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THE NEXT GENERATION NUCLEAR PLANT AND

HYDROGEN PRODUCTION: A CRITICAL STATUS

REPORT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 20, 2006

Serial No. 109–261

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

DAVID MARIN, Staff Director

LAWRENCE HALLORAN, Deputy Staff Director

BENJAMIN CHANCE, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND RESOURCES

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, NORTH CAROLINA

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

DIANE E. WATSON, California

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

TOM LANTOS, California

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director

DAVE SOLAN, PH.D., Professional Staff Member

LORI GAVAGHAN, Clerk

SHAUN GARRISON, Minority Professional Staff Member

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on September 20, 2006 ..................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Wells, Jim, Director, Natural Resources and the Environment, Government Accountability Office; Phil Hildebrandt, Idaho National Laboratory, special assistant to the Laboratory Director; and Andrew Kadak,

professor, Nuclear Science and Engineering Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology ........................................................................ 20

Hildebrandt, Phil ....................................................................................... 40

Kadak, Andrew .......................................................................................... 47

Wells, Jim .................................................................................................. 20

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Hildebrandt, Phil, Idaho National Laboratory, special assistant to the

Laboratory Director, prepared statement of ............................................... 43

Issa, Hon. Darrell E., a Representative in Congress from the State of

California:

Briefing memo ........................................................................................... 11

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 3

Kadak, Andrew, professor, Nuclear Science and Engineering Department,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, prepared statement of ................ 49

Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Ohio, prepared statement of .................................................................... 17

Watson, Hon. Diane E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California, prepared statement of ........................................................... 7

Wells, Jim, Director, Natural Resources and the Environment, Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of .................................... 23

(1)

THE NEXT GENERATION NUCLEAR PLANT

AND HYDROGEN PRODUCTION: A CRITICAL

STATUS REPORT

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND RESOURCES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:29 p.m. in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Darrell Issa

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Issa, Watson, Kucinich.

Staff present: Larry Brady, staff director; Lori Gavaghan, legislative clerk; Tom Alexander, counsel; Dave Solan, Ph.D., and Ray

Robbins, professional staff members; Joe Thompson, GAO detailee;

Shaun Garrison, minority professional staff member; and Cecelia

Morton, minority office manager.

Mr. ISSA. A quorum being present, this hearing of the Government Reform Subcommittee on Energy and Resources will come to

order.

Nuclear power is enjoying a global resurgence because of the environmental benefits and the expected growth in demand for electricity, and I might say, hydrogen. In the United States, there has

also been an interest in building new plants because the current

fleet of reactors is aging and the electricity demand is projected to

rise 40 to 50 percent by 2030.

The Next Generation Nuclear Plant is part of the Federal Government effort to advance commercial nuclear reactor design beyond the current generation that is being deployed around the

world. Additionally, NGNP—although sometimes it is easier to say

Next Gen—is a key component of the administration’s plan to develop the ‘‘hydrogen economy.’’ An important purpose of the advanced nuclear demonstration plant is to produce hydrogen on a

large scale.

Congress has given the plant a ‘‘drop-dead date’’ of September

30, 2021, for construction and the beginning of operation. The Department of Energy seems to be following a schedule that will cut

it close to that deadline, and I might say on the record, 2021 would

have been a date far further in the future than I would have shot

for. After all, it took less than 10 years to put a man on the moon.

Independent advisory panels and task forces have criticized DOE’s

schedule as being too slow; and too slow to be used by the private

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sector, too slow not to die a slow death from the lack of political

support.

Of particular concern for Next Gen projects is the development

of a number of technologies that will ensure project milestones are

met and construction will be completed on schedule. Even meeting

the time table does not provide a guarantee that the demonstration

plant will not have been overtaken by other commercial technologies that may be developed sooner.

In addition, delays in meeting milestones will call into question

the continued support for the Next Gen, considering other nuclear

priorities, such as the Nuclear 2010 and Global Nuclear Energy

Partnership programs that require a considerable Federal financial

backing.

Today we will hear from the Government Accountability Office

regarding an assessment that it prepared at my request. We will

also hear from a representative of the Idaho National Laboratory,

where much of the R&D is being done today. Last, we will hear

from a professor at MIT who is a former CEO in the nuclear industry and has a great deal of knowledge regarding advanced reactor

design.

Last to put on the record before I yield to the ranking member,

also a Californian, is that in the last few weeks our Governor in

California has set an ambitious plan for reducing the carbon footprint in California. It is this Member’s considered opinion that you

cannot reduce the carbon footprint if we retire the nuclear reactors

that today are putting out zero emissions in California, so we in

California have a particular interest in Next Gen nuclear.

With that, I would yield to the ranking lady for her opening remarks.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Darrell E. Issa follows:]

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Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening today’s

hearing to discuss this very critical project that can play a major

role in shaping the future of America’s energy use and production.

All of us are aware of the importance of nuclear energy, and I hope

that our witnesses today will update us on the progress of the Next

Generation Nuclear Plant project and tell us if the goals in completing the project are being met.

There are several concerns as to whether or not this project is

on track to meet its 2021 deadline for completion. In a recent GAO

study it has come to the committee’s attention that there are several technological challenges in completing the NGNP and whether

the technologies developed will meet the needs of the private sector.

GAO also found that the project’s initial research and development results indicate that the likelihood is slim that the project

will be able to stay on schedule, considering the amount of research

and development that still needs to be done, and this presents a

problem. This committee’s job is to conduct oversight on Federal

spending, and we must ensure that our projects, including this one,

are conducted in an expeditious and profitable manner that benefit

the American taxpayer. The public should be secure in knowing

that we do meet deadlines in the Federal Government, and when

we don’t we have a viable explanation as to why or why not a deadline was not met.

Every April 15th taxpayers are required to file their taxes or

they will face a penalty unless they explain why they need an extension. Shouldn’t that same accountability be held on the Government when conducting business?

