. As such a prescriptive radio 

equipage requirement would not add 

sufficient risk mitigation to the other 

requirements of this rule (when taken as 

a whole) to justify the cost of imposing 

this additional requirement. 

The FAA also declines to generally 

require small UAS operations to have 

radio equipage. As discussed earlier, 

this rule will require small unmanned 

aircraft to always yield the right of way. 

The remote pilot in command need not 

communicate with the manned-aircraft 

pilot to accomplish this task; the remote 

pilot can simply maneuver the small 


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unmanned aircraft away from the 

manned aircraft. As such, requiring all 

small unmanned aircraft to carry radio 

equipment would be needlessly 

burdensome. 

Turning to search and rescue 

operations, because this rule limits 

operations of small UAS to low altitudes 

within visual line of sight of the remote 

pilot and visual observer, the FAA does 

not anticipate that it will be necessary 

to conduct a search and rescue 

operation to find a small unmanned 

aircraft. Additionally, a small 

unmanned aircraft will not have any 

people onboard who would need to be 

found and rescued in the event of a 

crash. 

The FAA acknowledges the 

usefulness of FLARM systems for 

gliders and UAS in foreign countries. 

However this technology has not been 

proven or certificated for use in the 

NAS. As such, the FAA will not 

mandate that this technology be 

equipped on small UAS operating under 

part 107. 

Aerius Flight objected to the proposed 

rule’s reliance on restricting operations 

to a confined area to mitigate the risks 

associated with a loss of positive 

control. The company asserted that this 

reliance fails to acknowledge that loss of 

positive control could result in a 

departure from the vertical boundaries 

of a confined area, which could be 

dangerous due to the nearly nationwide 

presence of low-level military training 

routes and low altitude special use 

airspace. With that in mind, Aerius 

recommended that the FAA conduct 

analysis of small UAS operations that 

may warrant a requirement that an 

operator have a mobile radio transceiver 

at the control station to contact ATC 

having authority for overlying airspace. 

The FAA agrees that a radio 

transceiver may assist a remote pilot in 

responding to a loss-of-positive-control 

situation. However, a radio transceiver 

(or other technology) would not be a 

necessary mitigation for all situations 

and, thus, the FAA declines to impose 

it as a requirement. For example, a 

remote pilot in command could mitigate 

loss-of-positive-control risk through 

non-technological means by selecting an 

area of operation with natural obstacles 

such as trees or mountains that would 

stop the small unmanned aircraft from 

flying away if the remote pilot loses 

positive control of the aircraft. Because 

there is a wide variety of small UAS and 

small UAS operations, this rule will not 

mandate a specific means of mitigating 

loss-of-positive control risk. Instead, 

this rule will require the remote pilot in 

command to ensure that the small 

unmanned aircraft will pose no undue 

hazard to other aircraft, people, or 

property in the event of a loss of control 

of the aircraft and will allow the remote 

pilot to select the specific method of 

achieving this result within the 

confined area of operation. 

iii. Lighting 

Several commenters, including the 

Air Medical Operators Association, 

AirTractor, and CropLife America, 

recommended that FAA require small 

unmanned aircraft to be equipped with 

strobe lights to increase visibility. 

NAAA, Colorado Agricultural Aviation 

Association, Reabe Spraying, and Plu’s 

Flying Service recommended a strobe 

light requirement for both the small 

unmanned aircraft and its associated 

operator’s ground vehicle. GAMA 

suggested that FAA ‘‘undertake a 

specific review’’ to consider, among 

other things, ‘‘whether specific 

additional steps should be taken to 

increase visibility of small UAS for 

agricultural pilots,’’ including through 

the use of equipment such as strobe 

lights. Another commenter asserted that 

technology is commercially available to 

equip even the smallest UAS with an 8 

gram LED strobe light, which can be 

powered off a ship’s battery beyond the 

duration of flight. 

Remote pilots can effectively see-andavoid other aircraft during daytime 

operations without an additional 

lighting requirement. By keeping the 

unmanned aircraft within visual line of 

sight of the remote pilot in command 

and visual observer with sufficient 

visibility, the remote pilot in command 

will be able to see the relatively large 

manned aircraft that may be entering the 

area of operation. The remote pilot in 

command will then have to give right of 

way to manned aircraft and ensure that 

the unmanned aircraft does not pose a 

hazard to aircraft operating nearby. 

While remote pilots are encouraged to 

make their aircraft as visible as possible, 

the diverse range of aircraft that may 

operate under part 107 make 

prescriptive lighting requirements for all 

types of operations impractical. Thus, as 

described in section III.E.2.c.i of this 

preamble, the FAA will only require 

lighting for small unmanned aircraft 

operating during periods of civil 

twilight. 

The Professional Helicopter Pilots 

Association suggested requiring small 

UAS to be equipped with a lighting 

system ‘‘intense enough to be visible 

during daylight and under bright 

sunlight conditions.’’ An individual 

stated that each UAS should have 

‘‘identification beacon lights,’’ which 

are unique to UAS but similar to 

manned aircraft. The United States 

Ultralight Association said UAS should 

be required to have a ‘‘visual anticollision beacon’’ that will make the 

UAS visible for 3 miles during daylight 

operations. 

Due to the diverse nature of small 

unmanned aircraft, intense lighting 

systems may prove impractical in many 

cases due to weight and size limitations. 

As discussed in the previous section, 

the remote pilot in command is directly 

responsible for yielding the right of way 

to any manned aircraft and ensuring 

that the small unmanned aircraft will 

pose no undue hazard to other aircraft. 

Further, the remote pilot must fly the 

aircraft in such a way that the pilot or 

the visual observer is able to observe the 

airspace for other conflicting traffic. 

Because the remote pilot will have the 

ability to see and avoid other aircraft 

under the visual-line-of-sight framework 

of part 107, this rule will not require 

lighting during daytime operations. 

A few commenters recommended 

requirements for specific lighting color 

schemes. Two individuals 

recommended requiring green and red 

lights. One of those commenters noted 

that this is the standard for marine 

navigation lights, which enables other 

vessels to determine if a ship is 

approaching or departing and if it is 

moving left or right. The other 

commenter also recommended the use 

of white lights for landing and white 

flashing lights for emergency situations. 

Another individual asserted that 

hobbyists already use high-intensity 

LED and/or strobe lights for orientation 

assistance, and that blue and red 

provide the greatest contrast on small 

models. Yet another commenter 

recommended ‘‘a pattern of 3 rapid red 

(.5 second intervals) a 1 second delay 

then 3 rapid white’’ while the pilot is in 

control, and in the event of a lost link, 

‘‘a continuous red white at .5 second 

intervals to indicate that the pilot has no 

command.’’ 

Position and navigation lights on an 

aircraft allow other pilots to observe the 

visible lights and determine the relative 

position of the aircraft and direction of 

flight. For many small unmanned 

aircraft, such as quadcopters, there is 

not a clearly defined relative position on 

the aircraft, so navigation lights would 

not be practical. The FAA disagrees that 

lighting requirements are necessary for 

an emergency situation because the risk 

associated with loss of aircraft control is 

mitigated by the other provisions of this 

rule. 

To ensure airspace division near 

airports, CAPA recommended requiring 

small UAS operating above 400 feet and 

within airport airspace to have 

minimum equipment requirements, 


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including ‘‘anti-collision lighting.’’ 

However, as discussed in section 

III.E.3.a.ii of this preamble, with one 

exception, this rule will not allow small 

unmanned aircraft to operate higher 

than 400 feet AGL. With regard to 

airports, remote pilots operating in the 

vicinity of airports, heliports, or 

seaplane bases in uncontrolled airspace 

may not operate a small unmanned 

aircraft in a manner that interferes with 

operations and traffic patterns. Further, 

the small unmanned aircraft may not 

enter controlled airspace without ATC 

permission. 

iv. Conspicuity 

Many commenters asserted that small 

unmanned aircraft may be difficult to 

see, both from the ground and from 

other aircraft operating in the NAS. For 

example, ALPA pointed out that many 

models of UAS are monochromatic or 

nearly so (either all black or all white), 

making them difficult to see against a 

non-contrasting background. The 

association urged FAA to develop 

conspicuity standards or advisory 

material discussing the factors 

influencing the ability to maintain 

visual contact. 

Another commenter stated that a 

commercial UAS is likely more difficult 

to see than other R/C model aircraft 

because model aircraft are usually 

painted with bright colors and flown in 

predictable locations. This commenter 

also said quadcopters and hexacopters, 

in particular, may be harder to see due 

to their ability to move very slowly and 

hover. The commenter added that these 

types of small unmanned aircraft are 

capable of climbing directly into the 

flight path of a manned aircraft, which 

may not see them because they are in an 

area obstructed by the nose of the 

manned aircraft. 

To resolve these issues, a number of 

commenters, including CoAAA, the 

California Agricultural Aircraft 

Association (CAAA), and the Permanent 

Editorial Board of the Aviators Model 

Code of Conduct Initiative, 

recommended a requirement for small 

unmanned aircraft to be coated in 

‘‘highly visible’’ or ‘‘high visibility’’ 

colors to contrast them from 

surrounding airspace and the ground. 

NAAA argued that FAA should require 

colors that make the unmanned aircraft 

‘‘readily distinguishable’’ from the 

background. 

NAAA pointed out that the FAA’s 

advisory circular on obstruction 

marking and lighting recommends 

‘‘[a]lternate sections of aviation orange 

and white paint should be used as they 

provide maximum visibility of an 

obstruction by contrast in colors.’’ 

CAAA and Raebe also supported 

standardized markings of white and 

orange paint. Schertz Aerial Services 

recommended a paint scheme where the 

underside of the UAS is painted black, 

the top is painted mostly white, and at 

least two areas of the UAS are painted 

‘‘florescent/aviation orange.’’ An 

individual suggested alternating 

aviation orange and red paint. Another 

individual recommended bright neon 

orange, red, or green. 

The FAA currently has no data 

indicating what color(s), if any, would 

enhance the conspicuity of small 

unmanned aircraft. Small unmanned 

aircraft operating under part 107 vary 

significantly by size, shape, and profile. 

As such, color patterns viable for one 

unmanned aircraft may not work for 

another unmanned aircraft. 

Additionally, contrasting colors cannot 

always be seen with varying light, 

weather, and cloud coverage, nor will 

specific colors always provide a 

contrasting effect. Very small unmanned 

aircraft also may not have the surface 

area or reflectivity to accept color 

patterns that would easily be seen by 

others not involved with the operation. 

Because of these considerations and 

in light of the fact that the risk of a 

midair collision is mitigated by the 

other provisions of this rule, the FAA 

will not require small unmanned 

aircraft to be painted in a specific color 

scheme. However, this rule does not 

restrict small UAS owners or remote 

pilots in command from painting a 

small UAS in a conspicuous manner if 

doing so would increase safety in their 

specific operating environment. The 

FAA will consider any conspicuityenhancing measures as a potential 

mitigation in support of an application 

for a waiver from the operating 

restrictions of part 107. 

3. Containment and Loss of Positive 

Control 

As discussed above, one of the issues 

unique to UAS operations is the 

possibility that during flight, the remote 

pilot in command may become unable 

to directly control the unmanned 

aircraft due to a failure of the control 

link between the aircraft and the remote 

pilot’s control station. This failure is 

known as a loss of positive control. 

Because the remote pilot’s direct 

connection to the aircraft is funneled 

through the control link, a failure of the 

control link could have significant 

adverse results. 

To address this issue, the NPRM 

proposed a performance-based standard 

built around the concept of a confined 

area of operation. Confining the flight of 

a small unmanned aircraft to a limited 

area would allow the remote pilot in 

command to become familiar with the 

area of operation and to create 

contingency plans for using the 

environment in that area to mitigate the 

risk associated with possible loss of 

positive control. For example, the 

remote pilot in command could mitigate 

loss-of-control risk to people on the 

ground by setting up a perimeter and 

excluding people not involved with the 

operation from the operational area. The 

remote pilot in command could also 

mitigate risk to other aircraft by 

notifying the local air traffic control of 

the small UAS operation and the 

location of the confined area in which 

that operation will take place. 

The following subsections discuss the 

concepts involved in the confined area 

of operation. Those concepts consist of: 

(1) The boundaries of the confined area 

of operation, and (2) mitigation of lossof-positive-control risk within the 

confined area of operation. 

a. Confined Area of Operation 

Boundaries 

The following subsections discuss: (1) 

The horizontal boundary of the confined 

area of operation and moving vehicles; 

and (2) the vertical boundary (maximum 

altitude) of the confined area of 

operation. 

i. Horizontal Boundary and Moving 

Vehicles 

With regard to the horizontal 

boundary of the confined area of 

operation, the visual-line-of-sight 

requirement discussed in section 

III.E.2.a of this preamble will create a 

natural horizontal boundary on the area 

of operation. Due to the distance 

limitations of human vision, the remote 

pilot in command or visual observer 

will be unable to maintain visual line of 

sight of the small unmanned aircraft 

sufficient to satisfy § 107.31 if the 

aircraft travels too far away from them. 

Accordingly, the visual-line-of-sight 

requirement in § 107.31 will effectively 

confine the horizontal area of operation 

to a circle around the person 

maintaining visual contact with the 

aircraft with the radius of that circle 

being limited to the farthest distance at 

which the person can see the aircraft 

sufficiently to maintain compliance 

with § 107.31. 

However, one way in which the 

horizontal area-of-operation boundary 

tied to the remote pilot in command’s 

line of sight could be expanded is for 

the remote pilot to be stationed on a 

moving vehicle or aircraft. If the remote 

pilot is stationed on a moving vehicle, 

then the horizontal area-of-operation 

boundary tied to the remote pilot’s line 


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91 Legal Interpretation to Leanne Simmons (2010). 

92 Legal Interpretation to Gary S. Wilson (2006); 

Legal Interpretation to Anderson (2009). 

93The FAA notes that the small unmanned 

aircraft flight will also have to comply with all 

other applicable requirements of this rule, 

including the prohibition on flight over people who 

are not directly participating in the small UAS 

operation (discussed in section III.E.3.b.iv of this 

preamble). 

of sight would move with the pilot, thus 

increasing the size of the small 

unmanned aircraft’s area of operation. 

To prevent this scenario, the NPRM 

proposed to prohibit the operation of a 

small UAS from a moving aircraft or 

land-borne vehicle. However, the FAA 

included an exception for water-borne 

vehicles in the NPRM reasoning that 

there are far fewer people and less 

property located on or over areas of 

water than on land. Consequently, a loss 

of positive control that occurs over 

water would present a significantly 

smaller risk of injuring a person or 

damaging property than a loss of 

positive control that occurs over land. 

For the reasons discussed below, this 

rule will maintain the proposed 

prohibition on operating a small UAS 

from a moving aircraft. This rule will, 

however, allow operation of a small 

UAS from a moving land-based or 

water-borne vehicle if the small 

unmanned aircraft is flown over a 

sparsely populated area. The 

prohibition against operating a small 

UAS from an aircraft and the limitations 

on operations from moving vehicles will 

be waivable as long as the small 

unmanned aircraft is not transporting 

another person’s property for 

compensation or hire. 

Several commenters, including ALPA, 

Aerius, and Drone User Group Network, 

concurred with the FAA that the 

operator should not be allowed to 

operate the small UAS from a moving 

vehicle or aircraft. NetMoby said the 

next generation of regulations can 

address this type of operation once a 

large database of information 

concerning the first generation of UAS 

operations has been developed. CAPA 

argued that the final rule should 

prohibit operation from all moving 

vehicles, including watercraft. The 

Professional Society of Drone Journalists 

stated that operations from any moving 

vehicle should only be permitted with 

special training and safeguards. 

A large number of other commenters, 

including MPAA, NAMIC, EEI, and 

MAPPS, specifically opposed a blanket 

prohibition on operations from moving 

land-based vehicles. AIA said that FAA 

should conduct ‘‘robust’’ risk analysis to 

determine if small UAS can be operated 

safely from moving land-based vehicles. 

NBAA stated that the FAA has not 

sufficiently justified the proposed 

prohibition of operations from moving 

land-based vehicles. 

Commenters provided a variety of 

reasons for why small UAS operations 

should be permitted from moving landbased vehicles. Modovolate asserted 

that such operations may be safer than 

operations from a stationary position 

because the operator can maintain a 

position closer to the small UAS. The 

Associated General Contractors of 

America and UPS claimed that 

operations from a land-based moving 

vehicle can be as safe as operations from 

a water-based moving vehicle, noting 

that both types of operations could lead 

to the small UAS flying over land. 

Vision Services Group said that 

allowing operations from a moving 

vehicle (with authorization from ATC or 

a COA issued by the FAA) will give the 

FAA an opportunity to begin collecting 

documentation on the safety of such 

operations in low-risk scenarios, as well 

as give commercial and public entities 

an opportunity to test the technology 

and practicality of moving land/waterbased ground station operations. 

Several commenters pointed to the 

beneficial operations that could be 

conducted if small UAS operators are 

permitted to extend the visual line of 

sight by operating from a moving landbased vehicle. EEI, Exelon Corporation, 

and Southern Company pointed to the 

inspection of objects that extend for 

miles, such as power lines, pipelines, 

railway lines, highways, and solar and 

wind farms as such beneficial 

operations. State Farm pointed to 

surveying catastrophe scenes. Aviation 

Management pointed to safety scouts 

leading and surveying railroad tracks in 

front of trains, and surveying for road 

hazards in front of trucks and 

emergency vehicles. Vision Services 

Group pointed to wetland and shoreline 

monitoring, and Modovolate pointed to 

photography and motion picture filming 

as beneficial operations that could be 

conducted from a moving land-based 

vehicle. 

The proposed rule would have 

allowed operation from watercraft due 

to the fact that water is typically 

sparsely populated. However, that is not 

always the case because some 

waterways are constantly or 

intermittently congested with 

watercraft, float planes and people. On 

the other hand, as pointed out by the 

commenters, not all land areas are 

congested; some areas of land, such as 

unpopulated areas or large open fields, 

are sparsely populated. ‘‘Sparsely 

populated’’ is not defined in FAA 

regulation—rather, it is typically factdependent. In a 2010 legal 

interpretation, the FAA cited Mickalich 

v. United States, 2007 WL 1041202 (E.D. 

Mich.) for a discussion of what 

constitutes a sparsely populated area.91

The court found that twenty people on 

a ten acre site would be considered 

sparsely populated under 14 CFR 

91.119(c). Additionally, in other legal 

opinions by the FAA, the agency has 

emphasized that it would adopt a caseby-case analysis in determining when a 

pilot violates § 91.119, which includes 

determining when an area is ‘‘sparsely 

populated.’’ 92

In reviewing the comments and 

reexamining its proposal, the FAA 

determined that the safety-relevant 

factor for the moving-vehicle provision 

of part 107 is population density not 

terrain. Therefore, this rule will allow 

small UAS operation from moving landor water-based vehicles, as long as the 

small unmanned aircraft is flown over 

sparsely populated land or water 

areas.93 The FAA anticipates that this 

change will enable additional small 

UAS operations such as utility 

inspection, disaster response, and 

wetland and shoreline monitoring. 

A number of commenters, including 

ALPA, AUVSI, American Insurance 

Association, and MPAA, said operations 

from moving land-based vehicles should 

be permitted as long as the operator is 

not also driving the vehicle. 

As discussed previously, this rule will 

allow operation of small UAS from land 

and water-based vehicles over sparsely 

populated areas. However, the FAA 

emphasizes that this rule will also 

prohibit careless or reckless operation of 

a small UAS. The FAA considers flying 

a small UAS while purposely distracted 

by another task to be careless or 

reckless. The FAA cannot envision at 

this time an instance of a person driving 

a vehicle while operating a small UAS 

in a safe manner that does not violate 

part 107. Additionally, other laws, such 

as State and local traffic laws, may also 

apply to the conduct of a person driving 

a vehicle. Many states currently prohibit 

distracted driving and State or local 

laws may also be amended in the future 

to impose restrictions on how cars and 

public roads may be used with regard to 

a small UAS operation. The FAA 

emphasizes that people involved in a 

small UAS operation are responsible for 

complying with all applicable laws and 

not just the FAA’s regulations. 

Planehook argued that until such time 

as sense-and-avoid systems are accepted 

by the FAA, implemented by 

manufacturers, and installed by trained 

operators, operations from moving landbased vehicles should only be permitted 


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by waiver. Commenters including the 

Small UAV Coalition, State Farm, 

Aviation Management, and DJI also said 

that small UAS operations should be 

permitted from moving land-based 

vehicles on a case-by-case basis, via 

waiver or deviation authority. Skycatch 

and FLIR Systems recommended 

allowing operations from moving landbased vehicles as long as the UAS 

features a software protocol that ensures 

the operator is present and has positive 

control. An individual recommended 

allowing operations from moving landbased vehicles as long as the UAS is 

equipped with a telemetry system so the 

operator knows the range/bearing of the 

UAS. Another individual recommended 

allowing operations from moving landbased vehicles if the UAS is operating 

in ‘‘follow-me’’ mode. 

The primary risk associated with an 

operation from a moving vehicle is that 

the remote pilot in command will lose 

positive control of the small unmanned 

aircraft and that aircraft will collide 

with a person on the ground. Part 107 

mitigates this risk by restricting small 

UAS operations from moving vehicles to 

sparsely populated areas, which 

generally have a very low population 

density. Thus, there is no need to 

impose additional restrictions on 

moving-vehicle operations in a sparsely 

populated area. The FAA considered 

eliminating the sparsely populated 

restriction but ultimately determined 

that operations from a moving vehicle 

over an area that is not sparsely 

populated pose a higher risk to nonparticipating persons and property due 

to changing topography, obstructions, 

and un-anticipated persons that enter/

exit the operational area. 

However, the FAA acknowledges that 

technological innovation may allow 

small UAS to be operated safely from 

moving vehicles in areas that are not 

sparsely populated. Accordingly, the 

restriction on operation from moving 

vehicles will be waivable. The FAA will 

consider waiver applications on a caseby-case basis to determine whether the 

applicant has established that his or her 

operation can safely be conducted under 

the terms of a certificate of waiver. 

However, as discussed in section III.C.1 

of this preamble, the FAA will not grant 

a waiver to allow the use of a moving 

vehicle to allow UAS-based 

transportation of another person’s 

property for compensation or hire. 

One individual suggested that the 

FAA consider allowing operation of 

small UAS from a moving aircraft. 

In most instances, a manned aircraft 

is not as maneuverable and cannot be 

stopped in flight with the same ease as 

a land- or water-based vehicle. Thus, a 

remote pilot in command who is 

onboard a manned aircraft in flight has 

a more limited ability to respond to 

situations that may arise during the 

small UAS operation. Additionally, 

because manned aircraft generally 

operate at significantly higher speeds 

than small unmanned aircraft, there is a 

higher likelihood that a remote pilot in 

command onboard a manned aircraft 

will lose sight of the small unmanned 

aircraft. Accordingly, this rule will 

retain the proposed prohibition on 

operating a small UAS from a moving 

aircraft. This prohibition will, however, 

be waivable if the remote pilot in 

command demonstrates that his or her 

operation can safely be conducted under 

the terms of a certificate of waiver. 

ii. Vertical Boundary (Maximum 

Altitude) 

Next, we turn to the vertical boundary 

of the confined area of operation. 

Because most manned aircraft 

operations take place higher than 500 

feet above ground level (AGL), the 

NPRM proposed a 500-foot operating 

ceiling for small UAS operations. For 

the reasons discussed below, this rule 

will reduce the operating ceiling to 400 

feet AGL unless the small unmanned 

aircraft: (1) Is flown within a 400-foot 

radius of a structure, and (2) does not fly 

higher than 400 feet above the 

structure’s immediate uppermost limit. 

This operating-ceiling provision will be 

waivable. 

Several commenters, including the 

Professional Photographers of America, 

ALPA, Boeing, Google, and State Farm, 

supported the 500-foot altitude limit 

proposed in the NPRM. Some noted that 

a 500-foot ceiling for UAS operations 

would strike a positive balance between 

flexibility for the UAS operator and the 

safety of manned aircraft operating in 

the NAS. 

Other commenters, including Barrick 

Gold of North America, argued that the 

altitude restrictions in the rule are 

unnecessary because the current 

airspace stratification and operating 

rules already provide the requisite level 

of safety. Barrick added, however, that 

it would support a buffer of 200 feet 

below the terminus of Class G airspace. 

An altitude limit for small UAS 

operations is necessary in this rule. 

Given the expected proliferation of 

small UAS in the NAS, and the safety 

implications for manned aircraft, the 

FAA must address the safe use of small 

UAS in the NAS. Moreover, Congress 

has directed the FAA to establish a 

regulatory framework to safely integrate 

small UAS operations into the NAS. 

Allowing unrestricted small unmanned 

aircraft to operate at high altitude 

without the benefit of additional 

equipment (for example, transponders 

and altimeters) and the provision of air 

traffic services introduces a significant 

threat of collision to manned aircraft 

operating in the NAS. Most manned 

aircraft operations transit the airspace at 

or above 500 feet AGL, and an altitude 

limitation provides a necessary barrier 

between small unmanned aircraft and a 

significant majority of manned aircraft 

operations in the NAS. However, as 

discussed below, this rule will make an 

exception to the altitude restriction for 

small UAS operations that are 

conducted close to a structure. 

Other commenters, including 

Northrop Grumman Corporation, AOPA, 

EAA, and HAI, recommended a 

reduction in the proposed 500-foot 

altitude limit. These commenters were 

concerned about the potential for 

conflict with manned aircraft operating 

in the NAS. The United States Ultralight 

Association and the U.S. Hang Gliding 

and Paragliding Association expressed 

general concern regarding the volume of 

manned aircraft traffic below 500 feet 

and the potential for collisions with 

small unmanned aircraft. 

While some commenters did not 

recommend a specific alternate 

maximum altitude, most that did 

favored a 400-foot operating ceiling. 

Commenters offered a variety of reasons 

to support a 400-foot altitude limit. One 

commenter justified a lower altitude by 

noting it is difficult for the operator to 

maintain visual contact with the small 

unmanned aircraft when operated above 

500 feet, and a 400-foot limit would 

provide an added margin of safety. Most 

commenters stated that a 400-foot 

altitude limit would provide a 

reasonable buffer between UAS and 

manned aircraft operating in the NAS. 

NAAA remarked that recent narrowly 

averted collisions involving agricultural 

aircraft and UAS aircraft justify the 

establishment of a 400-foot limit. NAAA 

also noted the importance of the 

missions performed by aircraft at lower 

altitude, including agricultural and air 

ambulance operations. Northrop 

Grumman and the Aviation Division of 

the Washington State Department of 

Transportation asserted that a 500-foot 

altitude does not provide an adequate 

buffer between UAS operations and 

those conducted by manned aircraft. 

Other commenters, including the 

North Central Texas Council of 

Governments, noted that the 100-foot 

difference between the limits for model 

aircraft and UAS aircraft, which would 

result from the proposed 500-foot 

altitude ceiling, would create confusion. 

These commenters pointed out that 

because it is difficult to distinguish 


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between UAS and model aircraft, the 

two should have similar altitude 

restrictions. 

Some commenters identified lower 

ceilings for UAS operations in other 

countries. For example, one commenter 

noted that Australia has established a 

400-foot limit for UAS operations. 

Further, Transport Canada cited a 

similar approach for UAS operations in 

Canada, noting that a 400-foot operating 

ceiling provides a margin of safety that 

considers barometric altimeter error and 

cold weather temperature corrections. 

Some commenters, however, asserted 

that even a 400-foot maximum altitude 

is too high. The Professional Helicopter 

Pilots Association recommended a limit 

of 200 feet to provide an adequate 

altitude buffer between UAS and 

rotorcraft operations. One commenter 

suggested a 200-foot limit until ADS–B 

is mandated for UAS. Positive air traffic 

control was also recommended as a 

requirement for operations above 200 

feet. 

In contrast, several commenters, 

including those from the media and 

agricultural communities, asserted that 

the proposed 500-foot altitude limit for 

small unmanned aircraft operations is 

overly restrictive. One commenter stated 

that the 500-foot altitude ceiling 

increases the risk for striking terrain, 

power lines, or other structures. A 

commenter also noted that the proposed 

altitude restriction may contribute to a 

loss of communication with the aircraft 

due to terrain and other obstructions. 

The most frequently cited reason for 

raising the altitude limit was to allow 

the small unmanned aircraft to more 

effectively perform missions such as 

search and rescue, aerial surveys, and 

other applications for industries ranging 

from agriculture to petroleum, as well as 

inspections of buildings, bridges and 

other structures. In addition, several 

commenters asserted that a 500-foot 

limit is impractical for radio-controlled 

soaring. Aerobatic operations would 

also be severely limited by a 500-foot 

restriction. 

Other commenters highlighted the 

needs of the media industry, remarking 

that a 500-foot restriction limits the 

utility of UAS for certain newsgathering 

operations. Commenters noted that for 

these activities, the ability to operate at 

higher altitudes increases their ability to 

film news events and access other areas 

beyond normal reach. 

Some commenters, including the 

Nebraska Farm Bureau Federation, 

suggested that the 500-foot operating 

ceiling could be lifted under certain 

circumstances in remote areas given the 

uncongested airspace above remote 

areas. The American Petroleum Institute 

agreed that a case-by-case process is 

needed for approval to fly at higher 

altitudes. In its comments, API noted 

that the proposed rule effectively 

eliminates lower-resolution surveillance 

operations where larger ground sample 

distances would have value for a variety 

of activities over broad areas, such as 

pipeline right-of-way surveying and 

metocean (meteorology and physical 

oceanography used in offshore and 

coastal engineering) data gathering. In 

addition, in areas with high vegetation, 

this restriction acts to limit distances 

across which pre-programmed flights 

may function even if the visual-line-ofsight restriction were modified. One 

commenter noted this would be similar 

to what is now codified in 14 CFR 

91.119(b) and (c), and to the precedent 

established by 14 CFR part 101. 

Many commenters, such as Boeing 

and the News Media Coalition, also 

focused on the need to permit higher 

operating altitudes in proximity to 

certain structures. This would allow 

small unmanned aircraft to be used to 

perform inspections and other tasks that 

would traditionally place persons in 

harm’s way. The Exelon Corporation 

noted the need to allow for inspection 

of tall structures. An individual 

recommended that the FAA allow 

operations at higher altitudes within a 

2,000-foot radius of certain towers. 

NoFlyZone.org asserted that UAS 

operations above 500 feet should be 

permitted within 250 feet of a structure 

as long as the operator has permission 

from that structure’s owner. Skycatch 

asked that operations above 500 feet be 

permitted under specific circumstances, 

such as bridge or building inspections 

as proposed by AUVSI. The Professional 

Society of Drone Journalists stated that 

the airspace above and around buildings 

should be considered to be the domain 

of legal UAS operations. 

Commenters also recommended 

mechanisms to allow operations above 

500 feet ranging from pilot training and 

equipment requirements (such as 

transponders and ADS–B), to the 

establishment of flight restriction areas 

or a waiver process. The American 

Insurance Association requested that 

UAS aircraft be allowed to operate 

above 500 feet if accompanied by a 

visual observer on the ground aided by 

a mechanical enhancement of his or her 

sight. 

Other commenters noted that an 

increase in altitude may be appropriate 

in areas where the threat to manned 

aircraft is minimal. For example, one 

commenter proposed that in Class G 

airspace, the ceiling for UAS operations 

be raised to the base of the overlying 

controlled airspace. A variety of other 

altitudes were proposed. Clean Gulf 

Associates stated that 1,000 feet is an 

appropriate altitude, allowing for oil 

spill skimming targeting operations, 

where the mid-air threat over water is 

lower. Prioria Robotics also proposed 

1,000 feet. The American Fuel & 

Petrochemical Manufacturers noted that 

technical developments in the near 

future will allow for operations up to 

1,000 feet with additional equipage and 

procedural safeguards. Another 

commenter stated that if an under-10- 

pound category of UAS aircraft could be 

created, an altitude of 1,000 feet should 

be permitted. 

Another commenter offered that an 

increase in maximum altitudes is 

appropriate as size of the UAS aircraft 

increases. For example, a rotorcraft up 

to 4 kgs or a fixed-wing aircraft between 

6 and 12 kgs would be able to fly up to 

700 feet AGL. Rotorcraft up to 20 kgs 

and fixed wing up between 12 and 24 

kgs would be able to fly up to 3,000 feet 

AGL. These altitude limits would be 

accompanied by pilot medical and 

training requirements, as well as 

additional equipage requirements, such 

as ADS–B. 

One commenter noted that the rule is 

harsh toward non-hazardous UAS 

operations. This commenter argued that 

low-altitude quad copter operations 

should be given relief to operate at 

altitudes similar to those used for a 

commercial moored balloon or kite. 

The Resource Stewardship Consortia 

proposed an extension up to 1,400 feet 

for a proof of concept trial performed in 

places where the threat of collateral 

damage is minimal should a failure 

occur, and for operations that would 

benefit from a higher altitude. 

In response to comments addressing 

the specific altitude limit, the FAA 

agrees that a 400-foot ceiling will allow 

for a significant number of applications 

for the small UAS community, while 

providing an added level of safety for 

manned-aircraft operations. A ceiling of 

400 feet AGL will provide an additional 

100-foot margin of safety between small 

UAS operations and a majority of 

aircraft operations in the NAS. This 

additional 100-foot buffer will help 

maintain separation between small 

unmanned aircraft and most manned 

aircraft in instances such as the remote 

pilot losing positive control of the small 

unmanned aircraft or incorrectly 

estimating the altitude of the aircraft. 

Further, the revised limit addresses 

other concerns regarding potential 

confusion between model aircraft and 

small unmanned aircraft. Specifically, 

limiting operations to 400 feet is 

consistent with FAA guidance on model 

aircraft best practices identified in AC 


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94United States Government Accountability 

Office, Unmanned Aerial Systems: FAA Continues 

Progress toward Integration into the National 

Airspace, at 32 (July 5, 2015). 

91–57A, thus standardizing operating 

altitudes for the majority of small 

unmanned aircraft flying in the NAS. A 

400-foot altitude ceiling is also 

consistent with the approach adopted in 

other countries. Specifically, Canada, 

Australia, and the United Kingdom all 

set a 400-foot or lower altitude limit on 

UAS operations conducted in those 

countries.94

While the FAA considered the lower 

altitudes proposed by commenters, it 

ultimately determined that these lower 

limits would unnecessarily restrict 

small UAS operations without a 

commensurate increase in safety 

because the concentration of manned 

aircraft below 400 feet AGL is much 

lower than the concentration of manned 

aircraft at or above 500 feet AGL. The 

FAA also considered the comment 

recommending positive air traffic 

control above 200 feet. The FAA 

ultimately rejected this recommendation 

because it is overly burdensome to both 

remote pilots and the air traffic control 

system. Air traffic controllers could not 

reliably provide positive separation for 

operations at this altitude throughout 

the NAS, and the benefits to users from 

such separation efforts would not justify 

the significant additional workload 

placed on air traffic controllers or the 

equipment and training costs to remote 

pilots. In addition, without additional 

equipment mandates, the provision of 

positive air traffic control would be 

unachievable. 

To address the concerns expressed by 

commenters requesting higher operating 

altitudes in proximity to buildings, 

towers, power lines, and other tall 

structures for the purposes of 

inspections and repair, the FAA is 

establishing new provisions in the final 

rule that will enable those operations in 

a way that does not compromise 

aviation safety. Specifically, the FAA 

notes that 14 CFR 91.119 generally 

prohibits manned aircraft from 

operating in close proximity to 

structures. Section 91.119 requires 

manned aircraft to stay 500 to 1,000 feet 

away from the structure, depending on 

whether the area is congested. Because 

manned aircraft are not permitted to 

operate in close proximity to structures, 

this rule will allow a small unmanned 

aircraft to fly higher than 400 feet AGL 

as long as that aircraft remains within a 

400-foot radius of a structure up to an 

altitude of 400 feet above the structure’s 

immediate uppermost limit. Allowing 

higher-altitude small UAS operations 

within a 400-foot lateral limit of a 

structure will enable additional 

operations (such as tower inspection 

and repair) while maintaining 

separation between small unmanned 

aircraft and most manned aircraft 

operations. 

The FAA disagrees that a further 

increase in altitude is justified. Higheraltitude small unmanned aircraft 

operating in airspace that is transited by 

most manned aircraft operations would 

no longer be separated from those 

manned aircraft, which would greatly 

increase the risks of a collision. Most 

remote pilots of small UAS would also 

benefit very little from an additional 

increase in altitude because the visualline-of-sight restrictions of this rule and 

the equipment limitations of a small 

UAS would, in many cases, limit the 

ability or need to operate at altitudes 

higher than what is provided for by this 

rule. Such a limited benefit would not 

be commensurate with the added risk 

that a higher altitude would impose 

upon other users of the NAS. 

However, the FAA recognizes that 

new technologies may increase the 

feasibility of higher altitude operations. 

Therefore, to provide flexibility to 

accommodate new developments, the 

altitude limitation of this rule will be 

waivable. Thus, if a remote pilot 

demonstrates that his or her highaltitude small UAS limitation will not 

decrease safety, the FAA may allow that 

operation through a certificate of 

waiver. This will enable a number of 

operations, such as research and 

development for higher-altitude small 

UAS operations. The FAA is committed 

to working with the stakeholder 

community to pursue such options 

when it is deemed appropriate. 

With regard to search and rescue 

operations, most of these operations are 

conducted by government entities under 

COAs as public aircraft operations. 

Those operations will therefore not be 

subject to the altitude limitations of this 

rule. 

Several commenters raised concerns 

regarding a remote pilot’s ability to 

discern the altitude of the small 

unmanned aircraft. Commenters 

including AOPA and GAMA asserted 

that current UAS lack accurate altimetry 

systems, making compliance with any 

altitude restriction difficult. GAMA 

asked that the FAA clarify how an 

operator determines the UAS altitude in 

flight. Similarly, one individual stated 

that while the altitudes proposed in the 

rule are in principle sound, they are 

unenforceable. Other commenters 

asserted that it is impossible to judge 

altitude, particularly over precipitous 

terrain, and that altitude restrictions of 

any kind may only be relied upon if 

UAS were required to have altitudelimiting devices. The Permanent 

Editorial Board of the Aviators Model 

Code of Conduct proposed that the FAA 

require the use of a practical technique 

for UAS operators to estimate their 

altitude with sufficient accuracy or 

require the use of a technical solution to 

ensure compliance. 

Remote pilots have effective 

techniques to determine altitude 

without mandating the installation of an 

altimetry system. For example, with the 

unmanned aircraft on the ground, a 

remote pilot in command may separate 

him or herself 400 feet from the aircraft 

in order to gain a visual perspective of 

the aircraft at that distance. Remote 

pilots may also use the known height 

above the ground of local rising terrain 

and/or structures as a reference. The 

FAA acknowledges that these methods 

of estimating altitude are less precise 

than equipment-based altitude 

determinations, which is one of the 

reasons this rule will increase the 

separation between manned and small 

unmanned aircraft by reducing the 

maximum altitude for small unmanned 

aircraft to 400 feet AGL. 

Additionally, the FAA will provide, 

in its guidance materials, examples of 

equipment options that may be used by 

remote pilots to accurately determine 

the altitude of their small unmanned 

aircraft. One example is the installation 

of a calibrated altitude reporting device 

on the small unmanned aircraft. This 

device reports the small unmanned 

aircraft’s altitude above mean sea level 

(MSL). By subtracting the MSL elevation 

of the control station from the small 

unmanned aircraft’s reported MSL 

altitude, the aircraft’s AGL altitude may 

be determined. The installation of a GPS 

altitude-reporting device may also 

provide for a requisite level of altitude 

control. The FAA emphasizes, however, 

that this equipment is simply one means 

of complying with the altitude 

restrictions in this rule. 

One commenter asked if the proposed 

500-foot limit represents the altitude 

above the launch point or the height of 

the UAS altitude above the ground. The 

commenter noted that some 

topographical features present dramatic 

changes in altitude. Glider operators 

raised similar questions regarding 

altitude over sloping terrain. 

The maximum altitude ceiling 

imposed by this rule is intended to limit 

the height of the aircraft above the 

ground over which it is flying (AGL). It 

is incumbent upon the remote pilot in 

command to maintain flight at or below 

this ceiling regardless of the topography. 


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95 80 FR at 9563. 

Several commenters stated that the 

500-foot altitude restriction does not 

address the public’s expectation that 

airspace (up to 500 feet) above private 

property is under their control and may 

not be penetrated without permission. 

Event 38 Unmanned Systems stated that 

the FAA should attempt to set a 

reasonable altitude requirement for 

overflight of property not controlled by 

any UAS operator. This commenter 

proposed a 100-foot limit for incidental 

incursions and a 300-foot limit for 

intentional flight across private property 

without permission. Another 

commenter suggested requiring small 

UAS to operate between 400 and 500 

feet AGL when flying above private 

property, unless the remote pilot has 

obtained the property owner’s 

permission. Other commenters, 

including the NJIT Working Group and 

the Kansas Livestock Association, 

commented on the relationship between 

the final rule requirements and trespass 

and nuisance protections for private 

landowners. 

Adjudicating private property rights is 

beyond the scope of this rule. However, 

the provisions of this rule are not the 

only set of laws that may apply to the 

operation of a small UAS. With regard 

to property rights, trespassing on 

property (as opposed to flying in the 

airspace above a piece of property) 

without the owner’s permission may be 

addressed by State and local trespassing 

law. As noted in section III.K.6 of this 

preamble, the FAA will address 

preemption issues on a case-by-case 

basis rather than doing so in a rule of 

general applicability. 

The North Central Texas Council of 

Governments opposed a 500-foot 

maximum altitude, stating it is 

inconsistent with Public Law 112–95 

and the 400-foot ceiling identified in 

Advisory Circular (AC) 91–57. 

Public Law 112–95 directs the 

Department to establish requirements 

for safe integration of UAS operations 

into the NAS but does not specify the 

altitude parameters of such operations. 

AC 91–57A is advisory in nature and 

pertains to model aircraft not subject to 

part 107. However, the 400-foot 

maximum altitude imposed by this rule 

is similar to the 400-foot maximum 

altitude suggested as a best practice for 

modelers by AC 91–57A. 

One commenter stated that the COA 

process should be maintained for 

operations outside of class G airspace 

and altitudes above 500 feet. However, 

with the exception of flight that is 

within 400 feet of a structure, small 

unmanned aircraft seeking to fly higher 

than 400 feet AGL will have to obtain 

a waiver to do so. 

Several commenters recommended 

the creation of specialized airspace for 

UAS operations. This may include 

designated airspace for certain clubs, or 

the establishment of special airways or 

corridors. Farris Technology and the 

University of Washington promoted the 

use of corridors or dedicated airways 

that will allow UAS flights above 500 

feet. 

Creation of UAS-specific airspace is 

beyond the scope of this rule because 

the NPRM did not propose to create any 

new airspace classifications or reclassify 

existing airspace. 

One commenter suggested that the 

500-foot restriction in Class G airspace 

should only be in place for rotorcraft 

UAS. However, after careful 

consideration, the FAA could not find a 

compelling reason to differentiate 

between fixed-wing and rotorcraft UAS 

for the purposes of altitude restrictions. 

For both aircraft, the threats posed to 

the NAS are similar. The UAS aircraft 

class itself does not mitigate those 

threats in any calculable manner. 

Therefore, a distinction based on UAS 

aircraft class is unwarranted. 

ALPA recommended a change to the 

preamble discussion regarding the 

maximum altitude. As currently written, 

the preamble to the NPRM states that a 

small unmanned aircraft is prohibited 

from ‘‘travel higher than 500 feet 

AGL.’’ 95 ALPA recommended replacing 

the word ‘‘travel’’ with ‘‘fly’’ or 

‘‘operate.’’ 

For added clarity, the FAA will use 

the terms ‘‘fly’’ or ‘‘operate’’ in 

discussing the maximum altitude 

limitation in this preamble. 

Several commenters, including Green 

Vegans, stated that the proposed 500- 

foot operating ceiling would make it 

impossible to comply with 14 CFR 

91.119, which prescribes minimum 

altitudes for part 91 operations. Green 

Vegans questioned how a small UAS 

operator could remain in compliance 

with both part 107 and section 91.119. 

Except where expressly stated to the 

contrary, the provisions of part 107 will 

replace the provisions of part 91 for 

small UAS operations subject to this 

rule. Consequently, a small UAS 

operating under part 107 will not be 

required to comply with § 91.119. 

b. Mitigating Loss of Positive Control 

Risk 

Now that we have defined the 

confined area of operation, we turn to 

the question of how loss-of-positivecontrol risk can be mitigated within that 

area of operation. There is significant 

diversity in both the types of small UAS 

that are available and the types of 

operations that those small UAS can be 

used in. Accordingly, remote pilots in 

command need significant flexibility to 

mitigate hazards posed by their 

individual small UAS operation, as a 

mitigation method that works well for 

one type of small UAS used in one type 

of operation may not work as well in 

another operation that uses another type 

of small UAS. For example, in a loss-ofpositive-control situation, a rotorcraft 

that loses pilot inputs or power to its 

control systems would tend to descend 

straight down or at a slight angle while 

a fixed wing aircraft would glide for a 

greater distance before landing. Since 

the loss-of-positive-control risk posed 

by different types of small unmanned 

aircraft in various operations is 

different, the NPRM proposed to create 

a performance-based standard under 

which, subject to certain broadly 

applicable constraints, remote pilots in 

command would have the flexibility to 

create operational and aircraft-specific 

loss-of-control mitigation measures. 

The broadly applicable constraints 

proposed by the NPRM consisted of: (1) 

A limit on the maximum speed of the 

small unmanned aircraft; (2) a 

prohibition on the simultaneous 

operation of more than one small 

unmanned aircraft; (3) a restriction on 

flight over people; and (4) a requirement 

for a preflight briefing for people who 

are directly participating in the small 

UAS operation. The NPRM also 

proposed to create a separate micro UAS 

category of UAS operations that would 

not be subject to a restriction on flight 

over people. Within these broadly 

applicable constraints, the NPRM 

proposed a two-part performance 

standard under which the remote pilot 

in command would conduct a preflight 

assessment of the operating area and 

then use the knowledge gained during 

that assessment to ensure that the small 

unmanned aircraft would not pose an 

undue hazard to other aircraft, people, 

or property in the event of a loss of 

control of the aircraft for any reason. 

The following sections discuss the 

above components of the NPRM. The 

following sections also discuss the 

comments that the FAA received 

regarding automation within the 

confined area of operation and the use 

of equipage to mitigate the risk 

associated with loss of positive control. 

i. Maximum Speed 

The NPRM proposed a maximum air 

speed limit of 87 knots (100 mph) for 

small unmanned aircraft. The FAA 

explained that this speed limit is 

necessary because if there is a loss of 

positive control, an aircraft traveling at 


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high speed poses a higher risk to 

persons, property, and other aircraft 

than an aircraft traveling at a lower 

speed. The NPRM also noted that a 

speed limit would have safety benefits 

outside of a loss-of-positive-control 

scenario because a small unmanned 

aircraft traveling at a lower speed is 

generally easier to control than a higherspeed aircraft. For the reasons discussed 

below, this rule will impose an 87-knot 

(100 mph) speed limit. This rule will, 

however, make the pertinent speed 

measurement the groundspeed rather 

than the airspeed of the small 

unmanned aircraft. The speed limit will 

also be waivable. 

Commenters including NAMIC, the 

Drone User Group Network, and the 

Remote Control Aerial Platform 

Association supported the proposed 

maximum airspeed. These commenters 

generally noted that the speed limitation 

of 100 mph seems reasonable for small 

UAS operating within visual line of 

sight. 

Other commenters, including the Air 

Medical Operators Association, the 

Virginia Department of Aviation, and 

SWAPA, stated that FAA should lower 

the maximum permissible airspeed (e.g., 

to 50 or 75 mph) because, the 

commenters argued, the proposed speed 

of 100 mph is too high and would pose 

undue risks. Several commenters, 

including Texas A&M University, HAI, 

the Virginia Department of Aviation and 

others, asserted that the NPRM failed to 

demonstrate the safety of the proposed 

speed limitation. These commenters 

argued that it would be extremely 

difficult to maintain positive control of 

a small unmanned aircraft flying at 100 

mph. 

Some commenters, including the 

American Association for Justice, the 

United States Ultralight Association, 

and the State of Nevada, asserted that 

the kinetic energy of a 55-pound object 

moving at 100 mph could cause 

significant damage to large aircraft. The 

US Hang Gliding & Paragliding 

Association, the Metropolitan Airports 

Commission, and Predesa stated that a 

lower maximum speed would provide 

additional time for UAS operators and 

pilots of manned aircraft to see and 

avoid each other. Several of these 

commenters, including the Metropolitan 

Airports Commission and Kansas State 

University UAS Program, stated that a 

100 mph speed limit would make it 

extremely difficult (if not impossible) 

for an operator to maintain visual line 

of sight with the unmanned aircraft. 

NBAA, the Airports Council 

International—North America and the 

American Association of Airport 

Executives recommended that the FAA 

conduct further study and risk 

assessment regarding appropriate speed 

limitations for this type of UAS. The 

Permanent Editorial Board of the 

Aviators Model Code of Conduct 

Initiative argued that FAA should 

establish a lower maximum speed that 

will create no greater harm than is 

caused by most birds (approximately 30 

knots) until such time as further data 

demonstrates the safety of a higher 

speed limitation. 

A speed limit of 87 knots (100 mph) 

must be viewed within the context of 

the overall regulatory framework of part 

107. In other words, a small unmanned 

aircraft may reach a speed of 87 knots 

only if the remote pilot in command can 

satisfy all of the applicable provisions of 

part 107 while flying the small 

unmanned aircraft at 87 knots. For 

example, since this rule requires small 

UAS operations to be conducted within 

visual line of sight, a remote pilot in 

command may not allow the small 

unmanned aircraft to reach a speed 

where visual-line-of-sight cannot be 

maintained in accordance with § 107.31. 

Additionally, as discussed in section 

III.E.3.b.vi of this preamble, the remote 

pilot in command must, prior to flight, 

assess the operating environment and 

consider risks to persons and property 

in the vicinity both on the surface and 

in the air. The remote pilot in command 

must also ensure that the small 

unmanned aircraft will pose no undue 

hazard to other aircraft, people, or 

property in the event of a loss of control 

of the aircraft for any reason. Thus, if 

the remote pilot in command plans to 

have an operation in which the small 

unmanned aircraft will travel at 87 

knots, that remote pilot will, as part of 

the preflight assessment process, need 

to take precautions to ensure that the 

unmanned aircraft will not pose an 

undue hazard to other aircraft, people, 

or property on the ground. Those 

precautions will likely be greater than 

the precautions that a remote pilot in 

command will need to take for a small 

unmanned aircraft traveling at a lower 

speed. Accordingly, a maximum speed 

limit of 87 knots is appropriate because 

the remote pilot in command will have 

to implement mitigations commensurate 

with the risk posed by his or her 

specific small UAS operation. 

Other commenters, including Textron 

Systems recommended no limitations 

regarding airspeed, arguing that as long 

as the operator can maintain visual line 

of sight and control of the UAS, there 

should be no performance limitations. 

A speed limit is generally necessary 

for small unmanned aircraft because an 

aircraft traveling at high speed poses a 

higher risk to persons, property, and 

other aircraft than an aircraft traveling at 

lower speed. As discussed earlier, the 

other parameters of this rule (such as 

visual line of sight and the preflight 

assessment conducted by the remote 

pilot in command) mitigate this risk for 

small unmanned aircraft traveling at 

speeds up to 87 knots. However, those 

parameters do not address the risk 

posed by small unmanned aircraft 

traveling at speeds faster than 87 knots. 

Accordingly, this rule will retain the 

proposed 87-knot speed limit but will 

make that limit waivable. As part of the 

waiver process, the FAA will consider 

operation-specific mitigations to address 

additional risk posed by higher-speed 

small UAS operations. 

The Kansas State University UAS 

Program and SWAPA questioned 

whether there would be any commercial 

applications of small UAS that would 

necessitate a 100 mph airspeed. Further, 

several commenters, including 

Modovolate Aviation, asserted that 

many small UAS, such as those 

employing multi-rotor technology, may 

not need to or may not be able to reach 

a speed of 100 mph. 

The FAA agrees that there will likely 

be small unmanned aircraft incapable of 

reaching a speed of 87 knots. The FAA 

also agrees that there will likely be 

small UAS operations that are incapable 

of satisfying the other provisions of this 

rule, such as visual line of sight, at a 

speed of 87 knots. However, that is not 

a sufficient justification for reducing the 

maximum permissible speed for all 

small unmanned aircraft because there 

may be small UAS operations that can 

reach a speed of 87 knots and operate 

safely at that speed in compliance with 

all applicable provisions of part 107. 

The New Hampshire Department of 

Transportation noted that the FAA did 

not propose any specific equipage 

requirements for small UAS that would 

be used to determine airspeed. 

Similarly, CAPA stated that the NPRM 

does not require or define how the 

operator will maintain operations below 

a specified airspeed other than visually, 

which the commenter said would be 

very difficult to do when operating in 

congested airspace and scanning for 

other conflicts. 

Aerius recommended that the FAA 

amend the proposed regulatory text to 

make any speed limitations based on 

groundspeed because many UAS are not 

equipped with a system that would 

provide airspeed to the small UAS 

operator. Several individuals noted that 

multi-rotor helicopter UAS cannot sense 

airspeed, only groundspeed. Another 

individual suggested that the regulatory 

text be amended to reference GPSgenerated airspeed because all UAS do 


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not have the equipment to provide 

airspeed to the operator. 

As noted by the commenters, the 

provisions of this rule will not require 

small UAS to be equipped with a system 

that would provide calibrated airspeed 

to the remote pilot in command. The 

FAA also notes that the groundspeed of 

the small unmanned aircraft is what is 

pertinent to the safety of a small UAS 

operation because that is the 

information that specifies how quickly 

the aircraft is moving relative to the 

ground in proximity to where the 

remote pilot is located. Because 

changing the standard to groundspeed 

rather than calibrated airspeed would 

not have a detrimental effect on safety 

and because many unmanned aircraft 

may not have the equipage necessary to 

measure calibrated airspeed, the FAA 

agrees with the commenters and has 

changed the maximum airspeed 

standard to be a function of 

groundspeed. A small unmanned 

aircraft’s groundspeed could be 

determined by measures such as GPSbased speed, visual estimation, a radar 

gun, or timed travel across a fixed 

distance. This rule will retain the 

maximum speed limit of 87 knots (100 

mph), but that limit will be a measure 

of groundspeed rather than airspeed. 

A few individuals (who self-identified 

as recreational operators of model 

aircraft) said the proposed maximum 

speed would preclude them from 

holding certain types of model aircraft 

competitions. In response, the FAA 

emphasizes that, as discussed in section 

III.C.4 of this preamble, part 107 will 

not apply to model aircraft operations 

that meet the criteria of section 336 of 

Public Law 112–95. 

ii. Operating Multiple Unmanned 

Aircraft 

The NPRM proposed that an operator 

or visual observer would be limited to 

operating no more than one small UAS 

at the same time. The NPRM explained 

that performing the duties required of a 

crewmember in real time is a 

concentration-intensive activity and as 

such, it is necessary to place a limitation 

on the number of UAS that a person can 

operate simultaneously. For the reasons 

discussed below, this rule will retain 

the proposed prohibition on the 

simultaneous operation of multiple 

small unmanned aircraft. This 

prohibition will be waivable if a person 

establishes that his or her simultaneous 

operation of more than one small 

unmanned aircraft can safely be 

conducted under the terms of a 

certificate of waiver. 

NAAA, the California Agricultural 

Aircraft Association, NAMIC, Colorado 

Agricultural Aviation Association, and 

Schertz Aerial Services supported 

limiting operators or visual observers to 

operating only one small UAS at a time. 

The International Brotherhood of 

Teamsters urged the FAA to maintain 

all operational limits and safeguards 

presented in the NPRM, including the 

limit of one UAS per operator, until 

there is technological certainty that no 

workers, or the general public, would be 

at risk from automated package delivery. 

Other commenters disagreed with the 

proposed limitation on the number of 

small UAS that a person can operate 

simultaneously. Several commenters 

asserted that technology currently exists 

to allow for the safe operation of 

multiple small UAS by a single 

operator. The Mercatus Center at George 

Mason University said existing and 

developing technologies ‘‘can more than 

compensate to the diminished 

concentration that operators might 

apply to each individual aircraft.’’ 

AirShip Technologies stated that it 

currently incorporates technology that 

will allow clusters of UAS with similar 

missions to be pre-programmed and 

controlled by one operator. Boeing and 

Aviation Management similarly said 

that current technology allows a group 

or swarm of multiple vehicles to operate 

safely and efficiently in highly 

automated modes. 

The commenters also claimed that 

new operator consoles have been shown 

to be able to safely control multiple 

small UAS systems. The NJIT Working 

Group pointed to the Navy Low-Cost 

UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST), 

which it said could be used for nonmilitary purposes, such as first 

responder and search and rescue 

operations. Vision Services Group said 

multiple small UAS operations should 

be permitted if both the operator and 

visual observer possess a Permit to 

Operate and a valid Third Class Medical 

Certificate. 

As discussed in the visual-line-ofsight section of this preamble, the 

remote pilot in command, the person 

manipulating the flight controls of the 

small UAS, and the visual observer (if 

one is used) are required to maintain 

visual awareness of the small unmanned 

aircraft and the surrounding airspace in 

order to minimize the risk of a mid-air 

collision with a manned aircraft. This 

activity requires active attention and 

operating more than one unmanned 

aircraft at the same time would split the 

concentration of the small UAS 

crewmembers. By decreasing the 

amount of attention that the remote 

pilot in command, person manipulating 

the flight controls, and visual observer 

can dedicate to each small unmanned 

aircraft, the operation of multiple small 

unmanned aircraft at the same time may 

introduce additional risk into the NAS. 

This risk would further be compounded 

if larger numbers of aircraft are operated 

at the same time because each aircraft 

would receive an even smaller fraction 

of each person’s attention. 

The FAA recognizes that technology 

may allow a remote pilot in command 

to operate multiple small unmanned 

aircraft as one system. While such a 

system may, in some circumstances, 

help address the split-attention problem 

discussed above, it would introduce 

significantly more risk into the 

operation because of the remote pilot’s 

potentially reduced ability to resolve 

multiple aircraft or system failures to a 

safe outcome. For example, if one small 

unmanned aircraft in a multi-aircraft 

system loses its link to the control 

station, it may cause the whole system 

to break down, resulting in loss of 

positive control of multiple small 

unmanned aircraft and significantly 

increasing the risk to the NAS. The FAA 

notes that, at this time, none of the 

technologies cited by the commenters 

have established a necessary level of 

reliability through a nationally 

recognized formal testing process such 

as through ASTM International, SAE 

International, or civil aviation 

airworthiness certification. Accordingly, 

this rule will prohibit a person from 

manipulating the flight controls of more 

than one unmanned aircraft or acting as 

a remote pilot in command or visual 

observer in the operation of more than 

one unmanned aircraft at the same time. 

However, as discussed below, this 

prohibition will be subject to waiver. 

Commenters including Aviation 

Management, Boeing, the Small UAV 

Coalition, and AIA said that the FAA 

should revise the rule to create the 

framework for the agency to be able to 

administratively approve multi-UAS 

operations. Several of those 

commenters, as well as Google, 

Amazon, and AUVSI, among others, 

supported allowing the operation of 

multiple small UAS per operator in 

certain cases using a risk-based 

approach. Amazon, for example, said 

the proposed provision should be 

revised to specifically permit the 

operation of multiple small UAS by a 

single operator ‘‘when demonstrated 

that this can be done safely.’’ The Small 

UAV Coalition said approval for the 

operation of multiple small UAS by a 

single operator would be based on a 

demonstration of operator ability and 

technological capabilities of the UAS. 

DJI said it may be possible for an 

operator to operate more than one small 

UAS at a time if there are sufficient 


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visual observers or detect-and-avoid 

technology. An individual said the rule 

should allow for the use of multiple 

small UAS by a single operator if all of 

the UAS are within the visual line of 

sight of either the operator or visual 

observer or if there is some other means 

of compliance for see-and-avoid for all 

small UAS involved in the operation. 

Other commenters said the final rule 

needs to have the flexibility to 

accommodate emerging technology in 

this area. The Utah Governor’s Office of 

Economic Development stated that 

‘‘[t]here must be a road map to, and 

provisions for, multiple UAS per 

operator to allow this technology to be 

tested and eventually implemented.’’ 

The University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign said there should be an 

exception to the proposed restriction for 

research into developing technology to 

allow multiple drones to successfully 

navigate together. MPAA asserted that 

‘‘as control systems improve it may 

become possible to operate more than 

one system at a time.’’ MPAA urged the 

FAA to provide a mechanism in the 

rules to allow additional flexibility for 

filming in controlled environments as 

such technology advances. The National 

Association of Broadcasters, National 

Cable & Telecommunications 

Association, and Radio Television 

Digital News Association said that given 

the speed at which technology is 

developing, the FAA should be open to 

considering automated systems that 

contemplate one person controlling 

multiple small UAS that demonstrate an 

equivalent level of safety to the 

requirements of the final rule. 

The FAA acknowledges the points 

raised by the commenters that the risks 

discussed above may, at some point in 

the future, be mitigated through 

technology. However, as of this writing, 

the FAA does not have data on which 

to base a safety finding that the available 

technology for multiple simultaneous 

small unmanned aircraft operations by 

one person has matured to the extent 

necessary to allow these types of 

operations in a rule of general 

applicability. The FAA also 

acknowledges the benefits of research 

and development associated with the 

simultaneous operation of multiple 

unmanned aircraft and agrees that 

additional flexibility is called for in this 

rule so that the agency can 

administratively allow these types of 

operations based on operation-specific 

mitigations. Accordingly, the FAA has 

made the prohibition on the 

simultaneous operation of multiple 

small unmanned aircraft waivable on a 

case-by-case basis. To obtain a waiver, 

a person will have to demonstrate that 

his or her simultaneous operation of 

more than one small unmanned aircraft 

can safely be conducted under the terms 

of a certificate of waiver. The FAA 

recognizes the potential of one person 

being able to operate multiple small 

unmanned aircraft and will evaluate 

operations conducted under FAA-issued 

waivers to help inform future agency 

actions to enable the simultaneous 

operation of multiple small UAS. 

Amazon asserted that the proposed 

restriction is based on the flawed 

premises that small UAS must be 

operated under constant manual control 

and that FAA-recognized mitigation 

measures like flight termination systems 

are not already available today. Aerial 

Services and MAPPS stated that the 

FAA should allow the operation of 

swarms of UAS if the flight management 

system is capable of supporting it and 

each aircraft has rigid automated 

procedures in case of loss of signal. 

As discussed previously, swarms of 

multiple small unmanned aircraft that 

are linked up to a single system 

introduce additional risk into the NAS 

because a single unmanned aircraft 

losing its link to the control system may 

destabilize the system and result in loss 

of positive control of multiple aircraft. 

Additionally, the FAA does not 

currently have data on which to base a 

finding that the pertinent technology 

has matured to the extent necessary to 

allow the safe operation of multiple 

small unmanned aircraft in a rule of 

general applicability. As such, the FAA 

will consider the use of this technology 

on a case-by-case basis via the waiver 

process. 

AirShip Technologies and the NJIT 

Working Group cited military and nonmilitary uses for clusters, swarms, and 

multiple UAS. These include combat, 

first responder missions, mapping, and 

search and rescue operations. Skycatch, 

Clayco, AECOM, DPR Construction, and 

AUVSI noted that the use of multiple 

UAS in a single operation allows for 

more efficient completion of complex 

tasks to include work over job sites 

without increasing the amount of time 

in flight or recharging of batteries. 

The FAA agrees with the commenters 

that the operation of multiple 

unmanned aircraft may provide a 

valuable and broad spectrum of 

services. However, the technology 

necessary to mitigate risk associated 

with this type of operation is still in its 

infancy and has not yet been proven to 

meet a level of reliability sufficient to 

allow that technology to be relied on for 

risk mitigation in a rule of general 

applicability. As discussed previously, 

the waiver process will continue to be 

available for small UAS operations that 

fall outside the operational parameters 

of part 107. 

The International Center for Law and 

Economics and Tech Freedom said the 

proposed restriction ‘‘fails to reflect the 

‘best reasonably obtainable scientific, 

technical, economic, and other 

information,’ ’’ as required by Executive 

Order 12866. The commenters further 

stated that the FAA has a constitutional 

obligation to explore the adequacy of 

simultaneous operation technology. 

Otherwise, the commenters continued, 

the rule will greatly increase the cost of 

operating UAS, thus limiting their 

availability for both commercial and 

non-commercial uses that are protected 

by the First Amendment. 

The FAA received over 4,500 

comments on this rulemaking and none 

of the commenters (including the 

International Center for Law and 

Economics and Tech Freedom) 

submitted any data establishing the 

safety or maturity of simultaneousoperation technology. Based on the 

number and high quality of the 

comments submitted, the FAA believes 

that this lack of data was not an 

oversight but, rather, evidence of the 

fact that existing data about this 

technology is very limited at this time. 

The FAA will continue exploring the 

feasibility of this technology in future 

agency actions that will be informed, in 

part, by small UAS operations that will 

take place under a part 107 waiver 

allowing the operation of multiple small 

unmanned aircraft at the same time. 

iii. Micro UAS 

The NPRM raised the possibility of 

creating a separate micro UAS 

classification for UAS weighing no more 

than 4.4 pounds (2 kilograms). The 

NPRM went on to list the following 

restrictions that the FAA was 

considering for such a micro UAS 

classification: 

• Require that the micro UAS be made out 

of frangible materials that break, distort, or 

yield on impact. 

• Require that the unmanned aircraft 

weigh no more than 4.4 pounds. 

• Impose a maximum airspeed of 30 knots. 

• Impose a maximum altitude of 400 feet 

AGL. 

• Restrict flight distance to 1,500 feet from, 

and within the visual line of sight of, the 

operator. 

• Ban the use of first person view during 

operations. 

• Require the operator to maintain manual 

control of the flight path of the micro UAS 

and, therefore, ban the use of automation to 

control the flight path. 

• Limit operations to Class G airspace. 

• Require the micro UAS to maintain a 

distance of at least 5 nautical miles from any 

airport. 


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96Some countries, such as the United Kingdom, 

allow approval for flight in congested areas on a 

case-by-case basis. See GAO, Unmanned Aerial 

Systems: FAA Continues Progress toward 

Integration into the National Airspace at 32 (July 

2015). 

97Title 14 CFR 1.1 defines ‘‘person’’ as ‘‘an 

individual, firm, partnership, corporation, 

company, association, joint-stock association, or 

governmental entity. It includes a trustee, receiver, 

assignee, or similar representative of any of them.’’ 

Because the term ‘‘person’’ is defined in 14 CFR 1.1, 

part 107 uses the term ‘‘human being’’ in the 

regulatory text to capture only an individual human 

being. For readability, the preamble uses the terms 

‘‘person’’ and ‘‘human being’’ interchangeably. 

With these additional operating 

restrictions, the NPRM proposed to: (1) 

Allow micro UAS to fly over people not 

involved with the operation; and (2) 

create a separate airman certificate with 

a micro UAS rating. 

Many commenters addressing the 

issue supported the creation of a 

separate micro UAS classification, 

noting that the reduced regulatory 

requirements associated with the 

classification are consistent with the 

lower hazards posed by micro UAS. 

Commenters in research/academia and 

the agricultural, news/media, insurance, 

and construction industries, among 

others, also noted the value of being 

able to operate micro UAS under the 

lesser restrictions contemplated in the 

NPRM. 

However, a number of commenters, 

including ALPA, NAAA, NetMoby, 

Aerius, Planehook, Green Vegans, and 

NextGen Air Transportation Program at 

NC State University, opposed the 

creation of a separate micro UAS 

classification. Reasons for their 

opposition included concerns about: (1) 

The safety of flying over people not 

involved in operations; (2) an airman 

certificate issued on the basis of selfcertification; and (3) the lack of data 

available on the safety of micro UAS 

operations. UAS America Fund and the 

Property Drone Consortium 

recommended that micro UAS operators 

should be required to obtain liability 

insurance for their operation. 

Other commenters, including the 

Small UAV Coalition, National 

Association of Broadcasters, Skycatch, 

DJI, Predesa, the Nez Perce Tribe, and 

the New Hampshire Department of 

Transportation opposed the operational 

limitations that the NPRM proposed for 

micro UAS. These commenters argued 

that many of the proposed limitations 

such as the frangibility requirement, the 

prohibition on use of FPV devices, the 

prohibition on autonomous operations, 

and the prohibition on operating within 

five miles of an airport, would be 

unduly restrictive and would 

significantly impair micro UAS 

operations. 

Still other commenters, including the 

Association of American Universities, 

the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 

Associated General Contractors, 

Southern Company, and the Oklahoma 

Governor’s Unmanned Aerial Systems 

Council argued that micro UAS should 

be exempted from some of the other 

operational restrictions of part 107 (not 

just flight over people). Commenters 

suggested that micro UAS be exempted 

from the visual-line-of-sight restriction, 

the limitation to daylight-only 

operations, the prohibition on 

simultaneous operation of multiple 

aircraft, and the minimum visibility 

requirements. 

The FAA agrees with the commenters 

who pointed out that many of the micro 

UAS limitations proposed in the NPRM, 

such as the requirement to remain more 

than five miles away from an airport 

and the prohibition on autonomous 

operations would, if finalized in this 

rule, significantly impair micro UAS 

operations. At the same time, the FAA 

acknowledges the concerns raised by 

ALPA, NAAA, and other commenters 

who pointed out that, even though 

micro UAS are smaller than other small 

UAS, they can still pose a safety risk. 

This concern is particularly troubling 

given the limited safety data currently 

available with regard to micro UAS 

operations and the fact that almost all 

other countries that currently regulate 

UAS generally do not allow small 

unmanned aircraft to fly over people or 

congested areas.96

Thus, after consideration of the 

comments that the proposed micro UAS 

restrictions would limit the utility of 

such operations and safety concerns that 

remain even with the operating 

limitations proposed in the NPRM, the 

FAA has determined that a different 

framework to regulate micro UAS is 

called for. Because the public has not 

yet been given an opportunity to 

comment on an alternate framework for 

micro UAS operations, the FAA has 

determined that a new comment period 

should be provided for the micro UAS 

component of this rule. Accordingly, the 

FAA chartered a new ARC to provide 

the FAA with recommendations 

regarding Micro UAS. On April 2, 2016, 

the FAA received the Micro UAS ARC’s 

recommendations, and is moving to 

expeditiously issue an NPRM. In the 

meantime, the FAA will finalize the 

remainder of this rule to immediately 

integrate all other small UAS operations 

into the NAS. 

While the micro UAS NPRM 

rulemaking is pending, micro UAS will 

remain subject to the same provisions as 

all other small UAS. However, the FAA 

notes that many of the operational 

restrictions of part 107 are subject to 

waiver. A very low-weight unmanned 

aircraft may be one mitigation that 

could, in conjunction with other 

mitigations, be used to help support a 

safety finding as part of a waiverapplication evaluation. 

iv. Flight Over People 

The NPRM proposed to prohibit the 

operation of small unmanned aircraft 

over a person unless that person is 

either directly participating in the small 

UAS operation or is located under a 

covered structure that would protect the 

person from a falling small unmanned 

aircraft.97 This rule will finalize this 

provision with two changes. First, this 

rule will allow a small unmanned 

aircraft to be operated over a person 

who is inside a stationary covered 

vehicle. Second, this rule will make the 

restriction on operating a small 

unmanned aircraft over people 

waivable. 

Many commenters, including NAAA, 

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 

and Professional Photographers of 

America, supported the flight-overpeople provision as proposed in the 

NPRM. Other commenters objected to 

the proposed requirement. 

DronSystems stated that the proposed 

ban on operations over non-involved 

persons would impact e-commerce and 

‘‘a number of other sectors,’’ and would 

be difficult to enforce. The University of 

Washington said that banning 

operations over non-operators is overburdensome. WAG said the proposed 

prohibition ‘‘could have a significant 

chilling effect on both the commercial 

application of sUAS technology as well 

as the future development of sUAS 

technology,’’ and is inconsistent with 

the ‘‘model aircraft’’ protections 

afforded by part 101 and section 336 of 

Public Law 112–95. Similarly, Foxtrot 

Consulting suggested that adequate 

training and a performance evaluation is 

a better mitigation measure because it 

ensures that remote pilots can operate 

their small UAS safely, regardless of 

what is below. 

The Small UAV Coalition, 

Aeromarine, and an individual 

commenter stated that the proposed 

prohibition is unduly restrictive because 

there is no prohibition on manned 

aircraft flying over people. The 

Coalition also asserted that, given the 

consequent reduction in risk associated 

with the visual-line-of-sight and seeand-avoid requirements, a small UAS 

may safely be operated over persons. 

The International Center for Law and 

Economics and TechFreedom claimed 


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98Public Law 112–95, sec. 336(a)(2). 

99Academy of Model Aeronautics National 

Model Aircraft Safety Code, § B(1). 

that by prohibiting UAS operation over 

people who are not directly involved in 

the operation, the FAA is ‘‘essentially 

limiting commercial UAS operations to 

unpopulated or extremely sparsely 

populated areas,’’ and thus is 

‘‘improperly ignor[ing] the important 

incentives for innovation suggested by 

Executive Order 12866 without 

apparent corresponding benefit.’’ 

The Consumers Energy Company 

(CEC) stated that the likelihood of injury 

from contact with a small UAS is low 

given the restrictions on the size of 

small UAS, as well as the fact that they 

use small rotors and carry small fuel 

loads. With respect to the maintenance 

of power lines, poles, and related 

facilities, in particular, CEC pointed out 

that most operations occur in remote or 

rural locations with low population 

densities, where the risk of contact 

between a small UAS and a noninvolved person is minimal. CEC said 

the FAA needs to consider ‘‘whether the 

risk perceived from small UAS usage 

really justifies a restriction that could 

have a substantial impact on the ability 

to use sUAS on a commercial scale.’’ 

Manned aircraft are generally 

permitted to fly over people because 

manned aircraft are formally evaluated 

for airworthiness through the 

airworthiness certification process. This 

process ensures that the manned aircraft 

has a level of reliability that would 

allow it to, among other things, safely 

fly over a person. 

This rule does not require 

airworthiness certification. Because 

small unmanned aircraft have not been 

tested for reliability through the 

airworthiness certification process, they 

will likely have a higher failure rate 

than certificated aircraft. A small 

unmanned aircraft that fails may fall on 

a person standing under it at the time 

of failure, which is why this rule 

restricts small unmanned aircraft flight 

over people. 

With regard to the risk caused by 

small UAS operations, the FAA agrees 

that, to date, the number of actual 

fatalities caused by small UAS operation 

has been low. However, that may be a 

function of the fact that, until recently, 

commercial civil small UAS operations 

have been prohibited in the United 

States. As discussed in the Regulatory 

Impact Assessment, the FAA expects 

the use of small UAS to increase after 

issuance of this rule, and thus, the 

agency has to ensure that part 107 

implements appropriate mitigation to 

address potential risk caused by small 

unmanned aircraft flight over people. 

The FAA agrees with WAG and 

Foxtrot Consulting that the knowledge 

that remote pilots in command will 

acquire during the certification process 

will help mitigate against small UAS 

accidents caused by human error. 

However, the safety concern underlying 

the flight-over-people restriction is not 

human error, it is mechanical failure. 

While a remote pilot in command may 

be able to detect some signs of potential 

mechanical failure during the preflight 

check, the preflight check does not, by 

itself, assure a level of mechanical 

reliability established by the formal 

airworthiness and maintenance 

processes that apply to other aircraft in 

the NAS. The appropriate mitigation to 

address this discrepancy, especially for 

heavier small unmanned aircraft, is an 

operational restriction on flying over 

people who could be hurt in the event 

of a mechanical failure. 

The FAA disagrees with WAG’s 

assertion that model aircraft are subject 

to a lower flight-over-people standard 

than part 107 operations. In order to 

operate under section 336 of Public Law 

112–95, a model aircraft must, among 

other things, be ‘‘operated in accordance 

with a community based set of safety 

guidelines and within the programming 

of a nationwide community-based 

organization.’’ 98 Today, the largest 

nationwide community-based 

organization that operates model aircraft 

is the Academy of Model Aeronautics 

(AMA). AMA’s safety code specifically 

prohibits ‘‘flying directly over 

unprotected people, vessels, vehicles or 

structures.’’ 99

Several commenters, including the 

American Council of Engineering 

Companies, AUVSI, and Consumer 

Electronics Association, urged the FAA 

to implement a risk-based approach to 

allow operations over people. 

AUVSI asserted that ‘‘by allowing 

sUAS operations over human beings 

following a risk-based approach, the 

FAA would foster industry innovation 

to develop the proper equipment and 

software necessary to meet safety 

standards regarding such operations.’’ 

CEA provided an example of such a 

risk-based restriction used by another 

country that it said ‘‘would permit 

operations in less populated 

environments and continue to allow 

industry to gain experience and 

innovate.’’ Specifically, CEA noted that 

the Swiss have successfully used a 

permitting system for UAS operations 

over ‘‘gatherings of people,’’ defined as 

‘‘several dozen people standing in close 

proximity to one another’’ or within a 

radius of 100 meters of such gatherings. 

Drawing on that example, CEA 

recommended the FAA ‘‘tailor the rules 

to prohibit operations over mass 

gatherings, such as concerts and 

sporting events.’’ Although CEA 

commended the FAA for rejecting as 

‘‘unduly burdensome’’ a prohibition 

against the operation of small UAS over 

any person, it nevertheless asserted its 

belief ‘‘that the proposal is just as 

burdensome and that small UAS 

incorporate sufficient safety measures 

that make the prohibition unnecessary 

under the new rules.’’ 

Boeing similarly recommended that 

the FAA reconsider proposed § 107.39 

and ‘‘develop criteria using a risk-based 

approach to this issue, based upon 

population density and overflight, to 

take into account agriculture as well as 

law enforcement uses.’’ The 

Professional Helicopter Pilots 

Association suggested allowing small 

UAS to be operated over persons or 

property if they do so in a safe manner. 

DJI pointed out that ‘‘the proposed 

performance standards already impose 

an obligation on the operator to 

familiarize himself with the operating 

environment and take steps to assure 

the operation does not present an 

‘undue hazard’.’’ Depending on the 

nature of the operation, DJI continued, 

‘‘the risk associated with an inadvertent 

loss of positive control may require that 

there be no third parties exposed to any 

risk,’’ or ‘‘the risk may be so minimal as 

to merit notification but not evacuation 

or taking cover,’’ or ‘‘the required safety 

measure may fall within this range of 

options.’’ As such, DJI suggested that 

‘‘the best way to address the risk to 

individuals not directly involved in the 

operation is through the proposed 

performance standard.’’ 

Trimble Navigation proposed the FAA 

rely on a performance-based regime for 

operations over persons. Noting that the 

onus and obligation should be primarily 

on the small UAS operator to assess the 

overall safety environment before 

operating over persons, the company 

said the FAA ‘‘should avoid trying to 

specify precise design-based criteria in 

favor of a general standard of care that 

requires the operator to take into 

account the full range of operational 

safety protections and procedures at the 

site in question.’’ 

A commenter suggested the final 

regulations should discern between 

UAS weighing 5 pounds or less (which 

could be operated over ‘‘populated’’ 

areas at a maximum speed of 40 mph), 

UAS weighing between 5 and 25 

pounds (which could be operated over 

‘‘sparsely populated’’ areas at a 

maximum speed of 70 mph), and UAS 

weighing between 25 and 55 pounds 

(which could be operated according to 


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100See Letter to James E. Gardner from Rebecca 

MacPherson, Assistant Chief Counsel for 

Regulations (June 18, 2012). 

101See, e.g., 14 CFR 103.15. 

the limitations imposed in the NPRM). 

The commenter further suggested that 

COAs be available for UAS between 25 

and 55 pounds to be operated in 

populated and sparsely populated areas. 

