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PRELIMINARY PRINT 

Volume 598 U. S. Part 1 

Pages 142–151 

OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OF 

THE SUPREME COURT 

March 21, 2023 

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 

reporter of decisions 

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 

the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 

of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 
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142 OCTOBER TERM, 2022 

Syllabus 

LUNA PEREZ v. STURGIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS et al. 

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 

the sixth circuit 

No. 21–887. Argued January 18, 2023—Decided March 21, 2023 

Petitioner Miguel Luna Perez, who is deaf, attended schools in Michigan's 

Sturgis Public School District (Sturgis) from ages 9 through 20. When 

Sturgis announced that it would not permit Mr. Perez to graduate, he 

and his family fled an administrative complaint with the Michigan Department of Education alleging (among other things) that Sturgis failed 

to provide him a free and appropriate public education as required by 

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). See 20 U. S. C. 

§ 1415. They claimed that Sturgis supplied Mr. Perez with unqualifed 

interpreters and misrepresented his educational progress. The parties 

reached a settlement in which Sturgis promised to provide the forwardlooking relief Mr. Perez sought, including additional schooling. 

Mr. Perez then sued in federal district court under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) seeking compensatory damages. Sturgis moved to dismiss. It claimed that 20 U. S. C. § 1415(l) barred 

Mr. Perez from bringing his ADA claim because it requires a plaintiff 

“seeking relief that is also available under” IDEA to frst exhaust 

IDEA's administrative procedures. The district court agreed and dismissed the suit, and the Sixth Circuit affrmed. 

Held: IDEA's exhaustion requirement does not preclude Mr. Perez's ADA 

lawsuit because the relief he seeks (i. e., compensatory damages) is not 

something IDEA can provide. Pp. 146–151. 

(a) Section 1415(l) contains two features. The frst clause focuses on 

“remedies” and sets forth this general rule: “Nothing [in IDEA] shall 

be construed to restrict” the ability to seek “remedies” under “other 

Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities.” The 

second clause carves out an exception: Before fling a civil action under 

other federal laws “seeking relief that is also available” under IDEA, 

“the procedures under [§ 1415](f) and (g) shall be exhausted.” Those 

provisions provide children and families the right to a “due process 

hearing” before local or state administrators, § 1415(f)(1)(A), followed 

by an “appeal” to the state education agency, § 1415(g)(1). Mr. Perez 

reads § 1415(l)'s “seeking relief” clause as applying only if he pursues 

remedies that are also available under IDEA. And because IDEA does 

not provide compensatory damages, § 1415(l) does not foreclose his ADA 

claim. Sturgis reads the provision as requiring exhaustion of § 1415(f) 
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Cite as: 598 U. S. 142 (2023) 143 

Syllabus 

and (g) so long as a plaintiff seeks some form of redress for the underlying harm addressed by IDEA. And because Mr. Perez complains about 

Sturgis's education-related shortcomings, his failure to exhaust is fatal. 

Pp. 146–147. 

(b) Mr. Perez's reading better comports with the statute's terms. 

Because § 1415(l)'s exhaustion requirement applies only to suits that 

“see[k] relief . . . also available under” IDEA, it poses no bar where a 

non-IDEA plaintiff sues for a remedy that is unavailable under IDEA. 

This interpretation admittedly treats “remedies” as synonymous with 

the “relief” a plaintiff “seek[s].” But that is how an ordinary reader 

would interpret the provision, based on a number of contextual clues. 

Section 1415(l) begins by directing a reader to the subject of “remedies,” offering frst a general rule then a qualifying exception. IDEA 

treats “remedies” and “relief” as synonyms elsewhere, see § 1415(i) 

(2)(C)(iii), (3)(D)(i)(III), as do other provisions in the U. S. Code, see 

18 U. S. C. § 3626(d); 28 U. S. C. § 3306(a)(2)–(3). The second clause in 

§ 1415(l), moreover, refers to claims “seeking relief” available under 

IDEA. In law that phrase (or some variant) often refers to the remedies a plaintiff requests. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3), for 

example, says a plaintiff's complaint must include a list of requested 

remedies—i. e., “a demand for the relief sought.” Likewise, this Court 

often speaks of the “relief” a plaintiff “seeks” as the remedies he requests. See, e. g., South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U. S. 256, 260. 

Pp. 147–149. 

(c) Sturgis suggests this interpretation is foreclosed by Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 580 U. S. 154. But the Court in Fry went 

out of its way to reserve rather than decide this question. What the 

Court did say in Fry about the question presented there does not advance the school district's cause here. Finally, Sturgis says the Court's 

interpretation will frustrate Congress's wish to route claims about educational services to administrative experts. It is unclear what this 

proves, as either party's interpretation of § 1415(l) would preclude some 

unexhausted claims. In any event, it is the not the job of this Court 

to “ `replace the actual text with speculation as to Congress's intent.' ” 

Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 89. Pp. 149–150. 