So, Mr. Chairman, I again want to thank you for your leadership

in bringing this issue before the subcommittee, and I am confident

that our discussion today will yield us some definite answers on the

progress of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant. I hope that the

findings of this GAO report will be of benefit to all of the researchers and scientists involved to make this endeavor a success.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Diane E. Watson follows:]

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Mr. ISSA. I thank the gentlelady, and I ask unanimous consent

that the briefing memo prepared by the subcommittee staff be inserted into the record, as well as all other relevant materials.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. ISSA. With that I would yield to the gentleman from Ohio,

who is not without some familiarity on nuclear power, Mr.

Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Of course, with that

in mind I will be offering a slightly different perspective, but I

want to thank the witnesses and I also want to thank the Chair

for his dedication on energy issues. This committee has done some

very important work, and it has been because of the dedication of

the chairman. I just want to let you know how much we appreciate

it, Mr. Chairman.

A hydrogen infrastructure is a revolutionary technology. It can

power our transportation, heating, and electricity needs because

hydrogen is so easy to transport, store, and convert by way of fuel

cells. These qualities allow renewable technologies like solar and

wind to supply the majority of the energy demanded by our Nation.

There is much promise in truly sustainable hydrogen energy distribution system. To achieve the benefits of less dependence on foreign oil, clean air, and a better future for our children, the hydrogen system must strive for sustainability and replace the polluting

fuels we depend on today.

Now, a nuclear plant designed to generate hydrogen I believe is

antithetical to a sustainable energy system. The advantages of a

hydrogen economy are substantial, but to reap all the advantages

we desire I think that hydrogen production must come from renewable sources. Anything less and we will have spent significant taxpayer dollars, questionable gain.

The notion of using nuclear power to produce hydrogen looks like

an industry attempt to just take more tax dollars for nuclear subsidies. We all remember that existing nuclear power plant technology was heavily subsidized in the last century, and they are continuing to eat up those subsidies today.

Between 1948 and 1998 the Federal Government spent $74 billion on nuclear power research and development, the majority of

Federal dollars spent on energy supply R&D during this time. To

me, this idea of connection between a hydrogen infrastructure and

nuclear power amounts to kind of a greenwashing to prop up the

nuclear industry. Nuclear power is not safe, and the wastes generated create an environmental challenge that this country continues not to have an honest answer to.

I want to remind this committee about Davis-Besse. This is why

I have a particular concern and an expertise. It is a nuclear reactor

upwind from my hometown in Cleveland, Ohio. This nuclear reactor was shut down because of a large cavity the size of a football

discovered in the top of the reactor wall. The utility, First Energy,

unfortunately knowingly avoided mandatory inspection cleanings,

would have prevented this near-miss. Instead, they chose to protect

their profits and run their reactor dangerously close to disaster.

Now, I am not going to confuse First Energy with the rest of the

nuclear industry, but it has to be said that the NRC, instead of

protecting the public, chose to protect the financial interests of

First Energy. They repeatedly took minimal actions to prevent this

near disaster, punish the utility for its negligence, reform its own

operations, and place safety first. The NRC Inspector General

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found the NRC chose to protect the financial impact on First Energy rather than force compliance with safety regulations.

After the shutdown of Davis-Besse the NRC released the report

that documented its lessons learned. The report made a few recommendations as to how the NRC might avoid future incidents like

the corrosion problems at Davis-Besse. Since the release of the

final report, a draft lessons learned report surfaced that contained

several far-reaching recommendations that would, in fact, make a

real difference in nuclear power plant safety, because you can’t talk

about the relationship between nuclear power and hydrogen infrastructure unless you look at the underlying safety issues. But to

avoid costly regulation on the industry, those recommendations

that are mentioned didn’t even make the final report.

I don’t have any doubt that a nuclear power plant producing hydrogen will face a similar regulatory system designed to protect industry profits, and such a plant will pose an unacceptable risk to

the public.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to mention that I think it would be

important for this subcommittee, along with the other wonderful

work it does, to examine the complete and total failure of the NRC

to regulate the current reactors. The Davis-Besse incident showed

a fundamental flaw in how our Nation regulates reactors. It is a

failure in every rung of the bureaucratic ladder.

We also must acknowledge that nuclear reactors produce highly

radioactive waste the United States is attempting to bury in Yucca

Mountain, Nevada. No matter how deep you bury it, no matter

where you bury it, this waste is going to re-emerge. Basic geology

dictates that over a million years the Earth shifts and water moves

and this waste will re-enter our environment. I have no doubt the

nuclear waste generated to create hydrogen will have no responsible solution, either.

Mr. Chairman, the lesson we learned here is that the United

States should question the taxpayers’ money that is being spent for

nuclear industry and should question a plan that could end up

trashing our environment to prop up a dangerous industry. Hydrogen production should be moved forward from sustainable sources.

It will be more cost effective, better for the environment, and safer

for our citizenry.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:]

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Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Kucinich. I would second one very important portion of what you said, and that is that I look forward

to the day in which renewables represent a substantial, if not all,

of our production of fuels, both for fixed and mobile through hydrogen.

With that I would like to welcome today our guests. You are

more than guests. We hopefully, though, will treat you as well as

guests. We have Mr. Jim Wells from the Government Accountability Office; Mr. Phil Hildebrandt from INL; and Dr. Andrew Kadak

from MIT. I look forward to your testimony. As all guests here, I

would like to begin by asking you to rise for the administration of

an oath. It is always good to have people with Ph.Ds. They know

to raise their right hands without being asked.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. ISSA. The record will show all nodded yes.

Mr. Wells, we will kick off with you. We normally give 5 minutes.

Is that going to be sufficient for you to summarize your written testimony?

Mr. WELLS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ISSA. All of it will be placed in the record. Great. The lights

will show you the time remaining, and we only ask that you respect the light, not that you stop the instant it turns red.

Mr. WELLS. Fair enough.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you.