The FAA agrees that for certain types 

of small unmanned aircraft, a more 

performance-based set of operational 

mitigations may be appropriate because 

the lighter weight or other 

characteristics of those aircraft may 

result in less impact force if they should 

collide with a person. That is why, as 

discussed in the previous section, the 

FAA will be issuing an NPRM inviting 

public comment on a framework under 

which micro UAS will be allowed to 

operate over people. However, other 

small unmanned aircraft that do not 

meet the characteristics of a micro UAS 

may result in more impact force if they 

should collide with a person and that 

greater force may seriously injure or kill 

the person. 

The risk associated with flight over 

people is due to mechanical reliability 

issues that a remote pilot in command 

may have a limited opportunity to 

evaluate without airworthiness 

certification or a more extensive 

maintenance process. At this time, the 

FAA has no data establishing how that 

risk could be mitigated through 

operational constraints (whether 

performance-based or otherwise), other 

than a prohibition on flight over people. 

Accordingly, this rule will retain the 

general prohibition on flight over 

people. However, as discussed below, 

this prohibition will be waivable to 

allow the FAA to consider case-specific 

mitigations. The FAA will use data and 

operating experience gained as a result 

of the waiver process to help inform 

future UAS rulemakings. 

A number of commenters said the 

proposed restriction should be 

narrowed to apply only to certain 

crowded or heavily populated areas. 

The American Petroleum Institute urged 

the FAA not to apply the prohibition in 

cases of ‘‘intentional acts to disrupt 

lawful UAS operations’’ (e.g., anti-oil 

and gas activists placing themselves in 

generally accessible areas of operation 

to frustrate or halt routine activities). 

Event 38 Unmanned Systems proposed 

that ‘‘certain events and other areas with 

high people concentration locations be 

designated as no-fly zones,’’ instead of 

a total ban on operations over nonparticipants. The company suggested 

that local and State entities could be 

involved in this part of the rulemaking. 

Matternet similarly recommended 

that the only overhead operations that 

should be restricted are operations 

‘‘over an open air assembly of persons 

if such operation endangers the life or 

property of another.’’ The company 

compared the proposed regulation to 

regulations for ultralight vehicles 

(ULV)—which weigh up to 250 pounds, 

plus the weight of the person, and are 

permitted to be operated over persons— 

and suggested that a device weighing 

less than one-sixth the weight of a ULV 

with a passenger, and operated at an 

altitude of only 500 feet or less 

(compared to thousands of feet for the 

ULV), poses far less risk to persons on 

the ground. Several individuals also 

recommended that the final rule 

prohibit any operation in congested 

areas or over open-air assemblies of 

people. 

As an initial matter, the FAA notes 

that there is a significant difference 

between the terms ‘‘congested area’’ and 

‘‘open-air assembly of people.’’ While 

the term ‘‘open-air assembly of people’’ 

applies only to a large group of people, 

the term ‘‘congested area’’ could apply 

to an area that has no people in it. For 

example, a town’s commercial/business 

district can be considered a congested 

area, even in the middle of the night 

when there are no people in the area.100

As pointed out by the commenters, a 

number of existing operations that take 

place in the NAS, such as the operation 

of ULV, are prohibited from taking place 

over congested areas.101 The FAA 

considered imposing a similar 

restriction on small UAS operations 

conducted under this rule. However, the 

FAA ultimately rejected this approach 

as needlessly restrictive because it 

would prohibit small UAS operations 

over certain parts of a town even when 

there are no people in the area of 

operation who could be hurt by a small 

unmanned aircraft. 

With regard to operations that are not 

conducted over an open-air assembly of 

people, the FAA agrees that this may be 

a consideration for some small 

unmanned aircraft that pose a lower 

injury risk if they collide with a person, 

consistent with the micro UAS ARC’s 

recommendations. Accordingly, the 

FAA may consider this approach as part 

of the micro UAS rulemaking. However, 

other small unmanned aircraft pose a 

higher injury risk and in the event of a 

mechanical failure, those aircraft could 

seriously injure or kill a person in their 

path, even if that person is not part of 

a larger group. Accordingly, this rule 

will not allow flight over people even 

when they are not part of an open-air 

assembly. We will continue to evaluate 

this issue and address it in rulemaking 

in response to the Micro UAS ARC 

recommendations, as noted earlier. 

The FAA declines to add an exception 

for intentional acts to disrupt lawful 

small UAS operations. A person who is 

standing under an uncertificated small 

unmanned aircraft is subject to the same 

amount of risk regardless of his or her 

subjective motivation for standing under 

the aircraft. The FAA notes, however, 

that State and local laws, such as 

trespassing, may provide a remedy for 

companies whose small UAS operations 

are deliberately interfered with by 

people entering the area of operation 

without permission. 

Finally, with regard to State and local 

entity involvement in this rulemaking, 

the FAA notes that the comment period 

for the NPRM was open to everyone, 

including State and local entities. The 

FAA received a number of comments 

from State and local entities, and it 

considered those comments when 

formulating this final rule. 

Several commenters, including the 

Small UAV Coalition, Google, and 

Statoil, suggested that the prohibition 

on flight over people should be subject 

to waiver or some other type of 

deviation authority. The Small UAV 

Coalition urged the FAA to revise 

proposed § 107.39 to allow the 

Administrator or his delegate to 

authorize small UAS operations over 

non-participating persons through 

exemption, deviation authority 

(certificate of waiver or authorization), 

or certification, ‘‘upon a showing that 

any risk to persons on the ground is 

sufficiently mitigated.’’ 

Google pointed out that an outright 

ban on operations over people not 

directly participating in the operation of 

the UAS or not located under a covered 

structure would limit beneficial uses for 

small UAS which involve operations 

above nonparticipants. Google proposed 

that operators be able to ‘‘present a 

safety case’’ to the FAA for operations 

over non-participants. 

The National Ski Area Association 

(NSAA) said the final rule should 

recognize and accommodate 

technological innovations, which could 

be required for use of UAS at ski areas 

when operating near open-air 

assemblies of persons. Such 

technologies include geo-fencing, 

return-to-home capabilities, preprogrammed waypoint software, landimmediately function, GPS, signal 

processing, and increasingly reliable 

navigation systems. 

CEA suggested that the FAA allow 

small UAS to be eligible to obtain 

airworthiness certifications, and that 

UAS with such certifications not be 

subject to the prohibition on operations 


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over people. CEA asserted that such an 

approach ‘‘will create a vibrant market 

for UAS and encourage manufacturers 

to seek airworthiness certification.’’ 

Airware pointed out that standards 

have been developed by ASTM 

subgroup F38 to ensure higher levels of 

safety for operations that pose a higher 

risk like flight over populated areas. In 

addition to those existing standards, 

Airware asserted that the combination 

of the use of fly-away protections like 

geo-fencing and contingency 

management, applying design and 

testing to industry standards, the use of 

reliable flight control systems, and the 

use of parachutes to mitigate against the 

risk of all out failure ‘‘provides an 

equivalent level of safety for flight in 

populated areas.’’ Airware further 

asserted that this goes well beyond the 

requirements imposed in the countries 

that currently allow for operations over 

populated areas like France, the Czech 

Republic, Austria, Denmark, Italy, and 

Sweden (among others), which ‘‘are 

currently being conducted with 

extremely high levels of safety.’’ 

ASTM pointed out that there are 

multiple approved industry consensus 

standards under development to 

support operations over people, in case 

the FAA decides to require compliance 

with industry consensus standards for 

this requirement in the final rule. ASTM 

also noted that precedent exists for the 

utilization of industry consensus 

standards by Federal agencies in the 

United States. The commenter went on 

to point out that the National 

Technology Transfer and Advancement 

Act (NTTAA) mandates that all Federal 

agencies use technical standards 

developed and adopted by voluntary 

consensus standards bodies, as opposed 

to using government-unique standards. 

In addition, ASTM asserted that, 

consistent with Section 12(d) of the 

NTTAA, OMB Circular A–119 directs 

agencies to use voluntary consensus 

standards in lieu of government-unique 

standards except where inconsistent 

with law or otherwise impractical. 

ASTM further noted that OMB Circular 

A–119 also provides guidance for 

agencies participating in voluntary 

consensus standards bodies and 

describes procedures for satisfying the 

reporting requirements of the Act. 

The FAA agrees that technology or 

additional mitigation, such as 

airworthiness certification, may allow 

small unmanned aircraft to safely fly 

over people in certain circumstances. 

Accordingly, the flight-over-people 

restriction in this rule will be waivable. 

In order to obtain a waiver, an applicant 

will have to demonstrate that he or she 

has implemented mitigations such that 

small unmanned aircraft flight over 

people can safely be conducted under 

the terms of a certificate of waiver. 

The FAA also agrees with CEA that 

while this rule does not require 

airworthiness certification, this rule also 

does not prohibit a small UAS from 

voluntarily obtaining this certification. 

The FAA generally agrees that having a 

small UAS meet an appropriate 

airworthiness standard could increase 

safety to the point of permitting a small 

unmanned aircraft to operate over 

persons who are not directly involved in 

the flight operation (i.e., nonparticipants) and who are not under a 

covered structure. The FAA may 

consider airworthiness certification of 

the small UAS as mitigation to support 

an application for waiver that would 

allow a small unmanned aircraft to 

operate over unprotected nonparticipants. 

With regard to the use of industry 

consensus-standards, as noted by 

ASTM, consensus standards for 

operations such as flight over people are 

currently in development. As of this 

writing, those standards have not yet 

been published. The FAA notes, 

however, that the level of safety that 

must be demonstrated in order to obtain 

a waiver may be demonstrated in a 

number of different ways. Once 

consensus standards are published, the 

FAA may consider whether compliance 

with the published consensus standards 

would be one way to demonstrate that 

the proposed operation can be 

conducted safely under the terms of a 

certificate of waiver. The FAA will also 

consider UAS-specific consensus 

standards, once they are published, in 

future UAS rulemakings. 

Several commenters said the 

proposed prohibition should not apply 

when additional risk mitigating 

measures are employed. Southern 

Company said the FAA should allow 

operations over any person who is 

located on the property, easement, or 

right of way of the person or entity for 

whom the small UAS is operated, and 

any person who is participating in the 

activity for which the small UAS is 

being operated. The commenter said 

such mitigating restrictions could 

include a lower operating ceiling, 

lateral-distance limits, a lower speed 

restriction, and a prohibition on 

operations over large gatherings of 

people. Qualcomm similarly proposed 

that FAA permit operations over 

uninvolved persons where risks are 

mitigated by the use of ‘‘proven means 

of avoiding harm to individuals via 

technologies that allow the device to 

land safely under even extreme 

circumstances.’’ The Rocky Mountain 

Farmers Union urged the FAA to allow 

operations over non-participants ‘‘under 

circumstances when the UAS operator 

can maintain safe operation of the UAS 

and either depart the area or safely land 

the UAS without risk to unrelated 

persons on the ground.’’ The Newspaper 

Association of America asserted that the 

FAA should not prohibit news 

organizations from overhead flight, 

‘‘provided that adequate precautionary 

measures are taken to ensure that [UAS] 

are operated safely at all times.’’ 

The Mercatus Center at George Mason 

University said that the FAA did not 

consider the benefits of allowing UAS 

operations over persons not involved in 

the operation, and that the FAA 

overstates the risks of operation in 

populated areas. The University 

asserted that, ‘‘[u]pon loss of positive 

control, unmanned aircraft can be 

programmed to safely return to a base, 

or to simply hover in place.’’ Thus, the 

University continued, the risk to 

bystanders can be mitigated without a 

ban on operation over uninvolved 

persons. 

NAMIC recommended that the FAA 

allow small UAS operations over people 

not directly involved in the operation, 

as long as those operations follow 

enhanced safety protocols, including, 

for example: (1) That the small 

unmanned aircraft not loiter over a 

person or persons for an extended 

period of time, but transition over them 

as needed to reach a location where 

operating is permitted to complete the 

flight; and (2) that an operator must 

operate the UAS at a sufficient altitude 

so that if a power unit fails, an 

emergency landing can be accomplished 

without undue hazard to persons or 

property on the ground. Exelon 

Corporation said that the final rule 

should include reasonable 

accommodations to allow for brief, lowrisk exceptions to the ban on flights over 

non-participating persons (e.g., flying 

across a road during a survey of damage 

to power distribution lines in suburban 

areas), and that ‘‘proper safety 

precautions as well as signage, 

education, and protocol can be put in 

place to mitigate any safety concerns.’’ 

The Property Drone Consortium said 

that any UAS with ‘‘special safety 

features’’ should be exempt from the 

ban on flight over non-participants. 

Furthermore, the Consortium suggested 

the FAA mitigate any safety concerns by 

requiring appropriate insurance 

coverage or creating a suggested list of 

‘‘best practices’’ for use in the insurance 

industry. Similarly, the University of 

Illinois at Urbana-Champaign said the 

proposed prohibition ‘‘is onerous and 

overprotective,’’ and suggested instead 


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102Other commenters who urged FAA to 

reconsider the proposed prohibition as it applies to 

agricultural operations include the National 

Farmers Union, National Corn Growers Association, 

National Association of Wheat Growers, and the 

Virginia Agribusiness Council. 

that insurance and equipment 

requirements could be employed ‘‘to 

promote responsible use of the UAS.’’ 

As discussed earlier, the restriction on 

flight over people in this rule will be 

waivable. This will allow the FAA to 

consider, on a case-by-case basis, any 

additional mitigations that are 

incorporated into a small UAS 

operation. The FAA will grant a waiver 

request allowing small unmanned 

aircraft flight over people if the 

applicant establishes that his or her 

operation can safely be conducted under 

the terms of a certificate of waiver. In 

response to comments suggesting an 

insurance requirement in place of the 

flight-over-people restriction, the FAA 

notes that, as discussed in section III.K.1 

of this preamble, the FAA lacks 

jurisdiction to mandate the purchase of 

liability insurance. 

An individual commenter suggested 

that operations in congested areas be 

permitted with additional licensure, 

which the commenter said ‘‘will assist 

the operator in recognizing potential 

hazards and risks as well as the ability 

to assess those risks to ensure that these 

hazards to the public be minimized.’’ 

Another individual commenter 

recommended an additional rating for 

operators to allow them to fly ‘‘in cities 

and other crowded areas.’’ The 

commenter said the operators could be 

required to go through a more 

comprehensive certification process, 

and the UAS could be required to have 

annual or semiannual maintenance 

checks and be equipped with an 

automatically deployable parachute 

system. 

As discussed earlier, the FAA 

considered and rejected additional 

limitations on operations over congested 

areas because that approach would 

needlessly limit small UAS operation 

over congested areas during times when 

those areas are devoid of people. The 

FAA also does not agree that additional 

remote pilot certification should be 

required to operate over an empty area 

of operation, even if that area of 

operation happens to be located in a 

congested area. 

The Stadium Managers Association 

suggested modifying proposed § 107.39 

to mirror the current section 333 

exemption language which, in addition 

to prohibiting flights over people, 

includes a prohibition against flight 

over vehicles, vessels, and structures. 

Vision Services Group similarly 

recommended prohibiting flight over 

people in a covered structure. 

On the other hand, Edison Electric 

Institute, NRECA, the American Public 

Power Association, and Continental 

Mapping suggested that the exception 

allowing flight over people located 

under a covered structure that can 

provide reasonable protection from a 

falling small unmanned aircraft should 

be clarified to indicate that persons 

under cover in a vehicle ‘‘may qualify 

as being in a structure providing 

reasonable protection.’’ 

This rule will allow flight over people 

located under a covered structure 

capable of protecting a person from a 

falling small unmanned aircraft because 

such a structure mitigates the risk 

associated with a small unmanned 

aircraft flying over people. The FAA 

also agrees with Edison Electric 

Institute, NRECA, the American Public 

Power Association, and Continental 

Mapping that a small unmanned aircraft 

should be allowed to fly over a person 

who is inside a stationary covered 

vehicle that can provide reasonable 

protection from a falling small 

unmanned aircraft. The FAA has 

modified this rule accordingly. This rule 

will not, however, allow operation of a 

small unmanned aircraft over a moving 

vehicle because the moving vehicle 

operating environment is dynamic (not 

directly controlled by the remote pilot 

in command) and the potential impact 

forces when an unmanned aircraft 

impacts a moving road vehicle pose 

unacceptable risks due to head-on 

closure speeds. Additionally, impact 

with a small unmanned aircraft may 

distract the driver of a moving vehicle 

and result in an accident. 

Several commenters sought 

clarification on the NPRM’s use of the 

phrases ‘‘directly participating in the 

operation’’ (as used in proposed 

§ 107.39(a)) and ‘‘directly involved in 

the operation’’ (as used in the 

preamble). Associated Equipment 

Distributors noted that the preamble to 

the NPRM indicates that direct 

participation is limited to the operator 

and the visual observer, but the 

proposed regulatory language ‘‘does not 

afford clarity on this point.’’ SkySpecs 

proposed allowing anyone who has 

permission to be on a construction site 

and is covered by liability insurance to 

be covered by the definition. 

Edison Electric Institute, NRECA, and 

the American Public Power Association 

said the definition of ‘‘directly 

participating’’ ‘‘should be expanded to 

include personnel engaged in related 

activities, such as workers at a power 

plant a small UAS is being used to 

monitor or an electric utility crew 

whose work the small UAS is being 

used to assist.’’ The organizations 

further proposed that such individuals 

would qualify as ‘‘directly participating 

in an operation’’ if they had received the 

pre-flight briefing described in proposed 

§ 107.49. 

Some commenters, including NBAA, 

the American Insurance Association, 

FLIR Systems, the North Carolina 

Association of Broadcasters, and 

Skycatch, felt that FAA should permit 

small UAS operations over individuals 

not involved in the UAS operations 

when those individuals consent to, or 

are made aware of, the operations. 

Several State farm bureaus and NBAA 

urged the FAA to allow small UAS 

operations over people not directly 

involved in an operation so long as the 

operator notifies those people of the 

operation before it starts. The American 

Farm Bureau Federation and a number 

of state farm bureau federations said the 

definition should be expanded to 

include individuals ‘‘who have been 

made aware of the presence and 

approximate flight path of the sUAS in 

their vicinity.’’ The farm bureau 

federations claimed that the risk of a 

small UAS endangering a consenting 

individual working in a field who is not 

directly involved in, but is aware of, a 

small UAS operation ‘‘is simply too 

remote to justify a blanket 

prohibition.’’ 102 AED proposed 

including consenting individuals, such 

as employees and contractors at a 

construction site, in the definition of 

‘‘directly participating in the 

operation.’’ The International 

Association of Amusement Parks and 

Attractions also suggested that the 

definition of ‘‘directly participating in 

the operation’’ include persons who 

have consented to the operation of the 

UAS overhead. 

Associated Builders and Contractors 

also proposed lifting the restriction on 

flight over non-participants on a 

construction site, so long as those 

people have been notified of the small 

UAS operations, wear hard hats, and 

have been provided orientation 

regarding the equipment prior to 

entering the work site. 

Kapture Digital Media questioned 

whether people can become ‘‘directly 

involved’’ in an operation if they are 

notified of the operation by signs posted 

around the area of operation, or, 

alternatively, whether people can only 

become ‘‘directly involved’’ in an 

operation by signing a waiver. Vail 

Resorts noted that many of the best uses 

of UAS technology at ski areas would 

necessarily involve some temporary 

amount of flight over individuals who 


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103See FAA Order 8900.1, vol. 3, ch. 8, sec. 1. 

are not ‘‘necessary for the safe 

operation’’ of the small UAS, which is 

how the NPRM defined ‘‘directly 

involved in the operation.’’ 

Consequently, Vail asserted that a strict 

ban on operations over people not 

‘‘directly involved’’ in the operation 

‘‘could have the unintended 

consequence of making many 

potentially critical ski resort drone 

operations noncompliant with FAA 

regulations.’’ As such, Vail said FAA 

should broaden the definition of 

‘‘directly involved’’ to include ‘‘those 

people who are aware of and have 

consented to being involved in the 

drone operation by, for example, 

reading particular signage or signing a 

release.’’ Similarly NoFlyZone.org said 

operations over non-participants should 

be permitted provided the operator has 

advised all non-participants to remain 

clear of the small UAS launch/recovery 

area, and also advised all nonparticipants that the small UAS does not 

comply with Federal safety regulations 

for standard aircraft. 

The National Ski Area Association 

(NSAA) pointed out that for UAS 

operations that may involve operations 

near skiers and snowboarders, or 

participants and spectators in special 

events, ski areas could inform 

participants of the event and associated 

risks and could obtain consent prior to 

using a UAS. NSAA suggested further 

that ski areas ‘‘could be obligated to 

determine, based on the event or 

assemblage of persons, acceptable 

proximity parameters, either laterally or 

vertically.’’ 

The term ‘‘directly participating’’ 

refers to specific personnel that the 

remote pilot in command has deemed to 

be involved with the flight operation of 

the small unmanned aircraft. These 

include the remote pilot in command, 

the person manipulating the controls of 

the small UAS (if other than the remote 

pilot in command), and the visual 

observer. These personnel also include 

any person who is necessary for the 

safety of the small UAS flight operation. 

For example, if a small UAS operation 

employs a person whose duties are to 

maintain a perimeter to ensure that 

other people do not enter the area of 

operation, that person would be 

considered a direct participant in the 

flight operation of the small UAS. 

Anyone else would not be considered 

a direct participant in the small UAS 

operation. Due to the potential for the 

small unmanned aircraft to harm 

persons on the ground, the FAA does 

not consider consent or the need to do 

other work in the area of operation to be 

a sufficient mitigation of risk to allow 

operations over people. The FAA 

considers the risks associated with 

allowing operations over directly 

participating persons to be a necessary 

risk associated with the safety of flight 

because if UAS crewmembers are 

prohibited from standing near a flying 

unmanned aircraft, they may be unable 

to complete their duties. Additionally, 

some small UAS operations require the 

aircraft to be hand-launched or retrieved 

by a person, so it would not be possible 

to conduct such operations without 

permitting operations over those people. 

Further, the FAA notes that people 

directly participating in the flight 

operation of a small unmanned aircraft 

have situational awareness that provides 

them with increased ability to avoid a 

falling unmanned aircraft. Conversely, a 

non-participant who has consented to 

allowing operations overhead may not 

share the same situational awareness 

and consequently may not be able to 

avoid being struck by a small unmanned 

aircraft. For this reason, a remote pilot 

intending to operate small unmanned 

aircraft over non- participants must 

apply for a waiver under this part, 

which will allow the FAA to evaluate 

each applicant’s operation on a case-bycase basis. 

The American Fuel & Petrochemical 

Manufacturers and Employees, 

Associated General Contractors of 

America, Skycatch, Clayco, AECOM, 

DPR Construction, and the State of Utah 

Governor’s Office of Economic 

Development said operations over 

uninvolved persons should be permitted 

at areas closed to the public (e.g., 

construction sites, movie sets), as long 

as the uninvolved persons are aware of 

and consent to the activity. The 

National Association of Broadcasters, 

National Cable & Telecommunications 

Association, and Radio Television 

Digital News Association, commenting 

jointly, pointed out that the FAA has 

already granted a number of section 333 

exemptions for aerial photography and 

filming which have allowed small UAS 

flights over consenting production 

personnel, and thus urged the FAA to 

define ‘‘directly participating in the 

operation’’ to include persons who have 

‘‘implicitly consented to the operation 

of the sUAS overhead by nature of their 

presence on a set where sUAS filming 

is occurring.’’ The Motion Picture 

Association of America similarly asked 

the FAA to specify that ‘‘all parties on 

a closed set’’ qualify as ‘‘directly 

participating in the operation,’’ thereby 

ensuring that current practices under 

the filming exemptions are consistent 

with § 107.39. 

As pointed out by the commenters, 

the FAA currently allows small 

unmanned aircraft flight over people in 

only one type of situation: A closed-set 

movie set which is a controlled-access 

environment where the person in charge 

has extensive control over the 

positioning of people who are standing 

near the small unmanned aircraft. The 

FAA currently considers each movie-set 

exemption on a case-by-case basis 

through the section 333 exemption 

process. The FAA will continue 

considering flight over people on a 

movie-set on a case-by-case basis 

through the waiver process in this rule. 

The FAA notes that this framework is 

consistent with the regulatory 

framework used for motion picture and 

television filming in manned-aircraft 

operations, where a waiver is usually 

required prior to using an aircraft for 

filming purposes.103 The FAA also notes 

that, as discussed in section II.C of this 

preamble, current section 333 

exemption holders who are allowed to 

fly over people when filming a movie 

will be permitted to continue operating 

under their section 333 exemption until 

they are able to obtain a waiver under 

part 107. 

With regard to flight over people in 

other controlled-access environments, 

such as construction sites, the FAA will 

consider that issue on a case-by-case 

basis through the waiver process. This 

process will allow the FAA to consider 

the specific nature of the controlledaccess environment to determine how 

that environment would mitigate the 

risk associated with flight over people. 

The Association of American 

Railroads said operations over railroad 

personnel during a railroad incident 

investigation or routine railroad 

inspections should be permitted. The 

Association noted that the risks 

associated with such operations can be 

mitigated by giving those personnel a 

small UAS operations and safety 

briefing before flight is commenced. 

The FAA disagrees. While this rule 

will allow flight over direct participants 

in a small UAS operation after they 

receive important safety information, 

the information does not, by itself, 

completely mitigate the risk posed by 

flight over people. As discussed earlier, 

the reason this rule allows flight over 

direct participants in a small UAS flight 

operation is because without this 

exception, those people may be unable 

to complete their duties to ensure the 

safety of the small UAS flight operation. 

People who are not directly 

participating in the small UAS flight 

operation are not needed to ensure the 

safety of that operation, and as such, 

this rule will not allow flight over those 

people without a waiver. 


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The Property Drone Consortium said 

homeowners inside their homes while 

an inspection operation is conducted 

overhead, or homeowners who are in 

their back yards while an inspection 

operation is conducted in their front 

yards, should be considered ‘‘protected’’ 

for purposes of the ban on flight over 

non-participants. 

A homeowner who is inside his or her 

home would be under a covered 

structure and flight over him or her 

would be permitted if the home can 

provide reasonable protection from a 

falling small unmanned aircraft. 

However, a person who is inside his or 

her backyard would presumably not be 

under a covered structure and could be 

injured by a falling small unmanned 

aircraft. Accordingly, a person who is in 

his or her backyard would not be 

considered protected if that backyard is 

not covered. 

The Institute of Makers of Explosives 

asked the FAA to expand or clarify the 

proposed prohibition on operation of a 

small UAS over ‘‘most persons’’ to 

clearly define the persons over whom 

UAS operations may not be conducted. 

IME specifically recommended that a 

UAS not be allowed to operate over any 

person conducting operations with 

explosives under the jurisdiction of the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 

and Explosives, and that the restriction 

apply to unauthorized, unrelated 

operators. 

As discussed earlier, this rule will 

prohibit operations over people who are 

not directly participating in the flight 

operation of a small UAS and who are 

not under a covered structure or in a 

stationary covered vehicle that could 

reasonably protect them from a falling 

small unmanned aircraft. This 

prohibition applies regardless of what 

the person who is not directly 

participating in the small UAS flight 

operation is doing. 

A number of commenters sought 

clarification as to what the FAA 

considers to be an operation ‘‘over a 

human being.’’ Southern Company 

asserted that, as written, the proposed 

provision could either be read strictly, 

to prohibit operations directly overhead, 

or it could be read more broadly, to 

prohibit operations directly overhead 

and within a short lateral distance of the 

person. Kansas University UAS Program 

similarly said the FAA needs to clarify 

whether by ‘‘over a human being’’ 

means directly overhead or ‘‘within an 

area that the aircraft could come down 

on the person.’’ 

Similarly, NAMIC asked the FAA to 

provide further guidance as to whether 

the small UAS operation is prohibited 

directly above persons or ‘‘within a 

proximate area over persons.’’ NAMIC 

acknowledged that it does not have the 

FAA’s understanding of aeronautics or 

physics, but nevertheless stated its 

belief that a terminated UAS at 500 feet 

and 100 mph seems unlikely to fall 

directly onto a person standing directly 

under the UAS at the time of the 

termination. An individual commenter 

asserted that a small UAS flying towards 

a person, even if not directly above that 

person, could still pose a threat. By way 

of example, the commenter stated that a 

multi-rotor helicopter flying at a ground 

speed of 30 mph at 400 feet AGL that 

experiences a catastrophic failure ‘‘will 

transcribe a parabolic arc that will 

extend horizontally several hundred feet 

in the direction of travel.’’ 

Matternet also stated that the 

proposed restriction ‘‘appears to be 

based on the faulty premise that aircraft 

only fall straight down when they 

malfunction or when pilots err’’ when, 

in fact, an aircraft in flight will typically 

follow its original trajectory, subject to 

aerodynamic forces and gravity. Thus, 

the company asserted, an operation that 

passes directly over a person is not 

significantly more dangerous than an 

operation that passes several linear feet, 

or even tens of linear feet, away from 

that person on the ground. 

The term ‘‘over’’ refers to the flight of 

the small unmanned aircraft directly 

over any part of a person. For example, 

a small UAS that hovers directly over a 

person’s head, shoulders, or extended 

arms or legs would be an operation over 

people. Similarly, if a person is lying 

down, for example at a beach, an 

operation over that person’s torso or 

toes would also constitute an operation 

over people. An operation during which 

a small UAS flies over any part of any 

person, regardless of the dwell time, if 

any, over the person, would be an 

operation over people. 

The remote pilot needs to take into 

account the small unmanned aircraft’s 

course, speed, and trajectory, including 

the possibility of a catastrophic failure, 

to determine if the small unmanned 

aircraft would go over or strike a person 

not directly involved in the flight 

operation (non-participant). In addition, 

the remote pilot must take steps using 

a safety risk-based approach to ensure 

that: (1) The small unmanned aircraft 

does not operate over non-participants 

who are not under a covered structure 

or in a stationary covered vehicle; (2) 

the small unmanned aircraft will pose 

no undue hazard to other aircraft, 

people, or property in the event of a loss 

of control of the aircraft for any reason 

(§ 107.19); and (3) the small UAS is not 

operated in a careless or reckless 

manner so as to endanger the life or 

property of another (§ 107.23). If the 

remote pilot cannot comply with these 

requirements, then the flight must not 

take place or the flight must be 

immediately and safely terminated. 

Several commenters recommended 

that the FAA include specific vertical 

and horizontal minimum-distance 

requirements. Continental Mapping and 

MAPPS recommended that no 

operations be permitted ‘‘within 50 

meters vertically or horizontally from 

people, animals, buildings, structures, 

or vehicles, with a particular emphasis 

on takeoff and landing.’’ MAPPS 

pointed out that its testing has shown 

this is a safe distance to perform 

emergency landings should something 

go wrong, particularly with rotary wing 

platforms. NAMIC recommended that 

FAA prohibit persons from 

‘‘intentionally operat[ing] a small UAS 

over or within 100 feet’’ from a human 

being who is not directly participating 

in its operation or not located under a 

covered structure. 

State Farm suggested that FAA 

remove the word ‘‘over’’ from proposed 

§ 107.39, and instead prohibit persons 

from ‘‘intentionally operat[ing] a small 

UAS within 100 feet’’ from a human 

being who is not directly participating 

in the operation or not located under a 

covered structure. Aviation 

Management similarly suggested that 

the FAA provide protection to humans 

on the ground ‘‘in close proximity to’’ 

small UAS operations by requiring that 

a small UAS remain a minimum of 100 

feet from the nearest human who is not 

directly participating in the operation (a 

requirement the commenter pointed out 

is imposed by Canada and Australia). 

Stating that an aircraft ‘‘needs a fall 

radius that contemplates kinetic energy, 

max speed, max altitude,’’ an individual 

commenter suggested that small UAS 

flight be restricted to a vertical cylinder 

with a radius of 200 feet, centered over 

an animal or persons not directly 

involved in the operation. 

Several other commenters made 

suggestions as to how the FAA can more 

precisely define the requisite separation 

between a small UAS and persons not 

involved in an operation. The Civil 

Aviation Authority of the Czech 

Republic said the proposed prohibition 

‘‘should be extended to a safety 

horizontal barrier, not only directly 

above people, but also not in an unsafe 

proximity (for multicopters this should 

be twice the actual height AGL).’’ 

NOAA and Southern Company said 

proposed § 107.39 should be revised to 

include specific lateral distances. 

Colorado Ski Country USA said the final 

rule should include a definition of 

‘‘Operations Over a Human Being’’ that 


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sets out ‘‘the proximity in which UAS 

operations would be prohibited.’’ The 

New Hampshire Department of 

Transportation suggested that the final 

rule include a ‘‘specified threedimensional space that a small UAS is 

prohibited from when operating over 

any person not directly involved with 

the operation.’’ The Hillsborough 

County Aviation Authority suggested 

that the lateral separation from people 

or structures be revisited to consider a 

safety area around the UAS ‘‘with 

regards to momentum, wind drift, 

malfunction, etc. that would affect 

people or structures nearby.’’ 

The National Association of Flight 

Instructors (NAFI) advocated for a larger 

separation between small UAS and nonparticipants, and recommended that 

proposed § 107.39 be revised to prohibit 

operation of a small UAS ‘‘closer than 

400 feet’’ to persons not directly 

participating in the operation or not 

located under a covered structure or to 

‘‘any vessel, vehicle, or structure not 

controlled by the operator or for which 

written permission by the owner or 

licensee of that vessel, vehicle or 

structure has not been obtained.’’ NAFI 

went on to assert that there is no reliable 

or sufficient database from which to 

project accident or injury rates, and to 

urge FAA to ‘‘proceed cautiously and 

relatively slowly in significantly 

reducing the protection currently 

afforded to persons and property on the 

surface from the hazards of small 

unmanned aircraft systems. 

Green Vegans asserted that under 

Public Law 112–95, Congress directed 

the FAA to implement restrictions for 

small UAS operations which ‘‘include 

maintaining a distance of 500 feet from 

persons.’’ 

The FAA considered requiring 

minimum stand-off distances in this 

rule, but ultimately determined that, 

due to the wide range of possible small 

unmanned aircraft and small UAS 

operations, a prescriptive numerical 

stand-off distance requirement would be 

more burdensome than necessary for 

some operations while not being 

stringent enough for other operations. 

For example, a 5-pound unmanned 

rotorcraft flying at a speed of 15 mph in 

a remote area with natural barriers to 

stop a fly-away scenario would likely 

not need a stand-off distance as large as 

a 54-pound fixed-wing aircraft traveling 

at a speed of 100 mph in an urban area 

with no barriers. 

Thus, instead of imposing a 

prescriptive stand-off distance 

requirement, this rule will include a 

performance standard requiring that: (1) 

The small unmanned aircraft does not 

operate over a person who is not 

directly involved in the flight operation 

unless that person is under the 

appropriate covered structure or 

vehicle; and (2) the remote pilot ensure 

that the small unmanned aircraft will 

pose no undue hazard to other aircraft, 

people, or property in the event of a loss 

of control of the aircraft for any reason 

(§ 107.19(c)). This performance-based 

approach is preferable, as it will allow 

a remote pilot in command to determine 

what specific stand-off distance (if any) 

is appropriate to the specific small 

unmanned aircraft and small UAS 

operation that he or she is conducting. 

In response to Green Vegans, the FAA 

notes that Public Law 112–95 does not 

direct the FAA to promulgate a small 

UAS rule that includes a requirement 

for a small unmanned aircraft to 

maintain a distance of 500 feet from 

persons. 

Some commenters proposed specific 

vertical distances that they claimed 

could permit safe operations of a small 

UAS over persons not directly involved 

in its operation. Asserting that flights 

‘‘well above’’ a person’s head pose 

minimal additional safety risks, the 

News Media Coalition recommended 

that the FAA permit overhead flight so 

long as the UAS remains at least 50 feet 

vertically from any person not involved 

in the operation of the UAS. Cherokee 

National Technologies and an 

individual commenter recommended 

that operations be permitted above 

people not directly involved in an 

operation, so long as those operations 

are not conducted less than 100 feet 

above those people. 

These commenters did not provide 

data that the FAA could use to evaluate 

this assertion. The FAA notes, however, 

that a small unmanned aircraft falling 

from a higher altitude may actually pose 

a higher risk because the higher altitude 

would provide the small unmanned 

aircraft with more time to accelerate 

during its fall (until it reaches terminal 

velocity). This may result in the small 

unmanned aircraft impacting a person 

on the ground at a higher speed and 

with more force than if the small 

unmanned aircraft had fallen from a 

lower altitude. 

The National Association of 

Broadcasters, the National Cable & 

Telecommunications Association, and 

the Radio Television Digital News 

Association, commenting jointly, said 

the proposed rule would limit the 

potential of unmanned aircraft to serve 

the public interest, particularly with 

respect to newsgathering. The 

associations recommended a few 

changes to ‘‘increase the utility of sUAS 

for newsgathering and video 

programming production purposes.’’ 

First, the associations said the FAA 

‘‘should clarify that only flights directly 

over non-participating people are 

barred’’—i.e., the ‘‘FAA should specify 

that the rule would still permit sUAS 

with a camera that is capable of 

filming—at an angle—an area where 

people are present.’’ Second, because 

‘‘the proposed rule raises the question of 

what level of knowledge a reasonable 

operator can be expected to have,’’ the 

associations said the FAA ‘‘should 

clarify that the operator must have a 

good faith belief that sUAS will not be 

flying over people.’’ Third, the 

associations said ‘‘the FAA should 

consider relaxing or removing this 

requirement for sparsely populated 

areas,’’ which ‘‘would give 

newsgatherers and video programming 

producers the freedom to cover events 

and film entertainment programming 

with sUAS in areas where the risk to 

human beings on the surface is 

extremely low.’’ 

NSAA and several individual 

commenters recommended that the final 

rule make clear that the prohibition 

does not extend to incidental or 

momentary operation of a UAS over 

persons on the ground. The 

Organization of Fish and Wildlife 

Information Managers requested that 

exemptions for ‘‘unintentional flyovers’’ 

be included in the final rule. The 

Organization noted that, while 

conducting fish and wildlife surveys in 

remote areas, UAS may inadvertently be 

flown over hunters, anglers, hikers, 

campers, and other individuals 

participating in recreational activities. 

The Organization went on to say that 

‘‘[i]n areas where a UAS may be flown 

over a person, either intentionally or 

unintentionally, public notice of the 

planned survey activity could be issued 

in advance of the survey.’’ 

In response, the FAA clarifies that 

this rule allows filming of nonparticipants at an angle as long as the 

small unmanned aircraft does not fly 

over those non-participants. 

With regard to sparsely populated 

areas, as discussed earlier, the 

restriction on flight over people is 

focused on protecting the person 

standing under the small unmanned 

aircraft, which may occur in a sparsely 

populated area. The FAA notes, 

however, that because sparsely 

populated areas have significantly fewer 

people whose presence may restrict a 

small UAS operation, a newsgathering 

organization will likely have significant 

flexibility to conduct small UAS 

operations in those areas. 

With regard to the remote pilot’s 

good-faith belief and momentary 

operation of a small unmanned aircraft 


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over a person on the ground, the FAA 

notes that the remote pilot in command 

is responsible for ensuring that the 

small UAS does not fly over any nonparticipant who is not under a covered 

structure or vehicle. This may require 

creating contingency plans or even 

terminating the small UAS operation if 

a non-participant unexpectedly enters 

the area of operation. The FAA declines 

to amend this requirement because, as 

discussed earlier, this requirement 

creates a performance-based standard 

for a stand-off distance that the remote 

pilot in command must use to ensure 

that his or her small unmanned aircraft 

does not fly over a person. 

The National Association of Realtors 

suggested that more guidance is needed 

to clarify the operator’s obligations for 

communicating with bystanders that a 

UAS flight will occur in the area. 

Specifically, the commenter wondered: 

(1) How much notice is required to clear 

an area of bystanders before the flight 

takes place; (2) how the notice should 

be given; (3) for how long an area 

should be required to be cleared of 

bystanders; and (4) within what 

distance bystanders should be provided 

notice. 

This rule will not require that notice 

be given to non-participants prior to the 

operation of a small unmanned aircraft. 

Likewise, the rule will not prohibit the 

remote pilot from employing whatever 

means necessary to ensure that the 

small unmanned aircraft does not 

endanger the safety of bystanders, such 

as providing prior notice of operations. 

Providing notice to bystanders is simply 

one method that a remote pilot in 

command can utilize to clear the 

operating area (assuming that nonparticipants comply with the notice). 

However, providing such notice will not 

relieve the remote pilot in command of 

his or her duty to ensure the safety of 

non-participants. 

An individual commenter asserted 

that, taken literally, the proposed 

prohibition ‘‘would require a UA 

operator to know at all times, the exact 

location of all people on the ground 

who are within VLOS of his or her UA.’’ 

As stated earlier, this rule imposes a 

performance-based requirement 

concerning flight over people. It is up to 

the remote pilot in command to choose 

the specific means by which he or she 

will satisfy this requirement. The 

guidance issued concurrently with this 

rule provides some examples of means 

that a remote pilot in command could 

utilize to satisfy the prohibition against 

flight over non-participants in part 107. 

NAMIC sought guidance with respect 

to when the presence of a third party 

‘‘can prevent or interrupt UAS use.’’ 

Specifically, NAMIC questioned 

whether, if an insurance review of a 

private building requires some limited 

flight over a public street, the street 

needs to be closed or, alternatively, if 

the flight can simply take place when 

there are no pedestrians on the street. 

An individual commenter similarly 

questioned what happens when a 

person enters the operational area once 

the operation has commenced and the 

UAS is airborne—i.e., whether the UAS 

may loiter until the person clears the 

area or whether the operation must be 

terminated. 

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 

said that, given the fact that almost any 

operation of a small UAS over urban 

areas will necessarily result in flight 

over human beings, ‘‘the final rule 

should include a reasonableness 

standard whereby, through a safety 

assessment such as currently permitted 

in section 333 exemptions, an operator 

may determine that a flight over a 

particular area does not pose a 

reasonable threat to persons who are not 

covered by a structure.’’ If such a 

reasonable determination is made, 

Liberty Mutual said, the flight should be 

allowed. Liberty Mutual noted that this 

change ‘‘would be particularly 

important for assessing disaster 

situations or performing surveys over 

areas larger than a single structure.’’ 

As discussed earlier, this rule 

prohibits any small unmanned aircraft 

from flying over a person who is not a 

direct participant in the small UAS 

flight operation and is not under a 

covered structure or vehicle. This is a 

performance standard: It is up to the 

remote pilot in command to choose the 

best way to structure his or her small 

UAS operation to ensure that prohibited 

flight over a person does not occur and 

that the small unmanned aircraft will 

not impact a person if it should fall 

during flight. The FAA anticipates that 

the remote pilot in command will need 

to determine an appropriate stand-off 

distance from nearby persons in order to 

comply with this requirement. With 

regard to the specific examples provided 

by the commenters, the FAA notes that 

the remote pilot in command is not 

required to cease small UAS flight if he 

or she can continue operating in a 

manner that ensures that the small 

unmanned aircraft will not fly over an 

unprotected non-participant. 

Several individual commenters 

suggested proposed § 107.39 be 

expanded to prohibit operation over any 

personal property without the 

permission of the property owner. 

Property rights are beyond the scope 

of this rule. However, the FAA notes 

that, depending on the specific nature of 

the small UAS operation, the remote 

pilot in command may need to comply 

with State and local trespassing laws. 

NAMIC questioned whether a UAS 

operation over private property is 

prohibited if the owner wants to watch, 

‘‘even if the owners agree that they may 

be in danger.’’ 

Southern Company suggested that 

FAA allow operations over any person 

who is located on the property, 

easement, or right of way of the person 

or entity for whom the small UAS is 

operated, and any person who is 

participating in the activity for which 

the small UAS is being operated. This 

commenter said such mitigating 

restrictions could include a lower 

operating ceiling, lateral-distance limits, 

a lower speed restriction, and a 

prohibition on operations over large 

gatherings of people. 

The flight-over-people restriction is 

intended to address the risk of a small 

unmanned aircraft falling on and 

injuring a person. Being the owner or 

easement-holder of the area of operation 

does not reduce a person’s risk of being 

hit by the small unmanned aircraft. 

Accordingly, this rule will not impose a 

different safety standard based on the 

ownership status of the person over 

whom the small unmanned aircraft is 

operating. With regard to additional 

operational mitigations, the FAA will 

consider those on a case-by-case basis 

through the waiver process. 

The Wisconsin Department of 

Transportation (WisDOT) expressed 

‘‘concern that this (107.39) restriction 

may severely limit the ability of public 

sector agencies to incorporate UAS’’ 

into certain activities, such as bridge 

inspections, traffic and incident 

management activities on public 

highways, and search and rescue 

operations. 

NSAA also said operations over the 

public should be permitted ‘‘in nonnormal or emergency operations where 

life, limb, and property are at risk.’’ 

UAS Venture Partners similarly sought 

an exemption from the proposed 

prohibition on operations over persons 

not directly involved in the operation 

for Civic Municipal Rescue Service 

agencies and the trained rescue first 

responders who will be operating the 

UAS devices. Vail also said the final 

rule should include specific exemptions 

from the ‘‘directly involved’’ 

requirement ‘‘for temporary flight over 

uninvolved persons for emergency and 

safety uses.’’ 

As discussed in section III.C.3 of this 

preamble, this rule applies only to civil 

small UAS operations. It does not apply 

to public UAS operations which may 

include governmental functions such as 


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public road and bridge inspections, 

traffic control and incident management 

on public highways, and search and 

rescue operations. To that end, a public 

UAS operator such as WisDOT may 

apply for a COA to use its UAS for 

specific governmental functions instead 

of operating and complying with the 

provisions of part 107. 

With regard to emergency and searchand-rescue operations, it should be 

noted that those operations are typically 

conducted by local, State, or Federal 

government agencies (such as fire 

departments or police) as public aircraft 

operations. Public aircraft operations 

will be granted operational authority by 

way of a COA and will not be subject 

to part 107. With regard to civil small 

UAS operations, the FAA emphasizes 

that the remote pilot in command’s 

ability to deviate from the requirements 

of part 107 to address an emergency 

(discussed in section III.E.1.d of this 

preamble) is limited to emergency 

situations that affect the safety of flight. 

For emergency situations that do not 

affect the safety of flight, the remote 

pilot in command should contact the 

appropriate authorities who are trained 

to respond to emergency situations. 

The Professional Helicopter Pilots 

Association suggested that the FAA 

provide a means by which individuals 

or companies can limit or eliminate the 

overhead or adjacent operation of UAS 

by anyone other than properly certified 

public service/public safety operators. 

Though a governmental entity may 

choose to operate a small UAS under 

the civil regulatory structure of part 107, 

the FAA does not agree that operational 

distinctions should be made within part 

107 regarding the specific entity that is 

conducting a civil operation. To that 

end, under part 107 all civil small 

unmanned aircraft operations are 

prohibited from operating over a person 

not directly participating in the 

operation of the small unmanned 

aircraft and not under a covered 

structure or in a covered vehicle and not 

directly participating in the flight 

operation of the small unmanned 

aircraft. 

The International Association of 

Amusement Parks and Attractions 

(IAAPA) stated safety and privacy 

concerns are implicated by third-party 

small UAS operations. IAAPA stated 

that the operation of UAS over 

amusement parks and attractions by 

third parties is also implicated by 

proposed section 107.39. IAAPA 

asserted that the facility operator can 

carefully control the use of UAS over a 

person who is not directly participating 

in its operation if the UAS is operated 

by the facility or its designee, but this 

degree of control is impossible when 

hobbyists or other third-parties who do 

not have the facility owner’s permission 

operate UAS near or over the perimeter 

or interior of amusement parks and 

attractions. IAAPA stated that 

amusement parks and attractions 

generally contain large numbers of 

people, and that the safety risks posed 

to employees and to visitors enjoying 

rides potentially traveling 100 miles per 

hour, watching shows, or walking 

through amusement parks and 

attractions are considerable and outside 

the control of facility operators. 

The restriction on flight over people 

applies regardless of the location in 

which that flight occurs. Thus, a remote 

pilot in command may not operate a 

small unmanned aircraft over a nonparticipant in an amusement park who 

is not under a covered structure or in a 

vehicle. Additionally, the remote pilot 

in command must ensure that the small 

unmanned aircraft does not pose an 

undue hazard to a person in the event 

of a loss of control for any reason. The 

FAA also notes that hobbyists or other 

third parties who do not have the 

facility owner’s permission to operate 

UAS near or over the perimeter or 

interior of amusement parks and 

attractions may be violating State or 

local trespassing laws. 

Aerial Services, the National Society 

of Professional Surveyors, Continental 

Mapping, MAPPS, and 12 members of 

the Wisconsin Legislature said the ban 

on flights ‘‘over populated areas’’ needs 

to be removed or modified, because the 

definition of ‘‘populated area’’ is 

inadequate and seems to mean ‘‘any 

single person within the area of 

operation that is not inside a structure.’’ 

In response, the FAA notes that this rule 

does not ban flights over a ‘‘populated 

area.’’ This rule only restricts flights 

over a person who is not directly 

participating in the flight operation and 

who is not inside a covered structure or 

vehicle. 

v. Preflight Briefing 

The NPRM proposed to require that, 

prior to flight, the remote pilot in 

command must ensure that all persons 

directly involved in the small UAS 

operation receive a briefing that 

includes operating conditions, 

emergency procedures, contingency 

procedures, roles and responsibilities, 

and potential hazards. The FAA 

proposed this requirement because, as 

discussed in the previous section, this 

rule will allow a small unmanned 

aircraft to fly over people who are 

directly participating in the small UAS 

operation. A preflight familiarization 

briefing would help ensure that these 

people have greater situational 

awareness and are better able to avoid 

the flight path of the small unmanned 

aircraft if the remote pilot in command 

were to lose positive control of the 

aircraft or if the aircraft were to 

experience a mechanical failure. 

The Travelers Companies said the 

FAA should modify proposed § 107.49 

to eliminate the ‘‘briefing’’ requirement 

for operations conducted without a 

visual observer or other crew members. 

If the remote pilot in command is 

conducting a small UAS operation 

entirely by him or herself, there is no 

one else that he or she can brief. 

Additional regulatory text is not 

necessary to explain this concept. 

However, upon reviewing the regulatory 

text of § 107.49(a)(2), the FAA noted 

that the proposed briefing requirement 

would apply to people who are 

‘‘involved’’ in the small UAS operation, 

while the exception to the flight-overpeople restriction discussed earlier will 

apply to people who are ‘‘directly 

participating’’ in the small UAS 

operation. Because the briefing 

requirement is supposed to apply to 

people who may have a small 

unmanned aircraft fly over them, the 

FAA has amended § 107.49(a)(2) to 

reference people who are directly 

participating in the small UAS 

operation. 

The FAA also noted that the proposed 

requirement to convey important 

information in the form of a briefing was 

needlessly prescriptive. Thus, the FAA 

has amended § 107.49(a)(2) in the final 

rule to simply require that the remote 

pilot in command ensure that persons 

directly participating in the small UAS 

operation are informed about the 

operating conditions, emergency 

procedures, contingency procedures, 

roles and responsibilities, and potential 

hazards. This information could be 

conveyed through a briefing or through 

some other means that would 

reasonably be expected to inform the 

recipient. 

vi. Preflight Assessment of the 

Operating Area and Ensuring That the 

Aircraft Poses No Undue Hazard 

Within the above constraints, the 

NPRM proposed a two-part 

performance-based standard for 

mitigating loss-of-positive control risk. 

The first part consisted of a preflight 

assessment of the operating 

environment. The second part consisted 

of a requirement to ensure that the small 

unmanned aircraft will pose no undue 

hazard to other aircraft, people, or 

property in the event of a loss of 

positive control of the aircraft for any 

reason. 


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1. Preflight Assessment of the Operating 

Environment 

The NPRM proposed to require that, 

prior to flight, the operator must become 

familiar with the confined area of 

operation by assessing the operating 

environment and assessing risks to 

persons and property in the immediate 

vicinity both on the surface and in the 

air. As part of this operating 

environment assessment, the operator 

would need to consider conditions that 

could pose a hazard to the operation of 

the small UAS as well as conditions in 

which the operation of the small UAS 

could pose a hazard to other aircraft or 

persons or property on the ground. 

Accordingly, the operating environment 

assessment proposed in the NPRM 

would include the consideration of: (1) 

Local weather conditions; (2) local 

airspace and any flight restrictions; (3) 

the location of persons and property on 

the ground; and (4) any other ground 

hazards. 

For the reasons discussed below, this 

rule will finalize the operating 

environment assessment as part of the 

preflight familiarization provision as 

proposed in the NPRM, but will change 

the reference from ‘‘operator’’ to 

‘‘remote pilot in command’’ to reflect 

the change in the crewmember 

framework discussed in section III.E.1 of 

this preamble. 

Boeing asserted that the proposed rule 

imposes a requirement to assess risk, 

but provides no criteria against which to 

measure that risk. The commenter 

therefore recommended the FAA revise 

the proposed provision to include 

criteria to measure risk (e.g., reference 

the Structural Repair Manual (SRM) or 

similar criteria). The commenter also 

noted that there is no requirement to 

determine if the risk is acceptable, and 

recommended the FAA clarify this issue 

to ensure appropriate compliance with, 

and consistent interpretation of, the 

regulation. 

As discussed in the next section of 

this preamble, this rule will require the 

remote pilot in command to ensure that 

the small UAS will pose no undue 

hazard to other aircraft, people, or 

property in the event of a loss of control 

of the aircraft for any reason. Section 

107.49 is intended to help the remote 

pilot in command satisfy this 

requirement by having the remote pilot 

in command assess the operating 

environment so that he or she can 

design the operation, as well as any 

mitigation, to ensure that the small 

unmanned aircraft does not create an 

undue hazard if positive control is lost. 

As a performance-based requirement, 

it is not the intent of this section to be 

prescriptive with regard to how remote 

pilots conduct an assessment of their 

operating environment. Because there is 

a diverse range of aircraft and operating 

environments that could exist for part 

107 operations, a prescriptive preflightassessment standard may be more 

burdensome than necessary in some 

instances. For example, a remote pilot 

in command operating a small UAS in 

an empty rural area would not need to 

look at the same things to assure the 

safety of the operation as a remote pilot 

in command operating a small UAS in 

a crowded urban environment. The 

guidance material which the FAA has 

issued concurrently with this rule 

provides examples and best practices for 

how to conduct the preflight assessment 

of the operating area and assess risks 

that may affect the small UAS operation. 

The FAA will also consider publishing 

industry best practices in future small 

UAS guidance that will assist remote 

pilots in assessing risk. 

The Professional Helicopter Pilots 

Association said that, prior to flight, the 

remote pilot should be required to 

obtain a briefing, similar to a mannedaircraft pilot’s briefing, which would 

include weather, NOTAMs, and any 

other pertinent information for the area 

in which they intend to operate. 

As discussed in sections III.E.2 and 

III.E.5 of this preamble, this rule 

includes requirements for assessing the 

operating environment with regard to 

weather and NOTAMs. The remote pilot 

in command is responsible for satisfying 

those requirements. The remote pilot 

may choose to use the means suggested 

by the commenter to help satisfy his or 

her regulatory obligations, or he or she 

may choose some other method of 

obtaining the pertinent information. As 

long as the pertinent regulatory 

requirements are fulfilled, the means by 

which the remote pilot in command 

accomplishes this goal is within his or 

her discretion. 

API encouraged the FAA to consider 

all provisions of the Helicopter Safety 

Advisory Conference’s Unmanned 

Aerial Systems Guidelines, including 

provisions related to pre-flight briefings, 

as the rule is finalized. The FAA 

concurs with the API’s recommendation 

to consider the provisions of the 

Helicopter Safety Advisory Conference 

Recommended Practices 15–1 

Unmanned Aerial Systems Guidelines 

document (HSAC RP UASRP 15–1) 

published in February 2015. After 

reviewing the HSAC RP UASRP 15–1 

guidelines, the FAA finds that the 

recommended practices address all of 

the requirements found in § 107.49. 

The Kansas State University UAS 

Program also recommended that the 

assessment consider potential issues 

with link integrity to the aircraft from 

obstacles between the ground antennas 

and the aircraft (e.g., trees) or 

electromagnetic interference from 

nearby RF sources such as radio towers 

and radars. In response, the FAA notes 

that this concern is addressed in 

§ 107.49(a)(3). Section 107.49(a)(3) 

requires that the remote pilot ensure 

that all control links between ground 

station and the small unmanned aircraft 

are working properly. The remote pilot 

in command may not commence a small 

UAS operation if a control link is 

working improperly (whether as a result 

of radio interference or for some other 

reason). The FAA also expects that the 

remote pilot in command will develop 

a contingency plan for ensuring that the 

small unmanned aircraft does not pose 

an undue hazard to other aircraft, 

people, or property if positive control of 

the small unmanned aircraft is lost 

through a disruption in the data control 

link. 

2. Undue Hazard If There Is a Loss of 

Control 

The NPRM proposed that, after 

becoming familiar with the confined 

area of operation and conducting an 

operating environment assessment, the 

operator must ensure that the small 

unmanned aircraft will pose no undue 

hazard to other aircraft, people, or 

property in the event of a loss of 

positive control of the aircraft for any 

reason. The FAA proposed this 

performance-based requirement instead 

of a more prescriptive standard because 

it would provide the operator with 

significant flexibility to choose how to 

mitigate the hazards associated with 

loss of aircraft control. 

In a joint submission, PlaneSense and 

Cobalt Air stated that the language in 

proposed § 107.19(b) sets a different 

standard from that in § 107.23 

(hazardous operation). They noted that 

while § 107.19(b) requires that small 

UAS operations ‘‘pose no undue hazard 

to other aircraft, people or property[,]’’ 

§ 107.23(b) prohibits persons from 

operating a small UAS in a ‘‘careless or 

reckless manner so as to endanger the 

life or property of another[.]’’ The 

commenters argued that these two 

standards are not consistent, because 

§ 107.23 does not include other aircraft 

within the scope of the third parties 

who must be protected. The 

commenters went on to say that these 

discrepancies create inconsistencies 

which result in incomplete guidance for 

the operators of small UAS, and may 

result in an increase in danger to the 

public. The commenters suggested that 

the appropriate standard is to be found 


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in § 107.19(b), and that § 107.23 should 

be changed to match it. Finally, the 

commenters asked the FAA to clarify 

whether ‘‘other aircraft’’ includes other 

unmanned aircraft. 

Part 107 prohibits a small UAS 

operation from endangering life or 

property, and prohibits a remote pilot 

from operating a small UAS in a careless 

or reckless manner. Property includes 

other aircraft, including other 

unmanned aircraft. These two 

requirements complement, rather than 

contradict, one another, and provide the 

remote pilot with the flexibility to 

adjust his or her operation according to 

the environment in which he or she is 

operating. For example, if the operation 

takes place in a residential area, the 

remote pilot in command could ask 

everyone in the area of operation to 

remain inside their homes while the 

operation is conducted. If the operation 

takes place in an area where other air 

traffic could pose a hazard, the remote 

pilot could advise local air traffic 

control as to the location of his or her 

area of operation and add extra visual 

observers to the operation so that they 

can notify the remote pilot if other 

aircraft are approaching the area of 

operation. These precautions would be 

one way to ensure that the operation 

will not pose an undue hazard to other 

aircraft, people or property in the event 

of a loss of control of the aircraft. 

Additionally, during the operation of 

the small unmanned aircraft, the remote 

pilot in command is prohibited from 

operating the aircraft in a careless and 

reckless manner, further ensuring that 

the operation does not pose an undue 

hazard to other aircraft, people, or 

property in the event of a loss of control 

of the aircraft. 

The NextGen Air Transportation 

Program, NC State University 

commented that § 107.19(b) is ‘‘not 

realistic.’’ The commenter stated that 

the remote pilot can do everything 

possible to minimize the risk and harm 

possible in the event of loss of positive 

control, but asserted that requiring that 

no damage be caused without requiring 

fly-away prevention or other risk 

management mechanisms does not align 

with the general NPRM objectives. 

Similarly, ALPA stated that many 

small unmanned aircraft, particularly 

those with multiple propulsion units, 

may become highly unstable when they 

enter a state of ‘‘lost link’’ or ‘‘loss of 

positive control.’’ This commenter also 

asserted its strong belief that if lost link 

occurs, mitigations to safely perform 

auto-hover, auto-land, and return-tohome maneuvers, and geo-fencing 

protection, must be incorporated into 

the navigation and control systems for a 

small UAS to safely land without harm 

to persons or property. 

The undue hazard standard in this 

rule is a performance-based standard, 

which the remote pilot in command 

may satisfy through operational or 

equipage/technological mitigations. In 

section III.E.3.b.vi of this preamble, the 

FAA describes equipment that remote 

pilots may incorporate into their small 

unmanned aircraft systems as one 

means of complying with this 

requirement. Due to the diversity and 

rapidly evolving nature of small UAS 

operations, this rule allows individual 

remote pilots to determine what 

equipage methods, if any, mitigate risk 

sufficiently to meet the performancebased requirements of this rule, such as 

the prohibition on creating an undue 

hazard if there is a loss of aircraft 

control. This provides the greatest 

amount of regulatory flexibility while 

maintaining the appropriate level of 

safety commensurate with part 107 

operations. 

The methods suggested by the 

commenters are some, but not all of the 

possible mitigations available for remote 

pilots of UAS. The FAA recognizes that 

it is impossible to prevent every hazard 

in the event of a loss of control of the 

small unmanned aircraft; however, as 

several commenters stated, this rule 

requires remote pilots to do everything 

possible to minimize risk and harm in 

the event of loss of positive control. 

NOAA commented that § 107.19(b) 

should be revised to include ‘‘protected 

wildlife’’ in the class of entities to be 

protected from undue hazard in the case 

of loss of positive control. NOAA states 

that this change would acknowledge the 

importance of other Federal statutes 

already in place to protect, conserve, 

and recover vulnerable wildlife 

populations and ensure the FAAregulated community is aware of them 

and that the final rule does not 

contradict them. 

The FAA notes that other Federal 

statutes already in place establish laws 

on the protection of wildlife. 

Independent of this rule, the remote 

pilot in command is responsible for 

complying with any other Federal, 

State, or local laws that apply to his or 

her small UAS operation. 

vii. Automation 

Several commenters addressed the 

issue of autonomous operations of small 

UAS. An autonomous operation is 

generally considered an operation in 

which the remote pilot inputs a flight 

plan into the control station which 

sends it to the autopilot onboard the 

small unmanned aircraft. During 

automated flight, flight control inputs 

are made by components onboard the 

aircraft, not from a control station. Thus, 

the remote pilot in command could lose 

the control link to the small unmanned 

aircraft and the aircraft would still 

continue to fly the programmed mission 

or return home to land. During 

automated flight, the remote pilot in 

command also must have the ability to 

change routing/altitude or command the 

aircraft to land immediately. The ability 

to direct the small unmanned aircraft 

may be through manual manipulation of 

the flight controls or through commands 

using automation. 

For the reasons discussed below, this 

rule will allow autonomous small UAS 

operations. However, the remote pilot in 

command must retain the ability to 

direct the small unmanned aircraft to 

ensure compliance with the 

requirements of part 107. 

ALPA, the U.S. Hang Gliding & 

Paragliding Association, and the 

Permanent Editorial Board of the 

Aviators Model Code of Conduct 

Initiative asserted that the NPRM says 

autonomous operations would be 

permitted for small UAS, but then fails 

to discuss such operations further. 

ALPA generally opposed allowing 

autonomous operations for small UAS. 

The Permanent Editorial Board of the 

Aviators Model Code of Conduct 

Initiative said the NPRM’s mention of 

autonomous operations ‘‘requires 

explanation and context.’’ The U.S. 

Hang Gliding & Paragliding Association 

said it would be opposed to such 

operations ‘‘unless the operator has the 

ability to take positive control 

immediately and redirect the sUAS.’’ 

The Air Medical Operators 

Association raised concerns about the 

safety of ‘‘automated UAS,’’ saying that 

such aircraft do not have the capability 

to maintain the necessary separation 

from manned aircraft. The association 

acknowledged, as noted in the NPRM, 

that the many advancements in anticollision avoidance systems have been 

very effective in reducing the rate of 

mid-air collisions, but went on to say 

that the evidence of the effectiveness of 

such technology in preventing collisions 

between UAS and manned aircraft 

‘‘would have to be overwhelming in 

order to alleviate the safety concerns of 

the low-altitude flying public.’’ 

Other commenters supported 

allowing autonomous operations for 

small UAS. Yale University 

recommended the final rule clarify that 

small UAS operators ‘‘may rely on 

autonomous or pre-programmed flight 

systems.’’ Streamline Designs also stated 

that autonomous operations should be 

permitted, adding that some commercial 

uses ‘‘may depend heavily on 


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automatic, stabilized flight.’’ A number 

of individual commenters also 

supported autonomous operations. One 

such individual noted that there are 

situations where manual operations are 

more dangerous than automated 

operations, because computer controlled 

flight ‘‘can provide much greater control 

and safety by making corrective inputs 

on the order of hundreds of inputs per 

second.’’ 

The Property Drone Consortium 

recommended the final rule clarify what 

types of autonomous flights are 

permitted. The organization further 

recommended that autonomous flight be 

permitted without a need for the pilot/ 

operator to intervene, although the 

pilot/operator ‘‘would always have the 

ability to intervene.’’ 

Several commenters suggested that 

autonomous operations be permitted in 

certain circumstances. LifeDrone, LLC 

sought a final rule that would 

specifically permit the autonomous 

operation of an emergency small UAS 

‘‘that is initiated by an emergency signal 

along prearranged, low flight risk 

corridors at an altitude of 150 feet.’’ 

Prioria Robotics suggested that 

autonomous operations should be 

permitted ‘‘with the simultaneous usage 

of first person video (FPV) flight 

equipment.’’ AOPA recommended that 

the FAA consider an autopilot 

requirement for operations in controlled 

airspace, which the association said 

would provide ‘‘a layer of safety for 

operations in airspace that contains a 

concentration of manned aircraft.’’ 

The New England Chapter of AUVSI 

and Devens, IOP, commenting jointly, 

noted that ‘‘[t]he future will bring more 

reliable UAS technology that can be 

fully autonomous.’’ The Competitive 

Enterprise Institute similarly noted that 

‘‘[a] number of developers have 

expressed confidence that their senseand-avoid technologies will soon permit 

safe automated operations.’’ 

Autonomous operations have 

numerous practical applications, 

including agricultural operations, aerial 

photography, and search and rescue. 

The FAA agrees with the commenters 

who pointed out that the ability for a 

small unmanned aircraft to fly 

autonomously could add significant 

utility to a small UAS operation and 

would further encourage innovation in 

the industry. Accordingly, this rule will 

allow the autonomous flight of small 

unmanned aircraft. 

While sense-and-avoid equipment 

may one day be integrated into an 

autonomous aircraft to aid the pilot in 

avoiding hazards, as discussed in 

section III.E.2.a of this preamble, there 

is insufficient data to establish that UAS 

equipage is able to, at this time, detect 

other nearby aircraft in a manner that is 

sufficient to provide a substitute for the 

human pilot’s ability to see and avoid 

those aircraft. Thus, a small unmanned 

aircraft may be unable to, without 

human input, yield the right of way to 

another user of the NAS that may enter 

the area of operation. Accordingly, this 

rule will require that the remote pilot in 

command have the ability to direct the 

small unmanned aircraft to ensure 

compliance with the provisions of part 

107. In particular, the FAA emphasizes 

the requirements of §§ 107.37 and 

107.39, which require the small 

unmanned aircraft to yield the right of 

way to all other users of the NAS and 

to avoid flying over a human being who 

is not directly participating in the small 

UAS operation and not under a covered 

structure. 

There are a number of different 

methods that a remote pilot in 

command may utilize to direct the small 

unmanned aircraft to ensure compliance 

with part 107. For example, the remote 

pilot may transmit a command for the 

autonomous aircraft to climb, descend, 

land now, proceed to a new waypoint, 

enter an orbit pattern, or return to home. 

Any of these methods may be used to 

satisfactorily avoid a hazard or give 

right of way. 

The FAA also emphasizes that, as 

discussed in section III.E.3.b.ii of this 

preamble, a person cannot act as a 

remote pilot in command in the 

operation of more than one small 

unmanned aircraft. Thus, this rule does 

not allow a person to use automation to 

simultaneously operate more than one 

small unmanned aircraft. 

NetMoby recommended that FAA 

consider UAS that are pre-programmed 

to fly a mission to one or more 

waypoints as being ‘‘under positive 

control.’’ The company recommended 

that, for local line-of-sight and multiwaypoint missions, ‘‘an active, live 

wireless link to the UAS be present and 

that loss of such a link below the link’s 

reliable signal receive threshold for a 

period of greater than 15 seconds be 

defined as an instance of loss of positive 

control,’’ thus triggering a return-tohome command. 

As discussed earlier, this rule will 

allow a small unmanned aircraft to 

conduct preprogrammed flight through 

a waypoint as long as the remote pilot 

has the means to direct the aircraft to 

ensure compliance with part 107. With 

regard to when a return-to-home 

command should be triggered, the FAA 

declines to add this level of 

prescriptiveness to the rule. Instead, as 

discussed in section III.E.3.b.vi.2 of this 

preamble, the remote pilot in command 

must ensure that the small unmanned 

aircraft remains within visual line of 

sight and does not pose an undue 

hazard in the event of loss of positive 

control. The remote pilot in command 

may do this in the manner suggested by 

NetMoby or in another manner that 

satisfies the regulatory requirement. 

viii. Other Equipage 

In the NPRM, the FAA considered 

technological approaches, such as a 

flight termination system, to address a 

failure of the control link between the 

aircraft and the operator’s control 

station. However, because small UAS 

operations subject to the proposed rule 

would pose a lower level of risk, the 

FAA proposed operational alternatives 

to mitigate their risk to an acceptable 

level without imposing an FAA 

requirement for technological equipage. 

Accordingly, the proposed rule did not 

mandate the use of a flight termination 

system or the equipage of any other 

navigational aid technology. The FAA 

invited comments on whether a flight 

termination system or any other 

technological equipage should be 

required and how it would be integrated 

into the aircraft for small UAS that 

would be subject to the proposed rule. 

The FAA also invited comments, with 

supporting documentation, as to the 

costs and benefits of requiring a flight 

termination system or other 

technological equipage. 

1. Geo-fencing 

A geo-fence is a virtual barrier which 

may prevent the small unmanned 

aircraft from either entering or exiting a 

geographically defined area. The area 

may be defined by a property owner or 

aircraft operator utilizing a combination 

of mapping programs and technology 

such as global positioning system (GPS) 

or radio frequency identification (RFID). 

Such technology could restrict the small 

unmanned aircraft from flying in 

locations where a flight may be 

restricted for security, safety, or other 

reasons. 

The proposed rule did not establish 

geo-fencing equipment requirements for 

small UAS operating in the NAS. 

Instead, the NPRM proposed operational 

limitations such as requiring small UAS 

operators or visual observers to 

maintain visual line of sight in order to 

mitigate the risk of failure of the control 

link resulting in loss of positive control. 

After careful consideration of the 

comments, the FAA has decided not to 

add any geo-fencing equipment 

requirements in the final rule. 

The Small UAV Coalition and Predesa 

supported the FAA’s proposal to not 

require geo-fencing equipment under 


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104Executive Order 12866, § 1(b)(6). 

proposed part 107. However, these 

commenters noted the increased safety 

benefit provided by these systems in 

applications beyond visual-line-of-sight 

operations. Airware provided detailed 

information on its flight control system 

that offers geo-fencing and contingency 

management functionality. However, 

Airware noted that ‘‘[d]etailed 

airworthiness requirements [are] not 

needed for the very low risk 

environment proposed by this NPRM.’’ 

Conversely, some commenters 

disagreed with the FAA’s proposal, and 

advocated for requiring geo-fencing 

technology on small UAS. Commenters 

including TTD, ALPA, AOPA, and the 

Electronic Privacy Information Center 

(EPIC) generally requested that the FAA 

require geo-fencing technology to be 

equipped on small UAS. 

TTD, ALPA, the Air Medical 

Operators Association, and an 

individual supported geo-fencing 

technology standards that provide 

functional performance and reliability 

to ensure safe operation of small UAS in 

the event of loss of positive control or 

flying near restricted, unauthorized, or 

controlled airspace. ALPA urged the 

FAA ‘‘to consider means, other than the 

operator’s skill and intention, to ensure 

the aircraft cannot be operated outside 

the confined area required to mitigate 

the collision risk.’’ The Air Medical 

Operators Association requested that the 

FAA ‘‘test the effectiveness of these 

technologies and consider requiring 

them onboard UAS.’’ AOPA stated that 

the FAA ‘‘should consider requiring 

small commercial UAS to use geofencing technology to ensure safety and 

reliability of their operations.’’ The 

International Brotherhood of Teamsters 

stated that it supports ‘‘geo-fencing and 

other technologies which would directly 

inhibit the movement of an 

unauthorized UAS into secure areas.’’ 

MAPPS stated that ‘‘[a]ll UAS must be 

constructed with firmware that 

incorporates a database of restricted 

flight areas.’’ MAPPS provided 

information on its concept of geofencing using cellular technology and 

requiring flight plans to be uploaded to 

the small UAS flight management 

system before each flight. MAPPS 

explained that this geo-fencing 

technology requires access to a ‘‘Master 

Restricted Flight Area Database 

(MRFAD)’’ including ‘‘any and all 

restricted flight areas’’ to prevent the 

operator from flying the small UAS into 

these restricted areas. An individual 

stated that the FAA should require 

‘‘autonomous vehicles flying in, or 

within range of, airspace where UAS 

operations are prohibited’’ to have an 

updated database of that airspace. 

Requiring the installation of a geofencing system capable of keeping small 

unmanned aircraft out of restricted and 

prohibited airspace would present a 

number of technical hurdles. 

Specifically, there are currently no 

design or performance standards for 

geo-fencing equipment to ensure safe 

and reliable integration into the NAS. 

Without appropriate geo-fencing design 

and performance standards, the industry 

and the FAA lack the data necessary to 

assess the accuracy and reliability of 

geo-fencing equipment and therefore, 

the FAA cannot promulgate geo-fencing 

equipment design requirements (i.e., 

airworthiness certification). 

Also, geo-fencing equipment 

integrated on small UAS would require 

an evolving database of terrain and 

obstacle updates, restricted and special 

use airspace, Notices to Airmen 

(NOTAMs), and Temporary Flight 

Restrictions (TFRs). The FAA is 

unaware of a database that provides this 

full capability and therefore cannot 

accurately determine the effort to 

develop and maintain it for remote 

pilots. The FAA also does not have 

information on how frequently updates 

to the onboard small UAS geo-fence 

database would be required to maintain 

safe and reliable operation in the NAS. 

In addition, any geo-fencing 

equipment required under part 107 

would also need to include an override 

feature to allow the remote pilot to enter 

the airspace if he or she receives 

permission from Air Traffic Control or 

an appropriate controlling agency. 

Additionally, as discussed in section 

III.E.1.d of this preamble, this rule will 

allow the remote pilot to deviate from 

the operational restrictions of part 107 

if doing so is necessary to respond to an 

emergency situation. Thus, an override 

feature may also be necessary to allow 

a remote pilot to respond to 

emergencies. A geo-fencing system 

without an override function that 

prevents the human pilot from 

exercising this deviation authority may 

impair the pilot’s ability to safely 

respond to an emergency situation. 

If these technical obstacles are 

overcome, a mandatory geo-fencing 

system may provide a marginal increase 

to safety by forcibly keeping small 

unmanned aircraft out of certain 

airspace in which the aircraft may pose 

a higher risk to manned-aircraft 

operations. However, under Executive 

Order 12866, the FAA can adopt a 

regulation ‘‘only upon a reasoned 

determination that the benefits of the 

intended regulation justify its costs.’’ 104

Here, the FAA has no data that would 

allow it to quantify the benefits of a 

possible safety increase associated with 

a mandatory geo-fencing system. 

Conversely, a mandatory geo-fencing 

requirement would substantially 

increase the costs of this rule. If 

mandated, there would be a cost for 

developing the minimum performance 

standards for this equipment. Once the 

standards are developed, the cost to 

owners for retrofitting previously 

purchased small UAS would be 

realized. If it is not possible to retrofit 

a small UAS to include geo-fencing, a 

replacement cost would be incurred. 

Additionally, an incremental per unit 

cost to small UAS manufacturers for 

installing mandated geo-fencing on 

newly built small UAS would be 

incurred. 

Once geo-fencing is installed, the onboard avionics would rely upon a 

database of restricted airspace, 

NOTAMs, TFRs, obstacles, and terrain 

upon which to remain current. 

Maintaining these databases would 

incur additional costs, based on the 

frequency of database updates and the 

value of the time for the individual 

performing the task. Finally, small UAS 

owners would have recurring costs for 

subscribing to the database supplier or 

app developer for updates to regulatory 

airspace. To sum up, mandating geofencing equipage would result in 

substantial costs and, at this time, the 

FAA does not have sufficient data to 

determine, consistent with its 

obligations under Executive Order 

12866 and 13563, whether the benefits 

associated with such a mandate would 

justify those costs. 

The FAA appreciates the commenters’ 

information and support for geo-fencing 

technology, and the agency will use this 

information in follow-on UAS-related 

activities. However, based on the 

considerations outlined above, the FAA 

has decided not to add any geo-fencing 

equipment requirements in this rule. 

Commenters including the 

Association of American Universities, 

Association of Public Land-grant 

Universities, and NAMIC generally 

stated that geo-fencing technologies 

should be considered to allow small 

UAS operation beyond visual line of 

sight. The Association of American 

Universities and Association of Public 

and Land-grant Universities stated that 

this final rule should require 

‘‘performance-based standards for the 

capabilities of a UAS authorized to 

conduct [beyond-visual-line-of-sight] 

operations’’ and noting ‘‘dual auto pilot 

modes, anti-collision systems 

employing SONAR, LIDAR,’’ and ‘‘geofencing capabilities’’ as possible means 

of compliance. NAMIC cited benefits of 


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beyond-line-of-sight UAS operations 

following a catastrophic disaster. The 

Colorado Cattlemen’s Association and 

the Rocky Mountain Farmers Union 

supported rules that ‘‘allow for the use 

of such technologies to expand the 

permissible operating area for UAS in 

appropriate circumstances’’ and ‘‘permit 

the use of these technologies.’’ The 

Interstate Natural Gas Association of 

America suggested geo-fencing 

technology, ‘‘programmed into a UAS 

that establishes defined controlled zone 

such as a pipeline corridor, combined 

with location, altitude and forward 

looking camera’’ to provide an 

equivalent level of safety to the 

proposed line of sight requirement. 

The National Ski Areas Association 

acknowledged that collision detection 

and avoidance systems are in 

development; however, the commenter 

stated that FAA ‘‘needs to recognize and 

accommodate these technological 

innovations, especially when the risk to 

manned aircraft and public safety is so 

minimal, as it is at ski areas.’’ 

An individual asserted that multirotor helicopter small UAS have 

equipment providing ‘‘geo-fencing to 

prevent loss of control link—or even to 

prevent airspace incursions and 

accidental ‘fly-aways’.’’ Another 

individual stated that ‘‘[s]everal 

technologies have been available for the 

last four years that enable preprogrammed GPS guided flight paths 

using latitude and longitude 

coordinates.’’ Qualcomm added that 

geo-fencing ‘‘can ensure small UAS 

remain well outside of airspace that is 

off limits to UAS.’’ 

As discussed in other parts of this 

preamble, the two operational 

restrictions of interest to these 

commenters (the requirement to remain 

within visual line of sight and the 

restriction on flying over people) are 

both waivable upon demonstration that 

the proposed operation can safely be 

conducted under the terms of a 

certificate of waiver. Waiver applicants 

may use geo-fencing and other 

technological equipage to help 

demonstrate, in support of a waiver 

application, that the proposed operation 

can be conducted safely. Alternatively, 

applicants may be able to demonstrate 

the safety of their proposed operation 

through non-technological means, such 

as mitigations present in the area of 

operation. The FAA will evaluate the 

technological and non-technological 

means employed by a waiver applicant 

to mitigate the risk of a small UAS 

operation and will issue a waiver if the 

applicant demonstrates that his or her 

specific means establishes the requisite 

level of safety. 

2. Flight Termination System 

The FAA initially considered 

requiring a flight termination system 

(FTS), which is a system that terminates 

the flight of a small UAS in the event 

that all other contingencies have been 

exhausted and further flight of the 

aircraft cannot be safely achieved, or 

other potential hazards exist that require 

immediate discontinuation of flight. 