3 F. 4th 236, reversed and remanded. 

Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 

Roman Martinez argued the cause for petitioner. With 

him on the briefs were Nicholas Rosellini, Ellen Marjorie 

Saideman, Marc Charmatz, and Mitchell Sickon. 
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144 LUNA PEREZ v. STURGIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS 

Opinion of the Court 

Anthony A. Yang argued the cause for the United States 

as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief 

were Solicitor General Prelogar, Assistant Attorney General Clarke, Deputy Solicitor General Fletcher, Bonnie I. 

Robin-Vergeer, Teresa Kwong, Francisco Lopez, and Eric 

Moll. 

Shay Dvoretzky argued the cause for respondents. With 

him on the brief were Parker Rider-Longmaid, Kyser 

Blakely, Jeremy Patashnik, Timothy J. Mullins, and Kenneth B. Chapie.* 

Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 

84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1400 et seq., seeks to 

ensure children with disabilities receive a free and appropriate public education. Toward that end, the law sets forth 

a number of administrative procedures for children, their 

parents, teachers, and school districts to follow when disputes arise. The question we face in this case concerns the 

extent to which children with disabilities must exhaust these 

administrative procedures under IDEA before seeking relief 

under other federal antidiscrimination statutes, such as the 

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 327, 

42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. 

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Advocates for 

Children of New York et al. by Jeffrey S. Ginsberg and Kathleen E. Gardner; for The Arc of the United States et al. by Selene A. AlmazanAltobelli, Catherine Merino Reisman, and Alexis Casillas; for Former 

U. S. Dept. of Education Offcials by Aaron M. Panner; for Professors by 

Leslie Salzman, Rebekah Diller, Brian Wolfman, and Brigid F. Cech Samole; and for Sen. Tom Harkin et al. by David A. Strauss, Sarah M. 

Konsky, Matthew S. Hellman, and Claudia Center. 

Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for AASA|The 

School Superintendents Association et al. by Christopher B. Gilbert; and 

for the National School Boards Association et al. by Francisco M. Negrón, 

Jr., Sonja H. Trainor, and Roy Henley. 
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Opinion of the Court 

* * * 

From ages 9 through 20, Miguel Luna Perez attended 

schools in Michigan's Sturgis Public School District (Sturgis). 

Because Mr. Perez is deaf, Sturgis provided him with aides 

to translate classroom instruction into sign language. For 

years, Mr. Perez and his parents allege, Sturgis assigned 

aides who were either unqualifed (including one who attempted to teach herself sign language) or absent from the 

classroom for hours on end. Along the way, Sturgis allegedly misrepresented Mr. Perez's educational progress too, 

awarding him infated grades and advancing him from grade 

to grade regardless of his progress. Based on Sturgis's misrepresentations, Mr. Perez and his parents say, they believed 

he was on track to graduate from high school with his class. 

But then, months before graduation, Sturgis revealed that it 

would not award him a diploma. 

In response to these developments, Mr. Perez and his family fled a complaint with the Michigan Department of Education. They alleged that Sturgis had failed its duties under 

IDEA and other laws. App. 16–45. Shortly before an 

administrative hearing, the parties reached a settlement. 

Under its terms, Sturgis promised to provide Mr. Perez all 

the forward-looking equitable relief he sought, including additional schooling at the Michigan School for the Deaf. 

After settling his administrative complaint, Mr. Perez fled 

a lawsuit in federal district court under the ADA seeking 

backward-looking relief in the form of compensatory damages. Id., at 56–57. That complaint drew a motion to dismiss from Sturgis. The school district argued that a provision in IDEA, 20 U. S. C. § 1415(l), barred Mr. Perez from 

bringing an ADA claim without frst exhausting all of 

IDEA's administrative dispute resolution procedures. Ultimately, the district court agreed with Sturgis and dismissed 

the suit. 2019 WL 6907138, *3–*4 (WD Mich., Dec. 19, 2019). 

Bound by circuit precedent already addressing the question, 
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146 LUNA PEREZ v. STURGIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS 

Opinion of the Court 

the Sixth Circuit affrmed. 3 F. 4th 236, 241 (2021) (citing 

Covington v. Knox Cty. School System, 205 F. 3d 912, 916– 

917 (CA6 2000)). 

Whether § 1415(l) bars lawsuits like ours holds consequences not just for Mr. Perez but for a great many children with disabilities and their parents. Because our colleagues on the courts of appeals have disagreed about how 

best to read the statute, we agreed to take up the question. 598 U. S. ––– (2022). Compare 3 F. 4th, at 241–242; 

McMillen v. New Caney Independent School Dist., 939 

F. 3d 640, 647–648 (CA5 2019), with D. D. v. Los Angeles 

Unifed School Dist., 18 F. 4th 1043, 1059–1061 (CA9 2021) 

(Bumatay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 

Doucette v. Georgetown Public Schools, 936 F. 3d 16, 31 

(CA1 2019). 

