Department of Veterans Affairs 

Office of Inspector General 

Audit of VA’s Response to 

Hurricane Katrina 

Report No. 06-02860-215 September 28, 2007

VA Office of Inspector General 

Washington, DC 20420 
To Report Suspected Wrongdoing in VA Programs and Operations 

Call the OIG Hotline – (800) 488-8244 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Contents 

Page 

Executive Summary ..............................................................................................i

Introduction ..........................................................................................................1

Purpose............................................................................................................................. 1

Background...................................................................................................................... 1

Scope and Methodology .................................................................................................. 4

Results and Conclusions ....................................................................................6

Issue 1: VA Needs To Improve Procedures for Making Transitional Housing 

 Available for Disaster Victims......................................................................... 6 

Issue 2: Stronger Emergency Preparedness Planning Could Better Guide Disaster 

 Response ........................................................................................................ 11 

Appendixes 

A. Acting Assistant Secretary for Operations, Security, and Preparedness 

 Comments ................................................................................................................ 15

B. OIG Contact and Staff Acknowledgments............................................................... 20

C. Report Distribution................................................................................................... 21

VA Office of Inspector General 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Executive Summary 

Introduction 

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck areas of the Gulf Coast, causing 

widespread damage over 90,000 square miles located in Alabama, Louisiana, and 

Mississippi with Category 3 winds and torrential rains. In addition, a key levee 

protecting New Orleans failed, and much of the city flooded. Hurricane Katrina was the 

third strongest hurricane in history to hit the United States and the sixth strongest 

hurricane ever recorded in the Atlantic Basin. The hurricane directly impacted the VA 

Southeast Louisiana Veterans Health Care System in New Orleans, LA; the VA Gulf 

Coast Veterans Health Care System in Gulfport, MS; five community-based outpatient 

clinics (CBOCs) along the Gulf Coast; the New Orleans Regional Office; and the Biloxi 

VA National Cemetery. In addition, the hurricane indirectly impacted other VA 

facilities. For example, patients were moved to various medical centers throughout the 

region, and various regional offices assisted veterans with benefit processing. 

As a result of widespread congressional and public interest in the Federal response to 

Hurricane Katrina, the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) established 

a working group that developed a coordinated oversight effort by the inspectors general 

community to evaluate response and recovery efforts related to the hurricane. Our 

oversight responsibilities included determining whether actions taken by VA in response 

to Hurricane Katrina fulfilled its requirements as outlined in the National Response Plan

(NRP) and VA’s emergency preparedness plans. The NRP establishes a single, 

comprehensive framework for managing domestic incidents across all levels of 

government. 

Results 

While VA’s overall response was effective and employees were recognized for their 

heroic efforts in providing assistance to Hurricane Katrina victims in a difficult 

environment, actions taken by VA in response to Hurricane Katrina needed strengthening 

in order to fulfill the Department’s requirements as outlined in the NRP. These actions 

included improving interagency coordination between VA and the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) to provide transitional housing to hurricane victims in a 

timely manner and, in some instances, making all habitable transitional housing available 

to victims. On September 1, 2005, VA identified 1,301 habitable properties in its 

continental United States inventory that were available for immediate occupancy by 

Hurricane Katrina victims. However, VA properties were not made available to disaster 

victims until 4 months after VA received a mission assignment for providing housing 

assistance to victims. Of the 1,301 habitable properties, 716 (55 percent) were returned 

to the market and never made available to hurricane victims. This occurred because the 

VA Office of Inspector General i 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Office of Operations, Security, and Preparedness (OSP) needed to strengthen operating 

procedures between VA and FEMA and perform more effective oversight of the 

management of mission assignments. 

We also determined actions taken by VA needed strengthening in order to fulfill the 

Department’s requirements as outlined in VA’s emergency preparedness plans. We 

determined VISN 16 managers did not mitigate risks associated with disaster recovery 

planning by including all essential functional elements in Continuity of Operations Plans 

(COOPs) and by incorporating needed improvements identified in previous COOP 

exercises. The Office of OSP and Veterans Health Administration (VHA) managers 

attributed this to the lack of oversight by OSP and Veterans Integrated Service Network 

(VISN) 16 managers. The lack of complete and effective COOPs could increase the risk 

that mission-critical functions may not be carried out. 

Recommendations 

To improve management of VA’s emergency preparedness, we recommended the Acting 

Assistant Secretary for OSP develop: 

• A definition of habitable housing that meets the requirements of the National Disaster 

Housing Strategy. 

• Timeliness criteria and mechanisms to periodically test whether procedures can make 

transitional housing available to disaster victims in an effective, expedited, and 

efficient manner as required by the NRP. 

• Mechanisms to continuously maintain a listing of habitable housing that meets FEMA 

criteria. 

• Criteria for when to place habitable housing set aside for disaster victims back on the 

market. 

• Mechanisms to provide oversight of housing support provided in the event of a 

disaster. 

• Site-specific emergency plans for VA facilities in accordance with Federal 

Preparedness Circular 65. 