However, the FAA determined that 

there are other viable alternatives that 

can achieve this goal without requiring 

an FTS. 

The NPRM invited comments as to 

the costs and benefits of requiring an 

FTS. After reviewing comments, the 

FAA has decided against requiring 

small UAS to include an FTS. 

Several commenters, including the 

Small UAV Coalition, the University of 

Arkansas Division of Agriculture, and 

Northrop Grumman, agreed with the 

NPRM that use of an FTS should not be 

mandatory. Southern Company stated 

that alternative operational measures 

would adequately mitigate loss of 

control risk. Two individuals argued 

that flight termination systems are too 

heavy for small UAS. The Oklahoma 

Governor’s Unmanned Aerial Systems 

Council commented that automatic 

termination of flight could have 

significant unintended consequences for 

the safety of people and property on the 

ground. NetMoby agreed that flight 

termination systems are not necessary, 

but encouraged the FAA to require 

return-to-home capabilities in UAS. 

Predesa also agreed that flight 

termination systems should not be 

required for small UAS, but asserted 

that GPS-based flight termination 

systems could mitigate risk. Planehook 

Aviation argued that the use of flight 

termination systems should be the 

operator’s decision. 

On the other hand, some commenters, 

including ALPA and EAA, among 

others, said the FAA should require 

small UAS to have flight termination 

systems. Texas A&M University-Corpus 

Christi/LSUASC and TTD said that a 

UAS without a flight termination system 

is dangerous to other users of the NAS 

if positive control is lost. The 

Professional Helicopter Pilots 

Association commented that this 

technology is already being included in 

most devices above the hobby level. 

NAAA said most of these technologies 

are software-based and utilize GPS 

systems already onboard the UAS and 

thus have no effect on the weight of the 

aircraft. Modovolate Aviation said the 

FAA should encourage small UAS 

stakeholders to develop performance 

standards for flight termination systems 

and require manufacturers to certify 

they have designed and manufactured 

their vehicles in accordance with these 

standards. 

The Aviation Division of the 

Washington State Department of 

Transportation, the Nez Perce Tribe and 

UPS generally felt that an FTS could be 

optional equipage but stopped short of 

supporting a mandate. One individual 

stated ‘‘. . . that if loss of control does 

occur, it can be easily mitigated by GPS 

based ‘return to home’ systems which 

take control of the craft and 

automatically fly it back to its launch 

point. The most widely available 

consumer quadcopter, the DJI Phantom 

2, comes standard with this capability 

out of the box, and many hobbyists and 

commercial operators who build their 

own craft also install similar systems, 

which can be obtained for less than 

$100.’’ 

The NPRM mitigated the potential 

risk associated with UAS flight 

primarily through operational 

restrictions rather than airworthiness 

certification and equipage requirements, 

such as the installation of an FTS. If 

installed, an FTS may mitigate the risk 

associated with loss of positive control 

by having the unmanned aircraft 

execute intentional flight into terrain if 

the link between the remote pilot and 

the unmanned aircraft is severed. 

However, mandating equipage such as 

FTS would increase the costs of 

complying with this rule to address a 

safety risk that may be mitigated 

through low-cost operational 

parameters. 

Instead of requiring an FTS, the 

NPRM proposed to mitigate the risk 

associated with loss of positive control 

using the concept of a confined area of 

operation. Under the NPRM, the remote 

pilot would, prior to flight, be required 

to become familiar with the area of 

operation and to create contingency 

plans in that operations area to mitigate 

the risk associated with possible loss of 

positive control to people on the ground 

or other aircraft. 

The NPRM proposal is a less costly 

method to address loss-of-positivecontrol risk because it does not require 

equipage (such as FTS, ‘‘return home,’’ 

or geo-fencing systems) or airworthiness 

certification. If FTS were to be required, 

that would be an equipage requirement 

that would likely increase the costs of 

this rule. In addition, an FTS equipage 

requirement would likely have to be 

accompanied by some type of 

airworthiness certification requirement 

to ensure that the FTS works reliably. 

This also would increase the costs of 

this rule. 


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Conversely, it is unclear whether an 

FTS would provide a safety increase 

justifying the increase in costs for two 

reasons. First, the operational 

restrictions of this rule would 

significantly confine the area of 

operation of a small UAS, thus 

mitigating the loss-of-positive control 

risk through operational parameters. 

Second, an FTS could be potentially 

unsafe because using it would 

immediately terminate the flight with 

the possibility of placing people below 

in harm’s way, especially if the FTS is 

programmed to automatically activate 

sometime after the control link is lost 

and cannot be re-established. For these 

reasons, the FAA will not require FTS 

on small unmanned aircraft in this rule. 

3. Other Technological Equipage 

A number of commenters suggested 

additional equipage requirements for 

small UAS operations. However, 

because small UAS operations subject to 

this rule pose a lower level of risk, there 

are operational alternatives available to 

mitigate their risk to an acceptable level 

without imposing an FAA requirement 

for technological equipage. 

Additionally, the FAA recognizes that 

the use of new and advanced technology 

applications on UAS has not been tested 

and there is not enough data to support 

regulatory requirements of technological 

equipage. Therefore, this rule will not 

mandate the use of any kind of 

technological equipage or device. 

Modovolate Aviation recommended a 

general process for developing and 

integrating equipage requirements for 

small UAS. The commenter said it is 

important that the FAA ‘‘avoid anything 

resembling airworthiness and type 

certification for manned aircraft,’’ and 

instead ‘‘adapt the consensus standard 

approach used in the early days of 

occupational health and safety 

regulation and combine it with the 

performance standards approach used 

by the Federal Communications 

Commission for unlicensed wireless 

devices.’’ Modovolate Aviation 

explained that the FAA should 

encourage small UAS organizations to 

articulate performance standards for 

control technologies, and then 

manufacturers would certify that they 

have designed and manufactured their 

UAS in accordance with these 

consensus standards. The operating 

rules would require operators to 

confirm, as part of their pre-flight 

inspection, that these basic features are 

present and operating properly, and any 

manufacturers that falsely certify 

compliance with the standards would 

be subject to civil penalties and criminal 

prosecution for mail or wire fraud. 

As discussed in section III.J.3 of this 

preamble, the FAA has determined that 

airworthiness certification for small 

UAS operating within the limits set by 

part 107 is unnecessary. However, as 

noted by the commenter, the FAA 

encourages industry organizations to set 

voluntary standards for small UAS to 

further develop the industry. Such 

standards, however, would not relieve 

the remote pilot in command of his or 

her pre-flight responsibilities to 

determine that the system is in a 

condition for safe operation under 

§§ 107.15 and 107.49. That is because 

the remote pilot in command must 

ensure that the small UAS is in a 

condition for safe operation for each 

flight, which requires greater diligence 

as the small UAS ages. 

A number of commenters addressed 

the NPRM’s statement that ‘‘existing 

technology does not appear to provide 

a way to resolve the ‘see and avoid’ 

problem with small UAS operations 

without maintaining human visual 

contact with the small unmanned 

aircraft during flight.’’ CropLife America 

and Responsible Industry for a Sound 

Environment, commenting jointly, and 

the Professional Helicopter Pilots 

Association agreed with FAA that no 

see-and-avoid technology currently 

exists, but nevertheless said such 

technology should be required once it 

does become available. The United 

States Ultralight Association said UAS 

equipment should be designed with 

software or firmware that prevents the 

UAS from being flown further than one 

mile from the operator. The association 

asserted that ‘‘[d]epth perception fails 

well before that distance and one mile 

should be seen as the outside limit for 

safety.’’ 

The FAA recognizes that the use of 

software or firmware that prevents the 

UAS from being flown further than one 

mile could potentially help to prevent 

the small unmanned aircraft from flying 

out of the area of operation. This type 

of software and firmware could also 

potentially help to prevent injury or 

damage to those on the ground. 

However, as discussed in section 

III.E.1.d of this preamble, the remote 

pilot in command may need to deviate 

from the regulations of part 107 to 

respond to an emergency. A 

technological limitation on the small 

unmanned aircraft traveling more than 

one mile from the remote pilot could 

limit the remote pilot’s ability to 

respond to an emergency situation that 

requires quickly moving the small 

unmanned aircraft farther away from the 

remote pilot. 

Several commenters addressed the 

issue of compliance with the proposed 

maximum altitude and speed 

restrictions. PlaneSense and Cobolt Air, 

commenting jointly, wondered why 

manned aircraft are required to be 

equipped with an altimeter or an 

altitude limiting program or device, but 

unmanned aircraft are not. 

The Permanent Editorial Board of the 

Aviators Model Code of Conduct 

Initiative noted that, absent altimetry 

technology (such as altimeters or GPS), 

altitude would need to be estimated 

from the ground, and ground-based 

estimates are generally inaccurate and 

may cause significant noncompliance 

and safety challenges. As such, the 

organization recommended the final 

rule either require the use of a ‘‘practical 

and effective technique’’ for small UAS 

operators to estimate altitude ‘‘with 

sufficient accuracy,’’ or require the use 

of altimetric technology. The U.S. Hang 

Gliding and Paragliding Association 

said a ‘‘simple barometric system set at 

launch would likely suffice’’ to keep 

small UAS in compliance with 

maximum altitude restrictions. An 

individual also said UAS should be 

equipped with ‘‘devices that provide the 

operator with telemetry data such as 

(but not limited to) height, speed, 

distance, bearing and battery level.’’ 

Virginia Commonwealth University 

Honors Students asserted that GPS 

systems could be used to ensure 

compliance with both altitude and 

speed restrictions for small UAS 

equipped with minimum equipment, 

such as an altimeter and magnetic 

direction indicator, to ensure the UAS 

remains below a specific altitude and 

within a certain radius from the 

operator’s location, in compliance with 

ATC instructions. Several individuals 

said that FAA should require UAS to be 

equipped with technology that limits 

operations to below a certain altitude or 

within a certain airspace. Another 

individual suggested the requirement of 

technology to enable automated 

communication between a UAS and an 

FAA computer that can authorize flight 

in a particular area at a specific time. 

As discussed in section III.E.3.a.ii of 

this preamble, while 400 feet AGL is 

generally the maximum altitude for a 

small unmanned aircraft, there is an 

exception to that requirement. 

Specifically, this rule allows a small 

unmanned aircraft flying within 400 feet 

of a building to fly higher than 400 feet 

AGL. As such, a technological 

component limiting aircraft altitude to 

400 feet AGL would disallow some 

small UAS operations that are permitted 

by part 107. In addition, a categorical 

technological limitation on altitude 

would limit the remote pilot’s ability to 

respond to an emergency. With regard to 


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estimating altitude, section III.E.3.a.ii 

provides examples of other methods 

that a remote pilot in command can use 

to estimate the altitude of a small 

unmanned aircraft. 

The NJIT Working Group 

recommended the use of ‘‘a heads up 

display of flight information such as 

airspeed, vertical speed, attitude, 

heading and power’’ to help the remote 

pilot fly according to actual flight 

parameters instead by sight. 

The FAA supports the NJIT Working 

Group’s efforts to provide remote pilots 

with an optimized method of displaying 

telemetry data of the aircraft. However, 

a regulatory requirement for a heads up 

display is unnecessary in this rule due 

to the limited nature of small UAS 

operations, and for many aircraft, the 

lack of telemetry data to display to the 

remote pilot. 

A number of commenters addressed a 

requirement for return-to-home 

capabilities. Virginia Commonwealth 

University Honors Students said the 

FAA should require UAS to be 

equipped with a GPS system that 

automatically returns the UAS to home 

in adverse weather conditions. Those 

students and NetMoby also said UAS 

should be equipped with technology 

that returns the UAS to home when 

battery life is low. 

NetMoby also recommended UAS be 

equipped with return-to-home 

capability ‘‘which, when automatically 

activated, as a result of loss of positive 

UAS control, puts the aircraft on a 

course to a waypoint that is mandated 

to be programmed into the UAS circuit 

board Random Access Memory 

(‘‘RAM’’) prior to departure from the 

ground.’’ The company further 

recommended the following to mitigate 

the risk associate with loss of positive 

control of a UAS: (1) UAS be equipped 

with GPS capable of position refresh 

rates of 5 seconds or better; and (2) GPS 

be accompanied with WAAS differential 

for greater position accuracy. 

The Small UAV Coalition asserted 

that technological capabilities such as 

return-to-base and geo-fencing 

programming are currently being used 

by small UAS operators in other 

countries, and that such technologies 

‘‘achieve and surpass the level of safety 

attained by a pilot’s control of aircraft.’’ 

Airware acknowledged that detailed 

airworthiness requirements are not 

needed ‘‘for the very low risk 

environment proposed by this NPRM,’’ 

but that ‘‘minimal protections’’ should 

nevertheless be required. One such 

requirement cited by the company is a 

flight control system that allows for 

certain contingency events to be 

monitored (e.g., lost RC link, lost data 

link, low voltage), and for an 

appropriate response to be executed 

should any such events occur (e.g., land 

now, return to home and land, return to 

home, loiter and land). Airware said 

such programmable contingency actions 

‘‘are critical, as flight systems which just 

simply execute a return home and land 

procedure for example, may send the 

aircraft on a course that intersects with 

a structure or other obstacle.’’ 

Section 107.19 requires the remote 

pilot in command to ensure that the 

small unmanned aircraft will pose no 

undue hazard to other aircraft, people, 

or property in the event of a loss of 

positive control of the aircraft for any 

reason. In consideration of the 

numerous ways that a remote pilot may 

mitigate the risk associated with a 

contingency event, the FAA considers it 

unnecessary to enact a prescriptive 

requirement such as a return-to-home 

function, as many other methods may 

exist now and in the future to ensure no 

undue hazard due to a loss of control. 

For example, non-equipage mitigations 

for loss of control may include utilizing 

physical barriers such as trees or 

netting, utilizing security/safety 

personnel to control non-participant 

entry into the operating area, or 

ensuring non-participants are under/in a 

protected covering. 

The AIT Austrian Institute of 

Technology GmbH said that a data link 

requirement is essential for safe 

operations, and that ‘‘adequate 

Frequencies and Standards should be 

put in place to support the growing 

market potentials.’’ The Institute went 

on to recommend specific data link 

spectrum requirements for both visualline-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight 

operations. 

Frequency spectrum requirements are 

outside the scope of this rule. The 

comment has been forwarded to the 

FAA Spectrum Engineering service unit 

for future consideration. 

Several individuals said small UAS 

should be equipped with flight data 

recording systems or ‘‘black boxes’’ so 

that operators can be held accountable 

for infractions. One individual said that, 

for those aircraft that can record flight 

log data, there should be a requirement 

to preserve that data in the event of an 

operation that causes injury or property 

damage. The commenter further 

suggested that, in case of airspace 

violations, the FAA consider requiring 

all such flight logs be kept for some 

predetermined period of time. 

Due to the mitigations provided by 

part 107 that reduce the likelihood of a 

small UAS flight resulting in significant 

injury or property damage, a 

requirement to equip small unmanned 

aircraft with flight data recorders would 

be unnecessarily burdensome. 

Transport Canada questioned 

whether, ‘‘[g]iven the potential 

interference caused by radios, cell 

phones, electronic devices, etc.,’’ the 

FAA has considered a prohibition 

against using personal electronic 

devices at, or in the vicinity of, a control 

station. 

Prior to flight, the remote pilot in 

command must, pursuant to § 107.49(c), 

ensure that all control links between the 

ground control station and the small 

unmanned aircraft are functioning 

properly. If an electronic device is being 

used nearby and that electronic device 

affects the control link such that it is not 

functioning properly, the remote pilot in 

command may not commence the 

operation until the problem with the 

control link has been resolved. The FAA 

expects that the remote pilot will 

resolve this problem by either: (1) 

Terminating the use of any electronic 

devices that are known to the remote 

pilot to cause interference with 

operation of the UAS; or (2) delaying the 

operation until use of the interfering 

electronic device has ceased. It would 

not be practical to enact a prohibition 

on the use of personal electronic devices 

because such devices are routinely used 

to control or monitor small UAS. 

The City of Phoenix Aviation 

Department said the FAA should 

require ‘‘7460 applications’’ from small 

UAS because ‘‘there are unknown 

impacts of UAS remote frequency 

system[s] interacting with commercial 

airport operations.’’ 

The FAA disagrees. FAA Form 7460, 

Notice of Proposed Construction or 

Alteration, applies to persons 

constructing structures greater than 200 

feet AGL, or within a specific distance 

of an existing airport or heliport. 

Because the form does not apply to 

aircraft operations, there is no 

requirement for small UAS remote 

pilots to submit a 7460 application. 

4. External Load and Dropping Objects 

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to 

not allow external load and towing 

operations under part 107. The FAA 

also proposed to prohibit objects from 

being dropped from an aircraft in flight 

if doing so would endanger the life or 

property of another. For the reasons 

discussed below, this rule will allow 

external load and towing operations as 

long as the object that is attached to or 

carried by the small unmanned aircraft 

is secure and does not adversely affect 

the flight characteristics or 

controllability of the aircraft. This rule 

will also maintain the prohibition on 

dropping objects from a small 


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105 80 FR at 9553. 

106 Id. 

unmanned aircraft if doing so would 

create a hazard to persons or property, 

but will rephrase the regulatory text of 

§ 107.23(b) to make it similar to the 

‘‘undue hazard’’ standard used in 

§ 107.19(b). Additionally, as discussed 

in section III.C.1 of this preamble, this 

rule will also allow the intrastate 

transportation of property for 

compensation or hire. 

a. External Load and Towing 

In the NPRM, the FAA noted that 

external load and towing operations 

‘‘involve greater levels of public risk 

due to the dynamic nature of externalload configurations and inherent risks 

associated with the flight characteristics 

of a load that is carried or extends 

outside of the aircraft fuselage and may 

be jettisonable.’’ 105 The FAA added that 

these types of operations may ‘‘also 

involve evaluation of the aircraft frame 

for safety performance impacts, which 

may require airworthiness 

certification.’’ 106 Accordingly, the 

NPRM would not have permitted 

external load or towing operations to be 

conducted under part 107. However, the 

FAA invited comment on whether 

external-load and towing UAS 

operations should be permitted, 

whether they should require 

airworthiness certification, whether 

they should require higher levels of 

airman certification, whether they 

should require additional operational 

limitations, and on other relevant 

issues. 

Several commenters, including 

Cherokee Nation Technologies, NAAA, 

and ALPA, generally supported the 

proposed prohibition on conducting 

external load and towing operations. 

Cherokee Nation Technologies 

contended that the risks associated with 

external loads and towing are beyond 

the scope of this rulemaking effort. 

NAAA argued that additional data is 

needed to safely allow external load 

small UAS operations in the NAS. 

ALPA asserted that external load and 

towing operations require a level of 

piloting skill that is higher than the one 

envisioned by part 107. 

Approximately 30 other commenters 

opposed a blanket prohibition on 

conducting external load and towing 

operations. Modovolate Aviation stated 

that the NPRM does not explain 

sufficiently why external load and 

banner-towing operations should be 

excluded. DJI asserted that external load 

and towing operations could be 

conducted safely within the other 

operating parameters proposed in the 

NPRM. DJI specifically noted that the 

55-pound limit on the total weight of 

the small unmanned aircraft would 

significantly reduce the risk of cargocarriage operations by limiting the 

weight of the cargo that could be carried 

or towed by the unmanned aircraft. 

Yale University, the Information 

Technology and Innovation Foundation, 

American Farm Bureau Federation, and 

Google stated that the proposed 

prohibition on external load and towing 

operations would offer only marginal 

improvements in safety, if any, at the 

cost of important research and a wide 

range of useful applications of small 

UAS. American Farm Bureau 

Federation, the Michigan Farm Bureau, 

and the Missouri Farm Bureau 

specifically noted that the prohibition is 

overbroad and impractical as applied to 

agricultural applications. Short of 

recommending that the FAA completely 

eliminate the external load and towing 

prohibition, the American Farm Bureau 

Federation and the Michigan Farm 

Bureau urged the FAA to clarify that 

this prohibition only applies to actual 

towing operations or operations that 

would cause the weight of the UAS to 

exceed 55 pounds. The Oklahoma 

Governor’s Unmanned Aerial Systems 

Council said that if a small UAS is 

specifically designed to safely 

accommodate external loads and towing 

operations, then these operations should 

be allowed as long as they are in 

compliance with the manufacturers’ 

engineering and operating 

specifications. 

The Mercatus Center at George Mason 

University stated that the NPRM fails to 

include a discussion of the benefits of 

allowing small UAS to conduct external 

load operations. The commenter 

asserted that, given that no fatalities 

have been reported due to ‘‘jettisoned 

parcels from UASs,’’ parcel-for-parcel, it 

may be safer to transport goods via UAS 

external load operations than to do so 

using delivery trucks. The Colorado 

Cattlemen’s Association and Amazon 

argued that the FAA should take a 

performance-based approach to allow 

external load and towing operations. 

AIA similarly recommended the FAA 

apply ‘‘risk analysis techniques’’ to the 

specific operations under consideration. 

The University of California and the 

Consumer Electronics Association 

stated that, instead of a blanket 

prohibition on external load and towing 

operations, safety concerns could be 

mitigated by sensible limits on weight, 

range, location and altitude, and by 

technology and a registration procedure 

that certifies to a higher degree of safety. 

By way of example, the Consumer 

Electronics Association pointed out that 

Amazon has said that a 5-pound 

package limit would create minimal 

safety concerns, yet would still permit 

the delivery of more than 85 percent of 

the products it sells. 

Google and several individual 

commenters cited numerous examples 

of small unmanned aircraft missions 

that would be adversely affected by a 

prohibition on external loads and 

towing. These operations include 

activities such as banner towing, 

magnetometer missions, towing lines for 

electric utility industry, and delivery of 

tools and equipment. A few commenters 

opposed the prohibition on external 

load and towing operations in limited 

contexts. The National Ski Areas 

Association said the prohibition should 

be relaxed for safety and emergency 

operations. The Associated General 

Contractors of America said that the 

FAA should invite further comment on 

whether the prohibition should extend 

to highly controlled construction 

jobsites. Aviation Management stated 

that FAA should be able to effectively 

assess the risk of towing operations on 

a class basis or a case-by-case basis. One 

commenter suggested that external loads 

of a limited weight should be allowed, 

and that the weight allowed should be 

a specified percentage of the weight of 

the unmanned aircraft. 

The FAA agrees with the commenters 

who objected to the proposed 

prohibition on external load and towing 

operations. Under part 107, the 

combined weight of the small 

unmanned aircraft and any objects 

towed or loaded (either externally or 

internally) must be less than 55 pounds. 

As a result of this limitation, the risk 

posed by a small unmanned aircraft 

conducting external load or towing 

operations is significantly lower than 

the risk associated with manned-aircraft 

external load or towing operations, 

which can carry 1,000 to 50,000 pounds 

of cargo. 

Further, the majority of risks 

associated with load (either internal or 

external) and towing operations are 

already mitigated by the other 

provisions of this rule. First, § 107.19(c) 

requires the remote pilot in command to 

ensure that the small unmanned aircraft 

will pose no undue hazard to other 

aircraft, people, or property in the event 

of a loss of control of the aircraft for any 

reason. Second, § 107.49(a) requires the 

remote pilot in command to conduct a 

preflight assessment of the operating 

environment, and consider the potential 

risks to persons and property in the 

immediate vicinity. Finally, as 

discussed below, § 107.23(b) prohibits a 

person from dropping an object from a 

small unmanned aircraft in a manner 


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that creates an undue hazard to persons 

or property. 

Because the other provisions of this 

rule mitigate the risks associated with 

external load and towing operations, 

these operations will be permitted 

under part 107 if they do not adversely 

affect the flight characteristics and 

controllability of the small unmanned 

aircraft. To ensure that this is the case, 

the FAA has revised § 107.49 to require 

that, prior to flight, the remote pilot in 

command and the person manipulating 

the flight controls of the small UAS 

must ensure that any object attached to 

or carried by the small unmanned 

aircraft (either internally or externally) 

is secured and does not adversely affect 

the flight characteristics or 

controllability of the aircraft. 

Flight characteristics refer to the 

stability of the small UAS, while 

controllability refers to the 

maneuverability of the small UAS. To 

satisfy the above requirement, the 

remote pilot in command must examine 

the equipment used for lifting or 

securing a payload to ensure that it is in 

good condition, strong enough for the 

task, and attached in a manner such that 

there is no unintended shifting or 

detaching of the payload. For example, 

if a single cable is used to secure and 

lift a payload, the cable must be 

inspected to determine that it is 

securely attached at both ends and that 

the cable and attach points are in good 

condition so that the payload will not 

inadvertently detach. If netting is used, 

the netting and the attach points must 

be in good condition so that the netting 

does not inadvertently become 

detached. The payload must also be 

securely fastened so that it does not slip 

out of the netting during flight. 

A payload will likely adversely affect 

the flight characteristics of the small 

unmanned aircraft if that payload shifts 

in a manner that causes the small 

unmanned aircraft to deviate from its 

intended flight path or become 

uncontrollable. In other words, if a 

payload becomes partially detached or if 

the presence of the payload creates an 

imbalanced small unmanned aircraft, 

then the flight characteristics of the 

small unmanned aircraft have been 

adversely affected. Additionally, if a 

payload shifts during flight or weighs 

down a small unmanned aircraft such 

that the aircraft is unable to properly 

respond to a remote pilot’s controls, 

then the controllability of the small 

unmanned aircraft has been adversely 

affected. 

A joint submission from the State of 

Nevada, the Nevada Institute for 

Autonomous Systems, and the Nevada 

FAA-designated UAS Test Site, and a 

comment from an individual claimed 

that external load and towing operations 

involve a greater level of complexity 

and safety risk and that the FAA should 

develop appropriate standards and 

certification criteria for these 

operations. Conversely, Yale University 

said that a prohibition on all externalload operations or requiring an 

airworthiness certificate for such 

operations would impede ability to 

rapidly prototype aircraft. The 

Oklahoma Governor’s Unmanned Aerial 

Systems Council recommended 

airworthiness certification only for 

larger UAS platforms conducting 

external load operations. 

Planehook Aviation said that the FAA 

should create a special category of 

common carrier certification for 

conducting external load operations. 

The commenter recommended that FAA 

create a UAS-specific advisory circular 

to mirror manned aviation guidance in 

AC 133–1A, Rotorcraft External Load 

Operations in accordance with 14 CFR 

part 133. 

Separate airworthiness or other 

certification analogous to mannedaircraft operations is not necessary for 

external load and towing operations that 

will be conducted under part 107. As 

discussed earlier, a small unmanned 

aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds 

(including the weight of any payload) 

does not pose the same safety risk as a 

1,000 to 50,000-pound manned aircraft. 

Thus, it is not necessary for a small 

unmanned aircraft to be subject to the 

same regulatory provisions as a manned 

aircraft that conducts external-load 

operations. 

Consequently, this rule will not 

require small unmanned aircraft 

operating under part 107 to comply with 

either the provisions of part 133 (which 

normally applies to rotorcraft external 

load operations) or current guidance 

associated with airplane external load 

operations. However, because larger 

UAS than the ones governed by this rule 

may pose additional safety risk, future 

rulemakings may impose additional 

mitigations, such as those required by 

part 133, on larger UAS operations. 

While the FAA does not plan to issue 

guidance on external load operations 

with larger UAS in conjunction with 

this rulemaking, it may do so in the 

future. 

DJI recommended that instead of 

banning towing operations, the FAA use 

existing language from § 91.15, which 

prohibits dropping objects from aircraft 

in flight ‘‘that creates a hazard to 

persons or property.’’ One individual 

commenter said the FAA should 

consider a restriction on the size of a 

towed banner, and that the device 

should meet requirements similar to the 

requirement for 14 CFR part 101 

(balloons). Another individual 

commenter said towing operations 

should be permitted as long as the 

power-to-weight/drag ratio is 

appropriate for safe flight. In response, 

the FAA notes that, as discussed earlier, 

this rule will allow external load and 

towing operations (including banner 

towing) as long as the object is securely 

attached to the small unmanned aircraft 

and does not pose adverse flight 

characteristics. 

Several commenters, including the 

Small UAV Coalition, the North 

Carolina Association of Broadcasters, 

and Modovolate Aviation stated the 

FAA needs to clarify whether a gimbal, 

camera, or sensor affixed to a UAS is 

considered an external load. The News 

Media Coalition stated that the final rule 

should make clear that an 

interchangeable camera that is affixed to 

or carried by a small UAS to be used by 

that UAS is permissible. SkyBridge 

Holdings said that any item that is 

clearly, mechanically fastened to the 

aircraft (e.g., using screws or bolts) 

should not be considered an external 

load. 

The FAA acknowledges the concerns 

raised by the commenters, but as 

discussed earlier, this rule will remove 

the proposed prohibition on externalload operations. Consequently, part 107 

will not have any external-load-specific 

regulatory provisions and, as such, a 

UAS-specific definition of external load 

is unnecessary in this rule. The FAA 

also emphasizes the requirements 

(discussed earlier) that any object 

attached to or carried on or in the small 

unmanned aircraft must be secured and 

may not pose adverse flight 

characteristics. These requirements 

apply regardless of whether the object is 

carried inside or outside of the aircraft. 

Southern Company sought 

clarification as to whether the proposed 

external-load and towing prohibition 

would apply to tethered operations (e.g., 

the stringing of a conductor, the rigging 

of climbing protection, or the carriage of 

any line or cable that is tied to the 

ground or held by a person). If tethered 

operations are permitted, the 

commenter asked whether the weight of 

the tether counts toward the small UAS 

weight limitation. Southern Company 

stated that a tether provides sufficient 

risk mitigation such that it should not 

be considered part of the aircraft for the 

purpose of determining weight. 

As discussed in section III.D.4 of this 

preamble, the weight of the small 

unmanned aircraft includes everything 

that is on board or otherwise attached to 

the aircraft and may be lifted. Thus, if 


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107 Depending on whether the applicant holds a 

part 61 pilot certificate other than student pilot, that 

demonstration will take the form of either an 

aeronautical knowledge test or online training. 

a cable is attached to an unmanned 

aircraft, then the weight of the entire 

cable must be added to the weight of the 

unmanned aircraft to determine whether 

the total weight is under the 55-pound 

limit imposed on small unmanned 

aircraft. The FAA acknowledges that a 

portion of the attached cable may rest 

on the ground during the small UAS 

operation, but the small unmanned 

aircraft may end up lifting the entire 

cable if positive control is lost during 

the operation. If the unmanned aircraft 

is tethered by the cable in such a way 

that the cable, securely attached to an 

immoveable object, prevents the 

unmanned aircraft from flying away in 

the event of loss of positive control, 

only the portion of the cable which may 

be lifted aloft by the small unmanned 

aircraft must be added to the weight of 

the unmanned aircraft when 

determining total weight. 

Transport Canada asked whether the 

FAA has considered prohibiting certain 

payloads (e.g., explosives, corrosives, 

bio-hazards, lasers, weapons). Transport 

Canada added that the FAA might 

consider a prohibition on equipping 

small UAS with an emergency locator 

transmitter (ELT), ‘‘and the potential 

response of search and rescue assets as 

a result of an ELT activation.’’ 

As discussed in section III.C.1 of this 

preamble, this rule will not allow the 

carriage of hazardous materials. With 

regard to ELTs, an ELT is generally 

required to be installed in manned 

aircraft under 14 CFR 91.207 for the 

purpose of locating a downed aircraft 

and aiding in the rescue of survivors. 

Because a small unmanned aircraft will 

not carry any people onboard, the 

installation of an ELT would not result 

in significant safety benefits and will 

not be required by this rule. Further, 

due to the cost and weight of ELT 

devices, we do not anticipate small UAS 

owners voluntarily equipping their 

aircraft with ELTs. 

b. Dropping Objects 

In § 107.23(b) of the proposed rule, 

the FAA proposed to prohibit an object 

from being dropped from a small 

unmanned aircraft if such action 

endangers the life or property of 

another. The FAA received 

approximately 15 comments in response 

to this proposed provision. 

CAPA and one individual commenter 

expressed concern about the 

proliferation of small UAS and their 

accessibility to persons with limited or 

no aviation experience. Both 

commenters asserted that it requires 

great skill to drop an object safely from 

an aircraft. CAPA also expressed 

concerns about the potential security 

risks of permitting objects to be dropped 

from small unmanned aircraft. 

Similarly, two individual commenters 

worried that small unmanned aircraft 

equipped for package delivery could be 

used to carry out terrorist activities, 

such as dropping canisters of poisonous 

gases into populated areas such as 

shopping malls. 

The FAA disagrees with the 

commenters that airmen operating 

under part 107 will lack the skill 

necessary to safely drop an object from 

a small UAS. As discussed in section 

III.E.1 of this preamble, all small UAS 

operations must be conducted either by 

a certificated remote pilot or under the 

direct supervision of a certificated 

remote pilot in command. In order to 

obtain a remote pilot certificate under 

part 107, an applicant will be required 

to demonstrate his or her knowledge of 

how to safely operate a small UAS 

under part 107.107 Thus, operations 

under part 107 will be conducted and 

overseen by certificated airmen who 

will have the knowledge necessary to 

safely conduct various part 107 

operations, including safely dropping 

objects from a small UAS. 

With regard to dropping dangerous 

objects, the FAA notes that, as discussed 

in section III.C.1 of this preamble, this 

rule will prohibit the carriage of 

hazardous material by small unmanned 

aircraft. With regard to terrorism and 

criminal activities more broadly, as 

discussed in section III.J.2 of this 

preamble, there already exist criminal 

statutes that prohibit criminal and 

terrorist activities. 

Five commenters suggested that the 

language in the final rule regarding the 

dropping of objects should mirror the 

language in 14 CFR 91.15. These 

commenters suggested that while 

proposed § 107.23(b) does not 

necessarily differ in substance from 

§ 91.15, it should be made explicit that 

the rule does not prohibit the dropping 

of any object if reasonable precautions 

are taken to avoid injury or damage to 

persons or property. DJI suggested that 

the FAA adopt the ‘‘hazard to persons 

or property’’ standard used in § 91.15 

for external load and towing operations. 

Section 91.15 prohibits an object from 

being dropped from an aircraft in flight 

in a manner that creates a hazard to 

persons or property. Section 107.19(b) 

of this rule uses a similar standard of 

‘‘undue hazard’’ with regard to loss of 

positive control of a small unmanned 

aircraft. In order to promote regulatory 

consistency throughout part 107, the 

FAA has rephrased the regulatory text of 

§ 107.23(b) to use the ‘‘undue hazard’’ 

standard specified in § 107.19(b). The 

revised § 107.23(b) will prohibit 

dropping objects from a small 

unmanned aircraft in a manner that 

creates an undue hazard to persons or 

property. 

DJI noted that the term ‘‘hazard’’ is 

inherently subjective. DJI acknowledged 

that ‘‘it may be impossible to adopt a 

non-subjective standard,’’ and requested 

that the FAA provide guidance on the 

types of operations that the FAA would 

consider to be hazardous. 

As discussed earlier, § 107.23(b) will 

prohibit dropping an object from a small 

unmanned aircraft in a manner that 

creates an undue hazard to persons or 

property. For purposes of this rule, a 

falling object creates an undue hazard to 

persons or property if it poses a risk of 

injury to a person or a risk of damage 

to property. This standard will be 

applied on a fact-specific basis. For 

example, a small unmanned aircraft that 

drops a heavy or sharp object capable of 

injuring a person in an area where there 

are people who could be hit by that 

object would likely create an undue 

hazard to persons. The remote pilot in 

command of the operation could take 

reasonable precautions prior to flight by 

moving people away from the drop site 

to a distance where they would not be 

hit by a falling object if something goes 

wrong with the operation. Guidance 

associated with the enactment of part 

107 will provide additional examples to 

help remote pilots comply with 

§ 107.23(b). 

5. Limitations on Operations in Certain 

Airspace 

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed 

limiting the exposure of small 

unmanned aircraft to other users of the 

NAS by restricting small UAS 

operations in controlled airspace. In 

addition, the NPRM proposed 

prohibiting small UAS operations in 

prohibited and restricted areas without 

permission from the using or controlling 

agency. The proposed rule also 

prohibited operation of small UAS in 

airspace restricted by NOTAMs unless 

authorized by ATC or a certificate of 

waiver or authorization. 

For the reasons discussed below, this 

rule will adopt the provisions for 

operating in Class B through E airspace 

and in prohibited or restricted areas as 

proposed in the NPRM, but with the 

option to request a waiver from the 

provisions for operating in Class B 

through E airspace. This rule will not 

adopt the provisions for compliance 

with NOTAMs as proposed, but will 


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instead require compliance with 

§§ 91.137 through 91.145 and § 99.7, as 

applicable. This rule will also not adopt 

the proposed prohibition on operations 

in Class A airspace because the other 

operational restrictions of this rule will 

keep a small unmanned aircraft from 

reaching Class A airspace. Lastly, this 

rule will add a prohibition against small 

unmanned aircraft operations that 

interfere with operations and traffic 

patterns at any airport, heliport or 

seaplane base. 

a. Operations in Class B, C, D, and 

Lateral Boundaries of the Surface Area 

of Class E Airspace Designated for an 

Airport 

The NPRM proposed to require prior 

permission from Air Traffic Control 

(ATC) to operate in Class B, C, or D 

airspace, or within the lateral 

boundaries of the surface area of Class 

E airspace designated for an airport. The 

NPRM did not propose equipment 

requirements for small UAS operating in 

controlled airspace, nor did it propose 

to require small UAS to demonstrate 

strict compliance with part 91 in order 

to operate in controlled airspace. 

Several commenters including AOPA, 

EAA, and the Small UAV Coalition, 

supported the FAA’s proposal that 

remote pilots obtain ATC approval prior 

to operating small UAS in Class B, C, or 

D airspace, or within the lateral 

boundaries of the surface area of Class 

E airspace designated for an airport. 

Some commenters added that they 

would like clarification that ATC 

approval does not mean the FAA 

issuance of a COA. The International 

Air Transport Association supported the 

proposal and stated this requirement 

should not be allowed to impede ATC’s 

primary responsibility to manage traffic. 

Transport Canada requested 

clarification on the process for 

requesting ATC approval. Foxtrot 

Consulting and JAM Aviation expressed 

concern about inconsistent application 

of the regulation by ATC facilities. 

Some of these commenters requested 

that the FAA provide guidance to ATC 

facilities regarding the handling of 

requests to operate small UAS in 

controlled airspace. Modovolate 

Aviation agreed with the proposed 

framework, but suggested that the FAA 

should provide guidance on how ATC 

permission would be obtained. The 

Small UAV Coalition asked the FAA to 

provide contact information for each 

ATC facility, and to agree to provide 

timely decisions on whether to 

authorize operations in controlled 

airspace. NBAA suggested prohibiting 

use of ATC frequencies to obtain the 

required permission. 

In response to comments, the FAA 

will establish two methods by which a 

remote pilot in command may request 

FAA authorization for a small 

unmanned aircraft to operate in Class B, 

C, D, and the lateral boundaries of the 

surface area of Class E airspace 

designated for an airport. The first 

method is the same as what was 

proposed in the NPRM: A remote pilot 

in command may seek approval from 

the ATC facility with jurisdiction over 

the airspace in which the remote pilot 

would like to conduct operations. The 

second method allows a remote pilot to 

request a waiver from this provision in 

order to operate in Class B through E 

airspace. As stated in the NPRM, the 

appropriate ATC facility has the best 

understanding of local airspace, its 

usage, and traffic patterns and is in the 

best position to ascertain whether the 

proposed small UAS operation would 

pose a hazard to other users or the 

efficiency of the airspace, and 

procedures to implement to mitigate 

such hazards. The ATC facility has the 

authority to approve or deny aircraft 

operations based on traffic density, 

controller workload, communications 

issues, or any other type of operational 

issues that could potentially impact the 

safe and efficient flow of air traffic in 

that airspace. If necessary to approve a 

small UAS operation, ATC may require 

mitigations such as altitude constraints 

and direct communication. ATC may 

deny requests that pose an unacceptable 

risk to the NAS and cannot be mitigated. 

The ATC facility does not have the 

authority to approve or deny small UAS 

operations on the basis of equipage that 

exceeds the part 107 requirements. 

Because additional equipage and 

technologies such as geo-fencing have 

not been certificated by the FAA, they 

therefore need to be examined on a caseby-case basis in order for the FAA to 

determine their reliability and 

functionality. Additionally, requiring 

ATC to review equipage would place a 

burden on ATC and detract from other 

duties. Instead, a remote pilot who 

wishes to operate in controlled airspace 

because he or she can demonstrate 

mitigations through equipage may do so 

by applying for a waiver. 

Requests for authorization to operate 

a UAS in one of the above areas should 

be made by writing or an electronic 

method as determined by the 

Administrator and publicized on the 

FAA’s Web site. Requests for such 

authorization via air traffic control radio 

communication frequencies will not be 

accepted because they may interfere 

with the separation of aircraft. 

The FAA is not committing to a 

timeline for approval after ATC 

permission has been requested because 

determining the level of review required 

for approval is dependent on the 

management at the individual facilities. 

The FAA also notes that the time 

required for approval will vary based on 

the resources available at the ATC 

facility and the complexity and safety 

issues raised by each specific request. 

The FAA encourages remote pilots who 

know that they will need to operate in 

Class B, C, D, or E airspace to contact 

the appropriate ATC facility as soon as 

possible prior to the operation. 

While some UAS activity will still 

utilize a COA, operating under part 107 

regulations will not require a COA 

where ATC permission is specified. The 

FAA is working concurrently on several 

other documents, including an advisory 

circular, and training and direction to 

ATC facilities that will provide 

guidance to users and ATC personnel as 

to procedures and responsibilities. This 

guidance will ensure consistent 

application of ATC permission and 

processes, to the extent practicable. The 

FAA notes that some discrepancies may 

arise due to the unique nature of 

different airspace. 

Several commenters, including ALPA, 

TTD, and the University of North 

Dakota John D. Odegard School of 

Aerospace Sciences, opposed allowing 

operations in class B, C, D, or E 

airspace. The University of North 

Dakota John D. Odegard School of 

Aerospace Sciences argued that this 

provision would place an undue burden 

on ATC, and that the well-established 

COA process would be a better 

mechanism than ATC permission. TTD 

suggested that the FAA adopt design 

provisions that ensure small UAS 

remain in the intended airspace when 

operating optimally, as well as risk 

mitigation technology when command 

controls are lost, and that operations in 

controlled airspace be banned in the 

absence of such provisions. ALPA stated 

that it does not believe there is 

sufficient information on which to base 

a sound safety case for allowing small 

UAS into controlled airspace at this 

time. Several commenters including 

SWAPA, Airport Council InternationalNorth America and the County of Los 

Angeles Department of Public Works, 

thought a real-time two-way 

communication requirement should be 

included. The Property Drone 

Consortium opposed the requirement to 

notify ATC, while adding that it 

believed this requirement imposed 

burdens on UAS operators that are 

different from those imposed on 

manned operations. 

The FAA does not believe that 

prescriptive design provisions are 


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42144 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 28, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

108See, e.g., 14 CFR 91.215(b) (allowing ATC to 

authorize access to Class A, B, or C airspace for 

aircraft that do not have a transponder) and 

§ 91.225(b) (allowing ATC to authorize access to 

Class B or C airspace for aircraft that do not have 

ADS–B). 

necessary in this rule. The FAA 

acknowledges the concerns raised by 

the commenters but notes that, as of this 

writing, safety-relevant equipage such as 

transponders has not been certificated 

for use on a small UAS. Additionally, 

there could be small UAS operations 

with operational parameters that would 

make those UAS not a danger to 

manned aircraft even if positive control 

is lost. For example, a small unmanned 

aircraft flying at low altitude and 

surrounded by natural barriers that 

would stop the aircraft from flying away 

would not pose a danger to other 

aircraft, even in the absence of equipage 

mitigations. Thus, this rule will retain 

the framework allowing the FAA to 

evaluate operations seeking to be 

conducted in controlled airspace on a 

case-by-case basis, and will not impose 

generally applicable design or equipage 

provisions on all small UAS operations. 

The FAA will continue to monitor the 

development of small UAS technology 

and may revisit this issue once the 

pertinent technology becomes more 

mature and additional safety data is 

available. 

This framework is similar to the 

regulatory construct underlying 

controlled-airspace access under part 

91. Specifically, while part 91 imposes 

minimum equipage requirements on 

aircraft seeking to operate in controlled 

airspace, part 91 also gives ATC the 

power to authorize aircraft that do not 

have the required equipage to access the 

airspace.108 Part 107 provides ATC with 

a similar power to evaluate whether an 

individual small UAS operation may 

safely be conducted in controlled 

airspace even though the unmanned 

aircraft lacks equipage typically used to 

mitigate safety concerns in that airspace. 

Additionally, the FAA does not agree 

that the current COA process would be 

a better mechanism for operating in 

controlled airspace. Currently, when a 

small UAS operator applies for a COA, 

the Flight Standards Service in the FAA 

first addresses the equipage exemptions, 

and then if a favorable outcome is 

reached, the operator is allowed to 

operate in Class G airspace up to 200 

feet AGL. If an operator wishes to 

operate in controlled airspace, under the 

previous COA framework, the request is 

sent to the air traffic service center. The 

service center then works with the 

appropriate ATC facility to respond to 

the request. This rule will streamline 

the process, such that equipage no 

longer needs to be reviewed by the FAA 

if the part 107 requirements are met. 

Therefore, the only outstanding step in 

the COA process would be resolving 

requests to operate in controlled 

airspace. This rule incorporates that 

step within the ATC-permission 

framework, making the COA process 

unnecessary for part 107 operations. 

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 

University supported the proposed rule 

and proposed adding a filed flight plan 

option in lieu of explicit ATC approval. 

The City and County of Denver, 

Colorado, insisted that permission 

should be granted only for essential 

commercial, non-recreational purposes. 

Airport Council International–North 

America and the American Association 

of Airport Executives stated that ATC 

should only grant permission when 

there is a specific need to do so. The 

Center for Robot-Assisted Search and 

Rescue asked that public safety 

operators be exempt from the 

requirement to obtain ATC approval 

prior to operating in controlled airspace. 

The FAA does not agree with EmbryRiddle’s proposal to add a flight plan 

option in lieu of ATC approval. Filing 

a flight plan would not alert ATC in 

advance as to the nature of the 

operation, nor would it give them an 

opportunity to apply mitigations in a 

timely manner. The FAA also notes that 

the flight plan system is set up for pointto-point flights. Adapting it for small 

UAS operations would be a technology 

hurdle and would introduce 

unnecessary delay into the rule. 

Therefore, a flight plan is not a viable 

substitute for obtaining ATC 

permission. 

Additionally, ATC should not be 

placed in the position of validating the 

need of any specific operation. Any 

decision on allowing an operation 

within the appropriate ATC facility’s 

jurisdiction will take into account the 

workload of the controller. If it is 

anticipated the volume of traffic could 

change, the facility might require a 

means to terminate a small UAS 

operation in real-time, such as two-way 

radio or cell phone communication. 

The FAA also notes that this 

rulemaking does not apply to 

recreational small UAS operations that 

are conducted in accordance with 

section 336 of Public Law 112–95. 

Further, the FAA does not agree that 

public safety operators should be 

exempt from the requirement to obtain 

ATC approval prior to operating in 

controlled airspace. Although public 

safety operators may have time-critical 

aspects to their operations, the risks 

associated with flying in controlled 

airspace remain the same regardless of 

the type of operation. The requirement 

for ATC approval gives ATC the 

opportunity to prescribe mitigations to 

address any risks associated with 

operating in controlled airspace. The 

FAA notes that while a public entity has 

the option to operate under a public 

COA, it may gain an operational 

advantage by operating under part 107. 

However, in electing to operate under 

part 107, a public entity is required to 

operate wholly under the part, and its 

operation would therefore be considered 

a civil operation. 

Some commenters, including TTD 

and NAFI, expressed concern that the 

testing required by the proposed rule 

would not adequately prepare UAS 

operators to effectively communicate 

with ATC. The American Association of 

Airport Executives and the Associated 

General Contractors of America 

suggested that the FAA develop a 

protocol or guidance for UAS operators 

when communicating with ATC. NBAA 

asserted that if ATC requires two-way 

radio capability in their approval, the 

remote pilot should be required to hold 

at least a sport pilot airman certificate 

to ensure familiarity with ATC 

phraseology. 

Transport Canada asked whether FAA 

considered mandating that the UAS 

operator develop and adhere to 

procedures for loss of positive control 

that include communications with air 

traffic control. Similarly, CAPA said 

that the FAA should require procedures 

for operators of small UAS to notify the 

appropriate ATC agency when the UAS 

operator has lost positive control. 

This rule does not mandate a specific 

method of communication with ATC. In 

its evaluation of a request to fly in 

controlled airspace, an ATC facility may 

request two-way radio communications 

as a condition of approval for that 

request. ATC’s evaluation may include 

assessing the experience and ability of 

the remote pilot in using proper 

phraseology. Imposing a general sport 

pilot certificate requirement would not 

ensure the appropriate knowledge and 

skills because sport pilots are not 

permitted to operate in class B, C, or D 

airspace without an additional 

endorsement, and would not necessarily 

have the radio training or experience by 

virtue of holding a sport pilot certificate. 

Additionally, there are several means 

outside of an airman certificate that may 

provide proper ATC communication 

experience, such as airport ground 

personnel or air traffic controller 

training. 

The FAA has not mandated specific 

coordination with ATC for manned or 

unmanned aircraft during a loss-ofcontrol event. As described in the 


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109FAA Safety Team Course ALC–40: Aviate— 

Navigate—Communicate. 

110As it pertains to this discussion, Special Flight 

Rules Areas are areas of tightly constrained altitude 

and path where VFR aircraft can traverse Class B 

airspace without receiving a clearance or talking to 

ATC. 

introduction to the FAA Safety Team 

(FAAST) course ALC–40,109 a common 

rubric used by pilots is aviate, navigate, 

communicate. In other words, during an 

emergency, a pilot should maintain 

control of the aircraft, know where he or 

she is and where he or she intends to 

go, and let someone know his or her 

plans. To require a communication task 

during an emergency may distract a 

pilot from these priorities and possibly 

create additional risk. Proper flight 

planning by a remote pilot in command 

includes an assessment of the risk of 

violating regulatory airspace, and 

incorporation of mitigations and 

contingencies commensurate with that 

risk. 

Prioria Robotics said the FAA should 

consider blanket access to airspace 

below 500 feet for small and micro class 

unmanned vehicles of less than 15 

pounds, with exceptions for within one 

mile of airports. Prioria Robotics also 

recommended that only vehicles larger 

than 15 pounds be subject to airspace 

restriction. One individual stated that 

operations below 100 feet and farther 

than 3 miles from an airport in class B 

and C airspace should be allowed 

without ATC involvement. Similarly, 

the National Association of 

Broadcasters, the National Cable & 

Telecommunications Association, and 

the Radio Television Digital News 

Association, commenting jointly, 

suggested a sliding scale for operations 

that would require lower altitudes when 

closer to an airport for operations 

without ATC approval. DJI suggested 

that in lieu of restrictions in certain 

classes of airspace, the FAA should 

consider adopting an approach akin to 

the one that the agency has adopted in 

14 CFR part 77, in which maximum 

altitude increases as distance to an 

airport increases. 

The FAA disagrees with the 

assumption that the weight of an 

unmanned aircraft is the sole safety 

concern when operating in controlled 

airspace. The FAA designates the 

various classes of controlled airspace to 

allow ATC to provide separation 

services to instrument flight rules (IFR) 

and, in the case of class B and C 

airspace, VFR traffic. Controlled 

airspace surface areas have a high 

number of arriving and departing 

aircraft at altitudes below 500 feet and 

rely on ATC to assess and mitigate the 

associated risk. 

Trying to create a sliding scale that 

would require lower altitudes closer to 

an airport for operations without ATC 

approval would be complex because the 

slope would not be uniform. Instead, the 

slope would be shallower in the path of 

approach or departures, and steeper 

away from traffic flows. Each airspace 

has unique characteristics, and 

individual small UAS operations are 

different, making it impossible to 

establish a uniform standard. Allowing 

the local ATC facility to determine the 

feasibility of a small UAS operation is 

an efficient means to mitigate the risks 

involved in operating in controlled 

airspace. 

The Colorado Agricultural Aviation 

Association, the City of Phoenix 

Aviation Department, and PlaneSense 

and Cobalt Air, commenting jointly, 

suggested that a NOTAM be issued 

when small UAS are flying in class B, 

C, D, and E airspace. 

The FAA disagrees with this 

suggestion because, in many instances, 

a NOTAM would not provide any 

additional level of safety. For example, 

neither a very low altitude operation 

(e.g., below 50 feet), nor a flight that is 

shielded by a taller structure that would 

preclude manned aircraft from operating 

in that area, would benefit from a 

NOTAM. In both instances there is a 

low probability that manned aircraft 

will be present in those areas. The FAA 

has a responsibility to keep NOTAMs 

relevant to pilots, and NOTAMs that do 

not provide an additional level of safety 

may create information ‘‘clutter’’ during 

a preflight briefing. A facility may issue 

a NOTAM for the impacted timeframe 

after giving permission to a remote pilot 

to operate in controlled airspace, if 

appropriate. 

NOAA requested more details about 

requirements for civil UAS operated in 

the Mode C veil. In response, the FAA 

notes that operations conducted under 

part 107 do not need to comply with 

part 91 unless explicitly directed by part 

107. The transponder requirement in the 

mode C veil (14 CFR part 91.215(b)(2)) 

is not required of part 107 operations. 

NAFI asked what radio station license 

a small UAS operator would use on the 

aviation radio spectrum. In response, 

the FAA notes that licensing of radio 

stations is outside of its jurisdiction. 

The pertinent FCC guidance can be 

found in form 605 Schedule C (https:// 

transition.fcc.gov/Forms/Form605/

605c.pdf). 

Several commenters, including the 

American Association of Airport 

Executives, the Hillsborough County 

Aviation Authority, and the 

Metropolitan Airports Commission, 

suggested that the FAA require remote 

pilots wishing to operate in class B, C, 

D, or E airspace to also notify the 

appropriate airport operator. The City 

and County of Denver, Colorado, and 

the City of Phoenix Aviation 

Department added that UAS operators 

should be required to seek authorization 

from both ATC and the airport operator 

at least two full business days prior to 

small UAS operations in controlled 

airspace. 

An airport operator does not have 

responsibility for air traffic or activities 

outside airport property. The FAA has 

been tasked with integrating UAS 

operations into the NAS, and notes that 

manned aircraft do not have a 

corresponding requirement to notify 

airport management. The ATC facility is 

the proper focal point for approval and 

notification for small UAS operations in 

controlled airspace under this rule. 

The FAA does not agree that remote 

pilots must seek permission from an 

ATC facility at least two full business 

days prior to the small UAS operations. 

As discussed previously, the timeframe 

for ATC to process permission requests 

will vary based on the ATC facility, the 

airspace, and the small UAS operation. 

In some instances it may take less than 

two full business days to process a 

permission request and, as such, a 

requirement to submit the permission 

request two days in advance would be 

unnecessarily burdensome. 

The Professional Helicopter Pilots 

Association said operations in class B 

airspace should not be allowed without 

a transponder for operation above at 

least 200 feet AGL. 

Because part 107 operations are 

constrained to visual line of sight, they 

are confined to a limited area known to 

ATC. Requiring a transponder in class B 

airspace for all operations over a certain 

altitude would place a burden on the 

small UAS operation that might not 

provide any additional safety because 

all manned traffic (except under certain 

SFRA procedures) 110 is required to be 

in radio communication and under the 

direct control of ATC. ATC would deny 

a small UAS flight operating under part 

107 if lack of a transponder created an 

unacceptable risk for that operation. 

The Human Factors and Ergonomics 

Society expressed concern that UAS 

might inadvertently enter class B 

airspace. ALPA was concerned about 

the ability of a small UAS pilot/operator 

to correctly identify specific airspace 

areas and make the correct 

determination of whether operations are 

permitted or must be coordinated with 

ATC. 

This risk remains unchanged 

regardless of the restrictions imposed on 


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111 14 CFR 71.33. 112See 14 CFR 91.133. 

operating in class B airspace. Other than 

the inner surface areas, there are very 

few instances where the floor of class B 

airspace is less than 1,000 feet above 

ground level, and therefore a vertical 

intrusion would be rare. The lateral 

boundaries of Class B airspace can be 

easily ascertained and avoided with 

proper planning of the operation. 

Airspace configuration is a knowledge 

area that will be tested for remote pilot 

certification, and a remote pilot should 

be aware of proximity of the unmanned 

aircraft to more restrictive airspace. 

Remote pilot certificate holders will also 

be regularly tested on their knowledge 

of airspace configuration, either as part 

of their flight review (for part 61 pilot 

certificate holders) or when they take 

the recurrent knowledge test (for nonpart-61 certificate holders). In addition, 

applicants for a remote pilot certificate 

who do not hold a part 61 pilot 

certificate will be required to pass an 

initial aeronautical knowledge test that 

includes knowledge of airspace, 

airspace operating requirements, and 

the use of aeronautical charts. Pilots 

who hold a part 61 pilot certificate with 

an aircraft category and class rating will 

not have to take the initial aeronautical 

knowledge test, but they will have 

acquired the pertinent knowledge in 

order to obtain their part 61 pilot 

certificate. 

b. Operations in Class A Airspace 

The NPRM proposed prohibiting 

small UAS operations in Class A 

airspace. Class A airspace starts at 

18,000 feet mean sea level and extends 

up to 60,000 feet.111 This rule will not 

adopt the proposed prohibition because 

a small unmanned aircraft will be 

unable to access Class A airspace 

without violating the other operational 

restrictions of part 107. 

The Mid-Atlantic Aviation 

Partnership, Crew Systems, and three 

individual commenters questioned the 

need for specifically prohibiting 

operations in Class A airspace. One of 

the individual commenters did not have 

an objection to the proposed restriction, 

but stated that the other operational 

restrictions in the NPRM would make it 

impossible to operate in Class A 

airspace. Another individual commenter 

pointed out that the only location where 

an operation could meet all of the 

operational restrictions proposed in the 

NPRM and still be in Class A airspace 

is near the summit of Mt. McKinley. 

This commenter suggested that an 

explicit restriction on Class A airspace 

operations was unnecessary, as no one 

would bother to carry a small UAS up 

a mountain in order to fly it. 

The FAA agrees with the commenter 

who stated that other operational 

restrictions in the NPRM would make it 

impossible to operate in Class A 

airspace. Title 14 CFR 71.33(b) 

designating Class A airspace in Alaska 

specifically excludes the airspace less 

than 1,500 feet above the surface of the 

earth. This eliminates the possibility of 

a small UAS operating under part 107 

from reaching Class A airspace given the 

altitude limitations of the rule. 

Consequently, this rule will not adopt 

the proposed Class A airspace 

restriction. 

c. Prohibited or Restricted Areas 

The NPRM proposed prohibiting 

small UAS operations in prohibited and 

restricted areas without permission from 

the using or controlling agency, as 

applicable. Prohibited and restricted 

areas are designated in 14 CFR part 73. 

The proposed provision concerning 

prohibited and restricted areas was 

similar to the part 91 restriction on 

operations in these areas, and did not 

include any new UAS-specific 

prohibited or restricted areas.112 After 

careful consideration of the comments, 

the FAA will adopt the provisions as 

proposed. 

The FAA establishes prohibited and 

restricted areas when necessary to 

prohibit flight over an area on the 

surface in the interest of national 

security or welfare. As discussed in 

section III.J.2 of this preamble, several 

commenters requested that the FAA 

establish prohibited or restricted 

airspace over energy infrastructure 

facilities, citing national security 

concerns as the basis for their 

comments. However, four commenters 

also cited safety concerns when 

suggesting that the FAA establish such 

restrictions. 

Southern Company and Edison 

Electric Institute, individually and 

jointly with NRECA and APPA, 

explicitly cited safety reasons for 

restricting operations near energy 

infrastructure facilities. Edison Electric 

Institute raised concerns regarding UAS 

operations over critical energy 

infrastructure, including electric 

transmission and distribution facilities, 

power generation facilities, transmission 

lines, and substations. The commenter 

noted that the FAA currently has a TFR 

for manned aircraft over generation 

facilities, which the commenter said 

should be extended to cover UAS. The 

commenter argued that the FAA should 

extend the TFR to small UAS because of 

‘‘the obvious safety factor involved with 

any activity near high voltage 

equipment and the attendant economic 

loss that comes from the possible loss of 

electric distribution.’’ EEI also 

submitted a separate, joint comment 

with NRECA and the APPA, which 

reiterated the same concerns. 

Southern Company proposed that the 

FAA prohibit small UAS operations 

over power generation and transmission 

facilities, except by the utility or third 

parties acting on behalf of the utility. 

The commenter stated that the current 

NOTAM advising pilots to avoid 

overflight of power-generation facilities, 

including nuclear power plants, does 

not adequately address the potential risk 

small UAS pose. The commenter argued 

that, ‘‘[b]ecause of the small size, lowcost, great availability, and unmanned 

nature of small UAS, little deters smallUAS operators, as opposed to their 

manned aircraft counterparts, from 

operating over power generation and 

transmission facilities.’’ The commenter 

further argued that, although small UAS 

are capable of safe operation in close 

proximity to most structures, operation 

next to power generation and 

transmission facilities may be subject to 

invisible hazards, such as fire hazards 

caused by light and heat produced from 

an electric arc, that may be unfamiliar 

to non-utility operators. 

Consumers Energy Company and the 

American Fuel & Petrochemical 

Manufacturers also addressed the safety 

of energy infrastructure. Consumers 

Energy Company said the FAA should 

consider expressly identifying a zone of 

no small UAS operation within a 

specified distance from electrical 

facilities (substations, power lines, and 

utility poles), except for small UAS 

operations by the facilities’ owners. The 

commenter said that such a rule would 

reduce the likelihood of small UAS 

operations negatively affecting electrical 

facilities and continue to ensure the 

safety of the United States electric grid. 

The American Fuel & Petrochemical 

Manufacturers complained that the 

NPRM does not identify—much less 

address—issues of safety and security 

arising from certain scenarios that are a 

serious issue for its members, including 

an accidental crash into a facility, such 

as a refinery. The commenter expressed 

concern that the airspace and 

geographic limitations in the proposed 

rule are not sufficient to ensure the 

safety and security of critical 

infrastructure facilities, and therefore 

requested that the final rule prohibit the 

unauthorized use, or unauthorized 

operation, of a small UAS over all oil 

and gas production, handling, transport, 

and processing facilities. 


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113FDC 4/0811, June 18, 2007, at 2106. 

114See FAA Aeronautical Information Manual, 

para. 5–1–3. 

115See, e.g., https://www.notams.faa.gov/

dinsQueryWeb/ and http://www.faa.gov/pilots/flt_

plan/notams/. 

116 14 CFR 91.137(b). 

117 14 CFR 91.137(c). 

118 14 CFR 91.137(c)(2), (3), (5). 

119 14 CFR 91.141. 

120See 14 CFR 91.903, 91.905. 

121 DOD Policy Board on Federal Aviation 

comment at 5. 

EEI expressed concern that FDC 

NOTAM 4/0811 advising pilots to avoid 

the airspace over, or in proximity to, 

power plants would prevent electric 

utility companies from conducting 

small UAS flights around their own 

facilities. 

Restricted airspace is designated 

when the FAA determines it is 

necessary to confine or segregate 

activities hazardous to nonparticipating 

aircraft. The FAA does not create 

special use airspace applicable to only 

one particular airframe or aircraft type. 

The public’s right of free transit through 

the airspace includes the users of 

unmanned aircraft. Accordingly, the 

FAA declines commenters’ suggestions 

to create UAS-specific restricted 

airspace around certain facilities. 

However, the FAA acknowledges 

commenters’ concerns. In response to 

these concerns, the FAA emphasizes 

FDC NOTAM 4/0811, which states that 

‘‘. . . to the extent practicable, pilots are 

strongly advised to avoid the airspace 

above, or in proximity to such sites as 

power plants (nuclear, hydro-electric, or 

coal), dams, refineries, industrial 

complexes, military facilities and other 

similar facilities. Pilots should not circle 

as to loiter in the vicinity over these 

types of facilities.’’ 113 This NOTAM 

applies with equal force to pilots of 

manned and unmanned aircraft. In 

response to EEI’s concern, the FAA 

notes that FDC NOTAM 4/0811 is 

advisory and thus, does not constitute a 

regulatory prohibition. 

d. Areas Designated by Notice to 

Airmen 

The NPRM proposed to prohibit 

operation of small UAS in airspace 

restricted by NOTAMs, including 

NOTAMs issued to designate a TFR, 

unless authorized by ATC or a 

certificate of waiver or authorization. 

After reviewing comments on this issue, 

the FAA will change the method by 

which remote pilots may gain 

permission to operate in airspace 

restricted by NOTAMs. The final rule 

will require that small UAS operators 

comply with the provisions of §§ 91.137 

through 91.145, and § 99.7, as 

applicable. 

Southern Company commented that 

electric utility companies should be 

excepted from TFRs under 

§§ 91.137(a)(2) and (a)(3) to be able to 

expeditiously restore power during 

natural disasters. The Washington State 

Department of Transportation, Aviation 

Division, recommended that small UAS 

be allowed to operate in airspace 

restricted by NOTAMs, including TFRs, 

if the aircraft is equipped with positionreporting transmission capability, if 

two-way communication can be 

maintained between the operator and 

ATC, and if the appropriate level of 

permission to enter the airspace has 

been obtained. 

TFRs are implemented for a number 

of reasons, from protecting aircraft from 

hazards on the ground or other sightseeing aircraft, to providing a safe 

environment for the operation of 

disaster relief aircraft. The Washington 

State Department of Transportation, 

Aviation Division, did not describe how 

a UAS equipped with position-reporting 

transmission capability and two-way 

radio communication would allow for 

safe operation in a TFR. NOTAMs 

contain time-critical aeronautical 

information that is either temporary in 

nature or not sufficiently known in 

advance to permit publication on 

aeronautical charts or other 

publications.114 NOTAMs are available 

to the public on the FAA’s Web site.115

In response to Southern Company’s 

comment, the FAA notes that NOTAMs 

exist to address hazards in the restricted 

airspace, and allowing an aircraft to 

enter TFRs based only on its mission 

does not address the hazard that 

warranted the airspace restriction. 

However, these comments raise the 

question of whether the proposed rule 

needlessly conflicted with the NOTAM 

provisions in part 91. Part 91 contains 

various types of NOTAMs, and the 

requirements to gain permission differ 

accordingly. For example, § 91.137(b) 

requires an aircraft to be participating in 

hazard relief activities under the 

direction of the official in charge of onscene emergency response activities in 

order to operate within an area for 

which the specified NOTAM has been 

issued.116 Section 91.137(c) contains a 

number of conditions, at least one of 

which must be met in order to operate 

within an area for which the specified 

NOTAM has been issued.117 Conditions 

under § 91.137(c) include that the 

aircraft be carrying law enforcement or 

media personnel, or the aircraft is 

operating under an ATC-approved IFR 

flight plan.118 Conversely, a § 91.141 

TFR in the proximity of Presidential and 

other parties has no exceptions other 

than those stated in the NOTAM.119

These provisions conflict with the 

proposed language in the NPRM that 

would allow operations in airspace 

restricted by NOTAM with ATC or COA 

permission. In considering this issue, 

the FAA has identified no UAS-specific 

concerns that would require treating 

small UAS differently, for TFR 

purposes, than aircraft operating under 

part 91. Thus, the FAA has amended the 

language of § 107.47 to require 

compliance with §§ 91.137 through 

91.145 or § 99.7. 

Additionally, the FAA notes that part 

91 subpart J lists the provisions under 

part 91 that are waivable, and describes 

the process to request a waiver.120

Because small UAS remote pilots will 

be subject to the part 91 provisions 

described above, the waiver provisions 

and process described in part 91 subpart 

J will also apply should a remote pilot 

wish to seek a waiver from the 

applicable part 91 provisions. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) 

through its Policy Board on Federal 

Aviation (PBFA) submitted a comment 

on protecting certain military and 

Federal law enforcement facilities, 

recommending that ‘‘[t]he FAA 

Administrator classifies the airspace 

below 500 feet Above Ground Level 

(AGL) or within 2000 horizontal feet of 

a military installation (as defined in 10 

U.S.C. 2801(c)(4)), or any buildings, 

grounds or property owned, occupied or 

secured in whole or in part by any 

Federal law enforcement or national 

security agency, as ‘National Defense 

Airspace Area’ in accordance with 49 

U.S.C. 40103(b)(3).’’ 121 In their 

comments, the PBFA also requested that 

for small UAS operations within a 

military training route (MTR) or military 

operations area (MOA), that small UAS 

operators publish a NOTAM and notify 

the MTR/MOA scheduler at least 24 

hours in advance. 

The FAA implements the National 

Defense Airspace mentioned above as 

prohibited and restricted areas. These 

areas are created by rulemaking actions 

and charted on VFR and IFR charts. A 

prohibited area would prevent flight of 

all aircraft, manned and unmanned, 

including aircraft operated by the 

agency occupying the facility. In 

addition, a prohibited area is only 

established by the FAA over those areas 

demonstrating a need to prohibit all 

flight generally due only to national 

security concerns, a standard that is 

currently met by only eight areas in the 

United States. PBFA’s requested 


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122FAA Order 7400.2. 

123The official source regarding airport traffic 

patterns is the Airport/Facility Directory (A/FD). 

Instrument Approach Procedures are published by 

the FAA and can be found in U.S. Terminal 

Procedures Publications (TPPs), online from the 

FAA at https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/

aeronav/digital_products/dtpp/, or in numerous 

third-party sources. 

language would have the effect of 

expanding the number of areas 100-fold. 

A restricted area is also not 

appropriate because FAA Order 7400.2 

defines the purpose of a restricted area 

as ‘‘. . . necessary to confine or 

segregate activities considered 

hazardous to nonparticipating 

aircraft.’’ 122 Examples of hazardous 

activities in this context are live 

weapons fire, non-eye-safe lasers, and 

explosive demolition. The PBFA 

comment does not claim these facilities 

meet these criteria. 

The FAA also declines to impose 

additional NOTAM requirements on 

small UAS operations. The NOTAM 

system is used to alert pilots of 

conditions or situations in the NAS that 

could present a hazard to aircraft. 

Historically, the FAA has used a 

NOTAM requirement in the COAs it 

issued for UAS operations. This was 

appropriate because small UAS 

operations were outside the regulatory 

structure that was then in place, and, 

while not inherently hazardous, small 

UAS flights required exemption or 

waiver from a number of FAA 

regulations. Because these operations 

deviated from existing FAA regulations, 

a NOTAM was an acceptable means to 

notify pilots of the activity. However, 

with part 107, the FAA is bringing a 

subset of UAS operations within the 

FAA regulatory structure. Civil, public, 

and military pilots are expected to be 

familiar with regulations affecting their 

flight, including the possibility of 

encountering UAS activity below 400 

feet. Therefore, requiring a NOTAM 

would not be appropriate. 

UAS remote pilots must be aware of 

their location and operating 

environment in relation to MTRs and 

MOAs. As part of their see and avoid 

responsibilities, remote pilots must use 

extreme caution when operating 

through an MTR or MOA. Because of 

the high speed of some military aircraft, 

the necessary reaction time will be 

substantially less in an MTR or MOA. 

Checking the NOTAM system and/or 

the responsible Flight Service Station 

for activity in these areas will provide 

information to a remote pilot that will 

help ensure a safe flight. 

e. Operations in Class G Airspace 

The FAA did not include any 

discussion of airports in Class G 

airspace in the NPRM and it did not 

propose any regulatory text to restrict 

small UAS operations in the vicinity of 

airports in class G airspace. Class G 

airspace is considered uncontrolled and 

ATC does not have authority or 

responsibility for separation of traffic. 

For operations in the vicinity of nontowered airports located in class E 

surface areas, the remote pilot in 

command must obtain prior permission 

from Air Traffic Control. After further 

review, the FAA will include a 

provision in the final rule that prohibits 

any small unmanned aircraft operations 

that interfere with operations and traffic 

patterns at any airport, heliport, or 

seaplane base. 

Several commenters, including 

Trimble Navigation and NAMIC, 

supported allowing operations in class 

G airspace, without additional comment 

regarding operations in the vicinity of 

airports in class G. 

AOPA and GAMA recommended 

prohibiting small UAS operations 

within a minimal accepted horizontal 

distance from airports in Class G 

airspace, but they did not recommend a 

specific distance. NBAA suggested that 

FAA restrict operations within a 3-mile 

radius of airports in class G airspace. 

The Airline Pilots Association and 

Hillsborough County Aviation Authority 

recommended restricting operations 

within a 5-mile radius of airports. 

Several individual commenters also 

recommended a prohibition of small 

UAS in the vicinity of airports. 

The FAA agrees with commenters that 

supported the integration of small UAS 

operations with existing aeronautical 

operations in uncontrolled class G 

airspace because part 107 has specific 

risk mitigation and hazard reduction 

provisions that facilitate integration. 

First, small UAS pilots will be required 

to pass initial aeronautical knowledge 

testing before receiving a part 107 

airman certificate. This knowledge 

testing will include operations in class 

G airspace. With issuance of the remote 

pilot certificate, the pilot will have the 

authority and responsibility of a remote 

pilot in command. The remote pilot in 

command will also be directly 

responsible for, and will be the final 

authority as to the operation of the small 

unmanned aircraft system. Finally, the 

remote pilot in command will be 

required to ensure that the small 

unmanned aircraft will pose no undue 

hazard to other aircraft, people, or 

property in the event of a loss of control 

of the aircraft for any reason. 

The FAA acknowledges, however, 

that there is a risk associated with close 

operations between manned and 

unmanned aircraft. Therefore, this rule 

will include a performance-based 

approach to integrating small unmanned 

aircraft near airports, heliports, and 

seaplane bases. Because the NPRM did 

not contemplate prohibiting operations 

within the vicinity of an airport in class 

G airspace, the FAA will not restrict 

small UAS operations within a specified 

distance from an airport. Rather, in 

response to concerns regarding the 

integration of small UAS and manned 

aircraft, this rule will prohibit remote 

pilots from operating their small 

unmanned aircraft in a manner that 

interferes with operations and traffic 

patterns at airports, heliports, and 

seaplane bases. 

While a small unmanned aircraft must 

always yield right of way to a manned 

aircraft, a manned aircraft may alter its 

flight path or delay its landing or take 

off in order to avoid a small UAS that 

may present a potential conflict or 

otherwise affect the safe outcome of the 

flight. For example, an unmanned 

aircraft hovering 200 feet above a 

runway may cause a manned aircraft 

holding short of the runway to delay 

take off, or a manned aircraft on the 

downwind leg of the pattern to delay 

landing. While the unmanned aircraft in 

this scenario would not pose an 

immediate traffic conflict to the aircraft 

on the downwind leg of the traffic 

pattern or to the aircraft intending to 

takeoff, nor would it violate the right-ofway provision of § 107.37(a), the small 

unmanned aircraft would have 

interfered with operations and traffic 

patterns at an airport. 

In order to avoid interfering with 

operations in a traffic pattern, remote 

pilots should avoid operating in the 

traffic pattern or published approach 

corridors used by manned aircraft.123

When operational necessity requires the 

remote pilot to operate at an airport in 

uncontrolled airspace, the remote pilot 

should operate the small unmanned 

aircraft in such a way that the mannedaircraft pilot does not need to alter his 

or her flight path in the traffic pattern 

or on a published instrument approach 

in order to avoid a potential collision. 

Because remote pilots have an 

obligation to yield right of way to all 

other aircraft and avoid interfering in 

traffic pattern operations, the FAA 

expects that most remote pilots will 

avoid operating in the vicinity of 

airports because their aircraft generally 

do not require airport infrastructure, 

and the concentration of other aircraft 

increases in the vicinity of airports. 

The FAA adds this performance-based 

approach requirement in response to 

concerns that small UAS operations 


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124See 14 CFR 91.409. 

125See 14 CFR part 43, Appendix D (scope and 

detail of items as applicable to the particular 

aircraft) to be included in Annual and 100 hour 

inspections. Note: These items listed constitute 

inspection of the complete aircraft only and does 

not include interrelated system components and 

equipment. 

may present a hazard to manned aircraft 

operating at low altitudes in the vicinity 

of airports in both controlled and 

uncontrolled airspace. Due to the 

requirements for remote pilots to not 

operate in a careless or reckless manner 

and to yield the right of way to all other 

aircraft, the FAA does not consider it 

necessary to prohibit small UAS 

operations in the vicinity of an airport 

in uncontrolled airspace. Like 

ballooning, skydiving, banner towing, 

and other non-traditional aeronautical 

activities, the FAA expects that remote 

pilots will work with airport operators 

to identify ways to safely integrate small 

UAS operations into the flow of other 

operations at the airport. 

Experimental Aircraft Association, 

National Association of State Aviation 

Officials, Minneapolis-Saint Paul 

Metropolitan Airports Commission, US 

Hang Gliding & Paragliding Association, 

the Permanent Editorial Board of the 

Aviators Model Code of Conduct 

initiative, and several individual 

commenters said that FAA should 

require operators intending to fly small 

UAS within 5 statute miles of airports 

in Class G airspace to notify airport 

authorities in advance of the operations. 

These commenters said that such 

notification would allow airport 

authorities, in turn, to notify aircraft in 

proximity of the airport of the small 

UAS activity. City and County of 

Denver, Colorado and County of Los 

Angeles said that Airport Operators 

should be permitted to limit small UAS 

operations on and around airports. 

Airport operators have the proprietary 

right to operate their airport in a safe 

and efficient manner. Under 49 U.S.C. 

40103, the FAA has the sole authority 

to regulate airspace, including airspace 

overlying an airport. While airport 

operators have the ability to manage 

operations on the surface of the airport, 

airport operators may not regulate the 

use of airspace above and near the 

airport. In an effort to safely integrate 

small unmanned aircraft and manned 

aircraft at an airport, airport operators 

may recommend certain areas where 

small UAS operate, in order to avoid 

conflicts with manned aircraft. The FAA 

does not consider the notification of 

airport operators to significantly 

enhance the safety of integration with 

existing operations. The requirement for 

notification creates a burden on the 

airport operator with little benefit to 

users of the airport, because the airport 

operator would have no requirement to 

disseminate knowledge of small UAS 

operations to other airport users. 

Instead, remote pilots should adhere 

to operational recommendations and 

discontinue operations if the potential 

for interference arises. If the 

concentration of air traffic at an airport 

results in the likelihood of a small UAS 

interfering with operations, the remote 

pilot should avoid operating at that 

airport. Remote pilots who do not hold 

a part 61 pilot certificate will be 

required to pass initial and recurrent 

aeronautical knowledge tests that 

include specific knowledge of airport 

operations. Part 61 pilot certificate 

holders acquired this knowledge when 

they obtained their part 61 pilot 

certificate. 

6. Inspection, Maintenance, and 

Airworthiness Directives 

This section discusses the 

maintenance and inspection 

requirements applicable to a small UAS 

operation. Those requirements will 

consist of: (1) Conducting a preflight 

check prior to each flight to ensure that 

the small UAS is in a condition for safe 

operation; and (2) discontinuing flight if 

the small UAS ceases being in a 

condition for safe operation. 

Additionally, to mitigate risks 

associated with possible loss of positive 

control, this rule will also require the 

remote pilot in command to, as part of 

the preflight inspection, ensure that all 

control links between the control station 

and the small unmanned aircraft are 

working properly. Finally, this section 

will explain why this rule will not 

include airworthiness-directive 

requirements in part 107. 

a. Inspections and Maintenance 

As discussed in section III.J.3 of this 

preamble, pursuant to section 333(b)(2) 

of Public Law 112–95, the FAA has 

determined that a small UAS will not be 

required to obtain airworthiness 

certification if satisfying the provisions 

of part 107. However, without an 

airworthiness certification process, the 

FAA still needs to provide criteria for 

small UAS to meet that support safe 

operations. In considering how to 

address this issue, the FAA notes that 

existing regulations applicable to 

manned civil aircraft require particular 

U.S. airworthiness certificated aircraft to 

be inspected every 12 months.124

Maintenance that might be necessary as 

a result is governed primarily by the 

provisions of 14 CFR part 43. Part 43 

requires that the inspection examine 

every system and component of the 

aircraft in detail to identify present 

conditions that may render the aircraft 

as unairworthy.125 If the inspection 

reveals any hazardous characteristics 

that would render the aircraft as 

unairworthy, then maintenance, 

conducted pursuant to the regulations of 

part 43, must be performed in order to 

approve the return of an aircraft to an 

airworthy condition. 