STATEMENTS OF JIM WELLS, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; PHIL HILDEBRANDT, IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE LABORATORY DIRECTOR; AND ANDREW KADAK, PROFESSOR,

NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

STATEMENT OF JIM WELLS

Mr. WELLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. GAO is pleased to participate in this oversight hearing.

We are releasing today, Mr. Chairman, as you requested, our

GAO report on this particular project. It is available on the GAO

Web site. You also asked us to describe the progress and the status

of DOE’s attempt to deliver a $2.4 billion R&D project that will

build and demonstrate an advanced high-temperature nuclear reactor that DOE plans to link to a new hydrogen production plant.

The report, itself, describes the project, the players, and the intended purposes.

You held a hearing last year, Mr. Chairman, and heard testimony from DOE and others about where they were, their efforts,

their progress to date, and their future plans. Two separate, independent groups have since reviewed the project plans and have offered suggestions and recommendations. This report gives you and

the Congress a third assessment of where the NGNP project is.

Here are our quick findings. DOE has budgeted $120 million so

far from 2003 to 2006. This breaks down to about $80 million for

the reactor, $40 million for the hydrogen product side system.

Overall projections are that this would break out about $2 billion

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for the reactor and $300 million or so for the production of hydrogen.

DOE has laid out a timeline schedule, as you can see on the

graph that we give you here on the left. The chart starts in 2006,

ends in 2021. It proceeds through R&D testing, proof of concepts

and capabilities, NRC licensing strategy by 2008, moves into 2011

design, construction start by 2016, and startup by 2021.

Among the many stakeholders in this process, Mr. Chairman,

there are controversy, disagreements, significant technology organizational funding, and unknown challenges to completing this almost 20 year effort.

First, let me say that the people that we encountered in this

audit who were working on this project appear to believe in the

goals and the need for this project, but they do share cautious

skepticism as to whether it will continue to make the cut and advance to the end in 20 years. DOE’s current R&D approach we

would characterize as trying to advance the science of building a

new Generation IV advanced reactor that has high-end, very-hightemperature capabilities to achieve superior efficiency in terms of

fuel use and of heat transfer capabilities to allow magnitude improvements in the economical, commercial production of hydrogen.

What we are talking about is designing something that will potentially double today’s 25 percent efficiency of producing hydrogen.

This effort ties closely to the administration’s goal of

transitioning to the future of a hydrogen economy. Early R&D results have been favorable, especially as it relates to fuel testing,

but most of the important R&D remains to be done.

The Idaho National Lab, which you will hear from today, who

has the designated lead and the location for the building of this

full-scale reactor and a hydrogen production plant, are, in fact,

gung-ho and anxious to deliver the product as asked for. The program and management team that we talked to at the working level

at DOE, they share, too, a passion to meet the future energy challenge driving this particular project. This is the good news, Mr.

Chairman; however, there is bad news.

Between the times DOE last testified before you, they reported

to you they were making steady progress. The priority for funding

nuclear energy has changed, resulting in this project going a little

slower. Today, first priority in the Department of Energy is Nuclear Power 2010. Second is Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

[GNEP], second priority. And the new generation, or Next Generation, as you refer to this project, has fallen to third place in terms

of their priorities. The competition today is scarce for the existing

R&D dollars.

Getting the private sector, what we call the industry, the end

users, the vendors, the utilities, and the people that are actually

going to use the hydrogen, getting these people involved has been

slow in this project, and DOE is just now beginning to get that

started. Suggestions generated from the earlier two independent

assessments that I referred to earlier have looked at the DOE

project with some suggestions for changes. DOE has agreed to

some of those changes, made some changes, but DOE has not made

all the changes, particularly as they believe that the stated path

is better, in their opinion.

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For example, you are going to hear today about the belief that

the current schedule needs to be accelerated, with a quicker completion before 2021. Those that support acceleration say you stand

the risk of losing commercialization and private sector buy-in. DOE

says that doing so presents unacceptable risk to them and increases the technical challenges, as well as not keeping with the

existing Department’s current funding priorities.

We are weighing in after doing this audit, Mr. Chairman, in a

belief that we would agree that it may be too soon to accelerate,

in our view, to support that decision today. Our rationale is based

not so much on the science but more on the management concern

that we have in terms of DOE’s ability to get it right.

To speed up the project today narrows the plan R&D and reduces

the known unknowns. Moving forward could result in a re-work if

future research results are not supporting the decisions that have

been already made. DOE has only just now moved to get involved

in the industry, which is really going to be critical to knowing what

type of production facilities do they want, do they need, and what

are they going to be willing to invest in. DOE doesn’t have those

answers yet.

Finally, GAO has documented a long history within the Department of Energy regarding problems in managing large projects.

Their poor management skills have been on a high-risk list for over

16 years. The risk taking this path to accelerate is further elevated

by the fact that the DOE Nuclear Energy Office that has responsibility for this project has no experience in managing a project of

this size and complexity. There might be a time later to make this

critical path change as DOE gets further into the schedule.

Mr. Chairman, I want to conclude. My time has expired here.

This, to us, is the highlights and the lowlights, if you will, of what

we found.

I want to commend this committee in holding these hearings. As

a Nation it is clear we need energy. We need more energy. We need

environmentally responsible ways to meet this energy need. How

we can use nuclear power in the future deserves the Congress’ attention.

On a personal note, Mr. Chairman, I want to say, having testified before you many times on energy issues, I am retiring from

Government service after 37 years and I really appreciate your interest and your committee’s interest in government reform with

quality oversight.

With that I will conclude and answer any questions you may

have. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wells follows:]

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Mr. ISSA. Jim, I thought you were going to stay for a full career.

It is just not right for a young guy like you to consider retirement.

With your expertise, it is very likely to pay better than your work

did, but congratulations on 37 years.

Mr. WELLS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ISSA. That is a wonderful period of service.

Mr. WELLS. Thank you.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Hildebrandt, I don’t think you can equal that, but

give it a try.