Acting Assistant Secretary for OSP Comments 

The Acting Assistant Secretary for OSP agreed with the recommendations in the report 

and provided acceptable implementation plans. (See Appendix A, pages 15–19, for the 

full text of the Acting Assistant Secretary’s comments.) He reported the Office of OSP is 

in the process of developing: (1) a definition of habitable housing; (2) timeliness criteria 

and mechanisms to periodically test whether making transitional housing available to 

victims is effective, expedited, and efficient; (3) mechanisms to continuously maintain a 

list of habitable housing; (4) criteria to determine which properties VA makes available 

during disasters and when the properties are to be placed back on the market; and (5) 

VA Office of Inspector General ii 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

oversight mechanisms to ensure housing support is provided in the event of disasters. 

The Acting Assistant Secretary also reported he is in the process of ensuring that VA 

facilities have developed site-specific emergency plans in accordance with Federal 

Preparedness Circular 65 and VA Directive 0320. We will follow up on the completion 

of planned actions. 

 (original signed by:)

BELINDA J. FINN 

Assistant Inspector General 

for Auditing

VA Office of Inspector General iii 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Introduction 

Purpose 

As a result of widespread congressional and public interest in the Federal response to 

Hurricane Katrina, the PCIE established a working group that developed a coordinated 

oversight effort by the inspectors general community to evaluate response and recovery 

efforts related to the hurricane. Our oversight responsibilities included determining 

whether actions taken by VA in response to Hurricane Katrina fulfilled the Department’s 

requirements as outlined in the NRP and VA’s emergency preparedness plans. 

Background 

On August 27, 2005—2 days before the hurricane hit areas of the Gulf Coast— 

President Bush declared that a state of emergency existed in Louisiana. The President 

invoked the Stafford Act that established programs and processes by which the Federal 

government supplements state and local resources in major disasters or emergencies.1

 

The President's action authorized FEMA to coordinate all disaster relief efforts with the 

purpose of alleviating the hardship and suffering caused by the emergency on the local 

population and to provide appropriate assistance for required emergency measures to 

save lives, protect property, provide for public health and safety, and reduce or avert the 

threat of a catastrophe. 

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck areas of the Gulf Coast, causing 

widespread damage in an approximately 90,000 square mile area of the southeastern 

United States. It devastated portions of the Gulf Coast states of Alabama, Louisiana, and 

Mississippi with Category 3 winds and torrential rains when it made landfall. Hurricane 

Katrina was the third strongest hurricane in history to hit the United States and the sixth 

strongest hurricane ever recorded in the Atlantic Basin. Further, a key levee protecting 

the city of New Orleans failed, and much of the city flooded. Then on August 30, 2005, 

the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security activated the NRP by declaring an 

incident of national significance as a result of the devastation caused by Hurricane 

Katrina. 

The National Response Plan. Adopted by the Federal government in December 2004, 

the NRP is designed to provide the structure for the coordination of Federal support for 

disaster responses. The NRP establishes a single, comprehensive framework for 

managing domestic incidents across all levels of government and across a spectrum of 

activities that includes prevention; preparedness; response; and recovery from terrorism, 

natural disasters, and other emergencies. It applies to all Federal departments and 

agencies that may be requested to provide assistance or conduct operations in the context 

 

1

 In November 1988, Congress passed the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public 

Law 93-288, as Amended. 

VA Office of Inspector General 1 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

of actual or potential incidents of national significance. Hurricane Katrina was the first 

use of the plan in response to an incident of national significance. 

The NRP groups the capabilities of Federal departments and agencies into Emergency 

Support Functions (ESFs). The ESFs serve as the primary operational-level mechanism 

to provide assistance to state, local, and tribal governments and to Federal departments 

and agencies conducting missions of primary Federal responsibility. VA serves as a 

support agency for 7 of the 15 ESFs. Table 1 details VA’s NRP support responsibilities. 

Table 1. VA’s NRP Support Responsibilities 

Activity Primary Agency Description 

ESF 3 Army Corps of Engineers Public Works and Engineering 

ESF 5 FEMA Emergency Management 

ESF 6 FEMA Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services 

ESF 7 General Services Administration Resource Support 

ESF 8 Health and Human Services (HHS) Public Health and Medical Services 

ESF 13 Department of Homeland Security Public Safety and Security 

ESF 15 FEMA External Affairs 

In response to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA assigned VA responsibility for conducting 

missions in support of ESFs 6 and 8. 

VA Organizational Changes Made To Strengthen Emergency Preparedness. Prior 

to April 3, 2006, the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Planning, and Preparedness was 

responsible for providing VA-wide oversight of the implementation of VA’s emergency 

management program. 

On April 3, 2006, the Secretary approved the establishment of the Office of OSP to 

improve VA’s efficiency, effectiveness, and critical communications capability for 

oversight of VA emergency management; more effectively integrate efforts with Federal 

emergency preparedness partners in fulfilling NRP responsibilities; and enhance and 

bring greater accountability to VA-wide preparedness planning and emergency response 

programs. The Secretary created an Assistant Secretary position to oversee the Office of 

OSP and staffed the organization with personnel from the Office of Policy, Planning, and 

Preparedness (OPP&P). OPP&P was renamed the Office of Policy and Planning (OP&P) 

as a result of the reorganization. As of September 30, 2006, VA policy that directs VA’s 

emergency management programs, operations, and activities had not been revised to 

reflect this change.2

As of July 26, 2007, the Assistant Secretary for OP&P remained responsible for oversight 

of VA’s emergency management because the Assistant Secretary for OSP position had 

not been filled. The Office of OSP remained responsible for ensuring that VA has an 

effective emergency management program and policies. 