* * * 

Section 1415(l) contains two salient features. First, the 

statute sets forth this general rule: “Nothing in [IDEA] shall 

be construed to restrict” the ability of individuals to seek 

“remedies” under the ADA or “other Federal laws protecting 

the rights of children with disabilities.” Second, the statute 

offers a qualifcation, prohibiting certain suits with this language: “[E]xcept that before the fling of a civil action under 

such [other federal] laws seeking relief that is also available 

under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) 

and (g) shall be exhausted.” In turn, subsections (f) and (g) 

provide affected children and their parents with the right to 

a “due process hearing” before a local or state administrative 

offcial, § 1415(f)(1)(A), followed by an “appeal” to the state 

education agency, § 1415(g)(1). 

The parties offer very different interpretations of 

§ 1415(l). Mr. Perez reads the statute to require a plaintiff 

to exhaust the administrative processes found in subsections 

(f) and (g) only to the extent he pursues a suit under another 
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federal law for remedies IDEA also provides. None of this, 

Mr. Perez contends, forecloses his current claim because his 

ADA complaint seeks only compensatory damages, a remedy 

everyone before us agrees IDEA cannot supply. By contrast, Sturgis reads § 1415(l) as requiring a plaintiff to exhaust subsections (f) and (g) before he may pursue a suit 

under another federal law if that suit seeks relief for 

the same underlying harm IDEA exists to address. On 

this view, the law bars Mr. Perez's ADA suit because it 

seeks relief for harms fowing from Sturgis's alleged past 

shortcomings in providing a free and appropriate public 

education—a harm IDEA exists to address—and Mr. Perez 

chose to settle his administrative complaint rather than exhaust § 1415(f) and (g)'s remedial processes. 

If both views are plausible ones, we believe Mr. Perez's 

better comports with the statute's terms. Start with 

§ 1415(l)'s frst clause. It focuses our attention on “remedies.” A “remedy” denotes “[t]he means of enforcing a 

right,” and may come in the form of, say, money damages, 

an injunction, or a declaratory judgment. Black's Law Dictionary 1320 (8th ed. 2004); see also 13 Oxford English Dictionary 584–585 (2d ed. 1991) (defning “remedy” as “[l]egal 

redress”). The statute then proceeds to instruct that 

“[n]othing” in IDEA shall be construed as “restrict[ing] or 

limit[ing]” the availability of any of these things “under” 

other federal statutes like the ADA. 

Of course, § 1415(l) carves out an exception to this rule. 

The second clause bars individuals from “seeking relief” 

under other federal laws unless they frst exhaust “the procedures under subsections (f) and (g).” But, by its terms, 

this limiting language does not apply to all suits seeking 

relief that other federal laws provide. The statute's administrative exhaustion requirement applies only to suits that 

“see[k] relief . . . also available under” IDEA. And that condition simply is not met in situations like ours, where a plain-
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148 LUNA PEREZ v. STURGIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS 

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tiff brings a suit under another federal law for compensatory 

damages—a form of relief everyone agrees IDEA does not 

provide. 

Admittedly, our interpretation treats “remedies” (the key 

term in the frst clause) as synonymous with the “relief” a 

plaintiff “seek[s]” (the critical phrase found in the second 

clause). But a number of contextual clues persuade us that 

is exactly how an ordinary reader would understand this particular provision. Not only does § 1415(l) begin by directing 

a reader to the subject of remedies, offering frst a general 

and then a qualifying rule on the subject. In at least 

two other places, IDEA treats “remedies” and “relief” as 

synonyms, and we cannot conceive a persuasive reason why 

the statute would operate differently only here. Section 

1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) directs courts in IDEA cases to “grant such 

relief as the court determines is appropriate.” (Emphasis 

added.) That statutory instruction, we have said, authorizes courts to grant “as an available remedy” the “reimbursement” of past educational expenses. School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U. S. 359, 

369–370 (1985) (emphasis added). Elsewhere, IDEA sometimes bars those who reject a school district's settlement 

offer from recovering attorney's fees for later work if “the 

relief fnally obtained . . . is not more favorable . . . than the 

offer.” § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(III) (emphasis added). Once more, 

relief means remedy. 