STATEMENT OF PHIL HILDEBRANDT

Mr. HILDEBRANDT. I can perhaps say I might be older.

Mr. ISSA. I understand that you and the Admiral——

Mr. HILDEBRANDT. Grossenbacher?

Mr. ISSA. Yes, you taught him everything he knew, right?

Mr. HILDEBRANDT. I would never admit to that.

Mr. ISSA. OK.

Mr. HILDEBRANDT. He would not, as well. Rickover did teach me

much of what I know, however. I did work for him for many years.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it is an honor

to present the views of the Idaho National Laboratory regarding

progress being made on the schedule for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant and plans to ensure commercial viability of the project

and participation of the private sector.

I am a consultant to Admiral John Grossenbacher at the laboratory. I have a title, which is in the formal testimony. It is a long

one. I have worked for over 38 years in the nuclear industry, starting in the naval nuclear propulsion program for Admiral Rickover,

as the chairman mentioned, subsequently in the commercial electric power generation industry, and most recently then within the

Department of Energy, itself.

I am and we at the laboratory are encouraged by the recent resurgence of interest in nuclear technologies by the U.S. commercial

power generating industry, as indicated by announced plans to

seek licenses from the NRC to construct and operate new nuclear

plants.

The Idaho National Laboratory, under the leadership of its director, John Grossenbacher, is playing a central role in this nuclear

renaissance and in the future of nuclear energy, including the Next

Generation Nuclear Plant, the subject of today’s discussion, and the

Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.

The subject of today’s hearing, the Next Generation Nuclear

Plant, is an essential part of the future of nuclear energy, in our

opinion. The demonstrated success of the commercial nuclear industry in reliably producing electric power using nuclear technology in the United States and throughout the world provides the

foundation upon which these improved nuclear technologies can be

extended to other energy sectors, not just hydrogen.

I want to make sure we think of this perhaps more broadly. This

is what we call in the engineering field a process heat machine.

The importance is very high temperature, processed heat which can

be used not only to produce hydrogen but to be used complementary with coal gassification and extracting petroleum products from

oil and tar sands and for direct use in many chemical processes.

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In doing so, we have the important contribution to reducing the

carbon footprint, if I may, of the chemical industry that exists

today. So this is a very broad application, hydrogen being one of

the areas of focus; however, much broader than that in total.

The marketplace for the high-temperature processing and the hydrogen exists today. If we had a plant of this technology to provide

to the commercial industry, they would be able to compete in an

economic competition with hydrogen production by other means

today, and by doing so reduce the extent of natural gas that we use

for such purposes and better use the natural gas and other such

products elsewhere for their unique capabilities.

The key aspect of initiating a project such as the Next Generation Nuclear Plant is to obtain the commercial energy industry interest because, in fact, it is in the end a commercial venture.

Rather than take the approach of asking government to bring

this along to its completion, we are now taking the approach, with

the facilitation of the Idaho National Lab, to bring together a public/private consortium. In doing so, that public/private consortium

shares the risk with the government in the development of these

technologies. This is consistent with the Energy Policy Act of 2005

and the requests within that act.

The steps that we are currently taking and have just completed—preparing a credible business strategy and project plan and

beginning the development of the commercial alliance of major end

users and technology developers—there is a core of those today

which are traditional in the nuclear energy world in terms of

equipment vendors, nuclear system suppliers, and end users. We

are now going to broaden that into other sectors because this particular plant goes well beyond the use for, as I mentioned hydrogen, as well into other areas where the larger marketplace of the

petroleum industry, such as the petroleum industry, fertilizer industries, and other uses for this type of energy.

To address the item that Mr. Wells mentioned, which I share his

concern with regards to past experience in the Department of Energy in managing such ventures. I think there is an unfortunate

trail of problems in the past.

We are approaching this as a commercial venture. This public/

private partnership that I have described in brief will have direct

involvement of major commercial end users, technology developers,

nuclear system suppliers, and equipment manufactures in what we

are calling the Alliance; will implement commercial contracting vehicles between the Alliance and the national and international laboratories for the research and development; will use contemporary

commercial project management practices for the design, licensing,

and construction of the demonstration prototype.

So our emphasis is on the commercial sector, and then subsequently, upon building it, we will operate it by an experienced commercial nuclear operator. So we share the concern and we are addressing the concern from a commercial sector standpoint.

Addressing the item specifically of are we proceeding down a

schedule which will achieve the result that we wish in a timeframe,

the commercial sector, as has been consistent with other recommendations, would like to have this prototype demonstration

that supports commercialization completed sooner than 2021. The

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target for the technology development would be in the timeframe

of 2016 to 2018. In achieving that, it is a choice of a balance between the technologies that you choose to achieve the performance

that is acceptable to the commercial sector to reduce the risk of

completing it in the timeframe, so there is a choice—choice of technology, choice of schedule, choice of costs.

The commercial sector would drive this toward achieving success

in the 2016 to 2018 timeframe. As you know, in the commercial

sector such targets are not taken lightly. This is very important in

the financial realities.

I will stop there since the red light has gone on. I thank you for

your time and attention.

The Idaho National Laboratory fully supports the development of

these technologies for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant, and the

targeted energy needs in the United States and the world make

these technologies an essential part of the overall development and

strategy for nuclear energy.

I thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hildebrandt follows:]

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Mr. ISSA. Thank you.

Dr. Kadak.

STATEMENT OF ANDREW KADAK

Mr. KADAK. I thank you for the invitation.

First of all, I want to make sure that you understand that I am

speaking here as an individual, not representing MIT or the nuclear engineering department.

You have already mentioned my background relative to being a

past nuclear utility operator and servicing of the light water nuclear industry as we know it, but, in case I run out of time, I would

like to answer your questions.

First, I agree with you that we are way too far in the future with

2021. I think it can be done much earlier. Countries such as South

Africa and China are doing it. There is no reason why we cannot.