 

2

 VA Directive 0320, Comprehensive Emergency Management Program (March 24, 2005). 

VA Office of Inspector General 2 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

VA’s Emergency Preparedness Plans. VA established its Department-wide policy in 

accordance with the NRP and Federal Preparedness Circular 65, Federal Executive 

Branch Continuity of Operations (July 26, 1999), for the management and administration 

of its comprehensive emergency management program to include VA’s COOPs. It 

assigns emergency preparedness responsibilities to all levels of Department management 

and provides a central point of coordination for these activities. The primary objectives 

of the program are to: 

• Ensure continuous performance of the Department’s essential functions and 

operations. 

• Ensure and validate COOP readiness through a dynamic and integrated test, training, 

and exercise program to support the implementation of COOPs. 

• Provide for the health and safety of veterans, employees, and visitors. 

• Protect essential facilities, equipment, records, and other assets. 

• Achieve a timely and orderly recovery from an emergency and reconstitute normal 

operations allowing resumption of essential functions for both internal and external 

clients. 

• Reduce disruptions to operations. 

• Execute, as required, VA’s succession plan with accompanying authorities in the 

event a disruption renders VA leadership unable, unavailable, or incapable of 

assuming and performing their leadership roles. 

• Ensure VA has an alternate facility where essential functions can be performed during 

a COOP event.

Hurricane Katrina’s Impact on VA. The hurricane directly impacted the VA Southeast 

Louisiana Veterans Health Care System in New Orleans, LA; the VA Gulf Coast 

Veterans Health Care System in Gulfport, MS; five CBOCs along the Gulf Coast; the 

New Orleans Regional Office; and the Biloxi VA National Cemetery. In addition, the 

hurricane indirectly impacted other VA facilities. For example, patients were moved to 

various medical centers throughout the region, and various regional offices assisted 

veterans with benefit processing. 

As of September 7, 2005, all five CBOCs and the VA Gulf Coast Veterans Health Care 

System and VA National Cemetery in Biloxi, MS were operational. As of April 1, 2007, 

the Southeast Louisiana Veterans Health Care System in New Orleans, LA, continues to 

experience flood damage. To fulfill VA’s commitment to meet the health care needs of 

its veteran patients, additional outpatient clinics have been established. The VA Gulf 

Coast Veterans Health Care System in Gulfport, MS, was closed permanently. The New 

Orleans Regional Office remains closed, and services have been transferred to two 

locations. These locations are the Loyola Avenue office in New Orleans which is 

responsible for conducting public contact interviews, and the Gretna, LA, office for 

administrative and Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment staff. 

VA Office of Inspector General 3 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

This September 2005 picture depicts the flooding at the VA Southeast Louisiana 

Veterans Health Care System. 

VA Employees Performed Heroically in a Time of Crisis. On October 3, 2005, by 

unanimous consent, the U.S. Senate adopted a resolution of praise for VA employees for 

their heroic efforts following Hurricane Katrina.3

 The resolution stated that before the 

storm hit, employees oversaw the evacuation of 166 patients in Mississippi and Louisiana 

and that employees had the foresight to transfer copies of electronic medical records from 

the health care system in New Orleans to other VA facilities so that those records would 

be available on a national level. 

Compendium of Hurricane Oversight. The PCIE established a working group that 

developed a coordinated hurricane oversight audit model. The Compendium of 

Hurricane Oversight in the Gulf States, published in December 2005, identified 

management reviews, audits, and investigations to be performed by the inspectors general 

community. Our oversight responsibilities consist of audits of internal controls, contract 

actions, purchase card transactions, and program management. 

Scope and Methodology 

The audit included site visits and interviews of operations and management employees at 

VISN 16 in Jackson, MS; the Emergency Management Strategic Healthcare Group in 

Martinsburg, WV; the Readiness Operations Centers in Martinsburg, WV, and 

Washington, DC; and VA’s Office of OSP in Washington, DC. We also interviewed 

Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) operations and management employees in 

Washington, DC, and at the VA regional office in Jackson, MS. We reviewed COOPs 

 

3

 Senate Resolution 263, “Commending the Efforts of the Department of Veterans Affairs in Responding to 

Hurricane Katrina,” (October 3, 2005). 

VA Office of Inspector General 4 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

prepared by the affected facilities within VHA, VBA, and the National Cemetery 

Administration; police reports; damage assessment reports; and internal and external 

audit reports and documents. In addition, we assessed VA’s compliance with the NRP, 

VA policies, and Federal laws that addressed VA’s response requirements related to 

Hurricane Katrina. 

On November 10, 2005, we attended the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs hearing 

on rebuilding the Gulf Coast following Hurricane Katrina to obtain information related to 

the efforts required to rebuild VA’s assets and resume services for veterans along the 

Gulf Coast. 