In place of the requirements of part 

43, the NPRM proposed to create a 

maintenance and inspection framework 

that corresponds with the significantly 

reduced risk posed by small UAS 

operations conducted under part 107. 

First, the NPRM proposed to require, in 

§ 107.21, that the operator must 

maintain the small UAS in a condition 

for safe operation and inspect the small 

UAS prior to each flight to determine it 

is in a condition for safe operation. 

Second, the NPRM proposed to prohibit 

a person from operating a small UAS 

unless that UAS is in a condition for 

safe operation. Third, the NPRM 

proposed to require the operator to 

discontinue the flight of the small 

unmanned aircraft when he or she 

knows or has reason to know that 

continuing the flight would pose a 

hazard to other aircraft, people, or 

property. Finally, to reduce the 

possibility of a malfunctioning control 

link, the NPRM proposed to require 

that, prior to flight, the operator must 

ensure that all links between the control 

station and the small unmanned aircraft 

are functioning properly. 

For the reasons discussed below, this 

rule will require the remote pilot in 

command to check the small UAS to 

determine whether it is in a condition 

for safe operation. The remote pilot will 

be prohibited from commencing flight if 

the small UAS is not in a condition for 

safe operation. Additionally, the remote 

pilot in command will be required to 

discontinue the flight of the small 

unmanned aircraft if he or she knows or 

has reason to know that the small UAS 

is no longer in a condition for safe 

operation. This rule will also finalize as 

proposed the requirement that the 

remote pilot in command ensure, prior 

to flight, that all control links between 

the control station and the small 

unmanned aircraft are functioning 

properly. 

i. Preflight Check and Maintenance 

Requirements 

Most commenters, including Google, 

AOPA, the Property Drone Coalition 

and others, supported the proposed 

preflight inspection requirement. 

However, several commenters proposed 


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126The examples used in this preamble section 

are not intended to be exhaustive. 

changes to the requirement or requested 

clarification regarding what the 

inspection should entail. Two 

individual commenters expressed 

opposition to the preflight inspection 

requirement and suggested that the 

requirement is burdensome or 

unnecessary. One individual 

commented that it would be impractical 

to perform a meaningful inspection 

before every flight, since many UAS 

flights last only a few minutes each, and 

there is a need to minimize delay 

between flights. That commenter 

proposed instead that the FAA require 

only one thorough pre-flight inspection 

prior to the first flight of the day, and 

that the first flight of the day should be 

a test flight. Another individual 

commenter said a preflight inspection 

before every flight ‘‘could become a 

hassle and may be unnecessary,’’ and 

that a monthly inspection would be 

more suitable. 

This rule will require the remote pilot 

in command to conduct a preflight 

check prior to each flight to determine 

if the small UAS is in a condition for 

safe operation. An integral ground 

functional check as part of the preflight 

inspection will include a check of the 

associated data link equipment for 

proper operation. This is a check of the 

control link functionality between the 

ground control station and the small 

unmanned aircraft. If the preflight check 

reveals that the small UAS is not in a 

condition for safe operation or that the 

control link is not functioning properly, 

the remote pilot in command will be 

prohibited from commencing the flight 

operation until the small UAS is in a 

condition for safe operation and any and 

all control link deficiencies have been 

corrected. 

To satisfy preflight check 

requirements, the remote pilot in 

command must check the entire 

unmanned aircraft and associated 

system components and equipment for 

visible defects such as broken or 

damaged parts, loose fasteners or wires, 

leaking fluids, and general wear and 

tear.126 The remote pilot in command is 

responsible for making a condition for 

safe operation determination of the 

small UAS. A complete inspection of 

the aircraft and associated system 

equipment will include a functional 

ground check as a test to verify all 

control link systems are properly 

responding to control inputs and are 

otherwise functioning properly. The 

systems and equipment that could be 

checked in this manner could, 

depending on the complexity of the 

small UAS, include the engine, flight 

controls, landing gear, internal/external 

payload, link checks, ground control 

station, signal flow, auxiliary equipment 

rack, video dissemination, power 

requirements, and software 

configuration management. It is highly 

recommended that the remote pilot in 

command augment a complete small 

UAS preflight check by following 

manufacturer-suggested inspections and 

checks prior to conducting flight 

operations. The FAA will also issue 

guidance providing additional examples 

and best practices for how to properly 

conduct a preflight check to ensure that 

the small UAS is in a condition for safe 

operation. 

The FAA notes commenters’ concern 

that a mandatory check conducted prior 

to flight could be burdensome. 

However, the FAA anticipates that 

through repetition, the efficiency of the 

preflight check sequence will increase 

resulting in no more than a few minutes 

to complete the preflight check if the 

pertinent systems are functioning 

properly. As such, the FAA declines to 

remove the preflight-check requirement, 

as this check will serve to detect and 

mitigate the risks imposed by defects 

such as inoperative or deteriorating 

small UAS systems and components 

that may render adverse flight 

characteristics. Additionally, recurring 

checks will serve to identify equipment 

deficiencies that have occurred since 

the previous preflight inspection. 

An individual commenter suggested 

that a test-flight is necessary because 

certain components and systems, such 

as avionics and control systems, cannot 

be tested on the ground. In response, the 

FAA notes that many of the systems that 

are tested through a test-flight cannot 

currently be tested without introducing 

additional risk into the operation. For 

example, flight termination (e.g. ‘‘return 

to home’’) and fail-safe systems are 

designed to trigger when the control 

link between the small unmanned 

aircraft and the control station is lost. In 

order to do a flight test of these systems, 

the remote pilot in command may need 

to deliberately sever the control link 

between the small unmanned aircraft 

and the control station during a test 

flight to see how the unmanned aircraft 

responds. A deliberate loss of positive 

control may introduce unnecessary risk 

to safe flight operation in the NAS. In 

addition, requiring flight testing prior to 

each flight would also impose an 

additional burden on the remote pilot in 

command in the form of time and power 

consumption. Accordingly, this rule 

will not impose a flight testing 

requirement. 

DronSystems stated that a preflight 

inspection is unnecessary, asserting that 

a remote pilot could safely forego a 

preflight inspection by instead using 

‘‘sophisticated asset management tools’’ 

or ‘‘UAS self-diagnostic’’ equipment. 

The FAA is aware of no data showing 

that technology currently exists that 

could result in an equivalent level of 

safety to that attained by a visual and 

operational inspection conducted by the 

remote pilot in command. Visual and 

operational checks prior to each flight 

will serve as a vital safety practice 

essential for ensuring that the aircraft, 

control station, unmanned aircraft, and 

related integral systems are in a 

condition that will enable safe 

operation. 

A number of commenters expressed 

concern that the proposed maintenance 

and inspection requirements were not 

stringent enough. ALPA and several 

individual commenters asserted that a 

preflight inspection conducted by the 

remote pilot is insufficient to ensure 

safe operation, as it would be conducted 

in the absence of defined criteria on 

which the owner/operator can base a 

decision about airworthiness. ALPA 

further stated that in the absence of 

airworthiness certification requirements 

combined with tamper-proof equipage 

that limits the vertical and lateral 

movement of unmanned aircraft, there 

is no way to ensure that a small UAS is 

safe and reliable. 

Several commenters suggested that 

more formal maintenance and 

inspection requirements should be 

imposed on manufacturers and 

operators. The NextGen Air 

Transportation Program at NC State 

University said ‘‘some statement of 

airworthiness from the manufacturer, a 

certified inspector, or system provider 

with a date evaluation should be a 

minimum requirement.’’ The 

commenter also said that the aircraft 

should be tested for airworthiness every 

2 years. The State of Nevada, the 

Nevada Institute for Autonomous 

System, and the Nevada FAAdesignated UAS Test Site, commenting 

jointly, asserted that a preflight 

inspection ‘‘clearly does not infer than 

an aircraft is airworthy,’’ and said 

minimal standards should include lost 

link procedures and altitude 

determination. Other commenters 

similarly said small UAS should be 

required to have specific safety systems 

and protections. An individual 

commenter, who said self-certification 

establishes an unsafe precedent, said 

that UAS should be required to have 

redundant backup systems in place. 

That commenter said a standard 

airworthiness certificate may be 


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unnecessary for small UAS, and instead 

recommended an experimental-type 

certification, which would ensure an 

airworthiness review and reduce the 

excessive burden on manufacturers. 

An individual commenter said that 

allowing the operator to conduct a 

preflight inspection to certify 

airworthiness ‘‘is a mistake.’’ The 

commenter pointed out that for manned 

aircraft almost all of the equipment has 

to be periodically certified by an 

approved testing lab to ensure that it is 

still at manufacturer-issued standards. 

Without a similar requirement for small 

UAS, the commenter continued, the 

aircraft could have a modified airframe 

or propulsion system, the electric 

motors or batteries could be 

deteriorating, and the payload carrying 

capacity could be altered, among other 

concerns. Another individual 

commenter opposed allowing operators 

with no presumed specialized 

knowledge to make key safety 

determinations, and recommended the 

FAA conduct further cost-benefit 

analysis, ‘‘with a specific focus on the 

magnitude of potential damage that 

might be inflicted by errantly operated 

small UAVs.’’ 

The FAA notes commenters’ concern 

with regard to airworthiness but 

disagrees with the position that the 

maintenance and inspection 

requirements proposed in the NPRM 

need to be made more prescriptive in 

this rule. The proposed requirements 

are appropriate to the type of risk posed 

by small UAS operating under part 107. 

Specifically, as discussed throughout 

this preamble, small unmanned aircraft 

operating under part 107 will: (1) Weigh 

less than 55 pounds; (2) not carry any 

people onboard; and (3) operate within 

visual line of sight and other operational 

parameters that mitigate risk to other 

aircraft operating in the NAS, people, 

and property on the ground. Thus, a 

small unmanned aircraft operating 

under part 107 has been determined to 

pose a significantly lower risk than a 

manned aircraft that weighs hundreds 

or thousands of pounds and carries one 

or more people onboard that may be 

injured in the event of a mishap. 

Consequently, imposing a more 

prescriptive level of maintenance and 

inspection requirements on small UAS 

operating under part 107 is not justified 

in this rule. 

Completion of a preflight inspection 

of the small UAS prior to each flight 

will serve to mitigate risk in a manner 

appropriate for the risk posed by the 

small UAS operation. While this rule 

will not require small UAS to comply 

with part 43, the FAA encourages the 

use of certificated maintenance 

providers, which may include repair 

stations, holders of mechanic and 

repairman certificates, and persons 

working under the supervision of these 

mechanics and repairmen. 

Recommendation for the use of 

certificated maintenance providers is 

predicated on their heightened 

maintenance and inspection capabilities 

that may lend support to sustained 

conditions for safe operation of small 

UAS. Additionally, as discussed earlier, 

the FAA will publish guidance 

providing additional examples and best 

practices for how to ensure that a small 

UAS remains in a condition for safe 

operation. 

Several commenters, including 

NAAA, Reabe Spraying Service, and the 

University of North Dakota’s John D. 

Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences 

urged the FAA to include a requirement 

that remote pilots keep maintenance 

records. NAAA stated that it disagrees 

‘‘with the agency’s approach to abandon 

the aviation industry’s longstanding 

requirement of proper recordkeeping 

and inspections in favor of 

accommodation for a new NAS 

entrant.’’ The University of North 

Dakota’s John D. Odegard School of 

Aerospace Sciences asserted that a 

review of the aircraft’s maintenance 

history is necessary for a remote pilot to 

determine that the aircraft is in a safe 

condition for flight and that all 

manufacturer-suggested inspections, if 

any, are complied with. The commenter 

specifically recommended that, at a 

minimum, remote pilots be required to 

keep a permanent record of: (1) 

Component changes or replacements 

caused by inflight abnormalities; (2) 

command and control link frequency 

changes; (3) ground control station and 

aircraft software changes; and (4) 

airframe configuration changes which 

may affect the handling and 

performance characteristics of the 

aircraft. 

The Kansas State University UAS 

Program said the lack of required 

maintenance documentation will cause 

significant challenges in determining 

the causal factors associated with small 

UAS accidents that are investigated by 

the FAA and NTSB. The commenter 

recommended that the records 

requirement in § 43.9 be applied to 

small UAS, with any necessary 

alterations ‘‘to ensure the traceability of 

maintenance and approval of the aircraft 

for return to service.’’ 

The Washington State Department of 

Transportation, Aviation Division said 

documentation of maintenance should 

be required for small UAS operated over 

large assemblies of people, such as 

professional sporting events, large 

concerts, and ‘‘similar environments 

where a safe landing area is likely 

unavailable.’’ NetMoby suggested that 

operators should be required to log the 

results of each preflight inspection for 

inspection by the FAA if needed. 

Under Executive Order 12866, the 

FAA may ‘‘adopt a regulation only upon 

a reasoned determination that the 

benefits of the intended regulation 

justify its costs.’’ Imposing maintenance 

or preflight-check recordkeeping 

requirements, such as the ones 

suggested by the commenters, would 

likely result in a significant cost because 

the remote pilot in command would 

have to create new paperwork every 

time that he or she conducts a preflight 

check, or every time that any type of 

maintenance is conducted on the small 

UAS. At this time, the FAA does not 

have data to determine whether the 

safety benefits of additional 

documentation would be sufficient to 

justify this burden, especially in light of 

the significant safety mitigations already 

provided by the other provisions of part 

107. Accordingly, at this time, the FAA 

declines to impose the suggested 

documentation requirements on small 

UAS operated under this rule. 

Boeing asked the FAA to provide a 

definition for the phrase ‘‘safe 

operation.’’ In the context of preflight 

check and maintenance requirements, 

the FAA has concluded that ‘‘safe 

operation’’ pertains to mechanical 

reliability, and is predicated on overall 

condition of the entire unmanned 

aircraft and integral system equipment 

relative to wear and deterioration. 

Determinations made of the overall 

condition of the small UAS includes an 

evaluation based on the make, model, 

age, type and completeness of continued 

maintenance and inspections of the 

aircraft and associated system 

equipment making up the entire UAS. 

Some examples of characteristics that 

may render a small UAS not in a 

condition for safe operation are: (1) 

Unsecure, damaged airframe structures 

affecting flight characteristics; (2) 

damaged primary flight control surfaces 

affecting flight control characteristics; 

(3) inoperative, intermittent propulsion 

system components; (4) inoperative, 

intermittent flight controls; (5) data link 

equipment failures, e.g., control outputs 

from ground control station not 

matching control inputs to aircraft flight 

controls; and (6) damaged or distorted 

propeller blades. 

The Permanent Editorial Board of the 

Aviators Model Code of Conduct 

Initiative stated that the rule should be 

expanded to require certain operational 

checks, such as hover-checks for 

multirotors and rotorcraft, arguing that 


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127The sufficient-power requirements of this rule 

are discussed in section III.E.7.c of this preamble. 

such checks serve an important safety 

purpose. 

There is a wide variety of small UAS 

and many of them use different systems 

that are constructed and function in 

different ways. As such, the specific 

tasks necessary to check whether safetyrelevant components are functioning 

properly will vary between different 

small UAS. This rule will require the 

remote pilot in command to check at a 

minimum the control link and available 

power to complete the intended 

flight.127 However, beyond control link 

there may be many other systems and 

equipment, depending on the 

complexity of the small UAS, that may 

be necessary for safety of flight. The 

remote pilot in command will have to 

check those systems to ensure that they 

are functioning properly, but the 

specific tasks necessary to conduct these 

checks will be determined by the remote 

pilot so long as the tasks enable him or 

her to reasonably ascertain whether the 

pertinent systems are functioning 

properly. 

Several commenters, including 

Transport Canada, Skycatch, the Kansas 

State University UAS Program, and 

Prioria Robotics, stated that the FAA 

should require that remote pilots 

employ OEM-provided checklists and 

manuals when carrying out preflight 

inspections. The Small UAV Coalition 

suggested the FAA consider adopting its 

standard phrase from its section 333 

exemptions that the remote pilot ‘‘must 

follow the UAS manufacturer’s 

maintenance, overhaul, replacement, 

inspection, and life limit requirements 

for the aircraft and aircraft 

components.’’ The Professional 

Helicopter Pilots Association suggested 

that UAS manufacturers be required to 

provide ‘‘airworthiness’’ checklists. 

PHPA added that in the absence of a list 

of requirements, the criteria for a 

preflight inspection become subjective. 

ALPA also recommended that 

manufacturers be required to define 

parameters for maintenance and 

inspection. Similarly, Transport Canada 

asked whether consideration has been 

given to requiring the UAS operator to 

either adhere to the manufacturer’s 

maintenance instructions and schedule 

or, in the alternative, develop and 

adhere to his or her own maintenance 

schedule. 

DJI noted that it already provides its 

clients with significant information on 

how to inspect and maintain DJI’s small 

UAS. Several other commenters 

addressed the use of manufacturerdeveloped minimum maintenance 

standards. NAAA noted that the FAA 

has not set standards for what 

manufacturer’s instructions for UAS are 

to contain, and recommended that 

manufacturers make a manual available 

for approval by the FAA. A few 

individual commenters also said 

manufacturers should provide an 

operational manual, which they said 

should also contain a maintenance 

schedule. 

The FAA agrees with commenters that 

manufacturer-developed manuals, 

checklists, and instructions can provide 

excellent guidance about how to 

maintain a small UAS in a condition for 

safe operation. As such, the FAA 

recommends that the remote pilot in 

command familiarize him or herself 

with this material and strongly consider 

using the approach specified in the 

manufacturer’s materials. However, the 

manufacturer-recommended approach 

may not be the only way to keep a small 

UAS in a condition for safe operation. 

As such, this rule will simply require 

that the small UAS must be in a 

condition for safe operation. The 

specific method by which the small 

UAS achieves this state will be 

determined by its owner and the remote 

pilot in command; this could be the 

method recommended by the 

manufacturer or in accordance with a 

developed maintenance and inspection 

program that may encompass and 

exceed the manufacturer’s program. The 

remote pilot in command and/or small 

UAS owner may also follow the best 

practices outlined in the guidance 

provided by the FAA. 

The FAA acknowledges the concern 

raised by commenters that some 

manufacturer manuals may not provide 

sufficient guidance for the remote pilot 

in command to properly inspect the 

small UAS. However, this rule will not 

require the remote pilot in command to 

comply with the manufacturer’s manual 

as part of the preflight check. If the 

manufacturer’s manual provides 

sufficient guidance and the remote pilot 

in command determines that this 

guidance is the best way to conduct the 

preflight check, the remote pilot can 

conduct the check according to the 

manufacturer’s instructions. If the 

manual is deficient or the remote pilot 

in command determines that a different 

method of conducting the preflight 

check is more appropriate, the remote 

pilot in command will assume the 

responsibility of making that decision as 

well. 

The FAA notes that, as discussed in 

section III.F.2.j of this preamble, in 

order to obtain a remote pilot certificate, 

an applicant will have to demonstrate 

that, among other things, he or she has 

acquired knowledge about how to 

maintain and inspect a small UAS. 

Thus, the remote pilot in command will 

have the knowledge needed to select the 

best method by which to conduct a 

preflight check of the small UAS to 

ensure that it is in a condition for safe 

operation and the control link is 

functioning properly. 

Several commenters suggested that 

the FAA should develop—or encourage 

the development of—universal 

inspection and maintenance criteria to 

be used by remote pilots when 

conducting preflight inspections, or 

maintaining their aircraft. For example, 

the Nevada Institute for Autonomous 

Systems suggested that a preflight 

inspection would be insufficient to 

ensure safety in the absence of 

‘‘minimum maintenance standards.’’ 

Predesa stated that the FAA should 

consider publishing its own general 

guidelines on preflight inspections, 

including recordkeeping guidelines to 

track ‘‘major modular replacements of 

small UAS equipment.’’ The Associated 

General Contractors of America asked 

the FAA to provide more guidance on 

‘‘the scope and nature’’ of the required 

preflight inspections. Specifically, the 

commenter questioned: (1) Whether the 

time and effort the agency expects an 

operator to devote to preflight 

assessments depends on the size or 

nature of the aircraft, or the scope, 

complexity or other specifics of the 

operation; (2) to what extent the agency 

will defer to an operator’s exercise of his 

or her judgment; (3) if an operator 

performs a manufacturer-recommended 

preflight inspection, whether the FAA 

will defer to those recommendations; 

and (4) whether the FAA will defer to 

any more specific industry standards 

and whether the agency will go so far as 

to encourage the development of such 

standards. 

The State of Nevada, the Nevada 

Institute for Autonomous Systems, and 

the Nevada FAA-designated UAS Test 

Site, commenting jointly, recommended 

that minimum maintenance standards 

be developed with the help of the future 

FAA UAS Center of Excellence and the 

UAS Test Sites. ASTM International 

pointed out that it has developed 

approved standards for Maintenance 

and Continued Airworthiness of Small 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (F2909). 

Predesa said that remote pilots should 

consider applying the Academy of 

Model Aeronautics National Model 

Aircraft Safety Code’s ‘‘good general 

safety practices’’ pre-flight checks. 

Similarly, an individual commenter 

suggested that the small UAS should be 

maintained using standards developed 


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and approved by a recognized standards 

development organization. 

The FAA agrees that guidelines 

concerning the preflight check would 

assist the remote pilot in command with 

complying with this requirement. As 

discussed earlier, the FAA plans to 

issue guidance containing best practices 

for determining whether a small UAS is 

in a condition for safe operation. 

Separately from FAA guidance, other 

supporting industry guidance also exists 

that could be utilized by the remote 

pilot in command. The FAA notes the 

availability of ASTM standards such as 

practices for maintenance and 

continued airworthiness of small UAS, 

as well as AMA’s standards, as 

additional guidance that may be utilized 

by the remote pilot in command. The 

FAA also encourages interested 

stakeholders to develop additional 

guidance if they feel that it may provide 

further assistance to the remote pilot in 

command. 

With regard to the time and effort 

needed to conduct the preflight check, 

the FAA notes that this will vary 

depending on the size and complexity 

of the aircraft and the types of 

components used in the small UAS. 

Larger and complex UAS that have more 

components will likely take longer to 

check than simple micro UAS with few 

components. However, as discussed 

earlier, the FAA does not anticipate that 

an experienced remote pilot in 

command will need more than a few 

minutes to conduct the preflight check 

(assuming the preflight check does not 

reveal any adverse characteristics that 

render the small UAS not in a condition 

for safe operation). Repetition of the 

preflight inspection and checks will 

enhance the remote pilot’s skill and 

efficiency in completing this 

requirement. 

An individual commenter said the 

FAA should delete proposed 

§ 107.21(a), which requires an operator 

to maintain the small UAS in a 

condition for safe operation, because 

aircraft maintenance should be the 

responsibility of the registered owner, 

and not all operators are the registered 

owners of the vehicles they operate. 

Proposed § 107.21(a) would have 

required that the small UAS must be 

maintained in a condition for safe 

operation while § 107.15(a) would have 

prohibited the operation of a small UAS 

unless it is in a condition for safe 

operation. The FAA agrees that 

proposed § 107.21(a) is duplicative with 

§ 107.15(a) and as such, § 107.21(a) has 

been removed from this rule. For ease of 

readability the FAA has also moved the 

regulatory text of proposed § 107.21(b), 

which requires a preflight check to 

determine whether the small UAS was 

in a condition for safe operation, into 

§ 107.15(a). 

ii. Discontinuing Flight 

A small UAS that appears to be in a 

condition for safe operation during the 

preflight check may become unsafe for 

operation during flight. For example, 

the small unmanned aircraft could 

sustain damage or partial loss of 

propulsion during flight rendering that 

aircraft unsafe for continuing the flight. 

As such, the NPRM proposed to require 

the operator to discontinue the flight of 

the small unmanned aircraft when he or 

she knows or has reason to know that 

continuing the flight would pose a 

hazard to other aircraft, people, or 

property. For the reasons discussed 

below, this rule will revise the proposed 

provision to require the remote pilot in 

command to discontinue flight if he or 

she knows or has reason to know that 

the small UAS is no longer in a 

condition for safe operation. 

Several organizations, including DJI, 

Predesa, State Farm and the Small UAV 

Coalition, supported the provision as 

proposed. On the other hand, the 

University of North Dakota’s John D. 

Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences 

and an individual commenter suggested 

that the term ‘‘hazard’’ in this context 

should be qualified as it is in 

§ 107.19(b), which uses the phrase 

‘‘undue hazard.’’ These commenters 

suggested that § 107.15(b) should be 

amended for consistency, in part, to 

read ‘‘. . . pose an undue hazard to 

other aircraft, people, or property.’’ 

(Emphasis added). 

The FAA agrees with the University 

of North Dakota and the individual 

commenter that the term ‘‘hazard’’ in 

proposed § 107.15(b) is inconsistent 

with the standard of ‘‘undue hazard’’ in 

§ 107.19. In considering how to address 

this issue, the FAA noted that 

§ 107.15(b) is intended to address 

instances in which a small UAS that is 

in a condition for safe operation during 

the preflight check ceases being in a 

condition for safe operation after flight 

commences. Accordingly, the FAA has 

amended § 107.15(b) to reflect the fact 

that the pertinent standard is ‘‘condition 

for safe operation’’ and not ‘‘hazard.’’ 

AIA suggested that the FAA should 

define the timing of the discontinuation 

of flight if the small UAS ceases being 

in a condition for safe operation. AIA 

suggested that the requirement should 

be to terminate flight ‘‘as soon as 

practicable.’’ In response, the FAA notes 

that, if a small UAS should cease being 

in a condition for safe operation during 

flight, the remote pilot in command 

must immediately discontinue the flight 

by landing the small unmanned aircraft 

at the first available location where the 

landing can be conducted safely. 

iii. Control Link Check 

Several commenters specifically 

addressed the proposed requirement to 

ensure that all links between the control 

station and the small unmanned aircraft 

are working properly. DJI and 

Qualcomm supported the proposed 

requirement, without further comment. 

ALPA also supported the proposed 

requirement, but then recommended an 

additional requirement to verify the 

usable range of the transmitter in the 

control station before a flight. Transport 

Canada questioned whether the FAA 

has considered requiring the UAS 

operator to check for radio interference 

during the preflight inspection. The 

NextGen Air Transportation Program at 

NC State University argued that the 

proposed requirement should include 

‘‘something about spectrum 

management/approvals.’’ 

This rule will require the remote pilot 

in command to ensure that all links 

between the control station and the 

small unmanned aircraft are working 

properly. This can be done simply by 

inputting specific commands into the 

control station and seeing whether the 

small unmanned aircraft carries out the 

pertinent command. The FAA 

acknowledges the concerns raised by 

ALPA but the suggested requirements 

would not be appropriate for all small 

UAS operations. Specifically, in order to 

verify the usable range of the controlstation transmitter, the remote pilot in 

command would likely need to fly the 

small unmanned aircraft to the limits of 

the radio signal to determine the point 

at which the signal begins to degrade. 

Flying a small unmanned aircraft to the 

point that the control link begins to 

degrade may pose a heightened risk of 

loss of positive control, and as such, the 

FAA will not require the remote pilot in 

command to conduct this type of testing 

in this rule. 

With regard to radio interference and 

spectrum management, the FAA notes 

that the requirement for a preflight 

control link check is performance-based 

and already addresses radio interference 

and spectrum issues. Specifically, under 

§ 107.49(c), a small unmanned aircraft 

may not be operated in the NAS if the 

control link between the ground control 

station and the small unmanned aircraft 

is not working properly. If radio 

interference or a spectrum issue results 

in a control link working improperly, 

the small UAS operation will be 

prohibited from commencing until the 

issue has been resolved and the control 

link is once again working properly. 


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b. Airworthiness Directives 

The NPRM also proposed to require 

that small UAS comply with all 

applicable airworthiness directives. For 

the reasons discussed below, the FAA 

will not finalize this proposed 

requirement in the final rule. 

A number of commenters objected to 

the proposed airworthiness-directives 

requirement. Aviation Management and 

two individual commenters stated that 

the proposed requirement should be 

removed because part 107 does not 

contain any airworthiness certification 

standards. Similarly, Boeing asked for 

clarification as to what an operator 

would be required to comply with, since 

there are no specific airworthiness 

requirements. 

The FAA agrees with commenters that 

an airworthiness-directive framework 

may, at this time, not be suitable for part 

107 small UAS because of the lack of 

airworthiness certification requirements 

in part 107. Accordingly, this rule will 

not finalize the proposed airworthinessdirective requirement. However, the 

FAA notes that it is not precluded from 

taking appropriate action to address 

unsafe conditions that may be identified 

in small UAS subject to part 107. Any 

such actions would be conducted in 

accordance with the Administrative 

Procedure Act. 

7. Additional Operating Provisions 

a. Careless or Reckless Operation 

Current FAA regulations (codified in 

14 CFR 91.13(a)) prohibit a person from 

operating an aircraft in a careless or 

reckless manner so as to endanger the 

life or property of another. The NPRM 

proposed to apply similar regulations in 

§ 107.23 to ensure that a small UAS is 

not operated in a hazardous manner. For 

the reasons discussed below, the FAA 

will finalize this provision as proposed 

in the NPRM. 

One commenter stated that § 107.23 

must have the same force and effect as 

14 CFR 91.13. Two commenters said 

that ‘‘careless and reckless’’ is a vague 

and subjective standard, with one 

stating that it is unenforceable unless 

the FAA describes concretely what 

constitutes careless or reckless behavior. 

Section 107.23(a) will prohibit a 

person from operating a small UAS in 

a careless or reckless manner so as to 

endanger the life or property of another. 

This provision is derived from a similar 

prohibition on careless/reckless conduct 

that currently exists for manned aircraft 

in § 91.13(a), and as such, the FAA 

expects that these two provisions will 

have similar effects. 

The determination of whether 

conduct is careless or reckless is made 

on a case-by-case basis through NTSB 

caselaw. The FAA has issued guidance 

(FAA Order 8900.1, vol. 14, ch. 3, sec. 

5) summarizing the pertinent caselaw, 

which provides illustrative examples of 

conduct that is considered to be careless 

or reckless. 

One commenter suggested that the 

FAA should permit local law 

enforcement authorities to enforce the 

prohibition against careless or reckless 

operations. In response, the FAA notes 

that, as discussed in section III.I of this 

preamble, the FAA cannot delegate its 

formal enforcement functions. 

One commenter asked the FAA to 

clarify what evidence would be used to 

prove that a remote pilot operated in a 

careless or reckless manner. Another 

commenter suggested that a flight data 

recorder be required to facilitate the 

enforcement of the prohibition against 

careless or reckless operations. 

A flight data recorder requirement 

would add cost, complexity, and weight 

to small unmanned aircraft without a 

corresponding incremental safety 

benefit. The FAA notes that 

enforcement of violations will be similar 

to enforcement conducted for part 91 

operations: In addition to conducting 

routine surveillance of part 107 

operations, the FAA will act on reports 

of violations to conduct further 

investigations. The FAA relies on many 

sources to further investigate 

complaints, such as accounts from 

witnesses, video, and reports from 

Federal, State, and local law 

enforcement agencies. 

b. Drug and Alcohol Prohibition 

As proposed in the NPRM, this rule 

will require the remote pilot in 

command, the person manipulating the 

flight controls of a small UAS, and the 

visual observer to comply with the drug 

and alcohol provisions of 14 CFR 91.17 

and § 91.19. Section 91.19 prohibits 

knowingly carrying narcotic drugs, 

marijuana, and depressant or stimulant 

drugs or substances in civil aircraft 

unless authorized to do so by a Federal 

or State statute or government agency. 

Additionally, § 91.17 prohibits a person 

from acting as a crewmember of a civil 

aircraft: (1) Within 8 hours after the 

consumption of any alcoholic beverage; 

(2) while under the influence of alcohol 

or any drug that affects the person’s 

faculties in any way contrary to safety; 

or (3) while having an alcohol 

concentration of 0.04 or greater in a 

blood or breath specimen. Under 

§ 91.17, a remote pilot in command, the 

person manipulating the flight controls 

of a small UAS (if that person is not the 

remote pilot in command), and the 

visual observer must submit to testing to 

determine alcohol concentration in the 

blood if there is a suspected violation of 

law or § 91.17. These tests must be 

submitted to the FAA if the FAA has a 

reasonable basis to believe that the 

person violated § 91.17. 

The Small UAV Coalition, the 

Aviation Division of Washington State 

Department of Transportation, and three 

individuals generally supported the 

provisions related to drugs and alcohol. 

One commenter asserted that the FAA 

proposed no requirement about the 

condition of the operator, such as illness 

or impairment by drugs or alcohol, and 

that small UAS remote pilots should be 

required to self-certify that they are in 

a condition that enables them to safely 

operate a small UAS. 

The FAA clarifies that this rule does 

not allow operation of a small UAS if 

the remote pilot in command, visual 

observer, or the person manipulating the 

flight controls of a small UAS is unable 

to safely operate the small UAS due to 

drug or alcohol impairment. As 

discussed previously, this rule will, 

among other things, require these 

people to comply with the provisions of 

§ 91.17. 

With regard to non-drug or alcohol 

impairment, such as an illness, the FAA 

notes that, as discussed in section 

III.F.2.c of this preamble, a person may 

not act as a remote pilot in command or 

visual observer or manipulate the flight 

controls of a small UAS if he or she 

knows or has reason to know that he or 

she has a physical or mental condition 

that would interfere with the safe 

operation of a small UAS. It is also not 

necessary to require a self-certification 

statement prior to every small UAS 

flight because this requirement is not 

imposed on manned-aircraft operations 

by the drug and alcohol provisions of 

§§ 91.17 and 91.19. 

Cherokee Nation Technologies 

commented that over-the-counter 

medications could impair the ability to 

safely operate a small UAS. The FAA 

agrees with this comment and notes that 

over-the-counter medications are 

addressed by the provisions of this rule. 

Specifically, § 91.17(a)(3) prohibits the 

use of any drug that affects the person’s 

faculties in any way contrary to safety. 

The University of North Dakota’s John 

D. Odegard School of Aerospace 

Sciences commented that the contents 

of §§ 91.17 and 91.19, which are crossreferenced in proposed part 107, should 

be included in their entirety in 

proposed part 107 to enable ease of 

reading and understanding the 

regulations. However, duplicating the 

entire regulatory text of §§ 91.17 and 

91.19 in part 107 is unnecessary in this 

case. FAA regulations, such as §§ 91.17 


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and 91.19, may be changed by future 

rulemakings or statutory changes, and 

cross-referencing regulatory sections in 

part 107 will minimize inconsistencies 

between part 107 and any subsequent 

amendments made to §§ 91.17 or 91.19. 

Additionally, cross-referencing 

regulatory sections allows the FAA to 

avoid duplicative regulatory text in its 

regulations. 

Two commenters expressed concerns 

about the potential use of small UAS for 

drug-smuggling and other illicit acts. 

The Institute of Makers of Explosives 

asked that the FAA specify penalties for 

the use of small UAS in committing 

illicit acts, including those involving 

drugs and alcohol. One commenter 

stated that any remote pilot should lose 

his or her privileges under part 107 if 

found to be operating while in a 

condition that does not permit safe 

operation of the small UAS. Another 

commenter suggested that remote pilot 

certificates should be denied, 

suspended or revoked for committing an 

act prohibited by 14 CFR 91.17 or 

§ 91.19. 

The FAA emphasizes that, in addition 

to the requirements of § 91.17 discussed 

above, this rule will also require 

compliance with § 91.19, which 

prohibits the knowing transportation of 

illegal drugs unless authorized by a 

Federal or State statute or government 

agency. If a person violates § 91.17 or 

§ 91.19, the FAA can take enforcement 

action, which can result in the 

imposition of civil penalties or 

suspension or revocation of that 

person’s airman certificate. People who 

engage in illegal conduct involving 

drugs may also be subject to criminal 

prosecution under Federal or State law. 

c. Sufficient Power for the Small UAS 

For the reasons discussed below, this 

rule will amend the proposed 

requirement that, prior to flight, the 

remote pilot must ensure that the small 

UAS has sufficient power to operate for 

its intended operational time and an 

additional five minutes. After further 

consideration, the FAA retains the 

requirement that the small UAS has 

enough power to operate for its 

intended operational time, but has 

eliminated the additional five-minute 

requirement. 

Several commenters, including DJI, 

ALPA, and Qualcomm, supported the 

FAA’s proposal. On the other hand, the 

Kansas State University UAS Program, 

Center for Robot-Assisted Search and 

Rescue, Consumers Energy Company 

and an individual generally noted that 

some UAS have very short battery lives. 

One commenter asserted that some 

small UAS have only five minutes of 

total available flight time. Commenters 

suggested that a small UAS should 

simply be required to have enough 

available power to operate for its 

intended time and then land safely, 

which could require significantly less 

than five minutes of total power. 

The FAA concurs with commenters 

who suggested that a small UAS should 

be required to have enough available 

power to operate for its intended 

operational time and then land safely. 

As discussed in section III.E.3.a of this 

preamble, small UAS operations 

conducted under this rule will operate 

in a confined area of operation. As a 

result of this confined area, the 

prohibition of operations over people, 

and due to the defined weight of the 

small unmanned aircraft, small UAS 

operations conducted under part 107 

will generally pose a low risk as 

compared to manned aircraft. As such, 

a requirement for an additional five 

minutes of power is unnecessary. The 

FAA acknowledges that some small 

unmanned aircraft flights may be 

conducted for very short durations at 

very low altitudes, and the need for a 

larger battery to provide an additional 

five-minute power reserve may 

significantly limit those operations 

without a corresponding safety benefit. 

Several commenters suggested 

different approaches other than the 

requirement for five minutes of 

additional power. Embry-Riddle and 

several individual commenters 

generally noted that different small UAS 

have differing amounts of power and 

flight time available. These commenters 

suggested that a requirement that is 

based on a 10% reserve of power would 

better accommodate small UAS of 

differing design, equipment, and 

performance standards. The Center for 

Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue 

suggested that the reserve power 

requirement be based on the distance 

needed for the aircraft to return to the 

remote pilot. An individual commenter 

noted that gas powered aircraft may 

need a longer fuel reserve, such as 10 to 

15 minutes, to allow for extended 

emergency flights. 

The FAA notes that remote pilots are 

required under this section to ensure 

that the small UAS has enough power 

to operate for its intended operational 

time. The intended operational time 

includes all power requirements for the 

entire flight, including take off and a 

controlled landing. While the final rule 

does not prescribe a specific amount of 

reserve power, the FAA notes that a 

remote pilot must take into 

consideration the type of operation 

being conducted. The remote pilot must 

ensure that sufficient power is available 

to complete the intended flight, or 

terminate the flight early if the remote 

pilot has reason to believe that the 

power remaining is insufficient to 

continue flight. A remote pilot who fails 

to properly plan for sufficient power 

may also be in violation of §§ 107.15, 

107.23, and 107.49, particularly if 

insufficient power results in loss of 

positive control of the small unmanned 

aircraft. 

The reserve power requirement does 

not need to be based on the distance 

needed for the small unmanned aircraft 

to return to the remote pilot because 

small unmanned aircraft flight can be 

terminated through a controlled safe 

landing; the aircraft does not necessarily 

need to return to its point of origin. A 

percentage-of-power requirement would 

also be unduly burdensome, as it would 

require UAS with greater total power 

capacity to hold a larger power reserve 

than a UAS with a lesser power 

capacity. 

DJI, ALPA and QUALCOMM 

suggested that the FAA require 

equipment that would accurately 

display how much battery life remains 

to the remote pilot. In response, the 

FAA emphasizes that this rule does not 

prohibit remote pilots from using the 

type of equipment suggested by the 

commenters. However, while equipage 

may be one way to measure battery life, 

it is not the only way to measure 

remaining battery life. For example, 

prior to flight, a remote pilot could 

determine the total amount of time that 

a battery can provide power before it 

needs to be recharged. Then, during 

flight, the remote pilot could simply use 

a watch to determine how much energy 

is left in the battery. Accordingly, 

mandating specific equipage displaying 

how much battery life is left in the small 

UAS is not necessary in this rule. 

F. Remote Pilot Certificate 

As discussed in section III.E.1 of this 

preamble, this rule will create a new 

small-UAS-specific airman certificate 

called a remote pilot certificate with a 

small UAS rating. A person will be 

required to obtain this airman certificate 

prior to acting as a remote pilot in 

command. This rule will also require 

any person manipulating the flight 

controls of a small UAS to obtain a 

remote pilot certificate with a small 

UAS rating unless: (1) That person is 

under the direct supervision of a remote 

pilot in command; and (2) the remote 

pilot in command has the ability to 

immediately take direct control of the 

flight of the small unmanned aircraft. 

For the reasons discussed in section 

III.E.1 of this preamble, a UAS-specific 

airman certificate is preferable in this 


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128Because the temporary certificates will be 

issued electronically, the FAA will be unable to 

issue them to applicants who did not apply through 

electronic means. 

rule to one of the existing part 61 pilot 

certificates because the process for 

obtaining the remote pilot certificate 

will focus on UAS-specific areas of 

knowledge that are typically not 

included in the requirements associated 

with current part 61 pilot certificates. 

1. Use of UAS Experience To Apply for 

Part 61 Pilot Certificate 

In the NPRM, the FAA emphasized its 

desire to maintain a distinction between 

a remote pilot certificate and the airman 

certificates issued under parts 61, 63, 

and 65. As such, the NPRM proposed 

§ 61.8, which would prohibit UAS 

activities conducted under this rule 

from being used to meet part 61 

requirements. Under proposed § 61.8, 

activities would include any training, 

certification, or flights associated with 

small UAS under part 107. The FAA did 

not receive any adverse comments on 

this aspect of the proposed rule, and as 

such, this rule will finalize § 61.8 as 

proposed. 

2. Remote Pilot Certificate Eligibility 

and Issuance 

The NPRM proposed establishing 

eligibility requirements for a part 107 

airman certificate and specifying when 

a certificate would be issued. The 

NPRM proposed that an applicant must 

be: (1) At least 17 years of age; (2) able 

to read, speak, write and understand the 

English language; and (3) vetted by the 

Transportation Security Administration. 

Additionally, the NPRM proposed that 

the applicant must pass an initial 

aeronautical knowledge test and selfcertify, at the time of application, that 

he or she does not have a medical 

condition that could interfere with the 

safe operation of a small UAS. 

As discussed in more detail below, 

the process for issuance of a remote 

pilot certificate will be as follows. First, 

an applicant will have to take and pass 

an initial aeronautical knowledge test. 

After taking the knowledge test, the 

applicant will be provided with an 

airman knowledge test report showing 

his or her test results. If the applicant 

passed the test, the applicant will then 

fill out an application for a remote pilot 

certificate using either the FAA’s 

electronic application process (referred 

to as the Integrated Airman Certification 

and Rating Application (IACRA) system) 

or a paper application. The FAA will 

then forward the applicant’s 

information to the TSA for security 

vetting to determine whether the 

applicant poses a security risk. Once 

TSA notifies the FAA that the applicant 

does not pose a security risk the FAA 

will issue an electronic temporary 

remote pilot certificate to an applicant 

who applied through the IACRA 

system.128 This temporary certificate 

(valid for 120 days after receipt) will be 

issued within 10 business days after 

receipt of an electronic application, and 

it will allow the applicant to exercise all 

the privileges of a remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating. 

Once all other FAA-internal processing 

is complete, the FAA will issue the 

applicant a permanent remote pilot 

certificate. 

Holders of a part 61 pilot certificate 

other than student pilot who have 

completed a flight review within the 

previous 24 months will have the option 

of a different certification process. 

These pilot certificate holders will be 

allowed to substitute completion of an 

online training course for the small UAS 

aeronautical knowledge test. Upon 

completion of the training course, the 

part 61 pilot certificate holder will then 

go to one of the following authorized 

portals: An FAA Flight Standards 

District Office (FSDO), a designated 

pilot examiner (DPE), an airman 

certification representative (ACR) for a 

pilot school, or a certificated flight 

instructor (CFI). The certificate holder 

will provide his or her remote pilot 

certificate application and supporting 

documentation to that portal to verify 

the applicant’s identity, fill out the 

pertinent portion of the application, and 

then forward the completed application 

to the FAA Airman Certification 

Registry. Because a part 61 pilot 

certificate holder has already been 

vetted by TSA, he or she will be issued 

a temporary remote pilot certificate with 

a small UAS rating, valid for 120 days, 

immediately upon the FAA’s receipt of 

the completed application via IACRA. 

Once all other processing is complete, 

the FAA will issue a permanent remote 

pilot certificate. 

The FAA emphasizes that part 61 

pilot certificate holders are not required 

to use the process discussed in the 

previous paragraph and can instead 

apply for a remote pilot certificate by 

taking the small UAS initial 

aeronautical knowledge test. Part 61 

pilot certificate holders who pass the 

knowledge test will not be required to 

submit their application to a FSDO, 

DPE, ACR, or CFI. Instead these 

certificate holders may submit their 

applications via IACRA. Because these 

certificate holders have already been 

vetted by TSA, they will be issued a 

temporary remote pilot certificate, valid 

for 120 days, upon FAA’s receipt of 

their application via IACRA regardless 

of the method they use to qualify for the 

certificate (i.e. knowledge test or online 

training course). 

a. Minimum Age 

The NPRM proposed that a person 

must be at least 17 years of age to be 

eligible for a remote pilot airman 

certificate with a small UAS rating. This 

minimum age would be consistent with 

existing FAA minimum age 

requirements for the sport pilot, 

recreational pilot, and private pilot 

airman certificates with an airplane or 

rotorcraft rating. The FAA also invited 

comment on whether to adopt a 

minimum age of 16 years, which would 

be consistent with existing FAA 

minimum age requirements for the sport 

pilot and private pilot airman 

certificates with a glider or balloon 

rating. After review of the comments, 

the FAA adopts a minimum age of 16 

for a person to be eligible for a remote 

pilot certificate with a small UAS rating. 

Fourteen commenters, including the 

Small UAV Coalition, AUVSI, and 

NAMIC, all agreed that the proposed 

minimum age of 17 generally strikes an 

appropriate balance between safety and 

operational viability for low risk small 

UAS operations, ensuring that baseline 

safety is enhanced without unduly 

burdening low risk small UAS operators 

or their operations. These commenters 

argued that the NPRM’s proposal is 

consistent with the requirements for 

other pilot certificates and, at this time, 

there is a lack of data and evidence to 

support lowering the age to 16. The 

commenters added that although 

persons under the age of 17 are already 

allowed to operate model aircraft, it is 

unclear if there is a strong need for 

allowing younger remote pilots to 

operate non-hobby and non-recreational 

small UAS. 

University of North Dakota’s John D. 

Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences 

added that 16-year-old student pilots are 

accompanied or monitored by an 

instructor, whereas, a small UAS 

operator would effectively be 

unmonitored. Federal Airways & 

Airspace also agreed with limiting the 

certification age to 17 years old, and 

pointed out that the National Institute of 

Mental Health has stated on their Web 

site that the rate of death by any injury 

of those aged 15 to 19 years old is six 

times higher than that for individuals 

aged 10 to 14 years old. Federal Airways 

& Airspace also mentioned that studies 

have shown that the human brain does 

not reach maturity until the early 20s, 

and the CDC states that those aged 16 to 

19 are almost three times more likely 


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129See 14 CFR 61.103(a). 

130See 14 CFR 61.83(b). 131 14 CFR 61.103(b) and § 61.305(a)(1). 

than 20-year-olds to be in a fatal motor 

vehicle accident. 

Several commenters recommended 

raising the minimum age above 17. 

Commenters including the General 

Aviation Manufacturers Association 

(GAMA), Textron Systems, and Aerius 

Flight, recommended an 18-year-old 

eligibility requirement for small UAS 

operators, because it aligns with existing 

airman certification standards for other 

commercial flight operations. One 

commenter asserted that 18 is the 

appropriate age for an operator 

certificate because it is the age at which 

an individual is an adult and able to 

enter into legally binding contracts. The 

Air Line Pilots Association and 

Transportation Trades Department, 

AFL–CIO said small UAS operators 

should hold a commercial pilot 

certificate, and should therefore be a 

minimum of 18 years old. Several 

commenters recommended the 

minimum age requirement be raised 

even higher, to 21 or 25 years old. 

Conversely, 36 commenters, including 

NBAA, AIA, and the Kansas Farm 

Bureau, argued that the minimum age 

should be lowered to 16. One 

commenter asserted that: (1) Flying a 

manned aircraft is considerably more 

complex than operating a small UAS; 

and (2) a small UAS has no people on 

board who would be injured in the 

event of an accident. Many other 

individuals argued that because of all 

the operating constraints contemplated 

by the NPRM, a 16-year-old should be 

able to safely operate a small UAS 

without exposing anyone to undue risk. 

Nine commenters asserted that a 

minimum age of 16 would also align 

with current requirements for glider and 

balloon pilots. One commenter argued 

that the NPRM does not provide any 

justification to support why the operator 

of a small UAS must be older than a 

sport pilot, recreational pilot, or private 

pilot airman with a glider rating,129 or 

a student pilot of a glider.130 NBAA 

stated its belief that a lesser risk exists 

for small UAS operations conducted 

within the confines of the rule when 

compared to glider and balloon 

operations conducted within controlled 

airspace. 

One of the commenters from the 

Center for Information & Research on 

Civic Learning and Engagement 

(CIRCLE) argued that the minimum age 

should be dropped to 16. The 

commenter conducted research that it 

claimed supports the proposition that 

16-year-olds have the same capacity for 

sophistication as 21-year-olds. Although 

the research is geared towards younger 

individuals voting in local elections, not 

operating aircraft, the commenter 

believed that it makes a general 

statement about the intellectual capacity 

of minors at the age of 16. 

Prioria Robotics argued that the FAA 

should allow an apprenticeship-like 

certificate to be held by those younger 

than 18. Others argued that the 

minimum age for independent operation 

of a small UAS should be 16. One 

individual suggested that if the operator 

is under the age of 16, he or she should 

be required to be accompanied by a 

qualified operator who is over the age of 

18. 

The Washington State Department of 

Transportation, Aviation Division 

suggested that, with regard to minimum 

age, in many cases the maturity level 

difference of an operator between ages 

16 and 18 may be imperceptible. This 

commenter suggested lowering the 

minimum age to 16 would rule out the 

likelihood of willful underage violation 

and provide a legal path forward for 

younger operators. The commenter also 

pointed out that in many states a 

driver’s permit can be obtained at age 15 

and driver’s license at age 16. 

The Kansas Farm Bureau also argued 

that the added year available for 

academic use, education, and 

experience are positives for future UAS 

operators. DJI similarly noted that a 

lower age limit could increase academic 

use of small UAS because more high 

school age students could be operators. 

Also, commenters argued that a high age 

limit would inhibit curiosity and 

innovation among younger people who 

are exploring the capabilities of UAS. 

The Colorado Cattlemen’s Association 

did not object to the proposed minimum 

age requirement, but noted potential 

value in reducing the minimum age to 

16 years old. The commenter noted that, 

while this approach would be a slight 

deviation from the current age 

requirement for non-commercial airman 

certificates, it would be consistent with 

the recognized lower risk associated 

with small UAS operations. The 

commenter also noted it would 

accommodate UAS operations for those 

beef producers who run family 

operations, many of which include 

older teenagers. 

The FAA agrees that a certain level of 

maturity is required to operate any 

aircraft responsibly in the NAS. The 

FAA originally proposed a minimum 

age of 17 because it is consistent with 

existing FAA minimum age 

requirements for the sport pilot, 

recreational pilot, and private pilot 

airman certificates with an airplane or 

rotorcraft rating—the base-level 

certificates authorizing pilots to operate 

these two categories of aircraft while not 

under the supervision of an instructor. 

However, the FAA does not use a 

minimum age of 17 for all part 61 pilot 

certificates. As noted in the NPRM and 

by the commenters, the proposed 

minimum age of 17 is not consistent 

with existing FAA minimum age 

eligibility requirements for sport and 

private pilot airman certificates with a 

glider or balloon rating. 

After further consideration, the FAA 

has determined that the risk posed by a 

small UAS operation is comparable to 

the risk posed by a glider or balloon 

operation. Balloon and glider operations 

generally take place during daytime 

visual meteorological conditions and are 

limited to a relatively confined 

geographical area. Balloon and glider 

aircraft also tend to be lighter and 

slower-moving aircraft, limiting the 

harm to people and property on the 

ground in the event of a mishap. 

Similarly, small UAS operations do not 

take place at night or in instrument 

meteorological conditions, and are 

operated in a limited geographical area 

as necessary for the remote pilot to 

maintain visual line of sight. Analysis of 

safety data for balloon and glider 

operations suggests that there is no 

significant difference in accident rates 

for 16-year-old pilots compared to 17- or 

18-year-old pilots. Because the risk of a 

part 107 small UAS operation is 

comparable to the risk of a balloon or 

glider operation and because the 

minimum age for glider and balloon 

operations is 16,131 the FAA will lower 

the minimum age in this rule to 16 years 

old. 

The FAA also notes that a minimum 

age of 16 is consistent with its current 

practice of allowing airmen conducting 

a small UAS operation under a section 

333 exemption to hold a sport or private 

pilot certificate with a glider or balloon 

rating. Although the FAA does not track 

the age of persons operating small 

unmanned aircraft under section 333 

exemption grants, the agency is not 

aware of any specific safety concerns 

associated with 16-year-old private 

pilots or sport pilots operating small 

UAS. The FAA notes that lowering the 

minimum age to 16 will also enable 

additional small UAS agricultural 

operations, such as those described by 

the Colorado Cattlemen’s Association. 

Several commenters, including AIA, 

the Virginia Commonwealth University 

Honors Students, and the New Jersey 

Institute of Technology suggested that 

the minimum age should be no greater 

than 16. As noted in AIA comments, 


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132http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/

license_laws.html 

133Section III.C.4 of this preamble contains 

further discussion of model aircraft operations. 

AIA and others believe that a driver’s 

license issued from within the U.S. 

should be considered as a prerequisite 

for a remote pilot certificate. The 

commenters recommended mimicking 

the process to obtain a driver’s license, 

in which a person first obtains a 

learner’s permit and then, following 

months of training and test-taking, 

obtains a license. This would enable 16- 

year-olds (depending on their State of 

residence) to obtain a certificate. 

According to the commenters, 

maintaining currency of the driver’s 

license would also imply certain motor 

skills, vision, and a minimal level of 

medical fitness to operate UAS. 

Several individual commenters said 

the minimum age should be lowered 

even further to 14 years old. The 

commenters pointed out that 14-yearolds are capable of having certain afterschool jobs, and are allowed to operate 

a glider or balloon as a student pilot. 

Event 38 Unmanned Systems said that 

it sees no logical reason for a minimum 

age requirement, and that anyone who 

can pass the operator test should be 

allowed to fly a UAS. Two other 

commenters also said there should be 

no minimum age requirement. 

The FAA disagrees with commenters 

who suggest that the minimum age be 

less than 16 because age 16 is the 

youngest age at which a person can be 

certificated to operate an aircraft 

independently in the NAS. Because a 

remote pilot certificate allows people to 

operate their small UAS independently, 

it is critical that those people possess 

the maturity necessary to operate in a 

safe manner. The FAA also disagrees 

with commenters who provided the 

example of a driver’s license and a 

learner’s permit as a justification for 

lowering the minimum age below 16. In 

most states, the driving privileges of 

people under the age of 16 are 

significantly limited compared to the 

privileges granted at age 18. According 

to the Governors Highway Safety 

Association, most states do not permit 

full driving privileges until 17 or 18 

years of age. These privileges include 

high-risk situations such as the ability to 

drive unsupervised at night or with a 

certain number of passengers.132

The FAA also notes that driving a car 

does not use the same skills as operating 

a small UAS. For example, in order to 

successfully drive a car, drivers have to 

learn skills, such as parallel parking and 

making three-point turns, which have 

no applicability to small UAS 

operations. Requiring a U.S. driver’s 

license as a prerequisite to obtaining a 

remote pilot certificate would impose 

the cost of acquiring those skills on 

people who do not currently possess a 

driver’s license without a corresponding 

safety benefit. Accordingly, this rule 

will not require remote pilot certificate 

applicants to hold a driver’s license. 

In response to commenters who 

recommended a lower minimum age to 

enable academic uses, or the suggestion 

for an apprenticeship-like certificate for 

those under 18 years of age, the FAA 

notes that this is unnecessary because 

this rule allows an uncertificated person 

to manipulate the controls of a small 

UAS, provided that: (1) They are under 

the direct supervision of a certificated 

remote pilot in command; and (2) the 

remote pilot in command is capable of 

taking over controls at any time during 

the flight. The FAA also notes that, 

depending on the purpose of the 

operation, small UAS operations 

conducted by community groups and 

non-profit organizations may be 

considered recreation or hobby 

operations, which are not regulated 

under part 107 if conducted in 

accordance with Public Law 112–95, 

section 336.133

The Agricultural Technology 

Alliance, Illinois Farm Bureau, and 

GROWMARK suggested that the FAA 

treat age eligibility to operate a small 

UAS in the same manner as the 

operation of farm equipment—i.e., 

allowing individual State labor laws to 

control. Though it did not explicitly 

advocate for the use of State labor laws 

to determine eligibility, Predesa pointed 

out that child labor laws would apply to 

minors participating in commercial 

operations. The commenter 

recommended the FAA consider 

mandating an adult visual observer to 

assist a minor with an operator 

certificate when operating a small UAS 

for commercial purposes. The 

commenter also recommended that the 

FAA consider mandating an adult visual 

observer to assist a minor with an 

operator certificate when operating a 

small UAS for education in a private 

program for fee, in a university setting, 

or in a public school system. 

The FAA does not agree with the 

recommendation to adopt State labor 

laws to set the minimum age 

requirement. State laws are not uniform, 

and this could result in a patchwork of 

regulations that would apply uneven 

requirements depending on one’s State 

of residence. The FAA also notes that 

not all operations conducted under part 

107 will be commercial. For example, as 

discussed in section III.C.4 of this 

preamble, recreational small UAS 

operations that do not meet all of the 

criteria specified in Public Law 112–95, 

section 336 will be conducted under 

part 107. 

The FAA disagrees with Predessa’s 

suggestion that an adult visual observer 

should be mandated in order to assist a 

minor with a remote pilot certificate (i.e. 

someone between 16 and 18 years of 

age) when operating a small UAS. As 

discussed previously, the FAA currently 

allows 16-year-old pilots to operate, 

without supervision, glider and balloon 

manned aircraft and small UAS (under 

a section 333 exemption). The FAA has 

not observed an adverse effect on safety 

as a result of the pilot in those 

operations being 16 rather than 18 years 

old. Thus, while the FAA agrees that a 

visual observer enhances safety by 

providing additional situational 

awareness to the remote pilot, it is not 

necessary to mandate a visual observer 

based on the age of the remote pilot 

certificate holder or the type of 

operation being conducted. 

Accordingly, the FAA has amended 

proposed § 107.61(a) to lower the 

minimum age to be eligible for a remote 

pilot certificate with a small UAS rating 

to 16 years old. The FAA notes, 

however, that an academic institution is 

permitted to establish its own (more 

restrictive) policies and procedures for 

operational small UAS training, which 

may include requiring the presence of 

adult visual observers for students who 

are younger than 18. 

b. English Language Proficiency 

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to 

require that applicants for a part 107 

airman certificate be able to read, speak, 

and understand the English language. 

These proposed English-language 

requirements would be consistent with 

all other airman certificates issued by 

the FAA, as well as the international 

standard for aircraft operations accepted 

by ICAO. However, the FAA also 

proposed an exception for people who 

are unable to meet one of the Englishlanguage requirements due to medical 

reasons. Such a person would be 

eligible for a certificate, but the FAA 

would be able to specify limitations on 

the certificate to account for that 

person’s medical condition. 

Five commenters expressed support 

for requiring airman-certificate 

applicants to be able to read, speak, and 

understand the English language. There 

were no comments opposing this aspect 

of the proposal. Accordingly, this rule 

will require that applicants for an 

airman certificate be able to read, speak, 

and understand the English language. 


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134See, e.g., 14 CFR 61.83(c). 135 14 CFR 61.23(a). 

136See https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/

policyinformation/pubs/hf/pl11028/chapter4.cfm 

(stating that 87% of the population holds a driver’s 

license). 

Three commenters opposed the 

proposed exception to the Englishlanguage requirements. One of these 

commenters stated that there should be 

no exceptions to the English-language 

requirement, while another commenter 

stated that there should be no exception 

for persons whose medical reasons 

would preclude them from effectively 

communicating procedures or reading 

flight logs. A third commenter stated 

that a person who cannot speak English 

should not be permitted to operate 

anywhere near people on the ground 

because that person would be unable to 

communicate safety-relevant 

information to people in the vicinity of 

the operation. 

Limiting the exception for the 

English-language requirements of this 

rule would impose a needless burden on 

airman-certificate applicants who have a 

medical condition. Specifically, if an 

applicant cannot read, speak, or 

understand the English language, the 

proposed exception would allow the 

FAA to impose restrictions on that 

applicant’s certificate ensuring that the 

person’s English-language inability does 

not adversely affect safety. For example, 

if an applicant is unable to 

communicate using speech, then the 

FAA may restrict that applicant’s 

certificate to operations where speech is 

not necessary for the safe operation of 

a small UAS. 

Restrictions issued under this 

provision will be specific to each 

applicant, and as such, the FAA cannot 

make the categorical statements 

suggested by the commenters as to what 

will or will not be permitted for 

applicants with a specific Englishlanguage inability. The FAA notes that 

its English-language regulations for 

other airman certificates have a similar 

exception for applicants who have a 

medical issue,134 and the FAA has not 

observed any adverse safety effects from 

having this exception in the regulations. 

Accordingly, this final rule will retain 

the proposed exception for people who 

are unable to meet one of the English 

language requirements due to a medical 

condition. 14 CFR 107.61(b). However, 

the FAA emphasizes that, as with other 

airmen, it may specify limitations on a 

person’s airman certificate to ensure 

that the person’s medical condition does 

not endanger the safety of the NAS. 

c. No Airman Medical Certificate 

Required 

For the reasons discussed below, this 

rule will not require an airman medical 

certificate but will prohibit a person 

from manipulating the flight controls of 

a small UAS or acting as a remote pilot 

in command or visual observer if he or 

she knows or has reason to know that 

he or she has a physical or mental 

condition that would interfere with the 

safe operation of a small UAS. 

The FAA received approximately 115 

comments from organizations and 

individuals on this subject. Several 

commenters stated than an airman 

medical certificate is not necessary to 

operate a UAS. Other commenters 

suggested adding a requirement for an 

airman medical certificate. 

The FAA disagrees that a medical 

certificate should be required in this 

rule. With certain exceptions, the FAA 

currently requires an airman medical 

certificate for exercising the privileges 

of a student pilot certificate, a 

recreational pilot certificate, a private 

pilot certificate, a commercial pilot 

certificate, and an airline transport pilot 

certificate.135 The primary reason for 

medical certification is to determine if 

the airman has a medical condition that 

is likely to manifest as subtle or sudden 

incapacitation that could cause a pilot 

to lose control of the aircraft, or impair 

the pilot’s ability to ‘‘see and avoid.’’ 

Small UAS operations present a lower 

risk than manned operations to manned 

aircraft and non-participating people on 

the ground, especially because the 

operations do not involve any human 

beings onboard the aircraft who could 

be injured in the event of an accident. 

Additionally, unlike manned-aircraft 

operations, remote pilots and visual 

observers will be operating within a 

confined area of operation, subject to 

operational limitations intended to 

minimize the exposure of the small 

unmanned aircraft to manned aircraft in 

flight and people on the ground. 

Because of these operational limitations, 

traditional FAA medical certification is 

not warranted for remote pilots or visual 

observers. 

The FAA also notes that the risks 

associated with pilot incapacitation are 

similar to the risks associated with loss 

of positive control. As discussed in that 

section, risks associated with loss of 

positive control are mitigated in this 

rule through: (1) Preflight inspection of 

the control links, (2) a speed limit of 87 

knots, and (3) a prohibition on 

operations of small unmanned aircraft 

over people not directly participating in 

the operation. Just as § 107.49(a)(3) will 

require remote pilots to ensure that all 

links between ground station and the 

small unmanned aircraft are working 

properly, § 107.17 will require the 

remote pilot in command to abstain 

from small UAS operations if he or she 

knows or has reason to know that he or 

she has a physical or mental condition 

that would interfere with the safe 

operation of the flight. 

Federal Airways & Airspace, ALPA, 

and several individual commenters 

expressed concern about the lack of a 

required vision exam. General Aviation 

Manufacturers Association and 

Aerospace Industries Association 

suggested that remote pilots hold a valid 

U.S. driver’s license to ensure a basic 

eye exam. 

The FAA considers the visual-line-ofsight requirement for the remote pilot, 

the person manipulating the flight 

controls of the small UAS (if that person 

is not the remote pilot), and the visual 

observer (if one is used) to be able to see 

the aircraft’s direction, altitude, and 

attitude of flight to be preferable to a 

prescriptive vision standard. Even with 

normal vision, it is foreseeable that a 

small unmanned aircraft may be so 

small that the operational space must be 

reduced to meet the visual-line-of-sight 

requirements of § 107.31. Therefore, any 

demonstration of completing a vision 

exam would be less effective than this 

rule’s visual-line-of-sight requirements, 

and as such, the FAA will not adopt a 

vision exam requirement in the final 

rule. 

The FAA also disagrees with 

comments suggesting the FAA require a 

U.S. driver’s license. According to the 

DOT Office of Highway Policy 

Information, 13 percent of the 

population aged 16 or older does not 

hold a state-issued driver’s license.136

As such, requiring a U.S. driver’s 

license would create an undue burden 

for many remote pilots without an 

equivalent increase in safety because the 

skills necessary to obtain a driver’s 

license are not the same as the skills 

needed to pilot a small UAS. Further, 

the FAA has historically allowed pilots 

of gliders and balloons to exercise the 

privileges of their pilot certificates 

without requiring a medical certificate 

or U.S. driver’s license, and this practice 

has resulted in no adverse effects on the 

NAS. 

The Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and 

Transportation District supported the 

proposed requirement to disqualify 

persons with known physical or mental 

conditions that could interfere with the 

safe operation of the aircraft. 

Conversely, DronSystems commented 

that it would be impossible to enforce 

a prohibition on operations if an 

operator knows he or she has a medical 


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condition that could interfere with the 

safe operation of the small UAS. 

The FAA notes that a similar 

regulatory provision already exists in 

part 61. Under § 61.53, a pilot certificate 

holder is obligated to abstain from 

acting as pilot in command during a 

period of medical deficiency. The 

requirement of § 61.53 applies 

regardless of whether or not a pilot 

certificate holder also holds a medical 

certificate. 

One individual suggested that the 

FAA provide a list of disqualifying 

medical conditions. 

The FAA has not established a list of 

disqualifying medical conditions under 

§ 107.17 because there are a wide range 

of small UAS operations that could be 

affected differently by different medical 

conditions. For example, a person who 

is incapable of moving his fingers would 

not be able to safely operate a small 

UAS whose control station interface is 

manually manipulated with the fingers. 

However, that person may be able to 

safely operate a small UAS whose 

control station is operated through voice 

controls. 

A person participating in a small UAS 

operation is responsible for knowing his 

or her physical and mental limitations 

and evaluating whether those 

limitations would allow him or her to 

safely participate in the specific small 

UAS operation that he or she is 

considering. If that person is unsure as 

to the limitations of his or her physical 

or mental condition, he or she should 

consult with a physician. The FAA 

emphasizes that those with a medical 

history or who are experiencing medical 

symptoms that would prevent them 

from safely participating in a small UAS 

operation or that raise a reasonable 

concern cannot claim to have no known 

medical conditions. 

One commenter stated that residents 

of Alaska have a disproportionately high 

rate of ‘‘seasonal bipolar disorder’’ or 

‘‘polar night-induced solipsism 

syndrome,’’ and that Alaskans might 

therefore be disproportionately affected 

by this provision. This commenter 

suggests that the FAA remove ‘‘bipolar 

disorder—or at the least bipolar disorder 

and related conditions ‘with seasonal 

pattern’—from the list of mental 

conditions which may prevent someone 

from being able to operate’’ a small 

UAS. 

The FAA notes that the commenter is 

referring to a list of medical conditions 

enumerated in § 67.107(a)(3), 

§ 67.207(a)(3), and § 67.307(a)(3), 

referring to a candidate for a first, 

second, or third class medical certificate 

to have no established medical history 

or clinical diagnosis of a bipolar 

disorder. However, as discussed 

previously, part 107 does not include a 

list of disqualifying medical conditions. 

A person with bipolar disorder would 

violate § 107.17 only if his or her bipolar 

disorder was such that it would 

interfere with the safe operation of a 

small UAS. 

The FAA also notes that in the NPRM 

it proposed to require that an applicant 

for an airman certificate must submit a 

certified statement attesting to his or her 

physical and mental condition at the 

time of the application. However, upon 

further review, the FAA has decided to 

remove this provision from the rule 

because an applicant’s medical 

condition at the time he or she submits 

his or her application for a remote pilot 

certificate may change prior to operation 

of the small UAS. 

d. Flight Proficiency and Aeronautical 

Experience 

Because of the significantly reduced 

risk associated with small UAS 

operations conducted under part 107, 

the NPRM proposed to not impose flight 

proficiency or aeronautical experience 

requirements on applicants seeking a 

small UAS airman certificate. However, 

the FAA invited comments on whether 

flight proficiency or aeronautical 

experience should be required. For the 

reasons discussed below, this rule will 

not require applicants for a remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating to 

demonstrate flight proficiency or 

aeronautical experience. 

Several commenters, including 

NBAA, Colorado Cattlemen’s 

Association, and NetMoby, agreed with 

the NPRM that the FAA should not 

require small UAS operators to 

demonstrate their proficiency in 

operating a small UAS prior to obtaining 

an operator certificate. These 

commenters reasoned that requiring a 

proficiency test is unnecessary because 

small UAS are not very difficult to 

operate and the test could be cost 

prohibitive for some operators. NetMoby 

added that there will be a market 

incentive for manufacturers to ensure 

that future operators are capable of 

flying their UAS. 

Other commenters, including the 

AFL–CIO, AIA, and NAAA, disagreed 

with the proposal and suggested that the 

FAA require small UAS operators to 

demonstrate their proficiency in 

operating a small UAS prior to obtaining 

a remote pilot certificate. Some of the 

commenters asserted that this would be 

consistent with testing requirements 

used for part 61 pilot certificates. 

Aviation Management and 

Modovolate Aviation suggested 

requiring a practical test or 

demonstration of aeronautical 

knowledge for certain aircraft or flying 

conditions (e.g., those weighing more 

than 4.4 pounds, operation beyond 

visual line-of-sight), but not for others 

(e.g., micro UAS, operation in only 

Class G airspace). Virginia 

Commonwealth University Honors 

Students suggested that separate tests 

should be required for each type of 

small UAS. 

As discussed in section III.E.3.a of 

this preamble, small UAS operations 

conducted under this rule will operate 

in a confined area of operation. As a 

result of this confined area and due to 

the very low weight of the small 

unmanned aircraft, small UAS 

operations conducted under part 107 

will generally pose a very low risk as 

compared to manned aircraft. As such, 

flight proficiency and aeronautical 

experience requirements (which apply 

to part 61 pilots) are unnecessary for 

remote pilots of a small UAS. 

Flight proficiency testing is also not 

necessary for small UAS operations 

because, unlike a manned aircraft pilot, 

the remote pilot of a small UAS can 

easily terminate flight at any point. The 

light weight and lack of people onboard 

the small unmanned aircraft provides 

the remote pilot of that aircraft with a 

multitude of safe landing options. The 

remote pilot also has the option to 

sacrifice the small unmanned aircraft 

because there are no people onboard 

who would be endangered by that 

action. Conversely, a manned aircraft 

can only land at a location that can 

safely accommodate its large weight. 

The landing of a manned aircraft must 

also be accomplished in a manner that 

does not endanger the people onboard 

the aircraft. Because of the ease with 

which the flight of a small unmanned 

aircraft can be terminated and because 

of the overall low risk posed by small 

UAS operations that will be conducted 

under part 107, this rule will not 

include practical testing or flight 

experience requirements for a remote 

pilot certificate. 

The FAA notes, however, that certain 

operational restrictions of part 107, such 

as operations within visual line of sight, 

are waivable if the applicant can 

demonstrate that his or her operation 

can safely be conducted under the terms 

of a certificate of waiver. In processing 

a waiver, the FAA may request 

additional mitigations, such as a 

demonstration of remote pilot 

proficiency, to ensure that the operation 

can be conducted safely. 

The Nez Perce Tribe requested that 

the FAA provide additional flexibility to 

small UAS operators by allowing them 

to qualify for an operator certificate 


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137See FAA Order 8900.1, ch. 7, sec. 1 (providing 

guidance with regard to how the FAA exercises its 

reexamination authority). 138OMB Circular A–4 at 6. 

either via a written test, a practical test, 

or a demonstration of aeronautical 

experience. In response, the FAA notes 

that practical testing, aeronautical 

experience, and knowledge testing 

measure different things. Knowledge 

testing determines whether an applicant 

has acquired proficiency in the areas of 

knowledge being tested. Practical testing 

and aeronautical experience determines 

the applicant’s flight proficiency. 

Although practical testing and 

aeronautical experience may be used to 

assess some level of a person’s 

knowledge, the aeronautical knowledge 

test is the method used to directly assess 

an applicant’s knowledge. In this case, 

the FAA has determined that a remote 

pilot needs to have acquired the 

knowledge needed to safely operate a 

small UAS because small UAS 

operations will generally pose a very 

low risk as compared to manned 

aircraft. Thus, an aeronautical 

knowledge test is the appropriate 

vehicle to determine whether an 

applicant for a remote pilot certificate 

has acquired the necessary knowledge. 

e. Formal Training 

The NPRM did not propose to require 

formal training, but it invited comment 

on whether passage of an FAA-approved 

training course should be required 

either instead of or in addition to the 

aeronautical knowledge test. After 

reviewing the comments, the FAA has 

determined that it will not impose any 

specific training or flight instruction 

requirements for small UAS remote 

pilot certificate applicants. 

Many commenters, including NAFI, 

NAAA, and A4A, stated that the FAA 

should require individuals to attend a 

training course before obtaining a small 

UAS operator certificate. NAFI asserted 

that an applicant may be able to pass an 

initial knowledge test through rote 

memorization and retain little useful 

information or application after passing 

the knowledge test. According to NAFI, 

the present FAA test management 

systems do not allow for the robust, 

multi-version testing that is truly able to 

test to the application level of learning. 

Commenters argued that training should 

encompass various topics and forms 

such as scenarios, multi-rotor aircraft, 

educational contact time from a flight 

instructor, and simulations. 

Conversely, National Roofing 

Contractors Association, NBAA, 

Southern Company, Aerospace 

Industries Association, and Nez Perce 

Tribe argued that the FAA should not 

require a training course. Aviation 

Management suggested that the FAA 

make informational and training 

materials available online and also 

create online training programs, but 

should not require training courses. 

National Roofing Contractors 

Association, NRECA, and Team Rubicon 

suggested allowing industries to have 

tailored certification processes or 

training specific to their needs, or to 

allow agencies and organizations to 

conduct tailored in-house training. 

The FAA took a risk-based approach 

to defining the airman certification 

requirements for small UAS remote 

pilots, and in light of the contained 

nature of operations, opted not to 

propose specific training, flight 

experience, or demonstration of 

proficiency in order to be eligible for a 

certificate. A remote pilot certificate 

applicant’s knowledge of small UAS, as 

well as regulations concerning safe 

operations in the NAS, can adequately 

be evaluated through an initial and 

recurrent knowledge tests. A person 

who has acquired the pertinent 

knowledge will pass the knowledge 

tests while a person who has not done 

so will fail the test. 

In response to commenters’ concerns 

about rote memorization, the FAA notes 

that in addition to passing the initial 

knowledge test, remote pilot certificate 

holders will also have to pass a 

recurrent knowledge test every two 

years to ensure that they have retained 

the knowledge necessary to safely 

operate in the NAS. Further, remote 

pilot certificate holders will also be 

subject to continuing FAA oversight. 

The FAA emphasizes that under 49 

U.S.C. 44709 and § 107.7(b), the FAA 

may reexamine a certificated remote 

pilot if it has sufficient reason to believe 

that the remote pilot may not be 

qualified to exercise the privileges of his 

or her certificate.137 Because the 

qualification framework for the remote 

pilot certificate is based on aeronautical 

knowledge, a reexamination under 

section 44709 and § 107.7(b) would be 

limited to the certificate holder’s 

aeronautical knowledge. The 

reexamination may be conducted using 

an oral or written knowledge test. 

A prescriptive formal training 

requirement is not necessary in this 

rule. Instead, this rule will allow remote 

pilot certificate applicants to attain the 

necessary aeronautical knowledge 

through any number of different 

methods, including self-study, enrolling 

in a training seminar or online course, 

or through one-on-one instruction with 

a trainer familiar with small UAS 

operations and part 107. This 

performance-based approach is 

preferable because it will allow 

individuals to select a method of study 

that works best for them. These methods 

of study will then be validated by 

whether or not the individual is able to 

pass the knowledge test. As noted in 

OMB Circular A–4, performance-based 

standards are generally preferable in a 

regulation because they allow the 

regulated parties ‘‘to choose the most 

cost-effective methods for achieving the 

regulatory goal and create an incentive 

for innovative solutions.’’ 138

The FAA will publish Advisory 

Circulars to assist remote pilots in 

operating small UAS safely in the NAS. 

The FAA Safety Team (FAASTeam) will 

also host online training courses. These 

training courses could be used as one 

method of studying for the knowledge 

test. Lastly, because there is already a 

robust network of nearly 700 testing 

centers located throughout the country 

set up to administer FAA knowledge 

tests, the FAA has opted not to establish 

new standards for small UAS remote 

pilot testing centers. 

f. General Requirement for Initial 

Aeronautical Knowledge Test 

The NPRM proposed requiring 

applicants for a remote pilot airman 

certificate with a small UAS rating to 

pass an initial aeronautical knowledge 

test to demonstrate that they have 

sufficient aeronautical knowledge to 

safely operate a small UAS. The FAA 

adopts the provisions as proposed with 

three changes. First, as discussed in 

III.F.2.i below, the FAA exempts part 61 

pilot certificate holders from the 

requirement to complete an initial 

knowledge test as long as they satisfy 

the flight review requirements of their 

part 61 pilot certificate and complete an 

online training course within the 

preceding 24 months. Second, as 

discussed in III.F.2.h below, the FAA 

will require that pilots with military 

experience operating unmanned aircraft 

pass an initial knowledge test in order 

to obtain a remote pilot certificate with 

small UAS rating, and pass a recurrent 

knowledge test every 24 months 

subsequent in order to continue to 

exercise the privileges of that certificate. 

Many commenters, including 

National Association of State Aviation 

Officials, NAAA, ALPA, and NAMIC, 

supported the FAA’s proposal to require 

an initial aeronautical knowledge test in 

order to operate a small UAS. 

Conversely, several commenters 

opposed the initial aeronautical 

knowledge test. Commenters argued that 

initial testing is ‘‘overkill’’ and the FAA 

should treat small UAS pilots like part 


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103 ultralight vehicle pilots and not 

require airman certification or testing. 

The commenters further argued that all 

testing is unnecessary and 

inappropriate. 

The FAA disagrees with the 

commenters who asked that the 

knowledge test be abolished. Title 49 

U.S.C. 44703 requires the FAA to ensure 

that an airman certificate applicant is 

qualified and able to perform the duties 

related to the position to be authorized 

by the certificate. 

Here, in order to meet its statutory 

obligation to determine that an 

applicant for a remote pilot certificate 

possesses the knowledge necessary to 

safely operate in the NAS, the FAA is 

requiring that those persons pass an 

initial aeronautical knowledge test. 

Knowledge testing is the most flexible 

and efficient means for ensuring that a 

remote pilot possesses the requisite 

knowledge to operate in the NAS 

because it allows the applicant to 

acquire the pertinent knowledge in 

whatever manner works best for him or 

her. The applicant can then take and 

pass the aeronautical knowledge test to 

verify that he or she has indeed 

acquired the pertinent areas of 

knowledge. 