I agree with your moon analogy.

Second, are the goals being met? Clearly not. As you saw in my

testimony, the budget requests by the DOE for the NGNP are woefully inadequate, even for their 2021 date. I think they can be accelerated. I also believe that there is a way to accelerate not only

the project but also the amount of R&D necessary to bring this

project to fruition.

As you may remember, this project was started as a Generation

IV project called a very high-temperature reactor. The commercial

industry and Mr. Hildebrandt headed up a commitment called the

International Technical Review Team, and they had several recommendations. The technical goals set for the VHTR were way too

excessive, the timing was far too in the future, and what we have

done independently is look at what do we really need to do to bring

the Next Generation plant to fruition, not the very-high temperature reactor to fruition. A thousand degrees centigrade is a lot different than 850 and 900 centigrade, and that is sufficient to make

hydrogen, certainly on a demonstration scale.

So what you will see in my testimony is, I took a thorough look

at what the DOE was estimating for their cost, their R&D program, had that reviewed by people who are actually building their

pebble bed reactors, and this could also apply to the General

Atomics prismatic reactor, and we scrubbed those numbers and

said, ‘‘what would it cost to build this particular plant on a schedule that looks like 2015, 2017.’’ We were able to cut about $1 billion

off that number. It is a huge amount. For that amount of money,

which basically is for NGNP and hydrogen at $1.2 billion total cost,

we could get an operating plant, probably get it licensed by the

NRC as a test facility that could be commercialized once demonstrated.

Those are, I think, the two questions that you had.

In terms of oversight, absolutely. I think what you will see in the

funding profiles is it is desperately needed to make sure that the

funds are provided.

Relative to Mr. Kucinich’s comments about renewables, I strongly suggest there is a book that just came out by William Sweet entitled, ‘‘Kicking the Carbon Habit.’’ It is a very informative, very

helpful book that takes a very practical look at our energy technologies and the imminent crisis that we are facing in terms of

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global climate change. That has changed my opinion about the timing of projects such as this.

So I think I got pretty much everybody’s main concerns identified. Now to my testimony, which hopefully you all will read.

The key issues I think for us is the process of getting the industry involved. Mr. Hildebrandt is working on trying to get an alliance together, which I think is a very important goal. Some time

ago I proposed with industry a recommended approach, which was

a funded competition to develop conceptual designs for the NGNP

and also the hydrogen plant. Competing teams would participate,

with ultimately a down-selection that would be based on the mission goals, the costs and schedules, and their capability to deliver

the product. Then that team, whether it be a General Atomics team

or Westinghouse team or AREVA team, would then be charged

with building this plant, consider it an engineering project, not a

science project.

Clearly there is going to be some R&D that is going to be needed

to get this thing done. The Idaho National Lab will play a key role,

and hopefully universities, as well. But, there is a lot of R&D being

done internationally in China and in South Africa that was very

helpful and supportive of the kind of thing we want to try to do

here.

So we believe, at least I believe, that we can get this project done

within 2015—let’s just say within 2017, within the same time lines

as Mr. Hildebrandt is talking about—but an approached that is focused and phased.

I would like also to address what I could call the chicken or the

egg question. Where is this industry that is supposed to rise up

and support this particular NGNP? Well, the industry is very fragmented, as you know. If you start saying let’s make it the utilities,

utilities don’t care. All they want to do is buy power stations or buy

hydrogen plants and run them, so they are not going to be developers, and they are not developers.

If you go to the nuclear steam suppliers like Westinghouse, General Electric, where they used to invent new technologies, but they

haven’t had an order in 30 years. Their resources and capabilities

to put something like this together, put $1 billion on the table, is

just not going to happen. Then, as you mentioned, the hydrogen

producers, you know, they are quite fine with making hydrogen

with steam methane reforming, but the price is very high, the supply is going to get very tight, and they don’t want to do anything

with nuclear. Then you get the hydrogen users and they say, I just

want to buy the product. I don’t want to get involved with all of

this nuclear stuff or even more complicated technologies.

So there is no industry there, which is why I think this Next

Generation Nuclear Plant, with not only the hydrogen mission but

the process heat mission, oil recovery—we have done a lot of oil

sands work—ought to be a national strategic project. Stop playing

the games about who is going to put up the money first. It is a national strategic project, and if you read that ‘‘Kicking the Carbon

Habit’’ book, you are going to be convinced that it is vitally important for this Nation and perhaps for the world.

I think I am done. Thank you very much for your time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kadak follows:]

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Mr. ISSA. Thank you.

Dr. Kadak, I will kick off a little bit of the questioning.

Mr. KADAK. Yes.

Mr. ISSA. The figures I was given that come from the Nuclear Energy Institute, existing nuclear plants cost about $0.168 cents—

call it 1.7 cents—per kilowatt hour of electricity. Coal costs about

1.9. Existing nuclear plants pay 1/10th of 1 percent for the construction and maintenance of Yucca. Coal plants don’t pay anything for the acid rain. They don’t pay anything for any of the other

damage to the environment, and certainly they don’t pay for the

carbon footprint. Natural gas, my favorite fuel in California—every

new plant is natural gas can cost up to 5 to 7 cents, depending on

the market for natural gas. Yes. We pay that in California for a

big chunk of what we have, and I am very thankful that we have

both nuclear and hydro to offset that, along with some of our renewables.

The estimate for III-plus, what we are clearly going to be making

before we make Next Gen, is that they are going to run about 4.6

cents per kilowatt hour; however, clean coal is estimated at 5.1

cents, and natural gas 10 years from now clearly ain’t going to be

cheaper.

If the Federal Government takes the number of kilowatt hours

that we expect to produce with nuclear and puts $5 billion on the

table and says we want to recover at a rate of 2/10 or 3/10 of a cent

on our investment, from a practical standpoint by the time that you

have seven or eight reactors, aren’t you going to recover that in a

relatively short period of time and still be supplying for less than

the cost of coal with all of its inherent damage to the environment

and less than the cost of natural gas, a resource that we are presently importing at great risk because of where it comes from?