Our scope covered the period of August 29, 2005, to September 30, 2006. We conducted 

onsite work from July 31, 2006, to August 24, 2006. In planning and performing the 

audit, we relied on computer-generated data to identify the number of available VA 

properties as of September 2005. To test the reliability of this data, we compared 

relevant electronic data with contractor billing information and independently validated 

the information through a VBA employee with oversight responsibility for the contractor. 

The computer-generated data was sufficiently reliable to meet the audit objectives and 

support our recommendations. 

To address whether actions taken by VA in response to Hurricane Katrina fulfilled the 

Department’s responsibilities as outlined in the NRP, we reviewed FEMA mission 

assignment documentation, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between VA and 

FEMA, VA property inventory records, oversight efforts by the Office of OSP, and afteraction assessments prepared by VA. 

To assess the adequacy of actions taken by VA managers in preparation for disasters 

covered by the NRP, we reviewed COOPs for VISN 16, the VA Southeast Louisiana 

Veterans Health Care System, the VA Gulf Coast Veterans Health Care System in 

Gulfport, and the New Orleans Regional Office. We also reviewed actions taken by VA 

managers in preparation for a disaster; and oversight efforts by the Office of OSP. 

Our assessment of internal controls focused only on those controls related to the audit 

objective of determining the effectiveness of VA’s implementation of the NRP and VA’s 

Emergency Preparedness Plan in response to Hurricane Katrina. The assessment was not 

intended to form an opinion on the adequacy of internal controls overall, and we do not 

render such an opinion. In all other aspects, the audit was conducted in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

VA Office of Inspector General 5 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Results and Conclusions 

Issue 1: VA Needs To Improve Procedures for Making 

Transitional Housing Available for Disaster Victims 

The NRP provides the framework to ensure that work needed to help recover from 

disasters, such as hurricanes, is carried out by the Federal government in coordination 

with state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector. The NRP designated 15 

ESFs that address specific disaster response needs. Mission assignments designate 

recovery tasks to various agencies related to each ESF. In response to Hurricane Katrina, 

VA received one mission assignment related to ESF 6—Mass Care, Housing, and Human 

Services—which required the provision of transitional housing assistance to victims and 

seven mission assignments related to ESF 8—Public Health and Medical Services—

which required the provision of medical services to victims. 

VA needed to strengthen procedures related to ESF 6 in order to effectively provide 

transitional housing assistance to victims. VA’s reported actions fulfilled mission 

assignments under ESF 8. 

Findings 

VA did not provide transitional housing to hurricane victims in a timely manner and, in 

some instances, did not make transitional housing available to hurricane victims. This 

occurred because the Office of OSP needed to strengthen operating procedures between 

VA and FEMA and perform more effective oversight of the management of mission 

assignments. As a result, VA did not effectively use all its resources to help minimize 

hardships realized by Hurricane Katrina victims. 

According to the NRP, VA provides support to FEMA by developing and implementing 

programs and services designed to: 

• Identify the various factors that could impact the incident-related housing needs. 

• Develop a plan of action to provide housing assistance in the most effective, 

expedited, and efficient manner available at the time. 

• Identify solutions for the short- and long-term housing needs of victims by providing 

assistance that may include rental assistance, temporary housing, and loans for the 

repair and replacement of primary residences. 

VA policy provides that the Office of OSP directs VA’s emergency management 

programs, operations, and activities.4

 

4

 VA Directive 0320, Comprehensive Emergency Management Program (March 24, 2005). 

VA Office of Inspector General 6 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Response to Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services Needed Strengthening. On 

September 1, 2005, VA identified 1,301 habitable properties in its continental United 

States inventory that were available for immediate occupancy by Hurricane Katrina 

victims. However, VA properties were not made available to disaster victims until 

4 months after VA received a mission assignment for providing housing assistance to 

victims. Of the 1,301 habitable properties, 716 (55 percent) were returned to the market 

and never made available to hurricane victims. The remaining 585 properties were still 

available for hurricane victims. 

Transitional Housing for Hurricane Victims Was Delayed. On September 9, 2005, VA 

removed the properties not under contract for sale from the market in anticipation that 

they would be used as transitional housing for hurricane victims. On 

September 24, 2005, FEMA issued VA a mission assignment to provide housing for 

those individuals and families displaced by Hurricane Katrina. The first properties were 

not made available to hurricane victims until January 20, 2006, 4 months after the date of 

the mission assignment. In contrast, the Department of Housing and Urban Development 

(HUD) made 5,600 single-family homes available in September 2005 and placed 5,000 

families in Federal housing by early December 2005. The NRP required VA to provide 

housing assistance in an effective, expedited, and efficient manner. VA did not satisfy 

this requirement because VA and FEMA took 4 months to develop a plan to provide 

housing assistance, delaying the availability of VA properties to disaster victims. 

The delay was caused by ineffective coordination between VA and FEMA. The 

examples listed below illustrate interagency coordination issues that resulted in delaying 

VA making properties available to disaster victims. 

• In the fall of 2004, VA and FEMA entered into discussions to modify the MOU that 

would change operational procedures such as which agency would be responsible for 

leasing properties. This was necessary because VBA had undergone a significant 

reorganization due to contracting out VBA’s property management functions. 