NAFI recommended that an applicant 

should be required to obtain an 

instructor endorsement to take the 

initial aeronautical knowledge test. 

SkyView Strategies suggested that to 

protect the public from a poorly 

prepared UAS operator who receives a 

passing grade but gets important 

questions wrong, the UAS operator 

should be required to present to a flight 

training instructor his or her written test 

results, noting areas where knowledge is 

lacking. 

The FAA disagrees with the 

recommendation that an applicant 

should be required to obtain an 

instructor endorsement to take the 

initial aeronautical knowledge test. 

While an instructor endorsement is 

generally required for part 61 pilot 

certificates, the significantly reduced 

risk associated with small UAS 

operations conducted under part 107 

would make this framework unduly 

burdensome in this case. Instead, a 

stand-alone knowledge test is sufficient 

to verify the qualification of the remote 

pilot certificate applicant. 

Because the aeronautical knowledge 

test will determine whether an 

applicant possesses the knowledge 

needed to safely operate a small UAS, 

a separate flight instructor endorsement 

should not be required to take the 

knowledge test. The FAA also notes that 

the costs associated with failing and 

having to retake the knowledge test will 

provide an incentive to applicants to 

pick a method of study that maximizes 

the chance of them passing the 

aeronautical knowledge test on the first 

try. 

The FAA also does not agree that a 

certificate applicant should be required 

to present to a flight instructor his or her 

knowledge test results for remedial 

training. The FAA maintains that if a 

candidate is ‘‘poorly prepared,’’ then 

that person is unlikely to pass the 

knowledge test. 

The University of Arkansas Division 

of Agriculture suggested that a more 

appropriate ‘‘aeronautical knowledge 

exam’’ needs to be developed with input 

from UAS users. It further suggested 

that the FAA should periodically revisit 

the scope of the aeronautical knowledge 

test as operational experience data 

increases. 

FAA knowledge test banks are 

continuously updated to address 

changes to the industry, safety, and 

special emphasis areas. While the FAA 

responds to industry and user 

community feedback, the small UAS 

knowledge test bank is developed 

internally within the agency to protect 

the integrity of test. 

g. General Requirement for Recurrent 

Aeronautical Knowledge Test 

The FAA proposed that a certificated 

remote pilot must also pass a recurrent 

aeronautical knowledge test every 24 

months. Like the flight review 

requirement specified in § 61.56, the 

recurrent knowledge test provides the 

opportunity for a remote pilot’s 

aeronautical knowledge to be 

reevaluated on a periodic basis. The 

FAA adopts this provision as proposed, 

with one change. As discussed in 

III.F.2.i, the FAA exempts part 61 pilot 

certificate holders from the requirement 

to complete recurrent knowledge tests 

as long as they satisfy the flight review 

requirements of § 61.56 and complete an 

online training course every 24 months. 

ALPA, AOPA, AUVSI and several 

other commenters supported the 

requirement for a recurrent knowledge 

test. Conversely, Colorado Cattlemen’s 

Association and a few individual 

commenters argued that a recurrent 

knowledge test is unnecessary. The 

Colorado Cattlemen’s Association 

explained that small UAS operations 

present a substantially reduced risk as 

compared to manned-aircraft 

operations. Therefore, the commenter 

argued, it is appropriate to impose 

different, and in some instances lesser, 

operational requirements. 

The FAA disagrees with the notion 

that no periodic reevaluation of 

knowledge is necessary. Knowledge of 

rules, regulations, and operating 

principles erodes over time, particularly 

if the remote pilot is not required to 

recall such information on a frequent 

basis. This is a fundamental principle of 

airman certification, and it applies to all 

FAA-certificated airmen. For part 61 

pilot certificate holders, the flight 

review, conducted under § 61.56, 

specifically requires ‘‘[a] review of the 

current general operating and flight 

rules of part 91’’ in addition to 

maneuvers necessary to safely exercise 

the privileges of the certificate. 

Likewise, the FAA considers a recurrent 

knowledge test to be an effective means 

of evaluating a remote pilot’s retention 

of knowledge necessary to safely operate 

small unmanned aircraft in the NAS. 

Because of the reduced risk posed by 

small UAS, the FAA is not requiring 

remote pilots to demonstrate a 

minimum level of flight proficiency to 

a specific standard or recency of flight 

experience in order to exercise the 

privileges of their airman certificate. 

Drone Labs suggested extending the 

time period between recurrent tests to 5 

years, and/or making the test available 

online to ease recertification. Kansas 

Farm Bureau recommended a 6-year 

interval between recurrent tests, similar 

to the interval for renewal of a driver’s 

license. 

The FAA does not agree that the 

recurrent testing interval should be 

longer than two years. Unlike the 

privileges afforded by a driver’s license, 

which are exercised on a frequent basis 

by most drivers, many holders of remote 

pilot certificates may only exercise their 

privileges occasionally or may not 

regularly conduct operations that apply 

all of the concepts tested on the 

aeronautical knowledge test. For 

example, a remote pilot in command 

may spend years never operating 

outside of Class G airspace, and then 

may move to a different location that 

requires him or her to begin conducting 

small UAS operations in Class D 

airspace. Based on experience with 

manned pilots, those persons who 

exercise the privileges of their certificate 

on an infrequent basis are likely to 

retain the knowledge for a shorter 

period of time than those who exercise 

the privileges of their certificate on a 

regular basis. 

Further, as unmanned aircraft 

operations increase in the NAS, the 

FAA anticipates the possibility of 

further changes to rules and regulations. 

By requiring evaluation on a two-year 

cycle, the FAA is able to ensure that 

remote pilots are aware of the most 

recent changes to regulations affecting 

their operations. 


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139Under § 61.56(c), no person may act as pilot 

in command of an aircraft unless, since the 24th 

calendar month before the month in which the 

person acts as pilot in command, he or she has 

completed a flight review with an authorized 

instructor in an aircraft for which that person is 

rated. The flight review must consist of at least one 

hour of ground training and one hour of flight 

training that includes the general operating and 

flight rules of part 91. 14 CFR 61.56(a). 

The FAA acknowledges, however, the 

burden associated with in-person testing 

every two years. As such, the FAA 

intends to look at (in the Operations of 

Small Unmanned Aircraft Over People 

rule) alternative methods to further 

reduce this burden without sacrificing 

the safety benefits afforded by a twoyear recurrent knowledge check. 

h. Pilots With Military Experience 

The NPRM proposed allowing pilots 

with military experience operating 

unmanned aircraft to take the recurrent 

knowledge test in lieu of the initial 

knowledge test in order to be eligible for 

an unmanned aircraft operator 

certificate with a small UAS rating. For 

the reasons discussed below, this rule 

will require pilots with military 

experience operating unmanned aircraft 

to comply with the initial and recurrent 

knowledge testing requirements 

discussed in the previous sections. 

NBAA, Small UAV Coalition and 

Texas A&M University agreed with the 

proposed rule requiring only a recurrent 

knowledge test in lieu of the initial 

knowledge test to qualify for a UAS 

operator airman certificate. Prioria said 

that military UAS operators and OEMcertified UAS operators should be 

grandfathered in without the need to 

take an initial knowledge test because 

their prior operational experience 

should suffice. In addition, Aviation 

Model Code of Conduct Initiative, 

Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Small 

UAV Coalition, and others supported 

accepting existing pilot credentials, 

especially military pilot credentials, in 

lieu of requiring those pilots to take an 

initial knowledge test or obtain a 

separate small UAS certificate. 

ArgenTech Solutions suggested that 

FAA should put a time limit on when 

military experience is acceptable for 

taking the recurrent knowledge test. 

In contrast, ALPA and others 

suggested that an initial knowledge test, 

rather than just a recurrent test, is 

appropriate for applicants with military 

experience flying UAS. ALPA noted that 

such pilots do not necessarily have 

experience operating in the NAS, and 

therefore cannot be assumed to be 

familiar with all the subject areas 

included in the initial test. ALPA also 

pointed to the wide variety of UAS used 

in the military and suggested that a 

given pilot’s experience may not 

necessarily be relevant to the operation 

of a small UAS in the NAS. ALPA also 

stated that the FAA should review a 

military pilot’s specific training, skills, 

and experience before determining what 

‘‘supplemental training, knowledge 

testing, or skills demonstration’’ might 

be needed. 

Similarly, one commenter asserted 

that experience operating military UAS 

is not relevant to the operation of a civil 

small UAS, and that therefore those 

with military experience should be 

subject to the same testing requirements 

as other applicants. Another individual 

echoed ALPA’s concern that military 

operations are conducted almost 

exclusively in military airspace, not in 

the NAS. One commenter, while 

supporting an initial-test exemption for 

applicants with military experience, 

added that former military UAS pilots 

do not necessarily understand civil 

operations in the NAS. 

Planehook Aviation, NOAA, DOD, 

and an individual commenter said that 

the prior military experience provision 

proposed in § 107.75 should apply to 

both military and non-military COA 

UAS operators. One commenter 

provided supporting reasoning stating 

that ‘‘[t]here are several non-military 

Federal agencies that have well 

established sUAS programs and, as is 

the case with NASA, they have decades 

of experience with sUAS and operating 

sUAS in the NAS.’’ NOAA argued that 

there are no practical differences 

between NOAA pilots and military 

pilots because they are both trained in 

the same facilities. DOD raised a similar 

argument, asking that the rule recognize 

DOD civilian and contractor personnel 

that have a level of training equivalent 

to military personnel. One individual 

suggested that the FAA allow civilian 

operators with a minimum of 1,000 

logged hours as operators of UAS for 

government and military agencies to 

qualify for taking the recurrent 

knowledge test instead of the initial test. 

The FAA agrees with commenters 

who expressed concern about applicants 

obtaining a remote pilot certificate to 

operate civil small UAS without passing 

an initial knowledge test. The levels of 

training and certification for unmanned 

aircraft differ greatly between branches 

of the armed services, and therefore 

there is no consistent training the FAA 

can use as a comparison to its 

requirements in order to credit military 

UAS pilots. Further, many of the 

required knowledge areas for the part 

107 initial knowledge test, such as 

airspace classification, airport 

operations, and radio communications, 

are not consistently covered in training 

across all branches of the U.S. military. 

Accordingly, at this time, this rule will 

not allow military UAS pilots to bypass 

the initial aeronautical knowledge test. 

This applies to NOAA UAS pilots as 

well, because, as NOAA pointed out, 

they are trained in the same military 

facilities. 

The FAA notes, however, that in some 

cases, government and military UAS 

pilots are trained as pilots of manned 

aircraft, in which case they may qualify 

for a part 61 pilot certificate through 

military competency. Specifically, 

manned-aircraft military pilots are 

frequently able to qualify for a part 61 

pilot certificate under § 61.73 without 

taking a practical test by providing 

specific documentation and passing a 

military competency knowledge test. 

Provided those pilots obtain a part 61 

pilot certificate and meet the flight 

review and online training course 

requirements discussed in the next 

section, they may qualify for a remote 

pilot certificate with small UAS rating 

without having to take any UAS 

knowledge test. 

i. Credit to Holders of Part 61 Pilot 

Certificates 

For the reasons discussed below, this 

rule will allow part 61 pilot certificate 

holders (other than the holders of a 

student pilot certificate) with current 

flight reviews 139 to substitute an online 

training course for the aeronautical 

knowledge testing required by this rule. 

Airborne Law Enforcement 

Association and Texas A&M UniversityCorpus Christi, suggested requiring only 

the recurrent knowledge test for part-61- 

certificated pilots. Numerous 

commenters also suggested that holders 

of part 61 airman certificates should be 

required to take only the recurrent 

knowledge test, not the initial 

knowledge test, or should be exempted 

entirely from knowledge-testing 

requirements. One commenter suggested 

that the holders of private, commercial, 

and ATP certificates who have operated 

UAS under exemptions be exempted 

from the initial knowledge test 

requirement. Another commented that 

non-military COA pilots should be 

permitted to take just the recurrent test, 

since the applicants will usually hold at 

least a private pilot certificate. One 

commenter stated that those applicants 

who hold part 61 pilot certificates 

should be required only to complete 

UAS-specific modules as part of the 

existing FAA Wings program. Another 

commenter stated that there should be 

a provision to enable existing small 

UAS pilots with a certain amount of 


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logged PIC time to fly a small UAS 

without having to take a knowledge test. 

The FAA agrees with commenters 

who suggested that requiring part-61- 

certificated pilots who satisfy the flightreview requirements of § 61.56 to take 

an initial or recurrent knowledge test is 

unduly burdensome. Through initial 

certification and subsequent flight 

reviews, a part-61-certificated airman is 

required to demonstrate knowledge of 

many of the topic areas tested on the 

UAS knowledge test. These areas 

include: Airspace classification and 

operating requirements, aviation 

weather sources, radio communication 

procedures, physiological effects of 

drugs and alcohol, aeronautical 

decision-making and judgment, and 

airport operations. Because a part 61 

pilot certificate holder is evaluated on 

these areas of knowledge in the course 

of the part 61 certification and flight 

review process, reevaluating these areas 

of knowledge on the initial and 

recurrent knowledge tests conducted 

under part 107 would be needlessly 

duplicative. 

However, there are UAS-specific areas 

of knowledge (discussed in section 

III.F.2.j of this preamble) that a part-61- 

certificated pilot may not be familiar 

with. Accordingly, instead of requiring 

part-61-certificated pilots who are 

current on their flight reviews to take 

the initial and recurrent knowledge 

tests, this rule will provide those pilots 

with the option to take an online 

training course focusing on UASspecific areas of knowledge. Just as 

there is an initial and recurrent 

knowledge test, there will also be an 

initial and recurrent training course 

available to part 61 pilot certificate 

holders. Those certificate holders will 

be able to substitute the initial training 

course for the initial knowledge test and 

the recurrent training course for the 

recurrent knowledge test. To ensure that 

a certificate holder’s UAS-specific 

knowledge does not become stale, this 

rule will include the requirement that a 

part 61 pilot certificate holder must pass 

either the recurrent training course or 

the recurrent knowledge test every 24 

months. 

The FAA emphasizes that the online 

training course option in lieu of taking 

the knowledge test will be available 

only to those part 61 pilot certificate 

holders who satisfy the flight review 

required by § 61.56. This is to ensure 

that the certificate holder’s knowledge 

of general aeronautical concepts that are 

not included on the training course does 

not become stale. Part 61 pilot 

certificate holders who do not meet the 

flight review requirements of § 61.56 

will be unable to substitute the online 

training course for the required 

aeronautical knowledge test. Thus, 

under § 107.63(a)(2), a part 61 pilot 

certificate holder seeking to substitute 

completion of the initial training course 

for the initial aeronautical knowledge 

test will have to present his or her 

logbook upon application for a remote 

pilot certificate with a small UAS rating 

to demonstrate that he or she has 

satisfied this requirement. The applicant 

will also have to present a certificate of 

completion showing that he or she has 

completed the initial online training 

course. 

The FAA also notes that the above 

discussion does not apply to holders of 

a part 61 student pilot certificate. A 

person is not required to pass an 

aeronautical knowledge test, pass a 

practical (skills) test, or otherwise 

demonstrate aeronautical knowledge in 

order to obtain a student pilot 

certificate. Further, student pilot 

certificate holders who have received an 

endorsement for solo flight under 

§ 61.87(b) are only required to 

demonstrate limited knowledge 

associated with conducting a specific 

solo flight. For these reasons, the option 

to take an online training course instead 

of an aeronautical knowledge test will 

not extend to student pilot certificate 

holders. 

j. Areas of Knowledge on the 

Aeronautical Knowledge Tests and 

Training Courses for Part 61 Pilot 

Certificate Holders 

The NPRM proposed that the initial 

aeronautical knowledge test would test 

the following areas of knowledge: (1) 

Regulations applicable to small UAS 

operations; (2) airspace classification 

and operating requirements, obstacle 

clearance requirements, and flight 

restrictions affecting small unmanned 

aircraft operation; (3) official sources of 

weather and effects of weather on small 

unmanned aircraft performance; (4) 

small UAS loading and performance; (5) 

emergency procedures; (6) crew 

resource management; (7) radio 

communication procedures; (8) 

determining the performance of small 

unmanned aircraft; (9) physiological 

effects of drugs and alcohol; (10) 

aeronautical decision-making and 

judgment; and (11) airport operations. 

The NPRM also proposed the following 

areas of knowledge for the recurrent 

knowledge test: (1) Regulations 

applicable to small UAS operations; (2) 

airspace classification and operating 

requirements, obstacle clearance 

requirements, and flight restrictions 

affecting small unmanned aircraft 

operation; (3) official sources of 

weather; (4) emergency procedures; (5) 

crew resource management; (6) 

aeronautical decision-making and 

judgment; and (7) airport operations. 

For the reasons discussed below, this 

rule will remove obstacle clearance 

requirements and add maintenance and 

inspection procedures as areas of 

knowledge that will be tested on both 

the initial and recurrent aeronautical 

knowledge tests. Further, aviation 

weather sources will be removed from 

the recurrent aeronautical knowledge 

tests. Except for these changes, this rule 

will finalize all other areas of 

knowledge as proposed in the NPRM. 

With regard to the initial and 

recurrent training courses for part 61 

pilot certificate holders, those courses 

will only cover UAS-specific areas of 

knowledge that are not included in the 

training and testing required for a part 

61 pilot certificate. Thus, the initial 

training course will cover: (1) 

Regulations applicable to small UAS 

operations; (2) small UAS loading and 

performance; (3) emergency procedures; 

(4) crew resource management; (5) 

determining the performance of the 

small unmanned aircraft; and (6) 

maintenance and inspection procedures. 

The recurrent training course will cover: 

(1) Regulations applicable to small UAS 

operations; (2) emergency procedures; 

(3) crew resource management; and (4) 

maintenance and inspection procedures. 

i. Regulations Applicable to Small UAS 

The NPRM proposed to include an 

area of knowledge on both the initial 

and recurrent knowledge tests that 

determines whether the test taker knows 

the regulations applicable to small UAS. 

By testing the applicant for an airman 

certificate on knowledge of applicable 

regulations, the initial and recurrent 

knowledge tests would ensure that the 

applicant understands what those 

regulations require and does not violate 

them due to ignorance. 

The FAA did not receive any adverse 

comments on this aspect of its proposal, 

and as such, this rule will include 

regulations applicable to small UAS as 

an area of knowledge that is tested on 

both initial and recurrent aeronautical 

knowledge tests. This area of knowledge 

will also be included on the initial and 

recurrent training courses that can be 

taken by part 61 pilot certificate holders 

instead of a knowledge test because 

regulations applicable to a small UAS 

are a UAS-specific area of knowledge 

that is not included in the training and 

testing required for a part 61 pilot 

certificate. 


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140See Aeronautical Information Manual, ch. 1, 

sec. 1. 

ii. Airspace Classifications and 

Operating Requirements, and Flight 

Restrictions Affecting Small Unmanned 

Aircraft Operation 

The NPRM also proposed testing (on 

both the initial and recurrent knowledge 

tests) knowledge of airspace 

classification and operating 

requirements, as well as knowledge of 

flight restrictions affecting small 

unmanned aircraft operation. The 

NPRM explained that part 107 would 

include airspace operating 

requirements, such as the requirement 

to obtain ATC permission prior to 

operating in controlled airspace, and in 

order to comply with those 

requirements, an airman would need to 

know how to determine the 

classification of the airspace in which 

he or she would like to operate. The 

NPRM also proposed to test knowledge 

of how to determine which areas of 

airspace are prohibited, restricted, or 

subject to a TFR. 

Under the NPRM, this area of 

knowledge would also be included in 

the recurrent knowledge test because: 

(1) Airspace that the airman is familiar 

with could become reclassified over 

time; (2) the location of existing flight 

restrictions could change over time; and 

(3) some airmen may not regularly 

encounter these issues in their 

operations. For the reasons discussed 

below, this rule will include knowledge 

of airspace classification and operating 

requirements and knowledge of flight 

restrictions affecting small unmanned 

aircraft operation as an area of 

knowledge tested on both the initial and 

recurrent knowledge tests. 

The California Agricultural Aircraft 

Association supported testing on how 

the airspace is managed, what the rules 

and regulations are, and how manned 

aircraft operate in the airspace. Aerius 

suggested that the knowledge test 

should include special use airspace, 

right-of-way rules, visual scanning, 

aeromedical factors (e.g., the limitations 

of the human eye), and accident 

reporting. On the other hand, the 

Electronic Frontier Foundation asserted 

that airspace classification is not 

relevant for low altitude micro UAS 

flights far away from airports and 

should not be tested for airmen seeking 

to operate micro UAS. 

The FAA declines to eliminate 

airspace classification as an area of 

knowledge tested for small UAS 

operations. As an initial matter, the 

FAA notes that this rule will not 

prohibit any small UAS (including 

micro UAS) from operating near 

airports. For UAS not operating near an 

airport, the FAA notes that controlled 

airspace can extend a significant 

distance away from an airport. For 

example, the surface area of Class B 

airspace can extend up to 8 nautical 

miles away from an airport. 

Additionally, airspace classification 

may change over time; uncontrolled 

(Class G) airspace may be changed to 

controlled airspace and vice versa. A 

remote pilot of any small UAS will need 

to have the ability to determine what 

class of airspace his or her small UAS 

operation will take place in to ensure 

that the operation complies with the 

airspace rules of part 107. 

In response to Aerius, the FAA notes 

that special-use airspace will be covered 

under knowledge of flight restrictions, 

which will determine the test taker’s 

knowledge of regulatory restrictions on 

small UAS flight imposed through 

means such as prohibited airspace or a 

TFR. Right-of-way rules, visual 

scanning, and accident reporting will be 

covered by the knowledge area of 

regulations applicable to small UAS 

operations because all of these concepts 

are codified in the operational 

regulations of part 107. Aeromedical 

factors will not specifically be included 

on the knowledge test, but the FAA may 

publish further guidance to remote 

pilots on topics such as aeromedical 

factors and visual scanning techniques. 

AUVSI recommended that the FAA 

require more extensive knowledge 

testing than what was proposed for an 

operator desiring to fly in Class B, C, D, 

or E airspace, operate small UAS for 

commercial purposes, or operate small 

UAS beyond visual line of sight with 

risk-based approval. The commenter did 

not, however, specify what should be 

included in this more extensive testing, 

and as such, the FAA is unable to 

evaluate AUVSI’s suggestion. 

iii. Obstacle Clearance Requirements 

The NPRM proposed to include 

obstacle clearance requirements as an 

area of knowledge to be tested on the 

initial knowledge test to ensure that an 

applicant for a remote pilot certificate 

knows how to avoid creating a collision 

hazard with a ground structure. 

One commenter suggested removing 

this area of knowledge from the 

knowledge test because, according to 

the commenter, there are no obstacle 

clearance requirements in part 107, and 

therefore, there should be nothing to 

test. The FAA agrees with this comment 

and has removed obstacle clearance 

requirements as an area of knowledge to 

be tested on the initial knowledge test. 

The FAA notes that although the test 

taker will not be tested on knowledge of 

obstacle clearance requirements, they 

will be tested for knowledge of 

regulations applicable to small UAS, 

including the requirements of 

§§ 107.19(c) and 107.23(a), which: (1) 

Prohibit operating a small unmanned 

aircraft in a careless or reckless manner 

so as to endanger the life or property of 

another; and (2) require the remote pilot 

in command to ensure that the small 

unmanned aircraft will pose no undue 

hazard to other aircraft, people, or 

property in the event of loss of control 

of the aircraft. A small unmanned 

aircraft flown in a manner that creates 

a collision hazard with a ground 

structure may violate one or both of 

these regulations, especially if there are 

people near the ground structure who 

may be hurt as a result of the collision. 

iv. Aviation Weather Sources and 

Effects of Weather on Small Unmanned 

Aircraft Performance 

The NPRM proposed to test, on the 

initial and recurrent knowledge test, 

knowledge of official sources of 

weather. The NPRM also proposed to 

test on the initial knowledge test 

whether the applicant understands the 

effects of weather and micrometeorology 

(weather on a localized and small scale) 

on a small unmanned aircraft operation. 

The NPRM explained that knowledge of 

weather is necessary for the safe 

operation of a small unmanned aircraft 

because, due to the light weight of the 

small unmanned aircraft, weather could 

have a significant impact on the flight 

of the aircraft. 

One commenter recommended the 

removal of ‘‘official’’ from ‘‘official 

weather sources,’’ saying that operation 

of a UAS calls for assessment of ‘‘local’’ 

weather conditions, and, furthermore, 

that there are no clearly identified 

‘‘official sources of weather.’’ Aviation 

Management suggested that official 

sources of weather be excluded from the 

recurrent knowledge test. 

The FAA agrees with the commenter 

that there are no specific ‘‘official 

sources of weather,’’ and has removed 

that terminology from this rule. 

However, the FAA emphasizes that 

there are several sources of aviation 

weather useful to remote pilots. 

Accordingly, remote pilots will be 

required to be familiar with aviation 

weather products such as the ones 

provided by the National Weather 

Service through Flight Service Stations, 

Direct User Access Terminal Systems 

(DUATS), and/or Flight Information 

Services-Broadcast (FIS–B).140 While 

this rule does not require the use of 

those sources of weather for planning 

flights, aviation weather sources could 


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141Additional guidance on aviation weather for 

pilots can be found in AC 00–6. 

be a valuable resource for remote pilots 

that choose to use them. For example, 

a remote pilot conducting an operation 

in an area with quickly changing 

weather may wish to access weather 

information from an aviation weather 

source for the most up-to-date weather 

data to ensure that the small UAS 

operation will comply with the 

minimum visibility and cloud clearance 

requirements of § 107.51. The FAA 

notes that aviation weather sources 

include weather data that can be used 

to evaluate local weather conditions.141

Because there is no requirement for 

remote pilots to use aviation weather 

products on an ongoing basis, the FAA 

has removed this area of knowledge 

from the recurrent aeronautical 

knowledge test. 

Accordingly, this rule will include 

knowledge of aviation weather sources 

and the effects of weather on small 

unmanned aircraft performance on the 

initial knowledge test. Additionally, this 

rule will include knowledge of the 

effects of weather on small unmanned 

aircraft performance as an area of 

knowledge on the initial training course 

available to part 61 pilot certificate 

holders because this is a UAS-specific 

area of knowledge that is not included 

in the training and testing required for 

a part 61 pilot certificate. The training 

course will not include knowledge of 

aviation weather sources because that is 

not a UAS-specific area of knowledge. 

v. Small UAS Loading and Performance 

The NPRM proposed to include 

weight and balance as an area of 

knowledge to be tested on the initial 

knowledge test to ensure that an 

applicant for a remote pilot certificate 

knows how to calculate the weight and 

balance of a small unmanned aircraft to 

determine impacts on performance. The 

NPRM noted that in order to operate 

safely, operators need an understanding 

of some fundamental aircraft 

performance issues, including load 

balancing and weight distribution as 

well as available power for the 

operation. 

University of Arkansas Division of 

Agriculture suggested that the FAA’s 

proposal suggests a lack of 

understanding by the FAA of these 

lightweight aircraft. The commenter 

added that when they place a battery or 

camera on their aircraft, it is 

immediately obvious if something is not 

balanced. 

While the FAA agrees that in some 

circumstances the effect certain loads 

may have on the weight, balance, and 

performance of the aircraft may be 

obvious—such as adding a five pound 

weight to one side of a 0.5 pound small 

unmanned aircraft—other weight 

distributions and how they affect the 

balance of the aircraft may be more 

difficult to surmise. For example, it may 

not be intuitive for a remote pilot to 

determine the effect a half-pound 

battery will have when added to a fortypound aircraft. Additionally, a remote 

pilot needs to understand the effect that 

the added weight will have on the 

aircraft’s operation over time. For 

example, while a small unmanned 

aircraft may be balanced for the first few 

flights after a weight is added, that 

weight may influence the aircraft over 

time such that during later flights the 

aircraft is no longer balanced and no 

longer flying safely. 

For these reasons, the FAA will 

include a section on the initial 

knowledge test ensuring that a remote 

pilot applicant understands how to 

calculate the weight and balance of a 

small unmanned aircraft and the 

resulting impacts on performance. 

Because small unmanned aircraft 

loading is a UAS-specific area of 

knowledge, the FAA will also include it 

on the initial training course that part 61 

pilot certificate holders can take in 

place of the knowledge test. 

vi. Emergency Procedures 

The NPRM noted that a small UAS 

airman may have to deal with an 

emergency situation during a small UAS 

operation. As such, the NPRM proposed 

to include an area of knowledge on the 

initial knowledge test that would 

determine whether the applicant knows 

how to properly respond to an 

emergency. The NPRM also proposed to 

include knowledge of emergency 

procedures on the recurrent knowledge 

test because emergency situations will 

likely be infrequent and as such, a 

certificate holder’s knowledge of 

emergency procedures may become 

stale over time. The FAA did not receive 

adverse comments on including 

emergency procedures on the initial 

knowledge test, and as such, this area of 

knowledge will be included on the 

initial knowledge test. 

Turning to the recurrent knowledge 

test, Aviation Management 

recommended that the FAA remove 

emergency procedures as an area of 

knowledge covered on that test. The 

FAA declines to remove emergency 

procedures from the recurrent 

knowledge test. As discussed in the 

NPRM, emergency situations will likely 

arise infrequently, and as such, a remote 

pilot’s knowledge of emergency 

procedures may become stale over time. 

Accordingly, including this area of 

knowledge on the recurrent knowledge 

test will ensure that the remote pilot 

retains the knowledge of how to 

properly respond to an emergency. 

Because this area of knowledge is 

UAS-specific, it will also be included on 

the initial and recurrent training courses 

that can be taken by part 61 pilot 

certificate holders instead of an initial 

or recurrent knowledge test. 

vii. Crew Resource Management 

The NPRM proposed to include crew 

resource management as an area of 

knowledge to be tested on the initial 

and recurrent knowledge tests to ensure 

that an applicant for a remote pilot 

certificate knows how to function in a 

team environment, such as when visual 

observers are used to assist a remote 

pilot. In those circumstances, the remote 

pilot would be in charge of those 

observers and therefore need an 

understanding of crew resource 

management. 

Several commenters, including the 

Small UAV Coalition, Princeton 

University, and the Electronic Frontier 

Foundation, argued that crew resource 

management may not be relevant for all 

small UAS operations and, as such, 

should be removed from the knowledge 

test. Princeton University added that 

crew resource management would be an 

irrelevant area of knowledge for student 

operators who will be operating the 

aircraft at a low altitude, for a limited 

distance, on university property, and 

under the direct supervision of a faculty 

member. Electronic Frontier Foundation 

stated that this area of knowledge is 

irrelevant for micro UAS operations. 

One commenter suggested removal of 

crew resource management stating it is 

‘‘overkill’’ and is really just referring to 

possible communications between the 

pilot and the visual observer. If kept, the 

commenter suggested modifying it to 

‘‘Crew resource management as it may 

pertain to operation of a small 

unmanned aircraft system.’’ 

The FAA acknowledges that not all 

small UAS operations will utilize a 

visual observer or more than one 

manipulator of the controls of the small 

unmanned aircraft. However, the FAA 

anticipates that many remote pilots 

operating under part 107 will likely use 

a visual observer or oversee other 

individuals that may manipulate the 

controls of the small unmanned aircraft. 

In order to allow flexibility for 

certificated remote pilots to determine 

whether or not to use a visual observer 

or oversee other individuals 

manipulating the controls of the small 

unmanned aircraft, the FAA must 

ensure that an applicant for a remote 


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pilot certificate is able to function in a 

team environment and maximize team 

performance. This includes situational 

awareness, proper allocation of tasks to 

individuals, avoidance of work 

overloads in self and in others, and 

effectively communicating with other 

members of the crew such as visual 

observers and individuals manipulating 

the controls of a small UAS. 

The scenario Princeton University 

provided in its comment is precisely the 

type of scenario that would require a 

certificated remote pilot in command to 

have an understanding of crew resource 

management. The remote pilot in 

command in Princeton University’s 

scenario would be supervising a student 

who is manipulating the controls of the 

small unmanned aircraft. Therefore, the 

remote pilot in command in that 

scenario would need to know how to 

effectively communicate and guide his 

or her crew (the student). In response to 

Electronic Frontier Foundation, the 

FAA notes that even remote pilots 

operating smaller UAS may choose to 

use a visual observer or supervise other 

manipulators of the controls. 

It is not necessary to change the title 

of this area of knowledge because crew 

resource management correctly captures 

what this area of knowledge will cover. 

The FAA also notes that this rule will 

include crew resource management as 

an area of knowledge on the initial and 

recurrent training courses available to 

part 61 pilot certificate holders because 

this is a UAS-specific area of 

knowledge. 

viii. Determining the Performance of the 

Small Unmanned Aircraft 

The NPRM proposed to include an 

area of knowledge on the initial 

aeronautical knowledge test to ensure 

that an applicant knows how to 

determine the performance of the small 

unmanned aircraft. Aviation 

Management suggested that this area of 

knowledge be excluded from the initial 

knowledge test because, the commenter 

argued, this knowledge is unnecessary 

for all small UAS operations. 

The FAA will retain determining the 

performance of the small unmanned 

aircraft as an area of knowledge on the 

initial knowledge test. As discussed in 

section III.E.6.a.i of this preamble, the 

remote pilot in command will be 

required to conduct a preflight 

assessment of the area of operation and 

ensure that the small unmanned aircraft 

will pose no undue hazard to other 

aircraft, people, or property if there is a 

loss of positive control. In order to be 

able to do that, the remote pilot in 

command will need to be able to assess 

how a small unmanned aircraft will 

perform in a given operating 

environment. This area of knowledge 

will determine whether an applicant for 

a remote pilot certificate has acquired 

the knowledge necessary to conduct this 

assessment. 

This rule will also include this area of 

knowledge on the initial training course 

that can be taken by part 61 pilot 

certificate holders instead of an initial 

knowledge test because it is a UASspecific area of knowledge. 

ix. Physiological Effects of Drugs and 

Alcohol 

The NPRM proposed to include the 

physiological effects of drugs and 

alcohol as an area of knowledge covered 

by the initial knowledge test. The 

Electronic Frontier Foundation argued 

that knowledge of the effects of drugs 

and alcohol is irrelevant for micro UAS 

operations and should not be tested for 

pilots of a micro UAS. 

The FAA disagrees. As explained in 

the NPRM, there are many prescription 

and over-the-counter medications that 

can significantly reduce an individual’s 

cognitive ability to process and react to 

events that are happening around him 

or her. This can lead to impaired 

decision-making, which could adversely 

affect the safety of any small UAS 

operation. Accordingly, the initial 

aeronautical knowledge test will 

include an area of knowledge to 

determine whether the applicant 

understands how drugs and alcohol can 

impact his or her ability to safely 

operate a small UAS. 

x. Aeronautical Decision-Making and 

Judgment 

The NPRM proposed to include 

aeronautical decision-making and 

judgment as an area of knowledge tested 

on the initial and recurrent knowledge 

tests. Aviation Management suggested 

that this area of knowledge be excluded 

from the knowledge tests because this 

knowledge is unnecessary for all small 

UAS operations. 

The FAA disagrees. As discussed in 

the NPRM, even though small 

unmanned aircraft will be limited to a 

relatively low altitude by the provisions 

of this rule, they will still share the 

airspace with some manned-aircraft 

operations. To safely share the airspace, 

a remote pilot in command will need to 

understand the aeronautical decisionmaking and judgment that manned 

aircraft pilots engage in so that he or she 

can anticipate how a manned aircraft 

will react to the small unmanned 

aircraft. Accordingly, this rule will 

retain aeronautical decision-making and 

judgment as an area of knowledge 

covered on the initial and recurrent 

knowledge tests. 

xi. Airport Operations 

Noting that some small UAS 

operations could be conducted near an 

airport, the NPRM proposed to include 

airport operations as an area of 

knowledge tested on the initial and 

recurrent knowledge tests. 

Several commenters, including the 

Small UAV Coalition, Princeton 

University, and Predessa, argued that 

airport operations may not be relevant 

to all small UAS operations, and as 

such, should be removed from the 

knowledge tests. The Electronic Frontier 

Foundation argued that this area of 

knowledge is ‘‘clearly irrelevant’’ for 

micro UAS flights conducted far away 

from airports. 

There are over 5,000 public use 

airports in the United States. As such, 

the FAA expects that a number of small 

UAS operations may take place near an 

airport. The FAA also expects that there 

could be instances where a small 

unmanned aircraft unexpectedly ends 

up flying near an airport due to adverse 

conditions, such as unexpectedly strong 

winds that carry the aircraft toward the 

airport. In those instances, the remote 

pilot in command will need to have an 

understanding of airport operations so 

that he or she knows what actions to 

take to ensure that the small unmanned 

aircraft does not interfere with airport 

operations or traffic patterns. 

Accordingly, this rule will retain airport 

operations as an area of knowledge 

tested on the initial and recurrent 

knowledge tests. 

xii. Radio Communication Procedures 

Finally, the NPRM proposed to 

include radio communication 

procedures as an area of knowledge 

covered on the initial aeronautical 

knowledge test. 

Several commenters, including 

Princeton University, Predesa, and 

Aviation Management, argued that radio 

communications may not be relevant for 

all small UAS operations and as such, 

should be removed from the knowledge 

test. Predesa suggested that the FAA 

design a new ‘‘Class G-only unmanned 

aircraft operator certificate with a small 

UAS rating’’ that, among other things, 

does not include radio communication 

procedures as an area of knowledge that 

is tested on the knowledge test. One 

commenter recommended removal of 

‘‘radio communication procedures’’ 

because there is no requirement for 

radio communications of any sort with 

small UAS operations. 

As discussed earlier, the FAA expects 

that a number of small UAS operations 


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142See 49 CFR 175.8(a)(2). 

will take place near an airport. That is 

why § 107.43 prohibits a small 

unmanned aircraft from interfering with 

airport operations or traffic patterns. 

Understanding radio communication 

procedures will assist a remote pilot in 

command operating near a Class G 

airport in complying with this 

requirement. Understanding radio 

communication procedures will assist a 

remote pilot in command operating near 

a Class G airport in complying with this 

requirement if that pilot chooses to use 

a radio to aid in his or her situational 

awareness of manned aircraft operating 

nearby. As described in section 4–1–9 of 

the Aeronautical Information Manual, 

manned-aircraft pilots may broadcast 

their position or intended flight activity 

or ground operation on the designated 

Common Traffic Advisory Frequency 

(CTAF). This procedure is used 

primarily at airports that do not have an 

airport traffic control tower, or have a 

control tower that is not in operation. 

Pilots of radio-equipped aircraft use 

standard phraseology to announce their 

identification, location, altitude, and 

intended course of action. Selfannouncing for arriving aircraft 

generally begins within 10 nautical 

miles of the airport and continues until 

the aircraft is clear of runways and 

taxiways. Aircraft on the ground 

intending to depart will begin to make 

position reports prior to entry of the 

runway or taxiway and continue until 

departing the traffic pattern. Aircraft 

remaining in the pattern make position 

reports on each leg of the traffic pattern. 

Thus, knowledge of radio 

communication procedures will provide 

a remote pilot in command with the 

ability to utilize a valuable resource, 

CTAF, to help determine the position of 

nearby manned aircraft. As such, this 

rule will retain this area of knowledge 

on the initial aeronautical knowledge 

test. 

xiii. Other Areas of Knowledge 

Suggested by the Commenters 

The NPRM invited comment on 

whether additional areas of knowledge 

should be tested on the initial and 

recurrent knowledge tests. In response, 

the FAA received comments listing 

additional areas of knowledge that 

commenters would like to see on the 

knowledge tests. For the reasons 

discussed below, the FAA will add a 

section on maintenance and inspection 

to the initial and recurrent knowledge 

tests and the online training courses. 

The FAA will not add any other areas 

of knowledge to the knowledge tests or 

training courses. 

The National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB) suggested that the test 

content should include awareness of 

lost-link failsafe procedures, operator 

development, use of maintenance and 

inspection steps and guides, and the 

characteristics and proper handling of 

lithium batteries. The NTSB referred to 

an April 2006 accident involving a U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection 

unmanned aircraft and encouraged the 

FAA to review its recommendations and 

supporting information stemming from 

that accident for potential lessons 

learned when developing guidance 

material and specific content for the 

written knowledge tests outlined in 

proposed part 107. 

The FAA notes that topics associated 

with lost-link failsafe procedures will be 

covered by the area of knowledge testing 

an applicant’s understanding of the 

applicable small UAS regulations. With 

regard to maintenance and inspection, 

the FAA has taken action by adding 

maintenance and inspection knowledge 

test topic area requirements to the initial 

and recurrent knowledge tests. The 

addition of maintenance and inspection 

knowledge test topics will consist of 

small UAS basic maintenance and 

inspection knowledge that is common to 

all small UAS regardless of complexity. 

An understanding of maintenance and 

inspection issues will ensure that 

remote pilots are familiar with how to 

identify when a small unmanned 

aircraft is not safe to operate, and how 

to maintain a small unmanned aircraft 

to mitigate the possibility of aircraft 

failure during flight. Although this area 

of knowledge will not cover every 

possible inspection and maintenance 

method, it will provide a baseline of 

knowledge that will be useful to all 

small UAS remote pilots. 

The FAA disagrees with NTSB’s 

recommendation that the knowledge 

test include a topic on the 

characteristics and proper handling of 

lithium batteries. Under § 107.36, small 

UAS are prohibited from carriage of 

hazardous materials. When installed in 

the aircraft for use as a power source (as 

opposed to carriage of spares or cargo), 

lithium batteries are not considered 

hazardous material.142

NOAA suggested that the knowledge 

test include questions relating to 

protecting and operating in the context 

of wildlife. The Ventura Audubon 

Society also suggested that the FAA test 

an applicant’s understanding of Federal 

and State wildlife protection laws. 

The FAA is required by statute to 

issue an airman certificate to an 

individual when the Administrator 

finds that the individual is qualified and 

physically able to safely perform the 

duties authorized by the certificate. See 

49 U.S.C. 44703(a) (stating that the 

Administrator ‘‘shall issue’’ an airman 

certificate to an individual who is 

qualified and physically capable). 

Therefore, the FAA cannot deny or 

delay the issuance of an airman 

certificate if an applicant has 

demonstrated that he or she is qualified 

and physically able to safely perform 

the duties authorized by the certificate. 

In this case, a remote pilot certificate 

with small UAS rating authorizes the 

holder to operate a small UAS safely in 

the NAS. Thus, under § 44703(a), the 

FAA is required to issue an airman 

certificate to an individual who has 

demonstrated an ability to safely operate 

a small UAS, and may not require that 

individual to also demonstrate an 

understanding of Federal and State 

wildlife protection laws. 

The FAA emphasizes, however, that a 

small UAS operation may be subject to 

other legal requirements independently 

of this rule. A remote pilot in command 

is responsible for complying with all of 

his or her legal obligations and should 

thus have a proper understanding of 

wildlife protection laws in order to 

comply with the pertinent statutes and 

regulations. 

Drone User Group Network suggested 

the following topics for the knowledge 

test: the concepts of lift, weight, thrust 

and drag, Bernoulli’s principle, weight 

and balance, weather, situational 

awareness, safety in preflight, in flight 

and post flight, battery theory, radio 

frequency theory, electrical theory, 

understanding flight modes, fail-safes, 

and aircraft types and limitations. 

The FAA notes that weight and 

balance, weather, and preflight 

requirements will be tested under 

§ 107.73. The FAA agrees with the 

commenter that technical topics such as 

principles of flight, aerodynamics, and 

electrical theory may enhance the 

knowledge and technical understanding 

of the remote pilot. However, these 

topics are not critical subject areas for 

safe operation of small UAS. The FAA 

includes many of these topics in the 

curriculum of part 61 knowledge testing 

because they are critical knowledge 

areas for persons operating an aircraft 

with passengers over populated areas 

that may need to respond to an 

emergency resulting from engine failure, 

unexpected weather, or onboard fire. 

Conversely, small UAS operations take 

place in a contained area in a lightweight aircraft that has no people 

onboard, so these topics are not 

applicable to the same extent as they are 

to a manned-aircraft operation. 

However, the remote pilot in command 

should familiarize him or herself with 


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all of the necessary information to be 

able to fly the unmanned aircraft 

without causing damage to the aircraft. 

Southwest Airlines Pilots’ Association 

encouraged the FAA to require that 

operators be knowledgeable about 

Safety Management Systems (SMS) and 

the Aviation Safety Reporting System 

(ASRS), which could be used to collect 

data to support a risk managed growth 

of the industry and the integration into 

the NAS. 

The FAA disagrees that SMS and 

ASRS systems should be covered on the 

knowledge tests. Participation in a 

formal SMS program is currently 

required only for part 121 operations, 

which are the largest and most complex 

manned-aircraft operations regulated by 

the FAA. Requiring small UAS to 

participate in this program would not be 

justified considering the fact that the 

FAA does not require non-part-121 

manned-aircraft operations to have an 

SMS. Similarly, the FAA will not 

require testing on ASRS knowledge 

because ASRS is not currently required 

knowledge for part 61 pilot certificate 

holders. 

k. Administration of the Knowledge 

Tests and Training Courses 

This section discusses how the initial 

and recurrent knowledge tests and 

online training courses will be 

administered under this rule. 

Specifically, this section addresses: (1) 

The location at which a knowledge test 

can be taken; (2) the prohibition on 

cheating and engaging in unauthorized 

conduct during a knowledge test; (3) the 

identification of the test taker; and (4) 

retesting after failing a knowledge test. 

i. Location of the Knowledge Test and 

Online Option for Training Course 

Knowledge tests currently 

administered to prospective pilots 

under 14 CFR part 61 are created by the 

FAA and administered by knowledge 

testing centers. A knowledge testing 

center is a private company that has 

been approved to administer airman 

knowledge tests. These centers are 

overseen by the FAA to ensure that the 

testing center meets FAA requirements. 

The NPRM proposed to apply this 

existing framework to knowledge testing 

under part 107. The NPRM also noted 

that the FAA considered an online testtaking option, but ultimately rejected 

this option due to concerns about 

cheating and the protection of 

personally identifiable information (PII). 

The NPRM invited comments on 

whether online testing should be 

permitted under this rule. 

For the reasons discussed below, the 

FAA will finalize this provision as 

proposed with one exception. That 

exception is that the training course 

available to part 61 pilot certificate 

holders in place of an aeronautical 

knowledge test will be administered 

online rather than at a knowledge 

testing center. 

Texas A&M University-Corpus 

Christi/LSUASC suggested that the FAA 

UAS test sites should be involved in the 

training, testing, and certification 

processes. NRECA suggested allowing 

NRECA members to administer the tests 

for their employees. NRECA asserted 

that its members already have extensive 

experience with training and testing, 

and are well equipped to administer the 

testing contemplated in this rule 

without compromising the integrity of 

such tests. 

Additionally, the Small UAV 

Coalition suggested that DPEs, ACRs, 

CFIs, or other persons authorized by the 

Administrator be authorized to conduct 

the aeronautical test and issue the 

certificate. These commenters generally 

noted that these approaches would 

increase efficiency regarding the 

issuance of unmanned aircraft operator 

certificates with a small UAS rating. 

The Property Drone Consortium 

suggested that another way to increase 

efficiency would be for the FAA to 

allow certain industries to conduct 

internal training that would satisfy the 

requirement for applicants to pass an 

initial aeronautical knowledge test given 

by an FAA knowledge testing center. 

Property Drone Consortium and several 

individuals also suggested that the FAA 

begin planning for the establishment of 

testing centers so that there will be 

adequate capacity for operators to take 

the initial small UAS operator 

certification test. 

After considering the comments, the 

FAA has decided to use its existing 

system of knowledge testing centers to 

administer the aeronautical knowledge 

tests. There are currently about 700 

knowledge testing centers spread 

throughout the country. The FAA 

anticipates that this system has 

adequate capacity for individuals to take 

the initial aeronautical knowledge test. 

An updated list of commercial testing 

center locations and contact information 

may be accessed at: https://

www.faa.gov/training_testing/testing/

media/test_centers.pdf. 

The FAA also has the ability to 

designate additional knowledge testing 

centers if demand for the knowledge test 

exceeds existing capacity and the 

existing knowledge testing centers 

become incapable of meeting the 

increased demand, provided the FAA 

also has the ability to provide adequate 

oversight. Airman Knowledge Testing 

Organization Designation Authorization 

Holders are designated to administer 

airman knowledge tests under the 

authority of FAA Orders 8100.15, 

8080.6G and 49 U.S.C. 44702(d). To 

ensure FAA jurisdictional and 

surveillance oversight, only companies, 

schools, universities, or other 

organizations that meet the 

requirements of this order may be 

eligible for designation. The FAA also 

notes that there is nothing in the final 

rule that prohibits industries from 

conducting internal training for 

employees to prepare them for the 

initial or recurrent aeronautical 

knowledge test. 

A number of commenters, including 

the Professional Society of Drone 

Journalists, AUVSI, and NBAA, 

supported allowing applicants to take 

both the initial and recurrent 

aeronautical knowledge tests online. 

NRECA, Cherokee Nation Technologies, 

and the Nez Perce Tribe pointed to the 

benefits of online testing to applicants 

living in rural locations, who would 

otherwise have to travel great distances 

to take the knowledge test in-person. 

Other commenters, including AOPA, 

News Media Coalition, and New 

Hampshire DOT, supported online 

testing for recurrent aeronautical 

knowledge tests. Associated Builders 

and Contractors also recommended 

allowing an online option for recurrent 

test takers, but said it should be 

supervised. The commenter asserted 

that the FAA missed a number of factors 

when looking at the economic impact 

on businesses and individuals of 

allowing online testing. 

Several commenters addressed the 

FAA’s concerns about positive 

identification of applications and the 

need to protect applicants’ personally 

identifiable information (PII). NetMoby 

pointed out that there are numerous 

Federal judicial filing systems which 

protect PII, and recommended the FAA 

use these techniques to protect PII in 

online testing. The Colorado 

Cattlemen’s Association said the FAA 

can address issues related to positive 

identification and PII protection through 

a combination of existing driver’s 

license databases and existing measures 

used by the FAA to protect PII 

submitted by other applicants and 

certificated airmen. Planehook Aviation 

stated that ensuring the identity of testtakers in person using current 

‘‘identification credential fidelity 

methods’’ is just as subject to 

falsification as pre-online testing 

identification verification. Airgon 

suggested that FAA could draw from the 

experience of online universities to 

verify an applicant’s identity for 


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purposes of an online exam. The 

commenter noted that such techniques 

include posing challenge questions with 

personal information about a student, 

using video capture to record the 

student during the exam, using 

biometrics such as voice recognition, 

and using video proctoring, which 

connects a student to a live proctor who 

verifies the student’s identity. 

Other commenters addressed the 

FAA’s concern that online test-takers 

could cheat on the test. Two individual 

commenters asserted that many cities 

allow drivers to take defensive driving 

courses online, and asserted that if this 

method is sufficient for defensive 

driving courses, it is more than 

sufficient for small UAS testing. Airgon 

asserted that there are software 

programs, such as Examsoft, that lock an 

examinee’s computer, preventing the 

examinee from opening other 

applications during a test. The 

commenter also noted that companies 

are developing software that can track 

an examinee’s keystrokes and other 

activities during the test, such as 

opening another browser window, 

talking on a phone, talking to someone 

else in the room, or using a book. The 

commenter also suggested the FAA 

could impose time limits on the test to 

limit the time available for an examinee 

to look up information covered on the 

test. NRECA argued that the risk of 

cheating is low and can be managed by 

requiring ‘‘an appropriately worded 

sworn certification by the test-taker.’’ 

Several commenters, including the 

National Association of State Aviation 

Officials, NAFI, and Aerius, opposed 

online aeronautical knowledge testing. 

Those commenters generally opposed 

online testing for security purposes (i.e., 

difficulty of ensuring test-taker identity 

and securing test-taker PII) and because 

of concerns about cheating. Modovolate 

pointed out that it is not clear how 

online testing would avoid 

impermissible reference to materials. 

Because an applicant for a remote 

pilot certificate with small UAS rating is 

not required to pass a practical test, 

knowledge testing is the only way for 

the FAA to determine that a remote 

pilot has the requisite aeronautical 

knowledge to operate safely in the NAS. 

Therefore, it is imperative that the 

testing methodology being used assures 

that knowledge is demonstrated. The 

FAA is still evaluating whether online 

testing technologies can provide 

adequate proctoring of a test to ensure, 

among other things, that the test-taker is 

not taking the test for someone else or 

using reference material or other 

unapproved aids to help answer the test 

questions. Concerns with online testing 

are not limited to cheating. Because the 

knowledge test questions are pulled 

from a test bank with a finite number of 

questions, limiting access to that 

database to knowledge testing centers 

ensures the continued security and 

integrity of the test questions. 

At this time, the FAA is aware of no 

other Federal agency that has 

successfully implemented an online 

knowledge testing system for imparting 

privileges that can directly affect the 

safety of nonparticipating persons or 

property. The FAA acknowledges 

comments pointing out that there are 

States that either have or are 

considering online testing for driver’s 

tests. However, in all cases, States 

require an in-person practical driving 

test for issuing a driver’s license, which 

helps address concerns with online 

testing. Thus, the States’ online drivers’ 

license testing model is not directly 

analogous to the framework of this rule. 

The FAA notes, however, that the 

above concerns do not apply as strongly 

to UAS-specific training for holders of 

part 61 pilot certificates other than 

student pilot. These part 61 pilot 

certificate holders have already passed 

extensive testing and training 

requirements on general aeronautical 

knowledge and have gone through the 

positive identification process in order 

to obtain a part 61 pilot certificate. 

While part 61 pilot certificate holders 

may not have UAS-specific knowledge 

(hence the requirement for the training 

course), the UAS-specific knowledge is 

simply an application of general 

aeronautical knowledge principles to a 

specific type of operation. Because part 

61 pilot certificate holders have already 

demonstrated proficiency in areas of 

general aeronautical knowledge, 

administering the training course online 

would not pose a problem for this 

population of remote pilot certificate 

applicants. 

The FAA acknowledges that 

technology in this area could evolve to 

address its concerns with online testing 

(discussed earlier). The FAA also notes 

that online testing would, if 

implemented, significantly reduce the 

costs associated with part 107 by 

eliminating the travel costs incurred as 

a result of a person having to physically 

travel to a knowledge testing center. As 

such, the FAA will consider allowing 

the initial and recurrent knowledge tests 

to be taken online if an online system 

becomes available that allows a 

knowledge test to be administered 

securely (with controls in place to 

prevent cheating) and that allows the 

test taker to be positively identified 

without an in-person interaction. 

ii. Cheating or Engaging in 

Unauthorized Conduct 

To ensure that the aeronautical 

knowledge test is properly 

administered, the NPRM proposed to 

prohibit an applicant from cheating or 

engaging in other unauthorized conduct 

during the knowledge test. This would 

include: (1) Copying or intentionally 

removing a knowledge test; (2) giving a 

copy of a knowledge test to another 

applicant or receiving a copy of the 

knowledge test from another applicant; 

(3) giving or receiving unauthorized 

assistance while the knowledge test is 

being administered; (4) taking any part 

of a knowledge test on behalf of another 

person; (5) being represented by or 

representing another person for a 

knowledge test; and (6) using any 

material not specifically authorized by 

the FAA while taking a knowledge test. 

Cheating or engaging in unauthorized 

conduct during a knowledge test would 

be grounds for suspending or revoking 

the certificate or denying an application 

for a certificate. In addition, a person 

who engages in unauthorized conduct 

would be prohibited from applying for 

a certificate or taking a knowledge test 

for a period of one year after the date of 

the unauthorized conduct. 

The FAA did not receive any adverse 

comments on this component of the 

proposed rule. Accordingly, this rule 

will finalize the cheating or engaging-inunauthorized-conduct provisions of the 

NPRM as proposed. 14 CFR 107.69. 

iii. Identification of the Test-Taker 

The NPRM proposed to ensure that an 

applicant who is about to take the 

knowledge test is properly identified by 

requiring the applicant to present 

identification to the knowledge testing 

center prior to taking the knowledge 

test. This identification would have to 

include the applicant’s: (1) Photograph; 

(2) signature; (3) date of birth, which 

shows the applicant meets or will meet 

the age requirement for a remote pilot 

certificate; and (4) the applicant’s 

current residential address. For the 

reasons discussed below, this rule will 

finalize this aspect of the NPRM as 

proposed. 

An individual commenter questioned 

an apparent contradiction in the NPRM, 

which would allow knowledge testing 

centers to verify an applicant’s 

identification for the purposes of 

administering a knowledge test but 

would prohibit knowledge testing 

centers from verifying identification for 

the purposes of submitting an airman 

application. The commenter added that 

if the goal of this rule is to achieve the 

least burdensome process, then 


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knowledge testing centers should be 

permitted to verify a person’s 

identification for both testing and 

application submission to the FAA. 

The FAA acknowledges the positive 

identification conducted by the 

knowledge testing centers, and has 

determined that there is no need to 

repeatedly identify a person who has 

already been positively identified for 

the purposes of taking the knowledge 

test. Accordingly, as discussed later in 

section III.F.l, this rule will allow an 

applicant to submit his or her remote 

pilot application without having to be 

positively identified a second time. 

iv. Retesting After Failure 

The NPRM noted that some 

applicants may fail the initial 

aeronautical knowledge test the first 

time that they take it. To ensure that 

those applicants take the time to do 

additional studying and/or training 

(rather than simply take the test over 

and over again), the NPRM proposed to 

require that a person who fails the 

aeronautical knowledge test must wait 

14 calendar days before retaking it. For 

the reasons discussed below, this rule 

will finalize this provision as proposed 

in the NPRM. 14 CFR 107.71. 

One commenter suggested that an 

applicant who fails the knowledge test 

should be required to receive additional 

training in the area(s) of deficiency and 

receive an endorsement from a flight 

instructor in order to retake the test. The 

commenter rationalized that this would 

be consistent with current policy for 

pilot applicants with regards to failure 

and retesting, and will enhance safety 

by ensuring some level of oversight in 

the training process. 

A person who fails the aeronautical 

knowledge test will receive a knowledge 

test report pointing out the areas of 

knowledge on which he or she did not 

test well. That person will then have 14 

days to conduct additional study or 

training in those areas of knowledge 

prior to retaking the knowledge test. 

Specifying a prescriptive method of 

study is not necessary in this rule. 

Instead, the applicant will be 

incentivized to select the method of 

study that works best for him or her. 

l. Transportation Security 

Administration Vetting and Process for 

Issuance 

i. TSA Vetting and Temporary Remote 

Pilot Certificates 

Prior to the issuance of a remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating, the 

NPRM proposed requiring all applicants 

to be vetted by the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA). Under 

the proposed rule, the FAA would 

transmit an airman certificate 

applicant’s biographical information for 

security vetting to TSA and issue an 

airman certificate only after receiving a 

successful response from TSA. 

However, if TSA determines that an 

airman certificate applicant poses a 

security risk, 49 U.S.C. 46111 requires 

the FAA to deny the application for a 

certificate or amend, modify, suspend, 

or revoke (as appropriate) any part of an 

airman certificate based on TSA’s 

security findings. 

Additionally, the proposed rule 

would have required an applicant for a 

remote pilot certificate with a small 

UAS rating to submit the application to 

a Flight Standards District Office 

(FSDO), a designated pilot examiner 

(DPE), an airman certification 

representative (ACR) for a pilot school, 

a certificated flight instructor (CFI), or 

other persons authorized by the 

Administrator. The person accepting the 

application submission would be 

required to verify that the identity of the 

applicant matches the identity that is 

provided on the application. 

For the reasons discussed below, this 

rule will, with one exception, allow an 

applicant who has passed the 

aeronautical knowledge test to submit 

an application for a remote pilot 

certificate directly to the FAA without 

having to travel to a Flight Standards 

District Office (FSDO), designated pilot 

examiner (DPE), airman certification 

representative (ACR), or certificated 

flight instructor (CFI). Holders of a part 

61 pilot certificate who elect to take the 

online training course instead of the 

aeronautical knowledge test will, as 

proposed in the NPRM, be required to 

submit their certificate to a FSDO, DPE, 

ACR, or CFI in order to verify their 

identity. Part 61 pilot certificate holders 

will be issued a temporary remote pilot 

certificate immediately upon acceptance 

of their certificate application while all 

other applicants will be issued a 

temporary remote pilot certificate upon 

successful completion of TSA security 

vetting. 

Many commenters, including Google, 

NAMIC, and Edison Electric Institute, 

agreed that applicants for a remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating 

should be vetted by TSA as a 

prerequisite for obtaining a certificate. 

The City and County of Denver noted 

that a specific vetting mechanism is not 

detailed in the proposed regulations, 

and recommended that the FAA 

expressly require a completed Security 

and Threat Assessment (STA) as a 

prerequisite for obtaining an operating 

license. Virginia Commonwealth 

University Honors Students 

recommended that the vetting process 

include a criminal background check 

and that FAA decline operators who 

have been charged with a violent or 

sexual crime. The American Fuel & 

Petrochemical Manufacturers and the 

IME suggested that the FAA state 

explicitly in the final rule that failing 

the security threat assessment will 

disqualify an individual from obtaining 

an unmanned aircraft operator 

certificate with a small UAS rating. 

These and other commenters also 

generally noted that the FAA should 

ensure that there is a redress procedure 

for cases where an individual believes 

he or she improperly failed the security 

threat assessment. IME recommended 

that the certificate action processes 

codified in 49 U.S.C. 46111, including 

revocations, hearings, timely appeals 

and reviews, be included in the final 

rule. 

The governing statute requires that 

‘‘individuals are screened against all 

appropriate records in the consolidated 

and integrated terrorist watchlist 

maintained by the Federal Government 

before . . . being certificated by the 

Federal Aviation Administration.’’ 49 

U.S.C. 44903(j)(2)(D)(i). Also, if TSA 

determines that an applicant poses a 

security risk as a result of the security 

vetting, 49 U.S.C. 46111 requires the 

FAA to deny that applicant’s certificate 

application or amend, modify, suspend, 

or revoke (as appropriate) any part of an 

airman certificate based on the TSA’s 

security findings. 

The current certificate vetting 

program that the TSA administers 

satisfies the statutory vetting 

requirements. The FAA collects and 

provides the biographic information of 

FAA Airmen Certificate applicants, 

certificate holders, and those applying 

for airmen certificates on the basis of a 

foreign license to TSA for use in the 

security vetting. Under this final rule, 

the FAA will leverage the current 

process for the vetting of remote pilot 

certificate applicants. As stated in the 

NPRM and in accordance with the 

governing statute, the FAA may issue 

certificates to individuals who have first 

successfully completed an STA 

conducted by the TSA. The STA that 

TSA conducts adheres to the statutory 

mandate to vet certificate applicants 

against the government’s consolidated 

terrorist watchlists to determine 

whether they may pose a threat to 

national or transportation security. The 

FAA defers to TSA’s established STA, 

and TSA’s determination of what 

factors, such as items contained within 

an individual’s criminal record, will rise 

to the level of disqualification for a 

remote pilot certificate. The authority 


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143See 14 CFR 61.17. 

for TSA to establish these criteria and 

make this determination is codified in 

49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2)(D)(i). Because 

section 44903 vests the pertinent 

authority in the TSA, the Department 

cannot, in this DOT rulemaking, specify 

what factors the TSA should consider to 

be disqualifying. 

Additionally, TSA provides a 

substantial amount of due process to 

individuals who believe that they 

improperly failed an STA. Specifically, 

upon finding that an individual poses a 

security threat, the TSA issues a 

Determination of Security Threat to the 

individual. That individual may then 

make a written request for copies of 

releasable materials upon which the 

Determination of Security Threat was 

based. The TSA must respond no later 

than 60 days after receiving the request, 

and the individual may submit a written 

reply to the TSA’s response. Upon 

receiving TSA’s response, an individual 

who is a citizen of the United States is 

entitled to a hearing on the record in 

front of an administrative law judge 

(ALJ). That individual may then appeal 

the results of the hearing to the 

Transportation Security Oversight 

Board. If unsatisfied with the results of 

this appeal, the individual can obtain 

further review of the decision in Federal 

court. 

Non-citizen U.S. nationals (which 

generally includes individuals born in 

American Samoa and Swains Island) 

and permanent residents may also have 

a hearing before the ALJ, but the ALJ’s 

decision is reviewed by the TSA. TSA’s 

decision on appeal is a final agency 

action appealable to a Federal court. A 

foreign national does not have the right 

to a hearing before an ALJ, but may seek 

review of the final agency decision in 

Federal court. 

SkyView recommended that the FAA 

collect and verify additional 

information such as email address or 

home/cell phone numbers that could be 

used to contact the applicant quickly 

should the need arise. NBAA asserted 

that it had reviewed TSA’s STA 

requirements, which the association 

said seem to presume that a larger 

organization is involved rather than an 

individual. The association 

subsequently questioned how, in cases 

where an operator is a single person, the 

FAA and TSA plan to address 

requirements that NBAA believes were 

developed for larger, more complex 

organizations. 

In response to Skyview’s comment 

asking the FAA to collect applicant 

contact information, the FAA notes that 

an applicant will be required to provide 

pertinent contact information on the 

application for a remote pilot certificate. 

Additionally, the FAA clarifies that the 

STAs that are currently being conducted 

by TSA for the FAA Airmen 

Certification Branch are being 

conducted for individuals, not 

organizations. 

Several commenters suggested 

amending the TSA vetting process, 

creating exceptions for certain 

individuals, or eliminating the 

requirement altogether. Commenters, 

including Event 38 Unmanned Systems, 

Associated General Contractors of 

America, and Edison Electric Institute, 

expressed concern over the estimated 6- 

to-8-week time-frame between receipt of 

an application and issuance of a remote 

pilot certificate with small UAS rating 

as proposed in the NPRM. It is 

important to note that TSA’s security 

vetting is complete in less than 7 days 

unless derogatory information related to 

the applicant is discovered and must be 

investigated to complete the STA. 

Several commenters, including the 

Electronic Frontier Foundation, 

Washington Aviation Group, and Event 

38 Unmanned Systems, opposed the 

requirement for small UAS operator 

applicants to undergo a TSA 

background check prior to receiving 

their operator certificate. Many of these 

commenters pointed out that it is highly 

unlikely that an individual who poses a 

threat to national security would seek to 

obtain an airman certificate and go 

through the TSA vetting process. 

Several commenters argued that prescreening applicants is extremely 

burdensome for entrepreneurs and small 

businesses, and creates a barrier to 

market entry. Some commenters argued 

that 49 U.S.C. 46111 does not require 

the FAA to wait until hearing back from 

TSA prior to granting the certificate, or 

that it does not confer the authority to 

pre-screen applicants for an airmen 

certificate. One commenter suggested 

that the knowledge testing centers be 

able to issue temporary certificates upon 

passing the knowledge test, which could 

be revoked if the TSA vetting process 

indicated that the individual should not 

be issued a remote pilot certificate. 

As discussed previously, 49 U.S.C. 

44903(j)(2)(D)(i) is unambiguous and 

states that the vetting must be 

completed before the FAA may issue an 

airman certificate. Given the relatively 

short time the vetting takes for the 

overwhelming majority of applicants, it 

is difficult to identify a burden that is 

not outweighed by the clear benefit of 

ensuring that certificate holders do not 

pose a threat to national or 

transportation security. Section 

44903(j)(2)(D)(i) explicitly states that 

TSA screening of an individual must 

take place ‘‘before’’ that individual is 

certificated by the FAA. 

In addition, 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2)(D) 

and 46111 vest the authority for vetting 

with TSA. Specifically, section 46111(a) 

states that ‘‘[t]he Administrator of 

Federal Aviation Administration shall 

issue an order amending, modifying, 

suspending, or revoking any part of a 

certificate issued under this title if the 

Administrator is notified by the Under 

Secretary for Border and Transportation 

Security of the Department of Homeland 

Security that the holder of the certificate 

poses, or is suspected of posing, a risk 

of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to 

airline or passenger safety.’’ (Emphasis 

added). Thus, under § 46111, the FAA’s 

role in the vetting process is ministerial; 

the FAA acts on findings that have been 

made by the TSA, but it is TSA that 

makes the actual security 

determinations. Because the authority 

for making the pertinent security 

determination is vested with TSA, the 

Department does not have jurisdiction 

to alter the criteria and requirements of 

that determination in the manner 

suggested by the commenters. 

The FAA acknowledges, however, the 

commenters’ concern regarding the 

estimated 6-to-8-week timeframe 

associated with processing the 

certificate application. In response, this 

rule will allow an applicant who 

already holds a part 61 pilot certificate 

to obtain a temporary remote pilot 

certificate immediately upon FAA 

receipt of his or her application. The 

FAA is able to issue a temporary remote 

pilot certificate to part 61 pilot 

certificate holders prior to completion of 

new security vetting because these 

individuals have already been 

successfully completed the TSA vetting 

when they obtained their part 61 pilot 

certificates. 

The FAA will also issue a temporary 

electronic remote pilot certificate to all 

other applicants who apply through 

IACRA upon successful completion of 

TSA security vetting. The FAA 

anticipates that, while it may take the 

FAA 6 to 8 weeks to issue a permanent 

remote pilot certificate, a temporary 

remote pilot certificate can be issued in 

about 10 business days. The temporary 

remote pilot certificate will allow the 

certificate holder to exercise all the 

privileges of the certificate, thus 

significantly reducing the waiting 

period prior to being able to operate as 

a remote pilot in command under part 

107. 

Just like a temporary pilot certificate 

issued under part 61,143 a temporary 

remote pilot certificate with a small 


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144See 49 CFR 1552.3(h)(1). 

145These requirements are similar to the ones 

imposed on part 61 pilot certificates by §§ 61.15(a) 

and 61.16. 

UAS rating will be valid for 120 days 

after issuance. This will provide 

sufficient time for the FAA to complete 

its processing of the certificate 

application and issue the applicant a 

permanent remote pilot certificate. The 

temporary certificate will automatically 

expire once the applicant receives a 

permanent remote pilot certificate with 

a small UAS rating. The temporary 

certificate will also expire if the FAA 

discovers an issue with the certificate 

application and issues the applicant a 

notice that his or her certificate 

application is denied or the certificate 

(if one has already been issued) is 

revoked. 

The FAA defers to TSA on whether 

current part 61 pilot certificate holders 

will have to continue to undergo the 

vetting process in order to receive a 

non-temporary remote pilot certificate 

with a small UAS rating. The FAA also 

notes that applicants who have passed 

STAs for other federal programs, 

received background checks, or hold 

U.S. passports will still need to satisfy 

TSA’s STA specific to the statute that 

requires security vetting prior to 

issuance of an airmen’s certificate (49 

U.S.C. 44903). The FAA does not have 

jurisdiction to accept alternative 

documentation instead of a TSA 

security finding because, as discussed 

earlier, 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2)(D) and 

46111 vest the pertinent jurisdiction in 

the TSA. In response to DJI, the FAA 

notes that a complete TSA vetting 

process is an integral part of the 

requirements of this rule because it 

reduces the risk of a person who poses 

a security threat obtaining an airman 

certificate under part 107. 

ii. Issuance and Positive Identification 

Regarding issuance and positive 

identification, many commenters 

suggested changes to the FAA’s current 

process and responsibilities for testing, 

acceptance of airman applications, and 

issuance of airman certificates that 

would only apply to unmanned aircraft 

operator certificates with a small UAS 

rating. AirGon, as well as another 

individual commenter, generally 

suggested that the knowledge testing 

centers process the applications, verify 

the identity of the applicant and submit 

the applications to TSA. 

As discussed in section III.F.2.k.iii 

above, knowledge testing centers will be 

required to positively verify the identity 

of the applicant prior to providing him 

or her with a knowledge test to ensure 

that someone else is not taking the test 

for the applicant. The NPRM proposed 

that an applicant who passes a 

knowledge test would then have to be 

positively identified a second time by a 

FSDO, DPE, ACR, or CFI. This second 

identification would impose a burden in 

the form of travel costs and service fees 

(charged by DPEs, ACRs, and CFIs) 

without benefits sufficient to justify this 

burden, as the applicant has already 

been positively identified. Accordingly, 

this rule will not require applicants who 

pass an aeronautical knowledge test to 

submit their application to a FSDO, 

DPE, ACR, or CFI. Instead these 

applicants may submit their paper 

application via mail or electronically via 

IACRA. 

The FAA notes, however, that as 

discussed previously, part 61 pilot 

certificate holders who have completed 

a flight review within the previous 24 

months will have the option to take an 

online training course instead of an 

aeronautical knowledge test. Because 

part 61 pilot certificate holders who 

elect to exercise this option will not be 

positively identified at a knowledge 

testing center, this rule will require 

them to submit their remote pilot 

application to a FSDO, DPE, ACR, or 

CFI so that the person accepting their 

application can positively verify the 

identity of the applicant and establish 

that the applicant has met the eligibility 

requirements of the remote pilot 

certificate with small UAS rating. 

Under this approach, FSDOs, DPEs, 

and ACRs, who can currently accept 

applications for an airman certificate, 

will continue doing so for part 61 pilot 

certificate holders who take the online 

training course instead of a knowledge 

test. Additionally, as proposed in the 

NPRM, CFIs will also be able to accept 

remote pilot certificate applications 

because CFIs are recognized by TSA 

regulations as being able to verify 

identity.144 The FAA notes that there is 

an approximate combined total of 

100,000 DPEs, ACRs, and CFIs, all of 

whom will be able to accept an airman 

application and verify identity of part 

61 pilot certificate holders under this 

rule. 

ALPA questioned the use of the term 

‘‘student pilot’’ in the TSA vetting 

section of the NPRM. The FAA 

acknowledges the terminology should 

have been ‘‘applicant for remote pilot 

certificate with small UAS rating’’ and 

will correct the terminology in the final 

rule accordingly. 

3. Remote Pilot Certificate Denial, 

Revocation, Suspension, Amendment, 

and Surrender 

As proposed in the NPRM, this rule 

will allow the FAA to deny, suspend, or 

revoke a certificate for reasons including 

drug or alcohol offenses and refusal to 

submit to an alcohol test or furnish the 

results.145 Additionally, as discussed in 

the Remote Pilot Certificate Issuance 

and Eligibility section of this preamble, 

this rule will allow the FAA to deny, 

suspend, or revoke a certificate if TSA 

makes a finding that the applicant or 

certificate holder poses a security risk. 

This rule will also require certificate 

holders to notify the FAA of any change 

in name or address. Finally, certificate 

holders will be able to voluntarily 

surrender their certificates. 

a. Drugs and Alcohol Violations 

The FAA adopts the provisions 

related to drug and alcohol violations as 

proposed in the NPRM. Accordingly, 

under § 107.57(a), the FAA may deny a 

remote pilot certificate application or 

take other certificate action for 

violations of Federal or State drug laws. 

Certificates could also be denied, 

suspended, or revoked under § 107.57(b) 

for committing an act prohibited by 

§ 91.17 or § 91.19, as discussed in 

section III.I of this preamble. 

One commenter stated that any 

remote pilot should lose his or her 

privileges under part 107 if found to be 

operating while in a condition that does 

not permit safe operation of the small 

UAS. Another commenter suggested 

that remote pilot certificates should be 

denied, suspended or revoked for 

committing an act prohibited by 14 CFR 

91.17 or § 91.19. 

The FAA agrees. Under this rule, if a 

person violates § 91.17 or § 91.19, the 

FAA can take enforcement action, 

which may result in the imposition of 

civil penalties or suspension or 

revocation of that person’s airman 

certificate. Section 107.59 of this rule 

specifies that certificate action could be 

taken for: (1) failure to submit to a blood 

alcohol test or to release test results to 

the FAA as required by § 91.17; or (2) 

carriage of illegal drugs in violation of 

§ 91.19. 

b. Change of Name 

Section 107.77(a) will allow a person 

holding a remote pilot certificate with a 

small UAS rating to change the name on 

the certificate by submitting a namechange application to the FAA 

accompanied by the applicant’s: (1) 

Remote pilot certificate; and (2) copy of 

the marriage license, court order, or 

other document verifying the name 

change. After reviewing these 

documents, the FAA will return them to 

the applicant. These procedures mirror 

the regulations governing pilot 


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146See 14 CFR part 13, subpart C. 147Registration and Marking Requirements for 

Small Unmanned Aircraft, 80 FR 78594 (Dec. 16, 

2015). 

certificates currently issued under part 

61. The FAA did not receive any 

adverse comments on these provisions 

when they were proposed in the NPRM. 

c. Change of Address 

This rule will extend the existing 

change-of-mailing-address requirement 

of part 61 to holders of a remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating. 

Specifically § 107.77(c) will require a 

certificate holder who has made a 

change in permanent mailing address to 

notify the FAA within 30 days of 

making the address change. Failure to 

do so will prohibit the certificate holder 

from exercising the privileges of the 

airman certificate until he or she has 

notified the FAA of the changed 

address. This regulatory provision will 

help ensure that the FAA is able to 

contact airman certificate holders. The 

FAA did not receive any adverse 

comments on this provision when it was 

proposed in the NPRM. 

d. Voluntary Surrender of Certificate 

Section 107.79 will allow the holder 

of a remote pilot certificate with a small 

UAS rating to voluntarily surrender it to 

the FAA for cancellation. However, the 

FAA emphasizes that cancelling the 

certificate pursuant to § 107.79 will 

mean that the certificate no longer 

exists, and the individual who 

surrendered the certificate will need to 

again go through the entire certification 

process if he or she subsequently 

changes his or her mind. For 

individuals who are not part 61 pilot 

certificate holders, this includes passing 

the initial aeronautical knowledge test. 

Accordingly, § 107.79(b) will require the 

individual surrendering the certificate 

to include the following signed 

statement (or an equivalent) in his or 

her cancellation request: 

I voluntarily surrender my remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating for 

cancellation. This request is made for my 

own reasons with full knowledge that my 

certificate will not be reissued to me unless 

I again complete the requirements specified 

in § 107.61 and § 107.63. 

The FAA did not receive any adverse 

comments on this provision when it was 

proposed in the NPRM. 

e. Additional Comments on Remote 

Pilot Certificate 

Several commenters, including 

National Business Aviation Association, 

the State of Nevada, and Southern 

Company, agreed that unmanned 

aircraft operator certificates with a small 

UAS rating should not expire. On the 

other hand, two commenters suggested 

that the certificate should expire every 

2 years, and that the FAA should 

require passing the recurrent knowledge 

test for renewal. The American 

Insurance Association said that 

employees of insurance companies who 

operate micro UAS should only have to 

be certificated once and there should be 

no annual two year renewal unless the 

insurance company elects to replace its 

selected micro UAS. 

NetMoby commented that an 

unmanned aircraft operator certificate 

with a small UAS rating should be 

automatically revoked if the remote 

pilot fails a recurrent aeronautical 

knowledge test. Other commenters 

suggested that there should be a process 

for the FAA to revoke an unmanned 

aircraft operator certificate with a small 

UAS rating if the operator operates a 

UAS in an unsafe manner. NetMoby 

also suggested that a remote pilot who 

violates the prohibition regarding UAS 

operation in certain airspace should 

have their unmanned aircraft operator 

certificate with a small UAS rating 

revoked for life. 

As with other pilot certificates issued 

by the FAA, a remote pilot certificate 

with a small UAS rating will never 

expire. However, under the provisions 

of this rule, after a person receives a 

remote pilot certificate with a small 

UAS rating, that person will have to 

demonstrate that they have retained the 

required aeronautical knowledge in 

order to retain the privileges to operate 

a small unmanned aircraft. As discussed 

in section III.F.2.g of this preamble, a 

remote pilot who does not hold a part 

61 pilot certificate will have to pass a 

recurrent aeronautical knowledge test 

given by an FAA knowledge testing 

center every 24 calendar months after 

the issuance of a new remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating to 

continue to exercise the privileges of 

that certificate in the NAS. A remote 

pilot who holds a part 61 pilot 

certificate will have to either maintain 

a current flight review and complete an 

online recurrent training course every 

24 calendar months, or pass a recurrent 

aeronautical knowledge test as 

described above. This will ensure that a 

remote pilot continues to retain the 

knowledge necessary to safely operate a 

small unmanned aircraft. 

The FAA disagrees with comments 

suggesting automatic revocation of the 

certificate if a remote pilot fails a 

recurrent aeronautical knowledge test. 