Mr. KADAK. It is hard to do those numbers quickly, but I think

the bottom line——

Mr. ISSA. We will settle for nuclear, even if Next Gen is as expensive as III-plus, has a cost savings over fossil fuels today in our estimates. Unfortunately, you don’t have the $5 billion to get to market.

Mr. KADAK. Don’t have the money, but part of this proposal

would be a payback to the government for whatever they have put

on the table for the NGNP through revenues generated by electric

production or hydrogen production. So the idea is not to just make

it a complete subsidy, as Mr. Kucinich suggests, but it is an investment that you have to make and can make and get paid back for.

Mr. ISSA. So your position, for the record, is that——

Mr. KADAK. Yes.

Mr. ISSA [continuing]. If the Federal Government invests it can

recover its investment, either based on your assessment or based

on the numbers that I flashed around hoping that you could keep

them all in your head?

Mr. KADAK. Yes. The investment in this technology will have a

payback that the government ought to be able to get back from

that particular number.

Mr. ISSA. Last for you, Mr. Kadak, the difference, the compromise between, let’s say, an 850°C and a 1,000°C reactor, do we

yet have an appreciation for, one, the efficiency, the 50 percent effiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:22 Nov 12, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\45218.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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cient utilization of the source material. And, two, how that would

affect the sort of Yucca deposits, because I, for one, have been very

supportive of Next Gen because of the anticipation that we are

going to be dramatically reducing what we have to put into longterm storage and particularly, I know with General Atomics’ system and some others, their ability to burn plutonium—actually

burn it not for disposal but burn it for fuel—both of which reduce

what I feel we would have to leave in for a very long period of time

in, as Mr. Kucinich said, the million-year-water-will-happen situation.

Mr. KADAK. Clearly the efficiency advantage of high-temperature

reactors over, say, light water reactors is about 50 percent, so just

on that basis, alone, you would see advantages in the repository

performance.

But I think the key point is really from the standpoint of, ‘‘Can

we make this thing work?’’ The answer is we believe we can because there is a pebble bed reactor, as an example, operating now

in China. There is a pebble bed reactor in licensing and final design in South Africa. They are not doing this without any understanding of its cost and its schedules. The thermal efficiencies that

people are now talking about in terms of between 850 and 1,000

degrees relative to the hydrogen production efficiency is very small,

and the material challenges are huge to be able to get materials

that can withstand those temperatures, and not needed, in my

opinion and the ITRG’s opinion.

Mr. ISSA. OK. I see a head shaking, so you would say the sweet

spot may very well be at 850°C, not 1,000°C, from a standpoint of

cost/benefit?

Mr. HILDEBRANDT. Yes, sir, that is correct. I would expect the difference in those temperatures, in terms of overall efficiencies Dr.

Kadak was mentioning, was about 3 percent. That is the difference.

Mr. ISSA. So we are buying a moon shot instead of the X-craft?

Mr. HILDEBRANDT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ISSA. I can certainly relate to the difference between Burt

Rutan’s cost versus benefit. He got into space for a whole lot less

than we did.

Mr. HILDEBRANDT. That is right. I think that is a good analogy

for this discussion. How do we do it from a practical standpoint

with the least technology development risk and yet get as close to

our performance goals as we desire?

Mr. KADAK. And the other advantage would be, once built, it becomes the research platform for going to more advanced fuels,

higher temperatures. You can’t, as you said, pick 1,000°C and say

if we can’t build it because we can’t find the materials we should

stop. We should build what we can do and then develop it further.

Mr. ISSA. Jim, you are not getting a freebie on this.

Mr. WELLS. Let me jump in here and say we are talking about

the DOE mission and goal as to design and construct a reactor that

was tailored to develop a maximum efficiency production facility

that could produce hydrogen that could make the difference for

commercializing the success of the hydrogen. If they were to lower

their standards and lower temperatures and reduce the efficiency

gains, you may end up having to try and compete in a marketplace

at $3 equivalent gallon of gasoline. If they continued at the high

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temperature and gained the efficiency gains that they believe the

R&D would support and they are able to develop the materials that

can withstand the heat for 60 years, you may be in a situation

where you are developing hydrogen at $1.50 equivalent, which in

turn makes it that much more attractive to the commercial industry to compete in a marketplace that everybody is trying to bring

the lowest-cost product to the table.

So philosophically you are looking at what they are trying to do

in terms of designing high-end versus somewhere in the middle

that may jeopardize commercialization in the future.

Mr. ISSA. So, to paraphrase you, Mr. Wells, you are totally supportive of their position if they can make it pencil out in a way that

supports that position, and you are not supportive of it if they simply would like to do it but it may jeopardize the viability of replacing natural gas as a source material for hydrogen, either for petroleum cracking or for a hydrogen-based economy?

Mr. WELLS. That is right. That is what they are competing

against.

Mr. ISSA. OK. Gentlemen, I am going to wrap up by asking you

to tell me when and how you are going to give me the penciled

numbers in a way that this committee could participate in perhaps

asking for a near-Earth orbit rather than the moon shot if that is

all we need.

Mr. HILDEBRANDT. Let me suggest how we are doing that, if I

may.

Mr. ISSA. Please.

Mr. HILDEBRANDT. In this commercial alliance that I mentioned,

at every step the test is by the commercial world. Is it competitive

and will it remain competitive into the marketplace? Approximately a year downstream, perhaps by about this time next year,

the Alliance will have two things. One, presumably an agreement

amongst several commercial end users that allows us to work with

the government for its development; two, from a technical standpoint, as we just had this discussion, and a business standpoint, we

will have chosen the design, to answer your question, that would

be commercially viable, commercially competitive, and the lowerrisk alternative, if I may. We already have projections of that. Over

this next year there is preconceptual design work that is going on,

about to be started here in the month of October, where we will

be able to put the numbers on the table in a more confirmed manner than we can today. We are doing it on an estimate basis, best

judgment today.