However, VBA, VA’s General Counsel, and FEMA did not complete the 

modification of the existing MOU before Hurricane Katrina made landfall. VA 

properties could not be made available to disaster victims until after the agencies 

completed the modification of the MOU. In December 2005, VA and FEMA 

modified the MOU to make VA responsible for managing properties occupied by 

Hurricane Katrina victims. 

• VA and FEMA did not agree on the definition of habitable housing. For instance, VA 

identified a house with a swimming pool as habitable while FEMA did not consider a 

house with a swimming pool to be habitable due to safety concerns. This caused a 

delay because it required further reviews and discussions of VA’s listing of habitable 

properties. 

VA Office of Inspector General 7 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

• In September 2005, VA provided a list of 5,000 properties to FEMA that included 

both habitable and non-habitable housing. This contributed to the delay in identifying 

the 1,301 habitable properties because FEMA had to determine which properties were 

habitable and which were not. 

• The MOU assigned leasing and management responsibilities to FEMA. Due to the 

size of the disaster, FEMA was unable to perform required leasing and property 

management duties, and VA was unprepared to assume the duties. This caused a 

delay in leasing properties to victims. 

VA Reduced the Number of Available Transitional Housing Units Before Offering Units

to Hurricane Victims. On September 27, 2005, VA placed 716 (55 percent) of its 1,301 

habitable properties back on the resale market before any properties were made available 

to hurricane victims. An Office of OSP manager told us VA followed HUD’s 

designation of an 11-state geographic region as being the most effective region for 

making properties available to hurricane victims. HUD identified Alabama, Arkansas, 

Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 

Tennessee, and Texas as the 11-state region for providing transitional housing to 

hurricane victims. However, the NRP does not require VA to follow HUD guidelines. 

VA could not provide any documentation to support an analysis, study, or interagency 

agreement with HUD or FEMA to support its decision to place habitable properties back 

on the resale market. As of May 12, 2006, a total of 312 (53 percent) of the remaining 

585 properties had been leased by Hurricane Katrina victims. 

Oversight Needed Strengthening. OPP&P, currently the Office of OSP, did not 

oversee VBA’s operational procedures in support of making transitional housing 

available for use by disaster victims. Former OPP&P and current Office of OSP 

employees with oversight responsibilities told us this occurred because they relied on 

VBA to monitor its relief activities and self-report the results. Further, the managers 

believed that the mission assignment only requested VBA to provide Housing Specialists 

to FEMA, not housing. The managers knew VBA provided Housing Specialists to 

FEMA but did not realize what tasks were to be performed. The mission assignment 

requested that VA provide Housing Specialists to assist FEMA in placing evacuees in the 

1,301 habitable properties VA made available to FEMA for use by hurricane victims. 

VBA provided Housing Specialists to FEMA but did not provide housing timely and in 

some instances did not offer habitable properties to victims. 

VA Completed Mission Assignments Related to Public Health and Medical Services. 

HHS is the primary agency for implementing ESF 8: Public Health and Medical Services. 

VA received and completed seven ESF 8 mission assignments. For instance, VA 

deployed 12 mental health professionals and provided space for two 250-bed medical 

shelters being set up by HHS at the VA Medical Center (VAMC) Alexandria, LA. Under 

the National Disaster Medical System, 18 VA Federal Coordinating Centers were 

activated with 9 centers processing the majority of approximately 2,200 evacuees. VA 

VA Office of Inspector General 8 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

also mobilized $1.3 million in critical pharmaceuticals and medical supplies to the State 

of Mississippi through VA's National Acquisition Center and provided large stocks of 

pharmaceuticals and medical supplies to VAMCs that received evacuees. 

Conclusion 

VA employees were recognized for their heroic efforts in providing assistance to 

Hurricane Katrina victims in a difficult environment. However, VA’s response efforts 

related to ESF 6—Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services—suffered from the lack of 

clearly communicated responsibilities across agencies and the need to strengthen 

oversight of mission assignments. As a result, VA did not effectively meet its 

responsibilities under the NRP to help minimize hardships realized by Hurricane Katrina 

victims. In some instances, transitional housing was not made available until more than 

4 months after FEMA issued the mission assignment. In other instances, victims were 

not given the opportunity to occupy habitable VA properties. VA’s reported actions 

fulfilled mission assignments under ESF 8. 

Recommendations

1. We recommended that the Acting Assistant Secretary for OSP, after consultation with 

VBA, develop a VA definition of habitable housing that meets the requirements of the 

National Disaster Housing Strategy. 

2. We recommended that the Acting Assistant Secretary for OSP develop timeliness 

criteria and mechanisms to periodically test whether procedures can make transitional 

housing available to disaster victims in an effective, expedited, and efficient manner as 

required by the NRP. 

3. We recommended that the Acting Assistant Secretary for OSP develop mechanisms to 

continuously maintain a listing of habitable housing that meets FEMA criteria. 

4. We recommended that the Acting Assistant Secretary for OSP, after consultation with 

VBA, develop criteria, in concert with the National Disaster Housing Strategy, for the 

VBA business decision as to which properties VA makes available during disasters and 

when the properties are to be placed back on the market. 

5. We recommended that the Acting Assistant Secretary for OSP develop mechanisms to 

provide oversight of housing support provided in the event of a disaster. 