Revoking the airman certificate would 

impose the cost of having to eventually 

reissue the certificate on FAA and TSA 

without a corresponding safety benefit. 

A certificate holder unable to show that 

he or she has passed either the initial or 

recurrent knowledge test within the 

preceding two-year period, or has 

maintained a current flight review and 

completed the online training course 

within the preceding two-year period, 

will be unable to exercise the privileges 

of his or her certificate until he or she 

meets the applicable currency 

requirements. 

In response to comments asking the 

FAA to establish penalties for certain 

regulatory violations, the FAA clarifies 

that there already exists a process for 

addressing regulatory violations, which 

can be found in 14 CFR part 13. Part 13 

specifies the penalties that the FAA may 

impose in response to a regulatory 

violation, and, in appropriate 

circumstances, those penalties may 

include the revocation of an 

individual’s airman certificate.146 The 

FAA has also issued guidance on 

potential sanctions that may be imposed 

for specific regulatory violations. This 

guidance can be found in Chapter 7 and 

Appendix B of FAA Order 2150.3B. 

G. Registration and Marking 

The NPRM proposed applying to 

small UAS the then-existing registration 

requirements that applied to all aircraft. 

The NPRM also proposed requiring that 

all small UAS have their registration 

and nationality marks displayed in 

accordance with Subpart C of part 45. 

Approximately 125 commenters 

provided input on the proposed 

registration requirement or the 

associated process, with most 

commenters stating that it was a 

reasonable or necessary requirement. Of 

the roughly 110 commenters that 

addressed the proposed marking 

requirements, most supported requiring 

identification markings on small UAS. 

On December 16, 2015, subsequent to 

the issuance of the NPRM for this rule, 

the FAA published the Registration and 

Marking Requirements for Small 

Unmanned Aircraft interim final rule 

(Registration Rule).147 In the 

Registration Rule, the FAA considered 

and addressed the comments it received 

in response to the registration and 

marking proposals in the NPRM for this 

rule. As a result, the Registration Rule 

provided a streamlined and simple webbased aircraft registration process for the 

registration of small unmanned aircraft, 

as well as a simpler method for marking 

small unmanned aircraft. The 

Registration Rule invited further 

comment on its contents and the FAA 

will consider any significant issues that 

are raised by the commenters. 

Because the registration and marking 

components that were originally part of 


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148 Id. at 78623. 

149 18 U.S.C. 1001. 

150The FAA has exercised this power in 14 CFR 

61.59, 67.403, 121.9, and 139.115, which currently 

impose civil prohibitions on fraud and false 

statements made in matters within the FAA’s 

jurisdiction. 

151The original provisions in the NPRM referred 

to ‘‘operator.’’ However, due to the change in 

crewmember titles (discussed in section III.E.1 of 

this preamble), the term ‘‘operator’’ has been 

replaced by the remote pilot in command. 

the NPRM for this rule are now being 

addressed in a different rulemaking (the 

Registration Rule), these components 

are no longer a part of this rule. Thus, 

instead of imposing any new 

registration or marking requirements, 

this rule will simply require that any 

person operating a civil small UAS for 

purposes of flight comply with the 

existing requirements of § 91.203(a)(2). 

Section 91.203(a)(2) requires a person 

operating a civil small unmanned 

aircraft to have an effective U.S. 

registration certificate that is readily 

available to the owner or operator, as 

applicable.148

H. Fraud and False Statements 

Currently, the U.S. criminal code 

prohibits fraud and falsification in 

matters within the jurisdiction of the 

executive branch.149 The FAA too may 

impose civil sanctions in instances of 

fraud and falsification in matters within 

its jurisdiction.150

The NPRM proposed to prohibit a 

person from making a fraudulent or 

intentionally false record or report that 

is required for compliance with the 

provisions of part 107. The NPRM also 

proposed to prohibit a person from 

making any reproduction or alteration, 

for a fraudulent purpose, of any 

certificate, rating, authorization, record, 

or report that is made pursuant to part 

107. Finally, the NPRM proposed to 

specify that the commission of a 

fraudulent or intentionally false act in 

violation of § 107.5(a) could result in the 

denial, suspension, or revocation of a 

certificate or waiver issued by the FAA 

pursuant to this proposed rule. For the 

reasons discussed below, this rule will 

finalize these provisions as proposed 

with some minor revisions for 

clarification purposes. 

Three organizations and one 

individual commented on the proposal 

to prohibit fraud and false statements, 

and all of those commenters generally 

supported the proposal. For example, 

the Small UAV Coalition stated that 

they support the FAA’s proposal to 

prohibit intentionally false or fraudulent 

documents used to show compliance 

with part 107, and added that such false 

or fraudulent records or reports warrant 

enforcement action. One individual 

supported ‘‘heavy fines or jail’’ for those 

providing false information. 

Two commenters, the University of 

North Dakota’s John D. Odegard School 

of Aerospace Sciences and the Institute 

of Makers of Explosives, requested 

clarification as to the penalties that 

could be imposed for violating the 

prohibition on fraud and false 

statements. The University of North 

Dakota’s John D. Odegard School of 

Aerospace Sciences asked whether FAA 

Order 2150.3B would be applicable in 

its existing form to operations under 

part 107 and if so, whether the sanctions 

guideline ranges described in that 

publication are appropriate for 

violations of part 107. 

Subpart C of 14 CFR part 13 specifies 

the penalties that the FAA may impose 

in response to a regulatory violation. To 

provide further clarity, the FAA has 

amended § 107.5 with a list of potential 

sanctions that could be imposed in 

response to a violation of § 107.5. Those 

sanctions may, among other things, 

include a civil penalty or certificate 

action. The FAA has also issued 

generally applicable guidance on 

sanctions that may be imposed for 

regulatory violations, which can be 

found in FAA Order 2150.3B. The FAA 

is currently considering whether Order 

2150.3B addresses UAS-specific 

considerations that may arise in 

enforcement actions under part 107, and 

the agency may revise this order, as 

appropriate, to reflect this 

consideration. 

I. Oversight 

This section discusses two aspects of 

FAA oversight of part 107 small UAS 

operations. First, this section discusses 

inspection, testing, and demonstration 

of compliance requirements applicable 

to a part 107 operation. Second, this 

section discusses the accident-reporting 

requirements that part 107 will impose 

on the remote pilot in command. 

1. Inspection, Testing, and 

Demonstration of Compliance 

The FAA’s oversight statutes, codified 

at 49 U.S.C. 44709 and 46104, provide 

the FAA with broad investigatory and 

inspection authority for matters within 

the FAA’s jurisdiction. Under section 

46104, the FAA may subpoena 

witnesses and records, administer oaths, 

examine witnesses, and receive 

evidence at a place in the United States 

that the FAA designates. Under section 

44709, the FAA may ‘‘reinspect at any 

time a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, 

propeller, appliance, design 

organization, production certificate 

holder, air navigation facility, or agency, 

or reexamine an airman holding a 

certificate issued [by the FAA].’’ 

The NPRM proposed to codify the 

FAA’s oversight authority in proposed 

§ 107.7. First, § 107.7 would require the 

airman, visual observer, or owner of a 

small UAS to, upon FAA request, allow 

the FAA to make any test or inspection 

of the small unmanned aircraft system, 

the airman, and, if applicable, the visual 

observer to determine compliance with 

the provisions of proposed part 107. 

Second, § 107.7 would require an 

airman or owner of a small UAS to, 

upon FAA request, make available to 

the FAA any document, record, or 

report required to be kept by the 

applicable FAA regulations. For the 

reasons discussed below, this rule will 

finalize these provisions as proposed.151

The Department of Defense Policy 

Board on Federal Aviation suggested 

that § 107.7(a) be reworded to limit its 

applicability to ‘‘civil operators,’’ not 

operators in general. The commenter 

asserted that this change would preserve 

public operators’ statutory authorities. 

As discussed in section III.C.3 of this 

preamble, the applicability of part 107 

is limited to civil aircraft. Thus, part 107 

will not apply to public aircraft 

operations. Because public aircraft 

operations will not be subject to § 107.7 

(or any other provision of part 107) 

there is no need to amend the regulatory 

text of § 107.7 with regard to civil 

aircraft. 

The Kansas State University UAS 

Program asked the FAA to clarify, with 

respect to § 107.7(b), what types of tests 

or inspections could be performed on 

the remote pilot or visual observer. 

Specifically, the commenter suggested 

that the FAA define whether such 

persons could be subjected to blood 

alcohol tests, drug tests, or knowledge 

tests. They also recommend that the 

section be reworded to reference 

§ 91.17(c). 

Section 107.7(b) codifies the FAA’s 

authority under 49 U.S.C. 44709 and 

46104, which allow the FAA to inspect 

and investigate the remote pilot. This 

may involve a review, reinspection, or 

requalification of the remote pilot. With 

regard to requalification, 49 U.S.C. 

44709 and § 107.7(b) allow the FAA to 

reexamine a remote pilot if the FAA has 

sufficient reason to believe that the 

remote pilot may not be qualified to 

exercise the privileges of his or her 

certificate. Additional guidance 

concerning the reexamination process 

can be found in FAA Order 8900.1, ch. 

7, sec. 1. 

Pertaining to the visual observer, as 

an active participant in small UAS 

operations, this person may be 

questioned with regard to his or her 


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152A copy of the guidance document can be 

found at: https://www.faa.gov/uas/regulations_

policies/media/FAA_UAS-PO_LEA_Guidance.pdf. 

153See FAA Order 8900.1, ch. 1, sec. 4, par. 6– 

100(G)–(I). 

involvement in the operation. For 

example, if an FAA inspector has reason 

to believe that a visual observer was not 

provided with the preflight information 

required by § 107.49, the inspector may 

ask the visual observer questions to 

ascertain what happened. Because the 

visual observer is not an airman, the 

visual observer will not be subject to 

reexamination. 

With regard to § 91.17(c), the FAA 

notes that, as discussed in section 

III.E.7.b of this preamble, § 107.27 will, 

among other things, require the remote 

pilot in command, the visual observer, 

and the person manipulating the flight 

controls of a small UAS to comply with 

§ 91.17. This includes compliance with 

the alcohol-testing requirements of 

§ 91.17(c). 

The City and County of Denver, 

Colorado suggested that airports be 

given the same rights as those granted 

to the FAA under § 107.7(b). The 

commenter argued that airport operators 

have a duty to protect airport property, 

and that that duty can be fulfilled only 

when the airport operator has the 

opportunity to determine the nature and 

airworthiness of a small UAS. 

AUVSI suggested that the FAA allow 

designated representatives pursuant to 

14 CFR part 183 to act on behalf of the 

Administrator in order to determine 

compliance with the new regulatory 

standards. The commenter asserted that 

the FAA will not have the necessary 

manpower or financial resources 

required to allow the UAS industry and 

its technology to continue to evolve at 

its own pace. An individual commenter 

suggested that the FAA delegate 

compliance and enforcement authority 

to law enforcement officers and NTSB 

representatives. 

The FAA’s statute does not authorize 

the agency to delegate its formal 

enforcement functions. Because it lacks 

the pertinent statutory authority, the 

FAA cannot delegate its enforcement 

functions in the manner suggested by 

the commenters. The FAA notes, 

however, that even though it cannot 

delegate its formal enforcement 

functions, it has worked closely with 

outside stakeholders to incorporate their 

assistance in its oversight processes. For 

example, the FAA has recently issued 

guidance to State and local law 

enforcement agencies to support the 

partnership between the FAA and these 

agencies in addressing unauthorized 

UAS activities.152 The FAA anticipates 

continuing its existing partnerships to 

help detect and address unauthorized 

UAS activities, and the agency will 

consider other stakeholders’ requests to 

be part of the process of ensuring the 

safe and lawful use of small UAS. 

One individual suggested that a 

remote pilot in command must enable 

and make available to the FAA any 

flight log recording if the aircraft and/ 

or control station is capable of creating 

such a recording. In response, the FAA 

notes that this rule does not require that 

a small UAS operation have the 

capability to create a flight log 

recording. However, if a small UAS does 

create such a recording, § 107.7(b) will 

allow the FAA to inspect the small UAS 

(including the recording made by the 

small UAS) to determine compliance 

with the provisions of part 107. 

One individual suggested that the 

wording of § 107.7(b) be modified to 

permit the FAA to conduct only ‘‘nondestructive testing’’ in the event of a 

reported violation of one or more 

provisions of part 107. The commenter 

asserts that, as written, § 107.7(b) would 

permit the FAA to ‘‘destructively test’’ 

every small UAS ‘‘on whim.’’ 

The FAA declines this suggestion 

because there could be circumstances 

where destructive testing of a small 

UAS may be necessary to determine 

compliance with part 107. The FAA 

emphasizes, however, that this type of 

decision would not be made lightly and 

would not be part of a typical FAA 

inspection. For example, the FAA’s 

guidance to FAA inspectors about how 

to conduct a typical ramp inspection 

specifically focuses on non-destructive 

methods that the inspector can use to 

determine whether an aircraft is in 

compliance with FAA regulations.153

The FAA anticipates that, just as with 

manned aircraft, destructive testing of a 

small UAS will, if ever conducted, 

occur highly infrequently. 

One individual recommended that 

§ 107.7 be modified to require a remote 

pilot to make a photo ID available to the 

FAA on demand. The FAA did not 

propose this requirement in the NPRM, 

and as such, it is beyond the scope of 

this rule. 

2. Accident Reporting 

To ensure proper oversight of small 

UAS operations, the NPRM proposed to 

require a small UAS operator to report 

to the FAA any small UAS operation 

that results in: (1) Any injury to a 

person; or (2) damage to property other 

than the small unmanned aircraft. The 

report would have to be made to the 

FAA within 10 days of the operation 

that resulted in injury or damage to 

property. After receiving this report, the 

FAA may conduct further investigation 

to determine whether any FAA 

regulations were violated. 

The NPRM invited comments as to 

whether this type of accident reporting 

should be required. The NPRM also 

invited comments as to whether small 

UAS accidents that result in minimal 

amounts of property damage should be 

exempted from the reporting 

requirement, and, if so, what threshold 

of property damage should trigger the 

accident reporting requirement. For the 

reasons discussed below, this rule will 

require accident reporting of accidents 

that result in at least: (1) Serious injury 

to any person or any loss of 

consciousness; or (2) damage to any 

property, other than the small 

unmanned aircraft, unless the cost of 

repair (including materials and labor) or 

fair market value in the event of total 

loss does not exceed $500. 

Most of the commenters who 

addressed this issue generally supported 

an accident reporting requirement. 

However, the commenters questioned 

whether the proposed requirement to 

report any injury or property damage is 

too broad because it does not consider 

the severity of the injury or property 

damage. To correct what they also saw 

as an overly broad accident reporting 

requirement, most of the commenters 

recommended the proposed 

requirement be amended to stipulate 

that reporting is required only for 

operations that cause injury or property 

damage above certain thresholds. 

A number of commenters 

recommended general thresholds for 

reportable injuries and property 

damage. For example, the Drone User 

Group Network said an operation 

should be reportable if it involves 

‘‘significant’’ injury or property damage. 

The University of North Dakota’s John 

D. Odegard School of Aerospace 

Sciences said an operation should be 

reportable if it involves ‘‘serious’’ injury 

or ‘‘substantial’’ property damage; such 

a requirement, the commenter pointed 

out, is in line with the NTSB definition 

of ‘‘occurrence’’ and the FAA definition 

of ‘‘accident.’’ AIA suggested a reporting 

requirement for operations causing 

‘‘serious bodily harm (those requiring 

hospitalization, for instance)’’ or 

‘‘substantial’’ property damage. AUVSI, 

University of North Carolina System, 

and Prioria said operations resulting in 

minor injuries or minimal damage to 

property should not be required to be 

reported in the same manner as more 

serious injuries or substantial damage to 

property. UPS said an operation should 

be reportable if it causes an injury that 

requires medical attention or property 


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damage that exceeds a threshold amount 

‘‘sufficient to exclude insignificant 

incidents.’’ An individual commenter 

recommended a reporting requirement 

for operations that result in injury or 

property damage ‘‘which is over the 

upper monetary limit of the small 

claims court jurisdiction.’’ 

Several commenters recommended 

more specific thresholds for reportable 

injuries and property damage. These 

commenters generally recommended a 

requirement that the injury caused by 

the operation be one that necessitates 

some sort of medical attention and that 

the property damage caused by the 

operation exceed some minimum 

monetary threshold, ranging from $100 

to $25,000. For example, commenters 

recommended some of the following 

specific thresholds be added to the 

proposed accident reporting 

requirement: 

• Modovolate Aviation and Aviation 

Management said an operation should 

be reportable if it causes injury 

requiring ‘‘hospitalization or other 

treatment by a provider of medical 

care,’’ or ‘‘professional medical 

assistance,’’ respectively, or property 

damage of $1,000. 

• NBAA said an operation should be 

reportable if a person has to seek 

medical treatment as a result of the 

operation or if property damage exceeds 

$1,000 or if a police report is filed. 

• NAMIC said an operation should be 

reportable if it causes injury ‘‘requiring 

professional medical treatment’’ or 

property damage greater than $2,000. 

• The Travelers Companies said an 

operation should be reportable if it 

causes ‘‘‘serious’ injuries caused by 

impact of the UAS’’ or property damage 

of over $5,000. 

• Clean Gulf Associations said an 

operation should be reportable if it 

causes injury ‘‘which requires 

professional medical treatment beyond 

first aid or death to any person’’ or 

property damage greater than $10,000. 

• Jam Aviation said an operation 

should be reportable if it causes injury 

‘‘that requires emergency medical 

attention’’ or property damage that 

exceeds $25,000 or fair market value in 

the event of total loss, whichever is less. 

• Skycatch, Clayco, AECOM, and 

DPR Construction said an operation 

should be reportable if it causes injury 

‘‘requiring assistance of trained medical 

personnel’’ or property damage in 

excess of $20,000. 

The California Department of 

Transportation, Virginia Commonwealth 

University Honors Students, Southern 

Company, and a few individual 

commenters suggested that the accident 

reporting requirement in this rule 

should be modeled after the accident 

reporting requirement for manned 

aircraft, which, among other things, 

requires an operator to notify NTSB of 

an accident resulting in death or 

‘‘serious injury’’ (see 49 CFR 830.2) or 

of damage to property, other than the 

aircraft, estimated to exceed $25,000 for 

repair (including materials and labor) or 

fair market value in the event of total 

loss, whichever is less. (See 49 CFR 

830.5(a)(6)). 

The Kansas State University UAS 

Program and Cherokee Nation 

Technologies said the FAA should 

follow the NTSB reporting requirement 

for property damage, but made no 

comment regarding the injury 

component of the proposed accident 

reporting requirement. NTSB also 

pointed to the manned-aircraft reporting 

requirement for property damage and 

suggested the FAA take this, and other 

criteria included in 49 CFR part 830, 

into account. An individual commenter 

pointed out that the NTSB has specific 

reporting requirements for UAS, and 

said the FAA’s proposed accident 

reporting requirement should therefore 

be amended to begin with the phrase: 

‘‘In addition to UAS accident/incident 

reporting requirement of the National 

Transportation Safety Board. . . .’’ 

Several other commenters also only 

addressed the property damage 

component of the accident reporting 

requirement. An individual commenter 

said no accident need be reported where 

the property damage is considered 

inconsequential by the owner of the 

property. SkySpecs recommended a 

reporting requirement for property 

damage above $100, or if an insurance 

report is filed. The Center of InnovationAerospace, Georgia Department of 

Economic Development recommended a 

$500 threshold, which it said is a 

common deductible amount for 

property and automobile insurance. The 

Oklahoma Governor’s Unmanned Aerial 

Systems Council (which explicitly 

supported the proposed requirement to 

report all accidents resulting in any 

injury) expressed concern that a 

threshold lower than $1,000 would 

result in unnecessary and burdensome 

reporting of information and data that 

would not be beneficial to the FAA, the 

public, or the industry in general. The 

American Insurance Association 

recommended a $5,000 threshold for 

property damage. The Small UAV 

Coalition (who also supported the 

proposed requirement to report 

accidents causing any injury) said 

accidents resulting in property damage 

should only be reportable if the damage 

caused is to the property of someone not 

involved in the operation. The 

commenter did not propose a minimum 

monetary threshold for this property 

damage to be reportable. 

DJI, which opposed applying the 

NTSB accident reporting criteria to 

small UAS, suggested that the FAA look 

to how other Federal agencies, such as 

the National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration, categorize injury by 

level of severity. Airport Council 

International-North America and Clean 

Gulf Associations said the injury 

component of the proposed accident 

reporting requirement should be 

expanded to include a requirement to 

report all accidents resulting in death. 

Two commenters specifically 

addressed operations in an industrial 

setting that may result in injury or 

property damage. The American 

Chemistry Council said there should be 

no reporting requirement for operations 

in an industrial setting that cause 

workplace injuries that are covered by 

OSHA reporting requirements or cause 

less than $25,000 in damage to private 

property that is owned and operated by 

the facility owner. Associated General 

Contractors of America also encouraged 

the FAA to exclude any operations 

resulting in ‘‘OSHA-recordable’’ 

injuries. The commenter further 

recommended the FAA exclude 

operations resulting in ‘‘de minimis’’ 

property damage from the reporting 

requirement. 

The FAA agrees with commenters 

who suggested that injuries and 

property damage falling below certain 

thresholds should not be reportable. 

Requiring remote pilots in command to 

report minimal injuries (such as a minor 

bruise from the unmanned aircraft) or 

minimal property damage (such as 

chipping a fleck of paint off an object) 

would impose a significant burden on 

the remote pilots. This burden would 

not correspond to a safety/oversight 

benefit because an operation resulting in 

minimal injury or minimal property 

damage may not correspond with a 

higher likelihood of a regulatory 

violation. 

In determining the threshold at which 

to set injury reporting, the FAA agrees 

with commenters who suggested that 

the threshold should generally be set at 

serious injury. A serious injury is an 

injury that qualifies as Level 3 or higher 

on the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) of 

the Association for the Advancement of 

Automotive Medicine. The AIS is an 

anatomical scoring system that provides 

a means of ranking the severity of an 

injury and is widely used by emergency 

medical personnel. Within the AIS 

system, injuries are ranked on a scale of 

1 to 6, with Level 1 being a minor 

injury, Level 2 moderate, Level 3 


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154See Licensing and Safety Requirements for 

Launch, Supplemental Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking, 67 FR 49456, 49465, July 30, 2002. 

155See Economic Values for FAA Investment and 

Regulatory Decisions, sec. 2, available at: https://

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/policy_guidance/

benefit_cost/media/econ-value-section-2-txvalues.pdf. See also DOT Guidance on Treatment 

of the Economic Value of a Statistical Life in U.S. 

Department of Aviation Analyses, available at 

https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/

docs/VSL%20Guidance.doc. 

156Office of Regulatory Analysis and Evaluation, 

National Center For Statistics And Analysis, 

FMVSS No. 214 Amending Side Impact Dynamic 

Test Adding Oblique Pole Test, (Aug. 2007). 

157Blincoe, L. et al, The Economic Impact of 

Motor Vehicle Crashes, DOT HS 809 446 (May 

2000). 

serious, Level 4 severe, Level 5 critical, 

and Level 6 a non-survivable injury. An 

AIS Level 3 injury is one that is 

reversible but usually involves 

overnight hospitalization. 

AIS SEVERITY LEVELS

AIS 

Level Severity Type of injury 

1 ........ Minor ........ Superficial. 

2 ........ Moderate .. Reversible injury; 

medical attention required. 

3 ........ Serious ..... Reversible injury; hospitalization required. 

4 ........ Severe ...... Life threatening; not 

fully recoverable 

without medical 

care. 

5 ........ Critical ...... Non-reversible injury; 

unrecoverable even 

with medical care. 

6 ........ Virtually 

Un-Survivable.

Fatal. 

The FAA currently uses serious injury 

(AIS Level 3) as an injury threshold in 

other FAA regulations.154 DOT and FAA 

guidance also express a preference for 

AIS methodology in classifying injuries 

for the purpose of evaluating the costs 

and benefits of FAA regulations.155

Additionally, the U.S. National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration 

(NHTSA) uses AIS level 3 injuries as the 

metric evaluating the effectiveness of 

occupant safety measures for 

automobiles 156 and for estimating the 

costs associated with automobile 

accidents.157 The FAA has significant 

operational experience administering 

the serious-injury threshold and because 

the AIS Level 3 standard is widely used 

and understood, it is the appropriate 

injury threshold to use in this rule. 

In addition to serious injuries, this 

rule will also require accident reporting 

for accidents that result in any loss of 

consciousness because a brief loss of 

consciousness may not rise to the level 

of a serious injury. However, the 

confined-area-of-operation regulations 

discussed in section III.E.3 of this 

preamble, such as the general 

prohibition on flight over people, are 

designed with the express purpose of 

preventing accidents in which a small 

unmanned aircraft hits a person on the 

head and causes them to lose 

consciousness or worse. Thus, if there is 

a loss of consciousness resulting from a 

small UAS operation, there may be a 

higher probability of a regulatory 

violation. 

With regard to the threshold for 

reporting property damage, the FAA 

agrees with the Center of InnovationAerospace, Georgia Department of 

Economic Development, which 

suggested a property damage threshold 

of $500. Property damage below $500 is 

minimal and may even be part of the 

remote pilot in command’s mitigations 

to ensure the safety of the operation. For 

example, a remote pilot in command 

may mitigate risk of loss of positive 

control by positioning the small UAS 

operation such that the small unmanned 

aircraft will hit uninhabited property in 

the event of a loss of positive control. 

However, property damage above $500 

is not minimal, and as such, this rule 

will require reporting of a small UAS 

accident resulting in property damage 

exceeding $500. 

In calculating the property damage, 

the FAA notes that sometimes, it may be 

significantly more cost-effective simply 

to replace a damaged piece of property 

rather than repair it. As such, for 

purposes of the accident-reporting 

requirement of part 107, property 

damage will be calculated by the lesser 

of the repair price or fair market value 

of the damaged property. For example, 

assume a small UAS accident that 

damages a piece of property whose fair 

market value is $200. Assume also that 

it would cost $600 to repair the damage 

caused by the small UAS accident. In 

this scenario, the remote pilot in 

command would not be required to 

report the accident because the fair 

market value would be lower than the 

repair cost, and the fair market value 

would be below $500. The outcome 

would be the same if the values in the 

scenario are reversed (repair cost of 

$200 and fair market value of $600) 

because the lower value (repair cost) 

would be below $500. 

Transport Canada questioned whether 

small UAS operators would be 

permitted to continue operating their 

UAS after experiencing an accident/

incident, or whether they would be 

expected to cease operations until the 

accident has been reported and the 

causal factors addressed. In response, 

the FAA notes that a remote pilot would 

need to cease operations only if the FAA 

revokes or suspends the remote pilot 

certificate or the unmanned aircraft, as 

a result of the accident, is no longer in 

a condition for safe operation in 

accordance with part 107. 

A few commenters recommended 

changes to the 10-day deadline for 

reporting operations that result in injury 

or property damage. The American 

Insurance Association said the reporting 

deadline should be changed to 10 

business days. The Kansas State 

University UAS Program recommended 

a 3-day reporting deadline. The 

Professional Helicopter Pilots 

Association and Virginia Department of 

Aviation recommended a 48-hour 

reporting deadline, while an individual 

commenter suggested a 24-hour 

deadline. The Oregon Department of 

Aviation also recommended the FAA 

shorten the proposed 10-day reporting 

deadline, but did not suggest an 

alternative deadline. DroneView 

Technologies suggested a 3-hour 

reporting deadline. 

An accident triggering the reporting 

requirement of § 107.9 may involve 

extensive injuries or property damage. 

The remote pilot in command’s first 

priority should be responding to the 

accident by, among other things, 

ensuring that any injured people receive 

prompt medical attention. Having to 

immediately draft an accident report for 

the FAA may interfere with that 

priority, and as such, the FAA declines 

to make the reporting deadline shorter 

than the 10 calendar days proposed in 

the NPRM. The FAA also declines to 

extend the reporting deadline beyond 10 

calendar days because 10 days should 

provide a sufficient amount of time to 

respond to the accident and draft an 

accident report for the FAA. 

Several other commenters, including 

NBAA, and NAMIC, recommended that 

the FAA create an online reporting 

system. NBAA also recommended the 

FAA work with NASA to determine 

what modifications if any would be 

required to the Aviation Safety 

Reporting System (ASRS) to 

accommodate small UAS reports. An 

individual commenter similarly 

recommended the ASRS be expanded to 

allow small UAS operators to make 

reports of unsafe actions on the part of 

manned aircraft or other small UAS 

operators. That commenter also 

suggested the FAA consider creating an 

online reporting mechanism for 

operators to voluntarily provide 

operational data without fear of 

enforcement actions being taken against 

them. GAMA requested that the FAA 

review the agency’s Near-Midair 

Collision System (NMACS) incident 


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158Sec. 333(b)(1). 

159Sec. 333(b)(2). 

reporting system to ensure that the 

existing business rules for reporting 

NMACs appropriately consider UAS. 

Texas A & M University-Corpus Christi/ 

LSUASC suggested the COA online 

portal be used for accident reporting. 

Virginia Commonwealth University 

Honors Students also stated that 

reporting of incident data to the U.S. 

Department of Interior’s SAFECOM 

system should continue as well. 

This rule will allow an accident 

report to be submitted to the FAA 

electronically. The part 107 advisory 

circular provides guidance about how to 

electronically submit an accident report. 

Several commenters recommended 

that certain incidents other than 

operations resulting in injury or 

property damage should also be 

reportable. The State of Nevada, the 

Nevada Institute for Autonomous 

Systems, and the Nevada FAAdesignated UAS Test Site, commenting 

jointly, said the accident reporting 

requirement should be expanded to 

include a requirement to report any 

‘‘lost platform’’ incident. ALPA, AIA, 

AUVSI, and University of North 

Carolina System also said the proposed 

rule should include a reporting 

requirement for ‘‘lost link’’ or ‘‘fly 

away’’ incidents. ALPA asserted that 

such a reporting requirement will allow 

the FAA to develop hard data on the 

reliability of these systems and therefore 

more accurately evaluate risk. 

Modovolate said operations that 

involve complete loss of control or 

failure of automated safety systems such 

as airspace exclusion or return to home 

should also be reportable. An individual 

commenter said reports should be filed 

for operations where there is: Failure of 

the control device, failure of the flight 

control system, flyaway (lateral or 

vertical), loss of control as a result of 

either electrical failure or radio 

interference, or a close encounter with 

a manned aircraft where the manned 

aircraft was observed to make ‘‘an 

abrupt avoidance maneuver.’’ Airport 

Council International-North America 

similarly recommended the accident 

reporting requirement be expanded to 

include an operation where an operator 

was required to take evasive action to 

avoid manned aircraft, especially in 

cases where such actions took place 

within 5 miles of airports. The 

Professional Helicopter Pilots 

Association recommended a reporting 

requirement for all accidents involving 

other aircraft during flight (whether 

manned or unmanned), as well as all 

accidents resulting in substantial 

damage to the operator’s UAS. 

CAPA noted that the proposal does 

not address reporting ‘‘HATR or other 

incidents that do not rise to the level or 

property damage or injury.’’ The 

commenter recommended these 

incidents be reported and tracked ‘‘to 

ensure this policy is effective and 

continues to provide safe operating 

procedures for small UAS operations as 

they interface with commercial and civil 

aviation traffic.’’ ALPA suggested there 

would be a potential safety benefit to 

establishing a process for small UAS 

owners to report malfunctions, 

identified defects, and other in-service 

problems. ALPA noted that this 

operational data could be used in 

subsequent risk evaluation. 

The purpose of the accident-reporting 

requirement in this rule is to allow the 

FAA to more effectively allocate its 

oversight resources by focusing on 

potential regulatory violations that 

resulted in accidents. The FAA declines 

to mandate reporting of other events, 

such as the ones suggested by the 

commenters, because they do not rise to 

the level of a significant accident. The 

FAA notes, however, that a regulatory 

violation can occur without resulting in 

a serious accident and any regulatory 

violation may be subject to enforcement 

action. 

The FAA also notes that the Aviation 

Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is 

available for voluntary reporting of any 

aviation safety incident or situation in 

which aviation safety may have been 

compromised. The FAA offers ASRS 

reporters guarantees and incentives to 

encourage reporting by holding ASRS 

reports in strict confidence and not 

using ASRS information against 

reporters in enforcement actions. 

Further, the FAA agrees that data 

collection is a valuable tool for 

determining a baseline for performance, 

reliability, and risk assessment. The 

FAA plans to develop a tool where 

remote pilots of small UAS can 

voluntarily share data which may not 

meet the threshold for accident 

reporting. This would provide a means 

for evaluation of operational integrity 

for small UAS. 

NOAA supported the proposed 

accident reporting requirement, but said 

it should be expanded to include a 

requirement to report an operation that 

results in injury to protected wildlife. 

NOAA asserted that because many 

wildlife are also federally regulated, 

managed, and/or protected species, it is 

critical that the FAA require reporting of 

injury to these species, so other Federal 

agencies and interested parties can 

assess potential hazards caused by small 

UAS. 

The FAA currently provides a way for 

all aircraft operators in the NAS to 

voluntarily report wildlife strikes. Small 

UAS remote pilots who encounter a 

wildlife strike may also submit a report. 

Further, remote pilots may be obligated 

to report death or injury to wildlife 

under Federal, State, or local law. 

A few commenters opposed the 

imposition of an accident reporting 

requirement. Trimble argued that the 

damage a small UAS can cause is 

‘‘sufficiently small’’ that operators 

should not have an obligation to report 

an accident to the FAA or NTSB. 

Instead, the commenter said, if an 

operator is unable to land a small UAS 

safely and an incident occurs, the 

operator should only be required to 

notify local law enforcement. An 

individual commenter who opposed a 

reporting requirement recommended 

‘‘developing law enforcement 

relationships to facilitate investigations, 

insurance claims, etc.’’ 

The FAA disagrees with commenters 

who suggested that no data should be 

reported to the FAA. As discussed 

earlier, the FAA plans to use data 

collected from these reports to more 

effectively allocate its oversight 

resources. In response to the argument 

that accidents caused by small UAS are 

small, the FAA notes that reporting for 

accidents resulting in minor injuries or 

property damage below $500 will not be 

required. 

The FAA has long-established 

relationships with law enforcement and 

values the assistance that law 

enforcement provides during accident/

incident investigations. However, as 

discussed earlier, the FAA cannot 

delegate its formal enforcement 

authority to other entities such as local 

law enforcement personnel. 

J. Statutory Findings 

In order to determine whether certain 

UAS may operate safely in the NAS 

pursuant to section 333 of Public Law 

112–95, the Secretary must find that the 

operation of the UAS will not: (1) Create 

a hazard to users of the NAS or the 

public; or (2) pose a threat to national 

security.158 The Secretary must also 

determine whether small UAS 

operations subject to this proposed rule 

pose a safety risk sufficient to require 

airworthiness certification.159

1. Hazard to Users of the NAS or the 

Public 

Pursuant to section 333 of Public Law 

112–95, the Secretary proposed to find 

that small UAS operations subject to 

part 107 would not create a hazard to 

users of the NAS or the public. The 

Secretary proposed this finding after 


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concluding that the two primary safety 

concerns associated with small UAS 

operations—the ability to ‘‘see and 

avoid’’ other aircraft with no pilot on 

board and the operator losing positive 

control of the small unmanned 

aircraft—would be mitigated by the 

other provisions of the proposed rule. 

The NPRM invited comments on the 

proposed finding that small UAS 

operations subject to the proposed rule 

would not create a hazard to users of the 

NAS or the public. 

NRECA and NBAA supported the 

proposed finding, without further 

comment. NetMoby and Planehook, on 

the other hand, disagreed with the 

proposed finding. NetMoby argued that 

‘‘[s]imply because the UAS is smaller 

than a manned aircraft does not 

necessarily mean that it does not pose 

a risk to the NAS or the public.’’ 

Planehook argued that while operations 

conducted by ‘‘properly trained and 

conscientious operators’’ may not create 

a hazard to users of the NAS or the 

public, an operator may operate his or 

her small UAS in such a way that the 

operation does pose a hazard. 

One commenter disagreed with the 

FAA’s analysis of public risk, and 

therefore with the proposed finding that 

small UAS operations subject to the 

proposed rule would not create a hazard 

to users of the NAS or the public. 

The FAA acknowledges NetMoby and 

Planehook’s comments that even a small 

aircraft or a small UAS operated in a 

careless or reckless manner can cause a 

hazard to the NAS and the public. 

However the Secretary’s finding is based 

on small UAS operations subject to the 

mitigations of part 107. Any operations 

conducted in a careless or reckless 

manner would be in violation of part 

107. Additionally, although a smaller 

aircraft may pose a reduced hazard as 

compared to larger manned aircraft, the 

Secretary’s finding is not based on the 

size of the aircraft alone. Rather, the 

combination of mitigations provided by 

part 107, including requiring operations 

to be conducted within visual line of 

sight; limiting maximum gross weight of 

the small unmanned aircraft to be below 

55 pounds; limiting the operating 

altitude to below 400 feet AGL; 

requiring remote pilots to be 

certificated; defining area of operation; 

and prohibiting operations over any 

person not directly participating in the 

operation, support the Secretary’s 

finding that this rule will not create a 

hazard to users of the NAS or the 

public. 

In response to the individual 

commenter who disagreed with the 

Department’s analysis of public risk, the 

agency notes that its hazard 

determination is based on the 

mitigations required by part 107, rather 

than the public risk as determined by 

calculating the probability of a small 

UAS harming an individual. Because 

small UAS come in many different 

shapes and sizes, and with varied 

capabilities, the FAA determined what 

hazards all small unmanned aircraft 

pose to the NAS and the public, and 

then put mitigations into part 107 to 

reduce those hazards. Based on these 

mitigations, the Secretary finds that 

operations subject to and compliant 

with part 107 pose no hazard to the 

public and the NAS. 

2. National Security 

Section 333 of Public Law 112–95 

also requires the Secretary to determine 

whether the operation of UAS subject to 

this rule would pose a threat to national 

security. Part 107 will expand small 

UAS operations in the NAS to include 

non-hobby and non-recreational 

operations. Under part 107, these 

operations will be subject to specific 

requirements, such as being able to 

operate only during daylight (or civil 

twilight if there is anti-collision 

lighting) and only within visual line of 

sight of the remote pilot in command, 

the person manipulating the flight 

controls of the small UAS, and, if 

applicable, a visual observer. 

In addition, the remote pilot in 

command of the small unmanned 

aircraft must obtain an FAA-issued 

remote pilot certificate with a small 

UAS rating. The process for obtaining 

this certificate includes the same TSAreview procedures that are currently 

used under 49 U.S.C. 46111 in order to 

screen out airman-certificate applicants 

who pose a security risk. Because the 

above provisions will limit the security 

risk that could be posed by small UAS 

operations subject to this rule, the 

Secretary proposed to find that these 

small UAS operations will not pose a 

threat to national security. The 

Department invited comments on this 

finding, and around 45 individuals and 

organizations commented on this 

subject. 

Several commenters, including Aerius 

Flight and NRECA, explicitly agreed 

with the Secretary’s proposed finding 

that small UAS operating under part 107 

will not pose a threat to national 

security. 

A number of other commenters 

identified ways in which small UAS 

could be used to threaten national 

security. Numerous commenters, 

including the International Brotherhood 

of Teamsters, American Fuel & 

Petrochemical Manufacturers, and 

Institute of Makers of Explosives, 

discussed the potential use of small 

UAS for criminal or terrorist purposes. 

The Teamsters noted several recent 

high-profile security breaches in the 

United States and Japan involving small 

UAS, and suggested that allowing 

package delivery would have the 

unintended result of facilitating the 

delivery and deployment of dangerous 

substances. 

The Edison Electrical Institute and the 

American Petroleum Institute expressed 

concerns about the potential threat 

posed by small UAS to the nation’s 

critical energy infrastructure. API 

suggests that petroleum and natural gas 

storage and transportation infrastructure 

(e.g., pipelines) are critical to national 

security, and therefore the final rule 

should prohibit the unauthorized use of 

small UAS ‘‘within appropriate limiting 

distance’’ from such facilities or 

operations as refineries, distribution 

terminals, pipelines and similar 

infrastructure. 

The Electronic Privacy Information 

Center provided great detail on the 

vulnerability of UAS to hacking, and 

stated that ‘‘[t]he integration of drones 

into the NAS will mean that thousands 

of new, hackable devices will be 

hovering over our homes and streets 

without any clear security guidance, 

despite known vulnerabilities.’’ EPIC 

argued that the weak security of the 

civil GPS system presents a danger to 

UAS operators and to the general 

public, and that the FAA must address 

and mitigate these vulnerabilities before 

UAS are integrated into the NAS. One 

individual argued that because UAS 

radio frequencies can be jammed, UAS 

pose a threat to national security. 

Other commenters, including 

Planehook and the Travelers 

Companies, noted that there is no TSA 

vetting requirement for hobbyist 

operations conducted in accordance 

with section 336 of Public Law 112–95, 

and suggested that this will serve as a 

preexisting loophole for remote pilots 

with nefarious designs who may wish to 

evade security screening. Planehook 

further stated that many hobbyists 

already conduct operations in violation 

of the provisions of section 336, and 

that this may be an indication of the 

level of noncompliance with part 107 

that the FAA should expect. 

The South Dakota Department of 

Agriculture connected the issue of 

national security with those of privacy 

and personal property. Asserting that 

our food supply is a matter of national 

security, the SDDA questioned why the 

FAA was leaving to the states, rather 

than addressing nationally, the areas of 

agricultural intellectual property (i.e., 

photographic crop monitoring) and 


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other operations over private 

agricultural land. 

In response to the comments raising 

various ways in which small UAS may 

be used to threaten national security, 

the Department notes that many of the 

examples provided would be in 

violation of part 107. For example, 

hacking or jamming a small UAS and 

taking over its functions would be in 

violation of the part 107 provisions 

prohibiting reckless operations, 

§ 107.23. The provisions of this rule are 

also not the only legal requirements that 

may be applicable to small UAS 

operations; there are additional Federal 

and State laws and regulations that may 

criminalize certain UAS activity. For 

example, 18 U.S.C. 32 criminalizes the 

willful destruction of an aircraft or 

aircraft facilities. Hacking a small UAS 

may also violate Federal anti-hacking 

statutes such as the Computer Fraud 

and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. 1030) as well 

as State and local anti-hacking laws. 

The Anti-Terrorism Act also serves as a 

deterrent for operating small UAS in a 

manner that threatens national security. 

A remote pilot willfully using his or her 

small UAS to, for example, destroy an 

aircraft or cause death or serious bodily 

injury, may be subject to the criminal 

penalties described in such statutes. The 

FAA notes that these additional laws 

and regulations would likely apply to 

hobbyists as well. 

With regard to hacking specifically, 

the FAA notes that the visual line-ofsight requirement in this rule serves as 

a highly effective detection tool for 

hacking activities. A skilled hacker may 

be able to manipulate technological 

monitoring systems to make it appear 

that no hacking is taking place. 

However, because this rule requires a 

human being to personally maintain 

visual line of sight of the unmanned 

aircraft, a hacker will be unable to 

manipulate human vision to make it 

appear that a compromised UAS is 

behaving normally. Thus, a remote pilot 

in command will be able to quickly 

notice whether someone else has taken 

control of their small UAS and alert the 

appropriate authorities. 

In response to the various 

commenters concerned about 

surveillance of airports, energy 

infrastructure, and agricultural 

intellectual property, the security risk 

associated with small UAS is far less 

than that posed by manned aircraft, to 

the extent such activities are not in 

violation of existing laws. Small UAS 

are unable to support the advanced level 

of surveillance equipment manned 

aircraft can carry. In addition, because 

of fuel and power limitations, small 

unmanned aircraft flight times currently 

do not exceed one hour, and the average 

small unmanned aircraft that is 

available to a consumer has a maximum 

flight time capability of 30 minutes or 

less. Unmanned aircraft on the larger 

side of the small UAS spectrum will 

generally have even shorter flight times 

because the heavier small unmanned 

aircraft require more energy to stay aloft. 

The provisions of this rule, which 

include a prohibition on nighttime 

operations and a requirement for the 

remote pilot to remain within visual 

line of sight of the aircraft, also impose 

restrictions that would severely limit 

possible nefarious surveillance that 

could be conducted using a small UAS. 

As such, the Department finds that 

small UAS, which are less capable than 

many other methods of surveillance 

currently available, are not a threat to 

national security when operated in 

accordance with part 107. 

A number of commenters argued that, 

given the ease with which a small UAS 

can be purchased and deployed, it is 

unlikely that a bad actor would submit 

to the remote pilot certification process 

including TSA security vetting. 

Commenters, including Matternet, 

NetMoby, and the UAS America Fund, 

stated that only well-intentioned and 

law-abiding remote pilots will submit to 

the TSA vetting that is included in the 

remote pilot certification process. CAPA 

generally agreed with the TSA vetting 

provision, but worried that the rule will 

not sufficiently address situations in 

which a remote pilot is initially cleared 

by the TSA but later becomes a security 

threat. 

The Department does not agree with 

the commenters that TSA vetting as 

required by statute (49 U.S.C. 

44903(j)(2)(D)(i)) is an insufficient 

method to identify bad actors who wish 

to operate small UAS. The Department 

agrees that a bad actor may decide not 

to obtain a remote pilot certificate and 

submit to TSA security vetting 

procedures. However such an 

individual would be in violation of FAA 

regulations that require a remote pilot 

certificate and TSA vetting if he or she 

acts as a remote pilot in command. 

Adding more regulations for this 

individual to ignore would not increase 

the deterrent value of the FAA’s 

regulations but would simply impose an 

additional burden on individuals who 

seek to operate lawfully. The FAA notes 

that after initial vetting, TSA conducts 

recurrent or daily vetting to ensure that 

certificate holders do not subsequently 

become a security threat. All FAA 

certificate holders are subject to this 

recurrent vetting, which serves to 

identify any certificate holder that may 

later become a security threat. 

The Department recognizes that this 

rule will, in certain circumstances, 

allow a person without a remote pilot 

certificate, and therefore not subject to 

TSA vetting, to manipulate the controls 

of a small UAS. However, this may only 

be done under the supervision of a 

certificated remote pilot in command 

who must have the ability to 

immediately take control of the aircraft 

at any time. Therefore, although there 

may be circumstances under which a 

non-certificated, non-TSA-vetted 

individual is manipulating the controls 

of a small UAS, under no circumstances 

will that individual be able to use the 

small UAS to jeopardize national 

security because he or she will be 

supervised by a certificated remote pilot 

who can wrest control of the vehicle at 

any time during the operation. This 

framework is similar to the mannedaircraft framework of part 61, which, in 

certain circumstances, allows an 

uncertificated individual to manipulate 

the controls of an aircraft under the 

supervision of a certificated airman. 

3. Airworthiness Certification 

Pursuant to section 333(b)(2) of Public 

Law 112–95, the NPRM proposed not 

requiring small UAS to obtain 

airworthiness certification if the small 

UAS operation satisfied the provisions 

of proposed part 107. Proposed part 107 

would require that an operator maintain 

the small UAS in a condition for safe 

operation, and would prohibit an 

operator from operating a small UAS 

unless it was in a condition for safe 

operation. This condition would be 

determined during a required pre-flight 

inspection. 

More than 40 commenters supported 

the Department’s proposal not to require 

an airworthiness certificate for small 

UAS. Many commenters favored not 

requiring an airworthiness certificate 

under this rule because it would be a 

burdensome process that would stifle 

technology advancements and delay 

research. 

Several commenters said 

airworthiness certificates are 

unnecessary because safety concerns 

can be mitigated by other means. The 

Kansas Farm Bureau and Continental 

Mapping Consultants, for example, said 

the requirements to maintain a small 

UAS in condition for safe operation and 

to conduct a preflight inspection are 

adequate for maintaining safety. 

Two commenters, the Small UAV 

Coalition and Modovolate Aviation, 

noted the expense of a type-, 

production-, or airworthiness 

certification requirement for small UAS. 

Modovolate Aviation stated that 

airworthiness certification ‘‘would 


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160 14 CFR 91.119. 

impose unwarranted costs on vendors 

and operators of small UAS, 

discouraging their commercial use, and 

thus blunting their contribution to 

economic growth and American 

international competitiveness.’’ 

Modovolate Aviation also asserted that 

delays caused by an airworthiness 

certification requirement would render 

candidate vehicles obsolete by the time 

they are certificated and would 

encourage operation of uncertificated 

vehicles. 

Several commenters recommended 

airworthiness certification in limited 

circumstances. The City of Phoenix 

Aviation Department said all UAS 

operating in airspace adjacent to 

airports should be ‘‘airworthiness 

certified.’’ One commenter said the FAA 

should require large UAS (which he 

defined as ‘‘rotary craft greater than 20 

kg and fixed-wing between 12 and 24 

kg’’) to have an FAA airworthiness 

certificate, ‘‘which is civilian UAV 

specific, and not as stringent as the 

current COA.’’ Another individual 

commenter said small UAS should not 

be allowed to operate over others’ 

property or persons, and no closer than 

500 feet unless they have an 

airworthiness certificate. Reabe 

Spraying Service said small UAS that 

fly over or within 100 feet of a person, 

vehicle, or occupied building that is not 

part of the operation should have a 

manufacturer-provided airworthiness 

certificate and must come with a 

manual that outlines all required 

maintenance and part life limits. 

Finally, a number of commenters 

opposed the Department’s decision not 

to require small UAS to obtain an 

airworthiness certificate. NAAA and the 

Colorado Agricultural Aviation 

Association (CoAA), for example, said 

such certification is necessary to ensure 

small UAS can safely operate in the 

NAS without posing a hazard to persons 

or property. 

One commenter noted that two weeks 

prior to publication of the NPRM, he 

presented data from the Army to several 

FAA engineers at a meeting of the 

RTCA, and the agreement was that 

many of the small UAS ‘‘mishap issues’’ 

would be solved through airworthiness 

certification. The commenter included 

with his comment files from 

presentations to the American Society of 

Safety Engineers and the International 

System Safety Society, which he said 

highlight the importance of 

airworthiness certification of small 

UAS. 

Air Tractor said there should be a set 

of certification rules addressing the 

reliability of control systems for small 

UAS that are similar to the rules for 

civil certification of aircraft. The 

commenter stated its belief that the FAA 

has little knowledge of the quality, 

environmental performance, and 

software reliability of today’s 

commercial off-the-shelf small UAS 

control systems. The commenter said 

that, at a minimum, these systems 

should be certified, inspected, and 

tested to ensure reliable operations. 

Unmanned aircraft technologies 

continue to evolve at a rapid pace. The 

Department acknowledges that rapidly 

evolving technologies could face 

obsolescence by the time the 

certification process is complete. While 

the Department does consider such 

factors, the agency does not believe that 

this issue alone would warrant its 

choosing not to require airworthiness 

certification. Instead, the Secretary finds 

that operation in accordance with part 

107 sufficiently mitigates the safety risk 

posed by a small unmanned aircraft. 

To operate under part 107, a small 

unmanned aircraft must remain within 

visual line of sight of the remote pilot 

in command and may not fly over a 

person not directly participating in the 

flight operation. If commercial operation 

over people is desired, then the remote 

pilot will have to obtain a waiver by 

demonstrating that the operation will 

not decrease safety. The aircraft may be 

evaluated during the waiver process to 

ensure it has appropriate safety systems 

and risk mitigations in place for flight 

over people. 

The final rule also does not permit 

flight operations in Class B, C, or D 

airspace or within the lateral boundaries 

of the surface area of Class E airspace 

designated for an airport unless the 

remote pilot in command has prior 

authorization from the air traffic control 

facility having jurisdiction over that 

airspace. This operational requirement 

will mitigate risk and ensure safety 

around airports without the need for 

further equipment or certification 

requirements. 

These and other part 107 

requirements significantly reduce the 

risk of a mid-air collision or the 

likelihood that the unmanned aircraft 

will fall on top of a person standing 

underneath it. Additionally, with 

limited exception, the small unmanned 

aircraft may not fly higher than 400 feet 

AGL, which further separates that 

aircraft operation from most mannedaircraft operations in the NAS.160

Because of the significant risk 

mitigation provided by the operating 

rules of part 107, an airworthiness 

certification requirement would not 

provide sufficient additional mitigation 

to justify the costs of requiring all small 

UAS operating under part 107 to obtain 

airworthiness certification. 

Some commenters recommended that 

small UAS vendors and manufacturers 

be required to aid airworthiness by 

providing maintenance manual 

instructions or conducting testing. An 

individual commenter who supported 

the FAA’s decision not to impose 

airworthiness certification requirements 

on small UAS nevertheless urged the 

FAA to implement regulations that 

require small UAS vendors to provide 

maintenance manuals ‘‘such that the 

operator can indeed comply with the 

airworthiness requirements in a 

systematic way to allow ‘safe 

operation.’ ’’ ArgenTech Solutions 

recommended the FAA require each 

UAS manufacturer to obtain a limited 

special purpose certification for small 

UAS. The commenter suggested the 

certification include operation and 

testing at one of the FAA-authorized test 

sites to certify several minimum 

attributes. Another commenter, Kansas 

State University UAS Program, favored 

self-certification by either the operator 

or manufacturer using industry 

consensus standards. 

While the FAA will not mandate that 

manufacturers provide instructions to 

determine if the aircraft is in a condition 

for safe operation, the agency 

encourages this practice. Many aircraft 

manufacturers, such as DJI, already 

provide this for their aircraft. Aircraft 

that are sold with such guidance may 

benefit from lower insurance rates when 

compared to equivalent aircraft that do 

not provide the documentation. 

In developing the NPRM, the 

Department considered using industry 

consensus standards for airworthiness 

determination. However, consensus 

standards are still under development 

and thus cannot be used as the sole 

mandatory means of compliance. 

Additionally, a performance standard 

requiring the remote pilot to mitigate 

risk but giving him or her discretion to 

use non-technological mitigation will 

afford more flexibility to small UAS 

operations than airworthiness and 

technology-dependent requirements. 

One commenter suggested that section 

333(b)(2) is intended only for temporary 

use until a ‘‘lasting airworthiness 

means’’ is implemented. 

The Department disagrees with the 

argument that section 333(b)(2) was 

intended to be temporary. The statutory 

language in section 333(c) specifically 

requires the Secretary to ‘‘establish 

requirements’’ for the safe operation of 

UAS that meet the requirements 

specified in section 333. Section 

333(b)(2) states that the Secretary ‘‘shall 


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161Public Law 112–95, Sec. 333(b)(2). 

162As discussed in section III.C.1 of this 

preamble, air carriers (which are not included in 

this rule) are subject to liability insurance 

requirements. See 49 U.S.C. 41112 (noting that the 

Secretary may issue a certificate to a citizen of the 

United States to provide air transportation as an air 

carrier only if the citizen complies with the 

Secretary’s orders and regulations governing the 

filing of an insurance policy or self-insurance plan). 

determine . . . whether a certificate of 

waiver, certificate of authorization, or 

airworthiness certification under section 

44704 of title 49, United States Code, is 

required for the operation of unmanned 

aircraft systems. . . .’’ 161 There is no 

language in section 333 indicating that 

such requirements, if established, must 

be temporary. 

K. Miscellaneous Provisions 

1. Mandatory Insurance 

Although not specifically discussed or 

proposed in the NPRM, several 

commenters raised the issue of liability 

insurance. For the reasons discussed 

below, this rule will not include a 

liability insurance requirement. 

Approximately 30 commenters, 

including NAAA, Property Drone 

Consortium, and Northrop Grumman 

Corporation, supported the inclusion of 

a liability insurance requirement in the 

final rule. These comments argued that: 

(1) Other countries require liability 

insurance for small UAS operations; (2) 

liability insurance would incentivize 

safe operations and encourage operators 

to keep pace with technological 

developments; and (3) small UAS 

operations are analogous to automobile 

operations, which require liability 

insurance. 

This rulemaking is being jointly 

conducted by the FAA and the Office of 

the Secretary of Transportation (OST). 

The FAA statutes applicable to this 

rulemaking do not authorize the agency 

to impose mandatory insurance 

requirements. Thus, the FAA does not 

have jurisdiction to require small UAS 

operations subject to this rule to obtain 

insurance coverage. 

Similarly, OST also lacks authority to 

impose liability insurance requirements 

on small UAS operations covered by 

this rule because those operations do 

not rise to the level of air 

transportation.162 However, the 

Department emphasizes that remote 

pilots who offer these types of services 

are responsible for the operation, and 

could be held liable for any injury or 

damage that could result. Prudent 

remote pilots should evaluate their 

existing insurance policies to determine 

whether they have appropriate coverage 

for these operations. 

2. Test Sites 

To further facilitate the integration of 

UAS into the NAS, the FAA selected six 

UAS Test Sites to test UAS technology 

and operations. The NPRM invited 

comments on how the FAA can improve 

or further leverage its UAS Test Site 

program to encourage innovation, safe 

development, and UAS integration into 

the NAS. 

The Oklahoma Governor’s Unmanned 

Aerial Systems Council asserted that the 

legal restrictions imposed on the FAA, 

prohibiting the agency from ‘‘directing’’ 

the Test Sites under Other Transaction 

Agreements, leads to an unnecessary 

level of ambiguity and bureaucratic 

confusion regarding Test Site missions 

and objectives. The commenter 

concluded that it is unlikely that the 

industry or the FAA will benefit from 

continued operation of the Test Sites 

under the current regulatory and OTA 

structure. 

Modovolate Aviation said the FAA 

should be more explicit about the areas 

of research, demonstration, and testing 

that would be most helpful in filling the 

data void referred to in the NPRM. 

Aviation Management recommended 

the agency do the following: (1) 

Establish guidance to all academic 

institutions doing UAS research that 

defines the project, type, or nature of 

UAS research that the FAA needs to 

successfully pursue integration of UAS 

into the NAS; (2) define the means and 

methods that will allow defined 

research to be submitted, categorized, 

classified and evaluated in a ‘‘national 

library’’ of UAS searchable research; 

and (3) work with Congress to establish 

greater levels of UAS research funding. 

The New Jersey Institute of 

Technology claimed that the NPRM 

does not encourage entities to do 

business with the FAA-designated Test 

Sites or other air ranges, and that the 

development of products or services 

may be inhibited for some small UAS 

components or airframes. The 

commenter claimed that universities 

and other institutions related to Test 

Sites may reasonably be concerned that 

educational, research, and academic 

potential may be lost due to the 

prohibitive proposed rules. The 

commenter also pointed to 

communication issues between the FAA 

and the designated Test Sites, and 

suggested that the FAA elaborate and 

specify the roles and obligations of all 

current users, which would enable a 

reasonable discussion as to the 

effectiveness of an anticipated FAA 

UAS Center of Excellence. 

NBAA recommended that the FAA 

‘‘define parameters that can safely 

accommodate continued research and 

development of advanced UAS 

capabilities’’ and provide the future 

Center of Excellence with authority to 

approve advanced UAS operational or 

testing capabilities in coordination with 

ATC. 

AIA said the FAA could make better 

use of Test Sites by doing the following: 

(1) Provide a detailed vision of the 

specific types of data Test Sites should 

provide to further standards 

development and overall UAS 

integration; (2) provide funding 

mechanisms for operation of Test Sites; 

(3) provide an opportunity to designate 

private testing areas within the current 

sites; (4) expand issuance of COAs to 

designees at Test Sites and prioritize 

such COA requests; and (5) address 

barriers to use that are limiting private 

enterprise use of the sites, such as 

ownership and control of intellectual 

property and data rights. 

The FAA has been exercising every 

effort toward greater facilitation of the 

Test Sites. To that end, the FAA is 

working closely with the Test Sites to 

guide research programs toward specific 

goals such as System Safety & Data 

Gathering, Aircraft Certification, 

Command & Control Link Issues, 

Control Station Layout & Certification, 

Ground & Airborne Sense & Avoid, and 

Environmental Impacts that will help 

the FAA safely integrate UAS into the 

national airspace system. In addition, 

the FAA has worked with the Test Sites, 

industry, and the general public to 

quickly discern opportunities, design 

research challenges, and identify 

priorities. Many of the research areas 

suggested in the comments are being 

addressed in current and planned 

research sponsored by the FAA, or by 

one or more of its government or 

industry partners. The FAA continues 

an active engagement with the Test 

Sites, the Center of Excellence, and 

other research partners to undertake 

research that will facilitate future flight 

operations and airspace access. 

Lastly, it bears noting that UAS 

operations in the NAS continue to be 

developmental. As additional 

acceptable parameters are demonstrated 

for safe UAS operations, the FAA may 

adopt those parameters. With regard to 

providing the Center of Excellence with 

authority to approve advanced UAS 

operational or testing capabilities in 

coordination with ATC, the FAA 

remains open to considering various 

forms of delegated authority where a 

delegation is legally possible. The FAA 

is working to expedite the process of 

authorization of operators and UAS, but 

faces limitations in terms of manpower 


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and the sheer lack of technological 

information available. 

Many commenters were concerned 

about lack of funding and an ineffective 

COA process. UPS discussed two factors 

it believes have impeded the usefulness 

of the Test Sites: inadequate funding 

and the amount of time it takes to obtain 

the authorizations necessary to fly. UPS 

noted that in the absence of suitable 

government funding, the Test Sites look 

to their ‘‘customers’’ for funding, which 

creates a situation where the fees 

charged to use the Test Site exceed the 

economic benefit to the customer. UPS 

said that as a result, many operators 

seek a section 333 exemption to allow 

them to do research and development 

on their own property. UPS also 

asserted that the utility of Test Sites has 

been hampered by the amount of time 

it takes to obtain the authorizations 

necessary to fly. To remedy this 

problem, UPS proposed the FAA grant 

a blanket authorization to UAS of 

certain weight and performance 

standards to operate at Test Sites. 

Several other commenters also 

pointed to increased funding and a 

better COA process, among other things, 

as necessary to improve the Test Site 

program. Like UPS, State of Nevada, the 

Nevada Institute for Autonomous 

System, and the Nevada FAAdesignated UAS Test Site, commenting 

jointly, said the effective use of the Test 

Sites has been hindered by a lack of 

funding and by the fact that the UAS 

industry can ‘‘bypass’’ the Test Sites by 

obtaining section 333 exemptions. The 

commenters said that Congress needs to 

provide funding for FAA to: (1) Operate 

the Test Sites; (2) provide Test Sites 

with ‘‘Broad Area COAs’’ that are 

aircraft-agnostic; and (3) allow the Test 

Sites to immediately begin testing the 

small UAS rules proposed in the NPRM 

to either validate the proposed rules or 

identify gaps and issues, and to provide 

standards for small UAS SMS 

procedures, airworthiness processes, 

training, and aircrew qualifications. 

Another commenter said something 

must be done to relax the regulation 

preventing Nevada from using its 

designation as a ‘‘commercial UAS test 

range.’’ The commenter suggested that 

the COA procedure and approval 

process be expedited at the Federal 

level, or that Nevada Test Sites be given 

autonomy to approve COAs. 

Several commenters also discussed 

the need for additional funding of Test 

Sites. One commenter said the FAA 

should provide funding to the Test 

Sites, as well as develop the 

organizational architecture needed to 

facilitate research between the Test Sites 

and the Center of Excellence. Another 

commenter said Test Sites should be 

partnered with funded organizations ‘‘at 

a level that also allows the pool of Test 

Sites to handle the demand and to 

address more complicated operations 

that exceed the limited proposed rule.’’ 

One commenter said that due to lack of 

funding, limited support, and process 

management gaps, very few resources 

have been directly and solely assigned 

to the Test Site program. The 

commenter recommended prioritization, 

simplification, and a wide research 

scope be established at the Test Sites. 

Another commenter said the FAA needs 

to establish an informed set of research 

objectives and ensure coordination 

between emerging UAS manufacturing 

companies, potential UAS markets, and 

academic researchers at the Test Sites 

and the Center of Excellence. The 

commenter also said that a significant 

amount of testing will be done by 

academia and industry outside the Test 

Sites under COAs and exemptions, and 

that the FAA should take advantage of 

those efforts through Cooperative 

Research and Development Agreements 

(CRADA) and other agreements. 

Texas A&M University-Corpus 

Christi/LSUASC also recommended the 

FAA enable Test Sites to conduct 

operations without having to apply for 

COAs for every research operation. The 

commenter also recommended that 

these ‘‘blanket COA’’ operations at Test 

Sites be permitted at less than 200 feet 

AGL. In addition, the commenter said 

the FAA needs to engage the Test Sites’ 

research capacities. The commenter 

claimed that Test Site proponents have 

offered significant UAS research 

capacities to the FAA (e.g., expertise 

and infrastructure), but the agency has 

not indicated that these capacities will 

be used in the development of 

technologies to enable safe integration 

of UAS into the NAS. Finally, the 

commenter said the FAA needs to 

incorporate applicable portions of the 

proposed small UAS rule into test-site 

other transaction agreements (OTAs), 

which it said would have two residual 

effects—first, it would assist in the 

validation of the rules with actual 

operations, and, second, it would 

provide the Test Sites some leverage 

towards being financially sustainable by 

enabling them to offer services to 

public- and private-sector entities 

without burdensome administrative 

costs (e.g., COA applications). 

Regarding the COA process, the FAA 

has already issued ‘‘blanket COAs’’ to 

the Test Sites which are not aircraft 

specific. However, the FAA is also 

responsible for overseeing the 

operations of the 6 Test Sites, and 

ensuring each Test Site sets up a safetesting environment and adheres to 

strict safety standards. The FAA must 

exercise every caution to ensure that the 

introduction of UAS operations into the 

NAS is executed in a manner that will 

provide the greatest possible safety 

protections for manned aircraft as well 

as people or property on the ground. 

Thus, part 107, which reflects the safety 

considerations addressed during the 

course of this rulemaking, will extend to 

allowing operations at the Test Sites. 

Operations that conform to part 107 will 

require no additional authorization, 

obviating additional blanket COAs. 

Operations that are outside the scope of 

part 107 will require waivers to portions 

of part 107; this requirement is 

necessary to ensure that UAS vehicles 

are evaluated for safety on a case-bycase basis. 

Regarding the costs associated with 

UAS development and other related 

issues, the FAA cannot interfere with 

market pricing. The UAS industry, like 

any other, is subject to the economic 

structure of the United States and prices 

are typically controlled by supply and 

demand. With regard to the Test Sites 

and what they charge for services they 

provide, the FAA cannot interfere 

because the FAA is not charged with 

subsidizing the cost of operations at the 

Test Sites. The sites must be allowed to 

obtain funding for their continued 

operation. 

In regards to funding, Congress has 

not appropriated Federal funds for Test 

Site operations or research. If the FAA 

obtains funding specific to UAS, it will 

make those funds available to operators 

in accordance with the legislative 

language appropriating the funds. 

Several commenters proposed specific 

areas of testing for the FAA-designated 

Test Sites to undertake. Modovolate said 

energy dissipation tests should be 

conducted to obtain data on energy 

dissipation in collisions between small 

UAS and manned aircraft, particularly 

helicopters. The commenter said these 

collision energy dissipation tests should 

focus on collecting data on the effects of 

a collision with small UAS that are 

made of various types of frangible 

materials. 

The University of North Dakota’s John 

D. Odegard School of Aerospace 

Sciences—which is part of one of the six 

established Test Sites—said the FAA 

and academic institutions should work 

together to study 13 areas of UAS 

operations, including extended VLOS 

and BVLOS operations, operations over 

persons, and nighttime operations. The 

commenter urged all parties to work 

with Congress to establish levels of 

funding for this research, which it said 


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will lead to future integration of UAS 

into the NAS. 

Exelis said the FAA should use the 

designated Test Sites to prove and 

demonstrate the safety and operations of 

technology that enables beyond-visualline-of-sight UAS operations. To that 

end, the commenter said the Test Sites 

should be granted COAs that allow for 

BVLOS operations. The commenter also 

said the Test Site program can be further 

leveraged by undertaking testing of 

BLVOS operations in real-world 

environments. 

The State of Nevada, the Nevada 

Institute for Autonomous System, and 

the Nevada FAA-designated UAS Test 

Site, commenting jointly, stated that the 

FAA should enable specific research 

and development at the designated Test 

Sites ‘‘to identify operating limitations 

that could be relaxed based on 

technological advancements.’’ More 

specifically, the commenters said the 

Test Sites and future FAA UAS Center 

of Excellence can provide assistance in 

developing standards which delineate 

the acceptable performance of sensor 

technologies to satisfy ‘‘see and avoid’’ 

or ‘‘sense and avoid’’ requirements. 

The National Association of 

Broadcasters, National Cable & 

Telecommunications Association, and 

Radio Television Digital News 

Association, commenting jointly, urged 

the FAA to increase its efforts to 

facilitate and encourage use of the 

existing UAS Test Sites to expedite UAS 

research and development and to 

develop data and safety records for 

unmanned aircraft to support their 

expanded use for breaking news 

coverage, sports coverage, and video 

production, including over populated 

areas. The commenters also pointed to 

research that is currently being 

conducted by universities on the use of 

small UAS for newsgathering and 

reporting purposes, and encouraged the 

FAA to use the results of that research 

to further refine the small UAS rule. 

CTIA—The Wireless Association said 

the FAA should expeditiously grant any 

requests from the commercial wireless 

industry to test its technologies with 

small UAS at any of the FAA’s six 

designated UAS Test Sites, as well as in 

various geographic locations pursuant to 

the FAA’s section 333 exemptions and 

experimental aircraft certification 

processes. The commenter asserted that 

researchers can collect data on the 

networks’ reliability and robustness of 

signal and submit their findings to the 

FAA and its supporting committees. 

The commenter further asserted that the 

FAA should incorporate the results of 

this testing when considering spectrum 

to support small UAS operating within 

and beyond the visual line of sight. 

The Air Medical Operators 

Association said the UAS Test Sites are 

an excellent area to test the ability of 

UAS to avoid approaching aircraft. The 

commenter asserted that UAS must be 

tested to ensure to the flying public that 

the required separation is sufficient to 

allow the UAS operator to maneuver 

away from manned aircraft. 

One commenter recommended the 

Test Sites conduct testing on the 

visibility to manned aircraft of small 

UAS of various sizes and speeds and 

with various visibility treatments under 

a variety of conditions. The commenter 

also recommended testing various seeand-avoid technologies under a variety 

of test conditions and testing to help 

determine anti-collision lighting 

requirements. Another individual 

commenter said the use of UAS to 

transport property should be tested at 

one of the designated Test Sites. 

The FAA welcomes the commenters’ 

suggestions for UAS research, and 

encourages the Test Site sponsors to 

consider these recommendations as 

further testing parameters. Several of the 

comments coincide with ideas that the 

FAA has, or currently is in the process 

of adopting. The speed at which 

advanced technologies can be adopted 

is an issue that must be addressed step 

by step. Wireless operations and 

collection of data are both subjects that 

the FAA is examining. Wireless 

operations, however, must first be able 

to demonstrate the capability to operate 

under control and safely. Additionally, 

data collection is subject to a variety of 

laws. On occasion, additional 

limitations are imposed by desire of the 

operators. 

NetMoby suggested that one method 

to improve the Test Site program is to 

increase the number of Test Sites. 

Specifically, the commenter urged the 

FAA to establish a minimum of one Test 

Site per State (with no maximum). 

Travelers United similarly said the 

designation of only six Test Sites is 

‘‘unnecessarily limiting,’’ although it 

did not propose an alternative number 

of sites. The commenter did say that 

Test Sites should be able to expand their 

airspace further into Class G airspace 

within their region, to allow for more 

operations in different geographies and 

population densities. 

The number of Test Sites established 

by the FAA was specifically designated 

by Congress. Section 332 of the FAA 

Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 

(Pub. L. 112–95) directed the FAA to 

‘‘establish a program to integrate 

unmanned aircraft systems into the 

national airspace system at 6 test 

ranges.’’ The FAA therefore does not 

have the authority to establish 

additional Test Sites and also conform 

to its Congressional mandate. 

One commenter said the FAA can 

make better use of its six designated 

Test Sites by designating them as 

‘‘Qualified Entities,’’ as is done in 

Europe. NetMoby recommended the 

FAA establish standards for accredited 

academic institutions to apply for 

authority to operate as a Test Site, with 

stringent qualifications and reporting 

requirements for each test-site. The 

University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign similarly suggested that 

universities and others should be 

permitted to conduct research on their 

own properties, so long as the 

institutions are willing and able to 

implement adequate safety measures. 

Another commenter said private 

individuals and corporations should be 

allowed to set up private Test Sites for 

developing UAS. 

In the United Kingdom, the 

government has established ‘‘national 

qualified entities’’ that conduct 

assessments of UAS operators and make 

recommendations to the Civil Aviation 

Authority whether to approve those 

operators. In the United States, Congress 

has mandated the FAA under 49 U.S.C. 

44701 to prescribe standards in the 

interest of aviation safety. In response to 

comments suggesting that entities 

outside of the six selected Test Sites 

should be permitted to conduct research 

on their properties, the FAA notes that 

nothing prevents other entities from 

conducting small UAS testing within 

the confines of part 107. For UAS 

operations in which the small 

unmanned aircraft weighs less than 55 

pounds that are not permitted under 

part 107, an entity may seek a waiver, 

provided the entity intending to 

conduct testing provides evidence that 

that the proposed operation can safely 

be conducted under the terms of a 

certificate of waiver. 

Additionally, the FAA developed a 

process under FAA Order 8000.732A to 

appoint UAS Designated Airworthiness 

Representatives (DARs) for UAS 

Certification at UAS Test Sites. These 

DARs are specifically authorized to 

issue special airworthiness certificates 

in the experimental category for 

research and development, market 

survey, and crew training, at UAS Test 

Sites. Where UAS Test Sites are focused 

on public aircraft operations, this 

additional flexibility provides UAS Test 

Sites with the ability to conduct specific 

civil operations under a special 

airworthiness certificate/experimental 

category. 


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42186 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 28, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

163FAA has determined that this final rulemaking 

is covered by the CATEX described in paragraph 5– 

6.6(f) of FAA Order 1050.1F. In the NPRM, the FAA 

relied upon the categorical exclusion in section 

312(f) of FAA Order 1050.1E the NPRM the FAA 

has updated the order and the corollary provision 

in the new order is paragraph 5–6.6(f). 164 14 CFR part 36, Appendix G, Sec. G36.301(c). 

Although it did not mention UAS Test 

Sites, specifically, the Washington 

Aviation Group recommended that the 

FAA gather information on the 

frequency with which small UAS can be 

expected to fail, and on the prevalence 

of return-to-home technology. The 

Washington State Department of 

Transportation, Aviation Division— 

which also did not specifically mention 

UAS Test Sites—recommended the FAA 

initiate a study to examine hobbyist 

UAS activities in an effort to determine 

whether registration of some hobby UAS 

aircraft may now be appropriate. Event 

38 Unmanned Systems said the FAA 

must secure appropriate research and 

development funding, and conduct 

research on any proposed rule 

implementation, in an open and 

transparent manner with particular 

attention paid to non-biased review and 

quality assurance. 

The FAA has established 

requirements (in the Registration Rule) 

for registration of all unmanned aircraft 

and aircraft classified as model aircraft. 

As mentioned previously in regards to 

funding, Congress must appropriate 

Federal funds to the FAA for specific 

types of research and development. 

3. Noise and Environmental 

a. The National Environmental Policy 

Act 

The Department of Transportation has 

determined that this proposed action 

qualifies for categorical exclusion 

pursuant to Paragraph 4.c.5 of DOT 

Order 5610.1C, Procedures for 

Considering Environmental Impacts (44 

FR 56420, Oct. 1, 1979) and FAA Order 

1050.1F, paragraph 5–6.6(f).163

Paragraph 4.c.5 of DOT Order 5610.1C 

incorporates by reference actions 

identified by FAA as categorical 

exclusions. 

Categorical exclusions are actions 

identified in an agency’s NEPA 

implementing procedures that do not 

normally have a significant impact on 

the environment and therefore do not 

require either an environmental 

assessment (EA) or environmental 

impact statement (EIS). See 40 CFR 

1508.4. In analyzing the applicability of 

a categorical exclusion (CATEX), the 

agency must also consider whether 

extraordinary circumstances are present 

that would warrant the preparation of 

an EA or EIS. Id. A number of 

commenters expressed concern that 

there may be noise and environmental 

impacts as a result of this rule. Based on 

the information known at this time and 

what is reasonably foreseeable, FAA 

does not find any extraordinary 

circumstances that preclude use of a 

CATEX for implementation of this rule. 

For the reasons discussed below, the 

FAA will not make any changes to the 

rule based on these comments. 

b. Noise 

Approximately 60 commenters 

expressed some concern about the noise 

produced by small UAS. The comments 

ranged from very general to specific. 

One commenter specified the need for a 

noise metric to measure or control the 

noise from UAS. Another requested 

noise certification and operating limits 

to be established. Many of the 

comments regarding noise expressed 

concern over the potential effect on 

wildlife, such as startling nesting birds. 

One commenter described the potential 

for human noise exposure as 

‘‘considerable’’ since a person in New 

York City could be exposed to ‘‘dozens’’ 

of flights a day, and concluded that 

small UAS noise posed a greater 

problem than noise from airports. 

Another commenter indicated that the 

rerouting of manned aircraft for safety 

reasons when small UAS are operating 

in the same area might force the noise 

of larger manned aircraft to be unfairly 

concentrated on certain people. 

The Professional Helicopter Pilots 

Association stated that noise emissions 

from small UAS operations should be 

below 65 DBE under all operating 

conditions (we believe the commenter 

meant ‘‘dBA (A-weighted decibels’’)). 

The CAFE Foundation stated that the 

NPRM omitted limits for noise at a 

measured sideline distance, and stated 

that noise is ‘‘the principal source of the 

public’s complaints about aircraft.’’ The 

commenter concluded that ‘‘[t]he rules 

of operation for UAVs need to include 

certification standards for their noise 

emissions at a prescribed distance,’’ 

giving an example of 48 dBA at a 20- 

meter sideline distance that would 

result in a day-night level (DNL) of 54.7. 

Turning first to the potential 

environmental impacts of the proposed 

rule, based upon FAA’s forecasts and 

the best available science and 

information, the FAA has determined 

that this rulemaking qualifies for the 

CATEX in FAA Order 1050.1F, 

Paragraph 5–6.6(f). The FAA examined 

the potential noise impacts considering 

the projected amount and type of Small 

UAS operations. The FAA has 

documented the categorical exclusion, 

including the potential for extraordinary 

circumstances and review of the 

potential for extraordinary 

circumstances, and has placed a copy of 

it in the docket for the final rule. 

The NPRM did not propose noise 

certification standards or operating 

limitations for small UAS. As to the 

comments concerning noise limitations, 

there are two aspects—the formally 

tested limits of noise that are 

established when an aircraft is 

certificated by the FAA, and noise 

operating limits that apply to certain 

aircraft. Operators of UAS seeking type 

certification are subject to the limits for 

smaller non-jet aircraft listed in 14 CFR 

part 36 Appendix G (fixed-wing) and 

Appendix J (helicopters). Appendix G 

imposes a noise limit of 70 dBA for 

takeoff noise from a single engine 

airplane weighing no more than 1,257 

pounds that was manufactured on or 

after February 3, 2006.164 The small 

UAS to which part 107 will apply are 

considerably smaller, less than 55 

pounds. The commenters requesting 

noise certification standards as part of 

this rule did not provide any evidence 

to show that the noise emitted by the 

Small UAS subject to this rule would 

exceed the current limits of part 36 

Appendix G or J. The FAA recently used 

Appendix G to certificate two small 

unmanned aircraft, one with a takeoff 

weight of 44 pounds and the other 13.4 

pounds. These aircraft were subject to 

the full noise test procedures specified 

in part 36, Appendix G. The resulting 

noise levels (53.2 dBA and 27.0 dBA) 

were substantially lower than the 70 

dBA limit in Appendix G, by margins of 

16.8 dBA and 43 dBA, respectively. 

While the FAA has chosen not to 

require type certification of small UAS 

subject to this rule, the FAA is gathering 

data for all UAS on which it may base 

future certification standards, especially 

for those UAS that exceed the 55-pound 

weight limit of part 107 or that use more 

advanced propulsion systems that 

would affect their noise profiles. The 

FAA may apply the requirements of part 

36 separately to UAS under the FAA’s 

authority to regulate noise in the future. 

