COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Annunziata 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2626-98-1 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 MAY 28, 1999 

MARK EDWARD REYNOLDS 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 

Jerome James, Judge Designate 

Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellant. 

Earle C. Mobley (Marcus, Santoro, Kozak & 

Melvin, on brief), for appellee. 

 The Commonwealth appeals a pretrial order suppressing 

evidence obtained during an investigative stop of a car driven 

by Mark Edward Reynolds. It contends the trial court erred in 

concluding that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment’s 

guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures. We 

disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

 Upon appeal from an order granting a motion to suppress, 

the Commonwealth must show the trial court’s decision was 

erroneous. See Freeman v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 658, 660, 

460 S.E.2d 261, 262 (1995). We will not disturb the trial 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication.
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court’s ruling unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it. See id.

 As Reynolds, heading north, approached the intersection, he 

engaged his left-turn signal, proceeded to the northern edge of 

the break in the median, brought his vehicle to a stop 

approximately one foot from the curb of the northern median, and 

placed the front end of his vehicle across the yellow line of 

the left-turn lane of southbound traffic. Although the 

intersection was marked with two “no U-turn” signs, nothing 

prohibited a left turn onto the entrance ramp to Interstate 264, 

which was accessible from the position of Reynolds’ vehicle at 

the time of the stop. Thus, Officer Laskey lacked sufficient 

basis upon which to conclude that Reynolds was about to make an 

illegal U-turn into the southbound lanes of Frederick Boulevard 

rather than a legal left turn onto the entrance ramp. We cannot 

conclude, therefore, that the trial court’s finding that 

Reynolds could have turned legally onto the entrance ramp was 

clearly erroneous, and we decline to disturb that finding on 

appeal. 

 Laskey’s erroneous belief that Reynolds illegally crossed 

the yellow line of the oncoming turn lane constituted an 

insufficient basis for the stop of Reynolds’ vehicle. A police 

officer may stop a motor vehicle for investigatory purposes if 

the officer possesses a reasonable suspicion based on 

articulable facts that either the vehicle or an occupant is 
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subject to seizure for violation of law. See Jackson v. 

Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 347, 353, 470 S.E.2d 138, 141 (1996). 

Contrary to Laskey’s belief, it was not unlawful for Reynolds to 

cross the yellow line of the oncoming turn lane for the purpose 

of turning left onto the entrance ramp. See Code § 46.2-804(6). 

An officer’s mistaken belief as to the law will not support a 

finding of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. See Ford v. 

City of Newport News, 23 Va. App. 137, 145, 474 S.E.2d 848, 

851-52 (1996). 

 The evidence supports the trial court’s holding that the 

police lacked a factual basis for a reasonable suspicion that 

Reynolds was engaged in, or was about to engage in, illegal 

activity. Thus, the traffic stop was an unreasonable seizure in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed. 
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Annunziata, J., dissenting. 

 I dissent because, contrary to the majority, I find that 

the defendant could not have turned onto the entrance ramp to 

Interstate 264 from his position without completing an illegal 

U-turn on Frederick Boulevard. 

 A U-turn is defined as a turn “by a vehicle traveling along 

one side of a way by crossing the lane of oncoming traffic and 

turning into and proceeding along a lane on the other side of 

the way in a direction exactly opposite to the direction of 

movement at the start of the turn.” Webster’s Third New 

International Dictionary 2526 (1981). Officer Laskey testified 

that, because the defendant had driven “too far” north, the 

defendant could not have reached the entrance ramp without 

“looping around,” entering the lanes of southbound traffic on 

Frederick, and returning to the ramp. The pictures introduced 

as exhibits support the conclusion that the defendant would have 

had to turn his vehicle into southbound traffic on Frederick, 

albeit briefly, before reaching the beginning of the entrance 

ramp to Interstate 264. 

 Based on this evidence, I believe the trial court’s 

determination that the defendant could have legally turned left 

onto the entrance ramp was clearly erroneous. Because the 

evidence supports Officer Laskey’s reasonably articulated 

suspicion that the defendant was about to make an illegal 

U-turn, I would hold that the stop was justified and reverse the 
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denial of the defendant’s suppression motion. See Layne v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 23, 25, 421 S.E.2d 215, 216 (1992).