The Acting Assistant Secretary for Operations, Security, and Preparedness agreed with 

the recommendations. He reported the Office of OSP is in the process of developing: (1) 

a definition of habitable housing; (2) timeliness criteria and mechanisms to periodically 

test whether making transitional housing available to victims is effective, expedited, and 

efficient; (3) mechanisms to continuously maintain a list of habitable housing; (4) criteria 

VA Office of Inspector General 9 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

to determine which properties VA makes available during disasters and when the 

properties are to be placed back on the market; and (5) oversight mechanisms to ensure 

housing support is provided in the event of disasters. The improvement actions are 

acceptable, and we will follow up on the completion of planned actions. 

VA Office of Inspector General 10 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Issue 2: Stronger Emergency Preparedness Planning Could 

Better Guide Disaster Response 

As demonstrated by Hurricane Katrina, effective planning for continuity of operations is 

essential to the well-being of veterans, their families, and the community at large. VA’s 

medical facilities suffered extensive and catastrophic damage, causing a major disruption 

in medical services provided to veterans in Louisiana and Mississippi. 

Findings 

VISN 16 managers did not mitigate risks associated with disaster recovery planning by 

including all essential functional elements in COOPs and by incorporating needed 

improvements identified in previous COOP exercises. OSP and VHA managers 

attributed this to the lack of oversight by OSP and VISN 16 managers. The lack of 

complete and effective COOPs could increase the risk that mission-critical functions may 

not be carried out. 

Federal Preparedness Circular 65, Federal Executive Branch Continuity of Operations, 

states it is the policy of the United States to have in place a comprehensive and effective 

program to ensure continuity of essential Federal functions under all circumstances. As a 

baseline of preparedness for the full range of potential emergencies, all Federal agencies 

shall have a viable COOP capability which ensures the performance of their essential 

functions during any emergency or situation that may disrupt normal operations. The 

provisions of the circular are applicable to all Federal departments, agencies, and 

independent organizations. VA policy incorporates Federal Preparedness Circular 65 and 

provides VA-wide policy for the management and administration of emergency 

preparedness planning and requires VA’s Office of OSP to annually review plans to 

ensure consistency and compatibility.5

 

Facility COOPs Did Not Always Include All Elements. The VA Gulf Coast Veterans 

Health Care System and the VA Southeast Louisiana Veterans Health Care System 

COOPs did not identify the essential elements. For example, VISN 16, the VA Southeast 

Louisiana Veterans Health Care System, and the VA Gulf Coast Veterans Health Care 

System in Gulfport did not address and include procedures for the control of 

pharmaceuticals in their COOPs. VA policy requires the development and 

documentation of staffing, resource requirements, and other supporting activities needed 

to perform critical functions within 12 hours of COOP activation and until normal 

business activities can resume, which may be up to 30 days. Pharmaceuticals at the VA 

Gulf Coast Veterans Health Care System in Gulfport were unaccounted for and not 

discovered missing until 2 months after Hurricane Katrina made landfall. The missing 

pharmaceuticals included codeine, dextroamphetamine, diazepam, hydrocodone, 

 

5

 VA Directive 0320, Comprehensive Emergency Management Program (March 24, 2005). 

VA Office of Inspector General 11 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

hydromorphone, lorazepam, methadone, methylphenidate, morphine, oxycodone, 

phenobarbital, temazepam, and testosterone enanthate. All are considered controlled 

substances. VISN 16 managers estimated that the purchase value for the missing 

pharmaceuticals totaled $5,660, but did not estimate their street value. In 

November 2005, VISN 16 managers reported the missing drugs to the VA Police, the 

Drug Enforcement Administration, and the VA OIG Office of Investigations. The 

disposition of the drugs was not determined, and the OIG Office of Investigations closed 

the case on February 1, 2006. 

In addition, COOPs for the VA Gulf Coast Veterans Health Care System and the VA 

Southeast Louisiana Veterans Health Care System did not address the element related to 

continuity of operations for vital records, databases, and systems. 

VA policy requires each facility to identify and prioritize essential functions based on 

criticality and time sensitivity.6

 COOPs for essential functions should address staffing, 

resource requirements, and other supporting activities needed to perform these critical 

functions. VA policy also requires that each facility’s COOP address the identification, 

protection, and availability of vital records, databases, and hard copy documents needed 

to support essential functions across the full spectrum of emergencies. 

VHA COOPs Did Not Incorporate All Improvements Identified in Previous COOP 

Exercises. VISN 16, the VA Southeast Louisiana Veterans Health Care System, and the 

VA Gulf Coast Veterans Health Care System in Gulfport/Biloxi did not incorporate all 

needed improvements identified in previous COOP exercises. To illustrate, VISN 16 

fiscal year (FY) 2004 and FY 2005 COOP exercises identified the need to improve 

patient tracking and telecommunications. VA policy requires managers to revise and 

update COOPs as a result of needed improvements identified in COOP exercises. 

Addressing these issues before Hurricane Katrina may have mitigated the risk of similar 

instances related to patient tracking and communications from occurring. 

Patient Tracking Issues. In FY 2005, VISN 16 COOP exercises determined that VA’s 

method for tracking patients did not reliably record patient information 75 percent of the 

time. Due to similar problems encountered in FY 2004, VISN 16 after-action reports 

included a recommendation to place an observer at the flight line to relay information 

regarding departures and patients to provide information to reception sites and receiving 

hospitals. 