At this time, however, the FAA does not 

believe there is sufficient evidence to 

warrant such a standard. If full type and 

airworthiness certification for a UAS is 

applied for as a means to operate 

outside part 107 restrictions, the noise 

certification standards of part 36 already 

apply as they would to any manned 

aircraft, including the required noise 

tests. 

For similar reasons, the FAA lacks 

sufficient evidence at this time to justify 

imposing operating noise limits on 

small UAS. The only operating noise 


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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 28, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 42187 

165See 14 CFR part 91, subpart I. 

166Technical Report, Version 0.1—September 

2013 DOT–VNTSC–DoD–13–01 (February 2014). 

rules in the United States apply to 

turbojet aircraft and supersonic 

operations.165

The FAA considered the potential for 

noise impacts based on the projected 

amount and type of small UAS 

operations operating under this rule. 

Pursuant to 14 CFR part 150 land use 

compatibility guidelines incorporated 

by reference in FAA Order 1050.1F, 

Environmental Impacts: Policies and 

Procedures (July 16, 2015), noisesensitive areas such as residential, 

educational, health, and religious 

structures and sites are considered 

compatible land uses when the yearly 

day-night average sound level (DNL) is 

below 65. DNL is a cumulative noise 

metric, calculated by adding up the 

noise produced by individual aircraft, 

however, and does not directly 

correspond to the noise produced by an 

individual aircraft of any weight or size. 

To illustrate how the noise of an 

individual UAS affects the land use 

compatibility threshold, at 200 feet 

altitude over the measurement point, it 

would take 6,000 flights of the noisier 

of the two certificated UAS (at 53.2 

dBA) over one 24-hour period to exceed 

the 65 DNL land use compatibility 

threshold; at 400 feet altitude over the 

measurement point, there would need to 

be 25,000 flights in one 24-hour period 

to exceed the land use compatibility 

threshold. The FAA does not anticipate 

this level of small UAS operations at 

any location in the United States, nor 

would the airspace over a particular 

location support such levels of activity. 

The FAA may revisit the issue of noise 

from small UAS in light of future 

operational experience and more noise 

data for all UAS. 

c. Other Environmental Comments 

A number of commenters raised air 

quality concerns with regard to small 

UAS operations that would be 

conducted under the proposed rule. 

Green Vegans and five individual 

commenters asserted that the aggregate 

number of small UAS operations that 

would be conducted under part 107 will 

result in a significant impact on air 

quality. In support of their claim, these 

commenters cited a report released by 

Volpe in 2013,166 which projects a total 

number of UAS vehicles approaching 

approximately 250,000 by 2035, of 

which approximately 175,000 vehicles 

would be available for purchase from 

the commercial marketplace. 

The individual commenters argued 

that the collective number of projected 

UAS in the report indicates that there 

are significant environmental impacts 

and/or extraordinary circumstances that 

require a more extensive NEPA review 

process. The commenters further 

suggested that the aggregate number of 

UAS would cause an impact on air 

quality. On the other hand, Kapture 

Digital Media suggested that the 

substitution of small UAS for manned 

aircraft in various applications would 

have a positive effect on air quality, 

since most small UAS use electrical 

power rather than fossil fuels. Two 

individual commenters also opined that 

small UAS operations would not 

adversely impact air quality. 

The Clean Air Act established the 

National Ambient Air Quality Standards 

(NAAQS) for six pollutants (‘‘criteria 

pollutants’’) that are the most common 

types of pollutants that can cause 

damage to humans and the 

environment. Those pollutants are: 

Carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen 

dioxide (the most common of oxides of 

nitrogen gas), (NO2), ozone (O3), 

particulate matter (PM2.5 and PM10), 

sulfur dioxide (SO2), and lead (Pb). 

Under the Clean Air Act, the FAA must 

determine whether promulgation of this 

rule has the potential to cause or 

contribute to any new violation of any 

standard in any area, increase the 

frequency or severity of any existing 

violation of any standard in any area, or 

delay timely attainment of any standard 

or any required interim emission 

reductions or other milestones in any 

area. 

The FAA currently allows small UAS 

operations comparable to the ones that 

will be enabled by this rule through an 

exemption process utilizing Public Law 

112–95, section 333. As of this writing, 

the FAA has issued exemptions to allow 

over 3,385 small UAS operations. The 

majority of these operations used small 

UAS that were powered by electricity 

(i.e. through battery-powered electric 

motors) which generally do not produce 

the pollutants covered by NAAQS. 

Indeed, as noted by Kapture Digital 

Media and the individual commenters, 

the replacement of fossil-fuel-powered 

manned aircraft with electrically 

powered small UAS that promulgation 

of this rule will enable may even have 

a positive impact on air quality. 

Based on information available about 

the type of equipment likely to be used 

(i.e., battery-powered electric motors), 

emissions attributable to UAS operating 

subject to this regulation will not cause 

significant air quality impacts, and 

would not violate air quality standards. 

The FAA has no evidence that would 

change this conclusion. Therefore FAA 

has determined that air quality impacts 

from the small UAS rule are not 

extraordinary circumstances precluding 

the use of a CATEX. 

Green Vegans stated that ‘‘the use and 

numbers of UASs/drones by industry, 

government agencies, and critically, 

hobbyists, who do not need permission 

to operate their drones, have increased 

dramatically.’’ The commenter added 

that the ‘‘potential environmental and 

social impacts [of UAS use] are 

enormous.’’ Green Vegans further 

asserted that the FAA cannot rely on a 

CATEX to comply with NEPA and 

stated that the FAA must prepare an 

Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 

before proceeding further. 

The Department of Transportation has 

adopted policies and procedures for 

compliance with the National 

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), as 

implemented by Council on 

Environmental Quality (CEQ) 

regulations, in FAA Order 1050.1F, 

Environmental Impacts: Policies and 

Procedures. Among other things, DOT 

Order 5610.1C, paragraph 4.c.5, lists 

DOT actions that are normally subject to 

a CATEX, and incorporates by reference 

the actions identified by the FAA. FAA 

Order 1050.1F lists FAA actions that are 

normally subject to a CATEX. FAA 

Order 1050.1F, Paragraph 5–6.6(f) 

covers rulemaking actions (excluding 

those that if implemented may cause a 

significant impact on the human 

environment). Based upon its forecasts 

and the best available information, the 

FAA has determined that this 

rulemaking is covered by the CATEX in 

FAA Order 1050.1F, Paragraph 5–6.6(f), 

and will be documented pursuant to 

FAA Order 1050.1F, Paragraph 5–3. 

FAA does not find any extraordinary 

circumstances that would preclude the 

use of a CATEX. 

The FAA also notes that this 

rulemaking has limited applicability to 

two types of UAS use cited by Green 

Vegans. First, as discussed in section 

III.C.4 of this preamble, Public Law 

112–95, section 336 prohibits the FAA 

from conducting a rulemaking with 

regard to hobby/recreational operations 

that meet the statutory criteria specified 

in section 336. Section 336 provides an 

exception only for model aircraft that 

endanger the safety of the NAS, and this 

rule will codify that exception in part 

101. Second, as discussed in section 

III.C.3 of this preamble, this rule will 

also not apply to public aircraft 

operations of small UAS that are not 

operated as civil aircraft. 

Green Vegans and several individual 

commenters also argued that the ‘‘flood’’ 

of UAS predicted to fly in the NAS 

constitute extraordinary circumstances 

under paragraph 304 of FAA Order 


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42188 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 28, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

167Since the NPRM the FAA has updated the 

order and the corollary provision in the new order 

is paragraph 5–2. 

1050.1E.167 The commenters asserted 

that the high numbers of UAS will have 

an environmental impact on ecosystems 

and the human environment and this 

constitutes extraordinary circumstances. 

In response, the FAA notes that, 

because electrically powered small UAS 

could replace fossil-fuel-powered 

manned aircraft, the environmental 

impact of small UAS operations could 

be a positive improvement in air quality 

and noise. At this time, the FAA has no 

information indicating that the 

implementation of this rule will result 

in any significant impacts, cumulative 

or otherwise. As such, the FAA has 

determined that there are no 

extraordinary circumstances that 

preclude categorical exclusion of this 

rule. 

Green Vegans expressed concern that 

the FAA is ignoring the large numbers 

of hobby/recreational small UAS that 

would not be covered by part 107. The 

commenter suggested that communitybased organizations would be unlikely 

to issue guidelines that include 

provisions for operating model aircraft 

in an environmentally responsible way. 

In response, the FAA considered the 

effects of small UAS operating under 

this rule in light of other UAS 

operations, and did not find any 

evidence that this rule was likely to 

directly, indirectly, or cumulatively 

create a significant environmental 

impact. The FAA also emphasizes that 

section 336(a) of Public Law 112–95 

prohibits the agency from addressing in 

this rule model aircraft that are operated 

in accordance with section 336. 

Approximately 20 commenters 

discussed the use of UAS in wildlife 

conservation and monitoring efforts. 

Most commenters expressed support for 

adopting UAS technology. NOAA stated 

that high-quality UAS operations could 

be very beneficial and offer significant 

cost savings and increase safety for 

endangered, threatened and trust 

species. The Nez Perce Tribe stated that 

it sees enormous benefits in the use of 

small UAS for management of salmon 

fisheries and other wildlife. The Nature 

Conservancy discussed the benefits of 

using UAS for monitoring sand hill 

cranes and other wildlife, and the 

increased safety that small UAS use 

would provide for wildlife biologists. 

Shell Exploration and Production 

Company described the potential use of 

UAS to monitor and observe endangered 

species and marine mammals. 

On the other hand, several 

commenters, including Green Vegans, 

remarked on the danger that a small 

UAS traveling at up to 100 mph would 

present to migratory birds, mallard 

ducks, and other wildlife because birds 

might not be visible to small UAS 

operators. The Ventura Audubon 

Society expressed concern about the 

negative impacts the use of small UAS 

could have on nesting shorebirds. An 

individual commenter asserted that 

small UAS use can affect wildlife and 

manned aircraft in an unsafe manner, as 

evidenced by the aggregate number of 

bird and wildlife strikes every year. The 

commenter expressed concern that 

small UAS operations conducted under 

part 107 may interfere with birds and 

relied on the FAA Strike Report 1990– 

2012 in support of her comments. 

The FAA agrees with the commenters 

that wildlife surveying and monitoring 

operations conducted under part 107 

can have benefits for wildlife 

conservation. The RIA accompanying 

this rule contains a discussion of the 

many societal benefits that will be 

enabled by this rule, including wildlife 

conservation and monitoring efforts. 

In response to commenters who 

expressed concerns about negative 

impacts to birds and other wildlife, the 

FAA emphasizes that this rule does not 

authorize the harassment, harming, or 

killing of birds, mammals, or oceandwelling animals. These types of actions 

are prohibited by other laws and 

regulations such as the Migratory Bird 

Treaty Act (see 16 U.S.C. 703; 50 CFR 

part 21), the Endangered Species Act 

(ESA), and the Marine Mammal 

Protection Act (MMPA). The FAA 

emphasizes that in addition to satisfying 

the provisions of this rule, remote pilots 

of a small UAS will remain subject to 

all applicable laws, including 

environmental and wildlife laws. 

The Nature Conservancy and several 

individual commenters expressed 

concern with wetlands and other 

ecosystems that provide habitat for 

water fowl. 

Executive Order 11990, DOT Order 

5660.1A, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 

1899, and the Federal Water Pollution 

Control Act, as amended (commonly 

referred to as the Clean Water Act), 

address activities in wetlands. Executive 

Order 11990 requires Federal agencies 

to ensure their actions minimize the 

destruction, loss, or degradation of 

wetlands. It also assures the protection, 

preservation, and enhancement of the 

Nation’s wetlands to the fullest extent 

practicable during the planning, 

construction, funding, and operation of 

transportation facilities and projects. 

The Clean Water Act provides the 

authority to establish water quality 

standards, control discharges, develop 

waste treatment management plans and 

practices, prevent or minimize the loss 

of wetlands, determine location with 

regard to an aquifer or sensitive 

ecological area such as a wetlands area, 

and regulate other issues concerning 

water quality. 

It is not anticipated that this rule will 

involve land acquisition or ground 

disturbing activities that would affect 

coastal resources or wetlands. In regards 

to impacts to habitat, the rule is not 

intended to authorize encroachment 

into any habitats for waterfowl and FAA 

does not anticipate this rule causing 

significant impacts to such habitats. 

The Nature Conservancy asked for 

less restrictive daytime-operations and 

visual-line-of-sight requirements, 

asserting that changes to these proposed 

provisions would improve their 

conservation efforts. ‘‘In sum, The 

Nature Conservancy views UAS as a 

critical conservation tool.’’ Further, 

‘‘[t]he Conservancy’s envisioned use for 

UAS in California provides just one 

example of why the daytime operations 

requirement would limit the 

effectiveness of UAS as a conservation 

tool.’’ 

As discussed in section III.E.2.c.i of 

this preamble, the daylight-operations 

provision of this rule has been 

expanded to allow operations during 

civil twilight hours. This change will 

further enable small UAS operations 

under part 107, including operations 

conducted for positive environmental 

management. This change will also 

allow greater utilization of small UAS as 

a conservation tool in Alaska where, in 

the northern parts of that State, the sun 

does not rise for as many as 64 days a 

year. 

With regard to visual line of sight, as 

discussed in section III.E.2.a of this 

preamble, this rule will generally 

implement the visual-line-of-sight 

provision as proposed. However, the 

FAA will consider waiving that 

restriction if an applicant seeking 

extended operational flexibility can 

demonstrate that his or her operation 

will have at least the same level of 

safety as an operation conducted within 

visual line of sight. 

One individual commenter raised 

concerns about adverse visual impacts 

that could result from small unmanned 

aircraft flight. The commenter stated 

that the visual impact of seeing ‘‘. . . a 

drone rather than the natural scape is 

unfortunate.’’ The commenter compared 

unmanned aircraft regulations to land 

use controls such as building heights 

being limited when feasible to reduce 

visual impacts to natural scenic 

corridors. The commenter also 

complained that at the commenter’s 


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local school yard, ‘‘teenagers are their 

(sic) learning to fly their drones.’’ 

Pursuant to FAA Order 1050.1F, 

(Paragraph 4–3, Exhibit 4–1) the FAA 

generally considers visual impacts that 

could: 

(i) Affect the nature of the visual character 

of the area, including the importance, 

uniqueness, and aesthetic value of the 

affected visual resources, (ii) Contrast with 

the visual resources and/or visual character 

in the study area, and (iii) Block or obstruct 

the views of visual resources, including 

whether these resources would still be 

viewable from other locations. 

The FAA does not have evidence or 

data that the operation of small UAS 

under this rule would significantly 

affect the nature of visual character of 

an area, contrast with visual resources, 

or significantly block or obstruct the 

views of visual resources. 

The FAA notes that the provisions of 

this rule (such as the visual-line-of-sight 

requirement, the maximum altitude 

limitation, and the restriction on 

operations in controlled airspace) limit 

the areas where a small UAS could be 

operated under part 107. Additionally, 

as discussed in section III.J.2 of this 

preamble, because of the limitations of 

current fuel and power-source 

technology, small UAS currently 

available to consumers have an average 

flight time of only 30 minutes or less. 

Some small UAS have maximum flight 

time of less than 10 minutes. Because of 

the regulatory and practical limitations 

on small UAS operations that will be 

conducted under part 107, promulgation 

of this rule will not result in significant 

visual impacts. 

Berkey Williams asked the FAA to 

initiate formal government-togovernment consultation with Indian 

Tribes, and the Green Vegans noted the 

need for Tribal participation under 

NEPA. Berkey Williams stated that 

formal government-to-government 

consultation with Indian Tribes is 

needed to properly identify and mitigate 

the impacts that small UAS may have 

on Tribal interests in Tribal territory. 

The Nez Perce Tribe and the Northern 

Arapaho Tribe filed comments 

indicating their interest in using small 

UAS for fish and wildlife management 

and agricultural purposes. The Northern 

Arapaho Tribe restated their previous 

request to initiate government-togovernment consultation regarding the 

development and implementation of 

UAS on the Wind River Indian 

Reservation, and submitted comments 

on the NPRM concerning: (1) Waivers to 

the visual-line-of-sight requirement; and 

(2) recognition of Tribal authority to 

regulate or prohibit UAS use to protect 

against interference with traditional 

ceremonies and other activities. 

Consistent with Executive Order 

13175, Consultation and Coordination 

with Indian Tribal Governments, and 

FAA Order 1210.20, American Indian 

and Alaska Native Tribal Consultation 

Policy and Procedures, the FAA ensures 

that Federally Recognized Tribes 

(Tribes) are given the opportunity to 

provide meaningful and timely input 

regarding proposed Federal actions that 

have the potential to uniquely or 

significantly affect their respective 

Tribes. At this point, the FAA has not 

identified any unique or significant 

effects, environmental or otherwise, on 

tribes resulting from this rule. However, 

the FAA has entered into governmentto-government consultation with the 

Northern Arapaho Nation on its general 

use of UAS. In addition, the Nez Pierce 

tribe has contacted FAA to discuss 

obtaining a section 333 exemption to 

operate small UAS under existing rules. 

With regard to the specific issues 

raised by the Northern Arapahoe Tribe 

and the Nez Perce Tribe, the FAA notes 

that the requirements concerning 

airman certification and visual line of 

sight in this rule are not unique and 

significant environmental impacts on 

the Tribes. The FAA also notes the 

Northern Arapahoe Tribe’s concerns 

about Tribal authority to regulate or 

prohibit UAS flights, but, as discussed 

in section III.K.6 of this preamble, this 

rule does not address preemption issues 

because those issues necessitate a casespecific analysis that is not appropriate 

in a rule of general applicability. The 

FAA notes, however, that state 

governments have historically been able 

to regulate the takeoffs and landings of 

aircraft within their state boundaries. 

The FAA anticipates that the Tribes 

would be able to exercise similar 

internal sovereignty with regard to the 

takeoffs and landings of small UAS 

within their territories. Thus, while 

preemption is beyond the scope of this 

rule, the FAA will conduct outreach to 

tribes seeking information about their 

ability to regulate small UAS operations 

conducted within their territory to see 

how their concerns could be addressed 

within the broader UAS integration 

effort. 

NOAA asked the FAA to add a 

regulatory provision that would require 

the operator to ensure that a small UAS 

would not pose a danger to protected 

wildlife in the event of a loss of aircraft 

control. NOAA noted that it addresses 

this issue in its current guidance, such 

as the NMFS Marine Wildlife Viewing 

Guidelines. These guidelines 

recommend, in general, that the public 

keep a safe distance of 50 yards (150 

feet) from dolphins, seals, and sea lions 

on the water or land and 100 yards (300 

feet) from large whales on water or land. 

For all marine mammals, the 

recommended viewing guideline for 

aerial observations is 1,000 feet. 

To the extent NOAA seeks 

compliance with applicable 

environmental statutes, such as the 

Marine Mammal Protection Act 

(MMPA), the FAA agrees that the 

pertinent NOAA regulations and 

guidance provide an excellent overview 

of the applicable requirements that must 

be followed by individuals who seek to 

operate in germane areas. These 

regulations and guidance may be found 

at: http://uas.noaa.gov/policy/. Further, 

since NOAA administers the applicable 

environmental statutes, the FAA defers 

to NOAA regarding the requirements 

imposed by specific regulations that 

protect marine wildlife. 

NOAA also expressed concern that 

the rule would overlap and conflict with 

several statutes and regulations that 

prohibit the approach of endangered 

marine species. NOAA cited the 

National Marine Sanctuaries Act 

(NMSA) and the Endangered Species 

Act (ESA). NOAA asked the FAA to 

include wildlife-specific language in the 

rule so that the public is made aware of 

regulations and guidelines, including 

the NMFS Marine Wildlife Viewing 

Guidelines, which recommend, in 

general, that the public keep a safe 

distance of 50 yards (150 feet) from 

dolphins, seals, and sea lions on the 

water or land and 100 yards (300 feet) 

from large whales on water or land, and 

recommends viewing guideline for 

aerial observations of all marine 

mammals of 1,000 feet. Green Vegans 

also cited the same statutes as 

potentially being implicated by 

operation of small UAS. 

The FAA agrees with NOAA that 

remote pilots operating a small UAS are 

responsible for complying with all 

applicable laws and regulations, not just 

the requirements of this rule. This rule 

does not authorize the harassment, 

harming, or killing of wildlife, and 

remote pilots of small UAS remain 

subject to environmental and wildlife 

laws such as the ones cited by the 

commenters as well as any other laws 

applicable to the small UAS operation. 

With regard to marine wildlife, as 

discussed earlier, the FAA strongly 

recommends that remote pilots 

conducting operations near marine 

wildlife familiarize themselves with 

NOAA regulations and guidance, which 

can be found at: http://uas.noaa.gov/

policy/. However, with regard to the 

contents of this rule, the FAA defers to 

NOAA for the regulations and guidance 


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regarding matters within NOAA’s 

jurisdiction. 

Several individual commenters 

expressed concern that small UAS could 

be used to deliver hazardous materials 

to public and private citizens 

endangering the lives of people, 

wildlife, and property. In response, the 

FAA notes that, as discussed in section 

III.C.1 of this preamble, the provisions 

of this rule do not authorize the use of 

small UAS to transport or deliver 

hazardous materials. 

4. Privacy 

In the NPRM, the FAA acknowledged 

that privacy concerns have been raised 

regarding the integration of UAS into 

the NAS. Although proposed 

regulations to address privacy concerns 

were deemed beyond the scope of this 

rulemaking, the FAA emphasized its 

intended participation in the multistakeholder engagement process led by 

the National Telecommunications and 

Information Administration (NTIA) 

pursuant to the Presidential 

Memorandum, Promoting Economic 

Competitiveness While Safeguarding 

Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties 

in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft 

Systems (February 15, 2015). Pursuant 

to the Presidential Memorandum, NTIA 

and its interagency partners, including 

the FAA, are working with stakeholders 

to develop best practices concerning 

privacy, transparency, and 

accountability for the broad range of 

possible UAS platforms and commercial 

practices. 

In addition, the FAA conducted a 

privacy impact assessment (PIA) of the 

proposed rule in accordance with 

section 522(a)(5) of division H of the FY 

2005 Omnibus Appropriations Act, 

Public Law 108–447, 118 Stat. 3268 

(Dec. 8, 2004) and section 208 of the EGovernment Act of 2002, Public Law 

107–347, 116 Stat. 2889 (Dec. 17, 2002). 

As part of the PIA, the FAA analyzed 

the impact the proposed rule might have 

on collecting, storing, and disseminating 

personally identifiable information (PII) 

of airmen and UAS operators, and the 

FAA examined and evaluated 

protections and alternative information 

handling processes in developing the 

proposed rule in order to mitigate 

potential privacy risks. The PIA has 

been updated to reflect the provisions of 

this final rule and can be found at: 

http://www.transportation.gov/

individuals/privacy/privacy-impactassessments. 

The FAA intends to continue 

addressing privacy concerns through 

engagement and collaboration with the 

public, stakeholders and other agencies 

with authority and subject matter 

expertise in privacy law and policy. The 

FAA considered whether to include 

privacy provisions in this rulemaking. 

However, for the reasons explained in 

the discussion that follows, this rule 

does not include privacy regulations. 

The FAA received about 180 

comments on the NPRM raising 

concerns about the potential impacts of 

small UAS operations on privacy. Most 

commenters expressed support for UAS 

integration and recognized the many 

benefits of this technology across 

diverse industries, but commenters 

discussed concerns regarding personal 

privacy, data privacy, private property 

rights and intellectual property rights. 

Several commenters, including the 

Illinois Farm Bureau, Colorado 

Cattlemen’s Association, and the 

International Association of Amusement 

Parks and Attractions (IAAPA), raised 

concerns regarding small UAS 

operations over private property and 

several asserted that UAS operations 

should not be permitted over private 

property without advance authorization 

given by the business, institution or 

property owner. 

Some commenters, including 

Colorado Ski Country USA, the National 

Association of State Departments of 

Agriculture (NASDA), and the 

Electronic Privacy Information Center 

(EPIC), asserted that the FAA should 

include provisions to protect privacy as 

part of this rulemaking, while the Center 

for Democracy and Technology (CDT) 

asserted the FAA should address 

privacy in a future rulemaking. The CDT 

and EPIC included specific regulatory 

proposals for consideration. The 

National Farmers Union asked the FAA 

to be mindful of its concerns regarding 

the collection of data by industry and 

government, which might be used 

against a farm owner. 

However, several commenters, 

including the Colorado Cattlemen’s 

Association, National Farmers Union, 

and the Florida Department of 

Agriculture and Consumer Services, 

recognized that privacy regulations are 

beyond the scope of this rulemaking and 

FAA authority. Several commenters, 

including the Professional 

Photographers of America and the Law 

Office of Debbie Weecks, asserted that 

existing law already addresses the issue 

of privacy. The News Media Coalition 

asserted that privacy concerns are best 

addressed at the State level. The 

University of North Georgia commented 

that privacy concerns are minimal 

provided flights are operated in 

accordance with FAA rules, and images 

are acquired from 300 feet or above and 

are not obtained using facial recognition 

technology. 

The Colorado Cattlemen’s Association 

encouraged the FAA to continue its 

participation in NTIA’s multistakeholder engagement efforts 

consistent with the February 15, 2015 

Presidential Memorandum. On the other 

hand, AeroMarine recommended a 

federally commissioned review of the 

technological neutrality of FAA UAS 

proposed rules led by the Department of 

Commerce. Aeromarine also 

recommended a federally commissioned 

review of the adequacy of comparative 

technology-neutral privacy regulations 

(like the EU), led by the Department of 

Justice. One individual commented on 

the PIA and asserted it did not raise any 

strong concerns for the privacy of pilots. 

Overall, the comments demonstrate a 

lack of consensus regarding the extent to 

which UAS integration poses potential 

risks for privacy intrusions, how privacy 

concerns should be addressed, and the 

FAA’s role in efforts to address these 

concerns. In response, the FAA notes 

that its mission is to provide the safest, 

most efficient aerospace system in the 

world, and does not include regulating 

privacy. The FAA recognizes that 

unique characteristics and capabilities 

of UAS may pose risks to individual 

privacy. However, these concerns are 

generally related to technology and 

equipment, which may be installed on 

an unmanned (or manned) aircraft, but 

are unrelated to the safe flight of the 

aircraft. There is a long history of pilots 

placing cameras and other sensors on 

aircraft for a variety of purposes (e.g., 

news helicopters, aerial surveys, film/

television production, law enforcement, 

etc.). 

Although the FAA regulates the safe 

and efficient operation of all aircraft 

within the NAS, the FAA has never 

extended its administrative reach to 

regulate the use of cameras and other 

sensors extraneous to the airworthiness 

or safe operation of the aircraft in order 

to protect individual privacy. Moreover, 

there is substantial, ongoing debate 

among policymakers, industry, 

advocacy groups and members of the 

public regarding the extent to which 

UAS operations pose novel privacy 

issues, whether those issues are 

addressed by existing legal frameworks, 

and the means by which privacy risks 

should be further mitigated. 

Recognizing the importance of 

addressing privacy concerns in the 

proper forum, the FAA has partnered 

with other Federal agencies with the 

mandate and expertise to identify, 

develop, and implement appropriate 

mitigation strategies to address privacy 

concerns. 

Turning to specific concerns raised by 

the commenters, EPIC asserted that 


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168See id. at section 332(a)(2). 

169 80 FR 11978, Mar. 5, 2015; 80 FR 41013, July 

14, 2015. 

170See 78 FR 68360, 68364, Nov. 14, 2013. 

171 Id. at 68363. 

172See Civil UAS Roadmap at 1.4.4; 78 FR 18932, 

Mar. 28, 2013; 78 FR 12259, Feb. 22, 2013; and 78 

FR 68360, Nov. 14, 2013. 

privacy is a necessary component of the 

Comprehensive Plan for civil UAS 

required by Public Law 112–95, section 

332(a), the FAA is required to establish 

privacy regulations prior to the 

integration of UAS into the NAS, and 

the FAA must therefore reissue the 

NPRM to fulfill the Congressional 

mandate. EPIC believes the FAA should 

propose privacy regulations that include 

provisions for use and data limitations, 

transparency, and public accountability. 

The CDT proposed that the FAA 

consider a future rulemaking to 

establish (1) limits on UAS collection 

and analysis of data; (2) limits on UAS 

retention of data; (3) standardized 

methods to disclose data collection 

practices by non-hobbyist UAS 

operators and technical capacity to 

identify those operators; and (4) 

methods to honor requests to opt-out 

certain areas entirely or partially from 

UAS data collection. The NASDA and 

the South Dakota Department of 

Agriculture also asserted that privacy 

issues need to be addressed before UAS 

are integrated into the airspace. 

In section 332(a) of Public Law 112– 

95, Congress required the Secretary of 

Transportation to develop, in 

consultation with representatives of the 

aviation industry, Federal agencies that 

employ UAS technology in the NAS, 

and the UAS industry, a comprehensive 

plan to safely accelerate the integration 

of civil UAS into the NAS. The mandate 

included specific direction regarding 

the contents of the plan, which 

addressed the safe and efficient 

integration of UAS into the airspace, but 

did not require the consideration of 

privacy implications.168 Moreover, in 

section 332(b) of Public Law 112–95, 

Congress directed the FAA to issue a 

final rule on small unmanned aircraft 

systems that will allow for civil 

operations of such systems in the NAS. 

Section 333 of Public Law 112–95 

directed the Secretary to determine 

whether UAS operations posing the 

least amount of public risk could safely 

be operated in the NAS and, if so, to 

establish requirements for the safe 

operation of these systems in the NAS, 

prior to completion of the UAS 

Comprehensive Plan and rulemaking 

required by section 332. 

None of the UAS-related provisions of 

Public Law 112–95 directed the FAA to 

consider privacy issues when 

addressing the integration of small UAS 

into the airspace, or mandated the 

inclusion of privacy considerations in 

the UAS Comprehensive Plan. Reading 

such a mandate into Public Law 112–95 

would be a significant expansion 

beyond the FAA’s long-standing 

statutory authority as a safety agency. 

Nonetheless, the FAA has consistently 

recognized the importance of 

stakeholder engagement regarding the 

concerns raised regarding privacy 

implications associated with UAS 

integration and incorporated privacy 

considerations into the UAS Test Site 

Program, under its contracting 

authority, as discussed further in 

response to the following comment. 

Moreover, consistent with the 

February 15, 2015 Presidential 

Memorandum, the FAA has been 

working closely with the privacy 

experts at NTIA by participating in 

public engagement sessions and 

educating both its governmental 

partners and privacy stakeholders 

regarding the safety issues associated 

with integrating UAS into the NAS. In 

March 2015, the NTIA invited comment 

on the issues that should be addressed 

as part of the stakeholder engagement 

process, and in July 2015, the NTIA 

announced further plans to hold a series 

of public engagement sessions in an 

open and transparent forum to develop 

consensus best practices for utilization 

by civil UAS operators.169 The FAA will 

continue to participate in these public 

engagement sessions and any resulting 

working group to lend its insight and 

expertise regarding aviation safety 

issues as relevant to the development of 

consensus best practices for civil use of 

UAS. 

EPIC asserted that the FAA has 

acknowledged that privacy needs to be 

addressed as part of UAS integration by 

addressing privacy as part of its test site 

program. 

Section 332(c) of Public Law 112–95 

directed the FAA, in coordination with 

NASA and DOD, to develop a UAS test 

site program for purposes of gathering 

safety and technical information 

relevant to the safe and efficient 

integration of UAS into the NAS. The 

UAS test site program is expected to 

help the FAA gain a better 

understanding of operational issues, 

such as training requirements, 

operational specifications, and 

technology considerations, which are 

essential to the FAA’s chief mission to 

ensuring the safety and efficiency of the 

entire aviation system. Although not a 

required component of the test site 

program, the FAA recognized the test 

site program as an opportunity to 

further the dialogue with regard to 

privacy concerns raised concerning 

UAS integration. 

The FAA implemented privacy 

requirements for the UAS test sites 

pursuant to its broad authority in 49 

U.S.C. 106(l)(6), which allows the 

Administrator to enter into contracts 

under ‘‘such terms and conditions as the 

Administrator may consider 

appropriate.’’ Under this broad 

contracting authority, the FAA included 

certain terms and conditions for 

operating the test sites in the ‘‘other 

transaction agreement’’ (OTA) for each 

chosen test site operator, which 

included requirements that each test site 

operator establish, and make publicly 

available, a privacy policy governing all 

activities and that test sites must be 

operated in accordance with all 

applicable privacy laws.170 The FAA 

did not specify the contents of any test 

site operator’s privacy policy and noted 

its expectation that the public entities 

operating the test sites and their 

respective State and local oversight 

bodies would monitor and enforce a test 

site’s compliance with its own 

policies.171

To develop these privacy 

requirements, the FAA engaged the 

public and enlisted assistance from 

subject matter experts outside the 

agency specializing in privacy law and 

policy. While the test sites were 

established in fulfillment of the 

requirements in Public Law 112–95, the 

privacy requirements were ultimately 

included in the OTAs pursuant to the 

FAA’s contracting authority in order to 

further the dialogue regarding which 

privacy issues are raised by UAS 

operations and how law, public policy, 

and industry practices should respond 

to those issues in the long run. The FAA 

consistently emphasized that the 

privacy requirements for the UAS test 

sites ‘‘are not intended to predetermine 

the long-term policy and regulatory 

framework under which UAS would 

operate.’’ 172

Contrary to the FAA’s general 

contracting authority in § 106(l)(6), the 

FAA’s rulemaking authority is 

specifically tied to its critical safety 

mission. While the FAA must comply 

with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 

552a, and other applicable legal 

requirements related to privacy when 

the FAA is collecting, maintaining, and 

using information about individuals, the 

FAA’s rulemaking authority neither 

mandates nor permits the FAA to issue 

or enforce regulations specifically aimed 

at protecting privacy interests between 


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173Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored 

People v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976). 

174U.S. Congressional Research Service. Freedom 

of Speech and Press: Exceptions to the First 

Amendment (7–5700, September 8, 2014) by 

Kathleen Ann Ruane. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/

misc/95-815.pdf at 9. 

175Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City & Cnty. 

of Honolulu, 455 F.3d 910, 920 (9th Cir. 2006). 

third parties. Specifically, this 

rulemaking is being conducted under 49 

U.S.C. 40103(b), 44701(a)(5), and Public 

Law 112–95, section 333, which focus 

on the safe operation of aircraft in the 

NAS. Thus, the functions of the 

Administrator and the FAA in this 

rulemaking do not include the 

protection of privacy interests between 

third parties. However, as discussed 

earlier, the FAA recognizes the 

importance of addressing privacy 

concerns and will continue to 

participate in the NTIA process to lend 

its insight and expertise regarding 

aviation safety issues to the 

development of consensus best practices 

for civil use of UAS. 

EPIC asserted that UAS cannot be 

safely integrated into the NAS without 

privacy regulations and if the FAA does 

not address privacy it will create safety 

risks, because individuals will turn to 

self-help measures (e.g. by using 

technology such as geo-fencing, which 

could lead to the loss of positive control 

of a UAS) to protect their privacy. In 

response, the FAA notes that there 

could be many different motivations 

(not just privacy concerns) for an 

individual to engage in unsafe conduct. 

That is why the regulations of this rule 

require that a small UAS be safely 

operated. If a person engages in conduct 

that creates an unsafe small UAS 

operation, then that person will be in 

violation of this rule regardless of the 

specific motivation for that conduct. 

The FAA also notes that, with regard 

to EPIC’s example of geo-fencing as 

potentially dangerous self-help, a 

number of commenters on this rule 

specifically requested the FAA to 

mandate geo-fencing, asserting that this 

would increase the safety of a small 

UAS operation. As discussed in section 

III.E.3.b.vii.1 of this preamble, while 

this rule will not require geo-fencing 

equipage, the FAA may consider such 

equipage as a positive safety mitigation 

in evaluating waiver requests for 

individual operations. 

Several commenters, including the 

Illinois Farm Bureau, Colorado 

Cattlemen’s Association, and the 

IAAPA, raised concerns regarding small 

UAS operations over private property 

and asserted that UAS operations 

should not be permitted over private 

property without advance authorization 

given by the business or property 

owner. In addition, the IAAPA asserted 

that UAS could pose a threat to 

intellectual property and other business 

interests of amusement parks, and other 

commenters raised concerns regarding 

the use of UAS to collect proprietary 

data over privately owned farms and 

businesses. However, the Wisconsin 

Society of Land Surveyors commented 

that aerial geospatial data acquisition 

practices using UAS provide significant 

societal benefit, are not a threat to 

individual citizen privacy and therefore 

Federal efforts to impose limits on UAS 

should exempt surveying and aerial 

mapping. 

As indicated in the NPRM and by 

some commenters, State law and other 

legal protections may already provide 

recourse for a person whose individual 

privacy, data privacy, private property 

rights, or intellectual property rights 

may be impacted by a remote pilot’s 

civil or public use of a UAS. Moreover, 

as the New Jersey Institute of 

Technology, pointed out, established 

Fourth Amendment legal precedent may 

already ‘‘serve as guiding boundaries or 

thresholds’’ for law enforcement use of 

UAS. However, in light of the FAA’s 

long-standing mission and authority as 

a safety agency, it would be 

overreaching for the FAA to enact 

regulations concerning privacy rights.173

5. First Amendment 

The FAA also received comments 

concerning the First Amendment 

implications of this rulemaking. In the 

NPRM, the FAA proposed a number of 

restrictions on small UAS flight in the 

interest of aviation safety, which some 

commenters have asserted incidentally 

burden the First Amendment. Many 

commenters, including the International 

Center for Law and Economics and 

TechFreedom, the Student Press Law 

Center, and the News Media Coalition, 

encouraged the FAA to consider how 

the proposed rules may infringe on First 

Amendment rights. 

After describing the applicable 

standards of review, the International 

Center for Law and Economics and 

TechFreedom asserted that various 

aspects of the rule are likely 

unconstitutional because they are not 

sufficiently narrowly drawn and 

adequately tailored to respond to the 

government interest for which they were 

created to address. This commenter 

went on to argue that the following 

NPRM provisions would have particular 

difficulty meeting the First Amendment 

burdens for time, place, and manner 

restrictions: (1) Ban on UAS flights over 

populated areas; (2) the specific airspace 

restrictions proposed in the NPRM; (3) 

the licensing regime for UAS operators; 

(4) the prohibition on nighttime 

operations; (5) the proposed visual lineof-sight requirements; (6) the ban on 

operating a small UAS from a moving 

vehicle; and (7) the ban on simultaneous 

operation of multiple UAS. Another 

commenter added that self-employed 

media photographers and videographers 

should be exempt from paying fees for 

operating UAS that may apply to larger 

news organizations, because such fees 

unduly would infringe upon their First 

Amendment rights. 

The Student Press Law Center 

asserted that a failure to carve out an 

appropriate exemption for student 

journalism, similar to the one provided 

for ‘‘hobbyists,’’ could leave the final 

rule susceptible to a First Amendment 

challenge. The commenter argued that 

denying a journalist access to the skies 

on the basis of his intent to engage in 

protected speech unfairly punishes the 

would-be speaker, and stated that the 

intent to engage in a protected activity 

cannot be used as a basis for more 

burdensome regulation. 

Additionally, one individual asserted 

that citizens engaged in constitutionally 

protected First Amendment activity 

could be subject to increased policing as 

a result of widespread small UAS usage. 

Another individual was concerned 

about the distinction between hobbyists 

and commercial use because, according 

to this individual, this distinction could 

result in the demise of model aviation 

magazines by muzzling hobbyists who 

are also paid. 

a. First Amendment Law in the United 

States 

In the United States, there is a right 

to freedom of speech, except under 

certain circumstances where the 

government is permitted to restrict 

speech. Whether the speech can 

constitutionally be restricted depends 

on the forum in which the speech is 

made, the content of the speech, or the 

manner in which it is regulated.174

Government limitations on speech in a 

nonpublic forum receive a lower level of 

scrutiny than restrictions on speech in 

a public forum.175

In the public forum context, noncontent-based restrictions on speech, 

such as the provisions in this rule, are 

analyzed using an intermediate scrutiny 

framework. Under intermediate 

scrutiny, a restriction on speech must 

advance a ‘‘significant,’’ ‘‘substantial,’’ 

or ‘‘important,’’ (but not necessarily 

‘‘compelling’’) government interest, and 

the restriction must be narrowly tailored 

to achieve that interest. The restriction 

does not have to be the least restrictive 


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176CRS at 9. 

177CRS at 9. 

178Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City & Cnty. 

of Honolulu, 455 F.3d 910, 920 (9th Cir. 2006). 

179Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform at 915. 

180Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform at 922, citing 

Brown v. California Dept. of Transp.321 F.3d 1217, 

1222 (9th Cir. 2003). 

181Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform at 921. 

182Clark, 468 U.S. at 294. 

183S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic 

Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 (1987). 

184See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. 

Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983). 

In that case, the Supreme Court struck down a tax 

imposed on the sale of large quantities of newsprint 

and ink because the tax had the effect of singling 

out newspapers to shoulder its burden. Here there 

is no such disproportionate effect—there are many 

small UAS operators who are not newsgathering 

organizations. 

185Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705 

(1986). 

186 Id. at 705–06. 

187 Id. at 707. 

means to advance the governmental 

interest.176 There are two categories of 

non-content-based speech restrictions: 

(1) Incidental restrictions, which are 

restrictions aimed at conduct other than 

speech, but which incidentally restrict 

speech; and (2) time, place, or manner 

restrictions on speech.177

As discussed below, this rule 

regulates activity in a nonpublic forum: 

The NAS. However, even if we assume, 

for the sake of discussion, that the NAS 

is a public forum, the proper framework 

in which to view the provisions of this 

rule is not under the category of time, 

place, or manner restrictions, but under 

the category of incidental restrictions on 

speech. The flight of a small UAS is not 

speech—it is conduct other than speech 

which may incidentally restrict speech 

(e.g., news reporting, commercial 

speech, or aerial photography). 

However, for the reasons discussed 

below, even if this rule were to be 

analyzed using the more stringent time, 

place, manner framework, the 

provisions of this rule would still be 

consistent with the First Amendment. 

b. Restrictions on Speech in a NonPublic Forum 

First, the location in which an activity 

occurs determines the level of scrutiny 

the courts will apply to a restriction 

placed on the activity. Restrictions 

placed on activities that occur in a nonpublic forum receive the lowest level of 

First Amendment scrutiny. Airspace is 

a nonpublic forum. As discussed in 

Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. 

City and County of Honolulu, ‘‘one 

would be hard pressed to find another 

forum that has had its access as 

historically restricted as U.S. 

airspace.’’ 178 Thus, FAA regulation of 

the NAS may impose restrictions in this 

forum that are ‘‘reasonable and 

viewpoint neutral.’’ 179 ‘‘The 

reasonableness analysis focuses on 

whether the limitation is consistent 

with preserving the property for the 

purpose to which it is dedicated.’’ 180

This rule is reasonable because it 

directly addresses the FAA’s interest in 

preserving the safety of manned aircraft 

flying in the NAS, as well as the safety 

of people on the ground. This rule is 

also viewpoint neutral because it does 

not specifically target a certain opinion 

or stance.181 As such, the provisions of 

this rule are consistent with the First 

Amendment. 

c. Incidental Restrictions on Speech 

If we were to assume, for the sake of 

discussion, that the NAS is a public 

forum, then the appropriate category in 

which to evaluate the provisions of this 

rule would be as an incidental 

restriction on speech. The activity 

actually regulated by this rule—flying a 

small unmanned aircraft—is not speech 

or an expressive activity. Rather, the 

flight of a small unmanned aircraft has 

only an incidental relationship to 

expressive conduct because it could be 

used to assist an expressive activity, 

such as recording something via camera. 

However, the provisions of this rule 

regulate only the flight of small 

unmanned aircraft; the use of a camera 

or other method of recording something 

near the aircraft is not directly regulated 

by part 107. In other words, attaching a 

camera to a small unmanned aircraft 

does not transform flying that aircraft 

into expressive conduct any more than 

attaching a camera to a car would 

transform driving that car into 

expressive conduct. In both cases, any 

restrictions on expressive conduct that 

occur as a result of regulating the 

operation of the small unmanned 

aircraft or car are incidental restrictions. 

The Supreme Court has noted that the 

standard for determining the 

constitutionality of an incidental 

restriction is ‘‘little, if any, different 

from the standard applied to a time, 

place, or manner restriction.’’ 182 As 

long as the regulation is content-neutral 

and narrowly focused on a substantial 

government interest, an incidental 

restriction need not be the least 

restrictive or least intrusive means of 

furthering that government interest.183

As discussed in the previous section, 

this regulation is content-neutral and is 

narrowly focused on the substantial 

government interest of regulating 

aviation safety.184 Therefore, it need not 

be the least restrictive or least intrusive 

means of furthering aviation safety. 

In Arcara v. Cloud Books, the 

defendant challenged a New York State 

law under which an adult bookstore was 

closed because it was found to be a 

public health nuisance. Respondents 

argued that the effect of the statutory 

closure remedy impermissibly burdened 

its bookselling activities protected 

under the First Amendment. The 

Supreme Court observed that ‘‘[t]he 

severity of this burden is dubious at 

best, and is mitigated by the fact that 

respondents remain free to sell the same 

materials at another location.’’ 185 The 

Court continued: 

In any event, this argument proves too 

much, since every civil and criminal remedy 

imposes some conceivable burden on First 

Amendment protected activities. One liable 

for a civil damages award has less money to 

spend on paid political announcements or to 

contribute to political causes, yet no one 

would suggest that such liability gives rise to 

a valid First Amendment claim. Similarly, a 

thief who is sent to prison might complain 

that his First Amendment right to speak in 

public places has been infringed because of 

the confinement, but we have explicitly 

rejected a prisoner’s claim to a prison 

environment least restrictive of his desire to 

speak to outsiders.186

Ultimately, the Court concluded that 

absent any basis for heightened 

scrutiny, ‘‘the First Amendment is not 

implicated by the enforcement of a 

public health regulation of general 

application against the physical 

premises in which respondents happen 

to sell books.’’ 187

Similarly, this rule is directed at 

aviation safety and does not directly 

regulate reporting or other expressive 

activity. Anyone seeking to use a small 

UAS for photography or videography in 

a manner not permitted under this rule 

is free to utilize another method of 

photography or videography by, for 

example, using a manned aircraft, 

filming from a tall structure or 

landmark, filming from the ground, or 

using specialized equipment. Thus, the 

provisions of this rule meet the 

constitutional standard for an incidental 

restriction on speech, and enforcement 

would not implicate the First 

Amendment. 

d. Time, Place, Manner Restrictions on 

Speech 

Finally, even if we were to assume 

that this rule directly regulates 

expressive activity in a public forum, 

the provisions of this rule would still be 

consistent with the First Amendment as 

a permissible time, place, or manner 

restriction on speech. A constitutionally 

permitted time, place, or manner 

restriction on speech occurs when the 

regulation is content-neutral, narrowly 

tailored to serve a significant 


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42194 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 28, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

188Any disparities in operation between pilots of 

small UAS who are hobbyists and those who are 

using small UAS for commercial purposes are 

beyond the control of the FAA—the ‘‘carve-out’’ for 

hobbyists was not instituted with FAA authority. 

As stated in the rule, section 336 of Public Law 

112–95 specifically prohibits the FAA from 

promulgating rules regarding model aircraft that 

meet all of the following statutory criteria: 

• The aircraft is flown strictly for hobby or 

recreational use; 

• The aircraft is operated in accordance with a 

community-based set of safety guidelines and 

within the programming of a nationwide 

community-based organization; 

• The aircraft is limited to not more than 55 

pounds unless otherwise certified through a design, 

construction, inspection, flight test, and operational 

safety program administered by a community-based 

organization; 

• The aircraft is operated in a manner that does 

not interfere with and gives way to any manned 

aircraft; and 

• When flown within 5 miles of an airport, the 

operator of the aircraft provides the airport operator 

and the airport air traffic control tower (when an 

air traffic facility is located at the airport) with prior 

notice of the operation. 

Therefore, the FAA can only promulgate rules 

regarding commercial uses of small UAS that are 

outside the scope of section 336, such as 

commercial uses. 

189Clark, 468 U.S. at 294. 

190United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983). 191Stadium Managers Association Comment at 5. 192NPRM at 9552. 

government interest, and leaves open 

ample alternative channels of 

communication. 

First, the requirement that the 

regulation be content-neutral is satisfied 

in this rule. The rule applies equally to 

all remote pilots of small UAS subject 

to FAA regulation, regardless of 

content.188 The regulation ‘‘is not being 

applied because of disagreement with 

the message presented.’’ 189 There is no 

question as to the content-neutrality of 

the regulation in this rule. 

Second, this rule is narrowly focused 

on the FAA’s substantial interest in 

protecting the navigable airspace of the 

United States, in addition to people on 

the ground. An example of a restriction 

that was considered unconstitutional 

was a ban on displaying flags or banners 

on public sidewalks surrounding the 

Supreme Court because there was not 

sufficient justification for the ban and it 

was not narrowly tailored.190

Conversely, with respect to the 

regulation at issue, to discard the 

provisions with which the commenters 

have taken issue would be at odds with 

the FAA’s stated mission of providing 

the safest airspace system in the world. 

The safety rationale for the provisions 

specifically designated by commenters 

as posing First Amendment issues is 

discussed in those provisions’ 

respective sections of this preamble. 

Lastly, there are adequate alternative 

channels of communication available 

for operations that are not allowed 

under the provisions of this rule. The 

First Amendment analysis does not 

require that a regulation be the least 

restrictive means of achieving the 

government interest, only that there not 

be a less restrictive alternative that 

serves the government’s interest as 

efficiently as the regulation at issue. A 

variety of other reporting, photography, 

and videography tactics that have been 

used prior to the existence of small UAS 

continue to be available to this day—the 

provisions of this rule apply only to 

small UAS, and not to other methods of 

conducting photography or 

videography. For example, as 

mentioned previously, the capability to 

conduct aerial photography and 

videography using manned aircraft 

remains unaffected by this rule. 

This rule fulfills several legitimate 

needs, the most important of which is 

providing the safest, most efficient 

aerospace system in the world. The 

provisions at issue all align with that 

principle. As such, this rule (which 

does not discriminate based on the time, 

place or manner of any expressive 

conduct) is narrowly tailored to achieve 

a significant, substantial, and important 

government interest. 

6. Preemption 

Although the NPRM did not mention 

preemption, the FAA received some 

comments on Federal preemption over 

State and local regulations. The FAA 

has reviewed the comments and, as 

discussed below, decided that specific 

regulatory text addressing preemption is 

not required in the final rule. 

The Associated General Contractors of 

America, Consumers Energy Company, 

and National Association of Mutual 

Insurance Companies raised concerns 

about the proposed rule’s lack of a 

preemption provision. Consumer Energy 

Company pointed out that without a 

preemption provision, State and local 

governments may attempt to regulate 

small UAS operations, resulting in 

potentially conflicting rules. 

Commenters argued that conflicting 

rules may lead to confusion, litigation 

costs, increased operational limitations, 

burden on UAS users, and delay in the 

adoption of UAS technology. 

Additionally, the Stadium Managers 

Association commented that states and 

local jurisdictions may react to the lack 

of Federal regulations for model aircraft 

‘‘with a flood of legislation that might 

very well be more restrictive and 

controlling than that of the § 336 

community-based organizations.’’ 191

The Stadium Managers Association 

questioned how Federal preemption 

would apply to model aircraft and 

stated generally its concern about the 

potential conflict between State and 

Federal laws. 

The FAA is not persuaded that 

including a preemption provision in the 

final rule is warranted at this time. 

Preemption issues involving small UAS 

necessitate a case-specific analysis that 

is not appropriate in a rule of general 

applicability. Additionally, certain legal 

aspects concerning small UAS use may 

be best addressed at the State or local 

level. For example, State law and other 

legal protections for individual privacy 

may provide recourse for a person 

whose privacy may be affected through 

another person’s use of a UAS.192

On December 17, 2015, the FAA Chief 

Counsel and the Director of the FAA’s 

UAS Integration Office issued a Fact 

Sheet on State and Local Regulation of 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). The 

Fact Sheet is intended to serve as a 

guide for State and local governments as 

they respond to the increased use of 

UAS in the national airspace. It 

summarizes well-established legal 

principles as to the Federal 

responsibility for regulating the 

operation or flight of aircraft, which 

includes, as a matter of law, UAS. The 

Fact Sheet also summarizes the Federal 

responsibility for ensuring the safety of 

flight as well as the safety of people and 

property on the ground as a result of the 

operation of aircraft. Substantial air 

safety issues are implicated when State 

or local governments attempt to regulate 

the operation of aircraft in the national 

airspace. The Fact Sheet provides 

examples of State and local laws 

affecting UAS for which consultation 

with the FAA is recommended and 

those that are likely to fall within State 

and local government authority. For 

example, consultation with FAA is 

recommended when State or local 

governments enact operational UAS 

restrictions on flight altitude, flight 

paths; operational bans; or any 

regulation of the navigable airspace. The 

Fact Sheet also notes that laws 

traditionally related to State and local 

police power—including land use, 

zoning, privacy, trespass, and law 

enforcement operations—generally are 

not subject to Federal regulation. 

Finally, the Fact Sheet includes a list of 

relevant legal authorities in an 

appendix. The Fact Sheet is available at 

http://www.faa.gov/uas/regulations_

policies/media/UAS_Fact_Sheet_

Final.pdf. 

7. Agricultural Operations 

Several commenters stated that any 

aerial application work conducted with 

small UAS must comply with 14 CFR 


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193http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_

a004_a-4. 

194Commercial sUAS Market Forecast, Prepared 

for GRA Incorporated by Teal Group Corporation. 

December 31, 2015. 

195We note that the Small Business 

Administration (SBA) reports new firms with 

employees tend to have an annual failure rate of 10 

to 12 percent where new firms without employees 

have failure rates about 30 to 36 percent. As this 

is an entirely new industry, the failure rate may be 

towards the higher end of the range. We find that 

the FAA’s forecast of 20 percent is consistent with 

the SBA’s failure rate of new business. http://

www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ_Sept_

2012.pdf. 

part 137, ‘‘Agricultural Aircraft 

Operations.’’ The FAA agrees, and 

emphasizes that under the current 

regulations (which remain unchanged 

by this rule) a remote pilot must comply 

with part 137 if he or she is engaging in 

dispensing activities that meet the 

definition of ‘‘agricultural aircraft 

operation’’ in 14 CFR 137.3. 

Part 137 applies to ‘‘agricultural 

aircraft operations’’ conducted within 

the United States. Section 137.3 defines 

‘‘agricultural aircraft operation’’ as ‘‘the 

operation of an aircraft for the purpose 

of (1) dispensing any economic poison, 

(2) dispensing any other substance 

intended for plant nourishment, soil 

treatment, propagation of plant life, or 

pest control, or (3) engaging in 

dispensing activities directly affecting 

agriculture, horticulture, or forest 

preservation, but not including the 

dispensing of live insects.’’ 

Any small UAS remote pilot 

conducting operations under part 107 

that constitute an ‘‘agricultural aircraft 

operation’’ within the meaning of part 

137 is required to comply with part 137, 

in addition to part 107, and hold an 

agricultural aircraft operator certificate. 

A remote pilot of a small UAS 

conducting agricultural aircraft 

operations may pose a contamination 

danger to himself or people in the area 

of operation, either through the 

exposure to or ingestion of the 

dispensed substance, or through the 

contamination of water or food supplies. 

Part 137 addresses this safety concern 

by levying requirements on agricultural 

aircraft operations, including 

certification, knowledge, and skill 

requirements. Therefore, any small UAS 

operation that meets the applicability 

requirements of part 137 must comply 

with part 137 in addition to part 107; 

these regulations are independent 

requirements. The FAA recognizes that 

remote pilots may not be able to meet 

all of the part 137 requirements because 

these regulations did not contemplate 

the unique characteristics of unmanned 

aircraft. As with other regulatory 

provisions, those remote pilots may seek 

an exemption from the part 137 

requirements they are unable to meet. 

The FAA notes that not all operations 

related to agricultural uses of a small 

UAS will be subject to part 137. Small 

UAS operations that are related to 

agriculture (i.e., crop monitoring, crop 

photography) but do not constitute an 

‘‘agricultural aircraft operation’’ under 

part 137 are not required to comply with 

part 137. 

8. Miscellaneous Comments 

Several individual commenters urged 

the FAA to focus on education. A few 

commenters, for example, 

recommended the FAA require that all 

UAS sold in the United States include 

information about applicable UAS 

regulations. Another commenter 

recommended a televised or magazine 

ad campaign ‘‘to educate and steer 

people.’’ 

The FAA will conduct an outreach 

effort, including publishing an advisory 

circular providing guidance on safe 

small UAS operations, and will 

continue to develop guidance for the 

public at http://www.faa.gov/uas/. 

The North Dakota Department of 

Agriculture raised concerns related to 

data gathering, storing and ownership of 

UAS technology and the fact that UAS 

operations can take place across State 

borders. 

These issues are beyond the scope of 

this rulemaking. 

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses 

A. Regulatory Evaluation 

Changes to Federal regulations must 

undergo several economic analyses. 

First, Executive Order 12866 and 

Executive Order 13563 direct that each 

Federal agency shall propose or adopt a 

regulation only upon a reasoned 

determination that the benefits of the 

intended regulation justify its costs. 

Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act 

of 1980 (Public Law 96–354) requires 

agencies to analyze the economic 

impact of regulatory changes on small 

entities. Third, the Trade Agreements 

Act (Public Law 96–39) prohibits 

agencies from setting standards that 

create unnecessary obstacles to the 

foreign commerce of the United States. 

In developing U.S. standards, this Trade 

Act requires agencies to consider 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, that they be the basis of 

U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded 

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Public 

Law 104–4) requires agencies to prepare 

a written assessment of the costs, 

benefits, and other effects of proposed 

or final rules that include a Federal 

mandate likely to result in the 

expenditure by State, local, or Tribal 

governments, in the aggregate, or by the 

private sector, of $155 million or more 

annually (adjusted for inflation with 

base year of 1995). This portion of the 

preamble summarizes the FAA’s 

analysis of the economic impacts of this 

final rule. We suggest readers seeking 

greater detail read the full regulatory 

evaluation, a copy of which we have 

placed in the docket for this rulemaking. 

In conducting these analyses, FAA 

has determined that this final rule: (1) 

Has benefits that justify its costs; (2) is 

an economically ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ as defined in section 3(f) of 

Executive Order 12866; (3) is 

‘‘significant’’ as defined in DOT’s 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4) 

will have a significant positive 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities; (5) will not 

create unnecessary obstacles to the 

foreign commerce of the United States; 

and (6) is subject to the Unfunded 

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Public 

Law 104–4). These analyses are 

summarized below. 

Assumptions and Data 

The FAA’s estimated benefits and 

costs are based on assessments of the 

small UAS Aviation Rulemaking 

Committee (ARC), commenters to the 

NPRM, and the opinions of FAA and 

industry subject matter experts. We 

remind the reader that since legal 

operation of non-recreational/nonhobby small UAS in the NAS 

constitutes a new market, available data 

for these operations is sparse. The 

benefit and cost analysis for the 

regulatory evaluation is based on the 

following assumptions: 

• Because the commercial small UAS 

industry is not yet established and may 

evolve differently from current expectations, 

the FAA determines that a five-year time 

frame of analysis is appropriate. 

• The base year is 2016. 

• We use a three percent and seven 

percent discount rate for the costs, as 

prescribed by OMB in Circular A–4.193

• Costs of the rule are estimated using two 

separate fleet forecasts. Based on these 

forecasts, a low case and a high case are 

developed. 

Æ Low Case: For this scenario, the small 

UAS fleet is separated into two different 

categories, professional-grade and consumergrade, as discussed in the low case fleet 

forecast below. The FAA assumes 

professional vehicles are replaced every three 

years and the consumer vehicles are replaced 

every 1.5 years.194

D Small UAS remote pilots flying 

‘‘Professional’’ vehicles are assumed to 

remain part of the pilot stock for the five-year 

analysis period. Pilots flying ‘‘Consumer’’ 

vehicles are assumed to attrite at a rate of 20 

percent annually.195


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42196 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 124 / Tuesday, June 28, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

196Small UAS Registration and Marking interim 

final rule (Registry IFR), published on December 16, 

2015. 

197Based on the FAA Civil Aircraft Registry as of 

December 2015. 

198The FAA does not require a small UAS remote 

pilot applicant to attend ground school to be 

eligible to take the initial knowledge test. However, 

the FAA acknowledges that applicants may need 

self-study to pass the exam. 

199The FAA notes that a person first must apply 

to become a small UAS remote pilot. During the 

application process, this analysis will refer to a 

person applying to become a small UAS remote 

pilot as an applicant. After the applicant has 

successfully passed the application process, this 

analysis will refer to the person as a small UAS 

remote pilot. 

200Since the small UAS knowledge test has yet 

to be administered, statistics are not yet available 

to estimate the failure rate of applicants. However, 

the weighted average failure rate for all categories 

of airman taking knowledge tests in 2014 was 10%. 

201http://www.catstest.com/airman-testingexams/recreational-private-pilot.php. 

202See ‘‘Travel Expense’’ section of the regulatory 

evaluation for methodology and source information. 

203See ‘‘Travel Expense’’ section of the regulatory 

evaluation for methodology and source information. 

204https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/2016-

Standard-Mileage-Rates-for-Business-Medical-andMoving-Announced. 205Source: Economic Values for Evaluation of 

FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions (http:// 

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/policy_guidance/

benefit_cost/) Table 1–1 Recommended Hourly 

Values of Travel Time Savings. P. 1–2. Increased by 

1.1 percent annually per U.S. Department of 

Transportation Revised Departmental Guidance on 

Valuation of Travel Time in Economic Analysis. 

(https://www.transportation.gov/administrations/

office-policy/2015-value-travel-time-guidance. p.6). 

206The FAA considers this to be a conservative 

estimate since there are no overhead costs 

associated with positive identification. Since the 

FAA did not receive a comment providing a better 

basis for this estimate, the FAA will continue to use 

$50 as the positive identification fee for the final 

rule. 

207http://antonelli-law.com/Drone_UAS_

Practice_Group.php (Checked on 3/16/2016). 

208http://www.aopa.org/letsgoflying/ready/time/

options.html. 

209 Ibid. 

210To determine the amount of self-study an 

individual would need to prep for the knowledge 

test, we examined two different sport pilot ground 

schools that claimed attendance at one of their 

sessions over the course of a weekend would be 

adequate preparation to pass the sport pilot written 

knowledge test. We then used these hours as a 

proxy for the self-study time a remote pilot 

applicant would need to pass the initial knowledge 

test. One of the pilot schools we examined offered 

a two-day sport pilot course which included 19 

hours of instruction, and the other school offered 

a three-day course that lasted for a period of 23 

hours. Based upon these two estimates, the FAA 

assumes that 20 hours of self-study is adequate to 

pass the initial knowledge test. 

211Federal Aviation Administration—Flight 

Standards Service 

212The impact of regulatory actions on economic 

welfare also includes any resulting changes in 

‘‘producer surplus.’’ In this case, however, a 

government agency (FAA) is the ‘‘producer’’ of UAS 

pilot certifications, and its marginal or incremental 

costs for certifying additional pilots are assumed to 

be constant. Because the agency thus receives no 

producer surplus, the welfare impacts of this 

regulatory action consist entirely of changes in 

consumer surplus to the two categories of small 

UAS pilots. 

Æ High Case: The high case does not 

distinguish between small UAS types and it 

is assumed that all vehicles have a life-span 

of one year. 

D All pilots are assumed to attrite at a rate 

of 20 percent annually.196

• We estimate that there is one qualified 

FAA-approved remote pilot in command for 

every two small UAS registered 197 and that 

both small UAS are of the same type (i.e. 

professional or consumer). This is a 

simplifying assumption. 

• The FAA estimates that a small UAS 

remote pilot applicant will expend 20 hours 

of self-study in preparation for taking the 

initial knowledge test and ten hours for the 

recurrent test.198 For individuals that fail the 

initial or recurrent test on their first attempt, 

the self-study-time to retake the test is 

reduced by 50 percent. 

• The FAA assumes that it will take an 

applicant 3 hours to take the initial or 

recurrent knowledge test. This time may be 

over-estimated for the purpose of the 

recurrent knowledge test, given that it covers 

fewer topics than other pilot tests. 

• The FAA determines that holders of 

Public COAs for activities may choose to 

operate under part 107. 

• The FAA assumes that the failure rate of 

applicants 199 taking the small UAS initial 

and recurrent knowledge based test is 10% 

percent.200 However, applicants that fail are 

assumed to pass the knowledge test on their 

second attempt. 

• The cost to administer an FAA approved 

small UAS knowledge test to a small UAS 

applicant or operator is $150.201

• The FAA estimates that a small UAS 

operator applicant will need to travel an 

average of 19 miles one way to reach their 

closest KTC location (38 miles round trip).202

• The FAA estimates that pilots operating 

small UAS under a 333 exemption will need 

to travel an average of 19 miles one way to 

reach their sport pilot license (38 miles 

round trip).203

• The 2016 published IRS variable cost 

mileage rate of $0.19 per mile is used to 

estimate the cost of vehicle usage.204

• The FAA assigns the hourly value of 

time and hourly values of travel time savings 

as to equal $25.14 for Year 1.205

• The FAA cost to issue an airman 

certificate is $25. 

• The FAA assumes a $50 fee to validate 

the identity of a remote pilot applicant who 

holds a part 61 pilot certificate with a current 

flight review and who has opted to take the 

online training course instead of the initial 

knowledge test.206

• The FAA assumes that those remote 

pilots flying small UAS under a 333 

exemption will operate under Part 107 rules 

upon expiration of their exemption. 

• The FAA determines that the cost to for 

an applicant to be granted a 333 exemption 

is $1,500.207

• The FAA estimates that the cost for sport 

pilot school is $3,000.208

• The FAA estimates that the flight 

training time for a sport pilot certificate is 33 

hours.209

• The FAA estimates that a sport pilot 

applicant will spend 20 hours of self-study 

in preparation for taking the sport-pilot 

initial knowledge test.210

• The FAA estimates that an applicant for 

a sport pilot license will make 22 round trips 

to the training center.211

Benefits Summary 

The net benefit of a regulatory action can 

be expressed by the change in economic 

welfare that it generates for society. These 

welfare impacts are reflected by changes in 

‘‘consumer surplus.’’ 212 Consumer surplus is 

an economic concept reflecting the idea that 

individuals and businesses demonstrate a 

willingness to pay for various goods and 

services, which reflects the value they 

receive from consuming or using those goods 

and services. Of course, not all consumers 

and business will receive the same value 

from a good or service, and this is reflected 

in the fact that there is usually wide variation 

in their willingness to pay to acquire it. The 

demand curve for that good or service reflects 

the continuum of values that different 

businesses and consumers receive from using 

it, and the consequent variation in their 

willingness to pay to purchase it. 

Businesses and consumers to whom this 

value exceeds the price of purchasing a good 

or service will do so, and as a result will 

experience benefits equal to the difference 

between the value they receive from that 

good or service and the price they pay to 

purchase it. This difference represents the 

consumer surplus they experiencing from 

purchasing and using it. 

A government action that reduces the price 

of a good or service increases the difference 

between the value its original buyers attach 

to it and the price they pay for it, thereby 

increasing the consumer surplus they 

receive. At the same time, the reduction in 

its price leads some consumers or businesses 

that were previously unwilling to purchase 

it—because its value to them was below its 

price—will now find it worthwhile to do so. 

Like those who purchased it at its initially 

higher price, they now also experience 

consumer surplus equal to the difference 

between the value they receive from having 

it and the (lower) price they now pay to 

purchase it. 

The benefit resulting from such an action 

includes the increases in consumer surplus 

to both groups: The savings experienced by 

those who formerly purchased the affected 

good or service at its initially higher price, 

and the new or additional consumer surplus 

experienced by those who decide to purchase 

it at its now lower price. Again, because the 

demand curve for that good or service reflects 

the distribution of values that businesses and 

consumers receive from using it, this total 

benefit can be quantified by estimating the 

area under the demand curve between the 

old price and the new price. 

This Part 107 small UAS rule is an 

‘‘enabling rule,’’ which effectively reduces 

the cost of entry into the non-recreational, 

non-hobby (or ‘‘commercial’’) market for 

UAS services. Benefits are quantified in 

terms of changes in consumer surplus for 

both existing 333 exemption holders, who 

have incurred significant costs to enable 


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them to operate small UASs (and would 

continue to do so in the absence of this rule), 

and new small UAS pilots certified under the 

streamlined procedures it establishes. The 

consumer surplus for new pilots is measured 

by the traditional consumer surplus triangle 

while the consumer surplus for the 333 

exemption holders is measured as a cost 

savings. For new pilots, initial costs to obtain 

the remote pilot certificate were subtracted 

from consumer surplus to obtain an estimate 

of net benefits to pilots. For existing 333 

exemption holders, the costs of maintaining 

their remote pilot certificates and other costs, 

such as TSA vetting, were subtracted from 

the consumer surplus to obtain estimates of 

the net benefits to pilots. 

PART 107 FINAL RULE QUANTIFIED BENEFITS TO PILOTS—LOW CASE

[$ Millions] 

Year Cost savings 

333 pilots 

Consumer 

surplus remote 

pilots 

Total 

consumer 

surplus 

2016 ............................................................................................................................................. ........................ $33.7 $33.7 

2017 ............................................................................................................................................. $1.5 104.2 105.8 

2018 ............................................................................................................................................. 2.6 159.8 162.6 

2019 ............................................................................................................................................. 1.1 275.6 276.7 

2020 ............................................................................................................................................. 1.8 371.4 373.3 

Total ...................................................................................................................................... 7.2 944.9 952.0 

Discounted 3% ............................................................................................................................. ........................ ........................ 874.4 

Discounted 7% ............................................................................................................................. ........................ ........................ 785.1 

PART 107 FINAL RULE QUANTIFIED BENEFITS TO PILOTS—HIGH CASE

[$ Millions] 

Year Cost savings 

333 pilots 

Consumer 

surplus remote 

pilots 

Total 

consumer 

surplus 

2016 ............................................................................................................................................. ........................ $1,700 $1,700.0 

2017 ............................................................................................................................................. $1.5 5,226 5,227.5 

2018 ............................................................................................................................................. 2.6 521 523.6 

2019 ............................................................................................................................................. 1.1 1,507 1,508.1 

2020 ............................................................................................................................................. 1.8 1,352 1,353.8 

Total ...................................................................................................................................... 7.2 10,306 10,313.2 

Discounted 3% ............................................................................................................................. ........................ ........................ 9,852 

Discounted 7% ............................................................................................................................. ........................ ........................ 9,307 

Note: The benefits for existing 333 exemption holders are the same under both the high and low fleet forecasts. 

Cost Summary 

In addition to those costs subtracted from 

consumer surplus to calculate benefits, there 

are other costs which include renewal costs 

for new pilots, small UAS lighting costs, 

change of name costs, and government costs. 

In the Regulatory Evaluation, we estimate 

these costs by provision. In the following 

tables, we provide the estimated total cost for 

both the low case and high case of the final 

rule for the five year period of analysis. 

SMALL UAS PART 107 FINAL RULE COSTS—LOW CASE

[Millions of dollars] 

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2016–20 

Owner/Operator Costs 

Costs Netted Out of Consumer Surplus 

Initial ‘‘New’’ Pilot Costs ................... $9.83 $30.52 $47.10 $81.66 $110.76 $279.87 

333 Pilot Costs ................................. ........................ 0.1 0.24 0.04 0.07 0.49 

Total ........................................... 9.83 30.66 47.34 81.70 110.83 280.36 

Other Costs 

Pt 107 ‘‘New’’ Pilots—Recurrent 

Tests .............................................. ........................ ........................ 4.37 13.84 24.52 42.73 

Change of Name or Address Form .. 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.17 0.27 0.59 

Anti-Collision Lighting ....................... 1.05 2.72 4.80 8.54 12.50 29.61 

Total ........................................... 1.07 2.77 9.27 22.55 37.28 72.93 

Total Owner/Operator Costs .................... 10.90 33.43 56.61 104.25 148.11 353.29 

Government Costs 

TSA Security Vetting ........................ 0.12 0.39 0.59 0.99 1.32 3.41 


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SMALL UAS PART 107 FINAL RULE COSTS—LOW CASE—Continued 

[Millions of dollars] 

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2016–20 

FAA—Develop Knowledge Tests ..... 0.25 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 0.25 

FAA—Develop Part 61 Training ....... 0.12 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 0.12 

FAA—sUAS Operating Certificate .... 0.30 0.96 1.48 2.46 3.31 8.52 

FAA—Develop ATC Training ............ 0.03 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 0.03 

FAA—Train ATC Employees ............ 0.93 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 0.93 

FAA—Develop Flight Standards 

Training ......................................... 0.03 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 0.03 

FAA—Train Flight Standards Employees .......................................... 0.13 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 0.13 

FAA—Hiring Additional Employees .. 13.07 18.33 24.69 33.02 43.81 132.93 

Total Government Costs .......................... 14.98 19.68 26.76 36.47 48.45 146.34 

Total Gov’t and Owner/Operator Costs ... 25.87 53.11 83.37 140.72 196.56 499.63 

7% Present Value ............................. 25.87 49.64 72.82 114.87 149.96 413.15 

3% Present Value ............................. 25.87 51.57 78.59 128.77 174.65 459.44 

Note:Initial ‘‘New’’ Pilot Costs and 333 Pilot Costs were already subtracted to compute the estimates of the benefits to pilots presented above 

and should not be included when calculating total net benefits. 

SMALL UAS PART 107 FINAL RULE COSTS—HIGH CASE

[Millions of dollars] 

Owner/Operator costs 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2016–20 

Costs Netted Out of Consumer Surplus 

Initial ‘‘New’’ Pilot Costs ................... $248.00 $765.00 $77.00 $223.00 $202.00 $1,515.00 

333 Pilot Costs ................................. ........................ 0.14 0.24 0.04 0.07 0.49 

Total ........................................... 248.00 765.14 77.24 223.04 202.07 1,515.49 

Other Costs 

Pt 107 ‘‘New’’ Pilots—Recurrent 

Tests .............................................. ........................ ........................ $135.28 $417.90 $129.61 $682.79 

Change of Name or Address Form .. 0.29 1.19 1.23 1.27 1.32 5.30 

Anti-Collision Lighting ....................... 19.74 79.74 81.76 83.84 85.95 351.04 

Total ........................................... 20.03 80.93 218.27 503.01 216.88 1,039.13 

Total Owner/Operator Costs .................... 268.03 846.07 295.51 726.05 418.95 2,554.62 

Government Costs 

TSA Security Vetting ........................ $3.09 $9.38 $0.93 $2.69 $2.41 $18.50 

FAA—Develop Knowledge Tests ..... 0.25 0.25 

FAA—Develop Part 61 Training ....... 0.12 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 0.12 

FAA—sUAS Operating Certificate .... 7.71 23.44 2.33 6.73 6.03 46.24 

FAA—Develop ATC Training ............ 0.03 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 0.03 

FAA—Train ATC Employees ............ 0.93 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 0.93 

FAA—Develop Flight Standards 

Training ......................................... 0.03 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 0.03 

FAA—Train Flight Standards Employees .......................................... 0.13 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 0.13 

FAA—Hiring Additional Employees .. 22.40 35.21 34.76 35.95 45.97 174.29 

Total Government Costs .......................... $34.69 $68.02 $38.02 $45.38 $54.41 $240.52 

Total Gov’t and Owner/Operator Costs ... $302.72 $914.09 $333.53 $771.43 $473.36 $2,795.14 

7% Present Value .................................... 302.72 854.29 291.31 629.72 361.13 2,439.17 

3% Present Value .................................... 302.72 887.49 314.38 705.94 420.58 2,631.12 

Note:Initial ‘‘New’’ Pilot Costs and 333 Pilot Costs were already subtracted to compute the estimates of the benefits to pilots presented above 

and should not be included when calculating total net benefits. 

Net Benefits Summary 

This rulemaking responds to Congressional 

direction to allow commercial operation of 

small UAS in the national airspace system 

(NAS). Currently the FAA has issued over 

4,000 exemptions allowing for commercial 

operations. This rule will lower the costs of 

entry for small UAS commercial operations. 

Once issued, future operators will decide 

whether their benefits exceed their costs. The 

FAA has quantified these benefits by 

estimating consumer surplus resulting from 

future commercial operations. 

The final rule’s major costs are activities 

associated with recurrent knowledge test 

requirements for the airman certification of 

small UAS remote pilots. Also, there are 


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costs associated with the security vetting that 

TSA is required to conduct. The FAA incurs 

costs to issue operator certificates with a 

small UAS rating; costs for developing 

knowledge tests and on-line training for 

remote pilot applicants; and costs for training 

FAA personnel. Additional costs will also 

accrue from time it takes to complete the 

paperwork for airman certification and 

airman name or address change. 

The estimated out-of-pocket cash outlay for 

a remote pilot applicant to be FAAcertificated is $150. As this rulemaking 

enables new businesses and a new market, 

each remote pilot will decide to voluntarily 

enter the market and incur these compliance 

costs because they expect their benefits to 

exceed costs. As profitable opportunities 

increase, so will the social benefits. The net 

social benefits of this rulemaking over the 5- 

year analysis period are presented below. 

SMALL UAS PART 107 FINAL RULE NET SOCIAL BENEFITS: 2016–2020 

Millions $ 7% PV 

Millions $ 

3% PV 

Millions $ 

Net Benefits to Pilots: 333 Pilots and Pt 107 Pilots .................................................................... $952 $785 $874 

FAA and Other Costs * ................................................................................................................ 219 182 202 

Net Social Benefit ........................................................................................................................ 733 603 672 

HIGH CASE 

Net Benefits to Pilots: 333 Pilots and Pt 107 Pilots ............................................................. $10,313 $9,307 $9,852 

FAA and Other Costs * ......................................................................................................... 1,280 1,072 1,184 

Net Social Benefit ................................................................................................................. 9,034 8,235 8,668 

* Other costs include TSA vetting costs, anti-collision lights, and part 107 recurrent costs. Details may not add to column totals due to 

rounding. 

B. Final Regulatory Flexibility Determination 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(Public Law 96–354) (RFA) establishes ‘‘as a 

principle of regulatory issuance that agencies 

shall endeavor, consistent with the objectives 

of the rule and of applicable statutes, to fit 

regulatory and informational requirements to 

the scale of the businesses, organizations, 

and governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation. To achieve this principle, 

agencies are required to solicit and consider 

flexible regulatory proposals and to explain 

the rationale for their actions to assure that 

such proposals are given serious 

consideration.’’ The RFA covers a wide-range 

of small entities, including small businesses, 

not-for-profit organizations, and small 

governmental jurisdictions. 

Agencies must perform a review to 

determine whether a rule will have a 

significant economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. If the agency 

determines that it will, the agency must 

prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as 

described in the RFA. Section 604 of the Act 

requires agencies to prepare a final regulatory 

flexibility analysis (FRFA) describing the 

impact of final rules on small entities. When 

issuing a final rule, section 604(a) of the Act 

specifies that each FRFA contain: 

• A statement of the need for and 

objectives of the rule; 

• a statement of the significant issues 

raised by the public comments in response to 

the initial regulatory flexibility analysis, a 

statement of the assessment of the agency of 

such issues, and a statement of any changes 

made in the proposed rule as a result of such 

comments; 

• the response of the agency to any 

comments filed by the Chief Counsel for 

Advocacy of the Small Business 

Administration (SBA) in response to the 

proposed rule, and a detailed statement of 

any change made to the proposed rule in the 

final rule as a result of the comments; 

• a description of and an estimate of the 

number of small entities to which the rule 

will apply or an explanation of why no such 

estimate is available; 

• a description of the projected reporting, 

recordkeeping and other compliance 

requirements of the rule, including an 

estimate of the classes of small entities which 

will be subject to the requirement and the 

type of professional skills necessary for 

preparation of the report or record; and 

• a description of the steps the agency has 

taken to minimize the significant economic 

impact on small entities consistent with the 

stated objectives of applicable statutes, 

including a statement of the factual, policy, 

and legal reasons for selecting the alternative 

adopted in the final rule and why each one 

of the other significant alternatives to the rule 

considered by the agency which affect the 

impact on small entities was rejected 

1. A Statement of the Need for and 

Objectives of the Rule 

The FAA is amending its regulations 

to adopt specific rules to allow the 

operation of small unmanned aircraft 

system (small UAS) operations in the 

National Airspace System (NAS). These 

changes will address the operation of 

small UAS and the certification of their 

operators. The requirements will allow 

small UAS to operate in the NAS while 

minimizing the risk they may pose to 

manned aviation operations and the 

general public. 