Nor is IDEA particularly unusual in treating remedies and 

relief as synonyms. Other provisions in the U. S. Code do 

too. By way of example, 18 U. S. C. § 3626(d) provides that 

“[t]he limitations on remedies in this section shall not apply 

to relief entered by a State court based solely upon claims 

arising under State law.” (Emphases added.) Likewise, 28 

U. S. C. § 3306(a)(2)–(3) indicate that “the United States . . . 

may obtain . . . a remedy under this chapter . . . or . . . any 

other relief the circumstances may require.” (Emphases 

added.) 
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Infuencing our thinking as well is the fact that the second 

clause in § 1415(l) refers to claims “seeking relief” available 

under IDEA. To “seek” is “[t]o ask for” or “request.” 14 

Oxford English Dictionary, at 877. And often enough the 

phrase “seeking relief” or some variant of it is used in the 

law to refer to the remedies a plaintiff requests. Under the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, a plaintiff's 

complaint must include a list of requested remedies, or what 

the law calls “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. Rule 

Civ. Proc. 8(a)(3) (emphasis added); see also Fed. Rule Civ. 

Proc. 54(c). Many of our opinions as well similarly speak of 

the “relief” a plaintiff “seeks” as the remedies he requests. 

See, e. g., South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U. S. 256, 

260 (2010) (describing the “relief” South Carolina “seeks” as 

the remedies demanded in its “Prayer for Relief”); New York 

State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, 590 

U. S. –––, ––– (2020) (per curiam) (describing “the precise 

relief that petitioners requested in the prayer” as two remedies, a declaration and an injunction); Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U. S. 879, 892 (1988) (discussing 5 U. S. C. § 702's 

reference to an “ `action . . . seeking relief other than 

money damages' ”). 

Faced with all this, Sturgis replies that, whatever the merits of our interpretation, precedent forecloses it. Brief for 

Respondents 19–20, 26–27. Specifcally, the school district 

points to Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 580 U. S. 154 

(2017). But the Court in Fry went out of its way to reserve 

rather than decide the question we now face. See id., at 

165, n. 4; id., at 168, n. 8. And what the Court did say in 

Fry about the question presented there hardly advances the 

school district's cause here. In Fry, the Court held that 

§ 1415(l)'s exhaustion requirement does not apply unless the 

plaintiff “seeks relief for the denial of” a free and appropriate 

public education “because that is the only `relief' ” IDEA's 

administrative processes can supply. Id., at 165, 168. This 

case presents an analogous but different question—whether 
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150 LUNA PEREZ v. STURGIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS 

Opinion of the Court 

a suit admittedly premised on the past denial of a free and 

appropriate education may nonetheless proceed without exhausting IDEA's administrative processes if the remedy a 

plaintiff seeks is not one IDEA provides. In both cases, the 

question is whether a plaintiff must exhaust administrative 

processes under IDEA that cannot supply what he seeks. 

And here, as in Fry, we answer in the negative. 

Failing all else, Sturgis closes with an appeal to congressional purpose. Brief for Respondents 22–24. The school 

district worries that our understanding of § 1415(l) would 

frustrate Congress's wish to route claims about educational 

services to administrative agencies with “ `special expertise' ” in such matters. Id., at 22. But “it is . . . our job to 

apply faithfully the law Congress has written,” and “ `[w]e 

cannot replace the actual text with speculation as to Congress' intent.' ” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 

582 U. S. 79, 89 (2017) (quoting Magwood v. Patterson, 561 

U. S. 320, 334 (2010)). Even on its own terms, it is unclear 

what the school district's argument proves. Either interpretation of § 1415(l) operates to preclude some unexhausted 

claims. Under our view, for example, a plaintiff who fles an 

ADA action seeking both damages and the sort of equitable 

relief IDEA provides may fnd his request for equitable relief barred or deferred if he has yet to exhaust § 1415(f) and 

(g). Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22. It is 

“quite mistaken to assume,” too, that any interpretation of a 

law that does more to advance a statute's putative goal 

“must be the law.” Henson, 582 U. S., at 89. Laws are the 

product of “compromise,” and no law “ `pursues its . . . purpose[s] at all costs.' ” Ibid. And it isn't exactly diffcult to 

imagine that a rational Congress might have sought to temper a demand for administrative exhaustion when a plaintiff 

seeks a remedy IDEA can supply with a rule excusing exhaustion when a plaintiff seeks a remedy IDEA cannot 

provide. 
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* * * 

The parties pose a number of additional questions they 

would like us to answer—including whether IDEA's exhaustion requirement is susceptible to a judge-made futility exception and whether the compensatory damages Mr. Perez 

seeks in his ADA suit are in fact available under that statute. 

But today, we have no occasion to address any of those 

things. In proceedings below, the courts held that § 1415(l) 

precluded Mr. Perez's ADA lawsuit. We clarify that nothing 

in that provision bars his way. The judgment of the Court 

of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

So ordered. 
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Reporter’s Note 

The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 

and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 

makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 

publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 

the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 

who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 

argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 

include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 

punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 

None