Similar patient tracking problems occurred with the evacuation of nine patients on 

ventilators from the VA Southeast Louisiana Veterans Health Care System after 

Hurricane Katrina made landfall. Managers evacuated these nine patients because the 

VA Southeast Louisiana Veterans Health Care System was unable to provide them 

medical services due to severe flooding and the loss of commercial power. 

 

6

 VA Directive 0320, Comprehensive Emergency Management Program (March 24, 2005). 

VA Office of Inspector General 12 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

VA Southeast Louisiana Veterans Health Care System managers coordinated the 

evacuation of the patients on ventilators locally before VA Central Office managers could 

secure the needed resources, such as vehicles and planes. The patients were transported 

to the pre-staging area at the New Orleans Superdome using a laundry truck and hand 

ventilators. At the New Orleans Superdome, VA Southeast Louisiana Veterans Health 

Care System managers transferred the patients to a Department of Defense unit. The 

National Guard transported the nine patients via helicopter to a Federal evacuation 

staging area at the New Orleans airport. The transport planes were loaded with little or 

no accounting of patients because passenger manifests were typically not created. Even 

though the FY 2004 VISN 16 after-action reports included a recommendation that a VA 

observer be placed at the flight line, VA had no personnel at the airport. As a result, 

VHA was unaware of the location of the nine patients for up to 2 weeks after they were 

moved from the VA facility. VA eventually accounted for all nine patients. 

Telecommunications Issues. The VHA After-Action Report: Hurricanes Charley, 

Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne (December 2004), stated that satellite telephones were 

unreliable during weather related disasters. Our review of the VISN 16 COOP disclosed 

continued plans for VISN medical centers to use satellite telephones as the backup means 

of communication. 

The VISN Emergency Manager identified the same problems during Hurricane Katrina 

when normal telephone service was not available. Every facility had a satellite 

telephone, but they only worked sporadically. He stated that some of the problems were 

due to inadequate training on how to use the satellite telephones. After Hurricane 

Katrina, some of the satellite telephones worked only on roofs because many of the 

antennas were lost in the storm. The VISN had to set up specific times for calls so that 

the individual using the satellite telephone could go somewhere to get a clear signal. As 

a result, telecommunications during Hurricane Katrina were unreliable and prevented 

continuous communications between all levels of VA to coordinate the emergency 

responses at the sites affected by Hurricane Katrina.

Oversight of COOP Preparation Needed Strengthening. The Office of OSP has 

responsibility for developing and managing VA policies and directives for COOPs and 

for ensuring VA’s capability and readiness to provide continued services to veterans and 

their families. The Office of OSP did not ensure that COOPs addressed all essential 

elements and incorporated needed improvements identified in COOP exercises. An 

Office of OSP manager told us that the office relied on VHA to monitor its own relief 

activities and report the results to them. 

Conclusion 

VA needed to strengthen emergency preparedness planning by following prescribed 

guidance in its preparation for disasters. The lack of complete and effective COOPs 

could increase the risk that mission-critical functions may not be carried out. 

VA Office of Inspector General 13 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Recommendation 

6. We recommended that the Acting Assistant Secretary for OSP develop site-specific 

emergency plans for VA facilities in accordance with Federal Preparedness Circular 65. 

The Acting Assistant Secretary for Operations, Security, and Preparedness agreed with 

the recommendations. He reported the Office of OSP is in the process of ensuring that 

VA facilities have developed site-specific emergency plans in accordance with Federal 

Preparedness Circular 65 and VA Directive 0320. The improvement actions are 

acceptable, and we will follow up on the completion of planned actions. 

VA Office of Inspector General 14 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Appendix A 

Acting Assistant Secretary for Operations, Security, 

and Preparedness Comments 

Department of 

Veterans Affairs Memorandum

Date: July 26, 2007 

From: Acting Assistant Secretary for Operations, Security, and 

Preparedness (007)

Subject: Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina

To: Assistant Inspector General for Auditing (52) 

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review and respond to the 

subject draft report. On July 24, 2007, Mr. Charles Hopkins, the 

nominee for Assistant Secretary for Operations, Security, and 

Preparedness, was unanimously endorsed by the Senate Committee 

on Veterans’ Affairs and is awaiting a vote by the full Senate. The 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Emergency Management has 

oversight of the program areas contained in the IG audit and will 

provide the appropriate response. 

2. After taking into account all comments from the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Veterans Benefits 

Administration (VBA), and the Veterans Health Administration 

(VHA) pertaining to this report, we focused on the recommendations 

and necessary implementation plans. I concur with your 

recommendations. I also unconditionally support your 

acknowledgment that VA employees demonstrated heroic efforts 

throughout the hurricane’s catastrophic aftermath and commend all 

involved for the vital services they provided in support of our 

veterans and their families. 

3. Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath prompted the Federal 

government to perform a complete review of the National Response 

Plan (NRP) and the Federal government’s approach to responding to 

national disasters. VA has fully participated in the review and 

revision of the NRP and I am confident that in the event of another 

VA Office of Inspector General 15 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Appendix A 

national emergency, VA will be better prepared to activate 

established operational procedures. 