Currently commercial activity using a 

small UAS is prohibited by Federal 

regulation unless the civil aircraft has 

an airworthiness certificate in effect or 

operations are approved by the FAA on 

a case-by-case basis via an exemption 

from the pertinent regulations. Once 

this final rule is adopted, operators will 

be permitted to participate in certain 

non-hobbyist activities from which they 

are currently prohibited without a more 

costly exemption. The final rule 

requirements are intended to enable the 

opportunity for the private sector to 

develop commercial small UAS 

businesses and facilitate legal and safe 

operations. 

2. A Statement of the Significant Issues 

Raised by the Public Comments in 

Response to the Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis, a Statement of the 

Assessment of the Agency of such 

Issues, and a Statement of any Changes 

Made in the Proposed Rule as a Result 

of Such Comments 

One individual commented that the 

regulatory evaluation did not 

differentiate the economic impact 

between large operators of small UAS 

and small operators of small UAS, and 

that the regulatory flexibility analysis 

describing the impact to small operators 

was not available. The Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Determination (IRFD) was 

included as Section IV.B of the NPRM. 

In that regulatory flexibility 

determination, the FAA states that most, 

if not all, new commercial activities will 

be conducted by operators that would 

be small entities. Because the 

commercial small UAS industry is not 

yet established and legal operation of 

commercial small UAS in the NAS 

constitutes a new market, available data 

is sparse. Accordingly, the FAA has not 

quantified the number of small entities 

to which the final rule will apply 

because while the FAA believes most 

would be small entities, some may 

evolve quickly to become large firms. 

One individual commented that the 

proposed cost for the knowledge test 

fees, and TSA security vetting and 

related costs are too high, and that the 

high cost will be burdensome for small 

startup businesses and negatively affect 

new innovative small UAS businesses 

in the U.S. The commenter stated that 

the total cost at the beginning should be 

no more than $1,000. The FAA 


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213Based on analysis by AUVSI of the 3,136 

exemptions filed through January 2016, over 90% 

of the exemptions are held by small businesses 

http://www.auvsi.org/auvsiresources/exemptions. 

214See the ‘‘Commercial (Non Modeler) small 

UAS Fleet Forecasts: Reconciling Differences in the 

Registry IFR and Part 107 Final Rule’’ section of the 

regulatory evaluation for more detail to the low case 

and high case ranges. 

disagrees that the compliance costs of 

this rule are too high. As shown in the 

regulatory evaluation, the only initial 

out-of-pocket cost for an owner/operator 

is $150 to take the initial knowledge 

test. For part 61 pilot certificate holders 

with a current flight review, the cost is 

even less and consists of $50 for airman 

certificate application verification by a 

DPE, CFI or ACR. This rulemaking only 

requires that an applicant for a remote 

pilot certificate with a small UAS rating 

demonstrate aeronautical knowledge by 

passing an initial knowledge test, or, for 

those eligible, completing on-line 

training. 

One individual commented that he 

had been looking into starting a small 

business for monitoring pipelines and 

right of ways for oil and gas companies 

using UAV’s, but that the blanket visualline-of-sight requirement makes his 

business plan impossible. The 

commenter states that the rule 

essentially protects all current aviation 

companies from competition, and shuts 

down many small business startups. 

The FAA disagrees with this belief. The 

final rule will integrate small UAS 

operations posing the least amount of 

risk to the NAS. The operational 

limitations are imposed to keep the NAS 

safe. In the meantime, the FAA will 

continue working on integrating UAS 

operations that pose greater amounts of 

risk and will issue notices of proposed 

rulemaking for those operations once 

the pertinent issues have been 

addressed. Once the entire integration 

process is complete, the FAA envisions 

the NAS populated with UAS that 

operate well beyond the operational 

limits of this rule. The FAA has selected 

this approach because it will allow 

lower-risk small UAS operations to be 

incorporated into the NAS immediately 

as opposed to waiting until the issues 

associated with higher-risk UAS 

operations are resolved. 

The NBAA and an individual 

commented positively on the NPRM. 

The NBAA commented that they believe 

the NPRM could have a positive impact 

on small entities. An individual 

commented that he is a small business 

owner for whom UAS are an integral 

part of his business plan, and these 

rules will help him grow his business, 

while ensuring a safe operating 

environment for UAS. 

3. The Response of the Agency to any 

Comments Filed by the Chief Counsel 

for Advocacy of the Small Business 

Administration (SBA) in Response to 

the Proposed Rule, and a Detailed 

Statement of any Change Made to the 

Proposed Rule in the Final Rule as a 

Result of the Comments 

The SBA Office of Advocacy 

commented that the FAA should 

articulate and quantify the framework or 

parameters for assessing risk, reassess 

its consideration of alternatives in the 

proposed rule, and release any safety 

data it has in order to facilitate the 

public’s evaluation of the FAA’s 

assessment of risk. With regard to data, 

the supporting documents available in 

the docket for this rulemaking contain 

everything that the FAA relied on in 

issuing this rule. At this time, the FAA 

does not have data that would allow it 

to quantify the risk posed by small UAS 

operations conducted under part 107. 

The FAA notes, however, that many of 

the operating restrictions of part 107 are 

waivable, and the agency anticipates 

gaining a significant amount of data and 

operational experience as a result of its 

administration of the waiver process. 

The FAA also emphasizes that this 

rule is simply one step in the integration 

of small UAS into the NAS. Both the 

FAA and the private sector currently 

have a number of initiatives to obtain 

more data on small UAS operations, and 

the FAA anticipates using this data in 

future agency actions to further integrate 

UAS operations into the NAS. 

In response to the SBA Office of 

Advocacy comment regarding 

alternatives, the FAA responds that the 

initial regulatory evaluation discussed 9 

separate alternatives in its regulatory 

analysis. The alternatives were rejected 

due to policy considerations and the 

undue burden that would be imposed 

on small UAS operators. 

4. A Description and an Estimate of the 

Number of Small Entities to Which the 

Rule Will Apply, or an Explanation of 

Why No Such Estimate Is Available 

Because the commercial small UAS 

industry is not yet established and legal 

operation of commercial small UAS in 

the NAS constitutes a new market, 

available data for these operations is 

sparse. However, this industry is ideal 

for a small entity since start-up costs are 

lower than many other industries.213

Based on analysis by AUVSI, over 90 

percent of exemption holders are small 

businesses. If this trend continues over 

the 5-year analysis period, the FAA 

forecasts a 90 percent of the vehicle 

owners in both the low case and the 

high case will be small entities.214 The 

FAA believes that the final rule will 

enable numerous new industries, while 

maintaining a safe operating 

environment in the NAS. 

5. A Description of the Projected 

Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other 

Compliance Requirements of the Rule, 

Including an Estimate of the Classes of 

Small Entities Which Will Be Subject to 

the Requirement and the Type of 

Professional Skills Necessary for 

Preparation of the Report or Record 

This rule has two reporting 

requirements for small UAS remote 

pilots: Accident reporting and, upon 

request of the Administrator, reporting 

of deviations from the rules of Part 107 

during an emergency. The remote pilot 

in command is required to report any 

accident that results in at least serious 

injury to any person or any loss of 

consciousness; or damage to any 

property, other than the small 

unmanned aircraft. The remote pilot in 

command is also required to send a 

written report of any deviation from the 

rules of Part 107 during an emergency 

requiring immediate action, upon 

request of the Administrator. Both 

reports will be short and limited to 

capturing basic information. As such, 

completion of these reports will not 

require professional skills beyond basic 

literacy. 

Below is a summary of the major 

compliance requirements of the final 

rule. 

TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF PART 107 

Operational Limitations .............................. • Unmanned aircraft must weigh less than 55 lbs. (25 kg). 

• Visual line-of-sight (VLOS) only; the unmanned aircraft must remain within VLOS of the remote 

pilot in command and the person manipulating the flight controls of the small UAS. Alternatively, 

the unmanned aircraft must remain within VLOS of the visual observer. 


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TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF PART 107—Continued 

• At all times the small unmanned aircraft must remain close enough to the remote pilot in command and the person manipulating the flight controls of the small UAS for those people to be capable of seeing the aircraft with vision unaided by any device other than corrective lenses. 

• Small unmanned aircraft may not operate over any persons not directly participating in the operation, not under a covered structure, and not inside a covered stationary vehicle. 

• Daylight-only operations (30 minutes before official sunrise to 30 minutes after official sunset, 

local time). 

• Must yield right of way to other aircraft. 

• May use visual observer (VO) but not required. 

• First-person view camera cannot satisfy ‘‘see-and-avoid’’ requirement but can be used as long as 

requirement is satisfied in other ways. 

• Maximum groundspeed of 100 mph (87 knots). 

• Maximum altitude of 400 feet above ground level (AGL) or, if higher than 400 feet AGL, remain 

within 400 feet of a structure. 

• Minimum weather visibility of 3 miles from control station. 

• Operations in Class B, C, D and E airspace are allowed with the required ATC permission. 

• Operations in Class G airspace are allowed without ATC permission. 

• No person may act as a remote pilot in command or VO for more than one unmanned aircraft operation at one time. 

• No operations from a moving aircraft. 

• No operations from a moving vehicle unless the operation is over a sparsely populated area. 

• No careless or reckless operations. 

• No carriage of hazardous materials. 

• Requires preflight inspection by the remote pilot in command. 

• A person may not operate a small unmanned aircraft if he or she knows or has reason to know of 

any physical or mental condition that would interfere with the safe operation of a small UAS. 

• Foreign-registered small unmanned aircraft are allowed to operate under part 107 if they satisfy 

the requirements of part 375. 

• External load operations are allowed if the object being carried by the unmanned aircraft is securely attached and does not adversely affect the flight characteristics or controllability of the aircraft. 

• Transportation of property for compensation or hire allowed provided that— 

Æ The aircraft, including its attached systems, payload and cargo weigh less than 55 pounds 

total; 

Æ The flight is conducted within visual line of sight and not from a moving vehicle or aircraft; 

and 

Æ The flight occurs wholly within the bounds of a State and does not involve transport between 

(1) Hawaii and another place in Hawaii through airspace outside Hawaii; (2) the District of 

Columbia and another place in the District of Columbia; or (3) a territory or possession of the 

United States and another place in the same territory or possession. 

• Most of the restrictions discussed above are waivable if the applicant demonstrates that his or her 

operation can safely be conducted under the terms of a certificate of waiver. 

Remote Pilot in Command Certification • Establishes a remote pilot in command position. 

and Responsibilities. • A person operating a small UAS must either hold a remote pilot airman certificate with a small 

UAS rating or be under the direct supervision of a person who does hold a remote pilot certificate 

(remote pilot in command). 

• To qualify for a remote pilot certificate, a person must: 

Æ Demonstrate aeronautical knowledge by either: 

D Passing an initial aeronautical knowledge test at an FAA-approved knowledge testing 

center; or 

D Hold a part 61 pilot certificate, complete a flight review within the previous 24 months, 

and complete a small UAS online training course provided by the FAA. 

Æ Be vetted by the Transportation Security Administration. 

Æ Be at least 16 years old. 

• Part 61 pilot certificate holders will obtain a temporary remote pilot certificate immediately upon 

submission of their application for a permanent certificate. Other applicants will obtain a temporary remote pilot certificate upon successful completion of TSA security vetting. The FAA anticipates that it will be able to issue a temporary remote pilot certificate within 10 business days after 

receiving a completed remote pilot certificate application. 

• Until international standards are developed, foreign-certificated UAS pilots will be required to obtain an FAA-issued remote pilot certificate with a small UAS rating. 

A remote pilot in command must: 

• Make available to the FAA, upon request, the small UAS for inspection or testing, and any associated documents/records required to be kept under the rule. 

• Report to the FAA within 10 days of any operation that results in at least serious injury, loss of 

consciousness, or property damage of at least $500. 

• Conduct a preflight inspection, to include specific aircraft and control station systems checks, to 

ensure the small UAS is in a condition for safe operation. 

• Ensure that the small unmanned aircraft complies with the existing registration requirements 

specified in § 91.203(a)(2). 

A remote pilot in command may deviate from the requirements of this rule in response to an in-flight 

emergency. 

Aircraft Requirements ................................ • FAA airworthiness certification is not required. However, the remote pilot in command must conduct a preflight check of the small UAS to ensure that it is in a condition for safe operation. 


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TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF PART 107—Continued 

Model Aircraft ............................................. • Part 107 does not apply to model aircraft that satisfy all of the criteria specified in section 336 of 

Public Law 112–95. 

• The rule codifies the FAA’s enforcement authority in part 101 by prohibiting model aircraft operators from endangering the safety of the NAS. 

Operational Limitations .............................. • Unmanned aircraft must weigh less than 55 lbs. (25 kg). 

• Visual line-of-sight (VLOS) only; the unmanned aircraft must remain within VLOS of the remote 

pilot in command and the person manipulating the flight controls of the small UAS. Alternatively, 

the unmanned aircraft must remain within VLOS of the visual observer. 

• At all times the small unmanned aircraft must remain close enough to the remote pilot in command and the person manipulating the flight controls of the small UAS for those people to be capable of seeing the aircraft with vision unaided by any device other than corrective lenses. 

• Small unmanned aircraft may not operate over any persons not directly participating in the operation, not under a covered structure, and not inside a covered stationary vehicle. 

• Daylight-only operations (30 minutes before official sunrise to 30 minutes after official sunset, 

local time). 

• Must yield right of way to other aircraft, manned or unmanned. 

• May use visual observer (VO) but not required. 

• First-person view camera cannot satisfy ‘‘see-and-avoid’’ requirement but can be used as long as 

requirement is satisfied in other ways. 

• Maximum groundspeed of 100 mph (87 knots). 

• Maximum altitude of 400 feet above ground level (AGL) or, if higher than 400 feet AGL, remain 

within 400 feet of a structure. 

• Minimum weather visibility of 3 miles from control station. 

• Operations in Class B, C, D and E airspace are allowed with the required ATC permission. 

• Operations in Class G airspace are allowed without ATC permission. 

• No person may act as a remote pilot in command or VO for more than one unmanned aircraft operation at one time. 

• No operations from a moving aircraft. 

• No operations from a moving vehicle unless the operation is over a sparsely populated area. 

• No careless or reckless operations. 

• No carriage of hazardous materials. 

• Requires preflight inspection by the remote pilot in command. 

• A person may not operate a small unmanned aircraft if he or she knows or has reason to know of 

any physical or mental condition that would interfere with the safe operation of a small UAS. 

• Foreign-registered small unmanned aircraft are allowed to operate under part 107 if they satisfy 

the requirements of part 375. 

• External load operations are allowed if the object being carried by the unmanned aircraft is securely attached and does not adversely affect the flight characteristics or controllability of the aircraft. 

• Transportation of property for compensation or hire allowed provided that— 

Æ The aircraft, including its attached systems, payload and cargo weigh less than 55 pounds 

total; 

Æ The flight is conducted within visual line of sight and not from a moving vehicle or aircraft; 

and 

Æ The flight occurs wholly within the bounds of a State and does not involve transport between 

(1) Hawaii and another place in Hawaii through airspace outside Hawaii; (2) the District of 

Columbia and another place in the District of Columbia; or (3) a territory or possession of the 

United States and another place in the same territory or possession. 

• Most of the restrictions discussed above are waivable if the applicant demonstrates that his or her 

operation can safely be conducted under the terms of a certificate of waiver. 

Remote Pilot in Command Certification 

and Responsibilities.

• Establishes a remote pilot in command position. 

• A person operating a small UAS must either hold a remote pilot airman certificate with a small 

UAS rating or be under the direct supervision of a person who does hold a remote pilot certificate 

(remote pilot in command). 

• To qualify for a remote pilot certificate, a person must: 

Æ Demonstrate aeronautical knowledge by either: 

D Passing an initial aeronautical knowledge test at an FAA-approved knowledge testing 

center; or 

D Hold a part 61 pilot certificate, complete a flight review within the previous 24 months, 

and complete a small UAS online training course provided by the FAA. 

Æ Be vetted by the Transportation Security Administration. 

Æ Be at least 16 years old. 

• Part 61 pilot certificate holders can obtain a temporary remote pilot certificate immediately upon 

submission of their application for a permanent certificate. 

• Until international standards are developed, foreign-certificated UAS pilots will be required to obtain a remote pilot certificate with a small UAS rating. 

A remote pilot in command must: 

• Make available to the FAA, upon request, the small UAS for inspection or testing, and any associated documents/records required to be kept under the rule. 

• Report to the FAA within 10 days of any operation that results in serious or fatal injury , loss of 

consciousness, or property damage of at least $500. 

• Conduct a preflight inspection, to include specific aircraft and control station systems checks, to 

ensure the small UAS is in a condition for safe operation. 


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215To become certificated as remote pilot with a 

small UAS rating, an individual is only required to 

pass a knowledge test. The certification does not 

require an individual to attend ground school or to 

pass a practical skills exam, both of which are 

required to receive an airmen’s certification for 

sport pilot and above. 

TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF PART 107—Continued 

• Ensure that the small unmanned aircraft complies with the existing registration requirements 

specified in § 91.203(a)(2). 

A remote pilot in command may deviate from the requirements of this rule in response to an in-flight 

emergency. 

• FAA airworthiness certification is not required. However, the remote pilot in command must conduct a preflight check of the small UAS to ensure that it is in a condition for safe operation. 

Model Aircraft ............................................. • Part 107 does not apply to model aircraft that satisfy all of the criteria specified in section 336 of 

Public Law 112–95. 

• The rule codifies the FAA’s enforcement authority in part 101 by prohibiting model aircraft operators from endangering the safety of the NAS. 

6. A Description of the Steps the Agency 

Has Taken To Minimize the Significant 

Economic Impact on Small Entities 

Consistent With the Stated Objectives of 

Applicable Statutes, Including a 

Statement of the Factual, Policy, and 

Legal Reasons for Selecting the 

Alternative Adopted in the Final Rule 

and Why Each One of the Other 

Significant Alternatives to the Rule 

Considered by the Agency Which Affect 

The Impact on Small Entities Was 

Rejected 

With respect to the potential operator 

costs, we assume that each operator will 

be a new entrant into the commercial 

market and that each operator will have 

two small UAS. The following table 

shows the final rule’s estimated out-ofpocket startup and recurrent direct 

compliance costs for a new small UAS 

operator or owner. 

SMALL UAS OPERATOR STARTUP AND

RECURRENT COSTS REMOTE PILOT

APPLICANT/REMOTE PILOT OUT-OFPOCKET COSTS

Type of cost 

Cost 

Initial Recurrent 

Remote Pilot Applicant/Remote 

Pilot: 

Knowledge 

Test Fees ... $150.00 $150.00 

Owner: 

Anti-Collision 

Lighting ...... 32.00 32.00 

Current Part 61 

Remote Pilot Applicant: 

Positive Identification of 

the Applicant Fee ..... 50.00 

* Details may not add to row or column totals due to rounding. 

The estimated out-of-pocket cost for 

an individual to become FAA 

certificated as a remote pilot with a 

small UAS rating is $150, which is less 

than the cost of any other airmen 

certification that allows nonrecreational operations in the NAS.215

The FAA does not believe this amount 

on a per operator basis to be a 

significant negative economic impact to 

small entity operators because $150 is 

relatively inexpensive to be licensed for 

operation of a commercial vehicle. 

The FAA expects this final rule will 

have a significant positive economic 

impact because it enables new 

businesses to operate small UAS for hire 

and will stimulate a manufacturing 

support industry. The FAA believes that 

most, if not all, of these new commercial 

activities will be conducted by operators 

of small UAS who are small business 

entities. Therefore, the FAA believes 

that this final rule will have a positive 

significant impact on a substantial 

number of entities. 

The FAA considered both more costly 

and less costly alternatives as part of its 

final rule. The FAA rejected the more 

costly alternatives due to policy 

considerations and undue burden that 

will be imposed on small UAS 

operators. The less costly alternatives 

and the FAA’s reasons for rejecting or 

accepting those alternatives in the 

NPRM are discussed below. 

The NPRM noted that the FAA 

considered an online test-taking option. 

Ultimately, this option was rejected due 

to concerns about cheating and the 

protection of personally identifiable 

information (PII). Because an applicant 

for a remote pilot certificate with small 

UAS rating is not required to pass a 

practical test, knowledge testing is the 

only way for the FAA to determine that 

a remote pilot has the requisite 

aeronautical knowledge to operate 

safely in the NAS. Therefore, it is 

imperative that the testing methodology 

being used assures that knowledge is 

demonstrated. Online testing cannot yet 

provide adequate proctoring of a test to 

ensure, among other things, that the 

test-taker is not taking the test for 

someone else or using reference material 

or other unapproved aids to help answer 

the test questions. Concerns with online 

testing are not limited to cheating. 

Because the knowledge test questions 

are pulled from a test bank with a finite 

number of questions, limiting access to 

that database to knowledge testing 

centers ensures the continued security 

and integrity of the test questions. 

The next alternative the FAA 

considered was to proceed on with the 

provisions proposed in the notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM). Due to 

the large number of comments, we have 

decided to incorporate some of the 

additional types of operations received 

from commenters to this final rule. The 

FAA discusses the comments we 

received on the proposed rule and their 

resolutions earlier in the preamble. 

Also, in the NPRM, the FAA 

considered creating a separate micro 

UAS classification for UAS weighing no 

more than 4.4 pounds (2 kilograms). The 

NPRM went on to list the following 

restrictions that the FAA was 

considering for such a micro UAS 

classification: 

• Require that the micro UAS be made out 

of frangible materials that break, distort, or 

yield on impact. 

• Require that the unmanned aircraft 

weigh no more than 4.4 pounds. 

• Impose a maximum airspeed of 30 knots. 

• Impose a maximum altitude of 400 feet 

AGL. 

• Restrict flight distance to 1,500 feet from, 

and within the visual line of sight of, the 

operator 

• Ban the use of first person view during 

operations. 

• Require the operator to maintain manual 

control of the flight path of the micro UAS 

and, therefore, ban the use of automation to 

control the flight path. 

• Limit operations to Class G airspace. 

• Require the micro UAS to maintain a 

distance of at least 5 nautical miles from any 

airport. 

With these additional operating 

restrictions, the NPRM also proposed to: 

(1) Allow micro UAS to fly over people 

not involved with the operation; and (2) 

create a separate airman certificate with 

a micro UAS rating. 


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216Some countries, such as the United Kingdom, 

allow approval for flight in congested areas on a 

case-by-case basis. See GAO, Unmanned Aerial 

Systems: FAA Continues Progress toward 

Integration into the National Airspace at 32 (July 

2015). 

After consideration of the comments 

that the proposed micro UAS 

restrictions would limit the utility of 

such operations and safety concerns that 

remain even with the operating 

limitations proposed in the NPRM, the 

FAA has determined that a different 

framework to regulate micro UAS is 

needed. Because the public has not yet 

been given an opportunity to comment 

on an alternate framework for micro 

UAS operations, the FAA has 

determined that a new comment period 

should be provided for the micro UAS 

operation requirements. Accordingly, 

the FAA will move to expeditiously 

issue a new rule detailing a new more 

performance-based framework to 

integrate micro UAS into the NAS while 

addressing the safety concerns raised by 

the stakeholders. In the meantime, the 

FAA will finalize the remainder of this 

rule to immediately integrate all other 

small UAS operations into the NAS. 

The FAA also considered allowing all 

small UAS to fly over people not 

involved with the operation. Manned 

aircraft are generally permitted to fly 

over people because manned aircraft are 

formally evaluated for airworthiness 

through the airworthiness certification 

process, which could have significant 

costs to both the small UAS 

manufacturer and operator. Because of 

the high risk of injury, almost all other 

countries that currently regulate UAS 

generally do not allow small unmanned 

aircraft to fly over people or congested 

areas.216 The risk associated with flight 

over people is due to mechanical 

reliability issues that a remote pilot in 

command may have a limited 

opportunity to evaluate without 

airworthiness certification or a more 

extensive maintenance process. At this 

time, the FAA has no data establishing 

how that risk could be mitigated 

through operational constraints 

(whether performance-based or 

otherwise), other than a prohibition on 

flight over people. 

Accordingly, this rule will retain the 

general prohibition on flight over 

people, but with two changes. First, this 

rule will allow a small unmanned 

aircraft to be operated over a person 

who is inside a stationary covered 

vehicle. Second, this rule will make the 

restriction on operating a small 

unmanned aircraft over people 

waivable. This will allow the FAA to 

consider, on a case-by-case basis, any 

additional mitigations that are 

incorporated into a small UAS 

operation. The FAA will grant a waiver 

request allowing small unmanned 

aircraft flight over people if the 

applicant establishes that his or her 

operation can safely be conducted under 

the terms of a certificate of waiver. 

In section 333 of Public Law 112–95, 

Congress also directed the Secretary to 

determine whether ‘‘certain unmanned 

aircraft systems may operate safely in 

the national airspace system.’’ The FAA 

currently accommodates nonrecreational small UAS use through 

various mechanisms, such as special 

airworthiness certificates, exemptions, 

and certificates of authorizations (COA). 

As an alternative to this final rule, the 

FAA considered continuing to issue 

special airworthiness certificates, 

exemptions, and COAs to all nonrecreational small UAS users. We 

anticipate that many of the operations 

that would previously require 

exemptions and COAs will now fall 

under the purview of part 107, which 

generally does not require an exemption 

or a COA prior to operation. 

The FAA expects this final rule will 

have a significant positive economic 

impact because it enables new 

businesses to operate small UAS for hire 

and will stimulate a manufacturing 

support industry. The FAA believes that 

most, if not all, of these new commercial 

activities will be conducted by operators 

of small UAS who are small business 

entities. Therefore, the FAA believes 

that this final rule will have a positive 

significant impact on a substantial 

number of entities. 

C. International Trade Impact 

Assessment 

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 

(Pub. L. 96–39), as amended by the 

Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. 

L. 103–465), prohibits Federal agencies 

from establishing standards or engaging 

in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Pursuant to these Acts, the 

establishment of standards is not 

considered an unnecessary obstacle to 

the foreign commerce of the United 

States, so long as the standard has a 

legitimate domestic objective, such the 

protection of safety, and does not 

operate in a manner that excludes 

imports that meet this objective. The 

statute also requires consideration of 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, that they be the basis for 

U.S. standards. Under this rule’s 

requirements, additional access to 

United States airspace is permitted, so 

the rule does not create an obstacle to 

foreign commerce. 

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates 

Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) 

requires each Federal agency to prepare 

a written statement assessing the effects 

of any Federal mandate in a proposed or 

final agency rule that may result in an 

expenditure of $100 million or more (in 

1995 dollars) in any one year by State, 

local, and Tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector; such 

a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action.’’ The FAA currently 

uses an inflation-adjusted value of 

$155.0 million in lieu of $100 million. 

The assessment may be included in 

conjunction with other assessments, as 

it is here. 

This final rule is unlikely to result in 

expenditure by State, local or Tribal 

governments of more than $150 million 

annually. The final rule will potentially 

result in an expenditure of much more 

than that magnitude by pilots seeking 

remote pilot certificates. We have 

considered alternatives to this 

rulemaking, which are discussed above 

in the ‘‘Describe alternatives 

considered’’ section of the regulatory 

flexibility analysis. 

E. Paperwork Reduction Act 

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires that the 

FAA consider the impact of paperwork 

and other information collection 

burdens imposed on the public. 

According to the 1995 amendments to 

the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR 

1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not 

collect or sponsor the collection of 

information, nor may it impose an 

information collection requirement 

unless it displays a currently valid 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) control number. 

This action contains the following 

information collection requirements: 

• Submission of an application for a 

remote pilot certificate with a small UAS 

rating; 

• reporting any accident that results in at 

least serious injury to any person or any loss 

of consciousness; or damage to any property, 

other than the small unmanned aircraft, for 

which the cost of repair (including materials 

and labor) exceeds $500; or the fair market 

value of the property exceeds $500 in the 

event of total loss. 

• application for certificate of waiver or 

authorization to allow a small UAS operation 

to deviate from certain operating provisions 

of part 107. 

• during an emergency requiring 

immediate action, each remote pilot in 

command who deviates from any rule in part 

107 shall, upon request of the Administrator, 

send a written report of that deviation to the 

Administrator. 


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217 49 U.S.C. 44711(a)(2)(A). 

Below, we discuss each of these 

information-collection requirements in 

more detail. As required by the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 

U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA has submitted 

these proposed information collection 

amendments to OMB for its review. 

1. Obtaining a Remote Pilot Certificate 

With a Small UAS Rating 

Summary: The FAA’s statute 217

prohibits a person from serving as an 

airman without an airman certificate. 

This final rule will create a new airman 

certificate for remote pilots to satisfy the 

statutory requirement. The airman 

certificate will be called a remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating, and 

in order to obtain it, the applicant will 

have to either: (1) Take and pass an 

aeronautical knowledge test; or (2) for 

those part 61 pilots that have completed 

a flight review within the previous 24 

months, take an on-line training course. 

Upon successful completion of either 

the aeronautical knowledge test or 

online training, the applicant will 

submit an application for the certificate. 

To take and pass an aeronautical 

knowledge test, a person will have to: 

(1) Apply to take the test at an FAAapproved Knowledge Testing Center; (2) 

take the test; and (3) obtain an airman 

knowledge test report showing that he 

or she passed the test. After passing a 

knowledge test, the person will then 

apply for the certificate by: (1) Filling 

out and submitting an application for 

the certificate; and (2) attaching 

evidence showing that the person 

passed the airman knowledge test. 

For a flight review current part 61 

pilot certificate holders seeking to 

substitute the initial training course for 

the initial aeronautical knowledge test, 

the applicant will first set up an account 

with the FAA by providing their email 

address, first name, last name, suffix, 

and zip code. Once the applicant 

receives an email from the FAA to finish 

creating their profile, the applicant will 

be able to log-on, complete the course, 

and obtain a course completion 

certificate. The applicant will then (1) 

fill out and submit an application for 

the remote pilot certificate with small 

UAS rating; (2) present a copy of the online training course completion 

certificate and his or her logbook upon 

application to demonstrate that he or 

she has satisfied the flight review 

requirement within the preceding 24 

months. The on-line training course is 

available to anyone who sets up an 

account with the FAA. 

The above requirements do not result 

in a new collection of information, but 

instead expand an existing collection of 

information that is approved under 

OMB control number 2120–0021. This 

collection of information governs 

information that the FAA collects to 

certificate pilots and flight instructors. 

The above requirements will increase 

the burden of this already-existing 

collection of information. 

Use: The above requirements will be 

used by the FAA to issue airman 

certificates to remote pilots in command 

in order to satisfy the statutory 

requirement that an airman must 

possess an airman certificate. 

Estimate of Increase in Annual 

Burden: 

2. Accident Reporting 

Summary: To ensure proper oversight 

of small UAS operations, this rule will 

require a remote pilot in command to 

report to the FAA any small UAS 

operation that results in: (1) At least 

serious injury to any person or any loss 

of consciousness; or (2) damage to any 

property, other than the small 

unmanned aircraft, unless the cost of 

repair (including materials and labor) or 

fair market value in the event of total 

loss does not exceed $500. 

After receiving this report, the FAA 

may conduct further investigation to 

determine whether any FAA regulations 

were violated. The report must be made 

to the nearest Federal Aviation 

Administration Flight Standards District 

Office, or one of the Regional 

Operations Centers or the Washington 

Operations Center, in a manner 

acceptable to the Administrator. The 


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FAA emphasizes that this reporting 

requirement will be triggered only 

during operations that result in the 

conditions specified above. 

This requirement will constitute a 

new collection of information, and the 

FAA has submitted it to OMB for review 

and a control number. Notice of OMB 

approval for this information collection 

will be published in a future Federal 

Register document. 

Use: The above requirements will be 

used by the FAA to ensure proper 

oversight of small UAS operations. A 

report of an accident that results in an 

injury to a person or property damage 

may serve to initiate an FAA 

investigation into whether FAA 

regulations were violated. 

Annual Burden Estimate 

There is one page of paperwork 

associated with reporting an accident 

and it will take an applicant 0.25 hours 

to complete. The FAA does not have the 

data needed to quantify the paperwork 

burden imposed by this requirement. 

3. Emergency Powers 

Summary: The remote pilot in 

command must, upon FAA request, 

submit a report to the FAA if he or she 

has exercises his or her emergency 

powers. This report must provide a 

detailed explanation of what happened. 

Use: The above requirements will be 

used by the FAA to ensure proper 

oversight of small UAS operations. A 

report will help the FAA to better 

understand the reasons for a pilot 

deviating from part 107. 

Annual Burden Estimate 

There is one page of paperwork 

associated with reporting the use of 

emergency powers that will take an 

applicant 0.3 hours to complete. The 

FAA does not have the data needed to 

quantify the paperwork burden imposed 

by this requirement. 

The above requirements do not result 

in a new collection of information, but 

instead expand an existing collection of 

information that is approved under 

OMB control number 2120–0005. This 

collection of information governs, 

among other things, reports that are 

provided to the FAA by pilots in 

command who have exercised 

emergency powers. The above 

requirements will increase the burden of 

this already-existing collection of 

information. 

4. Certificate of Waiver 

The certificate of waiver will allow a 

remote pilot in command conducting a 

small UAS operation to deviate from 

certain provisions of part 107. To obtain 

a certificate of waiver, an applicant will 

submit a request containing a complete 

description of the proposed operation 

and a justification, including supporting 

data and documentation as necessary, 

that establishes that the proposed 

operation can safely be conducted under 

the terms of a certificate of waiver. 

The FAA expects that the amount of 

data and analysis required as part of the 

application will be proportional to the 

specific relief that is requested. 

Similarly, the FAA anticipates that the 

time required to make a determination 

regarding waiver requests will vary 

based on the complexity of the request. 

For example, a request for a major 

deviation from part 107 for an operation 

that takes place in a congested 

metropolitan area with heavy air traffic 

will likely require more data and 

analysis than a request for a minor 

deviation for an operation that takes 

place in a sparsely populated area with 

minimal air traffic. If a certificate of 

waiver is granted, that certificate may 

include additional conditions and 

limitations designed to ensure that the 

small UAS operation can safely be 

conducted under the terms of a 

certificate of waiver. 

Use 

This collection of information by the 

FAA governs applicants requesting a 

certificate of waiver for an aviation 

event. The above requirements will 

increase the burden of this alreadyexisting collection of information. 

Annual Burden Estimate 

The above requirements will not 

result in a new collection of 

information, but will instead expand an 

existing OMB-approved collection of 

information that is approved under 

OMB control number 2120–0027. We 

cannot quantify total costs, over the 5- 

year analysis period for waiver activities 

because The FAA does not have the 

information to estimate the number of 

waiver requests it will receive, but 

expects that individuals would apply 

for waivers only in instances in which 

the benefits exceed the costs. The 

application for certificate of waiver is a 

minimum of three pages and it is 

estimated to take at least 0.75 hours to 

complete. 

5. Total Annual Burden Estimate 

The total annualized burden estimate 

of the information-collection 

requirements associated with this rule is 

as follows: 

Final rule requirement 

Total no. of 

pages 

(millions) 

Total cost 

(millions) 

Annual cost 

(millions) 

Low Case: 

Remote Pilot Certificate ................................................................................................................... 17.3 ............ $19.4 .......... $6.5 

Accident Reporting ........................................................................................................................... Unknown .... Unknown .... Unknown 

Emergency Powers .......................................................................................................................... Unknown .... Unknown .... Unknown 

Certificate of Waiver ........................................................................................................................ Unknown .... Unknown .... Unknown 

High Case: 

Remote Pilot Certificate ................................................................................................................... 236.4 .......... $261.3 ........ $87.1 

Accident Reporting ........................................................................................................................... Unknown .... Unknown .... Unknown 

Emergency Powers .......................................................................................................................... Unknown .... Unknown .... Unknown 

Certificate of Waiver ........................................................................................................................ Unknown .... Unknown .... Unknown 

F. International Compatibility and 

Cooperation 

In keeping with U.S. obligations 

under the Convention on International 

Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to 

conform to International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) Standards and 

Recommended Practices to the 

maximum extent practicable. The FAA 

has determined that there are no ICAO 

Standards and Recommended Practices 

that correspond to these regulations. 

G. Environmental Analysis 

FAA Order 1050.1F identifies FAA 

actions that are categorically excluded 

from preparation of an environmental 

assessment or environmental impact 

statement under the National 

Environmental Policy Act in the 


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absence of extraordinary circumstances. 

The FAA has determined this 

rulemaking action qualifies for the 

categorical exclusion identified in 

paragraph 5–6.6f and involves no 

extraordinary circumstances. The FAA 

has documented the categorical 

exclusion, including its noise analysis 

and review of the potential for 

extraordinary circumstances, and has 

placed a copy of it in the docket for this 

rule. 

H. Regulations Affecting Intrastate 

Aviation in Alaska 

Section 1205 of the FAA 

Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 

3213) requires the FAA, when 

modifying its regulations in a manner 

affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to 

consider the extent to which Alaska is 

not served by transportation modes 

other than aviation, and to establish 

appropriate regulatory distinctions. In 

the NPRM, the FAA requested 

comments on whether the proposed rule 

should apply differently to intrastate 

operations in Alaska. The agency did 

not receive any comments, and has 

determined, based on the administrative 

record of this rulemaking, that there is 

no need to make any regulatory 

distinctions applicable to intrastate 

aviation in Alaska. 

V. Executive Order Determinations 

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

The FAA has analyzed this final rule 

under the principles and criteria of 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The 

agency determined that this action will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, or the relationship between 

the Federal Government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government, and, therefore, 

does not have Federalism implications. 

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations 

That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use 

The FAA analyzed this final rule 

under Executive Order 13211, Actions 

Concerning Regulations that 

Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The 

agency has determined that it is not a 

‘‘significant energy action’’ under the 

executive order and it is not likely to 

have a significant adverse effect on the 

supply, distribution, or use of energy. 

C. Executive Order 13609, Promoting 

International Regulatory Cooperation 

Executive Order 13609, Promoting 

International Regulatory Cooperation, 

promotes international regulatory 

cooperation to meet shared challenges 

involving health, safety, labor, security, 

environmental, and other issues and to 

reduce, eliminate, or prevent 

unnecessary differences in regulatory 

requirements. The FAA has analyzed 

this action under the policies and 

agency responsibilities of Executive 

Order 13609, and has determined that 

this action would have no effect on 

international regulatory cooperation. 

The Department continues to participate 

in the evaluation of ICAO’s SARPs and 

any recommended updates to reflect 

amendments necessary to address issues 

unique to the operation of remotely 

piloted aircraft. 

VI. Additional Information 

A. Availability of Rulemaking 

Documents 

An electronic copy of rulemaking 

documents may be obtained from the 

Internet by— 

• Searching the Federal eRulemaking 

Portal (http://www.regulations.gov); 

• Visiting the FAA’s Regulations and 

Policies Web page at http://www.faa.gov/

regulations_policies or 

• Accessing the Government Publishing 

Office’s Web page at http://www.gpo.gov/

fdsys/. 

Copies may also be obtained by 

sending a request to the Federal 

Aviation Administration, Office of 

Rulemaking, ARM–1, 800 Independence 

Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or 

by calling (202) 267–9677. Commenters 

must identify the docket or amendment 

number of this rulemaking. 

All documents the FAA considered in 

developing this rule, including 

economic analyses and technical 

reports, may be accessed from the 

Internet through the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal referenced 

previously. 

B. Comments Submitted to the Docket 

Comments received may be viewed by 

going to http://www.regulations.gov and 

following the online instructions to 

search the docket number for this 

action. Anyone is able to search the 

electronic form of all comments 

received into any of the FAA’s dockets 

by the name of the individual 

submitting the comment (or signing the 

comment, if submitted on behalf of an 

association, business, labor union, etc.). 

C. Small Business Regulatory 

Enforcement Fairness Act 

The Small Business Regulatory 

Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 

1996 requires FAA to comply with 

small entity requests for information or 

advice about compliance with statutes 

and regulations within its jurisdiction. 

A small entity with questions regarding 

this document may contact its local 

FAA official, or the person listed under 

the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

heading at the beginning of the 

preamble. To find out more about 

SBREFA on the Internet, visit http://

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/

rulemaking/sbre_act/. 

List of Subjects 

14 CFR Part 21 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Recording 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

14 CFR Part 43 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

14 CFR Part 61 

Aircraft, Airmen, Alcohol abuse, 

Aviation safety, Drug abuse, Recreation 

and recreation areas, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements, Security 

measures, Teachers. 

14 CFR Part 91 

Air traffic control, Aircraft, Airmen, 

Airports, Aviation safety, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements. 

14 CFR Part 101 

Aircraft, Aviation Safety. 

14 CFR Part 107 

Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, 

Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Security measures, Signs 

and symbols, Small unmanned aircraft, 

Unmanned aircraft. 

14 CFR Part 119 

Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety. 

14 CFR Part 133 

Aircraft, Aviation safety. 

14 CFR Part 183 

Airmen, Authority delegations 

(Government agencies). 

The Amendment 

In consideration of the foregoing, the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

amends chapter I of title 14, Code of 

Federal Regulations as follows: 

PART 21—CERTIFICATION 

PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCTS AND 

PARTS 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 21 is 

revised to read as follows: 

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 

106(g), 40101 note, 40105, 40113, 44701– 

44702, 44704, 44707, 44709, 44711, 44713, 

44715, 45303; Sec. 333 of Public Law 112– 

95, 126 Stat. 75. 

■ 2. In § 21.1, revise paragraph (a) 

introductory text to read as follows: 


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§ 21.1 Applicability and definitions. 

(a) Except for aircraft subject to the 

provisions of part 107 of this chapter, 

this part prescribes— 

* * * * * 

PART 43—MAINTENANCE, 

PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE, 

REBUILDING, AND ALTERATION 

■ 3. The authority citation for part 43 is 

revised to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 

44701, 44703, 44705, 44707, 44711, 44713, 

44717, 44725. 

■ 4. In § 43.1, revise paragraph (b) to 

read as follows: 

§ 43.1 Applicability. 

* * * * * 

(b) This part does not apply to— 

(1) Any aircraft for which the FAA 

has issued an experimental certificate, 

unless the FAA has previously issued a 

different kind of airworthiness 

certificate for that aircraft; 

(2) Any aircraft for which the FAA 

has issued an experimental certificate 

under the provisions of § 21.191(i)(3) of 

this chapter, and the aircraft was 

previously issued a special 

airworthiness certificate in the lightsport category under the provisions of 

§ 21.190 of this chapter; or 

(3) Any aircraft subject to the 

provisions of part 107 of this chapter. 

* * * * * 

PART 61—CERTIFICATION: PILOTS, 

FLIGHT INSTRUCTORS, AND GROUND 

INSTRUCTORS 

■ 5. The authority citation for part 61 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 

44701–44703, 44707, 44709–44711, 44729, 

44903, 45102–45103, 45301–45302. 

■ 6. In § 61.1, revise paragraph (a) 

introductory text to read as follows: 

§ 61.1 Applicability and definitions. 

(a) Except as provided in part 107 of 

this chapter, this part prescribes: 

* * * * * 

■ 7. Add § 61.8 to read as follows: 

§ 61.8 Inapplicability of unmanned aircraft 

operations. 

Any action conducted pursuant to 

part 107 of this chapter or Subpart E of 

part 101 of this chapter cannot be used 

to meet the requirements of this part. 

■ 8. In § 61.193, revise paragraph (b) to 

read as follows: 

§ 61.193 Flight instructor privileges. 

* * * * * 

(b) A person who holds a flight 

instructor certificate is authorized, in a 

form and manner acceptable to the 

Administrator, to: 

(1) Accept an application for a student 

pilot certificate or, for an applicant who 

holds a pilot certificate (other than a 

student pilot certificate) issued under 

part 61 of this chapter and meets the 

flight review requirements specified in 

§ 61.56, a remote pilot certificate with a 

small UAS rating; 

(2) Verify the identity of the 

applicant; and 

(3) Verify that an applicant for a 

student pilot certificate meets the 

eligibility requirements in § 61.83 or an 

applicant for a remote pilot certificate 

with a small UAS rating meets the 

eligibility requirements in § 107.61 of 

this chapter. 

■ 9. In § 61.413, revise paragraph (b) to 

read as follows: 

§ 61.413 What are the privileges of my 

flight instructor certificate with a sport pilot 

rating? 

* * * * * 

(b) A person who holds a flight 

instructor certificate with a sport pilot 

rating is authorized, in a form and 

manner acceptable to the Administrator, 

to: 

(1) Accept an application for a student 

pilot certificate or, for an applicant who 

holds a pilot certificate (other than a 

student pilot certificate) issued under 

part 61 of this chapter and meets the 

flight review requirements specified in 

§ 61.56, a remote pilot certificate with a 

small UAS rating; 

(2) Verify the identity of the 

applicant; and 

(3) Verify that an applicant for a 

student pilot certificate meets the 

eligibility requirements in § 61.83. 

PART 91—GENERAL OPERATING AND 

FLIGHT RULES 

■ 10. The authority citation for part 91 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 1155, 

40101, 40103, 40105, 40113, 40120, 44101, 

44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 

44715, 44716, 44717, 44722, 46306, 46315, 

46316, 46504, 46506–46507, 47122, 47508, 

47528–47531, 47534, articles 12 and 29 of the 

Convention on International Civil Aviation 

(61 Stat. 1180), (126 Stat. 11). 

■ 11. In § 91.1, revise paragraph (a) 

introductory text and add paragraphs (e) 

and (f) to read as follows: 

§ 91.1 Applicability. 

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs 

(b), (c), (e), and (f) of this section and 

§§ 91.701 and 91.703, this part 

prescribes rules governing the operation 

of aircraft within the United States, 

including the waters within 3 nautical 

miles of the U.S. coast. 

* * * * * 

(e) This part does not apply to any 

aircraft or vehicle governed by part 103 

of this chapter, or subparts B, C, or D of 

part 101 of this chapter. 

(f) Except as provided in §§ 107.13, 

107.27, 107.47, 107.57, and 107.59 of 

this chapter, this part does not apply to 

any aircraft governed by part 107 of this 

chapter. 

PART 101—MOORED BALLOONS, 

KITES, AMATEUR ROCKETS, 

UNMANNED FREE BALLOONS, AND 

CERTAIN MODEL AIRCRAFT 

■ 12. The authority citation for part 101 

is revised to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40101 

note, 40103, 40113–40114, 45302, 44502, 

44514, 44701–44702, 44721, 46308, Sec. 

336(b), Pub. L. 112–95, 126 Stat. 77. 

■ 13. The heading for part 101 is revised 

to read as set forth above. 

■ 14. In § 101.1, add paragraph (a)(5) to 

read as follows: 

§ 101.1 Applicability. 

(a) * * * 

(5) Any model aircraft that meets the 

conditions specified in § 101.41. For 

purposes of this part, a model aircraft is 

an unmanned aircraft that is: 

(i) Capable of sustained flight in the 

atmosphere; 

(ii) Flown within visual line of sight 

of the person operating the aircraft; and 

(iii) Flown for hobby or recreational 

purposes. 

* * * * * 

■ 15. Add subpart E, consisting of 

§§ 101.41 and 101.43, to read as follows: 

Subpart E—Special Rule for Model 

Aircraft 

§ 101.41 Applicability. 

This subpart prescribes rules 

governing the operation of a model 

aircraft (or an aircraft being developed 

as a model aircraft) that meets all of the 

following conditions as set forth in 

section 336 of Public Law 112–95: 

(a) The aircraft is flown strictly for 

hobby or recreational use; 

(b) The aircraft is operated in 

accordance with a community-based set 

of safety guidelines and within the 

programming of a nationwide 

community-based organization; 

(c) The aircraft is limited to not more 

than 55 pounds unless otherwise 

certified through a design, construction, 

inspection, flight test, and operational 

safety program administered by a 

community-based organization; 


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(d) The aircraft is operated in a 

manner that does not interfere with and 

gives way to any manned aircraft; and 

(e) When flown within 5 miles of an 

airport, the operator of the aircraft 

provides the airport operator and the 

airport air traffic control tower (when an 

air traffic facility is located at the 

airport) with prior notice of the 

operation. 

§ 101.43 Endangering the safety of the 

National Airspace System. 

No person may operate model aircraft 

so as to endanger the safety of the 

national airspace system. 

■ 16. Add part 107 to read as follows: 

PART 107—SMALL UNMANNED 

AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 

Sec. 

Subpart A—General 

107.1 Applicability. 

107.3 Definitions. 

107.5 Falsification, reproduction or 

alteration. 

107.7 Inspection, testing, and 

demonstration of compliance. 

107.9 Accident reporting. 

Subpart B—Operating Rules 

107.11 Applicability. 

107.12 Requirement for a remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating. 

107.13 Registration. 

107.15 Condition for safe operation. 

107.17 Medical condition. 

107.19 Remote pilot in command. 

107.21 In-flight emergency. 

107.23 Hazardous operation. 

107.25 Operation from a moving vehicle or 

aircraft. 

107.27 Alcohol or drugs. 

107.29 Daylight operation. 

107.31 Visual line of sight aircraft 

operation. 

107.33 Visual observer. 

107.35 Operation of multiple small 

unmanned aircraft. 

107.36 Carriage of hazardous material. 

107.37 Operation near aircraft; right-of-way 

rules. 

107.39 Operation over human beings. 

107.41 Operation in certain airspace. 

107.43 Operation in the vicinity of airports. 

107.45 Operation in prohibited or restricted 

areas. 

107.47 Flight restrictions in the proximity 

of certain areas designated by notice to 

airmen. 

107.49 Preflight familiarization, inspection, 

and actions for aircraft operation. 

107.51 Operating limitations for small 

unmanned aircraft. 

Subpart C—Remote Pilot Certification 

107.53 Applicability. 

107.57 Offenses involving alcohol or drugs. 

107.59 Refusal to submit to an alcohol test 

or to furnish test results. 

107.61 Eligibility. 

107.63 Issuance of a remote pilot certificate 

with a small UAS rating. 

107.64 Temporary certificate. 

107.65 Aeronautical knowledge recency. 

107.67 Knowledge tests: General 

procedures and passing grades. 

107.69 Knowledge tests: Cheating or other 

unauthorized conduct. 

107.71 Retesting after failure. 

107.73 Initial and recurrent knowledge 

tests. 

107.74 Initial and recurrent training 

courses. 

107.77 Change of name or address. 

107.79 Voluntary surrender of certificate. 

Subpart D—Waivers 

107.200 Waiver policy and requirements. 

107.205 List of regulations subject to 

waiver. 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40101 note, 

40103(b), 44701(a)(5); Sec. 333 of Pub. L. 

112–95, 126 Stat. 75. 

Subpart A—General 

§ 107.1 Applicability. 

(a) Except as provided in paragraph 

(b) of this section, this part applies to 

the registration, airman certification, 

and operation of civil small unmanned 

aircraft systems within the United 

States. 

(b) This part does not apply to the 

following: 

(1) Air carrier operations; 

(2) Any aircraft subject to the 

provisions of part 101 of this chapter; or 

(3) Any operation that a remote pilot 

in command elects to conduct pursuant 

to an exemption issued under section 

333 of Public Law 112–95, unless 

otherwise specified in the exemption. 

§ 107.3 Definitions. 

The following definitions apply to 

this part. If there is a conflict between 

the definitions of this part and 

definitions specified in § 1.1 of this 

chapter, the definitions in this part 

control for purposes of this part: 

Control station means an interface 

used by the remote pilot to control the 

flight path of the small unmanned 

aircraft. 

Corrective lenses means spectacles or 

contact lenses. 

Small unmanned aircraft means an 

unmanned aircraft weighing less than 

55 pounds on takeoff, including 

everything that is on board or otherwise 

attached to the aircraft. 

Small unmanned aircraft system 

(small UAS) means a small unmanned 

aircraft and its associated elements 

(including communication links and the 

components that control the small 

unmanned aircraft) that are required for 

the safe and efficient operation of the 

small unmanned aircraft in the national 

airspace system. 

Unmanned aircraft means an aircraft 

operated without the possibility of 

direct human intervention from within 

or on the aircraft. 

Visual observer means a person who 

is designated by the remote pilot in 

command to assist the remote pilot in 

command and the person manipulating 

the flight controls of the small UAS to 

see and avoid other air traffic or objects 

aloft or on the ground. 

§ 107.5 Falsification, reproduction or 

alteration. 

(a) No person may make or cause to 

be made— 

(1) Any fraudulent or intentionally 

false record or report that is required to 

be made, kept, or used to show 

compliance with any requirement under 

this part. 

(2) Any reproduction or alteration, for 

fraudulent purpose, of any certificate, 

rating, authorization, record or report 

under this part. 

(b) The commission by any person of 

an act prohibited under paragraph (a) of 

this section is a basis for any of the 

following: 

(1) Denial of an application for a 

remote pilot certificate or a certificate of 

waiver, 

(2) Suspension or revocation of any 

certificate or waiver issued by the 

Administrator under this part and held 

by that person; or 

(3) A civil penalty. 

§ 107.7 Inspection, testing, and 

demonstration of compliance. 

(a) A remote pilot in command, 

owner, or person manipulating the flight 

controls of a small unmanned aircraft 

system must, upon request, make 

available to the Administrator: 

(1) The remote pilot certificate with a 

small UAS rating; and 

(2) Any other document, record, or 

report required to be kept under the 

regulations of this chapter. 

(b) The remote pilot in command, 

visual observer, owner, operator, or 

person manipulating the flight controls 

of a small unmanned aircraft system 

must, upon request, allow the 

Administrator to make any test or 

inspection of the small unmanned 

aircraft system, the remote pilot in 

command, the person manipulating the 

flight controls of a small unmanned 

aircraft system, and, if applicable, the 

visual observer to determine compliance 

with this part. 

§ 107.9 Accident reporting. 

No later than 10 calendar days after 

an operation that meets the criteria of 

either paragraph (a) or (b) of this 

section, a remote pilot in command 

must report to the FAA, in a manner 

acceptable to the Administrator, any 


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operation of the small unmanned 

aircraft involving at least: 

(a) Serious injury to any person or any 

loss of consciousness; or 

(b) Damage to any property, other 

than the small unmanned aircraft, 

unless one of the following conditions 

is satisfied: 

(1) The cost of repair (including 

materials and labor) does not exceed 

$500; or 

(2) The fair market value of the 

property does not exceed $500 in the 

event of total loss. 

Subpart B—Operating Rules 

§ 107.11 Applicability. 

This subpart applies to the operation 

of all civil small unmanned aircraft 

systems subject to this part. 

§ 107.12 Requirement for a remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating. 

(a) Except as provided in paragraph 

(c) of this section, no person may 

manipulate the flight controls of a small 

unmanned aircraft system unless: 

(1) That person has a remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating 

issued pursuant to subpart C of this part 

and satisfies the requirements of 

§ 107.65; or 

(2) That person is under the direct 

supervision of a remote pilot in 

command and the remote pilot in 

command has the ability to immediately 

take direct control of the flight of the 

small unmanned aircraft. 

(b) Except as provided in paragraph 

(c) of this section, no person may act as 

a remote pilot in command unless that 

person has a remote pilot certificate 

with a small UAS rating issued pursuant 

to Subpart C of this part and satisfies the 

requirements of § 107.65. 

(c) The Administrator may, consistent 

with international standards, authorize 

an airman to operate a civil foreignregistered small unmanned aircraft 

without an FAA-issued remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating. 

§ 107.13 Registration. 

A person operating a civil small 

unmanned aircraft system for purposes 

of flight must comply with the 

provisions of § 91.203(a)(2) of this 

chapter. 

§ 107.15 Condition for safe operation. 

(a) No person may operate a civil 

small unmanned aircraft system unless 

it is in a condition for safe operation. 

Prior to each flight, the remote pilot in 

command must check the small 

unmanned aircraft system to determine 

whether it is in a condition for safe 

operation. 

(b) No person may continue flight of 

the small unmanned aircraft when he or 

she knows or has reason to know that 

the small unmanned aircraft system is 

no longer in a condition for safe 

operation. 

§ 107.17 Medical condition. 

No person may manipulate the flight 

controls of a small unmanned aircraft 

system or act as a remote pilot in 

command, visual observer, or direct 

participant in the operation of the small 

unmanned aircraft if he or she knows or 

has reason to know that he or she has 

a physical or mental condition that 

would interfere with the safe operation 

of the small unmanned aircraft system. 

§ 107.19 Remote pilot in command. 

(a) A remote pilot in command must 

be designated before or during the flight 

of the small unmanned aircraft. 

(b) The remote pilot in command is 

directly responsible for and is the final 

authority as to the operation of the small 

unmanned aircraft system. 

(c) The remote pilot in command 

must ensure that the small unmanned 

aircraft will pose no undue hazard to 

other people, other aircraft, or other 

property in the event of a loss of control 

of the aircraft for any reason. 

(d) The remote pilot in command 

must ensure that the small UAS 

operation complies with all applicable 

regulations of this chapter. 

(e) The remote pilot in command 

must have the ability to direct the small 

unmanned aircraft to ensure compliance 

with the applicable provisions of this 

chapter. 

§ 107.21 In-flight emergency. 

(a) In an in-flight emergency requiring 

immediate action, the remote pilot in 

command may deviate from any rule of 

this part to the extent necessary to meet 

that emergency. 

(b) Each remote pilot in command 

who deviates from a rule under 

paragraph (a) of this section must, upon 

request of the Administrator, send a 

written report of that deviation to the 

Administrator. 

§ 107.23 Hazardous operation. 

No person may: 

(a) Operate a small unmanned aircraft 

system in a careless or reckless manner 

so as to endanger the life or property of 

another; or 

(b) Allow an object to be dropped 

from a small unmanned aircraft in a 

manner that creates an undue hazard to 

persons or property. 

§ 107.25 Operation from a moving vehicle 

or aircraft. 

No person may operate a small 

unmanned aircraft system— 

(a) From a moving aircraft; or 

(b) From a moving land or waterborne vehicle unless the small 

unmanned aircraft is flown over a 

sparsely populated area and is not 

transporting another person’s property 

for compensation or hire. 

§ 107.27 Alcohol or drugs. 

A person manipulating the flight 

controls of a small unmanned aircraft 

system or acting as a remote pilot in 

command or visual observer must 

comply with the provisions of §§ 91.17 

and 91.19 of this chapter. 

§ 107.29 Daylight operation. 

(a) No person may operate a small 

unmanned aircraft system during night. 

(b) No person may operate a small 

unmanned aircraft system during 

periods of civil twilight unless the small 

unmanned aircraft has lighted anticollision lighting visible for at least 3 

statute miles. The remote pilot in 

command may reduce the intensity of 

the anti-collision lighting if he or she 

determines that, because of operating 

conditions, it would be in the interest of 

safety to do so. 

(c) For purposes of paragraph (b) of 

this section, civil twilight refers to the 

following: 

(1) Except for Alaska, a period of time 

that begins 30 minutes before official 

sunrise and ends at official sunrise; 

(2) Except for Alaska, a period of time 

that begins at official sunset and ends 30 

minutes after official sunset; and 

(3) In Alaska, the period of civil 

twilight as defined in the Air Almanac. 

§ 107.31 Visual line of sight aircraft 

operation. 

(a) With vision that is unaided by any 

device other than corrective lenses, the 

remote pilot in command, the visual 

observer (if one is used), and the person 

manipulating the flight control of the 

small unmanned aircraft system must be 

able to see the unmanned aircraft 

throughout the entire flight in order to: 

(1) Know the unmanned aircraft’s 

location; 

(2) Determine the unmanned aircraft’s 

attitude, altitude, and direction of flight; 

(3) Observe the airspace for other air 

traffic or hazards; and 

(4) Determine that the unmanned 

aircraft does not endanger the life or 

property of another. 

(b) Throughout the entire flight of the 

small unmanned aircraft, the ability 

described in paragraph (a) of this 

section must be exercised by either: 


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(1) The remote pilot in command and 

the person manipulating the flight 

controls of the small unmanned aircraft 

system; or 

(2) A visual observer. 

§ 107.33 Visual observer. 

If a visual observer is used during the 

aircraft operation, all of the following 

requirements must be met: 

(a) The remote pilot in command, the 

person manipulating the flight controls 

of the small unmanned aircraft system, 

and the visual observer must maintain 

effective communication with each 

other at all times. 

(b) The remote pilot in command 

must ensure that the visual observer is 

able to see the unmanned aircraft in the 

manner specified in § 107.31. 

(c) The remote pilot in command, the 

person manipulating the flight controls 

of the small unmanned aircraft system, 

and the visual observer must coordinate 

to do the following: 

(1) Scan the airspace where the small 

unmanned aircraft is operating for any 

potential collision hazard; and 

(2) Maintain awareness of the position 

of the small unmanned aircraft through 

direct visual observation. 

§ 107.35 Operation of multiple small 

unmanned aircraft. 

A person may not operate or act as a 

remote pilot in command or visual 

observer in the operation of more than 

one unmanned aircraft at the same time. 

§ 107.36 Carriage of hazardous material. 

A small unmanned aircraft may not 

carry hazardous material. For purposes 

of this section, the term hazardous 

material is defined in 49 CFR 171.8. 

§ 107.37 Operation near aircraft; right-ofway rules. 

(a) Each small unmanned aircraft 

must yield the right of way to all 

aircraft, airborne vehicles, and launch 

and reentry vehicles. Yielding the right 

of way means that the small unmanned 

aircraft must give way to the aircraft or 

vehicle and may not pass over, under, 

or ahead of it unless well clear. 

(b) No person may operate a small 

unmanned aircraft so close to another 

aircraft as to create a collision hazard. 

§ 107.39 Operation over human beings. 

No person may operate a small 

unmanned aircraft over a human being 

unless that human being is: 

(a) Directly participating in the 

operation of the small unmanned 

aircraft; or 

(b) Located under a covered structure 

or inside a stationary vehicle that can 

provide reasonable protection from a 

falling small unmanned aircraft. 

§ 107.41 Operation in certain airspace. 

No person may operate a small 

unmanned aircraft in Class B, Class C, 

or Class D airspace or within the lateral 

boundaries of the surface area of Class 

E airspace designated for an airport 

unless that person has prior 

authorization from Air Traffic Control 

(ATC). 

§ 107.43 Operation in the vicinity of 

airports. 

No person may operate a small 

unmanned aircraft in a manner that 

interferes with operations and traffic 

patterns at any airport, heliport, or 

seaplane base. 

§ 107.45 Operation in prohibited or 

restricted areas. 

No person may operate a small 

unmanned aircraft in prohibited or 

restricted areas unless that person has 

permission from the using or controlling 

agency, as appropriate. 

§ 107.47 Flight restrictions in the proximity 

of certain areas designated by notice to 

airmen. 

A person acting as a remote pilot in 

command must comply with the 

provisions of §§ 91.137 through 91.145 

and 99.7 of this chapter. 

§ 107.49 Preflight familiarization, 

inspection, and actions for aircraft 

operation. 

Prior to flight, the remote pilot in 

command must: 

(a) Assess the operating environment, 

considering risks to persons and 

property in the immediate vicinity both 

on the surface and in the air. This 

assessment must include: 

(1) Local weather conditions; 

(2) Local airspace and any flight 

restrictions; 

(3) The location of persons and 

property on the surface; and 

(4) Other ground hazards. 

(b) Ensure that all persons directly 

participating in the small unmanned 

aircraft operation are informed about the 

operating conditions, emergency 

procedures, contingency procedures, 

roles and responsibilities, and potential 

hazards; 

(c) Ensure that all control links 

between ground control station and the 

small unmanned aircraft are working 

properly; 

(d) If the small unmanned aircraft is 

powered, ensure that there is enough 

available power for the small unmanned 

aircraft system to operate for the 

intended operational time; and 

(e) Ensure that any object attached or 

carried by the small unmanned aircraft 

is secure and does not adversely affect 

the flight characteristics or 

controllability of the aircraft. 

§ 107.51 Operating limitations for small 

unmanned aircraft. 

A remote pilot in command and the 

person manipulating the flight controls 

of the small unmanned aircraft system 

must comply with all of the following 

operating limitations when operating a 

small unmanned aircraft system: 

(a) The groundspeed of the small 

unmanned aircraft may not exceed 87 

knots (100 miles per hour). 

(b) The altitude of the small 

unmanned aircraft cannot be higher 

than 400 feet above ground level, unless 

the small unmanned aircraft: 

(1) Is flown within a 400-foot radius 

of a structure; and 

(2) Does not fly higher than 400 feet 

above the structure’s immediate 

uppermost limit. 

(c) The minimum flight visibility, as 

observed from the location of the 

control station must be no less than 3 

statute miles. For purposes of this 

section, flight visibility means the 

average slant distance from the control 

station at which prominent unlighted 

objects may be seen and identified by 

day and prominent lighted objects may 

be seen and identified by night. 

(d) The minimum distance of the 

small unmanned aircraft from clouds 

must be no less than: 

(1) 500 feet below the cloud; and 

(2) 2,000 feet horizontally from the 

cloud. 

Subpart C—Remote Pilot Certification 

§ 107.53 Applicability. 

This subpart prescribes the 

requirements for issuing a remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating. 

§ 107.57 Offenses involving alcohol or 

drugs. 

(a) A conviction for the violation of 

any Federal or State statute relating to 

the growing, processing, manufacture, 

sale, disposition, possession, 

transportation, or importation of 

narcotic drugs, marijuana, or depressant 

or stimulant drugs or substances is 

grounds for: 

(1) Denial of an application for a 

remote pilot certificate with a small 

UAS rating for a period of up to 1 year 

after the date of final conviction; or 

(2) Suspension or revocation of a 

remote pilot certificate with a small 

UAS rating. 

(b) Committing an act prohibited by 

§ 91.17(a) or § 91.19(a) of this chapter is 

grounds for: 

(1) Denial of an application for a 

remote pilot certificate with a small 

UAS rating for a period of up to 1 year 

after the date of that act; or 


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(2) Suspension or revocation of a 

remote pilot certificate with a small 

UAS rating. 

§ 107.59 Refusal to submit to an alcohol 

test or to furnish test results. 

A refusal to submit to a test to 

indicate the percentage by weight of 

alcohol in the blood, when requested by 

a law enforcement officer in accordance 

with § 91.17(c) of this chapter, or a 

refusal to furnish or authorize the 

release of the test results requested by 

the Administrator in accordance with 

§ 91.17(c) or (d) of this chapter, is 

grounds for: 

(a) Denial of an application for a 

remote pilot certificate with a small 

UAS rating for a period of up to 1 year 

after the date of that refusal; or 

(b) Suspension or revocation of a 

remote pilot certificate with a small 

UAS rating. 

§ 107.61 Eligibility. 

Subject to the provisions of §§ 107.57 

and 107.59, in order to be eligible for a 

remote pilot certificate with a small 

UAS rating under this subpart, a person 

must: 

(a) Be at least 16 years of age; 

(b) Be able to read, speak, write, and 

understand the English language. If the 

applicant is unable to meet one of these 

requirements due to medical reasons, 

the FAA may place such operating 

limitations on that applicant’s certificate 

as are necessary for the safe operation of 

the small unmanned aircraft; 

(c) Not know or have reason to know 

that he or she has a physical or mental 

condition that would interfere with the 

safe operation of a small unmanned 

aircraft system; and 

(d) Demonstrate aeronautical 

knowledge by satisfying one of the 

following conditions: 

(1) Pass an initial aeronautical 

knowledge test covering the areas of 

knowledge specified in § 107.73(a); or 

(2) If a person holds a pilot certificate 

(other than a student pilot certificate) 

issued under part 61 of this chapter and 

meets the flight review requirements 

specified in § 61.56, complete an initial 

training course covering the areas of 

knowledge specified in § 107.74(a) in a 

manner acceptable to the Administrator. 

§ 107.63 Issuance of a remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating. 

An applicant for a remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating 

under this subpart must make the 

application in a form and manner 

acceptable to the Administrator. 

(a) The application must include 

either: 

(1) Evidence showing that the 

applicant passed an initial aeronautical 

knowledge test. If applying using a 

paper application, this evidence must be 

an airman knowledge test report 

showing passage of the knowledge test; 

or 

(2) If a person holds a pilot certificate 

(other than a student pilot certificate) 

issued under part 61 of this chapter and 

meets the flight review requirements 

specified in § 61.56, a certificate of 

completion of a part 107 initial training 

course. 

(b) If the application is being made 

pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of this 

section: 

(1) The application must be submitted 

to a Flight Standards District Office, a 

designated pilot examiner, an airman 

certification representative for a pilot 

school, a certificated flight instructor, or 

other person authorized by the 

Administrator; 

(2) The person accepting the 

application submission must verify the 

identity of the applicant in a manner 

acceptable to the Administrator; and 

(3) The person making the application 

must, by logbook endorsement or other 

manner acceptable to the Administrator, 

show the applicant meets the flight 

review requirements specified in § 61.56 

of this chapter. 

§ 107.64 Temporary certificate. 

(a) A temporary remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating is 

issued for up to 120 calendar days, at 

which time a permanent certificate will 

be issued to a person whom the 

Administrator finds qualified under this 

part. 

(b) A temporary remote pilot 

certificate with a small UAS rating 

expires: 

(1) On the expiration date shown on 

the certificate; 

(2) Upon receipt of the permanent 

certificate; or 

(3) Upon receipt of a notice that the 

certificate sought is denied or revoked. 

§ 107.65 Aeronautical knowledge recency. 

A person may not operate a small 

unmanned aircraft system unless that 

person has completed one of the 

following, within the previous 24 

calendar months: 

(a) Passed an initial aeronautical 

knowledge test covering the areas of 

knowledge specified in § 107.73(a); 

(b) Passed a recurrent aeronautical 

knowledge test covering the areas of 

knowledge specified in § 107.73(b); or 

(c) If a person holds a pilot certificate 

(other than a student pilot certificate) 

issued under part 61 of this chapter and 

meets the flight review requirements 

specified in § § 61.56, passed either an 

initial or recurrent training course 

covering the areas of knowledge 

specified in § 107.74(a) or (b) in a 

manner acceptable to the Administrator. 

§ 107.67 Knowledge tests: General 

procedures and passing grades. 

(a) Knowledge tests prescribed by or 

under this part are given by persons and 

in the manner designated by the 

Administrator. 

(b) An applicant for a knowledge test 

must have proper identification at the 

time of application that contains the 

applicant’s: 

(1) Photograph; 

(2) Signature; 

(3) Date of birth, which shows the 

applicant meets or will meet the age 

requirements of this part for the 

certificate and rating sought before the 

expiration date of the airman knowledge 

test report; and 

(4) Permanent mailing address. If the 

applicant’s permanent mailing address 

is a post office box number, then the 

applicant must also provide a current 

residential address. 

(c) The minimum passing grade for 

the knowledge test will be specified by 

the Administrator. 

§ 107.69 Knowledge tests: Cheating or 

other unauthorized conduct. 

(a) An applicant for a knowledge test 

may not: 

(1) Copy or intentionally remove any 

knowledge test; 

(2) Give to another applicant or 

receive from another applicant any part 

or copy of a knowledge test; 

(3) Give or receive assistance on a 

knowledge test during the period that 

test is being given; 

(4) Take any part of a knowledge test 

on behalf of another person; 

(5) Be represented by, or represent, 

another person for a knowledge test; 

(6) Use any material or aid during the 

period that the test is being given, 

unless specifically authorized to do so 

by the Administrator; and 

(7) Intentionally cause, assist, or 

participate in any act prohibited by this 

paragraph. 

(b) An applicant who the 

Administrator finds has committed an 

act prohibited by paragraph (a) of this 

section is prohibited, for 1 year after the 

date of committing that act, from: 

(1) Applying for any certificate, rating, 

or authorization issued under this 

chapter; and 

(2) Applying for and taking any test 

under this chapter. 

(c) Any certificate or rating held by an 

applicant may be suspended or revoked 

if the Administrator finds that person 

has committed an act prohibited by 

paragraph (a) of this section. 


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§ 107.71 Retesting after failure. 

An applicant for a knowledge test 

who fails that test may not reapply for 

the test for 14 calendar days after failing 

the test. 

§ 107.73 Initial and recurrent knowledge 

tests. 

(a) An initial aeronautical knowledge 

test covers the following areas of 

knowledge: 

(1) Applicable regulations relating to 

small unmanned aircraft system rating 

privileges, limitations, and flight 

operation; 

(2) Airspace classification, operating 

requirements, and flight restrictions 

affecting small unmanned aircraft 

operation; 

(3) Aviation weather sources and 

effects of weather on small unmanned 

aircraft performance; 

(4) Small unmanned aircraft loading; 

(5) Emergency procedures; 

(6) Crew resource management; 

(7) Radio communication procedures; 

(8) Determining the performance of 

small unmanned aircraft; 

(9) Physiological effects of drugs and 

alcohol; 

(10) Aeronautical decision-making 

and judgment; 

(11) Airport operations; and 

(12) Maintenance and preflight 

inspection procedures. 

(b) A recurrent aeronautical 

knowledge test covers the following 

areas of knowledge: 

(1) Applicable regulations relating to 

small unmanned aircraft system rating 

privileges, limitations, and flight 

operation; 

(2) Airspace classification and 

operating requirements and flight 

restrictions affecting small unmanned 

aircraft operation; 

(3) Emergency procedures; 

(4) Crew resource management; 

(5) Aeronautical decision-making and 

judgment; 

(6) Airport operations; and 

(7) Maintenance and preflight 

inspection procedures. 

§ 107.74 Initial and recurrent training 

courses. 

(a) An initial training course covers 

the following areas of knowledge: 

(1) Applicable regulations relating to 

small unmanned aircraft system rating 

privileges, limitations, and flight 

operation; 

(2) Effects of weather on small 

unmanned aircraft performance; 

(3) Small unmanned aircraft loading; 

(4) Emergency procedures; 

(5) Crew resource management; 

(6) Determining the performance of 

small unmanned aircraft; and 

(7) Maintenance and preflight 

inspection procedures. 

(b) A recurrent training course covers 

the following areas of knowledge: 

(1) Applicable regulations relating to 

small unmanned aircraft system rating 

privileges, limitations, and flight 

operation; 

(2) Emergency procedures; 

(3) Crew resource management; and 

(4) Maintenance and preflight 

inspection procedures. 

§ 107.77 Change of name or address. 

(a) Change of name. An application to 

change the name on a certificate issued 

under this subpart must be 

accompanied by the applicant’s: 

(1) Remote pilot certificate with small 

UAS rating; and 

(2) A copy of the marriage license, 

court order, or other document verifying 

the name change. 

(b) The documents in paragraph (a) of 

this section will be returned to the 

applicant after inspection. 

(c) Change of address. The holder of 

a remote pilot certificate with small 

UAS rating issued under this subpart 

who has made a change in permanent 

mailing address may not, after 30 days 

from that date, exercise the privileges of 

the certificate unless the holder has 

notified the FAA of the change in 

address using one of the following 

methods: 

(1) By letter to the FAA Airman 

Certification Branch, P.O. Box 25082, 

Oklahoma City, OK 73125 providing the 

new permanent mailing address, or if 

the permanent mailing address includes 

a post office box number, then the 

holder’s current residential address; or 

(2) By using the FAA Web site portal 

at www.faa.gov providing the new 

permanent mailing address, or if the 

permanent mailing address includes a 

post office box number, then the 

holder’s current residential address. 

§ 107.79 Voluntary surrender of certificate. 

(a) The holder of a certificate issued 

under this subpart may voluntarily 

surrender it for cancellation. 

(b) Any request made under 

paragraph (a) of this section must 

include the following signed statement 

or its equivalent: ‘‘I voluntarily 

surrender my remote pilot certificate 

with a small UAS rating for 

cancellation. This request is made for 

my own reasons, with full knowledge 

that my certificate will not be reissued 

to me unless I again complete the 

requirements specified in §§ 107.61 and 

107.63.’’ 

Subpart D—Waivers 

§ 107.200 Waiver policy and requirements. 

(a) The Administrator may issue a 

certificate of waiver authorizing a 

deviation from any regulation specified 

in § 107.205 if the Administrator finds 

that a proposed small UAS operation 

can safely be conducted under the terms 

of that certificate of waiver. 

(b) A request for a certificate of waiver 

must contain a complete description of 

the proposed operation and justification 

that establishes that the operation can 

safely be conducted under the terms of 

a certificate of waiver. 

(c) The Administrator may prescribe 

additional limitations that the 

Administrator considers necessary. 

(d) A person who receives a certificate 

of waiver issued under this section: 

(1) May deviate from the regulations 

of this part to the extent specified in the 

certificate of waiver; and 

(2) Must comply with any conditions 

or limitations that are specified in the 

certificate of waiver. 

§ 107.205 List of regulations subject to 

waiver. 

A certificate of waiver issued 

pursuant to § 107.200 may authorize a 

deviation from the following regulations 

of this part: 

(a) Section 107.25—Operation from a 

moving vehicle or aircraft. However, no 

waiver of this provision will be issued 

to allow the carriage of property of 

another by aircraft for compensation or 

hire. 

(b) Section 107.29—Daylight 

operation. 

(c) Section 107.31—Visual line of 

sight aircraft operation. However, no 

waiver of this provision will be issued 

to allow the carriage of property of 

another by aircraft for compensation or 

hire. 

(d) Section 107.33—Visual observer. 

(e) Section 107.35—Operation of 

multiple small unmanned aircraft 

systems. 

(f) Section 107.37(a)—Yielding the 

right of way. 

(g) Section 107.39—Operation over 

people. 

(h) Section 107.41—Operation in 

certain airspace. 

(i) Section 107.51—Operating 

limitations for small unmanned aircraft. 

PART 119—CERTIFICATION: AIR 

CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL 

OPERATORS 

■ 17. The authority citation for part 119 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 1153, 40101, 

40102, 40103, 40113, 44105, 44106, 44111, 


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44701–44717, 44722, 44901, 44903, 44904, 

44906, 44912, 44914, 44936, 44938, 46103, 

46105. 

■ 18. In § 119.1, revise paragraphs (e)(9) 

and (10) and add paragraph (e)(11) to 

read as follows: 

§ 119.1 Applicability. 

* * * * * 

(e) * * * 

(9) Emergency mail service conducted 

under 49 U.S.C. 41906; 

(10) Operations conducted under the 

provisions of § 91.321 of this chapter; or 

(11) Small UAS operations conducted 

under part 107 of this chapter. 

PART 133—ROTORCRAFT EXTERNALLOAD OPERATIONS 

■ 19. The authority citation for part 133 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701– 

44702. 

■ 20. In § 133.1, revise the introductory 

text to read as follows: 

§ 133.1 Applicability. 

Except for aircraft subject to part 107 

of this chapter, this part prescribes— 

* * * * * 

PART 183—REPRESENTATIVES OF 

THE ADMINISTRATOR 

■ 21. The authority citation for part 183 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 31 U.S.C. 9701; 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 

106(g), 40113, 44702, 45303. 

■ 22. In § 183.23, revise paragraphs (b) 

and (c) and ad paragraph (d) to read as 

follows: 

§ 183.23 Pilot examiners. 

* * * * * 

(b) Under the general supervision of 

the appropriate local Flight Standards 

Inspector, conduct those tests; 

(c) In the discretion of the appropriate 

local Flight Standards Inspector, issue 

temporary pilot certificates and ratings 

to qualified applicants; and 

(d) Accept an application for a remote 

pilot certificate with a small UAS rating 

and verify the identity of the applicant 

in a form and manner acceptable to the 

Administrator. 

Issued under the authority provided by 49 

U.S.C. 106(f), 40101 note; and Sec. 333 of 

Pub. L. 112–95, in Washington, DC, on June 

21, 2016. 

Anthony R. Foxx, 

Secretary, Department of Transportation. 

Michael P. Huerta, 

Administrator, Federal Aviation 

Administration. 

[FR Doc. 2016–15079 Filed 6–22–16; 11:15 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 


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