Mr. ISSA. OK. So you estimate, and I have to get re-elected and

come back if I want to see it in proof form?

Mr. HILDEBRANDT. Yes, sir, you certainly would.

Mr. ISSA. You have given me a goal.

Mr. Kadak.

Mr. KADAK. Yes. Could I just modify your analogy just a tad? It

is like going to the moon or going to Mars. We can go to the moon.

We have gone to the moon. The Chinese are going to the moon

shortly. Relative to the differential inefficiency versus the

thousand——

Mr. ISSA. But they have been celebrating the moon for a long

time, so for them it is old hat.

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Mr. KADAK. But, relative to the differential inefficiency between

1,000 and 900 degrees, as Mr. Hildebrandt said, it is 1 to 3 percent.

That is not going to be the driver for cost differential between $3

and $1 a gallon.

Thank you.

Mr. ISSA. Very good. I could do this all day, but the ranking lady

has been very patient, so with that I yield for her questions.

Ms. WATSON. I think my question was just answered by Mr.

Kadak. The difference between efficiency with the degrees is making the difference in the time it takes, and then this goes to Mr.

Wells. You are nodding your head, so that is the answer. If we

don’t meet the deadlines, what will the cost be? Mr. Kadak says,

you know, we just don’t have the resources. So what would you say,

Mr. Wells? You will probably be retired. When are you retiring?

Mr. WELLS. Maybe before I answer this question.

Ms. WATSON. No, after you answer the question.

Mr. ISSA. Do you want to take advantage of the congressional

ability to hold people on active duty indefinitely? We have done

that in the past, you know.

Ms. WATSON. What do you think, because what I am hearing, if

I can just sum it up, is that yes, we can do it. We got to the moon,

we can go on to Pluto maybe, whatever it is. And the difference in

the time would mean resources, money. What is your estimation?

Mr. WELLS. Our position and why we were not supportive of acceleration, the dangers of acceleration to us was that you increase

the project risk for success. There is potential for cost overruns. Rework has been huge in previous projects where we tried to start

construction and start design faster before the research was actually done to come to the right decisions about whether it was going

to work or not. Even DOE still believes that the technical challenges that exist to even build this type of reactor is going to take

the entire time to 2021, and they are concerned about the technical

challenges. I think if you do try to accelerate, the Congress has the

responsibility to hold DOE accountable for delivering what they say

they can deliver and good oversight.

Ms. WATSON. And I think the Congress then would have the responsibility for allocating the funds, and in a period where we have

reduced——

Mr. WELLS. Absolutely.

Ms. WATSON [continuing]. The income to government by all these

tax cuts, can we be realistic in our thinking that we can accomplish

it within a meaningful amount of time? I heard you, Mr. Kadak,

say that we don’t have the money and we could do it, but it is

going to take the resources. I don’t see us providing that kind of

priority on DOE and on the way we expend the taxpayers’ funds

any time soon because we have other priorities.

Mr. Chairman, to you, it just kind of looks really dim for the future, at least for the tenure of Mr. Wells and probably for our tenure.

Mr. ISSA. I am not going to get into a malaise here, if that is

what you are looking for.

Ms. WATSON. No, no, no. I am just making an observation because the problem is with the resources. Mr. Wells says we don’t

need to speed up and accelerate until we are sure it is safe, and

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that is going to take resources, a dedication of resources to be able

to meet those goals, and I am just saying we have other priorities

that we are dealing with within this era. I don’t think any of us

will be here by the time this project—I won’t be here by the time

this project reaches fruition. That is my observation.

Thank you. I am going to have to leave. I have another committee going on right now. You can carry it from here.

Mr. ISSA. OK. I thank the gentlelady.

I will just wrap up with one or two questions. I probably won’t

get into the 37 percent revenue increase we have experienced—no,

spending increases over discretionary spending or the fact that we

have a 30 percent reduction in the projected shortfall as a result

of the huge rising revenues as a result of the tax cut. I will not

get into that. I think that is important to stay away from for this

committee. I won’t mention it if you don’t.

You know, the one thing Republicans tend to do is they quote

Kennedy on his tax cuts, and I won’t do that today, either.

In conclusion, I am very interested in followup and I would like

the staff to be able to use the next few days to go back and forth

over a couple of these items. One of them is as much base material

for your projections of comparative hydrogen production cost and

comparative electricity cost based on moon two versus Mars or

other—yes, I am returning to the moon for less, or return to the

moon for half the fuel, so to speak, versus Mars.

I do also want as much new material as you can make available

on where you see the technology challenges. I am a layman on this,

but the difference between materials that hold up at 800-plus-C

and those that hold up at 1,000C, it does not surprise me that we

don’t have materials to do that available for any length of time and

that we need to develop those and that the thresholds could be

hugely different. I would like to understand that difference.

Last, the one that really gets me, is a rhetorical question, but,

Mr. Wells, it includes you particularly. What if we get to 2015 and

the French, the South Africans, and the Chinese are selling something that does the job and they are able to essentially take the

market, the potential market, which is a 30 year or 40 year renewing market, away from us prior to that occurring, because today we

are hoping to be putting in III-plus plants around the world, but,

in fact, in 2016, if they have an 800C product that can acceptably

produce, let’s say, hydrogen to be close to our Louisiana or other

ports where we do refining, will they, in fact, eclipse us in those

source locations?

That is a rhetorical question of, ‘‘is there a risk?’’ I know this is

a difficult risk for people to assess, but I want you to go down this

road if you could for a few minutes here if you have time, but then

further in writing, of what is the risk to not being on a path toward

that product, even if that product is not the same product we are

presently funding. And I might say we are spending $8 billion a

month in Iraq today, so the idea that it is $1 billion dual path a

Next Gen and a high-temperature as two separate, distinct potential but parallel goals doesn’t scare this particular chairman, even

if the idea of writing the check would petrify me.