4. A complete plan is attached showing specific corrective 

actions and target completion dates for each recommendation. The 

plan provides a summary of specific initiatives that appropriately 

addresses each of the report’s recommendations. If you have any 

questions please contact Mr. John Hancock at (202) 461-5767. 

(original signed by:) 

Kevin T. Hanretta 

DAS for Emergency Management 

Office of Operations, Security, and Preparedness 

Attachment 

VA Office of Inspector General 16 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Appendix A 

Office of Operations, Security, and Preparedness 

Action Plan 

 Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Recommendations/ Status Completion 

Actions Date 

Recommendation 1: OIG recommends that the Acting Assistant Secretary for OSP, 

after consultation with VBA, develop a VA definition of habitable housing that meets the 

requirements of the National Disaster Housing Strategy. 

Concur 

The Office of OSP, as the VA lead for Emergency Support Function (ESF) 6, and in 

consultation with VBA and FEMA, is in the process of developing a definition of 

habitable housing that meets the requirements of the National Disaster Housing Strategy. 

 In Process 10/01/07 

Recommendation 2: OIG recommends that the Acting Assistant Secretary for OSP develop 

timeliness criteria and mechanisms to periodically test whether procedures can make transitional 

housing available to disaster victims in an effective, expedited, and efficient manner as required 

by the NRP. 

Concur 

The Office of OSP, as the VA lead for ESF 6, is working with FEMA and VBA to 

implement a new memorandum of understanding (MOU) that will define timeliness 

criteria and mechanisms to periodically test whether VBA procedures can make 

transitional housing available to disaster victims in an effective, expedited, and efficient 

manner as required by ESF 6 of the NRP. 

 In Process 12/01/07 

VA Office of Inspector General 17 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Appendix A 

Office of Operations, Security, and Preparedness 

Action Plan 

 Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Recommendations/ Status Completion 

Actions Date 

Recommendation 3: OIG recommends that the Acting Assistant Secretary for OSP 

develop mechanisms to continuously maintain a listing of habitable housing that meets 

FEMA criteria. 

Concur 

The Office of OSP, as the VA lead for ESF 6, is working with FEMA and VBA to define 

habitable housing so that VBA Loan Guaranty Service can determine the feasibility of 

maintaining a standing or on-demand listing of habitable housing that meets FEMA 

criteria. 

 In Process 12/01/07 

Recommendation 4: OIG recommends that the Acting Assistant Secretary for OSP, 

after consultation with VBA, develop criteria, in concert with the National Disaster 

Housing Strategy, for the VBA business decision as to which properties VA makes 

available during disasters and when the properties are to be placed back on the market. 

Concur 

The Office of OSP, as the VA lead for ESF 6, is working closely with VBA to ensure that 

the Loan Guaranty Service develops criteria to determine which properties VA makes 

available during disasters and when the properties are to be placed back on the market. 

 

 In Process 11/01/07 

VA Office of Inspector General 18 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Appendix A 

Office of Operations, Security, and Preparedness 

Action Plan 

 Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Recommendations/ Status Completion 

Actions Date 

Recommendation 5: OIG recommends that the Acting Assistant Secretary for OSP 

develop mechanisms to provide oversight of housing support provided in the event of a 

disaster. 

Concur 

The Office of OSP, as the VA lead for ESF 6, is in the process of developing oversight 

mechanisms to ensure that housing support is provided in the event of a disaster in 

accordance with the new 2007 FEMA/VA MOU and the NRP. 

 In Process 12/01/07 

Recommendation 6: OIG recommends that the Acting Assistant Secretary for OSP 

develop site-specific emergency plans for VA facilities in accordance with Federal 

Preparedness Circular 65. 

Concur 

The Office of OSP, in consultation with VA Administrations and Staff Offices, is in the 

process of ensuring that VA facilities have developed site-specific emergency plans in 

accordance with Federal Preparedness Circular 65 and VA Directive 0320. 

 In Process 12/01/07 

VA Office of Inspector General 19 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Appendix B 

OIG Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

OIG Contact Brent Arronte (727) 395-2436 

Acknowledgments Alan P. Brecese 

Elizabeth Butler 

Charles F. Chiarenza 

VA Office of Inspector General 20 
Audit of VA’s Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Appendix C 

Report Distribution 

VA Distribution

Office of the Secretary 

Veterans Health Administration 

Veterans Benefits Administration 

National Cemetery Administration 

Assistant Secretaries 

Office of General Counsel 

Acting Assistant Secretary for Operations, Security, and Preparedness (007) 

Assistant Secretary for Policy and Planning (008) 

Director, VISN 16 (10N16) 

Director, Southeast Louisiana Veterans Health Care System (629/00) 

Director, Gulf Coast Veterans Health Care System (520/00) 

Non-VA Distribution

House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, 

 and Related Agencies 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, 

 and Related Agencies 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

National Veterans Service Organizations 

Government Accountability Office 

Office of Management and Budget 

This report will be available in the near future on the OIG’s Web site at 

http://www.va.gov/oig/publications/reports-list.asp. This report will remain on the 

OIG Web site for at least 2 fiscal years after it is issued. 

VA Office of Inspector General 21