I will give you each a chance to respond briefly, and then I would

very much encourage you to respond at length.

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Mr. WELLS. I am glad to jump in. It is clear. It is true that DOE

is designing a unique product and they have set parameters and

lowered the parameters from 1,000°C to 950°C and their goal is to

generate, design, and have the capabilities to produce hydrogen at

a very, very high temperature in a reactor that will allow commercialization at a price that the marketplace will pay, and it is going

to take 20 years to get there. I mean, that is their stated goal and

that is what they are moving forward on. There is no question

about that.

It is true that if the existing reactors that are available, whether

it be in South Africa or China, pebble bed, or the prismatic in

Japan or France, they are smaller scale. They are not of the full

scale that the DOE is proceeding upon. And if they do bring to

market something that would be 800°C, there is that competitive

environment where they will eat our lunch, so to speak, and question what are we going to do with the plant that we are bringing

online 10 years later. No question about that.

However, I would hang our hat a little bit on the fact that in Gen

IV the stated goal is these are international partners and the

United States will be a player in all the international development

in terms of whatever future reactor comes online, so I am not so

sure that competition is the word here if we, in fact, see the world

more internationally as opposed to just within our borders.

That would be a quick response to you.

Mr. ISSA. Thank you.

Mr. Kadak.

Mr. KADAK. I will always be happy to weigh in on that one.

Let me just tell you a few words about China. MIT and Tsinghua

University have a collaborative arrangement on the pebble bed reactor development. They have a commercial project. It is called a

demonstration plan. With their demonstration plan as successful,

and their scheduled commercial operation by 2011 or 2012—and

this is 190 megawatts of electric, which is smaller than the 600mw

reference thermal or 300mw electric of the DOE—but this plant, if

it is successful, will have a site of 3,600 megawatts of power, electric power—they are not looking at hydrogen yet—with 19 modules.

That is real.

Mr. ISSA. That is three reactors of a typical size in America

today?

Mr. KADAK. Exactly. Three per building, if you will. In South Africa, again, they are going to a commercial demonstration fronted

by the government, in large part, but for the utility, which is about

165 megawatts electric, certainly smaller than the 1,500mw French

reactors or the 1,200mw or 1,300mw American high water reactors.

But the market may be such that smaller units added when the capacity is needed is better than building one big one which, if you

lose, you have some serious problems.

I was just in Finland looking at the EPR reactor being built

there. They have to build a gas-fired power station to provide

power should that reactor shut down. Think about that. It got perhaps a little bit too big for a particular nation to absorb that kind

of capacity.

Mr. ISSA. That is a lot of peak power if you have to replace an

entire nuclear plant.

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Mr. KADAK. But it is not the entire plant, but it is enough to

keep the grid from collapsing when they lose it.

So we have some very interesting issues. I do believe we are already behind. This schedule will make us further behind. Although

our emphasis is on hydrogen and process heat applications, it

doesn’t take them long to figure out how to do that, either.

Mr. ISSA. You know, I don’t want to add to your testimony—I am

not qualified to—but it is always interesting when Mr. Kucinich

and I come to a common agreement on something. When he talks

about wind-to-hydrogen, he is talking about electricity we produce

and then use it with water to create hydrogen, so he is, in fact,

doing what we would certainly be able to do with Next Gen nuclear

equally well. I always remind that, that I believe in how we get to

hydrogen with high temperature nuclear, but I also recognize that

his proposal and why we get to hydrogen, if we simply get an unlimited supply of affordable electricity we still get to zero emissions

hydrogen without cracking natural gas.

Mr. Hildebrandt, you get the closing remark.

Mr. HILDEBRANDT. Yes, sir. Just as an overall observation of the

comments that were made earlier, nuclear power isn’t the answer,

alone. Coal gassification, carbon sequestration, renewables—all of

it needs to be together because no one of them can handle our huge

appetite for energy in the United States. These are complementary

efforts that need to be part of a large, overall nuclear strategy—

nuclear strategy, energy strategy more importantly.

With regard to your specific questions on such things as costs,

electricity, hydrogen, materials considerations, temperatures, I will

refer you to a report and I will also provide it to your staff if you

wish. It is called ‘‘Design Features and Technology Uncertainties

for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant.’’ It was work that is referenced in the Energy Policy Act. It is the group that, as Andy

mentioned, I chaired back 2 years ago. It answers most of those

questions, but we will also update it for you and provide updated

information based on what we know today.

Regarding the risk of others getting ahead of us, if I may, in the

simplest term, that is a very real risk. This is an international effort. However, at the same time we are emphasizing the need to

rebuild the industrial infrastructure in the United States to handle

such things as building large industrial facilities such as a nuclear

power plant—not that solely, but such as that. We have lost much

of that. It has gone overseas. Part of the intent of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant is to go after rebuilding those capabilities, even

though it is in the international marketplace.

The leveraging of the other gas-cooled reactor demonstration

projects that have occurred is very important. Dr. Kadak mentioned a couple of those. He mentioned the current one with the

pebble bed modular reactor in South Africa. We have also built two

gas-cooled reactors here in the United States which approach the

temperatures we are talking about here in Colorado and Peach

Bottom. Is that Pennsylvania? I believe it is Pennsylvania.

The work that has been done in Germany, as well, with a reactor

called ADR, which I won’t try to say the German name, and THTR,

each of these demonstrations have been an important contributor

to our understanding of gas-cooled reactor technology and allows us

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to take steps with confidence as to where we are going and how

big the risk is. So our choices here are fairly well understood based

on previous work that has been done and current work that is

being done.

I thank you.

Mr. ISSA. I thank you, and I would like to thank all of the witnesses for being here today.

I will hold the record open for 2 weeks from this date so that you

may forward your submissions and you may expand on your responses.

With that, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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